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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

U.S. Congress. Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 1

JULY 25, 26, 31, AUGUST 2 AND 7, 1951

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CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Barmine, Alexander Gregory	181
Carter, Edward C	5 and 127
Field, Frederick V	75
Massing, Mrs. Hede	223
Taylor, Prof. George Edward	342
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl August	273
Index	I

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Conor, Smith, Wiley, Watkins, and Ferguson.

Also present: Senator McCarthy.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Will one of the members of the staff please see to it that the door is open so that the public may come in? If there is a sign outside "Executive session," it should be taken off.

We regret that perhaps this room may be too small to accommodate the public, but we will accommodate as many as we can. It is the only room available today.

The Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee was empowered on December 21, 1950, under the terms of Senate Resolution 366 of the Eighty-first Congress to—

make a complete and continuing study and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950; (2) the administration, operation, and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and (3) the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States; its territories and possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.

This authority was subsequently extended under Senate Resolution 7 of the Eighty-second Congress, until December 31, 1952. I think it would be well to place these two resolutions in the record at this point.

(The resolutions referred to follow:)

[S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d sess.]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the Congress from time to time has enacted laws designed to protect the internal security of the United States from acts of espionage and sabotage and from infiltration by persons who seek to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence; and

Whereas those who seek to evade such laws or to violate them with impunity constantly seek to devise and do devise clever and evasive means and tactics for such purposes; and

Whereas agents and dupes of the world Communist conspiracy have been and are engaged in activities (including the origination and dissemination of propaganda) designed and intended to bring such protective laws into disrepute or disfavor and to hamper or prevent effective administration and enforcement thereof; and

Whereas it is vital to the internal security of the United States that the Congress maintain a continuous surveillance over the problems presented by such activity and threatened activity and over the administration and enforcement of such laws: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to make a complete and continuing study and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950; (2) the administration, operation, and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and (3) the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States, its Territories and possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.

SEC. 2. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpenas or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and, within the amount appropriated therefor, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report hearings of the committee or subcommittee shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. Subpenas shall be issued by the chairman of the committee or the subcommittee, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman.

A majority of the members of the committee, or duly authorized subcommittee thereof, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that a lesser number to be fixed by the committee, or by such subcommittee, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of administering oaths and taking sworn testimony.

SEC. 3. The committee, or duly authorized subcommittee, shall have power to employ and fix the compensation of such officers, experts, and employees as it deems necessary in the performance of its duties, and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the Government to the extent that such services, information, facilities, and personnel, in the opinion of the heads of such departments and agencies, can be furnished without undue interference with the performance of the work and duties of such departments and agencies.

SEC. 4. The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $10,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee on or before January 31, 1951.

[S. Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess.]

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the limitation of expenditures under S. Res. 366, Eighty-first Congress, relating to the internal security of the United States, agreed to December 21, 1950, is hereby increased by $75,000, and such sum together with any unexpended balance of the sum previously authorized to be expended under such resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee and covering obligations incurred under such resolution on or before January 31, 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the lines of inquiry undertaken by the Internal Security Subcommittee concerned the extent to which sub-

versive forces may have influenced or sought to influence the formulation and execution of our Far Eastern policy.

In this connection, the committee, acting on advice that certain files of the Institute of Pacific Relations had been removed to a barn in Lee, Mass., and that these files contained information bearing on matters of concern to the committee, took possession of the files in question, under subpena, and relegated to its staff, under close supervision, the lengthy and arduous task of sifting those files.

The committee was aware, at the time, of the fact that the board of trustees of the institute had been studded with personalities of such respectability, and of such preeminence of capitalistic achievement, that the very presence of their names on a letterhead might have put at rest all suspicion of intrigue or subversive influence. The committee was also aware of the possibility that this aggregation of prominent individuals may have been used as a facade for Communists operating shrewdly behind the scenes. It has been done before. The committee knew that it is not possible to identify a Communist by his appearance or by his attire or by his station in life, or even by the size of his bank account.

The committee's staff was instructed to maintain, and the committee sought to maintain, a high standard of evidence, and to proceed with a truly objective approach. The committee did not want first impressions. It wanted facts.

It is virtually impossible to define fully and accurately, in the abstract, the components of disloyalty or subversion. The inner currents of the human mind are at best difficult to gage. Motives are often so obscure that sometimes one does not fully comprehend his own impelling urges, and may completely misjudge the motives of an associate. Successful conspirators usually are consummate dissemblers; and thus the acts of such persons are often shrouded in the darkness of stealth, accompanied by acts of misdirection, or clouded by ambiguity of meaning. The measurement of men's motives, the assessment of the strands of thought and the elements of pressures which may have influenced another's behavior, is not a task to be sought. And yet if we are to do our full part to save our country and our way of life from subversion and erosion, we must make the effort. But we must withhold our judgment in all respects until the proper time. We must first make the record, so that the facts will be known.

In such an investigation as this, where a possible conspiracy is being examined, very often the only evidence obtainable derives from persons who once participated in the conspiracy. Only eyes that witnessed the deeds, and ears that heard the words, of intrigue can attest thereto. Thus, ex-Communists, and agents of the Government who posed as Communists, often are the only sources of evidence of what transpired behind doors closed to the non-Communist world. Government agencies do not readily yield up their concealed agents. Fortunately, it is possible to verify the loyalty of an ex-Communist, in large part, by the very extent of his willingness to give full and frank testimony against the Communist Party. Many ex-Communists have labored loyally and valiantly to expose the intrigues of their former associates. They often have no illusions about the Communist Party and its purposes, and have developed antibodies against further infection.

"Once a Communist, always a Communist" has become, in effect, a Communist slogan; but no one who professes to comprehend the significance of transgression and repentance, of wrongdoing and contrition, can subscribe to such a shibboleth. These facts must be borne in mind as, later in these hearings, the testimony of ex-Communists is used to supplement the evidence found in the files.

It should be made clear that the committee was mindful at the outset that we had under subpena only some of the files of the institute, and that we might for that reason run the risk of getting a distorted view of the workings of the organization. We, therefore, extended our subpena and brought all the records of the institute under our scrutiny. We have, further, repeatedly asked the secretary general of the institute to be sure that everything that should be seen by us is made available to us.

The press and the public, as well as the committee, should bear in mind that the mere fact that a person is shown during the course of these hearings to have been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations or to have been mentioned in certain letters which may be placed in evidence should give rise to no conclusions. Each bit of documentary evidence will speak with its own voice, but no such evidence should be weighed alone and without reference to the whole body of evidence which ultimately will comprise the record of these hearings. Neither should the testimony of any witness, standing alone and uncorroborated, be given undue weight, but, rather, the testimony of all witnesses should be weighed one against the other, after the record has been made, in an effort to sift the wheat from the chaff and arrive at the truth. Undoubtedly many good men will be mentioned in the course of these hearings, and it is in the interest of such men so mentioned that I make this statement.

We begin these hearings making no charges. We propose to let the evidence precede our conclusions. We shall hear the witnesses and read letters and other documents. We shall strive to be fair. The first witnesses will be persons long associated with the institute and undeniably competent to testify from the standpoint of the institute itself. The first witness, Edward C. Carter, was secretary general of the IPR for some 16 years and is still a member of its executive board. He will tell us what the institute is. The next witness, Frederick V. Field, was national secretary for many years and is a former member of the executive committee of the institute.

Before we proceed with the first witness I want to say a word or two about the future conduct of these hearings.

First, it should be known that we propose to continue public hearings probably 2 days a week for a number of weeks to come. The 2 days will probably be Tuesday and Thursday, in most weeks, although we are opening these hearings on a Wednesday and expect to continue tomorrow.

The question has arisen with regard to television, radio, and news pictures. The committee has specifically discussed these matters, and the ruling of the committee is that none of the proceedings of the committee will be televised and that no direct radio coverage of the proceedings of the committee will be permitted. News pictures may be permitted before and after the actual hearing sessions of the committee, but the taking of news pictures during the actual conduct of the hearings will not be allowed.

Neither will the committee permit the photographing of witnesses with members of the committee in the hearing room, nor the photographing of witnesses in the hearing room without the permission of the witnesses.

The committee has made these decisions because we are seeking facts, not publicity. We want to make a record, not to make headlines. Furthermore, we want to make it clear that no witness who is called here will be subjected to undue publicity against his will.

The committee has also discussed the matter of the submission of questions by Senators who are not members of the Internal Security Subcommittee. It is the order of the committee that any such questions should be submitted in writing to the chairman presiding at the hearing, to be asked by him at his direction.

Any witness called here may have the privilege of being accompanied and advised by counsel of his choice; but witnesses' counsel will not be permitted to testify nor to ask questions. This is not a trial, but an inquiry, and we intend to proceed in an orderly way. In the interests of expediting these hearings, members of the committee have agreed to refrain from filling the record with their own observations; and witnesses will be asked to limit their testimony to responsive answers to questions. However, after the conclusion of his testimony, any witness may file, for the record, any such supplementary statement as he may desire to make; and a reasonable time limit will be allowed, in any case, for the submission of such a statement.

The committee will proceed. Mr. Morris, you may proceed with the witness. The witness will be sworn.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. CARTER. Edward C. Carter, 215 East Seventy-second Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. CARTER. Retired. I am an educator retired, teaching part time at the New School at 66 West Twelfth Street.

Mr. MORRIS. You hold no position other than that of a teacher?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hold a Government position or a position with the United Nations?

Mr. CARTER. I have held no position with the United States Government. For 2½ months I served as a senior consultant to a United Nations organization in the Far East. It is called the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. That was a consultancy for about 10 weeks with reference to technical training of industrial workers in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that was in 1948?

Mr. CARTER. I think it was in 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you now associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CARTER. I am one of its roughly 50 board of directors of the American section of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. What position have you held with the Institute of Pacific Relations in the past?

Mr. CARTER. Shortly after it was founded in 1925 I served for a year or two as honorary secretary of the American IPR. Then I became an executive secretary. Then in 1933 I think it was I became secretary general of what was called the Pacific Council, namely, the governing body of 10 or 12 national councils in the Pacific countries, similar to, in a general way, the American section.

Then in 1946 I retired as secretary general of the international organization and became executive vice chairman of the American section, the American IPR, which position I held until roughly, 2½ years ago when I retired. Since then I have been one of 50 trustees of American IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you still maintain an active interest in IPR work?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Attend the board meetings?

Mr. CARTER. So far as possible, if I was in the country.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would give us very briefly in paragraph or so the construction or function of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. CARTER. It would have to be a long paragraph, Senator, but I will do my best.

Mr. MORRIS. As briefly as you can.

Mr. CARTER. The institute, as I have said a moment ago, is a loose federation of some 10 or 12 national institutes devoted to the study of the problems of the Pacific—economic, social, political, and so on. To take as a sample of those 10 or 12 councils, I will mention the structure of the American IPR which has grown from rather small beginnings in Hawaii in 1925 into an organization in a way you might compare it with the American Geographical Society or the Brookings Institution, of some fluctuating twelve to sixteen or eighteen hundred members, businessmen, journalists, academic people, a few labor, and so on, researchers, and the aim of the American IPR being to carry on competent research and discussion on America's interest in the Pacific and the whole of southern and eastern Asia. Its principal channels are publications. It might pretty nearly fill one of those larger cases over there, four or five hundred volumes over the years, and then two or three periodicals—the Far Eastern Survey, et cetera.

Then every 2 or 3 years years the American IPR participates in international conferences which the Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, and the Europeans who have an interest in the Pacific meet, not for a week end but for 12 to 14 full days, living together, eating together, in an attempt to get some integration of the various points of view for people who have interests in the Pacific area.

The American IPR has maintained a research staff of varying size over the years, and similarly the international secretariat has had a staff over the years, being unofficial and not endowed with great funds. It has had nothing the size of the personnel of, say, the United Nation. We have tried always, except in wartime, to keep Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos, Australians, New Zealanders, Frenchmen on the staff, but we never have had the money. We have always had people

of several nationalities on the staff so as to get as many points of view as possible and serve all the member councils impartially.

Our principal failures have been our inability to get sufficient funds to do as good a job as we would have liked to do.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your annual budget?

Mr. CARTER. It varied from around $90,000 to $150,000 for the American IPR, and there was a similar spread for the international secretariat.

Then the Royal Institute in London, which was the British chapter, has its own budget.

The China IPR was one of the most generous supporters and had its budgets, and so on around the different countries. I think the figures probably have been made available to the committee. I suppose altogether the IPR internationally and the various national councils have raised and expended $2 million or $3 million over the whole period, a very small budget compared with the budgets we hear about these days, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. We have heard a great deal about the fact that Mr. Field, Frederick V. Field, was a large contributor to the institute. I wonder if you could tell us the extent to which he did contribute to the financing of the IPR.

Mr. CARTER. The IRP could give you the exact details. I looked over the figures some time ago and gathered from the figures in the New York office that it totaled around $60,000 during the whole period of his active connection. In one or two publications a considerably larger sum has been mentioned, but I think the sum of around $60,000 would stand up.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it his practice to make up the deficit for certain years?

Mr. CARTER. I am not quite certain that he made up the deficit for the American section for several years. You would have to consult the New York office as to which years and how much. That was not over the whole period.

I remember a similar case where a partner of the bank firm of Lee, Higginson & Co. made up a deficit of around $17,000 or $19,000. So Mr. Field was not the only such person.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer you a carbon copy of a letter, sent reportedly by you, to Mr. W. L. Holland. I would like in particular to call your attention to the third paragraph from the end which reads:

> It is impossible for Field to go on paying each year's deficit. I think he now feels that contraction should have been effected 2 years ago.

I offer you this and ask you if you can recall sending that letter, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. The third of June 1940—which paragraph is that?

Mr. MORRIS. The third from the end on the second page.

Mr. CARTER (reading):

> It is impossible for Field to go on paying each year's deficit. I think he now feels that contraction should have been effected 2 years ago.

Senator, this clearly is a letter I wrote in 1940. Clearly we were in the midst of one of our periodic doldrums when we were short of money, and Mr. Field had helped out as others had. Apparently from

this he had told me that he just couldn't be sugar daddy for year after year and unless we got money from other sources we would have to contract. Happily, we did find other sources. I have forgotten, in what amount, and survived.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the expression you used?

Mr. CARTER. Sugar daddy. I was afraid you would pick me up on that.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer this in evidence, and have it marked as "Exhibit 1."

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1

[Private and confidential]

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, N. Y., June 3, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.
Care Giannini Foundation,
University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: With the unsettlement in the minds of potential contributors and the May 10 news from the Carnegie Endowment that it would not renew its contribution to Amco and the news a few days later that the Carnegie Corp. could not respond favorably to Amco's appeal, Field decided that, in addition to the salary cuts which I have already reported to you, very radical reductions should be made in rent, library purchases, and staff.

Field and the whole American council staff has been going through a terribly painful 10 days of group self-examination and reduction. Half a dozen plans have been proposed. The latest plan which was, I believe adopted at a meeting of the union on Friday afternoon, called, among other things, for giving notice and paying severance pay to Lasker's secretary, Shiman's secretary, Miss Taylor's secretary, and in addition Lasker, Mrs. Barnes, and Helen Wiss. About half the office space is to be given up. About half of the library is to be stored. Catherine Porter is to become field secretary and is to be responsible for regional conferences. She is also to be office manager. The number of pages of the Far Eastern Survey is to be reduced and Kurt Bloch will probably be added to the staff in order that Amco may have someone who can cover a half a dozen fields at the same time.

The present thought, I believe, is to cut the American Council contribution from $10,000 to $5,000 a year; to look for a successor to Fred; and to ask all of the research staff to do their own typing and recondition the entire staff so that in the future they will cooperate in membership and financial work and public relations generally.

This letter to you is unofficial and off the record. It is intended for you alone and nothing that is herein contained should be passed on to Alsberg, Wilbur, Oakie, or anyone else. In due season Field will be communicating, I assume, to all of these people in their American Council capacity and it would be unfortunate if any of them got the slightest hint of the reorganization that is taking place from you or me.

At this juncture I simply wanted you to know that after the 15th of June Lasker and Mrs. Barnes would presumably be open for university appointments. Lasker is, I think, entitled to 6 months' severance pay and Mrs. Barnes 3 months. I haven't the faintest idea what their plans for the future are.

It may be that it will be much sounder for the American council and for the institute as a whole if these two gifted staff members find their future careers entirely outside the framework of the IPR. Thus, though for humanitarian reasons I would like to propose one or two minor temporary international secretariat assignments to Lasker and Mrs. Barnes, my thought at the moment is that such proposals might be a disservice to both of them in that it would postpone just by so many weeks or months their facing up to the realities of the new situation that they unfortunately have to face. My present thought is that the biggest service we can do them is by commending them to other societies and to universities where their qualifications would be of very special value.

Would you write me privately your reaction to what I have written.

I need hardly say that practically the whole staff of the American council at the moment has been in a state of pretty nearly complete collapse. Everyone has suffered fearfully all along the line. It is impossible for Field to go on paying each year's deficit. I think he now feels that contraction should have been effected 2 years ago.

In connection with my future responsibility as pro tem part-time secretary of the American council, I have been more concerned with a study of the failure of the staff to secure the necessary income. I would have preferred to see the staff reorient itself completely to the problem of public relations and income production rather than engage in drastic curtailment of expenditure. I feel confident that the present plight could have been avoided if the entire staff had cooperated intelligently and loyally with those responsible for income production. However, there is no use in crying over spilt milk, and my objectives on this point can better be contributed orally rather than in writing.

Please send me your best thought on all these matters at the earliest possible moment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Frederick Field write for IPR publications?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. He wrote several articles for the Far Eastern Survey, the fortnightly of the American IPR. He may have written for the International Quarterly, Pacific Affairs. I can't remember specifically, but the office could tell you and he did two major research volumes, one on American participation in the Chinese consortium. We had the late Thomas W. Lamont read that carefully and he felt that it was an exceedingly competent piece of work. Then Mr. Field edited a very large volume, the Economic Handbook of the Pacific, and Chinese, Japanese, and others worked on it. That was a standard economic handbook for several years.

Mr. Newton D. Baker has studied it and wrote the foreword.

As I remember it, those were the only two books, in addition to the other articles you have inquired about.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, while you were secretary general and executive vice chairman, did you know Frederick Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CARTER. I did not, no.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first learn that?

Mr. CARTER. In the Saturday Evening Post a few years ago. I knew that while he was active in the IPR he wrote for the New Masses and Daily Worker, and when I inquired I was told that those two militant Communist publications frequently asked nonparty members to write.

I checked up on it and found that was true, and so I did not at the time think that his writing for his publications, later I think he served on the editorial board of one, constituted him as a party member.

The CHAIRMAN. That expression "later"—I did not catch what you said after the word "later." You said "Later he served," on something.

Mr. CARTER. My impression, Senator, is he contributed an occasional article to either New Masses or Daily Worker before he went on the masthead as a member of the editorial board of one or the other. I can't from memory give you the exact dates.

Mr MORRIS. When you say you checked, exactly how would you check on this affiliation?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't do it very scientifically the way the Senator would have, but I, in talking to people about the country, asked a

good many of my friends, "Here is the New Masses. Are all of these people Communists?" Several people said to the best of their knowledge and belief they were not all Communists. I haven't any doubt whatsoever but what the Daily Worker and New Masses were 100 percent Communist lines as far as their management was concerned, but I also got the idea at a certain period that they did invite non-Communists to contribute.

Senator EASTLAND. Then he was a member of the editorial board of one of the publications?

Mr. CARTER. As I said, at a later time.

Senator EASTLAND. You did not believe then he was a Communist; is that your testimony?

Mr. CARTER. My testimony is that he was aiding the Communist cause.

Senator EASTLAND. That was not enough to open your eyes that he was a Communist when he went on the editorial board?

Mr. CARTER. I had my eyes open for a considerable time, Senator, and I was never able to actually prove that he was a Communist Party member in a way an authoritative Government agency would. I assumed that he was someone who should be watched.

I would like to, if I may, ask counsel, Mr. Morris, who must have all these dates at his fingertips, whether Mr. Field was an executive officer of the IPR concurrently with being on the editorial board.

Mr. MORRIS. He certainly was a member of the executive board of trustees right up until 1948.

Mr. CARTER. That is a little different. I would like to comment on that, if I may, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You made the remark that you were going to ask counsel. You may confer with counsel but counsel is not going to testify.

Mr. CARTER. I meant your counsel, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Crossman, at this time I think for your sake we should have the record show precisely in what capacity you are here. I know, Mr. Crossman, I am acting now in response to your letter in which you objected to our listing you as having been present for Mr. Carter at the various hearings, the executive hearings to date. Will you notify the chairman exactly in what capacity you are here?

Mr. CROSSMAN. I will be glad to do that, Mr. Chairman. I am a partner in the firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl. We represent the Institute of Pacific Relations, the American council of the institute to be technically accurate, and do not represent any individual witness just because we appear here. We are representing the institute.

I realize I am not supposed to testify, but I thought I had the privilege of conferring, or rather the witness had the privilege of conferring with me. May I do that for a second now?

The CHAIRMAN. I rather take it you have put yourself out of that category now. You are here now representing the Institute of Pacific Relations. The witness is testifying. You are not here representing the witness; is that correct?

Mr. CROSSMAN. I am not representing the witness as an individual, that is correct, sir; but I think in my representation of the institute

I should like to have the privilege of having witnesses who have been connected with the institute confer with me. I will make it very brief.

The CHAIRMAN. You will not be permitted to testify, nor will you be permitted to interrogate. You have the same privilege as anyone else who comes here. You are representing the Institute of Pacific Relations. When the question arises as to the questions you may propound to any one witness, or what your attitude will be, the Chair will rule on it at that time.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I did not want to ask questions of the witness; I merely wanted to say something to him.

Mr. MORRIS. You have already stated he is not your client.

Mr. CROSSMAN. He is a witness for the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. That settles it. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it not a fact you tried to assist Mr. Field to get an Army intelligence commission in 1942?

Mr. CARTER. When Mr. Field was seeking an Army commission I am sure that I wrote to someone in the War Department speaking of his intellectual qualifications for such a job.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall that?

Mr. CARTER. I just don't remember the way that a letter I probably wrote looks.

Senator EASTLAND. You did recommend him for a commission?

Mr. CARTER. I am sure I did recommend him.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that consistent with your testimony about your knowledge of Mr. Field and your being suspicious of him and checking with certain authorities about his Communist membership?

Mr. CARTER. I thought so at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think so now?

Mr. CARTER. It looks a little fishy now.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever knowingly employed or used in the IPR in your official capacity which you described people you knew to be Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember ever employing in a paid position anyone whom I knew to be a Communist. I did, Senator, seek the cooperation of Communists in the Soviet Union and Communists from the Soviet Union because in the early days of the IPR, before I was active in it, the leaders in Hawaii felt that the only way to understand the total picture in the Pacific was to learn as much as we could of the activities, good or bad, of the Russians in the Far East in relation to China and Japan. And so following the visits of people sent by the committee in Hawaii in the early days—Mr. Merle Davis, C. F. Loomis, and J. B. Condliffe—I went with Roland Boyd, Jerome Greene, and others to Moscow on our way to the Kyoto conference in 1929 and sought contact with Russian scholars who were specializing in the Far East, urging them to participate and to form a national council of the IPR in the Soviet Union. I backed them. I tried to get money for them. I tried to get publications. We tried to get them to write articles because we thought the only way to look objectively at the whole picture was to try and understand every conflicting point of view whether we liked it or not.

We sometimes felt the points of view we did not like were more important than those we did.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you drawing distinction now that you consulted with and worked with Russian Communists rather than American Communists and Chinese Communists?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. May I rephrase my question, then: Did you while you were secretary general and executive vice president of the IPR ever knowingly use or employ in your organization people you knew to be American Communists, Chinese Communists, German Communists, or any other than Russian Communists?

Mr. CARTER. We employed two or three people whom we knew definitely had been Communists and had repudiated communism.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question exactly. The question is, Did you employ those whom you knew to be Communists? I think you had better listen to the question.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

Save for this debatable question of Mr. Frederick V. Field, who had been employed long before he began writing for New Masses, and so on, I don't remember employing anyone who I knew at the time to be a Communist. I did employ one or more who subsequently I seemed to be very certain if they had not become party members were playing the party line 100 percent.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they?

Mr. CARTER. Dr. Chao-ting Chi, a Chinese Communist, a graduate of Columbia had been recommended to us highly by the people who had given him his Ph. D. at Columbia on Chinese economic history who subsequently became secretary general of an international monetary stabilization board—British, American, and Chinese—to aid T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek, and H. H. Kung, in establishing the Chinese currency.

Then he served under Dr. Kung as head of the Research Department of the Central Bank of China and then subsequently about the time the Chinese Communists took over Peking he made a trip to Peking and in an incredibly short time transferred himself from being an employee of the Kuomintang to the apparently much trusted employee of the Mao-tse Tung government.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first realize that Dr. Chi was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CARTER. I first realized he was playing the Communist game when I received word that he had moved from Kuomintang employ in Shanghai to Chinese Communist employment in Peking. I can't give the date of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not know back in 1945 or 1946 that he wrote under a pseudonym for a Communist-controlled publication China Today?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know it at that time. I only learned that very recently.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn it?

Mr. CARTER. You brought it out at a hearing here 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "brought it out," what do you mean?

Mr. CARTER. I have forgotten whether you had a document or a copy of China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it not the case that you brought Mr. Holland in here with you, who was your successor as secretary general and vice

chairman and you were willing to state for the aspects of the testimony you could not recall and you would assent to his testimony? Remember, you brought Mr. Holland in here to supplement your testimony and you said that his testimony would be your testimony as far as it was consistent with your recollection?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. He had much greater familiarity with the whole research and publication program, as he had been my international research officer, and as Dr. Chi had been employed on a research project which was under Mr. Holland——

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

Mr. CARTER. Well——

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in 1940?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Holland was international research secretary in 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you not recall he conceded at that time he knew some time around 1945 that Dr. Chi had been writing in China Today under the pseudonym of Han-su Chan?

Mr. CARTER. I don't just remember that part of a very long session, but if you have the record there, or later wish to check on it, I am sure I said nothing at that time apropos of confirming Mr. Holland's statement that I would want to withdraw now.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you or the IPR first feel that Dr. Chi was no longer a person to be trusted by the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. It didn't come up while he was with us.

Mr. MORRIS. You trusted him at all times?

Mr. CARTER. Well, as much as you trust a temporary employee whom you think is competent to do a good job. You naturally want to give them every facility for doing the job you hired him for.

At that time I had trust in his competence, and we had always the validation right up to very recently when he quipped to the Communist side that he was in the good graces of the Kuomintang government. I met him when I went to the home of Dr. H. H. Kung's house in Chunking. Dr. Chi was there as one of his intimate friends and in view of the way Dr. Kung liked Communists, I thought that was good enough for me. They were fellow Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you testify at 1945 that the institute maintained friendly relations with Dr. Chi?

Mr. CARTER. I remember in 1948—you referred, Senator, to my short service with the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia—a part of my duty there was to attend to a Far East United Nations Conference at Ootacamund and Dr. Chi was one of the principal members of the Kuomintang delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. What about Mr. Holland's knowledge of 1945 when he knew Dr. Chi had been writing under the name Han-su Chan for a Communist-controlled publication called China Today in New York City?

Mr. CARTER. I prefer to have you ask that of Mr. Holland if you will later on, or if he is in the room now, because I would say my memory is not perfect. I thought in a previous executive session here Mr. Holland said that he did not know of Chi's writing under a pen name until the last year or so. But that I would like to have in the record—as I say, my memory may be faulty and it may be Mr. Holland testified that in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence at this time the excutive session testimony of Mr. Carter. At the request of Mr. Carter and at the request of Mr. Crossman, I believe we allowed Mr. Holland to participate in Mr. Carter's testimony in executive session. Mr. Carter has been out of the institute, at least in his official capacity, for a year or so now.

Mr. CARTER. Two and a half years.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland is more familiar with more of the details. So at his request we allowed Mr. Holland to participate.

The CHAIRMAN. At Mr. Carter's request?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He just stated so a few minutes ago. He has already stated—and I want him to correct me if I am wrong—he knows nothing in Mr. Holland's testimony he would now withdraw or repudiate.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On page 44 of the executive session testimony I would like to read the colloquy:

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, or Mr. Holland, did you know, or is it a fact, that Dr. Chi was one of the editors of China Today?

I addressed my question to both you and Mr. Holland, and Mr. Holland answered:

Speaking for myself, I have since learned this fact; at the time Chi worked in the IPR office, I was not aware of that. I understand, having heard it since, that he used another name when he was an editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the name of Han-su Chan?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't identify that name. My recollection is that it was something different. I can't say that I ever troubled to find out what his pseudonym or alibi was, but I do remember that—I think I first had it drawn to my attention after the Amerasia case broke into the news—

I might mention that that was in 1945—

that Chi under another name, had previously been on this magazine China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Holland, Mr. Field was the editor in chief of that publication, was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of which publication?

Mr. MORRIS. China Today?

Mr. HOLLAND. This was also something which I heard after, heard told the first time, because I understand he also used another name.

Do you remember hearing that testimony?

Mr. CARTER. As I said, my memory was a little vague and clearly Mr. Holland stated that he learned this in 1945, and I would fully subscribe to Mr. Holland's memory, which is usually better than my own.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that portion of the executive session testimony introduced into the public session testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go in. I think it is already in. You have inserted it already.

Mr. CARTER. Could it also be an extension of that, because either Mr. Holland or I indicated that Dr. Chi had left the employment of the IPR considerably in advance of 1945. You said in your opening statement you wanted to get the full rounded picture, and I think that would be appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is in the record it may go in with it.
(Portion of the testimony referred to follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Frederick Spencer.

Mr. HOLLAND. This is one of the names that I heard, but I also heard other people say it was not the one he used, and I don't pretend to know.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your understanding that China Today is a Communist publication, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I myself have never studied it, and certainly I have never accepted it as a Communist publication in the sense that I have always accepted, say, the New Masses or the Daily Worker.

It seemed to me occasionally, when I heard of it, to have articles that were critical of the Nationalist Government and sympathetic to communism, from what I heard of it. But I have no personal recollection of saying it was a Communist publication.

Mr. MORRIS. But the fact that the principal editors chose to use pseudonyms, is it not an unusual fact, don't you think, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think so now, but at the time I was not aware that they used pseudonyms.

Mr. MORRIS. And I should think that the fact that Dr. Chi used a pseudonym and was one of the editors of China Today, that that would be a factor in aiding you to come to the conclusion that Dr. Chi, all during this period prior to 1949, rather than being a loyal supporter of the Nationalist Government was secretly a Communist working against the Government.

Mr. HOLLAND. Well, Mr. Morris, you are entitled to your opinion. I don't wish to argue on it.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Wait a minute. The way the question is put, it seems to me a little difficult for Mr. Holland to answer. You assume that he knew that these people were writing under a pseudonym. At least that is how I get it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland said he knew.

Mr. HOLLAND. At that time I said I was not aware of that they were writing under pseudonyms.

Mr. CROSSMAN. When did you learn that?

Mr. HOLLAND. After the Amerasia case broke, which was sometime in 1945. In fact, even later than that, because at that time I was in China and didn't come back here until about November 1945.

So it was only then that, chiefly because I was curious to know what happened about this and troubled to read some of the reports.

But I want to be perfectly frank, and I recognize Mr. Morris here is asking a reasonable question, and certainly if, in the light of today's developments, what has happened, say, over the past few years, what we know about Soviet and Communist espionage, if I were today for the first time learn that these people were writing under pseudonyms in a magazine which had this general complexion, I would certainly be suspicious.

On the other hand, I have to report, in all honesty, that I saw this man's work, when he worked for the IPR, very closely. He gave no evidence of being Communist or biased. He was competent enough to report on wartime economic developments in China.

And I know enough from the people, Chinese bankers like Dr. K. P. Chen, and the British and American officials who served on this Exchange Stabilization Board, to know that they, too, were able and well-informed people.

And all I can say is that if he was at that time secretly a Communist he concealed it very successfully.

And even more remarkable is that he managed apparently to conceal it from so high an official as Dr. H. H. Kung, and many other top Nationalist Government officials right throughout the war period, including the Chinese secret police, who certainly must have been on the look-out for such people.

Mr. MORRIS. You were testifying in 1948 you were maintaining friendly relations to Dr. Chi?

Mr. CARTER. I met him at the Ootacamund conference. I met him at Dr. H. H. Kung's house. I tried to be friendly with people from all countries who were at that conference.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the present attitude of the IPR toward Dr. Chi? That is, as you know it.

Mr. CARTER. I think a clear recognition of the fact that Dr. Chi had a distinguished record at Columbia; that he served satisfactorily a very influential American-British-Chinese stabilization committee. He represented Dr. H. H. Kung in highly important relationships and then he slipped. Whether he slipped, whether he saw the way the tide was going, or whether he had always at heart been a Communist, your guess is just as good as mine.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think your answer is responsive to the question.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. I accept your rebuke and will try to mend my ways.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean it as a rebuke. I mean you did not address your answer to the question.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know he was the proposed Chinese Communist delegate to UNESCO?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes; I learned that after he had gone over to the other side.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you testify that after you learned that you were no longer friendly with Dr. Chi?

Mr. CARTER. I never saw him; never wrote him.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your outlook toward Chi now? Or the outlook of the institute now?

Mr. CARTER. I can only speak for myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Speak for yourself.

Mr. CARTER. The institute does not take a position either on ideas or personalities. My own position is that he is a brilliant young Chinese that I think has gone wrong by throwing in his lot with the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I had not anticipated introducing this letter at this time, but I think it is appropriate that I introduce a photostatic copy of a letter which bears the date of February 10, 1950. It is a copy of a letter from Mr. Holland, secretary general of the IPR, to Mr. Ivison Macadam in London.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you might well identify the letter unless you have already identified it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to bring out this one paragraph first.

Mr. Mandel, will you vouch for the authenticity of this document?

I think, Mr. Chairman, from time to time we will have to swear in Mr. Mandel to verify the authenticity of documents.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your name and address?

Mr. MANDEL. Benjamin Mandel, 3101 Pennsylvania Avenue SE.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I am the research director of the Internal Security Subcommittee.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you had that position?

Mr. MANDEL. Since March 1, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time did you ever hold any similar position?

Mr. MANDEL. I was with the Committee on Un-American Activities, on its research staff, since 1939 until the end of 1944.

Then I was for 2 years with the State Department in 1945 and 1946. From 1947 until I took the position with the present committee, I was research director of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you testify that photostatic copy is of a letter that was in the file of the Institute of Pacific Relations that was in your custody?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the last paragraph of this letter.

> If Loudon goes to Shanghai I hope he will see Chi Chao-ting, vice president of the Bank of China, who has been recently named Chinese delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. You may remember that Chi was attached to the IPR international secretariat in 1940 and wrote one of the inquiry reports on China's wartime economic development (distributed only in brief form because it was incomplete).

This is the sentence I want to call your attention to:

> Chi may well prove to be one of our more influential friends in China.

This is Mr. Holland writing about Chi after he had assumed this position as proposed Chinese delegate to UNESCO. Will you comment on that?

Mr. CARTER. May I have the privilege of looking at that?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. I think the question should be read back to you.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. CARTER. I am very happy to do so, although I am handicapped in that this was a letter from my successor, Mr. Holland, to Mr. Ivison Macadam of the World Institute in London, and just from internal evidence I note that I remember this man Loudon was a high official of the British-American Tobacco Co. in London who apparently had been commended to Mr. Holland, and Mr. Holland thought Mr. Loudon, if he was going out to Communist China, would find a Chinese who had been trained in a democratic country useful in getting a picture.

But I would much prefer, Senator, as this is a letter from Mr. Holland to Mr. Macadam, to have the committee interrogate Mr. Holland at the appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter the committee will have to decide on. I think you have answered the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

Mr. CARTER. Senator, may I have your permission just to go back to an item earlier regarding Mr. Field? I did not quite get the point of one of Mr. Morris' questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember the question?

Mr. CARTER. The point I wanted to clear up was whether the committee's records show that Mr. Field wrote for the New Masses or the Daily Worker before 1940 and the date he went on the board of New Masses and the relationship of the date of his withdrawal from the secretaryship of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you something, Mr. Carter. Are you asking that question yourself, or is your attorney asking that question?

Mr. CARTER. My attorney, as you noted, reminded me to follow up and clarify a question that I thought at the time I was speaking was left hanging in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not propose to let you have anything hanging in the air. The Chair will see that you have an opportunity to clarify anything you wish to clarify. I wish to say to the attorney, if you violate the rule of this committee we will remove you to the audience, and we will do it very fast.

Mr. CROSSMAN. May I have——

The CHAIRMAN. That is all; I have said the last word and that is all there is to it.

Mr. CROSSMAN. May I have an opportunity to discuss that question?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. I said no and that settles it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer into evidence that letter from Mr. Holland to Mr. Macadam as exhibit 1–A.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit 1–A" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1–A

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
1 EAST FIFTY-FOURTH STREET,
New York, N. Y., February 10, 1950.

IVISON S. MACADAM, Esq.,
Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Chatham House, St. James' Square, London, South Wales 1.

DEAR IVISON: Many thinks for your note of February 7 about Loudon's visit to the Far East. I shall certainly be grateful for anything he can do to get in touch with leading members of the Chinese IPR. The senior man is the research chairman, L. K. Tao, 15 Shao San Tiao, Pei Shin Chiao, Peking. Other members concerned with IPR research projects are Prof. Chien Tuan-sheng, department of political science, Peking National University, author of the forthcoming book on Chinese government and politics now being printed for the IPR by the Harvard University Press. Another is Prof. Chen Chen-han, economics department, Peking National University, who is working on a study of the rise of the modern Chinese business class, on the progress of which I would appreciate having some news. Another is Prof. Fei Hsiao-tung, sociological department, Tsinghua University, and his colleague, Prof. Quentin Pan who have been doing some work on an IPR study of the Chinese gentry.

I spoke to C. P. Fitsgerald about these people in Hongkong last November just before he left for Shanghai, but I have heard nothing from him as yet. If Loudon gets a chance to talk privately to Tao and to Chien, I hope, of course, that he will stress our desire to have a qualified group of professors and journalists come from China to the IPR conference in India (probably at Lucknow, starting during the last week in September and dealing mainly with the subject of nationalism in the Far East and its consequence for the Western World). I also hope that he will convey my hope that they reorganize the Chinese IPR or establish a new Council of International Affairs which would participate as a national council in the international IPR. Finally I would like him to assure them that the Indian Council of World Affairs as host, and Pandit Nehru personally, are eager to have Chinese delegates or observers at the conference and will do everything possible to facilitate their travel.

Loudon may also have an opportunity to talk to such Chinese IPR members as K. P. Chen (of the Shanghai Commercial Bank in Hongkong). Impossible as it seems now, I have an idea that K. P. will later go to Shanghai, and even before then may perhaps be disposed to make a token contribution to the Pacific Council budget.

If Loudon goes to Shanghai, I hope he will see Chi Chao-ting, vice president of the Bank of China, who has recently been named as Chinese Communist delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. You may remember that Chi was attached to the IPR international secretariat in 1940 and wrote one of the inquiry reports on China's economic development (distributed only

in brief form because it was incomplete). He may well prove to be one of our more influential friends in China.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, *Secretary-General.*

(W. L. Holland, Correspondence 1950, Royal Institute: Macadam.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, approximately how many members of the IPR would have been employed in an average year during these years of your tenure?

Mr. CARTER. The American IPR would have employed anywhere from 4 to 5 to perhaps 15 or 20 of all grades. I couldn't give the exact figures.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to go back, if you please. You wanted to clarify something. I do not want to deprive you of that privilege.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much. What I wanted to know was from the records of the Senate committee the date when Mr. Field went on the board of New Masses and the relationship of that date to his resignation as an executive officer of the American IPR. Just for my own knowledge I would like to know for how long a period, if any, he served jointly as an executive officer of our organization and on the editorial board of New Masses.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give that clarification from your records?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is a fact that we will present in due time. If Mr. Carter will be patient, he will see we will bring that out.

Senator EASTLAND. You testified you recommended Mr. Frederick V. Field for a commission in Army Intelligence. I would like to ask you if, to your knowledge, Mr. Owen Lattimore or Mr. Lauchlin Currie also recommended him for a commission?

Mr. CARTER. I would trust the committee's files on that.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to answer my question now. Do you know whether or not they did that?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. They may or may not. If you could refresh my memory, I could give you a less equivocal answer.

Senator EASTLAND. Here is a letter dated February 18, 1942, Mr. Edward C. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Someone suggested the other day that Merion Cooper, our friend John Cooper's brother, was fairly high up in the Army Air Intelligence. This information was not definite but sufficient so as to warrant checking. Am I not right in believing that you met him in Hollywood through a letter from his brother? If so, do you know whether he actually is in Air Intelligence and do you know him well enough to bring my case to his attention?

I am enclosing a confidential account of my attempt to get into Army to serve as a sort of aide mémoire to anyone loking into it. I am also enclosing a copy of my original Who's Who on the basis of what is regarded as sufficiently qualified for the job. Nothing new to report. I had a good talk with Justine Wise Polier and her husband. Both are working on the matter. Presumably Owen is taking it up with Currie. Again many thanks.

Sincerely,

FRED.

Does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. CARTER. May I look at it?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify the people in that letter as much as possible, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. John Cooper was at that time vice president of Pan American Airways. I think he was Juan Trippe's legal adviser.

Merion Cooper, according to this letter, is John Cooper's brother. I knew John Cooper very well when he was in Pan American. I don't remember ever meeting Merion Cooper, his brother. Field says am I right in believing that I know the brother, that I met him in Hollywood. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. I direct your attention to Owen and Currie. That is Owen Lattimore, is it not?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably.

Mr. MORRIS. That is who it is, is it not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Presumably Owen is taking it up with Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Lauchlin Currie, an assistant to President Roosevelt?

Mr. CARTER. I believe he was one of the five or six executive assistants to President Roosevelt.

Here Mr. Field is telling me that presumably Owen Lattimore is taking it up with Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any knowledge of that?

Mr. CARTER. Beyond this letter I remember nothing.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified that all you did to assist Mr. Field was to write a letter and outline his intellectual attainments. That was your testimony, was it not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is it that you were in correspondence with him over a period of time if all you did was write a letter and outline his intellectual attainments?

Mr. CARTER. Here was a man who apparently wanted to serve his country. At that time I think he would have been an asset.

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't your testimony wrong when you said you just wrote a letter and outlined his intellectual attainments?

Mr. CARTER. I think what I meant, Senator, was that I didn't go down to the Pentagon or go and see Senators or did not pull wires through Mr. Hull, or whoever was Secretary of State, but I wrote a letter. Beyond that I don't remember today going out in a campaign.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to read you another letter. This is May 4, 1942, signed Edward C. Carter, and I quote part of it: It begins "Dear Fred."

> I am very sorry that my efforts on behalf of you and also on behalf of Uncle Sam have not as yet yielded any substantial results.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Fred?

Senator EASTLAND. That is Frederick V. Field. That was a letter you wrote.

Senator SMITH. What date was that?

Senator EASTLAND. May 4, 1942.

Mr. CARTER. I remember distinctly saying earlier this morning that I must have written a letter commending Mr. Field and that was presumably considerably earlier than May 4, 1942, and that I was sorry that my effort—maybe there was something besides that letter. I don't remember any personal campaign of buttonholing to get Mr. Field——

Senator EASTLAND. What else did you do beside write that letter?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I received a letter from Mr. Field that I have already referred to and read it.

Senator EASTLAND. What did you do beside write that letter to get Mr. Field a commission? I want to have you answer that question.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember anything else, but if you or Mr. Morris or Senator McCarran could refresh my memory——

The CHAIRMAN. Would not this record that you just read, these 2 letters, refresh your memory?

Mr. CARTER. Well, the record is made to Justine Wise Polier. On seeing this letter, it is the first time I ever knew that Mr. Field knew Justine Polier, or her husband.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question there?

Mr. Carter, at or about the time that you were making this effort to get Mr. Field a commission in the Intelligence, did you have a conference with either or both Owen Lattimore or Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. I remember no such conference.

Senator SMITH. Were you acquainted with those two gentlemen?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I had known Mr. Lattimore since I recruited him as editor of Pacific Affairs in late 1933.

I had occasion to call on Lauchlin Currie when he was one of the President's executive assistants in connection with China relief, of which I was the director, and in connection with a visit to Chungking when Mr. T. V. Soong told me that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek wished me to come out and make a visit.

I remember very distinctly a contact with Mr. Currie at that time. I had not known him before he went into the President's office.

Senator SMITH. You had no contact with Mr. Currie about this proposal to get Mr. Field in the Intelligence Service?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Senator EASTLAND. But you knew that Mr. Currie and Mr. Lattimore were attempting to get Mr. Field a commission in the Army Intelligence, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I had it on Mr. Field's say-so from this letter.

Senator EASTLAND. And you knew that that was in 1942?

Mr. CARTER. 1942.

Senator EASTLAND. And you knew at that time that Mr. Field was on the editorial board of either New Masses or the Daily Worker, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. One reason that I wanted to get these dates straightened out——

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question, if you can. There was a direct question put to you, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. I must have known that he had contributed articles to one or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Carter, you and I will get along fine if you will just listen to the question and answer it, if you please.

Mr. CARTER. I am afraid I am trying to think of the answers too fast.

There is one question that "buggles" me in that I was asked 10 minutes ago to get dates.

Senator EASTLAND. Answer the question, please, sir.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not remember, then, whether or not you attempted to get a commission in Army Air Force Intelligence

for a member of the editorial board of either the Daily Worker or the New Masses?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, you do recall that Mr. Field took a position as chairman of the American Peace Mobilization, do you not?

Mr. CARTER. That I knew.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that the American Peace Mobilization was a Communist-controlled organization?

Mr. CARTER. I knew it was very definitely cited as that, and I came to the conclusion that the Commies took it over.

Senator EASTLAND. When did he take that position with the Peace Mobilization?

Mr. MORRIS. In 1940, was it not, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. It was the autumn of 1940, at the time that the Quakers, pacifists, and Reds were trying to keep us out of what was described as the Chamberlain-Daladier world.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, but you knew that Field was a Communist, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I know at that time he was behaving like a Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew at that time that he was a Communist, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't deduce, as I said earlier, Senator, that because a man wrote for a Communist paper that accepted articles from non-Communists, that Mr. Field was a Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. That they have non-Communists on the board of editors?

Mr. CARTER. I am speaking of the earlier period when he was a contributor, not on the board of editors.

Senator EASTLAND. He was on the board of editors before 1940, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. That was the question that I challenge and beseech and beg Mr. Morris to produce for me.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know what his memory is on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Senator.

You do know that he was executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization in 1940, do you not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you do admit now that the American Peace Mobilization was a Communist-controlled organization. Did you know it then?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn it?

Mr. CARTER. When they began picketing the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

Mr. CARTER. In the following spring.

Senator EASTLAND. In 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. It certainly must have been before June 22, 1941, is that not so, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. And is not any date in 1940, a date preceding this 1942 date in which you helped to get Mr. Field a commission in the Intelligence?

Mr. CARTER. That is logical.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it not? Answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you had better be frank with the committee.

Mr. CARTER. I am trying to be. I am trying to understand the question.

Senator EASTLAND. So you knew, in 1942, that he was a Communist, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I knew that he was playing the Communist line.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew that he was executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization in 1940, that you say that you knew was a Communist organization?

Mr. CARTER. That I learned in 1941 was a Communist organization.

Senator EASTLAND. And then the following year, the following year there, you attempted to get that man a commission in Army Intelligence?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, did you make those facts known to the Army that you were possessed of?

Mr. CARTER. If I had the letter here, I am pretty sure that I mentioned his left-wing interests.

Senator O'CONOR. You have no recollection of it, or just what facts you did make known to the Army?

Mr. CARTER. No; but I believe Mr. Morris has the letter, and I would like to refresh my memory.

If I may explain that, Senator O'Conor, I felt here was a fellow who was torn between the left and 100 percent Americanism. I had the feeling that when we entered the war, and the issues were perfectly clear, that we were out on a democratic campaign, that he would, because of his very profound—he is a scholarly guy, I mean, everyone admits that.

Senator O'CONOR. Of course, a lot of Communists are who are un-American.

Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir. That he would throw himself in as a loyal servant of Uncle Sam, and could use his great knowledge to aid the United States in winning the war with Japan.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you really believe that he was so disposed?

Mr. CARTER. I did, frankly. I did.

Subsequent history would imply that I was wrong. But, at the time, I sincerely believed he could be switched over and made an asset on our side.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you thought he might be switched over after he went into the Intelligence Department of the Army?

Mr. CARTER. No; I thought that he realized already that he had made some mistakes, and that he was ready to come clean and serve our Government.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, my question is, though, how much of that information you imparted to the Army, how much you told them as to your knowledge of his identification with Communist movements.

Mr. CARTER. Well, if I could get the letter, which undoubtedly Mr. Morris has——

Senator O'CONOR. I was really testing your memory, and wanted to get from you just what you recalled as to the extent of information

that you gave to the Army on which you based your recommendation for his commission in the Intelligence.

Mr. CARTER. I think there are two factors, if I may, in answer to your questions. One was a positive statement that he had assets that might be used. The other side was I felt sure that even in those days Government security would check up, and if they found out things that I didn't know, or interpreted the items in a different way, that they would have the final say, that I wasn't sufficiently a big guy with Army Intelligence for them to take him on my say so, because even then there was a good deal of checking.

Senator O'CONOR. But you have not any further knowledge as to how much you revealed and how much you told the Government about your personal knowledge?

Mr. CARTER. No. I, presumably, didn't say as much as I would now, because my convictions now are quite different from what they were then.

Senator O'CONOR. How much do you know as to Owen Lattimore's connection with Frederick Field and as to his knowledge of Field's identification with these movements?

Mr. CARTER. Contrarily, Lattimore and Field were employees of the IPR, Lattimore of the international body, the Pacific Council; Field as secretary of the American IPR.

Field was considerably junior to Lattimore in years and in intelligence; though Field was very intelligent, I considered Lattimore a far better informed man. I think they met at conferences. I don't think they were buddies or pals.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you have information then that Lattimore followed the Communist Party line?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator EASTLAND. Is that your testimony?

Mr. CARTER. That is my testimony.

Senator EASTLAND. Then you had no information that Lattimore followed the Communist Party line?

Mr. CARTER. I made up my own mind, and I was quite convinced at that time that Lattimore did not follow the party line. If you want me to extend my remarks, I still believe that Lattimore is completely opposed to communism and to the imperialistic Russian expression of communism at the present time.

Senator SMITH. I was going to ask a question.

As I recall, that letter said something about your efforts in behalf of getting Mr. Field a commission in Intelligence.

Now, what other efforts did you make; what were those efforts other than a letter that you wrote?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Senator SMITH. You do not remember talking to anybody about that, anybody connected with the Army or with the Government?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember to this day. It is some years ago; but if Mr. Morris has something that will be refreshing to my memory——

Senator SMITH. You do not recall any talk, conference, or conversation with Mr. Currie, who was then at the White House, as I understand it?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. It may be.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Proceed.

Senator WATKINS. Before you wrote this letter in behalf of Field, did you discuss the matter with him?

Mr. CARTER. Undoubtedly.

Senator WATKINS. What is your memory about what he told you, about what he wanted to do?

Mr. CARTER. That he wanted to serve Uncle Sam. I was convinced that he did. I had no thought at that time that he would use a position in Intelligence to serve any enemies, though, of course, at that time, our allies were somewhat different than what they are at the present time.

Senator WATKINS. Did you call to his attention, then, his left-wing activities?

Mr. CARTER. I think, undoubtedly, I said that I think, "You were very questionable to picket the White House," and I probably reminded him that I had told him that I thought it was a great mistake for him to join the American Peace Mobilization, that it would hurt his usefulness, but that if that really was attaining the task, that he might be a very useful intelligence officer.

Senator EASTLAND. How can you testify now that all you did was write a letter, call his intellectual attainments to the attention of the Government, when, in the light of this letter—and I hand you a letter dated December 15, 1941, addressed to Frederick V. Field, and signed Edward C. Carter.

Did you write that letter? Answer my question, sir. Did you write that letter?

Mr. CARTER. It clearly is my letter.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, let me have it, please. [Reading:]

DEAR FRED: I was all set to talk to two or three people in Washington when I got your letter of the 10th at the Mayflower, with Stone's rather surprising reaction. I wonder if this reflects his attitude or merely that of his colleague. I am anxious to talk the whole situation over with you before I make the next move. I want very much to see your unusual gifts utilized to the fullest extent during the emergency. We can discuss this fully when you come to see me at the IPR Tuesday morning, at 9:45.

Now, explain that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that letter?

Senator EASTLAND. That is December 15, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Mr. Stone?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Mr. Stone, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I can't for certain, but I believe it is William T. Stone, who was formerly Washington representative of the Foreign Policy Association, who was then in some Government agency job. I don't know which.

Senator EASTLAND. What do you mean by "I was all set to talk to two or three people in Washington"?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, about this letter, do you want it inserted in the record?

We are getting some letters here that have not been inserted in the record. I would like to keep the record as straight as I can.

Senator EASTLAND. He has identified this.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be marked for identification and inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3–C," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 3–C

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, December 15, 1941.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: I was all set to talk to two or three people in Washington when I got your letter of the 10th at the Mayflower, with Stone's rather surprising reaction. I wonder whether this reflects his attitude or merely that of his colleagues.

I am anxious to talk the whole situation over with you before I make the next move. I want very much to see your unusual gifts utilized to the fullest extent during the emergency. We can discuss this fully when you come to see me at the IPR Tuesday morning at 9:45.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might the other two previous letters go in the record ahead of this one?

The CHAIRMAN. There are a couple of other letters here that have been referred to that should go in the record, or at least be identified.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have been identified in the record, sir, but not for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. We will call one of them 3–A, another one 3–B, and this one 3–C. Those will be entered in the record as 3–B, 3–C, and 3–A.

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 3–A and 3–B," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 3–A

16 WEST TWELFTH STREET,
February 18, 1942.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Someone suggested the other day that Merian Cooper, our friend John Cooper's brother, was fairly high up in the Army Air Intelligence. This information was not definite, but sufficiently so to warrant checking. Am I not right in believing that you know him, that you met him in Hollywood through a letter from his brother? If so, do you know whether he actually is in Air Intelligence? And, do you know him well enough to bring my case to his attention?

I am enclosing a confidential account of my attempt to get into the Army to serve as a sort of aide memoire to anyone looking into it. I am also enclosing a copy of my original who's who on the basis of which I was regarded as sufficiently qualified for the job.

Nothing new to report. I had a good talk with Justine Wise Polier and her husband. Both are working on the matter. Presumably Owen is taking it up with Curry.

Again, many thanks,

Sincerely,

/S/ FRED.

EXHIBIT No. 3–B

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, May 4, 1942.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: This is a belated acknowledgment of your letter of April 16 enclosing copies of the interchange of correspondence with Pollard.

I am terribly sorry that my efforts on behalf of you and also on behalf of Uncle Sam have not as yet yielded any substantial result.

I certainly hope that the situation will change in the near future.

May I congratulate you on the great value of the last issue of Amerasia.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

APRIL 16, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The enclosed copies of an exchange of correspondence with Mr. Pollard of the Office of Coordinator of Information speak for themselves.

I propose devoting a large part of the next few months to baseball games and New Hartford.

Thank you again for your efforts.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ FRED
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

APRIL 16, 1942.

Mr. JOHN A. POLLARD,
Coordinator of Information,
270 Madison Avenue, New York City.

DEAR MR POLLARD: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter informing me that in the light of an FBI report your office could, or would, no longer consider me for a job.

This came as a great disappointment to me for I have been most anxious to serve the Government in some capacity that might be useful. It did not, however, come as a surprise. For I have yet to hear of a single person alleged by the FBI of having engaged in radical or liberal activities being assisted in obtaining a fair and open examination of the charges against him. I had also just learned of Mr. Gilmore's being fired by the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

One cannot help but be disturbed at the power which a small clique in the Government seems to have in judging the fitness of individuals for Government service without right of trial or defense. I am also disturbed at the apparent fear of those in charge of Federal offices to take any steps whatsoever to terminate this witch hunt against those whose entire record is that of being anti-Fascist.

I am, nevertheless, far more interested in seeing the war won than in creating any disturbance over this issue. At this particular period I fear that the latter course would be divisive. I shall, therefore, take no further steps to engage in war service so long as the present system of personnel selection prevails.

May I thank you most sincerely for your personal kindness in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

[Confidential]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
270 Madison Avenue, New York, April 14, 1942.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. FIELD: There seems to be nothing at all which can be done by this division to clarify your standing in the light of the Federal Bureau of Investigation report.

I am extremely sorry to have to advise that this is so, but the fact stands and there seems to be no conclusion to draw from it except that we could not go further in considering your availability for and expressed interest in the work of our division.

I wish you luck in finding war service which will be open to you.

Cordially yours,

JOHN A. POLLARD,
Special Reports Division.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. They have been referred to in the testimony by the witness.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder, attached to that short letter that I just identified was another letter which I didn't look at. May I have the privilege of looking at that?

Senator EASTLAND. I just asked you to identify the letter so I could question you about it.

What were those activities that you say you were about to make?

Mr. CARTER. I thought I could give you a more satisfactory answer.

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir. I want you to answer what those activities were. That other letter was not to you, you know that.

Mr. CARTER. I haven't seen it. We have established, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. MORRIS. Have you identified Mr. Stone? You mentioned William Stone. What does Mr. Stone do?

Mr. CARTER. Well, at the time, I remember these facts: He had been president of the Foreign Policy Association, had been Washington representative of the Foreign Policy Association. Then, at the time of the war, he went into some Government agency. I do not know what.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what he is doing now?

Mr. CARTER. He is in some Government agency. I haven't seen him for several years.

Senator EASTLAND. I want him to answer my question now.

What is it that you were going to talk about, and who was it that you were going to talk to?

Mr. CARTER. We have established, Senator Eastland, the fact that I wrote a letter commending him. This letter clearly indicates that from this man Stone, presumably W. T. Stone, Mr. Field received something very discouraging about the chance of his getting a commission, and that I was inclined to do something further. But it was suggested that we get together to talk over what the instructions were.

Senator EASTLAND. You said here a very plain statement. I want you to answer the question. You are dodging the question, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. I am sorry.

Senator EASTLAND [reading]:

> I was all set to talk to two or three people in Washington when I got your letter of the 10th at the Mayflower.

Now, who are those people, and what were you going to talk to them about?

Mr. CARTER. For the first question, I haven't the faintest idea now who were the two or three people he was going to talk to.

The second thing is that I felt that the matter should be pressed forward, and that I would talk to two or three people following up the letter.

Senator EASTLAND. You had intended, now, making some contacts?

Mr. CARTER. I certainly did.

Senator EASTLAND. To get Field a commission in Army Intelligence; had you not?

Mr. CARTER. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you just told us a little while ago that you did not propose to enter into any wire-pulling or seeing Senators, or anything of that kind.

Mr. CARTER. This has refreshed my memory and given me a more adequate basis for answering the question.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, Mr. Stone is now in the State Department; is he not?

Mr. CARTER. William T. Stone is, presumably the same man.

Senator SMITH. He has been for several years; has he not?

Mr. CARTER. I think so.

Senator SMITH. You knew that. Is he one of the men that you intended to see to assist in getting Field a commission in the Intelligence?

Mr. CARTER. I can't answer. It would be quite likely because I had known him in New York long before the war.

Senator SMITH. Now, do you know whether or not Mr. Stone, Mr. Currie, and Mr. Lattimore were friends or acquaintances?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I know that Mr. Lattimore knew Mr. Lauchlin Currie because it was through the President's, I think Mr. Currie, executive assistant to the President, executive assistant who handled a number of the President's negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek; and, that in connection with the invitation from Chiang Kai-shek for Lattimore to go out as his political adviser——

Senator SMITH. That is not what I asked you, Mr. Carter. We have heard that.

I am asking you whether or not you knew Mr. Stone, Lattimore, and Currie were all friends at that time, at the time you were trying to get Field a commission in the Intelligence.

Mr. CARTER. I didn't picture them as a special group.

The CHAIRMAN. In fairness to yourself, you should answer the question, Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. May I supplement the question?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

I think in fairness to yourself, you should answer the question. The question was: Did you know that they were all friends at the time?

Mr. CARTER. I knew they were acquaintances.

Senator SMITH. You knew they were interested in one capacity or another in the foreign affairs and foreign relations of the Government?

Mr. CARTER. Absolutely.

Senaor SMITH. And did you know whether or not each of the three knew Field?

Mr. CARTER. I knew that Lattimore did. I don't remember about Currie. I am certain that Stone knew Field, because they were in the same general foreign affairs gang when Stone was in the AIPR and Field was in the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, after having your memory refreshed by these letters and conversations, will you tell us now whether or not you aimed at Lattimore, Mr. Currie, and Mr. Stone to participate in securing a commission in the Intelligence for Mr. Field?

Mr. CARTER. Certainly, it points that way very definitely, and whether I had other people in mind, I don't know.

Senator SMITH. And you realized that each of those three gentlemen were in strategic positions to assist in that effort?

Mr. CARTER. That is quite clear.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, just on that point, and to clear up something that you have left in doubt, I have a letter before me addressed to you from Frederick V. Field, dated December 10, 1941, on the letterhead of Amerasia, and it shows that on the editorial board Frederick V. Field was chairman, and members of the board were Owen Lattimore and William T. Stone.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much for refreshing my memory.

Senator O'CONOR. How could you indicate any doubt as to the association among those men when the very letter addressed to you shows it on the letterhead, that they are all associated?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I wasn't always carrying a letterhead of Amerasia around with me.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, but here was a letter which came to you and from Field. I will read it to you, one or two sentences, to indicate that you were put on notice of something very serious, that a man whom you had recommended for a commission in the Army Intelligence, knowing that he was a Communist, had already met with resistance.

Let me read you a line or two to indicate that it was not just a passing thing, that you would not have to regain in your memory a letterhead, but it was a serious thing, that you were doing something detrimental to the interests of your country. Let me just read it to you. It is from Field to you.

> I have just had a conversation with Bill Stone over long distance. He was speaking from the office of the Economic Defense Board and indicated that we should go into the problem of my getting a job more fully in personal conversation. Nevertheless we had enough of a talk to convey a pretty clear picture. Bill said that there would be very formidable obstacles indeed to my getting a Washington job.

Now, do you recall that?

Mr. CARTER. Have I seen that before, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I have not shown it to you, Mr. Carter.

Senator O'CONOR. It is a letter to you, addressed to you, and, ostensibly, was received. Do you need to see it to remember that that important development occurred?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I don't need to see it. I take it from you that I wrote it.

Senator O'CONOR. No; that you received it.

The CHAIRMAN. Identify that, Senator, if you will.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; this is a letter on the stationery of Amerasia, dated December 10, 1941, addressed to Edward C. Carter, Hotel Mayflower, Washington, D. C. It is signed Fred. It is on the stationery of Amerasia, and the editorial board has Frederick V. Field, chairman. I would be very glad to have you examine it.

Mr. CARTER. I identify it as having been received, and with the members of the editorial board, including Kenneth Colegrove, who is with Northwestern University.

Senator O'CONOR. I refer, Mr. Carter, to the point in answer to your question to the Senator from North Carolina, where you indicated

some doubt as to William T. Stone's identification with these other persons, Frederick V. Field and Owen Lattimore.

My question is: Did that, in any sense, clarify it?

Mr. CARTER. Very greatly.

Senator O'CONOR. Very greatly. Now, having been clarified, what is your response to it, and what do you say now?

Mr. CARTER. Well, that Stone indicated that Field hadn't had a chance of a Government job.

Senator O'CONOR. Does it? In the very next sentence, he says he believed, referring to Stone, that these difficulties might disappear in time. Does that not indicate that there was still a chance, and that you all were still hoping for the day when Field would get by and get a commission in Army Intelligence?

Mr. CARTER. Speaking for myself, I was in that position.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get that cleared up. He said, "Speaking for myself, I was in that position."

Just what did you mean by that, please?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I am not presuming to tell what 8 or 10 years ago the position of other people was. I felt it was only fair for me to state that I clearly, at that time, saw there were difficulties, I anticipated them, I had talked to Field and said his Peace Mobilization and his picketing the White House were pretty lousy, and that this was confirmation from this man Stone that there were difficulties, and that Stone thought they might be surmounted.

The CHAIRMAN. You yourself thought they might be surmounted? Did you mean that as a part of your answer?

Mr. CARTER. And still, at that time, I did feel that, on balance with the checks and balances of security checking up on him, and so on, that if he passed all the hurdles, that he would be a good officer.

The CHAIRMAN. And he might get in?

Mr. CARTER. Might get in.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, at that time, then, you were possessed with at least some degree of determination to get Mr. Field into that Intelligence job, if you could, even in spite of the fact that you knew there were questionable circumstances about his career up to that point?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You were still determined to try to get him into Government service?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. All the evidence points that out.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the answer.

Mr. CARTER. That was my honest conviction, with all of these provisos and hedges, and so on.

Senator WATKINS. During that time that this conversation was going on, and at the time you had been requested to aid him, he was the financial angel for IPR, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. Not financial agent.

Senator WATKINS. Angel. He was helping all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You may use your own term, if you wish.

Mr. CARTER. He was a minor cherub. The main support came from the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Foundation and large American business corporations.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was picking up the deficit?

Mr. CARTER. He picked up several deficits very handsomely.

Senator EASTLAND. Did the Institute of Pacific Relations follow the Communist Party far-eastern program?

Mr. CARTER. I would say definitely not.

Senator EASTLAND. You did not?

Mr. CARTER. If anyone has read the 400 volumes and the periodicals, rather than simply a letter here and there, I think they would become convinced.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to ask you this question, Sir: Did the institute, or did you as an official of the institute, recommend people to the State Department of the United States for employment?

Mr. CARTER. Several times we had requests from various agencies of the Government to suggest a man for this or that job.

Senator EASTLAND. I asked you about the State Department. We will get to the others later.

Mr. CARTER. A number of our people, more of our junior people, were employed by the State Department during the war and since.

Senator EASTLAND. Who were those people?

Mr. CARTER. I think more of the people who went into the Army. Of the State Department, Robert W. Barnett is in the State Department at the present time. He went from us, however, to General Chennault's staff in Kunming. There must have been others.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you instrumental in having Mr. Jessup go into the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. No. We regarded him as a competent man.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, he was chairman of your board of trustees, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. He was chairman of the Pacific Council for some time, and we found him very useful.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Was he chairman of your board of trustees? Will you answer that question yes or no, please?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Let him tell who else. Let him tell who else they placed in the State Department.

Mr. CARTER. Jessup was chairman of the American IPR in 1939 and 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman of what?

Mr. CARTER. Chairman of the American IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. The American IPR is the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CARTER. Of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, and he was chairman of the Pacific council from 1939 to 1942.

I may have something here, Senator, that refreshes my memory on what other members of the IPR staff were employed in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is, and perhaps the record would correct me, that Senator Eastland's question was, Who did you recommend for employment in the State Department?

Senator EASTLAND. That is right.

Mr. CARTER. The one that I referred to, he went on to General Chennault's staff in Kunming, on intelligence work, and from there went into the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. You testified to that. Now, who else was there?

Mr. CARTER. I would like to give the most complete answer. My

memory is a blank. I don't know whether it would be permissible for me to consult Mr. Holland, who is in the room or not. I am anxious to give every name.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you give us that information?

Senator WATKINS. Did you recommend anybody to the State Department?

Senator EASTLAND. He testified they did.

Senator WATKINS. I did not get that, if he did.

Mr. CARTER. I think you are right. If the State Department consulted us on men like Barnett, I am very certain that they did in good character, because I don't remember anyone that we had who, at the time, would have hesitated to recommend. Maybe there was.

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer stands thus: The only one whom you recommended was a man by the name of Barnett.

Mr. CARTER. I think we must have given him a letter to OSS, if he was in OSS with Chennault.

The CHAIRMAN. The question by Senator Watkins is: Did you recommend anybody?

Mr. CARTER. That, I prefer, with a little time, to look up. Perhaps if we had an intermission shortly this afternoon, I could do it.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, there is one matter I started a while ago, but it was overcome by a lot of other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to have the witness finish the conversation that he had with Mr. Field about helping him get the commission in the Air Force Intelligence.

You detailed some, but I want to give the full conversation as you remember it, what you said, and what Mr. Field said.

Mr. CARTER. One of the American Peace Mobilization picketing the White House, and the relation to New Masses, very likely to hit him in the eye and throw him out, that I personally at that time thought he could be useful.

Senator WATKINS. What was his reply when you made that statement to him?

Mr. CARTER. That he had done these things for conscience's sake, because he didn't want to get into a Chamberlain-Daladier war. If it was a real war, to fight for democracy, he would go into it with both feet.

Senator WATKINS. Did he show any signs of repentance?

Mr. CARTER. A little sheepish.

Senator WATKINS. What did he say? Let us judge whether it was sheepish or not by what he said.

Mr. CARTER. I wish my memory was photographic. I can only remember the impression, not the exact words.

Senator WATKINS. Did he tell you the people that he thought could help him?

Mr. CARTER. You mean in getting——

Senator WATKINS. Yes; did he discuss the matter of who to help him get that commission?

Mr. CARTER. He may have mentioned Gen. Frank McCoy and Admiral Yarnell, both of whom he knew and who had been very useful in the IPR. Both of them had been members of the board, General McCoy and Admiral Harry E. Yarnell.

Senator WATKINS. You say he may have done it. Actually, did he mention those?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. He did mention those. Did he mention any others who could help him? How about Mr. Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember any more.

Senator O'CONOR. I have just one point along the line of what Senator Watkins was asking you about.

To clear up and finish this letter, Mr. Carter, was there any other position under discussion which Mr. Field thought he might get?

Mr. CARTER. I remember none.

Senator O'CONOR. I see. Well, now, I read just two additional passages from this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Identify the letter.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. It is the same letter of December 10, 1941, addressed by Mr. Field to Mr. Carter, on the letterhead of Amerasia.

After saying that he believed that the difficulties against him might disappear, he said, "I told him," that is, Bill Stone, "that I thought it would be a great mistake for me to get officially turned down, that is, that I should make no formal attempt until the way had been cleared."

Then, dropping down, it says, "Bill entirely agreed with this view."

After stating that, in the light of that, he sees no reason for him to come to Washington, he makes this statement, "I recognize that one of the difficulties of employing a person in my position, perhaps the chief difficulty, is not in the attitude of the directors of these Government agencies * * *." Apparently he thought that was pretty easy to get past. Do you think so? "* * * but in their desire to avoid criticism from Congress or other sources."

He mentions about newspapers.

Now, here is the important thing that I would like to ask you about, all of this difficulty about his getting this particular position of the Army Intelligence, "Perhaps, however, it would not apply to the other form of Government work which you yourself suggested."

Now, I would like to ask you what other form of Government work you, Mr. Carter, suggested to Frederick Field that he could get, knowing that he was a Communist or had Communist sympathies.

Mr. CARTER. I think the obvious ones; I don't remember in detail, would have been OWI or OSS, or, because of his knowledge of the economics of both China and Japan, the Board of Economic Warfare, where he had already shown himself very competent as an economist on the whole far-eastern area.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the State Department, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. It might have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris has a question.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with Senator Eastland's question about the Communist Party line, I would like to introduce one letter into evidence, and I would like to ask Mr. Carter to comment on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Identify the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I am going to read to you from the photostatic copy of a letter addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go on with that, the letter that Senator O'Conor used in interrogating the witness, perhaps, should be introduced to the record.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; I would like to offer it in evidence. It has not been offered, and I would like to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be offered and inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3–D," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 3–D

AMERASIA

EDITORIAL BOARD

Frederick V. Field, Chairman — Philip J. Jaffe, Managing Editor

T. A. Bisson, Ch'ao-ting Chi, Kenneth W. Colegrove, Owen Lattimore, Kate Mitchell, Cyrus H. Peake, David H. Popper, William T. Stone

NEW YORK, *December 10, 1941.*

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Hotel Mayflower, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have just had a conversation with Bill Stone over long distance. He was speaking from the Office of the Economic Defense Board and indicated that we could go into the problem of my getting a job more fully in personal conversation. Nevertheless we had enough of a talk to convey a pretty clear picture.

Bill said that there would be very formidable obstacles indeed to my getting a Washington job, and that that included the Economic Defense Board which was quite liberal. He believed that these difficulties might disappear in time. I told him that I thought it would be a great mistake for me to get officially turned down, that is that I should make no formal attempt until the way had been cleared. A turn-down would be a most unfortunate precedent not only for myself but also for a large number of other liberals. It would be particularly unfortunate for the Government itself, for it would indicate that they don't mean to carry out the President's plea for unity. No one is now interested in putting them, or ourselves in that position. Bill entirely agreed with this view.

In the light of that conversation, he and I agreed that there was little point in my coming to Washington this week. Instead we arranged to meet in New York next week.

I recognize that one of the difficulties of employing a person in my position—perhaps the chief difficulty—lies not in the attitude of the directors of these Government agencies, but in their desire to avoid criticism from Congress or other sources (e. g., certain newspapers, the Reader's Digest, those willing to print articles by unqualified liars). This is obviously a legitimate reason.

Perhaps, however, it would not apply to the other form of Government work which you yourself suggested. It might not apply because the very nature of that work, as I understand it, implies avoidance of personnel publicity.

I would, therefore, be most grateful to you if, on your return to New York, you could suggest that I be considered for that type of work. This assuming that the attitude you find regarding a Washington job is similar to Bill Stone's information.

Many thanks for your help, and apologies for adding one more incidental to your many preoccupations.

Best regards.

FRED.

The CHAIRMAN. This letter that you are now working on should be identified in some way.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, this is a letter on the letterhead of Pacific Affairs. It is dated Independence, Calif., July 10, 1938. It is addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter. It is signed by Mr. Owen Lattimore. It is a two-and-one-half-page letter.

I am going to ask Mr. Mandel if he will testify to the authenticity of this document.

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to read, before offering this into evidence, Mr. Chairman, two paragraphs from this letter.

Senator EASTLAND. Who is the letter from or to?

Mr. MORRIS. It is from Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. E. C. Carter, dated July 10, 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the witness should do it.

Senator WATKINS. He probably can identify it better than anyone.

Mr. CARTER. I would like to read it later, but identify it as having been written by Lattimore to me; that I received it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to read two paragraphs from this, and ask your comments on them. This is Mr. Lattimore writing to you.

Senator WATKINS. What is the date of the letter?

Mr. MORRIS. It is July 10, 1938. [Reading:]

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Continuing:

For the general purposes of this inquiry, it seems to me that the good scoring position for the IPR differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position, far enough not to be covered by the same label, but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. For Japan, on the other hand, hang back so as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals who cannot keep up whereas the Chinese liberals can.

I am skipping a sentence here:

For the U. S. S. R.—

that is, for the Soviet Republic—

back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and, above all, without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

I stop reading at that point.

Now, I would like to ask you a few questions, Mr. Carter, on those two points.

What was the inquiry that you referred to in this letter?

Mr. CARTER. The inquiry was a research financed to the extent of $90,000 by the Rockefeller Foundation, an inquiry into the issues of the Sino-Japanese War.

I was in Peking in 1937 when the Japanese came in and took Tientsin and Peking at the time of the famous Marco Polo Gate incident.

It was clear that the Japanese were on the march for aggression throughout China and further afield. It seemed to me that here we had an opportunity, while their major war was starting, to get people from different points of view to analyze the various features.

As a matter of fact, though Lattimore implies it, neither Asiaticus, Chi, nor Han-seng were major contributors to this study.

A number of other scholars—British, American, Australian, and so on—did contribute. For some reason or other, these three men did not make major contributions.

Mr. MORRIS. I think the letter, in that Mr. Lattimore said:

I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi.

Mr. CARTER. Presumably Mr. Lattimore was uninformed, or maybe I talked about it and didn't go through with it.

Senator EASTLAND. What did he mean by "cagey"?

Mr. CARTER. Did I use the word?

Senator EASTLAND. No; he said that in his letter. What did he mean by "cagey"; that you were cagey to turn it over to some Communists? That is what they were.

Mr. CARTER. He was attributing a skill or motive that I did not implement and carry out. I think he probably was trying to pay me a compliment.

Senator EASTLAND. Pay you a compliment to turn over that China section there to Communists, noted Communists?

Mr. CARTER. First of all, they were not noted Communists at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. They are noted Communists; are they not?

Mr. CARTER. They are today.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, and they were then; were they not?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know they were.

Senator EASTLAND. Are you a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No. I have never been, am not now, and I plan never to be.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, he told you there that he recommended you to follow the Russian line without the appearance of subservience; did he not?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Lattimore's letter, and I received it. I haven't followed the party line.

The CHAIRMAN. This expression here says: "I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus." That "you are pretty cagey."

You had evidently done something that he was commending as being "cagey."

Mr. CARTER. The facts are, Senator, that I didn't actually do it.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was Asiaticus?

Mr. CARTER. He was a man who personally I never met, who was long on the China coast, who wrote for continental——

Senator EASTLAND. What was his name, sir?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't the slightest memory.

Senator EASTLAND. But you know he is a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I now know that.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. He wrote for Communist publications; did he not?

Mr. CARTER. I now know that.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. And for capitalists as well.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, you answered Senator McCarran's question that you did not entirely adopt this Owen Lattimore's suggestion in following the party line. Would you say that Owen Lattimore was following the Communist Party line?

Mr. CARTER. No; I said that earlier, and I reaffirm it now.

Senator O'CONOR. Have you any other explanation to make as to why he would propose, in these words, "My hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position?"

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute: "* * * far enough not to be covered by the same label."

Senator O'CONOR. Can you give any further explanation of that, if he was not following the Communist Party line?

Mr. CARTER. Here, if I may take your time, Senator, I don't think it will take long.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to answer the question?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. CARTER. I said earlier that the Institute of Pacific Relations was made up of 10 or 12 national scientific academies—England, Japan, Australia, and the U. S. S. R. That was our biggest headache, to get cooperation.

We sincerely wanted cooperation on two theories, either that they were devils, and we should know the worst, or that their Oriental scholars had something to contribute.

One of the most active councils was the China IPR, which was made up of people who were friendly to Chiang Kai-shek and the Comintern. Then, until Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were in.

If you take the tensions of the British Council, the Dutch Council, and so on, along with Japanese and Russians, we were walking a tightrope. Maybe we were fools to think that people in Russia could ever find a meeting ground for cooperating with scholars in a democratic world. But we made that attempt in good faith. I am inclined to think that, thinking of this balancing act of our 10 or 12 national councils, Lattimore was thinking more in institute terms than in general political terms, and that we were using such as Sir George Sansom, and a whole kaleidoscope of people of different points of view, and trying to keep a reasonably united group of scholars, aiming to find a basic path of the Far East countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Now let me go back to the question. Reading the language of this letter—that is, of July 10, 1938—which you say is from Mr. Lattimore to you, I read again:

> I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi.

I draw your attention to this:

> They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Does that draw your attention to anything at the time you received it?

Mr. CARTER. It clearly must have. It was within this framework of getting all tints of view.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you intent on bringing out and assisting the absolutely radical aspect of the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. CARTER. We were intent on bringing out this complex of contending forces with different national groups having different ends, and we could only serve the American public and the wider international public if we had spokesmen for all substantial points of view. That, Mr. Chairman, was my aim for a great many years.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate to you that Mr. Lattimore was pretty conversant with conditions in the radical line; is that not true?

Mr. CARTER. I think in his later years he spent a good deal of time——

The CHAIRMAN. No, when you received that. Would that not arouse your interest immediately to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. What is the date of that?

The CHAIRMAN. I am dwelling on the language again: "They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects." He must have known what they would bring out. He must have been familiar with them; must he not?

Mr. CARTER. He must certainly have been convinced that it was important to get radical, conservative, all points of view.

The CHAIRMAN. And did that not immediately arouse your attention as to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. It didn't, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator WATKINS. I wanted to ask one question. I understood you to say, Mr. Carter, that you did not know Asiaticus.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember ever having met him, nor do I remember what names or name this was a nom de plume for.

Senator WATKINS. How about Han-seng?

Mr. CARTER. I knew Dr. Han-seng for several years.

Senator WATKINS. And Chi?

Mr. CARTER. I knew him for several years.

Senator WATKINS. How did it come about that you would recommend a man to take over this section of the inquiry that you did not know?

Mr. CARTER. I testified earlier, Senator Watkins, that I did not hand over major sections of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, or Dr. Chi. Lattimore seemed under the impression that I had, or was about to. Lattimore was in error in that assumption.

Senator WATKINS. This letter itself was in answer to correspondence you had with him?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably, yes.

Senator WATKINS. I know he mentioned the letter from Wellington about the paper bombs and so forth.

Mr. CARTER. Well, Wellington was secretary of the China IPR, and was still an official of the National government.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you are adjourning now, in the afternoon session I would like to introduce the evidence that we have compiled on Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. But, at the same time, I would like for this to be inserted in the record as exhibit No. 4.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 4

PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Independence, Calif., July, 10, 1938.

Mr. E. C. CARTER.

DEAR CARTER: For a fortnight I have been without a stenographer, and things have piled up on me so that I must have a whack, in my own bad typing, at trying to clear the accumulation a bit.

The letter from Wellington about the paper bombs was illuminating. I was interested to hear about the Mr. Kuo who had spent 20 years in Japan. The Japanese have some first-class experts whose finesse in dealing with warlords and crooked politicians is extraordinary. Their weakness is that they do not know the young China that is growing up from under all the rotten debris; and what they do know they underrate.

I was also interested in the Timperley correspondence. One of the most subtle and difficult problems in timing is to attempt to plot the graph showing the moment when all the liberal and decent opinion in England, discrepant

and unintegrated as it is, ranging from the Timperleys to the Lyttons to the Alexanders to the Barbara Woottens to the Freda Utleys and back toward the Amalgamated Engineers and so on, will coalesce enough to check Chamberlain and his bunch. I think it will coalesce all right, but will it be too late?

In this connection I was especially interested, in the remark, in your letter to Alsberg, about the possibility that the Chamberlain government might countenance a Far East settlement that would be totally unacceptable to Washington. This cuts near the bone. Naturally, the remark led me to wonder whether you would consider my proposed September editorial a well-timed poke in the eye or an ill-timed thorn in the pants.

The letter to Alsberg also brought me up to date on a number of points. I was interested to hear that Hu Shih is going to Europe. At the end of his considerable stay, what is your estimate of the weight that he swings in American circles and the extent to which he molds or leads the opinions of Chinese in America?

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. For Japan, on the other hand, hang back so as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals, who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on a check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression in Japan. For the British—scare the hell out of them, always in a polite way, but usually in a way that looks as if it might turn impolite. The British liberal groups are badly flustered; and being British, the way to encourage them to pull themselves together is to fluster the Tories. For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience. When it comes to the French, my wisdom fails. I haven't the vaguest idea what the real French constituency of our French affiliates is. The guy in Yosemite who thought he was on a ranch in the wild West may be the equivalent in France of Alexander in England, but I can't spot the French opposite number of Archie Rose, or Barbara Wootten, or George Taylor.

Yasuo seems to be functioning very creditably on the change from direct current to alternating current; but you are right, at any moment that whole fuse may blow out.

With Kurt Block I have begun a correspondence, but I am waiting for a clearer line on him. So many of the Germans drifting around now are interpermeated in the most curious way with both Marxism and Nazi hokum.

For the Italian stake in the Far East, have you checked on a tame, or at least semidomesticated Italian whom Lasswell has on some kind of a string (possibly frayed and still more possibly defrayed) in Chicago? Name of Renzo Sereno.

The news that Motylev may actually be over here in August is splendid. Tell him I have a mountain right here that he can climb any time.

Back to Block. Fred has sent me a copy of his letter to you of June 28, commenting on Block's memorandum on Germany's Far Eastern interests. I agree with Fred's main point—about the confusion caused to German commercial interests in China. Undoubtedly the German trading community in China bitterly resented the Japanese invasion and the political attitude taken by Germany. German trade even in Japan has also been thrown out of gear by the Japanese exchange restrictions. Nevertheless, the Germans who actually earn their living in the Far East are not the real big shots. Therefore I think Block may be broadly right; the determining interests in Germany decided that it was time to put their money on the eventual triumph of Japan; which necessarily means discounting immediate losses.

Fred has also sent me a copy of his letter to you of June 27, commenting on the San Francisco Japanese attacks on the IPR personnel. My position in this is a little different from Fred's. His work, even where it touches political controversy, is a logical extension of his economic research. He is also, as he points out in his letter, careful to the point of punctilio in his public appearances and speeches.

In my own case, before I had anything to do with the IPR I made my living partly by commercial lecturing and freelance writing. My political, travel and personal-observation and personal-opinion writing was undoubtedly better known than my academic work. In the circumstances, it would be silly and look timid for me to creep into the shelter of my desk and avoid further expression of opinions that I am already known to have. Considering, also, the way in which individuals of the Japanese IPR (Nasu specifically) have publicly endorsed such challenging measures of Japanese "forward policy" as military agricultural colonization in Manchuria, I do not see that Japanese publicists are entitled to question American employees of the IPR who express themselves on public issues as American citizens.

We are all doing fine now, and I am getting on with my book.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, at what hour would it be convenient to reconvene, 2 o'clock or 2:30?

The committee stands recessed until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris. Mr. Sourwine advises the Chair that he wishes to take up a letter at this point, however.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, I hold in my hand a press release marked for immediate release July 25, 1951, from the Institute of Pacific Relations. I ask you have you seen that press release?

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y.—Resumed

Mr. CARTER. I saw it just before the morning session.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in any way participate in its preparation?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have opportunity when you saw it before the morning session to read it and note its contents?

Mr. CARTER. Hurriedly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are then familiar with the fact that this press release states that Mr. William L. Holland, executive vice president of the American IPR today made the following statement:

Despite the fact that some of the institute's dead files were illegally seized last February by an agent of the subcommittee * * *.

In other words, that this press release at the outset seeks to convey the charge that the subcommittee acted illegally of taking possession under subpena of the files that were in the barn in Lee?

Mr. CARTER. My understanding, Mr. Sourwine, is that the question on the legal basis of subpena, I thought a subpena could subpena people, but I didn't know that it could subpena documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wasn't asking at the moment for your opinion in regard to what a subpena could or could not do. I was asking if you were familiar with the charge made.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it in any sense your charge?

Mr. CARTER. I would associate myself with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Disassociate yourself from it or with it?

Mr. CARTER. I associate with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had legal advice with regard to that charge?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you yourself a lawyer?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your position is that the committee took an illegal action when it took possession of the files under subpena in Lee, Mass.?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; because they didn't take them from an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations. They didn't take them from me, on whose property they were stored. They could have gotten them all by asking the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, I wasn't asking for an argument on the matter and I didn't intend to make one. I simply wanted the record to show that if the charge was made that you were associating yourself with it, that that was the fact, and whether or not you had legal advice in connection with it.

Mr. CARTER. The institute had legal advice. It was reported to me that the institute had legal advice. I personally had great confidence in the legal firm that gave the advice. Personally, I associate myself with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that firm?

Mr. CARTER. Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Keindl.

Mr. SOURWINE. What would you say, sir, was the purpose of making that charge in this press release distributed here at this time?

Mr. CARTER. You would have to ask an officer of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir; you have said you would associate yourself with the charge. For what purpose do you associate yourself with it?

Mr. CARTER. I was quite naturally surprised that after the institute had invited J. Edgar Hoover——

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, sir. I do not mean to interrupt you unduly, but I would like to have an answer in regard to what purpose you had in associating yourself with that charge.

Mr. CARTER. My neighbors in Lee, Mass., wanted to know what the situation was. It is the first time in my life that an agency of the American people, an official agency, had——

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, sir, but you are making another speech. The charge is being made now. I am trying to get at the purpose of making the charge at that time.

Mr. CARTER. To indicate that though it was something that appeared questionable at the outset, the institute has shown, ever since the seizure of those files, its willingness to cooperate in every possible way.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am glad you brought that point out, that the institute has made no previous challenges to the legality of taking possession of files by the committee.

Mr. CARTER. I couldn't answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, as you have pointed out, the committee has been given the files of the institute, have they not?

Mr. CARTER. So far as I know the institute has given everything requested.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am simply wondering whether it was either your intention or purpose, or whether it was the intention or purpose of the institute in making this charge at this time in a press release to seek in any way to discredit the committee.

Mr. CARTER. It was an effort to accredit the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when these files were taken, sir?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, sometime in February of this year.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you thought this was illegal, why wasn't there a contention to that effect made in February or in March rather than here in July in connection with these particular hearings?

Mr. CARTER. Because I was not an officer of the institute and that question should be addressed to a responsible officer of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything concerning the purpose of the institute with regard to this press release?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, when you were shown the press release, discuss with Mr. Holland or others its purpose or possible effect?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions on that point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. May I ask some questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Did you protest at the time these papers were seized?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't have any chance. They were taken out of my barn and brought down to Washington under guard. Who was I?

Senator SMITH. They were in your barn, on your property, near Lynn, Mass.?

Mr. CARTER. No; Lee, Mass. Two miles from Lee, not 17 miles, as was said in one of the papers. It is a very accessible place. It is my summer home. They had been sent there because of the fact that storage in New York of dead files was very expensive. It was hoped by the officers of the institute that because I retired if those old files were there I might spend some of my time writing a history of the institute.

Senator SMITH. How long had they been there at the time of seizure?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say, over a year, 2 years. They were there when the institute invited Mr. Edgar Hoover to inspect everything in the IPR files, both in New York and at Lee. I handed over the key of the barn to the representatives of the FBI that had a dozen people there. I gave them every facility for seeing everything. I didn't stay around. I gave them the freedom of the barn.

Senator SMITH. So you had no objection to these papers being seized or examined by the committee?

Mr. CARTER. I had no objection to their being seen by the FBI. I was not consulted as to whether I was for or against their being seen by this committee.

Senator SMITH. Did you protest against their being seen by this committee at the time?

Mr. CARTER. I certainly didn't myself write to Senator McCarran or to any of the committee.

Senator SMITH. Did you protest to any of the people who took charge of any of the papers in the barn?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't see any of them.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any agents on your farm that protested or that you entrusted to protest?

Mr. CARTER. No. Our next door neighbor, a nice New England farmer's wife who kept the key for us in case the electrician or the fire department wanted to come along, she was presented with a subpena. She didn't have legal advice. She was told she had to do it. She might have asked for a court order. I didn't hear about it until the next day.

Senator SMITH. They were in her custody; she had the key?

Mr. CARTER. They were not in her custody.

Senator SMITH. Who else had a key?

Mr. CARTER. They were in my custody as owner of the property. They had been stored on my property for the reasons that I have given, as a convenience for the fire department, and so on, so they could get quick access in case of need when I was living in New York 130 miles from Lee.

The commissioner of fire and police could go to our next-door neighbor and get the key for those specified purposes. She was not employed by the Institute of Pacific Relations; she wasn't an officer of the IPR; she wasn't custodian of the property; she had a friend who had the key.

The CHAIRMAN. The files were the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CARTER. They were.

The CHAIRMAN. You know them to be authentic files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CARTER. I know that the files came up from New York as the authentic files. Whether anyone ever slipped anything in that wasn't authentic, I have no means of saying. Anyone knows that in an old New England barn that if you haven't the key you can get up through the manure chute. You could go both ways.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think anything was put up through the manure chute?

Mr. CARTER. I have no evidence of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe there was? Have you any reason to say that?

Mr. CARTER. I have no reason except certain New England skepticism. I am not making any charge.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicated that someone of this committee could have slipped something up through the chute. Isn't that true, and they are going to pull it out here as a part of the rabbit out of the hat of the IPR files?

Mr. CARTER. I think you can read that into what I said.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not any reasonable person read it into your remarks?

Mr. CARTER. Apparently you have, and I regard you as highly reasonable.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you want to let it stand? Is that your charge?

Mr. CARTER. I do not wish to make any charge that any member of this committee or any member of the United States Government slipped anything up through the manure chute into the IPR files.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you say it?

Mr. CARTER. I am human.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another question?

The CHAIRMAN. I think his answer is "to err is human," and he has erred.

Senator FERGUSON. You say there were certain charges made against the IRP. Have any officer or group of officers of the IRP, since those charges have been made, made an independent check to ascertain whether there was any reasonable grounds for the charges?

Mr. CARTER. I don't want to duck, but I would prefer an executive officer of the institute answer that question, because I don't know all the operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you caused any such research to be made to see whether or not there was anything to the charges or reasonable grounds for the charges?

Mr. CARTER. You mean charges by the Senate committee?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You say charges were made.

Mr. CARTER. Charges were made in the press. Those charges in the press purported to stem from the process of seizure of those files.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any independent check made by the institute itself to ascertain if there was any truth to the charges—well, let me ask if there was an indication at least that this was a front for communism? Has anyone made a search to ascertain whether or not it was a front?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did it?

Mr. CARTER. A group of which Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California, was a member; Prof. Joseph P. Chamberlain at Columbia, recently deceased; Brooks Emeny, formerly of Cleveland, Ohio, and now president of the Foreign Policy Association; Arthur Deane, a colleague of John Foster Dulles and Allan Dulles, a partner of Southerland & Cromwell, and a few others.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they question you on that matter?

Mr. CARTER. They did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they question Field?

Mr. CARTER. Whether all of them did, I know Mr. Arthur Deane did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they make a written finding, a report?

Mr. CARTER. You are referring, Senator Ferguson, just to what period? After the seizure?

Senator FERGUSON. No; any time, even after the seizure.

Mr. CARTER. Before the seizure——

Senator FERGUSON. Did they make a written report?

Mr. CARTER. They made a written report. I think copies have been sent to Mr. Morris with the facsimile signatures.

Senator FERGUSON. After the seizure did they make an investigation and make a report?

Mr. CARTER. They considered the question of various applications——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did they make an investigation and make a report, and not whether they considered it.

Senator FERGUSON. It will not take long to answer that.

Mr. CARTER. Not an investigation in the sense of reading 400 books and thousands of letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think it would have been proper for an organization such as this to make a search to attempt to see whether

or not serious charges are true, so, if there were, they could clean their own house rather than to have a congressional committee do it?

Mr. CARTER. The charges made in a few papers appeared to the members of the committee——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is susceptible to a "yes" or "no" answer, and you can explain afterward. If you do not care to answer "yes" or "no," I think the matter ought to terminate.

Mr. CARTER. Would you repeat it once more?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know whether or not it would be a reasonable thing when charges are made against an organization as large as this that they were acting as a front of communism, that somebody in there would not have had an examination, a detailed investigation of their own house after these papers were seized and whether or not they did and whether or not they made a report.

Mr. CARTER. Charges that were made at the time of the seizure were in large part the same charges that had been made by a New York businessman, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg. They were investigated in view of the officers of the IRP. They were not substantiated. The new charges were so similar, in some cases so identical, that I imagine the committee felt there was no use of going through it again.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this investigation made after the papers were found in the office of Amerasia? Didn't that put an entirely different complexion on this whole Communist front and this organization being a Communist front?

Mr. CARTER. It would have been an entirely different complexion if there had been a proven charge that the Amerasia passed on restricted documents to representatives of foreign governments.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the fact that they stole the papers out of the files of the Federal Government, and used them, the mere fact they didn't pass them on to foreign governments made a difference?

Mr. CARTER. I think it did, because I think one would be espionage or something more serious.

The CHAIRMAN. One would be theft and the other would be treason; is that not true?

Mr. CARTER. You are the chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they not both serious matters?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't Mr. Field connected with both?

Mr. CARTER. He was not connected with Amerasia at the time of the seizure of the Amerasia files.

Senator EASTLAND. How do you know copies of those documents were not passed on to foreign governments?

Mr. CARTER. A lot of people have been trying to prove it and it has not been proven.

Senator EASTLAND. You just testified they were not passed on. How did you know that?

Mr. CARTER. Every effort was made by very competent and virile people to prove it and it was never proven.

Senator EASTLAND. Stolen by Communists, were they not?

Mr. CARTER. They were stolen; they certainly were stolen. They were secured irregularly by people who were accused of being Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Before commencing this next line of inquiry, I would like to call attention to the fact that exhibit 3–B has two corollary letters which I would also like to introduce into the record at this time. I show you them so you might see everything that is going into the record. We introduced that top letter and there were two corollary letters underneath.

Mr. CARTER. These appear to be authentic letters.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you offering them?

Mr. MORRIS. I now offer the corollary letters on exhibit 3–B into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will all be a part of exhibit 3–B. They are attached together.

(Documents referred to attached to exhibit 3–B were filed for the record. See p. 26.)

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to get back to a line of questioning we had just before the luncheon recess.

I refer you to a letter dated July 10, 1938, from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter. Among other things it says:

> I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Hang-seng and Chi.

Also that portion of the next paragraph:

> For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans, and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

Do you know that Asiaticus, who was referred to in that letter, wrote for Imprecorr, which is the official organ of Communist International published in Moscow?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know it at the time. As I said this morning, I did not employ Asiaticus on the inquiry.

Mr. MORRIS. Asiaticus did write for official Communist publications, did he not?

Mr. CARTER. I am so informed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce into the record a writing of Asiaticus in Imprecorr.

Mr. MANDEL. Asiaticus was a writer for the publication Imprecorr, which is an abbreviation for International Press Correspondence. He was a writer of at least one article in 1927 and seven articles in 1928. I have before me a photostat of one of his articles entitled "Dollar Imperialism in the Far East," which appears in the issue of May 31, 1928, page 534.

To get the flavor of the article I would just read one sentence:

> The United States which issued from the World War as the main creditor state, wanted us to maintain the financial control of the predatory campaign of imperialist finance in China.

The Imprecorr was a weekly official organ of the Communist International. This is shown by the following: In a Communist publication entitled "The Worker's Monthly," of December 1926 on its back cover, reference is made to the Imprecorr as follows:

> A weekly mine of information about the international Communist movement, articles by the leading Communists of the world, reports from every land, indispensable as a source of information of the world revolutionary movement.

There are other excerpts I could show that this paper was an organ of the Communist International. Just to summarize, I want to point out that in its issue beginning September 6, 1928, a series of articles is devoted to the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International.

Mr. MORRIS. How many articles did Asiaticus write for Imprecorr?

Mr. MANDEL. He wrote at least one in 1927, and seven in 1928. I can read the titles and dates if you desire.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't think it will be necessary, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest he put them in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. One of them is quite voluminous.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer the one article referred to by Mr. Mandel in the record and have it marked as exhibit No. 5.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 5" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 5

[From International Press Correspondence, May 31, 1928]

POLITICS—DOLLAR IMPERIALISM IN THE FAR EAST.

(By Asiaticus)

The Japanese attack on Shantung, the military operations around Tientsin and the comprehensive preparations "for the purpose of preserving Manchuria from civil war," which means occupying it with Japanese troops, very naturally raise the question as to how the United States imperialists will reply to this Japanese campaign. As from 1905, when by its victory over imperial Russia, Japan was enabled to appropriate Korea and the southern part of Manchuria, the United States were for practically two decades the most obstinate and dangerous opponent of Japanese expansion on the Asiatic Continent.

Nevertheless, in spite of the appeals issued from Nanking, the United States imperialists are continuing to observe the most mysterious silence and are so far refraining from any steps toward hemming the desire of the Japanese for intervention and annexation. Nay, more than that. For when the Japanese had expelled the south Chinese troops from the railway zone of Tsingtao and Tsinanfu and Japan suggested to the diplomatic corps at Peking that the task of defending Tientsin against the advance of the south Chinese be entrusted to the Japanese troops, the United States minister at Peking was one of the first to agree. It was only subsequently, upon instructions received from Washington, that the minister withdrew his consent, whereupon the Japanese Government simply proceeded with the military safeguarding of Tientsin on its own account without the sanction of the United States although, according to the Washington agreement of 1922, such an action in the Peking-Tientsin zone was only permissible with the consent of all the "interested" powers.

It is obvious, moreover, that Washington entertains no illusions in the matter of the Japanese promises, according to which Japan is ready to respect the Washington agreement regarding Shantung and according to which the Japanese campaign purports no intervention in the Chinese civil war but merely the protection of the Japanese interests in the zone of military operations.

The explanation of this attitude on the part of the United States toward Japan during the last few years can, nevertheless, not be sought in even a partial surrender of United States imperialism to Japan. The Washington Conference, at which the United States Government presented its claims to the hegemony in the Far East, obliged Japan to evacuate Shantung, while conceding that the harbor of Tsingtao, the railway line from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu and the bulk of the iron and coal occurrences in these regions should remain pronouncedly under Japanese financial control. The Japanese Government, or rather Japanese capital interests, were to have their creditor claims guaranteed, in the case of the mines also their proprietory claims.

The Washington Conference, moreover, determined that the interested powers were only to act in corpore in the question of granting loans to the Chinese Government. The United States which issued from the World War as the main creditor state, wanted thus to maintain the financial control of the predatory campaign of imperialist finance in China. For this reason the outcome of

the Washington Conference in China was not received as a general expression of the "traditional friendship" of the United States for China, but on the contrary as an imperialist front under the lead of the United States for the purpose of a maintenance and extension of the subjugation of China. It is merely characteristic of Chiang Kai-shek and his clique, as also their entire policy of treachery toward the national revolution, that they should now appeal against Japan to the "traditional friendship" of the United States.

So as to safeguard this policy of maintaining the financial lead of the imperialist proceedings of the powers, the United States required the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, a development which actually came about under pressure from Washington after the conclusion of peace. The evacuation of Shantung was a further success, making Japan more liable to acceed to an American financial control of the Japanese imperialist expansion in northern China.

Since the Washington Conference, however the United States have got nearer and nearer to their object by different ways. True, the loans, which can only be granted to the Chinese Government by an international financial consortium, have not materialized, partly because the Chinese Government was obliged, under the pressure of the national-revoluntionary forces, to refuse to deal with the international financiers, and partly because in the last few years the so-called Central Government at Peking was not capable of negotiating a loan. On the other hand, United States capital has found its way to Japan and into the Japanese enterprises in China, especially in Manchuria. In Japan itself and in the United States, there has been a visible change in the matter of mutual confidence, naturally only among such circles as are interested in the policy of expansion in Asia.

Since the World War and since the earthquake of 1923, Japan has not been able to extricate itself from its financial crisis. During the World War it was in a position to develop its national industries and to strengthen its commercial positions both in China and in India. European and American competition was partially suspended for the time being in view of the necessity of war requirements. After the World War it was inevitable that Japan should experience a serious economic and financial crisis by reason of the resumption of competition on the part of the industrially strengthened victorious powers. The earthquake in 1923 made the position still worse for Japan. Nevertheless, Japan is the only power that has managed to make big capital investments in China since the Washington Conference. At Tsingtao and Shanghai, big Japanese cotton mills have been erected in Chinese territory. Large and expensive railway systems have been constructed in Manchuria, and the mining industry in Manchuria and other north Chinese districts has made gigantic strides under Japanese management. This could only be effected with United States money.

According to United States estimates, some two thousand million dollars of United States money have been invested in the Japanese enterprises in Manchuria and northern China. Only a few weeks ago the Japanese South-Manchurian Railway management negotiated with Morgan for a loan of $50 million. This loan had already found the sanction of the United States Government, and it was only upon protest being raised in China that the consent of the United States authorities was withdrawn. The United States financiers are, however, in general undoubtedly acting with the consent of their Government in their repeated grants of financial "aid" to Japan. This development explains the present attitude of the United States in regard to the Japanese intervention in China. Japanese imperialism is also defending interests of the United States. The foreign policy of the United States limits itself to watching that these interests should not be endangered by the Japanese military operations in China and that the Japanese should not gain such positions as might threaten the future of the financial control of the United States in the Far East.

United States imperialism sees its strongest rival at present not in Japan, but in Great Britain. At the last disarmament conference, which was frustrated by the impossibility of an agreement between the United States and Great Britain, Japan played the part of a mediator. In the present struggle in the Far East, the United States are mainly interested in preventing a revival of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is therefore wrong to imagine that the United States are anxious to preserve their attitude of "traditional friendship" for China. The United States will safeguard their own interests, i. e., see to the realization of financial control in the Far East even on the basis of an increased Japanese colonization of Manchuria.

With its present action in the north of China and Manchuria, Japan is attempting to emancipate itself somewhat from United States capital by gaining further

positions. And here it is that the old conflict may possibly revive, on the basis of a struggle for the division of China and for the hegemony of the United States financial capital in such parts of China as have already been subjugated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a record of Asiaticus writing any publication under Communist auspices?

Mr. MANDEL. Asiaticus under that name also wrote a book in German entitled "Von Canton Bis Shanghai," which means from Canton to Shanghai, published by Agis Verlag. On page 53 of this book Asiaticus refers in German—and this is a translation—to "the Communist Party, the sole leader of the national and social revolution."

That gives the flavor and line of the book.

The CHAIRMAN. I like that word "flavor."

Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Chen Han-seng?

Mr. CARTER. I think I referred to him this morning. Chen Han-seng was a Chinese scholar, a graduate of American universities, got his doctorate over here, head of a section of the Academica Sinica, order of social sciences research council, who was an authority on the farm problems of China, who came to this country, and when we made a study of China and its labor he was recommended to us as a highly competent Chinese scholar who knew more about the tussles between landlord and so on, than any other Chinese, so we employed him.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long was he employed by the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he used a pen name?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't until you brought it up at the executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to show you a photostatic copy of a letter purportedly from you, dated January 15, 1940, to Dr. V. E. Motylev, Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

I will read this to you and then offer it for your examination:

DEAR MOTYLEV: I am not certain whether you are informed that the pen name of Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley are Raymond D. Brooke and Edith Cromwell.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. CARTER. You recall it to my attention. I had forgotten it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall writing that letter to Mr. Motylev?

Mr. CARTER. It is from my address. It hasn't got any signature on it, but my signature is typed in. It makes sense to me.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer this in evidence and wish it to be marked "Exhibit No. 6."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 6" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 6

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, January 15, 1940.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street,
Moscow, U. S S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: I am not certain whether you are informed that the pen name of Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley are Raymond D. Brooke and Edith Cromwell.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. CARTER. A great many members of the British Foreign Office wrote for IPR publications under pen names because in their position they couldn't write under their own signatures.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did these two people, Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, use pen names?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say. My only guess would be that some writers write so prolifically in order to get publishers to take their stuff they sign different names, appearing to have different individualities.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you identify Miss Fairfax-Cholmeley for us, please?

Mr. CARTER. She comes from an English aristocratic Yorkshire family. She is a cousin of Sir John Chancellor, or rather a niece of Sir John, who is British colonial governor in the West Indies. Her cousin is Christopher Chancellor, the present head of Reuters, known to many in this room, and a relative of hers, Mrs. Yates Thompson, who lived in Portland Square in London and owned Apollinaris which is a water that prosperous people drink in certain parts of the world. She was working for someone who joined my staff on a trip to the Far East and was told Mrs. Yates Thompson would be interested in helping finance the trip, as I didn't have money for a big staff. Mrs. Cholmeley went on the trip as my stenographer without cost either to me or to the institute.

(Subsequent to the hearing the following letter was received from Mr. E. C. Carter which was ordered inserted in the record at this point:)

NEW YORK CITY, *September 6, 1951.*

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated that Miss Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems that when the Chancellor children were young they went to stay for long periods in Yorkshire at the Cholmeley's home. It was because of this intimate relationship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were cousins.

I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant, but I want to correct it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a photostatic copy of an article appearing in the publication Far Eastern Spotlight for June 1949.

Mr. CARTER. This was considerably after my contact.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to call your attention to what purports to be page 16 which contains an article by Raymond D. Brooke, which you will notice is the same name as the name you told Mr. Motylev was the pen name of Dr. Chen Han-seng who was employed on your staff at the time.

Mr. CARTER. This is the review of the Columbia Press book.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Far East Spotlight? Do you know, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't see Far East Spotlight on it. This is just a photostat of part of a magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the photostat we are discussing here?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes. Far East Spotlight. It was down at the bottom, not the top caption.

I remember in the list of books received a lot of books by eminent people—Macmahon Ball, of Australia; Margaret Bourke-White; Pearl Buck—I am trying to recall what this Far Eastern Spotlight is. It seems whatever its political connection, which I can't establish from this, it was putting the spotlight on fairly important folks, which were by eminently democratic and capitalistic writers.

Mr. MORRIS. Don't you know that the Far East Spotlight is the official publication for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, aren't you an expert in the field of the Far East?

Mr. CARTER. I have done my role. My role has been more to organize and secure experts than to pose as an expert myself. My position has been more managerial than highly trained research person.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it not part of your function to be able to distinguish Communist from non-Communist, particularly——

Mr. CARTER. No; it was to distinguish scholars from nonscholars.

Mr. MORRIS. It did not make any difference to you whether they were Communist or not?

Mr. CARTER. If a Communist, especially in the period before the war, after we recognized the Soviet Union and during the period when we were allies of the Soviet Union, if I knew a Russian Communist who knew more about Kamchatka than any one else, I would try to get him to write. If he knew more about the Arctic Sea route or about fish——

Mr. MORRIS. Would you employ him on your staff and have him do your secretarial work?

Mr. CARTER. I certainly in the period that——

Mr. MORRIS. We are now talking about Chen Han-seng, who was working on the staff of IPR.

Mr. CARTER. I would certainly employ a Soviet Russian scholar whom I knew to be highly competent in the period when the Russians were allies and in the longer period when we were trying to extract all we could from the Soviet Union for the benefit of all the member countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to call your attention——

Mr. CARTER. I tried to get a Russian Communist on my staff several times and never succeeded.

Mr. MORRIS. We are talking about a particular man, Chen Han-seng.

Mr. CARTER. The answer is I have already said he was employed by the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. You made a point and I am developing it. You said at the time when United States was allied to the Soviet Union you would have been glad to do it. We are now talking about Chen Henseng, who you advised Mr. Motylev used the pen name of Raymond D. Brooke. I have shown you an article under the name of Raymond D. Brooke, under the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which is an organization on the Attorney General's list, a subversive organization. At the time we discussed this letter and Mr. Chen, it was January 15, 1940. That was during the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact. That was the time when the United States was in no sense allied with the Soviet Union.

I would wonder if that would alter your comment in any way?

Mr. CARTER. A great many people knew that the Hitler-Stalin thing was only a matter of a few months, that it was up. We still had diplomatic representation in Moscow. Moscow had diplomatic relations here.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is your testimony you would have turned anything over to a Soviet citizen, anything of value, on the ground that the Soviet Union was allied to the United States?

Mr. CARTET. We turned over material——

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me the question calls for a "yes" or "no." Then you may explain.

Mr. CARTER. Sure, I would pass on any publication of the IPR to a Russian scholar knowing he was a Communist, because we were giving stuff to British and American people everywhere. We were not dealing in secret information. We were dealing in what we believed to be facts. The more facts people, friend or foe, do—it was based on research on economic and social questions, more conceivably the human rights which might step forward in a few instances.

Senator FERGUSON. You believe that a Communist can be an objective scholar? You think their thinking allows them to be scholars in the true sense of the word?

Mr. CARTER. Not in what we conceive to be the true sense of the word. I think an enormous amount of their so-called scholarly stuff is puerile.

On the other hand, in certain areas a great many scientific publications of the Soviet Union stand up under the most searching criticism of the capitalistic world. A lot of them are "hooey."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think they can be really scholars? You were looking for scholars, as I understand it. Do you really believe that a Communist can be a real scholar in the true sense of the word?

Mr. CARTER. I will just repeat what you say, "in the true sense of the word."

Senator FERGUSON. That is begging the question. In any sense of the word. I will change it.

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes, in the Communist sense, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he is a Communist and not a scholar, that is all.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer this Raymond D. Brooke article as exhibit No. 7 and I would like to show it to Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 7

[From Far East Spotlight, June 1949]

FAR EAST READING—PEASANTS AND FREEDOM

(By Raymond D. Brooke)

AGRARIAN UNREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Erich H. Jacoby, Columbia University Press, New York.

Erich H. Jacoby, a Scandinavian who has none of the political biases and prejudices commonly found in this country, is to be congratulated for having successfully established in his book three very important points relating to the present problem of world peace.

Based upon his own experiences and field studies for 4 years in the Philippines, and also critically drawing from the publications of authors in the same

field of southeast Asia, notably Russell Andrus, Rupert Emerson, Pierre Gourou, L. S. Furnivall, Karl Peizer and Carle C. Zimmerman, Jacoby has systematically explained the agrarian situation in no less than six countries.

He has particularly emphasized the land tenure, the crop system and the peasant indebtedness in Java and the Philippines, the two countries of the tropical archipelagoes in Asia, as well as in Siam, Burma, Indochina and Malaya, all in the subtropical mainland.

The second point is brought out in the first and last chapters, namely, the close relation between agrarian unrest and the ardent desire for national independence, the interplay between economics and politics, or to be more concrete, the peasantry as bearer of the national idea in Asia.

Mr. Jacoby says in his preface: "As far as the national movements in southeast Asia are concerned, I have tried to show that, to a considerable degree, they are movements for land and for the reasonable use of land." Yes, Mr. Jacoby has admirably succeeded in his scholary endeavor. He has shown how the European and American colonial powers first allied themselves with the trading companies, then with the native princes or chieftains, and finally with the local landlord class, in order to maintain an indirect rule over the colony or semicolony. This political cooperation with the landlord "deepens the political crisis within the colonial system as the bulk of the population begins to identify colonial rule with landlord rule." (p. 32) Rizal's great novel, The Reign of Greed (El Filibusterimo) is cited as the best example of this expression.

The author's final point is that real political independence in each of these Asiatic countries must be tested by the solution of the present miserable agrarian situation, or the economic and social emancipation of the peasantry who constitute the majority of the people. (p. 258). For the sake of world peace, Mr. Jacoby explicitly states: "Certainly the withholding of independence from those nations might involve the most dangerous political consequences. * * * No solution, short of unrestricted political sovereignty, will be adequate for peoples that have conceived the national idea in all its aspects and are ready to develop the human and economic resources of their country in a liberal and democratic way" (p. 260). This point is now being clearly demonstrated by the dramatic events in China and the struggle of the Chinese peasantry for nationalism and democracy, which cannot but encourage all the southeast countries in Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to see that?

Mr. CARTER. I wonder if Mr. Sourwine could get me a copy of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Which is that?

Mr. CARTER. This Imprecorr, this letter that is just going in.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here is a copy for you.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a reproduction of the letterhead of the Communist Party of the United States dated March 1, 1949, addressed to all sections and counties and signed, "Comradely yours, May Miller, assistant organizing secretary; Robert Thompson, chairman."

I would like to call your attention to the last paragraph. This is on the Communist Party letterhead of New York State:

Any inquiries in relation to further activities can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy at 111 West Forty-second Street, New York City.

I would like you to observe it before I introduce it into the record.

Mr. CARTER. I have never seen it. I have never received a letter from the Communist Party of the United States, and it is addressed to "Dear Comrades," and dated March 1, 1949, and is a boost for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy which, as I understand it, was started as so many organizations were, containing liberals and leftists and rightists. I shan't use the word "liberal" in Senator Ferguson's presence because you asked me the other day what I thought a liberal was and I gave a pretty weak answer.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, as long as you recognize it was weak.

Mr. CARTER. It just ran according to form. A lot of anti-Com-

munists were on the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. When they found it was going to the left, they got off. As the nucleus left, it apparently satisfied the Communist Party of the State of New York, so I am not particularly interested.

Mr. MORRIS. I should like to introduce this into the record as a characterization of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 8" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 8

COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE,
New York, N. Y., March 1, 1949.

To All Sections and Counties

DEAR COMRADES: Enclosed please find program for action on China policy, as voted upon by a united front action conference on China, held in New York on January 29, 1949.

We are sure that you will find this material not only informative, but helpful in planning actions on China in your communities.

A special outline has also been issued by the National Education Committee on Communist Policy in China. This can be secured through orders from our district education department. The outline can be used as the basis for discussion in your sections and branches.

Any inquiries in relation to further activity can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, at 111 West Forty-second Street, New York City.

Comradely yours,

MAY MILLER, *Assistant Organizing Secretary.*

PROGRAM FOR ACTION ON CHINA POLICY

As suggested by the Action Conference on China Policy, New York City, January 29, 1949

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

1. Demand a congressional investigation—

A. Of the Chinese lobby in Washington—one of the largest spending foreign influences in our Capital; not registered as foreign agents.

B. Of the billions of dollars of private accumulation deposited in American banks and investments by Chinese officials and individuals.

2. Demand a new China policy—

A. An end to all forms of American intervention in China and of plans to aid any elements and remnants of the Kuomintang.

B. Preparation by our Government to recognize the government which the people of China are now establishing.

C. Planning now by our authorities for genuine and self-respecting cooperation with the people's government in China, including normal and friendly trade relations free of any political conditions.

3. Get the facts and implications of the Government's China policy to the American people.

IMMEDIATE STEPS FOR CARRYING OUT THE ACTION PROGRAM

1. Get your organization immediately to pass a resolution on China policy. (Use the enclosed January conference resolution for suggestions.) Send copies of your organization's resolution to your Senators and your Congressmen; give it publicity in your organization's publication and elsewhere; send a copy to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

2. Make use of the political ammunition of facts: the American people, if they know, will act.

A. Make a drive to get readers and subscribers to Far East Spotlight, the committee's monthly magazine. This is the indispensable tool for every fighter for a new and friendly policy toward China. Previous sources of reliable

information about China and the Far East now have a NAM slant; only Far East Spotlight gives you the positive and encouraging facts about the Chinese people's great and successful fight against American reaction, and keeps you up-to-date about Washington's evil plans to go on backing reaction in China and the Far East. Subscription: $2 a year; introductory offer: $1 for 8 months. Members of the CDFEP get this free.

B. Push the sale and reading of Anna Louise Strong's Tomorrow's China—paper bound, 65 cents; cloth bound $2. Organizational orders for five or more: 25 percent discount.

C. Have meetings on the China policy issue.

(*a*) The committee can furnish speakers:

In the New York City area: Telephone the speaker's bureau of the committee any afternoon, BRyant 9–6343.

In California, the San Francisco area: Contact Mr. William Kerner, 1841 Ellis Street, San Francisco. Los Angeles area: Contact Mrs. Jeannette Orel, 362 South Columbia Avenue, Los Angeles.

(*b*) Send your organization's own speakers to the briefing session on China; first session, Friday night, February 18, 7:30 sharp. Telephone the committee for registration blanks; BRyant 9–6343. No fee.

You can't fight without facts. Far East Spotlight is your basic source of information. Meetings on China will bring facts to hundreds of others.

3. See to it that the President and the Members of Congress hear from hundreds of individuals on China policy right now. Order prepared postcards from the committee, 1 cent each. Write your own messages. Make calls—in person and by telephone—on your Senators and Congressmen.

4. Have your organization make an immediate contribution to the work of the committee or plan to give a regular (monthly, quarterly, or yearly) contribution.

5. Support the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy—

A. By becoming members and by getting your friends to join. Membership includes subscription to Far East Spotlight.

B. By securing individual contributions for the committee. Your own; your friends; throw a party for the committee.

C. By doing volunteer work at the committee's office; 111 West Forty-second Street, fifth floor—**any time, any day.**

Every Tuesday night the staff is "at home" to friends who come to help.

The Chinese people are defeating the American reactionaries: So can we.

China policy reveals the over-all character of Washington's foreign policy—it harms the American people.

China policy is directly related to our domestic struggle for homes, for more consumption goods, for lower prices, for increased social security, for healthy international trade, for freedom from depression and militarism.

China shows up the weak spot in our reactionaries' program. Let's fight on China policy and take advantage of the blow the Chinese people have dealt the American reactionaries.

COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC FAR EASTERN POLICY.

RESOLUTION ON CHINA POLICY

ACTION CONFERENCE ON CHINA POLICY, NEW YORK, JANUARY 29, 1949

This Action Conference on China Policy, meeting in New York City on January 29, 1949, and attended by 182 registered delegates and observers from 80 organizations and including 48 individual participants, voted to send to every Member of the Eighty-first Congress, through the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy under whose auspices the conference was held, the following resolution:

In view of the following facts:

1. That our Government since VJ-day has violated both the democratic objective of World War II and the Charter of the United Nations in giving support to the antidemocratic and dictatorial Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek;

2. That our Government since VJ-day has made available to the Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek over $6 billion worth of the resources of the American people for use in civil war against the people of China who are our historic

friends and allies in the task of building a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic world;

3. That American guns, bullets, airplanes, bombs, poison gas, gasoline jelly, and flame throwers have brought suffering, death, and destruction to millions of people in China, thus threatening the alienation of the billion and a half people of Asia who are our natural allies in a democratic world;

4. That we Americans whose resources have been wasted and misused in China are still waiting for adequate and decent housing, for lower prices on consumption goods and food, for increased social security, for mutually beneficial trade relations between our two countries as a factor in preventing a depression, and for freedom from militarism and for the security which only peaceful and cooperative relations among nations can give;

5. That our Government's policy toward China is causing frictions and misunderstandings that can easily lead to conflicts and even to war;

6. That the people of China have decisively demonstrated their purposes and power to rid themselves of the callous, cruel, antidemocratic, and outworn feudal regime which for the past years has existed only with outside (American) support and have shown their power to negate all the military advice, training, and equipment given by the United States to the Kuomintang regime of Chiang Kai-shek, and are now establishing a functioning government of their own creating;

7. That there are nationally prominent American political, military, and publishing figures openly and secretly advocating and working for continued and intensified intervention in the internal affairs of China against the Chinese people;

8. That a strong Chinese lobby is at work in Washington (one of the biggest money-spending foreign influences in our Capital but not registered as a foreign agent) trying to influence our Government authorities to continue support of the antidemocratic and unpopular Kuomintang elements;

9. That the very Chinese officials and individuals who are urging more pouring out of the American people's money in China are known to have accumulated billions of dollars (wrung from the suffering people of China and stolen from the pockets of the American taxpayers) and now stowed away in American banks and investments:

Be it therefore resolved, That we go on record as demanding:

1. That there be a congressional investigation—

A. Into the activities of the Chinese lobby in this country; and

B. Into the private wealth which Chinese officials and individuals have stowed away in American banks and investments.

2. That there be an immediate end to all forms of American intervention in China including an end to any dealings with any elements or remnants of the Kuomintang regime, recognizing the right of the Chinese people to make decisions about their country free of all pressure or interference on the part of our Government.

3. That our Government prepare to recognize the government which the Chinese people are now establishing for themselves and that our authorities begin planning for genuine and self-respecting cooperation with that government, including normal and friendly trade relations free of any political conditions.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we come now to Dr. Chi and, Mr. Chairman, I think we have discussed Dr. Chi enough without going into this description of Chi again.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Morris, with the approval of the Chairman, you mentioned this afternoon this letter of Lattimore's about my being cagey, and so on. Are you going to come back to that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

You mentioned Asiaticus, Chen Han-seng, and Chi. I wanted the record to show there are Communists writings for Asiaticus Han-seng and Chi. Now that I have done that, I am going to address your attention to the latter. Do you have a comment on it?

The CHAIRMAN. To what letter?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the letter of July 10, 1938, from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter, in which Mr. Latimore commends Mr. Carter for thinking he was pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Chen Han-seng, and Chi.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question, then?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a comment to make on that?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, just to repeat what I said this morning, that contrary to Mr. Lattimore's impression, I did not turn over the inquiry stuff to be written by Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi.

Second, on the next page where reference is made to "back the international policy of the U. S. S. R.," in general our policy was in 1938 to back the international policy as we knew it of the Soviet Union in Asia because they and we and the Chinese were desperately concerned with Japanese aggression which was developing from '31, '37, '38 finally on to Marco Polo Bridge at Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "they" and "we" did you mean the institute when you say "we"?

Mr. CARTER. No; I meant the Russian Government, or the Chinese Government, the British Government, and our Government thought the Japanese were going much too far. And the principal element of Soviet far-eastern policy as we understood it vis-à-vis Japan, was to stop Japan. We felt that it was highly desirable to make it perfectly clear without propagandizing or carrying on political education to give the publics of the democracy and of the world chapter and verse on the implication of Japanese aggressions, Manchuria, China, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. When you used the word "we" you meant our Government?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were backing it up?

Mr. CARTER. I was in sympathy with it as an individual.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that paragraph read to you was the policy of our Government where they talk to you about being pretty cagey to turn it over to these two people, that they will bring out absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch? Is that the American policy?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How are you going to carry out the American policy.

Mr. CARTER. I was referring here——

Senator FERGUSON. I know what you are referring to, but the paragraph before that is the one I read. Were you carrying out the American policy when Lattimore wrote to you that sentence, and then do you think Lattimore was carrying out the American policy with that philosophy? The paragraph before, I mean, where in the same letter he said:

> The U. S. S. R.—back up their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and, above all, without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

Wasn't that exactly what he was doing when he said you were hiring these people to do that very thing and you were cagey about it, you were smart? Doesn't that tie in with the exact sentence that you were doing it and you never objected to that expression?

Mr. CARTER. I objected in that I didn't carry out the employment of these three men.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they in your employ at that time?

Mr. CARTER. Not in the context that Lattimore said.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever write him a letter and say you were not cagey, you didn't know those people were carrying it out underhanded as to funds?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't a copy of my reply to this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. The question could have been answered "yes" or "no."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator SMITH. What contacts do you have with these three men? Did you employ them?

Mr. CARTER. I am glad you raised that. Chi was earlier employed for a short time on a job for the institute. Chen Han-seng was employed to write a monograph on China's agrarian problems and one or two other monographs.

Asiaticus was invited by someone on the staff—I don't remember who—to write an article from time to time.

As I said this morning, I have no memory of ever having met Asiaticus. I didn't know what his nom de plumes were. I knew there appeared articles or an article signed by Asiaticus, who clearly, as Lattimore makes out here, had a more radical view or fundamental view than few of the writers in the Far East at that time who thought the status quo in China could continue indefinitely when many of us saw that it was crumbling and a totally different situation was inevitably coming about and it was in the American and world interest to know what the forces were that on the one side were causing the crumbling of the old Chinese regime and what the forces for good or evil were that were in reaction to building up from the point of view of power.

Senator SMITH. In what capacity did you employ those three men?

Mr. CARTER. In different capacities—one on land problems, one on economics and the institute, but not I personally employed Asiaticus for contemporary comment from the point of view of a radical on the China coast as to how the Western World looks at China. One of the things that we felt was that all of the time we were looking at things from the American point of view.

Senator SMITH. I am thinking now you did employ these three men as Mr. Lattimore suggested, although not on the specific item that he mentioned here. Is that the point?

Mr. CARTER. That is quite true.

The CHAIRMAN. From the last paragraph of that letter of July 10, I take it there had been correspondence between you and Lattimore that led up to his remark in that last paragraph; is that true.

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I was in constant contact with Lattimore throughout the times he was on the staff. I hadn't known him before. I am quite frank to say that I regarded him as a good American, a great scholar, and one of the best authorities on Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. From what he stated "I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi," he must have been advised by you that it must have been turned over?

Mr. CARTER. Not necessarily; I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did he get the information?

Mr. CARTER. You will have to ask him. I don't know. I know his information was wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not get it from you?

Mr. CARTER. Well, as I send out——

The CHAIRMAN. Answer my question. He did not get that information from you? The information that is found in his statement, "I think you are pretty cagey in turning so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi"?

Mr. CARTER. I just don't remember. In building up that inquiry which involved 30 or 40 scholars, we made a list of many scholars from all over the world on trade, on tariffs, on foreign ships in Chinese waters, and so on, and sent these around. We said to people: "Who do you think are the best people?"

The CHAIRMAN. This question he had been advised you turned the matter over to these three so you were not inquiring any further there, were you?

Mr. CARTER. He may have seen the list. I can't answer that. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. He says, "They will bring out the absolutely radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch."

Did you afterward advise him you had not turned the matter over to these three so he would not be misled?

Mr. CARTER. He must have known it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you afterward advise him?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. In the next paragraph the letter reads—

> For the general purposes of this inquiry, it seems to me that the good scoring position for the IPR differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. For Japan, on the other hand, hang back so as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on the check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression and Japan. For the British—scare the hell out of them. Always in a polite way but usually in a way that looks as if it might turn impolite. The British liberal groups are badly flustered, and being British, the way to encourage them to pull themselves together is to fluster the Tories.
>
> For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and, above all, without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

So he was giving you pretty general advice. Did you tell him afterward you were not following his advice?

Mr. CARTER. I would hope you would——

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer my question, yes or no. Did you tell him or did you write to him that you were not going to follow his advice?

Mr. CARTER. I cannot prove it, but I am certain we talked over these general issues——

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask him what his meaning of radicalism was?

Mr. CARTER. Why, no. Yes; I knew what it was, which was very different from what—you know you can be a radical and not be a Red.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you tell him you were not going to follow his advice?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you tell him, by letter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember the geography and dates.

Senator FERGUSON. I think now we ought to ask you this question, and you say that radical aspects were entirely different than being a Red. In the next paragraph he shows you that Red was the philosophy or the radical aspect was the philosophy of Red Communist Russia because he told you to follow it. Is that not true?

Mr. CARTER. He told me he thought I was cagey in following it. I have said I have not followed it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is very significant to me and I wish you would make an explanation of it. After the words that the chairman read:

> My hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

Did he not really tell you to follow—didn't Lattimore tell you to follow the Communists of China?

Mr. CARTER. If he was telling me what line to follow, he was telling someone who was not responsive to that line.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write and tell him you did not want his advice and that you had no——

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember, but I know when I had disagreements with him I told him so, and forcefully. In a case like that on a balance between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang, both sides purported to be anti-Japanese and to stop the Japanese, and far more influential people than I believed that everything that would unite the Chinese Reds and the Chinese Kuomintang in stopping Japanese aggression was in the Chinese interest and American interest.

Senator FERGUSON. Don't you think that Lattimore told you in those two paragraphs that have been read that he was wanting you to follow the "Commie" line?

Mr. CARTER. It would seem to me that he was assuming that I was, and I denied it.

Senator FERGUSON. And wanted you to continue; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. He was giving me a bouquet.

The CHAIRMAN. He was approving of it?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I would prefer to address these questions to Lattimore, because he would remember what was in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter, when he said you were cagey, he was approving of it, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. It was a bouquet.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did not that letter raise a grave question in your mind at the very least as to whether or not Lattimore was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. My conviction was, and is, he was not and never has been, and, second, this should be remembered: In the context of 1938 where the political pattern of the world and the tensions were totally different from what they are now. We are feeling out to find out who were our allies. We didn't care very much who they were, so long as they pasted the Japs and got us ready to beat the Germans.

Senator EASTLAND. You say we followed the U. S. S. R. line without the appearance of being subservient. That statement was not noticed to you he was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I don't think I can add anything that will help.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Watkins.

Senator WATKINS. On the second paragraph of the letter dated July 10, 1938, it reads:

> The letter from Wellington about the "paper bombs" was illuminating. I was interested to hear about Mr. Kuo, who had spent 20 years in Japan. The Japanese have some first-class experts whose finesse in dealing with war lords and crooked politicians is extraordinary. Their weakness is that they do not know the young China that is growing up from under all the rotten debris; and what they do know they underrate.

What was he talking about when he spoke of the young China growing up? He was not speaking of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. CARTER. No; in 1938—along from 1931 on when things were really booming and China was getting organized and under way under the superb efforts of the generalissimo there was a wholly fresh clan among the young Chinese who felt at least we are getting unified, we are going to resist Japan. We are going to get reforms. And anyone who was in China over those years was aware right from 1931 on—the railroads were being built, airfields were being built, the currency was getting into a better position, trade was moving, and so forth. The universities were prospering; there was new blood and within the Kuomintang, and one of the reasons that the Japanese struck when they did was because they saw if this process of advance went on under Chiang it would be too late for Japan to take China.

Senator WATKINS. In 1938 the war with Japan had been on for many years.

Mr. CARTER. There was the Manchurian incident in 1931. The Japanese moved into Tientsin and Peking in the summer of 1937, but they didn't go very far south. This new life under Chiang Kai-shek and the threat of a militant Japan was causing unity, hope, progress in the use of the young intelligentsia who had never been used by the old war lords. They saw a bright future ahead.

Senator WATKINS. This does not refer to the Communist movement that was coming up in China?

Mr. CARTER. That you would have to ask Lattimore. I think it was primarily the Kuomintang.

Senator WATKINS. What was the rotten debris he had in mind? Wasn't that the Chiang Kai-shek regime he was talking about?

Mr. CARTER. I happened to be out there about that time. There was quite a little rotten debris around Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Some other governments have a little rotten debris around them, and Americans notice it more for a foreign country than we do at home.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, do you say now you did or did not answer a letter Lattimore wrote dated July 10, 1938?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know whether it is in writing or orally.

Senator SMITH. Have you examined your own personal file since you were subpenaed to come here?

Mr. CARTER. I had not seen this letter—I mean, I have——

Senator SMITH. Have you examined the files?

Mr. CARTER. I have turned the pages of some, although it has been very difficult to look at them systematically because they were taken out of the barn and I have not had access to them here.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking about the papers taken out of the barn; I am asking you about correspondence now in your personal possession.

Have you examined any of that correspondence with reference to this hearing?

Mr. CARTER. Sure.

Senator SMITH. You do have some other papers in your personal possession?

Mr. CARTER. I have nothing as much as you have.

Senator SMITH. I did not ask that question. I am asking whether or not you now have in your possession, your personal possession, any correspondence or copies of correspondence that you were having with Mr. Lattimore and others about this whole activity.

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator SMITH. You have no personal files at all then?

Mr. CARTER. I have personal files. Well, there, again, as I stated in executive session, the Senate committee not only took IPR files but took four drawers of my own personal files. I have not got those back yet.

Senator SMITH. Do you now have any personal files with any letters or copies of letters or correspondence bearing on this subject about which we are examining you?

Mr. CARTER. I have photostatic copies of a number of letters which the FBI took out of the IPR files thinking they were pertinent to the question of the IPR loyalty and the FBI, though they made this investigation a long time ago, has never seen fit to render any charges whatsoever against the IPR.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking you about that; I am asking whether now you have in your possession any correspondence, copies of letters, bearing on the subject of this inquiry?

Mr. CARTER. I repeat; I have photostat copies.

Senator SMITH. Outside of that. You have told us about the photostats. Do you have any other correspondence?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember any.

Senator SMITH. Where do you keep your personal files? In the barn? In New York? Or where?

Mr. CARTER. Most of them are somewhere in this building, but my current stuff may be in my home, my house or barn, at Lee, or in my New York apartment.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you maintain an office?

Mr. CARTER. I do not at the present time.

Senator SMITH. Have you discussed this letter of July 10 with Mr. Lattimore recently?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, no.

Senator SMITH. You have not?

Mr. CARTER. No. Until I saw it this morning I hadn't seen it. I hadn't seen it for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think somebody ought to ask whether or not there is a copy of any letter to Lattimore in reply to this.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what Senator Smith was trying to get at.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean in this file.

Mr. Mandel, did you find any copy?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to go back to one point, Mr. Chairman, that may be clear in the record but which remains unclear to me.

Did you testify, sir, that Mr. Chi had nothing to do with the inquiry or the so-called inquiry series?

Mr. CARTER. He was asked—Mr. Holland, who was in executive charge——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you testify he had nothing to do with it? Answer that "Yes" or "No." Then you can explain.

The question is calling on your recollection as to whether you testified.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall his was one of three names mentioned in Mr. Lattimore's letter?

Mr. CARTER. I recall it from this morning's statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that you stated, when questioned about it, that you had not done what Mr. Lattimore had presumed you had done?

Mr. CARTER. I so testify.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean by that you had not employed Mr. Chi in connection with that matter?

Mr. CARTER. It meant that the end result was that he did not produce a book in the inquiry series.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you meant?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not mean you had not approached him?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't mean to imply one way or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in fact, approach him in that connection?

Mr. CARTER. I think I was undoubtedly consulted when one of my colleagues approached him for a volume which he never completed.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you approach him? That is easily answered.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember doing so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he did, in fact, write anything in connection with that inquiry series?

Mr. CARTER. I think, in executive session, Mr. Holland reported that he wrote a manuscript which was not ever printed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you recall in connection with this exhibit 1–A, which was put in the record earlier at today's session, we had the letter of Mr. Holland and the final paragraph of which spoke of Mr. Chi, and included this sentence:

> You may remember that Chi was attached to the IPR international secretariat in 1940 and wrote one of the inquiry reports on China's economic development, distributed only in brief form because it was incomplete.

Didn't you recall that?

Mr. CARTER. I remember that. I thought what I just said supported it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doesn't that seem to indicate that actually Mr. Chi did write something and that it was actually distributed to the membership of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. One hundred copies were mimeographed. It wasn't felt substantial enough to print it in larger edition.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was substantial enough that many years later, in 1950, it was recalled as a portion of his contribution to the inquiry; was it not?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your answer?

Mr. CARTER. I am affirming Mr. Sourwine's knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. You meant by waving your hands you affirmed what he said?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't want this committee to believe that Mr. Chi wrote whatever it was that he did write which was ultimately circulated as a voluntary matter and without having been asked to write anything, do you?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was asked by the institute or someone representing the institute to take part in that inquiry, and you are shaking your head again.

Mr. CARTER. I am affirming; I think you are right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. There is one thing I would like to ask in response to Senator Eastland's question in relation to the writer of this letter.

Do you know of anyone who was not a Communist and/or following the Communist line that was advocating what these two paragraphs advocate in this letter; that is, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2? They have been read a number of times. That is the paragraph which says that you were cagey and the paragraph that contains the Russian and Chinese foreign policy. Do you know of anyone who is not a Communist and/or following the Commie line that was advocating that philosophy?

Mr. CARTER. I know a good many people who felt that insofar as the Soviet Government was opposing Japanese or German aggression that it was in the interest of the IPR to get as much as we could out of that situation.

With reference to my being cagey——

Senator FERGUSON. No; the part about following the Communists of China.

Do you know anybody that was not a Communist and/or following the line that was advocating following the Communists of China?

Mr. CARTER. The testimony that has come out in this city in the past——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, do you know anybody?

Mr. CARTER. Sure.

Senator FERGUSON. How many?

Mr. CARTER. I think of one.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is it?

Mr. CARTER. General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. You think General Marshall was following that line?

Mr. CARTER. He was following the line of getting as much of the Chinese Communists, to woo them away from Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. This was for China. It says, "For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position."

You say that General Marshall was following that? If so, I have never heard it. It is news to me, and you are supposed to be an expert in this field.

Senator O'CONOR. At or about the time of this exchange in correspondence, to your knowledge was Mr. Lattimore in touch with representatives of the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. I would think on any scale it wholly unlikely. I don't know.

Senator O'CONOR. Was he subsequently?

Mr. CARTER. Very tenuously. He wasn't in and out of the State Department all the time.

Senator O'CONOR. Was he sometimes?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say.

Senator O'CONOR. I have a letter before me written to you by Owen Lattimore on the stationary of Pacific Affairs of June 7, 1940, which was the next month to that which has already been referred to.

Mr. CARTER. 1940?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. This is July, 1938.

Senator O'CONOR. There is one of July 1940.

Senator FERGUSOON. The one with two paragraphs, the 10th of July.

Mr. CARTER. That is 1938.

Senator O'CONOR. There was another one of 1940.

We will omit that part of the question. This is 1940, in which he refers to John Carter Vincent. Had he been in touch with Mr. Vincent very frequently, do you know?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say.

Senator O'CONOR. I read this paragraph in which he is referring to the possible engagement of some one outside of the institute to do some extra work and he said:

I am pretty sure that John Carter Vincent is not back from Geneva or we should have heard. Moreover, as a member of the State Department, he would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book—

Et cetera.

I ask you whether or not that would indicate he was in pretty close touch with members of the State Department?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, that letter should be identified. Is that the Lattimore letter?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, sir. It is a letter from Lattimore to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. And the date is what?

Mr. CARTER. June 7, 1940. It concerns the geology of China. He wanted criticism of a book.

The CHAIRMAN. Go to the question, please.

Mr. CARTER. This was a matter of getting a review for the quarterly Pacific Affairs, of a book by Lattimore entitled "Inner Asian Frontiers of China."

The question was whether Gaus, who had been United States Ambassador in China, could review it. Lattimore says that he is pretty sure that Vincent isn't back from Geneva, or, as a member of the State Department, he would probably have pussyfooted. This was quite the usual routine in that members of the British Foreign Office or the Canadian External Affairs of the State Department really felt free to write a hard-hitting review of a book by a nonofficial.

Senator O'CONOR. But my point was whether it was indicative of the fact that Lattimore was in close touch with John Carter Vincent or other representatives of the State Department.

Mr. CARTER. You could interpret that either way. At that time, anyone working in the Far Eastern field knew that John Carter Vincent was an important man in the State Department. We would read in the newspapers about his movements. Personally, I wouldn't take it that he was close, a close day-by-day friend. He may have been, but I don't know.

Senator O'CONOR. If not day-by-day, would you say he was in very close association with him on numerous occasions?

Mr. CARTER. I can't tell you; no.

Senator O'CONOR. I asked you previously whether, to your knowledge, Owen Lattimore was identified closely with the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. And I said I didn't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he connected with Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. I testified this morning that, in connection with Lattimore's going out to Chungking, to Chiang Kai-shek, that some of the dealings on the passage and reservations were handled——

Senator FERGUSON. I am familiar with the Pearl Harbor hearings on that.

Senator O'CONOR. But is it not a fact that Mr. Lattimore had an office in the White House or in the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Lattimore never had an office in the State Department or the White House.

Senator O'CONOR. Are you sure of that?

Senator FERGUSON. Are you sure of that?

Senator EASTLAND. Did he use Lauchlin Currie's office, which was in the Old State Department Building, while he was an Assistant to the President?

Mr. CARTER. Let me qualify that. On the State Department, I am prepared to take Lattimore's testimony on the Old State Building. I should assume that a man who is going out on the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt to be political adviser to the head of the Chinese Government, Chiang Kai-shek, would naturally spend several days in close contact with Mr. Currie, because he was going on a special relationship, nominated by Roosevelt.

Senator EASTLAND. At the suggestion of Currie, was it not? He was promoted for that job by Currie, was he not?

Mr. CARTER. I assume so; yes.

Senator O'CONOR. And in connection with that, he maintained the office in the White House or in an annex adjoining it.

Mr. CARTER. Old State.

Seator O'CONOR. Well, that put him in direct touch with both the White House and the State Department, did it not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you get any nearer to the State Department than in the Old State between the White House and the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I have been accused of looking like Mr. Hull, when walking through the corridors.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was it that accused you of that? I would like to have a photograph of him.

Mr. CARTER. He was slightly tipsy.

The CHAIRMAN. He must have been.

Senator FERGUSON. But you are not going to quibble over whether or not he had it in the White House or the State Department, if he had it in the annex; would you?

Mr. CARTER. I want to state, as firmly as I can, that he must have had a desk for several days adjoining one of the offices of one of the President's executive assistants on an operation which, organizationally, on a chart of organization, was totally different from having an office in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your analysis of what you think or what you know? Do you know that he had an office?

Mr. CARTER. That is what I think. I never saw him in the office. I have seen Currie in his office in the Old State Building, and was informed that it was an office of an assistant, executive assistant, and that for convenience's sake it was in that building, but it was not a part of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you are talking about Owen Lattimore's office?

Mr. CARTER. I am talking about Mr. Currie.

Senator EASTLAND. Lattimore was in that office; was he not?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Lattimore in that office?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore got his mail through Mr. Currie's office; did he not?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. He used the White House telephones, got telephone calls through the White House exchange, which was connected with Currie's office; did he not?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember whether it was the State Department exchange or the White House exchange when I once or twice phoned Mr. Currie.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask you this question: Did you ever attempt to send Mr. Lattimore to Moscow? Did you ever attempt to get Mr. Lattimore sent to Moscow?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. CARTER. I can't tell you. It is in the record from the executive hearing. He was in Sweden carrying on a research, and I thought it would be a good idea, since he was so near Moscow, to go to Moscow. I sent him a telegram as to whether he would be interested in going.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you telegraphed him the day after the Hitler-Stalin pact; did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I did. But I am not satisfied on the date when the telegram was received.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you want him to go to Moscow the day after the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mr. CARTER. I can't tell you, but I do not think it was in connection with the pact, but in connection with his research.

Whenever possible, whenever one of the principal officers of the IPR was in Europe, visiting our branches in London, the Hague, and Paris, I urged them, if possible, to also visit the Moscow office which then was affiliated to the International Secretariat. It was just the same as before Pearl Harbor when one of our men was in the Far

East. I said, "If you go to China, you have to go to Japan and you have to go to the Philippines," because they were all members, and I was trying to play fair. We had fewer opportunities to go to Moscow, and we desired to get everything we could out of the Bolsheviks.

I learned that Lattimore was in Sweden. It is only a few hours away, and I inquired whether he could go, and hoped he could go.

Senator EASTLAND. Then it was not for him to see if he could get permission to enter one of the Chinese provinces that Russia occupied?

Mr. CARTER. For a great many years, he was a specialist on Mongolia. He knew the Mongolian language and the Chinese language perfectly. Very few Americans or British had the opportunity of going to Mongolia. He wanted to supplement his book knowledge and his knowledge of it, a history, by going into that part of Mongolia which was definitely under Russian influence.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question, Senator Eastland? I missed it.

Senator EASTLAND. I asked him if his testimony was, by Lattimore, that Mr. Carter was sending him, wanted him to go into a Chinese province that Russia controlled.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been answered.

Mr. CARTER. That was my hope, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. You have previously indicated, Mr. Carter, your belief as to the Communist leanings of Lattimore and others.

Mr. CARTER. Not of Lattimore, please.

Senator O'CONOR. I said one way or the other.

Mr. CARTER. All right.

Senator O'CONOR. You expressed an opinion. I did not say what the opinion was.

What have you to say with regard to Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. CARTER. He was Canadian-born, a Harvard economist.

Senator O'CONOR. No; I do not mean his life history. I am referring to his identification or his espousal of Communist principles or his leanings to the Communist line.

Mr. CARTER. I never saw any.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator O'CONOR. There was no evidence to your knowledge?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to read to you a list of names, which names turn up with great frequency in the files. This list has been compiled by the staff here as a condensation of many people, of the many names, who are interested in the institute.

I am going to read a name, and, for the sake of time, I will ask you, in your opinion, yes or no, in your recollection, if they were connected with the institute in any way.

Mr. CARTER. Well, do you mean if I wrote a letter to John Smith in Timbuctu?

Mr. MORRIS. No. The standard is this, Mr. Carter: They are either members of the staff, they were contributors to IPR publications, they were members of the executive board of trustees, or they performed substantial services in addition to their membership in the IPR.

Solomon Adler—yes or no?

Mr. CARTER. I can't answer.
Mr. MORRIS. James S. Allen?
Mr. CARTER. I think he wrote one article.
Mr. MORRIS. Well, I mean, on these cases, we will not go into the details, Mr. Carter. Just answer yes or no.
Asiaticus?
Mr. CARTER. We have covered him.
Mr. MORRIS. Hilda Austern?
Mr. CARTER. She was a bookkeeper; yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Joseph Fels Barnes?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Betty Barnes?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Kathleen Barnes?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Robert W. Barnett?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. T. A. Bisson?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Esther Brunauer? She was one of the incorporators. When you incorporated, she was one of the three incorporators, Mr. Carter?
The CHAIRMAN. Your answer to that would be "Yes"?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, for the time.
Mr. MORRIS. Angus Cameron?
Mr. CARTER. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Evans Carlson?
Mr. CARTER. Lecturer; yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Abraham Chapman?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Han-seng Chen?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Ch'ao-ting Chi?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Elsie Cholmeley?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. O. Edmund Clubb?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Frank V. Coe?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Lauchlin Currie?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. John P. Davies?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Hugh Deane?
Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. A member of the D. C. Council, the Washington Council.
Len De Caux?
Mr. CARTER. Might have, yes.
Mr. MORRIS. A member of the board of trustees, was she not?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Len DeCaux?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Emile Despres?
Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. Lawrence Duggan?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Dolly Eltenton?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Israel Epstein?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. John K. Fairbank?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Frederick V. Field?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Theodore Draper?
Mr. CARTER. Dromedary Dates, was he, or Federal Reserve? Yes, I had lunch with him one day.
Mr. MORRIS. Was he connected with the IPR, Mr. Carter?
Mr. CARTER. I don't think so.
Mr MORRIS. Edith Field?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Julian Friedman?
Mr. CARTER. We had a Friedman whose name was Irving. I don't place Julian.
Mr. MORRIS. Did he attend the Ninth IPR conference as a delegate.
Mr. CARTER. May have.
Mr. MORRIS. Mark J. Gayn?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, slight.
Mr. MORRIS. Randall Gould?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Andrew Grajdanzev?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. He is now known as Andrew Grad?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Michael Greenberg?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Haldore Hanson?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. John Hersey?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Alger Hiss?
Mr. CARTER. He was a member of our board for a short time.
Mr. MORRIS. And an adviser, was he not?
Mr. CARTER. Consultant.
Mr. MORRIS Y. Y. Hsu?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Joy Hume?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Philip J. Jaffe?
Mr. CARTER. Contributing member.
The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question.
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Anthony Jenkinson?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Sergei Kournakoff?
Mr. CARTER. Don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a writer for your Pacific Affairs?
Mr. CARTER. Don't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. Corliss Lamont?
Mr. CARTER. Contributor, yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Olga Lang?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Eleanor Lattimore?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Owen Lattimore?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. W. J. Leaning?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Duncan C. Lee?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Michael Lee?
Mr. CARTER. Attended a conference; yes.
Mr. MORRIS. A member of the secretariat?
Mr. CARTER. At the conference.
Mr. MORRIS. Michael Lindsay?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Lewis Lorwin?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. William Mandel?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Kate Mitchell?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Harriet Moore?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Hozumi Ozaki?
Mr. CARTER. Ex-mayor of Tokyo. Maybe, I don't know.
Mr. MORRIS. Was he not a delegate to your Yosemite Conference in 1936?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Fred Poland?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Catherine Porter?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Mildred Price?
Mr. CARTER. I don't know.
Mr. MORRIS. Ludwig Rajchman?
Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. I remember him. I don't remember his IPR connections to be known, I suppose.
Mr. MORRIS. Jefferson Franklin Ray?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Lawrence Rosinger?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Andrew Roth?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Kuikazu Saionji?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Helen Schneider?
Mr. CARTER. Don't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. Was she not a staff worker?
Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. John S. Service?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Agnes Smedley?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, she was a member for 2 years.
Mr. MORRIS. Edgar Snow?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Edgar Snow?
Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. That is Nym Wales.
Mr. CARTER. I don't remember as an extensive correspondent.
Mr. MORRIS. Guenther Stein?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Marguerite Stewart?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Maxwell S. Stewart?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. William T. Stone?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. And Anna Louise Strong?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Mary Van Kleeck?
Mr. CARTER. I don't know. I know her, but I don't remember her in an IPR connection.
Mr. MORRIS. Did she not write for your publication?
Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. John Carter Vincent?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Adam Von Trott?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Harry Dexter White?
Mr. CARTER. Very limited, yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Ella Winter?
Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. Victor Yakhontoff?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Rose Yardumian?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
May I make one short comment?
The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. CARTER. It is said that this represents the greater volume of the correspondence. I see a great many important omissions of people with whom I was in constant correspondence, like Ray Lyman Wilbur, Robert Gordon Sproul, Lord Hailsham.

I think there is a long list of people not mentioned with whom it was my obligation and pleasure to be in correspondence. I would hope, if I may make a suggestion, that this list would not be used as a sample of the personnel connections of the IPR, because it is at all levels—stenographers, accountants, people who wrote one article, and so on—whereas, the framework of the institute was the wise leadership of men like Sproul, and Wilbur, and Newton Baker, and Dafoe, and a very large number of people who, by long distance phone, by interview, and by extensive correspondence, I was in touch with.

You said at the beginning that you wanted me to give the whole picture.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. That is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. That is perfectly all right, and we understand that that is not the complete list. But we are going to be addressing ourselves to these names, and we want an affirmation or denial of whether they were connected with the institute.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, before you go to another subject, I asked a question about investigations within the IPR itself.

You indicated that prior to the Amerasia exposure, that there had been an investigation on the so-called Kohlberg charges.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read just a line or two of testimony, not giving you the name of the party who testified to it.

Do you think there was an investigation made by IPR of the Kohlberg charges?

The answer is:

No; I would say that there was an answer prepared by a staff member of the Kohlberg charges which were accepted by the executive committee.

Now, there was no investigation, but only a member of the staff prepared an answer. Is that what happened?

Mr. CARTER. It is part of what happened. The Kohlberg charges came in, they were analyzed by a large number of members of the staff, in consultation with members of the board. They were then given to the members of the board with the complete text of the Kohlberg charges, the complete text of the proposed staff analysis that was made by the board's committee.

The board's committee took a great deal of time to read both documents and to study afresh a great many of the publications. The board finally accepted that as a voice of the board.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that the witness that testified that there was not—

I would say that there was an answer prepared by the staff members of the Kohlberg charges which was accepted by the executive committee—

is not a correct statement?

Mr. CARTER. I think it is a little thin.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is a little thin. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter, you have been on the stand now from this morning until nearly 1 o'clock, and now it is 20 minutes after 4. We are going to ask you to be here tomorrow.

You have been a ready witness, and the committee is grateful for the information you have given us.

Tomorrow, we will have before this committee Mr. Field. We have been advised by the district attorney of New York that Mr. Field will be here tomorrow at 10:30.

The district attorney of New York has put off the hearings that he was to conduct so that Mr. Field might be here.

We will ask you, also, please, to be present at 2:30 tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. CARTER. Will both of those be public or executive hearings?

The CHAIRMAN. They will both be public.

Mr. CROSSMAN. May I ask you if you will want Mr. Carter to testify further? I gathered you did, but I was not quite sure.

The CHAIRMAN. I told him we wanted him for a few questions at 2:30. Just how long it will take, I am not certain.

The committee will stand at recess until tomorrow at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:24 p. m., Wednesday, July 25, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10:30 a. m., Thursday, July 26, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, JULY 26, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Conor, Smith, Wiley, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator McCarthy.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Ladies and gentlemen and members of the press, the room is a bit congested. We are sorry we have not more accommodations. Will you kindly aid us in keeping as quiet as you can because even a low voice when audible seems to be distracting. So, if possible, please refrain from speaking at least above a whisper and try to keep your whispers down so that we may proceed.

We will swear the witness. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FIELD. I do.

TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK V. FIELD, NEW YORK CITY; ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR RABINOWITZ, ATTORNEY AT LAW, NEW YORK CITY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Field, when you appeared before his committee in executive session you refused to answer many questions on the ground that to do so might incriminate you. In no case, when you made such a claim, did the committee require or compel you to answer the question.

I think you should know that the committee has carefully examined and studied the record of the executive hearings with a view to determining, so far as possible on the basis of information available to the committee, what your rights may have been with regard to the questions which you refused to answer.

Today, the committee does not intend to adopt a harsh attitude toward you. Where you deem it necessary to claim your privilege

against self-incrimination, in good faith, the committee will not seek to compel you to answer unless, first, the committee believes your privilege does not apply to that particular question and, second, the information sought to be elicited through your answer is of particular importance to the committee.

It may be that in no instance, where you claim your privilege, will the committee demand that you answer. But I wish to caution you that if and when such a demand is made, it will be a demand backed by the committee's studied judgment that the committee does have a right to compel your answer. You should have that information so that you may guide yourself accordingly.

I think it might be well if the record at this point contained a brief discussion of the privilege of a witness to decline to give evidence incriminating himself. Let me say, Mr. Field, that in this connection I am not attempting specifically to give you legal advice. I am stating certain tenets of the law as I understand it, for the guidance of any witness before this committee who may benefit thereby.

The privilege of a witness to decline to give evidence incriminating himself is not confined to the right to refuse to answer a direct question as to the commission of a crime, but includes the right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by the witness, or would be the source from which evidence of his commission of a crime might be obtained.

Whether an answer to a question would tend to incriminate the witness depends on whether, if he gave a true and responsive answer to the question asked, that answer would form part of a chain of evidence which might tend to convict him.

In the case of a series of questions, the true and responsive answers to all of which would establish the criminality of the witness, an examiner may not pick out a particular question from the series and say that if that particular question shall be asked, the answer will not incriminate the witness. If the question is one link in a chain having a tendency to incriminate the witness, he is not compelled to answer.

Where, from the evidence and the nature of the question, it can be definitely determined that the question, if answered in a particular way, will form a link in the chain of evidence to establish the commission of a crime by the witness, then we may not inquire whether the witness claimed his privilege in good faith or otherwise. It is only where the incriminating effect of the question is doubtful that the witnesses' motive may be considered; for in such case his bad faith would tend to show that his answer would not subject him to any danger.

But the good faith of a refusal to answer questions because the witness fears the answers would tend to incriminate him may properly be inquired into.

Where it is not manifest, so as to preclude all reasonable doubt, that the answer called for cannot incriminate the witness, the privilege must be protected. But the privilege against self-incrimination is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law. Furthermore, in determining whether the answer to a particular question will incriminate the wit-

ness, previous testimony by the witness may properly be taken into consideration. A matter which the witness has already admitted, though it might, being admitted for the first time, have a tendency to incriminate the witness, is not privileged when the witness is asked to make the disclosure for a second or subsequent time.

At witness before a congressional committee always may exercise his privilege of refusing to answer questions, and submit to a court the correctness of his judgment in doing so; but in the event that he is mistaken as to the law it is no defense, for he is bound rightly to construe the statute.

I think that is all I have to say on the subject, excepting one other matter, if I may.

Mr. Field, I think those of us who come from the West are especially appreciative of the wonderful name that has been made in the history of America by your family. It is a regrettable thing to me, and to many others, that for some reason or other, best known to yourself, you seem to have perhaps for the time being forgotten the great achievements that were worked out by your ancestors and forebears. Your country is today at the cross-roads of its existence. Never was it challenged by a more dangerous enemy, both at home and abroad. It behooves every American, every man who has the red blood of America in his veins to come to the aid of his country now with everything he knows that will protect this country from its most dangerous enemies. The history of your fine family, the history of your forbears indicates to me, and I hope I will be pardoned for my expression, that we must have a certain high degree of sorrow at the attitude which seems to be assumed by you which I think, hope, and pray is only a momentary attitude and that you may aid the Congress of the United States and the courts and the people of this country in their most trying hour by giving to us frankly and fairly everything that you know. I hope that may be your attitude and I assure you this committee is your friend. They want to get the information. They want to put you with your family in the fine history of your forebears indicates to me, and I hope I will be pardoned which it is intended.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter.

Mr. FIELD. Frederick V. Field, 16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. FIELD. My present occupation is a prisoner.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you are a prisoner?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Before you became a prisoner what was your occupation?

Mr. FIELD. I identified myself as a writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is your present wife?

Mr. FIELD. My present wife is Anita Boyer Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was her former husband?

Mr. FIELD. Her former husband is Raymond Boyer.

Mr. MORRIS. What is he doing now?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know what he is doing now.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he recently serve a prison sentence?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On what charges?

Mr. FIELD. I don't remember the technical charges. It had something to do with information regarding explosives as I remember. I am not familiar with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did it have to do with espionage? Was he a Canadian involved in espionage trials?

Mr. FIELD. I don't really know. I don't know about that case.

The CHAIRMAN. State what you do know.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent can you tell us about the sentence which Mr. Boyer served in Canada?

Mr. FIELD. I can tell you almost nothing whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. You know it involved espionage?

Mr. FIELD. I believe so. The reason I hesitate is only the legal technicalities in identifying the charges.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your understanding?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I am frankly not familiar.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of your first wife?

Mr. FIELDS. Elizabeth Brown.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she active in IPR?

Mr. FIELD. She was associated with the staff of an organization that was housed in the same group of rooms—offices of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. What organization was that?

Mr. FIELD. An organization called the Inquiry. I am just trying to remember whether she also actually became a staff member of the IPR. There was a rather close relationship at that time.

I think it would be correct to say "Yes"; she has been associated with at least one of the conferences—one of those international conferences where she probably served as a staff secretary, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is she presently married to?

Mr. FIELD. Joseph Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active in IPR?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; he was.

The CHAIRMAN. When you used the letters "IPR" in the first instance I respectfully suggest you spell it out as to what it is.

Mr. MORRIS. In reference to IPR, you meant the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. May I also say, in connection with Mr. Barnes, I would have been referring to the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the name of your second wife?

Mr. FIELD. Edith Chamberlin.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she active in IPR?

Mr. FIELD. Only in this sense: She went to one of the IPR conferences—one of the international conferences as secretary to her uncle, Prof. Joseph Chamberlin, of Columbia. He recently died.

Perhaps at another conference she was a staff secretary. She was not a staff member—only served at a couple of conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you presently serving a jail sentence?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I am.

Mr. MORRIS. For what?

Mr. FIELD. Well, it is for the matter contained in the last sentence of Senator McCarran's memorandum that apparently according to the

courts at present I have misinterpreted the use of the privilege; that is, against self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you recently posted bond for Communists?

Mr. FIELD. I think under the circumstances I must ask leave to employ the privilege of refusing to answer that question. I do so on the grounds that the answer might be self-incriminating under the circumstances. I hope the privilege is available to me in this instance under the fifth amendment.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you recently posted bail for anyone?

Mr. FIELD. In my opinion, Mr. Morris, I speak with hesitancy here on this point because of what the chairman has said and because of my own recent experience; but in my opinion that is a question which tends or does lead me into an area, into perhaps a chain of questions which I do believe might be self-incriminating. It is a question which in itself is awfully hard to decide. I feel that because of my present circumstances I must also decline to answer that on the grounds that the answer might be self-incriminating.

Mr. Chairman, may I, on some of these questions that may be puzzling to me, consult my counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may consult with him in confidence, not aloud, if you please.

I stated yesterday, Mr. Counsel, that the propounding of questions would not be permitted. We will not deprive the witness of the right of his counsel by his side so long as it does not interfere with the proceeding.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, will you relate to the committee your associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I will.

Do you wish me to repeat what I gave in executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right; it was very well done in that session.

Mr. FIELD. You wish me to give a full and lengthy answer?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, a full expression of your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. FIELD. The association began in 1928 when I was invited by Mr. Carter to become secretary to a committee in this country which was raising money for a well-known Chinese educator, Dr. Y. C. James Yen, who headed up a movement in China against illiteracy.

I accepted the job and spent perhaps 8 or 10 months, something like that, traveling throughout this country with Dr. Yen raising funds for this purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. This was in 1928?

Mr. FIELD. This would be 1928, probably lapping over into '29. I forget how the months fell at the time. It surely fell over into '29.

This was not directly an Institute of Pacific Relations project, but Dr. Yen was given the hospitality of the institute offices in New York. Mr. Carter was a member of chairmen of the American committee aiding him. There was an obvious link between work and personnel in that effort and the institute. I think almost perhaps imperceptibly at the end of that period of work on behalf of Dr. Yen, I found myself a staff member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I became—I think my first title was assistant secretary, but as I explained to the committee in executive session, there were then only

two people in the office. So the assistant secretary was the bottom man. Mr. Carter was then secretary.

I retained this association as a staff member of the American Council with one or two interludes I will refer to, until the fall of 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you have the title of research secretary?

Mr. FIELD. That is one of the interludes I wish to point to.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become national secretary?

Mr. FIELD. I am not sure about the exact dates, but in the early thirties there was a period of 8 or 10 months—I think it was under a year—when Mr. Holland, who had been research secretary of the international organization, the international part of the institute, was on leave of absence. I forget for what purpose, whether it was to take a degree, to write a book, or something of the sort. I pinch-hit for him for that period. I believe it was at that time that I established my quarters in Honolulu and served——

Mr. MORRIS. That is for a period of about 8 months?

Mr. FIELD. Eight or ten months, something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. In approximately what year was that?

Mr. FIELD. Approximately '32 or '33. I am not positive about that. It was the early thirties. I then reverted back to the staff of the American Council of the IPR. I became secretary of the American branch. I haven't got any records with me.

Mr. MORRIS. Does the date 1934 seem right to you?

Mr. FIELD. I think that is early. I would say probably '35. I think you probably have the records. I would agree with anything that is available to you on that subject.

Mr. MORRIS. You were national secretary for how long?

Mr. FIELD. About 5 or 6 years.

Mr. MORRIS. You terminated approximately in 1940?

Mr. FIELD. In the fall of 1940 I resigned as secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you remain on as a member of executive board of trustees?

Mr. FIELD. I remained both as a trustee and as a member of the executive committee board. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain as a member of the executive committee of the board?

Mr. FIELD. The record will show that. I certainly would agree with it. I think until the summer of 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it be 1948?

Mr. FIELD. I think it is very probably correct.

Mr. MORRIS. You still are a member of the Institute of Public Relations?

Mr. FIELD. I am simply a dues-paying member at $10 or $15 a year, whatever it is.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been that since 1948?

Mr. FIELD. I have continued that. May I say in that connection that as I am sure you are aware, the privilege of membership is to obtain certain publications. It is almost synonymous with being a subscriber to the publication the Far Eastern Survey and a few other things.

Mr. MORRIS. We had a witness yesterday who testified that you contributed approximately $60,000 to the institute during the years that you were associated with it. Does that seem like a reasonable figure?

Mr. FIELD. As I said to you in executive session, Mr. Morris, I am perfectly willing if it were possible for me to check any records and verify anything.

Mr. MORRIS. You said you were going to do that.

Mr. FIELD. I have not been able to since I saw you. I have not been able to check them. I don't know who testified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter testified yesterday that the total of your contribution to the institute through the years that you were associated with it approximated $60,000.

Mr. FIELD. I am perfectly willing to accept that. I really have very little idea myself. That would be over a period of what, perhaps 15 years?

Mr. MORRIS. That is approximately correct.

Mr. Field, he also testified that for a certain period of time you made up the deficit of the institute. Does that square with your recollection?

Mr. FIELD. You asked me that before. I am still a little unclear what you mean. You mean on December 31, plugging the gap?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. I am using the language that appeared in the files of the institute; namely, that the records did seem to show you made up the deficits for a period of time. Mr. Carter conceded that that was the case.

Mr. FIELD. I have no argument about that. Of course I made contributions. It is just the exact meaning of making up the deficit that puzzles me a bit.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall, Mr. Field, that the problem was ever put to you: "We are here with a deficit, will you make up this deficit?"

Mr. FIELD. On the contrary, that is the kind of situation I can't recall vividly because it is exactly what you say to anyone. That is, anyone you go to to raise money for an organization. I went out myself to raise money for the institute and I would put it that way. We have got a deficit.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it put to you that way.

Mr. FIELD. Certainly it was. I was one of the contributors. I assume it was.

Senator EASTLAND. You made up the deficit?

Mr. FIELD. I certainly made contributions toward the deficit each year.

Mr. MORRIS. You also wrote for IPR publications?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe in general what your writings in the Institute of Pacific Relations publications have been?

Mr. FIELD. I wrote two books which were published under the auspices of the institute. The first was published by the University of Chicago Press I think in 1931. It was called American Participation in the China Consortiums. You don't want me to describe it?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Mr. FIELD. The second book was one which I edited called Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area, fairly large parts of which I wrote myself. That was published about 1934 by Doubleday Doran.

I wrote a number of articles for the Far Eastern Survey, which is the American council's fortnightly publication and for its predecessor, which was a more informal kind of publication.

First we put it out in mimeographed form. I think it was called IPR Memorandum. I am not certain about that. The articles in the survey, as I recall, all appear under authors' names. I believe those in the memorandum were put forth as a staff job.

I wrote certain articles for Pacific Affairs and——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe approximately how many you wrote?

Mr. FIELD. I was also going to add I did several book reviews for them.

I just from memory couldn't. I am sure you agree with any record you have of that. Not very many, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write pamphlets issued by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. I remember Mr. Barnes and I coauthored——

Mr. MORRIS. That is Joseph Barnes?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct. Coauthored two, I think, that I can recall. There may be more.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, could you tell us whether you registered as a foreign agent with the Department of Justice for the Chinese Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Hong Kong on September 19, 1950?

Mr. FIELD. I did so register. The date I will accept from you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, did you register as an agent for the directorate general of the Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Peking on September 19, 1950, again with the Department of Justice?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. It is my impression they are both one in principle.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you register as a foreign agent for the Bank of China in Peking on September 19, 1950?

Mr. FIELD. Again as to the date I am not certain, but as to the fact, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, did you register as a foreign agent for the China National Aviation Corp. of Peking with the Department of Justice on September 19, 1950?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it not true that these four foreign principals were controlled by the Chinese Communist Government?

Mr. FIELD. No; I would not accept that. As a matter of fact, the issue that was fought, and successively fought in court in the first case related to the Bank of China established that there was sufficient independence and autonomy of the Bank of China as apart from the Chinese Government to warrant the funds being frozen. There is an appeal being argued, I believe, at this very moment on this case.

Mr. MORRIS. I am about to show you exhibit C of your registration statement. I call your attention to paragraph (d) which reads:

My information is to the effect—

This is now about the Bank of China—

that two-thirds of the stock is owned by the Peoples Republic of China; that the owner of these shares exercises the usual prerogatives consistent with such ownership.

I ask you if that is not your statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That instrument you have just shown the witness is signed by the witness?

Mr. MORRIS. It is exhibit C of his registration statement, Senator, which is signed.

At this point I will introduce the whole registration statement which bears the signature of Frederick V. Field, and ask him to authenticate his signature.

Mr. FIELD. You want me to reply to that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. That is perfectly true, I am afraid I can't adequately describe to you the argument in the court which resulted favorably——

Mr. MORRIS. At the time you registered, it was your understanding——

Mr. FIELD. It is more complicated than that, because a registration filed does not reveal more information than is called for.

As I recall, one of the important things in the trial itself was the fact that the majority of the board of directors of the Bank of China were not Government appointees. In any case, whatever the evidence was, the judges in San Francisco decided in favor of the autonomy.

Mr. MORRIS. We don't care to go into the particular legal controversy involved, but it was your understanding at the time that you registered, according to your own words—I am quoting them again:

My information is to the effect that two-thirds of the stock is owned by the Peoples Republic of China.

That is your own statement.

Mr. FIELD. I am not denying the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an answer.

What about these other documents?

Mr. MORRIS. I have not finished them.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to identify them.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer the photostat of the statement, Mr. Field——

The CHAIRMAN. As to your signature.

Mr. FIELD. That is my signature.

Mr. MORRIS. You also acknowledge these exhibit C's are part of that registration statement?

Mr. FIELD. I think they are. I am willing to accept that.

Mr. MORRIS. I am reading from exhibit C of the registration statement on the China National Aviation Corp., again subdivision (d):

According to my information the Peoples Republic of China—

And that is the name of the Communist Chinese Government; is it not?

Mr. FIELD. The present Chinese Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Chinese Communist government.

Mr. FIELD. Chinese Communist government.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not recognized by the United States or the United Nations as the Government of China.

The CHAIRMAN. Listen to the questions because there is a little confusion there, I think. Please clear that up.

Counsel asked you, "And that is the present Chinese Communist government?"

You said "The present government."

Mr. FIELD. I wanted to make a distinction there, Mr. Chairman, but I don't want to labor the point.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the Communist Government of China at the present time; is that correct?

Mr. FIELD. My own opinion is that it is a coalition government in which Communists participate.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

According to my information the Peoples Republic of China owns 80 percent of the stock of the corporation and exercises the usual prerogatives consistent with such ownership.

Mr. FIELD. That is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, it was your understanding at the time you registered.

Mr. FIELD. You are now referring to the Chinese National Aviation Corp.?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. I see.

Mr. MORRIS. So it was your understanding they were controlled by the Chinese Communists?

Mr. FIELD. Certainly. Again may I just make that amendment in the same way I did before about the Chinese Peoples Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us the circumstances leading up to your registration as an agent for these four foreign principals?

Mr. FIELD. I think I covered this before, did I not?

Mr. MORRIS. You did. I would like you to bring in that portion which shows your association with Dr. Chi.

Mr. FIELD. I will bring that in immediately if you wish. Dr. Chi is the—I am not certain of his title, the document would show it—assistant general manager, is he not, of the Bank of China?

Mr. MORRIS. On your exhibit C on the Bank of China you referred to Chao-ting Chi as the assistant general manager of the Bank of China?

Mr. FIELD. He had formerly been a student in New York City. He took his doctorate degree at Columbia in the late thirties. I am not going to say this with absolute certainty as to dates and the position, but he was associated with the international organization of the IPR for some period of time as a research person.

Mr. MORRIS. You met him as such with the institute?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct. I met him in connection with the preparation of his doctorate thesis through whoever it was he was working with at Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was working on the Inquiry series?

Mr. FIELD. I believe he wrote one of the books in connection with it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that you recall he wrote one of the books in the inquiry series?

Mr. FIELD. It is my recollection that he did, but I am not going to—I may be incorrect here.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the relationship?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. You asked me to bring out that relationship and I have.

Presumably it was through this connection I had with Dr. Chi and I had lost track of him for a number of years and was surprised when he emerged in this particular position.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you first hear from Dr. Chi?

Mr. FIELD. By cable.

Mr. MORRIS. He cabled you?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he ask you to do?

Mr. FIELD. He asked me—I think the cable is probably—I am not sure whether it was submitted here or not, but the gist of it was he asked me if I would accept being attorney in fact for the Bank of China in this country in specific connection with a suit which had been brought by Wells-Fargo Bank in California against another bank with respect to determining correct ownership of funds which would then be claimed by another group of Bank of China representatives, H. H. Kung and others. The bank itself brought the dispute to court, the Wells-Fargo Bank where these funds were deposited, in order to have the court determine the true owner.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of that?

Mr. FIELD. It was some time before the registration. It must have been several months before because I think the case was first argued in the spring of 1950, something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you know anything about the nature of the China National Aviation Corp.?

Mr. FIELD. This followed—I forget the date—after the Bank of China.

Mr. MORRIS. The registration was dated September 19.

Mr. FIELD. All the registrations had the same date. There was a prolonged period of time with respect to the question of registration.

Mr. MORRIS. Before you received that cable from Dr. Chi, had anyone broached the subject with you, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. No one had broached it, not that I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Your first knowledge came at the time you received this cable from Dr. Chi?

Mr. FIELD. I believe so. I want to answer this accurately. I don't want to—What I am trying to recall is the possibility as to whether I had sent some communication or not. I cannot recall it. I don't know if the record shows it. If I did——

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last communicate with Dr. Chi prior to that time?

Mr. FIELD. I had been out of touch for, well, a good many years.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would concentrate on that point because it is important.

Will you try to recall what steps you took prior to your receiving the cable from Dr. Chi bearing on this whole question of registration?

Mr. FIELD. I had not—I do not recall having seen Dr. Chi. I really find it impossible to tell you a date. Let me put it this way and perhaps we can work it out: I know he came to this country at least once, and perhaps twice, and I did not see him.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that, approximately?

Mr. FIELD. I worked out these dates. They will appear—I am afraid I can't give this from memory, but I can tell you where the information is available.

In filing the original papers with the court in San Francisco it was necessary to establish this relationship between Dr. Chi and myself. I can't remember why, but I was called upon to do it. I then did work out the chronology. Those papers are public records of the court. I cannot right now do it in justice to myself from memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Give us your best recollection.

Mr. FIELD. I don't remember—my best recollection—please don't hold me to this because it is only a recollection—would be the—I was going to say the late thirties, but I am trying to think.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't see him at San Francisco at the UN conference?

Mr. FIELD. He wasn't there; to my knowledge he wasn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you there?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, sir; I was there.

What I am trying to do is to work back in terms of the international conferences of the IPR to think whether or not he attended them.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you roughly, within 2 or 3 years, give us the date?

Mr. FIELD. I would say—I can't at the moment think of any time after 1940 having seen him. I must say I may be mistaken.

Mr. MORRIS. Who sent the cable to you preliminary to your registering as an agent for China National Aviation Corp.?

Mr. FIELD. I think the cable is here. I will stand by it. It was either the president or general manager of the CNAC and I believe from Hong Kong. I think you have got it. Because it was submitted.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your relation to that particular man?

Mr. FIELD. I had none. I had never known and didn't know his name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you presume he was acting on the suggestion of Dr. Chi?

Mr. FIELD. The cable apparently said so. As I recall, it did. Isn't it in these documents? Have you got those, Senator? Those may be the termination cables. Are they?

In any case, I am quite sure all the cables are on file.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the role of Mr. Martin Popper in this transaction?

Mr. FIELD. I asked him—I had appointed attorney in fact. I asked Mr. Popper to become attorney at law.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Popper is associated with the American-China Export Co.?

Mr. FIELD. May I speak to my counsel on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Morris, again I think this is a question drawing me into an area which I feel might be self-incriminating. I would respectfully decline to answer on that ground and I would also invoke my privilege under the fifth amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the question, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Read the question back, please.

(The following question was read by the reporter:)

Mr. Popper is associated with the American-China Export Co.?

The CHAIRMAN. To that you refused to answer, invoking your privilege?

Mr. FIELD. I would like to invoke the privilege on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You must do it or not do it.

Mr. FIELD. I have done so.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you resign as agent for the aforesaid foreign principals?

Mr. FIELD. The cancellation of the agency was effective some date in January of this year.

Mr. MORRIS. 1951?

Mr. FIELD. Some date in January of this year, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you resign as agent for those foreign principals?

Mr. FIELD. I resigned—I remember I began the negotiation toward resignation perhaps the end of November, early November of 1950. I resigned on the ground that the changes in the international situation made it undesirable and impossible to continue these agencies or made it impossible for me certainly to continue playing the role as I had up to that period.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you effectively were blocked from carrying out the function which you thought you were going to carry out?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; and I was also unwilling to continue for personal reasons. I didn't wish to continue as agent at that period.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not because you disagreed with the policy of the Chinese Government in waging war against the American troops in Korea?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Morris, I have answered this chain up to this question, and at this point I would like to invoke the privilege and decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Field, I hope you are keeping in mind the expressions that the chairman made. I hope you are keeping in mind everything that pertains to these hearings and to the value that may be placed upon your testimony.

Again I bring to your attention the country that is your country that needs the help of every red-blooded American today and if you have information that would be of assistance to your country in her trying hours, the chairman can only say to you that it behooves every American to come forward because of the blood of Americans is spilled all over Asia today, and it behooves us to try to see that our country is protected internally.

Senator O'CONOR. There is a question there that I would like to ask.

Mr. Field, what specific development caused you to set into motion the cancellation or withdrawal from that representation?

Mr. FIELD. The events which took place in the latter part of last fall, Senator, which were the new situation in the Korea, the developing policies in this country, the embargo, the freezing of funds, and other measures being undertaken in China in retaliation.

My own personal situation in which I did not wish to continue in the light of such developments also. It was something I did not wish to do, as I stated before.

These things led me to initiate the cancellation of the four agencies.

Senator O'CONOR. Was the intervention of the Chinese Communists in the Korean conflict a major consideration?

Mr. FIELD. Well, I have just described it as certainly a factor which was part of the complex events which took place at that time.

Senator O'CONOR. I was taking it up from the standpoint of the timing.

Mr. FIELD. It was the direct relation.

Senator O'CONOR. In other words, it was quite in point of time related to that?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Are there any other specific developments which led up to your decision to withdraw your associations, any other major ones?

Mr. FIELD. I think the ones I have mentioned are sort of general. I can't think of any further way to express it.

Senator O'CONOR. You have mentioned the embargo which went on during the early days of December, about December 9, if my memory serves me correctly. That had a decided bearing upon your decision?

Mr. FIELD. In the case of the agencies, to be on the practical side, the freezing of funds of course was decisive.

Senator O'CONOR. That is the third thing I wanted to ask you.

Mr. FIELD. That was decisive. The embargo did not affect it.

Senator O'CONOR. These two things were interrelated?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. They occurred at or about the same day or week?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. I was going to ask you whether the freezing of the funds did have a very definite bearing on your decision.

Mr. FIELD. Yes; and I think I mentioned that in my original testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. As the result of that action by the United States Government it was virtually impossible for you to carry on the representation as it had been carried on by you previously?

Mr. FIELD. I said it was both impracticable and impossible in that period. I said also it was undesirable from my point of view to continue in that capacity.

Senator O'CONOR. The point I was directing attention to was whether or not the developments by others than yourself and including the United States Government forced your decision, or whether it was by reason of a change of attitude upon your part as to your willingness to be the accredited representative of these four institutions.

Mr. FIELD. Senator, I could put it this way: That inevitably changes in international relations such as I think did take place last fall impinge on any individual's point of view.

This certainly did have an effect on me. I tried to give some expression to it now in replying to your question.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Field, I have before me a booklet which is captioned "China's Greatest Crisis," by Frederick V. Field. You are familiar with it since you are the author of it, is that not true?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, with respect to that question I may say that I would like to invoke the privilege on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. At the outset I was merely intending to identify the Frederick V. Field as to whether or not that was you or another person, to your knowledge.

Mr. FIELD. I think I must invoke the privilege on that question.

The CHAIRMAN. You deny you were the author of it?

Mr. FIELD. I invoke the privilege. I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'Conor. I read two passages on the back page of the publication for the specific purpose of having you tell us, if you will, whether or not in your withdrawal of representation you departed from these views, or were adhering to them still. The first is a quotation from Earl Browder which is imprinted on the back page of the booklet just over your name. That is your name at the bottom of the second of the two pages. I will hand it to you when I have read it.

The text is as follows:

China's new democracy by Mao Tse-tung, outstanding spokesman for the Chinese Communist, is a work of historical importance, one of the essential documents for evaluating the current Chinese crisis proclaiming the Chinese Communist long-time program and perspective for the liberation and development of that great nation.

That is signed "Earl Browder."

I ask you whether or not you caused that to be imprinted on the back of this booklet?

Mr. Field. Senator, I did mean to suggest that if I may I feel I must use the privilege on that whole chain of questions with reference to this document. I do so in this connection and decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'Conor. Then the one which I read and the name Frederick V. Field is attached to the bottom, is as follows:

China's new democracy reaches the English-speaking public just as the Chinese Nation faces the sharpest test of its history. If we thoroughly comprehend the lessons which Mao Tse-tung here teaches, our efforts to support those policies which will result in a regeneration of China will be immeasurably strengthened.

That is signed "Frederick V. Field."

It is published by New Century, January 1945. You will notice that at the bottom.

Mr. Field. If I may, I would like to refuse to answer on the ground that the reply might tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Field, is there anything concerning this publication which you would tell us about, anything which you feel you can elaborate upon without incriminating yourself?

Mr. Field. Senator, my understanding of my use of the privilege, and I do believe it is the understanding I derived from the chairman's introductory remarks, is that this is an area of questioning or chain of questioning which might incriminate me, and therefore, I am entitled to invoke the fifth amendment and decline to answer.

The Chairman. I understand that you invoke the privilege?

Mr. Field. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. On the ground that it might tend to incriminate you; is that right?

Mr. Field. Yes.

Senator O'Conor. Without giving support to the views expressed herein or without reaffirming them or in any sense taking any responsibility for the views, will you tell us whether or not this booklet was in fact published and distributed? I am not asking you for any connection you may have had with it other than just the fact of whether or not this booklet was in fact distributed. That is without asking you for a reaffirmation of the views or anything else relating to it, just as to the mere fact.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Does he know whether or not it was printed?

Mr. FIELD. You have shown me a document. It has clearly been published and exists. I must acknowledge that.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you seen it before?

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen it before?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Chairman, I must respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. The negative answer when you started to answer, you do not mean to say you did not see it before?

Mr. FIELD. No; I meant I must decline to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you find this article is such that it could be incriminating? Is it of such a nature?

Senator O'CONOR. That, Senator Ferguson, is a matter of opinion. There is contained in the publication a series of statements in respect to the present Chinese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is possible the writer could be indicted and convicted for writing it?

Senator O'CONOR. I have an opinion of my own on that and I do think so.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask that; otherwise I don't see how a claim could be made on the refusal to answer, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. I do not think the witness would have the right to refuse to testify concerning certain facts of it. That is why I distinguished between the reaffirmance of the views expressed in it.

Just one last question: Is there nothing further that you care to say?

Mr. FIELD. I don't think so.

Senator EASTLAND. What were your duties as attorney in fact for the Bank of China?

Mr. FIELD. I would say my primary function had been to secure an attorney at law and to keep in touch with his work.

Senator EASTLAND. Attorney at law for what purpose?

Mr. FIELD. To carry out the interest of the principals.

Mr. EASTLAND. What were those interests?

Mr. FIELD. They were primarily—I say "primarily"; I think they were exclusively the question of the funds deposited in a large number of banks in this country under the name of these three corporations.

Senator EASTLAND. How much money was involved?

Mr. FIELD. I am afraid I couldn't answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Approximately.

Mr. FIELD. Let me think just a moment. A great deal of money was and still is hidden. The Wells-Fargo case involved—well, I hate to use a figure and have it turn out entirely inaccurate.

Senator EASTLAND. What is your best judgment?

Mr. FIELD. Several million dollars involved, not in the Wells-Fargo case. I will say there were $600,000 in that case.

Senator EASTLAND. All of several million dollars involved?

Mr. FIELD. In the Bank of China's deposits in various banks in this country. In connection with the Chinese National Aviation Corporation——

Senator EASTLAND. Do you mean to testify that you received a cablegram out of the clear sky from a man, Dr. Chi, whom you hadn't seen since approximately 1940, that you had lost track of—received

a cablegram appointing you attorney in fact for the Bank of China and when he didn't know whether you would accept it or not?

Mr. FIELD. No; because there is more to be said on that and I have said something about it before, but not drawing its full implications.

The Wells-Fargo Bank of San Francisco itself started this whole procedure in court. It invited—it refused to honor a withdrawal, I believe, signed by H. H. Kung, but it might have been one of the old officials of the Bank of China—it refused to honor a withdrawal. It took it to a court and determined the true ownership. In the course of the litigation the Wells-Fargo Bank sent the papers and documents over to China to get their side of the story and it was in that way that the new Bank of China——

Senator EASTLAND. It was your duty to arrange to represent the legal interests of the Bank of China in litigation involving several million dollars. That is true, is it not?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it your testimony—and I want you to answer "yes" or "no"—that you received a cablegram from Dr. Chi, a man you had not seen since approximately 1940, that appointed you attorney in fact?

Mr. FIELD. Inviting me.

Senator EASTLAND. To represent that bank.

Well, he named you agent in fact to represent that bank?

Mr. FIELD. No.

Senator EASTLAND. When no one had previously contacted you but to see if you would act, or whether or not you would accept? Is that true?

Mr. FIELD. No, Senator. I think the way you put it does not give quite the correct impression. The first cable asked me whether I would accept. Upon my cabled reply I would, then came a cable of more definitive nature.

Senator EASTLAND. Who first contacted you? Who in this country discussed the matter with you before you received a cablegram?

Mr. FIELD. No one. I did also testify earlier in this session that I am not sure whether it was in this case or in another that I had sent a cable or a letter, some kind of communication to China, with respect to the situation of these funds. I can't identify this and I don't know whether it is available in the record. Presumably it is.

Senator EASTLAND. Did any official of the Communist Party of the United States discuss this matter with you before you received Dr. Chi's——

Mr. FIELD. No; they didn't. I do want, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just to finish that one link I was trying to point out, that the Wells-Fargo Bank started this; that the whole matter was called to the attention of the people in China by the Wells-Fargo Bank. It was through that that it finally came back.

Senator EASTLAND. Here is a cablegram:

We hereby appoint you attorney in fact in connection with * * *.

The CHAIRMAN. Signed by whom?

Senator EASTLAND. The Director General of Posts, Su Yu Nung.

Mr. FIELD. That is a different principal.

Senator EASTLAND (reading):

We hereby revoke all previous powers of attorney and appoint you as attorney in fact representing our interests in the lawsuit of the Bank of China, New York, against the Wells-Fargo.

Signed, "Chi Chao-ting." That is the cablegram in question; is it not?

Mr. FIELD. That would be the cablegram following the previous exchange which would not have been filed because all that the Bureau requires is the instrument effecting the formal appointment of the agency.

There would have been cables prior to any one of those, preparatory, introductory cables, leading up to the ones here submitted.

Senator EASTLAND. Where are those cables?

Mr. FIELD. I have them.

Senator EASTLAND. With you?

Mr. FIELD. No.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you make those cables available to the committee?

Mr. RABINOWITZ. If I may——

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute.

Mr. FIELD. If I may consult my counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, but he is not going to answer for you.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. I did not intend to answer. I wanted to refer to a perfectly obvious fact that the witness does not at the moment have access, physical access, to his records.

The CHAIRMAN. He will have to answer that for himself, please.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. I wasn't trying to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Propound your question, please.

Mr. FIELD. I have no objections. I have a practical problem.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the record cleared up as to the cablegrams read by Senator Eastland. They should be marked as an exhibit in this case, or some identifying mark put on them.

Senator EASTLAND. I thought they had already been put in.

The CHAIRMAN. We had just connected them up.

Senator EASTLAND. I thought they were in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you therefore testify you will make available to this committee all pertinent correspondence, telegrams, and everything else relating thereto in connection with that registration?

Mr. FIELD. I thought the question was to complete the file of cables prior to these—this I agreed to do. I am in no position to fulfil this now.

Mr. MORRIS. As soon as you are in a position?

Mr. FIELD. I will do so as soon as I am.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer in evidence the registration, No. 640, with exhibit C in connection with the foreign principals—the China National Aviation, the Bank of China, the Directorate General of the Postal Remittances and Savings Banks.

Mr. FIELD. The Chinese National Aviation Corp.

Mr. MORRIS. And the Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Peking. There are four registrations with exhibit C's in four cases.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be admitted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 9" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 9

[Radiogram]

MARCH 23, 1940.

FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Care Amchipo, New York:

We hereby appoint you attorney in fact in connection Chase Bank lawsuit.

SU YU NUNG,
Director General of Posts.

(Exhibit B, registration No. 640.)

[Radiogram]

PEKING, *December 24.*

FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Care AMCHIPO, New York:

We hereby revoke all previous powers attorney and appoint you as attorney in fact representing our interest in lawsuit Bank of China, New York, against Wells Fargo.

KUNG YIN-PIN.
CHI CHAO-TING.
CHAN WU.

Head office, Bank of China.
(Exhibit B, registration No. 640.)

[Radiogram]

PEKING, *February 16.*

FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Care AMCHIPO, New York:

Replying yours third, we hereby appoint you attorney in fact representing all Bank of China interests in United States.

KUNG YIN-PIN,
General Manager.
CHI CHAO-TING,
CHAN WU,
Assistant General Managers.

Head office, Bank of China.
(Exhibit B, registration No. 640.)

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the CHINA NATIONAL AVIATION CORPORATION organized and existing under and by virtue of the Laws of China, having its principal place of business in Tientsin, China, pursuant to a resolution duly adopted by its Board of Directors and hereto annexed and forming a part hereof, has made, constituted and appointed and by these presents does make, constitute and appoint, Frederick V. Field, a citizen of the United States of America, residing at 23 West 26th Street, City of New York, United States of America, its true and lawful attorney to represent the China National Aviation Corporation in the United States of America and with board authority to manage and conduct the business, property and affairs of China National Aviation Corporation in the United States of America, and without limiting the generality of such powers, and by way of enumerating some of the powers which it is intended to repose in said Attorney, to do and perform the following in the United States of America:

1. To manage and control the funds and assets of China National Aviation Corporation, and without limiting this general power, to invest and reinvest the same, to purchase, arrange for the purchase of, or otherwise acquire, sell, arrange for the sale of, or otherwise dispose of, own, hold, exchange, transfer, deliver, pledge, or otherwise deal in and with bonds, stocks, bills of exchange, acceptances, notes, and other securities or property, including, but not limited to, all such securities and property, at any time held or controlled by any bank, Government or person, either as collateral, in custody, or otherwise; to receive

the delivery of any securities or other property, and if conditionally released by any bank, Government or person, to execute conditional or trust receipts therefor.

2. To accept for payment at a future date, drafts, bills of exchange and any other instruments for the payment of money, whether expressed in United States dollars or in any other currency, negotiable or non-negotiable, drawn upon the China National Aviation Corporation by its head office, branches, correspondents, customers, or others, and to issue letters of credit, including commercial letters of credit and travelers letters of credit, authorizing the holder thereof to draw drafts upon China National Aviation Corporation or its correspondents at sight, on time or otherwise in United States dollars or in any other currency.

3. To purchase, or otherwise, acquire, own, hold, sell, endorse, negotiate, assign, transfer, exchange, deliver or otherwise dispose of, make, draw, sign, issue, open, accept, pay, renew, guarantee, discount, collect, transmit, protest, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate, and otherwise deal in and with, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, acceptances, letters of credit, including commercial letters of credit and travelers letters of credit, checks, orders for the payment of money, stocks, bonds, securities, bills of lading or other shipping documents, insurance policies, warehouse receipts, trust receipts, and other instruments, negotiable or non-negotiable of every kind and description; to waive presentment, notice of nonpayment and protest of any and all negotiable or other instruments.

4. To open, maintain, adjust, settle and close any deposit account, foreign currency account, or other account in the United States of America, for the deposit or collection of funds belonging to China National Aviation Corporation, or to others with any bank, and to make any agreements or arrangements and to issue any instructions relative to such accounts; to designate one or more depositories for said accounts; to deposit such funds in said deposit accounts. All said funds shall be subject to withdrawal or charge at any time and from time to time, upon checks, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, acceptances, undertakings or other instruments or orders for the payment of money, when made, signed, drawn, accepted or endorsed by said Attorney or his substitute or substitutes. Each depository be and it hereby is authorized to pay cash, certify, give credit for, accept, or purchase the same, or make any such charge without limit as to amount, and without inquiry as to the circumstances of issue or the disposition of the proceeds, even if drawn, made or endorsed to said Attorney or his substitute or substitutes, or tendered in payment of his individual obligation or for his credit, or for deposit to his personal account. Any and all endorsements for or on account of China National Aviation Corporation upon such checks, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, acceptances, undertakings and other instruments or orders for the payment of money, tendered for deposit or collection to any said bank, may be by written or stamped endorsements of China National Aviation Corporation without any designation of the party making such endorsement.

5. To open, maintain, adjust, settle and close, custody, safekeeping, collection, or other accounts with any bank or person, in the United States of America; to deliver to, transfer to, and deposit with any such bank or person for custody and safekeeping, and to withdraw any securities or other property belonging to China National Aviation Corporation, its customers or others, and to execute any agreements or other instruments and instructions relative thereto or relative to any custody or safekeeping account or the securities and property therein; to have securities of China National Aviation Corporation, its customers or others, placed on registered in the name of the depository's nominee. The said Attorney may authorize each such bank or person to receive and hold in any such custody or safekeeping account as depository, and to sell or arrange for the sale of, or otherwise dispose of, checks, notes, drafts, bills of exchange, acceptances, or other instruments for the payment of money, negotiable or non-negotiable, stocks, bonds, coupons and other securities and funds not subject to check or other property, to collect all interest, dividends and other income which may become due and to credit the same to any account of China National Aviation Corporation, to execute on behalf of China National Aviation all necessary ownership certificates or other instruments that may be required under any income tax or other laws of regulations of any Government now or hereafter in effect.

6. To hire deposit boxes, safes or other space in any vault or any safe deposit company or bank in the United States of America, or in any warehouse or other premises, subject to the terms, conditions, rules and regulations of any such safe deposit company or bank, warehouse or owners of any other premises, and to execute any and all agreements and instruments required therefor.

7. To execute deeds, conveyances, mortgages, bills of sale, conditional bills of sale, assignments, transfers or other instruments of assignment or transfer.

8. To the extent permitted by law, to accept, receive, maintain and manage deposit account, savings accounts, safekeeping or custody accounts, or other accounts, from any bank, person or Government.

9. To receive personal property, both tangible or intangible, of every kind and description for safekeeping or management, and to lease to customers for hire, safe deposit boxes, receptacles or other space for the safekeeping of such personal property.

10. To receive goods, wares and merchandise, which may be shipped to or consigned to China National Aviation Corporation by or for the account of customers or others or for its own account, or in which China National Aviation Corporation may be interested, and to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or deal with the same, or any part thereof; to transport, store or warehouse the same or any part thereof in the name of China National Aviation Corporation or otherwise. To do and perform any act or thing necessary or proper, in order to obtain clearance through customs of goods, wares and merchandise or other property, for the account of China National Aviation Corporation or its custmers or others including but not limited to the following: to make customs entries; to pay customs duties; to challenge and contest any duty or tax; to make delivery or other disposition of such property, to obtain proper dutiable valuation and proper tariff classification for any such property; to settle and determine all claims, disputes and matters; and to execute bonds, reports and other instruments in connection with the foregoing matters.

11. To place or effect insurance of any kind upon any property or assets of China National Aviation Corporation or of its customers or others, including but not limited to fire, compensation, fidelity, theft, credit, liability, and public liability; to obtain binders for, contract for, renew, cancel or make other disposition of, such insurance; in connection therewith and in case of loss, to execute proofs of loss, statements, affidavits, agreements or other documents, and to collect, receive and acquit for any such insurance, or any sum or sums which may be due to the China National Aviation Corporation, its customers or others in connection therewith.

12. To purchase or otherwise acquire, own, hold, sell, convey, exchange, manage, alter, remodel, repair, lease, rent, invest in and make loans upon, act as broker with respect to mortgage, or otherwise deal in and with real estate, both improved and unimproved, and wheresoever located, or any interest therein, and to construct, erect, build, alter, improve, demolish buildings and structures of every kind, necessary in the transaction of China National Aviation Corporation's business or for account of customers or others.

13. To retain attorneys; to appoint, engage, employ, make contracts with, manage and control agents and subagents, assistants, accountants, representatives, and other employees in any agency, branch or other office of China National Aviation Corporation wherever located, as the said Attorney may deem necessary or advisable. Without limiting the foregoing general powers, to fix their terms, conditions and agreements of retainer or employment and salaries or other compensation; to prescribe their duties; to terminate their employment and to dismiss, discharge or suspend any of them in the absolute discretion of said Attorney, with or without cause, and solely upon such grounds as the said Attorney may deem sufficient in the best interest of China National Aviation Corporation; to fill vacancies and to increase or decrease the number of all such employees; to assemble and maintain an adequate and proper staff; and to establish, alter or amend rules and regulations for the control of such staff, agents and employees.

14. To execute such leases, extensions, and renewals of leases, options, service contracts, and such other instruments as may be necessary or proper in the establishment and maintenance of offices for China National Aviation Corporation anywhere in the United States; to purchase, acquire, sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of such furniture, fixtures, supplies, and other personal property as may be necessary or convenient in connection with the business of China National Aviation Corporation in the United States of America.

15. To ask, demand, sue for, recover, receive, and give acquittances for any and all moneys, debts and demands, bonds, stocks, securities, and other property due or payable to, belonging to, or deliverable to China National Aviation Corporation, or which may hereafter become due, or payable or deliverable to China National Aviation Corporation, or to which the China National Aviation Corporation may have the right of immediate possession, either as principal, interest,

dividend, or otherwise, and from any bank, person, or Government; to compromise, adjust, settle, compound, or otherwise dispose of all claims, demands, disputes, and controversies; to execute any composition, agreement, or other debtor or creditor agreement, or to make any arrangement with debtors to refer any dispute, controversy or matter to arbitration and to appoint or consent to the appointment of arbitrators or an umpire, either before or subsequent to the commencement of legal proceedings; without limiting to any extent the various rights and remedies which are or might be available to China National Aviation Corporation to accept, take possession of, hold, or store any goods, wares, or merchandise, or other personal property whether belonging to China National Aviation Corporation or held by China National Aviation Corporation as security or in trust, or held by any bank or person as security or in trust or for the account of China National Aviation Corporation, or otherwise, and to hold, manage, sell, assign, transfer, lease, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise deal with the same, or any part thereof.

16. To commence, prosecute, enforce, appear in, intervene in, accept service of process in, defend, settle, adjust, compromise, or discontinue any action, suit, proceeding, or litigation at law or in equity, in any court, or before any Government; to apply for or consent to the appointment, removal, or substitution of any Receiver, Trustee, Referee, Master, or Arbitrator.

17. To appear in and participate in any bankruptcy, insolvency, equity, or receivership proceeding or suit, or in any matter relating to the assets, estate, or effects, or the winding up of the affairs of any person, intended to the China National Aviation Corporation or its customers; to execute proofs of claim, and powers of attorney; to attend at and participate in any and all meetings of creditors, either prior to the commencement of or in connection with any such proceeding or suit; to vote in respect of any claim or other matter at any such meeting; to appoint proxies; to withdraw, compromise, settle, satisfy, and deal with any claim; to execute petitions in bankruptcy or applications for the appointment of receivers in any court and under insolvency, bankruptcy, or other laws; and to execute any and all other petitions, answers, proofs of claim, pleadings, or other papers which may be necessary or proper.

18. To attend and vote at, or to appoint proxies or other representatives to attend or vote at any and all meetings of creditors.

19. To execute applications, affidavits, petitions, and other instruments in order to obtain licenses, permits, franchises, and rights from the Government of the United States of America, the several states, territories, and dependencies thereof, the District of Columbia, or any other Government or representatives of any of the foregoing with reference to importing, exporting, selling, exchanging, storing, transshipping, trucking, moving, and matters relating to the performance of any act or thing or the exercise of any power granted by this power of attorney.

20. To execute all such tax returns, information returns, schedules, affidavits, waivers, petitions, applications for refunds, and other instruments and documents as may be required by or permitted under any tax law, income-tax law, or other law, rule, regulation, or requirement of any Government.

21. To do and perform any and all of the foregoing acts and things and to exercise the broad general powers herein granted as well as the specific powers mentioned in this instrument within and throughout the State of New York, the District of Columbia, and the several states, territories, and dependencies of the United States of America and within any other country except as herein otherwise stated, provided only that the same be not inconsistent with the laws, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations of any Government having valid jurisdiction in the premises.

22. To transact generally, any and all business on behalf of the China National Aviation Corporation, with full power and authority to do and perform all acts and things incidental to the exercise of, or requisite, necessary, or proper to be done under and by virtue of the broad general powers hereby granted as well as the specific powers herein enumerated, and in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as the China National Aviation Corporation might or could do if personally present in its corporate capacity, or as the Board of Directors of the China National Aviation Corporation could do if present in person and acting directly therein; to have and possess a seal of the China National Aviation Corporation and to affix the seal to any instrument and to attest the same: *provided, however*, that at no time shall the seal of the China National Aviation Corporation be or constitute a requirement for the validity of any instrument which said Attorney is authorized to execute and that the right herein granted to use such seal as aforesaid shall not be construed to require the use thereof on any instrument.

23. To do and perform any and all of the acts and things, and to exercise all of the powers herein granted, to the extent that the same shall be in accordance with the laws, rules, or regulations of the Government of the United States of America, the several states, territories, and dependencies thereof, the District of Columbia, or any of the governments or representatives of any of the foregoing. Should the performance of any act or thing or the exercise of any power herein granted, be determined to be illegal or contrary to the laws, rules, and regulations of any such Government as aforesaid, by any Court of competent jurisdiction, or pursuant to the opinion of counsel, or otherwise, it is the intention of the China National Aviation Corporation that this Power of Attorney and all the powers herein granted, nevertheless, shall be and continue at all times in full force and effect as to all acts, things, and powers the performance and exercise of which shall not have been held or determined, specifically, as aforesaid to be illegal or violative of such laws, rules, and regulations.

24. In the interpretation and construction of this power of attorney, the several terms hereinafter mentioned shall be defined to include the meanings indicated, but these definitions shall not be deemed to limit in any way the broader definitions or meanings that would otherwise be given to them in law. The term "bank" shall be defined to include any government bank, central bank, correspondent bank, agency bank, branch bank, private banker, banking partnership or firm, or any other banking or financial organization or institution, public or private. The term "person" shall be defined to include any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, public or private, or association, and also any Government or bank as herein defined. The term "execute" or "make" shall be defined to include make, draw, sign, swear to, verify, acknowledge, certify, deliver, deposit, send, file, and record.

25. To nominate, constitute and appoint from time to time, a substitute or substitutes to act in the name, place, and stead of said Attorney who at all times shall have full power of revocation.

26. The China National Aviation Corporation for itself, its successors and assigns does hereby ratify, confirm, and approve all acts and transactions which said Attorney or any lawfully appointed substitute or substitutes shall do or cause to be done by virtue of this Power of Attorney. All acts and transactions of said Attorney and of his substitutes, shall, notwithstanding any prior revocation of any substitution thereunder, be valid, effectual and binding upon the China National Aviation Corporation, unless notice in writing of such revocation of this Power of Attorney shall have been previously delivered to the China National Aviation Corporation or person to whom a copy of this Power of Attorney shall have been delivered.

27. The China National Aviation Corporation does hereby annul, cancel, revoke, and terminate any and all previous Powers of Attorney heretofore granted and does hereby annul, cancel, revoke and terminate all rights, powers, authorities, privileges, and immunities granted therein and thereby vested in or given to any and all such previous attorneys-in-fact.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the China National Aviation Corporation has caused this Power of Attorney to be executed, and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed by being thereunto duly authorized by the resolution hereinabove referred at to this day aforesaid.

Sealed with the Common Seal of The China National Aviation Corporation and signed by Liu Ching Yi, its Managing Director, in the presence of—

[SEAL] CHINA NATIONAL AVIATION CORPORATION,
By C. Y. LIU, *Managing Director.*

Notary Public, Hong Kong.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

REGISTRATION STATEMENT

Registration No. 640

PURSUANT TO SECTION 2 OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED

1. (a) Name of Registrant: Frederick V. Field.
(b) All other names ever used by Registrant and when used: In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, I decline to answer this question.

(c) All present business addresses: 23 West 26th St., New York City (personal business office); 51 Pine Street, New York City (office as President of American-Chinese Export Corporation).

(d) All present residence addresses: 16 West 12th St., New York 11, N. Y.; New Hartford, Connecticut.

2. (a) Date and place of Registrant's birth: April 14, 1905.

(b) Present citizenship or nationality: American.

3. All visits to or residence in foreign countries during the past 5 years: Numerous visits to Canada, skiing, motor trips, other vacations, personal visits to friends.

4. (a) All clubs, societies, committees, and other nonbusiness organizations, in the United States or elsewhere, of which Registrant is or has been during the past 5 years a member, director, officer, or employee: The answer to this question is attached.

(b) All membership or service during the past 10 years in the active reserve, military, naval, or other armed forces of any foreign government or foreign political party: None.

5. Name and principal address of each foreign principal of Registrant: The answer to this question is attached.

6. State the nature and purpose of Registrant's representation of each foreign principal named under item 5 and descibe fully all activities of Registrant for or in the interests of each such foreign principal: The answer to this question is attached.

7. Describe briefly all other businesses, occupations, and public activities in which Registrant is presently engaged. President, American-Chinese Export Corporation—engaged in export-import trade. Member of the Board of Directors of Trade Union Service, Inc. Owner of office building located at 23 W. 26th St., N. Y. C. Vice President 8 & 10 W. 37th Street Corporation. As to all other businesses, occupations and public activities, I decline to answer this question in exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Consitution.

8. All employees and other individuals who render any services or assistance to Registrant, with or without compensation, for or in the interests of each foreign principal named under item 5. I had in the past retained attorneys at law to render legal services but these services now are and have for some time been rendered directly to and by agreement with the principals named under Item 5.

9. Furnish the following information as to Registrant's receipts and expenditures during the 3 months proceeding the filing of this statement. The information may, if Registrant desires, be furnished for Registrant's latest fiscal quarter or other latest fiscal period of not less than 3 months.

(a) All amounts received during the period directly or indirectly from each foreign principal named under item 5, itemized as follows: [1] None.

(*b*) All amounts received during the period from other sources to be used directly or indirectly for or in the interests of any foreign principal named under item 5, itemized as follows: [1] None.

(*c*) All expenditures made during the period directly or indirectly for or in the interests of each foreign principal named under item 5, itemized as follows: [2] None.

10. (*a*) Speeches, lectures, talks, and radio broadcasts arranged, sponsored or delivered by Registrant during the past 3 months: In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I decline to answer this question.

(*b*) Publications prepared or distributed by Registrant, or by others for Registrant, or in the preparation or distribution of which Registrant rendered any services or assistance, during the past 6 months: In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I decline to answer (*b*) and (*c*) of this question.

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[1] Include all amounts so received, whether received as compensation, loans, contributions, subscriptions, fees, dues, subsidies, or otherwise.

[2] Include all transfers of funds to any foreign principal.

(*d*) Distribution of publications referred to in answer to (*b*) above: In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I decline to answer this question.

11. (*a*) Registrant's connections, not fully described above, with foreign governments, foreign political parties, or officials of agencies thereof: None.

(*b*) Registrant's pecuniary interest in or control over partnerships, corporations, associations, or other organizations or combinations of individuals, not fully described above: The answer to this question is attached.

(*c*) If the Registrant is subject to the supervision, direction, or control of any individual or organization, except as hereinabove fully described in this statement, explain fully. In exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I decline to answer this question.

12. File the following exhibits with this statement:

Exhibit A.—File an Exhibit A, on the printed form provided therefor, for each person named under item 8.

Exhibit B.—File a copy of the agreeement, arrangement, or authorization (or if not in writing, a written description thereof) pursuant to which Registrant is acting for, or receiving funds from, each foreign principal named under item 5.

Exhibit C.—File an Exhibit C, on the printed form provided therefor, for each principal named under item 5.

Exhibit D.—File copies of all printed matter referred to under item 10 (*b*), except photographs and moving pictures.

Exhibit E.—File a copy of the agreement or arrangement (or if not in writing, a written description thereof) between the Registrant and each business firm or other organization named under item 10 (*c*) or (*d*).

The undersigned swears or affirms that he has read the information set forth in this statement and the attached exhibits, that he is familiar wih the contents thereof, and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned makes no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in Exhibit A insofar as such information is not within his personal knowledge.

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at New York, N. Y., this 18 day of September 1950.

ESTHER BURTON,
Notary Public, State of New York; qualified in New York County.

My commission expires March 30, 1951.

4. (*a*).

Name and address of organization	Nature of connection with organization	Date connection began	Date connection ended, if ended
Harvard Club of New York	Member	Approximately 1928	
Century Association	do	Approximately early 1930's.	
Foreign Policy Association	do	Approximately 1928	
American Institute of Pacific Relations	Formerly an officer, presently a member.	do	

Numerous academic associations, including American Academy of Poltical Science, American Economic Association, American Sociological Society, American Geographical Society, of which I have been a member since the late 1920's or early 1930's.

As to all other clubs, societies, committees, and other nonbusiness organizations, I decline to answer this question in exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

5. Bank of China, Peking, China; China National Aviation Corporation, Peking, China; Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, China; Chinese Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Hong Kong.

6. (1) Attorney in fact for the Bank of China to represent all Bank of China interests in the United States.

Registrant's authority has been used in connection with several lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division. In the first of those actions (*Bank of China* v. *Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.*, No. 29287-G), there is a contest between two groups, each of whom claim to have authority to act on behalf of the Bank of China for control of several deposits in the Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco. Registrant, pursuant to appointment as attorney in fact for the present management of the Bank of China, authorized the filing of certain motions in the actions. The suits had previously been commenced by persons who alleged that they were authorized to act on behalf of the Bank of China. Their purported authority was first questioned by the Wells Fargo Bank and later contested by the registrant.

A decision has been rendered in this case by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, and the matter is now on appeal.

Registrant has also been designated attorney at law to make claim on behalf of the present management of the Bank of China to deposits in several other American banks. No litigation is pending involving those deposits.

(*a*) Attorney in fact of China National Aviation Corporation with broad authority to manage and conduct the business affairs of this corporation in the United States.

Registrant has used his authority as attorney-in-fact in connection with a number of pending lawsuits in the Federal Court in California initiated by Civil Air Transport, Inc., a Delaware corporation, in which the question to be determined is the ownership of the deposits in various banks as well as to certain property in California. Civil Air Transport, Inc., claims that the stock and assets of China National Aviation Corporation were sold to it. The California banks in which the deposits are held are acting merely as stakeholders and China National Aviation Corporation, a defendant in the suits, is opposing the claims of Civil Air Transport, Inc., on the ground that the purported sale of the stock and assets of China National Aviation Corporation was fraudulent and wholly invalid.

(3) Attorney-in-fact for Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking.

(4) Attorney-in-fact for Chinese Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Hong Kong. In both (3) and (4) Registrant's power-of-attorney is limited to the protection of the interests of these banks in an interpleader action started in the New York Supreme Court by the Chase National Bank of the City of New York. The question involved in that lawsuit, since removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, is which of several adverse claimants have authority to act on behalf of the banks. Registrant's power-of-attorney comes from the present management of the banks.

11. (b) Ownership of stocks

	Shares
American Smelting & Refining	100
Anaconda Copper	50
Curtis Wright A	100
Eastern Air Lines	100
Hoving Corp., $1.00 Com	100
Louisville & Nashville	100
Northwest Airlines	150
Northwest Airlines, conv. pfd	125
Pennsylvania R. R	150
United Aircraft	6
United Airlines, Inc	125
U. S. Rubber	100
Beryllium Corp	40
Kennecott Copper	66
Northern States Power Co., pfd	25
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co	25
Sears, Roebuck & Co	100
Great Northern Rlwy Co., pfd	50
Boston Edison Co	50
Commonwealth Edison Co	54
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y	100

11. (b) Ownership of stocks—Continued

	Shares
Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., pfd	25
8 & 10 West 37th Street Corp	100
Chase National Bank of N. Y	25
Chemical Bank & Trust Co	50
Insurance Co. of North America	30
American Can Co., pfd	18
International Harvester Co	100
International Harvester Co., pfd	12
U. S. Steel Corp., pfd	15
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., pfd	25
Timken Roller Bearing Co	25
W. & J. Sloane	973
W. & J. Sloane, pfd	418
W. & J. Sloane, prior pfd	13

Interest, governed by an agreement of sale by installments, in 2,280 shares of a Brazilian corporation known as Companhia de Importacoes Industrial e Construtora, S. A. and in 60 share of a New York corporation known as CIIC, Inc. The agreement provides that these shares or a portion of them, will revert to me in case of total or partial default of the sales price.

S. R. T. Publications, Inc	1
S. R. T. Publications, Inc., pfd	200
Boni & Gaer, Inc	30
Boni & Gaer, Inc., pfd	50
International Insulating Corp	10
World Reports, Inc	25
American Chinese Export Corp. (preferred and common) (approximate)	500
Trade Union Service, Inc	90

Pecuniary interest in oil leases and/or royalties

My records as well as those kept by my accountant show only original cost and current income. They identify the leases or royalties, moreover, only by the name of the remitter. In other words I do not presently have on hand the exact identity or location of each royalty or lease nor the exact fraction of my holdings in each of these properties.

The latter information can be secured, and will be secured if desired, by keeping track of incoming checks from these properties, for the fractional interest and lease number are usually indicated thereon. As all properties do not regularly pay on a monthly basis such information would take several months to accumulate.

It should further be noted that I have a few other investments in royalties and leases which, not having furnished income for a number of years, I regard as washed out. I do not carry such holdings in my records. Again, however, should a list of these washed-out investments be desired it would be possible, with considerable effort, to identify them by scrutinizing my accounts for earlier years.

The list of investments in oil royalties and leases, identified by the name of the remitter and the original cost follows:

Remitter	*Cost*
Anderson-Pritchard Ref. Corp	$3,535.00
Do	2,700.00
Sunray Oil Corp Anderson-Pritchard Ref. Corp Do Do Do	4,020.00
Champlin Refining Co	2,187.50
Sohio Petroleum Co The Ohio Oil Co	0
Champlin Refining Co Continental Oil Co Do Duval Gasoline Co Continental Oil Co	3,150.00

Remitter	*Cost*
Gulf Oil Corp	$450.00
Do	600.00
Do	900.00
Humble Oil & Refining Co	5,950.00
Stanolind Oil Purchasing Co Helmerich & Payne, Inc Shell Oil Co	1,900.00
Investors Service Co	300.00
Magnolia Petroleum Co Gulf Refining Co	894.90
Phillips Petroleum Co	3,150.00
The Pure Oil Co	3,607.24
Republic Oil Refining Co	2,275.00
Shell Oil Co	416.12
Do	4,200.00
Sinclair Prairie Oil Co	1,665.00
Esso Standard Oil Co Do	1,625.00
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana	280.00
The Texas Co	1.00
Magnolia Petroleum Co	1.00
The Derby Oil Co Shell Oil Co	2,950.00
Deep Rock Oil Corp Do	150.00
Union Producing Co	1,170.00
Globe Petroleum Corp	24,056.10
Forrest Parrott	1,829.42
Globe Petroleum Corp	12,907.50
Forrest Parrott	31,643.81
Globe Petroleum Corp	12,308.95
Do	22,643.62
Do	[1]
Phillips Petroleum Corp	[1]
Do	[1]
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp	[1]

[1] No information on costs available. The income derived from these four properties for the year 1949 was, respectively: Zero, $57.54, $21.78, and $7.25.

Beneficiary of the Frederick V. Field Trust established under the will of Lila V. Field of which the Guaranty Trust Company of New York is executor.

Secretary and Director of Soviet Russia Today Publications, Inc.

Miscellaneous United States Government as well as State and Municipal bonds a listing of which I assume is not called for by this question but which information I am ready to make available if called upon to do so.

As to all other partnerships, corporations, associations, or other organizations or combinations of individuals covered by this question, I decline to answer in exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

(Exhibit B, registration No. 640.)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Registration No. 640

EXHIBIT C TO REGISTRATION STATEMENTS

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended

Furnish this exhibit for each foreign principal of the registrant.

This exhibit will not be accepted for filing unless it is reasonably complete and accurate.

1. (*a*) Name of Foreign Principal: Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank.
   (*b*) Principal address of Foreign Principal: Peking, China.

2. Nature of all businesses, occupations, or functions of Foreign Principal: Postal savings bank and commercial banking activities.
3. If the Foreign Principal is an individual (natural person) state—
   (*a*) All present business and residence addresses not given under item 1 (*b*).
   (*b*) Citizenship or nationality.
   (*c*) If an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, state name of such government, political party, official, or agency; nature of Foreign Principal's office, employment, or agency; nature of any subsidy or other financial arrangement.
4. If Foreign Principal is not an individual (natural person) state—
   (*a*) Type of Foreign Principal's organization: Corporate entity under Chinese law.
   (*b*) All partners, officers, directors, and similar officials of the Foreign Principal: According to my information the persons in charge of the affairs of the principal are Su Yu Nung and Koh Tsung Fei, both of Peking, China.
   (*c*) Unless the Foreign Principal is a business organization or a government list all of its branches and local units and all other component or affiliated groups or organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
   (*d*) If the Foreign Principal is supervised, directed, or controlled by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of supervision, direction, or control: According to my information the principal was created in 1930 by legislation enacted by the National Legislature of China and functions under its own charter and bylaws. The charter of the Bank provides that the affairs of the Bank are to be managed by an executive officer called the Director General, appointed by the Minister of Communications, and by a Control Committee of nine persons—five of whom are appointed by the executive and four by the legislative branch of government.
   (*e*) If the Foreign Principal is financed or subsidized in any way by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of such financing or subsidization: According to my information the principal has received no moneys or other capital from the government.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Registration No. 640

EXHIBIT C TO REGISTRATION STATEMENTS

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended

Furnish this exhibit for each foreign principal of the Registrant.
This exhibit will not be accepted for filing unless it is reasonably complete and accurate.

1. (*a*) Name of Foreign Principal: Chinese Postal Remittances And Savings Bank.
   (*b*) Principal address of Foreign Principal: Hong Kong.
2. Nature of all businesses, occupations, or functions of Foreign Principal: Organized as overseas branch of Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, China, it is a separate entity engaged in the business of private banking in Hong Kong.
3. If the Foreign Principal is an individual (natural person) state—
   (*a*) All present business and residence addresses not given under item 1 (*b*).
   (*b*) Citizenship or nationality.
   (*c*) If an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, state—name of such government, political party, official, or agency; nature of Foreign Principal's office, employment, or agency; nature of any subsidy or other financial arrangement.

4. If the Foreign Principal is not an individual (natural person) state—
   (*a*) Type of Foreign Principal's organization: Corporation.
   (*b*) All partners, officers, directors, and similar officials of the Foreign Principal: According to my information K. C. Tseng is Manager of the principal, acting under the supervision of the persons in charge of the Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, China.
   (*c*) Unless the Foreign Principal is a business organization or a government, list all of its branches and local units and all other component or affiliated groups or organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
   (*d*) If the Foreign Principal is supervised, directed, or controlled by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state—name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of supervision, direction, or control: Affairs of this principal are conducted by its own manager under the supervision of the Directorate General of Postal Remittances and Savings Bank, Peking, China.
   (*e*) If the Foreign Principal is financed or subsidized in any way by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state—name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of such financing or subsidization: I have no further information other than stated in 4(d) above.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Registration No. 640

EXHIBIT C. TO REGISTRATION STATEMENTS

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended

Furnish this exhibit for each foreign principal of the Registrant.
This exhibit will not be accepted for filing unless it is reasonably complete and accurate.

1. (*a*) Name of Foreign Principal: Bank of China.
   (*b*) Principal address of Foreign Principal: Peking, China.
2. Nature of all businesses, occupations, or functions of Foreign Principal: Commercial Banking Business.
3. If the Foreign Principal is an individual (natural person) state—
   (*a*) All present business and residence addresses not given under item 1 (*b*).
   (*b*) Citizenship or nationality.
   (*c*) If an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, state name of such government, political party, official, or agency; nature of Foreign Principal's office, employment, or agency; nature of any subsidy or other financial arrangement.
4. If the Foreign Principal is not an individual (natural person) state—
   (*a*) Type of Foreign Principal's organization: Corporation.
   (*b*) All partners, officers, directors, and similar officials of the Foreign Principal: I have knowledge that Kun Yin-Pin, Peking, is General Manager, and that Chi Chao-Ting and Chan Wu of Peking are Assistant General Managers.
   (*c*) Unless the Foreign Principal is a business organization or a government list all of its branches and local units and all other component or affiliated groups or organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
   (*d*) If the Foreign Principal is supervised, directed, or controlled by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of supervision, direction, or control: My information is to the effect that two-thirds of the stock is owned by the People's Republic of China and that the owner of these shares exercises the usual prerogatives consistent with such ownership.
   (*e*) If the Foreign Principal is financed or subsidized in any way by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state name of such govern-

ment, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of such financing or subsidization: I have no knowledge upon which I can answer this question other than what has already been stated in 4 (d) above.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Registration No. 640

EXHIBIT C TO REGISTRATION STATEMENTS

Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended

Furnish this exhibit for each foreign principal of the Registrant.
This exhibit will not be accepted for filing unless it is reasonably complete and accurate.

1. (*a*) Name of Foreign Principal. China National Aviation Corporation.
   (*b*) Principal address of Foreign Principal: Peking, China.
2. Nature of all businesses, occupations, or functions of Foreign Principal: Commercial Aviation.
3. If the Foreign Principal is an individual (natural person) state—
   (*a*) All present business and residence addresses not given under item 1 (*b*).
   (*b*) Citizenship or nationality.
   (*c*) If an officer, employee, or agent of a foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, state—name of such government, political party, official, or agency; nature of Foreign Principal's office, employment, or agency; nature of any subsidy or other financial arrangement.
4. If the Foreign Principal is not an individual (natural person) state—
   (*a*) Type of Foreign Principal's organization: Corporation.
   (*b*) All partners, officers, directors, and similar officials of the Foreign Principal: I have knowledge that C. Y. Liu, Hong Kong, is Managing Director.
   (*c*) Unless the Foreign Principal is a business organization or a government list all of its branches and local units and all other component or affiliated groups or organizations in the United States and elsewhere.
   (*d*) If the Foreign Principal is supervised, directed, or controlled by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state—name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of supervision, direction, or control: According to my information the People's Republic of China owns 80% of the stock of the corporation and exercises the usual prerogatives consistent with such ownership.
   (*e*) If the Foreign Principal is financed or subsidized in any way by any foreign government, foreign political party, or any official or agency thereof, or by any other person or persons, state—name of such government, political party, or other persons; nature and extent of such financing or subsidization: I have no information other than already stated in 4 (*d*) above.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to introduce the document referred to——

The CHAIRMAN. To these instruments, I think you have already answered that your signature is attached?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to identify the pamphlet and introduce it into the record, the one that was subject of a conference between Mr. Field and Senator O'Conor. It is a booklet entitled "China's Greatest Crisis." It is published by the New Century Publishers, Inc., 832 Broadway.

On page 1 it has a statement here about the author, Frederick V. Field. [Reading:]

The author of this pamphlet is a member of the executive committee of the American council, Institute of Pacific Relations, an author on far eastern problems. He is also executive vice president of the Council for Pan American Democracy and member of the editorial board of New Masses.

The publishing date is January 1945. I would like to introduce this into the record as exhibit No. 10.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 10" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 10

CHINA'S GREATEST CRISIS

(By Frederick V. Field)

New Century Publishers, New York

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Frederick V. Field, the author of this pamphlet, is a member of the executive committee of the American council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an authority on far-eastern problems. He is also executive vice president of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and a member of the editorial board of New Masses.

Published by New Century Publishers, Inc.

832 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y., January 1945. Printed in U. S. A.

CHINA'S NEW DEMOCRACY

(By Mao Tse-tung)

"China's New Democracy by Mao Tse-tung, outstanding spokesman for the Chinese Communists, is a work of historical importance * * * one of the essential documents for evaluating the current Chinese crisis * * * containing the Chinese Communists' long-time program and perspective for the liberation and development of that great nation."—Earl Browder.

"No document more important than China's New Democracy by Mao Tse-tung, the revered Chinese Communist leader, has emerged from that nation since the beginning of the war. It is unquestionably the most significant contribution to the foreign understanding of the problems and perspectives of our far eastern ally available to us. * * *

"China's New Democracy reaches the English-speaking public just as the Chinese nation faces the sharpest test of its history. If we thoroughly comprehend the lessons which Mao Tse-tung here teaches us, our efforts to support those policies which will result in a regeneration of China will be immeasurably strengthened."—Frederick V. Field.

Price 25 cents

New Century Publishers, 832 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, on that point, Mr. Field, what was the time or the date when you first undertook to make application for a commission in the Army Intelligence of the United States?

Mr. FIELD. The origin was the other way around. I was asked if I would accept a commission.

Mr. MORRIS. Who asked you?

Senator O'CONOR. I was going to bring that out. I wanted to get the time first.

Mr. FIELD. It began very early in January of 1942.

Senator O'CONOR. It extended over quite a period, did it not, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. At least 2 months.

Senator O'CONOR. By whom were you asked to join the Intelligence Corps of the United States Army?

Mr. FIELD. I have been trying to think since I read this coming down on the train yesterday who it was. I cannot recall the name. I remember it was an officer who had established emergency headquarters in New York. He was apparently engaged in recruiting people for specialized jobs of one sort or another.

Senator O'CONOR. Why did he single you out?

Mr. FIELD. Among a great many others, obviously. I had worked for a great many years on American far eastern policy and didn't consider myself a great expert, but presumably I had some slight reputation in the field, and I suppose they were looking for these people.

Senator O'CONOR. Who else assisted, or who assisted you in your efforts to secure the commission, or who was interested in regard to the pending matter as to whether or not it initiated with you or came to you by way of an offer?

Mr. FIELD. I would like to answer as fully as my recollection permits on this. At that time I was—everybody was interested—so there is a general answer to that—anybody I knew. After conversation with this officer whose name I cannot recall—there may be some correspondence with him; I am not sure—I was asked to come here to Washington to go through a series of rather prolonged interviews with the officers who were heading up, or under whom this particular section, which was to be a research staff on certain problems that they were facing, was organized. I spent some time down here and had long individual discussions with the various officers. The subject of the discussions was the question of my political views and whether they could be reconciled with the task which they wished me to undertake. We had very long talks, very full and frank talks on both sides. Finally, I was definitely offered a commission by this particular branch.

Senator FERGUSON. I wondered whether or not from the witness when he was being questioned on his political views by these officers, whether he refused to answer on the grounds it would tend to incriminate him. Did you?

Mr. FIELD. I have just said we had a very full and frank discussion.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you reveal to them fully your views?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I did.

Senator O'CONOR. In connection with that, and I will come back to that, were you endorsed for the commission by Edward C. Carter, Owen Lattimore, and William T. Stone among others?

Mr. FIELD. Could I come to that in just a moment?

Senator O'CONOR. If you would be good enough to give me the answer categorically.

Mr. FIELD. At one point I was.

Senator O'CONOR. You were endorsed by each of those three?

Mr. FIELD. Maybe I answered too hastily. Could I make just one remark introductory to that?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. The whole thing was cleared in this particular Army set-up. It then was blocked at some point, some undeterminable point outside the Army. I meant——

The CHAIRMAN. Speak up, please. The reporter is behind you.

Mr. FIELD. The commission was blocked elsewhere. I was notified of it, and asked to come back to Washington, which I did.

At the time it was suggested that it was impossible for the officers in question themselves to initiate any investigation as to what had gone wrong. They did suggest that I do so myself and see if I could eliminate the problem. It was at that point that I went to everybody I knew whom I thought might be in a position to help me, and Mr. Carter was one of them. I remember that he did offer to help me. I believe he did take certain steps.

Senator O'Conor. How about Owen Lattimore?

Mr. Field. I am not sure whether I went to him or not. I would have. I do remember distinctly going to Mr. Carter. I don't have a real recollection of going to Mr. Lattimore. If he were there, I doubtless did go to him.

Senator O'Conor. If I were to state to you there was certain correspondence that indicates, in which reference is made to Owen Lattimore as being interested in the——

Mr. Field. I definitely—either I or somebody went on my behalf.

Senator O'Conor. And William T. Stone?

Mr. Field. I suppose he would have been one of the persons. I noticed his name in the paper. My recollection is I didn't go to him.

Senator O'Conor. Did he come to you?

Mr. Field. No; I imagine he was interested indirectly through someone else, but I am not sure about that.

Senator Eastland. Did Lauchlin Currie endorse you for a commission?

Mr. Field. I didn't recall he had. I didn't go to him myself.

Senator Eastland. Did you understand he endorsed you?

Mr. Field. No, I hadn't until I heard this. I think it was quite possible he was reached through one of these other people.

Senator Eastland. It is quite possible he did endorse you for a commission?

Mr. Field. I think it is quite possible.

Senator O'Conor. Who is William T. Stone? What is his position?

Mr. Field. I had known him for many years when he worked for the Foreign Policy Association.

Senator O'Conor. Was he not a member of the board of Amerasia?

Mr. Field. The letter helped——

Senator O'Conor. The letter showed you were chairman of the board, and among its members were Owen Lattimore and William T. Stone?

Mr. Field. Then he was.

Senator O'Conor. Was he connected with any agency of the United States Government?

Mr. Field. At that time in 1942?

Senator O'Conor. Or subsequently.

Mr. Field. Subsequently I know he has been.

Senator O'Conor. In what?

Mr. Field. I haven't seen him but I know—wasn't he with OWI during the war, or OSS? Then he, perhaps, when they were taken over by the State Department, went over too.

Senator O'Conor. You state, Mr. Field, that the reason for the effort to receive a commission was that there was a certain problem that was under consideration. Did I understand you correctly to use that expression?

Mr. Field. Yes; I did.

Senator O'CONOR. What was the certain problem?

Mr. FIELD. I have no idea what the rules were about this kind of question. I am perfectly willing to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, answer.

Mr. FIELD. This problem of the strategic bombing of Japan.

Senator O'CONOR. You were consulted as to the strategic bombing of Japan, or rather, you were consulted as to taking a job which would have direct relationship with that problem?

Mr. FIELD. That is the way I understood it, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Were these persons with whom you consulted, including Mr. Carter, Owen Lattimore, William T. Stone, Lauchlin Currie, aware of the nature of the problems that were then under consideration, about which you were being considered for a commission?

Mr. FIELD. That I am certain of, as to the specific nature; as to the general nature, they certainly would have. It would have depended, and I don't now recall what the rules were with regard to the confidential nature of that——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Field, did you apply for a commission yourself?

Mr. FIELD. I went through down here in Washington—whatever one does. I imagine I signed the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Army investigate you?

Mr. FIELD. All I am aware of, Mr. Chairman, were these prolonged interviews which I referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they investigate you before you applied for that, or afterward? Do you remember?

Mr. FIELD. They initiated this.

The CHAIRMAN. The investigation?

Mr. FIELD. No, they initiated the question of my coming into this work.

The CHAIRMAN. Who initiated that?

Mr. FIELD. The Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you made the application pursuant to their initiation?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Before that or after that did they investigate you, to your knowledge?

Mr. FIELD. All I am aware of is the investigation that took place through these long interviews.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I want to ask Mr. Field, when did you first learn that the Senate was going to make an investigation of IPR?

Mr. FIELD. I am not—I mean I was down here last year, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. It was last fall?

Mr. FIELD. I testified in May of 1950 before Senator Tydings' committee, April or May or something like that. Do you remember that?

Senator SMITH. No, I am referring to after that investigation was closed, when did you next hear that the Senate was going to investigate this matter further in regard to IPR?

Mr. FIELD. I don't believe I can identify this. I remember there was a great deal carried in columnists' political gossip columns to the effect that such an investigation was going to proceed.

Senator SMITH. Was it after that time you resigned your agency with the four institutions mentioned here this morning?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, there was no connection whatsoever between knowledge of such an investigation and such agency, the proof of which there is no secrecy about, in regard to my agency. I have testified fully as to it.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any instructions from those institutions as to what disposition was made of the funds recovered for them as attorney in fact?

Mr. FIELD. The litigation never went to the point of recovering funds.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking that. I am asking whether you had any instructions ahead of time as to any disposition of funds, the several million dollars.

Mr. FIELD. None.

Senator SMITH. May I ask you also what was to be your compensation and what compensation in fact did you receive, if any, from those institutions for acting as attorney in fact?

Mr. FIELD. That is declared in the report that we submitted to the Bureau. None.

Senator SMITH. You understood to start with you would not receive any compensation?

Mr. FIELD. What is that?

Senator SMITH. You understood when you accepted the agencies you were not to receive any compensation?

Mr. FIELD. I either understood it or stipulated it myself; the conditions.

Senator SMITH. The reason you did that was because you were trying to assist these institutions in getting these funds?

Mr. FIELD. I was interested in that purpose; yes.

Senator SMITH. Why were you interested in that purpose?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, again I think this is a question which leads into an area in which I must invoke the fifth amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Field, let me just give you a little word of advice, if I may. You have answered the question to which you could have raised the question. The reason for it does not incriminate you and never will, in any sense of the word. You may claim your privilege if you want to, but I am just giving you that advice.

Mr. FIELD. Could the question be repeated?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state the question again, please?

The reason I make that observation, on two or three occasions I have refrained from making it, but you have raised the question and invoked the privilege when in reality it was not worthy of the invocation.

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Chairman, may I say on my behalf I endeavor to us the privilege as little as possible?

The CHAIRMAN. I compliment you on that. I hope you will not invoke the privilege.

Mr. FIELD. Please read the question.

Senator SMITH. Read the question.

(The following question was read by the reporter:)

Why were you interested in that purpose?

Senator SMITH. The purpose of recovering funds for these institutions.

Mr. FIELD. Senator, the thought that occurred to me originally in declining to answer is that that is a question which asks for my political views and leads into this area. This is an area which, because of certain legislation in this country, may lead me to self-incrimination. It is on these grounds, in spite of the chairman's warning, which I appreciate, I must decline to answer the question.

Senator SMITH. About the matter of his commission, at the time you discussed with someone in connection with the Army a proposed commission for you in the Intelligence Department, can you tell us with whom you talked?

Mr. FIELD. Down here in the Army?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. I don't recall the names. I have been trying to think of them. There was some correspondence at the time. It is possible I retained some of it.

Senator SMITH. You do have some of that now?

Mr. FIELD. I am not sure I do, but I remember running across it a few years ago.

Senator SMITH. You don't recall a single one of the men in the Army or the military service you discussed this with?

Mr. FIELD. Senator, what makes me hesitate is to throw out a name that might turn out to be inaccurate might be doing an injustice to someone. I think I could suggest a couple of names but I am not sure they would be correct. I would only have their last names.

Senator SMITH. Why do you think it would be doing an injustice to any Army officer to throw out his name that you were the man he met?

Mr. FIELD. It is possible it is doing someone an injustice to be associated unfavorably with me as far back as 1942.

Senator SMITH. Regardless of who the officers who you talked to were, did you disclose to that officer or those officers any connection with the Communist Party you may have had?

Mr. FIELD. I am sure this type of question came up. We had a full and frank discussion. I have no hesitancy whatsoever, if the letters were available, to inform you the names of these—there were two people in particular. I have no hesitancy in giving those names if I can identify them.

Senator SMITH. You say whatever you told the Army officers at that time about your connections was true?

Mr. FIELD. Unquestionably.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall acquainting them with any connection you may have had with the Communist Party?

Mr. FIELD. At this point I would have to decline to answer on the grounds the answer might tend to incriminate me.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Field, you said you do not remember the names of the people in Intelligence. Didn't you write a letter to Carter giving him the name of Merian Cooper, "Our friend John Cooper's brother," as very high in the Army Air Intelligence, telling him you had taken this matter up, the letter being dated February 18, 1942? Does that refresh your memory?

Mr. FIELD. The name Cooper refreshes my memory. I have no wish to conceal or deny these names. If you have the documents, I am glad to answer.

Senator EASTLAND. If we have the documents you will admit it.

Mr. FIELD. I have offered before to supply the documents myself. I would like to make it clear I offered to supply the documents myself.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you this question about Owen Lattimore and about Currie, that you don't remember going to, whether in this same letter you didn't say this:

I am enclosing a confidential account of my attempt to get into the Army to serve as sort of an aide memoire to anyone looking into it. I am also enclosing a copy of my original Who's Who on the basis of which I was regarded as sufficiently qualified for the job.

By the way, I might wonder why anybody thought his Who's Who would put him in the Navy or Army Intelligence.

Mr. FIELD. I was asked for it.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing):

Nothing new to report. I have had a good talk with Justine Wise Polier and her husband. Both are working on the matter. Presumably Currie is taking it up with Owen.

Mr. FIELD. That is unquestionably Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Currie?

Mr. FIELD. That would be Lauchlin Currie. It carries out exactly the testimony that I gave recently that Mr. Currie had probably been reached indirectly.

Senator FERGUSON. Not only probably but was; he was reached by Lattimore.

Mr. FIELD. There isn't any question about it.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt, is there?

Mr. FIELD. I never entertained or suggested any doubt.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's get a copy of the letter.

Mr. FIELD. I acknowledge the truth of it if it is here in the letter.

Senator FERGUSON. I can show you here the original written on your own stationery. There is no doubt about it is there?

Mr. FIELD. No, sir; I have no doubt.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anybody else in the Army Intelligence you took it up with?

Mr. FIELD. As I say—I am sorry, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anybody else in Army Intelligence you took this matter up with?

Mr. FIELD. I testified to Senator Smith there were others to whom I talked. You probably have references to them in those letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have any objections to Army Intelligence turning over to this committee all that you told them and the recommendations and all the matters they have before them?

Mr. FIELD. None whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. There is nothing in that file you know of you would not want turned over?

Mr. FIELD. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have further questions later, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Eastland.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Field, you testified for many years you worked in far eastern affairs? That is correct, that is your testimony?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever have dealings with the United States State Department in our Far Eastern policies or affairs?

Mr. FIELD. I knew people in the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. Whom did you know in the State Department?

Mr. FIELD. This question of what you meant by dealings——

Senator EASTLAND. Whom did you know in the State Department?

Mr. FIELD. One of the people that I recall very vividly knowing in the early time was Dr. Hornbeck, Stanley Hornbeck.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else?

Mr. FIELD. Over this whole period?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. I knew a great many of them.

Senator EASTLAND. Name them. Did you know Alger Hiss?

Mr. FIELD. No; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew he was Hornbeck's assistant, did you not?

Mr. FIELD. He wasn't at the time; at least I didn't believe he was at the time. I knew Dr. Hornbeck. Dr. Hornbeck was the Chief of the Far Eastern Division at the time I knew him. I am trying to think who succeeded Dr. Hornbeck as head of the Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it John Carter Vincent?

Mr. FIELD. I think that is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it John Carter Vincent?

Mr. FIELD. I am not sure. I met John Carter Vincent at an IPR conference.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever discuss our Far Eastern policy with John Carter Vincent?

Mr. FIELD. No, I don't remember ever having any discussion with him.

Senator EASTLAND. What dealings did you have with the State Department relative to our Far Eastern affairs or Far Eastern policy?

Mr. FIELD. Personally I had very few dealings with them. I just had to, as part of trying to carry out the job of the institute, the research job of the institute. One would try to keep as well informed as possible, keep coming down and checking on whether things were accurate or not.

Senator EASTLAND. Tell me with whom you had dealings.

Mr. FIELD. If you want to ask me certain names and refresh my memory——

Senator EASTLAND. I don't want to refresh your memory, and you are bound to remember whom you had dealings with.

Mr. FIELD. I have given you some names.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else? You have given two names.

Mr. FIELD. I met on several occasions. The name I was trying to think of before was Nelson Johnson, who was later Ambassador to China. I am sorry, I am more than willing to think about this. I happen to be extremely tired and I am not recalling names very rapidly.

I went to China a couple of times. I met most of the officials of the Embassy on both those trips. I certainly acknowledge knowing the people who were in the Far Eastern Division during most of this period, let us say, at least up to 1940.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you discuss our China policy with them?

Mr. FIELD. I wouldn't put it in terms of discussing. I was at the time a very inexperienced person in the field and I was trying to learn. I would come down to learn from them.

Senator EASTLAND. How long have you known Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. FIELD. I only met him once. That was in Canada at a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations during the war.

Senator EASTLAND. You never had a conference with him in Washington?

Mr. FIELD. No; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain your relationship with the publication Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I testified on this at your executive session.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, may I——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. I beg your pardon, but I have laid down the rule. You may confer with the gentleman.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. I wanted to address a question to you with respect to the procedure here, merely with this in view: I note they are opening a new subject here. The witness came down from New York last night, got in very late and was up in accordance with the routine at the District jail at 5 o'clock this morning, which is when he last had something to eat. If we are going to open a new subject and go on for some time, I wonder whether it would be possible to take a luncheon recess now? I know it is a trifle early, but the witness is very much fatigued, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. If he can carry on for 20 or 25 minutes more, that will be all.

Mr. FIELD. Do you want me to testify as I did in your executive session on this subject?

Mr. MORRIS. Were you the owner of 50 percent of the shares of the corporation?

Mr. FIELD. Your information was accurate. If you will repeat it——

Mr. MORRIS. That you were the owner of 50 percent of the stock?

Mr. FIELD. I don't think that was it. Yes, Jaffe had 49 percent of the stock of Amerasia. Somebody had 1 percent.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you chairman of the editorial board of Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this during the time when you were national secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. There was an overlapping, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were national secretary from 1934 to 1940?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, and this started in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you resign from Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. I think it was the very end of 1943, but I am not absolutely certain. I testified as to the exact date before Senator Tydings. At that time I know my testimony because I looked it up.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony, therefore, from 1937 to 1943 you were half owner of the publication Amerasia, the corporation?

Mr. FIELD. I don't think there was any change in the ownership.

Mr. MORRIS. When you resigned, who took over control of Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you discuss with your associates in the Institute of Pacific Relations the workings of Amerasia during that period?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, we did have discussions. I think I touched on some of those in the executive sessions. I remember your drawing

me out on a development that took place with respect to it. In what manner do you want me to proceed here?

Mr. MORRIS. Would you just relate in general what were your relations with the institute people? They knew full well you were half owner of Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. There were discussions prior to the establishment of Amerasia as to whether or not it was proper and suitable for a responsible staff person to undertake this outside activity. I believe from the very beginning certain people in the institute had grave doubts about it which came to the surface some years later and were more vigorously expressed.

I recall testifying in executive session that my argument for starting the magazine and one which I think did carry considerable weight at the time, was a number of us in our several years of work in the institute had developed certain ideas. We were interested in conclusions to be drawn from research as well as the research itself. One of the best ways to insure the institute itself, to insure it remained in the research field and avoided becoming political, was to establish an organization, and where we could blow our steam off outside the institute. This was one of the prevailing arguments which I think persuaded somewhat doubtful people in the institute about the advisability of undertaking this.

Mr. MORRIS. A good many of your associates of IPR were on the editorial board of Amerasia, were they?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us who some of those were?

Mr. FIELD. If you have the masthead—Mr. Lattimore was.

Mr. MORRIS. Kate Mitchell?

Mr. FIELD. Is that an early masthead?

Mr. MORRIS. This is 1943.

Mr. FIELD. 1937 or 1938 would be more accurate.

Mr. MORRIS. Kate Mitchell?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Harriet Moore?

Mr. FIELD. If the masthead shows it.

Mr. MORRIS. T. A. Bisson.

Mr. FIELD. He was not in the IPR at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Benjamin Kizer?

Mr. FIELD. He was a trustee.

Mr. MORRIS. And of course Philip Jaffee?

Mr. FIELD. He was not an IPR staff person.

Mr. MORRIS. He was associated with the IPR?

Mr. FIELD. Only as a member. He wasn't a trustee or an officer in any capacity, or a staff person.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, were you ever known as Comrade Frederick Spencer?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. When I used "comrade," I meant a member of the Communist Party and you have given your answer.

Did you contribute an article in the publication China Today under the name of Frederick Spencer in March 1935?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute an article in China Today in April 1935?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Also under the name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

The CHAIRMAN Did you ever write under the name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Chairman, I must decline to answer that question on the ground the answer might tend to incrimi nate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel, who was previously sworn, to introduce into the record articles by Frederick Spencer in the March and April issues of China Today.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. Mr. Mandel is under oath.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, how many other articles have appeared in China Today under the name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. MANDEL. Under the pseudonym of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. MORRIS. How many times did Frederick Spencer contribute articles to China Today?

Mr. MANDEL. Nine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel's testimony is that nine articles by Frederick Spencer appeared in China Today.

Will you give the dates, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. March 1935 and April 1935 (2); May 1935; October 1935; November 1935 (2); June 1936 and October 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do any articles appear in the publication China Today under the name of Frederick V. Field?

(List appears on p. 125 as part of exhibit No. 15.)

Mr. MORRIS. Were you executive secretary of American Peace Mobilization in 1940 and 1941, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. I respectfully decline to answer on the ground that to answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you active in any way with the American Peace Mobilization in 1940 and 1941?

Mr. FIELD. I must give the same declination on the ground that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you picket the White House in connection with the demonstrations conducted by the American Peace Mobilization in 1941?

Mr. FIELD. I must also decline to answer that question on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you remain executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization after June 2, 1941, when the Germany Army invaded the Soviet Union?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. The Daily Worker of January 10, 1941, lists you as a speaker at a defense rally for convicted Oklahoma Communists. Did you take part in such a defense rally?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute to the New Masses on December 16, 1941?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the ground the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute on April 14, 1942?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer on the same ground.

Mr. MORRIS. During the period July 22, 1947, or during the period April 14, 1942, which is the last date, up until July 22, 1947, did you contribute 37 articles to the New Masses?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to reply on the grounds that the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you at any time editor of the New Masses?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article in the Communist, which was the official monthly publication of the Communist Party, and was later known as Political Affairs, in September of 1944, entitled "China's Real Destiny"?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write 14 articles in this same publication up to December 1950?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article on April 25, 1944, in the Daily Worker?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you thereafter contribute 54 articles, published with your bylines, up until October 9, 1949, in the Daily Worker?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question for the same reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in the Institute of Pacific Relations, were the publications China Today, the New Masses, the Communist, and the Daily Worker in the institute library?

Mr. FIELD. I don't recall. Would you name them again?

Mr. MORRIS. Once again: China Today, do you recall whether that was in the IPR library?

Mr. FIELD. It probably was.

Mr. MORRIS. It should have been?

Mr. FIELD. I imagine it was, and I would say "Yes" to that.

Mr. MORRIS. The articles there, under the name of Frederick Spencer, should have been in the IPR library?

Mr. FIELD. You would have to rephrase that question. I am not sure how you are asking the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Should not the articles there by Frederick Spencer have been in the IPR library?

Mr. FIELD. Presumably all of the contents of China Today were in the library, if the magazine was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the publication New Masses in the library?

Mr. FIELD. That I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. As national secretary, you do not recall whether or not the library of the IPR will contain New Masses?

Mr. FIELD. We were building a fairly substantial library, and I don't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. You were specializing in publications particularly on the Far East, were you not, and the New Masses frequently wrote on the far eastern policies?

Mr. FIELD. I really must answer I cannot recall whether it was there or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the publication The Communist in the library?

Mr. FIELD. I do not recall that, either.

Mr. MORRIS. Should it have been there?

Mr. FIELD. I would not have thought so, in the far eastern library. I don't know whether it was there or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the articles on far eastern problems?

Mr. FIELD. I imagine occasionally that there are such articles.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the Daily Worker; was that in the files of the library of the IPR?

Mr. FIELD. In that case, I should say almost definitely it was not, and I can see no reason why it should have been.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a speaker at a Communist Political Association at San Francisco in the Palace Hotel on May 17, 1945?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. I show you a photostatic copy of an invitation called for a United Nations Conference presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco, Thursday, March 17, 1945, 8 p. m., concert room, Palace Hotel, and the speakers listed and the program listed here is Frederick V. Field, member of the executive committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and correspondent for the New York Daily Worker. The other speaker is William Schneiderman, national vice president of the Communist Political Association, and also president of the California Chinese Political Association.

I offer that, Mr. Field, and ask you if you have ever seen it before?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer, Mr. Morris, on the ground the answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 11" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 11

You are invited to hear a panel of speakers on the United Nations Conference, presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco, Thursday, May 17, 1945, 8 p.m., at concert room, Palace Hotel.

Communist Political Association of San Francisco.

Offices: Suite 701, Garfield Building, 942 Market Street, San Francisco 2, Calif. Phone EXbrook 2996.

PROGRAM

Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, correspondent, New York Daily Worker.

A. Simones, editor, Nord Rouge, Northern France Industrial Area Daily.

William Schneiderman, national vice president, Communist Political Association. President, California Communist Political Association.

Chairman, Oleta Yates, president, Communist Political Association of San Francisco.

This panel of distinguished speakers is presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco to contribute to public information and understanding of world security.

They will discuss various aspects of the United Nations Conference for International Organization, its progress, problems, and perspectives.

There will be opportunity for the audience to ask questions from the floor.

Admission is by invitation only.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, I would like to show you a photostatic reproduction of an article, and I am going to ask you if you will look at it.

Mr. FIELD. Do you want me to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. Read it and tell us what it is.

Mr. FIELD. It is a photostat of an article.

Mr. MORRIS. In what publication?

Mr. FIELD. It is not indicated—yes, it is, Political Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the last sentence, and who wrote the article, commencing on page 60?

Mr. FIELD. Would you clarify that question, Mr. Morris? Do you want to know what name appears here?

Mr. MORRIS. What name appears on that article as the author of that article?

Mr. FIELD. The name is Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the last sentence?

Mr. FIELD (reading):

It is our task as American Communists to help mobilize the forces of labor and all anti-imperialists in our country, and deal further blows at Wall Street, so that the Chinese new democracy may consolidate its victories and move firmly and powerfully on the road toward socialism.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 12" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 12

This is the concluding page of an article by Frederick V. Field, published in the January 1949 issue of Political Affairs and entitled "The Meaning of the Chinese Revolutionary Victories":

74 POLITICAL AFFAIRS

union movement destroyed by Chiang Kai-shek. Already, in Harbin, in August 1948, an All-China Trade Union Conference laid the foundation for such a development. From this conference its chairman, Liu Ning-Yi, spoke out to the organized working people of America. He said:

Let there be greater solidarity between the Chinese and American working class. Support the war of liberation of the Chinese people. Oppose the aggressive policy and the antilabor, antipeople policy of American imperialism. Oppose the reviving of Japanese fascism by the American Government. Oppose the American policy of helping the slaughter of the Chinese people. Let the workers and people of China and the United States unite! Let us hold fast to our posts and defend democracy and world peace![1]

A special responsibility devolves upon American Communists. The China issue presents a signal opportunity to deal a mighty blow at the fortress of world reaction. The opportunity and the power exist to smash American imperialist plans for China. Under the leadership of the great Communist Party of China and its renowned chairman, Mao Tse-tung, the heroic Chinese people are discharging their duties with honor. The imperialists are being decisively beaten back in China. It is our task, as American Communists, to help mobilize the forces of labor and all anti-imperialists in our country, to deal such further blows at Wall Street, that the Chinese new democracy may consolidate its victories and move firmly and powerfully on the road toward socialism!

[1] Liu Ning-Yi, chairman, in a letter from the All-American Trade Union Conference in answer to greetings from 130 American trade-unionists. Harbin, August 1948, received November 1948.

The magazine Political Affairs was formerly known as the Communist.

Senator O'CONOR. Could I ask a question?

Mr. Field, in view of this series of questions, there is just one fact regarding the knowledge on the part of others concerning your views and philosophies.

For example, you have stated that from 1928, Mr. Edward C. Carter was in close association with you. If you recall, you mentioned the invitation to become the Assistant Secretary at the time that Dr. Yen, on the subject of the discussion of illiteracy—was Mr. Carter in close association with you continuously from that time until 1942, when you were invited or under consideration for a commission in the Army?

Mr. FIELD. If I may put it the other way around, I was in close association with Mr. Carter, that would be correct.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, that probably is more nearly correct.

Mr. FIELD. Except the terminal point would be earlier; it would be the fall of 1940.

Senator O'CONOR. 1940?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. It is a fair assumption, then, for one to draw, that he was quite familiar with your views and ideologies?

Mr. FIELD. I would think so.

Senator O'CONOR. Would the same be true of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FIELD. To a much less extent.

Senator O'CONOR. But, nevertheless, to some degree?

Mr. FIELD. To some degree. We were colleagues in the same organization.

Senator O'CONOR. Colleagues in the same organization?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. So that when he endorsed or took steps concerning your obtention of the commission, he was familiar with your views?

Mr. FIELD. To some extent; yes.

Senator O'CONOR. And would the same be true, to a lesser extent, possibly, of Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. FIELD. No. As I think I testified, to the best of my recollection I had never met Lauchlin Currie at that time.

Senator O'CONOR. Was Mr. William T. Stone familiar with your views and philosophies?

Mr. FIELD. Well, as I believe I testified, our association had been through his being a staff member of the Foreign Policy Association, and I in the IPR, and the two organizations working in somewhat similar fields, and I would see him occasionally, and we weren't particularly close.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, the only other question, Mr. Field, I would like to ask you, is this: You have previously testified that at one point during the consideration of the application for the Army commission, it was blocked or it was stopped, or some impediment occurred.

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Did Mr. Carter or Mr. Lattimore or Mr. Field learn of that development, of the fact that there had been——

Mr. FIELD. The last name——

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Stone, I meant.

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Carter and Mr. Stone and Mr. Lattimore, you mean, did they learn of this?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. It is my recollection that I went immediately to Mr. Carter, to inform him of it; and I think, and I am almost certain, to ask him to do anything he possibly could to break the jam.

Senator O'CONOR. And similarly, according to the correspondence, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FIELD. Presumably so.

Senator O'CONOR. Did they, upon learning of that development, still persist in their efforts to have you appointed or be given a commission by the Army, in Intelligence?

I would advise, if you would, you answer me.

Mr. FIELD. I wanted to put it differently. I would put it they were all interested in seeing if the jam could be broken.

Senator O'CONOR. In other words, my point is, did they continue their efforts?

Mr. FIELD. I can speak with certainty about Mr. Carter, because I remember he did; and the evidence is Mr. Lattimore did; and I can't speak about the others.

Senator EASTLAND. I want to ask a question. Do you know Dr. Philip Jessup?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I do.

Senator EASTLAND. How long have you known Dr. Jessup?

Mr. FIELD. I met him through the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I believe I went into it before he did, and I am not perfectly certain of that, and let me say roughly, Senator, it would be the early thirties, or maybe 1930, or something like that. I am not perfectly certain as to the date.

Senator EASTLAND. You have been closely associated with him, have you not?

Mr. FIELD. No. I was associated with him in the sense of a staff member, of the association between a staff member and an officer of the organization with whom you are only in occasional contact.

Senator EASTLAND. When did you resign from your position in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. It was in the fall, as I said, of 1940.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Dr. Jessup attempt to get you to remain in that position?

Mr. FIELD. I think it is quite possible. I am not sure whether he was chairman of the council or not, and I think it is very possible that he did try, and I think that there were several people that tried to persuade me to change my mind.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, Dr. Jessup was acquainted with your political background and political affiliations, was he not?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know what the implications of your remarks are, Senator, and it is hard to answer. He knew me as a staff member in an organization of which he was an officer.

Senator EASTLAND. But now, he knew your political affiliations, did he not?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know what political affiliations you refer to, Senator, so it is hard for me to answer.

Senator EASTLAND. You know your political affiliations, Mr. Field.

Mr. FIELD. What Mr. Jessup knew about me is something that I find it very difficult to testify to, and I can testify to the relationship we had.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, in your judgment, now, he knew your political affiliations, did he not?

Mr. FIELD. I imagine he made his own judgment.

Senator EASTLAND. You would say, in your judgment, now, in your judgment he knew your political affiliations?

Mr. FIELD. I find it impossible to give an intelligent answer to that question, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer into evidence a statement signed by Phillip C. Jessup, chairman of the board of trustees of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 28, 1940, and this is a memorandum to the board of trustees, and I would like to read the last paragraph, because I think that this is Senator Eastland's point.

> At this time the staff wish to express their appreciation of the leadership which Mr. Field has given to the American Council in the past. We consider that it is in the best interest of the American Council that Mr. Field should remain as closely associated with it as possible. We therefore should like to see him continue as secretary of the council, exercising the maximum amount of guidance and determination of policy consistent with his desire to be relieved of the burden of administrative work and financial promotion.

I would like to introduce that into evidence and mark it as exhibit No. 13.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 13" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 13

AMERICAN COUNCIL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
New York City, June 28, 1940.

OFFICERS

Philip C. Jessup, chairman
Miss Ada L. Comstock, vice chairman
Benjamin H. Kizer, vice chairman
Philo W. Parker, vice chairman
Robert Gordon Sproul, vice chairman
Ray Lyman Wilbur, vice chairman
Frederick V. Field, secretary
Francis S. Harmon, treasurer
Miss Hilda Austern, assistant treasurer

To the Board of Trustees:

In transmitting Mr. Field's report of the reorganization of the American Council, involving a drastic reduction of its budget, I should like to let you know that Mr. Field's tactful and sincere handling of the problem has carried us through a crisis with less damage than an outsider would have believed possible. The staff's cooperation in this most unfortunate contraction which the financial situation made unavoidable is a tribute to it and to the unusual abilities of Mr. Field. He and the staff built up a spirit in the organization which has proved that it can withstand a hard blow. The spirit is still there and the job of the American Council is still to be done with your help.

It is not possible, in my opinion, to refuse Mr. Field's request that he be freed from the administrative and financial routine of the office. But, since I share the view of the staff as expressed in a letter from Miss Farley of the staff to the executive committee, I cannot acquiesce in his complete separation from the direction of the affairs of the American Council. I have, therefore, appointed him staff adviser with the understanding that he is to be on leave without salary for the next 6 months. Miss Farley's letter included the following resolution of the entire staff:

"At this time the staff wishes to express their appreciation of the leadership which Mr. Field has given to the American Council in the past. We consider that it is in the best interests of the American Council that Mr.

Field should remain as closely associated with it as possible. We should therefore like to see him continue as secretary of the council, exercising the maximum amount of guidance in the determination of policy consistent with his desire to be relieved of the burden of administrative work and financial promotion."

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record the minutes of the executive committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 5 p. m., September 18, 1940; present: Philip C. Jessup, chairman, Philo Parker, Francis Harmon, and Edward C. Carter; together with a telegram from Frederick V. Field, from Chicago, dated September 1, 1940, to Philip C. Jessup. I would like to introduce both of these into the record as the next exhibit and have them so marked.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so marked and inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 14" and are as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 14

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Held at 5 p. m., Thursday, September 18, 1949, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

Present: Philip C. Jessup, chairman; Philo W. Parker; Francis E. Harmon; Edward C. Carter.

(1) Letters of comment and telegrams of regret were received from the two absent members, Prof. Joseph P. Chamberlain in Washington, and President Ada Comstock in Boston.

(2) The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his immediate resignation from all IPR responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field who explained in detail the reasons that had lead him to accept the new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American council. The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

(3) Dr. Jessup then invited the attention of the committee to the question of Mr. Field's successor. Mr. Field himself had considered a large number of names in consultation with others. He had finally informed Dr. Jessup that of all those considered, he thought Mr. Harry B. Price was the best fitted for the secretaryship of the American Council. The committee went over a long list of names, considering various possibilities from many angles. Finally the committee came to the conclusion that Mr. Price was the most promising of all.

(4) After further discussion, the committee voted to authorize Mr. Carter to offer the secretaryship of the American Council to Mr. Price (but not until hearing from Dr. Wilbur). If Dr. Wilbur strongly dissented, the matter should be referred back to the executive committee.

(5) It was voted to increase the American Council budget so as to make it possible to offer Mr. Price a salary of $5,200 a year. Mr. Carter was to explain to Mr. Price that at the present time the finances of the American Council would not permit of a larger salary, but that when the financial situation improved the committee would recommend that the salary be fixed at $6,000.

(6) Mr. Francis E. Harmon, the treasurer, explained that he had accepted the treasurership as a stopgap, that he felt that the position required a man of commanding leadership in business or industry, and that he hoped that the committee would shortly find a new treasurer of the required qualifications in his place. The chairman assured Mr. Harmon of the committee's appreciation of his position and also of the invaluable service he had rendered already as treasurer. The committee would, however, take Mr. Harmon at his word and would relieve him if and when a more suitable candidate became available.

(7) With reference to the date of the board of trustees meeting, Mr. Carter reported that he had asked Dr. Wilbur to suggest a time in October or November when he would be in the East and free to attend a meeting. It was hoped that Dr. Wilbur's reply would permit of the fixing of the date for the meeting of the trustees.

(8) Owing to lack of time it was proposed that other items on the agenda be postponed until the next meeting. These had to do with proposals regarding the interrelation of the Far Eastern Survey, Inparel and a proposed news bulletin, with the starting of regional groups, and with the development of a Latin-American research center.

TELEGRAM FROM FREDERICK V. FIELD FROM CHICAGO, SEPTEMBER 1, 1940, TO PHILIP C. JESSUP

I have been attending a peace congress of some 6,000 representatives from all parts of the country, labor, farm, and middle-class organizations. This is a genuine peace movement through the interpretation of democracy. These people and our program represent what I have for long profoundly believed in. They are asking me to become the executive of a continuing organization, and I feel a deep conviction that I must accept. As the people I should be working for will meet to elect officers tomorrow, I must, despite obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with you and others, and as the executive must be presented to them, make an immediate affirmative decision. This show has been and will be smeared by the newspapers. I anticipate losing the respect of many present friends. These developments I regard as inevitable if we do the job in this country that was not done in France, etc. In view the inevitable criticism and misunderstanding, and because of my continued deep interest in the IPR welfare, I feel that I must, by this telegram, affirm my immediate resignation from all the IPR responsibilities that its officers wish to accept. Finally I must urgently hope for both personal and professional associations that you will reserve your own judgment until I can talk with you.

F. V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to read one particular part of it here. I am reading now in the middle of the first paragraph:

Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field, who explained in detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position.

And what new position is that, Mr. Field, could you tell us?

Mr. FIELD. No; I decline to answer that on the ground that the answer may be self-incriminating.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, in connection with the previous correspondence, the previous part of the letter shows it is in connection with the American Peace Mobilization.

Mr. Parker voiced the feeling of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances, it was moved that a minute be drafted, indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation, with deep regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished

service which Mr. Field had rendered during the 11 years of service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed, though, when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

I would like Mr. Mandel to put into the record all those documents that I made reference to during the series of questions on Mr. Field's writings from 1935 down to 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Let us proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. They have been compiled under my direction.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be marked as one exhibit, and then designated.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 15" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 15

FREDERICK V. FIELD

New Masses

Editor (issue of December 15, 1943, p. 21).
Member editorial board (issue of October 9, 1945, p. 20).
Associate editor (issue of January 5, 1943).
Guest of honor new Masses dinner (Daily Worker, November 18, 1942, p. 6).
Managing editor (issue of April 30, 1946, p. 2).
Member, board of contributing editors (Daily Worker, November 18, 1942, p. 6).
December 16, 1941—How Strong is Japan.
April 14, 1942—Speaker and Sponsor New Masses, Anti-Cliveden Rally.
June 2, 1942—Letter to New Masses says, "Can defeat Axis this year."
June 30, 1942—A Second Front Will Beat Japan.
July 7, 1942—China After Five Years.
October 1942—Contributing editor of New Masses.
November 18, 1942—Member, board of contributing editor.
January 1943—Associate editor New Masses.
January 26, 1943—Author of Behind the Chinese Front.
April 27, 1943—Reviews and denounces The 5th Seal by Aldenov.
July 13, 1943—Author of Outlook in China.
August 24, 1834—Author of The Crises in China.
November 2, 1943—Author of China's Internal Crises.
January 4, 1944—Nazi Bridgehead "44" Bolivian Situation.
February 22, 1944—Chiang's Strange Book.
November 14, 1944—Behind Stilwell's Recall.
December 12, 1944—Key to Far Eastern Victory.
February 20, 1945—Our Job in This Hemisphere.
May 1, 1945—The Issue of Mandate Colonies.
June 19, 1945—San Francisco, Words and Reality.
July 10, 1945—Sulzberger's Sinkiang Issue.
July 31, 1945—Appeasement of Japan.
August 21, 1945—What is China's Future.
August 28, 1945—Dynamite in China.
September 4, 1945—Are We Heading for World War III—coauthor, John Stuart.
September 11, 1945—Behind The Sino-Soviet Treaty.
September 18, 1945—Reviews China's Crises by Rosinger.
December 18, 1945—Will China Be Americas' India.
February 19, 1946—New Turn in China.
April 16, 1946—Action for Peace.
April 30, 1946—Betrayal in China.
August 13, 1946—Get Out of China: an Edit.
September 10, 1946—Doublecross in China.
June 17, 1947—Showdown in China.
February 4, 1947—China After the Marshall Mission—by Fred V. Field.
June 10, 1947—General Evans F. Carlson.
July 22, 1947—Unfinished Review in China.

FREDERICK V. FIELD'S ARTICLES

1. Daily Worker

1944: April 25, May 6, May 13, May 20, May 27, June 3, June 10, June 17, July 15, September 2, December 16, December 17.

1945: January 13, January 20, February 10, February 17, March 17, March 24, April 7, April 16, April 22, April 27, April 28, May 12, May 14, May 17, May 26, June 6, June 9, June 13, June 18, July 2, July 28, August 11, August 15, August 25, September 1, September 8, September 15, September 24, September 29, October 6, October 13, October 27, November 3.

1946: February 8, March 26, April 5, April 23, May 4.

1948: January 10, July 25.

1949: May 22, October 9.

2. The Communist, later known as Political Affairs

September 1944, pages 830 to 845—China's Real Destiny.

January 1945, pages 89 to 96—For a Deeper Understanding of China. (Review of China's New Democracy, by Mao Tse-tung).

April 1945, pages 318 to 328—Mexico City—On the Road from Yalta to San Francisco.

April 1945, pages 372 to 376—An Important Work on China's Labor Movement. (Review of The Chinese Labor Movement, by Nym Wales).

August 1945, pages 675 to 687—San Francisco Balance Sheet.

September 1945, pages 843 to 850—Avert Civil War in China.

January 1946, pages 31 to 41—The Record of American Imperialism in China.

May 1946, pages 395 to 496—Exploding the Iranian Myth.

November 1946, pages 88 to 1000—American Imperialist Policy in the Far East.

January 1948, pages 51 to 64—The New China Program of the American Interventionists.

July 1948, pages 609 to 614—Some Considerations of the China Issue.

January 1949, pages 60 to 74—The Meaning of the Chinese Revolutionary Victories.

September 1950, pages 15 to 29—Wall Street's Aggression in Korea and the Struggle for Peace.

December 1950, pages 16 to 24—China, Korea, and the Struggle for Peace.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, CONTRIBUTOR, CHINA TODAY, UNDER PSEUDONYM OF FREDERICK SPENCER

Issues of

March 1935, pages 102 and 108.

April 1935, page 123.

April 1935, page 126—Japan Enters the Fascist Ranks.

May 1935, pages 143, 154, and 159.

October 1935, page 12.

November 1935, page 2—Chiang Kai-shek Licks Japan's Boots.

November 1935, page 43—The Same Old Wheeze.

June 1936, pages 167 and 178.

October 1936, page 247.

AS FREDERICK V. FIELD

These issues

April 1941, page 9—A Program for Democracy.

December 1941, page 4—No Compromise—No Appeasement.

Mr. MORRIS. It may be that we will finish with Mr. Field, and I wonder if he could come back here at 2 o'clock for a 15- or 20-minute session.

The CHAIRMAN. Two-thirty.

Mr. MORRIS. We have another witness at 2:30.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. Is it possible to clear it up now? There is the problem of getting Mr. Field back to New York, and from the point of view of his physical condition.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think he would rather stay here.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. I don't know. This is more pleasant than perhaps some other places.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, as far as I am concerned, we can let Mr. Field go until some other time when he is more free to come down here.

Mr. RABINOWITZ. We would appreciate that very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to make a little observation here.

Because there has been some misunderstanding about the rule laid down yesterday concerning pictures, television, radio, and so forth, it might be well to make it clear on the record that television cameramen have the same privileges as moving-picture or news photo cameramen with respect to taking pictures before or after the committee sessions, and that these privileges are subject to the important condition previously stated, namely, that pictures are not to be taken of a witness in the hearing room without the permission of the witness. No one need have his picture taken here unless he consents to it.

We will stand in recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y.—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris. Mr. Carter is on the stand, and he has been sworn. You may proceed with your examination.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Vladimir Rogov?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I have known him for a number of years, as a Tass correspondent, formerly as a student in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was the Soviet writer who wrote the article in a Communist publication in Moscow, the War and the Working Class, that signalized a change in Communist policy from support of Chiang Kai-shek to that of opposition to Chiang Kai-shek in August of 1943?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that article?

Mr. CARTER. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall, Mr. Carter, that at that time the Communist Party line called for all-out support of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. CARTER. That I remember very definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall some time after August of 1943, the Communist Party line changed; instead of supporting Chiang Kai-shek, they began to undermine him?

Mr. CARTER. That I didn't know. My impression was they supported him for a much longer period, but I don't read Communist documents, and there is always the possibility that they might announce one policy but continue another.

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't that your function as a far eastern expert, Mr. Carter, to have observed these changes?

Mr. CARTER. As I have said, Senator, my impression was, wholly apart from what may have been written, that the Soviet Government continued support of Chiang Kai-shek for considerably longer.

Mr. MORRIS. For how much longer?

Mr. CARTER. And with more suspicion of Mao Tse-tung and Communists than of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was more suspicious?

Mr. CARTER. The Kremlin.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that the Kremlin was suspicious of Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. CARTER. They certainly were, and I think they thought he was getting too strong.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anything ever written to that effect, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember when Vladimir Rogov, as I said, who did write this article, in the War and the Working Class, signalizing the change in policy of the Soviet policy toward Chiang Kai-shek from one of support to one of undermining, do you remember he came to the United States early in 1944?

Mr. CARTER. I do. I have forgotten the year, and I know he came during the year on his way to London to join the London office of Tass.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I would like to introduce into the record, or show you at this time, this article by Vladimir Rogov, and it is reprinted from the Soviet trade-union periodical, The War and the Working Class, and I am showing you a photostatic copy of the editorial page of the Daily Worker of Thursday, August 12, 1943.

I offer that to you, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. Not being a subscriber or a reader of the Daily Worker, this is the first time I have seen this.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you at all acquainted with that particular article?

Mr. CARTER. I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, the article, even though it is reprinted in the Daily Worker, did appear in the War and the Working Class.

Mr. CARTER. That is apparent from the authenticity of the photostat.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer that into evidence as the next exhibit and have it properly marked.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 16" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 16

[From Daily Worker, New York, August 12, 1943]

EDITORIALS and COMMENT—SOVIET EXPERT WARNS of APPEASERS in CHINA

(By Vladimir Rogov)

(Reprinted from the Soviet trade union periodical The War and the Working Class)

(By wireless to Inter-Continent News)

MOSCOW, August 11.—During the 6 years of war the Chinese command at the cost of considerable territorial losses, succeeded in saving its troops from defeat. Despite the numerous odds the Chinese Army preserved its capacity for resistance.

The Japanese militarists failed in their plan for a rapid conquest of China. The Japanese proved incapable of breaking the resistance of the Chinese people and bringing them to their knees. The war against China became clearly drawn out, threatening Japan with ever-growing complications.

In defensive battles on an extremely long front the Chinese Army, weakening the Japanese troops, gained the necessary time for reorganizing its troops and strengthening their fighting capacity. Soon after the fall of Wuhan (Hankow) in October, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek outlined a program for the reorganization of the country's armed forces, whose principal points were as follows:

Firstly, China's national policy must become the policy of a long, defensive war.

Secondly, the necessity to develop the guerrilla movement.

Thirdly, for conducting a general counteroffensive it is necessary to create a new, many millions strong army, trained in the use of the most up-to-date war equipment.

Covert Opposition

However, from the outset the intentions of the commander in chief of the Chinese Army, Chiang Kai-shek, met with covert resistance.

Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. The main reason for this is the diverse work of the appeasers, the defeatists and capitulators.

The war economy resources of National China (Free China) are tremendous and afford an adequate base for the rearmament and supply of the massed army. On its territory National China has all the strategic war materials necessary for the conduct of a prolonged war.

Nevertheless, large-scale construction has not been undertaken since the industrial and financial circles prefer to engage in profiteering rather than invest their capital in the armaments industry.

The unrestrained profiteers advanced the "theories" that the people are weary of war and that it is primarily necessary to satisfy the demand of the population for goods, etc.

This situation leads to the weakening of the army's fighting capacity and greater dependence on the supply of armaments from the United States and Great Britain, which however has encountered serious difficulties since the beginning of the Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain.

The elements favoring capitulation have sabotaged the measures for mobilizing the internal resources with the object of creating their own war economy base, as well as the measures for extending economic warfare against the Japanese invaders.

No Regular Reinforcements

China has no lack of human reserves, but the Chinese Army nevertheless receives no regular reinforcements. There are insufficient trained reserves. There is not even an organized military registration of the population. To this day the law on universal military service is not fully carried out. The army receives a large percentage of men unfit for service.

The main defect of the Chinese Army is the shortage of trained commanding personnel. All foreign military observers who have visited the Chinese Army agree that the Chinese soldier is tenacious and enduring in the field and is unpretentious as far as food and uniforms are concerned; whereas the commanding personnel is extremely weak and backward in military and technical training.

The army's equipment is still at low level. The organization and control of troops are far from perfect. One of the defects of the Chinese Army is the lack of an effective united command and of coordinated operations on the separate fronts. The internal friction and suspicion among the generals could not but affect the fighting capacity of the troops and their discipline.

In Chungking, of course, there are no open advocates of surrender, but this does not mean that there is a lack of capitulators and defeatists there.

The capitulators and defeatists who occupy important positions in the Kuomintang weaken the strength of China by their harmful political intrigues and constitute a serious danger at present.

Since December 1941 the Japanese have centered their attention on the war in the Pacific. The war in China has receded to the background. This has led to the appearance among Chinese military and political leaders of a certain

complacency of which the Japanese imperialists took advantage to intensify their "peace offensive."

JAPANESE MACHINATIONS

The Japanese conquerors are now concentrating on deepening and sharpening the internal contradictions in China and are trying in every way to utilize these contradictions to weaken China and strengthen their positions in the struggle against China.

These Japanese plans profit from the maneuvers of the Chinese appeasers, who provoke conflicts and incidents up to armed clashes, do their utmost to undermine the military collaboration of Kuomintang circles with the Communist Party and incite the persecution and rout of the Eighth and Fourth Armies, which as units of China's united national army have inscribed many heroic pages in the history of the resistance of the Chinese people to the Japanese invaders.

These armies consist of the most progressive, tenacious and selfless people of China. They are led by the Chinese Communist Party which enjoys merited prestige among the broad masses of the working people as the organizer of their struggle for national freedom and independence.

Today by direct military pressure new attempts are being made to bring about the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party and the liquidation of the Eighth and Fourth Armies. The Chinese command has transferred new divisions to the districts where these armies are stationed, with tremendous supplies of munitions and food, obviously in preparation for an attack on the Eighth and Fourth Armies with the aim of liquidating them even at the price of unleashing civil war.

Such an attack of the Chungking generals on the Eighth and Fourth Armies which, moreover, is completely unprovoked by these armies, would be a treacherous stabbing in the back of the Chinese people and play into the hands of the Japanese imperialists who could hope for nothing better.

A number of outstanding Kuomintang leaders oppose such treacherous activities of all sorts of appeasers, capitulators and provocateurs. The Chinese Government, nevertheless, does not exert firmness in overcoming the activities of the capitulators designed to undermine national unity and weaken China's resistance against Japanese aggression.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

In the last few years I have had occasion to visit more than 15 provinces of China. Both on the front and in the deep rear, in occupied Shanghai and Manchukuo, representatives of various circles of China watch with grave concern the criminal activity of the traitors, turncoats, defeatists and saboteurs. Nevertheless they are unanimous in their confidence that all the plans to provoke civil war are doomed to failure since National China, in hard fighting, has accumulated much strength and will not permit the great national liberation cause of the Chinese people to die.

With inexhaustible strategic raw material resources and tremendous manpower reserves at its disposal, China has every possibility for victory over the enemy. The necessary conditions for this victory are the realization of radical measures for reorganizing the entire economy on a war footing, subordinating all economic life to the needs of the front and strengthening the armed forces against capitulation and defeatest moods, and most important, the genuine unity of all national forces in the struggle for freedom and national independence.

On the extent to which Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking leading circles will understand the importance of this principal condition and succeed in averting the danger of internal struggle in China, tortured by the enemies of the Chinese people—the inevitable consequence of which would be measures directed against the eighth and fourth armies and the Communist Party—rests whether the exhausting war forced upon the Chinese people by Japanese imperialism will be brought to a successful conclusion in the interests of the whole Chinese people.

Mr. CARTER. If I may, Mr. Chairman, if there is an extra copy of that, I would like to read it so as to get up to date on Communist writings, as Mr. Morris has implied I should have.

Mr. MORRIS. We will see an extra copy is made for you, Mr. Carter.

Now, you can recall that Mr. Rogov came to the United States in 1944?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take him to introduce him to important Government officials in Washington?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, I did. I introduced him to some of my colleagues in the IPR, from Canada and the United States and China, and so on, and I had a feeling, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. Now, listen to the question. It says "important public officials in Washington."

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a photostatic copy of a telegram that you sent to Alger Hiss, Department of State, dated January 17, 1944, and ask you if you can recall sending that telegram to Mr. Hiss?

Mr. CARTER. I take it that it isn't a very good photostatic job, and I can't read what it says, but just give me a minute, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Take your time.

Mr. MORRIS. This may be easier to read, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. That recalls that I sent the telegram.

Mr. MORRIS. This telegram, Mr. Chairman, reads:

My friend Vladimir Rogoff, Tass correspondent, en route Moscow to London. Will be Washington Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. Knows Chinese language, been China 5 years, was in Shanghai following Pearl Harbor until last March. Perhaps you, Hornbeck, would enjoy meeting him. If so please communicate Tass, Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date, and who was the addressee?

Mr. MORRIS. January 17, 1944, to Alger Hiss, State Department, Washington, D. C.

I would like to offer that into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. As to what the word "Tass" means, I think might be explained.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain to us what "Tass" was?

Mr. CARTER. I think Tass is the official news, or international news agency at least, of the Soviet Government, and it represents Soviet policy, and it is even more a government press agency than Reuters in England or Havas in France.

Mr. MORRIS. Anyone representing Tass would be a reliable Communist, in your opinion?

Mr. CARTER. So long as he held his job, the Kremlin would think he was reliable.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 17" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 17

[Western Union]

JANUARY 17, 1944.

ALGER HISS,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.:

My friend, Vladimir Rogoff, Tass correspondent, en route Moscow to London. Will be Washington Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. Knows Chinese language; been China 5 years; was in Shanghai following Pearl Harbor until last March. Perhaps you, Hornbeck, would enjoy meeting him. If so please communicate Tass, Washington.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer you a similar telegram, Mr. Carter, this one being addressed to Lauchlin Currie, Foreign Economic Administration, Temporary T Building, Washington, D. C., January 17, 1944, and I will ask you if you can recall sending that telegram?

Mr. CARTER. It is practically identical with the other telegram, and it has hand scratchings on it that makes me quite sure that I sent it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record and properly marked as the next exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, these markings on here, you do not place any significance on that, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't mean to place any significance on that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness called them hand scratchings, and so I wanted to get them designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 18" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 18

JANUARY 17, 1944

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Foreign Economic Administration,
Temporary T Building, Washington, D. C.:

My friend, Vladimir Rogoff, Tass correspondent en route Moscow to London. Will be Washington Wednesday, Thursday, Friday. Knows Chinese language; been China 5 years; was in Shanghai following Pearl Harbor until last March. Perhaps you would enjoy meeting him. If so please communicate Tass, Washington.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you select Alger Hiss and Lauchlin Currie to introduce Rogov around Washington?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Alger Hiss was at that time, I think, secretary to Stanley Hornbeck, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division, and as Hornbeck undoubtedly was interested, not only in the total China situation but the impact of Russian views on the situation, I thought it would be helpful, if Hornbeck desired it, to get from Rogov a definitely 100 percent Soviet Communist reaction to what was going on.

I ought to add that in my view, Rogov had a particular qualification in that (1) his English was perfect, and (2) his son had been at the American school in Shanghai, and he knew a good deal about American psychology; and also, he had a sense of humor like a good newspaperman, and you could josh him and say, "Now, you know that doesn't strike foreigners very well." And I thought as the Government was trying to get information and different points of view, that it would be useful for Rogov to see Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. May I break in for a minute? May I ask why you sent him to Alger Hiss, if you wanted him to see Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. Because Hiss, as Hornbeck's secretary, sat in his outer office and made appointments for him, and I don't know whether he determined who Hornbeck should see; and in the event that Hornbeck had to be out of Washington at that time, I thought probably Hornbeck's assistant secretary, Hiss, would be the best channel in case Hornbeck should want a memorandum on what Rogov had to say.

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't you testify, Mr. Carter, that Hornbeck was a friend of yours, and you knew him very well?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Why didn't you send him to Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. I thought this was the most courteous way for a humble private citizen to approach really a very important figure, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Alger Hiss very well at that time, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Not nearly as well as I knew Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. And yet you chose to send this telegram to Hiss to have Rogov meet Hornbeck, rather than to send Hiss down directly to your good friend Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. You mean send Rogov?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. I chose it, and I don't suppose I debated it for hours, and I thought it was a natural approach to Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Lauchlin Currie have at that time?

Mr. CARTER. I feel quite certain, as I said yesterday, that he was executive secretary to the President; and as I said yesterday, he was handling a certain amount of Chinese affairs for the President, and he was a man who traveled all over China, and he was—

The CHAIRMAN. He was in the White House at that time, was he not, as one of the assistants to the President?

Mr. CARTER. He was executive assistant to the President, on the White House telephone, in the White House offices.

Mr. MORRIS. At the same time, you knew Mr. Currie was also active in IPR, is that right, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Currie, I think—I am not certain—my impression is—

The CHAIRMAN. I think the question calls for a "Yes" or "No" answer, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. You understood that Mr. Currie had been active with IPR up until that time?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't understand it, because I don't believe it is a fact.

Mr. MORRIS. Had Mr. Currie been a member of the IPR conference in 1942?

Mr. CARTER. He had.

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't he have the chairmanship of one of the groups at that conference?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your recollection?

Mr. CARTER. My recollection is that he was a member of the American group, and I do not remember that he had any special status, and I could not remember that he was a member of the IPR. Some people went to conferences as members of the group without being members of the institute, and that I would have to look up.

Mr. MORRIS. You know he was a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. CARTER. Much later, and not all after he left Government service.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know he had an official position at the Mont Tremblant conference?

Mr. CARTER. He was one of 40 Americans, mostly non-Government officials, with the exception of Senator J. A. Thomas, who was a member of the group.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Alger Hiss active in IPR affairs?

Mr. CARTER. Never during his position in the State Department. After he joined the Carnegie Endowment, he became a member of the board of trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he never while he was in the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. He was never on the board when he was in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. He was active in IPR affairs?

Mr. CARTER. No. He cooperated, as scores of Washington officials and Congressmen and Senators cooperated.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you, Mr. Carter, a letter that you wrote to Alger Hiss, dated February 5, 1947. You wrote to him at the Carnegie Endowment, and you say here:

DEAR ALGER: Yesterday at your suggestion I had a delightful and illuminating talk with Robert T. Miller, whom I hope to see again. He brought me the good news that you had succeeded Dr. Butler as president of the endowment. I hope this will mean frequent visits to New York, if not permanent residence.

I do hope that Columbia University will be as eminently successful in getting a successor for Dr. Butler as the endowment has been.

The next time you are in New York, I hope you will telephone me, for I would like to have you come along and see our shop. You have done so much for the IPR in cooperation and wise advice that I am hoping this fine relationship can continue in your new post where we have so many common interests and problems.

If you are to be in New York on the evening of February 24, I hope you can accept the enclosed invitation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

I offer you that, and I will see if you can remember.

Mr. CARTER. I recall it without looking at it, and if I may have the privilege, I will say a word of comment at the appropriate time.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask a few questions, please. Who was Robert T. Miller?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that Robert T. Miller was associated with the State Department?

Mr. CARTER. I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember Robert T. Miller has, since February 5, 1947, been identified before a Senate congressional committee as a member of an espionage ring?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know that, and when you read the letter, the only thing in the letter that I couldn't remember was who the dickens Robert Miller was.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall who Robert Miller was?

Mr. CARTER. If your files would show what was the subject of the conversation, the whole thing might come racing back.

Mr. MORRIS. I was going to ask you about it. You said that you had a "delightful and illuminating talk with Robert T. Miller, whom I hope to see again," and I am reading your letter.

Did you ever write a letter like that?

Mr. CARTER. I think that I would remember——

The CHAIRMAN. Now, wait a minute. Did you have this meeting with Mr. Miller?

Mr. CARTER. I say so, and I did.

The CHAIRMAN. You were undoubtedly stating a fact when you wrote that letter.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. By my recalling Robert Miller was in the State Department at that time, can you recall now that conversation?

Mr. CARTER. No; it is just a blank, I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Robert Miller has been identified before a congressional committee as a member of an espionage ring?

Mr. CARTER. I never remember hearing it until 2 minutes ago when you stated it.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you say also in this letter: "You have done so much for the IPR in cooperation and wise advice," and will you tell us the extent of that cooperation and wise advice?

Mr. CARTER. Wasn't there another sentence, that "I wish you could come and visit our shop, our office"?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. CARTER. He never had been to the office, and he wasn't active enough to have come to the office. Repeatedly when I wanted to discuss with Dr. Hornbeck something, I would go along to the State Department office, and Hornbeck was behind on his schedule, and the receptionist would say, "Well, here is Mr. Hiss," and I would chat with him, and at that time he was, as you will remember, Senator, widely accepted as an efficient Government agent, and I would talk with him, whatever was to be my subject with Hornbeck, and then go in and see Hornbeck.

The CHAIRMAN. You were a frequent visitor at Hornbeck's office?

Mr. CARTER. I suppose I was a more frequent visitor at Hornbeck's office than any other official in State, War, Navy, or Treasury.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were a frequent visitor to Hiss' office, naturally?

Mr. CARTER. To the anteroom feature of it, and I saw Hornbeck much oftener than Hiss, because frequently Hiss would be somewhere away, and I would go in direct to Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, again, that you cannot recall a conversation with Mr. Miller, or any other dealings with Mr. Miller?

Mr. CARTER. I can't recall it, and I would be interested in finding out what it was about, and whether I brushed him off or whether he had some serious thing.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that you had a long and "illuminating" talk with him, and so you obviously didn't brush him off.

Mr. CARTER. I may have brushed him off, but I give him——

The CHAIRMAN. You illuminatingly brushed him off?

Mr. CARTER. I doubt if I would have brushed off a man whom the new president of the Carnegie Endowment sent to me, whether it was with reference to a building—there was talk of taking a site over at the United Nations for the Foreign Policy Association and the IPR, and the Council of Foreign Relations, and so on, and it may have been real estate, and I haven't any idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Mandel, will you at this point——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Mr. Carter, was not Mr. Hiss assistant to Mr. Hornbeck, and you designate him as a secretary, and he was assistant on the Far Eastern desk, is that not true?

Mr. CARTER. Without looking up the State Department register, I couldn't give a "yes" or "no," and he wasn't more than a stenographer.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not more than a stenographer?

Mr. CARTER. He clearly wasn't much more than a stenographer.

The CHAIRMAN. He was an assistant to Mr. Hornbeck, and is it not true that he had an office of his own, separate and apart from Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. You went in and there were two or three lady secretaries, and receptionists, and so on, and to the right was one of those old State Department lattice doors, and you went in to Hornbeck; and at the left you went in to Hiss, and it was a much smaller office, and as I remember it there was not a lattice door; and that was the geography of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would identify or introduce into evidence an excerpt from the testimony concerning Mr. Miller.

Mr. MANDEL. Excerpts from testimony in hearings regarding Communist espionage in the United States Government, before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, as follows:

Miss BENTLEY—Elizabeth

This is the testimony of Miss Bentley—

Besides——

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that?

Mr. MANDEL. (continuing):

Besides which we have two other people in the same office, so he did not carry on with him very long.

Mr. MUNDT. Who were the other two people?

Miss BENTLEY. One was Robert Miller, who was the head of the Research Division of the CIAA, and the other was Joseph Gregg, who was one of his assistants.

Mr. MUNDT. Was Mr. Miller a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you collect dues from him?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

That is page 531 of those hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that refresh your memory at all?

Mr. CARTER. No. I am also a little vague as to what the CIAA is.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Central Intelligence—we will have that in just a moment.

Mr. CARTER. Don't bother. There is an organization called the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and I couldn't conceive of that. Don't bother to look it up. I am not so sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, to get back to Mr. Hiss, Mr. Carter, Did you consult with Alger Hiss on the selection of delegates for the Mont Tremblant Conference?

Mr. CARTER. I would be likely—I couldn't say definitely—I would be likely to, because, for the first time at IPR conferences, because so many businessmen, journalists, and professors were in Government service, we made an exception and invited a number of Government servants from different countries to attend that conference in a private capacity, and Mr. Currie was one of those, and undoubtedly I would have run over with Hornbeck or——

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Did you confer with Mr. Hiss?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember, but it is likely.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you a telegram sent by Robert W. Barnett to you, Mr. E. C. Carter. The date is November 17, 1942, and it reads:

Hiss expresses admiration of Rajchman's incisive mind. Sees no objection his participating conference.

ROBERT W. BARNETT

I offer that, and ask you if you can recall having received that?

Mr. CARTER. It is not fully addressed, and I am willing to say I received it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer that into evidence, and ask it be marked as the next exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 19" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 19

[Western Union]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 17, 1942.*

E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Hiss expresses admiration Rajchman's incisive mind sees no objection his participating conference.

ROBERT W. BARNETT.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have a word of explanation here, and who is R-a-j-c-h-m-a-n?

Mr. MORRIS. Would you identify Mr. Rajchman?

Mr. CARTER. I am glad you can spell his name. He is a Polish doctor, a health officer in the Secretariat of the League of Nations for many years, and he was invited by Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong to make a public health survey in China, and I have forgotten whether it was in reference to plague or one of the great floods and the fevers that followed; and then, because of his very intimate association with T. V. Soong at the time of the Manchurian business, he lived in Soong's house and he became a friend, and when T. V. Soong was over in this country trying to get maximum aid for Chiang Kai-shek of a military character, T. V. Soong had a purchasing agency, and I don't know the name of it, and he invited several Americans and this Pole, or ex-Pole, Rajchman, to assist him in getting the maximum amount of purchases or lend-lease or military aid.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist, to your knowledge, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. He is just about the last man in the world I would picture as a Communist, but in the executive hearing you told me that he was now a member of the Polish Communist Party, and I accept it, but it seemed to me as incredible as if the chairman of this meeting joined the brethren.

The CHAIRMAN. That is rather incredible.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know whether I described him as a Polish Communist, now, but I would like Mr. Mandel to read into the record——

Mr. CARTER. You said he was.

Mr. MORRIS. I said he was an official of the Polish Communist Government, which is virtually the same thing, but I am being very careful with you, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. He is in the front door, anyhow.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read——

Mr. MANDEL. May I first establish the date of the Bentley testimony. It was July 31, 1948.

This is a letter dated July 24, 1951, addressed to the Honorable Pat McCarran, chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee, United States Senate; addressed from the Department of State, from H. J. L'Heureux, Chief of the Visa Division:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: "With reference to Mr. Mandel's inquiry of July 18, 1951, the records of the Department show that a passport visa as a nonimmigrant under section 3 (7) of the Immigration Act of 1924, as amended, was granted at the American Embassy at Warsaw, on October 17, 1950, to Ludwig Rajchman, bearer of Polish Passport No. S–000613, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a validity from October 14, 1950, to October 14, 1951, and the bearer of the passport was described as "Polish Government delegate to and Chairman of the Children's Emergency Fund of the United Nations."

Sincerely yours,

H. J. L'HEUREUX.

Mr. CARTER. May I ask, Mr. Mandel, does it state that the visa was granted, or that it was refused?

Mr. MANDEL. It does not state.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of that, Mr. Carter, is to show that he is an official of the present Polish Communist Government.

Mr. CARTER. I don't think it is terribly important, from my point of view, but I know for a considerable time he was, I think, the Chairman or the executive officer of the UN Children's Emergency Fund, and I heard of his doing a good deal of work in raising money for that.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the Polish Government delegate to that, wasn't he?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I mean the official record we have just made is that Mr. Rajchman was the Polish Government delegate to and Chairman of the Children's Emergency Fund of the United Nations.

Mr. CARTER. Then he was both a Polish Government official, and an official of a United Nations committee.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the official Polish Communist——

Mr. CARTER. This establishes also that he was a Pole, and I thought he might have become a Chinese or American citizen.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Robert W. Barnett, to get back to the other telegram?

Mr. CARTER. He is the son of Eugene Barnett, the national head of the American YMCA, and he was born in China and knew Chinese, and worked for a short time at the Institute of Pacific Relations, and then went out to General Chennault's staff, with the Eighth Air Force, in Kunming.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had that yesterday, as I recall.

Mr. CARTER. I didn't like to tell Mr. Morris he was asking a second question.

Now he holds some position in the State Department; and I have heard, but I couldn't swear to this, he sits up nights trying to prevent munitions getting to Communist China.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I would like to offer you a memorandum dated November 20, 1942, and the initials are R. W. B., obviously Mr. Barnett, and from you, Mr. Carter, and it reads:

We extended the Mont Tremblant invitation to Rajchman and he was very much pleased. He called to see me today to say that he believes it would be unwise for him to accept. His immigration status is such that he would have to get a reentry permit, and it might take him an unduly long time to get this, and he fears that there might be some embarrassment, because apparently someone in Mr. Breckinridge Long's office is not terribly keen on Rajchman and there might be complications.

Mr. CARTER. That I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the difficulty in Long's office, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I don't know whether this is for the record, but I suppose it is, because the gentleman of the press are here, and it is ancient history. And I described earlier, Senator, Dr. Rajchman's close association with T. V. Soong. T. V. Soong is a terribly dynamic man, as you know, a real American go-getter, and some of the people in lease-lend, or whatever the agency he was working with, sort of thought he worked things with a little too much high pressure, and they felt that Rajchman was sort of his intelligence officer, finding out what was going on in Senate committees.

The appropriate person in the State Department didn't think that that was, as the English say, "cricket," and so I think they were rather annoyed, slightly, with Soong, and slightly with Dr. Rajchman, who was non-Chinese and non-American, for being T. V. Soong's handyman.

Mr. MORRIS. It wasn't because of his Communist record?

Mr. CARTER. Personally, I am quite sure that there wasn't a breath of that. T. V. Soong would have him out on his ear if he suspected him of being a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. He had Dr. Chi around, didn't he?

Mr. CARTER. That was H. H. Kung, also of the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MORRIS. They could be fooled, couldn't they?

Mr. CARTER. And the other thing was, as you remember, there was quite a complicated thing——

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked a question, Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. They could be fooled, couldn't they?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I won't say anybody couldn't be fooled, but none of us are infallible all of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that that is the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, the last line of this memorandum reads:

You might pass this message on informally and orally to Hiss.

Now, why was it necessary that the message be passed on informally and orally to Hiss, that someone in Breckinridge Long's office was not terribly keen on Rajchman?

Mr. CARTER. I happened to know that Hiss' chief, Hornbeck, was not particularly happy over a remark of Rajchman that T. V. Soong knew within 15 minutes everything that happened in a confidential Senate committee, and that didn't sit very nicely, and I thought that Hornbeck would want to know it.

The CHAIRMAN. This is to go in evidence. We will accept this document in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 20" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 20

NOVEMBER 20, 1942.

RWB from ECC.

We extended the Mont Tremblant invitation to Rajchman and he was very much pleased. He called to see me today to say that he believes that it would be unwise for him to accept.

His immigration status is such that he would have to get a reentry permit. It might take an unduly long time to get this, and he fears there might be some embarrassment because apparently someone in Mr. Breckenridge Long's office is not terribly keen on Rajchman and there might be complications.

You might pass this message on informally and orally to Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, this CIAA means Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. CARTER. It wasn't Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was it necessary to send this message to Mr. Hiss through Barnett?

Mr. CARTER. May I see it again?

Mr. MORRIS. Why was it necessary to send it through Barnett?

Mr. CARTER. Barnett was in Washington, and I was in New York, and Barnett had talked, apparently, about this Rajchman man, and so it went to Hiss just as, frequently, if I had a communication from Mr. Hull, I would send it through Mr. Sumner Welles.

I will say, Senator, that Rajchman never came to the Mont Tremblant Conference. He was not a citizen of a country which was a member of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. And, of course, Mont Tremblant was in Canada, and it would require a reentry permit to go up there.

Mr. CARTER. And it would take a lot of time.

Mr. MORRIS. That series of questions was to bring out or in response to the question of Alger Hiss' associations with the IPR, and you recall this all started when we were discussing Vladimir Rogov, and your sending two telegrams to Alger Hiss and Lauchlin Currie to introduce him to certain people in Washington.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I show you a letter dated January 17, 1944, and it is addressed to Miss Rose Yardumian, Institute of Pacific Relations, 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington 6.

Would you identify Rose Yardumian?

Mr. CARTER. She was a Radcliffe graduate who for a short time served as a secretary in the Washington office of the IPR, which was maintained for the brief period during the war, because so many members of the IPR from China, Canada, Britain, France, and so on, were in Washington, and we wanted an opportunity to bring them up to date as to contact.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the secretary there in January of 1944, was she not, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. She was, and that was during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. And she was also the secretary in June of 1945, at the time that the Amerasia case broke, was she not?

Mr. CARTER. In June of 1945, the war was still on; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So when you say a brief period of time, I wish you would elaborate on that.

Mr. CARTER. I can't tell you.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you approximate it?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember what year during the war it was opened, and I know it was not opened at the very outbreak of the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I never suspected her of it, and I haven't seen her for many years.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is she now?

Mr. CARTER. I can't testify on that. She went out to UNRRA in China, and I think transferred there to the Chinese Industrial——

Mr. MORRIS. Did IPR help her to get a job with UNRRA?

Mr. CARTER. I very likely would have commended her for it if she asked me to.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, she worked with UNRRA in 1946, and in all likelihood she went from your office to UNRRA in 1946?

Mr. CARTER. I couldn't be sure, and if you have got testimony to that effect or evidence to that effect, I would gladly accept it.

Mr. MORRIS. I am taking this from one of your own publications here, Biannual Report of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944–46, and on page 11 you say:

> Early in 1946, Rose Yardumian, former Washington representative of the IPR, joined the staff of UNRRA in China, as did several other people.

So I am accepting your authority on that one, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. I still think, Senator, that IPR publications are reasonably accurate, and I accept that.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know where Rose Yardumian is now?

Mr. CARTER. Only by hearsay. She was in UNRRA, and she joined one of the agencies that Mr. Lewis and Paul Hoffman had maintained under United China relief, called Indusco, getting handicrafts going, and it is only hearsay, and I understand she married an Englishman and is now living in England, but I couldn't swear to that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to introduce into the evidence at this time, and first offer it to you, photostats of two publications, both of them are published in Communist China, and they are the same publications, but you will see the difference in a minute. One is the China Weekly Review, January 14, 1950, published in Shanghai, which was at that time Communist China, and I call your attention to the fact that one of the editors there, one of the three editors there is listed as Rose Yardumian. I offer that, and ask you to make any observation you would like to make on it.

Mr. CARTER. This is the first time I have seen this; and second, it is the first time I have heard that she was on the China Weekly Review; and third, the China Weekly Review, as you know, for many years was edited by a heroic newspaperman, J. B. Powell, and he lost a leg or a heel owing to Japanese torture, and he was pro-democratic.

Mr. MORRIS. Anti-Communist, wasn't he?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. And after his death, or after he left China, his son took over, and I understand his son has gone or left, and this would seem to indicate it. But I do remember a somewhat parallel case, in that the American-owned and edited Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury continued for some time in Shanghai after the Communists took over, and finally the Communists made it impossible for them to operate, and ultimately the American staff got out.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer Mr. Carter the China Weekly Review of December 1950, and the China Monthly Review of December 1950, late in the same year.

Mr. CARTER. Is that something different from the China Weekly Review?

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently the difference is in the time.. One is the China Monthly Review and the other is the China Weekly Review, and the editorial board is much the same.

I call your attention to the list of contributing editors, and here we have the name Rose Yardumian, and this is now December of 1950.

I think, just to describe the character of the publication, I have here in the Letters to the Editor column, under a headline "Brutal invasion," apparently the communication there to the editor:

America's invasion of Korea is many times more brutal and Fascist than Hitler's and Tojo's adventures, judging from the broadcasts by the American captives.

Now, I think that will dispel any doubt that you may have that that is a Communist publication, don't you think, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. It is following the Communist line, and I haven't studied it.

Mr. MORRIS. In a rather strident way.

Mr. CARTER. It seems to me going it whole hog and a little further.

The CHAIRMAN. I think at this time we will have to suspend for a few minutes. I have to go over and cast a vote, and I will be right back.

(Brief recess.)

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce both the photostat of the China Weekly Review of January 14, 1950, showing Rose Yardumian as one of the three editors as of that time, as well as a photostatic copy of the editorial page of the China Monthly Review of December 1950, showing Rose Yardumian as one of the contributing editors.

Now, before doing so, I would like to point out to Mr. Carter, you will notice among the contributing editors there the name of Hugh Deane. Is that the same Mr. Hugh Deane who was a member of the Washington chapter of IPR?

Mr. CARTER. He may have been, and I don't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be that he is the same, or he may have been a member of the Washington chapter.

Mr. CARTER. Both.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have both of those introduced into the record and have them so marked as the next exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record and so marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 21 and 22" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 21

[From the China Weekly Review, January 14, 1950]

THE CHINA WEEKLY REVIEW

J. B. Powell (Editor & Publisher, 1918-47)

John W. Powell, Editor & Publisher

Editors—Mary Barrett, Rose Yardumian, Alun Falconer.
Contributing Editors—William Berges, Tong Chun-cho, Chen Fu-sheng, Mark M. Lu, Galahad Wood, Julian Schuman, C. Y. W. Meng, Chiang Pi-hou, Lin Wo-chiang, Ngiam Tong Fatt, Hugh Deane, Duncan C. Lee, T. P. King, Shen Chien-tu, Betty C. Chang.
Fang Fu-an, Financial Editor
F. K. Chao, Business Manager
Chen Pang-cheng, Circulation Manager

EXHIBIT No. 22

CHINA MONTHLY REVIEW

J. B. Powell (Editor & Publisher, 1948-49)

John W. Powell, Editor & Publisher

Associate editor: Julian Schuman.
Contributing editors: Yen Chung-fah, Chen Fu-sheng, Mark M. Lu, Mary Barrett, Alun Falconer, C. Y. W. Meng, Rose Yardumian, Chiang Pi-hou, Lin Wo-chiang, Hugh Deane, Duncan C. Lee, T. P. King, Shen Chien-tu, Betty C. Chang, Wang Tsung-yen, Margaret Turner.
Fang Fu-an, Financial Editor
Chen Pang-cheng, Circulation Manager

Mr. MORRIS. Was it surprising to you that Rose Yardumian should have turned up as one of the editors for a paper published in Communist China?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, very. She left the IPR, I would say, over 5 years ago, and maybe six.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she related to Guenther Stein?

Mr. CARTER. You reminded me in executive session that her sister married Guenther Stein.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Guenther Stein?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I don't think you want me to repeat all of the biographical sketch.

Mr. MORRIS. Just tell what Guenther Stein's connections with the IPR have been.

Mr. CARTER. He wrote a number of articles, 6, 9, or 10, for IPR publications, at the time when he was also working for T. V. Soong. He was at one time regarded as one of the top economic journalists, having been on the Berlin Agis Verlag; and, not liking Hitler, went to London, and went to the Far East; and the Japanese militarists didn't like him, and he went to work for T. V. Soong in China. And later he was cited by the illustrious Sorge—a mystery and devilish spy who was shot or hung—and mentioned, Sorge mentioned that Guenther Stein accommodated him, and I think Guenther Stein denied it. And it was mentioned by spokesmen for MacArthur as though Guenther Stein had worked for Sorge. But then an officer at the Pentagon, of our United States Army, apparently withdrew or dissented from the statement.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you recall that Guenther Stein was mentioned by General MacArthur's headquarters as one identified by Richard Sorge as a participant in his espionage ring?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you also recall Guenther Stein was the IPR Chungking correspondent?

Mr. CARTER. He corresponded for us at Chungking, and whether he was labeled "correspondent," or not, I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall he was a delegate of British IPR to your Hot Springs convention?

Mr. CARTER. I remember that. The British had a very high regard for him, and I think he became a British citizen.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your impression of Guenther Stein today?

Mr. CARTER. The last time I saw him, he was anti-Nazi, and anti-Japanese and anti-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last see him?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, I should say very soon after the war, he came to this country. And he was asked to do a study——

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think that that goes to the question. Let us confine this, if we can.

Mr. CARTER. I am trying to recall, through the project that he was asked to undertake, about what the date was, and I would say roughly 1946 or 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. This all started again with this letter to Rose Yardumian, and now I would like to read this letter, and first I offer it to you, Mr. Carter, and I would like to read it:

Here is a copy of a telegram——

The CHAIRMAN. Let us identify this for the record.

Mr. CARTER. It is from Carter to Rose Yardumian, dated January 17, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS (continuing):

Here is a copy of a telegram I have just sent to Alger Hiss. Would you telephone him that I think Hornbeck and he would greatly appreciate a private talk with Rogoff.

I also enclose a copy of a telegram I have sent to Currie. You might phone Currie, too, telling him I think he would like to talk with Rogoff.

Will you telephone Rogoff at Tass Wednesday morning and ask him whether he would like you to arrange for him to visit the Library of Congress, the Mellon Gallery, or the IPR?

Will you also phone Colonel Faymonville in the Ordnance Department of the War Department, to say that I thought he would want to know Rogoff was in Washington. You could explain to Faymonville that Rogoff can be reached at the Tass office in Washington, and that he would be there on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.

Why did you think that Colonel Faymonville should want to see Rogoff?

Mr. CARTER. Faymonville had been United States military attaché in the United States Embassy in Moscow for a number of years, and he knew the Russian language, and he was always eager to meet Russians of all points of view, and he later became head of a military assistance program to Russia during the war, in the Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer that in evidence as the next exhibit and have it properly marked.

The CHAIRMAN. It is inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 23" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 23

NEW YORK 22, N. Y., *January 17, 1944.*

Miss ROSE YARDUMIAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
744 Jackson Place N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

DEAR ROSE: Here is a copy of a telegram I have just sent to Alger Hiss. Would you telephone him that I think Hornbeck and he would greatly appreciate a private talk with Rogoff. I also enclose a copy of a telegram I have sent to Currie. You might phone Currie, too, telling him I think he would like to talk with Rogoff.

Will you telephone Rogoff at Tass Wednesday morning and ask him whether he would like you to arrange for him to visit the Library of Congress, the Mellon Gallery, or the IPR.

Will you also phone Colonel Faymonville in the Ordnance Department of the War Department to say that I thought he would want to know Rogoff was in Washington. You could explain to Faymonville that Rogoff can be reached at the Tass office in Washington and that he will be there on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.

It may be that you would like to find out from Rogoff whether he would like to meet at the office four or five Congressmen like Judd and Fulbright. But don't make this suggestion if it clutters up the time which you may want to give to more urgent matters.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I now offer you a reply letter from Miss Yardumian dated January 20, 1944, and I will ask you if you if you will look at that, Mr. Carter, and ask if you can recall receiving that letter from Rose Yardumian?

Mr. CARTER. I now remember the letter, and it converts, slightly alters something that I said earlier about the article in War and the Working Class, and——

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask you a few questions on it? I want to call your attention to the opening paragraph:

I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the telegrams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morning and he told me that he had received your wire but was sure that I would understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff.

Will you tell us why Alger Hiss thought that she would understand that he could not be the first to make the advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff?

Mr. CARTER. Because the State Department had received this article of Rogoff's that you introduced earlier, from War and the Working Class, and they didn't like it, and they didn't think it was appropriate for them to go out of their way to receive a guy who had written something that they considered inaccurate.

Mr. MORRIS. You notice that you do recall that there was an article.

Mr. CARTER. This reminds me, and I had completely forgotten about it, because I had never seen it.

Mr. MORRIS. You also recall that the reason why Hiss was disturbed about this was because of the article?

Mr. CARTER. I now recall it, and compliment Hiss for thinking that it was not quite appropriate to run after a fellow who had written this kind of an article.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you so testify, Mr. Carter, when, after prompting your recollection four or five times, you had no recollection whatever of that particular article in War and the Working Class?

Mr. CARTER. What is the date of this?

Mr. MORRIS. January 20, 1944.

Mr. CARTER. I haven't a perfect memory, and I have thought of a good many things since, and I wasn't evading there, Senator. My mind is not an encyclopedia.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would Alger Hiss want not to be the first to make the advance in arranging this private talk?

Mr. CARTER. Well, Hornbeck's principal assistant, and therefore the spokesman for the Department.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the purpose of this meeting?

Mr. CARTER. I thought I indicated that earlier, that I thought—and this was not an initiative on the part of Hornbeck or anyone else in the State Department—I thought it was helpful to know what people who disagree with you think.

Mr. MORRIS. If that were the case, why wouldn't Hiss want it known that he was going to be the first to introduce him? I don't understand that at all, and why should Hiss be afraid to be the first one in bringing Rogoff in to see Stanley Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. He was a subordinate, and you would have to ask him, and I can't reconstruct Alger Hiss' mind.

Mr. MORRIS. It does give you a wrong impression when you read a letter like this, or maybe the right impression, doesn't it, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Well, it gave me the impression that Hiss was being correct and didn't want to involve the United States Government in a conversation with a man who technically, in the Russian sense, was not a representative of the Russian Foreign Office or of the Soviet Embassy here.

Now, you and I recognize Tass as part and parcel of the Soviet Government, but from—

Mr. MORRIS. Who would know if he brought him in to see Hornbeck?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I frequently meet alert men of the press who would coast down the aisles of the old Senate Building, or the old State Department Building, looking for something the American public could be interested in, and they were doing their job.

Mr. MORRIS. If Hiss was doing his job with Hornbeck and really out to get information out of Rogoff, why should he be so ashamed of that fact?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know that he was. He thought it was inappropriate, and it may have been simply the diplomatic thing of making an appointment to see a Soviet citizen who wasn't accredited as representing the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Alger Hiss always, to your knowledge, as correct in all of his dealings as you claim on that occasion?

Mr. CARTER. Personally, I never remember his doing a diplomatically incorrect thing, and I thought he was pretty well trained in State Department poise.

Mr. MORRIS. You see in the next sentence:

He mentioned the Rogoff articles in War and the Working Class and that Rogoff's material had caused considerable controversy in circles here.

Mr. CARTER. Naturally.

Mr. MORRIS (continuing):

He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's office, they would not refuse to see him.

Will you explain that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Well, certainly most State Department people in those days received foreign newspapermen from any country if they asked to see them.

Mr. MORRIS. I see in the next sentence Miss Yardumian said:

I am not sure that I understand the machinations of our State Department.

Mr. CARTER. I think that there have been other people in this room who take that same position.

The CHAIRMAN. You could have heard that on television last night.

Mr. MORRIS. In the next paragraph you have:

Mr. Currie has arranged to see Rogoff at 12 o'clock today.

Do you know what happened at that particular conversation?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS (continuing):

Colonel Faymonville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed to get in touch with our office then.

Do you remember what happened at the conversation with Faymonville?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I would like to turn over to the next page, Mr. Carter, and I draw your attention to the P. P. S. on this:

Rogoff and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last 2½ hours talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

Will you identify the people mentioned in that postscript?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know who the "Bill" was, but something may reveal it; and Lattimore has been mentioned once or twice, and I think this committee has seen him in executive session; and Remer is a high-ranking professor of economics at the University of Michigan.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he at that time, do you know, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I think probably he was in some Government agency, and I haven't any idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he the head of the Far Eastern Section of OSS?

Mr. CARTER. He might have been. I should think he would be more in an economic job, but OSS tried to do everything.

Mr. MORRIS. That was January 20, 1944. What was Mr. Lattimore's assignment, do you know?

Mr. CARTER. I have quite forgotten the dates.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was "Vincent" mentioned there?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably Mr. John Carter Vincent, who has a middle name like mine, no blood relation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position in early 1944? Was he head of the China Desk then?

Mr. CARTER. I should think so, and the record would show, and at one time he was head of the China Desk succeeding Max Hamilton, who immediately succeeded Stanley Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could "Bill" there be Bill Johnstone, who is mentioned in another part of the letter?

Mr. CARTER. It might very well be, because Johnstone then, who was at the university here, was quite active in the Washington branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I think a member of our national board.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what transpired at that particular meeting, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't think that I was ever sent any report.

Mr. MORRIS. Even after you had sent Rogoff down there to arrange for all of these conferences?

Mr. CARTER. No. I was not interested in the outcome. I thought it was a useful opportunity for people to meet a Russian who spoke good English and who knew China thoroughly well, and who had a sense of humor and could crack little jokes in the American vernacular, and he never stood on a high horse the way most of the Soviet diplomats did.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, do you have any questions on that particular thing?

The CHAIRMAN. I have no questions at this time, no.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to offer you a letter dated June 20, 1941, and it is from you to Owen Lattimore, and it reads here:

> If you have time while in San Francisco, you and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville, whose present address is Headquarters of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriette Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking.
>
> If you wish me to, I will wire him for an appointment.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> EDWARD C. CARTER.

And I offer you that, and ask you if you can recall that particular letter?

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Do you recall that letter?

Mr. CARTER. I recall the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on it?

Mr. CARTER. I would be delighted.

As indicated, Philip Faymonville became Brigadier General Faymonville, and was a very highly rated ordnance officer who was then in the Presidio in California.

As I indicated earlier, he had unusually wide knowledge of the Russian language, the Russian people.

As I did not indicate earlier, he had been our attaché in Japan and had learned Japanese and thus knew a good deal of the Far Eastern complex.

Would this, Mr. Morris, have been just before Lattimore went to Chungking for Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, that was before that time.

Mr. CARTER. When it was under consideration, presumably?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. CARTER. Here I say that I think Faymonville might be exceptionally useful to Lattimore and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at some future time in Chungking.

What I had in mind then was that the Generalissimo's two question marks—one was Japan, and the other was Russia—Chiang Kai-shek was in quite intimate relations with the Soviet authorities.

Mr. MORRIS. I have identified Colonel Faymonville here. You say:

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday.

Can you remember what luncheon that was?

Mr. CARTER. I think the luncheon we had with a number of our Kuomintang friends.

Mr. MORRIS. This is June 1941. Perhaps I might help your recollection by pointing out this is 2 days before the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union. Can you remember whom you had lunch with at that particular time?

Mr. CARTER. I remember talking with a number of Chinese friends, Nationalist Chinese friends, and the latter part makes me wonder whether it wasn't at a time when all Americans wanted to help Chiang Kai-shek in being as strong as possible and having as many allies as possible in withstanding aggression.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Harriet Moore?

Mr. CARTER. Harriette Moore had been, or was, at that time, a member of the IPR staff, a graduate of Bryn Mawr, who worked competently on our staff for some time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You were associated with Russian War Relief?

Mr. CARTER. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember if she was secretary of Russian War Relief?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember David Dubinsky, the head of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union who refused to make any contributions to that as long as Harriet Moore remained as secretary?

Mr. CARTER. I remember. I remember he was photographed with me, handing me a check of $25,000 or $50,000 for Russian relief.

Miss Moore was still on the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Moore was no longer secretary?

Mr. CARTER. No. She insisted if Dubinsky did not like it, or he wanted to get her to resign that she remain on the board, even though members of the board thought she was invaluable and she wasn't a Communist. She insisted for the good of the organization to resign as secretary.

Allen Wardwell, a very distinguished New York lawyer, succeeded her. She remained on the board until the end. She was mixed up with another Harriette Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. Not by Mr. Dubinsky?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes. I had several hours with Mr. Dubinsky later after he made his protest. He conceded there must have been another Harriet Moore. That Rarriet Moore was 10 years older and 6 inches shorter than the other Harriet Moore.

I have in the other room a statement from the Garment Workers in warm support of what we were aiming to do in cooperating with our Soviet allies.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should take a break at this time to introduce any testimony on Harriet Moore. We will come to that later.

Let us go back to this letter.

Harriette Moore and you had a favorable impression of Colonel Faymonville. What was that impression?

Mr. CARTER. Very competent as an ordnance officer in which we were not experts; a man who knew Japan and Russia and was an American.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your recollection that the occasion that you had lunch on the previous Wednesday was that you had it with some Chinese officials?

Mr. CARTER. That is my memory, but I couldn't swear to it, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce another letter at this time, into the record. I would like to offer that, a letter dated June 23, 1941. This is a letter to Philip Jessup, care of American Express, Santiago, Chile. It is sent by Edward C. Carter. The date is June 23, 1941. The last paragraph reads (and in the meantime this same week end Hitler has invaded the Soviet Union):

I wonder whether you happened to hear Churchill's speech yesterday.

That is Churchill's speech announcing that the British people, or, rather, the British Empire, was going to support the Soviet Union against Hitler.

Mr. CARTER. It was one of the greatest offerings in English literature and democratic statesmanship.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill managed quite a spectacular week end. It so happened that last week I had lunch with Oumansky in Washington on Wednesday. We talked for a couple of hours.

That is the same date, is it not?

Mr. CARTER. (Nodding affirmatively.)

Mr. MORRIS (continuing):

We talked for a couple of hours. I was fortunate in getting Lattimore over from Baltimore, as I thought it was pretty important for him to have a long talk with Oumansky, in view of his job and the evolving world situation. It was a most illuminating 2 hours.

Will you concede that was the same luncheon?

Mr. CARTER. I would want to look at the record a little further. If you have got things that will refresh my mind——

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy of that second letter in front of you?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you look at the dates of both letters—June 23, 1941, and June 20, 1941?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Apparently quite clearly I wrote that letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you concede that the Wednesday preceding both of those dates was June 18?

Mr. CARTER. I would say it is likely. I can't prove it.

Mr. MORRIS. You are talking about the same luncheon in both cases, are you not?

Mr. CARTER. Occasionally in Washington I happened to have two luncheons.

Mr. MORRIS. This lunch lasted 2 hours.

Mr. CARTER. I think you are pretty sure that it was the same luncheon. I am willing to take your view.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it wasn't a luncheon you had with some Communists, Chinese Communist officials?

Mr. CARTER. Chinese nationalists.

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry. It was a luncheon you had with Mr. Oumansky.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show the witness nodded his head affirmatively to that last question.

You cannot get that into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice you say:

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday.

Will you describe the atmosphere that prevailed at the luncheon with Mr. Oumansky in Washington on the previous Wednesday?

Mr. CARTER. Which paragraph is that "at home" business?

Mr. MORRIS. This is on the June 20 letter.

Mr. CARTER. Faymonville had a principal interest on the part of the United States Government for several years. His interest was Russia. He was eager to meet all sorts of Russians who could bring him up to date. He was particularly interested because Oumansky at that time, if I remember rightly, saw little chance of America going to war with Japan, and I was, myself, certain that Japan was going to take the initiative and we would be in a state of war with Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to call your attention to the time of this. It is June 20, 1941. This is during the Hitler-Stalin pact. That was not at a time when the Soviet Union was friendly with the United States.

Mr. CARTER. Quite the opposite.

Mr. MORRIS. Yet, you say at luncheon the political atmosphere was one that you would say that you were at ease with Mr. Oumansky?

Mr. CARTER. Because Mr. Lattimore and I were telling Oumansky that we thought that he was all wet in thinking that a state of war between Japan and the United States was not imminent. We thought it was.

Faymonville, having been in Japan, knew a great deal about the Japanese military expansion movement, and Oumansky at that time and all times was a persona non grata, to say the least, with most American correspondents.

Mr. MORRIS. He wasn't persona non grata with you?

Mr. CARTER. He wasn't a very useful contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he at ease at luncheon?

Mr. CARTER. He is always at ease.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he at ease at luncheon?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you use the expression "he would have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea"?

What do you mean by that?

Mr. CARTER. There would be a scrap on, and Oumansky in his very dogmatic self-assured way would take one position that Lattimore and I would consider in a different vein and would take a diagonally opposite position.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would Colonel Faymonville be at home?

Mr. CARTER. Because it was two Americans against a Russian, and the two American happened to be right, and the Russian was wrong.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that very well now?

Mr. CARTER. It comes back to me.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time you had no recollection?

Mr. CARTER. I thought it was another luncheon. I nearly always try to break all the hygienic rules by using the luncheon time to see people.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Oumansky? Tell us who he was at that time.

Mr. CARTER. Some people at the press table could give a better picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind. Tell us.

Mr. CARTER. Oumansky was a Russian Communist, a militant Communist. He had been, I think, press officer for the Russian Foreign Office in Moscow. Later he came as Ambassador to this country.

It so happened in one of my several visits to Moscow, trying to get the Soviet scholars interested in the Orient to form a Soviet chapter of the IPR, I was finally channeled to Oumansky's office. I had a long talk with him.

The Soviet officials had been negative before Oumansky listened, asked for IPR documents; said that he thought the IPR had proved itself as a scholarly and useful organization and that he had no power to say whether or not a decision would be made to form a Soviet IPR, but he would take it up with the highest quarters.

You can guess who that was.

That I might never hear from him again, or I might be called back, he said.

A few months later I was called back and the Soviet IPR was organized.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it organized in the highest quarters at that time when you were called back?

Mr. CARTER. Apparently high quarters approved the idea. The people I met were so-called researchers on Asia and the Pacific.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you realize at the same time that Mr. Oumansky was an important intelligence agent for the Soviet Union?

Mr. CARTER. He was in the Foreign Office. I think his contact with the foreign press was not only to give hand-outs to the Times and the Tribune and Writers, et cetera, but to get as much dope as he could from them.

They were always working on a two-way proposition.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, do you have any more questions?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have the record made clear on a very small point.

Have you been here describing what you meant by your reference "being at home" in the letter that has been discussed at some length, or have you been only describing what you might have meant?

Mr. CARTER. It is a darn good question.

What year was this?

Mr. MORRIS. This is 3 days before the Soviet invasion by Hitler, during the Hitler-Stalin pact, June 20, 1941.

Mr. CARTER. My memory is pretty accurate on that thing. It was a big historic moment. Some of us saw the Japs were all ready. I had so much contact with the Japanese to know what their time table was.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think you are answering the question at all. I think you had better get to the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought he was getting around to it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not want to be here all afternoon.

Mr. CARTER. I am speaking from memory, not hypotheses.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have now testified as to what you did mean by your reference to the fact that Colenel Faymonville would have been very much at home at this luncheon?

Mr. CARTER. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were a moment or so earlier testifying on the theory that the luncheon had been with a group of Chinese nationalists, that was testimony as to what you might have meant?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. I gave that provisionally. I said I am not sure, but I thought it might have been that.

Mr. MORRIS. The two statements, one that you have a very vivid recollection of what happened in view of the particular crisis in history does not square with your statement earlier when it was recognized you had luncheon with some Chinese officials at that time.

Mr. CARTER. I think the human mind remembers some things very much more vividly than others. It is a sort of automatic psychological process.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that? Follow that through, please.

Awhile ago you demonstrated you did not recall what had happened at that particular occasion.

Mr. CARTER. You remember when you married your wife, but you cannot always remember the birthday of your ninth child.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your answer?

Mr. CARTER. I have not nine children; I wish I had.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what your relations have been with Harry Dexter White?

Mr. CARTER. Very slight.

At a time when it looked to some that Mr. Hull, to prevent war between the United States and Japan, might concede certain Japanese demands, Mr. White——

Mr. MORRIS. This must be November 1941; is it not?

Mr. CARTER. I should imagine so. That was when, I think, Nomura was here following Horiunuchi as Japanese Ambassador.

I got an urgent telegram from Harry White asking me to come to Washington. I had no idea what he wanted.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know him at that time?

Mr. CARTER. As I remember, he was only a name of a financier who was influential in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to get to that again. I want you to answer that question fully.

Mr. CARTER. I didn't know him well.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, please?

Mr. CARTER. I got down and saw him. He apologized. He said that the situation was such that every friend of China could be satisfied. They were not going to concede China to the Japs and they were telling or had told the Japanese that they could not accept the Japanese terms by which Japan would have a predominant influence in China.

I also met him after the war. I was returning from a trip to the Far East and to the Near East and the Soviet Union on Mr. Harriman's plane with Donald Nelson and Colonel Kessler and John Hazard. We stopped to refuel and rest in Cairo.

We dined at the American Embassy or Legation in Cairo. Mr. White was coming or going on some Government mission. We had dinner at the Embassy with 20 guests. I may have had 5 minutes' conversation with him. I may have seen him once or twice since.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was this?

Mr. CARTER. The Cairo dinner must have been shortly after VE-day and VJ-day.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. White had asked you to come to Washington to help persuade Mr. Hull from making this proposal, or accepting this proposal?

Mr. CARTER. To talk it over to see if there was anything that private citizens or Government servants could do to make certain we did not sell out China to Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you making reference now to the proposed modus vivendi which was widely discussed at that time? I think you recall that was a proposition that there be a truce effected between Japan and the United States. It was first advanced by the American military authorities on the grounds they wanted more time to prepare for what they thought was the impending attack by the Japanese?

Mr. CARTER. I don't at the moment remember that aspect of it.

There were rumors that Mr. Hull, who had been playing golf with, I think, Admiral Nomura, or the top Japanese representative in this country, playing golf week ends, that he was being persuaded by the Japanese that by right of conquest and because Japan was so much more civilized they should really be in China as the British were in India; they had a God-given mission of civilization to give to the poor Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, what did you do to dissuade Mr. Hull from accepting that?

Mr. CARTER. I did nothing, because when I arrived the next morning, after getting the telegram, Mr. White assured me that everything was all right and there was going to be no sell-out of China through Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you discuss this with Mr. Currie at that time in Washington?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't the faintest memory. I may have, and may not.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a crucial time.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You had testified awhile ago you have a short memory when it comes to great events in history. It is a few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Did you discuss this with Mr. Currie?

Mr. CARTER. I can't answer "yes" or "no." It would be very likely because Currie was worried as a friend of China.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know he was worried?
Mr. CARTER. I talked with him long before.
Mr. MORRIS. How long before?
Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. So, you did discuss this?
The CHAIRMAN. Of whom are you speaking?
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Currie.
You did discuss this with Mr. Currie?
Mr. CARTER. Not necessarily the White-Hull business, but the trend in certain sections of the American public was "let's wash our hands of the whole Far East and let the Japs run China."
Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a letter you sent to Mr. Tarr on November 29, 1941.
Who was Mr. Tarr?
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Tarr at various times had been governor of the Bank of Canada in Ottawa. He is head of the second- or third-largest insurance company—I have forgotten its name—with headquarters in Winnipeg. He had been for many years chairman of the Canadian affiliate of the IPR and for some years chairman of the Pacific Council, one of the wisest, most intelligently conservative of Canadians consulted constantly by Canadian Prime Ministers of different political parties.
Mr. MORRIS. I would like to read a paragraph from this letter. This is November 29, 1941, and the second paragraph reads:

Yesterday Elmhirst and I saw Currie who, as I wired you——

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is this letter written?
Mr. MORRIS. This is Mr. Carter's letter.

Yesterday Elmhist and I saw Currie who, as I wired you, has not yet been able to see the President. I should think that Currie probably had a terribly anxious time for the past week. For a few days it looked as though Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river. Currie did not say this, but I learned it from other high sources. Currie was a little apologetic for not having pressed our idea further, but I knew something of his difficulties and they are not due to lack of interest.

Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Carter? I offer you this.
Mr. CARTER. He was my chief at that time; at least an old friend.
Do you want me to identify Elmhirst?
Mr. MORRIS. No.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the question now?
Mr. MORRIS. Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Carter?
Mr. CARTER. Yes. I mentioned a lot of friends—General McCoy, Whitney Shepardson——
Mr. MORRIS. I don't mean those names. You recall you did discuss this matter with Currie?
Mr. CARTER. Clearly, because I say so.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall what you discussed with Currie?
Mr. CARTER. That is a little more difficult in spite of this.
Mr. MORRIS. Try to recall without reading the rest of the letter, Mr. Carter.
You are not responsive. Mr. Holland does not need that, Mr. Carter. I am asking you for your recollection of that particular occasion. I wish you would not look at the rest of the letter.
Please recall what you can at this juncture without looking at the rest of the letter.

Mr. Chairman, the witness is being unresponsive.

The CHAIRMAN. He is trying to get his recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. I am asking for his reaction without his reading the letter.

Mr. CARTER. Could I react to the letter if I don't know what is in it?

The CHAIRMAN. The human mind is rather peculiar. A man can remember whether he dined in Cairo and who was present, but he might not remember some other great event. So we have to be patient on this.

Mr. CARTER. I think at that time we were being urged by a certain Frenchman and some other British and some Dutch to hold a North Atlantic conference. People in Europe who knew the IPR believed that the IPR rendered as an unofficial organization very real service to the public in its research and conferences on the Pacific.

Mr. MORRIS. Without breaking in, this question concerns your conversation with Mr. Currie about the possible sell-out, as you put it, of China on that particular occasion?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you ought to address your answer to the question, Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. The British and French were concerned with the sell-out in China, as well as ourselves. The British and French at the same time thought that unofficial gatherings of people in the Atlantic would be helpful as they had been in the Pacific. They were talking with a number of people.

Currie himself was originally a Canadian.

Mr. St. Laurent, the present Prime Minister of Canada, attended that meeting, though he was not in office at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Owen Lattimore was strongly urging the rejection of the modus vivendi that had been proposed by the American military authorities?

Mr. CARTER. I don't, because I don't remember that 90-day proposal.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, a dispatch to Lauchlin Currie from Chungking on November 25, 1941.[1]

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 24," and is as follows:)

CHUNGKING, *November 25, 1941.*

LAUCHLIN CURRIE: After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any modus vivendi now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

LATTIMORE.

[1] Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, pts. 13–14, 1945, p. 1160.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Lattimore's position at that time, November 25, 1941?

Mr. CARTER. Was he political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MORRIS. I am asking you.

Mr. CARTER. If you understand it that way, it is my understanding.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Lauchlin Currie? What position did he have at that time?

Mr. CARTER. I am quite sure he was executive assistant to the President of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Here is a dispatch dated Chungking, November 25, 1941, and it reads:

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. The loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan had its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any modus vivendi now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road which permanently destroyed British prestige.

I would like to offer this dispatch if I have not already done so.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been received.

Is that the dispatch from Mr. Currie?

Mr. MORRIS. From Lattimore to Lauchlin Currie, who was then executive assistant to the President. It is dated November 25, 1941. I introduced it in connection with Mr. Carter's testimony that he did have a discussion with Mr. Currie; also in connection with this letter which I now introduce into evidence from Mr. Carter to Mr. Tarr to the effect that Mr. Currie was very much disturbed and had been taking action against the modus vivendi, and connected with the fact that Harry Dexter White called you to Washington from New York and asked you in your representative capacity if you would go down and use your influence to prevent the modus vivendi from being accepted, at least prevent any truce with Japan to be accepted.

The CHAIRMAN. That letter will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 25" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 25

NEW YORK, N. Y., *November 29, 1941.*

EDGAR J. TARR, ESQ.,
Monarch Life Assurance Co.,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.

DEAR TARR: Lockwood has talked to Shepardson and McCoy, who seemed favorable but not yet enthusiastic. I imagine a reenactment of the Gladstone meeting is essential to get them to see the significance of the proposed conference.

Yesterday Elmhirst and I saw Currie who, as I wired you, has not yet been able to see the President. I should think that Currie probably had a terribly anxious time for the past week. For a few days it looked as though Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river. Currie did not say this but I learned it from other high sources. Currie was a little apologetic for not having pressed our idea further, but I knew something of his difficulties and they are not due to lack of interest.

In order to keep the matter alive I asked Currie whether he would be willing to spend a couple of hours some evening with a few of us, examining the whole problem, and he said he would be delighted to do this. Now your letter of

November 27 has come indicating that you could be here on the morning of the 5th. If I did not have to go to Cleveland I would propose immediately to Currie that we have the little meeting I proposed to him in Washington on the 5th, but as Holland and I are committed to the week-end conference in Cleveland that seems to be ruled out. As a substitute I have suggested to Emeny that he invite Currie and you to the IPR week-end conference in Cleveland on the sixth and seventh in the hope that the Washington meeting might be arranged between sessions there. I might be able to get Currie for an evening meeting on December 8 in Washington, if you could stay in the East that long. Won't you wire me on receipt of this letter?

Wherever the meeting is held, I would hope that you and Lockwood and Holland and Elmhirst could be present, and if in Washington we would make every effort to have Shepardson and McCoy present. Perhaps the best plan would be to take it in two jumps, namely to call a long luncheon meeting for Friday, December 5, here in New York to be attended by McCoy, Shepardson, Elmhirst, Lockwood, Holland, and Tirana and myself. I think we might get Dellard and Willite to come to such a meeting, though personally I am not at all worried about getting the meeting financed so long as it is agreed that the meeting is desirable.

I am asking Lockwood to see whether he can get McCoy and Shepardson for lunch on Friday provided you can join us. Will you wire me as to whether you could come to New York for such a luncheon discussion as I have just proposed?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. CARTER. I did not say that. I did not recall the details of this trust, but apparently I was following the Chiang Kai-shek-Lattimore-Currie line that any concession to Japan was hostile to the best interest of either the United States or Nationalist China and that we ought to continue to aid Chiang to the maximum of our ability.

Mr. MORRIS. You had known Owen Lattimore for a long time?

Mr. CARTER. Since 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever since 1943 noticed any concern on Mr. Owen Lattimore's part or the generalissimo?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean he is well disposed?

Mr. CARTER. Since 1933, you mean?

Mr. MORRIS. 1943.

Hasn't Owen Lattimore been one of the principal opponents of the generalissimo since 1943?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I would have to look up the record, or ask you to refresh me. I know that since the war he has expressed doubt as to whether Chiang Kai-shek has the ability to keep the businessmen, the bankers, and intellectuals and masses of China behind him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what Harry Dexter White's attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek was since 1943?

Mr. CARTER. I have never read or heard anything one way or the other on that.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Currie's attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek after 1943?

Mr. CARTER. You would have to ask him, unless you have something I have read, which I don't remember having done.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the congressional disclosures and testimony before the congressional committees that Harry Dexter White was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I have not read the original text. I read some of the newspaper summaries and, personally, it was inconceivable to me that Harry Dexter White should be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard the testimony before congressional committees that Lauchlin Currie gave information to an espionage ring in Washington?

Mr. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Your telegram was to be inserted in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That has been introduced, Mr. Chairman.

If necessary, Mr. Chairman, we have Mr. Mandel, who can read the testimony about Mr. Harry Dexter White.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think so.

Mr. MORRIS. I might say, Mr. Chairman, on these issues, we are going to have testimony later on. I do not think we should break in at this time.

I would like to ask you, inasmuch as you mentioned J. B. Powell in a favorable vein, as anti——

Mr. CARTER. Anti-Japanese, anti-Communist. That is the father, the senior.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall an article that J. B. Powell and Max Eastman wrote in the Reader's Digest in 1945?

Mr. CARTER. You have got a copy.

Mr. MORRIS. No. I am asking you to go back to your often vivid recollection.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember it specifically. I would have to see it. It probably might flash back to me.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to offer you a letter. It is from you, Edward C. Carter, to Owen Lattimore. The date is June 19, 1945. It reads:

DEAR OWEN: Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to the One Hundred and sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and probably will be gone all summer. I explained the general situation to the son, and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and finally suggested the possibility of his father. He thought it would be better for me to approach him than for him to do so, so he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday.

He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him with as strong and tactful letter as I can write on the off chance that he might be willing to do something.

Does that now recall anything to you?

Mr. CARTER. I remember considering a letter that might conceivably be signed by Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co. He occasionally writes a rather thoughtful letter to the New York Times. He found I was not in North Haven, Maine. I found his banker son, Thomas S. Lamont, was away and so I went to the third string, his other son, who is a professor at Columbia, his first name being Corliss.

This is the report on that.

Mr. MORRIS. What particular letter did you want written at this time?

Mr. CARTER. What is the date of this?

Mr. MORRIS. This is June 19, 1945. I have already refreshed your recollection, Mr. Carter, to the extent we are talking about J. B. Powell and Max Eastman.

Mr. CARTER. Undoubtedly it was some possible trend in American Government policy that I didn't think was in the American interest. At the moment I can't recall what the issue was.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is it necessary for you to write to Owen Lattimore in this fashion?

Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to One Hundred Sixty Sixth Street and saw the son.

Why is it necessary to use that language? That is an extraordinary way to address a letter.

Mr. CARTER. I don't think so. Ghost writing isn't always publicized. I mean the ghost isn't.

Mr. MORRIS. You are writing to an old friend of yours, Owen Lattimore. Why should it be necessary for you to call Lamont as the son? Were you doing something you didn't want anyone else to know about?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't make it confidential.

Mr. MORRIS. No, it is not marked confidential.

The CHAIRMAN. You might answer that question: Were you doing something you didn't want anyone else to know about?

Mr. CARTER. I think undoubtedly someone in our shop was to do some ghost writing for another person—I have never known it was good etiquette to advertise that very usual American procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Corliss Lamont?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you spoken on the same platform with him?

Mr. CARTER. I think once in a war relief—I think on one ocassion, something that used to be Mecca Temple where I spoke on the same platform, but under what auspices I think I would say it was Russian relief, but it may have been some other organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Corliss Lamont a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you be so sure of that?

Mr. CARTER. I think he has done a great deal to put certain aspects of Russian policy in a good light before the American people, but it would take a long time to build up piece by piece why I do not think he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You were fooled on Dr. Chi, were you not?

Mr. CARTER. I will not admit that I was fooled, that Dr. Chi was a Communist while he was working for the IPR. Many years later, like hundreds of Chinese Nationalists, he went over to the Communists.

I think the fact that a man eventually becomes a Communist does not prove that he was always a Communist any more than it proves that a person who has been a Communist is always a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comment to make on the articles we introduced under the pseudonym of Han-Seng Chen? I mean in a Communist publication by Dr. Chi.

Mr. CARTER. I have not read the article, so I wouldn't like to comment.

Mr. MORRIS. I also would like to introduce at this time an additional letter. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that this letter from Rose Yardumian as well as the one from Mr. Carter, may have been properly introduced, but if not, may I introduce them now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 26" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 26

AMERICAN COUNCIL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
Washington, January 20, 1944.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the telegrams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morning and he told me that he had received your wire but was sure that I would understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff. He mentioned the Rogoff articles in War and the Working Class and that Rogoff's material had caused considerable controversy in circles here. He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's office, they would not refuse to see him. I am not sure that I understand the machinations of our State Department. Bill Johnstone saw no point in my trying to get in touch with Mr. Hornbeck directly, since presumably Hiss had consulted with Hornbeck.

Mr. Currie has arranged to see Rogoff at 12 o'clock today. Colonel Faymonville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed to get on touch with our office then.

Rogoff visited our offices yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little talk with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 5:30. Rogoff said that he thought that it was unwise for us to hold the meeting; that certain Chinese groups in Washington were very distressed at the fact that he was talking so much. He thinks that it would be bad for the Institute of Pacific Relations to have him speak under its auspices. Bill and Anne Johnstone had hoped to get a small group of people together at their home this evening—the Hornbecks, Remers, Blakeslees, and a few others—but time is very short and many of these people have already made plans for this evening, so the Johnstone idea will probably not come off. However, Rogoff is coming in to our office at 2 o'clock today; Bill is planning to take him to the Cosmos Club to talk with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Carter Vincent. After he talks with these people, we are making arrangements to take him to the Library of Congress and a few other places.

I am sorry that our meeting did not work out for him as I know that there are many people here who would have enjoyed hearing him.

Sincerely yours,

Rose,
ROSE YARDUMIAN.

P. S.—I am enclosing a list of the Army-Navy people who have accepted to date.

P. P. S.—Rogoff and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last 2½ hours talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

BALLARD LITTLE.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce by reference one more document, and that is a photostat from the Workers Monthly. This has an early date on it. This is December 1925.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 27" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 27

Positive print of workers monthly with picture of C. T. Chi.
(Filed in biographical folder.)

Mr. MORRIS. This is a picture of C. T. Chi, according to this.

I offer that picture and ask you if you can identify this man here. Is that your friend, Dr. Chi?

Mr. CARTER. It is a damn poor picture. I wouldn't want to stand up and swear that is Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. That is 1925.

Mr. CARTER. Yes; but it is quite a different head, hair cut and avoirdupois, et cetera.

Mr. MORRIS. That is an unusual name, C. T. Chi.

Mr. CARTER. Oh, no.

Is Smith an unusual name?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to read the inscription with this caption here:

The world of imperialism is passing. Let us join hands with all enemies of imperialism, disregarding race, creed, or nationality—C. T. Chi of the Chinese students alliance who addressed the Congress on anti-imperialism.

Mr. Mandel, would you testify as to the nature of this publication we are discussing?

Mr. MANDEL. The Worker's Monthly, a copy of which I have here, on its masthead, states that it is published by the Daily Worker Society.

At that time that was a Communist publication. The picture was published in connection with an article on the first Negro Workers Congress by Robert Minor, a leader of the Communist Party at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interrupt, please, Mr. Mandel has stated that he has the original there. If Mr. Carter could look at the picture in the original which would be black on white instead of white on black, he might make the identification.

Mr. CARTER. This is even more unlike him, in my view. To satisfy me, which is not your business, I would want a little more documentary evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a witness who will testify on this particular score, but I prefer not to introduce this testimony at this time.

May I get back to this letter of June 1945. This is the second paragraph.

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly, and this is at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. This possiblity is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria, etc. While you put it in reverse, I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of avoiding this?

Does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You now recall the article in question?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I have already.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent?

Mr. CARTER. I have not been able to remember the contents of the Reader's Digest article, or whether I saw it or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you see in this matter? Who worked on this project? Isn't it so this is a joint effort between you and Mr. Lattimore to draft a reply that you were hoping Thomas Lamont was going to insert in the New York Times?

Mr. CARTER. That was the proposal. It was never carried through. It was never accepted by Mr. Lamont, and, therefore, never published.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom else did you work with on this matter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember, except as I indicated earlier, I consulted Corliss Lamont, the second son.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man named T. A. Bisson?

Mr. CARTER. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take this matter up with Mr. Bisson?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember, but if you have got something that will refresh my mind, I will be glad to comment.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a memorandum "TAB from ECC." That is Mr. T. A. Bisson and that is your nomenclature?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

> What would you think of one of us writing to the Times some such letter as the enclosed first draft? If we should send such a letter I think a final paragraph should be added putting in a plea for a strong united independent China, a China which would inspire the confidence of the world in general and a China which would give confidence to those businessmen who seek mutually advantageous trade between their country and China.

Mr. CARTER. That is a splendid objective.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer this letter to you and ask you to make a comment on that.

Mr. CARTER. I wrote some pretty good stuff.

Mr. MORRIS. Whose reply is on there? Do you recognize the handwriting there?

Mr. CARTER. It is in pencil. I can't make out the initial.

Mr. MORRIS. "TAB."

Mr. CARTER. That is Bisson.

Mr. MORRIS. He thought it was a beautiful piece.

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Clear, objective, uncompromising.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Bisson a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. The same way I know my wife is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean the same way your wife is not?

Mr. CARTER. Is not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record straight on that.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't quite understand the remark, but I would like you to explain it.

Mr. CARTER. I have known Bisson for a great many years, naturally not as well as I know my wife. I think he is a 100 percent American, very conscientious, very honest, and apparently was so considered.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Bisson one of the editors of China Today?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. You may refresh my memory on that by showing me the masthead of China Today at the time when it was more inclusive than you would expect; I mean in its editorial staff when it included people who were non-Communists quite definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. If you saw T. A. Bisson's name on this publication China Today, you would say that China Today at that time also included non-Communists? Was that your answer?

Mr. CARTER. If his name was on China Today in the early days of that magazine, I would conclude that they were doing perhaps the usual game of including non-Communists as a sort of front.

But whether it was Communist controlled, or not, I don't happen to know because I didn't subscribe to the paper and wasn't intimately familiar with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, you do remember Mr. T. A. Bisson's very controversial article published by IPR in 1943, which divided China into two Chinas—one Mr. Bisson called feudal China and one democratic China?

Feudal China he identified as Nationalist China and democratic China he identified as Communist China?

Mr. CARTER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think that is the writing of a man who you could be so sure is not a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think that is the division of China, or was the division of China in 1943?

Mr. CARTER. Certainly not today.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1943, was it?

Mr. CARTER. In 1943 Nationalist China because of the war and other causes was pretty feudal. Chiang Kai-shek admitted a little later that China was feudal and had to modernize.

At that time in 1943 Chinese Communists were not carrying on the rough dirty stuff they are today. They were getting in the villages and the counties something more like a democratic pattern than anything that was happening in Kuomintang China.

I told Bisson I thought that was too much a black and white division; that it was more gray, but I didn't see the article until after it was published.

So my disagreement with him on that terminology had no influence because it was over the dam.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this point the article, China's Part in a Coalition War, by T. A. Bisson, wherein he describes the two Chinas, one as feudal China and one as Communist China.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 28" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 28

[From Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, July 14, 1943, vol. XII, No. 14]

CHINA'S PART IN A COALITION WAR

(By T. A. Bisson)

Article starts by recognizing how long China fought alone; then strongly reprimands the China Nationalist Government for demanding that Japan, not Germany, be defeated first. Says this demand plays into the hands of American isolationists. Also reproves China for saying she is near to collapse. Then proceeds (pp. 138–141):

"Still more, it left questions in the minds of many Americans as to what lay behind the ineptness of the political tactics applied to Chinese relations with this country. The answers to these questions must be sought, in large part, in the changes which have occurred in China's political and economic life during the past few years.

"TWO CHINAS

"At the outset of such an analysis, it is necessary to repeat an important generalization stressed by many commentators on Chinese affairs—that the early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of Chinese national unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic reforms, has not been fulfilled.[1] This promise, in fact, died early in the war.

[1] See, for a recent example, Pearl Buck, A Warning About China, Life, May 10, 1943, pp. 53–56.

"It received its best documentary expression in The Program of National Resistance and Reconstruction adopted by an emergency session of the Kuomintang Congress at Hankow, on March 29, 1938.[2] The democratic provisions even of this program, which was not without shortcomings, were not carried out, and this high point of the first year of the war soon became a melancholy landmark.

"Early in 1939 the Kuomintang conservatives became alarmed at the rapid reconquest and reorganization of territories behind the Japanese lines by the Eighth Route and New Fourth, Communist-led armies.[3]

"Clashes, at first sporadic, soon became more frequent. Early in 1941, the New Fourth Army was outlawed by the Chungking military authorities, following an abortive effort to destroy its headquarters corps and crush its leadership. Central Government aid to the Eighth Route Army had meanwhile lapsed; and the blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning border region by Kuomintang forces, numbering some 500,000 and commanded by Gen. Hu Tsung-nan, has since continued.

"A year or more before Pearl Harbor, therefore, two Chinas had definitely emerged. Each had its own government, its own military forces, its own territories. More significant, each had its own characteristic set of political and economic institutions. One is now generally called Kuomintang China; the other is called Communist China.

"However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China.[4] These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

"COMPARISON OF CASUALTIES INFLICTED

"In an attempt to analyze these differences, it should be recognized at once that one is not dealing with irrelevant abstractions. The institutions which characterize one China as feudal and the other as democratic have the most practical relevance to the leading problems of the day. They are, in fact, the determinants of all policies, domestic and international, espoused by the two Chinas. They explain, as will be indicated, why Kuomintang China is compelled to demand immediate aid on a scale so great as to necessitate reversal of United Nations' global military strategy. They also explain the declining rate of casualties inflicted on the Japanese by the Kuomintang Armies, as contrasted with the increasing rate of casualties inflicted by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

"According to official reports, the Kuomintang Armies have inflicted on the Japanese average annual casualties (in a total of 66 months) of 354,935, while the combined annual average for the Eighth Route (58 months' total) and the New Fourth (48 months' total) amounted to 113,338. For the last comparable year (July 1941–June 1942), however, the absolute figures are respectively 182,094 and 130,010. In other words, the Kuomintang Armies show an average annual record of 76 percent of total casualties inflicted, but in 1941–42 their achievement falls to only 58 percent of the total. On the other hand, the record of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies was lifted to 42 percent of the total in 1941–42, as against an annual average of 24 percent.

"The significance of this comparison is that it excludes the problems of blockade and foreign aid. Indeed, in these respects, the advantage lies entirely on the side of the Kuomintang Armies. They are supported by incomparably larger populations and richer territories. They have enjoyed the benefit of virtually all the military and economic aid rendered China by foreign nations. Since before Pearl Harbor, the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies have been doubly blockaded, by the Japanese on one side and by the Kuomintang Armies on the other.

"The differences indicated by the casualty figures must therefore be explained solely on the basis of efficiency or lack of efficiency in the mobilization of the human and material resources of the two Chinas. This question forces one back to an examination of the institutions which differentiate the two regions.

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[2] For text, see Amerasia, April 25, 1943, pp. 118–120.

[3] It is important to note that the "reorganization"—involving land reforms and electoral procedures in local government—was as much opposed as the "reconquest." For the emergence of effective political unity in China required, on the part of the Kuomintang, the acceptance of at least these minimal land and electoral reforms.

[4] The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

"DEMOCRATIC CHINA

"The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

"But the ingenuity of this reform, without which it could hardly be made to work, is that the newly introduced procedures of local democracy serve as the final sanction. The landlord and entrepreneur are not excluded from this process, but neither are they permitted to dominate it. Tax assessment committees, for example, are controlled by a majority of local members and exercise a strictly local jurisdiction. Farmers know well what their neighbors own.

"Over wide areas of this new China, elected councils—village, town, and district—and elected executive officials have completely supplanted the old autocratic system of feudal agrarian China. These councils and officials are either unpaid or receive mere pittances which leave them no better off economically than their fellow citizens.

"It is this democratic process, finally, which permits a large measure of free competition to operate over the whole of the economy. Bureaucratic price controls are not attempted. They are as unnecessary in this society as they would be in a New England town meeting. No landlord or merchant, with the watchful eyes of his neighbors upon him, can engage in hoarding or speculation. Within limits set mainly by local democratic checks, the individual landlord or entrepreneur is free, and is even encouraged, to expand his operations, and many are doing so.

"By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed 'communism'; it is, in fact, the essence of bourgeois democracy, applied mainly to agrarian conditions. The leaders in Yenan see in this program more than the answer to China's immediate problem of efficiently mobilizing her resources for the war against Japan. They see in it also the means of throwing off China's feudal shackles, the transition to modern nationhood.

"FEUDAL CHINA

"The declining curve of military achievement by the Kuomintang Armies is correlated with a progressive decrease in the economic strength of Kuomintang China. While this decrease is notable, there is no need to adopt the alarmist view that collapse is inevitable. The human and material resources of Kuomintang China are large. Its economic reserves are still considerable. So also are its military reserves and potentialities.

"General Ch'en Ch'eng's use of the term 'negligence' clearly implied that more could be done with the military resources at hand than was being done. Concentration on the demand for more planes and guns from abroad, in other words, was getting in the way of full utilization of the weapons and forces at hand. General Ch'en Ch'eng has since given a specific illustration of this situation by pointing out that the American planes were based too far from the fighting fronts to be fully effective in the Hupeh campaign.[5] An attitude of military passivity is revealed by this failure to develop facilities for air action near the front. The alert, active seizure of opportunities open even to limited means is evidently lacking.

"These considerations also apply to the economic sphere, although the problem is far more complicated and difficult. Here, too, General Ch'en Ch'eng's comments go straight to the nub of the issue. He states that 'there should be unrelenting vigilance and intensified preparations for counterattacks through military, political, and economic coordination.[6]

"This is a demand for more vigorous action on the home front, with an emphasis sharply different from pleas for help from outside. As has already been seen, questions of blockade and outside aid are not necessarily decisive for effective military resistance, providing an efficient economic mobilization is accomplished.

[5] New York Times, June 28, 1943. The same paper on June 29 carried Ch'en Ch'eng's statement that China needed "guns and equipment of all kinds," and would welcome "even one-thousandth part of 1 percent" of United States production.

[6] China Daily News, June 19, 1943.

"In Kuomintang China, such a mobilization is severely handicapped by the leaders' unwillingness to challenge the basic postulates of the feudal system. No serious effort has been made to uproot the landlord-usurer system. With the port cities and their nascent bourgeois class removed, the landlords have become the economic mainstay of the Kuomintang regime.

"BUREAUCRACY TIGHTENS HOLD

"At the same time, the bureaucracy has taken over administration of a considerable slice of industrial production. Many industries have become government monopolies, not forced to maintain themselves in competition with private industry. Industrial development under private initiative, valuable as an offset to feudal relations, and needed in an economy of scarcity, was thus choked off at the very time when stimulation of the entrepreneur was justified. The declining numbers and strength of the industrial class weakened its challenge to the landlord-bureaucrat regime thereby putting new props under the tottering structure of Chinese feudalism.

"In these circumstances, there could be no real progress toward democratic reform or wider civil liberties. Inauguration of constitutional government, considered for a time in 1938, was eventually shelved for the duration. Non-Kuomintang representatives on the People's Political Council, which could have evolved into a national legislature, have steadily decreased. Over the new Political Councils in the provinces, Kuomintang control is carefully maintained. In the so-called 'new Hsien system,' embodying the program for instituting representative local government, candidates will be limited to those who have acceptably passed through Kuomintang training schools, while suffrage will be indirect and linked to the household units of the pao-chia system. These developments do not promise to create effective popular checks on the Kuomintang bureauracy.

"With no effort at reform of the land system or initiation of democratic processes, the two basic prerequisites for an efficient wartime economic mobilization were lacking. As conditions deteriorated, successive measures looking toward the institution of a 'controlled economy' were introduced. The bureaucracy steadily expanded until its relative cost, measured against the limited output of the productive system, itself became a drag on the war effort.

"Even so, it could institute neither price nor commodity controls that were adequate to stay the course of inflation. Grain hoarding and speculation, the key factor in Kuomintang China's inflationary problem could be curbed by nothing less than genuine popular participation in application of the controls. This solution was barred. In a country predominately agrarian, with the landlords still entrenched in their feudal positions, no centralized government organ could send out the multitude of agents required to enforce its paper controls. Turn as it would, the bureaucracy could not solve this problem, and the economic foundations of the war effort were increasingly undermined.

"It is at this point that the true relevance of foreign aid to an economy of the Kuomintang model becomes evident. In order to conduct war on the basis of such an economy, access to the outside world is imperative. Steady injections of foreign supplies were in fact pumped into Kuomintang China up to Pearl Harbor, although in declining amounts after 1940.

"This extreme dependence on aid from the outside is a key which unlocks many mysteries. It provides an adequate explanation for the declining rate of the Kuomintang armies' military achievements. It also explains the persistent outcry in Chungking for a reversal of United Nations' strategy, as expressed in the editorials of its leading papers.[7] The desperate need for outside assistance felt by Kuomintang China could only be met by such a reversal of strategy, since this alone would bring aid quickly on a large scale. And, finally, this appeal was logically transferred directly to the United States in the propaganda campaign conducted last winter.

"Obviously, the resources available in free China are much too limited to encompass the defeat of Japan. Large amounts of outside supplies are essential if the Chinese armies are to be equipped for successful offensives. Until then, however, the need is for the most effective utilization and development of the resources at hand.

"Elements within Kuomintang China are making efforts to achieve this end, as indicated by the forthright statements of General Che'en Ch'eng. Strong forces are working to establish greater freedom for the entrepreneur, as a means

[7] See excerpts in article by Guenther Stein, Far Eastern Survey, June 14, 1943, p. 117.

to increase industrial production. The industrial cooperative movement, once freed of bureaucratic restrictions, would be able to forge ahead more rapidly. With proper encouragement, these sound elements within Kuomintang China can do much to overcome current economic weaknesses, although more thoroughgoing reforms are necessary in order to effect complete mobilization.

"A COALITION WAR—AND ITS REQUIREMENTS

"The United States, as the arsenal of democracy, bears a heavy responsibility for the war program of the United Nations. Its immense productive effort has begun to register with increasing effect on the war fronts. As the German tide in Europe recedes, the pressure on Japan will steadily increase. It is clearly essential that China, which has borne the heat and burden of the defensive in the Far East, should have a full and significant share in the victorious offensives that are now in the making. Toward this end, it would be advisable that China be given an adequate voice in framing the decisions on strategic policy. But China herself must change, if she is to make her full contribution to a coalition war.

"Realistic thinking on this problem will be stimulated if there is candid recognition that two Chinas exist at the present time. The task of statesmanship is to merge these two Chinas into one. To be sound and effective, such unification must come on the high plane of social advance and democratic reform. Until unification is achieved on this plane, China's full strength cannot be placed behind the war effort.

"It is also necessary to recognize that Kuomintang China is passing through a serious crisis. The challenge is for a renewal of the forward-looking elements in the party of Sun Yat-sen and a bold cutting loose from an archaic past. Defections of allegiance, already occurring, will tend to increase as reform is postponed, and the leadership of the China of the future may well pass to the progressive forces outside the Kuomintang.

"These issues in China pose a delicate and difficult problem for the other members of the United Nations. They are issues of such fundamental importance, however, that they cannot be ignored. Not only does the effective prosecution of the war during its final phase depend on the answers—the future status of China as a healthy and vigorous Nation, in which the people's livelihood is safeguarded by democratic processes, is at stake. Only such a China, moreover, can bring to the family of nations that level of constructive statesmanship that will be needed to guard the peace that the war has won."

Mr. CARTER. I hope you will emphasize the bouquets he gave to Chiang Kai-shek's government.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also ask Mr. Mandel if he would report to us, or testify for us, on the question of whether or not Mr. T. A. Bisson's name appeared as one of the editors of China Today.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mandel, what does your record show?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel does not have the information on China Today with him at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record the letter of E. C. Carter to Mr. Lattimore, dated June 19, 1945, and the memorandum of Mr. Bisson, and I think in all fairness to Mr. Lamont, I would like to introduce into the record his reply which he wrote on July 5, 1945, to Mr. Carter, in which he told him very strongly that he would not be willing to put his name to a draft of an article, the draft you, Mr. Bisson, and Mr. Lattimore, had worked on, Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. The documents will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 29, 30, and 31," inclusive, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 29

JUNE 19, 1945.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
Roland View Road, Ruxton 4, Md.

DEAR OWEN: Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to the One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and

probably will be gone all summer. I explained the general situation to the son and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and then finally suggested the possibility of his father. He thought it would be better for me to approach him than for him to do so, though he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday. He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him with as strong and tactful a letter as I can write on the off-chance that he might be willing to do something.

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly and this is at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria, etc. While you put it in reverse, I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of avoiding this?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—May I make one more suggestion? That is, that you add a final paragraph in which the author puts in a plea for a strong, united, independent China; a China which would inspire the confidence of the American people in general and a China which would give confidence to those American businessmen who seek mutually advantageous trade between the United States and China.

EXHIBIT No. 30

JUNE 20, 1945.

T. A. B. from E. C. C.

What would you think of one of us writing to the Times some such letter as the enclosed first draft? If we should send such a letter I think a final paragraph should be added putting in a plea for a strong, united, independent China; a China which would inspire the confidence of the world in general and a China which would give confidence to those businessmen who seek mutually advantageous trade between their country and China.

At the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4, I am wondering whether Eastman and company might pick up the reference to north China's adhesion to Russia and shout that it just proves his point that Russia plans to annex Manchuria.

(The following is in pencil on same page:)

This is a beautiful piece—clear, objective, uncompromising. It should have a big effect in the Times.

I would not change the page 3–4 statement. The threat developing should be made clear in all its dimensions, as this statement does.

The end could be strengthened just along the lines you say.

In short, I agree with your whole piece, with a few changes as indicated, but these are not material, if you dislike them.

T. A. B.

EXHIBIT No. 31

NORTH HAVEN, MAINE, *July 5, 1945.*

EDWARD C. CARTER, ESQ.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, N. Y.

MY DEAR CARTER: Many thanks for yours of June 29. You are too flattering about my casual letters to the New York Times. I, too, have been concerned over the steady drip against Russia by various commentators. Max Eastman has always been a weather cock, veering from pro-Trotsky to bitter anti-Soviet. Powell I had thought better of.

I have read the Reader's Digest article and have gone over with care your memorandum. In effect I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter urging our Government to alter its apparent present policy, and to make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in northwest China. Quite aside from any question of transport to such a remote region,

the principle involved seems to be that I should assume knowledge of the situation, and of the proper policy to be drawn from same—more adequate than our Government has.

Of course, I have no such knowledge and could not justify myself in attempting to correct the policy adopted. My way would always be first to seek information from the Department at Washington. As a matter of fact, even in my letters to the Times when any possible question of current policy was involved, I have first shown the letters to the Department of State, not for approval but for clearance as to any question of crossing wires.

You know your China better than I do, for my stay there was hardly more than a month or two. But we both realize how exceedingly complicated the situation is and is bound to be. Chiang's government now loosely rules all eastern and southern China (subject to Japanese occupation). The area includes all the great cities. Now, if Chiang has his doubts as to the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist armies against the Japanese—and such question has been many times raised—and if Chiang is fearful that once Japan is ousted, then those northern armies will turn on him, perhaps he is justified in feeling that the meager supplies available for China should be furnished for his armies and not for the other boys. In your memorandum you point out that Russia has been scrupulous to send supplies to Chiang alone. Well, if that be true, why is that not additional argument for us to do the same?

I am really discussing things about which I have no first-hand information. And in reading your memorandum I may well have just been stupid. Am I all wrong?

With personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

T. W. LAMONT.

(Written but not signed by Mr. Lamont.)

The CHAIRMAN. This piece of paper I hold in my hand dated June 20, 1945, TAB from ECC, with some handwriting on the bottom, what do you want to do about that?

Mr. MORRIS. That was introduced, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you going to do with the handwriting on the bottom?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, it could be the handwritten reply of T. A. Bisson?

Mr. CARTER. I think so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. When you use the expression that, "A former White Russian is currently pink," what do you mean?

Mr. CARTER. What year and who was the guy?

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to introduce a letter that you wrote to Harriette Moore. I think we have discussed Harriette Moore before.

On 12–10–45—that is December 10, 1945—I would like to call your attention to the last sentence on the first paragraph that ends on page 2.

Mr. CARTER. Is there a white copy of this?

The CHAIRMAN. I am informed it is in the other room.

Mr. CARTER. Do you want me to comment on it?

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you call a White Russian wholesomely pink?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't.

The Master of Balliol—that is the head of Oxford, a most ancient college. He had told me that this guy, Kovanolov, though a White Russian, was now wholesomely pink and he would have to ask the Master of Balliol and me what he meant.

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't you agree with that interpretation at the time? Will you read the preceding paragraph?

The CHAIRMAN. Was there an article by Bisson?

Mr. MORRIS. It was inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CARTER. Here I am reporting on varied activities in England where I sought to establish contact with Englishmen interested in Russian studies. I saw the heads of various colleges and London institutions.

Also the editor of the London Times, and several others.

A proposal was made that a full professor of Russian at Oxford now at New College, Oxford, one time was at Birmingham University, whom I saw and that he was a great pal of Samuel Cross at Harvard, who was a great Slavic scholar and highly regarded.

They asked the Academy of Science in Moscow to send a philologist for a year to Oxford.

Mr. MORRIS. The expression in the fourth paragraph of the letter is:

Kovanolov, the new full professor of Russian at Oxford, is now at New College. He is a White Russian who left the Soviet Union legitimately in the early days on the advice of Gorki.

What do you mean by that?

Mr. CARTER. I was told in Oxford he was not an emigre from the Soviet Union, as what the Bolsheviks would call a flow of the people.

Mr. MORRIS. He was in good graces with the Soviet Union?

Mr. CARTER. He was in good graces enough to get out.

Mr. MORRIS. And he had the advice of Gorki?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the Master of Balliol?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. I think it was——

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Michael Lindsey's father?

Mr. CARTER. Was it H. A. L. Lindsey who has a son called Michael, whom I did not meet at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't Michael Lindsey active in IPR?

Mr. CARTER. He wrote one or two articles for the IPR. He was a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in England, and did a great deal of work for the British Foreign Office, bringing out information from Communists and Nationalist China to aid in the British war effort.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Michael Lindsey a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CARTER. I never heard of it.

Mr. MORRIS. When you wrote here that the Master of Balliol: "told me that Kovanolov, though a White Russian, was now wholesomely pink," what did you understand it to mean by Kovanolov?

Mr. CARTER. I cannot speak for the most distinguished head of an Oxford College.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was what you meant when you used that language.

Mr. MORRIS. When you were writing to Harriette Moore.

Mr. CARTER. I was quoting someone else. Now I am going to do what Sourwine says I shouldn't, try to reconstruct because I don't remember. If I am allowed to reconstruct——

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. CARTER. Several types of people come out of Russia—those who like Russia but hate the Communist system; those who are fed up and never want to go back, and those who don't like the Communist system, but want to go back when the present gang is thrown out.

This fellow is a philologist, so interested in philology, astrometry, or what not, that they spend their time on their profession instead of becoming professional anti-Soviet agitators.

I know quite a number of Russians who want to keep off of political questions and go on with their scientific job. I assume that is what the Master of Balliol meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you have brought up the subject of reconstruction, I would like to go even back of that and ask you if you can recall whether the Master of Balliol actually used these precise words to you?

Mr. CARTER. I can't recall.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. CARTER. I cannot recall whether he used those.

This reads:

The Master of Balliol had told me that Konaolov, though a White Russian, was now wholesomely pink.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he use to you the words "wholesomely pink"?

Mr. CARTER. I can't swear to it. I don't think I would have invented it if he hadn't used it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he didn't use the words "wholesomely pink," he used something else that meant the same thing to you?

Mr. CARTER. I was trying to recall the impression I got out of what he was driving at.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you usually put quotation marks around somebody else's words when you are trying to convey the fact you are quoting them?

Mr. CARTER. Not always; sorry to say.

Mr. SOURWINE. In this case you were attempting to convey your memory of the precise words that had been used by the master of Balliol to you?

Mr. CARTER. That is right. This was written from London clearly after a very recent visit to Oxford.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Carter, there is another letter, a copy of which is before me, and I would be very pleased to have you read it, if you so desire, and one which I do not think has previously been examined by you during this interrogation. It is under date of April 12, 1943. It is addressed to the Honorable John H. Kerr, chairman of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

It is regarding T. A. Bisson. If I make references, I would be glad to make it available to you.

The specific point I would like to bring out has to do with the question of the time when Dr. Jessup was in part control or sole control of the editorial policy of IPR.

Was there such a period?

Mr. CARTER. There was no period where he was editor or chairman of the research committee.

There were periods when he was chairman of the American IPR and another period when he was chairman of the Pacific Council.

He was never on the paid staff.

Senator O'CONOR. Wasn't he chairman of the research advisory committee of the American Council?

Mr. CARTER. He was.

Senator O'CONOR. What time was that?

Mr. CARTER. I can't give you the date without looking.

Senator O'CONOR. This letter from you to Mr. Kerr contains this reference:

Dr. Philip Jessup was chairman of the institute at that time. This assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval.

Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the book in order that you may familiarize yourself with the quality of his writing. This book has high praise from a good many American experts on the Far East.

Then you go on to attest to Mr. Bisson's 100-percent Americanism.

Does that correctly state the fact as to the time and Dr. Jessup's position?

Mr. CARTER. I don't find here in my hurried reading—the book on American policy in the Far East?

Senator O'CONOR. That is right.

Mr. CARTER (reading):

Dr. Jessup, of Columbia, was chairman of the institute at that time, and this assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval. I am sending a copy under separate cover.

I have just said I think correctly Dr. Jessup was not chairman of the research committee or a research officer.

However, in the series of inquiry volumes some 40 titles are listed that Mr. Holland and I had immediate supervision of. We had an executive committee of Dennery, a Frenchman; Angus, an eminent Canadian; and a third person I have forgotten.

But in setting up this Rockefeller finance project on the issues of the Sino-Japanese War, it was arranged that the whole operation be under the direction of whoever was chairman of the institute.

During part of that time it was Dr. Jessup.

Senator O'CONOR. Did he at any time substitute for you, or replace you when you were away?

Mr. CARTER. Jessup? No; never.

Senator O'CONOR. Was there any period during which you were away from the country and had anyone else to take your place in the current matters?

Mr. CARTER. That would have been Mr. Holland, if I remember rightly.

Mr. Jessup was a volunteer at a higher echelon. I was paid.

Senator O'CONOR. There is one other point, Mr. Carter, I would like to ask you about. That is regarding Mr. Lattimore's association with Frederick V. Field.

I have before me a letter which is dated October 17, 1940, addressed by Owen Lattimore to Mr. F. V. Field, American Peace Mobilization, 1116 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR FRED: Enclosed I am sending you an article submitted to me by Asiaticus. For readers of Pacific Affairs, it would read like propaganda, and rhapsodical propaganda at that.

During this period from and after October 17, was Mr. Lattimore in more or less direct contact with Mr. Field, to your knowledge?

Mr. CARTER. October 17, 1940—Lattimore, I think, was still editor of Pacific Affairs. I think he continued for a few months into 1941.

He also sent drafts of articles submitted to him to quite a variety of

people of different points of view. I would have to ask Lattimore to verify the letter.

On the surface it looks as though Lattimore wrote this letter to Field.

Senator O'CONOR. It shows a very friendly relationship, does it not?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

In 1944, yes. In 1940, yes. The break with Field intellectually came when he joined the American Peace Mobilization.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date?

Mr. CARTER. October 17, 1940.

Senator O'CONOR. That is addressed to him at the American Peace Mobilization?

Mr. CARTER. But shortly after. Wasn't this the year?

Mr. MORRIS. It was after.

Mr. CARTER. But not much after?

Mr. MORRIS. It was after.

Mr. CARTER. Continuing on your point, when Mr. Field was pressured in Chicago to join the American Peace Mobilization, as I remember it, he phoned both Mr. Jessup and myself saying that for conscience sake he thought he ought to join this movement and, therefore, as it was an action thing, resign from the IPR. He thought it would embarrass the IPR as an action movement, but he at that time felt, as many Americans did, that we were being euchred into a Daladier-Chamberlain war.

It was the phony war period, and he was willing to fight for king and country, or for President and country, in a real war for democracy, but he did not want to fight for Chamberlain and Daladier, and eventually the French and the British decided they didn't want to fight for Chamberlain.

Changes were made. Churchill became Prime Minister of England.

In the meantime, pacifists, clergymen, and a bunch of Communists started this organization. Ultimately they took over.

Jessup and I tried to persuade Fred Field he would regret it all of his life. He is now paying a bit of the price.

Senator O'CONOR. The other topic in this general connection about which I would like to ask you had to do with a series of communications between you and Lauchlin Currie, copies of which have been introduced in evidence. I do not know whether you have read them.

Mr. CARTER. I would like to look at them.

Senator O'CONOR. I give them to you first. They show a series of telegrams from you to Lauchlin Currie at the White House, and letters.

My question is whether or not that was at or about the time that you were interested in the possible commissioning of Mr. Field as an intelligence officer in the United States Army?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Senator O'CONOR. May 1942.

Mr. CARTER. One is May 5, 1942, and one is September 17, 1941; one is January 21, 1941; one is May 4, 1941.

Is there any mention of Field in here?

Senator O'CONOR. Not in the telegrams.

What were you telegraphing him about? Or what did you wish to see him about on these occasions?

Mr. CARTER. On two or three occasions Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles thought I should inform the White House of what I was doing as president of Russian War Relief. Whenever the few times I wanted some information given to the President, I did it through Currie, one of his executive assistants.

There are so vague as to what the purport of a visit was, but I think I saw Hiss quite as much after talking with Sumner Welles about Russian relief, about the IPR.

(After the hearing was closed, witness informed the reporter that Hiss, above referred to, should be Currie.)

Senator O'CONOR. You don't recall any further representations you made to Lauchlin Currie about the possible Field commission?

Mr. CARTER. What do the records show as to the time that Field was invited by one or two people in the War Department to apply for a commission? What year?

Mr. MORRIS. It is in 1942.

Mr. CARTER. A good many of these letters are 1941, before that came up. I may or may not.

Senator O'CONOR. Yesterday we asked you as to what other places in the Government, if any, you were recommending for Mr. Field. I think you volunteered the information, although you weren't given very much time to think it over, possibly OWI and in OSS, if I recall; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. That was sort of a hunch. It was a possibility.

Senator O'CONOR. Upon further reflection of the matter, since yesterday, can you give us any more specific information as to what other places, if any?

Mr. CARTER. No. I racked my brain last night. As I said, I definitely wrote a letter when I knew that officers of the War Department asked him to apply. I wrote quite sincerely saying I thought he would be useful, but I don't remember at all when that avenue closed what, if anything; I did for other appointments.

Mr. MORRIS. I have one other question.

I would like to show you a copy of a letter that we discussed in executive session. This is a letter from you to Brooke Claxton in Montreal, dated October 31, 1938. It reads:

DEAR CLAXTON: Fred Field from San Francisco has sent me an amusing answer to my inquiry for American speakers. I should say that W. T. Stone of the Foreign Policy Association was well qualified. Raymond Leslie Buell is more forceful and more sure of his views than Stone.

If the Canadian Club can stand the general secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, Earl Browder would give you an exceedingly interesting, pleasantly provocative, but a really important statement on the Roosevelt administration either from the point of view of its internal or its foreign policy. He is really very well informed, and, contrary to the public view, is 100-percent American.

Do you remember our discussion in executive session on that?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; and you have given me more information which I welcome, because in the form I am reading, you did not give me the lead which said that this was an amusing answer to my inquiry.

I knew Claxton well. He had a wonderful sense of humor. He is now Minister of Defense in Canada. He asked me for speakers. I gave him a mixed group—a brilliant fellow, a dramatic, Leslie Buell.

I said if the Canadian Club can stand the general secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, Earl Browder would give you an exceedingly interesting, pleasantly provocative, but a really important statement on the Roosevelt administration.

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session you never claimed it was said in frolic and banter?

Mr. CARTER. Here you helped me. You hand me today—

Mr. MORRIS. If you concede it, you have said he was 100 percent American, and I do not see why it would be frolic and banter.

Mr. CARTER. Because you have given me a letter in which I refer to it as an amusing instance.

Mr. MORRIS. Was your testimony in executive session not true testimony?

Mr. CARTER. My testimony in executive session was without this document you have just handed me.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Was it true?

Mr. CARTER. I intended it to be true. It was true.

Mr. MORRIS. It may not have made sense.

Mr. CARTER. At that time people in Canada and the United States were inviting Soviet diplomats to make speeches. Most of them spoke poor English. They did not understand North American psychology. Browder, in his Kansas way, had a 100-percent American look, knew our vernacular. If they wanted something amusing and provocative, they would get a better dose of the true Communist gospel, more vivid terms, from an American than from a Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what you mean by 100-percent American?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

I didn't mean and Claxton wouldn't mean—

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show the following documents with which in the course of the last hour we have neglected to introduce:

One is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lattimore, dated June 20, 1941, which I understand has not been introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 32" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 32

Copy to WLH sent.
NEW YORK, N. Y., *June 20, 1941.*

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: If you have time while in San Francisco you and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville whose present address is Headquarters of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking. If you wish me to I will wire him for an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. One is a letter that Senator O'Conor made reference to, which is a letter from Edward Carter, dated April 12, 1943, to Hon. John R. Kerr.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 33," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 33

NEW YORK CITY, *April 12, 1943.*

Regarding T. A. Bisson.

Hon. JOHN H. KERR,
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He was a member of the American delegation to the IPR Conference at Yosemite National Park in 1936. The late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that delegation.

As a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association, I have followed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has consistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of such a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on American policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University, was chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval. Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of that book in order that you may familiarize yourself with the quality of his writing. This book has received high praise from a great many outstanding American experts on the Far East. It has consequently had a wide sale and is a standard reference book in a great many public and university libraries.

Mr. Bisson is 100 percent American. He was alert to the Japanese menace long before the general public became aware of the implications to the peace of America of Japanese aggression and in many of his writings he faithfully stated the issues that the United States must face vis-à-vis Japanese military expansion.

If you wish further information please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. The other is a letter from Mr. Carter to Harriette Moore, dated October 12, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 34," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 34

(Copy of this letter sent to Dr. Percy E. Corbett and Dr. Owen Lattimore.)

PARK LANE HOTEL,
London W. 1, October 12, 1945.

Miss HARRIETT MOORE,
American Russian Institute, 58 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HARRIET: Among my rather too varied activities in England I have tried for the sake of the IPR to establish as many contacts as possible with those who are interested in Russian studies. Yesterday I visited the School of Slavonic Studies and had a long talk with Miss Dorothy Galton, whom you probably met on her recent visit to North America. She kindly gave me for our private use this copy of her report to the Rockefeller Foundation. You will notice that it has everything except her conclusions. Doubtless I can get her conclusions from Marshall when I reach New York. If Corbett has not seen her report, I think he will doubtless want to do so and eventually I want to show it to Belshaw and others. The London school is hanging on by its ears and is pretty well bereft of staff; they tried to get E. H. Carr, now of the London Times, to take Sir Bernard Pears' place, but the higher-ups in London University black-balled him. They are now intriguing with Vernadsky of Yale to lure him to London for the twilight of his life.

At Oxford on my first visit I had a useful talk on both Russian and Chinese studies with Maurice Bowra, the warden of Wadham. He spent his early days in China and at that time knew Chinese and learnt Russian and when some Red

Army men visited Oxford he surprised everyone by bursting forth into good Russian. He is going to be a useful man not only at Oxford for Chinese and Russian studies, but could ultimately be of use to the IPR.

On my second visit I saw Sumner, the new warden of All Souls. You are probably familiar with his recent book on Russia. He is intensely interested and is behind the whole new movement at Oxford to found serious schools of Arabic, Indian, Chinese, and Russian studies. Both he and Bowra would be very competent reviewers for Pacific Affairs.

Kovanalov, the new full professor of Russian at Oxford, is now at New College. He is a White Russian who left the Soviet Union legitimately in the early days on the advice of Gorki. He has been at Birmingham University where he fought with the other White Russian and is now entrenched at Oxford, I suppose for the rest of his life. He was absent on both my visits, but today on his arrival from a visit in Paris came to see me and told me in detail of his big ideas for the new Russian school at Oxford. I will share my notes with you and Corbett on my talk with him in due season. He is a pal of Sam Cross at Harvard, is very eager for American, French, and Russian collaboration. He had not heard of the big new plans at Columbia. He hopes to get Cross over to Oxford for some lectures this year. He has asked the Academy of Science in Moscow to send a philologist for a year to Oxford, thinking that that was a subject which would not cause any political complications. The master of Balliol had told me that Kovanalov, though a White Russian, was now wholesomely pink.

I will also share with you in due season my notes on people at Birmingham, Glasgow, and Cambridge. Also I will give you the reasons for Kovanalov's statement that Russian scholarship in France is much more broadly based than it is likely to be in England for a considerable time. At Chatham House, Dr. Lindgren is just leaving to return to Cambridge. Violet Connolley is still working for Ford but I suspect may return to Chatham House.

Carr is a tower of strength to the London Times and personally I am glad that he is there rather than at the School of Slavonic Studies.

I had a very long talk with Moseley and find that he has matured and I think has become more objective with reference to the U. S. S. R. As one of the few people who were on the inside of the London Foreign Ministers Conference, he felt that there were mistakes on both sides and that though Molotov was obstructionist, there was a considerable measure of rational thinking on his part. He agreed with me that Stalin and Molotov are following a line similar to that of Fox in his book "The Super Powers." The Kremlin clearly believes that in this interim period the Big Three have certain major responsibilities, that it would be premature to share with an ever-widening circle of middle and small powers, with always the danger that they may be forced to share responsibility with definitely fascist states.

I have had two long evenings with Gromyko who is heavy, conscientious but has not, when he is in a formal meeting, the light touch or the quick knowledge of English that is so essential in these meetings where the main thinking and speaking is in the English language.

Rogoff, as you will suspect, I have seen several times with great profit and with great delight because he has so many of the qualities that Gromyko and Molotov lack.

Alexander Werth spoke at a big meeting at Chatham House and did extraordinarily well, though much of the audience was, if not hostile, at least incredulous. The main body of his talk will appear ultimately in *International Affairs.* His big 300,000 word book will be published next spring by Hamish; I want to talk with you and Corbett as to the desirability of the Secretariat or the Yale Press, or the ARI considering a North American edition if Hamish is interested and if you think the matter should be explored. Werth is convinced that Truman's exclusiveness with the atom was one of the reasons for Molotov's doubting attitude at the London conference. Salter's Oxford speech, at least as quoted in the London press, could not have helped the situation; that is a pity because in his general attitude, when I dined with him, Sumner and others at All Souls, I found that Salter tended to endorse the Moscow insistence on certain responsibilities remaining for a further period with the Big Three.

Jo Barnes passed through London and gave me a little picture of the sag in American confidence in Russia, but wasn't sure whether it would be permanent. Moseley was very emphatic that the atrocities of the Red Army in Germany and Eastern Europe were mostly exaggerated. He has had access, I gather, to all of the American governmental reports on this matter. His long skepticism about the Soviet Union makes his remarks in this connection carry considerable weight.

Werth gave invaluable insight as to the psychology of the Red Army as they went into other countries and had considerable material on the variance in the attitude and behaviour in different areas.

I had the privilege of meeting a number of the internationally Friends at the Friends International Centre (37 Gordon Square, London W.C. 1). You will remember that the Friends rendered a very distinguished service in Russia for many years after the revolution. They would like an opportunity for further service and are very eager for intellectual and cultural contacts. They are doing their best to promote more general study of Russia as you will see from the enclosed program.

One evening I spent with Z. F. Willis, the National Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. He and his colleagues are hoping the day may come when they can render some service to youth in the U. S. S. R.

The foreign office is completing a report on Russian studies in this country. It is not yet available but I am asking Mitrany and his research secretary, Miss Ford Smith, to try and get me a copy ultimately.

Then there is a new commission, the Scarbrough, which is making a survey for the whole United Kingdom with the aid of all Government departments, and with I think Russian, Middle Eastern, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese studies in its purview. All the scholars are giving evidence, or hoping to be asked to give evidence. I imagine it will be months before a report is published, but here again I will ask Mitrany and Miss Ford Smith to follow it and send me anything that is available. Professor Dodds, who went to China for the British council about the same time as the biochemist Needham, undoubtedly contributed a report on Chinese studies in the United Kingdom and British scholarly opportunities in China. Stevens and Marshall, of the Rockefeller Foundation, had him make a study of oriental studies in the United States and I am going to try and get a copy when I reach New York. He is actively cooperating with all at Oxford who are advancing scholarship in all these fields.

Perhaps the most dynamic person at Oxford in the establishment of the schools is Gibb, of St. Johns, the Arabic scholar. He is eager ultimately to go to the Soviet Union and has made some progress in the Russian language. He gave the Haskell lectures at Chicago last summer; he will help at many points all along the way from Egypt to the Bering Straits.

I neglected to say that at Chatham House there is a temporary research staff member who has a good knowledge of the Soviet Union, her name is Mrs. J. Dogras. I am not certain what her tenure of office is to be.

Dobb, of Pembroke College, Cambridge, spent several hours with me on two occasions, reviewing Russian studies in England in general and from the economic angle in particular. He ought to be freed to do more work in the Russian economic field for he is one of the few top-ranking economists here who is generally familiar with Russian economic material.

On the social side, I had a most charming tea party with Mrs. Winston Churchill, who spent 1¾ hours telling me of her impressions of the Soviet Union during her visit in the spring.

Some of the finest, most broad-minded people in England, like Mitrany, are very eager to establish direct contacts with Soviet citizens here and correspondence with scholars in the Soviet Union. Until points of view change and personal contacts multiply in natural ways this indispensable intercourse will be slow in coming.

I sometimes feel that one ought to forget all current problems and devote the rest of one's life to stimulating basic studies of the Russian language and history, economics, and law throughout the Western World and concurrently stimulate schools in the Soviet Union for the advance study of the Western World. Maybe in 30 years the results of such foundation work would begin to have constructive results.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.
(Dictated but Signed in Absence).

Mr. MORRIS. The other two are copies of a letter from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Field, where Mr. Lattimore mentions that the writing from Asiaticus read like propaganda.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 35" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 35

BALTIMORE, MD., *October 17, 1940.*

Mr. F. V. FIELD,
American Peace Mobilization,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR FRED: Enclosed I am sending you an article submitted to me by Asiaticus. For readers of Pacific Affairs, it would read like propaganda, and rhapsodical propaganda at that. As the article is also too long, however, we might be able to shorten it, pruning out a great many adjectives but still retaining the realistic points. However, it is too late for our December issue.

I am therefore sending you the article as is, to see whether you may have any suggestions for placing it.

The sooner you can look in on us here, the better we'll be pleased.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. The last one was a letter I made reference to in which Mr. Carter states that Mr. Earl Browder on October 31, 1938, is really very well informed and contrary to public view, is 100 percent American.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 36" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 36

NEW YORK CITY, *October 31, 1938.*

BROOKE CLAXTON, Esq.,
Montreal, Canada.

DEAR CLAXTON: Fred Field from San Francisco has sent me an amusing answer to my inquiry for American speakers. I should say that W. T. Stone of the Foreign Policy Association was well qualified. Raymond Leslie Buell is more forceful and more sure of his views than Stone.

If the Canadian Club can stand the general secretary of the Communist Party in the United States, Earl Browder would give you an exceedingly interesting, pleasantly provocative, but a really important statement on the Roosevelt administration either from the point of view of its internal or its foreign policy. He is really very well informed and, contrary to the public view, is 100 percent American.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better pause here.

Are you through with Mr. Carter?

Mr. MORRIS. I think for the time being, Mr. Chairman, we are.

Mr. CARTER. For this afternoon, anyhow?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. And probably for this next week?

Mr. MORRIS. At least the next couple of weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be advised.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. We have not covered everything, but we are not likely to come to you within the next 3 or 4 weeks.

Mr. CARTER. In 20 or 25 years you cannot compress in 2 or 3 days, even the sins.

Mr. MORRIS. Yet sometimes you do it very rapidly.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until Tuesday at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Tuesday, July 31, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Again I draw the attention of those who are with us today, and I do not want to say especially the press but the press as well, we are unable to accommodate all who would like to sit in here. But the accoustics in this room are such that any audible expressions are confusing and a little bit annoying. If possible be as easy with your chairs as you possibly can because they make the most noise. Let me say to the members of the committee the witness today is here under subpena and it is the judgment of the chairman of this committee he is rendering a great patriotic service to the country of his adoption. We rejoice in the fact that he has the courage to come forward with the truth.

I want to say to you, General, that this committee and the Senate of the United States is not going to tolerate any reprisal of any kind. Any witness, including yourself, who comes before this committee is invited and urged under oath to tell the truth and the whole truth. You need be in nowise fearful of any reprisal being made on you by any agency of the Government or outside the Government. This committee is going to see to it that its witnesses who come here under oath or voluntarily are protected in telling the Congress of the United States the truth and all of it.

The witness will be sworn. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER GREGORY BARMINE, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. BARMINE. I do.

Senator O'CONOR. Before the examination commences might I say a word?

I want to bring up a question concerning the previous testimony taken and to just make this very brief statement. Sworn testimony previously taken is to the effect that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was assisted by Owen Lattimore, Lauchlin Currie, and others in an effort to obtain a commission in the United States Army Intelligence. It has been reported in the press since our last meeting that Lauchlin Currie denies any such assistance. So far as I have noted Owen Lattimore has made no such denial. It would appear that the matter is of such importance that this committee should hear directly from these individuals who should welcome an opportunity to appear if the accusations against them are not well founded.

Accordingly, I respectfully suggest that Owen Lattimore and Lauchlin Currin be informed of the readiness of this subcommittee to have them appear and testify in open hearings.

I would also suggest that the committee cause to be brought before it detailed information as to what the Department of Defense files show as to the recommendation submitted in favor of the proposed Frederick V. Field Army Intelligence commission.

Mr. Chairman, I merely submit that for the consideration of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say, Senator, that the presentation of evidence before this committee has been a matter of careful study as to the order in which the testimony would be presented. The respective counsel for the committee have been in conference with committee members. We are not able to present everything at once. We must present it in the order in which we think it will have proper sequence. With that in mind, what you have said now is in the mind of the committee and the mind of the chairman and counsel for the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I say I anticipated that this should be done. I asked the question from Field whether he had any objections to the military disclosing all that he had said in that file and to the people at that time. I do not see how this comes under the rule of a loyalty file of any individual because it is the contention of the Government that Field was not hired.

It is also, as I understand it, the contention that Lattimore was not an employee. So it would not come under any of those rules of not disclosing the evidence to this committee. I think the entire file should be subpenaed or requested first and if not delivered that the whole file of all the correspondence should be supplied. Field said somebody blocked him. Let us find out who blocked him. Let's find out who recommended him and what the recommendation said about Field. I think that ought to be part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, Senator, that is now being worked out and will in due course be presented.

Senator O'CONOR. I agree entirely with Senator Ferguson. I brought it up because it had been touched on last week and I thought it might be well to make it a matter of record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your name, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. Alexander Gregory Barmine.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BARMINE. I am in the Voice of America in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness says that he is with the Voice of America in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. What particular position do you have?

Mr. BARMINE. Chief of the Russian unit.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Mr. BARMINE. About 3 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever testified before any other forum of Congress or any other body?

Mr. BARMINE. Except this? No.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the first time you have testified in public?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Before an executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. Other than the executive session of this committee, you have testified before no other body?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you been in the United States, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. Eleven years.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

Mr. BARMINE. In Russia, in Mohileff.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mr. BARMINE. 1899.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you become a citizen of the United States?

Mr. BARMINE. I was naturalized in the southern district of New York court July 15, 1943, after I received honorable discharge from the Army.

Mr. MORRIS. What process did you go through by way of becoming a citizen?

Mr. BARMINE. The regular process of application.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the fact that you had served in the United States Army something that accelerated the process?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; it did, for 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. By virtue of the fact you served in the American Army your naturalization was accelerated?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What rank did you hold in the American Army?

Mr. BARMINE. Private.

Mr. MORRIS. Private first class?

Mr. BARMINE. No; just private.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last connection, Mr. Barmine, with the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. I was Chargé d'Affairs of the Soviet Union in Athens, Greece.

Mr. MORRIS. You were the Soviet Chargé d'Affairs to Athens?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You were acting ambassador?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. Until July 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened to cause a termination of your relationship with the Soviet Union at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That was a period of purges in the Red army in Moscow and most of my former classmates in the general staff school in France were accused and shot and I knew well that they were innocent of charges preferred against them.

Mr. MORRIS. At this time, Mr. Barmine, even though you were in diplomatic status, did you have military rank?

Mr. BARMINE. I was retired.

Mr. MORRIS. With what rank?

Mr. BARMINE. Brigadier general.

Mr. MORRIS. So when you make reference to your classmates, you were making reference to your military classmates?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You were at that time a retired brigadier general of the Soviet Army?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. I realized I couldn't serve Russia at this time by remaining in the Soviet service because I consider that was going on against the interests of the country.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Barmine, when you realized that all your classmates were being purged, all your military classmates, and included among them was Marshal Tukachevsky?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. He had been purged?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You realized you no longer would carry on in the Soviet service in view of the fact these people were being purged and you knew they were innocent?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, you separated yourself from the Soviet service?

Mr. BARMINE. I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Soviet react to your resignation? Did they simply accept it?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, there were different kinds of reactions, of course. They were trying to liquidate me, to kill me in France when I went there as a refugee.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in Athens. You left Athens. Did you serve any notice on the Soviet authorities you were leaving?

Mr. BARMINE. I sent a wire to Litvinov and asked him to appoint another man in charge of the Embassy. Then I left for Paris.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make your presence known in Paris or were you in hiding?

Mr. BARMINE. No; I was in hiding.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you think it was necessary?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; because I learned that the Soviet secret service was given orders to liquidate me in France.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that?

Mr. BARMINE. I met my fiancée, who was in France. She received a letter from her mother from Greece. The Greek Communists came to her and told her that she should write her daughter not to see me and cut all relations, because I would be liquidated anyway. They insisted that the daughter should be warned. They told her, "If you want your daughter to be safe, tell her not to save him."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see Ignatz Reiss when you were in Paris?

Mr BARMINE. No. Then I was followed in Paris. They attempted to get me there.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position in the Communist Party at that time, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. At what time?

Mr. MORRIS. At the time of your being chargé d'affaires in Greece.

Mr. BARMINE. I was a member of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. I resigned from the party at the same time.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly what your diplomatic achievements had been up to that time? What had you accomplished in the field of diplomacy at the time of your departure from the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. What do you mean by achievements?

Mr. MORRIS. What positions did you hold in Soviet diplomacy?

Mr. BARMINE. My first assignment was in Bokhara. I was detached from the general staff school and sent as a military attaché That was between 2 years in the general staff school, in the summertime.

Then I was appointed consul general in Bokhara. Then next year after the second year in general staff school I was sent for a summer to Riga in Latvia as second secretary of the Embassy in Latvia.

Mr. MORRIS. You were second secretary there?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

After being graduated from general staff school in 1923, I was sent to Persia as consul general in northern Persia. I stayed there until 1925.

Mr. MORRIS. You were consul general in northern Persia until 1925?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

My next diplomatic assignment was Greece in 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. You were chargé d'affaires in Greece from 1935 until your termination?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I came first as a first secretary of the embassy. After the minister went to Moscow, I was appointed chargé d'affaires.

Mr. MORRIS. You held that position until 1937?

Mr. BARMINE. Until I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly what your military career had been up to that time?

Mr. BARMINE. I started in 1919 in the army. Then I was sent to the officers' school, the infantry officers' school, at the end of 1919. I was graduated from the officers' school in 1920, in the spring.

Then I was assigned to the western front against Poland. I went through the Polish campaign. Late in 1920 I was sent to the general staff school in Moscow. I had the rank of commander of a regiment by then. From 1920 to 1923 I was in general staff school. I was graduated in 1923.

Mr. MORRIS. You were graduated from the general staff school in 1923?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. During the studies in the general staff school I was assigned to the intelligence department of the army. After graduation I was sent to the intelligence department.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1923 you were assigned to the intelligence department?

Mr. BARMINE. Already in 1921. The moment when the first class in the general staff school was completed, they were going over the people who were in general staff school taking some that had to be after the graduation assigned to general staff school work. I was one among them, so I was also ordered to study oriental languages because the idea of using me and some other people for the military work in the Orient was considered. Besides the military class in general staff school I was studying in the oriental language, the Persian language, Urdu and Arabic.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Mr. BARMINE. Urdu.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that, please?

Mr. BARMINE. You spell it U-r-d-u, and Arabic and also French.

Then already in 1921 in the summertime between the year of classes I would be attached to the intelligence and would be sent on an assignment by the intelligence office.

This way I was sent to Bokhara in the summer of 1921, in Latvia in 1922.

Mr. MORRIS. While you held these diplomatic positions were you actually working for the intelligence organization at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That was a civilian assignment.

Mr. MORRIS. It was a civilian assignment——

Mr. BARMINE. Temporary assignment, but I was always at the disposal of the intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. You were always at the disposal and under the direction of the intelligence authorities; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean an assignment to a diplomatic post is regarded as an intelligence assignment?

Mr. BARMINE. No; it doesn't. I was to fulfill my diplomatic duty and complete it as it should be. There would be no difference with regular diplomatic staff members.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you had additional duties; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. Not special additional duties. I would explain to you how it worked.

Military intelligence had several officers, maybe two dozen high-ranking officers, who were attached directly to the chief of intelligence. Besides those who worked in the regular military network underground, these people were kept in reserve in order to use them in such civilian assignments where it would be in the interest of military intelligence to have men with military knowledge and with contacts.

Before the relation was following: I could be sent by the foreign office only to the places which would be approved by the chief of military intelligence. For instance, when I was graduated and I went to the intelligence service, they needed people in Persia. The Soviet Union had there about 16 consulates in Persia. There were several important consulates in an important sensitive area in which military intelligence wanted a military man in charge. So out of the 16 consulates, about 6 of them were consul generals of my group, the general staff officers with intelligence training.

I was sent to the foreign office and the foreign office offered the job in southern Persia. Military intelligence insisted they needed me in northern Persia. According to the chief of military intelligence I was appointed to the post in Resht.

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

Mr. BARMINE. That area including the Enveli port. There was a specific situation in 1923 because according to the Soviet-Persian treaty the port had to be given back to Persia. The Persian Government insisted very much, but our policy was not to give it back. It wasn't in contradiction with the treaty. The policy decision was to keep the port, the facility, to keep the fishery concession in our hands. It was a very critical time because Persia tried to force it with army forces. We had two destroyers also contrary to the treaty, which stood in Enveli port and the possibility was of the attempt to take over the fishery concession by arms and the military office wanted the man who would be on the spot in order to make a decision on the spot who would have a military background and military training.

This group of destroyers in Enveli was under my orders and at my disposal. When there was an attempt to take, in 1924, the fishery, the Persian Governor of Resht Province sent a detachment there. I had to order the commander of the destroyers to put the guns on the shore and be ready to resist by force.

Also we had special interests in northern Persia. There was a question of people working there on military assignment and among the tribes. These were the reasons why military intelligence wanted to have military men as the consul general. That means I was under orders of the foreign office and I was fulfilling diplomatic status.

Mr. MORRIS. We are conducting an inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations, and we are going to be asking you certain questions in connection with this, and we wish you would give us your best recollection of events as you recall them.

I am going to offer you a translation from the Political, Social, and Economic Quarterly of the Soviet Union called, in English, The Pacific Ocean. I would like to call that to your attention and ask you if you will identify as far as you know some of the Soviet authorities who appear in the Soviet council of the Institute of Pacific Relations as it appears on this translation. I also give you a Russian copy of the same thing.

Mr. BARMINE. Out of these names I knew three people personally.

Mr. MORRIS. We have here, Mr. Chairman, the members of the Soviet council of the IPR. They are the people that the Soviet Government sent to its own particular council in the institute. Mr. Barmine has testified he knew three of them to him own knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they members of the international section?

Mr. MORRIS. Just of the Soviet council. I can stress that.

Mr. BARMINE. May I say the Russian text mentions they are founders of the Pacific Institute of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. These are listed here in this political, social, and economic quarterly as the founding members of the Pacific Institute of the USSR. The three whom you know are who?

Mr. BARMINE. Vice President Voitinski.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you know about Mr. Voitinski?

Mr. BARMINE. When I returned from Bokhara in the fall of 1921 to resume my studies in the general staff school, then the Chief Secretary and Foreign Minister of Russia, Commissar Chicherin, was my classmate. He invited me to work in my spare time, especially at nights, as secretary to Chicherin. At this time I met executives and high officials of the Foreign Office in Moscow. Among them was Voitinski who at this time was in charge of the far-eastern section of the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you knew Voitinski as the man who was the head of the far-eastern section of the Foreign Office at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. He came to the Foreign Office from the Comintern and when he was also in charge of far-eastern affairs. He returned back from the Foreign Office a couple of years later again to the same work.

Mr. MORRIS. You, therefore, testify he had come from the Comintern to occupy that position as head of the far-eastern section of the Foreign Office and after he finished that assignment he went back to the Comintern?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWEIN. Did you testify also, General, in the Comintern he was in charge of far-eastern affairs?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the other two men who you knew on that list?

Mr. BARMINE. Arosev, chairman of the Society of Cultural Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you spell that?

Mr. BARMINE. A-r-o-s-e-v.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about him?

Mr. BARMINE. I met him because he was my colleague in the diplomatic service. He was once Ambassador in Czechoslovakia. I knew him personally in Moscow as a friend. Then I met him on his job.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of his job, political?

Mr. BARMINE. As Ambassador, yes. Arosev was an old Bolshevik. At this time he had the confidence of the central committee. He was one of the hierarchy of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. He had the confidence of the central committee of the Communist Party and shared their confidence?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So when Arosev appears in this work, do you think he is appearing as a dutiful member of the Soviet international organization in a political capacity?

Mr. BARMINE. He was appointed as the president of the Society of Cultural Relations by the central committee of the party and, of course, he acted as such in his duties.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, do you know anybody else on that list?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; I knew Svanidze.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about him?

Mr. BARMINE. He is a Georgian. He is a brother-in-law of Stalin.

Mr. MORRIS. What else do you know about him?

Mr. BARMINE. Svanidze was also high up in the hierarchy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. At this time he was director of the foreign trade bank, which means the organization which was in control of all financial exchange abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. In that capacity or holding that position he took a political assignment?

Mr. BARMINE. I knew about his other assignments, too, which he carried abroad besides being president of this bank.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you a translation of volume XII of the Soviet Encyclopedia. This is an excerpt from Mr. Voitinski, and I ask you if that squares with your recollection of Mr. Voitinski's assignments?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. That confirms the fact that I knew he was a high executive of the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record this translation of the "Pacific Ocean" we have just made reference to as well as the translation from the Bolshevik Soviet Encyclopedia with the biographical sketch of Mr. Voitinski. I would like to introduce both of them into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they should be inserted in the record as documents with reference to which the witness is testifying. I do not know that they have been identified.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 37 and 38" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 37

[Translation from "Tikhii Okean" (The Pacific Ocean), Political, Social, and Economic Quarterly Review No. 1, July–September 1934, pp. 217–218]

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS IN THE U. S. S. R.

The International Institute of Pacific Relations, at present, consists of the national Pacific institutes of the United States of America, Japan, China, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. At its regular conference, held at Shanghai in 1931, a unanimous decision was passed to invite the U. S. S. R. to join the institute. This invitation was repeatedly reiterated in the name of the institute by its secretary general. The scientific research and economic organizations of the U. S. S. R., which are interested in the problems of the Soviet Far East and of the Pacific Ocean, decided to accept the invitation of the international institute.

To this end, the said organizations resolved to combine their efforts directed to the study of the above-mentioned problems and to establish a special Pacific institute.

The founding meeting of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. took place on July 28, 1934, in Moscow. Present at the meeting were representatives of the NII (Institute for Scientific Research) of the Great Soviet World Atlas, the All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Institute of Oceanography, the Administration of the Great Northern Sea Route, the Chamber of Commerce, the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, the Kamchatka Joint Stock Co., and the East Fish Trust.

Thus, the above-listed institutions become the founding members of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R.

The following board of the institute was elected at the founding meeting:

1. President of the institute: Prof. V. E. Motylev (director of the Scientific Research Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas).
2. Vice President: G. N. Voitinskii (chief of the Pacific "cabinet" of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics).
3. A. Ia. Arosev: (chairman of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with foreign countries).
4. K. A. Mekhonoshin: (director of the Institute of Oceanography).
5. S. S. Ioffe: (deputy chief of the administration of the Great Northern Sea Route).
6. A. S. Svandze: (director of the Bank for Foreign Trade).
7. I. A. Adamovich: (chairman of the Kamchatka Joint-Stock Co.).
8. Ia. D. Ianson: (president of the chamber of commerce).

9. Ia. M. Berkovich: (manager of the East Fish Trust).

Mr. A. Kantorovich was appointed secretary-general of the institute.

The chairman of the new institute, Comrade Motylev, addressed a letter to the secretary general of the International Institute of Pacific Relations notifying him that the Pacific institute, which had been established in the U. S. S. R., was prepared to join the internaitonal institute as a member in response to the invitation extended by the conference of the international institute held in Shanghai in 1931.

At the beginning of September V. E. Motylev received a reply from Mr. Carter, who welcomed the U. S. S. R. as a new member of the International Institute for Pacific Relations.

The board of the institute voted to commence preparations for the coming Congress to be held in 1935 or 1936. For this purpose it is planned to publish before the Congress assembled the following monographic studies:

1. The First and Second 5-Year Plans of the Soviet Far East.
2. The Nationality Policy in the Soviet Far East.
3. The Great Northern Sea Route and the Pacific Ocean.
4. The Economic Struggle in the Pacific Ocean Area.
5. The Problem of Raw Materials in the Pacific Ocean Area.

At the same time it is planned to publish in 1935 two symposium volumes devoted to current problems on the Pacific area and on the economic activities in the Soviet Far East.

[Translation from "Tikhii Okean" (The Pacific Ocean), Political, Social, and Economic Quarterly Review, No. 1 (3), January–March 1935, pp. 268–269]

The Pacific Institute

The Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. (a section of the International Institute of Pacific Relations) has developed its activities considerably.

The following monographs in Russian and in English will be published by the U. S. S. R. Pacific Institute prior to the International Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to be held in 1936:

1. The First and Second 5-Year Plans in the Far East (being compiled by the staff of the Far East regional plan).
2. The U. S. S. R. National Policy.
3. The Economic and Political Struggle in the Pacific Ocean Area.

The institute is also preparing the publication in English and in Russian of a symposium volume dedicated to current political and economic problems connected with the Pacific Ocean area.

The symposium will cover approximately the following items: (1) Relations between Japan and China since 1931; (2) the repudiation of the Washington Treaty; (3) the problem of the unification of China; (4) the crisis in Japan and the sociopolitical consequences of the war in Manchuria and in China; (5) the Anglo-Japanese struggle for world markets; (6) silver and the colonial countries of the Far East; (7) the ideological preparations for the war in Japan; (8) naval armaments in the Pacific Ocean area following Japan's repudiation of the Washington Naval Treaty; (9) the colonial policy of Japan; (10) England and her dominions in the Pacific Ocean; (11) the Philippine Islands and their share of the contradictions of imperialism in the Pacific Ocean area; (12) the economic and sociopolitical development of the Soviet Far East under the first and second 5-year plans; (13) the nationality policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East and in the northern regions of Siberia; (14) the establishment of the Jewish autonomous region in Birobidzhan; (15) the significance of the great northern sea route.

This program, however, is subject to further concretization.

In accordance with the plans for scientific research adopted at the last international conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1933, the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. undertook to prepare the following works: (1) a monograph on the standard of living in the U. S. S. R.; (2) a report on the status of foreigners as stipulated by the Soviet laws (prepared by Prof. M. A. Plotkin); (3) a report on the means of communication in the Soviet Far East.

The Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. has compiled a systematic catalog of all books which were published in the Soviet Union since 1922 on questions connected with the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, including questions pertinent to the Soviet Far East and Siberia.

The Institute of Pacific Relations of the U. S. S. R. maintains a book exchange with the American section of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The most important books published in both countries on Far East and Pacific questions come under this book exchange. There was, also, an intention by the institute to send to America a collection of selected books on the U. S. S. R. in exchange for a corresponding number of American books on the United States of America.

At the end of December Mr. E. C. Carter, the secretary general of the International Institute of Pacific Relations, visited Moscow with a group of his collaborators. During his stay in Moscow (from December 20 to December 31) Mr. Carter met representatives of a great number of Soviet scientific institutions and of public organizations. Mr. Carter had a number of conferences with the presidium of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. on questions relating to the activities of the institute as a section of the international organization. Before his departure from Moscow Mr. Carter was received by Mr. Litvinov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 38

[Translation from vol. XII columns 657–658 of the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, Moscow, 1928 (Soviet Encyclopedia)]

VOITINSKII (Zarkhin), Grigorii Naumovich (born 1893), Communist, Comintern worker, writer. Son of a low-grade white-collar worker, Voitinskii completed only an elementary school and supplemented his further education by reading and self study. In 1913 he emigrated to America and lived in a number of places in the United States and Canada as a student and worker. In the spring of 1918 Voitinskii returned to Russia, joined the Communist Party and began to work in the Krasnoiarsk soviet of workers' delegates. After Kolchak had taken over the government Voitinskii took part in the underground work and in the uprising against Kolchak at Omsk. After the failure of the uprising he was detailed to underground work at Vladivostok. There he was arrested in May 1919 and sentenced to hard labor for life on the island of Sakhalin. In January 1920, still prior to the overthrow of the Kolchak government in the Far East, Voitinskii together with other political prisoners, and with the help of an organization of sympathizers who were free, took part in the seizure of power on the island. From 1920 on, he worked at the order of the Comintern in the Far East. He worked for a number of years in the eastern secretariat of the Comintern. In the summer of 1920 he participated in the organization of the first Communist cells at Shanghai, Peiping, and Canton; he also took an intensive part in the further work of the Chinese Communist Party and, in particular, conducted the negotiation with Sun Yat-sen concerning the collaboration of the Kuomintang and of the Chinese Communist Party.

Writer of Communist literature.

Cited in Literature on the Chinese Soviet Movement, Pacific Affairs, September 1936 (prepared by staff of American Council of Institute of Pacific Relations). British Imperialism in China, Communist International, No. 6, November 1924; The Situation in China, Communist International, No. 21, April 1925; The Errors of the Communist Party of China in the Revolution of 1925–1927.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce the original Russian translation of the same thing from which Mr. Barmine made references.

The CHAIRMAN. That will go in the files of the committee and the translation will go in the record, with its proper identification.

The translation from volume XII of the encyclopedia is dated 1928 and has been identified and testified to by this witness.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 39" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know General Berzin?

Mr. BARMINE. I knew him for 15 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go into this, I may be a bit too meticulous in this, but I think you should identify this translation if you please. I think Mr. Mandel can probably lay the foundation.

Mr. MANDEL. Both translations were submitted to the committee by the Library of Congress. Their qualified experts did the translation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, will you describe to us what your relationship was to General Berzin?

Mr. BARMINE. In 1921 there was a decision that I was one of the General Staff officers who would be attached to intelligence after being graduated. Since this time I was on assignments by the intelligence service and put at the personal disposal of General Berzin. As I said, he had about 20 people special assistants who were always at the disposal for assignments which would be given to them. Therefore, from 1921 to 1935 he was my direct superior.

Mr. MORRIS. What military rank did you have in 1935?

Mr. BARMINE. Brigadier general.

Mr. MORRIS. How long had you held that rank?

Mr. BARMINE. Until the middle of 1935 when I was retired.

Mr. MORRIS. How long had you held it? How long had you been brigadier general when you were retired?

Mr. BARMINE. It would be for 11 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Your relationships were directly with General Berzin?

Mr. BARMINE. I was directly under his orders.

Mr. MORRIS. What were some of your assignments, some of your later assignments? What was the Auto-Motor Export Corp.?

Mr. BARMINE. In 1928 the military intelligence needed men in France because at this time the trade legation in France was placing orders for airplane models, spare parts, and some important equipment for military factories. There was a special military purchase department and there was an air force commission in France. As it was a diplomatic assignment, military intelligence asked that one of the high executives of the trade legation be a General Staff officer. In 1928 I was appointed to the trade legation in France as director general of imports. I had in charge nine import departments and I carried in full the duty of foreign trade officer, but special attention had to be given to these military purchases because the air force commission had a high officer in charge and before there was needed an authority in the trade legation who would handle any complicated matters right there.

Mr. MORRIS. So you cite that as one of your experiences in military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. That was my assignment. I went to France to the trade legation under orders of General Berzin.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us of some other experiences in the Soviet military intelligence you had?

Mr. BARMINE. In 1931 I was transferred to Italy as director general of imports because at this time we also had the Navy purchasing commission and the air force purchasing commission in Italy. We were buying destroyers built for us in Trieste.

Then we had orders for planes and aviation models. We had two purchasing commission there. Military intelligence decided and the war department decided to have the men in charge in Italy. I was director general of improts in Italy. I stayed there for a year until 1932.

My next assignment was in Belgium. At this time we had no diplomatic relations with Belgium, and it was the decision of the Politburo

to open the unofficial agency. So that was also with the approval of General Berzin and I was transferred to Brussells where I stayed for 1 year.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. That was 1932. Then I was recalled back to Moscow. At this time there was carried on a very huge program of retooling of the aviation industry. There were several during the first 5-year plan, several big aviation factories built. It was very important to get the necessary machinery quickly. Most of this machinery was going, during the end of the first 5-year plan, for military industry and the most expensive and the most important part of it they had priority. In Moscow there existed the Foreign Trade Corp. called Stanko-Import, Machine Tool Import. In order to keep and speed orders for military industry, I was appointed the first executive vice president of Machine Tool Import.

Mr. MORRIS. You were the first vice president?

Mr. BARMINE. Of Stanko-Import in Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that last name?

Mr. BARMINE. S-t-a-n-k-o-Import. It was a corporation which was placing a very huge order in England and Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next assignment?

Mr. BARMINE. I remained 1 year on this job.

At this time for several years the Soviet Government was carrying the export of arms to the country of China. There was a huge delivery in 1925–27 to Chiang Kai-shek's government about 15 or 20 million dollars of equipment.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1925 and 1926?

Mr. BARMINE. From 1925 to 1927. Then in later years we delivered some artillery and some munitions to Afghanistan; then airplanes and aviation parts to Persia.

Then there was a huge shipment of ammunition and arms exported to western China to Sinkiang and to Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that done during the Chinese Government?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I will come back to it. It was a completely separate project. The Soviet Government at this time was ready to grant a loan to Turkey. As I remember it, it was a loan for $10,000,000 which ostensibly, officially in the papers, was for the industrialization of Turkey, for textile machinery. But in fact, only about 20 percent of this was given for industrial machinery; 80 percent was arms and ammunition.

It happened sporadically. Some of the things for delivery to Persia were done by the War Department, some by the Ministry of Industry, some were military intelligence. It was spread in dividends. The Politburo decision was to consolidate all of it in one organization under cover of the Foreign Trade Department. So there was the decision of the Politburo at the end of 1933 to organize a special corporation. The name of the corporation was Auto-Motor Export Corp. This is one of the corporations of the Foreign Trade Department. This corporation has an official charter approved by the Government for the export of automobiles and motors.

Mr. MORRIS. The charter was just for the export of automobiles and motors?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right, but there was a secret part of the charter which gave to this corporation full and complete control

in the execution of all of the export of arms from the Soviet Union. It was like lend-lease.

Mr. MORRIS. This was a secret clause in the charter?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. What we had was official business in the order department of the corporation which business was to export trucks and passenger vehicles. The point was that at this time the Ford Co. built the Gorki factory, but Ford was far-sighted enough to put the clause in which prohibited the reexport of passenger cars of the Ford model. So we would have no right for our legal official business to reexport the production of passenger cars.

We signed the dealer contacts with the Ford Co. of Alexandria, Egypt, and with Vauxhall in England, together with the trucks of Russian production, heavy vehicles. We were reexporting the American automobiles. Neither Ford nor Vauxhall were completely unaware of the second part of the business of this organization.

The second part had officially the name of motor department. It was not exporting any model. It took over from the war department, from intelligence, from the Ministry of Industry all the job of the export of arms, those which were in planning and those which were in execution. This department was in charge of the military export.

When the decision of this organization was reached, the War Department and Marshal Tukachevsky who was assistant commissar of defense offered my name as president of this corporation.

Mr. MORRIS. So Marshal Tukachevsky offered your name as president of the Auto-Motor Export Corp.?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. Rozenholz, the Trade Commissar, concurred.

Mr. MORRIS. Who concurred?

Mr. BARMINE. Rozenholz.

Mr. MORRIS. Spell his name, please.

Mr. BARMINE. R-o-z-e-n-h-o-l-z. He was also shot in 1938.

My name was submitted and the Politburo approved. I was appointed the president of this trust.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. That was at the end of 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position?

Mr. BARMINE. I held this position until the end of 1935 when I asked to be relieved. I was appointed to Greece.

Mr. MORRIS. When you held that position did you as a matter of fact show a great deal of activity in this motor division?

Mr. BARMINE. That was under my complete control.

Mr. MORRIS. That was also under your complete control?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us how you functioned in that respect?

Mr. BARMINE. As a matter of fact for a year and a half, until I was given another general staff job, I was president of the corporation and I was director of this motor department. I had to handle these things directly. With this work you had to be in daily contact with the war department and with military intelligence because of the things you had to do in a hurry and often we had to borrow the equipment from the Army.

I had to get officer instructors to accompany the arms to teach people in this country how to use them. This job kept me not only in con-

tact with the War Department but besides that that was the year of the most constant and close cooperation with General Berzin because he, from the War Department, was charged with handling this side of it.

Mr. MORRIS. So during this period you were in particularly close association with General Berzin, your superior?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. I was seeing him several times every week.

Mr. MORRIS. In this connection did you ever hear of the organization, Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you heard about the Institute of Pacific Relations and will you tell us who told it to you?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, in order to come to it I would like to mention the thing that brought the Institute of Pacific Relations in.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Barmine.

Mr. BARMINE. At the end of 1933 when I was taking over the job of the export of arms and delivery, one of the unfinished jobs we took was the export of arms in Sinkiang. That is a Province in western China. This work was completely independent. You asked me about the regulation with the Chinese Government. It was completely independent from the Chinese Government because the policy was different. In fact, when I started this job, I received a letter from the Ministry of Aviation of Nationalist China, the Chiang Kai-shek government, who was asking for delivery of aviation material and planes.

I had to report to the Chinese Commission of the Central Committee and to the Politburo about the answer. I was given the decision not to even answer this letter. It means we had no contact on this subject of export with the Chinese Government and the letter remained in our file unanswered.

The CHAIRMAN. That is with the Chiang Kai-shek government?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. At the same time the Russian Government had a special interest in western China in Sinkiang because the problem was to secure the control of Sinkiang independently. First combat the British influence in Sinkiang and then secure it as a military base.

The governor of the Province was friendly. At this time there was a Moslem revolt in Sinkiang. We were delivering artillery, planes, ammunition, shells, and rifles for this government. In fact, the situation deteriorated so rapidly that once a lot of these things arrived at the Sinkiang border, Uramchi, the capital, was surrounded by rebels. So I was ordered to put the bombs on the planes. These bombs were delivered right on the heads of the rebels around Uramchi. Then the Chinese governor was billed later for this ammunition as delivered.

Mr. MORRIS. You billed the Chinese governor at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say "governor" or "government"?

Mr. BARMINE. Governor of the Province. We were dealing only with the Governor of west Sinkiang. At this time two brigades of the secret-police troops walked into Sinkiang. They participated and tried to liquidate the rebellion. This was never published in the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you speaking of Soviet troops?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; two brigades of NVD troops crossed the border.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify NVD?

Mr. BARMINE. Ministry of Internal Affairs security police.

Mr. MORRIS. The Russian security police?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. There were two full infantry brigades with artillery. When our artillery arrived to Sinkiang after this rebellion was dispersed, the NVD troops took over the new artillery pieces which I was delivering there and left the Chinese the old ones which they used in suppressing the rebellion.

Before the governor asked for a reduction of price because it was rather second-hand and we first insisted that they were used to help them. Then I was ordered to give a reduction and forget about it.

Senator O'CONOR. Can we have the date of that?

Mr. BARMINE. This is the end of 1933.

Senator O'CONOR. When the deliveries were made on the heads of the rebels you describe?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. After the rebellion was suppressed, the central committee and the Chinese commission of the Politburo decided to send a commission to Sinkiang which would work up a large plan of reconstruction, of financial help, of military help, of building the roads, airdromes, the delivery of the means of transportation, and so on.

The president of this commission was appointed and he was a brother-in-law of Stalin who went to Sinkiang and remained there several months.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the man we had previously identified?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. I got in contact with Svanidze after they returned. They returned with the proposals which were discussed in the Sinkiang commission of the Politburo. They were approved by the Politburo. We had to equip completely 10,000 troops which would be independent under the orders of the governor of the Province. The son of the governor, the young colonel, came to Moscow and stayed and worked in contact with my office.

The plan included building of hangars, airdromes, roads, completing the aviation line established there, then completely equipping and organizing and training the 10,000 troops. Of course, it was not acknowledged, this question of dismemberment or complete separation of Sinkiang. It was still part of Nationalist China. So among the equipment I had to deliver we even had to make Kuomintang stars, 10,000, which would be put on at the start of this.

Mr. MORRIS. You had to put on 10,000 Kuomintang stars even though you were going to use them for a different purpose?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. We discussed this order, too. The Sinkiang commission was supposed to give a huge loan and silver to western China.

This military part of armed supplies by the decision of the Politburo was given to my corporation. Before I worked with the son of the governor of the Province and with close contact under control of General Berzin's office. There was a military resident, a military attaché, in Uramchi who was also my classmate in the General Staff School who participated. This affair took several months and during this affair the problem came up about China proper, about the Pacific coast of China. General Berzin inquired of me if I am doing some-

thing in the line of the automobile department and the export of cars in eastern China. I said we were only starting. At this time we sent several trucks to Shanghai as samples. But I had no branches there. We had huge deliveries to Mongolia but nothing to China proper.

Mr. MORRIS. You had a heavy delivery to Mongolia but nothing to China proper?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. We sent a few trucks and a representative to Shanghai. He asked me if it would be possible that the war department and military intelligence would be interested in building on certain points along the China coast in eastern China the secret cache of arms and ammunition, and if it would be possible that I open branches in China proper for ostensibly or factually the export of trucks, for selling the trucks and spare parts, opening warehouses, but the military intelligence could use the warehouses for storage for the arms.

Mr. MORRIS. May I review that? In other words, Soviet military intelligence wanted you at this time to open branch offices in China which would ostensibly serve as a cover for exporting of automobile parts?

Mr. BARMINE. No. Factually it would be used for the export of automobiles, trucks and spare parts, but besides that using this branch and these warehouses we would have to store up arms and ammunition without knowledge of the Chinese Government.

Senator. FERGUSON. Would you find out what percentage was motors and trucks?

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the relationship between the two? Which was the greater?

Mr. BARMINE. You mean in the operation of my corporation?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BARMINE. In the operation of my corporation it would be this way. About 10 percent would be automobile exports and 90 percent export of arms, because we had eight million dollars of gold, the value of the arms that were delivered in Turkey in 1935, the delivery of tanks and armored cars, ammunition, gas masks and all to fill up this loan.

Mr. MORRIS. What kind of crates did you use? Would they be ostensibly for automotive parts?

Mr. BARMINE. They went as busses. They were fully crated. Armored cars and tanks were fully crated. Officers and training personnel given to me by the general staff also went as engineers of the Auto-Motor Export Corp.

I had a special delegation which came from Turkey of five military men with a general at the head. The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow was Vasyf Chinar who was in charge of carrying this contract and the contract was signed with the Turkish Ambassador. The legation came. They were very strict about the requirements. They were very much pleased.

So I had to go to Marshal Tukachevsky and ask to borrow tanks and armored cars from the Red Army reserve in order to fulfill the requirements.

Senator EASTLAND. Were they for the Turkish Government?

Mr. BARMINE. That was officially for the Turkish Government. Our Government gave them a loan. This loan was 20 years without interest.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the arms in China? Was that for the Chinese Government, or to promote revolution in China?

Mr. BARMINE. I didn't inquire of General Berzin. It wouldn't be proper for me to inquire the purpose of it. He was my superior.

Senator EASTLAND. What was your judgment as to what the material was used for?

Mr. BARMINE. I understand the situation in China for many years before and after was the situation which the policy of the Russian Government was to seek a decision by force of arms and before this cache of arms and ammunition would be held up until the moment when the military situation in every area would be favorable or Chinese Communists would be there and could be supplied. Of course that is my guess. I didn't discuss the purpose of it. I just discussed the fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You were there to take orders, not to speculate?

Mr. BARMINE. In a sense. This is a delicate situation. The corporation belongs to the foreign trade department. The decision about any operation was to be approved by the Politburo. I couldn't deliver any arms without special decision by the Politburo signed by Stalin himself. There would be no possibility of that. All 90 percent of the motor department operation was every time by specific approval of the Politburo. I had to receive a decision signed that I received it and I would have to carry it out.

So before the final decision on this it would be by the Politburo. This was exploratory conversation because they obviously—military intelligence had special assignments. They were looking for a way to accomplish it. Being the president of this corporation and at the same time I was a general staff officer and was still at this time, until 1935, at the disposal of General Berzin, but he wouldn't press it because—it would be only preliminary conversation about it. Was it possible to do? Would it be convenient? What are the ways?

Then we would have to go to the Chinese Commission of the Politburo and get the approval. Of course foreign trade department was rather reluctant. They considered that we would be involved in something more than official delivery of arms to the governments. That would be some kind of an entirely new operation. Rozenholz was very reluctant. In fact, he accused me of going too far along with the War Department, Tukachevsky and Berzin.

He went to the Politburo asking that I would be retired from active reserve and would remain only completely civilian as the chief of the corporation because he felt, due to my relations with Berzin, there was undue influence and I was carrying too much military side of it. I said it would be not for any relations. We couldn't get a lot of arms and ammunition from the war department if we couldn't get the training instructors to carry it out so successfully. Still he went and that was the reason why in 1935 I was put on the retirement list. Rozenholz announced this to me. I was put on the retirement list and that brought also the cooling of relations and that is why at the end of 1935 I asked to be relieved. I went to the foreign office and was sent to Greece.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about the Institute of Pacific Relations? You have now given us the details leading up to that.

Mr. BARMINE. When the question arose about the opening of this cache of arms, there was a question of personnel, whom I could put in charge.

Senator FERGUSON. You are talking about China?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt, you are welcome here and will you please have a seat at the table with us.

Mr. BARMINE. At this time I had already difficulty with the personnel. I had about three or four hundred people working in Sinkiang in western China. I had to send a very huge commission to Turkey for the delivery of the arms. Then I had to get our Air Force officers and mechanics for Turkey and for Persia before I ran out of trained people whom I could have. The first of my objections to General Berzin was that this is a very delicate affair. You have to have reliable people. Then you have to have competent people in charge of those branches.

Mr. MORRIS. When you use the term "reliable" you mean people loyal to your organization?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I mean people who would be trained in carrying this kind of secret operation out, who would have military training to take care of arms and who would be responsible enough not to let these things all open.

Senator FERGUSON. That was secret, the armed part of your corporation?

Mr. BARMINE. Always top secret.

Senator FERGUSON. Putting it in the warehouse, putting the motors and the automobiles in the warehouse, was secret because, after all, they were arms and ammunition?

Mr. BARMINE. The Soviet Government didn't care about it being known we are exporting arms. So I said to him that I couldn't get any more. One man from the Air Force, one man from the tank forces, one from the artillery division of the General Staff—I got several for Turkey. I couldn't get any more. He complained they had to give me some of their best officers to carry this out. It was a conference in which Terian——

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

Mr. BARMINE. T-e-r-i-a-n.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he?

Mr. BARMINE. General Berzin's deputy. Then Malikoff, who was the military resident in western China——

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

Mr. BARMINE. M-a-l-i-k-o-f-f.

General Berzin said, "We might give you our men."

Mr. MORRIS. "Give you some of our men" did he say?

Mr. BARMINE. For working in China or on the problems of China.

Mr. MORRIS. People who had been working in the China area on China problems?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. They would be intelligence officers?

Mr. BARMINE. These people when he mentioned "our men," talking about intelligence, that means there was a member of this apparatus of the military intelligence and working on an assignment for them.

Mr. MORRIS. They are members of the Soviet military intelligence organization?

Mr. BARMINE. When General Berzin said "I might give you our men," I assumed that is the only thing he could mean. I didn't question him more.

In this connection several names were mentioned. Now I have to state here most of the personnel, except the top supervising jobs, most of the personnel were used in underground work by military intelligence which was completely separate of what we were doing in the foreign office, and that work was carried by the foreigners, people with foreign passports, born in foreign countries, because they would not be so obvious as Russians. All the top controlling positions would be Russians and even not always that. Most of the personnel would be all professional intelligence people, recruited from the different groups, people recruited among the sympathizers of Communist causes or even men specially assigned by the foreign Communist Party for military intelligence work.

Of course, at the moment when they would be detached for the military intelligence work they would rave to break any connection, formal connection, with the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. They would have to break formal connection?

Mr. BARMINE. Not to participate in any other form of party activity. In every Communist Party in the central committee there would be a special person who would be in charge of collecting the military information from the Communist Party cells and also going through this selecting and assigning the personnel who would be completely delivered for good to the military intelligence. When the question of using military men of the intelligence apparatus came to discussion, several names were mentioned of foreign nationalities.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. So far is I can remember now, they were a few Russian names. Then they were French, Czechs, Germans, and Americans.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the Americans?

Mr. BARMINE. Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. They were mentioned as "our people" by Berzin who could be assigned to this project you were complaining about where you did not have the personnel to staff.

Mr. BARMINE. We played with this idea. It was one of the possibilities which was discussed.

Senator EASTLAND. Just exactly what did he say about Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, I want to emphasize that this project which finally was never realized by me was only a very small part of the preparation. I had the assignment of delivery to western China and Turkey. We spent hours in long conferences on these. This was 15 or 16 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Just give it to us the best you can.

Mr. BARMINE. To tell you exactly what words, I would not like to say anything I don't remember very firmly.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us your recollection of that conversation and subsequent conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. All I can recollect is subsequent conversations, the question of the personnel or reliable people who ought to organize it or put in charge or to start this business. It was because I said I had no man who could do it, I could not spare anyone for preparation. Then he talked about General Terian and that was the question of who might be suitable. Among the names was a Czech, the one whom I knew personally.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the Czech's name?

Mr. BARMINE. Creichi. I knew only about Creichi because he was in Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. That is C-r-e-i-c-h-i?

Mr. BARMINE. C-r-e-i-c-h-i, probably this way; I would not know how to spell it in English.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall that Creichi's name, Barnes' name, and Lattimore's name were mentioned as "our people who could be assigned to you"?

Mr. BARMINE. There were French, German, there were two Russians, Mamaiev——

Mr. MORRIS. How do you spell that name?

Mr. BARMINE. M-a-m-a-i-e-v.

Mr. MORRIS. He was Russian?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. There was Vatmanov, V-a-t-m-a-n-o-v. This one was the highest division because they were Russians and they carried all the part of the job from the military intelligence.

Senator EASTLAND. Now General Berzin was the head of Soviet military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. He spoke of Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes as two agents of Soviet military intelligence

Mr. BARMINE. He spoke of them as "our men"?

Senator O'CONOR. He referred to them as "our men"?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Meaning Russian men?

Mr. BARMINE. It was my understanding meaning military intelligence.

Senator O'CONOR. Had you ever heard of Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes before that?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you later hear of them?

Mr. MORRIS. You see, there were more conversations where those names were mentioned.

Mr. BARMINE. They were the first American names that ever came to me.

Senator O'CONOR. They were the first two Americans who were ever described to you as being identified with the Russian cause?

Mr. BARMINE. Ever mentioned in connection with any of my work for many years before that.

Senator O'CONOR. In the first conversation did General Berzin say anything further that you can recall as to what Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes had done or were prepared to do?

Mr. BARMINE. Now the question was that—we were talking the first time of the whole affair; the problem of personnel was not the biggest one. The problem was principally how to go about it. Would it be possible technically? How we were going to ask permission of the Politburo to do it? What would be the position of the Commissar of the Foreign Trade Department? These things were mentioned. When the practical solution would come, we would come back to it again. The question which was pushed on this conference was, "Do they have men to give me and do they have suitable men?" Later they decided most of these men they couldn't spare, they had other things

to do and more important things, and they were not suitable for this purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Barmine, these names that were mentioned in the first conversation were repeated again?

Mr. BARMINE. I wouldn't recall that conversation, the first.

Mr. MORRIS. These names came up not only once but they came up more than once?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In which they discussed the possibility of making Lattimore, Barnes, Creichi, Mamaiev and Vatmanov available to your organization?

Mr. BARMINE. It was not discussed how they would be available, what position they would take and what capacity. This was the first idea only.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was present at this first conversation where these two names were mentioned? Will you tell us who were there besides General Berzin?

Mr. BARMINE. General Terian and General Malikov.

Senator FERGUSON. This was their headquarters?

Mr. BARMINE. General Berzin's office where I usually came to talk to him.

Senator FERGUSON. An official conversation?

Mr. BARMINE. We were talking about our work.

Senator EASTLAND. Was his office the Kremlin?

Mr. BARMINE. No, it was on a small street, the intelligence office was on a small street around the corner from the main War Department building.

Senator EASTLAND. He did not speak of them as Communists but as military agents of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BARMINE. He spoke about "our men" and I assume when people work in military intelligence they usually have no more formal connections with the party at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, did he mention to you in any of those conversations what organizations they were working for, that is, Barnes and Lattimore in particular?

Mr. BARMINE. Not in that conversation.

Mr. MORRIS. In subsequent conversations did General Berzin tell you what organizations they were working with?

The CHAIRMAN. During a subsequent conversation did they tell you what organization these men were working with?

Mr. BARMINE. When it came to the second time, as I remember, that was the first time the Institute of Pacific Relations was mentioned. The question was that there were more important things and they would be more suitable with the plans in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, the building up of the branches of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the military using it for a cover shop for military intelligence work in the Pacific area.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first hear the term "Institute of Pacific Relations?"

Mr. BARMINE. I first read about it—at this time when this was mentioned first in the office of General Berzin I had not the faintest idea that the Institute of Pacific Relations had anything to do with this kind of affair. All I knew about it was what I read in the news-

papers at this time in Moscow. My idea was that it was probably some kind of geographical, scientific organization, and I think that was probably correct at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What year was that?

Mr. BARMINE. I think it was shortly before, probably in 1934 or 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. How did General Berzin describe the Institute of Pacific Relations to you from this point of view?

Mr. BARMINE. This was not describing the Institute of Pacific Relations, of course, because these things, when you spoke, they were mentioned passingly because you assumed all you know about it or you are not supposed to know more than you are told at this moment. I couldn't question my superior about what his plans are. The question was only that in this long conference when we came back again to the question of personnel he said that we had some important planning developments in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the men would be valuable more in connection with this, so let us forget about them.

Senator FERGUSON. What men would be valuable in that institute?

Mr. BARMINE. Lattimore and Barnes, Americans.

Senator O'CONOR. How long was that after the first conversation? About what interval of time was that?

Mr. BARMINE. I couldn't answer you exactly because I was seeing him at this time probably two or three times a week. It would certainly be within a period of 4 weeks.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, as a result of these conversations with General Berzin and the other generals in which you discussed the Institute of Pacific Relations, what was your understanding of the nature of the Institute as a result of those conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, when this was mentioned, we speak, we sit in General Berzin's office, then the conference is finished. I go to Terian's office or Malikov's office and we talk about what happened because we have to carry things, and then we refer to the conversations which were held in this. Of course, I imagine I could not recollect now how I would state it, because there were hours of conversation, but certainly I am sure I expressed some surprise about the Institute of Pacific Relations brought into our affairs. I knew of the cover shop that would be put up for intelligence agents' use or some expert in a private firm of Belgium, France, or Italy, or whatever it was, but that was the first time.

Mr. MORRIS. So you understood it to be a cover shop?

Mr. BARMINE. Then we talked about it and I was explained by Terain more in detail what Berzin just mentioned, and then it was a question of what is the plan. I couldn't ask much. You are not supposed in this world to ask things that are not directly in your line of duty. Whatever my friends would volunteer me to say, and frankly, it is of big importance now here, but it was of a very secondary and small importance for me at that time. The idea was, as I was explained, that the Institute of Pacific Relations being an organization who can carry research work, who can open branches around the Pacific in the countries where we were not yet recognized—the Soviet Union at this time has no embassy all around the Pacific area—with this difficulty about contacts, the idea which I was given was that

that is the idea, under-cover work when you can have legal reasons and innocent reasons to travel to do specifically military research and reconnoitering work and gathering of information materials, because military intelligence is comprised of the gathering of printed material, classified and unclassified, of every kind. You have reason to keep the foreign members of the military network on the job, you can send them from one area to another, you can have for them a legitimate reason to have their offices to gather information, to get in contact with people who know something about geography, topography, and many other things.

So the explanation I was given was that the Intelligence Division considered this a very valuable outlet, a very valuable cover organization, they have an important plan for it, because it would be extremely convenient.

Now what I want to say is that there was no idea of any question of political work, it was purely professional, just to use the organization, develop it in a way where it could contribute for the assignment that military intelligence had.

Senator EASTLAND. In reality, it was considered an arm of the Soviet military intelligence; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. I do not know when it was decided, how it was decided, but at this moment when I came to this picture, as I say accidentally, for a very short time, at this time this was considered important for Russia, which was developing to use this and to build within this organization the convenient apparatus which could have this very innocent and respectable cover.

Senator EASTLAND. But to make it an agent of Soviet military intelligence was the plan, was it not?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, how you come to make an agent, it is not just that you hire somebody for a job the way you hire for any organization. Some of the people who would work in the institute would not know that they were working for military intelligence. Some of them will be drafted into it gradually, first given an assignment to make an expedition for research to go to China, Manchuria, Korea, and then there would be military topography, and finally the men would be drafted in and one moment the point will come when maybe there will be disclosed whom they are working for and they consider to be reliable and willing to do this job. That is a gradual process and different with every person.

Senator EASTLAND. Whether all the people knew it or not, the Soviet military intelligence planned that this organization would be its agent?

Mr. BARMINE. I would term it not as an organization as such but the organization would be infiltrated, then the organization would be used for recruiting, for bringing people into this organization, and gradually take some of them who came to this organization with an innocent purpose or scientific purpose.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know at that time that Mr. Lattimore was in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. No, I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. You learned it in the conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. We had plans for them in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I couldn't ask who Mr. Lattimore was, what he was doing, was he on the job there or not.

I explained to you all this procedure. For me, I had by this time intelligence training. I went through special courses. For me, it was not necessary to explain me all this in detail, just mentioning the question we are going and we are planning to use this for our purpose; it would be not for me—all the rest I told you, the matter of operation would be something part of my training, I would know how it was done. It was not necessary to be explained to me in connection with the institute.

Senator EASTLAND. Later General Berzin told you to forget the plans for Lattimore and Barnes, that they had more important assignments for them?

Mr. BARMINE. In connection with the institute. Then I asked questions about the institute.

Senator FERGUSON. I wonder there whether or not he could explain the difference between a front that you set up and one that they penetrate.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Senator, that is exactly what he was explaining a minute or so ago.

Mr. BARMINE. If you want me to, I can tell you.

Senator FERGUSON. In as short a way as you can. And which was the Institute of Pacific Relations? Was it a front or one that you would penetrate?

Mr. BARMINE. Of course you have sometimes what we call a cover shop. It was specially organized for the narrow military purpose. It was phony, it was a fake. There would be some import-export business or some kind of shop or some tourist office which would be built as a place for a rendezvous or a gathering and for giving the reason for legal residence in the area.

Now this of course was a different project to the extent they had an organization that existed already that was found to be ideally suitable for not just one local place but there was a whole Pacific area that they could give movement for people and open very large possibilities for intelligence work. So it was not especially built up from an organization which should be infiltrated, taken over at the most decided place. When the question of moving people, there would be enough people there who could report to the military network, work within the organization undisturbed for their operations for collection of material, for recruiting people and all.

Senator FERGUSON. So the Institute of Pacific Relations was the latter set-up that you were going to use and were using; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right; that is my understanding of it. Of course I have to qualify this as my conclusion on the basis of my training, because it was not considered enough to explain to me.

Senator O'CONOR. They did not have to tell you a great deal; you had had enough experience to put two and two together.

The point I would like to have you clear up for us is whether or not in their discussions about the Institute of Pacific Relations it was all as to what they planned to do or whether or not at that time or subsequently you got any information as to what they had accomplished, whether they had succeeded in getting to it.

Mr. BARMINE. At this time, as I understood it, it was already in process.

Senator O'CONOR. In other words, they had already infiltrated?

Mr. BARMINE. I don't know how much they had, but the development of this operation was in process. I couldn't ask about anything, but so far as I was told I was told it was in process. Then it came completely out of the sphere of activity. When I went to Greece I did not hear anything about it except I would see and read in the newspaper about formal activity, and I was not interested really at this time, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. It was your understanding that these Americans were already in this service or would be put in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. In the service generally. Whether they were at this time actively connected with the IPR and there were plans for them to do it, I wouldn't know it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know?

Mr. BARMINE. At this moment I wouldn't ask about it. I was told we have plans for them in connection with the institute. I couldn't tell you whether actually they were already in it or preparing something.

Mr. SOURWINE. You make a distinction there, General, do you not? You say you got the clear implication that they already were "our men," that they were already working for General Berzin.

Mr. BARMINE. It was not for me. So far as it was told by General Berzin, it was a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a question of where they were working, you did not know?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recall the two names so that when you had a discussion with General Krivitsky some years later you asked him about those?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the time of the conversation?

Mr. BARMINE. It was in early 1938 when I was in France.

Mr. MORRIS. This is after you had separated yourself from the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. In France in 1938?

Mr. BARMINE. In France in 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us of your conversaiton with General Krivitsky. Identify him first.

Mr. BARMINE. It happened this way: At this time after several Soviet attempts on me the French Government gave me special protection. I had two detectives day and night with me who were accompanying me wherever I would go in Paris, and also police in the night near my house. Once one of the detectives told me that the other two were guarding General Krvitsky in Paris, they kept him in the hotel room under constant guard. He told me he was very jittery and nervous, very depressed, and they were just worrying about him very much. Then my French friends who were in contact with him said that he asked if possible that I should go and see him probably to cheer him up, because I was maybe in a better mood. So it was arranged that I would go and see him in his hotel and talk.

Well, I had a personal interest in this rendezvous for other reasons because in 1937 in Paris when there was a special group assigned, sent

partly from Moscow and partly organized in France, which had an assignment to kill Ignatz Reiss and me——

Mr. MORRIS. Krivitsky told you this?

Mr. BARMINE. I knew this, because the French police blew it up and they arrested several. They succeeded to trace me already. At this time several of them were arrested. Therefore I was saved from the possibility of the same thing.

What I knew from my French friends who were in contact with Krivitsky, Krivitsky participated in this conference in which the decision to liquidate me and Reiss was discussed. I wanted to know about it, to ask Krivitsky what was talked and what was going on and his part in it.

The CHAIRMAN. You wanted to know how you were going to be liquidated?

Mr. MORRIS. He had broken with the Soviet organization also.

Mr. BARMINE. At this moment when he asked me to see him, but when this group came to Paris in 1937, in July, he was called to this conference by Spiegelglass and that was discussed because it so happened that Reiss broke from the Soviet organization in Holland almost exactly the same day as I did in Athens. Reiss was killed in Switzerland later. We almost at the same time left the respective countries and came to Paris.

I didn't know about this break at this time at all, but this group who came, was organized in Paris, and the people who came from Moscow, had an assignment to liquidate both of us. That is what Krivitsky told. So when I went to see him I was interested not only in cheering him up but finding what this was all about.

Now subsequently I saw Krivitsky two or three times more, always at his request. At one of these meetings there was talk of he was planning to go to the United States, he was trying to get a visa to the United States, and so I was planning to do the same thing.

At this time, you see, you have to understand psychologically when you are breaking you are very much feeling alone and then you expect when all these ugly things you knew were going on about Russia that you were able to persuade other people to do the same thing. Now the experience with Reiss, who was trying to persuade one of his friends and was taken into the trap and murdered, he was made to think that you should be cautious. Of course when you plan to come to the United States you try to find people who feel the same way as you do, who went through the same tragedy that you went through, and try to persuade them also to break. So we were talking about the people who would come here, who we might see, and who we can approach or who we should be careful about, too.

From the other point of view I never met Krivitsky during my intelligence work because he was in the underground network.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify his position?

Mr. BARMINE. I can identify only so far as he told me myself. As I say, he worked under different names. As I say, the group who was working within the Soviet organization, the foreign office and trade office, except when it was necessary for some particular things, were never told about people who worked in the underground. You could guess it.

I could see in passing through Berlin one of my classmates in general staff in civilian clothes. As I remember, I met one in the

railroad station. I wouldn't recognize, of course, and I would never ask him about him, but that would give me the idea that this, my friend is working also for military intelligence in the underground military network. That would be my assumption. So I could meet one accidentally or meet him at the entrance of Berzin's office at intelligence. We don't ask people where they are coming from and what they are doing, why they are here, or in Berlin, or why they are in Paris. So I wouldn't know anything about it. So I would have to believe what he told me.

Of course I was interested, to be sure, and I was checking him. In the first of my conferences with him and in the second time when I saw him we talked for hours and I was putting the question to confirm to me what he told about himself. I would ask him about people in the military intelligence, does he know this one or that one and whom he would know.

Mr. MORRIS. You asked him if he knew Barnes and Lattimore?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You wanted to know whom to be careful of?

Mr. BARMINE. Not necessarily. I didn't know anything about this man except what I told you. I didn't know about whom I should be careful about, but I asked him what he knows. As I say, this conversation went for hours. There were many things to talk and many questions to ask about people who disappear, about people who work, about people whom we might meet, and when the two names and several others came back again then I remember I asked him about the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The thing I could only say was that he said this operation was very successful because he, who had contact with military intelligence people who worked in the United States, told me that. He was informed more than I was on what was going on in military intelligence work in the United States.

What he told me, I would be amazed how many very important contacts the people working in the institute got, they were very influential and important, and he had some high hopes when he would come here that from the one point of view, high hopes that he could not only contact them but——

Mr. MORRIS. May I bring that out so it is clearly understood? In other words, when you discussed the Institute of Pacific Relations with General Krivitsky he told you that that particular Soviet operation, the cover shop in the institute, was doing very well and you would be amazed at what important contacts they were making in connection with their work?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that?

Mr. BARMINE. I would say the word used in Russian was "flourishing."

Mr. MORRIS. That is the word he used?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes. I had no idea of American political situations and conditions. I had no questions to ask. I would not understand much, of course, what that meant. I assumed only from a purely professional point of view that they are flourishing in the sense that this operation on military lines was going successfully. That was all at this time that came to my mind.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Russian word for "flourishing?"

Mr. BARMINE. Prozdetaet.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, did he also confirm your impression of Barnes and Lattimore, your recollection of Barnes and Lattimore that is?

Mr. BARMINE. He knew about them.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he know they were members of the Soviet organization?

Mr. BARMINE. Now, at this time he told me that they were connected with the institute. So then I knew what he is telling me, because it was important for me, because very few people that I would know, that he would tell the truth that he ever had contact with the agents in the United States, that he is really covered with the person that he tells he is.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think he answered your question.

Senator O'CONOR. He has not told us specifically what General Krivitsky told him about Barnes and Lattimore.

Mr. BARMINE. That they are working within the Institute of Pacific Relations and they are still, what he said, "they are still our men."

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I think it is wise if we have Mr. Mandel testify to what positions Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes held in the institute during this period. Mr. Mandel has been sworn previously.

TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN MANDEL, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. MANDEL. The literature and files of the Institute of Pacific Relations show that Joseph Barnes was secretary of the American council and served on its staff from 1931 to 1934, and Owen Lattimore was the editor of the official organ of the Institute called Pacific Affairs.

Senator EASTLAND. Is that the Joseph Barnes who was foreign editor of the New York Herald Tribune?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Was he stationed in Moscow for that paper?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long was Lattimore in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. He began to serve approximately in 1934. I think he served in that position until 1941.

Senator O'CONOR. Editor of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. MORRIS. Editor of Pacific Affairs.

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER GREGORY BARMINE—Resumed

Senator JENNER. Senator McCarthy said last year that Lattimore was the top agent of the Communist Party. As a former agent of the Kremlin, would you say that that statement was true in view of what you have learned from your conservations with the chief of the Russian military intelligence, with that gentleman in Paris, or other conversations?

Mr. BARMINE. I told you exactly what I know. So I don't know enough to say anything about this statement, because what I knew about them I told you everything. I don't know anything more.

Senator JENNER. When the chief of the military intelligence says, "He is one of our men," would that leave the impression in your mind that he was a top Communist in America?

Mr. BARMINE. Not necessarily. That assumes it; that doesn't preclude it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there a difference being a high Communist official and agent for the military intelligence of Soviet Russia?

Mr. BARMINE. Agents for military intelligence would not be necessarily, rather more as a rule, would not be high Communist officials.

Senator FERGUSON. They would not be high Communists——

Mr. BARMINE. Officials, but in the organization of the Communist Party would be a very high Communist official who would channel people for military intelligence work.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course they were made to resign from the party?

Mr. BARMINE. Take them out of party work and send them for assignment. Duclos was such a man in France at the time I was there.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were in the intelligence branch of the Russian Government you were not a high Communist Party member?

Mr. BARMINE. I was never a Communist Party official. I was just a member of the party and that was all.

Senator EASTLAND. You were not in the underground work?

Mr. BARMINE. Never.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. I joined the Communist Party in 1919, the same day I volunteered in the army and went to the Red army. Since then I remained a member of the party of average standing, I would say, but I never held any Communist position in the party apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that when you did discuss Barnes and Lattimore with Krivitsky in Paris that Krivitsky did state they were members of the Soviet organization?

That was your testimony, was it not, General?

Mr. BARMINE. That is what he told me.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what he told you. I want to bring that out because it was not understood by everyone.

Senator O'CONOR. You have been very fair in not attempting to overstate anything you do not know.

Mr. BARMINE. It is difficult for me because so many years passed and so many things happened since, before, during, and after. This was very accidental and not a substantial part of whatever I went through. So I am rather under strain trying to remember exactly and answer questions that would be truthful. I am afraid to say something that wasn't correct.

Senator O'CONOR. You did not anticipate at that time you would be in this position and it would have so much importance.

Mr. BARMINE. I did not anticipate I would be in the United States and I did not anticipate I would ever have to talk about the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator O'Conor. Nevertheless, as a very experienced and intelligent military officer, did you not have the feeling or did you have the feeling that Lattimore and Barnes were actively engaged in work for the Soviet Union rather than just being used by them? We are trying to distinguish whether you got the impression they were just being used or whether or not they were actively identified with the Soviet intelligence.

Mr. Barmine. Well, as I say, the process of becoming an active member is slow and gradual and different with every person, but as much as I can understand at this time, when I was told by General Berzin and repeated by Krivitsky my assumption was that they were in active and conscious participation.

Senator O'Conor. That is what I want, active and conscious participation.

Mr. Barmine. I can't tell you that, that is only my assumption.

Senator Eastland. Did you tell any agency of the United States Government what you knew about Lattimore and Barnes?

Mr. Barmine. When I was asked by the FBI agent who came to me I told him exactly the same thing as I told you. I was asked about it several times and I told it very early. They came to me several times and it was several years ago already and then they came repeatedly. So I couldn't tell you exactly the date.

Senator Ferguson. During this last hearing when they were having hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee last year were you approached by the FBI?

Mr. Barmine. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them that at that time?

Mr. Barmine. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever questioned by any of the committee members or the counsel about coming in as a witness?

Mr. Barmine. No.

Senator Ferguson. Or giving this evidence?

Mr. Barmine. No.

Senator Ferguson. But the FBI did have that evidence that you have told here this morning about Mr. Barnes and Mr. Lattimore; is that right?

Mr. Barmine. Well, if you call it evidence——

Senator Ferguson. Well, your statements that you gave here.

Mr. Barmine. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. You mean to count that as evidence, do you not? It is what happened?

Mr. Barmine. I have to tell you that when I got this to the FBI, I just considered in the sense that I learned to understand the evidence, I was very reluctant that this thing should be used, because I think it is a very old story and since then many things could happen, and that was all that I knew, but it was after all not my direct knowledge from the workings.

Senator Eastland. You just told them what you have told us?

Senator Ferguson. You understand what you are saying here today is evidence? You have been sworn to tell the truth.

Mr. Barmine. I know that is the truth. I am not legally qualified to weigh how much evidence is this.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Barmine, I wonder if you would tell us if you have done anything to counteract the effect of Mr. Lattimore's performances in the United States?

Mr. BARMINE. You see, when I first came to this country I did not know the English language at all. I couldn't say a word. So I started to learn English in 1940. So I had a very little idea of what was going on in America's political life. Then I was studying it very intensively and I began to read the newspapers. That was my manual for my English.

Then I was approached by several magazines for whom I worked giving advice and editorial assistance on some stories. Many times I was approached by Life or Time magazine. I published several articles and then I began to work with the Reader's Digest.

From the Army I was transferred to OSS and I remained in OSS, in the Office of Strategic Services, until the fall of 1944. At the same time I began to work as editorial adviser to Reader's Digest. In 1944 I wrote an article in the Reader's Digest about Communist infiltration in the Government apparatus in the United States.

When I was writing this article I had in mind the background of all the things I told you, but I was not considering it possible or proper to bring it out publicly. What I wanted, I wanted to warn the Government about infiltration, about the way, about the plans, and about the scope of the danger. I was discharged from the Office of Strategic Services after that.

Senator FERGUSON. After you published the Reader's Digest article?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right, in 1944. Then I remained with Reader's Digest in an editorial capacity, but this time I learned about the Chinese problem in relation with the American foreign policy, and I would say I was very much worried about the course that this development took and about the propaganda that was spread at this time on China.

Now I was asked by Reader's Digest to pass on manuscripts, articles which were connected with Soviet policy and communism. And I was asked to give my opinion about the condensation of the Lattimore book, Solution in Asia, in 19— I couldn't say exactly, but it was probably in the spring of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. April 7, 1945?

Mr. BARMINE. In the spring of 1945.

Well, my opinion was asked about this book and I wrote a memorandum for Reader's Digest because I considered this book a very clever camouflage Communist propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. You had in mind your previous conversations with General Berzin and General Krivitsky?

Mr. BARMINE. I had it in mind but I did not consider that was necessarily relevant to the point, because many years passed, I would consider this book on its merits and the position of the author. I considered this book tremendously harmful and deceiving. This was my opinion expressed to the editor of Reader's Digest.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the author of that book?

Mr. BARMINE. Owen Lattimore. My recommendation was that if this condensation of the book would be published in many millions of copies in Reader's Digest would bring very serious harm to the interest of the United States.

A lot of pressure was put on the Director of the Reader's Digest to publish the condensation. Practically when I was writing this memo I was called every day and told the editor in chief demanded the memo because a decision must be made, they considered it very

important. So I wouldn't be sure that the memo was decisive, but as a result of the memo the decision was taken by Reader's Digest against publishing the condensation.

I reworked this memo in the form of a review of the book. I gave this review and it was printed in the New Leader.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer into evidence a copy of the book review of Solution in Asia by Owen Latimore, reviewed by Alexander Barmine, which appeared in New Leader on April 7, 1945. I would like to introduce that in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a public issue that was put out?

Mr. MORRIS. A book review by Mr. Barmine of Lattimore's book Solution in Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 40" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 40

[From the New Leader, April 7, 1945]

BOOKS IN REVIEW—NEW DEFENDER FOR YENAN

(By Alexander Barmine)

SOLUTION IN ASIA. By Owen Lattimore. Little, Brown & Co., New York. 214 pages. $2.

The Chinese Communists have been particularly fortunate in the American newspaper correspondents who have written about the controversy between Chungking and Yenan. Through such writers as Brooks Atkinson, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Harrison Forman, and Owen Lattimore, the cause of the Yenan regime has been pleaded to the American public more effectively, persuasively, and cleverly, than any known Communist could possibly do it. Lattimore is the smoothest propagandist among them all, precisely because he gives the appearance of being objective, realistic, and factual.

Owen Lattimore, after various experiences in Asiatic affairs, including work for the Institute for Pacific Relations, was recommended by President Roosevelt as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and remained in that position for two years. He then occupied for several years the high post of Director of Pacific Operations for the OWI. It can be presumed that for Kuomintang leaders the conceptions and policy of Lattimore represented, or were identified with, those of the American Government. Notwithstanding his high authority, he evidently did not impress the Chinese, for Chiang Kai-shek's present policy is contrary to the appeasement of Chinese Communists—and consequently of quiet suicide—suggested to him by his former adviser in this book.

The main thesis of the book and the political philosophy of its author are exposed recklessly by the anonymous writer of the blurb on the jacket: "He (Lattimore) shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism * * * He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas."

Lattimore can hardly have known that a Little, Brown blurb writer was going to "spill the beans" in this naive way, for although this is a correct discription of what he attempts to do, he does it far more subtly than that. His book follows the propaganda line of the Communists and the Soviet Union faithfully, but it dresses this propaganda up to look like a "realistic" American policy, mixing it with many interesting comments and observations on things in general.

As a point of departure for his Solution in Asia, Lattimore takes from the Communists their mechanical and oversimplified division of Chinese social forces into two: "The Kuomintang-landlord right wing in China and the Communist-democratic-United Front left wing." If this dichotomy is accepted, of course there is no place for democracy in China except on the side of the Communist-dominated United Front.

The idea that American democracy might have anything to teach the Chinese in contrast to the official Soviet doctrines is dismissed by Lattimore in the following remark: "We may count on seeing, over wide areas (in Asia), the partial acceptance of Marxist ideas and the adoption of one or another part of the Soviet system. What, then, will be America's primary concern with Asiatic problems? * * * We cannot assume that Americans can draw authoritative blueprints for Asia." All the light, evidently, must come from Russia!

Here is Lattimore's evaluation of the Communist regime in China: "The political structure under the Communists is more nearly democratic than it is under the Kuomintang. It is a fact that governing committees and representative committees are elected, and that the Communists limit themselves (sic!) to one-third of the representation; whereas in Kuomintang-controlled territory it is increasingly difficult to hold a public position without joining the Kuomintang and accepting its discipline."

* * * * * * *

Lattimore presents a picture of Soviet Russia which corresponds accurately with his picture of Communist China. As usual, he begins cautiously with what in his opinion the Soviet Union represents to Asiatic peoples: "In their eyes * * * the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy: a powerful combination." And then Lattimore adds his own opinion: "The fact that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things."

"Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy," Lattimore argues. "If China, or Russia, or some other alien people does not measure up to the standards of the particular American modification of Anglo-Saxon democracy, we say that it is not democratic * * * The fact is that for most of the people in the world today what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant. What moves people to act, to try to line up with one party or country and not with another, is the difference between what is more democratic and less democratic in practice."

Why this more-than-tolerant approach, which includes Stalin's Russia and Mao Tse-tung's Communist China in the circle of democracies, is not applied by Lattimore to Kuomintang China is an unexplained mystery.

Lattimore presents a complicated and hazy plan of "reconciliation" or compromise with Communists in China. "We should advocate a reorganization of the National Army and the disbandment of superfluous troops. We should avoid isolating the problem of the Communist troops, remembering that there are also * * * regular troops which, while nominally part of the National Army, are in fact Kuomintang party troops." That is a familiar maneuver. The demand by the Eam to disband the Greek Regular Army as "proroyalist" was based on the same reasoning.

Lattimore is for liquidation of colonial empires in Asia. He has a more definite plan for defeated Japan. First, the question of ownership and management of Japan's industries: the holdings of principal Japanese capitalist families and corporations in banks, insurance, shipping, and other large corporations as well as in industry, should be taken over by the state. When it comes to the question of what social groups will constitute the state, and how the government will be formed, Lattimore says: "We must, on the other hand, not be soft with the old-school kimono 'liberals' who * * * made such a good impression on Wall Street, art collectors, and garden clubs. They were part of the liaison between predatory militarism and predatory big business."

Lattimore suggests vaguely for Japan that the leadership should be "left of center and at least liberal enough to be friendly with Russia." Does he mean a regime of the type used by Stalin in Rumania and Bulgaria, an amalgam of Fascist generals with Communists?

Lattimore disposes of Korea and both Mongolias as obviously within the sphere of Soviet influence. But what about the American policy toward China? "We do not want China to become dependent on us", i. e., on the democracies. Why? "Otherwise there would be grave danger of conflict between our China policy and that of Russia * * * Our relations with China today are getting uncomfortably close to this limit of safety."

It would seem that the opening of the Burma Road, and the prospect of enormous military help by the American armies, and our liberation of China, are a

source of anxiety to Lattimore, since they may hinder the domination of the continent by Soviet Russia. He advises: "It is esssential that America should cease to be so conspicuously the main link between China and the United Nations."

"Britain and America can successfully support their legitimate capitalist interest in China, and at the same time work in cooperation with the Russians for democratic harmony in a country in which the second largest party is Communist. * * * China is but a major example of the new world situation. The world is now grouped in three major divisions. In one, the capitalist economic system and democratic political system are vigorous and unshaken. In another the Communist (or strictly speaking, the Socialist) political system is now permanently established and identified with a collectivist economic system. In the third, there is an adjustment yet to be made between capitalism and collectivism, and mixed political orders have not yet clearly taken shape."

Lattimore's "adjustment" between the first two divisions is obviously that of defeatist appeasement on the part of the capitalist democracies, which are to accept as inevitable a Soviet Communist domination of the Asiatic Continent. The third division, if his advice is followed, can be nothing but camouflaged Communist totalitarianism. That is his "Solution in Asa." He advises Americans to give in to it with a light heart, even though the Asiatic peoples, who may not like to be sold down the river so easily, continue to expect from us a vigorous assertion of democratic policy and of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

There is in America a growing group of sophisticated intellectuals who call themselves left-wing liberals, and who are most vociferous and fanatical in demanding war to complete and crushing victory. But in reality they are complete defeatists who do not believe in the living force of democracy. They have lost faith in liberal ideals. They do not believe it possible to establish democracy in most of the liberated areas, are not willing to work for it, and instead are trying to force on the American Government the policy of selling the peoples of Asia to the Soviet form of totalitarianism.

This surrender of faith in democracy in favor of Soviet totalitarianism is permeating American public opinion. Under its influence America is in danger of adopting in Asia this same so-called realistic policy of appeasement and self-abdication which will not only abandon to totalitarianism several small nations, as in Europe, but hundreds of millions of Asiatics. This folly may ultimately spell the doom of democracy throughout the world.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an excerpt from your book?

Mr. BARMINE. This is a review of the book Solution in Asia. The basis of this review was my memorandum to Reader's Digest.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the second one you wrote? Once you wrote a memorandum to Reader's Digest pointing out the harm you thought was inherent in the book and in addition you wrote a book review for the New Leader?

Senator O'CONOR. The witness has described it as clever Communist propaganda, if I understood your description?

Mr. BARMINE. That was my impression.

Senator O'CONOR. Could you briefly elaborate on that and give us the benefit of your views as to why you described it thusly?

Mr. BARMINE. I don't think I could say it better than I put it.

Senator O'CONOR. You do give it in pretty lengthy fashion.

Mr. BARMINE. If you want a general appraisal, that would be the book which, if it could convince the people, would sell them unknowingly the Communist line in China which would be in the interest of the Soviet Union and disaster to the United States.

Senator O'CONOR. It did follow the Communist line?

Mr. BARMINE. In a very slick and smooth manner, in very devious ways. It never would be the direct statement of the author; it would be always related to people who think, people who say the other, but in fact it was telling the straight Communist line, camouflaged, I would say, very skilled.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, I point out one part of it which you have apparently taken out here, quoting your eighth paragraph. You say:

Lattimore presents a picture of Soviet Russia—

You can understand Soviet Russia, having been there all of your life—

which corresponds accurately with his picture of Communist China. As usual, he begins cautiously with what in his opinion the Soviet Union represents to Asiatic people: "In their eyes * * * the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy: a powerful combination." And then Lattimore adds his own opinion: "The fact that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things."

You in your experience with the Soviet Union did not find that to be the case, did you, Mr. Barmine?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. It was the picture that was presented usually by the Communists, the false picture of the Soviet Union.

Senator EASTLAND. You have read Mr. Lattimore's writings, have you not?

Mr. BARMINE. That was the first of his writings I ever read.

Senator EASTLAND. Judging alone from what he writes, would you say he is a Communist?

Mr. BARMINE. Do you mean formally a member of the party?

Senator EASTLAND. No, that he follows the policy of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, I would say that he does follow the policy of the Soviet Union to propagandize this policy and he is helping this policy. That is my assumption on the basis of his writings.

Senator EASTLAND. It would be your judgment, then, if you knew nothing else, that he is a Communist?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, I think that would be sufficient.

Senator O'CONOR. Would you say from a review of his writings and your knowledge of what you have learned of him in recent years, that the description given him by General Berzin as to his being one of their men is accurate?

Mr. BARMINE. Those two things, not necessarily.

Senator O'CONOR. Whether that was consistent with what General Berzin described?

Mr. BARMINE. When I first read this book my impression was that Mr. Lattimore was still at it, because I didn't know his development, his evolution. In this year many people who realized what was going on, they broke with it, some of them were honest and had illusions. The others finally parted ways, but of course I think in early years little was known about what was going on in Russia. By the time the book was published I am sure every intelligent man and scholar and especially the men who were in Russia continuing this kind of deceitful job knew it would be in direct support.

Senator EASTLAND. Would you say that he is the shrewdest and cleverest Communist propagandist in the United States?

Mr. BARMINE. I would say one of them, the most.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any others connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations that were in his class? I notice you

name some in this book. You named Smedley, Forman, and Atkinson. Was Atkinson connected with the institute, do you know?

Mr. BARMINE. No. I was just reading the writings of these people. There was one of them only that I had occasion to hear myself. That was Mr. Harrison Forman who made a report about his trip to China in the Dutch Treat Club somewhere in this same period between 1943 and 1946, I think. Mr. Forman's report impressed me also as straight Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. You figure that this book was straight Communist propaganda of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BARMINE. It was not straight; it was a very crooked one, in my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a clever piece?

Mr. BARMINE. It was very clever.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it Communist propaganda?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, there is nothing that could better serve the Communist cause in China than the book, in my opinion, to sell this line to the American people.

Senator FERGUSON. It was, therefore, in your opinion, following the Communist line as far as the Chinese problem is concerned?

Mr. BARMINE. It was following the Communist line, how to sell to the American people the Communist policy in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, would this review alter your impression of Mr. Lattimore in the sense that, instead of working in a cover shop, as you call it, he was now making policy? Would you comment on that in any way, please?

Mr. BARMINE. Well, as I say, I consider this book, if it would be taken at its face value, if it would be taken at its face value by people who were connected with foreign policy and worked in China, it would be very harmful to the interest of the United States. The position I took about this book was that this book was presenting a false picture; it was giving a false line to follow, and if the policy suggested in this book, the solution suggested by Mr. Lattimore at this time, were followed, it would bring disastrous results.

I remember when I was talking about this with the editors of Reader's Digest at this time in the beginning of 1945 I told them exactly the following, I remember it well, that for the struggle between democracy and communism maybe it doesn't mean so much if 15,000,000 Yugoslavs are on this side or another, but it will be disastrous if 500,000,000 Chinese will go over to the Communist side. A book of this kind can only facilitate this process by demoralizing the foreign policy of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this indicate to you in any way that the institute was making policy, and was that your impression of it when you discussed it with General Krivitsky and Berzin in 1935 and 1938?

Mr. BARMINE. No; I didn't discuss making policy, because I didn't have the faintest idea of what policy or what part in policy the institute was playing at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not understand that this book was written under the auspices of the institute?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Mr. BARMINE. I don't connect this book with the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you done anything else, Mr. Barmine, about bringing out what you know about the Soviet Union to the American people?

Mr. BARMINE. I have written several articles. I have written a book. I was advising the magazines on this subject. I made a few speeches there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you advise the Navy during the war?

Mr. BARMINE. When they would come and ask me to, yes; I would.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you have done everything possible to impart what you know about the Soviet Union to the American people?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. In the review, Mr. Barmine, you have this inserted:

He—

referring to Lattimore in Solution in Asia—

advises Americans to give in to it with a light heart, even though the Asiatic peoples, who may not like to be sold down the river so easily, continue to expect from us a vigorous assertion of democratic policy and of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

Did that conform to the Communist line? I am reading at the bottom of page 2.

Mr. BARMINE. That was the position that the Soviet Union would like the Americans to take.

Senator O'CONOR. It was consistent with what had been enunciated by them?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Just slightly touching on this, has it been your observation, General, that the American people generally are much more gullible with respect to these questions of foreign affairs than the people of Europe?

Mr. BARMINE. I wouldn't say so. Fortunately, I think that the more sophisticated people, high intellectuals who profess to be liberals, are more gullible than the main mass of the American people. That is my firm belief on the basis of talking to a lot of people. I do believe that in spite of this kind of propaganda it does not go very well with the American people.

Senator SMITH. You think then that the main mass of Americans have come to understand this kind of progapanda?

Mr. BARMINE. I think they do.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I was not clear; I could not see exactly what you had in mind in this Paris conversation about the Institute of Pacific Relations. I want to ask you several questions about it. You say that it came up in conversation with a man who had broken with the Communists, General Krivitsky; that he and you were talking about whom you might contact and whom you would be compelled to avoid. Is that correct?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. The question of the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations came up?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you make it clear just how it came up?

Mr. BARMINE. First of all, as I said, I wanted to be sure of his identity, who he was, and how much he knew.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the general?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes; to be sure. I was trying to find out——

Senator FERGUSON. Whether he was a former agent?

Mr. BARMINE. Former——

Senator FERGUSON. You were not quite sure but he might have been? You may have thought you had the idea he might be in on this plan to kill you?

Mr. BARMINE. Not then, but I was not sure that he was not an official of the NVD, if he had something to do with military intelligence or with the secret police, which are two different things. The only way I could be sure, I would dig out of my memory and ask him.

Senator FERGUSON. Some of the problems?

Mr. BARMINE. Not only problems; first men's names.

Senator FERGUSON. To find out whether or not he did know what was going on in military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. If he is what he is telling me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you raise the question then of the institute?

Mr. BARMINE. No, but when the question comes back, then was the question in that connection, then I told him how I felt about the man.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. BARMINE. He said "This is flourishing."

Senator FERGUSON. It was flourishing and had been acting for the Communists?

Mr. BARMINE. Used for the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Who mentioned Lattimore's name with the general in Paris, you or the general?

Mr. BARMINE. I asked him if he knows of anybody in the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. BARMINE. He gave me those names.

Senator FERGUSON. He gave you those two names as connected with the institute?

Mr. BARMINE. No; he didn't say at this time. The first time he didn't mention the institute; but then, when he gave me names, I told him the story of Berzin. At this time I had nothing to keep secret. So, I told him how I happened to know about them. I told him the story I heard, what was planned.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say he knew about these two men?

Mr. BARMINE. He knew that they were working for the military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. For the Russian military intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. He said he knew that?

Mr. BARMINE. He gave the names to me.

Senator FERGUSON. He gave the names first to you?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt in your mind now that he made the statement the substance of which was that these two men were working for the Russian military government?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct?

Mr. BARMINE. Military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Russian Government?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not at first the institute was merely used as an agent and then it became a policy-making branch?

Mr. BARMINE. I didn't know anything about policy making until I came to the United States and gradually learned the character of work of the institute and some facts in connection with influence.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, which would be the most beneficial to the Russian Government, a man who was in the institute and would merely get papers, like the Jaffe case, the Amerasia case, or a man who was in the institute and could make policy, talking about an agent, whether he was of the secret police or army intelligence?

Mr. BARMINE. I can only answer by an assumption that, if he then became so important or valuable or established such contacts that he could be more useful in a much wider area of activity, of course he would be relieved of any kind of small job of the military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. His policy-making job would be more important?

Mr. BARMINE. Enormously more important without any comparison. That would be at this time a very pure waste to use him for this kind of work.

Senator FERGUSON. When you reviewed this book back in April 1945, known as the Solution in Asia, none of the questions had been raised in our press about Owen Lattimore or his connections with communism or otherwise; is that true?

Mr. BARMINE. So far as I remember; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you were writing this as a reader of the book; is that correct?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in any way trying to put out anti-Communist propaganda by the writing of this article?

Mr. BARMINE. I was trying to neutralize the harm this kind of book would do.

Senator FERGUSON. You realized that this book could do a lot of harm in America as Communist propaganda; is that correct?

Mr. BARMINE. Not only propaganda but as practical assistance to the Soviet Union to carry out their purpose in China.

Senator FERGUSON. To carry out the Soviet Union's purpose in China?

Mr. BARMINE. And to neutralize the American position.

Senator FERGUSON. To neutralize that, then, you wrote this article?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. It was published in the New Masses?

Mr. BARMINE. New Leader. The New Masses wouldn't publish it.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you were aiding the Reader's Digest as adviser on Communist activities?

Mr. BARMINE. On Soviet affairs and Communist activities.

Senator FERGUSON. This was really prepared——

Mr. BARMINE. First, I prepared a memo advising against the condensing and publishing of this book in the Reader's Digest.

Senator FERGUSON. Do these stars indicate there was something left out?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not mean that?

Mr. BARMINE. I probably omitted my recommendation, and I made it in the form of a review instead of inside editorial matter, but all the substance was exactly the same.

Senator FERGUSON. This book of Lattimore's was never published in the Reader's Digest?

Mr. BARMINE. I say I cannot be sure, but I assume that my memo had something to do with making the decision.

Senator FERGUSON. Keeping it out?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find out why you were discharged from the OSS?

Mr. BARMINE. I was formally discharged because of sickness and absence on duty because of sickness. That was the formal reason.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the real reason, if you know?

Mr. BARMINE. I was never explained the real reason, but when the newspaper reporters went to OSS in New York and asked them if the reason for discharge was the writing of the article about Communist infiltration, as I remember, the spokesman for OSS answered: "It was not, but of course, Mr. Barmine, being in the Government service, should not write this kind of article."

Senator FERGUSON. When did you go to work for the Voice of America?

Mr. BARMINE. In October 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. Between the time you left OSS and October 1948, did you work for the Government?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. During that period you were not working?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did the FBI have in substance all of the matters that you have brought to our attention here this morning?

Mr. BARMINE. I believe so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They had that prior to the so-called Tydings hearings on the question of Communists in the Government?

Mr. BARMINE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did any of the lawyers for that committee question you?

Mr. BARMINE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure he knows the committee to which you are referring and the hearings?

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with the Tydings committee?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why this matter was not brought out at those hearings, the FBI having the evidence?

Mr. BARMINE. I was asked privately, not by any representative of the committee but by people I know, what would happen if I would be asked by the Tydings committee to testify. I said, of course, I would come and testify, I am ready to, and I was asked if I would tell the Tydings committee everything that I told now. I said yes, I would.

Senator FERGUSON. If the FBI had given aid to the Tydings committee, as I understand the Tydings committee claimed they had all the information from the FBI, I am just wondering why this was not brought out at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, can you do any more than wonder about it?

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out if he knows.

Mr. BARMINE. I don't know anything about it. I can only assume that maybe these things were not considered substantial evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings us back to the question of your discussion with General Berzin. That discussion was in your course of business as an intelligence agent of the Russian Army; is that right?

Mr. BARMINE. Intelligence officer.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was when you were storing or about to store goods, ammunition, and so forth, in China proper?

Mr. BARMINE. That is what was planned to do.

Senator FERGUSON. How much material was actually stored, if you know, in China proper?

Mr. BARMINE. It was not because the Politburo decision of the Chinese Commission was that they were opposed to using our corporation and the corporation was kept away from it.

Senator FERGUSON. It was finally given up?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you related what you did in northwest China?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That was actually carried on?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That concludes the testimony of this witness.

I want to say to you, General, that I commend you for your frankness and for the way in which you have answered the questions. There were some pretty sharp questions propounded to you. Your knowledge of what is fact and what is conjecture impressed the chairman of this committee a great deal. I want to express my gratitude to you for coming before the committee of the Senate and before the American people and giving us the facts as to the dangers that are here with us at home. We are somewhat conversant with the dangers that confront us abroad but we should become more conversant with the dangers that exist here in our own home.

The committee is grateful to you, the country should be grateful to you.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I understand there is a Senator here, Senator McCarthy, who gave the name of this general to the Tydings committee. Is that right?

Senator MCCARTHY. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that ought to go on the record here.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until Thursday morning at 10 o'clock. Because on that day we have a matter on the floor that the chairman has to handle, we will have to close the committee meeting at noon. So we will reconvene Thursday at 10 o'clock.

Thank you, General.

(At 1:10 p. m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Thursday, August 2, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, and Ferguson.

Also present: Senator McCarthy, J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Let me say before commencing the hearing of today I would like to mention that the names of people now dead will figure in today's testimony. I would like to say that the introduction of such names into the record is done with reluctance because we are aware that it is not for us to pass judgment on those who have passed beyond. But a congressional committee, charged with a heavy duty, must present every possible fact to shed light on present day conspiracy. Thus an association of 5 or 10 years back involving a man or woman now dead can well illuminate a relationship of today or aid in characterizing a living conspirator. Death does not rob a man of his place in history. It is in this spirit then that reference will be made to the dead today.

The witness will stand and be sworn.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. MASSING. I do.

TESTIMON OF MRS. HEDE MASSING, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give your name and address to the stenographer?

Mrs. MASSING. I am Hede Massing. I live at 17 West Eighty-second Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mrs. MASSING. I am a writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

Mrs. MASSING. In Vienna, Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mrs. MASSING. 1900.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, when did you first meet Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. In 1917.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly about the circumstances of your meeting Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, I will do that. I met Gerhart Eisler as people meet in Vienna, in a cafe. He was then a man who had achieved slight fame by having been against the war, having made propaganda against the war in the army. He was not a Communist then because there was no Communist Party at the time. He was, though, what I would call a Socialist. I met him and shortly after I met him I married him.

Is that sufficient?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. How long were you married to Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. Five years altogether.

Mr. MORRIS. During the time of your marriage to Gerhart Eisler were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. No; I was not a member of the Communist Party. First of all, during those years he didn't become a member of the party; the party was small and young. In my specific case Gerhart Eisler thought I would have to learn much more, I would have to become a Marxist first before I would be permitted to join the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, in what year did you leave Gerhart Eisler, were you divorced from Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. I left Gerhart Eisler in 1923 and I was divorced in 1924 or 1925.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified during that period you were not a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. During that period was your loyalty and devotion to the Communist Party as strong as if you had been a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. Indeed it was. As a matter of fact, the party was more or less my life, as it is for people who are either party members or connected with the party. There is no question that once you are a Communist, whether you take party membership or not, you are a loyal party member and you adhere to the discipline of the party, which I did in a vague way, because, as I say, I was neither a functionary nor was I intellectually developed enough to be taken seriously by the party. I was just the wife of Gerhart Eisler and lived in the upper strata of Communist leadership with Gerhart Eisler.

Mr. MORRIS. You are now talking of your position with respect to the Communist Party during the period you were married to Gerhart Eisler?

Mrs. MASSING. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when did you first make a trip to Moscow, Mrs. Massing?

Mrs. MASSING. My first trip to Moscow was in 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay?

Mrs. MASSING. I stayed just for 2 weeks and went back again the end of 1929 to stay until 1931.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you went back, Mrs. Massing, what do you mean by that?

Mrs. MASSING. I went for 2 weeks in order to see whether I liked it and whether I could work there, and though I found it rather different than I expected to, I decided to go back and stay for some time in the Soviet Union, as every Communist wants to do. I mean every Communist who has a chance wants to go to the Soviet Union not only to learn but to serve, to help.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you treated as a Communist by the Communists during this period about which you are talking?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course, naturally; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Then is it your testimony that after you left Gerhart Eisler your devotion to the Communist Party did not diminish?

Mrs. MASSING. No, my way was set. Once I had met Gerhart Eisler, once I was indoctrinated, I was a Communist, and I remained a Communist until I left in 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. You distinguish, then, do you, between being an actual member and a member in spirit? You were a member in spirit?

Mrs. MASSING. Why, Senator McCarran, I would believe that even then, and of course much more today, there are many more members in spirit than actually card-holding party members, because, as I have explained very often—and I hate to do this, but I think it is rather necessary—for many party members it is an order not to take out party membership. For example, my affiliation really lasted for many years and though I was a Soviet agent and was closely connected with the German party, only for 2 weeks by mere coincidence actually was I a party member. Still my affiliation dates from 1918 or 1919 to 1938, which is quite a long time, and this goes for many people.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever pay dues?

Mrs. MASSING. I probably did during those 2 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a card?

Mrs. MASSING. It is a book. In Germany we had a book.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will describe for us the circumstances leading up to your joining the Communist Party and explain why it was only of 2 weeks' duration.

Mrs. MASSING. That is sort of jumping ahead very much.

I had lived in Russia from 1929 to 1931. This is a very complicated process to describe because I would have to go into many psychological factors and I do not think we have time for it here. In spite of my being rather disappointed with the Soviet Union, I joined the party because when I got back to Germany in 1931 fascism had grown terrifically. It was visible, it was obvious, and I believed that the thing to do is to fight fascism, and I was convinced that the Communist Party of Germany was the only party that was very adamant about fighting fascism. As I arrived, I thought that now I would want to partake in this actual fight and I joined the party. I hardly joined it; I mean I joined my unit.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mrs. MASSING. 1931, as soon as I got back from Russia. I lived in the section of Berlin which was mostly populated by fellow Communists, many of them not party members either until then but at-

tending the party unit, and I hardly joined the party when my superior—I am sure I will have to speak of him later, his name is Ludwig, I knew him as Ludwig, he was Ignatz Reiss and was killed by the Russians in 1937, came from Moscow—called me, saw me when I told him I had joined the party, and he said, "You must drop out at once. Why did you do this?" "You did not tell me not to." "Didn't you understand enough not to? You are not the kind that joins the party." And I dropped out and it was rather difficult.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time what was your relationship to Ignatz Reiss?

Mrs. MASSING. Do you want me to go into this, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like you to explain to the committee the relationship in the Communist organization that you had at that time to Ignatz Reiss when he told you that you had made a mistake when you had joined the Communist Party for that 2 weeks' period.

Mrs. MASSING. That of course also goes further back. I had met Ludwig. I knew him as——

Mr. MORRIS. That is Ignatz Reiss?

Mrs. MASSING. That is Ignatz Reiss, until he was killed by the Russians. I learned by the papers that this was Ignatz Reiss. I had met him in 1924 and I had known him very closely until 1926. I never knew his name. He was introduced to me as a Communist on special duty.

This is the way agents are introduced to Communist Party members that are solicited for the service, a Communist on special duty. He had observed me in 1924. I then had worked in a bookshop. I had seen him very often merely as a customer, as a man who bought books, a man with very good taste in books, a man with whom I discussed books on all levels. I never knew who he was.

In the beginning of 1929—I had been in America from 1926 to 1928—and I came back to Germany and stayed in Frankfort-on-Main, then went to Berlin because I wanted to pass a psychology exam. I was introduced officially to Ludwig—Ignatz Reiss—by Dr. Richard Sorge. He is a famous man, now dead. He had been the most outstanding Soviet spy in Japan. I suppose we all know. It was Dr. Richard Sorge who I knew since 1922 who introduced me to Ludwig with the purpose of my working for Ludwig from then on. This was the establishment of the relationship. That means from 1929 on I was under his supervision and in cooperation with Ludwig I became an apparatchik.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that?

Mrs. MASSING. A-p-p-a-r-a-t-c-h-i-k.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they use the expression "Russian agent" or "Soviet agent"?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. That is an American expression?

Mrs. MASSING. Exactly. I believe if I had known at the time, and so many of my coworkers, that they are Russian agents, there probably would never have been Russian agents. They were Communists, they were Communists on special duty. They were soldiers of the revolution. They were Communists that had been chosen for a particularly difficult task and they were very proud to have been chosen. I was for this special duty. No; they never considered themselves agents, of course not.

Senator FERGUSON. Both of these men were Communists?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, of course; leading Communists. Dr. Sorge was a leading Communist, as a matter of fact one of the Communists that had written quite a bit in Germany, had a status at the University of Frankfort-on-Main, and later on was called to Moscow in order to work at the Marx Engels Institute. In reality he had been called by the Comintern and was then a Comintern agent.

Senator FERGUSON. Did people then keep it secret that they were Communists or was it open and notorious?

Mrs. MASSING. At that time it was no secret at all.

Senator FERGUSON. It was open and notorious?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. They would keep secret they were on special duty. That was not supposed to be talked about but was whispered about and was the topic of conversation within party circles. It was very—well, it is almost a social question, you belong to the higher strata of the Communist movement if you belong to the apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, will you describe to us what an apparatchik is?

Mrs. MASSING. An apparatchik is a member of an apparatus, a member of—as I know today, and we all know—an espionage unit. The term is derived, I would assume, from the word "apparatus," "apparat" in German, meaning a unit that functions like a mechanism or an apparatus like a very finely constructed mechanism, and a member of such a unit was called an apparatchik. "Chik" is the Russian ending.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, will you generally describe the nature of the period in your life from 1931 to 1933? Fundamentally to what was it devoted?

Mrs. MASSING. 1931 to 1933 was in my life my training as an espionage agent. I want to repeat again that I did not consider myself at that time an espionage agent. I did not know that I was being trained for espionage. I did not know that I was doing espionage.

I am not saying this to defend myself. I am saying it in order to explain because I believe we must understand the development of people like myself within the movement and the function they finally achieve and the fact that they did not quite understand—and this is the intricacy of communism—what they are doing when they first begin. Once they are in it, there is absolutely no way of getting out of it, or rarely a way of getting out of it, let us say.

My training with Ludwig was really in the form of conversation, regular meetings, training in behavior, training in approach, training in understanding, political issues, personal issues. It was highly focused on psychology, how to size up people. Once you have sized them up; how to approach them for a specific function or purpose. It is a very slow process. It was also to some extent, but only to a very small extent, his trying to make me understand the necessity of socialism, of communism, of world communism, but it was merely a technical training.

After about the first year I was sent out on small missions. I was taught underground work.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mrs. Massing, at the end of the 1933 period were you then given an assignment?

Mrs. MASSING. At the end of 1933 when fascism had come to power in Germany I went to Moscow for personal reasons partly, and on

my way back from Moscow I met Ludwig in Paris and was assigned to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Assigned to the United States in what year?

Mrs. MASSING. In 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your assignment in the United States?

Mrs. MASSING. My assignment was not clearly defined in Paris. I was briefed by Ludwig to the effect, really ideology mostly. Of course by then technically I was a well-trained agent. Ideologically the thing he told me was that fascism had succeeded, that we have failed to stem it in Europe, that now we have to fight fascism from the outside. He said, "You are going to a great country where there are many good people. You understand fascism. Bring the message of fascism to them and rally people behind the fight against fascism."

Now that sounds rather vague for an espionage agent and I do want to emphasize that I am pretty sure that during the years between 1933 and 1935 many Americans have been solicited into the services with this very idea, the fight against fascism, which was a very noble fight and which many Americans could be made to believe was the most important thing to do at this specific point during these specific years.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the Soviet organization capitalized on that feeling in order to create an atmosphere by which people would be drawn in their orbit?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I don't know whether they were as crude as that but the functionaries like myself, and certainly Ludwig and some of the people I later on worked with in America that belonged to my immediate unit, indeed believed that this was the thing that would do it.

It took me about a year and a half to quite realize that this was not the main focus in my work, that I was really being made to do things that had actually nothing to do with the fight against fascism.

These are slow processes, because, you see, you must understand that a person who does not willingly want to be an agent will have a resistance to recognize his own function. He will rationalize and will say, "Well, this is not realy a fight against fascism fully but partly."

Mr. MORRIS. Now what was your assignment in the United States with particularity, Mrs. Massing?

Mrs. MASSING. Let me say first I was told by Ludwig I would be contacted and the contact was arranged.

Mr. MORRIS. How was that arranged?

Mrs. MASSING. It is again one of these stories that one reads and thinks so unlikely, and this is exactly how it happened. I got half of a cigarette box and I was told that the person who would contact me will have the other half of the cigarette box. Now it is a customary procedure to get half of a picture. I mean these are the technical arrangements. They seem very primitive but they have always worked quite well.

Senator FERGUSON. Your assignment was secret, of course?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, indeed. I did not know who would contact me here. Probably the person who sent me off didn't know who the immediate contact would be, because in espionage work decentralization is predominant and you are not told, as you are never told who the person is you deal with. You know the person for 10 years but you

do not know his second name or where he lives. You know him as Bill, Fred, Ludwig, Carl, or Francis.

I was told I would be contacted. I was told already in Paris that my first and immediate function would be to go to Washington regularly. Let me just say here that my cover was that of a foreign newspaperwoman. It was not a complete cover, not only a cover, because I had been writing for a liberal weekly, I had been translating articles from English into German. I really was working for this specific liberal weekly and that gave me then an identification to come here as a foreign newspaperwoman.

My first function was to come to Washington to observe periodicals, newspapers, newspapermen, Senators, people who would be friendly or who would lean toward the fight against fascism and be friendly toward the Soviet Union. I was to write reports on this regularly.

Mr. MORRIS. Ostensibly what was the name of the publisher for which you worked?

Mrs. MASSING. Die Weltbuhne. It is the World Theatre in translation.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us how you proceeded in your operations over there?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I am not hesitating because I am thinking of how I proceeded. I am hesitating because I would like to say just one word that as clear as it is to me that one has to testify, it is not pleasant and it is difficult.

I lived first when I got to New York in 1933 with a friend that I had met in 1926. Her name was Helen Black, and she is or has been—I don't know what she is doing now—a registered Soviet agent. She was a representative of Soviet Photo and I had become friendly with her. As a matter of fact, I was devoted to her and she to me in 1926.

When I first got here in 1933 my husband Paul Massing was in a German concentration camp. Though I knew that I was a Communist on duty and ought to be brave, my personal situation was rather sad and this friend, Helen Black, felt I should stay with her and not alone in a strange country. She was a very good friend to me during these months that I stayed with her. It was through Helen Black and the environment around Helen Black that I made my first contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Now what was your assignment in 1933, Mrs. Massing?

Mrs. MASSING. As I said before, my assignment in 1933 was the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. What were you to do in the United States?

Mrs. MASSING. I was sent out to fight against fascism. I was an apparatchik. I was a member of an espionage outfit and my orders were to come from the boss that I was to meet here and that I had met at this point. You see, I met the superior that I had in New York only after I was contacted.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do after you made that contact?

Mrs. MASSING. The first thing I did was to be a courier. My very first assignment when I was contacted by my superior, who was Valentine Markin—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that, please?

Mrs. MASSING. V-a-l-e-n-t-i-n-e M-a-r-k-i-n. I did not know him under that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he?

Mrs. MASSING. He was the first and foremost Soviet agent during those years in the United States. He was killed here. First we thought that it was an accident. In retrospect it might well be that he was killed by the Soviets because he had had deviations and he was critical and was supposed to be a Trotskyite.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he the one who had the other half of the match box?

Mrs. MASSING. No; he was the boss.

Senator FERGUSON. Who had the match box?

Mrs. MASSING. The match box was held by Bill, the man who I later learned was Berman.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the first name?

Mrs. MASSING. What was Berman's first name? I have forgotten, I am terribly sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony at the time you did not know his name was Berman but you knew him only as Bill?

Mrs. MASSING. When Berman came he showed me the other half of the box.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not know his name was Berman?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you know his name was Berman?

Mrs. MASSING. Let me be logical about this. Berman came and contacted me. He was my contact. After I had seen Berman for some days and discussed with him generalities, I was introduced to the boss. The boss I knew as Walter. His name was Valentine Markin.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not know that at the time?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not. Valentine Markin's name and Berman's name I found out for myself because I had to know him, but Markin's name I only learned when I spoke to the FBI and was shown his picture and I was told this was Valentine Markin. I did not know his name before that. Valentine Markin sent me out on my first courier job carrying microfilm from New York to Paris. This was the very first assignment Valentine Markin gave me.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the nature of the microfilm?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not, you never know. As a courier, first of all, you never know anything if you are an espionage agent. You are given an assignment and you do it. You don't ask; you don't want to know. That would be considered completely undoctrinaire behavior and bad manners. That just isn't done.

Senator FERGUSON. You took them there secretly?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I was told how to go about it. The arrangement was made for me to meet a person, a Dr. so-and-so—I have forgotten his name; it is not important, because it wasn't his name—in a Paris hotel, to stay in this hotel until he would come and see me. I would hand the film, then leave the hotel, move to another hotel and live in Paris as a tourist for 10 days, 12 days, and then come back to New York. This I did for about—I am not quite sure whether it was 9 or 10 days. Altogether I made 20 trips.

Senator FERGUSON. How large film would you take?

Mrs. MASSING. About this large, sometimes two or three rolls, regular-size microfilm.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever learn where those films came from?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What they were?

Mrs. MASSING. No; never.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your first assignment other than that of a courier in the United States?

Mrs. MASSING. After I had completed my assignment as a courier I came back and then I worked with Valentine Markin again. It wasn't to last very long because he died soon after I met him in this rather unusual way, and it took some time until my next superior arrived, whom I knew as Bill. His name was Grinke.

Valentine Markin assigned me to go to Washington, as I had done before I had met him, but now not merely to write about periodicals and people but focus on specific people who could be of use to us. That means I became a recruiter. I was then a recruiter. I was a courier and a recruiter. The American press uses the term "courier" rather broadly. Everybody who works in an espionage apparatus is a courier. Now it is not so. A courier is the specific function to carry things from one place to the other. Within an espionage outfit are very many functions and you wouldn't call, for example, the photographer in such a unit a courier. He is not a courier at all. He is a photographer.

I was to go to Washington and observe people and if I found them amiable and interested in the Soviet Union, in the fight against fascism, to propose to them to become a member of our unit in whatever function they could be in.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your first case?

Mrs. MASSING. Noel H. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Noel H. Field now?

Mrs. MASSING. He has disappeared behind the iron curtain, he and his wife and his brother, Herman Field, and his adopted daughter, Erika Glaser Wallart.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe to us the process by which you first had contact with Noel Field?

Mrs. MASSING. Again I will have to go a little further back. I had met through the recommendation of Helen Black, Marguerite Young. Marguerite Young in 1933 and probably some years thereafter was a Daily Worker correspondent in Washington. I am sure many of the newspapermen present here will know her. She was a young and very intelligent Communist and it was she who was my contact, not officially, because I was not to be seen with her, of course, but I saw her privately and socially and it was she who would point out people to me that she knew and thought would be interesting to me. She gave me a whole list of them. To some she introduced me. To Noel Field she introduced me. It happened this way: By then my husband, Paul Massing, had been released from the concentration camp.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mrs. MASSING. That was the end of 1933 but he got to this country only in 1934. He was writing a book about his experiences in the concentration camp. It was called Fatherland. He wrote it under a pseudonym because his family was still in Germany. Part of this book had been published in New Masses and had created quite a sensation.

Marguerite Young knew people who had read this part of the book and who were interested to meet the wife of the man who had

written this book. Field was one of them. She said I should meet Field, I would like him, his wife was German, and I might find him very interesting. Indeed I did; I am sorry I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you succeed in recruiting Noel Field into the Communist apparatus?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did it take you?

Mrs. MASSING. It took me about three quarters of a year and it was the typical work of a recruiter in meeting the object regularly, discussing with him principal issues, issues that he was particularly interested in, leading him toward my goal, namely, to consent to be a member of my apparatus. I didn't put it in these words, of course. What I said was, in gist, that this was the thing we are up against, fascism was the menace of the world and each one of us had to fight it, that he was in a very privileged position, that he could furnish us with documents and material to help in this fight. Though he was reluctant and he had great misgivings about handing me documents, he consented to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Now after you succeeded in recruiting him, did you have any further connection with him at that time?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, your function was simply to recruit, and then what did you do?

Mrs. MASSING. Then I would hand this person over. The person I recruited would then be handled or worked with by another agent. I would never know who this person was. I was not supposed to know. The official situation would have been that I would sever all relationships to the person that I had recruited.

In Noel Field's case I didn't do that because I had developed quite an intensive personal friendship to him and his wife. Also, since he had this great reluctance in betraying his country, as he called it, we advised him—meaning my unit, I myself, and even my husband, Paul Massing, helped in convincing him—that he should accept a job at the League of Nations, that he was offered at the time, because there he would not feel he was betraying his country and could be of great use to Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. When you first met him what was Field's business?

Mrs. MASSING. He was a State Department official in the western division, I believe. Was it called the western division?

Mr. MANDEL. Western European.

Mrs. MASSING. Western European Division.

Senator FERGUSON. He is no relationship to this Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mrs. MASSING. Not that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. He was actually employed in the State Department when you were introduced to him by Miss Young?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As a prospect for your work?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, in this connection did you ever have an encounter with Alger Hiss in connection with Noel Field?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that to the committee, please?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. It is this encounter with Alger Hiss that forced me out of my seclusion because I don't believe that ex-Communists tend to go out and talk about their experiences, and I recall so well that when Whittaker Chambers was very reluctant and low-voiced in his testimony, how well I understood him, because it is a very difficult and horrible thing to not only speak about one's own past deviations in sins but about other people's involvements.

When Noel Field and I had established a rapport to the extent that he was quite willing to help me, when I had also convinced him—and I would like to say this here—that he must not join the open party because for a man of Noel Field's status and importance it would be very unwise and useless to join the open party, and he had wanted to do so—when he had agreed to work with me, which was not something like black and white—I mean there were many ups and downs, he would say "Yes" today and "No" tomorrow, and he would say "Yes, I will only do so much, I am willing to give you verbal reports but I am not willing to show you any documents, and I don't have any documents to show"—I mean it is an involved process—one of his last reluctances or one of his last resistances toward me came up in this way:

I visited with him and his wife. As a matter of fact, I lived in their house. He said to me, "You know, Hede, I thought the whole thing over and I have come to the conclusion that it is really quite ridiculous that I should work with you where I can work with an old friend of mine who works with me in the State Department and who is a man of my kind. Not that I mean to say I don't respect you but, you see, you are a foreigner and this man is an American and we see eye to eye on all principal issues, and you understand even technically it would be so much easier for me to work with this man." Well, this was, of course, quite a disappointment for me. I had invested very much labor and intensity to get this man. If you do a job like this you want to do a good job, as I think everybody wants to do a fairly good job, and I was an espionage agent and I tried to do a good job, and having to lose Noel Field would have been quite a shock. So I said, "Who is this man?" He said, "I don't think you know him. His name is Alger Hiss." I said, "Well, why don't you introduce me to him? I just don't believe he has any priority over you. In reality I believe you are much better off in my apparatus." Then I said to him, "Where does he work? Where does he really work? How do you know he is the right man?" He said, "I don't know. I don't know where you work either."

Noel Field arranged this meeting with Alger Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. So you did meet Alger Hiss?

Mrs. MASSING. I did meet Alger Hiss. That is a meeting that I have spoken so much about that I find it very difficult to speak about again.

My superior, Russian superior at that time, Boris, was quite distressed about this meeting because it was unorthodox and it had not gotten the O. K. from Moscow. You see, Noel Field immediately arranged this meeting. Such things are not done without an O. K. from Moscow. But Boris said since it had been arranged I should go ahead and meet him.

I came to Washington and the meeting was at the Noel Field apartment and though it was a long evening, I believe the only thing that

interests us here is that the discussion between Hiss and me ran like this:

He said, "So you are this woman that is trying to get Noel Field away from me?" I said, "No; you are the man who is trying to get Noel Field away from me, because I have worked with Noel Field for quite some time." He said, "Well, where have you worked?" I said, "Look Alger,"—you understand among Communists people call each other Hede and Alger and not Mr. Hiss and Mrs. Massing. "You know, Alger, you couldn't ask that and I wouldn't ask that either." He laughed and said, "Well, we will see who is going to win." I think I said, "Well, you know I am a woman," being very coy, and in order to break up this rather unpleasant conversation, and at the end either he or I agreed that it would not be for us to decide on whoever will get Noel Field; after all, we are working for the same boss.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "get," what do you mean?

Mrs. MASSING. Get, meaning soliciting him into your own unit as a coworker.

Senator FERGUSON. In the apparatus?

Mrs. MASSING. In the apparatus.

Senator SMITH. What difference would that make so far as the objective is concerned?

Mrs. MASSING. That really is competition. There are always similar apparatuses in one country. There is a Comintern apparatus, a Red-army apparatus, a military-intelligence apparatus, and NKVD apparatus, and none of them have terribly much to do, I am made to believe, and getting a man as an informant is a very great thing to achieve. It is real competition. I mean you have worked on this man, you want to fulfill your job, you want to finish your job. In reality, actually, as for information, it would not probably make a great difference.

Senator SMITH. It gave you different recognition in the party by getting and holding the man?

Mrs. MASSING. Why, of course. For example, when I had achieved this and later on had achieved soliciting Laurence Duggan into my apparatus I was given honor, I was recognized as a fine comrade.

Senator SMITH. That is what I thought you meant. I wanted to bring it out.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned Laurence Duggan. Did you have the assignment of recruiting Laurence Duggan into the apparatus?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; after I had met him and had reported about him.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you leave Field, did you get Field into your apparatus or did Hiss get him into his?

Mrs. MASSING. I got Field into my apparatus. Field then transferred to Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not think she was going to lose, did you, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get this record straight.

Mrs. MASSING. I didn't lose him then, so I couldn't lose him now. He is lost to us, though, I am afraid.

Field transferred to Geneva. In Geneva he was introduced by me to Ignatz Reiss. He was introduced also to General Krivitsky. He did not work in Geneva with Ignatz Reiss; he worked with General Krivitsky.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he then with the State Department?

Mrs. MASSING. Then he was with the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the League of Nations?

Mrs. MASSING. The League of Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about Laurence Duggan?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I had met Duggan through Field.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing at the time?

Mrs. MASSING. He was the head of the Latin-American Department in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that for us, Mrs. Massing, please?

Mrs. MASSING. I am sure that this was Laurence Duggan to whom you were referring, Senator, when you were speaking about the dead. I want to say in one sentence that when I wrote about Laurence Duggan in my book and when I testified before the grand jury it was with the utmost reluctance, and only after I was completely convinced, had convinced myself, it was necessary if I told my story at all to tell it fully, that I had to speak about Laurence Duggan. I have been quite persecuted for it. My book has been dropped by the first publisher because I was not willing to take out the whole Duggan chapter. I understand that very great pressure was brought upon my second publisher by Duggan's friends, which are Hiss' friends, and probably the Duggan family.

Mr. MORRIS. May I say this, your feelings to the contrary are appreciated, but we have the obligation here of asking you what your relationships were with Laurence Duggan.

Mrs. MASSING. I will tell you.

Mr. MORRIS. As the chairman has stated, we are doing this not to pass judgment on someone in the past but to determine whether or not there is a present-day conspiracy. So strictly in the light of that will you tell us what your relationships have been with Laurence Duggan?

Mrs. MASSING. I will.

Senator FERGUSON. At all times, of course, you understand you are under oath?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, I know that.

Senator FERGUSON. And the dead have no opportunity to rebut it, as the chairman has said. So you will give us just the facts?

Mrs. MASSING. Senator, I am not afraid; I am just sad.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand.

Mrs. MASSING. I met Duggan through Field. He was a close friend of the Fields. They lived together in one house at one time. Duggan has about a similar background as Field, Quaker family, well-to-do, highly intellectual, very fine, straight-thinking men at the time, as I thought.

Duggan when I met him seemed very interested in my ideas. He knew a great deal about the Soviet Union. He knew a great deal about fascism in Germany. He knew a great deal about the details and the technique of the fight against fascism. I did not need to work with Duggan as I did with Field. Duggan was much easier for me to reach. It took only a few weeks, probably not more than three or four meetings.

You understand, after my first meeting with a man like this I reported to my superior in great detail who the man was, what his position was, what his background was, and what his thoughts were at

present. Then I got an O. K. and I would go ahead and see the man again and speak to him generally.

With Laurence Duggan after a few meetings I suggested to him to be of help to us and he consented. He made very specific demands. He, too, said he would neither have nor be willing to give me secret documents but that he would be quite willing to meet a person and he was quite pleased about the decentralization of the apparatus and that the person would not be I and that I would not know who the person was that would work with him. But he was willing to meet this person regularly, probably once a week or once in 2 weeks, and give him for some time verbal reports. The man or woman would have to be a shorthand person, would have to be able to write shorthand and would have to know English well. He made it quite clear he would not have enough time to bother with translations and involvements.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt in your mind that Field and Duggan knew you were a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. And in an apparatus for the Communists?

Mrs. MASSING. No. That I made quite clear to both of them. I did not say I was a Soviet spy, but I said I was a member of an apparatus doing this specific work. Whether it was clear to them this was espionage I am not certain, though I would assume they must have known.

Senator FERGUSON. What was this material that you were to get from them out of the State Department?

Mrs. MASSING. That I don't know, Senator, because I never saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you tell them you wanted?

Mrs. MASSING. I told them I would want to know all news, all information relating to the Soviet Union, to our attempts. I didn't say military secrets, because I wasn't told to ask that. I would just propose what I was told to propose, to give me all news, all information that would be relative——

Senator FERGUSON. To the Soviet Union?

Mrs. MASSING. To the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you talked to them first about fascism?

Mrs. MASSING. The Soviet Union was fighting fascism. It was the Soviet Union who was fighting fascism and all the Communist Parties with the Soviet Union all over the world.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way you explained it to both these men?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you succeed in recruiting Laurence Duggan?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, I succeeded.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you turn him over to the apparatus?

Mrs. MASSING. I did turn him over to the apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. To whom did you turn him over?

Mrs. MASSING. I don't know. I made arrangements for him to meet a person.

Mr. MORRIS. You made arrangements with whom?

Mrs. MASSING. With Laurence Duggan. To be more specific, my boss Boris told me to tell Duggan that he would be met by a man who would have an identification. I think it was a flower and a

magazine, and he would be met in a car on a road which Duggan was to assign at a specific time on a specific day, that Duggan would enter the car of this man who would be standing in front of the car and be visible so as to be noticed by Duggan and Duggan would speak to this man. I did not know who the man was. All I knew was the time and the methods of identification. Then I dropped out.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it was your function to recruit and turn over to the apparatus and to do nothing more?

Mrs. MASSING. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, at this juncture I would like to introduce into the record some letters from the institute's files which concern Laurence Duggan's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you intend to read them first?

Mr. MORRIS. I will read excerpts.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Do you have identification of them as belonging to the files?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will identify them as such.

First, I would like to introduce a letter dated May 8, 1940. This is a letter from Edward C. Carter to William W. Lockwood. Mr. Carter in this letter is discussing plans of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you had better identify it and lay your foundation for it through Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I offer you this letter and ask you if you will desecribe where that letter came from.

Mr. MANDEL. This is one of the letters in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations which were turned over to us.

Mr. MORRIS. You recognize it as such?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. This is from Edward C. Carter to William W. Lockwood, dated May 8, 1940, from 129 East Fifty-second Street, which was the address at that time of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Paragraph 12 reads:

Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan, and others who are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America from a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization.

I would like to introduce that in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 41" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 41

NEW YORK CITY, *May 8, 1940.*

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Committee for International Studies,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR BILL: I have given your letter of May 2 considerable thought. Rather than limit myself to one or two suggestions, I think it is better for me to make quite a number which I regard as of great importance, or of being worthy of further investigation.

In order that you may understand my reaction to your letter, and to this highly interesting and significant statement which Earle and you have just

issued on the American Committee for International Studies, I am venturing quite informally to send you quite a number of names.

Your committee's statement, as well as the quality of its leadership and its membership are most encouraging. As would be expected of the kind of leadership that you and Earle are giving, it is encouraging to note that you are not disinterested in relating scientific research to questions of policy and that your main objective is to make new and constructive approaches to the study of international affairs.

You are, I think, familiar with Dr. Percy E. Corbett's general plan of work. He has the approval of McGill for a continuation of major work on this project after his return to McGill in 1941. In the meantime, he and I are looking for an appropriate colleague with a far eastern background comparable to Corbett's background in Europe, the Americas and the British Commonwealth, in the hope that the two of them with appropriate assistance can make a synthesis and interpretation of all that is most fundamental in the I. P. R.'s far eastern inquiry with what is basic in the studies of Chatham House, of P. E. P., of Shotwell's Committee, the New School, Buell's book and the many European studies and those that are appearing in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere. Corbett is thinking not simply of a review of reviews or a synthesis of existing plans. He aims to carry them further, more fundamentally and courageously.

The basic work that he has in mind and much of the work of many of the groups and individuals just mentioned would in my view be aided enormously if arrangements could be made for some such international exchange fellowships as the following:

(1) Bring over R. H. Tawney so that he may appraise, criticize and interpret the Corbett project, contribute to it and at the same time make a critique of the plans of the other serious groups on this continent.

(2) Bring Ushiba, Saionji and Yokota in order that we may have someone from the very inside of Japan closely in touch with current thought in the Japanese Army, the bureaucracies and the universities.

(3) Send Harriet Moore to the U. S. S. R. to go through all government and party writing on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and politburo chiefs.

(4) Bring von Trott from Berlin to be associated with Corbett, Sansom, Tawney and others, and hold him here until a week before America enters the war.

(5) Discover who is the most valuable man in the P. E. P. group, namely, the one principally responsible for the now really first-class P. E. P. memorandum (7th ed.), and bring him to the United States after a visit with Kittredge and his French colleagues in Paris.

(6) If Tamagna turns out to be as promising as he looks on paper, send him to Rome to undertake a study there on lines similar to Miss Moore's study in Moscow, returning at the end of 6 months to give 6 months to collaboration with the group under the direction of Corbett, Sansom, Holland, Alexander, and also with the A.C.I.S., Earle and yourself.

(7) Discover whether there is one wise and great man in Manila—(Would Apostol qualify?)—and have him spend 3 months on the project in Manila, a month each in Chungking and Tokyo and then bring him, preferably by way of the Trans-Siberian Railway, to collaborate with the groups here.

(8) Send Phil Jessup or Jack Shepherd for 3 months each to Batavia, Chungking, Manila, Tokyo.

(9) Discover whether Myrdal would be free 3 months after his return to Sweden to contribute an analysis of above-ground and under-ground concepts in Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania on postwar organization.

(10) After he served 6 months in the French Army, if he is still alive, dig up Dennery by the roots and bring him over to collaborate with Corbett, Earle, and yourself. Failing Dennery, consider Joxe.

(11) Discover whether there is some European, African or British scholar who knows the greater part of Africa from the political and economic angle, and arrange for him to make a fresh visit to the principal African states and colonies. After a 10-months survey of war repercussions and the establishment of contact with that handful of people in each area who are thinking of postwar organization, bring him to New York for collaboration with the groups here.

(12) Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan and others who are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America for a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization.

(13) Bring both Searle Bates and Chen Han-seng from China to collaborate both with Corbett, Tawney, Sansom, and Holland on the one hand and with such groups as the American Committee may recommend on the other.

(14) Bring either Motylev, Troyanovsky, or Voitinski, to contribute alike to the IPR inquiry, Corbett's special synthesis and to such studies by other American groups as may be recommended by the American Committee for International Studies.

(15) Discover from S. K. Datta and Jawaharlal Nehru what Indian scholar is qualified or could take time under a Rockefeller fellowship to qualify himself to come to New York to contribute to the work of the various international and national groups here.

The parochialism of even the greatest thinkers is such that unless international organization is studied in an atmosphere that is made realistic by the physical presence of people from every continent, grave errors are inevitable. You will remember that in his A Study of History, Arnold J. Toynbee asserts that, as a historian, he disapproves of the use to which historical information has been put. He maintains that historical scholarship has substituted the Nation for mankind and thwarted the impulse to comprehend life as a whole. To support this he examines one case and discovers that English history is unintelligible when taken by itself. The "intelligible field of study" must be in some larger unit than the Nation. "Historical thought takes a deep impression from the dominant institutions and the transient social environment in which it happens to live."

You will note that the people I envisage as fellowship holders and collaborators represent every one of the disciplines in the social sciences.

It seems to Holland and me that either your committee or your committee acting jointly with IPR or the Rockefeller Foundation itself should set up a temporary research bureau in New York for the next 3 or 4 years, devoted solely to studying the question of wartime and postwar problems.

Many of these suggestions, or perhaps the multiplicity of them, may cause you to feel that I have gone beyond your request. This I have clearly done, but I have been moved to do so by my fairly deep convictions. The ISC has done valuable work, but one of its principal limitations has been that it has been too much conditioned by its European environment. The IPR has done valuable work, but it has been too much conditioned by its Pacific environment. It seems to me that the war situation makes it more imperative than ever that a nucleus of scholars be established somewhere in the world, probably of necessity in New York, which can look at present problems of mankind from an even more inclusive point of view than that of either the ISC or the IPR.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

MAY 9, 1940.

ECC from PEC

I have been thinking about your name on the combination of fellowship holders and special collaborators in a broadly international joint study of peace terms and postwar reconstruction. It does not seem to me a bit overambitious. As you suggest at the end there is a job of unlimited importance to be done, or at least attempted, and to my way of thinking it is worth any possible concentration of brain power. The big way is indeed the only way of tackling it adequately, and I believe that by a bold initiative of this type the institute may render incalculable service. As we are working now, we are employing an occasional leisure hour of a number of scholars each very busy in his special field. The task really calls for a large team of experts devoting their whole time to it. It seems to me very fitting that the only plan I have seen which grasps the magnitude of the need and the opportunity should emanate from the IPR. Even if necessary aid should not be forthcoming you will at least escape the reproach of failing to rise to the occasion.

We know a good deal about the thought now being devoted to problems of world organization for peace in a number of countries. But, so far as I know,

only two efforts have been made to mobilize in one spot an international corps of thinkers to work on these problems. One of them is the program of the ISC, the other the League Committee under Colijn at The Hague. It seems to me inevitable that the operations of both these bodies will be greatly impeded, if not suspended, by the war. Moreover, neither has the material or geographical scope contemplated in your plan, and essential to the conception of world peace as an indivisible whole.

One or two suggestions of detail

1. In sending anyone on a mission of inquiry, I think care should be taken to select a person who, on his return, will not be so much absorbed in other work that he will not be able to participate fully in discussion here. The ideal will be someone who can give most of his time for a reasonable period.

2. For the African topics, the name of W. K. Hancock should be borne in mind. He had a great deal to do with the colonial studies conducted by Chatham House, wrote a good book on The Empire, has spent some time in the mandates and colonies, and is a man of first-rate character and ability. He is professor of history at Birmingham.

3. I know an unusually intelligent Canadian engineer who spent some years in Russia, speaks the language, and traveled from Moscow to Vladivostok and from Leningrad to Odessa, who might be induced to do some useful work on Soviet industry and commerce, and its probable importance in the postwar world.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I would also like to introduce at this time the testimony in executive session of Mr. E. C. Carter, taken before this committee June 21, 1951, pages 212 and 213 of the executive session.

The interrogation follows:

Mr. MORRIS. What relation did Laurence Duggan have to your organization, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. * * * Laurence became quite a high-ranking officer—in whatever is called the Latin-American Section in the State Department.

And I remember once when Sumner Welles was urging that we try to get an unofficial society in some Latin countries, I went along to Laurence Duggan's office and talked to him, and he seemed to be generally sympathetic and suggested that I talk to certain other Americans in the Latin-American Section of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did he suggest?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. He suggested whoever was their economic adviser, on the ground that if the Latins saw that it was in their economic and business interest to become a part of the IPR, that might be more persuasive with some of the countries.

I would like to introduce this executive session testimony into today's testimony on the relation of Mr. Laurence Duggan into the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. That was taken at the time when Mr. Carter was under oath before the committee in executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record. This is the same Mr. Carter who testified here in open session?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 42" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 42

[From hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee in executive session June 21, 1951, pp. 212–213]

TESTIMONY OF E. C. CARTER

Mr. MORRIS. What relation did Laurence Duggan have to your organization, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. * * * Laurence became quite a high-ranking officer—in whatever is called the Latin-American Section in the State Department.

And I remember once when Sumner Welles was urging that we try to get an unofficial society in some Latin countries, I went along to Laurence Duggan's office and talked to him, and he seemed to be generally sympathetic and suggested that I talk to certain other Americans in the Latin-American Section of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did he suggest?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. He suggested whoever was their economic adviser, on the ground that if the Latins saw that it was in their economic and business interest to become a part of the IPR, that might be more persuasive with some the countries.

Mr. MORRIS. I show Mr. Mandel photostats of two letters and ask him if he will identify those letters from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get those letters, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. These were obtained from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations as turned over to us.

Mr. MORRIS. One letter is dated December 2, 1935. It is from Frederick V. Field to Laurence Duggan, Department of State:

Thank you for your quick reply to my telegram in regard to Friday evening. I look forward to meeting with you and your friends and only hope the occassion won't be too formal.

I shall be glad to have dinner with you beforehand. I shall get in touch with you Friday morning.

The preceding letter which was sent from Duggan to Field, dated November 7, 1935, reads:

Dear FRED: Every so often a group of us here in Washington gets together in the evening to discuss international matters of interest. Some time we would like to have a discussion that would center around possible developments in the Far East as a result of Europe's preoccupations, in particular in the Italian-Ethiopian dispute. For these discussions, which are very informal, we try and get someone in who is particularly well versed in the subject under discussion. I wonder whether you or Joe, or anyone like Pfeffer, is going to be in Washington in the near future and would be willing to spend an evening with this group? We will fix the date to meet your convenience.

The CHAIRMAN. Now who is the Field mentioned in that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. That is Frederick V. Field who up to that time had been secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Frederick Vanderbilt Field who testified in open session before the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 43–A; and 43–B" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 43–A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 7, 1935.

FRED FIELD, Esq.
Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.

DEAR FRED: Every so often a group of us here in Washington gets together in the evening to discuss international matters of interest. Some time we would like to have a discussion that would center around possible developments in the Far East as a result of Europe's preoccupations, in particular in the Italian-Ethiopian dispute. For these discussions, which are very informal, we try and get someone in who is particularly well versed in the subject under dis-

cussion. I wonder whether you or Joe, or anyone like Pfeffer, is going to be in Washington in the near future and would be willing to spend an evening with this group? We will fix the date to meet your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

LARRY.

EXHIBIT NO. 43-B

DECEMBER 2, 1935.

MR. LAURENCE DUGGAN,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR LARRY: Thank you for your quick reply to my telegram in regard to Friday evening. I look forward to meeting with you and your friends and only hope the occasion won't be too formal.

I shall be glad to have dinner with you beforehand. I shall get in touch with you Friday morning.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce this other letter now, identified by Mr. Mandel, which is dated November 15, 1935, on the letterhead of the Department of State, from Laurence Duggan to Frederick V. Field of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

DEAR FRED: I am delighted to learn that you may be down here shortly and will be willing to induct us into the mysteries of the Far East. You have no idea how much we don't know!

May I say, Mr. Chairman, we had previous testimony to the effect that at that time Mr. Frederick V. Field was the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 15, 1935.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR FRED: I am delighted to learn that you may be down here shortly and will be willing to induct us into the mysteries of the Far East. You have no idea how much we don't know!

Very sincerely yours,

LARRY (Lawrence Duggan).

The CHAIRMAN. These are photostatic copies you are giving for the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a photostat of an original letter?

Mr. MORRIS. A photostat of a letter taken from the files.

Mrs. Massing, did you know a man named Robert T. Miller?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what you know about Robert T. Miller?

Mrs. MASSING. I know not too much about him really. I met him on, I believe, my second courier trip on a boat. He was on his way to the Soviet Union. I didn't know him then. I met him on the boat and we started to discuss politics. As far as I remember, he was anti-Soviet. I tried, as I tried during those years, to convince everybody that the Soviet Union was the solution to all problems in this world.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this?

Mrs. MASSING. That was probably in 1934. I would not know exactly. It might have been 1935. It must have been 1934. We discussed at great length. He was going on a trip to the Soviet Union quite determined not to like it. I told him that he doesn't understand, that he doesn't know, and I offered to give him a letter of recommendation to Mrs. Louis Fischer, Markoosha Fischer, provided that he take chocolate to the sons of Louis Fischer, who were little boys at the time. There was no chocolate in the Soviet Union, and everybody who had a chance to send food into the Soviet Union did, and I told Miller if he would buy a lot of chocolate in Germany I would in exchange give him a letter of introduction to Markoosha Fischer, who would then show him around in Moscow and explain the Soviet Union. She, being a Russian and the wife of an American newspaperman, was the appropriate person to introduce to him the great secrets of the Soviet Union. He accepted it. He did buy chocolate, and he did meet Markoosha Fischer, who took him to the Moscow Daily News, where the doctrination was completely taken out of her hands because he married an American Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the American Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. I don't know. I heard her name. I don't know her personally. I wasn't there. He stayed on sometime, I understand, and left as a Communist. This is all I know about him. I have never seen him since.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to make reference to the letter that was introduced into the testimony on the second day during the Carter testimony. It was a letter from Edward C. Carter to Alger Hiss which reported on a discussion with Robert T. Miller. It reads in part:

DEAR ALGER: Yesterday, at your suggestion, I had a delightful and illuminating talk with Robert T. Miller, whom I hope to see again.

I would like to make that part of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Miller work at?

Mrs. MASSING. I don't know. He seemed to me to be a student at the time. He was very young.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. It has been inserted, Mr. Chairman. I just was making reference to it.

Now, Mrs. Massing, did you ever have any encounter with Joseph Barnes?

Mr. MASSING. Yes, if you want to call it "encounter."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe exactly what your experience has been with Joseph Barnes?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. In order to do that, Mr. Morris, I have to explain who Peter Zubelin is. Peter Zubelin was the second attaché at the Russian Embassy in Washington, I believe, during the years of 1943, 1944, 1945. I am not certain. I just want to say he was in Washington and was a very high official. I met Peter Zubelin in Moscow in 1937. Peter Zubelin was my main interrogator during the time I stayed in Moscow more or less against my will. The thing I refer to as "my purge" was a mild purge, because I am alive today, which does not happen to many people who go through a Russian purge. Peter Zubelin was the first man that met me in Moscow and

was for many months my interrogator. I got to know him very closely.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him as Peter Zubelin?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not. I knew him as Peter. As a matter of fact, I was accompanied—and this is too long to tell here, but just to say that when Ignatz Reiss was killed I was called back to Moscow. I did not want to go.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mrs. MASSING. That was in 1937. There was a special agent assigned to bring me and my husband, Paul, to Moscow. We knew her by the name of Helen. Helen worked on us and in a way watched us for many weeks before we were ready to leave. We left on a boat, finding her on a boat, at which point I knew we were really under police escort more or less.

It was Helen who brought Peter to my house, to the hotel Metropole in Moscow, where my interrogation took place. It was Helen who was present the first few weeks, and though Peter and Helen were married I never knew it, and though I spent with them many nights, because the interrogation took place at night mostly, I never knew they were a couple.

Peter Zubelin, after several months of interrogation and after the measures were relaxed and we were taken into the social life of the NKVD in Moscow, went one morning with my husband, Paul, to play tennis, and I went along. Now, let me say that Peter Zubelin was a kind of NKVD official. I don't know his exact rank in Russia. It was a very high army rank. NKVD people live a very different life from the average Russian. Not only is it privileged but a very secluded life, a very guarded life. For example, they have their own living quarters, their own dachas, their own shops, and their own hospitals, their own sanatoriums, and their own tennis courts. Peter went with us to a tennis court which was, of course, a closed tennis court. As we entered he whisked out whatever identification it was—I didn't see it; I didn't ask what the card was like. It was obviously a closed and private court. As we entered, I sat down on the bench and on the other court I saw Joseph Barnes, whom I knew to be a newspaperman and of whose presence in Moscow I had heard before, because, let me say this, I was very aware of all American newspapermen in Moscow merely because I hoped that they would keep track of me so that I would not disappear. Therefore, I knew very well who Barnes was and what his function was, what his work in Moscow was. I saw on the other court Barnes playing tennis with somebody else. I don't know who it was.

I said to Peter, "You know, Peter, this is very unfortunate that you have us here being seen playing tennis by an American newspaperman, playing tennis with you." He said, "What do you mean?" I said, "Look, there is Barnes." He said, "Barnes? Oh, you needn't worry about Barnes."

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, I would like to make reference at this time, unless any of the Senators want to ask a question——

Senator SMITH. I have one or two questions, Mr. Morris.

I was going to ask you whether or not you had any contacts with anybody else in the State Department other than those you have mentioned up to now.

If you are going to cover that, Mr. Morris, I will defer.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Senator, there is a list of people that I am going to ask her about.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not your purpose to connect only those at the present time that had connections with the IPR?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

In answer to the Senator's question, I would like again to make reference to this list of 83 people that we introduced on the first day.

Senator FERGUSON. Who had connections with the IPR?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. We have this list and we asked Mr. Carter if they were associated with the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. He either identified them or not.

Mr. MORRIS. We are trying to restrict, as much as possible, questions to this particular list. If another name comes up, it is only because it will bring an indirect relationship to some of these people.

Senator SMITH. We will have another chance to ask this witness about other things?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir.

Mrs. Massing, I wonder if you would tell us what you know about a man named James S. Allen.

Mrs. MASSING. I never worked with James S. Allen, because James S. Allen was an open party member, but I knew James S. Allen, and his real name is Sol Auerbach. I knew him as Sol. I met him socially.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, I would like to offer you a photograph that appeared in the Daily Worker of May 4, 1936. There is a picture of James S. Allen. I wonder if you will identify the man whose picture appears there as the man we are talking about now.

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, that is he.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce this into the record purely for identification purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom do you refer to as the man we are now talking about

Mr. MORRIS. James S. Allen.

Mrs. MASSING. James S. Allen is the man we are talking about.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about James S. Allen?

Mrs. MASSING. When I met Allen, I met him at Harry Freeman's. He belonged to the group of party intellectuals. He was a theoretician in the party.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say a party, what do you mean?

Mrs. MASSING. American party.

Senator FERGUSON. The Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

I must say here that my social contact with the American party was strictly against my orders. I maintained it because Gerhart Eisler, my first husband, was in this country and we were very good friends, and the people I had met when I first was in this country in 1926—there was a circle of people that in spite of the fact that neither Gerhart was permitted to see Harry Freeman, who was a Tass representative, nor was I permitted to see Harry Freeman or Gerhart Eisler, still we would meet at Freeman's apartment.

It was there that I met James Allen or Sol Auerbach. Sol at the time was working for Trachtenberg International Publishers. He was an editor. He was also the theoretician for the party in regard to the

Negro problem. He had written one book on the Black Belt theory, as far as I remember. He was at this time writing a second book. He was a highly intelligent man, but had very great difficulties in writing the second book.

I remember he discussed it at great length with me, that he did not fully believe in the theory he was to propound for the party, and, therefore, took a great, a long time, to write this book he really did not want to write. He was rather critical, I must say, and I am sorry to go on record with this because I do not think it is going to help him very much within the Communist Party—he was critical of the Soviet Union at the time, which was true for many intellectuals. They were critical in a sort of friendly manner. He was certainly very critical of the American party, too, toward the Negro problem he was assigned to write about.

Shortly after I had met Sol and his wife, meaning James Allen and his wife, his wife went on a mission, first to China and later to the Philippines. Of course, I wasn't told this. This was just by inferences. She was in the east and she was on a mission that nobody knew what it was about. It was during this time that my husband also was in France.

Sol Auerbach and I became rather friendly. Sol's mother had a place in a suburb of New York where I spent evenings fairly frequently.

So I really know a great deal about Sol's thoughts at the time. Sol at this time was not connected directly with the Comintern in any other way but being a theoretician for the open Communist Party. When his wife got back from her mission, I did not see them very often because she was an apparatchik and did not very much mix with this group after she came back from the mission.

I don't quite know what happened in Sol's development, but I remember very distinctly after not having seen him for several months, he called me and came to my house and again said that he was very dissatisfied with his position within the party, with his writing, and that he would very much like to join my apparatus. He was asking my advice on this. I was rather critical myself, and quite appalled at a young man who should be willing to join a group that I did not think was a very good thing to be in or be involved with. I told him I could neither help nor would I, could I. I advised him to stay out of that, that if he was dissatisfied with his work to not to do it, but make up his own mind and do what he wanted to do. This is all I know about him. I have never seen him since.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I would like to offer you four groups of letters and ask you if you will identify those four letters.

Mr. MANDEL. I identify these letters as being taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to make reference, Mr. Chairman, to a letter dated April 13, 1938, from Mr. James S. Allen to Mr. Frederick V. Field, addressed to the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Allen, in this letter, says:

I am contemplating a small book on the Philippines, with chief emphasis upon the internal situation in the light of the problems of the Pacific area.

I have already done much preparatory work, and expect to round out my materials by additional observation and new data during another trip to the islands. I will probably leave in July and spend 4 or 5 months there.

It has occurred to me that the institute may be interested in the project, and may be willing to extend financial aid.

Then he goes on to say:

Should the institute be unwilling to make any commitments with regard to the sponsoring or publication of the book, another alternative seems possible. In the kind of general book which I am planning, it will be impossible to use the mass of data which I already have and which I will gather during my next trip.

There is another letter in this same batch from James S. Allen, dated June 2, 1938, to Mr. Edward C. Carter, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and reads:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Field with regard to my proposed book on the Philippines. Please pardon the delay in replying to your note of May 28, since I have just returned to the city.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

Senator SMITH. I wonder if you will accept that in evidence?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, is that one of the four groups of letters that Mr. Mandel has perviously identified?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; it is.

Senator SMITH (presiding). I think it will be all right for this purpose. According to law, I guess you would have to identify it by signature. I think under the circumstances in which it was found, for the purpose of this hearing, it is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of this is to show the relationship between James S. Allen, about whom the witness has testified, and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. That might not be James S. Allen's signature, but apparently it is, according to the circumstances under which it was found.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 46 and 47," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 46

APRIL 13, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am contemplating a small book on the Philippines, with chief emphasis upon the internal situation in the light of the problems of the Pacific area.

I have already done much preparatory work, and expect to round out my materials by additional observation and new data during another trip to the islands. I will probably leave in July and spend 4 or 5 months there.

It has occurred to me that the institute may be interested in the project, and may be willing to extend financial aid. Upon my return at the end of this year, I will have at hand the materials necessary for the writing of the book. But my problem will then be to assure myself 3 or 4 months of uninterrupted time for writing the book. I do not know the usual procedure of the institute in such matters, but may I take the liberty of requesting an advance grant to enable me to complete the book for publication?

Should the institute be unwilling to make any commitments with regard to the sponsoring or publication of the book, another alternative seems possible. In the kind of general book which I am planning, it will be impossible to use the mass of data which I aready have and which I will gather during my next trip. The institute may be interested in taking the materials for utilization in a Philippine handbook or other form. In this case, I could arrange for the publication of my book on its completion with a commercial publisher.

If it is possible to work out some basis of aid in advance, I could plan my trip and future plans accordingly. Should it be felt that some arrangement could be worked out, I would, of course, be glad to supply further details on the plan of the book.

I am ready to consider any other suggestion you may have in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

EXHIBIT No. 47

NEW YORK, *June 2, 1938.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Field with regard to my proposed book on the Philippines. Please pardon the delay in replying to your note of May 28, since I have just returned to the city.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to introduce into evidence a copy of a letter identified by Mr. Mandel as having come from the files as a memorandum from Mr. Lockwood to Mr. Carter, dated April 14, 1938.

Reference here is made to the fact, on page 2, the second full paragraph from the top, that Lockwood is asking Carter:

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the Black Belt which most people thought rather fantastic. Since the agrarian problem in the Philippines is obviously a key issue and since Allen has been short of funds, at least until recently, there may be some way in which the IPR can give him a useful boost.

I would like to introduce that in evidence in connection with Mr. Allen's association with the IPR.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 48," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 48

W. W. L. to E. C. C.

APRIL 14, 1938.

PHILIPPINE RESEARCH

Our luncheon meeting still leaves rather vague what the American council should do both as regards the secretariat inquiry and a long-term research program. Even if we follow up the suggestion and call a committee under Hayden, we should attempt meanwhile to clarify what we want done and might be in a position to do. It is unlikely that merely setting up a committee will carry us far unless we have a pretty good idea what we want and unless we are prepared to put a good deal of staff effort into pushing the thing along. I hope that Hayden will be here within a few weeks for a research committee meeting so that we can confer with him in person. Meanwhile, the situation looks to me about as follows:

SECRETARIAT INQUIRY

The bulk of the contribution to the secretariat inquiry, as I understand it, is to come from the Philippine council, with what assistance the secretariat and the American council may be able to give. The American council is to be primarily responsible, however, only for the specific American angle—the Philippines as a factor in our far eastern relations. Not only does this accord with IPR policy, but it recognizes the fact that with two possible exceptions, which I shall mention below, Americans in this country are hardly in a position to make any very useful contribution to the study of internal Philippine affairs or of Philippine relations in the Far East. Just what the general program of the Philippine study should be is for someone else to say. Perhaps the possibilities can be divided into two categories: (1) Memoranda on the general aspects of the external problems of the Commonwealth, and (2) more thoroughgoing research into various domestic phases of Philippine economic and political life.

Under the first category come the general subjects of international trade and international political relationships during and after the change in the political

status of the islands. From the Philippine angle this involves the problem of economic readjustment and of political security in the present and future. From the American, it involves primarily the Philippines as a factor in our policy in the Pacific. In this category the American council shares with the Philippine council the responsibility for documenting the secretariat inquiry.

It hardly seems necessary, however, for the American council to plan any extensive effort along this line. Philippine-American trade relations have been abundantly documented by the United States Government and private investigators. The facts are known and the problem is largely the political one of negotiation. So, too, the political and strategic phases of American interests are not in need of extensive research, particularly in view of Hayden's forthcoming volume (about which I have written for more specific information). The naval angle will come in for consideration in our naval study. In addition, we contemplate a data paper on American Far Eastern policy for the next conference, and meanwhile the conferences now being held may turn up a good deal of analysis and opinion on the subject.

Accordingly, I see no reason to alter our original proposal—that the American council should now plan only for a memorandum (possibly a data paper for the next conference) analyzing the place of the Philippines in American policy and the American angle of the Philippine question itself. Even this should be somewhat conditional on Hayden's present work, and on the needs of the situation as it develops next fall. It may be that the most useful thing we could do would be to assemble a small group of people next winter to prepare a brief series of recommendations on Philippine policy, comparable to that issued under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association 2 or 3 years ago. Possibly this report might be correlated with a parallel report undertaken and issued in the Philippines by a responsible group of Filipinos.

In the second category—that of Philippine research projects bearing on the secretariat inquiry—it is not clear to me that the American council should undertake anything at the present time. Little progress can be made in any important Philippine studies except by persons on the spot. I do not know whether the secretariat is sending someone to the islands or what relationship, if any, this person might have to the American council. Presumably this matter of research on internal political, economic, and social affairs will be worked out between the secretariat and the Philippine council, although the American council would naturally do everything it could to assist.

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the Black Belt which most people thought rather fantastic. Since the agrarian problem in the Philippines is obviously a key issue and since Allen has been short of funds, at least until recently, there may be some way in which the IPR can give him a useful boost. Chen Han-seng says that Allen's former hostility to Quezon has now been somewhat modified. Without knowing any more of the situation than this, I wonder if it would be desirable to investigate the possibility of hooking up Allen, Fred Howe, and others in such a way as to secure a thoroughgoing and rounded report on all phases of the agrarian problem. Perhaps this is altogether fanciful in view of personalities, etc., but in any case the sample of Allen's work is most promising.

With reference to your exchange of letters with Field on the subject of Miss Eleanor Dennison, which you passed along for comment—the subject of Philippine economic interest in the Far East deserves thoroughgoing study. The existing trade is relatively small, of course, and is a subject easily documented. The important question is rather the potentialities for the future. If the American trade tie is cut, the islands will be forced to reorient themselves in terms of Far Eastern trade relations, and this means primarily but not exclusively trade with Japan. (A study of Hong Kong trade, for example, shows that intra-regional trade has developed rapidly in this area, even excluding the Japanese share.) Someone ought to make a close study of both the competitive and complementary relationships of Philippine products and potential products with those of adjacent countries on all sides. But this is a highly technical matter and hardly to be undertaken as a doctoral thesis by some American girl in California. Unless it is already being done in the Philippines under official auspices, I should think it would constitute one important phase of the secretariat inquiry in the islands.

LONG-RANGE RESEARCH PLANS

Before setting up any committees and inviting suggestions for a program, I wonder if we should not consider rather carefully what we are actually prepared to do. In general, the need seems to be for basic studies in the social sciences in the Philippines rather than for anything that can be done from secondary materials over here. Moreover, our program, as you have pointed out, should be the stimulation of interest among American scholars, largely lacking in the past, rather than carrying through some particular research project under American council auspices. Such a research promotion campaign would presumably include a survey of these research needs, after the fashion of an SSRC committee, to be followed by a varied program including publicity for these needs, the coordination of research efforts, the provision of funds for travel and study in the islands, the encouragement of gradute study by Filipinos in the United States, the building up of library resources here and in the islands, etc.

There is only one objection to our launching such a program right away, but that is a practical one: Who is going to do it? We can get useful advice, suggestions, and contacts from a committee set up for the purpose, as proposed, but the actual execution of the program—the administrative responsibility—would fall upon us to a large extent and would be quite time consuming. There is little value in making the gesture unless we are prepared to follow it through. At present we are already rather far extended in our general program. It is questionable whether we should embark on any special effort along this line until some of our present responsibilities are liquidated.

It was this limitation of staff which was largely responsible for dropping the proposal discussed last summer for a Philippine-American council or committee. The plan which Lasker then proposed was a program to stimulate cultural relations in general with research as one of its important subdivisions. For a time it looked as though Veatch might be the man to carry out this research project, to serve as correspondent for the committee in the islands, and to carry a good deal of responsibility for organizing the thing at this end. When this scheme collapsed, owing to Veatch's decision to stay with the State Department, and when the war broke out, we went no further.

What we need is a staff person who would be our research person on the Philippines, thoroughly conversant with the subject, and who, in the remainder of his or her time, would be a Mortimer Graves in this field. It would be advantageous, although not essential, for this person to spend a period in the Philippines and return with a first-hand understanding of the situation. Until we see our way clear to some such arrangement, I am somewhat skeptical of the wisdom of making the initial splash and arousing expectations which we may not be in a position to fulfill. Is this taking a too negative view as far as the immediate possibilities are concerned?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like also to introduce into evidence a copy of a letter from Owen Lattimore to James S. Allen, dated February 27, 1939, and addressed to 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street, apartment 42, New York City:

DEAR ALLEN. Excuse my writing to you by dictaphone, as I am away from my office and kind of crowded for time.

It was good to hear from you again and I am only sorry that your "letter to the editor" was not in time for publication in our March number. It will have to come out in June. I am returning to you herewith a copy of the letter as set up to go to the printer. I am also sending copies to the Compania and to the Philippine branch of the IPR.

What about some more on the Philippines sometime? We are really rather hard-pressed to get enough material that is not directly about the Japanese war on China. At the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed radical stuff on the islands. Have you done any work in French Indochina, the Malay Straits, or Netherlands India?

By the way, have you any ideas that I could use in expanding circulation in the Philippines for Pacific Affairs? I think it is a healthy thing not to depend entirely on the organizational efforts of the IPR in each area for subscriptions. The more we can widen out everywhere by getting people who are not just members or joiners to subscribe to Pacific Affairs, the better for us.

I may be in New York toward the end of March. If so I very much hope that I may be able to make your acquaintance personally.

I would like to introduce that in evidence as one of the letters identified by Mr. Mandel as being taken from the files.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 49" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 49

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., February 27, 1939.

Mr. JAMES S. ALLEN,
New York City.

DEAR ALLEN: Excuse my writing to you by dictaphone, as I am away from my office and kind of crowded for time.

It was good to hear from you again and I am only sorry that your "letter to the editor" was not in time for publication in our March number. It will have to come out in June. I am returning to you herewith a copy of the letter as set up to go to the printer. I am also sending copies to the Compania and to the Philippine Branch of the IPR.

What about some more on the Philippines sometime? We are really rather hard-pressed to get enough material that is not directly about the Japanese war on China. At the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed "radical" stuff on the islands. Have you done any work in French Indochina, the Malay Straits, or Netherlands India?

By the way, have you any ideas that I could use in expanding circulation in the Philippines for Pacific Affairs? I think it is a healthy thing not to depend entirely on the organizational efforts of the IPR in each area for subscriptions. The more we can widen out everywhere by getting people who are not just members or joiners to subscribe to Pacific Affairs, the better for us.

I may be in New York toward the end of March. If so I very much hope that I may be able to make your acquaintance personally.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to also introduce the fourth batch of letters identified by Mr. Mandel, which is an exchange of correspondence dated May 25, 1938, from Mr. Allen to Mr. Carter and Mr. Carter's reply, dated May 28, 1938. Mr. Carter says in his reply to Mr. Allen:

DEAR ALLEN: This is to acknowledge with thanks your letter of May 25. Some time ago, Mr. Field forwarded your letter and outline for a book on the Philippines but, for some reason, I fail to find it in my files. It may have been lost in the mails.

I wonder whether it would be easy for you to send me a duplicate so that I may give it and your letter of May 25 the attention it deserves.

Whether the institute can make any grant, I cannot say at the moment. We are, however, very much interested in your proposal.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carter's letter to Mr. Allen is dated May 28, 1938, and sent to 381 Fourth Avenue, New York City, which is the address of the International Publishers Co. and also the address of the Communist Party of the United States, New York County Committee.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 50 and 51" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 50

NEW YORK, *May 25, 1938.*

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,
Intitute of Pacific Relations, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Mr. Frederick Field informed me some time ago that he had forwarded to you my letter outlining a short book on the Philippines and requesting assistance from the institute. He suggested that you might have something concrete to offer in this regard.

I am taking the liberty to write to you, since the time is drawing near for my departure to the Philippines and I have so little time left in which to make arrangements for the publication of the book.

If the institute is not in a position to render assistance to this project, I should like to know as soon as possible, since I would then attempt to make other arrangements. It seems to me, however, that the type of book I have in mind would especially suit the research and publication program of the institute and lend itself to your sponsorship. Professor Hayden is working on a lengthy and rather exhaustive study of all aspects of Philippine economic and social life, a book which will undoubtedly be of great value. My purpose, rather, is to write a concise book on the chief internal and international issues facing the Philippines in view of the new phase of Japanese aggression and the world alinement of the Fascist and militarist powers.

I expect to leave New York during the first week in July and will return from the Philippines at beginning of next year, when I will be ready to devote a number of months to the writing of the book.

Should you wish any further information, I will be only too glad to supply it. Any indication you can give me immediately as to the possibility of some constructive proposal from the institute would, of course, be highly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

EXHIBIT No. 51

NEW YORK CITY, *May 28, 1938.*

Mr. JAMES S. ALLEN,
381 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

DEAR ALLEN: This is to acknowledge with thanks your letter of May 25. Some time ago, Mr. Field forwarded your letter and outline for a book on the Philippines but, for some reason, I fail to find it in my files. It may have been lost in the mails.

I wonder whether it would be easy for you to send me a duplicate so that I may give it and your letter of May 25 the attention it deserves.

Whether the institute can make any grant, I cannot say at the moment. We are, however, very much interested in your proposal.

Sincerely yours.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I introduce a letter from the general directory manager of the New York Telephone Co., dated May 15, 1951. I ask you if you will take the letter from the New York Telephone Co. in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be presented in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 52" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 52

NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.,
New York, N. Y., May 15, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Your letter of May 9, 1951, in reference to a listing in the Manhattan telephone book for 1938 of the names, International Publishers, Communist Party U.S.A., or Communist Party of New York State has been referred to me for reply.

The 1938 edition of the Manhattan alphabetical directory, corrected to November 10, 1937, contained the following listings, among others:

International Publishers Co., 381 Fourth Ave., MUryhil 5-2864.

Communist Party of the U. S. A., New York County Committee, 381 Fourth Ave., MUryhil 5–2462.

No listing appeared in this directory for a New York State Communist Party or a Communist Party of New York State.

The two listings published in the 1938 Manhattan alphabetical directory also appeared in the 1938–39 edition, corrected to May 12, 1938, and again in the 1939 issue, corrected to November 9, 1938.

If we can be of any further assistance to you or to your committee in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely yours,

L. J. JORDAN,
General Directory Manager.

The CHAIRMAN. Where does this letter come from?

Mr. MORRIS. It is from the New York Telephone Co., addressed to you.

I would like also to make part of the record two articles published in Pacific Affairs, the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in 1938. One is on page 52, called The Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines by James S. Allen, and the other is called The Philippine Problem Enters a New Phase, by James S. Allen. That is on page 159.

I would like to introduce both of these articles in evidence as writings of Mr. Allen from the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want those printed in full in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You want this to go in the files, then?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; in the files.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the excerpts getting into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. I think the record should show those two articles did appear.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they will lie before the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a reference so if anyone wants to read the whole articles he can find them in the Library.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one more letter I would like to introduce on the question of James S. Allen, Mr. Chairman. This is dated May 29, 1940. It is a letter from Edward C. Carter to W. L. Holland; it is sent from 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, which at that time was the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The last paragraph reads:

Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet Policy in the Pacific made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were: Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Muhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

That is signed by Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the origin of that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel is getting the original letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Please lay the foundation for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you introduce this letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this letter of May 29, 1940, as a letter from the IPR files.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 53" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 53

NEW YORK, N. Y., *May 29, 1940.*

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.
Care Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: You will, I think, wish to scan this docket of the London, Ontario, Study Meeting. Please return it at your convenience. It was really a very good show. The Canadians seemed most deeply to appreciate the presence of the Americans.

Referring to your very generous letter of May 23 and your check for the New Zealand part of the general purposes budget, I wish to thank you most sincerely for your characteristically generous help. May I have the privilege of reporting this to the New Zealand Institute?

Elizabeth has assured me that she willingly accepts the salary cut. She is eager to work harder than ever for the IPR.

By now you will have had a copy of my letter containing the letter from Switzerland regarding the latest news from Adam. I have not had anything from Boeke or Moll. I suppose I might try a letter through Geneva. Have you any special message that you would like me to send?

Corbett's group has been meeting pretty regularly. I will check with him and see what minutes are available.

Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet policy in the Pacific made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were: Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Muhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. In regard to this letter from Edward C. Carter to W. L. Holland, dated May 29, 1940, I call attention to the last paragraph which discusses a meeting held under IPR auspices in discussing Soviet policy in the Pacific.

Mrs. Massing, will you tell us what you know about Max Granich?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. Max Granich is the husband of Grace Maul and was a brother of Mike Gold. I know he was at one time—but this is much later than when I met him—the editor of China Today. I met Granich through Mike Gold, whom I met in 1926 in New York. I knew the Gold family very well because it was through Mike Gold that I was introduced to my first job in an orphanage working with defective children in 1936, shortly after I arrived here.

Granich was a Communist, and so was Grace Maul. I think Grace Maul had a rather high function in the central committee of the Communist Party, but I am not certain what her status was. I met Granich and Grace Maul in Moscow in 1929 or the beginning of 1930. I saw them a great deal in New York between 1926 and 1928. I knew they belonged to the Communist Party, I mean.

Mr. MORRIS. How high a position do they occupy in the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. I wouldn't know about him. I know about her, Grace Maul. I think she was a member of the central committee. What her specific function was, I wouldn't know. That was as far back as 1926.

I think later on she went on many missions. I knew she was in England. I met them in Paris in the American Express Co. by mere coincidence once. They traveled a great deal. I would say they were Comintern employees, Comintern missionaries, in a way. They were sent on jobs. What their specific jobs were, I wouldn't know. China was the focus, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time, and Mr. Mandel will identify it as a letter coming from the files of the institute.

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacfic Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify it as from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. A copy of a letter from Owen Lattimore to Mr. Max Granich, China Today, 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York City. In this letter, Lattimore says:

Thank you for your letter of December 11. I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible for me to join the editorial board of China Today. I am a member of the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that one of my employers is the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the board of China Today, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia.

I have been desperately busy the last few months completing a book and, consequently, have published very little in magazines. I am expecting to write some articles in the next few months, but I think you will agree that these articles would have their maximum impact if not published in magazines which are devoted to "the cause of China."

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I would like to introduce that letter in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 54" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 54

300 GILMAN HALL,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., December 13, 1939.

Mr. MAX GRANICH,
China Today, 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. GRANICH: Thank you for your letter of December 11. I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible for me to join the editorial board of China Today. I am a member of the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that one of my employers is the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the board of China Today, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia.

I have been desperately busy the last few months completing a book and, consequently, have published very little in magazines. I am expecting to write some articles in the next few months, but I think you will agree that these articles would have their maximum impact if not published in magazines which are devoted to "the cause of China."

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Bearing on the testimony of this witness on Max Granich, that is.

Did you know Agnes Smedley?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; I knew her quite well. Agnes Smedley I met in Frankfurt-am-Main when I got back from the United States in 1928. She had written her life story. I don't quite recall what the title of it in English was, but my second husband, Julian Gumperz,

who was the owner of a large publishing firm in Berlin, called the Maleek Verlag, had translated and published it in his publishing firm. She was a very close friend of his. I met her through him. I saw her rather frequently before she went off to China. She was then a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung.

I believe Julian Gumperz was rather instrumental in getting her the assignment as a correspondent. I did not discuss with her at the time whether she was a Communist. As a matter of fact, it is never discussed among Communists whether you are a Communist. You take it for granted. The fact that she was a friend of Julian Gumperz, the fact that she had published in the Maleek Verlag, which was a left-wing publishing firm, made me assume that she was one of us. That is how I met her.

I saw her next in Russia in 1930. She had come back from China. She was rather sick. I am not quite sure whether it was the fall of 1930 or the winter of 1930–31, but it was during this winter that I saw her in Moscow. She lived at the Hotel International. She had with her a German girl that had been with her in Shanghai. She had written the book that made her rather famous—about the Chinese Red army.

I spoke to her about Gerhart, whom she had met in China, and whom she liked very well. I saw her rather frequently in Moscow. I believe, when she was in Moscow, she had some difficulties. I had the feeling, in retrospect I must admit—at that time I would not have quite understood the situation—that she was there in almost a similar situation as I was later in 1937. She was waiting for an exit visa. She didn't get it. She wasn't treated too well by the Russians. She had difficulties with the Russians. In fact, when I saw her again in New York in 19—either 4 or 5—I am not certain because I just saw her once socially——

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't mean 1904; do you?

Mrs. MASSING. 1934 or 1935. She referred to this time where she had seen me in Moscow as having had great difficulties with the party, with the Russians. She never referred to the party but the Russians mainly.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you try to describe her relative importance in the Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. She had a very high status as a foremost writer on China. When I spoke to Gerhart Eisler, who was also in China as a Comintern representative during the time Agnes Smedley was there, and I saw Gerhart when he got back from Moscow in 1931—when I asked him about Agnes Smedley, he said she was "a wonderful person" and had been of tremendous help to him.

Mr. MORRIS. When he said "wonderful," he meant wonderful within the Communist scheme?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course. To Gerhart Eisler no person is wonderful if he is not a Communist. "Wonderful" is a good Communist, a useful Communist. He spoke very highly of her.

Later, when Dr. Richard Sorge was on his way to Germany from China before he went to Japan, he saw me in New York. I asked him about Agnes Smedley. He, too, said that Agnes—but he said it very smirkingly—that Agnes was "a very wonderful helper." He didn't say she was working for him. Only when he went back to

Japan and saw me in New York again, he said, and this was at the time when I was ordered to go to Japan with him, he said to me, "You have a very responsible job if you go with me. You will be established like Agnes was with me in China," meaning in a rather high position, in a much higher and more responsible job than I had held in New York today in my "apparatus."

Mr. MORRIS. Do any of the Senators care to ask about Agnes Smedley?

Senator SMITH. There is one question but it may not be proper here, but it will take a minute to answer.

On all these trips you made, such as the last one, who paid you? How did you get the money?

Mrs. MASSING. I was a paid Soviet agent. I was on a party salary.

Senator SMITH. Paid by the funds that came from Moscow?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, indeed.

Senator SMITH. How did they reach you?

Mrs. MASSING. As a matter of fact, in New York I was for some time in charge of the money for our unit. How the money came from Moscow, I wouldn't quite know had I not been once, at the very early start of my career, a courier to bring money from Moscow to the French party. I mean, the money was brought by couriers, as I was one. How it was brought to New York, I don't know, because I didn't bring it. Somebody else did.

Senator FERGUSON. Who gave it to you in New York?

Mrs. MASSING. In New York, my superior, whoever it was at the time, Bill or Boris.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it in rubles or in dollars?

Mrs. MASSING. It was in dollars. As I said once before, rubles were just used in Russia. Even there they are not worth very much and never have been. It was the currency of the country that it was used in. In France, I took French francs.

Senator SMITH. Did any of the parties you have mentioned, in connection with this group you have testified to this morning, transmit to you directly or indirectly any funds for the uses of the party for the purposes you were serving?

Mrs. MASSING. You mean any of the people that I solicited?

Senator SMITH. That you testified about this morning.

Mrs. MASSING. No, except for the members of my "apparatus" which were Russians. No, nobody did.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any doubt in your mind that Agnes Smedley was a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course not, Senator; I couldn't have had because Agnes was referred to, and this is the round that is so very hard for us to understand—we know when somebody is a Communist. A Communist knows when a Communist is a Communist. Agnes was one of us. Agnes was referred to in our circles as one of us. Whether she had a party membership, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I ask you this question is: Did you know that the War Department issued an order in effect clearing this woman?

Mrs. MASSING. No, indeed, and I was very much flabbergasted by it because I know very much about her role in China. I knew that she was very instrumental in helping Dr. Richard Sorge, who was one

of the most outstanding Soviet spies. She helped him in introducing to him people and help him set up his "apparatus." She was a rather high functionary in Richard Sorge's outfit. I was very amazed at the withdrawal of the War Department when she threatened to sue.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no doubt, notwithstanding the War Department's clearance, that this woman was a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. I had no doubt that she was an outstanding Communist. I do not know whether she ever took out a party membership.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about that. I am not talking about a party card, or a booklet, as you said this morning. I am talking about who is an instrumentality of the Communists.

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, Senator. After her death, she willed all her possessions and her body to the Chinese Communists. I don't think anybody can doubt any longer she was a convinced Communist and an active Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time an excerpt from the New York Times of May 7, 1951, with the date line "San Francisco." It reads:

Agnes Smedley, pro-Red American writer who died in Oxford, England, exactly one year ago, was buried today in Peiping, the Chinese Red radio reported.

In accordance with her will, the Peiping broadcast said, her ashes were placed in the New Cemetery for Revolutionists at services attended by 800 Chinese Red notables.

Miss Smedley's will, probated in New York last year, bequeathed her estate to General Chu Teh, Chinese Red commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 55" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 55

AGNES SMEDLEY BURIED—PRO-RED WRITER IS INTERRED IN PEIPING YEAR AFTER DEATH

[From the New York Times, May 7, 1951]

SAN FRANCISCO, May 6.—Agnes Smedley, pro-Red American writer who died in Oxford, England, exactly 1 year ago, was buried today in Peiping, the Chinese Red radio reported.

In accordance with her will, the Peiping broadcast said, her ashes were placed in the New Cemetery for Revolutionists at services attended by 800 Chinese Red notables.

Miss Smedley's will, probated in New York last year, bequeathed her estate to General Chu-Teh, Chinese Red commander in chief.

The Red broadcast said that Miss Smedley's personal possessions, such as typewriter, camera, radio set, and correspondence with General Chu, was placed on exhibition in the hall of the Youth Palace.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show this letter to Mr. Mandel and ask him if he will identify it as a copy of a letter from the IPR files.

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this letter as one taken from the IPR files.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter signed "Agnes Smedley" and sent to the Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

GENTLEMEN: I understand there is a system whereby the Red Cross can secure an exchange of prisoners. I therefore appeal to you to write officially in the name of your organization, to the American Red Cross, asking that Mr. Chen Han-seng * * *.

Mr. Chairman, may I recall that Chen Han-seng was identified in the first session here as a staff member of the IPR, a man who had worked on the inquiry series of the IPR and a man about whom Mr. Carter wrote to Mr. Motylev, a member of the Soviet IPR that he was writing under the pen name of Raymond D. Brooke.

Then we introduced in evidence at that time photostatic copies of Raymond D. Brooke's articles in the Far Eastern Spotlight which is a publication of the American Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Resuming the letter—

* * * asking that Mr. Chen Han-seng and his wife be placed on the exchange list, and that you do all you can to get them out of Hong Kong. Chen Han-seng was not only one of your members, but he was the chief person in charge of the industrial cooperative office in Hong Kong. His wife is very ill. I doubt very much if they were among the Chinese enabled to leave Hong Kong for China during the fighting.

Toward the end of the letter it reads:

China is our ally. Chen Han-seng and his wife are among the most important men in the Far East. Holding the position he does, he would most certainly be most in danger from the Japanese.

That is dated January 31, 1942. It is written from Ojai, Calif.

I would like to introduce that in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 56" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 56

RURAL ROUTE 2, BOX 57, OJAI, CALIF., *January 31, 1942.*

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

GENTLEMEN: I understand there is a system whereby the Red Cross can secure an exchange of prisoners. I therefore appeal to you to write officially in the name of your organization, to the American Red Cross, asking that Mr. Chen Han-seng and his wife be placed on the exchange list, and that you do all you can to get them out of Hong Kong. Chen Han-seng was not only one of your members, but he was the chief person in charge of the industrial cooperative office in Hong Kong. His wife is very ill. I doubt very much if they were among the Chinese enabled to leave Hong Kong for China during the fighting.

Please find time to write me a line about this. I understand that John Gunther ,like others, is trying to have people in Hong Kong placed on the prisoner-exchange lists. Surely, at such a moment in history, we will not let nationality alone determine our actions. China is our ally. Chen Han-seng and his wife are among the most important men in the Far East. Holding the position he does, he would most certainly, be most in danger from the Japanese.

Very sincerely yours,

AGNES SMEDLEY.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to introduce another letter and ask Mr. Mandel to identify this.

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this letter of January 14, 1939, as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that signed?

Mr. MORRIS. This is from Edward C. Carter to Frederick V. Field at the institute address. It reads:

DEAR FRED: You may care to scan these two sets of inquiries: I, material from the Chinese campaign committee in London, including a letter from Miss Smedley; and II, two circular letters from Bates, of Nanking.

After you have scanned them will you pass them on in an envelope to Chen, Liu, Holland, Sheppard, and Mitchell.

I would like to introduce that.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 57" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 57

JANUARY 14, 1939.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

DEAR FRED: You may care to scan these two sets of inquiries: I, material from the Chinese campaign committee in London, including a letter from Miss Smedley; and II, two circular letter from Bates of Nanking.

After you have scanned them will you pass them on in an envelope to Chen, Liu, Holland, Sheppard, and Mitchell.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. The accompanying letter from Miss Smedley is not on that covering letter, I would like to note.

Mrs. Massing, do you know Harriet Lucy Moore?

Mrs. MASSING. I have met her socially in Moscow, probably once or twice, I am not certain. I don't know her well at all. I know of her. I know that her name figured in Moscow and in the American party, meaning that I might have heard it from Grace Maul and from Agnes, from people concerned with China, with the Far East, and I knew where she lived in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did she live?

Mrs. MASSING. In the International Hotel.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is the International Hotel?

Mrs. MASSING. I am not absolutely certain whether she didn't live in the Hotel Lux. I went to many American parties in the Hotel Lux. It was the hotel in which only Comintern, foreign Comintern people lived, Comintern employees. The Hotel International was the hotel in which fellow travelers, or agents that were not supposed to be known as such, lived. For example, where Noel Field and Herta Field visited in Moscow in 1938 just before I left, in the spring of 1938. They lived in the Hotel International.

That meant that she was put up not where the regular Intourist people were but in the near party, the people that ought to be under cover. The Lux was the hotel for strict Comintern employees, foreign Comintern employees. For example, my sister lived in the Hotel Lux. Gerhart Eisler lived there.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall with particularity whether it was the International or the Lux?

Mrs. MASSING. It was one of the two; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. When you heard discussion of Harriet Moore, was it in connection with her being a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. Again I must say nobody said Harriet Moore is a Communist, but Harriet Moore was a name like Grace Maul. Nobody said Grace Maul was a Communist but she just was. You understand, it is difficult for me to say it in any other way. This is just how I heard her name referred to.

Mr. MORRIS. At this juncture, Mr. Chairman, may I mention, to be sure the committee understands, these names are all being intro-

duced now while this witness is on the stand as people who are associated, people on the list of those associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations and that we would like an identification of these people as testimony goes along, and then there will be further development on their association with the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. These are the names, as I understand it, that were identified by Mr. Carter when he was on the stand.

Mr. MORRIS. At least this is the list that we presented to Mr. Carter and the list has been made available to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, it is about 12 o'clock now and the Senate will be in session. There is a very important vote to be taken this afternoon sometime.

You have gone along for 2 hours now. I do not think you can conclude with this witness from the appearance of your records here before you.

The chairman must be on the floor as soon as possible. I wonder if it is not possible to recess now and to take this witness up later.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish before we recess, for this record to show her naming her superiors in the order that she had them.

Mrs. MASSING. My Russian superiors?

Senator FERGUSON. In the United States.

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, if we are going to have another session, would that not be all right?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it part of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris advises me that he can conclude in 10 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. If we could get those superiors.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish to rush him. I want him to get the evidence in as he wants it presented.

You will answer Senator Ferguson's question, please.

Mrs. MASSING. My first superior was Valentan Markin in New York.

My next superior was Bill. I knew him as Bill. His name, not his real name, of course—the passport he lived under in New York City was Grinke, Walter Grinke, G-r-i-n-k-e. It was a German name and I am sure it was not his real name, because he was a Russian.

My next superior was Boris. I knew him here under the name of Fred. His real name was Boris Bazorof, B-a-z-o-r-o—either "v" or "f." I am not sure.

That was all, because after Bazorof, Helen Zubelin, whom I knew as Helen, her real name being Elizabeth, took me to Moscow. These were my three superiors.

I had several Russian coworkers, of course, but these were my superiors.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the last person we asked Mrs. Massing, Harriet Moore, I would like to quickly introduce in evidence six letters, which I ask Mr. Mandel to identify, as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. While he is identifying them, another question: Did you have plenty of money to operate with in your work here?

Mrs. MASSING. Money for Communists is not of much concern, really. I was on what is called the part maximum. Part max, it was called, as an abbreviation. Everybody working for the party or for near-party organizations would have the same amount of money

which varied as to the country one lived in. It was enough to live on, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And to travel on?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course, I had an expense account. My travels were paid. I had an expense account. Yes, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I will now ask Mr. Mandel to identify these letters.

Mr. MANDEL. I identify those six letters as having come from the institute's files.

Mr. MORRIS. I will quickly identify them. The first is a memorandum on personnel in connection with Soviet studies, dated August 10, 1934, the last paragraph of which reads:

> The fourth group consists of the few people who are already familiar with the institute's record in the Soviet Union or who could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism. With Harriet, a further period of language study, which she may at present be contemplating, would probably be essential.

I would like to introduce that.

Senator FERGUSON. Who signs that?

Mr. MORRIS. It is unsigned. It is an IPR memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 58" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 58

(Confidential—not for distribution outside the office)

MEMORANDUM ON PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET STUDIES

AUGUST 10, 1934.

In connection with the folders on the Soviet Council and the memorandum on IPR work in the field which I am submitting to you today I would like to answer your memorandum of July 31 on the question of staff appointments in this connection.

The longer memorandum adequately states the reasons, I think, why the position should be supported jointly by the American Council and the Pacific Council. Whether it should be a full-time appointment or a part-time appointment depends on the scope of the work decided on. A really full program, such as outlined in that memorandum, would probably fill the waking hours of any one individual. A legitimate selection could be made for immediate purposes which would warrant the employment of a good reasearch worker on a half-time basis.

There are roughly four groups of people among whom someone could be found. We have information in the office on a very large percentage of those in each class who would be available, but I see no point in listing them here.

The first group is the emigre Russians. Among them can be found some who are not politically antipathetic to the new regime, and whose knowledge of Russian is far better than you will find anywhere else. On the other hand, their knowledge of the Soviet Union is less sound, and their understanding of the American end of the problem is very often weak. On the whole, I would advise you against any Russian.

The second group consists of the academic Russian scholars of American birth and parentage. This group includes such people as Bruce Hopper, whom you know, Mulford Martin, who is recommended highly by Robinson and Alva Johnson, Merle Fainsod, of the government department at Harvard, who is extremely able, I should judge, and a trained scholar, and several others. The disadvantages of this group are chiefly too: Most of them are already embarked on academic careers which they would probably be reluctant to interrupt (this would not apply to Martin, I believe), and they have all got the fingers-crossed attitude toward the Bolsheviks which is so much de rigueur in academic circles. This can be differently described as the scientific spirit or just good scholarly

caution. It makes few friends in the Soviet Union. Moseley belongs in this group.

The third group is the graduating class at our summer school. I have no candidate from this group. Few of them are going to know Russian well enough to use it fast and accurately immediately, before they have ploughed through some graduate theses with it, and there is no single stand-out whom I have yet discovered among them.

The fourth group consists of the few people who are already familiar with the Institute's record in the Soviet Union or who could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism. With Harriet, a further period of language study, which she may at present be contemplating, would probably be essential. This could be arranged, however, or you could decide to start from the beginning and send some young person of promise to Moscow to train him for the job.

Mr. MORRIS. The second is a letter from Edward C. Carter to Frederick V. Field, dated August 31, 1935. It reads:

This is to invite you to participate in a secretariat staff conference that will be held at Sunset Farm, Lee, Mass., from the morning of Friday, October 18, to the evening of Monday, October 21.

I am hoping that amongst others the following can be present:* * *

and among the list of the nine people is listed the name of Harriet Moore.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 59" and is as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 59

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., August 31, 1935.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
New York City.

DEAR FRED: This is to invite you to participate in a secretariat staff conference that will be held at Sunset Farm, Lee, Mass., from the morning of Friday, October 18, to the evening of Monday, October 21.

I am hoping that amongst others the following can be present: Escott Reid, Richard Pyke, Kate Mitchell, Leonard Wu, Kathleen Barnes, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Harriet Moore, W. L. Holland, and yourself.

If there are other members of the American Council whom you would like to have invited, I am, of course, eager to ask anyone who you nominate. The principal object of this conference will be program preparation for the California conference. I am hoping that nine-tenths of the time can be spent on the agenda, completely subordinating all questions of place, physical arrangements, etc.

Would you kindly let me know whether it would be convenient for you to reserve these dates.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I introduce a list of the officers and committees included in the annual report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1940–41.

Among the board of trustees listed in that year was a Miss Harriet L. Moore.

On the executive committee for that year there is the name of Harriet L. Moore. And on the nominating committee in 1941 there appears Miss Harriet L. Moore, chairman, Edward C. Carter, ex officio, Frederick V. Field, Jerome D. Greene, and Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio.

In this particular year she was a member of the board of trustees, a member of the executive committee, and chairman of the nominating committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 60" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 60

[From annual report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1940–41]

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES

NATIONAL OFFICERS, 1941

Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairman

Vice chairmen:
Miss Ada L. Comstock
William R. Herod
Philip C. Jessup
Benjamin M. Kizer
Philo W. Parker
Robert Gordon Sproul

Acting secretary:
Edward C. Carter

Assistant secretary:
Miss Katrine R. C. Greene

Treasurer:
Francis S. Harmon

Assistant treasurer:
Mrs. Rose W. Landres

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 1941

Riley H. Allen, Honolulu
Frank C. Atherton, Honolulu
Carroll Binder, Chicago
*Edward C. Carter, New York
Everett Case, Cambridge
Joseph P. Chamberlain, New York
Allen E. Charles, San Francisco
Miss Ada L Comstock, Cambridge
John C. Cooper, Jr., New York
David L. Crawford, Honolulu
Joseph S. Davis, Stanford University
W. F. Dillingham, Honolulu
Brooks Emeny, Cleveland
*Frederick V. Field, New York
Galen M. Fisher, San Francisco
Henry F. Grady, San Francisco
Jerome D. Greene, Cambridge
Francis S. Harmon, New York
Joseph R. Hayden, Ann Arbor
Mrs. Arthur Neineman, Los Angeles
Mrs. Edward H. Heller, San Francisco
William R. Herod, New York
Edward H. Hume, New York
*Philip C. Jessup, New York
Frederick P Keppel, New York
Benjamin H. Kizer, Spokane
Mrs. Joseph Lilienthal, New York
Ira S. Lillick, San Francisco
Herbert S. Little, Seattle
Henry R. Luce, New York
Frank R. McCoy, New York
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, San Francisco
Frank E. Midkiff, Honolulu
*Miss Harriet L. Moore, New York
Charles Page, Jr., San Francisco
Philo W. Parker, New York
Mrs. A. W. Reinhardt, Mills College, California
W. S. Rosecrans, Los Angeles
Chester M. Rowell, San Francisco
James T. Shotwell, New York
Mrs. F. Louis Slade, New York
Robert Gordon Sproul, Los Angeles
Eugene Staley, Medford, Mass.
Jesse M. Steinhart, San Francisco
Luther Tucker, New York
Richard S. Turner, San Francisco
W. W. Waymack, Des Moines
Ray Lyman Wilbur, Stanford University
Mrs. Quiney Wright, Chicago
Harry E. Yarnell, Newport, R. I.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 1941

Philo W. Parker, chairman
*Edward C. Carter, ex officio
Joseph P. Chamberlain
*Frederick V. Field
William R. Herod
Francis S. Harmon
*Miss Harriet L. Moore
Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio

NOMINATING COMMITTEE, 1941

*Miss Harriet L. Moore, chairman
*Edward C. Carter, ex officio
*Frederick V. Field
Jerome D. Greene
Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to also introduce into the record a letter from Mr. Frederick V. Field, dated August 22, 1939, to Miss Harriet

Moore, which discusses Miss Moore's writing an article for Amerasia and it goes into the subject matter of the thing.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 61" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 61

AUGUST 22, 1939.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,
American Russian Institute,
New York City.

DEAR HARRIET: I wonder if you would be interested in writing a little piece for Amerasia based on the enclosed propaganda blurb from Kinney of the SMR? Incidentally, would you return the blurb for our propaganda files?

What I have in mind is something roughly comparable, although I hope better done and a little more elaborate than the piece I wrote on Japanese propaganda in the Topics in Brief for our October 1938 issue.

This present item on the Manchoukuo-Mongolian border fighting of the summer seems to me particularly vicious because they use the names of at least two pretty decent American correspondents to support their allegations. I doubt very much, for instance, whether Steele of the Chicago Daily News ever filed a dispatch to the effect that "the Japanese aerial force was far superior to that of the Soviet and that the bravery and morals of the Japanese-Manchoukuo troops far excelled those of the Soviet-Mongolian forces." This, of course, may be true, but I am sure that neither Morris nor Steele said so, not to speak of the eight other correspondents mentioned. It would be interesting to compare what Kinney says these men said with what they actually sent their newspapers. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare his account of the border fighting with what appears to have taken place. Incidentally, what did take place? That, too, would be pretty good news.

I really wish you would try your hand at this either in a Topics in Brief of three to five hundred words or in an article of a thousand or more. In answering this note as to whether or not you will agree to write the article you might also attempt a brief paragraph telling me the inner and outer significance of the Soviet-German trade treaty and accompanying Russian editorials.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Here is a letter from Edward C. Carter to Dr. V. E. Motylev, September 11, 1939, Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, from Sunset Farm, Lee, Mass., in which Mr. Carter discusses a forthcoming article by Harriet Moore on Soviet-German Relations, which was to appear in the Virginia Quarterly.

It says:

It is the best analysis that has appeared in this country thus far.

That is on the question of Soviet-German relations.

I would be grateful if you would let me have your criticisms of it.

I would like that in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 62" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 62

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., September 11, 1939.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: A copy of Miss Harriet Moore's article on Soviet-German relations will doubtless reach you in due course, but as second-class mail is sometimes delayed I am enclosing a copy herewith. It is the best analysis that has appeared in this country thus far. I would be grateful if you would let me have your criticisms of it.

I have just been asked to write on this subject for the Virginia Quarterly. My decision will depend a good deal on whether I can supplement my present information with fuller documentation. Perhaps you can help me with this. I have, of course, Stalin's speech in March, Molotov's speech in May, and also Molotov's more recent speech of August 31. You will know what material I most need in addition in order to round out the picture for a really complete and objective treatment, in the event of my deciding to accept the Virginia Quarterly's invitation.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a letter dated November 28, 1942, from Mr. Edward C. Carter to Mr. William W. Lockwood, listing the rapporteurs for the Mont Tremblant Conference, which is the biennial conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as follows:

Rapporteurs: Harriet Moore, Frederick V. Field, W. W. Lockwood, William Stone, Frank Coe, J. O. M. Broek, Karl Pelzer.

It shows Miss Moore was a rapporteur at that particular conference.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 63" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 63

NEW YORK CITY,
November 28, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Council, I. P. R., New York City.

DEAR BILL: Because of the increased membership of all the groups attending the Mount Tremblant Conference and because of the limited accommodations at the lodge, it has been necessary for us to limit our usual working staff. We would greatly appreciate it, therefore, if you could indicate which of your members and secretaries could be asked to act as rapporteurs, recorders, or stenographic secretaries and clerical workers. The following come to mind in each of the above categories:

Rapporteurs: Harriet Moore, Frederick V. Field, W. W. Lockwood, William Stone, Frank Coe, J. O. M. Broek, Karl Pelzer.

Recorders: Harriet Moore, J. O. M. Broek, Karl Pelzer, Carolyn Kizer, Miriam S. Farley, Dorothy Borg, Mrs. Eltenton, Fay Smith, Wilma Fairbank, Catherine Porter, Katrine Greene, Elizabeth Downing.

Secretaries: Katrine Greene, Elizabeth Downing.

Since the international secretariat staff is planning to leave New York December 1, I would greatly appreciate if you would answer this letter directly to Miss Hilda Austern, Mont Tremblant, Province of Quebec, Canada.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

NOVEMBER 28, 1942.

Memorandum to: ECC (copy to HA).
From: WWL.

In answer to your letter of today's date, I would like to submit the following suggestions on rapporteurs, recorders, and secretaries for Mont Tremblant.

Rapporteurs: Harriet Moore, Frederick V. Field, W. W. Lockwood, William To Stone, Frank Coe, J. O. M. Broek, Karl J. Pelzer, James Shoemaker, and Brooks Emeny.

Recorders: Harriet Moore, Karl J. Pelzer, Carolyn Kizer, Miriam S. Farley, Dorothy Borg, Mrs. Dolly Eltenton, Fayette Smith, Wilma Fairbank, Catherine Porter, Katrine Greene, Virginia C. Lockwood, Edith Field, Mrs. B. H. Kizer.

Secretaries. Katrine Greene, Rose Yardumian (and perhaps Mrs. Eltention; we shall have to check when she arrives).

As I have already told Hilda Austern, most of the staff will of course be available for miscellaneous staff work at Mont Tremblant, as needed.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like also to make reference to an excerpt from Windows on the Pacific, which is the biennial report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and this reads:

When Harriet L. Moore who served most ably as acting secretary for the year following William Lockwood's departure for the China war theater, resigned in the spring of 1944 to resume her duties as research director of the American Russian Institute, she was replaced by Raymond Dennett.

I would like to introduce that excerpt in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an excerpt?

Mr. MORRIS. The whole volume will be put in the record by reference.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 64" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 64

HARRIET MOORE

Harriet L. Moore (1933, 1936, 1939), executive director, American Russian Institute, New York. Member of the international secretariat, IPR. (War and Peace in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on wartime and postwar cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East. Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4 to 14, 1942, p. 160.)

When Harriet L. Moore who served most ably as acting secretary for the year following William Lockwood's departure for the China war theater, resigned in the spring of 1944 to resume her duties as research director of the American Russian Institute, she was replaced by Raymond Dennett. (Windows on the Pacific, biennial report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1944–46, p. 10.)

Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–1945. By Harriet L. Moore. Princeton. Princeton University Press, in cooperation with the international secretariat, IPR, Inquiry Series. 1945. 284 pages. $2.50. A survey of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and relations with China and Japan from 1931 to 1945. (New IPR books, Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 4.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, do you know Guenther Stein?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; I met him in Frankfort-am-Main, just very casually. I didn't know him very well.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you know about him?

Mrs. MASSING. I knew he was in China. I knew he belonged to Richard Sorge's apparatus in China. I knew he was a coworker. I wasn't told he belonged to the apparatus but working with Richard Sorge I knew what it meant.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent did you know that Guenther Stein was a member of the Communist organization?

Mrs. MASSING. I only knew it to the extent that he was a coworker of Dr. Sorge. Knowing that Dr. Sorge was an apparatchik of old standing, one of the most famous apparatchiks, I assumed that Guenther Stein was an apparatchik. Whether he was a Communist, I wouldn't know, but he certainly was with Richard Sorge.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Corliss Lamont at all?

Mrs. MASSING. I knew him quite well.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Corliss Lamont a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. He didn't tell me he was a Communist, but everybody knows he was a Communist, as everybody knows that Frederick

Vanderbilt Field or Earl Browder is a Communist. I haven't seen his party membership.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you meet him?

Mrs. MASSING. When I first got here in 1926.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that last answer? "He didn't tell me he was a Communist, but everybody knows it"?

Mrs. MASSING. He didn't tell me.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you mentioned Field, and who else?

Mrs. MASSING. Earl Browder. What I mean to say is it isn't necessary for Earl Browder to tell me he is a Communist, because everyone knows it. That was true for Corliss Lamont. I met him several times socially. I saw him in Moscow in 1937 and I had a rather significant little meeting with him there because I wanted to send a message to Roger Baldwin, who was a friend of mine, to let Roger Baldwin know I was being kept in Moscow, hoping that he would arouse, if I should not get back, public opinion.

When I spoke to Corliss about the situation explaining to him what was going on in Moscow, the purges, that I was being held against my will, he listened to me. Obviously, he did not believe me.

He got back to the United States, saw Roger Baldwin, and said to him, "You know, Roger, I saw Hede. My, she has gone sour."

That was the impact of my great distress, that I told him I was being held a prisoner virtually and all he understood was I had gone sour. That is what he told Roger Baldwin.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record an exchange of correspondence between Guenther Stein and W. L. Holland.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this as having come from the records of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify these telegrams and letters.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter dated February 20, 1942. It is from William Holland to Guenther Stein at the Press Hostel, Chungking, China. Mr. Holland asks:

Cable whether willing act as Chungking correspondent Institute Pacific Relations until May 1 supplying substantial fortnightly political economic reports similar China air-mail honorarium 75 monthly.

It is signed: William Holland.

One of the articles in the correspondence is a cable which Stein writes to the Institute of Pacific Relations with the one word, "Accepting," dated February 27, 1942.

I would like to introduce that.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 65" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 65

FEBRUARY 20, 1942.

GUENTHER STEIN,
Press Hostel, Chungking, China:

Cable whether willing act as Chungking correspondent Institute Pacific Relations until May 1 supplying substantial fortnightly political economic reports similar China air-mail honorarium 75 monthly.

WILLIAM HOLLAND.

K. P.: Send this if E. C. C. approves. Barnett and I have talked it over and still think Stein is a good enough bet to try until Bob gets to China.

W. H.

E. C. C. approved February 19, 1942.

CHUNGKING, *February 27, 1942.*

INSTITUTE PACIFIC RELATIONS,
New York:

Accepting.

STEIN.

FEBRUARY 27.

GUENTHER STEIN,
Press Hostel, Chungking:

Thanks. Will send honorarium when requested.

HOLLAND.

FEBRUARY 26, 1942.

GUENTHER STEIN,
Press Hostel, Chungking:

Desire mail reports only.

HOLLAND.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Olga Lang?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. Olga was the wife of Karl Wittfogel. She was a Russian. She was a representative of Trud, a Russian newspaper. She attended a unit of it, the Communist unit, of the dwelling that we lived in which was the Friedrich Ebert Sieedlung. I think she was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean you think she was?

Mrs. MASSING. She attended all party meetings. She worked at the Russian Embassy sometime. She was a Russian that had come as a correspondent of a Russian paper. Her associates were merely amongst Communists. I think she is a Communist. She was a Communist at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. She was at the time?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You know she was?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. I don't know whether she is today.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the nature of the publication, Trud?

Mrs. MASSING. I couldn't exactly tell you what it was. I don't know. It is a Russian name. I never read it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is an official Russian publication?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes, a Soviet publication.

Mr. MORRIS. An employee of that is, in all likelihood, loyal to the Soviet organization?

Mrs. MASSING. Indeed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any members of the apparatus or agents for the Soviet Union, or the Communist Party, as we understand it here in America, who were not Communists but only for hire? Would you take in somebody who did not believe in the philosophy and just pay them for what they did as agents?

Mrs. MASSING. No, not that I know of, not in my time.

Senator FERGUSON. All were believers in the philosophy?

Mrs. MASSING. There were variations. There were shadings as to the intensity of belief, but they would believe.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not just go out and hire a person as a stool pigeon and pay them a certain consideration for some work?

Mrs. MASSING. No, not in my time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, What steps have you taken to inform the American authorities of the evidence you have presented to this committee this morning?

Mrs. MASSING. I have spoken to the FBI at very great length. So has my husband, Paul Massing. I have testified before the grand jury twice and I was a witness in the Hiss trial. I have been terribly misrepresented and my thoughts were not clarified. So I decided to write an article series which I did, together with Eugene Lyons. Due to the limited space, I again felt it did not explain enough the motivation and the philosophy of Communists of my type. I decided to write a book which was published this March.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you a Communist now?

Mrs. MASSING. No, I am not a Communist now.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you drop the philosophy of communism?

Mrs. MASSING. The philosophy of communism I dropped much earlier than I left the party. I was critical for many years. I left the party and my job in 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, have you taken any other steps so the American public will understand what the facts are here?

Mrs. MASSING. I am now lecturing to groups and I write whenever I can.

Mr. MORRIS. There is just one thing I would like to introduce into the record.

There was a series of three articles written by Olga Lang for Pacific Affairs and for Far Eastern Survey. One is in Pacific Affairs, 1940, Bibliography of Recent Russian Literature on Buriat Mongolia, pages 45–62; a review of Soviet Islands of the Pacific, by M. A. Sergeev, pages 110–111.

There is a review by Olga Lang on Chinese Women: Yesterday and Today, by Florence Ayscough, pages 212–214.

There is an article on The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army, pages 20–33 in Pacific Affairs, 1939.

There is also a book Chinese Family and Society, Yale University Press, 1946, under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Institute of Social Research.

I would like the record to show that was Miss Lang's contribution under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. I want to ask Mrs. Massing this question: there has cropped up in the hearing this morning the names of five men, which names have been used before, whether justly or unjustly, I am not here to say—Carter, Field, Lattimore, Stone, and Currie.

Did you ever have any conferences with any of those men?

Mrs. MASSING. No. I have met some of them socially. I have met Mr. Lattimore just once and I have met Mr. Field just once but not in any working connection.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever meet Mr. Carter?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Stone or Mr. Currie, you never met?

Mrs. MASSING. I think I met Mr. Stone once.

Senator SMITH. Under what circumstances?

Mrs. MASSING. Also socially through Noel Field.

Senator SMITH. You mean in Noel Field's apartment?

Mrs. MASSING. No, it wasn't in Noel Field's apartment.

If I remember, I think it was at the World Fair where Noel Field came here to represent the League of Nations. I believe I met him. It might have been in Europe. I do not remember. I only met him once.

Senator SMITH. Did you meet any of these people in Washington at any time on your trips here?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever try to recruit anyone else beside the two you have named or the three that worked for our Government, either in the State Department or any place else?

Mrs. MASSING. No. I recruited people from other walks of life but not the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Other Government positions?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But from other walks of life?

Mrs. MASSING. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they have any connection with the IPR?

Mrs. MASSING. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You have told us all you know about the people who were connected with that institute?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, it was your purpose, Mr. Morris, to bring out just the names. For that reason I am not going to ask you who the others were that you recruited if they were not connected with the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one question I would like to ask: On how many occasions did you, as a courier, carry microfilms from this country abroad?

Mrs. MASSING. I am not certain whether it was 9 or 10 times, but about that amount.

The CHAIRMAN. Those microfilms were given to you by your superior or some person here for you to carry to get to the Russian agents?

Mrs. MASSING. They were always given to me, either by a superior or by the assistant to my superior who would be a Russian.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom did you deliver them?

Mrs. MASSING. I always delivered them to a Russian. I never knew who he was. I would meet him for 10 minutes, 5 minutes, and that is all I knew of him. The identification was always arranged in New York.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I have.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be some means as you have indicated, a match box, or something else?

Mrs. MASSING. No; it wasn't. It was always a hotel room. I would be called from downstairs by a specific name and since nobody else could know that I was in this hotel room at that date, it was always the right man.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you be registered?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes. Under a different name, naturally.

Senator FERGUSON. That name would be called?

Mrs. MASSING. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you want to meet again, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Tuesday, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will reconvene on Tuesday, at 10.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., Thursday, August 2, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Tuesday, August 7, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 7, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: Senator McCarthy; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

During the last few hearings we have been looking at the Institute of Pacific Relations and some of the personnel through the eyes of a former general in the Soviet military intelligence and a woman who was working for an international apparatus.

Today we have two outstanding scholars and professors in the field of oriental studies who will impart their somewhat different perspectives.

The first witness, Prof. Karl August Wittfogel, will discuss events of the 1930's and 1940's as they relate to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In order to understand fully the events of the 1930's and how they have a direct bearing on the world, counsel has been asked, as much as possible, to relate the events of the 1930's as they occurred to the present.

Professor Wittfogel, you are a member of the faculty of Columbia University?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I am a member of the faculty of the University of Washington in Seattle, but my headquarters are at Columbia.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee, at the outset, wants to express its gratitude to you for the information that you have given and that you will give us here. The United States of America is fighting for its life, is fighting for its existence, and those who, like yourself, occupy important places, are to be commended for the courage and the forthrightness that you display in coming to this committee and giving us facts.

You are here under subpena. The country will owe you a debt of gratitude for truth regardless of what may be the result. The Nation owes a debt of gratitude to all who tell the truth in these matters regardless of who may be affected.

Will you kindly stand and be sworn?

You do solemnly swear in the testimony that you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, it will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL, NEW YORK, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Give your full name and address to the reporter please.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Karl A. Wittfogel, 420 Riverside Drive, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I am professor of Chinese history at the University of Washington and director of the Chinese history project sponsored by this university together with Columbia University, where the project is located.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held those positions?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was made professor at the University of Washington in 1947 and I have been director of the Chinese history project since 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us a short outline of your degrees and your educational training?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was born in Germany and educated there in high schools and universities and took my Ph. D. in the year 1928 at the University of Frankfort.

Mr. MORRIS. What are your other academic achievements?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I worked in the field of Chinese economic history from the middle of 1920 on and before leaving Germany I wrote a comprehensive study of Chinese economics and society.

I continued working in the field of Chinese institutional history in America, in China, where I lived from 1935 to 1937 and ever since.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was born in Woltersdorf in the province of Hanover in northern Germany in 1896.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly about your political experiences in Germany prior to the time that you came to this country, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I became a student and grew up in the chaotic times of the war and after-war situation of the First World War, and was a Socialist student in the period after.

I joined the Communist Party in 1920 and was a fee-paying member of the Communist Party until the winter of 1932 or the beginning of 1933, when Hitler came to power. I had disagreed with the party.

I may say more about that later, but I had disagreed about a number of things, including the attitude toward Hitler, who I considered a grave danger to German life and to European life. Because of my strong attitude against the Hitler movement, I was imprisoned and I was in several concentration camps in the year 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you in a concentration camp?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was detained altogether for about 9 months. In the winter I was released, I left early in 1934, passed through England, where I spent about 8 months, and came to this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, after you left the organized Communist Party, did you remain, psychologically speaking, within the Communist periphery?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. If you emphasize both, the psychology of the matter and the periphery, namely, the border-line situation, but in form, indeed, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, even though you were no longer an organized member of the Communist Party, you were hailed and welcomed by members of that party; is that right?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. You had minor differences with the party on which you retained your independence?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The difference turned out to be much bigger than it seemed at that time. What seemed to be academic differences became a No. 1 controversy and the ideas which made me split away now are considered the No. 1 heresy in the Soviet Union.

At that time, it looked indeed that way. Also, my difference in attitude about the Hitler movement was conducted in such a way that although I was bitter about this ever since, I still continued to stay in the fringe of the Communist movement after I left Germany.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, did you at that time, in 1934 or at the end of 1933, take any formal action to renounce the Communist Party or to sever your connection with the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything which would have served notice to your Communist friends and acquaintances you were leaving the party or severing your relationship with it?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, I realize it is a difficult thing, since we are dealing with a tapering trend, but could you give us a date at which your break with the Communist periphery was really complete?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Before answering this, I would like to go back to the last question.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I know that persons going to another country very often, or as a rule, when they wanted to take up or continue their Communist activities, reapplied. I did not. I made no effort, neither did the other side make any effort, to reenlist me here.

I was considered not a very, or shall I say, rather an obviously doubtful case. I know there existed minority Communists, minority groups in this country. I was never asked to join officially the German Communist group. Let me say, shyness was mutual.

Mr. MORRIS. Then we come to the next question: Do you recall it?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You asked me about the time table.

Mr. MORRIS. If you could fix a date. I realize this is a tapering conclusion, but could you fix a date where you really made a direct break with all your Communist friends?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There are in a gradual development points of climax. I would say from the late twenties on, the difference between me and the Communist movement in the key theoretical field became obvious.

In 1932, I was called, with great dismay, a man who believed in the objectivity of science, which may sound queer in this country, which

may be a compliment, but coming from the Soviets, it was a very strong form of disapproval.

During the coming of Hitler, my attitude toward the Communist movement became one of great bitterness about the situation.

So far as I could see, it brought Hitler to power in Germany. I had the feeling when I came to England and America these are not people who are proper leaders of a decent world labor movement. However, and I think I shared this with many people, not only in this country but in other countries—I mean this situation was being shared. I had been brought up as a young Socialist. I thought that there is practically everything wrong with this movement and with this country—the U. S. S. R.—that this country is the beginning of a new Socialist type of life, and as long as I had that belief I was still attached in a certain way. I was what I would call an ideological cripple. I couldn't move. I thought there was something which was nowhere else.

Mr. MORRIS. Roughly, what year was that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This conclusion I reached around 1936 or 1937. I came back to this country. Among friends I said it quite clearly; but when I came back to this country I found here the united front at its height and everybody was around everybody else's neck or arm, or whatever it was.

I had continued arguments, and particularly in that inner group we are dealing with, people like Jaffe—I still continued to have my connections in this group, talking less and less about certain things, becoming more angry and critical about others, but only in the year 1939 did I finally break connections with people whom I considered Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in 1939?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Right; the summer of 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were an organized Communist, did you ever encounter Dr. Chao-ting Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was in the summer of 1929. I lived in Frankfort-am-Main. There was convoked a Second Congress of the League Against Imperialism. This congress brought people to Europe from all parts of the world.

You may remember at the first congress Mr. Nehru was present. There was a Chinese group, and I remember very clearly Mr. Chi. He wasn't a doctor yet. I had long talks with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Would his appearance at that conference indicate to you he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He came from the Comintern in Moscow. He had been working there. Usually the people who work there are not members of the YMCA.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you say working at the Comintern?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point may I relate this name, Dr. Chi, has been coming up throughout the hearings.

Here Dr. Wittfogel has encountered him as a Comintern man in 1929.

We previously had testimony that Dr. Chi, who is the presently proposed Chinese Communist delegate to UNESCO, was the person who

was instrumental in bringing Mr. Frederick V. Field's registering as a foreign agent for four Chinese Communist principals. That was in 1950.

We have also had evidence introduced into the record that Mr. Holland has referred to this present Dr. Chi in Communist China, and I am quoting, "Chi may well prove to be one of our more influential friends in China." That is dated February 10, 1950.

We have also had testimony of Dr. Chi's long association with the Institute of Pacific Relations here in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. From what did you read that excerpt?

Mr. MORRIS. That was a letter, dated February 10, 1950, from Mr. Holland, which we have already introduced into the record. It was introduced as exhibit No. 1–A, at the open hearing of July 25, 1951, testimony of E. C. Carter, page 18.

Even though, Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with something here now at this particular time—we are going to bring it down to date—it is important we stress these things about Dr. Chi being, in 1929, a Comintern man. I would like to make that point in response to your opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit to which you refer is already in evidence and part of the record.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. May I just say something? In order to be permitted to work in the Comintern, which is the headquarters of the Communist movement, you have to be not only a rank-and-file member of the movement but a very well trained and extremely well selected man.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that a little bit clearer. You are referring now to the Comintern. The Comintern is centered in Moscow?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. The Comintern is the nucleus or center of the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Communist Parties of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that anyone who would work in the Comintern, as Dr. Chi had been working in the Comintern, must be not only one of the rank and file but must be quite qualified and highly trusted?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would put into the record what position Dr. Chi had in the United States during the war with respect to the United States Government?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from a letter addressed to Mrs. Dudley Stuart Blossom, from Edward C. Carter, dated August 1, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the source of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations files, and it states here, referring to Dr. Chi, who—

went with our best wishes on the same plane to become General Secretary of the American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund of United States, $95,000,000.

Mr. MORRIS. When they say "on the same plane," what is the reference, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This was on the same plane with Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Who had been appointed what?

Mr. MANDEL. Envoy to Chiang Kai-shek's government.

The CHAIRMAN. Appointed an envoy from what country?

Mr. MORRIS. Does it give a description of his position there?

Mr. MANDEL. I will read from the letter preceding the previous quote:

You doubtless know that on President Roosevelt's nomination, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek invited Owen Lattimore to go to Chungking as his personal political adviser. Lattimore arrived in Chungking 10 days ago. Another member of the International Secretariat, Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi, went with our best wishes on the same plane.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to relate here is an event in 1939, which has a direct bearing on present-day events.

The CHAIRMAN. The letter from which you are reading, is that in the file at this time? If so, what is its number?

Mr. MANDEL. It has not been introduced.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce this letter, from which Mr. Mandel has read into the record as the next exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a question here.

Mr. Mandel, in regard to those excerpts that you have read, where did you secure them?

Mr. MANDEL. From the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations as turned over to us from the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record and marked as designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 66" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 66

AUGUST 1, 1941.

Mrs. DUDLEY STUART BLOSSOM,
South Euclid, Ohio.

DEAR Mrs. BLOSSOM: Since I last saw you, four governments have recognized the IPR's achievements and the high quality of IPR personnel by the following appointments.

You doubtless know that on President Roosevelt's nomination, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek invited Owen Lattimore to go to Chungking as his personal political adviser. Lattimore arrived in Chungking 10 days ago. Another member of the International Secretariat, Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi, went with our best wishes on the same plane to become general secretary of the American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund of United States, $95,000,000. Here we have a case of outstanding services of the IPR—in that of Lattimore, an American to the Chinese Government and in that of Chi, a Chinese to the American, British, and Chinese Governments. A former member of the Secretariat, Irving Friedman, for whom I secured an appointment and an opportunity to study India as an employee of the Indian Government trade commissioner in New York, has now been given an important research position in the Treasury in Washington, one for which he is highly qualified.

Officers in the Army, Navy, Federal Research Bank, Department of Commerce, and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies are asking for and getting substantial help from our research staff. The Office of the Export Control Administration recently asked for the full-time service of all the American Council research staff for a long period. We had to persuade that office that our staff could render a greater service by continuing its work here as a well-balanced, experienced research group rather than by moving en bloc to Washington, where its services would be available only to a single Government department.

Another demand of a different kind has been made upon us. Mr. Henry R. Luce, Mr. Wendell L. Willkie, and Mr. James G. Blaine have asked me to serve as chairman of the disbursements committee which is making a very thoroughgoing survey of China's needs and how the $5,000,000 fund, if raised, can best be spent for maximum relief and at the same time to contribute to long-range reconstruction.

All of the foregoing is for your private information, for part of it is obviously not for general circulation.

This service to governments has not, happily, thus far lessened our service to business groups, the press, and our university and secondary-school constituency. The demands for institute services from all these groups is greater than ever before, and I think we are furnishing more help in all these directions than ever before.

Nor has the international work of the IPR throughout the world been reduced by the war excepting in the case of France and Holland. In the case of Holland nearly all of the activities have been transferred to Batavia, where Van Mook, who has been the principal negotiator with Yoshizawa, has been the IPR leader. (Interestingly enough, Van Mook and Yoshizawa were members of the same round table for a fortnight during the IPR conference at Yosemite.)

While Prince Konoyo has been Premier, Ushiba, the chief IPR secretary in Japan, has acted as his private secretary. While Ushiba has been helping the Premier, Saionji, the grandson of the Genro, has acted as chief secretary of the IPR in Tokyo, save for the period of Matsuoka's visit to Europe. Saionji accompanied the Foreign Minister on his fantastic round of visits to Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin.

Bruce Turner, for many years secretary of the IPR in New Zealand, has just come to Washington with a member of the New Zealand Cabinet and will shortly be going to London to help get another New Zealand Cabinet officer there.

The Royal Institute in London has recently very greatly augmented its studies of the Far East. The Far Eastern program of the Canadian and Australian institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any period in the past.

In view of the war emergency and the exceptional service which the institute is asked to render at this time, I am wondering whether you could not consider making a special and nonrecurring gift of $250 to the American Council sometime before the 1st of September.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER, *Acting Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in England in 1934 while you were en route to the United States?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you encounter any Institute of Pacific Relations personnel in England at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I met Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe the circumstances of your meeting Mr. Carter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe the circumstances of your meeting Edward C. Carter in England in 1934, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, which had belonged to the university, and which, like several other institutes of social studies, had been closed by Hitler, had gone to America, and was then located at Columbia.

A member of that institute contacted the Institute of Pacific Relations because it was my plan to go to China. When Mr. Carter passed through England, I was notified that I might come and see him.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you then?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was living in England.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate the circumstances of your visit with Mr. Carter at that time, Doctor?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think I met him in Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before Dr. Wittfogel goes forward with that, may I clarify one thing?

Is it the fact, Doctor, that the contact had been made with the Institute of Pacific Relations, or with Mr. Carter, by someone in your

behalf and that you were meeting him as an applicant for a position, or a connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that contact?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This was Mr. Julian Gumperz, who at that time lived in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, will you relate the circumstances of your visit with Mr. Carter at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I came to see him. Mr. Carter was there with two or three lady secretaries. After I had introduced myself, Mr. Carter asked me a question which embarrassed me no end, or more puzzled me than embarrassed me.

This was his first question: "Dr. Wittfogel, are you a member of the German Communist Party?"

I was not quite accustomed to this kind of thing, and I thought maybe in America everything is different from anywhere else.

I found out later in regard to this question, it was not frequently repeated here. It was a more individual thing.

I answered, "I was, but I am not now," whereupon Mr. Carter smiled somewhat and said, "Well, in any case, you are not a member of the Chinese Communist Party."

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did he have the impression that you were still friendly with the German Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. We did not go further into this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, Dr. Wittfogel has already testified at that time and subsequent to that time he had done nothing overtly which would give anyone any notice he had broken with the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that so?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So, at that time, when you told Mr. Carter that you had been a member of the German Communist Party, he had reason to believe that was the atmosphere in which you were presently discussing the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do not know what was in his mind. It is a sheer guess, I would say, and that smile unfortunately no television has preserved for eternity.

I had the feeling he didn't believe me, even the fact I technically was no longer a member of the party. I did not discuss it with him.

Mr. MORRIS. His only reply was, "At least you are not a member of the Chinese Communist Party"?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in England, did you ever meet Michael Greenberg?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was in Cambridge. I met him there.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I saw him there among English Communist friends and he was, according to the general attitude toward him and his own behavior, an organized Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You met Michael Greenberg at that time as a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I hadn't seen his card, but I had seen him under circumstances which would indicate as clearly as you can in this way that this was his position.

Mr. MORRIS. So you had assumed he was a member of the English Communist Party at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I certainly did assume so. I assumed so later when I met him here during the time of the pact when I was very surprised this man was connected with Owen Lattimore in Pacific Affairs as managing editor, or whatever it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record at this time documents showing what Mr. Greenberg's position with the Institute of Pacific Relations was, as well as what his position is with the United States Government?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here, as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a letter on the stationery of the White House, Washington, August 31, 1943, addressed to Miss Hilda Austern, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR HILDA: Mr. Currie has asked me to write you about the sending of IPR publications to William D. Carter in New Delhi, India. He says that he is baffled by the problem.

The only thing I can suggest is that you select a few books and try to get them out via OWI.

Sincerely yours,

signed "Michael," and the typed signatured "Michael Greenberg." No title is attached to the document.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that is on White House stationery?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, what was your understanding of Michael Greenberg's position during the war, 1943?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I don't remember having seen him after a somewhat unpleasant scene in the fall of 1941. I have to say before he proceeded to the White House, there was one man who was in charge of the so-called security. I am sure this man did his duty. I am not saying anything unpleasant about anybody, but that is just an epic fact. This man talked to me about Mr. Greenberg. I told him about my experience.

Sometime after I saw him, Mr. Greenberg landed cheerfully in the White House in a minor capacity.

Mr. MORRIS. As an assistant to Mr. Currie?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want this letter to go into the record or have it marked?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have the letter on the stationery of the White House from which Mr. Mandel just read introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go in properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 67" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 67

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, August 31, 1943.

Miss HILDA AUSTERN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HILDA: Mr. Currie has asked me to write you about the sending of IPR publications to William D. Carter, in New Delhi, India. He says that he is baffled by the problem.

The only thing I can suggest is that you select a few books and try to get them out via OWI.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Michael
MICHAEL GREENBERG.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what position Michael Greenberg held in the Institute?

Mr. MANDEL. Senator Pat McCarran wrote to the Department of State inquiring as to the position of Michael Greenberg. On July 16, 1951, a reply was received from the Department of State from Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary, and I quote from that letter:

Michael Greenberg is not now an employee of the Department. He entered the Department on September 27, 1945, by transfer from the Foreign Economic Administration, under the provisions of Executive Order 9630. He was separated from the Department by reduction in force on June 15, 1946.

Another letter on the same matter came from the United States Civil Service Commission dated July 13, 1951, and signed by Robert Ramspeck, chairman, and states:

Michael Greenberg was appointed to a position with the Board of Economic Warfare on November 9, 1942. On July 7, 1944, he was transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration and on September 27, 1945, he was transferred to the Department of State. His employment was terminated due to reduction in force on June 15, 1946. In connection with his employment with the Foreign Economic Administration, an investigation of Mr. Greenberg was conducted by the Civil Service Commission to determine his general qualifications for Federal employment. As a result of this investigation Mr. Greenberg was barred from competing in civil-service examinations on March 7, 1947, because of questionable loyalty.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want those inserted?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, and marked with the next exhibit number.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 68" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 68

MICHAEL GREENBERG

To: Hon. Senator McCarran.
From: Robert Ramspeck, chairman.

Michael Greenberg was appointed to a position with the Board of Economic Warfare on November 9, 1942. On July 7, 1944, he was transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration and on September 27, 1945, he was transferred to the Department of State. His employment was terminated due to reduction in force on June 15, 1946. In connection with his employment with the Foreign Economic Administration an investigation of Mr. Greenberg was conducted by the Civil Service Commission to determine his general qualifications for Federal employment. As a result of this investigation, Mr. Greenberg was barred from competing in civil-service examinations on March 7, 1947, because of questionable loyalty.

Information received from: United States Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C., July 13, 1951.

To: Hon. Senator McCarran.
From: Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary.

Michael Greenberg is not now an employee of the Department. He entered the Department on September 27, 1945, by transfer from the Foreign Economic Administration under the provisions of Executive Order 9630. He was separated from the Department by reduction in force on June 15, 1946.

Information received from: Department of State, July 16, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. You came to the United States for the first time in what year?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In the fall of 1934, having spent the greater part of the year in England.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see Mr. Edward C. Carter again at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. As soon as I settled down, I went to present myself in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I went there with Mr. Gumperz, who had established the contact. I met Mr. Carter and Mr. Field there.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in this country?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, in the fall of 1934.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean your disclosure to Mr. Carter in response to his question at your first interview; that is, your disclosure that you had been a member of the German Communist Party, and your statement which you said you felt he did not believe that you had left that party, that did not interfere with your forming a connection with the institute? You were, in other words, hired, in spite of that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I wasn't hired, but I was promised and given assistance.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by "given assistance"? Do you mean your writings were purchased?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was formally attached for several years to the institute with some titles which were technically meaningless, but made me look like a member of the institute.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you compensated for this?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was not compensated. I was listed in Pacific Affairs later on as a research associate. I was listed under the secretariat, and so on.

So I was given a formal position which was very useful to me when going to China.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the prestige that you received by this listing in connection with the IPR was of value to you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was wonderful. At the time when people knew nothing about me, and I am sorry to say it because the people who gave it to me—I think some of them gave it because they liked me, but I don't know whether those politically in charge did. Anyhow, I had a lovely time. I was introduced to many people and was received by the president of Stanford University. Wherever I went, I was referred to as a man who had written a wonderful book. I knew my then friends, such as Mr. Carter, didn't read this book because they didn't read German.

Anyhow, I had a wonderful time. I must say, later on when I did something which contributed to the scholarship of this country, but I was no longer connected by an umbilical cord or otherwise with the Communists, I was deemphasized and I wasn't even introduced to the janitors of universities.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, while they thought you were a Communist, you received a listing; is that right?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. In that listing, then, you had entree to certain people and certain society; is that right?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But when you were definitely known to be not Communist, then this all disappeared?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The thing faded away.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find they did not want you in the Institute of Pacific Relations as a non-Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I didn't go near it, and I was not invited.

I will come to that later on.

I was invited to one more conference. I made myself disagreeable. After that time—whatever my scholarship was, objective sources seemed to think it had not decreased but increased. This didn't compensate for the wrong development of my political position.

Senator FERGUSON. You think by being a non-Communist in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, they had no use for you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is the way it looked.

Senator FERGUSON. You are satisfied as to that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Dr. MORRIS. In 1935, Dr. Wittfogel, it is your testimony you were still within the Communist periphery?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time, which is n v late 1934, did you encounter Dr. Chi, T. A. Bisson, and Philip Jaffe?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe the circumstances of your meeting those three gentlemen?

The CHAIRMAN. Where was it, when was it, and under what circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do not remember who took the initiative, but I was somehow told that there were two or three gentlemen who wanted to see me. I think it was in Mr. Bisson's office. I had been introduced to Mr. Bisson through the institute.

It suddenly comes back to me it was in the Fo olicy Association in Arthur Bisson's room. Into the room rched a beaming Chinese and it was a gentleman I didn't know. The Chinese introduced himself: "Do you remember me? I am Ch'ao-ting Chi." It was Ch'ao-ting Chi with whom I had the long talks in Frankfort. He came into my house in Frankfort and we discussed many things. The foundation for the only historical book he has written was laid through these discussions.

So there was Chi. There was Jaffe. We had lunch together.

Mr. MORRIS. There was Bisson, Jaffe, and Dr. Chi, whom you had met before as a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He wasn't a doctor yet. He was just writing a thesis.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they come to you as Communists?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Between Chi and me, there was no problem. We had met in 1929. We carried on as a matter of fact. There were some changes. He was somewhat disgruntled in 1929 because he didn't like certain chores he had been doing in the Comintern. This was one of the reasons he had gone west, as he told me, in 1929. I never worked out the details of this. This had more or less dis-

appeared. He seemed to be a perfectly well-adjusted Communist, if I may say so. I was less well adjusted, but we were friendly, and he was a very pleasant man.

So there was no problem politically. I was introduced to Jaffe, who was working with this organization, the American Friends of the Chinese People.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they have a publication China Today?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they discuss that organization and that publication at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, sir; they were proud of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked the question: Where did this meeting occur, and when? I do not think I got a specific answer.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think late fall or early winter. I think late fall 1934, in New York. We met in Mr. Bisson's room. We proceeded to a Chinese restaurant.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they discuss the American Friends of Chinese People and the publication China Today as if that were a Communist organization and a Communist publication?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You did not have to discuss it with me. I had seen too many of these organizations. It was very obviously an organization which was run in the way in which Mr. Munzenberg, the greatest German Communist organizer, at that time, ran all these outfits. It was, so to speak, one of those. There was nothing particularly exciting about it for somebody who had seen that for about a dozen years.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you come to learn that those gentlemen wrote for China Today under pseudonyms?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what Dr. Chi's pseudonym was in China Today?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Han su Chan?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what Mr. Jaffe's pseudonym was?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Something like Phil.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Mr. Phillips?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Phillips.

Mr. MORRIS. While we are on Dr. Chi, I offer you a photograph from the Workers Monthly, which Mr. Mandel will characterize, and ask you if you recognize the man whose picture is there on the rostrum, and whether it appears to be Dr. Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It is kind of young. Yes; I would say it looks like him.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record, is this the same picture which has been offered to another witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom was it offered?

Mr. MORRIS. Edward C. Carter, and Mr. Carter did not identify the man whose picture appears on there as the picture of Dr. Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter was shown the picture, both in this magazine and the original, was he not?

Mr. MORRIS. He was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And found more difficulty in the original than in the magazine print?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

I would like to also point out the caption under the photograph describes the person as C. T. Chi, which coincides with the name of the gentleman we are discussing.

Mr. Mandel, will you redescribe this exhibit?

Mr. MANDEL. The photograph accompanies an article by Robert Minor. The article is entitled "The First Negro Workers' Congress."

Robert Minor is a well-known leader of the Communist Party. The Workers Monthly, in which this appears, is dated December 1925. The Workers Monthly had been previously characterized as the official monthly organ of the Workers Communist Party of America. Under the picture is a quote from C. T. Chi, as follows:

The world of imperialism is passing. Let us join hands with all enemies of imperialism disregarding race, creed, or nationality.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, do you remember having a conversation with Mr. Joseph Barnes in this 1934–35 period?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us the circumstances of your conversation with Joseph Barnes?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was introduced to him through Mrs. Elizabeth Field and we went together to a Chinese restaurant and had lunch together.

Mr. MORRIS. Elizabeth Field was then the wife of Frederick V. Field?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she now the present wife of Joseph Barnes?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That I don't know. I think she married him after her divorce from Mr. Field. I think she was divorced afterwards from Mr. Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, was the conversation that you had with Mr. Barnes the kind of conversation that would take place between two people who accepted each other as Communists?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was a friendly, political conversation. There was no friction and no argument between us. He told me about the work he and Mr. Field had been doing in building up the student movement in Harvard which was under Communist influence.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The students' association.

The CHAIRMAN. What movement is that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The students—what is the name of this?

Mr. MANDEL. The Liberal Club?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No. It doesn't matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was building it up at Harvard?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think Barnes was a leading man in building up this student group of which there were many.

Mr. MORRIS. Working in conjunction with Field?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. It was a Communist movement?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This was a group which, at that time, was well known to be very strongly, if not completely, under Communist influence. I am sure you will remember that name. It was a students' organization which flourished at that time but later on lost its strength.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, was your conversation with Dr. Barnes of such a nature that you could conclude he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had the feeling that he was informed about my background, which was a Communist background, and we proceeded in a very friendly way. I do not remember the details, but it certainly was conducted in a spirit of political congeniality. That is all I can say.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, what year was this?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. 1934, late in 1934. It may have been early 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. From that time, Dr. Wittfogel, or at that time, did you decide to make a trip to China?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what route you took to China?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I went via Chicago, San Francisco, to Hawaii and Japan to China.

Mr. MORRIS. When you went to Japan, Dr. Wittfogel, did you encounter Chen Han-seng?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us who Chen Han-seng was?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Chen Han-seng was a Chinese economist who did not get along with the Nationalist Government and who lived more or less in exile in Japan. I knew that he had connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his connection at that time with the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. A very friendly one. He told me that he was not an organized member, being somewhat of a Bohemian type, and didn't like discipline, and so on. Politically, he identified himself.

Senator FERGUSON. As what?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. With the Chinese Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you come to learn later on he was an organized member of the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I heard later on in 1947 that he eventually had joined the Chinese Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. But at that time when you met him, and that is in 1935, in Japan, he was not an organized member of the party but someone who was very friendly to the Communist movement?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. I think he would have considered them his people and they would have considered him their man.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, when did you arrive in China?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think in June 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in China, Dr. Wittfogel, did you meet Owen Lattimore?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us your associations with Owen Lattimore at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was editor of Pacific Affairs and lived somewhere in the country in the Province of Shansi. During that summer another member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Bruno Lasker, whom I had also met in Japan, was now in Peiping or in Tientsin. I think in Peiping. I think he was connected with, or assistant editor of Pacific Affairs, so Mr. Lattimore invited him to come to his place.

There was a plan of two other gentlemen to take a trip. One of these, Dr. Woodbridge Bingham, was with Owen Lattimore, staying there in this cool summer place. I went originally to see Mr. Woodbridge Bingham, but then I met Mr. Lattimore, so our contacts were established. As a matter of fact, afterward, the three of us took a trip to the west of China together.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did you tell Mr. Lattimore about your experience with Dr. Chi in Germany in 1929?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. We talked a great deal about Dr. Chi—Mr. Chi, I mean.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify that conversation you had with Owen Lattimore about your previous experience with the then Mr. Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You see, there wasn't only one conversation. There were many. We had a lot of time. We traveled for days and sometimes we stayed for a half a day or a day in a Chinese inn. Mr. Lattimore was very much interested in Chi as quite a brilliant young man. He was just writing the thesis I have referred to, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History.

Since I had met Chi, too, we discussed the things which, from my point of view, were Chi's interest in my ideas which he later on dropped without much major difficulty, so I don't know. I had practically a vested interest in Chi as a man who took up some of my ideas, and Lattimore was interested in him. So naturally I told him about the circumstances I met him under, and that Chi had worked in the Comintern and came back at that time via Germany to America and that he was going on doing this political work.

Mr. MORRIS. You did tell him both of your encounter with the then Mr. Chi in Germany as well as your encounter with Jaffe and Bisson in 1934?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I sure did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any episode that took place that would corroborate your recollection of the fact that you had these conversations with Mr. Lattimore? Did you visit anybody connected with Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. Professor Chi, who I think has come up in one of those epic features of the Lattimore story, namely, this letter he wrote to Mr. Barnes about Mr. Chi, where he mentions the father and the son Chi. There he refers to exactly this old Professor Chi who had a high position at the university. I think he was commissioner of education at that time of the Province of Shansi, and he had been head of the law school.

We were kind of interested in how this Papa Chi would take his son's Communist adventures, and naturally we approached the matter subtly. You know that a Chinese is a very dignified man and well restrained. Like other fathers, you could see the papa was not too happy with the way his son developed, but he accepted it as the fact. He loved him nevertheless.

I met Professor Chi later on in America.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time, did Mr. Lattimore know Ch'ao-ting Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think he had met him here in New York. I think they had discussed the beginning of his thesis.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were discussing Dr. Chi with Mr. Lattimore, the two of you were then discussing someone known to both of you, not merely by reputation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall, Dr. Wittfogel, whether or not you mentioned Mr. Bisson to Mr. Lattimore at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I guess I did, but we didn't discuss him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if at this time you would put into the record what Mr. Bisson did in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, as well as what positions he subsequently held in the United States Government?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from a volume published by the Institute of Pacific Relations entitled "Windows on the Pacific," the biennial report of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1944–46, page 11. In referring to certain individuals, including Mr. Bisson, the quote says:

* * * T. A. Bisson of the international secretariat left for Tokyo, where they are working under General MacArthur on a research project concerned with problems of Japanese reconstruction.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the date of that?

Mr. MANDEL. That was from a report of the institute dated 1944 to 1946. The date of employment is not given in the quote.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have a record of Mr. Bisson's employment at General MacArthur's headquarters in 1948?

Mr. MANDEL. I will present that subsequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, did the question of your telling Owen Lattimore you were a Communist at this time ever come up?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. There was an episode when the question came up. I was practically never asked the question whether I was a Communist, but one of the few instances occurred during our trip that we took, the three of us together.

Mr. MORRIS. This is in 1935?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were the three?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Mr. Woodbridge Bingham, Mr. Lattimore, and myself. I think it was in the old fortress of Tung-Kuan. That is overlooking the Yellow River.

I had told about my experience at the time before Hitler came to power and certain episodes. I think once as the head of a mixed students' group, I had a discussion with the head of the Nazi student organization. I think I referred to Mr. Knickerbocker's book. The first chapter of the book essentially was devoted to a description of one of the biggest arguments we had in Berlin with the Nazi student leader, and I told this story, and others.

Mr. Knickerbocker thought I wiped the floor with the Nazis, and I still think I did. So I told it in due modesty, but I brought it out the way you do when you look back on things in the past. At the end Bingham asked me, "Karl August, after all you tell me, weren't you a member of the Communist Party?" This embarrassed me no end, because for some reason or other it does not come very natural to me to lie. So I hemmed and hawed and I said a number of things, but at the end I more or less said that I hadn't been.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you denied you were a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. To Bingham?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you deny you were a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had no intention of joining it again. I wanted to go to America. I want to build a new life, and I saw no reason to tell him this story which might, if handled indiscreetly, frustrate my future plans.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew Bingham at the time had no connection, or you felt he had no connection with the Communist Party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He never had.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you felt it was impertinent, however, of him to ask you so direct a question?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think he is a very decent man. I think he asked it out of great naïveté.

Many people in New York who had a much greater interest in political matters but were more sophisticated never asked that question because they made up their opinion, and I think people didn't ask this kind of question. This is something which, in one way, sounds amusing, but in another way it is not so amusing. I have been told there were dozens of people in England who knew Fuchs was a Communist. Scotland Yard officers didn't know it, but there were dozens of people who knew it. You didn't talk much about it. It was known, but there were reasons why people, though they didn't like communism, maybe they had been former members of the Communist movement, but yet why should they get in more difficulty? So they kept it to themselves. So when people like Bingham asked that question, I think he did it because he was a naive young man at that time.

Lattimore, I think, was more sophisticated.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did Mr. Lattimore ever make any comment on Bingham's question?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He sure did. As soon as I was alone with Lattimore after Bingham had gone, he smiled the same nice smile for me which we didn't have a television set for yet, and made it very clear to me that he thought Woodbridge Bingham was a very nice man but he shouldn't have asked the question, and it was obvious what kind of an answer I would give under the circumstances.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did Lattimore leave China shortly after that and go to Moscow?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; in the spring of 1936 he left China.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you next see Mr. Lattimore after that trip down to the west?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. After the trip to the west, we went back to Peiping. He stayed there. I stayed on, but he went away to Moscow, England, and America, and came back in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. When he came back in 1937, could you tell us whether or not he had discussed with you some of the deviations that you had expressed in Moscow?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had made these deviations quite clear to him. I remember a number of talks I had with Lattimore about what I considered the growing bureaucratic monster in the Soviet Union. I had discussed my peculiar academic position in the interpretation of China. He obviously liked it. His writings show it—that he was very much interested. The largest book he wrote shows a great many traces of it. So he went to Moscow and told me he discussed my ideas with people there. As a matter of fact, in one of his last books, he men-

tioned that he had talked about an ex-Communist's ideas in Moscow. He may have forgotten the ex-Communist was I, but he told me he had discussed my ideas, and I think Freda Utley says the same, and he encountered some difficulties. They didn't like it as well as he thought they would.

Mr. SOURWINE. With whom in Moscow did he discuss your ideas?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. As far as I remember, the members of the Soviet group of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and maybe others, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any name of an American mentioned in that connection?

Was Harriet Moore's name mentioned?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was no mentioning of Miss Moore in that connection, but there was something else which kind of surprised me somewhat, though it didn't completely surprise me, because I had heard that Moscow did not think well of me before, when I wrote the novel on my concentration-camp experiences.

I first got back a letter. The Russians considered it the best book of its kind, and later made a movie of, or a movie was made, based on my main idea. They didn't publish the book for a long time because they thought there was something wrong about me politically. Owen Lattimore told me Harriet Moore had talked with people of the Comintern. They said, "There is something wrong with this Wittfogel because he went west; he should have come to the Soviet Union."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what signifinance talking with people in the Comintern had to you, Dr. Wittfogel?

Should Harriet Moore have had access to the Comintern?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Maybe they changed the rules for her and made a special law for her, if she was not connected with the Communist movement, that is. I never knew of any non-Communist who would go in and talk with Comintern people about Communists. This is not the way it was being done. Sometimes the law of gravity may not work and stones may move upward, but if the stones fall down—I think the fact that Harriet Moore had access to this kind of information from the Comintern—well, I leave it to you. I think it is very obvious.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not she was making a study in relation to the U. S. S. R. in 1940?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You mean later on?

Senator FERGUSON. In 1940.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether she went to the U. S. S. R. to make a study?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I knew she had all kinds of connections—headed various organizations connected with the U. S. S. R.

I know she wrote on foreign relations of the U. S. S. R.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we introduced in the record previously as exhibit 41 in our hearing of August 2, 1951, a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lockwood. Assignment No. 3 on the first page of that letter reads, Mr. Carter talking to Mr. Lockwood, when they were discussing what should be done in connection with the development of the institute:

> Send Harriet Moore to U. S. S. R. to go through all Government and party writings on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and politburo chiefs.

That was assignment No. 3 that Carter was giving Harriet Moore. Would you read that, Dr. Wittfogel, and make comment on Harriet Moore's having access to the Communist records?

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion could anybody other than a Communist do what was asked there in No. 3 at the bottom of that page?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This is so very, very high up. This is a very unusual thing. I am not an expert to give more than my opinion. I have been a few times in the Soviet Union, and I have seen a bit of the wildlife of the Communist part of the world. I think it is too—people may assign any task to you, but I don't think such a thing could have any meaning or success if you were not connected with it.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were not a Communist and connected with it; is that your opinion?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Of course, whether you have to have a card is a question of bookkeeping.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about a card.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, politically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor, how about your opinion of a person who would assign a non-Communist to do that job that is there described?

Mr. MORRIS. That is Mr. Carter.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. A non-Communist?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. If I may rephrase the question, would a person like Mr. Carter, as you know him, be at all likely in your opinion to assign a non-Communist to a job of that nature?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. After my first talks with Mr. Carter, I have had no close connection with him. I would be surprised if he would be so naive, but I cannot give a definite answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that our last witness, Mrs. Hede Massing, has identified Harriet Lucy Moore, whom we are discussing now, as a Communist. She said she had met her in Moscow as a Communist.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call attention again of the Chair to a series of documents which were introduced at that time which show that Harriet Moore was a leading member, in fact acting secretary in the middle forties of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like those reintroduced in the record at this time, Mr. Mandel.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to identify them?

Mr. MANDEL. Exhibit No. 60, taken from the annual report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated 1940 to 1941, shows Harriet Moore as holding the following offices: She was a member of the board of trustees. She was a member of the executive committee for 1941 and she was chairman of the nominating committee for 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. How many members were on that nominating committee, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. There are five, including two ex officio members.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify the members of the nominating committee in 1941 of which Harriet Moore was chairman?

Mr. MANDEL. Harriet L. Moore, the chairman; Edward C. Carter, ex officio; Frederick Field, Jerome D. Greene, and Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officio.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony from Mr. Carter on the question of Harriet Lucy Moore. Mr. Carter saw fit to comment on a conversation that he had with Mr. David Dubinsky, head of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. At that time, Mr. Chairman, the story that Mr. Carter told did not square with our records, and we elected to write Mr. Dubinsky to ask him his recollection of the testimony that Mr. Carter gave at this time.

I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you will read into the record the letter that we sent to Mr. Dubinsky as well as Mr. Dubinsky's subsequent answer.

Mr. MANDEL. The letter is dated August 1, 1951, to Mr. David Dubinsky, president, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 1710 Broadway, New York, N. Y.:

DEAR MR. DUBINSKY: I enclose herewith testimony of Mr. Edward C. Carter before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee relative to Miss Harriet L. Moore and dealing with the Russian War Relief in which your name is involved.

We would appreciate it if, in the interest of accuracy, you would make a comment regarding what you remember actually took place.

Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel.*

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Special Counsel, Internal Security Subcommittee,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: I have your letter of August 1, together with excerpts of testimony given by Edward C. Carter before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on July 26, in which my name and that of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, of which I am president, are mentioned.

I note Mr. Carter's statement to the effect that our refusal to participate in Russian War Relief because of the important position held in that organization as secretary by Miss Harriet Moore was based on mistaken identity.

At the outset, I want to emphatically deny his statement that I have ever "conceded" that my objection to Miss Moore was based on an error of identity. Mr. Carter's correspondence in 1941 did not even bring up the subject of another Miss Moore to whom he now refers.

Our attitude concerning Miss Moore and her record has not changed in the slightest although we later on contributed funds to Russian War Relief. This being the case, I deem it advisable to give a little of the history of the entire matter.

When Russian War Relief was organized in 1941 and an appeal was made to us to contribute to it, we had a study made of the officers because of our opposition to participating in any Communist-front organization. A member of our staff was assigned to this task and he submitted to us the enclosed memorandum. Based on this report, we definitely refused to be associated with Russian War Relief in any way and decided to make our contribution for Russian relief through the American Red Cross.

Several months later, Russian War Relief also made an appeal to the Rockefellers, who, having learned of our union's opposition to Russian War Relief, were interested in ascertaining the reason for our position in this matter. We thereupon submitted this same memorandum to them and they, too, based on the facts contained in the memorandum, refused to participate in the fund. Mr. Carter, fearful that this may affect the drive generally, formally inquired as to the reason for our opposition to Russian War Relief.

While this memorandum raised questions in our minds about Mr. Carter's own associations, it gave concrete evidence that Miss Moore was definitely tied up with communistic activities. We therefore contended that so long as she remained in the key position of secretary, our union would refuse to cooperate with Russian War Relief. We were subsequently notified by Mr. Carter that Miss Moore had resigned her post. Thereupon we changed our position and transmitted to Russian War Relief approximately $500,000 over a period of a number of years.

Quite some time later, we learned that Mr. Carter, although complying technically with his promise to us as the head of the organization, in typical Communist fashion placed Miss Moore in another equally important position in Russian War Relief.

Now I learn that Mr. Carter is using my name and that of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union to alibi himself and Miss Harriett Moore in the proceedings before you.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID DUBINSKY,
President, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that inserted in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like both my letter and the letter of Mr. Dubinsky to me as well as the enclosure, the memorandum that was enclosed therewith, inserted into the record as the next exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and marked consecutively.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 69–A" and "Exhibit No. 69–B," respectively, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 69–A

INTERNATIONAL LADIES GARMENT WORKERS' UNION,
New York, N. Y., August 3, 1951.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Special Counsel, Internal Security Subcommittee,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

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Sincerely yours,

DAVID DUBINSKY,
President, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.

REPORT ON RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF, INC. (November 9, 1941)

SUMMARY

Russian War Relief, Inc., is probably the best organized and most innocent-appearing of all "innocent" fronts of the Communist Party. The long list of endorsers contain dozens of prominent, respectable personalities and relatively few of the shopworn stooges of the Marcantonio-Quill type, whose names have been attached to scores of Communist Party fronts in the past.

The real nature of the organization, however, is not determined by the endorser but by the character of the people who have organized the movement, who do its work, who hire the help, who write the publicity, and who make all the practical decisions. From this point of view, Russian War Relief, Inc., is as much an innocent front as any in the past.

On the board of directors of Russian Relief, Inc., there is a group of at least five—Edward C. Carter, Harriet Moore, Dr. Henry E. Sigerist, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, and Col. Raymond Robins—who have proven their sympathy with the Stalin regime in a network of propaganda organizations where they worked closely and harmoniously with outright Communists in furthering some particular aim of the Communist Party. Cooperation with Communists, especially in defense of the Moscow trials and during the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, may be taken as the highest mark of reliability. These five above-named directors of Russian War Relief, Inc., have never at any time hesitated to cooperate with known Communists. Furthermore, they have never engaged in any activity, such as Aid to Britain before June 22, 1941, which would have been obnoxious to the Communist Party.

In addition to these five, there are on the board of directors, Mrs. Vincent Sheehan, the wife of the writer who until the Stalin-Hitler pact was a frequent participant in innocent fronts.

The experience of all innocent fronts has been that the presence on a leading committee of a reliable group of experienced, active Communists and fellow travelers is sufficient guaranty that the organization will serve the needs of the Stalin regime and the Communist Party rather than the purpose for which it was established.

The arrangements for the Madison Square Garden meeting of October 27 and the demonstration against Lord Halifax which occurred there are proof that this organization is no exception to the general rule.

EDWARD C. CARTER

The initiator of Russian War Relief, Inc., and its present chairman is Edward C. Carter, secretary general of the Institute for Pacific Relations and director of the American-Russian Institute for Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union.

The executive secretary of the Institute for Pacific Relations, working under Mr. Carter, is Katherine Terrall, who was also national vice president of the American Peace Mobilization until the invasion of Russia. Another colleague of Edward C. Carter's is Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a director of the Institute for Pacific Relations. Mr. Field was elected national secretary of the American Peace Mobilization in September 1940. Mr. Carter may not himself have been a member of the American Peace Mobilization but his close association with agitators against Aid to Britain is significant.

Mr. Carter's reliability for the Communist Party was publicly demonstrated a number of years ago when the Moscow trials were beginning to disgust an increasing number of American liberals who had been sympathetic to the Soviet Union. A group of "friends of the Soviet Union" arranged a meeting in Mecca Temple on March 24, 1938, where Ambassador Troyanovsky and others "explained" the trials. Edward C. Carter also addressed this meeting, saying:

"When they (the Russian people) think of the trials, they are thankful that their Government has at last been firm in dealing with what they regard as Fascist-supported intrigue to overthrow the Government of the Soviet Union."

His speech, which reveals a great deal about his point of view, was printed in full in Soviet Russia Today, May 1938, a photostat of which is attached. It is further significant that the pro-Communist editors of that magazine had the following to say of Mr. Carter in the same issue:

"Dr. Edward C. Carter is the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was chief secretary of the YMCA with the American Expeditionary Force in France during the World War and later foreign secretary of the British YMCA. He has been decorated by a number of foreign governments for his signal contributions to international understanding. He is a frequent contributor to our leading periodicals, particularly on eastern problems."

The purpose and tone of this Mecca Temple meeting is indicated in the New York Times report of this meeting on March 25, 1928:

"Conceding that the facts revealed by the recent Russian trials 'were a great shock to all of us,' Alexander A. Troyanovsky, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, defended last night the 'elimination' of the 'conspirators' and said that the fate of Austria showed the folly of weakness or tolerance toward fascism.

"He belittled the importance of the defendants in the trials, contending that most of them had long lost all influence and had been repeatedly rejected by 'the vote of our democratic organizations.'

"Mr. Troyanovsky addressed a mass meeting at Mecca Temple, 130 West Fifty-sixth Street, which was held under the auspices of a committee of sponsors headed by Corliss Lamont and including Federal Judge Julian M. Mack, Lillian D. Wald, Maurice Hindus, Raymond Robins, and Francis J. Gorman, president of the U. T. W. of A.

"Upton Sinclair also addressed the gathering by telephone from his home in Pasadena, Calif. The other speakers were Dr. Edward C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Arctic explorer; James Waterman Wise and the Rev. Thomas L. Harris of Philadelphia."

HARRIET MOORE

The Secretary of Russian War Relief, Inc., is Harriet Moore, who is also secretary, a director, and editor of publications for the American-Russian Institute.

Other directors of Russian War Relief who are also associated with the American-Russian Institute are Edward C. Carter, Dr. Henry Sigerist, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, and Col. Raymond Robins.

In editing the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union and a Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union, Harriet Moore has kept these publications in line with the policies of the Soviet regime at all times; giving the official Soviet versions of its policy and reprinting the official speeches and documents of the Soviet Union.

Beginning with the very first issue of the Quarterly in April 1938, there are articles whitewashing the Moscow trials and denouncing the "dissenters and highly placed counter-revolutionaries". This is followed in other issues by a glorification of the Soviet elections (October 1938) and an apology and defense of Soviet policy on oil sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian War as well as Stalin's hand in Spain (The National Defense Program of the Soviet Union by Harriet Moore in the April 1939 issue of the Quarterly). Not a single issue either of the Quarterly or the Bulletin appeared under Harriet Moore's editorship without flattering accounts of Soviet penology, the Russian standard of living, Soviet music, Soviet genetics, etc.

As far back as September 30, 1936, Harriet Moore explained in the Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union how the new Soviet Constitution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia really amounted to a democratic system. She writes:

"Of what does the dictatorship of the proletariat consist? The dictatorship of the proletariat appears to be, at any given time, the particular organization of the state which assures the principle that nothing shall be done within the state detrimental to the interests of the builders of communism, foremost among whom are the proletariat. It must be regarded as a coercive power in relation to all opponents of this building, but as a cooperative power in relation to all other members of the working population insofar as their interests are identical with those of the proletariat.

"It (the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) is one of many types of popular organizations, like the trade-unions, cooperatives, etc., and enjoys exactly the same rights of participation in the Government as they do. * * *"

Her article continues to praise the extent of national autonomy in the Soviet Union and concludes:

"* * * the Soviet Union has now achieved, if not a level of abundance, at least a level of national wealth at which it can guarantee to every citizen employment, social security, education, and leisure. These the Soviets have always considered as a minimum of the inherent rights of mankind for which they fought the revolution."

In the Bulletin of December 30, 1936, Harriet Moore discusses Criminal Law in the Soviet Union. She points out that the trials and executions that followed the assassination of Kirov in 1935 prove that the Soviet Union practices great leniency.

In the March 30, 1937, issue of the Bulletin Edward C. Carter reviews the court proceedings in the Moscow trials and concludes:

"For those who sincerely want to understand the Soviet Union and this series of trials this verbatim report will be welcome indeed. From it the student will discover the untenability of the theory that this was a 'frame-up.' The Kremlin's case was genuine, terribly genuine."

Harriet Moore discusses the nationalities question in the Bulletin of June 30, 1937, and finds that—

"Today the nationality policies of the Soviet Union have progressed to the point where the member nations are approaching real equality, culturally and economically."

Harriet Moore developed the same theme in the February 1936 issue of Soviet Russia Today.

The publications of the American-Russian Institute constantly attempt to describe Soviet institutions in such a light that they appear to be as democratic as those in this country. Discussing the Russian trade-unions, for instance, the Bulletin on the Soviet Union of October 3, 1941, says:

"Soviet trade-unions are voluntary labor associations markedly similar to those existing in this country in structure, functions, and activities."

In the next issue of the Bulletin an interview with the Metropolitan Benjamin of the Russian Orthodox Church is printed. This interview purports to show that the Russian people really enjoy full religious freedom under the Soviets.

In discussing Russian foreign policy and suggesting a diplomatic course for this country, Harriet Moore has at all times echoed the views of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party. Throughout all phases of Russian policy and even during the life of the Stalin-Hitler pact, Harriet Moore always stressed that the aims of the United States of America and the U. S. S. R. were identical and that this country ought to lift all embargoes and permit widest trade with Russia.

In an article entitled "U. S. S. R.'s Position in the Far East: What It Means to the United States" for the magazine Amerasia of May 1938, she writes:

"The foreign policy of the U. S. S. R., whether it be in the Pacific or in Europe, is no new thing. That it is one which pursues peace in as concrete and direct a manner as the meanderings of other powers permit is generally accepted even among liberals who in recent months have allowed their friendly interest in the Soviet Union to lapse. Nonaggression becomes a keynote * * * the U. S. S. R. has not sought foreign adventures."

Her reference to the liberals is undoubtedly directed at those liberals who become critical of the Soviet Union as a result of the Moscow trials and Stalin's role in Spain. The article continues:

"It is surprising how often communism and the Soviet Union can be used as a smoke screen. The general public ultimately glimpses the reality as the smoke is dispersed by actualities, but this has not discouraged the repeated use of this device. Few people are still deceived by the anti-Communist label attached to the alliance of Japan, Germany, and Italy. Nor do many American citizens actually consider Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. LaGuardia followers of Mr. Browder. Experience has dispelled the smoke screen in these cases but the same anti-Moscow fog is being generated, with as little cause, to becloud the issue of collective security.

"For those Americans who are interested primarily in preventing the extension of war, the Soviet Union again enters the picture with a similar interest. Those who favor a boycott of the aggressor and hope for an eventual Government-imposed embargo, automatically find themselves sharing with the Soviet Union a

belief in the efficacy of economic sanctions, collectively applied. For them the presence in the councils of the nations of the Soviet Union as a large power strongly advocating and ready to support such a plan to very positive factor, whether or not they like its social system."

It is worth noting that this article and another in defense of the Stalin-Hitler pact which will be quoted later appeared in Amerasia, which is edited by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, a party liner who was national secretary of the American Peace Mobilization during the Stalin-Hitler pact and a "warmonger" before the pact and now again.

The first Bulletin on the Soviet Union following the Stalin-Hitler pact expressed the same confusion and attempt to reassure the followers that was seen in all Communist publications. The Bulletin even repeats the absurd argument that this was all a clever trick on the part of Stalin to break up the anti-Comintern alliance and expose Hitler. The Bulletin of August 31, 1939 reports:

"The new nonaggression pact, signed on August 23, is one of the series of similar treaties which the Soviet Union has made with its neighbors and others—with Afghanistan, China, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Persia, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey. * * *

The article goes on to show that there is really nothing alarming about the Stalin-Hitler pact and after an elaborate quotation from Stalin is concludes:

"It dispersed the anti-Cominterm smoke screen; it established one more treaty to be torn up before Hitler can move against the Soviet Union * * *"

After the war broke out and Stalin began to share in Hitler's conquests, the Bulletin on the Soviet Union under Harriet Moore's direction continued to defend the line. On October 20, 1939, the Bulletin contains a long "historical" justification for Stalin's conquest of half of Poland and his policy toward the Baltic states.

The Bulletin of April 25, 1940, reporting on the Finnish war, declares:

"The termination of the Finnish war gave the Soviets a treaty which in their opinion 'reliably and durably' safeguards 'the security of Leningrad, Murmansk, and the Murmansk railway.' "

The same article justifies Stalin's diplomacy toward Rumania and indicates that Molotov's policy was that—

"Although the U. S. S. R. had never recognized the Rumanian seizure of Bessarabia it has never raised the question of recovering Bessarabia by military means."

As the war continued and British and American protests multiplied to the effect that Russian trade with America constituted a leak in the British blockade of Germany, the Bulletin on the Soviet Union (May 17, 1940) contains an article on Russian Foreign Trade and concludes that—

"There is little evidence that any of these purchases (copper, rubber, tin, etc.) have as yet exceeded Soviet consumption needs * * *"

This theme is also developed by Harriet Moore in the November 1940 issue of American Quarterly on the Soviet Union. The article is entitled "American Relations With the Russian Empire and the U. S. S. R." and in it she deplores the hostility in this country for the Soviet Union, especially since the Stalin-Hitler pact.

Harriet Moore has an article called Changing Far Eastern Policies of the Soviet Union in the May 1941 issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. It consists of the official Soviet version of the diplomatic steps that had been taken in recent years. Her judgment is that—

"The defense of the territory of the U. S. S. R. is the primary aim of all Soviet diplomacy * * *."

This was written after Stalin had partaken of all Hitler's conquests, after the Baltic States had been absorbed into Russia, and after the war with Finland.

Harriet Moore's feelings about the Soviet Union, the war, and America's part in it during the life of the Stalin-Hitler Pact are perhaps best expressed in an article called Two Wars or One in the January 1940 issue of Frederick Vanderbilt Field's magazine Amerasia. In this article she says:

"The Soviet foreign policy, whatever may be judged to be its motives, is clearly aimed at preventing the approach of any strong, antagonistic, capitalist power to its borders. The U.S.S.R. supported efforts to establish collective security in the hope of maintaining a balance of power in Eastern Europe and it was only the Munich settlement which made a Soviet-German agreement necessary."

The article goes on to stress a pact with Japan on the part of the Soviet Union as a possibility if the western powers arrive at another "Munich" settlement with Japan. The article continues: "Theoretically, American and Soviet interests in the Far East are similar in that both countries want a free and inde-

pendent China—America for trade and investment, the U. S. S. R. as a peaceful and progressive neighbor." Harriet Moore concludes with this suggestion for an American foreign policy: "It (the U. S. A.) should exert its influence to stop the European conflict as soon as possible by means of a negotiated, balance-of-power peace, such as were originally envisaged in Wilson's 14 points."

In the Far Eastern Survey, a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations of March 12, 1941, Harriet Moore has an article entitled "Soviet 'Enigma'?" The point of the article is that Russia is not on Germany's side, but is really neutral and that there is no reason why America should not extend more trade to the Soviet Union. She denies that trade with Russia helps Germany and insists that "Britain and the United States have found little reason to be critical of Soviet far-eastern policies * * *."

A few months later, after the Nazi invasion of Russia, Harriet Moore wrote another article for the same magazine (August 11, 1941). Here she enlarges on the theme that the United States and the Soviet Union have a "historical community of interest." She criticizes those Americans who, during the life of the Stalin-Hitler pact, pointed to the similarity between National Socialism and Bolshevism. She holds this view to be incorrect and that this view has hindered the proper relations between this country and the Soviet Union. As for the problem of democracy in the Soviet Union, Harriet Moore quotes with approval the opinion of Edgar Snow: "There are many levels of democracy. For purposes of international political mobilization against a common menace, it might have been well to take a nation's word for the kind of government it prefers to think it has."

DR. HENRY E. SIGERIST

Another member of the board of directors of Russian War Relief, Inc., is Dr. Henry E. Sigerist. He is also a director of the American Russian Institute.

Dr. Sigerist was on the committee sponsoring the March 24, 1938, meeting in Mecca Temple at which Ambassador Troyanovsky and Edward C. Carter spoke. This meeting is described on page 4.

In March 1937 and again in May 1938 he signed special appeals to American liberals urging them to support the Moscow trials. These statements are such that only very close sympathizers of the Communist Party, if not members, could possibly sign their names to it. Copies of these statements are attached.

The Daily Worker of November 5, 1937, carries an advertisement for a "Twentieth Soviet Anniversary Ceremonies" meeting which names Dr. Henry E. Sigerist as a speaker, together with Troyanovsky, and Vilhjalmur Stefansson. The meeting was sponsored among others by Col. Raymond Robins.

In November 1937 and again in November 1938 (Dr. Sigerist wrote articles for Soviet Russia Today reporting on his trips to the Soviet Union and his discovery that the U. S. S. R. has a better system of public health than we have in this country.

Throughout the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact and the Soviet war with Finland, Dr. Sigerist continued to visit Russia and write articles for Soviet Russia Today on "Soviet medical progress" (Soviet Russia Today, November 1939, January 1940).

VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON

Another director of both Russian War Relief, Inc., and the American-Russian Institute is Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the Arctic explorer.

He wrote laudatory articles for Soviet Russia Today, in April 1938, about Soviet explorations in the Arctic and, in February, 1940, during the Soviet war with Finland.

On October 25, 1937, under a Moscow date line, the Daily Worker prints a report of the Golden Book of American Friendship for the Soviet Union, which was presented to the U. S. S. R. on its twentieth birthday. Among the signers of this book, the Daily Worker reports, was Col. Raymond Robins and Vilhjalmur Stefansson.

He addressed the twentieth anniversary mass meeting of the Soviet Union together with Troyanovsky and others. (See p. 13).

Mr. Stefansson addressed the mass meeting on the Moscow trials at Mecca Temple on March 24, 1938, together with Ambassador Troyanovsky and Edward C. Carter. (See p. 3).

Most recently, Vilhjalmur Stefansson's name is found on the sponsoring committee of a "Rally to Honor Eight Years of United States Soviet Ties" (Daily Worker, Nov. 9, 1941).

"RALLY TO HONOR EIGHTH YEAR OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET TIES

"Louis Bromfield and Van Wyck Brooks, both Pulitzer prize winners, are among the noted sponsors of a meeting in honor of the eighth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be held in Manhattan Center, Eighth Avenue and Thirty-fourth Street, Monday evening, November 17.

"Other sponsors include Ales Hrdlicka, director of the Smithsonian Institution; Dr. Walter B. Cannon of Harvard University; Dr. Dick J. Struik of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Kenneth Leslie, editor of the Protestant Digest; Frank Bancroft, editor of Social Work Today, Marcy Blitzstein, composer; Richard Storrs Childs, publisher; Vilhjalmur Stefansson, explorer; Herman Shumlin, producer; Donald Ogden Stewart, writer; Paul Robeson, singer; Alice Stone Blackwell, women's leader; Clifford Odets."

"RALLY MARKING UNITED STATES-SOVIET TIE TO HEAR OFFICER—LIEUTENANT COMMANDER SEELY AND OTHER NOTABLES TO SPEAK MONDAY

"Lt. Comdr. Charles S. Seely of the United States Navy (retired) will analyze the military prospects and situation in the Soviet-German war at a meeting next Monday evening, November 17, in Manhattan Center, Thirty-fourth Street and Eighth Avenue.

"The meeting, which marks the eighth anniversary of American-Soviet diplomatic relations is sponsored by the American Council on Soviet Relations.

"Commander Seely spent 15 months in Europe just before the beginning of the war. Upon his return to the United States he wrote Russia and the Approach of Armaged-don.

"Other speakers at the meeting will be Mrs. Joseph E. Davies, wife of the former ambassador to the Soviet Union; Prof. Arthur Upham Pope, chairman of the Committee for National Morale; Clifford T. McAvoy, legislative director of the Greater New York Industrial Union Council; Corliss Lamont, national chairman of the American Council on Soviet Relations; Jack McMichael, chairman of the American Youth Congress; and Thomas L. Harris, former adviser in religion at Harvard University. Dr. Henry E. Sigerist, director of the Institute of the History of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University, will preside."

COL. RAYMOND ROBINS

A fifth member of the board of directors of Russian War Relief, Inc., is Col. Raymond Robins who was head of the Red Cross Mission to Russia in 1917 and has been a director of the American-Russian Institute.

In an article for Soviet Russia Today in November 1937 the colonel reported that there is "Equality of opportunity for every child born under the Red Flag * * *" and in foreign affairs he reported that "today the whole influence of mighty Russia, through its wise foreign policy, guided by Stalin and Litvinoff, is being used to prevent the threatened Fascist world war."

Colonel Robins signed the open letter to American liberals on the Moscow trials, referred to on page 13.

He signed the Golden Book of American Friendship for the Soviet Union. (See p. 14.)

EXHIBIT No. 69–B

AUGUST 1, 1951.

Mr. DAVID DUBINSKY,
President, International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
1710 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. DUBINSKY: I enclose herewith testimony of Mr. Edward C. Carter before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee relative to Miss Harriet L. Moore and dealings with the Russian War Relief in which your name is involved.

We would appreciate it if, in the interest of accuracy, you would make a comment regarding what you remember actually took place.

Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel.*

Dr. WITTFOGEL. A few things come to my mind to supplement what was said before. Point 1: I think it was American Students Union, ASU, which I was thinking of.

Senator FERGUSON. You are talking about Harvard?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The organization which you said Mr. Barnes was extremely active in promoting?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Point 2: When you asked me about whether Lattimore knew that in these early days I was a Communist—he has later written me a letter in which he told me that he hasn't been aware of this—we do not have to refer to the nonexisting television set. As I said, all our talks about Chi the son and Chi the father made sense only in connection with the background of the Chis' story when it was perfectly clear that we were dealing with a man who had this Communist background, and my relations were in the same set.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you go into point 2, Doctor, at one point in line with your previous testimony that you and Mr. Lattimore had gone to see the elder Chi, partially at least for the purpose of finding out how he reacted to his son's Communist escapades——

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Not quite. We were in the town where he lived and we thought of looking him up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any discussion between you and Mr. Lattimore on the question of how the elder Chi would react?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, exactly. We talked about it, but we were going to see him anyhow and in this connection the question came up, how is he going to take this? How is he taking his son's political escapades?

Mr. SOURWINE. There is then no question whatsoever that prior to the time you actually went to see the elder Chi, both you and Mr. Lattimore knew the younger Chi to have been a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Quite, quite.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss with Lattimore the fact that Chi was a Communist before you went to see the father?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, sure.

Senator FERGUSON. When did Lattimore write you a letter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Last winter, in December.

Senator FERGUSON. Last December?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. What were the contents of that letter? Do you have a copy of it?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was a letter in which he said that he had heard something about testimony I had given before the Un-American Committee in secret session—some of it leaked out in the press—and he challenged me; one of the statements was—would you like to see this?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I would like to see the letter.

Dr. WITTFOGEL (reading):

In your testimony——

Senator FERGUSON. You are reading from the letter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. From the letter.

In your testimony, as quoted in the newspaper, you mention that we first became acquainted in 1935. You apparently did not mention, however, that you did not tell me that you had been a Communist Party member, although you

did not disguise either your immense reading and scholarship in Marxist literature or the fact that you were intensely hostile to the Stalinist regime in Russia.

The letter was written on December 18, 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your comment on that? Was there any doubt in your mind that you had told him?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Since 1947 I have learned that Lattimore brazenly denies facts that can be established, so I just thought this was a repeat performance of something that happened between me and Lattimore in 1947; and I said at the end, this is the end of our relations. I can place no more belief in what he says.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you had a disagreement with Lattimore in 1947?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. They will cover that later, but you had mentioned it in the letter, and I thought it should be covered at this time in the record.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I think it is kind of pertinent, because I would say that Lattimore's story when he came back in 1947 telling me about what he had heard about Harriet Moore does not make much sense either, if he is not a political imbecile. Comintern people do not comment just on the political views of whether people should have gone to Russia or somewhere else, unless they feel they belong in their field of jurisdiction. Lattimore seemed to be fully aware of that at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt in your own mind, Dr. Wittfogel, that you had told Lattimore about Dr. Chi?

Mr. WITTFOGEL. No doubt whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the subject of discussion on your visit to the elder Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel informs me that we now have Mr. Bisson's record with the United States Government which was not available when we came to Mr. Bisson's name in the testimony. So I will ask him if he will very briefly describe what Mr. Bisson's employment with the United States Government was.

Mr. MANDEL. I read from Who's Who, volume 24, where T. A. Bisson is listed as former adviser, Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, principal economist, Board of Economic Warfare in 1942–43.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the year of his employment at Tokyo?

Mr. MANDEL. That will be given.

A letter to Senator Pat McCarran from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman, United States Civil Service Commission, dated July 13, 1951, states:

> Thomas Arthur Bisson received appointment as principal economic analyst on the Board of Economic Warfare on January 22, 1942, in which position he served until July 10, 1943, when he resigned voluntarily. On October 4, 1945, Mr. Bisson was appointed to a position with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Department of War. His employment with that Department was terminated on May 23, 1947, due to the completion of his contract.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, can you recall an invitation that you received to make a trip to Yenan?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. To Yenan? You mean the then capital of Communist China?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In the early summer of 1937, I was still in Peiping. Lattimore was there; a number of other people around, and during that time Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe and Mr. Bisson came to visit Peiping. The person who I thought was around, too, was Ed Snow, the author of Red Star Over China. He was just writing that book.

Mr. MORRIS. Peiping, and this is 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Early summer of 1937.

Mr. Snow had been the first known foreigner who went to see Yenan, as you remember, and that is what gave, among other things, his book great news value. I knew him fairly well at that time. As a matter of fact, I am partly responsible for the unfriendly remarks about the Soviet bureaucracy which appeared in the first edition and which were very much softened in the later editions of his book.

Snow had told me how he had had his Communist contact and how they organized it for him to go to Yenan. So, Snow came to me one day and said, "You see, there is a possibility of some persons going to Yenan," and I said "Who?" He said; "Jaffe, Bisson, Lattimore, and yourself."

Now, as I have indicated, I was on my way out, not of the party but of the fringes. It was a time when I had ever more angry arguments. I had some very unpleasant arguments with Jaffe and Bisson, Bisson being particularly generous concerning the execution of Tukhashevsky and other top-ranking generals. He said, "It doesn't matter; they have so many generals." It was a very large gesture, and it indicated the kind of difference in feeling and sense of direction. So I said, "I don't think I want to go." Whereupon, instead of myself, Mrs. Jaffe joined the group, and the four of them went.

Mr. MORRIS. Could any group have gotten together to have gone to Yenan, the capital of Communist China?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You mean spontaneously?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is ridiculous.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The place was very isolated. You had to have the cooperation, and the people from the other side would be very careful whom they would let in.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there an iron curtain around Yenan?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was the Nationalist region, and troops were around it, although conditions had very much relaxed after the Sian incident. Still the Nationalist Government didn't like it particularly, and obviously; and there was the other side of the story, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you need Chinese Communist cooperation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Certainly you would need cooperation, but in this case it went further. Snow told me the thing was organized—I mean between him and his Chinese contact man—in Peiping. He did not disclose who made the choice, who was behind it.

Mr. MORRIS. But you knew this trip then was organized by Snow and his Chinese Communist contacts?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, why did you decline to go on that trip? What was your reason?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Because I wanted to disentangle myself. I did not want to go further into this.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were in the stage where you were becoming disentangled, breaking away from the Communist organization, and you felt such a trip like that would be the act of someone who would be getting closer to the organization?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It might very well lead to closer relationship. They all came back very cheerful and warmed up. As said by others, Yenan had a very good way of organizing friendly ways of receptions.

The CHAIRMAN. Who went on that trip?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, Mr. Bisson, and Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. The four of them made the trip?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they discuss the events on the trip later with you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify that to the best of your recollection? Did they run into anybody else on the trip, for instance, on the way up to Yenan?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was a queer incident. Yes; they told me. I remember Bisson's story. I think it was confirmed later by the others. I met Bisson first; I was at the seashore when he came back. This was a thriller, and also I mean it will go into the history of human stupidity, of which several volumes shall be written.

I asked him whether there were any other foreigners moving toward Yenan. He said, "Yes; there was another car." This is a very rugged country. They were very unhappy, and one of the key remarks, I am sure not only of Jaffe, but others, because human memory is of that kind. Jaffe was somewhat angry. He said, "I wish the Japanese would come and clean up this mess." For a pro-Communist it was a very funny remark to make. It was repeated with a certain smile afterward by Bisson.

So, it was kind of difficult country, and why anybody should go up on a trip up there is not very likely to imagine.

They saw there was another car moving in the same direction. There were rivers; there were few bridges. They had to get together. In certain parts there was maybe only one ford. According to this account, they found out that the people in that car were Russians. These Russians were not very talkative men. They were very restrained. I said, "What kind of Russian were they?"

"We occasionally talked with them there, particularly the chauffeur, who spoke English quite well."

Mr. MORRIS. Bisson said he spoke to the chauffeur; you did not?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I didn't. They talked with one of these chauffeurs, they talked with him; and they were told these were White Russians who were going to Yenan to do business.

Mr. MORRIS. To do business with the Chinese Communists?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This is one of those unique experiences. According to their own records, the Chinese Communists did business with nobody; and to a Communist the White Russian was not exactly the most attractive man in the world to do business with, the way I knew White Russians. That is, those who were really white were hated. They certainly would not seek out Communist business partners. There wasn't much business to do. Anyhow, that is the story they told.

I said, "Did these men in that mysterious car arrive in Yenan, too?"

They said, "Yes, they did arrive."

"What happened?"

The four went on, yodeling, had theater performances, they had a wonderful time. The Russians just disappeared. There was no indignation. These guys were not thrown out. They were just there and disappeared, and nobody paid any attention.

It puzzles me still today, and I just throw it in as one of these little incidents.

Mr. MORRIS. At this time I should like to introduce in the record a letter that Mr. Lattimore wrote to Mr. Field on April 19, 1937, bearing on a record of Lattimore's conversations with Mr. Wittfogel at that particular time.

I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you will identify that letter and read the last two paragraphs thereof.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is on the letterhead of Pacific Affairs but inserted is an address, 33, Ta Yuan Fu Hutung, Peiping, China, dated April 19, 1937. The letter is signed by Owen Lattimore and is addressed to Frederick V. Field.

I read the following excerpts:

The amount of stuff under which my desk is groaning has prevented me from taking full advantage of the easy settling down: but of course we have already accumulated to our credit a number of hours of Wittfogelian conversation and dined there one night with the Bissons and Bertram and Ida Pruitt. By the way even Wittfogel's enthusiastic and triumphant letters don't give any adequate idea of the bulk, quality, and really fundamental importance of the work he has been doing. He has an organizing and executive ability that could give Henry Ford a start and a licking; and on top of the unbelievable quantity of work that he and his wife have been doing, he has found time to supervise a survey of source material that I needed for my work.

You sure have piled Amerasia on the market here; and I believe you've made a dent. When I've had a chance for more of a talk with Bisson, I'll see if I can't do more toward pulling my weight as a member of your editorial team.

All the best,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that letter in the record, Mr. Chairman, as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 70" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 70

PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
New York City, April 19, 1937.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Your letter of February 26 gives us I think the starting point for the suggested article on the problems with which the Chinese language school is designed to cope. I am presuming that the first school will be held this summer. If so, the article should be planned for our December number, so that Kennedy can include the experience gained from the first trial in his article. This would also make it possible for you to get the criticism of the Wittfogels, both on the article, when drafted, and on the general problems. I think they both have some pretty shrewd ideas as a result of their work in the language school here, which has both strong and weak points.

Your biographical note on Kennedy was a help; obviously I had underestimated him. By the way, what about putting pressure on him to review Chinese and

Japanese books occasionally? I have thought for a long time that we ought to mobilize as many as possible of the people living in countries like America and England and Holland who can review books in Chinese, Japanese, and Russian, but have never known quite how to go about it. As a general proposition however, the idea of a panel of such people, each of them turning in an occasional review of a book in one of these languages ought not to be unreasonable.

Finally, having brought the subject thus far, and being handicapped in carrying it further by the time lag in correspondence, may I leave it to you to push the proposed article through the next stage?

Your reference to your annual report: I shall go through this shortly and let you know if I can make useful suggestions.

I'm glad you like our March issue. I am afraid I may have let Catherine down on the June issue; as it turns out, there was plenty of material floating around, but I had not sufficiently insured myself against accidents of delays en route, change of boats, and so on, with the result that I am afraid that Catherine had to take at the last moment more decisions than it was fair to impose on her. I'm especially glad you liked Freda Utley's article. I remember suggesting to you some time ago that both she and George Taylor might make good contributors for Amerasia; but of course I don't know what your policy is with regard to non-American contributors.

The articles suggested to you by Arthur Christy on Shinto Nationalism in Japan and on contemporary face-lifting operations on Confucianism in China reached me in Nanking. I took up the question there with Bates, for the article on Confucianism but he had no suggestion. For the Shinto article he suggested a man named Holtom in Japan, who contributed an article on State Shinto during 1935 to the Japan Christian Year Book 1936. I shall accordingly write to Holtom making the suggestion. If in the meantime you flush any coveys of talent for the companion Chinese article, you might let me know.

Owing to the fact that we sublet our house while we were away, to people who were nice and orderly and left everything right side up, we settled down again here with miraculous ease. Inside a couple of hours everything was unpacked and in its right place, and you would not dream that we had been away for more than a year. David, at whose age it is really quite a strain to be yanked around the world with one arm perpetually almost out of its socket, settled down blissfully. Of course we met a dust storm in the first couple of days, and poor David got it in the neck, the inside of the neck, in the form of a streptococcic throat, but he is practically well already.

The amount of stuff under which my desk is groaning has prevented me from taking full advantage of the easy settling down, but of course we have already accumulated to our credit a number of hours of Wittfogelian conversation and dined there one night with the Bissons and Bertram and Ida Pruitt. By the way even Wittfogel's enthusiastic and triumphant letters don't give any adequate idea of the bulk, quality and really fundamental importance of the work he has been doing. He has an organizing and executive ability that could give Henry Ford a start and a licking; and on top of the unbelievable quantity of work that he and his wife have been doing, he has found time to supervise a survey of source material that I needed for my work.

You sure have piled Amerasia on the market here, and I believe you've made a dent. When I've had a chance for more of a talk with Bisson I'll see if I can't do more toward pulling my weight as a member of your editorial team.

All the best,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to introduce in the record a letter from Wilma Fairbank on October 19, 1943, on the letterhead of the Department of State to Mr. Bisson. I am introducing this letter at this time purely to show that Mr. Bisson was at that time acting editor of Pacific Affairs, which was the publication of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to introduce it after it has been authenticated.

Mr. MANDEL. For that purpose alone.

I read in the record a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 19, 1943, on the letterhead of the Department of State, Washington, marked "Personal," addressed to

Mr. T. A. Bisson, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City, addressed "Dear Art" and signed "Wilma Fairbank," with both typewritten and handwritten signature.

The letter reads as follows——

Mr. MORRIS. Just read that part which shows he is acting editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

> Harriet writes me that Chien Tuan-sheng's article on local government (?) is going to be published in the December issue of Pacific Affairs. I understand that you are now acting editor.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all we would like in the record at this time, Mr. Chairman. We would like the whole letter in the record, but we call attention only to that portion.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 71" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 71

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 19, 1943.

Personal.

Mr. T. A. BISSON,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.

DEAR ART: Harriet writes me that Chien Tuan-sheng's article on local government (?) is going to be published in the December issue of Pacific Affairs. I understand that you are now acting editor. I don't know what financial arrangements may have been made but this letter is a request that whatever payment is made for the article be made through me. This is not to get me a cut as literary agent but because Chien has asked me to send out to him whatever he earns in greenbacks and by hand. My last attempt on his behalf was to hand John Davies five $20 bills for his Foreign Affairs article to be delivered to Chien in Kunming. The money, in John's brief case, went halfway down by parachute with him into the Naga Hills, dropped the rest of the way and was finally returned intact by the tribesmen several days later for a 40-rupee reward.

I trust that you got the copy of your article republished in Chinese which John sent you from Chungking, and with it a letter of explanation and commendation from John.

Sincerely,

WILMA FAIRBANK.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, did you have any arguments with Lattimore of this period—namely, 1937—about the Russian purges which had just been effected?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think we talked about the purges in 1937, too, and I am quite sure I told him about the argument I had had with Bisson and Jaffe about it. At that time that was all there was. After he had been in Yenan I met him in America and he wrote a note in Pacific Affairs which has been a comment on the purges in which he, contrary to other observers, thought the terror of that time made the people in Russia more eager to speak up against their Government and kind of developed the spirit of democracy.

I talked to him about it, and I told him I thought that was an absurd argument.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he did defend the purges?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; that is on record. I put now on record that I heard an argument with him and disagreed with him on his defense.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man who wrote under the name of Asiaticus?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us the circumstances of your meeting a man known as Asiaticus in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The name "Asiaticus" was known to me in Germany as the name of a German Communist who had held a leading position in the German party, who was known as Heinz Moeller,[1] and who I think in the middle of the twenties left Germany. His faction was defeated, and one of the ways of leaders of such groups would be to make themselves useful in Moscow and be reassigned, as Gerhardt Eisler was later on.

This man went to China and participated in the early developments of the expansion of the Kuomintang regime, when there was cooperation with the Communist Party at that time, from Canton into the Yangtze Valley up to 1927. And Moeller, who, like I think a number of other Communists, held a position in the Kuomintang government, as Mr. Stalin would say "apparatus."

He worked there in some kind of press or publicity center and put his articles and some others together in a book which was published I think in 1928 in Germany under the title, translated, "From Canton to Shanghai."

Mr. MORRIS. Did a Communist publishing house publish that, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, that is right, in Germany, and I was interested. He was a protege of Gerhart Eisler's, and I thought this was not a very good book. It was poorly written, and I think it was dull stuff. So I inquired about the circumstances and I heard more about this Heinz Moeller. It was published at that time. It was just before the fall of Eisler; and Eisler wanted it, and he was then powerful. The book was printed.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you met Asiaticus in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I met him in the house of, I think, some doctor, some people from Europe who I don't think were political. I don't remember any details about them. They said there was a man who would like to see me, and he introduced himself as Asiaticus-Moeller. He told me he had been expelled—maybe I knew it, I don't remember exactly how this came about—from the party, but that he had made his peace with the great father in the Kremlin, and that he had been back in Moscow and that he was in good standing again, and at that time he was writing for Izvestia, which would indicate indeed he was in good standing.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you did meet him in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, I would like to present to you a copy of a letter which we introduced into our official files here as exhibit No. 4 on the first day of the hearings. This is a letter from Mr. Lattimore, of July 10, 1938, to Mr. Carter.

[1] Heinz Moeller also spelled Hans Mueller.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. What was the date?

Mr. MORRIS. July 10, 1938. I would like to call your attention to this paragraph, which I will ask you to read. It is the next to the last paragraph on that first page of the letter of Lattimore to Carter, dated July 10, 1938.

Dr. WITTFOGEL (reading):

> I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the three people referred to in that article?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know the three of them to be Communists?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Chi story I have told. No doubt I have said I discussed it with Lattimore. The Asiaticus story I told you and I talked to Lattimore after he came back here. We talked about Asiaticus, too, several times. I told him the story the way I knew it; I told Lattimore that.

Senator FERGUSON. When was he writing for Pravda?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. For Izvestia?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In the summer of 1937 he said he wrote for Izvestia.

Senator FERGUSON. There was not any doubt that he told you in 1937 he was in good standing again and had been up to the Kremlin in Moscow?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right, and that he had come back. So the two of them are men who I would say were technically Communists and the third was politically a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know what the China section of the inquiry was?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I don't know the details of it. I know it would take up the various aspects of China during the war, its background and what it might lead up to, a general idea.

Senator SMITH. Talking about Mr. Lattimore and these other three men, do you know whether or not Mr. Lattimore was or is a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In all my correspondence with him and in person the exchange of remarks with Lattimore he has always taken the position that he is not a Communist, not an organized member of any political——

Senator SMITH. What is your judgment from what you know of him and your contacts with him?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. For reasons which may be shown later I would not take Lattimore's statements at their face value, and this letter of which I have seen other parts in the press indicate him as a key man at the time, but I was not aware of it. I would say during his earlier days his ideological attitude was a much more easy-going one, let me say, but many features of his own political inclinations that I have discussed so far showed, I am certain, that a consistent pro-Soviet pattern had developed.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether or not he ever was a full-fledged member of the party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I do not know.

Senator JENNER. For all intents and purposes he might as well have been; is that right? He was following their line, their philosophy, playing their game?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Jenner, I think Dr. Wittfogel would rather relate, as we come along through the years, the particular incidents and episodes that he had vis-à-vis Lattimore and let the committee draw its conclusions about that. Mr. Wittfogel has been very careful to testify to his actual experience with Mr. Lattimore. He wants to lay great stress on what actually did happen rather than for him to draw any conclusions.

Senator SMITH. When was the last time you saw Mr. Lattimore?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think a few months ago in a room in the Institute of Pacific Relations. We both listened to a report given by Mr. Holland.

Senator SMITH. Have you had contact with him by telephone or correspondence since the announcement that these hearings were to begin?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Last December was the last correspondence you had?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, have you any doubt in your own mind as to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. They would be just 100 percent. I would say from the point of view of careful political maneuvering, it would be an idiocy. If I would have run any undercover organization or anything which should look respectful and achieve some usefulness for the Communists, this was a silly suggestion. You see, if you lay all your cards on the table, how can you play the game?

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, do you recall having an argument or a conversation with Lattimore as editor of Pacific Affairs at that period of time, I mean in 1937, in which you complained that there were too many pro-Communists and Communist writings in Pacific Affairs?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think I had such a talk after his return from China. I met him in New York. We talked about many things.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you recall as much as you can of that conversation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I don't remember any details, but I remember the gist of the argument very clearly. That was that I said, "Now there is a feeling that is a kind of unbalanced thing you have, too many Communists and pro-Soviet people."

He said, "You think so?"

Like many advices or criticisms I have given, I think it made no impression.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time he was editor of Pacific Affairs?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Frederick Field in this period, 1938?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had met him in 1934 or 1935, and I met him again during this period.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you try to obtain a Rockefeller grant through Field and the Institute of Pacific Relations at this time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate that to us?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. To continue the work which Mr. Lattimore so flatteringly described in the letter you cited, I wanted to ask for a grant to write up this large amount of material from the Dynastic Histories.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field aided you in that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He made the application in 1948, in the spring.

Mr. MORRIS. I realize the limitation of words, Dr. Wittfogel, but would you describe yourself at that time as a person still within the Communist periphery?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I was very much at the periphery, but I was still there. This is one of those things—maybe most people who have taken my own development just moved faster, but I would say, taking myself as an exhibit it is something interesting: I came back with the feeling that the last asset was gone, which I still had upheld, that maybe everything may be rotten, but there is still some hope for socialism in Russia.

I had discussions in the Institute of Social Research. I said this quite clearly, but afterwards for over a year I was still sticking around. It was just very hard to break away from a group of people whom you have known and the environment you have been in for a long time.

Some ideas you still hold, and then there was the great fight against Hitler. At that time they were very much in it, and that overshadowed everything else. Thus I was still seen from the ouside, and I think objectively, at the fringe of it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you get out?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. All contacts were broken in the summer of 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did you know Phil Jaffe and stay at his summer house in the summer of 1938?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This I have to preface by a remark about my relations. You see, it was not quite easy going.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, did you stay at his house in 1938?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you may make your explanation.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The thing was doubtful, because I had had so many clashes with Mr. Jaffe that the invitation which was made a long time ago wasn't repeated. Finally, Mrs. Jaffe repeated it because of my mother. Once I said when Jaffe visited me in this country place of his, "Phil, if you think Soviet Russia is so wonderful, why don't you go there yourself and see what the thing looks like? It might make some impression on you." It made him so angry he bypassed a red light and got a ticket.

Afterward, it was in the fall when the clashes got sharper and sharper, I said to him, "Why did you invite us to your summer house"—he wasn't there, he was in town—"if that is the way you feel about it?" But I stayed at his house.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time did you know that Jaffe was a friend of Browder and a friend of Willy Muenzenberg?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He told me he was not an organized Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Jaffe told you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Jaffe told me, but he told me all his activities, the way he described them, were activities of a Communist and pro-Communist kind, and he told me that Browder was his good friend. He

said, really his good friend. Field only told me he saw Browder from time to time, but Jaffe made it quite clear he was a good friend of Browder's.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say about Willy Muenzenberg?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was very interested in Muenzenberg who was, as I said, a genius of an organizer. Even as you read Nehru's biography—I think Nehru even now thinks the First Congress of the League Against Imperialism was not a Communist-controlled thing. This was really a tribute to Mr. Muenzenberg. He certainly could put up a good show.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he work for the Communist International?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Muenzenberg was a big shot in the German Communist Party. He was for many years a member of the Reichstag. There was nothing hidden or conspiratorial about him. He was the father of innumerable outlying front organizations. They were not fronts in the sense of those here, because it was very obvious in most cases, except maybe for some strangers, that these things were run by the Communists.

Now, Jaffe talked with me a great deal. He wanted to know all about it, because he had a great admiration for Muenzenberg, and he thought that was the kind of thing he would like to imitate in America.

Mr. MORRIS. Do they conceal the fronts here much more than they did in Germany at that time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. They do the work, but they are concealed; is that the idea?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. Of course, I cannot talk about the time after I left Europe, but in the early days they were big mass parties, and the majority of the people just did not hide their affiliation. It was a completely different political picture.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, where did you stay later on in the summer of 1938? That was early in 1938?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. Then I went to Provincetown.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you stay there?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I stayed in the house together with a gentleman who was a graduate student at Columbia. His name was Moses Finkelstein.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Moses Finkelstein in the summer of 1938 run a summer camp or a summer study session?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Not that summer. He later became a very active organizer of some academic front organizations, of which you know, and which had many prominent persons of the campus and I think of some other campuses in them. He was a very skillful man that way. He had sometimes, it seems, study groups assembled in his house.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this study group that he ran a Communist study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Well, it was a discussion among a group of friends, of people who belonged to his political creed. There was no problem about that.

Mr. MORRIS. Now would you tell us who some of the members were of that particular study group which you have just characterized?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was a very small group. There were just a very few people that I met there. One person I met afterward was Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Mr. Rosinger, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Beg pardon?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Mr. Rosinger? Is he Mr. Laurence Rosinger?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Laurence Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to ask Mr. Mandel if he will identify Rosinger, tell what his connections were with the Institute of Pacific Relations as well as positions with the Government.

Mr. MANDEL. Laurence K. Rosinger was a writer for the Institute of Pacific Relations. According to a release dated May 20, 1950, released by the State Department and published by the Tydings committee on pages 1826 to 1831, Laurence Rosinger is listed among those who submitted a memorandum to the State Department in connection with a round table conference at the Department on October 6, 7, and 8, and also participated in the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. What year?

Mr. MANDEL. That was May 20, 1950, the date of the release. The year of the conference is not given.

Mr. MORRIS. It is October 1949. Do you not find that date in there somewhere?

Mr. MANDEL. It probably was 1949 because the release refers to a subsequent year.

Senator FERGUSON. I think we can check the record of the Appropriations Committee. I think that is the meeting.

Mr. MANDEL. In the same release it refers to a round table discussion on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, arranged by the Office of Public Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, that record shows Mr. Laurence Rosinger was acting as adviser to the Secretary of State on far eastern policy?

Mr. MANDEL. Correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, can you tell us more about Laurence Rosinger's experience at that time? You testified about Moses Finkelstein's Communist study group and Rosinger was a member of that. Can you tell us anything further?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I don't remember whether it was a permanent group. I was invited a very few times. I met Rosinger there, and he was treated as a Communist and spoken of as a Communist by Finkelstein; and afterward I met Rosinger a number of times and up to my formal break he was a very friendly man. Afterward he behaved, I mean I would say with a smoothness which I think is more becoming to an eel than to a human being, smiling all the time, but keeping away from me as if I were a poisonous affair.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened to you after you broke as far as the Communists that you had been associating with were concerned?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. We just cut each other on the street and didn't talk to each other. Some would manage this uneasy friendly smile, while they desired to get away as fast as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what happened with Rosinger?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. Maybe he hoped I would have the same kind of poor memory which seems to be a political disease in certain groups and forget what happened. Anyhow I think he tried to avoid me as much as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Now did you know he had been called down by the Secretary of State to be an adviser on Far Eastern policy in 1949, Dr. Wittfogel.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. You mean whether he wrote a memorandum and whether he was in that discussion?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Mr. Mandel has read that he submitted a memorandum and actually participated in the 3-day conference.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, I heard that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know about that at the time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I knew about it because I, too, wrote a memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you stress in that memorandum, Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In my memorandum I criticized the weaknesses of our attitude toward China and said we have paid a price for not fully understanding what we are doing. As a matter of fact, I warned not to have the same ideological advisers on other parts of Asia which we had had on China. Looking at Rosinger's and others' beginning to write on India now, I had the feeling that the ideological demolition squad which has done such a good job on China is now doing it in India. I therefore said that we should be much more aware of their tricks and try to work out devices which will enable us to protect ourselves against further disaster in other parts of Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have copies of that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, one. It is my last copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson would like to see it now.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened with the State Department after you told them about this demolition squad?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There were more things. I warned them against things you find rampant all over the white book and which I found at least in the mind of one high-ranking gentleman in the State Department with whom I once had an opportunity to discuss Chinese affairs, the idea that the Chinese Communists may be different from other Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is this high-ranking gentleman?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. John Davies.

Mr. MORRIS. John P. Davies?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. John P. Davies. You find extreme positions taken in Lattimore's memorandum about the necessity of giving as much as we can and leaning over backward. Otherwise we might—this is a formula which you find again and again—drive the Chinese Communists in the arms of the Russians. In my opinion this is one of the funniest remarks I have ever heard in my life. You don't have to drive them very hard. I think it is insulting the intelligence of this country to make that kind of remark.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the Communists of China are of the same type?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The genuine brand. I have written so in several articles translated also abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you discuss this memorandum with anyone in the State Department?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I belonged to that small minority that was not invited to the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. You wrote the memorandum, and after you wrote the memorandum you were not asked to the conference?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. First I did not write the memorandum. I wrote to Dr. Jessup whether he really wanted something serious because I thought it was an emergency situation and the thing should be discussed seriously; otherwise I wouldn't write. He said, "Yes, write fully and really say what you have to say."

So I wrote this pamphlet, a rather full analysis of what I consider the basic weaknesses in our concept and procedure and the reasons why we had been deceived, in order not to be deceived again.

Mr. MORRIS. After you wrote this and sent it in, then you were not invited to the round-table discussion; is that right?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Most of the other people who submitted memoranda were invited to the round-table discussions?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. According to what I read later in the published statements, yes.

Senator JENNER. Did you ever ask Dr. Jessup why you were not invited?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I haven't seen him since.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will put in the record Mr. Laurence Rosinger's latest work in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and whatever other pertinent information you have showing his connection with the institute?

Mr. MANDEL. I have in my hand a book published in 1951, issued under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. The title is "The State of Asia, a Contemporary Survey by Laurence K. Rosinger and Associates." On the wrapper is the following: Laurence K. Rosinger has covered far eastern events as a member of the research staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and Foreign Policy Association."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that book introduced in the record together with the excerpts from the flyleaf which Mr. Mandel has read, not to be printed but inserted in the record by reference.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be put in the files of this committee and will be a reference.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 78" and filed for the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Dr. Wittfogel, at that point you had discussed in your own way the question of the connection, actual or ideological, between the Chinese Communists and the Russian Communists. I wish you would comment for the benefit of this committee on the recent official suggestions that Mao Tse-tung might be becoming an anti-Stalinist, that a rift might be growing between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, and there might be some parallel between the direction in which Communist China is going and the direction in which Yugoslavia has gone. Are you familiar with the suggestions to which I refer?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you comment, please?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It seems to me that we have to look at the Chinese pattern as a general pattern. The Yugoslav pattern is an extreme exception. In Yugoslavia you have, it may be called a geo-military situation where a member of the satellite zone very badly treated, might break away successfully because he sits in a part of the country which even Hitler's army could not take. It is a very strong position for such a possibility.

There is another factor which at that time may have been conducive to what Tito did, and that is the much stronger impression that the Western and American Armies made in Europe than they did on the Chinese mainland. A man like Tito has seen the Western World's industrial and military capacity clearly, and I think he had at that time the feeling, and I think he has still that, in the case of an open military clash that the West has a good chance of winning. So burdened by things which he describes in his correspondence as excessive exploitation by Stalin, he severed his relations.

I think the Chinese picture is entirely different. The movement was established from the beginning on a freer footing. It was much more impressed with Soviet power, both industrial and military, because in that part of the world, against the Japanese, the Soviet Russians made a very good showing. The possibility of developing together with the Russians full control over Europe and Asia I think is an enormous attraction for Mao Tse-tung.

I think it is important when discussing the Tito-Mao relations not to forget one thing that in this country should be particularly well known. England overplayed its hands once against its colonies and dominions. This was against the United States, and it lost this old colony. It never overplayed it since.

To assume that Stalin will be so stupid to repeat the mistakes which he has made in Yugoslavia, to overplay his hand and to destroy all the enormous powers of attraction, is a marginal possibility. So I would say, statistically speaking, that is a completely minor point.

Stalin will do everything not to overstrain relations and from Mao's point of view everything is to be gained by staying with Stalin. He looks forward to the coming of the next world war, and I think Mao thinks he belongs in this camp. He has to be victorious, or go down, with it. I think that is his deep conviction; he has said so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Dr. Wittfogel, Mao Tse-tung is a fairly indoctrinated Stalinist Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. And has been brought up in the party?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He has been brought up in the party. It seems that the final soaking with Stalinist ideas came in the middle of the war, in 1941 to 1942. He was technically speaking, in spite of minor differences certainly—he had some argument in the twenties—a faithful Communist, and I think he is completely monolithic in his ideas too since the early forties.

Mr. SOURWINE. His emergence as the leader of the Communist Chinese is not a spontaneous thing, is it, Doctor?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No, it was beautifully organized. He learned it. It is not the ultimate reason why he would stay, because gratitude in politics is very rare, but I think communism, the way it has de-

veloped, is a device of gaining dictatorial power and maintaining it, by using social and racial unrest, weaknesses, and disturbances.

The great academy for this has been Moscow, and Mao Tse-tung and his people have profited immensely from it in the past and I think they hope to profit immensely in the future. If the greater part of agrarian Asia would come under Mao Tse-tung's wings—you have to see this really in terms of the Communist economic evaluation of power—it would still be a world of peasants; and the great center of heavy industry, the big armaments center, things which in the eyes of both Mao and Stalin are decisive—would still be the great Eurasian-Russian heartland.

So the Russians can go very far in letting Mao be supreme in his part of the world. Much more, he may take the whole of India under his jurisdiction; and he will still be the number two man. Stalin may have a lot of trouble, but don't forget it, if you read in the papers, Russia is full of trouble. The Communist system has existed with continuous frictions and explosions. The fact that there are numerous frictions does not mean that things cease to hang together. This is a Communist axis with very tight relations.

If you think back to all the things Mussolini did. He double-crossed Hitler. They didn't like each other. They were not closely allied. Mussolini gave hints to the Soviets. Nevertheless when it came to the ultimate test of the war, Mussolini stuck by Hitler, because that was where he institutionally belonged, and he fought with him and went down with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are perhaps two questions which tie together. Are you familiar with the fact that at the time when there were many in this country who were urging that we should help the Chinese Communists they used among others two favorite arguments, one that the Chinese Communists were simply agrarians, and the other that the Chinese Communist movement was a parallel to Titoism and a chance to build something in China which would combat Stalin?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That was the second version of the same thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That argument died down after it was more or less contradicted by history?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with the fact that that argument has had a resurgence very recently after stimulation from official or semiofficial sources?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I am aware of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any theory which would logically explain the resurgence of that idea?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There may be several reasons. There may be different people who have this feeling for different reasons. I have looked at Hitler Germany and many of my friends, you know, and whenever there was a crack and whenever there was conflict or shooting we said, "This is the end of the thing."

So there were a number of people who genuinely believed this. I think there was a difference in the size of a basketball or something,

and people disagreed on matters of sport, so some people thought: "Here now, really the whole thing is cracking up. Even on the playgrounds, the rift asserts itself." But there may be much worse rifts without consequence. I think there are people who just genuinely are wishful thinkers.

I have several friends who proved scientifically and mathematically that Germany must collapse, that it cannot conduct a war. It has to fall to pieces; and Hitler couldn't conduct the war. I think there are a number of people now who think wishfully that the enormous Communist axis will crack because conditions are strained. I am sure they are strained, and I am sure the Soviet Russians are not very popular in China. That may be why the Soviet names have been taken off the slogans. But that is no reason to assume that the whole thing may fall to pieces, it has survived much more serious crises. That is an extreme possibility, but I don't think it follows necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not communism adjust itself to some of these stresses and strains?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Exactly, to many of them, with an enormous vitality. The history of the Comintern is the history of explosions, of conflicts. But it shows an amazing healing capacity, you know, assuring the survival of the general pattern.

Senator FERGUSON. One central figure and one common denominator?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I think at this point we had better recess until 2 o'clock. Doctor, you will return at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH (presiding). The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed with the examination of the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at the termination of the last session, chronologically, we had gotten as far as Dr. Wittfogel relating his experiences at a certain Communist study group in the summer of 1938. We had mentioned that the school was run by Moses Finklestein and that one of the people at the study group was Lawrence Rosinger who, in the course of conversation with Dr. Wittfogel, indicated he was a Communist.

Who were some of the other students at this study group?

TESTIMONY OF KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL, NEW YORK, N. Y.—Resumed

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was a talented and pleasant young man who was studying in the Japanese Department at Columbia. His name is Herbert Norman.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of this study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, did he know it was a Communist study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, it was obvious.

Mr. MORRIS. To you?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think it was obvious, in general.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it obvious therefore that he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce into the record, first of all, a letter that would indicate Herbert Norman's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated May 30, 1940, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore. It reads as follows:

Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the even of his sailing for Tokyo as language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs.

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on contemporary matters, providing he writes under a nom de plume.

I imagine that by now you have read his inquiry book, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. This is probably the most fundamental study that has yet appeared in the inquiry series. I am hoping that all of us may find some way of continuing Norman as a contributor to the IPR publication program in one form or another.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. That date is approximately 2 years after the episode testified to by Dr. Wittfogel, is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any further material on that series of letters that is pertinent to this?

Mr. MANDEL. There is another letter, apparently a memorandum headed "ECC from WLH." E. C.C. is apparently Edward C. Carter, and W. L. H. is apparently W. L. Holland, and it is dated September 5, 1940. It is on a typed letterhead of the Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. I will just read an excerpt from that letter.

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking with him Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuo's Industral Japan. Among the other manuscripts to be sent to him very shortly will be Laura Thompson's book on Guam for the American Council, Wentworth's on Filipino living standards in Hawaii, the new catalog, and Wittfogel's monograph on oriental society. I am hoping to have the two big books by Mills and Keesing published commercially in this country. Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6, and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation. Phil will cable us after he arrives about whether the Japanese want him to remain for an extra week or two to help them with their publications, and will also indicate his probable date of arrival in Shanghai. His temporary address in Shanghai, until we hear that he has actually arrived, will be care of the American Express Co.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer that in evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

I would like to ask Dr. Wittfogel, however, if he would care to comment on the statement:

Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6 and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do not think I can.

Mr. MORRIS. You know 2 years previously Herbert Norman was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I might say there is nothing in this letter that would indicate on its face who Phil was at this time. We have to check to see who that is.

Senator SMITH. They are received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 72" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 72

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, N. Y., May 30, 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md

DEAR OWEN: Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the eve of his sailing for Tokyo as language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs.

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on contemporary matters, providing he writes under a non-de-plume.

I imagine that by now you have read his inquiry book, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. This is probably the most fundamental study that has yet appeared in the inquiry series. I am hoping that all of us may find some way of continuing Norman as a contributor to the IPR publication program in one form or another.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

GIANNINI FOUNDATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., September 5, 1940.

E. C. C. from W. L. H.:

By air express I am sending you Bloch's Manchukuo manuscript, over which Phil and I have sweated and cursed mightily. We have been so irritated by it at times that it is hard to give a balanced opinion of it, but after duly leaning over backward I think I can safely say that with a little more work and with some very necessary checking of the tables by someone like Kate or Jack working together with Bloch, it can be made into a valuable report.

I enclose a letter to Bloch for you to pass on to him after you have looked over the manuscript or got Kate and Jack to look at it. You will note that my suggestions involve some additional work for Bloch, probably 3 or 4 weeks, and you will have to decide after talking to him whether this could be arranged and at what expense.

Some of the weaknesses in the report derive from the inevitable inadequacies and inconsistencies in the source materials, and no doubt some of the gaps might be filled by a person like Matsuo who has presumably had more recent first-hand acquaintance with developments in Manchukuo. Other weaknesses, however, may be attributed directly to Bloch's apparent carelessness in the handling of some of the statistics and to his very irritating habit of elaborating on some minor incidental aspect of a problem instead of first giving the broad outline in simple, straightforward language. This is particularly noticeable in the chapters on railways and economic planning. A certain number of these intellectual diversions are pardonable, if only because they serve to show up some of the absurdities and inconsistencies in the materials released by the Japanese themselves, but they should not be included at the expense of more elementary information which the general reader will want.

I suppose a good deal of the manuscript will have to be retyped, but there may be some chapters, e. g., on mining and manufacturing, in which our pen-

cilled corrections can be transferred to another carbon copy or written more legibly in ink on the present copy.

I shall leave it to you and Kate to decide whether the manuscript should be submitted to the advisers after the present corrections have been made or only after Bloch has done the additional work I have suggested in my letter to him. There are, of course, some advantages in submitting it now in that Bloch will be able to take account of the advisers' comments in the final revision, but I am afraid that both Dennery and Condliffe would object to the inadequacies of the chapters on foreign trade, railways, and economic planning; and Angus might object to the somewhat critical tone of the whole study. I suspect that Condliffe will be critical of the report anyway, since you will remember that he had some reservations about the wisdom of assigning the study to Bloch or to anyone who had not had recent first-hand experience in Manchuria, and close cooperation from the Japanese. On the whole, therefore, I should personally recommend waiting until Bloch has had a few weeks to amplify and rearrange the study.

I have had a telegram from Yasuo saying that he has been unable to complete the additional sections of his book on industrial Japan, owing to the pressure of heavy business, but that he is trying to finish it in 3 weeks and is writing me. I assume this is in response to your intercession. The additional sections are to deal with Manchukuo, and I would suggest that you ask Yasuo for an extra carbon copy which Bloch can use in connection with his revisions.

I enclose a suggested revision of the editorial note for Chi.

Although I shall have a good deal of additional work to do on Pat Glover's manuscript, on Keesing's book on The South Seas in the Modern World, and on Mills' book on Hong Konk and Malaya, I wonder if there is not another inquiry manuscript which you could send me in the near future, e. g. Tamagna's? Shouldn't you also send another frantic appeal to Colegrove, asking what in the world is delaying his report on the Japanese military?

If it would relieve the load on the New York staff, I should be glad to look after the proofreading of some of the forthcoming inquiry reports, e. g. Fahs, Dietrich, and Taylor. This might involve my employing Mrs. Ward for more than the present 3 days a week.

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking with him Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuo's Industrial Japan. Among the other manuscripts to be sent to him very shortly will be Laura Thompson's book on Guam for the American Council, Wentworth's on Filipino living standards in Hawaii, the new catalog, and Wittfogel's monograph on oriental society. I am hoping to have the two big books by Mills and Keesing published commercially in this country. Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6, and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation. Phil will cable us after he arrives about whether the Japanese want him to remain for an extra week or two to help them with their publications, and will also indicate his probable date of arrival in Shanghai. His temporary address in Shanghai, until we hear that he has actually arrived, will be care of the American Express Co.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else was in this study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is all I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Daniel Thorner in the group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No. I met Mr. Thorner through the head of the group. Mr. Finklestein treated him as a man of his political confidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Thorner himself did not participate.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He did not. Mr. Finklestein said, "You might give a lecture on China in the history student club; there is our friend Thorner, and I will arrange it with him." Which he did; and I spoke there.

Mr. MORRIS. You did speak there?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. This is during the period when you were still within the Communist periphery?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. I saw Thorner afterwards. He came to me occasionally. He showed a great interest in Marx's writing

on India. He was studying India. He took me once over to the basement of the Columbia Library to show me Marx's articles on India.

In these writings, Marx acted like a Socialist-Fascist and Imperialist. That is, these articles are now particularly abhorred in Moscow. I throw that in to show how complicated the ideological developments are. At that time, I am sure, Thorner wasn't aware of it. He thought this was good, pure, doctrine. We talked it over. I would say his behavior was that of a man who moved along that line. Our talk was not specific.

But there is a little episode I might add. This was during the time of the pact and before Italy entered into the war.

Mr. Thorner came back from India via Italy and France, and I met him on the street. If I had any doubt that he was a Communist, it was removed then. I had been long enough in the movement to know. The card is a question of bookkeeping, and whoever has been near this business knows there are many ways of being connected with this gigantic political machine. The second highest man in the German Communist Party until 1924 is said to have never paid any fee in the early days, Mr. Thalheimer.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you spell that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. T-h-a-l-h-e-i-m-e-r.

Mr. MORRIS. Your testimony is he never had a card?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He never paid any dues. This was the episode: Mr. Thorner told me about his experiences. He was very warm about Fascist Italy. This was a fine country, very good. Compared to this things were stinko in France, which was then under the stress of war.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean Italy was a fine country?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. According to the Communist Party line, the main enemies then were England and France, and fascism wasn't quite so bad. After he told me this, I wouldn't say I kicked him off the boardway, but I told him something that you cannot say in Sunday school. For me, I had no desire to see him again. If that is the way he felt about fascism and about the defense of the western world, I had no desire to see him again. This is the end of my experience.

I heard later that he is now in the only institute in America dealing with India, he and his wife, in Philadelphia. I know some other "unpartial" men, like Chen Han-seng have also worked at this institute.

Mr. MORRIS. You say Chen Han-seng was with the institute?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. As far as I remember. Yes, in Philadelphia.

Mr. MORRIS. You say further Thorner was closely associated with Moses Finklestein?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that a bit?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is all I know.

Mr. MORRIS. You say closely associated. Politically?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was a political friend, I would say.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what Moses Finklestein is doing now?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think he is teaching history at Rutgers College in New Jersey.

Mr. MORRIS. Under that name, or has he changed his name?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think he assumed the name of Moses Finley.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you get your Rockefeller grant?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes; I got it early in 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. That was prior to the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You did get your grant from the Rockefeller Foundation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe to us your reaction to the Hitler-Stalin pact, particularly discussing that portion of your reaction which had to do with these people in the Institute of Pacific Relations whom we have been discussing.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. My general reaction was if the only thing I gave them still credit for, to fight Hitler, if they are washed up even there, then really everything has gone down the kitchen sink of history. That was the general thing. In the institute not much happened. Mr. Field, who by the way, all the time behaved like a gentleman toward me, he lost interest in the institute. He got restless. He wanted to do something else. Finally, he went into this peace mobilization work. I thought he had gone completely crazy. I saw very little of him.

I would like to say as far as the Institute of Pacific Relations handled the technical part of my work, they behaved without reproach. Later on, it came to the publication. This was a big book. Assuming there were some people who did not like the anti-Stalin attitude of social science in this work, I don't think those people were aware of it. It was a nice big book. It looked very scholarly. It was a feather in the institute's cap; I think from the point of view of the book I have nothing to complain.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that published?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was finished by the middel of the '40's. It was published very slowly because of the difficulties of printing, in 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we are running a little ahead of ourselves by adverting to it now.

Did you have a controversy or conversation with Joseph Barnes during the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was either at the end of the pact or shortly after. I had heard that Barnes had kind of weakened. Some people said "Even Barnes can't stand this any longer and even he seems to be somewhat shaken."

I rang him up several times. I found him not very eager to see me. I was insistent, and we had a conversation. Just by accident, Owen Lattimore was in town. We had a conversation, the three of us. It was one of those attempts, I thought, "Here, you might pull Barnes out of what he has been in. He has been in it, but maybe he has seen the light." I pulled in vain.

I tried to disentangle him, to uproot him as far as I could. I told him many things about my own experience. I have had some experiences which made me very sure that the Comintern engineered the fight between the German Communists and the Social Democrats to confuse the anti-Fascist front, and to bring Hitler to power, not because they were political perverts but because they wanted a big war

in the west. They thought this was the way to achieve it. They would have preferred a military conservative government. They took Hitler. He was the lesser evil.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would develop that? I think it would be pertinent if you would develop that argument that you just alluded to.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. If I may say, and I would like to put this on the record for history and not just for our hearing, this will be a very big issue for years to come, and it will be one thing which the Communists and Mr. Stalin will never live down, if it is fully developed.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop it so we will understand the basis of the problem?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In 1931 to '33, the German Communists were told that the "main enemy" to fight was not fascism and Hitler but it was the Social Democrats. Later they changed the formula from a main enemy to the "main support" of capitalism.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that from your own knowledge?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Sure. I was in the midst of it. I have seen the most devastating development. And the people knew what they were doing.

In the summer of '32 I was in Moscow. I will not forget. A man who has become part of modern American folklore—Mr. Gerhart Eisler—stood there. He was a man who goes around claiming he was sent out by the German party, which he never was. And that he was a great fighter against fascism. Actually he took exactly the line against the "Social Fascists" the others took. There was, my old friend, Madjar. He was a Hungarian originally, who wrote the best book at that time about agrarian China in the Soviet Union, and he was full of deviations. Madjar stood in front of the Comintern building. There stood Gerhart Eisler next to him.

Madjar said 20,000 of the best labor leaders in Germany will have to be killed. I said, "What do you mean?"

He said that Hitler has to come to power. His whole face was distorted. There were other people who talked about it the same way. This was the great line of the Comintern, to bring Hitler to power, not because they loved him; they did not. They thought that through him they would get the big thing going.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say, "get the big thing going," what do you mean?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The big war, which the Soviets would support, the thing which they got going in '39.

So when I heard my friend, Madjar, say this, Mr. Eisler, the great fighter against fascism, stood there, and nodded strongly. So Madjar said, "Come, let's discuss it tonight. Come along, Gerhart." Gerhart didn't turn up. He was a cautious man. That is why he lives so long.

There were many other incidents which made it very clear to anybody, you don't need personal experience. Only sit down for an afternoon and read the Comintern literature from 1931 to 1933. If you look at it under this angle, you will see that one of the great monstrous crimes were committed. I myself thought at first the Russian Communists were just dumb. Gradually, I realized myself that this was a very big strategy to get one of the great wars of modern times going. This took some time, but it succeeded in 1939.

I told Barnes about it. Of course, there was no reason why he should have known all these things, but what interested me was that his reaction was to take up the defense of Mr. Stalin's policy and the Comintern without going into the facts. If he had an open mind, he should have said, "Let's really weigh the facts."

But he pretented to be a man who knew all. I said, "You know a lot about Russia which I don't know, but I happen to know this very well. Let's go over the documentation."

I saw here a man who was fanatical. He stuck by his allegiance to the Comintern which he defended in an abstruse manner. He didn't care about the facts. I got the feeling the man is just a fanatic. That was the end of my contact with Barnes.

Later, when I saw Lattimore and I said, "Is Barnes such a fellow traveler as he was previously?" That was linked up with this episode.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember having a clash with Michael Greenberg in the fall of 1941, Dr. Wittfogel.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe that, if that is the correct time?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This was at a time when Mr. Lattimore had been appointed special envoy or adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

The Pacific Affairs had to be run by somebody else. I see that technically it was Mr. Carter, but as for the second man it was Mr. Greenberg. As far as I could see, he became the actual editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who was instrumental in having Michael Greenberg take over the running of Pacific Affairs?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No; I know nothing about this.

Mr. MORRIS. But at that time you knew Mr. Greenberg was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I had seen him in America before. First, when I saw him he didn't know about my own development. He tried to continue talking in the way in which we had talked in Cambridge about a couple of years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1934?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. I made it clear I was sorry he didn't develop.

Mr. MORRIS. Away from communism?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The way I had. So I saw little or nothing of him. When he became the editor or managing editor of the magazine, I had two book reviews written for it that summer. They were thrown together by him in a funny way. I knew they wouldn't like certain points in my reviews. Greenberg certainly wouldn't like them, from his point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his point of view?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The argument had something to do with the interpretation of Chinese society.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew he wouldn't agree, for the simple reason you had known in 1934 he was a Communist and from all appearances he was still a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This was against the Communist doctrine.

Mr. MORRIS. What you had written?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Sure. Anyhow, he published the stuff and threw it together with things which had nothing to do with each other,

history of philosophy and some modern stuff. As he edited it, it looked silly, in my opinion.

Then when we had a talk about another book which should be reviewed, I said why don't you let me review the book?

He said, "You know too much about the subject."

I said, "Michael, I think when you come with this argument we are through. When you make this kind of a pretext, I fear we shall not cooperate. I mean, seeing the way you conduct this business, I think that I will never write a line for Pacific Affairs again," and I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in the fall of 1941?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any association with Pacific Affairs from that time on?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Amerasia?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I have written one article in the first year; none since.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record, Mr. Chairman, two names that have come in this last portion of the testimony in an excerpt from the Library of Congress.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that and read the significant names?

Mr. MANDEL. The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress was asked to make for us a study of the research fellows and students in the Walter Hines Page School headed by Mr. Owen Lattimore. They sent this study which is being inserted into the record for 1940 to 1951.

Among those listed as research associates, fellows, or students in seminars, are these two names which appear in our present investigation. One is Dr. Chen Han-seng and the other is Mr. Daniel Thorner. This is dated August 6, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that in evidence and have it marked.

Senator SMITH. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 73" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 73

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

Washington 25, D. C.

RESEARCH FELLOWS AND STUDENTS IN THE WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL, 1940–51

(Compiled by Helen Miller, Government Section, August 6, 1951)

The following list was compiled from the Johns Hopkins University circular and president's reports for the years 1940–51.

The Walter Hines Page School of International Relations is primarily for research into far-eastern affairs. Its personnel consists principally of faculty members and students who have received their doctoral degrees. According to the 1950–51 university circular, "fellows in the Page School are appointed primarily to enable them to undertake independent research work." Consequently the names appearing here were listed as research associates, fellows, or students in seminars. The Legislative Reference Service has written to the Johns

Hopkins University for a definition of these terms and a more complete list of students at the school since 1940. Until we have further information from them this list is the best we can submit.

Dr. David F. Aberle.
Dr. William M. Austin.
Miss Ruth F. Bean.
Mr. Schuyler Cammann.
Mr. Chih-yi Chang.
Dr. John De Francis.
Mr. Clive E. Glover.
Mr. John Gombojab Hangin.
Dr. Chen Han-seng.
The Dilowa Hutukhtu.
Mr. Nobutaka Ike.
Mr. Catesby Jones.
Mr. George Mct. Kahin.
Dr. Karl H. Menges.
Dr. Francis Henry Michael.
Mr. Peter Urgunggi Onon.
Dr. Karl J. Pelzer.
Mr. Martin R. Ring.
Mr. Richard Schraml.
Mr. Daniel Thorner.
Mr. Ho Tze-Ch'Uan.
Mr. H. H. Vreeland, III.
Dr. Leo Waibel.
Mr. Thomas G. Wiener.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall a dispute you had with Owen Lattimore in the fall of 1944 on the subject of Korea?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate that to us?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Our relations had become less and less intense and also less and less cordial. We had more political arguments, which I may bypass for the time being.

I had a long talk with him in 1940, which I think led to nothing. There was some argument in 1942 when I said something like this: "You talk about Russia and about communism without being fully experienced. These are very tricky things. You ought to know your watch when you talk about it." We use the formula for a watch maker. We had an argument on that.

In 1944, when he came back from the trip with Vice President Wallace, I saw him. First we had a cheerful encounted about Mr. Joe Barnes, which made him very angry; then we went to some other matters.

Mr. MORRIS. Angry at you or at Barnes?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It made Lattimore very angry.

Mr. MORRIS. At you or at Barnes?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was angry at me.

It is shown in his letter to me. The fact that I referred to Barnes as a fellow traveler, he thought was very insulting. I shall come back to the correspondence. I said, "You know Joe Barnes talked there about things about which he had obviously no great experience." Lattimore himself took up the argument on Germany. It was very easy to see that he did it with the same light cargo on his shoulders; namely, he didn't know anything about it either. Whereupon I told him so rather bluntly, as we used to do.

He finally said, "O. K. You think I know little about Europe. Maybe I don't, so let's talk about that part of the world where you admit I know something about, namely, the Far East." So we talked about Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of this conversation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It was October 1944, I think. We talked about possible solutions in the Far East. He said for Korea it would be the best solution, a good conservative solution, if the Soviet Union would take the country over, which upset me very much. I blew up properly and thought this was not exactly the way a representative of the American Government should talk about its interest.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he is a representative of the American Government. What do you mean?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. He was still a official of the American Government. He was still connected with OWI. He was no longer the Deputy Director, but still a member of that Government organization.

Mr. MORRIS. He had just come back——

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Maybe he was too snooty to deal with the State Department. He talked with President Roosevelt and he went around with a Vice President of the United States. These are no small men, it seems to me. He had the right to feel kind of important. I thought this was an extraordinary statement coming from a man of these connections and these responsibilities.

So our conversation ended kind of sadly. He knew I did not take many of his other ideas very seriously, but I thought that in the field of Mongolian, Inter-Asiatic and Chinese relations he had great experience, almost unique experience, I would say. Thus I still maintained the plan to have him supply the introduction to our first volume here which deals essentially with these relations.

We went on with correspondence after that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember having a discussion with him on the disposition of the Mikado?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This came up at the end of this whole affair. As I said, we tried to patch up our relations from both sides.

Mr. MORRIS. This is after the 1944 conversation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. In 1944 to 1945. He even sent me his Solution in Asia. I wrote him a nice letter about the book, and said what I wanted for the project. To me he was still a leading expert in this field. I would like to say this here: The fact that Lattimore lacked formal academic training does not impress me.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not impress you adversely?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. As very relevant. I would say if Johns Hopkins gave him a big position, it honors Johns Hopkins.

Lattimore might have trouble today in the Soviet Union, where they are now ridiculously pedant about academic titles and positions, but in a democratic country like ours persons with an unusual contribution may be given unusual opportunities, also in the universities. In my opinion this is something to be proud of, but the generosity should be properly appreciated by him who benefits by it. In Lattimore's case, here was a man who was a real authority in a limited field. This was before he tried to build himself up as a global expert. Here was a man who had been given great trust and shown great generosity—I think that is a conclusion we might draw—but he would have to justify it and not abuse it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think he abused that trust?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. But if you will permit me to go on with our story——

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. So there was this problem of the introduction. I personally was very unhappy. In my letter of 1945 I was in a great conflict. I did nothing about his introduction. This has been done before in the bureaucratic world. I just let it wait. We went on printing the general introduction. I thought of a way of getting out of his contribution. This finally offered itself by Lattimore asking

me, at the end of 1946, whether he couldn't write the introduction. He wrote in such a way that I in my reply could answer, "I think we gave you enough credit. Let's call it a day." Whereupon he said, "No, I would like very much to write the introduction."

He had seen a good deal of the manuscript. It is the work of a group of fine scholars. It is not only my personal work. I may therefore say, it represents good scholarship.

So, a correspondence developed which finally brought in big political matters.

Do you want somebody else to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. No, this is your file. I would like you to make reference to it. These are the copies that we have made up.

Will you identify those as copies of your own letters?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, I do. Let me go back to the letters before these.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these records that we are referring to in the record. They are going to be made a part of the record.

Senator SMITH. They will be inserted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 74, 75, and 76," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 74

FEBRUARY 18, 1947.

DEAR OWEN: Your letter of January 29 is very flattering to me, but it places you in a somewhat peculiar light—if I accept your statement of your attitudes.

You know that I have never sought any important political position. In fact, I have refused to consider positions of this kind even when they have been suggested, for, although I as a citizen have taken a deep interest in the commonweal, I do not feel myself fitted for political leadership. You, on the contrary, have held political positions of great responsibility—positions in which your judgment and advice affected vital features of this country's foreign policy. Nevertheless you state that my political opinions are "much stronger" than yours. Do you really think that I, the simple citizen, take political opinions more seriously, than you; the man who occupied important political posts? Do you really mean to say that you voiced important political opinions without holding them strongly?

When you, in conversation with Esther and me after your return from the U. S. S. R. suggested that Korea might advantageously be taken over by the "conservative" forces of Soviet Russia, you certainly expressed a startlingly significant political idea. Did you or did you not mean what you said? When, during the war, you urged the removal of the Mikado, you certainly expressed a politically significant idea, and one which, had it been accepted, would probably have cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. Did you hold these views when you uttered them? Did I, when expressing others, contradict your real opinions or opinions which you really did not hold? (In your letter you remark that I have tried to convert you from opinions "which I do not hold").

You say that I express my political opinions more vehemently than you do. There are probably differences in temperament which manifest themselves as differences in expression. But it seems to me that for a number of years we exchanged many ideas, political and otherwise, without getting into any heated argument. After your trip with Wallace, your tone changed. If I hurt you by my vehemence, I am sorry. Even strongly felt conviction should not be so expressed. There may have been a good reason why I reacted violently to your attitude—and I think there was; but whatever the reason, I certainly do not defend the passion of my expression.

But please examine the substance of your argument in your last letter. If it is difficult to understand what your political opinions are, how can I be sure about your scientific views? There are systems of political ideas, just as there are systems of scientific ideas. To make sense they have to operate—and, can be apprehended, checked, and argued in an orderly fashion. For some time, I have felt that your system of values, scientific as well as political, is not an

integrated one. In the past you have made fine scholarly contributions, and I shall never hesitate to acknowledge them; but, in view of your lack of certainty regarding your present ideas, collaboration between us had better wait until they have recrystallized. I am looking forward to the day when I can again talk with you about opinions which you do not only seem to hold, but which you really hold.

Sincerely.

EXHIBIT NO. 75

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore 18, Md., February 20, 1947.

DR. KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL,
Chinese History Project, Columbia University,
New York City.

DEAR KARL AUGUST: Your letter of February 18 bears out, I am afraid, the opinion which I expressed in my last letter to you—that your ideas and feelings on political matters are more extreme than mine and more vehemently expressed. As examples of trying to convert me from opinions which I do not hold, I cannot imagine how you could have got the idea that I believe that "Korea might advantageously be taken over by the 'conservative' forces of Soviet Russia." As for the removal of the Mikado, I have never argued that America should remove him; my position has always been that American policy should not be committed to support of the Mikado, particularly if there should arise a strong Japanese demand for his removal.

In view of these misunderstandings it is obvious that when we meet we shall get on best if we confine the conversation to those subjects in which I can exercise my respect for your enormous and in some ways unrivaled knowledge.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT NO. 76

MARCH 19, 1947.

MY DEAR OWEN: Your letter of February 20 showed me again how far apart we are, not only in our recollection of the spoken word, but in our interpretation of the printed fact.

Regarding the matter of Korea, it will always remain your memory against mine and Esther's and those few friends to whom we repeated, in our dismay, your statement made some minutes previously in the cafeteria of the Social Security Building.

Likewise, our conversation at dinner, just before your Columbia lecture on Japan, regarding your new man, Carter's improper handling of archaeological material of the Southwest (this from archeologists) and my own criticism that he had been equally remiss in dealing with the historical data. Such a blatant scientific deficiency bothered you very little—your answer, semantically not literally, ran something like this: "Oh, I myself have been criticized for bending the facts." Certainly an astonishing response, and a very irresponsible one, from a person of your scientific achievement and academic position. But perhaps you don't remember this incident either—and again it is a question of your memory and mine, your spoken word and mine.

Your statement on the Mikado is something else again. Here you are on record in your book, Solution in Asia, page 189. Here you write:

"If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good. If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China but under the supervision of a United Nations commission, to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy."

Did you remember this when you wrote me in your last letter, "As for the removal of the Mikado, I have never argued that America should remove him; * * *"?

The question between us is really a simple one. Can we be of scientific value to each other while your opinions are held so lightly, denied so readily, and interpreted so arbitrarily?

Sincerely.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I mentioned in the preceding letters the difference in our political attitudes. He said, "Your political opinions are much stronger than mine, much more vehemently expressed." Whereupon, I answered.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe that letter? That is a letter you have written to Lattimore?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. To Lattimore. He said, "Let's make up our difference. We have a political difference. Maybe we can still go on in our scientific field."

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of this letter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This is February 18, 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. You are writing to Lattimore?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Answering his charge that I hold my opinions so strongly. My letter reads:

Your letter of January 29 is very flattering to me, but it places you in a somewhat peculiar light—if I accept your statement of your attitudes.

You know that I have never sought any important political position. In fact, I have refused to consider positions of this kind even when they have been suggested, for, although I as a citizen have taken a keen interest in the commonweal, I do not feel myself fitted for political leadership. You, on the contrary, have held political positions of great responsibility—positions in which your judgment and advice affected vital features of this country's political policy. Nevertheless you state that my political opinions are "much stronger" than yours. Do you really think that I, the simple citizen, take political opinions more seriously than you, the man who occupied important political posts? Do you really mean to say that you voiced important political opinions without holding them strongly?

When you, in conversation with Esther and me after your return from the U. S. S. R. suggested that Korea might advantageously be taken over by the "conservative" forces of Soviet Russia, you certainly expressed a startlingly significant political idea. Did you or did you not mean what you said? When, during the war, you urged the removal of the Mikado, you certainly expressed a politically significant idea, and one which, had it been accepted, would probably have cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. Did you hold these views when you uttered them? Did I, when expressing others, contradict your real opinions or opinions which you really did not hold? (In your letter you remark that I have tried to convert you from opinions "which I do not hold".)

You say that I express my political opinions more vehemently than you do. There are probably differences in temperament which manifest themselves as differences in expression. But it seems to me that for a number of years we exchanged many ideas, political and otherwise, without getting into any heated argument. After your trip with Wallace, your tone changed. If I hurt you by my vehemence, I am sorry. Even strongly felt conviction should not be so expressed. There may have been a good reason why I reacted violently to your attitude—and I think there was; but whatever the reason, I certainly do not defend the passion of my expression.

But please examine the substance of your argument in your last letter. If it is difficult to understand what your political opinions are, how can I be sure about your scientific views? There are systems of political ideas, just as there are systems of scientific ideas. To make sense they have to operate—and, can be apprehended, checked, and argued in an orderly fashion. For some time I have felt that your system of values scientific as well as political, is not an integrated one. In the past you have made fine scholarly contributions, and I shall never hesitate to acknowledge them; but, in view of your lack of certainty regarding your present ideas, collaboration between us had better wait

until they have recrystallized. I am looking forward to the day when I can again talk with you about opinions which you do not only seem to hold, but which you really hold.

Whereupon, Mr. Lattimore answered me as follows:

FEBRUARY 20, 1947.

Your letter of February 18 bears out, I am afraid, the opinion which I expressed in my last letter to you—that your ideas and feelings on political matters are more extreme than mine and more vehemently expressed. As examples of trying to convert me from opinions which I do not hold, I cannot imagine how you could have got the idea that I believe that "Korea might advantageously be taken over by the 'conservative' forces of Soviet Russia."As for the removal of the Mikado, I have never argued that America should remove him; my position has always been that American policy should not be committed to support of the Mikado, particularly if there should arise a strong Japanese demand for his removal.

In view of these misunderstandings it is obvious that when we meet we shall get on best if we confine the conversations to those subjects in which I can exercise my respect for your enormous and in some ways unrivaled knowledge.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

To which I answered, and this is the last letter and the end of my relations as a human being with self-respect to Owen Lattimore:

Your letter of February 20 showed me again how far apart we are, not only in our recollection of the spoken word, but in our interpretation of the printed fact.

Regarding the matter of Korea, it will always remain your memory against mine and Esther's—

I wasn't alone—

and those few friends to whom we repeated—

I think Professor Taylor was there—

in our dismay, your statement made some minutes previously in the cafeteria of the Social Security Building.

Likewise, our conversation at dinner, just before your Columbia lecture on Japan, regarding your new man, Carter's improper handling of archeological material of the Southwest (this from archaeologists) and my own criticism that he had been equally remiss in dealing with the historical data. Such a blatant scientific deficiency bothered you very little—your answer, semantically not literally, ran something like this: "Oh, I myself have been criticized for bending the facts." Certainly an astonishing response, and a very irresponsible one, from a person of your scientific achievement and academic position. But perhaps you don't remember this incident either—and again it is a question of your memory and mine, your spoken word and mine.

Your statement on the Mikado is something else again. Here you are on record in your book Solution in Asia, page 189. Here you write:

"If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good. It not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China but under the supervision of a United Nations commission, to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy."

Did you remember this when you wrote me in your last letter, "As for the removal of the Mikado, I have never argued that America should remove him; * * * "

The question between us is really a simple one. Can we be of scientific value to each other while your opinions are held so lightly, denied so readily, and interpreted so arbitrarily?

He denied not only what he said before two witnesses about Korea, but he denied even what he had printed in his own book. I felt this was a brazen attitude and a complete lack of responsibility.

I decided never to touch that man again. I saw him, however, shortly after that at a conference at Princeton. He addressed me and said: "You were probably pleased that you caught me with the one about the Mikado." I said that I was ashamed rather than delighted, and I was embarrassed by the shabby way in which he made this concluding remark; which, by the way, was heard—I think—also by Professor Taylor. I was deeply ashamed. It was something that was very undignified. It was something which I do not think I care to experience either in personal or political relations.

I think this was a brazen way of handling key political matters, matters of great importance, and it should give pause for thought to all those who consider the Lattimore cult a part of their citizenship activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, have you found in Owen Lattimore's writings any terminology that would demonstrate his intrinsic devotion to Communist interpretation?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Generally speaking, he has avoided the jargon. I have seen that letter of——

Senator FERGUSON. Do you care to comment on that whole letter?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think I have not much to add. I think the newspapers have well commented on it.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your comment about it? You were talking about "jargon" and the use of language.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. It would show obviously how somebody tries to proceed along certain political lines without showing himself. There would be a technical term for it. Proceeding in a pro-Communist way without "exposing yourself"; this would be the technical Communist Party term for such an attitude.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a Communist philosophy or trait?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think that is a general line of procedure, of course. If you work as a man who does not come out openly as a Communist—Mr. Foster and Browder would not work that way—but people who officially pretend to be something else, would speak that way. It is a division of labor.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a strange method?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. You would say it is the method which would be used by those elements of the periphery who are really closely coordinated and integrated into the movement, but who try to promote the advantages of the movement without exposing themselves. As a matter of fact, I remember that once Owen said to me. "You know, Karl August, I never read Marx, because if I don't read the stuff nobody can ever accuse me of using the Marxist jargon when saying anything pro-Soviet."

Senator FERGUSON. Who said that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Mr. Lattimore. So he avoided even learning the jargon in order not to become too conspicuous. It was somewhere around 1938 or 1939.

Mr. Morris asked me whether there were instances in which Mr. Lattimore had taken up the Communist terminology clearly and openly. In answer to this, I would like to read a few lines. Before

Mr. Lattimore went to Russia with Henry Wallace in March of 1944, he wrote a review article for Pacific Affairs called a Soviet Analysis of Chinese Civilization. In this article he goes over a number of articles written in this symposium which looks at Chinese society and culture obviously from the point of view of several disciplines.

He says here on page 83:

Here, of course, it is to be expected that a Communist writer has paramount Communist theses to maintain.

He enumerates a few, something about Lenin, and then he comes to Stalin. He mentions—

Stalin's definition of foreign imperialism in China as a force which supports, inspires, cultivates, and conserves feudal servivals.

Senator FERGUSON. What year was that?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. March 1944—

and the entire bureaucratic-militaristic superstructure.

The term "feudal survival" is absurd. It has become a standard formula as Stalin's description of Chinese society. How a society can consist of survival, I will not go into, but anyhow, this as a key formula of Stalinism.

Owen Lattimore in 1944 recognized it as such and listed it among the "paramount Communist theses" to be maintained by Communist writers.

In another part of this article, he says,

The social data are somewhat obscured by loosely used terms like "semi-feudal" and "feudal survivals."

This was in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the Communist line in China that they had a feudal government, a feudal system?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right, but by "feudalism" they meant something no human being ever thought of. They didn't think of feudal knights and serfs. They talked just about the tenancy system.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, when they described tenants, they called that a feudal system. When an experienced man in government speaks of feudalism, he goes back to the lord and the manor and the serfs, and the big estates.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words where the economical, the political, and the military system was under the state. That was feudalism?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. A unified system of these institutions. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Does Stalin claim his system of government is new and has no roots?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. No precedent in history, and here comes the catch and the clash with the contention of most real social scientists about countries like China and India. They say that there, with powerful bureaucratic machines, bureaucracy is a ruling class and property plays a secondary part. By concentrating the whole problem on what they call "'feudal" land ownership, the Communists focus the energy of the peasants to the property question, and divert it from a ruling bureaucracy which they have had in the past and which the Communists intend to establish everywhere in the future. The term

"feudal" is a technique to concentrate the energy of the restless masses on the property question and not to see the enormous danger of what Lenin once called a bureaucratic monster state. This is a very handy term. It confuses the situation. It concentrates. It manipulates the energy in a way which is useful for the destruction of the old order without endangering the masters of the new, those who want to benefit from it by setting them up as the masters of the new state apparatus, what I call the new apparatchik society.

The term "feudal" is a wonderful cover term. Lattimore, in 1944 described it as still quite openly as part of the Communist outfit.

Senator FERGUSON. Is "agrarian reform" a similar term now being used?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Communists usually talk about agrarian revolution, not reform. What they undertake really is a revolution, not a reform. It would be much better to call this violent change in rural conditions an agrarian revolution, which it really is. I think the use of the term "land reform" was just one of those ways of selling it, of making it look nice.

Mr. MORRIS. The technical terminology would be Communist revolution rather than Communist reform?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Lattimore's statement talks about the "feudal survivals" being one of the paramount Communist theses to be maintained by Communist writers, and then a statement that these terms are not good, that they obscure somewhat, completely confuse the social data. That means they are harmful for the social scientist. In this study which was made under Mr. Lattimore's direction by the members of the Walter Hines Page School on Sinkiang on which a preliminary résumé published in the Far Eastern Survey on March 10, 1948——

Mr. MORRIS. That is 4 years later than the previous communication?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

We find it says it was directed by Owen Lattimore and included among others: Chen Han-seng, and John De Francis, and Daniel Thorner.

So you find here in the part about economic conditions a description of the situation in which you find reference to the "semifeudal" agrarian relations.

We find later on a description as to the relations between landlords and rich peasants, agricultural laborers and tenants who are "semifeudal." You will not be surprised also to hear that the relations between the two groups of this system, namely, the two types of lands, are the "survival" of feudal lands. So you find your survival of feudalism appears here quite cheerfully.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in Lattimore's writing?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. This is a study which he directed and which was published by his school under him.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you mind reading a pertinent sentence or two that would indicate that for the record?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Some of these are long.

Mr. MORRIS. Just parts of them, then.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. (reading):

Cultivation of this idle land depends on solution of correlated problems (*a*) irrigation projects, which are dependent on railway construction; (*b*) deficien-

cies of livestock and fertilizers and of water supply; (*c*) the development of a substitute fuel supply—

All these are rather technical points, the way they are treated here, and then

(*d*) semifeudal agrarian relations.

This is the only term which deals with the over-all agrarian situation.

I see the term "semifeudal" in the following context: "Land distribution among various rural groups classified according to economic status." The report then goes on with statistics and says:

The relation between landlords ("ba") and rich peasants, on one hand, and agricultural laborers ("bivantel") and tenants ("dikhan") on the other hand, are semifeudal.

Furthermore—

mention must be made of the institution of "mulk and'wakf". The former is the survival of feudal land granted by the former ruling Khans with attached "chakar" or serfs.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough on that.

Mr. Mandel, in connection with Daniel Thorner, about whom there was just testimony, I would like to introduce into the record, Mr. Chairman, a letter dated June 2, 1942, from Catherine Porter to Edward C. Carter.

I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you will vouch for the authenticity of that letter and read it into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated June 2, 1942, and it is entitled "Memo to E. C. C. from C. P.," presumably Catherine Porter and E. C. C. is presumably E. C. Carter. It reads:

My 4 days in Washington last week were fruitful in ideas if nothing else. Several things came up which Bill Lockwood has suggested that I pass on to you.

1. W. Norman Brown (British Empire section of the COI, Library of Congress Annex), whose specialty is India, was full of good intentions and would very much like to see some arrangement made whereby an organization like the IPR would have access to material and personnel in the various Washington departments——

Mr. MORRIS. What is COI?

Mr. MANDEL. That stands for the Coordinator of Information.

He is going to suggest to someone in the Office of Facts and Figures that they consider making the IPR a semi-official channel for releasing certain information to the public. This was his own idea, and coming from him it might carry some weight.

I spent quite a while with Bill Carter in the hope that some way could be found of securing for the IPR such releases as the monitoring department can distribute. Bill felt that the only way that such an agreement could be made would be by an important IPR person making an appeal directly to MacLeish or someone of equal importance. Bill realizes that the IPR would make far better use of the releases than some of the newspapers which evidently do get the benefit of this service. It does seem ridiculous that an office like ours has to depend upon newspaper stuff at second or third hand.

Would you be willing to write to MacLeish presenting the problem which the IPR is facing now that it is cut off from most far eastern news, and ask whether it would be possible for certain information secured through the monitoring service to be released to us for use in the Survey, Pacific Affairs, et cetera?

2. The people who are working on India seemed to show more interest in IPR and its potentialities than anyone else I met in Washington. Eric Bee-

croft (Board of Economic Warfare) talked to me at length about his desire to see the Far Eastern Survey and other institute publications give adequate attention to India. He thinks it important that we add a scholar on India to our staff and raised the question of making such an appointment. Having in mind the possibility of a Rockefeller fellowship for such a person, I asked Beecroft whether he could suggest any candidates. He mentioned (I suppose this should be treated confidentially) Daniel Thorner who is in the COI working under Brown's direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know—

It is not clear here, but resuming the quotation—

background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and he wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in India than any other person in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is the Daniel Thorner we have had testimony on here just a short while ago.

Mr. MANDEL. (reading):

It is Beecroft's notice that a fairly attractive offer here would wean Thorner away from his present Government job. (Beecroft is not sure what Thorner's present salary is. He thinks it is probably $2,600 or $3,200. I have discussed this somewhat briefly with Bill Lockwood. He is a little uncertain about the second fellowship for the American Council staff. If this fellowship could be made available, or if you could find it possible to give Thorner a secretariat appointment, it would certainly mean a great deal to the IPR program for the the next year.

3. I was very much interested to find a large number of our friends in Washington bemoaning the fact that the whole IPR was not located in Washington, or at least that a branch office was not in full operation there. Several people mentioned to me the dinner meeting which was called by Graves on May 13 to discuss the whole problem of India and the presentation of information about India in this country. Every person who attended that dinner was delighted that the opportunity had been given him, and said quite honestly that if it had not been for Graves' action, they would probably not have sought the opportunity to discover what other departments of the Government were doing in their field of particular interest. It was pointed out that an active IPR office in Washington could do a great service by calling together frequent meetings of this kind. I wish it were possible for our staffs to have someone in Washington full time. We are certainly missing opportunities of service to ourselves and of usefulness to others.

All in all, it is very heartening for a member of the IPR staff to discover how highly the organization and its publications are regarded everywhere in the Capital City.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that in the record.

Senator SMITH. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 77" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 77

JUNE 2, 1942.

Memo to E. C. C. from C. P.

My 4 days in Washington last week were fruitful in ideas if nothing else. Several things came up which Bill Lockwood has suggested that I pass on to you.

1. W. Norman Brown (British Empire section of the COI, Library of Congress Annex), whose specialty is India, was full of good intentions and would very much like to see some arrangement made whereby an organization like the IPR would have access to material and personnel in the various Washington departments. He is going to suggest to someone in the Office of Facts and Figures that they consider making the IPR a semiofficial channel for releasing certain information to the public. This was his own idea, and coming from him it might carry some weight.

I spent quite a while with Bill Carter in the hope that some way could be found of securing for the IPR such releases as the monitoring department can distribute. Bill felt that the only way that such an arrangement could be made would be by an important IPR person making an appeal directly to MacLeish or someone of equal importance. Bill realizes that the IPR would make far better use of the releases than some of the newspapers which evidently do get the benefit of this service. It does seem ridiculous that an office like ours has to depend upon newspaper stuff at second or third hand.

Would you be willing to write to MacLeish presenting the problem which the IPR is facing now that it is cut off from most far eastern news, and ask whether it would be possible for certain information secured through the monitoring service to be released to us for use in the survey, Pacific Affairs, etc.

2. The people who are working on India seemed to show more interest in IPR and its potentialities than anyone else I met in Washington. Eric Beecroft (Board of Economic Warfare) talked to me at length about his desire to see the Far Eastern Survey and other institute publications give adequate attention to India. He thinks it important that we add a scholar on India to our staff and raised the question of making such an appointment. Having in mind the possibility of a Rockfeller fellowship for such a person. I asked Beecroft whether he could suggest any candidates. He mentioned (I suppose this should be treated confidentially) Daniel Thorner who is in the COI working under Brown's direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in India than any other person in this country. It is Beecroft's notion that a fairly attractive offer here could wean Thorner away from his present Government job. (Beecroft is not sure what Thorner's present salary is. He thinks it is probably $2,600 or $3,200.) I have discussed this somewhat briefly with Bill Lockwood. He is a little uncertain about the second fellowship for the American Council staff. If this fellowship could be made available, or if you could find it possible to give Thorner a secretariat appointment, it would certainly mean a great deal to the IPR program for the next year.

3. I was very much interested to find a large number of our friends in Washington bemoaning the fact that the whole IPR was not located in Washington, or at least that a banch office was not in full operation there. Several people mentioned to me the dinner meeting which was called by Graves on May 13 to discuss the whole problem of India and the presentation of information about India in this country. Every person who attended that dinner was delighted that the opportunity had been given him, and said quite honestly that if it had not been for Graves' action, they would probably not have sought the opportunity to discover what other departments of the Government were doing in their field of particular interest. It was pointed out that an active IPR office in Washington could do a great service by calling together frequent meetings of this kind. I wish it were possible for our staffs to have someone in Washington full time. We are certainly missing opportunities of service to ourselves and of usefulness to others.

All in all, it is very heartening for a member of the IPR staff to discover how highly the organization and its publications are regarded everywhere in the Capital City.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Wittfogel, what have you done in the last 10 years to express your opposition to the Communist movement of which you were an organized member and from which you gradually broke away, according to your testimony, finally in 1939? Would you give that information to the committee?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I shall be glad to. But first I would like to add one more remark to this "semifeudal" and "feudal survival" business. I want to avoid the impression of narrow word catching.

In an active fight against Communist ideological infiltration the thing which should be avoided at all cost is emphasis on symptoms without studying them. There are persons who might use the term "feudal" about agrarian Asia without knowing any better and living

in the innocence of paradise. It would be terrible if anybody would do any harm to them and would accuse them of any Communist leanings or indoctrination.

But a man like Lattimore who for years has studied these things—he has discussed them with his friends, they are in his letters to me, and he presents them as communistic criteria in his own life—when such a man turns around and in a weak moment comes forth with such terms that has a political significance.

I think it is very important to see both this specific significance and to avoid any danger of drawing political conclusions from the naive use of the terms without examining the circumstances.

Mr. MORRIS. What have you done personally to express your opposition to the Communist movement?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Since the last 12 years, since the last ties between me and the Communist fringe have been broken——

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like this record to show that this question searches for information on the general phenomenon of how long it takes a man to break away from the Communist Party and what he can do and how effective such a man is who has broken away from the Communist Party if he has genuinely determined to take a stand in opposition to it. That question bears on evidence relating to that point.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I do not know whether I will live up to this description, but after a long period of preparation, which I will not go into—I think I will do that later—I had thoroughly worked through the main points that made me break on the political and ideological issues.

First, during the war I concentrated myself primarily on reorganizing the project from an essential translation project to a project of interpretation and translation. The Rockefeller Foundation was extremely generous in letting me make that change. You will find in this interpretation, many of those great ideas of real social science which Mr. Stalin and his ideological henchmen tried to destroy. I concentrated essentially on developing this scientific work in a way which I considered my possibility and my duty.

However, I was not altogether idle politically. I supported personally somebody who in the United States has done more than anybody else during the war in the field of German anticommunism. That was Ruth Fisher, who was very modestly and personally aided by myself at that time—she did a great deal to discredit and shake the Free German Committee which was set up here parallel to the Moscow and Mexican committees of the same type.

I hoped that my advice might be of some use. Obviously the Institute of Pacific Relations had some use for men who eventually worked in the historical field, such as Mr. Norman. I was invited only to one of the IPR conferences. This one took place in the fall of 1941. This was, by the way, the time I had an argument with Greenberg. I knew that the Communists were building up the line, "We must get the Mikado, we must make no compromises concerning the Mikado." This I considered a suicidal policy.

It would cost millions of American lives because, I feared, the Japanese might just die en masse in order to defend what to them seemed very sacred. So I took the line we should not make the

Mikado a special issue, and we should understand the particular religious and psychological aspect of the matter.

This was the last contribution I made to any IPR conference. I was never invited after that.

I may now come back to a point I made this morning, and that is that Mr. Carter at the beginning had taken an interest in my Communist past. I heard that the same day he had talked to a Communist friend of mine, Maurice Dobbs, one of the prominent Communists and an organized Communist.

Mr. Carter saw him immediately after he had seen me, Professor Dobbs told me that. Mr. Carter asked him whether Mr. Wittfogel is persona grata with the Soviet Union. Whereupon Maurice Dobbs answered as far as he knew Wittfogel has some academic argument there. This was a reference to my disagreement on the interpretation of Asia, but otherwise, he is persona grata. I have not heard that Mr. Carter has ever tried to find out whether I was persona grata with the American Government.

I said that this Mikado question should not be made an issue. In doing so, I took as my criteria what should be to the benefit of this country and the American GI's who were dying there en masse. But that was the end of my political contribution to IPR conferences.

I spoke and advised many friends in the Government who were interested in my views. I may mention Prof. George E. Taylor, with whom I had many discussions about how the Russians treated America as potential enemies and not as people with whom we would be living in harmony ever after.

After the war I have been criticized for my insistence on the Soviet issue by some of my colleagues, but I hope that today many of them see things differently.

I may have been one of the first persons who raised the question among the Orientalists that we have to adjust ourselves to a world which is not one world. We held the first convention of American Orientalists in the spring of 1946, and the president of our professional organization discussed the lessons of the war.

In my own paper I took the line that the Orientalists have to become realists and to be aware that we are not going to live in one world, but maybe in five, three, and possibly two; and that we might as well prepare for that.

Year by year I have tried to show we cannot work in the modern field of oriental history and study what is going on in modern times without understanding communism in general and without understanding the connection between the various countries and the Soviet Union.

We had a bicentennial meeting in Princeton in 1947, where I tried to bring this out very strongly. Mr. Lattimore was there, and Mr. Chen Han-seng, but neither of them argued with me.

I think it was in 1948 in Philadelphia at a meeting where the majority of the speakers like Rosinger and others neglected the aspect of America's security. What I tried to recommend seemed to appeal strongly to the students. I may say this because it shows that the question of our intellectuals is somewhat more hopeful than our pessimists think. I said when looking at China, we might look at the security of this country, and we should defend China even though the Nationalist Government is a weak government with enormous

mistakes and weaknesses. It is still better to defend this Government and to keep it out of the Soviet power system and strengthen the other side. The students understood it without difficulty, but many more mature minds still had a few years to go before understanding the point.

In my talk at the State Department I tried to expose the Tito illusion; "Let us be nice to the little Chinese tiger, and it will not develop into a big tiger but into a pussycat." I argued that this is not the proper type of applied zoology.

At the end of the year, together with some of my friends in Seattle, I wrote a memorandum which was officially sent by the Seattle IPR, to ask IPR in New York to remove Mr. Rosinger from his position as research secretary, or whatever it was. The memorandum was of no avail.

From 1949 to 1951 in articles, reviews, speeches, besides my scientific work proper, I have continued to combine the interest in our field with the full awareness of the present political situation—the very dangerous situation in which the Western World in general and America in particular lives at the moment. The memorandum to the State Department which I wrote in the fall of 1949 was part of these efforts.

In 1950-51 I went on lecturing about the problem of how to recognize the methods of the ideological war as conducted by the U. S. S. R. Our friends the biologists have no difficulty in recognizing the absurdity of the Soviet position. They handled the Lysenko attack very nobly and very clearly without witch hunting and in an efficient manner, because they had studied the material. They were fully masters of the situation, and in a powerful and convincing way settled it. They do not close the door to new ideas, which I think we should never do. Any new terms, any new idea, even if they occur also in the Soviet Union, I am sure, freemen in a free society should discuss freely.

But we should get no counterfeit money in our field. We should learn how to recognize counterfeit. The greatest freedom of ideas provides the opportunity for constructively exerting the greatest vigilance. This has been my attitude throughout these years. This is what I have to say about myself.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to incorporate by reference the History of Chinese Society and I also would like to introduce at the same time excerpts from a commentary of various scholars on that project. I would like to incorporate that by reference into the record today.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 79" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 79

STATEMENTS MADE CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CHINESE SOCIETY, LIAO

C. Martin Wilbur, Columbia University, American Anthropologist, July–September 1950: "One of the great contributions made in America to far-eastern history * * * "

Esson M. Gale, director, International Center, University of Michigan, letter: " * * * most important contributions on the highest scientific level, to knowledge of a significant era in Chinese and central Asiatic history."

Woodbridge Bingham, University of California, Far Eastern Quarterly, May 1950: "The book under review presents for the first time in any Western language a whole Chinese dynastic period with detailed material drawn directly

from the basic sources and arranged in categories so as to explain the functioning of its society."

Homer Dubs, Oxford University, England, letter: "You have indeed opened up an almost new field and done it effectively."

W. F. Albright, Johns Hopkins University, Bulletin of American Schools of Oriental Research, December 1949: " * * * a volume of extraordinary interest and importance for Orientalists in general, far outside the field of Sinology proper. Practically everything of interest to any branch of the social sciences has been classified and interpreted. Nothing comparable is as yet available in near-eastern fields, so the volume before us is a challenge as well as a stimulus."

William E. Lingelbach, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia; former head of department of history, University of Pennsylvania, letter: "Returning to your history, I am more convinced than ever that it will revolutionize the approach to Chinese history, especially the use of the literary histories. That this will make for a more intelligent understanding of present-day China is, I believe, certain, despite tragic development in recent years * * * I wish our foreign policy in the Far East savored more of the real understanding of the background and its tremendous importance, such as you and your associate, Feng Chia-sheng, reveal."

George P. Murdock, Yale University, letter: "You are doing a job which, in my humble opinion, promises to be more valuable than all the social philosophies written since the beginning of time rolled into one."

Clyde Kluckhohn, Harvard University, letter: "It is clearly something unique in the history of scholarship—the first really firm social-science analysis of a large historical period."

Fred Eggan, University of Chicago, letter: "It should put Chinese studies on a new plateau."

George Sarton, editor, Isis, Harvard University, letter: "You have raised Chinese historiography up to a higher level."

R. H. Tawney, University of London: "Your work should effect a revolution in Chinese scholarship, and have a most beneficial effect not only on that but on historical studies in several different fields."

K. Grønboch, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, Acta Orientalia, XX1, 2, 1951: "The book is invaluable to students both of Chinese history proper and of the nomad empires, and will for many years remain the standard work on its subject."

Bertold Spuler, University of Hamburg, letter: " * * * a monumental achievement which opens up completely new paths for the writing of Chinese history and generally for the fruitful use of oriental sources."

S. Wada, Tokyo University, letter: "The History of Chinese Society, Liao, published under your editorship, is believed to be one of the greatest achievements America ever made on the studies of far-eastern history."

Mr. MORRIS. The next witness will be Dr. George Taylor.

Senator SMITH. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you shall give at this hearing being conducted by a duly constituted subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. TAYLOR. I do.

TESTIMONY OF PROF. GEORGE EDWARD TAYLOR, DIRECTOR, FAR EASTERN INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WASH.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and and address to the stenographer?

Professor TAYLOR. My name is George Edward Taylor. The address is the University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position, Dr. Taylor?

Professor TAYLOR. My present position is director of the Far Eastern Institute of the University of Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Professor TAYLOR. That particular position since 1946, but I have been a professor there since 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Taylor, could you tell us what degrees you have achieved by way of education?

Professor TAYLOR. Most of my education was in England where I got the M. A. degree. I was reeducated in America at Johns Hopkins and Harvard Universities. That is the extent of my formal degrees, but not the end, I trust, of my education.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Taylor, when did you join the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Professor TAYLOR. I joined the institute in March of 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. At whose invitation?

Professor TAYLOR. That I don't recall, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall that you joined in 1941, however?

Professor TAYLOR. I checked on that by ringing up the office.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Taylor, have you heard complaints while you have been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations that it is Communist-influenced or Communist-controlled?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I have heard many people say that there are Communists in the IPR, and some people have even thought of it as being controlled, and some as not.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any way that you as a member of the IPR could conclude with any degree of satisfaction that there are Communists in the IPR?

Professor TAYLOR. It is an extremely difficult thing to do, Mr. Morris. I have always operated for a very long time on the general principle that the Communists will infiltrate anything from a Sunday school to the FBI and that when you remember that Lenin's right-hand man was planted there by the Czar, one can believe almost anything. I have therefore taken it as a general principle that the IPR is not likely to be left aside by our friends, who are looking around for a good thing to infiltrate, but the question of deciding how, in what manner, is extremely difficult.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Dr. Taylor, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Professor TAYLOR. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any way you could have of conclusively determining whether a person was a Communist unless you had been a member of the Communist Party or else he had told you he had been a member of the Communist Party?

Professor TAYLOR. I took the precaution of cultivating the friendship of a fairly large number of ex-Communists, and I found in talking with them I enjoyed their anti-Stalinist conversation, and I found in talking with them I got certain cues and sometimes actually precise information as to who has belonged in a certain area and who does not, but in direct answer to your question, Mr. Morris, one has to look as through a glass, darkly.

You have to build up a frame of references as to what the Soviet Union is after in general, what its relationships are to parties in the rest of the world, how they operate in general and how they operate in particular. Then you have to study your own field. You have to find out—and there are ways of doing this, of course—you have to find out what the general party line is on a given subject at a given time.

Then in the areas you know best you examine a man's writings and by what he leaves out sometimes as well as by what he puts in you decide whether he is dealing with all the facts that he should know if he knows anything about it at all or whether he is angling them in any particular manner.

Obviously with that type of interpretation it is extremely difficult to say exactly where a man would be in the hierarchy, how far away from the sun he would be, but you can, I think, with reasonable assurance over a given length of time decide whether certain people are following a consistent line or whether they are not.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the secondary test really. The first test would be to talk to somebody who was in the Communist Party and let them tell you who was in it; otherwise, you have to use a standard such as yours?

Professor TAYLOR. Or both.

Mr. MORRIS. Or both?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now did you have any encounters with members of the IPR during the last 10 years by which you applied the standard you just described and therefore have been able to come to a conclusion satisfactory to your own purposes? For instance, did you have a conversation with Frederick V. Field in which you were able to apply such a standard as you described to us?

Professor TAYLOR. There is on the record, Mr. Morris, a written conversation with Mr. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what that is?

Professor TAYLOR. We had a certain dispute in 1942 as to whether a book I had written was any good or not. Mr. Field wrote a somewhat critical review of it, which he is thoroughly entitled to do, in Pacific Affairs, and attacked the book, which was called America in the New Pacific, and attacked it I think mainly on the point that I had described the war we were in as four wars rather than one war.

The general line at the time of course was that this was one war, war against Fascism. I said that there were four wars wrapped up in one.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say general line, what do you mean by that?

Professor TAYLOR. The Communist Party line, and it has been adopted by a good many other people, too.

I argued that the first war was a war between democracies and Fascist Axis. The second war—and this is where we came to grief—was a war between the two competing totalitarian revolutions, that between Germany and Russia. This was not to be mixed up with the first war.

The third war was the struggle between the colonial countries to take advantage of the situation to recover their independence.

The fourth war was the war in which the Fascist and Communist countries were gobbling up the little fellows that they found around them.

The main point of Mr. Field's review was that this way of presenting and analyzing the situation was divisive—the word he used, I believe—was divisive and was making no contribution to the war effort.

The New Masses went so far as to say that the book was worth two divisions to the enemy. I thought they were short-changing me a little, but that was their figure.

I thought that Mr. Field who, though he had been personally very delightful to me, had made his position sufficiently clear, however, by this time without the assistance of any written conflict on my book. So I had to assume that he was certainly acting like a member of the party, and I differed with some of my friends in the institute as to the influence that he would have on the institute.

They felt—and these are two different views—that his views on the Soviet Union had no influence whatsoever upon his work in the institute. I frankly found it difficult and I have still found it difficult to accept that view. That is one example.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a similar experience with Michael Greenberg?

Professor TAYLOR. Mr. Greenberg, I was tipped off by Professor Wittfogel here as to his previous party affiliations and therefore was looking for trouble, but is was not very difficult to find. I think a blind man could have found Mr. Greenberg's views very, very quickly. He did not take too much trouble to conceal them.

I would say without any hesitation whatsoever that within a very short time one came to the conclusion that he was following very closely the general party line.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that at the time he was acting editor of Pacific Affairs?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes. On the other hand, he did publish my reply to Frederick Field in the next issue of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more about Michael Greenberg which you could put in the record at this time?

Professor TAYLOR. I was a little surprised to see him turn up in Washington, quite frankly.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he turn up in Washington?

Professor TAYLOR. He turned up in what was called, I believe, the Board of Economic Warfare. Then he turned up in Lauchlin Currie's office for a period of time. That was the last I saw of him.

Senator FERGUSON. That was in the White House?

Professor TAYLOR. The office was in the Old State Department Building.

Senator FERGUSON. It was connected with the Executive Department?

Professor TAYLOR. Technically.

Mr. MORRIS. You were surprised because of the blatancy of his ideas that he should assume such a high position in the Government?

Professor TAYLOR. I was surprised, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have an opportunity to observe Laurence Rosinger, who is editor of the latest publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Professor TAYLOR. Professor Wittfogel has already testified that as a trustee of the IPR, which I have been since 1946, and I still am, that as a trustee I sent in to the proper officials a memorandum written by three people, who try to be scholars, which is an analysis of Mr. Rosinger's books. This was done within channels in a purely constitutional manner, and our general argument was that Mr. Rosinger

was not an objective scholar. We felt that we had demonstrated this in the memorandum, but Mr. Clayton Lane, to whom it was sent and those with whom he consulted, decided that we were wrong.

The decision has been accepted, but I certainly have not changed my view. In fact, the last publication of the IPR in which Mr. Rosinger had two or three chapters further confirms my view of Mr. Rosinger's lack of objectivity in handling such problems as contemporary China and the Communist movement in contemporary China.

Senator FERGUSON. Along what line do you claim he deviates from the normal channel?

Professor TAYLOR. I would say that in general he is far—I will put it this way, that he gives no sign of understanding the real nature of China's communism or Soviet imperialism in Asia. I find it difficult to believe that he has not had the documents available to him that have been available to the rest of us, and even in this last book there is nothing to indicate the quality and character of the Communist movement in China.

The man who reviewed the book in the New York Times states the thing much better than I can, off the cuff, anyway, in this review he points out how Mr. Rosinger's analysis of the Communist regime is:

> Based on published plans, regulations, constitutions, proclamations, Communist statistics and percentage figures, and is comparable to an attempt to describe the Government of the Soviet Union on the basis of the 1936 constitution. The violent anti-United States propaganda, militarism, Soviet imperialism, and penetration, and the compulsory apparatus to which Mr. Rosinger gives little attention were all apparent even in the honeymoon period to which he limits himself.

That is a perfect example of what you are talking about—the problem of nailing a fellow down when you see that he walks like a duck and talks like a duck and has wings like a duck.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Taylor, will you tell us about the project behind that publication? Was there a grant behind that, do you know?

Professor TAYLOR. I don't happen to know. I have the impression that Mr. Rosinger himself was supported by a Rockefeller grant. It is probably on the cover somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. The name of that book is the State of Asia?

Professor TAYLOR. The State of Asia.

I agree with the reviewer that the book on the whole is an extremely good book. It has a lot of excellent stuff in it. He ends up by saying:

> Mr. Rosinger's chapters, however, must not be allowed to detract from the high standards set by the other writers.

I would add one more criticism to what he says, and that is I really don't see how we can write about Asia today without including the Soviet Union as an Asiatic country. If not the Soviet Union as such, then it seems to me the nature of Soviet imperialism and the connection between the Soviet Union and all the other Communist movements in Asia should certainly come in for slightly more vigorous treatment than it meets at the hands of Mr. Rosinger.

Senator FERGUSON. That book is sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir; this is sponsored by the IPR. There was a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the amount given there, Dr. Taylor?

Professor TAYLOR. No.

I just want to point out that the IPR also published or joined in the publication of my own book in 1942, which was so bitterly criticized by Mr. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Taylor, you have testified that you have been a member of the board of trustees in the Institute of Pacific Relations since 1946. In view of your conclusions about the institute and the fact that according to your standards it has been infiltrated, why have you held on so long?

Professor TAYLOR. For several reasons, sir. I think this book is an excellent example. I would say that the proportion of nonobjective work in here is about the same sort of proportion I have always thought there was in the institute as a whole.

In other words, I do not think the battle is lost because it is the sort of battle that never ends. This is going on forever.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Doctor, if you pulled out men who think as you do, then there would only be the one side?

Professor TAYLOR. Well, the Communists would take over. What they don't take over they destroy.

Senator FERGUSON. You had a chapter in Washington, did you not, of the IPR?

Professor TAYLOR. I think during the war years there was a chapter, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it now a chapter?

Professor TAYLOR. Offhand I don't know, sir. I don't believe there is one here now.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean in your State of Washington.

Professor TAYLOR. In the State of Washington?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir, we had a very vigorous branch in Seattle, in the State of Washington, which we merged into a World Affairs Council about 6 months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did that chapter in the State of Washington leave the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Professor TAYLOR. I think there were several reasons. I think there was a general tendency all over the country toward these World Affairs Councils of cities the size of Seattle and even bigger.

Another reason, I think, is that the group in Seattle has been at loggerheads to some extent with the main office in New York. Some of that was due to the difficulties that always arise in large organizations. Some of it is due to political differences, the sort of thing we are talking about now, the general feeling that there was far too much nonobjective scholarship getting into IPR publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Communist line have anything to do with it?

Professor TAYLOR. That is what I meant to say then, sir. And I suppose there were financial reasons, the difficulty of maintaining a group together in Seattle with sufficient money to make it worth while. Then the pressure from other people to join the World Affairs Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any experience at all with Lauchlin Currie during the war?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That bears on this point?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I saw Lauchlin Currie several times. I was trying to remember just when. I imagine it must have been in 1943. I don't recall I had met him before. He had asked me to go over to his office every Wednesday morning, which I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You were then working with the Office of War Information?

Professor TAYLOR. The Office of War Information in Washington. I found out what he wished to talk about was what the OWI was doing in China. He helped me get some film strip for China, I recall, by writing a note on White House stationery, and he was generally helpful.

Then he organized some meetings on China. I have the impression that he had a sort of special assignment to look after China on behalf of the President. He called together people who were in various departments of the Government, the man who was functionally connected with China, and there were somewhat desultory discussions in his office in the Old State Department Building. They occurred I imagine about every 2 or 3 weeks, and then at the end rather suddenly I was requested to write up the discussion on which I had taken no notes. I did this to the best of my ability.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the head of the China section of the State Department John Carter Vincent?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes. I remember he was there once at the meetings. I think his deputy was there at one time.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was his deputy?

Professor TAYLOR. I am sorry, it escapes me at the moment. Then there was somebody from the War Department. They used to send a different man every time—the various departments of the Government.

At the end of the memorandum I wrote a special paragraph of my own in which I recommended that as the chances of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was negligible, we should provide Chiang Kai-shek with sufficient arms and ammunition to shoot up the Communists even during the war.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Professor TAYLOR. That was about the fall of 1943, I believe. It was a slightly unusual view even for me, I think, but I verified it last night by ringing up somebody who remembered it. My relations with Mr. Currie ended about then.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that had anything to do with the ending of your relations with Mr. Currie?

Professor TAYLOR. I don't know, sir. I don't know what was in his mind. He might have thought I was too dumb; he might not have had the time. I cannot say under oath what the timetable was, but it was around about that time I turned up the next Wednesday morning, and his secretary said, "Awfully sorry, he had another appointment," and I got the hint.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time he showed a great interest in you; did he not?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You had had considerable experience in the Far East, you had been writing on the Far East and so forth, is that not right, and you had charge of that section at that time?

Professor TAYLOR. In the Washington office, yes, I was in charge of the China Section in the Planning Division of the Washington office.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever consult with you after that?

Professor TAYLOR. I never saw him again.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the last you saw of him?

Professor TAYLOR. As far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been with him up to that time every week?

Professor TAYLOR. Weekly, Wednesday morning at 10 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, we want to thank you for appearing here. Is there anything you want to add by way of explanation?

Professor TAYLOR. No, sir. I would like to say that I think the Institute of Pacific Relations is an organization that has done a very great deal for the far-eastern field and one which I personally hope—some of my friends do not agree with me—I personally hope will survive and be useful again.

Senator FERGUSON. You do feel, though, that where the Communist influence enters an organization, particularly one as important in foreign relations as the Institute of Pacific Relations, it could become a danger to our Nation?

Professor TAYLOR. Yes, sir; but I believe we are in danger everywhere. The American Government is going to be infiltrated just as much as the IPR, the labor unions, and all the rest, and we have to fight the battle wherever we meet it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why you say it must be eliminated from such organizations?

Professor TAYLOR. I couldn't agree with you more, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would read into the record before you go your analysis of Rosinger's writings. I think you have alluded to it. I wonder if you would leave it here and we can incorporate it by reference as part of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received as part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 80" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 80

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

China's Wartime Politics, 1937–44. Princeton University Press, 1944 (quoted as Rosinger, 1944).

China's Crisis, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1945 (quoted as Rosinger, 1945).

Restless India, Headline Series, No. 55, Foreign Policy Association, 1946 (quoted as Rosinger, 1946).

The three above-listed writings of Rosinger are characterized, as are practically all his writings and speeches, by the accumulation of a great deal of detail and the careful avoidance of value judgments and a cliché terminology. In the discussion of the role of the Communists in China and of their Russian background, there are endeavors to present both sides of a possible argument. However, the objectivity is apparent rather than real. The books of 1944 and 1945 both show him in a number of critical instances either disregarding the obvious connection with the U. S. S. R. or directly denying such connection when factual evidence to the contrary exists and must have been known to him.

I

According to Rosinger, "The first major steps toward internal unity were taken on August 1 and 31, 1935, when the Chinese Communist Party issued two appeals for national resistance to Japan" (Rosinger, 1945, p. 17). The Communist movement is described as essentially domestic in its aspect and motivation. No attempt is made to explain the coincidence of the Chinese Communist turn toward a united front with the corresponding change in the policy of the Communist International in the summer of the same year, 1935. In view of Rosinger's thesis that the Chinese Communists, in spite of their sympathy toward the Russian outlook and purpose, were "for more than a decade and a half" (obviously from 1927 to 1942) "essentially on their own" (p. 94), it would have been highly significant to show whether the strong change in the line of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935 had anything to do with the policy of the Communist International. The reader has a legitimate claim to be informed that an argument exactly like the one promoted by the Chinese Communist Party in August was made at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in the same summer, 1935.

N. B.—It would also be worthy of Rosinger's attention to see the coincidence of an earlier Communist step toward a united front with the Nanking Government in 1933 and Russia's growing concern in 1932 and 1933 about the threat of a Japanese attack against the Soviet Union. Mao Tze-tung considered the first Chinese offer for a united front sufficiently important to mention it in a speech in 1938. Rosinger's reference to the move of the Chinese Communists "for a united front" in 1933 (Rosinger, 1944, p. 11) neither explains clearly the character of the Communist move nor does it in any way discuss its connection with what Stalin on January 19, 1933, called the "complications in the Far East"—complications which from the Soviet point of view were considered so serious that, according to Stalin's own statement, significant changes in the military sphere of the new second 5-year plan were made.

II

Rosinger describes the "moderate, democratic domestic program that the Chinese Communists adopted in 1935–37" as a program to which they adhered "despite all changes in the foreign relations of the Soviet Union" (Rosinger, 1945, p. 95). In the context surrounding this thesis, Rosinger tries to prove the essentially Chinese-conditioned character of the Chinese Communist policy. Since Rosinger clearly states the importance of this issue, it is a pity that he considered it unnecessary to quote Mao Tze-tung's own statement on the "great concessions" which the Chinese Communists made during this period and particularly in 1937. "Those political concessions were made for the sake of the establishment of the united front * * * for the formation of the united front against the Japanese imperialists, these concessions were excellent and correct" (Mao, 1938).

The connection between the Communist effort to involve the Nanking government in a war with Japan and the effect of diverting the pressure from the Soviet Union was too obvious to permit silencing over. The Russian interest in supporting the Chinese war against Japan in order to ward off a Japanese attack against herself was clearly seen by Harriet Moore, who in the January 1940 issue of Amerasia wrote, "There is a fighting China between the Soviet Union and Japan, and the Soviet Union can thus ward off a Japanese attack by continuing her support of China." Mrs. Moore wrote for the same magazine, Amerasia, of which Rosinger has been a permanent contributor, and it seems most unlikely that he has not seen her analysis. Instead of making unsubstantiated claims concerning the internal change of the Chinese Communist Party, Rosinger should have made the reader familiar with Mao's insistence that this change was conditioned by considerations of the war against Japan and not by any abstract domestic reasons. Whether or not the change in the internal Chinese party line had anything to do with the attitude of the Comintern, Mao in 1938 takes pains to assert agreement between his party and the Comintern and with the defense situation of the Soviet Union, this is such a vital problem and Mrs. Moore's comment of 1940 is so suggestive, that Rosinger's attempt to becloud this vital issue is a highly deplorable feature of his book.

III

Rosinger's praise for Russia's material assistance to the Chinese Government during the first years of the war is highly unrealistic because it does not take

into consideration the practical advantages derived by Russia from such an action. It was obviously much cheaper for the Soviet Union to "ward off a Japanese attack by continuing her support of China" than to fight such a war herself.

IV

Rosinger's treatment of the increased friction between the Chinese Communists and the Nanking government and the refusal of the Communists to participate in the session of the People's Political Council in March 1941 (Rosinger, 1944, p. 39) sounds completely incidental, and by implication it is suggested that the change was caused by certain Kuomintang circles losing their interest in remaining allied with the Communists. There is no doubt as to the existence of such a trend within the Kuomintang, but it remains a fundamental weakness of Rosinger's study that it completely disregards the vital changes in the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan which took place exactly at the end of 1940 and early in 1941.

Negotiations between the U. S. S. R. and Japan for the conclusion of a neutrality pact began in July 1940, Matsuoka was in Moscow in March and April 1941, and the pact was concluded on April 13. Rosinger forgets to mention this background when describing the increased estrangement between the Chinese Communists and the Nanking government during this period which culminated in the refusal of the Chinese Communists to attend the People's Political Council in March 1941.

Very little is said by Rosinger about the Russo-Japanese Pact of April 1941 and this treatment may be justified by the fact that neither of the two signatories were Chinese, but it is highly regrettable that Rosinger did not reproduce—or discuss at least in substance—the declaration made by the Chinese Communist Party on the occasion of this pact. It is well known that the pact implied the mutual recognition of Russia's position in Outer Mongolia and of Manchukuo, the Japanese puppet state, that had been recognized so far only by members of the Axis. Mao Tse-tung's earlier expectation, expressed in 1936 in his interview with Edgar Snow, that Outer Mongolia would be part of a Chinese Federation, is silently dropped. While the Chinese Central Government was deeply concerned about what, it feared, might be Russia's indirect recognition of Manchukuo, the Chinese Communists did not find any flaw in the Russian procedure which they on the contrary tried to justify. The Communist declaration stated: "By this treaty the U. S. S. R. has not disappointed and never will disappoint China." The full text of the Chinese Communist statement was reproduced in Amerasia, the magazine to which Rosinger contributed regularly, but his book on China's Wartime Politics does not consider it necessary to discuss the fact and the extraordinary political attitude of the Chinese Communist Party to it.

V

All these features go to show that Rosinger in his two books on China tried to minimize and in part to hide the relations between the policy of the Chinese Communists and the needs of U. S. S. R. power politics. Rosinger's over-all study of recent China (Rosinger, 1945) tries, like his other writings, to bypass critical points without committing himself in one way or the other, but in his larger documentary study of 1944 he indicates on a number of occasions his affinity to the Russian interpretation of Chinese society and history. Rosinger is without doubt fully familiar with the Russian line to avoid the application of the concepts of oriental despotism to Chinese society and to use a "feudal" interpretation instead. But he throws in remarks about Confucius and Mencius as supporters of a "feudal social order," which perfectly fit the Rusisan pattern. His description of those elements particularly interested in the maintenance of the existing Chinese Government places the "rural landlords" before the gentry and officials (Rosinger, 1944; cf. Rosinger, 1945, p. 5 ff.), fully in conformity with the Russian attempt to create the impression that China's ruling class was (and is) predominantly constituted of a landlord class not dissimilar to the western and Russian type. His illustrations for the actual conditions in a Chinese village are taken from utterances of the Moscow-trained son of the Generalissimo, Chiang Ching-kuo, who speaks of "the overpowering dominance of feudal forces of the landed local political bosses and wicked gentry" (Rosinger, 1945, p. 6). Faced with these passages, Rosinger could always answer that in the case of Confucius and Mencius he was only referring to the earlier part

of Chinese institutional history and that in the second instance he only quoted somebody else's opinion. This is absolutely correct, but it is characteristic that in the second case he used a Moscow-trained guide and that in both cases he avoided explaining the haphazardly used Soviet type of ideology. Rosinger is fully familiar with the counterthesis, as it was, among others, presented by his friend, Chi Chiao-ting. His avoidance of taking a clear-cut stand in the controversy, as well as his indirect acceptance of the Soviet Russian side of the argument, is indicative both of his glib method of presentation and of his actual stand in the matter.

VI

Rosinger's study of restless India shows the same peculiarities of a carefully shielded adjustment to the Soviet type of analysis. The adherent of the Stalin-shaped ideology has to avoid drawing attention to the managerial-hydraulic functions of Asiatic government and the resulting development of an all-powerful and all-oppressive type of state, oriental despotism. In his India book Rosinger refers to irrigation in such a way as not to give the impression that the direction of public waterworks has been an essential factor of India's traditional society. Irrigation is mentioned as something that occured in prehistoric times (p. 38) and as an element of village economy (p. 43), but not in connection with the structure of government and society. On page 47 the great irrigation projects in two territories are mentioned in connection with recent attempts at modification; that is, not as features of India's traditional society but in the setting of British colonial policy. On page 49 a clear-cut classification of the traditional Indian system of land tenure and taxation is avoided. It is only said that in the areas ruled by native princes "conditions are similar to those existing in Europe under feudalism"; and in explanation of this thesis it is said that "the peasants have to rent virtually every economic right" from the princes and that "there is widespread forced labor." It is characteristic that the connection of this forced labor—obviously state-directed forced labor—is left undefined and furthermore that the only classification reference in the whole argument is to feudalism and to a feudalism similar to a European one. The treatment of India, like that of Chinese society, followed in a veiled manner the basic concepts outlined by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in 1928.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Wittfogel, did you have anything else you wanted to offer the committee?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think you have been very patient.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, the committee appreciates the appearance of a man before it who has been a Communist and, as it were, bares his soul as a witness. The committee owes thanks to the people who are willing to come in here and testify on the record as they really see things. We appreciate it.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Thank you very much.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will recess until Thursday at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing was recessed until Thursday, August 9, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

INDEX TO PART I

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

Page

Aberle, Dr. David F---- 327
Academica Sinica---- 50
Academy of Science, Moscow---- 171, 178
A. C. I. S---- 238
Acta Orientalia---- 342
Action Conference on China Policy---- 55, 56
Adamovich, I. A---- 189
Adler, Solomon---- 69
Aid to Britain---- 295
AIPR---- 29
Albright, W. F---- 342
Aldenov ---- 125
Alexander---- 40, 238
All American Trade Union Conference---- 119
All-China Trade Union Conference---- 119
Allen, James S. (*See* Sol Auerbach.)
Allen, Riley H---- 264
Allied Powers---- 302
All Souls---- 178
All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. (*See* Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R.)
Amalgamated Engineers---- 40
AMCHIPO---- 93
AMCO---- 8
Amerasia---- 14, 30, 34, 35, 46, 74, 114, 115, 140, 165, 220, 255, 265, 298, 305, 326, 350
American Academy of Political Science---- 99
American Anthropologist---- 341
American Army. (*See* Army, United States.)
American banks---- 57
American-British-Chinese Stabilization Committee---- 16, 277, 278
American Can Co---- 101
American-Chinese Export Corp---- 86, 98, 101
American Committee for International Studies---- 79, 237, 239
American Council (IPR)---- 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 32, 41, 78, 79, 80, 81, 106, 118, 121, 123, 124, 125, 141, 161, 172, 191, 209, 241, 246, 247, 248, 262, 263, 264, 266, 267, 278, 289, 305, 321, 325
American Council on Soviet Relations---- 300
American Economic Association---- 99
American Embassy (Warsaw)---- 139
American Expeditionary Force---- 296
American Express Co---- 150, 254, 319
American Friends of the Chinese People---- 285
American Geographical Society---- 6, 99
American Peace Mobilization---- 22, 25, 33, 116, 124, 173, 174, 180, 295
American Philosophical Society---- 342
American Quarterly---- 296
American Red Cross---- 258, 259, 293, 294
American-Russian Institute---- 177, 265, 267, 295, 296, 297, 299, 300
American Smelting & Refining---- 100

Page
American School in Shanghai 132
American Sociological Society 99
American Students Union (ASU) 301
American YMCA 138
American Youth Congress 300
Anaconda Copper 100
Anderson-Pritchard Refining Corp 101
Andrus, Russell 54
Anglo-Japanese alliance 49
Angus, Mr 173, 321
Apostol, Mr 238
Army Air Intelligence. (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Army Intelligence 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 106, 111, 112, 121, 182
Army (United States) 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 106, 111, 112, 121, 182, 183, 212, 316
Arosev, A. Ia 188, 189
Asiaticus, (See Hans Moeller)
Atherton, Frank C 264
Atkinson, Brooks 213, 217
Atlantic Charter 215, 218
Auerbach, Sol 70, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254
August, Karl 289
Austern, Hilda 70, 122, 266, 281
Austin, Dr. William M 327
Auto-Motor Export Corp 192, 193, 194, 197
Axis 351
Ayscough, Florence 270

B

Baker, Newton D 9, 73, 177
Baldwin, Roger 268
Ball, Macmahon 52
Balliol 178
Bancroft, Frank 300
Bank of Canada 155
Bank of China 17, 82, 83, 84, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 99, 100, 104
Barmine, Alexander Gregory 181–222
Barnes, Mrs 8
Barnes, Betty 70
Barnes Joseph Fels 70, 78, 82, 178, 200, 201, 202, 203, 208, 209, 210, 211, 243, 244, 246, 287, 288, 301, 323, 325, 327
Barnes, Kathleen 70, 253, 254, 262, 263
Barnett, Mr 268
Barnett, Eugene 138
Barnett, Robert W 32, 33, 70, 137, 138, 139, 140
Barrett, Mary 143
Bates, Searle 239, 259, 306
Bazorof, Boris 233, 261
Bean, Miss Ruth F 327
Beecroft, Eric 337, 338
Belshaw 177
Bentley, Elizabeth 136, 138
Berges, William 143
Berkovich, Ia. M 190
Berlin Agis Verlag 143
Beryllium Corp 100
Berzin, General 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 208, 212, 216, 217, 222
Big Three 178
Bill. (*See* Walter Grinkied.)
Binder, Carroll 264
Bingham, Woodbridge 288, 289, 290, 341
Birmingham University 171, 178, 240
Bisson, T. A 35, 70, 115, 163, 164, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 177, 253, 254, 284, 285, 288, 289, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307

Page
Bisson, Mrs. T. A 306
Black, Helen 229, 231
Blackwell, Alice Stone 300
Blaine, James G 278
Blitzstein, Marcy 300
Bloch, Kurt 8, 40, 320, 321
Blossom, Mrs. Dudley Stuart 277, 278
Board of Economic Welfare 34, 282, 302, 337, 345
Boeke 254
Bolsheviks 69, 171, 188, 189, 262
Boni & Gear, Inc 101
Borg, Dorothy 266
Boris. (*See* Boris Bazorof.)
Boston Edison Co 100
Bourke-White, Margaret 52
Bowra, Maurice 177
Boyd, Roland 11
Boyer, Raymond 77, 78
British-American Tobacco Co 17
British Foreign Office 51, 66, 170
British IPR. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, British.)
British YMCA. (*See* YMCA.)
Broek, J. O. M 266
Bromfield, Louis 300
Brooke, Raymond D 50, 51, 52, 53, 259
Brookings Institution 6
Brooks, Van Wyck 300
Browder, Earl 89, 106, 175, 176, 180, 268, 297, 333
Brown, Elizabeth 78
Brown, W. Norman 336, 337, 338
Brunauer, Esther 70
Bryn Mawr College 149
Buck, Pearl 52, 163
Buell, Raymond Leslie 175, 180
Bulletin of American Schools of Oriental Research 342
Bulletin on the Soviet Union 297, 298
Burton, Esther 99
Butler, Dr 134

C

California Communist Political Association 118
California Japanese. (*See* Nisei.)
Cambridge University 178, 325
Cameron, Angus 70
Cammann, Mr. Schuyler 327
Canadian Club 175. 176, 180
Canadian Institute of International Affairs 136
Canadian IPR 155
Canadian Legation 319, 320, 321
Canadian Prime Ministers 155
Cannon, Walter B 300
Carlson, Evans F 70, 125
Carnegie Corp 8
Carnegie Foundation 8, 31, 134, 135
Carr, E. H 177,178
Carter, Edward C 4–74, 80, 81, 107–109, 111, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127–180, 191, 237, 239, 240, 241, 243, 245, 247, 248, 251, 253, 254, 259, 260, 261, 263–266, 268, 270, 277, 279, 280, 281, 283, 285, 291, 293, 294, 296, 297, 299, 300, 308, 309, 319, 320, 330, 336–338, 340
Carusi, J. S 358
Case, Everett 264
Catherine 306
CDEEP 56
Central Bank of China 12

Page
Central Government (China) 49, 165
Central Intelligence 136, 140
Century Association 99
Chamber of Commerce (*see also* Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R.) 189
Chamberlin, Edith 78
Chamberlain, Prof. Joseph P 45, 78, 123, 264
Chamberlain, Neville 22, 33, 40, 174
Chambers, Whittaker 233
Champlin Refining Co 101
Chan, Hansu. (*See* Chao-ting Chi.)
Chancellor, Sir John Christopher 51
Chang, Betty C 143
Chang, Mr. Chih-yi 327
Chao, F. K 143
Chapman, Abraham 70
Charles, Allen E 264
Chase National Bank 93, 100, 101
Chatham House 178, 179, 238, 240, 279
Chemical Bank & Trust Co 101
Ch'eng, Gen. Ch'en 166, 167
Chen, Han-seng 70, 160
Chen, Dr. K. P 15, 18
Chennault, General 32, 33, 138
Chi, Chao-ting "Hansu Chan" 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 47, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 70, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, 93, 104, 139, 160, 161, 162, 276, 277, 278, 284, 285, 286, 288, 301, 302, 309, 352.
Chi Papa (father of Chao-ting Chi) 288, 301
Chiao, Pet Shin 18
Chia-sheng, Feng 342
Chicherin, Commissar 188
Chief Secretary and Foreign Minister of Russia 188
Chien-tu, Shen 143
Childs, Richard Storrs 300
China Daily News 166, 265
China Desk (State Department) 147
China IPR 7, 39
China Monthly Review 142, 143
China National Aviation Corp 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 105
China New Democracy 106
China Section (Planning Division, State Department) 349
China Today 12, 13, 15, 115, 116, 117, 163, 168, 255, 285
China Weekly Review 141, 142, 143
Chinar, Vasyf 197
Chinese Army 128, 129
Chinese Central Government 351
Chinese Commission of the Central Committee 195
Chinese Communist Party. (*See* Communist Party, China.)
Chinese Federation 351
Chinese history project, Columbia University 330
Chinese Industrial 140
Chinese IPR 18, 38
Chinese lobby 57
Chinese National Army 214
Chinese Nationalist Government 15, 39, 45, 67, 90, 151, 153, 160, 164, 193, 196, 197, 287, 303, 340, 350
Chinese Peoples Government 84
Chinese Postal Remittances & Savings Bank of Hong Kong 82, 99, 100
Chinese Red Radio 258
Cholmeley, Elsie 70
Christy, Arthur 306
Chun-cho, Tong 143
Chung-fah, Yen 143
Churchill, Mrs. Winston 179
Churchill, Winston 150, 174

Page
Chu-teh, General 258
CHA (Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs) 140
CIIC, Inc 101
Civil Affairs Department 360
Claxton, Brooke 175, 176, 180
Clubb, O. Edmund 70
CNAC 86
Coe, Frank V 70, 266
Colegrove, Kenneth W 30, 35
Colijn 240
Columbia Press 51
Columbia University 12, 53, 78, 84, 134, 159, 173, 177, 178, 273, 274, 312, 318, 322, 330, 332, 337, 341
Comintern 188, 189 191, 227, 234, 246, 254, 256, 260, 276, 277, 284, 291, 324, 325, 350
Commerce Department 278
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives 162, 177
Committee for a Far Eastern Policy 54, 5456
Committee for National Morale 300
Commonwealth Edison Co 100
Communist (*see also* Political affairs) 119
Communist armies 169, 170
Communist-democratic-united front left wing 213
Communist International 47, 48, 312
Communist International, No. 6 191
Communist International, No. 21 191
Communist International, World Congress Sixth 352
Commuist International, Seventh World Congress 350
Communist Party 2–4, 9–12, 15, 16, 23, 32, 34, 36, 38, 46, 50, 79, 111, 115, 117, 127, 130, 162, 171, 175, 185, 188, 191, 200, 209, 210, 224–226, 236, 245, 246, 254, 256, 269, 274, 275, 277, 283, 286, 287, 289, 290, 295, 299, 301, 308, 333, 339, 343, 344.
Communist Party (California) 118
Communist Party (China) 16, 36, 37, 40, 60, 61, 65, 66, 82, 83, 84, 87, 89, 106, 119, 138, 141, 151, 163, 165, 166, 171, 191, 198, 213, 214, 216, 258, 276, 277, 280, 287, 303, 304, 314, 316, 350, 351.
Communist Party (France) 257
Communist Party (Germany) 225, 280, 283, 285, 308, 312, 322, 323, 324
Communist Party of New York State 55, 251, 252
Communist Party (Oklahoma) 116
Communist Party (Russia) 361
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 297
Communist Political Association 118
Communist Political Association of San Francisco 118
Companhia de Importacoes Industrial e Construtora, S. A 101
Comstock, Miss Ada L 122, 123, 264
Condliffe, J. B 11, 321
Congress 2, 34, 56, 77, 162
Connolley, Violet 178
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York 100, 101
Continental Oil Co 101
Cooper, John C 19, 20, 26, 111, 264
Cooper, Merion 19, 20, 26, 111
Coordinator of Information (British Section, Library of Congress) 336, 337, 338
C. P 337
Corbett, Percy E 177, 178, 238, 239, 253, 254
Cosmos Club 147, 161
Council of Foreign Relations 135
Council of International Affairs 18
Council for Pan-American Democracy 105, 106
Counterintelligence Service. (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Crawford, David L 264
Creichi 201, 202

Page

Cromwell, Edith 50
Cross, Samuel 171, 178
Crossman, Mr 10, 14
Currie, Lauchlin 19,
20, 21, 26, 29, 34, 67–69, 70, 108, 109, 112, 114, 120, 132, 133, 136,
140, 144, 145, 154, 155–158, 161, 174, 175, 182, 270, 281, 345, 347, 348
Curtis, Wright A 100

D

Dafoe, Mr 73
Daily Worker 9, 10, 15, 17, 21, 22, 116, 117, 118, 125, 126, 128, 131, 162, 245, 299
Daladier 22, 33, 174
Datta, S. K. 239
David 306
Davies, John P 70, 307, 314
Davies, Mrs. Joseph E 300
Davis, Joseph S 264
Davis, Merle 11
Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl 10, 42
Deane, Arthur 45
Deane, Hugh 70, 142, 143
De Caux, Len 70
Deep Rock Oil Corp. 102
De Francis, John 327, 335
Dennery, Mr 173, 238, 321
Dennett, Raymond 267
Dennison, Miss Eleanor 249
Department of Defense 182
Derby Oil Co 102
Despres, Emile 71
Dietrich, Mr 229
Die Weltbuhne 229
Dillingham, W. F 264
Director of Pacific Operations (OWI) 213
Dobb 179
Dobbs, Maurice 340
Dodds, Professor 179
Dogras, Mrs. J 179
Doubleday-Doran Publishing Co 81
Downing, Elizabeth 266
Draper, Theodore 71
Dromedary Dates 71
Dubinsky, David 149, 293, 294, 295, 300
Dubs, Homer 342
Duggan, Laurence 71, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242
Dulles, Allan 45
Dulles, John Foster 45
Dutch Treat Club 217
Duval Gasoline Co 101

E

Eam 214
Earle, Mr 238
East Fish Trust 189
Eastern Air Lines 100
Eastman, Max 159, 169
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 5
Economic Defense Board 30
Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area 9, 81
Eggan, Fred 342
Eight & Ten West 37th Street Corp 98, 101
Eighth Air Force 138
Eighth Chinese Army 130
Eighth Route new Communist-led Army 165
Eisler, Gerhart 224, 225, 256, 308, 324

Page
Elmhirst, Mr 155, 157, 158
Eltenton, Mrs. Dolly 71, 266
Emeny, Brooks 45, 158, 264, 266
Emerson, Ruppert 54
English Communist Party 280, 281
Epstein, Israel 71
Esso Standard Oil Co 102
Esther 329, 331
Exchange Stabilization Board 15
Executive Department 345
Export Control Administration 278

F

Fahs, Mr 321
Fainsod, Merle 262
Fairbank, John K 71
Fairbank, Wilma 266, 306, 307
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Miss Elsie 50, 51, 263
Falconer, Alun 143
Far East Command 353, 359
Far East United Nations Conference at Ootacamund 13
Far Eastern Institute 342
Far Eastern Quarterly 341
Far Eastern Spotlight 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 259
Far Eastern Survey 6, 8, 9, 80, 81, 163, 167, 270, 299, 335, 337
Farley, Miriam S 122, 266
Fascists 27, 126, 344
Fatt, Ngiam Tong 143
Faymonville, Col. Philip R 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 161, 176
FBI. (*See* Federal Bureau of Investigation.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation 27, 43, 63, 211, 221, 230, 270, 343
Federal Reserve 71, 278
Fei, Koh Tsung 103
Field Anita Boyer 77
Field, Edith 71, 266
Field, Mrs. Elizabeth 286
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt 4, 7–9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24–31, 33–35, 45, 71, 74, 75–127, 173–175, 179, 180, 182, 232, 241, 242, 246, 247, 249, 251, 253, 254, 260, 263–265, 268, 277, 283, 286, 292, 295, 298, 305, 310, 311, 344, 345, 347.
Field, Herta 260
Field Lila V 102
Field, Noel H 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 260, 270, 271
Finkelstein, Moses 312, 313, 318, 321, 322
Finley, Moses 323
First Negro Workers Congress 286
Fischer, Louis 243
Fischer, Mrs. Louis 243
Fischer, Markoosha. (*See* Mrs. Louis Fischer.)
Fisher, Galen M 264
Fisher, Ruth 339
Ford Co. (*see also* Gorki Factory) 194
Ford Co. (Alexandria, Egypt) (*see also* Vauxhall, England) 194
Ford, Henry 178, 194, 305, 306
Foreign Economic Administration 132, 282
Foreign Office (Moscow) 188
Foreign Policy Association 22, 28, 45, 99, 108, 120, 135, 175, 177, 180, 249, 349
Foreign Relations Committee, Senate 211
Foreign Trade Corp. (*see also* Stanko-Import, Machine Tool Import) 193
Forman, Harrison 213, 217
Forrest, Parrott 102

Page
Foster, Mr 333
Fourth Army Headquarters (Presido) 148, 176
Fourth Chinese Army 130
Frankfurter Zeitung 256
Free German Committee 339
Freeman, Harry 245
French Army 238
French Communists. (*See* Communist Party, France.)
French Government 206
Friedman, Irving 71, 278
Friedman, Julian 71
Friends International Centre 179
Fu-an, Fang 143
Fuchs, Mr 290
Fulbright, Congressman 145
Furnivall, L. S 54
Fu-sheng, Chen 143

G

Gale, Esson M 341
Galton, Miss Dorothy 177
Gaus 66
Gayn, Mark J 71
General Chennault's staff 32, 138
Genro 279
German Army 116
German Communists. (*See* Communist Party, Germany.)
Giannini Foundation (University of California) 8, 254, 319, 320
Gibb 179
Gilmore, Mr 27
Glasgow University 178
Globe Petroleum Corp 102
Glover, Olive E 327
Glover, Pat 321
Gold, Mike 254
Golden Book of American Friendship for Soviet Union 300
Gorki factory (*see also* Ford Co.) 171, 178, 194
Gorman Francis J 296
Gould, Randall 71
Gourou, Pierre 54
Grad, Andrew (*see also* Andrew Grajdanzev) 71
Grady, Henry F 264
Grajdanzev, Andrew (*see also* Andrew Grad) 71, 253, 254
Granich, Max 254, 255
Graves 337, 338
Great Northern Railway Co 100
Great Northern sea route 189
Greater New York Industrial Union Council 300
Greek Communists 184
Greek Regular Army 214
Greenberg, Michael 71, 280–282, 325, 326, 339, 345
Greene, Jerome 11, 263, 264, 292
Greene, Miss Katrine R. C 264, 266
Gregg, Joseph 136
Grinkie, Walter 231, 261
Gromyko 178
Gronboch, K 342
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York 102
Gulf Oil Corp 102
Gulf Refining Co 102
Gumperz, Julian 255, 280, 283
Gunther, John 259

H

Page

Hague, The---- 69, 240
Hailsham, Lord---- 73
Hamilton, Max---- 147
Hamish---- 178
Hancock, W. K---- 240
Hangin, John Gombojab---- 325
Han-seng, Gen. Chen---- 36 38–40, 47, 50–52, 57–60, 239, 249, 258, 259, 287, 309, 322, 326, 327, 335, 340
Hansen, Haldore---- 71
Harmon, Francis S---- 122–124, 264
Harriman, Mr---- 154
Harris, Rev. Thomas L---- 296, 300
Harvard Club of New York---- 99
Harvard University---- 171, 178, 262, 286, 300, 301, 342, 343
Harvard University Press---- 18
Haskell---- 179
Havas---- 131
Hayden, Joseph R---- 248, 249, 264
Hazard, John---- 154
Helen (*see* Elizabeth Zubelin)---- 244, 261
Heller, Mrs. Edward H---- 264
Helmerich & Payne, Inc---- 102
Herod, William R---- 264
Hersey, John---- 71
Higginson & Co., Lee---- 7
Hindus, Maurice---- 296
Hiss, Alger---- 71–118, 131–137, 139, 140, 144–146, 161, 175, 232–235, 243, 270
Hitler, Adolph---- 150-152, 178, 188, 196, 198, 214, 274, 279, 289, 296–300, 302, 308, 315–318, 323–325, 334, 339, 343
Hitler-Stalin pact---- 52, 53, 68, 151, 323
Hoffman, Paul---- 141
Holland, William L---- 7, 12–14, 16–19, 33, 41, 43, 64, 80, 155, 158, 173, 176, 238, 239, 253, 254, 260, 263, 268, 269, 277, 310, 319, 320.
Holtom---- 306
Hoover, J. Edgar---- 42, 43
Hopper, Bruce---- 262
Horiunuchi---- 153
Hornbeck, Stanley---- 113, 131–133, 135, 136, 139, 141, 145–147, 161
Hotel Lux---- 256, 260
Hoving Corp---- 100
Howe, Fred---- 249
Hrdlicka, Ales---- 300
Hsiao-tung, Fei---- 18
Hsu, Y. Y---- 71
Hull, Cordell---- 20, 67, 140, 153–155, 175
Humble Oil & Refining Co---- 102
Hume, Edward H---- 264
Hume, Joy---- 71
Humelsine, Carlisle H---- 282
Hutukhtu, Dilowa---- 325
Hutung, Ta Yuan Fu---- 305

I

Ianson, Ia. D---- 189
Ike, Nobutka---- 327
Imprecorr---- 47, 48, 54
Indian Council of World Affairs---- 18
Indusco. (*See* United China Relief.)
Inner Temple of London---- 358
Institute of the History of Medicine---- 300
Institute of Oceanography---- 189

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations 2, 4 6–13, 15–19, 24, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 38, 40–46, 50–53, 60, 63–65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 80–82, 86, 106, 109, 113–115, 117, 118, 121–125, 131, 133–137, 140–145, 148, 149, 156, 158, 160, 161, 163, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 178, 189, 191, 195, 198, 202–206, 208–210, 213, 216, 218, 220, 237, 238–240, 241, 246–248, 250–255, 259, 261–264, 265–271, 277–280, 283, 284, 287, 289, 295, 305, 306, 313, 315, 319–321, 323, 325, 336–340, 341, 343, 346, 347, 349.
Institute of Pacific Relation (British) 7, 144
Institute of Pacific Relations (Russian) 191
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite National Park) 72, 177, 279
Institute of Social Research 270, 311
Institute of World Economics and World Politics 189
Insurance Co. of North America 101
Inter-Continent News 128
Internal Affairs Security Police 196
Internal Security Committee 16
International Affairs 178
International Harvester Co 101
International Hotel 260
International Insulating Corp 101
International Ladies Garment Workers Union 149, 293, 294, 295, 300
International Press 47, 48
International Publishers Co 252
International Quarterly 9
International Secretariat (IPR) 68, 72, 161, 189, 190, 267, 289, 306
Investors Service Co 102
Ioffe, S. S 189
ISC 239, 240
Isis 342
Izvestia 308, 309

J

Jack 320
Jacoby, Mr. Erich H 53, 54
Jaffe, Mrs 303, 304
Jaffe, Philip J 35, 71, 114, 115, 220, 276, 284, 285, 288, 303, 304, 311
Japan Christian Year Book 1936 306
Japanese Council, IPR 41, 255, 321
Japanese-Manchoukuo troops 265
Japanese South-Manchurian Railway 49
Jenkinson, Anthony 71
Jessup, Dr. Philip C 32, 121–124, 150, 172–174, 177, 238, 315
Johns Hopkins University 176, 251, 255, 300, 320, 326, 328, 330, 342, 343
Johnson, Alva 262
Johnson, Nelson 113
Johnson, Robinson 262
Johnstone, Bill 147, 148, 161
Jones, Catesby 327
Jordan, L. J 253
Joxe 238
Judd, Congressman 145
Justice Department 82, 97, 102, 103, 104, 105

K

Kahin, Mr. George Mct 327
Kai-shek, Generalissimo Chiang 12, 21, 29, 38, 49, 56, 57, 62, 67, 119, 125–130, 137, 148, 149, 156–158, 163, 168, 170, 193, 195, 213, 277, 325
Kamchatka Joint Stock Co 189
Kantorovich, Mr. A 190
Kashi, Tomohaiko 363
Kate 320, 321
Kawai, Teitchi 355
Keesing, Mr 319, 321
Kennecott Copper 100

Page
Kennedy ---------- 305
Keppel, Frederick P ---------- 264
Kerner, William ---------- 56
Kerr, John R ---------- 172, 173, 176, 177
Kessler, Colonel ---------- 154
Kiendl. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
King, T. P ---------- 143
Kinney ---------- 265
Kirov ---------- 297
Kittredge, Mr ---------- 238
Kizer, Benjamin H ---------- 115, 122, 264, 266
Kizer Carolyn ---------- 266
Klausen, Max ---------- 355
Kluckhohn, Clyde ---------- 342
Knopf, Alfred A ---------- 349
Kohlberg, Alfred ---------- 46, 74
Konoye cabinet ---------- 279
Knoye, Prince. (*See* Konoye cabinet.)
Kournakoff, Sergei ---------- 71
Kovanolov ---------- 170, 171, 172, 178
Krasnoiarsk ---------- 191
Kremlin ---------- 128, 131, 178, 202, 209, 297, 308, 309
Krivitsky, General ---------- 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 217, 218, 234
Kung, H. H ---------- 12, 13, 15, 16, 85, 91, 139
Kuo, Mr ---------- 39
Kuomintang Government ---------- 12, 13, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 130, 163, 165, 166, 167, 213, 214, 308, 348, 351
Kyoto Conference ---------- 11

L

LaGuardia, Mr ---------- 297
Lamont, Corliss ---------- 72, 159, 160, 162, 168, 267, 268, 296, 300
Lamont, Thomas W ---------- 9, 159, 170
Landon, Mr ---------- 319, 321
Landres, Mrs. Rose W ---------- 264
Lane, Clayton ---------- 346
Lang, Olga ---------- 72, 269, 270
Lasker, Bruno ---------- 8, 250, 287
Lasswell, Mr ---------- 40
Lattimore, Owen ---------- 19–21, 24, 26, 29–31, 35–39, 42, 47, 57–63, 66–69, 72, 107–109, 112, 115, 120, 121, 147, 148, 150, 151, 156–158, 159–161, 168, 173, 176, 177, 179, 182, 200–204, 208–215, 217–221, 250, 251, 253–255, 270, 277, 278, 281, 287–291, 301–311, 314, 319, 320, 325–335, 339, 340.
League Against Imperialism, First Congress ---------- 312
League Against Imperialism, Second Congress ---------- 276
League of Nations ---------- 232, 235, 240, 271
Leaning, W. J ---------- 72, 254
Lee, Duncan C ---------- 72, 143
Lee, Michael ---------- 72
Lenin ---------- 334, 335, 343
Leslie, Kenneth ---------- 300
Lewis, Mr ---------- 141
L'Heureux, H. J ---------- 138
Liao ---------- 341
Liberal Club ---------- 286
Library of Congress ---------- 144, 145, 161, 192, 253, 325, 336
Life Magazine ---------- 163, 212
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co ---------- 100
Lillenthal, Mrs. Joseph ---------- 264
Lillick, Ira S ---------- 264
Lindgren, Dr ---------- 178
Lindsey, Michael ---------- 72, 171
Lindsey, H. A. L ---------- 171
Lingelbach, William E ---------- 342
Little, Ballard ---------- 161

Page
Little, Herbert S 264
Litvinoff 184, 191, 300
Litvinov. (*See* Litvinoff.)
Liu, C. Y 97, 105, 260
Lockwood, Virginia C 266
Lockwood, William W 158, 237, 248, 253, 254, 266, 267, 291, 336, 338
London Foreign Ministers Conference 178
London Times 171, 177, 178
London University 177
Long, Breckinridge 139, 140
Loomis, C. F 11
Lorwin, Lewis 72
Loudon 18
Louisville & Nashville R. R 100
Lu, Mark M 143
Luce, Henry R 264, 278
Ludwig. (*See* Ignatz Reiss.)
Lyons, Eugene 270
Lysenko 341

M

Macadam, Ivison 16–19
MacArthur, General 143, 144, 289
Machine Tool Import 193
Mack, Federal Judge Julian M 296
MacLeish 336, 338
Madison Square Garden 295
Madjar 324
Magnolia Petroleum Co 102
Maleek, Verlag 256
Malikoff (*see also* Malikov) 199, 202, 203
Malikov (*see also* Malikoff) 199, 202, 203
Mamaiev 201, 202
Mandel, William 72
Manhattan Center 300
Mao-tse Tung government 12
Marcantonio-Quill 295
Marco Polo Bridge 58
Marco Polo Gate 36
Mark, Karl 302
Markin, Valentine (*see also* Walter) 229, 231, 261
Marshall, General 65, 177, 179
Martin, Mulford 262
Marx Engels Institute 227
Marx, Karl 214, 224, 321, 322, 333
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 300
Massing, Mrs. Hede 223–271, 292
Massing, Paul 229, 231, 232, 244, 270
Massing, Mrs. Paul. (*See* Mrs. Hede Massing.)
Master of Balliol (head of Oxford) 170, 171, 172
Matsuo 320
Matsuoka 279
Maul, Grace 254
Mayflower Hotel 26, 30
McAvoy, Clifford T 300
McCarran, Senator 282
McCoy, Gen. Frank 33, 155, 157, 158, 264
McGill 238
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred 264
McMichael, Jack 300
Meaning of the Chinese Revolutionary Victories (article in Political Affairs) 119
Mecca Temple 160, 295, 296, 299
Mekhonoshin, K. A 189
Mellon Gallery 144, 145

Page
Meng, C. Y. W ---- 143
Menges, Dr. Karl H ---- 327
Mercury (periodical) ---- 142
Metropolitan Benjamin of the Russian Orthodox Church ---- 297
Michael, Dr. Francis Henry ---- 327
Middle Temple of London ---- 358
Midkiff, Frank E ---- 264
Military Intelligence. (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Miller, Helen ---- 326
Miller, May ---- 54, 55
Miller, Robert T ---- 134–136, 242, 243
Mills ---- 319, 321
Mills College ---- 264
Ministry of Aviation (Nationalist China) ---- 195
Minor, Robert ---- 162, 286
Mitchell, Kate ---- 35, 72, 115, 260, 263
Mitrany ---- 179
Moe, Henry Allen ---- 237, 239
Moeller, Heinz "Asiaticus" ---- 36–40, 47, 48, 50, 57, 58, 60, 180, 308, 309, 310
Moll ---- 254
Molotov ---- 178, 266
Monarch Life Assurance Co ---- 157
Mont Tremblant ---- 136, 139, 140, 266, 267
Moore, Harriett ---- 72, 115, 148–150, 170, 171, 176, 177, 238, 253, 254, 260, 261–264, 265–267, 291, 293–300, 302, 307, 350
Morgan, J. P. & Co ---- 49, 159
Morris, Robert ---- 293, 294, 300
Moscow Daily News ---- 243
Moseley ---- 178
Motylev, V. E ---- 40, 50, 52, 189, 190, 239, 259, 265
Mueller, Hans. (*See* Heinz Moeller.)
Muenzenberg, Willy ---- 311, 312
Muhle ---- 253, 254
Munzenberg, Mr ---- 285
Murdock, George P ---- 342
Murmansk Railway ---- 298
Mussolini ---- 279, 317
Myrdal ---- 238

N

NAM ---- 56
Nanking Government ---- 251, 350
National Education Committee on Communist Policy in China ---- 55
National Legislature of China ---- 103
Nationalist Chinese Government. (*See* Chinese Nationalist Government.)
Navy Department ---- 135
Navy Intelligence ---- 112
Negro Workers Congress ---- 162
Nehru, Jawaharial Pandit ---- 18, 239, 276
Neineman, Mrs. Arthur ---- 264
Nelson, Donald ---- 154
New Cemetery for Revolutionists ---- 258
New Century ---- 89, 105, 106
New Chinese Army ---- 270
New College, Oxford ---- 171, 178
New Fourth Communist-led Army ---- 165
New Leader ---- 213
New Masses ---- 9, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 105, 106, 116, 117, 125, 220, 231, 345
New York Daily Worker ---- 118
New York Herald Tribune ---- 209
New York Telephone Co ---- 252 253
New York Times ---- 159, 162, 163, 166, 169, 258, 296, 346
New Zealand cabinet ---- 279
New Zealand Institute ---- 254

Page
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp 101
NII (Institute for Scientific Research) Great Soviet World Atlas 189
Ning-Yi, Liu 119
Ninth IPR Conference 71
NKVD 234, 244
Nomura, Admiral 153, 154
Nord Rouge 118
Norman, Herbert 318, 319, 321, 339
North Atlantic Conference 156
Northern States Power Co 100
Northwest Airlines 100
Northwestern University 30
Nung, Su Yu 91, 93, 103
NVD (*see also* Internal Affairs Security Police, Russian Security Policy 196, 218

O

Oakie, Alsberg, Wilbur 8
Odets, Clifford 300
Office of Coordinator of Information 27
Office of Facts and Figures 336
Office of Price Administration 278
Office of Public Affairs 313
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 33, 34, 108, 147, 175, 212, 221
Office of War Information (OWI) 34, 108, 175, 213, 281, 328, 348
Ohio Oil Co 101
Oklahoma Communists. (*See* Communist Party, Oklahoma.)
Onon, Mr. Peter Urgunggi 327
Ootacamund Conference 15
Orel, Mrs. Jeannette 56
Oxford University 150, 151, 152, 170, 171, 172, 178, 179, 342
Ozaki, Hotsumi or Hozumi 72

P

Pacific Affairs 9, 21, 39, 66, 72, 82, 173, 178, 180, 191, 209, 248, 250, 251, 253, 255, 270, 281, 283, 287, 305, 306, 310, 319, 320, 325, 326, 334, 338, 344, 345
Pacific Council, IPR 6, 18, 24, 32, 155, 172, 262
Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R 50, 189, 190
Pacific Ocean (*see also* Political, Social and Economic Quarterly of the Soviet Union) 187, 189, 190
Page, Charles Jr 264
Pan American Airways 19, 20
Pan, Quentin 18
Pang-cheng, Chen 143
Paris Police. (*See* French Secret Police.)
Parker, Philo W 122, 123, 264
Peace Mobilization 31
Peake, Cyrus H 35
Pear, Sir Bernard 177
Pearl Harbor 38, 58, 154, 165, 167
Pearl Harbor Attack, Joint Committee on 156
Peizer, Karl 54
Peking National University 18
Pelzer, Karl J 266, 268, 327
Pembroke College, Cambridge 179
Pennsylvania Railroad 100
Peoples Political Council 167, 351
Peoples Republic of China 82, 83, 84, 104, 105
P. E. P 238
Persian Government 187
Pfeffer 241, 242
Phil 320
Phillips, Mr 285
Phillips Petroleum Co 102
Pi-hou, Chiang 143
Plotkin, M. A 190

Page
Poland, Fred ---- 72
Polier, Justine Wise ---- 19, 21, 26, 112
Polish Communist Government ---- 137, 138
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ---- 138
Politburo (Chinese Commission) ---- 192–196, 198, 201
Political Affairs formerly "Communist" ---- 117, 119
Political, Social, and Economic Quarterly of the Soviet Union (*see also* The Pacific Ocean) ---- 187
Polk. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Pollard, John A ---- 26, 27
Pope, Prof. Arthur Upham ---- 300
Popper, David H ---- 35
Popper, Martin ---- 86
Porter, Catherine ---- 8, 72, 266, 336
Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Peking ---- 82, 92, 99, 100, 104
Powell, J. B ---- 141, 143, 159, 169
Powell, John W ---- 143
Pravda ---- 309
Press Hostel ---- 268, 269
Price, Harry B ---- 123
Price, Mildred ---- 72
Princeton University Press ---- 267, 340, 349
Protestant Digest ---- 300
Pruitt, Betram ---- 305, 306
Pruitt, Ida ---- 305, 306
Pulitzer prize ---- 300
Pure Oil Co ---- 102
Pyke, Richard ---- 263

Q

Quezon ---- 249

R

Rabinowitz, Victor ---- 75, 114, 127
Radcliffe College ---- 140
Rajchman, Ludwig ---- 72, 137–140
Ramspeck, Robert ---- 282
Ray, Jefferson Franklin ---- 72
Readers Digest ---- 159, 169, 212, 213, 215, 217, 220, 221
Red Army. (*See* Russian Army.)
Red Army in Germany ---- 178
Red Army (Soviet) ---- 184, 197, 234
Red Cross ---- 258, 259
Red Cross mission to Russia ---- 300
Reichstag ---- 312
Reid, Escott ---- 263
Reinhardt, Mrs. A. W ---- 264
Reiss, Ignatz ---- 184, 207, 226–229, 234, 244
Remer, Carl ---- 147, 161
Republic Oil Refining Co ---- 102
Research Bulletin ---- 296
Reuters ---- 51, 131
Ring, Martin H ---- 327
Robeson, Paul ---- 300
Robins, Col. Raymond ---- 295, 296, 299, 300
Rockefeller fellowship ---- 338
Rockefeller finance project ---- 173
Rockefeller Foundation ---- 31, 36, 177, 179, 239, 323, 339, 346
Rockefeller grant ---- 310
Rockefellers ---- 293, 294
Rogoff, Vladimir. (*See* Vladimir Rogov.)
Rogov, Vladimir ---- 127, 128, 131–133, 140, 144, 145–148, 167, 178
Roosevelt administration ---- 175, 176, 180
Roosevelt, President ---- 20, 21, 29, 35, 67, 68, 133, 155, 175, 213, 278, 297, 328, 348
Rose, Archie ---- 40

Page

Rosecrans, W. S---- 264
Rosinger, Lawrence---- 72, 125, 313, 314, 315, 318, 340, 341, 345, 346, 350–352
Roth, Andrew---- 72
Rowell, Chester M---- 264
Royal Institute---- 19
Royal Institute of International Affairs---- 171, 279
Royal Institute in London (British chapter, IPR)---- 7
Rozenholz---- 194, 198
Russian Army---- 222
Russian Communists---- 52, 152, 315
Russian Embassy, Washington---- 243
Russian Foreign Office (Moscow)---- 146, 152
Russian Government---- 195, 198
Russian military government---- 219
Russian military intelligence---- 209, 210, 219
Russian Orthodox Church---- 297
Russian Security Police (*see also* NVD, Internal Affairs Security Police)---- 196
Russian war relief---- 149, 175, 293, 294, 296, 299, 300
Russo-Japanese pact---- 351
Rutgers College---- 322

S

St. Johns---- 179
St. Laurent, Mr---- 156
Salter---- 178
Samson, Sir George---- 38, 238, 239
Sarton, George---- 342
Saturday Evening Post---- 9
Schneider, Helen---- 72
Schneiderman, William---- 118
School of Slavonic Studies---- 177, 178
Schraml, Mr. Richard---- 327
Schuman, Julian---- 143
Scotland Yard---- 290
Sears, Roebuck & Co---- 100
Secretariat---- 178, 248, 278
Secretariat of the League of Nations---- 137
Seely, Lt. Comdr. Charles S---- 300
Senate Appropriations Committee---- 313
Serenos, Renzo---- 40
Sergeev, M. A---- 270
Service, John S---- 72
Seventh World Congress, Communist International---- 350
Shanghai Commercial Bank---- 18
Shanghai Evening Post---- 142
Sheehan, Mrs. Vincent---- 295
Shell Oil Co---- 102
Shepardson, Whitney---- 155, 157, 158
Shepherd, Jack---- 238
Sheppard---- 260
Shih, Hu---- 40
Shoemaker, James---- 266
Shotwell's committee---- 238
Shotwell, James T---- 238, 264
Shumlin, Herman---- 300
Sieedlung, Friedrich Ebert---- 269
Sigerist, Dr. Henry E---- 295, 296, 299, 300
Simones, A---- 118
Sinclair Prairie Oil Co---- 102
Sixth World Congress, Communist International---- 48, 352
Slade, Mrs. F. Louis---- 264
Smedley, Agnes---- 73, 213, 217, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260
Smith, Fay---- 266
Smith, Miss Ford---- 178
Smithsonian Institution---- 300

Page
SMR ---- 265
Snow, Edgar ---- 73, 213, 299, 303, 351
Social Democrats ---- 323, 324
Social Fascists ---- 324
Social Work Today ---- 300
Sohio Petroleum Co ---- 101
Soong, T. V ---- 12, 21, 137, 139, 143
Sorge, Richard ---- 143, 226, 227, 256, 267
Sorge-Smedley Report. (*See* "Sorge Spy Ring.")
"Sorge Spy Ring" (report of Army Intelligence) ---- 359
Southerland & Cromwell ---- 45
Soviet Air Force ---- 199
Soviet Air Force Purchasing Commission ---- 192
Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Athens ---- 183
Soviet Consul General in Bokhara ---- 185
Soviet Council ---- 262
Soviet Consul General in Northern Persia ---- 185
Soviet Council of the IPR ---- 187
Soviet Embassy, Athens ---- 184
Soviet Embassy in Latvia ---- 185
Soviet Foreign Trade Department ---- 193, 201
Soviet General Staff ---- 192, 196–199
Soviet Government ---- 65, 188, 193, 199
Soviet military intelligence ---- 192, 197, 199, 201, 204, 273
Soviet Ministry of Industry ---- 193, 194
Soviet-Mongolian forces ---- 265
Soviet Navy Purchasing Commission ---- 192
Soviet Photo ---- 229
Soviet Russia Today Publications, Inc ---- 102, 299, 300
Soviet Secret Service ---- 184
Soviet Union ---- 11, 52, 53, 58, 150, 169, 171, 178, 179, 186, 187, 194, 202 203, 214–218, 220, 225, 229, 231, 236, 242, 243, 246, 262, 263, 269, 275, 290, 291, 295–300, 324, 328, 340–341, 343, 346, 350, 351.
Soviet War Department ---- 193, 194, 195, 198, 202
Spencer, Frederick (*see also* Frederick V. Field) ---- 15, 115, 116, 117
Spiegelglas ---- 207
Sproul, Robert Gordon ---- 45, 73, 122, 264
Spuler, Bertold ---- 342
S. R. T. Publications, Inc ---- 101
SSRC Committee ---- 250
Staley, Eugene ---- 264
Stalin-Hitler ---- 150–152, 178, 188, 196, 198, 214, 279, 296–300, 302, 308, 315–317, 323–325, 334, 339, 343.
Stalin, Joseph ---- 150–152, 178, 188, 196, 198, 214, 279, 296–300, 302, 308, 315–317, 323–325, 334, 339, 343
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana ---- 102
Stanford University ---- 264, 283
Stanko-Import, Machine Tool Import (*see also* Foreign Trade Corp.) ---- 193
Stanolind Oil Purchasing Co ---- 102
State Department ---- 17, 32–34, 66–68, 112, 113, 131–136, 138, 139, 161, 170, 183, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240–242, 244, 250, 271, 282, 306, 313, 314, 341, 345, 348, 349.
Steele ---- 265
Stefansson, Vilhjalmur ---- 295, 296, 299, 300
Stein, Guenther ---- 73, 143, 144, 167, 267, 268, 269
Steinhart, Jesse M ---- 264
Stevens ---- 179
Stewart, Donald Ogden ---- 300
Stewart, Marguerite ---- 73
Stewart, Maxwell S ---- 73
Stilwell ---- 125
Stone, William T ---- 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 73, 107–109, 120, 121, 175, 180, 266, 270

Page
Strong, Anna Louise 56, 73
Struik, Dr. Dick J 300
Stuart, John 125
Sulzberger 125
Sunderland. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Sunray Oil Corp 101
Sunset Farm, Lee, Mass 263
Sun Yat-sen 168
Surrete Nationale. (*See* French secret police.)
Survey, Pacific Affairs 336
Svanidze, Mr. A. S 188, 189, 196

T

Tamagna 238
Tao, L. K 18
Tarr, Mr. Edgar J 155, 157
Tass 127, 128, 131, 144, 145, 146, 245
Tawney, R. H 238, 239, 342
Taylor, Prof. George Edward 40, 306, 321, 332, 342–352
Terian, General 199, 200, 202, 203
Terrall, Katherine 295
Texas Co 102
Thalheimer 322
Thomas, Senator J. A 133
Thompson, Robert 54
Thompson, Yates, Mrs 51
Thorner, Daniel 321, 322, 326, 327, 335, 336, 337, 338
Tiao, Shan San 18
Time magazine 212
Times 152
Timken Roller Bearing Co 101
Timperley 39, 40
Tito, Marshal 316, 317, 341
Todd, Larry 147, 161
Tokyo University 342
Topics in Brief 265
Toynbee, Arnold J 239
Trachtenberg International Publishers 245
Trade Union Service, Inc 98, 101
Trans-Siberian Railway 238
Treasury Department 135
Tremblant Conference 140
Tribune 152
Trippe, Juan 19
Trotsky 169, 230
Troyanovsky, Ambassador Alexander A 239, 295, 296, 299
Truman, President 56, 178
Tseng, K. C 104
Tse-tung, Mao 89, 106, 119, 126, 128, 214, 215, 316, 317, 350, 351
Tsinghua University 18
Tsung-nan, General 165
Tsung-yen, Wang 143
Tuan-sheng, Chien 18, 307
Tucker, Luther 264
Tukachevsky, Marshal 184, 194, 197, 198, 303
Turkish Government 197
Turner, Bruce 279
Turner, Margaret 143
Turner, Richard S 264
Tydings' committee 109, 114, 221, 222, 313
Tydings, Senator 109, 114, 221, 222, 313
Tze-Ch'Uan, Mr. Ho 327

U

Page

Un-American Activities Committee, House 17, 136, 301
Union Producing Co 102
Union Trust Co 100
United Aircraft 100
United Airlines 100
United China Relief (Indusco) 141
United Nation 5, 6, 13, 16, 17, 83, 86, 135, 138, 167, 168, 215, 235, 323, 330, 332
United Nations Charter 56
United Nations Conference (presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco) 118
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia 13
United Nations, Economic and Social Council 16, 17, 18, 276
UNRRA 141
United States Army 106, 174, 183, 278
United States Civil Service Commission 282, 302
United States Embassy (Moscow) 144
United States Navy 218, 278
United States Rubber 100
U. S. S. R 36, 38, 58, 60, 61, 178, 179, 187, 189, 190, 238, 276, 291, 297–299, 329, 331, 341, 349, 351
United States Steel Corp 101
U. T. W. of A 296
University of California 8, 254, 320, 319, 341
University of Chicago 342
University of Chicago Press 81
University of Copenhagen 342
University of Frankfort 274
University of Hamburg 342
University of London 342
University of Michigan 147, 341
University of Pennsylvania 342
University of Washington 273, 274, 342
Ushiba 238, 279
Utley, Freda 40, 306

V

Van Kleeck, Mary 73
Van Mook 279
Vatmanov 201, 202
Vauxhall (England) (*see also* Ford Co., Alexandria, Egypt) 194
Veatch 250
Verlag, Agis 50
Vernadsky 177
Vincent, John Carter 66, 67, 73, 113, 147, 161, 348
Virginia Quarterly 265, 266
Voice of America 183, 221
Voitinski, Mr. Grigorii N 187, 188, 189, 191, 239
Von Trott, Adam 73, 238
Vreeland, Mr. H. H. III 327

W

Wada, S 342
Wadham 177
Waibel, Dr. Leo 327
Wald, Lillian D 296
Wales, Nym 73, 126
Wall Street 119, 214
Wallace (Vice President) 327, 329, 331, 334
Wallart, Erika Glaser 231
Walter. (*See* Valentine Markin.)
Walter Hines Page School 325, 326, 335
Wardell. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
War Department 11, 135, 144, 145, 175, 258, 348
Wardwell, Allen 149

Page

Warren, Franklin E. N. 358
Washington Conference 48, 49
Washington Naval Treaty 190
Waymack, W. W. 264
White, Harry Dexter 73, 153, 155, 157–159
White House 22, 24, 25, 31, 33, 67, 68, 116, 133, 348
White-Hull 155
White Russians 172, 304
Who's Who 19, 112, 302
Wiener, Mr. Thomas G. 327
Wilbur, C. Martin 341
Wilbur, Raymon Lyman 73, 122–124, 263, 264, 292
Willkie, Wendell L. 278
Willis, Z. F. 179
Wilson, Woodrow 299
Winter, Ella 73
Wise, James Waterman 296
Wiss, Helen 8
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl August 269, 273–342, 345, 352
Wo-chiang, Lin 143
Wood, Galahad 143
Wooten, Barbara 40
Workers Communist Party of America 286
Workers Monthly 47, 161, 162, 285, 286
World Affairs Council 347
World Fair 271
World Institute 17
World Reports, Inc. 101
World Theater. (*See* Die Weltbuhne.)
Wrad, Mrs. 321
Wright, Mrs. Quincy 264
Writers 152
Wu, Chan 93, 104
Wu, Leonard 263

Y

Yakhontoff, Victor 73
Yale University 177, 342
Yale University Press 178, 270
Yardumian, Miss Rose 73, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 160, 161, 266
Yarnell, Harry E. 33, 264
Yasuo 319, 321
Yates, Oleta 118
Yat-sen, Sun 168
Yen, Dr. Y. C. James 79, 120
Yi, Liu Ching 97
Yin-Pin, Kung 93, 104
YMCA 276, 296
Yokota 238
Yosemite Conference (IPR) 72, 177, 279
Yoshizawa 279
Young, Marguerite 231, 232
Youth Palace 258

Z

Zubelin, Elizabeth 261
Zubelin, Peter 243, 244
Zimmerman, Carle C. 54

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 2

AUGUST 9, 14, 16, 20, 22, AND 23, 1951

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CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Bentley, Elizabeth T	403
Budenz, Louis Francis	513–593
Canning, William Martin	466
Carter, Edward C	449
Chambers, Jay David Wittaker	487
Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A	353
Yoshikawa, Mitsusada	449

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee has before it this morning General Willoughby. The Chair wishes to say to the general that his fine service in the armed services of the United States and in the Intelligence Department of the Army especially is well known to his countrymen, but never did he render a more worthy service, nor one more needed for the welfare and protection of this country, than to make known to this committee and to the people anything that savors of internal danger to this Government and to the American way of life.

The Chair wishes to congratulate the general for his presence here, and we feel certain that beneficial results will flow from his expression of his knowledge of the subject.

The general will be sworn.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WILLOUGHBY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY, MAJOR GENERAL, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, FAR EAST COMMAND AND UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, will you give your full name and your present military status to the committee?

General WILLOUGHBY. Charles A. Willoughby, major general, on duty as Chief of Intelligence of the Far East Command and the United Nations Command at this present time. I am under retirement procedures for disability and length of service.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, when do you expect to be separated from the service?

General WILLOUGHBY. Presumably on or about September 1.

Mr. MORRIS. General, what was your last military assignment?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have been General MacArthur's director of military intelligence on his immediate staff since the fall of 1939 without interruption.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in the Philippines with the general at the time of the Japanese attack?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I was on duty in the same capacity with General MacArthur.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make the retreat from Bataan to Australia?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I was one of the small group of staff officers selected to accompany him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make the subsequent invasion trek back through New Guinea on to the southwest Pacific and back into Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I served throughout this period now known as the Campaign of the Southwest Pacific Area.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, what position did you hold with the occupation forces in Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. The same as during the campaign, that is, chief of military intelligence with the understanding that the expanded staff of General MacArthur assumed occupation or civil, primarily civil, duties under SCAP, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General Willoughby, how did your duties divide functionally while you held that position?

General WILLOUGHBY. In general terms the division of functions would continue the normal military surveillance but would assume another aspect dealing with the internal security of Japan. A rough distinction would be between military and civil intelligence, and we use that term frequently—that is, the term "civil intelligence."

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, here in the United States the duties of the FBI are the internal security and not necessarily the Army?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But over in Japan the Army took on both the functions as if they were active in the capacity of an FBI; is that about what happened?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir; I concur with your definition.

I would say that under civil intelligence we had developed agencies similar to the FBI in America, known in Japan as the Counterintelligence Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, while you were occupying that position which you just described, did you come into the custody of the Richard Sorge espionage documents?

General WILLOUGHBY. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances of your coming into the possession of these documents?

General WILLOUGHBY. Under the general provisions of the Potsdam declaration we released a number of so-called political prisoners. In that group we discovered shortly that there were the remnants of an international espionage ring who were then serving varied sentences. The foreign nationals who profited by this political amnesty became especially interesting.

One case was that of Max Klausen, who turned out to be the radio operator of this ring. When this man disappeared via the Soviet Embassy, we realized that we were confronted with an espionage case of great significance.

In examining the court records pertaining to this trial—and I may say that it was a trial by civil court unconnected with the Japanese Army or Navy—we encountered a number of American Communists, second-generation Nisei with long residence in California.

Obviously this link with America made it mandatory that we make a thorough examination of this entire operation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, were all the exhibits and all the evidence concerning this espionage ring found in court records or were they to be found some place else?

General WILLOUGHBY. They were initially based on a translation of the court records supported by interrogation by us, postwar, of the judges, the investigating officers, the Attorney General, and other Japanese officials charged with this case.

In addition, we made independent postwar interrogations of the members, that is, the remaining members of this espionage ring, to verify the fact that their statements voluntarily and without pressure by the occupation would coincide with the statements previously rendered to the Japanese authorities.

One notable statement to which I invite your attention is that of Teitchi Kawai, a still living eyewitness to all the activities of the principals in this case, especially Ozaki Hotsumi, Smedley, and Stein.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Smedley an American?

General WILLOUGHBY. Smedley was an American citizen.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Stein?

General WILLOUGHBY. Stein was a British citizen, acquired citizenship in Hong Kong in 1941, an itinerant journalist of some reputation in oriental affairs who is thoroughly implicated in this case. If the fact is not known to you, he was arrested by the French secret police this spring, the Surrete Nationale, on the advice of the French Embassy. The charges were espionage, and he was deported.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you learn this through official channels?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Like all police agencies, we are in intimate liaison with international police bureaus and there is a continuous mutual exchange of information.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, General, that Guenther Stein was arrested for espionage in France in 1950?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. The significance that I personally attach to it is that when the initial report was released in February of 1949, Guenther Stein disappeared and has not been heard of since that period except in connection with his arrest by the Paris police.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Guenther Stein in prison in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. No; he was not present at the time the espionage ring came to the notice of the Japanese police; otherwise, he would have been arrested. I will deal with his implication a little later on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I at this point point out that the reason we are stressing Mr. Stein as this particular time, if we are stressing him, is that we had testimony from Edward C. Carter, who was the head of the Institute of Pacific Relations, that Guenther

Stein was the Chungking correspondent for the Institute of Pacific Relations in China, and that in addition he was the British delegate to the Hot Springs conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations which was held in 1945.

There are other activities of Guenther Stein which Mr. Mandel will later in in this session introduce in the record, but the significance of our dwelling on this particular name is that Guenther Stein was one of the IPR personnel whom General Willoughby encountered in his scrutiny of the Richard Sorge case.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the same individual referred to by Mr. Carter?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same individual, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, what reason do you have to believe that these Richard Sorge espionage records are authentic?

General WILLOUGHBY. As an investigating officer of some experience, I was of course convinced of their authenticity from the start, accepting the court records as evidence. However, in view of the inferential repudiation of my initial report as of February 1949, the Headquarters in Tokyo decided to go over the entire mass of documents and employing outstanding American, British, and Japanese lawyers then on duty at Headquarters in Tokyo.

I would like to briefly quote, Mr. Chairman, and make reference to the action, opinions, and reports of these lawyers, known as consecutive exhibit No. 12.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you made a report to the Army in 1939 on this espionage case, did you not?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It received some publicity in America, did it not?

General WILLOUGHBY. So I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not that was ever recalled, or what happened to that report?

General WILLOUGHBY. If I interpret your question correctly, Senator, the report was filed by us, meaning the Headquarters in Tokyo, as a normal intelligence or internal security report of which there were many in the period. They decided to publish, to release it because it compared most favorably with the then notorious Canadian espionage case. We made, of course, no objection. Reports, which we file in Washington, are available to them at their discretion.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you figured that the release of this report would not affect adversely our security, either internally or in our foreign relations?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have rather a feeling that it would contribute toward the internal security by unmasking certain techniques, procedures, habits of the clandestine fraternity with which you are dealing.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was then released; is that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. It was released.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever withdrawn?

General WILLOUGHBY. Not by us.

Senator FERGUSON. By anybody?

General WILLOUGHBY. Actually there was what I would term an indirect repudiation based solely on Agnes Smedley's protestation at the time, including a threat of libel.

Senator FERGUSON. Agnes Smedley was an American citizen? I asked you that before.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And she was mentioned in the report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Heavily implicated.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any reasons or to this day have you any reasons to believe that anything that was said about or in connection with Agnes Smedley in that report to the Army was not a fact?

General WILLOUGHBY. I take the same position today that I took in 1949 or at the time the report was prepared. Whatever was stated then is a fact which I am prepared to testify to, and I am about, in the quotation of this legal investigation, to give you the professional juridical views.

Senator FERGUSON. I anticipated that, but I wanted to clear the record first so that it would be clear that this was a report that was issued by your office and sent to Washington, it was released, it was then withdrawn under a so-called or, as you had learned, a threat of libel suit because of one person mentioned in it.

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And then I wanted to see whether the fact was that there was any change in your attitude as to the truthfulness or accuracy of that report, and I find that there is not.

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur with your statement, sir, in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask one question there? You say they withdrew it. Whom do you mean by "they"?

General WILLOUGHBY. The War Department public relations officer, in my recollection, as well as officials of the Secretary of War's office, then under Mr. Royall, indicated that this report should never have been published. I am at the moment not familiar with the exact phraseology but, roughly speaking, that was the statement and the intent.

The result was that no action was taken on this report. Smedley never sued for libel, though her legal representative, Mr. Rogge, threatened to do that; and the case died, you might say, because of lack of further attention.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, the publicity that could be given to that was limited because of threats of libel. Now you do not feel, do you, or do you feel as a general in the Intelligence Division that anything that you are going to say here in relation to Smedley in this report can in any way affect adversely our internal or external security?

General WILLOUGHBY. In the sense of adversely you mean the publication of data?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed not. On the contrary, anything that I say this morning—and I am in complete sympathy with the purposes of this committee—will tend to clarify, to support, to add contributory evidence to the very courses that are now under your scrutiny and investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out since we have mentioned the name of Agnes Smedley that we have introduced evidence of her activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations and for that reason we are dwelling on that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same Agnes Smedley referred to by witnesses who have testified here before this committee previously?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I might point out that Mrs. Paul Massing has testified that she knew that Agnes Smedley was a member of the Communist Party and a member of the Soviet espionage ring of her knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore I think it is pertinent to this particular inquiry. It is not like taking an outside name.

Mr. MORRIS. General, you were about to read from the documents of the Sorge case.

General WILLOUGHBY. In line with your thought, senator, as to the quality of this evidence and in view of this, shall we say inferential repudiation, as I stated, we employed the best legal American talent then available in Tokyo to go over this entire mass of evidence running into perhaps more than a million words and thousands of photostatic exhibits, and this is the deliberate statement, opinion, and conclusion of these high-ranking American lawyers in important legal positions:

LEGAL OPINIONS OF DOCUMENTARY AUTHENTICATIONS IN THE SORGE CASE

We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before they may be introduced in courts of record of the United States or be used as a basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the authentication and verification of the documents listed in the following six pages—

meaning the raw material of the Sorge case—

and after having duly considered the testimony of witnesses and having examined their written statements and interrogations together with their seals and signatures appended thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authentication and verification of the documents, including the statements from witnesses, are in accordance with existing law and procedures.

We therefore certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and verification of each of the several documents mentioned is legally sufficient to give legal standing to their full use within the scope of the rules of civil procedures for the courts of the United States or foreign courts adhering to Anglo-American jurisprudence.

It is our further opinion that:

(a) The authentications herein referred to are good, sufficient, and legal identifications to the documents to which they relate.

(b) That such records and documents are sufficiently authenticated to permit their full use before any court of record subject to the limitations imposed by the prevailing rules of evidence, and, finally, that the procedures and methods employed in the authentication of the documents herein referred to are those that are normally used in the preparation of documents to be used for the same identical purposes for which these documents are or may hereafter be intended.

Now the signatures to that document are: J. Woodall Greene, member of the Maryland bar; J. S. Carusi, member of the Connecticut bar; Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma bar and member of the New Mexico bar; and finally, E. V. A. de Becker and Rokuro Yusami, a firm of international Tokyo lawyers who are members of the Middle Temple of London and members of the Inner Temple of London.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. I will have to check that date, but it is roughly in the spring of 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it after the withdrawal of the Smedley report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then was there any reaffirmation or publication of the Sorge-Smedley report, or whatever we call it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Not since that date.

Senator FERGUSON. Not since that date, notwithstanding that these civilian lawyers gave this opinion after a thorough examination of all of the evidence that went into the making of that report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Having presented to you, Mr. Chairman, this reputable American legal opinion, I would like to continue and state the conclusions which these very men arrived at because they are pertinent to the entire juridical quality of this case. I am now speaking of the same men and, for your clarification, they were members of the legal sections of the Far East Command in the Civil Affairs Department. They practiced their profession then, their technical knowledge in legal channels continuously.

I am now reading the end part of their conclusions, which is again a numbered exhibit. By amicable arrangement with Mr. Morris, counsel, these cross-references are entirely known to him and available. When I speak of exhibits 12 and 20 he knows exactly where they are and can lay his hands on them. This is what these able and impartial lawyers have to say:

Based upon our examination of the documents listed immediately heretofore, it is the opinion of the undersigned that these evidences establish proof that Richard Sorge and his associates were espionage agents for the Russian Army and that Agnes Smedley and Guenther Stein are Communists in mind, spirit, and practice, and that they were actively and knowingly connected with the Sorge spy ring in China and Japan; and we are further of the opinion that the strong chain of evidence fully and conclusively supports the intelligence report entitled "The Sorge Spy Ring," dated December 15, 1947, a case study of international espionage in the Far East, and that such evidence amply justifies its submission to the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army, by the G–2 of the Far East Command.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, do you have anything there on the element of coercion, the freedom from coercion?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am glad you asked this question, Mr. Morris. I do.

As part of this smear campaign, to use this slightly objectionable term, in the wake of my initial publication of this report, Smedley—although I am reluctant to bring up the name of a dead woman because she is merely a type and there are hundreds of others—at that time it was immediately charged that this was an illegal court procedure. They suggested that the Japanese Army in its known cruelty was involved and that whatever testimony was obtained was under pressure, under duress, under torture.

This element, which, of course, is one of defense, was so important that we made unusual efforts, that is, the legal group which I have just listed, to determine that that element was lacking. So, we obtained the affidavit through personal interrogation by the American lawyers of the attorney general of Japan, Mr. Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

It may be of interest to the chairman to know that this attorney general is now in the States. He is on an investigative or educational journey sponsored by both the American and Japanese Governments, and is in Washington. It is my understanding that he will be interrogated by another congressional committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, he had first-hand knowledge of this Sorge case?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Senator FERGUSON. Because he was connected with it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Directly connected with it.

May I refer—merely a concession to age and faltering memory—to selected quick references? All of them are familiar to your counsel. These are my personal comments or briefs superimposed over perhaps 50 to 100 typewritten pages, abbreviated in order to assist not only this committee and their research staff but also the Washington authorities.

This affidavit—

I say—

is an affidavit by a Japanese Government official who was an attorney in the Tokyo district criminal court and interrogated Sorge in preliminary hearings in October 1941. The significance of this affidavit lies in the fact that Yoshikawa employed no irregular means of duress, third degree, or torture as the Smedley innuendo in her press statement at the time implied with a view of discrediting from the outset the quality of these important eyewitness statements, reports, and interrogation. The court was a normal constituted civil court. There was no pressure by the Army or Navy. The document in case was retained by Mr. Yoshikawa, as it was a corrected or edited copy of certain portions of the basic Sorge statement, and thus escaped destruction by burning as many documents were in our area of bombardments that destroyed important Japanese official buildings.

The further significance of the affidavit in substantiating the general court record is a clear picture this statement gives of the international character of Sorge's espionage ring in Tokyo and Shanghai, its military, strategic, political, and social objectives, its evident connection with the Moscow center, the Comintern, and the Soviet Army intelligence bureau.

For our purpose, if I understand Mr. Morris correctly, the emphasis is not so much on contents in addition to other evidence but the fact that no duress, no irregular means of coercion, no third degree, or torture, were applied in obtaining these statements or confessions.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I wonder if you will tell us in general the make-up and the purpose of the Richard Sorge Soviet spy ring. Who, for instance, was Richard Sorge?

General WILLOUGHBY. While this has been fairly well covered by the press at one time or another——

Senator FERGUSON. I really think, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of the record it should be placed in the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. Though we are merely scratching the surface, I will give my own version of this case.

Richard Sorge was a Soviet professional spy working under instruction of the fourth section—that is intelligence—of the Soviet army. He went to China in 1930 under cover as a legitimate journalist. As an aside or footnote, you will find that all of these agents somehow use an otherwise honorable profession, that of journalism, as their cover. You will find Stein being arrested in Paris as the correspondent of the Hindustani News.

You find Smedley operating as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung. You find Sorge appearing as the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung. He operated both in Shanghai and Tokyo. He obtained the collaboration of Miss Agnes Smedley, who, in turn,

introduced him to several coworkers of various nationalities—American, German, Chinese, and Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. When did he start this and when did he go there? Is that date given?

General WILLOUGHBY. That date is contained accurately in the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. About what year?

General WILLOUGHBY. Between 1930 and 1940. He operated in Shanghai in 1930, moved to Tokyo in 1936, remained there until 1941, until his arrest and the subsequent development of this case.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Smedley used principally in China rather than Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. She was used principally in China, and so was Guenther Stein. For that reason testimony concerning those two is primarily with activities on the China mainland. There is, however, as I will develop further, an important link, in fact the link with the Japanese operations. That is in the person of Ozaki, a very interesting individual whom Smedley procured as a recruit and introduced to Sorge in China. So there is your link between the China mainland and the Japanese background.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out at this time that Mr. Ozaki was in 1936 the Japanese council delegate to the IPR conference at Yosemite?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. That makes Ozaki doubly interesting to this committee specializing in the quality of the membership of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Ozaki is a type member in good standing of the Institute of Pacific Relations in his days.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to change the subject, but did you run into the Institute of Pacific Relations when you were going over this case?

General WILLOUGHBY. Merely in the recognition that some of the protagonists here were members.

Senator FERGUSON. And were doing work in that organization?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Senator FERGUSON. That is how it came into the picture?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that is how this all comes into this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General WILLOUGHBY. I understand your specialization, entirely meritorious, and I am merely contributing collateral axillary verification.

In order to once more emphasize the character of Sorge's organization—apparatus is the pseudo or Russian term for it—I would like to quote from his diary, duly authenticated reference in the hands of the counsel. This is Sorge speaking:

> As head of the Japan spy ring, I was directly affiliated with the central committee of the U. S. S. R. Communist Party. I was also under the fourth bureau (intelligence) of the Red army with respect to the technical aspects of my work and a few subject matter problems.
>
> As I see it—

this is Sorge speaking—

> my espionage group should be considered a special arm of the central committee of the U. S. S. R. Communist Party. That was its essential characteristic.

Another distinguishing feature was its technical and organization connection with the fourth bureau (intelligence) of the Red army. The espionage group which I operated in Japan, all of its members have frankly confessed that they were working to advance the cause of communism and not for money or personal gain.

Mr. MORRIS. General, approximately how many members were there in that ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. Fifteen to twenty. While the personnel of this ring varied from time to time, this skillful bank of spies—agents, if you wish—worked for nine productive years before their discovery. The famous Canadian spy case was one of the best examples of this type of espionage. I believe, however, that the Sorge efforts in Tokyo compare most favorably with this famous case.

Senator FERGUSON. How many nationalities were in this ring? Sorge was a German?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Guenther Stein was British?

General WILLOUGHBY. British citizen of German origin.

Senator FERGUSON. Smedley was an American?

General WILLOUGHBY. Was an American.

Senator FERGUSON. Any Canadians?

General WILLOUGHBY. None in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have the Japanese and the Chinese?

General WILLOUGHBY. And a class that is important in California is the Nisei or ex-California residents who were employed, recruited in this service. There were additional American citizens or applying for citizenship then resident in California in a certain strata of Japanese local population. So that is an additional element of membership.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not in any way, as far as counsel has been able to find out, connected with the IPR?

General WILLOUGHBY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. These California Japanese?

General WILLOUGHBY. No; they are not connected with the IPR, but there are some in conformance to your interest on which I believe Mr. Morris has made a fixation there.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you in the forthcoming testimony confine your testimony to those four people, at least as much as possible, whom we have mentioned as people who are involved in the Institute of Pacific Relations? Now will you speak very briefly about Hotsumi Ozaki? In the first place, will you tell us, General, what his position in the Soviet spy ring was?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record an excerpt from the handbook of the sixth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which was held at Yosemite National Park in California, August 15 to 29, 1936. There listed among the members and group secretaries of the conference are, Japan, Hotsumi Ozaki, research member, Asahi Institute of the Far East, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun; and, secretaries, IPR, Kinkazu Saionji. They were both listed in the Handbook of the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I would like that introduced in the record as such.

The CHAIRMAN. How was the handbook secured? How do you identify the handbook?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the handbook?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the handbook referred to there from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 81" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 81

[From Handbook For the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15 to 29, 1936]

MEMBERS AND GROUP SECRETARIES OF THE CONFERENCE

Japan:

Hotsumi Ozaki, research member, Asahi Institute of the Far East, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (p. 49).

Secretaries: IPR: Kinkazu Saionji (p. 50).

General WILLOUGHBY. Do you desire a comment on Ozaki?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, General, if you please.

General WILLOUGHBY. Next to Sorge, Ozaki Hotsumi was by far the most important member of this ring. His death on the gallows with Sorge is somber testimony of his relative importance.

In April 1937 Ozaki became a member of the China section utilized by Prince Konoye, several times Prime Minister of Japan, which placed Ozaki in immediate contact with a most important Japanese governmental circle. This was accentuated when one of his associates in the China section became chief secretary of the first Konoye Cabinet in June 1937.

When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, the Foreign Office—that is the Japanese State Department—set up a special investigative agency to handle north China affairs and Ozaki was designated as a Tokyo liaison representative.

We thus have the picture of Ozaki, secret Communist, Soviet spy, intimate associate of Sorge, to hold first an official position as an adviser to the Japanese Cabinet from 1938 to the fall of the Government, as being attached to the entourage of a Prime Minister; in other words, unusual opportunities to obtain highly top-flight information.

Mr. MORRIS. You know, General, from your own military experience that a man who was chief secretary to a Cabinet is in a very strategic position to obtain information?

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course.

Even more important than his official position, Mr. Chairman, was his friendship with old friends of college days who became very prominent at that time, namely, Ushiba and Tomohaiko Kashi, who were private secretaries to Prince Konoye.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like, Mr. Chairman, the record to show that Ushiba was predecessor of Saionji as secretary to the Japanese council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

General WILLOUGHBY. In these two men were centered the so-called "breakfast group," an informal discussion society of the bright young men around Prince Konoye. When dinners became inconvenient, these men met at breakfast, hence the name "breakfast groups." That

is an informal gathering of the important individuals closely affiliated with the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Office.

The American equivalent would be, if a selected group of State Department advisers were in an informal gathering, having access to usually top-level information. That was the group actually in existence, and we will see presently what they did with their opportunities.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, General, Ozaki was a full-fledged member of this spy ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. That I will demonstrate, or rather it is part of the attestation of the American lawyers long after we had already arrived at that conclusion. He is, next to Sorge, the most important member of this espionage organization.

Senator FERGUSON. General, from your facts are you of the opinion that the Institute of Pacific Relations, that is the Japanese branch, was in effect being used as a spy ring for Russian Communists and the Russian Red army because of the tie-in with the Foreign Minister's office and the others?

General WILLOUGHBY. I think that conclusion can be arrived at because of the membership, the intimacy, the association of those individuals, especially Ozaki, who had an official position and was the representative of the IPR in the Yosemite meeting. That relationship, of course, continued throughout his activity.

Senator FERGUSON. So it gave them a field to work in, the foreign relations of Japan and the foreign relations of America, through the American branch and the international branch of the IPR?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say that I agree with your conclusions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record at this time and present to the committee at this time a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field relating to the two Japanese that General Willoughby has just named, Ushiba and Saionji? Ushiba was secretary of the Japanese council of the IPR, who was succeeded by Saionji as secretary of the Japanese council of the IPR.

Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would authenticate that document and read the pertinent sections in the record.

Mr. MANDEL. I read a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 29, 1938, marked "private and confidential," addressed to Frederick V. Field from Edward C. Carter. The following is an excerpt from the letter:

DEAR FRED: As you know, we began early last autumn trying to get a man of the rank of Ushiba, Matsukata, or Saionji to join the international secretariat. None of these was available, but in January as you know Yasuo was nominated and has proved a very valuable member of the staff. As our work developed, we found that we needed to clear up a great many outstanding questions between the secretariat and the Japanese council, so on May 5 I cabled Dr. Yamakawa as follows:

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough. We would like to introduce the entire letter in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 82" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 82

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, June 29, 1938.

Private and confidential.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: As you know, we began early last autumn trying to get a man of the rank of Ushiba, Matsukata, or Saionji to join the international secretariat. None of these was available but in January as you know Yasuo was nominated and has proved a very valuable member of the staff. As our work developed, we found that we needed to clear up a great many outstanding questions between the secretariat and the Japanese council, so on May 5, I cabled Dr. Yamakawa as follows:

"Please cable could Saionji come New York for 1 or 2 months this summer to discuss questions arising from Dafoe's letter of February 9. We will pay all expenses."

On May 8, he replied as follows: "Will do best to comply with your request."

Now I have received a cable from Viscount Ishii, reading as follows:

"Japanese council regrets unable agree research project envisaged by international secretariat. In view of importance of problem for institute, Takayanagi sailing on July 15 to discuss matter with you. Circumstances prevent Saionji from leaving."

I have replied to Viscount Ishii as follows:

"Takayanagi most welcome. Hope he can remain at least throughout August and September. Am confident that on studying our plan of work here, he will discover that secretariat project can serve the interests both of Japan and Japanese council."

Ishii cabled Dafoe in a similar vein and Dafoe has asked me to indicate that he cannot see Takayanagi in Winnipeg, owing to the dislocation of his work by the Royal Commission, but suggesting that I urge Takayanagi to come straight through to New York preparatory to going to Lee for the week of August 10 which Dafoe is planning to spend at Lee. That is the only week he can manage to clear for the IPR between now and the end of the year.

I do not think it is in the interest of the IPR, either from the Japanese or the Pacific council point of view to publicize Ishii's cablegram. As I have stated in my reply, I feel that if Takayanagi can come and work with us for several weeks and have the unhurried week at Sunset Farm with Dafoe and others, a great deal of progress can be made.

Of course, we do not know as yet what the Japanese objections are. It may be that they want the secretariat to go ahead but with the record showing that the Japanese council voted against the project. It may be that they want the whole basis of the project altered so that the documentation of the inquiry will be similar to that of an IPR conference, namely, that it will consist in the main of national council contributions. It may be that the reports they have received of the attitude toward the conflict expressed in writing and speech by members of the secretariat makes them feel that the secretariat is incapable of directing an objective study of this sort. It may be that they feel that we made some technical mistakes in procedure in the way the project has been set up.

All of these are at this stage merely surmises on my part. The help that I want from you can be given if you will answer the following questions: (1) Do you think our procedure is sound to urge Takayanagi to come straight through to New York for consultations here just before going to Lee for the round-table conference with Dafoe? (2) If you wish a visit from Takayanagi at Pacific center, would you agree that he might render a greater service if he visited you on his way back to Japan in the autumn, rather than stopping over for a few days on his arrival on the *Chichibu Maru* on July 29? (3) Have you any advice as to whether I should go to San Francisco so as to be on the wharf with you to welcome him and bring him across the continent, or would you be willing to meet his steamer and put him on the first train east?

Takayanagi will doubtless want to have a talk with Alsberg some time while he is in the United States. Enclosed is a letter that I am sending to Alsberg today which is self-explanatory. I am wondering whether it would not be better

for Takayanagi to have his talk with Alsberg after he has cleared matters with Dafoe, inasmuch as Dafoe, in his circular letter of February 9 to the members of the Pacific council, assumed responsibility for recommending that the secretariat go ahead with the project.

By September, Takayanagi would be in a very much better position to profit fully from Alsberg's sage advice than he might be immediately on landing.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

General WILLOUGHBY. These data that are being furnished on the American IPR are as interesting to me as probably my comments are to you. This is an entirely new field. I regret only that I did not have that information in 1947, 1948, or 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, this committee just received these files within 6 months; these were the private files of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. These files were taken under subpena duces tecum and brought from New York here.

General WILLOUGHBY. I must congratulate this committee on its fast and decisive action.

Speaking of Ozaki, in summing up his relation to the Konoye Cabinet, the intimacy with Saionji, whom we will examine under a magnifying glass presently, I would say it is obvious that Ozaki's special position gave him unsurpassed opportunities to learn the exact nature and progress of all principal diplomatic or military projects of the Japanese Government.

Does that clarify the position?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Would you say he was probably the outstanding assistant to Sorge in the espionage ring, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. That has been repeatedly asserted, and he was so recognized in the interrogations and in the official appraisal of the Japanese judges and the opinion of the American legal investigators.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, the next name I think we will come to will be that of Saionji. As we have stated before, General, Mr. Saionji was the secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of time. I wonder if you will tell us what his connection with the espionage ring was.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes indeed.

Saionji is a very interesting figure because of his background and the curious sidelight on Japanese social and governmental character.

To begin with, Saionji was the adopted grandson of the late famous Genro, Prince Saionji. To understand his position, the Genro are of the elder statesmen of Japan who served under the Meija restoration which launched Japan as a world power. These elder statesmen consequently enjoyed an exceptional degree of veneration by the Japanese population, and some of this prestige naturally accrued to their family, and especially this man Saionji.

Saionji was a full-fledged member of the Sorge espionage ring in addition to his other qualifications that we developed. He was arrested by the Japanese police and was found guilty of passing secret information to Ozaki, an associate of the breakfast club. Saionji was given a sentence of 3 years with a stay of execution, undoubtedly a concession to the importance of his family connections.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, is there any evidence that Ozaki and Saionji were closely associated with each other?

General WILLOUGHBY. They were intimate, and the association ranged over many years.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Saionji's position with the Japanese Government?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was a consultant of the Foreign Ministry, that is the Japanese State Department, and the Cabinet and belonged to the bright young men forming the "breakfast club," the bright young men around Prince Konoye.

Senator FERGUSON. So they had them in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur.

Mr. MORRIS. General, what role did Agnes Smedley play in the Sorge spy ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. That has been covered generally, but here again I will give you an abbreviated pointed formation.

Smedley's association with the China spy ring of Richard Sorge dates back to 1930. Smedley introduced Sorge to Hotsumi Ozaki, that same Ozaki was his right-hand man, then a special correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun, but here again is the predilection of these individuals to seek cover in an otherwise honorable profession, to wit, correspondents of important newspapers.

Smedley was also instrumental in securing the services of Teikichi Kawai, who is still living and whose affidavit furnished freely to the American occupation authorities is one of the most important exhibits in this entire series available to the counsel. In fact, may I suggest, Mr. Morris, that you quote from exhibit 28, from the question series 100 onward, what our friend Kawai had to say.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you extract from the records the interrogation of Mr. Kawai just referred to by General Willoughby and read those portions commencing on about question 98?

The CHAIRMAN. To what records do you refer and how were the records made?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this record was a record that was in the possession of General Willoughby, which is a pertinent exhibit taken from the official files in Tokyo.

Is that right, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Duplicates are in the War Department, the same type of records which I described when I quoted the opinion of the American legal group.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, this opinion of the legal group went to the War Department and became part of the official files?

General WILLOUGHBY. It did.

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the interrogation of Kawai Teikichi, dated March 31, 1948, and April 1, 1949:

Question 98. When did serious discussions start about your second assignment?

A. I was asked if I would be able to go back to Manchuria the same night I submitted my report in Smedley's apartment.

Question 99. When were definite plans made for you to return?

A. I think we talked about that when we were walking through the park

Question 100. Describe that a little more fully.

A. At the first meeting in Smedley's apartment I was asked whether I would be able to go back or not at which time I answered that I would be able to go. When we left that night we decided to meet again the next morning at Smedley's apartment. Sorge came late after everyone else had assembled, and it was decided at that time I would go to Mukden. After the meeting at Smedley's

apartment the four of us, Ozaki, Smedley, Sorge, and I, went by automobile to the park. We made definite plans for me to go back to Mukden at that park.

Question 251. Can you tell what Smedley's influence and position were in Chinese espionage? Was she a person of high rank in the activity?

A. Yes, I did get that impression.

Question 252. In your conversations and contacts with Smedley did you get the idea that she had direct contact with Moscow or with Russia?

A. I got the impression that she had some liaison with the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you are reading from the testimony of Mr. Kawai, a member of the espionage group, which testimony was taken in 1949; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I add to this, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General WILLOUGHBY. This interrogation was made by Mr. Woodall Greene, one of the group of American lawyers. This is a voluntary statement of a member of this ring. He happened to be a Communist belonging to the Japanese Communist Party and that party was so apprehensive at that time about his testimony that I was obliged to furnish this man police protection because of threats directed against him.

Senator WATKINS. Did I understand, General, that you said he is still living?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, he is available as a personal witness. In order to save the committee expense, in view of their known limited allocation of funds for this purpose, a completely notarized affidavit is available, and it is this affidavit that Mr. Mandel has now quoted from.

Senator WATKINS. He was a member of the spy ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was a member of the spy ring, yes.

Senator WATKINS. How did he escape punishment?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was punished. We released him in this grandiose gesture following the Potsdam Declaration in 1945. He was in jail and was released as a potential amnesty gesture, which released all the members of this spy ring.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, there were some executed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Only two.

Senator FERGUSON. Two had been executed?

General WILLOUGHBY. All the rest were imprisoned and released.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the Potsdam agreement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator WATKINS. Was he not tried by the Japanese at the time Sorge and the others were tried?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was tried. He was a member of Sorge's ring, arrested, and in due process of law was tried and convicted with all the others. When we stepped into the picture in 1945 we made a sort of grand gesture, primarily designed to protect political prisoners, that is without definition, because in the fall of 1945 we were busy disarming the Japanese Army and occupying Japan, ranging from roughly Seattle to San Diego, Calif., with four divisions.

So, this sort of thing was interesting but by no means pressing, and we released perhaps people we should have not released.

Senator WATKINS. What was the sentence given him by the Japanese courts?

General WILLOUGHBY. Is the sentence of Kawai listed there? My memory being what it is, it would be like asking Edgar Hoover the details of case No. 1560. I had a policy-making position.

Senator FERGUSON. You do know he was released in 1945 under the Potsdam agreement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I think I can answer your question in just a moment. Ten years, and the release date of this gentry incidentally was in October 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. He did prove to be of assistance to the military authorities in Japan; did he not?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. We realized that if we could get in this group of prisoners someone of sufficient authority in his position to give us the story—us, the American occupation forces—it would be a valuable confirmation of the documentary evidence, and we proceeded then to interrogate all of them, and we found this man Kawai.

Since my interest was primarily in Stein and Smedley at the time, I concentrated on those two. We found his testimony to be conclusive of the character of which Mr. Mandel has just given you a sample. He was, therefore, of great assistance to us. He is now available on call. This affidavit is available. Given time we might produce the affidavits of all of them.

The CHAIRMAN. However, you had corroborating evidence besides his voluntary statement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Ohashi?

General WILLOUGHBY. Ohashi was in the same category, a relatively minor individual whom we also interrogated. Both knew and worked with Smedley is the gist of their contribution.

Senator WATKINS. What surprises me about it is that he escaped execution if he was a spy and working in the spy ring.

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very interesting comment. It is also to some extent characteristic of the civil quality of this court. They did not treat all of them in a summary fashion. They made a fine distinction on relative importance. Sorge was No. 1, Ozaki was No. 2, the rest in a descending scale of relative guilt, shall we say. However, their sentences ranged, for example, Koshiro 15, Taguchi 13, Akiyama 10, Kawai 10, Hotzumi 8—down to 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Repeat again the sentence imposed on Saionji.

General WILLOUGHBY. Saionji, according to this record, was found guilty of passing secret information to an unauthorized person—namely, Ozaki—was given a sentence of 3 years with a stay of execution, a suspended sentence. Talk of the time is that being the grandson of the Genro, who has the same emotional standing with Japan as the signers of the Declaration of Independence with us, got him off the hook.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will read from the testimony of Ohashi, just referred to by General Willoughby, in connection with the supporting evidence on Agnes Smedley.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the testimony of Ohashi Haideo, May 2, 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you are reading from the same document, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From which you presented the excerpt before?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir; who is listed here as chief, Ikegmi Police Station:

Question 5. In your voluntary statement of April 16, 1949, you said that Sorge mentioned Agnes Smedley. Will you tell us what he said about her?

A. Sorge was in China before he came to Japan. He organized an espionage ring in Shanghai, and Smedley was one of the members of the ring. Sorge was introduced by Smedley to Ozaki, who later became one of the leading members of the ring in Japan. Sorge met Smedley for the first time in Shanghai, but Smedley was not a member of this group in Japan. In 1934 Smedley stopped for a day in Japan. She went to the Asahi Shimbun, where she met Ozaki, who tried to contact Sorge but was unable to do so. Smedley left the same day.

Question 6. Did Sorge tell the nature of Smedley's duties in connection with his ring in China?

A. Sorge did not go into details about the actiivties of any of the members of the ring in Shanghai. I merely interrogated him concerning the names of the members of his ring and did not go into details concerning their activities. I was interested only in information covering the Japanese phase.

Question 7. In your statement of April 16, 1949, you said that Sorge praised Smedley's work in Shanghai. Is that true?

A. Sorge did say she was a very intelligent woman, that she had been with the Eighth Route Army and knew quite a bit about that organization, and also that her information was very good.

I will skip now to question 9, on Sorge's mention of Smedley and her activities in connection with his spy ring in China:

Question 9. Did you infer that she was an important member of the ring?

A. Yes; I did get that impression. As far as the members of the Shanghai ring were concerned, with the exception of Paul and Smedley he only listed their names. He often mentioned Paul and Smedley, which gave me the impression that she was an important member of the Shanghai group.

Question 14. You said that Sorge considered Stein one of the top members in his ring, also that Sorge informed you that Stein's house in——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that Mr. Mandel defer the rest of that until we come to the Stein testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. General, was Guenther Stein a member of Richard Sorge Soviet espionage ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was. Guenther Stein, special correspondent for a London newspaper, was a regular member of the Sorge spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge lists six members together with their aliases, and Stein was listed among the six. An intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name. In this connection, we are in possession of course of the entire series of radio code messages dispatched to Moscow by Sorge in this period, and many of the operators involved in it are mentioned not only by activity but by code references.

There is testimony by Max Klausen—Max Klausen was his radio operator at the time—that this wireless operator erected a transmission set in Stein's residence to forward reports to Russia. Stein not only was living on the premises but at the time gave his consent.

I think, Mr. Morris, that exhibit 23 has a direct quotation from this testimony, the establishment of a radio transmitter communicating with Khabarovsk, a Siberia station, is damaging activity.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, General. I would like Mr. Mandel to read from the police investigation of Max Klausen, which was made on the 25th of October in 1945. I would like Mr. Mandel to read page 9 on this Consecutive Exhibit No. 23, closure No. 1–A. This is from the interrogation of Max Klausen, whom General Willoughby has

identified as one of the leading members of the Sorge espionage ring.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from what again?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will be reading from Consecutive Exhibit No. 23, which was in the custody of General Willoughby in this connection.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

GUENTHER STEIN

One night in December 1935, while I was still at the Sano Hotel, Sorge called me to his home and introduced me to Guenther Stein. Stein and I discussed radio, and he drew a map to show me where he lived. I visited him several days later at his home in Motomura-cho Minatoku, examined the house to see whether it was suitable for installation of radio equipment and decided with his consent to use two of his upstairs rooms. As previously indicated, I installed the equipment and began testing around the middle of February. I transmitted around 30 messages from Stein's home. I stopped using it in 1937—I do not recall the date—when he left for England via Siberia. Stein once confided to me that while in Moscow, a special correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt, before coming to Japan, he had been a Communist sympathizer. I did not know the nature of his previous activities in Japan, but I am sure that in addition to the above he went to Shanghai as a courier. There is no doubt that he was a member of our group.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you might just clear that up.

Of course, the man who was speaking was a member of the espionage organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Max Klausen.

Senator FERGUSON. They are the group of men mentioned.

General WILLOUGHBY. The organization.

Mr. MORRIS. General, would you prefer that Mr. Mandel read a continuation of the Ohashi testimony, or is your testimony now coming up more appropriate?

General WILLOUGHBY. On the subject of Stein?

Mr. MORRIS. Guenther Stein.

General WILLOUGHBY. If I may make a suggestion——

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

General WILLOUGHBY (continuing). I am at your disposal, being a Government employee, soon to be on half pay.

You can continue on this theme, and you will merely reiterate that that he set up the radio station in his house, furnishing the cover of a fairly respectable position at the time, while the Japanese Secret Service was running around in nervous apprehension as to where the code messages to Russia were coming from. They didn't think of Stein, of course.

There is your story.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read, then, the next two questions in the Ohashi testimony, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Quesion 14. You said that Sorge considered Stein one of the top members in his ring, also that Sorge informed you that Stein's home in Motomura-Cho Minato-Ku Tokyo-To was used by Max Klausen for the transmission of messages to Russia. The testimony of Sorge and Klausen contains that information also. Did Sorge give you any additional information about Stein?

A. Not that I recall.

Question 15. You referred to a notebook which was confiscated from Sorge and in which were listed the top members of his ring, including Richard Sorge.

Branko de Voukelitch, Max Klausen, Stein, Ozaki, and Miyagi. Did you see that notebook?

A. Yes; I did see that book.

Question 16. Did you actually see the name Guenther Stein in Sorge's handwriting in this notebook which listed the top six members of his ring?

A. I do not remember clearly whether Guenther Stein was listed as such, or not, but his pseudonym was listed.

Question 17. Were all the names listed as aliases in the book?

A. In that book some members were listed by their real names, some by their aliases, some by more than one alias, but I do not remember clearly whether Stein's name or his alias was listed, but to anyone knowing these individuals by both their real names and by their aliases as I did, it meant the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you tell us something about the influential position that Guenther Stein was able to assume in Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. He had a wide range of contacts, naturally, in the press fraternity. He also had some entree in the British Embassy, being a British subject.

Generally speaking—and this is based on inquiries from people who have known him—they rated him as an individual with access to important international information.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder, General, if you think it would be appropriate if Mr. Mandel would read further from the confession of Richard Sorge on the important position that Guenther Stein was able to achieve in Tokyo at the time.

I offer you this volume, General, and ask you if you will identify the excerpt he is about to read.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

For your information, Mr. Chairman, this is a sample of actually over 150,000 pages, translated from Japanese text court records. This is the story as written by Sorge himself, not in the nature of a confession, because he was interrogated in a series of Attorney General's interrogations, but he wrote a sort of diary.

He was under the impression that, in view of the importance that he held in the Soviet hierarchy that he might be released at the last moment.

Waiting 3 or 4 years, his resistance perhaps weakened and he began to jot down in an informal diary type his thought sand feelings, his record. That is a part of this record.

Mr. MORRIS. When was he executed, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Executed in 1944, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. And arrested in 1941?

General WILLOUGHBY. 1941; yes, sir.

An interesting sidelight in the international field, if I am not imposing too much on your time, is that the Japanese Government was then on a neutrality basis with Russia, as you know, until 5 minutes to midnight. They came in in August of 1945, after we had accomplished the Pacific War. The Japanese were very anxious, of course, not to upset this neutrality balance, and in one of the commentaries on this case, the Attorney General warns his individuals, his subordinates, to be sure that the conduct of the trial, the interrogation, and so forth, would be of such a humanitarian plane that the Soviet Embassy, if they should become interested in the end, could take no offense or register objection.

So this is as close to a voluntary statement by Sorge, this diary, which we entitled in our translation as Sorges' own story, typewritten, typed by himself at a leisurely pace.

He even made editorial and stylistic corrections.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read from the document so described by General Willoughby.

Mr. MANDEL. Referring to Stein:

> He was a sympathizer but never an actual member of my group. Actually, however, he did give us positive cooperation.
>
> Stein was closely associated with Ambassador Dirksen, whom he had known since Moscow, and who looked upon him as an intelligent and important person. More significant for our work was the connection with the British Ambassador which he enjoyed by virtue of the fact that he represented a British newspaper. He was especially close to the famous Sir Sansom in the British Embassy. From the British Embassy he was able to obtain information chiefly on general diplomatic policy. At times he had opportunities to talk to the then British Ambassador and British naval attaché.
>
> As Stein was also on very intimate terms with all the foreign newspapermen, especially the British and American reporters, he sometimes wanted interesting individual facts from them. Lastly, he had close connection with Domei and hence like Voukelitch was able to scent out the general political undercurrent and atmosphere there. He was also very valuable as a source of information in that he had studied the Japanese economic situation very conscientiously and had written complete books about it. His economic studies clarified many facts hitherto little understood. His chief fields of study were Japans' foreign trade and financial problems.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just inquire whether, in connection with Stein, you ever heard the name Herbert Norman?

General WILLOUGHBY. That name does not appear in what we have now classified as the Sorge record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I think it might be appropriate if I point out that we had Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who is a distinguished professor of Columbia University. He is head of the Chinese language project of Columbia University. We had him on the stand here on Tuesday. He identified as a member of a Communist study group and as a member of the Communist Party Herbert Norman.

Herbert Norman is today, Mr. Chairman, Chief of the American Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs of Canada. That is a place of great importance.

I was wondering, General Willoughby, if you knew Herbert Norman at all when you were in Tokyo.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, I knew Herbert Norman. He was the Canadian Minister in Tokyo in the period 1946 to 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. He was then only the Canadian Minister to Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. He has since assumed this high position.

General WILLOUGHBY. The Canadian Minister.

Technically, all diplomatic representatives maintain their diplomatic classification, ambassador, minister, chargé d'affaires. They were attached to SCAP.

In other words, he was the chief of the Canadian diplomatic mission attached to SCAP.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think at this place in the record we might make reference to the testimony of Wittfogel on page 318.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. It will bring out who Herbert Norman was back in 1938 and his connection with the Pacific Affairs and the IPR.

I think the letter on pages 319 or 320, No. 72, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore, under the name of "Dear Owen," is signifi-

cant in the light of Wittfogel's testimony, and if it is referred to in the record here it could be of importance to this testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from the letter No. 72, in the record, on page 319 or 320, from Carter to Owen Lattimore. It begins: "Dear Owen"—and that has been identified as Owen Lattimore.

Here is the paragraph that I think ought to be put in here:

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on contemporary matters providing he writes under a nom de plume.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the letter, Senator, which referred to the using of Mr. Norman as a conduit for transmission of information?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And that he used a fictitious name rather than his own name because he would be connected with the Canadian Embassy.

The reason I thought of that General, was that when you brought Stein as being connected with the Canadian Embassy in a way——

General WILLOUGHBY. British Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you also said Canadian. Did you not?

General WILLOUGHBY. What was the quotation?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not say both Canadian and British when you read that about Stein, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. British.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It covered both. That is why I thought the Norman testimony was significant.

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course, I was not aware and I am intensely interested in this Wittfogel testimony on that particular name. But, of course, I am in no position to——

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reason why I want to know whether or not he came into the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. He did not come into this record we are now dealing with, and of course my personal acquaintanceship in Tokyo was that of a SCAP official with a foreign diplomatic representative, and I am reluctant to dwell on this.

Senator FERGUSON. I would not want you to do so. I want the testimony emphatic that if it was as it is now, that he was not mentioned at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you want me to read into the record today the testimony of Dr. Wittfogel, or do you think it is clear enough?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would clarify it if you read an excerpt from it, so as to tie it in with Wittfogel's testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. I am now reading from the testimony of Karl August Wittfogel, of last Tuesday. This is page 318. The question put to Dr. Wittfogel was:

Who were some of the other students at this student group?

This is a Communist student group that met on Cape Cod in the summer of 1938.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was a talented and pleasant young man who was studying in the Japanese department at Columbia. His name is Herbert Norman.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of this study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, did he know that it was a Communist study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. It was obvious.
Mr. MORRIS. To you.
Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think it was obvious in general.
Mr. MORRIS. Was it obvious, therefore, that he was a Communist?
Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce in the record first of all a letter that would indicate Herbert Norman's associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.
Mr. MANDEL. I have here a record taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 30, 1940, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore. It reads as follows:
"Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the eve of his sailing for Tokyo, with language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period. I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs."

The CHAIRMAN. Right there, Mr. Morris, can we get the tie-in between the Norman referred to by Senator Ferguson in interrogating the witness and the Norman referred to by Wittfogel? Are they one and the same?
Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Dr. Wittfogel described Herbert Norman as a Canadian.
Senator FERGUSON. He was going to the Embassy at the time.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand. The witness identifies him as the consul.
General WILLOUGHBY. As the Canadian chief of the diplomatic mission in Tokyo approximately 1946 to 1950.
The CHAIRMAN. I just want to see if they are one and the same person.
Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I think the next letter bears on that point.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, is the letter you just read dated much earlier than 1946?
Mr. MORRIS. It was 1940.
I am reading from another letter dated September 5, 1940, which was introduced into the record of last Tuesday on page 601.
Mr. Mandel, there is another letter, apparently a memorandum, headed "E. C. C. from W. L. H.," apparently from Mr. Carter to Mr. Holland, dated September 5, 1940.
It is on a typed letterhead of the Gianini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.:

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuto's Industrial Japan. Among the other manuscripts to be sent to him very shortly will be Laura Thompson's book on Guam for the American Council, Wentworth's Philippine Living Standards in Hawaii, the new catalog, and Wittfogel's monograph on oriental society. I am hoping to have the two big books by Mills and Kesting published commercially in this country. Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6 and can be reached in care of the Japanese IPR.

This is the significant sentence, Mr. Chairman:

Any very secret messages might be sent in care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation. Phil will cable us after he arrives about whether the Japanese want him to remain for an extra week or two to help them with their publications.

So in 1940 Herbert Norman was associated with the Canadian Legation.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

What is the question now?

General WILLOUGHBY. I might make a remark. As a police officer, this is a most interesting statement by Dr. Wittfogel on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. The Chair understands that at this present time Herbert Norman is Chief of the American Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs of the Canadian Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record an extract showing the number of articles that Guenther Stein has written for the Institute of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Mandel, will you describe that compilation that appears on that page before we introduce it into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the source of the information?

Mr. MORRIS. It is a compilation by Mr. Mandel. I am asking him to testify, Mr. Chairman, as to what that represents.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the source of his information?

Mr. MANDEL. These are articles from Pacific Affairs, the official organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and also another one of its publications, called Far Eastern Survey, and lists the writings of Guenther Stein.

Just by way of sample, let me read a few titles: "Japanese State Finance," in the December 1937 issue of Pacific Affairs.

In the Far Eastern Survey we have "What's Free China," June 29, 1942, and so on, giving a list of approximately 15 titles.

Also, Mr. Stein was coauthor of a study of American trade with Pacific countries, which was slated for fall publication in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. We offer that document as the next exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 83" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 83

GUENTHER STEIN

Writer of articles in Pacific Affairs:

Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader, pages 177–190, June 1936.
Japanese State Finance, pages 393–406, December 1937.
The Yen and the Sword, pages 5–19, March 1939.
China's Price Problem, pages 322–333, September 1941.
Free China's Agricultural Progress, pages 339–343, 1943.
Book "The Challenge of Red China" reviewed, page 199, June 1946.
Book review of American Business with East Asia, page 105, March 1948.

Writer of articles in Far Eastern Survey:

China's Inflation Menace, June 1, 1942, page 124.
What's Free China, June 29, 1942.
People's Political Council Reorganizing, July 13, 1942.
Chungking Considers the Future, September 7, 1942, page 190.
The Chinese Press Weighs Allied Strategy, June 14, 1943, page 117.
Japan's Army on China's Fronts, July 14, 1943, page 141.
Free China's Industrial Production, August 11, 1943, page 161.
China's Fiscal Program, August 25, 1943, page 169.
China's Internal Transport System, October 20, 1943, page 208.
Overseas Chinese Look Ahead. November 17, 1943.
China's Forbidden Crisis, March 12, 1947, pages 49–52.

Listed on research and publication program of the Institute of Pacific Relations, May 9, 1947.

Study of American Trade with Pacific Countries by Guenther Stein.

Shirley Jenkins and an advisory committee of businessmen versed in problems of far eastern trade. Publication date—fall, 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we find anywhere that Stein ever wrote under a fictitious name, an alias?

Mr. MANDEL. I have no record of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Norman was supposed to, was he not? Is not there evidence in the hearing, a letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in introducing this compilation of Mr. Mandel's, I would like to have the record show that there were 21 contributions through the years by Mr. Guenther Stein to the Institute of Pacific Relations in one of its subdivisions.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to tie this in properly.

Mr. Mandel, in your listing here, from what source did you get the information?

Mr. MANDEL. From the Index to Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey, as published by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You found it where?

Mr. MANDEL. In the actual index that they publish.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean you looked at the magazines yourself, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. At the index.

Mr. MORRIS. And you made up this compilation having the official records in front of you?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. Can I contribute something?

Mr. MORRIS. Very well, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. This is a purely impromptu, off-the-cuff contribution, but as you are establishing, I take it, the literary quality of Mr. Stein, this is what we thought about that field.

Lately I have read a most illuminating study by Mrs. Irene Kuhn on the subject of, to me a revealing subject, of how Communist-slanted books bought, sold, reviewed, peddled, propagandized, log-rolled or log-jammed, as the case may be.

I am quoting from this article.

After an absence of 13 years from the United States, I am, of course, avid for information that would give me the modern landscape.

Mrs. Kuhn's article, which had its fifth reprint in the American Legion, deals with the technique of propagating, peddling, and supporting Communist-tainted books.

Guenther Stein's reports by their titles, I would say, look rather innocuous. But this is what one of our investigators has to say about him:

> Late in 1944 he was one of a group of six who visited Yenan.

Yenan is a hot-land of Chinese Communists, the cradle of Chou Teh and other gentlemen with whom we are now engaged in North Korea.

> He was one of the two correspondents whose accounts of Communist China were published as books. His Challenge of Red China (McGraw-Hill, 1945) has the outward appearance of thoughtful reporting. His book has had a great deal of effect in perpetuating the legend that Chinese Communists aren't Communists and are not in any way connected with the Soviet Union—a legend started and kept alive so much earlier by Agnes Smedley. Like Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein was an established Soviet agent, and one can be certain that neither of them was publishing the truth about Chinese Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Again, that is a memorandum from one of your staff; is it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, and filed with the War Department, and is part of the original report of 1947, 1948, and 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one that was later suppressed after it was released.

General WILLOUGHBY. It was later, shall we say, released and then given the "cold shoulder."

Mr. MORRIS. And you think, Senator, it is significant that when Herbert Norman did write for Pacific Affairs, Carter and Lattimore wanted him to write under a nom de plume?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. I think that ought to appear in the record, owing to Wittfogel's testimony.

Senator WATKINS. Would that not be because he was a member of the Canadian Foreign Service and could not write, without getting into trouble, under his own name?

Mr. MORRIS. It may well be.

I would like to introduce into the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, a memorandum dated June 24, 1942, from Mr. "W. W. L."—presumably Mr. Lockwood—to "E. C. C. and W. L. H."—presumably Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland. This reads:

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff—

Now, at that time Mr. Fairbank was associated with the OWI—

who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however.

I would like to introduce this into the record, Mr. Chairman, as evidence of the fact that the Office of War Information at that time was expressing a great deal of interest in seeing Guenther Stein's—as Mr. Lockwood says—"stuff" in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Will you identiy that, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as an authentic document?

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get it? Where did it come from? What is its authenticity?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this memorandum dated June 24, 1942, from "W. W. L. to E. C. C." marked also "W. L. H." as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 84" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 84

JUNE 24, 1942.

W. W. L. to E. C. C., W. L. H.

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I wonder if you would tell us what this espionage ring was able to accomplish by way of transmitting secret information to the Soviet Government and aiding the Soviet foreign policy?

General WILLOUGHBY. There is an enormous amount of information of records on that subject, Mr. Morris. I will touch upon the high lights for this committee.

For example, under interrogation from memory alone, in the initial stages, Sorge dispatched more than 50 reports, Klausen another 50. The decoded radio messages added much greater detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Radio messages from whom to whom?

General WILLOUGHBY. From Sorge via Klausen to his Russian superiors. The relays were either via Harbin or direct to Khabarovsk.

However, the year 1941 was naturally the crucial year for all of us, and I think you will get an impression of the quality and importance of those reports if I limit myself roughly to that year, 1939–40, with emphasis on 1941.

For example, the relation of Russia with the Central Powers, with Germany, was of an immense interest in that year. Sorge, having a position as press attaché of the German Embassy, on the one hand, and having a direct access to Prince Konoye—that is, the Japanese Premier—and/or their State Department, through Ozaki, was in a position of not only obtaining the details of the German negotiations, which he relayed promptly to his Russian masters, but he was able to get the reaction or actions of the Foreign Office and do likewise.

Now, that information, if the Allies had known it—had had advance notice of this in that critical year 1941—might have changed the course of history.

For example, the quality of this man's reports is an example: An appraisal of the Japanese output of munitions, which, from a military viewpoint is, of course, terribly important to all those who were then contemplating or considering Japan as a potential enemy.

He made periodical reports beginning with February of 1940 throughout 1940 and 1941.

In August 1941 he reported an item which the American Navy was intensely interested in, had they known it; namely, the record of petroleum storage and stockage available to the Japanese military forces.

His report was that there was in storage in Japan sufficient petroleum for 2 years' use by the Navy, half a year by the Army, and half a year by the nation at large. That became a prime military objective for use in the course of the war.

On the 20th of May, through his connections, of course, with the German military attaché in the Embassy, of which he was a member——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe, General Willoughby, exactly what his relationship was?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was the officially designated press relations officer of the German Embassy in Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to whom now?

General WILLOUGHBY. Sorge.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the German Ambassador at that time?

General WILLOUGHBY. General Ott, whom he had known in China and by a process of friendship probably got this assignment.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, did Richard Sorge hold a military rank in the Soviet Army?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was, as he stated, "a subordinate to the Fourth Bureau," which is the intelligence section of the Soviet Army, and had the assimilated rank of colonel.

In other words, you find a Russian intelligence officer being the press attaché, with diplomatic immunity, at the German Embassy, at a time when the relationship of these two nations was one of crucial international balance.

Mr. MORRIS. And this time you are now describing is May 1941? That is just 1 month prior to the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

The type of Sorge's reports was due, of course, probably not to inherent talent, but to the advantages of his unusual position.

On the 20th of May 1941, he flashed a warning—meaning to Russia—that the Reichswehr would concentrate from 170 to 190 divisions on the Soviet border, and on the 28th of June would attack along the entire frontier; the main effort, however, would be made in the direction of Moscow.

This attack did occur on the 22d of June.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, General, that brings me back to many of the things that happened at the Pearl Harbor hearings. We were slightly interested in knowing whether Japan was going to attack America, Russia, or Britain in her colony.

General WILLOUGHBY. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. And if we had Americans like Smedley in this spy ring, they may have been able to acquire, through various rings, for instance, here in Washington—we have learned about papers being taken from the State Department—that Japan was getting some information through this same spy ring to her as to what our intentions were.

Is that not possible?

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, Senator, and I think I can give you a connecting link here.

The potential of Japan to attack Russia via Siberia or to attack south, which would involve the Philippines—that is, United States and the British—was of equal interest to Russia, but it was also of equal interest to us. And the deduction which is permissible, if Smedley was in a position of intimacy with this bird Sorge, is that she might have obtained that information, too, had she been on the right side of the fence.

But regardless of that, sir, actually that became Sorge's main mission. He was ordered to concentrate on what Japan was going to do, because without that knowledge the Russians would not withdraw from the Siberian mainland the divisions they maintained.

Once having assurance that Japan would go south—that is, an attack which would involve the United States—they were then free to denude their Siberian border and put their troops into the defense of the frontier then in existence.

Actually, they came in time to save the situation in the German advance—well, their farthest advance in that period: Smolensk, Stalingrad.

So it might be said that, predicated on the information furnished by this superbly competent agent, the Russian situation on the west front depended as a life and death question. He gave them the answer.

This is very interesting—always with a background of your own and pre-Pearl Harbor inquiries, which I remember very well, indeed.

Sorge maintained a concentrated watch on United States-Japanese negotiations during the summer and fall of 1941. His information was full and accurate; naturally so, since Ozaki was so close to Prince Konoye, the keyman in these negotiations.

During early October, Sorge reported on this mobilization, that it was completed in mid-September and that men from 25 to 35 years had been called up—mobilization of an expansion in forces as a prelude to war.

By the 15th of October, Sorge transmitted his final sober conclusions that the Japanese had decided to move south, and that there now was no serious danger of an attack through Manchuria in the direction of Siberia. He felt that his mission was completed.

He drafted a dispatch, suggesting his recall to the Soviet Union. His radio operator Klausen argued that his request was premature, and the message was never sent. Three days later Sorge and Klausen were under arrest.

Mr. MORRIS. It is significant, General, that they were arrested just a few days after their mission was accomplished; is it not?

General WILLOUGHBY. The throw of the dice—the fortunes of war.

Mr. MORRIS. General, we have had testimony before this committee that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified as members of the Communist Party, exerted great efforts in November 1941 to prevent a 90-day truce being worked out between Japan and the United States.

This committee has that testimony both in executive and open session, namely, that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified as members of the Communist Party, made great efforts to prevent a 90-day truce being worked out between the United States and Japan.

I wonder if you would care to comment on that and possibly correlate any information or evidence that you have with that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, the calendar is to be called on the floor. The chairman of this committee has many bills on that calendar. Will you kindly take the chair and carry on for me?

General, I am sorry to have to leave. I will be back to see you again.

Senator SMITH. Will you proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Does the general understand the question?

General WILLOUGHBY. Would you mind repeating it?

Senator FERGUSON. Before you proceed with that, if I might refer back, I would like to introduce a memorandum from the Pearl Harbor hearings, joint hearings, page 1160, held in 1945. The memorandum is dated Chungking, November 25, 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. That can be marked the next exhibit number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 85" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 85[1]

[Exhibit taken from hearings on Pearl Harbor attack, 1945, p. 1160]

CHUNGKING, *November 25, 1941.*

LAUCHLIN CURRIE: After discussing with the generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never

[1] Previously used as exhibit No. 24.

seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any modus vivendi now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. To get back to the question, General:

We have introduced into the record documents and testimony to the effect that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified before this committee in executive and open session as members of the Communist Party, or connected with the Communist Party, were making efforts in November 1941, to prevent the United States and Japan from effecting a 90-day truce at the time, at the request of the military leaders of the country, namely, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A 90-day truce was sought in order to prevent any outbreak of hostilities. We had evidence, as I say, introduced, General, that IPR officials, top officials in the IPR, were trying to prevent that truce from being effected.

I wonder if any evidence or information that you acquired while you were in Tokyo would have any bearing on the testimony that we have already taken before this committee on that score, General Willoughby.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say that this is a very complicated question, since it deals with activities in the United States when I was absent in the Philippines at that time, since 1938.

And, of course, I must delegate activity to other officers and cannot specifically point to anything that is in the nature of concrete evidence.

With this limiting background and based purely on recollection, and guided solely by a desire, of course, to assist this committee in its hard-working enterprise, I will say that, as a student of history and of Japan, that I have the impression that Prince Konoye was desperately serious in effecting a last-minute understanding with the United States and that there was, in the opinion of many Japanese of substance and probity, there was a fear that certain elements, unidentified in the States, were opposed to such an understanding.

That is probably an unsatisfactory answer, but it is the best I can do.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Ferguson has made reference to a dispatch sent by Owen Lattimore, who at that time was personal adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Lauchlin Currie, who was then executive assistant to the White House, in which Lattimore urged that the modus vivendi be rejected. The date of that is November 25, 1941.

Further, General, we had testimony here from Mr. Carter that he was called down to Washington by Harry Dexter White, who was

then Under Secretary of the Treasury, asking Mr. Carter to use his influence to prevent any—as he described it—sell-out of China at that time.

At that time they were showing a concern for China, when this took that form.

General WILLOUGHBY. Amazing, amazing.

Mr. MORRIS. This has already been introduced into the record.

Now, in connection with Guenther Stein, I would like to point out, General, that you have been testifying through your records that Guenther Stein was doing espionage work for the Soviet fourth bureau, fourth army.

General WILLOUGHBY. There is his association, with Sorge as one of his associates. If we established that he was a trusted and important associate of Sorge—and that, I think, is established—I will take out the words, "I think"; we've got it all, cross-reference of Klausen, his wife, Kawai, et cetera.

So if we classify him as a bona fide member of this ring, then, of course, the reference of reporting to the fourth army is to be understood in that light.

He didn't report directly. He reported to Sorge, and it was Sorge who relayed the information.

I think it is a fine distinction which I may be exaggerating, but I am making it.

Mr. MORRIS. General, I would like to point out that he has written 21 articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations and two more letters, which Mr. Mandel will authenticate and read into the record on Guenther Stein, as well as the letter from Mr. Lockwood to Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland that the Office of War Information and the Institute of Pacific Relations was circulating—to use their own words—"Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington."

I see here in this letter we have already introduced Lockwood says:

When I mentioned it to John Fairbank—

who was then head of the China section of OWI—

he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest.

In other words, the Office of War Information was actively promulgating Guenther Stein's material. So it apparently served another function at that time, did it not, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would agree with you; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, the evidence clearly shows that he was an agent of the Comintern, so that he at all times, whether they be two or one, the Red army and communism in Russia, he was serving both those according to the documented record. Is that not right?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was; in his capacity as an indispensable and important member of the Sorge organization, whose complete purposes were for these two agencies that you mentioned, the army, on the one hand, the Comintern, on the other.

I haven't the slightest hesitancy personally, if you wish to ascertain that, that Stein is as guilty as Smedley or any of the others listed.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have no doubt, have you, from these records, that Stein was a Communist?

General WILLOUGHBY. None; none whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Smedley was a Communist?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have no doubt about that, personally.

And I notice there is a reference, which Mr. Morris has, that Sorge recommended her to the clearinghouse in Moscow, who pass on the bona fides of these agents, and he needed the supporting certification of another card-bearing member and he got it from somebody.

Anyway, that is a very unusual step to have taken, and I base my feelings about her on this.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have not any doubt that she was one, have you?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have no doubt.

Mr. MORRIS. About Guenther Stein's present activity, General, do you know from official authority that he was arrested for espionage in France in 1950?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Of course, Mr. Morris, when you begin to sum up or draw conclusions, my opinion, or, rather, my thought process is probably not any better than yours, but when I know of an individual with that record disappearing at the time a report was published—he disappeared within 24 hours after the War Department released the 1949 version—and then remains incognito at large and then picked up by the French police in the spring on an espionage charge, he is one of the boys who continued to be in the same business.

Conversely, talking about Smedley, with due deference to her demise, you find her being pictured by a columnist at the time, and notably Mr. Harold Ickes, as an upright American woman, of unimpeachable reputation, veracity, and political coloring, and then find her willing her ashes to Chou Teh, the commander in chief of the Chinese Communist Army, with whom we are now engaged in Korea, and having her ashes placed in a special shrine in Peking, under actual governmental ceremony of extreme value in the heartland of Asiatic communism.

You don't have to be either a police officer or investigative genius to draw your almost inescapable conclusion on these two characters.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read into the record two letters which bear on Guenther Stein's position and activity in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I read one letter from the fiiles of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 6, 1942, addressed to Mr. Richard R. Sanger, Economic Intelligence Division, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C., from W. L. Holland:

> In reply to your letter of June 29 to Mr. Lockwood, of the American council, I am glad to send you under separate cover our latest radio letter from Guenther Stein in Chungking.
>
> Some of this material will probably be used in a forthcoming issue of the Far Eastern Survey, but you may be interested to have it in the meantime.
>
> As far as possible we shall try to send you these reports from Stein as soon as they come in.
>
> Sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into evidence as further evidence of Guenther Stein's activity through the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 86" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 86

NEW YORK CITY, *July 6, 1943.*

Re: OW–S–FES.
Mr. RICHARD H. SANGER,
Economic Intelligence Division, Board of Economic Welfare,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SANGER: In reply to your letter of June 29 to Mr. Lockwood, of the American Council, I am glad to send you under separate cover our latest radio letter from Guenther Stein in Chungking.

Some of this material will probably be used in a forthcoming issue of the Far Eastern Survey, but you may be interested to have it in the meantime.

As far as possible, we shall try to send you these reports from Stein as soon as they come in.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MANDEL. I have another letter here, addressed to W. MacMahon Ball, of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, at 177 Collins Street, Melbourne, Australia, dated February 3, 1939, from Owen Lattimore. I read one sentence:

Guenther Stein, who is by long odds the best economic journalist in the Far East, writes an article on the inherent weakness of Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. This is now from Mr. Lattimore, is it, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is still from Mr. Lattimore's letter:

If an authority of the standing of Stein makes a case as strong as this in an article on the weakness of Japan, should the instinctive response be "what is on the Japanese side?" Should it not be "If this is true, how does it affect Australian interests?"

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence as the next exhibit the letter just read from by Mr. Mandel.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 87," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 87

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., February 6, 1939.

Dr. W. MACMAHON BALL,
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin,
Melbourne, C. 2, Australia.

DEAR BALL: To my unspeakable chagrin I have missed a cog. I made a mental note that your boat sailed on February 9, and was going to catch you by air mail. Today I had the article ready for mailing and on turning up my written note found that you had sailed on February 1. I am terribly ashamed of this as I like to make a point of hitting my assignments on the nose.

Anyhow I am sending the article herewith by air mail to Los Angeles, hoping it will catch a fast mail from there. If it arrives too late, has to be held over an issue, and thereby gets out of date, throw it in the wastebasket and blame me.

I am sending a carbon copy to E. C. Carter, who may overhaul the original with a fast letter to you asking you not to publish. I am making a general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can reprove me whenever I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentleman.

Following up our conversation at lunch, I have read the December-January issue of the Bulletin, the latest to arrive here. This issue contains an example of what I shall rudely call exaggerated neutrality. Guenther Stein, who is by long odds the best economic journalist in the Far East, writes an article on the inherent weakness of Japan. One of your editors hastened to soften the shock and to avoid any impression that the Bulletin is anti-Japanese by writing an

article in which he seeks to prove that there is a lot to be said on the other side. The impression thus created is that the war in the Far East is no business of Australians. Australians can look at it from a safe distance and say "Well, well, how interesting. A lot to be said on both sides, evidently."

Is this true? If an authority of the standing of Stein makes a case as strong as this in an article on the weakness of Japan, should the instinctive response be "What is to be said on the Japanese side?" Should it not be "If this is true, how does it affect Australian interests?" For the fact of the matter is that you in Australia and we in America have the same kind of interest in the outcome of this war. We are not distant and disinterested spectators. A victory for Japan would mean one kind of world, in which we should be vitally interested. A victory for China would mean another kind of world, in which we should also be vitally interested. I am distressed at the lack of realization of this in both America and Australia. We keep balancing "what can be said for China" with "what can be said for Japan" dodging the really important questions, which are "Where do we come in, or where do we get out?"

As far as the Bulletin is concerned, all of this is none of my business. Consider, therefore, that the seat of my pants presents a broad target, and deliver me a long-distance kick in the middle thereof at your leisure.

I hope we'll be meeting again.

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I understand that there is a slight conflict here in the date of Guenther Stein's arrest in Paris. Apparently the testimony conflicts. You said last spring, and again I think you said in 1950.

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course, I am not a walking file case, naturally, having this type of information at my fingertips.

Have you got a translation which I will identify as having been made by me? That is a message from the French Ambassador to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we have that, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. That will give you the date. It must have been this spring.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we will get that, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. The INS carried it as a news item. I am so impressed with the accuracy of intelligence reporting by journalistic professionals that I consider their reportage as always a part of my evidence. So if you cannot locate it there, I know of an INS dispatch at that time. It must have been around February, I should say, offhand speaking.

If the INS hasn't got it, then I am sure AP has. If not, Mr. Bett.

Mr. MORRIS. While we are getting that, General, I would like to ask you about certain leaders of the IPR who were active at headquarters during the war.

During last Tuesday's session, General, we had testimony from Prof. Karl Wittfogel that T. A. Bisson was a member of the Communist Party when Dr. Wittfogel knew him back in 1935—I think the date was.

Do you know that Mr. Bisson was assigned to your headquarters and served there until 1948, General Willoughby?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have a recollection that Bisson was a Department of Army civilian employee in one of the civil sections of SCAP, probably the Government section, in the period 1946–48.

Here again the exact dates you have to indulge the fact that I do not have the details of every investigative case at my fingertips.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask a question, if I might, please.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. General, are you under the same ban as other witnesses who came here, that they are unable to testify in relation to personnel files and so-called loyalty files?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, your lips are closed to this committee and you are unable to give to this committee anything in relation to a personnel file?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So if there is or is not a personnel file and its contents on any of these people that we are talking about in the United States Government, the people cannot learn through this committee what that file shows, or anything that is in that file, or your knowledge as to that file; is that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. Will you permit me, Mr. Chairman, as this is a question of administrative significance, that I answer that in my way?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may answer it your way. I do not call for a yes or no answer. I just want the evidence. I want the facts.

General WILLOUGHBY. The point was brought up by the counsel yesterday in which he requested from me information on Mr. T. A. Bisson, one Miriam Farley, and one Grajdanzev, who has since changed his name to Grad.

Mr. MORRIS. And they, General, are people who have been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations, are they?

General WILLOUGHBY. I realize that.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were employed at your headquarters, who were assigned to your headquarters by executive authority in the United States?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct. They were hired in the States and unloaded on Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the word "unloaded" may enable us to draw some conclusions from that word.

General WILLOUGHBY. In which case, Mr. Chairman, you must permit me an editorial rescission.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I understand that.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would like to put it this way: Mr. Chairman, as a citizen, I am naturally most desirous to assist this important committee. However, as a Federal officer, I am expected to observe Army orders and Presidential directives.

I invite your attention to a Department of Army circular letter dated August 21, 1948, on the subject, Release of Personnel Records and Information. I quote:

> No information of any sort relating to the employee's loyalty and no investigative data of any type, whether relating to loyalty or other aspects of the individual's record, shall be included in material submitted to a congressional committee.

The provision of the Presidential directive of March 13, 1949, I intended to apply to records of former employees as well as persons now in the Federal service.

These people, Bisson, Farley, Grajdanzev, fall under the category of former employees.

Still quoting the regulation:

> Any individual who may appear as a witness before a congressional committee will respectfuly decline to testify concerning the loyalty of any person or as to the contents of any investigative files and will state that he is forbidden to answer such questions by pertinent directives of the Army.

Senator WATKINS. I take it, General, that the order of that directive is not classified.

General WILLOUGHBY. No. The basis is the Presidential directive of 13th of March 1948.

You can find it in Bulletin No. 6, Department of the Army, on the 17th of March 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. We have had high military officers and others quote the same in the hearings where the present Chair was chairman.

In other words, you are unable to give us this information?

General WILLOUGHBY. Based on the precise wording of this.

Senator FERGUSON. I shall, however, ask the chairman of this subcommittee if he will not again ask the President to allow this committee to have access, through you or someone else, to personnel files in relation to activities of certain people whose names are brought to the attention of the committee, particularly those connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to show that I join in that request.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I add the following?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I desire to further clarify my position in this matter and say that the personnel files and records are within the purview of Counterintelligence.

While this investigation unit, like the Four Hundred and Forty-first CIC in Tokyo, is a subdivision of G–2, my personal and prior attention was concentrated on the Korean War effort and on military intelligence in the Far East.

Ultimately you must obtain information from officers whose sole business it was to develop and maintain personnel investigations.

I am, of course, not familiar with the details of literally thousands of file references or case histories.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently the same rule applies not only to personnel files and those that have been employed, but it applied to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who made an application for a position as an official in the Intelligence Branch of the United States Military Service.

The present Chair asked for that file, and all that is in it is merely a medical report, but no application for the position or letters of recommendation, or anything else. Nothing is in the file except a medical report.

Senator WATKINS. That is notwithstanding evidence to the fact that numerous other persons had made statements referring to said letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; notwithstanding their testimony.

I want to express my opinion to the witness, the able general in Intelligence, that he does feel that he is bound by a Presidential and a military superior order, and he has given the reason for not giving this information and not answering these questions, that I accept his explanation.

But that does not prevent me, as a Senator and temporary chairman, from advocating to the chairman and to the counsel that we again, in behalf of the people of the United States, ask for this information, because I think it is valuable to our internal security and our defense.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in this connection, I would like to point out that the reason we are asking for these particular three files is that Mr. T. A. Bisson, Miss Miriam Farley, and Mr. Andrew Grad have been active people in the Institute of Pacific Relations, who in addition were assigned to General Willoughby's headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will further identify from the exhibits already introduced, and letters that we may introduce now, something about the identity of those three people.

Senator FERGUSON. I might say in reply to that that is true, and it is always our duty, as members of this committee, to produce all the evidence we can outside of what the official records show, which would aid us greatly.

But it creates an impossible burden on many occasions upon this committee to complete its investigation.

Senator WATKINS. This record is from the letters taken from the IPR files, is it?

Mr. MORRIS. Some of the letters and some from exhibits already introduced, Senator.

Mr. MANDEL. It has been previously introduced that the Windows On the Pacific biennial report of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated 1944 to 1946, on page 11, refers to T. A. Bisson, of the international secretariat.

Another exhibit previously introduced was a letter to Mr. Bisson from Wilma Fairbank, dated October 19, 1943, which referred to Mr. Bisson as the acting editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. So he was a member of the secretariat as well as the acting editor of the Pacific Affairs before he was assigned to General Willoughby's headquarters in Tokyo?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Grajdanzev?

Senator WATKINS. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. The date of the letter was October 19, 1943, and the date of the report was 1944–46.

Mr. MORRIS. They have already been introduced, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 26, 1941, addressed to Mr. Robert K. Straus, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y., from Robert W. Barnett.

I read a portion of this letter which refers to Mr. Grajdanzev:

> A month ago one department of the United States Government, and then later three departments, asked the institute for a monograph on the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway together with a full analysis of the differentials in east to western movement of goods, the location of repair shops and round houses, the various points where congestion occurs, etc. Mr. Grajdanzev prepared a monograph which has been hailed in three Government departments as far more accurate than anything which they themselves could have prepared. This is just a sample of the kind of work which the institute is able to do and explains why the governments in this and other countries are so eager to get the services of members of the institute staff.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, and have that marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 88," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 88

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Mr. ROBERT K. STRAUS,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. STRAUS: In response to your request for me to do so, I have tried to set down in this letter how the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations has risen to the demands of the national emergency.

From the Army, Navy, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Department of Commerce, the Administrator of Export Control, and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies have come repeated calls for assistance which have been fulfilled by our research staff. Owen Lattimore, as you know, the editor of Pacific Affairs, was loaned to serve, on the nomination of President Roosevelt, as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's personal political adviser. We loaned first to the Universal Trading Corp. and then to the American, British, and Chinese Governments Ch'ao-ting Chi to serve as Secretary General of the A. B. C. Currency Stabilization Fund. We are glad that the War Department has recognized the ability of our expert on the Netherlands East Indies, Miss Ellen van Zyll de Jong, by giving her a research appointment. We assisted in arranging that Irving Friedman, a former member of the Secretariat, enter the division of monetary research of the Treasury Department. William W. Lockwood, on temporary leave, has worked as secretary of the American Committee for International Studies, and simultaneously for General Maxwell's and for Colonel Donovan's offices in Washington, but recently has taken over the secretaryship of the American Council. Both Mr. Carter and I have been invited to serve on the staff of the office of the Coordinator of Information, but have remained here because the necessity for popular education and private research seemed now more urgent.

A month ago one department of the United States Government, and then later three departments, asked the institute for a monograph on the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway together with a full analysis of the differentials in east to western movement of goods, the location of repair shops and roundhouses, the various points where congestion occurs, etc. Mr. Grajdanzev prepared a monograph which has been hailed in three government departments as far more accurate than anything which they themselves could have prepared. This is just a sample of the kind of work which the institute is able to do and explains why the governments in this and other countries are so eager to get the services of members of the institute staff.

Our service to governments has not, happily, lessened thus far our aid to business groups, the press, and university and secondary-school circles. The demands for institute services from all these groups is greater than ever before. We provided indispensable information to the Fortune staff as it prepared its far eastern issue. We have assisted teachers' organizations to carry out their far eastern projects. We have set up some 13 regional conferences. Under the leadership of Catherine Porter, Miriam Farley, Dorothy Berg, and Kurt Bloch, a greatly enlivened Far Eastern Survey reaches a wider and more attentive audience. We broadcast weekly over CBS. We are publishing inexpensive pamphlets, among them Showdown at Singapore, Philippine Emergency, Japan Strikes South, Our Far Eastern Record, American Aid to China, and the Soviet Far East.

In the international field only in France and Holland has the work of the institute been curtailed. The Royal Institute in London has recently augmented its studies of the Far East and the far-eastern program of the Canadian and Australian institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any period in the past.

You will agree with me, I feel sure, that the reasons which led to your support of the American Council last year are doubly valid now. May I suggest that you raise your 1940 contribution of $25 to $50 for 1941–42? This may prove to be the year of the long-awaited Japanese-American war—or, of Japan's surrender to ABCD economic pressure. Either development will greatly increase the

American Council's responsibilities to our Government and to the American public.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT W. BARNETT.

Senator FERGUSON. For the purpose of explaining to the members of the committee, who are Mr. Straus and this man Barnett?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Straus is of no significance in this instance, Senator, but Mr. Barnett served as secretary of the Washington office, I believe, and is now an important official of the United States State Department.

Senator WATKINS. Do the records show that?

Mr. MORRIS. In other places, Senator.

As I say, at this point we say that Mr. Straus has no significance in this.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 10, 1941, addressed to Lt. Col. Frederick D. Sharp, room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Our research has shown that Colonel Sharp was at that time connected with Military Intelligence.

The letter states:

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: I am sorry for the delay in answering your questions on the Siberian railways. I had hoped to put one of my colleagues at work on it, but his schedule has been a little dislocated through learning that his father and two other members of his family were killed in the German bombing of Belgrade.

Instead, I have asked another of my colleagues, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev, to turn up as much material as possible. Without sources he has drafted the enclosed very tentative memorandum, a copy of which I enclose.

Neither he nor I wish you to regard this interim report as authentic or definitive. To give you anything really satisfactory will take about 12 days of very thorough research. Mr. Grajdanzev and I hope we can send you something to meet your requirements not later than July 22. Will that be too late for your purposes?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Then there is another letter addressed to a Mr. Thurber. No initial is given. It is under date of July 23, 1941, addressed to the same address, room 811, 1207 Sixth Avenue, which was the office at that time of Military Intelligence:

My colleague, Andrew Grajdanzev, has handed me the first draft of his notes on the Trans-Siberian Railway. I have not had an opportunity to check through this, nor have I had any of my other colleagues check on it. However, knowing that you are in a hurry for this first draft, I am sending it over today and will send you any corrections as soon as they reach my desk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Finally, I have a letter to Mr. Carter, Edward C. Carter, dated July 24, 1941, from Lt. Col. Frederick D. Sharp, G. S. C.:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have received the report on the Trans-Siberian Railroad drawn up so ably by your colleague, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev.

To thank both you and him in proportion to its value would be difficult. May it suffice to say that our own researches are at an end with such a reference source, and that Mr. Thurber, of my office, will be sorely tempted to draw on your knowledge of industries and raw materials east of the Urals, which is the next goal.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received in evidence and marked the next consecutive exhibits.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 89, 90, and 91," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 89

NEW YORK, N. Y., *July 10, 1941.*

Lt. Col. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,[1]
New York, N.Y.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: I am sorry for the delay in answering your questions on the Siberian railways. I had hoped to put one of my colleagues at work on it, but his schedule has been a little dislocated through learning that his father and two other members of his family were killed in the German bombing of Belgrade.

Instead, I have asked another of my collegaues, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev, to turn up as much material as possible. With sources he has drafted the enclosed very tentative memorandum, a copy of which I enclose.

Neither he nor I wish you to regard this interim report as authentic or definitive. To give you anything really satisfactory will take about 12 days of very thorough research. Mr. Grajdanzev and I hope we can send you something to meet your requirements not later than July 22. Will that be too late for your purposes?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 90

NEW YORK CITY, *July 23, 1941.*

Mr. THURBER,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,
New York City.

DEAR MR. THURBER: My colleague Andrew Grajdanzev has handed me the first draft on his notes on the Trans-Siberian Railway. I have not had an opportunity to check through this, nor have I had any of my other colleagues check on it. However, knowing that you are in a hurry for this first draft I am sending it over today and will send you any corrections as soon as they reach my desk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 91

NEW YORK, N.Y., *July 24, 1941.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have received the report on the Trans-Siberian Railroad drawn up so ably by your colleague, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev.

To thank both you and him in proportion to its value would be difficult. May it suffice to say that our own researches are at an end with such a reference source, and that Mr. Thurber, of my office, will be sorely tempted to draw on your knowledge of industries and raw materials east of the Urals, which is the next goal.

Gratefully yours,

FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.

Mr. MANDEL. I have another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 3, 1942, addressed to Mr. George H. Kerr, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.:

DEAR MR. KERR: Thank you for your letter of April 2 about Grajdanzev's report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy

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[1] New York Office, Military Intelligence.

of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments, and if there are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that you let me know in the next day or two, as we may want to insert an errata slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactory set of proofs.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Finally, on April 2, 1942, George H. Kerr writes to William L. Holland, on the stationery of the War Department, War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G–2, Room 2628, Munitions Building:

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of further writing.

Some weeks ago there came to our MID files—and my Formosa section—a set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinarily good work, which I first saw briefly in your office and now have read thoroughly. No covering letter came with it to me and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our files. If it is not a loan, I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan, I shall keep it intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We live very largely on loans these days.

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few very minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.

With every good wish,

GEORGE H. KERR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I think that will suffice for Mr. Grajdanzev, who, as the record will show, has now changed his name to Mr. Grad.

Mr. Chairman, we offer that letter from Mr. Holland to Mr. Kerr, and the letter from Mr. Kerr to Mr. Holland, as the next consecutive exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 92 and 93," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 92

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.,
April 3, 1942.

Mr. GEORGE H. KERR,
Military Intelligence Division, War Department,
Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. KERR: Thank you for your letter of April 2 about Grajdanzev's report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments, and if there are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that you let me know in the next day or two, as we may want to insert an errata

slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactorily set of proofs.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 93

WAR DEPARTMENT, GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G–2,
Washington, April 2, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of further writing.

Some weeks ago there came to our MID files—and my Formosa Section—a set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinarily good work, which I first saw briefly in your office and now read thoroughly. No covering letter came with it to me, and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our files. If it is not a loan, I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan, I shall keep it intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We live very largely on loans these days.

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few very minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.

With every good wish,

GEORGE H. KERR.

My residence address: 2700 Wisconsin Avenue NW.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you can just tell us briefly who Miss Farley is, in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and possiby one letter indicating that she was looking forward to her activity in Tokyo?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an excerpt from the volume entitled "Security in the Pacific," a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, at Hot Springs, Va., January 6–17, 1945.

On page 159 Miriam S. Farley is listed as having participated in the conferences of 1936, 1939, and 1942. She is listed here also as an editor of the American Council Pamphlet Series, research associate, American Council, IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the editor of the Far Eastern Survey; was she not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. We offer that document as the next exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 94" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 94

[From Security in the Pacific. A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., January 6–17, 1945]

CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP, UNITED STATES

Miriam S. Farley (1936, 1939, 1942), editor, American Council Pamphlet Series, research associate, American Council, IPR (p. 159).

(Years in parentheses after names indicate attendance at previous IPR conferences.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have here another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 8, 1946, addressed to "Dear Bill."

Senator FERGUSON. Who could "Bill" be?

Mr. MANDEL. It may be William L. Holland, or William W. Lockwood.

I read only the last paragraph, as follows:

I've been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's Monthly report. There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

Yours,

MIRIAM.

This is addressed from "M. S. Farley, GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A. P. O. 500, Care Postmaster, San Francisco."

Senator FERGUSON. This would indicate that on April 8, 1946, Miriam whose name was—what?

Mr. MANDEL. Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. Miriam S. Farley?

Senator FERGUSON. "M. S. Farley, GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A.P.O. 500, care of Postmaster, San Francisco." She was then a Government employee on General MacArthur's staff and she was writing to someone in the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this is in the file and you obtained it from that file, and the paragraph was as she had written it.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You have identified this from the files; have you not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was that personnel file that we were asking the general about that we might get some information from. That is correct; is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive the whole letter because we do not want to take a section out of context.

Mr. MORRIS. The whole letter is introduced into evidence and will be marked as the next consecutive exhibit number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 95," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 95

APRIL 8, 1946.

DEAR BILL: Matsuo asked me to send this on to you after I had read it. It is a report which he did for the political adviser's office, and is not for publication.

I saw Yasuo last week. He looks well though much older, and is working 10 hours a day as editor of the English edition of Jiji Press. He has a year-and-a-half-old son. He told quite a tale of the days of the surrender. It seems he was instrumental in breaking the story of the first note (accepting Potsdam terms on condition that Emperor, etc.). Domei, with which he then was, got hold of the note somehow from the Foreign Office and was not authorized to make it public. After consultation between Yasuo and his chief, they did so nevertheless—put it on the radio. Within half an hour they got a reaction from San Francisco. Then the Kempeitai (Gendarmerie) descended on them and they had quite a rough time for 3 days. Y.'s chief was locked up for a while. To cover themselves they claimed to have gotten the story from the Moscow radio.

I've been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly report. There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

Yours,

MIRIAM.

M. S. FARLEY,
GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A. P. O. 500, care of Postmaster, San Francisco.

P. S.—I forgot to say that Yasuo wanted to be remembered to you, Phil Lillienthal, and others at the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we do not want to restrict our request for files to those particular people.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that. The request may be in connection with all that you may list.

Mr. MORRIS. That are other particular people about whom we would also like a file, because we understand that there are such files in the Tokyo headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I think this would be a sufficient example and this will be the last we will cite, Hugh Deane, who was an active member of the IPR.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Hugh Deane, Radio News Room, Coordinator of Information, Washington, D. C., January 12, 1942, and signed by Miriam Farley:

It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us; we are standing on our heads.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was addressed to Mr. Hugh Deane at the Office of the Coordinator of Information?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the date?

Mr. MANDEL. January 12, 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced in the record, Mr. Chairman, as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 96" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 96

JANUARY 12, 1942.

MR. HUGH DEANE,
Radio News Room, Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR HUGH: It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us; we are standing on our heads.

One rather obvious suggestion that occurs to me offhand is to plug Hull's note of November 26 and other American statements such as our note of December 1938 indicating that the United States was always willing to consider the peaceful alteration of the status quo including economic concessions to Japan. "We made you a fair offer but your military leaders rejected it and chose war," etc. Another rather obvious line which has doubtless already occurred to you is, "the Nazis are not your friends, they look down on the Japanese race and are just using you for their own purposes." This can be backed up by quotations from Nazi writings, the kind of thing that is found in the special section of Asia magazine for November 1941.

For our part we shall of course be much interested to know the kind of stuff that our Government is broadcasting to Japan. Would it be possible for us to obtain a file of transcripts of these broadcasts? It seems to me that it would be a very good thing if at a little later date the Far Eastern Survey could carry a short article describing American propaganda to Japan providing that this is consistent to the policy of your department.

You will be interested to know, in case you have not already heard, that we are about to open an office in Washington for the purpose of keeping in touch with all of the various departments of the Government which are working on the Far East. Bob Barnett is to be in charge and some of the rest of us will doubtless get down occasionally. I know that Bob will want to look you up as soon as he gets established.

I am passing your order for the Far Eastern Survey on to the subscription department.

Sincerely yours,

MIRIAM FARLEY.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record also to show that previous exhibits have described Mr. Hugh Deane as the editor of a publication now being circulated and printed in Shanghai, which is Communist China.

Hugh Deane was listed as an associate editor of the Shanghai Monthly Bulletin, which is now published from Shanghai.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long he has been connected in that capacity in Shanghai?

Mr. MORRIS. No. We have just introduced particular volumes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Hugh Deane was so associated in Communist China?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, at the time China was under Communist control.

Mr. Chairman, we have planned to introduce many more exhibits, such as those we have just introduced, but in consideration of the fact that the general is here and has been here all morning, I think we would like to discontinue the hearing at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask the general something. I know he has been ill.

Mr. MORRIS. The general has one more thing.

Senator FERGUSON. He has been ill, but I want to ask him one more question.

General, in your experience in the Far East, have you found that the policies of communism, the Communist Party line, has been affecting in any way United States relations with and in the Far East?

General WILLOUGHBY. If I interpret your question correctly, Senator, you want me to give you a statement of the impact of communism on the Far East, with particular reference to Japan?

Senator FERGUSON. No. The United States and its relations in the Far East.

General WILLOUGHBY. Perhaps it is the fatigue, or the late morning hour, but would you mind stating that again, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what I want to find out, if you can give me the information: If you have seen any evidence of communism, as practiced by Russia, and the principles of communism in the Far East, having any bearing or relations to our policies, American policies, in the Far East?

General WILLOUGHBY. I will try to give you a series of perhaps disconnected comments, hoping that at the end the mosaic will become clear.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say that the impact of communism, as practiced by the Russians, of course, is by now pretty well known. It affects all Communist parties in all countries. It affects the Japanese Communist Party, and inferentially, of course, created a problem for the occupation forces, that is, America as exemplified by the occupation forces, in which we had either to take a stand or support the Japanese Government in taking a stand against the Japanese Communist Party and what it stood for.

We felt that that party was not a national party at all. It has no political independence or identity, that it took its orders from the master mind, the Politburo, like so many other Communist parties of national origin.

We felt that if we could not maintain American predominance in the sense of political ideals, that someone else would move in; that if we create a vacuum in the Far East, that that vacuum, on the basis of pure applied physics, would be filled by someone.

That someone is Soviet Russia.

Then we talk about the problems of the Far East now and in the past 10 years. We really mean the corrosive influence exercised by the power politics of the Soviet against and upon neighboring areas.

You had that example in what they have done to North Korea, liberated by us in 1945, and within a space of 5 years, converted to a warlike opponent of the United States.

You have seen the same thing in China. And unless the American policy is firm along this outpost of western civilization, that runs from, roughly, Alaska through Japan, through the Philippines, down to and including the British and Indonesian areas; if we create or permit the development of a vacuum there, that great and sinister power will move into it as it has moved into it on other occasions.

Whether that falls within the purview of a calculated policy by the United States, in that case the policy of our Government, I am not in a position to comment in either approving or disapproving manner.

But to any student of a geographical strategic problems, we must accept that the western frontier runs roughly from British Malaya through Siam, through Indochina, where there is an active front in Chungking; through the Philippines and the island chain leading ultimately to Alaska.

That is an opinion which is a blend of geopolitical military strategic factors, predicated on the raw materials which we must seize or not permit to fall into opposing hands.

In other words, it is a global problem of such complexity that it is probably difficult to answer in a brief summation statement.

And I may be disappointing to you, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I am glad to get that opinion.

I would like to have this answered: We found that there was an attempt to get Guenther Stein's works that he had written, to exert an influence. We find from this evidence that he was and is a Communist and was a Russian spy as a Communist.

Do you find any evidence that the writings of such people have had an influence upon America's foreign policy in the Far East?

I cite merely his writings as one example that he was writing here these many articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

General WILLOUGHBY. I will attempt to give you a reply considering the moral importance of this committee, or any congressional committee, which earnestly seeks to arrive at demonstrable facts, and it is within the obligation of citizenship, immigrant or otherwise, to assist those committees.

In an appraisal of my reply, which I am developing as I go along, you must discount my absence from the United States since 1938. I am a sort of oriental Rip Van Winkle, who is returning now in a series of shattering disillusions.

But I will say that, in general, your thesis that that type of writing is corrosive, objectionable, deteriorating to public opinion, cannot be challenged, and I agree with you. I think that there is a deliberate attempt to circulate, to public relation, to sell this type of book by every channel which these people are capable of, and I again refer to the illuminating article of Irene Kuhn in the American Legion, and Ralph Toledano's in Mercury, which are some of the outstanding articles that I have read since my return from abroad; that they show how that type of book is promoted, supported, book reviewed in calculated channels of subversion, while other books which would establish a balance of judgment are suppressed, belittled, criticized.

So in general terms, taking Stein or Smedley, or the ubiquitous Grajdanzev, to build up their stuff as the last word in reliable, technical, and expert information is part of a pattern of conversion of the mind, which is going on, and has been going on apparently for some time.

Does that answer your question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, it does; because we get from the file of the Institute of Pacific Relations, June 24, 1942, "W. W. L. to E. C. C." and "W. L. H.", a further comment:

> On circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his Chinese staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his officer might be asked to trade certain information in return.

And I underscore:

> John suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return.

It continues:

> I am leaving the matter to you to handle, however.

Mr. MORRIS. John Fairbank, Mr. Chairman, was head of the China desk of OWI at the time.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say, as an interested bystander, that this letter is almost conclusive and highly indicative of the techniques that they employ in recommending each other and disseminating their work.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean Communist work?

General WILLOUGHBY. People that range from communism to fellow traveling, befuddled liberals, and whatever that category that has been described so often in the current press reports.

Senator FERGUSON. In your work in the Far East, you naturally came in contact with Communists and their activities, and that is

the reason that I asked you the question, because I know that you could not perform your functions as a general in the United States Intelligence Service, major general, without having contact and experience. I know that your opinion will be of great value to this committee.

Now, General, you had something you wanted to present.

Mr. MORRIS. This clears up, Mr. Chairman, a conflict that may have come into the testimony earlier, about the time of Guenther Stein's arrest in Paris. The general has an official document there which he will identify and which will be introduced into the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. I will act as assistant to the counsel to file this. It is a message from the French Embassy to me in response to a query on the whereabouts and activities of Guenther Stein. In order to preserve its authenticity I will read it in its original French, and give you the translation immediately.

Entre en France dans le courant de 1949, Guenther Stein a obtenu le 18 octobre de la meme annee une carte de correspondant de l'Hindustani Times, quotidien de New Delhi.

* * * Entered France during 1949, Guenther Stein obtained, on the 18th of October of the same year, an identification card as accredited correspondent of the Hindustani Times, which is a daily of New Delhi.

A son arrivee, il a produit un passeport delivre le 2 septembre 1941 par les authorities de Hong Kong, ville ou il avait ete naturalise citoyen brittaique le 6 aout 1941.

At his arrival, he produced a passport, which he obtained on the 2d of September 1941, through the authorities of Hong Kong, the town where he obtained naturalization papers, as a British citizen, on August 6, 1941.

Il a ete expulse de France pour espionnage, en vertu d'un arrete du 14 novembre 1950 at s'est dirige sur l'Angleterre.

He was expelled from France for espionage—

The term is "espionage"—

following his arrest on the 14th of November 1950 and apparently left for England.

Il est probable qu'il se trouve encore actuellement dans ce pays.

It is likely that he at this time is actually in that country.

Mr. MORRIS. Who signed that, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. It has no signature because it is a carbon copy, but I will identify it as a report from the French Embassy in Tokyo to me.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have it introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit, having been identified by General Willoughby.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 97" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 97

NOTE

Confidential

Entré en France dans le courant de 1949, Güenther Stein a obtenu le 18 octobre de la même année une carte de correspondant de l' "Hindustani Times," quotidien de New Delhi.

A son arrivée, il a produit un passeport délivré le 2 septembre 1941 par les autorités de Hong Kong, ville où il avait été naturalisé citoyen britannique le 6 août 1941.

Il a été expulsé de France pour espionnage, en vertu d'un arrêté du 14 novembre 1950 et s'est dirigé sur l'Angleterre.

Il est probable qu'il se trouve encore actuellement dans ce pays.

GUENTHER STEIN

Translation:

Entered France during 1949, Guenther Stein received a press card for the Hindustani Times, a daily of New Déphi on October 18 of the same year.

On his arrival, he produced a passport issued on September 2 1941, by the Authorities of Hong Kong, the city where he obtained naturalization papers, as a British citizen, dated August 6, 1941.

He was expelled from France, on a charge of espionage, following his arrest on November 14, 1950, and has left for England. It is probable that he is actually in that country.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I want to thank you for coming before us this morning. I realize that there has been some handicap by virtue of Executive order. I hope that it is not found that you have violated any of the sections of that order and that, as the chairman has expressed, it is this committee's desire that there be no retaliation against any Government employee for testifying before this committee.

Again I want to thank you. I know that you have been ill. We appreciate your coming down. We regret the length of the session.

General WILLOUGHBY. Not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess now. I do not want to say that we are through with your examination, because we may call you at another time.

We will meet again at 10 o'clock on Tuesday. Counsel will tell you as to whether or not you are desired.

Again I want to tell you that we appreciate your coming down.

General WILLOUGHBY. Glad to be of service.

(Thereupon, at 12:55 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Tuesday, August 14, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Miss Bentley, will you stand and be sworn, please?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss BENTLEY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY, CLINTON, CONN.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the stenographer, please?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, my full name is Elizabeth T. Bentley.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you speak loudly enough so that all can hear you, please?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. My address is Clinton, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, I wonder if you would tell us briefly of your formal education.

Miss BENTLEY. I have an A. B. degree from Vassar College, a master's degree from Columbia University, and a year's study at the university in Florence, Italy.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Communist Party of the United States?

Miss BENTLEY. In the middle of March 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in the open Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. The so-called open Communist Party, that is, where I was attached to a unit of some twenty-odd people, for 3½ years up until about October 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. You say about 3½ years?

Miss BENTLEY. About 3½ years.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you then discontinue all connection with the Communist Party, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I went with what they called the underground; that is, I was working for an Italian Fascist contact. I was put under a person under whom I worked.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were working for the Italian Fascist Party, you had infiltrated?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. From there you went into what?

Miss BENTLEY. I was put in contact with one person to whom I reported.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Miss BENTLEY. Jacob Golos, G-o-l-o-s.

Mr. MORRIS. Jacob Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position?

Miss BENTLEY. He was quite high up in the NKVD, which is the OGPU. He was also a member of the three-man control commission.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was a member of a three-man control commission of the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. That is practically the outfit that runs the American Communist Party. They are the disciplinary committee that can take action against the members.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who the other two members were at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know offhand. It's on record some place.

Mr. MORRIS. But you know he was one of three men?

Miss BENTLEY. He was one of three men.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was also connected with the NKVD?

Miss BENTLEY. He had been connected with it as far back as the early twenties.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the NKVD?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't think I know what it means in Russian, but it's the internal security police, translated. It includes all of the Soviet espionage work whether military intelligence or rounding up the recalcitrants.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. That is right, operating abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Abroad, from the Soviet Union?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You say Golos was a representative of the NKVD for the Soviet Union?

Miss BENTLEY. And a high-up one.

Mr. MORRIS. And a high-up one?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us the nature of your assignment with Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, after I had left the Italian Library of Information, which was the Italian Fascist outfit I mentioned, I stayed on with Mr. Golos as my contact, doing odd jobs for him. Finally the odd jobs came into contacting undercover Communists to get information. It started with a gentleman by the name of Abraham Brothman. He was doing espionage work.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the man who recently was convicted in New York?

Miss BENTLEY. He was recently convicted in New York for obstructing justice.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a witness in that case?

Miss BENTLEY. I was a witness in that case.

It gradually worked up to picking up people who were working for the United States Government and gathering information.

Mr. MORRIS. While you had that job, I wonder if you would describe what your relation was to Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. I never dealt with Mr. Browder until after Mr. Golos' death, at which time I took over his job.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your relation?

Miss BENTLEY. I was the boss, and he took the orders on intelligence matters.

Mr. MORRIS. On intelligence matters?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. If we wanted people to run cover businesses for agents, he would provide them. In one case that I recall a Soviet intelligence agent was about to be drafted into the Army, and he was to contact the NMU fraction—that is, the Communist group in the union—and get him shifted into the merchant marine.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Miss BENTLEY. 1944—the beginning of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would you contact to get him shifted to the merchant marine?

Miss BENTLEY. I didn't do that; it was his job.

Senator FERGUSON. That was his job?

Miss BENTLEY. That was his job.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time Browder was the head of the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Browder was the head of the American Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Since then he is not connected in your opinion with the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. I doubt if he is connected with the American Communist Party?

Senator FERGUSON. What about the International Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. What gives you that opinion?

Miss BENTLEY. He was in 1946, and I see no reason to change my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were the assistant to Mr. Golos from what year?

Miss BENTLEY. From the middle of October 1938 until his death in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. So for that 5-year period you were the assistant to Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened upon the death of Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Upon the death of Golos, because evidently no plans had been made within the secret police, I took over his job temporarily.

Senator FERGUSON. Was his death from natural causes?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he died of a heart attack. He had an extremely bad heart.

Mr. MORRIS. So at that time, after you had succeeded Golos, your relationship to Browder would be that of his superior in intelligence work?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know about the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I did vaguely before 1943, but much more closely starting with the summer of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. What were your dealings with the Institute of Pacific Relations and concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, it happened rather by accident. I had better go back a little bit on that and mention that in February, I think it was 1941, we took on a new Communist agent, and that was Mary Price, who at that time was secretary to Walter Lippmann. The Soviet Intelligence felt that Lippmann had valuable material in his files, and therefore we had taken her on to get us copies of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get copies?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, we got complete copies—or so, at least, she told us.

Senator FERGUSON. You know you got some copies?

Miss BENTLEY. We got a tremendous amount. I know I went down one time and typed a pile like that [indicating].

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "came down," what do you mean by that?

Miss BENTLEY. From New York to Washington. I was living in New York, and I would come down on trips to Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. Where would you go in Washington? In other words, when you say you came to Washington?

Miss BENTLEY. I went to Mary Price's house. She was living on Olive Avenue at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You never went to Mr. Lippmann's place?

Miss BENTLEY. Oh, no; because Mr. Lippmann did not know anything about it.

Senator FERGUSON. She was a secret agent?

Miss BENTLEY. She was a secret agent.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were attempting to steal things out of Mr. Lippmann's files?

Miss BENTLEY. Not only attempting, but we succeeded.

Senator FERGUSON. You succeeded. What were these things you copied? Do you recall any of them?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. A number of them were documents dealing with our relations with Britain. Some of it was material that seems to have had some relation to the War Department and things of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, you stated that your dealings with Mary Price at that particular time brought you into contact with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder if you would explain that.

Miss BENTLEY. Mary got into rather bad health in the late spring of 1943 and went to Mexico on a vacation. She suggested that we keep in contact with her through Mildred Price, her sister. Mildred Price was a member or executive secretary of the China Aid Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Member or executive secretary?

Miss BENTLEY. Executive secretary, which is tantamount to being the head of it. That was a Communist-dominated organization.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the name of that organization?

Miss BENTLEY. The China Aid Council. At that time it was located, I think, around Twenty-third Street and Fifth Avenue. At first we looked on Mildred as a means of getting word back and forth to Mary. Then when we began talking to her we began realizing that there was a fertile field from which to get intelligence and that is when we began to get interested in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. This China Aid was for Communist China?

Miss BENTLEY. China Aid Council. I would say so.

Senator FERGUSON. There were different names for China aid, and I wondered.

Miss BENTLEY. The China Aid Council was particularly concerned with the Eighth Route Army and the Communist-dominated part of China.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the China Aid Council completely dominated by the Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; according to what she told me.

Mr. MORRIS. She was executive secretary?

Miss BENTLEY. Executive secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any way that you can amplify that?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; Mr. Golos told me the same thing, and later Earl Browder told me the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mildred Price's assistant was the woman named Mentana Sayers?

Miss BENTLEY. Michael Sayers' wife.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know her to be a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred told me that.

Mr. MORRIS. But Mildred Price did tell you that Mentana Sayers, her assistant in the China Aid Council, also was a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Is this the Mary Price that came from North Carolina and ran for public office down there?

Miss BENTLEY. I understand that. I believe Senator Hoey told me at one time she was running on the Progressive ticket. Was that it?

Senator SMITH. Something like that.

Miss BENTLEY. She went back to Greensboro, having come from there, in 1945.

Senator SMITH. It was some State office, I believe.

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same one.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer into evidence two letterheads with incidental letters of the China Aid Council into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. From what source are you getting these?

Senator SMITH. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Is this the same girl that was connected with the Southern Council for Human Welfare?

Miss BENTLEY. She went with the Southern Council for Human Welfare in the spring of 1945 and how long she stayed with them I don't know.

Senator SMITH. Was she a Communist at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. She had been one for at least 10 years before I met her. She was a charter member of UOPWA.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record three letterheads. Mr. Mandel will identify the source, but I would like to show these to ask Miss Bentley if the organization that she has just testified about is the organization referred to on these letterheads.

First is a letterhead of the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy. I would like to offer that to Miss Bentley and ask her if that is the same organization that she has just testified about.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, I imagine that is the same one. There wasn't any League for Peace and Democracy at the time I knew the organization, but I was told, again second-hand, that that was an offshoot of it.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Here I show you a letterhead dated November 24, 1941, China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans, and ask you if that is the same organization about which you are testifying.

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same organization. It has the same phone number and same address.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you notice who the executive secretary and the administrative secretary to the executive secretary are? I think it is at the bottom of the list.

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred Price is the executive secretary, and Mentana Sayers is administrative secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now I offer you a third letterhead, Miss Bentley, and ask you if you will identify that organization. That is a letterhead dated March 1, 1944, I believe; is it not?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, this is after the organization moved up to around Columbus Circle.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. It left its quarters at 200 Fifth Avenue.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that that is the same organization about which you have testified?

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same organization, but it moved uptown into a building with, I understand, other Chinese organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. That organization was Communist-controlled, you say, and you were dealing with Mildred Price, executive secretary, who, according to your testimony, virtually ran the organization?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now will you authenticate those exhibits?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter dated March 1, 1944, from the China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans is addressed to William Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Being the same letter that has just been shown to the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; and going from Mrs. Edward C. Carter, president. It is a part of the Institute of Pacific Relations files which were turned over to us.

Now the letterhead reading "China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy" is not a part of the institute files, but comes to us as a result of our research, and I might note that the American League for Peace and Democracy has been cited as a Communist front by Attorney General Biddle.

We have another letterhead from the China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans dated November 24, 1941, signed by Arthur Upham Pope, chairman, American Committee for Chinese War Orphans.

The CHAIRMAN. Being the same exhibit as was shown to the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. This is also a part of the institute files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the members of the executive committee on that last letterhead?

Mr. Chairman, in the course of our investigation we are going to show that many of the personnel of the Institute of Pacific Relations were connected with the China Aid Council, so I think at this time as an example I would like to point out the list of people who were on the executive board as shown on the last letterhead, which I believe is a 1941 letterhead.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. You wanted only people connected with the institute read, or all of them?

Mr. MORRIS. Put the whole list in.

Mr. MANDEL. The chairman is Dr. Claude E. Forkner. Then we have the honorary vice chairmen——

Mr. MORRIS. Leave the honorary vice chairmen out.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer. Then we have the executive committee, consisting of Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, Dr. Henry L. Bibby, Lyman R. Bradley, Mrs. Edward C. Carter, Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, Mrs. Lucy Forkner, Margaret Forsyth, Talitha Gerlach, Dr. Claude E. Heaton, Philip J. Jaffe, Sally Lucas Jean, Mrs. Philip C. Jessup, Duncan Lee, Mrs. Lin Yutang, Dorothy McConnell, Edgar H. Rue, Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany, Mildred Price, executive secretary, and Mentana G. Sayers, administrative secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Miss Bentley, in connection with your development of your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You had mentioned Mildred Price and then had gotten to the China Aid Council.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel want these exhibits to go into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce these three letterheads and have them marked as the next three consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so marked and entered into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 98" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 98

CHINA AID COUNSEL COMBINED WITH THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS

NEW YORK 19, N. Y., MARCH 1, 1944

Mme. Wei Tao-ming, honorary chairman
Mrs. Edward C. Carter, president
Arthur Upham Pope, vice president

Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, treasurer
Sally Lucas Jean, chairman, children's division
Dr. Claude E. Heaton, chairman, medical division
Board of directors:
Dr. Phyllis Ackerman
Dr. Henry A. Atkinson
Samuel L. M. Barlow
Dr. Leona Baumgartner
Dr. Henry L. Bibby
Dr. Peter Blos
Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi
Mrs. Angelika W. Frink
Talitha Gerlach
Philip J. Jaffe
Mrs. Philip C. Jessup
Beatrice Kates
Dr. Lawson G. Lowrey
Mrs. C. Reinold Noyes
Dr. Max Pinner
Mrs. John Tee-Van
Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany
Dr. George M. Wheatley
Mildred Price, executive secretary
Mentana G. Sayers, executive assistant

Participating in National War Fund, Inc., through United China Relief, Inc.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 99" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 99

CHINA AID COUNCIL COMBINED WITH THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS

200 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941

Dr. Claude E. Forkner, chairman
Honorary vice chairmen:
His Excellency, Dr. Hu Shih
His Excellency, Dr. W. W. Yen
Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer
Executive committee:
Dr. Henry A. Atkinson
Dr. Henry L. Bibby
Lyman R. Bradley
Mrs. Edward C. Carter
Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi
Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton
Mrs. Lucy Forkner
Margaret Forsyth
Talitha Gerlach
Dr. Claude E. Heaton
Philip J. Jaffe
Sally Lucas Jean
Mrs. Philip C. Jessup
Duncan Lee
Mrs. Lin Yutang
Dorothy McConnell
Edgar H. Rue
Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany
Mildred Price, executive secretary
Mentana G. Sayers, administrative secretary

Participating in United China Relief

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 100" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 100



THE CHINA AID COUNCIL
of the
American League for Peace and Democracy
has the co-operation of
AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE
CHINESE HAND LAUNDRY ALLIANCE JAPANESE PEACE SOCIETY
CHURCH LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
METHODIST FEDERATION FOR SOCIAL SERVICE, LEAGUE OF WOMEN SHOPPERS
and many other organizations

Some of the individual sponsors are:

Sherwood Anderson — Prof. Frank Graham — Bishop Robert L. Paddock
Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi — Maj. Gen. C. Duppenheimer — A. Philip Randolph
William E. Dodd, Sr. — Prof. Robert M. Lovett — Prof. Eugene Staley
Sherwood Eddy — Bishop Francis J. McConnell — Maxwell Stewart
Dr. Harry F. Ward — Rabbi Stephen S. Wise

Miss BENTLEY. During the summer and fall of 1943, we became interested in the far eastern field and in the IPR group.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred Price at this particular point was Communist unit organizer for the unit operating in the far eastern field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that a little more fully, please, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. As you probably know, the Communist Party, the lowest echelon is made up of what they call the unit. That contains anywhere from three people on up. In the so-called head of that for purposes of party work is the unit organizer. Mildred, being a very energetic person and willing to take on a great deal of labor, was elected as unit organizer.

Since she was unit organizer of that far eastern unit, which included the IPR and the other organizations, we turned to her to see if there were people in the IPR and others of those far eastern organizations that came within our sphere of influence who would be useful for intelligence work. I once asked Mr. Golos why we just didn't take on the Institute of Pacific Relations itself, and he said, "No; they are operating much too loosely."

Mr. MORRIS. What did he mean by that?

Miss BENTLEY. He meant by that that they were operating so much in the open and they were making so many blunders that it would be a mercy if the FBI didn't get them.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean the Communists in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. The Communists in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Miss Mildred Price indicate to you the degree of control that the Communists exercised in the institute?

Miss BENTLEY. She told me it was one of our organizations in the sense that we exercised a control over it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Golos confirm that?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you amplify on that?

Miss BENTLEY. He told me it was an organization that originally had not, as far as he knew, been much under our control but later came under our control.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you call an instrument?

Miss BENTLEY. It would be a Communist-front organization of a sort. It is hard to find the exact technology for it.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time he told you that you were his assistant working for the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. But, he said the members in that were operating in what he said was a dangerous method and therefore he said he didn't think we should take it on en masse. However, we did go through the list of Communist members in the IPR to see if there was anybody to salvage. We had already picked up Duncan Lee, who had to go to Washington in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Duncan Chapin Lee?

Miss BENTLEY. Duncan Chapin Lee.

Mr. MORRIS. What had he been doing?

Miss BENTLEY. He had been working for a law firm in New York, and then he received a position as a lawyer in OSS.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you had taken him out of the institute?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he had been brought to our attention by Mary Price through Mildred Price, and we found that he would be very close to General Donovan. Therefore, we relayed word to Mildred to disconnect him with that unit and put him in contact with us.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet him?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I did. Mary Price took care of him for, I believe, 6 months, and then I took him over personally.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you took him from the institute for work in your particular undertaking?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was he completely a member of your organization at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he had been a Communist Party member I gathered for some little while. He paid his dues to me, I brought him his literature, and he was under Communist discipline. He was quite definitely a member.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he at that time working for Donovan?

Miss BENTLEY. He was one of that circle of lawyers who worked around Donovan. I don't know what they were called—advisers, probably.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any information from him?

Miss BENTLEY. Quite a bit.

Senator FERGUSON. Out of the OSS?

Miss BENTLEY. I think he was our most valuable source in the OSS.

Senator FERGUSON. He delivered the material directly to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the nature of the material that he delivered to you, in what form, in manuscript?

Miss BENTLEY. Most of it was given to me orally because he was frightened to death of what he was doing and afraid to pass it on. Some of it he had written on scraps of paper.

The CHAIRMAN. You got no microfilms?

Miss BENTLEY. No, no; we only had two people doing our microfilming.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, was there anyone else whom you got into your organization via the IPR?

Miss BENTLEY. There was one other, Michael Greenberg. He was not strictly speaking a member of the American party, being at that time a Britisher, and the policy of the party at that time was not to have aliens as members.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this Michael Greenberg, we have had testimony last Tuesday on Michael Greenberg and at the same time we introduced into the record a series of exhibits showing his connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I just would like to review those at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. While he is looking that up, was Greenberg connected with the United States Government in any way?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I think it was the summer or fall of 1943 that he came down to Washington and took a position as sort of assistant to Lauchlin Currie, who was then I believe in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Greenberg ever deliver any papers to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he delivered information via Mildred Price to me. He was extremely temperamental and I thought it unwise to have him meet me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this information come out of the White House?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; it was mostly on the Far East, on China.

Senator FERGUSON. It came out of the White House and he was assistant to Lauchlin Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; or one of the assistants. I don't know whether he was the only one.

Mr. MORRIS. The nature of the exhibits is they showed that Greenberg succeeded Owen Lattimore as editor for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to what exhibits?

Mr. MORRIS. Exhibits 8, 7, and 51.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. All I want you to do is to identify the exhibits and their connection with the party named.

Mr. MORRIS. We will have to get that, Senator. I would like to comment upon exhibit No. 67, which was taken from the institute files. It is from Michael Greenberg on the letterhead of the White House in Washington, addressed to Miss Hilda Austern, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HILDA: Mr. Currie has asked me to write you about the sending of IPR publications to William D. Carter in New Delhi, India. He says that he is baffled by the problem.

The only thing I can suggest is that you select a few books and try to get them out via OWI.

Sincerely yours,

MICHAEL.

That was introduced as exhibit 67 at the open hearings of August 7, 1951.

I would like to introduce, Mr. Chairman, at this time a letter dated May 23, 1943, from Mr. Y. Y. Hsu to Mr. Carter. I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will verify that that was taken from the institute files.

Mr. MANDEL. This letter was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is dated May 23, 1942, addressed to "Dear Mr. Carter," and it is from Yung-ying Hsu.

Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request. Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same problem. She also suggests my participation. The present memorandum is based upon findings in my two previous memos which have been submitted to you and Mr. Holland. There are a few new points which I intended to examine more closely as a part of my research work. These have been included in the present document in the form of general statements. I believe they are reasonably correct. I have not been able to secure an additional copy of the present memo for Mr. Holland. I am sure you will make the enclosed copy available to him as you see fit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 101" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 101

OFFICE, *May 23, 1942.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills, of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request.

Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same problem. She also suggests my participation.

The present memorandum is based upon findings in my two previous memos which have been submitted to you and Mr. Holland. There are a few new points which I have intended to examine more closely as a part of my research work. These have been included in the present document in the form of general statements. I believe that they are reasonably correct.

I have not been able to secure an additional copy of the present memo for Mr. Holland. I am sure you will make the enclosed copy available to him as you see fit.

Sincerely yours,

YUNG-YING HSU.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we will have the exhibit presently showing that Michael Greenberg succeeded Owen Lattimore as editor of Pacific Affairs, which is the publication of the International Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did Earl Browder ever come to you to talk over about the degree of control the Communist Party had or its interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. Did he come to talk to me about it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. It arose from the fact that this particular Communist Party unit of which Mildred was the organizer and took care of business in the field, had as its political commissar Frederick Vanderbilt Field. He was to give them directives as to what they were to do and to relay messages to the top Communist leaders, especially to Browder. Browder had been personally in China and was interested in the far eastern situation.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. What did you call Mr. Field?

Miss BENTLEY. I said that the closest I could come to his function re the far eastern field would be political commissar.

Mr. MORRIS. So, Miss Bentley, you testify therefore that the Communist Party exercised control over the institute through Earl Browder through Frederick Field?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; and through other groups, the party nucleus, the party units within the far eastern field.

Mr. MORRIS. Who headed that unit within the far eastern field?

Miss BENTLEY. Miss Mildren Price, but Frederick Vanderbilt Field was the man who was higher up than Mildred Price.

Senator FERGUSON. During what period would he be the commissar in the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. During the period I knew it, I can say from my own experience, certainly in 1933 and 1934. I know that three times Mildred Price complained to me that Fred Field had not shown up to have conferences and they did not know how to apply the party line in the Far East; that they needed instructions, and would I go to Browder and complain. She couldn't go directly. Three times I went to Browder and said, "Will you get Fred Field on the job he should be doing?" and he, Browder, said, "I will do that."

Senator FERGUSON. So he was the man steering the organization and laying down the party line to Mildred Price as far as the party line concerned the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. In other words, he relayed the line. I wouldn't say he made up the party line.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He was the man responsible for telling, at least, Mildred Price what the party line was?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way that people are steered to the party line, through someone like Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Miss BENTLEY. Not entirely, This was an unusual situation. Usually you have a pyramiding from your unit to your section to your district, but this was considered to be such an important unit that they couldn't risk having it go through all these levels of Communist Party development, and therefore it went specially.

Senator FERGUSON. From a man like Field down through to her so that she could work the party line and hew to it in the Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct, and it was done that way so that there would be less danger.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified that her other activity was that she was executive secretary of the China Aid Council?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. There was no conflict between that assignment and the assignment in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. No, rather they complemented each other.

Mr. MORRIS. May I introduce into the record after Mr. Mandel identifies this letter as a copy of a letter to Michael Greenberg, managing editor, Pacific Affairs, dated April 28, 1942. This is by way of showing that Michael Greenberg was connected with Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a copy of a letter dated April 28, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. Michael Greenberg, managing editor of Pacific Affairs, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City, signed by F. V. F., presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say that is a copy of a letter, did it come from the files in this form or have you the original?

Mr. MANDEL. We have the original, and that is a carbon.

The CHAIRMAN. The original was in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a true and correct copy?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The original is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire for the record when Frederick Vanderbilt Field applied for a commission in the United States Army in the Intelligence Section? What was the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. I believe it was May 1942, is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that come in the time when he was Communist Commissar for the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. It could have been that. From what Mildred said he had been for some time, and that was in the summer of 1943, so it could be.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that be an important position, to have the commissar on our intelligence staff, for the Communists, I mean?

Miss BENTLEY. The Soviet Intelligence didn't like to lose anybody to the Army unless they could get into strategic positions—that is, not the infantry but with Intelligence they would consider that very good.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be an important position?

Miss BENTLEY. That would be an important position.

Senator FERGUSON. As you say, though, you tried to keep your members out of the real fighting because they could give you little aid?

Miss BENTLEY. They could give us little aid, and they would also get knocked off. We tried to get them into Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. You tried to get them into a safe spot.

Senator SMITH. Did you know about the efforts and maneuvers made to get Frederick Field in the Intelligence Service of the Army?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I didn't.

Senator SMITH. At that time, I mean.

Miss BENTLEY. No. I had heard of Fred Field before, but I had really not come up against him until 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified that Michael Greenberg was taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations and sent to Washington. Would you tell us a little bit about his assignment in Washington?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid I probably told you most of what I know. He was simply one of the assistants to Lauchlin Currie in the far-eastern field, which he knew well.

Mr. MORRIS. Lauchlin Currie was then executive assistant to the President?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. Right on the heels of that I believe he became, was it the head of FEA or Far Eastern Division?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have in the record when Greenberg became a United States citizen?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we have that later on, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That will go into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, I at this point think we should discuss Mr. Lauchlin Currie.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 102" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 102

APRIL 28, 1942.

Mr. MICHAEL GREENBURG,
Managing Editor, Pacific Affairs,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MICHAEL: I have read the letter which George Taylor has written to Pacific Affairs regarding my review of his book. I understand from you that the editors have opened the way for him to write this letter and intend to print it in the same issue which will contain my review. I also understand that this is the first time in the history of the journal that the editors have permitted a reviewer to be attacked in this manner and without allowing his review to stand unchallanged for at least one issue.

Let me say that I regard Taylor's letter as nothing more nor less than an attempt to smear me personally. I am naturally sorry to find my former

associates so frightened of their shadows as to lend themselves to this method and procedure.

I shall not offer any reply to Taylor's letter. My review stands; it expresses about all I wish to say on the matter. Anything further would simply add to a personal controversy in which I have no interest. A counterreply on my part would make the magazine look even more ridiculous than it will under present circumstances.

In order to point out to you, and for the record to show how thoroughly irresponsible I believe this matter to have been handled, let me review what happened:

1. Bill Holland telephoned me to ask if I would be willing to review the Taylor book. I replied that I had not read it, but would be glad to do so and write a review. After reading the book I felt that I should not review it for a journal like Pacific Affairs because my review would have to be extremely critical. I telephoned you to explain this and asked you to find a substitute. You replied that you wished me to go ahead with the review, knowing that it was to be strongly critical.

2. I turned in the review a few days later. As you were not in your office when I went to the I. P. R. I gave the message to Hilda Austern. At this point I want to clear up what appears to be another misunderstanding. In asking Hilda to give you the review I asked her to request you to make no changes in the copy without my having the opportunity to approve them. I specifically did not take the unreasonable and dogmatic position that no changes were to be made. Simply that I wanted to see them if they were made. I checked this with Hilda today and find that she agrees that this was the message she passed on.

3. Finally, I was informed that the editors had decided to let Taylor write an answer for publication with my review, and you then gave me a copy of his letter.

I would have regarded this as entirely appropriate if I had originally been asked to contribute to a political discussion of the main impressions given Mr. Taylor's book—I say "main impressions" because, as you are well aware, somewhere in the book he says everything, therefore, the reviewer can only comment on the general impressions he conveys. But I was not asked to do this. I was simply asked to write a review for a supposedly scholarly journal. I myself thought I was not the person to do this, but on calling this to your attention I was urged to go ahead. Taylor, on the other hand, was apparently let loose to write a slippery political rebuttal packed with ridiculous innuendoes about my "revelation" received of course straight from Moscow.

A final word. In printing Taylor's letter I should like to ask the favor that you print it precisely as you showed it to me, with no editing, no deletions whatsoever. I shall count on its being sufficiently absurd to thoughtful persons to vindicate my judgment of his book and, by inferences, of his work.

I said that was a final word, but obviously there must be one more. If you and the other editors want to forget the whole business, I suggest that you withdraw my review, get someone else—any of a hundred "scholars" with whom you are in contact—to review it for the next issue, forget the entire episode yourselves, and give me the very great privilege and pleasure of so blanketing this out of my mind that I retain the high respect for my I. P. R. colleagues that I am most anxious to preserve.

With most cordial personal regards,

F. V. F.

Mr. MORRIS. We have exhibits to show that Mr. Lauchlin Currie was a very active adviser and participant in the Institute of Pacific Relations work. While we are introducing those exhibits, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Miss Bentley if she will testify concerning the relationship that Lauchlin Currie had to her particular activities in that period.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. One of the espionage groups that I handled in Washington, which I roughly call the Silvermaster group because the man who headed it was N. Gregory Silvermaster.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately how many people were in that group?

Miss BENTLEY. I think there were 8, 9, or 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Silvermaster was in what section?

Miss BENTLEY. FSA, which is the Farm Security Administration, which is a part of the Agriculture Department, although for 6 months I think he was in the Board of Economic Warfare.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have trouble or difficulty in moving these agents that you had into strategic positions in Government or in the Army that you were talking about, that you did not want them where there was danger but you wanted them in strategic positions? For example, Silvermaster, did you have trouble moving people such as that, or how were they moved to strategic positions so that you could get your information?

Miss BENTLEY. We didn't have too much trouble. In the case of Silvermaster, he pulled strings and got in there.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your avenues for placing people in strategic positions?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say that two of our best ones were Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie. They had an immense amount of influence and knew people and their word would be accepted when they recommended someone.

The CHAIRMAN. Harry Dexter White was in what department?

Miss BENTLEY. Under Secretary of the Treasury, under Mr. Morgenthau.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Currie and White were your instrumentalities in putting people in strategic positions?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say they were our most important ones.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you have any other ones?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. I mean, whoever we had as an agent in the Government would automatically serve for putting someone else in. For example, Maurice Halperin was head of the Latin American Section in OSS, and we used him to get Helen Tenney in. Once we got one person in he got others, and the whole process continued like that.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you desired to shift a person from one position to another position you would use White and Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. We would use White and Currie if we could.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know who White's principal contacts were in the Government so that he could place people in Government?

Miss BENTLEY. It was my understanding that he knew practically everyone in Washington who had any influence.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know who he would contact?

Miss BENTLEY. No, not specifically; that was his affair, and we did not inquire into it.

Senator FERGUSON. As I recall the Far East, Mr. Morgenthau at the time before Pearl Harbor had drawn a plan for the Far East, it was the Morgenthau plan. Did you know anything about it?

Miss Bentley. No, the only Morgenthau plan I knew anything about was the German one.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know who drew that plan?

Miss BENTLEY. Due to Mr. White's influence, to push the devastation of Germany because that was what the Russians wanted.

Senator FERGUSON. That was what the Communists wanted?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely Moscow wanted them completely razed because then they would be of no help to the Allies.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that Harry Dexter White worked on that?

Miss BENTLEY. And on our instructions he pushed hard.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of the Morgenthau plan that was set up for the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't recall it.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else participated in drawing up the Morgenthau plan besides Harry Dexter White?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid I don't remember now.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sol Adler have anything to do with it?

Miss BENTLEY. As far as I remember Sol Adler was in China.

Mr. MORRIS. He was in China?

Miss BENTLEY. He was a Treasury Department expert, but most of the time he was in China. I am quite sure he hadn't returned by that time.

Senator EASTLAND. What you say is that it was a Communist plot to destroy Germany and weaken her to where she could not help us?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. She could no longer be a barrier that would protect the Western World.

Senator EASTLAND. And that Mr. Morgenthau, who was Secretary of the Treasury of the United States was used by the Communist agents to promote that plot?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by "I am afraid so"?

Miss BENTLEY. Certainly Secretary Morgenthau didn't fall in with Communist plots.

Senator FERGUSON. But you know it to be a fact?

Miss BENTLEY. I know it to be a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not qualify it, do you?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't qualify it. I didn't want to give the thought that he did it knowingly.

Senator SMITH. He was unsuspectingly used.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have conscious and unconscious agents?

Miss BENTLEY. Of course, The way the whole principle works is like dropping a pebble into a pond and the ripples spread out, and that is the way we work.

Senator FERGUSON. Some are conscious and some are unconscious as to what they are doing?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. A good many of our most valuable items came from the fact that many people in the Pentagon couldn't contain themselves, and they had to confide in our people.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us for our record the relationship that Harry Dexter White had with your work.

Miss BENTLEY. Harry Dexter White, I couldn't tell you that he had actually been a member of the party, but to all intents and purposes he was because he followed its discipline. According to Nathan Silvermaster he was afraid to meet people like myself. He had for some years been working for an agent who had turned sour, later identified as Whittaker Chambers. That had given him a terrific fright, and he had stayed away for a while from these activities.

Then he had met the Silvermasters and they had brought him back into their group. His attitude was that I am going to help you, but my right hand doesn't want to know what the left is doing. Therefore, he didn't want to meet anyone he knew to be a Soviet agent, he wanted to pass it through Silvermaster to me.

Senator FERGUSON. This idea of Chambers going sour on the Communist Party was learned by the State Department because he made his report to the State Department, did he not, so that the people knew that he had gone sour? That was before he testified in court or in the open, was it not?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know, but the Communists know when their people go sour before anybody else does usually.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that Chambers had given information to the American Government officials who were anti-Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. I didn't know anything about Whittaker Chambers at all except as a man called X who had handled a number of my people in 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. So his name you did not learn?

Miss BENTLEY. No. They gave a name such as Sam or Al and you don't know his real name.

Senator FERGUSON. So White did not name Chambers as the man who went sour?

Miss BENTLEY. No. I don't know whether White knew Chambers. Certainly he didn't give it to Silvermaster.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a confidential Government record come to you from White?

Miss BENTLEY. Many of them, all labeled from "Harry" because Soviet agents like to know who is providing what.

Mr. MORRIS. How many copies of such reports would you receive?

Miss BENTLEY. How many copies?

Mr. MORRIS. Would it come in duplicate?

Miss BENTLEY. Sometimes it was a carbon copy. Many, many times those documents were photographed in the Silvermasters' cellar because they couldn't be spared.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give us a concrete example of your dealings with Harry Dexter White?

Miss BENTLEY. In the way of material?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Who gave it to you, for instance?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, in the early days Lud Ullmann, who was then working in the Treasury, used to bring it out. Sometimes Harry was leery about bringing it out himself. Sometimes it would be given to Bill Taylor.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is William Taylor?

Miss BENTLEY. He was another Communist Party member in the Treasury who paid his dues and was a member of the Silvermaster group.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Ullmann in the same category?

Miss BENTLEY. Ullman was in the same category. I knew Ullmann as well as the Silvermasters.

Mr. MORRIS. Let us take Ullmann. Would he give you a report and tell you it was a report from Harry White?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, and he would also type on it "from Harry."

Mr. MORRIS. What would you do?

Miss BENTLEY. I would take that back, and when Mr. Golos was alive I would give it to him and after he passed on I would give it to the successor agent.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom?

Miss BENTLEY. To the succeeding Soviet contact I had; there were three of them.

Mr. MORRIS. In any case, were they ever microfilmed?

Miss BENTLEY. Many cases. In many cases the volume got too big, and they had to be microfilmed.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that done?

Miss BENTLEY. In their basement. They had a home-made affair there where they put their camera.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you describe where that was?

Miss BENTLEY. The Silvermaster home?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. Right off Chevy Chase Circle, I think it was 5515 Thirty-fourth. I have forgotten the exact number.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been there?

Miss BENTLEY. I was there almost every 2 weeks, I should——

Mr. MORRIS. What was your purpose in going there?

Miss BENTLEY. My purpose in going there was to collect Communist dues and all the information collected during the 2 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the bulk got so large that you could not carry it to New York?

Miss BENTLEY. Physically I could have carried it, but it would have been unwise to go hauling large bundles around like that.

Senator FERGUSON. And you got it into microfilms so that you could take them into New York without being seen and having a package?

Miss BENTLEY. There was also the problem with lots of documents that you could only take them overnight and return them in the morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, would you testify about an idea of Harry Dexter White whereby he was going to perfect your intelligence organization?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't quite understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified in executive session that Harry Dexter White had a plan whereby he was going to integrate all intelligence matters coming into your ring.

Miss BENTLEY. Do you mean the trading of information between Government agencies?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. He not only had a plan, but we put it into effect.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that.

Miss BENTLEY. We were so successful getting information during the war largely because of Harry White's idea to persuade Morgenthau to exchange information. In other words, he would send information over to Navy, and Navy would reciprocate. So there were at least seven or eight agencies trading information with Secretary Morgenthau.

Mr. MORRIS. You say this plan of trading information was initiated by White?

Miss BENTLEY. This plan was initiated by White because he knew it would come across his desk.

Mr. MORRIS. He being the Executive Assistant?

Miss BENTLEY. He was the Under Secretary, next man down the ladder.

Senator EASTLAND. Who negotiated that agreement?

Miss BENTLEY. From what I was told, it was Secretary Morgenthau himself.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was initiated by White?

Miss BENTLEY. It was initiated by Harry White.

Senator EASTLAND. You testified he used Morgenthau?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, I wonder if you would tell us exactly what your relations were with Lauchlin Currie.

Miss BENTLEY. Lauchlin Currie was not, as far as we knew at that time, a member of the Communist Party, but he was very close to various members of the Silvermaster group, including George Silverman, whom he knows very well, and Silvermaster. He was willing to bail them out when they were in trouble, when they were being fired for disloyalty or when they needed help to get a job.

Besides that he was passing on information to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Currie was passing it on?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us any information on what you received through Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. Most of it was far eastern. There was the time when he relayed the information that the Soviet code was about to be broken.

Mr. MORRIS. Broken by whom?

Miss BENTLEY. The United States authorities.

Mr. MORRIS. He discovered that the United States authorities had broken the code, and he relayed it to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Were about to break it. I relayed it back, and my Russian head said, "Which code?"

Senator EASTLAND. Did he say which code?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I was unable to get back and find out. He just said the Soviet code.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that information?

Miss BENTLEY. That information came from White via Silverman, as I recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. From Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. From Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a highly classified fact at the time?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely. I don't know enough about Government labelings, but it was certainly something you wouldn't pass around.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your understanding, Miss Bentley, that Lauchlin Currie was a full-fledged member of the Silvermaster group?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he always act in that capacity or was he reassigned in some fashion?

Miss BENTLEY. It was my understanding he was going to be reassigned when I left the group in September, I think it was, 1944. My Soviet contact told me that they did not believe in having such large groups for security reasons because if someone turns sour they know too much; that he intended to put White directly in contact with a Soviet superior, and Lauchlin Currie also in direct contact with a Soviet agent, and possibly with some of the smaller fry he could put

two or three in one group. But he definitely mentioned putting White and Currie in direct contact.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was it that mentioned them?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know his real name, he was known to me as Bill.

The CHAIRMAN. He was living where?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know whether he lived in Washington or New York.

Mr. MORRIS. But he was your superior in the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. He was my superior in the Soviet military police and also I am quite sure it went through.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what particular agent Currie was going to be assigned to?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say you think it went through?

Miss BENTLEY. Because after this Soviet contact had taken over the Silvermaster group he requested me to stay on with them for 3 months. In talking with Silvermaster he told me they had already put the plan into effect, and they were about to make contact with Soviet agents, so I am convinced it went through.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think at this time we should point out what Lauchlin Currie's relations were with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I therefore ask Mr. Mandel if he will call to our attention some few of the exhibits that we have selected to show what Lauchlin Currie's role was in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are these exhibits to which you refer being made a part of the record?

Mr. MORRIS. We will introduce them.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the foundation, the source, and how you got it.

Mr. MANDEL. First I refer to the testimony of Edward C. Carter on July 25, 1951, in which he identified Lauchlin Currie as a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Now I have here a photostat of a letter dated October 27, 1942, addressed to Joseph Barnes at 430 West Twenty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Where does the instrument come from?

Mr. MANDEL. The instrument comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it an original instrument or photostat?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat. It is signed by Edward C. Carter and the letter reads as follows:

DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope that some day when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon.

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the White House exchange.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that letter into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and entered into the record

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 103" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 103

NEW YORK, N. Y., *October 27, 1942.*

JOSEPH BARNES, ESQ.,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope that some day soon when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon.

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the White House exchange.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated November 30, 1942, and the memorandum is addressed to Mr. Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup at Mont Tremblant. This is in connection with the Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR.

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of Mont Tremblant committee, I am putting down the following suggestions.

This is signed by William W. Lockwood.

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup so that they are merely tentative for the present.

The Pacific Council: Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in the chair so presumably another American should represent the Council. I believe Kizer is the best choice.

Program Committee: Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later.

International Research Committee: Dennett is the best person, in view of his availability afterward for continuing responsibility. I would hope that Frank Coe could at least sit in on the meetings, in addition.

International Finance Committee: Brayton Wilbur; alternate, Brooks Emeny.

Publications Committee: Tentatively, Len De Caux.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that received into the evidence as the next exhibit, pointing out that the significance of this document is that Lauchlin Currie, about whom we have had testimony, on November 30, 1942, was proposed by Mr. Lockwood in official capacity to Mr. Jessup as chairman of the program committee of the Mont Tremblant conference, which was the triennial conference and one of the important functions of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit will be properly marked in sequence and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 104" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 104

NOVEMBER 30, 1942.

Memorandum to: Mr. Carter.
Copy for: Mr. Jessup, Mont Tremblant.

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of Mont Tremblant committee, I am putting down the following suggestions.

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International finance committee: Brayton Wilbur; alternate, Brooks Emeny.

Publications committee: Tentatively, Len De Caux.

WM. W. LOCKWOOD.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 18, 1941, addressed to Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi from Edward C. Carter and reads as follows:

DEAR CHI: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable as the following:

"LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

"American Embassy, Chungking:

"If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's unified resistance."

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific for China to start a two-front war.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit pointing out at the same time that Dr. Chi is a man who has been identified by several witnesses here as an important member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 105" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 105

NEW YORK CITY, *February 18, 1941.*

DR. CH'AO-TING CHI,

New York City.

DEAR CHI: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable as the following:

"LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

"American Embassy, Chungking.

"If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's unified resistance.

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific nor China to start a two-front war.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. This is another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is dated March 10, 1944, addressed to Dr. John Fairbank, care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie, the White House, Washington, D. C., signed by W. L. Holland.

DEAR JOHN: Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the APO in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via APO

to Mac Fisher or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

No more stuff seems to have come from Hsiang. Is there any way you could get a note to him via Kates or Mac Fisher asking whether anything has been transmitted for the use of the IPR?

As Carter probably told you, we have now prodded the University of California into taking some action about our friend and have offered to advance them a travel fund immediately.

P. S.—As a project in the field of cultural relations with China, I wonder what you and Wilma would think of the idea of getting an American publisher to reissue all or most of the chapters in the Symposium on Chinese Culture.

Mr. MORRIS. The significance of this document, Mr. Chairman, is that John Fairbank received his mail care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie at the White House. I would like to have that introduced as the next consecutive exhibit in the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 106" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 106

MARCH 10, 1944.

Dr. JOHN FAIRBANK,
Care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN: Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the APO in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through to Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via APO to Mac Fisher or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

No more stuff seems to have come from Hsiang. Is there any way you could get a note to him via Kates or Mac Fisher asking whether anything has been transmitted for the use of the IPR?

As Carter probably told you, we have now prodded the University of California into taking some action about our friend and have offered to advance them a travel fund immediately.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—As a project in the field of cultural relations with China, I wonder what you and Wilma would think of the idea of getting an American publisher to reissue all or most of the chapters in the Symposium on Chinese Culture which the China IPR published in Shanghai in 1932. One or two chapters, for example, on industry are a little out of date but the book is still constantly being quoted and asked for though it has long been out of stock. If you thought the scheme worth while, I might ask Hu Shih and perhaps one or two other Chinese here to add supplementary chapters which would serve to bring the book partly up to date. There's such a demand from the publishers today for books from the Far East that I don't think we would have any difficulty in finding a publisher.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is another memorandum dated June 20, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "1942 conference personnel, interview WWL," presumably with W. W. Lockwood, "with Lauchlin Currie, June 17, regarding IPR 1942 conference."

1. We may proceed on the assumption that the administration looks with favor on the idea of the conference and will put no official obstacle in the way of participation by Government people. (This implies no guaranty, of course, that any particular individual will be able or will agree to attend.)

Currie himself would like to be at the conference and presumably we can count on his being present.

Official participation will be essential to success.

2. Wallace and Perkins would be ideal, if available. Currie also suggested Harry White of the Treasury and Jim Baxter of the Office of Strategic Services.

As for the State Department, it is awkward to choose among four or five individuals. Berle would be important to secure, but he is always bracketed with Acheson. Similarly, Hornbeck and Hamilton are usually bracketed together. Pasvolsky is very important in the whole postwar set-up of the State Department.

Currie evaded a direct answer to the question as to whether we must include the old-line far eastern people, but indicated by inference that it would be rather awkward not to do so. He also said that if Alger Hiss were invited and Hornbeck were not, it would put the former in an impossible position. Currie's suggestion was that ECC see Welles, extend the courtesy of an invitation to him personally, and then invite his suggestions as to which of the other top State Department people should be included. Currie also mentioned Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, which takes in India and Burma. He expressed no opinion as to Murray's personal qualifications.

There is no strong reason from the Washington viewpoint to prefer September to December or vice versa. Currie himself, however, thought that last year's plan of catching people at the end of the summer was a good one.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit, the item referred to. The purpose of introducing this exhibit is to show the role that Lauchlin Currie played as a high adviser in connection with the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 107" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 107

[1942 conference personnel, June 20, 1942]

INTERVIEW WWL WITH LAUCHLIN CURRIE JUNE 17 REGARDING IPR 1942 CONFERENCE

1. We may proceed on the assumption that the administration looks with favor on the idea of the conference and will put no official obstacle in the way of participation by Government people. (This implies no guaranty, of course, that any particular individual will be able or will agree to attend.)

Currie himself would like to be at the conference, and presumably we can count on his being present.

Official participation will be essential to success.

2. Wallace and Perkins would be ideal, if available. Currie also suggested Harry White of the Treasury and Jim Baxter of the Office of Strategic Services.

As for the State Department, it is awkward to choose among four or five individuals. Berle would be important to secure, but he is always bracketed with Acheson. Similarly, Hornbeck and Hamilton are usually bracketed together. Pasvolsky is very important in the whole postwar set-up of the State Department.

Currie evaded a direct answer to the question as to whether we must include the old-line far eastern people, but indicated by inference that it would be rather awkward not to do so. He also said that if Alger Hiss were invited and Hornbeck were not, it would put the former in an impossible position. Currie's suggestion was that ECC see Welles, extend the courtesy of an invitation to him personally, and then invite his suggestions as to which of the other top State Department people should be included. Currie also mentioned Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, which takes in India and Burma. He expressed no opinion as to Murray's personal qualifications.

3. There is no strong reason from the Washington viewpoint to prefer September to December or vice versa. Currie himself, however, thought that last year's plan of catching people at the end of the summer was a good one.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a group of telegrams, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One telegram is addressed to Edward C. Carter:

Glad to see you at 12:30 Wednesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

The telegram does not show a date, but the subsequent telegram will undoubtedly indicate the date of the correspondence.

The next is a copy of a telegram dated September 17, 1941, to Lauchlin Currie, White House, Washington, D. C.:

Wire collect could I see you 10 minutes any time Thursday or Friday preferably Thursday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Here is another telegram dated October 7, 1942, to Lauchlin Currie, Executive Offices of the President, the White House, Washington, D. C.:

Visiting Washington tomorrow Thursday will telephone you in morning for appointment.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another one dated October 7, year not given, the White House:

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Eighth any time would be better if convenient.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Here is another dated June 26, 1942, a note addressed to Currie:

I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2, and hope you can see me in the forenoon of that day.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another telegram, a copy of a telegram, June 23, 1942, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, Washington, D. C.:

Washington visit postponed until next week.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another copy of a telegram dated May 5, 1942, addressed to Lauchlin Currie:

Wire collect can you spare 5 minutes any time Wednesday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

And then we have another here, dated April 25, 1942, a telegram to Edward C. Carter.

Planning to attend conference Tuesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

The telegram is marked as coming from the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Are they samples of correspondence that you have discovered in the files between Lauchlin Currie and Edward C. Carter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not all of the correspondence between these two people, are they?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these telegrams just read by Mr. Mandel into the record, and have them marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The purpose of these telegrams is to show the relationship that existed between Lauchlin Currie and Edward C. Carter, namely, that Carter frequently went to Washington and conferred with Lauchlin Currie in the White House. Mr. Carter, at that time, was the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. These will be inserted into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 108" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 108

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., April 25, 1942.

EDWARD CARTER,
129 East Fifty-second Street:

Planning to attend conference Tuesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

MAY 5, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
White House, Washington, D. C.:

Wire collect can you spare 5 minutes any time Wednesday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

JUNE 23, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.:

Washington visit postponed until next week.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

NEW YORK CITY, *June 26, 1942.*

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Adminstrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2, and hope you can see me in the forenoon of that day.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., October 7.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Eighth any time would be better if convenient.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

OCTOBER 7, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Executive Offices of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.:

Visiting Washington tomorrow, Thursday, will telephone you in morning for appointment.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
White House, Washington, D. C.:

Wire collect could I see you 10 minutes any time Thursday or Friday, preferably Thursday?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:
Glad to see you at 12:30 Wednesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a brief memorandum, dated July 10, 1941. "W. L. H." presumably W. L. Holland, from "E. C. C." presumably E. C. Carter.

I am, of course, delighted that you have persuaded Chi to allow us to go ahead with his book suppressing only those passages which are likely to affect Chi's work.

My acquiescing in Chi's request did not derive from a desire to defer to Washington bureaucrats, but simply and solely to my desire to refrain from doing anything which would defeat the purposes of Chen Han-sen, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, Harry White, and Morgenthau in their very big program in China.

I had a feeling that you would be able to persuade Chi to approve of precisely what you have secured his approval for. I am naturally delighted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit. I understand that Senator Ferguson has a question he would like to ask about it before we pass it on.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about this program, and concerning which I was talking about previously, in China? Did that come to your attention?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I am afraid not. I was pretty new in the game at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew about it in the one in Germany but not the one in China?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to point out at this time that we have thus far introduced into the record evidence that Chen Han-seng, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, and Harry White are the four people mentioned in this memorandum as having had former connections with the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibits will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 109" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 109

JULY 10, 1941.

W. L. H. from E. C. C.

I am, of course, delighted that you have persuaded Chi to allow us to go ahead with his book suppressing only those passages which are likely to affect Chi's work.

My acquiescing in Chi's request did not derive from a desire to defer to Washington bureaucrats, but simply and solely to my desire to refrain from doing anything which would defeat the purposes of Chen Han-seng, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, Harry White, and Morgenthau in their very big program in China.

I had a feeling that you would be able to persuade Chi to approve of precisely what you have secured his approval for. I am naturally delighted.

Mr. MANDEL. Another exhibit coming from the file of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 15, 1942. "E. C. C." presumably Mr. Carter, from "W. W. L." presumably W. W. Lockwood.

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in

the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

Then follows a list of individuals. Under the heading of "Government," we have Ernest H. Gruening.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Mandel, we do not have to go into that list. I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as evidence of the fact that the Institute of Pacific Relations, and, in this case, Mr. Lockwood writing to Mr. Carter, considered that the competent advice should be gotten from Currie, who is Lauchlin Currie, Barnes who is Joseph Barnes, and Jessup who is Philip Jessup, again to establish that Mr. Currie was looked upon by the institute as one of the senior advisers of that organization.

As such, I would like to have it introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 110" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 110

JUNE 15, 1942.

E. C. C. from W. W. L.:

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

GOVERNMENT

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska
Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare
Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare
Riefler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare
Shoemaker, James H., Board of Economic Warfare
Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare
Wallace, H. A., Vice President, Board of Economic Warfare
Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget
Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information
Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information
Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information
Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information
Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture
Ropes, E. C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade
Berle, A. A., Department of State
Davies, Joseph, Department of State
Grady, Henry, Department of State
Hiss, Alger, Department of State
Hornbeck, S. K., Department of State
Sayre, Francis B., Department of State
Stinebower, L. D., Department of State
Vince, Jacob, Treasury Department
White, H. D., Treasury Department
Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board
Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration
Nathan, Robert, War Production Board

OTHERS

Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross
Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council
Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point
Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News

Clapper, Raymond, Washington columnist
Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register and Tribune
Dennett, Tyler, historian
Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corp.
Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland
Field, Frederick V., New York
Herod, W. H., International General Electric
Jessup, Prof. Philip C., Columbia University
Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission
Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corp.
Luce, Henry, Time, Inc.
Molyneaux, Peter, Texas weekly
Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States District Court, Spokane, Wash. (ex-Senator)
Sproul, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York
Sweetland, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief
Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives
Wilkie, Wendell, attorney
Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation
Wilson, C. E., General Electric
Yarnell, Admiral H. E., United States Navy, retired

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel has just one more, Mr. Chairman, bearing on this point of Lauchlin Currie's position in the IPR.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a letter dated August 28, 1941, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, Executive Offices of the President:

DEAR CURRIE: A Chinese scholar who ought to know better has written recently to at least three of my friends criticizing at length Lattimore and Lattimore's appointment, the IPR, etc. All three of his correspondents have referred the letters to me.

It is not terribly important, but I would like to send copies of the letters to Lattimore, but in such a way as to make certain that they are not read by others before reaching him. Have you any means of getting a letter of mine to Lattimore if I were to send it to you to forward?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom was that addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. This is addressed to Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. At the White House.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is the reply, dated September 2, 1941, on the stationery of the White House, addressed to Edward C. Carter:

DEAR CARTER: I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore uncensored. Since it will not be official business I will have to ask you for airmail postage as far as Hong Kong.

Sincerely,

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 111" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 111

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, August 28, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, ESQ.,
Executive Offices of the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: A Chinese scholar who ought to know better has written recently to at least three of my friends criticizing at length Lattimore and Lattimore's

appointment, the IPR, etc. All three of his correspondents have referred the letters to me.

It is not terribly important, but I would like to send copies of the letters to Lattimore, but in such a way as to make certain that they are not read by others before reaching him. Have you any means of getting a letter of mine to Lattimore if I were to send it to you to forward?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 2, 1941.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore uncensored. Since it will not be official business I will have to ask you for air-mail postage as far as Hong Kong.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Lauchlin Currie.
LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of introducing those exhibits was to show the connection of Lauchlin Currie, about whom we have had testimony this morning, with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Miss Bentley, do you know Sol Adler?

Miss BENTLEY. Not personally; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know about Sol Adler?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Solomon Adler was, again, a member of the Silvermaster group. He paid his dues through Mr. Silvermaster to me. Most of the time I was in charge of that group, he was over in China. But he did send reports to various people, including Harry Dexter White in the Treasury Department, which were relayed on to us.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what were the natures of those reports, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Reports on internal Chinese politics, mainly, as to what the Nationalists were doing and what the chances were for the Eighth Army people and the Communists in China.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his Communist assignment in China? Can you tell us a little bit about that, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. When he went over there he was told—that was before my day, so I didn't participate in it—he was told that he should follow the party line in China, and carry out to the utmost whatever Moscow wanted in the Far East.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that?

Mr. MORRIS. This is Sol Adler, Senator, who was one of the high officials in the Treasury Department, and who was in charge of the Treasury Department for China.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you can tell us something more about Solomon Adler, Miss Bentley? Anything more about Solomon Adler that you can tell us would be helpful.

Miss BENTLEY. In what respect?

Mr. MORRIS. About his connection with the organization.

Miss BENTLEY. I understand that he had been connected with the organization for a few years before I came along.

He not only was connected with the Silvermaster organization, but he had Communist contacts within China. One of those was Chi. I have forgotten his first name.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi?

Miss BENTLEY. He was the man proposed to be the Chinese delegate to the United Nations. Is that the same one?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Miss BENTLEY. Well, he had dealings with him, both in this country and in China, and with numerous others of the Communists in China, although he was supposed to cultivate the Nationalists on behalf of our own Government, and also to forward the Communist plan.

He was really quite friendly, for example, with Madam Chiang Kai-shek. I remember one report that came through on Adler at one time that complained that he was not tending to business and influencing the quarters he should be. He was playing too much bridge with Madam Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know a man named Israel Epstein?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know him personally, no. I know about him.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what you know about him, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. In February 1941, I helped set up a cover business, to cover the espionage activities, with funds supplied by Earl Browder, of the American Communist Party, and with a contact from a Soviet agency which had been arranged by Soviet Intelligence. We needed personnel, and Israel Epstein's then wife, Mrs. Edith Epstein, had just returned not too long before from China, and we considered her. So Mr. Golos got her dossier and discovered that Israel Epstein had been a member of the Russian Secret Police for many years in China, and because Mrs. Edith Epstein was his wife, she would be fit to take on as part of our personnel in the business.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any doubt in your mind that Israel Epstein was an important Sovie agent?

Miss BENTLEY. No doubt at all. Mr. Golos checked up on him and had heard a great deal about him.

Mr. MORRIS. How reliable would a report like that, from Mr. Golos about Mr. Epstein as a Soviet agent, be as far as you are concerned?

Miss BENTLEY. Any report which I would get from my Soviet superior on those things would be reliable on that.

Mr. MORRIS. So there was no doubt in your mind that Israel Epstein was what he told you he was?

Miss BENTLEY. No doubt whatsover.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever take his wife on as an agent?

Miss BENTLEY. No, we simply used her in the office. It turned out she was not as far left as her husband, and we did not like our agents to know too much about us. Since we hired her in the office, it would be unwise to take her as an agent.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did put her in the office?

Miss BENTLEY. We did put her in the office because we thought she would be discreet and protect us in case anything came up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you can bring forth the exhibit to show Israel Epstein's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Epstein was the author of the article entitled "Hong Kong, Past and Present," in the Far Eastern Survey for April 24, 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Far Eastern Survey a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It is an official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Here is a letter dated September 6, and the year is not given. It is addressed to "Dear Holland" signed by "I. Epstein."

The CHAIRMAN. That was obtained from where?

Mr. MANDEL. It was obtained from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters on Saturday. One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions.

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would like to have these back when you are through.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York.

Sincerely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit bearing on Israel Epstein's activities with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 112" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 112

DEAR HOLLAND: I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters on Saturday.

One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions.

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would like to have these back when you are through.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York.

Sincerely,

(Signed) I. EPSTEIN.

SEPTEMBER 6.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know anything about John K. Fairbank, who was mentioned in the last letter?

Miss BENTLEY. Only that he was sometimes used by Mildred Price to bring material back from China. You see, it was difficult to bring things back from China that wouldn't go through the censorship or wouldn't otherwise get opened and looked at. Mme. Sun Yat-sen and a number of other people in China, a few Communists, were sending material to Mildred for the China Aid Council. So, anyone who was sympathetic or one of the boys would bring them back on their trips.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you know that Mildred Price did use John K. Fairbank to bring back messages from whom?

Miss BENTLEY. From Mme. Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. MORRIS. To?

Miss BENTLEY. To Mildred Price, from China, because I know at least one occasion when he did bring all these documents back.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mme. Sun Yat-sen a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you develop that a bit for us?

Miss BENTLEY. As to show Mme. Sun Yat-sen was?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; and her relations with your organization.

Miss BENTLEY. Mme. Sun Yat-sen, as far as I know, had been a Communist for quite some time, and was very important in the Communist movement over there. And, therefore, she was in contact with the China Aid Council, which was going all out to help the Communist area.

Mr. MORRIS. So, you do know that she was working with the China Aid Council?

Miss BENTLEY. Quite definitely. They got consistent letters from her, and they wrote back, and their aid was going to Communist areas in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, would you try to place a date of the time when John K. Fairbank brought a message back from Mme. Sun Yat-sen to Mildred Price? Was it during the time he was the head of the China Division of the Office of War Information?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know exactly when he was head of that. I would say it was in 1944. It was after Mr. Golos' death. It must have been 1944, or the tag end of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, could you tell us what you know about Philip Jaffe?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. His name first came up when, as I told you, we had been canvassing the IPR through Mildred Price to see if we could find good intelligence material. We had gone through them. It didn't look hopeful; a lot of them were too temperamental, and our best prospect as an intelligence worker seemed to be Philip Jaffe, according to Mildred, although she did say that she was very much afraid that he was rather too well known as a Red and, therefore, he wouldn't be too useful.

In undercover work, you have to have people who are inconspicuous and not too well known. So, we decided not to go on with that project. But she described him as being a very loyal comrade and reliable.

Mr. MORRIS. So, it is your testimony that you did not take Philip Jaffe from the Institute of Pacific Relations for espionage because he was too open a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. We got that information from Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. And, for that reason, he wouldn't be suitable?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever warned against associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. I was told to be very careful in dealing even with Mildred. As a matter of fact, I think Mr. Golos' phrase was: "It was as red as a rose, and you shouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole."

Mr. MORRIS. The IPR?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. He felt, from the point of view of good undercover work, they were far too bungling and they were too much in the open, and it was far too dangerous to be associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations. It might get us in trouble.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever hear of Edward C. Carter's relationship to the Communist organizations mentioned?

Miss BENTLEY. I know very little about Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about him?

Miss BENTLEY. I know that Mildred Price brought his name up, inasmuch as they were associated, and she said he was O. K., and by that she meant that he was a reliable person that she could trust.

Mr. MORRIS. That she could trust in connection with the party work?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Whether or not he was actually a party member is something I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more you know about Edward C. Carter, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Not that I can think of at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a Miss Harriet Lucy Moore?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. I knew Harriet Moore personally. This forum, that I told you we set up as a cover business in 1941, had a license to ship parcels to Russia. Right after we had set it up in February, you remember, the Germans attacked Russia. And the result of that was that we got the brilliant brainstorm of wanting to send packages to Russia, and the Russian War Relief was born not too long after that. And in connection with that, I had dealings with Harriet Moore, and I was told by Mr. Golos, by the people downtown in the Communist Party, that she was a comrade and I should deal with her as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record a long series of exhibits showing Harriet Lucy Moore's connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In the middle 1940's, she was acting secretary of that organization. Prior to that, Mr. Chairman—I think it was 1941—she was chairman of the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations. At that same year she was also a member of the executive committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a member of the board of trustees.

Mr. Chairman, those exhibits have already gone into evidence, together with many others, showing that she was very actively associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Miss Bentley has now testified about knowing her as a member of the Communist Party.

What do you know about Frederick V. Field, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know him personally. I know, as I have stated before, being told by Browder and by Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Your dealings with him were through Browder?

Miss BENTLEY. My dealings with him were through Browder, because I was not getting into the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever have a meeting at Field's house?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Earl Browder very often used Fred Field's house to meet people where it had to be highly underground.

Mr. MORRIS. Field was not there?

Miss BENTLEY. Field was not there; no. He just loaned the house to Browder, and Browder was there when I went with a couple of people that he didn't want to come out in the open. They met there. I understand that was done quite frequently on undercover meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of that particular meeting?

Miss BENTLEY. That particular meeting was in connection with what should happen about the cover business.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did it last?

Miss BENTLEY. The cover business?

Mr. MORRIS. No; the meeting?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say we were there a good 2 hours, probably. We had quite a number of things to talk about.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, do you know of an organization called the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Miss BENTLEY. I have heard about it; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about it, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I have been told that it, again, was in the Communist sphere of influence.

Mr. MORRIS. By whom?

Miss BENTLEY. I think I was told that by Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about the publication Amerasia?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about Amerasia?

Miss BENTLEY. I was also told that that was Communist-dominated.

Mr. MORRIS. Who told you that?

Miss BENTLEY. Both Golos and Mildred Price.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know anything about Owen Lattimore?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't know Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know whether he is a Communist or not?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Robert Miller?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I know Robert Miller. Robert Miller was one of the Communist Party members that I took on as an espionage agent way back in 1941. He worked for the CIAA. That is Nelson Rockefeller's Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, I think it was called. I think he was in the Political Division of that outfit. I think in 1944 he migrated from there to the State Department. He was one of the people I dealt with directly, collected his dues and got his information.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever have any direct relations with John P. Davies?

Miss BENTLEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have anything to do with any of his reports, official State Department reports?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, through the Silvermaster group. I was told that he was quite sympathetic to our cause, and I remember one report of his that they gave to me which definitely showed that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You were shown a report written by John P. Davies?

Miss BENTLEY. I think it was just after he came back from India. I wouldn't swear to it, but I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. What did the report show, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I remember at the time saying, "Yes; they were quite right about his sympathies," because the report showed it.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know James S. Allen?

Miss BENTLEY. I may have met him once. I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about James S. Allen?

Miss BENTLEY. Not too much. You see, he was more or less in the open party, and I was undercover. So, if I met him at all, it was in the early days in the party, when I could associate openly with people.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I might point out that these people that we are asking Miss Bentley about are people who are connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and have been shown to be such by previous exhibits.

I would like to point that out, Mr. Chairman.

Do you know Frank Coe?

Miss BENTLEY. Not personally. He, again, was a member of the Silvermaster group, worked in the Treasury Department. I collected his Communist Party dues from the Silvermaster group, and it was my understanding from the Silvermasters, again, that he had been a member of the party for quite some time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have already introduced the exhibits into the record which show that Mr. Frank Coe attended conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, have you anything further?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked "Private IPR Discussion Group on United Nations Cooperation," dated March 15, 1943, at 700 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. On this list is Dr. Frank Coe, Michael Greenberg, and others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. They all came from the files of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 113

PRIVATE IPR DISCUSSION GROUP ON UNITED NATIONS COOPERATION, MARCH 15, 1943, WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMBERS EXPECTED

The Honorable Frances Bolton, House Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Ralph Bunche, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Edward C. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Frank Coe, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Cabot Coville, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Mrs. Judith Daniel, Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Michael Greenberg, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
Dr. George H. C. Hart, Research Chairman of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council, Washington, D. C.
Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
Mr. William C. Johnstone, dean, junior college, George Washington University, Washington, D. C.
Dr. Kan Lee, China Defense Supplies, Washington, D. C.
Miss Katrine Parsons, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
Mr. L. B. Pearson, Minister-Counselor, Canadian Legation, Washington, D. C.
Sir George Sansom, British Embassy, Washington, D. C.
Mr. R. Tirana, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
Dr. A. P. Tixier, Fighting French Delegation, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Alan Watt, Australian Legation, Washington, D. C.

ATTENDANCE UNCERTAIN

Mr. Wilfred Benzon, International Labor Office, Montreal.
Mr. Joseph Jones, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Mr. David Weintraub, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Len DeCaux, Publicity Director, CIO, Washington, D.C.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know anything about Joseph Barnes?

Miss BENTLEY. Not personally; no. He was a friend of Mr. Golos. Mr. Golos worked with him, and Mr. Golos told me he was O. K.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by "he was O. K."?

Miss BENTLEY. That meant that he could be worked with and would take directives.

Mr. MORRIS. Communist directives?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know Vladimir Kazakevich?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us what you know about Vladimir Kazakevich?

Miss BENTLEY. He was originally a White Russian who came to this country, I think, in the twenties, and then fell in with some Communist Russians on the west coast in the early thirties, never actually becoming a member in the sense that he was possessed with a book or that he was considered one, but to all intents and purposes was just as good. He was a propagandist for the Russians. He lectured for them. He wrote articles for them, and he had continuous dealings with Mr. Golos.

Whenever he found any interesting information, he brought it in to him, knowing where it was going. In fact, Mr. Kazakevich even told me several times he knew that. At one time he got a job at Cornell University giving courses on Russian civilization to Army students. But someone discovered him, I think it was Mr. Woltman on the then World Telegram, and he was exposed. I understand that he has now gone back to Russia. At least, I read it in a newspaper article.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you can tell us what you know about Alger Hiss?

Mr. Chairman, we have had previous testimony showing that Alger Hiss was an adviser of the IPR, and a member of the board of trustees of the IPR. For that reason, we are going to ask Miss Bentley if she had any connections, indirect or direct, with Alger Hiss.

Miss BENTLEY. They were indirect ones, but to my mind conclusive ones.

In 1944 I took on a group of people I called the Perlo group.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Perlo?

Miss BENTLEY. Victor Perlo is a gentleman that I understand was a quite brilliant statistician with the War Production Board. He is now out of the Government. At the last I heard of him, I think he is in the Jefferson School in New York.

One of the members of the group was a Mr. Harold Glasser, in the Treasury.

In the process of checking everyone's past, I found that Mr. Glasser had, at one time, been pulled out of that particular group and had been turned over to a person whom both Mr. Perlo and Mr. Charles

Kramer refused to tell me who it was, except that he was working for the Russians, and later they broke down and told me it was Mr. Alger Hiss.

Of course, I immediately checked that with my Soviet superior, because it could have been somebody else's intelligence service, and could be dangerous. Word came back to me "that is all right. Lay off the Hiss thing. He is one of ours, but don't bother about it any more."

Mr. MORRIS. And you did not bother about it?

Miss BENTLEY. No. When you were told by your superior to lay off, you laid off.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have more testimony from Miss Bentley in the executive session, but I think it is of such character, particularly inasmuch as it involves foreign governments, that we should have an executive session on that score.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we adjourn until after lunch and commence with an executive session at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The chairman will be unable to preside after lunch. I have another committee meeting.

Senator Smith, could you preside?

Senator SMITH. I have another committee meeting also. I could probably be here for a little while. I think my committee starts at 3 o'clock.

Mr. MORRIS. It is important testimony, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I was wondering if we could meet at a later hour in the afternoon, when I might get through. What would you say to 4:30? It would be a little late.

Mr. MORRIS. That would be all right, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. I might be able to be here for an hour, at 2 o'clock.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will be able to finish in an hour, Senator Smith.

The CHAIRMAN. How about at 4:30?

Mr. MORRIS. That will be fine, Senator.

Senator SMITH. You spoke about collecting Communist dues and making your rounds.

How often did you make these rounds? I believe you said every 2 weeks.

Miss BENTLEY. I came down every 2 weeks. Once in a while it would be less frequent, if people were on vacations, and once in a while more frequently if there was extra data. I didn't collect them every time.

Perhaps I should explain. Ordinarily, in the open party, they try to collect them regularly. When it comes to undercover work, it is done more or less as a matter of tightening your hold on a person. In other words, the money that you get out of him isn't so important, it is impressing on him that he has one more link in the party.

Senator SMITH. Did you collect the dues in other spots than Washington?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. For example, the Perlo group came up to New York to meet me, and I collected them there.

Senator SMITH. What is the amount of the dues?

Miss BENTLEY. That is one of the most awful things for anyone to try to get. I don't know whether you have ever seen a Communist

dues scale, but no one short of a financial wizard can keep them straight, and they change all the time.

All I can remember of my own dues is that at one time when I earned $25 a week, I paid 25 cents a week dues. But it was broken down in categories, almost like an income tax, and then a surtax after so much.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any trouble collecting from your members?

Miss BENTLEY. Very often. Very often, at least they said, they were financially embarrassed.

Senator SMITH. Did you get any money for this work from Russia?

Miss BENTLEY. No; in our case we didn't, no. As a matter of fact, it went the other way around. People were paying dues, including myself, for the privilege of being Communists. We were not being paid by Russia. But then, that is good espionage practice. The Russians told me that they felt that a person who thought something of it would be able to go up higher.

Senator SMITH. They train you also on that phase, do they?

Miss BENTLEY. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would put into the record additional evidence that Harry Dexter White was associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations? We have already put in some, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. Taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is a memorandum dated November 3, 1942, for Miss Harriet L. Moore, Prof. Philip C. Jessup, and Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, entitled "Invitations Issued for the American Group, Mont Tremblant Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations."

Listed here as representing the White House, Currie, Lauchlin (attendance probable); Treasury Department, White, Harry D. (in London).

Others mentioned are Frank Coe, William T. Stone, and others.

Mr. MORRIS. That was for the Mont Tremblant Conference in 1942, is that right, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. That is right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 114" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 114

NOVEMBER 3, 1942.

For: Miss Harriet L. Moore
Prof. Philip C. Jessup
Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer

INVITATIONS ISSUED FOR THE AMERICAN GROUP, MONT TREMBLANT CONFERENCE, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

White House: Currie, Lauchlin (attendance probable.)
State Department: Hornbeck, Stanley K. (attendance probable.)
Treasury Department: White, Harry D. (in London.)
Board of Economic Warfare:
Perkins, Milo (declined.)
Coe, Frank (accepted for part time.)
Stone, William T. (accepted for part time.)
Office of Strategic Services:
Remer, C. F. (accepted.)
Despres, Emile (accepted.)
Bunche, Ralph (accepted.)
Brown, Norman (accepted.)

Federal Reserve Board: Hansen, Alvin H.
Office of War Information: Barnes, Joseph (declined.)
Office of Price Administration: Emerson, Rupert (declined.)
Congress: Coffee, John M.
Journalism:
Luce, Henry R. (declined.)
Reid, Mrs. Ogden.
Waymack, W. W.
Business and law:
Kizer, Benjamin H. (accepted.)
Herod, W. R. (declined.)
Grady, Henry F. (attendance probable.)
Hoffman, Paul G.
Labor:
DeCaux, Len (CIO) (accepted.)
Shiskin, Boris (AFL.)
Academic:
Sproul, R. G.
Earle, Edward M. (accepted.)
Shotwell, James T. (declined.)
Moore, Harriet L. (accepted.)
Wilbur, Ray Lyman.
Jessup, Philip C. (accepted.)
Emeny, Brooks.

TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN GROUP

Governmental:

Acheson, Dean, Department of State.
Barnes, Joseph, Office of War Information.
Baxter, James P., Office of Strategic Services.
Berle, Adolf, Department of State.
Beukema, Col. Herman, United States Military Academy.
Currie, Lauchlin, White House.
Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
Hamilton, Maxwell, Department of State.
Hornbeck, Stanley K., Department of State.
Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
Stone, William T., Board of Economic Warfare.
Studebaker, John W., United States Office of Education.
Wallace, Henry A., Vice President.
Welles, Sumner, Department of State.
White, Harry D., Treasury Department.

Nongovernmental:

Bates, Searle, University of Nanking; International Missionary Council, New York City.
Binder, Carroll, foreign news editor, Chicago Daily News, Chicago.
Clapper, Raymond, Scripps-Howard columnist, Washington.
Dennison, Eleanor, National League of Women Voters, Washington.
Earle, Edward M., Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.
Eliot, Thomas, United States Congressman from Massachusetts, Cambridge.
Field, Frederick V., New York City.
Gibson, Hugh, New York.
Grady, Henry F., president, American President Lines, San Francisco.
Herod, W. R., vice president, International General Electric Co.; president, United China Relief, New York City.
Jessup, Philip C., Columbia University, New York City.
Kizer, Benjamin H., chairman, Northwest Regional Planning Commission, Spokane.
Luce, Henry R., Time, Inc., New York City.
Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute, Now York City.
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States district court, Spokane.
Sproul, Robert G., president, University of California, Berkeley.
Sproul, Allan, president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.

Sweetland, Monroe, director, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief, Washington.
Viner, Jacob, University of Chicago, Chicago.
Wilson, C. E., president, General Electric Co., New York City.
Wilson, Howard, Harvard University; American Council on Education, Cambridge.
Yarnell, Admiral Harry E. (retired), Newport.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a letter from the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 21, 1942, addressed to Robert W. Barnett, from William W. Lockwood, and I read a few excerpts:

The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless OSS policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservation; also he is not yet sure of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for 2 or 3 days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and these I'll take up with you later.

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his return.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 115

OCTOBER 21, 1942.

Mr. ROBERT W. BARNETT,
I. P. R. 700 Jackson Place NW.

DEAR BOB: The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless OSS policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservation; also he is not yet sure of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for 2 or 3 days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and these I'll take up with you later.

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his return.

I also invited Len De Caux, CIO publicity director and editor of the CIO News. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a very favorable impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him.

De Caux suggested Boris Shiskin of the A. F. of L. as another good labor person for the conference. He is the research director, I believe. If the nominating committee approves, I'd like you and Michael to see him at the Washington headquarters and extend an invitation. Before doing this, however, you had better wait for further word from me.

In the opinion of Hiss, Coe, and Despres, we ought to try to get Berle or Acheson, or both. More about this later, too.

One important gap in the present line-up is India. The Washington possibilities are Paul Alling, now political adviser and formerly chief of the State Department's Near Eastern Division; Wallace Murray, present chief; Eric Beecroft, and Norman Brown. From what I learned of the two State Department men, neither would be very useful to us. As between Beecroft and Brown,

I'd like your opinion and Michael's. Despres says that the written work of Brown's section is first rate—imaginative and pointed. He doesn't know Brown's qualifications as a conference participant Remer thinks well of Brown as more than the conventional academician. In his favor are not only his position, but also his academic standing. Although we are paying little attention to this consideration in making up the American group, it would be desirable, other things being equal, to include at least one person with senior rank among scholars in the Asiatic field. But this shouldn't decide the matter unless on other grounds as well Brown is the best nominee.

Another possibility we might consider is someone from Knox's office or Stimson's. Coe and Hiss mentioned Adlai Stevens, one of Knox's special assistants. Hiss also suggested with some approval Harvey Bundy, former assistant Secretary of State and now special assistant to Stimson. Then there is General Little, a Marine general formerly in China, now retired (?) Also General Magruder, whereabouts unknown. Despres suggested Admiral Hart, saying that it wouldn't be a bad idea to have someone who would give a pretty forthright and orthodox Navy view, as this view will greatly influence the postwar settlement.

Still other suggestion include Robert Sherwood, head of the OWI's Overseas Section, and Gardner Cowles.

Ben Kizer probably will write Congressman Coffee a personal letter, and leave it to us to follow up with an interview.

In a day or so I'll send a revised list indicating where we now stand on invitations and acceptances.

Read Hager, by the way, would like very much to see you, and took down your telephone number He has been with Rupert Emerson in the office of the OPA regional administrator handling Territories and possessions. Next week he probably will shift to the civilian staff of the Munitions Assignments Board. This will put him in a key position, as a member of the group, working for Hopkins in this field. His home address is 2031 Huidekoper Place.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. You see there that Harry White is represented as invited as representing the Treasury Department.

Senator SMITH. I think, Mr. Chairman, that maybe the statement should be made there that that does not mean, the introduction of this exhibit does not mean, that all of the people on here, whose names are on here, are called suspects because there are names of a great many.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it is introduced for a purpose, to connect Harry Dexter White.

Mr. MORRIS. It is introduced to show that Harry Dexter White was interested in IPR activities.

In this particular case, he was a delegate to the Mont Tremblant Conference in 1942.

Senator SMITH. I see names of a great many American citizens here on these two sheets of paper, and I was wonrdering about it.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit does not refer to them at all.

Senator SMITH. That is exactly what I wanted.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, further along those lines, Mr. Chairman, you have pointed out that incidental association between people whom we have named as Communists here, which association reflects only mere association and nothing significant, that we have asked the members of the committee to withhold any conclusions about their particular identity with the Communist organization.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. One more question.

Could you tell us what you know about Joseph Eckhart.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, quite a lot about Joseph Eckhart. I met him originally in November 1936 because he needed a secretary, or so the excuse was, to edit his letters, because his English wasn't too good.

I was introduced to him by the then organizational secretary of the city office of the League Against War and Fascism.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Miss BENTLEY. Beatrice Carlin.

That organization, of course, has been thoroughly branded as being Communist dominated; not only that, the organization originated in Moscow. It was understood that Mr. Eckhart was a Communist.

As time went on, he was unable to use me because he had come to this country, I understand, for the express purpose of trying to get airplanes to Spain. That was during the civil war. He was going to sneak them out through Mexico. The Neutrality Act intervened along in there, and he stayed on until 1938, and found that he couldn't use me.

But I discovered that he was a highly important person at that point, that he had come from Moscow without the usual strings of reporting to superiors, and I knew him, as I said, from November 1936 until January, I guess it was, 1938.

I found out later on that he was a Soviet military intelligence person. Mr. Golos told me that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have introduced that testimony into evidence not immediately connecting the Institute of Pacific Relations with that individual person.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Is that all you have to offer?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, until we have an executive session, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The committee will stand in recess until 4:30 when we will have an executive session.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., Tuesday, August 14, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Thursday, August 16, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, your witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am going to call on Mr. Carter first. Mr. Canning and Mr. Chambers, I wonder if you would accommodate the gentlemen of the press by letting them have the pictures?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to the witnesses that they are not required or do not have to have their pictures taken in this committee. If there is no objection on their part, they may sit up here and the press may take pictures, otherwise they will not be taken.

Mr. CHAMBERS. In my case one more will not matter.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter?

The CHAIRMAN. Now again may I say that the acoustics in this room are not very good, and when it is crowded it makes it just a little bit worse. Will you kindly bear with the committee and try to be as quiet as possible, especially if you have to speak to your neighbor, in which case please resort to the whisper method only.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris, the witness has been sworn.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of calling Mr. Carter in today is that we have run into a certain amount of difficulty in determining the identity of a person mentioned in one of the exhibits. Since Mr. Carter was the recipient of the letter involved I thought it would be best to have him in here to answer this particular question. We had one day last week testimony by Prof. Karl August Wittfogel of the School of Chinese Studies in Columbia University, testimony that Herbert Norman was in 1938 a Communist.

In filing our exhibits at the time there was a possibly significant letter that we introduced at the time, which reads as follows, and this is a letter now which was introduced as an exhibit on that occasion. It is a letter from W. L. Holland to Mr. Carter dated September 5, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the origin of that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. It was identified by Mr. Mandel as taken from the IPR files.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the exhibit number?

Mr. MORRIS. What is the exhibit number, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Exhibit No. 72.

Mr. MORRIS. I will read the letter. The significant paragraph reads as follows:

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking with him Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuo's Industrial Japan.

It goes on to list other things that this Phil is taking with him to Japan.

Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6, and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation.

We do not know who Phil is, Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that counsel is now reading from Exhibit 72 of the hearing of the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. We thought we would ask Mr. Carter who Phil is, in this letter that you received from Mr. Holland.

Mr. CARTER. I will be very glad, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just tell us who Phil is, that is the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Identify him by his last name.

Mr. CARTER. Lilienthal.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to say something?

Mr. CARTER. If I may. In view of the introductory remarks of Mr. Morris regarding Mr. Norman, I wish to say that the reiteration by the counsel of this committee of Dr. Wittfogel's slanderous attack on Mr. Norman is, I think, out of keeping.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the end of the answer, that is sufficient.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman, what the secret information was that you wanted to send or was being sent?

Mr. CARTER. May I answer this question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Lilienthal was at that time research assistant to Mr. W. L. Holland, whose office that year was provided by the University of California in the offices of the Giannini Foundation, and we had a large number of research manuscripts which Mr. Lilienthal was taking to Shanghai to be printed there for two reasons, one because costs in Nationalist China for printing were very low, and second, Shanghai was a very good distribution point for the whole Pacific. Mr. Lilienthal took these manuscripts, but was to stop in Tokyo to visit the Japanese IPR.

It was a somewhat tricky situation because at that time Japan and China were at war, and the Japanese were opposed to the IPR at that time because the IPR writers usually supported actively China's resistance to Japan under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There might be some necessity of communicating with Mr. Norman, but it was undesirable to involve the Chinese and the Japanese in any fur-

ther controversy, and so we used, or it was proposed by Mr. Holland, that the facilities of the Canadian Legation be used.

As a matter of fact, there was no occasion for using them, and no message was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not use our Embassy, the American Embassy?

Mr. CARTER. You would have to ask Mr. Holland that.

Senator FERGUSON. And the secret messages were these documents that were to be printed?

Mr. CARTER. No, they weren't the documents; they were simply——

Senator FERGUSON. Manuscripts to become documents?

Mr. CARTER. The manuscripts were to become documents, but it was not about those manuscripts that were to become books, it was in the case the Japanese, who were very critical of the international IPR and the American IPR at that time because they regarded the IPR as pro-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Japanese, it was simply in case some misunderstanding of that sort came up that this precaution was taken but never exercised.

Senator FERGUSON. Now Herbert Norman.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he representing the IPR in Japan?

Mr. CARTER. No; he had been a research assistant in the International Secretariat sometime before, and after he had finished his Rockefeller Fellowship at Harvard he wrote one of the really great books in the IPR shelf, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. Because of his eminence in the Japanese field, after he terminated his work with the IPR the Canadian External Affairs Ministry appointed him to their Legation in Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. Your only reason then for using Norman was that he was a member of the Legation?

Mr. CARTER. Two reasons. One was, he was a former member of our staff and was still interested in the institute, and his book was continuing its sale, and he was there in the Legation. Mr. Lilienthal would see him, and it was thought that it might be a convenient post-office address, but as I said, it was not used. There was no occasion to use it.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator WATKINS. Did not the Japanese at that time have a unit in the IPR in good standing?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Senator WATKINS. Whatever material you sent out would be sent to them the same as to other countries that had units?

Mr. CARTER. The final product would be sent to them just as it was to all the other countries in the Pacific.

Senator WATKINS. In view of the nature of your organization, why was it necessary to have secrets?

Mr. CARTER. Because Japan and China were in a state of violent war, although I think technically it was undeclared.

Senator WATKINS. That is the only reason?

Mr. CARTER. Obviously.

Senator WATKINS. I do not think it is so obvious, otherwise I might have caught it before you gave your answer.

Mr. CARTER. It was obvious to me. I am sorry I did not make it obvious to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter here, and while we have Mr. Carter on the stand I would like to ask him a few questions on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. We had testimony yesterday, day before yesterday, by Elizabeth Bentley that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent. That was brought out in the regular course of her testimony, and she knew that from her official dealings in the Communist Party.

Now this letter concerns itself with The Unfinished Revolution in China, which was written by Israel Epstein, and this letter, which Mr. Mandel will identify, was one of the letters taken from the IPR files.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated June 12, 1947. Would you like it read?

Mr. MORRIS. May I have a copy of that, please?

I think, Mr. Chairman, if we have this read paragraph by paragraph and then I will ask Mr. Carter a few questions about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the first two paragraphs?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if you have copies of that letter, would you give a copy to Mr. Carter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is marked "Private and confidential."

DEAR MISS FORD:

The reference is to Miss Ann Ford, publicity director, Little, Brown & Co.—

This is to acknowledge Epstein's The Unfinished Revolution in China, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives; John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have you thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would be all to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. Sometimes, for mercenary reasons, they make substantial cuts.

Mr. MORRIS. That is enough for the time being. Why were you so interested, Mr. Carter, to have the leaders, the heads of our State Department, John Foster Dulles, John Carter Vincent, and Secretary of State George Marshall, read The Unfinished Revolution in China by Israel Epstein?

Mr. CARTER. And Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives. It struck me as a human document by a man who had been long in China and seemed to me to have a rather broad and deep knowledge of things Chinese and the Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not know that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recognize the book as a Communist publication?

Mr. CARTER. I did not. I would hardly have sent it to as astute and wise and patriotic men as this list if I had thought that it was Communist propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you never knew Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. At that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Or a special pleader for the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was, Did you know him to be?

Mr. CARTER. I did not know him to be a Communist on June 12, 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you changed your mind since then as to whether or not he was?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you could answer that question "Yes" or "No" and then make your explanation. It would save time, Mr. Carter, if you do that.

Mr. CARTER. I am terribly sorry, Senator McCarran, but this is one of the things that you can't say "Yes" or "No."

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question and see whether you can answer "Yes" or "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Let me put the question again. Have you changed your mind as to Epstein being or ever having been a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I have reconsidered and have not reached a final conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. You are now in doubt?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You are familiar with this book, are you not, The Unfinished Revolution in China?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't read it for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I would like to have the clerk of the committee put some of these paragraphs in here, but I do not want to delay this examination this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will designate, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have them designated and see that they go in the record here, and I will have a copy of that furnished to you and then ask you, and get an answer later, about what you think in the light of your reconsideration.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness has made a statement that on June 12, 1947, he did not know Mr. Epstein to be a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that we might have a comprehensive answer on that point, Mr. Carter, did you on June 12, 1947, know Mr. Epstein ever to have been a Communist or ever to have worked for the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the next to the last paragraph in the letter—that is, the next to the last in the P. S.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

P. S.—Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, what did you mean there, that Epstein was a special pleader?

Mr. CARTER. He was pleading for the Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your interpretation of the expression "many will say that Epstein is a special pleader"?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He was pleading also for a new kind of world, was he not? Do you not say that?

The CHAIRMAN. It is the P. S., I think.

Mr. MORRIS. He has it, I believe.

Mr. CARTER. He is "pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Epstein was there pleading for what you thought was a sound analysis of the world?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of the fact that we had Israel Epstein identified as a Soviet agent as of that time, does it surprise you about your own opinions of the world situation at that time?

Mr. CARTER. Not completely because some of the identifications alleged in this room haven't convinced me of their authenticity.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony then that you do not believe that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent at that time?

Mr. CARTER. I had no knowledge at that time that he was a Soviet agent, and I do not know today whether he was or was not.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read one paragraph here about you saying that he was a special pleader for a new kind of world and ask you whether it was this kind of world that you were talking about. This is page 411.

The only point in this formulation with which a student in political science might quarrel was the phrase "Communistic form of government." Communism is not a form of government but an economic society.

Now, is that what you were talking about, that he was a special pleader for that?

Mr. CARTER. Well, not having read the book for some time and being confronted with a few sentences out of a big book——

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

Mr. CARTER. At the moment I don't feel that I would help the committee at all by making an answer. I would be very glad to study it and send you in writing my reaction and my answer to your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were saying that he was a special pleader for a particular form of government or kind.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that Epstein was advocating communism in this book?

Mr. CARTER. I don't want to be difficult, but I would like to read the book unhurriedly.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you questions later on it then.

Mr. CARTER. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there was reference there to—

I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I think it would be appropriate to make excerpts from Mr. Lattimore's review, which appeared in the New York Times.

Senator FERGUSON. First, I would like to ask Mr. Carter the question, Did you think that Owen Lattimore would give the same kind of review of this book as you had in mind, a new form of government that was appropriate?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember what I had in mind. I did regard and still regard Owen Lattimore as very acknowledgeable about China, and this was a book by a man who knew a great deal about China. Whether I had in mind any particular emphasis on this or that point in the book I can't for the life of me remember this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you were all for the book?

Mr. CARTER. I thought it was a good book, and that it should have wide circulation, and that it should come to the attention of our most thoughtful Americans.

Senator FERGUSON. And you felt that if Owen Lattimore reviewed this book he would take the same slant on it as you have taken?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I thought he probably would see that it was a useful book.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You anticipated that he would follow the same thinking on it as you had?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you say "I hope other publications will make as wise a choice."

Mr. CARTER. I thought he was a qualified reviewer, and I hoped that other papers would get equally qualified reviewers.

Senator FERGUSON. And you anticipated that he would recommend it?

Mr. CARTER. I thought it was likely.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, I think, wanted to ask a question.

Senator SMITH. I was wondering if Mr. Carter would read the last paragraph on sheet 2 and tell us what he meant by that.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly read that, Mr. Carter?

Senator SMITH. Out loud.

Mr. CARTER (reading):

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles—

That is the son of Sumner Welles—

Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Sun Yat-sen and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

Senator SMITH. What did you mean by that paragraph, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I thought that it certainly should be in the hands of our Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, who has a lifelong knowledge of China, some of our principal American correspondents, and Sun Fo, who was a member of the Chiang Kai-shek cabinet, Madame Sun Yat-sen, who was a member of the Soong family, and others.

It seemed to me that I was suggesting that this book come to the attention of first, correspondents from the Times and Tribune and other American papers.

Senator SMITH. When you put in quotation marks "forbidden list," what did you mean by that?

Mr. CARTER. I knew at that time that the war-weariness following the war, the difficulty of reorganizing China at that time after the devastation of the Japanese and so forth, that some agencies of the Nationalist Government were very sensitive to any criticism of the regime and that they might, that some bureaucrats might, put this on a forbidden list.

Senator SMITH. You regard this book as inimical to the Nationalist interests then?

Mr. CARTER. No, I though it could be very useful to the Nationalist Government, but I thought that some of the less intelligent bureaucrats in the Nationalist Government might think it was hostile.

Senator SMITH. Do you not think it was hostile to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. CARTER. On what point?

Senator SMITH. The book.

Mr. CARTER. I think I said I would comment after I had read the book. But I think it was critical of certain features in the Nationalist Government, features that our own Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, was aware of and constantly labored in private with Chiang Kai-shek to reform.

Senator SMITH. Do you not regard the book as being one that would add to the blame, so to speak, of the Nationalist cause and encourage the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not so regard it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not regard it as an open espousal of the Communist cause?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you reconcile the fact that Israel Epstein in your opinion was a special pleader for Communist China? It was your testimony that he was a special pleader for the Chinese.

Mr. CARTER. I felt that Leighton Stuart was a special pleader for the Chinese.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of your testimony when you discussed the idea of Israel Epstein being a special pleader, you felt he was a special pleader on the part of Communist China?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you reconcile this paragraph which Senator Smith has been just examining you on where you say that the book would probably be put on the forbidden list by China?

Mr. CARTER. Put on the forbidden list, as I said, by some bureaucrat.

Mr. MORRIS. By the Chinese Government? Obviously it is an official list you are talking about?

Mr. CARTER. The dichotomy in the various bureaus of the Chinese Government, or multichotomy, were such that, as in some other governments, one section of the government doesn't know what the other section's right hand and left hand is doing.

Senator WATKINS. Modeled after our own?

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't make that aspersion.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like an answer, Mr. Chairman, to my question whether this book was an open espousal of the Communist Chinese cause.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask a question. You at least thought, Mr. Carter, that this book was more favorable to the Communist element in China than it was to the then existing Nationalist Government?

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't affirm that without reading the book again.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you wanted to get it to Madame Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, and Sun Fo, members of the Cabinet.

Senator FERGUSON. But Madame Sun Yat-sen, you wanted to get it to her?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. She was more favorable to the Communist side at that time?

Mr. CARTER. She was very keen on the united front.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the united front meant to some of those people victory for the Communists, did it not?

Mr. CARTER. I suppose it did to the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now was she not favorable to the Communist side?

Mr. CARTER. She is apparently living now under Communist rule. I don't know whether she is having a good time or bad time.

Mr. MORRIS. She is an official of the Government, is she not?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Have you any doubt that she is sympathetic to the Communist Government?

Mr. CARTER. Pretty nearly everyone—the Chinese Communist Government, the Communist Government of China, contains hundreds, thousands of former Chiang Kai-shek officials.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not say that they are not Communists?

Mr. CARTER. They may or may not be.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the present Chinese Government in China proper is not a Communist Government?

Mr. CARTER. The leaders are Communists and are following definitely an out-and-out Communist line, but there are employed in high positions in that Communist Government a great many Chinese who were loyal supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and the National regime. Which category Madame Sun Yat-sen is in today I don't know. I have read a great many attacks saying that she has gone over hook, bait, and sinker to the Communist cause.

I have heard other statements that she is very critical of many of the features of the Communist regime and not having been on the spot I am not able to reach any balance.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not want to say then that this book was more favorable to the Communist side of the Government, of the people in China, that were represented?

Mr. CARTER. Not until I have read it.

Senator FERGUSON. But not withstanding this statement that you were fearful that it was going on the forbidden list and would be kept out?

Mr. CARTER. As I said, there were cliques, there are opposition groups, within the Kuomintang government, and as the Senator hinted, as there exists elsewhere.

Senator WATKINS. I was referring to the fact that you said one group would not know what the other group was doing. I thought that perhaps you meant they were following what our people were doing.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find Owen Lattimore more sympathetic to the Communist China side than to the Kuomintang side?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. But you thought he was a wise choice to review this kind of a book?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have Mr. Mandel read excerpts from this review by Owen Lattimore, which has been referred to in testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. This review is taken from the New York Times book review section, June 22, 1947, pages 5 and 29. I will read excerpts:

* * * From Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China to Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China the list of names is distinguished—and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company * * *.

* * * The writers either throw their weight into criticism of the Kuomintang, like Mr. White and Mr. Jacoby, or into outspoken support of the Chinese Communists, like Mr. Epstein * * *.

There is no question about Mr. Epstein's partisanship. He not only justifies Chinese Communist policy but he justifies it and Russian policy in relation to each other and in relation to American policy. * * * Mr. Epstein has presented enough facts for this reviewer, at least, to form an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Who wrote that?

Mr. MORRIS. Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that disappoint you when you said that you hoped other publications would make as wise a choice?

Mr. CARTER. This was written over 4 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall now that Lattimore said that about the book?

Mr. CARTER. I don't. I am very glad to see it and discover that Lattimore was writing frankly and honestly about the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Now your opinion of Lattimore, does that bring you to the conclusion that this book was more favorable to the Communists than to the non-Communists?

Mr. CARTER. It does; certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt about it?

Mr. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Your letter of June 12, 1947, is the one that had the paragraph that I directed your attention to just now. I notice this review was published in the New York Times June 22, 1947, 10 days after you wrote the letter?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Had you seen Lattimore's review that was going to be published at the time you wrote your letter of the 12th?

Mr. CARTER. No; I hadn't seen it. Well, I don't remember. I think it's unlikely, but I can't swear to it. Mr. Morris might bring up something.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, are you now going to change your testimony, namely, that you did not recognize that to be an open espousal of the Chinese Communist cause on further thought?

Mr. CARTER. I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that on piecemeal quotations I would like to read the book.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Are you going to change your mind?

Mr. MORRIS. I have two other reviews that I think are appropriate.

Senator FERGUSON. You agreed with this opinion of Lattimore? You usually agreed with Lattimore's opinion on China; did you not?

Mr. CARTER. Usually, not invariably.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you now in conflict with this opinion? Does this not refresh your memory?

Mr. CARTER. Well, it tells me what Lattimore's reaction to the book was.

Senator FERGUSON. You never got that reaction?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. I am not trying to stall.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not seem strange to you now, not having to use hindsight, that you would recommend a book to George Marshall, Senator Vandenberg, my distinguished colleague, and others mentioned in this article, that Owen Lattimore talked of in this language? Does that not now seem strange to you?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I have such high respect for the intellectual ability and integrity of all those men that I must have thought they would make up their own minds.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you want to get this side at least to them, the Communist side?

Mr. CARTER. I had no desire to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how do you reconcile that with Lattimore's judgment that you respect so much, on China if this was not a Communist propaganda book?

Mr. CARTER. Of course, I have to let you do the reconciling.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever know a Communist to do some writing that he did not infiltrate his writings with Communist propaganda? You have been a great reader and a student. Have you ever known a Communist to write and not infiltrate his writing with Communist propaganda?

Mr. CARTER. I have read translations of Soviet Russia, presumably Communist scientists on fish, on forests, on cattle breeding, where I could never discover a Communist line. That is my answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get a little closer. I will change my question a little. You did answer that, I think, by some avoidance when you got to fish and cattle. Let us go into the political field.

Have you ever known a Communist writer to not infiltrate his political writings with Communist propaganda?

Mr. CARTER. I think it's their usual pattern.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Not only usual.

Mr. CARTER. Invariably, you would say?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder——

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want that answer to stand about the fish now, or do you want to strike it out?

Mr. CARTER. No; I would leave it in. Put reindeer in also.

Senator FERGUSON. I still think the Commies have a line on the fish question.

Mr. CARTER. The Japanese think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read excerpts from two other reviews of the same book?

Mr. MANDEL. I read excerpts from a review by Frederick V. Field appearing in the New Masses for July 22, 1947, on pages 20 and 21. The New Masses is a Communist magazine.

> The main subject of the Unfinished Revolution in China is the history, first, of China's war of resistance against Japan, and second of the struggle of the Chinese people against the Kuomintang dictatorship and American imperialism. * * *

Then we find further down the following:

> * * * During the war against Japan it was in those parts of China where the people were moved to organize themselves by Communist leadership that resistance was successful and that Chinese history spurted forward. * * *

The next is a quotation from the Daily Worker of June 18, 1947, a review of the same book by Samuel Sillen.

> We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years, books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Gunther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's Unfinished Revolution in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you read either of those reviews, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't subscribe to either the New Masses or the Daily Worker. I see them occasionally on subway stands.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recognize now that the three reviews are very much similar, in fact, Sillen's analysis of the thing, talking about the distinguished company, almost coincides completely with Lattimore's?

Mr. CARTER. Well, not quite; Lattimore does not mention Smedley, Guenther Stein, or Harrison Forman.

Mr. MORRIS. He mentioned Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China, and Ted White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China, and says:

> Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company.

Mr. CARTER. Is that from the Daily Worker?

Mr. MORRIS. No; that is from the review by Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that distinguished company?

Mr. CARTER. Lattimore thought so. You will have to ask him.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, with respect to the thing by Field, published in the New Masses 10 days after your letter, had you seen Mr. Field's review at the time you wrote your letter?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator SMITH. Were not you and Mr. Field working very closely at that time, June 1947?

Mr. MORRIS. He was a member of your executive committee, was he not, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I have forgotten the exact date. Perhaps you could refresh my memory as to when he resigned from the board's executive committee. He had a long time previously resigned as a member of the staff, and when he resigned as a member of the staff my weekly or monthly or daily contact with him ceased. He was working on other things mostly.

Senator SMITH. Did you subscribe to what Field said in his review?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember seeing it until this morning. Which particular point?

Senator FERGUSON. About the American imperialism.

Senator SMITH (reading):

that their foreign oppressors are today primarily American imperialists——

Mr. CARTER. That was the usual Communist line all over the world, that the people of the United States of America were imperialists if we had taken over the job from the French, and so forth.

Senator SMITH. This was a review of that book?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Is this one of the reasons why you wanted this book to be distributed in China to slant the people further in favor of the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. What I was concerned about, Senator, was that the most intelligent people in this country could get an understanding of various points of view and stresses in China. I felt that unless the Kuomintang cleaned house economically, administratively, militarily, the Communists were bound to take over, and I hoped that public opinion in this country could be so informed that before it was too late Chiang Kai-shek and the better elements in the Nationalist Government could listen to our Ambassador Leighton Stuart, listen to others, clean house, and prevent the Communists from taking over China.

Senator SMITH. But your paragraph here was referring to getting the book circulated in China.

Mr. CARTER. Well, my focus first of all with the American edition was to get it circulated in the United States. A second suggestion was that there be a Chinese edition in the hope that it would reach as many Chinese as possible who were in a position to aid in the reform of the Kuomintang and shoring it up and making it so democratic, so efficient, that the Chinese Communists would have nothing to offer and that Chiang and the better element around him would remain in China. And we now know he is not in China but is in Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter, did you then think that the way to change the Chiang Kai-shek government was to espouse the cause of communism?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not that just what this book did? Is that not exactly what the book did?

Mr. CARTER. If that is your opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. I take these men who wrote about it. Is that not what they say it did?

Mr. CARTER. It certainly looks like it.

Senator FERGUSON. You read it before you recommended it?

Mr. CARTER. I read the book, I think, in manuscript or galley proof.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you now think that that was the way to change the Government of China, was to advocate the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not; I just said that I thought we were playing for time as a chance that Chiang, with American aid, could save the situation and stop the Communist avalanche.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you know of any other books of similar nature that you recommended to our Secretary of State and those that were in the Far Eastern Division or people in Congress that had something to say in relation to foreign policy that was similar to the Epstein book?

Mr. CARTER. It was our practice to send to appropriate officers of our Government copies of all our publications. Of course, they automatically went to the Library of Congress, they went to those few people in Congress who were members of IPR, the Far Eastern Division, the Secretary of State's Office, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. It was your purpose to influence public opinion in America in the Far East?

Mr. CARTER. It was our purpose to provide facts and diverse opinion so that the public could make up its own mind. Mr. Root, Mr. Hughes, many of our Secretaries of State have said that the Government has great difficulty in acting intelligently because of the lack of an informed public opinion. So far as the Pacific was concerned we conceived our role to get the facts, to provide a variety of opinions, analyses from all sorts of points of view so that the public, the Government, press, and business could make up its own mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You did hope, however, that it would follow the suggestions that you were making?

Mr. CARTER. The institute as such didn't make suggestions on policy at all.

Senator FERGUSON. You were hoping that this book, the Unfinished Revolution in China, would influence American public opinion?

Mr. CARTER. We thought it should be; I thought it should be considered.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "we" who do you mean, Mr. Carter? Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Larrimore was not on the staff of Pacific Affairs at that time. I meant my colleagues on the staff. I wish now to speak for myself. I hoped that this and other books would aid because I think you remember, Senator McCarran, always throughout our history we have concentrated on Europe. We teach French, Italian, German, and Spanish. It is only recently that we have taught Chinese and Japanese. We wanted the public to have ample data on the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. So for that reason you wanted a Communist doctrine spread in this country; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you mark this "private and confidential" when you wanted so many people to know about it?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I was writing to a publisher, Little, Brown & Co. in Boston using the names of eminent people whom I had not consulted. I had not consulted Senator Vandenberg or General Marshall. I simply said, "You may wish to get this book into the hands of these people."

Senator FERGUSON. Was the reason that you wanted this private and confidential that you were saying that this book would be forbidden in your opinion in Nationalist China?

Mr. CARTER. It could be.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be a reason for keeping this confidential?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, without laboring this point too long I would like three more paragraphs read into the record at this time. Would you read the first three paragraphs in the P. S.?

The CHAIRMAN. Of what?

Mr. MORRIS. From the letter of Mr. Carter to Miss Ford.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

P. S. 2.—Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who could get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, why were you so anxious that John Carter Vincent read the book?

Mr. CARTER. Wasn't he Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. As such did he have access to General Marshall?

Mr. CARTER. Well, through, I suppose, the Under Secretary of State. I never knew whether he went directly to General Marshall or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you say here—

If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Mr. CARTER. John Carter Vincent's official duty at the that time was to handle the China administration of the State Department, and he would probably be regarded in a formal organization of the Department by General Marshall as one of the far eastern experts.

The CHAIRMAN. And you thought that this book would be a good book for General Marshall to be guided by naturally?

Mr. CARTER. I thought it would be a good thing for him to read.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you mean when you said, Mr. Carter:

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically.

What did you mean by that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I thought John Carter Vincent was very open-minded, I still do, and I thought that there would be very little material that was in it new to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you say that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Because his whole machinery of the State Department, War, Navy, Treasury, Agriculture, the data, the intelligence, of that whole area came automatically to him and his colleagues.

Mr. MORRIS. Including Communist doctrine?

Mr. CARTER. Well, the State Department's job was to find out what was going on, whether the people who were operating were friends or foes. Their duty was to study Communist China. They sent people to study. Any government that is on its job has its intelligence officers going into what is called enemy territory and our Government apparently did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, did you ever consider John Carter Vincent to be a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these two documents received as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 116" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 116

JUNE 12, 1947.

Private and confidential.

Miss ANNE FORD,

Publicity Director, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.

DEAR MISS FORD: This is to acknowledge Epstein's The Unfinished Revolution in China, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have you thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would be all to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. Sometimes, for mercenary reasons, they make substantial cuts.

Would it be out of the question for you to consider at an early date printing a cheap paper cover edition for maximum circulation in India, the Philippines and China with the expectation that some orders would come in from Indochina, Siam, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies?

The book combines in one volume several books. It is a penetrating history of China during the war years. It is a sociological document of importance, and it is a military handbook that might have been of enormous value to the Maquis in France and even to the little handful of anti-Hitler Germans in Germany. It might become a military and political handbook for Viet-Nam and in other Asiastic areas if the imperialist powers try to reassert their pre-Pearl Harbor domination.

The book is not so much needed in the Communist areas in China as it is in the Kuomintang areas where its authoritative accounts would give new hope, as well as new methods, to the millions of Chinese who are dissatisfied with the right wing Kuomintang domination. You have only to read the newspapers to discover what a large potential market for Epstein's book there is amongst non-Communist professors and students in the Chinese universities. The history of the last few decades proves conclusively that the Chinese student

movements are far more influential in China than in many other countries in starting new and creative political and social movements.

More than at any other time in recent years, there is a large British public both in the United Kingdom, Canada, and also in Australia and New Zealand which would find the book illuminating, not only with reference to China, but in their thinking with reference to a great many movements in the continent of Europe and elsewhere.

I congratulate Little, Brown & Co.'s unerring wisdom in deciding, not only to publish this book, but in leaving no stone unturned in getting a very wide circulation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

P. S. 2.—Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who would get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Sun Yat-sen and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 117" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 117

REVIEWS OF THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION IN CHINA, BY ISRAEL EPSTEIN, BOSTON, MASS., LITTLE, BROWN & CO.

(By Owen Lattimore, New York Times, Book Review, June 22, 1947, pp. 5 and 29):

* * * From Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China to Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China the list of names is distinguished—and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company. * * *

* * * The writers either throw their weight into criticism of the Kuomintang, like Mr. White and Mr. Jacoby, or into outspoken support of the Chinese Communists, like Mr. Epstein * * *

There is no question about Mr. Epstein's partisanship. He not only justifies Chinese Communist policy but he justifies it and Russian policy in relation to each other and in relation to American policy. * * * Mr. Epstein has presented enough facts for this reviewer, at least, to form an opinion.

He convinces me that the trend of the civil war in China is not toward the triumph of an ideology or the winning of dictatorial power by individual generals or politicians. * * *

(By Frederick V. Field, New Masses, July 22, 1947, pp. 20–21):

* * * The people of China have arisen against both their native and foreign oppressors and because it happens that their foreign oppressors are today primarily American imperialists the story of this great historical event is especially pertinent to the political life of the American people.

There is no other book that so faithfully or expertly records this momentous turning point in history as Epstein's * * *

What distinguishes Epstein's work from the notable contributions of the others is, first, that his is more comprehensive both at the contemporary and historical levels, and second, the amazing wealth of detail which he has assembled. * * *

The main subject of The Unfinished Revolution In China is the history, first, of China's war of resistance against Japan, and second of the struggle of the Chinese people against the Kuomintang dictatorship and American imperialism. * * * He writes about the American missionary who sold out to the would-be emperor Yuan Shih-Kai and the reader recognizes the present Congressman who now parallels his infamous role.

* * * During the war against Japan it was in those parts of China where the people were moved to organize themselves by Communist leadership that resistance was successful and that Chinese history spurted forward. * * *

The Unfinished Revolution In China deserves to be widely read.

(By Samuel Sillen, Daily Worker, June 18, 1947, p. 11):

We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years—books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Gunther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's Unfinished Revolution In China.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, that that is all we want on this particular point at this time.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you call Mr. Canning?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Canning, will you come forward, please?

Will you raise your right hand? You do solemnly swear in the testimony that you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, it will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CANNING. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM MARTIN CANNING, CINCINNATI, OHIO

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, will you give your name and address to the stenographer, please?

Mr. CANNING. William Martin Canning, 789 North Crescent Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, will you tell us your most recent employment?

Mr. CANNING. I was until recently on the staff of Xavier University of Cincinnati.

Mr. MORRIS. You are a graduate of what college?

Mr. CANNING. College of the City of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a graduate degree?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, I have a master's degree from Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year did you obtain that, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Canning, did you ever join the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you join the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. In the early part of 1936 I joined the Communist Party unit at the City College.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you remain a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. A little over 2 years, until the latter part of 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, during that period were you ever in a position that you were able to discern people in the Communist movement and learn of their identity?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. I, of course, was active in the City College unit and as a student at Columbia I knew others there at Columbia who belonged to other units of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position in the Communist fraction there, Mr. Canning.

Mr. CANNING. At City College?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. CANNING. Well, I had various positions at one time or another. I assisted in the editing of a secret publication distributed among the staff, the City College Teacher-Worker. I was also literature director for another period.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder generally, Mr. Canning, could you give us an idea of how many members of the City College faculty were in the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. Somewhere between 40 and 50. I have forgotten that now.

Senator FERGUSON. Out of a total number of how many?

Mr. CANNING. The total staff?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. CANNING. The total staff consisted perhaps of 300, at least 300.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, you also had occasion to know who some of the people on the Columbia faculty were who were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. Not so much on the faculty, but I did know graduate students who were members of the Columbia unit.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the schools have separate cells?

Mr. CANNING. That is right; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of calling Mr. Canning here today is to ask him to identify some of these people that he encountered in City College and at Columbia whose affairs have come into the Institute of Pacific relations, and we are going to discuss that.

First, of all, Mr. Canning, did you know a man named Lawrence Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about him?

Mr. CANNING. I knew Lawrence Rosinger while he was a student at City College and subsequently when he continued on at Columbia in graduate work. I knew Lawrence Rosinger to be a member of the Columbia University unit of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any doubt in your mind whatever that Mr. Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet him?

Mr. CANNING. Quite frequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate it as much as possible?

Mr. CANNING. I would meet him at Columbia several times a week during 1936 and 1937, in that period.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce into the record at this time evidence of Rosinger's activities within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. I would just like to ask a question. Did you discuss communism with Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. I did; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you feel certain that he was a member of the Columbia unit?

Mr. CANNING. There is no doubt in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt?

Mr. CANNING. No.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. These excerpts have been taken from the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations and from books written by Mr. Rosinger and I read some of these excerpts.

Author of China's Wartime Politics, 1937—44, Princeton University Press in cooperation with the International Secretariat of the IPR, published in 1944.

On the jacket of Mr. Rosinger's book entitled "State of Asia," and this book is issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1951, I quote:

Lawrence K. Rosinger has covered far-eastern events as a member of the research staffs of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. His books include China's Wartime Politics, 1937–44—

and so forth.

He is listed as a member of a meeting staff and round table recorder in a volume entitled "Problems of the Pacific, 1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Seventh Conference, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18, December 2, 1939," page 275.

He is listed as a conference member of other conferences in 1939 and in 1949. The one held in New Delhi, India, was in 1949.

Then his writings in the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations, including the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, are here listed.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would like to have that received as the next consecutive exhibit.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 118" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 118

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

Author of China's Wartime Politics, 1937–44 Princeton University Press in cooperation with the International Secretariat, IPR, 1944.

"Lawrence K. Rosinger has covered far eastern events as a member of the research staffs of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. His books include China's Wartime Politics, 1937–44; China Crisis; Restless India, and India and the United States." (Jacket of State of Asia. By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates. Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951).

Listed as a meeting staff and round table recorder (Problems of the Pacific—1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Seventh Conference, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18, December 2, 1939, p. 275).

Listed as a conference member:

"Lawrence K. Rosinger (1939). Far Eastern Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association." (Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the

Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., January 6–17, 1945, p. 160).

"L. K. Rosinger, associate member, American Delegation India-American Conference, New Delhi, December 1949, listed as research associate, American Institute of Pacific Relations." (Source: Indian-American Relations, Proceedings of the India-America Conference held in New Delhi in December 1949 issued under the joint auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the American Institute of Pacific Relations. P. 72.)

"Mr. Rosinger is a member of the staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relation; and of the editorial board of its magazine, the Far Eastern Survey." (Jacket of India and the United States by Lawrence K. Rosinger, An Institute of Pacific Relation Book, 1950).

Writer of the following articles for the Far Eastern Survey:
Book Reviews, 1944, pages 73 and 133.
India in World Politics, 1949, pages 229–33.
The White Paper In Brief, 1949, pages 205–208.
Book Review, 1949, page 95.

Writer of the following articles for Pacific Affairs:
Book Review, 1936, pages 610–611.
Book Review, 1937, pages 102–103.
Book Review, 1938, pages 421–432.
Book Review, 1939, pages 186–188.
The Far East and the New Order In Europe, 1939, pages 357–369.
Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile War, 1939, pages 263–277.
Book Review, 1940, pages 366–367.
Book Review, 1940, pages 111–113.
Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1940, pages 263–278.
Book Review, 1941, pages 480–482.
Book Review, 1942, pages 117–118.
Book Review, 1944, page 347.
China's Wartime Politics, 1937–44, book reviewed, 1945, pages 287–288.
Book review, 1946, page 97.

Senator FERGUSON. What year were you discussing these matters with Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. As I recall, throughout this period of my own membership he was also a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. The years again?

Mr. CANNING. From the early part of 1936 to the latter part of 1938.

Senator FERGUSON. So it is just before these writings?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Some of them even while you were doing the discussing?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, did you make available to the proper authorities your knowledge that Rosinger was a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will extend that just a little bit. Tell us to what extent you made that known to the authorities.

Mr. CANNING. Well, my first testimony on these matters of the City College Communist unit and Columbia University activities was in 1940 during the hearings of the New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools, Coudert committee.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you testified publicly that Lawrence Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. As I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. That fact was probably reported in all the press at the time?

Mr. CANNING. As to the publicity, I did testify on all of these matters both in private testimony and in public but, Mr. Morris, I don't recall whether or not the public testimony carried this information.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you leave the party, if you did leave it?

Mr. CANNING. In the latter part of 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have any other letters showing Mr. Rosinger's activities with the Institute of Pacific Relations? I would like to have you read them if you have.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here dated August 9, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. Edward Carter and signed by Lawrence K. Rosinger. I read the first paragraph as follows:

> On returning from my vacation, I found that a letter had arrived from the New York City Board of Education, appointing me to a high-school teaching position, beginning with this fall. I wish that I were not confronted with a choice between this and devoting all my time to the Far East, but I have decided to accept. Refusal now would simply make it necessary to accept 6 months hence or to be removed from the list and might involve going to a far less satisfactory school than the one I have been assigned to.

Another letter, dated August 19, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "E. C. C.," presumably E. C. Carter, from "W. L. H.," presumably William L. Holland. I read from the paragraph referring to Rosinger as follows:

> Speaking of Rosinger, I am of course delighted to hear that he has landed a job and I think that he is wise in taking it. I should like your advice on his request that we extend the research grant of $500 to apply for a longer period. Since the grant has already been authorized and is to be turned over to the custody of the American Council, I suppose there is no real objection to this procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that writing, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. That is E. C. C., presumably E. C. Carter, to E. C. Carter from W. L. H., presumably W. L. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the chairman to take cognizance of the fact that this was dated 1940. I would like to have this entered into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit together with this previous one.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 119 and 120" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 119

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
New York City, August 9, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Lee, Mass.

DEAR MR. CARTER: On returning from my vacation, I found that a letter had arrived from the New York City Board of Education, appointing me to a high-school teaching position, beginning with this fall. I wish that I were not confronted with a choice between this and devoting all my time to the Far East, but I have decided to accept. Refusal now would simply make it necessary to accept 6 months hence or be removed from the list and might involve going to a far less satisfactory school than the one I have been assigned to. Besides, as you know, I expect to be married in the near future, and it may be well to secure a steady position as soon as possible.

This will not interfere with my IPR work, except that it will slow down the pace. I have practically finished the research for my inquiry report on China's recent political development and will begin writing next week. By the beginning of the school term (September 9), I should have about 50 printed pages done (i. e., approximately one-third of the book). Teaching will not prevent my going forward with the rest in the evenings and over weekends, and the entire

report should be finished some time in the fall (let us say, by the end of November).

As you know, Bill Holland assigned me $500 for 5 months' research (September 1940–January 1941) on another book, which is to be my doctoral dissertation as well as an IPR publication: Nationalism and National Unity in China, 1924–35. The fact that the inquiry report will extend into the fall means that I shall not be able to start on this second project until a few months after the expected date. Besides, teaching will make it necessary to devote part time rather than full time to the new research. I would therefore like to suggest that the $500 grant apply to a period of 12, instead of 5 months, i.e., cover the entire year, September 1940–August 1941. I feel that this is a logical arrangement that will be fair to the IPR as well as satisfactory to myself. I have not yet written to Bill Holland about this, since I am awaiting your approval. If you find it satisfactory, I will write to Bill, and perhaps you will want to do the same.

I have received the pamphlet, Total Defense, and will send you my comments in a few days.

I was very sorry to learn of your sister's death and wish to extend my condolences.

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER.

EXHIBIT No. 120

BERKELEY, CALIF., *August 19, 1940.*

E. C. C. from W. L. H.

Many thanks for your letter of August 14, about the Fahs manuscript. I think you have reached a most statesmanlike compromise and I am very pleased that Fahs has agreed to accept so many of the changes. I know that Fahs regretted that we did not put the long marks over the vowels of Japanese words. I recognize that there is a good deal to be said for including them, but our decision was based simply on the fact that Hilda and I had gone into the question when Norman's book was being printed and had come to the conclusion that the extra expense was not warranted, since there were really no instances where the omission of the marks would have resulted in error or ambiguity. Having once established that rule we felt that we should follow it in the case of Fah's manuscript, where the number of Japanese words was even smaller. I would be perfectly happy to be overruled in this matter, particularly if the printer can insert the marks without having to do substantial resetting. I personally feel that inserting them would be both unnecessary and pedantic. In fact in many of Fah's references I felt that he was being unnecessarily learned by quoting the full Japanese titles of laws, which for the purposes of the inquiry might better have been given in the English translation, as in Allen's book, since there was nothing peculiarly Japanese about the language. If Fah's had had occasion to quote rather long passages of Japanese or to discuss the meaning of certain Japanese terms, then I shold have had no hesitation in making full use of the long remarks.

I am interested in his report of the opinions expressed by Borton and Norman. Phil and I were both surprised to hear that Norman had raised any question since he and Phil and I had extensive correspondence over the bibliography and Norman usually had no hesitation in expressing his desires. Neither Phil nor I recollect that he raised any objections to the manner of quoting French titles.

I am sending a further personal note to Fahs to thank him for having come so far in meeting our wishes. I shall be interested to hear his reaction to the letter from Ushiba.

I have read Angus' memorandum on Peffer's report with great interest. While I do not often agree with Angus' interpretations, I have great respect for his clarity and powers of criticism. It seems to me that his comments are important, and that it would be a good idea for you to make a rather strong personal plea with Peffer to attempt some means by which those comments and also those made by Dennery Condliffe and myself could be at least mentioned in the report. As you know, Toynbee takes account of criticisms in footnotes, but if necessary they could be lumped together in an appendix, together with any specific replies or general remarks that Peffer cared to make. In addition to this, I think it would be desirable for Peffer or you to explain in the preface to the book that it is necessarily different in character from other reports in

the inquiry series because it must be frankly a personal view and somewhat speculative in character.

I am a little perturbed to know that Angus is still not in favor of publishing his own memorandum nor of enlarging and revising it as we had hoped. I don't know what we can do about this, but it seems to me that we had reason to expect a good deal more from Angus for the money that was paid to him in one way or another. Perhaps there is some totally new subject that he would prefer to write on, not strictly in the legal field. At any rate, I hope you will let him know that we feel the inquiry will not be complete unless it has a substantial report from him on this or some other topic.

I shall send you my comments on Roth in a day or two. In the meantime I have been wondering what the situation is on the manuscripts by Harriet Moore and Keenleyside. There is also the same question of Borton's report. At one time I thought Leaning had screwed himself up to the point where he thought he could attempt a rewrite job. However, the political situation in Japan has been changing so fast that I now think it might be a better idea for you to discuss the whole question afresh with Borton, and ask whether he would not rather let you attempt a fairly substantial revision in which he could omit the greater part of the economic sections, including the materials on agriculture and population which are now being covered more fully by Miriam Farley. I would also suggest a working arrangement by which either Shepherd or Leaning could go over Borton's revisions from week to week, so that we should not have a substantial rewrite job at the end. It might even be desirable to offer Borton a further $40 or $50.

If this plan could be followed, I believe that we might salvage something pretty useful from the study. Something should be done because there will be a serious gap in the inquiry documentation if we omit a study on Japanese political developments. It will parallel the corresponding Chinese study by Rosinger. Speaking of Rosinger, I am of course delighted to hear that he has landed a job, and I think that he is wise in taking it. I should like your advice on his request that we extend the research grant of $500 to apply for a longer period. Since the grant has already been authorized and is to be turned over to the custody of the American Council, I suppose there is no real objection to this procedure. The only slight reservation I have is that we stretched a point or two in making this grant to Rosinger, largely on the ground that it would enable him to devote 4 or 5 months full time in the American Council to completing a study on which he has already done considerable research. However, I know that high-school salaries are pathetically low, especially for anybody contemplating marriage, and I also have high regard for Rosinger's scholarship. So, if you are prepared to back me up, I shall be willing to accede to Rosinger's proposal.

I enclose a letter from Miss Cleeve, which you may want to read and return to me. The last paragraph refers to a suggestion I made some months ago, urging that something pretty decisive should be done about leasing or ceding some of the British West Indian possessions to the United States as a means of getting American good will and increasing material support, and also taking the wind out of the sails of the extreme isolationists in this country. Miss Cleeve is lukewarm, as I suspected she would be. It was ironical, however, that her letter arrived on the very day that the papers announced that actual negotiations were in progress about this scheme.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated June 6, 1940, to Mr. Carter from Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you read that, I would like to inquire. Mr. Canning, did you ever know whether or not Rosinger either publicly or privately withdrew from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. During the period that I was in the Communist movement he did not withdraw.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that he had after that?

Mr. CANNING. No; I never did.

Senator FERGUSON. Either in a public manner or private manner?

Mr. CANNING. No: I had no knowledge of his having left.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read anything by Mr. Rosinger in the last few years, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. I have read several articles of his; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they impress you as the writings of a man still in the Communist movement?

Mr. CANNING. It would be hard to say. There is no open sign that what he is writing is Communist propaganda, but the tendency is toward support of the Red Chinese group.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, they are not the writings of a man who has broken with the Communist Party, in your opinion?

Mr. CANNING. I think the writings would give no evidence of his either being in or out of the party; that is, the few that I have read.

The CHAIRMAN. What is next?

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter, dated June 6, 1940, to Mr. E. C. Carter from Owen Lattimore, refers to "Rosinger's promised article on Soviet policy ought to interest him; and so should Brandt's article on the Far East and the World Market." I cite also the testimony of Mr. William L. Holland in company with Edward C. Carter in executive session on June 21, 1951. Mr. Morris asked:

> How about the grant to Rosinger?
>
> Mr. HOLLAND. I think, either late in 1949 or early 1950, I requested from the offices of the Rockefeller Foundation a special grant to be made to the American IPR to enable Mr. Rosinger to undertake a comprehensive survey of the post-war Far East. This book, entitled "The State of Asia," edited by Rosinger, with contributions by some 13 other Far East experts, had just been published by Alfred Knopf.

It continues the quotation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is a reading of testimony that already has been presented to the committee. The point of that is to show that it would indicate from that testimony that Mr. Carter had obtained two grants from the Rockefeller Foundation for Mr. Rosinger to continue his work.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations a typed list of some experts on China, Netherlands Indies, and Manchuria, and among those listed is the name of Lawrence Rosinger, Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades, 220 East Sixty-third Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the last two letters read by Mr. Mandel introduced in evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 121, 122, and 122–a" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 121

BALTIMORE, MD., *June 6, 1940.*

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for sending me Corbett's comments. I am glad to see that plans for the next issue of Pacific Affairs fit in with his suggestions. Rosinger's promised article on Soviet policy ought to interest him; and so should Brandt's article on the Far East and the World Market.

I might also be able to make an article on What Japan Knows About Outer Mongolia, from the translation of a Japanese book which Grajdanzev is to send me.

With regard to Corbett's idea for a "substantial review article combining Buell and Bingham * * * working out in practice their plan of Pacific

association," wouldn't you consult with Corbett to see whether he himself would undertake such an assignment? His qualifications and his outlook indicate that he is the man to give such an article depth as well as breadth.

If he should want to do it for the September issue, the copy would have to be in my hands at the end of this month.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 122

[Executive session, vol. 53, June 21, 1951]

EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER AND WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, (P. 260)

Mr. MORRIS. How about the grant to Rosinger?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think, either late 1949 or early 1950, I requested from the offices of the Rockefeller Foundation a special grant to be made to the American IPR to enable Mr. Rosinger to undertake a comprehensive survey of the post-war Far East. This book, entitled "The State of Asia," edited by Rosinger, with contributions by some 13 other leading Far East experts, has just been published by Alfred Knopf.

Now you may also be referring to the fact that in late 1949 the Rockefeller Foundation—I think on the request of my predecessor, Mr. Clayton Lane—made a travel grant of, I should imagine, something like $2,000 to Mr. Rosinger to enable him to go to India to attend the India-American Conference which was held jointly by the American IPR and the Indian Council of IPR in Delhi, in the summer of 1949.

EXHIBIT No. 122–A

SOME EXPERTS ON CHINA, NETHERLANDS INDIES, AND MANCHURIA

(This list is by no means comprehensive. In certain categories it could be added to extensively)

China:

Economic:

William W. Lockwood, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.
W. L. Holland, Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley
C. F. Remer, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
John E. Orchard, Columbia University, New York
Ch'ao-ting Chi, Universal Trading Corp., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York
Kurt Bloch, Fortune Round Table and Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Economic and political:

William W. Lockwood. (See above.)
W. L. Holland. (See above.)
Robert W. Barnett, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York
Lawrence K. Rosinger, Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades, 220 East Sixty-third Street, New York
Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
T. A. Bisson, Foreign Policy Association, 22 East Thirty-eighth Street, New York
Cyrus H. Peake, Columbia University, New York
Kate L. Mitchell, Amerasia, 125 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Political:

Nathaniel Peffer, Columbia University, New York
John K. Fairbank, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
G. Nye Steiger, Simmons College, Boston, Mass.
Harley F. MacNair, University of Chicago
Harold M. Vinacke, University of Cincinnati, Ohio
Miriam S. Farley, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York
Dorothy Borg, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Relation of ancient China to China today:
Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University, New York
Owen Lattimore. (See above.)
L. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University, New York
Herrlee G. Creel, University of Chicago
Problems of Chinese language:
George Kennedy, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Owen Lattimore. (See above.)
L. Carrington Goodrich. (See above.)
Manchuria:
W. L. Holland. (See above.)
Kurt Bloch. (See above.)
Miriam S. Farley. (See above.)
John R. Stewart, National Credit Office, 2 Park Avenue, New York
Russell G. Shiman, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York
Owen Lattimore. (See above.)
Andrew Grajdanzev, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York
Netherlands Indies:
W. L. Holland. (See above.)
Ellen van Zyll de Jong, international secretariat, IPR, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York
Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky, Lexington
Rupert Emerson, formerly of Harvard, now in the Territories Section, Department of Interior, Washington, D. C.

All of the foregoing are American citizens except the following:

Mr. Holland is a New Zealander who has resided in the United States for several years.

Dr. Chi is Chinese, but is employed by the Sino-American Corp., set up jointly at the instance of the Chinese and American Governments.

Dr. Bloch and Dr. Wittfogel have probably taken out their first citizenship papers.

Mr. Grajdanzev is a Siberian who reads Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. He has taken out his first citizenship papers.

Mr. MANDEL. Another item from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is dated February 5, 1950, "FVF from LKR," presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field, from Lawrence K. Rosinger. I read the first sentence:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent, clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further * * *.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the letter introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 123" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 123

FEBRUARY 5, 1940.

F. V. F. from L. K. R.:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent; clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further:

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 3: Shouldn't "therefore" be "however", since the implication of the two previous sentences is that we are taking a strong position toward Japan?

Page 3, line 10: Since the implication here is that we should develop a correct policy before the events, instead of sadly understanding events after they have occcurred, how about saying "the problem today is one of correctly understanding and shaping history in the making"?

Page 4, line 11: Wouldn't it be better to say: "It will be partly because of American stupidity"? After all, if it is foolish to say that Russian influence by itself can bring Bolshevism to China, then it is at least equally false to attribute that power to the United States.

Pages 4–5: The argument here is that social explosions result when internal forces meet outside pressures. I don't know what can be done about it, but this argument—despite a certain cogency—struck me as a little bit foolish, since it is almost equivalent to saying that (e. g.) if Tsarism had been Tsarism, then there would never have been a Bolshevik revolution. And yet the point has its validity. Perhaps it would be helpful to indicate here (as well as later) that the pressures upon China do not now constitute a fixed mathematical quantity, but that their weight can be changed radically by the counterpressure of the United States.

Page 5, last line: Considering the highly dubious origin of the New Life movement (i. e. it was essentially a political move in the civil-war period), I wonder whether it should be cited as an example of the drive toward "modern," "efficient" political ideas. I don't know much about what has happened to the movement since the outbreak of the far-eastern war, but my feeling is that New Life is pretty much in the background—perhaps almost the discard.

Page 6, line 10: Perhaps it would be desirable to qualify "every" by "almost," since I suppose that there are certain elements, particularly compradore elements in the captured cities, that—whatever their abstract desires—would be willing to deal with the Japanese—permanently. Or is Lattimore's statement "wants to grow stronger" sufficient to make "almost" unnecessary?

Page 12, paragraph 3, line 5: "led by the Communists." Since Lattimore has not stated precisely what the nature of the split in the united front might be, one would be entitled to assume that important Kuomintang elements might go along with the Communists. In this case, one could only say that the Communists would have more weight than they do now, but whether they would actually be the leaders is at least open to discussion. (This, I think, is particularly valid, since Lattimore has already said that "most" of the Chinese, in the circumstances mentioned, would go along with Russia and that only "some" of them would be of the Wang Ching-wei type.)

At this point perhaps it would buttress the argument to mention the well-known fact that Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia back in 1923-24 only after he was convinced that he could expect nothing—except possibly opposition—from other powers.

I think it might be wise in the paragraph next to the last line in the article to indicate that there might be ways, other than the embargo, of helping China—just so that the suggestions made will have as catholic a character as possible.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated October 9, 1940, "E. C. C. from W. L. H.," presumably E. C. Carter from William L. Holland, and Mr. Holland writes regarding a trip that he is proposing to make: "The principal people I want to see," and he lists among others Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 124" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 124

GIANNINI FOUNDATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., October 9, 1940.

E. C. C. from W. L. H.

Thank you for your letters of October 7 about the meeting on the 16th and 17th. I shall be awaiting your word about whether Tarr can come. I can easily arrange to meet you in Chicago on the morning of the 15th, and would like to leave by an afternoon train that would enable me to spend an hour or so that evening in Ann Arbor with Remer and Hayden. I could then go into Detroit and get an overnight train to New York from there. I should like to have 1 day in Washington and this might be either on the 18th or the 21st or 22d, thus leaving the week end free for a possible meeting at Lee.

I should be glad if you would make some appointments for me in the New York office. The principal people I want to see are Shepherd, Yasuo, Grajdanzev, Ellen van Zyll de Jong, Rosinger, Porter, Farley, Austern, and Downing. In addition I should like to see Leaning, Greenberg, and Virginia Thompson, if she is well enough. At Columbia I should like 15 minutes each with Wittfogel,

Peffer, Leonard, and Roth. Perhaps some of these can be arranged at the IPR office. Leonard can be reached through Jessup's office or through Catherine Porter. I'd also like to see Harry Price and, of course, Fred Field either in New York or Washington. I shall count on seeing Lockwood either in New York or at Lee. In Washington the principal people I want to see are Rupert Emerson in the Interior Department, Henry Deimel and Sydney Smith in the State Department, Ladejinsky and Rossiter in the Department of Agriculture and Johnstone, Tasca, and Merrill. I can arrange these appointments myself after I know the rest of my time table.

I'd also like to have an evening or an hour or two with Lattimore in Baltimore.

If time permits, I'd also like to have a word with Bisson, Yarnell, Jaffe, and Mitchell, but I expect these can be fitted in easily, perhaps at lunch. I'd also like a word with Shiman and Kay Greene.

Probably Matsuo had better come straight on to New York at fast as possible so that I could see him about the 23d. If possible I'd like to leave that night, but this can be kept flexible.

I take it from your letter that you have no particlar business that you want me to see Wilbur or Sproul or Mrs. McLaughlin about before I leave.

W. L. H.

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter referring to France is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated August 14, 1940, E. C. C. from K. M., presumably E. C. Carter from Kate Mitchell. I read the first sentence:

With regard to Rosinger's letter of August 9 it is of course up to Bill Holland to decide whether the research fund is willing to extend the time of the grant to August 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that to be introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 125" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 125

AUGUST 14, 1940.

E. C. C. from K. M.

With regard to Rosinger's letter of August 9, it is, of course, up to Bill Holland to decide whether the Research Fund is willing to extend the time of the grant to August 1941. I should say that there was no objection inasmuch as Larry doesn't ask for any more money, and considering the fact that most of our research reports are received at least 10 months later than the specified date! Why don't you tell Larry that you approve in general, but that he should take the matter up with the Research Committee. As far as his inquiry project is concerned, I suppose we will have to be satisfied with a completed manuscript in November. Are we allowed to keep our unexpended printing fund balance for use after the first of the year?

With reference to the letter from Peffer of August 6, I haven't any special comments to offer as I have not seen a copy of the manuscript, therefore cannot pass judgment either on Holland's criticisms or Peffer's refusal to accept many of them. If there is a spare copy of the manuscript floating around anywhere, might I have a look at it over this week end?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I also would like Mr. Mandel to introduce into the record or to reintroduce if it is necessary, the fact that in 1949 Lawrence Rosinger was called down to Washington by the Secretary of State to be a consultant on foreign policy to submit a memo far-eastern policy and to attend a 3-day conference in the capacity of a consultant.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have an exhibit setting that up or are you referring to testimony already taken?

Mr. MORRIS. I think Mr. Mandel has an official announcement of that fact from the State Department that he will make reference to.

Mr. MANDEL. I quote from a release dated May 20, 1950, No. 289, Department of State. It says:

The 31 who submitted memoranda were—

and included in that list are Lawrence Rosinger, New York, N. Y. Then describing further the memo says:

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the round table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 (1949), to discuss Far East policy.

On that list we find Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 126" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 126

[For the press, Department of State, May 20, 1950. No. 259—For release at 7 p. m. e. d. t., Saturday, May 20, 1950]

EXCERPT

The 31 who submitted memoranda were: Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, N. Y. * * *

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the round table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 (1949), to discuss Far East policy: Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you also introduced into the record the fact that the last publication that was supported by a grant of the Institute of Pacific Relations was edited by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Mr. MANDEL. That is already in the record.

I have a letter here dated November 12, 1943, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent, UNRRA Conference, Hotel Claridge, Atlantic City, N. J., from T. A. Bisson.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this time, I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the original copy of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was sent to you for criticism. With your new FEA responsibilities, there is no reason to burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we are anxious to have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer, if it is conveniently possible to have it sent back.

Hoping to see you in New York soon,

Sincerely yours,

T. A. BISSON.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 127" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 127

NOVEMBER 12, 1943.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
UNRRA Conference, Hotel Claridge,
Atlantic City, N. J.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this time, I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the original copy of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was

sent to you for criticism. With your new FEA responsibilities, there is no reason to burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we are anxious to have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer, if it is conveniently posible to have it sent back.

Hoping to see you in New York soon,

Sincerely yours,

T. A. BISSON.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of this long introduction of documents into the record is to show extensive activity on the part of Louis Rosinger, who has been identified here as a Communist in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter dated February 21, 1944, is addressed to Dr. John Fairbank, care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Division of Cultural Relations, State Department, from W. L. Holland:

I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's Wartime Politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticism. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comment from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part from page 47 onward—

and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. There are only a few more, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 128." and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 128

FEBRUARY 21, 1944.

Dr. JOHN FAIRBANK,
Care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank,
Division of Cultural Relations, State Department,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN: I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part, from page 47 onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice as much but had to change his plans because of his illness and lack of time.

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then for a few minutes.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—I have sent the books from Lowdermilk to Wilma.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter which comes in "care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, the White House, February 28, 1944," signed "John" and typed initials, J. K. Fairbank.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You said signed "care of Lauchlin Currie." Just give us that again to clarify the record.

Mr. MANDEL. The return address is "care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, The White House, Washington, D. C."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this is John K. Fairbank, and he uses as his return address, "care of Lauchlin Currie, The White House, Washington, D. C."

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from the files of the Institute:

"Dear Mr. HOLLAND: I have referred to the latter part,"

and then in pencil "of Rosinger's ms on China."

"and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China sometime? The Government will not be happy about this, but it is so well done that they can hardly call it propaganda. How can we expedite bringing our friend to California?

Sincerely,

J. K. FAIRBANK.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. So marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 129" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 129

c/o MR. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
February 28, 1944.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I have read over the latter part and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China sometime? The Government will not be happy about this but it is so well done that they can hardly call it propaganda.

How can we expedite bringing our friend to California?

Sincerely,

J. K. FAIRBANK.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, you noted that this was care of Lauchlin Currie. I am hoping that the committee can subpena Lauchlin Currie here to make an explanation of many of these matters that were going through his hands and his connection with the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to call your attention to the fact, Mr. Chairman, that Fairbank says, "It is done so well that they can hardly call it propaganda."

Senator FERGUSON. This letter indicates that he ought to be called to make an explanation of these things.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Senator, at the proper time in the hearings that will be accomplished.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter dated January 5, 1942, from the files of the institute, addressed to G. E. Hubbard, Esq., Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, London, England. I read part of a paragraph:

In spite of the war or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs, but have managed to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the Pacific Council staffs are stronger than ever—

and further down—

Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner here in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. So marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 130" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 130

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, January 5, 1942.

G. E. HUBBARD, ESQ.,
Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office,
London, England.

DEAR HUBBARD: It was delightful to get your letter. I am enclosing copies of two of the broadcasts in the series. Unfortunately no copies are available of the initial broadcast which Yarnell and I led off. This series has been an attempt by the American Council of the IPR to make more widely available the material which it is so carefully and laboriously assembling. I understand that the first eight broadcasts are appearing in pamphlet form in a week or two. I will see that a copy goes to you. I assume that you still see the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs.

In spite of the war, or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs but have managed to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the Pacific Council staffs are stronger than ever. Lattimore is of course an asset in Chungking, though he is not technically on the IPR staff. Michael Greenberg and Mrs. Dobbs are carrying on Pacific Affairs well within the Lattimore tradition. Ch'ao-ting Chi is secretary general of the ABC stabilizaton fund in China and is gaining experience that will ultimately be of the greatest value if and when he is able to return to the secretariat. Friedman, who did that very able book on British relations with China, is now in the Treasury in Washington. Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner here in New York. Shiman has gone to the Tariff Commission, and Miss Ellen van Zyll de Jong, to Military Intelligence.

W. W. Lockwood has come back from Princeton and taken over the secretaryship of the American Council. For a time he had to work in Washington in the Office of Export Control, but he has managed to disentangle himself from Government service.

Lilienthal got out of Shanghai in time and is back on the American Council staff.

The Government has been after Barnett and me, but both of us have been able to persuade the United States authorities that we can render a bigger service to every department of the Government by continuing the staffs of the American and Pacific Councils intact rather than by scattering our energies through a dozen Government departments.

I wish you could write us more fully about your own work and views now that we are comrades in arms.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The final exhibit taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 30, 1943, on the stationery of the Foreign Policy Association, addressed to William L. Holland and signed "Larry Rosinger." I read the first paragraph:

DEAR BILL: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 131" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 131

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION,
New York, December 30, 1943.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, New York

DEAR BILL: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss.

I have taken care of your order for the two foreign policy reports, which I understand will be sent to you at a 20 percent discount. I think you will be interested to know that we will publish on February 1st another report of mine, tentatively titled "The Western Stake in Colonial Asia". I doubt that this will be available in print much before publication date, but if your conference is taking place before the end of the month, it may be possible to secure some copies. In any event, if you want me to, I will send you the proofs in about 2 weeks.

Yours,

LARRY ROSINGER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do any of the Senators have any questions on Mr. Rosinger?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't on Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, we had testimony recently that a man named Moses Finkelstein ran a Communist study group. Professor Wittfogel has testified that this Communist study group met in New York City. At least his contentions were that it met in New York City when he so testified. Did you know that Moses Finkelstein ran a study group in New York City?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. I knew Moses Finkelstein as both a teacher at City College in the evening session and as a graduate student at Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. He was a member of the Communist unit at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that of your own knowledge?

Mr. CANNING. I did, and I did attend for some time a group that did meet at Moses Finkelstein's house, a Communist study group which met there about once a week for a period of several months.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't know all members of the group, did you, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. There weren't very many in that group at the time, and I believe I knew all of them.

Senator FERGUSON. They met as Communists?

Mr. CANNING. That is right. One or two who were not members of the party would meet as well.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the purpose of having some come in like that?

Mr. CANNING. To interest them in communism.

Senator FERGUSON. To convert them to the idea?

Mr. CANNING. To Communist ideas.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he run any other study groups there that you know of?

Mr. CANNING. Not that I know of. That is the only one that I attended.

Senator FERGUSON. The only one that you attended.
Mr. CANNING. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that he ran any others?
Mr. CANNING. No, I don't of my own knowledge.
Senator FERGUSON. Have you heard that he ran others?
Mr. CANNING. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that a man named Daniel Thorner was a member of a study group there?
Mr. CANNING. Yes, he was one of the people who met in the study group that I referred to.
Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist?
Mr. CANNING. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that Daniel Thorner was a Communist?
Mr. CANNING. From his own statements to me that he belonged to the Columbia University unit.
Mr. MORRIS. Do we have anything indicating that Daniel Thorner was active in IPR affairs, Mr. Mandel?
Mr. MANDEL. Yes. I read from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated June 2, 1942, a memo to ECC, presumably E. C. Carter, from CP presumably Catherine Porter, and I read a paragraph in which Daniel Thorner, who is in the COI, working under Brown's direction, is referred to:

> Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know Thorner's background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in India than any other person in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. I think that already has been introduced and is exhibit No. 77, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MANDEL. I have here also as an exhibit previously introduced a list of research fellows and students of the Walter Hines Page School, 1940 to 1951, which is headed by Owen Lattimore, and among these students, research fellows, and so forth, is the name of Mr. Daniel Thorner.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that already has been introduced into the record.
Mr. Canning, do you remember when Prof. Karl August Wittfogel was invited to address a study group at the home of Mr. Finkelstein?
Mr. CANNING. No; I don't know about that.
Mr. MORRIS. You don't know that particular session?
Mr. CANNING. Not during the time that I attended the study group, I don't recall any invitation to Mr. Wittfogel.
Mr. MORRIS. But you did know that at least one study group did meet at the home of Moses Finkelstein?
Mr. CANNING. That is right.
Mr. MORRIS. Where was that?
Mr. CANNING. In the neighborhood of Columbia.
Mr. MORRIS. In New York City?
Mr. CANNING. I think about One Hundred Fourteenth Street, in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what Mr. Finkelstein is doing today?

Mr. CANNING. I understand from the newspapers that he is teaching at Rutgers University, but under a different name. Finley, I believe his name is now.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his real name?

Mr. CANNING. Finkelstein; Moses Finkelstein.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what name is he going now?

Mr. CANNING. Finley, F-i-n-l-e-y.

The CHAIRMAN. He would take an Irishman's name, would he not? [Laughter.]

Senator WATKINS. How do you know that?

Mr. CANNING. I believe that was first called to my attention a year or so ago when I was questioned by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever check to see that he was actually teaching at Rutgers?

Mr. CANNING. No; I didn't personally check. I was told that by this agent of the FBI who was questioning me.

Senator WATKINS. That is where you got your information?

Mr. CANNING. That is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it public knowledge that Mr. Finkelstein was a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Canning, if you know?

Mr. CANNING. I testified to it previously.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1940?

Mr. CANNING. In 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he tried by the board of higher education?

Mr. CANNING. I don't believe that he came up for a trial. I think he resigned, though I would have to check to be sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know if the same gentleman has a grant from one of the foundations?

Senator FERGUSON. Who is that?

Mr. CANNING. Moses Finkelstein, formerly Moses Finkelstein.

Senator FERGUSON. What has he to do with this grant from the Ford Foundation?

Mr. CANNING. It is a grant apparently to improve the teaching standards of the university.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear, either publicly or privately, that he had withdrawn from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No, I have never heard that he has withdrawn from the party.

Senator FERGUSON. You do know that when you knew him back in New York he was a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. He was a Communist, and especially active in the Columbia University unit.

Senator FERGUSON. He was directly connected with IPR, but do you know any other Communist in your cells or that you knew up in these colleges that came down in the Government, the United States Government?

Mr. CANNING. There was one other who belonged to the same Columbia University unit, Theodore Geiger.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes; he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Any doubt about it?

Mr. CANNING. No doubt in my mind that he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you know him?

Mr. CANNING. I knew him both at City College where he was a student, and later at Columbia University where he continued his graduate studies.

Senator FERGUSON. About when did he leave there?

Mr. CANNING. When did he leave Columbia? City College?

Senator FERGUSON. Or City College.

Mr. CANNING. I think he finished at City College, he received his bachelor's degree in 1935.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he come in the Government?

Mr. CANNING. Into the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he is in Government now?

Mr. CANNING. No. I have been informed that he has resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. CANNING. Not a very long time ago, several months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Just months ago.

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position in Government?

Mr. CANNING. He was, I believe, Deputy Administrator to the ECA, though I am not certain of his exact title.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the same man that you knew in Columbia as a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he active in communism?

Mr. CANNING. He was.

Senator FERGUSON. As active as you and Finkelstein?

Mr. CANNING. Not quite as active as Finkelstein, but perhaps as active as I was.

Senator FERGUSON. As you were?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anybody else who came into Government?

Mr. CANNING. One further person——

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you ever hear that this man had ever left the Communist rank, either publicly or privately hear that he had left?

Mr. CANNING. No, sir; I never heard that he had resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard?

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say, Senator, that some time ago the "watchdog committee" of the Committee on Appropriations made a representation to ECA as to this individual and drew the attention of ECA to his past history and asked for an investigation, following which I think there was a resignation. That is my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. I hope that Geiger will be given an opportunity to rebut this or to answer this testimony.

Is there anybody else who came down here in Government?

Mr. CANNING. During the war I was surprised to read in the New York World-Telegram in 1945 that a certain Louis Balamuth had been associated in the atomic bomb project at the University of Chicago.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. CANNING. I believe it was 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945. Was he—and are you certain about it—a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir; he was a member of the same cell at City College to which I belonged.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he active as a Communist in that cell?

Mr. CANNING. His main activity in the cell was editing—he was in charge of putting out this secret publication I spoke of, the Teacher Worker.

Senator FERGUSON. He was active then in the cell as a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You learned that he went with the Atomic Energy Commission activity over in Chicago?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever learned that he either publicly or privately withdrew from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No; I never learned of any withdrawal from communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. CANNING. No, I don't know where he is now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave his full name?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. Louis Balamuth.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did you know him to be a Communist in that cell to which you belonged?

Mr. CANNING. Throughout the entire period of my membership he was an active member of that unit.

The CHAIRMAN. That was for about what length of time in years?

Mr. CANNING. About 2½ years.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anybody else who were Communists, that you knew to be Communists, who came in the Government?

Mr CANNING. No other persons that I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no doubt and you have no doubt now that these men at the time that you are talking about and knew them were actually Communists?

Mr. CANNING. I have no doubt whatsoever, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one question in addition to the questions propounded by Senator Ferguson. You knew them to be active participants in the Communist cause in this country?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir. All those persons named during the period of my membership were actively engaged in Communist work.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask one question.

Mr. Canning, during the period that you were a member of either of those cells, did you from time to time make any memoranda about people who were making up those cells that would give us any light now on the membership?

Mr. CANNING. In the testimony which I gave some 11 years ago and in the subsequent hearings before the New York City Board of Higher Education, I gave a full account of the Communist activities at City College.

Senator SMITH. I mean did you include the names of parties who were members at that time?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. That is all in the record back there.

Mr. CANNING. All in the New York State Legislative Record.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that public?

Mr. CANNING. The hearings were both private and public.

Senator SMITH. Since that time have you run across any memoranda such as frequently one has, memos, diary notes, and what-not that would refresh your recollection and add any other names to that list?

Mr. CANNING. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was there any such thing as a roster of the membership of those cells that you may have had?

Mr. CANNING. The chairman of the unit no doubt kept records of that sort.

Senator SMITH. Who was the chairman?

Mr. CANNING. The chairman of this particular cell I have been speaking of was Louis Balamuth.

Senator SMITH. Who was the chairman of the other cells?

Mr. CANNING. Morris Schappes is a very important organizer of the City College unit. There was an Arthur Braunlich who was for a time the head of the entire City College unit. Some six or seven persons who were the principal leaders in the Communist cell there, the Communist unit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the last part of this testimony does not relate to the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a subject that has interested the Senators and the evidence has come out under that form.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all I have with Mr. Canning, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Senators?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it ought to remain in this record because it is material to the question being studied by the whole committee as to Communists in government. It certainly ought to remain in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It certainly will remain in the record. That is where it belongs. That is where it was made, and there is no reason for taking it from the record.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris, with the next witness. That is all, Mr. Canning, for this time. I thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Thanks very much for coming in this morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers is the next witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chambers, do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, WESTMINSTER, MD.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the stenographer, Mr. Chambers.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Jay David Whittaker Chambers, Route 2, Wesminster, Md.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am a writer and dairy farmer.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last employment, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. My last employment was with Time magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The year 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell the committee whether or not you ever belonged to the Communist Party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I belonged to the Communist Party from the early part of 1925 until the middle of April 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. At what period of time did you belong to the underground Communist Party, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I belonged to the underground Communist Party from about June of 1932 until the middle of April 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you describe for us the method by which you transferred from the open party to the underground party?

The CHAIRMAN. First of all, I would like to ask what is meant by the underground Communist Party as distinguished from the Communist Party proper.

Mr. CHAMBERS. The Communist Party internationally has always been organized on two planes. There is the open Communist Party with which we are all almost or are almost all familiar now, and the underground Communist Party which is organized as secretly as possible.

The underground Communist Party a great deal of the time is actually the more important part of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever have any direct dealings with the Insitute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I do not believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I knew Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us of your experiences with Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. CHAMBERS. To do that I will have to go back of that subject a little way to describe my reasons for meeting Fred Field.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Chambers.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I met Fred Field in 1937. I met him in connection with Mr. Lawrence Duggan, the late Lawrence Duggan. Mr. Duggan was then in the State Department, and I think at that time in the Latin American Division. I was then in the Soviet apparatus in Washington, which was headed by Col. Boris Bykov. That apparatus worked very closely with the so-called Ware group, which had been organized in Washington by Harold Ware, who was a Communist. The group consisted of Communists and was a unit of the Communist Party and its members were all or chiefly Government employees. In that group—in fact its secretary-treasurer—was Henry Collins, who first worked, I believe, with the NRA and then in the Department of Agriculture and later in the military government in Germany. He is now head of the Russian-American Institute in New York, if my information is correct. That institute I think has been cited by the Attorney General.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean cited as Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Cited as subversive. Mr. Collins had been a college friend of Lawrence Duggan, and from my earliest days in Washington in the Communist Party, which was the spring of 1934, I heard Lawrence Duggan's name mentioned as someone very sympathetic to the Communist Party. His name was first drawn to my attention, I believe, by one Webster Clay Powell, who was then an

assistant to Harold Ware in a little Communist front called Farm Information, or some such name—Farm Research, I believe. Webster Clay Powell subsequently became an employee of the State Department and I think served in Australia in one of the legations. In any case Webster Powell first drew my attention to the name of Lawrence Duggan.

Henry Collins was equally sure that Lawrence Duggan was a man for the Communist Party to approach and particularly for the Soviet apparatus to approach. He voluntarily made at least two efforts to recruit Lawrence Duggan as a source in the State Department for the Soviet apparatus. Neither of those efforts was successful. Lawrence Duggan was approached obligingly in another way. At one point Alger Hiss, after he had entered the State Department, thought that he would be able to recruit Noel Field. Noel Field and Lawrence Duggan were very close friends and I believe lived in the same apartment house. As soon as Alger Hiss began to entertain the Fields, he also began to see the Duggans. A question arose early in that association between Hiss and Field about which Soviet apparatus Field should belong to, because Hiss discovered, much to his surprise, that there was a second Soviet apparatus operating in Washington. We now know that it was the apparatus headed here by Hede Gumperz, or Hede Massing, as she is now better known. Then Noel Field received an offer to work, if I remember correctly, in the International Labor Office in Geneva, Switzerland, for the League of Nations. He accepted that offer. Before he left——

The CHAIRMAN. Who is this?

Mr. CHAMBERS. This is Noel Field. I suppose everyone here is aware that Noel Field has disappeared into the Russian occupied territory.

Before Noel Field left for Geneva, Alger Hiss had a conversation with Field about Duggan, and he asked Field if Duggan would work for the Bykov apparatus. Field said that since he, Field, was leaving, Duggan would continue his work here for him. I heard nothing more of Duggan until the year 1937.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Chambers how did he know about the conversation between Duggan, Hiss and Field. Were you present or did one of those people tell you?

Mr. CHAMBERS. What I know of that conversation is from what Alger Hiss told me at that time.

In the year 1927 Colonel Bykov decided that the apparatus should make an attempt, which was I suppose the fourth attempt——

Senator FERGUSON. The apparatus was an espionage apparatus.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That was the Soviet espionage apparatus in Washington, the head of which so far as I know was Boris Bykov.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you trying to get information out of the State Department? Is that why you wanted these people in your apparatus?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. CHAMBERS. To repeat, Colonel Bykov decided to make another attempt to recruit Lawrence Duggan for his apparatus. In pursuance of that effort I talked to J. Peters. J. Peters was the head of the underground section of the American Communist Party. Peters knew that Fred Vanderbilt Field and Lawrence Duggan were friends

and told me so. I then asked Peters to introduce me to Fred Vanderbilt Field, and that Peters did in New York City close to Park Avenue and Thirty-fourth Street. I then had lunch with Fred Vanderbilt Field, but before I go into our conversation at lunch perhaps I should go a little further into what Peters told me about Fred Field in the course of a general casual conversation, in discussing Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Peters told me that Field was a member of an underground unit of the American Communist Party, which was meeting, if I remember correctly, in a house belonging to Mr. Field's mother somewhere in Central Park West, New York. In that unit were Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Joseph Barnes. Peters was considerably disturbed about the unit because some difficulty had arisen between the two men about their wives. I believe they subsequently divorced their wives and remarried each other's wives. I am not sure of the details.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony that the present Mrs. Barnes was the former wife of Frederick V. Field.

The CHAIRMAN. That was earlier testimony before this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barnes has so testified.

Senator FERGUSON. How could that interfere with communism? [Laughter.] That you were frightened about it? What was wrong?

Mr. CHAMBERS. What was disturbing J. Peters was what would disturb any executive if he found such a situation among his personnel.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a little disturbing.

Mr. CHAMBERS. A disturbing factor.

I had, as I said, lunch with Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and I asked him to go to Washington and try to recruit for the Bykov apparatus Lawrence Duggan in the State Department. Field, as nearly as I can remember now, left either that day or the next day for Washington, and I saw him a day or two later. He told me that he had had a long conversation with Lawrence Duggan, and that Lawrence Duggan said that he could do nothing for the Bykov apparatus because he was already connected with another apparatus.

I think that is all.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the other apparatus, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That was not defined. I can't answer that except as I assume it was the Hede Massing apparatus.

The CHAIRMAN. There were two apparatuses working here in Washington at that time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. There were at least two.

The CHAIRMAN. One was by Hede Massing?

Mr. CHAMBERS. One was headed by Hede Massing.

The CHAIRMAN. The other was headed by whom?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The other was headed by myself locally and by Colonel Bykov.

Senator FERGUSON. Just so the record may be clear, were these so divided that you were each trying and getting information out of the State Department and other departments unbeknown to the other?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right. That is what is called in the Communist Party the principle of parallel apparatuses. The apparatuses are set up so that neither in theory shall have any knowledge of the personnel or the activities of the other.

Senator FERGUSON. That is valuable to get information. It is not to check the other apparatus to see whether it is remaining honest?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have reason to believe that there are still other apparatuses for that purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Outside of that you have your counter espionage?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. So, to get information they are set up parallel.

Mr. CHAMBERS. These two apparatuses, as I know now, were informational apparatuses. Unquestionably there are other counter-intelligence apparatuses, of which I have no direct knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know how they checked the loyalty of the Communists?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The check on loyalty would be in the first instance an inner-organizational check. Everyone in any Communist organization is always vigilant about the loyalty of all other Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, they object so strenuously to their loyalty being questioned when they are in Government. As I understand it, they have a very close check in their own organization as to loyalty.

Mr. CHAMBERS. There is a kind of invisible control which is self-operating, and self-starting. There are in addition other organizational controls, but of their nature I can't speak from direct knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. But there is a loyalty check on them?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The loyalty subject preoccupies Communists a great deal for the obvious reason that the conspiracy must be tight or it will fail. In other words, I am sitting here. You can't have people like that in a conspiracy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the purpose of this testimony at this time is to show that these three people who have been named so far, namely Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Joseph Barnes, and Lawrence Duggan, were active in the Institute of Pacific Relations and during that period were active members of the Communist organization. For instance, we have shown that Joseph Barnes was the secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1931 to 1934. Mr. Frederick V. Field was the secretary from 1934 to 1940 and remained on the executive committee until 1947. Mr. Duggan, we have had testimony, was the man used by the IPR when they gave consideration to founding a Latin-American division of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to relate that as much as possible, Senator, to show that this does come within the scope of the inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations.

It may be that we are laboring this too much on Mr. Barnes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chambers is now the fourth witness who has identified Mr. Barnes as a member of some Communist unit and Communist organization, and yet I think it is necessary, Mr. Chairman, because Mr. Barnes continues to deny it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chambers, did you ever contact Harry Dexter White, who was in the Treasury Department?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; I knew Harry Dexter White rather well.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he in any apparatus?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Harry Dexter White was a source of the Soviet apparatus which I have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Was a source? Give that again.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Was a source for material. He gave both original Government documents and a weekly or fortnightly written memo summarizing information which had come to him in the course of his activities. One specimen of that memo is I believe now in the custody of the Justice Department.

Senator FERGUSON. A memo that White gave?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right, in his handwriting.

Senator FERGUSON. In his own handwriting. Did you ever see any notes of Harry Dexter White in relation to the Far East, the Pacific, the Chinese, economic problems?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did, and the specimen that I have referred to, the exhibit contains, as nearly as I recall, some information about Chinese finances. I am not familiar with the subject, and I have forgotten the exact matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Were those notes in your safety deposit box at one time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I don't believe they were ever in my safety deposit box.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where they were obtained? Were they ever obtained by the Un-American Activities Committee?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I will have to think for a moment to remember what the chain of custody was. I believe that they were first given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I am no longer quite sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us the contents of those notes?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am sorry, I have forgotten very largely what is in that exhibit. The exhibit exists.

Senator FERGUSON. If you can give the committee any information on where that exhibit may be now, the committee would appreciate it.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should think counsel would know or could find very easily. For one thing, Senator Nixon, while he was Congressman, read them I believe into the Congressional Record.

Senator FERGUSON. He did?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe so. Shortly after the conviction of Alger Hiss.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, as a matter of fact, that they were in the handwriting of White, Harry Dexter White?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Without any question.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no question about that.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Moreover, the handwriting has been certified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record documents showing Harry Dexter White's extensive association and activity within the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder, Mr. Chambers, if you would amplify on your knowledge of Harry Dexter White's association with the Communist organization.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Harry Dexter White was not a member of the Communist Party as near as I know, and I have reason to believe that is true because he was reluctant to accept any form of discipline. I had the impression that he was a man of such character that he very much enjoyed being of the Communist Party but not in the party and not subject to its discipline. In that relationship he was willing to go to great lengths to assist them.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us about some of the lengths that he did go to assist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think I have already stated the two chief ones. He gave original and handwriting memo of his own containing Government information.

Mr. MORRIS. And the other one?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I meant that to include two.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you know Solomon Adler?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I never have known and so far as I know, I never have seen Solomon Adler.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I cannot testify definitely that he was. I can, however, tell you what I do know about him, which is this: That at some point, I presume in the year 1936 or 1937, J. Peters told me that one Schloma Adler——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that please?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I probably can't spell it any better than you can. I presume it is Schloma, S-c-h-l-o-m-a, and is a Jewish diminutive of the name Solomon. In any case, J. Peters told me that one Schloma Adler was supplying a weekly memo containing information about the United States Treasury to the Communist Party. I know nothing further about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced documents into the record showing Solomon Adler's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and we are going to have further testimony bearing on Mr. Adler's activity in the Far East and in the American Embassy in Nanking. That will come later. Mr. Chambers' testimony related to that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you know Len De Caux?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No; I never knew Len De Caux.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; I knew Len De Caux was a Communist and I knew he was in Washington, and I believe that he was here for the Federated Press roughly from 1934 through 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything at this time that we could introduce showing Len De Caux's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here, August 1, 1944, on the stationery of Columbia University, city of New York——

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to reading that, Mr. Chairman, I think he ought to state how you knew he was a Communist.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Again, my knowledge of his Communist is subject to a conversation with J. Peters, who at one point wanted me to meet Len De Caux, whom he thought might be helpful to the Soviet apparatus. For some reason which I have now forgotten it was never accomplished.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find Peters, in these tops of the Communist organization, to be wrong on who were Communists and who were not, who could be trusted in the cause and who could not?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have no recollection of any such occasion. It seems to me very unlikely that there would be.

Senator FERGUSON. So you always accept as truth that kind of statements by Peters and other tops?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I would have accepted any statement that Peters made about such a point.

The CHAIRMAN. I might state here at this point—I don't have to state to the Senators who are sitting here—that we are dealing with hearsay, but we are also dealing with a conspiracy, and the exception to the rule on the receipt of hearsay applies here.

Senator FERGUSON. After you establish the conspiracy, hearsay between the conspirators and statements are admissible even in a court of law.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do your records show Len De Caux's activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Len De Caux is shown as a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Council on page 158 of a volume called Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the IPR, Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945. I have here a letter dated August 1, 1944, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the stationery of Columbia University in the city of New York as addressed to Mr. Raymond Dennett, secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and signed by Philip C. Jessup. It is signed "Phil." This letter reads as follows in part:

DEAR RAY: In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation * * * the following are people whom I would include—

and among those suggested is the name of Len De Caux.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 132" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 132

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
August 1, 1944.

Mr. RAYMOND DENNETT,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR RAY: In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American delegation. The Pacific Council provides a secretariat for the conference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific Council for that purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.

The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry White, Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert J. Watt, Len De Caux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginius Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Ada Comstock Notestein.

In reply to yours of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine.

I definitely would exclude Hunter on the ground that we have too much of the Kizer group; I would exclude Captain Pence because he is now out of the Occupied Areas Section. If either of them were available I would suggest Commodore Vanderbilt or Commodore Stassen.

I suppose we may need to invite General McCoy for organizational purposes. I do not know anything about General Bissell. Yarnell should certainly come as a vice chairman and not as a member of the American delegation. Apropos your statement below "Military" on page II, I would get away from the idea of California naming a delegate.

Personally I would exclude Swing and would add to your press people Waymack of Des Moines.

I would be careful that we do not get too stodgy a delegation but keep a balance. I think the above list is fairly good. Another Government man who would be new to us but very helpful because of his interest in native peoples and Pacific Island government is John Collier, head of the Indian service and a fine person. Let me know what you hear from the others and we will see how things add up.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Frank Coe of FEA also good (penciled note).

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. White in New Hampshire, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Has your testimony covered that meeting with him?

Mr. CHAMBERS. At great length.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever meet Edmund Clubb? I think before you answer that question, Mr. Chambers, would Mr. Mandel tell us who Edmund Clubb is.

Mr. MANDEL. The Biographical Register of the Department of State dated April 1, 1950, on page 98, lists Edmund Clubb in his most recent position as follows:

Consul General at Shanghang from May 29, 1949, at Peiping September 23, 1947. Class I, April 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his present position?

Mr. MANDEL. Presumably that is his present position. I have no later data.

Mr. MORRIS. No, that is not his position. Mr. Clubb is the head of the Chinese desk, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. In the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. In the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that should be established by something more than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is why I want to know what the official record shows.

Mr. MANDEL. The New York Times of July 13, 1951, refers to Oliver Edmund Clubb as director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the United States Department of State?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that spelled?

Mr. MANDEL. C-l-u-b-b.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the same man you are talking about?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever meet Mr. Clubb?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances of your meeting Mr. Clubb?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Probably in June, in May or June of 1932, while I was editing the New Masses.

Mr. MORRIS. That is 1932.

Mr. CHAMBERS. 1932. While I was editing the New Masses, which is a Communist-controlled magazine, there came into my office a young man who asked to see Walt Carmon.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Walt Carmon?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Walt Carmon had been in effect the managing editor of New Masses before I became editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he have any connection with the Communist underground?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Walt Carmon may or may not have had connection with the Communist underground. I don't know. He was a Communist.

This stranger seemed rather disturbed not to find Walt Carmon in the office where he expected him. Walt Carmon, in fact, wasn't any longer in the building, in the New Masses. The man, the stranger, told me his name was O. Edmund Clubb.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you recognize a picture of him?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I can no longer identify a picture of Clubb. If you realize that I spoke to him not more than 15 minutes in the year 1932, I think it is simply impossible to make a positive identification.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot identify the picture.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I feel that other impressions bear on it, and I should not make an identification of him positively.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Nevertheless this man told me his name was O. Edmund Clubb, that he was a consular official of some kind at Hankow, I believe, that he was on leave of absence, and he had some kind of message which he wanted to deliver. The difficulty about my recollection of Edmund Clubb or Oliver Clubb is that I can no longer remember what that message was or even to whom it was to be delivered, but there has stayed in the back of my mind an impression which I will not testify to positively that the message was written and that it was for Grace Hutchins. Grace Hutchins is an open Communist, a member of the open Communist Party, has run on the Communist ticket in various elections, and is well known to be a Communist. But I cannot testify more positively to anything along those lines. Clubb then sat talking a little about China. Naturally I don't recall what our conversation was over that length of time, but I do remember that we talked about Hayang Arsenal. As you probably know, Hankow is one of three cities which lie close together—originally called the Wuhan cities where the Communists made their last stand when Chiang Kai-shek first swept them out. I have a further recollection, which I hesitate to make positive, that the message was from Agnes Smedley, but again I can't really testify to that positively.

Senator FERGUSON. This is your best judgment; is it?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I find it impossible, with the play of so many influences on my mind, because people are always asking me questions, bringing me information, and there are actually areas of my experience where I can no longer distinguish between what I once knew and what I have heard and learned in the course of testifying. I have given many thousands of words of testimony by now, as you know.

Mr. MORRIS. But there is no doubt about the fact that Clubb came into the New Masses office.

Mr. CHAMBERS. There is not the slightest doubt about it. He further told me that his parents lived in Minnesota and that he was going there to spend at least part of his leave with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you amplify any more about whether or not Clubb at that time was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have no knowledge whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything to show that Mr. Clubb was assigned to Hankow at that particular time?

Mr. MANDEL. I read again from the State Department Register of April 1, 1950, which says that Oliver Edmund Clubb was born at South Park, Minn.; and, further, that he was vice consul at Hankow on March 12, 1931. That is obviously the date of appointment.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to defer our introducing evidence showing Clubb's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to ask you if you have that evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. There is that evidence; yes, sir. I would like to defer introducing that until the subject comes up the next time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. This question is not very necessary, Mr. Chambers, but will you identify Alger Hiss to be a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Will I identify Alger Hiss to be a Communist?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. It may not be necessary to your mind, but we are making a record here.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; Alger Hiss is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The reason I ask that is that we have introduced into the record in the past extensive documents showing Hiss' activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations. In fact, he was a member of the board of trustees; and, as I say, other documents show extensive activity on his part within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt in your mind that Alger Hiss was a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. You are positive of that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. I think this is all for the time being, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. What about this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. We have nothing planned for this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will rise at this time.

(Whereupon, at 2:15 p. m., the hearing recessed until 10 a. m. Wednesday, August 22, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4:30 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senators Willis Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Mr. Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator SMITH. The committee will come to order.

Will you take the oath, please? You solemnly swear that you will well and truly interpret unto the witness called to testify before this subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the oath which shall be administered to him; and that you will well and truly interpret unto said witness the questions which shall be propounded him by counsel and by members of the committee and the testimony of said witness delivered before this committee, so help you God?

Mrs. TAKESHITA. I do.

Mr. KURODA. I do.

Senator SMITH. Will you take the oath, please, Mr. Yoshikawa. Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give in this proceeding before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA, MUSASHIHO-SHI, TOKIO. DIRECTOR, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, INTERPRETED BY MRS. KATSUYO TAKESHITA, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND REV. ANDREW Y. KURODA, WASHINGTON, D. C., OF JAPANESE SECTION, DIVISION OF ORIENTALIA, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs. TAKESHITA. Mitsusada Yoshikawa, who is presently the Director of the Special Bureau, Attorney General's Office, of the Japanese Government.

Mr. MORRIS. I will address the questions to you.

Mr. Yoshikawa, what is your present occupation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Director of the Special Investigation Bureau, Attorney General's Office.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you work for the Japanese Government officially?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position in Japan at the trial and prosecution of Richard Sorge and his associates in the Sorge espionage ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was connected with the Tokyo Criminal Court as a procurator at the time and was connected with the Tokyo Criminal District Court Procuration Bureau.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe your functions in that case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. At the time of the Sorge case a group of procurators was formed to investigate the Sorge case, and I was one of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a Japanese Government official?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. They were all procurators.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a Government official position?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in over-all charge of the case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. There was one chief procurator assigned to the case. He was the chief of a division of the criminal affairs bureau.

Mr. MORRIS. What in particular was your function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. There were two assistant procurators assigned to the case under the chief procurator, and one of them was I.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do as opposed to what the other man did?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was appointed to carry on the investigation of the foreigners in this group.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the other man carry out the investigation of the native Japanese?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In that capacity, did you examine Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I believe that the arrest of Sorge took place in the latter part of November 1941, and from that day on until May 1942 the investigation of Sorge was carried on every day.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you examine him every day?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. I gave special orders to the police to carry on the investigation of Sorge in the morning, while in the afternoon I personally conducted the examination of Sorge myself. However, in the first week I carried on the investigation by myself entirely.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge freely and willingly speak?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. During the first week he denied all the charges.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did he confess after 1 week?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I believe that there are four reasons for his confession. The first reason that might be given for his confession is that much material evidence was unearthed with the arrest of these persons. In the material evidence that was discovered in the Klaussen home was a wireless apparatus for sending messages and the German Statistical Yearbook, which was used as a part of the code, and had coded messages, and also the original code. The second reason for Sorge's confession could be laid to the fact that, with the arrest of these members, practically all members of the ring were apprehended at one time. The third reason that might be given is that all the

other members of the ring had given their confessions before Sorge. For instance, we had received a confession from Klaussen that he belonged to the fourth section of the Red army headquarters. Furthermore, Brando de Boukelitz was a member of the French Communists, and was in Japan as a correspondent for the Havas newspaper. It is one of the very famous news agencies in France.

Mr. MORRIS. How many reasons have you given now?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Three reasons. I spoke to Sorge about the discovery of the material in evidence and the confessions of the other persons. It is my belief that Sorge felt much relieved that he had just about completed all the work that he had set out to do since his arrival in Japan in 1933. That is the fourth reason.

I discovered this after Sorge had made his confession. About a week before Sorge's arrest, I learned that Sorge and Klaussen and de Boukelitz gathered together in Sorge's home and met together, and they spoke this: "It seems that we have lost contact with the Japanese lately. I wonder what the reason for that is. We have just about completed all the intelligence work which we had started out to do in Japan, and we have learned what Japan is to do it this critical time. Since Germany has begun her attack on Russia, let us leave Japan and go to Germany to carry on our work, and let us do intelligence work in Germany for Moscow."

This is the sort of conversation that was carried on at the time. Sorge and his group in a sense enjoyed a feeling of relief, but they felt that they had completed a very important piece of work in Japan and had completed their mission successfully.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say what the mission was?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. They have confessed to that in detail.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the substance of their mission?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The important question at the time was whether Japan, after her long war in China, would send or direct her military activities to the north or to the south.

Senator FERGUSON. So, it was not only to obtain intelligence—that is, information—but they were to penetrate for the purpose of getting Japan to strike to the south rather than to strike Russia, which meant that they were to strike America and Britain rather than Russia; is that correct.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That was the second motive in Sorge's mission in Japan. The first was to gain objective information.

Senator FERGUSON. The second was to have this take place, though, of attacking to the south rather than attacking Russia?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How could a German like Sorge accomplish that task? Did he have some Japanese on his side?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge was not only very intimate with the German Ambassador Ott, but he was also intimate with many of the military general staff. Furthermore, a man with whom Sorge had very close connections, Ozaki, was one of the "brain trust" group in the Konoye Cabinet, and he belonged to this group which had great influence in the policy making of the Cabinet.

Furthermore, Ozaki was a top-notch newspaperman.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after the attack at Pearl Harbor was Sorge arrested? Or was it before?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was before Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The latter part of November 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. The attack took place on the 7th of December.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was the 8th in Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before that was Sorge and his group arrested?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. About 2 or 3 weeks before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge relate anything about a modus videndi between Japan and America?

Mrs. TAKESHITA. Would you explain modus vivendi?

Senator FERGUSON. An agreement or stay of proceedings, as it were, when they were negotiating prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor. A 90-day truce, as it were, in their negotiations.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. Sorge's sources of information were not just the Konoye Cabinet, but also from the top officers in the military clan.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of a proposed modus vivendi between America and Japan prior to the 8th, as you say, of December?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No; I do not remember. Sorge considered the negotiations taking place between America and Japan as of very high importance, and he paid very, very close attention to the negotiations that were going on at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Sorge did say that he was watching negotiations between America and Japan prior to the attack?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge confess to you more than you felt that he knew?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; almost all of it was so. All the information.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he confess more than you felt that he knew about?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I think you have the wrong answer. Did Sorge confess to more facts than you felt that he knew?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, most of what Sorge told me was more than I knew. May I explain. The character of the Sorge group in the beginning was a great question, and if it were connected with Moscow, how did they receive instructions. All those questions were very important at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't understand the question. Was Sorge a Communist when he died?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he freely confess to Mr. Yoshikawa secrets that Mr. Yoshikawa could never have learned otherwise?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In part the things that I learned were entirely from Sorge's confessions and that part was a very important part.

Mr. MORRIS. If Sorge knew that another ring was operating, another spy ring was operating, does Mr. Yoshikawa think he would have confessed about that, too?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It is my private opinion, but I don't believe that he would.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your private opinion that you don't think that he would?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't think Sorge would.

Mr. MORRIS. Why not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. If another group had been active in Japan at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any coercive methods used in obtaining the confessions?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No coercive methods were used.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any pressure put on the prosecutors on the part of the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. There was.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The first man in this group who was arrested was Ozaki. Ozaki was a man held in very high esteem in the Konoye Cabinet, and it was expected that the arrest of Ozaki would have a very bad political effect on the Konoye Cabinet, but Ozaki immediately upon his arrest made the confession to me that he was an international Communist. Because of that, Konoye was not able to ignore that confession and put pressure on the procurators. Furthermore, after the arrest of Ozaki, because of other political reasons, the Konoye Cabinet resigned, and it was succeeded by the Tojo Cabinet. Therefore, we did not have any political pressure put on us in the case of Ozaki, but when Sorge was arrested some pressure was put on us.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the pressure to stop prosecution, or was it to press it and carry through the prosecution?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not a pressure that was strong.

Senator FERGUSON. But whatever pressure there was, which way was it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was just a matter of arrest at the time. The matter of prosecution had not come up yet.

Senator FERGUSON. About getting a confession, what was the pressure?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. When Sorge was arrested, Ambassador Ott and his wife became highly indignant. The Ambassador, through the Tojo Cabinet, requested that they be allowed to see Sorge and to have a report of the case immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, Ott was Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Seantor FERGUSON. And Sorge had some connection with the Ambassador, with the German Embassy, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As I remember, Ott was a military attaché to the German Embassy at Nagoya at the time of the ambassadorship of Von Dirkson. From that, Sorge had become intimate with Ott from that time that he was a military attaché.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge hold any positions with the Germans?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge did not have any official position, but he was considered one of the closest friends of Ott and was regarded as one of his highest advisers. Therefore Sorge had access to all the German military and political secrets, and consulted him on many matters concerning such matters. At times when the German high officials connected with the army or the Government came to Japan, out of respect for Sorge's position they would divulge many of the confidential matters to Sorge, and he would go practically every day to the German Embassy and was connected with the newspaper in the Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a public-relations officer?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Not in the way of liaison; no. He was just connected with a news service or a press release.

Mr. MORRIS. For the Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, for the Embassy. At one time Ott said to Sorge that he would very much like to have him attached officially to the Embassy. Although this was a very high position for Sorge, he declined. The reason for his declination was that there would be an investigation of his past and he wanted to avoid that.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the principal purpose of this ring to collect information for the Soviet Union?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they carry on another function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As I said before, Ozaki and Sorge, working together, tried as much as possible to influence Japanese military news to the south.

Mr. MORRIS. What was their second function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. To influence——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us the details of this endeavor to influence the foreign policy of Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Although his position was unofficial, he enjoyed a very high standing in the Germany Embassy, and he was also a member of the Nazi Party, and as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung he had many friends among the Japanese and the foreigners in Japan. He also knew many persons in the high military command. Ozaki also had a very important position as one of the brain trust group in the Konoye Cabinet. He also had a good reputation as a topnotch newspaperman. Through consultation between themselves they initiated this political strategy. Moscow had forbidden that they take any part in political matters, to do anything that might connect them with the Japanese Communist Party. Sorge asked Moscow whether it would be permissible for him to engage in this political maneuvering. There was no answer from Moscow to that question. Sorge took it for granted that Moscow had given silent consent and, together with Ozaki, engaged in activities that would influence Japanese foreign policies as they wished. One of their methods was of course to speak to many people about what political policy Japan should take, and also to write articles on the subject. The main points in their propaganda were as follows: The first reason was that the Reds were militarily very strong and that their social set-up was also very powerful. If Japan should go to the north, it would be very unlikely that she would be the victor.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "go to the north," you mean attack the Soviet Union?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Even though Japan should send her armies into Siberia, she would find very little there that she could use, and she would probably meet with greater difficulties than she had encountered in her war with China, and historically speaking, Japan has always failed in any military missions to the north.

Moreover, should Japan send her forces to the south, she would find many resources in that area which she needs and could use.

Mr. MORRIS. When you testify that Japan should move to the south, you mean Japan should attack Great Britain, the United States and the Dutch?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. French Indochina, America, England, and the Dutch.

Mr. MORRIS. Whenever in your testimony you refer to moving to the south you mean attacking all those countries?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. I mean the dispatching of military forces to the south. By "resources" I mean great amounts of oil and rubber and other resources. For these reasons, then, it would be more advisable for Japan to go south rather than to the north.

I would like to add a few explanations as to the political position of Ozaki.

Senator FERGUSON. Ozaki is the man who was directly connected with Sorge in this espionage ring?

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Ozaki's first name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It probably is Hozumi, but in the group which investigated him he was called Hidemi. There are many readings of Japanese characters. Although Ozaki was a Communist, his position was somewhat different from the Communist Party in Japan. The aim of the Japanese Communist Party was to work within the framework of the Japanese Communist Party in Japan, and to instigate a revolution and win political power in Japan. However, Ozaki's position differed from the Communist Party in Japan. Ozaki's position was that Japan should be Communized through the cooperative efforts of Russia, China, and Japan, and that Japan should become a satellite under the leadership of Moscow. In the many conversations with Sorge we formulated the strategy which I have described.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Institute of Pacific Relations' name ever come into the investigation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In what way?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Ozaki had as one of the sources of information a person by the name of Saionji.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his first name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Kimikazu. The acquaintance of Ozaki and Saionji began with their attendance at a meeting at an American-Pacific conference in America.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Institute of Pacific Relations conference, isn't it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know in what year?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not remember distinctly but I believe it was about 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. How else, if it did, did the name come into these hearings, the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Other than that which I have just told you about, I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that by previous exhibits we have identified Mr. Saionji as the secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. The record will so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain to us the relationship that existed between Ozaki and Saionji?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The intimacy between Ozaki and Saionji increased with their return to Japan, and both of these men were

members of the group closely connected with the Konoye Cabinet, and they were very good personal friends also.

Mr. Morris. Was Saionji arrested with the other members of the ring?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Saionji's arrest came very much later. I believe it was in the spring of 1942.

Mr. Morris. Did he give important secrets to Ozaki?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes, regretably, but Saionji did give many of the important state secrets to Ozaki.

Mr. Morris. Was Gunther Stein implicated in this spy ring?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was an indirect member of the group.

Mr. Morris. Did he consciously work for the group?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes; he did.

Mr. Morris. Will you describe some of his activities?

Mr. Yoshikawa. According to Sorge's confession, Gunther Stein was a man well versed in economics and a man of great activity. Gunther Stein, knowing that Sorge was a member of the group connected with Moscow, cooperated with him freely. Sorge valued Gunther Stein's cooperation very highly, and it was Sorge's wish for Gunther Stein to become a direct member of the group. He proposed that to Moscow. By a "direct member" I mean a person who is registered in Moscow and receives money from Moscow, and furthermore is protected by the Moscow network.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that we introduced at a recent hearing records that Gunther Stein was the representative of the IPR in 1937 and we also introduced into the record extensive articles that he wrote for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I think the number is 21, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Smith. The record will so show.

Mr. Morris. Was Agnes Smedley a member of this spy ring?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Were there any other Americans involved in this spy ring?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. It would be a very general statement. I would not be able to give definite facts.

Senator Ferguson. How many?

Mr. Yoshikawa. Several. When Sorge was carrying on his work in Shanghai there were more than three, including Agnes Smedley.

Mr. Morris. In what year was that?

Mr. Yoshikawa. As I remember, it was about from January 1931 to December 1932.

Mr. Morris. Who were the other members in addition to Agnes Smedley who operated in the spy ring in Shanghai during that period of time?

Mr. Yoshikawa. One was an American by the name of Jacob, a newspaper correspondent.

Mr. Morris. Was Jacob his true name?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I do not believe that it was his true name.

Mr. Morris. Did you ask Sorge for his true name?

Mr. Yoshikawa. I asked him.

Mr. Morris. Did he refuse to tell you?

Mr. Yoshikawa. He smiled but did not answer me.

Mr. Morris. Did he give you a description of Jacob?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked him that also but he did not give that information to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any other American in the spy ring in Shanghai during that period?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; there were.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was a young official connected with the American consulate in Shanghai.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get the name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked the name but Sorge did not give it to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give you a description?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked him that also but he would not give that information to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever give the name of Agnes Smedley?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But he wouldn't give you these other names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No; he did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not? Did you try to get the names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He would not give them to me, even though I asked him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to get the names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I did not try to compel him to give the names.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that because they were in Shanghai rather than Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That was one of the reasons, yes; because we wouldn't have any jurisdiction over them in the other country.

Mr. MORRIS. Did part of the spy ring operate in Harbin, in Manchuria?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge used another group in Harbin as a mail box.

Senator FERGUSON. A mail drop?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As a message center.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this message center deal directly with the Soviet fourth division?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was an intelligence group connected with the fourth section of the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. And they operated directly under Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How did it operate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Under instructions from Moscow, this Harbin center would act as a courier, which would relay messages or wireless messages for Sorge to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any reason to believe that there were Americans associated with that set-up?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not I who investigated this case, but it was through one of my subordinates who investigated Max Klaussen that I obtained this. The fact that this Harbin group was used as a message center is in the statement that Sorge made to me. Although Klaussen was working under Sorge in Shanghai under the instructions from Moscow, Klaussen was attached to the Harbin group for a while. According to the procurator who investigated Klaussen, I was told that there was a wireless apparatus set up in the American consulate in Harbin.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Klaussen? Was he a German?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; he was a German.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he the man who sent the radio messages?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; he was a wireless operator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find the wireless in the American Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. This was information which I got from the report of the procurator who investigated Klaussen.

Senator FERGUSON. But Klaussen must have then stated to the procurator that the place where he had the wireless was in the American Embassy. Is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Klaussen stated that the wireless was in the American consulate.

Mr. MORRIS. This was a wireless of the spy ring, was it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not an apparatus belonging to the American consulate. It was an apparatus belonging to the spy ring.

Mr. MORRIS. And they used the American consulate general's office as a headquarters?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; surprisingly it was so.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Around 1931 and 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. Just approximately the same time as the American operators in Shanghai?

Senator FERGUSON. 1931 and 1932?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this in China or Japan where the apparatus was in the Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was in Harbin, Manchuria.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Yoshikawa, we had testimony before this committee that Sorge relayed to his superiors the message that the German Army was going to attack the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941. Do you have any information that would confirm that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Before war had been declared between Russia and Germany, many members of the German high command came to Japan and visited the German Embassy. According to their reports, although I do not remember whether it was 150 divisions or 1,500,000 men, it was their report that this large number of the German military were massed on the Soviet-Russian border, and that they would be able to attack and accomplish the fall of Petrograd within 2 months. That was the plan of the German military. There were some differences of opinion among the Germans at the time. However, it was already decided that this plan would be put under way and that the attack would be launched. This information was not only related to Sorge by the German military officials, but also by Ambassador Ott. When Sorge heard this he was amazed at the plan and he took measures to confirm the information, and then to relay the information to Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this spy ring ever learn that there was to be an attack on America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In a broad sense; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what you know about it.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In July, after the outbreak of the war between the Germans and the Russians, there was a mobilization of 1,300,000 men in Japan. This was a very, very large mobilization and a highly important one. Whether this large force would be deployed to the north or to the south was a question of great military importance in Japan. Along with this, the Kwantung army in Manchuria, under the pretense of special army maneuvers, mobilized the rolling force of the South Manchurian railway. Sorge was very zealous in this investigation as to whether this army would be deployed to the north or the south, and he tried to obtain this information through Ozaki.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he obtain the information that it would be used against the American, British, French, and Dutch?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As a result of his information activities he learned that this force would be sent to the south.

Senator FERGUSON. Which meant that it would be an attack on America, the British, the Dutch, and the French, rather than upon Russia. Is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It is a question as to whether that meant it would be actual warfare to the south, but even at that time many of the Japanese forces were being sent into French Indochina. Sorge was engaged in a detailed study of the negotiations, which were taking place between America and Japan at the time. Not only was he interested in what the government was planning, but also what the military had in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge tell you that he learned that Japan was going to attack America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In October or November 1941 Sorge arrived at the conclusion that Japan would send her forces south, and sent that information to Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you reconcile that testimony with what you said before the Un-American Activities Committee that was reported in the press recently?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was shown a wireless message which was sent by Klaussen, carrying a message to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. You were shown a message that had been sent by Klaussen, who was one of the spy ring, to Russia, advising Russia that it was the intention of the Japanese military forces to move south and not against Russia, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. This message also contained the sentence that Japan would attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Attack what?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Attack the south.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the date of that message?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not remember the date, but I saw the message and it brought back the fact that I had seen that. Sorge also confessed to the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Was America's name used in that message?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not believe that America was mentioned as America.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you interpret the message that they would attack in the south? The Japanese were already fighting in China and in Indochina.

22848—52—pt. 2——11

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In the attack, other places such as Java and Singapore would be included.

Senator FERGUSON. That was Dutch. Singapore was British and Java was Dutch.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then your language should not be interpreted either here or before the Un-American Activities Committee that the Sorge ring knew that Japan was going to attack America. Is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge stated that of necessity attacking to the south would mean going to war with America.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Sorge did tell you the name "America" in relation to the attack of Japan, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge said so.

Senator FERGUSON. Sorge said that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge mentioned America.

Senator FERGUSON. So that as I understand it now, your testimony here under oath is that Sorge said to you that he had learned from the Japanese Government prior to the time of his arrest, which was prior to the Pearl Harbor attack on the 8th your time, the 7th our time, that he learned that an attack by the Japanese would be made upon America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge stated so.

Senator FERGUSON. The answer is yes, that he did state so, is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge visit any American Communist en route to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He stated so; yes. But on the details of that matter, I had the police make the investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the result of the investigation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. After his stay in China, Sorge went to Moscow and then he left for Japan from Moscow by way of America. At the time he made arrangements to have a Japanese Communist in America join him in his activities in Japan. I do not know definitely just whom he met and where he met them.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the American Communist? What was the American Communist's name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I had given instructions to the procurator, the policeman Okashi, to investigate the matter, but I do not believe that Sorge disclosed the man's name.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Ushiba was ever a Japanese Communist?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not believe that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Tsuru was ever a Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I had never heard that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active in Communist activities?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. While I was investigating this case I did not hear anything of that nature.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any instance whereby the American

Communists aided the Japanese Communists in Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain it to us, please?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was before the arrest of Sorge, and I believe it was in either 1937 or 1938. It was a period in which the Japanese Communist Party has been greatly weakened and was in a state of disorganization. It was a very important matter to the Japanese Communists that the party be reorganized. However, that was not possible at the time with their own strength alone, and unless they received help from Moscow they would not be able to attain that end. We had the instance that at this time the Japanese branch of the Communist Party in America gave aid to the Japanese Communists in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean those Japanese and Japanese-Americans in the American Communist Party?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Not only the Japanese. Although the group was made up of Japanese, there were also other Americans who participated in this aid. The methods which they employed were as follows: They put out a very good publication by the name of International Correspondence or Kokusai Tsuhin. The contents of this publication were directed toward propaganda in Japan, taking up the current problems of that time within Japan, and gave instructions as to what steps should be taken by the Japanese Communists and it was also a very radical magazine. Another publication which was put out was the Taiheiyo Rodo-sha, which in translation means the Pacific Worker. It was a magazine put out by an organization which endeavored to bring into close relations the various radical trade unions of the various countries bordering on the Pacific. This office published this publication. This publication was published in Japanese also, and it took up practical problems such as what the Japanese Communists should do within the labor organizations in Japan. This publication was sent by mail to all the right, center, and left labor front organizations and labor organizations in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it Mr. Yoshikawa's testimony that these publications were put out by American Communists in aid of the Japanese Communist Party because its ranks had been depleted by the Reds in Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I haven't any other questions.

Senator SMITH. I want to thank you very much for your participation and testimony here.

The committee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 6:26 p. m. the committee was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator Welker; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Budenz, will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about to give before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do.

The CHAIMAN. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.

Mr. BUDENZ. Louis Francis Budenz, Crestwood, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, where were you born?

Mr. BUDENZ. Indianapolis, Ind.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BUDENZ. Assistant professor of economics at Fordham University.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I was a member of the Communist Party and of its national committee.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. For 10 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what positions you held in the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I held quite a few positions, and I will give some of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, give the more notable ones, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. I was labor editor of the Daily Worker, editor of the Midwest Daily Record—that was a Communist paper in Chicago—managing editor of the Daily Worker and president of the corporation publishing that paper, a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, as I have stated, chairman of the Commission on Publications, penetrating various publications for the Communist Party, and a member of the radio commission, penetrating the radio industry. There were other assignments.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long were you a member of the national committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Nine years, six of them public, three of them secret.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you break with the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. October 11, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, since that time, Mr. Budenz, have you cooperated with Government agencies in trying to eliminate Communists from positions of power?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, to the best of my ability, that is, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon their request, and also always on subpena.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, could you just give us a general idea to what extent, say in hours contributed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. BUDENZ. During the last 5 years I have contributed 3,000 hours, approximately, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in questions directed to me and in the research required by those questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a witness at the trial of the 11 Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was the first witness at the trial of the 11 Communists, and I might say that I was on the witness stand 10 days at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us if you were also a witness at the Santo and Peters proceedings, the deportation proceedings against Santo and J. Peters?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was a witness for the Government against Santo and J. Peters, Soviet agents, and as a matter of fact I might say I was the chief witness against J. Peters, who was one of the chief Soviet espionage agents in this country. After my testimony, both of these men agreed to go to Europe voluntarily.

Mr. MORRIS. And were you responsible for the exposure of Gerhard Eisler?

Mr. BUDENZ. In 1936, I stated publicly that Gerhard Eisler was a representative of the Communist International. That was confirmed thereafter. And I was a witness at one of his trials.

Mr. MORRIS. What trial was that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was the trial down here in Washington, in which he was convicted.

Mr. MORRIS. Convicted of what?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Perjury, was it not, on the passport?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think that was it.

Mr. MORRIS. And then there were other contributions that you have made to various Government agencies, were there not, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I have appeared many times before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. I think it is 14 times. And before the House Labor Committee, before the Senate committee which was chaired by Senator Ferguson, and before the committee under the chairmanship of Senator Tydings. Just recently, I appeared for the New York Board of Education in the educational situation there as an expert on Marxism and Leninism, and most recently the State of New York subpenaed me in the case of the International Workers Order, which now by court order has been declared to be dissolved.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, this committee is conducting an inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations. We are going to ask you a series of questions, all of which will be related, either directly or indirectly, to the Institute of Pacific Relations. And we are going to ask you, to the best of your ability, to answer all these questions.

At the outset, Mr. Budenz, were you in a position in the Communist Party where you would have access to more secrets, to the identity of more people, than the ordinary Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly. Indeed, more than the normal member of the national committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. As managing editor of the Daily Worker, it was essential that I know the various delicate turns and twists of the line; not only of the line but of the emphasis of the line in the particular period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "line" in that respect, what do you mean, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I mean the Communist viewpoint at that particular moment, the Communist objective. This has nothing to do fundamentally with the Communist philosophy, except that it is an expression of it in action during a period of time. And that had to be emphasized in the Daily Worker, not merely as to what the line was but as to its various delicate nuances, if I may use that term. The Daily Worker is not a daily paper in the normal sense of the word. It is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy giving directives to the conspirators.

Mr. MORRIS. On individuals?

Mr. BUDENZ. On individuals likewise. It was a matter of political life and death to have a correct viewpoint of the various individuals who were dealt with by the Daily Worker.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it the same today as it was in your day?

Mr. BUDENZ. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Is the Daily Worker now a telegraph agency for the men in the conspiracy?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I can't testify of my own first-hand knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. But as to what you see in it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. It is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy. That is its sole function. It parades under the guise of a daily paper in order to protect itself through the cry of freedom of the press, but it is not concerned primarily with how much circulation it has. The circulation sometimes has gone down to 8,000 a day. Its concern is to get out every day to the Communists throughout the country, the active ones, the instructions upon which they are to act. It is used in that way, by the way.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Budenz, from the eyes of the then editor of the Daily Worker and a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, what was your opinion of the Institute of Pacific Relations? What did you know of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. What I know is perhaps the better way to put it, because I was at Politburo meetings and in consultation with members of the Politburo constantly. As a matter of fact, day by day I was in consultation. And frequently I was at Politburo meetings because of my position. The Politburo in these discussions declared the Institute of Pacific Relations repeatedly to be a captive organization, completely under control of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the Institute of Pacific Relations was a captive organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Completely under the control of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was during the entire period of my membership in the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be from 1935 to 1945?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1935 to 1945.

We have to distinguish according to the Communist parlance between captive organizations and fronts. Communist fronts are those created by the Communist Party itself. Captive organizations are those penetrated successfully and taken over. That is to say, the policies are under control of the party, although not necessarily all the personnel is.

The United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union is a very splendid example of that in the trade-union field. That was an organization that was certainly not Communist. The overwhelming majority of its members were not Communists. But it was completely controlled by the Communists. And the Institute of Pacific Relations was viewed in the same light.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Budenz, you mentioned the Politburo. Would you dwell on that somewhat, so that we may know exactly what you mean by that, for the record?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Politburo is the name used by the Communists for the political bureau of the Communist Party, whose name has now been changed to the National Board. Many of these Communist organs undergo many changes of name, either for conspiratorial reasons, to avoid legal identification later, or for some other purpose. The term "Politburo" though, was the original name. That is to say, it was modeled after the Politburo in Moscow, and on the same leadership principle.

It is the governing body insofar as there can be one, in America, of the Communist Party, although it receives its instructions from the Communist International representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it is called what, now?

Mr. BUDENZ. The National Board of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. You are talking about the American section, which is tied directly to the Moscow section; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. The Moscow directing body, that is, the political body of the Soviet Union, is called the Politburo. But

that is the Moscow Politburo. I am speaking about the American Politburo.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, would you say there was a cell, a Communist cell, operating within the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Alexander Trachtenberg, in these political bureau discussions, emphasizing the importance of the work of this cell, described the Institute of Pacific Relations as "The little red schoolhouse for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East."

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us who Alexander Trachtenberg is, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Alexander Trachtenberg is one of the most important members of the Communist conspiracy in this country. He is the cultural commissar of the Communists in this country. He has published all the authorized works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and all other works authorized by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow. Through his hands these works have to go. He is technically the head of International Publishers, but he is vested with much more authority, with reference to the Daily Worker. He is in charge of the whole cultural work of the party, or at least he was when I was in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that the Communists use the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence foreign policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt in your mind, Mr. Budenz, that when a man like Trachtenberg is speaking about this being an educational process, this IPR, here in Washington—and I take it that is what is meant by the "little red schoolhouse"—that that was an actual fact, that he knew what he was talking about, because of his tie-in in the whole Communist activity?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; and because he knew it through the reports which were received from the Communists within the Institute of Pacific Relations, largely through Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Senator FERGUSON. And when he was giving this information, you being the managing editor of the Daily Worker, these were instructions to you as part of the party line here in America?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was an observation in the Politburo, a political observation, a conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was information that you might be able to operate on in the future if necessity required?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore had to be accurate?

Mr. BUDENZ. Every Communist judgment has to be carried in some form into action.

Senator FERGUSON. And it had to be accurate for you to carry on; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. Communist information among themselves is absolutely accurate. It must be. It is the foundation of their work.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, we hear a lot said about so much evidence in this conspiracy being hearsay. And I am trying to get at the point as to what weight this committee can give to hearsay of this nature. Are you able to tell the committee now that in your

opinion this is, let us say, a hearsay that deserves consideration by a committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is an official communication between leaders of the conspiracy.

Senator FERGUSON. Among themselves?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. An estimate of their work among themselves, borne out, however, by other corroborating facts. The fact that Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field was secretary of the American council, among other acts and other incidents of that sort which we cannot go into now in detail, support this judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, there is so much supporting evidence around this hearsay that you feel absolutely certain this morning when you are giving this testimony that this was a fact?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, I could not be more certain if I had heard this said within the Institute of Pacific Relations itself.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get your idea on this question.

Mr. BUDENZ. It was based on reports by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. He was really the man who reported to your agency?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was coming from the Institute of Pacific Relations among the coconspirators and giving it to all of them, so that they may operate and act upon it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask: Could it be possible that Mr. Field was mistaken, that he just thought they were acting that way; that he really did not have members of the party in their sufficiently strong to influence it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I believe that he was not. In fact, I have knowledge that there were a considerable number of Communists within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. Have you given the committee the names of those that you say you have no knowledge were members?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have.

Senator WATKINS. That will come out later, I suppose.

Mr. MORRIS. No; that hasn't come out yet, Senator.

Mr. Budenz, will you tell us how this cell operated in connection with the Politburo, this cell that operated within the Institute of Pacific Relations? Will you tell us structurally how it was connected to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course, this cell, as all Communist cells, changed from time to time in personnel. It was largely, though, linked up with Amerasia and was a joint cell with Amerasia, and it operated by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reporting to the Politburo on the activities of the cell within the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the results of these activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you tell us, Mr. Budenz, approximately how many times you were present at meetings of the National Committee or the Politburo of the Communist Party, at which Field, as secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reported on the activities of the cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations, approximately?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, that would be very hard to state. The meetings were irregular. I should say four or five times a year.

Mr. MORRIS. Four or five times a year, or for a period of 10 years?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. With the exception of my being in Chicago, although even then Field did report to the Politburo in my presence when I was in from Chicago.

Mr. MORRIS. And when you say that he reported to the Politburo, did he at the same time receive instructions from the Politburo to carry on his work?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most definitely. That was the purpose of his report.

Mr. MORRIS. So there were two purposes then: to report in on the activities of the institute and at the same time receive directives from higher authorities in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Right at that point, Senator Ferguson's observation a few minutes ago dwelling on the subject of hearsay testimony brings my attention back to a remark that I heard over the radio the following morning from the date on which the chairman made reference to the fact that hearsay testimony may be received on certain conditions. The authorities are unanimous that hearsay testimony is not ordinarily to be received. One of the exceptions is in the establishment of a conspiracy. All of the authorities are unanimous that where a conspiracy is being established or has been established, then hearsay testimony under an exception to the rule may be received. The remark made over the radio was to the effect that this was testimony of a nature which would never be received in any court of justice. The gentleman who made the remark might stand corrected by reading Wigmore on Evidence or any one of the other standard works on evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I think I ought to put in the record the same idea that I have. And I do not wish to accuse any newspaper of misquoting what we said here, because I know the difficulty of giving accuracy on legal matters. As to those of us who are trained in the law, it is an easy matter for us, but sometimes we feel that there are misquotations. I felt there was a misquotation on the radio and in the press on this question of hearsay. I want it understood that I have said as a lawyer, and I say it now, that after a conspiracy has been established statements between coconspirators are always admissible in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. As an exception to the rule.

Senator FERGUSON. As an exception to the hearsay rule. And that applies in criminal cases. As a former member of the bench, I applied the rule. It has been affirmed in Michigan decisions in conspiracy cases and in cases that I tried on the bench.

So I feel that I have made a study of it and there is no question about it. But it has to be applied, that when the conspiracy has been established then the statements among the coconspirators, as we find here in this case, are admissible in evidence even in courts of law.

That is the reason I was asking my questions on what you felt about this hearsay, how it was, and what weight you were giving it. Because we, as members of this committee, must weigh all of the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue, Mr. Morris. I am sorry to interrupt.

Senator WATKINS. May I observe that this is not a court, and nobody is actually being tried here. It is an investigation, and it is not bound by the same rules that a court of law would be bound by.

The CHAIRMAN. No; you are entirely right, Senator. But it has been the desire of the chairman to follow what he deems to be orderly procedure under what he understands to be and knows to be court procedure as nearly as we can, so as not to get off into a wild field where there is no limitation.

Senator WATKINS. I greatly appreciate the chairman's statement on that, and I have admired his conduct of this hearing and the adherence to these rules of evidence, even though we are not required in this type of an investigation to observe them. I think it is being conducted on a very high plane. I say that as a former judge who has tried conspiracy cases and is acquainted with the rule just referred to by the chairman and Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. May I point out, Mr. Chairman, lest anyone have the wrong impression here, that the overwhelming bulk of Mr. Budenz's testimony here today will be events that he experienced.

The CHAIRMAN. The only reason that the chairman brought it up is that I was reminded of the remark by a well-meaning commentator who evidently did not catch the real meaning of my expression.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you describe a few of those many meetings of the Politburo that you attended and heard Frederick Field report and receive directives with respect to the Politburo? Will you take a few of those meetings, some of the more notable ones, and describe exactly what happened as you recall it from your own personal experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Necessarily, many of these meetings will not be recalled with any great clarity as such. However, the first meeting, necessarily, at which I met Mr. Field, impressed itself on me. That was in 1937, when he was introduced to me by J. Peters as Comrade Frederick Spencer. This was a meeting called of certain members of the Politburo and of others interested in China work—Harry Gannes, foreign editor of the Daily Worker, J. Peters, Ferruci Marini, whose name was also Fred Brown in the Communist Party—to receive a report of Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are they important Communists, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. These are representatives of the Communist International, to whom I have referred.

Mr. MORRIS. Are they leaders of the Communist underground movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. They were at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Just develop a little bit of their importance. Most of their names this committee is not acquainted with.

Mr. BUDENZ. J. Peters should be known by now. He was the chief espionage agent for the Communist International apparatus. He was the link or liaison officer between the Communist International apparatus in this country and the Soviet secret police. That is on record in my testimony against him in his deportation proceeding. His other activities have been aired in other investigations.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Gannes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he is now dead. He was then foreign editor of the Daily Worker. Every foreign editor of the Daily Worker is knee

deep in the conspiratorial apparatus, particularly in regard to international communications. And this was true of Harry Gannes, who had been to China and had many very close connections with many underground groups and individuals in connection with China.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe who Brown was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Brown was the man who was in charge of the organization and the preparation of the party for, I should say, violent operations. He had charge of the organizational work for the Communist International of the Communist Party. There were other members of the political bureau there, but I just cannot recall them, because they changed from time to time.

Mr. MORRIS. You say Browder was present, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. He made the report that day.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what happened at that meeting as you recall it from your own personal experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. At that meeting Earl Brower declared that we had to end the business of speaking so loudly about the Chinese Communists as being champions of Soviet conditions as in Russia. Although we had begun to taper off on that, we had to emphasize their democratic character. And he described them as being represented as North Dakota nonpartisan leaguers. He likewise said that we should bring out the full democratic content of the Communist movement and particularly the fact that they represented Asia for the Asiatics against white imperialism, and were for the complete independence and democratization of Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time, how were you treating the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Up until that time largely we had treated them very extremely, as champions of a Soviet China completely. In fact, the Communist propaganda used to talk about Soviet China in those provinces under Red rule. I say during the time when the transition was taking place, however, there had been a tapering off of that, but there had not been any sharp decision upon the matter.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is as much as you can reall about that particular meeting at this time, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. There is more about the meeting if you wish me to go into it.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I wish you would, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Because at that meeting it was decided that Owen J. Lattimore, because of his position, should more or less initiate or supervise the matter of having writers and authors and people in public opinion take up this attitude.

Mr. MORRIS. And when you said "because of his position," what did you mean by that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Because of his being in a position where he was not —For instance, Field's connections with the Communist Party were very close at that time, even, and were fairly well known in quite a circle. And then in addition to that, Lattimore was supposed to have quite an influence in the publishing world.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was Lattimore discussed as a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Instructions were given to him as a member of the Communist cell, yes, sir. That is, through Field; not in person.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say instructions were given by the Politburo to Lattimore through Field that he should do some work in connection with the change of policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain what he was supposed to do in connection with that?

Mr. BUDENZ. The details were not worked out. As a matter of fact, that is a common Communist procedure, that the details are not worked up. They are left to the initiative of the individual. They are checked on later. And his success or failure is commented upon.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question right there?

Mr. Budenz, you of course have demonstrated clearly your close association with the operations and your knowledge of the men who were taking an active and an influential part. I would like to ask you just a question or two concerning Owen Lattimore.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. The question suggests itself as to whether his name might just have been used loosely, or whether in fact, from your knowledge of everything, he was identified actively and knowingly with the Communist movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was specifically mentioned as a member of the Communist cell under instructions. There was no loose mention of his name.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you recall just what position he held at that time, if any, with either IPR or with any other movement, either as a captive organization or as a front?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't specifically. It is my impression that he was the editor of their publication. As a matter of fact, there was reference to the fact that he was—yes, he was the editor of their publication.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose publication? You say "their publication."

Mr. BUDENZ. This was Pacific Affairs, if I remember correctly. They had two.

Senator O'CONOR. I was wondering whether in their operations there was any possible code designation that might either have attached to him or in any way might have identified him if he were actually an active member.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Later on; not in connection with this meeting.

Senator O'CONOR. No, I said that because you have mentioned his name in connection with the meeting.

Mr. BUDENZ. During the course of time the Politburo issued for a number of years, from the time when I first entered the party, in 1935, or rather from the time I became a member of the national committee, in 1936, to all members of the national committee, an onionskin report of all their proceedings in great detail. However, people in key or delicate positions were designated either by blanks, when they were easily described by the circumstances, or by initials. Now, Lattimore was described as L or XL in these onionskins.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by an onionskin?

Mr. BUDENZ. I mean onionskin paper, these light papers sent around. They were sent around to every member of the national committee up until 1940 and 1941. During the Hitler-Stalin pacts they were ended, through fear that the onionskins would be used against the Communist Party.

Senator O'CONOR. And was that done frequently? That is to say, was his designation indicated on frequent occasions?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, rather frequent. I can't designate the number.

Senator O'CONOR. From it all, Mr. Budenz, would you say as to his connection with the movement whether his position in the entire movement was an important one or an unimportant one?

Mr. BUDENZ. His position from the viewpoint of the Communist Party was a very important one. It was particularly stressed in the political bureau that his great value lay in the fact that he could bring the emphasis in support of Soviet policy in language which was non-Soviet. And they consider that a very valuable asset. I could give you many quotations on that. It was discussed more than once.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Field's designation?

Mr. BUDENZ. Field was Secretary——

Senator FERGUSON. No. In this onionskin paper.

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he first was designated under the name of Spencer. Where they had false names like that, they used "Spencer." And for quite a while he went under the name of Spencer and then he went under his initial of F.

Senator FERGUSON. Just under F?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then when XL, who was Owen Lattimore, you say—is that right?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in high authority given the interpretation of what these initials were on these onionskins, so that when you would read them you would know who would make the statement and who was designated?

Mr. BUDENZ. Only upon inquiry. And I had to inquire, since I was editor of the paper in Chicago, the Midwest Daily Record.

Senator FERGUSON. Over what period, would you say, was Lattimore described in these onionskin sheets of paper? Over what period of time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I should say about 4 years. It ended in 1940 or 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. About 4 years?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And part of this plan was to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and its relation to the Soviet Union. Was that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct; not only on China, but on the whole Far East, to advance the Soviet objectives in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever discussed in these meetings that Owen Lattimore was a man who could put out propaganda and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was precisely the estimate given, that the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy, but that they were expressed in that language, which was non-Soviet in character.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore terms that designated that it was coming out of Russia were avoided; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But still carrying out the Communist line?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator O'Conor. If I might just ask a question there: Mr. Budenz, did I understand you to say that Owen Lattimore was designated for the purpose of exerting influence on the Japanese as well as the China policy?

Mr. Budenz. That was later on, to my knowledge.

But during this period we are speaking of, most of the emphasis was on China.

Senator O'Conor. On China. I understand. I did not want to anticipate what you might come to later, but just so that we can get the connection, it did happen that subsequently he was referred to as exerting an influence on the Japanese policy as well as on China?

Mr. Budenz. That is correct.

Senator O'Conor. And continuously over 4 years, you would say, these matters continued, in relation to which he was supposed to exercise an influence on the China policy as well?

Mr. Budenz. Yes. There may have been some gaps.

Senator O'Conor. But it, however, started from a time and did not end until 4 years thereafter.

Mr. Budenz. That is in regard to that particular incident. However, there were other references.

The Chairman. You used the term "during this period," Mr. Budenz. I wonder if you would, just for the record, and for clarification, state what the period was, what years?

Mr. Budenz. Well, that was the years 1937 or 1936, to 1940 and 1941. That is the years of the onionskin papers. We are only discussing them at the present moment, as I understand it.

Senator O'Conor. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, we were discussing this 1937 meeting of the politburo, and Mr. Lattimore's name came up, and we had this series of questions.

Senator Ferguson. Before you take that up, I would like, along the line of the thinking that we were carrying out, to have you read two paragraphs in a letter that is already in evidence, dated July 10, 1938. I will mark those two paragraphs.

The Chairman. What is that exhibit, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. I will try and find it.

Mr. Morris. It is exhibit No. 4, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read them aloud, so that they will go in the record?

The Chairman. Gentlemen, I wanted an executive meeting before we commenced this hearing this morning, but members of the committee were not present. I would like to take about 5 or 10 minutes now in recess, if the members of the committee would come with me to the rear room for just a minute, please.

(A short recess was taken.)

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Budenz, getting back to that memorandum, that exhibit 4 that I gave you to read, what do you have to say about the language in that? Is that in your opinion carrying out what was expressed about Owen Lattimore?

Mr. Budenz. I think it is a splendid example; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That he was telling the IPR in effect that the policy of the Communists in Russia was to be carried out, but it was to be carried out, how, as he says?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the whole excerpt should be read, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And then comment on it as you go along, explaining how it does carry out the purpose for which Lattimore was to be used by the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ (reading):

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

That is a typical Lattimore method which was approved by the Politburo. That is, to not appear to be a Communist, but to forward the burden, as I have said, of the Communist line, to throw the weight into Communist support.

Senator FERGUSON. To carry it out, but not let it appear that in carrying it out you, the man who is advocating it, is a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

And as a matter of fact, beyond that, to influence people who are non-Communists by appearing even to present it in non-Communist approaches and in non-Communist language:

For Japan, on the other hand, hang back as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals, who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on a check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression in Japan.

Well, there is a lot about the British here, and the French.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would go to the Russian part.

Mr. BUDENZ (reading):

For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of "subservience."

That, again, is indicative of the method of expression to which I have referred. This was to throw the weight of support to the U. S. S. R., not to American policy, but to the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. And to do it in such a way that the American people and the other people would not feel that it was being advocated by a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. By anyone subservient, namely, by a Communist; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, coming back to the question: Is that the position that you say Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, was described in this meeting as having the capacity to take, to carry out the policy of the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; in that meeting, and on a number of other occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, the witness is prepared today to testify to five episodes concerning Owen Lattimore, and we are going to come to those later.

Senator FERGUSON. That will probably cover this.

But I did at this time, when he brought up this question of Owen Lattimore's position with the party, want to ask him his opinion as in this letter written by Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter, exhibit 4, as to whether this did in his opinion carry out that policy.

And your answer is——

Mr. BUDENZ. That is a very fine example of the expression of Mr. Lattimore to which reference was made with approval.

Senator O'CONOR. Before you leave that, you made mention in answer to a question by Senator Ferguson that this was a typical Lattimore method, or words to that effect.

Would you say that he continued to operate in that manner? Or did he change after it?

Could you say whether or not he has until recent times continued in that line?

Mr. BUDENZ. I, of course, am confining myself to such information as I obtained officially within the Politburo, and I am stating that it was their conclusion time after time that he was very serviceable because of this peculiar facility of his in this matter.

Senator O'CONOR. Would you say that the reference to the Japanese situation would confirm your previous contention that he did have influence on the Japanese policy questions on China?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, Senator, except that later this became more pronounced.

The CHAIRMAN. Any question, Senator Smith?

Senator Watkins?

All right. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. We were discussing the meeting of the Politburo in 1937, and you had gotten as far as the mention of the name of Owen Lattimore, and then you had some questions amplifying that point.

Have you finished testifying about that 1937 meeting, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

I would like to state, in regard to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, that it was specifically mentioned there that he was to be the political representative of the cell, or was the political representative of the cell, for the party.

Further than that, likewise, at the conclusion of the discussion, J. Peters having explained to me that Frederick Spencer was actually Frederick Vanderbilt Field, that I would know that later, that I would see his pictures, and the like, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Harry Gannes, and J. Peters, at the conclusion of this political bureau meeting, in my presence discussed the matter of couriers to Washington on underground work in regard to the Far East.

The details of that work, naturally, I am unfamiliar with.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else about that 1937 meeting that you are prepared to tell us about now, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That seems to exhaust it, so far as my memory goes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you think of one or two other meetings that you have testified about that you can describe to us in detail?

Mr. BUDENZ. There was the meeting in 1943.

The CHAIRMAN. This other meeting was when, this one to which you referred?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1937.

However, in regard to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, if you will permit, I would like to refer to the meetings in 1940.

There were a series of meetings of the political bureau in 1940, which, to some degree are more or less blurred in my memory, because they had to be held at second-hand. Many of the members of the political bureau were already in hiding at that time, since the party had come to the conclusion that it was about to turn the imperialist war into civil war. They expected instructions along that line during the Hitler-Stalen pact period.

The discussions, though, with the politburo by Mr. Field arose over whether he should leave the Institute of Pacific Relations as secretary of the American Council and go to the American Peace Mobilization as its head. The politburo had decided quite early that he should, because they wanted a national organization. They already had a localized organization, but they wanted a national one.

And they held a convention in Chicago, I think in that summer, at which Mr. Field was chosen.

The CHAIRMAN. What summer was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1940.

In the course of this discussion, Mr. Field declared that Dr. Philip Jessup, who was an official, in fact, one of the responsible officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, had impressed upon Mr. Field that he thought that Mr. Field could be of more service in the I. P. R. than he could in the American Peace Mobilization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Service to whom, or to what?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was never very clear, at least so far as my memory is concerned. I thought to the cause of humanitarianism. But that would be only my interpretation.

The Politburo, however, in a number of zig-zag meetings, because some of them had to be conducted, as I say, for instance, by conference with Jack Stachel from under cover and the like, decided Mr. Field then should go to the American Peace Mobilization for two reasons:

First, that it was necessary to create a very strong reserve of the party eventually, if the party should become illegal completely, and that Mr. Field would qualify splendidly as a leader of that reserve, being a man of wealth, not having any technical difficulties, as the Communists call it, that is, not having any false passports, and having a position in society which would lead to a reluctance on the part of the Government to take action against him.

The second reason given was he need not end his relations with the IPR, but could eventually even increase them, though maybe not under the guise of being secretary.

But the first reason was the compelling one, because most of the party leaders were going under cover at that time, and they needed a structure which could serve for the party openly, and the American Peace Mobilization was, I should say, the chief one chosen for that purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, our exhibit No. 14, which we introduced into the record on July 26, duplicates the testimony given by Mr. Budenz here, and I think I would like this reread at this particular time, to show how the two tie in, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

EXHIBIT 14

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, HELD AT 5 P. M., THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1940

Present: Philip C. Jessup, chairman, Philo W. Parker, Francis E. Harmon, Edward C. Carter.

The second paragraph of these minutes is as follows:

The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility, because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone the decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his immediate resignation from all I. P. R. responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field, who explained in detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

Senator FERGUSON. This democracy that is explained in this letter was Communist, was it not?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was the organization devised to help Hitler. It picketed the White House. It assailed President Roosevelt and his "war and hunger program." And it was designed to step up the tempo of opposition to any defense efforts on the part of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was really the Communist line.

Mr. BUDENZ. It was completely controlled by the Communists from beginning to end. That was a Communist front, not a captive organization.

Senator O'CONOR. Obviously it was a Communist front and it was so known and its actions indicated that it was inherently Communist. Have you ever heard of any repudiation by Mr. Jessup of that laudatory expression concerning Field, who, of course, has been proven to be one of the greatest traitors in this country.

Mr. BUDENZ. No, I have not, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, can you tell us of another meeting you attended which Mr. Field reported for the IPR?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a meeting of 1943 which I began to anticipate and then thought of the 1940 series of meetings. At this meeting of the political bureau at which Earl Browder I know definitely was present, and I believe Robert William Weiner. His name strikes me because he was not always present at these meetings, and other members of the Politburo who were not generally there, including

Trachtenberg. At this meeting Mr. Field stated that he had received word from Mr. Lattimore. It is my impression that he had seen Mr. Lattimore personally just a day or two before, but I may be mistaken there. . It was a communication either personally or in some other way. Mr. Field just returned from a trip and I get the impression that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore personally, and Mr. Lattimore stated that information coming to him from the international Communist apparatus where he was located indicated that there was to be a change of line very sharply on Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say, that the negative opposition to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a positive opposition and that more stress was to be put upon attacking Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Communist Party line change at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists took action to discover the accuracy of this. They were advised that there was in the course of preparation an article by Vladimir Rogoff, the Tass correspondent, written at Moscow's request on this question which would attack the appeasers in China and Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. The Tass correspondent, you say.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain what Tass was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Tass was the official Soviet news agency in this country and so far as I know still is, but I knew it then quite definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this article subsequently communicated to the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article was communicated to the Daily Worker. The first message was received throught Grace Granich who had been in charge of Intercontinent News, a Soviet agency, which had been put out of business by the Department of Justice, but who continued to maintain her relations with the Soviet Embassy, Consulate, and other sources of information, including communications to Moscow and we were advised of the coming of this article and then we received it.

Mr. MORRIS. And was the Communist line actually changed as a result of these steps that were taken?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Politburo suggested that someone, and the name of T. A. Bisson was mentioned in that connection, be enlisted to write an article in connection with the Institute of Pacific Affairs publication on this matter explaining the democratic character of the Chinese Communists and indicating that Chiang Kai-shek and his group represented antidemocracy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz, but you mentioned the Institute of Pacific Affairs. You were referring to the Institute of Pacific Relations and its publication Pacific Affairs?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. I sort of got the two together.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time the article refered to by Mr. Budenz, not as it appeared originally in War and the Working Class, but as it was reprinted in the Daily Worker. I would like to offer this into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Please lay the foundation for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, can you testify to the authenticity of it?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an article taken from the Daily Worker of August 12, 1943, page 8, and is headed "Soviet expert warns of appeasers in China," by Vladimir Rogoff, reprinted from the Soviet Trade Union periodical the War and the Working Class.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it appear, Mr. Mandel, what date this appeared in the War and the Working Class?

Mr. MANDEL. It does not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you the article described by Mr. Mandel and ask you if you can recall the existence of such an article in the Daily Worker?

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the witness is being shown a photostatic copy of the article.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, this is the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any particular passage in the article that you think the committee should be interested in?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This article attacks the appeasers of Japan in China. You will note in so doing it attacks the whole governmental policy, that is to say, it says that 3 years have passed since Chiang Kai-shek gave certain orders in regard to reforms. Now, I will quote:

> Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. The main reason for this is the diverse work of the "appeasers," the defeatist and capitulators.

There is more to this line, but this is, I should think, a key expression.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you an editor of the Daily Worker when this appeared?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your purpose in putting this in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was our understanding that we were to begin, under the guise of attacking the appeasers of Japan, to have an onslaught against Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. The appeasers of whom?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of Japan, that is, in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time what was your official Communist policy with respect to the situation?

Mr. BUDENZ. The official Communist policy was very critical of Chiang Kai-shek, and that will lead us to other episodes——

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time what had been the policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. The policy had been critical of Chiang Kai-shek, but the policy now was, as we understood it, that we were to prepare for an all-out attack on Chiang Kai-shek, which was entirely different. However, if I may continue this, what the Soviet Government was trying to tell us was that this should be done under the cover of coalition government. Later on Rogoff had to explain and in fact apologize for his article, and Harriet Lucy Moore had to write an article, if I remember correctly, in Soviet Russia Today. It may have been in one of the organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations also explaining that Rogoff's article had been misinterpreted, but the purpose of this whole thing was to put the skids, if I may use that phrase, under Chiang Kai-shek under a gradual developing campaign for coalition government.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is what you meant by the sharp change in policy that you testified to earlier?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. Moscow has difficulty every once in a while in letting the Communists know the difference between how

they should emphasize things and the general presentation of the subject. We could not have such a sharp attack on Chiang Kai-shek if at the same time we were to advocate coalition government, but the purpose of the coalition government was to destroy him.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that this conference that you testified about today took place prior to the publication of this article in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the article should go in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I move that it be introduced into the record and made an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It shall be made a part of the record and appropriately marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 133" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 133

[From the Daily Worker, August 12, 1943, p. 8]

SOVIET EXPERT WARNS OF APPEASERS IN CHINA

(By Vladimir Rogov)

[Reprinted from the Soviet Trade Union periodical the War and the Working Class]

Moscow, August 11 (by wireless to Inter-Continent News).—During the 6 years of war the Chinese command, at the cost of considerable territorial losses, succeeded in saving the troops from defeat. Despite the numerous odds the Chinese Army preserved its capacity for resistance.

The Japanese militarists failed in their plan for a rapid conquest of China. The Japanese proved incapable of breaking the resistance of the Chinese people and bringing them to their knees. The war against China became clearly drawn out, threatening Japan with ever-growing complications.

In defensive battles on an extremely long front the Chinese Army, weakening the Japanese troops, gained the necessary time for reorganizing its troops and strengthening their fighting capacity. Soon after the fall of Wuhan (Hankow) in October 1938 Chang Kai-shek outlined a program for the reorganization of the country's armed forces, whose principal points were as follows:

Firstly, China's national policy must become the policy of a long, defensive war.

Secondly, the necessity to develop the guerrilla movement.

Thirdly, for conducting a general counteroffensive it is necessary to create a new, many-millions-strong army, trained in the use of the most up-to-date war equipment.

COVERT OPPOSITION

However, from the outset the intentions of the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army, Chiang Kai-shek, met with covert resistance. Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. The main reason for this is the diverse work of the "appeaser," the defeatists and capitulators.

The war economy resources of National China (Free China) are tremendous and afford an adequate base for the rearmament and supply of the massed army. On its territory National China has all the strategic raw materials necessary for the conduct of a prolonged war.

Nevertheless, large-scale construction has not been undertaken since the industrial and financial circles prefer to engage in profiteering rather than invest their capital in the armaments industry.

The unrestrained profiteers advance the "theories" that the people are weary of war and that it is primarily necessary to satisfy the demand of the population for goods, etc.

This situation leads to the weakening of the army's fighting capacity and greater dependence on the supply of armaments from the United States and Great Britain, which however has encountered serious difficulties since the beginning of the Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain. The elements favoring capitulation have sabotaged the measures for mobilizing the internal resources with the object of creating their own war economy base, as well as the measures for extending economic warfare against the Japanese invaders.

China has no lack of human reserves, but the Chinese Army nevertheless receives no regular reinforcements. There are insufficient trained reserves. There is not even an organized military registration of the population. To this day the law on universal military service is not fully carried out. The army receives a large percentage of men unfit for service.

The main defect of the Chinese Army is the shortage of trained commanding personnel. All foreign military observers who have visited the Chinese Army agree that the Chinese soldier is tenacious and enduring in the field and is unpretentious as far as food and uniforms are concerned; whereas the commanding personnel is extremely weak and backward in military and technical training.

The army's equipment is still at low level. The organization and control of troops are far from perfect. One of the defects of the Chinese Army is the lack of an effective united command and of coordinated operations on the separate fronts. The internal friction and suspicion among the generals could not but affect the fighting capacity of the troops and their discipline.

In Chungking, of course, there are no open advocates of surrender, but this does not mean that there is a lack of capitulators and defeatists there.

The capitulators and defeatists who occupy important positions in the Kuomintang weaken the strength of China by their harmful political intrigues and constitute a serious danger at present.

Since December 1941 the Japanese have centered their attention on the war in the Pacific. The war in China has receded to the background. This has led to the appearance among Chinese military and political leaders of a certain complacency of which the Japanese imperialists took advantage to intensify their peace offensive.

JAPANESE MACHINATIONS

The Japanese conquerors are now concentrating on deepening and sharpening the internal contraditions in China and are trying in every way to utilize these contradictions to weaken China and strengthen their positions in the struggle against China.

These Japanese plans profit from the maneuvers of the Chinese appeasers, who provoke conflicts and incidents up to armed clashes, do their utmost to undermine the military collaborations of Kuomintang circles with the Communist Party and incite the persecution and rout of the eighth and fourth armies, which as units of China's united national army have inscribed many heroic pages in the history of the resistance of the Chinese people to the Japanese invaders.

These armies consist of the most progressive, tenacious, and selfless people of China. They are led by the Chinese Communist Party which enjoys merited prestige among the broad masses of the working people as the organizer of their struggle for national freedom and independence.

Today by direct military pressure new attempts are being made to bring about the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party and the liquidation of the eighth and fourth armies. The Chinese command has transferred new divisions to the districts where these armies are stationed, with tremendous supplies of munitions and food, obviously to preparation for an attack on the eighth and fourth armies with the aim of liquidating them even at the price of unleashing civil war.

Such an attack of the Chungking generals on the eighth and fourth armies which, moreover, is completely unprovoked by these armies, would be a treacherous stabbing in the back of the Chinese people and play into the hands of the Japanese imperialists who could hope for nothing better.

A number of outstanding Kuomintang leaders oppose such treacherous activities of all sorts of appeasers, capitulators, and provocateurs. The Chinese Government, nevertheless, does not exert firmness in overcoming the activities of the capitulators designed to undermine national unity and weaken China's resistance against Japanese aggression.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

In the last few years I have had occasion to visit more than 15 provinces of China. Both on the front and in the deep rear, in occupied Shanghai and Manchukuo, representatives of various circles of China watch with grave concern the criminal activity of the traitors, turncoats, defeatists, and saboteurs. Nevertheless they are unanimous in their confidence that all the plans to provoke civil war are doomed to failure since National China, in hard fighting, has accumulated much strength and will not permit the great national liberation cause of the Chinese people to die.

With inexhaustible strategic raw material resources and tremendous manpower reserves at its disposal, China has every possibility for victory over the enemy. The necessary conditions for this victory are the realization of radical measures for reorganizing the entire economy on a war footing, subordinating all economic life to the needs of the front and strengthening the armed forces against capitulation and defeatist moods, and most important, the genuine unity of all national forces in the struggle for freedom and national independence.

On the extent to which Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking leading circles will understand the importance of this principal condition and succeed in averting the danger of internal struggle in China, tortured by the enemies of the Chinese people—the inevitable consequence of which would be measures directed against the eighth and fourth armies and the Communist Party—rests whether the exhausting war forced upon the Chinese people by Japanese imperialism will be brought to a successful conclusion in the interests of the whole Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz has testified that Mr. T. A. Bisson figured in the discussions at this time. I would like to introduce into the record, after identification by Mr. Mandel and authenticity affirmed by him, excerpts from an article written by T. A. Bisson in the Far Eastern Survey which was a publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from an article, China's Part in a Coalition War, from the Far Eastern Survey, published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in its issue of July 1943, and I will read the following excerpts:

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

Then I go further:

DEMOCRATIC CHINA

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producers in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

And further down:

The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the other paragraphs on this page, Mr. Mandel, excerpts from the article which you have been reading?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have those other excerpts inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 134" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 134

[From Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, July 14, 1943. vol. XII, No. 14]

CHINA'S PART IN A COALITION WAR

(By T. A. Bisson)

* * * * * * *

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. (6) These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

* * * * * *

DEMOCRATIC CHINA

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

But the ingenuity of this reform, without which it could hardly be made to work, is that the newly introduced procedures of local democracy serve as the final sanction. The landlord and entrepreneur are not excluded from this process, but neither are they permitted to dominate it. Tax assessment committees, for example, are controlled by a majority of local members and exercise a strictly local jurisdiction. Farmers know well what their neighbors own.

Over wide areas of this new China, elected councils—village, town, and district—and elected executive officials have completely supplanted the old autocratic system of feudal[1] agrarian China. These councils and officials are either unpaid or receive mere pittances which leave them no better off economically than their fellow citizens.

It is this democratic process, finally, which permits a large measure of free competition to operate over the whole of the economy. Bureaucratic price controls are not attempted. They are as unnecessary in this society as they would be in a New England town meeting. No landlord or merchant, with the watchful eyes of his neighbors upon him, can engage in hoarding or speculation. Within limits set mainly by local democratic checks, the individual landlord or entrepreneur is free, and is even encouraged, to expand his operations, and many are doing so.

By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed "communism"; it is, in fact, the essence of bourgeois democracy, applied mainly to agrarian conditions. The leaders in Yenan see in this program more than the answer to China's immediate problem of efficiently mobilizing her resources for the war against Japan. They see in it also the means of throwing off China's feudal shackles, the transition to modern nationhood.

The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you made reference to T. A. Bisson. Was the reference to Bisson to him as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

[1] The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. And it was your knowledge that T. A. Bisson was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. My official knowledge. I have not met Mr. Bisson, but I have repeatedly heard him referred to officially and have been so advised he is a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you elaborate on that just a little bit when you say "officially"? Officially by whom?

Mr. BUDENZ. Officially in Politburo discussions such as this in 1943 by Earl Browder, who was general secretary of the party, and then again on several occasions subsequent to that by Jack Stachel, who was the official representative of the Politburo to the Daily Worker.

The CHAIRMAN. As to the T. A. Bisson, can you tie that in individually by an expression that you know of? Could there be other T. A. Bissons?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; this was definitely the T. A. Bisson who was the so-called far eastern expert in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. His activities were discussed, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. That particular article of T. A. Bisson was the subject of considerable controversy and I think at the expense of a few minutes we should introduce elements of that controvery on the record to see how important an article this particular one was.

Mr. Mandel, do you have anything from the institute files bearing on this subject?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 3 from the Chinese News Service marked "confidential," addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter.

It is signed by C. L. Hsia, representing the Chinese News Service. I read a paragraph from this letter:

> I believe I said to you at Princeton that I could not agree with you or Mr. Tarr about the reason given for your declining to disown Mr. Bisson's article. Freedom of speech does not warrant any of us making attacks on the government of a friendly nation or making misrepresentations as to facts. To label the National Government of China as "feudal" is an open attack on my Government, and to say that certain casualty figures emanating from sources other than the Chinese Government or Chinese "official reports" is a misrepresentation. You are free to tell Mr. Tarr that I cannot accept his interpretation of the right of free speech.

Then another letter from the same gentleman is dated July 17, 1943, addressed to Mr. William Holland.

The CHAIRMAN. From whom?

Mr. MANDEL. From C. L. Hsia, director of the Chinese News Service. He says:

> When I telephoned yesterday, I thought it would be polite for me to come and see you and Mr. Carter to exchange views on the article written by Mr. Bisson. Since I more or less said to you what I had to say on the subject, I don't know whether there is any point in my coming to see you on Monday. I find that I won't be able to get back to town on Monday until after half past 11, so if you and Mr. Carter still wish to have a talk with me, I think I can make it around about 12 noon.
>
> What I said to you yesterday was purely my personal reaction and as a friend and member of the IPR I cannot speak for the China Council, nor in my official capacity. Personally I am deeply solicitous for the interests of the IPR, but the principles, objectives, and functions of the IPR may be defeated through the pursuit of this kind of activity, namely, an open, deliberate attack on one of its members, because I know how the Chinese members of the IPR feel about it, even among the most "democratic and liberal" and the most pro-IPR group. If Mr. Bisson tries to divide China into "federal and democratic," then I can't think of anybody in the Chinese IPR who can be said to be on the

"democratic" side. I imagine nothing can be done about it—I mean Mr. Bisson or the American Council or the international secretarial are not prepared to do anything in the way of retraction or amendment—so I don't see what useful service can be served by my coming to see you and Mr. Carter—

et cetera.

I have here a statement by Hollington K. Tong, who has been an official of the Chinese National Government, and whose biography can be found in the China Handbook on page 777, and here is his full comment on the whole Bisson incident, which I would like to introduce into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like two more paragraphs read in the record, Mr. Chairman. This is a point that has been disputed by Mr. Carter, and I think we should elaborate on it just a bit.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I will read:

We took a serious view of the Bisson thrust for two reasons. In the first place, the Far Eastern Survey is not a magazine of private American opinion. It is an official publication of an organization of which there is an active China branch, and Mr. Bisson is a member of the board of directors of that organization. Therefore, an article attacking China, published in the Far Eastern Survey, would appear to have the sanction of the institute, including its China branch. In the second place, in the middle of war, such an attack seemed nothing less than a boost to the enemy's propaganda.

My first action in the matter was to notify Guenther Stein, Chungking correspondent of the IPR, that his privilege of sending his weekly messages to the IPR free of charge through Chinese Government radio facilities would be withdrawn until Bisson's article was satisfactorily explained. This caused alarm at the Press Hotel, and I was visited by a delegation from the Foreign Correspondents' Club. Did my action imply that the Government's policy in the future would be to deny transmission facilities to them if articles deemed unfavorable to China were found to have been published by their principals at home, they asked. I pointed out that I was only withdrawing free Chinese Government facilities from the IPR correspondent pending an explanation from IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that whole letter introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been identified as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

First, I would like to introduce into the record the previous letters referred to, dated August 3, 1943, and July 17, 1943, from C. L. Hsia, the letter of August 3 to Mr. Edward C. Carter as the first, and the letter of July 17, to Mr. William Holland as the second, and have them marked as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so filed.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 135" and "Exhibit No. 136," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 135

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE,
New York, N. Y., August 3, 1943.

Confidential.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Many thanks for your note of July 31, which was purely for my private information. I greatly appreciate your sending me a copy of your confidential memorandum to Miss Porter.

I believe I said to you at Princeton that I could not agree with you or Mr. Tarr about the reason given for your declining to disown Mr. Bisson's article. Freedom of speech does not warrant any of us making attacks on the government of a friendly nation or making misrepresentations as to facts. To label the National Government of China as "feudal" is an open attack on my government, and to say that certain casualty figures emanating from sources other than the Chinese Government are Chinese "official reports" is a misrepresentation. You are free to tell Mr. Tarr that I cannot accept his interpretation of the right of free speech.

I hope very much that what you wrote Miss Porter can be made public or in some other way you can make clear that Mr. Bisson's article does not reflect the viewpoint either of the American Council or of the Pacific Council.

Furthermore, I wish to advise you quite sincerely and frankly that the policy or attitude represented by your telegram to Liu Yu-wan will greatly embarrass him and his colleagues in Chungking. Knowing the situation as I do, a matter like this may make it impossible for some members of the China group to participate in the next IPR conference. I wish to make it quite clear that I am speaking as a personal friend and a member of IPR and not delivering an ultimatum, as I am not an officer and cannot speak for the China Council.

In my other capacity, I am duty bound to report to Dr. T. V. Soong what are the reactions of the Pacific Council and the American Council to my request that they publicly dissociate themselves from Mr. Bisson's article where he attacked the National Government of China. I do not know what he will do. He may think it is too small a matter to bother about and let it drop. On the other hand, he may wish to inform the China Council of his dissatisfaction. So far, the only course open to me is to report to him to the effect that neither the Pacific Council nor the American Council is willing to disown any part of the article written by Mr. Bisson.

The suggestion that Mr. Bisson write a second article does not appear to me to be any solution of the difficulties with which we are confronted. As I said to you the other day, no writer will ever admit that he was wrong. If he says he made a slight mistake, probably he will give half a dozen reasons for that slight mistake and those reasons will put him more "right" than ever. My frank advice is that he had better keep quiet for a time and let other people have a go at it.

I will try to get in touch with Miss Porter as soon as possible and I hope she will publish our comments on Mr. Bisson's article. In this connection may I repeat what I have said before, that it has been insisted that whatever comments we may make will have the same privilege of being circularized as a special release as did the summary of Mr. Bisson's article.

Sincerely yours,

C. L. Hsia, *Director.*

Exhibit No. 136

Chinese News Service,
New York, N. Y., July 17, 1943.

Mr. William Holland,
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations.
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Holland: When I telephoned yesterday I thought it would be polite for me to come and see you and Mr. Carter to exchange views on the article written by Mr. Bisson. Since I more or less said to you what I had to say on the subject, I don't know whether there is any point in my coming to see you on Monday. I find that I won't be able to get back to town on Monday until after half past 11, so if you and Mr. Carter still wish to have a talk with me I think I can make it around about 12 noon. (Will you please telephone my secretary, Mrs. Chen?)

What I said to you yesterday was purely my personal reaction and as a friend and member of the IPR. I cannot speak for the China Council, nor in my official capacity. Personally I am deeply solicitious for the interests of the IPR but the principles, objectives, and functions of the IPR may be defeated through the pursuit of this kind of activity, namely, an open, deliberate attack on one of its members, because I know how the Chinese members of the IPR feel about it, even among the most "democratic and liberal" and the most pro-IPR group. If Mr. Bisson tries to divide China into "feudal and democratic," then I can't

think of anybody in the Chinese IPR who can be said to be on the "democratic" side. I imagine nothing can be done about it—I mean Mr. Bisson or the American Council or the International Secretariat are not prepared to do anything in the way of retraction or amendment—so I don't see what useful purpose can be served by my coming to see you and Mr. Carter. But I thought as an old friend you would not mind my calling your attention to what I consider to be a highly regrettable incident.

Very sincerely yours,

C. L. Hsia, *Director.*

Mr. Mandel. This is an excerpt from a book called Dateline: China, by Hollington K. Tong, from pages 204, 206, and 208, published in 1950 by the Rockport Press.

Mr. Morris. I would like to introduce the statement into the record.

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 137" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 137

Excerpts From the Book, Dateline: China, by Hollington K. Tong

[Pages 204, 206, and 208—Published by the Rockport Press, Inc., New York, 1950]

A note of incongruity was given to the whole attack by the fact that it was the Institute of Pacific Relations which fired the shot. The institute had been established, ostensibly, to promote good will among the peoples living in the Pacific area. Even though we knew that leftist influence had long been strong in its secretariat, it hurt us to see a blow coming from such a quarter.

In June 1943, Mr. T. A. Bisson, of the international secretariat of the institute, wrote the following in an issue of the Far Eastern Survey:

"The early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of Chinese unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic reforms has not been fulfilled. Two Chinas have emerged, each with its own government, military forces, political and economic institutions. One is generally called Kuomintang China, and the other Communist China. But the terms 'feudal China' and 'democratic China' more accurately express the actualities as they exist today."

This seemed to us an unwarranted and unfriendly attack upon China and the Chinse Government, since Mr. Bisson's "Kuomintang" or "feudal" China was the National Government of China.

We made an issue of it.

We took a serious view of the Bisson thrust for two reasons. In the first place, the Far Eastern Survey is not a magazine of private American opinion. It is an official publication of an organization of which there is an active China branch, and Mr. Bisson is a member of the board of directors of that organization. Therefore, an article attacking China, published in the Far Eastern Survey, would appear to have the sanction of the institute, including its China branch. In the second place, in the middle of war, such an attack seemed nothing less than a boost to the enemy's propaganda.

My first action in the matter was to notify Guenther Stein, Chungking correspondent of the IPR, that his privilege of sending his weekly messages to the IPR free of charge through Chinese Government radio facilities would be withdrawn until Bisson's article was satisfactorily explained. This caused alarm at the Press Hotel, and I was visited by a delegation from the Foreign Correspondents' Club. Did my action imply that the Government's policy in the future would be to deny transmission facilities to them if articles deemed unfavorable to China were found to have been published by their principals at home, they asked. I pointed out that I was only withdrawing free Chinese Government facilities from the IPR correspondent pending an explanation from IPR. To give free Government facilities to an organization which maliciously attacked the Government seemed to me foolish in the extreme. I also pointed out the different status of the IPR as compared to other independent, non-organization papers and magazines.

Meanwhile, a spirited interchange of letters and rejoinders was taking place with the IPR. Dr. C. L. Hsia, of our New York office, presented our point of view in a letter to the institute which was published with an introductory

editorial note stating that "Bisson's article expressed a point of view seriously held by many sincere American friends of China."

Also, in the same issue, Mr. Bisson contributed a rebuttal to Dr. Hsia's letter. Although both Mr. Bisson and Mr. Edward C. Carter, the secretary general of the IPR, who, incidentally, was also national president of the American Society for Russian Relief, stated that Mr. Bisson's article expressed ideas which were entirely his own and did not come officially from the organization as a whole, it seemed to us that the editorial note appended to Dr. Hsia's letter confirmed our feeling that the editorial board of the Far Eastern Survey was backing Bisson's point of view. They were setting a precedent which would make it possible for prejudiced writers and commentators in the United States to issue any sort of libel against China with impunity under cloak of being "sincere American friends of China."

The question of the Bisson article was further discussed a month later (August 1943) when Mr. Carter himself, accompanied by Mr. W. L. Holland, research secretary of the IPR, came out to China for a 3-week visit. Dr. Monlin Chiang, president of the National Peking University and chairman of the China branch of the IPR, discussed the matter with Mr. Carter. The members of the China branch of the IPR were as disturbed by the article as I had been, and the China branch finally lodged a formal protest. As a result, the president of the Institute of Pacific Relations issued a statement publicly dissociating the institute from the views expressed by Mr. Bisson, and we considered the matter closed. Guenther Stein's privilege to make use of our free facilities was restored to him.

During the controversy, the Institute of Pacific Relations came very close to losing its China branch altogether, which would have left it a predominantly American rather than an international organization. The China branch, whose members are by no means all Government officials, is a liberal-minded organization. But its members rebelled at the thought of being made a party to an international organization which openly attacked their Government.

During this period an article appeared in Moscow's War and the Working Class, written by V. N. Rogoff, who had been a Tass correspondent in China, and a personal friend of mine. This article was cabled by the United Press correspondent in Moscow both to England and the United States and appeared in hundreds of American and British papers. Mr. Rogoff stated that the Chinese Government was facing serious internal difficulties that could result either in civil war or a victory for Japan. He claimed that "appeasers" and "defeatists" in China were seeking to provoke trouble by urging the dissolution of the Communist units of the Chinese Army and that the alleged "intriguers" were undermining the Chinese war efforts and "have evolved the theory of an honorable peace with Japan or the futility of fighting." He insinuated that no serious attempt was being made by China to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more about that particular meeting you would like to tell us about?

Do you have any comment on the Bisson article as it was read today?

Mr. BUDENZ. Nothing. It shows that the Politburo's views were carried out in this article and that Communist China was held forth as the democratic China.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is also an example—is it not—that the Institute of Pacific Relations was used as an instrument for carrying out that policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is a very splendid example, splendid from the Communist viewpoint.

Mr. MORRIS. Before we leave the subject of Frederick V. Field, I offer you a pamphlet which was put out in his name and ask you if you can recall that particular pamphlet.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. We were instructed by the Politburo to emphasize this pamphlet. The Daily Worker did so, and throughout the party it was emphasized and pushed, as the party does those things.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify for us that pamphlet?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is entitled "China's Greatest Crisis," by Frederick V. Field, published by New Century Publishers, Inc., of 832 Broadway, New York, in January 1945.

The New Century Publishers, may I say, are official publishers for the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very definitely. The head of it was Robert William Weiner, the head of the secret conspiratorial fund of the Communist Party and former treasurer of the Communist Party, and also former president of the International Workers Order, but it was also under control of Trachtenberg, to whom I have referred before.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that particular pamphlet?

Mr. BUDENZ. From first-hand knowledge, having been many times in the offices of this publication, conferring with Mr. Weiner, and with other officials of that Communist-created organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that particular pamphlet, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. This pamphlet was, as I say, pushed by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything significant about that pamphlet that we should know in carrying on an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

In the very introduction of the pamphlet it gives an explanation of the author. This is called "About the Author."

> Frederick V. Field, the author of this pamphlet, is a member of the executive committee of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an authority on far-eastern problems. He is also executive vice president of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and a member of the editorial board of New Masses.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that reference to the Institute of Pacific Relations made with any significance?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. That was in order that the name of the Institute of Pacific Relations would be an entering wedge into many civic organizations, to ministers, to professors, to others who were circularized with this pamphlet; that is, either it was sent to them, or their interest was solicited.

Mr. MORRIS. This is to show in this particular pamphlet that it was a new Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But that is a subject of common knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is not.

Mr. MORRIS. So, it is your idea with reference to this description of Mr. Field and your testimony is that it was done to confuse? Is that it?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was done specifically, to my knowledge. I was in meetings in which this was discussed, the necessity for publishing this pamphlet among wide groups of people who were not yet familiar with China from the Soviet viewpoint, in order to get their interest and attention.

In order to get their interest and attention it was printed in this fashion.

Mr. MORRIS. And the name of the Institute of Pacific Relations was so used for that purpose?

Mr. BUDENZ. Specifically used for that purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. And the material in that pamphlet is Communist propaganda?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was decisively. It was approved by the Politburo.

Senator WATKINS. I thought you referred to some fund that the Communists had in connection with this.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe he referred to an individual who had charge of the fund.

Senator WATKINS. Maybe that was it, but at any rate, I wanted a further explanation, if you could give one.

Mr. BUDENZ. I think that would take us quite far afield, to go into this fund, but I can say that Robert William Weiner, to my personal knowledge, was the head of the conspiratorial fund of the Communist International apparatus in this country which doled out thousands of dollars in cash for many purposes; that is to say, if a Communist would take a trip abroad which is illegal, he couldn't put that on the books of the Communist Party. Earl Browder, if he had taken an illegal trip to the Orient or to Moscow, he was given this expense in cash and this was quite a large business.

Robert William Weiner's assistant incidentally was Lem Harris, who springs from the Wall Street brokerage house, although he is not in that business. He merely comes from that family.

Senator WATKINS. Would you know whether any of that fund was used to finance that pamphlet just as you have described it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That I would not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, what was the date of this pamphlet?

Senator O'CONOR. 1945.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1945.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, I do think it is pertinent at this point to observe that this is the very pamphlet about which we interrogated Mr. Field and he declined to answer on the grounds it would incriminate him.

Mr. MORRIS. It is, incidentally, introduced in the record as exhibit 10.

Senator O'CONOR. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. The secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations before Mr. Frederick V. Field was Mr. Joseph Barnes, who, according to documents, was secretary from 1931 to 1934.

Did you know that Joseph Barnes was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did not know Mr. Barnes during this period to which you refer.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not asking you that. I am asking you if you knew Mr. Barnes was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ. I did know Mr. Barnes was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that from personal encounters, as well as from official conferences of the Communist Party leaders?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe to us any personal encounter you had with Joseph Barnes in connection with Communist Party work?

Mr. BUDENZ. I had one personal encounter.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would——

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go into that, the name "Joe Barnes" or "Joseph Barnes" is not an uncommon one. I would like some way to identify the Joe Barnes to which you have reference.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz, if he continues with his testimony, will bring that out, and I will make it a point to tie up the two names.

Mr. BUDENZ. The Joseph Barnes I have reference to was the foreign correspondent for some time of the New York Herald Tribune and later on, not to my personal knowledge, but in the public print, took over a part ownership of PM.

The CHAIRMAN. PM was a newspaper regularly published in New York for some time?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was a daily paper. Its name was changed to something like the New York Star.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. In the 1936 period it is my impression that the 1936 convention of the Communist Party—my very sharp impression—a few newspapermen who were Communists were admitted into the convention or into a national committee meeting. I say that on that I am not quite clear; it was either a convention or national committee meeting, and I am practically certain it was the convention of the Communist Party of 1936.

The purpose of introducing these Communist newspapermen into the convention or national committee meeting, which broke all the rules of the party up to that time since those were always executive sessions, was to have them go out and represent the party as an American institution under the new idea that was developed later by Browder so fully in saying communism is Twentieth Century Americanism, and in the hall where these people met, a small room attached to this meeting of the Communists, were several newspapermen, among whom was Joseph Barnes.

I was introduced to him by Si Gerson in the presence of J. Peters.

Mr. MORRIS. Why does the name stand out? Why does the name stand out since many years have passed and why does it stand out that you recall meeting him at this particular time?

Mr. BUDENZ. This incident which is so clear in my memory that I have reported it a long time ago to other agencies stands out in my memory because Joe Barnes was so emphasized as having been of service to the party from the very moment I came into it.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time you had heard the name of Joseph Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mentioned in connection with the activity of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. On many occasions?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, a number of occasions, so much so that it became quite a personality with me without me knowing him.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is your testimony that these people you met on this occasion, which you think was 1936, were all Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it was the 1936 period. The only thing I am uncertain of, though my uncertainty is not very great, is whether it was the convention or national committee meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have one matter brought out clearly for the record.

Are you stating that you know Mr. Barnes to have been a Communist because he was one of these newspapermen who was admitted, or are you stating that you knew him to be a Communist and that he was in this group which was admitted? In other words, does your statement that he was a Communist rest on the fact that he was one of the group which was admitted?

Mr. BUDENZ. Partly, although it also rests on official reports in the Politburo to the effect that Barnes had been of great service to the party as a Communist; secondly, to the fact that he was introduced as Comrade Barnes to me by Si Gerson.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was on this particular occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the situation be this: That you knew prior to this occasion, and had known for some time prior to this occasion, that there was a Joseph Barnes who was a Communist and who had been of great service to the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on this occasion you met a Joseph Barnes who was identified to you and in your mind as the same Joseph Barnes who was a Communist and who had been of service to the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the Joseph Barnes that you have already identified here?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. The Joseph Barnes presented to me was presented in such a vivid color as of aid to the party that he was supposed to be outstanding.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was introduced by J. Peters?

Mr. BUDENZ. By Si Gerson.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have, or did you have, any experience subsequent to that experience which you believe took place in 1936, that could confirm your understanding that Joseph Barnes was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

I had a number of references to Barnes in the Politburo as a Communist, and also statements by Jack Stachel to me officially advising me of that fact. In about 1941 Earl Browder told me, though I don't know positively that he acted on what he said, that he was to take a certain newspaper with him to the Atlanta prison, he being privileged to only subscribe to one paper, because of the great influence of Joe Barnes in that paper and the contributions he had made.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the chairman of this committee must be on the floor very shortly. I am going to ask Senator O'Conor if you would kindly take over. I may not be able to be here this afternoon, Senator. Do you want to continue with the hearing this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will have to get some more testimony in. We are just really getting into this testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, can you preside this afternoon?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, I can.

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). The hearing will please be in order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you an article written by Joseph Barnes entitled "American Dream," which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, pages 111 to 116, in January 1937. I offer you this article and ask you when you first saw that article?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yesterday.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first communicate to the committee your testimony about your meeting with Joseph Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Last spring, and I communicated to other agencies before that, but I communicated to the committee specifically last spring.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at that article and tell us what that purports to be?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article is a review of the Communist Party convention of 1936 and also a review of the Communist tendency developing out of that convention. It presents the Communists as being Americanized.

Mr. MORRIS. And does that description of the Communist Party convention conform in every way with your understanding of the party purpose in allowing newspapermen to cover the convention?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; it may not be always expressed in Communist phraseology, but naturally the Atlantic Monthly, although I could talk about the Atlantic Monthly too, in that it wouldn't appear in that form.

However, this does express the purpose of the newspapermen being admitted, those who were.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this into the record in its entirety and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. Has it been identified?

Mr. MORRIS. I have described it.

Mr. Mandel, did you authenticate that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of an article appearing in the Atlantic Monthly in January 1937, pages 111 to 116, entitled "American Dream," by Joseph Barnes.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted and marked in evidence.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 138" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 138

[From the Atlantic Monthly, January 1937, pp. 111–116]

AMERICAN DREAM

(By Joseph Barnes)

I

The Communist Party of the United States, assembled in convention in New York City last summer, nominated its candidate for President as "the new John Brown of Osawatomie." This leather-faced Kansan, with a prairie twang in his voice, conducted a campaign which was patently not planned from Moscow. Over national radio networks, on the platforms of union meeting halls, and from a cell in the Terre Haute, Ind., jail, he insisted on the legitimate and historical right of his followers to the title of sons and daughters of the American Revolution, and defenders of American liberty.

"John Brown's Body" blared from the party's bands in alternation with the "Internationale." The American flag festooned the rafters of the party's meeting places. Mr. Browder's zeal for American democracy, which led him to single out the Republican Party as the tool of big business interests, to be defeated

at all costs, made his party's campaign for the first time a factor in national political discussion.

This borrowing of American symbols was more than a political strategam, or a knavish trick of Communist expropriation. The seventh world congress of the Communist International in Moscow a year ago had bent the party line more sharply in this direction. But in its membership, its growing press, and its special language of exhortation, the Communist Party had for several years been naturalizing itself in the American scene.

Mr. Albert Jay Nock has properly rebuked, in the October issue of the Atlantic, the word-mongers who foist "imposter terms" upon a gullible public, twisting their meanings to serve new ends. But the true study of semantics is more than invective against philological jugglery; it is the attempt to learn the reasons for real changes in the meaning of words. The success or failure which the Communists may have in adopting the slogans of 1776 and 1861, and infusing them with new life, will show how far and why these terms have changed their meanings.

Many of them, coined or borrowed in a simpler time, when words and slogans could be held in the mouth until even their taste was fixed, have inevitably changed since they first set the pattern of American speech. Since then, the rich have compounded their riches and the poor their poverty. Mr. Browder can find ample evidence in the reports of college deans, relief administrators, or industrial-relations experts, that freedom, liberty, revolution, the American dream, are being given, in many American minds, new definitions not to be found in McGuffey's Eclectic Readers.

Every crackpot third party may appropriate for its own purposes the word "American," and the song "The Battle Hymn of the Republic." But in Mr. Browder's campaign some of the fighting words were not mere borrowings; they were already a part of the Communist vocabulary. Even in the maze of Marxist rhetoric these words may be made for many Americans to sing with something of an older throbbing rhythm. They lose the bitter, anxious note given them in so many latter-day speeches or in Mr. Hearst's editorials, the flatted pitch betraying fear that our liberties may be something less imperishable than the rocks and rills which cradled them. They can carry confidence and faith to millions of Americans for whom the old American dream has not yet curdled.

II

That dream itself was largely one of freedom. It was born in the hearts of men who wanted freedom enough to fight the wilderness for it. And for the greater number of them, from Daniel Boone who wanted room enough "to rassle b'ars in" to the Polish immigrant who wanted a loom and a less crowded ghetto and no more pogroms, the wilderness and its simple, natural freedom were forthcoming.

Sir Charles Lyell, English geologist, traveled through the eastern seaboard of the United States in 1841, as open-mouthed as any Englishman of his time could be at its geological wealth and at the freedom of its people. When he asked the keeper of his inn at Corning, N. Y., to find his coachman for him, that free-born Yankee called into the barroom: "Where is the gentleman that brought this man here?" It was, Sir Charles concluded, the young country's chief blessing.

"I am also aware that the blessing alluded to," he wrote in his diary, "and many others which they enjoy, belong to a progressive, as contrasted with a stationary, state of society; that they characterize the new colony, where there is abundance of unoccupied land, and a ready outlet to a redundant laboring class. They are not the result of a democratic, as compared with a monarchical or aristocratic, constitution, nor the fruits of an absolute equality of religious sects, still less of universal suffrage."

Karl Marx paraphrased Sir Charles on this point a few years later, but the identification of freedom with political liberty was already frozen in American thinking. Twenty years later, at the beginning of the Civil War, more than half the entire area of the United States, over a billion acres, still belonging to the Government. The opening of the West had hardly started. So long as a man could move, and stretch his arms, and "rassle" new bears, he was not far wrong in thinking himself free. And if he thanked the Constitution or his right to vote for this blessing of freedom, it was an error which history and the inviting, empty prairies overlooked.

Today the sons and grandsons of these searchers for freedom have reached a full stop in the expansive pressure of a young people into its promised land. For a few hundred farmers, crowded from the soil by the relentless growth of tenancy—which has claimbed in Iowa until 60 percent of the State's 222,000 farms are tenant-operated in 1936, and 80 percent are mortgaged—there is the Matanuska Valley in Alaska. For a few hundred textile workers in New York City, whose very looms have been transported to the cheaper-labor cities of the South, there is Mr. Tugwell's Hightstown, N. J., resettlement project. Both were designed as symbols to revive the old American confidence in the invincibility of the pioneer. But both serve today to remind Americans that there is no longer an open geographical frontier offering freedom to large numbers of those who seek it.

There are still drought and grasshoppers and business depressions and tax-collecting politicians, it is true. But without unoccupied land for a redundant laboring class the older pioneer virtues of individual strength and character have been seen for nearly 7 years to falter badly against even these old adversaries. You can't "rassle," many Americans have learned, a public utility or the United States Steel Corp.

Instead, a few have learned, you can organize. It is among these few that Mr. Browder still numbers most of his 51,000 enrolled supporters. But his party's campaign to become a mass revolutionary party has been planned in larger figures. Only an embittered class of industrial workers can be won by talk of dialectics, proletarian dictatorship, and "Hands Off China." Besides them, the black-browed Marxist has slowly but carefully learned, he must win the support of millions of Americans who still feel themselves the sons of pioneers and who dream the great American dream.

For most of these, he argues, property has become an empty word, a memory, like stone walls and rail fences to an Iowa farmer. Where the title deeds and gilt-printed certificates have survived, the cold, enlacing grip of finance capital on management has wrenched both profit and the sense of ownership from the shell of property to which the middle class has clung. The old controversy of Marxist scholars as to the relative rates of growth of the so-called middle and working classes has been forgotten. It has been dwarfed by the blunt, unpleasant fact that every year, growing by geometrical progression through prosperity and depression, there are more men and women dependent for a living on a job, the surplus value of their labor taken from them, the specter of unemployment staring them in the face.

The interests of these Americans, Mr. Browder and his board of strategy have seen, lie with those of the working class. Only their loyalties, the accumulated pressure of a strong tradition, keep them befuddled by a Liberty League which works for liberty only for the rich. The Communists have set out this year to change these loyalties.

They have premised their plans on the assumption that the new allegiance of these millions need not be to Moscow, but to Bunker Hill and Harper's Ferry. They have found in the American dream issues which are fresh and vital today. By a policy of "united front" with other groups which recognize these issues, and by working on social and economic problems which have replaced the geographical frontier, they propose to use the American dream in a new search for freedom.

III

The primary purpose of the Yankees moving westward across the American Continent, and of the later Americans who came as immigrants to a country already settled, was to make a living. A better living has been the first promise they have demanded of those who wished to change their homes or their ways of thinking. In recent years the depression, unemployment, and increasing fear of an accelerating spiral of boom and panic leading to some undefined disaster have prepared many Americans to listen to tales of greener pastures.

This the Communists have recognized, and their appeal for new support rests squarely on a promise of abundance. To support the promise, they can point with powerful effect to the constricting scope of human life and enterprise in the middle-class nations of the modern world. With much less effect as yet, at least for Americans, they can cite the rising standard of living and the widening world of the Soviet Union. But while they wait for these two converging lines to meet in inevitable revolution, there are other elements of the American dream which they can shape to their own purposes.

The first of these is the desire of security. The depression has been blamed perhaps too much, for the rising clamor which has enlisted even the Republican Party in support of the principles of social insurance. The true cause may have been rather the prosperity of postwar years, which sucked farmers to the cities and undermined the independence of the small merchant and producer. Merger and monopoly were the order of the day, and the economics of self-sufficiency were relegated to the textbooks, unlearned and unpracticed.

How far this change has already gone may be seen in the increasing repudiation by large numbers of citizens, not all of them on relief rolls, of the venerable American maxim that insecurity is a necessary incentive to hard work. What would make men work, we used to ask, if it were not for the wolf at the door?

How can they work, many now ask instead, if they have no access to the tools with which to work? These are no longer the ax and flintlock with which Daniel Boone made insecurity his blessing of freedom. Today they are jobs, for corporations, banks, and railroads, work to be done with hand or brain for someone else, and a wage at the end of the week. Even the farmers, caught in the spider web of mortgages and closing markets, have begun to learn that the incentive of fear, when independence has dried up with the free land, is small defense against the wolf.

Another traditional element of the American dream, according to the Communist analysis, is the revolt against injustice. To a nation familiar with abolitionists, quakers, and pacifists, this is nothing new. Even its most recent forms have only put into the conversation of increasing numbers of Americans what Ruskin knew about himself 65 years ago.

"For my own part," he wrote, "I will put up with this state of things, passively, not an hour longer. I simply cannot paint, nor read, nor look at minerals, nor do anything else that I like, and the very light of the morning sky has become hateful to me, because of the misery that I know of, and see signs of where I know it not, which no imagination can interpret too bitterly. Therefore, as I have said, I will endure it no longer quietly."

I once knew a missionary in China, a man of fine, explosive moral indignation. His ancestors had been Connecticut Yankees, whose tombstones in the cemeteries of Litchfield County, the Western Reserve, Iowa, and California marked one of the trails of American history. Its last expansive thrust sent him into China, equipped with little but his Bible and the American dream. The misery he saw around him made him rage and quiver.

A few days ago I met his son, organizing unemployed workers in New Jersey. With him one of the driving forces of American life had come full circle. The religious character of the older emotional protest had changed. But no one who has seen a Yankee agitator, like this missionary's son, forced by the misery he sees to break his silence, can doubt that his accents are those of his father, and of Emerson and of Thoreau.

Much of the same ethical basis underlies still another of the elements in modern American thinking, especially that of a younger generation, on which the Communists have based their strategy and shaped their language. This is the desire for a world of ideas that makes sense. It is the belief that the values and the esthetics of a civilized people, like its economics and its social mores, are not predestined to perpetual confusion and debasement.

It is this half-inarticulate conviction that has enlisted so many younger writers in the United States under the banner of a still-nascent proletarian literature. The treason of the intellectuals has become a series of mass desertions from the standards of a business society. The present confusion of many of these younger writers belies their avowed desire for synthesis and order. Yet large numbers of them have joined the chorus of revolt, apparently for some personal satisfaction they derive from looking at the still dim outlines of an integral world.

It may be that the attraction to them of the Marxist world is nothing more than the ageless appeal of any church to any believer. It may be simply a rock on which to rest a weary head. But there are few such syntheses left with equally compelling vitality inside the world of middle-class culture and ideas, according to the Communists; and they claim to be embarrassed by the number of their recruits who come to them for faith alone.

All these things, it may be argued, are not new, by the very token of the ease with which the Communists can find American words with which to fit them. We have sought freedom and security before, and rebelled against injustice, and looked with patience for integration in a world that moves too fast for any simple hypothesis to hold it. Those who have failed have become cynical, but have gone on living, and there has been little change.

Some young Americans have found two new and ponderable changes, which have made the whole equation new. The first is Soviet Russia. To the imagination of a Montana wheat grower or a Detroit mechanic, hard empiricists in their American dream, the scale of 5-year plans and their tough and palpable reality may make them compelling visions. Americans know of their own experience that steel and wheat and machines rank high among the things for which men live.

The second is Marxism. It is not the party line of any orthodox or schismatic group, but the tool for understanding which a few scholars, and fewer leaders, have learned to use. To the English world it is still fresh and untested; and it has the plausible ring in many ears that only those doctrines have which promise the millennium—in this case, a society without classes and without poverty, where men may be really free.

"The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history," Engels promised, and the promise still holds good, "will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men wil have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom."

IV

For some years it has been easy to dismiss the Communists as foreigners in the fatal sense of that term, alien to our people and to our land, speaking a language few men understood. Only out of our own soil, it was cheerfully repeated, could roots spring that would fulfill what Herbert Croly called the "promise of American life."

In one sense the Communists have admitted the validity of this claim in their adoption of Thomas Paine, Samuel Adams, and John Brown for their political iconology, and their campaign to capture the American dream. In another, they have repudiated it, in their steadfast insistence that there is no exception to the rules of capitalist decay.

The continent is no longer virgin, they insist. Its people count their ancestors in all the corners of the world. They make their living and sell their labor as in any other industrial country. The exceptional scale and speed of American life serve only to telescope the inexorable changes inherent in all industrial civilization. The specter that was haunting Europe in 1848 has appeared mysteriously lurking in the shadows of America.

This specter may not be conjured away so easily in the years to come as in the last decade. In Gary, Ind., along the Monongahela River, on the San Francisco docks, and in the rayon mills of North Carolina, it is reported, the Communists have found new men, speaking the American tongue, unhampered by doctrinaire orders from Moscow, to spread their naturalized doctrine.

William Z. Foster, the party's elder statesman and three times candidate for President, is the son of a Taunton, Mass., carriage washer, who learned his economics not from Karl Marx but from Lester F. Ward. On a platform he chews gum with the slow, deliberate rhythm of a baseball fan. Robert Minor, a Communist candidate in November for Governor of New York State, is a grandson of a first cousin to Gen. Sam Houston, first president of Texas. At the 1936 convention he nominated, as "an average American," Earl Browder, former bookkeeper and Standard Oil employee, who wears a gold wedding ring and lives in Yonkers, speaks with the slow, dry irony of a Kansas farmer, and writes in a style that suggests a little of Daniel Webster mixed with much of "Sockless Jerry" Simpson.

These men spoke at Communist meetings during the campaign to shirt-sleeved mechanics and miners, organizers from Alabama textile mills, sailors and stevedores from three American coasts. Most of their lieutenants appeared to be young. Few were women. A surprising majority had Scotch or Irish names and Yankee cheekbones. On these men, more than on Browder, or Foster, depends the success of this new experiment with the American dream.

Even more will it depend, perhaps, on the competition they encounter. It would be comforting to think that there was a reasonable body of ideas being shaped by liberals or conservatives to bring the old American dream into line with new realities in American life.

The depression has uprooted many families and with them many loyalties and ways of thinking. When they settle again, it will inevitably be in new patterns.

In the short run, most of these appear to be of two kinds. On the one hand, conservatives hold out the nostalgic hope of a return to the older agrarian virtues, confused themselves between the liassez-faire spirit of independence they preach and the controlled monopoly they practice. On the other hand there is a fumbling effort to trim and cut the American dream by endless compromise, a liberal muddling-through which promises only scarcity to the sons of men who wanted abundance and freedom.

Given time, either of these sets of ideas might bend the tradition of Daniel Boone and the American pioneer to the new and imperious demands that daily living makes on millions of confused Americans. But there may well be no time. In a world where war and fascism are bacteria in the air we breathe, the few who see the danger and prepare to struggle against it may win the title they have claimed—spiritual inheritors of the founding fathers.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, we have had testimony here previously that Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist, and in addition, we have introduced extensive records showing that she was a very active person in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Will you tell us if you knew that Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I knew Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet her personally?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; she attended several meetings of the national committee, the enlarged national committee, and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that should be explained.

The national committee is generally composed of 60 members, though it can go up and down according to Communist exigencies, but that is not the national committee meeting to which I refer.

The national committee meeting to which I refer is the enlarged national committee which takes place about four times a year and in which from 300 to 400 Communist leaders throughout the country are invited to attend. A very strict security surveillance is kept on the meeting by the Communists and it is very secret. It generally took place up in the forties in New York in a large hall there which the Communists had rented off and on.

Now, there at that meeting, occasionally in the forties—the exact time I couldn't say just at the moment—but Harriet Lucy Moore was present. Only Communists were admitted to these meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Harriet Lucy Moore a member of the cell that operated in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. She was, both according to my knowledge gained in national meetings and in the reports of the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything else about Harriet Lucy Moore's activities, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, they were called so much to my attention that I am really at a loss how to express them; that is to say, she wrote articles which were passed on by the Politburo and she was specifically praised for a review of Owen Lattimore's book which she presented, I think, to Soviet Russia Today, though it may have been another magazine. I remember the incident. It was brought up as a sample of good Communist work.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she active in Russian war relief, as well?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; she was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have previously indicated that Harriet Lucy Moore was the acting secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as well as at one time chairman of the nominating committee of the institute.

Mr. Budenz, we would like some testimony from you on the subject of whether or not Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist organization. Can you relate the episodes that indicated to you that Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. These episodes which I have brought to your attention?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. You have called to our attention five or six episodes.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain these in detail, stressing at all times in your relating of them the fact of Owen Lattimore's association with the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. These episodes indicate within the conspiracy the importance of Lattimore as a sort of an advance guard for the Communist Party out in the land of the heathens, so to speak, as he was not exactly described; but as he was described, and his active and prominent part from the Communist viewpoint, such as his being assigned to prepare the ground, at least for this campaign of agrarian reformers and Asia for the Asiatic, his being conversant with changes in the line, which actually did take place, and after information we found the correct way in which to carry them out, his being likewise stated by Mr. Jack Stachel when he went with Henry Wallace to Soviet Siberia and to China——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate them in chronological order?

Mr. BUDENZ. You want me to go over them again? I was trying to save time.

Mr. MORRIS. You did get into some of them when we were talking about Frederick Field. I wish you would rerelate them, stressing on each occasion the role that Lattimore had on these particular episodes.

Senator O'CONOR. I think it would be informative to us all if he would enumerate the episodes first, and then possibly go into detail in confirmation.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1937, that was the episode in regard to Browder's bringing forward the idea that the Communists should be represented as democratic, as agrarian reformers, as Asians for the Asiatics.

There Lattimore's important role is indicated by his being given an assignment by the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the assignment in general?

Mr. BUDENZ. The assignment was to be responsible for seeing that there was produced in the American publication market articles and books which would carry forward this point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Did his role in Pacific Affairs come up at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; at that time it was stressed by Earl Browder specifically as leader of the party, that Lattimore was performing a very great service for the party in Pacific Affairs by more and more bringing in Communist authors.

Browder said: "We appreciate that every writer for Pacific Affairs can't be a Communist," that, however, the number must be increased and that Lattimore had shown a willingness and readiness to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequent to that time, did you follow the publication Pacific Affairs?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; although, of course, today that is not all fresh in my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that all of the people writing for Pacific Affairs were Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; it is not. I said that Mr. Browder stated that it was not understood that everyone who wrote for Pacific Affairs was a Communist; quite the contrary.

The very function of Pacific Affairs or the Institute of Pacific Relations was to have a non-Communist appearance and a non-Communist approach, but carrying the burden of the Communist viewpoint always.

Now, the fact is that some of the writers for Pacific Affairs undoubtedly were non-Communists. That was stated by Browder, and, I think I can say that from him in other discussions this was intended to be so.

As a matter of fact, it was even said that people of outstanding position would undoubtedly be attracted to the Institute of Pacific Relations as they had been in the past and that would be a gain to the Communists because their names would be used and very frequently they would not know anything about what was happening, they being busy people, so the emphasis on Lattimore was that he was getting more and more Communists, however, to give the proper weight to the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we will, at a subsequent time, during Mr. Budenz' testimony, put into the record the Communist writers who did contribute to Pacific Affairs, but at this time I would like to proceed with Mr. Budenz' narrating the episodes and indicating to him from his own experience that Lattimore was a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1943 was the report by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, as I say, my understanding being that he had just seen Lattimore and that Lattimore told him there was to be a change in regard to Chiang Kai-shek, that the negative criticism was to be changed to positive criticism. In other words, into an effort eventually to destroy Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the Nationalist government in China. That, of course, was borne out by the fact that we immediately received verification of that, the only difficulty being that we interpreted it somewhat incorrectly, as it happens every once in a while.

This is not only a difficulty of the Communists here; it is a difficulty that Moscow has in getting over their viewpoints, where they have a double-talking viewpoint. We had that situation on a number of other occasions to which I could refer, but I think I better not or we go far afield, but that is not a new experience in the Communist policy.

The Politburo wishes really to smash those with whom they are coalescing, but that has to be the property or knowledge of the Communists, whereas the coalition has to be the property or knowledge of the non-Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony at that time that Mr. Field had received an official Communist communication from Lattimore?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us of any other episodes?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1944, the trip of Vice President Henry Wallace. I don't know whether I can emphasize the importance of this trip to the Communists as much as it should be. It received a very great attention from the Politburo and it was constantly brought to my attention by Jack Stachel as the representative of the Politburo as a very important mission which would redound to the benefit of the Communist cause in the Far East.

In that respect a great deal of dependence was placed on Owen Lattimore, whom I was told by Mr. Stachel at that time to consider a Communist——

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean, "consider a Communist"? Is that a technical word you are using?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a technical term we used which meant he was an authority from the Communist viewpoint. He was a Marxist authority.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that warning given to you by anyone else at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, there were many other references of similar character. I remember specifically Stachel's because my relations with him were very close and he was constantly giving me these instructions.

I do know that similar statements were made within the Politburo itself by other members in connection with Wallace's trip.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the significance of that? Was that a note of warning to you by Stachel, or was it an admonition, or what?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, I should say an underscoring of Lattimore's position, that we should be on the alert for anything that Lattimore might say or do. That was really carrying out the Communist line.

If I may explain that for just a moment, there isn't just the line to carry out, but you must know at any particular moment how the line is to be emphasized. You might talk about united fronts, but you might be emphasizing one particular element in the united fronts, or something like that, or, in the case of Italy, where we were taken by surprise, you might attack Badoglio one day and find you should be with him the next day, according to Moscow's policy.

That was within all one line of procedure with regard to Italy, but Badoglio suddenly changed in that line.

Now, in order to be advised of such things as that, we were to rely on anything Lattimore might say or do that we would be aware of.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you also to handle the name of Lattimore in any particular way?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, with consideration; yes, sir. As a matter of fact, it has been handled with great consideration.

Mr. MORRIS. And you handled it with consideration?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Could Stachel possibly be giving you misinformation under those circumstances?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is utterly impossible. The Communist Party is an army and the whole strength of its invasion of the country, which is what it is doing, is being advised correctly through the whole organization insofar as it is necessary for a person to be advised of the facts in a situation, but when someone is designated as a Communist that is utterly impossible to be false, because if that were so then the whole thing would fall into chaos.

Senator O'Conor. Just before you leave that episode, the one in 1944, and with specific reference to the conversation with Stachel, do you place any significance on the fact that he told you to consider Lattimore as a Communist; that is to say, were those words used, "to consider him as"?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.

Now, you understand that some of these discussions and considerations had to be carried on under pressure. As a matter of fact many offices have arranged their walls so that you can't hear through them for various business reasons, but ours were arranged that way so that the staff of the Daily Worker couldn't hear what was being said by the leadership because many confidential and secret messages were brought there.

Now, the thing is that because of that fact, and the danger of interruption, and all that, we tried to reduce everything to what I used to call political shorthand, my own term, namely, to make everything as concise as possible, and the phrase "to consider a man as Communist" came to me that he was an authority as a Communist and that we should regard him as such.

That is a distinction from other phrases, like "treat him as a Communist," or things like that.

Mr. Morris. What does that mean?

Mr. Budenz. That he is part of the Communist conspiracy. These things had to be divided because of interruptions by staff members of conversations of this character.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you mean that when a man had been referred to by the phrase "consider him as a Communist" that he was to be regarded as speaking with authority on matters of Communist ideology; that he was an interpreter of the line with the party back of him?

Mr. Budenz. That's correct.

Mr. Sourwine. And if a person was inclined in their own mind to differ with what such a man had said that he had better take notice that there was something wrong with their thinking because he was right?

Mr. Budenz. That is correct.

You must understand in the case of Mr. Lattimore this was only said at that time with regard to his functioning in the Wallace mission.

Mr. Morris. I did not understand whether you were trying to "treat" or "consider" Mr. Lattimore as a Communist.

Mr. Budenz. Consider him a Communist.

Mr. Morris. I thought you used the word "treat" in your testimony a while ago.

Mr. Budenz. I say that that was also a phrase used.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean that in connection with the Wallace mission the word was passed by the use of the phrase "consider him as a Communist," that with respect to that mission Mr. Lattimore might not be setting the line; he was giving the line, and he was interpreting that mission in Communist terms?

Mr. Budenz. That's correct. He was a representative of the party in the Wallace mission.

Senator Smith. He was sort of a VIP in the movement?

Mr. Budenz. That's right.

Mr. Morris. Would a man like that be allowed to make a statement, to voice a criticism of the Soviet Union, which would not be consistent with the official Communist Party line?

Mr. Budenz. In order to explain that, I think we have to understand the Communist position, the position of the Communist conspiracy.

Mr. Morris. As best you can answer the question, though, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Budenz. He would be granted an exemption if the burden of his work was such as to rebound to the line of the party in that field to which he was assigned.

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any such exemptions that were granted to people?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, I do.

Mr. Morris. Would you explain that?

Mr. Budenz. There was a noted Hollywood actor who was certainly a devoted Communist. As a matter of fact, he wept every time there was any thought that he might not be a Communist, although he couldn't publicly proclaim it. He was granted an exemption to contribute to the Finnish relief because it was said in the political bureau by V. J. Jerome that, "What are a few cents to Finland compared to the place he occupies in Hollywood for the party? There is no scandal in the party. No one knows he is a Communist."

An open Communist couldn't do that without being expelled, but a concealed Communist is permitted these exemptions.

In another case a college professor who has done very yeoman work for the party, particularly in Communist fronts—he always comes back to the Communist fronts, no matter whatl ine is being pursued—was given an exemption to say a kind word about Trotsky. Of course, Trotsky was thoroughly dead at that time, but he was given permission to say a kind word about him in order to distinguish him from the Communists because the burden of his activities in Communist fronts, to which I say he constantly returned, was much greater from the party viewpoint from this casual reference to the fact that he wasn't known publicly as a Communist and there would be no scandal in the party. That is a phrase used.

Mr. Morris. Can you tell us of any other episodes that indicated to you that Lattimore was a Communist?

Mr. Budenz. Incidentally, in this respect, I might bring this out in another way in order that it be understood and not cause confusion, and that is that just recently when a number of Communists who were heads of trade-unions signed affidavits that they had all suddenly had a common inspiration to resign from the Communist Party, the Daily Worker ran an explanation that their function and the way they should act would be different from that of the rank and file. The rank-and-file Communist must continue because he is expected to assert openly that he is a Communist at all costs, but these leaders, because they have responsibilities to great masses, organizations, funds, and the like, may properly, while continuing their fraternal relation with the Communist Party, swear that they are not Communists.

In other words, right there is a note. I could bring in many other examples. I want to show that there is an open example there in the

pages of the Daily Worker that here is a leader of a trade-union who is a Communist. Ben Gold is an example, among others.

Suddenly one day he says he has resigned from the Communist Party and he can take the affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board. The Communists in the Daily Worker had to explain that because that did create some difficulty, and so they said that the rank-and-file Communist must continue to assert his open communism. He has no responsibility to large institutions, funds, and to the welfare of masses, but those who have responsibility, while maintaining their fraternal relations with the party, may repudiate the party openly in this way, so they went to the extent of repudiating the party in that case.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the next episode, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The next episode is a brief one, but a rather important one, and that was during the Amerasia incident, which occurred very rapidly and it is not as sharp, even though later, in my memory as some others, but nevertheless in the Amerasia case in 1945 there were many hurried meetings in the Politburo and segments of the Politburo, and in that connection Lattimore's name was mentioned several times; that is, that he should be appealed to for help, and, finally, Jack Stachel did report that Lattimore had been of considerable assistance in the Amerasia case.

The nature of the assistance I could not say.

Senator O'CONOR. Could you state, Mr. Budenz, by whom Lattimore's name was mentioned? You said it was mentioned by several.

Mr. BUDENZ. By Jack Stachel specifically mentioning that he had been of great assistance to the defendants in the Amerasia case.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you describe for us the role of Jack Stachel and your relationship to him at this time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Jack Stachel, who is among those who were convicted in the trial on Foley Square, has been for years the most important Communist in the United States for all-around activity. He was one of the small commission of five which was in constant touch with Moscow.

Mr. BUDENZ. He also was the one who brought the line very frequently to the political bureau from this contact with Moscow representatives. When I say "in touch with Moscow," that doesn't always mean with the Soviet Embassy or Consulate; it means through intermediaries.

He was the one who was in touch with Gerhart Eisler.

In other words, he was the most important cog in the Communist machine linking up the legal party, the open party in this country, with the illegal Stalinite representatives from abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say that he monitored your work in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. In addition to that he became a representative of the political bureau of the Daily Worker. That was a custom, though, for years, different personnel being involved on that.

When I first went with the Daily Worker, Alexander Bittelman of the party was the chief even though Hathaway was supposed to be editor-in-chief. He met every day with the editorial staff of the Daily Worker. He could meet because he knew the line that he had received from Communist International representatives.

Mr. Morris. Was Jack Stachel your superior?

Mr. Budenz. Just a moment. Even Bittelman was succeeded by others like William Z. Foster and others and Stachel for a long time during a large part of my being managing editor was a representative of the Politburo. He therefore was my direct and immediate superior in the conspiracy.

Mr. Morris. Was there another episode involving Owen Lattimore that you can testify about, Mr. Budenz, connected with his Japanese activities?

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes. That leads us, of course, into another field and I wasn't thinking along that line at the moment.

As the war against Japan approached the climax the Communist conspiracy proceeded to emphasize the necessity of a hard peace in Japan. They had in mind a Morgenthau plan for Japan and anyone who was against that, who would treat the Japanese people in any reasonable terms, was denounced as a Facist and an agent of the Zaibatsu. That is a Japanese term, as I understand it, meaning the industrialists of Japan.

That was the Communist position which you could find very extremely emphasized in the Daily Worker and other Communist publications of that period.

They wanted to have a hard peace for Japan, just as they emphasized the necessity of a hard peace for Germany. This was clearly told us in order to alienate these countries from the United States.

In this connection a very valuable Lattimorian contribution was made. Just in the middle of the Communist campaign Lattimore gave an interview to the United Press attacking the Zaibatsu and declaring that the democratic element should be brought forward. That's what the Communists were saying, the democratic element from the Communist viewpoint being themselves.

Now, this statement by Mr. Lattimore in that period was considered so important that extra copies of the Daily Worker were published and distributed throughout the country and the party was advised in a private directive—they get out many of these private directives—well, they advocated that Guenther Stein's books be published in that manner and Harrison Forman's books, and the like.

In one of these directives they emphasized that Lattimore's interviews, just as it appeared in the Daily Worker, should be given the widest distribution in trade-unions, youth groups, and the like; in communities, in other words.

Senator Smith. What year was that?

Mr. Budenz. 1945.

Mr. Sourwine. Doesn't Zaibatsu mean a little more than industrialist? Doesn't it mean the larger merchants? Does it not carry a connotation of blood-sucking oppression?

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. It was the use by the Communists of an attack upon a group who perhaps needed criticism, but the Communists used that to identify themselves with all of the anti-Zaibatsu elements and to make themselves the sole democratic group.

In the midst of this campaign Mr. Lattimore's statement served Communist purposes well. I cannot say that that was the arrangement of the Communist Party in this instance—I don't know that—but I know that we were instructed to use it because it was so effective.

Mr. Sourwine. You think it might have been rather timely?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was certainly considered timely by the Communists. It was right in line with their campaign.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned Guenther Stein and Harry Forman as having books published by the Communist Party. Were they both Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your official position with the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here numerous exhibits bearing on the testimony of Mr. Budenz on Communist Party policy on Japan, as well as the UP release at that time, the interview at that time which Mr. Lattimore gave. I prefer to introduce those into the record immediately after lunch. The witness seems to be tired, and I suggest that we adjourn until 2 o'clock.

Senator SMITH. I have one question I would like to ask you if you can tell us now.

I thought I heard you say that the purpose of the movement for a coalition government in China was to destroy somebody or some movement.

Mr. BUDENZ. Destroy Chiang Kai-shek and establish Communist China.

As a matter of fact, Senator, if time will permit later, I can refer you to statements by the Chinese leaders to that effect right at the moment they were advocating a coalition government.

Senator SMITH. Was that before, after, or about the time that Lattimore became the confidential adviser of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was after.

Senator SMITH. Do you regard Lattimore's connection or appointment as a confidential adviser to Chiang Kai-shek a part of that plan to have a coalition government to destroy Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That I could not testify to. I have my opinion, but I cannot testify with absolute knowledge, of my own knowledge.

You see, during that period partly I was out in the Middle West, and after taking over the duties of the Daily Worker, and I couldn't say that of my own knowledge.

Senator SMITH. You did know that Lattimore turned up as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. And I know that the Communist political bureau was not ill-served by that function. That he was deliberately put there for that purpose, I cannot say.

Senator SMITH. You do not know who put him there, or how that came about?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. If there are no further questions the committee will take a recess until 2:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m. upon the expiration of the recess.)

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please be in order.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—Resumed

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Budenz, just before the noon recess there were certain matters referred to concerning Owen Lattimore about which I should like to ask you a few questions. You had recounted the several episodes starting in 1937 and then up to 1943 and 1944, which, in your opinion, referred to Owen Lattimore's activities. I would like to ask you whether throughout that period you met Owen Lattimore.

Mr. Budenz. No, sir; I did not meet Mr. Lattimore at any time until at the hearing in Washington.

Senator O'Conor. My next question is whether it is significant, and inasmuch as you say you were yourself active in the affairs of the Communist Party and you attribute to Mr. Lattimore certain interests in furtherance of Communist purposes, whether it is significant that you did not meet him or know him.

Mr. Budenz. It is significant. It is significant in the sense that many men of Mr. Lattimore's functioning were directed—I don't know that he was directed—but many men of Mr. Lattimore's functioning were directed specifically to avoid all contacts with official Communist organs that would commit them in any way in the public eye. As a matter of fact, there is quite a difference of responsibility among members of the Communist Party, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know whether you want me to pursue that or not.

Senator O'Conor. I think it would be of very great interest to have you do so at this time.

Mr. Budenz. We have what I call the Communist spectrum. The spectrum of Communist allegiance; that is a term I used while I was still a Communist and to some extent was adopted by other people who discussed this in the Politburo. That is to say, we will take the spy.

Anyone engaged in espionage like Judith Coplon, and there are a number of those people trained for espionage alone, must not give any indication of any association with Communists. As a matter of fact, they are not even permitted to approach Communist branch meetings; they are ordered not to do so. They cannot have any contact with known Communists.

That of course is quite obvious why that would be. The infiltrator of government is somewhat in a similar position and is not supposed to have any vestige of Communist membership on him and to avoid any public relationship with Communists. Beyond that he is also permitted of course within limitations to make such statements critical of the Communist Party as will assure his non-Communist standing so that he may put the burden—I use that word "burden" of his activity in the Communist cause because that was the way it was used—the weight of his activities in the Communist cause.

Then there is the infiltrator of other organizations. They likewise have the same responsibilities, though they are not so much protected as anyone in the Government. I mean protected by the Communist Party. They likewise can misrepresent.

You take, for example, during the one month that I was supposedly a non-Communist, though a Communist, in August 1935, I was specifically directed by Stachel again to criticize the party to non-Communists but to do it lightly and to put the burden of my arguments in

favor of cooperation with the Communists, although I was a fully admitted Communist Party member working as a non-Communist until they could decide what my function should be.

We have also the case of even Ben Gold, the open Communist, and this was worked out while I was still in the party, though it didn't come to fruition until the next CIO convention, who as an open Communist signed a report denouncing Communist infiltration in the CIO. That was in order to ameliorate the feelings of Philip Murray.

These special exemptions are granted by the district leader functioning as a non-Communist in infiltrating into other organizations in order that his infiltration may be effective.

Next in the category are the members of the Communist fronts who have still another set of responsibilities, to follow out the fronts, to respond when called upon, but who again deny they are Communists, and of course in denying it have to express occasionally why they are not Communists. You just can't say, "I am not a Communist," you have to explain why. They are permitted to do that, although 95 percent of the Communist fronts, according to my knowledge, are members of the Communist Party.

When I say members of the Communist Party I do not mean necessarily card-carrying Communists because most Communists do not carry cards but are subject to Communist allegiance.

Then there are the open party members, the expendables as they have been called, the rank-an-file Communists, the picket-line Communists who are supposed to be open, and they are not permitted to deviate from the line of the party because they represent the reputation of the party.

Likewise with the bureaucrat or functionary. The word "bureaucrat" is not used in the party. Although Lenin said our party is bureaucratic, they don't like to use that. They are functionaries. They, of course, have a deep responsibility and they cannot deviate from the party at all. Anyone who is a section organizer or district organizer of the party or the like in his person is the party because the leadership principle is very strong.

Among the bureaucrats, though, there are variations again. There are those illegal agents sent in here by Stalin who direct the party, who are largely underground; there are the open party representatives like William Z. Foster, today, and Browder when I was there, and the like; and then there are, of course, certain functionaries who for one reason or another, from time to time, become concealed.

Now each one of these, at the time that they perform these different functions, have different responsibilities in regard to how much they will assert their Communist integrity. The great question that was always put in the Politburo and at State committee meetings, and I have attended a number of State committee meetings where this question came up for lesser people in the party, those people who were concerned, the question always was how far they could go in order that they could carry on their deceit of others, what scandal it will create in the party.

According to the answer to that question were they granted a certain immunity from being quite regular from the party line or party regulations.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Budenz, therefore did you consider it exceptional or extraordinary or unusual that Owen Lattimore was not known to you or seen by you during this period?

Mr. Budenz. No, sir; that could be said of a number of other people, some of whom later on were divulged to be Communists. That would be true of Dr. Norman Bethune, a noted Canadian surgeon who also was very active in the Communist Party in the United States and for various reasons was not known to me. I never saw him. He was supposed always to be a non-Communist. He asserted strenuously, he was not a Communist, but after he died in China, helping the Chinese Reds, Earl Browder announced at a public meeting that the wish of Bethune when he went to China was that he be publicly acknowledged to be a member of the Communist Party for many years.

Now Dr. Bethune was not known to me. I just mention him because his case was rather outstanding.

Senator O'Conor. All right, Mr. Morris, will you proceed then?

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we had gotten as far as Mr. Budenz' testimony on a certain press interview given by Mr. Owen Lattimore. I would like to introduce that into the record at this time.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this photostat you have just given me?

Mr. Mandel. I have had this photostat made of the Daily Worker of September 5, 1945, page 8, of an article by Gwen Morgan entitled, "'Allies Must Break Japanese Monopolists' Grip,' says Lattimore."

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, do you recognize that article?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Were you editor of the Daily Worker when that was published?

Mr. Budenz. I was indeed; yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Was that part of the Communist program to impose a hard peace on Japan?

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. You will find that this is accompanied in the Daily Worker by demands of a similar character though expressed sometimes in different language. Just at this time the campaign of the Communists was for a hard peace in Japan, and this hard peace was to be directed against the Zaibatzu.

That is in accordance with Communists calling other people Fascists or saying they are against monopoly and saying they are the only democratic elements. This campaign was to be carried on in that manner.

As a matter of fact, I believe we shall see an interesting development of this in the effort to destroy anyone connected with the Government who opposed a hard peace for Japan.

Mr. Morris. You mean people in our State Department?

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. That was the Communist program, but that would have to be developed further.

Mr. Morris. Now is there any particular thing in that article that you would like to comment further on, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. Budenz. I think not. The article more or less speaks for itself and it accompanies the campaign of the Daily Worker, which upon investigation would have been found to be along the same line. The emphasis of both the Daily Worker and of Mr. Lattimore was that the democratic elements in Japan should be brought forward, but when you examine who the democratic elements in Japan were, Mr. Lattimore doesn't examine them except very superficially, and the

Daily Worker did, we will find them to be those represented by the Communists.

The importance of this article so far as I am concerned and so far as my knowledge is concerned is this: (1) That it was quite in line with the headline reading, " 'Allies must break Japanese monopolists' grip which was what the Communists were driving for at that time; (2) that it was used so widely by the Communist Party to my own knowledge—that is, among non-Communist groups.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this photostat of the Daily Worker article, the Daily Worker of Wednesday, September 5, 1945, page 8, with the headline reading, " 'Allies must break Japanese monopolists' grip,' says Lattimore," I would like to have this introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted and will be given the next consecutive number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 139" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 139

[From the Daily Worker, New York, September 5, 1945]

"ALLIES MUST BREAK JAPANESE MONOPOLISTS' GRIP" SAYS LATTIMORE

(By Gwen Morgan)

BALTIMORE, September 4 (UP).—Owen Lattimore, former adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, said today that the Allies must free Japan of the "Zaibatsu's" grip before democracy can develop there. He declared that the Zaibatsu—or industrialists—merged completely with the militarists in controlling Japan for aggression and that the primary control always was civilian.

"Together," he said, "they are like a small octopus with huge tentacles which holds everything in its power. Their tool and front was the Emperor, owner of vast shares and estates, and he still is—although now they are loudly disclaiming the militarists."

Lattimore said in an interview at Johns Hopkins University, where he is director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, that preserving the Emperor and the Zaibatsu means preserving the "entire machinery that made Japan an aggressive country."

The biggest misconception about Japan, he said, is that the interests of the industrialists, the militarists and the Emperor differ.

"The only difference is that the civilians or industrialists are the go-slow crowd about aggression," he said. "The militarists are the go-fast. The Emperor belongs to both of them."

The Emperor's holdings alone, he said, amount to thousands of shares in banking, railroad, sugar, utilities, paper, and shipping companies, as well as hundreds of thousands of acres of land.

Lattimore said breaking the stranglehold of the Zaibatsu would make possible the development of a "genuine spontaneous and thoroughly Japanese movement which would substitute for the Emperor a real republic."

He declared that if this were permitted, supported, and encouraged by American policy it would take the form of middle-of-the-road democracy, and there would be no "danger" of communism.

"The only danger of communism would arise if American policy were to choke off the development of democracy, leaving communism as the only alternative to reactionary Japanese forces supported by the victorious powers," he said.

Lattimore said a democratic potential does exist in Japan, composed of thousands of small, independent businessmen who were not brought completely under the Zaibatsu until the war period and now would like to regain their independence; laborers who have been shorn of rights and poorly paid, and peasants whose cooperatives have been subject to monopoly control and who have been dominated by landlords, the most powerful of whom are related to the Zaibatsu and military families.

MONOPOLISTS' PROGRAM

Lattimore said the Zaibatsu were better prepared for defeat than the United States for victory.

"They already have put their collaborationist team on the field to capitalize on the United States belief that the Emperor controls them while, in fact, they control him," he said.

He predicted this would be their line of action:

1. To stimulate disorder and conflict in China.
2. To work up antagonism between Russia and the other Allies.
3. To be awfully good boys with the Americans and carry out their wishes. If any uprisings occur in the name of democracy, the Japanese authorities would run to the Allies and report it as subversive activity.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with a publication called the United Nations World, whose editor is Louis Dolivet?

Senator O'CONNOR. I note that it is dated Baltimore, September 4. What is the year?

Mr. MORRIS. 1945.

Senator O'CONNOR. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the United Nations World, the editor of which in 1950 was Louis Dolivet?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know of Louis Dolivet?

Mr. BUDENZ. Louis Dolivet was officially stated to me by Earl Browder to be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with an article appearing in the United Nations——

Mr. BUDENZ. May I explain how that arose?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. It may take your time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right.

Mr. BUDENZ. There was a predecessor to this paper which was independent, we didn't have the United Nations. It was Free World or something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. As chairman of the publications commission of the party I organized for the penetration of the Free World and even had arranged for a secretary to be in Louis Dolivet's office, which was a very common method of Communist penetration to get information. I first consulted because this was partially an international matter, I consulted Mr. Browder. He told me not to do this, that Mr. Dolivet was with us, that he had technically resigned in order to come to the United States, but that he was a Communist in good standing so far as the party was concerned.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same Louis Dolivet who became editor of United Nations World?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the same man.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I have a copy of the United Nation World dated March 1950, the masthead of which shows that Louis Dolivet was the editor. On page 22 there is an article, Asia Reconquers Asia, by Owen Lattimore. I ask you if you have read that article, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you comment on it for us, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article carries out very skillfully the Asia for the Asiatics campaign of the Communists. Of course, this is after

my being in the party, but it carries forward exactly what the idea was.

Mr. MORRIS. You learned what the Communist policy was from your experience in the Communist movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. It begins with this statement:

> It is clear that the change of power in China cannot properly be described as primarily a victory of Communist armies or of Communist ideas. The chief phenomenon has been the moral and political bankruptcy of the National Government of China, whose "ability" to collapse greatly exceeded the ability of the Communists to push it over.

Well, we could go forward, but there is another paragraph here that might be of some pertinence.

> The shift of power which took place in spite of a formidable American intervention and in the absence of any ponderable Russian intervention means that China for the first time for a hundred years is beyond the control of the most powerful of the western nations. There are a number of reasons for believing that the power of control by intervention which has fallen from the hands of the west has not passed into the hands of Soviet Russia. It may well be that Russia also will not be able to "move in on" China and take over control within China.

Well, Mr. Lattimore must certainly have been advised when he wrote that article of the many official declarations of the Chinese Communists not only of adherence to Stalin but of adoration of him. I have scores of such statements in my own library. To state that there was no Russian intervention in China and to picture the whole thing as just a revolt against the west is typically in line with the Communist position to those who were not Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the date of that article, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The date is March 1950.

Senator O'CONOR. Will the hearing please be in order? Mr. Morris, will you kindly resume?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Maxwell S. Stewart a Communist to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Maxwell S. Stewart under circumstances that would conclusively show to you that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe those circumstances to the committee, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was in the early forties. The exact year I cannot remember as yet. The incident I remember very definitely.

There was a confidential matter connected with the party that I had to consult Mr. Stewart about. I had an appointment at the Nation with him. I went to Mr. Browder to consult with him, as the leader of the party, as to whether I could talk to Maxwell S. Stewart, and in what capacity.

Mr. Browder said, "You may speak to him as a Communist." So in the resultant conference, I disclosed to Mr. Stewart that I knew that he was under the same allegiance that I was.

Mr. MORRIS. You did meet with Mr. Stewart?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, in the office of the Nation.

Mr. Morris. What was Mr. Stewart's position in the Nation at that time?

Mr. Budenz. He was one of the editors, I believe.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any other reason to believe that Maxwell S. Stewart was a Communist?

Mr. Budenz. Many reasons.

Mr. Morris. Would you describe them, please, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. Budenz. Maxwell S. Stewart has been one of the most active members of the Communist fronts that exist in the United States. I cannot keep track of all of these Communist fronts.

In connection with these Communist fronts, over and over again Maxwell Stewart was discussed by the leaders of the party with me as either an initiator or sponsor or one who could be relied upon to see that others joined these Communist fronts.

In that connection, I learned repeatedly over the years from the early forties until I left the party in 1945, that Maxwell Stewart continued to be one of the reliables of the party—a phrase which was used in his regard by Mr. Browder.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, would you put something officially into the record to show that Mr. Stewart was the editor of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series?

Mr. Mandel. In the report entitled, "Windows on the Pacific, Biennial Report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations," 1944–46, page 11, we find this notation:

In Miriam Farley's absence, Maxwell S. Stewart, editor of the well-known Public Affairs Pamphlets, assumed the editorship of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that excerpt read by Mr. Mandel to appear in the record and that exhibit be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 140" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 140

[From Windows on the Pacific, Biennial Report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1944–46 (p. 11)]

Maxwell S. Stewart

In Miriam Farley's absence, Maxwell S. Stewart, editor of the well-known Public Affairs Pamphlets, assumed the editorship of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you take a sample pamphlet completely written by Mr. Stewart and call it to the attention of the committee, please?

Mr. Mandel. I have here a pamphlet entitled, "Wartime China."

Mr. Morris. Will you listen to what is read here, Mr. Budenz? We may ask for a characterization.

Mr. Mandel. (reading):

By Maxwell S. Stewart. IPR Pamphlets No. 10. American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Published in 1944.

I read from an excerpt on page 45.

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other

countries and you can also find resemblances to the "grass-roots" Populist movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that whole excerpt appear in our record and that pamphlet be introduced by reference as part of the record.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be so introduced and marked.

(The pamphlet referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 141" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you any comment to make on that excerpt from Mr. Stewart's article?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This appeared while I was very active in the Communist Party. This is good illustration of the carrying out of the North Dakota Non-Partisan League formula.

This describes the Chinese Communists as the Populists. That is similar to the American Populist. It is a complete deceit on the American people because, at the same time, if I may be privileged to say so, Mr. Stewart and the Institute of Pacific Relations had at their disposal official statements by the Chinese Communists, such as they made in the opening of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935, that they were pledged to Soviet power throughout the world and to mounting the barricades in that pursuit.

In other words, the Chinese Communists by their official declarations had thoroughly established in the Communist world their own character as adherents of Moscow and completely devoted to Marxism Leninism.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, that was a pamphlet written by Mr. Stewart. Do you have an example of one edited by Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. MANDEL. We have a pamphlet entitled "Land of the Soviets," by Marguerite Ann Stewart, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Marguerite Ann Stewart the wife of Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. This is published as a cooperative project between American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co., St. Louis, Dallas, and Los Angeles.

I have selected some excerpts from that pamphlet to give the tone of the pamphlet. I now read a few of these excerpts.

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government.

But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who devotes himself conscientiously to the common good. An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice in running the factories.

Mr. MORRIS. Just one more, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. In reference to the Soviet purges:

The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It regarded such acts as violations against Socialist property and punished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again; in a few instances they were shot.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on that?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, if the Communist Party circulated that, it could not be better done as a Communist apologia. It is precisely what the Communists were saying. It is thoroughly a Communist point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have such of the excerpts as extracted by Mr. Mandel from the pamphlet, Land of the Soviets, written by Marguerite Ann Stewart and edited by Maxwell S. Stewart introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 142

LAND OF THE SOVIETS

(By Marguerite Ann Stewart, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart, cover by LaVerne Riess)

(A cooperative project between American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations and Webster Publishing Co., St. Louis, Dallas, Los Angeles)

* * * * * * *

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government (p. 3).

* * * As we know, under the capitalist system, property of all kinds may be owned by private individuals or commercial organizations, and all business is conducted primarily for the profit of the owner. * * * But, under a Socialist system, the factories and other types of business are socially owned, that is, they belong to the population as a whole and are operated by the government, not for the profit of any one person or group of individuals, but for the benefit of all the people. * * * And all industry—every single factory, office, bank, grocery, and department store, every theater, movie, bakery, and newspaper—is the property of the people as a whole and is operated by their government or by their organizations (p. 6).

* * * Ivan Petrovich Petrov might be considered a rather typical Russian city worker. Blonde, rosy-cheeked, and of medium height, he has a keen sense of humor; loves to dance, sing, and talk until late at night and to enjoy himself with his friends; admires things on a big scale and adores mechanical devices and machinery. * * * Ivan, a very responsible worker, was a member of the factory committee, elected by the workers to advise the director of the plant. Each day he and Anna took Sasha to the attractive nursery school maintained by the factory for the children of its employees (p. 17).

* * * Curious as it may seem to us, the person at the top of the social scale is the worker (p. 21).

* * * But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who devotes himself conscientiously to the comomn good. * * * An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice in running the factories. * * * (P. 26.)

Why did the Russians resort to revolution in 1917? Was such a complete overthrow necessary? And, why, after the revolution, did they set up a system so different from that of other governments? Why were they not satisfied with a republic, for example, like that of the United States? (P. 27.)

* * * On November 7 (October 25 by the old Russian calendar), the Red Guards were sent by the Soviets to surround the Winter Palace and all the Government buildings in the name of the Socialist revolution. All the provisional ministers were arrested except Kerensky, who had managed to escape. * * * Thus, at one stroke, the peasants attained the right to more than 500 million additional acres which had heretofore belonged to the Crown, the nobility, and

the church. Industry likewise was taken over as the property of the people (p. 37).

Probably the greatest surprise of Hitler's life lay in the fact that the Russian peasants, particularly in the Ukraine, did not hail his approach in 1941 as a signal to revolt against the Soviet Government. * * * (P. 53.)

* * * The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It regarded such acts as violations against Socialist property and punished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again; in a few instances they were shot. * * * (P. 60).

* * * Communists are expected to be an example to others (p. 66).

* * * Each of these has its own village soviet, chosen at a village meeting not unlike our New England town meeting. * * * City soviets are also elected directly by the people (p. 68).

* * * The 1936 constitution also introduced into the Soviet Union many of the elements of democracy as we know them in this country. It introduced the secret ballot (p. 69).

Mr. BUDENZ. Incidentally, I did not say that rashly. These phrases can be found almost in the same order in official Communist documents.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know that Ben Kizer is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe how you know that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know this through official information given me by Jack Stachel, and also by the district leader of the party in Washington, Henry Huff.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, at that point, if you do not mind, I think, for the same reason that the chairman commented today, it might be well at this juncture to identify Ben Kizer.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. I would be glad to do it. He is a rather well known and, as a matter of fact, distinguished lawyer in the State of Washington and has quite a wide circle of acquaintances.

He has been rather active on the Pacific coast advancing the Soviet idea of the Far East, that is, those Soviet ideas which could be put forth under a non-Communist cover.

Mr. Kizer has been mentioned to me—I cannot give you exactly the occasions, but on a number of occasions—and in reports to the national committee on one or two occasions was praised by the district leader of the Communist Party in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name, Mr. Budenz, of the leader of the Communist Party in Washington?

Mr. BUDENZ. Henry Huff.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have something to show that Mr. Kizer is presently on the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letterhead, a 1951 letterhead of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, showing Benjamin H. Kizer as a member of the board of trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this letterhead identified by Mr. Mandel introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be introduced and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 143" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 143

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Gerard Swope, chairman
Robert G. Sproul, vice chairman
Heaton L. Wrenn, vice chairman
Clifford B. Marshall, treasurer
William L. Holland, executive vice chairman
Trustees:
Edward W. Allen
Raymond B. Allen
J. Ballard Atherton
Joseph W. Ballantine
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H. Clifford Brown
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Gordon R. Clapp
Chas. F. Clise
Arthur G. Coons
George B. Cressey
Walter F. Dillingham
Brooks Emeny
Rupert Emerson
John K. Fairbank
G. W. Fisher
Richard E. Fuller
Sidney D. Gamble
Martha A. Gerbode
L. Carrington Goodrich
John R. Hersey
Joseph E. Johnson
Benjamin H. Kizer
Clayton Lane
Owen Lattimore
Herbert S. Little
William W. Lockwood
Charles F. Loomis
James A. MacKay
George C. Marshall
Charles E. Martin
Frank E. Midkiff
J. Morden Murphy
William Phillips
James H. Shoemaker
Gregg M. Sinclair
Paul C. Smith
J. Wallace Sterling
Donald B. Straus
George E. Taylor
Donald G. Tewksbury
W. W. Waymack
Sumner Welles
Brayton Wilbur
Herbert J. Wood
Louise L. Wright

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any information on the activities on the part of Mr. Kizer?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify them and read them into the record, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Miller Freeman, from Charles W. Eliot, Director of the Executive Office of the President, National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D. C. It is dated May 1, 1943.

We have delayed replying to your letter of March 30 inquiring about Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer's, The Northern Pacific International Planning Project, as reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this statement as mimeographed in a confidential edition by the institute was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. Those two agencies have completed examination of the document and related maps and have given their approval to general publication of the material with some modification.

The confidential mimeographed edition was not reproduced by this agency and we assume that it was kept confidential, because it was realized by the institute that some of the statements might be objected to by military authorities and it was for this reason that the document was submitted to the censor and to the Army for clearance.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT, *Director.*

This comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then we have here a letter to Benjamin Kizer from Owen Lattimore, dated January 27, 1939, which is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I read parts of the letter.

I have just been reading with great appreciation an advance copy of your article to come out in Amerasia. This article will do a lot of good, I think. It is one of the best statesmanlike discussions of the whole subject that I have seen.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this Mr. Lattimore writing?

Mr. MANDEL. This is Mr. Lattimore writing.

Is it in time, however? Aren't we all of us too late? One of the most shocking things about the present atmosphere of crisis is that at the very time when the Gallup poll has tabulated the fact which most of us know already—that the majority of people in this country are in favor of Loyalist Spain and disgusted with the Spanish embargo—nothing has been done about it, and Barcelona has been allowed to fall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment on that, Mr. Budenz, to the extent that you heard it read?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, except that it followed the Communist position at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these two letters introduced into the record and marked as consecutive exhibits.

Senator O'CONOR. The Chair has brought up the question because of our possible doubt as to the propriety of introducing a letter dated May 1 from one Charles W. Eliot to Mr. Miller Freeman.

Mr. Morris, would you indicate why you think it is relevant?

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of introducing that letter was to show that Benjamin H. Kizer's book, The Northern Pacific International Planning Project, was reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that it was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. It is being introduced simply for those two facts, without any implication whatsoever with respect to the addressee or the sender.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. With regard to those two matters, it also is not indicated whether it was reproduced with or without the authorization—I do think if it is introduced for that limited purpose, without there being any inference upon the sender or the addressee, it would be permissible.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. When Senator McCarran had the chair, he issued a caveat at one time that these letters being introduced carry no implication broader than the mere fact of the letters themselves. There is no implication by the mere association of either the addressee or the people mentioned in the body, or the senders of the letters.

Senator SMITH. Was this found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel testified that it was extracted from the files.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Smith, I had no difficulty about it being applicable to the IPR. I did think it might have some unfortunate connotations in regard to the sender or the addressee. But with the stipulation that has been made——

Senator SMITH. The question occurred to me whether or not it was reproduced by or with the consent and the approval of any of these men. I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, on that point, the letter says it was reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that letter was in the files of the institute. It was for that purpose that we are showing Mr. Kizer's association with the institute.

Senator SMITH. That is the only purpose of it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. With that limited purpose, it will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 144 and 145" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 144

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD,
Washington, D. C., May 1, 1943.

Mr. MILLER FREEMAN,
71 Columbia Street, Seattle, Wash.

DEAR MR. FREEMAN: We have delayed replying to your letter of March 30 inquiring about Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer's The Northern Pacific International Planning Project, as reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this statement as mimeographed in a confidential edition by the institute was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. Those two agencies have completed examination of the document and related maps and have given their approval to general publication of the material with some modification.

The confidential mimeographed edition was not reproduced by this agency and we assume that it was kept confidential, because it was realized by the institute that some of the statements might be objected to by military authorities and it was for this reason that the document was submitted to the censor and to the Army for clearance.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT, *Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 145

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., January 27, 1939.

Mr. BENJAMIN H. KIZER,
Old National Bank Building,
Spokane, Wash.

DEAR MR. KIZER: I have just been reading with great appreciation an advance copy of your article to come out in Amerasia. This article will do a lot of good, I think. It is one of the most statesmanlike discussions of the whole subject that I have seen.

Is it in time, however? Aren't we all of us too late? One of the most shocking things about the present atmosphere of crisis is that at the very time when the Gallup poll has tabulated the fact which most of us knew already—that the majority of people in this country are in favor of Loyalist Spain and disgusted with the Spanish embargo—nothing has been done about it, and Barcelona has been allowed to fall. Is this purely inertia? Is it just a lag between the forming of the popular will and the expression of that will through political action by the Government? Not just that, I am afraid. The effect of the natural inertia or lag has been very much aggravated by the lobbying and string-pulling of those who "view with alarm" just that very thing—the expression of the popular will.

Are we going to be as far behind the run of the play in Asia as we have in Europe? Maybe we have a slight edge, because, as you have pointed out, the key to the whole situation is the fact that Japan is the angle of the Fascist triangle. The Japanese don't need to be defeated outright. If they are just properly stalled, it will nullify the gain in Europe made by Italy and Germany.

We have just met here your friends, the Hazelton Spensers, and are enjoying them very much. I had dinner there the other night with Archibald MacLeish. He has been giving a series of lectures here on modern poetry. Very brilliant, and some penetrating analyses. I think he is dead right in saying that in our times, the atmosphere of our generation, the genuinely poetic mood is bound to be political.

With warm regards from both my wife and myself.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a list of positions held in the IPR by Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, as taken from the official publication of the IPR, which I wish to place in the record.

The positions include vice chairman, American Council, IPR; member of the international secretariat, and other positions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record Mr. Mandel's compilation of the positions held by Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer in its entirety in the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Budenz, there is no doubt that this is the individual to whom you refer? It gives his address as "Attorney, Spokane, Wash."

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 146" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 146

BENJAMIN H. KIZER

Benjamin H. Kizer (1933, 1936), member of the law firm of Graves, Kizer & Graves; Chairman, Region No. 9, National Resources Planning Board; associate member of the War Labor Board; vice chairman, American Council, IPR (p. 160).

Source: War and Peace in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on wartime and postwar cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4–14, 1942; international secretariat, IPR; copyright, 1943.

Benjamin H. Kizer (1933, 1936, 1942), lawyer (Graves, Kizer & Graves), Spokane, Wash.; trustee, American IPR; associate public member, National War Labor Board, 1943–45; Director, China Office, UNRRA, 1945–46 (p. 120).

Source: Problems of Economic Reconstruction in the Far East, tenth conference of the IPR, Stratford-on-Avon, England, September 5–20, 1947; international secretariat, IPR; copyright, 1949.

B. H. Kizer, attorney, Spokane, Wash. (p. 456).

Source: Problems of the Pacific, 1933, economic conflict and control proceedings of the fifth conference of the IPR, Banff, Alberta, Canada, August 14–26, 1933; edited by Bruno Lasker and W. L. Holland, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.; published June 1934.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter on the letterhead of Benjamin H. Kizer, dated August 23, 1937, and addressed to Frederick V. Field of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to read the letter. [Reading:]

Now that dramatic and bloody events in the Far East are so rapidly making history of the sort that we have come to regard as inevitable, no matter how evil the consequences, I have taken occasion to reread, in the quiet of Sunday afternoon, your article "The Far East and American Foreign Policy," reprinted from The Annals.

Even more than in my first reading, I am deeply impressed with the insight into those tangled relations that it discloses. It calls to my mind a characteristic sentence of Judge Holmes: "The final gift is, I think, insight." Your article has that "final gift" in its best form.

You take up the question of American foreign policy in the Far East where the rest of us who recently contributed in Amerasia left off and give us a relatively complete picture, not merely of that policy but of its probable consequences. It is the world's tragedy that, although such insight as yours exists, the world is incapable of making use of it while nations stumble along blindfolded by their want of insight, with consequences that play havoc with human happiness and human destiny.

More than ever your article makes me eager to hear you on the neutrality topic at Victoria next month.

Yours faithfully,

B. H. KIZER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, this letter was written on August 23, 1937. At that time did you know that Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I had not yet met him, but I knew from official statements that he was a member.

Mr. MORRIS. Your earlier testimony was that you attended a meeting with him in 1937.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. That was approximately in October.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. This was in October. Do you think it is possible that Mr. Field could have assumed such an important position in the Communist Party in the ensuing 2 months?

Mr. BUDENZ. No. He had come to my attention before as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. So, at the time Mr. Kizer wrote this letter praising Mr. Field's writing on the Far East, you know that Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. I had not met him, however, until approximately October, as far as I recall. I may have met him earlier.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be introduced and marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 147" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 147

SPOKANE, WASH., *August 23, 1937.*

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

MY DEAR FRED: Now that dramatic and bloody events in the Far East are so rapidly making history of the sort that we have come to regard as inevitable, no matter how evil the consequences, I have taken occasion to reread, in the quiet of Sunday afternoon, your article "The Far East and American Foreign Policy," reprinted from The Annals.

Even more than in my first reading, I am deeply impressed with the insight into those tangled relations that it discloses. It calls to my mind a characteristic sentence of Judge Holmes: "The final gift is, I think, insight." Your article has that "final gift" in its best form.

You take up the question of American foreign policy in the Far East where the rest of us who recently contributed to Amerasia left off and give us a relatively complete picture, not merely of that policy but of its probable consequences. It is the world's tragedy that, although such insight as yours exists, the world is incapable of making use of it while nations stumble along blindfolded by their want of insight, with consequences that play havoc with human happiness and human destiny.

More than ever your article makes me eager to hear you on the neutrality topic at Victoria next month.

Yours faithfully,

B. H. KIZER.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter on the letterhead of the National Resources Planning Board, field office, Portland, Oreg. It is dated December 1, 1942. It is addressed to Mr. W. W. Lockwood, and it is signed by George Sundborg, senior planning technician, region X.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: We have just received from the Military Intelligence Service of the Army a request that it be furnished with four copies of your American Council Paper No. 2, which as I understand it is Mr. Kizer's paper

on the North Pacific planning project, prepared for presentation at Mont Tremblant. The copies are needed for distribution within the Army.

Can you take care of this request? The address is:

North American Group,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Lt. J. S. Culbertson.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE SUNDBORG,
Senior Planning Technician, Region X.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose for introducing this letter into the record is to show that Mr. Kizer's papers were being distributed and taken up by the Army Intelligence on December 1, 1941. With that limited purpose, I introduce this letter into the record and ask that it be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. Are we to understand that it was found in the records of IPR?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel did so testify.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be then introduced at this time for that limited purpose.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 148" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 148

NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD,
FIELD OFFICE,
Portland, Oreg., December 1, 1942.

Mr. W. W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: We have just received from the Military Intelligence Service of the Army a request that it be furnished with four copies of your American Council Paper No. 2, which as I understand it is Mr. Kizer's paper on the North Pacific planning project, prepared for presentation at Mont Tremblant. The copies are needed for distribution within the Army.

Can you take care of this request? The address is:

North American Group,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Lt. J. S. Culbertson.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE SUNDBORG,
Senior Planning Technician, Region X.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a footnote dated November 5, 1948, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

"C. L. from E. C. C." "C. L." may be Corliss Lamont, and "E. C. C." may be E. C. Carter.

The letter reads as follows:

I don't know whether you ever met Ben Kizer who for years has been one of our stanchest board members from anywhere in the country. He believes profoundly in the institute and has the broadest kind of international outlook. It will pay you to keep very closely in touch with him and whenever you do decide to go to the Northwest, you should spend at least a full day with him in Spokane and let him arrange for a visit at least to nearby Pullman. The above is occasioned by this letter which I wish you would return.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'Conor. It will be so introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 149" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 149

[Handwritten note:]
R. D. C.: Please note for me.
E. C. C.: Thanks, and double congratulations for footnote in both [unintelligible]—L.

November 5, 1948.

C. L. from E. C. C.

I don't know whether you ever met Ben Kizer who for years has been one of our stanchest board members from anywhere in the country. He believes profoundly in the institute and has the broadest kind of international outlook. It will pay you to keep very closely in touch with him and whenever you do decide to go to the Northwest you should spend at least a full day with him in Spokane and let him arrange for a visit at least to nearby Pullman. The above is occasioned by this letter which I wish you would return.

[Handwritten] R. D. C.: Has E. C. C. asked Mayer for his India letters? P. E. L. might find them a useful suggestion for FES articles.—K. R. C. P.
[Handwritten] I'd also like to see them.—W. L. H.

Mr. Morris. One reason for mentioning this is to show that Ben Kizer was for many years associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations as a board member. It is also introduced for the other comments contained therein.

Mr. Mandel. Next is a letter dated November 2, 1948. It is from Benjamin H. Kizer to Mr. Edward C. Carter. It was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Dear Ned: Responsive to your good letter of the 29th instant, I have concluded, for this year only, to add $100 to my contribution, and make it $150. This, in spite of the fact that the drains on me for this year are exceptionally heavy. I do this solely because I do want to support you as fully as I can in this year. I have a deep loyalty, admiration, and affection for you, and for the generous, self-abnegating way in which you have so richly spent your life in the cause of international relations, now of primary importance to us all.

I will send the remittance within a month. Just now, I am accumulating pennies for the final installment of income tax, which I want to have behind me before remitting.

With friendliest greetings, as always,
Yours faithfully,

Benjamin H. Kizer.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 150" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 150

Spokane, *November 2, 1948.*

Mr. Edward C. Carter,
American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Dear Ned: Responsive to your good letter of the 29th instant, I have concluded, for this year only, to add $100 to my contribution, and make it $150. This, in spite of the fact that the drains on me for this year are exceptionally heavy. I do this solely because I do want to support you as fully as I can in this year. I have a deep loyalty, admiration, and affection for you, and for the generous, self-abnegating way in which you have so richly spent your life in the cause of international relations, now of primary importance to us all.

I will send the remittance within a month. Just now, I am accumulating pennies for the final installment of income tax, which I want to have behind me before remitting.

With friendliest greetings, as always,
Yours faithfully,

Benjamin H. Kizer.

P. S.—I have a letter from Arthur Mayer that indicates that he has returned from his trip to India. His office has sent out mimeographed letters to a circle of friends, covering his India experiences. Do ask him for a set of them. You will find them richly rewarding.

B. H. K.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a small note dated August 16, 1942, which is headed "W. W. L. from R. W. B."

We presume "W. W. L." to be William William Lockwood, and "R. W. B." to be Robert W. Barnett.

The letter reads as follows. This is also taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

W. W. L. from R. W. B.

Your letter of July 23 to Kizer is most interesting and very sound. I don't see Julean Arnold maneuvering public opinion and congressional pressure groups with the finesse required. He is essentially sentimental about China. Lattimore has pointed out what damage sentiment might do. Would it be desirable for Schwellenbach, now, to take the lead in initial soundings and have Arnold and Walsh et al. attach themselves to him? I would like to talk to you about this.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. For whom did you say the initials "R. W. B." stood?

Mr. MANDEL. Robert Warren Barnett. The initials "W. W. L." stood for William W. Lockwood.

Senator SMITH. What is the basis for your assumption?

Mr. MANDEL. We have numerous correspondence with those initials and those names.

Senator SMITH. The reason I ask this, Mr. Chairman, I do know this gentleman Barnett. I know he went to school in my State, our State university. About 40 or 45 years ago, I knew his father. I was interested when you called out his name.

Mr. MANDEL. He is the secretary of the Washington IPR and there is a great deal of correspondence from him with his name written out.

Senator SMITH. There is no question about his identity?

Mr. MANDEL. No.

Senator SMITH. If there was any question, I wanted to raise the propriety of introducing something that carried an assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. The situation is this, Mr. Senator. These particular initials are found with great frequency in the files.

The gentleman concerning whom Mr. Mandel said the initials presumably referred to is the only person with those initials who we know is closely connected with the institute. He was connected, as Mr. Mandel testified.

Senator SMITH. I did not know.

Senator O'CONOR. I might ask Mr. Mandel if he can give us assurance that as of this time, August 16, 1942, or at or about that time, those parties were so connected.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. This morning, was there not another name mentioned—Robert Somebody? Who was that mentioned this morning?

Mr. MANDEL. Nobody else.

Senator SMITH. There was something said about a Robert Somebody this morning. I do not recall now. I just wanted to be sure.

Mr. MORRIS. May I make an observation, Mr. Chairman, on that?

Senator O'Conor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. I notice from my perusal of the files in the Institute of Pacific Relations, the people did not make any reference by initials only to staff members; that is, by their own staff members, and in their own offices. Robert Barnett is the only staff member or officer who does have those initials.

Senator Smith. I did not know whether he was a member or not. I was just trying to be guarded lest we might attach some implication to some initials here that is not warranted. What you say puts a different light on the subject.

Mr. Morris. I, myself, understand that Mr. Robert W. Barnett was the secretary of the Washington, D. C., chapter of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator Smith. That is something I had not heard of before.

Mr. Morris. I would like to have that introduced into the record.

Mr. Mandel. The next exhibit is that of a photostat of a round-table proceedings of August 26, 1936; obviously connected with the Yosemite IPR Conference which occurred at that time.

This give the comments of the various participants. I want to read only the comments of Kizer, who is listed here as representing the United States:

> We may begin with the illuminating point of Mr. Dafoe that between 1922 and the present time the emergence of the powers Russia and China has made a fundamental alteration in the balance in the Pacific.
>
> We have discovered that the United States and other powers are now more or less powerless so that the Washington Treaty is correspondingly out of date. There has been a tendency in the discussions to emphasize political questions at the expense of economic ones. The emergence of Russia as a Pacific power has been due to her emphasis on internal economic development and the same is true of China with her emphasis on the reconstruction policy. Nations emphasizing their internal economic policy are thereby making a contribution to the settlement of problems around the Pacific.
>
> We should study the possibility of adjustments of strains by each nation trying to adjust its own internal problems so that it does not need to export goods or labor and so disturb other economies.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Morris, before going into that, if we can go back for just a brief moment to the previous exhibit, which is a note from W. W. L. to R. W. B.

A reference is made to one Julean Arnold. Is there any further information that bears on that individual that might indicate or identify him?

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce that excerpt from the Department of State?

Mr. Mandel. This is taken from the Register of the Department of State. It is dated April 1, 1950.

Julean Arnold, Jr., is listed here. I will just read his last position in the Department of State. "P–4, May 3, 1946, as a country specialist." This is his full biographical record.

Senator O'Conor. This register, I note, is as of April 1, 1950.

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Reference to him is purely incidental. There is no implication in any way.

Senator O'Conor. I wanted to be certain that he was identified so that it would not reflect on anyone else.

All right. That will be introduced.

(The first document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 151" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 151

AUGUST 16, 1942.

W. W. L. from R. W. B.

Your letter of July 23 to Kizer is most interesting; and very sound. I don't see Julean Arnold maneuvering public opinion and congressional pressure groups with the finesse required. He is essentially sentimental about China. Lattimore has pointed out what damage sentiment might do. Would it be desirable for Schwellenbach, now, to take the lead in initial soundings and have Arnold and Walsh et al attach themselves to him? I would like to talk to you about this.

Arnold, Julean, Jr.—b. Hankow, China, of Am. parents Oct. 8, 1914; Shanghai Am. Sch, grad.; Pomona Coll., B. A. 1936; Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, A. M. 1938; cml. agt., Bu. of For. and Dom. Com., 1939–41; U. S. Army 1941–46, lt. col.; app. country specialist, P–4, in the Dept. of State May 3, 1946; P–5 Feb. 9, 1947; GS–12 Oct. 30, 1949; married. (Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1950, p. 18.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that the last exhibit read by Mr. Mandel be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be so marked.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 152" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 152

ROUND TABLE C. AUGUST 26, 1936

(Recorder, C. B. Fahs)

(Chairman (Motylev) opened discussion on the first three questions of subtopic A in the agenda.)

KIZER (United States). We may begin with the illuminating point of Mr. Dafoe that between 1922 and the present time the emergence of the powers Russia and China has made a fundamental alteration in the balance in the Pacific. We have discovered that the United States and other powers are now more or less powerless so that the Washington Treaty is correspondingly out of date. There has been a tendency in the discussions to emphasize political questions at the expense of economic ones. The emergence of Russia as a Pacific power has been due to her emphasis on internal economic development and the same is true of China with her emphasis on the reconstruction policy. Nations emphasizing their internal economic policy are thereby making a contribution to the settlement of problems around the Pacific. We should study the possibility of adjustments of strains by each nation trying to adjust its own internal problems so that it does not need to export goods or labor and so disturb other economies.

SCHILLINGLAW (United States). To what extent does Mr. Kizer imply isolation?

KIZER. Not in least. The policy of voluntary association will develop better when the nations adjust their internal stresses so that the question of cooperation with other nations is really a voluntary one.

MOTYLEV. We should pay attention to military as well as political questions. For example, the problem of navies and the denunciation of the Washington Treaty. Also changes in the economic strength of various nations and their political effects.

BELSHAW (New Zealand). It seems that the emphasis of question (3) is on maladjustment but behind that problem is the actual increase in economic power, e.g., of Japan and the U.S.S.R. Japan's increase in armaments is both motivated by and made possible by her increasing economic strength. On the other hand the preoccupation of the United States and Great Britain with domestic problems has made more difficult the maintenance of a positive interest in the Far East and so removed an obstacle to Japanese expansion. The question

involves the possibilities of agreement between the great powers as to what policy should be in the east. I have an idea that agreement between two parties is easier when they are approximately equal in strength. When there is a wide disparity in strength the possibility of agreement is less. In the east it is now virtually impossible for the United States or Great Britain to take effective action and therefore it is much more difficult to agree on policy. Changes in relative power are also influenced by the political situation in Europe. In Australia and New Zealand there is a growing feeling that we can no longer rely on defense by the British Navy. Therefore there is an emphasis on internal defense, e.g., by development of air force. The fear is not of occupation but of the changing balance. I should like to see a discussion of the increase in productive capacity and the resulting maladjustment.

TAKAHASHI (translated by Nagakura). The greatest factor in the change of economic conditions is that the principle of freedom of trade has been wiped out. This is the fundamental reason for various disputes of a political nature.

HAMANO. Re Takahashi's statement I should like to add that recent changes must be traced back to the World War which caused a great price rise and a reduction of exports from England. As a result far eastern countries became more or less self-sufficient. India which before the war imported three-fourths of its cotton piece goods now only imports one tenth or one fifth. This tendency was accentuated by the depression of 1929—also a result of the war—which decreased the price and market for the agricultural products of the east (and so reduced the exchange resources available for imports). We must consider the internal production changes in each country. Takahashi says free trade was forbidden but why? The cause is the self-sufficient tendency growing out of the high prices of the World War.

HOPPER. (United States). Question 1 implies a shift of power in the east, the decline of western states and the increase of the U. S. S. R. and Japan. Could we not list the changes meant in order to avoid confusion?

LATTIMORE (United States). If we are to discuss changes in the distribution of power we must get common idea of the nature of power. The present period may be considered the period of breakdown of Washington treaties. The treaties were surely the expression of a sigh of relief of the countries dominant after the war who thought they could establish a stable state of affairs in the Pacific. The great omission of the Washington treaties was the Soviet Union. No one foresaw the rapid rise of the Soviet Union and the vindication of its principles. I said sometime ago that the shift in balance of power in the Far East was from a maritime to a land basis. Soviet critics challenged me, prophesying that Japan would demand a larger rather than a smaller navy in connection with its land expansion. They were right and I wrong. It is not simply a geographical question of distribution of land and sea power. The rise of the Soviet Union has vindicated the efficiency in practice of an economic system quite different from that of the other powers. We must be very careful when speaking of nations and national policies. Motive powers are frequently interests not nations themselves. The question implies a change in the nature of power and a challenge to the western system of a new system challenging it in efficiency. The tendency of China in the past was to gravitate to the stronger power and to adopt capitalism. The rise of the U. S. S. R. not only changed the balance but raised the question of relative efficiency and China now shows a conflict of tendencies—half to the west, half to the U. S. S. R. This influence of the Soviet Union must not be confused with propaganda.

KIZER. Has not Lattimore too easily given up his point that the center of gravity was bound to shift from sea to land? Was not the denunciation of the Washington treaty by Japan part of its program to establish power on the continent?

LATTIMORE. I still think the theory is sound as far as it goes but it does not go far enough. Must also consider balance of efficiencies between social and economic systems.

MOTYLEV. The discussion has brought us to the question of navies. What is the economic and political significance of the denunciation of the Wahs. [sic] naval treaty? What are the prospects of a naval race?

ROSE (Great Britain). Suggest invite Admiral Taylor who is a naval expert.

MOTYLEV. All right but question not only a military one. Has economic and political significance as well.

VAN MOOK. The question especially concerns countries in the tropical sphere of the Pacific. As China, Japan, and the U. S. S. R. have developed economic stability they have developed a certain amount of self-sufficiency which has

decreased foreign trade. As Motylev has pointed out the 5-year plan was intended to supply the home market. Japan has also sought to develop markets and sources of material within her control. Nevertheless there have been increased Japanese exports to the Dutch East Indies. If this were not balanced by Dutch East Indies trade to the United States we would have the contradiction of Asiatic countries forcing exports to be limiting exports from the Dutch East Indies.

Another consideration is that if the United States should withdraw from the Pacific the Philippine Islands would enter this unhappy family of nations and conditions would be worse than now. The policy of self-sufficiency can be followed by countries of great area and economic resources but is difficult for small countries with limited resources. As long as economic nationalism predominates it tends to dislocate trade in the less favored countries.

MOTYLEV. Called on Admiral Taylor for a statement on the naval issue and on the influence of the development of air forces.

TAYLOR (Great Britain). Air power may have important effects in certain limited regions but not on the general question of sea power in the Pacific because of the great distances concerned. Aircraft are an important auxiliary to naval forces but their influence by themselves on sea power is slight. They cannot carry stores or troops in large quantities. If these are carried by ships they must be defended by ships except perhaps at the terminals.

In regard to sea power. In our estimate the settlement at Washington of naval ration plus status quo agreements gave everyone a fair degree of security. It gave Japan a greater degree of security than the British Empire can ever possess.

HOPPER. Asked Taylor whether view should not be directed to broad Pacific area. Wasn't it shown in the Mediterranean that the air force dictated settlement? Could this not be applied to the China coast?

TAYLOR. I was in the Mediteranean and did not think air power a deciding factor. Of course there are certain areas where air power will have to very great effect but in the Pacific the distances are too great. Hongkong to Japan is 1,500 miles. It is possible but not a "military operation." It would be possible for purposes of frightfulness but that is ineffective policy.

HOPPER. The distances in the north are less. Vladivostok to Tokyo is only 700 miles.

TAYLOR. The distance is still very great.

SCHILLINGLAW. What will be the effect of denunciation of the treaties on policies and strengths in the next few years.

TAYLOR. General answer impossible. Depends on circumstances in Pacific and elsewhere. We all hope that although Japan has not signed she will not depart from the 1936 agreements to such an extent as to cause any other power to have to increase armaments beyond the present ratios and that there will be no need for change re agreement armaments status quo in the Pacific.

WRIGHT (Great Britain). Do the Japanese agree that the Washington treaties give Japan a greater measure of security.

TAMURA (Japan). The reason for denunciation was the desire on the Japanese Government to recover autonomy of national defense. The 5–5–3 ratio was accepted reluctantly by the Japanese people and led to many tragedies, such as the assassination of the Premier. We do not intend to have the same strength as Great Britain and the United States, but psychologically want equality of status. It is a question of national pride. Japan is satisfied with the release from the restrictions of the treaty and has no intention to increase naval power and engage in a naval race with United States or Great Britain.

WRIGHT. Does this mean that Japan would be opposed to a collective system or to all-around disarmament?

TAMURA. That is another question. For 15 years Japan was a loyal member of the League of Nations. Difficulty was that Japan's two great neighbors, the United States and U. S. S. R., were not members. For example, in the case of the North Manchuria Railway dispute of 1929 between the U. S. S. R. and China, when hostilities broke out, Japan cooperated with the United States in refusing to interfere along with other League powers. Another difficulty in collective agreements is that the rise of Russia has changed the conditions under which the so-called Nine-Power Treaty was signed. The U. S. S. R. is not a party. The treaty guarantees the integrity of China, but Outer Mongolia would seem not to be a territory of China.

China's territorial integrity has been violated by a nonsigner of the Nine-Power Treaty. A great power nonparty to the treaty has penetrated Outer

Mongolia and Outer Mongolia has been alienated from China. This is a serious problem to us, because we are direct neighbors. The United States and Great Britain are far off, interested only in trade and not concerned, but for Japan it becomes a question of self-defense.

MOTYLEV. Is the Nine-Power Treaty still recognized or not?

TAMURA. Of course.

DAFOE. The unofficial opinion in the United States seems to be that it has lapsed.

SCHILLINGLAW. The statements of Secretary Stimson and Hull indicate that it is still effective.

VAN MOOK. Would the accession of the U. S. S. R. to the Nine-Power Treaty change the view of Japan?

TAMURA. I cannot answer. Would the U. S. S. R. join the treaty?

MOTYLEV. That is a conditional question, and I need not answer. Can we turn to the question of the influence of reconstruction in China on the changing balance of power?

LEE (China). A full answer is impossible. Reconstruction in China exercises a stabilizing influence on peace in the Far East, provided that it does not induce aggression on part of other powers. Reconstruction efforts have centered on the development of unity—for example, through road building, a nation-wide radio network, and so forth—and this unity should be a stabilizing influence.

HAMANO. Recently American air companies have extended lines in the interior of China. Are these paying lines or not?

LEE. Are Japanese airlines paying? Most airlines are not. In any case the control of these lines is solely in Chinese hands.

HOPPER. The United States has taken no action in regard to the Nine-Power Treaty, but I believe it is the opinion of the State Department that the three Washington agreements fall together.

DAFOE. It is a nice question of international law.

MOTYLEV. The problem of the balance of power requires attention to tendencies of development. From this viewpoint, it is much more complicated. It is necessary to pay attention to the real economic strength and the strength of the social order, to the influence of real economic possibilities on future development, to possible American naval and air expansion, and to the significance to the Pacific of the European balance of power. We cannot hope to answer the whole question, because the round-table is more or less limited to questions of economies and access to raw materials. But clarification requires understanding not only of facts but also of tendencies.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment on that exhibit, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The date is important. Yes; I do. This follows exactly the line laid down by Eisler: that the Pacific Ocean was to become a Soviet lake.

It is well known through the Communist Party. It is in line with the agreement with the Communist Parties of China, the Philippines, the United States, and Japan—under the guidance of Moscow—to get American "imperialism" out of the Pacific, because they declared that America is powerless in the Pacific and should turn to its own internal development.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your interpretation of the article to the extent that you heard it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. Insofar as you would express it in non-Communist expressions.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Chairman, the next name we have on the list here is a person who is now dead. Again, as the chairman has counseled at the outset, we do not introduce this name to introduce evidence about that particular person.

Our interest is his associations in the past with people now living. It is for that purpose that we introduce the following evidence on Evans F. Carlson.

Mr. Budenz, do you know that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. General Carlson was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I met him on one occasion in the middle forties.

Mr. MORRIS. Were his Communist activities extensive?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. He has been a Communist for a long time according to the official reports made in the Politbureau and to me. I met him at Fred Field's house. He was not a general then. I think at that time he was for the moment retired. But he returned to the Army again.

I saw him for only a moment because I had to go back to the Daily Worker. I met him along with Marian Bachrach.

Mr. MORRIS. Along with official party circumstances?

Mr. BUDENZ. It would have been a party meeting. Then, again, General Carlson was very widely discussed just before I left the party as the man who would lead the movement for a Red China in the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he—I am sorry.

Mr. BUDENZ. That developed later in the organization, I understand. This was being discussed very definitely. His consent had already been received according to statements in the Politbureau when I left the party.

Mr. MORRIS. What organization did that become?

Mr. BUDENZ. I just cannot recall its name. If you can recall it to my——

Mr. MORRIS. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in the party, you heard that organization being formed?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And you heard that Evans Carlson was to be the head of that organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read from the——

Senator O'CONOR. Can you amplify, or give us any further information as to its objective or purpose other than that which you have given in such a general way?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This organization was to be a new organization which would declare that the United States would completely withdraw any interest in China and should allow the Chinese Communists to develop their activities there.

Of course, it had many ramifications; but that was the general idea: Within the United States to drive for the United States' abandoning Nationalist China completely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you know if you have a listing that that organization is listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MANDEL. It was cited as a subversive organization by the Attorney General—Attorney General Tom Clark on April 27, 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say the name was?

Mr. MANDEL. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt that Carlson was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir. That was brought to my official attention on many occasions and over a number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce or read the exhibits showing Evans Carlson's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I wish to introduce a list of books and articles officially published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and written by Evans Fordyce Carlson.

Quoting from his book, if I may, an authorized biography of Evans F. Carlson, entitled "The Big Yankee." I read from page 257, a letter from Carlson to United States Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in answer to the latter's question as to the nature of the Chinese Communists:

> Their political doctrines are representative democracy; their economic doctrines are the cooperative theory, and only in their social application are they Communists, for they place a great deal of emphasis on social equality. * * * They want democracy in China, free speech, free press, and the rest.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, would you recognize that as Communist propaganda?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. I also would recognize the author of General Carlson's biography as a Communist—Michael Blankfort. He is well known to myself as a Communist. He had many consultations with me as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, were you going to read the list of books written by Evans Carlson and put out by the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. Author of The Chinese Army. Author of Strategy of the Sino-Japanese War, Far Eastern Survey, May 19, 1941, page 99. Author of The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyan, Pacific Affairs, 1939, pages 279–284, and the writer of Letters Regarding the Guerrilla War in China, in Pacific Affairs, June 1939, pages 183–184.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that excerpt made by Mr. Mandel introduced into the record in its entirety and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be so introduced and marked by the reporter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 153" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 153

EVANS FORDYCE CARLSON

Author of The Chinese Army—Its Origin and Military Efficiency, published by the international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations; publications office, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, 1940.

Author of Strategy of the Sino-Japanese War, far-eastern survey, May 19, 1941, page 99.

Author of The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyan, Pacific Affairs, 1939, pages 278–284.

Quoting from The Big Yankee, an authorized biography of Evans F. Carlson, written by Michael Blankfort (Little, Brown & Co., 1947), page 257, a letter from Carlson to United States Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in answer to the latter's question as to the nature of the Chinese Communists: "Their political doctrines are representative democracy; their economic doctrines are the cooperative theory, and only in their social application are they Communists, for they place a great deal of emphasis on social equality. * * * They want democracy in China, free speech, free press, and the rest."

Writer of Letters Regarding the Guerrilla War in China, in Pacific Affairs, June 1939, pages 183–184.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any letters showing Carlson's activities within the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. We have here several letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One is dated March 27, 1939, which is a letter addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, from Owen Lattimore. I will read the letter:

> Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak out, he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east, I have no recent impressions by which to gage his possible usefulness as a "friend of China."
>
> I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write you again.
>
> Yours very sincerely,
>
> OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that "Friend of China," in quotes, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I was just wondering why the words "Friend of China" were in quotes. Would that mean anything?

Mr. BUDENZ. Where?

Senator FERGUSON. Right at the bottom of the letter there.

Mr. BUDENZ. It in itself does not mean anything. No, I would not put any particular interpretation on it, except, of course, for one who had Mr. Lattimore's allegiance as a "Friend of China" and——

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the same allegiance that Evans Carlson had?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any other comments to make on that incident, Mr. Budenz? Did you hear about that within the Communist Party—the resignation of Carlson?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell what you recall about it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, in reference to his resignation, I know it was partly due to the fact that he had such a strong feeling for the Chinese Communists, that he felt he could serve better by being outside the Army, where he could express his opinion.

He had come into contact with them, and had formed a very strong alliance with them, or, at least, a friendship with them, and wished to speak out on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that letter indicate to you that Mr. Lattimore thought it would be better for him as a "Friend of China" to remain in the services and act in the services rather than quit and go out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, most decidedly. That was the way the advice was given to Carlson. I was not there. I was not present. That was the advice the party gave to General Carlson, and he used the first opportunity to take advantage of it when the war came along.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his rank; do you know?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was a colonel most of the time. My understanding is they made him a general. I do not know the exact specifications.

We referred to him as colonel Carlson, but he has been referred to in recent years as general.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the same man?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. It is the same man.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record this document and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be so introduced and admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 154" and filed for the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 154

BALTIMORE, MD., *March 27, 1939.*

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak out he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east I have no recent impressions by which to gauge his possible usefulness as a "Friend of China."

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write you again.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MANDEL. The next letter from the files of the institute is dated June 6, 1940. It is addressed to Mr. John H. Oakie. The sender is Mr. Frederick V. Field. I shall read the letter:

DEAR JACK: I wonder if you know that Maj. Evans Carlson is going to be in Berkeley for a few weeks in connection with the Mills summer institute, and that he will then proceed to China? You doubtless do have this information but I want to urge you to try and arrange a meeting at which Carlson can speak perhaps more frankly and openly than he could at Mills for he has direct contacts with our administration people from the top down and has a pretty good first-hand picture of the way things are moving. One interesting point, for instance, is that our whole naval strategy is in process of rapid transition which if it goes through will withdraw approximately half of the fleet from the Pacific for operations in Latin American waters. This, as you can obviously see, has broad implications with regard to the possibility of our taking any action—even short of military action—in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know that on June 6, 1940, Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. He certainly was. He not only was a member of the Communist Party, but he was openly an enemy of President Roosevelt as the head of the Nation and of the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment to make on that letter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it speaks for itself.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask a question.

Senator O'Conor. Senator Smith.

Senator Smith. I notice the word "Administration" is capitalized. Whom do you think they were referring to—the national administration or the administration of some other activity?

Mr. Budenz. No. He means the national administration.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into evidence and marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'Conor. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 155" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 155

New York City, *June 6, 1940.*

Mr. John H. Oakie,
San Francisco, Calif.

Dear Jack: I wonder if you know that Maj. Evans Carlson is going to be in Berkeley for a few weeks in connection with the Mills Summer Institute, and that he will then proceed to China? You doubtless do have this information but I want to urge you to try and arrange a meeting at which Carlson can speak perhaps more frankly and openly than he could at Mills for he has direct contacts with our Administration people from the top down and has a pretty good first-hand picture of the way things are moving. One interesting point, for instance, is that our whole naval strategy is in process of rapid transition which if it goes through will withdraw approximately half of the fleet from the Pacific for operations in Latin-American waters. This, as you can obviously see, has broad implications with regard to the possibility of our taking any action—even short of military action—in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick V. Field.

Senator Ferguson. I do not know that I know who John H. Oakie is.

Mr. Budenz. I do not either.

Senator Ferguson. You do not know?

Mr. Budenz. Not offhand.

Mr. Morris. Senator Ferguson, he was an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator Ferguson. I know.

Mr. Morris. We are not going to introduce any evidence about it at this time.

Senator Ferguson. It would seem from this letter, as I read it, then, that Field thought that Carlson had some information in relation to our Navy that could be given to Oakie and other men.

Mr. Morris. He was a Marine officer.

Senator Ferguson. Carlson was?

Mr. Morris. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. This Mills Summer Institute; what was that?

Mr. Mandel. Mills College. It is a women's college on the west coast.

Next is a letter dated June 15, 1943, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, and it is from Edward C. Carter. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

Dear Currie: Sweet, of UCR, has compiled the enclosed list of foreign personnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and return this copy to me in due course.

"Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new and characteristically valuable experiences behind him. He leaves tonight

for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next 2 days in case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted, and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 156" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 156

NEW YORK 22, N. Y., *June 15, 1943.*

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: Sweet, of UCR, has compiled the enclosed list of foreign personnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and return this copy to me in due course.

Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new and characteristic valuable experience behind him. He leaves tonight for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next 2 days in case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.

Sincerely yours.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. That letter, Mr. Chairman, seems to imply that Mr. Carlson had access to the President.

Senator O'CONOR. It is noted.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Lauchlin Currie, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. By official reports; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When he was in the White House?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Executive Administrator, or whatever his position was; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you know about him?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, we have an episode concerning Lauchlin Currie that we are going to develop tomorrow in better sequence.

I think it would be more appropriate to wait until tomorrow, if you do not mind.

Senator FERGUSON. I will withhold my question.

Mr. MORRIS. If that is satisfactory with you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I think it should be brought up—two reasons; one, Currie's connection with the institute, and Currie's present position.

As I understand it, while it could not be classified as officially with the United States Government, it is in connection with money that is loaned by the United States Government or financed by the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the episode that I relate to, and suggest that we take up at another time, involves many exhibits, and we are not quite ready for it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will withdraw it.

Mr. MORRIS. It should be interesting to find out.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he ought to be given an opportunity to come in here and explain some of these associations and things that happened here in the file.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated August 26, 1939. This is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter. It is from Evans F. Carlson.

I will read excerpts from the letter.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of the 15th, in which you enclosed the comment from Colonel Faymonville. I agree with Colonel Faymonville that " * * * the politics, economics, and military power of the Soviet Union constitute an important background for any event which happens in Asia * * *." I did not consider that an extended discussion of the relations of the Soviet Union to China formed a part of the subject under discussion. If you consider it desirable I can prepare four or five hundred words on that angle.

The nature of the concessions which China has had to make to gain Russian assistance is debatable. It is certain that such assistance has been used to induce the generalissimo to make certain concessions regarding the mobilization of the people and the ethical indoctrination of the army. I know from my conversations with Russian military men that these two doctrines are regarded as important potential military weapons.

I plan to depart for New York on Monday, the 28th. My plan is to move toward China by way of Europe. I would like to go via the Soviet Union if I can negotiate the necessary credentials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that letter in its entirety into the record and ask it be marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 157" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 157

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., *August 26, 1939.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of the 15th, in which you enclosed the comment from Colonel Faymonville.

I agree with Colonel Faymonville that "* * * the politics, economics, and military power of the Soviet Union constitute an important background for any event which happens in Asia * * *." I did not consider that an extended discussion of the relations of the Soviet Union to China formed a part of the subject under discussion. If you consider it desirable I can prepare four or five hundred words on that angle.

The Relation of Russia to the Sino-Japanese conflict can be argued from various points of view. If approached from the point of view of international politics, i. e., based on the self-interest of nations, it must be obvious that Russia's interest in China's independence is predominant. I have felt since this conflict began that Russia could not permit China to succumb to Japan. She has been providing assistance in an unofficial manner since September 1937. If China should reach the point where she could not carry on, even with the sub-rosa assistance, I believe that Russia would engage Japan openly and officially in order to assure China's independence.

The nature of the concessions which China has had to make to gain Russian assistance is debatable. It is certain that such assistance has been used to induce the generalissimo to make certain concessions regarding the mobilization of the people and the ethical indoctrination of the army. I know from my conversations with Russian military men that these two doctrines are regarded as important potential military weapons.

I plan to depart for New York on Monday, the 28th. My plan is to move toward China by way of Europe. I would like to go via the Soviet Union if I can negotiate the necessary credentials.

I hope to see you in New York. If possible, I would like to make the modifications in the manuscript which may be indicated.

With kind personal regards, I am,

Sincerely,

EVANS F. CARLSON.

Ian Pruitt is en route east.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally, there is a reference to exhibit No. 20. This is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated August 30, 1939.

The note is marked "F. V. F. from E. C. C." Presumably "F. V. F." is Frederick Field, and "E. C C." is Edward C. Carter. The note reads as follows:

You will be interested in this letter from Major Carlson. I will endeavor to furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials.

Senator SMITH. This is from whom?

Mr. MANDEL. From Carter to Field.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 158" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 158

F. V. F. from E. C. C.

AUGUST 30, 1939.

You will be interested in this letter from Major Carlson. I will endeavor to furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose for introducing that correspondence and that testimony about Mr. Carlson was relevant to present associations with people now living.

Mr. Budenz, do you know Talitha Gerlach?

Mr. BUDENZ. She is an active Communist-front member, and engaged in educational activities. She has been known to me personally. She was at several committee meetings in the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt that she was, when you knew her, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have no doubt at all. Not only from those occasions, but from repeated references to her in the State committee of New York and in many other official——

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, you spoke of her as an active Communist-front member. Does that characterization have a particular meaning in Communist parlance, or did you merely mean to generalize that she was a member of perhaps many and various Communist fronts?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, they do not use the expression "Communist fronts." They distinguish them between captive organizations and those which the Communists create. Those which the Communists create are Communists fronts. This woman has been a member of many Communist fronts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your characterization of her as an active Communist-front member was interesting. I believe it was the first time you referred to anyone that way. I was wondering specifically why she came to your mind that way, since you have almost in the same breath testified that she was an active Communist—that is, a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ. I was endeavoring to identify her to some extent. Her name appears on a number of Communist-front lists.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean she is a person more active than the usual Communist in connection with Communist-front matters?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. In other words, there were some Communists who were full-fledged Communists, you might say and who were also members of groups that were referred to as Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. As I have said, to my knowledge 95 percent of the members of the Communist-front organizations are actually Communists, and the other 10 percent are thrown in there to give that appearance or that uncertainty of connection with the Communist movement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz. You have 105 percent. Will you settle for 90 and 10?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would say it was 5 and 95 percent.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have anything to show Miss Gerlach's relations with the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. I have two letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One letter is addressed to Miss Gerlach and sent to Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: As you know, I recently heard that Miss Cholmeley would like an invitation from the IPR to come to the United States for a short-time appointment. I cabled her an invitation some time ago. Today I received from Kweilin the following cable:

"Temporarily delayed owing Stevens State Department requesting assistance here.

"ELSIE CHOLMELEY."

Doubtless, I will have in due season further particulars by mail, but I thought you would want to know that she is not likely to turn up in the near future.

I am glad that she has a temporary appointment with a State Department official, because that should simplify her problem of getting the necessary visas to come here when she wants.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The other is a letter dated February 6, 1943, and marked "Private and confidential."

DEAR MISS GERLACH: Interestingly enough Miss Cholmeley, who, as you know, is a 200 percent Indusco fan, is working for Mackenzie Stevens, of Maryland University, who was sent out by the State Department for 3 months to aid in reorganizing CIC. Unless Stevens is a miracle man, I doubt if Indusco has much to fear from Stevens, now that he is apparently in Miss Cholmeley's hands.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence for the simple reason of showing the influence on the part of Miss Cholmeley without any comment whatever with respect to Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify Miss Cholmeley for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is the wife of Israel Epstein, whose record we have previously testified about.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, as I recall, Senator Ferguson the other day asked for the immigration record on Israel Epstein.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that record, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D. C., dated July 20, 1951:

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 28, 1951, concerning Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein, also known as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Your communication under reference advised that it was your understanding that both these aliens were subjects of investigation by this Service, and requested that you be informed regarding the disposition of these cases. In response thereto, I wish to inform you that Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein were under investigation by this Service to determine whether or not they were deportable from the United States. However, prior to the completion of investigations, both aliens departed from the United States.

The records of this Service disclose that Mary Epstein departed on the steamship *Liberte* on November 11, 1950, destined for Plymouth, England. Israel Epstein departed on the steamship *Batory* on March 3, 1951. It may be of interest to you to know that prior to his departure from the United States, Mr. Epstein executed a document for the Service wherein he abandoned his domicile in the United States.

Upon the departure of these two aliens from the United States, this Service issued lookout notices throughout the United States in order to prevent the possible reentry of these aliens into this country at some future time.

Sincerely yours,

B. JOHN HABBERTON, *Commissioner.*

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, does that answer your question?

Senator FERGUSON. That covers the matter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew that he was a Communist by official information, and from J. Peters, that he was engaged in Communist underground activities of an espionage character.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know his wife?

Mr. BUDENZ. I just heard her name. I did not hear any reports—that is, that I can remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call your attention to a document we introduced into the record the other day. It is from Edward C. Carter to Miss Anne Ford, publicity director, Little, Brown & Co.

It is dated June 12, 1947, wherein Mr. Carter endorsed the book by Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China.

I would like to make reference to it again at this time.

Senator O'CONOR. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record the correspondence on Miss Talitha Gerlach, as well as the letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service on Israel Epstein and his wife, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 159 and 160," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 159

NEW YORK, N. Y., *February 6, 1943.*

Private and confidential.

Miss TALITHA GERLACH,
Foreign Division, YWCA,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: Interestingly enough Miss Cholmeley who, as you know, is a 200-percent Indusco fan, is working for Mackenzie Stevens of Maryland

University who was sent out by the State Department for 3 months to aid in reorganizing CIC. Unless Stevens is a miracle man, I doubt if Indusco has much to fear from Stevens now that he is apparently in Miss Cholmeley's hands.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

NEW YORK, N. Y., *February 4, 1943.*

Miss TALITHA GERLACH,
Foreign Division, YWCA,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: As you know, I recently heard that Miss Cholmeley would like an invitation from the IPR to come to the United States for a short-time appointment. I cabled her an invitation some time ago. Today I received from Kweilin the following cable:

"Temporarily delayed owing Stevens, State Department, requesting assistance here.

"ELSIE CHOLMELEY."

Doubtless I will have in due season further particulars by mail, but I thought you would want to know that she is not likely to turn up in the near future.

I am glad that she has a temporary appointment with a State Department official, because that should simplify her problem of getting the necessary visas to come here when she wants.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 160

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington 25, D. C., July 20, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 28, 1951, concerning Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein, also known as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Your communication under reference advised that it was your understanding that both these aliens were subjects of investigation by this Service, and requested that you be informed regarding the disposition of these cases. In response thereto, I wish to inform you that Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein were under investigation by this Service to determine whether or not they were deportable from the United States. However, prior to the completion of investigations, both aliens departed from the United States.

The records of this Service disclose that Mary Epstein departed on the Steamship *Liberte* on November 11, 1950, destined for Plymouth, England. Israel Epstein departed on the Steamship *Batory* on March 3, 1951. It may be of interest to you to know that prior to his departure from the United States, Mr. Epstein executed a document for the Service wherein he abandoned his domicile in the United States.

Upon the departure of these two aliens from the United States, this Service issued lookout notices throughout the United States in order to prevent the possible reentry of these aliens into this country at some future time.

Sincerely yours,

BENJ. G. HABBERTON,
Acting Commissioner.

Senator O'CONOR. It had been agreed that we would suspend at this time because of certain commitments. So at this time the committee will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 a. m.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Representative Kersten; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz at the termination of yesterday's session was identifying people associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations who were Communists. I would like to interrupt that process today and ask Mr. Budenz to discuss at some length the extent to which the Communists were able to influence our foreign policy, and we will commence our hearing today with that aspect.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, during the time that you were editor of the Daily Worker and a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, did you Communists endeavor to influence the Far East policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; that was one of our main assignments from the international Communist organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you succeed in influencing the policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Successes were reported on a number of occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, would you tell us how you were able to influence the foreign policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Through personal contacts here in Washington which had been laid over a series of years, through organizations like the Institute of Pacific Relations, which Browder had designated as an umbrella for Communist operations in this respect, and through other channels.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could give us some specific details.

Mr. BUDENZ. There is an incident in 1942 which stands out.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what happened at that incident, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. In the fall of 1942—it was sometime ahead of October 2, and I will tell you why I recall that date later—but sometime ahead of October 2 Earl Browder called me to his office and asked me to look over a rough draft of an attack upon the State Department.

This was an attack upon the anti-Soviet clique in the State Department, more specifically. I looked it over and made a few changes, which were not supposed to be changes in content but in editing, and returned it to him. Thereupon very shortly thereafter he gave me this document for setting up, for printing, in the Sunday Worker.

He was to deliver this message at a meeting, if I recall correctly, of the Young Communist League on October 2, 1942. In that message or speech or document he attacked very sharply the reactionary clique in the State Department which was favoring Chiang Kai-shek and injuring the Chinese Communists.

I do not mean by that to give the inference that there was aid given in a military fashion; I don't mean by troops, but otherwise.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean Mr. Browder came to you with this article which had been prepared already, and the substance of the article was that it was an attack on the people in the State Department who favored Chiang Kai-shek and were against the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was directed to those who were opposed to the Soviet policy in the Far East. He stated incidentally that this document had been worked out by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify on that a little bit, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can only quote his precise words. He didn't say how an arrangement had been made. He said that this had been prepared by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie in order to smoke out the anti-Soviet elements in the State Department. The reason that he mentioned that was to emphasize to me the importance of the document, even asking me to read the material both before it went into the paper—that is, into type—and also after it was in type.

That is why he gave it to me sometime in advance.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you a photostatic copy of the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942, and I ask you if that is the article to which you have testified?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; that is the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this article for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Worker of October 4, 1942, pages 1 and 5, prepared at my direction.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say this is the article that you saw in advance of its being printed in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that article had been worked out by Mr. Browder and, according to Mr. Browder, had been worked out in conjunction with Mr. Currie?

Mr. BUDENZ. That the article had been prepared through arrangements with Lauchlin Currie to smoke out the people who were opposed to Soviet policy in the Far East in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us dwell on that for just a moment. You say the article had been arranged by Mr. Browder through arrangements with Lauchlin Currie; is that right?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what Mr. Browder told you?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. He was emphasizing its importance and that I should be careful to see that there were no words that would give a distortion to the article.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened after that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, later on I saw Mr. Browder either in connection with the publication of a further statement on this matter or shortly afterward, but it was a discussion of the statement which appeared after Mr. Browder made a trip to Washington to see Mr. Sumner Welles.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, sometime after that is it your testimony, Mr. Budenz, that Browder then did go down to the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he went down to the State Department with Robert Minor.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what happened at that meeting?

The CHAIRMAN. He went down to the State Department with Robert Minor?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Robert Minor?

Mr. BUDENZ. Robert Minor then, I think, was assistant secretary of the party. At least he was technically second in command to Browder. I say "technically" because Jack Stachel was an important person, and we have to always remember that.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this visit to the State Department connected with the original statement which you have already testified about?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. There was much discussion of this matter. I just can't recall all of the discussion, but at any rate it was definitely in connection with this first article.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, inasmuch as you have a number of articles before you, Mr. Morris, I suggest that the first one to which you have referred and which was identified by the witness here be identified and inserted in the record or otherwise identified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record the photostatic copy of the article in the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942, which was authenticated by Mr. Mandel.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 161" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 161

[From the Worker, New York, October 4, 1942]

BROWDER ACCUSES STATE DEPARTMENT CLIQUE—IT HAMPERS OUR WAR IN PACIFIC, EUROPE

(By Earl Browder)

Almost 10 months after the United States is fully committed to the war against the Axis we are being told that "the United States is losing the war, period."

Loss of this war means destruction of our Nation and slavery for our people. Yet we are told that we are losing this war. That would seem to be a matter to get excited about, something to call for action.

We are losing this war before we have well begun to fight.

Would it not be more accurate to say that we are losing this war because we have not yet begun to fight?

What is the matter? Whence comes this seeming paralysis which keeps our tremendous military potential idle at the moment our fate and the fate of the world is being decided?

Roy Howard, Hearst, and the Patterson-McCormicks, the chief newspaper spokesmen for the modern Copperheads, give the double-barreled answer that the people are not behind this war and that the President is bungling it. But they are liars, any they spread the lies that please Hitler. The people are behind this war to the end; they are ready for every necessary sacrifice; they are impatient to go ahead. The President is doing the best he can with advisers who keep jogging his elbow and holding back his arm; he can only be criticized for hesitating to sweep these mischief makers out of his councils, and for failing to crack down on the defeatist newspapers.

Let us frankly face the facts, however, that the defeatist poison penetrates and tends to paralyze the war policies of our Government in Washington. We must learn how to locate the seats of this poison, in order to eliminate them.

Look first of all at the Pacific front. Our Armed Forces in the Pacific have already demonstrated that they have a fighting spirit fit for any task given them. But what about the policies which direct that fighting spirit? They are not yet serious fighting war policies.

I charge that powerful appeasement forces in the State Department in Washington are deliberately withholding 1,000,000 of the most effective soldiers in Asia, keeping them out of the fight against the Japanese, and thereby releasing that many Japanese soldiers for action against our boys in the South Pacific.

I charge that it is on the advice of reactionary officials in the State Department that Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies out of the war. The army under General Hu Chung-han, with 440,000 troops, is engaged not in fighting the Japanese but in blockading the Chinese Eighth Route Army in the north and northwest, and hampering that army in its fight against the Japanese; the army under General Tang En-po, with 500,000 troops, is engaged not in fighting the Japanese but in blocking the Chinese New Fourth Army in central and eastern China, and hampering that army in its fight against the Japanese.

These two Chinese armies, the best equipped and trained in all China, totaling almost a million men, are being confined to blockading the Chinese Communist armies and territories, because the State Department in Washington has informed Chungking's representatives that our Government would be displeased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists. These officials continue the old policy of "war against the Communists" in China; they tell Chungking it must continue to fight the Communists if it wishes United States friendship, and they thereby accept responsibility for withdrawing a million Chinese troops from the war against Japan, and keep China back from full unity in this war.

What suicidal nonsense is this, by which persons who speak for our own Government keep the best Chinese fighters out of the war and create a gap which must be filled by a million American boys?

This is not a way to fight a war of survival, this is a sure way to continue to lose the war.

Our attitude toward Europe is equally ambiguous. Our State Department continues to do business with Mannerheim Finland, Franco Spain, and Vichy France, three puppet regimes of Hitler, to feast the representatives of these Nazi agencies in the highest Washington society, to send vital materials to them, and to appease them in every way while they conduct active war against the United Nations.

This two-faced attitude of the State Department toward Europe finds its highest expression in the campaign being waged through the defeatist press against the opening of the second front in Western Europe. Of course it is impossible to carry on a policy of appeasement of Mannerheim, Franco, and Laval, and at the same time energetically prepare the immediate second front in Europe. Find those figures in our Government who push through this appeasement policy, and there you will find the high opponents of the second front. They are the men who keep our men, guns, planes, and tanks in idleness while our fate is being decided at Stalingrad where men, women, and children hold off the full might of a Nazi-occupied Europe without counting the cost to themselves.

The only way to stop losing this war is to begin seriously to fight it. And to fight it we must overcome the influence of Munichism, of appeasement, of defeatism, in the United States itself. This Munich influence is not among the

people, and it does not proceed from our Commander in Chief; it is entrenched in some high officials of the State Department, some members of the Cabinet, in a disorganized Congress, dominated by a clique of Vanderbergs, Wheelers, Brookses, and Dieses, several powerful industrialists, and above all in the newspapers of Patterson-McCormick, Hearst, and Roy Howard, which poison the mind of the country with defeatism day after day. The people must be roused and organize in support of the President against this cabal of the Munichmen.

These days we are being shown the most astonishing depths of depravity to which the defeatist newspapers will descend in their fight against the second front. I wish to impose upon you for a few moments to turn the microscope upon an example of this moral and intellectual rottenness. I pick up Roy Howard's newspaper for September 29, where this defeatist speaks through his hired scribbler, William Philip Simms. At the moment of crisis of the battle of Stalingrad, the miserable voice finds it possible to whine that we "would appreciate a little more cooperation from the Russians." In that phrase we can see the spirit of a Laval or Doriot, the spirit that rotted out the heart of the French Republic and delivered that nation over to Hitlerite bondage.

"A little more cooperation from the Russians," cries Roy Howard through the pen of Mr. Simms. At such a sound, every decent American should vomit, in revulsion at the monstrous thought that this could be America's answer to Stalingrad. "A little more cooperation from the Russians," while certain gentlemen from high places in the United States and Britain carefully calculate the last and final buttons on the uniforms of our boys which will make it safe to throw them into the battle.

Nothing could be further from the spirit of America's youth, in and out of the Armed Forces, than the rotten defeatism, appeasement, and cowardice expressed in this slogan of Roy Howard.

The spirit of our boys in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, is expressed in opposite slogans:

"Let's give some fighting cooperation to our heroic Russian allies."

"When do we begin to fight?"

"Open up the second front in Europe now."

Let us not drop Roy Howard's man Simms, however, without looking deeper into the cesspool of his mind. What kind of cooperation does he want from the Russians that he is not getting in the most magnificent battle for freedom in all history? "Perhaps this may require explanation," remarks Mr. Simms. Indeed it does. And what is Mr. Simm's explanation? He explains that he wants the Russians to teach the Americans and British how to fight. "The one place really to learn war is in war," says Mr. Simm's and "Moscow still refuses" to permit Americans to learn how to make war in that "one place." That, says Mr. Simms, is why we have no second front. Our officers and soldiers don't know how to fight and the Russians refuse to teach them. Therefore there is nothing to do but wait until Timoshenko gets time and leisure to open up a school for us.

I wonder what American Army officers think of this kind of arguments? I think I know. I think the vast majority will "give the works" to anybody who tells them they cannot open up a second front because they do not know how to fight. The have already learned the great lesson the Russians have taught the world, that the way to fight is to fight, to push aside all the hesitators and appeasers and if necessary to shoot them, to go to battle and put everything you have into it, to engage the enemy, to kill him, to get into the battle without delay, to fight, fight, and fight again until the Hitler Axis is crushed.

Yes, it is true, the one place really to learn war is in war. But who is holding us back from learning war by making war? It is the Roy Howards, the Hearsts, the Patterson-McCormicks, and their fellow appeasers and one-time friends of Hitler, who now join together in their obscene outcries against the second front. The second front is the practical school in which British and American soldiers will learn how to smash Hitlerism. We are all learning and will learn from the mighty achievements of the Red army and the Soviet people, but we will not allow the worthy idea of learning from them to be used for the purpose of delaying our joint action with them in a two-front war.

Young people of America have no part or parcel of the appeasement conspiracies. Defeatism is the property of old and corrupt reactionaries and their hired men. No young person could possibly live in their stifling atmosphere. Young people are particularly immune to the counsels of cowardice and capitulation. A thousand times they prefer to risk their lives in combat with Hitler's hordes than to risk the living death of a Vichyfied America, the slavery of a

Hitlerite world. Our young people are demanding the chance to fight. They are the front lines of the movement for a second front now. They will not permit their future and the future of the world to be gambled away by the Munichmen of appeasement and defeatism. They want to know: When do we begin to fight?

The Young Communist League, dedicating tonight its service flag, has as high a percentage of its members in the Armed Forces as any group of Americans. And this is not the first time the Young Communists have given their best members to the armed struggle against the Axis. Not less than one-third of the Lincoln Battalion composed of Americans who gave their lives to stop the Axis in Spain in 1936 to 1938 were from the Young Communist League. This first American expeditionary force against the Axis, defending the Spanish Republic from the Hitler assassins, gave their lives in order to prevent the present war; if their warnings and their example had been heeded and followed, the Axis would have been broken before it could challenge the entire world. But their blood was not spilled in vain. They left an imperishable and glorious tradition, fully in the spirit of the Stalingrad of today. They helped to hold the Axis hordes outside the gates of Madrid for 32 months. They were fully representative of the youth of America today, a youth which is ready and eager to strike Hitler's gangs now in Western Europe, and guarantee that they will not have to stop them on American soil later on.

There is no room for any issue in our country today except the issue of how most quickly and effectively to crush the Hitlerite Axis. There is no room for partisanship or special interests. There must be national unity of all men and women regardless of race, creed, or class, who are ready to subodrinate all else to victory. There must be international unity among all the United Nations, who, win or lose, stand or fall together. And at this moment all this is summed up in one issue, whether our country can meet the crisis of war with honor, whether we win through to freedom or go down into slavery, whether we have the quality of victors or whether we shall be shamefully defeated without even having fought—all this is summed up in the one issue of the immediate opening of the second front in Europe.

We ask our Commander in Chief: When are we going to fight?

(The above article is based on an address delivered by Earl Browder before a second front rally of the Young Communist League in New York on October 2.)

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the upshot of the meeting in Washington? Who attended the meeting in Washington, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Browder stated to me, and so he published in the Daily Worker if my memory is correct, that the meeting was attended by Mr. Browder, Mr. Minor, Lauchlin Currie, and Mr. Welles.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened at that meeting?

Mr. BUDENZ. At that meeting an agreement was reached which was embodied in this statement.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this statement," will you identify that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. This is the statement printed in the Daily Worker of October 16, 1942, headed, "Welles states United States policy on China. After interview with Under Secretary of State, Browder retracts charges against State Department officials." That is the article.

The CHAIRMAN. That has not been identified?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you should lay the foundation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Daily Worker of October 16, 1942, pages 1 and 2, the photostat being prepared under my direction.

The CHAIRMAN. It ought to be identified by a number so that we can go along and keep these separate.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced as the second exhibit introduced this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be identified by the proper number and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 162" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 162

[From the Daily Worker, New York, October 16, 1942]

WELLES STATES UNITED STATES POLICY ON CHINA—AFTER INTERVIEW WITH UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, BROWDER RETRACTS CHARGES AGAINST STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party, at his office at 35 East Twelfth Street, New York City, made the following statement to the press yesterday:

"In the Worker of October 4, I made charges that persons whom I designated as 'reactionary officials in the State Department' were encouraging the maintenance of a situation in China harmful to the war effort of our country and its allies. I spoke of strained relations between Kuomintang and Communists, resulting in the immobilization of large numbers of the best troops of that country.

"Upon the invitation of Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, I visited him in his office on October 12, in company with Mr. Robert Minor, and heard from him, and from Mr. Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President, a detailed refutation of my charges in this respect. The information received from Mr. Welles and Mr. Currie convinced me that my charges had been made on the basis of incomplete information. I believe it is established that no responsible official of the State Department is contributing to disunity in China, and that the policy of the United States Government is being exerted in the opposite direction.

"I am therefore more than happy to retract those charges without reservation.

"What I had thought of as a heavy door that needed pushing open proved to be but a curtain of lack of information. Since many persons in the United States and in China also are without that information which I lacked before visiting Mr. Welles, I believe our war effort will be benefited if I make public that portion of Mr. Welles' remarks which was given to me in written form."

Mr. Welles' memorandum follows:

"With regard to the specific 'charge that it is on the advice of reactionary officials in the State Department that Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies out of the war, 'the simple fact is that the nearest approach to 'advice' given by any officials in the Department of State in this context has been an expression of an opinion that civil strife in China, at all times unfortunate, would be especially unfortunate at a time when China is engaged in a desperate struggle of self-defense against an armed invader. The implication of the expression of opinion was that the Chinese Government should try to maintain peace by processes of conciliation between and among all groups and factions in China. And, the course which Chiang Kai-shek has been pursuing is not 'keeping his best armies out of the war' Both the armies of the National Government and the 'Communist' armies are fighting the Japanese. No Chinese armies are actively engaged in large-scale offensive operations against the Japanese—for the reason, principally, that there is lacking to all Chinese armies types and amounts of equipment which are essential to such operations; but this situation is one which both the Chinese Government and the American Government are endeavoring to remedy as equipment becomes available.

"With regard to the specific charge that 'the State Department in Washington has informed Chungking's representatives that our Government would be displeased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists,' what this statement alleges is the exact opposite of the fact. The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic contexts and publicly, that the United States favors 'complete unity' among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof.

"With regard to the specific charge that 'these officials continue the old policy of "war against the Communists" in China, this Government has had no such policy, either 'old' or new. This Government has in fact viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the 'serious menace' of 'Communism' in China. We have, for instance, as is publicly and well known, declined to be moved by Japanese contentions that presence and maintenance of Japanese armed forces in China were and would be desirable for the purpose of 'combatting communism.'

"With regard to the specific charge that officials of this Government 'tell Chungking it must continue to fight the Communists if it wishes United States

friendship,' the simple fact is that no officials of this Government ever have told Chungking either that it must fight or that it must continue to fight the 'Communists'; this Government holds no such belief; this Government desires Chinese unity and deprecates civil strife in China; this Government treats the Government of China as an equal; it does not dictate to the Government of China; it does not make United States friendship contingent; it regards unity within China, unity within the United States, unity within each of the countries of the United Nations group, and unity among the United Nations as utterly desirable toward effectively carrying on war against the Axis Powers and toward creation and maintenance of conditions of just peace when the United Nations shall have gained the victory which is to be theirs."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you take some of the highlights and discuss them with us inasmuch as you were the editor of the Daily Worker at that time, the significance of that statement? I do not think it is clear to the committee as to the purpose of that statement.

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, this statement says that upon invitation of Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, "I visited him in his office on October 12 in company with Mr. Robert Minor and heard from him and from Mr. Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President, a detailed refutation of my charges in this respect."

In other words, in regard to China. The charges that he made were:

In the Worker of October 4 I made charges that persons whom I designated as "reactionary officials in the State Department" were encouraging the maintenance of a situation in China harmful to the war effort of our country and its allies.

Browder had spoken of strained relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists resulting in the immobilization of large numbers of the best troops of that country. The assurance given by Mr. Welles, to make this brief, was that the policy of the State Department was not against the Communists in China and that there was to be no distinction made between the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek.

That was the understanding which led Browder on his part to make what he called a retraction.

Senator O'CONOR. Could I interrupt you to ask whether or not any use was made of that by the Communists on that point?

Mr. BUDENZ. You can see in the first place how it is played up, and the Daily Worker gives directives to the Communists. It was used throughout the country as an indication that American policy was seeing eye to eye with Soviet policy in the Far East.

As a matter of fact, in a subsequent meeting of the Politburo which I attended, Browder said it was as important as an agreement between nations and that we should emphasize it throughout the country as something very fundamental, representing what he considered to be a great gain for the Communist cause.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz, as I understand the gist of what you have just said, plus what you said yesterday, that the Daily Worker took its line from the Politburo and then passed that on, and the Daily Worker was in effect the instruction sheet to Communist organizations all over America?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is exclusively what it is. It is, as I say, the telegraph agency of the conspiracy.

Senator SMITH. So that when the Communists read something in the Daily Worker indicating what line is being taken by the Daily

Worker, that is the same as definite instructions to them to follow through on that line?

Mr. BUDENZ. Every time the Daily Worker arrives in the district office of the Communist Party it is read immediately by the district leader. He calls together his staff, and he assigns to them their tasks as a result of the Daily Worker articles and editorials.

Of course, that is supplemented by other things, mail sent out through mail drops and the like, but this is the constant source of directives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether the conference that is referred to in that article of the 16th of October was simply the successful fruition of a plan which started with the blast that was carried in the issue of the 4th or whether blast and conference, cause and effect, were all part of a single prearranged plan?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I can only cite Mr. Browder's words. I wouldn't want to put my own interpretation into that, but very strongly the impression was given that this was all arranged, that this was the complete picture; that Mr. Browder when he went to Washington understood that he was going to gain.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say, Mr. Budenz, that this statement, after it was promulgated by Mr. Welles, was used extensively by the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most extensively; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say his statement, after it was promulgated by Mr. Welles. What statement do you refer to and what exhibit?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the statement in exhibit No. 162 that we have introduced this morning, "Welles States United States Policy on China."

Prior to that time, had there been any such statement on the part of the United States Government, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, you are not offering that exhibit as evidence that Mr. Welles made such a statement but only as evidence that the Daily Worker carried that story, that Mr. Browder attributed that story, statement, to Mr. Welles, are you not?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Watkins?

Senator WATKINS. I was going to ask if we have available the statement issued by Mr. Welles, the actual statement. I came in late, so I do not know what has preceded this, but it seems to me in view of what Mr. Sourwine has said that there ought to be some follow-up as to the statement actually issued by Mr. Welles.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a statement issued by Mr. Welles? The Senator is asking for it.

Senator WATKINS. The confirmation.

Mr. MORRIS. We have that, Senator, and we will bring it out in just a minute.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not copies of the Daily Worker were circulated among employees of the State Department that were likely to be brought to the attention of Mr. Welles?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I wouldn't have knowledge of that. The Daily Worker though is pretty well examined by governmental officials, and that is a matter of public knowledge.

Senator SMITH. Did you receive any protest from Mr. Welles about the publication of these statements?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, no, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, was this statement, as it appears in the Daily Worker there, used as a basis for a campaign by the Communists to eliminate people who were anti-Communist from places of influence in the Government?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I intended to complete Senator O'Conor's question there along that line and had my thought interrupted, that is to say, the campaign began actually then against those who were considered to be against Soviet policy in the Far East. It began with an attack on Mr. Adolf Berle, who by the way was under fire from the Communists at that particular moment, very definitely and strenuously. It proceeded through the years until in 1944 or 1945 it broke out into an organized campaign.

I don't want to give an exact quote, but this is the essence of it, as the Communists express it, "To clean the State Department of all anti-Soviet elements."

Mr. MORRIS. You say that was a sustained Communist campaign all during the war period?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Of course, it had highlights, but it was sustained.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you a photostat of an article that appeared in the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Worker of October 4, 1942, page 5, the photostat being prepared at my direction.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated. You are getting your exhibits a little confused, Mr. Morris, because your exhibits have been running along in a series from the beginning of the hearings, and now you are starting with a series of this date. I think it might be well to have it follow in sequence following your exhibits of former days.

Mr. MORRIS. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I just want to designate that as the third this morning so we will be able to distinguish.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 163" an is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 163

[From the Worker, New York, October 4, 1942, p. 5]

THE SINISTER A. A. BERLE—CHAMPION OF MUNICH, ANTI-SOVIET INTRIGUER IN OUR STATE DEPARTMENT

(By Adam Lapin)

WASHINGTON, October 3.—A few days ago Adolph Augustus Berle, Jr., was discussing the Spanish situation with an intimate group. The slight, sallow-faced Assistant Secretary of State expressed gratification that Franco, the puppet of Hitler and Mussolini, had crushed the Spanish Republic.

He said that the world situation would have been infinitely worse if "communism" had triumphed in Spain and then spread over Europe.

This incident is typical of the thinking of Adolph Berle, whom many informed observers here consider the nearest thing to an American counterpart to George Bonnet, the corrupt French politician, who was one of the principal architects of Munich.

As the last few months have passed without the opening of a second front, the voices of the Munichmen in Washington have grown louder.

Not only in Congress, but in the State Department, the War Department, and the War Production Board the men of faint heart have begun to speak up, to intrigue against the Soviet Union, to spread anti-Soviet rumors. Even speculation about a negotiated peace is no longer a rarity.

Try to trace down the anti-second front and the anti-Soviet talk in Washington, and you will find that an exceptionally high percentage emanates from room 200½, off the dank second floor corridors of the musty State Department Building, from the office of Assistant Secretary Berle.

Berle is no longer the boy wonder who graduated Harvard at 18 and was an adviser on Russian affairs to President Wilson at Versailles when he was 23.

He is now a cynical, power-hungry man of 47. He is a brilliant and fluent phrase-maker, but beneath the flowery verbiage is the hard inner core of his dominant passion: A bitter, last-ditch hostility to the Soviet Union.

During the Munich crisis Berle wrote in a memorandum to the President that the United States should not be swung off base either by diplomacy or emotion.

The memorandum was quoted by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, the Washington newspapermen, in the book which they wrote from a desk in Berle's office.

They saw Berle every day for several weeks, and they must know whereof they speak when they say that Berle pleaded "for the most hard-headed—even cold-hearted—approach to the Czechoslovak question."

Berle was an advocate of Munichism then. There is every reason to think that he still is.

He was one of the men who helped to strangle the Spanish Republic and today helps perpetuate the continued appeasement of Franco.

He was one of the most influential State Department officials to favor the shipment of war materials to Japan over several costly and long-to-be-regretted years.

He is an ardent advocate of appeasing Vichy France.

Around Berle gathered the more dangerous anti-Soviet element among the European emigrees now in the United States.

The Assistant Secretary of State confers frequently with Alexander Kerensky, who has never forgiven the Russian people for turning on his Government in favor of the Communists.

Tibor Eckhardt, the Hungarian Facist who claims that he is opposed to Hitler but is active in sponsoring anti-Soviet propaganda in this country, also sees Berle frequently.

Berle was active in trying to spike the conversations between former Soviet Ambassador Costantine Oumansky and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.

The newspapermen who saw Berle in those days would almost invariably leave his office with a juicy anti-Soviet story.

The Assistant Secretary of State is frequently present at Mrs. Evalyn Walsh McLean's parties. Last New Year's Eve he was photographed there chatting with Finnish Minister Hjalmar Procope, Senator Robert Taft, the notorious Ohio defeatist, and Ambassador Espil, of Argentina.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you identify this, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, we published this in the Daily Worker and the character of the article is indicated by the headline, "The Sinister A. A. Berle, champion of Munich, anti-Soviet intriguer in our State Department."

Mr. MORRIS. That is a sample of the campaign which was being sustained by the Communists at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the campaign that was carried into every part of the United States, not only among the Communists but the organizations which they were infiltrating.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this campaign extend to other officials in the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us who the other officials were?

Mr. BUDENZ. Joseph B. Grew, Under Secretary of State; Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, not technically with the State Department but connected at least diplomatically with State Department relations; Eugene C. Dooman, who was head of the Far Eastern Division, if I remember correctly, at least he was in control of the details of the far eastern policy; and Gen. Patrick Hurley, Ambassador to China, who particularly was under attack from the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I think, Mr. Chairman, if we take these items one at a time it will be a lot clearer.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. In point of time, Mr. Budenz, which is the first one of these that we should discuss?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I think Under Secretary of State Grew is the first because as early as at least 1944 the Politburo laid plans against Mr. Grew, asking him questions, criticizing his policy, and the like.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us the first episode that you can recall in point of time, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, there were episodes before this, but the ones that I can recall occurred in 1945 and are the most vivid. Mr. Grew was attacked on two grounds, one that he didn't have the right policy in China, and secondly, as we approached the question of what to do with Japan, that he favored a soft peace with Japan.

The Communists wanted a tough peace just as there was to be the Morgenthau plan in Germany. They didn't hesitate in their own discussions to show that this would tend to drive the Japanese into the hands of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know they wanted a tough peace?

Mr. BUDENZ. They discussed it and planned it and discussed it in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in aid of the testimony this morning I have here a folder full of exhibits which are extracts from the Daily Worker. By way of refreshing the recollection of the witness I would like to make those available to him while he is testifying to episodes that occurred in this campaign.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do so if he identifies them as articles published in the Daily Worker under his editorial supervision.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to present them in chronological order.

The CHAIRMAN. If he can identify them as publications in the Daily Worker under his supervision.

Mr. MORRIS. As each one is pulled out we can identify them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think that as the witness identifies it there should be an identifying mark on the exhibit to show what exhibit he is holding in his hand at the time. The clerk will see to that, please.

Mr. BUDENZ. The first exhibit is from the Daily Worker of June 4, 1945, page 4.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Mandel, was this photostat prepared under your direction?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. This is a reprint of the statement made by the national board of the Communist Political Association, that being the temporary name, as you recall, of the Communist Party during a cer-

tain period. This statement was made on the eve of changing back to the Communist Party.

In the course of their general program they outline a far-eastern policy which, to make it brief, includes:

One, rout and defeat the advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese imperialists and war lords. Guarantee a free democratic Asia with the right of national independence for all colonial and dependent peoples. Curb those who seek American imperialist control in the Far East.

Three, press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Communists and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victory.

There are other items, but those are the outstanding ones.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so designated and entered into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 164" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 164

[From the Daily Worker, New York, June 4, 1945, p. 4]

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND NEXT TASKS—RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL BOARD, CPA, ADOPTED ON JUNE 2, 1945

This resolution is submitted as a draft for discussion and action by the national committee and the entire membership of the Communist Political Association.

The vote on the resolution in the national board was as follows:

For: Morris Childs, Benjamin Davis, Jr., Eugene Dennis, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, James Ford, Wm. Z. Foster, Gilbert Green, Robert Minor, Robert Thompson, John Williamson.

Against: Earl Browder.

Abstained: Roy Hudson.

Absent: William Schneiderman.

PART 1

The military defeat of Nazi Germany is a great historic victory for world democracy, for all mankind. This epochal triumph was brought about by the concerted action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition—by the decisive blows of the Red Army, by the American-British offensives, and by the heroic struggle of the resistance movements. This victory opens the way for the complete destruction of fascism in Europe and weakens the forces of reaction and fascism everywhere. It has already brought forth a new antifascist unity of the peoples in Europe marked by the formation in a number of countries of democratic governments representative of the will of the people. It has also created the prerequisites for bringing about the speedy defeat of Japanese imperialism. Thus great possibilities have been opened up for realizing a durable peace.

2

However, a sharp and sustained struggle must still be conducted to secure the complete destruction of fascism in Europe and throughout the world and to guarantee that the possibilities which now exist for creating an enduring peace shall be realized. This is so because the economic and social roots of fascism in Europe have not yet been fully destroyed. This is so because the extremely powerful reactionary forces in the United States and England, which are centered in the trusts and cartels, are striving to reconstruct liberated Europe on a reactionary basis. Moreover, this is so because the most aggressive circles of American imperialism are endeavoring to secure for themselves political and economic domination in the world.

With the ending of the war against Nazi Germany, important groupings of American capital, which were opposed to German imperialist world domination, are joining hands with the most reactionary and profascist circles of monopoly capital—with the profascist du Pont clique in the leadership of the NAM. Now

that Nazi Germany has been crushed, these big business circles which heretofore supported, though inconsistently, the war against Hitler, in order to eliminate their German imperialist rival are today frightened by the democratic consequences of that victory.

Like their British counterparts, they are alarmed at the strengthened positions of world labor, at the democratic advances in Europe and at the upsurge of the national liberation movements in the colonial and dependent countries. Therefore they seek to halt the march of democracy; to curb the strength of labor and the people. They want to save the remnants of fascism in Germany and in the rest of Europe. They are trying to organize a new cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union which bore the main brunt of the war against the Nazis, and which is the stanchest champion of national freedom, democracy, and world peace.

This regrouping in the ranks of American capital, reacting to the defeat of Germany, has been reflected in many recent actions of the State Department. It is evidenced by the fact that the majority of the American delegation at San Francisco yielded on certain issues to the extreme reactionaries. In so doing they departed from Roosevelt's foreign policy of Big Three unity as worked out at Tehran and Yalta.

This regrouping in the ranks of capital explains why, on most basic questions, Stettinius and Connally were influenced to join hands with Vandenberg—the spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance capital. This explains the seating of Fascist Argentina and the British-American reluctance to live up to the Yalta accord on Poland and Germany. This is the reason why the American delegation at San Francisco refused to join with the Soviet Union to pledge the right of national independence for mandated territories and colonies, and refused to give official recognition to the representatives of the World Labor Conference who spoke for 60,000,000 organized workers.

This shift in the position of certain big business circles explains the reactionary intervention at Trieste and the threat of armed force against our Yugoslav ally. This development also explains why Washington and London are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united, and democratic China, and why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime which is obstructing an all-out war against Japan. It accounts, too, for the new campaign of anti-Soviet slander and incitement calculated to undermine American-Soviet friendship and cooperation which was the cornerstone for victory over Hitler Germany and is the indispensable key to attain postwar peace and world security.

On the home front the camp of reaction is blocking the development of a satisfactory program to meet the human needs of reconversion with its accompanying economic dislocations and severe unemployment. Reactionary forces—especially the NAM and their representatives in Congress—are planning a new open-shop drive to weaken or smash the trade-unions. They are trying to prevent the adoption of governmental measures which must be enacted at once if our country is to avoid the most acute consequences of future economic crisis. Likewise they are vigorously preparing to win the crucial 1946 elections.

If these reactionary policies and forces are not checked and defeated, America and the world will be confronted with new aggressions and wars and the growth of reaction and fascism in the United States.

3

However, the conditions and forces exist to defeat this reactionary threat, and to enable our country to play a progressive role in world affairs in accord with the true national interests of the American people. For one thing, the military defeat of Nazi Germany has changed the relationship of world forces in favor of democracy. It has enhanced the role and influence of the land of socialism. It has strengthened those forces in our country and elsewhere which seek to maintain and consolidate the friendship and cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union—a unity which must now be extended and reenforced. This is evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the American people, and in the first place labor, are opposed to reaction and fascism, support the foreign and domestic policies of President Roosevelt as embodied in the decisions of Tehran and Crimea, and in the second bill of rights.

This majority must now speak out and assert its collective strength and will. The united power of labor and of all democratic forces must express itself in a decisive fashion so as to influence the course of the Nation in a consistently progressive direction.

It is imperative that the American people resolutely support every effort of the Truman administration to carry forward Roosevelt's program for victory, peace, democracy, and 60,000,000 jobs. It is equally necessary that the people sharply criticize all hesitations to apply this policy, and vigorously oppose any concessions to the reactionaries. The camp of reaction must not be appeased—it must be isolated and routed.

Toward this end it is necessary, as never before, to decisively strengthen the democratic unity of the Nation. It is essential to weld together and consolidate the broadest national coalition of all anti-Fascist and democratic forces, including all supporters of Roosevelt's anti-Axis policies. To forge this democratic coalition most effectively and to enable it to exercise decisive influence upon the affairs of the Nation, it is essential that the working class—especially the progressive labor movement and the Communists—strengthen its independent role and activities and display far greater political and organizing initiative. It is imperative to develop the maximum unity of action between the CIO, the AFL, and the Railroad Brotherhoods and to achieve their full participation in the new World Federation of Trade Unions.

While cooperating with the patriotic and democratic forces from all walks of life, labor must, in the first place, strengthen its ties with the veterans, the toiling farmers, the Negro people, the youth, the women, professionals and small-business men, and with their democratic organizations.

4

To achieve the widest democratic coalition and the most effective anti-Fascist unity of the Nation, it is vital that labor vigorously champion a program of action that will promote the complete destruction of fascism, speed victory over Japanese imperialism, curb the powers of the trusts and monopolies—advance the economic welfare of the people and protect and extend American democracy.

In the opinion of the Communist Political Association, such a program should be based on the following slogans of action:

I. Hasten the defeat of Fascist-militarist Japan!

Rout and defeat the advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese imperialists and warlords.

Guarantee a free, democratic Asia with the right of national independence for all colonial and dependent peoples. Curb those who seek American imperialist control in the Far East.

Press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Communists and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victory. Full military aid to the Chinese guerrillas led by the heroic Eighth and Fourth Armies.

Continue uninterrupted war production and uphold labor's no-strike pledge for the duration. Stop employer provocations.

II. Complete the destruction of fascism and build a durable peace.

Cement American-Soviet friendship and unity to guarantee the fulfillment of Tehran and Yalta accords for an enduring peace and a world free of fascism.

Carry out in full the decisions made by the Big Three at Crimea.

Punish the war guilty without further delay. Death to all Fascist war criminals. Make Germany pay full reparations in labor and in kind for the reconstruction of Europe.

Strengthen the World Labor Congress as the backbone of the unity of the peoples and the free nations.

Support the establishment of an effective international security organization based upon the Dumbarton Oaks plan and the Yalta agreement.

Guarantee to all peoples the right to determine freely their own destiny and to establish their own democratic form of government. Put an end to Anglo-American intervention against the peoples, such as in Greece, Belgium, and Italy.

Grant immediate national independence to Puerto Rico.

Break diplomatic relations with Franco Spain and Fascist Argentina.

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials.

Help feed and reconstruct starving and war-torn Europe. Reject the Hoover program based on reactionary financial mortgages and political interference.

Pass the Bretton Woods proposals and other democratic measures designed to promote international economic cooperation and expanding world trade. Grant extensive long-term loans and credits, at low interest rates, for purposes of reconstruction and industrialization.

III. Meet the human needs of reconversion—Push the fight for 60 million jobs.

Make the right to work and the Roosevelt second Bill of Rights the law of the land.

Increase purchasing-power to promote maximum employment. No reduction in weekly take-home pay when overtime is eliminated.

For an immediate 20 percent wage increase to meet the rise in the cost of living. Establish an adequate minimum hourly wage on a national scale.

Establish the principle of the guaranteed annual wage.

For a shorter workweek without wage reductions, except where this would hamper war production.

Support Truman's proposals for emergency Federal legislation to extend and supplement present unemployment insurance benefits. Start unemployment insurance payments promptly upon loss of job and continue until new employment is found. Provide adequate severance pay for laid-off workers. Insure the retraining, education and reemployment of the young workers.

Prevent growing unemployment during the reconversion and post war period by starting large-scale Federal, State and municipal public works programs—slum clearance, low rental housing developments, rural electrification, the building of new schools, hospitals, roads, etc.

No scrapping of Government owned industrial plants. If private industry cannot operate these at full capacity for peacetime purposes the Government must.

Maintain and rigidly enforce rent and price control and rationing. Strengthen the law enforcement powers of the OPA. Smash the black market.

Utilize the Labor-Management Charter to press for the organization of the unorganized, to strengthen collective bargaining, to defend the trade-unions from all attacks by the open-shoppers, to raise living standards, and to promote the fight for 60 million jobs.

Prosecute the war profiteers. No reduction in corporate, excess profit and income taxes for the millionaires.

Pass the Wagner-Murray-Dingell social security bill.

Maintain equitable farm prices and assure adequate Federal and State aid to all needy farmers.

IV. Repay our debt to the men who fought for victory.

Guarantee jobs and security for all returning veterans regardless of race, creed or color.

Extend the scope and benefits of the GI bill of rights and eliminate all red tape from the Veterans' Administration. Guarantee adequate medical care to every veteran.

Press for the speedy enactment of legislation providing for substantial demobilization pay, based on length and character of service, and financed by taxes on higher personal and corporate incomes.

Insure full benefits of all veterans legislation to Negro veterans.

V. Safeguard and extend democracy.

Enforce equal rights for every American citizen regardless of race, color, creed, political affiliation or national origin.

End Jim Crow. Outlaw anti-Semitism. Eliminate all anti-Communist legislation. Pass a national FEPC. Abolish the poll tax and the white primary. End every form of discrimination in the Armed Forces.

Protect labor's rights, especially the right to organize and bargain collectively.

Outlaw and prohibit all fascist organizations and activities.

Curb the powers and policies of the monopolies and trusts which jeopardize the national welfare and world peace. Prosecute all violations of the antitrust laws, and all moves and acts to restore or continue the Anglo-German-American cartel system and practices. Protect and extend Federal aid to small business.

This program represents the most urgent interests of the American people and the Nation. It is not a program for socialism which alone can completely abolish insecurity, exploitation, oppression, and war. This is an immediate program of action around which all progressive Americans can unite today. It is a program of action which will advance the destruction of fascism, help realize a more stable peace.

(*Continued on Page 5*) *etc.*

CPA National Board Decides Upon Discussions on Resolution

The national board of the CPA, at its meeting of June 2, also adopted the following additional motions:

1. The national committee shall be convened within 2 weeks.

2. The discussion by the membership of the association on the resolution of the national board shall start immediately in the clubs and in other meetings

of the association to be determined by each State committee. The discussion shall continue up to a date to be decided by the national committee, CPA.

3. For the period of the discussion, arrangements shall be made with the Daily Worker to publish a semiweekly discussion bulletin as a supplement to the paper. This bulletin shall be open to all members of the association.

4. State organizations may publish special discussion bulletins if they so desire.

5. During the entire period of the discussion, the policy and practical mass work of the association shall be governed by the resolution of the national board.

Mr. MORRIS. I might say that that exhibit is the fourth one we have introduced today.

Mr. BUDENZ. I am going by chronology rather than a rounded-out picture, but the picture will be given, Mr. Chairman.

The next one as far as I can see is dated June 26, 1945, page 9, headed, "One of Six Arrested Hits Clique in State Department."

The CHAIRMAN. That is of the issue of the Daily Worker of what date?

Mr. BUDENZ. June 26, 1945, page 9.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BUDENZ. This refers to Andrew Roth, one of those arrested in the Amerasia case and the Daily Worker predicts:

Roth's forthcoming book, Dilemma in Japan, "dissects" the State Department's "past mistakes and current fallacies," in the author's words. It exposes Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co. announced that the book would come out in September.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done and it will be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 165" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 165

[From the Daily Worker, New York, June 26, 1945, p. 9]

ONE OF SIX ARRESTED HITS CLIQUE IN STATE DEPARTMENT

Andrew Roth, on inactive status as senior lieutenant in the United States Naval Reserve since his arrest June 6, declared yesterday that charges against him "reflect the hopes of a powerful conservative clique in the State Department."

In a copyrighted article in the New York Post Roth warned that, should this clique have its way, "the end result will almost certainly be a China wracked by civil war, a Japan in which the roots of aggression have been left intact, and a sharp clash of American and Soviet interests in the Far East."

Roth expressed confidence that he would be cleared of the accusation against himself and five others, of having been party to a conspiracy to transmit confidential information to unauthorized persons.

Roth's forthcoming book, Dilemma in Japan, "dissects" the State Department's "past mistakes and current fallacies," in the author's words. It exposes Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co. announced that the book would come out in September.

Mr. SOURWINE. To save time, could Mr. Mandel be asked whether these photostats which have been handed to the witness are all photostats of the Daily Worker, photostats prepared under his direction?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUDENZ. The next is an editorial in the Daily Worker of August 6, 1945, page 6, and reads:

It is for Under Secretary Grew to answer: Why are American guns being used to pursue civil war in China? What measures are being taken to halt such crimes and guarantee against their repetition?

This is an attack on Mr. Grew under the title, "Question to Mr. Grew."

Mr. MORRIS. I offer that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 166" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 166

[From the Daily Worker, August 6, 1945, p. 6]

QUESTION TO MR. GREW

Far up in northern China, Chinese are fighting Chinese at this very moment—yet how is it possible that hardly a mention of this gets to the American people?

The Yenan radio has charged that American lend-lease guns are being used against the Chinese Communist guerillas by the armies of Gen. Hu Tsung-nan—yet the War Department and the State Department say nary a word.

We think this warfare in northern China is scandalous. And equally scandalous is the absence of any recognition by the State Department of American responsibility in this deadly serious affair.

For who gains when a Kuomintang soldier is ordered to attack a Chinese Communist guerilla? Only Japan, the common enemy.

And who profits by this silence from the United States? Only the Kuomintang dictatorship, which interprets silence as giving consent to its evil plans for the disunion of the Chinese nation.

The Yenan radio has twice appealed to Chiang Kai-shek, urging him to call off the attack of Kuomintang's Fifty-ninth Division. It is an appeal directed to Americans as well.

For the plain fact remains that American lives are being jeopardized if the Chungking regime is permitted to continue such policies.

And if such things can happen while the Kuomintang is supposedly liberalizing its dictatorship, while the Soong-Stalin discussions are about to be resumed—the American people can have no confidence whatsoever in the Chungking leaders and all their promises and plans.

It is for Undersecretary Grew to answer: Why are American guns being used to pursue civil war in China? What measures are being taken to halt such crimes and guarantee against their repetition?

Mr. BUDENZ. The next that I can find is the Daily Worker of August 13, 1945, page 5, headed "The Allied Reply and the Role of the Emperor," in which they state:

Our public knows, from a correct understanding of Japanese history, that the Emperor is the focus of the militarist-feudal-industrialist set-up in Japan responsible for the war and the oppression of Asia.

And they feel correctly that powerful capitalist forces, represented by such men as Under Secretary Joseph Grew and Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, want to preserve this particular Emperor's powers and the royal institution as such. They want to preserve as much of Japanese fascism as they can.

That is an editorial.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert that as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 167" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 167

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 13, 1945, p. 5]

THE ALLIED REPLY AND THE ROLE OF THE EMPEROR—AN EDITORIAL

Reprinted from late edition of Sunday Worker

The four great powers have given their answer to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam surrender declaration, in which the Japanese rulers asked for clarification on the Emperor's role. The world awaits the next developments while the war itself is being pressed forward on all fronts.

Faced with the overwhelming power of the United Nations, the vast American air and naval power, the atom bomb, the Soviet Union's rapid advances in Manchuria and Korea, the Japanese rulers were forced to accept the Potsdam terms.

The great powers have elaborated these terms to the extent that the Emperor will have to subordinate himself entirely to the Allied Supreme Command. He will have to carry out the Supreme Command's orders in compelling the Japanese troops to lay down their arms. The institution of the monarchy itself will ultimately be decided by the Japanese people.

If we remember that the Potsdam declaration provided a good basis for eradicating Japanese fascism, eliminating the possibility of renewed aggression and opening the path for democratic development in Japan, it is clear that the United Nations stand on the eve of an immense victory. The tremendous fact is that fascism in Asia as well as in Europe has at last been forced to its knees.

We do not know, and cannot know, all the factors which entered into the Big Four's reply. Certainly, one of them is the necessity of intimate unity among the great powers. For without such unity a common program for ending the war, occupying the strategic areas of eastern Asia, and beginning the destruction of fascist-militarism would be endangered.

This should be remembered, even though on the role of the Emperor himself the American people are understandably disappointed. He is continuing on the throne, even though he is a war criminal, and the people rightly want to treat him as such. Our public knows, from a correct understanding of Japanese history, that the Emperor is the focus of the militarist-feudal-industrialist set-up in Japan responsible for the war and the oppression of Asia.

And they feel correctly that powerful capitalist forces represented by such men as Under Secretary Joseph Grew and Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, want to preserve this particular Emperor's powers and the royal institution as such. They want to preserve as much of Japanese fascism as they can. The Vandenbergs and the Tafts unquestionably will attempt to use the royal house for desperate efforts to sabotage the impending United Nations victory.

That is why the American people must continue their vigilance—even though the war will undoubtedly end before the Japanese people have decided the ultimate fate of the royal house.

A great victory of epic dimensions is unfolding before the democratic world.

It is a victory well earned. It is a victory for which heavy sacrifices have been made. It is a victory which must lead to the complete eradication of fascism, and for this task—the precondition of a long and real peace—the unity of the great powers is decisive.

The advance of democracy in China, the full independence of the colonial peoples is equally decisive. It is on all these issues that continued vigilance and struggle will be required.

Mr. BUDENZ. This is August 15, 1945, an editorial in the Daily Worker, page 2, which means it was given particular prominence.

The CHAIRMAN. As regards this last one that you just identified, you said it was an editorial in the Daily Worker. Were you the editorial writer at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was the managing editor of the Daily Worker. The writing of the editorials was assigned at each editorial board meeting to various editors on the board. This was very likely written by Joseph Starobin, although that wasn't always the case. It was written under the supervision of the editorial board.

This is entitled "Prevent Civil War in China," and at the conclusion states:

The State Department should be bombarded with messages demanding the recall of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, and the immediate cleansing of the people in the Department responsible for this suicidal policy.

That is, the policy which they were condemning.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that as the next consecutive exhibit in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be given its proper number and will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 168" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 168

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 15, 1945, p. 2]

PREVENT CIVIL WAR IN CHINA—AN EDITORIAL

With Japan's surrender just around the corner, the danger of civil war in China assumes immediate and alarming proportions. During the last few days Chiang Kai-shek has clearly revealed his intention of launching the civil war immediately, using Central Government troops which have been held ready for this moment, as well as puppet troops which collaborated with the Japanese.

And especially disturbing to the American people, in the midst of their jubilation over the approaching end of the war, are the reports from Chungking that American airplanes, troops, and munitions may be placed at the disposal of the Fascist-feudal clique in Chungking.

The calamity of civil war in China must be prevented. For should it take place the peace for which we have fought a long and hard war would be seriously endangered. The American people, as well as our allies, must not be cheated of the fruits of the global victory. Much less can we permit the continuation of government policies which give aid to a reactionary, Fascist clique, a clique which has stood aloof from the war against Japan since 1938, which has connived with the collaborationist regime at Nanking against all the democratic forces of China and which now rushes to make open war against them.

CONFIRMATION IN UNITED STATES PRESS

The charges made by the Yenan radio against Chiang, accusing him of collusion with the puppet troops and of setting up a united front with the Nanking collaborationists for the immediate launching of the civil war, are fully confirmed by A. T. Steele's report to the New York Herald Tribune yesterday.

"It is no secret," writes Mr. Steele, "that many puppet officials and army officers are in league with Chungking and plan to declare allegiance to the Central Government when the time is ripe."

According to the same correspondent, Chiang "is counting on assistance from Chinese puppet troops in enemy-held areas." This was openly admitted by the Generalissimo when he forbade the Communist-led armies and guerrillas to disarm the enemy, and called upon the puppet armies to "maintain order."

In the tense and dangerous situation it is absolutely impermissible for Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer to place American material and men at Chiang's disposal.

According to reports from Chungking, the two top American representatives have been conferring with Chiang for the purpose of planning the rapid occupation by Kuomintang troops of key ports and areas which have already been largely liberated by the Yenan armies. It is reported that American planes are ready to transport Chiang's troops into sectors already occupied or soon to be taken by the Communist-led and guerrilla forces.

WORLD PEACE ENDANGERED

For Chiang to attempt to possess these areas would mean to oust the liberation armies and declare war upon the people. We cannot be a party to such nefarious and dastardly plans. They would endanger the prospects of peace in the Pacific and in the world.

For Hurley and Wedemeyer to participate in this scheme is to place our Government policy entirely at the disposal of the most reactionary and imperialist forces in our country who want to prevent a united and democratic China, and will stop at nothing to achieve their end.

The American people, especially the labor movement, should intervene directly, and at this very moment when the end of the war is at hand.

We do not want the continuation of the war in another form, in the shape of a civil war in China.

We want peace in the Pacific and in the world, and that means a democratic and united China. It means that the Chinese collaborationists, the Nanking puppets, and their Kuomintang traitors should be held strictly to account and made to suffer for their treachery.

Not a single American gun, soldier, plane or other war equipment must be placed at the disposal of the Fascist clique in Chungking.

The Chinese liberation armies, including the eighth and fourth route armies which did the major land fighting against the enemy, should be fully represented in working out the allied occupation of Japan and liberated areas.

As with the other main problems of the peace, American-Soviet cooperation must be maintained and extended in the process of preventing civil war in China.

The State Department should be bombarded with messages demanding the recall of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, and the immediate cleansing of the people in the Department responsible for this suicidal policy. We want a durable and democratic peace.

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I have stepped out of the chronology, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, but I will introduce this anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. This is the Daily Worker of July 24, 1945, an editorial, the chief editorial, "Mr. Grew Must Explain," in which they accuse the State Department under Mr. Grew's direction of playing up to the Japanese imperialists and appealing to them to surrender in time to save themselves.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that for the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 169" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 169

[From the Daily Worker, July 24, 1945]

MR. GREW MUST EXPLAIN

There is something very strange, very rotten, and very alarming in the way American policy toward Japan is developing. It is time the entire Nation realized what is going on, and what is at stake.

Early last week, the Herald Tribune's Washington correspondent reported that plans were being made to modify the unconditional-surrender policy. Japan was going to be told that her Imperial Government might remain if only she would subordinate herself to the United States and submit to a peace which would not necessarily destroy her feudal-militarist structure. The Navy and State Department were reported favorable to such a plan. But it was all a matter for the future, to be decided by President Truman himself.

Now it is disclosed that a direct Navy Department representative, Capt. E. M. Zacharias, has been broadcasting to Japan for the OWI. On Friday night he openly appealed to the Japanese industrialists to surrender in time. He said that American patience was running short, that unless the Japanese leaders surrender now, the peace may be complicated by the pressure of China, Australia, and perhaps also by the Soviet Union. Japan, unlike Germany, would be well treated under the terms of the Atlantic Charter. In other words, an open appeal to negotiate a peace.

Under Secretary Joseph Grew last week did not deny the Herald Tribune reports; he merely said that no official peace offers had been received, which could be an invitation for them. And Elmer Davis now discloses that Captain

Zacharias has already made 12 such broadcasts. Evidently, what was going to be a modification of policy in the future is already a fact—to this officer—and has been the basis of repeated broadcasts.

This is a scandalous situation. Both the Herald Tribune and the New York Times have in recent days devoted sharp editorials to it, which shows that while there is serious resistance to modification of the unconditional-surrender policy in the very highest circles, there is also plenty of fire to cause such smoke.

Both newspapers point out that this kind of thing is only prolonging the war. It is encouraging the Japanese to resist even more fiercely. Instead of shortening the war, this is literally costing American lives. The Tribune cites a commentator of the Japanese Broadcasting Co., Kuso Oya, who gleefully predicts an impending about-face by the United States, urging the Japanese to fight on until that happens. Of course, it is not only the fact that the war is being prolonged by such tactics. The very basis of a democratic Asia would be undermined if the State Department conception wins out.

Explanations to the American people are in order. The Navy Department should explain the case of Captain Zacharias. Mr. Grew should openly and frankly inform the American people whether and why the policy of unconditional surrender is being modified.

Mr. BUDENZ. The next two are from the Daily Worker of August 18, 1945, the first of them being on page 2 and being a news dispatch from Art Shields, the Daily Worker correspondent at that time in Washington. In the course of this article, which is headed "See danger of United States intervention for Chiang," it says:

Unfortunately America's declared policy, as laid down by Ambassador Patrick Hurley, is to help the Kuomintang and to isolate the popular resistance forces operating from Yenan. There is no evidence yet to show that Grew's designation means that the United States intends to follow the united policy urged by General Stilwell, before he was taken out of China at the request of Chiang.

That "designation" is a typographical error, it means "resignation" because they have just mentioned that Grew has resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 170" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 170

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 18, 1945, p. 2]

SEE DANGER OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION FOR CHIANG

(By Art Shields)

WASHINGTON, August 17.—The resignation of Joseph C. Grew, long a foe of Chinese unity, from his strategic post as Under Secretary of State, might be seen as an encouraging token of American policy toward China if taken by itself. Unfortunately it cannot be taken by itself. And there is too little time to speculate hopefully on inconclusive data, while the danger of further American intervention in the civil war, which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is preparing, remains so obvious.

This intervention in the next few days may take a more active form than it has in recent months when the United States was merely equipping the Kuomintang armies, which were giving more attention to the blockade against the popular anti Japanese resistance forces, led by the Communist General Chu Teh, than to fighting the enemy.

The best informed authorities on China in Washington, in talks with the Daily Worker, yesterday foresaw certain types of American military and naval intervention to help the reactionary dictatorship, as distinct possibilities for the very near future.

Military intervention could come if General Wedemeyer, commander of American forces in China, carried out his reported promise to Chiang to carry airborne

Kuomintang troops to areas where the Japanese are surrendering. In most of those areas the Japanese and puppet troops would otherwise be forced to surrender to Chu Teh's armies, which are engaging more enemy forces than Chiang's armies are engaging.

Such action, if it takes place, would constitute American military intervention on behalf of the Chinese reactionaries, who are plotting civil war. It would involve the loss of American lives and a breach of faith with the Chinese people. It would jeopardize postwar peace in Asia and the world.

Chiang has already appealed to the Japanese not to surrender to the democratic forces, in other words to continue resisting them until he can take over with American help, thus encouraging the Japanese to continue the war in violation of the Allied orders for immediate and unconditional surrender. He also has told the puppet troops under Japanese command that he will hold them "responsible for maintaining local peace and order."

This means that Chiang is seeking an alliance with foreign enemies and Chinese traitors against the people. And it means, says a statement from the people's government at Yenan, that Chiang is seeking to get possession of enemy arms for the purpose of launching large-scale civil war against the heroic anti-Japanese guerilla fighters and the Eighth and Fourth Route Armies led by the Communists.

NAVAL INTERVENTION

The danger of naval as well as military intervention may come in port cities like Shanghai. The democratic, anti-Japanese armies, not Chiang's are advancing on Shanghai and most of the other large cities. The people, not the Kuomintang, will take these cities unless America intervenes.

Unfortunately America's declared policy, as laid down by Ambassador Patrick Hurley, is to help the Kuomintang and to isolate the popular resistance forces operating from Yenan. There is no evidence yet to show that Grew's designation means that the United States intends to follow the unity policy urged by General Stilwell before he was taken out of China at the request of Chiang.

Authoritative observers of the Chinese scene here also point out that Americans should not develop hasty illusions from Chiang's recent request to Mao Tse-tung, Communist political leader in Yenan, to confer with him in Chungking.

Conferences that are intended as more than gestures are not called in such vague fashion, they declare. There must first be preliminary meetings of representatives of the two groups to prepare the ground before the principals sit down together. There must be understandings regarding the specific issues to be discussed. Chiang's florid but brief invitation to Mao does not provide such understandings.

And, most important, the invitation must be accompanied by such measures of good faith as the cessation of civil war by the Kuomintang, the lifting of the blockade against the border region, the release of political prisoners, and the establishment of democratic civil liberties.

TERRORISTIC ATMOSPHERE

Chungking's present terroristic atmosphere is not conducive to the conference Chiang proposes.

America's first concern, however, is to tell our Government that there must be no intervention against the anti-Japanese fighters in China. No intervention on the side of a civil war plotter like Chiang, who, Yenan spokesmen have revealed, has set up a special Chinese brand of fascism—the brand called Compradore fascism, which is a reactionary dictatorship under the wings of foreign imperialism.

Mr. MORRIS. May I make it clear that we are reading these articles and editorials from the Daily Worker to show that the Communist Party, during this period, was carrying on an extensive campaign against the then Under Secretary of State Grew, because he was advocating a so-called soft peace for Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the case?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the Communist policy for Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was that of a tough peace for Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Grew was not carrying out that policy and therefore they were opposing him?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

We have here an editorial, Stop the Monkey Business, appearing on the same date, August 18, 1945, on the regular editorial page of the Daily Worker, page 6. This is the leading editorial, which concludes as follows:

> Americans today are in no mood to take any wooden nickels. The dilly-dallying with the Emperor in Japan must stop, and, incidentally, Joseph Grew must really be retired from public life and in no case appointed to any post dealing with far-eastern affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Now was this campaign being carried on against anyone else in the Japanese Division of the State Department, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; it was carried on at the same time extensively by the party, much more than these articles in the Daily Worker indicate. They corroborate the campaign, but through communications of the Politburo it was also against Eugene C. Dooman, who I understand was then connected with the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any reference to Mr. Dooman in those articles?

Mr. BUDENZ. There are references which I don't see in these articles, but there were many. There is an announcement here that the State Department "retires soft-peace advocate," but this is a United Press dispatch played up in the Daily Worker. This is dated September 6, 1945, page 2. It indicates that the campaign against Mr. Dooman was meeting with success.

Mr. MORRIS. The campaign against Mr. Dooman was meeting with success?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have these introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be so received and so designated.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 171 and 172," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 171

[From the Daily Worker, August 18, 1945, p. 6]

STOP THE MONKEY BUSINESS

The American people are watching the spectacle of Japan's delayed surrender with very suspicious eyes. And when you take into account the treacherous policies of Chiang Kai-shek, and the rip-roaring appeal to the reactionaries of the entire world by Winston Churchill—you get a very strange picture indeed. The American people are in no mood for monkey business. And that's what they fear is afoot.

For example, there is today's report of a Japanese airplane attack upon our bombers, who were peacefully photographing Tokyo. The Kwantung army is still fighting.

The behavior of the Japanese Emperor is very strange, and all his rescripts read as though Japan still thinks she can make war again at some future time. At least three war criminals, members of the old Cabinet, have been reappointed to the new one; and one of these ministers even has the portfolio for "Greater East Asia," as though to say that Japan still expects to exercise imperialist control over the peoples of Indochina, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Burma, and Thailand.

The Japanese Government explains to its people that the war was won "spiritually"; the Tokyo radio breathes insidious suggestions of revenge; there is no mention of the war guilt of the former Japanese Cabinet whatsoever.

And the Emperor's emphasis on the atom bomb makes it appear that Japan lost the war because of some scientific freak and not because she was forced to her knees. This is exactly the kind of propaganda to prepare for sabotaging the Potsdam declaration. We cannot share President Truman's complacency about it.

SURRENDER DELAYED

But the main thing is that the cease-fire order is being delayed. Russians and Mongolians—our allies—are still dying. And our own soldiers face treachery at every point. No wonder the American people are suspicious. It is as though the American supreme command is just as worried about a social and political crack-up inside of Japan as the Emperor himself. It is as though our State Department is trying to help the Japanese feudalists and industrialists to weather their internal crisis. That is none of our business. Any leniency to the Japanese along those lines contains the prospect of rupturing the Allies and laying the basis for future wars.

And then there is the crisis in China. The facts are brutally plain. Chiang Kai-shek is trying to keep the Japanese armies intact and fully armed until his own troops can get to Shanghai and Nanking. In other words, Chiang Kai-shek is afraid of the Chinese people who have suffered so long under the Japanese heel; he prefers to keep them under that heel rather than allow them to liberate themselves.

What does it mean, after all, when the Japanese puppet at Nanking publicly offers to hold the city with quisling troops until Chiang Kai-shek gets there? This is simple treachery. If it had happened in Europe, the country would be crying "sellout" from the housetops.

But how can Chiang Kai-shek dare to fly his troops into Shanghai and Nanking? Only because the American general, Albert Wedemeyer offers to help him with the services of American planes. In blunt language, this is intervention in the affairs of the Chinese people. It is encouraging Chiang to make civil war on all Chinese democrats. It is a dastardly game, and neither our soldiers nor our people want any part of it.

And finally, there is the Herbert Hoover of Great Britain—Winston Churchill. His speech in Parliament was much more than a challenge to the British Labor Government, although it was that, too, and we hope the British people and their leaders will know how to answer it. The speech was also a call to American reactionaries, urging them to treat Japan and to handle China in such a way as to prevent the victory of the democratic forces.

His reference to communism in Eastern and Central Europe, and his defense of the poor Germans in eastern Prussia is dangerous in itself, but most important, it bears immediately on the issues in Asia.

Americans today are in no mood to take any wooden nickels. The dilly-dallying with the emperor in Japan must stop, and incidentally Joseph Grew must really be retired from public life and in no case appointed to any post dealing with far-eastern affairs.

The United States must disavow Chiang Kai-shek's plans for civil war in China and give no support whatsoever to such a project. Vigilance of the Nation is required today, a responsibility which falls particularly upon the labor movement.

EXHIBIT No. 172

[From the Daily Worker, New York, Thursday, September 6, 1945, p. 2]

STATE DEPARTMENT RETIRES "SOFT PEACE" ADVOCATE

WASHINGTON, September 5 (UP).—Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, shaping a stiff occupation policy toward Japan, today was replacing old-line Japanese policy-making officials in the State Department with experts on China.

Eugene Dooman, special assistant to the director of the Department's Far Eastern Division, retired on August 31, it was revealed today, after 33 years of diplomatic service in the Japanese department. He was born in Japan and has been criticized by liberal publications for a "soft" attitude toward Japan.

He had held a key spot in formulating occupation procedure for Japan as chairman of a joint State, Army, and Navy Department committee responsible for occupation policy.

John Carter Vincent, chief of the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs, was recalled hurriedly from his vacation to fill Dooman's place on the committee. Vincent also retained his China post.

OTHERS MAY GO

Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew's recent resignation, and Dooman's retirement intensified speculation that Byrnes would replace other old liners in the Japanese section. Mentioned prominently were Ballantine and Erle R. Dickover, Chief of the Japanese Section.

Observers regarded it significant that Vincent was the second China specialist to be appointed to a vital Japanese policy-making post within the last few days.

Byrnes yesterday appointed United States Minister to Thialand George Atcheson to be acting political adviser to Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Both Vincent and Atcheson have spent years in China and have seen the effects of Japanese aggression. Atcheson was aboard the U. S. S. *Panay* when the Japanese bombed it on December 12, 1937.

At his press conference Byrnes made it clear that United States policy toward Japan was more stringent than had yet been disclosed.

Asked if he had seen reports that the Japanese did not believe they had lost the war, he said the terms of the occupation would soon be presented to the Japanese and if they didn't bring defeat home to them he didn't know what would.

Mr. BUDENZ. May I state, Mr. Chairman, that I have one more exhibit, which while I have taken it out of order is slightly different, it indicates the continuation of the campaign against Mr. Grew in order to drive him completely out of public life, as the editorial of August 18 stated, and this is a very large display article playing up with a great deal of praise John Stewart Service for having been vindicated after he had allegedly taken State Department documents and given them to Philip Jaffe.

After his vindication and reinstatement in the State Department this says—

"So sorry," says Grew; State Department reinstates man he called spy.

There is a very prominent picture of John Service, and it says—

Mr. Grew, late but unlamented Undersecretary of the State Department, popped off, too.

Then they go on to indicate that Grew was compelled personally to apologize to one of the victims of the witch hunt, John S. Service, who was reinstated to his State Department job.

So there was nothing that poor Mr. Grew could do but echo the American equivalent of the Japanese "so sorry" which he learned after a long sojourn in Tokyo.

This is written up by a special writer for the Daily Worker and plays up Mr. Service, and of course belittles Mr. Grew.

Senator O'CONOR. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Senator O'CONOR. In view of your reference just made I am going to ask the question whether you considered Amerasia a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. Amerasia was organized, according to official information given to me, under complete Communist auspices. As a matter of fact, the first copy of Amerasia when it first appeared was presented to me before it ever appeared to get my opinion. This

was done, however, within the Communist apparatus and not by the Amerasia people.

After I passed on it it went back to the Politburo. They said it had been submitted to me first before publication.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean issue No. 1 of volume No. 1 was submitted to you for approval?

Mr. BUDENZ. For my comments as to whether it was going to perform its task.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce the previous photostat we were discussing into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 173" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 173

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 24, 1943, p. 4]

"SO SORRY," SAYS GREW; STATE DEPARTMENT REINSTATES MAN HE CALLED SPY

(By John Meldon)

Yes, sir; it was all quite a mistake—but you won't find acknowledgment in those newspapers which screamed "Spy ring" a short time back.

You recall the case: Five men and a woman were arrested and the Scripps-Howard press and Dirty Willie's Journal-American and Mirror, as well as the staid Times, ran the story in banner headlines. The six were accused—by the press and not the authorities—of constituting a "spy ring" with "connections" with those awful Communists.

For several days the newspapers raved and ranted, and Mr. Grew, late but unlamented Under Secretary of the State Department, popped off, too. He hinted darkly that the six accused—three employees of the State Department and several editors and writers for the magazine Amerasia—had done everything but back a Mack truck up to the State Department and expropriate all sorts of "confidential" documents relating to the China situation.

Payoff came yesterday when Mr. Grew personally apologized to one of the victims of the witchhunt—John S. Service—who was reinstated to his State Department job by Secretary Byrnes. In putting Service back on the job, Mr. Byrnes praised Service to the skies for his excellent 12-year record with the Department. So there was nothing that poor Mr. Grew could do but echo the American equivalent of the Japanese "so sorry" which he learned after a long sojourn in Tokyo.

But do you think the newspapers which went to town on the "spy ring" phony had anything to say yesterday? Of course not. For that matter when, on last August 10 only three of the original group accused were indicted—not as spies, mind you, but on the far less serious charge of removing documents without permission—the newspapers buried the fact in little one-column stories somewhere back among the want ads.

However, don't get the idea Mr. Howard or Mr. Dirty Willie are sorry. They accomplished what they set out to do. They planted a terrific lie and some of it stuck. You see, the whole thing behind the story is that the accused group were fed up with Mr. Grew's policies toward our Chinese allies. So Mr. Grew and the big-circulation press nailed them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony previously that the first issue of Amerasia appeared in 1937.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. While the campaign against Mr. Grew and Mr. Dooman was proceeding with respect to policy for Japan, was there a policy in the Communist Party councils also being carried out with respect to certain officials concerning our China policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; definitely. As we have indicated here it was against Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, against Ambassador and Gen. Patrick Hurley.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow the same procedure with respect to this folder. Mr. Mandel, will you testify as to the contents of that folder?

Mr. MANDEL. All copies from the Daily Worker appearing in this folder have been prepared at my direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Photostatic copies?

Mr. MANDEL. Some are photostated and a couple are typed.

Mr. MORRIS. I am forwarding this list to the witness, Mr. Chairman, so that it will refresh his recollection in testifying to the coming incidents.

Mr. BUDENZ. This first photostatic copy of the Daily Worker is linked up with the campaign on Grew to some extent in addition to the campaign on Hurley. It was engineered, to my knowledge, by the Communist Party—that is, by official reports that I have received. This was the statement by 21 prominent Americans urging President Truman to avert the serious danger of civil war in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at this point to show that these 21 people who signed the statement, which according to the testimony of Mr. Budenz was signed to influence our foreign policy, that a great number of them were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to go through that list with this in mind. Mr. Budenz, have you a copy of the list?

Mr. BUDENZ. It appears here in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if we could linger here for a minute and I would like to ask you to read out the names.

Mr. BUDENZ. All of them?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. Dr. Phyllis Ackerman; T. A. Bisson, writer——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we have had testimony concerning Mr. Bisson's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Mrs. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she the wife of Edward C. Carter, the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my understanding.

Mr. MORRIS. Continue, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Maurice P. Davidson, lawyer; Israel Epstein, correspondent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we have had testimony that Israel Epstein was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that speaks for itself, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BUDENZ. Melvin J. Fox; Talitha Gerlach, Young Women's Christian Association——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that Talitha Gerlach, according to previous testimony, has been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Freda Kirchwey, editor, the Nation; Lewis Merrill, president, United Office and Professional Workers of America;

Frederick N. Myers, vice president, National Maritime Union; Rev. Richard Morton, executive secretary, United Church Council for Democracy; Arthur Upham Pope, director, Iranian Institute; Martin Popper, executive secretary, National Lawyers Guild; Lawrence E. Salisbury, editor, Far Eastern Survey.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the Far Eastern Survey is the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator Smith. May I ask a question?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. Mr. Budenz, do you know Mr. Martin Popper?

Mr. Budenz. I have talked to him on the phone and my impression is that I have met him.

Senator Smith. Do you know about his alleged trip to Russia in the spring of 1946?

Mr. Budenz. I don't recall that.

Senator Smith. Did you know about that?

Mr. Budenz. I couldn't recall it offhand. His relations with the Daily Worker were of the closest.

Senator Smith. I saw him in Europe myself, and it was alleged that he went from Nuremberg to Russia and I wondered if you knew about it.

Mr. Budenz. I do not.

Mr. Morris. I think that will be enough, Mr. Budenz.

The purpose of that, Mr. Chairman, was to show the high incidence of the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations which participated in that which Mr. Budenz described as a Communist maneuver.

The Chairman. This is a list on some document addressed to the President?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Was it arranged by the Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. What is the date of that?

Mr. Budenz. August 17, 1945.

Senator O'Conor. I do understand, Mr. Budenz, that you either are prepared to say or have said it that the telegram was signed by the individuals in their individual capacity? You did make reference to certain organizations such as the Young Women's Christian Association.

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir.

Senator O'Conor. I do not think you wanted to give any impression that they were speaking for the organization?

Mr. Budenz. No; but this is a typical Communist procedure, putting the organization down and giving the impression that they are linked up in some way. I might say that they call themselves the Friends of Chinese Democracy. It was a committee called that, so it was under the cover of that committee.

Senator Smith. The same might be said with respect to the National Lawyers Guild, Mr. Martin Popper of the National Lawyers Guild?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. I would prefer not to discuss the National Lawyers Guild today because I have to indict it and that would take quite a bit of time.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that all there is to this particular one?

Mr. BUDENZ. There is another name, Ilona Ralf Sues, writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and given the proper designation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 174" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 174

[From the Daily Worker, New York, Friday, August 17, 1945, p. 2]

AMERICANS IN PLEA TO TRUMAN ON CHINA

Twenty-one prominent Americans yesterday urged President Truman to avert the serious danger of civil war in China. They demanded immediate steps to prevent American planes and other military equipment from being turned over to the Chungking government.

Pointing out that Chiang Kai-shek has made a direct appeal to the Japanese troops "to retain their arms and equipment for the maintenance of public order," the telegram to Truman stated that "the only American policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender of Japanese troops to patriotic Chinese groups on the spot.

The message to President Truman noted that the Communist-led Eighth Route and new Fourth Armies which Chiang Kai-shek is preparing to attack "have borne the brunt of the Allied fight in North Central China.

SIGNERS

The telegram was signed by the following in their individual capacities (organizations listed for purpose of identification only):

Dr. Phylles Ackerman; T. A. Bisson, writer; Mrs. Edward C. Carter; Maurice P. Davidson, lawyer; Israel Epstein, correspondent; Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee, Institute of Pacific Relations; Melvin J. Fox; Talitha Gerlach, Young Women's Christian Association; Freda Kirchwey, editor, the Nation; Lewis Merrill, president, United Office and Professional Workers of America; Frederick N. Myers, vice president, National Maritime Union.

Rev. Richard Morton, executive secretary, United Church Council for Democracy; Arthur Upham Pope, director, Iranian Institute; Martin Popper, executive secretary, National Lawyers Guild; Lawrence E. Salisbury, editor, Far Eastern Survey; Vincent Sheean, writer, Mrs. Edgar Snow, writer; Ilona Ralf Sues, writer; Richard Watts, writer; Dr. Max Yergan, director, Council on African Affairs, and Reid Robinson, president, Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, CIO.

A committee called The Friends of Chinese Democracy, is being formed, the purpose of which will be to press for an American foreign policy designed to support all efforts of the Chinese people for unity and democratic government, it was announced yesterday.

The full text of the message to President Truman follows:

"We are alarmed at the news that the Chungking government is planning to use American planes and other military equipment made available to them by General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley to combat the perfectly legitimate efforts of patriotic Chinese forces in north and central China engaged in disarming enemy troops and liberating areas in which they alone have fought throughout the war.

"If these plans are carried out it can only mean civil war in China instead of Chinese democratic unity on which the security of the Far East depends.

"We are particularly disturbed by Chiang Kai-shek's recent order to Chinese puppet troops who have been serving the Japanese enemy and who now apparently are to be used by the Chungking and American Governments against patriotic forces.

"The latter, despite never having received any assistance from the United States or Chungking, have borne the brunt of the Allied fight in north and central China, cooperated with American military personnel and rescued almost 100 American airmen forced down in the vicinity of Peiping, Taiyuan, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong.

ENCOURAGES FOE

"Generalissimo Chiang, moreover, encourages continued resistance of the enemy by inviting them to police the areas which they hold at present, and by stating that they will be held "strictly accountable" for arms which they or their puppets "might surrender to any organization or party other than officers or men duly authorized by the Chinese (Central) Government."

If carried out, such a policy would violate the purposes of this war. It would seriously jeopardize the peace that has been won. Americans would not support a policy toward China similar to that of the British in Greece.

Under circumstances existing in China today we believe that the only American policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender to patriotic Chinese troops on the spot and simultaneously to encourage all Chinese efforts to a democratic government.

"Such action must be based on full agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

"In appealing to you, Mr. President, we reflect the views of thousands of Americans, including many of those serving in the Armed Forces in China."

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other articles, Mr. Budenz, establishing the point that the Communists were then carrying on a policy such as you testified to?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Having disposed of Grew and Dooman, the campaign was laid before I left the party, and it was already under way, as you can see from these editorials to which I have referred, for attack on Ambassador Hurley, which was more prolonged than we have indicated here. I say, before I left the party because these copies of the Daily Worker are after I am out of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. BUDENZ. However, I recognize them as copies of the Daily Worker which I have read.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue your testimony on that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Just on that point, do you intend to follow up, Mr. Morris, as regards the attack on General Wedemeyer? If not I would like to ask a question or two. If you have it in the course of your presentation, all right.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you prepared to testify about the campaign against General Wedemeyer, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not in great detail. I just know that this campaign in the Daily Worker was carried out to the various sections of the Communist Party and was made the order of business for the Communists in other organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. I am interested in that phase of the campaign which seems to have been pointed toward General Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer was at that time, or at some time either prior to or subsequently sent under the auspices of the State Department to China, as I recall?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And was the representative of the State Department in China. Was it during that time that he was attacked by the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my impression. As a matter of fact, the Communists viewed General Wedemeyer as the enemy of the Soviet interests in the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. General Wedemeyer's report was a controversial thing here for a long time and was refused to congressional committees even under subpena when we issued subpenas for the presentation of General Wedemeyer's report on China and the Far East.

I am just wondering why the attack was directed against Wedemeyer, if you know.

Mr. BUDENZ. The attack was directed against Wedemeyer from the Communist viewpoint because they consider him to be an enemy of Soviet policy in the Far East. The policy of the Communists was to work out a coalition government in which they could strangle those who coalesced with them. That was the phrase used in the discussion so that I am not straining the question.

General Wedemeyer's tendencies—I can't go into them in detail, were in opposition to that course—that is, at least to the extent that the Communists viewed him as one who would not go along fully with their program.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to General Wedemeyer, the public press reported him to have told about a time when he was appointed Ambassador to China and then his appointment was canceled because some intereststs in China objected. Do you know anything about that campaign about getting his appointment canceled?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not specifically. I know there was a general campaign against General Wedemeyer as one of those in our diplomatic service who was inimical to Soviet interests.

Senator WATKINS. Do you recall his testimony where he said he bought his clothing for that particular assignment?

Mr. BUDENZ. I read in the public press and that is the only knowledge I have.

Senator WATKINS. Were you connected with the party at that time? That goes back a number of years.

Mr. BUDENZ. That I am not sure of. I don't know the date of it, and I would want to be precise.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. When General Wedemeyer's report was held up, do you know, Mr. Budenz, enough about the influence of the Communists on anybody in State Department that tended to cause that report to be held up; and, if so, how was that worked out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of my own knowledge I wouldn't know that. I wouldn't know everything about Communist activity. But I do know that the Communists relied very strongly on Service and John Carter Vincent in the campaign against Ambassador Hurley, for example.

Senator SMITH. Was a part of the campaign against General Wedemeyer to have his report suppressed, as it was indeed suppressed for several years?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Smith, it may be that Mr. Budenz' experience in the Communist Party terminated in 1945. Was not General Wedemeyer's report issued subsequent to that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my impression.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you have been testifying up to this point with regard to the people that the Communists planned to eliminate from the State Department because they interfered with Communist policy. What people were you relying on to put over your policy?

The CHAIRMAN. The policy of elimination?

Mr. MORRIS. The policy of elimination. Let's take the Japanese situation first. Did the Communist Party make use of Owen Lattimore or Owen Lattimore's writings with respect to Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, we see that with respect to Japan policy and others.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you elaborate on that?

Mr. BUDENZ. His book, Solution in Asia, was it not?—was used by the Communists and other writings of his.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify about a certain press release yesterday?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is what I referred to just now.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify that, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. This press release we can see runs in line with the Communist charges here against everybody; that they are for the retention of vested interest in Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. To what press release do you refer when you say "this press release"?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was a press release which was introduced in evidence the other day issued in 1945. I don't say that I have any knowledge that Mr. Lattimore conferred with the Communists before making the statement. I do say that this statement was used extensively by the Communists to my knowledge, it was made a special order of business for the Communist Party to press it.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that supplemented the Communist campaign to eliminate Grew from the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And also in imposing a hard peace on Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any writings of Andrew Roth used for this purpose?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Dilemma in Japan was not only advanced by the Communists but it was submitted to the Politburo before publication.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Andrew Roth a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, from many official reports he was a Communist. These came up particularly in the Amerasia case and definitely Mr. Roth was described as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that Andrew Roth's book was used to supplement this Communist campaign?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports that I have received, he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he went to China with Henry Wallace and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear at that time in official Communist Party circles that John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore were members of the Communist Party traveling with Henry Wallace?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would elaborate on that.

Mr. BUDENZ. As I have stated, the trip by Wallace to China was followed by the Communists with a great deal of interest in discussions in the Politburo. In those discussions it was pointed out that Mr. Wallace was more or less under good influences from the Communist viewpoint, that is to say, that he had on one hand Mr. Lattimore and on the other John Carter Vincent, both of whom were

described as being in line with the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it, and that they would guide Mr. Wallace largely along those paths.

The CHAIRMAN. To what are you referring, are you referring to publications or statements made in party conclave, or statements made by high officials of the Communist Party or to what are you referring when you say that it was stated that Mr. Wallace was under good influence?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel. This is also confirmed to some degree, not the Wallace business but the dependence on John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent, that is confirmed by the Daily Worker's subsequent statement that they were responsible to a great degree for getting Mr. Hurley out of the State Department.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Budenz, at that point could I ask you if you knew what position John Carter Vincent held at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I could not. I know as yet he wasn't head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and that he was subsequently placed in that Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by a few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was one of the objectives of the Communists to put Mr. Vincent in the position he afterward acquired?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists were eager that Mr. Vincent advance and that he obtain a place in the State Department where he could get rid of Hurley and in addition to that could also influence policy.

Senator SMITH. Was that purpose achieved by his being put in the position that he was placed in?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, Mr. Dooman was got out and he was put in his place.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read extracts from Henry Wallace's book at that time which elaborates on Mr. Budenz' testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. What was the name of the book and when was it published?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the book entitled "Soviet Asia Mission," by Henry A. Wallace, published by Reynal & Hitchcock, the following two paragraphs on page 172.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you the date of the publication?

Mr. MANDEL. It was 1944 or 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Henry Wallace's writing.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

> We spent the night of July 4 at Chita. In the evening I had a long talk with Sergei Goglidze. He was curious about the Chinese situation. I replied in the spirit of the Chungking joint statement. Like other Russian officials Goglidze was concerned about the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in China. He was anxious that China remain united in the war against Japan and was conscious of the vital role the United States has in China's future. His feelings were revealed in telling incidents during our entire journey.
>
> One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast: "To the modernization of China." Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification: "May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese militarism,

China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there anything in the previous paragraph that identifies who Goglidze was?

Mr. MANDEL. Goglidze, according to the same book, was a Georgian, an intimate friend of Marshal Stalin, president of the executive committee of Khabarovsk Territory, under which this far northern area is governed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit, this excerpt from Mr. Wallace's book. But I would like to ask Mr. Budenz a question on that last toast Mr. Goglidze proposed.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted in the record and properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 175" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 175

SOVIET ASIA MISSION

(By Henry A. Wallace—Regnal and Hitchcock)

I was assisted by expert interpreters who accompanied me. They were, in addition to Mr. Lattimore: Mr. John Hazard, Chief Liaison Officer, Division for Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration of Chinese Affairs, State Department (p. 21).

* * * * * * *

We spent the night of July 4 at Chita. In the evening I had a long talk with Sergei Goglidze. He was curious about the Chinese situation. I replied in the spirit of the Chungking joint statement. Like other Russian officials Goglidze was concerned about the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in China. He was anxious that China remain united in the war against Japan and was conscious of the vital role the United States has in China's future. His feelings were revealed in telling incidents during our entire journey.

One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast: "To the modernization of China." Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification: "May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese militarism, China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future" (p. 172).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you hear the toast that Goglidze proposed, "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future"? As an expert on the Communist movement, bearing in mind the fact that Mr. Goglidze was an intimate of Marshal Stalin and that he made that toast, would it have any significance to you?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it speaks for itself. I think it speaks for itself that the Russians always make these toasts for political purposes. Of course, everybody they toast is not a Communist, but I think that they were definitely trying to establish the place of Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent in Mr. Wallace's mind for Mr. Wallace and also placing upon them the responsibility.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Goglidze speaks of China's future he does it with what in view?

Mr. BUDENZ. Definitely he does it with the view of a Red China, that is no secret, that was told us long ago and was the whole program.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters there showing John Carter Vincent's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. John Carter Vincent——

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Mr. MANDEL. I am reading from a list of attendance at the discussion conference held in Washington, D. C., of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations held December 9 to 10, 1938, and Mr. John Carter Vincent attended that conference. He was also a conference member of the Hot Springs IPR conference held January 6 to 17, 1945, according to a volume called Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on page 159.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there anything showing when Mr. Vincent was a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. No, I do not have that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you make that a part of the record later today?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

DECEMBER 27, 1944.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: This is just a last minute reminder to you about the conference. According to our records, you are expected during the following dates: January 9 through 17.

I would urge you to carefully observe the following suggestions:

1. There are no additional copies of data papers available. This means that you should bring your data papers with you or have them sent to you care of room 250, which is the headquarters of the American delegation. Any papers so sent should get out as soon as possible in order for them to arrive by January 5.

2. Additional data papers, not previously distributed, are being mailed direct to Hot Springs and will be distributed to you upon arrival.

3. Prior to January 4, please notify us of any change in your schedule by telegram to this office. After January 4, please notify us of any such change by wiring us at room 250, The Homestead, Hot Springs, Va.

The following is a listing we have for you in the conference who's who. If you have any changes, will you please let me know immediately:

"Chief, China Section, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Member, Board of Trustees, American Council, IPR."

I need not impress upon you again the importance of this meeting nor urge that you keep us informed of your plans.

Looking forward to seeing you at our sessions in Hot Springs, I am,

Very cordially yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any letters, Mr. Mandel, that we can introduce at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 4, 1944. It is really a memorandum headed "W. L. H.," presumably William L. Holland, "from M. S. F.," presumably Miriam S. Farley. It says: "Copy to H. M." That might be Harriet Moore.

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence), with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting.

Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

That is an excerpt from the memorandum which is offered as an exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit and then I would like to ask Mr. Budenz a question.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 176" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 176

FEBRUARY 4, 1944.

W. L. H. from M. S. F.
(Copy to H. M.)

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence), and with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

I am now editing the Ms. in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless I am making some changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not, likely, enough to satisfy him completely. My position is that I am willing, in fact, anxious, to go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, provided this does not destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it.

Personally I doubt that the China Council will leave the IPR because of this or anything else in similar vein. They have more to lose than the IPR by such action, though naturally they will use threats for what they are worth. I am inclined to agree with Max that they respect us more if we don't knuckle under to them.

The American Council is of course prepared to take full responsibility for this pamphlet and will quite understand if the Secretariat wishes to disown it. Nevertheless we should welcome your views. Perhaps I have assumed too much from the meagerness of your comments on the original Ms.; if so, please let me know. I shall be glad to show you the revised Ms. if you care to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you previously testified that Maxwell Stewart is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I have met him as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; not by personally meeting him but by official reports, particularly in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. You have already testified that John Carter Vincent was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I call your attention to the second paragraph in that letter, Mr. Budenz. Will you read that second paragraph? Mr. Budenz, the "Ms." stands for manuscript, I believe.

Mr. BUDENZ. "I am now editing the manuscript"——

Mr. MORRIS. The second paragraph.

Mr. BUDENZ. I beg your pardon.

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said, in confidence, with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator O'Conor.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Budenz, I particularly note the parenthesis that John Vincent said in confidence and with a certain emphasis. Can you give any reason why any such statement should be made in confidence or just what significance that had?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. It certainly was part of the Communist plan to protect, as I have said, those who were in key and delicate positions and therefore what he would give would be in confidence so that his name could not be used extensively but for immediate purposes involved among those in whom he had confidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, from your own experience was it a practice before a manuscript was issued that it be looked over by members of the Communist Party for perfection?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you elaborate on that a bit for us?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course, that doesn't prove this was looked over by Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand.

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a practice; that is to say, frequently a pamphlet was referred to the Politburo or to someone immediately in charge of that particular work involved. He would then assign it to two or three people to look it over. I have looked over pamphlets and then people outside the immediate Communist apparatus would look over it for determination as to whether it stood up for the Marxist viewpoint, and to see whether it met the peculiar exigencies of the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know with respect to this particular document, the author of which was Maxwell Stewart, read by John Carter Vincent and John Fairbank, that they were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a brief slip taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations that is undated, which is headed "E. C. C." and the name of Mortimer Graves is attached at the end. It reads as follows:

I have been asked by the Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call together a few people in Washington for discussion of a Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R.. I can't spend any time on the matter myself but am quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with Russian War Relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, of course, I won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent, just back from Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. That is signed "Mortimer Graves"?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so inserted and identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 177" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 177

E. C. C.:

I have been asked by Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call together a few people in Washington for discussion of a Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R.. I can't spend any time on the matter myself but am quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with Russian War Relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, I won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent, just back from Chungking.

MORTIMER GRAVES.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on that particular memorandum?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't think so. I don't think so unless you want to ask me some question about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Council of American-Soviet Friendship a Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a Communist front. That was a duplicate, if I may use the word duplicate here, because of many other organizations involved, founded by the Russian apparatus all over the world. They were first known as Friends of Soviet Russia and then became the Council of American-Soviet Friendship, completely controlled by the Communists, as it was created by them.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the staff of the Russian War Relief made up of Communists, Mr. Budenz, to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; at least to my knowledge. I don't know that I can detail them at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. Generally would you describe it?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Russian War Relief was organized by the Communists. It was organized under orders of the Soviet Embassy, at least from the statements made in the Politburo that they had received instruction to see that Russia War Relief was not only organized but made efficient and this matter was discussed on many occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you continue with your going through those exhibits there with the view toward supplementing your testimony on the point that Communists were influencing our foreign policy with respect to China?

Mr. BUDENZ. These are Daily Workers published after I left the Communist Party, but I recognize them as copies of the Daily Worker I have read, as I continue to read the Daily Worker up to the present day. This one is dated November 28, 1945, page 3, Hurley Out as Envoy to China, Backs War Policy in Far East.

The paragraph to which I wish to direct your attention here, the one at least in my opinion that should be given attention, reads:

It is well known that liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department have opposed Hurley's reappointment. The former Ambassador continually sought to bypass them in his one-man rule of the Embassy in China.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists—

By the way, the Communists made particular point of attacking Hurley's mentality, representing him as a crude fellow. I could, if I had time, give you many examples, but they wouldn't be profitable.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists, and his main fire was centered on "the considerable section of our State Department which is endeavoring to support communism generally as well as specifically in China."

This article is significant beyond being an article in the Daily Worker because it is a specially written article by Joseph Starobin, foreign editor of the Daily Worker.

Mr. Morris. Were you managing editor of the Daily Worker at that time?

Mr. Budenz. I was not.

Mr. Morris. Can you describe the significance of the language there, "liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department"?

Mr. Budenz. That is generally used, liberal and progressive, for those who are Communist or pro-Communist. It doesn't necessarily mean that, however, but I think these speak for themselves.

Mr. Morris. What did you know about John Stewart Service, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. Budenz. I might add that those who are allies of the Communists, and some may be unconsciously, are designated as liberals Progressives are always identified as Communists, so when the Communists speak of liberals they mean those that go along with Communist policy either because of their own self-interest or because of being in line with the Communist views.

Mr. Morris. Now, in this case I notice they use the term "liberal" in connection with John Carter Vincent.

Mr. Budenz. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. Yet at the same time you knew that Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes; the stressing of Vincent and Service as "liberal" by Starobin the moment Hurley is thrown out is significant. They are being recommended as people who stand for the things that the Daily Worker stands for.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Morris, before you introduce that, did you want this one introduced?

Mr. Morris. That is the one I referred to.

The Chairman. That has been identified by the witness.

Mr. Sourwine. That is the one the witness referred to?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

The Chairman. It may be inserted in the record and properly designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 178" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 178

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 28, 1945, p. 3]

Hurley Out as Envoy to China, Backs War Policy in Far East

(By Joseph Starobin)

Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley resigned yesterday from the post of Ambassador to Chungking with a statement indicating an all-out drive of the Hoover Republicans and American imperialists to encourage the Truman administration's headlong intervention in China.

Hurley's inflammatory 1,500-word statement was essentially the voice of those American imperialists who are openly anti-Soviet and call everything democratic in Europe and Asia a manifestation of "Communist imperialism."

At the same time, it was a criticism of American support for British imperialism in Asia in the sense that Hurley feels American capital should be getting more out of support for Britain than it is now getting.

The decision not to return as Ambassador in China came after weeks of a varied criticism of Hurley's policies from liberal experts on China, from the labor movement, from six progressive west coast Congressmen and even from the Republican independent paper, the New York Herald Tribune.

BLATANT POLICY SEEN

The White House immediately announced the appointment of Gen. George C. Marshall, who resigned last week as Chief of Staff.

This choice of a conservative military man gave no indication that American policy is today concerned with conciliation or peace in China.

Hurley, while criticizing the professional diplomats in the State Department—that is, the civilian pro-Roosevelt elements who have been increasingly worried by where our policy is going—nevertheless associated himself completely with President Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.

Major political interest was focused yesterday on the Hurley resignation, since it indicates the various personal, factional, and political conflicts within the administration. These in turn reflect the great popular alarm with the administration's course.

The way to take advantage of these conflicts, of course, is not to bank on their stopping the Truman-Byrnes policy, but to redouble pressure on all elements in the administration.

HOOVER LANGUAGE

Hurley used the characteristic language of the Hoover-Vandenberg crowd. He claimed to be favoring "democracy and free enterprise" against "imperialism and communism."

He was full of praise for the Atlantic Charter and was bitter at the "professional Foreign Service men," who, he said, were sympathetic to the "Communist armed party in China."

It is well known that liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department have opposed Hurley's reappointment. The former Ambassador continually sought to bypass them in his one-man rule of the Embassy in China.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists, and his main fire was centered on "the considerable section of our State Department which is endeavoring to support communism generally as well as specifically in China."

STEP UP "QUIT CHINA" FIGHT IN CONGRESS

(By Art Shields)

Washington, Nov. 27.—Ambassador Patrick Hurley's resignation, and his replacement by General Marshall, will not stop the congressional campaign to end America's intervention in China.

"Regardless of who is the ambassador to Chungking, we will press for the passage of our anti-intervention resolution until the Marines and GIs and transports are taken out of China," declared Representative Hugh DeLacy (Democrat, Washington), the leader of the group.

The stop-the-intervention drive will be pushed at two meetings on Capitol Hill tomorrow.

At 4:30 p. m., a number of congressmen are expected to meet in the Indian Affairs Room to press for action by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

DeLacy, Charles Savage, (Democrat, Washington), John M. Coffee (Democrat, Washington) and Ellis E. Paterson, Ned R. Healy and Helen Gahagan Douglas, California Democrats who sponsored the resolution, will be joined by others.

At 2 p. m. DeLacy is calling a meeting of representatives of the CIO, the AFL, Americans United, the Young Men's Christian Association and other groups.

Representative Savage told this reporter yesterday:

"Trade unions, farm organizations and many individuals are writing me daily against the intervention. We are getting more letters on the China issue than on anything else except army demobilization."

"We expect early action by the Foreign Affairs Committee. The pressure for such action will continue."

Hurley's leave taking must be followed by an exodous of Hurley's policies, said DeLacy today.

"The resignation of Ambassador Hurley," he said, "presents the Secretary of State with a great opportunity."

Mr. BUDENZ. We have here November 22, page 9, an article in the Daily Worker written by Helen Simon, who to my knowledge was a very important member of the staff of the Daily Worker and also engaged in Soviet underground international work through Mexico and other places.

The CHAIRMAN. November 22 of what year?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1945, excuse me, Senator, page 9.

This article deals with "Social Workers Get the Truth About China." It is carrying forward clearly the Communist campaign on this question.

Mr. MORRIS. May I see that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that in this article the following people were mentioned and these people have been identified by this committee as Communists and as associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Paragraph 2 reads:

Guenther Stein, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in China and author of Challenge of Red China, making his first public appearance in New York since his return, painted a picture of the feudalism that has been China's centuries-old curse.

Do you know that Gunther Stein was a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, and also that he was engaged in Soviet undercover work.

Mr. MORRIS. And I think, Mr. Chairman, we have put into the record his associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. At a later paragraph in the same article, Mr. Budenz, we find the following:

Israel Epstein, who represented the New York Times on the American correspondents' trip to Yenan last summer, contrasted the genuine cooperatives in Yenan areas to the so-called credit cooperatives in Kuomintang areas which serve to line the landlords' pockets, and "cooperative hostels" where ragged workers are not allowed.

Did you know that Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Israel Epstein was emphasized as one of the most important Communists in regard to Far East affairs. There was great solicitude in getting him into this country, and J. Peters said he was also engaged in Soviet undercover work.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced evidence of his association with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Later in the article, Mr. Budenz, it reads:

Chu Tong, an editor of the New York China Daily News, rounded out the picture.

Then it goes on to say:

The feudal evil is allied with foreign imperialism, he explained, outlining the 100-year history of Anglo-American intervention which "has always been on the wrong side."

Did you know that the New York China Daily News was a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 179" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 179

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 22, 1945, p. 9]

SOCIAL WORKERS GET THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA

By Helen Simon

The CIO social service workers who attended Local 19 forum on the crisis in China Monday night were outraged and angry. The speakers, outstanding experts in the field, presented the facts and the union members felt that now they were better armed to fight America's undemocratic intervention and to get their men folk home.

Gunther Stein, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in China and author of Challenge of Red China, making his first public appearance in New York since his return, painted a picture of the feudalism that has been China's centuries-old curse.

FEUDALISM CITED

The Chungking government is based on the identical feudal landlords, money lenders, parasites who had to be ousted from power in 18th and 19th century Europe to make way for industrialization, Stein said. The oriental village, with its thankless primitive toil, its exorbitant rents and innumerable taxes, is the key to China's problem.

Chiang Kai-shek's central government is "corrupt and inefficient;" its control is limited to the Chungking area and based elsewhere on compromise with local chieftains. It is incapable of developing industry—which would be to the interest of American investors—because it does not consider raising mass purchasing power. It is interested in using American loans for a new war industry, for a dumping-export industry—but not for consumption.

This is the feudal set-up which Washington supports, Stein charged. And this is the set-up which the Communists undertake to replace.

Stein spoke of rent and tax reduction in Yenan areas; of the first successful program anywhere in the Orient of village self-government; of doubling farm production and creating ingenious factories despite the blockade.

"The Chungking feudal regime can never win," Stein concluded.

Israel Epstein, who represented the New York Times on the American correspondents' trip to Yenan last summer, contrasted the genuine cooperatives in Yenan areas to the so-called credit cooperatives in Kuomintang areas which serve to line the landlords' pockets, and "cooperative hostels" where ragged workers are not allowed.

He compared "trade unions" in Kuomintang China—many of which have no right to strike or bargain collectively—to Yenan unions which have full rights, even sharing in the planning of government-owned industries and fully responsible for spending the three percent social-security fund paid out by employers.

CONTRAST IN WAGES

As to wages, even official Kuomintang figures admit that real wages dropped 60 percent during the war. In Yenan two equally beneficial wage systems apply: either the worker receives free rent, three suits a year, food, soap and other goods for himself and an additional one and one-half persons plus a money wage or else his wage is computed by the market price of a fixed measure of millet, the staple food.

There is no free medical care in Kuomintang China while all medical care is free in the north, Epstein reported.

Chu Tong, an editor of the New York China Daily News, rounded out the picture.

The feudal evil is allied with foreign imperialism, he explained, outlining the 100-year history of Anglo-American intervention which "has always been on the wrong side."

The Chinese-American editor demolished arguments currently used to justify the transporation of Kuomintang troops to Communist-liberated areas and their armed support by American marines.

It's just to disarm Japanese? But the Japanese are not disarmed and are working alongside Kuomintang, puppet and American troops against Communist-led forces.

We must back the legal government? Was this so of Spain's Republican government? Should Lafayette have helped George III rather than Washington?

WARNS OF UNITED STATES ROLE

We must protect the lives of Americans? But we are risking them by becoming involved in China's civil war. And this traditional excuse for intervention was used by the Japanese, too.

Remember that United States General Wedemeyer said that we must make North China a military base to prevent Russian expansion, Chu Tong warned. Remember that some United States monopolists may be interested in China as an economic colony.

The room teemed with questions when the speakers stopped. What is Russia's role? Russia is not intervening, is withdrawing as promised from Manchuria.

Why was General Stilwell replaced? Because he opposed corruption and inefficiency in the Kuomintang armies and sought cooperation with the Communist-led armies.

RAP INTERVENTION

How do Chinese groups other than Kuomintang and Communists stand? All demand withdrawal of United States troops.

The meeting unanimously passed a resolution condemning United States intervention (see box) and determined to circulate a petition. One girl, to strong applause, urged mass action—meetings, parades, demonstrations.

The wife of a marine now stationed in Tientsin added a note of desperate urgency:

"Our boys don't understand what's happening to them. They are being wined, dined, corrupted by the Kuomintang mayor of Tientsin. We've got to get to them somehow and explain how terribly wrong it is to fight against the democratic peoples of China."

Mr. MORRIS. You say this was part of the Communist campaign to influence foreign policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can say that definitely because this campaign was organized ahead of time, not with Gunther Stein, but ahead of time for a great number of organizations which were not necessarily Communist organizations but were infiltrated with Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is another article, November 29, 1945, which I have here, page 2, written by Joseph Starobin and, therefore, of very high standing in Communist directives and information, and it says:

State Department career men like Raymond T. Ludden had visited Yenan and brought back favorable impressions; there was an American mission in Yenan, headed by Col. David Barrett, whose reports were also favorable. Newspapermen like Brooks Atkinson, Harrison Forman, and Israel Epstein, who knew China better than Hurley, were telling the truth about both the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Then they go on. This is an attack upon General Hurley, it is quite evident, to belittle Hurley as a man who liked Cadillac cars.

This accounts for his spleen against the "career men," whom he considers "college fellers" and pro-Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry, proceed.

Mr. BUDENZ. "College fellers," by the way, is in quotations to indicate that Hurley is not coherent.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent do you know the Communist affiliation of those people?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Israel Epstein. I know the close association of Harrison Forman with the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he was intimately connected with the Communist Party; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Raymond Ludden?

Mr. BUDENZ. Raymond Ludden I only know in this way: That the group around Stilwell were constantly referred to as those relied upon to help advance the Communist cause in China. I wouldn't want to indict one individual of that group, although Mr. Ludden is one of them, but the discussions did not refer to individuals.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that, when you were talking about people that the Communists could rely on, the reliance was on the whole group around General Stilwell and not to any one individual?

Mr. BUDENZ. The group around Stilwell, in persuading him to antagonism toward Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That completes this.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 180" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 180

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 29, 1945, p. 2]

HURLEY'S COLORFUL CAREER PAINTED IN OIL

(By Joseph Starobin)

Sympathetic newspapers always use the word "colorful" to describe men like Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley. It is part of big business mythology about democracy and free enterprise that such oil speculators (preferably with plenty of gold braid on their shoulders) should run the foreign policy of the United States.

Yet Hurley has colorfully succeeded in master-minding the present warfare in China. The result is that American boys are dying—3 months after VJ day—to bolster a dictatorial regime which the Chinese people themselves don't want.

Who is Hurley, and what do his resignation statements mean?

It does not say enough to call him an imperialist, for so are Byrnes and Truman. For that matter, Roosevelt who appointed and tolerated Hurley, also wanted to advance the specific American interest in Asia.

Hurley is first of all a big-business man, with the typical concern for direct money interests, with the special streak of a frontier background in the old Choctaw Indian territory of Oklahoma, where he was born 62 years ago. He served as attorney for the Choctaw Indians and saw action in the First World War, becoming a colonel by the end of it.

BIG OILMAN

Hurley assisted in organizing the United States Chamber of Commerce in 1912, and was chairman of the Oklahoma Republican State convention in 1926. He did big business in oil development, and was instrumental in forcing Mexico to indemnify the oil interests when their imperialist properties were seized.

And he became, as a reward for services rendered, the Secretary of War in Herbert Hoover's administration, serving from 1929 to 1933. He was in office when Gen. Douglas MacArthur shot down the bonus marchers in 1932. He is, incidentally, a great friend of John L. Lewis.

Hurley's prewar mentality can best be seen from a speech on November 11, 1939, to the Overseas Masonic Lodge at Providence, R. I.

Hurley proposed that western civilization should be saved by an alliance between Germany and Great Britain, impossible as that might seem, he added.

Otherwise, the gates will be opened to an avalanche of orientalism, namely Soviet Russia, he said, from which it would take western civilization a century to recover.

This fear of orientalism sounds funny, doesn't it, in view of Hurley's supposed love for China. What he meant, however, was clear.

He was bitterly afraid of the Soviet Union, afraid that the war might develop in such a way as to let the Soviet Union share in the victory. And he sought some way to reconcile the Anglo-German struggle.

But he was an America Firster enough to stress that we should not intervene in Europe and should develop a cash-and-carry trade with France and Britain.

The reason why the Republicans and all the former isolationists now rush to embrace Hurley is that they recognize the former Republican isolationist in him.

GLOBE-TROTTER

He favored victory over the Axis, not because he opposed fascism as such but because he wanted the United States to cash in on that victory by pursuing an anti-Soviet course simultaneously with a policy of forcing Britain to shell out to the USA. Only if you see this in Hurley can you understand his opposition to Communist and colonial imperialism.

During the war he was sent to all corners of the globe as Ambassador to New Zealand, as special emissary in the Near East, as observer in Moscow during the critical days of 1942. And finally, he bobbed up with Donald Nelson's economic mission in China in the late summer of 1944.

In China, Hurley's flamboyant self-advertising methods were notorious; he was strongly attracted to Chiang Kai-shek for he recognized the man who might build a reactionary China subservient to a strong imperialist America—at the expense of the Soviet Union and Great Britain as well.

Hurley's first bit of "colorfulness" was to maneuver Gen. Joseph Stilwell and the former Ambassador, Clarence E. Gauss, out of China. Stilwell had been critical of the way Chiang was saving American lend-lease weapons for the ultimate civil war; Gauss knew more about Kuomintang corruption than anyone else.

When Chiang demanded Stilwell's scalp, Hurley said to "Vinegar Joe": "I have only two stars to your four, but I'm going to tell Washington one of us has to leave."

From November 1944 until April 1945 Hurley put on a big show of trying to bring about Kuomintang-Communist unity. He even thought a personal visit to Moscow last April would solve all problems in China. Hurley, who knew nothing about China, acted very much the prima donna. He tried to trick the Chinese Communists into an abject surrender to the Kuomintang. When that finally failed, he became openly pro-Chiang and bitterly anti-Communist.

IRKED BY CRITICS

What irked him just as much as his failure to force a Chinese settlement was the fact that well-informed American opinion among experts and journalists was very critical of the Kuomintang and of Hurley's methods.

State Department career men like Raymond T. Ludden had visited Yenan and brought back favorable impressions; there was an American mission in Yenan, headed by Col. David Barrett, whose reports were also favorable. Newspapermen like Brooks Atkinson, Harrison Forman and Israel Epstein (who knew China better than Hurley) were telling the truth about both the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Hurley was the kind of man who could arrange for a specially designed Cadillac to be flown in from India to Chungking. He insisted on wearing his uniform in performing civilian duties, although he was not entitled to do so. Roosevelt had to tell him point blank to cut it out. This kind of man had no use for the pro-China experts, and succeeded in forcing them out of the Chungking Embassy one by one.

This accounts for his spleen against the "career men," whom he considers "college fellers" and pro-Communists. Actually they are only the last of the pro-Roosevelt Mohicans in a Department which is increasingly dominated by the Byrnes type of political ignoramus.

Now Hurley resigns with a big bang, which is completely in keeping with his bang, bang career.

The moral of the tale is this: when Truman and Byrnes broke with the Roosevelt policy and backed Chiang Kai-shek's civil war plans, they naturally had to rely on world more and more—for he expressed the logic of their position and, moreover, carried it out in practice.

So it is in every phase of foreign affairs. Wherever American-Soviet understanding is abandoned and an attempt is made by Democratic politicians to embark on world domination, the Hurley Republicans will make the most of it. They will go the Truman-Byrnes type one better. They will rapidly drive this country to an internal coup d'état and external aggression in other people's affairs.

Mr. BUDENZ. This was written while I was still in the Communist Party, and I recall it. It is a special dispatch by Virginia Gardner and Art Shields, Communist correspondents here in Washington, Daily Worker correspondents in Washington. It is headed Washington Notes, and says:

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened.

That is found on page 2 of that issue.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 181" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 181

[From the Worker, October 7, 1945, p. 2]

WASHINGTON NOTES

(By Virginia Gardner and Art Shields)

WAR DEPARTMENT DIVISION ON JAPANESE POLICY; UNITED STATES CHAMBER ADVISES OPTIMISM WITH HUMOR

The recent rebuke to Gen. Douglas MacArthur's policies given by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the culmination not only of a split in the State Department but in the War Department itself.

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened. They were able to push through certain directives which had been held up in committee theretofore, so that the set of directives for treatment of Japan which the White House recently released were even better than the original directives which had been flown over to MacArthur and apparently lay ignored somewhere on his desk or thereabouts.

But in the War Department itself there developed what amounted to virtually a revolution. Among those most alarmed and exercised by the MacArthur policies and the complete lack of carrying out of directives from the State Department was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. In fact, McCloy is said to be determined that the new directives shall be carried out even if he has to go over to Japan and take a look-see himself.

Yet Senator H. Styles Bridges (Republican of New Hampshire) continues to attribute to Washington officials who represent "the leftist thinking of the Nation" the wave of criticism against MacArthur.

You don't hear much these days in Washington about what a good administrator President Truman is, since MacArthur has flouted the directives sent him and the Ways and Means Committee declared a lockout on all unemployment-compensation legislation. In all the years during which the late President Roosevelt took such a beating as a poor administrator, there never was quite such contempt shown for legislation he recommended or directives sent to any part of the Govenment by a constituted authority.

The United States Chamber of Commerce determined to be sunny, even if it hurts. So in a piece which underlines with a note of grimness its advice to business to exude confidence the Chamber of Commerce Business Action for September 24 says: "If we read the signs aright, the great mass of the population is ready to welcome an active, aggressive leadership by business * * *. But labor is afraid of unemployment, just as business fears it * * *. Some believe the answer is to be found in the Murray (full employment) bill. The sharp, forceful movement behind that measure is a manifestation of fear * * *. The formulas have got to be achieved on the local or industry level, or more specifically on the individual level."

Then, in italics: "This is the time for businessmen to think, talk, plan and act in forceful tones of optimism, with the confidence which they are fully justified in feeling—and with a sense of humor."

What amounts to an actual conspiracy to build up an anti-Communist labor movement in Germany under official United States auspices is under way. Spark plug in it from Washington is Irving Brown, who along with many of his former associates in the Labor Section of the War Production Board had a Social-Democratic orientation.

For 3 months he did little else but busily recruit candidates on the basis of such refined qualifications as their devotion to the cause of Red-baiting. Among others he has picked are Joseph D. Keenan of the AFL, Vice Chairman for labor production of WPB. Paul Porter, Wisconsin Socialist, who has been kicking around the Government for years now trying to retrieve his standing with labor after the fiasco he pulled at the airframe wage hearing he conducted early in the war, and David Saposs of the WPB Labor Section, who is a natural for the assignment. In Germany as a result they are dealing only with non-Communist elements in the labor movement, and actively encouraging anti-Communists in the unions being established or revived.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that terminates the phase of Mr. Budenz' testimony concerning the Communist effort to infiltrate and influence American foreign policy. I would like to get back to Mr. Budenz' identification of people who were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations and their Communist affiliation.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know James S. Allen?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; Mr. Allen was well known to me. He was foreign editor of the Daily Worker for a considerable period of time while I was managing editor, and then he had a sort of special assignment as foreign adviser to the Daily Worker.

Prior to that he was Communist International representative in the Philippines with all the powers of a Communist International representative in the islands.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record Mr. Allen's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations on a previous occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Abraham Chapman?

Senator SMITH. Is this Mr. Allen the man who wrote a review of some books or the review of an attack on some of the Southern States and was part of a group to incite the Negroes down there?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. That is not involved here now, however.

Senator SMITH. He was a Communist at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He held a high place in the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was a very much trusted man, and this is shown by the fact that he was the Communist representative in the Philippines, sent on a special mission there and directing the Philippine Communist Party.

In addition to that, he was the leading authority on foreign affairs for the Daily Worker, and even when he resigned as foreign editor to do special writing he continued to be foreign affairs adviser and was closely in touch with many International agents. I can say that from his own statements and from my knowledge of what a foreign editor of the Daily Worker does.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Hilda Austern was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record evidence of Miss Austern's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Hilda Austern was also known as Mrs. Bretholz.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Mr. MANDEL. Her associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations are taken from War and Peace in the Pacific, a Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR on Wartime and Postwar Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, page 162 being the proceedings of the Mont Tremblant, Quebec, conference of December 4 to 14, 1942.

In that volume she is listed as a member of the international secretariat and as having participated in the 1936 and 1939 conferences as assistant treasurer.

Mr. MORRIS. Assistant treasurer of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Next I read from Handbook for the Sixth Conference of the IPR at Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15 to 29, 1936, page 62, where Hilda Austern is listed as a member of the international secretariat and conference staff and also a member of the finance committee.

I read from Security in the Pacific, a Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, page 160, where Hilda Austern is listed as a member of the international secretariat. She is again so listed in the proceedings of the Virginia conference, Virginia Beach conference, held November 18 to December 2, 1939, and she is also there listed as assistant treasurer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those references made by Mr. Mandel incorporated into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be so incorporated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 182" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 182

MISS HILDA AUSTERN

International secretariat (also known as Mrs. Bretholz): Miss Hilda Austern (1936, 1939). Assistant treasurer. (Source: War and Peace in the Pacific (A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR on Wartime and Postwar Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East), Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4–14, 1942, p. 162.)

International secretariat and conference staff, finance committee: Minute secretary, Hilda Austern. (Source: Handbook for the Sixth Conference of the IPR, Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15–29, 1936, p. 62.)

International secretariat: Hilda Austern (1936, 1939, 1942). Assistant treasurer, IPR. (Source: Security in the Pacific (A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations), Hot Springs, Va., January 6–17, 1945, p. 160.)

International secretariat: Hilda Austern, assistant treasurer (1936). (Source: Problems of the Pacific (Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18–December 2, 1939, p. 274.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an item from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 1, 1941, being a letter marked "Strictly Confidential," addressed to Miss Hilda Austern from Edward C. Carter. I will read excerpts from this letter as follows:

DEAR HILDA: Would you like to tackle the following research job for the War Department? You would be on the international secretariat payroll, and I do not propose to charge the Army anything for this service.

The project has to be done if possible in a fortnight, and the aim is to discover what the possibilities would be of finding suitable space for landing fields, preferably 4,000 feet long, but with an absolute minimum of 3,500 feet, on the following islands.

Then there is a list of islands in the Pacific which is given.

Supplementary information which would be required would be:

Then there is a list given such as prevailing winds, possibilities for landing supplies, and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that letter introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that signed?

Mr. MANDEL. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Addressed to Hilda Austern, about whom we were talking.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 183" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 183

LEE, MASS., *September 1, 1941.*

Strictly Confidential.
Miss HILDA AUSTERN,
Office.

DEAR HILDA: Would you like to tackle the following rush research job for the War Department? You would be on the international secretariat payroll and I do not propose to charge the Army anything for this service.

The project has to be done if possible in a fortnight, and the aim is to discover what the possibilities would be of finding suitable space for landing fields, preferably 4,000 feet long, but with an absolute minimum of 3,500 feet, on the following islands:

Palmyra	Baker
Enderbury	Christmas
Samoa (British and United States)	Fiji group
New Hebrides	New Caledonia
Howland	Jarvis
Johnson	Canton
Loyalty	

Supplementary information which would be required would be:

(*a*) Prevailing winds, storms, monsoons, etc.

(*b*) Possibilities for landing supplies by steamer.

(*c*) Natural defenses, i. e., would the fields be far enough inland or, if near the sea, protected by higher ground from, say, the gunnery range of submarines that might emerge from the sea nearby.
(*d*) Health conditions, i. e., mosquitoes, malaria, or other diseases.
(*e*) Local food supply.
(*f*) Local labor supply.
(*g*) Local government and its political orientation.
(*h*) Local police or military organization, if any.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that that last letter was introduced for the purpose of showing that Miss Austern was on the payroll of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the general nature of some of the work that she performed for that organization.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know Abraham Chapman?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he is a veteran Communist, also known as John Arnold.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "John Arnold" is that his party name?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he wrote under these different names and was sometimes known in the party as John Arnold. It was a party name. He was on the editorial board in connection with Freiheit, which is the Communist daily paper in New York, published in the same building as the Daily Worker. Therefore I conferred with Mr. Chapman many times and know him as a Communist. He has a very high position so far as the regard of the Communist Party leaders in the Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record the associations of Mr. Chapman with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 9, 1947, headed, "Research and publication program of the American Institute of Pacific Relations," and listing books and research projects and studies under way for 1946–47. It lists Philippine Nationalism Today, by Abraham Chapman.

Then I have here a list of articles written for the Far Eastern Survey by Abraham Chapman. There are four articles. It is to be noted also, however, that Abraham Chapman is coauthor with Earl Browder of a pamphlet entitled "The Meaning of the Palestine Partition," published in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But the first four articles were?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like Mr. Mandel's notation showing Abraham Chapman's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. These are notations, Mr. Mandel, as I understand it, from instruments that you found in the records, these notations were made by you or notations that you found?

Mr. MANDEL. They are notations in the first case from the memorandum of the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the second case from the actual volumes of the Far Eastern Survey, the official organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the notation?

Mr. MANDEL. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You examined the volumes yourself?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 184" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 184

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION PROGRAM OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS—BOOKS AND RESEARCH PROJECTS

Studies under way 1946–47: Philippine Nationalism Today, by Abraham Chapman.

Abraham Chapman, author of American Policy in the Philippines (Far Eastern Survey, June 5, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Hawaii Seeks Statehood (Far Eastern Survey, June 17, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Pacification in Central Luzon (Far Eastern Survey, August 17, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Notes on the Philippine Election (Pacific Affairs, June, 1946, p. 193).

Abraham Chapman, coauthor with Earl Browder, of pamphlet, The Meaning of the Palestine Partition (1937).

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew of her, I did not meet her personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know she was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I will not say that I knew it through the whole 10 years I was in the Communist Party, but I heard it mentioned at various times.

Mr. MORRIS. So you do know that at one time she was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would say a couple of times. She did not receive the constant reference that some of the other names that you have mentioned received.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us of Mrs. Barnes' association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the files of Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern Survey, both organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and is a long list of articles by Kathleen Barnes which is here submitted for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you indicate the number of articles in each publication, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. For Pacific Affairs, 8, and for Far Eastern Survey, 23.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that compilation introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that compilation made by, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. By actual consultation of the volumes of both publications.

The CHAIRMAN. By yourself?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had the volumes in your possession?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 185" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 185

KATHLEEN BARNES

Member of board of directors of the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, Inc., 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.

The following articles by Kathleen Barnes appear in Pacific Affairs:

Eastward Migration Within the Soviet Union, December 1934 (pp. 395–405).

Review of Project for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U. S. S. R., December 1934 (pp. 470–471).

Review of Birobidzhantsy na Amure (The Birobidjans on the Amur) by M. Goldstein, September 1935 (pp. 507–508).

Review of Soviet Journey by Louis Fischer, June 1935 (pp. 254–256).

Comment and Opinion of Another Perspective, September 1935 (pp. 477–481).

Review of Soviet Communism: A New Civilization by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, June 1936 (pp. 294–296).

Review of The Soviets by Albert Rhys Williams, December 1937 (pp. 490–492).

Review of Over the North Pole, by George Baidukov, June 1938 (pp. 274–275).

Review of Great Soviet World Atlas, volume 1; edited by A. F. Gorkin, et al., September 1940 (pp. 354–355).

The following articles by Kathleen Barnes appear in the Far Eastern Survey:

Industrialization of the Soviet Far East, April 10, 1935.

Japanese Soviet Friction, September 25, 1935.

The Soviet Economic Stake in the Orient, January 29, 1936 (p. 19).

Siberia—From Mongolia to the Arctic, May 6, 1936 (p. 93).

The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific, November 18, 1936 (p. 243).

The Agricultural Foundation of Siberia's Economy, February 17, 1937 (p. 37).

Tanna Tuva Showing Signs of Industrial Activity, March 17, 1937.

Siberian Gold Production Tops Previous Figures, May 12, 1937.

New Bed of Radio Active Ores Found in Central Asia, June 23, 1937.

Overcoming Obstacles to Rubber Control, August 4, 1937 (p. 177).

Alaska Salmon in World Politics, March 2, 1938.

Japanese Government Given Blank Check, April 6, 1938 (p. 79).

Asiatic Russia, Storehouse of Mineral Wealth, July 13, 1938 (p. 157).

Soviet-Japanese Relations Still Hanging Fire, January 5, 1939 (p. 1).

Konisomolsk—Pioneer City on the Amur, February 15, 1939.

Japan Seeking Larger Contribution From Her Mandate, March 15, 1939.

Outer Mongolia on the World Stage, August 30, 1939, (p. 207).

Soviets Promoting Migration to Siberia, October 25, 1939.

Soviets Hope for Rubber Self Sufficiency by 1942, November 8, 1939.

Soviet Union Improving Railway Network, December 20, 1939.

Pacific Islands Double Phosphate Output, May 22, 1940.

Soviets Stress Program for Far Eastern Section, July 17, 1940.

Fisheries, Mainstay of Soviet-Japanese Friction, March 27, 1940 (p. 75).

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any letters from the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mrs. Barnes?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here two letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the Council of the U. S. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations, one dated April 16, 1938, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes from E. V. Harondar, who has been previously designated as an official of the U. S. S. R. Council of the IPR.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Could you kindly obtain and send us on an exchange basis the following publications which we urgently need for our work here: (1) Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, (2) Official Handbook of the Panama Canal, and (3) Panama Canal Record. We would like to get all these data for the last 3 years. Thanking you in advance for this favor.

Sincerely yours.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that written from?

Mr. MANDEL. From Moscow, 20 Razin Street, April 16, 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. Who signed that first letter?

Mr. MANDEL. E. V. Harondar.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is he?

Mr. MANDEL. He is an official of the U. S. S. R. Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then we have another letter dated August 29, 1939, to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes on the same type of letterhead from the same individual, E. V. Harondar, as follows:

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Referring to your letter of June 14 and July 6, I take pleasure in informing you that all books mentioned therein have been received. We note that there will be some delay in obtaining some of them. However, The United States in World Affairs, 1938, has already been received. We have recently sent you an English edition of the papers published in connection with the Eighteenth party congress under the title, The Land of Socialism, and an English edition of the History of the Communist Party. Today under separate cover I am sending you a book of statistical information on Soviet agriculture. Our librarian is collecting a new set of books on the Soviet Union which will be forwarded to you shortly. We would appreciate it if you could include in the next shipment of books the following publication: Panama Canal and its Ports, United States War Department, United States Army Corps of Engineers, revised 1938.

Sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this introduced into the record. The purpose of introducing this exhibit, these two exhibits, would be to show the functions being carried on by the Institute of Pacific Relations, particularly by Kathleen Barnes, who has been identified by Mr. Budenz as a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 186" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 186

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
Moscow, August 29, 1939.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Referring to your letter of June 14, and July 6, I take pleasure in informing you that all books mentioned therein have been received. We note that there will be some delay in obtaining some of them. However, the United States in World Affairs, 1938, has been already received. We have recently sent you an English edition of the papers published in connection with the XVIII Party Congress under the title The Land of Socialism and an English edition of the History of the Communist Party. Today under separate cover I am sending you a book of statistical information on Soviet Agriculture. Our librarian is collecting a new set of books on the Soviet Union which will be forwarded to you shortly. We would appreciate it if you could include in the next shipment of books the following publication: Panama Canal and Its Ports. U. S. War Department, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Revised 1938.

Sincerely yours,

E. V. HARONDAR.

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
Moscow, April 16, 1938.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Could you kindly obtain and send us on an exchange basis the following publications which we urgently need for our work here: (1)

Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, (2) Official Handbook of the Panama Canal, and (3) Panama Canal Record. We would like to get all these data for the last 3 years. Thanking you in advance for this favor.

Sincerely yours,

E. V. HARONDAR.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comments on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would like to call attention to the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I don't know what the date of this letter is.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that letter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1939. If I am correct, this is an advance copy before the American Communists got it. We must understand the significance of this book, that it is the foundation stone today of Communist doctrine.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this book"?

Mr. BUDENZ. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Bolsheviks, to which he refers, which is now fully credited to Josef Stalin. It is required reading by every Communist and is used as a basis of their thought and action. This was not got out in the United States until after this was sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a modern edition of Marxism?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is Stalin's rendition of Marxism-Leninism under the guise of history. It shows the necessity for violent revolution, the overthrow of the bourgeois government, and the importance of a Communist Party devoted to revolution, a party of a new type, in order to bring about this overthrow of these governments.

Senator SMITH. Is that available here now?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is available in the English translation, gotten out by the Communist Party through the International Publishers, headed by Alexander Trachtenberg.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I refer to a previous exhibit already introduced, exhibit 58, and I read one paragraph of that exhibit, being a memorandum on Personnel in Connection With Soviet Studies. It is marked "confidential, not for distribution outside the office."

This is dated August 10, 1934, and the last paragraph reads as follows:

The fourth group—

That is, the people engaged in these studies—

consists of the few people who are already familiar with the institute's record in the Soviet Union, or who could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism. With Harriet, a further period of language study, which she may at present be contemplating, would probably be essential. This could be arranged, however, or you could decide to start from the beginning and send some young person of promise to Moscow to train him for the job.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Harriet Moore——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. By whom was that signed?

Mr. MANDEL. This has no signature.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently it is addressed to somebody?

Mr. MANDEL. It is evidently an interoffice memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Harriet Moore identified in that document is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think I identified her yesterday as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had evidence that Kathleen Barnes was the first wife of the Joseph Barnes who has been identified before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. I have another letter here from the S. S. *Chitral* dated January 24, 1935. The document comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is addressed to Frederick Field from E. C. Carter, and I read:

DEAR FRED: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow gave me, indicating precisely what American Fisheries Publications they already have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect of the fish business.

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by way of confirmation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is signed by whom?

Mr. MANDEL. As I understand, by E. C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is addressed to Frederick Field. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record again as an example of the type of work being carried on by Kathleen Barnes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is already an exhibit, is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 187" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 187

STEAMSHIP "CHITRAL,"
January 24, 1935.

F. FIELD,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow gave me, indicating precisely what American fisheries publications they already have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect of the fish business.

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by way of confirmation.

Sincerely yours,

E. C. CARTER.

Send all stuff to Oceanography people via Kantarovich.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here some quotations from Mrs. Barnes' actual writings in the magazine of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in Pacific Affairs. The first is reviewing a book called The Soviets, by Albert Rhys Williams.

The Soviets, by Albert Rhys Williams, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes: "The Soviets is absorbing reading and bears impressive witness to the achievements of the country under consideration."

From Pacific Affairs, December 1937, page 492.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Albert Rhys Williams is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Albert Rhys Williams personally, and he is a Communist.

Mr. MANDEL. Then next is a review of Soviet Journey by Louis Fischer.

Soviet Journey, by Louis Fischer, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 255: "Agitation in foreign countries is not likely to be productive of revolutionary results until such time as the workers of these countries can see that life under bolshevism is better in every way than under capitalism. Is that time coming? What will result from this burgeoning activity in the U. S. S. R.? This question is implied in the short last chapter of Soviet Journey."

From Pacific Affairs, March 1935, page 255.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment to make on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I didn't catch it fully. I was distracted by the spelling of Albert Rhys Williams' name.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 294 ff: "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the consideration of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' is replaced by the 'service of man.' Such is the Webbs' appraisal of Soviet communism."

From Pacific Affairs, June 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those excerpts made by Mr. Mandel incorporated into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 188" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 188

KATHLEEN BARNES

The Soviets, by Albert Rhys Williams, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes: "The Soviets is absorbing reading and bears impressive witness to the achievements of the country under consideration" (Pacific Affairs, December 1937, p. 492).

Soviet Journey, by Louis Fischer, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 255: "Agitation in foreign countries is not likely to be productive of revolutionary results until such time as the workers of these countries can see that life under bolshevism is better in every way than under capitalism. Is that time coming? What will result from this burgeoning activity in the U. S. S. R.? This question is implied in the short last chapter of Soviet Journey" (Pacific Affairs, March 1935, p. 255).

Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 294ff: "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the consideration of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' is replaced by the 'service of man.' Such is the Webbs' appraisal of Soviet communism" (Pacific Affairs, June 1936).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Angus Cameron to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; from official reports.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with Angus Cameron?

Mr. BUDENZ. None at all.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of the official reports, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The official reports had to do with the conduct of the Communist Party in Massachusetts, with which I was very closely in touch; that is to say, I was in Massachusetts a great deal as a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, perhaps more than in any other State. It repeatedly was called to my attention

at State committee meetings the important part that Angus Cameron was playing in the Communist Party.

Secondly, and more important than that, he was called to the attention of the Politburo by Alexander Trachtenberg as having committed himself to the Communist cause and also with the statement by Alexander Trachtenberg that Little, Brown & Co. was being made into the international publishers of the Communist front.

I said the other day that Communist leaders didn't use the words "Communist front"; that was one time that Trachtenberg in a sort of jesting way used the term. The work of Angus Cameron in getting published the works of those who were pro-Communist but not necessarily known publicly as such was commended by the Politburo and his plans particularly for doing that in the future.

Mr. MORRIS. What firm was he associated with, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Little, Brown & Co. in Boston.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of that testimony was to show the nature of this publishing firm which did put out quite a few books of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I understand that there has been a reorganization of the firm recently.

Senator SMITH. Little, Brown & Co.?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. That is one of the oldest firms in America, a publishing firm; is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; Mr. Budenz just testified to that.

Do you have any comments to make, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Little, Brown & Co. had a high and distinguished record as publishers and maintains it by some of the works they publish and some of the authors they bring forth. That was, of course, of great value to the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. You did know of many Communist publications which were gotten out by Little, Brown & Co.?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know that was the plan, and I know that many people in Communist fronts have had their books published by them. I can't say that I know specifically that it was all arranged, because I wasn't present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you previously testified that John K. Fairbank was a member of the Communist Party to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have any letter at this time that we can introduce showing Mr. Fairbank's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. John K. Fairbank is listed as a member of the board of trustees of the American council of the publication IPR News, in a letter dated March 1950. We have had previously testimony that he was chairman of one of the subcommittees of the Mont Tremblant conference.

Mr. MORRIS. He is presently a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is he not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 29, 1944, and I read a section of this letter as follows:

> If Wellington Liu visits India, perhaps he can help in forwarding the manuscripts to New York, but it would be best to have them brought back by some American or sent in a diplomatic bag, perhaps to Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 189" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 189

APRIL 29, 1944.

Message for Prof. Chien Tuan-sheng,
Southwest Associated University, Kunming, or care of
Lt. Robert W. Barnett, Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force,
Kunming Airfield.

DEAR MR. CHIEN: I was extremely disappointed to receive your cable stating that you were discontinuing work on the study of Chinese government and politics. As you will know from my cabled reply of April 10, I had already sent you a message about the project in care of Professor Staley, asking him to leave it with Robert Barnett in Kunming. I do hope it has now reached you; but, in case it has not, here is what I said:

"Holland approves outline of project on Chinese government as described in Chien's letter of December 6. Holland is cabling approval on February 17, 1944. In addition to the $300 already turned over to Professor Chou, Holland will arrange a further payment of $600. Part of this might be paid with the help of Barnett if he agrees and informs his wife or Holland accordingly. Holland is also consulting Wong Shih-chieh about facilitating part of the payment. Holland hopes that a substantial part of the manuscript may be completed and in his hands by the end of September, so that portions of it might, if necessary, be used as a document for the IPR conference in January 1945. Holland also hopes that Chien or his colleague can make available part of the chapter on recent trends of the Kuomintang, which might be used as an article in the September issue of Pacific Affairs. This should reach New York by June 30 at the latest. If this topic is not convenient, an article on some problems of postwar political readjustment in China might be substituted. For safety's sake, Holland thinks that there ought to be at least three copies of the manuscript, but Chien can decide whether these shall be rough copies or clean copies. It might be wise to send Holland a copy of each chapter as it is completed. If Wellington Liu visits India, perhaps he can help in forwarding the manuscripts to New York, but it would be best to have them brought back by some American or sent in a diplomatic bag, perhaps to Mr. Fairbank.

It has not been as easy as I expected to send the money to you in the form requested, but I trust that by this time you will have already received an installment of $200 from Barnett and more will be coming shortly.

I realize that with prices rising so fast the original fee I proposed may now be inadequate and it was for that reason that I suggested in my cable that we could increase the amount from $800 to $1,100. I most earnestly hope that you will not have to drop the project, as we have been counting on it very much. Even if it is not possible to complete the study on the original scale, I would urge you or Mr. Wang to prepare a short monograph and send it to me by October or November at the latest.

If there is anything else we can do to assist you in completing the study, please let me know. I realize that conditions for doing this kind of research work must be terribly difficult now, and I am anxious to do everything possible to facilitate matters for you. I am sure that Wellington Liu will be just as disappointed as we are if you do not produce a manuscript. As you know, your study has been included in the list of research projects announced by the China Council of the IPR.

With all good wishes and looking forward to hearing from you,
Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—Would you kindly tell Dr. Chiang Mon-lin when you see him that I have received his letter of April 11 with some errata for his book. We have tried two publishers so far but have not yet succeeded in getting the book accepted. It is now being considered by the Oxford University Press, and I hope to get a decision soon. One of the difficulties is the paper rationing.

Mr. MANDEL. We have previously introduced a letter signed by I. Epstein to W. H. Holland, from which I read a paragraph. This was exhibit 112.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that has already been introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated March 10, 1944, addressed to John Fairbank care of Lauchlin Currie of the White House, Washington, D. C. I read:

Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the A. P. O. in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through to Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via A. P. O. to Mac Fischer or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

That is signed, "W. L. Holland."

The CHAIRMAN. Addressed to whom?

Mr. MANDEL. Addressed to John Fairbank, care of Lauchlin Currie, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Fairbank doing at that time? What was his job? Why did he get his mail at the White House?

Mr. MANDEL. I believe he was connected with the Office of War Information.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did he not get at the Office of War Information? Have you any records to show?

Mr. MORRIS. We do not have any records to show why. We will have to ask Mr. Fairbank that.

Mr. MANDEL. This is exhibit 106, previously used.

Senator FERGUSON. We notice quite a bit of this mail going through courier.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I have to go to the floor. I am in charge of a bill that is coming up. Senator Smith, would take over?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Max Granich was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Max Granich very well, know him to be a member of the Communist Party and engaged in underground work. He is the husband of Grace Granich to whom I previously referred and a brother of Mike Gold, the Communist columnist of the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. You know he is a trusted member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very trusted, part of the very protected apparatus, or protective apparatus, the security apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a letter that will show the connection between Mr. Granich and the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. An exhibit that was previously used.

Senator FERGUSON. Might we get the time when he was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. All through the period of my membership, 1935 to 1945.

Mr. MANDEL. This letter is dated December 13, 1939, and is exhibit 54, addressed to Mr. Max Granich at China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you listen particularly to this, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is addressed to him at 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York City, and as I understand by Owen Lattimore. I read from the letter as follows:

I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible for me to join the editorial board of China Today. I am a member of the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that one of my employers is the Japanese council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the board of China Today, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on that particular publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. China Today was the Communist publication run by Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Philip Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they run it under their own names?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; they ran it under the names of Frederick Spencer and J. W. Phillips or some such name. I think that is correct, J. W. Phillips.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Amerasia a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; Communist-created, but in order to have a certain different function than China Today. China Today was clearly Communist from its inception.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that account for the language that is used there about having a different slant?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. This letter, it seems to me, is very revealing. You will note Mr. Lattimore did not reject the policy of China Today, he just thinks it wouldn't permit him to function as well if he were connected with it. China Today was clearly a Chinese publication devised by the Communists in secrecy, to a degree, but with Communist policies very clearly defined for the purpose of influencing other agencies and organizations, penetrating them, and in that way working out the Communist program in the United States for China.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was more openly for the Communist cause than Amerasia?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Reading that letter, Mr. Budenz, would you not say that Owen Lattimore knew the nature of those organizations when he used the term "one is more partisan than the other"?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can't see as an expert of the Far East how he could avoid knowing it because these were prominent publications in New York activity.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say the words "more partisan" meant more communistic?

Mr. BUDENZ. Decidedly.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as China was concerned and the Far East?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. If you are Communist in regard to China, you are Communist everywhere.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Philip Jaffee was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; both by official information and by personally being acquainted with Mr. Jaffe in his not too frequent but nevertheless several visits to the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no doubt in your mind that Philip Jaffe was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. During the whole period that you were one?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Of course, during the whole period I didn't always see him personally, but from official reports. Not only may I say that he was a Communist, but he was a Soviet espionage agent from advice given to me by J. Peters, immediately following conversations of Peters with Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I have here a photostat of the Daily Worker of December 3, 1945. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that document for us?

Mr. MANDEL. This photostat was made at my direction. It is a photostat of the Daily Worker of December 3, 1945, page 11.

Mr. MORRIS. I call your attention to the review of Joseph Starobin there of Jaffe's book on the Far East. I ask you if you will make comments on it, Mr. Budenz. You will note some part of it is underscored.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. Well, of course, Mr. Starobin—this by the way, was published after I was out of the Communist Party, but it is an issue I have read. Mr. Starobin begins by attacking Patrick J. Hurley all over again and says:

> Militarists like Patrick J. Hurley are riled by the virtual unanimity of American intellectual opinion on the broad issues of the future of Asia. The writers, experts, journalists—and even career diplomats in the State Department—are almost unanimous in their judgment of the reactionary character of the Kuomintang leaders, in their sympathy for the Chinese Communist program, and their emphasis on the need for an independent, democratic India.

Then he goes on to say:

> This has given rise to virtual renaissance of American writing and thinking on the Far East.

The renaissance in this case is evidence by Philip Jaffe.

> Philip Jaffe's book is the latest contribution to this judgment of the experts. It follows a remarkable outpouring of progressive literature about Asia in the last 2 years. There was Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia; Kate Mitchell's study of India, and Kumar Goshal's work on the same subject. We have also had Lawrence K. Rosinger's China's Crisis and Andrew Roth's Dilemma in Japan—excellent statements from the younger men in the far eastern field. And then there were the two eyewitness reports on the Chinese Communists by Harrison Forman and Guenther Stein.

It goes on then with quite an acclaim of Jaffe's contribution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Kate Mitchell was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I met her as such at enlarged meetings of the Communist Party.

Senator SMITH. Is this Harrison Forman a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I am glad you asked me that question, Senator. Yesterday in the double question raised by Mr. Morris on Harrison Forman and Mr. Stein I said "Yes," they were Communists. Technically and legally I cannot say that Harrison Forman is a Communist. This is the situation: Harrison Forman was working with the Communists, knew he was working with them.

According to all official information I have he consented to have the Communists get out a special campaign for his book. He consented to have Joe North look over his book, and in addition to that was

referred to as one of "our people," but I have never heard him referred to as Communist specifically and I like to be meticulous about that.

I would like to make that sharp distinction. He was as close to the Communists as one could be without having been called such.

Mr. MORRIS. And he consciously worked with them?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, he consciously worked with them and arranged that the Communists should send out a secret memorandum which plugged his book and Gunther Stein's at the same time as required reading for all Communists and also as those books which should be pushed forward in non-Communist organizations.

Senator SMITH. Is he any relation to Dr. Clark Forman?

Mr. BUDENZ. He is no relation so far as I know. Dr. Clark Forman is another man.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Clark Forman to be a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You read there that Kumar Goshal wrote a book. Did you know that Kumar Goshal was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have heard him referred to as such though not very emphatically.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and given the next consecutive number.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 190" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 190

[From the Daily Worker, New York, December 3, 1945, p. 11]

JAFFE'S BOOK ON FAR EAST STRESSES NEED FOR DEMOCRACY, INDUSTRIALIZATION

(New Frontiers in Asia, by Philip Jaffe. Alfred A. Knopf, $3. Reviewed by Joseph Starobin)

Militarists like Patrick J. Hurley are riled by the virtual unanimity of American intellectual opinion on the broad issues of the future of Asia. The writers, experts, journalists—and even career diplomats in the State Department—are almost unanimous in their judgment of the reactionary character of the Kuomintang leaders, in their sympathy for the Chinese Communist program, and their emphasis on the need for an independent, democratic India. There is probably no other phase of American policy on which there is such a broad agreement among well-informed people. This has given rise to a virtual renaissance of American writing and thinking on the Far East.

Philip Jaffe's book is the latest contribution to this judgment of the experts. It follows a remarkable outpouring of progressives literature about Asia in the last 2 years. There was Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia; Kate Mitchell's study of India; and Kumar Goshal's work on the same subject. We have also had Lawrence K. Rosinger's China's Crisis, and Andrew Roth's Dilemma in Japan—excellent statements from the younger men in the far eastern field. And then there were the two eyewitness reports on the Chinese Communists—by Harrison Forman and Guenther Stein.

PROGRAM FOR ASIA

Jaffe's contribution is in the same tradition of scholarship; but in addition to presenting the facts as they are, Jaffe has attempted, like Lattimore, to couch his scholarship in the framework of a general proposition. This proposition is that the needs of American capitalism demand a large-scale program of industrializing China and India on the basis of democratic and progressive governments in those countries. Not only do the needs of America require such a pro-

gram but also the necessity of minimizing rivalry with Great Britain, securing a peaceful Asia and establishing a real basis for cooperation with Soviet Russia.

In reality, there are two separate aspects to the book: One is a detailed exposition of recent history in India and China, an excellent and rich library of information in itself. The other aspects, linked with the first but quite separate, is an essay on how the United States can solve the problems created by its enormous wartime productivity. The first aspect of the book is easier to appraise than the second.

SKILLFUL ANALYSIS

The discussion of India and China offer an excellent picture of what's what in both countries. The strategy of British imperialism in the Cripps proposal is exposed with great skill, and Jaffe makes full use of his detailed knowledge of the All India National Congress both before and after the August 1942 events.

He also uses the letters of William Phillips to the late President Roosevelt to good advantage, and what gives the passage on India particular depth is his treatment of her economic problems, the various proposals which have come from India itself for postwar economic development.

The discussion of China is probably the most elaborate single aspect of the book. It adds up to a damning indictment of the Kuomintang regime and a very firm statement on behalf of Communist China's achievements—or more exactly—"new China's" achievements.

These passages are jam-packed with material of the greatest topical value to the layman and yet of equal academic value to the student of China. The full story of Kuomintang deception over the draft constitution is here; likewise, the hitherto unpublished summary of what really happened in Sinkiang, the details of General Hurley's antics and the meaning of the Stilwell-Gauss ousters a year ago. All this offers as fresh a background for today's headlines as one could hope for.

BRITAIN'S DILEMMA

I would have liked an equally thorough treatment of the Indonesian, Indo-Chinese and Philippine independence movements, and a greater differentiation in analyzing French as compared with British imperial policy.

On the other hand, one comes across rare material that is so little understood in this country—such as the story of Anglo-American rivalry in Siam. In general, one of Jaffe's strong points is his delineation of the British imperialist dilemma and the use which he makes of sidelights and comments from British sources. This enriches the entire discussion.

QUESTIONS ON ASIA

The second aspect of this book—the proposal for large-scale development of Asia—raises many more questions, and I can only indicate them here.

Jaffe does not say that American capitalists will accept his proposals; he does not regard them as inevitable in any sense, and in fact exhibits many doubts as to whether the United States will take the course he advises.

He is also quite well aware that the alternative to a program of democratic cooperation with the progressive forces of Asia is a policy of imperialist expansion and cut-throat rivalry with Great Britain.

Yet it is also true that his appeal has a certain one-sidedness. It does not analyze very sharply the actual possibilities of realizing his program. And of course, this discussion is entirely within the framework of the continuation of capitalism as such.

AMERICAN POLICY

I think that American Communists can certainly agree with the concept of American assistance in the industrialization of an Asia in which an independent India and a progressive, anti-feudal China would be the recipients of this aid.

But the immediate problem, as recent events show, is that American policy is blocking the independence movements of Asia and shows no inclination to accept or work with the anti-feudal, democratic program of the Chinese Communists.

It is this aspect of American policy which determines our approach to everything else about United States relations with the Far East. And this refusal to accept a democratic Asia is not sufficiently foreseen in Jaffe's discussion and even in his premises.

This was perhaps understandable since the bulk of the book was written in the summer of 1944. But when read today, it gives rise to illusions about the nature of American policy.

In all fairness, I see these faults only as an aspect of the book, and not necessarily the decisive aspect. For its factual material and its elaboration of the true issues inside of India, China, and Japan it ranks second to none in the growing library of progressive thought on the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice that this writing kind of lumped all these books together. Would you say that was a proper classification?

Mr. BUDENZ. These are some exhibits of those books which carried forward the idea of Communists represented by Mr. Browder in 1937; that the Chinese Communists should be represented as the democratic elements for the salvation of China.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you were to class the writings of this writer that we have been talking about would you class them the same as he did?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, we were discussing Philip Jaffe. I offer you there an article from the New Masses and ask you if that recalls anything to you.

Mr. BUDENZ. This article from the New Masses is its issue of October 12, 1937, with the chief article, the one to which you refer by Philip Jaffe, China's Communists Told Me, a Specialist in Far Eastern Affairs Interviews the Leading Men of Red China in Their Home Territory. This expedition, if you wish to call it that, under Jaffe's supervision to Yenan was a Communist project so far as discussions in the Politburo showed.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew it was a Communist project from your position in the Daily Worker, is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. Not only in the Daily Worker, it was discussed with the editors of New Masses before the Politburo and was considered to be a very important mission to stimulate activity among intellectuals everywhere about Red China to bring out that which Joseph Stalin later pointed out that the intellectuals have been won to sympathy for Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. So you knew this was a Red project?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other excerpts that you care to comment on, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. We shouldn't take too much time on it. I think the significant part is the concluding part.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The part I shall quote is this:

Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the 1,500 cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about 500 from other schools.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Chu Teh?

Mr. BUDENZ. Chu Teh is one of the great leaders of the Chinese Communists. Bisson, he is identified as T. A. Bisson in other parts of the article. Lattimore is identified as Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, in another part of the article.

Here are some questions asked of me. "What is the position of woman in the United States of America? How do American workers live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's NRA campaign? What is

the present situation in the left literary movement in America? What do the American people think of our long march west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.

Then omitting one paragraph he concludes with Agnes Smedley's estimate of their trip—that is, of the trip of Bisson, Jaffe, Lattimore, to the Red Chinese areas. In this letter Miss Smedley says, or rather Jaffe says, that Miss Smedley indicates "better than I am able," how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in the former Soviet regions.

This is Agnes Smedley now being quoted:

In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I want to tell you that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the effect of that meeting until 2 or 3 days had passed. Then it began to roll in. I have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people.

Then she goes on with other similar praises for the contribution made.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that article of October 12, 1937, in the New Masses magazine, incorporated by reference.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 191" and was filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. And I would like to have such extracts as read by Mr. Budenz completely incorporated into the record.

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know Anthony Jenkinson?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew him personally, sir; Anthony Jenkinson.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he, according to his own statement to me, was sent here under instructions from Moscow to penetrate the conservative labor press with the Allied Labor News. I had a number of conferences in his office in mid-Manhattan on this question.

These conferences—may I explain?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. BUDENZ. These conferences arose from the fact that the Daily Worker was having difficulty in getting full coverage from Moscow, and we wanted to get the help of the Allied Labor News and Anthony Jenkinson declared in a series of conferences I had with him that this was contrary to the instructions which he had received in England; that the instructions he had received from Moscow were to confine the Allied Labor News to the conservative labor press and to try to penetrate the American Federation of Labor newspapers under the guise of being merely a labor service on the international basis.

Later on, after further discussions and because in part the Allied Labor News didn't get into the A. F. of L. newspapers as they wanted—the A. F. of L. labor leaders have a remarkable ability to smell out Communist institutions—they did then relent in regard to the Daily Worker first by permitting the Daily Worker to quote the Allied Labor News, and then finally by allowing us, if I remember correctly—at least we were on the eve of that—to use its name, its byline.

22848 O - 51 - pt. 2 (Face p. 659) No. 2

FEE PAID $5.00
STUB NO. 6961
MAY 13 1942
COUNTY CLERK N.Y. CO.

CERTIFIED COPY ISSUED
Fee Paid
Dated
County Clerk, N. Y. Co.
By

5078

Certificate

of

Anthony E. Jenkinson

Robert Ferrell

CONDUCTING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF

ALLIED LABOR NEWS

1133 BROADWAY, NYC

THIS RECORD NOT TO BE REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY CLERK

FILED BY

MAY 13 1942

PROPERTY CONVEYED
STUB No. 51469
PAGES
TOTAL
AUG 8 - 1951
CLERK'S OFFICE, N. Y.
BY

State of New York,
County of } ss.:

On this 12 day of May in the year one thousand nine hundred and forty-two before me personally appeared Anthony E. Jenkinson and Robert Ferrell

to me known and known to me to be the individuals described in and who executed the foregoing certificate, and they thereupon duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

[signature]
NOTARY PUBLIC
Notary Public, New York County
New York County Clerk's No. 1943
N.Y. County Register's No. 1943
Commission Expires March 30, 1943

2 - 1 - 25 — 1 — 25000 12-2-50

AUG 8 - 1951

I, the undersigned do hereby certify that Mary [illegible] to me known to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing certificate, and duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same.

[illegible]

Mr. Morris. You have no doubt, then, that they were completely controlled?

Mr. Budenz. Completely controlled by the Communists. Not only do I know that from the Politburo but Jenkinson told me definitely he had been sent from England for that purpose. You must understand that a great many of the translations, for popular purposes, of Moscow publications at that time took place in London. They had over there at that time for that purpose a division of Communist International and he had received his instructions from the Soviet capital for that purpose.

Mr. Morris. Was he an English citizen?

Mr. Budenz. That is my understanding. He was even supposed to be titled.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, in connection with your statement that it was created by the Communist Party, I would like Mr. Mandel to introduce a certificate of incorporation of the Allied Labor News.

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of the certificate of incorporation of the Allied Labor News, dated May 12, 1942, in which Anthony B. Jenkinson and Robert Terrall, T-e-r-r-a-l-l, are listed as the incorporators.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Robert Terrall?

Mr. Budenz. I don't recall him now.

Mr. Morris. But you do know that Anthony B. Jenkinson is a Communist?

Mr. Budenz. Definitely.

Mr. Morris. I notice he uses the address of 16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

Do you know what address that is?

Mr. Budenz. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. Is that the home residence of Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. Budenz. It's near it; it's opposite the Daily Worker.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate where that came from?

Mr. Mandel. That photostat was made at my direction from the records of the county clerk.

Mr. Morris. Also the records of the secretary of state of New York?

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.

Senator Smith. That will be received as an exhibit.

Mr. Mandel. To indicate the nature of the Allied Labor News.

Mr. Morris. Not on that, his association with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 192" and is herewith inserted.)

Mr. Mandel. I have the following letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one is dated February 2, 1942, addressed to Philip E. Lilienthal, from W. L. Holland, referring to Sir Anthony Jenkinson. I read the following excerpt:

> The Shepherd book and the second volume of the handbook should be out this week and Bradley next week. We have added a new chapter on strategy to the Formosa book and that should be out in about two more weeks. Elizabeth is greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Department for our pamphlets, the latest being for 20,000 copies of a very brief, elementary affair, called Know Your Enemy, Japan, by Tony Jenkinson. We are expecting them to order 15,000 copies of your pamphlet.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> W. L. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this is to show that Anthony Jenkinson's book was the subject of interest of the Institute of Pacific Relations and also that the War Department had ordered 20,000 copies of his pamphlet.

May that be introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 193" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 193

NEW YORK CITY, *February 2, 1942.*

Mr. PHILIP E. LILIENTHAL,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR PHIL: Many thanks for your notes of Friday and Saturday and the earlier note about Condliffe's approval of the Mitchell proofs.

I am not surprised that the Washington proposal smelled bad to you, but I thought I ought to let you know about it in case you had caught the prevailing yearning to be in the Nation's Capital. Personally, I should much prefer you here. Thus far Luce apparently has not been able to persuade the Government to give Bob Barnett passage to China on a bomber, so the whole business is still in suspense. Please don't feel bound to leave exactly on the 14th. I only suggested it because it was the end of the week. If you want to stay a week longer, please do so.

I wrote last week to Albany for a certificate of ownership for my car and hope the GMAC will send it to me soon. I am sorry to be giving you so much trouble over the car. I enclose a check for $40 to cover part of the expenses you have been incurring, e. g., for Doreen's excess baggage and license plates. I am awfully grateful for all you did to help Doreen and hope the cleaning-up job has not been too awful. The laundry box arrived safely. We seem to have brought a few of Miss Stewart's things and have apparently left our electric kitchen clock behind, but I will write Miss Stewart about this when I return her things.

The first part of the Brock manuscript looks pretty good, and Hilda thinks the printer will be able to read the manuscript quite well. Farquhar was on a considerable bender in New York. Whether it was because of this or not I don't know, but Hilda was finally able to make a pretty remunerative deal with him on the Burma book which is now being reprinted by Haddon. We are actually going to get 10-percent royalties on it. I hope Sammy won't repudiate the agreement when he sobers up.

The Shepherd book and the second volume of the handbook should be out this week and Bradley next week. We have added a new chapter on strategy to the Formosa book and that should be out in about two more weeks. Elisabeth is greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Department for our pamphlets, the latest being for 20,000 copies of a very brief elementary affair called "Know Your Enemy Japan," by Tony Jenkinson. We are expecting them to order 50,000 copies of your pamphlet.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the next letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated July 24, 1940, addressed to Chen Han-seng, care of the American Express Co., Hong Kong. He is addressed as "Dear Geoffrey," and I read a section of the letter, as follows:

> In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an invaluable friend.

That is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. By that he means the international secretariat of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 194" and is as follows:)

NEW YORK, N. Y., *July 24, 1940.*

CHEN HAN-SENG, ESQ.,
Care of American Express Co., Hong Kong.

DEAR GEOFFREY: Yesterday was certainly a red-letter day in the office, for I received two letters from you both dated the 8th of July. It is very exciting to be in direct communication with you again, for we have all missed you greatly and no one has missed you more than I.

What you have said about Pacific affairs is most timely. I have sent copies of your Pacific Affairs letter to Owen, Lockwood, Field, Porter, Holland, and others. I know that they will all enjoy it as much as I have.

I wish you would write me frankly your private estimate of the Far Eastern Survey. I assume that you get it regularly. Do you have time to read it? Is it of use (*a*) to you, (*b*) to any Chinese of your acquaintance in China or Hong Kong, (*c*) to any foreigners of your acquaintance in China or Hong Kong?

What is your reaction to Amerasia as at present operating? Does it fill the need of a monthly, or do you still feel that Pacific Affairs should become a monthly in competition with Amerasia?

I am glad that you have sent Bill Holland direct a copy of your other letter of July 8 reporting on your program of work. I am sure he will be glad to have this letter and will doubtless be writing you as to several questions in due course. I know he will be as excited as I am to be in direct communication with you again.

The next month is likely to be fateful for both Hong Kong and England. We hope that no damage will come to you and Susie or to Elsie or to Wellington and all of the members of his family.

We feel important here in the midst of the enormous, but undirected, latent power of the United States. The administration is preparing to be strong in a military way in 2 or 3 years, but is doing little to use its moral and material strength now when it is needed.

In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an invaluable friend.

Linebarger has written most enthusiastically of the help you gave him when he was in Hong Kong.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated January 18, 1937, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Dr. James T. Shotwell. It comes from Frederick V. Field. I read:

DEAR DR. SHOTWELL: One of the secretaries of the British group at the Yosemite Conference was Sir Anthony Jenkinson, who has just been in my office and asked if I would be so good as to put him in touch with you. He is a young Englishman who, like a good many others, at first gives a good many people the impression of being superficial but who on longer acquaintance turns out to be exceedingly thoughtful, talented, and indeed quite brilliant. Three or four years ago he wrote a book called America Came My Way, which I am told had phenomenal sales in England.

Since the Yosemite Conference, Jenkinson has been traveling in Canada, gathering information for a book on that country. He has heard about the large study of the Canadian-American relations which you have organized, and is very anxious to know more about it. It is for this reason that he would welcome an opportunity to have a talk with you. I therefore told him that I would write you this note so that you would know who he was if he called for an appointment.

I hope you will forgive my taking this liberty on your time, but I think you will find that Jenkinson is well worth while.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have Mr. Field's letter of January 18, 1937, introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 195" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 195

JANUARY 18, 1937.

Dr. JAMES T. SHOTWELL,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. SHOTWELL: One of the secretaries of the British group at the Yosemite Conference was Sir Anthony Jenkinson, who has just been in my office and asked if I would be so good as to put him in touch with you. He is a young Englishman who, like a good many others, at first gives a good many people the impression of being superficial but who on longer acquaintance turns out to be exceedingly thoughtful, talented, and indeed quite brilliant. Three or four years ago he wrote a book called America Came My Way, which I am told had phenomenal sales in England.

Since the Yosemite Conference Jenkinson has been traveling in Canada gathering information for a book on that country. He has heard about the large study of Canadian-American relations which you have organized, and is very anxious to know more about it. It is for this reason that he would welcome an opportunity to have a talk with you. I therefore told him that I would write you this note so that you would know who he was if he called for an appointment.

I hope you will forgive my taking this liberty on your time, but I think you will find that Jenkinson is well worth while.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a list of writings, articles, by Israel Epstein, writing for the Allied Labor News and appearing in the Daily Worker.

I would like to incorporate that list into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be incorporated in the record?

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 196" and is as follows:)

ISRAEL EPSTEIN—ARTICLES FOR ALLIED LABOR NEWS

Daily Worker, July 29, 1946.
Daily Worker, January 30, 1948.
Daily Worker, August 26, 1948, page 8.
Daily Worker, August 27, 1948, page 8.
Daily Worker, December 1, 1948.
Daily Worker, August 18, 1949, page 6.
Daily Worker, August 19, 1949, page 6.
Daily Worker, September 5, 1949, page 6.
Daily Worker, August 16, 1950, page 6.
Daily Worker, September 11, 1950, page 6.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. William Mandel, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I have met him both at the headquarters of the Communist Party and also up at the offices of Soviet Russia Today, or, yes, Soviet Russia Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him to be a Communist of long standing, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he is a well-versed Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have anything to show Mr. Mandel's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. William Mandel, listed as a research associate of the American Russian Institute, IPR—no relative of mine—was the author of a paper on the Soviet Far East and Central Asia which was presented at the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Mount Tremblant, Canada, in December 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, when you said "member of the American Council," do you mean the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. He is listed as a research associate of the American Russian Institute which is one of the organizations listed by the Attorney General and in the foreword to his study, had the following note:

This study, constituting part 2 of a larger work on the Soviets in the Far East, is to be published later by the IPR and is submitted by the international secretariat——

Mr. MORRIS. Of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Of the IPR.

as a document of the eighth conference of the IPR to be held in December 1942. The author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion in his study that later appeared as a book entitled, "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia," which is listed as follows: "By William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute, IPR, inquiry series, issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, the Dial Press, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1944.

Now, I have made some excerpts from the book which are worthy of note, and I read from the foreword:

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern carried the major share of this responsibility.

Now, I have an excerpt from the book——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel's book?

Mr. MANDEL. William Mandel's book. The author's preface might be worthy of note and I read:

The Soviet Union has stated its desire for continued neutrality vis-à-vis Japan. It feels that this neutrality is necessary in order finally to defeat Hitler and thus deprive Japan of the partner without which it cannot hope for victory. Its single-handed aid to China from the beginning of the Japanese attack in 1937, helped to prevent Japan from winning the Pacific war during China's 4 years of otherwise lonely struggle before Pearl Harbor. That neutrality means not only that Soviet forces in the Far East need not be replenished and supplied in active campaign, but that American lend-lease aid can continue to reach the Soviet Union without loss by submarine attack or aerial bombardment.

* * * For the most complete prewar data available, the reader is referred to Land of the Soviets, by Nicholas Mikhailov, a Soviet work available in English, and Soviet Asia, by R. A. Davies and Andrew Steiger.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce those excerpts into the record.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 197" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 197

THE SOVIET FAR EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

(By William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute IPR inquiry series issued under the auspices of the international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. The Dial Press, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1944)

FOREWORD

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

* * * * * * *

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute.

* * * * * * *

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

* * * * * * *

The purpose of this inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East with a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area.

* * * * * * *

(Pp. vii, viii, ix)

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary-General.

NEW YORK, *May 15, 1943.*

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

* * * * * * *

The Soviet Union has stated its desire for continued neutrality vis-à-vis Japan. It feels that this neutrality is necessary in order finally to defeat Hitler and thus deprive Japan of the partner without which it cannot hope for victory. Its single-handed aid to China from the beginning of the Japanese attack in 1937, helped to prevent Japan from winning the Pacific war during China's 4 years of otherwise lonely struggle before Pearl Harbor. That neutrality means not only that Soviet forces in the Far East need not be replenished and supplied in active campaign, but that American lend-lease aid can continue to reach the Soviet Union without loss by submarine attack or aerial bombardment.

* * * For the most complete prewar data available, the reader is referred to Land of the Soviets, by Nicholas Mikhailov, a Soviet work available in English, and Soviet Asia, by R. A. Davies and Andrew Steiger.

* * * Industrial enterprises have been evacuated to, and erected in central Asia in such numbers during the course of the war as to have completely changed the basis of its economy. Refugees have been resettled en masse. They include not only Slavs, but large numbers of Jews, as well as persons from the Baltic states. As a result of the Soviet policy of safeguarding not only cultural institutions, but the creative individuals who are the bearers of culture, these evacuees include a large proportion of scientists, artists, writers, the personnel of the motion-picture industry, and the like.

* * * * * * *

(Pp. xii, xiv, xv)

WILLIAM MANDEL.

NEW YORK, *September 1943.*

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, two previous witnesses have identified Michael Greenberg as a member of the Communist Party. Did you know that Michael Greenberg is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz. I knew him from official communications to be a member of the Communist Party, yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have already shown Mr. Greenberg is connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, but I think we have one inquiry by Senator Ferguson which has not been answered.

Mr. Mandel. Senator Ferguson asked about the naturalization of Michael Greenberg. Our files show that Michael Greenberg was naturalized in the United States District Court of Washington, D. C., June 6, 1944, certificate No. 6370908.

Senator Smith. Where was he from?

Mr. Mandel. England.

Mr. Morris. May the record so show?

Mr. Budenz, do you know Andrew Roth to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, from official communications. My impression is that I met Andrew Roth but I am not sure. He was very active, particularly during the Amerasia difficulties in sending suggestions to the Communist leaders.

Mr. Morris. Do you know his book, Dilemma in Japan?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. This book, Dilemma in Japan, was submitted to the Politburo for reading before it was published.

Mr. Morris. You know that from your own knowledge?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir; I saw at least what purported to be a copy of it. It was to be given to several people and I didn't read it.

Mr. Morris. Who published Dilemma in Japan?

Mr. Budenz. I think it is Little, Brown & Co.

Mr. Morris. It so states in that article?

Mr. Budenz. That was my remembrance.

Mr. Morris. Could you comment any further on Dilemma in Japan as used by the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. Budenz. Well, this particular photostat that has been given me, which is the Daily Worker of September 12, 1945—the date is obscure, but it's 1945—page 8, Seeds of New Pearl Harbor still in Japan, Writer Warns, by Samuel Sillen, was a leading article in order to focus attention on Japan, which the Communist leaders were on orders to advance everywhere they could. In this book, Lieutenant Roth attacks very sharply Under Secretary of State Grew, or rather former Under Secretary of State Grew, because Grew had resigned while this book was in the course of being prepared or published rather.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like this photostat, if it is authenticated by Mr. Mandel, to be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of the Daily Worker of September 12, 1945, page 8, which was reproduced at my direction.

Senator Smith. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 198" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 198

[From the Daily Worker, New York, September 12, 1945, p. 8]

SEEDS OF NEW PEARL HARBOR STILL IN JAPAN, WRITER WARNS

(By Samuel Sillen)

A new Pearl Harbor will threaten America unless sweeping changes are quickly effected in Japan's political and economic structure. The imperialist rulers of Japan have a carefully planned come-back strategy which calls for retention of their power within the country and for creating disunity among the victor nations. If United States policy is not directed toward smashing this strategy at the outset, the blood of American boys will again redden the Pacific. This urgent warning is the theme of Dilemma in Japan, a book completed after VJ-day and published this morning by Little, Brown & Co.

Andrew Roth, the author, is one of the group of the Far East experts, who earned the displeasure of former Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, leading advocate of friendship with the Emperor both before and after Pearl Harbor. He is at present under indictment for allegedly making use of State Department documents marked "Confidential."

But there is nothing confidential in this book. The public record of tragically wrong-headed policy speaks for itself. And a review of that record—which prominently includes Mr. Grew's published diary, Ten Years in Japan—casts a disturbing light on the events of the past few days in Southern Korea, China, and Japan itself.

Mr. Roth rips away the unreal distinction between the moderates and extremists among Japan's rulers. The moderate elements—Emperor, navy, businessmen—on whom the State Department experts relied for peace, joined hands enthusiastically with the most rabid militarists in the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

And today again, Roth warns, the group in Japan that will try most eagerly to please us will be our greatest danger.

"These self-proclaimed angels of peace," he writes, "will be the front men for the Zaibatsu, which is Japanese for plutocracy or moneyed groups."

In view of General MacArthur's announcement that he does not intend to interfere with Japan's internal economy, Roth's analysis of Japan's Big Four financial combines—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda—assumes vital significance. Emphasizing that they boast a concentration of financial power unparalleled anywhere else in the world, Roth notes that "the relative position of the Mitsui or Mitsubishi concerns in the life of Japan is so important that beside them the role played by organizations like du Pont and Standard Oil seems small."

"During most of the modern period," he writes, "Japan's giant trusts have been important and willing partners of the militarists in the acquisition of new territories for exploitation, with quarrels restricted to the question of methods, division of spoils, and supreme power over the domestic economy."

A surrender that would leave these elements in power would fall far short of victory.

Like these imperialists, the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal, Roth believes. Hirohito, a wealthy landowner, is also a substantial member of the Zaibatsu, an integral part of the economic oligarchy. The occupying forces should encourage literature critical of the Emperor institution. The opponents of the throne, who favor popular sovereignty against imperial sovereignty, should be strengthened, he declares.

These antiimperialist elements in Japan are described historically in one of the most important sections of Roth's valuable book. Japanese censorship has kept the world in virtual ignorance of popular resistance movements within the country, so that the average American thinks of Japan as one undifferentiated mass.

But the severity of Japanese reaction reflects, as in Germany, the imperialists' need to stamp out or siphon off the discontent of the people organized in trade-unions and democratic political movements.

Roth recalls that in the Diet elections of 1928, for example, the laborites won 8 seats with 438,000 votes, and the Communist-influenced Workers and Peasants Party won 2 seats with 188,000 votes.

STRUGGLE AGAINST WAR

The Japanese Communists have consistently fought against Japan's imperialist war even under the most savage repression.

"On July 8, 1937, the day after the beginning of the China Incident, the Communists issued a statement denouncing Japan's attack as an 'unjust robbers' war which every Japanese should oppose."

Roth cites dramatic evidence of labor resistance, under Communist leadership, even after Pearl Harbor.

The problem, says Roth, is to convert Japan's democratic minority into a majority. Working with the labor movement which has persisted, even if in rudimentary form, during the war is indispensable for achieving a peaceful and democratic Japan.

But Roth understands clearly that American monopolists, who certainly don't like to encourage labor at home, will be most reluctant to promote labor organization in Japan.

Under the slogan of working with the forces of "order" and "stability," American reactionaries will resist essential modification of the class structure in Japan. That way lies another Pearl Harbor for America.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I notice that we are introducing quite a few people, mentioning quite a few people, as Communists connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Was there ever any comment made in official Communist Party circles that you know of that indicated the degree of concentration by Communist writers and Communist members?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; there were a number of discussions within the Politburo that while they were pleased with the success that IPR was making in its contacts and in the infiltration and its influence in governmental agencies and in agencies of public opinion, they constantly criticized the Institute of Pacific Relations comrades for not spreading out more—that is, they felt that the institute was too much a concentration point for Communists; that control could be maintained without such a galaxy of Communists in it. These problems were presented to the Communist Party from time to time. This discussion, therefore, went on for several years, to my knowledge, and the constant criticism by the Communist leaders was that those within the Institute of Pacific Relations were too much concentrated in regard to Communist personnel.

Mr. MORRIS. Then they had too many Communists for their purpose?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right, they didn't need so many.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have anything else that would associate Andrew Roth with the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We find a list of books and articles by Andrew Roth, for example, French Interest and Policies in the Far East, coauthored by Andrew Roth. IPR Inquiry Series, 1941. I have here four articles, three articles by Roth and one a review of his book, Dilemma in Japan, taken from Pacific Affairs. Then there are three articles by Roth or about his book in the Far Eastern Survey.

I offer that for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that compilation be introduced into the record and made a part of it with the next consecutive number?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 199" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 199

ANDREW ROTH

IPR BOOKS

French Interests and Policies in the Far East by Roger Levy, Guy Lacam, Andrew Roth. IPR Inquiry Series, 1941. (IPR Books, New and Forthcoming Publications on the Far East and Pacific Area—IPR (p. 11)).

ARTICLES IN PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Japan Strikes South, 371–372 (Review 1941, volume XIV.
Review of Blood on the Rising Sun by Douglas G. Haring, 235–236, 1944, volume XVII.
Review of Our Japanese Foe, by Ian Morrison; My Life With the Enemy, by Phyllis Argall; Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan, by Willis Lamott, 351–352, 1944, volume XVII.
Dilemma in Japan (review) 114, volume XIX, 1946.

ARTICLES IN FAR EASTERN SURVEY

War Leads to Sharp Rise in Soviet-United States Trade, October 1940.
Cotton for the Soviets, January 2, 1941.
Dilemma in Japan, Little Brown. Reviewed by Richard Watts, October 10, 1945.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a press release from the Federated Press, Eastern Bureau, 30 Irving Place, New York City, sheet 2, February 19, 1941. The article is by Andrew Roth and at the top it says:

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the author?

Mr. MANDEL. Andrew Roth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, could you tell us what the Federated Press was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. As chairman of publications, Dick Sellers reported to me. He was in charge and afterward so was Mark Stone or Finestone, the brother of I. N. Stone, who reported to me. He was its business manager or manager and the Federated Press was completely controlled by the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comments to make on the fact that Andrew Roth's book was released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by the Federated Press?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I must say that if someone who was a non-Communist in the American Council was responsible for that, he was very naive. Undoubtedly, it was due to Communist influence.

Mr. MORRIS. That was an article, not a book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. The article was released in that fashion because the Federated Press by that time had a well-established reputation.

Mr. MORRIS. It was openly Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. It wasn't openly Communist but everybody in New York knew.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 200" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 200

LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

(By Andrew Roth, author of numerous articles on India and Indochina)

Indochina has emerged from the obscurity of small items buried in the back pages of the American press into the full glare of front-page headlines.

Friction between the unofficial Anglo-American alliance and Japan has reached a new intensity. The fate of Indochina is a key to future developments in the area.

Indochina's importance is largely strategic. From northern Indochina, where Japan obtained bases last September, Japanese planes have taken off to bombard the Burma road and southwest China. In addition, Japan has taken steps to obtain Camrahh Bay, Indochina's partly developed naval base on the southeast coast, and Saigon, a smaller but completed base further south.

Possession of these bases would not only help Japan to outflank the defenses of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, but also bring Japan within 750 miles of Singapore—the British Gilbraltar of the East.

It was largely because Indochinese officials refused to give up these bases that Japan encouraged Thailand to attack Indochina, paving the way for Japan to step in as mediator. The peace conference between Thailand and Indochina is now going on in Tokyo and Japan is expected to emerge as the winner, with the possibility of obtaining bases in Thailand—as well as Indochina—as payment for its mediation.

Most discussions of Indochina have ignored the fact that the nation's 23,000,000 inhabitants have aspirations of their own. As in China and India, the great mass of the Indochinese people are peasants, impoverished by a tremendous burden of high taxes and low returns. In Indochina the economy was largely owned by the Bank of Indochina, whose political representative in France was Paul Baudoin, foreign minister in the Reynaud cabinet and also in the early days of the Petain regime.

The development of the nationalist movement in China in the twenties and the effect of the depression of 1929 promoted agrarian discontent in Indochina. This culminated in an uprising of Indochinese troops at Yenbay in 1930, with sporadic fighting continuing into 1931. The rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed, but the basic cause—peasant poverty—was not removed.

That unrest still exists in Indochina was demonstrated by a series of riots and demonstrations which occurred throughout the state in November and December of 1940. In the Saigon area alone more than 1,000 rebels were arrested, 200 of them being lined up and shot at the Saigon airport. The desire on the part of the Indochinese to be free from the bondage of either the Japanese or the French may yet play an important part in southeast Asia, the Balkans of the Far East.

Mr. BUDENZ. The American Federation of Labor had publicly labeled it as Communist. I don't know the exact year, but it was on several occasions.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated September 26, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Owen Lattimore from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR OWEN: Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important monograph for the IPR inquiry is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese postwar history, and also on Indian history.

He will be delighted to contribute to Pacific Affairs if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for Pacific Affairs

during the next 2 years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Peffer.

Mr. MORRIS. Who signed that?

Mr. MANDEL. It is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 201" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 201

SUNSET FARM,
LEE, MASS., *September 26, 1940.*

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important monograph for the IPR inquiry, is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese postwar history and also on Indian history.

He will be delighted to contribute to Pacific Affairs if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for Pacific Affairs during the next 2 years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Peffer.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a recommendation of Andrew Roth showing other members of the IPR, and Jessup is Philip Jessup.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated May 23, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. Holland from Mr. Carter, and reads:

Andrew Roth called to see me today as a result of your letter to him of May 10.

Then the last paragraph says:

Roth knows Barnett and Rosinger and is working under Peffer and Peake at Columbia. He hopes to stay in the Far East field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 202" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 202

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
May 23, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
Giannini Foundation, University of California,
Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: Andrew Roth called to see me today as a result of your letter to him of May 10. He is prepared to undertake to add the chapter that you have proposed; namely, to bring the history of French political and economic relations with China and Japan up to the present time, since Levy's report does not go beyond 1938. I have assumed that you want Roth to cover anything he can in 1939 and thus far in 1940.

I have told Roth that I hope he can finish his work by July 1 or July 15 at the latest.

As he is headed for a scholastic career, he is wondering what he can get out of this task professionally; that is, what sort of a byline he could get. I said I supposed there were three possibilities: First, that he might be mentioned in

the foreword as having contributed a chapter; second, that he might be mentioned on the title page as having contributed a chapter; and, third, that the book might be published as being written by Levy and Roth. I, myself, think that the latter would probably not be possible, but I told him that this was a matter that you would have to decide, and that I could not commit myself at all. Will you let me know what your reaction is?

Roth knows Barnett and Rosinger and is working under Peffer and Peake at Columbia. He hopes to stay in the Far East field.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter from the Department of the Navy, dated July 19, 1951, addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran, and reads:

In reply to your letter of 27 June 1951, the following data concerning Andrew Roth are submitted for your information.

Roth was enrolled in the United States Navy Japanese-language course at Harvard University as a contract employee on 28 August 1941. This contract was canceled on 5 December 1941 when Roth enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve. On 8 September 1942, he was commissioned as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve and was ordered to duty with the Department of the Navy.

On 6 June 1945, Roth was arrested by Federal authorities in Washington, D. C. The complaint charged Roth with conspiracy to violate subsections C and D of section 31 title 50, United States Code (revised under act of 25 June 1948, 80th Cong., as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 793), and the violation of section 88, title 18, United States Code (revised as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 371. On that date he was presented with an order signed by the Secretary of the Navy which relieved him immediately from active duty in the Navy.

At the August 1945 criminal term of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Roth was indicted with others for removing United States Government records from the files of various Government agencies and converting them to their own use. The charges against Roth were subsequently nol-prossed by the United States attorney.

Roth's resignation from the United States Naval Reserve was accepted on 3 April 1947. Since that time, he has had no connection with the United States Navy.

That is signed by Dan A. Kimball, Under Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter from Under Secretary of the Navy be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 203" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 203

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, July 19, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In reply to your letter of 27 June 1951, the following data concerning Andrew Roth are submitted for your information.

Roth was enrolled in the United States Navy Japanese-language course at Harvard University as a contract employee on 28 August 1941. This contract was cancelled on 5 December 1941 when Roth enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve. On 8 September 1942 he was commissioned as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve and was ordered to duty with the Department of the Navy.

On 6 June 1945 Roth was arrested by Federal authorities in Washington, D. C. The complaint charged Roth with conspiracy to violate subsections C and D of section 31, title 50, United States Code (revised under act of 25 June 1948, 80th Cong., as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 793), and the violation of section 88, title 18, United States Code (revised as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 371). On that date he was presented with an order signed by the Secretary of the Navy which relieved him immediately from active duty in the Navy.

At the August 1945 criminal term of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Roth was indicted with others for removing United States Government records from the files of various Government agencies and converting them to their own use. The charges against Roth were subsequently nol-prossed by the United States attorney.

Roth's resignation from the United States Naval Reserve was accepted on 3 April 1947. Since that time, he has had no connection with the United States Navy.

Sincerely yours,

DAN A. KIMBALL,
Under Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, United States Navy, dated August 4, 1942, from Edward C. Carter, coming from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I read as follows:

DEAR SIR: I have known Andrew Roth for several years and have found him to be exceedingly intelligent and of pleasing personality and good judgment. I have the highest regard for his scholarship and knowledge of the problems of southeast Asia. He completed the research assignment made to him by the Institute of Pacific Relations promptly and in an entirely satisfactory manner. He is a tireless worker.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

This letter of August 4 is a response to a request from Andrew Roth dated July 28, 1942, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, and found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

DEAR MR. CARTER: It was very good seeing you, if only for a moment. Knowing how busy you are, I thought that my contact with you would be restricted to hearing you over the radio as I have several times, including the Shostakovitch premiere.

I am nearing the end of the course, and I am increasingly happy that I chose to follow your advice. I feel that I can perform a useful function not only now but in the postwar world, should I be around to observe it.

As you may have guessed, this letter has an ulterior purpose. I am about to be elevated from the lowly rank of yeoman, second class, to lieutenant, junior grade, and I require letters of recommendation. I am sorry that the effectiveness of your past recommendations compels me to ask you for another.

Therefore, I should heartily appreciate it if you were to find time to write another. It should be addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, but be sent to me and bear no reference to the particular division to which I expect to be assigned. Unfortunately for your secretary, the rules require the letter to be in triplicate. I should appreciate receiving a letter as soon as possible, because our applications are being held up until our letters of recommendation are in.

I put the whole letter into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Two letters?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those two letters authenticated by Mr. Mandel as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. First is the letter signed by Andrew Roth to Mr. Carter, and the second letter does not appear to be signed.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not introduce that into the record; did you?

Mr. MANDEL. No.

Senator SMITH. You are not introducing this last one?

Mr. MORRIS. Since this is part of the file, we will introduce it exactly for what it was, as a letter attached to the rest of the file.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. We will just introduce it as being an appendage to the other letter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 204" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 204

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
August 4, 1942.

CHIEF OF BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
United States Navy.

DEAR SIR: I have known Andrew Roth for several years and have found him to be exceedingly intelligent and of pleasing personality and good judgment. I have the highest regard for his scholarship and knowledge of the problems of southeast Asia. He completed the research assignment made to him by the Institute of Pacific Relations promptly and in an entirely satisfactory manner. He is a tireless worker.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

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36 GRAY STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,
July 28, 1942.

DEAR MR. CARTER: It was very good seeing you, if only for a moment. Knowing how busy you are, I thought that my contact with you would be restricted to hearing you over the radio as I have several times, including the Shostakovitch premier.

I am nearing the end of the course, and I am increasingly happy that I chose to follow your advice. I feel that I can perform a useful function not only now but in the postwar world, should I be around to observe it.

As you may have guessed, this letter has an ulterior purpose. I am about to be elevated from the lowly rank of yeoman, second class, to lieutenant, junior grade, and I require letters of recommendation. I am sorry that the effectiveness of your past recommendations compels me to ask you for another.

Therefore, I should heartily appreciate it if you were to find time to write another. It should be addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, but be sent to me and bear no reference to the particular division to which I expect to be assigned. Unfortunately for your secretary, the rules require the letter be in triplicate. I should appreciate receiving the letters as soon as possible, because our applications are being held up until our letters of recommendation are in.

In the little spare time at my disposal, I have been doing some thinking and reading on postwar Japan, and have come near formulating a study on that subject. However, since I do not know whether my next tour of duty will admit of any research or writing, I cannot plan very definitively at this time. Perhaps I can discuss this with you on my next leave.

Sincerely yours,

ANDREW ROTH.

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129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
August 4, 1942.

MR. ANDREW ROTH,
36 Gray Street, Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR ANDY: Thank you for your letter of July 28. I was glad to hear of your impending promotion.

Enclosed is the letter of recommendation in triplicate with an extra copy for your own files.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you ever see Corliss Lamont at Communist meetings?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not at Communist meetings, but I have met him as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You have?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; and I have discussed with him on several occasions Communist affairs, with him as a Communist. You must understand that while Mr. Lamont, to my knowledge, was a Communist—that is, to my personal knowledge and in meeting with him as such and conferring with him, that he sometimes had little difficulties with the Communist viewpoint with some criticism, and on several occasions and specifically on one that I can remember, I was called upon by the Communist leaders to gice him information that would straighten him out. This was with regard to James Burnham, now of New York, who had evidently made quite an impression on Lamont and whom I assured him was a Trotzkyite. Lamont was sending reports to Comrade Hathaway of his activities in the organization which he then represented, formerly known as Friends of Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Len DeCaux was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very well, and personally. I have met him on many occasions at secret Communist meetings and specifically in July 1940, though I could recall many more, but July 1940 at the national convention of the CIO in St. Louis. I recall that because just at that time I had become president of the corporation controlling the Daily Worker, and we commented on that. He attended secret meetings with Roy Hudson and other representatives of the Communist Party in regard to the role he was to play in the national office of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your knowledge that he is a highly placed Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew him as a Communist before he was in the CIO.

By the way, he was released from the CIO because he could not agree with Mr. Murray. I think that should be clear.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have already introduced into the record the fact that Len DeCaux was a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations as well as the man who was in charge of public relations for the Triennial Conference at Mont Tremblant in 1942.

Mr. Chairman, we have, I would estimate, about another half hour's work.

Senator SMITH. We will recess now until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2:30 of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH. The hearing will come to order. We will proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a book review of William Mandel's book, IPR Inquiry Series, New York, the Dial Press, 1944. This appeared in the Saturday Review of Literature, March 11, 1944, page 18. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the authenticity of that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a review appearing in the Saturday Evening Review of Literature for March 11, 1944, page 18.

Here we have a book review appearing in the New York Times of February 28, 1944, on page 16, also an opinion of the Library of Congress in a letter to Senator Pat McCarran, August 23, 1941, signed by Ernest S. Griffith, Director, Legislative Reference Service.

Mr. Morris. I would like to introduce those into the record and have them marked the next consecutive exhibits.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 205 and 206," and are as follows:)

Exhibit No. 205

[From the Saturday Review of Literature, March 11, 1944, p. 18]

The Rump of the Bear

(The Soviet Far East and Central Asia. By William Mandel. IPR Inquiry Series. New York: The Dial Press. 1944. 151 pp. $2.50—reviewed by Emil Lengyel)

The Soviet Far East is a huge land bordering on Japanese-held territory and the Pacific. William Mandel compares it to Canada and Alaska from Lake Superior to the Pacific Ocean, insofar as its size is concerned. The Yakut Republic itself—part of this territory—is as large as all of European Russia.

Most important region of the Soviet Far East is the Maritime Territory with the city Vladivostok on its southern tip. On the map this region looks like a finger thrust into the intestines of the Japanese Empire. It was bases there that attracted the envious attention of the world-traveling United States Senators, some of whom told the country that the Soviets should place those bases at our disposal.

This is a rich country and would be much richer if more manpower could be had. Oil is one of its most important raw materials in this mechanized world, and large quantities of it are found in the northern part of Sakhalin Island. The author points out that the Soviet Far East produces more than its quota of coal, pig iron, and cement. It exports large quantities of lumber, fish, and fur to the western Soviet Union. The known natural riches of the Far East sound like a list of chemical elements. In agricultural products it became self-sufficient a couple of years ago, and is now expected to provide an exportable surplus.

This vast territory is sparsely settled, most of its white inhabitants living along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and great river banks. The January average temperature of the city of Khabarovsk is 6 below zero Fahrenheit, while that of Verkhoyansk, in Yakutia, it is 58° Fahrenheit.

The Soviet Far East is the land of one railway, the author shows. That railway is the Trans-Siberian. The much talked about and little known Baikal-Amur Railway has not yet been completed, in the author's view. Rivers afford water transportation when open to navigation, which may not be more than an average of 6 months a year.

Obviously, Mr. Mandel made an effort to assemble most of the material available about the natural resources, economic and cultural development, population and land settlement, transportation and administrative divisions of the Soviet Far East. The available material is not rich, which may be judged by the fact that all of it is presented on not more than 85 pages, several of which are reprints of Soviet daily press articles, containing so few points of interest that they could have easily been presented in condensed form. Just the same, the material provided by Mr. Mandel will prove useful to Far East specialists.

Readers may be interested in Mr. Mandel's treatment of the importance of this region for the outcome of the war with Japan. The Soviets are at peace with the Mikado's empire, since, as the author points out, first they had to stave off Hitler's aggression. The Far East was turned into an arsenal for the forces fighting in the west.

In his interpretation of the Soviet policy in the Far East, Mr. Mandel does not seem to be consistent. He writes in his preface that the Far East's economic expansion was "determined by Soviet estimates of potentialities inherent in the position of the U. S. S. R. as members of opposition coalitions." On the other hand, he writes in a later chapter: "Any attempt to read into the regionalization of the economy of the Far East now proceeding, any special design arising out of the proximity of Japanese forces would not be borne out by the facts." Not only is this statement not consistent with the previous one, but it is hard to accept it in view of the constant state of preparedness characterizing life in Far East border districts.

Some 30 pages of this small book are devoted to a discussion of the vast Soviet Central Asiatic Republics. The author himself warns the reader that these chapters contain no rounded treatment. The title page of his book reads: "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia," while the other titles, on the jacket and elsewhere, simply call it: "The Soviet Far East." Had more material been available about the more eastern region, it would have been preferable for the author not to roam so far afield.

EXHIBIT No. 206

[From the New York Times, February 28, 1944, p. 16 of Book Review Section]

THE NEW SIBERIA

(The Soviet Far East, by William Mandel, 158 pp. New York: The Dial Press. $2.50—by William Henry Chamberlin)

The Soviet Far East, the vast, bleak, sparsely settled territory between Lake Baikal and the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, is one of the least known regions of the world, so far as the developments of the last 10 or 15 years are concerned. Ever since the Japanese seizure of Manchuria the Soviet Government has regarded this area as an advanced military zone and has not extended facilities for detailed study to any foreign observer.

In the event that the Soviet Union should enter the war against Japan this region would assume great importance in American eyes. So it is useful to have a compilation of the information that is available from Soviet sources about economic development and settlement and population policies. This is what Mr. Mandel has prepared in this little book, which is one of the inquiry series prepared by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

While the author concentrates his attention on the Soviet Far East, he includes some material bearing on Soviet Central Asia. Here, as he shows, population has increased and cultural life has been enriched because of the mass evacuation of refugees from the Ukraine and other sections when the Germans invaded European Russia in 1941 and 1942.

Climatically and physically the Soviet Far East, as the author suggests, is similar in some respects to western and northwestern Canada. There are rich fisheries and timber and mining regions in the southern part of the area; but the greater part is an unbroken Arctic waste. Of the 4½ million people who lived east and north of Lake Baikal in 1939 nearly 4 million lived along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway or in the valley, 50 to 100 miles wide, between the Amur River and the mountains. In Canada one finds this same ribbonlike distribution of population—though Canada, of course, has developed a much thicker network of railways and an infinitely higher standard of living than eastern Siberia.

The Soviet Government has tried to push the development of the Far East, both for military and for economic reasons. Discharged Red army soldiers have been settled in military farm colonies along the Manchurian border. Ardent young Communists have helped to establish a pioneer town, Komsomolsk, on the lower reaches of the Amur River and have helped to develop oil resources in the northern, Russian half of the island of Sakhalin.

While the reader will find interesting information on a little-known part of the world in this book, two limitations must be noted. The first (for which the author is, of course, not responsible) is the absence of first-hand foreign information. The second is Mr. Mandel's extremely uncritical attitude toward the Soviet regime. The czarist practice of sending political prisoners to Siberia is frequently mentioned; but there are no references to the much larger employment of forced labor under the Soviets. And it is highly questionable, to put it mildly, whether Soviet Uzbekistan is, in Mr. Mandel's words, "a State comparable to Sweden in economy, culture, and national statehood."

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D. C., August 23, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: We have examined the book, The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, by William Mandel (New York, international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944). The book mentions the czarist practice of

sending exiles to the Far East but does not contain any references to Soviet slave-labor camps. It cites several cases of increases in the population of various localities due to new arrivals which are described in such terms as "the influx of settlers," "mass settlement of refugees," "influx of evacuees," etc.

The two reviews of Mr. Mandel's book which accompany this letter comment upon its merit. The underlined portions contain the more critical remarks.

The map which we are sending contains the best information that we have on the location of forced-labor camps in the Soviet Union. We have roughly sketched in on this map those regions comprising the Soviet Far East and Central Asia as delineated in the book by Mr. Mandel.

Sincerely yours,

ERNEST S. GRIFFITH,
Director, Legislative Reference Service.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Agnes Smedley was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew it by official information. I also knew Miss Smedley many years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no doubt at all about her being a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, no; not then or afterward.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Mildred Price is associated with the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I know that from personal knowledge, having met Miss Price several times at the Daily Worker. When I say several, not too many. Secondly, from her attendance on occasion at large national committee meetings of the Communist Party. At the Daily Worker on two occasions that I can recall she brought Chinese Communists up there, three of them at one time and two at another. This was during the forties, and I just don't recall the years.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the names of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not. I was introduced to them for an extensive period of time but my memory doesn't recall, at least at the present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I show you a copy of a letter, our exhibit No. 99, which was introduced at the open hearing of August 14, 1951. This is a copy of a letter headed "The China Aid Council." I ask you if you know that organization to be a Communist-controlled organization? You will notice that Mildred Price was the executive secretary.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This was not just a Communist-controlled organization. It was a Communist-created organization, and was, therefore, also Communist-controlled. It is what is popularly known as a Communist front.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. We had that testimony from Miss Elizabeth Bentley last week, Mr. Budenz. Did you know Miss Bentley when you were in the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I was introduced to her by Jacob Golos in order that she could take down stenographically my reports intended for the Soviet secret police. He couldn't do it constantly. He had been my intermediary for years, but after he pleaded guilty to being a foreign agent without having registered, he felt that he shouldn't too frequently be in contact with me, and he asked that I meet Miss

Bentley. That was for a very short period of time, because my activities in that respect ended about 6 months after I first met Miss Bentley. I used to have to call her up under the name of Helen Johns.

Mr. MORRIS. J-o-h-n-s?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you testify to the fact that she held a high place in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. She held a very important key position in the espionage apparatus of the Communist in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it from my experience. I know it from Mr. Golos' introduction. He was chairman of the control commission of the Communist Party, and from my own personal knowledge and of course mountains of evidence in other proceedings, was also for many years engaged in espionage activities in the United States, using the World Tourist Agency, of which he was the head, for that purpose. He was the center of false passports and things of that character.

He introduced Miss Bentley to me as one who already had won her place in confidential work for the party and that I could rely upon her completely, tell her anything and that that was equivalent to telling it to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, Miss Bentley testified that Mr. Golos was one of the three-man control commission. You have now said he was chairman of the control commission. Can you tell us who the other members were at any time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I had many contacts with Mr. Golos as chairman of the control commission, since occasionally in addition to the secret work I was doing with the Soviet secret police, I also had the political responsibility of keeping watch over the staff of the Daily Worker and of other people in the publication field when the control commission demanded it. Consequently, I had many relationships with Mr. Golos. The control commission at that time was really more than three, but three were publicly named. That is publicly named within the party. They weren't publicly named so much outside for the general public, but I mean within the party. These three were generally named in the national committee with power to enlarge their numbers, which permitted them to make the control commission as large as they wished. But the three that were constantly named during that period were Jacob Golos, Charles or Clarence Derba (he used both names, and he spelled his name either D-i-r-b-a or D-e-r-b-a), and Dora Lipshitz.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, the name of John S. Service came up this morning. Will you tell us what you knew about John S. Service's connection with the Communist Party to be?

Mr. BUDENZ. John S. Service, at least from the official information I received, had many contacts with the party. He was designated as Lattimore's pupil in some of these discussions. He was designated as a man to be relied upon in the State Department, particularly in 1945 in the campaign against General Hurley. I have never heard him mentioned specifically as a Communist, but his relationship was certainly very close from all the official reports I received. You must understand that during a considerable period of time I was in the Communist Party, Mr. Service was in China and would not come so much directly to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. But did you know that the Communist Party relied on John Stewart Service to put over their policy in the Far East?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most specifically. That is to say, it came out very sharply in 1945 and the names of John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent were repeatedly mentioned as being dependable in the campaign within the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I interrupt at this point? You have a couple of times used the word "designated," Mr. Budenz. Did you make it clear for the record, do you think, by whom Mr. Service was designated?

Mr. BUDENZ. As what?

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned that he was designated in several capacities. He was designated. Do you recall?

Mr. BUDENZ. Designated as Lattimore's pupil?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUDENZ. I have heard that expression several times. My memory is that it came from Earl Browder and Jack Stachel.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't use that word in the sense of an official appointment, but rather as a characterization of him?

Mr. MORRIS. That was a characterization in the discussion in the Politburo.

Mr. SOURWINE. By more than one member of the Politburo?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. At more than one time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the same true with regard to our subsequent use of the word designation? You spoke of Mr. Lattimore in another capacity?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Service, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Service.

Mr. BUDENZ. Being designated as a man who was reliable.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. This was used repeatedly. Perhaps if I search my memory further I could think of who these people were who mentioned him specifically, but it was within the Politburo.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply wanted to clear up your connotation of the word designated, in your use of it, because otherwise the testimony might not be clear on that point.

Mr. BUDENZ. I see.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, yesterday you testified that at the time Owen Lattimore was with Henry Wallace in the Far East, you were approached by Jack Stachel and were told of his particular role, that is of Lattimore's particular role in the Communist organization. Was there any mention by Stachel at that time of John Carter Vincent's position in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. So the testimony you gave this morning with respect to John Carter Vincent could be amplified by stating that Jack Stachel told you that on that particular occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; that is very definite.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you hear on other occasions of John Carter Vincent?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; particularly during the period of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Nym Wales, who was the wife of Edgar Snow?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew her officially. During the past year I recall that I met her once, but I don't recall the occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't recall the occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. No.

Mr. MORRIS. But did you know that she was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly. She was, so far as official reports went, a Communist before Snow was.

Mr. MORRIS. Before Edgar Snow was?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Is he the Snow who wrote the book, People on Our Side?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator SMITH. He also wrote Red Star Over China.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Can you recall anything about that book that would be of interest to this committee, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. He amended one edition of the book, as I recall, at the request of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, his first edition differed from the second edition?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I don't recall all the circumstances. By checking up on the book, I could, because I was in the midst of the discussions.

Mr. MORRIS. You participated in the discussion that led to the request on the part of the Communist Party to him to amend the first edition of his book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Either in those discussions or in subsequent discussions in which the matter was reviewed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters in the files on Edgar Snow or Mrs. Edgar Snow that would be of interest to us now?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated May 27, 1940, addressed to Edgar Snow, Esquire, Worchester House, Baguio, the Philippines, from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR SNOW: Your very important letter of May 3 with several enclosures has just arrived. I am sharing your letter and that of Mrs. Chuan with the following:

Miss Ida Pruitt
Harry Price
John Hersey
Frederick V. Field
Robert W. Barnett

I want to read another section of the letter.

Your Saturday Evening Post article was invaluable. All of your writing helps. Your discriminating analyses of China and the Far East today are of the greatest value to the future both of China and the United States.

That is signed "Edward C. Carter."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH: So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 207" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 207

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, May 27, 1940.

EDGAR SNOW, Esq.,
Worcester House, Baguio, the Philippines.

DEAR SNOW: Your very important letter of May 3 with several enclosures has just arrived. I am sharing your letter and that of Mrs. Chuan with the following:

Miss Ida Pruitt
Harry Price
John Hersey
Frederick V. Field
Robert W. Barnett

You give me credit for more work on behalf of the industrial cooperatives than I am entitled to. I am afraid I have a one-track mind. For the past year I have felt that the only person in the world who could put the CIC on the map in the United States is yourself. I shall continue to do all in my limited power to get you to come to the United States for this purpose. You and you alone have the ability to raise money for progressive China from out and out capitalists. You are the only American who knows the CIC from the inside who at the same time has Nation-wide prestige in the United States.

I have done a little on behalf of Miss Pruitt, but it is discouraging, for she has been the personification of devotion to the cause, but does not inspire quite that confidence which is so desperately essential if things are to be done in a big way in this country.

Your Saturday Evening Post article was invaluable. All of your writing helps. Your discriminating analyses of China and the Far East today are of the greatest value to the future both of China and the United States.

Hoping that you can come to us soon, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a review of Red Star Over China, by Edgar Snow. The review is by Edward C. Carter, published in Pacific Affairs for March 1938, pages 110 to 113. Mr. Carter:

The leaders of Red China represent to the peasants Franciscan simplicity, personal bravery, an abounding humor, and a strategic ingenuity of magical dimensions; but they represent, as well, a way of life that has convinced the masses that there at least are political leaders who will not betray them into the hands of the landlords and money lenders.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that excerpt from Edward C. Carter's book review of Edgar Snow's book be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 208" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 208

RED STAR OVER CHINA, BY EDGAR SNOW, REVIEWED BY EDWARD C. CARTER

The leaders of Red China represent to the peasants Franciscan simplicity, personal bravery, an abounding humor, and a strategic ingenuity of magical dimensions; but they represent, as well, a way of life that has convinced the masses that there at last are political leaders who will not betray them into the hands of the landlords and money lenders (Pacific Affairs, March 1938, pp. 110–113).

Mr. MANDEL. Quoting again from Pacific Affairs of September 1937, page 247, in regard to Edgar Snow. He is called:

Edgar Snow—the first foreign newspaper correspondent to be given free access to the Red districts of China, spent 4 months in Soviet territory in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. May that extract made by Mr. Mandel be incorporated into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 209" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 209

Edgar Snow—the first foreign newspaper correspondent to be given free access to the Red districts of China, spent 4 months in Soviet territory in 1936 (Pacific Affairs, September 1937, p. 247).

Mr. MANDEL. And finally a quotation from Pacific Affairs of September 1939 reviewing Inside Red China, by Nym Wales. The review is by Olga Lang:

It is curious how much of their good reputation abroad the Chinese Communists owe to one man—Edgar Snow * * * Nym Wales, as the wife of Edgar Snow, will inevitably have her work compared with that of her famous husband. * * * She is not impartial. She thoroughly approves of the Chinese Communists. * * * So she writes with gay excitement and eager partisanship.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that extract be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 210" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 210

INSIDE RED CHINA, BY NYM WALES

It is curious how much of their good reputation abroad the Chinese Communists owe to one man—Edgar Snow * * * Nym Wales, as the wife of Edgar Snow, will inevitably have her work compared with that of her famous husband. * * * She is not impartial. She thoroughly approves of the Chinese Communists. * * * So she writes with gay excitement and eager partisanship. (By O. L. (Olga Lang), Pacific Affairs, September 1939.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mary Van Kleeck?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have known her personally as a Communist and known her for many years.

Mr. MORRIS. You met her under circumstances indicating that she was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. She is Mary Van Kleeck, of the Russell Sage Foundation; that is, she is an officer of the foundation. That doesn't indict the whole foundation.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here on the stationery of the International Industrial Relations Institute, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated January 22, 1937, addressed to Frederick V. Field, signed Mary Van Kleeck.

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am very glad to become a member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I shall of course have a special interest in bringing about appropriate cooperation between the International Industrial Relations Institute and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter be introduced into the record to be marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of that is to show Miss Van Kleeck's membership in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 211" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 211

INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE,
New York, January 22, 1937.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am very glad to become a member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I shall, of course, have a special interest in bringing about appropriate cooperation between the International Industrial Relations Institute and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter dated May 2, 1933, to Mary Van Kleeck, signed Joseph Barnes:

DEAR MISS VAN KLEECK: I am very glad, indeed, to sign the statement concerning the Soviet Union which you have sent me. I am afraid that I am very optimistic as to the possibility of such good advice being followed by Mr. Roosevelt, but I am glad that you are at least seeing to it that the idea is expressed to him as forcefully as possible.

I am enclosing my small contribution to the expenses of the project.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter be introduced into the record to be marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 212" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 212

MAY 2, 1933.

MISS MARY VAN KLEECK,
Russell Sage Foundation,
130 East Twenty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS VAN KLEECK: I am very glad, indeed, to sign the statement concerning the Soviet Union which you have sent me. I am afraid that I am very optimistic as to the possibility of such good advice being followed by Mr. Roosevelt, but I am glad that you are at least seeing to it that the idea is expressed to him as forcefully as possible.

I am enclosing my small contribution to the expenses of the project.

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH BARNES.

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letter head marked "130 East Twenty-second Street, New York City," which is the Russell Sage Foundation where Miss Van Kleeck was employed, dated March 23, 1938, to Mr. E. C. Carter, signed Mary Van Kleeck.

DEAR MR. CARTER: You said that you wanted the manuscript of my radio speech of last night on the Moscow trials. I do not think that it can be of any real service to you, but I send it nevertheless by way of expressing my best wishes for your address tomorrow night. I hear that you are also giving a broadcast. I am sure that you will render fine service this week in the interest of a better understanding of this complicated situation.

With cordial greetings, I am,

Sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 213" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 213

130 EAST TWENTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, March 23, 1938.

MR. E. C. CARTER,
The Inquiry,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: You said that you wanted the manuscript of my radio speech of last night on the Moscow trials. I do not think that it can be of any real service to you, but I send it nevertheless by way of expressing my best wishes for your address tomorrow night. I hear that you are also giving a broadcast. I am sure that you will render fine service this week in the interest of a better understanding of this complicated situation.

With cordial greetings, I am
Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

Mr. MANDEL. On the same letterhead, dated April 20, 1938, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter from Mary Van Kleeck.

The full text of Newton D. Baker's statement on the Moscow trials at the Fourth Annual Women's Congress in Chicago in March 1937 was published in the April 1937 issue of Soviet Russia Today.

I am mindful of your request for a list of liberals present at the dinner with Mr. Troyanovsky and I shall send it as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, let me tell you how much I enjoyed your review of Red Star Over China. It seems to me a very fair appraisal and criticism of the book.

Have you seen the Labor Monthly published in London? The current issue is called the Crisis Issue and the comment on the Moscow trials is very interesting. Incidentally it supports essentially my remarks in the broadcast, a fact which I am glad to report to Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 214" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 214

NEW YORK CITY, *April 20, 1938.*

MR. E. C. CARTER,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The full text of Newton D. Baker's statement on the Moscow trials at the Fourth Annual Women's Congress in Chicago in March 1937 was published in the April 1937 issue of Soviet Russia Today.

I am mindful of your request for a list of liberals present at the dinner with Mr. Troyanovsky and I shall send it as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, let me tell you how much I enjoyed your review of Red Star Over China. It seems to me a very fair appraisal and criticism of the book.

Have you seen the labor monthly published in London? The current issue is called the Crisis Issue and the comment on the Moscow trials is very interesting. Incidentally, it supports essentially my remarks in the broadcast—a fact which I am glad to report to Pacific Affairs.

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

Mr. MANDEL. On the same letterhead dated May 26, 1938, to E. C. Carter from Mary Van Kleeck:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Will you be one of a group of 10 or 12 of different related professions to cooperate in giving a dinner on Tuesday, May 31, to Deputy Commissioner Vassily Bourgman, who is now in this country arranging plans

for the Soviet pavilion at the New York World's Fair? Mr. Bourgman sails Wednesday morning, so the plans are being hurriedly made. We shall also invite as our guest Mr. Constantin Oumansky, counsel of the Soviet Embassy.

* * * * * * *

The dinner will be at 7 o'clock, at the Cosmopolitan Club, 122 East Sixty-sixth Street * * *.

I have read excerpts from the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 215" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 215

NEW YORK CITY, *May 26, 1938.*

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Will you be one of a group of 10 or 12 of different related professions to cooperate in giving a dinner on Tuesday, May 31, to Deputy Commissioner Vassily Bourgman, who is now in this country arranging plans for the Soviet pavilion at the New York World's Fair? Mr. Bourgman sails Wednesday morning, so the plans are being hurriedly made. We shall also invite as our guest Mr. Constantin Oumansky, counsel of the Soviet Embassy.

The suggestion for this plan has been made to me by Mr. Simon Breines, who is associated in the architectural planning of the building. He and I believe it is not too early to begin to plan the exhibits. Suggestions from American friends on this point will be welcome. The building will undoubtedly be a central point of interest for visitors, as was the Soviet building at the Paris exposition.

The dinner will be at 7 o'clock at the Cosmopolitan Club, 122 East Sixty-sixth Street, where a room will be reserved in my name as a member. The cost for each member of the group of hosts will be $2.75.

As the time is short, I should greatly appreciate your telephoning or telegraphing your response tomorrow, Friday, to me at my office at the above address (GRamercy 5-7060).

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Vilhjalmur Stefansson?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know from official reports that he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was a member of many Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is where much of the discussion around him centers. He was a member of so many, I think the word countless can be used without exaggeration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if the interruption may be permitted, the name that your are discussing is not a common one, but would it be improper to identify the particular Stefansson to whom you now refer?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Vilhjalmur, V-i-l-h-j-a-l-m-u-r, Stefansson, S-t-e-f-a-n-s-s-o-n.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the first name m-u-r or m-a-l?

Mr. MANDEL. m-u-r.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. He has been very much interested in the Arctic. In fact, his latest book on geopolitics, on the Arctic, with contributions by Mr. Lattimore to it, shows, although in a very involved and I should say semischolarly way, that Soviet Russia is impregnable because it has control of the heartland.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he an explorer, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he has been an explorer.

Mr. MORRIS. You are testifying that party discussions indicated that he was on many Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very many indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that in addition to being a member of many Communist-front organizations, he was also a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. It was on the occasion of the Communist fronts precisely that I recall his association being officially brought to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you put into the record letters that will indicate Mr. Stefansson's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here dated January 26, 1939, addressed to Philip J. Jaffe from Edward C. Carter, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR JAFFE: This is to express the hope that you and Mrs. Jaffe will attend the opening of the Arctic exhibition at the Natural History Museum on Sunday, February 5, at 3:30 p. m., under the auspices of the American Russian Institute. Stefansson, the great explorer, and Oumansky will both speak . The exhibit is on a very important subject. I will send you the details later.

Oumansky, by the way, is the Russian Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 216" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 216

NEW YORK, N. Y., *January 26, 1939.*

PHILIP J. JAFFE, Esq.,
49 East Ninth Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR JAFFE: This is to express the hope that you and Mrs. Jaffe will attend the opening of an Arctic exhibition at the Natural History Museum on Sunday, February 5, at 3:30 p. m., under the auspices of the American Russian Institute. Stefansson, the great explorer, and Oumansky will both speak. The exhibit is on a very important subject. I will send you the details later.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a memo dated April 2, 1940, presumably Frederick V. Field, from ECC, presumably E. C. Carter. This memo says:

I have just had word from Cripps—

that would be the British Foreign Minister—

that he will accept my invitation for dinner on the evening of Thursday the 11th.

Then there is listed those who are invited, presumably the IPR, and among those is the name of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, along with Frederick V. Field and others.

Senator SMITH. Will you state where that came from?

Mr. MANDEL. From the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 217" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 217

APRIL 2, 1940.

F. V. F. from E. C. C.

I have just had word from Cripps that he will accept my invitation for dinner on the evening of Thursday the 11th. This takes the place of the dinner to which I had invited you for this week. I hope you can come.

Before I send out all of the invitations that I would like to, I wish you would glance through the list below and let me know what four or five people had better be eliminated and what four or five people are important to add from the American Council point of view.

The private room at the Gladstone only holds 20 at the outside and I had rather thought that a meeting of more than 20 might inhibit complete candor on Cripps' part.

Frederick V. Field, yes.
P. E. Corbett, yes.
W. W. Lockwood, yes.
W. B. Osgood Field, Jr.
Philip C. Jessup, no.
Joe Barnes, no.
Harriet Moore, yes.
Mrs. Eliot Pratt, no.
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, yes.
Rose Rubin
Rose Somerville
Robert S. Lynd
Wm. W. Lancaster
Ruth Carter, yes.
Jack Shepherd, yes.
Kathleen Barnes, yes.
Robert W. Barnett, yes.
Ch'ao-ting Chi, yes.
Andrew Grajdanzev.
Edward C. Carter, yes.
Sir Stafford Cripps, yes.
Rossinger, yes.
T. A. Bisson, no.
Harry Price, yes.
Luther Tucker, no.
Sam Harper, no.
John Hazard.
W. D. C.
Faymonville, yes.
Geoffrey Wilson, ?.
McCann, no.
Muhle, yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally I have a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 14, 1938, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, from Edward C. Carter, as follows:

DEAR FRED: I have accepted Corliss Lamont's invitation to speak at the Hippodrome on the evening of Thursday, March 24, on the Soviet Union and present world events. The other speakers will be Troyanovsky and Stefansson. I am wondering whether there are any points that you would like me to make on behalf of the American Council. The meeting is held under the auspices of an ad hoc committee of which Corliss Lamont is chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that an ad hoc committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I believe it would be an ad hoc committee of the American Council of the Soviet-American Friendship.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 218" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 218

NEW YORK CITY, *March 14, 1938.*

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: I have accepted Corliss Lamont's invitation to speak at the Hippodrome on the evening of Thursday, March 24, on the Soviet Union and present world events. The other speakers will be Troyanovsky and Stefannson. I am wondering whether there are any points that you would like me to make on behalf of the American Council. The meeting is held under the auspices of an ad hoc committee of which Corliss Lamont is chairman.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew her very well indeed for a number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Always she was during my membership in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a long and trusted member of the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very much so; engaged in the confidential work for the Communist International. That was told me by J. Peters and many others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters indicating that Anna Louise Strong was associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Her book is reviewed entitled "This Soviet World," in Pacific Affairs for December 1936, on pages 611 to 612. She has an article in Pacific Affairs for June 1941, on page 11, entitled "Eighth Route Regions in North China," and also an article "Dawn Out of China," appearing in Pacific Affairs for September 1949, on page 454.

Here is also an excerpt from Pacific Affairs for December 1936 appearing on pages 611 and 612 in the review of this Soviet World by Anna Louise Strong, the review being written by Owen Lattimore, and I quote:

Her book as a whole is good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of regimentation.

Mr. MORRIS. May those references of Mr. Mandel be incorporated?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 219" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 219

ANNA LOUISE STRONG

Strong, Anna Louise, *This Soviet World*, 611–612, reviewed.
Source: Volume 9, December 1936, Pacific Affairs (p. 14).
Strong, Anna Louise, *Eighth Route Regions in North China*, 154–165, article.
Source: Volume 14, June 1941, Pacific Affairs (p. 11).
Strong, A. L., *Dawn Out of China*, 302.
Source: Pacific Affairs, Volume 22, September 1949 (p. 454).

This Soviet World, by ANNA LOUISE STRONG

(Reviewed by Owen Lattimore, p. 611–612)

"Her book as a whole is a good confrontation of the Soviet idea of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of regimentation" (Pacific Affairs, December 1936).

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Ella Winter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know of her by official declarations.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know she is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, repeatedly and over my entire period of membership. She was a very active Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Is her membership in the Communist Party rather an open fact?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it must be open. Many people know it.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say repeatedly, Mr. Budenz, you don't mean she was repeatedly a member. You mean that you repeatedly heard references to her within the party.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right, and official references. She was quite active and reports of hers or reference to her work on the west coast

and in other places came to the attention of the national headquarters repeatedly.

Mr. MANDEL. Ella Winter is the author of a book review appearing in Pacific Affairs in 1934, pages 473 and 474. In the March 1935 issue of Pacific Affairs, on page 87, we find the following quote in reference to Ella Winter, and her article What Next in California. And it says she speaks of the hard-hitting and hard-fighting minority that heads the workers' fight in California, the Communist Party."

Then we have some letters here. One is a letter dated February 8, 1935, to Mrs. Ella Winter from Catherine Porter, who has been previously identified as a member of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR MRS. WINTER: Thank you for your note of the 24th. Your editorial was received in ample time after all. The March issue of the magazine is now in the press and you will receive your copy shortly.

Enclosed is our check for $25 in payment for the editorial.

I am somewhat embarrassed about the book review, especially since I see that Joe Barnes was quite indefinite about the matter in his letter of September 24. As a matter of fact, we do not pay for book reviews, and this has always been made quite clear to our reviewers * * *.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this and the reviews mentioned by Mr. Mandel by Ella Winter be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 220 and 221" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 220

ELLA WINTER

Articles in Pacific Affairs: Book review, 1934, pages 473–474.

Ella Winter, What Next in California, speaks of "the hard-fighting and hard-hitting minority that heads the workers' fight in California, the Communist Party" (Pacific Affairs, p. 87, March 1935).

EXHIBIT No. 221

FEBRUARY 8, 1935.

MRS. ELLA WINTER,
Box 855, Carmel, Calif.

DEAR MRS. WINTER: Thank you for your note of the 24th. Your editorial was received im ample time after all. The March issue of the magazine is now in the press and you will receive your copy shortly.

Enclosed is our check for $25 in payment for the editorial.

I am somewhat embarrassed about the book review, especially since I see that Joe Barnes was quite indefinite about the matter in his letter of September 24. As a matter of fact, we do not pay for book reviews, and this has always been made quite clear to our reviewers. Ordinarily editorials are not paid for, either, but Mr. Lattimore made a special exception in your case as he was very anxious to have that subject treated by you. I am more than sorry that the question of fee for book reviews was not made clear to you earlier.

Sincerely yours,

CATHERINE PORTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally, I have a list of articles by Ella Winter which appeared in the Daily Worker with the dates and pages which I would like to introduce into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. And the purpose of this is to show that Ella Winter contributed to the Daily Worker and was at the same time a contributor to the Institute of Pacific Relations? Is that the purpose of that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you accept that into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 122" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 222

ELLA WINTER

Following is a list of contributions to the Communist publication, the Daily Worker, and the Worker, by Ella Winter:

Worker. (See Daily Worker for December 24, 1931, p. 3).
Daily Worker. (See issue of June 25, 1934, p. 5, col. 1).
Worker. (See Daily Worker December 21, 1935, p. 3).
Daily Worker. (See issue of March 6, 1936, p. 5).
Daily Worker. (See issue of August 12, 1936, p. 1).
Daily Worker. (See issue of February 12, 1937, p. 2).
Daily Worker. (See issue of October 3, 1947, p. 6).
Daily Worker. (See issue of October 2, 1947, p. 6).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that when we had a discussion this morning about certain policies represented by the Daily Worker as being the policy of the United States State Department issued by Sumner Welles, we have nothing at this time to show what the State Department's official attitude was at that time. I suggest that we set in motion an inquiry to find out exactly what the situation was so that the record will be complete in that respect.

Senator SMITH. So that the record may carry a copy of whatever statement was made by Mr. Welles at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. In other words, I think the record should have the official statement.

Senator SMITH. I think so, too. We will follow up on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. In expanding on that, in fairness to the State Department might it be well if the committee requested the Department for a brief statement of what the Department's official policy was at that particular time and permit it to be entered in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the order be made for entry of it at the point where reference was made in this morning's hearing?

Senator SMITH. Yes. It would seem to me that the statement which was printed in the Daily Worker, if that is called to the attention of the State Department, they can say whether or not they issued such a statement as was attributed to Mr. Welles. They either know or don't know whether or not such a statement was issued.

Mr. MORRIS. Our record has nothing to show that.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce at this time for the following probative value, letters from the Institute of Pacific Relations files by and concerning Sumner Welles. The purpose of introducing these letters is to show the degree of influence that the Institute of Pacific Relations was able to bear on Sumner Welles, who was for a period of time Under Secretary of State. I wonder if you will receive those letters into evidence at this time.

Senator SMITH. Not for the purpose——

Mr. MORRIS. For that particular purpose.

Senator SMITH. For that particular purpose only, yes.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated October 21, 1946, addressed to R. M. Fowler, 2279 Sun Life Building, Montreal, Canada, from Edward C. Carter.

Senator SMITH. Where was that found?

Mr. MANDEL. Found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I quote an excerpt from that letter:

DEAR BOB: I understand that Mr. Sumner Welles is going to be your guest shortly. As you know, he is really a very great man and a terrible loss to the United States State Department. You ought to know that consistently throughout the last 10 years whenever I have gone to Welles with any request on behalf of the IPR he has instantaneously and generously responded—cutting red tape—speeding the IPR on its way. He has always professed sincere admiration for the work of the IPR. A few months ago, he accepted the chairmanship of the Washington group of the IPR on the understanding that he couldn't give time actively for several months so we have not been making demands on him, but expect his help at a few key points during the coming winter. I am sure he will have greatly enjoyed his Canadian trip.

That is an excerpt from the letter.

Senator SMITH. What is the date?

Mr. MORRIS. October 21, 1946. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record for the stipulated purpose that I have indicated?

Senator SMITH. Yes. Have you identified the file?

Mr. MORRIS. It is significant, Senator. We want it introduced for that particular purpose, which I think is apparent from reading that letter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 223" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 223

OCTOBER 21, 1946.

R. M. FOWLER, ESQ.,
2279 Sun Life Building,
Montreal, Canada.

DEAR BOB: I understand that Mr. Sumner Welles is going to be your guest shortly. As you know, he is really a very great man and a terrible loss to the United States State Department. You ought to know that consistently throughout the last 10 years whenever I have gone to Welles with any request on behalf of the IPR he has instantaneously and generously responded—cutting red tape—speeding the IPR on its way. He has always professed sincere admiration for the work of the IPR. A few months ago, he accepted the chairmanship of the Washington group of the IPR on the understanding that he couldn't give time actively for several months so we have not been making demands on him, but expect his help at a few key points during the coming winter. I am sure he will have greatly enjoyed his Canadian trip.

If it is natural for you to do so, I hope you will draw him out a bit on the IPR—remind him that the Canadian Institute is the very honored Canadian section of the IPR and, if you get any reaction that would be helpful to me, be sure and let me know.

It would do no harm for you to place on one of your tables in your library at home in Montreal a copy of Windows on the Pacific and IPR books which I am mailing to you today under separate cover.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter date June 6, 1946 to The Honorable Sumner Welles, from Edward C. Carter, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I read the last paragraph:

I was greatly intrigued by Walter Lippman's suggestion this morning that you become the American delegate on the Security Council. This would certainly be a great step forward and I hope Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes will so regard

it. Although my own personal preference would be to see you serving as Secretary of State, perhaps this is too ideal a solution to hope for.

Mr. MORRIS. May we introduce that into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 224" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 224

JUNE 6, 1946.

The Honorable SUMNER WELLES,
P. O. Box 4669, Anacostia Station, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. WELLES: Would there be any chance of your having half an hour free when Mr. Pollard and I could call on you at Oxon Hill any time on Tuesday, June 11, before 3:30 p. m.? I have to be at Mr. Justice Black's at 4 p. m. and then go to the station to take the train for Detroit. But any time in the morning or early afternoon would be convenient for me and Mr. Pollard.

Lord Inverchapel has asked that the dinner which we wanted to give him be postponed until the autumn. He apparently wants to get acclimatized before doing much speaking.

As example is frequently more persuasive than exhortation, I am wondering whether you would be able to consider making a contribution of $1,500 this year to the over-all national budget of the American Council of $250,000. Such a gift would carry great weight with others, both nationally and in the Washington area, and would be of great material aid in our plans for a more adequate service in Washington.

I was greatly intrigued by Walter Lippmann's suggestion this morning that you become the American delegate on the Security Council. This would certainly be a great step forward and I hope Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes will so regard it. Although my own personal preference would be to see you serving as Secretary of State, perhaps this is too ideal a solution to hope for.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated March 15, 1946, addressed to the Honorable Sumner Welles from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MR. WELLES: This is to inquire the approximate date of your return to Washington. A few days after your return I would like to call to see you when you might conveniently spare an hour for an unhurried talk regarding IPR problems and policies. Demands on the IPR are steadily increasing, and we want sound advice as to which of the many calls are more important.

That is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 225" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 225

MARCH 15, 1946.

The Honorable SUMNER WELLES,
250 Via Bellaria, West Palm Beach, Fla.

DEAR MR. WELLES: This is to inquire the approximate date of your return to Washington. A few days after your return I would like to call to see you when you might conveniently spare an hour for an unhurried talk regarding IPR problems and policies. Demands on the IPR are steadily increasing and we want sound advice as to which of the many calls are most important.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter on the stationery of Sumner Welles dated April 22, 1946, to Mr. Carter, and signed by Sumner Welles:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of April 19. Your letter of April 8, of which you have been kind enough to enclose a copy, crossed my most

recent letter to you in the mails. The information you send me with regard to the selection of a vice chairman of the Washington group is of course most agreeable to me. I do not know Mr. Graves personally, but I shall needless to say be delighted to be associated with him.

With kind regards, believe me, sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I introduce that into the record and ask to have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. Where was this found?

Mr. MANDEL. That is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 226" and is as follows:)

OXON HILL MANOR, OXON HILL, MD.,
April 22, 1946.

EDWARD C. CARTER, ESQ.,
Director, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street,
New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of April 19.

Your letter of April 8, of which you have been kind enough to enclose a copy, crossed my most recent letter to you in the mails.

The information you send me with regard to the selection of the vice chairman of the Washington group is, of course, most agreeable to me. I do not know Mr. Graves personally, but I shall, needless to say, be delighted to be associated with him.

With my kind regards, believe me
Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated June 30, 1942, addressed to Mr. Harold Young, Assistant to the Vice President, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C., from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: This is to thank you for your letter of June 11, asking whether I could call to see you next time I visit Washington.

I am planning to be there all day Thursday, July 2, and would appreciate the privilege of talking with you. I am relatively free all day except that I am tied up from 12:30 to 1 with an engagement with Mr. Welles.

Ultimately I am anxious to talk about our proposed IPR conference with Mr. Wallace, but I can do this on some other visit after you and I have had our preliminary talk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

By way of explanation, Mr. Young was Mr. Wallace's secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. Is he referring there to Mr. Henry Wallace?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 227," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 227

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, June 30, 1942.

MR. HAROLD YOUNG,
Assistant to the Vice President,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: This is to thank you for your letter of June 11, asking whether I could call to see you next time I visit Washington.

I am planning to be there all day Thursday, July 2, and would appreciate the privilege of talking with you. I am relatively free all day except that I am tied up from 12:30 to 1 with an engagement with Mr. Welles.

Ultimately I am anxious to talk about our proposed IPR conference with Mr. Wallace, but I can do this on some other visit after you and I have had our preliminary talk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated June 29, 1938, addressed to Frederick V. Field. The letter is unsigned. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR FRED: Upon advancing into Carter's office, your June 23 letter in hand, I was confronted with his air-mail letter to you of June 27, enclosing the letter to John Thompson. There is nothing more to add at the moment, though I know that Carter is keeping in touch with Welles and Duggan in the State Department and with any other contacts and suggestions that he can find, and would welcome any specific suggestions you might make as to how the Pacific Council could explore the possibilities more thoroughly. At present it appears that any contacts we might develop in that part of the world would have to be through individuals, as unofficial organizations in the field of foreign affairs seem to be nonexistent. Could you let us know exactly what the members of the American Council to which you refer would propose doing?

The rest is a comment I don't think it necessary to read.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spoke of that as a letter. As a matter of fact, it is a carbon copy of a letter; is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The original letter may well have been signed and, for all you know, was signed; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. So it would appear.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether the original letter was sent?

Mr. MANDEL. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I note that the address on the letter is 129 East Fifty-second Street, which is the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Will you receive that into evidence, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 228" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 228

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, June 29, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: Upon advancing into Carter's office, your June 23 letter in hand, I was confronted with his air-mail letter to you of June 27 enclosing the letter to John Thompson. There is nothing more to add at the moment, though I know that Carter is keeping in touch with Welles and Duggan in the State Department and with any other contacts and suggestions that he can find, and would welcome any specific suggestions you might make as to how the Pacific Council could explore the possibilities more thoroughly. At present it appears that any contacts we might develop in that part of the world would have to be through individuals, as unofficial organizations in the field of foreign affairs seem to be nonexistent. Could you let us know exactly what the members of the American Council to which you refer would propose doing?

With reference to your query about Saionji you will have already seen in Carter's long letter to Alsberg that he had invited Saionji to come over. We have now heard that it will be impossible for him to come, but that Takayanagi

will be coming in July to discuss the various problems raised for the Japanese Council by the secretariat inquiry. Carter will be writing you in detail about this point, so I won't elaborate.

I delivered the Bretholtz family, bag and baggage, at 24 West Fifty-fifth this morning. They are extremely pleased to be there, and we are planning to drink a suitable toast to the absentee landlord on Friday evening.

My regards to Edith and Lila and Gail.

As ever,

———— ————.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter, a carbon of a letter, from the Department of State, dated March 17, 1942. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and signed by Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary, and attached is a small slip which says: "Please note that this is not to be published," with the initials "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter. This is the letter:

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: I have your letter of March 11, 1942, in which you inquire with regard to the practical value of the publications and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The receipt is also acknowledged of similar letters addressed to other officers of the Department.

The importance of the development of an informed public opinion with regard to problems affecting foreign relations requires no special emphasis. In the development of such a public opinion, a valuable service is rendered by organizations which seek to present in readily accessible form studies by serious scholars of current problems and to stimulate an intelligent discussion of these problems. While for obvious reasons the Department of State has necessarily adopted the practice of refraining from endorsing or sponsoring any particular private organization, I am glad to say that in the opinion of officers of the Department who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of the institute have been of interest and value, and the institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion.

I note and appreciate your statement that you propose not to use this letter publicly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that and mark it as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 229" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 229

Please note that this is not to be published—E. C. C. [Typewritten note attached to letter.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., March 17, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER.
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: I have your letter of March 11, 1942, in which you inquire with regard to the practical value of the publications and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The importance of the development of an informed public opinion with regard to problems affecting foreign relations requires no special emphasis. In the development of such a public opinion, a valuable service is rendered by organizations which seek to present in readily accessible form studies by serious scholars of current problems and to stimulate an intelligent discussion of these problems. While for obvious reasons the Department of State has necessarily adopted the practice of refraining from endorsing or sponsoring any particular private organization, I am glad to say that, in the opinion of officers of the Department who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of the institute have been of interest and

value, and the institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion.

I note and appreciate your statement that you propose not to use this letter publicly.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat of a letter on the stationery of the Department of State, dated July 2, 1940. This photostat was made at my direction from the document in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, signed Sumner Welles, Under Secretary.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Please accept my thanks for your courtesy in sending me, with your letter of June 28, 1940, a first draft of Mr. Lattimore's article "Empire Lies in the East." I have noted with interest the contents of the article and am bringing it to the attention of some of my associates here for their information."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 230" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 230

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 2, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Please accept my thanks for your courtesy in sending me with your letter of June 28, 1940, a first draft of Mr. Lattimore's article, "Empire Lies in the East."

I have noted with interest the contents of the article and am bringing it to the attention of some of my associates here for their information.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES, *Under Secretary.*

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter, a copy of a letter from Harper & Bros., dated July 31, 1946, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. Carter, E. C. Carter:

As I phoned your office today, we are to publish this fall a book by Sumner Welles to be entitled "Where Are We Heading?" which will deal with various aspects of the present international scene.

The book is to contain a few maps, one of which is to be a map of China showing the areas controlled by the National and Communist Governments. When we asked Mr. Welles for further details in this connection, which we could turn over to the professional map men, he replied, "I would suggest that the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, might be the best authority on the second map (that of China) and I have no doubt that Mr. Carter will take a personal interest in giving us all the help needed."

That is an excerpt from the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce this into the record, again for the same limited purpose?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 231" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 231

HARPER & BROS.,
New York, N. Y., July 31, 1946.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: As I phoned your office today, we are to publish this fall a book by Sumner Welles to be entitled "Where Are We Heading?" which will deal with various aspects of the present international scene.

The book is to contain a few maps, one of which is to be a map of China showing the areas controlled by the National and Communist Governments. When we asked Mr. Welles for further details in this connection, which we could turn over to the professional map man, he replied, "I would suggest that the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, might be the best authority on the second map (that of China) and I have no doubt that Mr. Carter will take a personal interest in giving us all the help needed."

Any information which you or your organization can give us will be greatly appreciated. You may think it wise to use shading to indicate not only the known controlled areas, but also disputed areas or regions where the boundaries are now in doubt.

We shall look forward to hearing from you in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

BEULAH HAGEN,
Assistant to Cass Canfield.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter to Miss Beulah Hagen, of Harper Bros., taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 1, 1946, from Edward C. Carter:

DEAR MISS HAGEN: Your letter of July 31 reached me this morning with Mr. Sumner Welles' suggestion that we cooperate in supplying your map maker with data showing the areas of China controlled by the Nationalist and Communist Governments. This is to assure you that we will do our best to give you the expert help Mr. Welles and you desire. It is somewhat of a tricky business because some of the marginal areas are in a constant state of flux.

Those of my colleagues who have the most precise data happen to be away from the office this week, but if you can wait until next week I think we can be of assistance.

Perhaps you will want to send up your map maker with such material as he already has, and then we can tackle the problem together.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 232" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 232

AUGUST 1, 1946.

Miss BEULAH HAGAN,
Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS HAGAN: Your letter of July 31 reached me this morning with Mr. Sumner Welles' suggestion that we cooperate in supplying your map maker with data showing the areas of China controlled by the Nationalist and Communist Governments. This is to assure you that we will do our best to give you the expert help Mr. Welles and you desire. It is somewhat of a tricky business because some of the marginal areas are in a constant state of flux.

Those of my colleagues who have the most precise data happen to be away from the office this week, but if you can wait until next week I think we can be of assistance.

Perhaps you will want to send up your map maker with such material as he already has, and then we can tackle the problem together.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. The next letter that Mr. Mandel is about to read I think will give significance to the last two, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 6, 1946, to Miss Beulah Hagan, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I read the next to the last paragraph.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote this letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is from Edward C. Carter to Miss Beulah Hagan, of Harper Bros.

Whether you will want to adopt our consultant's broader phrase for the Communists by calling the area Communist-Democrats is up to you and Mr. Welles. It has this advantage: that it gives cognizance to the fact that in many areas the sympathizers with the third party—the Democratic League—are working hard to bring about a coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, doesn't that further show something else? Would you read the preceding paragraph, too?

Mr. MANDEL (reading:)

I think you can improve on the designation of the Times map by using the word "Kuomintang" at the top and the bottom in place of "Nationalists."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the idea there was to make the recommendation that the "Nationalists" be changed to "Kuomintang" and the term "Communists" be changed to "Communist-Democrats."

Do you have any comment to make on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have not, except I think it speaks for itself.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 233" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 233

AUGUST 6, 1946.

Miss BEULAH HAGEN,
Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS HAGEN: My third consultant has just brought in this copy of the New York Times map of Sunday, July 28, with a few changes in ink.

He thinks that this is about as nearly accurate as you can get from this distance.

He has located Changchun, which I incorrectly on the phone this morning, thought the Times had put in the Communist area. But this is not the case.

The name "Changchun" at the spot indicated should certainly be included in Mr. Welles' map.

Then it is rather important to add to the map "Kalgan" and to show the cross-country railroad which my consultant has put in in pen.

I think you can improve on the designation of the Times map by using the word "Kuomintang" at the top and the bottom in place of "Nationalists."

Whether you will want to adopt our consultant's broader phrase for the Communists by calling the area Communist-Democrats is up to you and Mr. Welles. It has this advantage: that it gives cognizance to the fact that in many areas the sympathizers with the third party—the Democratic League—are working hard to bring about a coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

If I get any further details I will let you know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Ilona Ralf Sues?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do. I know her personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. She was a member of the Communist Party who, under Communist orders, entered the home of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Entered the home of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. She was a friend or attendant or secretary or something of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, if I remember correctly. At any rate she had very close relationships with Chiang Kai-shek. When I say "entered the home," I don't necessarily mean she lived there, though my impression is that she did.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean she had access to the family circle?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew her to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have met her personally as a member of the Communist Party and I have talked to her at some length about her experiences.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that she wrote Shark Fins and Millet?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you available now——

Mr. MANDEL. Not now.

Mr. MORRIS. May we submit the information on Miss Ilona Ralf Sues later in the record?

Do you know Andrew Steiger?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know him through official words in the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. According to my memory he wrote a number of pro-Communist articles some years ago. I mean for the Daily Worker. That is my remembrance.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz can testify more extensively along the lines that we are pursuing today, but we would like to develop our research a bit to keep pace with that, and we ask that Mr. Budenz, after a few final questions, be permitted to leave but stay under subpena for a short period of time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if you are going to stop at this time asking Mr. Budenz questions about the names of persons, I would like to inquire. Mr. Budenz has now testified on 2 days with respect to a number of names. Do you know how many of the persons who have been established as associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations Mr. Budenz has now identified as Communists?

Mr. MORRIS. My count runs to 43, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Including the last name that was identified today?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were all of those names included in the list that was made a part of the record earlier, of persons who had connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. No; there are some additions. There are some we did not have on the original list of 82.

Mr. SOURWINE. That were brought out by Mr. Budenz yesterday or today for the first time?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine. One other thing, Mr. Budenz. One of the Senators asked me if you would expatiate just a bit on the official Communist policy adopted in official meetings of the Communist Party to bring about the conquest of China. One of the members of the committee asked if you would further develop that.

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course the Communist Party changed its tactics and

also its propaganda in accordance with the instructions from Moscow. If I had known this question was going to be asked, I could have brought you exactly the period by dates, but from my memory I don't want to be too exact. Originally the Communists in China were represented as extreme revolutionists. They were establishing soviets. At the same time, though, China occupied in Communist activities and propaganda a very prominent part always. From the very beginning of my entry into the party China was considered to be a key to world conquest. This is borne out by the constant emphasis of the Communist Party itself in demonstrations and in the publications on that score.

Now, as time went forward, particularly with the Communist Party in the United States, under the people's front policy, developing infiltration, and becoming more powerful in its influence in the country through its various agents, the policy in regard to China likewise was given a new twist, and as we see, the effort was to promote the idea of the Chinese Communists being a democratic force.

This was contrary to the previous propaganda.

After that, there was developed a coalition government, and this began, of course, in 1943, but it takes some time for a line to develop. It came to fruition in 1944 and 1945. And after I left the party, the idea of coalition government was stressed very emphatically as a task put upon the American Communist Party to win the United States to the idea of coalition government in China.

It was pointed out that this was an application of the constant Communist tactic of the united front, whereby you united with those who wished to destroy. This coalition government was to be applied not only in China but in Poland and the eastern European states and was to be popularized in the United States. We were particularly to stress it, though, in regard to China, in order to bring about a Red China, as Earl Browder said in speaking to the national committee as early as the latter part of 1943, and again in 1944. The task given to the American party by Moscow was to so condition American opinion and the American Government as to assure a Red Poland and a Red China at that particular time, this under the banner of coalition government.

Senator WATKINS. How did they react to General Marshall's appointment as Ambassador to succeed Patrick Hurley?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may I say that that point came up this morning.

Mr. Budenz left the Communist Party in 1945, and I think at that time General Marshall had not assumed the position of Secretary of State.

Mr. BUDENZ. General Hurley had not yet resigned?

Senator WATKINS. In other words, the witness does not know how they officially reacted to it.

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not, except from reading the Daily Worker, and I could not inform you on that offhand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz would like to restrict his testimony, and we are asking him to, to only those incidents that took place during the period of his membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. Budenz, will you supplement the testimony you have just given, namely, that the coalition government was the official Communist

Party policy, by going through your personal records and sending to the committee whatever additional documents you can give along those lines?

Mr. BUDENZ. I shall, very gladly.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Sourwine, when you asked the question before about how many people were identified, I want to stress that that number did not include incidental names that turned up in the course of testimony that were not directly related to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One name I had in mind is Louis Dolivet.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant to inquire with regard to names that you had posed to Mr. Budenz for purposes of identification.

Mr. MORRIS. My figure includes only those who were associated directly with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

And Mr. Budenz, will you remain available to this committee, so that we can get these last bits of testimony straightened out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

I would like to put on the record here in that respect, so that it won't be forgotten by me or the committee, that among these documents will be a statement by the Chinese Communist Party to the Communists, that while the Communists were to the outer world advocating coalition government, the Chinese Communists were telling the Communists of the world that they were for coalition government in order to destroy Chiang Kai-shek and impair American imperialism.

Senator SMITH. The hearing will recess now until further call of the chairman as to when the next meeting will be held.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p. m., Thursday, August 23, 1951, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the chairman.)

22848—52—pt. 2——23

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.)

A Page

ABC stabilization fund 481
Acheson, Dean 428, 444, 445, 494, 639
Ackerman, Dr. Phyllis 410, 620, 622
Adams, Samuel 548
Adler, Solomon (Schloma) 420, 434, 493
Administrator of Export Control 390
AFL. (*See* American Federation of Labor.)
Agriculture Department 419, 432, 464, 477, 488, 577
Air Force (United States) 597
Akiyama 369
Al 421
Allen, Edward W 568
Allen, James S 439, 471, 640
Allen, Raymond B 568
Allied Labor News 658, 659, 662
Allied Powers 354, 379, 419, 560, 561, 562, 617, 622
Allied Supreme Command 611, 615
All India National Congress 656
Alling, Paul 445
Alsberg 365, 366, 694
Alson, Joseph 603
Amerasia 439, 474, 518, 555, 569, 572, 609, 618, 619, 625, 653, 661, 665
American and Allied War Relief 445
American-British-Chinese currency stabilization fund 390
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans. (*See* China Aid Council.)
American Committee for International Studies 390
American Communist Party. (*See* Communist Party, United States.)
American Consulate (Harbin) 507, 508
American Consulate (Shanghai) 507
American Council on Education 445
American Council Paper No. 2 572, 573
American Embassy (Chungking) 638
American Embassy (Nanking) 493
American Embassy (Tokyo) 451
American Express Co. (Hong Kong) 660, 661
American Federation of Labor 444, 445, 607, 633, 640, 658, 669
American Fisheries Publications 648
American Friends of the Chinese People 411, 439
American League for Peace and Democracy. (*See* China Aid Council.)
American Legion 377, 399
American Navy 379
American occupation authorities (Japan) 367
American Peace Mobilization 527
American Populist 565
American President Lines 444
American Red Cross 432
American Revolution 544
American-Russian Institute 433, 444, 488, 645, 663, 664, 686
American School (Shanghai) 577
American Society for Russian Relief 539

Page
Americans United ---- 633
Anderson, Sherwood ---- 411
Anglo-German-American cartel system ---- 608
Angus ---- 471, 472
Annals ---- 571, 572
Anti-Hitler Germans ---- 464
AP (*see* Associated Press) ---- 386
A. P. O ---- 395, 396, 426, 427, 652
Argall, Phyllis ---- 668
Army Air Intelligence. (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Army Intelligence (Military Intelligence Division) ---- 353, 354, 357, 359, 388, 391, 392, 393, 394, 400, 416, 417, 481, 572, 573
Army and Navy Club (Washington, D. C.) ---- 586
Arnold, John (*see* Abraham Chapman) ---- 643
Arnold, Julean ---- 576, 577
Asahi Institute of the Far East ---- 362, 363
Asahi Shimbun ---- 367, 370
Asia Magazine ---- 396
Asiaticus ---- 425
Associated Press (AP) ---- 386
Atcheson, George ---- 618
Atherton, J. Ballard ---- 578
Atkinson, Brooks ---- 638
Atkinson, Henry A ---- 409, 410
Atlanta prison ---- 543
Atlantic Charter ---- 613, 633
Atlantic Monthly ---- 544
Atomic Energy Commission ---- 486
Austern, Miss Hilda (Mrs. Bretholz) ---- 414, 418, 471, 476, 641, 642, 660, 663, 664, 695
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin ---- 385, 386
Australian Legation (Washington, D. C.) ---- 440
Axis ---- 495, 597, 598, 600, 607, 638

B

Bachrach, Marian ---- 581
Badoglio ---- 552
Baidukov, George ---- 645
Baikal-Amur Railway ---- 675
Baker, Newton D ---- 684
Balamuth, Louis ---- 485, 486, 487
Ball, W. McMahon ---- 385
Ballantine, Joseph W ---- 568, 618
Bank of Indochina ---- 669
Barlow, Samuel L. M ---- 410
Barnes, Joseph ---- 424, 425, 431, 432, 444, 490, 491, 494, 541, 542, 543, 544, 648, 683, 687, 689
Barnes, Kathleen ---- 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 687
Barnett, Robert W. (Bob) ---- 389, 391, 397, 445, 474, 481, 575, 576, 577, 651, 660, 670, 671, 680, 681, 687
Barrett, Col. David ---- 636, 638
Bassett, Arthur ---- 432
Bates, Searle ---- 432, 444
Batory (steamship) ---- 590, 591
Baudoin, Paul ---- 669
Baumgartner, Dr. Leona ---- 410
Baxter, James P ---- 428, 444
Bean, Louis ---- 432
Beecroft, Eric ---- 445, 483
Belshaw ---- 577
Bentley, Elizabeth (Helen Johns) ---- 403, 447, 452, 652, 660, 677, 678
Benzon, Wilfred ---- 441
Berg, Dorothy ---- 390
Berle, Adolph A ---- 432, 444, 445, 602, 603
Berliner, Taggeblatt ---- 371

Page
Bethune, Dr. Norman 560
Bett, Mr 386
Beukema, Col. Herman 432, 444
Bibby, Dr. Henry L 409, 410
Biddle, Attorney General 409
Big Four 611
Biggerstaff, Knight 568
Big Three 606, 607
Binder, Carroll 432, 444
Biographical Register (Department of State) 495, 497, 576, 577
Bissell, General 495
Bisson, T. A 386, 387, 389, 393, 474, 477, 479, 529, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 620, 622, 657, 658, 687
Bittelman, Alexander 555, 556
Blankfort, Michael 582
Bloch, Kurt 390, 474, 475
Blos, Dr. Peter 410
Board of Economic Warfare 384, 385, 393, 419, 432, 440, 443, 444
Bolsheviks 476, 647
Bolton, Frances 440
Bonnet, George 603
Boone Daniel 547, 549
Borg, Dorothy 474
Borton, Hugh 471, 472, 568
Bourgman, Vassily 684, 685
Bradley, Lyman R 409, 410, 659, 660
Brando de Boukelitz 501
Brandt 473
Braunich, Arthur 487
Breines, Simon 685
Bretholz, Mrs. (*See* Miss Hilda Austern.)
Bretholz family 695
Bretton Woods 607
Bridges, Styles 639
British Embassy (Tokyo) 372, 373, 374
British Embassy (Washington, D. C.) 440
British Government 390
British Labor Government 617
British Navy 578
Broek 660
Brooks, Overton 597
Brothman, Abraham 404
Browder, Earl 405, 415, 435, 438, 520, 521, 528, 535, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 548, 550, 551, 559, 560, 562, 563, 564, 593, 594, 595, 598, 599, 600, 601, 605, 626, 643, 644, 657, 679, 700.
Brown, Fred 520, 521
Brown, H. Clifford 568
Brown, Irving 640
Brown, John 548
Brown, Norman 444, 445, 446, 483
Brownell, Lincoln C 568
Budenz, Louis Francis 513, 701
Bunch 445
Bunche, Ralph 432, 440, 443
Bundy, Harvey 446
Burden, W. A. M 494
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce 432, 577
Bureau of the Budget 432
Burma Road 382
Burnham, James 674
Bykov, Col. Boris 488, 489, 490
Byrnes, James F 617, 618, 619, 633, 637, 639, 691, 692

C

Page
California University 375, 427, 444, 450, 474, 476, 670
Cameron, Angus 649, 650
Canadian diplomatic mission in Tokyo 375
Canadian Embassy (Tokyo) 374, 375, 450, 451
Canadian External Affairs Ministry 451
Canadian Foreign Service 378
Canadian Legation (Washington, D. C.) 440
Canfield, Cass 697
Canning, William Martin 466, 487
Carlin, Beatrice 447
Carlson, Gen. Evans F 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588
Carmon, Walt 496
Carnegie Corp 433
Carter, Edward C 355, 364, 366, 373–375, 378, 382, 383, 385, 390–392, 399, 408, 424–426, 428–434, 438, 440, 449–466, 470, 471, 473, 474, 476, 477, 481, 483, 526, 528, 535, 536, 537, 539, 568, 573, 574, 583–589, 590, 591, 620, 630, 631, 642, 643, 648, 660, 661, 664, 669–673, 680, 681, 683, 684–687, 691, 692, 694–698
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 409, 410, 620, 622
Carter, Ruth 687
Carter, William D 414, 415
CBS. (*See* Columbia Broadcasting System.)
Central Powers 379
Chamberlain, William Henry 676
Chambers, Jay David Whittaker 420, 421, 487–497
Chapman, Abraham (John Arnold) 640, 643, 644
Chen, Mrs 537
Chi, Dr. Chao Ting 409, 410, 411, 426, 431, 435, 474, 475, 481, 525, 687
Chicago Daily News 432, 444
Chicago University 445, 474, 475, 485
Childs, Morris 605
China Aid Council 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 416, 436, 437, 677
China defense supplies 440
China Handbook 536
China spy ring 367, 370
China Today 652, 653
Chinese Communist Army 384, 531, 532, 582, 612
Chinese Central Government 623, 635
Chinese Communists. (*See* Communist Party, China.)
Chinese Government. (*See* Nationalist Chinese Government.)
Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance 411
Chinese News Service 535, 536, 537
Ching-wei, Wang 476
Chitral (steamship) 648
Cholmeley, Elsie Fairfax (Mary Epstein) 589, 590, 591
Chou, Professor 651
Christian Science Monitor 634, 635
Chuan, Mrs 680, 681
Chung-han, General Hu 596
Churchill, Winston 616, 617
Church League for Industrial Democracy 411
CIAA. (*See* Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.)
CIC 388, 591
CIO. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
CIO News 445
City College. (*See* College of the City of New York.)
City College Teacher-Worker 467, 486
Civil War 545
Clapper, Raymond 433, 444
Claridge Hotel 478
Clark, Tom 581
Clayton, Will 494
Cleeve, Miss 472
Clise, Charles F 568
Clubb, Oliver Edmond 495, 496

Page
Coe, Frank 425, 426, 440, 443, 445, 446, 495
Coffee, Congressman 446
Coffee, John M 444, 633
COI. (*See* Coordinator of Information.)
College of the City of New York (City College) 466, 467, 469, 485, 486, 487
Collier, John 495
Collins, Henry 488, 489
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) 390
Columbia University 373, 374, 403, 433, 444, 449, 466, 467, 469, 474, 475, 476, 482, 483, 484, 485, 493, 494, 670
Comintern 383
Commerce Department 390
Commission on Publications 514
Committee on Appropriations (watchdog committee) 485
Communist-Democrats 698
Communist International 405, 514, 520, 521, 541, 545, 565, 640, 659
Communist International (Seventh World Congress) 545, 565
Communist Party ..... 373, 374, 381, 382, 386, 397, 399, 403–407, 412, 415–417, 421–423, 426, 431, 438, 439, 441–443, 446, 447, 450, 452, 453, 456, 460, 466, 467, 469, 472, 476, 482, 483–488, 490–493, 496, 472, 476, 482, 483–488, 490, 493, 496, 510, 513, 525, 527–530, 532–535, 540–547, 550–552, 554–563, 565–567, 572, 580, 581, 583, 584, 588, 593, 599, 601, 602, 604, 605, 619, 621, 623–626, 630–632, 634–640, 641, 643, 644, 646–650, 652, 654, 657–659, 662, 665, 667, 674, 677–680, 682, 686, 688, 689, 698–700.
Communist Party (China) ..... 377, 397, 398, 407, 434, 435, 436, 437, 456, 457, 458, 459, 461, 464, 465, 473, 521, 525, 529, 532, 533, 534, 538, 560, 563, 564, 565, 581, 582, 583, 594, 599, 600, 634, 635, 637, 638, 654, 656, 657, 658, 677, 682, 696, 697, 700, 701.
Communist Party (France) 501
Communist Party (Japan) 368, 398, 504, 505, 510, 511, 667
Communist Party (Massachusetts) 649
Communist Party (Philippines) 641
Communist Party (underground) 488
Communist Party (United States) ..... 403, 404, 405, 413, 435, 490, 510, 511, 517, 518, 544, 560, 581, 605, 608, 609, 649, 700.
Communist Political Association 604, 605, 607
Condliffe 471, 660
Congressional Record 492
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 414, 433, 441, 444, 445, 559, 607, 622, 633, 635, 674
Congress of the United States. (*See* United States Congress.)
Connally 606
Constitution. (*See* United States Constitution.)
Coons, Arthur G 568
Coordinator of Information 390, 393, 396, 432, 483
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) 439
Coplon, Judith 558
Corbett, P. E 473, 474, 687
Cornell University 441
Cosmopolitan Club 685
Cotten, Mrs. Elizabeth B 409, 410
Coudert Committee. (*See* New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools.)
Council on African Affairs 622
Council of American-Soviet Friendship 630, 631
Council for Pan-American Democracy 540
Counterintelligence 388
Coville, Cabot 440
Cowles, Gardner 433, 446
CPA. (*See* Communist Party, United States.)
Creel, Herrlee G 475
Cressey, George B 568
Cripps, Sir Stafford 686, 687
Croly, Herbert 548

Page
Culbertson, Lt. J. S---- 573
Currie, Lauchlin---- 382, 413, 414, 417, 418, 419, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 433, 434, 443, 443, 444, 479, 480, 494, 585, 586, 594, 595, 598, 599, 600, 652.

D

Dabney, Virginius ---- 494
Dafoe, Mr. J. W---- 365, 576, 577, 580, 663, 664
Daily Worker---- 460, 466, 514, 515, 516, 517, 529, 530, 531, 535, 539, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 560, 561, 594, 595, 598, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 626, 631, 632, 634, 635, 637, 639, 640, 641, 643, 652, 654, 655, 657, 658, 659, 662, 665, 666, 674, 677, 678, 689, 690, 699, 700.
Daniel, Mrs. Judith---- 440
Davidson, Maurice P---- 620, 622
Davies, John---- 426, 427, 439, 652
Davies, Joseph---- 432
Davies, R. A---- 663, 664
Davis, Benjamin, Jr---- 605
Davis, Elmer---- 613
Deane, Hugh---- 396, 397
DeBecker, E. V. A---- 358
De Boukelitz, Brando---- 501
DeCaux, Len---- 425, 426, 441, 444, 445, 493, 494, 674
Declaration of Independence---- 369
Deimel, Henry---- 477
De Jong, Miss Ellen Van Zyll---- 390, 475, 476, 481
DeLacy, Hugh---- 633
Democratic League---- 698
Dennery---- 471
Dennett, Raymond---- 494, 628
Dennett, Tyler---- 425, 426, 433
Dennis, Eugene---- 605
Dennison, Eleanor---- 444
Department of the Army---- 386, 387, 388
Department of External Affairs of Canada---- 373, 376
Department of Justice---- 492, 529, 590, 591
Derba, Charles. (*See* Clarence Dirba.)
Des Moines Register and Tribune---- 433
Despres, Emile---- 443, 446
Dial Press, Inc---- 664, 674, 675, 676
Dickover, Erle R---- 618
Dies ---- 597
Dillingham, Walter F---- 568
Dirba, Clarence (Charles Derba)---- 678
Dirkson, Ambassador---- 373
Dobbs, Mrs---- 481
Dodd, William E., Sr---- 411
Dolivet, Louis---- 701
Dollard, Charles---- 433
Domei---- 373, 395
Donovan, Colonel---- 390
Donovan, General---- 413
Dooman, Eugene C---- 604, 616, 617, 618, 619, 623, 626, 639
Doreen (*see also* Doreen Holland)---- 660
Doriot---- 597
Douglas, Helen Gahagan---- 633
Downing---- 476
Duggan, Lawrence---- 488, 489, 490, 491, 694
Dulles, John Foster---- 452, 464
Dumbarton Oaks---- 607
Dunn, James C---- 639
Du Pont---- 666

E

Page
Earle, Edward M---- 444
ECA. (*See* Economic Cooperation Administration.)
Eckhardt, Tibor---- 603
Eckhart, Joseph---- 446, 447
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)---- 485
Eddy, Sherwood---- 411
Edith---- 695
Eighteenth Party Congress---- 646
Eighth Route Army---- 370, 407, 434, 532, 596, 599, 607, 615, 622, 688
Eisler, Gerhard---- 514, 555, 580
Eliot, Charles W---- 568, 570
Eliot, Thomas---- 444
Elsie---- 436, 661, 652
Emeny, Brooks---- 425, 526, 433, 444, 568
Emerson---- 547
Emerson, Rupert---- 432, 444, 445, 446, 475, 494, 568
Engels---- 517, 548
Enlai, Chou (Chow)---- 426
En-po, Gen. Tang---- 596
Epstein, Israel---- 435, 436, 452, 453, 455, 456, 458, 460, 463, 464, 465, 466, 545, 589, 590, 591, 620, 622, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 651, 662
Epstein, Mary. (*See* Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.)
Espil, Ambassador---- 603
Executive Offices of the President---- 429, 430, 433, 568, 570, 586

F

Fahs, C B---- 432, 471, 577
Fairbank, John K---- 378, 383, 399, 426, 427, 436, 437, 474, 479, 480, 481, 482, 568, 628, 629, 630, 650, 651 652.
Fairbank, Wilma---- 389, 427, 479
Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC)---- 608
Far Eastern Division (*See* State Department.)
Far Eastern Survey---- 376, 377, 384, 385, 390, 394, 397, 435, 436, 468, 469, 481, 533, 534, 536, 538, 539, 574, 582, 621, 622, 643, 644, 645, 667, 668.
Farley, Miriam---- 387, 389, 390, 394, 395, 396, 397, 472, 474, 475, 476, 564, 628, 629
Farm Information---- 489
Farm Research---- 489
Farm Security Administration (FSA)---- 419
Farquhar, Sammy---- 660
Fascist Party---- 404, 560, 570, 603, 606, 607, 608, 612, 613, 638
Faymonville, Col. Carl---- 494, 586, 687
FEA. (*See* Foreign Economic Administration.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)---- 354, 412, 484, 492, 514
Federal Reserve Bank---- 390, 433, 444
Federal Reserve Board---- 444
Federated Press---- 493, 668, 669
FEPC. (*See* Fair Employment Practices Commission.)
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt (Frederick Spencer)---- 364, 365, 388, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 425, 426, 433, 438, 444, 460, 461, 465, 475, 477, 488, 490, 491, 494, 517, 518, 520, 521, 523, 526, 527, 528, 529, 539, 540, 541, 550, 551, 571, 572, 581, 584, 585, 588, 620, 622, 648, 653, 659, 661, 662, 680, 681, 682, 683, 686, 687, 694.
Field, Noel---- 489
Field, W. B. Osgood, Jr---- 687
Fighting French delegation---- 440
Finestone---- 668
Finkelstein, Moses---- 482, 483, 485
Finley. (*See* Moses Finkelstein.)
Fischer, Louis---- 645, 649
Fisher, G. W---- 568
Fisher, Francis MacCracken---- 427, 652
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy---- 577

Page
Florence (Italy) University 403
Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley 605
Fo, Sun 455, 456, 457, 465
Ford, Miss Ann 452, 463, 464, 590
Ford Foundation 484
Ford, James 605
Fordham University 513
Foreign Affairs Council (Cleveland) 433
Foreign Correspondents Club 536, 538
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) 417, 478, 479, 495
Foreign Policy Association 384, 468, 474, 481, 482
Forkner, Dr. Claude E 409
Forkner, Mrs. Lucy 409, 410
Forman, Dr. Clark 655
Forman, Harrison 460, 466, 556, 557, 636, 637, 638, 654
Forsyth, Margaret 409, 410
Fortune 390
Fortune Round Table 474
Foster, William Z 548, 556, 559, 605
Fourth Annual Women's Congress (Chicago) 684
Fourth Army 532, 596, 599, 607, 615, 622
Fowler, R. M 691
Fox, Melvin J 620, 622
France 596, 602, 603, 607
Frankfurter Zeitung 360, 504
Freeman, Mansfield 494
Freeman, Miller 568, 570
Freeman, R. E 494
Free World 562
Freiheit 643
French Communists. (*See* Communist Party, France.)
French Embassy (Tokyo) 400
French police 384
French secret police 355
Friedman, Irving 390, 481
Friends of Chinese Democracy 621, 622
Friends of Soviet Russia 631, 674
Frink, Mrs. Angelika 410
FSA. (*See* Farm Security Administration.)
Fuller, Richard E 568

G

Gail 695
Gallup Poll 569, 570
Gamble, Sidney D 568
Gannes, Harry 520, 521, 526
Gardner, Virginia 639
Gauss, Clarence E 638
Geiger, Theodore 484
General Electric Co 433, 445
General Staff. (*See* War Department, General Staff.)
Geoffrey (*see* Chen Han-seng) 660
George III 636
George Washington University 440
Gerbode, Martha A 568
Gerlach, Talitha 409, 410, 588, 589, 590, 591, 620, 622
German Army 508
German Embassy (Nagoya) 503, 504
German Embassy (Tokyo) 379, 508
German Statistical Yearbook 500
Gerson, Simon 542, 543
GHQ, SCAP 395, 396
Gianini Foundation 375, 450, 474, 476, 670
Gibson, Hugh 444
Glasser, Harold 441

Page
GMAC 660
Goglidze, Sergei 626, 627
Gold, Ben 555
Gold, Mike 652
Goldstein, M 645
Golos, Jacob 404, 405, 407, 412, 421, 437, 438, 439, 441, 447, 677, 678
Goodrich, L. Carrington 475, 568
Goshal, Kumar 654, 655
Grad, Andrew. (*See* Grajdanzev.)
Grady, Henry F 432, 444
Graham, Prof. Frank 411
Grajdanzev, Andrew 387, 389, 390, 391, 392, 394, 399, 475, 476, 687
Granich, Grace 529, 652
Granich, Max 652
Graves, Kizer & Graves 571
Graves, Mortimer 571, 630, 631, 693
Greater New York Industrial Council (CIO) 414
Green, Gilbert 605
Greenberg, Michael 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 440, 444, 445, 476, 481, 665
Greene, J. Woodall 358, 368
Green, Kay 477
Grew, Joseph B 604, 609, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 623, 665, 666
Griffith, Ernest S 674, 677
Gruening, Ernest H 432
Guggenheimer, Mrs. 411
Gulick, Luther H 432
Gumperz, Hede. (*See* Hede Massing.)

H

Habberton, B. John 590, 591
Hagen, Beulah 697, 698
Hager, Read 446
Haideo, Ohashi 369, 371
Hamano 578
Hamilton, Maxwell 428, 444
Handbook of the Sixth Conference (IPR) 362, 363
Hansen, Alvin H 444
Han-seng, Chen 431, 525, 660, 661
Haring, Douglas G 668
Harmon, Francis E 528
Harondar, E. V 645, 646, 647
Harper & Bros 696, 697, 698
Harper, Sam 687
Harris, Lem 541
Hart, Admiral 446
Hart, Dr. George H. C 440
Harvard University 445, 451, 474, 475, 603, 671
Havas 501
Hathaway, Comrade 555, 674
Hayang Arsenal 496
Hayden, J. R 432, 476
Hazard, John N 627, 687
Healey, Ned R 633
Hearst 545, 596, 597
Heaton, Dr. Claude E 409, 410
Herod, W. H 433, 444
Hidemi. (*See* Hotsumi Ozaki.)
Hindustani News 360
Hindustani Times 400, 401
Hippodrome (New York) 687
Hirohito, Emperor 609, 611, 616, 617, 666
Hiss, Alger 428, 432, 441, 445, 446, 481, 482, 489, 492, 494, 497
Hitler, Adolph 380, 464, 522, 527, 528, 567, 596, 597, 598, 602, 603, 606, 664, 675
Hitler-Stalin Pact 522, 527

Page
Hoey, Senator 407
Hoffman, Paul G 444
Holland, W. L 375, 378, 383, 384, 385, 393, 394, 395, 399, 408, 414, 415, 418, 427, 436, 440, 450, 451, 470, 471, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 479, 480, 481, 482, 535, 536, 537, 539, 568, 571, 574, 628, 629, 651, 652, 659, 660, 661, 663, 664, 670.
Holmes, Judge 571, 572
Hoover, Herbert 606, 607, 617, 633, 638
Hoover, J. Edgar 369
Hoover Republicans 632
Hopkins 446
Hopper 578, 579, 580
Hornbeck, Stanley K 428, 432, 443, 444
Hotel Claridge 478
Hot Springs Conference (IPR) 355, 628
Hotzumi. (*See* Hotsumi Ozaki.)
House of Representatives 433
Houston, General Sam 548
Howard, Roy 596, 597
Hsia, C. L 535, 536, 537, 538, 539
Hsiang 427
Hsu, Yung-ying 415
Hubbard, G. E 480, 481
Hudson, Roy 605
Huff, Henry 567
Hughes, Charles Evans 462
Hull, Secretary 396, 580
Hunter 494
Hurley, Gen. Patrick 604, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 620, 622, 623, 624, 626, 631, 632, 633, 634, 636, 637, 638, 639, 654, 655, 656, 678, 700
Hu Shih 427
Hutchins, Grace 496

I

Ickes, Mr. Harold 384
Immigration and Naturalization Service 590, 591
India-American Conference (IPR) 469, 474
India Government Trade Commissioners Office 480, 481
Indian Council of World Affairs 469
Indian railways 483
Indian Service 495
Indusco 590
Inquiry 684
INS. (*See* International News Service.) 386
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 444, 474
Institute of Oceanography 648
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) 375, 378, 381, 384, 386, 388, 389, 391, 392, 394, 395, 399, 406–409, 412–418, 424–438, 440, 441, 443, 445–447, 451, 452, 462, 467, 468, 470, 471, 474, 475, 477–484, 487, 488, 491, 492–494, 497, 506, 516, 517, 518, 522, 524, 525, 527–530, 535, 536–540, 541, 549–551, 567, 568–570, 571–576, 581–583, 587, 589, 591, 593, 620–622, 628, 629, 634, 640–646, 650–653, 659–661, 663–665, 667–670, 672, 674– 676, 682–686, 688–697, 699, 701.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 364, 366, 384, 385, 389, 390, 391, 394, 425, 426, 431, 432, 443, 446, 451, 469, 470, 472, 473, 474, 480, 481, 494, 515, 518, 527, 528, 533, 534, 536, 537, 538, 540, 564, 565, 566, 568, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 628, 646, 650, 663, 668, 682, 683, 687, 692, 693, 694, 696, 697.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American-Pacific conference) 504
Institute of Pacific Relations (biennial report) 564
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese) 427, 535, 537, 538, 539, 651
Institute of Pacific Relations (eighth conference) 571, 641, 663
Institute of Pacific Relations (fifth conference) 571
Institute of Pacific Relations (India-American Conference, American delegation) 469, 474

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (international branch) 364, 389, 415, 425, 451, 468, 475, 536, 571, 582
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japanese council) 363, 364, 365, 366, 375, 450, 505, 653, 695
Institute of Pacific Relations (Latin-American division) 491
Institute of Pacific Relations (ninth conference) 394, 468, 494, 628, 641, 642
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific council) 365, 366, 425, 426, 480, 481, 494, 537, 663, 664, 694
Institute of Pacific Relations (political intelligence department) 480, 481
Institute of Pacific Relations (popular pamphlet series) 564
Institute of Pacific Relations (seventh conference) 468
Institute of Pacific Relations (sixth conference) 361-363, 364, 576, 641, 642
Institute of Pacific Relations (tenth conference) 571
Institute of Pacific Relations (U. S. S. R. Council) 645, 646
Institute of Pacific Relations (Virginia Beach conference) 641, 642
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite conference) 361-363, 364, 576, 641, 642, 661, 662
Intelligence. (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Inter-Continent News 529, 531
Interior Department 475, 477
International Communist Party. (*See* Communist Party, International.)
International correspondence 511
International General Electric Co 433, 444
International Industrial Relations Institute 682, 683
International Labor Office 441, 489
International Missionary Council 432, 444
International News Service (INS) 386
International Publishers 517, 647
International Secretariat 389, 451, 468, 475, 536, 537, 571, 582, 641, 642, 661, 663, 664
International Workers Order 515, 540
Inverchapel, Lord 692
Iranian Institute 621, 622
Ishii 365
Italian Fascist Party 404
Italian Library of Information 404
Ives, Senator 452, 464

J

Jabitzu. (*See* Zaibatsu.)
Jacob 506
Jacoby, Annalee 458, 460, 465, 466
Jaffe, Philip J 409, 410, 437, 477, 618, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 686
Jaffe, Mrs. Philip J 686
Japanese Army 355, 359, 361, 368, 379
Japanese Attorney General's Office (special investigation bureau) 499
Japanese Broadcasting Co 614
Japanese Cabinet 367
Japanese Communist Party. (*See* Communist Party, Japan.)
Japanese Council. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Japanese Council.)
Japanese Diet 667
Japanese Government 360, 366, 372, 398, 499, 500, 503, 579, 613, 617, 645
Japanese Navy 355, 361, 379
Japanese Peace Society 411
Japanese police 366
Japanese secret service 371
Japanese State Department 363, 367, 379
Jean, Sally Lucas 409, 410
Jenkins, Shirley 376
Jenkinson, Anthony 658, 659, 660, 661, 662
Jerome, V. J 554
Jessup, Dr. Philip C 425, 431, 432, 433, 443, 444, 477, 495, 527, 528, 663, 670, 687
Jessup, Mrs. Philip C 409, 410
Jiji Press (English edition) 395
Johns, Helen. (*See* Elizabeth Bentley.)
Johns Hopkins University 385, 474, 561, 570, 670

Page
Johnson, Joseph E---- 568
Johnson, Nelson T---- 582
Johnston, Eric---- 494
Johnstone, William C---- 440, 477
Joint Chiefs of Staff---- 382
Jones, Joseph---- 441
Journal-American---- 619
Justice Department. (*See* Department of Justice.)

K

Kai-shek, Chiang---- 381, 382, 390, 436, 450, 451, 456, 457, 461, 462, 496, 529, 530, 531, 533, 551, 557, 561, 594, 596, 599, 600, 606, 610, 612, 614, 615, 616, 617, 622, 623, 635, 637, 638, 639, 698, 701.
Kai-shek, Madam Chiang---- 435
Kates, Beatrice---- 410, 427
Katsuyo, Mrs. Takeshita---- 499
Kawai, Teikichi (*see also* Mrs. Max Klausen)---- 367, 369, 383
Kazakevich, Vladimir---- 441
Keenan, Joseph D---- 640
Keenleyside, Hugh L---- 472
Kennedy, George---- 475
Kentucky University---- 475
Kerensky, Alexander---- 566, 603
Kernpictai (gendarmerie)---- 395
Kerr, George H---- 392, 393, 394
Kesting---- 375
Kimball, Dan A---- 671, 672
Kintner, Robert---- 603
Kirchwey, Freda---- 620
Kirk, Grayson---- 494
Kizer, Benjamin H---- 425, 426, 433, 443, 444, 494, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578
Klausen, Max---- 370, 371, 372, 379, 381, 383, 500, 501, 507, 508, 509
Klausen, Mrs. Max (*see also* Teikichi Kawai)---- 367, 369, 383
Knopf, Alfred---- 473, 474, 655
Knox---- 446
Kokusai Tsuhin. (*See* International correspondence.)
Konoye Cabinet---- 363, 366, 367, 379, 381, 382, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506
Konoye, Prince. (*See* Konoye Cabinet.)
Koshiro---- 369
Kramer, Charles---- 441, 442
Kuhn, Mrs. Irene---- 377, 399
Kuomintang Government---- 455, 458, 460, 461, 464, 465, 466, 476, 532, 538, 596, 599, 600, 610, 612, 613, 614, 615, 635, 636, 638–651, 654, 655, 656, 658, 698
Kuroda, Rev. Andrew Y.---- 499
Kwantung Army---- 509, 616

L

Labor Committee (House)---- 515
Labor-Management Charter---- 608
Labor Monthly (London)---- 684
Lacam, Guy---- 668
Ladejinsky, Wolf---- 477
Lafayette---- 636
Lamont, Corliss---- 573, 574, 673, 674, 687
Lamott, Willis---- 668
Lancaster, William W---- 687
Landon---- 450
Lane, Clayton---- 474, 568
Lang, Olga---- 682
Lapin, Adam---- 602
Lasker, Bruno---- 571
Latin-American Section (OSS)---- 419

Page
Lattimore, Owen J---- 373–375, 378, 382, 385, 386, 390, 414, 415, 424, 425, 433, 439, 454, 455, 458–460, 462, 465, 472–478, 481, 483, 494, 521–526, 529, 549, 550–558, 560–563, 568–570, 578, 583, 584, 624, 625, 627, 654, 655, 657, 658, 669, 670, 678, 679, 685, 688, 689, 696.
Laval---- 597
League Against War and Fascism---- 447
League of Nations---- 489, 579
League of Women Shoppers---- 411
Leaning---- 476
Lee---- 476, 477, 580
Lee, Duncan Chapin---- 365, 409, 410
Lee, Dr. Kan---- 440
Legislative Reference Service (Library of Congress)---- 674, 677
Lengyel, Emil---- 675
Lenin, Vladimir I---- 515, 517, 559, 565, 647
Leonard---- 477
Levy, Roger---- 668, 670, 671
Lewis, John L---- 638
Liberte (steamship)---- 590, 591
Liberty League---- 546
Library of Congress---- 462, 674, 676, 677
Lila---- 695
Lilenthal, Philip E---- 450, 451, 471, 481, 659, 660
Lincoln Battalion---- 598
Linebarger---- 661
Lippmann, Walter---- 406, 494, 691, 692
Lipshitz, Dora---- 678
Little, Brown & Co---- 452, 463, 464, 465, 590, 609, 650, 665, 666, 668
Little, General---- 446
Little, Herbert S---- 568
Liu, Wellington---- 650, 651
Lochhead, Archie---- 433
Lockwood, William---- 383, 384, 385, 390, 395, 396, 399, 425, 426, 427, 428, 431, 432, 445, 446, 474, 477, 481, 568, 572, 573, 575, 576, 577, 661, 687.
Loomis, Charles F---- 568
Lovett, Prof. Robert M---- 411
Lowrey, Dr. Lawson G---- 410
Loyalist Spain---- 569, 570
Luce, Henry R---- 433, 444, 660
Ludden, Raymond T---- 636, 637, 638
Lyell, Sir Charles---- 545
Lynd, Robert S---- 687

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas---- 354, 395, 396, 618, 638, 639, 640
MacKay, James A---- 494, 568
MacNair, Harley F---- 474
Magruder, General---- 446
Mandel, William---- 662, 663, 664, 674, 675, 676, 677
Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades---- 473, 474
Mannerheim Finland---- 596
Maquis---- 464
Marine Corps---- 583, 584, 585, 597, 633
Marini, Ferruci---- 520
Marshall, Clifford B---- 568
Marshall, George C---- 452, 459, 463, 464, 465, 508, 633, 700
Martin, Charles E---- 568
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (Moscow)---- 517
Marx, Karl---- 515, 517, 545, 546, 547, 548, 552, 565, 630, 647
Maryland University---- 589, 590, 591
Massing, Hede---- 358, 489, 490
Matsukata---- 364, 365

Page
Matsuo ... 395, 477
Maxwell, General ... 390
Mayer, Arthur ... 574, 575
Mazuruk ... 626, 627
McCann ... 687
McCloy, John J ... 639
McConnell, Dorothy ... 409, 410
McConnell, Bishop Francis J ... 411
McCormick ... 596, 597
McCoy, General ... 495
McGraw-Hill ... 377
McGuffey Eclectic Readers ... 545
McLaughlin, Mrs ... 477
McLean, Evalyn Walsh ... 603
Meija restoration ... 366, 375
Meldon, John ... 619
Merchant Marine (U. S.) ... 405
Mercury ... 399
Merrill, Lewis ... 477, 620, 622
Methodist Federation for Social Service ... 411
Michigan University ... 474
MID (Military Intelligence Division). (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Midkiff, Frank E ... 568
Midwest Daily Record ... 514, 523
Mikhailov, Nicholas ... 663, 664
Military Intelligence Division (MID). (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Miller, Robert ... 439
Mills, Mr ... 375, 414
Mills College. (*See* Mills Summer Institute.)
Mills Summer Institute ... 584, 585
Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, CIO ... 622
Minor, Robert ... 548, 595, 598, 599, 600, 605
Mirror ... 619
Mitchell, Kate L ... 474, 477, 654, 655, 660, 663, 664
Mitsubishi ... 666
Mitsui ... 666
Mitsusada, Mr. Yoshikawa ... 359, 360
Moffat, Abbot Low ... 494
Molyneaux, Peter ... 433
Mon-lin, Dr. Chiang ... 651
Mont Tremblant Conference ... 425, 443, 446, 571, 573, 641, 650, 663, 674
Moore, Harriet Lucy ... 433, 438, 443, 444, 472, 530, 549, 550, 628, 629, 647, 687
Morgan, Gwen ... 560
Morgenthau, Mr ... 419, 420, 422, 423, 431, 556, 604
Morgenthau plan ... 556, 604
Morrison, George A ... 494
Morrison, Ian ... 668
Morse, Senator ... 452, 464
Morton, Rev. Richard ... 621, 622
Moscow Radio ... 395
Motylev, V. E ... 577, 578, 579, 580
Muhle ... 687
Munichmen ... 597, 598, 603
Munitions Assignments Board ... 446
Murphy, J. Morden ... 568
Murray full-employment bill ... 640
Murray, Philip ... 559
Murray, Wallace ... 428, 445
Mussolini, Benito ... 602
Myers, Frederick N ... 621, 622
Myyagi ... 372

N

Nagakura ... 578
NAM ... 605, 606
Nanking University ... 444

Page
Nathan, Robert ---- 432, 444
Nation ---- 563, 564, 620, 622
National Board (Politburo) ---- 398, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 526, 528, 529, 535, 543, 549, 550, 555, 556, 558, 559, 581, 600, 604, 605, 608, 616, 619, 625, 631, 650, 657, 659, 665, 667, 679.
National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief ---- 433
National Credit Office ---- 475
National Labor Relations Board ---- 555
National Lawyers Guild ---- 621, 622
National League of Women Voters ---- 444
National Maritime Union ---- 621, 622
National Peking University ---- 539
National Recovery Administration (NRA) ---- 488, 657
National Resources Planning Board ---- 432, 568, 570, 571, 572, 573
National War Fund, Inc ---- 410
National War Labor Board ---- 571
Nationalist Chinese Government ---- 390, 435, 450, 456, 457, 461, 462, 463, 475, 531, 533, 535, 536, 537, 538, 551, 563, 581, 599, 600, 612, 696, 697.
Natural History Museum (New York) ---- 686
Naval School of Military Government and Administration (Columbia University) ---- 494
Navy Department ---- 382, 390, 422, 433, 445, 446, 464, 583, 584, 597, 613, 614, 618, 639, 671, 672, 673
Nazi Party ---- 504, 596, 605, 606
Nelson, Donald ---- 638
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council ---- 440
Neutrality Act ---- 447
New Century Publishers, Inc ---- 540
New Life Movement ---- 476
New Masses ---- 460, 465, 495, 496, 540, 657, 658
New York China Daily News ---- 634, 635, 636
New York City Board of Education ---- 470, 486, 515
New York Herald Tribune ---- 542, 612, 613, 614, 633
New York Post ---- 609
New York Star (formerly PM) ---- 542
New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools (Coudert committee) ---- 469
New York State Legislative Record ---- 486
New York Times ---- 454, 455, 456, 458, 459, 465, 495, 614, 634, 635, 674, 676, 698
New York Worlds Fair ---- 685
New York World-Telegram ---- 485
Nine Power Treaty ---- 579, 580
Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (*see also* Institute of Pacific Relations) ---- 394
Nisei ---- 355, 362
Nixon, Senator Richard M ---- 492
NKVD. (*See* OGPU.)
NMU ---- 405
Nock, Albert J ---- 545
Norman, Herbert ---- 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 449, 450, 451, 471
North American Group (Military Intelligence Service) ---- 573
North Dakota Non-Partisan League ---- 565
North, Joe ---- 654
North Manchuria Railway ---- 579
Northern Pacific international planning project ---- 568, 569, 570
Northwest Regional Planning Commission ---- 444
Notestein, Ada Comstock ---- 494
Noyes, Mrs. C. Reinold ---- 410
NRA. (*See* National Recovery Administration.)

O

Oakie, John H ---- 584, 585
Office of Censorship (Washington, D. C.) ---- 568, 569, 570

Page
Office of Education. (*See* U. S. Office of Education.)
Office of Export Control ---- 481
Office of Price Administration (OPA) ---- 390, 432, 444, 446, 608
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) ---- 412, 413, 419, 428, 440, 443, 444
Office of War Information (OWI) ---- 378, 383, 399, 414, 437, 444, 446, 613, 652
OGPU (Soviet military intelligence) ---- 360, 404
Ohashi, Haideo ---- 369, 371
Okashi ---- 510
Oklahoma Republican State Convention (1926) ---- 637
OPA. (*See* Office of Price Administration.)
Orchard, John E ---- 474
OSS (*See* Office of Strategic Services.)
Ott, General ---- 379, 501, 503, 504, 508
Oumansky, Constantine ---- 603, 685, 686
Overseas Masonic Lodge (Providence, R. I.) ---- 638
Owen ---- 661
OWI. (*See* Office of War Information.)
Oxon Hill Manor ---- 693
Oya, Kuso ---- 614
Ozaki, Hotsumi ---- 355, 361–364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 379, 381, 501, 503, 504, 505, 506, 509

P

Pacific Affairs ---- 373, 375, 376, 377, 378, 389, 390, 415, 416, 417, 418, 462, 468, 473, 481, 522, 529, 550, 551, 582, 644, 645, 648, 649, 651, 653, 657, 661, 668, 669, 670, 681, 682, 684, 688
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission ---- 433
Pacific Worker ---- 511
Paddock, Bishop Robert L ---- 411
Page, Walter Hines ---- 483, 561
Paine, Thomas ---- 548
Panama Canal Record ---- 647
Panay. (See U. S. S. *Panay.*)
Parker, Philo W ---- 528
Parliament ---- 617
Parsons, Miss Katrine ---- 440
Pasvolsky ---- 428
Paterson, Ellis E ---- 633
Patterson-McCormick ---- 596, 597
Peake, Cyrus H ---- 474, 670
Pearl Harbor ---- 419, 464, 501, 502, 510, 663, 664, 665, 667
Pearl Harbor hearing ---- 380, 381
Pearson, L. B ---- 440
Peffer, Nathaniel ---- 471, 474, 477, 670
Peking National University ---- 539
Pence, Captain ---- 494
Pentagon ---- 420
Peoples Anti-Japanese Military-Political University ---- 657
Perkins, Milo ---- 428, 432, 443, 444, 445
Perlo Group (*see also* Victor Perlo) ---- 441
Perlo, Victor ---- 441, 442
Petain ---- 669
Peters, J ---- 490, 493, 494, 514, 520, 526, 542, 543, 590, 634, 654, 688
Petrov, Ivan Petrovich ---- 566
Phil ---- 375
Phillips, J. W ---- 653
Phillips, William ---- 568, 656
Pinner, Dr. Max ---- 410
PM. (*See* New York Star.)
Politburo: (*See* National Board.)
Politburo (Moscow) ---- 517, 526, 539, 541, 551, 552, 555, 556, 558, 625, 630, 631, 657
Pollard, Mr ---- 692
Pope, Arthur Upham ---- 409, 621, 622
Popper, Martin ---- 621, 622
Populist ---- 565
Porter, Catherine ---- 390, 476, 477, 483, 536, 537, 689

Page
Porter, Paul 640, 661
Potsdam declaration 354, 368, 369, 395, 611
Powell, Webster Clay 488, 489
Pratt, Mrs. Eliot 687
Presidential directive 387, 388
Press Hotel 538
Price, Harry 477, 680, 681, 687
Price, Mary 406, 407, 413
Price, Mildred 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 436, 437, 438, 439, 677
Princeton University 444, 474, 481, 535, 537
Princeton University Press 468
Private IPR discussion group on United Nations cooperation 440
Procope, Hjalmar 603
Progressives 632
Progressive ticket 407
Pruitt, Miss Ida 680, 681
Pruitt, Ian 587
Public Affairs pamphlets 564

R

Radio news room (*see also* Coordinator of Information) 396
Railroad Brotherhood 607
Rand, Christopher 455, 465
Randolph A. Philip 411
Red Army (fourth section) 507
Red Army (Russia) 383, 501, 597, 605
Red Guards (Russian) 566
Register of State Department. (*See* Biographical Register, Department of State.)
Reichswehr 380
Reid, Mrs. Ogden 444
Remer, C. F 393, 443, 445, 446, 474, 476
Republican Party 544, 547, 638, 639
Research committee 477
Reynal & Hitchcock 626, 627
Reynaud 669
Riefler, Winfield 432
Riess, La Verne 566
Robinson, Reid 622
Rockefeller fellowship (Harvard) 451
Rockefeller Foundation 433, 451, 473, 474
Rockefeller, Nelson 439
Rockport Press 538
Rogge, Mr 357
Rogoff, Vladimir N 529, 530, 531, 539
Rogov, Vladimir. (*See* Vladimir Rogoff.)
Roosevelt, President 381, 382, 390, 528, 584, 586, 596, 597, 599, 600, 606, 607, 633, 637, 638, 639, 640, 656, 657, 683
Root, Elihu 462
Ropes, E. C 432
Rose 578
Rosinger, Lawrence K 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 481, 482, 654, 655, 670, 671, 687
Rossiter 477
Roth, Andrew 472, 477, 609, 625, 654, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673
Round table 577
Royal Commission 365
Royal Institute (London) 390
Royall, Mr 357
Rubin, Rose 687
Rue, Edgar H 409, 410
Ruskin 547
Russell Sage Foundation 682, 683

Russian-American Institute. (*See* American Russian Institute.) Page
Russian Army ---- 359, 361, 362, 364
Russian Calendar (old) ---- 566
Russian Secret Police. (*See* Soviet Military Intelligence.)
Russian War Relief ---- 438, 549, 630, 631

S

Saionji, Kimikazu ---- 364, 365, 366, 504, 506, 694
Saionji, Prince ---- 366
Salisbury, Lawrence E ---- 621, 622
Sam ---- 421
Sanger, Mr. Richard R ---- 384, 385
Sano Hotel ---- 371
Sansom, Sir George ---- 440
Santo ---- 514
Saposs, David ---- 640
Saturday Evening Post ---- 680, 681
Saturday Review of Literature ---- 674, 675
Savage, Charles ---- 633, 634
Sayers, Mentana ---- 407, 408, 409, 410
Sayers, Michael ---- 407
Sayre, Francis B ---- 432
SCAP ---- 373, 374, 386, 395, 396
Schillinglaw ---- 577, 579, 580
Schneiderman, William ---- 605
School of Chinese Studies (Columbia University) ---- 449
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B ---- 433, 444
Scripps-Howard newspapers ---- 444, 619
Secretariat ---- 390, 481, 629
Security Council ---- 691, 692
Security in the Pacific ---- 394
Sellers, Dick ---- 668
Service, Jack ---- 427, 652
Service, John Stewart ---- 618, 619, 624, 626, 631, 632, 633, 679
Shanghai Monthly Bulletin ---- 397
Sharp, Lt. Col. Frederick D ---- 391, 392
Sheean, Vincent ---- 622
Shepherd, Jack ---- 476, 659, 660, 687
Sherwood, Robert ---- 446
Shi-chieh, Wong ---- 651
Shields, Art ---- 614, 633, 639
Shih, Hu ---- 427
Shih-Kai, Yuan ---- 466
Shiman, Russell G ---- 475, 477
Shiskin, Boris ---- 444, 445
Shoemaker, Colonel ---- 494
Shoemaker, James H ---- 432, 568
Shotwell, James T ---- 444, 661, 662
Siberian Railways. (*See* Trans-Siberian Ry.)
Sillen, Samuel ---- 460, 466, 665, 666
Silverman, George ---- 423
Silvermaster, N. Gregory ---- 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 434, 439, 440
Simmons College ---- 474
Simms, William Philip ---- 597
Simon, Helen ---- 634, 635
Simpson, "Sockless Jerry" ---- 548
Sinclair, Gregg M ---- 568
Sino-American Corp ---- 475
Sixth Conference (IPR) ---- 362
Smedley, Agnes ---- 355–362, 367, 368, 369, 370, 377, 380, 383, 384, 399, 460, 466, 496, 506, 507, 658, 677
Smith, Paul C ---- 568
Smith, Sydney ---- 477
Snow, Edgar ---- 458, 460, 465, 680, 681, 682
Snow, Mrs. Edgar (Nym Wales) ---- 622, 680, 682
Social-Democrat ---- 640

Page
Somerville, Rose ---- 687
Soong, Dr. T. V ---- 537
Sorge, Richard ---- 354, 356, 358–362, 364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 379, 380, 381, 383, 384, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 511
Southern Council for Human Welfare ---- 407
South Manchurian Railway ---- 509
Southwest Associated University (Kunming) ---- 651
Soviet Army ---- 379
Soviet Embassy ---- 631, 685
Soviet Embassy (Tokyo) ---- 372
Soviet Embassy Consulate ---- 529, 555
Soviet Fourth Army ---- 383
Soviet military intelligence ---- 360, 404, 412, 417, 424, 435, 507, 520, 678
Soviet Russia Today ---- 530, 549, 662, 684
Soviet Trade Union ---- 529, 531
Soviet Union ---- 377, 381, 398, 404, 459, 508, 516, 517, 523, 525, 530, 546, 548, 550, 554, 562, 563, 567, 577, 578, 579, 580, 587, 603, 604, 606, 613, 623, 638, 645, 646, 647, 663, 664, 675, 676, 677, 683, 685, 687
Spanish Republican Government ---- 636
Spencer, Frederick. (*See* Frederick Vanderbilt Field.)
Spenser, Hazelton ---- 570
Sproul, Allan ---- 433, 444
Sproul, R. G ---- 444, 568
Sprout, Harold ---- 494
Stachel, Jack ---- 527, 535, 550, 552, 553, 555, 556, 558, 567, 595, 626, 679
Staley, Prof. Eugene ---- 411, 432, 651
Stalin, Josef ---- 517, 522, 527, 555, 559, 563, 565, 627, 647, 657
Standard Oil Co ---- 548, 666
Starobin, Joseph ---- 611, 632, 636, 637, 654, 655
Stassen, Commodore ---- 494
State Committee of New York ---- 588
State Department ---- 364, 380, 391, 417, 421, 424, 425, 428, 432, 439, 440, 443–445, 452, 462, 463, 464, 477–479, 488–490, 495, 497, 560, 576, 577, 580, 589, 591, 594, 595, 597–599, 601–604, 606, 607, 609, 610, 612–614, 616, 619, 623–627, 631–633, 636, 638, 639, 654, 655, 678, 679, 690, 691, 694–696.
State Department (Biographical Register) ---- 495, 497, 576, 577
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs) ---- 618
State Department (Division of Cultural Relations) ---- 479
State Department (Far Eastern Division) ---- 417, 462, 463, 604, 616, 626, 628
State Department (Foreign Economic Administration for Chinese Affairs) ---- 627
State Department (Latin-American Division) ---- 488
State Department (Near Eastern Division) ---- 428, 445
Steele, Arch T ---- 455, 465, 612
Stefansson, Vilhjalmur ---- 685, 686, 687
Steiger, Andrew ---- 663, 664, 699
Steiger, G. Nye ---- 474
Stein, Guenther ---- 355, 356, 359–362, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 383, 384, 385, 386, 398, 399, 400, 401, 460, 466, 506, 536, 538, 539, 556, 557, 634, 635, 636, 654, 655
Sterling, J. Wallace ---- 568
Stettinius ---- 606
Stevens, Adlai ---- 446
Stevens, Mackenzie ---- 589, 590
Stewart, John R ---- 475, 482
Stewart, Marguerite Ann ---- 565, 566, 660
Stewart, Maxwell S ---- 411, 563, 564, 565, 566, 629, 630
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph ---- 614, 615, 636, 637, 638
Stimson, Secretary ---- 446, 580
Stinebower, L. D ---- 432
Stone, I. N ---- 668
Stone, Mark ---- 668
Stone, William T ---- 432, 443, 444, 445
Straus, Donald B ---- 568
Straus, Robert K ---- 389, 390, 391

Page

Strong, Anna Louise ... 688
Stuart, Leighton ... 455, 456, 461, 465
Studebaker, John W ... 444
Sues, Ilona Ralf ... 622, 698, 699
Sumitomo ... 666
Sunday Worker ... 594, 611
Sundborg, George ... 572, 573
Sun Fo ... 455, 456, 457, 465
Sunset Farm ... 365
Sun Yat-sen ... 476
Sun Yat-sen, Madam ... 436, 437, 455, 456, 457, 465
Sweet ... 585
Sweetland, Monroe ... 433, 445
Swing, Raymond Gram ... 495, 565
SWINK ... 639
Swope, Gerard ... 568
Symposium on Chinese culture ... 427

T

Taft, Robert ... 603, 611
Taguchi ... 369
Taiheiyo Rodo-sha. (*See* Pacific Worker).
Takahashi ... 578
Takayanagi ... 366, 694
Tamura ... 579, 580
Tao-ming, Mme. Woi ... 409
Tariff Commission ... 481
Tarr, Mr. Edgar J ... 535, 537, 663, 664
Tasca ... 477
Tass ... 529, 539
Taylor, Admiral ... 578, 579
Taylor, George E ... 417, 418, 568
Taylor, William ... 421
Tee-Van, Mrs. John ... 410
Teh, Chou ... 377, 384, 614, 615, 657
Tehran Conference ... 606
Teikichi, Kawai ... 367
Tenney, Helen ... 419
Terrall, Robert ... 659
Tewksbury, Donal G ... 568
Texas Weekly ... 433
Thompson, John ... 694
Thompson, Laura ... 375
Thompson, Robert ... 605
Thompson, Virginia ... 476
Thoreau ... 547
Thorner, Daniel ... 483
Thurber, Mr. ... 391, 392
Tiffany, Mrs. Gordon M ... 409, 410
Tijo Cabinet ... 503
Time, Inc. ... 433, 444
Time Magazine ... 487
Timoshenko ... 597
Tirana, R ... 440
Tixier, A. P ... 440
Tojo Cabinet ... 503
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun ... 362, 363
Tokyo Criminal Court ... 500
Tokyo Criminal District Court, Procuration Bureau ... 500
Toledano, Ralph ... 399
Tong, Chu ... 634, 636
Tong, Hollington K ... 536, 538
Toynbee ... 471
Trachtenberg, Alexander ... 517, 529, 540, 647, 650
Trans-Siberian Railway ... 389, 390, 391, 392, 675, 676

Page

Treasury Department 390, 419, 420, 421, 428, 432, 434, 440, 441, 443, 444, 446, 464, 491, 493
Tribune 456
Trotsky, Leon 554, 674
Troyanovsky, Mr 684, 687
Truman, President 388, 607, 608, 613, 617, 620, 622, 623, 632, 633, 637, 639, 640, 691, 692
Tsarism 476
Tse-tung, Mao 615
Tsung-nan, Gen. Hu 610
Tsuru, Shigeto 510
Tuan-sheng, Chien 651
Tucker, Luther 687
Tugwell, Mr 546
Tydings, Senator 515

U

Ullman, William Ludwig 421
Un-American Activities Committee 492, 509, 510, 515
United China Relief, Inc 410, 444, 585
United Church Council for Democracy 621, 622
United Electrical Radio, and Machine Workers Union 516
United Nations 353, 435, 440, 562, 571, 598, 600, 611, 641
United Nations World 562
United Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA) 620, 622
United Press 539, 556, 557, 616
United States Army 353, 354, 356, 357, 359, 386, 387, 390, 405, 416, 417, 419, 568–570, 596, 597, 598, 608, 618, 623, 636, 642, 646
United States Army Corps of Engineers 646
United States Bureau of Navigation 672, 673
United States Chamber of Commerce 640
United States Congress 444, 462, 603, 606
United States Constitution 545
United States District Court (Spokane, Wash.) 433, 444
United States District Court (Washington, D. C.) 665, 671, 672
United States Government 387, 389, 390, 397, 405, 413, 419, 421, 435, 475, 480, 481, 484, 485, 486, 491, 527, 545, 558, 584, 586, 596, 599, 601, 672
United States-Japanese negotiations 381
United States Military Academy. (*See* West Point Military Academy.)
United States Naval Reserve 609, 671, 672
United States Navy 382, 390, 422, 433, 445, 446, 464, 583, 584, 597, 613, 614, 618, 639, 671, 672, 673
United States Office of Education 444
United States Steel Corp 546
Universal Trading Corp 390, 433, 474
University of California 375, 427, 444, 450, 474, 476, 670
University of Chicago 445, 474, 475, 485
University of Chicago Press 571
University of Cincinnati 474
University of Kentucky 475
University of Maryland 589, 590, 591
University of Michigan 474
University of Nanking 444
University of Princeton 444, 474, 481, 535, 537
UNRRA (Atlantic City conference) 478
UNRRA (China office) 571
UPOWA (United Office and Professional Workers) 408
Ushiba 363, 364, 365, 471, 510
U. S. S. *Panay* 618
U. S. S. R. ..... 377, 381, 398, 404, 459, 508, 516, 517, 523, 525, 530, 546, 548, 550, 554, 562, 563, 567, 577, 578, 579, 580, 587, 603, 604, 606, 613, 623, 638, 645, 646, 647, 649, 663, 664, 675, 676, 677, 683, 685, 687.

V

Page
Vandenberg, Arthur H. 452, 463, 464, 597, 606, 611, 633
Vandenbosch, Amry 475
Vanderbilt, Commodore 494
Van Kleeck, Mary 682, 683, 684, 685
Van Mook 578, 580
Vassar College 403
Veterans' Administration 608
Vichy France 596, 603
Viet-Nam 464
Vinacke, Harold M. 474
Vince, Jacob 432
Vincent, John Carter 452, 463, 464, 465, 478, 494, 618, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 679
"Vinegar Joe." (*See* General Joseph Stilwell.)
Viner, Jacob 445
Von Dirkson 503
Voorhis, Jerry 433
Voukelitch, Branko de 372, 373

W

Wagner-Murray-Dingell social security bill 608
Wahs 578
Wales, Nym. (*See* Mrs. Edgar Snow.)
Wallace, Henry A 432, 444, 550, 552, 553, 625, 626, 627, 679, 693, 694
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations 483, 561
Wang, Mr 651
Wang Ching-wei 476
War and the Working Class 529, 530, 531, 539
War Department (General Staff) 393, 394
War Department (United States) 353, 354, 357, 359, 367, 378, 382, 384, 388, 390, 391–394, 400, 406, 416, 417, 464, 481, 568-570, 572, 573, 603, 610, 639, 642, 646, 659, 660.
War Labor Board 571
War Production Board 432, 441, 444, 603
War Production Board (WPB) 640
Ward, Dr. Harry F 411
Ward, Lester F 548
Ware Group. (*See* Harold Ware.)
Ware, Harold 488, 489
Washington, George 636
Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R 630, 631
Washington State University 575
Washington Treaty 576, 577, 578, 579
"Watchdog committee" (Committee on Appropriations) 485
Watt, Mr. Alan 440
Watt, Robert J 494
Watts, Richard 622, 668
Waymack, W. W 444, 495, 568
W. D. C 687
Webb, Beatrice 645, 649
Webb, Sidney 645, 649
Webster, Daniel 548
Webster Publishing Co 565, 566
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert 604, 612, 613, 614, 617, 620, 622, 623, 624, 636
Weiner, Robert William 528, 540, 541
Weintraub, David 441
Welles, Benjamin 455, 465
Welles, Sumner 428, 444, 455, 494, 568, 595, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698.
Wellington 661
West Point Military Academy 432, 444
Wheatley, Dr. George M 410
Wheeler, Leslie 432
Wheeler, W. M 597

Page
White, Harry Dexter ---- 382, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 428, 431, 434, 443, 444, 445, 446, 491, 492, 494
White House ---- 382, 413, 414, 424, 425, 426, 427, 429, 430, 433, 434, 443, 444, 479, 480, 528, 586, 633, 639, 652.
White Russians ---- 441
White, Theodore ---- 458, 460, 465, 466
Wigmore ---- 519
Wilbur, Brayton ---- 425, 426, 494, 568
Wilbur, Ray Lyman ---- 444, 477
Wilkie, Wendell ---- 433
Williams, Albert Rhys ---- 645, 648, 649
Williamson, John ---- 605
Willie, Dirty ---- 619
Willits, Joseph H ---- 433
Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A ---- 353–401
Wilson, C. E ---- 433, 445
Wilson, Howard ---- 445, 494
Wilson, Geoffrey ---- 687
Wilson, Woodrow ---- 603
Windows on the Pacific ---- 389
Winter, Ella ---- 688, 689, 690
Winter Palace (Russia) ---- 566
Wise, Rabbi Stephen S ---- 411
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl August ---- 373, 374, 375, 376, 386, 449, 450, 475, 476, 483
Womens Congress. (*See* Fourth Annual Womens Congress.)
Wood, Herbert J ---- 568
Worchester House ---- 680, 681
Worker ---- 639, 690
Workers and Peasants Party (Japan) ---- 667
World Federation of Trade Unions ---- 607
World Labor Conference ---- 606, 607
World Telegram ---- 441
World Tourist Agency ---- 678
World War I ---- 578, 637
WPB. (*See* War Production Board.)
Wrenn, Heaton L ---- 565
Wright ---- 579
Wright, Louise L ---- 568
Wu-Keu, Miss Liu ---- 436

X

Xavier University ---- 466

Y

Yakut Republic ---- 675
Yale University ---- 475
Yalta Agreement ---- 606, 607
Yamakawa, Dr ---- 364, 365
Yarnell, Adm. H. E ---- 433, 445, 477, 481, 495
Yasuda ---- 666
Yasou ---- 364, 365, 395, 450, 476
Yasuto ---- 375
Yat-sen, Sun ---- 476
Yat-sen, Madam Sun ---- 436, 437, 455, 456, 457, 565
Yergan, Dr. Max ---- 622
YMCA. (*See* Young Mens Christian Ass'n)
Yosemite Conference. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations Yosemite Conference.)
Yoshikawa, Mitsusada ---- 499–511
Young Communist League ---- 594, 598
Young Mens Christian Association (YMCA) ---- 633
Young Womens Christian Association (YWCA) ---- 590, 591, 620, 621, 622
Yusami, Rokuro ---- 358

Page
Yutang, Mrs. Lin 409, 410
Yu-wan, Liu 426, 427, 537, 652
YWCA. (*See* Young Women's Christian Association.)

Z

Zacharias, Capt. E. M 613, 614
Zaibatsu 556, 560, 561, 562, 666

×

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

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CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Carter, Edward C	896
Colegrove, Prof. Kenneth	905
Dooman, Eugene H	703
Fortier, Brig. Gen. L. Joseph (retired)	843
Kornfeder, Joseph Zack	864
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C. (retired)	775
Widener, Mrs. William Harry	755

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Smith of North Carolina.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The chair regrets that, due to the absence of the chairman from the Senate for 2 weeks, the matter of these hearings has been delayed. They will proceed more expeditiously from now on.

Who is our witness today, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Eugene Dooman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DOOMAN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE H. DOOMAN, LITCHFIELD, CONN.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, please, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Eugene H. Dooman, and my home is at Litchfield, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. I am retired.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, will you tell us what positions you have held in the United States State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, from the beginning, in 1912, when I entered the Foreign Service, I was first assigned to the Embassy at Tokyo to study the Japanese language.

After several years' tour of duty in several of the consulates in Japan, I was assigned to the American Embassy at Tokyo as third secretary in 1921.

I remained there until 1931, when I was transferred as first secretary of the Embassy at London.

From 1933 to 1937 I had the Japanese desk in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, and in that last year I was transferred to Tokyo as counselor of the American Embassy.

In 1942 after my return from Japan I was assigned to the Embassy in Russia as minister consular. I returned to the State Department in 1942 and after doing various things I was assigned in February 1945 as Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.

And I retired on the 31st of August 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the importance of that Far Eastern Committee mentioned as your last position held in the State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. It had previously been found that discussions between the various departments—that is, primarily the State Department, the War Department, and the Navy Department—in connection with problems that arose out of the war through negotiations were unsatisfactory.

And in 1944, I believe it was, a committee was formed, known as the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. The members of that committee were the Assistant Secretaries of those repective Departments, the Chairman being James Dunn, who was Assistant Secretary of State.

Under the Coordinating Committee there were two subcommittees, one for Germany and one for Japan, and it was the function of those committees to formulate a joint agreement or meeting of the minds of the three Departments on various problems that had both political and military content.

The Subcommittee on the Far East, of which I was Chairman, then had the function of developing and formulating policies with respect to Japan primarily, which had both military and political content.

I would therefore say that it was the original source of all of the ultimate decisions that were made in the field of policy respecting Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Dooman, can you recall that Owen Lattimore was proposed at one time as a consultant to the chief of the China desk of the Department of State?

Mr. DOOMAN. I can; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us your recollection with respect to that particular incident, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. At that time, which must have been early in 1945, I was, as I have just said, acting as Chairman of this Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, and I was therefore not primarily interested in the functions and operations of the Far Eastern Division, or the Far Eastern Office, as it was then called.

But one of the men in the office told me that papers were going through the State Department calling for the appointment of Dr. Lattimore as adviser to the China Division, the papers having been initiated by the Chief of the China Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Mr. DOOMAN. That was Mr. John Carter Vincent.

I discussed the matter with Mr. Ballantine, who was then Director of the Far Eastern Division, and pointed out that Lattimore at that time, and for several months previously, had been using every opportunity to discredit the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Grew.

And I pointed out that it would be incongruous for a man who had expressed himself so freely on Mr. Grew to be occupying a position under Mr. Grew.

With that I reported the matter to Mr. Grew, and he then called up the administrative people who had charge of appointments and ordered that the papers be quashed.

Senator EASTLAND. What did Mr. Lattimore have to say against Mr. Grew? What was the complaint against him?

Mr. DOOMAN. That would take a long time.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it because he had been opposing communism in the Far East and because he wanted a peace treaty that would prevent the Communists from getting Japan?

The CHAIRMAN. By "he," you refer to Mr. Grew?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. DOOMAN. The principal cause of complaint was that Mr. Grew had advocated an attitude on the part of the United States of noninterference with the Japanese themselves in the form of government which they wanted to institute.

In other words, if they wanted to keep the Emperor, by all means let them keep it. If they wanted to disestablish the monarchy, by all means let them disestablish it.

Senator EASTLAND. Why would the Communists want the Emperor overthrown?

Mr. DOOMAN. The point which you have mentioned, Senator, was one of the cardinal points of the Communists not only in the United States but also throughout the world. They knew perfectly well, of course, that communism and a monarchial system were incongruous.

Therefore, the first thing was to get rid of the monarchial system.

They knew also that the communalistic type of society which has existed in Japan for 2,000 years existed largely because of the Emperor being a sort of an element which brought the Nation together.

Now, this is the type of thing which I do not understand myself, and I do not believe any occidental can, but nevertheless, it is a fact.

Senator EASTLAND. Lattimore understood that fact?

Mr. DOOMAN. Lattimore understood the fact that it was the Emperor who did bring it together.

Senator EASTLAND. His opposition to Grew was that Mr. Grew was favoring a policy after the war was won that would prevent the Communists from getting Japan. That is it in a nutshell, is it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. That would be—if I were to answer your question, Senator, it would be largely question of opinion.

Senator EASTLAND. That is your judgment?

Mr. DOOMAN. That is my judgment.

Senator EASTLAND. And Mr. John Carter Vincent was urging the appointment of Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a question?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Eastland's proposed question was: Was Mr. John Carter Vincent urging the appointment of Owen Lattimore at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

As I mentioned in my testimony, the papers calling for the assignment of Lattimore as adviser to the China Division were initiated by Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point, since we have gotten into the subject, I think it is appropriate that we should introduce into the record a resolution of the Communist Party at this juncture with respect to the policy toward Japan.

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the resolution that has been discussed so far today?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a mimeographed copy of excerpts from a magazine called Political Affairs for July 1945, the official organ at that time of the Communist Political Association.

It is headed "The present situation and the next tasks."

The CHAIRMAN. That is published where?

Mr. MANDEL. In Political Affairs, July 1945, published in New York City.

These excerpts are taken from a draft resolution of the national board of the CPA, which is the abbreviation for the Communist Political Association, as amended and approved by the national committee on June 20.

This draft is now submitted for the further consideration of the membership and for final action by the emergency national convention of the CPA on July 26–28.

The following excerpts are quoted [reading]:

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist Europe in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms of government and social system has been reflected in many of the recent actions of the State Department.

This explains why, at San Francisco, Stettinius and Connally joined hands with Vandenberg—the spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance capital. * * *

It is this reactionary position of the American big business which explains why Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united and democratic China; and why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East.

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist-militarist Japan, it is necessary that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese imperialism.

However, labor and other anti-Fascists must take cognizance of the fact that, amongst those big-business circles who desire military victory over Japan, there are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are seeking a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war, at the expense of China and the other Far East peoples, and directed against the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings, including many in administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of Japan for imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang regime in China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far East. * * *

In the opinion of the Communist Policy Association, such a program should be based on the following slogans of action:

* * * * * * *

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials. * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into the record the excerpts of the extracts from Political Affairs of July 1945, which was read by Mr. Mandel. I would like to introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 234," and is as follows:)

[From Political Affairs, July 1945]

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE NEXT TASKS

Draft resolution of the National Board, CPA (Communist Political Association), as amended and approved by the national committee on June 20. This draft is now submitted for the further consideration of the membership and for final action by the emergency national convention of the CPA on July 26–28 (p. 579):

* * * * * * *

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist Europe, in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms of government and social system, has been reflected in many of the recent actions of the State Department. This explains why, at San Francisco, Stettinius and Connally joined hands with Vandenberg—the spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance capital * * * (p. 580).

It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united and democratic China; why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East * * * (p. 581).

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist militarist Japan it is necessary that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese imperialism.

However, labor and the other anti-Fascists must take cognizance of the fact that, amongst those big-business circles who desire military victory over Japan, there are influential forces, including some in the State Department, who are seeking a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war, at the expense of China and the other Far East peoples, and directed against the Soviet Union. Similarly, there are powerful capitalist groupings, including many in administration circles, who plan to use the coming defeat of Japan for imperialist aims, for maintaining a reactionary puppet Kuomintang regime in China, for obtaining American imperialist domination in the Far East * * * (p. 583).

In the opinion of the Communist Political Association, such a program should be based on the following slogans of action:

* * * * * * *

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials * * * (p. 584).

Mr. DOOMAN. May I add something to that story about the papers for appointment?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Dooman.

Mr. DOOMAN. I just recall now that about 2 weeks after this episode Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of the Johns Hopkins University, came to see the President. That must have been then, I think it was, along about February of 1945. He came to see the President and asked the President to intervene on behalf of Dr. Lattimore with the State Department. And the matter was brought to the attention then of the State Department and no further action was taken.

May I correct it again? This must have been about April of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did John Carter Vincent hold at that time, Mr. Dooman, at the time these papers for employing Mr. Lattimore as consultant were submitted?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was Chief of the China Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he hold any other position in the State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. Not at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he associated with one of the area committees?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, yes. The far-eastern area was an intradepart-

mental committee at which there was an attempt made to get a consensus of opinion about various policies concerning the Far East. And the composition of that committee varied with the problems that were discussed.

But, generally speaking, the standing members of that were Dr. Blakeslee, who was chairman, Dr. Hugh Borton, who was secretary, and then the Chief of the Japan Division, Mr. Earl Dickover; Mr. Ballantine, Director of the Far Eastern Office, and myself as chairman of this far eastern subcommittee.

And then, depending on the problems to be discussed, there was representation from other divisions of the Department who were interested in that particular problem.

For example, if we were discussing the question of the mandated islands, we would have representatives from the Legal Section and from, we will say, the European Section, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you say this was a policy-making committee, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was a policy-developing committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Was John Carter Vincent a member of that committee?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; he could come in whenever he wanted to. As a matter of fact, he chose not to come very often. He was usually represented by a man from his office called Julian Friedman.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked the question: Was John Carter Vincent a member of that committee.

I would like to have an answer to: Was he a member of that committee?

Mr. DOONAN. Well, as I tried to explain, the membership in that committee was a fairly loose thing, because it varied with the subjects to be discussed. There were no officially appointed members of the committee. There were certain standing members, those primarily concerned with Japan.

And then the composition of the committee was extended, depending upon the character of the subject to be discussed. Naturally, China would be very much influenced by whatever policies we set up for Japan, and, therefore, it was quite right and proper that the China Division should be fully familiar with whatever was going on in the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. When John Carter Vincent did attend, did he have full authority the same as any other member of the committee both to speak, act, and vote?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify, Mr. Dooman, that when Mr. John Carter Vincent did not attend he sent a representative?

Mr. DOOMAN. Sometimes they both came.

Mr. MORRIS. Sometimes both Julian Friedman and John Carter Vincent came?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Julian Friedman take a position and express himself at these meetings?

Mr. DOOMAN. Not very often.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever make any charges against Julian Friedman at that time in connection with his attendance at the area meetings?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; I did not make any charges because that implies that I complained to somebody else, some higher authority.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt again. I may have lost track of this.

Who was Julian Friedman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Julian Friedman was a member of the China Division of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time a letter which indicates Julian Friedman's association with the State Department, and at the same time his connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, which composition is being considered by this committee.

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate both of those documents?

Mr. MANDEL. The first is a letter from the State Department to the Honorable Pat McCarran, dated April 23, 1951, signed by Eldridge Durbrow, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.

The letter reads as follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the Secretary, concerning Julian R. Friedman, has been referred to me for reply.

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from October 5, 1945, until the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was effective November 13, 1946. Consequently, it had been decided to abolish the Auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the Auxiliary, it was necessary to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or Auxiliary officers, including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that his services were terminated without prejudice.

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.

Sincerely yours.

The Biographical Register of the State Department, dated October 1, 1945, on page 106, lists the positions held by Julian Friedman, which I would like to put into the record.

I can read them, if you desire.

Mr. MORRIS. I do not think it is necessary, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. I also submit Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the ninth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, on page 1061, which shows that Julian Friedman was a member of the conference secretariat.

And further I submit a circular distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations showing a meeting held announcing a new IPR study, Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein, with a supplement called Labor in Nationalist China, 1945–48, by Julian R. Friedman.

Introduce that circular into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record, to have marked as the next consecutive exhibits, the four documents just described and read by Mr. Mandel.

The first is a letter from the State Department to the chairman on Julian Friedman's position in the State Department.

The second is the Biographical Register excerpt.

The third is the record from Security in the Pacific, the Institute of Pacific Relations publication, showing that Julian Friedman was a member of the conference secretariat, and the fourth being a throw-away indicating that Julian Friedman had written the publication under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record and properly identified.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 235, 236, 237, and 238," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 235

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 23, 1951.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the Secretary, concerning Julian R. Friedman has been referred to me for reply.

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from October 5, 1945, until the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was effective November 13, 1946. Consequently it had been decided to abolish the Auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the Auxiliary, it was necessary to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or auxiliary officers including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that his services were terminated without prejudice.

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.

Sincerely yours,

ELBRIDGE DURBROW,
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.

EXHIBIT No. 236

JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN: App. div. asst. in the Dept. of State, Sept. 2, 1943; asst. to chief Div. of Labor Relations, Sept. 1, 1944; divisional asst., Nov. 20, 1944; asst. sec. of comm., United Nations Conf. on Int. Org., San Francisco, 1945; research and analysis asst., May 17, 1945. (Biographic Register, Dept. of State, Oct. 1, 1945, p. 106.)

EXHIBIT No. 237

JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN

CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP

Conference Secretariat:

* * *

Julian Friedman

* * *

(Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., Jan. 6–17, 1945, p. 161.)

EXHIBIT No. 238

Announcing a new IPR study, Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein (159 pp. mimeographed), $2.25.

With a supplement: Labor in Nationalist China, 1945–48, by Julian R. Friedman. Chapters: The War and Industry; Hours and Wages; Migrant Skilled Workers; New (Local) Workers; Women and Children in Industry; "Coolie" Labor; Conscript, Contract, and Slave; Kuomintang Labor Law and Decrees; Labor Organizations and the Labor Movement * * * with a documentary appendix with the text of important Nationalist and Communist labor laws and policy statements.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.

[Attached]

Please send me ____ copies of "Labor Notes on Nationalist China."
____ $2.25 enclosed____Bill me (Postage added).
____ I am an IPR member entitled to $1.80 price.
Name _____
Address _____

Mr. MORRIS. I think we have shown in past hearings the connection between Mr. Owen Lattimore and the Institute of Pacific Relations to a great extent, and John Carter Vincent.

I think we may as well at this point show the connection of John Carter Vincent with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter dated November 12, 1945, addressed to E. C. Carter, that was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I read the first paragraph:

In answer to your letter of November 1, there is attached hereto a list of the present board of trustees of the American Council, listing the dates of their election, the amounts of their current contribution, and the largest amount they have ever contributed.

On this list we have the name of John Carter Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this shows that John Carter Vincent was in 1945 a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. From what source does this come?

Mr. MANDEL. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. It may be marked and filed with the committee.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 239" and is as follows:)

NOVEMBER 12, 1945.

DEAR MR. CARTER: In answer to your letter of November 1, there is attached hereto a list of the present board of trustees of the American Council, listing the dates of their election, the amount of their current contribution, and the largest amount they have ever contributed.

The answers to your other questions can be summarized as follows:

The most active trustees in the New York area are those on the executive committee. Of these, Calkins, Barnett, Huggins, Jessup, and McConaughy have been the most active. Morris has regularly attended meetings, made a special gift to the library of some books in his father's collection, is available for advice, but is neither a large contributor nor will he assume any responsibility for fund raising. Seymour regularly attended meetings the first 6 months after my arrival but has been reorganizing a new company and so has been unavailable for anything more than telephone comment for some months. He is more allergic to Kohlberg's charges than most members of the committee, but is unquestionably of value in money raising, as he is well known downtown and generally well liked. The most important person to rely upon Seymour's judgment currently is E. B. Kilner of the Associated Telephone Services, who has repeatedly told me that his company is on the verge of supporting us by a contribution of $1,000 to $5,000 or withdrawing their current $250 support entirely.

In Seattle, the most active members of the board are Martin and Allen. Other active people in Seattle are Greenwood, Baillargeon, and Fuller, although Reginald Parsons has renewed a good deal of his old interest. Allen is a potential troublemaker but I find he can be handled by talking as tough to him as he talks to you. If the current plans for a National Conference of Amco go through and Allen is completely sold on our bona fides, he will be of considerable use in money raising in the Northwest. It would be unwise to rely on Ben Kizer in that area as many of the Seattle businessmen, although close friends of Ben, regard him as an outsider by virtue of his Spokane connections.

The most active members of the board in San Francisco are Greenslade, Allen, Emma McLaughlin, Hunter Galen Fisher, Brayton Wilbur, and Wickett. Of these, Brayton Wilbur and Wickett are the most important in money raising. Galen Fisher has contributed articles to the Far Eastern Survey. Mrs. McLaughlin, Mrs. Dorothy Rogers (not a national board member), and Lynn White, Jr., president of Mills (not a national board member) have been most active in the school program and in general membership activities.

In Los Angeles, Rosecrans, although technically chairman of the now defunct Los Angeles committee, has done little more than make his annual contribution. Arthur Coons is the spearhead in that neighborhood and, if Rosecrans can be persuaded to give Coons a go-ahead signal, a Los Angeles committee can very easily be reconstituted. Harvey Mudd is interested—almost entirely in research—but would probably be available for financial support if a research program centered at the Huntington Library were undertaken. Dr. Millikan is interested in such a program and would put on a meeting in Huntington Library for discussion of such activities.

In Chicago, an entire new slate of trustees is required with the exception of the Quincy Wrights. Edward Embree freely admits that he has only a small portion of his time available for the IPR and would like to be relieved of responsibility. The same is true of McNair; and, Colegrove, although willing to talk, is carrying a torch against us because of our handling of India and the use of people like Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal.

In other sections of the country, the most interested trustees, as shown by correspondence, are Jerome Green and Mortimer Graves, both of whom have written coments on articles in the Survey and are interested in activities generally.

Apart from the executive committee, Fisher, Ned Allen, Mortimer Graves, Arthur Coons, Brayton Wilbur, and Morison represent the only individuals on the national board of trustees with whom there has been correspondence on anything other than renewing their contributions.

EXHIBIT No. 239

AMCO board of trustees

	Year elected	Present contribution		Highest contribution	
		Date	Amount	Date	Amount
Greene, Jerome D	1928	Nov. 15, 1944	$10	1930	$10,000
Wild, Payson		Aug. 7, 1945	5		
Chapman, Mrs. Ralph		Nov. 2, 1944	10		
Embree, Edwin R	1943	Mar. 19, 1945	10	Jan. 23, 1943	25
Wright, Mrs. Louise	1924-37	June 18, 1945	10		
Allen, Riley H		1943	25		
Atherton, Frank C		1943	650		
Dillingham, W. F		1943	100	1941	250
Loomis, Charles F		Dec. 16, 1944	250		
Morison, George Abbot		June 5, 1945	10		
Barnett, Eugene E		Dec. 21, 1944	10	Dec. 21, 1943	25
Calkins, Robert D	1943	Mar. 12, 1945	10		
Chamberlain, Joseph P	1929	Aug. 4, 1944	500	July 26, 1943	1,000
Field, Frederick V	1932	1944	760	1938	12,600
Gilchrist, Huntington		Dec. 29, 1944	25		
Huggins, G. Ellsworth	1937	1944	650		
Jessup, Philip C	1933	July 20, 1945	10		
Luce, Henry R		Dec. 16, 1944	2,500		
McConaughy, James L	1943	Jan. 12, 1945	10		
McCoy, Frank R	1943	Oct. 13, 1944	25		
Morris, Lawrence		Oct. 20, 1944	25	Oct. 23, 1943, WPF, 3 years.	300
Parker, Philo W	1937	Aug. 7, 1945	25	Feb. 24, 1942	50
Seymour, Lawrence D	1943	July 13, 1945	25		
Kizer, Benjamin H	1935	Dec. 15, 1944	50	Aug. 17, 1943, WPF.	10
Martin, Charles E	1927	Jan. 30, 1945	10		
Allen, Captain		Feb. 12, 1945	10		
Charles, Allan E		Jan. 20, 1945	15		
Davis, Joseph S		Dec. 1, 1944	5		
Fisher, Galen M	1927	July 3, 1945, New York.	25	1940, New York	275
Do		Mar. 6, 1945	50	1940, San Francisco.	315
Grady, Henry F		Oct. 31, 1944	100		
Greenslade, Admiral		Feb. 7, 1944	10		
Do		Dec. 6, 1944	50		
McLaughlin, Mrs. A	1927	Dec. 6, 1944	75	1940	450
Rowell, Chester	1927	Feb. 8, 1945	10	December 1929	500
Sproul, Robert G		Apr. 6, 1945	10	June 30, 1941	25
Wickett, F. A		Jan. 26, 1945	40	Mar. 29, 1944	5
Do		Jan. 26, 1945		Sept. 21, 1944	100
Do				Dec. 14, 1944	350
Wilbur, Brayton				1942	100
Wilbur, Ray Lyman	1934	Mar. 14, 1945	150	1940	300
Rosecrans, W. S		May 2, 1944	100		
DeCaux, Len	1943	Jan. 5, 1945	10		
Fairbank, John		Feb. 26, 1945	5		
Graves, Mortimer	1943	Mar. 8, 1937	5		
Lattimore, Owen		Nov. 20, 1944	10	June 8, 1938	20
Thomas, Elbert D		Mar. 6, 1945	10		
Vincent, John Carter		Complimentary			
Buck, Pearl S		Dec. 26, 1944	25		
Emeny, Brooks		Oct. 25, 1943	500		
Emeny, Brooks and Mrs		WPF	2,500		
Hoffman	1943	Mar. 28, 1945	100		
Notestein, Mrs. A	1927	July 18, 1945	100		
Trippe, Juan		Dec. 30, 1944	2,500		
Yarnell, Admiral H. E		Nov. 6, 1944	25		

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, could you describe for us Owen Lattimore's position with respect to Japan at the time of the episode we have just had testimony concerning?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Morris, may I remind you that I have not answered the last question that you put to me?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to draw that to your attention. I did not think the last question had been answered. You interrupted him with the insertion of some material.

Mr. DOOMAN. You asked me whether I had made any charges against Julian Friedman, and I said I had not made any charges because that implied that I had complained to some higher authority.

The fact was that a very short time after statements had been made in secret meetings of this Far East Area Committee, the proceedings and the statements made by various individuals immediately were quoted in various left-wing periodicals and newspapers There were literally dozens of such occasions

Senator EASTMAN. Such at PM?

Mr. DOOMAN. That would include PM.

It so happens that among all these instances that actually occurred, I happened to keep one, and that was in the Nation of February 3, 1945, where there appears an article by one Pacificus, entitled "Dangerous Experts."

Among other things here is the following paragraph which I would like to read, if I may. I might say that Dangerous Experts refers among others to myself.

> Mr. Dooman not only believes in retaining the emperorist system minus some of the more militaristic forms of emperor worship, but also thinks that the only elements we can rely on in Japan are the business leaders, court circle aristocrats, and bureaucrats.

It so happened that at one of the meetings of the Far Eastern Area Committee, a few days before this article was published, we were discussing the question of education, and I pointed out that the big business leaders, members of the aristocracy, the people in the professions in the higher levels, included by far the largest majority of those who had been educated at Yale and Harvard and Cambridge and Oxford, and other universities, both in England and the United States.

If there was any value whatsoever in reeducation along our lines it was obvious, then, that either these people had enjoyed the benefits of our educational facilities and were, therefore, the most progressive elements, or there was no value whatever in reeducation. You could not have both.

Now, I did make that statement. This is a garbled version of what I said. But the important thing is that it appeared a few days later in The Nation.

Well, by a process of elimination in a number of instances of this kind, I found that outside of those who were more or less standing members of the committee who appeared every time and who were completely reliable, that Friedman was the constant element.

I therefore went to Friedman and I taxed him with being the source of information for these articles that appeared in Amerasia, in PM, The Nation, New Republic, and so on. He denied that he had given any of this information to unauthorized persons.

He said that he reported only to his chief, who was then Mr. Vincent.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. who?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. That being John Carter Vincent?

Mr. DOOMAN. John Carter Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, would you tell us to the best of your ability the position that Owen Lattimore took at that time with respect to Japan? This is in 1945.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, there is a whole library that could be made up of statements made by Mr. Lattimore during that period. I suppose the best known, the one most frequently quoted, is a book called Solution in Asia, which was published, I think, in about February 1945, and was very widely circulated during the spring and early summer, in fact until the surrender of Japan.

In general, he took the position that the Japanese people, when they were defeated, would rise in rebellion against the system and overthrow the monarchy; that there were elements in the State Department, the so-called reactionary Fascist elements, who knew nothing whatever about Japan except what they had picked up from people in high social levels in Japan, and that these elements were intended to use the prestige and the force of the influence of the United States to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the Japanese people.

Another point which he made was that the chief militarists were not the war lords, General Tojo and others, but the big industrial leaders. That these, the army and the navy, were merely puppets and instruments of the big industrialists.

Therefore, his position was that we should allow the Japanese people to have their revolt and disestablish the monarchy and that we should then try these industrialists as war criminals and put them out of the way so that they would never be in a position of influence.

And, third, that the Japanese system, economic system, should be completely broken up and a highly developed competitive economic system should be instituted.

Now, as I say, these statements can be found in a great many places.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us whatever documentation you can?

Mr. DOOMAN. I have here, for example, a radio discussion, a round-table discussion that was carried out, I believe, under the auspices of the University of Chicago. It was along about July 8, 1945.

Now, I notice that the press recently quoted Dr. Lattimore as having said that his position had been consistently one of urging that we do not interfere in the event that the Japanese wanted to disestablish the monarchy. That is not the whole story.

In Solution in Asia, he makes this statement, which I cannot quote textually, but it runs somewhat along these lines. He says:

> I will venture the political prophecy that the Japanese people will themselves revolt and disestablish the monarch.

Now, the suggestion at the same time, at that time—that is, before the surrender—that people like Mr. Grew and myself were intending to keep the Emperor in power implied, then, that we proposed to use the influence and the position of the United States to prevent the exercise by the Japanese people of their own will.

Well, let me say at this point that this whole discussion about the Emperor carried on by the leftist press at that time was a piece of sheer lunacy. If the Japanese people wanted to get rid of the Emperor there was obviously nothing we could do to keep him in; if, on the other hand, the Japanese people wanted to keep the Emperor it would have been a piece of folly on our part to have disestablished a monarchy.

Senator EASTLAND. Did John Carter Vincent endorse those views of Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. DOOMAN. I never heard him express that opinion, except probably indirectly through—and this is only an assumption—no, Senator; if I may correct my statement, I will say no, I have never heard him express it.

Senator EASTLAND. When Mr. Grew resigned, what place in the Department did Mr. Vincent get?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Grew retired, or at least presented his resignation on or about the 14th of August. I may be off a matter of a few days or so. But the day he retired, or presented his resignation, it was announced in the papers that Mr. Dean Acheson has been appointed as Under Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson having previously retired as Assistant Secretary of State with the announcement that he was going to resume private practice.

Mr. Acheson then returned to the State Department somewhere around the 25th of August 1945. And the day after he returned there he announced that I would be replaced as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of Swink by Mr. Vincent.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like also to know, if I am not getting too far afield——

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right.

Senator EASTLAND. The difference in what was advocated by John Carter Vincent for Japan and the policies that the Communists put over in Eastern Europe. I would like to know the difference between the policies that he advocated for Japan and the policies that the Communists put over in Eastern Europe.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, sir, I am not competent to discuss authoritatively what the Communists put over in Eastern Europe, but I can tell you what was done in Japan.

And it may, perhaps, occur to you that there are certain very distinct analogies between what was done there and what was done in Eastern Europe.

Senator EASTLAND. They were practically the same; were they not?

Mr. DOOMAN. I would prefer, if I may, Senator, to describe——

Senator EASTLAND. What is it? You have discussed it, in executive session. Is it not your judgment, now, that the policies that Mr. Vincent attempted to put over in Japan were the same as the policies that Russia dictated for the satellite countries?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I am trying to be as accurate——

Senator EASTLAND. What is your judgment?

Mr. DOOMAN. My judgment is it is the same.

Senator EASTLAND. They were the same?

Mr. DOOMAN. Obviously the same. But I would like to amplify that, if I may.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to. I want you to explain what our State Department attempted to do in Japan, and the similarity with what Russia did in the satellite countries.

Mr. DOOMAN. On September 22, 1945, the White House released a paper, which was entitled, "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." That paper was the work of our committee, the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, for a period of about 7 or 8 months, except for certain important changes which I will refer to.

As I was to retire from the State Department on the 31st of August I asked Mr. Dunn, as chairman of SWINK, to call a meeting for the express purpose of adopting this paper that we had been working on for a long time; namely, the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan.

That paper was adopted by SWINK on the 29th of August, and on the 29th of August that was telegraphed out to General MacArthur as a firm United States policy for Japan.

However, in this release that was issued on the 22d of September, it was pointed out, or it was clear, that the paper had been reopened.

On September 6—mind you, on September 6—by September 6, Mr. Grew had retired as Under Secretary, and had been replaced by Mr. Acheson. I had retired and had been replaced as chairman of the far eastern subcommittee by Mr. Vincent.

Well, I was very much interested in seeing whether there had been any changes. And I found these, which I will quote. These were among the changes that had been made in the paper after it had been adopted on the 29th of August [reading]:

Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander—

(*a*) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends.

Please do not ask me to explain what that means.

(*b*) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Japan's trade and industry.

It is on the basis of these two clauses that work was undertaken to destroy, first of all, to eliminate the capitalist class in Japan.

Senator EASTLAND (presiding). Who attempted to eliminate the capitalist class in Japan?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Who attempted to eliminate it?

Mr. DOOMAN. These were the instructions sent from Washington.

Senator EASTLAND. That was the American State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. With the concurrence of the Navy Department and the War Department.

These were the instructions sent to General MacArthur through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator EASTLAND. That was the work of John Carter Vincent, was it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was chairman at that time of this Far East subcommittee.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead. Excuse me.

Mr. MORRIS. May I just keep the record straight. It may be unnecessary, but may I point out that Mr. Dooman is testifying that this is the promulgation of American policy, and it represents a document that Mr. Dooman worked upon while he was officially connected with the State Department.

And he noticed that when the program was finally promulgated these were the changes that had been made by his successors from the program that had been adopted by Mr. Dooman and Mr. Grew prior to that time.

Mr. DOOMAN. That is so.

Senator EASTLAND. That was the Acheson-Vincent program there?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. What did they attempt to put over under that program?

Mr. DOOMAN. The first thing that was done, and this was in 1946, was to levy a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent on all property in excess of $1,000.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Russia do that in the countries of Eastern Europe?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, that is why I hesitate to answer your questions directly, Senator, because I do not know whether they did, or not. I know that the end means was achieved by perhaps the same means, or by other means; I don't know.

Senator EASTLAND. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. DOOMAN. You can imagine what that meant. That is, a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent of all property above $1,000. That almost at one stroke wiped out the capitalist class.

The excuse for that was that it was necessary to prevent an inflation.

At that time, if I am correct, in my recollection, the Japanese yen was pegged to the dollar at 15 yen to the dollar. And this was a measure purportedly to prevent any further inflation.

It was not more than a month or two after this thing was carried out that the yen then was pegged at 50 to 1. In other words, it had declined by more than a third. That was the ostensible reason given.

Of course, as anybody could see, it would not have been an effective one. But it did have the effect——

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead. What were the other things that were proposed?

Mr. DOOMAN. The next thing was, and this is somewhat controversial, but perhaps a good case might be made out for it, but as everybody has seen today, after this thing has been in effect for some years, the thing is not working.

The next thing was to expropriate all land in excess of 5 acres held by any one owner.

Senator EASTLAND. That was a Communist system, was it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, Senator, in Poland I think they put the limit at 200 acres at that time. But in Japan, where 85 million people are trying to make a living off an area——

Senator EASTLAND. I understand, but they were following now the Communist system, were they not?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Senator SMITH. May I ask him one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I understood you to say just now the yen was first pegged at 15 to 1.

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Later on at 50 to 1. And then you made the observation that that was a decline of one-third. It would decline 300 percent, would it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; that is right.

Senator SMITH. You were in error about the one-third?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Well, all land was expropriated in excess of 5 acres. There was an ostensible effort to pay them compensation for this land, but by this time they were paying for land in yen which had depreciated to one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the nominal value of the land.

For example, if the land had been valued in 1920, as it was—that was when the financial panic was taking place—if the land was valued at $1,000 an acre, they paid the owners of the land at $1,000, but in currency that had depreciated to one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the value.

In other words, if a man had $1,000 in land, he was paid one-one-hundred-and-eightieth.

There was virtually confiscation of all land above 5 acres.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead and describe what else there was.

Mr. DOOMAN. Then all holdings by any one individual in any large corporation in excess of 3 percent were confiscated. There were more polite terms used. That is, they were transferred to a government pool.

And then the Japanese Government was ordered to sell those shares in a certain order of priority to farmers' cooperatives, labor unions, and shopkeepers, at whatever price might be offered.

And, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to disregard any relationship between the price offered and the real value; and, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to finance any bids for the shares by farmers' cooperatives and labor unions.

So that the net result was then to destroy the previously existing capitalist class. As a capitalist class they no longer exist. Their places have been taken by hordes of black marketeers and Chinese and Formosan thugs of various kinds who have been engaged in illicit trade of various kinds and have then amassed this enormous fortune.

The net result was then to replace people who had traditionally had property with these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards of various kinds.

Senator EASTLAND. Were those recommendations favored by General MacArthur?

Mr. DOOMAN. Let me cite in reply to that the statement made by Mr. Acheson in reply to General MacArthur's pronouncement to the Japanese people. I think it was on the first anniversary of the occupation where General MacArthur had indicated that he looked forward to the time when the American occupation in Japan could be reduced to some figure below 200,000 soldiers.

That aroused great resentment in the State Department, and at that time Mr. Acheson issued the statement that General MacArthur or the military occupation were there merely to carry out the orders of the executive in Washington; that they were not the formulators of policy.

By implication policy was formulated in Washington.

Therefore, in general, one would say that it didn't really make—I don't know whether General MacArthur approved or disapproved.

Senator EASTLAND. What other policies were there?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, in the draft of this initial policy paper, which had been prepared under my chairmanship, with regard to people who were suspected of being war criminals or being militarists, it was provided that they should be purged; that is, removed from any position of authority, in the light of their own personal record, as brought out by some form of judicial investigation.

In other words, a man would stand or fall on his own personal record.

As you will see from that statement that I just read out, people were removed from office on the basis of their occupation. Practically the whole executive branch of Japanese business, from chairmen of boards down to section chiefs, practically the whole white-collar element in Japanese big business was removed at one stroke. Not because there was any record against them, but because they occupied certain positions. They destroyed it.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it not an attempt to destroy Japanese capitalism?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was an attempt to destroy and eliminate the brains of Japanese business.

Senator EASTLAND. If you destroy the brains, you destroy——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Let us see if we can get the question and answer together. The question was: Was this not an effort to destroy Japanese capitalism, and you converted that into saying Japanese brains. Let us get them together.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I am saying——

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the Senator's question.

Mr. DOOMAN. In my opinion it was. I would like to stress that in my opinion it was.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

What else did they attempt to put over?

Mr. DOOMAN. Just following that question, following that point, I want to quote from this round-table discussion of the University of Chicago on July 8, this statement attributed to Mr. Lattimore [reading]:

> That includes a lot of economic and political action as well because we cannot forget that the civilian warmakers, that is the big industrialists and financiers of Japan, are really primarily even more responsible for Japan's going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and navy are only the striking instruments and the tools.

Now, after the occupation about 12 of the leading Japanese industrialists were put in prison, and they were held in prison for 18 months while every effort was made to dig up evidence which would warrant their being put on trial, just as the military and political people were put on trial and later condemned.

They were held, as I say, for 18 months, and released because there was no evidence.

Now, if we are then to follow Mr. Lattimore, we obviously did a great injustice to General Tojo in hanging him, because according to Mr. Lattimore, we released his lords and masters and hung the tool and the instrument.

Senator EASTLAND. What other things were in the policy for Japan?

Mr. DOOMAN. I have with me a copy of a paper known as Far East Commission 230. This is a paper of considerable length, Senator, in which all of the principles are laid out for the atomizing of Japanese industry.

Senator EASTLAND. The what? I did not understand.

Mr. DOOMAN. The atomizing, the fragmentation of Japanese industry. It is a very long paper.

The general purport was to see to it that the Japanese economy, not only in industry but in banking and in every other field, should be reduced to the smallest possible element.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that tied in here? Who is the article by?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, it was a paper. It was introduced as follows: To the Far Eastern Commission by the Secretary General, Mr. Nelson T. Jonathan, under a paper which reads as follows [reading]:

The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far East Commission and is referred to Committee No. 2, economic and financial affairs.

Who prepared this paper, I have no means of knowing.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it an official publication of the State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. This has been released——

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that yes or no.

Mr. DOOMAN. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it an official publication of the State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. I do not know.

This is a privately printed paper I have before me.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you obtain that, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. This was obtained, and given to me by a friend of mine, Mr. James Lee Kaufman, an American lawyer in New York, who went out to Japan and discovered the existence of this paper, and he had it privately printed and distributed among his friends, and he also had a copy of it reproduced, or summarized in an issue for News Week 2 years ago.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did he get the paper in Japan?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was told of the existence of this paper, and was told if he went to a certain office he could find it. So he went to this—I don't know where—some repository of documents and asked a young lady——

Senator EASTLAND. It was there to guide the occupation forces, was it not? It was a policy to guide our occupation, was it not?

Mr. DOOMAN. I was getting around to that in just a second, Senator, if I may. I am answering the question.

The CHAIRMAN. The question has been propounded to you. Was it or was it not there to guide our occupation forces?

Mr. DOOMAN. This paper was submitted through the Far Eastern Commission for consideration, and it was never adopted by the Far Eastern Commission.

However, in draft form, it was sent out to Tokyo to the occupation authorities in the economic section and they acted on it.

Senator EASTLAND. It was sent by our State Department?

Mr. DOOMAN. Sent by whom, I do not know. But it was sent to the occupation authorities and they acted on it.

And when the disclosure was made by my friend, Kaufman, that this paper had been acted on, it was then disavowed as merely being a draft and merely presented to the Far Eastern Commission for consideration.

But the point I want to emphasize was that it was, for all practical purposes, an official document, because it was on the basis of this that various instructions were sent to the Japanese Government.

Senator EASTLAND. As a matter of fact, to put it very mildly, there is a striking similarity between the American policy toward Japan and the policies laid down by Russia to the satellite states in Eastern Europe, is there not?

Mr. DOOMAN. I think that would be a fair statement to state.

Let me amplify that, if I may. You may remember that there had been, before this establishment of this Far Eastern Commission, in existence in London, the so-called European Commission of which the members were representatives of the United States, England, Russia, and, I believe, France. And it was pretty well known in the discussions before the Far Eastern Commission what the ideas of the Russians were with regard to Germany, with regard to the treatment of Japan.

Therefore, when it came to the question of Japan, there were those elements who, knowing what the Russians wanted in Germany, assumed that they would be satisfied with parallel policies in Japan.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, what Russia wanted was to set up a chaos and a system by which they could move in; was that not it?

Mr. DOOMAN. I think so.

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Are there now in positions of power and trust in the American Government any of the men who were responsible for the enunciation of this policy you have described to us?

Mr. DOOMAN. Oh, yes.

Senator SMITH. Who are they?

Mr. DOOMAN. Some, I say are responsible, from the chain of command.

Senator EASTLAND. Name them, please.

Mr. DOOMAN. In 1945 when this initial post surrender policy was promulgated, the responsible people were, from the top, Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Byrnes.

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State; Mr. Acheson, Under Secretary of State; John Carter Vincent, as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, and also Director of the Far Eastern Division; Mr. Edward Barton, who is still an economist, I believe; he is the economist in charge of economic affairs for the occupation of this area; James Pennfield, and then——

Senator SMITH. What position is he in now?

Mr. DOOMAN. I believe he is in Yugoslavia as counselor of the Embassy, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. He had just returned from the Far East and was assigned as deputy to Mr. Vincent in the Far East Subcommittee of SWINK.

Now, subsequently—and this is hearsay—the people who have been busy on Japanese affairs, Japanese policies, in addition to those I have named, would include Mr. John Allison, and—what is his name now—an economist, Barnett. I don't know what his first name is. Barnett.

I think those are the principal ones.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, is there any indication of any activity by the top two men you mentioned in the furtherance of this policy, Mr. Byrnes or Mr. Acheson? Is there any evidence at all, indication of activity on their part toward favoring the carrying out of that policy?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, in my personal knowledge, and this requires—well, my personal knowledge, I can recite one case.

In the spring of 1945 there was a meeting of the full Committee of SWINK, the chairman at that time for that day being Mr. McCloy, John McCloy, who was then Assistant Secretary of War. And the committee as a whole had been discussing some European matter with which I was not concerned, and, therefore, I came into the room when they had completed their discussion of this European problem.

And I noticed among the people present was Mr. Dean Acheson. Now, he had been called in, apparently, for consultation on the European problem, and he had nothing whatever to do with the problem that I was to discuss, which was the question of the Japanese political system.

However, he stayed on. He was then Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. He had nothing to do with this officially.

And I made my report to the committee, and at the end of that report Mr. McCloy said, turning to Mr. Acheson:

> Dean, you are a great authority on far eastern matters. What do you think of what we have just heard?

And the reply was:

> I have discovered that far eastern experts are a penny a dozen. And you can find some experts which will support any point of view that you care to have. And I, myself, do not go along with what we have just heard. I prefer to be guided by experts who think more along my point of view.

From then on he quoted virtually textually from this Solution in Asia by Dr. Lattimore.

Senator SMITH. Do you mean he quoted from this paper that you mentioned?

Mr. DOOMAN. Where Dr. Lattimore had said that the Japanese people, he predicted that the Japanese people would rebel and disestablish the monarchy, and that if the monarchy existed it would be only because there are certain Fascist groups in the State Department who used the prestige of the United States.

Senator SMITH. Did he approve of this policy that was enunciated about practically confiscation of property?

Mr. DOOMAN. Oh, yes; he was Under Secretary of State.

And, as I say, I don't know, except from the fact that he would have been in the chain of command. That paper could never have gone through.

Senator EASTLAND. Who appointed Vincent?

Mr. DOOMAN. I think I testified that the day after Mr. Acheson returned as Under Secretary of State——

Senator EASTLAND. Just name him. Who appointed Vincent? Just name the man.

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Acheson.

Senator SMITH. Is there any indication that Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of State, knew about this at all?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; there is no indication.

Senator SMITH. That surprises me that that had developed, and I ask you specifically was there any evidence that Mr. Byrnes himself knew about this promulgation or enunciation of policy?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; there is no indication to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back to the episode you have just testified to. When did that take place?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was in the spring of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you thoroughly conversant with Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. Thoroughly.

Mr. MORRIS. When you heard Mr. Acheson enunciate his views on Japan, is it your testimony that they coincided with the views expressed by Owen Lattimore in Solution in Asia?

Mr. DOOMAN. Exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Did his view on experts being a dime a dozen coincide with the views of Owen Lattimore at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; his opinions about certain types of experts; yes. He had a very dim view of experts who did not agree with him.

As a matter of fact, he said, in effect, in his book, Solution in Asia, that people like myself had spent a long time in Japan, but we were spending all of our time with very polite people, and we really didn't know very much about what was going on.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back to some previous testimony that we have not completely finished.

I asked you earlier if you would document as much as possible your expression of Owen Lattimore's views at that time. You had given a rather precise summary of what his views were, and then I asked you if you had any documentation to support that.

I also offer you just by way of assistance in connection with that extracts from Mr. Lattimore's Solution in Asia that may aid you in answering the question I have just put to you.

Mr. DOOMAN. Here is a very reminiscent phrase.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. What are you testifying from?

Mr. MORRIS. These are extracts from Owen Lattimore's book, Solution in Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. DOOMAN (reading):

> Washington is full of experts who will tell you that the Japanese are mysterious, fanatical, and not to be understood by any ordinary use of the intellect. The same experts are also addicted to citing bits of lore which, they tell you condescendingly, explain why the Japanese always do this or never do that.

Here is an example of the attempts on the part of Dr. Lattimore to put into ridicule people who did not agree with his point of view.

There is missing from this that quotation to which I have just referred, and I think it runs:

As a political prophecy—

whatever that may mean—

As a political prophecy, the Japanese people will disestablish the monarchy unless there is interference on the part of people in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. You are attempting to quote now from Lattimore's——

Mr. DOOMAN. From memory, yes. I do not have a copy of the book.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a copy here, Mr. Chairman. I think we might ask Mr. Dooman if he would put the precise quotation in if possible.

Is it page 189, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, this is not the quotation I have in mind:

I assume that the Japan of the future will be a republic.

That follows another reference where he says, as a matter of political—will you give me just a minute?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Dooman.

Mr. DOOMAN. Here it is. It is on page 187 [reading]:

As a matter of political prophecy, I agree that the Japanese people are likely to overturn the throne unless we prevent them.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Dooman. Will you proceed with your documentation of views of Owen Lattimore which you have testified to here today?

Mr. DOOMAN. Would you like further references to Mr. Lattimore's opinion about the Emperor?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I think if you would put in a few more of those, Mr. Dooman; those extracts are of no assistance to you, are they, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; on page 189, I quote as follows [reading]:

If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good. If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China, but under the supervision of a United Nations Commission to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy.

The CHAIRMAN. From what did you read that extract?

Mr. DOOMAN. I am reading from page 189 of Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the whole of the Solution in Asia laid in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that book?

Mr. Morris. Yes; as well as the document referred to by the witness on the Round Table Conference from which quotes have been taken.

The Chairman. I do not think we will put the book in the record. We will make it a part of the files of this committee.

Mr. Morris. I meant make it a part of the files of the committee.

The Chairman. The excerpts are from the book, are they not?

Mr. Morris. We have read the excerpts from the record, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. They are from this?

Mr. Morris. Some excerpts are from Solution in Asia, Mr. Chairman, and others are from this publication of the Round Table Conference.

The Chairman. You want all of these put into the record?

Mr. Morris. So much of them as have been quoted by Mr. Dooman.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Morris. Meanwhile, I would like both of these documents made a part of the file of the record.

The Chairman It will be made part of the record so much as you select as having been testified to by the witness, but I may say that it all has not been testified to.

(The documents referred to were filed for the information of the committee.)

The Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, we have not finished the line of questioning before which concerns the official attitude or the attitude of John Carter Vincent with respect to these particular discussions.

Now, you said, to your own knowledge you have never heard John Carter Vincent give expression to any views that coincided with those of Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Dooman. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any official publications of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department that would show that the views of the head of that Department coincided with the views expressed by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Dooman. Yes; I have already—I thought I made it clear that primarily this initial post-surrender policy for Japan was one for which Mr. Vincent would have primary responsibility, and I have tried to show that.

Mr. Morris. How do you know that, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. Dooman. Because ipso facto he was an ex officio. He was chairman of this committee that produced that document.

Mr. Morris. In other words, he was the working chairman of the committee?

Mr. Dooman. He was the working chairman of that committee.

Mr. Morris. The reason I ask that, Mr. Dooman, is that awhile ago you gave expression to the view that Mr. Byrnes, as Secretary of State, you did not know that he personally shared the views put forth in this publication?

Mr. Dooman. No; I did not.

The question was whether I knew the people who were responsible and I mention Mr. Byrnes as being responsible by reason of the chain of command, he being the Secretary of State and the person ultimately responsible.

Mr. Morris. But is it your testimony, then, that John Carter Vincent, in addition to being the nominal head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and your successor in SWINK, that he was an active member, working member?

Mr. Dooman. Yes. May I say that he was more than the nominal director of the Far Eastern Office, he was the actual working director as of the 7th of September, 1945.

Mr. Morris. That is right. It is your testimony that Mr. Byrnes, as Secretary of State, his work in that position did not necessarily coincide with the position taken by——

Mr. Dooman. Mr. Byrnes actually had very little interest in the Far East.

Senator Smith. What I was trying to fix, Mr. Dooman, was that it was inconceivable to me that Mr. Byrnes had any such ideas.

Mr. Dooman. I tried to make it clear. I mentioned Mr. Byrnes among those responsible purely on grounds of chain of command.

Senator Smith. Yes.

The Chairman. The responsibility that you apply to Mr. Byrnes, if I understand it, stems from the fact that he was Secretary of State and that all mentioned in your testimony were under him; is that correct?

Mr. Dooman. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other promulgations of policy that you are acquainted with either directly or from your reading knowledge of them that you care to put into the record at this time?

Mr. Dooman. Very much.

Mr. Morris. Will you proceed, then, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. Dooman. Mr. Chairman, this is a fairly long story, and I hope you will bear patiently with me while I go into it.

The Chairman. Well, I want to know what the question is now, please.

Mr. Morris. Will you read the question back, please?

(The reporter read the pending question, as follows:)

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other promulgations of policy that you are acquainted with either directly or from your reading knowledge of them that you care to put into the record at this time?

The Chairman. Promulgation of policies as to what?

Mr. Morris. Promulgation of far-eastern policy with respect to Japan.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Smith. By whom? Anybody connected with the State Department?

Mr. Morris. By the State Department, particularly the Far Eastern Division thereof.

Senator Smith. That is all right.

Mr. Dooman. You will notice that all through my testimony I have referred constantly to this question of the Emperor.

In March or April of 1945, Colonel Dana Johnson, who was Chief of Psychological Warfare in Hawaii, came to Washington and saw Mr. Grew and myself. His conclusion, drawn from interrogating high-ranking Japanese prisoners of war, was that the Japanese were ready to surrender but that the various statements and the trend of

public opinion with regard to the question of the monarchy was such that so long as the Japanese were left with the impression that the Emperor was personally to be tried as a war criminal and punished, that the monarchial system would be disestablished, so long as those ideas were assumed to be public opinion and would be implemented as American policy after Japan's surrender, that the Japanese would not surrender.

Shortly thereafter on, I think it was the 17th of April——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you that was his opinion?

Mr. DOOMAN. He did, sir.

On April 17, there was a change of government, a general retired as Prime Minister and there was a reconstitution of the Government at the head of which was Admiral Suzuki, who was then Chamberlain to the Emperor and who had been throughout his career a moderate. He took that as a very clear signal that the Japanese were ready to surrender, ready to talk about this matter.

Furthermore, we had the advantage of reading messages between the Japanese Government and their Ambassador in Moscow, and it was clear from these and other indications that the Japanese were ready to surrender if only it were made clear that this trend of opinion that had been developed by the leftist press in the United States, namely, that the Emperor would be tried as a war criminal and the monarchial system disestablished, it was made clear that those were not policies of the United States.

We then started on preparing a document. About the middle of May, Mr. Henry Luce came back from a visit to the Pacific, and he was very much aroused. He said that the failure of the American Government to persuade the Japanese to surrender was causing, was doing, great damage to the morale of the American forces who had fought through Saipan and Tarawa, and who were anticipating then the assault on Japan and were fearful of the losses that would have to be paid there.

Mr. Grew, who saw Henry Luce, explained to him that we were working on that effort, we were working on a plan along those lines.

It was, I think, on the 24th of May, if that happens to be, if my recollection is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. 1945?

Mr. DOOMAN. 1945. It was on a Saturday that Mr. Grew called me in and instructed me to have ready Monday morning a paper which he would then present to the President outlining the policies that the United States would follow if Japan surrendered.

I then prepared that paper and took it to Mr. Grew on Monday morning.

So far as the portion relating to the Emperor is concerned, my original draft reads as follows—this was paragraph 12 [reading]:

> The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives—

namely, those previously enumerated—

> have been accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

Mr. Grew approved the draft and called a meeting of the Policy Committee of the State Department. The Policy Committee of the State Department at that time consisted of the Assistant Secretaries of State and the Legal Adviser. He read this document to them, and there was no dissent until he came to that paragraph which I have just read. There was then a violent reaction on the part of Mr. Acheson and Mr. MacLeish.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did both of those gentlemen hold at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. I was not present at the meeting but the whole idea of allowing the monarchy to remain was distasteful.

Mr. MORRIS. To Messrs. Acheson and MacLeish?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Dooman, if you were not present at the meeting, I think you ought to explain how you knew what took place.

Mr. DOOMAN. This was immediately told to me by Mr. Grew after the meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are describing, then, is Mr. Grew's description of what took place at the meeting?

Mr. DOOMAN. That is correct. Mr. Grew said that this committee was, after all, advisory to him, and that he was ultimately responsible, and that he would take the responsibility for presenting that document to the President with the recommendation that he include that document within a speech which he was to deliver at some appropriate occasion.

On the 28th of May, with Judge Rosenman, he went in to see the President. The President read it over and he said that he would approve, accept, the document, provided that it was agreeable to the armed services.

On the 29th of May, Mr. Grew, Judge Rosenman, and myself attended a meeting in Mr. Stimson's office.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose office?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Stimson, who was then Secretary of War.

This was at the Pentagon. There were present Secretary Forrestal, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Elmer Davis, who was then Director of the Office of War Information, Mr. Grew, myself, General Marshall, and I should say in addition about 10 to 12 of the highest military and naval officers—who they were I do not remember at this time.

We had prepared copies of this paper for distribution so that each member present would have a copy.

Mr. Stimson, who was in the chair at the meeting, said that he approved the document right along, he went right along with the paper. In fact, he thought, as a matter of fact, that we did not give sufficient allowance to the Japanese for their capacity to produce as they had in the past such progressive men as Baron Shidihara, Hamaguchi, and Wakatsuki, and others. These are former Japanese Prime Ministers.

Mr. Forrestal read it over and he agreed. Mr. McCloy agreed also.

The CHAIRMAN. Agreed, or approved?

Mr. DOOMAN. Approved. Mr. Elmer Davis reacted very violently and would have none of it.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did he hold at this time?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was, as I said, Director of the Office of War Information. Various other officers approved of it, but there was a feeling that the publication of that document——

Mr. MORRIS. Vincent was not present?

Mr. DOOMAN. No. As a matter of fact, information on this was restricted to a very small number of people, those people that I have just indicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were present at this conference?

Mr. DOOMAN. I was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you speak of Mr. Davis having reacted violently, you were there and saw the reaction?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did Mr. Davis react, what was the nature of his violent reaction?

Mr. DOOMAN. He did not approve, he did not approve of anything which might be construed in any way as forming a basis for a negotiated surrender.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what he said?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; that was, in effect, what he said. However, the thing was pigeonholed because of the view among the military people that the publication of this document at that time would be premature.

Mr. MORRIS. What military people?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, principally, General Marshall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did not General Marshall express disagreement?

Mr. DOOMAN. No; he went along with the paper but his statement was that the publication of the document at that time would be, and this word I remember textually, "premature." With that, the paper was set aside for the time being. However, a very short time after that, it was a matter of perhaps 2 or 3 weeks——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the time again, the week and month, if possible?

Mr. DOOMAN. The 29th of May 1945, that this meeting took place in Secretary Stimson's office. Within a very short time, I should say a matter of a fortnight, information was available in the State Department that Dr. Lattimore had called on the President and had remonstrated very strongly against any position or decision taken by this Government which would enable the monarchy to remain in Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean "information was available in the State Department," Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, you understand, Mr. Sourwine, that so far as Japan was concerned, I was in a rather key position, and there was information passing back and forth between the State Department and the White House which was very closely guarded.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean official information?

Mr. DOOMAN. Official information.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you learned of Mr. Acheson's protest to the President from official——

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Lattimore's

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore's protest from official papers which came across your desk?

Mr. DOOMAN. No: word of mouth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who told you?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Grew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone else tell you?

Mr. DOOMAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you meant by information becoming available was that Mr. Grew told you?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was Mr. Grew who told me.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. DOOMAN. Now, Mr. Lattimore had been using every opportunity for a period of a year or more to propound the doctrine that the Japanese people would overturn the monarchy and that there were a group of people in the State Department, Fascists and reactionaries, who were going to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the Japanese people.

But, to me, it was very queer that once a decision—now, mind you, up to that time, there had been no decision within the State Department on the question of the Emperor. There was a trend of thinking but there was no decision until the recommendation was made to the President. To me, it was very queer that immediately, well, within a matter of weeks, 2 or 3 weeks after that decision was made, that Mr. Lattimore went to the President and remonstrated with this decision.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, are there any other incidents or episodes or official reports that you know that would document your views on Owen Lattimore, which you are now testifying to?

Mr. DOOMAN. I would like to identify this document that I have been talking about if I may.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we should put that into this record, too, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DOOMAN. This document, as I say, was put aside.

The CHAIRMAN. You say "this document," and we have been dealing with a number of documents. Is this the document which you prepared at the instance of the Secretary?

Mr. DOOMAN. As the Acting Secretary of State.

I am proceeding now to identify the document.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. DOOMAN. This paper, then, was taken by Mr. Stimson to Potsdam. I arrived myself at Potsdam on the 13th of July, and I was told by Mr. McCloy, who was then there, that Mr. Stimson was in active discussion with Mr. Churchill with regard to that document and I heard later, I believe also from Mr. McCloy, that there was an agreement between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Churchill, and that they had then gone to Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes and had received an acceptance of the document. It was then telegraphed to General Chiang Kai-shek, and on May 29, it was promulgated then as the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan, and it was on the basis of that document that Japan surrendered.

May I also add, for the benefit of—I do not want to take credit that really belongs to somebody else, but I would like to put on record here that the preamble to the Potsdam Proclamation was taken from a document prepared by Douglas Fairbanks, who was then in the Navy Department in the Psychological Warfare Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Douglas Fairbanks?

Mr. DOOMAN. Douglas Fairbanks.

I would like to make acknowledgment, if I could, of his contribution

to a paper which, after all, is part of history.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are referring to the movie actor?

Mr. DOOMAN. The movie actor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Father or son?

Mr. DOOMAN. Son.

Mr. SOURWINE. Douglas Fairbanks, Jr.

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished with that episode, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand now that he started out to identify this instrument and he does not identify it?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe in detail so that we might make that a part of our record if the chairman deems it necessary?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes. This was entitled when prepared: "Draft Proclamation by the Heads of the State, U. S.–U. K.–China," and it was then ultimately issued on the 29th of July at Potsdam, by Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Truman, and General Chiang Kai-shek, and when Russia came into the war, the Soviet Union then adhered to this document.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back and get the document straight again, please.

Is this the document that you are now testifying to the same document that you prepared at the instance of the Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the one that was rejected at the instance of General Marshall?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was later signed.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean, but temporarily, at least, laid aside?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the document that afterwards was adopted at Potsdam?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the preliminary to that, the preamble to that was prepared by Douglas Fairbanks?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, sir. I would like to mention this thing that the only portion of my draft which was changed, not in substance but in text, was that paragraph 12 which I have just read; that was cut down to read that the Japanese might have such form of Government as they desired.

The CHAIRMAN. Had your document set up or attempted to set up the continuation of a monarchy?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I haven't read it; that the occupation of Japan should cease—

> when a responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people had been set up. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

As I say, that particular paragraph was cut down to the effect that such type of government as they pleased, in accordance with the wishes of the Allies, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this now.

Mr. Dooman. Excuse me, that includes some other papers.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this introduced into the record in its entirety, it is only three pages and I would like to have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. It reads: "Draft Proclamation by the Heads of State, U. S., U. K., USSR-China."

The Chairman. Now, this instrument that I now hold in my hand, consisting of three pages, was that the entire instrument that you prepared at the instance of the Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. Dooman. That was prepared at the direction of Mr. Grew, then Acting Secretary of State.

The Chairman. Acting Secretary of State.

Mr. Dooman. Yes.

The Chairman. Was this the entire instrument?

Mr. Dooman. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Going back a little bit, this was the instrument which was discussed in the Pentagon at the time Mr. Marshall was present, and it was at his instance, laid aside?

Mr. Dooman. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. This is the instrument that was shown to the President in the White House?

Mr. Dooman. As I recall, on the 28th of May.

The Chairman. This may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 240" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 240

Draft Proclamation by the Heads of State U. S.–U. K.–[U. S. S. R.]–China

[Delete matters inside brackets if U. S. S. R. not in war]

(Completed in Department of State May, 1945)

(1) We,—The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that the Japanese people shall be given an opportunity to end this war on the terms we state herein.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her capitulation.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) Are the Japanese so lacking in reason that they will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation? The time has come *for the Japanese people* to decide whether to continue on to destruction or to follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established *and* until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikohu and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes, with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies among the Japanese shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as are determined to offer no potential for war but which can produce a sustaining economy and permit the Japanese to take their part in a world economic system, with access to raw materials and opportuniies for peaceful trade.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established beyond a doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

(13) We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back again for a question or two. What part of that was prepared by Douglas Fairbanks?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was the preamble.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the preamble?

Mr. DOOMAN. The preamble consists of those paragraphs preceding the numbered paragraphs in that paper.

The CHAIRMAN. Preceding?

Mr. DOOMAN. Preceding the numbered paragraphs.

Mr. MORRIS. The first paragraph here is a numbered paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct, the first paragraph is a numbered paragraph.

Mr. DOOMAN. My recollection was faulty. It consists of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4. In other words, paragraphs 1 to 4, inclusive, were prepared by, largely by, Mr. Fairbanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was Mr. Fairbanks at that time?

Mr. DOOMAN. He was in the Psychological Warfare Section of the Navy Department at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, when you testified in executive session on July 11, 1951, at the beginning of your testimony with respect to a conflict of views between yourself and Mr. John Carter Vincent, you said then:

> My view was then that a country such as Japan with a population far in excess of what it could support without colonies was in very grave danger of being communized unless certain of the natural resources available on the continent could be made available to the Japanese. Vincent's position always was that the opportunities for these 70- or 80-million Japanese to make a livelihood should be restricted as much as possible to what they could find on their own metropolitan area of Japan, the four main islands.
>
> Senator EASTLAND. Whose policy was that?

Mr. DOOMAN. That was the general policy, Vincent's.
Senator EASTLAND. Vincent's?
Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Now, I wonder, Mr. Dooman, if you would, either from your own personal experiences or from your reading of official documents published by Mr. Vincent or Mr. Vincent's division, support that testimony.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, those views were set forth in a broadcast under the auspices of the State Department. I think it was carried on in D. C. on the night of October 6, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your recollection of that broadcast? Did you hear the broadcast, or did you read a transcription of it?

Mr. DOOMAN. I read a transcription of it in the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom was the broadcast made?

Mr. DOOMAN. There were several people who participated in it, General Hilldring, who was a member of SWINK for civil affairs matters, Captain—I can't remember his name now, but he is now the President's naval aide—Captain Davidson.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy of that transcription with you, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your recollection of what took place on that broadcast?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, it was substantially along the lines testified to previously by me in the executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Namely, that Vincent's position always was that the opportunity for these 70 or 80 million Japanese to make a livelihood should be restricted as much as possible to what they could find on their own metropolitan area, the four main islands?

Mr. DOOMAN. That's right. In other words, emphasis was to be laid on agriculture and fishing and such minor industries as they could support.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that transcription inserted in the record because of its considered importance.

The CHAIRMAN. What transcription?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the transcript.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is headed "Department of State Bulletin, Our Occupation Policy for Japan." The date of the bulletin is October 7, 1945, and it gives the participants in this broadcast to which Mr. Dooman has referred.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, I offer you this and ask you if there are any particular passages you would like to underscore in that transcript.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to introduce the whole transcript into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a photostatic copy of the original?

Mr. MORRIS. Pardon, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostatic copy of the original?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel has so identified it.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is taken from the files of the State Department?

Mr. MANDEL. That photostat was made at my direction by the Library of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 241" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 241

[From the Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945]

OUR OCCUPATION POLICY FOR JAPAN

Participants

JOHN CARTER VINCENT: Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Chairman, Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.

Maj. Gen. JOHN H. HILLDRING: Director of Civil Affairs, War Department.

Capt. R. L. DENNISON: U. S. Navy, Representative of the Navy Department on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.

STERLING FISHER: Director, NBC University of the Air.

[Released to the press October 6]

ANNOUNCER: Here are *headlines from Washington:*

General Hilldring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken Up; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines; Promises Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military Fanatics.

John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto; Says That the Institution of the Emperor Will Have To Be Radically Modified, and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free Assembly and Free Discussion.

Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil Aviation; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan.

ANNOUNCER: This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Government officials and Members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them.

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan". Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U. S. N., Navy Department representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They wil be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. Mr. Fisher—

FISHER: No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much of the confusion surrounding this debate.[1] But it also raised many questions—questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned—the State, War, and Navy Departments—to interpret further our Japan policy.

General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that policy is determined.

HILLDRING: Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will try to explain how it *is* made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee—

[1] BULLETIN of Sept. 23, 1945, p. 423.

"SWINC", we call it—formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we think he is doing it very well.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chairman does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.

VINCENT: That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with which General Hilldring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and I sit in an advisory capacity.

HILLDRING: The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Artemus Gates.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, I'd like to know whether there is a—shall we say—strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.

VINCENT: No, there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. I *can* assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.

FISHER: There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian advisers.

VINCENT: That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to send more and more such people out.

FISHER: As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee, Captain Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and *voice* in, the policy for Japan.

DENNISON: We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000 vessels of the United States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played in the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always present a naval problem.

FISHER: What part is the Navy playing now in that control?

DENNISON: Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil-affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.

FISHER: Does that include Okinawa?

DENNISON: Yes.

FISHER: That's not generally known, is it?

DENNISON: No, I believe not. I'd like to add—besides these immediate duties the United States Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan long after our troops are withdrawn.

FISHER: Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcommittee which drafts our occupation policy, can you give us a statement of our over-all objectives?

VINCENT: Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to *democratize* Japan—to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

FISHER: And how long do you think that will take?

VINCENT: The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic tendencies.

FISHER: General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?

HILLDRING: To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clairvoyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish our aims. We *must* stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.

FISHER: To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy?

HILLDRING: That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.

FISHER: Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?

VINCENT: Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies for the control of Japan.[2] In addition to the four principal powers in the Far East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the Commission.

FISHER: Coming back to our first objective—General Hilldring, what about the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?

HILLDRING: Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.

FISHER: And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia?

HILLDRING: It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority. Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated; the return of Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.

FISHER: Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the Japanese forces scattered through Asia?

DENNISON: It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.

FISHER: And what is being done with the Japanese Navy?

DENNISON: The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed.

FISHER: Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military system—the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecuting liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be done about that?

VINCENT: That vicious system will be abolished, Mr. Fisher. Not only the top chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have to be substituted for it.

DENNISON: We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and not an army in the guise of police.

HILLDRING: As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already abolished the Kempai and political police.

FISHER: It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government, from the Emperor on down.

VINCENT: Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the people of Japan must be removed.

FISHER: Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?

VINCENT: The institution of the Emperor—if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it—will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher.

DENNISON: The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent to General MacArthur establish that point.

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[2] See p. 545.

FISHER: Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point, Captain Dennison?

DENNISON: I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur said:

"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force."[3] That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

FISHER: That's clear enough. . . . Now, General Hilldring, you have to do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference between them?

HILLDRING: Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Reduced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Government, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government, and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.

FISHER: Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of the national Government in Japan?

HILLDRING: The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Government available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications.

FISHER: But some people argue, General, that by utilizing the Japanese Government we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?

HILLDRING: Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japanese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed. The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial. Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.

DENNISON: Our policy is to *use* the existing form of government in Japan, not to *support* it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to feel out the situation.

FISHER: Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?

DENNISON: In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has correspondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies.

FISHER: He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me.

VINCENT: Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out.

FISHER: Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war criminals?

VINCENT: We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection.

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[3] BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480.

HILLDRING: We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is applying in Germany are being used in Japan.

DENNISON: Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they are punished—not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.

FISHER: All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let me ask you this: Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu—the big industrialists—who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war, among the guilty?

DENNISON: We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.

FISHER: General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?

HILLDRING: Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos—militarists—will be removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines *must* be broken up. There's no other way to accomplish it.

FISHER: What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT: Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.

FISHER: And the financial combines as well?

VINCENT: Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of their loot.

FISHER: Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu." Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?

DENNISON: There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war criminal.

FISHER: General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farbenindustrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in Japan. What about that?

HILLDRING: I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are *not* rebuilding the big trusts in Germany, we *have not* rebuilt them, and we *are not going to* rebuild them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only will we not *revive* these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans or the Japanese to do so.

FISHER: And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?

HILLDRING: The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steeel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment.

VINCENT: This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT: Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

FISHER: What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

VINCENT: They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

FISHER: They'll have to have *some* foreign trade of course to keep going.

VINCENT: Of course, but not the unhealthful sort they had before the war. A large portion of Japan's pre-war foreign trade assets were used for military preparations, and not to support her internal economy; after all, scrap-iron and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign trade far below the pre-war level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had before the war.

FISHER. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our policy be on food?

HILLDRING: General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.

FISHER: They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?

DENNISON: We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy—that's the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's imports, in order to keep her from rearming—and the best way to do that may be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.

FISHER: Then, Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some Japanese transport planes to resume operations.

DENNISON: That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General MacArthur's directive in this field, *no civil aviation* will be permitted in Japan.

VINCENT: Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.

FISHER: In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialists will be?

VINCENT: Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agriculture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider distribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself—and will, we expect.

FISHER: And the labor unions? What about them?

VINCENT: We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher, because that's an essential part of democracy.

FISHER. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?

VINCENT: General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.

FISHER: That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?

DENNISON: Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a constructive reform program.

VINCENT: All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.

FISHER: I take all this to mean that the democratic and anti-militarist groups will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

VINCENT: It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan". It

also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored".

FISHER: And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain *their* objectives?

VINCENT: In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force.

DENNISON: We are *not* interested in upholding the *status quo* in Japan, as such. I think we should make that doubly clear.

FISHER: One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting together in one party—a Socialist party. What stand will we take on that, General Hilldring?

HILLDRING: If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military fanatics.

FISHER: You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for the democratic forces.

HILLDRING: We're prepared to support the development of democratic government even though some temporary disorder may result—so long as our troops and our over-all objectives are not endangered.

FISHER: I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion of nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"?

VINCENT: Shintoism, in so far as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, as a state-directed religion is to be done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools.

FISHER: That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.

VINCENT: Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will be completely suppressed.

FISHER: And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.

VINCENT: Yes, but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic learnings are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.

DENNISON: That's where the real change must stem from—the school system. The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes for the older generation as well.

FISHER: And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.

DENNISON: How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through all channels—school texts, press, radio, and so on.

FISHER: What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?

DENNISON: Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, I think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during the war.

FISHER: What accounts for that loyalty?

DENNISON: Simply that they *like* the American way of life better. At seven, it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like, but as they get older they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a taste of them—of real civil liberties—they'll never want to go back to their old ways.

HILLDRING: I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack—they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated with one basic idea: obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.

VINCENT: Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if there's to be a real, working democracy in Japan.

HILLDRING: I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.

FISHER: Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese under the occupation?

VINCENT: The press has told you a lot, Mr. Fisher. I can say here that recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about the emergence of sound democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle the East", or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully fostered.

FISHER: Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you, General Hilldring and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupation policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic policy—one that's aimed at giving *no* encouragement to the imperialists and *every possible* encouragement to the pro-democratic forces which are now beginning to reappear in Japan.

ANNOUNCER: That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee. This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy," presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of the broadcasts, send $1 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State Department program on our Latin American policy, with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this important program. . . . Kennedy Ludlam speaking from Washington, D. C.

Mr. DOOMAN. Will you give me just a minute? Here is one quotation.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me have the question now, please.

(The record was read by the reporter as follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, I offer you this and ask you if there are any particular passages you would like to underscore in that transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the counsel handed the witness the photostatic copy of the transcript of a radio speech.

Mr. DOOMAN. I will have to read several quotations from other people here.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. DOOMAN. This is General Hilldring speaking [reading]:

HILLDRING. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment.

VINCENT. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under

our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

That, I think, is indicative of the thinking of Mr. Vincent, in other words, that the Japanese would have to subsist primarily on the resources that they found within their own islands, main islands, and confine their efforts largely to agriculture and fishing and the development of consumer goods.

As I remarked previously, here were today 85,000,000 people supposed to be able to make a living off an area equivalent, roughly, to one-quarter of Pennsylvania, and with no natural resources in the way of iron, steel, coal, cotton, wool, or any of the primary raw materials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, are there any other documents that you care to introduce into the record at this time to support the conclusion just arrived at, your conclusion?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I refer to a statement made by General MacArthur, I think it was on the 1st of September, in which——

Mr. MORRIS. What year?

Mr. DOOMAN. 1946, excuse me. This was the first anniversary of the setting up of the occupation in Japan. At that time, he issued a statement to the Japanese people warning them of the dangers from the left as well as from the right.

In other words, he was warning them of the dangers of communism. As a matter of fact, a short time after that, in February 1947, the Communists tried to take over the country by means of a general strike which was prevented only by General MacArthur preventing it. However, the Herald Tribune, as of September 3, 1946, publishes a dispatch from Mr. John C. Metcalfe, its correspondent in Washington, stating that there was in effect, that there was considerable unfavorable reaction in the State Department to General MacArthur's pronouncement to the Japanese people.

It quoted at that time, this article quoted, as follows; if I may read:

State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General MacArthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the cry of "communism" in Japan. The source said they were taken completely by surprise by comments in the MacArthur statement, such as that the Japanese islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard for war."

The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world.

The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establishment of a just and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at "building a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up "a bulwark against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources added.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what year?

Mr. DOOMAN. September 3, 1946.

The CHAIRMAN. 1946?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And published in what publication?

Mr. Dooman. The New York Herald Tribune.

Mr. Morris. Do you know who the sources referred to in that article are?

Mr. Dooman. I do not know first-hand, I only know from rumor.

The Chairman. Do you know that writer, byline writer?

Mr. Morris. John C. Metcalfe?

Mr. Dooman. No; I do not know him.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I offer that, introduce it into the evidence, for whatever probative value it may have.

The Chairman. It may be admitted.

(The document marked "Exhibit No. 242" is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 242

[From the New York Herald Tribune, September 3, 1946]

MacArthur Blast Against Reds Draws State Department's Fire

(By John C. Metcalfe)

Washington, September 2.—General Douglas MacArthur, Allied Supreme Commander in Japan, was charged by State Department sources today with having launched on his own initiative an anti-Communist campaign in violation of American policy directives to him from President Truman.

The charge, unofficial in character, was based on General MacArthur's published statement yesterday on the first anniversary of Japan's formal surrender. In the statement, he suggested that in certain circumstances the Japanese people might fall prey to those seeking to impose the "philosophy of the extreme radical left."

It was stated bluntly at the State Department today that General MacArthur made public his statement "without any consultation" in advance with American officials directly responsible for the foreign policy of the United States.

CONTROVERSY THREATENS

The development threatened to revive an old controversy between General MacArthur and Washington policy makers. President Truman made it clear 6 months ago that he, in consultation with James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, is responsible for policy and that General MacArthur's job is solely to carry out that policy under White House directives forwarded to him by the War Department.

State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General MacArthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the cry of "communism" in Japan. The sources said they were taken completely by surprise by comments in the MacArthur statement such as that the Japanese islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous springboard for war."

The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world.

The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establishment of a just and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at "building a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up "a bulwark against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources added.

STATEMENT HELD UNWARRANTED

"There is nothing which the Japanese have done since their surrender to warrant the statement issued by General MacArthur," one official commented.

General MacArthur's task is to "neutralize Japan" and to get along with the other interested Allied powers, it was explained. If the United States holds any fears about its security, it will counter any Soviet threat with a strong Navy and Air Force, it was said.

Private advices from Tokyo gave the following information today:

"The emphasis on important developments in Japan has shifted from General MacArthur to the doings of the Japanese. One is apt to get (from headquarters) a completely false view of what is going on in this country. Listening to the

military authorities one wonders why the occupation is not ended right now. Actually, however, the Japanese are no more ready to govern themselves on a democratic basis than they were a year ago. The Conservatives are firmly in the saddle and are doing all in their power to preserve the status quo.

"Everyone must be aware by now that the Allied Council here is a farce and that the Far Eastern Commission seems to us out here like something on another planet."

DEMOCRACY PREFERRED

At the State Department it was said that if the Japanese have a tendency to go anywhere they will "most likely turn toward democracy" as the preferred type of government. But it was also pointed out that the Japanese, like the Germans, are primarily interested in extricating themselves from their unhappy situation and will take any course that might lead to a way out. They are playing off democracy against communism, it was said, and statements like those by General MacArthur are extremely helpful to them.

Department officials, moreover, were particularly annoyed by the MacArthur statement because of the disturbing situations in Korea and China.

"Maybe General MacArthur thinks he is bolstering Mr. Byrnes at the Paris Peace Conference, but he is not helping the situation in the Far East with his comment," a State Department official said.

Diplomatic observers also pointed out that American-Soviet relations at the Paris Conference, in Yugoslavia, Poland, Greece, and at the United Nations Security Council are none too calm. They were, therefore, particularly disturbed by anything resembling a move to launch an anticommunist campaign in Japan.

State Department sources considered the whole incident as "undoubtedly especially embarrassing" to Maj. Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko, Soviet representative on the Allied Council for Japan, which meets at Tokyo.

There was no indication tonight whether the State Department would make any official comment, since most officials were away for the Labor Day week end.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other incidents or episodes concerning this part of the testimony that you care to add at this time? If there are, we ask you to do so.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, I can't recall any, offhand, bearing on this particular point.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, do you know what the attitude of the State Department, or any individuals in the State Department, was with respect toward Japanese Communists?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any personal experience with Japanese Communists?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain those to the committee, Mr. Dooman?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any personal experience with Japanese Communists, that is your question?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Did you experience the State Department's policy with respect to Japanese Communists first hand?

Mr. DOOMAN. May I submit that the question is perhaps not relevant to the situation as it existed, because the State Department had no policy at that time with regard to——

Mr. MORRIS. Any individuals in the State Department, Mr. Dooman.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, some time in May I believe it was, May or June, I think it was May, there returned——

Mr. MORRIS. 1945?

Mr. DOOMAN. 1945.

There returned from China a Foreign Service officer named John K. Emerson, who, before the war, had been one of my subordinates

at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I understood that he had been sent to Yenan. Yenan in China then was the capital of the Chinese Communists. There were present at that time in Yenan a Nosaka, the leading Japanese Communist, and other leading Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Nosaka the same as Susumo Okano, head of the Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. DOOMAN. I believe the latter is a pseudonym. I believe that Emerson had been sent to Yenan to study methods used by the Japanese Communists in Yenan in indoctrinating Japanese prisoners of war taken by the Chinese. As I said, he returned to Washington in about May of 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did?

Mr. DOOMAN. Emerson. He brought back a report describing at considerable length the method used by the Japanese Communists with respect to Japanese prisoners of war, and as I recall, he recommended that Japanese prisoners in American stockades be then turned over to Japanese Communists in the United States for indoctrination along methods used by the Japanese Communists in Yenan.

At that time he was also invited to come over to OSS, the Office of Strategic Services, where I was helping with my own services in the field of psychological warfare to address a group on what he had found in Yenan. At that time he displayed a large number of posters and papers of various kinds and he also showed me a number of letters that he had brought from Yenan. These letters were written by Japanese Communists in Yenan to certain Japanese Communists who were then employed by OSS in psychological warfare against Japanese.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the episode, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with a publication that is entitled "Eighteen Years in Prison" by Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, published by the Japanese Communist Party in 1948?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes; I have a copy of that book. The title in Japanese is "Gokuchi juhachi-nen" which means Eighteen Years in Jail.

Mr. MORRIS. That publication, which is in Japanese, which you understand, Mr. Dooman, indicates that it was published by the Japanese Communist Party? A translation here from the Library of Congress, Mr. Dooman, indicates that it was published by the Japanese Communist Party in 1948.

Mr. DOOMAN. Oh, yes. I see. It was published by the Japanese Communist Party, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, on page 159 to 161, there is described an episode which involves individuals concerned with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I ask you if you have any supplementary or corroborative knowledge of the facts described by these two Japanese Communists in the publication that you have in your hand.

I think it would be best if I read the episode referred to, Mr. Dooman, and ask you if you had read it in the book and whether you know of any corroboration of it.

Mr. DOOMAN. All right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you describe what this is, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a translation from the book entitled "Eighteen Years in Prison," the last chapter written by Yoshio Shiga, pages 159 to 161, published by the Japanese Communist Party in 1948 and translated by Andrew Y. Kuroda, Japanese Section, Orientalia Division, the Library of Congress.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the episode to which we are referring, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

THE DOOR OF FREEDOM

At last the day came when we could become active again. That day came after those who called us traitors had turned Japan into a ruined wasteland, had taken the lives of a million people and had destroyed all peace and happiness.

On August 15 (1945) all hands in the prison, from the warden on down, assembled around a radio speaker, to hear a transcribed broadcast of the so-called August Voice. It was hardly intelligible because of the terrible static, but I caught the passing phrase of "bear the unbearable." At any rate, I was sure that Japan had lost the war.

The prison officials, from then on, had become like men without spirit. We had demanded many times our immediate release. However, it was to no avail. We were still held in the jail even at the end of September. On October 4, however, the SCAP directive was issued ordering the release of political prisoners, and that settled the situation.

By the end of September, a reporter of the American Army had come three times to investigate. He asked the warden if he still kept political prisoners in his jail. The warden's answer was always "No." On September 30, however, Mr. Isaac of Newsweek, and M. Marukyusu and M. Giran of a French news agency came to the prison. They did not ask about the political prisoners. Instead, they merely requested to see the prison. The prison authorities reluctantly showed them first the work shop. Next they requested to see the wards. After they went through the wards, they requested next to see the solitary cells. The Fuchu Prison is an American style cross-shaped building, with the solitary cells at the center. As they came to the section which contained the solitary cells, the three newsmen asked the prison authorities point-blank: "You have political prisoners here, don't you?" The officials, taken off guard, tried to evade the question and replied, "No; we don't." They told them, "Then we will bring in American soldiers and see. Is that all right?" So finally the prison officials admitted holding such prisoners and said, "That over there is their detention quarters." The three newsmen came rushing to our section, M. Marceuse shouting aloud, "Where is Mr. Tokuda? Where is Mr. Shiga?" That was the first voice of the outside world we heard for those long years.

From that day on, until we came out of the jail—about 10 days—war correspondents of various newspapers came to see us. From SCAP also came Mr. Emerson, Dr. Norman, and Lieutenant Colonel Davies. They asked, "What are you going to do after your release?" They also told us about the policies of SCAP. "On October 10, at 10 o'clock in the morning, we came out of the prison. It was raining. The great iron doors were swung open and we comrades arm-in-arm stepped out into the world of freedom after an imprisonment of 18 years. We were all moved very deeply when we were met by those comrades who, with red flags in their hands, were waiting for us in the rain. Some of them had been there since the previous night.

"Then we plunged into our new activities with renewed spirit."

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Dooman, this committee is interested in the episodes that are reported in that book.

I ask you if you will supplement the facts presented in this book from whatever knowledge you have of the episode.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, what knowledge I have is derived largely from—is largely second-hand. I was not there, naturally, and I have no first-hand information.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard about these episodes from State Department officials?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about it from the sources that we recognize are second-hand?

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, there are two categories. I have heard from State Department people, other State Department people, who were there at that time. Also I have heard of this from a large number of Japanese whom I met in New York since the war, because this thing became a sensation among the Japanese people, it was talked about from hand to mouth, it was talked about from person to person, although there was no reference to this in the papers. It was a matter of general discussion among the Japanese.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a matter of common knowledge among the Japanese?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was a matter of common knowledge among the Japanese. I gather so from the fact that perhaps a dozen people, dozen Japanese, with whom I have talked of the matter since the war in New York were quite familiar with the story.

Now, combining these two sources, that is, from State Department officials who were there and from what the Japanese themselves said, this was in effect the substance of what I heard; that Harold Isaac and a French correspondent who was known to be a Communist went to this prison, Fuchu Prison, and the events took place pretty much as described by Shiga, in his book.

The story then continues that they came back, Isaac and this Frenchman came back and reported their experience to John Emerson in SCAP headquarters.

A few days later, Emerson and, I believe, Herbert Norman——

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Herbert Norman?

Mr. DOOMAN. Herbert Norman was a Canadian, member of the Canadian Foreign Service, who had been in Tokyo before the war, and who had been sent back by the Canadian Government to Japan as soon as the occupation started to undertake the repatriation of Canadian citizens left in Japan during the war. When he got through with that, he was assigned to Counter-Intelligence under SCAP. The story goes on to say that Emerson, and I believe they weren't quite certain whether Norman went with Emerson or not, a few days later went back to this prison and demanded to see Tokuda and Shiga and the other Communists.

The story further continues, and this was a matter that was generally talked about by the Japanese in Tokyo at that time, was that on the day they were released, apparently October 10, following the order by General MacArthur for the release of political prisoners, that Emerson and Norman went in a staff car to the prison and brought Shiga and Tokuda back to their homes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are Shiga, and Tokuda?

Mr. DOOMAN. Shiga was one of the top leaders of the Japanese Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the effect of that on the Japanese population from what you know, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. DOOMAN. The effect of that, as said by one of the Japanese to me, was to add 100,000 new members to the Japanese Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the prestige accorded by the American and Canadian officials in transporting Japanese Communists in

an official limousine afforded the Japanese Communists a certain amount of reputation?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes, a substantital increase in prestige and standing, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, do you know from your own knowledge anything of the report prepared by Ambassador Pauley on Japanese reparations? Are you acquainted with that document?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about that document with respect to the policy he enunciated therein?

Mr. DOOMAN. Mr. Pauley, who was sent out as Reparations Commissioner or Ambassador, made a survey, was supposed to make a survey, of the Japanese industry potential and needs and what could be removed for reparation purposes. He took with him, as his economic adviser, Mr. Lattimore, Owen Lattimore; and, without knowing first-hand, the belief is quite general that Mr. Lattimore wrote the report which Mr. Pauley submitted when he returned to the United States.

Well, the report, which I believe, is readily accessible, in effect provided for the "pasteurizing" of Japan—that is, the reduction of Japan to, as has been previously indicated in that broadcast by Vincent, to a very simple economy; that is, one of primarily agriculture and fishing, plus small consumer industries.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to press Mr. Dooman as to his knowledge that Mr. Lattimore did write the Pauley reparations report inasmuch as Mr. Lattimore has acknowledged in executive session, his connection with that particular report.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore has acknowledged?

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you propose to offer that to the committee in open session?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I will do that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DOOMAN. I may add that, in general, the report reflects the view set forth by Mr. Lattimore and others and the Nation, and so on: the general concept that Japan should be reduced to a very simple type of economy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention so much to introduce, although I will do that since you ask, any of the executive session we had with Mr. Lattimore, but I was making that suggestion to account for the fact that I was not going to press Mr. Dooman as to how he knew that Mr. Lattimore wrote that particular report.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no desire to direct you as to how you present the evidence, but I just thought, if you had it available for the open session, it would probably clarify some things because Mr. Dooman testifies largely from hearsay in that regard.

Mr. DOOMAN. On that particular point.

Mr. MORRIS. In that particular point.

We have sat for it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dooman, did you have any dealings with John K. Fairbank?

Mr. DOOMAN. No. Only periodically.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, you did encounter John K. Fairbank in your official capacity; did you not?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe your connections with John K. Fairbank, whatever they were?

The CHAIRMAN. Who is he?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had John K. Fairbank's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations set forth in the record at great detail.

We have also had testimony on the part of three witnesses in connection with his association in connection with the Communist Party.

I am asking Mr. Dooman if he had encountered at all Mr. John K. Fairbank in his associations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. DOOMAN. I understood Mr. Fairbank was in that section of the Office of War Information which dealt with psychological warfare against Japan.

Now, the practice was that—I believe it was—once a month a group would come over from the Office of War Information with a draft program of the propaganda that was to be directed against Japan for the ensuing month, and the various targets and subjects which were to be dealt with were set forth on a piece of paper, and the purpose of their visit to the State Department was to get clearance on these targets.

As I say, my contacts with Mr. Fairbank were limited primarily to those visits to the State Department when he brought over these programs of proposed psychological warfare.

Mr. MORRIS. From your association, what was his view toward these——

Mr. DOOMAN. I don't know what responsibility or what part Mr. Fairbank played in the formulation of these programs—that is, the setting up of the targets—but I found that invariably in these programs there would be found an item directing the psychological warfare toward creating in the minds of the Japanese an attitude of resentment and opposition to the Emperor and to the monarchial system.

At that time we had not come to any decision as to what our policy should be in that resepect, and I invariably red-penciled these items referring to the Emperor. However, they would always appear either overtly or covertly in the next program that would be presented.

There was, in other words, a persistent effort on the part of the Office of War Information to get our approval toward phychological warfare directed at the relationship between the Japanese people and the Emperor.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you underscored it in red?

Mr. DOOMAN. I crossed out with a red pencil.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I made reference to the executive session that we had with Mr. Owen Lattimore here on the 13th of July 1951; and from the executive minutes, on page 15, I would like to read the following excerpt.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the witness testifying under oath at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. The witness, Mr. Owen Lattimore, was testifying under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. After you returned, Mr. Lattimore, what was your next assignment as far as the Government was concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was a member of the American Mission to Japan on the subject of reparations.

Mr. MORRIS. In that assignment, you were on the payroll of the State Department; were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understand that it was a White House mission; that all or some of the members including myself were on the State Department payroll.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you on that payroll, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Four or five months, from about October 1945 to about February or March 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. What part did you play in the preparation of the report of that mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I helped to draft the report in Tokyo.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent did you help?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Quite largely.

That is the acknowledgement I referred to.

Mr. Chairman, I may as well finish the paragraph, however. [Continues reading:]

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe that for us, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, when we were in Tokyo, we had a number of experts with us, economists, engineers, and so forth; each expert was given access through General MacArthur's headquarters to figures and data on Japan. Each person assembled his own material, and I was largely responsible for the continuous writing of the report. Each expert was responsible for his own figures.

I would like to have that incorporated in the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the record now; you have read it.

Mr. MORRIS. I think with respect to the extracts from the book Eighteen Years in Prison, inasmuch as it was read by Mr. Mandel, nothing more is necessary.

With respect to the book itself, I suggest that it be filed with the records of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The book referred to was filed for the information of the committee.)

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That instrument that you had there a minute ago, which is a transcript from this book, has not been admitted in the record; it was read by Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel read that. However, if you think it is necessary, I will introduce that into this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 243" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 243

[Translation [1]]

THE DOOR OF FREEDOM [2]

At last the day came when we could become active again. That day came after those who called us traitors had turned Japan into a ruined wasteland, had taken the lives of a million people, and had destroyed all peace and happiness.

On August 15 [1945] all hands in the prison, from the warden on down, assembled around a radio speaker to hear a transcribed broadcast of the so-called august voice. It was hardly intelligible because of the terrible static, but

[1] Translated by Andrew Y. Kuroda, Japanese Section, Orentalia Division, the Library of Congress.

[2] Last chapter, written by Yoshio Shiga, pp. 159–161. From Gokuchu juhachi-nen (18 years in prison) by Kyuichi Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga, published by the Japan Communist Party, 1948.

I caught the passing phrase of "bear the unbearable." At any rate, I was sure that Japan had lost the war.

The prison officials, from then on, had become like men without spirit. We had demanded many times our immediate release. However, it was to no avail. We were still held in the jail even at the end of September. On October 4, however, the SCAP directive was issued ordering the release of political prisoners, and that settled the situation.

By the end of September, a reporter of the American Army had come three times to investigate. He asked the warden if he still kept political prisoners in his jail. The warden's answer was always "No." On September 30, however, Mr. Isaac, of Newsweek, and M. Marukyusu [Marceuse?] and M. Giran [Gilland?],[3] of a French news agency, came to the prison. They did not ask about the political prisoners. Instead, they merely requested to see the prison. The prison authorities reluctantly showed them first the workshop. Next they requested to see the wards. After they went through the wards, they requested next to see the solitary cells. The Fuchu Prison is an American-style cross-shaped building, with the solitary cells at the center. As they came to the section which contained the solitary cells, the three newsmen asked the prison authorities point-blank: "You have political prisoners here; don't you?" The officials, taken off guard, tried to evade the question, and replied, "No; we don't." They told them, "Then we will bring in American soldiers and see. Is that all right?" So, finally the prison officials admitted [holding such prisoners] and said, "That over there is their detention quarters." The three newsmen came rushing to our section, M. Marcense shouting aloud, "Where is Mr. Tokuda? Where is Mr. Shiga?" That was the first voice of the outside world we heard for those long years.

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On October 10, at 10 o'clock in the morning, we came out of the prison. It was raining. The great iron doors were swung open, and we comrades, arm in arm, stepped out into the world of freedom after an imprisonment of 18 years. We were all moved very deeply when we were met by those comrades who, with Red flags in their hands, were waiting for us in the rain. Some of them had been there since the previous night.

Then we plunged into our new activities with renewed spirit.

Mr. MORRIS. The volume itself is in Japanese, which Mr. Dooman has translated for us.

The CHAIRMAN. It will become a part of the files of this committee.

Mr. DOOMAN. Just to bring that Pauley report into proper perspective, may I add that the following year—I think it was 1947—a mission was sent out by Mr. Strike, one of the leading consulting engineers in this country. He sent to Japan a large group of, I think, over 20 consulting engineers that went out to Japan, and they returned with a report generally overruling the Pauley report, and the report of the Strike committee in turn was then upheld by another mission consisting of Mr. Johnson, who was president of the Chemical Bank in New York or chairman of the board of the Chemical Bank, and Mr. Paul Hoffman, who, between them, submitted a report which virtually wiped out the recommendations of the Pauley mission.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dooman, do you know Lawrence Salisbury, who was editor of Far Eastern Affairs, which was the publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DOOMAN. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever make any effort to change the personnel in the State Department, to your knowledge?

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[3] These names are difficult to identify from their transcription into the Japanese syllabary.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, he is the ringleader of a group of men in the Far Eastern Division, who protested against the assignment of Dr. Hornbeck as director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, when Secretary of State Stettinius organized, carried out, his reorganization of the State Department in, I believe, January 1944.

As a result of that rebellion, which was successful, Dr. Hornbeck was then, I believe, sent to the Netherlands as Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it was a successful movement?

Mr. DOOMAN. It was a successful movement.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say Mr. Salisbury was the ringleader?

Mr. DOOMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. DOOMAN. I know that from personal knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I think not.

Have we neglected anything that we should know, Mr. Dooman? If you know of anything within the scope of our inquiry, the chairman and I ask that you present that knowledge to this committee.

Mr. DOOMAN. Well, my purpose, Mr. Morris, has not been to give you any evidence as to whether this, that, or the other man was a Communist or not, because I am in no position to give you any such evidence.

My purpose in testifying here was to indicate in general that policies put forward by the left-wing press, from the Daily Worker right down through the line, were in effect substantially translated into United States policies and to indicate from personal knowledge how that operation was carried out.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

May the record show, Mr. Chairman, that at no time was Mr. Dooman asked whether or not any particular person was a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. The record will speak for itself in that regard.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you identify for the record as much as you can, who Lawrence Salisbury was, with respect to his connection with the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Our files show that Lawrence Salisbury was at one time the editor of Far Eastern Survey, official organ of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a State Department officer, according to your files?

Mr. MANDEL. Editor of Far Eastern Survey, Official Organ of the American Council of IPR, former Foreign Service official, 12 years in Japan, 5 years in China, and 2 in Manila, and 5 in the Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from our records, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. That comes from the biographical register of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he serving in the State Department while he was writing for that publication?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When is your next meeting, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Next Tuesday at 10 a. m.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until that time.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., Friday, September 14, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m. Tuesday, September 17, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly stand and be sworn?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. WIDENER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MRS. WILLIAM HARRY WIDENER, NEW YORK, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show the witness is here under subpena.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, last Friday during the testimony of Eugene Dooman the name of Julian Friedman turned up. According to Mr. Dooman's testimony, Julian Friedman was John Carter Vincent's assistant. John Carter Vincent was then head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and Mr. Dooman would attend the Far Eastern area committee meetings for John Carter Vincent. Mr. Dooman testified in the course of the day that he suspected that Julian Friedman was the person responsible for leaks of classified information from those meetings to the left wing press and, according to Mr. Dooman's testimony, he made specific charges against Julian Friedman to Julian Friedman.

I thought it would be appropriate this morning to have someone here who had encountered Mr. Julian Friedman.

Mrs. Widener, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please.

Mrs. WIDENER. I am Mrs. William Harry Widener. My address is 829 Park Avenue, New York City.

Mr. Morris. What is your occupation, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. Widener. I am a writer and a housewife, a professional writer.

Mr. Morris. Are you qualified in any way as a writer for the United States Government, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. Widener. Yes. I wrote free lance scripts on a WAE basis for the Voice of America from January 1, 1951, to the end of May 1951. I applied for classification as an information expert and I received such classification.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any record of that classification with you?

Mrs. Widener. Yes; I have.

Mr. Morris. Would you mind letting me have it so I might put it in the record, please?

Mrs. Widner. Here it is.

Mr. Morris. Will you identify these papers for us, Mrs. Widener? What are these papers?

Mrs. Widener. They give a classification for me as an information specialist from the United States Civil Service Commission, a notice of rating from the Department of State.

Mr. Morris. What is your rating?

Mrs. Widener. They are dated June this year—radio, GS–12, radio, GS–11, radio, GS–11, periodicals and publications, GS–11.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like these in the record.

The Chairman. I would like to know what these signify and what the designations testified to by the witness signify. What does GS–11 mean?

Mrs. Widener. As I understand it, Senator, when I was taken into the Voice of America on a WAE basis, I filled out a civil service application stating my qualifications.

The Chairman. What is a WAE basis and what does it mean?

Mrs. Widener. I was on a purchase order basis. The Voice of America ordered from me eight scripts a month. They paid me $40 per script. I was up for what they called classification under civil service and investigation by the security officers.

When I filed my papers, I had to state what qualifications I would have for such an appointment with the State Department. I happen to speak several languages. I had to give the entire history of my education, my background for security investigation and for professional qualifications a list of my publications in the writing field and my experience.

I was told to start out to be classified in that field; GS–12 was a very good classification. I believe it was not in the lowest category.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Morris. I would like to have those introduced in the record by way of describing the witness.

The Chairman. Those instruments, are they from your own hand, or just what are they?

Mrs. Widener. Those were sent to me by the Department of State, Senator.

The Chairman. What is the object of this, Mr. Morris?

Mr. Morris. To establish who Mrs. Widener is. They are just for a description of the witness.

The Chairman. A copy of each will be inserted in the record by reference and filed with the committee.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 244 and 245" and filed in the committee's files for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man named Clark Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you known Clark Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. I first met Mr. Andrews, I believe, in 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions, approximately, have you met Mr. Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. A great many. He was a fiancé of a friend of mine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, can you recall an experience that you had regarding Clark Andrews in the spring of 1947 that would be of interest to this committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question again, please, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that you could pin that down more, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, would you tell us who Clark Andrews is?

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Andrews was a radio producer.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his occupation when you first met him?

Mrs. WIDENER. He had returned from China where he had been in radio, I believe, in Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this?

Mrs. WIDENER. In 1946 when I first met him. The pertinence would be in reference to Mr. Julian Friedman whom you mentioned to Senator McCarran.

Senator FERGUSON. Andrews had been in private radio work in China?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, sir; with the Armed Forces, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Working for the United States Government?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing in the spring of 1947?

Mrs. WIDENER. He was a radio producer for the American Broadcasting System.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified that you had previously met him on numerous occasions?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall an episode that involved Mr. Friedman and Mr. Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us an account of what happened on that particular occasion?

Mrs. WIDENER. One evening in the spring of 1947 Mr. Andrews telephoned my home——

The CHAIRMAN. Where was this?

Mrs. WIDENER. In New York City—and asked if I would care to join him and his fiancée after dinner to meet a very special friend that he would like me to meet, a very brilliant man and a man who had been in China.

At that time I was not married to Mr. Widener, but I was married to a composer, and my husband was not really included in the invitation. He was busy with music and professional duties. I accepted the invitation to go along. When I reached the home of my friend, my friend didn't feel well and retired. I remained with Mr. Andrews.

We had a long talk and discussion. He said to me that his friend was expected but might be a little late. We chatted and waited. I should say certainly more than an hour later Mr. Andrews said to me, "Confidentially, I want to tell you that the man you are going to meet is absolutely brilliant. In fact, he is one of the top brains of the Communist Party."

At that moment the doorbell rang and the gentleman appeared.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he account for the delay in any way of Julian Friedman in arriving?

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Friedman accounted for the delay. Mr. Friedman came in. I didn't know his name at that moment. Mr. Andrews introduced Mr. Friedman to me as Mr. Julian Friedman. He said that he was very sorry to be late and to have kept us waiting, but that he had been occupied with a case that was being heard, a very important case, in arbitration in New York City before Mr. James Fly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that James Lawrence Fly?

Mrs. WIDENER. I don't know his middle name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it the Mr. Fly formerly with the Federal Communications Commission?

Mrs. WIDENER. I believe so.

Mr. Friedman said he was delighted that the case seemed to be going very well and that——

Mr. MORRIS. This is the case of which James Fly was the arbitrator?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir. And he said, "You see, I am conducting the defense from behind the scenes." I said, "May I ask what you mean by 'behind the scenes?'" He said to me, "It is an extremely complicated case. It is a case involving a worker"—I think he said social welfare worker or social service worker—"who was dismissed from New York City employ and who claimed she was unjustly dismissed because of her political beliefs."

I said, "What are her political beliefs?" He said, "Well, of course, she is a Communist but she is saying that she is not a Communist." I said that that struck me as very complicated indeed. Mr. Friedman said, "Of course, since she is a member of our party, I am defending her, but not out in the open."

Then Mr. Andrews interrupted the conversation and talked about me and my professional activities and what I had done. He and Mr. Friedman began to discuss China and international politics. I listened for quite a while. Mr. Friedman said to me, "I had a very interesting time in China." I said, "Well, when did you leave?" I remember I asked him what he was doing. He said that he was with the State Department. Prior to Mr. Friedman's arrival Mr. Andrews had told me that Mr. Friedman had graduated with the highest honors from Harvard University. I believe he graduated either with magna or summa cum laude.

Mr. Friedman took up the story of his going to China. He said to me that after he graduated from Harvard University he entered the State Department and that eventually he was sent to China where he was connected, I believe, with the Embassy in Shanghai, our Embassy there. He said, "I was able to do very useful work there, but eventually I got in a very tough spot." I asked him what he meant by a "tough spot." He said, "I really was on the spot. I was doing very good work for our cause, the Communist cause."

Mr. MORRIS. He said it was the Communist cause.

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir; "in China, but somebody must have gotten wise to me."

He was asked to write a report on the Communist Chinese labor movement.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me have that again, please. "He said——"

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Friedman said to me: "I was asked to write a report on the Chinese Communist labor movement." He said, "That put me in a tough spot. Naturally I wouldn't write anything against the party. If I did write what I wanted to write, it would tip my hand and destroy my usefulness. So I wrote a report that any 14-year-old boy could have written and got myself dismissed without prejudice."

Senator FERGUSON. Dismissed from the State Department, you mean?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Without prejudice?

Mrs. WIDENER. I asked him then what does "dismissed without prejudice" mean? He said, "It means exactly what it says."

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, may I interrupt at this time? Mr. Chairman, at our last session we introduced a letter from the State Department official indicating that Mr. Friedman had been dismissed without prejudice. That is a part of our record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that letter available now?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand that he was dismissed because he had written such a poor report?

Mrs. WIDENER. I understand Mr. Friedman told that he wrote a report that any 14-year-old child could have written.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tie that with his dismissal, the report? I mean what he said.

Mrs. WIDENER. He said to me that he got himself dismissed without prejudice.

Senator FERGUSON. Because of writing this report?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what he said?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir. That isn't exactly his every word.

Senator FERGUSON. But that is the substance of what he said?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir; that was my understanding.

Senator EASTLAND. Was Mr. Andrews in China?

Mrs. WIDENER. I have no knowledge of Mr. Andrews' activities in China whatsoever.

Senator EASTLAND. Was he in China?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. He did show a sympathy and friendliness toward the Communist movement?

Mrs. WIDENER. He showed friendliness toward Mr. Julian Friedman.

Senator EASTLAND. Had Mr. Andrews been with the State Department?

Mrs. WIDENER. I do not know.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was he with in China?

Mrs. WIDENER. I only know that he said he had been with radio. He was in the Armed Forces and had been with our United States radio in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair interrupt here. The letter referred to is one dated April 23, 1951, over the signature of Elbridge Dubrow, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, and is addressed to me. It has "Exhibit No. 235" on it. It says [reading]:

Your letter of April 10, 1951, addressed to the Secretary concerning Julian R. Friedman has been referred to me for reply.

A review of Mr. Friedman's record indicates that he had served as a junior economic analyst in the Foreign Service Auxiliary from August 5, 1945, until the termination of his employment on November 12, 1946.

As you may recall, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, approved August 13, was effective November 13, 1946. Consequently it had been decided to abolish the auxiliary, a temporary wartime branch of the Foreign Service, as of November 12, 1946. In proceeding with the liquidation of the auxiliary, it was necessary to order back to the United States for termination a number of temporary or auxiliary officers including Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman's record shows that his services were terminated without prejudice.

I trust that the foregoing information will meet your needs.

Sincerely yours—

That is now an exhibit in this case.

Senator FERGUSON. Hasn't the State Department ever made an explanation as to what they mean "your services are terminated without prejudice"? Prejudice to what?

The CHAIRMAN. I take it to mean prejudice, but you may apply again and be reemployed. That is just a guess on my part.

Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened then, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. WIDENER. Up to that stage I had been listening very carefully to what Mr. Friedman had been saying. He stopped talking. I said, "Mr. Friedman, I would like to ask you a couple of questions if I might." He said, "Certainly." I said, "When you said to me before you were conducting a defense in an arbitration hearing for someone who claimed that she was being unjustly treated because of a charge against her political beliefs, you also told me that she was a member of the Communist Party. I can't understand the need for 'behind the scenes.' If she is sincere in her membership in the Communist Party and it is a legal party, why doesn't she say she is a member of the Communist Party and stand on her rights to belong to it, and why do you need to be 'behind the scenes' if you believe that she is right?"

He said to me, "Those things are very complicated and you have to go about them in the most suitable way."

I said, "I would like to ask you another question. When you joined the State Department, didn't you take an oath of allegiance to the United States Government?" He said, "Yes, I did." I said, "Well, you yourself say to me you graduated from Harvard with honors and you told me that in the performance of your duties you wrote a report that any 14-year-old child could have written. How do you reconcile that with your sworn duties?

He said to me, "Well, I believe that the end justifies the means."

We got into a discussion of ends and means.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he say what his end was?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, he did not; not specifically in that way, but I think it came out what at least I believed his end was eventually. I said to him that I believed the use of the wrong means can preclude a right end. He went into further discussion, saying that to achieve the objective you have to use whatever tools were necessary to that objective. I said to him, "I think what you have just told me is the

most immoral story that I have ever heard, and I would like to ask you one more question: Do the means that you advocate to achieve an end include violence?"

The CHAIRMAN. Include what?

Mrs. WIDENER. "Include violence."

He said, "Yes, if necessary."

I stood up and I said: "Sir, it is my own belief that what you have just said to me is treason, and I cannot remain here." I said, "I want you to know that I don't consider myself bound by any confidence as to what I have listened to here and I want you to know that I am going to report you to the proper authorities."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you report him to anyone?

Mrs. WIDENER. Eventually I did.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom?

Mrs. WIDENER. To the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

But I would like your indulgence to continue, if I may.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not want to interrupt you, but I wanted to know what you did and whether you did report.

Mrs. WIDENER. I did eventually as the result of more knowledge, I would say, of that particular subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt you there.

At this interview that took place, who was present in the course of this conversation? The picture I have, it was your friend who had invited you there and Mr. Friedman and yourself; is that correct?

Mrs. WIDENER. There was Mr. Andrews, Mr. Julian Friedman, and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this to be a dinner party?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, sir. I was invited after dinner.

Senator FERGUSON. Just merely to come to the home?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it Mr. Andrews' home?

Mrs. WIDENER. It was the home of his fiancée.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she just retire to another room?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir. She was not feeling well.

Senator FERGUSON. She retired to another room in her home?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Which left you and Andrews and Friedman together talking?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir, Mr. Andrews and myself. Then after Mr. Friedman's arrival, Mr. Friedman, Mr. Andrews and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. The invitation came from Andrews and not your friend?

Mrs. WIDENER. Let's put it this way: Mr. Andrews telephoned me and I spoke to him on the telephone.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you gather they were trying to get you to do something for them? Was that the purpose of this visit?

Mrs. WIDENER. I didn't gather anything. I was simply—I went home alone. It was 2 o'clock in the morning. I am not accustomed to going home unaccompanied at that hour. I left.

Senator FERGUSON. What could you have done to help them in any manner? I am not clear as to the reason they would invite you and carry on this conversation. I can see part of the conversation, that part about his being late and he gave you that, and that started this

conversation; but he carried it on into China and how he got discharged and all.

Mrs. WIDENER. I suppose, Senator—I don't like to suppose——

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want you to suppose. I am trying to get a reason.

Mrs. WIDENER. I have a certain record as a professional writer. As a person during the war I had a radio show called Women of the World. It won a citation of merit from the Radio Institute of America for the promotion of international understanding in the women's field. I had a certain reputation. I think it was natural that anyone interested in politics might discuss them with me, especially foreign politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Particularly anyone who was desirous of carrying out propaganda would have a source through you to get certain propaganda carried out; is that correct?

Mrs. WIDENER. That would be a possible source.

Senator FERGUSON. If you took up their cause?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they in any way ask you to take up this cause of communism?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or the cause for this worker that had been discharged?

Mrs. WIDENER. No, sir. Most of the conversation that took place was between Mr. Friedman and me after Mr. Friedman's arrival.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say your success with your radio show Women of the World marked you in circles familiar with that production as a liberal?

Mrs. WIDENER. I think, Mr. Sourwine, perhaps the fairest way to answer is to say I think if anyone is in professional activity and field of public information they speak out in public. They say what they think out in public and the public, the press, and the critics judge them.

I had had favorable press notices and favorable comment. I feel that I would have—in general, people like to discuss politics with you or any professional activity if you are in that field. I was in that field.

The CHAIRMAN. The query naturally arises, as has been evinced by the questions of Senator Ferguson, and it is in my mind, as to why would one in Mr. Friedman's position open up the whole subject to you without first having known what your turn of mind was on that subject. In other words, he disclosed to you his communistic leanings and his communistic attitude, according to your statement, without having first determined, so far as we know now, what your turn of mind was.

Mrs. WIDENER. I would like to say this: I think Mr. Andrews on several occasions had made very complimentary remarks about whatever qualities I possessed. Mr. Friedman knew when I met him, or seemed to know, that I was a professional writer and commentator, a speaker. I don't think my work was of national importance or of such prominence that everybody would know about me.

Mr. MORRIS. Clark Andrews met you on numerous occasions?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes. He knew all about my activity.

Mr. MORRIS. You had seen him on very many occasions?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were introduced to Mr. Friedman by Mr. Andrews?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Everything he indicated was that he had discussed you prior to your meeting?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes. Mr. Friedman, the first thing he did was apologize for his being late, apologize to me.

Mr. MORRIS. He knew you were going to be present when he arrived?

Mrs. WIDENER. I assume if he apologized to me for being late that he must have expected to meet me.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your profession discussed?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes; oh yes; certainly, in the course of normal conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did this conversation take with Friedman? You say you left about 2 o'clock.

Mrs. WIDENER. My best recollection is that Mr. Friedman arrived about 11 o'clock or shortly thereafter, 11 o'clock at night. And I know that I left close to 2 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, in the course of the 1-hour conversation with Mr. Andrews and the 3-hour conversation with Mr. Friedman, did Mr. Andrews tell you that Friedman was a Communist?

Mrs. WIDENER. Mr. Andrews said to me: "Confidentially, I want you to know that this man is one of the top brains in the Communist Party."

Mr. MORRIS. Then subsequently did Mr. Friedman acknowledge he was a Communist?

Mrs. WIDENER. When he said, "our party" and said the social worker or social-service worker was a Communist "in our party," and when he spoke of "our cause in China" and said "Naturally, I would not do anything to hurt our cause, the Chinese Communist cause," it was obvious.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you report this conversation to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. WIDENER. I did after making an inquiry.

Mr. MORRIS. What inquiry did you make?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment before she answers.

Some time back the witness asked to be permitted to continue and Senator Ferguson, Senator Eastland, and I think myself broke in on what you wanted to continue with. Do you have something that you want to bring out there? There was an interruption.

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me.

Mrs. WIDENER. Thank you.

The following morning after that conversation I received a telephone call from Mr. Andrews who said that "Well, we certainly took you for a ride last night. You really fell for a practical joke."

I said, "Maybe it was and maybe it wasn't, but I would like to tell you this: I am going to make every effort and do my level best to find out if it was or it wasn't." I did make that effort.

I knew a presswoman in the United States Mission to the United Nation. Her name is Sarah Hodgekinson.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell that?

Mrs. WIDENER. H-o-d-g-—I am not sure whether there is an "e"—k-i-n-s-o-n.

I telephoned Miss Hodgekinson and said that I would like to come and see her. I went down to the United States Mission to the U. N. and saw her. I said, "If I am not imposing on you, I would like to ask you if you can get some information for me. I would like to know if there was a Julian Friedman in the employ of the State Department in China."

She said, "That is not hard to find out and I will be glad to do so." So she excused herself and came back and said, "Yes, there was." I said, "Well, then, may I ask you could you get me more information about Mr. Friedman? And she said, "Well, I can try. What would you like to know?" I said, "Can you find out for me if he is a graduate of Harvard University and if he graduated with honors."

She said, "You know, we have a direct line to Washington here and I will go in and ask the Department if I can use it, and I will try to find out for you." So I waited for, I guess, 20 minutes or half an hour. She came back and said, "I have checked on it for you. Yes, Mr. Friedman did graduate from Harvard and he graduated with high honors."

Then I said "Could I ask you to find out one more thing for me if I am not intruding or embarrassing you in any way?" She said, "No; not at all. It is all a matter of record." I said, "Would you find out if Mr. Friedman was dismissed without prejudice?"

She again left the room and came back and said "Mr. Friedman was dismissed without prejudice." She said, "Why do you want to know all this?" I said, "Because I had a long conversation with Mr. Friedman last night and it disturbed me very much." I said, "Do you know anything about an arbitration case taking place before James Fly?" She said, "No; I don't know." I said, "Well, I would like to find out."

I phoned a reporter that I knew and he was out. She said, "Why don't call—" I forget what name, the name of a reporter she knew. She said, "I will get him on the phone and find out." She did get her friend on the phone. He said, "Yes, there was a case before Mr. James Fly and it was being heard and it was a question of a dismissed worker."

Then I told Miss Hodgekinson about the conversation I had with Mr. Friedman. In the meantime the newspaper reporter had said that the World-Telegram newspaper had been following this case very closely, the New York World-Telegram. Sarah Hodgekinson said to me, "Well, if it has to do with a Communist problem, Mr. Frederick Woltman on the New York Telegram knows a great deal about the Communist activities, and why don't you call him?" I said that I had never met Mr. Woltman but I said I would. She said, "You can call him up and say I said to call him," which I did.

I asked Mr. Woltman was there such as case as had been described to you and did he know if a Mr. Julian Friedman was appearing in the case. He said "Not on the record but off the record he is; not on the scene, off the scene." I felt that verified the information that had been given to me. I reported it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Widener, is it your testimony that at the termination of your session with Julian Friedman you told him you felt free to report the incident to the necessary authorities.

Mrs. WIDENER. I did.

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that the next day you corroborated certain parts of the story told to you by Mr. Friedman in order to determine whether or not he was telling you those things in jest?

Mrs. Widener. Yes.

Mr. Morris. In making those efforts to verify details of the story, did you find that in fact those things he told you the night before were indeed true?

Mrs. Widener. I did.

Mr. Morris. Did you as a matter of fact report the incident to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mrs. Widener. Yes; I did.

The Chairman. Do you remember how long after this incident you made the report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, approximately?

Mrs. Widener. The morning I went down to the United States Mission to the United Nations and saw Sarah——

The Chairman. That was the morning after?

Mrs. Widener. That was the morning after. In the afternoon I spoke to Mr. Woltman.

The Chairman. To whom?

Mrs. Widener. Mr. Woltman on the New York World-Telegram. I believe it was that afternoon or the next morning I reported it to the authorities.

The Chairman. You reported it where, to the Washington office of the FBI or to the FBI representative in New York?

Mrs. Widener. To the New York office.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I recommend that we request of the State Department the report by Julian Friedman referred to by Mrs. Widener in her testimony on the Communist Chinese labor movement?

The Chairman. Will you kindly write that out so that I can make the request?

Mr. Morris. I have it here. It is in regard to the Chinese Communist labor movement, and I will use the exact wording in the testimony by Friedman.

Mrs. Widener has testified Friedman told her he wrote such a report and described the report.

The Chairman. That request will be made at once.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that you request also further information about his discharge, what they meant by without prejudice, the facts surrounding his dismissal.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Widener, while you were working with the Voice of America did you encounter any publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations in any way?

Mrs. Widener. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you describe whatever you did encounter?

Mrs. Widener. I think I must have a record of the date. I was given an assignment to write a script for the Voice of America covering confidential material that was sent by our Embassy in Moscow back to the United States. The report was written by, if my memory serves me correctly, Mr. John Stines. It covered conditions for women—I only wrote about the women's field, of course, for the Voice of America—it covered conditions for women in central and southeast Asiatic

parts of the Soviet Union. Mr. Stines' report covered in a very thorough way the deplorable or what he considered the deplorable conditions for women there, the fact they were being forced into heavy industry, into labor in pig iron production and heavy production destined for, I suppose, such things as armaments and so on.

The report was given to me to cover for a script for the Voice. I took it home. It was given to me to take home. When I studied it, I felt I needed a great deal of research material to write an effective script for it. So I went back to the Voice and I put in a request to the editor-in-chief if he could suggest good sources of research material. He said to me that the Foreign Affairs Publication section of the State Department had issued a very excellent bulletin on these deplorable conditions in the Asiatic regions of the Soviet Union and he would give that to me to study. No one at the Voice could find it. I waited a long time and though all other copies were in order in the files, this particular copy was missing. I waited quite a while, while they looked it up. Then the editor-in-chief said he would send me over to the research library of the Voice of America, which is about a block and a half away from the building in which I work. I did go over there. I was given a book issued under the sponsorship of the Institute of Pacific Affairs as research material for this script.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes. I am sorry, Institute of Pacific Relations.

When I took the book home and I started to try to do my research, really, I am sorry, I just burst out laughing, because it was diametrically opposite Mr. Stines' report. The research in this book was diametrically opposed to everything in Mr. Stines' report.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the name of it?

Mrs. WIDENER. Let me see. Either the Central Southeastern Soviet Russia—let me think—or Middle Eastern. I just can't quote the title to you. I know the author.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was it?

Mrs. WIDENER. William Mandel. When I opened the book I was very much interested to see the Office of War Information was in it. When I noticed that I thought I would get some really good material for my script. But I couldn't use it. It was my belief and feeling that the book was largely Communist propaganda. At least if Mr. Stines' report and other material that I had studied on the subject consistently is accurate, then this book is inaccurate. It paints conditions there in those regions of the Soviet Union as a kind of paradise.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that we have introduced into the record evidence that Mr. William Mandel is a member of the Communist Party, in addition to the fact that we did show some connection of his with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I mention that to show the fact this is germane testimony.

Was that the end of that episode, Mrs. Widener?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have taken, in executive session, testimony by an adviser of the Free China Labor League who spent some time on Formosa and in Shanghai. This gentleman is now currently in Europe. We have the choice today of either taking his executive session testimony and introducing it into the public record, or we can wait until he returns from Europe and he will give the

testimony in person. I think it is a decision that should be made by the chairman and the committee, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. He was sworn. The testimony was taken in regular executive session?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was present? What Senators were present and where was it taken?

Mr. MORRIS. It was taken in executive session here in Washington. I know Senator Ferguson was present because it took place in the Senator's room. I think Senator Eastland was also present, but the transcript will show it.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness is now in Europe?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. We summoned him to be here today. His wife notified us last week he could not be present for he is in Europe for a period of about 2 months. We have the decision of deciding whether or not we should use his executive session testimony and make it public, or wait until he returns from Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be the view of the Chair that we would defer until we can have the witness present, but that view of the Chair will be governed by the will of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. I would say normally that should be the program. I do not think we should delay the hearings because of the present condition when this could be made public.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I will take that up in committee in executive session at a later date as to what the decision will be. If it is necessary, we can use the executive testimony. I would prefer to have the witness appear and testify in open session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, for security purposes I feel we should not give his name, but this is the executive session taken Friday, July 6, 1951, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. That will be taken up by the committee in executive session and we will come to a conclusion on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here some evidence by Mr. Mandel which would corroborate the episode related by Mrs. Widener in connection with Mr. William Mandel's book.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a little pamphlet entitled "IPR books, 1950–51, Institute of Pacific Relations." It lists new and forthcoming publications on the Far East and the Pacific area. On page 24 of this list we find The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, by William Mandel, inquiry series. This is the book we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that title "The Soviet Far East" refresh your memory any?

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes, it does. Could I see the book?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Please see whether you can identify that as the book.

Mrs. WIDENER. Yes; this is the book that was given to me.

I would, if I may, like to call attention to something that struck me when I looked at the book. It has a foreword. I read the foreword. It was the first thing I read. Before I had read any of the book, it struck me that the foreword is, well, it is double talk.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at this point I think the entire foreword should be made a part of the record and then the witness can comment on it if she likes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

THE SOVIET FAR EAST

(By William Mandel)

FOREWORD

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute.

The study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process of revision.

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the view of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the national councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the author.

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. I. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

In the general conduct of this inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East the institute has benefited by the counsel of the following advisers: Prof. H. F. Angus, of the University of British Columbia; Dr. J. B. Condliffe, of the University of California; M. Etienne Dennery, of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques.

These advisers have cooperated with the chairman and the secretary-general in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the inquiry conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship. Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the advisers and although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies, they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the inquiry.

The purpose of this inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East with a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area. To this end, the analysis will include an account of the economic and political conditions which produced the situation existing in July 1937, with respect to China, to Japan, and to the other foreign powers concerned; an evaluation of developments during the war period which appear to indicate important trends in the policies and programs of all the powers in relation to the far eastern situation; and finally, an estimate of the principal political, economic, and social conditions which may be expected in a postwar period, the possible forms of adjustment which might be applied under these conditions, and the effects of such adjustments upon the countries concerned.

The inquiry does not propose to document a specific plan for dealing with the far eastern situation. Its aim is to focus available information on the present crisis in forms which will be useful to those who lack either the time or the expert knowledge to study the vast amount of material now appearing or already published in a number of languages.

The present study, "The Soviet Far East," falls within the framework of the first of the four general groups of studies which it is proposed to make as follows:

I. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of the policies of western powers in the Far East; their territorial and economic interests; the effects on their far-eastern policies of internal economic and political developments and of developments in their foreign policies vis-à-vis other parts of the world; the probable effects of the present conflict on their positions in the Far East; their changing attitudes and policies with respect to their future relations in that area.

II. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Japanese foreign policy and possible important future developments; the extent to which Japan's policy toward China has been influenced by Japan's geographic conditions and material resources, by special features in the political and economic organization of Japan which directly or indirectly affect the formulation of her present foreign policy, by economic and political developments in China, by the external policies of other powers affecting Japan; the principal political, economic, and social factors which may be expected in a postwar Japan; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of Japan's fundamental problems.

III. The political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of Chinese foreign policy and possible important future developments; Chinese unification and reconstruction, 1931–37, and steps leading toward the policy of united national resistance to Japan; the present degree of political cohesion and economic strength; effects of resistance and current developments on the position of foreign interests in China and changes in China's relations with foreign powers; the principal political, economic, and social factors which may be expected in a postwar China; possible and probable adjustments on the part of other nations which could aid in the solution of China's fundamental problems.

IV. Possible methods for the adjustment of specific problems, in the light of information and suggestions presented in the three studies outlined above; analysis of previous attempts at bilateral or multilateral adjustments of political and economic relations in the Pacific and causes of their success or failure; types of administrative procedures and controls already tried out and their relative effectiveness; the major issues likely to require international adjustment in a postwar period and the most helpful methods which might be devised to meet them; necessary adjustments by the powers concerned; the basic requirements of a practical system of international organization which could promote the security and peaceful development of the countries of the Pacific area.

EDWARD C. CARTER, *Secretary General.*

Mrs. WIDENER (reading):

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

I took that to mean that the Institute of Pacific Relations sponsors this book. I think anybody would. [Continues reading:]

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute.

The study has been submitted in draft to a number of authorities, many of whom made suggestions and criticisms which were of great value in the process of revision.

Though many of the comments received have been incorporated in the final text, the above authorities do not of course accept responsibility for the study. The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the national councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the author.

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

In the general conduct of this inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East, the institute has benefited by the counsel of the following advisers—

May I say that I take the word "institute" here to mean the Institute of Pacific Relations, and it seems to me that this foreword—"so far as we are publishing it, but we are not responsible for it"—is double talk. I mean, to a professional writer it is. It seems to me that way, anyway. [Continues reading:]

Prof. H. F. Angus, of the University of British Columbia; Dr. J. B. Condliffe, of the University of California; M. Etienne Dennery, of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques.

These advisers have cooperated with the chairman and the secretary-general—

I take that to be the chairman and the secretary-general of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. What else would you take it?

Mrs. WIDENER (continues reading):

in an effort to insure that the publications issued in connection with the inquiry conform to a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship.

Now, it seems to me before they said they were not responsible for the opinions expressed in this book. Here they are guaranteeing its impartiality.

Each manuscript has been submitted to at least two of the advisers; and, although they do not necessarily subscribe to the statements or views in this or any of the studies, they consider this study to be a useful contribution to the subject of the inquiry.

The inquiry is being conducted, I understand, by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The more I read this foreword, frankly—I did feel like Alice in Wonderland.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that that book was given to you as a guide in your writing?

Mrs. WIDENER. Oh, yes, sir. This was given to me as research material. It was the only material given to me.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom was it given to you?

Mrs. WIDENER. By the research library of the Voice of America.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you think of an individual in there?

Mrs. WIDENER. I don't know the name of the librarian who gave it to me, but I do know it was given to me. [Continues reading:]

Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East.

Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of the IPR conferences, and then it goes on. Then it says it does not propose to document a specific plan for dealing with the Far East situation. Then it goes on to guarantee that these are the contingencies. Anybody can read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out again we have had testimony before this committee that Mr. William Mandel, the author of that volume, was a member of the Communist Party. This episode is brought forth at this time, Mr. Chairman, simply as one episode that this particular witness is able to testify to and is offered for that purpose.

Mrs. WIDENER. May I say something?

Mr. MORRIS. If it is pertinent; yes.

Mrs. WIDENER. If you will permit me, I would like to make a suggestion here. I think this kind of thing is typical of the plight of the serious researcher and student and would-be accurate writer and re-

porter. I feel that if a book such as this exists in a Government library, for research purposes, a book which is I do not believe impartial, that somehow or other that book should be labeled so that the researcher who is writing for the Voice of America, or any other agency of the United States Government, knows when they are picking a book up such as this that this is in truth not an impartial factual document, or at least it is not when compared with the Government's own information.

I have no way of judging any of this information, except by what was given to me, but I do know what was given to me by the State Department on this subject which was in direct refutation of what is in this book.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then you feel, when the Government has in its library of research for the Voice of America a book and they present that book to a person to get out a script for the Voice, they in a way sponsor the accuracy of the information in the research book?

Mrs. WIDENER. I should think that the book in the research library would be classified as Communist propaganda or else Marxian-Socialist views, or Lenin-Stalin views. So, when you pick it up and read it, you know what you have. These are very complex, difficult matters covered in this book. If I had not been given special information by an expert, written by an expert in our own Embassy, how could I have any knowledge of the existing conditions in the central Asiatic part of the Soviet Union?

Senator FERGUSON. You could have accepted it as being the truth and the facts and given it on the air in your script.

Mrs. WIDENER. I could have accepted this book if I had not had any other information. If I had received an assignment and was given by my own Government this book to write about, which I was, it seems to me I would have accepted this as material suitable.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at the Friday session we introduced documents showing Mr. Julian Friedman was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I think Mr. Mandel has one more contribution to make to that list.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an issue of the Spotlight on the Far East, published monthly by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General. This is the issue of April 1947. On page 5 we find an article under the heading "Guest Column," by Julian Friedman, entitled "China's Unions Refuse to be Puppets." Under his name it says [reading]:

For the past 2 years the author was United States labor attaché in China. He became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks with authority on the Chinese labor movement.

I would like to put the article, which is brief, into the record and just quote a portion of it by way of example.

The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutely opposed to trade-unionism because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade-unionists are certainly opposed to the present antilabor National Government—

and so on in the same strain.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this whole column introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

This is a column that Julian Friedman wrote for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which has been termed "a subversive organization" by the Attorney General.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is at least a column which appeared in that publication under his name.

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I see there is a photograph. Is that a photograph of Friedman? Maybe the witness can identify it as being the person she spoke to on the night she has been talking about.

Mrs. WIDENER. It resembles; I wouldn't say positively.

Mr. MORRIS. Let the record show it is a very small photograph, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. The photograph shows head and shoulders and the entire photograph is less than an inch square, and it is square.

Mrs. WIDENER. It resembles the person, but I wouldn't say positively it was the person.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that exhibit made part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 246" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 246

[From the Spotlight on the Far East, vol. II, No. 4, published monthly by the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York, N. Y., April 1947]

GUEST COLUMN

CHINA'S UNIONS REFUSE TO BE PUPPETS

(By Julian Friedman)

[Photograph]

For the past 2 years the author was United States labor attaché in China. He became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks with authority on the Chinese labor movement.

Genuine trade-unionists are not easy to find in Kuomintang China. To reach them, you have to visit obscure, innocent-looking alleys or out-of-the-way fields in the suburbs of the cities.

But it is most dangerous for them to be known as trade-unionists or to work openly for real trade-unionism.

The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutely opposed to trade-unionism because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade-unionists are certainly opposed to the present anti-labor National Government.

Many were originally either company-union or Kuomintang headquarters appointees. There were also secret-society agents and gangsters in labor roles. The latter are quickly exposed today by the workers themselves.

As for the company-union and bureaucratic-union officials, the workers have given them every opportunity to work for the real trade-union movement. So, they now face this dilemma: serve as Kuomintang stooges and 'finks' and lose support among the workers or fight with the workers and be attacked by the Fascists.

That several have chosen the latter course has enraged the National Government and Kuomintang, which has retaliated with arrest, threats of violence, expulsion from official labor circles, purging of official unions, and reorganizing them.

Nothing illustrates the change in labor so aptly as the Shanghai anti-civil-war demonstration of June 23, 1946. On the day before, the Government had called official trade-union representatives to a meeting and dictated resolusions which said that no workers or unions would participate in the demonstration, and that any persons in the demonstration could not be considered workers. The resolutions were "unanimously adopted" because the Government chairman said so, with no one else given a chance to speak. But more than 100,000 workers

turned out the next day. And the representatives who had "passed" the resolutions the previous day marched at their head.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you wish the committee to meet again?

Mr. MORRIS. Tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, Mr. Chairman. We will have General Wedemeyer as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee stands in recess until tommorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11. 15 a. m. Tuesday, September 18, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m. Wednesday, September 19, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

General Wedemeyer, will you stand and be sworn, please?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WEDEMEYER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER, (RETIRED), AVCO, NEW YORK, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

General WEDEMEYER. A. C. Wedemeyer, AVCO, 420 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

General WEDEMEYER. I am vice president and a member of the board of directors of AVCO.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell the committee what service commands you have held in the American Army with respect to the China theater.

General WEDEMEYER. I was designated theater commander and chief of staff to the Generalissimo in the fall of 1944 when General Stilwell was relieved from those two posts.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position?

General WEDEMEYER. Approximately 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. That would be, then, until the fall of 1946?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next command then, General?

General WEDEMEYER. I commanded the Second Army with headquarters in Baltimore.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the end of your China command?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct. I went out to China again in 1947 for 2 months.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the purpose of that trip, General?

General WEDEMEYER. I was sent out there as an envoy of the President to make a survey of conditions in China and Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write a report as a result of that survey?

General WEDEMEYER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the report which is now referred to as the Wedemeyer report on China?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, when you assumed command of the China theater what civilian members were there on duty at that time? This is now in the fall of 1944.

General WEDEMEYER. What civilian members were on duty on my staff?

Mr. MORRIS. On your staff.

General WEDEMEYER. I had four political advisers who had been serving is that capacity on General Stilwell's staff. They included Mr. Jack Service, Mr. John Davies, Mr. Raymond Ludden, and Mr. John Emmerson.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did they remain as political advisers to your command after your arrival?

General WEDEMEYER. Only a few months.

Mr. MORRIS. General, during that period of time were you able to form an opinion of the various political reports that they submitted at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. My analysis of the reports submitted by those gentlemen could not properly be called an intelligent or thoroughgoing analysis, and this is the reason: In my judgment, if I had it to do over again, I would have more carefully analyzed those reports, but at that time, that is, at the time I assumed command of the theater, the Japanese were pushing us around and it looked for a while as if I were going to have difficulty remaining there and to retain China in the war. I had two areas of strategic importance—Kunming and Chungking. Kunming was the terminal of my principal base of supply. All of my supplies, as you gentlemen know, came over the "hump" by air. We were cut off from the outside world except by air, so if I lost that, China might be put out of the war.

The other area of importance was the seat of the wartime government in Chungking. If I lost that, psychologically and militarily China again might be out. So I was hard put to it to retain my situation there, to stabilize the military situation, with the result that I neglected the political, diplomatic, or psychological factors which I properly should have taken heed of and taken appropriate steps.

These four men who were political advisers, two or three of them I had known previously. I had met them socially over in India when I was serving there with Lord Louis Mountbatten.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they?

General WEDEMEYER. I met John Davies, John Emmerson, and Jack Service. I had not met, prior to my assuming command in China, Raymond Ludden.

Mr. MORRIS. General, did the recommendations of these four political officers coincide with American policy at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. At that time the American policy, as I interpreted it, was to keep China in the war and to support the Chinese Nationalist Government. There were no clear-cut American policies enunciated, insofar as I can recall, pertaining to China or any other area of the world. Theater commanders in remote areas had oftentimes to interpret or try to conjecture what was desired in a broad sense, what was desired to accomplish what the Government wanted. However, I felt that my job in China was to continue China in the war, to contain as many Japanese in that area fighting so that they could not be removed from the area and sent over to oppose General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific. As I stated, also to support the Chinese Nationalist Government which our own Government recognized as the sovereign government in that area.

So everything that I did militarily or otherwise was in consonance with that interpretation of American policy in China. If I had followed the advice of these four advisers, some of the advice that they embodied in these reports, in my judgment I would not have been carrying out my directive, nor would I have been following the policy of my country in that particular area.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say "the policy," are you speaking about the policy as laid down by the military or by the State Department, or was there a difference?

General WEDEMEYER. Senator Ferguson, I made a real effort back in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943 to determine American policy or policies insofar as our own country was concerned which were not clearly enunciated. Most of them were found in the Constitution, the bill of rights, and so forth, but our policies pertaining to other areas of the world were never, in my judgment, clearly enunciated. That goes right up to today. I don't think many people in our country know what we are striving to do in the Far East, in the Middle East, or in Western Europe today. The objectives established are too nebulous and, in my judgment, until we do have clearly enunciated policies by the appropriate authorities, not by the military but by civilian authorities, as is contemplated in our Constitution, we are going to have a difficult time in accomplishing what I think the American people believe to be our national objectives.

I said all of that because oftentimes as a theater commander I had to take action in the absence of clearly enunciated policy. I had to take action that inevitably created policy. Then if that action that I took had been wrong or had been subject to criticism on the part of our people, I would have been to blame. The military is assuming responsibility that they should not. But if the policy happened to be in consonance with the views of the American people, then the military would not be criticized. I just mention that because I think it is a vacuum that must be filled.

Senator EASTLAND. What was the policy that your political advisers put forth? What was their advice to you?

General WEDEMEYER. Sometimes it is quite implicit, Senator. Other times it is veiled, but the idea was to give more support to the Communist forces in lieu of the Nationalist forces. These reports would play up the shortcomings, the maladministration and the unscrupulousness of Nationalist leaders, play up the orderliness or the potentialities of the Communist forces in Yunan.

I could not support the Communists' political party and still carry out what I believed to be the American policy in the area.

Senator EASTLAND. Those policies were pro-Communist, were they not?

General WEDEMEYER. I would not state that categorically, sir. I remember a newspaperman out there whom I thought was an out-and-out Communist. The reason I thought so, after considering it more carefully, I was sure that he was so critical of the Nationalists. There was much to be criticized in the Nationalist set-up. There was maladministration and there were dishonesties.

Senator EASTLAND. That was true with regard to the Communists, too, was it not?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. It was a smaller set-up. The opportunities were not quite there.

Senator FERGUSON. The Communists were not in power and did not have the opportunity?

General WEDMEYER. That is right, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. If the Communists had the opportunity——

General WEDEMEYER. They would act just the same way; yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Knowing that these advisers favored the Communists over the Nationalists?

General WEDEMEYER. That is implicit in these reports, if you will read them over.

Mr. MORRIS. Were these reports critical of the Nationalist Government that you were there to defend and uphold?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like, if it is possible, for the general to designate which, if any, of the four people he has named rendered the reports that he makes mention of, the four advisers who were on his staff.

General WEDEMEYER. Actually, Senator, I do not recall ever receiving a written report from Mr. John Emmerson. The other three did submit written and oral reports to me. I stated clearly, sir, that I did not give them the attention that I properly should have, but I was involved in a military situation.

Mr. MORRIS. General, to whom were these reports made? I mean these reports that we are discussing.

General WEDEMEYER. They were submitted to me as theater commander.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they submitted through the State Department representative in China? They were State Department employees, were they not?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. They were all Foreign Service officers, professionals.

Mr. MORRIS. Do they report to you through the ranking State Department representative in China?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes. When I assumed command of the theater, Mr. John Davies—I believe he was the senior one of the group—reported to me, indicated what they had been doing for General Stilwell, and expressed the desire to cooperate and to assist me in every way possible. All of them spoke Chinese. They were all Chinese language students. I think two of them were born out there, the sons of missionaries.

Mr. Morris. General Wedemeyer, may I refer you to the first report that is on that list of papers there in front of you on the table and that you will see is a report made by John S. Service. It is one of the reports that we are discussing.

Mr. Chairman, I am now referring to Report No. 40 from the United States Army Observer Section, APO 879. This is a report from John S. Service to General Stilwell, commanding general, USAF–CBI. It is dated October 10, 1944.

Are you acquainted with that memorandum, General?

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. It was not submitted to me, of course, but when I assumed the command of the theater in order to get background for my duties, I read every document I could possibly get hold of in my headquarters. This document I definitely read at that time.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything outstanding in that memorandum that made an impression on you in the past?

General Wedemeyer. When I read it over I just recalled being impressed with the writer's criticism of the Chinese Nationalist Government. There were criticisms emphasized throughout the paper. When I took command of the theater, I found the American military were criticizing the Chinese military and the relations were not good. It was not a happy situation. I recall vividly visiting the Chinese headquarters to obtain from the Chinese generals a résumé of the situation as it existed at that time. I went over there with my chief of staff, a general named Hern. I was astounded at the attitude of the Chinese. They were correctly polite, but I did not get any information from them. I decided either they did not have any information or there was an intolerable situation that just couldn't continue.

So I suggested to the generalissimo that we set up a combined staff. I would sit at the head of this table and next to me would be the head of the Chinese Army. On my right would be one of my staff officers, say my Intelligence officer; and sitting next to him would be the Chinese Intelligence officer. That worked beautifully. At first the Chinese were not very cooperative. They were very quiet. When the war was over they gave a party for my staff officers, indicating that marvelous relationship had developed. That just was a thing because it permeated the field where we got better cooperation between the military Chinese and American.

I mention that because when I got over there there was no cooperation and there was mistrust and suspicion prevailing in the theater. These reports on the civilian side just played up that same philosophy that pervaded in the theater.

Mr. Morris. General, may we get back to this report? Is there anything outstanding in that particular report that you would care to comment on at this time?

General Wedemeyer. In my judgment the military capabilities of the Communist forces in Yunan were not great, were invariably overemphasized in this and other reports submitted to me by these political advisers.

I think I am qualified to speak knowingly on that subject, because I am a trained military man and those men were not. On the political, economic, and diplomatic side I would feel inclined to yield to their views and opinions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in this particular report there is certain underscoring. I think it would be appropriate if Mr. Mandel were to read the underscored portions of this report and we can have particular questions addressed to General Wedemeyer concerning the views expressed therein.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

> With the glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within China is growing rapidly. The prestige of the party was never lower, and Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader.

The CHAIRMAN. I think before that question is discussed by the general you had better lay a foundation. Whose report is this? From where does it emanate?

Mr. MORRIS. This is a report of John S. Service dated October 10, 1944, and it is submitted to General Stilwell, commanding general, USAF-CBI, on that date.

As testimony has brought forth, General Stilwell was the predecessor of General Wedemeyer. This letter came to the attention of General Wedemeyer when he assumed command in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, the underscored matter is drawn to your attention. Do you wish to discuss it?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment on that particular aspect of the Service report?

General WEDEMEYER. From the American viewpoint as expressed to me by practically everyone with whom I came in contact, that statement might be said to epitomize the entire American viewpoint toward Chiang Kai-shek and his government when I arrived in the theater in October 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "the entire American viewpoint," just what do you encompass by that expression?

General WEDEMEYER. Mr. Chairman, practically everyone with whom I spoke felt that there was nothing that could be done constructively to keep China fighting in the war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is those with whom you spoke in that theater?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. And Mr. Wallace was out there, the then Vice President. He stated that nothing but a miracle could keep China fighting in the war. He was quoted in the papers saying that.

That was the pessimistic view uniformly expressed to me when I went over there to assume command by military and by civilians with whom I came in contact.

Senator FERGUSON. General Wedemeyer, I wonder whether this was in line with what you thought to be the policy [reading]:

> Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we take a more realistic line.

He was the head, was he not, at that time of the Nationalist Government?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, he was.

Senator FERGUSON. How could that be in line with your idea of the policy of the United States in China, that sentence?

General WEDEMEYER. It was not, Senator. I state categorically these reports were not in consonance with my interpretation of my directive

or of American policy. That contravenes American policy as I understand it, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the second underscored passage?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on American support for survival. But we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang.

Then, skipping down—

We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The party and Chiang will stick to us because our victory is certain and is their only hope for continued power.

General WEDEMEYER. My comment on that is this: The Communist Party in the U. S. S. R. was dependent upon America for support during the war. We gave plenty of it to the U. S. S. R., much more than we ever gave to China. A statement like that is just inane, in my judgment.

Mr. MORRIS. Did we need the Chinese Government in the war, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. We needed it just as much as we needed the U. S. S. R. Any diversion of the Japanese effort that could be accomplished, it was sound to do so. The Chinese were containing in their fighting with the Japanese a million and a half Japanese that might have been deployed against our boys coming up through the Philippine Archipelago and through the Ryukyus.

So the fact that the Chinese fighting, not as well as we would like them to have fought, but doing increasingly better as the war went on, they contained one million and a half Japanese which I think was creditable and under the circumstances, a very great contribution.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony we did need the Chinese Government at that time to that extent?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; just as today we need Franco, anyone that will help us in this struggle against communism. We may not approve of everything they do. We may not go along with their governmental structure, but if they can help us in our struggle, I say use them. We needed them then.

Mr. MORRIS. On the basis of your entire experience in China would you say that the situation as described to you by the political officers was erroneous in this respect?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment they were erroneous.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were able to make use of the Chinese Nationalist forces?

General WEDEMEYER. If I had followed the advice I would not have been carrying out my orders.

Senator FERGUSON. General Wedemeyer, isn't the way this would read and what you have said make it apparent that if you had followed the political advice you would have tried to take the Communist Government in China as lining up with the United States and have nothing to do with the Nationalists?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I think that is a fair statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Their advice was to recognize in effect the Communist Government in China; whereas, you felt as we were then recognizing the Nationalists that that was the Government that you were to

support and to get the Nationalists' aid in your efforts in China; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. I think that is a fair statement. The Chinese Communists offered me command of their army and I notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff back in America. I, through the Ambassador, also notified the President that I did not want command of the army. At that time I recognized the implications of communism in the Far East as I did in Europe. I did not want to support people whom I knew were operating under the aegis of the Kremlin.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that the best interests of America would be served if the Nationalists were recognized?

General WEDEMEYER. Not only for America but for the world, for the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read further?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading):

> We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. All the other groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that paragraph, please, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. Here I am commenting on China in regard to experts' political views. It makes me rather vulnerable. But in my experience, which is only 5 years in China, or over 4 years, I found that most of the Chinese cannot read or write. They do not understand a thing about political philosophies, political structures, and economic structures. They mean nothing to them. They want shelter, food, and peace.

When he talks, when this man writes about other parties, there are not other parties over there worthy of the name. There was no other leadership through which I could work, except Chiang Kai-shek on the one hand, and on the other Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist leader. They were quite well organized, these Communists, and very articulate, much more so than Chiang Kai-shek, and very intolerant of criticism which Chiang was not. He did permit people to criticize him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Chinese Communists help you in your confining the Japanese on the mainland?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. I did make the effort to coordinate our military operations over there. They were operating in sporadic efforts to the north of wartime capital up in the Yunan area and Shansi Province. They never launched a concerted attack in coordination with those attacks that I was putting on down below.

Now I should say in fairness to those people when my fliers would be shot down behind the Japanese lines, frequently the Chinese Communists would facilitate the return of those fliers. I don't want to overemphasize that point because I don't want it to be given disproportionate emphasis. But that is true. At times they did do that.

But their military operations did not make the contribution so often one reads in the press or hears about on the radio. The military operations of the Chinese Communists, at least while I was in command of the theater, were not significant.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that on the basis of fact you were the theater commander?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. General, I call particularly your attention to the next sentence in the paragraph that Mr. Mandel has just read:

Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.

Would you comment on that?

General WEDEMEYER. As I stated, there were only two broad political parties, one the Communists and one the Kuomintang. The splinter parties were absolutely impotent. There were not enough people involved. If we threw over the Kuomintang, it meant we were going to assume support and cooperate with the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that then have been true, namely, that under any other than the present reactionary control, to use Mr. Service's words, the Communists would have been more cooperative?

General WEDEMEYER. The Communists, in my judgment—and I have tried to be objective, I have tried to find good in Marxist theories—the Communists will cooperate when the advantage accrues to them. At no time will a Communist cooperate otherwise. That was applicable then and it is applicable now. We are naive if we think otherwise.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue reading, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading):

We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the country, now and after the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. Again I do not know what other groups he is talking about. You had the professors——

Mr. MORRIS. Certainly the Communists were one of those groups.

General WEDEMEYER. They were the major group. There were only two major groups there. There were splinter parties made up of a few of the intelligentsia and they were not significant. They had no power. They were not articulate, so I think you can disregard them.

Mr. MORRIS. As a matter of fact, General, the Chinese Communists have not proved to be friendly to the United States and they have not looked to us for the salvation of their country then or after the war; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes. The Chinese Communists have no friendly attitude toward anyone, in my judgment, except the Kremlin. They certainly have no friendly attitudes or friendly intentions toward countries that they call capitalistic nations. Their objective is to destroy capitalism. Their avowed intention is to destroy capitalism, expressed to me personally.

Mr. MORRIS. General, their performances, particularly during the past year, would seem to be a complete refutation of that statement, would they not, sir?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading):

The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone, as it was to seek

the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's government in London, ignoring Tito.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you comment on that, General?

General WEDEMEYER. I think events that have transpired since we supported Tito have proved us wrong. I think the real patriot over in Yugoslavia, Mikhailovitch, we let down. Personally I think we should have supported him. The same would be true in China. With all his faults, and he does have faults, I think Chiang Kai-shek was the proper leader to support at the time we did. I do not know of another leader today whom we might support and obtain best results in China from other than Chiang Kai-shek. To me today he epitomizes leadership there.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more there, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading):

Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without consideration of the opposition forces—Communist, provincial, and liberal.

We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This is an old trick of Chiang's.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that, General?

General WEDEMEYER. It sounds exactly like somebody was writing about the attitude of Stalin when we were worried. Stalin was pressurizing the Allies in World War II to establish a second front. It was always the implicit threat there "If you don't establish a second front, we will make a separate peace with Germany."

I think the same philosophy behind the situation in Russia applied out in China, and this chap points out we should not support Chiang Kai-shek because he is a reactionary. So was Stalin, the worst kind, yet we supported him.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (continues reading):

Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit to the Communist capital at Yenan would have significance that no Chinese would miss—least of all the generalissimo. The effect would be great even if it were only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be more than a mere demonstration; we must, for instance, plan an eventual use of the Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment on that, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. I think that would be just like foreign representatives coming over here and visiting Bob Taft and ignoring President Truman. The only difference is Senator Bob Taft would not have an armed force to support his political Republican Party.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that would disturb Mr. Truman, do you?

General WEDEMEYER. I did not mean to imply any disparagement of any name I mention.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this document preparatory to its being put in the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This document, listed as No. 40, was taken from the transcript of the proceedings of the Loyalty Security Board meeting in the case of John S. Service as a reprinting of a State Department employee loyalty investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, as such may that be introduced in the record and marked with the next consecutive exhibit number?

The CHAIRMAN. It is to be understood and the record will show that this is the exhibit from which Mr. Mandel has been reading that the excerpts were commented on by the witness; it that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 247" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 247

UNITED STATES ARMY OBSERVER SECTION,
APO 879, October 10, 1944.

Report No. 40

Secret

Subject: The need for greater realism in our relations with Chiang Kai-shek.
To: General Stilwell, Commanding General, USAF-CBI.

1. You have allowed me, as a political officer attached to your staff, to express myself freely in the past regarding the situation in China as I have seen it. Although in Yenan I am only a distant observer of recent developments in Chungking and Washington, I trust that you will permit the continued frankness which I have assumed in the attached memorandum regarding the stronger policy which I think it is now time for us to adopt toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government.

2. It is obvious, of course, that you cannot act independently along the lines suggested. The situation in China and the measures necessary to meet it have both military importance and far-reaching political significance; the two aspects cannot be separated. Because of this interrelation, and because of the high level on which action in China must be taken, there must be agreement and mutual support between our political and military branches. But this will be ineffective without clear decision and forceful implementation by the President.

3. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted, as usual, to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters USAF-CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies.

(Signed) J. S.
(Typed) JOHN S. SERVICE.

Enclosure: Memorandum, as stated.

[First endorsement]

UNITED STATES ARMY OBSERVER SECTION,
APO 879, October 16, 1944.

To: Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding United States Army Forces, China, Burma, and India, APO 879.

Approved:

DAVID D. BARRETT,
Colonel, GSC.

MEMORANDUM

Our dealings with Chiang Kai-shek apparently continue on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we take a more realistic line.

The Kuomintang government is in crisis. Recent defeats have exposed its military ineffectiveness and will hasten the approaching economic disaster. Passive inability to meet these crises in a constructive way, stubborn unwillingness to submerge selfish power seeking in democratic unity, and the statements of Chiang himself to the People's Political Council and on October 10, 1944, are sufficient evidence of the bankruptcy of Kuomintang leadership.

With the glaring exposure of the Kuomintang's failure, dissatisfaction within China is growing rapidly. The prestige of the party was never lower, and Chiang is losing the respect he once enjoyed as a leader.

In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on American support for survival. *But we are in no way dependent on the Kuomintang.*

We do not need it for military reasons. It has lost the southern air bases and cannot hold any section of the sea coast. Without drastic reforms—which

must have a political base—its armies cannot fight the Japanese effectively no matter how many arms we give them. But it will not permit those reforms because its war against Japan is secondary to its desire to maintain its own undemocratic power.

On the other hand, neither the Kuomintang nor any other Chinese regime, because of the sentiment of the people, can refuse American forces the use of Chinese territory against the Japanese. And the Kuomintang attitude prevents the utilization of other forces, such as the Communist or provincial troops, who should be more useful than the Kuomintang's demoralized armies.

We need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition. The party and Chiang will stick to us because our victory is certain and is their only hope for continued power. But our support of the Kuomintang will not stop its normally traitorous relations with the enemy and will only encourage it to continue sowing the seeds of future civil war by plotting with the present puppets for eventual consolidation of the occupied territories against the Communist-led forces of popular resistance.

We need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang government. All the other groups in China want to defend themselves and fight Japan. Any new government under any other than the present reactionary control will be more cooperative and better able to mobilize the country.

Actually, by continued and exclusive support of the Kuomintang, we tend to prevent the reforms and democratic reorganization of the Government which are essential for the revitalization of China's war effort. Encouraged by our support, the Kuomintang will continue in its present course, progressively losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more impotent. Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government and joint prosecution of the war, the Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their own interests by more direct opposition.

We need not support the Kuomintang for international political reasons. The day when it was expedient to inflate Chiang's status to one of the Big Four is past, because with the obvious certainty of defeat, Japan's Pan-Asia propaganda loses its effectiveness. We cannot hope that China under the present Kuomintang can be an effective balance to Soviet Russia, Japan, or the British Empire in the Far East.

On the contrary, artificial inflation of Chiang's status only adds to his unreasonableness. The example of a democratic, nonimperialistic China will be much better counterpropaganda in Asia than the present regime, which, even in books like China's Destiny, hypnotizes itself with ideas of consolidating minority nations (such as Tibet and Mongolia), recovering lost territories (such as the southern peninsula), and protecting the rights and at the same time nationalities of its numerous emigrants (to such areas as Thailand, Malaya, and the East Indies). Finally, the perpetuation in power of the present Kuomintang can only mean a weak and disunited China—a sure cause of international involvements in the Far East. The key to stability must be a strong, unified China. This can be accomplished only on a democratic foundation.

We need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance in China are friendly to the United States and look to it for the salvation of the country, now and after the war.

In fact, Chiang has lost the confidence and respect of most of the American-educated, democratically minded liberals and intellectuals. The Chen brothers, military, and secret police cliques which control the party and are Chiang's main supports are the most Chauvinist elements in the country. The present party ideology, as shown in Chiang's own books China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory, is fundamentally antiforeign and antidemocratic, both politically and economically.

Finally, we need feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang. The men he has kept around him have proved selfish and corrupt, incapable, and obstructive. Chiang's own dealings with us have been an opportunist combination of extravagant demands and unfilled promises, wheedling and bargaining, bluff, and blackmail. Chiang did not resist Japan until forced by his own people. He has fought only passively—not daring to mobilize his own people. He has sought to have us save him—so that he can continue his conquest of his own country. In the process, he has worked us for all we were worth.

We seem to forget that Chiang is an oriental; that his background and vision are limited; that his position is built on the skill as an extremely adroit political manipulator and a stubborn, shrewd bargainer; that he mistakes kindness

and flattery for weakness; and that he listens to his own instrument of force rather than reason.

Our policy toward China should be guided by two facts. First, *we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled.* Second, *we cannot hope to solve China's problems* [which are now our problems] *without consideration of the opposition forces*—Communist, provincial, and liberal.

The parallel with Yugoslavia has been drawn before but is becoming more and more apt. It is as impractical to seek Chinese unity, the use of the Communist forces, and the mobilization of the population in the rapidly growing occupied areas by discussion in Chungking with the Kuomintang alone, as it was to seek the solution of these problems through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's government in Lonon, ignoring Tito.

We should not be swayed by pleas of the danger of China's collapse. This is an old trick of Chiang's.

There may be a collapse of the Kuomintang government, but it will not be the collapse of China's resistance. There may be a period of some confusion but the eventual gains of the Kuomintang's collapse will more than make up for this. The crisis itself makes reform more urgent—and at the same time increases the weight of our influence. *The crisis is the time to push—not to relax.*

We should not let Chiang divert us from the important questions by wasting time in futile discussions as to who is to be American commander. This is an obvious subterfuge.

There is only one man qualified by experience for the job. And the fact is that no one who knows anything about China and is concerned over American rather than Chiang's interests will satisfy Chiang.

We should end the hollow pretense that China is unified and that we can talk only to Chiang. This puts the trump card in Chiang's hands.

Public announcement that the President's representative had made a visit to the Communist capital at Yenan would have significance that no Chinese would miss—least of all the generalissimo. The effect would be great even if it were only a demonstration with no real consultation. But it should be more than a mere demonstration; we must, for instance, plan on eventual use of the Communist armies and this cannot be purely on Kuomintang terms.

Finally if these steps do not succeed, we should stop veiling our negotiations with China in complete secrecy. This shields Chiang and is the voluntary abandonment of our strongest weapon.

Chinese public opinion would swing violently against Chiang if he were shown obstructive and noncooperative with the United States. We should not be misled by the relatively very few Kuomintang die-hards; they are not the people. The Kuomintang government could not withstand public belief that the United States was considering withdrawal of military support or recognition of the Kuomintang as the leader of Chinese resistance.

More than ever, we hold all the aces in Chiang's poker game. It is time we start playing them.

(Signed) J. S.
(Typed) JOHN S. SERVICE.

OCTOBER 10, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. I think it would be appropriate at this time if we showed a connection between Mr. Service and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, will you bring something forth on that score, please?

Mr. MANDEL. From the same loyalty board meeting transcript of proceedings, the date being May 27, 1950, I read the following testimony:

Question. Under what circumstances did you give that off-the-record talk at the IPR?

This was a question directed to Mr. Service.

Answer. During the period of consultation at my return in 1944 I was much sought after because I was the first man to get back to Washington after having visited in the Chinese Communist areas since 1939. In addition to all these interrogations by the different agencies, a number of newspapermen were sent to me by the press section of the Department. I was asked to go up to New

York to talk to Mr. Luce. I got approval. I talked to Mr. Hopkins, Mr. White, and various other people. And the IPR asked——

The CHAIRMAN. Will you just explain IPR?

Answer. The Institute of Pacific Relations. May we refer to it as the IPR?

The CHAIRMAN. Afterward, yes.

Answer. The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of their people in the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be all right with me.

Question. In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the IPR?

Answer. That is right.

Question. I notice that in your statement you subscribed at that time to a number of magazines dealing with China, one of which was the Far Eastern Survey. What is the character of that?

Answer. The Far Eastern Survey is a biweekly publication put out by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations containing articles written by a very large number of people on subjects related to the Far East generally.

Question. And Pacific Affairs?

Answer. Pacific Affairs is a quarterly published by the International Council of the International Secretariat, I believe. Perhaps—I'm not sure of the exact wording of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Question. You were undoubtedly aware from the press of the charges that the Institute of Pacific Relations was seriously infiltrated by Communists. Do you have any knowledge as to how long that situation has existed, when the IPR first began to be influenced in its publications by Communist thinking?

Answer. No; I do not. Outside of being a subscriber to some of its magazines, I have had no interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have never attended its periodic conferences or participated in its affairs in any way. Certainly it was always thought of in the days referred to here as a most respectable type of organization. I have heard from reading the press that there were some Communists who did occupy positions of some influence in it at one period, but I can't tell you with any definiteness or from personal knowledge when that was or how influential those people were.

* * * * * * *

Question. I also notice in your statement that at that time you subscribed to the magazine Amerasia. How could you describe that magazine?

Answer. I subscribed to it just after it was established, I think.

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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS—LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD MEETING IN THE CASE OF JOHN S. SERVICE

Date: Tuesday, May 30, 1950, 10 a. m. to 12:30 p. m.
Place: Room 2254, New State.

* * * * * * *

Mr. RHETTS. I should like to offer as an exhibit at this time Document 327, which is a receipt signed by the assistant treasurer of the American Institute of Pacific Relations for membership dues for John S. Service in the IPR for the year ending February 1951 in the amount of $15.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get it clear. This document represents interrogation and answer by whom?

Mr. MANDEL. The Loyalty Security Board in the case of John S. Service, the Loyalty Security Board of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. With John S. Service answering?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to and read in its entirety by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 248" and filed for the committee's information.)

Mr. MORRIS. That bears on the precise connection that John S. Service had with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. I now come to the report of January 23, 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire whether that was sworn testimony?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

This document is marked No. 103 and is taken from the same proceeding in the case of John S. Service before the State Department Loyalty Security Board.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the report of January 23, 1943?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this a report by Mr. John S. Service?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may I call your attention to the report of January 23, 1943? I think that should be the second one in that group of papers before you.

General WEDEMEYER. I have it.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with that particular report of John S. Service?

General WEDEMEYER. I have read it over, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not made at a time you were theater commander?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; several months prior to my becoming commander.

Mr. MORRIS. It did come to your attention after you became theater commander?

General WEDEMEYER. There was a copy in the headquarters of the China theater.

Mr. MORRIS. You recognize it is a report made by John S. Service?

General WEDEMEYER. Frankly, I couldn't say under oath that I could say that.

Mr. MORRIS. You do remember reading it?

General WEDEMEYER. I remember reading all these memoranda in the headquarters submitted by the political advisers.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the fourth paragraph on that page?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the instrument?

Mr. MORRIS. This has been identified by Mr. Mandel as a John Service report that was made part of the record of the loyalty proceedings of the State Department in the case of John S. Service.

Mr. Mandel, please read part of the second paragraph, not the fourth paragraph, beginning with the third sentence.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

In Kuomintang-controlled China the countering of communism is a growing preoccupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever-widening definition of "communism" but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward forms of

democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after a victory over Japan.

Mr. Morris. Will you comment on that, General?

General Wedemeyer. Frankly, I do not know what to comment. I don't want to repeat over and over again and take the Senators' time. I have tried to make it clear that the Nationalist Government with which I dealt was improving steadily, cooperated with me to the best of its ability, and, on the other hand, I received no cooperation from the Communists. I didn't consider them a government, of course, but there wasn't much cooperation requested. The little I asked them to do was not done, namely, conducting these military operations coordinated with my over-all operations.

I really do not know what thoughts I could give.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything in that particular report, in the entire report, you would care to comment on?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce this in the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

The Chairman. Very well. It will be inserted and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 249" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 249

January 23, 1943.

Subject: Kuomintang-Communist Situation.

An outstanding impression gained during the past 18 months spent in Chungking and in travel through southwest and northwest China is that the most careful study should be given to the internal political situation in China, particularly the growing rift between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

The united front is now definitely a thing of the past and it is impossible to find any optimism regarding the possibility of its resurrection as long as present tendencies continue and the present leadership of the Kuomintang, both civil and military, remains in power. Far from improving, the situation is deteriorating. In Kuomintang-controlled China the countering of communism is a growing preoccupation of propaganda, of both military and civilian political indoctrination, and of secret police and gendarmerie activity. There is not only a rigorous suppression of anything coming under the ever widening definition of "communism" but there appears to be a movement away from even the outward forms of democracy in government. It is now no longer wondered whether civil war can be avoided, but rather whether it can be delayed at least until after a victory over Japan.

The dangers and implications of this disunity are obvious and far reaching. Militarily, the present situation is a great hindrance to any effective war effort by China. Its deterioration into civil war would be disastrous. The situation therefore has direct relationship to our own efforts to defeat Japan. At the present time a large and comparatively well-trained and equipped portion of the Kuomintang army is diverted from active combat against the Japanese to blockade the Communists. In the north (Kansu and Shensi) the lines are well established by multiple lines of block houses and those large forces remain in a condition of armed readiness. Further south (Hupeh, Anhwei, North Kiangsu) the lines are less clearly demarcated and sporadic hostilities, which have gone on for over 2 years and in which the Kuomintang forces appear to take the initiative, continue.

On the other side, the Communist army is starved of all supplies and forced in turn to immobilize most of its strength to guard against what it considers the Kuomintang threat. It was admitted by both parties that there was extreme tension in Kuomintang-Communist relations in the spring of 1942. The Communists believe that it was only the Japanese invasion of Yunnan that saved them from attack at that time. The Communists and their friends claim, furthermore, that the Kuomintang is devoting its energies to the strengthening of

its control over those parts of China accessible to it rather than to fighting Japan. This strengthening of the position of the Kuomintang will of course assist it in re-establishing its control over areas which will then be opened to it. A logical part of such a policy would be the taking over, as soon as an opportunity is found, of the Communist base area in Kansu-Shensi. Success in this move would weaken the Communists and make easier the eventual recapture by the Kuomintang of the Communist guerrilla zones. To support this thesis the Communists point to the campaign in the more extreme Kuomintang publications for the immediate abolition of the border area. Another factor sometimes suggested as tending to provoke an early Kuomintang attack on the Communists is the desirability, from the Kuomintang point of view, of disposing of them before China finds itself an active ally of Russia against Japan.

The possible positive military value of the Communist army to our war effort should not be ignored. These forces control the territory through which access may be had to Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Japanese North China bases. The strategic importance of their position would be enhanced by the entry of Russia into the war against Japan. This importance is largely potential but fairly recent reports of continued bitter fighting in Shansi indicate that the Communists are still enough of a force to provoke periodic Japanese mopping up campaigns. Reflection of this is found in the intensive Japanese anti-Communist propaganda campaign in North China in the summer of 1941, although the fact must not be overlooked that Japanese propaganda has emphasized the anti-Communist angle to appeal to whatever collaborationist elements there may be in occupied China and to the more conservative sections of the Kuomintang. This activity in Shansi and the difficulties of the Japanese there contrast with the inactivity on most of the other Kuomintang-Japanese fronts.

Aside from the immediate war aspects, the political implications of the situation are also serious. Assuming that open hostilities are for the time being averted, the eventual defeat and withdrawal of the Japanese will leave the Kuomintang still confronted with the Communists solidly entrenched in most of North China (East Kansu, North Shensi, Shansi, South Chahar, Hopei, Shantung, North Kiangsu, and North Anhwei). In addition the Communists will be in position to move into the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal from Suiyuan, Jehol, and Manchuria, in all of which areas there is already some Communist activity. In the rest of China they will have the sympathy of elements among the liberals, intellectuals, and students. These elements are of uncertain size but of considerable influence in China, and the Kuomintang's fear of their power, and the power of whatever underground organization the Communists have succeeded in maintaining in the Kuomintang area, is indicated by the size and activity of its various secret police organs.

But possibly the greatest potential strength of the Communists, and one reason why military action against them will not be entirely effective at the present time, is their control of the rural areas of North China in the rear of the Japanese. Here the Kuomintang cannot reach them and the Communists have apparently been able to carry out some degree of popular mobilization. I am in possession of a secret Koumintang publication describing the Communist control of Hopei. It discusses measures of combating the Communists (by such means, for instance, as the blockade now being enforced) and concludes that if the Communists fail to cooperate (i. e. submit to complete Kuomintang domination) they must be exterminated. I hope to make a translation of this pamphlet which would appear to have significance as an official Kuomintang indication of the policy it will pursue in these areas. It seems reasonable to question, as some thoughtful Chinese do, whether the people of these guerrilla zones, after several years of political education and what must be assumed to be at least partial sovietization, will accept peacefully the imposition of Kuomintang control activated by such a spirit and implemented by military force and the political repression, and secret police and gendarmerie power, which are already important adjuncts of party control and which are being steadily strengthened and expanded.

Non-Communist Chinese of my acquaintance (as, for instance, the nephew of the well-known late editor of the Ta Kung Pao) consider the likelihood of civil war the greatest problem facing China. They point out that the Communists are far stronger now than they were when they stood off Kuomintang armies for 10 years in central China and that they will be much stronger yet if it proves that they have succeeded in winning the support of the population in the guerrilla zone. They point to numerous recent instances of successful Communist infiltration into and indoctrination of opposing Chinese armies (such as those of Yen Hsi-shan) and wonder whether this will not cause a prolongation of the

struggle and perhaps make a victory for the Kuomintang, or for either side, impossible. There is undoubtedly a strong revulsion in the mind of the average, nonparty Chinese to the idea of renewed civil war and the Kuomintang may indeed have difficulty with the loyalty and effectiveness of its conscript troops.

Belief in the certainty of eventual civil war leads these same Chinese to question whether the United States has given sufficient realistic consideration to the future in China of democracy. The question is raised whether it is to China's advantage, or to America's own interests, for the United States to give the Kuomintang Government large quantities of military supplies which, judging from past experience, are not likely to be used effectively against Japan but will be available for civil war to enforce unity in the country by military force. These Chinese also speculate on the position of the American troops which may be in China (in support of the Kuomintang army) if there should be a civil war; and wonder what will be the attitude of Russia, especially if it has become by that time a partner in the victory over Japan.

But ignoring these problematical implications, there can be no denial that civil war in China, or even the continuation after the defeat of Japan of the present deadlock, will greatly impede the return of peaceful conditions. This blocking of the orderly large-scale rehabilitation of China will in itself seriously and adversely affect American interests. Even if a conflict is averted, the continuance or, as is probable in such an event, the worsening of the already serious economic strains within the country may result in economic collapse. If there is a civil war the likelihood of such an economic collapse is of course greater.

There is also the possibility that economic difficulties may make the war-weary, overconscripted and overtaxed farmers fertile ground for Communist propaganda and thus bring about a revolution going beyond the moderate democracy which the Chinese Communists now claim to be seeking. Such a Communist government would probably not be democratic in the American sense. And it is probable, even if the United States did not incur the enmity of the Communists for alleged material or diplomatic support of the Kuomintang, that this Communist government would be more inclined toward friendship and cooperation with Russia than with Great Britain and America.

For these reasons it would therefore appear to be in the interest of the United States to make efforts to prevent a deterioration of the internal political situation in China and, if possible, to bring about an improvement.

The Communists themselves (Chou-En-lai and Lin Piao in a conversation with John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942) consider that foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how tactfully made. But they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted elements of leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo.

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chanese Government, and in our propaganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict; democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China.

Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against facism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the central government to the eighteenth group army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.

Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves. But there is no doubt that they would welcome such action.

This visit would have the great additional advantage of providing us with comprehensive and reliable information regarding the Communist side of the situation. For instance we might be able to have better answers to some of the following pertinent questions: How faithfully have the Communists carried out their united front promises? What is the form of their local government? How Communistic is it? Does it show any democratic character or possibilities? Has it won any support of the people? How does it compare with conditions of government in Kuomintang China? How does the Communist treatment of the people in

such matters as taxation, grain requisition, military service and forced labor compare with that in the Kuomintang territory? What is the military and economic strength of the Communists and what is their probable value to the Allied cause? How have they dealt with problems such as inflation, price control, development of economic resources for carrying on the war, and trading with the enemy? Have the people in the guerrilla area been mobilized and aroused to the degree necessary to support real guerrilla warfare?

Without such knowledge, it is difficult to appraise conflicting reports and reach a considered judgment. Due to the Kuomintang blockade, information regarding conditions in the Communist area is at present not available. Such information as we do have is several years out of date, and has limitations as to scope and probable reliability. Carlson was primarily a military man and had a limited knowledge of the Chinese language. Most of the journalists who have been able to visit the Communist area appear to have a bias favorable to the Communists. They also suffered from language limitations and were unable to remain in the area for an extended period.

I suggest that the American representatives best suited to visit the Communist area are Foreign Service officers of the China language service. One or two men might be sent. They should combine moderately long-term residence at Yenan or its vicinity with fairly extensive travel in the guerrilla area. It is important that they not be required to base a report on a brief visit during which they would be under the influence of official guides, but that they should have a sufficient time to become familiar with conditions and make personal day-to-day observations.

There is mail and telegraphic communication between Yenan and Chungking, and similar communication between various parts of the Communist area. The officers would therefore not be out of touch with the Embassy and could, if it is thought desirable, make periodic reports.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may I call your attention to the report of April 7, 1944, that is before you?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read pertinent excerpts from that?

The CHAIRMAN. Before we go into that, what is this instrument, where does it stem from and what is the foundation for it?

Mr. MANDEL. The date is April 7, 1944 [reading]:

Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service forwarded to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 2461, April 21, 1944, under title "Situation in Sinkiang; Its Relation to American Policy vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union."

This was also introduced in the Loyalty Board proceedings before the State Department in the case of John S. Service.

Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies (or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious.

Mr. MORRIS. What paragraph is that?

Mr. MANDEL. The second paragraph. Further:

Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available; in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence.

Mr. MORRIS. General, can you comment on that?

General WEDEMEYER. This statement was made at a time when there were a lot of people in our country who were making similar statements. Today they are on the band wagon of opposing communism. Quite a few Americans were making statements along that line. In fact, when I came back after the war, I found it rather dangerous, and I could only talk to a very few people, found it very dangerous to talk realistically about the implications of communism in this country and in the world in general. I am very glad that Chiang Kai-shek

even at that time epitomized opposition to communism and thank God for General MacArthur out in Japan for the same reason when others were playing footsie with communism, many others. I think Chiang showed a shrewdness, a political shrewdness, in continuing his opposition.

As far as cooperation was concerned, the Soviet Communists did not persist in the China theater. The contribution they made in the war against Japan was negligible. The American people ought to understand that clearly.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask in relation to this: Is this not an indication that this was a warning at least to America that she had better see what Russia wanted in Asia and go along with Russia's desires rather than what was well for America or the world? That is, when he says "We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are," and the previous sentence that was read to you about Russia having her way. Is that right?

General WEDEMEYER. It could be interpreted that way. I think that is a sound interpretation of the statement.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may I refer you to a report now of Mr. John P. Davies, one of the four political advisers?

The CHAIRMAN. Has this last one been inserted in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir. That may be introduced in the record, having been identified.

The CHAIRMAN. It may.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 250" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 250

APRIL 7, 1944.

Subject: Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service, forwarded to Department as enclosure No. 1 of dispatch No. 2461, April 21, 1944, under title "Situation in Sinkiang; Its Relation to American Policy Vis-à-Vis China and the Soviet Union."

We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they are bound to affect our own plans in the same area. But our relations with Russia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our political and military relations with Russia in Europe in the over-all United Nations war effort and postwar settlement. We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese Communists. But in determining our policy toward Russia in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China. The initiative must be kept firmly in our hands. To do otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog.

As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship. Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies (or lack of them) are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism. The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious. But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counterweight to Russia. By so doing, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only north China and Manchuria but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.

Neither now nor in the immediately foreseeable future does the United States want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia; nor does it want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China.

The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give, in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary Government of China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the

military prosecution of the war against Japan. To give diplomatic or other support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal anti-Russian policy. It will convince the Chinese Communists—who probably hold the key to control, not only of north China but of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria as well—that we are on the other side and that their only hope for survival lies with Russia. Finally, Russia will be led to believe (if she does not already) that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available: in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence.

It is important, therefore, that the United States have the following aims in its dealings with China:

1. Avoid becoming involved in any way in Sino-Soviet relations; avoid all appearance of unqualified diplomatic support of China, especially vis-à-vis Russia; and limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of the war against Japan.

This may involve soft-pedaling of grandiose promises of postwar aid and economic rehabilitation, unless they are predicated on satisfactory reforms within China.

2. Show a sympathetic interest in the Communists and liberal groups in China. Try to fit the Communists into the war against Japan.

In so doing, we may promote Chinese unity and galvanize the lagging Chinese war effort. The liberals, generally speaking, already consider that their hope lies in America. The Communists, from what little we know of them, also are friendly toward America, believe that democracy must be the next step in China, and take the view that economic collaboration with the United States is the only hope for speedy postwar rehabilitation and development. It is vital that we do not lose this good will and influence.

3. Use our tremendous and as yet unexploited influence with the Kuomintang promote internal Chinese unity on the only possible and lasting foundation of progressive reform.

There is no reason for us to fear using our influence. The Kuomintang knows that it is dependent on us; it cannot turn toward a Japan approaching annihilation; it is inconceivable that it will turn toward communistic Russia; and Great Britain is not in a position to be of help. American interest in the Chinese Communists will be a potent force in persuading Kuomintang China to set its house in order.

The Communists would undoubtedly play an important part in a genuinely unified China—one not unified by the Kuomintang's present policy in practice of military force and threat. But it is most probable that such a democratic and unified China would naturally gravitate toward the United States, and that the United States, by virtue of sympathy, position, and economic resources, would enjoy a greater influence in China than any other foreign power.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have the Davies report? That is dated June 24, 1943.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May I refer to the second extract made on that page, General, November 7, 1944—Davies [reading]:

The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north China. They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley which they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China. The Communists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process which has been operating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines of communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists.

The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe blockade imposed by Chiang.

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million. And they will continue to grow.

The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and fundamental. It is mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people.

I wonder if you would comment on that extract, General?

General WEDEMEYER. As of that date, of that period, I think the writer is incorrect in the military capabilities of the Communists, and the statement there, the correctness of which I question namely, they had withstood the heavy attacks of the Japanese is not correct for the period I commanded the theater. I do not believe it was correct prior to my assuming command, because I read the history of the operations that had taken place from the beginning of the war, 1937. At no time were large numbers of Communist forces involved with Japanese forces, and at no time did the Chinese Communist military forces make a real contribution to the over-all China war effort. Most of their operations were guerrilla in nature. They were designed to capture blockhouses established by the Japanese and to capture small quantities of arms and equipment.

He goes on to say the reason for the success that he alludes to of the Chinese Communists is simple and fundamental. He says it is mass support, mass participation. I would change that and then go along with the statement [reading]:

It is Soviet support and police participation, secret-police participation and propaganda participation.

Those are the things that took over China.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say he was wrong when he said that "they have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people?" Were the Chinese people Communists at heart, or were they dominated by the Soviet Union?

General WEDEMEYER. In my judgment—and this man is an expert and I am not on China; he has lived most of his life there and he speaks the language—but in my humble judgment the Chinese people per se are not communistically inclined. They are individualistic. The family is the integral unit. We often accuse them of nepotism because they have these strong family ties. If one enjoys economic success, he is duty-bound to take care of the other members of his family.

I would go back to this, Senator: The Chinese people don't understand political philosophies. I mean the bulk of them do not. There is just a thin veneer of educated people in China who understand what we are talking about. When anyone talks about any leader, any war lord, any political party having the support of the Chinese people, you can see how nebulous that is.

Mr. MORRIS. Generel, I draw your attention to the same document on the second page.

Mr. Mandel, will you read that extract, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

The generalissimo realizes that, if he accedes to the Communist terms for a coalition government, they will sooner or later disposses him and his kuomintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity, form a genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present government, passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the Communist issue must eventually be joined.

It further says:

The Communists, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with the generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize that Chiang's positon is crumbling; that they may before long receive substantial Russian support, and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority in at least north China.

Mr. MORRIS. General, do you believe, if the generalissimo had acceded to the Communist terms for a coalition government, that they would sooner or later dispossess him and his Kuomintang of power?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I do. The Communists at that time had very little power. The generalissimo had most of the power. The Communists were determined to have all the power, and the generalissimo was just as determined to retain all the power. It just makes sense to me. That is the way the situation maintained out there. Any other solution I do not accept. I do not think it is sound.

Mr. MORRIS. With respect to the second paragraph there, you agree with Mr. Davies when he said that the Communists had no intention of reaching an agreement with the generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government?

General WEDEMEYER. I think the Communists had the idea of a coalition government just a step toward acquisition of all power. They would violate any agreement they made just as they have in other areas of the world. When the time came they would seize all the power and there would be no represenation on the part of the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang would be liquidated.

Senator FERGUSON. General, if this advice of Mr. Davies of December 9, 1944, was taken, how could we hope to sustain a democratic government in China by the use of philosophy of General Marshall's mission to form a coalition?

General WEDEMEYER. We couldn't, sir. I never did believe that a coalition with the Communists was possible. You can coalesce political parties at times over the years. The Republicans and Democrats have gotten together in a bipartisan approach to international problems. Personally I do not agree with that. It is the American way to make a man defend what he proposes to do. I think we should always question the other man's judgment; do it in a respectful but intelligent way, and continuously. I think that is the whole philosophy behind democracy.

Now, you will get no such philosophy or get no such modus operandi in operations with the Communists. All you have to do is read the Communist Manifesto and Karl Marx's Das Kapital and you will have it laid out for you just as Hitler so obligingly told us what he was going to do and we ignored his warnings.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you get a clearer statement than an indication of Davies as to what the Communists were. They were dominated by Russia and "if they have patience they will succeed to authority in at least north China." He limited it to the north of China, but he indicated that they would get the support to take over China. Is that not true?

General WEDEMEYER. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were to back the Communists, it was to back the idea that Russia would be the dominant power of China.

General WEDEMEYER. That is true.

I have told you earlier, sir, I neglected to give the attention that I should have when I was commanding that theater—give attention to these reports. As an alibi, I was involved in military operations and busy as the dickens. Later, in analyzing these reports and going back over many things that had happened in this, the psychological or diplomatic field, I realized I had been remiss in my duties as a theater commander in not analyzing them more carefully. I did not take the advice. I adhered to the path of trying to contain the Japanese and supporting the Nationalist Government in my personal relations with the Chinese military and civilians.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not follow this advice, in other words?

General WEDEMEYER. No. I was fortunate in having a very loyal American out there as a diplomatic representative, Patrick J. Hurley. I admired him a great deal and felt he represented American policies realistically, courageously and continuously. He was the American Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. General, may I draw your attention to the next extract we have on this page?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Under date of November 15, 1944, Mr. Mandel, and will you read that for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture would be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being continue recognition of Chiang's Government.

But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek Government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our great-assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent and friendly China—our basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Communists reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved from our point of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the Communists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we are going to support.

In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in mind these basic considerations: Power in China is on the verge of shifting from Chiang to the Communists.

If the Russians enter North China and Manchuria, we obviously cannot hope to win the Communists entirely over to us, but we can through control of supplies and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction of Chinese nationalism and independence from Soviet control.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you comment on that excerpt, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I think prior comments on other excerpts cover that, sir, namely, that a coalition government meant a Communist government, insofar as I am concerned. It would not be such a thing as a coalition government, the Communists would have all control.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you think that the Chinese Communist organization was a complete auxiliary and part of the international Communist organization?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely. I felt they were operating under the aegis of the Kremlin, and most of the leaders had been trained in the U. S. S. R., over the years, over a period of 20 years. And it is that hard core of fanatic loyal leadership that the Communists have generated in the various areas of the world that has enabled these well-organized minorities to take over unsuspecting intimidated masses. And particularly, where the masses are illiterate, unemployed, improvident, as they are in China and in India; those areas are particularly vulnerable to the Marxian philosophies and methods.

Mr. MORRIS. And is there not implicit in this statement, General Wedemeyer, an assertion that the Chinese Communists were independent of Moscow?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that not obvious, General?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In which you do not believe?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely, Senator. I think that all of these satellites are oriented toward the Kremlin. Now, the Soviet leaders wisely adjust and change the application of their political and economic ideas to conform more or less to the customs, the organization, and to the traditions of the particular area where they are applying these ideas. They make adjustments. But the basic idea is the destruction of free enterprise, the enslavement of mind and body and destruction of any spiritual force in this world. Those are the basic objectives of communism, and they are making progress toward accomplishing those objectives.

Mr. MORRIS. May I call your attention to the first full paragraph on page 3 in that statement. It begins [reading]:

> In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in mind these basic considerations: Power in China is on the verge of shifting from Chiang to the Communists.

Do you not interpret that, General Wedemeyer, as a recommendation that we should support the Chinese Communist faction?

General WEDEMEYER. That is one interpretation, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your interpretation, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. My interpretation is that this chap felt that the Communists in China were getting increasing power. I do not go quite so far as to suggest just from that statement that this Foreign Service officer wants us to feel that we should support the Communists. I think there is always danger in reading into a statement——

Mr. MORRIS. We do not intend to do that.

General WEDEMEYER. I know you don't, and I cannot do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You would say the language was an inducement toward that conclusion, though; would you not?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes; it inclines in that direction. In fairness to the writer, however, I think he is the best witness on that.

Senator FERGUSON. It could be taken as a recommendation that if you wanted to be on the power side you take his views; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce all of these excerpts into the record, but Mr. Mandel has not yet told us from what sources he has put these together, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. This document that we have in hand here on which General Wedemeyer has been testifying has not been offered for the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us what these are?

Mr. MANDEL. These are taken from a publication called United States Relations With China, a Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. Released by whom and by what authority?

Mr. MANDEL. By the State Department. That is popularly known as the white paper.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the paper I have in my mind.

Mr. MORRIS. Those are extracts from that publication, Senator. Before introducing that into the record, I think Mr. Sourwine would like to ask a few questions of General Wedemeyer on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, referring to the excerpt headed November 15, 1944, which has been previously discussed, the second paragraph starts out with the sentence, "But we must be realistic." Would it be fair, therefore, to judge the rest of this excerpt on the basis of whether it is realistic?

General WEDEMEYER. I think it would, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, the third sentence is the one referred to by Mr. Morris obliquely when he asked you if you shared the apparent feeling of this writer that the Chinese Communists were free agents, were independent, and that is the sentence which reads:

> And if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians.

That necessarily implies, does it not, that the Chinese Communists, at the time of this writing, were not tied up with the Russians?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes; that is implicit in that statement, but I do not agree with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is also implicit in that statement, is it not, that we could "capture" politically the Chinese Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you agree with that statement?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't agree with it, but that is implicit in the statement as you read it to me, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, is either of those implications realistic?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely not. In my judgment, in my humble judgment, definitely not.

I want to say one thing there to you, sir: In my relations with the Communists they were not emotional, they were not unobjective. They had illness up in that area and it was remote, and at great cost to my limited war effort I sent 15 tons of medical supplies to help Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, with the permission of the Generalissimo. I want you to understand that my attitude toward them was just as humanitarian as the record of our great country over many years.

Now, therefore, when I make statements they are not emotional replies, sir, they are just in the interest of the country; not in my own personal interest or not in the interest of the Communists or the Kuomintang.

I want to make a statement to you, because I have emphasized that I do not agree with the implications there. I accept the statements, that the statements are implicit in the way you interpret them, I accept that, but I do not agree with them.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, I am attempting here to be quite coldly logical about this passage and not emotional at all, and I appreciate your answer.

General WEDEMEYER. I am not saying you were suggesting emotion. I do not want emotionalism to enter into it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next sentence reads:

Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

That phrase "are committed to a steadily decaying regime" can only be interpreted as a charge that the Chiang Kai-shek government was steadily decaying, is that not correct?

General WEDEMEYER. You mean that the government was decaying? Is that what you are asking me, if it is correct?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is implicit in this language?

General WEDEMEYER. It is implicit in that language, but again——

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not true, was it?

General WEDEMEYER. That would require quite a lot of development. I do not know whether the Senators want me to develop that, Mr. Sourwine, or not, but I would be happy to do it. In other words, I am not going to answer yes or no and establish a very important point that will militate against my entire testimony here.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that would take an explanation?

General WEDEMEYER. It would take an explanation, Senator Ferguson, in my judgment, of about 10 minutes, indicating the development that brought about the steadily deteriorating situation in China, economic, psychological, and military.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the committee care to hear it?

Senator FERGUSON. I think because of the question it would be of interest on this record.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, then, General.

General WEDEMEYER. Do you want to hear it, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. You all are familiar with the fact that Chiang Kai-shek took over the Chinese Nationalist Government upon the death of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. At that time there were Soviet Russian advisers in the area and they had agreed that there would be no political propagandizing, but they would assist the new Chinese Republic in evolving a stable economy and building up their military forces.

In typical Communist fashion they violated their agreement with reference to the dissemination of Communist political propaganda and just brought about the conflict that ended up with the Communists being pushed back clear up in Yunan, in a remote western province of China.

The period 1927 to 1937 was often alluded to by Americans, Britishers, and other foreigners in the area who had lived there many years as the golden decade. From 1927 to 1937, during that period, communications were being improved, the economy was being better stabilized, and schools were being built to extend advantages of education, and many improvements, in other words, were being instituted.

Now, you all know that there are many dialects in China, but basically there are three areas and people living in those three areas,

respectively, cannot understand each other. They all read and write the same hieroglyphics, the same characters.

Chiang Kai-shek also was striving to bring about an alphabet that would be universally understood to simplify the education that he envisaged for his people.

Now, the military jingoists of Japan, recognizing the developments which would bring about a nationalization, a political consciousness in China, a unity, were concerned, and they had ideas of a coprosperity sphere in Asia under their domination. So many observers with whom I talked in the Far East who had lived there many years, they refer to this golden decade—mind you now, under Chiang Kai-shek's regime and approximately the same leaders whom we have today, and we read in the press considerable criticism about them, they had that period where they were improving conditions in China and many people feel that the thing that precipitated the war in 1937 on the part of the Japanese was the fact that a strongly unified China would make it more difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to take over in that area. So that precipitated the attack in 1937.

Now, for 8 years China fought the Japanese. The Japanese were a modern military nation. In the first year or so of the war we suffered many humiliating reverses at the hands of the Japanese in the battles that we fought with them on the sea and in the air and on the ground, as did the British. Gradually we evolved forces that enabled us to defeat the Japanese militarily.

But the Chinese did not have competent or well-organized military forces, and they did not fight well—they fought well with what they had—but by our standards it was not a great contribution. And I have never in any testimony stated that the contribution made by the Chinese in the war was overwhelming, but it was important to us in that it did contain large numbers of Japanese that might have been employed at crucial places and critical times aginst our forces as they advanced up north against the Japanese Archipelgo.

But during the war, and immediately subsequent to VJ-day, propaganda increased in that area, propaganda that denounced you and me, the Americans, and distorted our objectives in that area, called us imperialists, Yankee imperialists, and indicated our determination to take over the Far East, to dominate the Far East. These programs emanated from Yunnan, the Chinese Communist headquarters, and frequently were reaffirmed in articles appearing in Pravda and other Communist-inspired newspapers and radio releases.

It was perfectly obvious to those Americans who were out there with me in 1945 at the close of the war that this propaganda campaign was being intensified against us to cause the Chinese people to suspect our motives and to turn against us.

Now, in considering any problem in China, I think all of that period, the development in that period, must be thought about objectively. And I also think about those things in relation to the statements that I read here by experts on the area. This is just a soldier's view, a practical view that I personally experienced and concluded. These are conclusions that I drew as a result of serving out there just a few years.

That is the background I wanted to give you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, General. I have just two or three more questions about this particular section of the report, this November 15, 1944, item.

General WEDMEYER. All right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the same sentence which elicited the answer you have just given us is a phrase, and I had better read the whole sentence and underline the phrase vocally [reading]:

Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime—

and here is the phase I want to underline—

and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

Does that not carry with it, implicit in it, the thought that the working out of military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists was one of our objectives that it was important to us?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, it does.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that true?

General WEDEMEYER. Have you been here all morning?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir, and I heard your previous testimony, but I am attempting to get the answer to this.

General WEDEMEYER. I will be glad again to say it. The contribution made by the Communists was very limited militarily, and economic assistance would be nil.

Now, if the theater commander had been directed to assist the Chinese Communists by giving them equipment and advisers it would have been a very difficult logistical job for me to get it way up there by air. I had no other way of getting it up there. Just sending 15 tons of medical supplies, I indicated to you, impinged upon my little war effort in the southeastern part of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. But that difficulty was not caused by the fact that we were supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government, was it? That logistic difficulty you speak of was a logistic problem.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, it was, because I could not put my planes in operation in logistical support in southeast China and concurrently up to the north. So, in a way, it did militate against supporting the Communists. If I had been directed to support the Communists in lieu of the Nationalists, I would have carried out my orders, and I would have gotten supplies up there, but at much greater difficulty, because of the distance.

Now, may I explain to you, it may not be apparent to you right away, but intratheater distribution, within the theater, was a real problem, because I had to bring the fuel to operate the planes over the hump. But when we captured Bhamo and Mytchinya I had a staging area so my planes could hop over the short hop and unload and go back without refueling in my theater, so I kept the gasoline they brought. Once I started to distribute in China it was a real problem because I was burning up gasoline at long distances.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I was attempting to get at is whether there was some outstanding advantage to us to be gained through military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists, which we were losing at that time. In your opinion was there such an advantage?

General WEDEMEYER. No, I don't think there was an outstanding advantage to be gained.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the point.

General WEDEMEYER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was another item in which your own opinion is at variance with the opinion implicit in this statement?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The final comment I want to ask you for, sir, is on this, and this says [reading]:

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impassé most desirable to us. It provides our greatest assurance of a strong united, democratic, independent, and friendly China.

And in view of the statements already made by Mr. Davies, in one of these reports and in other testimony here with regard to what would have happened in the event there had been a coalition government, I would like to ask you, sir, Would a coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists found a satisfactory place have provided us with assurance of either a democratic or an independent or a friendly China?

General WEDEMEYER. No. For many reasons, in my judgment, it would not have provided a cooperative, friendly China. I indicated earlier, sir, that in my judgment the Chinese Communists were determined to take over all the power.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. And that they were working under the aegis of the Kremlin power whose avowed purpose is to destroy your country and mine. And it is just inconsistent; we are being naive if we consider for a moment that we could generate a friendly spirit among the Chinese as long as the Communists are influencing them with their sinister propaganda. We just cannot do it. And they are most vulnerable to that propaganda because they are illiterate and they are capable of intimidations that the Communists so skillfully handle.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it not then become apparent, General, that not only is that passage not realistic, but that in the space of a dozen lines it has advanced a half dozen propositions, all of which are unsound and untenable?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. For example, one other point that you could develop is the Chinese are not ready for a democratic government. Democracy, as I understand it, is predicated upon an informed electorate. So that as long as you have 80 percent of the population illiterate it is impractical to have a true democracy there There are a lot of things that are just inconsistent, in my judgment.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is as far as I wanted to develop that point, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That document therefore may be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 251" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 251

[From the Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949]

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA

MEMORANDA BY FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS IN CHINA, 1943–45

June 24, 1943 (Davies)

Chinese Communist policy appears to have followed the Comintern line. In its initial expression the policy adhered to the program of world revolution.

With the Comintern's abandonment of this program, the Chinese Communists embraced in 1935, in compliance with Moscow directives, the policy of the united front.

The new line, so far as it applied to Asia, was in all probability prompted by the Kremlin's realistic appraisal of the Soviet Union's position in the Far East. Russia was threatened by Japan. The Japanese Army had with its Manchurian adventure apparently decided upon a policy of continental expansion. Confronted by a strong Russian Army in eastern Siberia, the Japanese seemed to be intent upon outflanking the Russians through China. China could not be expected to offer strong resistance to Japanese expansion so long as it was torn by internal dissension. It was therefore evident that China should become unified and actively resist Japanese pressure westward.

As the Chinese Communists moved away from world revolution to nationalism they also moved in the direction of more moderate internal political and economic policy. Whether these other moves were in compliance with Comintern dictates is less material than that they were historically and evolutionarily sound.

The trend toward nationalism is believed to be strongest among the troops and guerrillas who have been fighting the national enemy. Although we have no accurate information on the subject, it is suspected that the political leaders of the party retain their pro-Russian orientation and that they are, notwithstanding the dissolution of the Comintern, likely to be susceptible to Moscow direction. This probable schism within the party may prove at some later date to be of major importance (p. 565).

November 7, 1944 (Davies)

The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north China. They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley which they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China. The Communists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process, which has been operating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines of communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists.

The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe blockade imposed by Chiang.

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately 90 million. And they will continue to grow.

The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and fundamental. It is a mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people (pp. 566–567).

January 4, 1945 (Davies)

The current situation in China must afford the Kremlin a certain sardonic satisfaction.

The Russians see the anti-Soviet government of Chiang Kai-shek decaying militarily, politically, and economically. They observe the Chinese Communists consolidating in north China, expanding southward in the wake of Chiang's military debacles and now preparing for the formal establishment of a separatist administration.

It is equally evident to the Russians that the Chinese Communists will not in the meantime be idle. The Communists have amply demonstrated a capacity for independent, dynamic growth. However Marshal Stalin may describe the Chinese Communists to his American visitors, he can scarcely be unaware of the fact that the Communists are a considerably more stalwart and self-sufficient force than any European underground or partisan movement (p. 567).

June 24, 1943 (Davies)

Basis for conflict: The Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek recognize that the Communists, with the popular support which they enjoy and their reputation for administrative reform and honesty, represent a challenge to the Central Government and its spoils system. The Generalissimo cannot admit the seemingly innocent demands of the Communists that their party be legalized and democratic

processes be put into practice. To do so would probably mean the abdication of the Kuomintang and the provincial satraps.

The Communists, on the other hand, dare not accept the Central Government's invitation that they disband their armies and be absorbed in the national body politic. To do so would be to invite extinction.

This impasse will probably be resolved, American and other foreign observers in Chungking agree, by an attempt by the Central Government to liquidate the Communists. This action may be expected to precipitate a civil war from which one of the two contending factions will emerge dominant. * * *

Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang lieutenants fully realize the risks of an attack on the Communists. This may explain the reported statements of high officials in Chungking that they must prepare not only for the coming civil war but also for the coming war with Russia. Chiang and his Central Government recognize that they cannot defeat the Communists and the Soviet Union without foreign aid. Such aid would naturally be sought from the United States and possibly Great Britain.

* * * We may anticipate that Chiang Kai-shek will exert every effort and resort to every stratagem to involve us in active support of the Central Government. We will probably be told that if fresh American aid is not forthcoming, all of China and eventually all of Asia will be swept by communism. It will be difficult for us to resist such appeals, especially in view of our moral commitments to continued assistance to China during the postwar period.

It is therefore not inconceivable that, should Chiang attempt to liquidate the Communists, we would find ourselves entangled not only in a civil war in China but also drawn into conflict with the Soviet Union (p. 571).

December 9, 1944 (Davies)

* * * The Generalissimo realizes that if he accedes to the Communist terms for a coalition government, they will sooner or later dispossess him and his Kuomintang of power. He will therefore not, unless driven to an extremity, form a genuine coalition government. He will seek to retain his present government, passively wait out the war and conserve his strength, knowing that the Communist issue must eventually be joined.

The Communist, on their part, have no interest in reaching an agreement with the Generalissimo short of a genuine coalition government. They recognize that Chiang's position is crumbling, that they may before long receive a substantial Russian support and that if they have patience they will succeed to authority in at least north China * * * (p. 572).

November 15, 1944 (Davies)

We should not now abandon Chiang Kai-shek. To do so at this juncture would be to lose more than we could gain. We must for the time being continue recognition of Chiang's government.

But we must be realistic. We must not indefinitely underwrite a politically bankrupt regime. And, if the Russians are going to enter the Pacific war, we must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians. Furthermore, we must fully understand that by reason of our recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government as now constituted we are committed to a steadily decaying regime and severely restricted in working out military and political cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

A coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our greatest assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent, and friendly China—our basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific. If Chiang and the Communists reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, there will have been achieved from our point of view the most desirable possible solution. If Chiang and the Communists are irreconcilable, then we shall have to decide which faction we are going to support.

In seeking to determine which faction we should support we must keep in mind these basic considerations: Power in China is on the verge of shifting from Chiang to the Communists.

If the Russians enter North China and Manchuria, we obviously cannot hope to win the Communists entirely over to us, but we can through control of supplies

and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction of Chinese nationalism and independence from Soviet control (p. 574).

December 12, 1944 (Davies)

The negotiations looking to an agreement between the Generalissimo and the Chinese Communists have failed. It is not impossible, however, that one or the other side may in the near future revive the negotiations with a new proposal.

So long as the deadlock exists, or new negotiations drag on, it is reasonable to assume that the Generalissimo will continue to refuse us permission to exploit militarily the Chinese Communist position extending into the geographical center of Japan's inner zone. With the war against Japan proving so costly to us, we can ill afford to continue denying ourselves positive assistance and strategically valuable positions.

It is time that we unequivecally told Chiang Kai-shek that we will work with and, within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese forces we believe can contribute most to the war again Japan. We should tell him that we will not work with or supply any Chinese unit, whether General Government, Provincial or Communist, which shows any inclination toward precipitating civil conflict. We should tell him that we propose to keep him as head of the recognized government, informed of what supplies we give to the various Chinese forces.

It is time that we make it clear to Chiang Kai-shek that we expect the Chinese to settle their own political differences; that we refuse to become further involved in and party to Chinese domestic political disputes. We greatly hope and desire that China will emerge from this war unified, democratic, independent and strong. We feel that this goal is to be achieved most expeditiously and with the least possible expenditure of Chinese and American blood and treasure if the United States bends its efforts in China primarily toward working with and assisting whatever elements can contribute most to the speedy defeat of Japan (p. 574).

Mr. MORRIS. We have some other reports here that I would like to get your advice on as to what we should do with them, Mr. Chairman. There are four reports here, and I believe they are all reports by Mr. Service, are they not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you take those into the record, Senator? They are amplifications of the same theme that we have been developing. Do you think we should go into them in detail?

The CHAIRMAN. No. But I want to lay the foundation for them. The foundation is the same as those that we have already inserted in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us what they are?

Mr. MANDEL. They deal with the theme developed by Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us where they are from.

Mr. MANDEL. They are all from the transcript of the testimony before the State Department Loyalty Security Board in the case of John S. Service.

Senator FERGUSON. Have they all been published in the white paper?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that they become at least part of this official record.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see any reason, if they are taken from an official record made in the State Department, that they should not be admissible.

Senator FERGUSON. And they should become part of this record.

Senator JENNER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 252, 253, 254, and 255," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 252

[From the Department of State publication, Far Eastern Series, released August 1949]

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CHINA

MEMORANDA BY FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS IN CHINA, 1943–45

October 9, 1944 (Service)

Reports of two American officers, several correspondents and twenty-odd foreign travelers regarding conditions in the areas of North China under Communist control are in striking agreement. This unanimity, based on actual observation, is significant. It forces us to accept certain facts, and to draw from those facts an important conclusion.

The Japanese are being actively opposed—in spite of the constant warfare and cruel retaliation this imposes on the population. This opposition is gaining in strength. The Japanese can temporarily crush it in a limited area by the concentration of overwhelming force. But it is impossible for them to do this simultaneously over the huge territory the Communists now influence.

This opposition is possible and successful because it is total guerrilla warfare aggressively waged by a totally mobilized population. In this total mobilization the regular forces of the Communists, though leaders and organizers, have become subordinate to the vastly more numerous forces of the people themselves. They exist because the people permit, support, and wholeheartedly fight with them. There is complete solidarity of army and people.

This total mobilization is based upon and has been made possible by what amounts to an economic, political, and social revolution. This revolution has been moderate and democratic. It has improved the economic condition of the peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform and good government. It has given them democratic self-government, political consciousness and a sense of their rights. It has freed them from feudalistic bonds and given them self-respect, self-reliance and a strong feeling of cooperative group interest. The common people, for the first time, have been given something to fight for.

The Japanese are being fought now not merely because they are foreign invaders but because they deny this revolution. The people will continue to fight any government which limits or deprives them of these newly won gains (p. 566).

June 20, 1944 (Service)

B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past 10 years.

China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army and the Government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes of growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a China which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weaknesses are becoming accentuated and there is taking place a reversal of the process of unification.

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is a general feeling of hopelessness.

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away from the larger cities. Government mandates and measures of control cannot be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.

3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoralized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress; the weight of years of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and leadership they once had.

5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever-increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may increase in scale and find political motivation.

6. The provincial groups are making common cause with one another and with other dissident groups, and are actively consolidating their position. Their continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Government is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.

7. Unrest within the Kuomintang armies is increasing, as shown in one important instance by the "young generals conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher plane, the war zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence and are thus creating a new warlordism.

8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows no signs of being closed, but grows more critical with the passage of time: the inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.

9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissensions and cliquism within the party, which grows more rather than less acute, the leadership is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers cliques.

10. The Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be sage as well as leader—shown, for instance, by China's Destiny and his book on economics—have forfeited the respect of many intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his dictatorship is becoming outspoken.

In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese society, the role in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.

C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by its own initiative: on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis.

Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and in the presence of obvious signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the Central Executive Committee.

1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations. The result is the enthronement of reaction.

The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitutionalism remains an empty promise for which the only preparation is a half-hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control.

Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the constitution and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character to the existing but impotent Peoples Political Council are ignored.

The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the authoritarian controls on which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the paraphernalia of a police state—the multiple and omnipresent secret police organizations, the gendarmerie, and so forth—it continues to strengthen them as its last resort for internal security.

2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class.

It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption which is one of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and speculation—all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or with intimate political connections.

It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy, as for instance, ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulation.

It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft production to run down, as they of course must when it is more profitable for speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal productive process.

It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the manufacture and trade of luxury goods, many of which come from areas under Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.

It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and increase revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to hog down in corruption and inefficiency, to the point that possibly not more than one-third of revenues collected reach the Government. It continues to spend huge government funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy.

At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempting palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and foreign currency.

It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China such as the growing concentration of land holdings, extortionate rents and ruinous interest rates, and the impact of inflation.

D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in the composition and nature of the party.

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has lost its power of leadership; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against Japan itself nor to cooperate whole-heartedly with the American Army in China; and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.

The answer to all these question is to be found in the present composition and nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description becomes ever more true; the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural-gentry-landlords and militarists, the higher ranks of the Government bureaucracy, and merchant bankers having intimate connections with the Government bureaucrats. This base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer commands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence politically, by the Japanese seizure of the coastal cities.

The relations of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded above is clear.

The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience of the war is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the party's selfish shortcomings.

It cannot fight an effective war because this is impossible without greater reliance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude; the threat of foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only real reform can regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's present leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present state of passive inertia. Thus are they sacrificing China's national interests to their own selfish ends.

For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give whole-hearted cooperation to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable to carry out or make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears the large scale, widespread and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liberalizing influence (pp. 567–570).

October 9, 1944 (Service)

Just as the Japanese Army cannot crush these militant people now, so also will Kuomintang force fail in the future. With their new arms and organization, knowledge of their own strength, and determination to keep what they have been fighting for, these people—now some 90 million and certain to be many more before the Kuomintang can reach them—will resist oppression. They are not Communists. They do not want separation or independence. But at present they regard the Kuomintang, from their own experience, as oppressors; and the Communists as their leaders and benefactors.

With this great popular base, the Communists likewise cannot be eliminated. Kuomintang attempts to do so by force must mean a complete denial of democracy. This will strengthen the ties of the Communists with the people; a Communist victory will be inevitable. * * *

From the basic fact that the Communists have built up popular support of a magnitude and depth which makes their elimination impossible, we must draw the conclusion that the Communists will have a certain and important share in China's future * * * I suggest the future conclusion that unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the Communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years (p. 572–573).

February 14, 1945 (Ludden and Service)

American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be subordinate.

The attainment of this objective demands the effective mobilization of China in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic resources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner zone of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources the attainmnt of our primary objective will be unecessarily delayed.

There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang Government the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utilization in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the Generalissimo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not been abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preservation depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor opposition groups are willing to expend their military resources against the Japanese through fear that it will then vis-à-vis other groups.

The aim of American policy as indicated clearly by official statements in the United States is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On the contrary, it has retarded its effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced the Kuomintang Government that we will continue to support it and it alone. The Kuomintang Government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide, it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all.

We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable influence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by diplomatic means has failed; * * *.

At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows:

"The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and

thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological preferences for one side or the other."

A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to make use of all available means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit united-front coalition. The present opposition groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a united ally (pp. 575–576).

EXHIBIT No. 253

YENAN, *May 1, 1945.*

CONGRESS OF COMMUNIST PARTY MEETS

YENAN, May 1.—The Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Yenan in the latter part of April. This is one of the most important events in the history of modern China.

"The task of this Congress is to rally people throughout China on the eve of the counteroffensive to save the nation from the crisis which is the consequence of the erroneous policy of the Kuomintang Government, and so thoroughly to defeat and annihilate the Japanese aggressors and set up an independent, free, democratic, unified, strong and prosperous new China.

"There are 752 delegates representing 1,210,000 members of the Chinese Communist Party. Of these 544 are delegates and 208 are probationary delegates.

"Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Li Shao-Chi, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, Lin Po-hu, Pen Tah-huai, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Ho Lung, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kao Kang, Lo Fu, and Peng Chen were elected to the presidium of the congress. Jen Pi-shih was elected secretary and Li Fu-chen assistant secretary of the congress.

"AGENDA ITEMS

"There were four items on the agenda: The political report by Comrade Chu Teh, the report on redrafting of the party statutes by Comrade Li Shao-chi, and the election of members of the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

"Since its foundation in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party held six national congresses. These congresses were held in July 1921, May 1922, June 1923, January 1925, April 1927, and July 1928. Because of the long period of war and struggle, 17 years have elapsed before the present seventh congress could be convened.

"At the convention of the present congress, the power of the Chinese Communist Party, unity and solidarity within the party, and the party's prestige among the people of China are higher than at any period in the past.

"TOTAL STRENGTH

"At present the Chinese Communist Party not only has over 1,200,000 members but also has under its leadership the Eighth Route, New Fourth, and other anti-Japanese regular armies, numbering 110,000 strong, over 2,200,000 People's Volunteer Corps, and 19 liberated areas distributed over 19 provinces in Manchuria, north, central, and south China, with a total population of 95,500,000.

"Because the war of resistance in the liberated areas is rapidly developing, these figures are steadily increasing. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party and liberated areas under its leadership have really become the center of gravity of the Chinese people in the anti-Japanese "national salvation movement" and struggle for liberation. The present congress will undoubtely have an extremely important influence on the future development of the war of resistance and internal politics of China." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, May 1, 1945, 9:30 a. m. e. w. t.)

"Coalition Government Needed," Says Mao

"Yenan, May 1.—On the 'coalition government' was the title of the political report given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

"Mao Tze-tung pointed out that the 'unification of all parties and groups and nonparty representatives, to form a provisional democratic coalition government so as to carry out democratic reform to overcome the present crisis, mobilize and unify the national forces of the war or resistance to effectively collaborate with the Allies in fighting and defeating the Japanese aggressor, and to secure the thorough liberation of the Chinese, are the basic demands of the Chinese people at present.'

"NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

"China needs a coalition government, said Mao Tze-tung, not only during the war but also after the war. 'After the victory of the war of resistance, the National Assembly, based on a broad, democratic foundation, should be called to form a regular democratic government of a similar coalition nature embracing more broadly all parties and groups and nonparty representatives. This government will lead the liberated people of the entire nation to build up an independent, free, unified, prosperous, and strong new country. After China has had a democratic elective system, the Government should be a coalition working on the basis of a commonly recognized new democratic program, no matter whether the Communist Party is the majority or minority party in the National Assembly.'

"IMMEDIATE FORMATION

"Mao Tze-tung repeatedly urged the necessity of immediate formation of a coalition government. One party, dictatorship, dictatorship of the antipopulation group within the Kuomintang, said Mao Tze-tung, is not only 'a fundamental obstacle to the mobilization and unification of the strength of the Chinese people in the war of resistance, it is also the (colossal) embryo of the civil war.' "

MAO REVEALS POSTWAR PLAN FOR CHINA

The following is Yenan's continuation in English Morse of the political report given by Chairman Mao Tze-tung to the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in Yenan, the first part of which was reported under the heading "Coalition Government Needed, Says Mao."

"In his report, Mao Tze-tung brought forward a program for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the establishment of a new China. This program is divided into two sections—namely, general and specific—and furnishes the answers to many important wartime and postwar problems. Concerning the thorough annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and forbidding a halfway compromise, Mao Tze-tung called the people's attention to the secret understandings and dealings between the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang government and the Japanese secret emissaries.

"NO COMPROMISE

"He said: 'The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang government must thoroughly annihilate the Japanese aggressors and forbid any compromise. At the same time the Chinese people should expand the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and other People's Armies. Moreover, wherever the enemy has penetrated, the Chinese people should universally and voluntarily develop anti-Japanese armed forces ready to cooperate directly with our allies in the fighting.'

"To reactionary elements who want to steal the sacred right of armed resistance to the Japanese aggressors from them, "The Chinese people should in self-defense resolutely deal a counterblow after remonstrances have proved futile."

PEOPLE'S FREEDOM

"With regard to the people's freedom, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that in their struggle for freedom at the present the first and main effort of the Chinese people is directed against the Japanese aggressor. But the Kuomintang government

has deprived the people of their freedom and bound them hand and foot, rendering them unable to oppose the Japanese aggressors.

"Mao said that 'The people in China's liberated areas have gained their freedom, and the people in other areas are able to and should gain such freedom. The more the Chinese people have gained, the greater is the organized democratic force, and then there is the possibility of a coalition government.'

"UNIFICATION OF PEOPLE

"With regard to the unification of the people, Mao pointed out that 'divided China must be changed into unified China.' But what Chinese people want is not 'absolutist unification by dictators' but the 'democratic unification by the people. The movement of the Chinese people striving for freedom, democracy, and a coalition government is actually a movement for unification.'

"With regard to the People's Armies, Mao pointed out that without any army which stands on the side of the people a coalition government cannot be formed. The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are wholeheartedly on the side of the people. Mao also pointed out that many Kuomintang troops which frequently suffered [words missing] oppress the people and discriminate against other troops should be reformed. Mao Tze-tung declared: 'As soon as the new democratic coalition government and the united high command is formed in China, troops in the Chinese liberated areas will at once be handed over to them. But all Kuomintang troops must also be handed over to them at the same time.

"PRIVATE CAPITALISM

"Mao Tze-tung declared that the Chinese Communist Party in the entire period [words missing]. The new democracy approves the development of private capitalism and ownership of private property, but this must follow the theory propounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen; namely, to carry out the principle of 'tillers own their land' and to guarantee that private capitalism 'cannot control the life of the people in the country.'

"With regard to the land problem, Mao pointed out that in the liberated areas the reduction of rent and interest has been carried out so that the landlords and peasants jointly take part in the war of resistance.

"Mao also declared: 'If there is no particular hindrance, we shall continue to carry out this policy after the war. First of all, the reduction of rent and interest will be carried out throughout the country and then [words missing]. Then appropriate means will be found to arrive systematically at the [words missing] "tillers own their land."' [Next paragraph garbled in transmission—Ed.]

"On the one hand 'workers' interest will be 'protected', while on the other hand 'guaranties are given to [words missing] profits from proper commercial [enterprise—Ed.].' He declared that in this new democratic state 'facilities will certainly be [words missing] widespread [development—Ed.] of a private capitalistic economy' apart from the economy of state-owned business and cooperatives.

"Mao Tze-tung welcomes foreign investments in China. He said that the industrialization of China 'will [afford—Ed.] a very great amount of foreign investments.'

"CULTURE AND EDUCATION

"'With regard to culture and education, Mao Tze-tung pointed out [words missing] respecting the intelligentsia who serve the people and have made [words missing]. He also pointed out the various tasks such as the liquidation of illiteracy, and the popularization of public hygiene. He further pointed out that the ancient Chinese and foreign culture should be 'absorbed critically.'

"NATIONAL MINORITIES

"Concerning the national minorities problem, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 'national minorities should be helped [asterisks supplied by Yenan—Ed.] to attain liberation and development, politically, economically, and culturally. Their language, literature, customs, habits, and religious faith should be respected.'

"With regard to the problem of religion, Mao Tze-tung pointed out that 'according to the principle of freedom of belief, China's liberated areas will allow evey school of religion to exist. Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists,

and other religious beliefs, provided they obey the Government laws and decrees, will be protected by the Government.'

"Mao Tze-tung in his report dwelt in detail on 'diplomatic problems' [words missing] principle of the Chinese Communist Party in diplomatic policy, declared Mao Tze-tung, 'is the establishment and consolidation of the diplomatic relations with other countries, the solution of mutually related wartime and postwar problems, such as the cooperation in fighting, peace conference, commercial intercourse, investments, [words missing] of thorough extermination of the Japanese aggressors, upholding of world peace [words missing] for equal and independent status of the nation [words missing] interests and friendship of nations and peoples.'

"INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

"Also the Atlantic Charter and resolutions was [words missing] Moscow, Cairo, Tehran, and Crimea international conferences, Mao Tze-tung said, that the Chinese Communist Party [words missing] the Crimea Conference on this question. The Chinese Communist Party 'welcomes the San Francisco United Nations Conference and has sent its representative to join the Chinese delegation in order to express the will of the Chinese people.'

"Mao Tze-tung opined that the Crimea line accords [words missing] with the policy held by the Chinese Communist Party in the settlement of the Chinese and oriental question. He is of the opinion that a policy similar to that of [words missing] be adopted in the Orient and China."

4-POINT PROGRAM

"He said that '(1) The Japanese aggressors must be ultimately defeated and the Japanese Fascist military and the causes producing them thoroughly exterminated. There should be on halfway compromise: (2) [words missing] the vestige of fascism in China must be exterminated without allowing the least trace to remain; (3) domestic peace must be established in China and civil war not allowed to recur; (4) the Kuomintang dictatorship [words missing] must be abolished [words missing.] After its abolition it should at first be supplanted by a provisional democratic coalition government fully supported by the whole nation. [Words missing] territories having been recovered, the regular coalition government executing the popular will should be set up through free and unrestricted elections."

SOVIET UNION

"Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, '[We are of the opinion—Ed.] that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity toward the Soviet Union and swiftly improve [Sino—Ed.] Soviet diplomatic relations.' 'On behalf of the Chinese people, Mao Tze-tung expressed [words missing] which has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people in China's war [words missing] liberated and expressed welcome of Marshal Stalin's speech [words missing] and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.'

"Mao Tze-tung added: 'We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.' "

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

"Regarding Sino-Anglo and Sino-American diplomatic relations, Mao Tze-tung said: 'The great efforts made by the Great Powers, American and Great Britain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to China, deserve our thanks. [Words missing] will or Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people. If any foreign government helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed.'

"Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China [words missing], Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese people welcome [words missing] Chinese people on a footing of equality. But he pointed out, China 'definitely cannot rely on an [words missing] equality [words missing] being given by the good will of foreign governments and peoples. [Words missing] and actual footing of equality must in the main rely on the efforts of the Chinese people

to build up politically, economically, and culturally a new democratic country, which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous, and strong. China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the policy of the Kuomintang government at present in force?"

FAR EASTERN COUNTRIES

"Mao Tze-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to the countries in the Far East: After the [words missing] unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors, all democratic [words missing] of the Japanese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people, thorough extermination of the Japanese [words missing] would not be possible to guarantee peace in the Pacific [asterisks supplied by Yenan—Ed.] 'The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese people should so help the Korean people to attain liberation [words missing].' With regard to Thailand, she 'should be dealt with according to the measures of dealing with a Fascist turncoat'." (Yenan, in English Morse to North America, May 2, 1945.)

EXHIBIT No. 254

JUNE 1944.

THE SITUATION IN CHINA AND SUGGESTIONS REGARDING AMERICAN POLICY

I. The situation in China is rapidly becoming critical

A. The Japanese strategy in China, which has been as much political as military, has so far been eminently successful.

Japan has had the choice of two alternatives.

1. It could beat China to its knees. But this would have required large-scale military operations and a large and continuing army occupation. And there was the danger that it might have driven the Kuomintang to carry out a real mobilization of the people, thus making possible effective resistance and perhaps rendering the Japanese task as long and costly as it has been in north China.

2. Or Japan could maintain just enough pressure on China to cause slow strangulation. Based on the astute use of puppets, the understanding of the continuing struggle for power within China (including the Kuomintang-Communist conflict), and the knowledge that Chiang expects to have the war won for him outside of China by his allies, this policy had the advantage that as long as the Kuomintang leaders saw a chance for survival they would not take the steps necessary to energize an effective war. It would thus remove any active or immediate threat to Japan's flank, and permit consolidation and gradual extension of the important Japanese-held bases in China. Finally, it would permit the accomplishment of these aims at a relatively small cost.

Japan chose the second alternative, accepting the gamble that the Kuomintang would behave exactly as it has. Like many other Japanese gambles, it has so far proved to have been nicely calculated. China is dying a lingering death by slow strangulation. China does not now constitute any threat to Japan. And China cannot, if the present situation continues, successfully resist a determined Japanese drive to seize our offensive bases in east China.

B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past 10 years.

China faces economic collapse. This is causing disintegration of the army and the Government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes of growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a China which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected strength during the first 2 years of the war with Japan. Internal weaknesses are becoming accentuated, and there is taking place a reversal of the process of unification.

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is general feeling of hopelessness.

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away from the larger cities, and Government mandates and measures of control cannot be enforced and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.

3. The governmental and military structure is being permeated and demoralized from top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress; the weight of years of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and leadership they once had.

5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection, and other arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may increase in scale and find political motivation.

6. The Provincial groups, are making common cause with one another and with other dissident groups ,and are actively consolidating their positions. Their continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Government is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.

7. Unrest within the Kuomintang Armies is increasing, as shown in one important instance by the "young generals' conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher plane the war-zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence and are thus creating a "new warlordism."

8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows no signs of being closed but grows more critical with the passage of time; the inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.

9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissension and cliquism within the party, which grow more rather than less acute, the leadership is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers' clique.

10. The Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be "sage" as well as leader—shown, for instance, by "China's Destiny" and his book on economics—have forfeited the respect of many intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his dictatorship is becoming more outspoken.

These symptoms of deterioration and internal stress have been increased by the defeat in Honan and will be further accelerated if, as seems likely, the Japanese succeed in partially or wholly depriving the Central Government of east China south of the Yangtze.

In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese security, the role in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.

C. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by its own initiatives: on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis.

Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the Kuomintang under the impact of hyperinflation and to the presence of obvious signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the central executive committee.

1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations.

The result is the enthronement of reaction.

The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitutionalism remains an empty promise for which the only "preparation" is a half-hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control.

Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the Constitution and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character to the existing but important People's Political Council are ignored.

On the contrary, the trend is still in the other direction. Through such means as compulsory political training for Government posts, emphasis on the political nature of the army, through control, and increasing identification of the party and Government, the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for "Ein Volk, ein Reich,

ein Führer," even though such a policy in China is inevitably doomed to failure.

The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the autoritarian controls on which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the paraphernalia of a police state—the multiple and omnipresent secret-police organizations, the gendarmerie, and so forth—it continues to strengthen them as its last resort for internal security. (For the reenforcement of the most important of these German-inspired and Gestapo-like organizations we must, unfortunately, bear some responsibility.)

Obsessed by the growing and potential threat of the Communists, who it fears may attract the popular support its own nature makes impossible, the Kuomintang, despite the pretext—to meet foreign and Chinese criticism—of conducting negotiations with the Communists, continues to adhere to policies and plans which can only result in civil war. In so doing, it shows itself blind to the facts: that its internal political and military situation is so weak that success without outside assistance is most problematic, that such a civil war would hasten the process of distintegration and the spread of chaos; that it would prevent the prosecution of any effective war against Japan; and that the only parties to benefit would be Japan immediately and Russia eventually. Preparations for this civil war include an alliance with the present Chinese puppets which augur ill for future unity and democracy.

2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class.

It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption, which is one of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding, and speculation, all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the party or with intimate political connections.

It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of wartime control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy, as, for instance, ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulations.

It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft production to run down, as they, of course, must when it is more profitable for speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal productive process.

It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the manufacture and trade in luxury goods, many of which come from areas under Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.

It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and increases revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to bog down in corruption and inefficiency to the point that possibly not more than one-third of revenues collected reach the Government. It continues to spend huge Government funds on an idle and useless party bureaucracy.

At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempting palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and foreign currency.

It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China, such as the growing concentration of landholdings, extortionate rents, and ruinous interest rates, and the impact of inflation.

3. On the external front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly short-sighted by progresive estrangement of its allies.

By persistence in tactics of bargaining, bluff, and blackmail, most inappropriate to its circumstances, and its continuing failure to deal openly and frankly, and to extend whole-hearted cooperation, which its own interests demand, the Kuomintang is alienating China's most important ally, the United States. It has already alienated its other major potential ally, Soviet Russia, toward which its attitude is as irrational and short-sighted as it is toward the Communists. The latest example of this is the irresponsible circulation of the report that Soviet Russia and Japan have signed a secret military agreement permitting Japanese troop withdrawals from Manchuria.

It is allowing this situation to develop at a time when its survival is dependent as never before upon foreign support. But the Kuomintang is endangering not only itself by its rash foreign policy: There are indications that it is anxious to create friction between the United States and Great Britain and Russia. When speedy victory, and any victory at all, demands maximizing of

agreements and the minimizing of frictions, such maneuvers amount to sabotage of the war effort of the United Nations.

4. On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided to let America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from active participation.

Its most important present contribution is to allow us, at our own and fantastic cost, to build and use air bases in China.

It delayed, perhaps too long for success, to allow forces designated for the purpose and trained and equipped by us to take the offensive in west Yunnan, even though needed to support the American-Chinese campaign in north Burma, the purpose of which is to open a life line into China and facilitate the eventual landing on the China coast. It agreed to this action only after long months of obstruction.

It fails to make effective use of American equipment given to it, as it also failed with earlier Russian supplies. Equipment brought into China has often not been transported to the fighting fronts. In other cases it has been known to have been hoarded or diverted to nonmilitary purpose. China has displayed a dog in the manger attitude in regard to equipment consigned to China and deteriorating in India for lack of transportation. It has concealed and refused to make available to our forces hoards of supplies such as gasoline known to exist in China, even when the emergency was great and China's own interest directly served.

It has consistently refused to consolidate and efficiently administer transportation. In the past this resulted in great losses of supplies in the Japanese capture of Burma and west Yunnan; now it is crippling Chinese internal transportation on which military activity must depend.

It has allowed military cooperation to be tied up with irrelevant financial demands which can only be described as a form of blackmail. It has made these excessive demands in spite of the fact that American expenditures in China (against which there are almost no balancing Chinese payments) continually add to the large Chinese nest egg of foreign exchange, which cannot be used in China at present and thus constitutes in effect a "kitty" being hoarded for postwar use.

It has failed to implement military requisitioning laws to assist us in obtaining supplies in China and has left us at the mercy of conscienceless profiteers, some of whom have been known to have official connections. It has permitted the imposition on us of fantastic prices, made more so by a wholly unrealistic exchange rate, for articles in some cases originally supplied to China through American credits. It seemingly has ignored the fact that the more supplies that can be obtained in China, the greater the tonnage from India that can be devoted to other essential military items.

It remains uncooperative and at times obstructive in American efforts to collect vital intelligence regarding the enemy in China. This attitude is exemplified by the disappointing fruits of promised cooperation by Chinese espionage organizations (toward which we have expended great effort and large sums); by the continued obstruction, in the face of agreement, to visits by American observers to the actual fighting fronts, and by the steadfast refusal to permit any contact with the Communist areas. It apparently remains oblivious to the urgent military need, both in China and in other related theaters, for this intelligence regarding our common enemy, and it seemingly cares little for the fact that exclusion from Communist-controlled territory hampers our long-range bombing of Japan and may cost needless loss of American lives.

In its own war effort a pernicious and corrupt conscription system which works to insure the selection and retention of the unfit, since the ablest and the strongest can either evade conscription, buy their way out, or desert. It starves and maltreats most of its troops to the degree that their military effectiveness is greatly impaired and military service is regarded in the minds of the people as a sentence of death. At the same time it refuses to follow the suggestion that the army should be reduced to the size that could be adequately fed, medically cared for, trained and armed. It bases this refusal on mercenary political considerations—the concentration on the continuing struggle for power in China, and the ultimate measurement of power in terms of armies.

For the same reason it refuses to mobilize its soldiers and people for the only kind of war which China is in a position to wage effectively—a people's guerrilla war. Perhaps our entry into the war has simplified the problems of the Kuomintang. As afraid of the forces within the country, its own people, as it is of the Japanese, it now seeks to avoid conflict with the Japanese in order to concentrate on the perpetuation of its own power.

The condition to which it has permitted its armies to deteriorate is shown most recently by the defeat in Honan, which is due not only to lack of heavy armament but also to poor morale and miserable condition of the soldiers, absence of support by the people, who have been consistently mistreated, lack of leadership, and prevalent corruption among the officers through such practices as trade with the occupied areas.

If we accept the obvious indications that the present Kuomintang leadership does not want to fight the Japanese any more than it can help, we must go further and recognize that it may even seek to prevent China from becoming the battleground for large-scale campaigns against the Japanese land forces. This helps to explain the Kuomintang's continued dealings with the Japanese and puppets. Thus the Kuomintang may hope to avert determined Japanese attack, maintain its own position and power, save the east China homes of practically all of its officials, and preserve its old economic-industrial base in the coastal cities.

If this analysis is valid it reveals on the part of the Kuomintang leadership, which means the generalissimo, a cynical disregard of the added cost of the inevitable prolongation of the war in American lives and resources.

D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in the composition and nature of the party.

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has lost its power of leadership; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against Japan itself nor to cooperate wholeheartedly with the American Army in China, and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.

The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition and nature of the party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description becomes ever more true: the Kuomintang is a congerie of conservative political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural gentry landlords, the militarists, the higher ranks of the Government bureaucracy and merchant bankers having intimate connections with the bureaucrats. This base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer commands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence politically, by the Japanese seizure of the coastal cities.

The relation of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded above is clear.

The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is no longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience of the war, is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the party's selfish shortcomings.

It cannot fight an effective war because this is impossible without greater reliance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the party and greater political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude; the threat of foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only real reform can now regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's present leaders, imperil the foundations of the party's power because it would mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present state of passive inertia. They are thus sacrificing China's national interests to their own selfish ends.

For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give wholehearted cooperation to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable to carry out or to make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears that large-scale, widespread, and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liberalizing influence.

The Kuomintang cannot unify the country because it derives its support from the economically most conservative groups, who wish the retention of China's economically and socially backward agrarian society. These groups are incapable of bringing about China's industrialization, although they pay this objective elaborate lip service. They are also committed to the maintenance of an order which by its very nature fosters particularism and resists modern

centralization. Countless examples can be given to show the line-up of the party with the groups that oppose modernization and industrialization—such as connections with Szechwan warlords and militarists. The Kuomintang sees no objection to maintaining the economic interests of some of its component groups in occupied China or in preserving trade with occupied China, the criterion of which is not the national interest but its profitability to the engaging groups. This explains why free China's imports from occupied China consist largely of luxuries, against exports of food and strategic raw materials. It is therefore not surprising that there are many links, both political and economic, between the Kuomintang and the puppet regime.

E. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure; if that failure results in a collapse of China, it will have consequences disastrous both to our immediate military plans and our long-term interests in the Far East.

The foregoing analysis has shown that the Kuomintang, under its present leadership, has neither the ability nor desire to undertake a program which could energize the war and check the process of internal disintegration. Its preoccupation with the maintenance and consolidation of its power must result, to the contrary, in acceleration rather than retardation of the rate of this disintegration. Unless it widens its base and changes its character, it must be expected to continue its present policies. It will not of its own volition take steps to bring about this broadening and reform. The opposite will be the case: Precisely because it has lost popular support, it is redoubling its efforts to maintain and monopolize control.

The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain to fail because they run counter to strong forces within the country and are forcing China into ruin. Since these policies are not favorable to us, nor of assistance in the prosecution of an effective war by China, their failure would not of itself be disastrous to American interests. For many reasons mentioned above, we might welcome the fall of the Kuomintang if it could immediately be followed by a progressive government able to unify the country and help us fight Japan.

But the danger is that the present drifting and deterioration under the Kuomintang may end in a collapse. The result would be the creation in China of a vacuum. This would eliminate any possibility in the near future of utilizing China's potential military strength. Because the Japanese and their puppets might be able to occupy this vacuum, at much less cost than by a major military campaign, it might also become impossible for us to exploit China's flank position and to continue operating from Chinese bases. The war would thus be prolonged and made more difficult.

Such a collapse would also initiate a period of internal chaos in China, which would deter the emergence of a strong and stable government, an indispensable precondition for stability and order in the Far East.

China, which might be a minor asset to us now, would become a major liability.

F. There are, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the present trends of the Kuomintang leadership which, if given a chance, might avert the threatened collapse.

These groups, all increasingly dissatisfied with the Government and the party responsible for it, include the patriotic younger army officers; the small merchants; large sections of the lower ranks of the Government bureaucracy; most of the foreign-returned students; the intelligentsia, including professors, students, and the professional classes; the liberal elements of the Kuomintang, who make up a sizable minority under the leadership of such men as Sun Fo; the minor parties and groups, some of which like the National Salvationists enjoy great prestige; the Chinese Communist Party; and the inarticulate but increasingly restless rural population.

The collective numbers and influence of these groups could be tremendous. A Kuomintang official recently admitted that resentment against the present Kuomintang Government is so widespread that if there were free, universal elections 80 percent of the votes might be cast against it. But most of these groups are nebulous and unorganized, feeling—like the farmers—perhaps only a blind dislike of conditions as they are. They represent different classes and varying political beliefs, where they have any at all. They are tending, however, to draw together in the consciousness of their common interest in the change of the status quo. This awakening and fusion is, of course, opposed by the Kuomintang with every means at its disposal.

The danger, as conditions grow worse, is that some of these groups may act independently and blindly. The effect may be to make confusion worse. Such might be the case in a military putsch, a possibility that cannot be disregarded.

The result might be something analogous to the Sian incident of 1936. But the greater delicacy and precariousness of the present situation would lend itself more easily to exploitation by the most reactionary elements of the Kuomintang, the Japanese, or the puppets. Another possibility is the outbreak, on a much larger scale than heretofore, of unorganized and disruptive farmers revolts. A disturbing phenomenon is the apparent attempt now being made by some of the minority parties to effect a marriage of convenience with the provincial warlords, among the most reactionary and unscrupulous figures in Chinese politics and hardly crusaders for a new democracy.

The hopeful sign is that all of these groups are agreed that the basic problem in China today is political reform toward democracy. This point requires emphasis. It is only through political reform that the restoration of the will to fight, the unification of the country, the elimination of provincial warlordism, the solution of the Communist problem, the institution of economic policies which can avoid collapse, and the emergence of a government actually supported by the people can be achieved. Democratic reform is the crux of all important Chinese problems, military, economic, and political.

It is clear beyond doubt that China's hope for internal peace and effective unity—certainly in the immediate future (which for the sake of the war must be our prior consideration) and probably in the long term as well—lies neither with the present Kuomintang nor with the Communists, but in a democratic combination of the liberal elements within the country, including these within the Kuomintang, and the probably large sections of the Communists who would be willing, by their own statements and past actions, to collaborate in the resurrection of a united front.

Given the known interest and attitudes of the Chinese people, we can be sure that measures to accomplish the solution of these problems will be undertaken in earnest by a broadly based government. Such a government—and only such a government—will galvanize China out of its military inertia by restoring national morale through such means as the reduction of the evils of conscription and stopping the maltreatment and starvation of the troops. Such a government—and only such a government—will automatically end the paralyzing internal dissention and political unrest. Such a government—and only such a government—will undertake the economic measures necessary to increase production, establish effective price controls, mobilize national resources, and end corruption, hoarding, speculation, and profiteering.

It is, of course, unrealistic to assume that such a broadly based democratic government can be established at one stroke, or that it can immediately achieve the accomplishment of these broad objectives. But progress will be made as, only as, the government moves toward democracy.

II. In the light of this developing crisis what should be the American attitude toward China?

It is impossible to predict exactly how far the present disintegration in China can continue without spectacular change in the internal situation and drastic effect on the war against Japan. But we must face the question whether we can afford passively to stand by and allow the process to continue to an almost certainly disastrous collapse, or whether we wish to do what we legitimately and practically can to arrest it. We need to formulate a realistic policy toward China.

A. The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dependence on us and will be forced to appeal for our support.

We must realize that when the process of disintegration gets out of hand it will be to us that the Kuomintang will turn for financial, political, and military salvation. The awareness of this dependence is the obvious and correct explanation of the Kuomintang's hypersensitivity to American opinion and criticism. The Kuomintang—and particularly the Generalissimo—know that we are the only disinterested, yet powerful, ally to whom China can turn.

The appeal will be made to us on many grounds besides the obvious, well-worn but still effective one of pure sentiment. They have said in the past and will say in the future that they could long ago have made peace with Japan on what are falsely stated would have been favorable terms. They have claimed and will claim again that their resistance and refusal to compromise with Japan saved Russia, Great Britain, and ourselves, ignoring the truth that our own refusal to compromise with Japan to China's disadvantage brought on Pearl Harbor and our involvement before we were ready. They have complained and will continue to complain that they have received less support in the form of materials than any other major ally, forgetting that they have done less fighting,

have not used the materials given, and would not have had the ability to use what they asked for. Finally, they have tried and will continue to try to lay the blame on us for their difficulties, distorting the effect of American Army expenditures in China and ignoring the fact that these expenditures are only a minor factor in the whole sorry picture of the mismanagement of the Chinese economy.

But however far-fetched these appeals, our flat refusal of them might have several embarrassing effects.

1. We would probably see China enter a period of internal chaos. Our war effort in this theater would be disrupted, instability in the Far East prolonged, and possible Russian intervention attracted.

2. We would be blamed by large sections of both Chinese and American public opinion for "abandoning" China after having been responsible for its collapse. (In a measure we would have brought such blame upon ourselves because we have tended to allow ourselves to become identified not merely with China but also with the Kuomintang and its policies. Henceforth, it may be the better part of valor to avoid too close identification with the Kuomintang.)

3. By an apparent abandonment of China in its hour of need, we would lose international prestige, especially in the Far East.

On the other hand, if we come to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own terms we would be buttressing, but only temporarily, a decadent regime which by its existing composition and program is incapable of solving China's problems. Both China and ourselves would be gaining only a brief respite from the ultimate day of reckoning. It is clear, therefore, that it is to our advantage to avoid a situation arising in which we would be presented with a Hobson's choice between two such unpalatable alternatives.

B. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence.

Circumstances are rapidly developing so that the Generalissimo will have to ask for the continuance and increase of our support. Weak as he is, he is in no position—and the weaker he becomes the less he will be able—to turn down or render nugatory any coordinated and positive policy we may adopt toward China. The cards are all in our favor. Our influence, intelligently used, can be tremendous.

C. There are three general alternatives open to us.

1. We may give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it althogether.

2. We may continue to give support to the Generalissimo, when and as he asks for it.

3. We may formulate a coordinated and positive policy toward China and take the necessary steps for its implementation.

D. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objectives in China.

The United States, if it so desired and if it had a coherent policy, could play an important and perhaps decisive role in—

1. Stimulating China to an active part in the war in the Far East, thus hastening the defeat of Japan.

2. Staving off economic collapse in China and bringing about basic political and economic reforms, thus enabling China to carry on the war and enhance the chances of its orderly postwar recovery.

3. Enabling China to emerge from the war as a major and stabilizing factor in postwar east Asia.

4. Winning a permanent and valuable ally in the progressive, independent, and democratic China.

E. We should adopt the third alternative—a coordinated and positive policy.

This is clear from an examination of the background of the present situation in China and the proper objectives of our policy there.

The first alternative must be rejected on immediate military grounds, but also for obvious long-range considerations. It would deprive us of valuable air bases and position on Japan's flank. Its adoption would prolong the war. We cannot afford to wash our hands of China.

The results of the second alternative—which, insofar as we have a China policy, has been the one we have been and are pursuing—speak for themselves. The substantial financial assistance we have given China has been frittered away with neglibible, if any effect in slowing inflation and retarding economic collapse. The military help we have given has certainly not been used to increase China's war effort against Japan. Our political support has been used for the Kuomintang's own selfish purposes and to bolster its short-sighted and ruinous policies.

The third, therefore, is the only real alternative left to us. Granted the rejection of the first alternative, there is no longer a question of helping and advis-

ing China. China itself must request this help and advice. The only question is whether we give this help within a framework which makes sense, or whether we continue to give it in our present disjointed and absent-minded manner. In the past it has sometimes seemed that our right hand did not know what the left was doing. To continue without a coherent and coordinated policy will be dissipating our effort without either China or ourselves deriving any appreciable benefit. It can only continue to create new problems, in addition to these already troubling us, without any compensating advantages beyond those of indolent short-termed expediency. But most important is the possibility that this haphazard giving, this serving of short-term expediency, may not be enough to save the situation; even with it, China may continue toward collapse.

F. This positive policy should be political.

The problem confronting us is whether we are to continue as in the past to ignore politcal considerations of direct military significance or whether we are to take a leaf out of the Japanese book and invoke even stronger existing political forces in China to achieve our military and long-term political objective.

We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement toward collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This can be brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic political reform within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this process of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exertion of our influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically used.

III. The implementation of this political policy, though difficult in some respects, is practical and can be carried out by many means

A. Diplomatic finesse will be required in the execution of this policy in such a way as not to offend the strong current of genuine nationalism (as distinguished from the chauvinism of the Kuomintang) which characterizes almost all sections of the Chinese people. There must be a sensitivity to the situation in China and the political changes there so that there can be an appropriate and immediate stiffening or softening of the measures which we undertake. This tact and sensitivity will be required not only of the top policy-directing agency but of all other agencies actually implementing that policy and concerned in direct relations with China.

There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all American Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China.

The present lack of effective cooperation between the various Government agencies—State, War, and some of the newer autonomous organizations—detracts from the efficient functioning of each, and weakens American influence, when it is most needed.

It must be recognized—and it will be even more the case under the policy proposed—that all our dealings with all our activities in China have political implication. Coordination is absolutely essential for the achievement of unity of policy and synchronization of action. It's attainment will require intelligent and forceful direction both in Washington and in Chunking.

The logical person to coordinate activities in Chunking is obviously, because of the broad issues involved, the Ambassador. Similarly the corresponding person in Wahington might be the Chief of the China Section of the State Department who would watch the whole field for the President or a responsible Cabinet member. Positive action, of course, would depend on constant and close consultation, both in Washington and in the field, between the representatives of the State, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments and the other agencies operating in China.

C. Since all measures open to us should not be applied simultaneously, there should be careful selection and timing.

Some measures will be simple and immediately useful. Others should be deferred until primary steps have been taken. Still others will be more forceful or direct and their use will depend on the Kuomintang's recalcitrance to change its ways. We must avoid overplaying or underplaying our hand.

D. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this positive policy include the following:

1. Negative: (*a*) Stop our present mollycoddling of China by: Restricting lend-lease, cutting down training of Chinese military cadets, discontinuing training of the Chinese Army, taking a firmer stand in the financial negotiations, or stopping the shipment of gold. Any or all of these restrictive measures can be reversed as the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang become more cooperative in carrying on military operations, using equipment and training supplied, being

reasonable on financial questions, or allowing us freedom in such military requirements as establishing contact with the Communist areas.

(*b*) Stop building up the Generalissimo's and the Kuomintang's prestige internationally and in the United States. Such "face" serves only to bolster the regime internally and to harden it in its present policies. Our inclusion of China as one of the Big Four served a useful purpose in the early stage of the war and as a counter to Japanese racial propaganda but has now lost its justification.

We make fools of ourselves by such actions as the attention given to the meaningless utterances of Chu Hsueh-fen as a spokesman of Chinese labor and the prominence accorded to China in the International Labor Office Conference. Our tendency toward overlavish praise is regarded by the Chinese as a sign of either stupdity or weakness.

Abandonment of glib generalities for hard-headed realism in our attitude toward China will be quickly understood, without the resentment that would probably be felt against the British. We can make it clear that praise will be given when praise is due.

(*c*) Stop making unconditional and grandiose promises of help along such lines as UNNRA, postwar economic aid, and political support. We can make it clear without having to be very explicit that we stand ready to help China when China shows itself deserving. This ties into the more positive phase of publicity and propaganda to the effect, for instance, that American postwar economic aid will not be extended to build up monopolistic enterprise or support the landlord-gentry class but in the interests of a democratic people.

(*d*) Discontinue our present active collaboration with Chinese secret police organizations, which support the forces of reaction and stand for the opposite of our American democratic aims and ideals. This collaboration, which results in the effective strengthening of a Gestapo-like organization, is becoming increasingly known in China. It confuses and disillusions Chinese liberals, who look to us as their hope, and it weakens our position with the Kuomintang leaders in pressing for democratic reform.

2. Positive: (*a*) High Government officials in conversation with Chinese leaders in Washington and in China can make known our interest in democracy and unity in China and our dissatisfaction with present Kuomintang military, financial, and other policies. Such suggestions will bear great weight if they come from the President and advantage can be taken of opportunities such as the visits of the Vice President Wallace to China and H. H. Kung to the United States. A progressive stage can be questions or statements by Members of Congress regarding affairs in China.

(*b*) We should take up the repeated, but usually insincere requests of the Kuomintang for advice. If advisers are asked for, we should see that they are provided, that good men are selected, and that they get all possible aid and support from us. While the Kuomintang will be reluctant to accept the advice we may give, its mere reiteration will have some effect.

(*c*) We should seek to extend our influence on Chinese opinion by every practical means available.

The Office of War Information should go beyond its present function of reporting American war news to pointing up the values of democracy as a permanent political system and as an aid in the waging of war against totalitarianism. We should attempt to increase the dissemination in China, by radio or other more direct means, of constructive American criticism. This should include recognition and implied encouragement to liberal and progressive forces within China. Care should be taken to keep this criticism on a helpful, constructive, and objective plane and to avoid derogatory attacks which may injure Chinese nationalistic sensitivities. To do this work, there may have to be some expansion of the OWI in China and of our propaganda directed toward this country.

A second line is the active expansion of our cultural relations program. The present diversion, by Koumintang wishes, to technical subjects should be rectified and greater emphasis laid on social sciences, cultural, and practical political subjects such as American Government administration. We should increase our aid and support to intellectuals in China by the many means already explored, such as aid to research in China, translation of articles, and opportunity for study or lecturing in the United States.

Other, more indirect lines, are the expansion of our American Foreign Service representation in China to new localities (since each office is in some measure a center of American influence and contact with Chinese liberals and returned students from the United States) and the careful indoctrination of the American

Army personnel in China to create, by example and their attitude toward Chinese, favorable impressions of America and the things that America stands for. Where contact between American and Chinese military personnel has been close, as in Burma, the result has apparently been a democratizing influence.

(*d*) We should assist the education of public opinion in the United States toward a realistic but constructively sympathetic attitude toward China. The most obvious means would be making background information available, in an unofficial way, to responsible political commentators, writers, and research workers. Without action on our part their writings will become known to Chinese Government circles and from them to other politically minded groups. We should, however, coordinate this with the activity described in the section above to promote dissemination in China.

(*e*) We should maintain friendly relations with the liberal elements in the Kuomintang, the minor parties, and the Communists. This can, and should for its maximum effect, be done in an open, aboveboard manner. The recognition which it implies will be quickly understood by the Chinese.

Further steps in this direction could be publicity to liberals, such as distinguished intellectuals. When possible they may be included in consideration for special honors or awards, given recognition by being asked to participate in international commissions or other bodies, and invited to travel or lecture in the United States. A very effective action of this type would be an invitation to Madam Sun Yat-sen from the White House.

We should select men of known liberal view to represent us in OWI, cultural relations, and other lines of work in China.

(*f*) We should continue to show an interest in the Chinese Communists. This includes contact with the Communist representatives in Chungking, publicity on the blockade and the situation between the two parties, and continued pressure for the dispatch of observers to north China. At the same time we should stress the importance of north China militarily for intelligence regarding Japanese battle order, Japanese air strength, weather reporting, bombing data, and damage assessment, and air crew evacuation and rescue work. We should consider the eventual advance of active operations against the Japanese to north China and the question of assistance to or cooperation with Communist and guerrilla forces. If our reasonable requests based on urgent military grounds do not receive a favorable response, we should send our military observers anyway.

(*g*) We should consider the training and equipping of provincial and other armies in China in cases where we can be satisfied that they will fight the Japanese.

(*h*) We should continue to press, and if necessary insist, on getting American observers to the actual fighting fronts. We should urge, and when possible assist, the improvement of the condition of the Chinese soldier, especially his treatment, clothing, feeding, and medical care.

(*i*) We should publicize statements by responsible Government officials indicating our interest in Chinese unity and our attitude toward such questions as the use of American lend-lease supplies by the Kuomintang in a civil war. It is interesting for instance, that Under Secretary Welles' letter to Browder regarding American interest in Chinese unity was considered so important by the Kuomintang that publication in China was prohibited.

This program is, of course, far from complete. Other measures will occur to the policy agency and will suggest themselves as the situation in China develops.

E. Most of these measures can be applied progressively.

This is true, for instance, of the various negative actions suggested, and of the conversations, statements, and other lines of endeavor to influence public opinion in China. A planned activity of encouragement and attention to liberals, minor party leaders, and the Communists can advance.

F. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in an uncoordinated and only partially effective manner.

What is needed chiefly is an integration, systematic motivation and planned expension of activities in which we are already, perhaps in some cases unconsciously, engaged. We do, for instance, try to maintain contact with liberal groups; we have expressed the desire to send observers to the Communist area; we have a weak cultural relations program; and the OWI has made some attempts to propagandize American democratic ideals.

G. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention in Chinese affairs.

It must be admitted that some of the measures proposed would involve taking more than normal interest in the affairs of another sovereign nation. But they do not go so far as to infringe on Chinese sovereignty. If we choose to make lend-lease conditional on a better war effort by China, it is also China's freedom to refuse to accept it on these conditions. We do not go nearly as far as imperialistic countries have often done in the past. We obviously do not, for instance, suggest active assistance or subsidizing of rival parties to the Kuomintang, as the Russians did in the case of the Communists.

Furthermore, the Chinese Government would find it difficult to object. The Chinese have abused their freedom to propagandize in the United States by the statements and writing of such men as Lin Yu-tang. They have also, and through Lin Yu-tang, who carries an official passport as a representative of the Chinese Government, engaged in "cultural relations" work. They have freely criticized American policies and American leaders. And they have attempted to dabble in American politics, through Madame Chiang, Luce, Willkie, and Republican Congressmen. They have had, and will continue to have, freedom to try to influence public opinion in the United States in the same way that we will try to do it in China.

EXHIBIT No. 255

MILITARY WEAKNESS OF OUR FAR EASTERN POLICY

FEBRUARY 14, 1945.

To the Commanding General, USAF:

American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of American lives. To the attainment of this objective all other considerations should be subordinate.

The attainment of this objective demands the effective mobilization of China in the war against Japan. Operating as we are in a land theater at the end of a supply line many thousands of miles in length, the human and economic resources of China increase in importance as we draw closer to Japan's inner zone of defense. Denied the effective use of these resources, the attainment of our primary objective will be unnecessarily delayed.

There is ample evidence to show that to the present Kuomintang government the war against Japan is secondary in importance to its own preservation in power. China's military failure is due in large part to internal political disunity and the Kuomintang's desire to conserve such military force as it has for utilization in the maintenance of its political power. The intention of the generalissimo to eliminate all political opposition, by force of arms if necessary, has not been abandoned. In the present situation in China, where power or self-preservation depend upon the possession of military force, neither the Kuomintang nor opposition groups are willing to expend their military resourses against the Japanese through fear that it will weaken them vis-à-vis other groups. A recent instance is the lack of resistance to the Japanese capture of the southern section of the Hankow-Canton Railway. Equally, the Kuomintang is jealously intent on preventing the strengthening of other groups: Witness the blockade of the Communists.

The aim of American policy, as indicated clearly by official statements in the United States, is the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable preliminary to China's effective military mobilization. The execution of our policy has not contributed to the achievement of this publicly stated aim. On the contrary, it has retarded its achievement. It has had this undesired and undesirable effect because our statements and actions in China have convinced the Kuomintang government that we will continue to support it, and it alone. The Kuomintang government believes that it will receive an increasing flow of American military and related supplies which, if past experience is any guide, it will commit against the enemy only with great reluctance, if at all.

We cannot hope for any improvement in this situation unless we understand the objectives of the Kuomintang Government and throw our considerable influence upon it in the direction of internal unity. We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the Kuomintang-Communist differences by diplomatic means has failed; we should not be deceived by any face-saving formula re-

sulting from the discussions because neither side is willing to bear the onus of failure. We should also realize that no government can survive in China without American support.

There are in China important elements interested in governmental reform by which unity and active prosecution of the war may result. Aside from the Chinese Communists, however, all of these elements are cowed by a widespread secret police system and lack any firm rallying point. They will remain helpless to do anything constructive as long as statements of our policy indicate that we are champions of the status quo.

At present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support for Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows:

"The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and factions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological preferences for one side or the other."

A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of military aid to the Central Government; that would be both unnecessary and unwise. It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to make use of all available means to achieve our primary objective. It would supply for all Chinese a firm rallying point which has thus far been lacking. The internal effect in China would be so profound that the generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit united front coalition. The present opposition groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding themselves, would be won wholeheartedly to our side and we would have in China, for the first time, a united ally.

Whether we like it or not, by our very presence here we have become a force in the internal politics of China and that force should be used to accomplish our primary mission. In spite of hero-worshipping publicity in the United States, Chiang Kai-shek is not China and by our present narrow policy of outspokenly supporting his dog-in-the-manger attitude we are needlessly cutting ourselves off from millions of useful allies; many of whom are already organized and in position to engage the enemy. These allies, let it be clear, are not confined to Communist-controlled areas of China, but are to be found everywhere in the country. The Communist movement is merely the most prominent manifestation of a condition which is potentially present throughout China. Other important groups favor the same program as that espoused by the so-called Communist-agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions—but the Communists are the only group at present having the organization and strength openly to foster such revolutionary ideas.

Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into a position from which we have only one approach to the objective. Support of the generalissimo is desirable insofar as there is concrete evidence that he is willing and able to marshal the full strength of China against Japan. Support of the generalissimo is but one means to an end; it is not an end in itself, but by present statements of policy we show a tendency to confuse the means with the end. There should be an immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility of approach to our primary objective may be restored.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you testify that to the best of your recollection the reports of these four political officers were uniformly derogatory of the Chinese Nationalist Government?

General WEDEMEYER. I could state that the reports oral and written of three, Mr. Service, Mr. Davies, and Mr. Ludden, were very commendatory in references to the Communists, and frequently derogatory in references to the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, can you recall that any friction or disagreement was openly expressed between yourself and General Hurley on the one hand and these political advisers on the other? You have testified that generally you were in support of General Hurley's position.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, my position out there was I was just a military man and I looked up to the Ambassador as the senior rep-

resentative of my country in that area. And when I first reported to take over the command I paid my respects to Ambassador Gaus. He was the Ambassador to China at that time. And shortly thereafter, a month or so later, he resigned, and Mr. Patrick J. Hurley became the Ambassador. And I evolved a system of working together, and, as I stated, I recognized him as a senior, a civilian, and I deferred to his ideas in the political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural fields. In the military field I felt that I was responsible and he did too.

Senator FERGUSON. General, when you were assigned to China on this mission, was it to carry out a new policy?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir, I received no instructions about a new policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You were assigned to carry out a mission which in your opinion was the mission previous to your assignment?

General WEDEMEYER. To support the Nationalist Government of China and to actually, to put it bluntly, kill as many Japanese as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. To help them in the Japanese cause.

General WEDEMEYER. To assist them or to cooperate with them in their military operations against the Japanese, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you understood that that was a carrying on of a policy that had been there?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you found in the files of the foreign officers a different philosophy?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But you kept to the assignment that you felt that you had and carried that out as nearly as you could?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was the policy at least of Hurley who came there as the Ambassador of the United States?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, there was a question, I think, on the record: Did you recall any expressions of disagreement between any of these Foreign Service officers and yourself and General Hurley?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I did not have any disagreement with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear of any?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about it, General Wedemeyer?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Ambassador Hurley moved over to my house during the winter of 1944–45 because the Japs used to bomb us there and a big boulder had rolled into the Ambassador's house, so he moved into my house for a few weeks while his house was being renovated. And he, in the evening discussions in my home, suggested that these four political advisers that I had be placed under him. That seemed logical to me. I looked to the Ambassador for my intructions in political matters, diplomatic matters, and I told him I would agree to that.

So we were ordered home in February of 1945 by President Roosevelt. And when we got back to this country, to the Capital, Mr. Hurley requested that those four men be returned to him and to operate in the Embassy, and said that General Wedemeyer had no

objection; which was correct. That was done. Mr. Stimson, as Secretary of War, had requested those four political advisers for his friend General Stilwell when General Stilwell assumed command out there some years earlier.

So, Mr. Stimson was interested in my view, and I had lunch with him and expressed agreement that they should be put back over under the Embassy. I did not express disapproval or concern about these men. I had none. They had been loyal to me. I did not agree with their reports. I found them to be very bright, keen, and they certainly knew most of the Chinese leaders. But, as I indicated, I did not analyze their reports nearly as carefully as I should have, and talk to them about it, because I was so busily involved with military duties. They were put over under the Ambassador.

When we got back, we were only home about a week, and we flew back to China, and Mr. Hurley then had some difficulties with these men. He felt, as he expressed it, that they were undermining his efforts to bring about a stability in the China area. He finally had one of them transferred. And some had already left, I think. Mr. Service had come back, and Mr. Emmerson and Ludden and Davies still were there. And finally Davies was transferred to Moscow, and he came over to say good-by to me. At that time Hurley was still living with me, and they had quite a heated argument in my home.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you tell us what the argument was about?

General WEDEMEYER. Of course, one does not remember all of the details.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that. Just give us the substance.

General WEDEMEYER. This has not occurred to me in the years intervening. But Hurley stated to Mr. Davies that he, Davies, had not supported Mr. Hurley and had made reports that contravened American policy as he, Hurley, understood it, and that he was going to ask the State Department to relieve Mr. Davies; that is, to discharge him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean discharge him entirely from the service?

General WEDEMEYER. Discharge him entirely from the Foreign Service. Mr. Hurley made that statement.

And Mr. Davies protested very strongly and became highly emotional, as did the Ambassador, and there were exchanges. I do not recall, really, in fairness to either one of them, what was said.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you can give the substance of it.

General WEDEMEYER. The substance was that Mr. Davies felt that he had been loyal, and Mr. Hurley that he had not been loyal to him, Hurley, and finally Mr. Hurley agreed not to request his discharge but definitely that he should be transferred and go to Moscow to see at first hand the operation of some of these ideas that Mr. Davies had been espousing.

Senator FERGUSON. So, it was Mr. Hurley's idea that he would not ask for his discharge from the service?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But he recommended that Davies be sent to Moscow to experience things that he had been advocating in China?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. That is my recollection of the conversation that took place in my house in about February or March or April, right around in there.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, you felt, when their advice was not in line with what you thought your mission was, that you, being a military man and assigned there to do a certain mission, did not have any personal feeling against them?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes: I did, Senator, but I was too busy with the military job. But if I had known—those men were under me, and if I ever have anybody, civilian or military, under me, and he is doing anything that I interpret as disloyal, I will go after him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you interpret these things as being disloyal?

General WEDEMEYER. I did not, sir, because I did not analyze them as I should have carefully.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put it to you now: What is your opinion now after you read these reports in the light of all the circumstances? Were they disloyal to the Government and the policy that we had there?

General WEDEMEYER. I cannot answer that question, sir; honestly I cannot answer it. But I can say this: If I had followed their advice, communism would have run rampant over China much more rapidly than it did. And I would not have carried out my directive or my instructions as I understood them.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is an answer to my question.

General WEDEMEYER. I would hesitate to call any man categorically disloyal, sir, unless I had the proof.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand your answer.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, when General Marshall went to China, did you ever see his directive that he took with him?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who prepared that directive?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I don't. I think that General Hull and General Lincoln and General Marshall himself had something to to with it.

Subsequently I saw a carbon copy of that directive in the Pentagon, and it had the initials J. C. V. in the lower left-hand corner, as I recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose initials could they be?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, the head of the Far Eastern Division was John Carter Vincent at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you saw the initials J. C. V. on the draft of the directive?

General WEDEMEYER. I have seen them on a carbon copy of that directive, sir. Whether it was the final directive, I don't know. I mean, I did not compare the phraseology exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I wonder whether you have an opinion as to why it is so difficult for committees to actually ascertain who did prepare this directive. Why should there be any argument about who prepared this or any secrecy about who prepared it? Why should it not be an open book?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. Senator Ferguson, I can understand why we should protect sources of information in the FBI. I can understand that where the FBI at times does not want you to have access, or anyone to have access, to their files.

Senator FERGUSON. To their source.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. You will destroy a source.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that.

General WEDEMEYER. Or jeopardize a source. But I do not understand at all why the repersentatives of the American people do not have more information concerning national and international developments.

Senator FERGUSON. As to who prepared a document.

General WEDEMEYER. I think that who prepared a document certainly should be available to you representatives of the American peoples.

I could not understand, for example, why Wedemeyer's name was mentioned so frequently in the MacArthur hearings, associated with a telegram, and yet we could not find out who in the State Department had direct contact with the same matter. And I do not know to this day, and I tried to find out. Yet my name was bandied about freely.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was not a secret on your part?

General WEDEMEYER. And my permission was not requested either. If I had some compunction about it, I certainly was not given the opportunity to express it, but I did not care.

Senator FERGUSON. When it comes to a State Department official, then it becomes a deep, dark secret?

General WEDEMYER. I could not say that as a generality, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It did in that case.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is certainly true as to who prepared the document of the Marshall situation; is it not?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't know, sir. I did not know that you people had made the request to get this information, sir. I did not know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that at this time we have not made such a request for that document.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I now suggest and ask that the Chair and the committee obtain this information as to who actually did, and let us have it on the record so that it will not be in dispute.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean we will try to obtain it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is all the committee can do. It can do its best.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will proceed through its chairman at once to try to secure the information by every means that we know of. I wish to say, however, that the Chair has had some difficulty in times past.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness on the stand now, General Wedemeyer, rendered a very valuable report that would have been of great interest to the people of this country, and the chairman, then chairman of another committee of the Senate, attempted by subpoena to get that report, and the subpena was denied, or the document was denied to the subpena officer. So, we may have some trouble here again, but we will try.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, do you recall the recommendations made in the directive that General Marshall took with him to China?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I could give you substantially what was in it. It required General Marshall, as a special envoy of the President, to go to China and to broaden the base of the Government, to bring about a coalition of the various political parties there and to create stability in that area.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say that was the substance of the directive?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General Wedemeyer, were you in China when General Marshall first arrived on his mission?

General WEDEMEYER. You mean on this mission? Yes, sir; I met him at the airport.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you the ranking American military commander in the field at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you consulted on military matters by General Marshall in the execution of his mission?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I gave General Marshall a résumé of the situation that maintained in China at the end of the war and indicated my intention, which was hardly necessary to do, but that every resource in the China theater was at his disposal to help him out.

Mr. MORRIS. Did General Marshall make an effort to bring about a coalition between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Communist government?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I think he made a very continued and studied effort to bring about a coalition of the political factions, and also to do away with the military forces of any particular political party, and to amalgamate them with the political forces, and they would be the army or the military force of the political entity that he ended up with. Obviously, it would be impossible to carry on a political entity if Republicans had an army and Democrats had an army in our own country.

Mr. MORRIS. General Wedemeyer, do you have any knowledge that General Marshall imposed an embargo on the Chines Nationalist Government at that time?

General WEDEMEYER. The term "embargo," in the connotation of that term, I do not know whether it had application to what I know about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us just what you know?

General WEDEMEYER. There was, as I recall it, $500,000,000 appropriated by the Congress to help China. I do not know whether the help was military or economic or both, but I know that General Marshall was authorized by the President to determine the assistance, economic and military, that would be given to China. This, of course, was to assist him in bringing about this coalition that he was ordered to accomplish.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you know that this money was withheld from the Chinese Government?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, sir, when I returned, I was put in command of the Second Army over here with headquarters in Baltimore. But I did receive calls from Chinese friends here telling me that they were desperate for ammunition and for maintenance parts for their vehicles, American vehicles that they had secured during the war, and they urged me to do what I could. I was in no official status and could

do nothing about it, but it would indicate that there were retardations or stoppages of the flow of supplies to China. That was my only contact with that situation.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no further questions to ask General Wedemeyer on this score.

Senator FERGUSON. I have a question.

You did answer some questions to the United States News; is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I am asking you in relation to the answers to questions on how our policy was influenced. Do you recall those answers?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I think Mr. David Lawrence asked me if in my judgment there were influences——

The CHAIRMAN. I think the questions and answers might be submitted.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to know whether or not there was any change that you wanted to make in those answers or whether that is your opinion.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; that is my considered opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your considered opinion?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we insert this.

General WEDEMEYER. I would like to emphasize there, Senator Ferguson, that in referring to that I know of my own personal experience that there are thousands of loyal Americans in Government service.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that in here.

General WEDEMEYER. And I want it emphasized here, sir, because I do not want in any way to reflect against the many of my own comrades in military service, or against many fine people in the Government service in general.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not detract from these answers in here?

General WEDEMEYER. Not one iota, sir. I believe those statements to be correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that this excerpt of an interview of General Wedemeyer appearing in the September 14, 1951, issue of United States News and World Report be inserted in the record. That is, only that portion of it beginning with How Policy Was Influenced and down to Basic Mistakes of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is proper. It may be inserted in the record.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

HOW POLICY WAS INFLUENCED

Question. What do you mean by "sinister influences"?

Answer. Communist influences which had their genesis in the Kremlin, but which were implemented by representatives in this country, both by Soviet representatives and, unfortunately, by some of our own misguided citizens.

Question. Inside the Government?

Answer. Undoubtedly to a limited extent. I do not want to reflect against the thousands of loyal Americans in Government service who have been stead

fast in their devotion to duty and to the principles of democracy. They are in the vast majority.

Question. I suppose you include the State Department?

Answer. Yes. I mean in many departments.

Question. Do you think there are communistic influences in the military departments?

Answer. I never came into direct contact with a man in uniform in any of the services of whom I could say categorically that he was a Communist or had Communist connections.

Question. But were there suspicions as to that voiced from time to time in the Far East?

Answer. Yes. Take the newspaper that we published and disseminated widely in the China theater during and subsequent to the war. It was called The China Lantern. There were editorials that appeared in that paper from time to time that were inimical to the best interests of our country. The men on the staff of that paper were in the military service.

Question. Going back to this matter of the influences on our policy, isn't it possible that some of these influences were those that swallowed the communistic line and believed it to be the better line of the two?

Answer. Yes, sir; I accept that explanation. But as far back as 1933, when we recognized Soviet Russia, I perceived in my small way the real implications of communism. I had read Das Kapital and had studied and followed as much as I could the developments in Soviet Russia. During the 2 years, 1936 to 1938, that I was in Germany as a student at the German War College, the Nazis contributed considerably—not intentionally—to my education pertaining to Soviet objectives. It was not all propaganda that the Nazis put out about the Soviets. I warned both civil and military leaders with whom I was associated in America about the implications of what I called "indiscriminate assistance to the Soviet Russians."

From 1940 through most of 1943, I was connected with strategic planning in the then War Department and had an opportunity to express views. There were a number of American officers who realized the real implications of what I term "indiscriminate assistance" to a nation whose objectives or aims were just as dangerous to America, if not more so, than were those of Hitler and his henchmen.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever express disagreement with General Marshall on the advisability of forming a coalition government in China?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. When General Marshall first came out and showed me his directive I told him I did not believe it was possible of accomplishment. I testified to that effect before in the MacArthur hearings, and that is in coincidence with the view I expressed earlier today several times, namely, you cannot coalesce Communists with people who desire individual freedom. It just is not going to work. People who have a spiritual belief, people who respect the dignity of the individual, they are just antithetical to the views or philosophies of Marxism.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jenner?

Senator JENNER. I have no questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say then that the old proverb of saying you cannot mix oil and water would apply to trying to mix these two philosophies, and that you would have domination by the Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I am always afraid of cliches, you know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least you think the Communist philosophy would dominate?

General WEDEMEYER. Definitely, yes, sir. They will dominate if they are permitted to.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, if you try to compromise with them.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no further questions at this particular time of General Wedemeyer.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions, Senator Jenner?

Senator JENNER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we wish to express our sincere gratitude for your presence here and for your splendid testimony and cooperation generally.

General WEDEMEYER. I would like to make just one statement, sir. I have been following the work of this committee, and I commend both the Democratic and Republican members for what I believe to be an objective investigation in the interest of the country. Don't pay any attention, please, to the smear campaigns that are being instituted by those very same forces that you are investigating. I wish you success.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee, the chairman of this committee has received a letter dated September 15, 1951, on the letterhead 450 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N. Y., purporting to be signed by Corliss Lamont and bearing his signature. The letter starts out by saying (reading):

> I wish to protest again to you and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, of which you are chairman—

and so forth. I will not detain the committee to read the letter.

Senator JENNER. I received a copy, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The members of the committee, I think, have received copies.

The letter from Mr. Lamont will be inserted in the record with the permission of the committee.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

NEW YORK 27, N. Y., *September 15, 1951.*

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Senate Judiciary Committee, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I wish to protest again to you and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, of which you are chairman, against the repeated actions of that subcommittee in attempting to smear me as a Communist and to associate me with the alleged betrayal of American foreign policy in the Far East. Your subcommitee has dragged me into this picture as part of a shabby endeavor to discredit the American Institute of Pacific Relations and to establish it as a subversive organization.

The Subcommittee on Internal Security has tried to give the totally false impression that I am a far-eastern expert and have been a prime mover in the affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations. But in fact I have never been particularly interested in the Far East and have only a few years been a member of the institute, and a very inactive one at that.

However, my late father, Thomas W. Lamont, of J. P. Morgan & Co., did have considerable knowledge of the Far East and visited both Japan and China. For more than 20 years he participated actively in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations and contributed generously to it. From 1925 until the time of his death in 1948 he made to that organization 14 donations amounting to $14,700.

On the other hand, I did not start contributing to the institute until 1946. From that year until the present I made six donations totaling $800, or about one-eighteenth of the total of my father's gifts. Yet your subcommittee and its investigators have never once mentioned my Republican father's long and deep interest in the institute. Instead, this subcommittee has stressed my own slight and brief association with the institute, obviously as part of its effort to paint that excellent organization as red by concealing the fact that leading bankers and conservatives have been among its chief backers.

At its hearing on August 22, 1951, your subcommittee read into its records the crudest sort of dishonesty about me. Your counsel submitted on that occasion a memorandum headed, "C. L. from E. C. C.," and then suggested that it had been written to Corliss Lamont from E. C. Carter, former secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Testimony continued for some time on this assumption; and nobody was given an opportunity to refute it and to show that the memo was from Mr. Carter to Clayton Lane, at one time an officer of the institute.

The memorandum itself was perfectly innocent. And this episode well illustrates the method of your subcommittee in striving to mislead public opinion. Evidently some members of this subcommittee would be glad to see me hung for the nonexistent crimes of someone else whose initials happen to be the same as mine.

On August 2, 1951, a self-confessed ex-spy, Mrs. Hede Massing, testified before your subcommittee that I was a Communist. I wrote your subcommittee August 12 disproving this charge and saying in part: "For the one-thousandth time I completely and categorically deny that I am or ever have been a Communist. My numerous disagreements on fundamental points with Communist and Soviet doctrines, such as those regarding philosophy, civil liberties, the Tito controversy, and the aggression of the North Koreans in 1950, show clearly that I rely on my own independent thinking and follow nobody's line. I am a radical American dissenter carrying on as best I can the dissenting tradition of my ancestors who came over on the *Mayflower*."

I requested your subcommittee to enter the above statement into its official records. But I did not even receive an acknowledgement of my letter.

From its record, Mr. Senator, it seems to me that your subcommittee is constantly encouraging the violation of the Ninth Commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." It is turning representative government into government by misrepresentation. It is causing the American people to lose faith in their democratic institutions and is thereby doing more to undermine the political system of the United States than all the Communists who have ever existed in this country.

Other congressional investigating committees, of both House and Senate, have behaved just as scandalously. The procedures of such committees ought to be revised by law in order to guarantee defendant witnesses, organizations, and other victims their legitimate rights and a fair hearing. The new rules should apply whether bankers or teachers, labor leaders or Communists, liberals or independents, Republicans or Democrats are being investigated.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me earnestly request that in the interests of the truth you enter this letter in the official records of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security as my refutation of the untrue accusations made against me at its hearings.

Very truly yours,

CORLISS LAMONT.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with Mr. Lamont's letter the chairman desires to insert in the record at this time the reply of the chairman of this committee dated September 19, 1951, addressed to Mr. Corliss Lamont and signed by the chairman of this committee. Those letters will be inserted in the record so as to become a part of the record of this hearing.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

SEPTEMBER 19, 1951.

Mr. CORLISS LAMONT,
New York 27, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LAMONT: I have your letter of September 15, 1951, which I notice you have released to the press.

I take note of the fact which you impart in your letter that your father, Thomas W. Lamont, contributed $14,700 to the Institute of Pacific Relations during the period 1925–48 and that he took an active interest in the institute and in the Far East. I also note that you point out that your own six donations to the institute totaled only $800 by contrast.

I would like to point out, however, that you are wrong in your statement that this committee has never once mentioned your father's name in its hear-

ings. In fact, the only substantial testimony involving either you or your father concerned an episode which took place in 1945. As you must know, if you read the record, this episode involved an effort made by Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations to induce your father, Thomas W. Lamont, through you, to sign a draft prepared by Mr. Lattimore in answer to an article that appeared in the Reader's Digest by J. B. Powell and Max Eastman. Testimony showed that Mr. Lattimore prepared a draft of an answer after consultation with Mr. T. A. Bisson and made arrangements to have it published in the name of some prominent American. According to testimony, they selected your father, Thomas W. Lamont, as a person who might sign the article. Arrangements for the carrying out of this plan, according to testimony and documents introduced into the record, were made through you. When your father declined to have his name signed to the article, this committee took especial care to bring out his refusal to do so.

It is also to be noted that the committee and the staff questioned Mr. Carter at length on the unusual language used in the letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lattimore who were admittedly good friends. The letter of June 19, 1945, reads in part:

"DEAR OWEN: Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to the One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and probably will be gone all summer. I explained the general situation to the son and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and then finally suggested the possibility of his father. He thought it would better for me to approach him than for him to do so, though he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday. He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him with as strong and tactful a letter as I can write on the off-chance that he might be will to do something. * * *

"EDWARD C. CARTER."

I believe if you will read or, if you have already done so, reread that testimony you will find that the committee was simply trying to bring out the facts, and the incidence of your name and your father's name was dictated by the underlying circumstances and by nothing else.

With respect to the second point you make in your letter, therein you accuse the committee of dishonesty to you. The record you refer to is as follows:

"Mr. MANDEL: I have here a footnote dated November 5, 1948, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 'CL from ECC'. 'CL' may be Corliss Lamont, and 'ECC' may be E. C. Carter."

Two letters "CL from ECC" were introduced into the record at this point and there was no significance whatever attached to the identity of the "CL."

As you must know, it was the habit of the Institute of Pacific Relations to refer to individuals in the various memoranda by their initials only. The assumption that it may have been Corliss Lamont was without significance and represented a mere guess on the part of the research director as to the addressee therein. Certainly there was no invidious connotation drawn from this conclusion. However, inasmuch as you point out that the "CL" is Clayton Lane and not Corliss Lamont, your statement of this fact will be cross-indexed to that testimony.

As for the fact that you have been identified before this committee as a Communist, I call attention to the fact that this committee has made no findings nor drawn any conclusions from the sworn testimony before it.

As you request, your letter is being put into the official record.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Michigan has received a letter from Henry A. Wallace, and I do not know whether other members of the committee have also received it, but I would ask that that be inserted in the record also. I will turn it over to the committee.

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[1] See p. 574, pt. 2.

The CHAIRMAN. As regards the letter to which Senator Ferguson refers, that letter and the reply will be inserted also.

(The letters referred to are as follows:)

SEPTEMBER 13, 1951.

Hon. HENRY A. WALLACE,
South Salem, N. Y.

MY DEAR HENRY: Upon my return from Turkey, I found your letter of August 25 which had been previously acknowledged by my secretary.

If you would permit me to do so, I shall be very glad to place your letter in the official record of the committee.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

SOUTH SALEM, N. Y., *August 25, 1951.*

Hon. HOMER FERGUSON,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR FERGUSON: In a UP report of August 22 you are quoted as saying that much of the Budenz testimony was hearsay. Therefore I am moved to call your attention to the Budenz testimony on August 23 before the Senate Internal Security Committee to the effect that I was under the influence of Communists (Lattimore and Vincent, according to Budenz) on my trip to China in 1944.

For your information I may say that Lattimore was sent along on the trip not as a member of my personal staff but as a representative of OWI at the instance of Elmer Davis and Roosevelt. He was an expert on the nomadic tribes and occasionally was helpful as an interpreter but he had nothing whatever to do with my report to President Roosevelt or with my communication to President Roosevelt on June 28, 1944.

The person who had by far the greatest influence on me was a Republican, Ambassador to China, Hon. Clarence E. Gauss. You may remember that in the fall of 1945 Senator Hart, of Connecticut, was urging him for the Republican place on the Export-Import Bank. It was at instance of Gauss that I reported to Roosevelt that in spite of Chiang's weaknesses as a leader that at the moment we had no alternative to the support of Chiang.

It was at Chiang's instance that I sent a message from Kunming to Roosevelt on June 28, 1944, suggesting the name of General Wedemeyer as liaison between Roosevelt and Chiang. While Vincent did not inspire this suggestion he was cognizant of what was in my cable and did not in any way object.

On December 15, 1945, the Honorable Patrick Hurley, recently resigned as Ambassador to China, told me in the presence of Herbert Brownell that he never had any quarrel with me with regard to the Chinese situation.

I thought you ought to have these facts in view of the Budenz testimony.

With cordial regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

HENRY A. WALLACE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter from Mr. Carter addressed to me which I think should go in the record. It is very short. Mr. Mandel, will you read that very briefly?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a letter from Edward C. Carter dated September 6, 1951 [reading]:

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated that Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems that when the Chancellor children were young they went to stay for long periods in Yorkshire at the Cholomeley's home. It was because of this intimate relationship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were cousins.

I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant, but I want to correct it.

Mr. MORRIS. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we allow that letter to go into the record as a correction of Mr. Carter's own testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

NEW YORK CITY, *September 6, 1951.*

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In my testimony some weeks ago I believe that I stated that Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a cousin of Christopher Chancellor, the present head of Reuters. My wife tells me that this is inaccurate. It seems that when the Chancellor children were young they went to stay for long periods in Yorkshire at the Cholmeley's home. It was because of this intimate relationship under the same roof that I made the mistake of thinking they were cousins.

I believe that the mistake is quite unimportant but I want to correct it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.[1]

Senator FERGUSON. When it is printed in the record, if it is possible, could this not be put in at that place so that it will correct the record without too much trouble? Has it already been printed?

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be satisfactory if that were cross-indexed back to it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; so that at least it would be clear that the correction was made.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. There is one other letter that the War Department has asked us to put into our record. It concerns the testimony of General Willoughby. It is not very important, but I think inasmuch as the Army has requested that it should go in, we could put it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. That letter is dated August 15, 1951, from Miles Reber, major general, GSC.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON,
Washington, D. C., August 15, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In connection with the recent testimony of General Willoughby before your committee pertaining to his official report on the Sorge case, it is respectfully requested that the following facts in connection with his report be included in the record of the hearings of your committee.

Copies of all consecutive reports and exhibits pertaining to the Sorge case received by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army, from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, FECOM, were distributed to the FBI, CIA, and State Department between the dates of March 9, 1949, and November 22, 1950. No reports or exhibits to the Sorge case have been received since November 22, 1950.

On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, may I suggest that this letter be made a part of the record of hearings in this case. Your cooperation in such action will be very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

MILES REBER,
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Legislative Liaison.

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[1] See p. 51, pt. 1.

Mr. MORRIS. Tomorrow, Senator McCarran, we have General Fortier who is theater intelligence commander in the Far East Command. He will be our witness tomorrow. That will be at 10 o'clock or 9 o'clock, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it can be 10 o'clock. It is very difficult to convene at 9 o'clock. I think we will be able to meet at 10 o'clock. I have discussed it with the leader and I think it will be all right to proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. General Fortier is under subpena to appear here at 9 o'clock. May I inform him that he may come in at 10?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The committee is recessed until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p. m., the committee recessed to be reconvened at 10 a. m. Thursday, September 20, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, Jenner, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator McCarthy.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Please stand and be sworn, General.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General FORTIER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. L. JOSEPH FORTIER, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED), McLEAN, VA.

Mr. MORRIS. General Fortier, will you give your full name and address to the reporter, please?

General FORTIER. Louis Joseph Fortier, brigadier general, United States Army, retired, Spring Hill Road, McLean, Va.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present military status?

General FORTIER. United States Army, retired.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last military assignment, General?

General FORTIER. Director of Theater Intelligence Division of the Far East Command.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you relinquish that command?

General FORTIER. I sailed from Japan in October, the middle of October 1950. I was the Director of Theater Intelligence Division until some time in September 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe briefly the nature of your assignment, General Fortier, at that time?

General FORTIER. From around the 1st day of February 1949 until September 1950 I was in charge of the Theater Intelligence Division under G–2, Far East Command, GHQ, Tokyo.

Mr. Morris. Will you describe for us generally the functions that you had to perform in that post?

General Fortier. As Director of this Division, my job was that of observing, studying the capabilities of any external threat to the Far East Command. In other words, I was concerned with any potential outside enemy that might threaten the security of the Far East Command.

Mr. Morris. As such, General, did you take recognition of the development of Red China?

General Fortier. Besides observing the capabilities of the Soviets in that area, probably my greatest interest was that of watching the development in China.

Mr. Morris. Had you been interested in communism in China as a professional matter, General Fortier?

General Fortier. I had been in and out of Intelligence for the last 14 years and, as a matter of fact, ever since 1921–23 when I took a master of science degree in political science, in which I specalized on the problems arising from the Versailles Treaty, I have been closely observing the development of Soviet Russia and communism in general.

Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony that while you held this position you were concerned with the development and the consolidation of communism on the mainland of China?

General Fortier. Yes, sir; I was.

Senator Ferguson. Would that not be right in line with your duties if you were to look into the questions that might be a threat to your command? Communism in China could be a threat to the command in Tokyo, could it not?

General Fortier. Yes, sir.

May I explain this? That whereas I had the division that was charged with the external security, in other words, a threat from outside, there was another division of G–2 which was charged with the internal security. My primary interest was watching the development in China and seeing the advance of communism and Mao Tse-tung's forces in China.

Mr. Morris. General, did you ever have occasion to brief important leaders of the United States Government as an adviser to Japan?

General Fortier. It was what we call in the service a standard operating procedure that whenever any distinguished representative of the United States Government came to Tokyo, he was given a briefing as to the situation as we saw it and in turn we endeavored to obtain from him his views, or the Washington view if he came from Washington.

Mr. Morris. That was standard operating procedure?

General Fortier. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Do you recall a visit that Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup made to Japan in late 1949 or early 1950?

General Fortier. Yes, I do.

Mr. Morris. Will you relate the circumstances to this committee, please?

General Fortier. As I recall it, Mr. Jessup came to Japan, to Tokyo, in the early days of January 1950. It was just about the time that we had gotten word that Britain had recognized Communist China. We gave Mr. Jessup the normal briefing that was given to visiting

people from Washington. And it so happened, the instance that Mr. Morris is referring to, that during one of the intermissions, I found myself alone with Mr. Jessup——

The CHAIRMAN. Found yourself where?

General FORTIER. Standing next to him in the conference room, and I put the following question to him. I said: "When will we recognize Communist China?"

Senator FERGUSON. You knew at that time he was connected with the State Department of the United States Government?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir. He was there as an ambassador with that rank.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you put the question that way, in the affirmative, General?

General FORTIER. I had been very much concerned about Britain recognizing Communist China.

Senator FERGUSON. Had he been briefed on that question? Was that mentioned in the briefing?

General FORTIER. I don't recall that it was. We had a set briefing that involved our views on Asia as a whole; that is, on the periphery of the Far East Command. That briefing was usually given by General Willoughby who was G–2.

Senator FERGUSON. You usually had around the table more than General Willoughby and yourself, did you not?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, as I recall, your briefing form.

General FORTIER. All the key staff officers of GHQ Far East Command were present at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know whether that question was raised in the briefing?

General FORTIER. I don't think it was, as a matter of fact.

Senator EASTLAND. What did Mr. Jessup tell you?

General FORTIER. Mr. Jessup said, "Well, in about 2 or 3 weeks."

Mr. MORRIS. Was it as a categorical statement?

General FORTIER. It is a little bit difficult for me to remember his exact words as to whether it was a categorical statement or not, but I do remember that I picked up the statement and I argued with Mr. Jessup and told him that I thought it would be a grave error if we recognized Communist China.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you think it would be a grave error?

General FORTIER. I thought it would be a grave error for the following reason: that as far as I knew never in its history had China been consolidated under one particular regime or one head. China had always had these regional groups and throughout the history of China there had been an attempt made to consolidate it, but never with success.

Having followed the development in China, in Communist China, and seeing Mao Tse-tung's army overrun the key areas, and feeling that Mao Tse-tung was being aided and abetted by the Russians, I felt that Mao Tse-tung had a very fine chance of consolidating that country for once under a regime that would be inimical to us and against the best interests of the United States.

Senator EASTLAND. If we recognized them?

General FORTIER. Yes; if we recognized the country and gave them that moral and political support that would be received by them should we grant recognition.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Jessup say about that?

General FORTIER. Mr. Jessup said, "Well, we must face facts." I am not putting in quotes and end quotes now. I am giving you my recollection on this. He said, "We must face facts. After all, Mao Tse-tung's armies have overrun the vast portion, in fact the key areas of China. They are in the process of reestablishing law and order and the mere fact that we should recognize them does not mean we approve either of the character of their government or of the nature of it. In arriving at a decision as to recognition or nonrecognition, the criteria should be whether the government that has come in has established sovereignty, has control of the majority of the country, and is in the process of reestablishing law and order."

Senator EASTLAND. Had they consolidated China at that time?

General FORTIER. In my opinion, no.

Senator EASTLAND. Had they consolidated their position in China when you left Japan?

General FORTIER. In my opinion, no.

Senator EASTLAND. Have they consolidated China today?

General FORTIER. In my opinion, no.

Senator EASTLAND. You think recognition by this country would do much to consolidate communism in China?

General FORTIER. I certainly do.

Senator FERGUSON. You told Jessup that?

General FORTIER. I told him substantially that.

About that time, someone else came in. Here was this conference room and the conversation was interrupted and never came to a final conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you we had an agreement with Great Britain that after recognition by Britain that we would recognize China?

General FORTIER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he mention anything about the fact of Britain's recognition?

General FORTIER. He did not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Right there, as a general in intelligence and from your sources of information and your feel of the atmosphere and general knowledge, did you not think that there had been an understanding between this country and Great Britain that Great Britain's recognition of Communist China would be followed by our recognition?

General FORTIER. That is a rather difficult question to answer. I prefer to give you the atmosphere.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that not your judgment, General, and is not that the reason you asked Mr. Jessup the question you did?

General FORTIER. Well, some time in October or November 1949, I had become so much concerned with the fact that Britain might recognize Communist China that I had made a study for my own satisfaction of the situation as faced by the British in Hong Kong in 1941, in December, when the Japanese invaded Hong Kong, and the situation as existed in 1949, late 1949.

I studied it from a political, economic, military, and psychological point of view, I drafted mainly for my own information and that of my immediate entourage, a study in which I concluded that while it would be a great error should Britain recognize Communist China, I feared very much they would and that possibly the economic factor would be the determining one because there was no question but that there had been a terrific increase in trade through Hong Kong between 1948 and 1949.

To answer Senator Eastland's question, I have no information, direct evidence, on which to base any deal between the United States and Britain. On the other hand, I feared, you might say, that the United States would follow a recognition by Britain, and if I remember correctly, either Britain had just recognized Communist China, at the time I spoke to Mr. Jessup, or I had obtained some information that they would do so shortly. I believe that is what prompted my questioning of Mr. Jessup, the fact that a day or two before there had been some sort of an official announcement that Britain had recognized Communist China.

Senator EASTLAND. You were worried about Formosa, too?

General FORTIER. I was worried we might follow suit.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get his personal opinion, or was he speaking, that the Government was going to do this?

General FORTIER. No, sir. This was a man to man conversation between Jessup and me.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was his personal idea that it should be recognized?

General FORTIER. Senator, the entire conversation——

Senator FERGUSON. Because you were giving him your personal argument and he was giving his.

General FORTIER. I feel he was.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the way it impressed you at the time?

General FORTIER. Yes. The whole conversation did not last more than 2 or 3 minutes, as you can well understand. We were having this conference and about every 50 minutes there would be a 10-minute intermission. It was in one of them I tackled him on that subject.

Senator EASTLAND. Were you afraid of the loss of Formosa, too?

General FORTIER. I was very much concerned with that.

Senator EASTLAND. Why were you concerned with that?

General FORTIER. Because I shared the view that Formosa is a key area—I do not like to use the word "vital" because the word has been overworked, but that Formosa lies between the Philippines and Japan and if it fell in enemy hands it would be a very serious threat to either country.

Senator EASTLAND. Would it not put Japan in a nutcracker between the islands we have given Russia on the north and those islands south of Japan?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Were there many airfields on Formosa?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir; there are.

Senator EASTLAND. Did the Far East Command have trouble with the State Department in getting in Formosa, or did the United States State Department attempt to keep generals in the Far East Command away from Formosa?

General FORTIER. Well, the correct answer to that is I know of no important official of GHQ who was ever barred admittance to Formosa.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you not have to resort to subterfuges to get in?

General FORTIER. I think the Senator is referring to the fact that there was at times a tendency to scrutinize the group from GHQ that had requested admission to Formosa, and I will say, Senator, that it was based largely, at least from the information we obtained, on the lack of hotel reservations and facilities there.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you not think that was a subterfuge, General?

General FORTIER. In my particular case, when I went to Formosa, every one in GHQ knew, of course, of my particular job, that of Director of Theater Intelligence Division, and the United States Government had its set-up in Formosa, including military, air, and naval attachés. At least, theoretically, any information that we desired concerning Formosa could have been obtained through those sources.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you not have to resort to subterfuge to get in Formosa? I want you to answer that question.

General FORTIER. I don't know whether I had to or not, but I did.

Senator EASTLAND. What was that subterfuge?

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you hesitate on this?

General FORTIER. Because, if I seem to hesitate it may have been in this particular instance being referred to that it was overplayed. I have no reason to believe that had I applied formally for admission to Formosa that that would not have been granted me. I think it would, but on a particular occasion, I had heard certain reports about the defense capabilities of Formosa that bothered me. I wanted to get over there and get there in a hurry, because it was a time when actually it was a critical period. It was late May, early June, of 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you have to ask the State Department?

Senator EASTLAND. Please go ahead and answer the question.

General FORTIER. So, in order to get there and get there in a hurry, an arrangement was made whereby I was invited as a guest of a very high-ranking official in Formosa.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that official?

General FORTIER. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it true that you sent word you were coming to the State Department representative and got in a plane and left before he had time to answer?

General FORTIER. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it not general knowledge that the Far East command was not welcomed down at Formosa by the American State Department?

General FORTIER. Well, it was my impression that we were none too welcome, at least those of us in the intelligence field.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever hear of a General Merritt who was being sent subrosa by the State Department to organize an anti-Chiang faction in Formosa?

General FORTIER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You made a statement a little while ago, General, that when you attempted to go to Formosa you seemed to be "scruti-

nized." Why do you use the word "scrutinize"? Your going to Formosa was scrutinized. By whom and how?

General FORTIER. Did I use that word?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General FORTIER. I believe I don't recall in a particular thing, but I said those officers who were involved in the intelligence field, their request for admission into Formosa would have been more closely scrutinized by the American representation in Formosa than would others. After all, let's be fair about this thing. The United States Government had a consul general, had United States Military, Air and Naval attachés in Formosa. Certainly, theoretically, we had appropriate United States representation in the place. If I was not satisfied with their views and reports and I desired my own estimate, why, you might attribute that to my own idiosyncrasy, that I preferred my own evaluation to that which I was receiving.

Senator FERGUSON. But, General, you don't claim that the military and attachés at an embassy are Intelligence officers, do you, in the sense of the word you were?

General FORTIER. No, sir; they are not.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you had to obtain information out of Formosa. Why did you have to ask the State Department for permission to go to Formosa?

General FORTIER. Sir, one has to obtain a visa from the State Department or through the State Department channels to visit any foreign country. Formosa was not under the aegis of the Far East Command.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it true that civilians who went to Japan, for instance, connected with the United States Government and not connected with the State Department, had difficulty going to Formosa?

General FORTIER. Sir, that I would not know. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that?

General FORTIER. That is the first I ever heard of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get a visa from the State Department?

General FORTIER. I got one from the State Department representative. General MacArthur's chief political adviser, Mr. Seabald, was my channel of getting into any country. Through him, we could contact these various missions that were in Tokyo. For example, when I went to Hong Kong or Indochina, or to Korea, that was processed through the State Department representative in Tokyo.

Senator EASTLAND. That State Department representative in Tokyo told you how to get into Formosa, did he not?

General FORTIER. He aided and abetted me.

Senator EASTLAND. That was through subterfuge, to send a message to Formosa you were coming and get in your plane and go before they had time to answer. Is that true?

General FORTIER. That is the way I got in there; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I might tell you, General, that I had a similar experience to get into Formosa after I was in the air in the plane. We had to obtain permission to go in instead of getting clearance from the State Department.

Is that not what you did? You got in the plane and got permission to land?

General FORTIER. I had anticipated that I would have trouble getting in.

The CHAIRMAN. Trouble from what source? From our authorities or from whom?

General FORTIER. Through Mr. Robert Strong, who was our consul general there.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out the relevancy of this testimony to our Institute of Pacific Relations inquiry.

Our records are replete with the association of Mr. Jessup to the Institute of Pacific Relations. So Mr. Mandel has compiled a list of the important positions that Mr. Jessup held in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like those introduced in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. He has compiled them from what source?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe your compilation?

Mr. MANDEL. According to Problems of the Pacific, 1933, Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held August 14 to 26, 1933, one of the conference members was Philip Jessup.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. The Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then, according to Problems of the Pacific, dated 1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Virginia Beach, November 18 to December 2, 1939, page 273, one of the international officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations was Philip C. Jessup, who was also chairman of the Pacific Council.

Then, according to the Annual Report of the American Council of the IPR, 1938, page 58, Philip C. Jessup was vice chairman and a member of the board of trustees.

Then in the volume called War and Peace in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Mont Tremblant, December 4 to December 14, 1942, page 159, Philip C. Jessup is listed as a conference member and as chairman of the Pacific Council.

Again in a volume called Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to January 17, 1945, page 157, Philip C. Jessup is listed as a conference member; and, finally, we have a telegram addressed to Edward C. Carter from "Fred"——

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know who that Fred is?

Mr. MANDEL. It may be Field.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the date of that?

Mr. MANDEL. November 23, and the year is not given.

It says: "Approve nominations suggest Jessup for research chairman."

Mr. MORRIS. There is no other Fred on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations other than Fred Field?

Mr. MANDEL. None that I know of.

Senator EASTLAND. Have you any idea what year that is?

Mr. MANDEL. We can check it and establish the year from other correspondence.

Mr. MORRIS. When you do verify that, which we are not prepared to do now, verify the position that Mr. Jessup did hold as research chairman, you will be able to relate it to that telegram.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I had another question of the witness. I wanted to ask whether or not it was a fact, to your knowledge, that in the Far East in the various embasssies there were rumors about the insecurity of the defense and the fact that Formosa was just ready for an overthrow of the Nationalist Government? That was back around the time you were talking about.

General FORTIER. There was considerable rumor and misgiving about the state of defense of Formosa in general.

To be very honest with you, that is the reason I was anxious to go down there.

Senator FERGUSON. To go down and see and get the facts?

General FORTIER. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know on October 26, I think that is the date, the United States Government sent a message to the Nationalist Government at Formosa that we would not give them any more military aid, and that was 1949?

General FORTIER. No, sir; I do not know that. I had heard they were not receiving any military aid, but I did not know of any message such as you spoke of.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that such a message was sent?

General FORTIER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To the Nationalist Government?

General FORTIER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you stay in Formosa?

General FORTIER. As I recall, I stayed there 3 days.

Senator FERGUSON.. I assume you talked to General Sun?

General FORTIER. I did, at long length.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no trouble getting hotel space?

General FORTIER. I did not live in a hotel.

Senator FERGUSON. You lived in the palace?

General FORTIER. No; but I lived in a cottage, a very comfortable cottage in the mountains.

Senator FERGUSON. Near Chiang Kai-shek's place?

General FORTIER. Yes; where the generalissimo lived.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not know they had plenty of space for visitors in Taipei?

General FORTIER. The facts are not quite that way, Senator. In late August 1950, I was the deputy chief of the Far East Command's survey group that made a complete, exhaustive study of Formosa. This was after the Korean war had broken out. This was in August 1950.

We sent a rather sizable group of officers and enlisted men to Formosa, to Taipei, to conduct the survey. We had, as I recall, something between 40 and 50 officers. We had considerable difficulty in finding——

Senator FERGUSON. But I am talking about the number of people you had in mind going down just to get information.

General FORTIER. Hotel accommodations——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about the hotels; I am talking about the place that the former resident commissioner of Japan used as a guest house for visiting people.

General FORTIER. Sir, I am inclined to agree that hotel accommodations in Formosa were extremely limited, that one or two individuals might not have been taken care of would not stand too close scrutiny. But if there were a group of 10 or 12 people——

Senator FERGUSON. If you tried to send a large mission over there; but that was not your purpose, was it? It was to get some man in there to get accurate information for you?

General FORTIER. The problem was to get just a few to obtain information.

Senator EASTLAND. The problem was for you to get in?

General FORTIER. I got in, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. General, it is just to get your full background in the record, but were you ever stationed in Yugoslavia?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir. I was military attaché to Yugoslavia from the latter part of May 1939 until I wrote my own orders to get out of there after the Germans had overrun the country.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you have anything to do with setting up the coup that overthrew the regency?

General FORTIER. Not that I had anything to do with it, but I was a very intimate friend of Gen. Bor Mirkovic, who was the deputy chief of aviation. He was the one who planned and implemented and executed the coup d'état on the 26th of March 1941. One of his lieutenants was Mikhailovich. I knew him quite intimately.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know Tito?

General FORTIER. I did not know Tito.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now it would be a grave mistake to recognize Red China?

General FORTIER. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now as you did in the past that it would consolidate them and give prestige and aid to them in their communism and their efforts as Communists?

General FORTIER. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel very strongly about that?

General FORTIER. I have felt right along there were two things that might happen that would consolidate Communist China. One would be for Chiang Kai-shek to make a deal with Mao Tsetung and lend his support to Mao Tse-tung.

The other would be for us to recognize them. In so doing, then they would have the moral and the economic force that would be needed to consolidate the country.

Senator EASTLAND. Would an armistice in Korea help consolidate the Communist regime in China?

General FORTIER. I doubt that seriously.

Senator WATKINS. May I inquire when it was that you had this conversation with Ambassador Jessup?

General FORTIER. Sir, it was in the early winter of 1949–50. If I recall correctly, it was in early January of 1950. The date can be fixed by studying Mr. Jessup's itinerary when he made that Far East survey in the winter of 1949–50. I have not any access to any records to determine the exact date on which I spoke to him.

Senator WATKINS. It was at least before the outbreak of the Korean police action?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir. It was several months before the outbreak of the Korean war.

Senator WATKINS. I notice you refer to that as a "war." I said a police action.

General FORTIER. Well, a police action. I am sure it is a war to the man in there fighting.

Senator WATKINS. I quite agree with you.

This might be a bit far afield, but somewhere along the line, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we ought to make some inquiry into what caused the United States to get out of Korea when we had our forces there, to get out when they moved back into Japan.

Do you know the situation with respect to what prompted us to get out of Korea at that time? I mean when we withdrew our forces.

General FORTIER. I would not have been too well informed on that. I may have seen the papers, in fact I probably did see the papers, in connection with it; but as I recall it, it was some United Nations agreement that by a certain date the United States would remove its forces from Korea. I went to Korea in April of 1949 and at that time we had a reinforced regiment there plus a number of instructors. By the 30th of June 1949, we had removed all troops from the area and had nothing but military advisers in a group.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know whether or not it was the recommendation of the Army that caused us to get out of Korea?

General FORTIER. I wouldn't know, sir. You can probably obtain that from National Defense.

Senator WATKINS. Would you inform the committee now without violating any classified information just what the situation was in Korea at the time we got out?

General FORTIER. From what point of view, sir?

Senator WATKINS. From the point of view of whether it was a wise or unwise move.

General FORTIER. In my opinion, it was a wise move for us to move out at that particular stage in the game. After all, a reinforced regiment is purely a token force. We would have been neither fish nor fowl with a reinforced regiment.

Senator WATKINS. Do you believe that the North Koreans or the Chinese would have attacked the United States forces even if they were only a token force?

General FORTIER. That, I do not. I do not believe they would have attacked us.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not making sporadic drives across the line before we moved out, or were they?

General FORTIER. Throughout the entire period there were border incidents.

Senator WATKINS. There were no actual attacks on American troops, however? All of the attacks occurred later on after the American troops had been withdrawn?

General FORTIER. There had been border incidents with the South Koreans even when we were there.

Senator FERGUSON. Almost weekly?

General FORTIER. Not against our forces.

Senator WATKINS. That was part of your investigation, to investigate any possible threat to the United States from North Korea, from China, and that particular section?

General FORTIER. When I went over there, it was to get the feel of the country, to study the capabilities, get information direct from the people on the ground as to what might be the North Korean capabilities. I did the same thing by traveling, for example, to the Kowloon-Hong Kong front. I went to Saigon and Hanoi and spent a week in Tonkin. I was a house guest there of the French deputy commanding general.

I studied the location of his advance posts and talked with his staff about the situation internally and externally in Indochina. We did not feel too secure about the whole situation there in the spring of 1950.

Senator WATKINS. What are you referring to now, just Korea?

General FORTIER. No, sir. This map that we had was showing more and more red. We were getting this encroachment on our command. Here were these four Japanese islands and Okinawa. The Reds were driving south. At first our attention had been drawn to the north around Hokkaido, but as it swept down, don't you see, here was our southern flank becoming more and more exposed. We had the responsibility for the Philippines, too.

So, naturally, anyone who is in the intelligence profession, and particularly one who had that special responsibility that I had, would concern himself with what was going on and where were the build-ups, what were the capabilities, where might they strike if they did strike.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you expect war to break out on one of those four fronts in 1950?

General FORTIER. To answer your question directly, sir, I was very, very much concerned. I was afraid. I had enough of an intuition that something was going to break out in the Far East that the record will show that I was constantly on the move traveling, trying to find out where it might break out.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Intelligence know where the Chinese divisions were concentrated?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir. We had very good information on where all these threats were, exactly how they were distributed. But I would like to say right here that to know what a potential enemy is capable of doing and to determine what he intended to do on the spur of the moment or at the last minute, those are two entirely different things.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was our potential enemy at that time that you were apprehensive?

General FORTIER. I was mostly apprehensive—well, of course, the Soviets never left my mind, and Mao Tse-tung and his forces.

The CHAIRMAN. It was in this atmosphere that you have described here that you discussed with Mr. Jessup as to when we might recognize Red China?

General FORTIER. Yes; it was. From around September 1949 until June 1950, to use the vernacular, I was "sweating it out" in the Far East Command.

Senator JENNER. When you talked to Jessup, he made his tour and inspection of Korea at that time?

General FORTIER. I think he was on his way out.

Senator JENNER. What did he say in regard to Korea?

General FORTIER. I did not discuss Korea with him.

Senator JENNER. Have you seen any statements he made to the American public upon his return to America about the situation in Korea being awfully peaceful over there and everything lovely?

General FORTIER. No, sir; I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, Senators?

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know if he can give us that information as to what the real situation in Korea was as far as the Army knew it just prior to the outbreak of this police action in Korea.

General FORTIER. We were quite well informed about the disposition of the North Korean forces, their strength, their armament. We knew their capabilities. We did not know on the morning of the 26th day of June 1950 at 4:30 a. m., or whatever time it was, they were going to jump off.

Senator WATKINS. Did you know in a general way an attack from that section was impending?

General FORTIER. Not any more so than any of these others; not any more so than it would have been against Formosa or Indochina.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, the indications were pretty strong there was likely to be an attack on Formosa, were they not?

General FORTIER. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. And also Indochina?

General FORTIER. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. If it were put in the same category, it would be in the realm of a probable attack coming from that point?

General FORTIER. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That was your business to find out?

General FORTIER. It was my business to find out.

Senator WATKINS. Did you evaluate the North Koreans as a danger to your security?

General FORTIER. Yes, we did; not as much so as the Chinese Communists.

Senator WATKINS. What I would like to know: Were you really caught flat-footed by the North Korean attack on South Korea?

General FORTIER. We were not surprised, but we were amazed. Let's put it that way.

To answer your question, I think the greatest surprise was what happened 2 days later when we got word we would intervene in that action.

Senator WATKINS. You were surprised at that?

General FORTIER. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Why were you surprised at that?

General FORTIER. I don't know why. I am just telling you.

Senator WATKINS You say you were surprised. There must have been some reason for it.

General FORTIER. In the first place, we had no responsibility in the Far East Command for Korea at all, as you probably well know.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no authority whatever to send troops in there at the time?

General FORTIER. No.

Senator JENNER. Was it not a determined fact among the high command that Korea was miiitarily untenable?

General FORTIER. I didn't share that view.

Senator JENNER. Was that not the view?

General FORTIER. I don't know of any official expression that ever came from the Far East Command to that effect, but I think that it has been shown that South Korea is tenable and those of us who were there in the days of the latter part of June, July, and August learned what America can do with very few resources with every one playing as one team and as one coordinated unit.

Senator EASTLAND. How many American divisions would you think it would take to bring the Korean war to a speedy conclusion?

General FORTIER. We have had in the military service a rule of thumb in determining the number of divisions to hold its own against a potential enemy, and that has been usually a division for every ten miles of front. Korea happens to be a peninsula. If I recall correctly, it is about 150 miles wide. With the superiority of naval forces we have guarding either flank, with the Air Force that we have, if we had a total of 12 to 15 divisions in there, I do not think there would be any question about the liquidation of the Korean conflict successfully.

Senator EASTLAND. We could go to the Yalu River?

General FORTIER. You are asking me to pit my knowledge of military strategy—in other words, you are shifting my role, sir. I have been playing in the role of an intelligence officer. Now I am to become the commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, you may proceed with your questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we had commenced to show the association between Mr. Jessup about whom we have had testimony today, and the Institute of Pacific Relations. We had set forth, to a partial extent, Mr. Jessup's association with the IPR.

I would like to put in in detail, Mr. Chairman, some of the roles that he did have in some of the more important conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations. For instance, the IPR holds a triennial conference which is one of the features of that organization, one of the principal means of expression.

I would like to show he had an important role certainly during the two conferences that were held during the war, the one at Mont Tremblant in 1942 and then again in the Hot Springs convention in 1945.

Mr. Mandel, will you put in the record Mr. Jessup's association with those two conferences?

The CHAIRMAN. From what are you reading, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This was formerly entered into the record as exhibit No. 110 on August 14, 1951. It is a letter dated June 15, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed: "E. C. C. from W. W. L:". The memorandum reads as follows:

> In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards nongovernment people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

Then a list of names follows.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that reintroduced in the record and one of the points is to show that the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations, E. C. C. and W. W. L., were consulting at this

time Currie, Barnes, and Jessup for the makeup of the representation to that particular conference. As such, I would like it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. For that purpose it will be inserted again.

(The document referred to previously marked "Exhibit No. 110," was reintroduced and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 110

JUNE 15, 1942.

E. C. C. from W. W. L.

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

GOVERNMENT

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska.
Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare.
Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
Riefler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare.
Shoemaker, James H., Board of Economic Warfare.
Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare.
Wallace, H. A., Vice President, Board of Economic Warfare.
Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget.
Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information.
Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information.
Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information.
Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information.
Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture.
Ropes, E. C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade.
Berle, A. A., Department of State.
Davies, Joseph, Department of State.
Grady, Henry, Department of State.
Hiss, Alger, Department of State.
Hornbeck, S. K., Department of State.
Sayre, Francis B., Department of State.
Stinebower, L. D., Department of State.
Vince, Jacob, Department of the Treasury.
White, H. D., Department of the Treasury.
Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board.
Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
Currie, Lauchlin, White House
Lubin, I., White House

OTHERS

Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross
Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council
Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point
Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News
Clapper, Raymond, Washington columnist
Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register & Tribune
Dennett, Tyler, historian
Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corp.
Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland
Field, Frederick V., New York
Herod, W. R., International General Electric
Jessup, Prof. Philip C., Columbia University
Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission
Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corp.
Luce, Henry, Time, Inc.
Molyneaux, Peter, Texas Weekly
Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States District Court, Spokane, Wash. (ex-Senator)

Sproul, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York
Sweetland, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief
Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives
Wilkie, Wendell, attorney
Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation
Wilson, C. E., General Electric
Yarnell, Admiral H. E., United States Navy, retired

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have something else?

Mr. MANDEL. Then we have former exhibit No. 104 from the open hearings of August 14, 1951.

It is a letter from the IPR files dated November 30, 1942. Memorandum to Mr. Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup, Mont Tremblant. It reads as follows:

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of Mont Tremblant committees, I am putting down the following suggestions.

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup so that they are merely tentative for the present.

The Pacific Council—Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in the chair so presumably another American should represent the Council. I believe Kizer is the best choice.

Program committee—Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later. * * *"

That is a partial excerpt from the exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I notice that this exhibit and the previous one have already been introduced in the record at previous hearings.

I believe Mr. Mandel gave the previous hearing dates.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. This is former exhibit No. 132, used in open hearings on August 16, 1951. It comes from the files of the IPR and is on the letterhead of the Columbia University, addressed to Mr. Raymond Dennett, secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, from Philip C. Jessup, and I read portions of this exhibit:

In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American delegation. The Pacific Council provides a secretariat for the conference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific Council for that purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Mr. Jessup writing?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry White, Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert J. Watt, Len DeCaux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginius Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Adam Comstock Notestein.

Further:

In reply to yours of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine.

There is a pencil note at the bottom which says: "Frank Coe of FEA also good."

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to point out in that list of names are names of 10 people identified before the committee as being members of the

Communist organization. I think it would be proper to make that comment as that exhibit number 132 was introduced in the open hearings of August 16, 1951.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this should go in the record at this point, notwithstanding the fact that the excerpts are already in.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be incorporated in its entirety?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Exhibit No. 132 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 132

Mr. RAYMOND DENNETT,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR RAY: In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American delegation. The Pacific council provides a secretariat for the conference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific council for that purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.

The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry White, Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert J. Watt, Len DeCaux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginius Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Ada Comstock Notestein.

In reply to your of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine.

I definitely would exclude Hunter on the ground that we have too much of the Kizer group; I would exclude Captain Pence because he is now out of the Occupied Areas Section. If either of them were available I would suggest Commodore Vanderbilt or Commodore Stassen.

I suppose we may need to invite General McCoy for organizational purposes. I do not know anything about General Bissell. Yarnell should certainly come as a vice chairman and not as a member of the American delegation. Apropos your statement below "Military," on page II, I would get away from the idea of California naming a delegate.

Personally I would exclude Swing and would add to your press people Waymack, of Des Moines.

I would be careful that we do not get too stodgy a delegation but keep a balance. I think the above list is fairly good. Another Government man who would be new to us but very helpful because of his interest in native peoples and Pacific island government is John Collier, head of the Indian service and a fine person. Let me know what you hear from the others and we will see how things add up.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Frank Coe, of FEA, also good. [Penciled note.]

General FORTIER. I would like to have it quite clear that the Far East Command was not caught short on an external enemy. In other words, our function in General MacArthur's headquarters was to take care of the security, both external and internal, of the Far East Command. No attack came on Japan, no attack came on Okinawa that we had not foreseen or anticipated. In other words, we had no responsibility in the Far East Command or for the intelligence between South and North Korea. There was a State Department representation there in South Korea and likewise there was a mission functioning under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in South Korea. It was not the MacArthur mission by any means.

Senator WATKINS. The reason I asked the question about that was because it had been reported that the Far East Command had been caught napping.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, and I think Senator Ferguson will confirm what I am about to say, that before the Appropriations Committee many months ago there was presented to us evidence that the Intelligence Department had full knowledge of what was going on and that they knew that munitions were being delivered from Russian boats into North Korea and that was also brought to the attention of the State Department and to the attention of the White House. That is testified before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate.

Senator FERGUSON. And the withdrawal of civilians away from the line.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. I merely wanted to give you an opportunity to explain that situation if you were caught napping or if you had any responsibility so that we would know about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Let the record show that Korea was not General Fortier's command. I hope that is understood.

General FORTIER. It was never my command. Korea was not under General MacArthur's command.

Senator FERGUSON. You did need some intelligence in order to do your own work out of both Formosa and Korea?

General FORTIER. And we got considerable intelligence from these other sources, occasionally to confirm on the ground that which was confirmed in cables and dispatches, which I think is a very reasonable reaction.

Mr. MORRIS. In reply to your question about the 10 people who have been identified as part of the Communist organization on that last list recommended by Mr. Jessup, I will point out that we have had testimony that Benjamin Kizer was a member of the Communist Party, testimony that Lauchlin Currie was associated with an espionage ring and gave vital military secrets to the Russian espionage system, the military secret being, in one case, the fact that the United States had broken the Soviet code.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire whether Currie is in the United States?

Mr. MORRIS. My information is he is in Colombia.

John Carter Vincent has been identified as a member; Harry Dexter White as a member of an espionage ring; Owen Lattimore as a member of the Communist organization; Len DeCaux as a member of the Communist Party; Alger Hiss as a member of the Communinst Party; Joseph Barnes as a member of the Communist Party; Frederick V. Field as a member of the Communist Party, and Frank Coe as a member of the Communist Party.

We have had other evidence on some of the other people there, but none of it that would warrant any such conclusion as we can make about those 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, have you any evidence that any salary or money is being paid to Mr. Lauchlin Currie furnished by the taxpayers of the United States Government?

Mr. MORRIS. I cannot answer that question, but that is one of the things we are inquiring about.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask now that we get that information as to whether or not taxpayers' money is being paid to Mr. Currie.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether he is on any payroll of the United States Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or getting money that the taxpayers are furnishing.

Senator WATKINS. Directly or indirectly.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I read a newspaper clipping last night. It would take me just 3 minutes to find it. It described his resignation from the World Bank and accepting the position with Colombia, and there was a related story about that.

Mr. Chairman, if you think it is appropriate, we could put in more associations of Mr. Jessup with the institute in the record at this time. Mr. Mandel is prepared to do so. For instance, his activity in the IPR bearing on the American Peace Mobilization. I wonder if you want that in the record now?

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you not insert that?

The CHAIRMAN. Please go on with your laying a foundation for each insertion.

Mr. MANDEL. I read exhibit 14 from the open hearing of July 26, 1951, being a telegram from Frederick V. Field, from Chicago, dated September 1, 1940, to Philip C. Jessup, as follows:

> I have been attending a peace congress of some 6,000 representatives from all parts of the country, labor, farm, and middle-class organization. This is a genuine peace movement through the interpretation of democracy. These people and our program represent what I have for long profoundly believed in. They are asking me to become the executive of a continuing organization, and I feel a deep conviction that I must accept. As the people I should be working for will meet to elect officers tomorrow. I must, despite obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with you and others, and as the executive must be presented to them, make an immediate affirmative decision. This show has been and will be smeared by the newspapers. I anticipate losing the respect of many present friends. These developments I regard as inevitable if we do the job in this country that was not done in France, etc. In view the inevitable criticism and misunderstanding, and because of my continued deep interest in the IPR welfare, I feel that I must, by this telegram, affirm my immediate resignation from all the IPR responsibilities that its officers wish to accept. Finally I must urgently hope for both personal and professional associations that you will reserve your own judgment until I can talk with you.

The CHAIRMAN. From whom was that and to whom, again, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is from Frederick V. Field to Philip C. Jessup, dated September 1, 1940. He is referring to his acceptance of a position with the American Peace Mobilization which was organized at that time.

May I read at this point the statement of Attorney General Francis Biddle in reference to the gathering that Mr. Field was to be made an official of? He declares in regard to the American Peace Mobilization:

> It was formed in December of 1940 under the auspices of the Communist Party and the Young Communist League as a front organization designed to mold American opinion against participation in the war against Germany.

The second communication is a part of exhibit 14, introduced in open hearings on July 26, 1951. It purports to be minutes of a meeting of the executive committee of the American Council of the Insti-

tute of Pacific Relations and it was taken from the files of the institute. Present, among others, was Philip C. Jessup, chairman, and Edward C. Carter. I read an excerpt:

The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his immediate resignation from all IPR responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field who explained in detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

That is an excerpt from the exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. That has already been introduced in evidence.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 20, 1940, headed "WLH from ECC." I read this memorandum for the record:

For your private information I enclose a copy of a telegram which Field sent to Jessup on August 31 or September 1. Field telephoned me late on the afternoon of August 30 from Chicago saying that great pressure was being put on him to become secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. I told him that institutionally I hoped he could postpone a decision, but that if personally he decided it was his national duty to take the Chicago job, I would do everything I could to back him up. From Ellsworth early the next morning I sent him a wire urging him to postpone a decision for another week. I thought it was of the utmost importance that he should first consult Edith, Jessup, and his colleagues of the New York office.

The immediacy of the program, the pressure of the 20,000 attending the Chicago convention, and the very short time that was left before the Conscription Act would be voted in Congress made him feel, however, that he must make an immediate and affirmative decision. He took a thousand people from Chicago to Washington where they bombarded Congressmen for several days and I think Fred believes that the conscription bill got 100 less votes in Congress than it otherwise would. He is now working night and day with a large staff and thousands of backers throughout the country, to get the conscription bill repealed or nullified.

He expects at any moment he may go to prison but desires to work full steam ahead until the moment of arrest in a gigantic Nation-wide effort to launch a movement which will preserve our democratic institutions so that if we do have to go to war we will have something worth fighting for. He does not wish to have the United States imitate France.

For a considerable time he lived on benzedrine instead of sleep and feels, I think, that he is in exactly the same position as a man who is suddenly drafted to throw everything else over and join in the work of the national defense council or join the ranks. He was here for 2 days this week and has agreed next week to go into the whole question of the handbook. It is on his conscience, though I cannot make out whether it is on his conscience as much as it is on yours and mine.

I shall use your letter in my talk with him, so I don't know that there is any point in your writing him yet. I have asked Miss Greene to prepare for Fred,

you, and me a very careful analysis of just how much progress has been made in quantity and quality and a detailed sketch of what still remains to be done. When we have this we will have to make a cost accounting of what would be required to finish the job. I am wondering whether I would be justified in telling Fred that he ought to consider giving whatever money is necessary to enable us to employ a staff to finish the book. Though I think he imagines he can give a little time to it each week, I personally do not think there is a ghost of a chance of his being able to give enough time to bring the book to a speedy conclusion.

Can you give me an estimate of what the project has cost us thus far, or should I get this from Miss Austern?

I heard Fred speak to an audience of 2,000 in the Manhattan Center a couple of nights ago. There must have been 5 minutes sustained cheering when he stood up before he could begin his speech. He has long wanted to be a part of a great mass movement. Now he is at the head of one. I think the Pacific will be a marginal interest from 1 to 5 years. Some day it may come back as the focus of his life, but there is no point in putting on any pressure at the present time.

If you have anything to add to your letter of September 18 on this matter, please send it to me by air mail.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that?

Mr. MANDEL. That is headed "WLH from ECC." There is no signature.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who WLH is?

Mr. MORRIS. It is the practice, Mr. Chairman, of the institute to refer to their staff members by initials only. "WLH" is generally W. L. Holland, and "ECC" is generally E. C. Carter. That is almost without exception true.

Mr. MANDEL. I might quote from Attorney General Francis Biddle, who describes the organization.

The CHAIRMAN. What organization?

Mr. MANDEL. The American Peace Mobilization.

The most conspicuous activity of the American Peace Mobilization was the picketing of the White House which began in April 1941 in protest against lend-lease and the entire national defense program. On the afternoon of June 21, 1941, Frederick V. Field, national secretary, suddenly called off the picket line around the White House.

Here is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Public Relations headed "Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations" and coming from the Columbia University, signed Phil. The signature corresponds to the signature of Philip C. Jessup on other letterheads in the file.

I read this letter, to Mr. Edward C. Carter:

OCTOBER 29, 1940.

DEAR NED: I don't really think we can use Fred's statement as is, much as I would be glad to help him with his cause. How about a combination of the two, something like this:

"Frederick V. Field, who has been on the staff of the American Council since 1928, has resigned in order to become executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. The American Peace Mobilization is a mass organization of progressive trade-unions, farm, church, youth, Negro and fraternal groups dedicated to preserving the interests of the United States through the strengthening of American democracy and through nonparticipation in the war between England and the fascist powers. Mr. Field had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility and felt that in view of the acceptance of his new position, it was not possible for him to continue his official connection with the IPR. The executive committee, being forced to the conclusion that Mr. Field's decision was final, felt compelled to accept Mr. Field's resignation with great regret. It expressed its appreciation of the distinguished service that Mr. Field had rendered during his 11 years of service to the American Coun-

cil and expressed the hope that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the IPR."

Perhaps we could add to that the expression of appreciation which came from the staff.

How does that strike you?

The paragraphs in regard to Lasker seem to me excellent.

Sincerely yours,

PHIL.

Mr. MORRIS. While we are reading these exhibits, Mr. Chairman, I might point out it is no longer necessary for General Fortier to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Thank you, General, for your presence.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, General.

May that letter of October 29, 1940, be introduced?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be.

(The document referred to and read in its entirety by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 256," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. We have Mr. Joseph Kornfeder available, Mr. Chairman, and he is prepared to testify today. The general nature of his testimony is to show that the Chinese Communist Party has been in the past a full-fledged member of the Communist Internationale, he having been in Moscow to make personal observations on this fact.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to hear that testimony, but I would like to have other members of the committee present also. I am inclined to believe we will have to defer on account of the vote being taken.

Mr. MORRIS. Until some time later today?

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest we convene at 2:30.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder is from Detroit and he is not easily summonable.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kornfeder, please be here at 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a. m., the hearing recessed until 2:30 p. m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Has the witness been sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH ZACK KORNFEDER, DETROIT, MICH.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this hearing, one of the purposes of this hearing, is that we would like the record to show something of the nature of the Chinese Communist organization.

It has been said on many occasions that Chinese Communists are not real Communists. An example of this can be found in a pamphlet which represents a cooperative project of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co. It is called China Yesterday and Today, by Eleanor Lattimore.

On page 108 of that pamphlet, we read the expression:

> When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word "Communist." They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control.
>
> Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic conditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable of taking part in political life, they are often described as a peasant party.

Then it goes on on that page, that is page 108 and page 109. Taking this, Mr. Chairman, as typical of such an attitude of the Chinese Communists, I think it is necessary that we have a witness here who can testify, first-hand, about the nature of the Chinese Communist organization.

For that reason, we have asked Mr. Kornfeder to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, would you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

Mr. KORNFEDER. My name is Joseph Zack Kornfeder, 3210 Book Tower, Detroit, Mich.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell your name?

Mr. KORNFEDER. K-o-r-n-f-e-d-e-r.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, when did you join the Communist Party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I joined the Communist Party at the time of its formation in 1919.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you remain a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I remained a member until October 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what the highest position you achieved in the Communist Party was, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was a member of the district committee of the Communist Party, New York district, a member of the central executive committee of the Communist Party, now known as the national committee, for several terms.

While in Moscow, I was a member of the Anglo-American secretariat of the Communist International at the Communist International headquarters, and later a representative of the Communist International in South America.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a Comintern delegate to North and South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was a Comintern delegate to South America.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, did you have any training in Moscow?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes; I took a 3-year course in the Lenin School.

The Lenin School is a college to train leaders for the various Communist Parties in the various methods of political warfare.

Mr. MORRIS. What years were you so trained, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was in Moscow from the latter part of 1927 until April or May 1930.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was your next assignment after your training period?

Mr. KORNFEDER. After that, I went as a representative of the Communist International to South America.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe your relationship under those circumstances to the Communist Party of South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, as representative of the Communist International in the Communist Parties of Columbia and Venezuela, I was in charge of these parties, that is, I was their political director about the same way Gerhardt Eisler was of the Communist Party of the United States, while he was here.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, in other words, Mr. Kornfeder, you were not a member of the Communist Party of South America, but you were their superior and their boss?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that really what your position was?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And when you say that you were then the counterpart of Gerhardt Eisler in the United States, do you mean that Gerhardt Eisler was the Comintern man that was sent here to run the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Kornfeder, while you were in Moscow did you have any opportunity to observe the workings of the Chinese Communist Party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, definitely so.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us whatever you can in connection with that question, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, in 1927, there developed a big crisis inside of the Chinese Communist Party

The reason for the crisis was that the Chinese Communist Party who, until then, had been a part of the Kuomintang, had been expelled from the Kuomintang by Chiang Kai-shek and his associates, and that created a crisis inside of the Chinese Communist Party.

The subject of that crisis and the question as to what was wrong in the policy, Communist policies, in China then became an item of discussion in all of the higher committees of the Communist International.

I attended the discussions. The result of these discussions was that the leading committees of the Chinese Communist Party were purged, reorganized, and those that Moscow disapproved of were expelled from the Communist Party as Trotskyites.

I also had an opportunity to become familiar with the Chinese Communist politics by attending the various meetings of the Communist International leading committees.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, before you get on to that, Mr. Kornfeder, in what capacity did you attend these other discussions that you have testified about?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was a member of the Anglo-American secretariat of the Communist International. That was a subcommittee in charge of the Communist Party's English-speaking countries.

The Communist Party of the United States always played a large role in the affairs of the Communist Party of China. So, because of that, I was interested to stay informed on affairs in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, Mr. Kornfeder, that the American Communist Party was very active in the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party in China?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Kornfeder, why were the American Communists employed in connection with the Chinese Communist activities? What is the reason for that?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the reason, as I get it from attending these discussion, is that America wielded a large influence in China all the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Wielded a large influence?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes. And the Comintern wanted to avail itself of that influence even if it was just in the form of representation from the United States, whether they had been Communist or Communist-controlled unions that claimed to represent a big following in the United States, or any other form.

It seemed to have an effect of building up the morale of the Chinese Communists to have Communist representation on the leading committees in the Chinese labor movement.

The CHAIRMAN. You say Communist representation, or do you mean American representation?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right, American Communist representation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Kornfeder, while you were in Moscow at these various Comintern meetings, did you encounter Chinese Communists there?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, definitely so.

The Chinese Communist Party was represented on all the leading committees in the Communist International. They were on the executive committee of the Communist International, they were on the agitation and propaganda commission of the Communist International, on the organization commission of the Communist International, and there was a special secretariat of the Communist International which preoccupied itself entirely with the problems of China, Japan, Malaya, Indochina, and so on, the so-called far eastern secretariat of the Communist International.

Mr. MORRIS. Now could you tell us, Mr. Kornfeder, the evidence as you experienced it which indicated to you that the Chinese Communists were an integral part of the Comintern organization?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, in the first place, there was a tremendous college, the largest college to train leaders in the arts of political warfare, the so-called Far Eastern University, formerly also known as the Sun Yat-sen University.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is located where?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Located in Moscow.

That university had a capacity to train 2,000 organizers and agitators a year.

At the time I was there, the number of Chinese Communists being trained there was 1,200.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that be 1,200 a year, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. 1,200 a year; yes.

This training system started in 1926 and, as far as I know—well, it certainly was there while I was in Moscow, and as far as I know from others that were there subsequently, it continued throughout the years.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you there?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was there until 1930.

The CHAIRMAN. From when?

Mr. KORNFEDER. From 1927.

The CHAIRMAN. Attending that university?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I attended another one, the Lenin School, which was a college to train leaders for the more advanced countries, like the United States, Germany, England, France, and so on.

But the Eastern University trained Communist leaders for China, Japan, Korea, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, India, and so on, the so-called colonial countries.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is your testimony, then, that the Chinese Communist leaders were being trained in Moscow?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Definitely so.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the discipline exerted by the Comintern organization on the Chinese Communist Party as strong as the discipline exercised in other Communist parties throughout the world?

Mr. KORNFEDER. It certainly was, even stronger because they had a civil-war situation.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain that, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, in a strange situation like existed inside of China, the Communist Party under such conditions maintained a discipline that is even more severe than in countries where conditions are relatively stable.

This manifested itself in the control that Moscow headquarters had on the personnel of the Chinese Communist Party. There was not a single official of any consequence that could be elected by the Chinese Communist Party without previous consent of the Communist International, whether it be a secretary of the party, whether he be a head of, let us say, trade-union activities commission, or organization commission, or of the guerrilla army that they were already then forming. All of these leading personnel were all decided first in Moscow before they could be put into position.

The same procedure was true, by and large, with all of the other Communist parties.

The Chinese Communist Party was an integral part of the world Communist Party, which is monolithic, and there is no difference between the control of Moscow over that party as compared with other parties, except that discipline was even more severe because of the more severe internal situation in China.

The CHAIRMAN. How did these students, as you termed them as such, maintain themselves in this University of Moscow?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the university, its teaching staff, and operating personnel, and all the trainees, all the expenses of that were paid by the Soviet Government and, coming there, that is the transportation costs, were also furnished from the same source.

If they had relatives back home, which they had to maintain, then a subsidy was allowed for that purpose.

There were all together about four colleges like that in Moscow. They were all at the expense of the Soviet Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The students then, so-called, were maintained with their tuition, their living, their housing, their clothing, everything was furnished to them by the Soviet Government?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, have you ever met Stalin, personally?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us whether or not he took an active interest in the affairs of the Chinese Communist organization?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Stalin was in charge of the affairs of the Chinese Communist Party by decision of the political bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1926.

All matters of policy, whether relating to the line to be adopted or to organization strategy, were decided in the final sense by Stalin himself.

I am not the only one that says that. At the celebration for Stalin's seventieth birthday which took place, I believe, 2 years ago, Beria, the head of the political police, known as the MVD, in a laudatory speech on Stalin, which appeared in some of the papers, also said that the successes in China are due to the brilliant leadership of our great leader, Joseph Stalin, who has been guiding the affairs of the Communist Party of China ever since 1926.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know that to be a fact, that statement of Beria, you know that to be a statement of fact from your own personal experience?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right. I knew it long before he made the speech.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Kornfeder, did you attend the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes; I attended the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that held?

Mr. KORNFEDER. The summer of 1928.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anything take place at that congress bearing on the importance of the Chinese Communist Party in its future role in world affairs?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes. The situation in China, from a Communist point of view, was one of the very principal topics of discussion and decision at the congress. I have here, and if I may I could quote it.

Mr. MORRIS. What is it that you have there?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I have here the Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, which was adopted at that congress, and all the principal parts of which were written by Joseph Stalin himself.

Mr. MORRIS. From what are you reading, Mr. Kornfeder? From what publication?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I would like to read from a copy of this, decisions, that appeared in the International Press Correspondence, which was a weekly news service of the Communist International, a thesis on the colonial question.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of the publication you are reading from, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. December 12, 1928.

Mr. MORRIS. And you attended this congress?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I attended the congress, and I know this is the resolution, the thesis that was adopted there.

Now, the decision at that congress revolved largely on the subject, that is, in reference to China, whether to orientate the activities of the Communists in China on the peasantry.

There is the accepted Marxian theory and the theory of Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, that the Communists should orientate

themselves on the factory workers and by forming labor unions there and so on and so forth, entrench themselves.

That was the accepted theory up until about the time of this congress, also for colonial countries.

Now, at the sixth congress, by the initiative of Stalin, the base of Communist politics in this type of country was fundamentally changed. From there on, the Communists were to base themselves on the peasants.

Now, the peasant, to make an illustration, would be something like a very poor sharecropper down in the South, not a farmer as we understand it. A farmer would be a relatively rich man. The peasant is something like the poorest type of sharecropper down in the South, except that in China their conditions are even worse.

Now, the Communists were to base themselves upon this strata, and conquer the countryside first, and then, after forming guerrilla armies in the countryside, conquer the cities.

Those of you gentlemen who may have followed the course of events must have noticed that that is the thing that took place in China, first the countryside was conquered and then the cities, instead of the traditional Marxian method of first conquering the cities and then conquering the rest of the country.

Now, the change in that direction, which required the Communists to change their organization methods, their agitation methods, to concentrate on what we call agrarian reform, and out of which some intellectuals here in this country got the impression that the Communists in China are agrarians—of course, that was entirely false. It was just the change of operational tactics on the part of Moscow.

Now, to show you here, I will quote this change. I will quote a part of this resolution on page 1665.

> Along with the national-emancipatory struggle, the agrarian revolution constitutes the axes of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the chief colonial countries.

The chief colonial country was, of course, in Asia, China. It is the peasantry that, from here, becomes the center of operation.

Another part which was already then introduced in the strategy of the Communists in this type of country is to exploit nationalism.

You see, prior to this, the Communists operated, well, under their own flag. All the propaganda was outright Communist and so on and so forth.

After this Congress, more and more, they shifted to the use of nationalism, to operate behind nationalist movements, to infiltrate nationalist movements, to use their flag and operate under it, and so on.

There is a part here which introduces that change of tactics. It is on the same page.

> It is very important, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, to investigate very carefully the special influence of the national factor, which to a considerable degree determines the special character of the colonial revolution, and to take it into account in the tactics of the Communist Party concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. How would that apply in the United States? Have you an illustration of it? Can you give us an illustration of it?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, in the United States they apply this thesis only to the Negroes. They consider the Negroes as colonials who are being exploited and oppressed by American imperialism, and who

should have an independent Republic based on the Negro Belt in the South.

That is the only part of this thesis that would apply to the United States, because the United States is an industrially advanced country where conditions are different.

You see, their strategy adjusts itself in its method of operation to the type of country in which the Communists operate.

In this country this would also be translated to the Communists hiding behind the skirts of the liberals.

The CHAIRMAN. Hiding behind what?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Operating behind the skirts of the liberals. That is, using the liberals as a front or pretending to be liberals.

They could not use nationalism in the sense that it is in China because, well, we are an independent Nation and the leading Nation.

But in their internal operations, they would make an assimilation of this tactic by not operating under their own flag, operating as liberals or so-called progressives, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. That concludes your comments on that world congress, Mr. Kornfeder, does it?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

I would suggest that it may be of use to introduce this part into the record, which is entitled "Communist Strategy and Tactics in China, India, and Similar Colonial Countries."

Of course, the Communist methods since that was adopted have gone through considerable changes, have become smoother. But the basic principles are still in here and are being used even today.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we have that introduced into the record for the purposes described by Mr. Kornfeder.

That is an official publication of the Communist International, and therein is a thesis on the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semicolonies. We have had testimony from Mr. Kornfeder on that score.

The CHAIRMAN. And this is under date of December 12, 1928, volume 8, No. 88.

Mr. MORRIS. That is an official publication of the Communist International?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That part referred to by the witness may be inserted in the record, commencing on page 1665, under the caption "On Communist strategy and tactics in China, India, and similar colonial countries," extending down to the middle of page 1670, just before "The immediate tasks of the Communists."

It will be inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 257" and is as follows:)

[From International Press Correspondence, December 12, 1928]

III. ON COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN CHINA, INDIA, AND SIMILAR COLONIAL COUNTRIES

16. As in all colonies and semicolonies, so also in China and India the development of productive forces and the socialization of labor stands at a comparatively low level. This circumstance, together with the fact of foreign domination and also the presence of powerful relics of feudalism and precapitalist relations, determines the character of the immediate stage of the revolution in these coun-

tries. In the revolutionary movement of these countries we have to deal with the bourgeois democratic revolution, i. e. of the stage signifying the preparation of the prerequisites for proletarian dictatorship and socialist revolution. Corresponding to this, the following kinds of tasks can be pointed out, which may be considered as general basic tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the colonies and semicolonies:

(*a*) A shifting in the relationship of forces in favor of the proletariat; emancipation of the country from the yoke of imperialism (nationalization of foreign concessions, railways, banks, etc.) and the establishment of the national unity of the country where this has not yet been attained; overthrow of the power of the exploiting classes at the back of which imperialism stands; organization of Soviets of workers and peasants and organization of the Red Army; establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry; consolidation of the hegemony of the proletariat.

(*b*) The carrying through of the agrarian revolution; emancipation of the peasants from all precapitalist and colonial conditions of exploitation and bondage; nationalization of the land; radical measures for alleviating the position of the peasantry with the object of establishing the closest possible economic and political union between the town and village.

(*c*) In correspondence with the further development of industry, transport, etc., and with the accompanying growth of the proletariat, the widespread development of trade union organizations of the working class, strengthening of the Communist Party and its conquest of a firm leading position among the toiling masses; the achievement of the 8-hour working day.

(*d*) Establishment of equal rights for nationalities and of sex equality (equal rights for women); separation of the church from the state and the abolition of caste distinctions; political education and raising of the general cultural level of the masses in town and country, etc.

How far the bourgeois-democratic revolution will be able in practice to realize all its basic tasks, and how far it will be the case that part of these tasks will be carried into effect only by the Socialist revolution, will depend on the course of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and its successes or defeats in the struggle against the imperialists, feudal lords and the bourgeoisie. In particular, the emancipation of the colony from the imperialist yoke is facilitated by the development of the Socialist revolution in the capitalist world and can only be completely guaranteed by the victory of the proletariat in the leading capitalist countries.

The transition of the revolution to the Socialist phase demands the presence of certain minimum prerequisites, as, for example, a certain definite level of development in the country of industry, of trade union organizations of the proletariat and a strong Communist Party. The most important is precisely the development of a strong Communist Party with a big mass influence, which would be in the highest degree a slow and difficult process were it not accelerated by the bourgeois-democratic revolution which already grows and develops as a result of the objective conditions in these countries.

17. The bourgeois-democratic revolution in the colonies is distinguished from the bourgeois-democratic revolution in an independent country chiefly in that it is organically bound up with the national emancipatory struggle against imperialist domination. The national factor exerts considerable influence on the revolutionary process in all colonies, as well as in those semicolonies where imperialist enslavement already appears in its naked form, leading to the revolt of the mass of the people. On the one hand, national oppression hastens the ripening of the revolutionary crises, intensifies the dissatisfaction of the masses of workers and peasants, facilitates their mobilization and endows the revolutionary mass revolts with the elemental force and character of a genuine popular revolution. On the other hand, the national factor is able to influence not only the movement of the working class and peasantry but also the attitude of all the remaining classes, modifying its form during the process of revolution. Above all, the poor urban petty bourgeoisie together with the petty bourgeoise intelligentsia is during the first period, to a very considerable extent, brought under the influence of the active revolutionary forces; secondly, the position of the colonial bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution is still for the most part an ambiguous one and its vacillations in accordance with the course of the revolution are even more considerable than in the bourgeoisie of an independent country (e. g., the Russian bourgoisie in 1905–17).

It is very important, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, to investigate very carefully the special influence of the national factor, which to a con-

siderable degree determines the special character of the colonial revolution, and to take it into account in the tactics of the Communist Party concerned.

Along with the national emancipatory struggle, the agrarian revolution constitutes the axis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the chief colonial countries. Consequently, Communists must follow with the greatest attention the development of the agrarian crisis and the intensification of class contradictions in the village; they must from the very beginning give a consciously revolutionary direction to the dissatisfaction of the workers and to the incipient peasant movement, directing it against imperialist exploitation and bondage as also against the yoke of the various precapitalist (feudal and semifeudal) relationships as a result of which peasant economy is suffering, declining, and perishing. The incredible backwardness of agriculture, the prevalence of oppressive rent relations, and the oppression of trading-usury capital represent the greatest hindrance to the development of productive forces in village economy in the colonies and stand in monstrous contradiction with the highly organized forms of exchange between the village agricultural production of the colonies and the world market created by monopoly imperialism.

18. The national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries does not adopt a uniform attitude in relation to imperialism. A part of this bourgeoisie, more especially the trading bourgeoisie, directly serves the interests of imperialist capital (the so-called compradore bourgeoisie). In general, it more or less consistently defends the antinational imperialist point of view directed against the whole nationalist movement, in common with the feudal allies of imperialism and the more highly paid native officials. The remaining portions of the native bourgeoisie, especially the portion reflecting the interests of native industry, support the national movement and represent a special vacillating compromising tendency which may be designated as national reformism (or, in the terminology of the theses of the Second Congress of the Communist International, a bourgeois-democratic tendency).

This intermediate position of the national bourgeoisie between the revolutionary and imperialist camps is no longer to be observed, it is true, in China after 1925; there the greater part of the national bourgeoisie from the beginning, owing to the special situation, took the leadership in the national-emancipatory war; later on it passed over finally into the camp of counterrevolution. In India and Egypt, we still observe, for the time being, the typical bourgeois-nationalist movement—an opportunistic movement, subject to great vacillations, balacing between imperialism and revolution.

The independence of the country in relation to imperialism, being to the advantage of the whole colonial people, corresponds also to the interests of the national bourgeoisie, but is in irreconcilable contradiction to the whole nature of the imperialist system. Various native capitalists, it is true, are by their immediate interests to a great extent bound by numerous threads to imperialist capital. Imperialism is able directly to bridge a considerable portion of them (it may be even a greater portion than heretofore) and to create a definite Compradore position, a position of intermediary trader, subexploiter or overseer over the enslaved population. But the position of slave owner, of monopolist supreme exploiter, imperialism reserves for itself alone. Independent rule, a future of "free" independent capitalist development, hegemony over an "independent" people—this imperialism will never voluntarily yield to the national bourgeoisie. In this respect, the contradiction of interests between the national bourgeoisie of the colonial country and imperialism is objectively of a radical character. In this respect, imperialism demands capitulation on the part of the national bourgeoisie.

The native bourgeoisie, as the weaker side, again and again capitulates to imperialism. Its capitulation, however, is not final as long as the danger of class revolution on the part of the masses has not become immediate, acute and menacing. In order, on the other hand, to avoid this danger, and, on the other hand, to strength its position in relation to imperialism, bourgeois nationalism in these colonies strives to obtain the support of the petty bourgeoisie, of the peasantry and in part also of the working class. Since, in relation to the working class it has little prospect of success (as soon as the working class in these countries has at all begun to awake politically), it becomes the more important for it to obtain support from the peasantry.

But just here is the weakest point of the colonial bourgeoisie. The unbearable exploitation of the colonial peasantry can only be put an end to by the way of the agrarian revolution. The bourgeoisie of China, India, and Egypt is by its immediate interests so closely bound up with landlordism, with usury capital

and with the exploitation of the peasant masses in general, that it takes its stand not only against the agrarian revolution but also against every decisive agrarian reform. It is afraid, and not without foundation, that even the more open formulation of the agrarian question will stimulate and accelerate the growth of the process of revolutionary fermentation in the peasant masses. Thus, the reformist bourgeoisie hardly dare to decide to approach practically this basic urgent question.

Instead, it attempts by means of empty nationalist phrases and gestures to keep the petty bourgeois masses under its influence and to compel imperialism to grant certain concessions. But the imperialists draw the reins ever tighter, for the national bourgeoisie is incapable of offering any serious resistance. Accordingly, the national bourgeoisie in every conflict with imperialism attempt, on the one hand, to make a great show of their nationalist "firmness" of principle, and on the other hand, they sow illusions as to the possibility of a peaceful compromise with imperialism. Through both the one and the other, the masses inevitably become disillusioned and in this way they gradually outlive their reformist illusions.

19. An incorrect estimation of the basic national-reformist tendency of the national bourgeoisie in these colonial countries gives rise to the possibility of serious errors in the strategy and tactics of the Communist Parties concerned. In particular, two kinds of mistakes are possible:

(*a*) A nonunderstanding of the difference between the national reformist and national-revolutionary tendency can lead to a "khvostist" policy in relation to the bourgeoisie, to an insufficiently accurate political and organizational delimitation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, and to the blurring of the chief revolutionary slogans (especially the slogans of the agrarian revolution), etc. This was the fundamental mistake into which the Communist Party of China fell in 1925–27.

(*b*) An underestimation of the special significance which the bourgeois national-reformist, as distinct from the feudal-imperialist camp, possess owing to its mass influence on the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and even a portion of the working class, may lead, at least in the first stages of the movement, to a sectarian policy and to the isolation of the Communists from the toiling masses.

In both these cases, insufficient attention is given to the realization of precisely those tasks which the Second Congress of the Communist International had already characterized as the basic tasks of the Communist Parties in the colonial countries, i. e. the tasks of struggle against the bourgeois-democratic movement inside the nation itself. Without this struggle, without the liberation of the toiling masses from the influence of the bourgeoisie and of national-reformism, the basic strategical aim of the Communist movement in the bourgeois-democratic revolution—the hegemony of the proletariat—cannot be achieved. Without the hegemony of the proletariat, an organic part of which is the leading role of the Communist Party, the bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be carried through to an end, not to speak of the socialist revolution.

20. The petty bourgeoisie in the colonial and semicolonial countries plays a very important role. It consists of various strata, which in different periods of the national-revolutionary movement play very diverse roles.

The artisan, who is hit by the competition of foreign imported goods, is hostilely disposed toward imperialism. At the same time, he is interested in the unlimited exploitation of his journeymen and apprentices, and accordingly, he is hostilely disposed toward the class-conscious labor movement. At the same time, also, he usually suffers himself from the exploitation of trading and usury capital. The exceedingly ambiguous and hopeless position of this stratum of the petty bourgeoisie determines its vacillations, and it frequently falls under the influence of utopian reactionaries.

The small trader—both in town and village—is connected with village exploitation through usury and trade, and he clings to the old forms of exploitation in preference to the prospects of an expansion of the internal market. These strata, however, are not homogeneous. These sections of the trading bourgeoisie which in one form or another are connected with the Compradores occupy a different position from those sections the activity of which is limited mainly to the internal market.

The petty bourgeois intelligentsia, the students, and such like, are very frequently the most determined representatives, not only of the specific interests of the petty bourgeoisie, but also of the general objective interests of the entire national bourgeoisie, and, in the first period of the national movement, they often come out as the spokesmen of the nationalist struggle. Their role at the

head of the movement is comparatively important. In general, they cannot act as representatives of peasant interests, for the very social strata from which they come are connected with landlordism. The upsurge of the revolutionary wave may drive them into the labor movement, bringing with them their petty bourgeois ideology of vacillation and indecision. Only a few of them in the course of the struggle are able to break with their own class and rise to an understanding of the tasks of the class struggle of the proletariat, and to become active defenders of the interests of the latter. It frequently happens that the petty bourgeois intellectuals give to their ideology a socialist or even Communist color. In the struggle against imperialism they have played, and in such countries as India and Egypt they even now, still partially play a revolutionary role. The mass movement may draw them after it, but it may also push them into the camp of extreme reaction or at least, cause the spread of utopian reactionary tendencies in their ranks.

Alongside of these strata, there are to be found in the colonial towns considerable sections of urban poor, the position of which objectively drives them to the support of revolution—artisans who do not exploit the labor of others, street traders, unemployed intellectuals, ruined peasants seeking work, etc. Further, the colonial town, as also the village, has a populous section of "coolies", semi-proletarians who have not passed through the school of factory production and who live by casual labor.

The peasantry, along with the proletariat and in the character of its ally, represents a driving force of the revolution. The immense many-millioned peasant mass constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population even in the most developed colonies (in some colonies it is 90 percent of the population). The many millions of starving tenant-cultivators, petty peasants oppressed by want and groaning under all kinds of precapitalist and capitalist forms of exploitation, a considerable portion of them deprived of the possibility of cultivation even on the lands that they rent, thrown out from the process of production and slowly dying from famine and disease, village agricultural laborers, all these are the allies of the proletariat in the village. The peasantry can only achieve its emancipation under the leadership of the proletariat, but the proletariat can only lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution to victory in union with the peasantry.

The process of class differentiation of the peasantry in the colonies and semi-colonies which possess important relics of feudalism and of precapitalist relationships, proceeds at a comparatively slow rate. Nevertheless, market relationships in these countries have developed to such a degree that the peasantry already no longer represent a homogeneous mass, as far as their class relations are concerned. In the villages of China and India, in particular in certain parts of these countries, it is already possible to find exploiting elements derived from the peasantry, who exploit the peasants and village laborers through usury, trade, employment of hired labor, the sale or letting out of land on rent, the loaning of cattle or agricultural implements, etc., etc.

In general, it is possible that, in the first period of the struggle of the peasantry against the landlords, the proletariat may be able to carry with it the entire peasantry. But in the further development of the struggle some of the upper strata of the peasantry may pass into the camp of counter-revolution. The proletariat can achieve its leading role in relation to the peasantry only under the conditions of unflinching struggle for its partial demands, for complete carrying through of the agrarian revolution, and only if it will lead the struggle of the wide masses of the peasantry for a revolutionary solution of the agrarian question.

21. The working class in the colonies and semicolonies has characteristic features which play an important role in the building up of an independent working class movement and proletarian class ideology in these countries. The predominant part of the colonial proletariat is derived from the pauperized village, with which the worker remains in connection even when engaged in production. In the majority of colonies (with the exception of some large factory towns such as Shanghai, Bombay, Calcutta, etc.), we find, as a general rule, only a first generation of proletariat engaged in large-scale production. Another portion is made up of the ruined artisans who are being driven out of the decaying handicrafts, which are widely spread even in the most advanced colonies. The ruined artisan, a petty owner, carries with him into the working class a guild tendency and ideology which serves as a basis for the penetration of national-reformist influence into the labor movement of the colonies.

The great fluctuation in the composition of the proletariat (frequent renewal of the labor force in the factories owing to workers returning to the villages and the inflow of new masses of poverty-stricken peasants into production); the considerable percentage of women and children; the numerous different languages; illiteracy; the wide distribution of religious and caste prejudices—all make difficult the work of systematic agitation and propaganda and retard the growth of class consciousness among the workers. Nevertheless, the merciless exploitation, practiced in the most oppressive forms by native and foreign capital, and the entire absence of political rights for the workers, create the objective pre-conditions on the basis of which the labor movement in the colonies is rapidly overcoming all obstacles and every year draws greater and greater masses of the working class into the struggle against the native exploiters and the imperialists.

The first period of the growth of the labor movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries (approximately 1919–1923) is organically bound up with the general growth of the national-revolutionary movement which followed the world war, and which was characterized by the subordination of the class interests of the working class to the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle headed by the native bourgeoisie. Insofar as the labor strikes and other demonstrations bore an organizational character, they were usually organized by petty bourgeois intellectuals who restricted the demands of the workers to questions of the national struggle. The most important characteristic of the second period of rapid growth of the labor movement in the colonies, on the other hand, the period which began after the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, was the emergence of the working class of the colonies into the political arena as an independent class force directly opposing itself to the national bourgeoisie, and entering upon a struggle with the latter in defense of its own immediate class interests and for hegemony in the national revolution as a whole. The history of the last few years has clearly confirmed this characteristic of the new stage of the colonial revolution, first of all in the example of the great Chinese revolution, and subsequently in the insurrection in Indonesia. There is every ground to believe that in India the working class is liberating itself from the influence of the nationalist and social-reformist leaders and is being converted into an independent political factor in the struggle against the British imperialists and the native bourgeoisie.

22. In order correctly to determine the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement, it is important as a starting point to take into consideration the degree of maturity attained by the movement in the separate colonial countries. The revolutionary movement in China is distinguished from the present movement in India by a series of essential features, characterizing the different degrees of maturity of the movement in the two countries. The previous experience of the Chinese revolution must, undoubtedly, be utilized in the revolutionary movement in India and other analogous colonial countries. But it would be a completely mistaken application of the Chinese experience if, at the present time in India, Egypt, etc., we were to formulate the immediate tasks, slogans and tactical methods in exactly the same form as took place in China, for example in the Wuhan period, or in the form in which it is necessary to formulate them there at the present time.

The tendency to skip over the inevitable difficulties and special tasks of the present stage of the revolutionary movement in India, Egypt, etc., can only be harmful. It is necessary to carry through much work in the building up and consolidation of the Communist Party and trade-union organizations of the proletariat, in the revolutionization of the trade-unions, in the development of economic and political mass demonstrations and in the winning over of the masses and their liberation from the influence of the national-reformist bourgeoisie, before it is possible to advance in these countries with definite prospects of success to the realization of such tasks as those which were fully carried out in China during the Wuhan period as the immediate tasks of the struggle of the working class and peasantry.

The interests of the struggle for the class rule of the national bourgeoisie compel the most important bourgeois parties in India and Egypt (Swarajists, Wafdists) still to demonstrate their opposition to the ruling imperialist-feudal bloc. Although this opposition has not a revolutionary but a reformist and class collaborationist character, this by no means signifies that it has not a special significance. The national bourgeoisie has not the significance of a force in the struggle against imperialism. Nevertheless, this bourgeois-reformist opposition has its real special significance for the development of the revolutionary

movement—and this both in a negative as well as in a positive sense—insofar as it possesses any mass influence at all.

Its chief feature is that it exerts a braking retarding influence on the development of the revolutionary movement, insofar as it is successful in drawing the toiling masses in its wake and holding them back from the revolutionary struggle. On the other hand, however, the demonstrations of the bourgeois opposition against the ruling imperialist-feudal bloc, even if they do not have any deep foundation, can exert a certain accelerating influence on the process of the political awakening of the wide masses of toilers; the concrete open conflicts of the national-reformist bourgeoisie with imperialism. although of little significance in themselves, may, under certain conditions; indirectly serve as the cause of the unleashing of even greater revolutionary mass actions.

It is true the reformist bourgeoisie itself endeavours not to allow of any such effect of its oppositional activities, and in one way or another seeks to prevent it in advance. But, wherever the objective conditions exist for a far-reaching political crisis, there the activities of the national-reformist opposition, even their insignificant conflicts with imperialism which are least of all connected with the real hearth of the revolution, can become of serious importance.

The Communists must learn how to utilize each and every conflict, to develop such conflicts and to broaden their significance, to connect them with the agitation for revolutionary slogans, to spread the news of these conflicts among the wide masses, to arouse these masses to independent, open manifestations in support of their own demands, etc.

23. The correct tactics in the struggle against such parties as the Swarajists and Wafdists during this stage consist in the successful exposure of their real national-reformist character. These parties have already more than once betrayed the national-emancipatory struggle, but they have not yet finally passed over to the counter-revolutionary camp in the manner of the Kuomintang. There is no doubt that they will do this later on, but at the present time they are so particularly dangerous precisely because their real physiognomy has not yet been exposed in the eyes of the wide masses of toilers. For this exposure there is still needed a very large amount of Communist educational work and a very great deal of new political experience on the part of the masses themselves. If the Communists do not already succeed in this stage in shaking the faith of the toiling masses in the bourgeois national-reformist leadership of the national movement, then this leadership in the coming upsurge of the revolutionary wave will represent an enormous danger for the revolution.

Consequently, it is necessary, by means of correct Communist tactics, adapted to the conditions of the present stage, to help the toiling masses in India. Egypt, Indonesia and such colonies to emancipate themselves from the influence of the bourgeois parties. This is not to be achieved by any noisy phrases, however, radical they may sound superficially, about the absence of any distinction between the oppositional national-reformists (Swarajists, Wafdists, etc.) and the British imperialists or their feudal counter-revolutionary allies. The national reformist leaders would easily be able to make use of such an exaggeration in order to incite the masses against the Communists. The masses see the chief immediate enemy of national emancipation in the form of the imperialist feudal bloc, which in itself is correct at this stage of the movement in India, Egypt, and Indonesia (as far as one side of the matter is concerned).

In the struggle against this ruling counter-revolutionary force; the Indian, Egyptian, and Indonesian Communists must proceed in advance of all, they must fight more determinedly, more consistently and more resolutely than any petty bourgeois section or national-revoluntary group. Of course, this fight must not be waged for the organizing of any kind of putsch or premature attempt at a rising on the part of the small revolutionary minority, but for the purpose of organizing the widest possible strata of the masses of toilers in demonstrations and other manifestations so that in this way the active participation of these masses can be guaranteed for a victorious uprising at a further stage of the revolutionary struggle.

At the same time, it is no less important mercilessly to expose before the toiling masses the national-reformist character of the Swarajist, Wafdist and other nationalist parties, and in particular of their leaders. It is necessary to expose their half-heartedness and vacillation in the national struggle, their bargainings and attempts to reach a compromise with British imperialism, their previous capitulations and counter-revolutionary advances, their reactionary resistance to the class demands of the proletariat and peasantry, their empty nationalist-phraseology, their dissemination of harmful illusions about the peaceful decolon-

ization of the country and their sabotage in relation to the application of revolutionary methods in the national-emancipatory struggle.

It is necessary to reject the formation of any kind of bloc between the Communist Party and the national-reformist opposition; this does not exclude the formation of temporary agreements and the coordinating of separate activities in connection with definite antiimperialist demonstrations, provided that the demonstrations of the bourgeois opposition can be utilized for the development of the mass movement, and provided that these agreements do not in any way limit the freedom of the Communist Parties in the matter of agitation among the masses and among the organizations of the latter. Of course, in this work the Communists must know how at the same time to carry on the most relentless ideological and political struggle against bourgeois nationalism and against the slightest signs of its influence inside the labor movement. In such cases, the Communist Party must take particular care not only to maintain its complete political independence and to make quite clear its own character, but also, on the basis of facts, to open the eyes of the masses of toilers who are under the influence of the bourgeois opposition, so that they will perceive all the hopelessness of this opposition and the danger of the bourgeois democratic illusions that it disseminates.

24. An incorrect estimation of the chief tendency of the parties of the big national bourgeoisie gives rise to the danger of an incorrect estimation of the character and role of the petty bourgeois parties. The development of these parties, as a general rule, follows a course from the national-revoluntionary to the national-reformist position. Even such movements as Sun Yat-senism in China, Gandhism in India, Sarekat Islam in Indonesia, were originally radical petty bourgeois ideological movements which, however, as a result of their service to the big bourgeoisie became converted into a bourgeois nationalist-reformist movement. After this, in India, Egypt, and Indonesia, there was again founded a radical wing from among the different petty bourgeois groups (e. g. the Republican Party, Watanists, Sarekat Rayat), which stand for a more or less consistent national-revolutionary point of view. In such a country as India, the rise is possible of some new analogous radical petty bourgeois parties and groups.

But the fact must not be lost sight of that these parties, essentially considered, are connected with the national bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeois intelligentsia at the head of the parties puts forward national-revolutionary demands but at the same time appears more or less conscious as the representative of the capitalist development of their country. Some of these elements can become the followers of various kinds of reactionary utopias, but when confronted with feudalism and imperialism, they, in distinction from the parties of the big national bourgeoisie, appear at the outset not as reformists but as more or less revoluntionary representatives of the anti-imperialist interests of the colonial bourgeoisie. This is the case, at least, so long as the development of the revolutionary process in the country does not put on the order of the day in a definite and sharp form the fundamental internal questions of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, particularly the question of the realization of the agrarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. When this happens, then it usually denotes the end of the revolutionary character of the petty bourgeois parties. As soon as the revolution has placed the class interests of the proletariat and the peasantry in critical contradiction not only to the rule of the feudal-imperialist bloc, but also to the class rule of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeois groups usually go back to the position of the national-reformist parties.

It is absolutely essential that the Communist Parties in these countries should from the very beginning demarcate themselves in the most clear-cut fashion, both politically and organizationally, from all the petty bourgeois groups and parties. In so far as the needs of the revolutionary struggle demand it, a temporary cooperation is permissible, and in certain circumstances even a temporary union between the Communist Party and the national revolutionary movement, provided that the latter is a genuine revolutionary movement, that it genuinely struggles against the ruling power and that its representatives do not put obstacles in the way of the Communists educating and organizing in a revolutionary sense the peasants and broad masses of the exploited. In every such cooperation, however, it is essential to take the most careful precautions in order that this cooperation does not degenerate into a fusion of the Communist movement with the bourgeois-revolutionary movement.

The Communist movement in all circumstances, most unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement and its own independence in

agitation, in organization and in demonstrations. To criticize the half-hearted ness and vacillation of the petty bourgeois groups, to anticipate their vacillations, to be prepared for them and at the same time to utilize to the full all the revolutionary possibilities of these strata, to carry on a consistent struggle against petty bourgeois influence over the proletariat, employ all means to liberate the wide masses of the peasantry from the influence of the petty bourgeois parties and to win from them the hegemony over the peasantry—these are the tasks of the Communist Parties.

25. How rapidly the revolutionary movement in India, Egypt, etc., will reach such a high degree of maturity as it has already reached in China, depends to an essential extent on how quickly there arises there a big revolutionary wave. In the event of its postponement for a considerable time, the political and organizational ripening of the driving forces of the revolution can only proceed by way of a gradual and relatively slow process of development. If, however, the coming powerful revolutionary wave rises earlier, then the movement may quickly be able to attain a much higher stage of maturity.

Under exceptionally favorable circumstances, it is not even excluded that the revolution there may be able in one single mightly wave to achieve the conquest of power by the proletariat and peasantry. It is also possible that the process of the development of the revolution from one stage to another more mature stage will be interrupted for a more or less prolonged period of time, in particular if the coming wave of revolutionary upheaval reaches a relatively small height and is not of great duration. Consequently, it is necessary in every case to subject the concrete situation to the most detailed analysis.

The following factors are of decisive significance for the immediate growing over of the revolution from one stage to another higher stage: (1) The degree of development of the revolutionary proletarian leadership of the movement, i. e. of the Communist Party of the given country (the numerical strength of the Party, its independent character, consciousness and fighting readiness, as well as its authority and connection with the masses and its influence on the trade union and peasant movement); (2) the degree of organization and the revolutionary experience of the working class, as well as, to a certain extent, of the peasantry. The revolutionary experience of the masses signifies experience of struggle; in the first place, liberation from the influence over them of the bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties.

Since these prerequisites for the first big mass outburst of the revolution, even in the best circumstances, are present only to an insufficient degree, an unusually deep revolutionary crisis and an unusually high and persistent revolutionary wave are required for it to be possible for the bourgeois-democratic revolution with the aid of this one wave of upheaval to lead to the complete victory of the proletariat and peasantry. Such a possibility is most easily presented, for example, when the ruling imperialism is temporarily distracted by a long-continued war outside the frontiers of the colonial country concerned.

26. Living, concrete, historical dialetics, such as were demonstrated by the now completed first period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China, will give to the Communists, especially those working in the colonial countries, a valuable experience which it is necessary to study carefully in order to draw the correct conclusions, especially from the mistakes committed in the course of Communist work in the colonies.

The rise of the revolutionary wave in China was unusually prolonged (over 2 years), since it was connected with a protracted internal war. Inasmuch as the Northern Expedition was not conducted directly against the great imperialist powers and inasmuch as the latter, owing to competition between them, were partially passive during the first period, while the bourgeois leadership of the national movement had already for some years held Canton in its hands—a definite, though limited, territory—as well as a centralized power backed up by the army, and so forth, it is understandable that in this exceptional case a great part of the bourgeoisie in the beginning looked upon the national emancipatory war as its own particular affair. The Kuomintang, in which it practically played a leading role, in the course of a short time came to be at the head of the national revolutionary movement, a circumstance which in the course of further events represented an extremely great danger for the revolution.

On the other hand, among the peculiarities of the situation in China must be numbered the fact that the proletariat there was stronger in relation to its bourgeoisie than the proletariat of other countries. It is true that it was weakly organized, but during the upsurge of the revolutionary wave the growth of labor organization proceeded at a very rapid rate.

The Communist Party also rose in a short time from a small group to a party with 60,000 members (and presently even more) and possessing a wide influence among the workers. Naturally, in these conditions many petty bourgeois elements also entered the party. The party was lacking in revolutionary experience and, even more, in traditions of Bolshevism. In the beginning, the upper hand in its leadership was taken by wavering elements, which were still only to a very small degree liberated from petty bourgeois opportunist tendencies which inadequately understood the independent tasks and role of the Communist Party and which came out against any decisive development of the agrarian revolution.

The entry of the Communists for a certain period into the leading party of the national revolution, the Kuomintang, in itself corresponded to the requirements of the struggle and of the situation, and was also in the interests of the indispensable Communist work among the fairly wide masses of toilers who followed this party. In addition, at the beginning, the Communist Party of China received in the territory under the rule of the Kuomintang Government the possibility of independent agitation among the masses of workers and peasants and among the soldiers of the national army and their organizations. At that time the party possessed greater possibilities than it actually made use of.

At that time the party did not sufficiently clearly explain to the masses its proletarian class position in distinction from Sun Yat-senism and other petty bourgeois tendencies. In the ranks of the Kuomintang, the Communists did not conduct any independent policy, leaving out of account that in any such inevitable bloc the Communists must adopt an unconditionally critical attitude toward the bourgeois elements and always come out as independent force. The Communists failed to expose the vacillations of the national-bourgeoisie and of bourgeois-democratic nationalism, just at the time when this exposure ought to have constituted one of the most important tasks of the Communist Party. The inevitable disruption of the Kuomintang drew nearer and nearer as the national army advanced, but the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party undertook nothing or almost nothing in order to prepare the party in case of a breach, and in order to guarantee its independent position and to unite the revolutionary workers and peasants in an independent fighting bloc which would oppose itself to the leadership of the Kuomintang.

Thus, the bourgeois-counter-revolutionary coup of Chiang Kai-shek found the revolutionary proletariat completely unprepared and threw its ranks into confusion. Further, the leadership of the Communist Party even at that time badly understood the process of the development of the revolution from one stage to another and did not carry through the correct changes in the line of the party made necessary by this coup. Inasmuch as the left wing of the petty bourgeois leaders of the Kuomintang during the course of a certain time still went together with the Communist Party, there took place a territorial separation; there arose the separate governments of Nanking and Wuhan. But the Communist Party did not occupy a leading position even in Wuhan.

Very quickly, in the Wuhan territory there commenced a second period, characterized, among other things, on the one hand, by the presence of elements of an incipient, still indefinite dual power (the seizure by peasant unions of a number of ruling functions in the villages, and the extension of the functions of the trade unions, determined by the endeavour of the masses to reach a "plebeian" independent solution of the questions of power), and, on the other hand, by the absence of sufficiently mature conditions for the organization of Soviets as organs of revolt against the Wuhan government, insofar as the latter still carried on a revolutionary struggle against the Nanking government which represented the treachery of the bourgeosie to the revolution.

The Communist Party at that time directly hindered the independent actions of the revolutionary masses, it did not facilitate their task of gathering and organizing forces, it did not assist in breaking down the influence of the leaders of the Left Kuomintang and their position in the country and in the army, instead of utilizing its participation in the Government for these purposes, it, on the contrary, screened the whole activity of this Government (individual petty bourgeois leading members of the party went so far that they even participated in the disarming of the workers' pickets in Wuhan and in sanctioning the punitive expedition to Changsha!).

At the bottom of this opportunist policy lay the hope of avoiding a rupture with the petty bourgeois leaders of the Wuhan governments. But, as a matter of fact, this rupture could only be put off for a short space of time. When the mass risings acquired a threatening character, the leaders of the Wuhan Kuomintang also began to reach out toward unity with their allies on the other side of the

barricades. The revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants still continued to exert all its forces in order to achieve victory.

The Communist Party of China now also corrected its line, elected a new leadership and took its place at the head of the revolution. But the revolutionary wave had already ebbed. The heroic mass struggles under the slogan of Soviets could only achieve a few temporary successes. Only in individual localities did the uprising of the agrarian revolution begin sufficiently early, in the remainder the many millions of the peasants' rearguard were delayed in their advance. Instead of the former gross errors of opportunist leadership, there were now revealed on the contrary, in various places extremely harmful putschist mistakes. The preparations for risings also did not take place without great defects on the part of the Communists. The heavy defeats once more threw back the revolution, which in the south had already entered into the second stage of development, to the starting point of this stage.

27. Thanks to the fact that the Chinese national bourgeoisie obtained power, the composition of the former bloc of the imperialists and militarists was partly altered and the new ruling bloc now represents the immediate chief enemy of the revolution. In order to overthrow it, it is necessary to win over the decisive masses of the proletariat and peasantry to the side of the revolution. This constitutes the most important task of the Chinese Communist Party for the immediate future. The Chinese workers have already acquired an enormous experience. The further strengthening and revolutionization of the trade union movement and the further strengthening of the Communist Party is essential. A certain portion of the Chinese peasantry has already outlived bourgeois democratic illusions and shown considerable activity in the revolutionary struggle, but this is only an insignificant minority of the huge peasant population of China.

It is very probable that some petty bourgeois groups will take up the position of national reformism (inside or outside the Kuomintang), in order by a certain display of bourgeois-democratic opposition to conquer influence over the toiling masses (to these petty bourgeois reformists belong also Tang Ting-san and the Social Democratic trade-union leaders). Under no circumstances must the significance of these attempts be underestimated. The isolation of these groups and their exposure before the masses by means of correct Communist tactics constitutes an absolutely essential precondition for the Communist Party to be able to take a really leading position in the moment of the coming new rise of the revolutionary wave in China.

Already at the present time, the party must everywhere propagate among the masses the idea of Soviets, the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and the inevitability of the coming revolutionary mass armed uprising. It must already now emphasize in its agitation the necessity of overthrow of the ruling bloc and the mobilization of the masses for revolutionary demonstrations. Carefully studying the objective conditions of the revolution as they continue to mature, utilizing every possibility for the mobilization of the masses, it must consistently and undeviatingly follow the line of seizure of state power, organization of Soviets as organs of the insurrection, expropriation of the landlords and big property-owners, expulsion of the foreign imperialists and the confiscation of their property.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, after you finished your assignment in South America, that is, you were Comintern delegate to South America, what was your next assignment?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, my next assignment was I was put in charge of the Communist Party's labor union activities in the New York area.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were assigned from South America back to New York?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That was about the end of 1931.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what you did when you reported for your duties, you new duties?

The CHAIRMAN. I think before you get into that, I have a question I would like to ask you. When you left South America, did you return to Russia?

Mr. KORNFEDER. No, I returned to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell me, what was the date of your departure from Moscow to go to South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I departed from Moscow, I believe, in April 1930. It may have been the early part of May.

Mr. MORRIS. So you were in South America a little more than a year?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was in South America about 17 months.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you in South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I was first in Colombia, stationed in the capital of Colombia, Bogota, and then I was in Venezuela, in the capital, Caracas.

The CHAIRMAN. Specifically, what was your mission down there? Was it to organize?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the strategic objective was to get at the oil fields of Venezuela and Colombia. But since there were no competent Communist Parties in existence, the job was, first, to organize Communist Parties with which to do it, and after organizing native Communist Parties, and organizing a labor federation, then to concentrate on the organization of the oil fields.

The CHAIRMAN. Through the labor population, is that right?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. How far along did you get with it while you were there?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, I succeeded to reorganize a very loose, inefficient, socialistic political party in Colombia, and make out of it a Communist Party, and organized also a committee for the formation of a labor federation, which had the affiliation of the existing local unions that then were operating in Colombia.

I also succeeded to organize organizing committees amongst the Colombian peasants and plantation hands—that is, the plantation workers, the coffee plantations, and some groups, two small organizing groups, in the oil areas and in the banana region.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the purpose of this work of the Communist organization to cut off raw materials from the United States in the event of an emergency with that country?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the whole strategic purpose of activities in this type of country is to isolate the hinterland from the advanced countries, and does deprive the advanced countries from raw materials and markets for their goods. That is the broad strategic purpose.

In the specific case of Venezuela and Colombia, the general purpose was similar, but the specific purpose was that, in the event of a war, a war between the United States and Russia, which was, of course, anticipated in Moscow all the time—because the United States was considered the ultimate fortress of capitalism—they wanted to be in a position during a strategic moment to tie up the oil fields. That was the immediate strategic objective of organizing Venezuela and Colombia.

Mr. MORRIS. A few years ago, Mr. Kornfeder, there was a Communist demonstration in Bogota. Do you know whether or not any of the people engaged in that uprising were people you organized when you were in South America?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes. All the leaders whose names appeared in the news dispatches from there were, at the time I was there, members of the central committee of the Communist Party that I had organized.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, we are just getting a little bit from our principal subject here.

Will you describe the activities, or rather describe your visit back to the United States in 1941? What was the first thing you did when you got to the United States?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the first thing I had to do was to find a place where to live, and since I didn't have one, I camped in Earl Browder's apartment for 6 weeks.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else was there during that period of 6 weeks?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, almost all the then leaders of the party off and on used to come to that apartment for discussions, tactical and organizational and strategic problems.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the city of New York?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That was in the city of New York.

And among them was one that I imagine you would be interested in, Harrison George.

Harrison George was then taking the place of Earl Browder in the Pan-Pacific Union secretariat.

The subsidiary body of the Red international labor unions, which was seeking to infiltrate the labor movement in China and Japan, and other countries in the Far East, had received a new project. The project was that this secretariat that he was then heading was to move from China to San Francisco because, in China at that time, the situation had become difficult for the Communists, and they were moving the headquarters of the Communist International that was operating secretly in Shanghai or Hankow, moving them to the United States.

There is one special episode I think I should mention before this committee.

From then on, the Communist Party of the United States began to concentrate on the district in California, which had been neglected until then. A great many of the agitators, writers, organizers, were from there on assigned to develop the party organization in California, especially in 'Frisco, Los Angeles, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you say from there on. From about what date would that be?

Mr. KORNFEDER. From 1932 on.

Now, among the problems that Harrison George raised was the problem under what auspices to do a great deal of this work, not only in the United States but in the countries at which these activities were especially aimed, that is, China, Indochina, Indonesia, India, and so on.

It is in this connection that I first took notice of the organization known as the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The subject came up because there was needed an organization that could function as a front for the operations in that area, a respectable enough front that is not suspect.

Earl Browder, as I recall it, said that the Institute of Pacific Relations could be made an instrument for that purpose, that the party had already important contacts in there at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. And was that in your line of activity in the Communist movement, to work on such a project, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. No, that was not in my line of actviity.

Mr. MORRIS. And you learned that just because of the fact that you happened to be staying at Earl Browder's house at that time?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you continued on and worked in the Communist Party until how long?

Mr. KORNFEDER. I continued in charge of their labor union and unemployment activities in the New York area and later on in Ohio, until 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. And then did you break with the Communist Party in 1934?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, as a matter of interest, how long did it take you to completely dissassociate yourself from the Communist Party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, to disassociate myself completely, not only from their organization but from their theories and ideology, I would say it took me until 1937, about 3 years.

I first rejected, of course, Stalin's methods and then I questioned Lenin's theories, but still held on to the principal concepts of Marxism, and then I sweated through that subject as to whether Marx was right or not.

Politically, I thought he was wrong 2 years after, but as to whether, on his economics, he was wrong, it took me another year.

So it took me about 3 years to completely disassociate myself from the philosophy, theory, et cetera, of that movement.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you initiate the break?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, the break occurred on a difference on current policy, which, at that time, involved the question as to whether the Communist Party should work through the craft unions of the American Federation of Labor and dissolve the independent nonaffiliated unions that it controlled, or whether it should form a new organization of the type, as later on, as the CIO became.

I was in favor of the type of organization like the CIO which, at that time, was contrary to the line dictated from Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a Marxist before you were a Communist?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why it took some time to break your ties with Marxism?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see now really any difference between Marxism and communism?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Not in the objectives, but there is a big difference in methods.

Senator FERGUSON. In the methods?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But do you not think that in the end they have to be one and the same if they are going to be successful?

Mr. KORNFEDER. In the end, if they get control, in order to stay in control they will have to use more and more Communist methods themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. They will have to use force to keep their control, will they not?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that not really their policy, was that not the Marxist policy?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That was Marxist policy; yes.

You see, the disputation between the Socialists and the Communists is, to a considerable extent, on the interpretation of what Marx meant. But they both consider Marx as their ideological prophet.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Kornfeder, after you broke with the Communist organization, and you say that break took you about 3 years, still you were not orientated to the point of view that you would have testified before a Senate committee at that time, would you, Mr. Kornfeder?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Definitely not. I would not have appeared before any official body of the Government, whether judicial, legislative, or any other. It requires the complete break and the realization that this thing is a menace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not mean that it requires more than a complete break, Mr. Kornfeder, that in addition to the complete break there must also come this realization you speak of, the menace of communism?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes, definitely so. Yes.

I came to look upon communism as a modern form of reaction in the sense that it seeks to reimpose the domination of the state in an absolutist form, a thing that humanity has struggled against for centuries.

So once that picture dawns upon your mind, well, then you are finished with the whole thing.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is sold to you in the package that it is something new?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes; that it is something new, that through its methods you are going to achieve great innovations that are good for the humanity as a whole, and especially for the underdog; and especially, if you are one of the underdogs, it is very appealing.

Senator FERGUSON. It does not show you the side that you become the slave of the state?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Definitely not.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it criticizes the economic royalists and it advocates the political royalists, does it not?

Mr. KORNFEDER. It criticizes the monopolies of capitalism and imposes a supermonopoly of the state.

Senator FERGUSON. Of statism?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So it would be well for us to see how we can get rid of the monopolies of the economic royalists and not impose upon ourselves a political monoply?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Something even worse.

Senator FERGUSON. Something even worse?

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I get back to this pamphlet again?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have the following passage, two or three passages, read into the record, and then I will ask Mr. Kornfeder a few questions on it.

This is from page 107, from a pamphlet called China Yesterday and Today, by Eleanor Lattimore, edited by Marguerite Ann Stewart, a cooperative project between the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and Webster Publishing Co.

Until early 1946, however, the Kuomintang refused to recognize other parties as legal political bodies. Friction has been especially bitter between the Government and the Communists. Soon after the war with Japan ended, armed conflicts occurred between them which, if allowed to become an all-out civil war, could easily have destroyed all that China had gained during her war against Japan.

For the Communists are by no means the small minority party they were when they were driven from the south by Chiang's troops. They are now second to the Kuomintang in size and influence, and control an area inhabited by about 100,000,000 people.

When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word *Communist.*

And the word "Communist" is italicized.

They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read that again?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

They are not advocating the Russian system for China, and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the rights of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control.

Because their chief interest at the moment is in improving the economic conditions of the Chinese farmer and in increasing the number of people capable of taking part in political life, they are often described as a peasant party.

They have established a system of popular elections in the regions under their control; they favor extending the vote to the people of the rest of the country; and they have long declared that they would support a democratic republic in which not only they themselves but all other Chinese political parties would be represented.

At the time this is being written—

and the date is 1946—

negotiations are being carried on between the Chinese Government and the Communists which, it is hoped, will result in a more democratic government. For not until China achieves a government in which the Chinese people are adequately represented and which brings about agricultural reforms designed to give her farmers enough to live on will the underlying causes of communism be removed.

Mr. Kornfeder, I ask you if you will comment upon those passages that I have just read. I offer this book for your scrutiny.

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, I think I already covered one angle of this, namely, that the Chinese Communists are just a peasant party.

The change of strategy from basing upon the factory workers to the Chinese peasants was important, decisive, tactical change.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it decided, Mr. Kornfeder, at that Sixth World Congress that you attended, that the Chinese Communists would be represented as a peasant party?

Mr. KORNFEDER. No; it wasn't decided. They don't accept the peasant party, they only accept affiliations of Communist parties. The change was to orientate the strategy on the peasants. The peasant can be made ideologically a Communist just like a factory worker.

A Communist is not necessarily made in the economic category, he is made through ideology. So the calculation of Stalin worked out, that you can work, which was one of his major contributions to Com-

munist strategy, by the way, the change of orientation in the colonial countries from the workers which, in the colonial countries, are only a few. There is not much industry. But the peasants which are the big, downtrodden mass, and the Chinese Communist Party became a Communist Party, recruited mainly from peasants who had become Communists. But it was a Communist Party in every sense.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say Communist Party, you mean international, under the domination of the Kremlin?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Under the complete domination of the Kremlin; yes.

Now, as to private property. Well, you see, this is a very skillful piece of sugar-coating the Communist position, very cleverly written. You could imply this, and you could imply another thing.

But it is a part of Communist strategy when they seize a country not to expropriate the peasants and the small shopkeepers right away. They cannot do it. But they nationalize the land.

Here it says that nationalization is taking place. Well, nationalization means that the Government takes title to all the land, whether it enforces that title right away or not in a matter of tactics, of operation.

In Russia, the land was nationalized immediately after seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks, but the nationalization wasn't really enforced until years later when they had consolidated themselves and collectivized the farms, had supercollectivized them, and so on and so forth.

So you can say, half-truths, that they are going to maintain private property. But for how long?

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that the facts today, that China today, and I am talking about the mainland, has disproved that statement?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Well, they nationalized the land. They have not yet taken the land off the peasants. They have taken the land from the larger landowners and distributed it among the peasants in order to get the support of the peasants and their cooperation until they entrench themselves.

Then, after they have entrenched themselves, they will do in China, carry out, the same Bolshevik program as in Russia. They will make state farms, and they will make supercollectives which are dominated, controlled, and managed by the state.

But in the first stage, in a colonial country, that would be a suicidal method, if the Communists would attempt to force collectivization immediately. They first have to have complete control of the Government apparatus, a well-organized political police, a well functioning Communist Party, and all the committees, before they can attempt to create a war with the peasants because when they begin to take the land away from the peasants, and the so-called collectives, the peasants will resist.

They resisted in Russia and they certainly will resist in China. So this is a very misleading, skillful piece of selling the Communist program with the pretense that it isn't Communist. But it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are referring to the article in the book handed to you by Mr. Morris?

Mr. KORNFEDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is "China Today',' is that it?

Mr. MORRIS. No; this is a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co., by Eleanor Lattimore, published in 1946, and it is entitled "China Yesterday and Today."

In other words, Mr. Kornfeder, you do not agree with Mrs. Lattimore when she says here:

> When we speak of the Chinese Communists, we should remember that they stand for something rather different from what is ordinarily meant by the word "Communist."

Mr. KORNFEDER. That is right. I disagree with it in every sense.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know that the Chinese Communists, from your own experience, is a member of the Comintern organization?

Mr. KORNFEDER. They are not only Communists, they are among the most intransigent, they are among the best Communists.

They really believe and they are thoroughly indoctrinated, like semi-illiterate persons. When they absorb a doctrine, they really are all-out for it. The Chinese Communists are that type.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before putting this into the record, I would like to make the observation that the photograph appearing on page 108, from which we have made these extracts, has been supplied by courtesy of the China Aid Council, and I would like the record to show that two witnesses have identified the China Aid Council as a Communist-controlled organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you say what the photograph is?

Mr. MORRIS. It is the photograph that appears on page 108. It says "Courtesy China Aid Council," and the caption is "Communist students of China's northwest studying in front of the loess cave which is their classroom."

May that go into the record, Senator? The text does not have to go in because I have read it.

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot put the picture into the record. The rest will go into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 258" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all we have of Mr. Kornfeder.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have some more exhibits. I think we will take a few minutes to put them into the record, if you have the time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, this last exhibit that went in, this pamphlet, is there any description in the record as to who Eleanor Lattimore is?

Mr. MORRIS. Eleanor Lattimore is the wife of Owen Lattimore, and is the Eleanor Lattimore who has held office in, and who has worked for, the Institute of Pacific Relations.

There would seem to be absolutely no doubt that she is the wife of Owen Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. What is in the record from before?

Mr. MORRIS. She has testified in executive session before this committee.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 31, 1938, addressed to Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter. It reads as follows:

DEAR JESSUP: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put.

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom is that addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. To Prof. Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter.

We have a letter, also from the files, from Birchfield, Norfolk, Conn., dated April 2, 1938, addressed to Mr. Carter, from Philip C. Jessup, reading as follows:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday the 20th. Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Senator FERGUSON. May I have the letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer that, and ask that that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Mr. Mandel, will you kindly identify that as having been taken from the institute's files?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Taken from where?

Mr. MANDEL. The files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record, and properly identified.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 259" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 259

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, March 31, 1938.

Prof. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Norfolk, Conn.

DEAR JESSUP: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20, to listen to a 100-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put?

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

BIRCHFIELD,
Norfolk, Conn., April 2, 1938.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I accept eagerly and gratefully for Wednesday, the 20th. Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you identify the Moscow trials?

Mr. MANDEL. The Moscow trials were in 1937, and were popularly known as the purge trials, and created a tremendous furor throughout the world because noted Soviet leaders were brought to trial, and they confessed to having tried to overthrow the Soviet Government. Many of them were liquidated or disappeared. They aroused indignation throughout the world and especially in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. I refer now to a document which is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 12, 1943, addressed to Hon. John H. Kerr, chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations, and it is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Now, the reference in this letter that I want to read is this:

I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He was a member of the American delegation to the IPR conference at Yosemite National Park in 1936. The late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that delegation.

As a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association, I have followed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has consistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of such a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on American policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup of Columbia University was chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that Mr. Bisson has been identified before this committee as a member of the Communist organization.

May I offer this into evidence, Mr. Chairman, for whatever probative value there may be in that one reference?

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, this is a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, the Hon. John H. Kerr was the chairman of a special subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, of the House of Representatives, and apparently the question of Mr. Bisson's loyalty had come up and letters of recommendation were sent in from various people, according to our scrutiny of the files,

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 260" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 260

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, April 12, 1943.

Regarding T. A. Bisson.

Hon. JOHN H. KERR,
Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I have known Mr. Bisson personally for more than 10 years. He was a member of the American delegation to the IPR conference at Yosemite National Park in 1936. The late Hon. Newton D. Baker was chairman of that delegation.

As a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association, I have followed Mr. Bisson's scholarly writing on the Far East very closely. He has consistently maintained a high standard of objectivity. Indeed, his work is of such a high order that in 1938 the institute asked him to write a book on American policy in the Far East. Dr. Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University, was chairman of the institute at that time and this assignment was given to Mr. Bisson with Dr. Jessup's full approval. Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of that book in order that you may familiarize yourself with the quality of his writing. This book has received high praise from a great many outstanding American experts on the Far East. It has consequently had a wide sale and is a standard reference book in a great many public and university libraries.

Mr. Bisson is 100 percent American. He was alert to the Japanese menace long before the general public became aware of the implications to the peace of America of Japanese aggression and in many of his writings he faithfully stated the issues that the United States must face vis-à-vis Japanese military expansion.

If you wish further information, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 16, 1940, addressed to Mr. Motylev, Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from the New York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1940, giving the views of Dr. Philip C. Jessup with reference to the *City of Flint* at Murmansk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

And I have here the clipping, a copy of the clipping, from the New York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1940, and I read the last paragraph of the article referred to as follows:

Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest supporters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter *City of Flint* at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing the *Mormacsun* to enter a belligerent port he described as contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international law.

May I point out that this occurred during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record and be marked as the next consecutive exhibit? That is the letter from the institute's files, Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev, as well as the clipping from the New York Herald Tribune that Mr. Mandel read.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 261" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 261

129 EAST 52D STREET,
NEW YORK CITY,
February 16, 1940.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street,
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: You will, I think, be interested in the enclosed clipping from the New York Herald Tribune of February 15, 1940, giving the views of Dr. Philip C. Jessup with reference to the *City of Flint* at Murmansk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, February 15, 1940]

UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY DOGMA CALLED MILD-MANNERED—JESSUP, OF COLUMBIA, FINDS CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The assertion of neutrality rights by the United States was called mild-mannered yesterday by Prof. Philip C. Jessup, of the Columbia University Law School, at a luncheon of the school's alumni association at the Lawyer's Club, 115 Broadway. He said the British blockade was not a blockade in any technical sense but a measure of reprisal against Germany for its submarine warfare.

Under earlier concepts of international law, Dr. Jessup explained, the burden of proof was on the captor of a merchant vessel in wartime. Under the present procedure of British prize courts, he said, this burden of proof had been shifted to the complainant, making it almost impossible for the neutral owner of a vessel to prove what would be the eventual destination of his cargo.

Dr. Jessup paid tribute to naval officers, who were, he said, the firmest supporters of international law at present. He declared that the Soviet Union had committed no violation of international law in holding the freighter *City of Flint* at Murmansk. The action of the British naval patrol, however, in forcing the *Mormacsun* to enter a belligerent port, he described as contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States and to accepted principles of international law.

Mr. MANDEL. In connection with the last item, may I refer to the New York Times of October 29, 1939, which carries a statement as follows, under the headline "United States accuses Soviet in *Flint* confusion. Formal charge is made that Russia treats American envoy with contempt."

The first paragraph:

With the freighter *City of Flint* evidently having left Murmansk carrying her American crew on board under a German prize detail, and with Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Russia, having been unable to communicate with Capt. Joseph A. Gainard of the ship, the State Department tonight charged the Soviet Government with "withholding adequate cooperation."

The article goes into greater detail.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire, then, is it a fact that Mr. Jessup was taking a stand contrary to the stand taken by the United States of America through its State Department?

Mr. MANDEL. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, in that article?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And then this stand, which was opposing the stand of the United States of America, was being sent by Mr. Carter to a Russian Communist in Russia?

Mr. MANDEL. To a Russian official.

Senator FERGUSON. And a Communist in Russia?

Mr. MORRIS. Whether he is a member of the Communist Party, we cannot say, Senator. But Dr. Motylev, who is the representative of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whether he is a member of the Russian Communist Party, we cannot say.

Senator FERGUSON. And this letter says "I think it will be interesting." You will be interested in this stand, in other words, of Dr. Jessup against the stand of the United States Government; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. Correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I had a little difficulty at first getting the significance when you put it in at first. Until you read the last, I wondered whether I was right in my conclusions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that Mr. Mandel make a photostat of this article from which he read, and have that introduced into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I think it should be, to make this perfectly clear as to what this is.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done. See that it gets into the record at the proper sequence.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

[From the New York Times, October 29, 1939]

UNITED STATES ACCUSES SOVIET IN "FLINT" CONFUSION—FORMAL CHARGE IS MADE THAT RUSSIA TREATS AMERICAN ENVOY WITH CONTEMPT

(By Bertram D. Hulen)

WASHINGTON, October 28.—With the freighter *City of Flint* evidently having left Murmansk carrying her American crew on board under a German prize detail and with Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador to Russia, having been unable to communicate with Capt. Joseph A. Gainard of the ship, the State Department tonight charged the Soviet Government with "withholding adequate cooperation."

The charge, made in a formal statement, reflected the intense irritation felt in Washington over the cavalier fashion in which the diplomatic representative of this Government in Moscow has been treated by the Soviet authorities. Officials expressed unconcealed anger over the failure to ascertain any definite facts officially regarding the vessel.

State Department officials discussed the situation from every angle during the day. It was learned that staff conferences, headed by Secretary Cordell Hull, were held behind closed doors twice during the day. Officials, however, preserved an unusual reticence and nothing more than the formal statement was made public.

HIGH OFFICIALS CONFER

Conferring with Mr. Hull were top-flight officials of his Department, including R. Walton Moore, counselor; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; and Green H. Hackworth, legal adviser of the Department.

It is generally believed that the *City of Flint* sailed, possibly 2 or 3 days ago, to run the British blockade and reach a German port in the Baltic before institution of prize court proceedings by the Nazi authorities.

According to press reports, the United States Embassy in Moscow was convinced tonight that she had sailed. This word had not been communicated to the State Department by the Embassy, but it was regarded as a reasonable assumption.

Previous reports from Moscow and from Berlin, first that the *City of Flint* had sailed, then that she had not, were considered an obvious effort to confuse the situation in order to minimize, if possible, the risks the ship must take in eluding British blockaders.

But it was apparent from the State Department's statement tonight that if she does run the blockade German claims to her permanent possession will be resisted in the expected legal proceedings.

The statement, factual in its contents and reciting the circumstances that have surrounded the *City of Flint* since her seizure, clearly implied that the Russian Government had disregarded the requirements of international law.

It implied also that neither Russia in her dealings with Ambassador Steinhardt nor Germany in her conversations with Alexander C. Kirk, the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, had been frank, if indeed honest.

It emphasized that Mr. Steinhardt throughout had been denied access to the primary source of information, the vessel herself.

So far, Mr. Steinhardt has been unsuccessful in persuading the Soviet regime to conform to the customary diplomatic procedure, even although this be of the most formal character. In short, official Washington considers that he has been treated with nothing less than contempt.

The State Department statement was considered as forming a basis for resistance to any claim for permanent possession of the vessel that Germany might advance in prize court proceedings.

VIEWS NOT VOICED IN NOTE

The statement could be considered a protest, although outside formal diplomatic channels. While some thought may have been given to voicing these views in a note, that course has not yet been adopted, at least so far as was revealed tonight.

An emphatic form of protest could be registered by ordering Mr. Steinhardt home for consultation, but no consideration is said to have been given to that course as yet.

Today's statement pointed out that, judging from press reports from German sources, the German authorities were not without information, although Mr. Steinhardt was having extraordinary difficulty in obtaining the facts and was given no facility for personally verifying them.

A short time before the statement was issued, the Ambassador reported to the State Department that again he had been unable to make telephone contact with Captain Gainard.

Officials here were satisfied that the vessel had left Murmansk and was seeking to reach a German harbor. Obviously, it was pointed out, Russia would not give this information if she were deliberately siding with Germany. If really neutral, she might feel that to announce departure of the ship would be to inform Great Britain and for that reason be an unneutral act.

That Germany would bend every effort to conceal the departure of the vessel was considered only natural, so reports on this score from Berlin today were discounted.

Mr. Kirk reported from Berlin to the State Department that in reply to an inquiry at the Ministry of Marine this afternoon he was told that the American crew was on board the *City of Flint* at Murmansk. After a further inquiry late this afternoon at the Foreign Office, Mr. Kirk was informed that, according to the latest reports, the vessel and crew were still in the Arctic port. It was also said that if, after the completion of repairs, the ship were taken to another port, the American crew would presumably be kept on board to operate the vessel.

Mr. Kirk also reported that, according to information he had received from the American consul general in Hamburg, the prize commissioner has received no news of the vessel.

The rebuffs received at the hands of Russia were resented here no less because the Foreign Office was following its customary course of putting off and humiliating an Ambassador and his Government. It is a well-understood technique of the Soviet regime.

An Ambassador will seek official information, only to be refused an appointment at the Foreign Office or be told that there is no information available. Later the substance of what he has sought will appear in press reports, and when he again calls at the Foreign Office this will be given him. In this and other ways the Moscow Government follows a calculated policy of insolence toward the envoy.

Diplomats of long experience in revolutionary Russia know the pattern well and are not surprised, though their resentment reaches the boiling point. To them it reflects Bolshevist philosophy of treating governments with contempt in making announcements first through Soviet press channels on the theory that in this way they are dealing directly with the people of a country, not with their representatives.

But the White House and the State Department are not concerned with the philosophy that might explain the treatment accorded the United States Government in this case. They are deeply resentful over the whole episode.

UNITED STATES STATEMENT ON "FLINT"

WASHINGTON, October 28.—Following is the text of the statement issued by the State Department tonight on the case of the steamer *City of Flint*:

"The *City of Flint* was captured by a German cruiser at an estimated distance of some 1,250 miles from New York, with a mixed cargo destined for British ports. The date of capture is understood to have been October 9.

"The *City of Flint* was taken into the harbor of Tromsoe on October 21, with a German crew and flying the German flag. After remaining 2 hours to take water, it was ordered by the Norwegian Government to depart, which it did.

The *City of Flint* was taken into the harbor of Murmansk on the evening of October 23.

"On October 25 the American chargé d'affaires cabled from Berlin that the Foreign Office, at its press conference, said that the *City of Flint* was captured by a German vessel and contraband was found on board, destined for England. The Foreign Office then added that it was found, however, that the ship was unseaworthy in that it did not have navigation charts adequate for bringing the ship into a German port.

"When the vessel entered the harbor of Murmansk, according to an announcement presmuably from the Soviet Government through the Tass news agency, 'the naval forces at the port of Murmansk have temporarily held the vessel and interned the German crew.'

"On October 25 the American chargé d'affaires at Berlin cabled that the German Foreign Office, referring to the seizure of the *City of Flint*, said that 'the German authorities were communicating with the Soviet authorities in the matter.'

"On the same day [October 25] the Tass Agency reported that 'the German crew of the cargo steamer *City of Flint* has been released from internment by the maritime authorities of Murmansk in view of the fact, as has been established, that the vessel was brought into port for repair of her machinery. The vessel is meanwhile remaining in Murmansk for verification of the exact composition of her cargo.'

"On October 26 the American chargé d'affaires cabled from Berlin quoting a memorandum received that morning from the Foreign Office relative to the *City of Flint* and its crew, which, among other things, stated that a 'prize crew placed on board [the *City of Flint*] has brought the steamer to the harbor of Murmansk because of sea damage.'

"When transmitting the memorandum an official of the Foreign Office stated informally to the chargé d'affaires that the Foreign Office had no details as to the damage which necessitated taking the ship to Murmansk, but he maintained, in response to an inquiry, that the term 'damage' would cover the case of a ship lacking charts with which to navigate the waters through which she had to proceed.

"For some reason as yet unexplained the German crew was interned in spite of the fact that according to German authorities they were without charts and had put into Murmansk because they could not proceed to a German port without charts. Later, they were released, seemingly under a plea that their entry into Murmansk was required for necessary repairs to defective machinery.

"A prize crew may take a captured ship into a neutral port without internment only in case of stress of weather, want of fuel and provisions, or necessity of repairs. In all other cases, the neutral is obligated to intern the prize crew and restore the vessel to her former crew.

"The conclusion from the foregoing facts and circumstances indicates that when the *City of Flint* entered the harbor at Murmansk, any plea relating to the chart requirements if advanced must have been ignored since the German crew was interned. A second and entirely different reason for entering Murmansk, namely, defective machinery which called for immediate repairs, was not advanced until later.

"A subsequent cable from the American chargé d'affaires at Berlin, also dated October 26, quoted a statement of the Foreign Office at its noon press conference to the effect that the fact that the Russians have freed the German crew indicates that the Soviet authorities have confirmed the view of the prize crew that the *City of Flint* was unseaworthy and it was therefore permissible to take the ship into a neutral harbor.

"Testimony of the American crew as to the full facts pertaining to the taking of the *City of Flint* into Murmansk is not yet available.

"It seems manifest that even if it is assumed that the German crew was proceeding legally prior to the entry of the *City of Flint* into the harbor of Murmansk, the known facts and circumstances support the contention of the American Government that the crew did not at the time of entry offer any reasonable or justifiable grounds such as are prescribed by international law for taking the vessel into this port, and that, therefore, it was the clear duty of the Soviet Government

to turn the *City of Flint* over to the American crew. This has been the major contention of the American Government.

"In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, each person can judge for himself the question as to how much light is shed on this entire transaction by the action of the Soviet Government in withholding adequate cooperation with the American Government with respect to assembling and disclosing to the American Embassy in Moscow the essential facts pertaining to the landing, the whereabouts, and welfare of the American crew; by the facts that it was first alleged by the German authorities that the need for charts was the ground for bringing the vessel into port; and by the fact that later this ground seems to have been abandoned and a new ground or theory relating to defective machinery was set up."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we are preparing more exhibits along the lines that we are presenting today, and I ask that they be presented at some other time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Is there anything further today?

Senator FERGUSON. I hope, Mr. Chairman, if they are along this same line, that they may all be put into the record as soon as possible because I understand there will be another hearing of another committee where Mr. Jessup's name will be up for confirmation by the Senate.

I think it is only fair to Mr. Jessup and to the Senators that anything that this committee has in relation to these exhibits should go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say, Senator Ferguson, that today I have, as chairman of this committee, addressed a letter to the chairman of the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate advising him that I am having a transcript of the proceedings of this committee bearing on Mr. Jessup prepared for that committee's perusal and use.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is proper because we should not have a hearing where one matter is brought up and then not refer that to another committee that is going to pass upon Mr. Jessup.

The CHAIRMAN. The entire files of this committee will be made available to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, may I point out some of the difficulties?

There is one point that arose this morning on whether or not Fred Field is the one who recommended Mr. Jessup for a particular office.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter is here. Why do we not clear this up and ask Mr. Carter if the Fred who signed that telegram is Fred Field?

Mr. Carter, can you give us information on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Come forward, Mr. Carter, if you care to.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have the telegram?

The CHAIRMAN. You were here this morning when that wire was read?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I was in the back row.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you look at this wire?

Mr. CARTER. I would be delighted.

Mr. MORRIS. One of the difficulties here, Senator, is that we have an estimated 300,000 letters here, and then we have all the files of the

institute. It takes a long time to track anything down, as Mr. Carter can appreciate.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that, and that is why I knew Mr. Carter was here, and he might clear this up.

Mr. CARTER. Well, the internal evidence, which is very slender, would seem to indicate that this was Frederick V. Field.

In what year was this, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. The year is not given.

Mr. CARTER. That is rather important.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you remember such a recommendation that Field made?

Senator FERGUSON. It is a recommendation at a certain convention or committee meeting that might bring it back to your mind. I think the place of the meeting is shown on the next page.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the record will show that Mr. Carter has been sworn.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, when did Jessup serve as research chairman? Do you recall that?

Mr. CARTER. I think it is here in the document you just gave to me.

Senator FERGUSON. The meeting is given, Mr. Carter, on the sheet attached to the telegram.

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't want to be too sure, but, frankly, I am mixed up as to whether Mr. Field was speaking of Mr. Jessup. I am confused on two points: One, whether it refers to the Mount Tremblant conference in 1942, or the Hot Springs conference in 1945.

It says, "approve him as research chairman." For the life of me, on the spur of the moment, I can't remember whether it was Mount Tremblant, 1942, or Hot Springs, 1945, where Jessup was proposed as research chairman and so served.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But was he proposed by Fred Field at either one of those? Did you have another Fred in either 1942 or 1945?

The CHAIRMAN. That is, on your staff.

Mr. CARTER. I think we only had one Fred.

Senator FERGUSON. That was Fred Field?

Mr. CARTER. From the text of this short telegram, Fred doesn't nominate him; someone else has nominated him.

Senator FERGUSON. But he approves him?

Mr. CARTER. But he approves him.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be Fred Field?

Mr. CARTER. That would be Fred Field.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not quite right, is it, Mr. Carter? It says here, "approve the nominations and suggest Jessup for research chairman."

In other words, the suggestion is coming from Field, if it is Field, that Jessup be research chairman?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. But just on the one telegram, without refreshing myself on all of the operations—this was a complicated international organization, with a dozen countries and committees within each country, trying to get agreement between the British and the French and the Australians, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. This Winsted, Conn., November 23 would not give you a clue, would it? The Hot Springs convention was in the summer, was it not?

Mr. CARTER. No; it was along, I think, in January.

Mr. MORRIS. Hot Springs?

Mr. CARTER. Winsted is far away from Hot Springs.

Mr. MORRIS. But someone may have lived there in 1942 and not in 1945. That does not mean anything to you?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he identified it earlier. Fred Field is the only one they have. Therefore it is apparent that it is Fred Field.

Mr. CARTER. I could call up Mr. Holland, who has the remains of the files there, and his memory might be better than mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all for today?

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be called any time you want it called.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a witness for next Tuesday.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime, if you have any additional files or records bearing upon matters that should go before the Committee on Foreign Relations, would you so advise the committee?

We will stand in recess until the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m., Thursday, September 20, 1951, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINSTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please.

Mr. Morris, have you anything to proceed with?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of requests made by this committee of the various branches of the Executive Department that are in a state of either we have been turned down on our requests, or else we have gotten a generally unsatisfactory answer. I would like that the record show some of the difficulties we have encountered in this respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Today, Mr. Chairman, we are going to take testimony on a 3-day conference that was held by the State Department in October 1949. At that time Secretary of State Acheson had appointed Philip C. Jessup to be the head of a panel of three people to advise him on the formulation and the review of far eastern policy. Thinking this to be completely in line with the line of our investigation because most of the people invited were Institute of Pacific Relations people, we requested on August 24, 1951, of Hon. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., over your signature, a request which reads as follows:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has had testimony in executive session concerning the 3-day round-table discussion arranged by the Office of Public Affairs of the State Department for the purpose of exchanging views with informed private citizens on United States foreign policy toward China, and which took place on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

It is requested that the minutes, which our testimony indicates were taken at the time, be made available to this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I would like that request on your part to Secretary of State Acheson on August 24, 1951, introduced in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be introduced in the record.

(The document referred to and read into the record by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 262" and filed for the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer?

Mr. MORRIS. The answer is dated September 12, 1951, and reads:

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have received your letter of August 24, 1951 (received August 27), requesting the minutes of the meeting held in the Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, concerning American policy toward China. I regret that this reply has been delayed during the absence of many departmental officers in San Francisco.

As I think you know, the record kept of this decision was classified confidential. This was done to insure frankness on the part of the non-Government people invited to the conference and they were specifically advised that their remarks would not be made available outside the Department of State. To honor the commitment made to these participants, therefore, the Department believes that the record of this meeting should not be released, even on a confidential basis. I am, however, enclosing a list of the people invited to this meeting.

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. MCFALL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

I would like that introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 263" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 263

SEPTEMBER 12, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have received your letter of August 24, 1951 (received August 27), requesting the minutes of the meeting held in the Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, concerning American policy toward China. I regret that this reply has been delayed during the absence of many departmental officers in San Francisco.

As I think you know, the record kept of this discussion was classified confidential. This was done to insure frankness on the part of the non-Government people invited to the conference and they were specifically advised that their remarks would not be made available outside the Department of State. To honor the commitment made to these participants, therefore, the Department believes that the record of this meeting should not be released, even on a confidential basis. I am, however, enclosing a list of the people invited to this meeting.

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. MCFALL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

LIST OF CONSULTANTS, CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN CHINA

Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, department of international relations, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Claude A. Buss, director of studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colegrove, department of political science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
Arthur G. Coons, president, Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, N. Y.
John K. Fairbanks, committee on international and regional studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
William R. Herod, president, International General Electric Co., New York, N. Y.
Arthur N. Holcombe, department of government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane, Wash.
Owen Lattimore, director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

Ernest B. MacNaughton, chairman of the board, First National Bank, Portland, Oreg.
George C. Marshall, president, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
J. Morden Murphy, assistant vice president, Bankers Trust Co., New York, N. Y.
Nathaniel Peffer, department of public law and government, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
Harold S. Quigley, department of political science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
Edwin O. Reischauer, department of far-eastern languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
William S. Roberston, president, American & Foreign Power Co., New York, N. Y.
John D. Rockefeller III, president, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, N. Y.
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
Eugene Staley, executive director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, Calif.
Harold Stassen, president, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
Harold M. Vinacke, department of political science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, during the testimony of General Willoughby testimony turned up which indicated that there are records in the War Department which could be available to this committee and which would aid us in our investigation. Accordingly, on August 20, 1951, a letter was sent to the President at the White House in Washington, D. C. It reads:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During the open public hearing of the Internal Security Subcommittee held on August 9, 1951, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby was questioned concerning the loyalty of three individuals who were attached to SCAP headquarters in the postwar period. General Willoughby replied that he was forbidden by official directive to testify on the contents of the files of the three employees involved. Each of these three persons, namely, Miriam S. Farley, Andrew Grajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson, was an active leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations prior to, during, and subsequent to their assignments to Tokyo.

It is respectfully rquested that the contents of these files be made available to the members of the Internal Security Subcommittee in order that they may translate the information in such files into evidence for the subcommittee, if the facts warrant such action. Naturally, if any confidential sources of information must be protected, the subcommittee will scrupulously protect identities.

Very sincerely yours,

PAT MCCARRAN.

I would like that introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Morris was marked "Exhibit No. 264" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. On September 19, 1951, over the signature of Harry Truman, President, we received a letter reading:

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have your letter asking that the files of Miriam S. Farley, Andrew Grajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

I am informed that none of these persons is now employed by the Federal Government. However, all three were formerly employed at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan. According to the records of the Department of the Army, Miriam S. Farley was employed there from January to May 1946; Andrew Grajdanzev was employed from January 1946 to August 1947; and T. A. Bisson was employed from October 1945 to May 1947.

I have asked the Secretary of the Army to make available to the subcommittee the employment records of these three persons. However, for reasons which I have set forth at length on a number of occasions, I do not feel that the in-

formation so made available to the subcommittee should include investigative data of a confidential nature.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY TRUMAN.

I would like to have that introduced, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Morris was marked "Exhibit No. 265" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. On August 27, 1951, over the signature of Pat McCarran, chairman, a letter was sent to the Hon. Dean Acheson.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I go back to this and ask what the employment records of the three persons mean to us? It only means the dates, does it not?

Mr. MORRIS. We have received nothing, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is all confidential data and the personnel file is kept from us?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason for discharge if they were discharged, recommended for their employment, and so forth?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Will you read this, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 27, 1951, addressed to Hon. Dean Acheson from Pat McCarran:

MY DEAR Mr. SECRETARY: The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee introduced into the record on August 23, 1951, two items from the Daily Worker, copies of which are enclosed herewith. One is dated October 4, 1942, pages 1 and 5, and is an article by Mr. Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party U. S. A., on the State Department; and the second is an article entitled "Welles States United States Policy on China," published October 16, 1942, pages 1 and 2.

The second article is preceded by a statement that the memorandum was the result of an interview between Mr. Earl Browder and Mr. Robert Minor, both representing the Communist Party, U. S. A., Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, and Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, held on October 12, 1942.

It was pointed out in the course of the hearing that in fairness to the State Department it might be well to request a brief statement on this matter from the Department. In this connection, we would appreciate the following information:

1. Was there an interview held at the State Department in which Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, Mr. Sumner Welles, and Mr. Lauchlin Currie participated on October 12, 1942?

2. Who arranged this interview and how was it arranged?

3. Is the enclosed memorandum, as taken from the Daily Worker of October 16, 1942, a true copy of the memorandum submitted by Mr. Sumner Welles and Mr. Lauchlin Currie on that date?

Your kind cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

The reply dated September 1, 1951, is signed by Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary, and reads as follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 27, 1951, addressed to Secretary Acheson requesting information concerning an alleged meeting held at the State Department October 12, 1942, in which Earl Browder, Robert Minor, Sumner Welles, and Lauchlin Currie participated.

The Department received a similar request from a Member of Congress some time ago and at that time made a thorough but unsuccessful search of departmental files for evidence of such a meeting. These efforts to obtain information respecting the meeting were complicated by the fact that the De-

partment officers who reportedly participated were no longer with the Department.

The Department will again examine its files with a view to obtaining information bearing on the specific questions in your letter of August 27 and will write you further upon completion of this reexamination.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that letter again?

Mr. MANDEL. The date is September 1, 1951.

Then on September 21, 1951, a telephone message came to the office from Mr. Holland, Chinese Affairs Division of the State Department, who said that they are working on the answer to the letter of August 27 in regard to Browder. This requires considerable research, but they want us to know that they are working on it. That is not a verbatim transcript of the message.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like those two letters to go in the record, along with the telephone conversation as read by Mr. Mandel, and given the next exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted.

(The documents referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel were marked as "Exhibit Nos. 266, 267, and 268" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from Senator Pat McCarran dated July 10, 1951, to the Honorable Dean Acheson:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Perhaps it might save some time for all of us if, in addition to my previous requests for information on loyalty cases, you sent us a complete list of individuals dropped or permitted to resign from the State Department since the end of 1944 because of loyalty considerations.

Thank you for your courtesy in this matter.

The reply is dated August 2, 1951, from the Department of State, signed Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I refer to your letter of July 10, 1951, in which you request to be supplied with a complete list of the individuals who were dropped or permitted to resign from the State Department since the end of 1944 because of loyalty considerations.

I regret that I am precluded from furnishing you with the information which you requested, by reason of the President's directive of March 13, 1948 (Federal Register, March 16, 1948), with regard to the confidential status of employee loyalty records.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those two letters introduced and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted.

(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 269 and 270" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 31, 1951, addressed to Hon. Dean Acheson and signed by Eva B. Adams, administrative assistant to Senator McCarran:

In connection with some matters now under consideration by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, we will have occasion to refer to certain memo randa from Foreign Service officers quoted in part on pages 564 to 567 of the State Department's publication "The United States Relations with China." In all fairness to the Department and the individuals involved, we would like the full documents for our use rather than the excerpts quoted. We would appreciate your sending us the full memoranda from which the quotations were taken.

Thank you for your cooperation,

Sincerely yours,

EVA B. ADAMS.

That refers to the reports of Davies, Ludden, and Service, along with Emmerson, in the white paper. The reply is dated September

12, 1951, Department of State, signed by W. K. Scott, Acting Deputy Under Secretary:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: The receipt is acknowledged of Miss Adams' letter of August 31, 1951, requesting the full text of certain memoranda quoted in part in pages 564 to 576 of the Department publication "United States Relations With China."

The Department will examine its files for the documents in question and will communicate with you further respecting this matter.

Sincerely yours,

_____

(For the Secretary of State).

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. September 12, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. I recommend that these two letters be introduced into the record and be marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted.

(The documents referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandell were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 271 and 272" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I have just one more exchange, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Has any further reply come from the State Department on that last letter?

Mr. MANDEL. I am searching to find if there is any further reply.

This is a letter dated September 12, 1951, to the Hon. Dean Acheson from Senator Pat McCarran:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: For purposes of use by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, we would like to have a copy of a report sent to the State Department by John Kenneth Emmerson, dated February 25, 1946, entitled "Political Factors in the Present Japanese Situation," and another dated January 5, 1945, entitled "The Japanese Communist Party."

We would like to use this material in connection with a hearing on Friday, September 14. We shall be glad to send a messenger to the Department if you will telephone us that this material is available.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

On Thursday, September 13, we received a telephone message from a Mr. Anderson of the State Department, extension 2206, in reference to the documents mentioned in our letter of September 12, 1951, telling us we would hear further.

On September 14 Mr. Walter K. Scott of the State Department called and stated that a letter "is being written us that they will not be able to release the documents requested."

We did not receive the letter for unexplained reasons, but we got this letter over the telephone from the State Department that they had sent us dated September 19, 1951:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This is in reply to your request for copies of two reports sent to the State Department by Mr. John Kenneth Emmerson, one dated February 25, 1946, entitled "Political Factors in the Present Japanese Situation," and another dated January 5, 1945, entitled "The Japanese Communist Party."

It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting by departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. In the present context, the release of these reports by individual officers would undoubtedly have the effect of inhibiting the free and frank expression of views by officers in the field in their reports to the Department. For that reason, the request must be respectfully declined.

As this matter is of great importance to the Department, I should very much appreciate an opportunity to discuss it with you at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Signed by Mr. Webb, Acting Secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like those letters to go in the record, together with the memoranda and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 273, 374, and 275," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show that Professor Colegrove is here today under subpena, and we are going to ask him to testify about a meeting that took place 2 years ago. Mr. Chairman, there is a transcript of this meeting, and we have requested it and it has been denied us.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to take time now, but I do want to comment on some of this information that is now put in the record about the cooperation of the executive branch, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH COLEGROVE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILL.

Senator FERGUSON. We asked the professor to come here and he has been waiting quite a while. I did want the record to show that I did not want the record to stand as it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. My name is Kenneth Colegrove. My address is Harris Hall 305, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

Mr. MORRIS. What are your present duties?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I am professor of political science, Northwestern University.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have held that position since 1919. I have been absent from Northwestern University on sabbaticals, traveling in Europe and Asia, but the position has been held since 1919.

Mr. MORRIS. What has been your major assignment in Northwestern?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Teaching political science, particularly the field of international law and international relations and also Asiatic politics in government.

Mr. MORRIS. What degrees do you hold, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have an A. B. degree from the State University of Iowa, a Ph. D. from Harvard University. Columbia University gave me an honorary Doctor of Letters some years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, what books have you written?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have written one book on Militarism in Japan, in 1936; a book on International Control of Aviation. That was back in 1930. I have written a book on United States Senate and World Peace, in 1944.

Mr. Morris. Professor, what has been your specialty in international affairs?

Mr. Colegrove. My specialty has been international control of aviation and treaty-making in the United States, and then government and politics and diplomacy of Japan. I might say that my studies on Japan amount to about 20 articles which are published in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of International Law and other learned journals.

Mr. Morris. Professor, when did you first join the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Colegrove. I joined at an early date. I am sorry to say I didn't refresh my memory on that, but somewhere in the middle of the thirties, I think.

Mr. Morris. How long have you remained a member of the institute?

Mr. Colegrove. I have been off and on, a member of the institute. You joined the institute simply by paying your dues. That is all it amounts to.

May I say I joined the institute back in the early thirties because at that time the institute had the reputation of unbiased scientific system of investigation and many of the books that it published and the survey which it published were very excellent helps in teaching and in research.

It also purported at that time to be wholly unbiased, wholly scientific, and a very large number of professors and libraries subscribed to it. I think most of the members like myself became members in order to get the publications rather than to participate in the studies.

Senator Ferguson. The studies were done by a group that could spend the time and the effort?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. The books that were sent out to the student of international affairs and teachers, you did want to be in a position to get these as they came out?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. We referred our students to these studies. They were excellent studies on the whole. Sometimes you could detect a bias but you attached that to the writer rather than to the institute itself.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know people were writing under fictitious names or aliases?

Mr. Colegrove. I didn't realize that with reference to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator Ferguson. That was not what the teacher really wanted. He wanted to know who the writer was, his experience, et cetera?

Mr. Colegrove. Exactly.

Mr. Morris. Professor, were you associated with the publication Amerasia?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes; I was, from the first issue down to the time when I resigned.

Mr. Morris. Was the first issue in 1937?

Mr. Colegrove. 1937. I resigned from the advisory board. I was a member of what was called the advisory board of editors from 1937 until 1942 when I resigned first and was persuaded to come back. Then I resigned for good in 1943.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the circumstances surrounding your first becoming associated with the publication and the two resignations you have just mentioned?

Mr. Colegrove. I was invited to join the editorial board by Frederick Field who was and still is a very personable young man.

Senator Eastland. What year was that?

Mr. Colegrove. That was in 1936, the year before the first publication.

At that time the American people were not widely awake to Asia and Asiatic problems. I was among those who felt we ought to know more about Asia, that we ought to study Asia more in the schools and we ought to have more information with reference to Asia and we ought to awaken a large public opinion with reference to Asia.

America knew a great deal about Europe but Asia had been very greatly neglected. What Frederick Field and what Mr. Jaffe and others connected with Amerasia, proposed to do was to publish a monthly journal called Amerasia, America-Asia, running the two together, which would translate into popular language the learning regarding current affairs in Asia. To me that was a very attractive proposition. I think most of the editors, most of the scholars who agreed to become editors, felt that they were really doing a service to the American people and doing a service to the schools, doing a service to public opinion, by serving on this Amerasia.

The first numbers of Amerasia were excellent. Some of the very best things we have on Asia were published in Amerasia.

The Chairman. Would you raise your voice just a bit, Professor?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes.

Some very good articles were published in Amerasia. I did not detect any special line in 1937, 1938, and 1939. I knew that some of the editorial board were attached preeminently to the American interests, looked at the national interest of the American people as first and foremost. I knew that others were not so careful of the American interests and sympathized with revolutionary processes, some of which are rather dangerous.

I thought at the time it was a well-balanced board. All views were expressed there.

Mr. Morris. Professor, looking back do you think there was a line there or do you think you just did not detect a line?

Mr. Colegrove. In the first few years as I look over the old numbers I would say there was no line to be easily detected. Later on the line appeared, especially in articles by a Chinese scholar by the name of Chi.

Senator Ferguson. What was the line, Professor?

Mr. Colegrove. It is very hard to say exactly what the line was. When I use "the line," I mean a person is following the policy of Soviet Russia.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if you had followed the line you would have gone to the Kremlin?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes; the line would go back to the Kremlin.

Mr. Morris. You say that is right?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. That is what I meant by party line.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor. I would like to offer you an exchange of correspondence involving you, which Mr. Mandel will certify came from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want the witness to see them first?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. COLEGROVE. This is a letter from Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. MORRIS. There were three letters, a copy of a letter from Mr. Lockwood to you and the second letter is one which purports to be an original of yours.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I recall the correspondence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that?

Mr. MANDEL. These letters dated November 30, 1942, November 20, 1942, November 18, 1942, and November 17, 1942, were taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, will you tell us your recollection of this exchange of correspondence?

Mr. COLEGROVE. As I just said, I served on this advisory editorial board from 1937 on. I was one of the few members from the West, and I must say I never attended a meeting of the editorial board, although I understand meetings were held about every month in New York City. I never happened to be in New York City when such a meeting was held.

In the beginning it was my understanding with the board that I would be given the right to approve all the articles on Japan that were published in Amerasia. These articles were sent out to me in bunches. I read them and sent back my comments. Later on I noticed that Amerasia did publish some articles on Japan which I had not O. K.'d. I was very busy at the time and didn't protest at this seeming neglect.

Then around 1940 a number of articles began to be published in Amerasia by Kate Mitchell and by Mr. Mattuch and Mr. Gohol very antagonistic to the British rule in India and also to the Dutch rule in Indonesia.

During the war Great Britain became our ally, or we became an ally of Great Britain and I thought this was very bad policy to publish these articles without having articles on the other side. I protested at this lack of impartiality and scholarship. Mr. Jaffe promised me that I would have the right before any article attacking British rule in India or Dutch rule in Indonesia——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you please speak up?

Mr. COLEGROVE. American articles were published in Amerasia attacking the British rule in India and the Dutch rule in Indonesia. That of course was following the Communist line. I didn't know that at the time. I thought it was very unscholarly to publish articles attacking British rule in India and Dutch rule in Indonesia without publishing articles on the other side. Mr. Jaffe agreed with me on this matter because I suppose he wanted to keep the old members of the board together, and said that before any article attacking the British in India or the Dutch in Indonesia was published, he would allow me to secure some other writer to publish an article on the other side.

Mr. Jaffe, I am sorry to say, in my view broke that agreement, and in the fall of 1942 I resigned from the editorial board, saying this was

not following the scholarly procedure. This correspondence relates to my resignation.

Mr. Jaffe later on persuaded me to come back, with the very firm promise that it would never happen again. I regret to say that it did happen again and I resigned for good in April 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, does Mr. Lockwood concede there was a line to Amerasia in his letter to you there?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I am afraid he does. Mr. Lockwood seems to be on both sides.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the second paragraph?

This is his letter?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date?

Mr. COLEGROVE. November 30, 1942.

It seems to me that as matters now stand the editors are put in an embarrassing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned and therefore all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything that is said whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen it in advance. Jaffe recognized the validity of this objection and promised to think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again.

In later correspondence Jaffe promised that would not be done in the future.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask that these four letters identified by Professor Colegrove and by Mr. Mandel as letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations be introduced into the record and be marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. There seems to be something more than letters here.

Mr. MORRIS. This is just our summary of the exchange. The four letters should go in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The letters will be inserted into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked as exhibits Nos. 276, 277, 278, and 279, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 279

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
November 17, 1942.

Mr. PHILIP J. JAFFE,
Amerasia, 125 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. JAFFE: I am writing you regarding the lack of objectivity and scholarship displayed in recent articles in Amerasia dealing with India.

In the October 25 issue of Amerasia occurs an article by Mr. Kurt R. Mattusch under the title "The American Public and India," which is not only bitterly anti-British but also unscholarly.

For instance, on page 403 he says that the debate on the Cripps Mission in the House of Lords envisaged safe reservations for British interests within India. As a matter of fact, the debate of July 30 was on Europeans in India and was not on the Cripps mission. The Marquess of Crewe, whose speech is quoted, was not an official spokesman. Mr. Mattusch completely ignores the statement of the Duke of Devonshire, who, speaking for the Government, said: "It is really impossible to make an offer both of complete self-government and to exact guaranties for specified British interests."

Again, his statement about taxes and the upkeep of Gibraltar, Malta, and Eden is simply fantastic. Numerous other errors in this article could be pointed out.

I wish also to refer to the number of Amerasia published in May and devoted to India and the war. This number contained numerous misrepresentations that

no scholar would tolerate. For instance, on pages 4 to 8, the onus of defeat of the Cripps mission seems to be laid on Mr. Jinnah, who is pictured as a scheming politician. Now, everyone with even a slight acquaintance with Indian affairs knows that the working committee of the Indian National Congress contains politicians just as scheming and selfish as Mr. Jinnah. Nevertheless the commentator ignores this fact.

The commentary also fails to give a proper consideration to Pakistan, to explain the Moslem case, to give proper consideration to the plight of the untouchables under the Hindu domination. It fails to call proper attention to the very small percentage of Indian people, barely 10,000,000 out of 389,000,000, who are political-minded. A scholarly treatment of the question should point out all these facts.

There is another consideration other than lack of scholarship in the publication of these one-sided articles and comment. We are engaged cooperatively in a war for the self-preservation of our institutions. Great Britain is our ally in this war. The publication of articles which misrepresent the facts while attacking Great Britain can do little else than impair our war effort. Loyalty to our own country requires intellectual honesty and moderation in any criticism of our ally.

I find myself under necessity of resigning from the editorial board unless Amerasia is willing to publish in the very near future two articles to offset the above-mentioned anti-British articles. I would like to see this principle also applied to the editorials.

It is a matter of deep regret to me to be compelled to write to you in this fashion. There is nothing personal in my feeling in this matter. But as a teacher I cannot permit my name to be used on an editorial board of a magazine which prints such unscholarly and unfair articles without also publishing articles on the other side.

It is probable that in any case I ought not be on the editorial board, inasmuch as I live so far from New York City and cannot attend the periodical meetings of the editorial board.

Please do not consider this letter as any ultimatum in this matter. I have nothing but the most friendly feeling toward you personally and all my colleagues on the board.

Faithfully yours,

KENNETH COLEGROVE,
Professor of Political Science.

EXHIBIT No. 278

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS,
Evanston, Ill., November 18, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM LOCKWOOD,
Secretary, American Committee for International Studies,
Princeton, N. J.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have just sent to Mr. Philip Jaffe, editor of Amerasia. I regret very much the necessity of sending this letter, but I feel that I cannot remain a member of the editorial board of a magazine which publishes articles severely criticizing our ally Great Britain unless those articles are scholarly in character and also unless the British side, or again the Moslem side, is also expressed on the pages of the magazine.

I suppose, anyway, it is time for me to withdraw from the editorial board, inasmuch as, living in Chicago, I cannot attend the board meeetings. I hope, of course, if the editorial board cannot arrange to publish some articles on the other side of the Indian question, and if I find it necessary to withdraw from the board, Amerasia will publish my letter of resignation, indicating exactly my reason for retiring.

Hastily yours,

KENNETH COLEGROVE,
Professor of Political Science.

EXHIBIT No. 277

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY,
Princeton, N. J., November 20, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

DEAR BILL: I am sorry we opened the enclosed letter from Kenneth Colegrove, which is not on American committee business even though it is addressed to you as secretary of the committee.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Ed.
(Typed) EDWARD MEADE EARLE.

P. S.—Incidentally, I was pretty peeved about the review of Mackinder, which I thought flippant.

EXHIBIT No. 276

NOVEMBER 30, 1942.

Prof. KENNETH COLEGROVE,
105 Harris Hall, Northwestern University,
Evanston, Ill.

DEAR PROFESSOR COLEGROVE: I have read with interest and some sympathy your letter to Phil Jaffe on Amerasia. I felt the same way about the treatment of India and have said so to him and to Kate Mitchell.

It seems to be that as matters now stand the editors are put in an embarrassing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned; and, therefore, all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything that is said, whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen it in advance. Jaffe recognized the validity of this objection and promised to think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again.

For some time I've been frankly rather puzzled as to whether to remain on the board, being torn between reluctance to sponsor the "line" being taken and, on the other hand, the feeling that Amerasia had a lot of useful stuff in it. Also, I dislike making any sort of break with Jaffe and Miss Mitchell, both of whom are close personal friends of mine.

It may be that the whole board of outsiders ought to disappear and the magazine be made frankly the personal vehicle of the two people doing all the work. They are reluctant to have that happen. The real reason I haven't withdrawn, confidentially, is the hope that sooner or later some kind of combination could be made between Amerasia and the two IPR periodicals which would strengthen their total usefulness to the public and eliminate the present duplication and competition. From the IPR standpoint, this of course would preclude a consistent and personalized editorial line, though it wouldn't by any means preclude a forum of opinion presenting a variety of views. Personnel is getting so scarce that there ought to be some combination in this general field of Far East periodicals. The new form of Amerasia serves really to increase the duplication and competition with Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern Survey, particularly the former.

My own ideas aren't very clear on this, and I'm writing you my puzzlement in the hope that you may have some suggestions. As a nonstaff person who has been interested both in Amerasia and in the IPR, I would very much appreciate having your views as to what we ought to do.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD.

NOTE.—I understand this is what happened: IPR people would not go along with Jaffe's personal views as reflected in Amerasia, which had started as an objective and substantiated paper.—CLAYTON LANE, *January, 1950.*

(Above is handwritten.)

Mr. Morris. Were you invited to participate in Government service during the war?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. I was invited to be a consultant by the Office of Strategic Services.

Mr. Morris. By whom?

Mr. Colegrove. I was invited by Charles Burton Foss. I might say as a matter of amusement here, that during the war a great many of us old professors were invited to serve in Government agencies by our bright young students who had gone into the Government service and gotten into positions of some importance. Charles Burton Foss was a former student of mine. He was inviting his old professor to come down and help him during the war, which I did.

Mr. Morris. What other invitation did you have to join the Government service, Professor?

Mr. Colegrove. During the war my consultation with the Office of Strategic Services was my only service. Immediately after the war, I was invited to become a consultant for General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. That was in 1946.

Mr. Morris. Did you as a matter of fact work for OSS, Professor?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. I served as a consultant on four or five different occasions in Washington for the OSS. I might say that Charles Burton Foss was first the Chief of the Japan Section of the OSS under the Far Eastern Division. Then he succeeded Carl Remer and was Chief of the Far Eastern Division of OSS.

Mr. Morris. Were you ever asked to join the Office of War Information?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. I was offered the post of head of the Japanese desk in the OWI in Japan. I was asked to take that position by Prof. Owen Lattimore, who was serving the Office of War Information from the San Francisco position.

Mr. Morris. Did you accept that offer, Professor?

Mr. Colegrove. No; I declined that position.

Mr. Morris. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Lattimore at the time of your declination, Professor?

Mr. Colegrove. Yes. Professor Lattimore wrote me several letters and then asked me to meet him as he came through from Washington to San Francisco; asked me to meet him in Chicago. I met him.

Mr. Morris. Will you relate to us what happened during the course of that conversation, Professor?

Mr. Colegrove. That was in December 1943, and Lattimore again offered me the post of the Japan desk in San Francisco. He seemed a little annoyed that I didn't accept it. We had dinner together. I was courteously awaiting until his plane took off for San Francisco; so we continued the conversation. We discussed first the position that Amerasia had taken with reference to the British in India, and I objected to Amerasia's attitude and articles and said that was one of the points why I resigned. Lattimore seemed to take great offense at that.

Senator Ferguson. At your position?

Mr. Colgrove. Yes, at my position; very great offense at my arguments, and I was entirely wrong regarding it. For some reason or other, we got on the subject of the Dutch in Indonesia. Lattimore was still more furious at my contradicting him with reference to the

benefits of Dutch rule in Indonesia. I was opposed to liquidating Dutch imperialism in Indonesia immediately after the war. Then I mentioned something about the Chinese Communists, and this surprised me a great deal to have Lattimore, whom I thought by this time had lost some of his control, claim that he had more information on China than I had, which was, of course, true. He went so far as to say that Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-tung were real democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no connection with Soviet Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. You say Professor Lattimore said the Chinese Communists were democrats, agrarian reformers, and had no connection with Soviet Russia?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you taken the opposite view?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes. I think most scholars felt the same way at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. That you were right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt I was right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did most scholars feel——

Mr. COLEGROVE. At that time I think most impartial scholars were very hesitant to believe that the Chinese Communists did not have some connection with Soviet Russia, that Mao Tse-tung was a Marxian doctrinnaire and not a mere agrarian reformer, and certainly not a democrat in any respect.

I told Lattimore on this occasion that I felt that he was saying something he didn't believe himself, and I was surprised to see Lattimore back down.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was conversing with you in a state of temper?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I think he got very annoyed with me and didn't exercise caution which he generally does exercise.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he mention whether or not he felt that the Chinese Communists were receiving aid from Soviet Russia?

Mr. COLEGROVE. He claimed they were not. In fact, he went so far as to say there was no means of communication.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not quite well known at that time that young Chinese had been taken to Moscow and indoctrinated and trained? That was a matter of pretty common knowledge; was it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Certainly, among persons who followed the situation in Asia, that was very well known.

The CHAIRMAN. Mao Tse-tung was one of them?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, Mao Tse-tung had not gone to Moscow. He was one of the few who did not. Every one of his lieutenants were Moscow-trained. That applied especially to Chou En Lai.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you not somewhat surprised at Lattimore's stand being in the OWI, Lattimore taking the stand he did in relation to these Communists in China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was amazed, frankly. I got the impression that perhaps Professor Lattimore was not following instructions from the State Department that he should be following with reference to his duties in San Francisco.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I meant.

Mr. COLEGROVE. About this time the official view of the United States was that nothing disparaging should be said of the Japanese

Emperor, the Tano system; nothing should be done to arouse hatred or antagonism of the imperial household, because my understanding is that Mr. Grew, who was the Under Secretary of State, had the opinion that the Emperor would be of very great assistance in bringing about the surrender of Japan when finally Japan should wisely surrender. The militarists would never give in. So, if you could only get the Emperor, you would save a situation.

Owen Lattimore's view from conversations was, as I recall, that the Emperor's system was the greatest deterrent to democracy in Japan and that the Emperor and his whole family should be exterminated.

Senator EASTLAND. You mean killed?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Killed, destroyed. Publicly he did not go that far. He went that far privately.

Senator FERGUSON. With you?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Publicly his proposal was that the Japanese Emperor and his whole family should be sent over to China to be dealt with by the Chinese. Everybody who knew Asia at that time would realize the Chinese would annihilate the Emperor and his family or put them beyond all power of living.

Senator FERGUSON. Professor, this line that Lattimore was taking, both on the Emperor and the situation of the Chinese, was that, in your opinion, the Soviet line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. That has always been the Soviet line. The Communist Party in Japan ever since 1921 has opposed the Emperor. That has been the line of the Communist Party in Japan while they were underground. They were underground from 1923 on. Of course, the Communist Party line in Japan was dictated by the Kremlin.

Senator FERGUSON. But here was a man, Owen Lattimore, that was well informed as to America's stand, or should have been, and as to the world situation. When he was advocating to you privately these matters, in your opinion, as you said to him once, I believe, that he was advocating something that he could hardly believe himself but he was still advocating it, that was the Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I do not charge him——

Senator FERGUSON. With being a Communist?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No. I did not charge him with following the Communist line. I simply told him I was sure he knew better, that Mao Tse-tung was not a democrat and a mere agrarian reformer. I probably did not make my statement clear here when I said I talked these things over with Lattimore on the occasion of our visit in December 1943.

Also I discussed with Lattimore the policy of the United States toward the Emperor that was being followed by the State Department, the War Department and the OWI at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you decline a job in San Francisco?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Largely personal. I did not trust Owen Lattimore. I did not care to be associated with him.

Senator EASTLAND. You thought they were following the Communist line out there?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I can't say that I was that alert, Senator. Some of us professors are not as alert as we should be. I could not say that Owen Lattimore was following the Communist line. I didn't like his attitude on Asiatic problems.

Senator EASTLAND. You say it was a Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I say it was the Communist line.

Senator EASTLAND. You say you did not trust him. Therefore, you did not take the job. Is that right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you not trust him?

Mr. COLEGROVE. For those reasons.

Senator EASTLAND. Because he was following the Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I would say in the back of my mind that would stand out, but at that time I would not have said that Owen Lattimore is following the Communist line.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no doubt about it now?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was the Communist line. As you look back over the situation and compare it with the editorials in the Daily Worker, you can see definitely that was the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, on the 10th of July of this year while you were examined in executive session you were shown a letter dated July 10, 1938, by Owen Lattimore to Mr. Carter. I would like to show this to you once again and ask you if you will make any general comment on the last full paragraph on the first page and the first paragraph on the second page.

The CHAIRMAN. What is this?

Mr. MORRIS. This, Senator, is a letter which has been introduced in evidence previously, a letter from Owen Lattimore to Edward C. Carter, dated July 10, 1938, and officially made a part of our record.

The CHAIRMAN. You are drawing his attention to certain paragraphs?

Mr. MORRIS. Two paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question?

Mr. MORRIS. I have just called attention to the fact that he was shown that letter in executive session and asked to comment on it. I am going to ask him if he will make any comments now.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well for you to read the paragraphs.

Mr. COLEGROVE. One paragraph that you refer to here Professor Lattimore says:

> I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Chi was a member of the editorial board of Amerasia and I did not know at that time he was a Communist, but it was very evident that he was following the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. It was evident to you, Professor, that Chi, while you were on the board of Amerasia with him, was following the Communist Party line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That came gradually into our minds, that he was following the Communist line. At first we thought he was a bright young Chinese scholar who had a mass of information, which he did. He had a mass of information. We finally realized it was along the Communist line entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. When you use the term "we" are you using the editorial "we" applying to yourself?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I would say it included members of the committee like Cyrus Peake and myself. I assume other members who were very sympathetic toward the Kremlin knew it all the time.

The last paragraph reads:

> For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position for the IPR differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

That sentence, together with his whole letter, seems to me to be one of the most intellectually dishonest academic documents that I have ever seen. This is a complete negation of what the IPR said to professors and teachers all over the country that it was. In its solicitation for membership it had always emphasized the scholarly, scientific viewpoint that it was presenting, amplified by the fact that it was not trying to advocate the interest of any particular country but only giving us the benefit of their researches and their scholarship.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you thought it was an honest organization and this sentence indicates to you that it was really a fraud?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. This is fraudulent. This is one of the most contemptible things I know from the whole academic world. Thousands of university professors and hundreds of thousands of students all over the country who were beginning to study Asia looked upon this institute as an unbiased, wholly scientific institution engaged in research, engaged in discovery of the truth and in not following any line.

I and other scholars would have been shocked if we knew that one official of the Institute of Pacific Relations was writing to the secretary-general telling him to follow a certain line with reference to China, Japan, with reference to Indonesia.

Senator FERGUSON. Professor, to do it in such a way as to deceive the people, not to come out and announce it was a Communist propaganda agency but to deceive the people, isn't that true with that sentence?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. It was shocking. It is almost revolting to think that you yourself were misled by such an organization. This will have done a very great injury to organized scholarship in the United States. It is no wonder people are suspicious of the Rockefeller Foundation or of the Carnegie Corp. which gives so much money to organizations of this sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Then to realize those that had charge of it would use it as a means of deceiving the people and use it really as a propaganda agency or front?

Mr. COLEGROVE. This shows behind the front the Institute of Pacific Relations was nothing else than a propaganda organization supporting a line.

Senator EASTLAND. A Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. In this case a Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Professor.

This, Mr. Chairman, has already been introduced into the record as exhibit No. 4 on the first day of the open hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show exhibit No. 4 is the exhibit in the hands of the witness at this time from which he testified.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Colegrove, did you attend a conference held under the auspices of the State Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I was invited to attend that conference. The invitation came in a telegram signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your understanding of this conference, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. My understanding had been that Professor Jessup had been charged by the State Department with the formulation of a new policy for China and that a committee had been set up with Professor Jessup as chairman, President Case and Dr. Fosdick as the two other members, and that Ambassador Jessup and the State Department wished to receive advice from experts regarding what the policy of the United States in China should be.

I might say the collapse of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Government had occurred that summer.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, were Messrs. Jessup, Fosdick, and Case all three IPR men?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I believe they were, but Mr. Jessup of course was the member of the board of trustees. I believe Dr. Fosdick was also. I have always assumed that President Case was a member.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified, Professor, that this conference, to your understanding, was called by Mr. Jessup in order to assist the Secretary of State in formulating far-eastern policy?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I wouldn't like to be positive about that. I would say that impression was that the list was prepared by Ambassador Jessup. The invitation was over the signature of the Secretary of State.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that the conference we are now having testimony about is the conference, the transcript of which was asked for by you of the State Department and which was denied.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record so show.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time of receiving a letter from the State Department a list of consultants who did attend this conference was made available. I would like now to show this list to Professor Colegrove to refresh his recollection on the make-up of that particular conference.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the list attached to the letter addressed to me under date of September 12, 1951, over the signature of Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. COLEGROVE. May I use this?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Would you just state that most of the participants of that conference were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. COLEGROVE. It seems to me, Mr. Morris, that most of these are members of the IPR, and many of them are high-ranking officers.

The CHAIRMAN. High-ranking officers of what?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Of the IPR, that is, members of the board of trustees. I must say I was never a high-ranking officer in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was merely a member. Thousands of

people in the United States were members simply to subscribe to the Survey and other publications.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the editorial staff?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No; but I was a member of the advisory editorial board of Amerasia but not of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I propose that the best way of identifying or establishing whether or not these people were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations is during the course of the testimony of the next witness on this conference to ask Mr. Holland, presently secretary-general, to confirm those who were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Mandel has made a compilation from our records, but I suggest it is inadequate and that the best way of establishing it would be to have Mr. Holland assert for our record who the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations are.

The CHAIRMAN. He is coming on?

Mr. MORRIS. No; but during the testimony of our next witness in regard to this conference have Mr. Holland establish that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. As I understand the witness' testimony now, he is saying that a considerable number of the names on that list were high-ranking officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; many were, not a majority, but many were.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe for us the developments of the conference as they unfolded, Professor?

The CHAIRMAN. You did attend the conference, first of all?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, I was present during the 3 days that the conference was held.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did it assemble?

Mr. COLEGROVE. In the State Department, in the large conference room right off of the offices of the Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. Who if anyone was the presiding officer?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The presiding officer was Ambassador Jessup, but Dr. Jessup was detained in Lake Success with the United Nations affairs and was not present in the opening session.

Mr. MORRIS. He was present during the second and third sessions?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Dr. Fosdick presided over the first day's session.

Mr. MORRIS. What were some of the subjects discussed at that conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Morris, may I say with reference to giving testimony on the subject of this conference in the State Department that the State Department did say that the proceedings would be confidential and would not be given to the press. The implication was that members of the conference should not discuss this matter with the press.

On the other hand, I take it that it is proper for any member of the conference who is testifying before a Senate committee to speak very frankly with reference to what was said and done in the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not only proper, sir; you are under oath.

Mr. COLEGROVE. And must answer the questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You were called in by the United States Government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. The telegram was signed Dean Acheson. Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. You were acting as a Government official?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you paid or not?

Mr. COLEGROVE, Travel expenses were given and a per diem.

Senator FERGUSON. You were to advise with the various members there?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Advise with Ambassador Jessup's committee.

Senator FERGUSON. It was public business; that is, the Government was paying for it, setting it up and taxpayers' money was being used for it?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The obvious purpose was to formulate far eastern policy?

Mr. COLEGROVE. So we understood.

Senator JENNER. Were there any press releases issued from this conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Some time later, as I recollect, and I am sorry I cannot give you the exact date, the State Department published a list of consultants.

Senator JENNER. Did they publish any news or anything said in the conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No. My understanding is they did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the question of Communist China discussed?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. The recognition of Communist China was one of the very important questions discussed. When Ambassador Jessup arrived he frankly said that the Department wanted the advice of these consultants on the question of recognition of Communist China, on the question of the Japan Peace Treaty, on the question of a Pacific pact, and on the question of giving economic aid to Communist and non-Communist countries in Asia. Those four subjects were broadly discussed and a great many other subjects, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a tendency of the various people during the course of these 3 days to break down into groups and take positions on the subjects as they arose?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, there was that tendency. As you will notice, it always occurs in a group of individuals. You can classify them more or less closely into groups. If you are going to limit the groups to three. I would say that one group was very obviously pro-American in its thinking, put America first, that is, foreign policy must serve the national interest of the American people.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that group generally take a strong anti-Communist position?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That group took a very strong anti-Communist position. Now on the other side of this group they were not thinking so much of America as they were thinking of other things and that group tended to be sympathetic to Communistic China and very, very considerate of the Kremlin.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I would say the leader of that group, if you consider he was a leader, was Professor Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Owen Lattimore. I would put in that group Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, of IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show at this time that Lawrence K. Rosinger has been identified by two witnesses as having been a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. By two witnesses before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Before this committee.

Mr. COLEGROVE. More or less, Professor Fairbank.

Mr. MORRIS. Prof. John K. Fairbank?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

To some extent Reischauer of Harvard and Professor Peffer of Columbia University.

Senator EASTLAND. As I understand, Ambassador Jessup invited Owen Lattimore to a conference in Washington to advise and assist in formulating United States Government's China policy and advise with him on the Japanese Peace Treaty; is that right?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, if Owen Lattimore received the very same telegram that I received, it was signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.

Senator EASTLAND. You say the list was made up by Professor Jessup?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I assume that. I don't know; that was the talk.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know that Professor Jessup was in charge of this particular conference you attended?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I think the Secretary of State would not act very wisely if he didn't allow Ambassador Jessup to select his own expert.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that in 1949?

Mr. COLEGROVE. October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned the interest for America in the first group and then you said there were others you thought were thinking of something else than the primary interest of America and her relations to the world. What was that other thing?

Mr. COLEGROVE. With reference to this extreme group?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt that they were very sympathetic toward Chinese Communists and also were extremely careful with reference to the Kremlin.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, they were favoring, in your opinion, the Communist line rather than the good interests of the United States of America?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. From what was said?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Did they advocate economic aid to Communist China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, very, very strongly.

Senator FERGUSON. And recognition of Communist China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Immediate recognition of Communist China, and were very much opposed to a Pacific pact.

The CHAIRMAN. You have named certain people who were present at that meeting as belonging to that particular group that favored Communist China and the Kremlin. Have you named all of them that you can recall who belonged to that group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I see one other name I should have thought of, Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, who is very decidedly of that group; sometimes Eugene Staley, Professor Staley.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the chairman take any side as to what group he was with?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Ambassador Jessup gave no sign he was in favor of one or the other. He was a good presiding officer. He was a good parliamentarian. Ambassador Jessup is suave, courteous, almost deferential. He knows how to cut off debate without offending anyone's sensibilities. He is an excellent presiding officer.

At the same time Professor Jessup is a great scholar. I have very great respect for his scholarship, his learning, and his books on international law particularly are very notable contributions.

In this conference Mr. Jessup did not indicate his own personal attitude on any question whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Colegrove, as a matter of fact which group dominated the conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt that the group that was sympathetic to Red China dominated the conference. Governor Stassen was among those who were very much opposed to Soviet Russia. Ballantine, Joseph W. Ballantine, was opposed. Professor Brodie was very much opposed. I was decidedly opposed myself. I think we could add the name of Professor Buss as among those who took a strong anti-Communist attitude. I felt that we were in the minority, I am sorry to say.

Mr. MORRIS. And the people who did favor Communist China were in the majority and they dominated the conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Then the third group I mentioned was a group between, that was on one side once and on the other side again, persons who were a little unstable—well, a little undecided as to the position they wished to follow.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may the record show at this time that a subpena has been sent to Governor Stassen to appear before this committee next Monday afternoon in connection with the testimony given today by Professor Colegrove?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The subpena has been issued?

Mr. MORRIS. It is going out today, Senator.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have not had an opportunity to read the transcript that the State Department kept.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a transcript?

Mr. COLEGROVE. A transcript was made of everything by the State Department. Governor Stassen was very shrewd; I believe he had his own secretary there making a transcript. But I have had no opportunity to review this, the proceedings, and I am speaking wholly from my memory 2 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. You have spoken generally of opinion, so you have not attempted to give specific statements.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; except I would be specific on the question of recognizing Red China. Mr. Lattimore was wholly for it. Mr. Kizer was for it. Mr. Rosinger was for it and Mr. Staley was for it, also Mr. Fairbank. I was opposed to it, Governor Stassen opposed to it, Ballantine opposed to it, and Brodie opposed to it.

Senator JENNER. Was there anything discussed in this conference with regard to our attitude toward Korea and Formosa?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Owen Lattimore, who had furnished the State Department with a memoranda, proposed in that memoranda that the United States immediately liquidate its responsibilities for Korea, and in the conference he expressed the same view. I remember that very distinctly.

Senator EASTLAND. As a loyal American, were you satisfied with the men who were invited to that conference at the State Department to advise Mr. Jessup on the formulation of China policy?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Frankly, Senator, I was very much surprised.

Senator EASTLAND. You were disappointed, were you not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was very much disappointed.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, the group that had been invited was the group largely that had betrayed the Chinese Government to the Communists?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That is exactly the situation.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, there were no new experts but it was the same crowd that had betrayed this country and sold China down the river?

Mr. COLEGROVE. And the State Department knew their views.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I might add this, and I have nothing to back it up except my impression—I thought the State Department in its briefing was doing a little propaganda work on a professor such as myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Who did the briefing?

Mr. COLEGROVE. There were several officers who briefed us. Nelson Johnson of the Far Eastern Commission did a very good job of briefing. I was very much disappointed in the briefing done by Cora Du Bois, who briefed the conference upon southeast Asia. I suspect, but I haven't much to go on, that the State Department thought it was good for some of the experts, so-called experts, to indoctrinate us and when it was over to approve the new policy which would be recognition of New China.

Mr. MORRIS. You thought that had been the policy and they just wanted to get somebody to back them up?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I got that impression, I am sorry to say.

Senator EASTLAND. Now did you read the American white paper on China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, all students of Asia studied that with a great deal of care.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that an honest or dishonest and false document?

Mr. COLEGROVE. In my opinion it was one of the most false documents ever published by any country.

Senator EASTLAND. It was a dishonest document?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Thoroughly dishonest.

Senator EASTLAND. Who supervised the preparation of that white paper?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The New York Times said that Ambassador Jessup had been appointed by the State Department to edit that but I can hardly believe that Phil Jessup really supervised that document. He is a scholar, he is a learned man, and as a scholar the man must have realized that that document is not the real story.

Senator JENNER. Owen Lattimore is a scholar and learned man?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, a fine scholar, he has a fine command of certain Asiatic languages, that is true.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the letter of transmittal?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That letter of transmittal was thoroughly dishonest, especially the paragraph of the letter which says that there is nothing that the United States could have done to save Chiang Kai-shek and again, except to reemphasize it, the United States had left nothing undone that might have saved him and kept the Communists from winning the victory.

Senator EASTLAND. You thought that was a lie?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That obviously was a lie, and I must say that those sort of statements are one thing we try to teach freshmen at Northwestern University never to make, such general sweeping statements like that, and I think by the time they have become seniors we have taught them those are not the kind of statements to make.

Senator EASTLAND. Who signed that letter of transmittal?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That letter was under the signature, I understand, of the Secretary of State, but obviously someone in the Department drafted it for him.

Senator EASTLAND. In reality was it drafted by Professor Jessup?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I don't know. I hope it was not. I sincerely hope that Phil Jessup did not draft that letter.

Senator EASTLAND. But the newspaper said he prepared that white paper, did it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. My understanding was that he supervised the editing of the paper.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, supervised the editing.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you remember when Mr. Alfred Kohlberg made charges that the Institute of Pacific Relations was Communist-controlled?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I was one of the members at that time that voted in favor of Mr. Kohlberg when an attempt was made to change the direction——

Senator EASTLAND. All he wanted was an investigation?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Merely an investigation, an outside investigation.

Senator EASTLAND. Did he get that investigation?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No; he did not.

Senator EASTLAND. It was whitewashed, was it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Very distinctly.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not even get an inside investigation, did he?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Presumably he got an inside investigation because a letter was sent saying that his charges had been found utterly false.

Senator EASTLAND. You know it was a whitewash, do you not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt that very strongly even at the time.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Professor Jessup have a hand in that whitewash?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I regret to say that Jessup's name is among the eight who signed the letter to the members informing them that the charges were false.

Senator EASTLAND. And he had a hand in whitewashing and concealing Communist control of the Institute of Pacific Relations, an organization which was offering alleged experts in foreign policy to the American Government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. To my great regret, his name was in the list of eight informing the members.

Senator EASTLAND. Now what about Indonesia? Were you satisfied with Professor Jessup's stand in the United Nations on the Dutch Government in Indonesia?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I might say, in answer to that, that my whole attitude in this matter goes back some years and I was utterly surprised that Phil Jessup would accept the chairmanship of the board of trustees of the IPR. He is a great international jurist; that is his field. He had not made a reputation, had not at that time, in the Far East. He had written no articles I know of and no books. He had made no special study. So the appointment of Professor Jessup as chairman of the IPR seemed to me at the time to be very peculiar, something extraordinary.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; but then it was extraordinary and in his attacks on the Dutch Government and Dutch imperialism in Indonesia he followed the Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; the Communist line for many years has been the destruction of the Dutch rule in Indonesia.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it your judgment that he went beyond his instructions from the State Department to follow the Communist line in this instance?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, it seemed to me that the speeches that Ambassador Jessup made to the Security Council in December 1948 and again in January 1949 against the Dutch Government were very unfair and were not the speeches that a scholar should make. There was a rumor around the State Department that Ambassador Jessup had exceeded his instructions in pressing the Security Council to take drastic action against the Dutch.

I recall a dinner I had with Ambassador Jessup in February of 1949 at which I said to him that rumors had been to the effect that he had exceeded his instructions in the Indonesia affair. Phil Jessup, however, denied that had been the case and told me that he had not exceeded his instructions. Nevertheless the rumors persisted.

Senator EASTLAND. He was following the Communist line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, that is the Communist line.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, do you know Edward C. Carter?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; he is a fine, old gentleman. I have always been annoyed by Mr. Carter. He is really, let me say, not the type of man who should have headed a research institute.

Senator EASTLAND. I certainly agree with you. He ought to have been on Union Square.

Now in April of 1945 there were charges that Carter was attempting to influence the State Department to force the Generalissimo to take the Chinese Communists into his government; that is true, is it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; those rumors were present and began even before that time.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think the board of trustees of the institute should have called Carter to rein then?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was very much disturbed by those rumors. I wrote to Raymond Dennett, who was acting as secretary at that time, and also I chose him because I knew him very well. I wrote to him informing him that the rumors were that Edward Carter and other IPR officers had been lobbying for the State Department to force Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to take the Communists into his government and even to share the Chinese government on a 50–50 basis. I said I objected very strongly to any officer of the IPR lobbying this way with the State Department and particularly on work that was said to have been done by Edward Carter.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you not think that Professor Jessup and the trustees of the institute should have stopped Carter?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Certainly. I got a letter back saying that Carter wasn't doing anything like that but I can hardly believe that letter because I think the letter informing me was——

The CHAIRMAN. From whom was the letter?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Raymond Dennett, son of Tyler Dennett. Dennett at that time was acting as secretary of the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. In that instance were you not disappointed in Professor Jessup, that he did not attempt to prevent Carter from lobbying with the State Department to force Communists in the generalissimo's government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was disappointed with the whole board of trustees.

Senator EASTLAND. Jessup was one of them?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Jessup was one of the board of trustees at that time. I was disappointed with all of them for not taking these rumors and examining them and for not taking action against Carter, who I believe unquestionably was lobbying with the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. You believe unquestionably he was lobbying with the State Department?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. To force Chiang Kai-shek to put Communists in the government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. You said on a 50–50 basis?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, that was the rumor.

Senator EASTLAND. That would have meant a bloodless revolution in China?

Mr. COLESGROVE. Yes. Whenever the Communists move in, even on less than a 50–50 basis, they take over the government in a very short time. We have seen that too frequently in Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. We have had great trouble discovering who in the State Department prepared the memorandum for General Marshall when he went out to accomplish that mission.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, Professor Jessup had been close to this left-wing group all along, had he not, Lattimore, Field?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Unfortunately that seems to be the case.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to go back to this question of the experts being briefed at the meeting in the State Department. Was that briefing before you were asked to give your opinion?

Mr. COLEGROVE. It began with a briefing by George Kennan on the very first day and the rest of it was interspersed. I was very much

disappointed in the briefing by George Kennan. This was a conference upon the Far East and George Kennan didn't tell us anything that we hadn't known or thought about for years and years and years. I thought George Kennan just wasted the time of the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You got a kind of feeling that the briefing was to give you some propaganda to take back to the people?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt distinctly that the briefing by Cora Du Bois was of that kind. The briefing done on the military situation by Colonel McCann didn't give us anything we had not already read in the New York Times.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get an impression from this conference on the Far East, which you said was in your estimation propaganda, that it was the desire of the State Department to have a policy of great leniency at least toward the Communists in China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The State Department didn't tip its hand in this respect. I indicated that Ambassador Jessup——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about his action but the lady who briefed you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I would like to have him conclude his sentence there. It would be interesting. You said didn't tip its hand?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Didn't tip its hand, and Ambassador Jessup is a very clever and able presiding officer. He didn't disclose his own views, but the briefing by Cora Du Bois was a briefing very sympathetic toward the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Those were the kind of questions that were being brought up in the meeting?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when her briefing took place?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I think her briefing took place in the second session.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the question discussed on the recognition of China by the United States?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Curiously enough that was discussed in every session but particularly emphasized in what would be the second session.

Senator FERGUSON. How did this lady who briefed you stand on that question? Did she express herself?

Mr. COLEGROVE. She was talking only about southeast Asia and did not cover other subjects.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record at this time the only document that we have on the reports made at this particular conference. That is a text of Lattimore's memorandum which he himself released during the time of the Foreign Policy Committee's investigation of the same subject a year ago. I think it is appropriate if we put that in the record, Mr. Chairman.

I think we might ask Mr. Colegrove whether or not the views set forth there coincide generally with the views that Mr. Lattimore expressed at the conference, according to his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you read this memorandum?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have read this memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. This that has been handed to the chairman purports to be the New York Times of Tuesday, April 4, 1950. It is a photostatic copy of certain parts of the New York Times. What is it that you want? How do you identify it?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel will authenticate that photostat.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the New York Times of April 4, 1950, pages 1 and 21, being a news release accompanying the text of Lattimore's memorandum on the United States far-eastern policy. It says:

Following is the text of Owen Latimore's memorandum on United States in the Far East, drafted for a State Department advisory committee last August and made public today by Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the photostat of the New York Times of the morning of——

Mr. MANDEL. April 4, 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. As such may it be introduced in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 280–A" and "Exhibit No. 280–B" and are filed as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 280–A

[From the New York Times, April 4, 1950]

LATTIMORE BARES HIS MEMORANDUM ON FAR EAST POLICY—PROFESSOR ACTS AFTER SENATOR CHALLENGES STATE DEPARTMENT TO RELEASE THE DOCUMENT—HE OPPOSED AID TO CHIANG BUT URGED EFFORTS TO CONVINCE ORIENTALS THEY SHOULD TURN TO UNITED STATES AND NOT RUSSIA

WASHINGTON, April 3.—Prof. Owen Lattimore made public today a secret memorandum on proposed far-eastern policy that he had submitted to the State Department last August.

He did so after Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin, who has accused the Johns Hopkins University professor of being a "top Soviet espionage agent," demanded that the State Department release the document, or "it will be my duty as a United States Senator to do so."

The State Department said, however, that Mr. Lattimore's views, together with those of about 30 other persons, were solicited on a confidential basis, and that it had no right to make them public.

Then a few hours later, Mr. Lattimore, who has called the spy charge "an unmitigated lie," released the contents of his memorandum, saying:

"Senator McCarthy in typical fashion is seeking by insinuation and concealment to spread some of the poison of which he has an inexhaustible supply."

AID FOR CHIANG OPPOSED

In the memorandum, Professor Lattimore warned against United States support for the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, but recommended efforts to convince the far-eastern peoples that it was this country and not the Soviet Union to which they should turn.

Mr. Lattimore bade the State Department "avoid premature or excessive" commitment of American resources in the Far East, and said that if there was to be war, "it can be won only by defeating Russia—not Northern Korea, or Viet Nam, or even China."

He said that Russia had won gains in the Far East without lessening the strength she could "deploy toward Europe" and cautioned against any United States assumption that Russia would become so involved in China that she would no longer be able to "maneuver in Europe."

WOULD BAR USE OF JAPAN

"It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American policy," he said, and "South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests of the United States."

"The kind of policy that failed in support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai-shek cannot possibly succeed if it is applied to a scattering of "little Chiang Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in Asia," he wrote.

In his statement, Senator McCarthy said that the State Department considered the Lattimore report "so important and of such a confidential nature that the American people were not entitled to know its contents." He has been arguing that Mr. Lattimore laid down a policy line as a State Department consultant that aided the Chinese Communists and "betrayed" the Chinese Nationalists.

The Senator had called a press conference for this morning at the Naval Medical Center in nearby Bethesda, Md., where he is undergoing treatment for a sinus condition. But after about 20 reporters arrived, they were told by the commanding officer of the institution, Capt. R. M. Gillett, U. S. N., that Mr. McCarthy was "under minor surgical procedure" and could not appear before them for interviews and questions.

Some reporters had intended to ask the Senator whether he wished to repeat off the Senate floor, and thus outside his congressional immunity from suit for libel, the charges he had made against Professor Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore, head of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins, has threatened, through his lawyers, to sue Senator McCarthy if given an opportunity outside the area of immunity.

The Senator's statement asserted in substance that Secretary of State Dean Acheson had not been truthful in saying last week that he believed he had never even met Professor Lattimore.

Mr. McCarthy declared that Drew Pearson, a newspaper columnist and one of the Secretary's "very loyal friends," had written in August 1945 that Mr. Acheson had arranged for a meeting between the professor and President Truman.

This meeting, Mr. McCarthy said, was "for the purpose of weaning Truman away from the Byrnes-Grew far-eastern policy." (He was referring to former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and former Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew).

"While Lattimore was not unsuccessful in convincing Truman at that particular time," the Senator went on, "it is significant that very shortly afterward both Grew and Byrnes left the State Department and the Acheson-Lattimore crowd took complete control."

The Senator coupled with this charge that Secretary Acheson had not conceded having received the Lattimore memorandum "until after learning that I knew the contents."

JESSUP REPLIES TO CHARGE

Tonight, Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, who had been accused by Senator McCarthy of "accepting" contributions for the American Council of Institute of Pacific Relations from Frederick Vanderbilt Field, denounced this as a false "insinuation" that the council was "being paid to peddle the Communist Party line."

Mr. Jessup declared in the first place that he was not, as alleged by Mr. McCarthy, largely in control of the organization. At the time in question, 1942 and 1943, the Ambassador added, its head was Dr. Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California, and sponsors for a drive for funds included Henry Luce, the magazine publisher, and Juan Trippe of Pan-American Airways.

Mr. Field's contributions of $3,500, Mr. Jessup said, were part of $200,000 taken up, much of it from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corp., and large industrial concerns.

Of Messrs. Luce and Trippe, Ambassador Jessup observed:

"Surely these gentlemen would never have accepted payments from Mr. Field or anyone else for 'selling the Communist Party line.' Neither would I if I had been in control."

Senator McCarthy had called Mr. Field a known Communist.

EXHIBIT No. 280–B

[From the New York Times, April 4, 1950]

TEXT OF LATTIMORE'S MEMORANDUM ON UNITED STATES FAR EASTERN POLICY

WASHINGTON, April 3 (AP).—Following is the text of Owen Lattimore's memorandum on United States policy in the Far East, drafted for a State Department advisory committee last August and made public today by Mr. Lattimore:

"In clearing the way for a fresh approach to the problems of United States policy in the Far East, several negative statements can usefully be made.

"1. The type of policy represented by support for Chiang Kai-shek does more harm than good to the interests of the United States, and no modification of this policy seems promising. Chiang Kai-shek was a unique figure in Asia. He is now fading into a kind of eclipse that is regrettably damaging to the prestige of the United States, because the United States supported him. His eclipse does not even leave behind the moral prestige of a good but losing fight in defense of a weak cause.

"On the contrary, he put up the worst possible fight in defense of a cause that was originally strong and should have won. The kind of policy that failed in support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai-shek cannot possibly succeed if it is applied to a scattering of 'little Chiang Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in Asia.

"2. China cannot be economically coerced by such measures as cutting off trade. Nothing could be more dangerous for the American interest than to underestimate the ability of the Chinese Communists to achieve the minimum level of economic stability that will make their regime politically secure. Sound policy should allow for a cautious overestimate of the ability of the Chinese Communists in this respect, and avoid a rash underestimate.

"3. It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American policy. There are two alternatives in Japan. The first alternative is to keep Japan alive by means of American 'blood transfusions' of raw materials and credits. Under this alternative Japan can be made to put on the surface appearance of a strong ally; but the reality will be an overcommitment of American resources to a distant and vulnerable region.

"Under the second alternative Japan can keep herself alive by coming to terms, economically and politically, with its neighbors in Asia, principally China. Under this alternative Japan cannot serve as a trusted American ally. Its own interests will compel it to balance and bargain between what it can get out of Asia and what it can get out of America.

"4. South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests and policy of the United States. It is doubtful how long the present regime in South Korea can be kept alive, and mere effort to keep it alive is a bad advertisement, which continually draws attention to a band of little and inferior Chiang Kai-shecks who are the scorn of the Communists and have lost the respect of democratic and would-be democratic groups and movements throughout Asia.

"5. The colonial and quasi-colonial countries of southeast Asia cannot be forced to grant priorities to the economic and military recovery of Europe at the expense of their own economic and political interests. In this region as a whole there is a rapid development of combined political and military resistance to coercion which can be indefinitely sustained by local resources. On the other hand, attempts at reconquest by European countries are so expensive that they defeat their own ultimate purpose, which is the strengthening of the country attempting the reconquest.

"The situation can now be handled only by convincing the Nationalist leaders in those countries that any sacrifices they are asked to make are matched by sacrifices made by their former or titular rulers, and are not designed to give priority to the interests of these rulers, but to bring joint benefits both to the ruling countries and to the colonial country, on terms that satisfy the colonial aspiration to equality.

"6. The United States cannot assume that Russia will move in to take over direct control in China, and will thus be subjected to heavy strategic and economic strains. It is dangerous to assume that there will be a diversion and commitment of Russian resources in Asia which will limit Russian ability to maneuver in Europe. Recent developments in the Far East have been favorable to Russia, but not in a way that lessens the resources that Russia can deploy toward Europe.

"Policy toward Russia and policy toward the Far East meet at the point where such a move as the imposition of an economic cordon sanitaire around China is considered. Such a move would increase Chinese dependence on Russia; but it would probably not make it necessary for Russia to undertake a large-scale program in China. The Russians would get credit in Asia, multiplied by propaganda, for any grants they might make to China, but would probably not have to make grants large enough to distort or strain their own resources.

"It would be possible, therefore, if the mistake is made of waiting for the Chinese Communists to come hat in hand to ask for American terms, for United

States policy to encounter another set-back in Asia, without even the compensating advantage of hampering Russia's ability to apply pressure in Europe.

"The foregoing statement defines negative aspects of the situation in Asia, limiting the freedom of maneuver of United States policy. Within these limitations, it seems advisable that a number of positive objectives should be defined.

"1. Policy in the Far East and policy toward Russia have a bearing on each other. It certainly cannot yet be said, however, that armed warfare against communism in the Far East, on a scale involving a major commitment of American resources, has become either unavoidable or positively desirable. Nor can it be said with any assurance that, in the event of an armed conflict undertaken for the purpose of forcing Russia back from Europe, the Far East would be an optimum field of operation.

"There are still two alternatives before us—a relatively long peace, or a rapid approach toward war. If there is to be war, it can only be won by defeating Russia—not Northern Korea, or Viet Nam, or even China. Sound policy should therefore avoid premature or excessive strategic deployment in the Far East.

"If there is to be a long peace, the primary factor in making peace possible will be a stabilization of relations between the United States and Russia. Sound policy should therefore maintain a maximum flexibility. If and when negotiated and mutually acceptable agreements with Russia become possible, American policy in the Far East should be in a position to contribute to Russo-American negotiations. It should not be so mired down in local situations that direct American-Russian negotiations are actually hampered.

"2. Any new departures in United States policy in the Far East must be able to fend off any accusation of 'appeasement' of local or Russian communism. In view of the effectiveness of the Russian issue as a weapon in in-fighting in American party politics, it would seem that the advice of experts on domestic politics should be coordinated with the opinions of those who are consulted on foreign policy.

"The dilemma is simple, but not easy to solve; but unless it can be solved, no successful United States policy in the Far East is possible. Any United States policy that is interpreted in various countries in the Far East as pressure applied for the purpose of creating a league against Russia will merely increase the ability of those countries to bargain with both the United States and Russia.

"It will also increase the identification, in those countries, between local nationalism and local communism. On the other hand, any proposed United States policy in the Far East that is attacked in America itself as a bid for better relations with Russia runs the danger of being defeated.

"3. The success of United States policy in the Far East will be measured largely by the contribution that it makes to the recovery of economic relations between the Far East and Europe. This recovery will be possible only if the assent and good will of the far eastern countries are won.

"Assent and real cooperation, in turn, can only be won if the representatives of the far-eastern countries, including those that are still technically the subjects of European countries, are convinced that they have as direct access to the highest American authorities as do the European representatives, and if they are convinced that their economic needs and political standards are not being given a second priority, lower than that of the European countries involved in the same negotiations.

"The two test cases in southeast Asia on which the leaders of various nationalist movements will rate the difference between what can be attained through friendly association with representatives of the United States and what can be attained through outright defiance of a European country which has strong economic support from the United States are Indonesia and the Viet Nam regime under Ho Chi Minh.

"If the negotiations between Dutch and Indonesians, brought about largely through benevolent United States pressure, eventuate in a settlement which seems, in Indonesia, to contain too much of hope deferred, while the resistance in Indochina under Ho Chi Minh achieves more and more of hope fulfilled, the results throughout southeast Asia will be adverse to the United States interest.

"Heavy and primary United States commitments in Western Europe makes it difficult to bear constantly in mind that when the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations are consummated, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of popular opinion in Indonesia, will have wider repercussions than the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of Dutch public opinion.

"It is a fact, nevertheless, that Indonesian opinion is more difficult to satisfy than Dutch opinion, and it is also a fact that the repercussions will be more serious if Indonesian opinion is not satisfied than if Dutch opinion is not satisfied. These facts mark an important difference between prewar and postwar colonial Asia. They are facts that Americans fully accepted; but they are also facts that are critical for the formulation of an over-all United States policy in Asia.

"4. The foregoing considerations indicate that the major aim of United States policy in the Far East should be to convince the countries of the Far East that they can get along well with the United States and with the countries of Western Europe. They must be persuaded that they can get along well because of the mutual benefits to themselves, to the United States, and to Western Europe.

"They must not be made to suspect that the real aim of the United States is an ulterior aim of using them against Russia.

To put it in another way, the aim of the United States policy should be to enable the countries of the Far East to do without Russia to the maximum extent.

This is a much more modest aim than an insistence on and organization of hostility to Russia; but it is an attainable aim, and the other is not.

"A few suggestions for implementation are appended.

"1. Conferences with the independent governments of the Far East, on the basis of helping them to build their own economies, to revive their trade with Europe, and to expand their trade with us. Emphasis on positive steps that can be taken. No negative conditions, such as prohibitions of trade with Russia or Communist China; no conditions that could be interpreted as American regulation of their political parties.

"2. Working relations, and a refusal to be bound by a protocol, with legitimate nationalist leaders in countries whose full political aspirations have not been met by their European rulers.

"3. The United States should not allow any European country, in its relations with any country in the Far East, to state openly or to imply by propaganda that its policy is 'backed by the United States.' European representatives, in negotiating with the representatives of countries in Asia, should be discouraged from stating or implying that they are authoritative interpreters of United States policy, or intermediaries without whom the United States cannot be approached.

"4. It should be made clear that if there is delay or difficulty in establishing relations between the United States and Communist-controlled countries, such as China, the trouble comes from the Communist side and not from the United States side.

"5. It should be made clear that friendly and beneficial relations with the United States depend essentially on the inherent friendliness or unfriendliness of the nation concerned, and not on the formalities of diplomatic recognition. In order to facilitate the contrast between countries which are on friendly terms with the United States and countries which are not, the number of countries formally recognized by the United States should be increased.

"As a first step, the United States should accept the list of countries recommended for admission to the United Nations by Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations. In the first place, it would at this time be a good move for the United States to accept with good will an initiative from the Secretariat of the United Nations. In the second place, the list is on balance more favorable to the United States than to the Soviet Union. In the third place, and with particular reference to the Far East, the move would bring within the scope of United States diplomatic activity the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia), an increasingly important potential listening-post country in the heart of Asia.

"6. The United States should disembarrass itself as quickly as possible of its entanglements in South Korea."

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the views expressed by Lattimore in the record?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you have read this?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, I have read that memoranda. That memoranda covers many of the points that Mr. Lattimore made in the con-

ference. The memoranda among other things calls for liquidation of American responsibilities in Korea. That was a point which Mr. Lattimore made during the conference. This was in October 1949. Professor Lattimore took the position of prompt recognition of Red China. He was very careful to say we should bargain with them when we were doing it, but nevertheless we should recognize them.

Professor Lattimore was opposed to dividing economic aid in Asia. He wanted to give economic aid to Communist countries equally with non-Communist countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear expressed at the conference, Professor, a sentiment as to the disposition of Formosa?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Governor Stassen made a very strong appeal to defend Formosa to the letter. I said something on that subject myself. I particularly commended the acceptance of General MacArthur's concept of what is now called the MacArthur line, namely from Korea, Formosa, Okinawa, the Philippines, and around to Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, do you know that on October 26, if that is the exact date, 1949, the State Department sent a message to the Nationalist government in China notifying them they would not give them any more military aid?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you learn that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I didn't learn that until I saw that in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. That was after this meeting?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That was shortly after this meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. So the policy was really laid down before you went to this meeting as far as Formosa was concerned?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, with respect to Formosa and breaking the so-called MacArthur line they were therefore aiding the Communists of China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Specifically, Governor Stassen has spent a good deal of time on maintaining Formosa and I believe—I am speaking without any record here—I believe that Joseph Ballantine said something on that subject that is favorable to holding Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, did General Marshall attend that conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, General Marshall was present at every session. He was one of the first ones there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he take part in this discussion at all?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No. General Marshall sat in the same seat at the end of the room, not at the conference table, about 5 feet from the end of the conference table, opposite Ambassador Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. And was he sitting near Owen Lattimore?

Mr. COLEGROVE. He was about 5 feet away from Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he hear Owen Lattimore express his views on those occasions?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I assume he heard Owen Lattimore talk the 13 or 14 times.

Mr. MORRIS. Thirteen or fourteen times Lattimore spoke?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now could you testify whether or not Rosinger had an active part in this conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Not as active a part as Owen Lattimore. He spoke probably six times, and all of his speeches, his comments, were very favorable to Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that we have had testimony in the past that Benjamin Kizer and John K. Fairbank, whom Professor Colegrove has included with this group dominated by Lattimore, to the effect that both of those were members of the Communist Party also.

How many times did you speak at that conference, Professor Colegrove?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I believe I spoke about 8, 9, or 10 times.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in view of the line of questioning developed by Senator Eastland on the importance of the actual preparation of the letter of transmittal on the white paper, I was wondering if you thought it necessary that we should ask the State Department for the facts behind that letter of transmittal.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall be very glad to write a letter. I may not be able to get any more information than I have, however.

Senator FERGUSON. I move, Mr. Chairman, that you do write a letter, that we keep on trying, because I think this is so vital to the Congress and to the people that we should not be discouraged.

Professor Colegrove, have you anything further to say about the letter of transmittal?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I objected to that letter of transmittal because of the bland statement that the white paper had given all of the evidence and presented a very unbiased view of it. It was very obvious that it had not given all the evidence. Even the Wedemeyer report was slightly expurgated as published by the State Department. All records as to Korea were pulled out of that report and it did not have the Wallace report in it. I felt that the State Department had glossed over the trouble between the State Department and General Hurley. They had not given both sides of that story.

What I objected most strongly to in the letter of transmittal was the argument that the letter made in favor of our policy, favored by withdrawing help to Chiang Kai-shek, and glossing over what help we had given the Chinese Reds, and in particular that paragraph at the end where the State Department sums up, in which it says that the United States Government had done everything that was possible to save the Nationalist government and that the United States had left undone everything that would have been helpful to Red China.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you not really think there was a conspiracy by people in the State Department to throw China to the Communists?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have been of that opinion for quite a while.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Colegrove, have you testified to the best of your ability on the question that arose at the conference we have been discussing on the possibility of sending economic aid alike to Communist and non-Communist countries? Is there anything more you can testify to on that score?

Mr. COLEGROVE. At least four members took strongly the position that no economic aid—of course no military aid—should be given to Communist countries in Asia. That would include Governor Stassen, myself, Mr. Brodie, and Mr. Ballantine.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you four took opposition to that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Yourself, Mr. Brodie, Mr. Ballantine, and Governor Stassen?

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the four whom you mentioned, including yourself, took the position that aid should go to Nationalist China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; and in no way to Red China.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the other group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The other group took the position that economic aid should go to to Communist and non-Communist countries alike.

Senator JENNER. What was their argument for that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Their argument, curiously enough, was this: That if we gave aid only to non-Communist countries, Soviet Russia would use this as propaganda, saying we were imperialistic, that we were trying to guide the affairs of Asia and be very effective propaganda against it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show the difficulty the witness would have without the benefit of the transcript which he requested be made available during the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. What transcript?

Mr. MORRIS. The transcript of the proceedings about which we are taking testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You want the record to show that the witness is testifying from memory because the transcript is not available; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, and that Professor Colegrove did ask before testifying that he be aided by the transcript in the course of his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, the record will so show.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. As a committee, I think we should take up this question of getting aid from the executive branch of the Government. Here is a good example that if the committee had, in executive session at least, this transcript which we are asking witnesses to come up and testify on several years later, that we would be aided in the solution of the problem that we have before us, which is a very important problem; and while some of the members of the committee may get discouraged that we are not being given the aid that we should have, and we certainly are not, I think the Chair should keep after this information.

For instance, I can cite another example that was not brought up here. That is where the question came up as to Fred Field trying to become an officer in the OSS of the United States Government. When we tried to get who were his sponsors and who recommended him, and so forth, all we could get from the military authorities even was the memorandum as to his physical examination. Now that is the only thing. I would say if anything was to be kept from the committee, that is the one thing that they must have held out, his physical examination, because that could have shown things that probably did not concern the IPR, but certainly the other items in the report were of great value to this committee in the solution of this problem.

So I hope that the Chair will keep after this, because I think that the time will come when public opinion in America will have some-

thing to say on this, and we should have this information before the Congress and the people.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say, Senator, that the Chair does not get discouraged when it is pursuing a course for the protection of this Government of ours. This committee has pursued that course with diligence and will continue to pursue it with diligence. We will ask for every aid that we think we might be able to get from any of the executive branches of the Government or from any other source that is at all authentic. To that end we will persist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, our witness for tomorrow will be Raymond Dennett, who was the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1944 and 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. We stand in recess until tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

(The hearing recessed at 12 noon until 10 o'clock, Wednesday, September 26, 1951.)

22848—52—pt. 3——16

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.)

A

Page

Acheson, Dean---- 716, 717, 718, 719, 722, 723, 724, 729, 730, 858, 859, 899, 902, 903, 904, 917, 918, 920, 928
Adams, Eva B---- 903, 904
Agriculture Department. (*See* United States Department of Agriculture.)
Air Force. (*See* United States Air Force.)
Allen, Captain---- 713
Allen, Riley H---- 712, 713
Allied Powers---- 728, 732, 733, 734, 738, 739, 741, 745, 784, 793, 812, 828, 901, 912
Allison, John---- 723
AMCO---- 712
Amerasia---- 714, 788, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 915, 918
American & Foreign Power Co---- 901
American Broadcasting System---- 757
American Committee for International Studies---- 910
American Federation of Labor---- 884
American Government. (*See* United States Government.)
American Journal of International Law---- 906
American labor---- 706, 707
American lend-lease---- 826
American Mission to Japan---- 752
American Peace Mobilization---- 861, 862, 863
American Political Science Review---- 906
American Red Cross---- 857, 901
American Republic Affairs---- 743
American-Russian Institute---- 768, 769, 857
American White Paper---- 922, 933
Anderson, Mr---- 904
Andrews, Clark---- 757, 758, 759, 761, 762, 763
Angus, Prof. H. F---- 768, 770
Armed Forces Radio Service---- 736, 757, 759
Armed Services. (*See* United States Army.)
Army Intelligence---- 779, 843, 844, 849, 860
Army War College---- 900
Asiaticus. (*See* Hans Moeller.)
Associated Telephone Services---- 712
Atherton, Frank C---- 713
Atlantic Charter---- 815
Attlee, Prime Minister---- 732, 733
Austern, Miss Hilda---- 768, 769, 863
AVCO---- 775

B

Baillargeon---- 712
Baker, Newton D---- 890
Ballantine, Joseph W---- 704, 708, 900, 921, 932, 933, 934
Bankers Trust Co. (New York City)---- 901
Barnes, Joseph---- 856, 857, 858, 859, 860
Barnett, Eugene E---- 712, 713, 723

Page
Barrett, David D---- 785
Barton, Edward---- 722
Bassett, Arthur---- 857
Bates, Searle---- 857
Bean, Louis---- 857
Beria---- 869
Berle, Adolph A., Jr---- 857, 893
Beukema, Col. Herman---- 857
Biddle, Attorney General Francis---- 861, 863
Big Four---- 786, 825
Binder, Carroll---- 857
Biographical Register. (*See* State Department, Biographical Register.)
Bissell, General---- 859
Bisson, T. A---- 838, 890, 891, 901
Blakeslee, Dr---- 708
Board of Economic Warfare---- 857
Bolsheviks---- 880, 887, 889, 894
Borton, Hugh---- 708
Bowman, Dr. Isaiah---- 707
Braden, Spruille---- 743
Briggs, Ellis O---- 743
Brodie, Bernard---- 900, 921, 933
Brookings Institute---- 900
Browder, Earl---- 826, 883, 902, 903
Brownell, Herbert---- 839
Buck, Pearl S---- 713
Budenz---- 839
Bunche, Ralph---- 857
Burden, W. A. M---- 858, 859
Bureau of the Budget---- 857
Buss, Claude A---- 900, 921
Byrnes, James F---- 722, 723, 724, 726, 727, 731, 738, 745, 746, 928

C

Cairo Conference---- 816
Cairo Declaration---- 734
Calkins, Robert D---- 712, 713
Cambridge University---- 714
Canadian Foreign Service---- 749
Canadian Government---- 749
Carlson---- 793
Carnegie Corp---- 857, 916, 928
Carter, Edward C---- 711, 769, 837, 838, 839, 840, 856, 857, 862, 863, 888, 890, 891, 892, 896-905, 915, 924, 925
Case, Everett---- 917
Central Executive Committee (Chinese)---- 809
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)---- 840
Century Club---- 889
Chamberlain, Joseph P---- 713
Chancellor, Christopher---- 839, 840
Chapman, Mrs. Ralph---- 713
Charles, Allan E---- 713
Chemical Bank (New York City)---- 753
Chen, Han-seng---- 786, 809, 817
Chen, Dr. K. P---- 786, 809, 817
Chen, Peng---- 812
Chen Yi---- 812
Chen Yun---- 812
Chio, Chao-ting ("Hansu Chan")---- 907, 915
Chicago Daily News---- 857
Chicago University---- 715, 720, 901
China Aid Council---- 888
China Lantern---- 835
Chinese Army---- 779, 812, 813, 814, 820, 824, 826
Chinese black marketeers---- 719
Chinese Central Government---- 785, 795, 805, 806, 808, 809, 812, 816, 817, 828

Page
Chinese Government (coalition) 804, 806, 813
Chinese Nationalist Government 709, 711, 732, 733, 772, 771, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 790, 792, 794, 798, 801, 803, 807, 820, 827, 828, 829, 833, 851, 886, 917, 922, 925, 927, 928, 929, 932, 933, 934.
Chinese Republic 801
Chinese revolution 876
Chou En-lai 792, 800, 812, 913
Chu Hsueh-fen 825
Churchill, Winston 731, 811, 828
Chu Teh 812
CIA. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency.)
Cincinnati University 901
CIO. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
City of Flint (steamship) 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896
Civil Service Commission. (*See* United States Civil Service Commission.)
Clapper, Raymond 857
Clayton, Will 858, 859
Coe, Frank 858, 859, 860
Colegrove, Kenneth W 712, 900, 905-935
Columbia University 857, 858, 860, 861, 863, 890, 891, 892, 901, 905, 920
Comintern 805, 865, 867, 868, 881, 888
Commerce Department. (*See* United States Department of Commerce.)
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 771, 772
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate 896, 898
Communist International 864, 865, 866, 867, 871, 883
Communist International (Anglo-American Secretariat) 865, 866
Communist International (Fifth Congress) 876
Communist International (Second Congress) 873, 874
Communist International (Sixth World Congress) 869, 886
Communist International (South America) 865
Communist Manifesto 797
Communist Party (China) First National Congress 812
Communist Party (China) Second National Congress 812
Communist Party (China) Third National Congress 812
Communist Party (China) Fourth National Congress 812
Communist Party (China) Fifth National Congress 812
Communist Party 706, 707, 711, 716, 718, 744, 746-752, 754, 758, 760, 763, 764, 766, 770, 778, 779, 781-784, 786-788, 790-792, 794-809, 811-819, 821, 822, 825-828, 833, 835, 839, 844-847, 852, 854, 856, 859-861, 864-872, 874, 876-882, 884-888, 913-914, 915, 919, 920, 922-926, 928-934.
Communist Party (China) 747, 759, 763, 765, 778, 779, 781-784, 786-788, 790-792, 794-809, 811-819, 821, 822, 825-828, 833, 835, 844, 845-847, 852, 854, 856, 864-870, 871, 874, 880, 881, 886-888, 913, 916, 919, 920, 921, 924, 926, 928, 929, 931-934.
Communist Party (China) Sixth National Congress 812
Communist Party (China) Seventh National Congress 812
Communist Party (Indonesia) 877
Communist Party (Japan) 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 752, 904, 914
Communist Party (New York district) 865, 881
Communist Party (Russia) 781, 794, 892, 930
Communist Party (South America) 865, 866
Communist Party (United States) 705, 866, 867, 883, 902
Communist Political Association 706, 707
Condliffe, J. B 768, 770
Congress. (*See* United States Congress.)
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 884
Connally 706, 707
Coons, Arthur G 712, 859, 900
Coordinating Committee. (*See* State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Coordinator of Information 857
Counter-Intelligence (SCAP) 749
Cowles, Gardner 857

CPA. (*See* Communist Political Association.) Page
Cripps Mission 909, 910
Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford 909, 910
Currie, Lauchlin 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 902

D

Dabney, Virginius 858, 859
DaFoe, Dr. I. W 768, 769
Daily Worker 754, 902, 915
Davidson, Captain 735
Davies, John P 776, 778, 785, 794, 795, 797, 804, 806, 828
Davies, Joseph 857, 903
Davies, Lieutenant Colonel 748, 753
Davis, Elmer 729, 730, 839
Davis, Joseph S 713
DeCaux, Len 713, 858, 859, 860
Decker, John W 900
Democratic Party 797, 833, 836, 837
Dennery, M. Etienne 768, 770
Dennett, Raymond 858, 859, 925, 935
Dennett, Tyler 857, 925
Dennison, Capt. R. L 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743
Department of Defense 843
Derevyanko, Maj. Gen. Kuzma 746
Des Moines Register & Tribune 857
Dickover, Earl 708
Dillingham, W. F 713
Dollard, Charles 857
Dooman, Eugene H 703–754
Du Bois, Cora 922, 926
Duke of Devonshire 909
Dunn, James 704, 717, 737
Durbrow, Eldridge 709, 710, 760
Dutch Government 924

E

Earle, Edward Meade 911
Eastman, Max 838
Ecole des Sciences Politiques 768, 770
Eighth IPR Conference 850, 856, 858
Eighth Route Army 812, 814
Eisler, Gerhardt 866
Ellsworth 862
Embree, Edwin R 712, 713
Emeny, Brooks 713, 857
Emeny, Mrs. Brooks 713
Emerson, Rupert 857, 858, 859
Emmerson, John Kenneth 746, 748, 749, 753, 776, 778, 830, 903, 904
En-lai, Chou 792, 800, 812, 913
Epstein, Israel 709, 711
European Commission 722
Executive Department 899
Export-Import Bank 839

F

Fahs, C. B 857
Fairbank, John K 712, 750, 751, 900, 920, 921, 933
Fairbanks, Douglas, Jr 731, 732, 734
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Miss Elsie 839, 840
Farbenindustrie, I. G 740
Far East Area Committee 714
Far East Command 841, 843, 844, 845, 847, 848, 849, 851, 854, 856, 859, 860
Far East Commission 721, 722, 746, 922
Far East Subcommittee. (*See* State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Far East Advisory Commission 738

Page
Far Eastern Affairs 753
Far Eastern Series 800, 804, 808
Far Eastern Survey 712, 754, 788, 911
Far Eastern University 867, 868
Farley, Miriam S 901
Fascist Party 707, 713, 723, 731, 740, 772, 815
Faymonville, Col. Carl 858, 859
FBI. (*See* Federal Bureau of Investigation.)
FEA. (*See* Foreign Economic Administration.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation 761, 763, 764, 765, 840
Federal Communications Commission 758
Federal Government. (*See* United States Government.)
Federal Reserve Bank 858
Field, Edith 862
Field, Frederick V 713, 850, 857–860, 862, 863, 896–898, 907, 925, 928, 934
Fifth IPR Conference 850
Fifth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
First National Bank (Portland, Oreg.) 901
First National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Fisher, Galen M 712, 713
Fisher, Sterling 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744
Fly, James Lawrence 758, 764
Fo, Sun 821
Foreign Affairs Council (Cleveland) 857
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) 858, 859
Foreign Policy Association 890, 891
Foreign Policy Committee 926
Foreign Service. (*See* United States Foreign Service.)
Foreign Service Act of 1946 709, 710, 760
Forrestal, Secretary 729
Fortier, Brig. Gen. L. Joseph (retired) 843–864
Fosdick, Dr 917, 918
Foss, Charles Burton 912
Fourth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Fourth Route Army 812, 813, 814
Franco 781
Free China Labor League 766
Freeman, Mansfield 858, 859
Freeman, R. E 858, 859
Friedman, Julian 708, 709, 710, 711, 714, 755, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 771, 772
Fu-chen, Li 812
Fuchu Prison 748, 749, 753
Fuller 712

G

Gainard, Capt. Joseph A. 892, 893, 894
Gates, Artemus 737
Gauss, Clarence E 829, 839
General Electric Corp 858
George, Harrison 883
German War College 835
Gestapo 818, 825
Gilchrist, Huntington 713
Gilland. (*See* M. Giran.)
Gillett, Capt. R. M 928
Giran, M 748, 753
Gohol, Mr 908
Goshal, Kumar 712
Grady, Henry F 713, 857
Grajdanzev, Andrew 901
Graves, Kizer & Graves 900
Graves, Mortimer 712, 713, 900
Green, Jerome 712, 713
Greene, Miss 862
Greenslade, Admiral 712, 713

Page
Greenwood ---- 712
Grew, Joseph C---- 704, 705, 715, 716, 717, 718, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 733, 914, 928
Gruening, Ernest H---- 857
Gulick, Luther H---- 857

H

Hackworth, Green H---- 893
Hamaguchi---- 729
Hankow-Canton Railway---- 827
Han-seng, Gen. Chen---- 915
Hart, Senator---- 839
Harvard University---- 714, 758, 760, 764, 900, 901, 905, 920
Hayden, J. R---- 857
Herald Tribune, New York---- 744, 745, 891, 892
Hern, General---- 779
Herod, W. R---- 857, 900
Higashi-Kuni Cabinet---- 739
Hilldring, Gen. John H---- 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743
Hirohito, Emperor---- 705, 706, 713, 716, 725, 727, 728, 731, 736, 738, 739, 751, 914
Hiss, Alger---- 857, 858, 859, 860
Hitler, Adolph---- 835, 891
Hobson---- 823
Ho Chi Minh---- 930
Hodgekinson, Sarah---- 763, 764, 765
Hoffman, Paul---- 713, 753
Holcombe, Arthur N---- 900
Holland, W. L---- 768, 769, 862, 863, 898, 903, 918
Ho Lung---- 812
Hoover, Herbert---- 706, 707
Hopkins---- 788
Hornbeck, Dr. Stanley K---- 754, 857
House Appropriations Committee---- 890
House of Lords---- 909
Hsiang-chien, Hsu---- 812
Hsueh-fen, Chu---- 825
Hsu Hsiang-chien---- 812
Huggins, G. Ellsworth---- 712, 713
Hulen, Bertram D---- 893
Hull, Cordell---- 893
Hull, General---- 831
Humelsine, Carlisle H---- 903
Huntington Library---- 712
Hurley, Patrick J---- 798, 828, 829, 830, 839, 933

I

Indian National Congress---- 910
Institute for Advanced Study---- 911
Institute of Pacific Relations---- 709, 710, 711, 712, 747, 751, 753, 754, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 787, 788, 789, 836, 837, 838, 850, 856, 858, 859, 861, 862, 863, 864, 883, 886, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 896, 901, 906, 908, 909, 911, 916, 918, 920, 923, 924, 925, 928, 934, 935
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council)---- 711, 753, 754, 788, 836, 850, 858, 861, 862, 863, 864, 886, 901, 928, 935
Institue of Pacific Relations (Eighth Conference)---- 850, 856, 858
Institute of Pacific Relations (Fifth Conference)---- 850
Institute of Pacific Relations (Ninth Conference)---- 709, 710, 850, 856, 897, 898
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council)---- 768, 769, 850, 858, 859
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite Conference)---- 890
Inter-American Conference (Rio de Janeiro)---- 743
International General Electric Co---- 857, 900
International Labor Office Conference---- 825
International Missionary Council---- 857, 900
International Press Correspondence---- 869, 871
International Secretariat (IPR)---- 711, 768, 788
Iowa State University---- 905
IPR. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations.)
Isaac, Harold---- 748, 749, 753

J

Page
Jackson, Justice 740
Jaffe, Philip J 907, 908, 909, 910, 911
Japanese-Americans 742
Japanese Army 734, 738, 805, 811
Japanese Emperor. (*See* Hirohito.)
Japanese Government 719, 722, 728, 733, 738, 739, 741
Japanese industrialists. (*See* Zaibatsu.)
Japanese Navy 738
Japanese Peace Treaty 919, 920
Jen Pi-shih 812
Jessup, Philip C 712, 713, 768, 769, 844, 845, 846, 847, 851, 852, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 864, 889, 890, 891, 892, 896, 897, 899, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 928, 932.
Jinnah, Mr 910
Johns Hopkins University 707, 900, 927, 928
Johnson, Mr 753
Johnson, Col. Dana 727
Johnson, Nelson 922
Johnston, Eric 858, 859
Joint Chiefs of Staff 737, 782, 859
Jonathan, Nelson T 721

K

Kai-shek, Chiang 706, 731, 732, 771, 772, 775, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 805, 806, 807, 808, 811, 812, 817, 822, 823, 824, 825, 828, 839, 848, 851, 852, 866, 880, 923, 925, 927, 929, 933.
Kai-shek, Madam Chiang 827
Kang, Kao 812
Kang Sheng 812
Kao Kang 812
Kaufman, James Lee 721, 722
Kampai (political police) 738
Kennan, George 925, 926
Kerr, John H 890
Kilner, E. B 712
Kirk, Alexander C 893, 894
Kirk, Grayson 858, 859
Kizer, Benjamin H 713, 857, 858, 859, 860, 900, 921, 933
Kohlberg, Alfred 712, 923
Kornfeder, Joseph Zack 864–896
Kremlin 782, 783, 799, 804, 805, 834, 887, 907, 914, 916, 919, 920
Kung, H. H 825
Kuni 739
Kuomintang government 706, 707, 711, 772, 780, 781, 782, 783, 785, 786, 787, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 795, 796, 797, 800, 805, 806, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 913, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 866, 877, 879, 880, 886, 917.
Kuroda, Andrew Y 748, 752

L

Lamont, Corliss 836, 837, 838
Lamont, Thomas W 836, 837, 838
Lane, Clayton 837, 838, 911
Lasker, Bruno 864
Lattimore, Eleanor 864, 886, 888
Lattimore, Owen 704, 705, 707, 711, 713, 714, 715, 716, 720, 723, 724, 725, 726, 730, 731, 750, 751, 752, 838, 839, 858, 859, 860, 888, 900, 912, 913, 914, 915, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 925, 926, 927, 928, 931, 932, 933.
Lawrence, David 834
Lawyers Club (New York City) 892

Page
Lenin ---- 771, 865, 869, 884
Lenin School (Moscow) ---- 865, 868
Library of Congress ---- 747, 748, 752
Lie, Trygve ---- 931
Li Fu-chen ---- 812
Lincoln, General ---- 831
Lin Po-hu ---- 812
Lin Yu-tang ---- 827
Lippmann, Walter ---- 858, 859
Li Shao-Chi ---- 812
Lochhead, Archie ---- 857
Lockwood, William W ---- 856, 857, 908, 909, 910, 911
Loomis, Charles F ---- 713
Los Angeles committee ---- 712
Loyalty Security Board ---- 784, 788, 789, 793, 807
Lubin, I ---- 857
Luce, Henry R ---- 713, 728, 788, 827, 857, 928
Ludden, Raymond ---- 776, 811, 828, 830, 903
Ludlam, Kennedy ---- 743
Lung, Ho ---- 812

Mc

McCann, Colonel ---- 926
McCarthy, Joseph R ---- 927, 928
McCloy, John J ---- 723, 729, 731, 737
McConaughy, James L ---- 712, 713
McCoy, General ---- 859
McCoy, Frank R ---- 713
McFall, Jack K ---- 900, 902, 917
McLaughlin, Mrs. A ---- 713
McLaughlin, Emma ---- 712

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas ---- 717, 719, 720, 736, 737, 738, 739, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 749, 752, 777, 794, 832, 835, 849, 859, 901, 912, 932
MacKay, J. A ---- 858, 859
Mackinder ---- 911
MacLeish, Archibald ---- 729
MacNaughton, Ernest B ---- 901
Mandel, William ---- 766, 767, 768, 789, 770
Manhattan Center ---- 863
Mao Tse-tung ---- 782, 800, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 844, 845, 846, 852, 913, 914
Marceuse. (*See* M. Marukyusu.)
Marquess of Crewe ---- 909
Marshall, Gen. George C ---- 729, 730, 732, 733, 797, 831, 832, 833, 835, 901, 925, 932
Martin, Charles E ---- 712, 713
Marukyusu, M ---- 748, 753
Marx, Karl ---- 771, 783, 797, 835, 869, 870, 884, 885, 913
Massing, Mrs. Hede ---- 837
Mattusch, Kurt R ---- 908
Merritt, General ---- 848
Metcalfe, John C ---- 744, 745
Mikado. (*See* Hirohito.)
Mikhailovitch ---- 784, 787, 852
Millikan, Dr ---- 712
Mills College ---- 712
Minh, Ho Chi ---- 930
Minnesota University ---- 901
Mirkovic, Gen. Bor ---- 852
Mitchell, Kate ---- 712, 768, 769, 908, 911
Mitsubishi ---- 740
Mitsui ---- 740
Moeller, Hans "Asiaticus" ---- 915
Moffat, Abbot Low ---- 858, 859
Molyneaux, Peter ---- 857
Mongolian Peoples Republic ---- 931

Page
Mont Tremblant---- 850, 856, 858, 897
Moore, Harriett L---- 857
Moore, R. Walton---- 893
Morgan, J. P., & Co---- 836
Morison, George Abbot---- 712, 713, 858, 859
Mormacsun (steamship)---- 891, 892
Morris, Lawrence---- 712, 713
Moscow Government---- 894
Moscow Trials---- 889, 890
Moscow University---- 868
Motylev, Dr. V. E---- 891, 892
Mountbatten, Lord Louis---- 776
Mudd, Harvey---- 712
Murphy, J. Morden---- 901
MVD---- 869

N

Nathan, Robert---- 857
Nation---- 714
National Board (Communist Political Association)---- 707
National Broadcasting Co. (*See* NBC University of the Air.)
National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief---- 858
National defense. (*See* Department of Defense.)
National Resources Planning Board---- 857
National Salvationists---- 821
National Shinto (Japanese)---- 736, 742
Nationalist Chinese Government. (*See* Chinese Nationalist Government.)
Naval Medical Center (Bethesda)---- 928
Navy. (*See* United States Navy.)
Navy Department---- 704–707, 717, 731, 734, 736, 737, 743, 824
Nazis---- 733, 742, 835
NBC University of the Air---- 736, 743
New Republic---- 714
News Week---- 721, 748, 753
New York Herald Tribune---- 744, 745, 891, 892
New York Times---- 892, 893, 922, 926, 927, 928
New York World-Telegram---- 764, 765
Nimitz, Admiral---- 777
Ninth IPR Conference---- 709, 710, 850, 856, 897, 898
Norman, Dr. Herbert---- 748, 749, 753
Northwestern University---- 900, 905, 909, 910, 911, 923
Nosaka. (*See* Susumo Okano.)
Notestein, Mrs. A---- 713
Notestein, Adam Comstock---- 858, 859

O

Occidental College---- 900
Office of Price Administration (OPA)---- 857
Office of Strategic Services (OSS)---- 747, 912, 934
Office of Strategic Services (Far Eastern Division)---- 912
Office of Strategic Services (Japan section)---- 912
Office of War Information (OWI)---- 729, 730, 751, 766, 825, 826, 839, 912, 914
Okano, Susumo---- 747
OPA. (*See* Office of Price Administration.)
OSS. (*See* Office of Strategic Services.)
Oumansky, Constantine---- 603, 685, 686, 889
OWI. (*See* Office of War Information.)
Oxford University---- 714

P

Pacific Affairs---- 911
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission---- 857
Pacificus---- 714
Page, Walter Hines. (*See* Walter Hines Page School.)
Pan American Airways---- 928
Pan-Pacific Union---- 883

Page
Paris Peace Conference 746
Parker, Philo W 713, 862
Parsons, Reginald 712
Pauley, Ambassador 750, 753
Pauley Report 750, 753
Peake, Cyrus 916
Pearson, Drew 928
Peffer, Nathaniel 901, 920
Pence, Captain 859
Peng, Chen 812
Pennfield, James 722
Pennsylvania University 901
Pentagon 729, 733
Pen, Tah-huai 812
Peoples Political Council (China) 785, 809, 817
Peoples Volunteer Corps 812, 813, 814
Perkins, Milo 857
Peter, King 784, 787
Piao, Lin 792
Pi-shih, Jen 812
PM 714
Po-hu, Lin 812
Politburo. (*See* National Board, Communist Political Association.)
Political Affairs 706
Potsdam Declaration 731, 732
Powell, J. B 838
Pravda 802
Psychological Warfare Department 727, 731, 734

Q

Quigley, Harold S 901

R

Radio City 743
Radio Institute of America 762
Readers' Digest 838
Reber, Miles 840
Reischauer, Edwin O 901, 920
Republican Party 784, 797, 827, 833, 836, 837, 839
Reuters 839, 840
Rhetts 788
Riefler, Winfield 857
Robertson, William S 901
Rockefeller Brothers' Fund 901
Rockefeller Foundation 858, 916, 928
Rockefeller, John D., III 901
Rogers, Mrs. Dorothy 712
Roosevelt, President 707, 728, 729, 785, 787, 825, 829, 833, 839, 902
Ropes, E. C 857
Rosecrans, W. S 712, 713
Rosenman, Judge 729
Rosinger, Lawrence K 901, 919, 920, 921, 932
Rowell, Chester 713
Russian Army 805, 872
Russian Military Intelligence 860

S

Salisbury, Lawrence 753, 754
San Francisco Conference (United Nations) 815
Sarekat Rayat 878
Sayre, Francis B 857
SCAP 748, 749, 753, 901
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B 857
Scott, Walter K 904
Seabald 849
Second National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812

Page
Secretariat 710, 859, 883, 931
Security Council. (*See* United Nations, Security Council.)
Senate. (*See* United States Senate.)
Senate Appropriations Committee 860
Sen, Dr. Sun Yat 801
Sen, Madam Sun Yat 826
Service, Jack 776
Service, John S 779, 780, 783, 784, 785–89, 793, 807, 808, 811, 828, 830, 903
Seventh National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Seymour, Lawrence D 712, 713
Shao-Chi, Li 812
Sheng, Kang 812
Shidihara, Baron 729, 739
Shiga, Yoshio 747, 748, 749, 752, 753
Shinto. (*See* National Shinto, Japanese.)
Shoemaker, Col. James H 857, 858, 859
Sixth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Social Democrats 881
Socialist Party 771, 885
Socialist Party (Japan) 742, 872
Sorge, Richard 840
Soviet Embassy (Washington) 889
Soviet Press 894
Soviet Union 706, 707, 716, 718, 722, 732, 733, 738, 744–746, 766, 770, 786, 791, 793, 794, 797–801, 805, 806, 815, 818, 834, 835, 844, 845, 847, 860, 865, 868, 869, 872, 881, 886, 887, 890–895, 907, 913, 914, 921, 927, 929–931
Spotlight on the Far East 771
Sproul, Allan 858
Sproul, Robert Gordon 713, 928
Sprout, Harold 858, 859
Staley, Eugene 857, 901, 921
Stalin-Hitler 891
Stalin, Joseph 771, 784, 805, 815, 868, 869, 870, 884, 886, 891
Stassen, Harold 901, 921, 932, 933, 934
State Department ..... 703, 704, 706–710, 713, 716, 717, 719, 721, 723, 725–727, 729–731, 733, 735–738, 743–746, 748, 751–756, 758, 760, 764–766, 771, 777, 778, 784, 787–789, 793, 794, 800, 804, 807, 808, 824, 831, 832, 835, 840, 847, 848, 849, 857, 859, 860, 892–894, 899, 900, 902–904, 913, 914, 917–919, 921–928, 932, 933.
State Department (Biographical Register) 709, 710, 754
State Department (Bulletin) 735, 736
State Department (China Division) 704, 705, 707, 708, 709, 788, 824, 903
State Department (Division of Foreign Service Personnel) 709, 710, 760
State Department (Division of Labor Relations) 710
State Department (European Section) 708
State Department (Far Eastern Division) 704, 708, 726, 727, 736, 743, 754, 755, 831
State Department (Foreign Affairs Publication Section) 766
State Department (Foreign Service Auxiliary) 709, 710, 760
State Department (Japan Division) 704, 708, 912
State Department (Legal Section) 708
State Department (Loyalty Security Board) 784, 788, 789, 793, 807
State Department (Office of Public Affairs) 899
State Department (Policy Committee) 729
State Department (Psychological Warfare Department) 727, 731, 734
State University of Iowa 905
State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee 704, 716, 717, 722, 736, 737, 743
Steinhardt, Laurence A 892, 893, 894
Stettinius 706, 707, 754
Stewart, Marguerite Ann 886
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W 775, 776, 778, 779, 780, 785, 830
Stimson 729, 730, 731, 830
Stinebower, L. D 857
Stines, John 765, 766
Stone, W. T 857

Page
Strike 753
Strong, Robert 850
Sumitome 740
Sun Fo 821
Sun, General 851
Sun Yat-sen, Dr 801, 814, 878, 880
Sun Yat-sen, Madam 826
Sun Yat-sen University. (*see* Far Eastern University.)
Survey 712
Suzuki, Admiral 728
Swarajists 876, 877
Sweetland, Monroe 858
Swing 859
Swink 704, 716, 717, 722, 723, 727, 735, 737

T

Taft, Senator Bob 784
Tah-huai, Pen 812
Tang, Ting-san 881
Ta Kung Pao 791
Talbot, Phillips 901
Tano, System 914
Tarr, Edgar J 768, 769
Tass 895
Taylor, George E 901
Teh, Chu 812
Texas Weekly 857
Theater Intelligence Division (Far East Command) 843, 844, 848
Third National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Thomas, Elbert D 713
Time, Inc 857
Times. (*See* New York Times.)
Ting-san, Tang 881
Tito, Marshal 784, 787, 811, 828, 852
Tojo, General 715, 720
Tokuda, Kyuichi 747, 748, 749, 752, 753
Treasury Department. (*See* United States Treasury Department.)
Trippe, Juan 713, 928
Trotsky, Leon 866
Truman, President 730, 731, 732, 733, 736, 745, 776, 782, 784, 901, 902, 903, 928
Tse-Tung, Mao 782, 800, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 844, 845, 846, 852, 854, 913, 914

U

United Kingdom 732, 733
United Nations 710, 725, 746, 765, 793, 794, 815, 819, 853, 918, 924, 931
United Nations (Conference of International Organization) 710
United Nations (San Francisco Conference) 815
United Nations (Security Council) 746, 924
United Nations (United States Mission) 763, 764, 765
United Press (UP) 839
United States Air Force 745, 779, 780, 827, 849, 856
United States Army 729, 736, 738, 748, 753, 757, 759, 775, 779, 785, 792, 810, 820, 823, 825, 826, 833, 843, 849, 853, 901
United States Civil Service Commission 756
United States Congress 736, 833, 862, 902, 935
United States Department of Agriculture 857
United States Department of Commerce 857
United States District Court (Spokane) 857
United States Embassy (London) 703
United States Embassy (Moscow) 704, 765, 771, 893, 896
United States Embassy (Shanghai) 758
United States Embassy (Tokyo) 703, 704, 747
United States Embassy (Yugoslavia) 722
United States Foreign Service 703, 710, 746, 754, 760, 778, 793, 799, 804, 808, 825, 829, 830, 903

Page
United States Government 728, 730, 732, 733, 756, 757, 760, 771, 777, 824, 825, 834, 844, 845, 848, 849, 851, 860, 861, 892, 894, 895, 896, 901, 912, 918, 919, 920, 924, 933, 934, 935.
United States Navy 737, 745, 849, 858, 928
United States News 834
United States Senate 710, 905
United States Treasury Department 824, 857
Universal Trading Corporation 857
University of British Columbia 768, 770
University of California 768, 770, 928
University of Chicago 715, 720, 901
University of Cincinnati 901
University of Minnesota 901
University of Moscow 868
University of Pennsylvania 901
Universtiy of Washington 901
UNNRA 825
UP. (*See* United Press.)
USAF–CBI 779, 780, 785
U. S. S. R. 706, 707, 716, 718, 722, 732, 733, 738, 744–746, 766, 774, 786, 791, 793, 794, 796–801, 805, 806, 815, 818, 834, 835, 844, 845, 847, 860, 865, 868, 869, 872, 881, 886, 887, 890–894, 907, 913, 914, 921, 927, 929–931

V

Vandenberg 706, 707
Versailles Treaty 844
Vinacke, Harold M 901
Vince, Jacob 857
Vincent, John Carter 704, 705, 707, 708, 711, 713, 715, 716, 717, 718, 722, 723, 724, 726, 727, 730, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 750, 755, 788, 792, 831, 839, 858, 859, 860.
Voice of America 756, 765, 766, 770, 771
Voorhis, Jerry 858

W

W. A. E. 756
Wafdists 876, 877
Wakatsuki 729
Wallace, Henry A. 780, 825, 838, 839, 857
Walter Hines Page School 900, 928
War Department 704, 717, 736, 741, 743, 745, 824, 835, 840, 901, 914
War Production Board 857
Washington University 901
Watanists 878
Watt, Robert J. 858, 859
Waymack 859
Webb, Mr. 905
Webster Publishing Co. 864, 886, 888
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C. (retired) 775–841, 933
Welles, Sumner 826, 858, 859, 902
West Point Military Academy 857
Wheeler, Leslie 857
White 788
White, Harry D. 857, 858, 859, 860
White House 717, 730, 733, 736, 745, 752, 826, 857, 860, 863, 894, 901
White, Lynn, Jr. 712
White paper. (*See* American white paper.)
White Russians 872, 873
Wickett, F. A. 712, 713
Widener, Mrs. William Harry 755–773
Wilbur, Brayton 712, 713, 858, 859
Wilbur, Ray Lyman 713
Wild, Payson 713

Page
Willkie, Wendell L---- 827, 858
Willits, Joseph H---- 858
Willoughby, Gen. C. A---- 840, 845, 901
Wilson, C. E---- 858, 859
Woltman, Frederick---- 764, 765
Women of the World (radio show)---- 762
World Affairs Council of Northern California---- 901
World Bank---- 861
World-Telegram (New York)---- 764, 765
World War II---- 784
Wright, Mrs. Louise---- 713
Wrights, Quincy---- 712

Y

Yale University---- 714, 900
Yarnell, Admiral H. E---- 713, 858
Yat Sen, Dr. Sun---- 801, 814
Yi, Chen---- 812
Yosemite Conference (IPR)---- 890
Young Communist League---- 861
Yun, Chen---- 812
Yu-tang, Lin---- 827

Z

Zaibatsu---- 715, 720, 725, 736, 740

×

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

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

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 4

SEPTEMBER 26, 28, OCTOBER 1, 5, 6 AND 10, 1951

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

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CONTENTS

Testimony of— Page

Budenz, Louis F ---- 1077
Dennett, Raymond ---- 937
Holland, William L ---- 1139
McGovern, William M ---- 1007
Stassen, Harold E ---- 1035–1112
Appendix I, map of China ---- Facing 1250

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Ferguson, Watkins, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Mr. Dennett, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DENNETT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND DENNETT, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., DIRECTOR OF WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, BOSTON, MASS.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. DENNETT. Raymond Dennett, 21 Lowell Street, Cambridge, Mass.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. DENNETT. Director, World Peace Foundation, Boston, Mass.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, did you ever hold the position of the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. I did, approximately March 1944 to December 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Who first offered you that position, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. I think that first came in a letter to me from William Lockwood, then the secretary, in the spring of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you decline the offer at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. I declined the offer at that time. Instead, later that summer, I took a job with the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation and with UNRRA. The offer was renewed in January 1944, at which time I accepted it.

Mr. MORRIS. Who offered the job the second time, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. It was either Edward C. Carter or Harriet Moore, or both.

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Mr. MORRIS. Why do you think that job was offered to you, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. I know that, when Lockwood left, Miss Moore was acting secretary, and I know she wanted to leave. I assume that one of my qualifications was that I was 4–F and, therefore, available and I wouldn't mind getting the job, and as a result of the manpower shortage. At least, it is possible it was that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you assume the duties of secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. I did; in March 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people were under your direct supervision at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. Somewhere between 24 and 30, roughly.

Mr. MORRIS. Who made up that group?

Mr. DENNETT. There was a group in New York consisting of the New York staff. Do you want the names?

Mr. MORRIS. As many as possible, Mr. Dennett, yes.

Mr. DENNETT. The assistant treasurer was Tillie G. Shahn; Miss Marguerite Stewart in charge of the school program; Rosamund Lee in charge of promotion; Miss Miriam Farley was in charge of, I think, the pamphlets and the Far Eastern Survey. I think Mrs. Catherine Porter was there when I first came but left very soon thereafter to go with OWI. There were a number of clerical help. I guess Miss Yardumian was in the library.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Rose Yardumian?

Mr. DENNETT. Rose Yardumian. She was later transferred to the Washington office. There was also a Washington office directly under the supervision of the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was in charge of the staff in the Washington office?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know as of March 1944, but within a very short time we had a set-up in the Washington office in which Miss Yardumian was in general charge of office procedure, Mr. William C. Johnstone was in charge of the study-group program, and either then or later Mr. Owen Lattimore was asociated with the Washington office.

Mr. MORRIS. In addition to the Washington office, what other branches were there, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. We had a branch in Chicago which was more or less dormant. It was a volunteer group which arranged occasional meetings as visiting firemen came through Chicago. We had a fairly active group in Seattle. We had a very active group in the Bay region.

While I was there, another group was developed in the Spokane area and there was some reactivation of a group which had previously been active in Los Angeles.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what was the underlying union situation in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, we had a union contract.

Mr. MORRIS With what union?

Mr. DENNETT. The Union of Office and Professional Workers of America.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what local of that union?

Mr. DENNETT. No; I don't know the exact local of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it local 18, Mr. Dennett?

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Mr. DENNETT. It probably was. It was whatever the local was that was operating in New York City. I never did know the number particularly.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that has a functional rather than a jurisdictional breakdown, Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just for the sake of precision, you spoke of the "Union of Office and Professional Workers of America". Did you mean the United Office and Professional Workers of America?

Mr. DENNETT. It was the UOPWA, whatever that stood for.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the CIO?

Mr. DENNETT. That was the CIO union. We had a union-shop agreement rather than a closed-shop agreement.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain what that is, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. The arrangements were that anybody who joined the staff at any level had to become a member of the union within 30 days after joining, with the exception of myself. I represented management. Everybody else had to be a member of the union. That did not apply to the Washington office, but it did apply to the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, will you tell us the nature of the staff workers at the Institute of Pacific Relations with respect to their objectivity?

Mr. DENNETT. It is a fairly involved story, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us as much as possible what happened in connection with that situation, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. The situation when I came there, very shortly after I arrived—in the first place, I was a little concerned about the nature of the union contract.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you concerned?

Mr. DENNETT. It seemed to me with a staff of 24 people, which was engaged in research, objective research, that a union contract of this nature in which everybody had to be written into the union was probably an error because there might be some people whom you would want to hire who didn't particularly believe they ought to be members of the union. I was not too certain as to the nature of the staff, how good they were, how bad they were, and I certainly was not at that point in a position to know in any great detail all the individuals who were writing or had been writing for the institute. So, I established a series of outside committees, a research advisory committee, I think a publications committee.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you did not trust the staff; is that right, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, I came not to trust them. I had no feeling of no trust at the time I took over the job, or I would not have taken over the job.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us as much as possible, Mr. Dennett, why you came to distrust the staff?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, the situation developed in 1945, late 1944 and 1945. The executive committee had been after me to get an assistant secretary because I was carrying quite a heavy load. At the time of the San Francisco conference the Bay region peaple wanted me to come out and help them with their San Francisco office. Prior to my departure I went to one of the members of the staff and suggested

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to her that, if she took over while I was away and did a good job, I would suggest her as assistant secretary upon my return from San Francisco.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Mr. DENNETT. Mrs. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Upon my return from San Francisco in the late part of May or early June of 1945, I went to the executive committee and suggested that she be appointed assistant secretary, was told by some members of the executive committee that they had not been satisfied with her work while I was away, and they turned down the suggestion.

The shop committee of the union immediately came in to see me to protest—this was a grievance—that I had in fact promised Mrs. Stewart the job, and insisted that I appoint her assistant secretary in any event.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the shop stewards, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. At that time—well, the shop committee changed semiannually. At that time I think Miriam S. Farley and probably Miss Shirley Jenkins, plus one of the clerical help, were on the staff. Mrs. Jenkins and probably one of the clerical help were on the shop committee. I don't recall.

I was going on vacation. I told the shop committee I would transmit their complaints to the executive committee, which I did, and when I returned I found on my desk a communication from the shop committee to the executive committee, from the union to the executive committee, demanding that the executive committee reverse its decision and appoint Mrs. Stewart assistant secretary. This seemed to me to put pretty clearly the question who was running the organization, the staff or the executive committee, and in order to clear the air I submitted my resignation at that time. It was not accepted until the following December.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any effort made to prevent you from going through with your resignation? Did they ask you not to go through with it?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, the executive committee at that time refused to accept it in July.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any special committee set up to hear the merits of the case?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; there was a special committee appointed to investigate. It consisted of Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein, both of whom were members of the executive committee. They heard Mrs. Stewart on her side and the shop committee and they heard me on the other. Mrs. Stewart was not appointed assistant secretary. There was some face-saving formula developed to go over the whole procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Mr. Field take in all of this?

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Field was rather consistently in favor of the union.

Mr. MORRIS. He was consistently in favor of the union?

Mr. DENNETT. I think that is fair to say yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the union?

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Mr. DENNETT. After all, he had put in the union contract when he was in charge of the Institute of Pacific Relations; so I was told, anyway.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, I wonder if you could tell me more about the operations of the staff in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations? How influential was the staff in the running of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. During the period when I was there the staff was not very influential.

Mr. MORRIS. Was not influential?

Mr. DENNETT. Not while I was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is that, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. Because at that time I was brought in I gather that the staff had regularly been appearing at meetings of the executive committee. I was informed that the executive committee in the immediate period prior to my arrival had not been a particularly active group and that was one of the things which was to be changed when I came in, and I certainly had the impression that the staff had had a good deal more to do with the determination of policy than is generally accepted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, Senator McCarran has been called down to the Rules Committee. We will have to stand by until another Senator arrives.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, I would like to show you a draft of a working agreement between the Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18, United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO, and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., and ask you if that is the local you have been testifying about this morning?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume that it is. This is the 1939 draft. I was not there until 1944 but I think it was a continuing contract annually with the same group.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the union with which you negotiated?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record the working agreement between the Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18, of UOPWA, CIO, and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which Mr. Mandel will verify was a paper taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. What is the number of the exhibit, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. We are now introducing it, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. Does it have a number?

Mr. MORRIS. Not yet.

Mr. MANDEL. This contract was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be accepted in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator WATKINS. That will be the order.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 281" and is as follows:)

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WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOOK AND MAGAZINE GUILD, LOCAL 18, UOPWA, CIO AND THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

This agreement, made and entered into this __ day of ------, 1939, by and between the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the council, and the Book and Magazine Guild, local 18, United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO, hereinafter referred to as the guild, witnesses that

Whereas, it is the desire of the parties hereto to establish a permanent and stable basis for the continuance of amicable and harmonious relations between the council and its employees and for the maintenance and improvement of standards of work and conditions of employment; and

Whereas these objectives can best be achieved through an agreement clearly defining the obligations of each party.

Now, therefore, in consideration of the covenants herein contained, the parties hereto mutually agree as follows:

I. UNION RECOGNITION

The council recognizes and acknowledges the guild as the sole and exclusive representative of all employees attached to its New York office, for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and all other conditions of employment.

1. For the purpose of this agreement "employees" shall be defined as persons on the payroll of the council's New York office, whether on a full or part-time basis, and normally working in the New York office. It shall not include persons having the power to hire and fire, volunteer workers, persons engaged temporarily for special projects, workers on a retainer basis, or holders of fellowships working under the supervision of the council but receiving no compensation from it. The list of persons covered by the contract shall be determined by agreement between the council and the office committee, hereinafter provided for, in accordance with the above definition.

2. It is understood that all staff work shall be performed by paid employees, except in cases where a volunteer would not replace a paid worker and where the appointment of the volunteer is made after consultation and agreement with the office committee.

II. PREFERENTIAL HIRING

Employees who are members of the guild at the time of signing of this contract or who subsequently join the guild shall remain members in good standing during the life of this contract. Employees who are not members of the guild at the time of signing shall not be bound by this contract to become members of the guild, although membership shall be open to those eligible for membership under the bylaws of the guild.

1. *Hiring.*—Whenever a vacancy occurs in any position, the council agrees to fill such vacancy by promotion from among the employees already in the office, or where this is impracticable it shall apply to the guild to fill such vacancy. If the guild is unable to supply a qualified person within 10 consecutive working days, the council may employ a person of its own selection.

When positions are to be filled otherwise than through the guild, the council shall recommend to all candidates that, if hired by the council, they become members of the guild; and in making appointments shall give preference to candidates who will agree to join the guild if hired, unless such preference would result in the appointment of a candidate who is not qualified to fill the position in question.

2. *Trial period.*—The council shall have the right, at the time of employing a worker, to declare a trial period of not more than 1 month, but the same worker may not be employed for more than one trial period in the same type of work. In special circumstances, however, an extension of the trial period may be permitted by agreement between the council and the office committee.

3. *Temporary employees.*—Temporary employees may be hired for a specified period, upon designation in advance of the temporary character of the employment, so long as the period of temporary employment shall not exceed 1 month. Any temporary employee retained for a longer period shall automatically become a regular employee. In special circumstances, however, an extension of the period of temporary employment may be permitted by agreement between the

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council and the office committee. Temporary employees shall be paid 10 percent above the minimum rates established for permanent employees in each category hereinafter provided, except by agreement with the office committee.

4. *Part-time employees.*—Part-time employees shall be paid in accordance with the wage provisions hereinafter set forth, adjusted pro rata in proportion to the average weekly hours of work of such employees.

III. LAY-OFFS, DISCHARGE

Should the council at any time find it necessary to reduce the number of employees, it is agreed that seniority rights will be respected; namely, that the last person hired in any particular capacity shall be the first to be laid off. In the event of a subsequent increase in the staff such employees, if qualified and available, shall be given preference in hiring.

No employee shall be discharged or laid off except for just and sufficient cause as determined by consultation and agreement between the council and the office committee. Nor shall any employee be discriminated against or discharged for his actions in behalf of the guild.

1. *Severance pay.*—Any employee who is laid off or discharged, except for dishonesty or other serious offense as determined by agreement between the council and the office committee, shall receive extra compensation as follows: One week's pay for every 6 months or major fraction thereof which he has spent in the employ of the council, up to a maximum of 26 weeks' pay. This may be paid either in a lump sum or in installments, as agreed between the council, the employee, and the office committee, provided that the full amount is paid within the period for which the employee is entitled to receive severance pay, and that no single installment is less than the amount of the employee's weekly wage.

2. *Resignations.*—In the event that any employee desires to resign from the staff, he shall give the council at least 2 weeks' notice of his intention to resign.

IV. WAGES

No employee shall be paid at a rate less than $21 per full-time week. The following minimum wages shall be paid to employees within the classification specified, it being understood and agreed that this schedule represents merely a minimum standard and is not to be regarded as a wage scale fixing the salary of every employee:

	Per week
Office boys, clerical workers, typist	$21
Secretaries	25
Professional workers	30

It is understood to be the policy of the council that in granting wage increases the factor of length of service shall be given consideration together with other factors.

Nothing in this contract shall prevent any individual employee from entering into an individual agreement with the council for a salary above the minimum to which he is entitled under this contract, provided that such agreement be made only after consultation between the council and the office committee. The office committee may also take the initiative in such matters.

At the time when the annual budget of the council is being drawn up, or at any other time when changes in the budget affecting any salaries or reduction of staff are under consideration, the office committee shall be consulted on such changes. No reduction in the wages of any employee shall be made except after consultation and agreement with the office committee.

The salary schedules of the council and such other financial data as may be relevant to the question of salaries shall at all times be open to the inspection of the office committee.

V. TRANSFERS

It is understood that no employee shall be transferred to different work without due notification to the employees concerned.

VI. HOURS

The working week shall consist of 5 days and 35 hours, from Monday to Friday, except that in order to keep the office open to the public on Saturday

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one employee at a time may be required to work an additional 3 hours on Saturday morning; or in the event of unusual pressure of work any employee may be required to work an additional 3 hours on Saturday morning.

Any employee required to do overtime work shall receive an equivalent amount of free time with pay.

VII. HOLIDAYS

Employees shall not be required to work on legal holidays, nor on religious holidays when leave is requested for observance of such holidays.

VIII. VACATIONS

All employees shall be entitled to the following yearly vacations with full pay: during the first 2 years of employment, 1 weekday for every month of employment; after 2 years of employment, 1 month.

IX. SICK LEAVE

No deductions from an employee's pay shall be made by reason of absence on account of sickness, provided such absences do not exceed a reasonable period as determined by agreement between the council and the office committee.

X. EXISTING PRIVILEGES

No rights or privileges now enjoyed by the employees and not specifically mentioned in this contract shall be withdrawn, curtailed, or modified in any way except by agreement with the office committee.

XI. OFFICE COMMITTEE

Employees who are members of the guild shall elect from among their number an office committee. It shall be the function of the office committee to represent the employees in all dealings with the council or its representative which may concern them as a group; to act as representative of the employees in the consideration and presentation to the management of all employee grievances, whether individual or collective; and to hear, consider, and negotiate for the settlement of all complaints and grievances presented by the council or its representative which may arise from or otherwise concern the relationship between the council and its employees. The office committee may seek the aid of any member of the guild, whether or not employees of the council, in performing any of the above functions.

XII. EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVE

The council shall designate in writing a particular person or persons with whom the office committee shall conduct any necessary dealings and negotiations and who shall have full power and authority to make decisions with respect to such dealings and negotiations.

XIII. GRIEVANCES

All grievances or complaints, whether of the council or any of its employees, resulting from the operation of this contract or otherwise affecting relations between the council and its employees, shall be made the subject of discussion between the council representative and the office committee, who shall endeavor to adjust the matter by mutual agreement.

XIV. ARBITRATION

In the event of disagreement as to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of this contract, which cannot be settled by negotiation between the parties, such dispute shall be referred to a board of arbitration consisting of one member designated by the council, one member designated by the guild, and a third member to be chosen by the other two. If they cannot agree on the third member, such member shall be chosen by the board of mediation of the New York State Department of Labor. The decision of the board of arbitration shall be accepted by both parties as final.

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XV. MODIFICATION OF TERMS

At any time before 30 days prior to the date of expiration of this agreement either party hereto may give to the other written notice of desire to change the terms of this agreement by adding to, deleting, or modifying the existing provisions thereof; it being understood that while the office committee shall participate in all steps and negotiations with respect to such changes, said committee shall act only through the guild. The notice herein provided for shall state the nature of the changes desired. Within five working days after receipt of such notice the parties shall enter into negotiations with respect to the proposed modifications, and such negotiations shall be continued until an agreement is reached or until it becomes obvious that the parties cannot agree. If no agreement is reached with respect to the changes proposed, the terms of this contract shall continue with the same force and effect as though no changes had ever been proposed, until its expiration date.

XVI. DURATION OF CONTRACT

This contract shall continue in full force for 1 year from the date of signing and it shall automatically renew itself for an additional year at the end of each and every yearly expiration date, unless either party to it gives written notice to the other that it desires to modify or change this agreement at the expiration date. Such formal notice shall be given at least 30 days before the yearly expiration date of the agreement. In such an event negotiations shall be immediately opened for the purpose of concluding a new agreement. During such negotiations and until the conclusion thereof, either by the signing of a new contract or the withdrawal of either party from the negotiations, this agreement shall remain in effect, even though it extend beyond the stated term.

This contract shall be signed in duplicate and one copy retained by each party.

For the Book and Magazine Guild:

For the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.:

LIST OF EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THIS CONTRACT

Kathleen Barnes
Annette Blumenthal
Hilda Austern Bretholtz
Miriam S. Farley
Katrine R. C. Greene
Bruno Lasker
William W. Lockwood, Jr.
Michael Minarovich
Catherine Porter
Jeannette Randolph
Elizabeth Raymond
Russell G. Shiman
Margaret R. Taylor
Emily C. Twaddell
Helen Wiss

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have a paper which would indicate that that particular local and that union were expelled by the CIO as being Communist controlled?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a resolution expelling the United Office and Professional Workers of America, with which the Book and Magazine Guild was affiliated, from the CIO. The last paragraph of that resolution reads as follows:

3. That, in pursuance of the powers granted to the executive board by section 10 of article IV of the constitution of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and pursuant to the findings of this board that the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and the purposes of the Communist party rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the constitution of the CIO, the certificate of affiliation with the CIO heretofore granted to the United Office and Professional Workers of America is, effective March 1, 1950, revoked, and the United Office and Professional Workers of America is, as of that date, expelled from the CIO.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this whole resolution of the CIO introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator WATKINS. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 282" and is as follows:)

RESOLUTION EXPELLING THE UNITED OFFICE AND PROFESSIONAL WORKERS OF AMERICA

Whereas section 10 of article VI of the constitution of the Congress of Industrial Organizations reads as follows:

"SEC. 10. The executive board shall have the further power, upon a two-thirds vote, to revoke the certificate of affiliation of or to expel or to take any other appropriate action against any national or international union or organizing committee the policies and activities of which are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program or the purposes of the Communist Party, any Fascist organization, or other totalitarian movement, rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the constitution of the CIO. Any action of the executive board under this section may be appealed to the convention: *Provided, however*, That such action shall be effective when taken and shall remain in full force and effect pending the appeal."

and

Whereas the eleventh constitutional convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, held at Cleveland, Ohio, between October 31 and November 4, 1949, adopted a resolution by the overwhelming vote of the delegates in attendance at the convention, which resolution reads as follows:

"Whereas, this convention has amended the constitution to empower the executive board to take appropriate action to maintain the integrity of the CIO and to project it against those who seek to pervert it from its constitutional objectives and purposes: Now, therefore, be it

"*Resolved*, That this convention hereby instructs the executive board immediately to exercise its powers under article VI, section 10 of the constitution and to take appropriate action to protect the CIO and to prevent the use of the good name of the CIO by those who have consistently directed their policies and activities toward the achievement of the program or the purposes of the Communist Party, any Fascist organization, or other totalitarian movement."

and

Whereas, at the meeting of the executive board of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, held on November 5, 1949, William Steinberg, president of the American Radio Association and a member of the CIO executive board, filed charges with said board that the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and the purposes of the Communist Party rather than the objectives set forth in the constitution of the CIO; and

Whereas the CIO executive board thereupon by resolution duly adopted authorized the giving of notice of the charges and the appointment by the president of the CIO of a committee to conduct hearings on the charges and to make a report and recommendations to the executive board; and

Whereas pursuant to and in accordance with this resolution, Philip Murray, president of the CIO, designated Emil Rieve, president of the Textile Workers Union of America, Martin Wagner, president of the United Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers, and Harry Sayre, president of the United Paperworkers of America, all of whom are members of the national CIO Executive Board, as a committee to conduct hearings on said charges and to make a report or reports to the executive board recommending appropriate action; and

Whereas appointment of said committee by President Murray was announced to and approved by the executive board, and due notice of the appointment of said committee and of said charges was given to the United Office and Professional Workers of America; and

Whereas upon notice duly given, hearings were held by the committee at which the committee heard testimony and received exhibits both in support of and in opposition to the charges; and

Whereas the United Office and Professional Workers of America were given full, complete, and adequate opportunity to present testimony and to submit material to the committee in opposition to the charges; and

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Whereas the committee has presented to and filed with the executive board of the CIO at a meeting of said board duly convened and held in Washington, D. C., commencing February 14, 1950, the report, findings, and recommendations of the committee, copies of which were furnished to the United Office and Professional Workers of America and to all of the members of the executive board present at said meeting; and

Whereas the executive board has considered the report of the committee and has given an opportunity to and has heard the United Office and Professional Workers of America in opposition to the findings and recommendations of the committee, and has heard other testimony both in support of and in opposition to these findings: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the executive board of the Congress of Industrial Organizations at a meeting of the board duly held at Washington, D. C., at CIO headquarters on Wednesday, February 15, 1950, as follows:

1. That the report, findings, and recommendations of the executive board committee appointed by President Philip Murray to conduct the hearing in the matter of the United Office and Professional Workers of America, be and said report, findings, and recommendations of that committee are in all respects approved, confirmed, and accepted as the report, findings, and decision of the executive board of the CIO.

2. That upon the basis of the report of the committee to investigate the charges against the United Office and Professional Workers of America and upon the hearing and argument conducted before this board, the executive board finds and concludes that the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and purposes of the Communist Party rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the CIO constitution.

3. That, in pursuance of the powers granted to the executive board by section 10 of article VI of the constitution of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and pursuant to the findings of this board that the policies and activities of the United Office and Professional Workers of America are consistently directed toward the achievement of the program and the purposes of the Communist Party rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the constitution of the CIO, the certificate of affiliation with the CIO heretofore granted to the United Office and Professional Workers of America is, effective March 1, 1950, revoked, and the United Office and Professional Workers of America is, as of that date, expelled from the CIO.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Morris, I have here also the report of the executive board committee appointed by President Murray to investigate charges against the United Office and Professional Workers of America.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you admit that into the record? It is a long document, and I do not particularly think it is necessary to have it copied in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you wish to have it incorporated by reference?

Mr. MORRIS. I think that would be adequate.

Senator WATKINS. It may be filed and incorporated by reference, but it need not be copied into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 283" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, is it your testimony that Frederick Field was the man responsible for initiating the negotiations of local 18 of the UOPWA, CIO?

Mr. DENNETT. That is what I was informed. I have no personal knowledge, but I believe the union contract was first written around 1938 or 1939, or perhaps slightly earlier than that, when Field was in charge of the American Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you find that that particular contract interfered with the orderly operation of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

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Mr. DENNETT. Not in precisely those terms. I think I perhaps ought to clarify the situation by saying that prior to the incident to which you refer there had been no particular difficulties with the union in regard to the operation of the union contract. Normal negotiations took place semiannually with no particular difficulties involved.

My personal feeling is that the difficulties arose as the method which I had set up for operations slowly deprived the staff or tended to restrict the staff in their normal, or what had been previously their normal, decisions by referring it to the executive committee or funneling their recommendations to advisory committees, and that as the staff found itself somewhat restricted it began to rely on the union contract as a method for, shall we say, getting rid of me.

Mr. MORRIS. In the last analysis you felt that the issue was whether or not the staff was going to control the operations of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations or whether you as secretary were going to be able to operate and administer the functions?

Mr. DENNETT. Whether the executive committee was going to control or I through the executive committee. I think I previously testified it got to the point where I had to go to one of the members of the executive committee to dictate a memorandum to my own committee because my memorandum would go to the union before it got into the United States mails.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, could you tell us whether the staff workers of the Institute of Pacific Relations were in fact objective research workers?

Mr. DENNETT. I had grave doubts. My problem or my responsibility, as I understood it, was to assure the supporters or be responsible to the supporters of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whether they were foundations, big business, or members, that we were getting balanced objective reports on the Far East. Now that encouraged actually the presentation of different points of view, but the problem was whether or not in the totality of our production we did in fact present a balanced objective scholarly interpretation. It was my feeling that in regard to periodical material and pamphlet material that there was a tendency on the part of the staff to pick people as authors and to submit their manuscripts to other writers for critical comment who by and large tended to agree with the point of view of the staff prior to the selection of either the authors or the readers of the manuscript, and that this tended over the whole period to give less than a complete objective picture, or at least tended to give less than the complete range of critical comment on the Far East that existed at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, were you in a position to know whether or not any of the staff workers were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. DENNETT. I certainly was not, nor did it ever occur to me at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Dennett, you feel you are not qualified to judge whether or not they were Communists?

Mr. DENNETT. I certainly am not, nor was I.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask this question? You state that you had a feeling that they were a little less than objective. Did anything specific happen that you could indicate to the committee now on which you based that conclusion? In other words, we would like to have some first-hand evidence of what occurred rather than just your opinion or your conclusion, so we may draw our own conclusions.

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Mr. MORRIS. Did you yourself ever write anything, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; I was thinking specifically of one or two instances of that sort. I wrote periodically for the Far Eastern Survey. I recall very specifically one article which I wrote. The normal procedure, I might say, when the articles were written was to circulate them in draft form to the various people involved in the research level for comment before they were put in final form for publication. I remember I wrote one article in regard to the Sino-Soviet treaties of 1945 in which I compared the 1945 treaties with the 1895 and 1898 treaties which the Czars had made with China, discovered there were some 14 or 15 identical articles, and drew among other conclusions this was a reentry by the Soviet Union into the Czarist control of Manchuria and was therefore merely an example of Soviet imperialism rather than Czarist imperialism, but it was in fact part and parcel of the same thing.

Senator WATKINS. Was this treaty of 1945 the treaty that was entered into as a result of the Yalta Agreement?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you use the term "Soviet imperialism"?

Mr. DENNETT. I recall I did, and I recall it was the subject of very considerable criticism by some members of the staff who didn't think I should refer to Soviet imperialism.

Senator WATKINS. For what reason? Did they indicate why they did not want you to refer to it?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall the arguments, but the general feeling seemed to be that the connection I had made between the Czars and the Soviets was not precisely accurate because the Soviet Union was, after all, different from the Czarist regime.

Senator WATKINS. Did it in any way reflect on the Soviet Union or Communists?

Mr. DENNETT. I think what you are getting at is basically what I came to feel, Senator, and that is there was a preoccupation with explaining the Soviet Union on the theory——

Senator WATKINS. In other words, a sort of apology for them or at least explaining them in a more favorable light?

Mr. DENNETT. Explaining it on the ground, and I think the staff felt at that time, if we had to live with the Soviet Union during the postwar period we had to explain why the Soviet Unon acted this way. I thought there was a point at which we had to say after all you had to call imperialism imperialism as well as Czars.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you were speaking rather frankly and bluntly?

Mr. DENNETT. I thought I was speaking accurately.

Senator WATKINS. That is probably a good expression for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, do you offer that episode as a typical reaction on the part of the staff and use it to describe the bias you said you attributed to the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. I do not recall any other episode quite as strong as that.

Mr. MORRIS. But that is typical?

Mr. DENNETT. That was the kind of thing which I was running into periodically on various issues.

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Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you found there was disposition on the part of the staff to favor the Soviet Union?

Senator WATKINS. Maybe he ought to finish what he started, Mr. Morris. I think he had an idea.

Mr. DENNETT. I was thinking of one other episode in regard to an article on China in which I suggested that some of the adjectives used were a little unnecessary. I don't recall the adjectives, whether they were futile or exactly what they were, but there were a number of rather heavy adjectives, and I thought the article would be just as good without the adjectives. This was describing the Nationalist regime.

Senator WATKINS. Critically?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes, and I had to fight kind of hard to get the adjectives and adverbs taken out.

Senator WATKINS. Indicating a bias against the Nationalist regime?

Mr. DENNETT. Certainly no favorable representation.

Mr. MORRIS. Further than that, was there a bias against the Nationalist government expressed on the part of the staff?

Mr. DENNETT. I think generally, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a sympathetic and favorable view to the Chinese Communists uniformly expressed by the staff?

Mr. DENNETT. I would say probably. I think now when you are talking about staff we ought to be more explicit because I think the people who are involved in the writing and the upper administration echelons are the people I am talking about. Clerical help were exempt from this. Library help were exempt. The four or five people who were doing the writing and the selection of materials, and so on,——

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they, again?

Mr. DENNETT. Mrs. Stewart, Miss Farley, subsequently Lawrence Salisbury, who joined the staff later, although less in his instance; possibly Mrs. Jenkins, who also joined the staff later. Those are the ones primarily involved in the writing.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you found there was disposition on the part of the staff to favor the Soviet Union?

Mr. DENNETT. If you would use the word "favorable" to interpret the Soviet Union, I would say "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. I will amend the question.

Senator WATKINS. That amounts to practically the same thing, does it not?

Mr. DENNETT. Sir, I don't like to be put in the position of accusing people when I don't know exactly what they were doing. Favorably interpret, yes.

Senator WATKINS. You saw the result of what they were doing?

Mr. DENNETT. Maybe a distinction without a difference, but it makes me happier to have the distinction.

Senator WATKINS. Of course you are the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, are you acquainted with a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations entitled "Our Job in the Pacific" by Henry A. Wallace?

Mr. DENNETT. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. This was put out under the auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

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Mr. MORRIS. Is that pamphlet familiar to you, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. It is indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that pamphlet prepared while you were Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. It was.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances behind the preparation of that pamphlet, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. Early in 1945 I received word from the Washington office that Owen Lattimore believed that Mr. Wallace might be willing to write a pamphlet for a pamphlet series in regard to American post-war Pacific policy. The question was taken up and discussed in the executive committee. It was decided that we should go ahead with this.

Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore was given the job of doing the writing for it. She had, I gather, three or four, two or three, sessions with the Vice President during which she took notes on his ideas. The pamphlet was then prepared by her and the manuscript subsequently approved by Mr. Wallace.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was he when he finally approved it?

Mr. DENNETT. According to my recollection, and I am not sure on this because I was in San Francisco at the time, the manuscript was sent out to him while he was on his trip in China. I didn't handle that last stage of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, on the 13th of July, 1951, during the executive session with Owen Lattimore——

Senator WATKINS. You mean while he was before the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Mrs. Owen Lattimore accompanied Mr. Lattimore and we asked her at this time whether or not she would confirm the testimony of Mr. Dennett which had been taken prior to that time in executive session on this particular point.

Mr. Mandel, will you read from the executive session of Owen Lattimore on July 13, the testimony of Mrs. Owen Lattimore on this particular point?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Lattimore, would you tell us what contribution you made to the preparation of Mr. Wallace's pamphlet on the Far East, which I will introduce here in just a minute?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think I can describe my contribution as donkey work. I helped with the actual writing, not with the assembling.

Mr. MORRIS. With the actual writing?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what I want to determine for the record, the extent to which you contributed to the preparation of that pamphlet which was later issued under IPR auspices under the name of Henry Wallace.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I suppose I might have been termed the ghost.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the colloquy in the afternoon session, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. FORTAS——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fortas is the attorney for Mr. Lattimore who sat in at that session.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. FORTAS. Before the recess some questions were asked of Mrs. Lattimore concerning her participation in the preparation of an IPR pamphlet for Mr.

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Wallace. I wonder if it would be agreeable to you if she stated the facts there in somewhat more detail?

Senator EASTLAND. Surely.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Mr. Fortas thought the term "ghost" was not a very clearly defined term. Perhaps different people understood different things from the term "ghost."

I simply meant that the ideas were Mr. Wallace's, and I simply did the actual writing down. I went to see him and he told me what his ideas were, and I would make a draft and go back to him with the draft.

Mr. MORRIS. How was the draft sent to him?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether I mailed it or took it. I went to see him several times because he didn't have time to do the actual writing himself. He simply dictated a lot of stuff to me.

Mr. MORRIS. My impression was that the draft was being worked on while he was with Mr. Lattimore.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No. This was before my husband went on this trip.

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't the final draft sent to him in China or Siberia?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Possibly for proof reading or for final O. K. or something. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. It was that that I was asking about, when that was sent out and how.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. FORTAS. I wonder if Mrs. Lattimore could state just how she came to participate in this.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you show that to anyone else before you finished with it? Did you consult with anyone?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am sure I did. The custom with IPR pamphlets was to have a lot of people read them and make suggestions.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand that.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. It originated because Mr. Wallace, who was the Vice President of the United States, had become interested in the Far East, and had some ideas about the Far East, and so the IPR thought it would be very interesting to have a pamphlet written by him. It was one of these very popular pamphlets for very wide distribution.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anyone who had to approve it before you sent it out?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Mr. Wallace had to approve it and I suppose the editor at IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think it was Miss Miriam Farley. I am not absolutely sure about that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as Mr. Mandel has read the entire excerpt that is pertinent from the executive testimony, there is no need for our introducing that in the record.

Senator WATKINS. It is in the record now as read.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will read certain excerpts from this particular pamphlet into the record at this time.

Mr. MANDEL. I read from page 24 of the pamphlet entitled "Our Job in the Pacific" by Henry A. Wallace, as follows:

> Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a "freedom bloc" which is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact. * * *

Then from page 28:

> The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs. * * *

Then from page 30:

> Russia's relation to Pan Asia may come to resemble in many ways our own relation to Pan America, with the same choices between good neighborliness and imperialism. * * *

Then from page 30:

> Russian interest in the Far East is not likely to be that of territorial expansion. The Russians certainly want a friendly government in China and a friendly

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government in Korea just as we do. The term "friendly" does not imply a desire for socialist governments but for governments that will work with Russia and not against her. This is vital for Russia as a matter of security in protecting her far-eastern front. * * *

Then from page 37:

* * * Our example in the Philippines, however, together with Russia's enlightened treatment of Asiatic minorities and any steps which China may take toward cultural and linguistic as well as political minorities, can bring tremendous pressure to bear on the whole colonial problem. * * *

Senator WATKINS. May I just at this moment make a suggestion with respect to the excerpt from the transcript of the executive hearing that you had Mr. Mandel read. I wish to instruct the clerk and the reporter to check with his original notes to be sure that it is an exact copy of what was put in the evidence at the executive hearing, so there will be no question about it.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be done, Mr. Chairman.

It may be rather unfair, although I do not think so, to take certain excerpts from this book. Inasmuch as the pamphlet itself runs only 47 pages, I suggest that the whole pamphlet be put into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. You mean have it typed into the record or filed as an exhibit, being incorporated in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. It will be filed as an exhibit and numbered in consecutive order, not necessarily copied into the record but incorporated by reference only.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 284" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, was there any controversy within the Institute of Pacific Relations on the publication of this pamphlet?

Mr. DENNETT. I recall there was some discussion, yes. When the matter was first brought up in the executive committee there were some members of the committee who felt that Mr. Wallace, who was then in the process of, I gathered from the press, trying to continue his position as Vice President in the forthcoming convention, was too controversial a figure for us to publish the pamphlet. There was another feeling on the part of others that since the Institute of Pacific Relations presented all points of view, Mr. Wallace's point of view was certainly one which was entitled to public hearing, and, therefore, we would not be under criticism if we published this pamphlet. There were others who felt very strongly that we ought to publish it in any event even though this were controversial. So we at least, I would say, had two discussions within the executive committee of this general subject.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it finally cleared?

Mr. DENNETT. It was finally agreed that Mr. Wallace was to write the pamphlet. So far as I recall, there was no reading of what he had written or what Mrs. Lattimore had written because we more or less felt that we were not in a position to edit the Vice President. Therefore we had to accept pretty much what he sent without editing.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Dennett, who was the principal advocate of the publication of this pamphlet in these controversies within the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. Frederick Field, I would say.

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Mr. MORRIS. He was the one pushing hardest for the publication of this pamphlet?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; he was certainly in favor, although I think it is fair to say that the executive committee in the end decided we should publish it.

Senator WATKINS. What position did he occupy?

Mr. DENNETT. He was a member of the executive committee, at the time I was there, 1 of about 10 or 11 members.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of publication of this pamphlet?

Mr. DENNETT. Probably late May or June 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Frederick Field had a byline in the Daily Worker at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. This was after the San Francisco Conference, so I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it generally known in the IPR office that Frederick Field had a byline in the Daily Worker?

Mr. DENNETT. Make your distinction between office and executive committee.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean them both.

Mr. DENNETT. I think it was certainly generally assumed by everyone that Frederick Field was, if not a Communist, at least a fellow traveler.

Mr. MORRIS. My question was more direct than that. I was wondering if it was generally known he had a byline at that time in the Daily Worker?

Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the evidence that sometime during 1944 Frederick Field ran a regular weekly column with a byline in the Daily Worker.

Senator WATKINS. Using his own name?

Mr. MORRIS. Using his own name. I am asking Mr. Dennett if as a matter of fact he knew about it and he stated he did.

Mr. DENNETT. I did after the San Francisco Conference. I did not before that.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. That is at the time of this publication?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now do you know whether or not the staff members or the officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations knew that Field had that byline in the Daily Worker?

Mr. DENNETT. I asume the staff did. I have no knowledge whether the executive committee did or not, because it was not mentioned.

Senator WATKINS. In the course of studies and investigations made by the institute, of course they would see the Daily Worker and it would be referred to and studied to get the point of view at least of the Soviet Government; would it not?

Mr. DENNETT. As far as I know, we did not get the Daily Worker in the IPR office.

Senator WATKINS. You did not have it there?

Mr. DENNETT. No; we didn't have it there. It never came in while I was there, that I know of.

Senator WATKINS That is interesting.

Mr. DENNETT. Frankly, Senator, it never occurred to me that is surprising, but actually, so far as I knew, we never got the Daily Worker in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. You do not know whether you subscribed to it?

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Mr. DENNETT. I know we didn't subscribe to it. As far as I know, I didn't see a copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not consider it to be part of your job to be familiar with it?

Mr. DENNETT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nobody ever told you that you should be familiar with it in that job?

Mr. DENNETT. I never saw it.

Senator WATKINS. May I call your attention, for the purpose of clearing the record and probably refreshing your recollection, to the third page of this pamphlet? I think you stated this pamphlet was published in 1945.

Mr. DENNETT. You are right; it is 1944. It was in the spring of 1944.

Senator WATKINS. That refreshes your recollection?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; it was June of 1944. I thought it was after the San Francisco Conference but it was the year prior to that, which may have some reference as to what Mr. Morris asked when he said testimony had been introduced that Field had a by-line in the Daily Worker in the latter part of 1944. If that came out in the spring of 1944, we would not necessarily have known he had a by-line at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. We have introduced in the record in the past the fact that Frederick Field ran what appears to be a regular weekly column in the Daily Worker commencing April 25, 1944. It runs April 25, May 6, May 13, May 20, May 27, June 3, June 10, and June 17.

Senator WATKINS. Did it have his name in the column?

Mr. MORRIS. It had his by-line.

Mr. Dennett, were you secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations when the Amerasia case broke?

Mr. DENNETT. I certainly was.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first learn about the arrest of the six Amerasia defendants?

Mr. DENNETT. When I got on the station in Bronxville that morning and saw it in the New York Times, upper left-hand headline.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recognize any of the names in that story in the New York Times?

Mr. DENNETT. I did indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the people you recognized?

Mr. DENNETT. The people whose names I recognized, that I knew specifically at that time, were Andrew Roth—I think he was the only one I knew personally. I think I had met Kate Mitchell but I am not sure. The others I knew by reputation or by comment or by the fact that they were working in this field. Mr. Service we had put on in a meeting before the Washington group, before the IPR, very shortly after he came back from Chungking, I thing about a month or three weeks previous to the arrest. I had not met him there; I had not been at the meeting.

Senator WATKINS. Who is that to whom you referred?

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe the atmosphere that prevailed in the Institute of Pacific Relations' Office in the subsequent days after that arrest, Mr. Dennett?

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Mr. DENNETT. I would say there was some consternation in the office.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there in addition considerable conversation about the arrest?

Mr. DENNETT. There was conversation about practically nothing else for several days. When I came into the office, knowing that we had put on a meeting for Mr. Service, naturally I was concerned as to what had happened in Washington. I immediately called the Washington office and discovered that Miss Yardumian and her secretary had been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that morning.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Miss Yardumian hold at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. She was in general administrative charge of our Washington office. So I hopped the first train I could to Washington to find out what was going on and talked with Miss Yardumian and her secretary when I arrived.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was her secretary, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. A Mrs. Ussachevsky?

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Betty Ussachevsky?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

I got from them the facts that they had been interviewed by the FBI that morning. I learned further that Miss Yardumian was quite concerned because several days or a few days prior to this general round-up she had put on a party in her apartment for Mr. Roth, who was about to leave for Hawaii, and that five of the six people had been present at this party, and she was therefore somewhat concerned about her involvement in this particular episode.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that you knew Mr. Roth?

Mr. DENNETT. I had met him, yes; several times.

Mr. MORRIS. At the institute in connection with your duties as secretary?

Mr. DENNETT. He had at one time, I think, worked for the International Secretariat and I saw him both at the Institute of Pacific Relations and I saw him occasionally when I was in Washington. I saw him I think once or twice with Phil Jaffe, but I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, you described the atmosphere in the Institute of Pacific Relations as one of consternation. Could you tell us with particularity who some of the individuals were who seemed to be particularly upset by the arrest?

Mr. DENNETT. I think, by and large, most of the research people were upset. I know I was certainly upset because I was wondering whether the Institute of Pacific Relations was going to get involved in this. But I would say that all of the major, the senior staff people, were very much concerned about it.

In the International Secretariat one or two of their staff had also been interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation because they were in one way or another close friends of one another, of the people who had been arrested.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Hilda Austern involved in any way in that case, do you know?

Mr. Dennett. She told me that she had been interviewed by the FBI and that she had been spending some time with Mr. Jaffe and Miss Mitchell in the 2 or 3 weeks prior to the arrest.

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She was not on my staff, you understand. None of my staff except Miss Yardumian was involved.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Austern's position?

Mr. DENNETT. She was working for Mr. Carter in the International Secretariat. There was a sharp distinction while I was——

Mr. MORRIS. I think it would be appropriate at this time if we had Mr. Dennett, executive secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, describe the structure of the Institute of Pacific Relations with relation to the international organization itself.

Senator WATKINS. You may do so.

Mr. DENNETT. The International Secretariat, the so-called Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was run by a separate committee composed of representatives of the 10 or 11 or 12 national councils. The administrative head was Edward C. Carter who had on his staff a director of research, who during the time I was there was either William L. Holland or Horace Belshaw, a New Zealander, and a certain number of people doing research on the payroll of the International Secretariat. These included while I was there T. A. Bissen and Andrew Grajdanzev, and may have included others. I think there may have been a Chinese there while I was there. I don't recall. Miss Austern was his administrative assistant who took care of administration, arranging for conferences and that sort of thing. She was sort of a contact person.

The American Council was separately directed entirely by its own board of directors, its own executive committee, of which Mr. Carter at that time was not a member, and therefore our program was entirely separate from the International Secretariat's program.

By and large, the Secretariat had charge of the publication of research studies and the preparation of conferences. Our fields covered the publication of periodical material with the exception of Pacific Affairs, which was an international publication, and the preparation of pamphlet material for adult use, the kind of thing Mr. Wallace's pamphlet is, and the preparation of simplified pamphlet textbooks which were to be used in the school system and were published by the Webster Publishing Co., I guess it was, and an agreement which we had with them.

Senator WATKINS. You mean to say that your council published pamphlets for use in the schools of the country?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes, sir, we did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe for us the nature of that operation, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. The general pamphlet program, school textbook program, was under the direction of Miss Marguerite Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. She is the wife of Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony previously to the effect that Mr. Maxwell S. Stewart was a member of the Communist Party.

Senator WATKINS. What about his wife?

Mr. MORRIS. We have had no testimony to that effect.

Mr. DENNETT. This arrangement had been made some time prior to my arrival and a contract had been made with, I guess, Webster. I think that is the publishing house—I wouldn't want to be sure without verifying it—for the preparation of either 8 or 10 pamphlet

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texts for use in high-school social science courses on various aspects of the Far East.

There was, I recall, a pamphlet on India, there was a pamphlet on the Soviet Far East. I don't recall the titles of the other pamphlets.

These were usually 128-page pamphlets designed for use in, I think, sophomore or junior years in high school. Mrs. Stewart located the authors, read the manuscripts. It was circulated to the committee for checking, and then was issued commercially by the Webster Publishing Co. in conjunction with the Institute of Pacific Relations, with the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. How many of those pamphlets would you say were prepared for use in public schools?

Mr. DENNETT. We completed our contract and I think it was either 8 or 10.

Senator WATKINS. In what year was that?

Mr. DENNETT. I think they probably started around 1942 or 1943. I think the last pamphlet was completed during the time I was there. I don't think I saw more than one or two of the pamphlets. The operation had all been set up before I arrived.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have any responsibility for passing on the subject matter or content of any of these pamphlets?

Mr. DENNETT. I did not, no, because they were either—I think the last pamphlet or next to the last pamphlet was in the process of being issued at the time I was there.

Senator WATKINS. You say a committee was set up to pass on that?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume there was. I have no knowledge.

Senator WATKINS. Were there any pamphlets published after your arrival under your direction?

Mr. DENNETT. Not that I recall. There may have been the final one but I have very little recollection of this because Mrs. Stewart was pretty much running her own show at that time. I don't think that these pamphlets went through the research advisory committee which I set up; that is what I am trying to establish.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Morris, do you have any of those pamphlets or do you have them all?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; we have introduced some of them in the record.

Do you know, as a matter of fact, the Land of the Soviets was so distributed among the schools, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't. I don't know whether that was a pamphlet or the pamphlet was a cut-down version of that book. If I could see the pamphlet, I could tell you, but I don't recall. I haven't seen them in years.

Mr. MORRIS. The one I have in mind is going to come up later in the testimony and it might be appropriate to have it now.

Senator WATKINS. While we are on the subject it might be interesting to tie in what the witness has been testifying to.

Mr. MORRIS. While they are looking for that, Mr. Chairman, may I go on to the next aspect of that?

Senator WATKINS. Yes. You will come back to that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Do you know whether the Army or Navy bought any of the IPR pamphlets while you were secretary of the American Council?

Mr. DENNETT. A great many of them.

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Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate the number, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. During the period that I was there or in the immediately preceding period the Educational and Information Branch of the Army and the equivalent in the Navy purchased somewhere in the vicinity of several hundred thousand total of pamphlets issued by the American Council for use in orientation programs on the Far East. Most of these pamphlets were, I believe, an IPR series similar to the Wallace pamphlet.

Senator WATKINS. Was the Wallace pamphlet one of them?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't think they bought that, but I don't recall. This was called the IPR series. This was called a different series.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "that" you mean the series including the publication Land of the Soviets and by "this" you mean the publication of Land of the Soviets which you now hold in your hand?

Mr. DENNETT. Right. It is primarily the series called IPR pamphlets which were bought by the Army and the Navy. A few of the numbers of this series were bought by the Army and Navy, that is, the ones entitled "A Cooperative Project Between the American Council, IPR, and Webster Publishing Co."

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that this particular pamphlet was sent to the schools?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; I think this is perhaps less typical, that is, I hope it is less typical, than some of the pamphlets, than some of the other pamphlets.

Senator WATKINS. Why do you say that?

Mr. DENNETT. This happens to be a pamphlet which I think is a very good example of what I referred to as the lack of objectivity in the American Council staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us be a little more frank about that. What kind of nonobjectivity is this pamphlet an example of?

Mr. DENNETT. I have an impression that Mr. Morris is going to read excerpts from it.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are interested at the moment in your opinion about that. You volunteered an opinion about the pamphlets.

Mr. DENNETT. I only read the pamphlet once and it was some years ago, and I have not read it since. It was certainly my impression that there was a disposition to give the most favorable light possible on the Soviet Union in that pamphlet.

Mr. SOURWINE. That single reading, as a matter of fact, was enough to impress you so that you still remember the impression that this pamphlet distorted the facts for the benefit of the Soviet Union, did it not?

Mr. DENNETT. You are putting words into my mouth which I don't think I put in there. You said "distorted the facts." I am not an expert on the Soviet Far East, on Land of the Soviet, therefore I don't know whether the facts are distorted. I would say such facts as I do know have been interpreted most favorably in that, more favorably than I would have done so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was simply trying to get the state of your impression at the time you got it, as you now remember it, which is a difficult thing to do.

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was obviously a strong impression because it has stayed with you all this time from that single reading.

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Mr. DENNETT. That is quite correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that single reading?

Mr. DENNETT. I wouldn't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it shortly after the pamphlet was issued?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know when the pamphlet was issued. If I may check the series on that?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you do not recall when you did read it, then looking at the date will not help you answer that last question, will it?

Mr. DENNETT. It must have been some time while I was at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was trying to relate the time you read it with the publication of the pamphlet. I thought those two matters might stick in your mind.

Mr. DENNETT. This was published in 1942. This was one of the early ones in the series.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was published before you came to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Probably if we read some excerpts it might refresh the recollection of the witness in connection with Mr. Sourwine's question as to whether or not it conforms with the actualities that existed in the Soviet Union.

Senator WATKINS. At least as to why he formed the opinion and impression he did.

Mr. MANDEL. I read certain excerpts from the pamphlet Land of the Soviets, by Marguerite Ann Stewart.

Senator WATKINS. Has this been put into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote this pamphlet?

Mr. MANDEL. This was written by Marguerite Ann Stewart and edited by Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Marguerite Ann Stewart, the author of this pamphlet, bear to the whole pamphlet series?

Mr. DENNETT. She was in charge of the educational program of the American Council. She had been hired some time prior to my arrival to work with the schools in the school program of the American Council.

Mr. MORRIS. It is important, Mr. Chairman, to know whether or not this is a typical publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Will you read some sections, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government.

That is on page 3. Then another excerpt:

As we know, under the capitalist system, property of all kinds may be owned by private individuals or commercial organizations, and all business is conducted primarily for the profit of the owner. * * * But, under a Socialist system, the factories and other types of business are socially owned, that is, they belong to the population as a whole and are operated by the government, not for the profit of any one person or group of individuals, but for the benefit of all the people. * * * And all industry—every single factory, office, bank, grocery, and department store, every theater, movie, bakery, and

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newspaper—is the property of the people as a whole and is operated by their government or by their organizations.

That is from page 6.

But when the Soviets assumed power this was changed. One of their first acts was to proclaim the equality of all people in the country and the right of each to full and free cultural development. No nationality was to dominate another. Each had a right to its own language, culture, and institutions, subraces no longer. The minorities were invited as equals in a free union of free peoples.

This is from page 14.

The Soviet Constitution grants equal rights for citizens of the U. S. S. R. regardless of their nationality or race and warns that any limitation of these rights or privileges for citizens on account of their race or nationality as well as any propaganda of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred or contempt shall be punishable by law.

That is from page 15. Another excerpt:

Ivan Petrovich Petrov might be considered a rather typical Russian city worker. Blonde, rosy-cheeked, and of medium height, he has a keen sense of humor; loves to dance, sing, and talk until late at night and to enjoy himself with his friends; admires things on a big scale and adores mechanical devices and machinery.

That is page 17.

Senator WATKINS. What was the purpose of this, to ascertain what was written before and after?

Mr. MANDEL. That was an idealization of the status of the Soviet worker.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the previous paragraph to that?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a symbol of the worker, not any particular worker.

Then again, on page 15, describing the lot of the typical Soviet worker:

Ivan, a very responsible worker, was a member of the factory committee elected by the workers to advise the director of the plant. Each day he and Anna took Sascha at that time to an attractive nursery school maintained by the factory for the children of its employees.

That is page 17. Then on page 21:

Curious as it may seem to us, the person at the top of the social scale is the worker.

Then on page 26:

But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no place too high for the person who devotes himself conscientiously to the common good. * * * An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice in running the factories.

There are other excerpts which I could read if they are wanted, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. Let us hear a few more of them.

Mr. MANDEL. Now on page 27:

Why did the Russians resort to revolution in 1917? Was such a complete overthrow necessary? And, why, after the revolution, did they set up a system so different from that of other governments? Why were they not satisfied with a republic, for example, like that of the United States?

Then on page 37:

On November 7 (October 25 by the old Russian calendar), the Red Guards were sent by the Soviets to surround the winter palace and all the government

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buildings in the name of the Socialist Revolution. All the provisional ministers were arrested except Kerensky, who managed to escape. * * * Thus, at one stroke, the peasants attained the right to more than 500 million additional acres which had heretofore belonged to the Crown, the nobility, and the church. Industry, likewise, was taken over as the property of the people.

That is page 37.

Mr. Chairman, I might add at this point we have in the files an analysis of this pamphlet made by the Russian experts of the Library of Congress. If you so desire, that analysis can be made part of the record.

Senator WATKINS. Since this is a pamphlet distributed in the public schools of the United States, I think it would be well to have that analysis in the record. At least, have it filed as an exhibit where it would be available, or incorporated by reference if it is too long to be printed in its entirety.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 285," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MANDEL. There was a revolt against the collective system in Russia at the time of collectivization. Mrs. Stewart's comment is as follows:

The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It regarded such acts as violations against socialist property and punished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again; in a few instances they were shot. * * *

In other words, justifying violence against peasants who refused to give up their property to the Government.

Here is an idealization of Communists on page 66:

Communists are expected to be an example to others.

Senator WATKINS. Did it specify what kind of an example?

Mr. MANDEL. No; but the previous sentence reads:

Conditions for membership are strict for it is generally regarded as a mark of responsible leadership and a high honor. Communists are expected to be an example to others. Applicants have to demonstrate unselfish loyalty to the Soviet state and to the principles of the party. They are required to give up a great deal of time for the party work and pay heavy dues.

And so, on it goes. It is part of a long session praising the work of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, as a system, are also idealized. On page 68 it reads:

Each of these has its own village soviet, chosen at a village meeting not unlike our New England town meeting. * * * City soviets are also elected directly by the people.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is writing that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a pamphlet entitled "Land of the Soviets," written by Marguerite Stewart and edited by Maxwell S. Stewart and published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co.

Senator WATKINS. Is this one of those pamphlets that 500,000 copies were ordered for the Navy and the Armed Forces?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall whether that was one of those ordered or not. There were a total of some 700,000 of the whole pamphlet series. There may have been 10,000 of one and 25,000 of another. Whether this was included in the orders or not, I don't know.

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Senator WATKINS. How can we find out?

Mr. DENNETT. It must be in the file somewhere as to what they sold to whom.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether this one was sold to the armed services so they would read it?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that is a fact?

Mr. DENNETT. Before you came in, Senator, I said this was one of the things which bothered me with regard to the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations which I think answers your question rather effectively.

Senator FERGUSON. It seems so absurd to have pamphlets put out, let us say, by American taxpayers—not taxpayers but American people who support the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is where it is really supported, by the American people?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. By their donations and membership fees?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. As Professor Colegrove said yesterday, he belonged because he wanted to get the pamphlet. Does that mean that the institute would even publish untruths to get both sides? You do not get both sides by publishing an untruth, do you?

Mr. DENNETT. That is quite correct. You don't.

Senator WATKINS. May I suggest this pamphlet was one of the series that was used and sent out to the public schools in the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that one sent out?

Senator WATKINS. I think so.

Mr. DENNETT. It was one of a series of eight that were prepared by Mrs. Stewart for use in schools.

Senator WATKINS. It was not actually published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, but through contract with a publishing house.

Senator FERGUSON. It is sponsorship. In other words, it has the name on it.

Mr. MORRIS. The Institute of Pacific Relations was largely responsible for the initiation and the carrying through of that pamphlet, was it not?

Mr. DENNETT. So far as I know. The whole arrangement was made before I arrived. I think all but one of the pamphlets were prepared prior to my arrival in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. But, Mr. Secretary, here we have the name, Institute of Pacific Relations, which is really a sponsorship, as Professor Colegrove said yesterday. At one time it was considered it was a sponsorship of facts and trying to get to the American people the facts so that they might become familiar with the various problems in the Pacific, and that was the reason why he, as a college professor in political science, and many others who were teaching students, were relying upon this. Yesterday, he indicated that after seeing the so-called letter by Mr. Lattimore to the secretariat, he came to the conclusion that this was, as he appraised it, a fraud upon the public because it was taking a Communist Party line.

Now, we find here the institute sponsoring what seems again is the Communist Party line even down to the school children of America.

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Wasn't there some censorship to find that untruths were going out and that they were following the party line?

Mr. DENNETT. Senator, as I explained before you came in, Mrs. Stewart presumably had those pamphlets read. By whom I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am wondering. Who read them?

Mr. DENNETT. As I explained, when I came in, I set up a research advisory committee and a publications committee, the function of which was to screen precisely such manuscripts as that.

Senator FERGUSON. We were misled once before. That is, the American public was misled. They were told that the satellites were going to have free elections. Now, free elections in Russia's language are not elections at all, which the satellites discovered, but the American public at the time were told a high sounding name of "free elections."

Here we get the same thing in this book. That is why it struck me so forcibly that we are again repeating to the school children about Russia's free elections. Anyone who knows anything about the Russian elections knows there are no elections at all in the sense that the American public knows them. Yet, we are telling our school children, "Here is how the people over in Russia elect their officials."

Senator WATKINS. Would the Senator say it is in line with the Mission to Moscow and such other writings?

Senator FERGUSON. The whole process of deceiving the American public, perpetrating the worst kind of a fraud upon the American public, is to represent that they have free elections over there and we were duped once and the satellites were really taken away from us by virtue of the fraud that was perpetrated in the offering of free elections.

Now we are continuing to do it with publications that are around. I think something ought to be done to gather up these books so the school children do not read books such as this to get the idea they have free elections under communism.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, is it your testimony that all eight of the series were prepared by Marguerite Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. That is my understanding of it; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand, out of this series, the Army and the Navy bought something?

Mr. MORRIS. We are coming to that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would find out who in the Army and the Navy was responsible for the purchase of these books and who in the Army and the Navy read them, if anybody did read them, before they were purchased for the Armed Forces.

Mr. MORRIS. We are coming to that as the next item.

While we are on the schools, I have one letter we had planned to introduce later. I think it may be appropriate to read it into the record now.

Mr. Dennett, I show you this memorandum which Mr. Mandel will certify came from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and ask you if you can recall that particular memorandum?

Mr. DENNETT. I can't recall it. It is to me from Edward C. Carter. I have no doubt I received it. Mr. Carter would send anywhere from one to a dozen memoranda a day on various subjects.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you certify that was taken from the files of the institute, and then read the contents into the record, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum headed: "RD" which presumably stands for Raymond Dennett from "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter, dated July 2, 1945, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

As you doubtless know, Martha Gerbode came to Washington last week in the hope of going abroad for the San Francisco Examiner, but because her husband is overseas, the War Department gave an emphatic no. She plans to be in New York a few days this week before returning to San Francisco. She hopes we have had a good vacation. It occurs to me it might be well if she got a thorough exposure to Mrs. Stewart and her program as Martha could really do a lot in the secondary school field, I am sure, if she got the feel of Peggy's program in vision.

Mr. MORRIS. "Peggy" in this case being Marguerite Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced in the record.

Senator WATKINS. It may be made a part of the record.

(Document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 286" and filed for the record.)

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Martha Gerbode?

Mr. DENNETT. She was a member of the board of directors of the San Francisco Bay region in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the board of directors of the institute?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes. The bay region had its own group of directors, and she was a member of that. I think she may have also been a member of the national board of directors.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was a newspaperwoman?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you take to be "Peggy's program in vision," that they were trying to expose Martha Gerbode to?

Mr. DENNETT. I presume Mr. Carter had in mind Mrs. Stewart's school program and his evaluation of her position he considered as her vision.

Senator WATKINS. That would be a program that would get out books like we have had excerpts from read to us this morning?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes. It is beyond my capacity, Senator, to read into what Mr. Carter said what he may have had in mind behind it.

Senator FERGUSON. While we are talking about a program and a vision, we are talking about a vision which would indicate high ideals. Then we get a program that is set forth in these books which, if I can read it properly, is the Communist line to try to indoctrinate into the American people through the school system the Communist line. We get that being called in this organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations, a vision.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter was the secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How could Martha Gerbode help them? Was she a writer in magazines or newspapers?

Mr. DENNETT. No; she was not.

Senator FERGUSON. What was she? She was going abroad for the San Francisco Examiner.

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Mr. DENNETT. As far as I know, she never had any connection with newspapers but you would have to ask her that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I do not understand.

Senator WATKINS. She did not go.

Senator FERGUSON. But she wanted to go.

Mr. MORRIS. Did she have something to do with the secondary school system?

Mr. DENNETT. Not so far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. There is a reference to that.

Mr. DENNETT. As far as I know, she was the wife of a distinguished surgeon in San Francisco who had been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. There is another word in here that rather intrigues me. It is the word "exposure." When you expose a person to a Communist line, is that not in keeping? You would not call exposing a person to American philosophy, would you?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't quite know what you are trying to get at in your questions.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out what that word "exposure" might mean here.

Mr. DENNETT. I think that is a question which you could better ask Mr. Carter than I. I had a great many dealings with Mr. Carter, and I still don't know many of the things he meant in the memoranda he sent to me, nor would I try to guess.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were dealing with an American program, it would be an open, frank discussion of the problems, would it not? You would not go around behind the words like "exposure" and try and conceal what you were trying to do and yet have it actually accomplished; is that correct?

Mr. DENNETT. That is probably correct. I would like to make it very clear I do not know by my own knowledge, as I testified earlier, about whether any of these people—Mr. Carter or Mrs. Stewart or any of the rest of them were or were not Communists or Communist sympathizers. Under those circumstances, I do not wish to impute motives when I do not know they exist, because I think that is, by and large, not a particularly wise thing to do.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me put a question to you. If you knew all that you know now, would you have taken the appointment with the institute?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Mr. DENNETT. For precisely the reasons which I have been giving, Senator, that I do not think it was an objective research organization.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel there was such a thing as trying to put over something that was not definitely and clearly stated; is that correct?

Mr. DENNETT. I won't go that far with you. It may have been; it may not have been. I think that certainly, so far as the staff is concerned, many of them, as I stated in my opinion, were not objective. Some of them may have been Communists. I don't know. I don't know now with the benefit of hindsight, but there were, if you may recall, a great many people in 1944 and 1945 who were not exclusively on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations who felt that the

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benefit of postwar or the future of American security depended upon cooperation with the five major allies.

These people may have been sincere; they may have been Communists. In the absence of knowledge they were Communists, I do not wish to accuse them by inference or any other method.

They may have been guilty merely of bad judgment. Bad judgment carries its own penalties. I don't want to be in a position of labeling them by my guess as guilty of the greatest possible bad judgment, which is membership in the Communist Party. I am perfectly prepared to testify as to the factual material which I know. I do not know the facts behind Mr. Carter's mind when he wrote that memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Dennett, you were in this organization, and there were other people, other people that had no idea when they went in what was going on. I think the so-called cagey letter is an example of the fundamentals underlying what was going on in the institute. As the professor indicated yesterday, he stayed in a long time until he came to the conclusion of what it was. I am satisfied that people who now see that letter—have you read it?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator WATKINS. Please identify the letter.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a letter dated the 10th of July 1938.

Senator WATKINS. Who signed it?

Senator FERGUSON. It was signed by Owen Lattimore.

Senator WATKINS. To whom was it addressed?

Senator FERGUSON. It is addressed to E. C. Carter, and it is on the letterhead of the Pacific Affairs, published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and, as I said, dated July 10, 1938.

Mr. DENNETT. It is a very revealing paragraph, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I think this is true and I will ask Mr. Mandel so it will appear on the record as to whether or not there is anything in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations where Mr. Carter replied to this and indicated that he was shocked in any way by any such proposition, or indicating that he would, under no circumstances, carry on such a deceptive and fraudulent program?

Mr. MANDEL. I have no knowledge of any such reply.

Senator WATKINS. I may say, in fairness to Mr. Carter, that I think he said he did not agree with that when he was on the stand.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted that in the record.

Senator WATKINS. He did not follow out the suggestion.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter did not have the role of carrying things out, did he? Pacific Affairs had something to do with what was obtained?

Mr. DENNETT. The publication of the international secretariat, Pacific Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. We find here at a later date this program that they wanted this lady to be exposed to, in effect, carrying out the program that is set forth in the Lattimore letter of 1938, wouldn't you say so?

Mr. DENNETT. It certainly could be interpreted that way; yes. I assure you, Senator, I am not in a position to interpret Mr. Carter or what he did. I think my position is very clear. I was responsible for objective research. I did not feel there was objectivity, and I resigned and got out.

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Senator FERGUSON. Then there was a lack of objectivity?

Mr. DENNETT. That is precisely what I have been testifying to.

Senator FERGUSON. Along what line? Did you find they were following the line that would lead to Moscow?

Mr. DENNETT. I didn't think of it in those terms. They may have.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did it lead, as far as you were concerned?

Mr. DENNETT. It led to the position where I was in charge of a program of objective analysis for the Far East and for which I was responsible, but in which I could not carry out any responsibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. In what way did it vary from being objective?

Mr. DENNETT. As I testified earlier, I felt that it was leading to somewhat too great an emphasis, in my opinion, on explaining the position of the Soviet Union; that is, the tendency always was to explain what the Soviet Union was doing or had done, or why it was doing things, rather than to make judgments upon those actions in the light of what was considered to be, or what I would consider to be, the best interests of our analysis of the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think this lack of objectivity, looking back, this lack on the part of the staff, aided the Communist movement?

Mr. DENNETT. It could very well have.

Mr. MORRIS. Did it, looking back, in your opinion?

Mr. DENNETT. It may very well have. I don't know enough about the Communist movement to judge, but I would say it probably did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, since we are on the subject of schools, I think two excerpts from Institute of Pacific Relations' publications should be put into the record.

Mr. Mandel, will you read these and identify them?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an excerpt from Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, as follows:

Since 1941 the IPR has published 72 volumes concerning social, political, and economic problems of the Pacific area. More than a million IPR texts and popular pamphlets have been used by schools, colleges, and by the United Nations' armies and navies in the training of armed forces going into the Pacific region.

Mr. MORRIS. From what is that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is an official IPR publication?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

This is an excerpt from IPR in Wartime, a report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941–43, page 24. The excerpt reads as follows:

In the winter of 1942–43, a new series of "unit texts" for high-school use were prepared under the council's auspices, and published by one of the leading school publishers, the Webster Publishing Co. of St. Louis. Thus far the IPR Webster series includes the following titles:, Changing China; Land of the Soviets; Lands Down Under; People of the China Seas; Modern Japan; India (in preparation), and America's Stake in the Pacific (in preparation).

These small books have met with an unprecedented response. Attractively designed and retailing at 40 cents they represent virtually the first authoritatively written materials on Asia to receive wide distribution through American schools. The first edition was exhausted in 6 weeks; the second was running out in the succeeding 3 months. One school superintendent in a midwestern city, for example, was so enthusiastic that he directed that a month be spent on the series in each of the four high-school classes.

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Mr. MORRIS. Is that from an official IPR publication?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. These excerpts may be received in evidence and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 287 and 288," and filed for the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 287

Since 1941 the IPR has published 72 volumes concerning social, political, and economic problems of the Pacific area. More than a million IPR texts and popular pamphlets have been used by schools, colleges, and by the United Nations Armies and Navies, in the training of armed forces going into the Pacific region.

(Source: From book wrapper of Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the IPR, Hot Springs, Va., January 6–17, 1945.)

EXHIBIT No. 288

In the winter of 1942–43 a new series of "unit tests" for high-school use were prepared under the council's auspices, and published by one of the leading school publishers, the Webster Publishing Co., of St. Louis. Thus far the IPR Webster series includes the following titles: Changing China; Land of the Soviets; Lands Down Under; People of the China Seas; Modern Japan; India (in preparation); and America's Stake in the Pacific (in preparation).

These small books have met with an unprecedented response. Attractively designed and retailing at 40 cents, they represent virtually the first authoritatively written materials on Asia to receive wide distribution through American schools. The first edition was exhausted in 6 weeks; the second was running out in the succeeding 3 months. One school superintendent in a midwestern city, for example, was so enthusiastic that he directed that a month be spent on the series in each of the four high-school classes.

(IPR in Wartime, report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1941–43 (p. 24).)

Mr. MORRIS. Before getting off the schools, Mr. Chairman, I asked for an analysis made by the Library of Congress which we have already asked to be made a part of the record.

Mr. Mandel, have you obtained that analysis?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an analysis coming from the Library of Congress:

U. S. S. R.: Some apparent contradictions from one congressional document to statements made in the book Land of the Soviets.

This was prepared by John L. Houk, Foreign Affairs Section, reviewed by Sergius Yakobson, senior specialist, International Relations, May 22, 1951, for the Library of Congress. I just read one excerpt by way of example.

From the Land of the Soviets, on page 70, it says:

The 1936 Constitution of the U. S. S. R. also introduced into the Soviet Union many elements of democracy as we know them in this country. * * *

The Library specialist finds the following as taken from Communism in Action, a Government publication, and this is on page 133, as follows:

* * * It must be kept in mind, however, that Soviet constitutional guarantee, unlike those in the Constitution of the United States, are not legally binding on the legislative and executive authorities of the Union. They are, generally speaking, statements of aims or goals, or, in some instances, descriptions of policies in effect at the time the constitution was adopted. They may be repealed or amended at any time by ordinary laws or regulations.

This is an excerpt from the analysis.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is in the record as exhibit No. 285.

Will you read the two letters on the Institute of Pacific Relations' letterhead?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a memorandum giving the minutes or the proceedings of a meeting of the executive committee of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 11, 1945, and it is signed by Philip C. Jessup, acting secretary. I read an excerpt from these minutes:

The treasurer submitted a financial report, including a statement by the executive secretary. He reported that it would be possible to go through November without drawing the additional $3,000 from the publications fund under the previous authorization; $5,000 of the $8,000 authorized for transfer have already been transferred. The sum of $19,000 due from Army-Navy purchases of pamphlets represents a profit balance which will enable the council probably to complete the year with a slight credit balance.

Senator WATKINS. Is that in evidence?

Mr. MANDEL. It has not been placed in evidence yet.

I have another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 20, 1945, addressed to "Dear Board Member" and signed "Raymond Dennett, secretary." I read an excerpt from that:

I am sure you will be interested to know that membership in the American Council has increased to a total of 1,800 as compared with 1,100, 18 months ago. Under the editorship of Laurence E. Salisbury, the Far Eastern Survey has increased from printings of approximately 2,500 to printings of approximately 3,800. In addition, the armed services have recently purchased nearly 700,000 copies of our pamphlet material for their educational work with soldiers being transferred from the European to the Pacific theater.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, do you recall these two letters?

Mr. DENNETT. This one I have no knowledge of, the first one, of October 11. It apparently was an executive committee meeting when I was not present.

This one I have no doubt that I wrote. I can testify to the fact that approximately 700,000 of these pamphlets were purchased by the Army and the Navy, but I do not know what titles or what numbers of what titles.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you certify to these two letters and that they came from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. They may be received and marked with the next consecutive exhibit numbers.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 289 and 290," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 289

MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MIDSTON HOUSE,
New York City, October 11, 1945.

The meeting was called to order by Dean Robert D. Calkins, former chairman, who had been asked to take the chair for this occasion.

The following members of the committee were present: Mr. Eugene E. Barnett, Mr. Frederick V. Field, Mr. Huntington Gilchrist, Mr. G. Ellsworth Huggins, Dr. James L. McConaughy, Mr. Lawrence Morris, Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein. In addition, the following persons who had been invited to attend were present and took part in the discussion without voting: Prof. Joseph Chamberlain, Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Dr. Grayson Kirk, and Mr. Owen Lattimore.

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In the absence of the executive secretary, Mr. Jessup was designated as acting secretary.

At the suggestion of the Chair, it was agreed that any decisions would be taken by vote of the members of the executive committee only, but that if questions of principle were decided the views of the guests would be recorded.

On motion made and seconded, the reading of the minutes of the last meeting were dispensed with, in view of the fact that they had been circulated and that they were adopted subject to the filing in writing of any corrections.

The treasurer submitted a financial report, including a statement by the executive secretary. He reported that it would be possible to go through November without drawing the additional $3,000 from the publications fund under the previous authorization; $5,000 of the $8,000 authorized for transfer have already been transferred. The sum of $19,000 due from Army-Navy purchases of pamphlets represents a profit balance which will enable the council probably to complete the year with a slight credit balance.

After discussion, it was moved, seconded, and passed that the report be accepted.

The committee then discussed the item on the agenda of organizational problems and program. There was general consideration of the purposes and program of the American Council and of the problems confronting it.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. McConaughy moved that a special committee, composed of Mr. Calkins, Mr. Gilchrist, and Mr. Jessup be appointed to carry on discussions and negotiations with any officers or branches of the American Council and with any outside organizations with a view to making proposals concerning the solution of the problems facing the council, including recommendations concerning the location of the various activities of the council, the special committee to report to the executive committee definite proposals at its next meeting.

The motion was seconded by Mr. Huggins, Mr. Gilchrist having indicated his inability to serve due to absence from the country, Mr. Conaughy was substituted in his place.

After discussion, the motion was unanimously carried, the nonmembers of the committee indicating their concurrence therein.

On motion of Mr. Gilchrist, seconded by Mr. Barnett, it was agreed that the executive committee, enlarged by the guests in attendance, would continue to function as a group until decisions had been reached on the main problems now confronting the council and that Mr. Calkins be requested to continue to serve as chairman during this period for this purpose.

It was moved and voted that Mr. Morris and Mr. Field serve as a subcommittee to suggest possible personnel who might be willing to serve on the executive committee.

It was agreed, after discussion, that the report of the program committee, submitted on October 1, 1945, would be revised and resubmitted for consideration at the next meeting.

The next meeting was scheduled for Tuesday, November 13, at 6 o'clock, at Midston House, the agenda to include the report of the special committee and the instructions to be given to the representatives of the American Council at the meeting of the Pacific Council in November.

PHILIP C. JESSUP, *Acting Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 290

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
New York, N. Y., July 20, 1945.

DEAR BOARD MEMBER: Attached herewith is a copy of the auditors' report for the fiscal year 1944 of the work of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I wish particularly to call to your attention that we had to negotiate a loan to carry us through last year. Although this has been paid off in full, it means that we must make every effort to increase our contributions during the present year.

I am sure you will be interested to know that membership in the American Council has increased to a total of 1,800 as compared with 1,100 18 months ago. Under the editorship of Laurence E. Salisbury, the Far Eastern Survey has increased from printings of approximately 2,500 to printings of approximately

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3,800. In addition, the armed services have recently purchased nearly 700,000 copies of our pamphlet material for their educational work with soldiers being transferred from the European to the Pacific theater.

Despite financial difficulties, therefore, the work of the American Council is growing in importance and usefulness.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Senator FERGUSON. Have you the names of the pamphlets the armed services did purchase?

Mr. MANDEL. Senator, they are not ready now, but we have a list of the contracts with numbers made with Government agencies for purchase of IPR material. If the committee is willing, we can place those in the record when we have them ready.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph from the publication, IPR in Wartime, which is a report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941 to 1943. Since it bears on this whole subject, I would like this one paragraph read into the record, which I will do, myself.

Under the heading, "IPR Services," it reads:

The first months of the war, therefore, placed exceptionally heavy demands on the Institute of Pacific Relations for direct services to Government agencies as staffs and libraries were hastily assembled to handle far-eastern questions first with the demand for Institute of Pacific Relations publications and bibliographical aids. Happily, a large number of Institute of Pacific Relations' studies began as far back as 1936 were nearing completion in 1941. Together they provided a mine of up-to-date information on the resources, government economy, and problems of Japan, China, Burma, Thailand, Formosa, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, et cetera. They were rushed into publication, or in some cases made available in proof or manuscript.

Institute of Pacific Relations libraries were exclusively used by officials from a dozen departments. Staff members gave freely of their time in consulting on research materials and programs; second, with requests for aid in recruiting far eastern experts for Government service. Here the IPR's extensive knowledge of scholars, journalists, and businessmen in the far eastern field was put at the disposal of Government agencies. This mobilization of key scholars, so few in number, has had its distressing aspects for it has stripped the universities and educational institutions of virtually all their trained far eastern personnel, but it was necessary and it will have its compensations in the enormous impetus to far eastern studies which the war will give. Hundreds of men are being trained in the far eastern languages through cooperative arrangements among the universities, the Government, and the American Council of Learned Societies which has taken the lead in this field.

Senator FERGUSON. By whom is that signed?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the official publication put out by, apparently, the executive committee. It ends up:

The job of the IPR is boundless and the stakes are high.

but there is no signature.

The next heading is headed: "By educating the Armed Forces."

The third aspect of direct IPR aid in the war effort has been the use of its publications in the education of the Armed Forces. Today, tens of thousands of young Americans are being called upon to fight for their country in a half of the world about which they know virtually nothing—China, India, Australia, New Guinea, the Solomons, and Alaska.

When the Army and the Navy wanted educational materials on these countries for use in camps, and on shipboard after Pearl Harbor, they turned to the IPR. In scores of Army and Navy establishments here and abroad will be found copies of China, America's Ally, Our Far Eastern Record, Meet the Anzacs, Know Your Enemy, Japan, and other Institute of Pacific Relations pamphlets which had been supplied at cost.

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From the standpoint of the council this is an educational job of first importance. With reference to the varied contributions of institute work to the war effort, IPR members and supporters may have satisfaction in such tributes as the following from a high-ranking official in Washington—

I think we will end up with that, Mr. Chairman. But this is the tribute:

From my own experience, which I know is also shared by others entrusted with official responsibilities has been that IPR publications are an indispensable aid. May I take this opportunity of paying special tribute to the help which the IPR has rendered and is continuing to render to the war effort of the United Nations. Its studies, notably the inquiry, constitutes what is undoubtedly the complete and useful documentation available on the nature, cause, and consequences of the far eastern conflict.

That is from a report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941 to 1943, entitled "Institute of Pacific Relations in Wartime."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know certain people were writing articles under the sponsorship of the Institute of Pacific Relations and using fictitious names?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not ever hear that?

(Nodding negatively.)

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have thought that people should write objective facts under fictitious names?

Mr. DENNETT. It has been done in a great many places, Senator. I think it depends on the individual. I believe one of the most important architects of our present containment policy of the Soviet Union wrote an article in Foreign Affairs under the name of "X." I think that is fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that?

Mr. DENNETT. That was George Kennan.

Senator FERGUSON. He has assigned his reason for doing that.

Mr. DENNETT. Well, I think that is reasonable, too. I think just to write under a fictitious name for that purpose is a bad idea. If there is a reason for it, I think that may explain it.

Senator FERGUSON. He had a genuine reason.

Mr. DENNETT. Certainly. I don't know about any people writing under the IPR, so I can't answer your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have approved writing under fictitious names?

Mr. DENNETT. In the case of somebody like Mr. Kennan; yes.

In the case of somebody else; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state a number of people here who were writing under fictitious names?

Mr. MORRIS. The one that came up was Asiaticus.

Mr. DENNETT. I know nothing about him.

Senator FERGUSON. He is the one mentioned in the "cagey letter."

Mr. DENNETT. He was not there when I was there.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we would have to have a compilation of that list.

Senator FERGUSON. Please put it in the record at this place, the people who have written under fictitious names for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

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(The information referred to is as follows:)

Asiaticus---------- Hans Mueller
J. E. N---------- Edmund O. Clubb

Mr. DENNETT. I was not there when that occurred.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you did not know about it?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, were you secretary of the American Council of the IPR when Alfred Kohlberg brought his charges that there was Communist influence in the Institute?

Mr. DENNETT. I was. I don't know whether it was when he brought his charges, because I don't know when they began.

I was there at the time he initiated legal action against the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, was there ever any thorough investigation made of the so-called Kohlberg charges?

Mr. DENNETT. I would say "No." I would say an answer was prepared, which was somewhat different.

Mr. MORRIS. Who prepared the answer?

Mr. DENNETT. Marguerite Ann Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Did she make any objective investigation of the so-called charges?

Mr. DENNETT. I am not really in a position to judge that, Mr. Morris. I would be inclined to think not, but I don't recall at what time that was in preparation; but I think the general feeling was that Mr. Kohlberg's charges were so wild as to be ignored.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the feeling of the officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. That was certainly the feeling of the staff and I think in the executive committee it was the feeling, at least, of some members.

Mr. MORRIS. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dennett, was there an investigation ever made of the Kohlberg charges?

Mr. DENNETT. I have stated there was not. There was an answer prepared.

Mr. MORRIS. It was prepared by Marguerite Stewart, the author of Land of the Soviets?

Mr. DENNETT. Quite correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that ratified by the executive committee? That answer?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall. The sequence of events, to the best of my recollection, is that Mr. Kohlberg issued a subpena on me to show reasons as to why we should not make available to him the membership lists of the American Council for purposes of a proxy fight. At that point, the matter was turned over to the lawyers. After a period of somewhere between 12 and 14 months an agreement was made, as I recall, by which Mr. Kohlberg was entitled to mail out to the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations his material.

We then felt, or it was then felt, in the institute, that we should mail out some material counteracting his. This material was prepared by Mrs. Stewart. I believe it was mailed out prior to the annual elections in March of 1946, at which time I had left the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I don't recall that there was ever any analysis or any investigation by the executive committee of Mrs. Stewart's reply. I know at one

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time I sent out a memorandum to the board which incorporated certain statistical material which Mrs. Stewart had given me.

Mr. MORRIS. That which you gave was prepared by Mrs. Stewart?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; and I sent it out to the board members.

Mr. MORRIS. Who designated Mrs. Stewart as the one to prepare an answer to the Kohlberg charges?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall that. It undoubtedly was approved by me at the time. I think it probably was a question of who was free in the office and who could take on this additional job. She volunteered to do it and presumably it would be a long one, so I said "All right."

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever read The Land of the Soviets by her?

Mr. DENNETT. I explained to the committee that I had, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. After reading that, do you think that you would designate her as the person to make an objective investigation as to whether Kohlberg's charges were true?

Mr. DENNETT. I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate now that a thorough investigation not be made for the board and the board put on an offensive before Kohlberg could put his on; was that not right? Was not information sent out to the various people?

Mr. DENNETT. Information was sent out. As I recall the sequence, as I said, there was a court action by Kohlberg that went through the district court and went up and came back down again. There was a compromise which we agreed to mail out to the members—the issue was whether or not Kohlberg could get the membership lists of the American Council. We agreed to mail out his material to the members. At the same time, we were going to mail out this material prepared by Mrs. Stewart so they would receive both Kohlberg's charges and this compilation, this report, of Mrs. Stewart.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Stewart analysis indicate it was a thorough investigation by the board?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall the covering letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Have we the covering letter, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. We will try to obtain it. If so, we will put it in the record.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
New York, April 4, 1945.

Confidential.

TO: MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
MEMBERS OF THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE,
REGIONAL OFFICES:

Following the policy of the previous confidential memorandum on the Hot Springs Conference, the present report is circulated for the purpose of summarizing recent developments of interest to those in positions of responsibility in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Conference of the United Nations.—The Bay Region Division, through Ray Lyman Wilbur, has forwarded to the Secretary of State an offer of its facilities during the period of the United Nations Conference which convenes on April 25 next. The Secretary received a request from Admiral John W. Greenslade, executive vice president, to visit San Francisco to assist in making plans for the activities of the office during the Conference, planned to leave New York on March 23, but was prevented by developments in the legal action against the Council by Alfred E. Kohlberg. He now plans to leave New York at the latest

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by April 10—and earlier if possible—and to stay until after the Conference opens.

According to information solicited from friends in the Department of State, the IPR can be of service in the following ways:

1. Through offering the use of its facilities, both library and office, to those in charge of Conference arrangements.

2. Through such arrangements as might be made to assist in the housing of delegates and technical advisers.

3. Through planning informal dinners for the Far Eastern experts in the various delegations.

Although the Department, officially, is discouraging the presence of informal observers from the multitude of American organizations who all have an interest in the Conference, assurances were informally given to the Secretary that the IPR might be able to be of real service both because of the expert character of its information, the projected release of the report of the Hot Springs Conference on April 18, and its international character which rather clearly distinguished it from those groups who will be present. In addition to any services which might be rendered to the Conference and its personnel, it is anticipated that newspaper correspondents covering the sessions may turn to the IPR for assistance and background material for their interpretative reports. The Foreign Policy Association has asked for the cooperation of the Bay Region Division of the IPR in offering office space to Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean and Mr. Blair Bolles, who will cover the proceedings for the FPA, and it is anticipated that such a combination will make the IPR office a real center for expert information. The Pacific Council will probably be represented during a portion of the Conference by various members of the staff of the International Secretariat.

Meeting of the Research Advisory Committee.—At the March meeting of the Research Advisory Committee, to the membership of which the Executive Committee had previously added the names of David N. Rowe of the Yale Institute of International Studies, William C. Johnstone, Dean of the School of Government at George Washington University, and Felix M. Keesing of Stanford University, the following decisions were reached:

1. An allocation of $1,500 was made for the study on colonial dependencies mentioned in the last report of the Secretary. The work is to be undertaken under the general supervision of a small steering committee in Washington which hopes to prepare a manuscript for discussion group consideration by fall, with a publication date line of the Spring of 1946.

2. It reserved judgment on the details of the projected study on the effect of Chinese industrialization upon the American economy pending a further report of a discussion group to be called together in Washington.

American Representatives on International Committees.—The Executive Committee has appointed the following as the representatives of the American Council on the Internaitonal Committees of the Institute:

Pacific Council—Dr. Robert G. Sproul.
International Research Committee—Dr. Eugene Staley.
International Program Committee—Dr. William C. Johnstone, Jr.
International Finance Committee—G. E. Huggins, Treasurer.

Program Planning.—The Executive Committee has authorized the appointment of a subcommittee to meet with the Secretary and the staff to work out a carefully integrated program for the American Council for the next few years. The report of this committee will no doubt provide a basis for discussion at the proposed national meeting of the IPR to be held later this year. It has been felt for some time that it is difficult to assess accurately the demands upon both staff and budget of various projects which are presented to the American Council until a yardstick in the form of a three to five year program has been formulated by which these demands can be judged. The Research Committee has recommended that, so far as research activity is concerned, the activities of the Council should be directed toward the study of those problems the decision on which are likely to set the pattern for Pacific relations for the next few decades. Within this general criterion, however, considerable further elaboration is needed.

The IPR and Mr. Alfred E. Kohlberg.—As indicated in a recent letter sent to the members of the American Council, the Executive Committee finally decided to attempt to solve the problems raised by Mr. Kohlberg's legal action to compel the IPR to furnish him with a list of members by allowing him to circulate the membership in an effort to secure proxies. The only restriction placed upon his communication is that it should not contain libelous material.

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Prior to this decision, several efforts were made to reach a satisfactory solution with Mr. Kohlberg. The Executive Committee took up Mr. Kolberg's original request for a committee to examine his charges, and suggested that a group composed of Mr. Randall Gould (named by Mr. Kohlberg as one of seven who would be acceptable to him), Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein of the Executive Committee, and Mr. Arthur Dean of the firm of Sullivan and Cromwell be asked to "investigate whether there had been bias in the publications of the IPR during the last eight years, and whether there had been a suppression or distortion of facts to support such bias." Mr. Kohlberg however retorted by withdrawing the name of Mr. Gould, substituting additional names, and insisting upon the right of the committee to examine files, correspondence, and minutes of *all* the Councils of the IPR, as well as "hear witnesses" whom he might wish to call. He also insisted that the frame of reference of the committee should not be the question of the existence of bias but an examination of the alleged "communist" background of writers and contributors to IPR publications.

To protect its position, the Executive Committee has (*a*) sought the advice of the legal firm of Shearman, Stirling, and Wright; (*b*) secured the authorization of the individual officers of the Pacific Council for its permission to Mr. Kohlberg to include charges against the International organization in his communication to the members of the American Council.

The exact nature of future developments remains uncertain. If Mr. Kohlberg prepares a communication which we are assured by counsel will not open the American Council to possible action for damages, he will presumably circulate the membership with a request for proxies. If he does not prepare suitable material, his petition requesting the court to require the American Council to provide him with the membership list will come up for hearing on April 9. We are advised that his petition is not likely to be granted.

The absurdity of the charges made by Mr. Kohlberg is revealed in a thorough study of his original 88-page document. This study, made under the direction of the Executive Committee, reveals the following facts:

1. Only 33 articles and book reviews, three pamphlets, and one book are quoted. During the period under review, publications of the IPR totalled 1,961 articles and book reviews and 384 books and pamphlets. The charges therefore, are based upon a selection of 2 percent of the articles and book reviews and 0.002 percent of the books and pamphlets.

2. The document, in the large majority of instances, ignores (*a*) the fact that material supporting the opposite point of view could be taken from the same pamphlets or articles by the same author, (*b*) the appearance in the same or later issues of the magazines of articles by other authors taking the opposite position of those quoted, or (*c*) the true meaning of the articles by selecting quotations out of context.

3. A close examination of his document fails to reveal the four definite shifts in attitude toward China which Mr. Kohlberg has charged.

National Conference of the American Council.—No final decision has been reached on the date or the agenda for the national meeting of the American Council as suggested by the informal meetings at Hot Springs. Regional offices have expressed a preference for having the meeting in San Francisco—which may be impossible in June if the United Nations Conference is still in session—but have disagreed as to time. Honolulu and the Inland Empire group prefer September, the Pacific Northwest group prefers June, and no word has been received from Milwaukee, Chicago, or San Francisco.

The Executive Committee would be pleased to receive any comments or suggestions which may come to mind from this memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., *November 5, 1951.*

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Special Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: I have your letter of October 31.

While I don't recall in detail the memorandum which you introduced in the record during my appearance before the open session, I do recall, to the best

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of my knowledge, that Mrs. Stewart, who was then engaged in examination of Kohlberg's brochure, provided me with the statistical analysis contained in that report which I incorporated with other information which I was sending to the Trustees.

Cordially yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have in the record at this point the statistical report supplied to Mr. Dennett by Mrs. Stewart and have that made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have that?

Mr. MORRIS. We have it.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 291."

(Only 33 articles and book reviews, three pamphlets and one book are quoted. During the period under review, publications of the IPR totaled 1,961 articles and book reviews and 384 books and pamphlets. The charges therefore, are based upon a selection of 2 percent of the articles and book reviews and 0.002 percent of the books and pamphlets.)

Mr. MORRIS. Were you secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations when the Hot Springs convention of the Institute of Pacific Relations was held?

Mr. DENNETT. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us when plans were first made for the working out of this conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I imagine that the preparation must have been begun in the spring of 1944 very shortly after I arrived. The conference was scheduled for January of 1945. I did not arrive in the American Council until March of 1944.

I think by the time I had arrived there probably had been some preliminary planning on it, because a conference of that sort takes some time to work out.

I was actively engaged in the preparation for it, I should suppose, by midsummer of 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, would you explain the general nature of this Hot Springs conference with respect to the Institute of Pacific Relations organization?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

The Pacific Council, the International Secretariat, the international end of the Institute of Pacific Relations, had for some years—I don't know when it first began—planned periodic international conferences to which the various national councils would send delegations to discuss an agenda agreed upon in advance which usually covered economic and political developments in the far eastern area. These conferences occurred every 3 or 4 years. The delegations usually had from 7 or 8 from the smaller countries to 15 or 25 from the largest countries who were part of the International Institute of Pacific Relations.

At the beginning these conferences had been exclusively limited to individuals, professors, economists, businessmen, and so on.

Starting, I believe, with the Mont Tremblant conference, which I know nothing about, because I was not there, in 1942 there had been apparently a disposition on the part of those in charge of the International secretariat to admit a limited number of government officials partially because many of the far eastern experts were serving governments, partially because I think they thought these discussions might

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have an air of reality if you had some government people who were closer to what was actually going on.

All the people at these conferences participated as individuals and they were not necessarily speaking for their organizations, their businesses, or their official connections.

Hot Springs, therefore, was one of a series of similar conferences to those which had gone before.

The American Council was the host council and therefore had special responsibilities in regard to entertainment and arrangements, et cetera.

Mr. MORRIS. In the preparation of this conference, Mr. Dennett, did the people with the prime responsibility have their eye on the forthcoming United Nations conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I presume they did. I don't know exactly when that United Nations conference was announced as being held. I think, as I recall, the final announcement of the holding of the San Francisco conference did not come out until after the Yalta sessions in January and the Institute of Pacific Relations conference was at about the time of Yalta.

So I doubt very much whether we had that specifically in mind, although I assume we knew there was going to be some sort of a postwar conference.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time of the conference, itself, you were well aware of the forthcoming United Nations conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I would have to check dates, but it must have been about that time, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In your executive session testimony, you said that generally the Hot Springs conference proved to be a trial balloon for the forthcoming United Nations conference.

Mr. DENNETT. That was unquestionably the case. I don't know whether that was something which we realized on a prior basis or a post hoc propter hoc basis, because I don't recall the announcement of the United Nations conference.

Mr. MORRIS. How similar were the delegations of the Hot Springs convention of the IPR and the subsequent United Nations conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I wouldn't know without a careful checking of the record, but it was certainly my impression that somewhere between a fourth and a third of those who attended the Hot Springs conference from these 10 or 11 countries subsequently turned up at San Francisco, either on delegations or as advisers to delegations of the similar countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, I would like to show you a copy of a letter that Philip C. Jessup wrote to you on August 1, 1944, and ask you if you can recall that letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall the letter, but I have no doubt I received it.

Mr. MORRIS. This letter was introduced previously as exhibit No. 132 at the hearing of August 16, 1951, Mr. Chairman. It is the one that contains the recommendation on the part of Mr. Jessup to Mr. Dennett who was then secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations for delegates to the Hot Springs convention. It contains the names of Benjamin Kizer, among others, and Lauchlin Currie, John Carter Vincent, Harry Dexter White, Owen Lattimore, Len DeCaux, Col.

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Carl Faymonville, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Alger Hiss, and Frank Coe.

You say you probably did receive that letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I have no doubt I received it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record at this time a letter from Mr. Dennett to Mr. William C. Johnstone, dated June 27, 1944, and it is on the same subject, that is, recommendations for delegates to the Hot Springs convention.

Mr. Mandel, will you certify the authenticity of this letter and read pertinent paragraphs?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 27, 1944, addressed to Dean William C. Johnstone, from Raymond Dennett, secretary.

I read portions of this letter:

When I talked to Grew about the conference there was one rather disturbing reaction which I backed away from at full speed. Grew commented that since the conference would be discussing entirely postwar plans he did not see how anyone in his capacity or in his department could attend, even in their individual capacity, since they would naturally reflect the postwar planning of the State Department itself upon which only Mr. Hull was competent to make statements. Not wanting to ask Grew and have him refuse, not to mention that I wanted Vincent and have Grew refuse to consider such action, I changed the subject. It is quite apparent that Grew is hypersensitive since the Chicago speech which he took 15 minutes to assure me was inaccurately reported by the press.

I think it highly important that you do a little sounding out with Currie or someone at that level as to just how we handle this situation. Either Grew has got to be changed or he might even refuse to let Vincent come, quite apart from coming himself. Hornbeck I am sure would like to come, but whether Grew would accept Hornbeck's statement that it was all right I am inclined to doubt. Currie spoke quite frankly in saying that it was unnecessary to worry much about SKH.

Presumably Stanley K. Hornbeck.

Then another excerpt:

You will be interested to know that Currie suggested the Government delegates should be Acheson, Vincent, Dooman (the latter two at the technical level: the first at the over-all policy level), Will Clayton, Harry White, and possibly Frank Coe. Rupert Emerson should be asked to represent FEA. I think this gives you an idea of Currie's opinion of the importance of the conference, but it might take some spade work by him to get Acheson there. His suggestion, of course, is a neat way of bracketing Hornbeck out.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into the record and marked accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record at this point.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 292" and is as follows:)

JUNE 27, 1944.

Dean WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
Washington 6, D. C.

DEAR BILL: I hope you had a pleasant trip and that you are full of gossip and information as to precisely what happened in San Francisco after I left. Dolly has written me mysterious words, but I have no official knowledge of what went on.

I had a very interesting 3 days in Washington during which I called on Currie, Hornbeck, Grew, Dooman, and various others. Currie was obviously very much interested in the conference and quite obviously would like to come. Hornbeck made an interesting comment to the effect that he rather disliked the apparent growing connection between the IPR and Government and the effort at the last

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conference to arrive at a consensus which approximated the idea of passing resolutions. He felt that as we approached that level of action the British would outsmart us and we would lose our strength.

When I talked to Grew about the conference there was one rather disturbing reaction which I backed away from at full speed. Grew commented that since the conference would be discussing entirely postwar plans he did not see how anyone in his capacity or in his department could attend, even in their individual capacity, since they would naturally reflect the postwar planning of the State Department itself upon which only Mr. Hull was competent to make statements. Not wanting to ask Grew and have him refuse, not to mention that I wanted Vincent and have Grew refuse to consider such action, I changed the subject. It is quite apparent that Grew is hypersensitive since the Chicago speech which he took 15 minutes to assure me was inaccurately reported by the press.

I think it highly important that you do a little sounding out with Currie or someone at that level as to just how we handle this situation. Either Grew has got to be changed or he might even refuse to let Vincent come, quite apart from coming himself. Hornbeck I am sure would like to come, but whether Grew would accept Hornbeck's statement that it was all right I am inclined to doubt. Currie spoke quite frankly in saying that it was unnecessary to worry much about SKH.

I wish you would sound the situation out a little so that all will be clear before any formal invitations are issued.

You will be interested to know that Currie suggested the Government delegates should be Acheson, Vincent, Dooman (the latter two at the technical level, the first at the over-all policy level), Will Clayton, Harry White, and possibly Frank Coe. Rupert Emerson should be asked to represent FEA. I think this gives you an idea of Currie's opinion of the importance of the conference, but it might take some spade work by him to get Acheson there. His suggestion, of course, is a neat way of bracketing Hornbeck out.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Senator FERGUSON. This man Currie has come up very frequently, and this letter brings him out again forcibly to the attention of the committee.

What did he have to do? What was his position? Here it sounds like a very important position as to how you reach Government officials. He was directly connected with the White House, the executive office.

Will you tell us where Currie fits into this proposition? Was he the liaison between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Government?

Mr. DENNETT. It is rather difficult to say, Senator, because I think I only saw him twice, of which this summary was one.

I believe that Mr. Carter saw him fairly often, but I don't know.

I had obviously been sent to him by somebody—I don't know whom—to discuss the whole question of membership of the American delegation; that is, the official representation in the American delegation.

I am, therefore, summarizing here what he said to me.

Senator FERGUSON. He must have been a confidante because here it is said:

I think it highly important you do a little sounding out with Currie.

You only sound out with a confidante, do you not?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know what you mean by confidante. He was no confidante of mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. He may very well have been. I heard him mentioned several times.

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I believe Mr. Carter saw him several times.

Senator FERGUSON. Here you were using this expression, "or someone at that level as to just how we handle this situation."

You wanted Currie to handle the situation that you could not handle with Grew who was the Under Secretary of State, was he not?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Explain who this man was, this man Currie. What could he do for IPR that the Under Secretary under Hull could not do? Why did you not lay your cards on the table and say to Mr. Grew, "Here is what we want to do"?

Why did you want to go around through Currie and manipulate things, which this indicates?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume, Senator, that the reason we wanted that was because we wanted certain people to come to the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not want other people to come?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume so.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you try to block off Hornbeck?

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Hornbeck had——

Senator FERGUSON. It is a neat way. You say:

I think this gives you an idea of Currie's opinion of the importance of the conference, but it might take some spade work by him to get Acheson there.

And then you say:

His suggestion, of course, is a neat way of bracketing Hornbeck out.

What is wrong with Hornbeck?

Mr. DENNETT. My understanding of that situation which goes back over 5 or 6 years is that at the time Mr. Hornbeck had already expressed his question as to the wisdom, or as to the desirability of the kind of conference which the Institute of Pacific Relations had put on at Mont Tremblant at which he had been present.

It would be natural, therefore, if he disapproved of this, not to have him as one of the delegates.

Senator FERGUSON. You only wanted yes men at the convention?

Mr. DENNETT. Don't put words into my mouth, Senator, because I didn't say that, nor did I mean to infer that.

The situation in regard to these delegations was somewhat influenced, and I think this is important to understand in regard to both of these letters, by the nature of the delegations coming from other countries.

The way the thing happened was that we would hear that the British were sending so and so and so and so, and the French were sending so and so.

Our problem, so far as the governmental representation was concerned, and as host council, was to attempt insofar as we could, to match the delegations from these other countries.

It was, therefore, logical to go to the Government and say, "Here is this conference. The British are sending somebody who is an expert on economic matters in the Far East. Here is somebody who is in charge, let us say, of the Chinese Desk. We would like to match them with similar people within the department," or whatever it happened to be.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not want to match them in opinion?

Mr. DENNETT. No, match them with the person holding the office. The office was the thing which was the matter of some concern to us.

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Senator FERGUSON. You don't tell me you want to bracket out Hornbeck because of his position. You want to bracket him out because of his opinion. That does not line up with what you are saying here.

Mr. DENNETT. At that time Mr. Vincent was the director of the Office of China Affairs, or whatever it was then called.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know he was pro-Soviet?

Mr. DENNETT. I did not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Currie knew he was pro-Soviet?

Mr. DENNETT. I had no idea what he knew or didn't know.

Senator FERGUSON. This letter, to me, up to this moment—you seem to know in this letter much about Mr. Currie.

Mr. DENNETT. I can assure you I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this letter really dictated by somebody else?

Mr. DENNETT. No, sir; that was by me. I saw Mr. Currie and asked him his opinions. Presumably Mr. Carter had talked with him earlier.

I went to Mr. Currie and said, "Well, now, here are the people that are coming that we know about so far. Whom did you suggest ought to come from the United States?"

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not have this confidential talk with Grew? I notice a line up here that says you shied away from Grew.

Mr. DENNETT. Because at that point Mr. Grew stated, as is stated in the letter, that he thought it would be impossible for anybody to come from the Department of State.

We were particularly anxious to have someone from the Department of State because the British, the French, the Dutch, and others were sending officials.

Therefore, if I had asked Mr. Grew at that time and had a flat "No," we presumably would have had then nobody from the Department of State.

We, as host council, would have been in the position where we would not be giving a delegation of the same character as the other councils.

Senator FERGUSON. Here was the next to the top man that had the power to allow somebody to come, or not, and you were afraid of getting a direct "No"?

Mr. DENNETT. Quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. So, you go to somebody who has not any direct connection, as far as we know, Lauchlin Currie in the White House?

Mr. DENNETT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Why? To get him to engineer to get you someone so that Grew could not keep him from coming?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify you were asked to go to see Mr. Currie by someone?

Mr. DENNETT. I probably was. I don't recall why or how I got to see him.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know who sent you?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you see him?

Mr. DENNETT. I haven't the remotest idea. I don't know where his offices were.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they not in the White House?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't think they were, but I am not sure.

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Senator FERGUSON. What did you think he had to do with Government?

Mr. DENNETT. I knew he was in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get to see him?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know. I have no recollection of whether I called him; whether I wrote him; whether somebody arranged the appointment. I have no recollection of that. It is perfectly obvious I went to see him. I saw him twice during the time I was with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. You were sent on both occasions?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know. It is presumably in the files. If I wrote a letter, there may be a memorandum to Mr. Johnstone.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this an attempt to use influence through Currie?

Mr. DENNETT. I think it is a fair conclusion to draw that we wanted to get people from the Department of State and thought he could get them.

Senator FERGUSON. He was the one man you could talk confidentially with and get the people you wanted?

Mr. DENNETT. There were a number of people I could have talked confidentially with and did, including Mr. Grew.

I said, "We would like to have some people from the Department of State, Mr. Grew."

Senator FERGUSON. You did not talk confidentially with him because you say you shied away.

Mr. DENNETT. When he did not think anybody could come from the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Up to that time you were careful in talking with Grew.

Who else could have talked to Lauchlin Currie and obtained influence to get these people?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't know I ever tried to obtain influence.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of anyone higher than Currie nearer the throne?

Mr. DENNETT. (Nodding negatively.)

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try Harry White?

Mr. DENNETT. I think I saw Mr. White once.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk confidentially with him about some of these matters?

Mr. DENNETT. No. The only time I saw Mr. White was when I invited him to come to the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you really get this idea of putting this in a letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I was reporting to the fellow in charge of our Washington office as to recent conferences in regard to the American delegation to the Hot Springs conference.

Senator FERGUSON. But the idea is that you put in here, it is rather significant to me, that you talked this way about Currie. You wanted to push that letter at the time?

Mr. DENNETT. I had no particular objection. I could talk to Currie, or anybody else about the American delegation.

Senator FERGUSON. This was not a confidential communication?

Mr. DENNETT. It is not labeled as such. I sent it to Bill Johnstone of the Washington office.

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Senator FERGUSON. You think he would have wanted Mr. Grew and Mr. Hull to know about it?

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Grew is a very astute man, and I had no doubt Mr. Grew knew I would like to have the Department of State people there. He may have concluded I did not want to ask him point blank.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you would want Mr. Grew or Mr. Hull to know that you were going over to the White House to see Currie, who had influence with the President to do this?

Mr. DENNETT. Not particularly.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think you would even want them generally to know it?

Mr. DENNETT. I had no doubt they knew somebody beside people from the Department could come.

Mr. MORRIS. You can't recall who it was who suggested you go to see Currie?

Mr. DENNETT. No.

Presumably it was Mr. Carter, but it may not have been because he saw a good deal of Mr. Currie.

Senator FERGUSON. You really accomplished your mission getting these people?

Mr. DENNETT. There was no final order that nobody could come.

Senator FERGUSON. You accomplished your mission?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

I think I may say that one of the factors in doing that—it may have been Currie—but one of the factors contributing to that was the list of people who came from the other countries as a result of which I think it was fairly apparent to the people in the department that it would be desirable to have some of their people present when other governments considered this sufficiently important to send people of the caliber they did.

So, it is entirely possible that the action of sending people from the department, or elsewhere, was not necessarily the result of any machinations by Mr. Currie, but a result of the discovery of who else was coming from the other countries.

There is another interpretation than that you suggested.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with this list suggested by Mr. Currie, you will notice he has Harry White and Frank Coe as people recommended.

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn Harry White and Frank Coe were associated with the Communist organization?

Mr. DENNETT. A good deal after I left the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think, in connection with this recommendation of Mr. Jessup's for the same conference, we had some testimony in the past that 10 of those people were connected with the Communists and Soviet organizations. I thought perhaps we might go into the testimony about some other people who were recommended and who were not identified as members of the Communist Party, such as Colonel Faymonville.

Mr. DENNETT. I was about to say—just so that the record will be straight—that, of all the people who were in the Institute of Pacific Relations and with whom I was associated, I think I would be doing a

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disservice if I didn't state that the person whom I never questioned as having any connection with either the Communist Party or Communist sympathizers was Philip C. Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. We were not asking you that. We are talking about the list of people recommended by Mr. Jessup. That question does not come up at all.

Mr. DENNETT. I wanted to get that in the record as to my feeling about Mr. Jessup, so you can then discuss this list.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us whom you were suspicious of having Communist leanings that were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, since you brought the subject up? Let us have the names of those you were suspicious of.

Mr. DENNETT. I made it clear earlier, I think, that I was primarily concerned with the objectivity of the staff.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not answer my question.

Mr. MORRIS. You brought your suspicions into it.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us have those that you were suspicious of being connected with, either directly or indirectly, the Communists or the Communist line.

We have got one that was not. What about all the others?

Mr. DENNETT. I would say, with the exception of Mr. Field, all the members of my executive committee.

Senator FERGUSON. You were suspicious of Field?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes. There was no question in my mind that——

Senator FERGUSON. That he was a Communist?

Mr. DENNETT. He was not.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. DENNETT. There was no question in my mind that Mr. Field was either a Communist or a Communist sympathizer. I think it was generally accepted he was. He was one out of 11 or 12 of the executive committee, and one member out of the 60 or 70 on the national board.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the writers for the organization?

Mr. MORRIS. How about the names of the people recommended by Jessup for the Hot Springs convention?

That would be more appropriate, Senator.

Mr. DENNETT. I had no suspicions in regard to any of them, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify previously you were in no position to determine whether or not anybody was a Communist?

Mr. DENNETT. I certainly did. I was in no position to know. I had no way of knowing; and as I have always stated, even with the benefit of hindsight I am very reluctant to impute membership where it may not have been, to impute motives, and I do not know that the motives existed, because I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not wish to tell us you were naive on this question of communism back in these days; that you did not understand it; that it did not enter your mental processes?

Mr. DENNETT. Certainly it never occurred to me any of the people with whom I was dealing were Communists or Communist sympathizers.

Senator FERGUSON. When you read such articles as this book The Land of the Soviets——

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Mr. DENNETT. I decided that was a person whom I did not regard as objective, and who may or may not have been sympathetic to the Communist side.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a Soviet line?

Mr. DENNETT. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not see any evidences of that line going through the Institute of Pacific Relations and leading over to Moscow?

Mr. DENNETT. There is a difference between seeing a line or a parallelism between two points of view and deciding as a result of that that the person taking this position is or is not a Communist or a Communist sympathizer.

As I suggested, in 1944 and 1945 there were millions of people in this country who really and sincerely believed that cooperation with the Soviet Union was the solution to postwar problems.

They were all guilty of bad judgment, but that does not necessarily mean that the millions who felt that way are all Communists, or were.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not any wonder that was true when you read this book that was copyrighted in 1942, Land of the Soviets, which Mrs. Stewart had taken out to the public schools?

Mr. DENNETT. If the Institute of Pacific Relations had the influence you suggest, there would be a lot more Communists than there are in the country, I suspect.

You give me faith in education with that comment. I am now in the field of education. I wish I could be as effective as you imply.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you don't think this kind of a book sent to the public schools or to the armed services would have its effect on the thinking of the youth of America and as they grow into manhood they would carry on some of this thinking?

Mr. DENNETT. It may very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the hope of you as an educator?

Mr. DENNETT. It would be my hope it would have some impact; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If that was not the fact that you wanted an impact, why were you publishing these books?

Mr. DENNETT. Disassociate me from publishing this one, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the IPR.

Mr. DENNETT. I want to make it clear as to the distinction as to my position and the previous history.

Senator FERGUSON. I hope you do.

I have had a little trouble this morning on the Currie letter that you have not quite made clear to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we will have to recess at this time until 1:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The hearing reconvened at 1:30 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

Senator JENNER (presiding). Come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else in addition to Mr. Jessup and Lauchlin Currie made recommendations for delegates to the Hot Springs convention?

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Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall in detail. I know that in regard to the west coast branches of the Institute of Pacific Relations we pretty well decided to let them name their own. I presume there was some sort of a subcommittee of the executive committee which made suggestions.

There were, for example, a number of businessmen suggested. These would have come presumably from some sort of a committee which was set up for it.

Mr. MORRIS. But the outstanding recommendations apparently came from Jessup and Currie?

Mr. DENNETT. Those are the only ones of which there is evidence, but there may be others in the file.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think while we are at this list of recommendations, I might say a letter had been introduced previously on Colonel Faymonville. I think Mr. Mandel will read it now for the record.

Senator JENNER. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is exhibit 32, introduced at open hearings on July 26, 1951. It is a letter addressed to Owen Lattimore from Edward C. Carter, dated June 21, 1941. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR OWEN: If you have time while in San Francisco, you and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville whose present address is Headquarters of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking. If you wish me to, I will wire him for an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you state what the reference is to the luncheon last Wednesday? The reference was to a luncheon with Oumansky?

Mr. MANDEL. I believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I just had that stated in the record in connection with Colonel Faymonville.

The point is that Edward Carter in writing to Lattimore thought that Colonel Faymonville would be thoroughly at home at this Oumansky luncheon.

Carter goes on to say:

It may be if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you.

Harriet Moore has been identified by several witnesses as having been a member of the Communist Party.

What were your experiences with Harriet Moore, Mr. Dennett?

Mr. DENNETT. I saw her only four or five times, I think. She was acting secretary before I was employed. Immediately after my employment, she went to the American-Russian Institute which she was particularly interested in. She was also the author of a book published by the American Council on the Soviet Far East, I believe, which I did not at the time, and do not now, regard as a particularly objective study.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, at the Hot Springs convention, were there any advance caucuses?

Mr. DENNETT. We had a 1- or 2-day advance meeting, as many members of the American delegation could get together in Washington sometime in the fall prior to the Hot Springs conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read into the record excerpts from one of the conferences, the advance conferences, described by Mr. Dennett at this time?

And what is this you are going to read?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a document appearing in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Preliminary meeting of the American delegation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, October 28, 1944, morning session, 10 to 11:15 a. m., Carolyn Kaiser and Harriett Mills, recorders."

Recorders apparently are those who do not take a stenographic copy of what was said, but give a digest, which appears here.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that true?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct. They take down in longhand the substance of what was said and type it up later.

Mr. MANDEL. I read some excerpts from this preliminary meeting:

Chairman, Mr. Jessup: In his introductory remarks, Mr. Jessup stated that this preliminary meeting of the American delegation was not called for the purpose of formulating a "party line" for the delegation, or to present a single point of view at the Hot Springs conference, but for the purpose of clarification of the major issues to be discussed, prior to Hot Springs, to discover points of agreement on opinions and the interpretation of facts.

He explained that the IPR had broken its long-standing precedent in regard to the exclusion of Government officials from the conferences because since Pearl Harbor so many of the authorities on far eastern affairs had accepted responsible positions in the Government. However, Government officials who represent any of the delegations do not speak as Government officials, but as well-informed private individuals.

The main point under discussion during this period of the morning's meeting was what the American attitude should be in regard to the discussion of the internal problems of China, at the Hot Springs conference. Mr. Jessup felt that if the American delegation could decide what "slant" to take in bringing forth a discussion of China's domestic difficulties, it would facilitate a free discussion of this problem at the conference. He pointed out that the Chinese delegates have not wished, and will not wish, to discuss the internal situation in China. The domestic China situation is covered in an indirect way in the agenda of the conference, as a diplomatic concession. He then asked Mr. Lattimore what factors in the Chinese internal situation were likely to come under discussion at the conference.

Mr. Lattimore: He thought that the method of including India as well as China in the topic on the agenda might cushion the Chinese discussion. He said that the Chinese delegation at Hot Springs may occupy the position formerly held by the Japanese delegation at IPR conferences. The Chinese will present the party line, well-cloaked in fog, and individual members of the Chinese party will hew to the party line although they may differ from it as individuals. They won't care to speak of their differences of opinion.

Owing to the scarcity of information about Chinese internal affairs, the discussion at Hot Springs is likely to boil down to a discussion of the Kuomintang and the Communists, although the actual situation is far more complex; there are many smaller groups who are playing active parts in the political picture whose roles will be ignored. Developments in China today will have important political consequences. One example: The development in southeast China, with the United States getting closer and closer to the Chinese coast. China's military leaders may decide to break through the Japanese lines to commandeer United States equipment when we land. The political affiliation of the Chinese commander who might make this move would influence the whole political set-up. The Chinese delegation will present no real data on China's internal situation,

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even though this situation is of military as well as political importance in the whole international picture.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else gave their opinions at this conference?

Mr. MANDEL. We have here a digest of the opinion of Mr. Dennett, Admiral Yarnell, Mr. Chase, and Mr. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Mr. Chase?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall. He wasn't in the delegation, I don't think. I don't know who Mr. Chase was.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Field?

Mr. DENNETT. Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Coe.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Coe?

Mr. DENNETT. Frank Coe.

Mr. MANDEL. Miss Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Miss Farley?

Mr. DENNETT. Miriam Farley.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Johnstone.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Mr. Johnstone?

Mr. DENNETT. William C. Johnstone.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Bunche.

Mr. DENNETT. That is Ralph Bunche.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. DeCaux.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Len DeCaux?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you can recall, what was the purpose of that advance session?

Mr. DENNETT. I think it is well described by the statement of the chairman; that is, to see what the attitudes of the members of the delegation were, many of them strangers to each other, and to discuss particularly at this session the degree to which it would be possible to examine as part of the discussions the internal developments in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read that through completely?

Mr. DENNETT. I have read this through. There are a lot of others I have not read, however.

Mr. MORRIS. With the exception of Admiral Yarnell, would you not agree there was uniformity of opinion there?

Mr. DENNETT. I think that is a fair statement; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the underlying expression of the majority of people there with the exception of Admiral Yarnell, with respect to the Chinese question?

Mr. DENNETT. The underlying agreement was that we certainly should discuss the internal situation in China as it bore very definitely upon postwar situations in China.

Admiral Yarnell's position is, I think, best summarized in one statement, and I am quoting:

> But if criticism leads to the overthrow of the Chungking government, what will take its place? No other party is strong enough at present to assume control.

Mr. MORRIS. Nobody agreed with him?

Mr. DENNETT. They seemed not to.

Are you entering this in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. DENNETT. As long as it is in the record, I think I am free to make comments on it.

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Senator JENNER. This will be received in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 293" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 293

PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, OCTOBER 28, 1944

Chairman, Mr. Jessup: In his introductory remarks, Mr. Jessup stated that this preliminary meeting of the American delegation was not called for the purpose of formulating a party line for the delegation, or to present a single point of view at the Hot Springs conference, but for the purpose of clarification of the major issues to be discussed, prior to Hot Springs, to discover points of agreement on opinions and the interpretation of facts. He explained that the IPR had broken its long-standing precedent in regard to the exclusion of Government officials from the conferences because since Pearl Harbor so many of the authorities on Far Eastern affairs had accepted responsible positions in the Government. However, Government officials who represent any of the delegations do not speak as Government officials, but as well-informed private individuals.

The main point under discussion during this period of the morning's meeting was what the American attitude should be in regard to the discussion of the internal problems of China, at the Hot Springs conference. Mr. Jessup felt that if the American delegation could decide what slant to take in bringing forth a discussion of China's domestic difficulties, it would facilitate a free discussion of this problem at the conference. He pointed out that the Chinese delegates have not wished and will not wish to discuss the internal situation in China. The domestic Chinese situation is covered in an indirect way in the agenda of the conference, as a diplomatic concession. He then asked Mr. Lattimore what factors in the Chinese internal situation were likely to come under discussion at the conference.

Mr. Lattimore: He thought that the method of including India as well as China in the topic on the agenda might cushion the Chinese discussion. He said that the Chinese delegation at Hot Springs may occupy the position formerly held by the Japanese delegation at IPR conferences. The Chinese will present the party line, well cloaked in fog, and individual members of the Chinese party will hew to the party line although they may differ from it as individuals. They won't care to speak of their differences of opinion. Owing to the scarcity of information about Chinese internal affairs, the discussion at Hot Springs is likely to boil down to a discussion of the Kuomintang and the Communists, although the actual situation is far more complex; there are many smaller groups who are playing active parts in the political picture whose roles will be ignored. Developments in China today will have important political consequences. One example: the developments in southeast China, with the United States getting closer and closer to the Chinese coast. China's military leaders may decide to break through the Japanese lines to commandeer United States equipment when we land. The political affiliation of the Chinese commander who might make this move would influence the whole political set-up. The Chinese delegation will present no real data on China's internal situation, even though this situation is of military as well as political importance in the whole international picture.

Mr. Jessup: He then asked Mr. Lattimore if American interest in China rests chiefly on military grounds.

Mr. Lattimore: It does not. But American military interest will launch the discussion of Chinese internal affairs as they affect the military situation. They have a direct bearing on how soon the war can be finished. The situation is comparable to the situation which would exist if the Japanese had invaded India. Then we would have to take up the domestic situation in India as it applied to the military, and subject it to intense discussion.

Mr. Jessup: He pointed out the economic side to the picture. China's appeal for United States economic and industrial aid is effected by the political situation within China.

Mr. Lattimore: The Chinese party line will be that we cannot discuss the Chinese political situation because it can be clarified only if the United States gives China large funds with which to strengthen the Government, and that that will clarify the political situation.

Mr. Dennett: He stated that the American point of view might well be that America could reasonably object to giving China money to reinforce a form of

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government with which we might not be in as much sympathy as some others. Our businessmen will not care to invest in a government whose situation is so unstable.

Mr. Lattimore: In answer to a query as to whether it is advisable to press the Chinese to express themselves on these problems, Mr. Lattimore said that it was a matter for regret that at previous conferences the other nations had not pressed the Japanese to express themselves on acute issues within Japan. It resulted in a sort of silent condoning of Japanese internal policy.

Admiral Yarnell: The Admiral expressed the opinion that nothing constructive could come from discussing the internal situation in China and India, and that we might serve only to antagonize the members of the delegation involved in these situations. He expressed doubt that we could learn anything from them which would aid in clarifying the situation anyway.

Mr. Lattimore: He stated the bad effect that such a hands-off policy had had on the Japanese delegates: they had gone home and reported that there was no cause to worry about American opinion, that America was "in the bag." There will be an equally destructive effect if the Chinese go home and tell their officials that America condones the Chinese political situation.

Admiral Yarnell: If we do not discuss these problems, the Chinese cannot interpret that to mean that the United States approves of their policy. The situation in China is known to us, the remedy is known; they cannot hope to believe that we do not realize what is going on.

Mr. Jessup: He stated that many people say that the Chinese desire a recording of adverse American sentiment, and that Chunking wishes to know about it.

Mr. Lattimore: Americans who have returned from China say that they are quietly taken aside in Chungking, and encouraged to continue the criticism of Chinese policies.

Admiral Yarnell: But if criticism leads to the overthrow of the Chungking government, what will take its place? No other party is strong enough at present to assume control.

Mr. LATTIMORE: The more reasonable Chinese feel that Chiang's Government is the only hope for a continuing and stable government in China, but that it will be continuing and stable only if it modifies its policy; otherwise it will be overthrown.

Mr. Chase: He stated that at the Hot Springs conference we could take up the discussion of internal factors in China only in relation to the aid which the United States will give her.

Mr. Field: He felt that if the domestic situations in other countries involved in the Pacific area, including the United States, were discussed—these questions which bear directly on the Pacific situation—it would be easier to bring about the discussion of China's domestic situation. If we are frank to discuss our own problems, and take the lead in discussing them before we reach the Chinese discussion, we can encourage the same thing in the Chinese when their turn comes. The point on the agenda which takes up the discussion of Chinese domestic issues comes too soon, Mr. Field felt. Our chances of leading gently and gradually into the Chinese discussion are poor. If we can wash some of our own dirty linen first we can more easily lead the discussion toward Chinese domestic affairs.

Mr. Jessup then asked whether the agenda should be modified.

Mr. Field: The discussion of India at the Atlantic City conference was skillfully skirted, so that a clash was avoided. If, before the conference, we can talk to the British delegates, perhaps we can agree to discuss the internal situation in India frankly. This also will help in leading into the Chinese discussion.

Mr. Coe and Miss Farley stated that the India situation was discussed fully at Mont Tremblant Conference, and could be done so again.

Mr. Field: If we can open up the discussion of pertinent internal topics, it will be of great help all the way around.

Mr. Johnstone: The discussion of domestic affairs at Atlantic City grew out of the discussion of economic aid to China. We said that our aid depended on the internal situation in China. The Chinese said that we had no business discussing the stability of the Chinese Government. What are the points of legitimate American interest to keep in mind in discussing the Chinese situation?

Mr. Jessup: He reminded the meeting that military and economic considerations had already been mentioned, and asked how far we could go in saying that American public opinion is concerned with the domestic Chinese situation. He asked if it was a matter of general informed interest.

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Mr. Coe: He said that the number of articles and news stories in the American press concerning the domestic situation in China testified to American interest in the situation.

Mr. Lattimore: Many people ask, with great interest, whether China is in for a period of progress when the war is over, or whether she is in for 50 years of civil war.

Mr. Jessup brought out the point that the security question is involved in the discussion, as China is a member of the Big Four.

Mr. Dennett: Let us say that there is widespread American interest in the problem, and the question of the propriety of discussing it or not discussing it is immaterial. The interest and publicity exists, whether it should or not. The more of a problem it becomes to China, the more the United States will discuss it and ask questions about it. Then we remove the question from considerations of personal curiosity, and it becomes a matter of public concern.

Mr. Bunche: How can we divorce national policies from domestic conditions? We cannot avoid discussing internal conditions in China in relation to her future foreign policy, and all other countries as well.

Mr. Lattimore reminded the group of the British insistence on clarification of American foreign policy at Mont Tremblant, because it vitally affected the discussion of international policy.

Mr. Coe: He stated that it would be necessary to either bar the whole discussion of China's internal affairs from the conference, or recognize that pertinent angles with reference to them will crop up continually in the discussion.

Mr. Jessup: We must put the stress on the interest which is based on economic and military grounds. Admiral Yarnell has raised the question of the discussion being helpful or harmful. It has been said that it will crop up in the agenda in several places unless it is directly suppressed. The staff should circulate a memoranda stressing these points before the conference takes place.

Mr. de Caux suggested a redrafting of the agenda, including the questions on foreign investment and long-term security.

Mr. Jessup further suggested that all those present should make notes on the agenda to go to the American secretary who was in charge of drafting the agenda, to see whether they might be included.

Miss Farley: If we assume that the American delegation is responsible for the agenda, it may have to stand as it is. If this meeting is considered to be representative, we should decide when and where the Chinese problem should come up, following Mr. Field's suggestion.

Mr. Jessup said that the matter would be discussed at greater length, and that there would be correspondence on the subject.

Mr. Bunche thought that under section C–1 of the agenda, Dumbarton Oaks should play an important part. And also he brought out the fact that a United Nations conference might take place before the Hot Springs meeting, and that that too should be included in the agenda.

Mr. Jessup then stated that the agenda would undergo revision.

C. KIZER.

Mr. MORRIS. There were many conferences such as this?

Mr. DENNETT. There were a series of meetings. I don't know whether it was one week-end meeting, or whether there were a number of them which covered the major points on the agenda.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they all presided over by Dr. Jessup?

Mr. DENNETT. I assume so, because he was to be the chairman of the American delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a volume, Security in the Pacific?

Mr. DENNETT. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like you to turn to that page which has to do with the make-up of the American delegation.

Mr. DENNETT. Page 157.

Mr. MORRIS. During the various round-table discussions, who, of all the delegates to the convention, was the most vocal?

Mr. DENNETT. The organization of the conference was such that there were three or four simultaneous round tables going on on differ-

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ent agenda items. I therefore only attended the round table to which I was assigned.

I attended the plenary meetings. I would say on the basis of my recollection, the most vocal members were Professor Jessup as chairman of the delegation, Admiral Hart as vice chairman.

In regard to problems of southeast Asia and colonial problems generally, it was Ralph Bunche; Frank Coe very much so on economic matters, since that was what he was dealing with in FEA; Mr. Coons; Rupert Emerson; Frederick V. Field; William C. Johnstone; and Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say Mr. Lattimore was the most vocal of them all?

Mr. DENNETT. Probably. He created a good deal of animosity.

Mr. MORRIS. Why?

Mr. DENNETT. There was one incident I recall where he commented that, "Just as Lincoln said the United States cannot exist half slave and half free, so the world could not exist half slave and half free until the metropolitan countries had freed their colonial territories."

This did not sit very well with the British, French, or Dutch, who thought he had overstated his case somewhat.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he express any views against the Chinese Government there?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall. My impression is that he was very doubtful as to their ability to continue without liberalization of their regime.

I was not in that particular round table, as I recall, and heard these comments only in plenary meetings, of which there were only four or five.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he comment on the necessity of having a Japanese Emperor?

Mr. DENNETT. You mean the necessity of not having one, I take it?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. DENNETT. He did, at length.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say? Can you recall the conversation?

Mr. DENNETT. No; except that his general theme was that the Japanese Emperor probably ought to be removed and he did not feel you could have a democratic Japan as long as you had the Japanese Emperor.

Mr. MORRIS. Did any of the members of the secretariat express themselves?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; a few did, on the international secretariat, T. A. Bisson, and Andrew Grajdanzev.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it proper for them to have expressed themselves?

Mr. DENNETT. There was some argument on that. Mr. Carter felt it was perfectly acceptable. The British, French, Dutch, and other delegations thought that members of the secretariat should not participate in the discussion since they were not full delegates.

There may have been others.

I am looking over this list just to have a complete record on this.

There may have been others that participated in the discussion. I think Professor Corbett did by invitation. I know he gave a talk at one point by request. It is possible that one or two others joined in—Mr. Tamagna I think did.

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I remember the opposition of the other delegations which arose, particularly to Mr. Bisson and Mr. Grajdanzev.

Mr. Morris, do you plan to put the list of delegates into the record at some point.

It bears on some of the discussion we had this morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I think Mr. Mandel will put the list into the record in regard to the United States delegation.

Well, I will offer the full list of the United States delegation to the Hot Springs conference and may that be entered completely into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator JENNER. Do you want to identify the pages in this?

Mr. MORRIS. These are pages 157, 158, and two-thirds of the way through 159 of Security in the Pacific.

Senator JENNER. It may go in the record at this point.

(List referred to is as follows:)

UNITED STATES

Jessup, Philip C. (1933, 1939, 1942): Professor of international law, Columbia University; former chairman of the Pacific Council, IPR; Chief, Division of Personnel and Training, OFRRA; Secretary pro tem of council of UNRRA, 1943; legal adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Author, The United States and the World Court, 1929; International Security, 1935; The Life of Elihu Root, 1938; chairman.

Hart, Admiral T. C.: Navy General Board, Navy Department; former commander in chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, 1939–42; vice chairman.

Allen, Edward W.: Member, Allen, Hilen, Froude & DeGarmo, attorneys at law, Seattle; American member and chairman of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission; member, Seattle Chamber of Commerce.

Bolton, Hon. Frances P.: Representative, Twenty-second Ohio District, United States Congress; vice chairman, National Republican Program Committee, 1938–40.

Bunche, Ralph (1942): Area specialist, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State; served with the United States group at Dumbarton Oaks Conference; substitute adviser on the United States delegation to the twenty-sixth session of the International Labour Conference at Philadelphia, April–May 1944.

Calkins, Robert D.: Dean, School of Business, Columbia University; dean, College of Commerce, University of California, Berkeley, 1937–41; vice chairman, San Francisco Regional Labor Board, 1934; chairman, Pacific Coast Regional Committee of Social Science, Research Council, 1939–41; chairman, executive committee, American council, IPR consultant, National Resoures Planning Board, 1940–41.

Coe, Frank (1942): Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.

Coons, Arthur G.: Dean of faculty and professor of economics at Occidental College, Los Angeles; visiting professor and research fellow at California College in China Foundation, in China, 1933–34; research chairman, southern California region, American Council, IPR, 1938–41.

DeCaux, Len (1942): Publicity director, Congress of Industrial Organizations; editor of the CIO News; Member, board of trustees, American council.

Emerson, Rupert. Director, Liberated Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration. On leave from Harvard, associate professor in the department of government. One year 1932–33, spent in Southeast Asia. Author, "Malaysia; a Study in Direct and Indirect Rule."

Fahey, Col. Daniel D., Jr., member of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, assigned as working member with Civil Affairs Division.

Field, Frederick V. (1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942). Executive vice chairman, Council for Pan-American Democracy. Secretary, American County IPR, 1935–1940. Author, "American Participation in the China Consortiums"; editor, "Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area," 1934. General editor, "Economic Survey of the Pacific Area," 1942.

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Gerbode, Mrs. Frank A. (1929). Member, Executive Committee, San Francisco Bay Region, American Council, IPR.

Gilchrist, Huntington. Executive, American Cyanamid Co.; Chief of Department of Administrative Commissions, League of Nations Secretariat, 1920–25; Assistant Director of Mandates Section, League of Nations, 1925–28; instructor, Anglo-Chinese College, Foochow, 1913–14; Peking University, 1914–15; secretary of the second session of the UNRRA Council, Montreal, 1944.

Johnstone, William C. Director of Washington Study Program, IPE; professor of political science and dean of the School of Government, the George Washington University, Washington, D. C.

Keesing, Felix M. (1931). Professor of Anthropology, Stanford University, Calif.; professor and chairman, department of anthropology and sociology, University of Hawaii, 1937–43; author, "Modern Samoa," 1934: "The Philippines—A Nation in the Making", 1937; "The South Seas in the Modern World," 1941.

Kirk, Grayson. Research associate, Institute of International Studies, Yale University; professor of government at Columbia University; served with the United States group at Dumbarton Oaks Conference; author, "Philippine Independence," 1936.

Lattimore, Owen (1933, 1936, 1939, 1942), director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University; consultant, Office of War Information; former political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

MacKay, J. A. Vice president, National City Bank, New York, in charge of far eastern district.

McCoy, Maj. Gen. Frank R. United States Army retired (1939, 1942). President, Foreign Policy Association. Member of Wood-Forbes special mission to the Philippines, 1921; in charge of American relief activities in Japan following the earthquake of 1923; American member of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry in Manchuria, 1932.

Morrison, George Abbot. Vice chairman. Bucyrus-Erie Co., Milwaukee; chairman, Milwaukee Office, American Council IPR.

Salisbury, Laurence. Editor, Far Eastern Survey. American Council IPR; Former Foreign Service officer: 12 years in Japan, 5 in China, and 2 in Manila, 5 years in the Department of State.

Staley, Eugene (1939). School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C. Consultant United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; formerly on faculty of University of Chicago, Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva), Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; author, "World Economy in Transition," 1939; "World Economic Development: Effects on Established Industrial Countries," 1944.

Thompson, Laura. Coordinator of research in administration, Society for Applied Anthropology; formerly consultant to the United States Naval Government of Guam. Author, "Guam and Its People," "Fifian Frontiers," "Steps Toward Colonial Freedom."

Van Zandt, J. Parker. Research associate, the Brookings Institution; observer at International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, 1944. Author, "Civil Aviation and Peace," "The Geography of World Air Transport."

Vincent, John Carter. Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State.

Waymack, W. W. Editor and vice president, The Des Moines Register and Tribune; chairman, Economic Policy Committee, 1938–41.

Dennett. Raymond. Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y., secretary.

AMERICAN SECRETARIAT

Dorothy Borg (1939, 1942), temporary member, American Council staff.

Miriam S. Farley (1936, 1939, 1942). Editor, American Council Pamphlet Series; research associate, American Council, IPR.

Margaret Fischl. American Council staff.

Shirley Jenkins. Assistant editor, Far Eastern Survey, American Council, IPR.

Mrs. William C. Johnstone. Temporary member, American Council staff.

Carolyn Kizer (1936, 1942). American Council staff.

Bruno Lasker (1931, 1933, 1936, 1942). Research Associate, American Council, IPR.

Eleanor Lattimore (1936, 1939). Washington Office, American Council, IPR.

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Charles F. Loomis (1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942). Secretary, Hawaii Office, American Council, IPR; Chief, Morale Section, Office of the Military Governor, Hawaii.

J. J. Mickle. Temporary member, American Council staff.

Harriet Mills. American Council Staff.

Harriet H. Parker. Assistant to the Secretary, American Council, IPR.

Lawrence K. Rosinger (1939). Far Eastern Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association.

Frances Sharpe. American Council Staff.

Marguerite A. Stewart. Editor and secretary of the school department, American Council IPR.

Rose Yardumian (1942). Washington Representative, American Council, IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you turn to page 161 and describe the makeup of the conference secretariat?

Mr. DENNETT. The conference secretariat was composed, I would say, of three classes of people, perhaps four.

First were members of the staff of the institute, or the international secretariat.

Second were people who were very much interested in coming to the conference who were not quite important enough to be put on as delegates and were brought to take notes.

Third were a number of people who were obtained from the Government to act as recorders and to take notes. Some of these came from the Department of State; some from the Army and the Navy. Some, I believe, were brought by the Canadian delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Michael Lee doing there, do you know?

Mr. DENNETT. Presumably he was acting as a recorder and taking notes. I don't recall him at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the role of Lt. Andrew Roth?

Mr. DENNETT. He was a recorder taking notes.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice he was there as a naval officer.

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember anything about the background of his being there as a naval officer?

Mr. DENNETT. I believe Mr. Carter suggested to me at the time we were discussing the staffing of this conference that at Mont Tremblant the conferences had proved to be of sufficient interest so that we had been able to obtain recorders without cost to us by inviting the Army and Navy to send junior officers to attend.

Mr. Carter suggested that since the American Council was the host council that I should take this subject up, which I did do, writing to the appropriate people in the military and naval establishments drawing their attention to the nature of the conference, the people who were going to be there, the agenda which was to be discussed, and asking whether they wished to assign certain people there.

Most of the Army and naval officers on this list were so assigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do we have any correspondence on this point?

Mr. MANDEL. We have an exchange of correspondence dealing with negotiations with Admiral F. J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and in the correspondence is listed those officers who were assigned by the Navy to the conference.

In a letter addressed to Admiral Horne from Raymond Dennett, dated December 4, 1944, as taken from the files of the Institute of

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Pacific Relations are four officers listed, among whom is Ensign Andrew Roth.

I offer that for the record.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 294" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 294

DECEMBER 4, 1944.

Admiral F. J. HORNE,
Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ADMIRAL HORNE: This will acknowledge with thanks your letter of December 1, in which you assign the following officers as recorders at the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations: Lt. Robert J. Bradley, Lt. (jg) Hugh D. Farley, Lt. (jg) William E. Franklin, and Ensign Andrew Roth.

It is my understanding that if there is any change in these assignments, you will notify me.

Invitations and information about the conference will be sent to these officers by Miss Hilda Austern of the international secretariat.

Thank you again for your cooperation in this matter. I hope the results of the conference will be of value to your department.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember such correspondence?

Mr. DENNETT. I remember having correspondence with Admiral Horne.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough, Mr. Chairman.

However, do you remember the presence of Squadron Leader Fred W. Poland at the conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I do not, but I see his name here, so I assume he was.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the conference secretariat?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the international secretariat or the American secretariat?

Mr. DENNETT. It was a mixed bag. The conference secretariat was composed, as I have suggested, by a number of people. They were merely those who were doing the recording, the clerical work, and so on.

I was responsible for getting the military people, some of these people like Mr. Fairbanks, Knight Biggerstaff, and various others, who were people we would like to have had on the delegation, but there was not enough room for all of them.

Others were provided for by Mr. Carter, the international secretariat, or by the Canadian delegation, which was also asked to supply people.

Mr. MORRIS. They all seem to be Americans, but there are a few Canadians?

Mr. DENNETT. There were two Canadians, apparently; Squadron Leader Poland and Lieutenant Doull. Lieutenant Jan may have been an American.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I call attention to the fact that this is a conference secretariat list of a conference being held at Hot Springs in the United States in 1945.

I was wondering if this committee should take any testimony, or take an insert here about the political complexion of Squadron Leader Fred W. Poland. He does appear in our correspondence at other

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places, and should the fact that he is a Canadian exclude the introduction of these opinions in our record?

Senator JENNER. I do not think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read an excerpt from the Canadian Royal Commission of the political complexion of Fred Poland, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the report of the Canadian Royal Commission, dated June 27, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Canadian Royal Commission?

Mr. MANDEL. It was a body set up to investigate espionage activities in Canada. One of the persons involved was F. W. Poland.

I read excerpts referring to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the conclusion of the Royal Commission, or testimony taken by the Royal Commission?

Mr. MANDEL. The excerpts include testimony and sort of an introductory statement.

* * * In general, the military espionage network in Canada, headed by Colonel Zabotin, was a self-contained unit directed from Moscow. At times, however, the documents from Colonel Zabotin's secret archives refer specifically to espionage networks in other countries. Some of these documents relate to the "handing over" from one espionage network to another of agents who have moved or are about to move to Canada from another country or from Canada to another country (p. 31).

Now, on page 163, it says:

F. W. Poland was born in the United States on the 20th of June 1909, of English parentage. In the spring of 1942 he became an administrative intelligence officer in the RCAF, Ottawa. He held the rank of squadron leader. As from November 10, 1944, he was seconded to the Armed Forces Section of the Wartime Information Board, and from May 1945 he was executive secretary of the Interdepartmental Psychological Warfare Committee. * * *

Then further, on page 165, it says:

* * * In Zabotin's notebook where he gives the outline of the organization of the Ottawa-Toronto group more fully dealt with in section III–1. (Sam Carr) we find the following entry, probably written in the fall of 1943:

"Poland. Department of Air Force:

"Works in Toronto in the Intelligence Branch. At the moment he has been transferred to Ottawa. He gave a map of the training schools. Is not yet working."

Mr. MORRIS. Please continue with the rest.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is testimony in regard to Poland:

* * * We have only this evidence to indicate that Poland has given any information or documents to the U. S. S. R. He was, however, obviously well known to the Russians, and at a certain period it was thought that he would be more useful if transferred to the NKVD. Speaking of him, Gouzenko said:

"Question. Had you heard of Poland other than what you say in that document? Had you heard his name mentioned?

"Answer. That is right.

"Question. What did you hear about him?

"Answer. I saw it in a telegram which was sent by Zabotin to Moscow in 1943 concerning Poland and he suggested to give Poland to the NKVD.

"Question. Just explain, will you please, what you mean by giving Poland to the NKVD.

"Answer. Poland was described as a clever man and Colonel Zabotin proposed to Moscow in a telegram to hand him over to Neighbours, which is the NKVD. Neighbours is the nickname for the NKVD. Moscow replied that it was not worth while; to wait a while; that he might develop into a good worker. I still do not know his real name or nickname. That was the only other time I saw the name of Poland and still I do not know whether it was his real name or his nickname.

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"Question. Did you have any knowledge apart from exhibit No. 22 of what Poland was doing?

"Answer. The telegrams that were sent on this subject made no detailed mention of his activities."

This was probably in August 1943 when Poland had not yet been given a cover name, for in Zabotin's notes we see, in the margin, opposite the reference to Poland and to another: "New names not given." (p. 166.).

Heard as a witness, Boyer says of Poland:

"Question. How long have you known him?"

That is referring to Poland.

"Answer. Ever since he came to Montreal, which I think was in the summer of 1939—1938 or 1939, I am not sure.

"Question. And do you know anything about his political sympathies?

"Answer. Well, I know he is sympathetic to the old Communist Party and the present Labour-Progressive Party, or that he was when I last saw him, which is a few years ago now."

In Poland's notebook, which has an alphabetical index, we find the name of Corporal Lawson, W. T. This man has been identified as William Lawson who was formerly connected with the Communist Party of Canada in Toronto. In 1939 Lawson acted as a teacher in the Leadership School of the Young Communist League, and in the January 1, 1940, civic election in Toronto, was elected as the representative of ward 4 to the Toronto Board of Education. Later he publicly admitted that he was a Communist, and went into hiding for a certain period of time until he was eventually located and detained in 1942 under regulation 21 of the Defense of Canada Regulations.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that mean that Poland publicly admitted he was a Communist?

Mr. MANDEL. No, that is referring to William Lawson whose name was found in Poland's notebook.

In the same notebook we find the names of Nightingale and Agatha Chapman, the latter being one of the main organizers of Communist cells in Ottawa, from where were recruited many of Zabotin's most ardent agents.

Poland also had some correspondence with a man named Mark Frank. It has been established that this person was connected with a magazine named the New Advance, which was the organ of the Young Communist League. Other inquiries reveal that Frank had also received subscriptions for the Clarion, the official organ of the Communist Party in Canada.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced into the record purely to show the make-up of a conference being held in Hot Springs, Va., in the United States, Mr. Chairman?

Senator JENNER. It may go in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 295" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 295

F. W. POLAND

* * * In general, the military espionage network in Canada, headed by Colonel Zabotin, was a self-contained unit directed from Moscow. At times, however, the documents from Colonel Zabotin's secret archives refer specifically to espionage networks in other countries. Some of these documents relate to the "handing over" from one espionage network to another of agents who have moved or are about to move to Canada from another country or from Canada to another country (p. 31).

F. W. Poland was born in the United States on June 20, 1909, of English parentage. In the spring of 1942, he became an administrative intelligence officer in the RCAF, Ottawa. He held the rank of squadron leader. As from November 10, 1944, he was seconded to the Armed Forces Section of the Wartime Information Board, and from May 1945 he was executive secretary of the Interdepartmental Psychological Warfare Committee (p. 163).

* * * In Zabotin's notebook where he gives the outline of the organization of the Ottawa-Toronto group more fully dealt with in section III–I. (Sam Carr) we find the following entry, probably written in the fall of 1943:

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"3. Poland, Department of Air Force: Works in Toronto in the Intelligence Branch. At the moment he has been transferred to Ottawa. He gave a map of the training schools. Is not yet working" (p. 165).

* * * We have only this evidence to indicate that Poland has given any information or documents to the U. S. S. R. He was, however, obviously well known to the Russians, and at a certain period it was thought that he would be more useful if transferred to the NKVD. Speaking of him, Gouzenko said:

"Q. Had you heard of Poland other than what you saw in that document? Had you heard his name mentioned?—A. That is right.

"Q. What did you hear about him?—A. I saw it in a telegram which was sent by Zabotin to Moscow in 1943 concerning Poland and he suggested to give Poland to the NKVD.

"Q. Just explain, will you please, what you mean by giving Poland to the NKVD.—A. Poland was described as a clever man and Colonel Zabotin proposed to Moscow in a telegram to hand him over to Neighbours, which is the NKVD. Neighbours is the nickname for the NKVD. Moscow replied that it was not worth while; to wait a while; that he might develop into a good worker. I still do not know his real name or nickname. That was the only other time I saw the name of Poland and still I do not know whether it was his real name or his nickname.

"Q. Did you have any knowledge apart from exhibit No. 22 of what Poland was doing?—A. The telegrams that were sent on this subject made no detailed mention of his activities."

This was probably in August 1943 when Poland had not yet been given a cover name, for in Zabotin's notes we see, in the margin, opposite the reference to Poland and to another: "New names not given" (p. 166).

Heard as a witness, Boyer says of Poland:

"Q. How long have you known him?—A. Ever since he came to Montreal, which I think was in the summer of 1939—1938 or 1939, I am not sure.

"Q. And do you know anything about his political sympathies?—A. Well, I know he is sympathetic to the old Communist Party and the present Labour-Progressive Party, or that he was when I last saw him, which is a few years ago now."

In Poland's notebook, which has an alphabetical index, we find the name of Corporal Lawson, W. T. This man has been identified as William Lawson who was formerly connected with the Communist Party of Canada in Toronto. In 1939, Lawson acted as a teacher in the Leadership School of the Young Communist League, and in the January 1, 1940, civic election in Toronto, was elected as the representative of ward 4 to the Toronto Board of Education. Later, he publicly admitted that he was a Communist, and went into hiding for a certain period of time until he was eventually located and detained in 1942 under Regulation 21 of the Defense of Canada Regulations.

In the same notebook we find the names of Nightingale and Agatha Chapman, the latter being one of the main organizers of Communist cells in Ottawa from where were recruited many of Zabotin's most ardent agents.

Poland also had some correspondence with a man named Mark Frank. It has been established that this person was connected with a magazine named the New Advance, which was the organ of the Young Communist League. Other inquiries reveal that Frank had also received subscriptions for the Clarion, the official organ of the Communist Party in Canada.

In Poland's office, room 309 of the New Post Office Building, a calendar pad was also found. The name of Pavlov, who is the head of the NKVD in Ottawa, appears on pages dated the 30th of October 1945; the 1st of November 1945; the 4th of November 1945; the 5th of November 1945 (plus a telephone number which is 5–4341); the 15th of November 1945; the 19th of November 1945; the 23d of November 1945; the 26th of November 1945; the 17th of December 1945; the 28th of December 1945; and the 5th of January 1946. The telephone number 5–4341 is that of the Soviet Embassy, 285 Charlotte Street, Ottawa (pp. 167–8) (the report of the Royal Commission, June 27, 1946).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here about four or five more exhibits. They are not particularly important. If you have to hurry, we can let them go.

Senator JENNER. Please proceed.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, I offer you a copy of a letter which purports to be a communication from Mr. Carter to you and ask you if you can recall that letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't recall the letter, but as I testified earlier, I was continually getting memoranda from Mr. Carter.

I assume this is one of many.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you certify the authenticity of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 29, 1944, headed "R. D. from E. C. C.," presumably Raymond Dennett from E. C. Carter.

It reads as follows:

When Michael Greenberg was in the other day he asked whether Irving Friedman, who has just returned from Chungking for the United States Treasury, was going to Hot Springs. I told him that I didn't know for sure, but would refer the matter to you.

From all accounts Friedman had a very successful experience in China and India. He is Harry White's right-hand man on the Far East in the Treasury. You will remember the exceptionally good book he did for the IPR in the Inquiry series when he was a member of the international secretariat.

I remember that Amco originally hoped to persuade Harry White to join the American group. I also know that your list is already over full and that this suggestion comes to you late in the day. I therefore do not anticipate that you will be able to act affirmatively in this matter; if so I know it will cause you and your colleagues great regret.

I sympathize with you in your difficult situation. I am in the same plight myself in that I am having to similarly turn down many applications, some of them from people who would be a real asset. Most of these people don't realize the limits that have to be put on the conference in order to get real discussion instead of the conference being a general town meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the letter introduced in evidence.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 296" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. I show you a letter from Mr. Carter to you, dated October 19, 1945, and ask you if you can identify that?

Mr. DENNETT. That is in the same category as the others. I have no doubt I received it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you authenticate that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It appears to be an interoffice memorandum and is dated October 19, 1945, headed "R. D. from E. C. C."

It reads as follows:

I don't know whether you ever knew Duncan Lee. He was, I think, at one time a Rhodes scholar; then he went into OSS and has ended up a colonel. He is likely to return to Gen. "Big Bill" Donovan's law firm in Wall Street and certainly would be a useful member of Amco and might conceivably be a useful member of the Amco board and executive committee. He has a very deep interest in the Far East and has been there a good deal for OSS.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lee has been identified before this committee as being a Communist. I would like that introduced in the record.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(Document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 297" and filed for the record.)

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Mr. MORRIS. I show you what purports to be a letter from yourself to Rose Yardumian, dated March 5, 1945, and ask you if you can identify that letter?

Mr. DENNETT. I can.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you authenticate that letter, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 5, 1945, addressed to Miss Rose Yardumian, from Raymond Dennett. It reads as follows:

Please make an appointment for me to see Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, 2300 Decatur Place NW, Washington, D. C. I have dropped him a note about wanting to see him and enclosed a letter of introduction from Huntington Gilchrist.

I should imagine that the best thing would be to try and get me an afternoon appointment at his home. I probably would want to spend pretty nearly an hour with him; so, you can plan things accordingly.

See you Monday. With cordial best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that letter introduced, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(Document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 298" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a paper that will show that Mr. Ludwik Rajchman is presently a delegate of the Polish Communist Government to the United Nations?

Mr. MANDEL. Permit me to recall a letter previously introduced in evidence from the Department of State from H. J. L'Heureux, Chief of the Visa Division, to Senator Pat McCarran.

I read the last sentence in reference to Ludwik Rajchman:

The bearer of the passport was described as Polish Government delegate to and chairman of the Children's Emergency Fund of the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. That has been introduced already, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DENNETT. May I for the record say, as I recall, I was talking to Dr. Rajchman about League of Nations activities and public health in southeast Asia, so there will be no inference as to what I was doing with him on the basis of the record that has been made so far.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a fitting observation on the part of Mr. Dennett.

Mr. DENNETT. I want to be clear on that.

Mr. MORRIS. On the basis of your experience as secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whom would you describe as the leading forces in shaping policy for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DENNETT. You are talking now about the American council?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. DENNETT. Rather than the Pacific council?

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to ask you about both. Please give the over-all impression.

Mr. DENNETT. The major policy formulation in the American council, my impression was prior to my time the staff had a great deal more to do with policy than they should have.

So, I would say from the point of view of the board of directors the most interested people in the American council were Owen Lattimore and Dr. Jessup, with Mr. Huggins and probably Mr. Seymour as the No. 2 people.

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Mr. MORRIS. Did the influence of Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Jessup even show during those periods when the staff did have a dominant influence in the affairs of the institute?

Mr. DENNETT. I don't think I would go quite that far, because Lattimore was engaged in Government work in the OWI and was seldom around on the council's activities.

Jessup I saw for a portion of the time he was there. I made him chairman of our research advisory committee, but he was not on the executive committee while he was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jessup, as far as you know, was an influence in the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of many years?

Mr. DENNETT. That certainly was my impression.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mrs. Ellen Atkinson attended the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. DENNETT. I think she did, but I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Again, was that arrangement made through the War Department?

Mr. DENNETT. Presumably it was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have a letter here. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate it?

Mr. MANDEL. There are two letters here from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one dated December 24, 1944, from the War Department addressed to Mr. Raymond Dennett, coming from Clayton Bissell, major general. It reads:

Reference is made to your letter of December 12, 1944, in which you suggest that Mrs. Ellen Atkinson might be detailed to attend the discussions of the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to be held in Hot Springs from January 5 to January 19, 1945, because of her experience in the Far East.

Thank you for the suggestion. It is believed, however, that it is preferable to adhere to the original arrangement. I am sure you will be pleased with the four officers whose names were included on the original list.

Then the next letter is dated December 27, 1944, to General Bissell from Raymond Dennett, reading as follows:

Many thanks for your letter of December 24, stating that Mrs. Atkinson will not be assigned to the conference.

I had no intention whatsoever of requesting her assignment but merely wished to draw her to your attention in case you were disposed to assigning her.

I am sure the four officers you have assigned will prove most helpful to us.

With sincerest best wishes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those introduced in the record.

Senator JENNER. They may go in.

(The documents referred to and read by Mr. Mandel were marked "Exhibits Nos. 299 and 300" and filed for the record.)

Mr. DENNETT. Does that say she was or was not assigned, because I think I said she attended.

Senator JENNER. Was not.

Mr. DENNETT. Then my guess that she was there should be removed, because I was not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the mention of Squadron Leader Fred Poland, and I think the record should show that on March 23, 1946, he had a habeas corpus proceeding filed for him, and on January 17, 1947, he was acquitted of charges of espionage in the County

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Court of Ottawa on January 17; so, I would like the record to show that.

Senator JENNER. It may so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Dennett, was Gunther Stein, about whom we have had testimony in the past, present as a member of the United States delegation to the Hot Springs convention?

Mr. DENNETT. That is correct.

Senator JENNER. We will close at this time until 10 a. m., Friday morning.

(Whereupon at 2:15 p. m., Wednesday, September 26, 1951, the hearings were recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, September 28, 1951.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. James Eastland presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I do so state.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Mr. MORRIS. Before we commence the testimony, there is a letter from Prof. Rupert Emerson, of Harvard University, which I would like to read into the record. Mr. Mandel, will you read the letter or put it in the record?

Senator EASTLAND. It will be inserted in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 301" and is as follows:)

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT,
Cambridge, Mass., September 26, 1951.

Senator PATRICK MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Internal Security Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: It is reported in the New York Times today that Prof. K. W. Colegrove testified before your committee yesterday that at a State Department round table conference in October 1949 I fell into a group which he labels as pro-Communist. I believe that a glance at the record will demonstrate that I was not invited to this conference and did not participate in it. I refer you to page 280 of the Tydings report on the State Department employee loyalty investigation of July 20, 1950, which gives a list of those present at this conference. I find it dismaying that the procedures of your committee allow the publication of misinformation which is easily verifiable.

I was, however, for a brief time, a consultant to the State Department on far eastern matters. In that capacity, as in my teaching, speaking, and writing, I

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freely expressed my views which were arrived at on the basis of independent study and conviction. The free expression of such views appears to me to be the right, and the obligation, of an American citizen. I have no doubt that from time to time these views were in disagreement with those of Professor Colegrove, and even with the official policy of the United States, but I am profoundly shocked that such disagreement can give rise to the loose and dangerous charge of procommunism.

For the sake of the record I should like to add I have never had any connection of any kind with the Communist Party nor, to the best of my knowledge, any association with Communist groups.

Since I have no other knowledge of what Professor Colegrove said than the Times report, I would appreciate it if you would have a transcript of the proceedings in which my name was mentioned sent to me.

Sincerely yours,

RUPERT EMERSON.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator McCarran's reply to Professor Emerson is also introduced in evidence.

Senator EASTLAND. That will be ordered.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 302" and is as follows:)

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
September 28, 1951.

MR. RUPERT EMERSON,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR MR. EMERSON: I have your letter of September 26, 1951, in which you protest being mentioned by Professor Colegrove as being a member of a pro-Communist group that attended the State Department round-table conference in October 1949.

I write this to say that Professor Colegrove did not mention your name in his testimony, and, in fact, the list of people who attended the conference and which was inserted in our public record did not contain your name.

However, I will be glad to enter your letter and this answer into the record.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us your name, please?

Mr. MCGOVERN. William Montgomery McGovern.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present address?

Mr. MCGOVERN. My private address is 1412 Judson Avenue, Evanston, Ill. My business address is care of Northwestern University.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am professor of political science at Northwestern University.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I have been at Northwestern since 1929, first of all as an associate professor and later, since 1936, as professor.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your education? Will you give us a brief sketch of it?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I would say a good deal is through travel. I was born in New York City of an American mother and father, but I spent a good deal of my boyhood in the Far East, in China, Japan, and the Philippines, attending various schools.

Later I completed my education in England, France, and in Germany at Oxford, the Sorbonne at Paris, and the University of Berlin in Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. What degrees do you hold?

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Mr. McGOVERN. Ph. D.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you obtain it?

Mr. McGOVERN. Oxford.

Mr. MORRIS. How many books have you written?

Mr. McGOVERN. I have written all together 10 books.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you sketch those notable ones dealing with the Far East?

Mr. McGOVERN. As a matter of fact, the first book I wrote was a book called Modern Japan: Its Political, Military, and Industrial Organization. I wrote a Japanese grammar called Colloquial Japanese.

I wrote a book called Early Empires of Central Asia. It took me about 7 years to write that, based on the Chinese and other sources dealing with the history of central Asia.

I also wrote a report for the congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs dealing with the political, military, and economic situation in Japan, China, and Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, when did you first have occasion to study the political forces that were at work in the Orient?

Mr. McGOVERN. As far as that is concerned, when I was a young boy and young man in Japan and China I began studying them at first hand, talking to various Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Philippine people. So I kept my interest in them ever since.

For a while, I was in London at the University of London teaching Chinese and Japanese at the School of Oriental Studies. So naturally I had to keep up my contacts there.

Ever since I have been back in the United States at Northwestern University I have been professor of political science with a special reference to international relations, and I have had to try to keep in touch with developments both in the Near East and the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first become aware of the existence of the Chinese Communist movement in China?

Mr. McGOVERN. Of course, I read about it in a general sort of way in the very confused period of Chinese influence in 1920, read about the early rise of the Communist movement there, but I began taking more serious and intensive interest in the Chinese Communist movement around 1935 and 1936.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you think then they were agrarian reformers and not Communists?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. That they were not connected with Moscow?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir. I went into it with an open mind. In the 1920's I had an open mind. In 1935–36 I began reading what the Communists were doing and saying in their published records. I became convinced they were really Communists. I am always willing to keep an open mind as long as possible.

I kept an open mind until 1937–38 when I was in the Far East studying the situation on the ground. By 1937–38 I was convinced they were Communists. And that they were in close cahoots with the Kremlin.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you think they were getting supplies and materials from Moscow?

Mr. McGOVERN. The amount was astonishingly small. The thing that interested me was how close they followed the party line.

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Senator EASTLAND. Did they get any help from Moscow?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I was never able to put my finger on any actual munitions that came from the Communists. In 1937 I was especially interested in that, and I was unable to see they were getting actual supplies, although in 1937 they were still following the party line. Why, it is mystery.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read the Communist basic literature on the relation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist International?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes; I have read it, both in Chinese and in various English translations. It so happens, having grown up in the Far East, I read Chinese and Japanese quite well, and I was not content with the English translation of it. I have studied very basic documents, books, and articles by Mao Tse-tung.

I have also read the various articles and addresses and speeches made by Chou En Lai, who to my mind is the most authoritative spokesman of the Communist group.

Senator FERGUSON. Your opinion is he is an international Communist and follows the Moscow line?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir; I am convinced of that. There was no sudden conversion. He has been a complete Marxist. He is a Marxist Communist, but not only a Marxist Communist but a Stalinist Communist as well.

Mr. MORRIS. Are these basic underlying doctrines that show the Chinese Communists as compared to the Communist International available to all scholars?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Certainly anyone who reads Chinese should have no difficulty. Some of the translations of Mao Tse-tung of China's New Democracy are not very good translations. You might be in doubt if you read the English translation. If you read the Chinese you would have no doubt. If you read it carefully even the bad English translation seems to be clear and obvious.

Senator FERGUSON. Who translated that into English?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I have forgotten. The best available translation is published in a publication brought out by the congressional House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wondering whether or not you saw any evidence in that translation that it was done poorly to conceal the real tie?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Even with the poor translation I think it is very clear. After reading that English translation, I went back to the Chinese original. To my mind the Chinese original was more definite and clear.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first meet Owen Lattimore?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I first met Owen Lattimore for a few moments in 1928 or 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time were you able to arrive at any substantial conclusion as to his political beliefs?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir; in 1928–29 it was purely a social occasion. He was going to central Asia, Outer Mongolia, so we talked about travel and travel conditions. I saw him much more in the winter of 1937–38 when I found him spending the winter in Peking, as was I. I was on leave of absence from Northwestern University, and I

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found he was out there spending his winter there. I saw quite a good deal of him during that period.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. 1937–38.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever discuss with you during that period the political complexion of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. During the period 1937–38 in various luncheon parties and dinner parties at which we were guests he was frequent in showing his warm admiration for the Chinese Communists—that they were the future for China and that they represented the real people.

On several occasions he indicated they were not Communists, and that is where we had violent differences of opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him your views they were?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. I always like to keep an open mind. At that time my mind was getting more and more convinced they were Communists. I asked him for evidence to show they were not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him the evidence they were?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I told him about the articles and essays of Mao Tse-tung and the other Communist leaders. I was certainly of the opinion that he could read Chinese and was going to read them.

Mr. MORRIS. On approximately how many occasions did you have these discussions with Owen Lattimore during the period late 1937 and early 1938?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Without having my diary before me, I cannot answer exactly, but I would say certainly more than 10 times and less than 15; 10 to 15 times.

Mr. MORRIS. There was a uniformity of consistency to his views?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever change those views?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I was somewhat surprised, considering his general attitude and frequent remarks in 1937–38. I again saw him after an absence of some years in the winter of 1941–42. After December 15 when I was called to active duty here in Washington and before March and April, that is, I saw him five or six times here in Washington then. I was very much surprised when he was at that time rather enthusiastic about Chiang Kai-shek. He was expressing great admiration for him as a great leader and a great leader of a democratic movement, and considering the conversations I had heard in 1937–38, I was somewhat surprised at that change of attitude.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony now that after you heard Professor Lattimore express the views at great length in 1937–38 that he did, which views were consistent with the Chinese Communists' aims, you then heard him in 1941 praise Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you call that to his attention?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir. This was wartime. I thought he and I were both working for the Government. I did not think it was necessary to bring it up. I thought he changed his mind. I am now convinced it was more part of the general technique of the fellow-travelers to have a united front during that particular time.

You find in reading the writings of the Mao Tse-tung himself that was so during that period.

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Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us why you think that was true?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Merely because of the fact that from time to time various Communist and pro-Communist leaders and popular front leaders have changed their line of approach to fit the world situation both in Europe and in Asia and inside the United States of America, as far as that is concerned.

Mr. Browder at one time would say one thing, and a few weeks later say the opposite thing, according to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that the Communist Party line with respect to Chiang Kai-shek changed in 1941?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Communist line definitely changed, as you can see in the writings both of Moscow and in the speeches of Mao Tse-tung.

Senator EASTLAND. You say you can tell from readings a man's work what kind of a Communist he is?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Would you repeat that?

Senator EASTLAND. You say from reading what a person writes you can tell what kind of a Communist he is?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Not invariably. There are some people who hew exactly to the party line. In other words, if you read the New York Daily Worker, you can tell what A, B, and C are going to say the next day.

Senator EASTLAND. You could tell whether one was a Trotskyite or a Stalinist?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Those who follow the full-fledged Communists are those who essentially are Stalinists, and those you can tell.

Senator EASTLAND. You have always read what Owen Lattimore wrote?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I will not say I have read every word he has written, but I have read several of his books.

Senator EASTLAND. What kind of a Communist did you think he was?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I have no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Lattimore——

Senator EASTLAND. I know you have not seen his card. You have not been to a party meeting, but then what is your judgment now from reading his works?

Mr. MCGOVERN. From reading him and hearing him talk, that he is a popular front man, either using or being used by the Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Is he a Stalinist?

Mr. MCGOVERN. He is not a Trotskyite. He is definitely following the Stalinist line.

Senator EASTLAND. He has always followed the Stalinist line?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to show you a letter which is an exhibit and have you read two paragraphs. The original of this was written by Owen Lattimore to E. C. Carter. I have marked the paragraphs I would like to have you read.

Senator EASTLAND. Read them aloud.

Mr. MCGOVERN (reading):

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring

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position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. For Japan, on the other hand, hang back so as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals, who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on a check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression in Japan. For the British—scare the hell out of them, always in a polite way, but usually in a way that looks as if it might turn impolite. The British liberal groups are badly flustered, and being British, the way to encourage them to pull themselves together is to fluster the Tories. For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of "subservience."

Senator FERGUSON. That was written by Owen Lattimore to E. C. Carter, who was then the secretary of the IPR. Could you comment on that as to what that means?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am not at all surprised. I did see this letter, but not until fairly recently when it came out in testimony. I am not surprised because I read Pacific Affairs rather closely and followed his editorials. That, I may say by way of comment, was the reason why I refused to join the IPR.

For many years past I have been teaching Chinese and Japanese affairs. Everyone wondered why I did not join. After having read several copies of Pacific Affairs, I felt they were taking a line which I could not sponsor, directly or indirectly, and my membership might seem I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that would be advocating the Stalinist party line?

Mr. MCGOVERN. There is very clear evidence that he was trying to advocate the Stalinist approach.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the normal way that these people act in concealing the fact that they are actually following that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. That is very true.

Senator FERGUSON. Deceive the public?

Mr. MCGOVERN. That has been true from the time of Karl Marx himself. If you remember The Life and Times of Karl Marx, in 1848–49, when he was the editor of the Rheinisch Zeitung in Cologne it had an open policy of liberal, and his secret policy of communism, and he was keeping the two. From time to time he would throw in a few suggestions in his newspaper and letters showing what his position was to fool people by false play, by pretending to be one and using camouflage.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a historic line of the Communists?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not change your mind about the fact that Owen Lattimore was favorable to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir, I did not, in 1941–42. I was somewhat surprised, raised my eyebrows once or twice, but I began to look at what was the attitude of the Chinese Communists. When I found they favored the popular front and ceasing their attacks, I was not too surprised.

Senator FERGUSON. That did not lead you to the conclusion he had changed his mind on the Communists in China?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I was open-minded again on the subject. When I

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first heard him I thought he changed his mind. When I heard the comments by Mao Tse-tung I realized there was no such change as I had imagined.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to put into the record two statements by Owen Lattimore. One is an excerpt from the publication America and Asia, by Owen Lattimore, published in 1943.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the next one?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like this one paragraph read by Mr. Mandel, please.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

One of the oldest historical controversies turns on the question of whether great men create the events of their time, or are created by them. The career of Chiang Kai-shek shows that the problem cannot be limited to such narrow terms. The truth is that great men and great events interact on each other in a subtle and close way that results in creating history. This is true of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin as it is of Chiang Kai-shek. What may be called the functional test of the historical importance of Chiang Kai-shek is the fact that, throughout an already long political career, he has grown steadily greater and greater. The greater the crises through which he has led his people, the greater he has become as a symbol. The greater the decisions he has made, the greater the decisions he is able to make. In this he is a part of the contemporary history of all Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that made part of the record together with this article from the San Francisco Chronicle dated July 6, 1941.

Mr. MANDEL. This is an article from the San Francisco Chronicle dated July 8, 1941. I read the first and last paragraphs:

Owen Lattimore, newly appointed political adviser to Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, said farewell to the United States last night in a speech that rang with faith and confidence in the China he is to serve.

Lattimore spoke before members of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the fourth anniversary of the opening of the Chinese-Japanese War. He leaves this afternoon by clipper for Chunking, President Roosevelt's nominee for the post as adviser to the Chinese leader.

The last paragraph reads:

Concluding, Lattimore praised the man he is to serve as a symbol of the growth of new China. "Among the handful of great world leaders, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is conspicuous for the fact that he is not only a great leader, but a leader who has steadily grown in strength and stature in the last 4 years, a growth commensurate with that of the country itself."

Senator EASTLAND. That is received in evidence.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 303" and is as follows:)

[San Francisco Chronicle, Tuesday, July 8, 1941]

ADVISER TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

CHINESE CANNOT LOSE, DECLARES OWEN LATTIMORE

Owen Lattimore, newly appointed political adviser to Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, said farewell to the United States last night in a speech that rang with faith and confidence in the China he is to serve.

Lattimore spoke before members of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the fourth anniversary of the opening of the Chinese-Japanese war. He leaves this afternoon by clipper for Chungking, President Roosevelt's nominee for the post as adviser to the Chinese leader.

Cannot be beaten

"It has become one of the standards of our belief," he said, "that China cannot and will not be beaten. Where 4 years ago we regarded China as only a

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secondary power, today she is one of the major defenses against international chaos. Russia and China, linked geographically, are the land powers holding back the Axis forces as Britain and the United States are doing as sea powers.

"China does not have institutional democracy, but this difference from the western democracies is to China's advantage. We have been defending an established democracy. The Chinese have been pouring out their lives to defend a democracy they do not have, but are determined to win.

Creating a new order

"What is essential in a democracy is the creative spirit of change, growth, and development. The Chinese have more of that in their struggle than we. While the Japanese are talking on paper of their "new order," the Chinese, with the help of the United States are creating a real new order in Asia.

Concluding, Lattimore praised the man he is to serve as a symbol of the growth of new China. "Among the handful of great world leaders, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is conspicuous for the fact that he is not only a great leader but a leader who has steadily grown in strength and stature in the last 4 years, a growth commensurate with that of the country itself."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the one sentence on page 45, Mr. Mandel, of America and Asia?

Mr. MANDEL. On page 45 we find the following in the book, America and Asia:

Many people talk of the danger of civil war in China at the end of this war, but I think that the danger of civil war in China is probably less than the danger of civil war in many countries in Europe. One reason is that we have in Asia a world statesman, of real genius, in Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you see Owen Lattimore after 1940?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Late in the 1944 or early 1945 period. At that time there was a committee, an informal committee which met at the State Department and served as an advisory committee to the policy making of the OWI. You had various members from the State Department, various people from OSS, various people from OWI.

I was an unofficial liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff representing the military.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position at that time?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Merely to listen to what they were saying and to report to my chiefs on one side. The other thing was to give my personal advice as to the line of propaganda that would be best pursued in dealing with broadcasts to China and Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a naval officer?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. With the Joint Intelligence Committee?

Mr. MCGOVERN. At that particular time I was a member of the Joint Intelligence Staff but assigned to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

Mr. MORRIS. As such you would attend these advisory committees that would give advice on what particular policy should be adopted toward various things in the Far East?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity did Owen Lattimore attend those meetings?

Mr. MCGOVERN. He attended as an official of OWI.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever express views toward Chiang Kai-shek at that time?

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Mr. McGOVERN. At that particular time most of the discussions were naturally how we can best approach the Japanese, how we can lower Japanese resistance. So we were talking about more means of defeating Japan than the future policy of China.

In those meetings he was very definitely thinking we should throw in our propaganda lot. We should play up to the Chinese Communists and through the Chinese Communists play upon the so-called liberal elements in Japan.

In other words, at that particular moment they already had the notion that the best way to overthrow Japan was to utilize the Chinese Communists and propaganda in the approach to Japan. Already at that particular moment some sharp differences of opinion came up as to the treatment of Japan and the Japanese Emperor. Those came out of the various meetings informally. No minutes were held, and I have no minutes to show what was done. A number of people were present—Mr. Dooman was present and can confirm what was said.

In these discussions it was very clear that Mr. Lattimore was very much in favor of overthrowing the Japanese Emperor and trying the Emperor as a war criminal. It was agreed it was not to be put in the official record as a part of the official propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the Emperor?

Mr. McGOVERN. They had a different policy. I gave them advice that I thought the best way to bring about the surrender of Japan would be not to dispose of the Emperor. If we attempted to attack him and are going to use him as a war criminal, the Japanese resistance would have gone on indefinitely, and we might have lost another million lives.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the official policy with respect to the Emperor, Professor?

Mr. McGOVERN. Actually there was no official policy. There was talk here and there. I would run up to the State Department once or twice a week trying to find out what the policy was. The policy was not decided until 1945 actually.

At one time the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to listen to the State Department on the matter, though they themselves felt, I know, individually and collectively that it would be unwise to depose the Emperor or announce that they were going to depose him.

The Joint Chiefs were not trying to run the political or diplomatic portion of the country. Therefore, they would listen to the State Department. They were firmly of the conviction, which I shared and wrote two or three papers on, that to get the surrender of Japan it would be much better to leave the Emperor out of it.

Mr. MORRIS. You did hear Lattimore express himself to the extent the Emperor should be eliminated?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir. I was somewhat shocked and horrified, not only as to his views with regard to the Emperor, but he wanted to have not only a strict and stern policy, but a bloody peace in Japan. If I may paraphrase his ideas, he wanted to impose a Morgenthau plan on Japan. He did not use that term, but he wanted to completely reduce Japan to beggary and impotence. He was bitter in his attacks upon Japan. He would reduce Japan and wipe out the bloody deeds they had done.

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As far as that is concerned, the whole policy of this was to purge all the Japanese officials, to reduce Japan back to an agricultural country and destroy all Japanese industry.

Senator EASTLAND. Japan cannot raise enough food, can they?

Mr. MCGOVERN. It was ridiculous as far as that was concerned, and Japan now has a population of 83,000,000. Then it was about 73,000,000. Japan in the best of times cannot live on her own food supply. She must import at least 25 percent of the food supply. Therefore, unless she can export something, she cannot pay for her own food.

The one way to bring on communism certainly in Japan was to have the Japanese starve and to deprive them of their industry.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who the real author of the Morgenthau plan for Germany was?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I have been told it was Mr. White. I do not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. How long ago were you told that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. That was rumored around back in 1944–45, and at that particular time the Morgenthau plan came before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Most of the Joint Chiefs were very vigorously opposed to it. They were not trying to interfere with the diplomatic decisions. I was told Mr. Roosevelt was influenced by Mr. Morgenthau, who was influenced by Mr. Dexter White. I have no official knowledge of that, however.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with Professor McGovern's testimony about Owen Lattimore's views toward postwar Japan, I would like to refer to exhibit No. 139, introduced at our open hearings. That is an extract from the Daily Worker of September 5, 1945, reporting on a press conference given by Owen Lattimore. It bears the title "Allies Must Break Japanese Monopolist Grip," says Lattimore. It is Wednesday, September 5, 1945.

Mr. Mandel, will you read a few appropriate portions from that, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

> Owen Lattimore, former adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, said today that the Allies must free Japan of the Zaibatsu's grip before democracy can develop there. He declared that the Zaibatsu—or industrialists—merged completely with the militarists in controlling Japan for aggression and that the primary control always was civilian.
>
> "Together," he said, "they are like a small octopus with huge tentacles which holds everything in its power. Their tool and front was the Emperor, owner of vast shares and estates, and he still is—although now they are loudly disclaiming the militarists * * *."

Mr. MORRIS. That has already been introduced in the record, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make reference to it again.

Mr. Chairman, I have here a publication called the Spotlight on the Far East, which is published by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which has been identified by the Attorney General as a Communist-front organization. This contains an article by Mr. T. A. Bisson, who himself has been identified as a Communist before this committee.

I would like Mr. Mandel to read a few pertinent extracts from that in connection with Professor McGovern's testimony.

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the issue of Spotlight on the Far East, of February 1948, published by the Committee for a Democratic

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Far Eastern Policy. This organization has been cited as a Communist front by the Attorney General.

Here is an article by T. A. Bisson. I will read some excerpts:

Keynoting the conference session on Japan, T. A. Bisson, writer and analyst, who recently returned from Japan where he was special adviser to the Government Section of General MacArthur's Headquarters, told how dominance by the empire-minded Zaibatsu (big business families) continues under MacArthur, in spite of nominal democratic reforms effected by the American occupation. It is true, Mr. Bisson pointed out, opposition parties can now exist, and that labor unions can now function and expand. But "two fundamental weaknesses of occupation policy are leading inevitably to what history will record as failure of the total operation."

* * * * * * *

The second major failure of the occupation, the economic one, has had equally great significance. It was, Bisson said, " * * * a direct outgrowth of the old guard's virtual monopoly of the Diet, the Cabinet, and the bureaucracy during the occupation's first 21 months."

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough, Mr. Chairman.

Will the entire article be introduced in the record?

Senator EASTLAND. It is ordered in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 304" and is as follows:)

OCCUPATION FAILS TO DEMOCRATIZE JAPAN, MACARTHUR'S ADVISER SAYS

Keynoting the conference session on Japan, T. A. Bisson, writer and analyst who recently returned from Japan where he was special adviser to the Government Section of General MacArthur's Headquarters, told how dominance by the empire-minded Zaibatsu (big business families) continues under MacArthur, in spite of nominal democratic reforms effected by the American occupation. It is true, Mr. Bisson pointed out, that opposition parties can now exist, and that labor unions can now function and expand. But "two fundamental weaknesses of occupation policy are leading inevitably to what history will record as failure of the total operation."

Mr. Bisson described first of these weaknesses as political and said it was clearly exposed by Japan's two post-war elections. The first or "trial run" election, Mr. Bisson said, "returned members of the Diet's (parliament) lower house, the house of representatives. What was the outcome? Representatives of the old regime, marshaled chiefly under the banners of the so-called Liberal and Progressive Parties, won three-fourths of the seats. It was the Yoshida Cabinet, formed as the result of the election which made inevitable the disastrous inflation of today."

Before the next election, the old guard found that new machinery would be necessary if it was to retain its power. A gerrymandering election law was the result, which Bisson called the clear responsibility of the MacArthur administration.

"It would have been easy," Bisson said, "for MacArthur to refuse to give Yoshida permission to introduce this bill. He could have rejected it as a tricky old guard maneuver concocted at the last minute."

But instead he gave his permission. In the election of April 1947, Japan again remained in the grip of its former rulers, though a plurality was returned by the Social Democratic Party.

"This," said Bisson, "was the outstanding example, although there were also others, of direct intervention by the occupation authorities to influence the election results."

The second major failure of the occupation, the economic one, has had equally great significance. It was, Bisson said, "* * * a direct outgrowth of the old guard's virtual monopoly of the Diet, the Cabinet, and the bureaucracy during the occupation's first 21 months."

When the Japanese labor movement sought in February 1947, to protest inflation by political action, it was prevented by direct orders from General MacArthur. This was one of the clearest cases of direct American support for the economic and political program of the old guard.

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UNITED STATES PEOPLE GAIN LITTLE

The American people, on the other hand, have gained little from the occupation.

Bisson said, "If we could say that we have put the Japanese people in control of their Government and that it was now being run in their best interests, that this new democratic Japan will be a bulwark of peace and stability in the postwar Far East, that the United States has thus made a constructive contribution to the welfare and security of the American people; then I think we would say that the investment has been worth while.

"I do not believe we can say these things. As matters stand now, there is every chance that representatives of the old regime will maintain control of the Government of Japan; that this Government will run, not in the best interests of the Japanese people as a whole, but in the selfish interests of the old vested clique of bureaucrats, business tycoons, and party leaders." Those leaders made the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor McGovern, will you comment on that last article introduced in the record?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

May I again point out that the fact that people are in agreement with Communists does not necessarily prove they are Communists, but I have heard Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Bisson hold discussions on that thing, and I was very much surprised how again and again their views did coincide with Communist views. Those are the well-known Communist views.

If I may call your attention to the report which I made to the congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, the position of the Emperor with Zaibatsu and reparations, in which I felt that the whole economy of Japan would go to ruin if they tried to have too abrupt a change—I am all in favor of equalizing the wealth—but too abrupt a change, the abolition of Zaibatsu overnight would wreck the Japanese industry and it is up to the American taxpayer to see that Japan is not wrecked, otherwise we will have to support Japan.

Senator EASTLAND. Not only that, but if the economy of Japan and Germany is wrecked, what would happen to our own economy? We have to have markets.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

I would like to make it plain I am not pro-Japanese or pro-German, but simply as a student of international politics I know you cannot have a prosperous America if the rest of the world is wrecked.

I thought it was important to restore some level of prosperity within Germany and Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard Owen Lattimore express himself on whether or not the institution of the Emperor should be abolished in Japan?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes; on several occasions, he was very much opposed to the Emperor. He wanted him treated as a war criminal.

Senator EASTLAND. He wanted him murdered?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever hear him advocate the murder of the Emperor's family?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir, I did not. All I can say is that he said they should be treated as among the worst of the war criminals.

Senator EASTLAND. His family?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The whole imperial family.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that is all you heard him say?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

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Senator EASTLAND. That is, the imperial family?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. That would mean his wife and children?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I suppose so. I did not ask him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear him advocate taking him and turning him over to the Chinese?

Mr. MCGOVERN. That was said on one occasion, not to me but someone else, in my hearing. He thought the best way to dispose of him was to turn him over to the Chinese who would know how to deal with him. But that was a side remark that I happened to overhear.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore has set forth his views on the Emperor in his book Solution in Asia. I understand we do not have those expression in our records.

At this time, I would like to have a few of them inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. These are views taken from Owen Lattimore's book, Solution in Asia:

Page 29:

* * * Sacred Cow No. 1, and in fact the cow to end all cows, is the Japanese Emperor. * * *

Page 30:

The orthodox "expert" approach to the position of the Emperor in Japan is all too often weakened by accepting the premise that in Japan the Emperor is officially holy. * * *

Page 34:

* * * Under this rigid structure of power the Emperor remained ritualistically the source which conferred a sanction on the real power held by the shogun. In spite of this venerability, however, neither the common people nor the nobles who enjoyed real power worked very hard at venerating him. The prevailing attitude toward the Emperor was a good deal like that of the many Christians who believe that of course God exists and religion is a good thing, but rarely go to church. * * *

Page 40:

* * * The Emperor was brought into the team by the investment of "imperial household" funds in the new enterprises. In this way the Emperor remained the ideological pillar of the feudal system and became at the same time a main pillar of vested interest in the new, capitalistic structure. * * *

Senator EASTLAND. That will be admitted into evidence.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 305," and is as follows:)

EMPEROR

(Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1945)

"* * * Sacred Cow No. 1, and in fact the cow to end all cows, is the Japanese Emperor * * *" (p. 29).

"* * * The orthodox 'expert' approach to the position of the Emperor in Japan is all too often weakened by accepting the premise that in Japan the Emperor is officially holy * * *" (p. 30).

"* * * Under this rigid structure of power the Emperor remained ritualistically the source which conferred a sanction on the real power held by the shogun. In spite of this venerability, however, neither the common people nor the nobles who enjoy real power worked very hard at venerating him. The prevailing attitude toward the Emperor was a good deal like that of the many Christians who believe that of course God exists and religion is a good thing, but rarely go to church * * *" (p. 34).

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"* * * The Emperor was brought into the team by the investment of 'imperial household' funds in the new enterprises. In this way the Emperor remained the ideological pillar of the feudal system and became at the same time a main pillar of vested interest in the new, capitalistic structure * * *" (p. 40).

"* * * The militarists have forced crises abroad partly in order to seize and keep control at home; and since, in these crises, they have always professed to be defending the interests of the Emperor, the Emperor is now identified as the resort of final appeal against any democratic trend. The democratic potential is still there, but if it is ever to emerge we must first, in the words of Sun Fo, 'puncture the myth of the divinity of the Mikado' * * *" (pp. 44–45).

"* * * If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an emperor, well and good. If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China, but under the supervision of a United Nations commission, to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy * * *" (p. 189)

Mr. MORRIS. Professor McGovern, before we finish this period of 1944–45 at the OWI advisory committees, did Mr. Lattimore ever express himself in disparagement of Chiang Kai-shek at those hearings?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir, "we have to build on the forward-looking elements in China."

When I asked him, he said the people in Yenan.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he had reversed himself again from the 1941 position?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes.

In 1944 and 1945, he was rather bitter in his expressions and opinions regarding Chiang Kai-shek, and very definitely in favor of cooperation with the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he refer to them as Communists?

Mr. MCGOVERN. To the "people in Yenan." I never heard him call Mao Tse-tung and his people the Yenan people, but I never heard him use the expression "Communist." But there was no question about whom he was referring to.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the numerous political reports submitted to the State Department by John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies, Jr.?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. A great many reports came over my desk in the JCS. I did not see all State Department reports, but a great many reports sent to the State Department were sent down by the State Department to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and those came to my desk for comment.

My function there, serving with the Joint Survey Committee, was to follow political trends in different parts of the world and annotate those and call them to the attention of my boss. Therefore, I saw a number of the statements made, written by John Davies, when he was serving as political adviser to General Stilwell.

I saw some of the reports made by John Stewart Service when he was in China and I had several long talks with Mr. Service after his return from China, I am going to say early in 1945.

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Mr. MORRIS. Now, did these reports uniformly express a political point of view?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Very definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the general nature of these reports, as you can now recall?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Both Mr. Davies and Mr. Service were wholehearted in their dislike of the Nationalist Government and their theory was that we should support the Chinese Communists.

One thing that I objected to most seriously from the intelligence point of view, and I was serving as a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee—and that is intelligence should be to estimate the capabilities and intentions both of our allies and of our enemies—and to my mind they were quite wrong in emphasizing that the intentions of the Chinese Communists would be friendly toward the United States, and quite apart from anything else, I thought that was completely wrong.

There is no use arguing the rights and wrongs of communism on which I have opinions, but apart from anything else, will they be with us or against us? I was convinced at that time, and still convinced, that they would be definitely anti-American—not that I think the Nationalist Government is pure, sweet, and holy, but I thought that at least the Nationalist Government would remain friendly to the United States, and I was convinced that the Communist Government would be very unfriendly to the United States, and, for that reason, I made my report to General Embick along those lines.

I though it was bad advice handed by the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. What was General Embick?

Mr. MCGOVERN. General Embick was Chairman of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and my immediate boss. The committee consisted of General Embick, Admiral Wilson, and General Fairchild.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, what they were advocating was not a negative policy but the United States assisting the Communists in overthrowing the Nationalist Government and taking over China, that we just not send aid to the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MCGOVERN. But throwing our whole weight behind the Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. That we actually assist the Communists in overthrowing the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MCGOVERN. I was quite shocked at this for a peculiar reason. I knew Mr. Service had been sent back from China—in fact, he told me.

Mr. MORRIS. He told you that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes. He was sent back and he was very violent against the way in which our foreign policy was going in China under General Hurley, the Ambassador, and General Wedemeyer, who was head of our troops over there.

I might say, in the summer of 1945, I was sent on this special mission around the world but Service spent some little time in China.

At that time I talked to General Hurley, and General Wedemeyer, whom I knew quite well. General Wedemeyer, for whom I had personal admiration both in regard to personality and his soundness and ability, discussed the situation and he was very much shocked with the kind of poor political intelligence that was being sent in by such men as Service.

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Senator EASTLAND. Did you hear Service advocate any measures to implement the policy that he was advocating?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir. The only thing I heard him say was that we should throw our full weight behind the Communists, withdraw all assistance to the Nationalists, and throw our full weight to the Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. That meant aiding the Communists?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was interested in the remark you just made. Did you say you were quite well acquainted with General Wedemeyer and his views and policies?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was over a period of what time?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Over a period of years. I first met him in 1942 when he was attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving with the Joint War Plans Committee on which I saw him many, many times then.

Then, he is the son-in-law of General Embick, my immediate boss.

When I was out in China, General Wedemeyer was kind enough to ask me to stay at his house, so I got to know him quite well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you any occasion to read the Kunming message or messages recently released?

Mr. MCGOVERN. You mean those sent back by Mr. Wallace?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCGOVERN. I have seen them recently.

They did not come over my desk during the war, but I have seen them recently, copies of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read them recently?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir; I looked through them again.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should like to ask for your opinion in particular and in general with regard to those messages, as to whether they are anti-Communist or pro-Communist, and if you do not mind, I would like to read just a few passages from the messages.

Senator EASTLAND. Give him the message and let him comment on it if he wants to.

Is that Wallace's report to President Roosevelt?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Recently released?

Mr. SOURWINE. There was a report which was delivered in person by Mr. Wallace. There were a few days prior to that, two cables sent from Kunming.

Senator EASTLAND. From Wallace to Roosevelt?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are these the documents which have been recently released?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCGOVERN. "Paraphrase of Vice President Wallace's message to the President."

There are one or two points here which I would like to just mention:

* * * the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.

And again Mr. Wallace says—

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I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia. With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do and the Chinese appear incapable of coping with it * * * Instability and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo * * *

The message is full of statements, as I now remember it, which shocked me, because Mr. Wallace said it was not at all pro-Communist, but certainly if it is not pro-Communist it certainly is giving aid and comfort to the Communists trying to disparage the Nationalist Government entirely and trying to throw his weight behind support of a pro-Russian policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been said that this was an anti-Communist message because it transmitted the request as made by Chiang Kai-shek that General Wedemeyer be considered in connection with the appointment of a presidential liaison man between the President and the Generalissimo.

Could you say, sir, whether at that time such a recommendation with respect to General Wedemeyer was an anti-Communist recommendation?

Mr. MCGOVERN. No, sir; General Wedemeyer had never expressed himself on Chiang Kai-shek. He was not an unknown figure. He was a well known man as a military planner and strategist and had served as spokesman for General Marshall on several occasions in discussions with the British planners. He had never expressed his views on communism, or never expressed his views on China.

As a matter of fact, some people wrongly thought that Wedemeyer would go along with the Communists, because with the Joint Chiefs he thought we should not invade the Balkans or interfere with the Russian campaign in eastern Europe.

On that ground, some people thought General Wedemeyer would go along with the Communists.

Knowing General Wedemeyer personally, I knew they were completely wrong in their reading of him, but no doubt some felt or thought that, because he did attack the Balkan campaign and attacked Churchill on the Balkan campaign.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that these so-called Kunming cables mentioned General Chennault and referred to his unavailability for the post?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that if it were a choice between General Wedemeyer and General Chennault for the job in question, that one of the two would have been less anti-Communist than the other?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am trying to think back to the thinking of that particular period. I am trying to think now what I knew about General Wedemeyer. General Chennault's opposition to the Communists was violent and emphatic. At that time there was an open mind as to where General Wedemeyer stood. He never committed himself and never made a formal position.

Knowing both people, I knew both were anti-Communist. I would say General Chennault was more anti-Communist. General Wedemeyer was brought in as a new man with no far-eastern background.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear any Communist objection to General Wedemeyer's being named?

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Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir. But I again emphasize that I don't attend Communist meetings, so I am not aware of the inner circles.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering whether or not Mr. Mandel knows what attitude the Daily Worker took to the Wedemeyer appointment.

Mr. MANDEL. I think that will be brought out in a few days.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor McGovern, do the views set forth in that Kunming cable coincide with the views in the Service and Davies reports to which you have testified?

Mr. McGOVERN. I would certainly say they covered the same general point of view. Never having seen the cables until recently, I had no knowledge whether Mr. John Carter Vincent or Mr. Service or Davies actually saw these things beforehand. I would be unable to say. But they certainly correspond very closely with the views expressed by Mr. Davies, by Mr. John Carter Vincent, and Mr. Service, those three people who expressed the same kind of views that are expressed in here.

I must say that I never heard either one of them talk about General Wedemeyer one way or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. After your reading of that document, you say that it is not an anti-Communist document?

Mr. McGOVERN. Definitely it is not an anti-Communist document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just prior to the time that the cables were sent, was there any agitation for the promotion of General Chennault in that regard? Was there any consideration of him as a successor to General Stilwell or in an improved position vis-a-vis Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. McGOVERN. There was some discussion of it. But may I summarize the situation? For personal reasons, General Chennault was not very popular with some of the brass hats at the Joint Chiefs of Staff building, and quite apart from any political considerations, his personality was such that they did not like him and therefore would have disliked putting him in unless forced to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was wondering if you regarded this cable as in any way a counter move against the possible naming of General Chennault to a higher position.

Mr. McGOVERN. It may very well. Not having discussed the matter with Mr. Wallace, I have no notion what was in the back of his mind, but if Mr. Wallace had thought there was a plan to put General Chennault in, I would have told him there was very strong opposition on the part of my boss to putting General Chennault in.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know John K. Fairbank and Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir; I have met them on several occasions. I first saw them in Harvard when I was teaching in Harvard. I again saw them in Peking, or at least I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937–38. He and Mr. Lattimore went to Peking at the same time for a very short period.

At the same time, Mr. Reischauer, Mr. Lattimore, and Mr. Fairbank were all in Peking. Mr. Bisson was also there. There was quite a gathering of the clan.

Again, I saw much more of Mr. Fairbank in the spring and summer of 1945 when I was sent on this mission out to China, and at that time I saw Mrs. Fairbank was working with OSS, I saw Mr. Fairbank was working with OWI, and had two or three fairly long discussions with

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them. I was shocked with the fact that they thought of going even further to the left than had Mr. Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they critical of the Chinese Government?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Extremely critical of the Nationalist Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they give forth expressions favorable to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Very definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor McGovern, were you in China in 1947?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occasion of your being in China in 1947?

Mr. MCGOVERN. In 1947, I was appointed a consultant to the Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs and was sent out there to examine the conditions in Japan, in Korea, and in China.

I represented the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but actually I traveled out with the Armed Services Committee.

Senator EASTLAND. The House committee?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The Armed Services House Committee. They went on around the world. I stayed for some time in Japan and China, and I came back with the House Committee on Domestic and Foreign Commerce.

I mention these things because going along with these Members of Congress, was briefed officially, and unofficially briefed, by the various commanding generals and the ambassadors wherever we went. As a matter of fact, as I stayed on after they had left, I had much longer and more personal conversations with many of the same people.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you briefed at all in China?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir; we were briefed considerably at the time in China.

First of all, we stayed for some little time in Peking and saw the various local Chinese officials there. Then we went down to Chengtu to see the Navy mission there, and then we went to Nanking. I had long talks with the Ambassador, the then Ambassador, Mr. Leighton Stuart, whom I had known previously. We were also briefed by Mr. Ludden, of the Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Mr. Ludden?

Mr. MCGOVERN. That is Raymond Ludden. He was either first secretary or consul of the Embassy. He was immediately under Mr. Leighton Stuart.

Mr. Leighton Stuart and I had a talk, and he said "Go down to the Embassy and be briefed by Mr. Ludden."

Mr. Ludden gave a speech and gave us a very dim picture of the possibility of the Nationalist Government surviving and a very strong briefing in favor of the ground movement in favor of the Communists.

While I was in Nanking I was very much interested also in the fact, which I had heard before, but it was not officially confirmed, we were also briefed by the then head of the Army Military Mission, General Lucas. He was telling us what he was doing. I asked what he was not doing. One of the things he was not doing was not giving tactical advice to the nationalists. He said they were allowed to give strategic advice to the Nationalist Government but always in such a way as not to have any effect on the war with the Communists. He was instructed not to train them how to man machine guns or tanks to fight Communists and never in any way to give effective aid in their fight against the Communists.

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Mr. MORRIS. Who told you that?

Mr. MCGOVERN. General Lucas.

I inquired, "This is your own personal choice?"

"No, sir; these are orders from Washington."

I said, "Is that the orders of the Defense Department?"

He said, "I get it from the Defense Department, but I understand it is from the State Department."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear that view from anybody else?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir; I asked two or three of the other men, colonels, who were assistants. When I was down to Shanghai, the head of the naval mission went down to meet us in Shanghai.

I repeated the question to him and he said the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Solomon Adler in Nanking at that time?

Mr. MCGOVERN. At that time he was present at some luncheon parties, but I had no conversation.

Mr. MORRIS. You know he was there?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I don't know. I saw him at a luncheon party given by the Embassy for us.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you proceed to Japan from China?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I had already been in Japan. Then I returned to Japan. Mr. Judd was coming over and Mr. Judd telegraphed me and asked me to meet him in Japan. Congressman Judd knew very little of Japan. So, I gave him my briefing in addition to the briefing he was getting through SCAP.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write a report for the congressional committee?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this your report, Professor McGovern?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir. This is the Economic and Political Conditions in the Far East: Japan, China, Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, I would like to direct your attention to that portion which deals with reparations.

Mr. Chairman, we have had an acknowledgment by Mr. Lattimore that he was largely responsible for the preparation of the Pauley report. With that background, I would like to ask Professor McGovern questions relating to his report on reparations which he made to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Congress.

Mr. MCGOVERN. That was one of the things in which I was particularly interested.

Mr. MORRIS. By that you mean the Pauley report?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The Pauley report had called my attention to the great to-do over whether we should or should not have reparations and the amount of reparations. Therefore, having read the Pauley report, I then went in and examined with some care the various people, both Japanese and American officials there in SCAP.

After a long discussion with various groups, official and unofficial, I came out with the following conclusion:

Another major factor in retarding Japan's economic recovery has been the problem of reparations.

It is clear that the reparation demands by some of the Allied powers have been based upon political and psychological considerations rather than upon economic realities. A quite natural desire to wreak vengeance upon the hated

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enemy, and an equally natural desire to build one's own industry in a cheap and easy way, have resulted in exorbitant demands upon Japanese plants and industrial equipment, which, if fully carried out, would permanently wreck the whole Japanese economy and make it impossible for the Japanese mission ever to become self-supporting again. (It would be equivalent to the application of an exaggerated Morgenthau plan to Japan.) It is equally clear that in many cases, if the plants were dismantled and transported elsewhere, it would result in permanent economic waste for everyone. The Japanese would be deprived of plants they urgently need, while the countries to which they were shipped would never be able to make use of them because of wastage in shipment, the lack of skilled workers and technicians in the receiving countries, and so forth.

May I bring out just one or two things in this support?

Mr. MORRIS. Is it pertinent to this particular discussion?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir; not about reparations, it is in connection with Korea I want to talk about.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir; proceed.

Mr. MCGOVERN. I felt then, and feel now, that I was rather good in my predictions as to what was going to take place. This report was printed in March of 1948.

Senator EASTLAND. 1948?

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Mr. MCGOVERN. In dealing with Korea, I said:

At the same time it must be borne in mind that if we withdraw from the southern zone—

in Korea—

it is practically certain that the small but powerful and well organized Korean Communists, backed by the Russians, will seize control over the whole peninsula. There has already emerged in North Korea a ruthless and self-perpetuating Communist oligarchy which is fully prepared to extend its sway over the southern area. In the event of American withdrawal it is very likely that the Russian forces would directly aid in carrying out this coup. Even if this were not the case, the Communists should have little difficulty in forcibly seizing power, as the Russians have already organized and trained a Communist indoctrinated "North Korea People's Army" (of about 150,000) men while in the south the Americans have neglected to organize any indigenous native force capable of meeting invasion from the north.

I should like to bring out this point in connection with that thing, because of the statements that Mr. Lattimore and others have made that it would be to our advantage to let the Communists seize control of the whole of Korea, reverting to an earlier position here. I thought if we did withdraw, they would seize power; and we did, and they did exactly as I predicted.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, are you acquainted with Owen Lattimore's memorandum which he submitted in connection with the State Department round table conference in 1949?

Mr. Chairman, the last witness before this committee, Professor Colegrove, gave extensive testimony concerning the round table conference held by the State Department in October 1949.

I have here the text of Mr. Lattimore's memorandum, which was submitted in connection with that conference. I would like to call the attention of Professor McGovern to the first five points.

In the first place, Professor McGovern, have you seen this memorandum before?

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Mr. McGOVERN. I have seen this memorandum. I have heard about it some time. I was told the general contents. It was only recently that I saw the actual wording of it.

Mr. MORRIS. You will notice at the very outset he has made five distinct points.

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, sir; and I think this is so important, the first point:

The type of policy represented by support for Chiang Kai-shek does more harm than good to the interests of the United States. * * *

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, at this time in 1949 when this memorandum was submitted, Mr. Lattimore clearly there is opposed to support of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. McGOVERN. It is very obvious here. At the same time I was making my report here to the congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs on the danger of Chinese communism undermining the whole support of the Nationalist Government, which was brought out.

The second point is:

China cannot be economically coerced by such measures as cutting off trade.

In other words, in this trade he wants to recognize Communist China and to trade with Communist China on the idea we will both benefit by it. It is perfectly impossible.

There is a third point which I think is very important:

It is not possible to make Japan a satisfactory instrument of American policy.

In other words, again he comes back to his old Morgenthau plan to keep Japan powerless and impotent.

As I tried to stress in my own report, written a year earlier, Japan is a pro-American bastion as a net result of which they attempt to keep a free Asia for the free Asiatics by the union of such free countries as Japan, Philippines, and Siam, of which Japan is the most important and strongest.

In the meantime, the Japanese became very pro-American through the wisdom of our administration out there, and certainly as to our support of a free and independent Japan not under Communist domination and make those the center of a new open-door policy for the Far East which will mean equal opportunity, with no special privilege, and integrity of the Far East.

There is one point here—

South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests and policy of the United States.

In other words, let it slide. As Mr. Lattimore said, let it sink.

I think it is contrary to our own policy. If the Communists get control of the whole of South Korea, it will be a dagger pointed to the heart of Japan and will overthrow our whole foreign policy in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that in view of the questions which were asked the professor with regard to the Kunming messages, it might be desirable to have the text of those two cables in the record at that point or just preceding the professor's comments on them.

Senator EASTLAND. They are ordered in the record.

(The text of the two cables follows:)

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KUNMING MESSAGE

(Paraphrase of Vice President Wallace's message to the President drafted in Kunming June 26 and dispatched from New Delhi about June 28:)

MESSAGE NO. 1

The discussions between the representative of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking, but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement. Chiang has assured me that only "political" measures will be used to reach a settlement.

Chiang expressed a desire for an improvement in relations with Russia and for our assistance in bringing about a meeting of representatives of China and Russia. I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

The economic, political, and military situations in China are extremely discouraging. The morale of the Chinese is low, and demoralization is a possibility with resulting distintegration of central authority. With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do, and the Chinese appear incapable of coping with it. However, a general collapse does not seem imminent. Instability and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang. With regard to the military situation, I can only say that it might be worse. It is critical in Hunan Province. Potentialities and plans are in existence for stiffening China's defense south of the city of Hengyang, but there is a serious threat that east China may be severed from contact with west China. Morale in remaining free China would of course be affected by such a development.

Calls Chiang discouraged or China military outlook

Prior to the receipt of your message of June 23 on the subject of a United States Army observer group proceeding to north China to obtain military intelligence, Chiang had informed me of his agreement to the dispatch of the group as soon as it could be organized. After receipts of your telegram I again discussed the matter in detail with Chiang. General Ferris, chief of staff in charge of General Stilwell's headquarters at Chungking, was present, and we obtained what should prove to be the full cooperation of Chiang in arranging for the early dispatch and effective operation of the group.

Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation, bewildered regarding the economic situation and, while expressing confidence in his army, distressed regarding military developments. Current military reverses are attributed by him to low morale caused by economic difficulties. He is convinced that a general offensive in Burma early this year would have bolstered the Chinese will to resistance and have prevented military reverses. He has assured me that the Chinese will continue to resist to the limit of their ability, but he displays discouragement rather than optimism.

Our need is vital for a more vigorous and better coordinated United States Government representation in China. In its military and related political aspects, our effort in China requires more positive direction and closer cooperation with the Chinese if this area is to be an effective basis of operations against the Japanese.

MESSAGE NO. 2

Loss of eastern China to Japanese predicted

There is a strong probability that east China wlil be severed from west China in the near future. It is the general opinion that such a development can only be prevented by unforeseeable chance.

There are various estimates with regard to the rapidity with which the Japanese may be able to carry out their intentions. Although the time factor may be longer than most people seem to expect, I feel that we should be prepared to see all of east China in Japanese hands within 3 or 4 weeks.

The loss of east China will nullify our military effort in this area. It will also prove a violent political and economic shock to the Chungking regime.

China may be rendered almost valueless as an Allied military base unless determined steps are taken to halt the disintegrative process. Popular and military morale, both seriously impaired already, must somehow be strengthened. A new offensive effort must somehow be organized, primarily guerrilla in character, probably.

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It is necessary also to consider political factors. Disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand.

The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available information to show you how serious is the situation. However, the situation is far from hopeless and may actually be turned to both military and political advantage if the right steps are taken promptly. The Generalissimo is alarmed, anxious for guidance, and, I believe, prepared to make drastic changes if wisely approached. Insecurity has undermined vested interests in the Government. It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least the semblance of a united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

Wedemeyer is proposed for liaison with Chiang

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton De Wiart occupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military situation.

An American general officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political considerations. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake the assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should not be removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions; (2) command all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal directly with the White House on political questions or China may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.

Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation here to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a representative should be appointed and reach Chunking before east China is finally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far.

While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular, I regret not having been able to see General Stilwell and get his views. Nevertheless, I am convinced of the need for the decisive action summarized in the final paragraph of my previous message.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished the fifth point?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The final point is in connection with southeast Asia, such as Indochina, in which he is obviously saying we should back here Ho Chi Minh and Communists in southeast Asia, which I think would be perfectly disastrous. I think you have to make it a point in our national policy to realize that any place where you have a Communist government or a Communist-dominated government, it is going to be anti-American. And whereas I have absolutely no use for French interest in Indochina, it would be disastrous to allow Indochina to fall in the hands of avowed enemies of the United States and both the Chinese and the Russian Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is no need of introducing those in the record. In fact, they have already been introduced in the record as exhibits 280–A and 280–B.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is already in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. The memorandum.

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Professor McGovern, did you have any dealings with Alger Hiss during your experience with the General Chief of Staff?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, purely informally and purely personal. Mr. Hiss served in a different capacity with the State Department. I saw most of him during the period when he was assigned to the creation of U. N. during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and before and after the San Francisco Conference. I was then serving with General Wilson and General Embick.

On several occasions I had to go to the State Department and give documents to Mr. Hiss and receive documents from Mr. Hiss to bring back to the Chief of Staff.

I may add that General Embick, on three different occasions, hammered on the table and said, "Now be sure and don't discuss any war plans or any other military secrets with Mr. Hiss. I don't trust that man."

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. McGOVERN. Early in 1945. I saw him first in 1944. I have seen him, as a matter of fact, when he was with Mr. Hornbeck but only very casually, coming in and out of the room, but in 1944 and 1945 when I was at the State Department, two or three times a week, that was the time I saw most of Mr. Hiss, but after those words of advice from General Embick, I was careful to discuss only the weather with Hiss.

There are many people—my bosses, brass hats—in the Army and Navy, who had sincere doubts as to Mr. Hiss's loyalty. General Embick would not say he was or was not Communist. He thought he did not have loyalty to the United States. Therefore, I was warned not to discuss matters with him.

Senator EASTLAND. Did he attempt to get information from you?

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, that is hard to say. He tried, on several occasions, to get into chit-chatty personal conversations. I was rather cold in my replies. I was so scared that we might have a general conversation that might lead me to divulge military secrets that I knew, I thought it was better not to discuss anything with him.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you judge he was attempting to get military secrets from you?

Mr. McGOVERN. He knew I came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He knew I had full possession of all military plans at that time, and I think he was interested in knowing what they were.

Senator EASTLAND. Your answer is that you thought he was attempting to get military information from you?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions to ask of Professor McGovern.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you trust him?

Mr. McGOVERN. No, sir; I did not. I still have no knowledge whatsoever that he was a member of the Communists. I never met Mr. Chambers, so far as I know, I had no knowledge of a thing, but I certainly did not trust him at all and was very glad not to have official meetings with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Those are all the questions we have of Mr. McGovern.

I would like the record to show that we have sent out a letter today to President Truman asking for the loyalty file on a member of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations who served in military intelligence during the war.

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Mr. Chairman, the purpose of that letter is that we have a letter from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, which reads, in part, as follows:

Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved.

In view of that statement and in view of the fact that Ellen Atkinson was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Senator McCarran sent a letter to President Truman asking that that file be made available to this committee. That reads, Mr. Chairman:

A letter from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, dated July 13, 1951, contains the following statement about Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson: "Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved."

Inasmuch as Ellen Atkinson was a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations which is presently under inquiry, it would be appreciated if her file were made available to this committee.

May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, as a footnote to my testimony, may I make one concluding remark?

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask what this request is about?

Mr. MCGOVERN. This request was with regard to the policy of the Espionage Act, the difficulty that I had in uniform in discussing matters with the State Department, with the OSS, and with the OWI, that a good part of my time I had to go over to OSS and go up to the State Department and try to get information from them which I would feed to my bosses.

Again and again General Embick and others would point out certain specific persons he thought were dangerous, but in general, "Don't talk about any military plans with civilians."

I said, "Why?"

"Because the wording of the Espionage Act was so vague that even if they were caught telling news to the enemy, there is little we could do about it."

The net result is that in contrast with England, we were handicapped with that thing, that the British Espionage Act is much stronger than ours and therefore the British Foreign Office would and did discuss matters with the British Joint Chiefs of Staff and could discuss matters fully and freely, whereas over here in America, the Espionage Act was so weak we felt there were a number of leaks inside the State Department and nothing could be done about it, and therefore we decided not to discuss any military plans with them.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think many of those leaks were pro-Communist?

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Mr. McGOVERN. I think many of those leaks were pro-Communist. I say that under advisement because I was interested in investigating the record after our successful operations in Europe and our successful invasion of Japan, and we were able to check the German and Japanese records and they did not know of our plans and intentions.

On the other hand, it is now very clear that many of our plans and intentions were known to the Russians.

Senator EASTLAND. Whom did you suspect?

Mr. McGOVERN. That I could not say, sir. I just knew these leaks were taking place. The net result of it was that we just simply had to tighten up. It hurt our effort when you could not deal with responsible officials in high places and the State Department and elsewhere. It did hurt our war effort.

Mr. MORRIS. If this last letter from Mr. Ramspeck is placed in the record, we have nothing else.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 306" and is as follows:)

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Washington 25, D. C., July 13, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of June 27, 1951, wherein you request information concerning 13 persons who you state have been employed by the Civil Service Commission.

The specific questions asked in your letter concerning these individuals are as follows:

1. Are they still employed by the Civil Service Commission? If so, in what capacity?

2. Have they severed their employment with the Civil Service Commission? If any questions of loyalty were involved, would you please indicate? What were the circumstances of their severance?

The records of the Civil Service Commission show that although all of these individuals have been employed in the Federal service, none has been employed in any capacity at any time by the Civil Service Commission.

A full report showing the Federal service of each of the 13 individuals you list is being furnished herewith for your information.

* * * * * * *

Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved.

* * * * * * *

If I can be of further assistance to you at any time, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT RAMSPECK, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. We have another hearing at 2 o'clock on Monday.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

We thank you very much, Professor.

Mr. McGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p. m., Friday, September 28, 1951, the hearing was recessed until Monday, October 1, 1951, at 2 p. m.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Wiley, Ferguson, Jenner, Watkins.

Also present: Senators Thye and Welker.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Will you stand and be sworn?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Committee on the Judiciary will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. STASSEN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HAROLD E. STASSEN, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

The CHAIRMAN. Governor Stassen, you have been subpenaed to come here to make such statements to this committee as may be pertinent to the subject before the committee. You are not asked to criticize or condemn anyone but to make a straight statement of the facts as you see them on any subject that is pertinent to the matter before the committee.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you, Senator.

May I say, in response to that, that I do appear in response to your subpena and that it is my basis of appearing and my understanding that I am not here to make accusations against anyone, nor to give exoneration to anyone, but to answer the questions as to the facts that I know in the matter pertinent to your inquiry.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, Governor Stassen was subpenaed to appear here today to testify primarily concerning a State Department round-table conference which was held on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

That conference is directly in the scope of our investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations because we had observed that the majority of people in attendance at that conference were members of

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the Institute of Pacific Relations and many of them were very active in that organization.

We had planned, Mr. Chairman, to have Mr. W. L. Holland, secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to be present today to identify exactly how many of the 25 in attendance at that conference were members of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Holland was not able to appear, but has sent in a letter which indicates that of the 25 in attendance 17 were members of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Then he proceeded to give the degree and the extent of activity of each one of these 17.

Mr. Chairman, subject to being verified by Mr. Holland when he appears here under oath, will you accept this list of people at that conference who were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be filed with the committee and identified, and Mr. Holland may further identify it when he comes.

Senator FERGUSON. Will it not speak for itself as to what it is? It is a memorandum, rather than a statement under oath, and it will complete our record. Could it not be received on that basis?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and placed in the files of the committee, and we can insert it in the record at a later time.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, when did you first become interested in problems of the Far East, Far East political problems?

Mr. STASSEN. About 25 years ago, when I was a student at the University of Minnesota.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us to what extent you have followed up your study of Far East developments?

Mr. STASSEN. I followed them quite actively ever since that time. I studied Far East policy and Far East history as a student at the University of Minnesota, and then followed it in a general way in subsequent years, and then, of course, became very closely touched with it during the war when I was on Admiral Halsey's staff; and during the major part of the war I was the assistant chief of staff to Admiral Halsey, and thereby, of course, knew all of the intelligence and other information of both General MacArthur's and Admiral Halsey's command and of the Washington headquarters.

In fact, it was my responsibility to follow it at that time.

Then, toward the end of the war, I was appointed by President Roosevelt as one of the Republican delegates to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. As such, you encountered many of the problems confronted, looking into the Far East situation?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. In fact, then, in the delegation, I was assigned to be in charge of the trusteeship portions of the Charter, and the trusteeship portions, of course, dealt in very great measure with the islands of the Pacific, with the areas of the Pacific and other parts of the world, and I had then assisting me Mr. Ralph Bunche and Benjamin Gerig, assigned to the staff at San Francisco.

Subsequent to the end of the war, I was in Japan during the liberation of the prisoners, and then have followed and traveled in that direction since the war.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first take cognizance of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. STASSEN. My earliest recollection is that sometime after I was

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elected Governor of Minnesota I was invited to membership, and I declined.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have never been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. STASSEN. I have never been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, do you recall a 3-day round-table conference held by the United States State Department, presided over by Philip C. Jessup, in October 1949?

Mr. STASSEN. I do. It was October 6, 7, and 8 of 1949, presided over in part by Dr. Jessup and in part by Dr. Fosdick.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attend that conference?

Mr. STASSEN. I did; about two-thirds of the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you invited, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I was in London in September——

Mr. MORRIS. September 1949?

Mr. STASSEN. Of 1949, and about the 17th of September Mr. Julius Holmes, of our London Embassy of the United States, told me that he had a cable request to ask whether I would attend a conference on Far East and Asiatic and China policy to be held October 6, 7, and 8.

Mr. MORRIS. Who had invited you?

Mr. STASSEN. The American State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. No one particular person?

Mr. STASSEN. It was just Mr. Holmes who, at that time, was Minister of our Embassy in London, and he was conveying the cabled invitation from the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know why you were being invited, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I have an assumption in that regard, but I had previously conferred with Mr. Jessup, following an earlier activity on my part in Asiatic policy. In other words, I had been openly very critical of the trend of Asiatic policy in this country and particularly on April 1 of 1949 at MIT, when I appeared with Mr. Churchill, in my address there I was very specific and very emphatic on the need of a change in our Asiatic policy.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you publicly expressed yourself on that, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you say at that time?

Mr. STASSEN. It was a background of interpreting our clash with the Communists on the world scene, and then I said:

> Relating this inescapable situation to the specific China problem, we must conclude that by our inaction and by our withdrawal of aid we are foolhardy thus to contribute to the Communist domination of China. We should move and move promptly to bolster the southern half of China, to assist by materials and by counsel in maintaining the independence of Canton, the four southern provinces of Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Fukien, and Yunnan, and the outlying islands of Hongkong and Formosa. Giving due consideration to our economic situation and capacity, we should regularly invest a portion of our resources in Asia for the resistance to communism.

I went on further in a further description of a major program in Asia. Because of the deterioration there and the delay, the vacuum that existed, I considered to be very serious.

From that speech at MIT, from that period on, I was very active

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in the public discussion of need of a change in Asiatic policy and a certain amount of controversy over it.

Following that, then came the appointment of the Jessup committee. That, as I recall, occurred on July 27 of 1949. At that time, Secretary Acheson announced that a thorough review of the United States policy toward the Far East would be made under the guidance of Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, and then on July 30 he announced that Dr. Case and Dr. Fosdick would act as consultants in an objective appraisal of Far East problems in general, with a view to making recommendations to the Secretary of State for the formulation and implementation of policy concerning those areas.

When I saw that announcement in the paper, having been advocating that there must be a new policy in Asia, I called Dr. Jessup up, and I congratulated him on his appointment and told him I felt it was tremendously important that they move forward promptly on the matter of Asiatic policy.

Mr. MORRIS. What month was this, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. This would have been the end of July, the first part of August of 1949.

I told him I would be glad to talk to them about it. He then invited me to come to Washington. So, on the 7th of September of 1949, I came down to Washington with Mr. Ed Larson of my staff, and met with Dr. Jessup, Dr. Fosdick, Dr. Case, and a few members of the State Department staff; and there I made a presentation of what I urged should be done and done promptly in Asia. We came down with our maps, with our documents, and spent considerable time urging this change in policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the recommendations that you made at that time coincide with the recommendations you made at the conference yourself, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. They did.

Mr. MORRIS Did the State Department people express themselves in response to your recommendations?

Mr. STASSEN. In that conference, no. They were only asking questions and probing various aspects of my recommendations in the September 7th conference.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the first manifestation to you of the fact that a review of foreign policy was in fact being undertaken?

Mr. STASSEN. The public announcement on July 27, Secretary Acheson's announcement.

Mr. MORRIS. The consummation of that plan took place when, for the first time? When was the first overt act undertaken?

Mr. STASSEN. Insofar as the October conference——

Mr. MORRIS. Was the October conference the first thing that that committee did?

Mr. STASSEN. I do not have information of what they did between their appointment and the October conference.

I do not remember any public statement of what else they were doing during that period of time.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you know, the first manifestation of that activity was the 3-day conference that was held on October 6, 7, and 8?

Mr. STASSEN. When you say "first manifestation," I am not sure of what you mean. I know they were in Washington. I know they were spending some time down here. I know they were in the State Depart-

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ment. But, so far as I have ever heard, the October conference was the first major grouping and discussion of the thorough study of Asiatic policy that they had been appointed to perform.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, I would like to go back to the July 27th notice in the press. Did that indicate to you that it was to be a study so that there would be a change, or what did it indicate?

Mr. STASSEN. Well, there had been considerable advocacy of a change, in the Senate, in the House, in the press, by myself personally, and out of that controversy before the public over the advocacy of the change; and then came the announcement that there was going to be—and this is a literal quotation from the stories—"an objective appraisal of Far East problems in general with a view to making recommendations to the Secretary of State for the formulation and implementation of policy concerning those areas."

That was the announcement in quotation marks.

Senator FERGUSON. So, it was indicated that there was going to be at least a study which might lead to a change; is that correct?

Mr. STASSEN. Furthermore, on October 6, which is 10 days after the announcement, Senator Arthur Vandenberg said publicly that the review of policy by the Jessup group should not overlook the possibility of finding a way to aid the non-Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at the time that Senator Vandenberg had insisted that he had not been consulted on the previous policy in the Far East?

Mr. STASSEN. Senator Vandenberg told me so, and I have also seen his public announcements to that extent.

Senator FERGUSON. You were familiar with that?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you appear in Washington, Governor Stassen, to attend this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. At about 9 o'clock on the morning of October 6. In other words, I returned to this country on October 4th from England and then came down here to the opening of this conference on the morning of October 6.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no preliminary discussions with anyone prior to the actual conference?

Mr. STASSEN. None whatsoever except my own staff, of course.

Mr. Robert Matteson, who is here with me, is my research assistant and has been for years.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Governor Stassen, who presided on the first day of the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Dr. Fosdick.

Mr. MORRIS. He was Ambassador Jessup's assistant at that time, was he not?

Mr. STASSEN. He was an associate on this committee of three that had been appointed.

Mr. MORRIS. Was a transcript taken of this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, a Stenotype transcript was taken.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you request that a copy of the transcript be given to you?

Mr. STASSEN. As the conference opened and when I observed the stenotypist, I stated that I wished a copy of the transcript of everything that I, myself, said during the conference, and that I would not participate unless I was assured of receiving that transcript. There

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was some demurring and some discussion and then it was agreed that I would receive a transcript of everything that I said during the three days.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, did you, as a matter of fact, receive such a transcript?

Mr. STASSEN. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you receive it?

Mr. STASSEN. I received it immediately following November 29, that is, it was forwarded on November 29, and reached me on the 30th or on the 1st of December, after I had followed up the failure to receive it by a telegram to Secretary Acheson.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Governor Stassen, did you, in addition, take notes at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the transcript that Governor Stassen has received and about which he was just speaking, together with his notes, will form the basis of the questions that will be addressed to him in this session.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that we had requested that a full copy of the transcript be made available to this committee, but that transcript was denied us, and for that reason it is necessary for us to have witnesses testify as to what took place at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask the witness one question?

Did your notes, Governor, unlike the transcript which was furnished you, cover what was said by others than yourself at the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; although I am never a person who takes extensive notes. I rely mostly on my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were to remind you, and not verbatim?

Mr. STASSEN. My own notes are to remind me of what I want to rebut or in answering something, and my memory is what I primarily rely on, but the transcript is a stenotype record of what I said at the various times during the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not just desire the transcript for corrective purposes?

Mr. STASSEN. No; not at all for that.

Senator FERGUSON. You desired it so that you might have a transcript of what you had said?

Mr. STASSEN. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you did not make any corrections and send it back?

Mr. STASSEN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You have the original of that transcript?

Mr. STASSEN. I have the original transcript of my statements.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume, then, that your statements would refresh your memory as to what others said?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you feel that you now have a memory of what took place at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume that recently, after you were subpenaed, at least you have gone over your notes and also your transcripts?

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Mr. STASSEN. After I received the subpena, I went over my notes and the transcript, and I prepared a memorandum for my own assistance in this conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, briefly for background purposes, I wonder if you could describe the condition existing at that time with respect to the various problems that were about to be discussed at the conference? I think it would be better if we had a little background of these facts before we begin.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

In thinking of the conference itself, it is very important to keep in mind what the circumstances were at the time. Of course, one of the most important things to keep in mind is that this was 9 months before the Korean war. The Korean war did not break until 9 months later.

About 4 months or 5 months before this conference, the Peiping radio had broadcast a statement that the Red Chinese would fight on the side of Communist Russia in the event of another world war.

Then on July 27, 1949, Secretary Acheson had announced this review that we spoke of a moment ago.

On August 5, 1949, the State Department had issued the white paper on China. You are all familiar with that.

I might say that a copy of that was mailed to me when I was asked to attend this October conference. In other words, that is just 2 months before the conference concerned, the white paper was issued.

On August 6, 1949, Senator Vandenberg had made this statement that I referred to, that it should not overlook the possibility of finding a way to aid the non-Communists of Asia.

On September 12, 1949, a little less than a month before, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee had recommended 20 to 3 the $1.3 billion military assistance program including $75 million for the general area of China, and Congress passed the measure on September 28, 1949.

On October 1 of 1949, the Chinese Communist People's Republic was proclaimed. In other words, this is just a week before the conference when the Chinese Communist People's Republic was proclaimed in China.

On October 2, 1949, the U. S. S. R. recognized the Chinese Communist People's Republic. Bulgaria and Rumania followed with recognition on October 3. Poland and Czechoslovakia followed with recognition of the Chinese Communist People's Republic on October 4.

On October 5, 1949, the line of the internal war in China extended across the nation at a point about 120 miles north of Canton, with the four southern provinces and approximately 40 percent of the people of China not under Communist control.

So that was the picture as the conference opened on the morning of October 6.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Kenneth Colegrove testified here last week. He stated that a group of people at that conference were able to loosely band themselves together and form a prevailing point of view, that their point of view prevailed throughout the 3-day conference.

Governor Stassen, did you notice while you were present at this conference the tendency of any group of people present to dominate the conference or to lead the conference?

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Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Morris, before proceeding as to what took place in the conference itself, I should like a specific ruling of the chairman on this point. In other words, I am perfectly willing and in the national interest will go forward to answer thoroughly all your questions with all facts, but I would like to have the record show and the chairman to rule that you are aware that the State Department has called this a confidential conference. You are aware that the transcript is stamped "confidential" and you are aware that the transcript is also stamped that it contains information affecting national defense, and so forth, and that it has taken the position that it, itself, will not release the transcript, and that knowing those things, as I understand it, Senator, you are now asking me to proceed to discuss what took place in this conference in your own pursuit of the national interest in your functioning of the United States Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. You have correctly stated the position taken by the committee.

What is more, aside from what may be matters that would affect the national security, it is the chairman's opinion that you are entirely free to discuss anything and everything that went on in that conference except that which would affect national security. I think your own judgment is sufficient when that is in question.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to know whether or not, since the conference, you have been notified in any way that this was a confidential conference and therefore everything in it was secret. Have you been so notified by the State Department?

Mr. STASSEN. No. When I received the transcript, it carried on each page a stamp "Confidential." Of course, I am also aware of the issue that came up on the same transcript in the so-called MacArthur hearings when Secretary Acheson was on the stand.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us what part of the transcript has this notation about security? Is it typed in there?

Mr. STASSEN. It is typed in at the top of the page.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you please read that to us?

Mr. STASSEN (reading):

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act or information of vital interest to the Federal Government and is transmitted for official use only.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire whether or not that was mentioned at the time?

Mr. STASSEN. It was not.

Senator FERGUSON. The Espionage Act was not mentioned?

Mr. STASSEN. No. And in Mr. Holmes' invitation to me and in the follow-up letter of September 27 to Mr. Russell, there was nothing said that the conference would be confidential. That was announced at the opening of the conference and that is what led me to insist that I have a transcript of my own remarks.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you, as a former governor, and with your knowledge of foreign affairs and domestic affairs, have knowledge of anything in this document that you believe would be adverse to the United States security?

Mr. STASSEN. It is apparent from the transcript and it will be apparent from the total transcript—it was apparent from the conference—that the national security would, in fact, be served by the

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release of the transcript rather than by holding it classified, and that the national security would have been served by the publication of the proceedings the day after the conference closed so that the American public and the Congress then could have had its say on it.

Senator FERGUSON. And could have seen the whole picture that took place at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, are you familiar with the fact that on October 26, our Government sent to the Nationalist Government notice that we would not give military aid to the Nationalist Government as far as the defense of Formosa was concerned?

Mr. STASSEN. I am aware of that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And if this had been released between the time of the conference and that date, public opinion could have operated and acted upon any such policy?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you feel now that the national interest would have been served and still served by a release of what took place at that conference?

Mr. STASSEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say just a little further with respect to the ruling on the matter submitted by Governor Stassen: The Governor is here under subpena. He has been interrogated aside from this public hearing. The committee is not inclined to elicit anything that would be detrimental to the national security. The Governor has wide experience which would justify him in saying that any answer he might give might be detrimental to the national security. Other than that, the Governor is here under subpena and is under the direction of the committee to answer the questions propounded.

Senator WATKINS. Governor Stassen, in line with the question that has just been asked, did I understand you to say that at this conference questions were asked of those who had been called in from outside of the Government by the State Department?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Rather than any information being given to you by the State Department?

Mr. STASSEN. There were both. There was a briefing, so-called, and then the discussion of the participants.

Senator WATKINS. As I understand it, you gentlemen were there at the invitation of the State Department to give advice and counsel with respect to policy to be adopted?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. One which was sought to probably be a reversal or change of what had been going on?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. I got the impression from what you said that probably the State Department officials were in the position more of listeners and questioners rather than revealing anything to you that might affect the security.

Mr. STASSEN. That is predominantly true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Governor Stassen, do I correctly understand your testimony that at the time of this conference there was no oath of secrecy imposed on those who attended?

Mr. STASSEN. There was not.

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Mr. SOURWINE. And at the time you requested this transcript of your own testimony there had been no condition imposed on you that you might not discuss what you had said outside the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. They had announced at that point that there was not to be any press release on the conference and that they did not wish us to discuss publicly what took place in the conference.

At that point I insisted then that I have a transcript of my own statements.

Mr. SOURWINE. Up to the time you received this transcript of your statement bearing the usual security note classifying it as confidential, did you feel up to that time that you would have been prohibited from discussing, say, in this committee, what you had said at that conference?

Mr. STASSEN. No; I would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you, then, take the classification notice as an imposition, in connection with the transmission of that transcript, of a security ban which, prior to that time, did not attach?

Mr. STASSEN. No, I take it as a matter of my response to this committee under proper subpena; so that is the basis, in other words.

You had asked a question and then I asked for this clarification.

Your question was as to whether or not there was a leading group in the conference, and there was.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the leader of that group, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. There were two leaders in this, one perhaps senior, Mr. Owen Lattimore, and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger. They were the leaders in the discussion of the prevailing group.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, as we have pointed out, during the course of the testimony of Prof. Kenneth Colegrove, each of those two men mentioned by Governor Stassen have been identified in each case by more than one witness as being members of the Communist organization.

Mr. STASSEN. I have no comment on that statement of yours, of course. That is your own statement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. That is a statement of the record made before you came on.

Mr. MORRIS. It was understood, Governor Stassen, you would not be qualified to say whether or not Lattimore or Rosinger is a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not called upon to state.

Senator FERGUSON. He is not being asked.

Mr. STASSEN. Unless I had the FBI files.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, would you in a concrete way set forth some of the recommendations that you recall those two gentlemen and the group that was, roughly, associated with them, made during the conference?

Mr. STASSEN. The group that was led in the discussion by these two gentlemen recommended 10 points for American policy in China and in Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. What were those 10 points, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I would summarize them, first, and then if you wish, go further into them.

The first point was that Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated first on Western Europe with its indus-

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trial strength; that the United States should likewise give priority to Europe.

Their second major point was that an aid-to-Asia program should not be started by the United States until after long and careful study because of the complexity of Asia and the dangers of a Communist charge of United States imperialism.

The third major point was that the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire.

Their fourth major point was that the United States should recognize the Communist Peoples Republic government of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung at an early date.

Their fifth point was that the United States should encourage the recognition of the Communist Peoples Republic government by Britain and India and follow with its own recognition soon thereafter.

Their sixth point was that it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist government.

Their seventh point was that it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted.

Their eighth point was that Premier Nehru had shown reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia.

Their ninth point was that the United States should not approve of the blockade of the Communist Chinese coast by the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, should assist in breaking it, and should send economic aid to the area of China under Communist control.

Their tenth point was that no aid should be sent to the non-Communist Chinese guerrillas in the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces, and the military supplies en route to them should be cut off.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, did you and other members attending that conference oppose those views as they were expressed by this prevailing group?

Mr. STASSEN. I opposed each and every point in this 10 group and had considerable support in the conference in opposition, but a minority support, and in the force and repetition of argument, the Lattimore-Rosinger group prevailed.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did Lattimore speak while you were present, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I would say 8 or 9 times.

Mr. MORRIS. And Rosinger?

Mr. STASSEN. About 5 or 6 times.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that you were there 2 of the 3 days; is that right?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire, Governor, whether or not it became apparent after the meeting started that there was a group advocating these 10 points?

Mr. STASSEN. It was very apparent that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger would fit their comments in together and then others would come in and you would not know, of course, so clearly whether that was just the thing that would happen or there was any prearrangement of discussion.

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Senator FERGUSON. But it did appear that after you got started, there was a rather distinct agreement among the group as advocating these 10 points?

Mr. STASSEN. There was a prevailing agreement on the points. You wouldn't have every member of any distinct group expressing agreement with every point, but as the discussion went on there would be supporting comment and in turn critical comment directed at the position which I and others had taken.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that the 10 points were advocated by Lattimore or Lattimore and Rosinger or a larger group?

Mr. STASSEN. Lattimore, Rosinger, and the group that was as a whole joining in with them.

Senator FERGUSON. Advocating the 10 points?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Was there any comment by the State Department officials on the 10 points that were advocated by this group?

Mr. STASSEN. Not at the time that the formal discussions were taking place.

Senator WATKINS. There was no indication of how the State Department representatives felt about those recommendations?

Mr. STASSEN. Not at that time during the conference. There was subsequently.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to know how long after you did find that the State Department was approving or disapproving of certain of these 10 points.

Mr. STASSEN. We went on and I opposed these and advanced my position as to what we ought to do and I had support.

Then at a recess, around noon of the third day, I spoke to Dr. Jessup. I said I certainly hoped that they would not make the tragic mistake of following this recommended program that had been advocated by Mr. Lattimore and his group.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. STASSEN. He responded that he felt that the greater logic was on that side.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, the side of Lattimore and Rosinger?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, and then I pleaded with him that he should not follow that view and urged that before he moved in that direction, that he should go to Tokyo and see General MacArthur to discuss the whole situation with him. I told him I had not seen General MacArthur or had any communication with him since the end of the war, but that I knew from the whole wartime experience that he was extremely brilliant and well informed about these very problems we were dealing with in this conference, and that it was, in my judgment, tremendously important that he go promptly to see General MacArthur and discuss with him the recommended Lattimore program.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say about that?

Mr. STASSEN. He said he may do that, and that was the end of that conversation.

Senator JENNER. Did he ever go, Governor, that you know of?

Mr. STASSEN. He went 3 months later. He arrived there, I believe, on January 6 of the next year.

Senator JENNER. In his public statements had be changed when he went over there?

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Mr. STASSEN. Well, changed——

Senator JENNER. Changed from the Lattimore line back to your line regarding the problems of the Orient and the Far East.

Mr. STASSEN. I do not know of him ever taking a stand in accord with my position. I do not know of him ever really expressing publicly in any definitive detail his position on these problems. I may have missed some of his speeches, but I was watching it quite closely.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, on the one point of this Nation of ours giving notice to Chiang Kai-shek's government on or about the 26th of October 1949, that we would not furnish the Nationalist Government any more aid as far as Formosa was concerned, that would indicate, at least on one of these principles, that they were following the Lattimore line?

Mr. STASSEN. There was much evidence in the succeeding weeks that the State Department and the United States Government was proceeding to implement the Lattimore program. I was following that, of course, very closely out of this situation.

Senator FERGUSON. You saw no signs of our acts that indicated they were following what the other group with you were advocating?

Mr. STASSEN. Not until after the Korean war broke, which was 9 months later, then there was some different evidence. During the 9 months' period, from October until the Korean war broke, I was following it very closely, very anxiously, and there was no indication that they were implementing anything that I had urged, and, on the contrary, the indications were that they were implementing the Lattimore proposals.

Senator WATKINS. May I inquire if there was any expression of the situation in Korea at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. I understood on the third day that there had been a bit of it on the second day, but I do not know the details of it. It was not a major part of the conference.

The CHAIRMAN. In that respect, you attended 2 days?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, at least the major part of 2 days. You see, I was on short notice with a schedule already planned and I had to readjust.

I remember on one of those evenings, I had to go to Harrisburg to speak to the Pennsylvania newspaper editors and I think I had to leave a little early on that day; things of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Your principal attendance was on the first and third days?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you accept testimony from this witness showing that each one of these 10 points, inasmuch as the governor has made them as definite and as precise as that, was opposed and ineffectively opposed, and there was an implementation on the part of the Government in each of the 10 cases subsequent to that time?

The CHAIRMAN. I think he has already testified in substance to that.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you take testimony on each particular point, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. First, I think we also seem to have notes and I move that the governor's minutes of what he said in the conference be received as part of our record.

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The CHAIRMAN. That motion will be granted. He has not dealt on those minutes yet.

Mr. MORRIS. I was proposing that we take each point singly and discuss them in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness is capable of saying what opposition was expressed to each of the points and whatever implementation was subsequent to that.

The CHAIRMAN. He is testifying of his own knowledge; he being present and on the ground, has a perfect right to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. My idea was to have the notes to implement his testimony. He would not want to read his notes.

The CHAIRMAN. Notes that he made himself?

Senator FERGUSON. That have been sent to him, his memorandum plus the notes.

The CHAIRMAN. The notes are one thing and the stenographic report is another.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to move that we make both the notes and the stenographic report part of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. The notes, I understand, are to enable the governor to testify. The stenographic transcript is a correct transcript?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the notes you made yourself?

Mr. STASSEN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be received as evidence in this case.

Senator WATKINS. I take it you would like to have the governor go into each point?

The CHAIRMAN. They are now before the committee and they are in evidence, and you may inquire.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Governor Stassen has stated that this document is a copy of the notes made by himself at this conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 307," and is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY HAROLD E. STASSEN, AFTER BEING SUBPENAED TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., ON OCTOBER 1, 1951, AT 1 P. M.

Subject: Conference on Asiatic policy, called by and held at the State Department, on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

I appear in answer to your subpena. I will answer your questions thoroughly because of the importance of your inquiry. But I wish to make it clear that I do not intend to make accusations against anyone, nor do I intend to give exoneration to anyone. I will simply and directly state facts. It is your province to form opinions and to reach conclusions.

A complete stenotyped record of the proceedings of the conference was taken by the State Department so that everything I testify to about the conference discussions can be verified from this record.

Before I began to speak at the conference I insisted upon a copy of the transcript of my own statements in the conference and I have this transcript in my possession for verification of my own statements and my own position in the conference.

In considering this matter it is important to have in mind the background at the time.

The conference was held 9 months before the Korean war began.

On April 3, 1949, Peiping radio broadcast a statement of the Red Chinese that

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China would fight on the side of Communist Russia in the event of another world war.

On July 27, 1949, Secretary Acheson had announced that a thorough review of United States policy toward the Far East would be made.

On August 5, 1949, the State Department issued the white paper on China.

On August 6, 1949, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg said that the review of Asiatic policy should not overlook the possibility of finding a way to aid the non-Communists of Asia.

On September 12, 1949, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee recommended 20 to 3 the $1.3 billion military assistance program including $75 million for the general area of China, and Congress passed the measure on September 28, 1949.

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Peoples Republic was proclaimed.

On October 2, 1949, the U. S. S. R. recognized the Chinese Communist Peoples Republic; Bulgaria and Rumania followed on October 3, and Poland and Czechoslovakia followed on October 4.

On October 5, 1949, the line of the internal war in China extended across the nation at a point about 125 miles north of Canton, with the four southern provinces and approximately 40 percent of the people of China not under Communist control.

On October 6, 1949, the conference began.

The prevailing group in the conference was led in the discussions by Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger. They recommended 10 points for American policy in China and in Asia as follows:

1. That Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated first on Western Europe with its industrial strength; that the United States should likewise give priority to Europe.

2. That an aid to Asia program should not be started by the United States until after long and careful study because of the complexity of Asia and the dangers of a Communist charge of United States imperialism.

3. That the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire.

4. That the United States should recognize the Communist Peoples Republic government of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung at an early date.

5. That the United States should encourage the recognition of the Communist Peoples Republic government by Britain and India and follow with its own recognition soon thereafter.

6. That it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist government.

7. That it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted.

8. That Premier Nehru had shown reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia.

9. That the United States should not approve of the blockade of the Communist Chinese coast by the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, should assist in breaking it, and should send economic aid to the area of China under Communist control.

10. That no aid should be sent to the non-Communist Chinese guerrillas in the the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces, and the military supplies en route to them should be cut off.

During the conference I opposed all of these 10 points, and as the stenographic transcript will show I urged the following:

A. That American Asiatic policy should be given immediate attention as I considered Asia to be the No. 1 priority of the Russian Communists and that they would move into the vacuum in Asia at an early date. That this was true because Asia was the vast underbelly of the Soviet Union, and the Communists would not move aggressively toward either Europe or Alaska so long as they were uncertain about Asia.

B. That an American aid-to-Asia program should be promptly established under able men with a headquarters in Bangkok, to assist the non-Communist peoples and that study and action should move forward together as in the Marshall plan.

C. That the Russian Communists were potentially just as aggressive as Hitler and that America should consider aggressive action by the Soviet Union as one of the definite alternative possibilities.

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D. That the United States should not recognize the Communist government in China, and that to do so would be one of the most tragic moves the United States could make in long-term world strategy.

E. That the United States should announce that it considers Formosa a vital part of our perimeter and that we would not permit an armed assault from the mainland on Formosa.

F. That the United States should back up the British at Hong Kong, and that if the British, who must be our close partner in the world, decided to stand and fight at Hong Kong we should back them up with planes and ships.

G. That Nehru was an important leader of the non-Communist areas of Asia, that India should receive economic aid, that he should not be opposed in his effort to develop his third position in the world struggle.

H. That for the sake of world peace and our own security, high American policy should be to prevent Russian Communist imperialistic consolidation of Asia, that every move of opposition to the Communist advance in Asia should be made, and that all forces resisting communism in Asia should be aided militarily as well as economically.

There was considerable support in the discussion for my position, but the Lattimore—Rosinger group prevailed.

Near the conclusion of the sessions I said, directly across the conference table (sec. D, pp. 6 and 7 of the original transcript p. 15 of transcript of Stassen remarks) that the steps advocated by the opposing group could best be characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists and that these steps would be a very sad mistake in American world policy.

Mr. MORRIS. The second, the witness has testified, is a copy of the transcript which was sent to him by the State Department at his request.

The CHAIRMAN. And is a correct transcript, he testified.

That also will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 308," and is as follows:)

TRANSCRIPT OF COMMENT OF HAROLD E. STASSEN AT A SPECIAL CONFERENCE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT REGARDING ASIATIC POLICY HELD ON OCTOBER 6, 7, AND 8, 1949, TO WHICH HE HAD BEEN INVITED BY CABLE TO LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1949.

(Minor editing for grammar and stenographic corrections have been made without change in substance. All discussion was informal without manuscript. Upon first being called upon for views by Dr. Fosdick at about 12 o'clock October 6)

Thank you, Doctor. I might say that it is with considerable reluctance that I explain my position before all these experts. I am willing to do it with the same motives I discussed with Dr. Jessup's committee in September. I state my views in the hope that I might contribute something toward thinking through to a new policy in Asia. I understand that is the process now going on.

I might say that my reluctance to state my views is increased by the fact that present at this table is the man who many years ago attempted to give me my first information about China and Asia, Dr. Harold Quigley, I add, with a smile that he will in no sense be responsible for what I say today even though he did stimulate my original interest in Asia many years ago at the University of Minnesota.

I am willing to give my tentative views very frankly and precisely in order that it might contribute toward seeing where we are at in Asiatic policy.

I have been listening with a great deal of interest to the discussion thus far and will participate as much as I can throughout the remainder of the conference. I am gravely concerned about the future of our American policy in Asia —perhaps more so than I should be—but I give you the basis for my deep concern for your own evaluation.

In my judgment Asia is No. 1 on Russia's board. I think that Russia puts Asia up in first place in her considerations. I say that, notwithstanding the other recognized centers of industrial power in the world that Mr. Kennan discussed this morning. I say that, because the geography of the situation is such that Asia is the underbelly of vast Russia. Russia has one projection out

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toward Europe, and the other projection out toward Alaska, and the underbelly is Asia. The Russians are very security conscious, but I do not agree with Mr. Kennan that you can consider that their thinking is different from Hitler's; that is, I do not feel it is correct to say the Communists are less aggressive in their tendencies than Hitler was.

While it is true the Communists consider that capitalism has the seeds of its own destruction, I understand their doctrine to be that when capitalism sees it is about to be destroyed by those seeds, capitalism will begin an imperialist war. The Communists have demonstrated before, in the case of Finland, that they will take aggressive advance action, in an effort, as they see it, to prepare themselves for an inevitable capitalistic imperialistic war. Thus I say that in our world strategy we should consider aggressive action by the Soviet Union as one of the very definite alternative possibilities. In that sense I put a different interpretation than Mr. Kennan does on the world picture.

Looking at the over-all objectives of our country on a world basis, it seems to me that clearly these objectives are to advance the standards of living and the freedom of peoples throughout the world, and to do so in a world at peace. We are going to have peace, for a generation at least, unless Russia commits aggression. I see very little possibility that there would be any war on this earth of any consequence in the next generation unless Russia commits an act of aggression. Therefore, the great problem of peace in the atomic period focuses down to our key consideration of what will affect the policies of the leaders of the Soviet Union. I believe that so long as the Kremlin leaders are uncertain about the future of Asia and of Asia's attitude, they are not very likely to commit aggression. That is why they are at this time giving great concentration to Asia.

They are starting with their infiltration methods throughout Asia—and not just in China.

I do not feel that within a generation anyone will draw from Asia any great forces or any military potential to play a part in aggressive action toward some other continent. But I do feel that the question of whether the military forces of Asia, limited in their military effectiveness though they may be, need to be contained by one side or the other in a world struggle, might be crucial in a future war. That status of these Asiatic military forces, therefore, might be crucial in a decision by the Kremlin as to whether or not a war should be attempted. That is one reason why there are many indications of concentration on the part of Russia upon Asia as No. 1. They are now in the early stages o' their concentrated attempt to consolidate the vast area of Asia.

Moving on from that analysis it, therefore, follows that very high American policy should be the determination to prevent Russian consolidation of Asia. I have the strong feeling that we are spending altogether too much time thinking of a China policy as a separate matter. I think that is a very unfortunate aspect of our thinking in these recent months and years. I emphasize also that as I see it we are not meeting to either approve or condone any past act, but the question is, Where do we go from here?

I think it is of vital importance that our country adopt a comprehensive Asiatic policy, of which the Chinese situation is an important part but definitely a subordinate part of the whole Asiatic approach. It is not quite so significant how far the Communists advance in China, or just exactly what happens in the Nationalist government or the Communist government of China. The question is, rather, How does all this affect the whole vast area of Asia? As we all know more than half the peoples of Asia are outside of China—in Malaya, Siam, Burma, India, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippine Islands.

Looking at the total situation, our country should at the earliest date, which presumably would be after Congress meets in January, initiate an economic aid-to-Asia program. The exact framework and details must be developed as time goes on, but I think some comment could be made on details at this time.

If we continue for a long period an atmosphere that the United States is waiting to see what happens in Asia, the result is a vacuum. Certainly all the lessons show that the Communists thrive on vacuums. They push into a vacuum with rapidity. So far as possible we must not permit vacuums to be present in Asia. Therefore we should establish an aid-to-Asia program, and we should decide, considering all the total demands upon our resources, what we can afford to spend in Asia. Clearly our own defense forces, the Marshall plan, and the arms for the Atlantic Pact members must all be firm and prior commitments. Our own internal problems of social security for our own people and of expenses of our Government are also demands upon our resources.

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Furthermore, there is a limit to our resources. But it seems to me when you add all those things up, and look at the world picture, we not only can afford up to one-fortieth of our national budget for Asia, or one two-hundredth part of our year's annual income, which is $1 billion a year; but we cannot afford not to do it. We should also establish a headquarters in Asia for the program.

It is my feeling that Bangkok in Siam would be the best headquarters for an American office for an aid-to-Asia program. From this headquarters this affirmative aid program for whatever area remains not under Communist domination in China and in the rest of Asia should be carried on.

In many respects it should be similar to that superb plan in Europe which is named for the distinguished American that sits at this table—the plan that has done so much for the advancement of the world's peace—the Marshall plan. Of course, in other respects it must be very different because the conditions in Asia are so different.

I would say it should be a firm rule of that plan that we do not hand out any aid to or through any governments in Asia because of the experience and the knowledge of the corruption and weakness of those governments. We should consult with governments as to what is to be done, and we should have joint committees for operation; but the aid must be handed out directly through American agents, having in mind not only the corruption, but also the great importance of evidence of aid from the standpoint of good will among the peoples.

In this positive program for China and for the rest of Asia, I would try to do such things as the drilling of wells in those plateaus that have good water—with good well-drilling equipment—the development of land use in conservation and fertilization. Admittedly this would make a small dent on that vast area but those are the types of constructive things that should be carried on. A portion of the program should include underwriting American private capital in going in and developing some of the natural resources of Asia. Underwriting under point 4 or a clause similar to the Marshall plan provision would be appropriate. From the special headquarters in Bangkok, selected for its central location and stability, an air service should be instituted with planes with American flags on them flying once again throughout Asia, carrying officials and some of the minor supplies. Some newsprint and informational services throughout the whole of the Asiatic area should be provided. Of course, measures having to do with health and with education would be included.

In other words, the immediate and the long-term to me are not two separate problems in Asia because there is only one kind of program you can have in Asia and that is a long-term one because it is a long-term continent as I see it in its position with reference to Russia.

Now, then, this economic aid to Asia program I would put up first and carry on regardless of what happens in China. From the military side, which clearly should be a separate program and should be under the direction of our own military leadership, I would emphasize here that there may well be intelligence information on which I do not have, and do not seek to have, which would vitiate the position I take.

I do not feel anyone can be certain that you can write off non-Communist China at this time. I think there should be encouragement to opposition to the Communist advance anywhere in Asia and, with the rough terrain to the south, you might well find there would be considerable pockets of opposition that would continue on for a number of years. During those years of time the problems of the Communists in the rest of China will clearly multiply.

Mr. Kennan has correctly said that China is the most have not of the have-not nations. This is the first time that the Communists have taken over a have-not nation. We all recognize that Russia has tremendous resources. When the Communists took over Russia with its great fields of grain, and mineral resources, and coal mines, they had within their borders a lot of natural resources. Now they are taking over in China what clearly should be characterized, in relation to the numbers of population, a have-not nation. The likelihood is that in these next 2 or 3 years, while the pockets of resistance would continue in the non-Communist China, a great amount of difficulty will arise in those areas under Communist domination, possibly leading to starvation within the Communist area and riots causing great difficulties that no one can foresee.

I had a conversation with one of the men most informed about the whole of China and of Asia. When I asked him at the end of the war what would happen in China, he said: "Governor, if anybody asks you what will happen in China, don't answer him." There is a lot to that kind of advice. Nobody can draw a blueprint for the future of China.

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I do know that in some respects the Communist advance through south China has been slower than was estimated; the advance up in northwest China is faster than was estimated. We are inclined to think, from our standpoint, that the withdrawal of forces show weaknesses. But if you are facing a million men with 250,000 men and with lack of morale maybe the best thing you can do is try to keep your men intact and keep on withdrawing until you get to the very nethermost areas of your country. I mean, China is so different that you should not attempt to appraise it from our standards. I think there is every indication that if we have a basic policy of opposition to the Communist advance, and opposition to the Communist consolidation of Asia, that then we should play out every card of opposition. That, of course, means that it would be unthinkable to recognize the Communist government in China and to withdraw recognition from the Nationalist government. Even though the last vestige of military opposition disappear, in my feeling, very strongly, a number of years should still go by before we recognize that new government. We must remember that the recognition of the new government would have a tremendous impact throughout Asia. It would place the new government with a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations, with full veto power. In my judgment it would be one of the most tragic moves we could make in the long-term world strategy. I feel very strongly that we should not recognize the Communist government in China even though they go on and consolidate the remaining area, which may still be a long way off in the very rugged terrain of the south of China. I am thinking again from an Asiatic and world-wide policy rather than exclusively the China policy.

On the other military question, I am inclined to feel that Formosa is an important strategic area for our own outer perimeter. Here again the military judgment should carry. There are excellent airfields in Formosa. If antagonistic air bases exist on Formosa the Philippine Islands and Japan are quite effectively severed from each other. Formosa is immediately astride of the airway and direct seaway. We should have in mind the psychological effect of a firm position and the fact that Formosa is still in an uncertain legal position because when the war ended, Formosa was not given the Nationalist government.

China was only given the right to go on Formosa to disarm the Japanese. There had been no peace treaty, no decision handing Formosa to China. The legal situation as to Formosa is an uncertain one and an undecided one. In view of that and in view of the picture in China, I feel that we ought to ask the United Nations to take the position that an attack on Formosa would not be countenanced at this time. Obviously, the United Nations could not take such action under the veto of Russia. We should then announce that we consider Formosa a very vital part of our perimeter and that we would not permit an exterior armed assault on Formosa. That is a very firm position to take. I think the whole picture requires some of that kind of firmness. If Formosa falls by internal infiltration, I feel we should not and cannot take action to counteract that. We should not land troops on Formosa, but we should take a firm position against assault from the mainland of China upon Formosa.

I think if the British take a stand in Hong Kong we ought to back the British up with everything they want us to back them up with in Hong Kong. These are matters of alternative, and if the British, who must be our close partner in this world picture, decide they are going to stand and fight, what do we do? Do we appear before the world as weak and indecisive? Do we back away from our British friends, or do we send ships and give them some air cover and do that sort of thing and indicate that we stand with them in a firm position against the Communist assault on Hong Kong? I grant these are grave decisions, but I think the whole picture demands that kind of very firm action. This military side leads to the question of Pacific pact. I know of these statements of Quirino and Rhee, and others. I cannot see that an affirmative Pacific pact of the nature of the Atlantic pact can be solidly formed at this time because I do not believe that India could join such a pact now, and I think that India must be a major consideration in our Pacific policy.

Therefore I think we ought to say to Quirino and Rhee that we do not think they should take action unless Nehru joins in it, and that will automatically defer it and cause a more gradual policy in that area. It ought to be our position that as far as association of the non-Communist area of Asia, it should not move any faster than Nehru is willing and India is willing to go along with it. We should develop an economic relationship in India which, I understand, the British have made more open to us now, by sending in equipment to assist in the development of hydroelectric power and of dams, engineers and capital and

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supplies and all that that involves. With these measures should be included constant pressure—not too great, but definite—upon the Dutch and the French to work out their situations in Indochina and in the Indies on a favorable basis. Perhaps if the Dutch policy now evolves into fair stability that pattern might be the basis of pressure on the French to try to move in the same direction. It will be slow and difficult; there will be set-backs; but I think it is the unending kind of thing we must do in Asia. I do feel strongly that adopting an over-all coordinated policy and putting it under able men who are out there in a headquarters at Bangkok, and who will then give it body and sinew and detail—much as did General Marshall and then Paul Hoffman in the Marshall plan—that kind of a development out of the beginnings of a broad policy will lead to a hopeful situation. I am perfectly willing to contemplate that the Communist advance might go a lot farther before it subsides, and the question of its subsiding is really the question of our own fundamental future.

That's an outline of my thinking and I state it not with an attitude that here are the answers, but more to expose in definite form a set of thinking that has developed over a period of years so that it might be differed with, it might be modified, and we might contribute toward an answer. I have purposely refrained from discussing the situation publicly since the white paper was published because I felt that by direct conferences with Dr. Jessup and such as this there might be a better chance of developing governmental policy than by any public debate at this stage, at least, on the situation.

[Later in the conference after a question:]

We might focus on the economic program for a bit. Supose, as I envisage it, that in various areas of south Asia American economic aid is coming in and getting some results in improved crops, in slightly better living conditions, in improved water and irrigation, and all that goes with it; whereas up in the Communist area of China they are going into a real economic tailspin. Is not that the kind of circumstance that over a period of a few years would begin to make some sense and give some answer to the great promises and claims of the Communists in Asia. I do not see where you have really differed in your specifics to that kind of an approach, and I do emphasize that if we pour in large sums of money in the hands of governments it is very unlikely that it gets out to the peasants. So what I am emphasizing is that what we do should be in terms of simple farm implements and of well-drilling equipment and of the simplest kinds of things put directly in the hands of the people without charge. Then it would be very hard for them to label that as imperialistic.

I agree that you should not require that they have an affirmative anti-Communist program politically as a prerequisite for economic aid; you should simply require that they be non-Communist-dominated and on that basis move on your economic aid.

Dr. Fosdick, to answer that I would say that it is very important, but I don't say that it is a prerequisite. In other words, I feel that the whole of Asia is such a vast problem that you cannot say anything is a prerequisite to the program. Just as the matter of studying just how you do these economic things, granted they need continuous study, but if we wait until we conclude our studies until we act, why we will all be dead before there is any action. So my feeling is that nobody could have painted out the Marshall plan when Dr. Marshall made that great presentation at Harvard. But after an exchange of views men were placed in charge of a program. Then study and action went forward together. That's what I feel is needed in Asia—study and action going on at the same time.

I, of course, do not mean to go in in spite of local governments or use American power to force our way in on the economic program. I mean that we go in with the permission and with joint working arrangements with the local governments, as we have in fact done in some of the South American countries. But there should be this distinction in the actual distribution of material—that is, that the prerequisite of our reaching agreement with the local government is that we be on hand in the distribution, so that it does not go into the black market and does not get dissipated as happened to so much of the former economic aid in Asia.

Dr. Fosdick, I want to clarify my position. I think Mr. Lattimore was under a misapprehension. By what I said regarding American aid, I did not mean to indicate that Asia was an exclusive problem of our country. I fully realize the interrelation of Europe and Asia and the whole world. But what I wish to emphasize is that when we are the country that has the most; when we actually, with about one-sixteenth of the world's people, produce one-third of the world's

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goods and services, we do have a very heavy responsibility toward this great continent and its have-not peoples there.

It has key relevance in the world security aspect with reference to Russia. I do not indicate that we try to pass upon whether there are any Communist tendencies in any country before giving economic aid, but I do feel strongly that if there is Communist dominance of a country, we should not go in with an economic aid program.

I feel that there is a grave clash of ways of life that has far-reaching implications for the future, and it is foolhardy for us to pour what is admittedly a limited resource into the area under Communist dominance. I not only feel that from a positive program but I think that in fact it would be quite academic to argue to the contrary. We must remember the realities: That we are talking about a program that will require congressional action for money and you will never get through Congress.

Question from the floor: Would you condone the Yugoslav policy?

I will get to that in a minute. You will never get through Congress a program that would permit the giving of economic aid to the Communist-dominated sectors of China. There are those who advocate aid to the Communist areas of China in the hope there would develop a form of Communist Titoism there. That has a false promise. Tito did not move away from Russia because of any promise of aid on the part of this country toward him. As a matter of fact, he moved away at a time when we had been very firm with him following the shooting down of United States planes. As long as he could follow a position of in effect taking directions from Russia and taking resources from us, that was the role he played. But when he had to choose, and chose Moscow, then came up against the result of his choice and the tightening of the screws by Russia, then the famous break came.

I actually asked Tito in March of 1947 whether he was going to take his economic direction from the Soviet Union and he got up from the luncheon table and paced up and down and said, "We are learning much from the socialist experience of the Soviet but Yugoslavia is a sovereign country. We all fought in the mountains—General Velebit (his interpreter) fought in the mountains." He was agitated on the nationalist angle. Now having made the break, I think it is right that we should be able to give some limited aid. But I think we should couple it with some insistence that there be a gradual moving toward more freedom in Yugoslavia, even though it be very slow and very gradual. The direction of movement of a government while receiving American aid should be toward the freedom of its people. Clearly American aid should not go in when the direction of the movement of a government is to the contrary and against the freedom of its people.

When it is the over-all aspect of security and the problem of Russia, then we need to think of the world strategy that is involved. I definitely do not agree that any softness toward the Communists of China will give a better prospect of Titoism developing. I say it should be firm and clear: If a country is under Communist dominance, it does not qualify for American generosity. If a country breaks with communism, then there will be American generosity. I think that should be clearly our action in this economic aid struggle.

As to being accused of imperialism, I think it is elementary that as long as we are producing more than the rest of the countries and living at a higher standard of living, we are going to be accused of imperialism in every argument that comes up all over the world regardless of what you do. If you let the accusation of imperialism stop you from a clearly indicated program of action, it would be a sad day.

Thus we need to move carefully, with all possible consideration of utilizing the nationalism Mr. Taylor emphasized, but definitely move. In the movement try to negate the charge of imperialism, but do not let that charge stop you from moving.

Mention has been made of India as a center of Asiatic operation. As I indicated before, I agree on Nehru and India being of great importance. But it would be a mistake to put our Asiatic headquarters in India, because on the one hand there is the sensitivity of India toward the British, just having come out from under, and a greater sensitivity there toward others coming in than there would be in other areas of Asia.

You would also get into the question of India and Pakistan, and the Hindu and Moslem religious issues in having our headquarters in India.

Someone suggested that our headquarters should be in Manila. The atmosphere then would be that we were returning to Manila rather than beginning

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a new Asiatic program. There is not the degree of democracy you would ideally desire in Siam. The strong man's record with reference to the Japanese in early 1942 is not good, but when you consider that Siam with approximately 17,000,000 people has one of the least dense populations and best food resources and greatest element of stability and a good location for travel by sea and air, I think you will come to feel that Bangkok is the logical center on the mainland of Asia for a long-term American aid program. Also, you have the fact that the terrain is additional security as to both Burma and Malaya, so for the greatest possible Communist onslaught, Bangkok would apparently be the last place to fall either by attack or infiltration, even if you take a black look at the future. That is why I am inclined to urge Bangkok as a center of Asiatic economic aid.

I emphasize that it is not to be a unilateral program and not to be one that we in America will do alone. It must be an aid to the people in Asia that help themselves. But let us be sure it will get to the people and not to corrupt elements in the governments. It will be a delicate operation. Let us also be certain we do not become involved in a joint operation with the British or French in a way that would bring to us the onus of their past colonial position. We do have a more favorable reputation in most of Asia than they do. While we must work closely with them in the world picture, let us not give ourselves this handicap in a new aid program by tying ourselves too closely to them.

Dr. Fosdick, I would say that clearly there should be consultation with the United Nations agencies and the utilization of them at every possible turn, but I cannot conceive that you could turn over the substance of American aid to be decided by United Nations agencies in Asia for a number of reasons. One is the aspect of the colonial powers being in there. The other is the amount of aid we give would fall so far short of what could well be used that I do not feel you could have the division of allocation that would parallel the OEEC in Europe. I think we would need to keep a more detailed control of the funds and of the goods in Asia than we do in Europe. I do grant and would urge that the United Nations agencies should be used to every degree possible.

I just want to say that I associate myself with Dr. Talbot and others who say that we must not try to have the Indians take positive sides between the Communists and ourselves. I think we must let that picture develop on pretty much their own pattern, and I also emphasize the view that you should try to get the greatest amount of the business approach into the situation, more of the underwriting and self-respect approach to the people of India. That is why, too, the Pacific Pact proposal, which might cause India to be outside of it, would be a very bad move, in my judgment.

Dr. Jessup, I might say first that I regret very much that I have not been able to sit through the entire conference. I made the greatest possible readjustment of my schedule when I received the invitation to be here and I will address myself very concisely to the point now under discussion and through the kind assistance of Dr. Talbot, I had some briefing of the discussion, and particularly of General Marshall's able presentation this morning.

I stated on Thursday that I was opposed to recognition of the North Government in China at this time and not at least for a question of a couple of years. I want to go into that a little more thoroughly because at that time I merely stated my position on it.

My first comment is on some of the related discussion this morning that has been advanced that along with recognition other steps we ought to take were proposed. I say, frankly, these steps, to me, could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. I think that would be the correct characterization of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date.

To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy. If we recognize the Communist Government of China now, clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other Government—the Nationalist Government—but that we must then join in affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no halfway measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we a great leading nation, take a different position to that. Nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So, we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations, with our great prestige, and throw out from that United Nations the representative of whatever you may wish to call them—the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think

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will for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance to the Communist areas.

Now, to put ourselves in that position in my mind, cannot be countenanced and I might urge, as I go forward, and respectfully submit that there have been some implications that perhaps those that oppose recognition are trying to play the popular tune in America, and the high view of statesmanship is the contrary and difficult and unpopular course. I will not attempt to draw any cloak of statesmanship about me this morning, or any other time, but I would modestly state that the steps that I took in the early days of opposition to Hitler and lend-lease and the whole question of isolation and world trade have not been popular courses at the time they were taken particularly in my home part of the country. To the greatest degree, it is possible, I approach these policies from the standpoint of what is right in the long view for our country and our ideals rather than what is the current popular view. In fact, I have such faith in democracy that if a policy is right, then I am certain you can interpret it to the American people and convince the majority of them it is right.

Going to the specifics of recognition, it seems to me that taking the affirmative stand of ejecting the Nationalist Government from the United Nations and placing in its stead the Communist Government of the north would be a clear invitation to a disregard of our fundamental ideals and objectives in the world picture. Whatever else may be said about the Nationalist Government, it seems to me that there has been a greater measure of democracy, a greater measure of individual freedom, the right of free expression, of a free press, of the communication of news in that area than there has been in any of the Communist areas of the world.

I might project my views of the Communist Government of north China. I believe that in the early stages they have brought in some of those who are not Communists into leadership—some of those we might call moderates. In the early stages they will say to the American businessman, if your country treats us better and recognizes us that will facilitate your doing business here. However, you will find quite rapidly as they consolidate their control over the country, and as they introduce people into these industries and businesses who learn something about them, they will proceed to throw out the moderates from the Government and will tighten up and possibly expropriate and take over the businesses, and that process will move forward steadily.

In saying that I anticipate that the pattern followed in Communist China will be the same as the Communist pattern in the Balkan area. I have a vivid recollection of a conference with President Benes of Czechoslovakia 2½ years ago in which he stated that Czechoslovakia was cooperating with the Soviet Union. He thought it was the best policy and that they were seeking to build a bridge between east and west and he had been pledged cooperation by Stalin. Benes thought it was the right policy for his country, and Stalin had pledged to him that Czechoslovakia could work out its solution in a broad democratic framework.

I think it is quite clear now that approach was used to Benes and other people of Czechoslovakia as a means of getting control, first, of the police and of the Department of Industries. After getting the Communists into the various industries they took over completely. Now week after week and month after month they obliterate more human rights and they bring the country under iron-handed dictatorship. The record in Poland has been similar to that.

If that effort is made in China, I believe you will find then disaffection of some of the generals in the Communist armies of China which will have to be met by rapid liquidation and new leaders being set in. Or it might involve a real split up and further division within the vast area of China in its leadership. This process, as I vision it, while the armies are in being and still moving about, would take place within the next few years, and I would think it would be regretted if we added to the prestige of the Communist Government of China, and then a process of this kind began to take place and we in fact would be in the position of always strengthening the hand of the new Communist government, which would be successively wiping out the liberties, freedoms, and opportunities of the Chinese people and would be putting down the efforts of those who wanted some nationalism in China and who wanted some independence and who were breaking away from the Communist leadership.

In my mind the plusses are very large on the side of saying that we want to watch this picture for a couple of years before we recognize the Communist Government of China. We may well find that just as the experts' anticipations

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have been unfounded so many times in China, that the anticipation and prediction now that the Communist armies can consolidate all China on their own timetable may meet many a reverse in some of the mountain passes by some of the troops who begin to defend their own territory as compared with defending an area far away from home.

Nobody knows the future under the frailties of the human race. Chiang Kai-shek in more recent months and years has had an unfortunate conclusion of what in many respects was a brilliant and remarkable career. Who knows but that Chiang at his age may pass from the picture and others may rise in the uncertain period of a few years and that in that we might find grounds perhaps; first, for a withdrawal of the full powers of the Nationalist Government in the United Nations, and perhaps even a request for a United Nations commission to study the situation in China, and that we might thereby gain time. We might serve notice that we are watching what the new government is doing in the matter of observing the recognized international amenities, and how it is treating American businessmen and missionaries; and how it is going about the obligations of international treaties; before we move in to recognize and to urge their seating in the United Nations.

I regret that I have not heard in detail the other arguments, but just what could be gained in that kind of a picture by a rapid recognition, I cannot evaluate as a counterbalance. It seems to me that after some period of time a group of men such as this could be assembled again to reevaluate the situation as to recognition and then analyze Russian dominance. In the meantime, let it be known that we are studying their independence on each of it.

Certainly the situation as to Tito is no indication that you move people away from the Soviet Union by being generous to them. He moved away at a time when we were being most firm and clearly classifying him in that area. On the other hand he was professing his association with the Soviet Union at a time when he could do that and still retain full American aid and full American assistance under UNRRA. There was no reason then for him to take any other position. But when he had to make a choice with the increasing tightening up of domination by the Soviet Union, he made the choice to move away.

If there are indications in China in the future of moving away from Moscow and of a greater recognition of rights of people within North China, that would be the moment at which we might decide to recognize and send assistance. But at a time when all statements being made by the leaders and the Communist Government are insulting and attacking our country, when the treatment of nationals is at a low ebb, clearly that is not a time to think of recognition. I think our prestige is involved in all of Asia and all we have done and all we will do.

I make the further point on this that by all means we should have a new aid to Asia economic program under way and functioning before we recognize the Communist government of the north of China.

If at a stage such as the present when the world says, what is America's Asia policy; the one outstanding fact was to be that we recognized the Communist Government of North China and joined in throwing out of the United Nations the Government that stood firm in the years of Japanese invasion; I think the result would be very sad. But if we start a new affirmative approach of aid to Asia in a positive way, and if our new American program and policy begins to project itself and be understood, if at that stage we find the intelligence officers' reports are of complete consolidation, and if at that stage we find there is an element of increasing stability and respect for rights rather than the reverse in the north of China, then at that stage I think recognition should be given after a full consideration—but not before.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, I wonder if you will address yourself to the first of those 10 points and tell us what opposition was expressed at this conference.

Mr. STASSEN. The first point that they had urged was that Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated first on Western Europe with its industrial strength; that the United States should likewise give priority to Europe.

It was my view before and expressed at the conference and since that American Asiatic policy should be given immediate attention be-

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cause I considered that Asia was the No. 1 priority of the Russian Communists at that time and that they would move into the vacuum in Asia at an early date. I said that in no uncertain terms in this transcript that you have.

I said this was true because Asia was the vast underbelly of the Soviet Empire and that the Communists would not move aggressively toward either Europe or Alaska, so long as they were uncertain about this vast underbelly below their great projection. In fact, in the conference with Dr. Jessup in September, we brought down the maps from the university to explain that whole situation and our basic analysis of it.

The CHAIRMAN. That was with Dr. Jessup?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That was your September meeting with him?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, when we used the maps, but the same points were made as the transcript will show, in the October meeting. But at that time we had official State Department maps on the wall and we did not bring our own maps down.

Mr. MORRIS. For what purpose did you use the maps, Governor?

Mr. STASSEN. To give emphasis and clarity to our analysis of the world strategic situation, that it was foolhardy for America to be thinking only in terms of Europe and to leave a vacuum in Asia in which I was positive the Communists would move in, and that would upset the whole world situation. That was the plea I was making at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not seem apparent to you that if it was deferred and only studied that the Communists might take over all of China, and southeast Asia, for that matter?

Mr. STASSEN. Exactly. If you deferred and studied that, then you left a vacuum and an atmosphere of hopelessness and you fitted in then with the Communist charge that America was neglecting and didn't care about what happened to the people in Asia, so that you left that weakness in Asia and weakness in American position during these crucial months.

Remember now, this is the point when the civil war is going on in China with approximately half the people on each side of the line, and these are the crucial months that you are going through. That was why I urged so strongly that I was certain that Asia was No. 1 on Russia's board and that America must countermove promptly.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this the beginning of the let-the-dust-settle policy?

Mr. STASSEN. That was in the middle of it, and I was trying to change it, and I was trying to get a positive policy instead of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been in a position to observe any implementation of that recommended policy?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. From that time on, and again on up into the Korean war, and specifically through the conference that was held in March of 1950, at the State Department, in which they had leaders of many organizations present, there was always a sort of general discussion of doing something in Asia and never a concrete moving ahead, always a continuing general talking back and forth and not a specific implementation and moving on a countering program.

Senator FERGUSON. On the second item, if we waited and did nothing to avoid the Communist charging us with imperialism, that also would

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play into the hands of the Communists much better and in a much stronger manner than their charge of imperialism; would it not?

Mr. STASSEN. It would leave the same vacuum there that the others could move into; yes. I can recall that part of the discussion very much, and I had told them then, and it will appear in the transcript, that as long as we were a nation of great success and great resources the Communists would always be charging us with imperialism, whatever we did, and that the real way to answer it was to have a broad world-wide approach to the economic gain of other peoples. That was the answer that I made at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That is point No. 2, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, point No. 2. There was this extended discussion on their part that you did not know just what would happen in one country or another and the relations between them, and therefore you had to do a lot of studying; that you could not start anything unless you did a lot of studying, and they constantly brought that up. I insisted that you should establish the program, put able men in charge of it, just as Paul Hoffman was put in charge of the Marshall plan, and then have the study and the action go forward together. Of course, you should study, but you just should not sit still and study and leave a vacuum in Asia.

I stated specifically a headquarters should be established in Bangkok to show that America meant business, and then go forward studying and acting at the same time to assist the non-Communist portions of Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Has there been any implementation of that particular recommendation on the part of this prevailing group, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. After Korea, long after Korea—in fact, in December of last year—the first recommendation was brought up by the State Department for aid to India in the form of wheat, which was then acted on a couple of months later. The first tangible moves on the point 4, which is partially in this area, but is not the direct kind of program that was then recommended, came forward; but from the time of this conference until Korea broke there was just a continuation of the delay and the study which had been recommended by the Lattimore group and no positive implementation such as our group had recommended.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, will you address yourself to the third point?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the third point?

Mr. STASSEN. The third point was that the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire.

I contended that the Russian Communists were potentially just as aggressive as Hitler—I pointed out Finland as an example—and that America should consider that aggressive military action by the Soviet Union was one of the definite alternative possibilities and that we should have that in mind in our policy.

But then, again, between that conference and the outbreak of the Korean war, there was no action taken to strengthen the military readiness or alertness of this country on the Soviet perimeter, but rather that attitude that they were not going to move by military

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force persisted until they proved when they went across the line at Korea that our analysis was right and that the analysis they urged was wrong.

Senator JENNER. When were our troops taken out of Korea?

Mr. STASSEN. In June 1949, just before this conference; June 29, 1949, the last 1,500 troops of the United States Army left South Korea, leaving a military mission to aid in training South Koreans.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, it appears now that you were correct in your views because aggression did take place in Korea, and of course they would be correct if you did not do anything about it and created the vacuum and allowed them to penetrate without force, which was their first two points, was it not?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, will you address yourself to the fourth point?

Mr. STASSEN. The fourth point was that the United States should recognize the Communist Peoples Republic government of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung at an early date.

That, of course, has continued to be an issue up to this time with the declaration since Korea on the part of the officials of our Government that we would not recognize the Chinese Peoples Republic.

Senator JENNER. Has not our Government taken the attitude that we are not going to permit Red China to fight its way into the United Nations?

Mr. STASSEN. That is one of the statements that was made. I think General Marshall said, "Shoot its way in."

Senator JENNER. That does not preclude the fact that if you could stop the war, and so forth, and Great Britain and the other nations recognize them, then we could recognize?

Mr. STASSEN. There has been much public discussion since Korea of this issue.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a very live subject at that time because just 5 or 6 days before the Communist government claimed this sovereign power.

Mr. STASSEN. It was a very hot subject at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. The country was evenly divided both as to people and territory; is that not so?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So, about 6 days afterward, they were advocating that we recognize the Communist Government, which would have been, of course, withdrawal of our recognition from the Nationalists?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, would you care to comment under the heading of implementation of that point?

Mr. STASSEN. The fourth and fifth tie in together.

In the discussion it was urged by the Lattimore group that the United States should encourage the recognition of the Communist Peoples Republic government by Britain and India and then follow with its own recognition soon thereafter. Of course, in the implementation, which we were following at the time, that is exactly what happened.

On November 16, Mr. Bevin, in the House of Commons, said, on

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the question of recognition of Communist China, they were waiting for the United States and others to make the same decision. Then on January 5, 1950, in other words a few months after this conference, Britain did recognize Red China, which, on the surface, indicates the implementation of the recommendations of the Lattimore group in the October conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when India recognized them?

Mr. STASSEN. India recognized them on December 30, of 1949, in other words, just 5 days before Britain.

So these two recognitions, which were in the conference urged as the way to lead it off, did take place.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what public opinion was around that time or after Britain and after India did recognize Communist China? In your opinion, was there a strong public opinion here in America against our recognition?

Mr. STASSEN. It was a divided opinion. I don't remember any polls at that particular period on it. In fact, I haven't followed the polls so much on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, did you hear any person publicly identified with the policy making of the United States Government express a prediction or a recommendation that the United States should recognize Communist China?

Mr. STASSEN. Did I hear them publicly express?

Mr. MORRIS. Or privately express.

Mr. STASSEN. In the conference, Mr. Butterworth of the State Department said that when the Communist Chinese crossed the Yangtze River, which, as I recall, would have been about April of 1949, that then this Government had approached these other governments as to their views about recognizing the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. We have had testimony before this committee, Governor Stassen, by General Fortier of General MacArthur's staff that Ambassador Jessup early in January 1950 expressed the view to him that the United States was about to recognize Communist China in a period of 2 or 3 weeks.

I was wondering if you heard publicly or privately such a prediction or such an expression of opinion.

Mr. STASSEN. No; I did not, but that testimony would tie in exactly with what the Lattimore group had said in the October conference. In other words, in the October conference they had said that the United States should encourage India and Britain to act first and then the United States should follow a couple of weeks afterward so that that would exactly relate to the testimony you recite to me from Mr. Fortier, but I do not know that first-hand from Mr. Fortier or from Mr. Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what date Mr. Jessup arrived in Japan?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. He arrived in Japan on January 6th of 1950, 5th or 6th. There is a change in date line between Japan and here and I am not just positive what date line applies here.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any expression of policy made in connection with that particular visit of Ambassador Jessup to Japan?

Mr. STASSEN. The day that Ambassador Jessup arrived in Japan, the President of the United States announced that the United States had no intention of providing military aid or advice to the Nationalists on Formosa or of using its Armed Forces to interfere there, which was

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widely characterized as the abandonment of Formosa by the United States, which was another one of the public indications of the implementing of the Lattimore group's policies which we followed in these succeeding months. That occurred before Ambassador Jessup saw General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Governor, that policy was announced before General MacArthur's opinion was made known, at least verbally, to Jessup?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, before there was an opportunity to make it known.

Senator FERGUSON. You had indicated that your opinion was that Jessup should see General MacArthur?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. About the Far East?

Mr. STASSEN. About the whole series of recommended points, which I said would be tragic for America.

Senator WATKINS. Do you remember who represented the State Department at this conference?

Mr. STASSEN. Not all of them. There were, I would say, eight or nine officials in and out on the different days. Of course, on the opening day, as I said, Dr. Fosdick presided. Later on, Dr. Jessup presided. Some came in for briefing. A number were sitting there taking notes that never were identified, so I do not know who they all were.

Senator WATKINS. Was Secretary Marshall there?

Mr. STASSEN. General Marshall was there but he was not then Secretary. General Marshall sat on the extreme right end of the table and Mr. Jessup at the extreme left end of the table.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether General Marshall expressed himself on any of these points?

Mr. STASSEN. General Marshall, on the opening of the third day, before I arrived, gave a statement which was then briefed to me and it was then indicated—it will show, of course, in the transcript—he did not go into any of these specific points, as it was then indicated to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he was present at the time Lattimore was advocating some of these points?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; he was.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it to Lattimore or Jessup that you expressed your hope that the policy put out by the Lattimore group would not be carried out?

Mr. STASSEN. To Dr. Jessup.

The CHAIRMAN. I caught it to be to Lattimore.

Mr. STASSEN. No, it was to Dr. Jessup that I said that. I pleaded with him not to implement the Lattimore policy. This, you understand, was at the recess of the third day when I saw the way the discussion was going, and when I felt strongly as to the tragic implications of it for our country.

The CHAIRMAN. He expressed himself contrary to your views?

Mr. STASSEN. He said he felt the greater logic was on the position advanced by the Lattimore group.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, we have partially covered point No. 6, namely, that it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist government, but lest we miss anything that

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may appear in your notes or in the transcript, is there anything more you can add by way of expression of opposition to that or by way of implementation to that?

Mr. STASSEN. I discussed that extensively in the conference. I took the position that the United States should announce that it considered Formosa a vital part of our perimeter of defense and that we would not permit an armed assault from the mainland on Formosa. That will be found at the bottom of page 7 of the transcript as given to you. It starts out:

On the other military question, I am inclined to feel that Formosa is an important strategic area for our own outer perimeter.

Remember, this is 2 years ago, before all of this military discussion, but I felt it from knowing it during the war. You see, we sailed all around Formosa with Admiral Halsey's fleet and I knew the information as to the strategic position of Formosa.

Then I referred to the maps, and I said:

If antagonistic air bases exist on Formosa the Philippine Islands and Japan are quite effectively severed from each other. Formosa is immediately astride of the airway and direct seaway. We should have in mind the psychological effect of a firm position and the fact that Formosa is still in an uncertain legal position because when the war ended, China was not given the Nationalist Government—

I mean Formosa was not given to the Nationalist Government.

There has been no peace treaty, no decision handing Formosa to China—

and so forth.

Then when they could not count me on the analysis of the perimeter, they said, furthermore it will do no good to defend Formosa from attack on the mainland. Formosa is going to fall from interior infiltration inside Formosa because of the weakness of Chiang's generals and the greater amount of communism on Formosa.

I said that is contrary to my information and I did not believe that Formosa would fall by internal infiltration.

That was the argument they pushed on the matter of giving up Formosa at that time.

Then in the implementation of that position in the ensuing months, on December 23 of 1949, in other words, a little over 2 months after this conference, the State Department sent a memorandum to foreign personnel throughout the world playing down the importance of Formosa. That memorandum has been entered into the records of the Armed Services Committee in recent weeks, but it went to everybody, the Voice of America, and all our representatives all over the world, in effect preparing the way to giving up Formosa.

That was another evidence to me, as I was following it, that the Lattimore policy was being implemented in the ensuing months.

Senator JENNER. Governor, if Dr. Jessup had followed your suggestion before he went out to confer with General MacArthur, he could easily have ascertained that General MacArthur determined that Formosa was the main key to the chain of defense for the security of this country; is that not correct?

Mr. STASSEN. It is clear now. As I said, I had not talked to General MacArthur before I said these things. We now know from General MacArthur's testimony that he at all times felt that way, that For-

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mosa must be held, and he said that to everyone who asked him in these various conferences, both military and diplomatic, since the war.

Of course, you see, in following this thing through in trying to analyze it, it is a fact that Dr. Jessup took the boat from San Francisco to Japan to see General MacArthur. In other words, he went by boat and not by air. He left San Francisco, I believe, on December 21. He arrived in Japan on January 6. During the time he was en route on the sea, the State Department memorandum on Formosa was issued around the world. India recognized Red China. Britain recognized Red China, and President Truman announced we had no intention of defending Formosa. Then the day after that Mr. Jessup arrived for the conference with General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, did you know that even prior to the issuing of the note on the 23d to the world, in fact, that is, the State Department in various parts of the world, that they were at the first part of December, or around the 1st of December, circulating the report that China was going to fall, that Formosa was going to fall from within, and therefore could not be defended? Did you ever hear that?

Mr. STASSEN. We were told that in this October conference. We were argued against on that, and the so-called briefing of an intelligence basis attempted to give credence to it. Of course, I have had enough experience during the war with intelligence briefing to know that we were not really given an intelligence briefing. We were given a sort of presentation to fit in with what was being recommended.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt that is what was happening in the various embassies in the Far East?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Governor, did you follow the testimony given before the Foreign Relations Committee when the hearings were held on the Atlantic Pact?

Mr. STASSEN. Quite closely.

Senator WATKINS. Do you recall the questions that were asked of General Bradley with respect to our defenses in the Far East when he outlined the Territory of Alaska, the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and left out Formosa?

Mr. STASSEN. That was Secretary Acheson's speech to the Press Club.

Senator WATKINS. What I am calling your attention to is General Bradley's testimony given for the Foreign Relations Committee. He responded to a question I asked him with respect to our far-eastern line. He had already stated that the defense line in Europe was on the Elbe, and I asked him then where it was in the Far East. He left out Formosa.

I wondered if that had any significance.

Mr. STASSEN. I am not aware of that testimony. I do not know anything about it.

Senator WATKINS. As I remember, that is what he said.

Mr. STASSEN. I do not know.

Senator WATKINS. If that is true, that would indicate that the State Department was probably acting in conjunction with the Defense Department.

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Mr. STASSEN. I would rather not attempt to characterize something, particularly if I have not seen the original testimony, and I have not seen that testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, would you care to develop the next point for us, please?

Mr. STASSEN. That it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there opposition to that point expressed?

Mr. STASSEN. Definitely. I insisted that we must back up the British in the then Asiatic picture and show strength rather than weakness. I said, and it will show on page 8 of the transcript——

I think if the British take a stand in Hong Kong we ought to back the British up with everything they want us to back them up with in Hong Kong. These are matters of alternative, and if the British, who must be our close partner in this world picture, decide they are going to stand and fight, what do we do? Do we appear before the world as weak and indecisive? Do we back away from our British friends, or do we send ships and give them some air cover and do that sort of thing and indicate that we stand with them in a firm position against the Communist assault in Hong Kong? I grant these are grave decisions, but I think the whole picture demands that kind of very firm action.

That, of course, was one of the hot arguments of the conference. I just felt that if we showed that kind of weakness and backed away from the British, as they were urging, that it would have a very deteriorating effect throughout Asia and throughout the world.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything to be said by way of implementation of that recommendation on the part of the group?

Mr. STASSEN. There was a statement, one of these sort of official information, from the State Department, in November of the following month, that the United States had no intention of defending Hong Kong.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, will you develop point No. 8?

Mr. STASSEN. That Premier Nehru had shown reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia.

I insisted then, and I had a great amount of support on this point in the conference, that Premier Nehru was an important leader in the non-Communist areas of Asia, that there frequently would be difficulty in understanding him because of the difference of the Hindu background and all of the multiple problems of India, but that in my judgment he definitely was non-Communist, he was being attacked by the Communists, and that India should receive economic aid and that Nehru should not be opposed in his effort to develop his third position in the world struggle. That position that I took in that respect was then ridiculed by the Lattimore group in the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Actually, subsequent to that time, the attacks on Nehru were discontinued, were they not, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. No. Months subsequent to that, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any information or any evidence to give us which would indicate why this change had taken place? That is, why the Communists were criticizing Nehru at this particular time, and today apparently they seem to be taking a different position?

Mr. STASSEN. They are not really taking a different position at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not?

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Mr. STASSEN. The Communists are still attacking Nehru. They play various angles in time, but the basic Communist approach is still trying to tear down Nehru and to get Communist leadership in India, but at any time that Nehru takes a position that is opposed to something that the United States is doing, then the Communists will back him on that particular thing; but as far as the continuing leadership of Nehru, the Communists continue to endeavor to undermine him and oppose him in this and to weaken him. That is very extreme.

In the Voprosy Economiki, which is a Russian Communist publication, you will find this language:

> In India Nehru has turned from a left-wing congressite and exposer of imperialism into a nimble servant of two masters, Britain and the United States, into an ally of the Indian princes and landowners, a bloody strangler of the progressive forces of India.

In other words, that is the attack the Communists make on Nehru.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that attack?

Mr. STASSEN. That is October 26, 1949.

There has been no basic change in that on the part of the Communists except as they will play a particular issue versus the United States.

You understand further that the Lattimore group's opposition to Nehru in the October 1949 conference was not on the basis that he was pro-Communist. It was on the basis that he had shown reactionary tendencies, reactionary and arbitrary tendencies, and therefore should not be backed by the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you address yourself to the next point, point No. 9?

Mr. STASSEN. That the United States should not approve of the blockade of the Communist Chinese coast by the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, should assist in breaking it, and should send economic aid to the area of China under Communist control.

I had strong support in the conference that for the sake of world peace and our own security, high American policy should be to prevent Russian Communist imperialistic consolidation of Asia, and that every move of opposition to the Communist advance in Asia should be made, and that all forces resisting communism in Asia should be aided militarily as well as economically.

In other words, that we should have a consistent unending policy in opposition to the Communist advance.

Subsequent to the conference, on this point, I noted that on November 16, in other words, 6 weeks after the conference, Secretary Acheson publicly protested the Nationalist Chinese firing on the *Flying Cloud* which was running the Nationalist blockade and taking supplies in to the Communist Chinese, which, of course, appeared to me to be an implementation of the view that had been advanced in the conference by the Lattimore group.

Then on December 3 Secretary Acheson said that the United States did not recognize the legality of the Nationalist Chinese blockade and protested the shelling of the United States ship of the Isbrandtsen line, which was a further indication of following those recommendations.

Then when Korea broke, and the United States intervened in Korea, at the same time the United States Seventh Fleet was told to prevent

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the Chinese Nationalists' Navy from blockading the Chinese Communist coast, so at that point when the Korean war broke out the Chinese Nationalist blockade was ended and war supplies began once more to move into the Chinese Communist area.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, do you know of any attempt made on the part of the United States Department of State to impose a complete blockade on the Chinese Nationalist Government during the time that they were still struggling on the mainland with the Chinese Communists?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate what you know about that particular subject, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I know what Senator Arthur Vandenberg told me.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what he told you about it?

Mr. STASSEN. When I saw Senator Vandenberg, for whom, as you know, I have the very highest regard, for the last time in his home in Grand Rapids, Mich., in November of 1950 just prior to my last trip through Asia and around the world, he told me of a White House conference on this question of stopping supplies for Chiang Kai-Shek

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that for us, if there is any more to develop?

Mr. STASSEN. Senator Vandenberg told me in this conference he was called in to, which he said was the only conference that he had been called in to on Asiatic policy, it was there proposed by Secretary Acheson and Dr. Jessup to the President that the supplies which were then being loaded in ships in Hawaii and San Francisco for the Chiang Kai-shek government be dramatically stopped as a move toward world peace.

That is that all armaments should be immediately cut off from the Chinese Nationalists and that the ships that were then on the way and then being loaded, as I recall—he said there were five such ships that would be carrying supplies to the Chinese Nationalists—they should all be stopped in a dramatic and direct announcement to stop the supplies that were continuing the internal war in China; that he then vigorously opposed it and analyzed it, and that after discussion with members of the Cabinet who were present, the President decided not to go ahead with the recommendation of Secretary Acheson and Dr. Jessup in view of Senator Vandenberg's statement he would publicly oppose it, and he was certain he would get the majority of the United States Senate to join with him in the opposition to that policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Were these supplies purchased by the moneys appropriated by Congress during the 1946–48 period?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they the supplies referred to by Senator Vandenberg?

Mr. STASSEN. They would be purchased by various sources, by the Chinese Nationalists. It was to be all arms en route to the Chinese Nationalists, just a complete stoppage of all supplies of a military nature for the Chinese Nationalists, whatever their source of purchase had been.

Mr. MORRIS. That in effect would have been a complete blockade?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, may we give consideration to point

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No. 10 here? That is, if you have finished the implementation of point No. 9. I am not sure you have.

Mr. STASSEN. I think I have.

That no aid should be sent to the non-Communist Chinese guerrillas in the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces, and the military supplies en route to them should be cut off.

That again was a subject of intense discussion, and as I earlier indicated, I had urged and supported that everyone opposing the advance of communism should have had American help, and that if we did that it could well be in this argument as to what Chiang Kai-shek's ability was, et cetera, that other leaders would come up in China opposing communism, and we might find new leaders in some of these provinces in the south, so it would be worthy of continuing support, and that you would begin to develop countermoves to the Communists.

So that we ought to assist everybody that showed some effectiveness and some willingness to oppose the Chinese Communists. But that was ruled out in this Lattimore group approach; that we should turn toward giving aid to the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of the White House conference that Senator Vandenberg told you about?

Mr. STASSEN. I do not know the date. It can be traced down at the point when these ships were going to sail from Hawaii and San Francisco with these supplies.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask you that by way of determining whether or not that instrument would be an implementation of point No. 10.

Mr. STASSEN. It was It was so discussed with Senator Vandenberg on that basis.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you add anything else by way of implementation of this recommendation?

Mr. STASSEN. At the time the Korea war broke out the Seventh Fleet was also directed to stop the airplane flights from Formosa over to supply the Chinese guerrillas still fighting in the south of China, and they were stopped at that time.

In other words, the guerrillas' supplies were stopped by the United States Seventh Fleet at the time of the beginning of the Korean war.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, we had testimony last Friday by Professor McGovern, of Northwestern University, that while he was an adviser, a consultant to the congressional committee that was reviewing foreign aid for Congress, that he was advised by the United States military missions in China in 1947 they were prohibited from giving any tactical recommendation or tactical assistance whatever to the Chinese Nationalist forces.

In your experience have you heard of anything that would be such to corroborate his testimony along those lines?

Mr. STASSEN. I have not heard of that particular matter, but I have not talked to the United States military missions that were in China at that period, so I wouldn't have had an opportunity to hear it.

Mr. MORRIS. Such a policy, if it took place subsequent to this 1949 conference, would have been implementation, however, of the recommendations of Lattimore and Rosinger, would it not?

Mr. STASSEN. You said this was in 1947. That would have been prior.

Mr. MORRIS. If it had taken place subsequent.

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Mr. STASSEN. Yes; but I had no knowledge of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor, you have expressed extensively the views that you set forth in opposition to the 10 points proposed by Lattimore and Rosinger. Did you make any over-all conclusion? In other words, a general conclusion that would not be addressed particularly to any of the 10 points?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, I did, near the close of the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you say, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. I had better give you that exactly from the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. STASSEN. On page 15 of the transcript in the middle of the page. This is the last time I spoke in the conference.

My first comment is on some of the related discussion this morning—

this is the morning of October 8—

that has been advanced that along with recognition other steps we ought to take were proposed.

This is the group of steps I have been discussing with you.

I say, frankly, these steps, to me, could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. I think that would be the correct characterization of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date.

To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy. If we recognize the Communist government of China now—

this is October 8, 1949—

clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other Government—the Nationalist Government—but that we must then join in affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no halfway measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we are a great leading nation, take a different position to that. Nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So, we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations, with our great prestige, and throw out from that United Nations the representative of whatever you may wish to call them—the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think will for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people, and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance to the Communist areas.

Now, to put ourselves in that position in my mind, cannot be countenanced—

and then I went on from there.

That was my final attempt to break through this related policy that was being advanced. I said these things to them right straight across the conference table. They are in the official transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. It was subsequent to all of this that you say that Ambassador Jessup said that he thought that greater logic was on the side of Lattimore and Rosinger?

Mr. STASSEN. I think you might have sensed somewhat of my feelings. Then the conference recessed. I stepped up to Dr. Jessup and the conversation I earlier described took place.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, is there anything else in your notes or in your transcript that has not been covered by our going over each of the 10 points and by our taking that general conclusion? Is there anything else which we should have in our record bearing on this point?

Mr. STASSEN. You have the whole transcript. Obviously there are

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the things you had not gone into that are necessary. The whole transcript is full of important statements, but I think you certainly covered the main outline of the clash of policy that existed at that time in that conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you notice anything about the make-up of the personnel attending this conference? In other words, Governor Stassen, did you have the impression there was a predominance of Institute of Pacific Relations people present?

Mr. STASSEN. I did not have any knowledge then and had not attempted to define who were members and who were not. I had declined membership in the institute way back 10 years before and had not followed the institute. So I did not know as to that part of it. I did notice the absence of some people that it seemed to me should have been present, among them, for example, Dr. David Rowe of Yale University, who is one of the great authorities on Asia and China and the Far East; Dr. Arthur Steiner of UCLA, on the west coast, a very eminent writer and a distinguished scholar; Dr. Norman Brown of our own University of Pennsylvania, who is the director of our southeast Asia area study group.

It is the only southeast area study group in the United States in any university. There are other parts in other universities, but it is supported by the various grants. General Wedemeyer I thought clearly was in a position to give much light in a reexamination of policy. Admiral Nimitz clearly would have been from the Pacific standpoint. General Frank McCoy of the Far Eastern Commission; Maxwell Hamilton of the Far East Commission, and those are entirely apart from the question of whether you are going into the senatorial side.

I know many Members of Congress, such as Walter Judd and others, are very well qualified, but entirely apart of whether you go to the congressional side, there were many distinguished scholars and students of far eastern affairs who were not present.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, did you attempt to make known your views when you saw that our foreign policy was taking a course different from what you had recommended and a course you felt was basically wrong?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what steps you took to express yourself on that subject?

Mr. STASSEN. As I watched these implementations unfold I described to you, it was of grave concern as to what they would mean to our country. I felt so certain the Communists would move into that vacuum with tragic consequences to our country. After it appeared to me apparent that you could not get results on it in any of these conferences with the State Department people, I then sent a wire to Senator Connally and asked whether I could appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on it.

I will see if I have that letter here.

On April 22 of 1950 after watching this implementation of Lattimore and being more and more concerned as to what that would mean to our country and the world situation, I wired Senator Connally on April 21, 1950, as follows:

I am gravely concerned with the status of American foreign policy in Asia and the deteriorating situation in that continent in the cold war. I would

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deeply appreciate an hour in which I might present to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee constructive proposals for American action in Asiatic policy and a concise analysis of the current situation. As you know, I was a participant in the State Department conference last October 6, 7, and 8 on Asiatic policy. I concentrated on Asia and on dependent territories in large measures at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, and I spent most of the last war in the Pacific. My knowledge of the urgency of the situation and my sincere belief I have information which would be helpful to you and to our country motivates this request.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you get a reply to that, Governor?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. Senator Connally replied on April 26:

Re telegram: Foreign Relations Committee this week is busily engaged on the ECA bill. We shall endeavor next week to find time to hear you in executive session. Signed, Tom Connally, United States Senate.

Then I waited a week. On May 8 I sent another wire. I said:

Supplementing our previous communications I of course understand that the ECA bill kept you engaged all last week. I trust a convenient hour can be set this week. Sincerely yours.

On May 10 he replied:

Re telegram: Committee is still busily engaged in conference with House on ECA bill, and it will not be possible to hear you this week.

That was on May 10. I heard nothing further.

Then Senator Vandenberg was ill. I felt so certain this thing was very serious. On June 8, 1950, I wrote to Senator Vandenberg:

DEAR ARTHUR: I have been delighted with reports of your regaining strength and of your reappearance at the Capitol. I hesitate to write to you on this matter, and yet I cannot find rest easily unless I do. I am greatly concerned about the course of our policy in Asia and believe I can make some constructive contribution, and as a result of many years of study of that area. I feel this can best be done through an hour with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As the enclosed copies of communications will show, Senator Connally indicated that they would hear me in executive session after the ECA bill was completed. I have heard nothing further from him. I know I need not assure you that my presence will be affirmative and thoughtful. I believe we are moving in the wrong direction now, and only a conviction on the part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can change the policy. If you wish and felt able to do so, I would be pleased to come to Washington at your convenience for a personal discussion of my analysis and recommendations. Sincerely yours.

Then Senator Vandenberg's secretary called me and said she was sorry to report the Senator was not able to handle the situation, was not able to see me because of his illness. She called me about a week later. Then the Korea war broke.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, you mentioned in the first part of your testimony you had some experience with Japanese prisoners at the end of the last war. In that connection did you encounter any undue or inappropriate courtesies extended to the Japanese Communists who had been held in prison by the Japanese Government on the part of the occupying forces?

Mr. STASSEN. I had no experience with Japanese prisoners, sir. I was the chief staff officer in the liberation of American, British, and Australian prisoners under Admiral Halsey at the end of the war in Japan. My entire experience was with liberating the American and allied boys and not with the Japanese prisoners.

Mr. MORRIS. We had testimony along the lines of my questions. I thought perhaps you had encountered such courtesies.

Mr. STASSEN. I had no knowledge of that.

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Mr. MORRIS. Have you attended any subsequent conferences in connection with formulation of far-eastern policy, Governor Stassen?

Mr. STASSEN. No; I have not. I mentioned the one when they called in the heads of organizations, about 200 or so. That was not a policy-formulation session. That was in March 1950. That was when they made various speeches to the group.

Senator WATKINS. What was the purpose of that meeting?

Mr. STASSEN. Apparently to present the State Department's view on various subjects to the leaders of various national organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. They do not really ask you for views at those meetings; they tell you what their program is and back it up?

Mr. STASSEN. It would be more accurate to say they do not tell you their program.

Senator FERGUSON. What do they give you?

Mr. STASSEN. They make talks that are somewhat of the nature of public talks. They tell you some parts of the program. They are not really comprehensive or specific.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not complete and show what the program actually is?

Mr. STASSEN. No.

Senator WATKINS. I have heard of those meetings. Could you tell us how they are conducted, who is invited to take part, and what happens?

Mr. STASSEN. They invite the chairman or representative of various national organizations to come in. That basic thought is a good one. As a matter of fact, it started at the San Francisco Conference. There we met with them as consultants. It was a give-and-take. It was a good approach.

The only ones since the San Francisco Conference that I was a delegate to was this one in March 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. Then they did not use both parts of the program, give and take; they only gave the information. Is that correct?

Mr. STASSEN. They broke up into some sections for a while and opened up a chance for questions. In the section on India which I went into I asked why they were not moving forward with a program for aid to India and for wheat for India. There was no answer given. It was sidestepped and general talking around. You did not come to grips with these matters. There were subordinates in the State Department there, so it was not a conference in which you could advance a consideration of policy, but more it was an informational policy from the State Department to these leaders of national organizations.

Apart from that I have attended no conferences in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Senator JENNER. Governor, have you been invited after your appearance on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, back to any conference?

Mr. STASSEN. No; I have not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is just one point I would like to make. We introduced into the record what may appear from the record to be the notes of Governor Stassen. May the record show that

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that is a memorandum prepared by Mr. Stassen on the basis of his notes. I think that is accurate.

Mr. STASSEN. Notes and transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Thank you, Governor, very much for your presence here.

(Whereupon, at 3:55 p. m., Monday, October 1, 1951, the hearing was recessed subject to call.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record a request made by you to the Honorable Dean Acheson in connection with the transcript of the minutes of a conference held in September 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter in full?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter is as follows:

OCTOBER 5, 1951.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you make available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee a transcript of the minutes of a conference held by the Jessup commission, presided over by Philip C. Jessup, on September 14, 1949, in Washington, at which were present Messrs. Meaney, Delany, and Lovestone, of the American Federation of Labor, and Messrs. Carey and Ross of the CIO? Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, we had requested the minutes of the meeting of October 6, 7, and 8, or maybe the 5, 6, and 7, being the meeting where Harold Stassen and Professor Colegrove were with Mr. Jessup and others in the State Department, and we were denied the minutes.

After that, Professor Colegrove and Governor Stassen both testified as to what took place at the meeting. I understand that Mr. Lattimore has requested that the State Department furnish those minutes.

I ask that you again, by letter, request that those minutes be delivered to this committee, so that we may have the entire matter before us tomorrow morning when Governor Stassen appears before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, have you reliable information that Mr. Lattimore has requested that the minutes be furnished?

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Senator FERGUSON. All I have is in the press, and I take it the press report is accurate on that.

I see no reason at all, from the contents of the testimony, why there could be any question now of security.

Also, Mr. Rosinger and Mr. Lattimore have both made statements as to what took place.

Therefore, the minutes would be the best evidence, under all rules of court procedure, at least.

The CHAIRMAN. I am entirely in agreement with your ideas, and your request will be made.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to say that I also favor the suggestion made by Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. The request will go down to the Department just as soon as I can prepare it.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have gotten an answer to one of our requests of Mr. Dean Acheson on the question of the letter of transmittal of the white paper. Our letter of September 25, 1951, reads as follows:

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: According to an analysis made in testimony by Prof. Kenneth Colegrove, a well-known authority on the Far East, the letter of transmittal dated July 30, 1949, under your name as a foreword to United States Relations With China, bears the earmarks of having been prepared by one or possibly more individuals other than yourself. In view of the heavy demands made upon your time as a public official, it is felt that it is quite possible that you may have had this material prepared by others for your signature.

Would you therefore kindly inform us as to the name or names of the individual or individuals who prepared this letter of transmittal. This question is asked by me in accordance with a motion adopted at a meeting of the Internal Security Subcommittee held on September 25, 1951.

The answer is dated October 2, 1951:

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have your letter of September 25 requesting "the name or names of the individual or individuals who prepared" my letter of July 30, 1949, transmitting United States Relations With China to the President.

As I remember the circumstances, several drafts of a letter of transmittal were submitted to me prepared by various persons. None of these drafts was satisfactory; and, using one or another of them as a basis, I rewrote the letter myself. Inasmuch as the letter expressed my views and because it represented my best judgment, the responsibility for it is entirely mine.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

I think both of those should be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibits Nos. 309 and 310," respectively, and filed for the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. We have communications from Professor Rishauer, of Harvard University, and Maxwell Stewart, of New York City. They have transmitted to us, in the first case, a letter, and in the second case a telegram, asking they be inserted in the record.

I ask that they go into the record, Mr. Chairman.

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The CHAIRMAN. What are they?

Mr. MORRIS. Rishauer was named in the Colegrove testimony, and he would like to make a statement addressed to that testimony.

The same is true in the case of Maxwell Stewart. Maxwell Stewart is concerned with other testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I agree that these communications ought to go into the record, but I also think that these people should also be given the opportunity to make statements under oath because the other testimony is under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. That is the reason why I paused on admitting them into the record. We will hold them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz has been called back to complete his testimony. He is sworn, and I think we can continue.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. You understand, Mr. Budenz, that you are under oath now, because of having been previously sworn.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. I understood when I left the stand here at the hearings that I was under continuing subpena.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct, and you are still under oath.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know a woman, who was the wife of Isidore Schneider, by the name of Helen Schneider?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did. I knew both of them personally; that is, Mr. and Mrs. Schneider.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Helen Schneider a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. She was a very active member. Indeed, at one time she was in what was considered to be quite a key position, a receptionist at the Daily Worker. She has also been active in the party in other capacities.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you give us as much detail as possible on that score, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can say that she was interested in various front organizations and the like; their names, I can't give you.

But I have met Isidore Schneider and Helen Schneider over the years while in the Communist Party a great number of times, and know them quite well, on a personal basis.

From that meeting, I can say that she was a Communist during the entire time I was in the Communist Party. In fact, she was a Communist when I joined the Communist Party, being then located at the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, two witnesses before this committee have identified Lawrence K. Rosinger as a member of the Communist Party. Did you know Lawrence Rosinger as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did not know Mr. Rosinger personally, but I did know, from official communications, that Mr. Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party.

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Specifically, I can recall during 1944, in a discussion of some of his writings on the Far East, that he was so mentioned officially in the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you testify to this fact before any senatorial committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did. Before the previous committee, headed by Senator Millard Tydings.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the connection of Mr. Rosinger to the Institute of Pacific Relations has already been established.

Are we prepared to introduce documents, Mr. Mandel, showing Helen Schneider's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. Our files show that Helen Schneider was a member of the staff of the IPR, and we are supporting that with documentary evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Your documentary evidence is what? Where is it contained?

Mr. MANDEL. From the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony in executive session on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that, in making a statement of that kind, it would be best to have your documents present.

Senator FERGUSON. I agree with the Chair that we ought to have it first.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know Harry F. Ward to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I knew Dr. Ward very well and over a great number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the circumstances that enabled you to conclude that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Dr. Ward has been active in a great number of Communist fronts, including the American League for Peace and Democracy. As a matter of fact, he was the head of that organization. In that connection, and also in connection with many other activities of Dr. Ward, he was—I won't say frequently, but not infrequently a visitor to the national headquarters of the Communist Party, consulting with members of the Politburo, sometimes in my presence.

Senator FERGUSON. A consultant in your presence?

Mr. BUDENZ. Consulting them in my presence.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Mr. BUDENZ. I also know, from conversations with Dr. Ward personally, of his Communist affiliation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Harry F. Ward's name will be turning up in forthcoming testimony, and it is for that reason that we had Mr. Budenz identify him as a member of the Communist Party while he is here today.

Mr. Budenz, did you testify before this committee about the association or lack of association of John Stewart Service with the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you restate that testimony for us, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, as I recall it, in brief, the testimony was that I did not know officially that Mr. Service was a member of the Communist Party; that is, he had never been specifically referred to in that

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respect; that he had, however, in Politburo meetings, particularly in connection with the Amerasia case, been referred to as Lattimore's pupil.

The CHAIRMAN. Lattimore's what?

Mr. BUDENZ. Pupil.

That was a political term, since it didn't indicate that he was a student of Mr. Lattimore, but a pupil of his politically.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you testify to that fact, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. At the recent hearing of this committee.

I also testified substantially to the same thing in the hearings before the committee chaired by Senator Millard Tydings.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party before this committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; from official communications.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, before which you appeared a year ago?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; I did not. I asked leave in the executive session to have more time to place Mr. Carter on the list, where I could explain in detail what I knew about his political affiliations.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "Mr. Carter," you mean Mr. Vincent; do you?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Vincent. Excuse me.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you told?

Mr. BUDENZ. May I read the extract here, because it is better than my interpretation?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. This was after I was queried about Donald Hiss and John Davis, Senator Hickenlooper asking me.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from what record, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is the record, Senator, of hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-first Congress, second session, the chairman of which was Senator Millard Tydings. This is page 613 of that record in executive session:

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Senator McMahon mentioned three names, three other names. I mention here Ruby Parsons and John Carter Vincent, who is now Minister to Switzerland.

Mr. BUDENZ. I would prefer not to discuss those at the moment, until I can file the list with the committee. That will permit—I feel this is quite a responsible obligation—without being more careful in my statements.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I shall not press——

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do subsequent to that in connection with making that testimony available to the committee, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I wrote to the committee; that is, the counsel of the committee, Mr. Morgan, and Mr. Morris, the minority counsel, with carbon copies to Senator Tydings, Senator Hickenlooper, and Senator McMahon, among others, stating that this list, which didn't only include John Carter Vincent, but many more names on which I had been questioned, would be prepared by September.

I explained that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had kept me engaged on going over the list of 400 concealed Communists, which had been brought up at that time, and that it would require until September to complete this list.

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The committee did not avail itself of my offer because it ended its sessions before September came around.

Mr. MORRIS. What else did you do, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I also advised Robert Morris, who was minority counsel of that committee, even before the hearings that John Carter Vincent was known to me, from official communications, to be a Communist. I advised Mr. Morris of this because I had had an acquaintance with him, knowing him to be a Naval Reserve Intelligence officer.

It was under those circumstances that I first met Mr. Morris. And he assured me that he would file a report on Mr. Vincent in accordance with my communication to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is such a report in existence, and I think it is appropriate that we ask that that be made available to our committee, to establish the fact that Mr. Budenz did make such a report.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean the Tydings committee official files?

Mr. MORRIS. No. There is a report in the Intelligence files that Mr. Budenz reported Mr. Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party a year ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right.

Senator FERGUSON. In what files?

Mr. MORRIS. It should appear in the files of the Naval Intelligence and the FBI.

Senator FERGUSON. So when you were a Naval Intelligence officer you put a report in the files, did you?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, Mr. Chairman, I ask that we obtain this report from the proper officials of the Naval Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. We will try.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that there is nothing confidential being violated here, because the source of our information in that report is Mr. Budenz, who appears before this committee. So there is no question of security whatever involved.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BUDENZ. I also reported, Mr. Senator, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Mr. John Carter Vincent a considerable time ago, the exact time of which I cannot tell you at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us the year?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was the year 1950, so far as I can recall. It may have been earlier; it may have been slightly later.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it before the Tydings testimony?

Mr. BUDENZ. That I can't be sure, Senator. It is my impression that it was.

In regard to the case of Mr. Morris, I am very clear, because I remember his stating that he was to make a report on the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. I am at a loss to get the connection of Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a Naval Intelligence officer.

The CHAIRMAN. It was at the time that he was in the position of a Naval Intelligence officer, was it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is what I understood, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Or was it after his severance?

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I can answer that question.

Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a Naval Intelligence officer, the fact that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that report in writing?

Mr. MORRIS. There is a written report on it. I transmitted mine verbally, and a written report was made. So there is one in existence.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the written report, if you transmitted yours verbally?

Mr. MORRIS. It is an official record of the Naval Intelligence Office.

The reason why I know there is one there is because, there was a follow-up on it, Senator. Several people subsequently came around to see me about it.

The purpose of this testimony, Mr. Chairman, is to show that Mr. Budenz did report at least a year ago that Mr. Vincent was a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was before the Tydings investigation?

Mr. MORRIS. It was about the time of the Tydings investigation.

Mr. Budenz, I wish you would address yourself to a copy of the Kunming cable that Henry Wallace sent in 1944. I am going to ask you, Mr. Budenz, if you will take that cable and analyze it, paragraph by paragraph, and let us have the benefit of your interpretations of that particular cable.

This is message No. 1.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his position with reference to that cable, by reason of which he can authoritatively testify to this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. The background, Mr. Chairman, of this series of questions is the following:

Testimony of Mr. Budenz has been disputed in several sources, the testimony of Mr. Budenz that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party. It has been stated by unsworn testimony that John Carter Vincent saw and approved the particular cable that we are now addressing ourselves to.

The argument is then made that this cable is so demonstrably anti-Communist that anyone acceding to it and going along with it would necessarily not be a Communist, and therefore, Mr. Budenz' testimony was impeached.

I think we should address ourselves to this because so much of it has been made, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few preliminary questions before the witness testifies.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, I suppose that you have seen by the public press and the official records, that is, the records of the United States Senate which it has had inserted in newspaper articles, that your testimony could be false. In fact, it indicates that your testimony was false in certain respects.

Have you seen those articles?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have looked through them: yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, you are again called to the witness stand this morning, and I want to ask the question whether or not you want to change any of your testimony.

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely not, sir.

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Senator FERGUSON. You now again reiterate, do you, under oath, that the previous testimony is true?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume that you understand the value of an oath.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, most decidedly.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. You have sworn to these articles that are not under oath, the Senator has inserted them in the record, and you again reiterate that that testimony is true; is that right?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. And I can explain why, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I wish you would give an explanation.

Mr. MORRIS. I think the explanation, Senator, could take the form of our addressing ourselves to the cable itself.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean.

From now on, explain it.

Mr. MORRIS. The point of it is this: The contention has been made that these cables are demonstrably anti-Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. In order to explain those cables, I should review the period briefly in which these cables occurred and the attitude of the Communists at that time.

It is common knowledge, public knowledge, that the Communists not only changed their line, but changed their interpretation of their line.

What they are seeking at some specific moment, 1 year later they will have emphasized much more, or not have emphasized much more.

What were the Comunists seeking during this period? They were seeking:

1. What they call Chinese-Soviet friendship, and under the guise of that, they had hoped that they would be able to advance the Communist Chinese and also the Soviet domination of Chinese policies;

2. They were not pressing—although they had raised the question of a coalition government, they did not begin to press that until a year later. They did not feel that they were in a position to press it at that time.

Indeed, at that time, as point No. 3, they were urging that Chiang Kai-shek withdraw his troops from what they called the blockade of the Communists in order, as they contended, to war upon the Japanese; but, in reality, to be able to allow the Chinese Communists to act at their own will.

That is, there had been a civil war in China, and Chiang Kai-shek cautiously was trying to prevent the Chinese Communists from attacking in what we might call the rear while he had the Japanese situation on his hands.

They demanded an end to what they called this blockade.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand, then, that the Communist line at times takes a line——

Mr. BUDENZ. May I get the fourth one in, Senator, so that the whole picture will be in?

Senator FERGUSON. I beg your pardon.

Mr. BUDENZ. Fourth, preliminary to pushing the coalition government on a big scale, they wished to have Washington receive the impression that Chiang Kai-shek was an inefficient, incompetent, and

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more or less blundering personality, who could not exist long in control of China.

That, by the way, is a tactic used in every country where the Communists have taken over. They brought Mikolajczyk back to Poland and represented him in such capacity, to a greater or lesser degree, according to circumstances. And we could recall other roles of leaders of this type who have been given this treatment.

So we have the fourfold objective of the Communists, which was particularly centered on sending to Washington the idea that Chiang Kai-shek was incompetent and that he was incapable of controlling the situation for a long period of time.

They did not demand immediately that Chiang Kai-shek be deposed; no Communist literature at that time did. Nor did the discussions in the Politburo.

But they were preparing for a big campaign of the coalition government, and the first essential of that was the necessity of showing Chiang Kai-shek to be incapable of leadership in the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand now that the Communist Party then at times does change its party line and even the underlying principles of that party line to acquire a long-distance, far-away future objective? Is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the secret of its success.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the secret of its success?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And words do not mean anything to it; facts do not mean anything. They lay down their own line and go along that line to acquire their success in the future; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

And the Communists know that you have to take the line by stages very frequently. That is to say, in this case of the coalition government, they understood that they couldn't sell to the United States the idea of coalition government or Communist China at once; that first they had to belittle Chiang Kai-shek.

At that time they even expressed fears that there be a coup against Chiang Kai-shek, publicly, I mean, within the Kuomintang. They even looked like they were solicitous about him, to show that he was a weakling. They didn't in that respect, through their propaganda, let the public know that Chiang Kai-shek had put up a very stiff fight against the Japanese, when you consider he had a civil war on his hands, and did a better job perhaps than France did against Hitler.

Now, it is in the light of this that I would like to call attention to some of the items in these cables.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read each paragraph that you address yourself to, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

The first paragraph is in message I:

The discussion between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking, but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that an anti-Communist expression, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly not. It helps the Communists. If some person visiting the United States, of a diplomatic character, were

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to be represented to the American authorities today as prejudiced against the Communists, that would be of a kind, except that in this case Chiang Kai-shek has had civil war on his hands for a number of years, and Chiang Kai-shek's experience shows that he could not trust the Communists, and events proved he was correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you address yourself to the second point in that cable, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The second point is the sentence:

I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

This was the first point in the Communist drive at that time, in their literature and in the discussions with the Politburo. The necessity for what they called Russian-Chinese friendship.

And that was an authority purchasable, when you come realistically to consider it, only by the Chinese Communists coming to the front in China. That is what they understood.

Incidentally, this isn't exactly what the Communists were stressing at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel, no nation that is anti-Communist could have friendly relations with Russia?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think history has proved it is impossible.

Senator FERGUSON. So a friendly relationship between China and Russia, real friendly relations, would have to be on the basis of both being Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

This is particularly true of small nations, as we see in the case of the Baltic countries, who were promised that they were going to be liberated and then were taken over by the Red army.

There are plenty of examples now.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, what is the date of those cables of Henry Wallace there?

Mr. BUDENZ. June 28, 1944.

However, the point I make here, Senator Ferguson, is that, regardless of that, I am just showing what the Communists had in mind. This was in accordance with the Communist drive at that time, these recommendations.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, at the time these were sent, you are talking about a policy when you were in the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was in the Communist Party very decidedly and present in the Politburo meetings in which they were discussing and giving instructions in order to convey it through the pages of the Daily Worker.

Senator FERGUSON. You were right in the inner circle and knew the policy from official sources?

Mr. BUDENZ. As far as could be the case of any individual.

The CHAIRMAN. This cable that you are reading from, or these cables, are they cables of Henry Wallace?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you contend, or is it your position here, that these are pro-Communist cables?

Mr. BUDENZ. My contention is that they were in accord with the Communist policies at that time. Whether Mr. Wallace was aware of that, I am not stating.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what I wanted to bring out now.

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From what source would Mr. Wallace get these thoughts and this policy if he did not have them himself?

I think that should be cleared up.

Who were his advisers? Where was he getting the advice that gave rise to these expressions?

Mr. BUDENZ. I testified, Senator, before the committee before, that the Communist Politburo was very pleased with the fact that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. John Carter Vincent were present on Mr. Wallace's mission, which not only included, by the way, China, but Soviet Asia.

They considered these two questions together.

As a matter of fact, if I may mention it, in Soviet Asia Mission, Mr. Wallace says, on page 156:

> On my mission in China I was fortunate to have along an adviser who had served in 1942–43 as President Roosevelt's personal envoy to Chiang Kai-shek. He was Owen Lattimore, a State man in Pacific affairs, and a scholar in the Chinese language.

And Mr. Wallace refers in like language more or less to Mr. Lattimore in this book.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to clarify at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was it the mission that Mr. Wallace was cabling about that he mentions in his book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This was the mission to Soviet Asia and China. This is called Soviet Asia Mission, but the whole trip was the same trip.

Senator FERGUSON. And these were messages coming back officially from him on that mission, were they?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Thirdly—and I consider this very important, in view of what the Communists were driving for at that time—

> Instability and tenseness characterized the political situation, with a rising lack of confidence in the generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang.

That, again, I think very emphatically represents Chiang Kai-shek as incapable of coping with the situation.

This is stressed still further when it says:

> Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation, bewildered regarding the economic situation, and while expressing confidence in the army, distressed regarding military developments.

That is the picture the Communists were trying to have presented of Chiang Kai-shek, as incompetent and incapable of handling the situation. There is no mention here of the long struggle of Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese in any definite terms, and the picture is out of focus. That, therefore, confirms to what the Communists wanted presented to Washington.

In message No. 2, we note:

> It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least a semblance of the united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

Now, the term "united front" is not a popularized Communist term, but it is well known, and was well known, at that time that "united front" is a term used by the Communists historically to represent their coalition efforts with other governments, or with other groups; and

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the fact that in this report there is no reference made to "united front" within the Kuomintang or "united front" of the Kuomintang and other forces which are not found to exist here, but a "united front" in itself, is in accord with the campaign being conducted by the Communists.

The only "united front" you could have in China which would be of any substantial character would be a "united front" with the Chinese Communists.

Therefore, these messages, in light of the period, were what the Communists wanted presented.

Senator FERGUSON. Could it be possible, Mr. Budenz, that the reason that this document has been classed as non-Communist and absolutely opposite to the Communist line is that the people who criticize it as such or say that it is not Communist, were not familiar with the Communist line as of that date?

Mr. BUDENZ. That may possibly be.

Senator FERGUSON. But you are swearing under oath now as to what the line was, and it is your opinion that this document is not anti-Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Decidedly not. It gives aid to the Communists in the policies they were forwarding at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you continue, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. There is also a reference here to General Wedemeyer.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Will you address yourself to that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

General Wedemeyer, when he first came into public attention, was not opposed by the Communists. Indeed, the Communists felt that the compromise made with Wedemeyer was a good compromise. They were not opposed to Wedemeyer. They thought he was nonpolitical.

By the way, I am quoting.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by the compromise made with Wedemeyer? Who compromised with Wedemeyer?

Mr. BUDENZ. The compromise made by bringing Wedemeyer into the situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was not any compromise with Wedemeyer.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, no.

Did I say with Wedemeyer?

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't mean to imply that he ever compromised with the Communists; do you?

Mr. BUDENZ. No; not at all. I meant to say, if I didn't say it, the compromise by which Wedemeyer came to his position in China. The Communists were very much opposed to General Chennault and didn't want him in the picture at all. They thought Wedemeyer was a better choice. He was not political and, in addition to that, he was supposedly, according to their discussions, of a school in the Military Establishment friendly to General Marshall.

Without any reflection on General Marshall, the Communists felt that that group would be more reasonable toward the Communists in various countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you discussed the Wedemeyer reference?

Senator FERGUSON. How was he mentioned in this report, in other words?

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Mr. BUDENZ (reading):

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested to ask you to appoint a personal representative.

Then it recommends that General Wedemeyer be appointed. I have it marked off right here where the reference is made.

These facts are hinted at in my report to Roosevelt on July 10, in which it is noted as "significant" that "T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions (with the generalissimo) except as interpreter" while Gen. Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Gens. Chiang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-Hsi as the sort of men who might rally the Chinese armies to greater efforts.

I don't find here the reference to Wedemeyer which I had marked off.

Unfortunately, I used two or three copies, and that one I have neglected to mark. There was a reference to General Wedemeyer, a recommendation.

What I wish to say is that General Wedemeyer in 1944 was not unacceptable to the Communists. Indeed, to a certain degree, they thought he was a good compromise, since it excluded General Chennault.

It wasn't until 1945 that the Communists began their real attack on General Wedemeyer when they discovered his position, and also, of course, this was intensified by the fact that they were beginning to organize a cold war in addition.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have brought up into this part of the record the testimony of Prof. William Montgomery McGovern, given September 28, 1951. This is the testimony of Professor McGovern on this particular point.

We had shown Professor McGovern the particular cables we are discussing, Senator, and his testimony is the following:

The message is full of statements, as I now remember it, which shocked me, because Mr. Wallace said it was not at all pro-Communist, but certainly if it is not pro-Communist it certainly is giving aid and comfort to the Communists trying to disparage the Nationalist Government entirely and trying to throw his weight behind support of a pro-Russian policy.

Then there is a question by Mr. Sourwine:

It has been said that this was an anti-Communist message because it transmitted the request as made by Chiang Kai-shek that General Wedemeyer be considered in connection with the appointment of a Presidential liaison man between the President and the generalissimo.

Could you say, sir, whether at that time such a recommendation with respect to General Wedemeyer was an anti-Communist recommendation?

Professor McGovern:

No, sir. General Wedemeyer had never expressed himself on Chiang Kai-shek. He was not an unknown figure. He was a well-known man as a military planner and strategist and had served as spokesman for General Marshall on several occasions in discussions with the British planners. He had never expressed his views on communism, or never expressed his views on China.

As a matter of fact, some people wrongly thought that Wedemeyer would go along with the Communists, because with the Joint Chiefs he thought we should not invade the Balkans or interfere with the Russian campaign in eastern Europe.

On that ground, some people thought General Wedemeyer would go along with the Communists.

Knowing General Wedemeyer personally, I know they were completely wrong in their reading of him, but no doubt some felt or thought that because he did attack the Balkan campaign and attacked Churchill on the Balkan campaign.

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I would like that testimony correlated with the testimony given by Mr. Budenz.

The CHAIRMAN. That is already in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. It is, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You are just bringing it forward.

Senator FERGUSON. And McGovern was a professor.

Mr. MORRIS. At Northwestern University. But he worked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, connected with the military campaign.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you any documents to back up your testimony on this score?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean you have documents showing the party line as of that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, and their attitude toward Wallace's expedition through China and Wallace's attitude on the Pacific.

In the first place, almost coincident with these reports, on June 24, 1944, by order of the Politburo, Frederick Vanderbilt Field has a column on Vice President Wallace's pamphlet on the Pacific, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You say almost coincident with these reports. I take it that you mean coincident with the Wallace cables?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. Just for a few quotations:

Vice President Wallace's pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, just published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, is a progressive and statesmanlike approach to problems of our foreign policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, when the Daily Worker printed that kind of language, can we assume and should we say that it meant the Daily Worker was approving? They did not just write factual news.

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists must write under the most rigid discipline, and in a case like this, on such a vital question, either by orders of the Politburo or in consultation with the Politburo, and Frederick Vanderbilt Field was the man who had the chief responsibility for the far eastern situation, so far as the Politburo was concerned, that is, immediately. He was an authority on the question from the Communist viewpoint.

Senator FERGUSON. So that he was writing not news; he was writing propaganda.

Mr. BUDENZ. He was writing not only propaganda; he was writing a directive. The Daily Worker is an agency for directives of the conspiracy. It is not a daily paper in the normal sense of the word.

Every Communist studies the Daily to know what he should do.

This meant Wallace's pamphlet should be expanded, put into organizations and the like by the concealed Communists.

Here is the important point about this:

I have studied and compared these sections of the Wallace pamphlet with the chapter on National Liberation in Asia in Earl Browder's Tehran. Our Path in War and Peace. Both stand for the most rapid reconstitution of the colonial system consistent with the maintenance of unity among the United Nations. * * *

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And the reason I am giving this for political purposes is to emphasize Mr. Wallace's high standing among the Communists, which verifies my testimony on the question.

The reason I am giving this is that these two publications, namely, Wallace's Our Job in the Pacific and Tehran, Our Path in War and Peace, is to show the highly controversial problem of the colonies.

Mr. SOURWINE. You referred to Mr. Wallace's high standing with the Communists at that time, do you?

Mr. BUDENZ. At that time.

Mr. MORRIS. And this is now Frederick V. Field writing in the Daily Worker of what date?

Mr. BUDENZ. June 24, 1944; page 7.

To compare Wallace with Browder favorably was the highest compliment that the Communists could pay any public figure. Browder was always hailed as the greatest Marxist-Leninist in the Western Hemisphere—at that time, I must again, during that period—and to compare anyone to Browder was, I say, the highest compliment that could be paid, in so far as the Communists were concerned.

Secondly, I would like to call the committee's attention to the Daily Worker of July 11, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Chairman, may that article, the previous one, go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. The whole article.

Mr. MORRIS. It is the article by Frederick V. Field in the Daily Worker of June 24, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

That is the article read from by the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. We would like the whole article to go into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole article will go into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 311," and is as follows:)

TODAY'S GUEST COLUMN

VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S PAMPHLET ON THE PACIFIC

(By Frederick V. Field)

Vice President Wallace's pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, just published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, is a progressive and statesmanlike approach to problems of our foreign policy.

The question of the future of the British, Dutch, and French colonial empires in the Pacific is given conspicuous attention. Mr. Wallace does not come out for the immediate freedom of India, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies and the other colonies, as certain newspaper headlines would have us believe. He says there is a "Free Asia" and a "Subject Asia" or "Colonial Asia." "It is to our advantage," Mr. Wallace writes, "not to perpetuate this division but to see an orderly process of transition so that the area of free Asia will grow and the area of subject Asia continually diminish."

In order to accomplish the orderly process of transition, the Vice President envisages the drawing up of a system of training and preparation for self-government and the acceptance by the sovereign government "of a definite date for the termination of trusteeship and the beginning of independence and self-government." All of this is to take place within the framework of the international organization projected at the Moscow Conference.

Mr. Wallace advocates a positive United States policy on the colonial question not only because of our special relation to the Philippines, whose independence is already guaranteed, and possible military bases which we may acquire elsewhere among the Pacific islands, but also "because in southeast Asia there are conflicting forces in operation which have in them the seeds of future wars."

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I have studied and compared these sections of the Wallace pamphlet with the chapter on National Liberation in Asia in Earl Browder's Tehran, Our Path in War and Peace. Both stand for the most rapid reconstitution of the colonial system consistent with the maintenance of unity among the United Nations. Mr. Browder, however, carries the analysis several steps beyond where the Vice President leaves off.

The United States, Mr. Browder points out, requires the release of national energies in the prewar colonies because after the war our internal economy will depend in good part upon the markets provided by the rapid development of the areas previously stifled by colonialism. "Colonial or semicolonial regimes provide narrow and restricted markets, while independent, self-governing nations provide expanding markets." This leads to a potential basic conflict with the British and other colonial powers who, in a desperate effort to compete against the more powerful American capitalism, cling to their colonial monopolies. This is a conflict the solution of which cannot be relegated to the postwar period. Unity during the war is affected by the proposals being made on both sides even though these proposals may not come into operation until after hostilities.

How can this conflict be reconciled? Mr. Browder provides a concrete solution within the framework of the United Nations. In return for a progressive colonial policy on the part of Britain, perhaps one such as Mr. Wallace advocates, the United States must provide a quid pro quo. This should take the form of "an economic concord which will limit the play of free competition between them on the world market," providing a guaranteed proportinate share to the weaker capitalist power, Great Britain. And the agreement must be of such a character that it would gain the support and participation of the Soviet Union.

* * * * * * *

These two publications mark an advance in the American thinking on the highly controversial problem of colonies. It is an advance made possible by harmony between leaders representing traditionally divergent economic and political interests which are now coming together to win the war and to carry forward the spirit of Tehran.

Mr. BUDENZ. These are being introduced merely to show that the Communists consistently had more than a friendly attitude toward Mr. Wallace in 1944 and 1945, and therefore my testimony that they were pleased with his Soviet and China mission is verified.

Wallace's charter for our self-interest in Asia.

This is from the Daily Worker of July 11, 1944, page 8. There they declare in this statement by Mr. Wallace, which was his first statement after returning from China and Soviet Siberia, in which he recommended aid to Soviet Siberian China, but with certain conditions. They declared that:

It is vision of a great American statesman—this insight that Wallace has into American-Soviet-Chinese collaboration * * *.

And they go on to say that—

many of these ideas are contained in Wallace's pamphlet Our Task in the Pacific, published last month by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then they point out something very significant:

Wallace attached only one condition to the help which "thousands of technical and businessmen in the United States" are ready to give China and the U. S. S. R. And this is the only reference to the immediate political situation.

"They want to be certain" he said, "before they lay the foundations and make the necessary outlay, that there is no foreseeable likelihood of conflict within China or between China and Russia."

The Vice President is referring, of course, to the danger of civil war in China because of the Kuomintang's blockade of the Communists. He is also referring, no doubt, to certain anti-Soviet moods that he encountered "behind the scenes" in Chungking.

He is very right in this warning, but also very right in placing the issue of China's unity and Sino-Soviet friendship within the framework of America's own interest * * *.

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Then down below a little further:

Wallace has shown the way. If we don't have the intelligence and understanding of our own interests to follow it, the fault won't be his.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, do I understand you correctly that you are attempting to make the point that because of these nice things the Communists were saying about Mr. Wallace at that time, it indicates that they approved these Kunming cables that you just read and the report that he had filed with it recommending Wedemeyer?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not necessarily; no, sir. It is in confirmation of my testimony that the Communists were pleased with the Wallace mission, which I gave at the last hearings of the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. That was not your testimony, was it, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, that they were satisfied that he would be guided into the right channels; which means the same thing.

That is, I didn't say specifically that they were pleased, but I said that they were satisfied that Mr. Wallace would be guided correctly in the mission.

And it is in order to show that they continued their support of Wallace on the Far East and elsewhere after his mission was completed that I introduced this evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not the Communist Party was able to get copies of these messages and this report that was kept secret? Is that the kind of a document that they would want?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, they would want the document. But I have heard no reference to any written documents by Mr. Wallace. I have heard discussion of his attitude on Soviet Asia and China which are along the lines of these cables, so the cables don't surprise me.

That is to the effect that he was disgusted with Chiang Kai-shek and that his recommendations had the effect of weakening Chiang Kai-shek's prestige in Washington.

As a matter of fact, there was an almost remarkable knowledge of those documents, though I have not heard any reference to written documents.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask the counsel whether or not these documents appeared in the white paper, the Chinese white paper, or the State Department's releases or white papers.

Mr. MORRIS. My recollection on that point, Senator, is that they did not, and I believe there was a statement in the footnote that these things did not exist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I recall speaking on the floor about this so-called report. Senator O'Conor had in some way obtained a memorandum either of the report or about the report. The question was as to the accuracy of that document.

So I wondered whether or not you had any evidence to indicate that the spy system was able to get these particular secret documents that have been secret until just a few weeks or——

Mr. BUDENZ. Not to my knowledge.

Of course, there were gaps in my attendance at the Politburo. There were no references that I can recall, to written documents. There was a very elaborate recommendation from Frederick Vanderbilt Field and it was discussed by the Politburo on several occasions as to Mr. Wallace's attitude and to his possible recommendations or even

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possibly to his recommendations. I just can't recall, of his possible recommendations, or possibly recommendations.

Mr. MORRIS. In answer to Senator Ferguson's question, I am now reading from the white paper, page 549, footnote 11. It says here:

By John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, who accompanied the Vice President to China. The files of the Department do not contain any indication of the existence of a report in written form made by Mr. Wallace to President Roosevelt or of the nature of any oral report made.

Senator FERGUSON. Which is an unusual thing to appear in the so-called white paper of this country which was published in its United States Relations With China.

The transmittal letter is as of July 30, 1949. So that the State Department then indicates that there are no such reports as we now have produced at this time.

Is not that correct, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. In the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

It seems to be a strange thing that they appear at certain times, but they cannot be found at other times.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a little strange also that they evidently constitute the background for publications in the Daily Worker under the byline of Frederick Field and others.

Mr. BUDENZ. May I, violating chronology, call your attention to another column by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, on December 2, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed to the next one, may that entire article go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the article just testified to by the witness under what caption?

Mr. MORRIS. The Daily Worker, Tuesday, July 11, 1944, page 8, under the heading "Wallace's charter for our self-interest in Asia."

The CHAIRMAN. That article may go into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 312" and is as follows:)

INTERPRETATION, PLEASE—WALLACE'S CHARTER FOR OUR SELF-INTEREST IN ASIA

When Vice President Henry A. Wallace returned from his tour of Latin America just a year ago, he was attacked on all sides as a "visionary" and a "dreamer." But only 2 months ago, a commission of North American and Latin American government and business spokesmen at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York endorsed in essence Wallace's ideas.

Industrialization of our neighbors to the south of us, Wallace had declared, is in our own self-interest. It means a truly united hemisphere, based on rising living standards everywhere. Now Wallace returns from his historic trip to Soviet Siberia and China, and again he brings back the same message.

OUR OWN INTERESTS

America's self-interest, he says, in a very good example of vision and hard-headed practicality, demands unity and friendship with our neighbors of the North Pacific.

Convinced that the American way of life is best for us, Wallace nevertheless stresses "cooperation with other nations and other peoples whose way of life is different from ours, but who need our cooperation quite as much as we need theirs, and who are not only willing, but eager to cooperate with us."

What Wallace saw in his visit to Soviet Siberia and China convinced him that the "main area" of new development after the war—"new enterprise, new invest-

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ment, new trade, and new accomplishments—will be in—the North Pacific and eastern Asia."

A POSTWAR VISION

It is vision of a great American statesman—this insight that Wallace has into American-Soviet-Chinese collaboration. It is a vision of vast trade with the already industrial growing industrial civilization which the Russian and Mongol peoples have built on their soil.

China is on a much different level, he says, but with China also we can look forward to immense trade once that country enters "the machine age," as the Soviet people have already done.

Many of these ideas are contained in Wallace's pamphlet, Our Task in the Pacific, published last month by the Institute of Pacific Relations. What he has added are the insights of his own travel and observation.

All in all, it makes for a great document, a charter for peace and development in Asia, and stamps its author as a man who could be entrusted to lead American destinies.

A WARNING

Wallace attached only one condition to the help which "thousands of technical and businessmen in the United States" are ready to give China and the U. S. S. R. And this is the only reference to the immediate political situation.

"They want to be certain," he said, "before they lay the foundations and make the necessary outlay, that there is no foreseeable likelihood of conflict within China or between China and Russia."

The Vice President is referring, of course, to the danger of civil war in China because of the Kuomintang's blockade of the Communists. He is also referring, no doubt, to certain anti-Soviet moods that he encountered behind the scenes in Chungking.

He is very right in this warning, but also very right in placing the issue of China's unity and Sino-Soviet friendship within the framework of America's own interest. Yes, our businessmen for the sake of their own future have a stake in China's unity, and China's good neighborliness with Soviet Siberia.

Wallace has shown the way. If we don't have the intelligence and understanding of our own interests to follow it, the fault won't be his.

Mr. BUDENZ. In order to indicate the nonhostile attitude toward General Wedemeyer on the part of the Communists, December 2, 1944. This represented, however, previous discussions in the Politburo, but it is a summing up by Frederick Vanderbilt Field:

I disagree with those who take an entirely pessimistic view regarding recent developments in China. On the contrary, for the first time in several years that situation shows signs of improving. Those who argue that the recall of Stilwell indicated nothing but the intransigence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or those who interpret the recent Cabinet shifts as a mere reshuffle designed to camouflage the continuance of reaction are failing to see the movement of history.

Then this is the important part I wish to call to your attention. He mentions three conditions, but the third is the one that is important to the question of General Wedemeyer:

* * * as to the third, we know only that there was a breakdown over the particular person nominated as commander in chief, General Stilwell, and that President Roosevelt wisely and quickly compromised on that point. There is no indication that the general proposition for an American commander has been refused.

Then he goes on to say about evidence of progress in China:

* * * another is Major General Wedemeyer's reaffirmation on November 23 that it would be necessary to engage Japanese forces on the Chinese mainland and his further statement that Chiang Kai-shek had approved his recommendations for redisposition of the forces in China for more effective operation, and that these plans were already being carried out.

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That sounds like cooperation to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Daily Worker column by Frederick V. Field, appearing in the Daily Worker, December 2, 1944, page 7.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 313" and is as follows:)

TODAY'S GUEST COLUMN

SOME STEPS FORWARD IN CHINESE SITUATION

(By Frederick V. Field)

I disagree with those who take an entirely pessimistic view regarding recent developments in China. On the contrary, for the first time in several years that situation shows signs of improving. Those who argue that the recall of Stilwell indicated nothing but the intransigence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek or those who interpret the recent cabinet shifts as a mere reshuffle designed to camouflage the continuance of reaction are failing to see the movement of history.

As I write this I have before me the AP dispatch from Chunking which appeared in newspapers Thursday morning and in which P. H. Chang, Chinese cabinet spokesman, said: "It would be necessary for the Government to reach an agreement with the Chinese Communists," and added that "the Government is sparing no effort in trying to reach a settlement."

The latter part of that statement is not likely to impress anyone, because for years Chunking spokesmen have been saying the same thing while "sparing no effort" to accomplish the very opposite. What is worth noting is that Mr. Chang conveyed the impression that the Chinese Government now has no choice except that of reaching an agreement with the Communists. In other words, the situation has reached the point where it is either death for the Chinese nation or a progressive solution of their internal difficulties.

The Chinese people, backed as they are by the influence of the United States, will see to it that a solution is reached before the final breakdown occurs. And the recent cabinet shifts were made in order to make possible the negotiations leading to some sort of solution.

At the time of General Stilwell's recall the press reported—reliably, in my opinion—that the United States had conveyed to the Chinese Government three conditions for effective coalition warfare against Japan. These were, first, that the Chinese high command undertake a thorough reorganization of its armies in order to make them effective fighting units; second, that the military effort of the Kuomintang and Communist-led armies be unified; and, third, that an American be named commander in chief of all allied forces in China.

What is the status of these conditions—not ultimata—for coalition warfare? I believe that the first two remain intact and that progress is being made to carry them out. As to the third, we know only that there was a breakdown over the particular person nominated as commander in chief, General Stilwell, and that President Roosevelt wisely and quickly compromised on that point. There is no indication that the general proposition for an American commander has been refused.

The evidence that progress is being made is found in several very recent events. The Cabinet shifts, eliminating Ho Yin-ching, H. H. Kung, and Chen Li-fu from their most important posts, and bringing Gen. Chen Cheng, who had cooperated closely with Stilwell, into the Ministry of War is one of these events. Another is Major General Wedemeyer's reaffirmation on November 23 that it would be necessary to engage Japanese forces on the Chinese mainland and his further statement that Chiang Kai-shek had approved his recommendations for redisposition of the forces in China for more effective operation, and that these plans were already being carried out. That sounds like cooperation to me, and cooperation based upon the need to develop coalition warfare between American and Chinese forces.

Then a day or two before the announcement of his appointment as the new United States Ambassador to Chungking, Major General Hurley gave a public and publicized banquet in honor of Chou En-lai, who had just arrived in the Chinese capital to reopen unity negotiations with the Government. That could hardly have been done without the acquiescence of the generalissimo.

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Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I might say we have found the reference in the Wallace cable to General Wedemeyer. The paragraph reads as follows:

While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me, and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

The whole cable has been introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Chairman, without wishing to intrude on the time of the committee, I would like to introduce one or two more documents here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. One is a critical reference to the report publicly made by Chiang Kai-shek and Henry Wallace publicly in China, in Chungking. The criticism is that it didn't include the question of raising the blockade of the Chinese Communists.

But the Daily Worker hastens to say:

But there is no focus on these events in Wallace's statement, for which I do not, of course, blame the Vice President * * *

And he goes on to indicate why the Vice President should not be blamed.

The CHAIRMAN. Who says that?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is Joseph Starobin in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Starobin's position, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was foreign editor of the Daily Worker, and that is a responsible position because the foreign editor is knee deep in international intrigue, I might say.

I would like to point out that Mr. Starobin seems to know here what is on Mr. Wallace's mind, because he says that his statement at Chungking in regard to relations between China and Siberia, which the communists applauded, leads to this conclusion:

He—

that is, Mr. Wallace—

is clearly perturbed with the many hostile expressions against the Soviet Union which he heard in Chungking, and in saying this I am telling no special secrets. * * *

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, this writer indicated that he was getting information as to what Mr. Wallace's real thinking was.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct, although he said he is telling no special secrets.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the Daily Worker of June 28, 1944, page 6.

The column is headed "Between the Lines—Wallace learns about China," by Joseph Starobin.

May that be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 314," and is as follows:)

WALLACE LEARNS ABOUT CHINA

(By Joseph Starobin)

Henry A. Wallace is probably on his way home now after his dramatic visit to Soviet Siberia and China. The most important document summarizing his week-long stay in Chungking has gone before him. I mean the joint statement signed with Chiang Kai-shek, and published last Sunday.

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On the face of it, Wallace and the Chinese generalissimo say some excellent things. It would appear that their discussions have been "informal, frank and friendly." Special emphasis is placed on the "cornerstone position of China in Asia," in a system of Pacific security, built upon Chinese, Soviet, British and American collaboration, and the "permanent demilitarization" of Japan.

As for the realization of Sun Yat Sen's three principles, the statement speaks of "national sovereignty" as something already achieved for China, of "democracy" as something apparently not yet achieved but "implicit in the plans for a new constitution," and economic reconstruction as something for the future.

The order in which these principles are discussed in significant; I suppose we must be grateful that the long-delayed constitution is mentioned at all.

WALLACE ANXIOUS FOR CHINA-SOVIET TIES

A curious feature of the joint statement is its emphasis on the relations between China and the Soviet Union. Wallace and the generalissimo consider it "axiomatic" that the future peace of Asia must rest on a "continuation of the ties of friendship that have characterized American-Chinese relations for over a century." And then in the same sentence, virtually on an equal basis, they place the importance of "mutual understanding" between China and the Soviet Union—"China's nearest great neighbor."

It is nothing short of historic that Chinese-American and Chinese-Soviet relations should be discussed in the same breath and on the same plane. Yet it must be noted that in the case of our own country the statement speaks of a century-long friendship, whereas in the case of the Soviet Union is pleads only for mutual understanding.

If we bear in mind the Vice President's excellent remarks upon arriving in Chungking to the effect that the borders between China and Siberia ought to be as free and peaceful as the borders of Canada and the United States, we have a right to conclude that something is preying on Wallace's mind.

He is clearly perturbed with the many hostile expressions against the Soviet Union which he heard in Chungking, and in saying this I am telling no special secrets. In Cairo last December many a hardboiled British and American diplomat was shocked to hear vigorous anti-Soviet opinions from leading Chinese officials. The Vice President has now heard them also. He has gone out of his way to emphasize his own view of the Soviet Union's importance to China. Let us hope that the generalissimo's signature to the same statement will have its effect in Chungking.

But weighing the excellent, long-range implications of this document, one must also pause on the fact that they are so long-range.

Nothing is said on the one question that must surely be uppermost in everyone's mind: the extremely difficult military situation in central China and its connection with the extremely serious and continuing blockade of the Chinese Communists in the northwest border region.

The Wallace-Chiang statement is therefore more interesting for what it does not say than for what it says. Perhaps not all Americans realize that 120,000 Japanese soldiers are at this moment plunging from captured Changsha toward the vital junction of Hengyang, threatening to control the key railway from Peking in the north clear down to Canton in the south.

This is a terrific offensive designed to cripple China, to trap our inland air bases, to force a coup de'etat against the generalissimo and an effective separate peace.

So far the Japanese have had their way. The only redeeming feature of the dark picture lies in the fact that sections of Hunan and Honan province used to be guerrilla strongholds in times gone by and guerrilla warfare will undoubtedly revive there on a large scale.

But there is no focus on these events in Wallace's statement, for which I do not of course blame the Vice President. The immediate picture could not have been discussed without noting that 500,000 Chinese soldiers are all this while blockading the northwest in a futile, treacherous, "frozen" kind of civil war. The fact that Wallace could not (even by implication) comment on this overshadowing problem reflects the gravity of the problem itself.

TWO PICTURES—AND THE STAKE FOR AMERICA

The most striking fact about the world picture today is the contrast between the military and political crisis in China as against the heartening military and political successes everywhere else among the United Nations.

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Without losing our sense of perspective, it must be said that very alarming things can happen in China, affecting the whole course of the war unless unity is achieved between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and in a hurry.

It is the job of conscientious Americans to leave no stone unturned in facilitating that unity. History has a way of forcing its pound of flesh for the mistakes and errors of the past. In this case, Japan will be the Shylock. And Uncle Sam, among others, would be the loser.

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Chairman, now, if I may be permitted, I would like to show very briefly that this Communist applause of Mr. Wallace—and this is not for the purpose of pillorying Mr. Wallace but for the purpose of showing that his mission was not regarded by them as to be considered as very hostile to the Communists—led them into the big campaign to support Mr. Wallace for Vice President in 1944, and then led to the big campaign for Mr. Wallace for Secretary of Commerce in 1945.

I was knee deep in both of these campaigns and know very thoroughly of the almost hectic and extensive campaigns conducted by the Communists on behalf of Mr. Wallace, which meant approval of all that he stood for.

Now, I would like to introduce just a sample of this approval.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean to say, then, that the Communist Party was interested in the domestic policies in the United States, as far as the Secretary of Commerce was concerned, and that they were carrying on certain programs?

Mr. BUDENZ. They conducted the biggest campaign of any group or political unit on behalf of Mr. Wallace for Secretary of Commerce.

Senator FERGUSON. How did they do it? Out in the open, we Communists advocate this, or how do they do it? Both ways?

Mr. BUDENZ. They advocated it in the sense it was in the columns of the Daily Worker, which meant transmission to the Communists everywhere.

It also took the form of getting unions to be for Mr. Wallace; getting Negro groups for Mr. Wallace; of getting other groups to be for Mr. Wallace, and then publishing that in the Daily Worker to show a tremendous popular campaign for him.

In that connection, I just want to bring a couple of these items to your attention, of scores that I could have brought before this committee.

The first is the editorial "The People Want Him"—referring to President Roosevelt.

But in that connection, they say:

Thus, the fight on Wallace has become the vehicle for the anti-F. D. R. resurrection within the Democratic Party.

Because of this, and because of Wallace's policies and his great services to the Nation, he should be continued in office.

That was only an opening gun of an official editorial.

The CHAIRMAN. That is when he was up for Vice President, was it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. The date of that, Mr. Chairman, is July 13, 1944. That is 2 weeks after the cables.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that with reference to the Democratic Convention in Chicago?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was on the eve of the convention.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that whole article go into the record?

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The CHAIRMAN. The article may go into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 315" and is as follows:)

THE PEOPLE WANT HIM

The proverbial man on the street is breathing easier today now that all doubt concerning the President's candidacy has been resolved.

In Democratic and labor circles there was, naturally, wholehearted approval of the President's announcement. And quite as naturally, the insurrectionists within the Democratic Party were displeased. For they are not only fifth columnists within that party but enemies of the national interest as well, and that interest can be served by the President remaining in office.

The anti-Roosevelt newspapers, and they remain the great majority, have performed in the accustomed manner. Their cry is that F. D. R. has remained too long in power. There is a note of contempt for the people in that argument. For, as the President says, the people are sovereign and they will determine whether he has remained too long in office.

DIVERSIONARY TACTICS

Any cry of opposition today based on a fourth term is pure smokescreen. The problem today is the winning of the war, the establishment of a secure, democratic United Nations peace, the reconversion to a peacetime economy of prosperity. Anyone who dares put up against these issues that of length in office is clearly practicing diversionary tactics because he doesn't want to face them.

The military problems are still terrific. The war is far from won. And despite Governor Dewey's position, it is the business of the President to serve as Commander in Chief and to be thoroughly familiar with those problems. Otherwise he is abdicating his responsibilities.

The problem of relations with the United Nations is a complex and delicate one. Not only is the President's familiarity with it a factor in the elections, but who can honestly compare Governor Dewey with him as the American spokesman on a world scale?

Suppose the President were not to run. The Democratic Party would immediately be torn between various factions with naked defeatism and reaction organized to take over or to ruin. The G. O. P. would win the election hands down and would no longer find it necessary even to cover itself with the pretense of supporting a war for complete destruction of the Axis, in collaboration with the Soviet Union and England. There would be fear and suspicion generated abroad, and rightly so. In place of the ideals for which the world is fighting would be substituted the cynical imperialism of the G. O. P. spokesmen. The Axis would be encouraged to continue resistance.

For the Republican Party, as now constituted, would not represent a continuity of leadership in America if it should win the election. This is obvious from the speeches of its present leaders, from its candidates, from its platform and from its activities in Congress and elsewhere. It is evident in its rejection of Wendell Willkie and his program.

The danger of this leadership coming into power is reason enough to rule out the argument that F. D. R. has been in office too long.

THE VICE PRESIDENCY

The problem of the Vice Presidential nomination still remains to be decided. That office has undergone a transformation in the last 4 years. It is no longer a place for a "Throttlebottom," as Walter Lippman has described Governor Bricker. Henry A. Wallace has made it an important cog in the Federal machine.

With the President immersd in military and foreign policy problems, the job takes on important aspects. The country needs a Vice President who is both capable and a consistent supporter of the President's policies.

There are several who might fill the bill. But those who are fighting Wallace would also fight them, because the anti-Wallace movement is essentially an anti-Roosevelt movement that has become diverted because the President is too popular. Thus, the fight on Wallace has become the vehicle for the anti-F. D. R. resurrection within the Democratic Party.

Because of this, and because of Wallace's policies and his great services to the Nation, he should be continued in office. We are not greatly impressed by the argument that he is unpopular. Every poll taken among the people and

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among Democratic leaders has shown him leading by a wide margin among prospective candidates.

We feel that a change in the Vice Presidency could be considered only if there were an opportunity for a coalition ticket such as President Lincoln organized in 1864.

Lacking that, we are sure that the people will not only plunge into the fight to reelect the President, but will give full support to Vice President Wallace, as well.

Mr. BUDENZ. Then on June 18, 1944—and I say I am only making selections—we have this editorial: "Renominate Wallace," which I wrote personally.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. And in it they say that—

The decision will be made in the next 48 hours. We suggest that the people back home everywhere let the delegates to the Democratic convention know at once that they desire the nomination of Henry Wallace for Vice President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you write that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I wrote that upon request of Earl Browder, who was the leader of the party, and because the Politburo was convinced that Mr. Wallace represented those views, whether he was aware of it, or not, which the Communists thought should be forwarded.

In that connection, there was a great, extensive debate, and Mr. Wallace's whole record of having declared in public addresses that Soviet Russia had many features of democracy superior to our own, although he also said we had features superior to theirs, such as ethnic democracy of Soviet Russia and women's democracy, sex, and his speech in 1943, where he had said that if peace is ever broken, it will be solely due to the American double-cross of Soviet Russia; those things were debated at that time, and it was on the basis of that record of Mr. Wallace and his entire career that this stand was taken.

Senator FERGUSON. You were writing the Communist line at that time and praising Mr. Wallace and advocating his selection, were you?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And claiming that it would be great for the United States.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not claim much pride this morning in that work that you did back in '44, do you, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, Senator, I wouldn't want to discuss Mr. Wallace in person here.

Senator FERGUSON. No. I mean as to carrying out the party line?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think I have endeavored to make amends, as much as I could, under great difficulty.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you have.

Mr. BUDENZ. It has been my feeling that the damage that I did to the United States must be compensated for by my service to the Government insofar as I can do it today.

Senator FERGUSON. And to the people of the United States.

Mr. BUDENZ. And to the people.

But I certainly am ashamed, very bitterly ashamed, of my whole career as a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and that you attempted to carry out the party line as you did in this editorial.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

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Of course, I wish to say here, without wishing to introduce extraneous matters, that the Communists were encouraged in this by instructions or representations from abroad; also from Mr. Wallace, as a result of his Soviet-Asia visit.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by from abroad?

Mr. BUDENZ. I mean from Moscow, from the Communist international representatives.

Here is one sample of day-after-day campaigning of the Daily Worker for Mr. Wallace, merely to indicate their deep interest:

Drive to renominate Wallace gains at Democratic convention—

in which we must understand that in the Daily Worker these articles are also directives as well as just observations. They are also directions and they constantly are endeavoring to inspire or whip up the Communists to the campaign.

I didn't give the date, Senator, but it is quite obvious there.

The CHAIRMAN. Wednesday, July 19, 1944.

Mr. BUDENZ. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept this into the record, this article by Adam Lapin, which appears on page 2 of the Daily Worker of Wednesday, July 19, 1944, entitled "Drive To Renominate Wallace Gains at Democratic Convention"?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 316" and is as follows:)

DRIVE TO RENOMINATE WALLACE GAINS AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

(By Adam Lapin)

CHICAGO, July 18.—Upsetting predictions by professional politicians and many newspapermen that Henry A. Wallace was out of the running, the Roosevelt and labor forces backing the Vice President for renomination made significant gains today.

The powerful Pennsylvania and California delegations, with 72 and 52 votes respectively at the convention, both went on record overwhelmingly for renomination for Wallace.

Former Gov. Culbert L. Olson introduced the resolution to back Wallace which was enthusiastically approved by the California delegates. CIO, AFL, and railroad brotherhoods delegates spoke in favor of the resolution.

At the Pennsylvania caucus, the fight to back Wallace was led by CIO President Philip Murray and Senator Joseph Guffey.

Other significant developments showing the stubborn strength of the Wallace forces among rank and file delegates included:

A resolution passed by Negro leaders and delegates to the convention last night insisting on Wallace.

Statements by W. Murray and CIO Political Action Committee Chairman Sidney Hillman at a huge press conference that "It's Wallace" and "We have no other choice, as far as labor is concerned."

TORY MANEUVER

Reactionary southern delegates and some of the politicians opposing Wallace attempted to make capital out of the statement in the President's letter that he did "not wish to appear in any way as dictating to the convention."

But the fact that Roosevelt said that he would vote for Wallace's "renomination if I were a delegate to the convention" clarified the President's position and actually strengthened Wallace's position.

With his campaign picking up, Wallace was scheduled to arrive here tomorrow to take personal charge of the forces backing his nomination.

There were also persistent reports that in the event of a deadlock Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas would have influential support.

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One story which was current was that Senator Harry Truman of Missouri, who has been prominently mentioned for the Vice Presidential spot, had agreed to place Byrnes in nomination.

Truman was reported to have asked the CIO for support but was flatly turned down by Hillman who said that Byrnes would not be satisfactory.

CIO SOLID FOR WALLACE

Hillman confirmed at the CIO press conference late this afternoon that he had breakfasted with Truman this morning.

"We're not discussing other delegates," Hillman said, emphasizing that Wallace was the only choice of the CIO.

Murray declared that "the strength of the rank and file is behind Wallace."

He expressed the hope that the delegates would come to appreciate "the strength which will be given by putting Wallace on the ticket."

Murray confirmed reports that two Cabinet members had voted against Wallace on the first ballot in the Pennsylvania delegation, but said that one of them later switched over.

The two Cabinet members were Attorney General Francis Biddle and Postmaster General Frank Walker.

The vote in the delegation was 41 for Wallace, 6 against and 15 abstained.

Mr. BUDENZ. Then in regard to the campaign for Secretary of Commerce, in which I was deeply involved, because I directed the publicity specifically for the Communist Party—and, indeed, my name appeared on many articles on behalf of Mr. Wallace—I would like to present two exhibits of many that could be presented.

This was even a bigger campaign in some ways than the one for Vice President, because they had more time to carry it through.

The CHAIRMAN. What date is that?

Mr. BUDENZ. The date I am presenting first is January 27, 1945. They had "Wallace's Program for Postwar America" in detail, but it is to the editorial that I direct attention:

All United States has stake in Wallace fight.

In speaking about Wallace's testimony which clashed with that of Jesse Jones, they make a contrast between the two, and then they say about Mr. Wallace:

> There was grandeur about the Wallace testimony, a grandeur imparted to it by the vision of the man, by his profound concern for the future of the people—all of the people—of America, by his understanding of the interconnection between the economic welfare of the people and the maintenance of American democracy, by his grasp of America's position in a postwar world, by his boundless confidence in the Nation's ability to go ahead.

There is much more to the same effect, in which they conclude by urging that Henry Wallace be confirmed as Secretary of Commerce.

Mr. MORRIS. That is page 4 of the Daily Worker, Saturday, January 27, 1945; an editorial, "All United States Has Stake in Wallace Fight".

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you connected with the Daily Worker as an editor on that date?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I was directing that campaign specifically. I was assigned by the Politburo to the Wallace campaign to see it was effected.

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 317," and is as follows:)

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ALL UNITED STATES HAS STAKE IN WALLACE FIGHT

AN EDITORIAL

All Americans must have been impressed with the profound contrast in the testimony presented to them by Jesse Jones and Henry Wallace.

Where Jones sneered at those who want to build a prosperous postwar America as "impractical dreamers," Wallace presented a sound, concrete program for building that kind of America.

When Jones attacked those who would "remake America," Wallace placed his faith in the ability of America to "remake" itself so that there would be no more starvation, mass business failures, recurrent crises.

There was a grandeur about the Wallace testimony, a grandeur imparted to it by the vision of the man, by his profound concern for the future of the people—all the people—of America, by his understanding of the interconnection between the economic welfare of the people and the maintenance of American democracy, by his grasp of America's position in a postwar world, by his boundless confidence in the Nation's ability to go ahead.

His testimony revealed that this was no "impractical idealist" talking, but one who had full command of the realities facing postwar America. His "practicality" was evident from the brief review of his own experience as Secretary of Agriculture, when he administered successfully several huge Federal farm programs. And he appeared as a thorough exponent of the policies of President Roosevelt. Those who would attack Wallace as a "dreamer" for projecting that kind of postwar program would also have to indict the President. Yet who, in his sense, would today call FDR an "impractical idealist," after his immense achievement in peace and in war?

Wallace noted that the attack on his "inexperience" was subterfuge; that the only true issue involved in the controversy over his confirmation was whether or not the resources of the Government should be used to guarantee prosperity for all Americans. The President and Wallace say they shall be so used. The foes of the Wallace appointment say they shall not.

Is there any doubt where the American people stand? Is there any question that all of us, whether worker or farmer or large- or small-business man, want a prosperous postwar America? Will anyone dare say openly that the people want a return to Hooverism? Yet this is what the foes of Henry Wallace are saying by indirection.

And when we say that the people want such a program as outlined by Wallace, we include the bulk of the 22,000,000 who voted for Dewey. Whether they voted Republican for partisan reasons or whether they were taken in by Dewey's demogogy, these 22,000,000 did not vote for a return to Hooverism.

In his statement to the Senate committee, Wallace made it clear there is no issue of "big business versus small business" involved in his appointment, any more than there is an issue of "socialism versus capitalism." Big business and small business alike will profit from the kind of America to which he aspires. And it will be an America where private enterprise will be stronger and healthier, not weaker.

Thus, the President's appointment of Henry Wallace advances national unity. Wallace's program provides the economic foundation for advancing the interests of all groups and classes in American life. Worker, farmer, big-business man, and small-business man have a common stake in seeing that Henry Wallace is confirmed as Secretary of Commerce.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say the Soviet Union and Moscow had cognizance of this particular drive?

Mr. BUDENZ. They have cognizance of all drives. The drive I specifically referred to was the drive for Vice President.

Mr. MORRIS. I see; not this one?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not this one.

This is the Daily Worker, New York, Thursday, January 25, 1945:

CIO, AFL unions rally to Wallace; Anti-Wallace press aims at F. D. R.

There are two articles here, almost a whole page devoted to it, Negro Leaders Rally Behind Wallace, and the like.

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Then there is another article here, and another by myself, under my byline, in which I take a review of the Nation's press and show that the Fascists and reactionary press is against Mr. Wallace. That was the line of the Daily Worker at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What relationship does the Daily Worker bear to the Communist Party in America?

I think you have testified to that before, but I would like to have you testify again.

Mr. BUDENZ. The Daily Worker is the official daily organ of the Communist Party in the United States, completely controlled by the party and unable to make a move without the approval of the Politburo.

This is a literal matter, Senator. There is a representative of the Politburo always as a liaison representative of that organization in the editorial board of the Daily Worker.

This personnel is changed from time to time.

Secondly, the Daily Worker, from that position as daily organ, is the telegraph agency of directives to the conspiracy. That is, every morning a Communist leader out through the country opens up the Daily Worker, from it decides what campaigns to carry forward, whom to support, whom to attack, what organizations to rout.

That is one of the sources of the success of the Communist conspiracy in this country: the quickness with which they can operate.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the party line, is it not?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the party line as it is delicately interpreted from day to day by the Daily Worker, because even in the party line there are certain changes from time to time, emphasis to get certain things out more rapidly, to get certain organizations into activity quicker, and the like.

The Daily Worker, for example, once had a circulation of 8,000. That didn't bother the Communist Party, from information I have received. That wasn't while I was connected with it.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the circulation when you were there?

Mr. BUDENZ. The daily circulation was around 29,000, and the Sunday circulation ran about up to a hundred thousand on the Worker, but it ran up and down from seventy-five to a hundred.

That was not the concern of the party, though, of course, the more circulation they got, the better they liked it. But their concern was that it reached quickly those Communists who could transmit what it said out in waves to others.

The CHAIRMAN. How is it supported? By its subscriptions, or by its advertising, or by what means?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is largely supported by what is called a financial drive every year for the Daily Worker, in which several hundred thousand dollars is raised, because neither its subscriptions nor its advertising would, of course, bring it any substantial revenue.

The main advertising it has is from such organizations as the International Workers Order, which is an adjunct of the Communist Party and which from time to time, as a gift, but in the form of an ad, gives large ads to the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record, that article of January 25, 1945?

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The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 318" and is as follows:)

CIO, AFL UNIONS RALLY TO WALLACE; ANTI-WALLACE PRESS AIMS AT FDR

(By Louis F. Budenz)

Rallying behind President Roosevelt in his selection of Henry A. Wallace as Secretary of Commerce, the Greater New York CIO Council yesterday wired Senators Wagner and Mead urging them to work for Wallace's confirmation. Joseph Curran, president, and Saul Mills, secretary, asked the Senators to oppose unequivocally any attempt to divorce the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) from the Department of Commerce.

The Wayne County (Detroit) CIO Political Action Committee also pressed for approval of the President's appointment. The Detroit PAC wired the President that his action "will further cement our national unity front against the facist Axis."

In Washington, CIO president Philip Murray and presidents of the largest AFL unions and railroad brotherhoods also spoke for confirmation.

Murray said that the CIO "hails with delight the nomination of an outstanding American in the person of Henry Wallace to the position of Secretary of Commerce. I am hopeful that the Senate will confirm him without quibbling."

Dan Tobin, president of the AFL, Brotherhood of Teamsters, asserted that "there isn't a man better fitted for this job than is Henry Wallace."

Tobin said he was aware of the move to separate the Department of Commerce from its more important RFC activities and added:

"So when I say I favor Mr. Wallace's appointment as Secretary of Commerce, I naturally include these newer functions of the Department."

Harvey Brown, president of the AFL International Association of Machinists, commented that the former Vice President "will be able to make a very real contribution toward solving our postwar problems, especially since everything must be done to promote continuity of employment. * * *"

RAIL UNIONS

E. E. Milliman, president of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, said he favored the appointment and "without question the Senate should confirm it."

Felix Knight, president of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, said he favored confirmation on the grounds that "a person in a position of responsibility should have the right to choose his assistants."

George M. Harrison, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, largest railroad union in the country, said he was highly pleased with the Wallace appointment and looked forward to confirmation.

Wallace's appointment will be tremendously helpful because of the program of readjustment required for the postwar, H. W. Fraser, president of the Order of Railway Conductors, said. He predicted Wallace would prove to be a very able Secretary of Commerce.

Nothing lets us know so dramatically that the opposition to Henry Wallace for Secretary of Commerce is in reality a battle against President Roosevelt as the opinions on the controversy expressed in the Nation's press.

In the recent election campaign about 85 percent of the commercial newspapers of the country were against FDR for the fourth term, as Secretary of the Interior Ickes put down for the record immediately after November 7. Approximately the same percentage is hounding Wallace now. The same purpose of scuttling the national-unity position represented by Mr. Roosevelt exists in this anti-Wallace campaign.

There are some voices of opinion, of course, which have learned something from the Roosevelt coalition's victory. Among these is the Des Moines Tribune, owned by the Cowles brothers. Backing the GOP in the 1944 elections, it is now out in strong terms for the former Vice President.

"Henry Wallace," it says editorially on January 23, "knows more about the economics of trade and finance in an interdependent world than Jesse Jones will ever suspect."

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And it says sarcastically that it is not impressed by the argument that no man should be in public office "who hasn't at one time or other made vast sums of money."

On the banks of the Mississippi, the independent St. Louis Post-Dispatch is winning national fame againn in its pro-Wallace attitude. This paper states that Jesse Jones "failed in the crucial test; was still pinching pennies instead of buying strategic materials in a desperate period of the war."

The defeatist press, as was to be expected, is 100 percent on the other side. The Chicago Tribune, leader of the subversive gangs in America, tears its hair in opposition to Wallace. It sees a new Red plot in his appointment, but, in its ranting talk of Communist slavery, lets us know the true basis of its barrage by bitterly saying that Wallace is a fit companion for FDR. The pro-Fascist New York News echoes the same thoughts.

The New York Times, which grudgingly came out for FDR just before November 7, and then only because of his foreign policy, is now saying things to hurt Wallace. Its reasons for not liking his appointment are the same as those that cause it to be against the President's domestic policies.

The Republican Herald Tribune likewise follows the pattern of the election period. Then its partisanship betrayed it into supporting the Dewey ticket, and caused it to resort to arguments that must have made the editorial writers blush. Now it follows the same course, talking stupidly about "socialism" being the only way to get full employment, implying that Wallace is therefore a "Red" and that full employment is undesirable in America.

The issues therefore are sharply drawn in this contest; they are Mr. Roosevelt's view of prosperity and enduring peace versus those people who oppose such objectives.

As in the national election campaign, some danger that the scene may be messed up comes from the liberals. The newspaper PM would like to make the fight for Wallace a battle on a white horse against "big business" monopolies.

The New York Post, as it did before November 7, spends much time in whining about the words used by the President in the Wallace appointment. Were either of these attitudes to become widespread, it would be injurious to the Wallace appointment.

Seeing the line-up, the people can make the fight for the former Vice President a clear-cut one for FDR and national unity.

Negro Leaders Rally Behind Wallace

(By Eugene Gordon)

Negro leaders in all walks of life are rallying to the support of Henry A. Wallace, in the struggle around Wallace's appointment as Secretary of Commerce.

Wallace's appointment brought the decisions of Tehran "several steps nearer to the people," declared Miss Daisy George, business agent of local 6, Hotel and Club Employees Union, AFL.

The appointment "is proof that the President means business in his plan to put America to work," declared Charles A. Collins, executive secretary of the Negro Labor Victory Committee. He added:

"The disappointment felt by the Negro people when Wallace failed to get the Vice Presidential nomination has been more than compensated for by his inclusion in the President's Cabinet. He'll be associated with his chief on the program for 60,000,000 jobs. The Negro people want him."

Mrs. Ada Jackson, chairman, Brooklyn Interracial Assembly, expressed her feeling in the story of the women who, riding in a buggy along a narrow road overhanging a precipice, retorted, when asked whether she was scared:

"Scared. Why, how could I be scared? Isn't Brother Jones holding the reins?"

MAN OF VISION

The Reverend Charles Y. Trigg, pastor of Salem Methodist Church, 209 West One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Street. He said:

"The Secretary of Commerce should be a man of great vision and of unwavering courage. Wallace is that man. It would be a gloomy day for us all if he were sidetracked by the reactionaries. That must not happen."

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Ludlow Werner, editor of the New York Age, traditionally a Republican paper but which supported Roosevelt last November, saw the Wallace appointment as a "boon to the forgotten man in business in the professions and everywhere else."

The Negro people, Mr. Werner added, certainly constitute the largest segment of America's forgotten men."

The Department of Commerce is "basic to the welfare of the Nation's economy," said the Reverend James B. Johnson, pastor of the Church of the Master, 86 Morningside Avenue.

Mrs. Dorothy Robinson Homer, librarian, One Hundred and Thirty-fifth Street branch, New York Public Library, said the appointment "means a feather in the President's cap." It means a great deal "for the colored people, whom he knows so well and who have such a high regard for him."

Alpheus Hunton, educational director, Council on African Affairs, said:

"The basic question confronting the United States is postwar economy in international trade. Wallace's presence in the Cabinet as representative of the Department of Commerce will give us all a feeling that our interests are being looked after."

Mr. BUDENZ. If I may be permitted, Mr. Chairman, may I add one more thing here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is: To cap off the attitude of the Communist Party toward Mr. Wallace in the 1944–45 period, in the famous article by Jacques Duclos, the general secretary of the Communist Party of France, attacking Earl Browder as a revisionist, and which led to Browder's demotion from leadership, Henry Wallace was commended to Browder as an example on two different occasions.

Now, this was a very unusual thing, and immediately the Communists understood that they should adopt Henry Wallace as a substitute for Browder, not as a Communist leader, but as a united front leader, which eventually, within a very short time, they proceeded to do, through the Progressive Party.

It is very significant that an international document such as that written by Jacques Duclos, in effect demoting Browder, and in which Browder said in its introduction that it represented the mind of all the leading Marxists in Europe, should have twice commended Wallace to Browder's consideration as having a more correct view of how to proceed than what Browder had.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that article available?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is available. It was published in Political Affairs and in the Daily Worker and in many other places by the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. We have the article, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mandel is now getting it. It will be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this your book, Soviet Asia Mission?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say it is your book, you mean you own the book; it is the Soviet Asia Mission, by Henry Wallace?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. It isn't mine.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would read a memorandum there on page 32. It is underscored. Then I think the same thing is referred to on page 172. That is one of the men mentioned there.

I would like to have you read it aloud.

Mr. BUDENZ. Do you want the whole paragraph?

Senator FERGUSON. That part.

Mr. BUDENZ (reading):

When we arrived at Seimchan, it was the early evening of our first day in Soviet Russia. We were put up for the night at the Airport Hotel. On the walls

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of the large pleasant room assigned to me were Soviet oriental rugs. An official banquet of welcome was arranged for us. The master of ceremonies was a Georgian, Sergei Arsenevich Goglidze, an intimate friend of Marshal Stalin. He is president of the executive committee of Khabarovsk's territory, under which this far northern area is governed, and he had flown up 1,500 miles from the Amur River region to greet us.

Senator FERGUSON. Page 172 shows who was at the meeting and what this Russian was thinking about. Will you read that?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, Senator. I think this was read before in the proceedings, but I will read it again:

At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to place how the responsibility for China's future was placed upon these two men.

At that time, what was Vincent's mission? As I understood, at that time he was the United States employee representing the United States to carry out the United States policy; was he not?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Lattimore's mission?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he was sent as an adviser, because of his knowledge of China and Soviet Asia, particularly of China.

Senator FERGUSON. But he was really representing the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But this Russian, who was a personal friend of Stalin and represented really one of the republics of the Soviet Union, said there was a burden on them in relation to China. How do you account for that?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I only accounted by my own knowledge of these Soviet toasts.

First of all, a Soviet toast to an individual is not necessarily a sign that he is a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I did not mention that.

Mr. BUDENZ. But when he puts a responsibility on them, that does indicate that he expects them to deliver the goods—if I may use an American phrase. He expects them to deliver the goods.

Senator FERGUSON. It was more than a toast of good health. It was an indication that they had a certain responsibility.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that? They were also advisers to Mr. Wallace, were with him at the time that he was going along on this mission; is not that true?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I account for it by the fact that my official information is that they were Communists, and I think that is the interpretation that is most to be drawn from that statement.

The future China the Communists had in mind was a Communist China, to be attained through a coalition government, and the responsibility for that future China was placed on their shoulders.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have at this time noted the author's note on this volume that we have been having testimony about, Soviet Asia Mission.

Mr. Mandel, will you read the author's note?

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Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Author's note: In acknowledgment of invaluable assistance in preparing the manuscript of Soviet Asia Mission, my sincere thanks are extended to John Hazard, Owen Lattimore, and Capt. Kennith Knowles, for intimate observations of life in east Asia today; Joseph Barnes, Harriet Moore, Albert Rhys Williams, Dr. Tredwell Smith, and Myra Jordan for reading the text and offering editorial suggestions; and to Andrew J. Steiger, who compiled the book from the diary I wrote during the trip and from other factual materials supplied him by me.

HENRY A. WALLACE.

Mr. MORRIS. In addition to Mr. Lattimore, you had two people who served as secretaries, who have been affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, Joseph Barnes and Harriet Moore, making a contribution to this particular volume.

Mr. Chairman, we have here an article in Political Affairs, about which Mr. Budenz gave testimony.

First, I wonder if Mr. Budenz would want to refresh his recollection on the article that he testified about and, secondly, how much would you like to have go into the record?

Mr. BUDENZ. It requires very little refreshing on this historic document on the dissolution of the Communist Party in the United States, by Jacques Duclos, which was reprinted and issued as the theoretical organ of the Communist Party in France, in which Browder, who was held to be the leading Marxist-Leninist in the Western Hemisphere, was renounced as a revisionist and demoted eventually, in accordance with Duclos' directives as general secretary of the Communist Party.

In this connection Mr. Duclos refers Mr. Browder and the Communist Party to Mr. Wallace:

The former Vice President of the United States, Henry Wallace, present Secretary of Commerce, said rightly that one cannot fight fascism abroad and tolerate at home the activity of powerful groups which intend to make peace "with a simple breathing spell between the death of an old tyranny and the birth of a new."

The Yalta decisions thwarted these plans, but the enemies of liberty will not disarm of their free will. They will only retreat before the acting coalition of all the forces of democracy and progress.

And it is clear that if Comrade Earl Browder had seen, as a Marxist-Leninist, this important aspect of the problems facing liberty-loving peoples in this moment in their history, he would have arrived at a conclusion quite other than the dissolution of the Communist Party of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. That is taken from Political Affairs, of July 1945, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

It is my impression there was still another reference to Mr. Wallace here, but I can't find it in the short time we have before us.

At any rate, this created a certain definite repercussion within the leading ranks of the Communist Party, because it was an unusual and, in fact, unheard of precedent that a non-Communist, such as Mr. Wallace is, should be used as an example or an imitation for a Communist leader, and should have been shown to have been more in line with the Communist thinking than the Communist leader was.

It was immediately understood and so analyzed at the Politburo that Mr. Wallace was to be the leader of the united front forces as formulated by the Communists, in the immediate future, at least.

And so it turned out to be.

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Senator FERGUSON. But the Communist Party does not hesitate to take advantage of a person's thinking, even though he is not a Communist, if it is in line with their philosophy.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. They have referred to many people.

But in this case, this was an official act demoting a Communist leader and, in addition, was quoting a non-Communist leader as having clearer thoughts on the questions from the Communist viewpoint than the Communist leader.

That, I state, is where the precedent is remarkable, and it was immediately seized upon in the Politburo discussions and acted upon, as history shows, in the fact that they understood that Mr. Wallace was destined to be the leading united front figure for the Communists before the American people, during that period.

Senator FERGUSON. I would just go back now to the first part that I asked about.

Again, you have testified before this committee and gave your reasons this morning for your belief that your testimony was true and accurate, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Do you now again say that it was?

Mr. BUDENZ. I say it with more assurance than ever, because these documents I presented, as I have said, are only part of what could have been presented to this committee, and they confirm my contention, which was that the Communist Party Politburo, from its vantage point, thought that the Wallace Mission to Soviet Asia and China was being properly guided and would end in the way they wished it would end.

We have to appreciate what that objective of theirs was, knowing their objective during that particular period of time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel their objective was carried out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely, it was carried out.

In addition to that, this is demonstrated by the Communist attitude toward Mr. Wallace. The Communists are not modest people who shrink before public personalities. If they disagree with someone they attack him, and very vigorously.

In this case, we have a rising crescendo of commendation for Mr. Wallace, up to the Duclos article.

Senator FERGUSON. You come back to the proposition, then, that the cables and the report to the President, that is now before you, were not adverse to the Communist line at the time they were written?

Mr. BUDENZ. They were certainly not adverse; they were helpful to the Communist line at the time they were written, for example, where it says that—I don't want to go too far afield, but where it says that Chiang Kai-shek can only be viewed as a short-term investment.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we addressed ourselves only to the Kunming cables because they are the only issues before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. There has been a good deal of discussion about that, and the connotation makes it appear that Mr. Budenz is testifying that the Communists were approving Mr. Wallace in spite of the Kunming cables and therefore the Communists concurred in the Kunming cables, but I do not think we have any testimony that the Communists knew anything about that.

How about that, Mr. Budenz?

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Mr. BUDENZ. To my knowledge, there was no discussion in the Politburo cables, or any official report of Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge that the Communist leaders knew anything about those reports?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know that they knew Mr. Wallace's attitude. They discussed it, and it was in accordance with these cables.

That is to say, they knew that Mr. Wallace stood for Soviet-Chinese close relations, and that he also stood for a criticism of Chiang Kai-shek as ineffective and inefficient.

I said they had a remarkable knowledge of what later develops appeared apparently in these cables.

Senator FERGUSON. I agree with you, Mr. Sourwine, that there is no evidence in the record that shows that the Communist Party knew of the contents of the cables or the report to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been testified to on 2 occasions now.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Senator FERGUSON. I was directing my questions to what the cables show now and his opinion on them in the light of his knowledge of the Communist line as of the date they were written.

Mr. BUDENZ. And I so addressed myself to the question.

Senator FERGUSON. And you understood my question?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as there is no indication whatever that John Carter Vincent concurred in the so-called Wallace report, as opposed to the Kunming cables, I suggest that we not accept Mr. Budenz's testimony at this time on that report.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you made yourself clear so that you know what you have?

Senator FERGUSON. I think, Mr. Chairman, the purpose of Mr. Budenz's coming here was to be sure the record was complete on the score of his testimony.

Since the record is irrelevant on that point, I think we would be going too far afield in our inquiry on the Institute of Pacific Relations if we went into that. So that is all we have on that score, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the witness to be excused indefinitely, or is he to be held under subpena?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, he has agreed to have an executive session with the committee on another matter we have under inquiry. That will be the next assignment for the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

(Thereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Saturday, October 6 ,1951.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Wiley, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator Knowland; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel, Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The record discloses that Governor Stassen wired the chairman requesting an opportunity to return before the committee. The chairman replied to his wire that if it was satisfactory he might appear this Saturday morning, to which he replied it was satisfactory and he would appear.

The governor is still under oath so far as presenting his testimony to this committee is concerned. If there is any question as to that, he will be sworn again.

Mr. STASSEN. I might as well be sworn again so there will not be any question.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Committee on the Judiciary, of the United States Senate, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. STASSEN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HAROLD E. STASSEN, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, you have requested that the record will show the two letters that you sent yesterday pursuant to the decision of the committee after yesterday's session. They are now in the possession of Mr. Mandel.

Will you read those into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. What replies have we had?

Mr. MORRIS. They only went out late yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. If it were possible this morning to call up the State Department, Mr. Chairman, and see whether or not we can get all of the minutes this morning in compliance with your letter, it would allow the governor to have an opportunity to see them.

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I wonder whether that could be done.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know. I would make a guess that this being Saturday morning you would not get very much.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be possible to try?

The CHAIRMAN. I would not hesitate to try; no.

Read these into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. October 5, 1951:

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of September 12, 1951, in connection of the State Department round-table conference of October 6, 7, and 8, 1949.

In that letter you state that you would not make the transcript available because you wish to honor a commitment made to the participants and not make their remarks public.

In view of the extensive comments made concerning the remarks of the participants, I write this to renew my request that the transcript be made available to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate.

Very sincerely yours,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

OCTOBER 5, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There was testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee today that a report was made by a Naval Intelligence officer, reporting that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party. The estimated date of the report is sometime during the summer of 1950.

The source of that information was Mr. Louis Budenz who testified today before the Internal Security Subcommittee.

The committee decided today that it would like to have this report in its record. Inasmuch as there is no security involved because the source of the information has publicly testified to the fact of his reporting, it is requested that this report be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

The report went through the district intelligence office of the Third Naval District.

Sincerely yours,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

The CHAIRMAN. I am now sending a communication to the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may both of those letters be made part of the official record?

The CHAIRMAN. They will.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibit Nos. 319 and 320," and filed for the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Governor Stassen.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, subsequent to your testimony here before this committee last Monday, have you learned anything more, any more facts, that would be relevant to our inquiry?

Mr. STASSEN. I have, Mr. Morris and Senator McCarran, and before proceeding, I would like, with your permission, to say again that I appear following through from the earlier hearing in which I was subpenaed that day, and I do not appear to make any charges against anyone nor to give any clearance to anyone.

I appear to answer your questions and to directly and simply state facts.

I feel, as I said then, it is your province to form opinions and to reach conclusions.

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Mr. Morris and Senator, following my appearance on Monday, my attention was called to a State Department denial of certain important aspects of my testimony.

Starting in on that question, I might refer back to the transcript of what I said on Monday. I have in my hand the official transcript of the committee in which you say:

Will you tell us what he told you about it?

That is with reference to Senator Arthur Vandenberg.

I might further indicate, as you are aware, this recollection developed in the course of my testimony. This was not something on which I had prepared my advance memorandum, nor did I have any documents with me. It developed as you explored further the consequences of my first testimony which I did have outlined and prepared.

So this is what I then testified when I said:

When I saw Senator Vandenberg, for whom, as you know, I have the highest regard, for the last time in his home in Grand Rapids, Mich., in November of 1950, just prior to my last trip through Asia and round the world, he told me of a White House conference on this question of stopping supplies for Chiang Kai-shek.

You said:

Will you develop that for us, if there is any more to develop?

I said:

Senator Vandenberg told me in this conference he was called into, which he said was the only conference he had been called into on Asia policy, it was there proposed by Secretary Acheson and Dr. Jessup to the President that the supplies which were then being loaded in ships in Hawaii and San Francisco for the Chiang Kai-shek government, be dramatically stopped as a move toward world peace. That is, all armaments should be immediately cut off from the Chinese Nationalists and the ships that were then on the way and then being loaded—as I recall, he said there were five such ships that would be carrying supplies to the Chinese Nationalists—they should all be stopped in a dramatic and direct announcement to stop the supplies that were continuing the internal war in China; that he then vigorously opposed and analyzed it, and that after discussion with members of the Cabinet who were present, the President decided not to go ahead with the recommendation of Secretary Acheson and Dr. Jessup in view of Senator Vandenberg's statement he would publicly oppose it and he would certainly get a majority of the United States Senate to join with him in the opposition to that policy.

That is the essential part of that testimony.

The next day in my office in Philadelphia a representative of the United Press brought from the ticker a release ticked out of Washington, which I will now present for this record and in referring to it, it states that the State Department said Stassen's memory was playing him tricks.

It says that neither Acheson nor Jessup had recollection of such a meeting and it said further that there has never been any proposal to abolish aid to Nationalist China by Secretary Acheson, by Ambassador Jessup, or by any other authorized official of the State Department.

I present that for the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it continue with the other part of the release:

Insofar as military aid is concerned, this was covered by the President's statement of January 5, 1950, and exhaustively covered by Secretary Acheson and others during the course of the MacArthur hearings.

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Mr. STASSEN. The ticker does not go to that extent, but I have subsequently obtained the official department of State press release No. 895.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that ticker release be made part of the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I will look it over while the witness is testifying.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 321" and is as follows:)

(Teletype copy, United Press story)

WITH JESSUP

WASHINGTON, October 3 (UP).—The State Department and far-eastern expert, Owen Lattimore, both have contradicted statements by Harold E. Stassen on China and Asian policies.

Lattimore accused the former Republican Governor of Minnesota of "fantastically inaccurate" statements. He asked the State Department to make public "all remarks made by me" at a 1949 conference on Asia.

The State Department said that Stassen's memory was playing him tricks. In considerable detail it disputed statements made by the now president of the University of Pennsylvania to Senate investigators on Monday.

Stassen testified that Lattimore gave the 1949 round-table conference 10 recommendations "best characterized as steps to hasten the victory of the Chinese Communists and liquidation of the Chinese Nationalists."

Stassen said the recommendations included United States recognition of Red China and turning over Formosa and Hong Kong to the Communists.

Lattimore denied last night that he urged such action. He said Stassen's testimony before the Senate Internal Security Committee gave "an entirely misleading impression" of the conference.

The State Department said Stassen's memory was "playing him tricks" when he testified that the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican, Michigan, told him that Acheson and Ambassador at Large Phillip C. Jessup proposed cutting off United States aid to the Chinese Nationalists as a dramatic gesture to achieve world peace.

Stassen told the Senate committee that Vandenberg said the proposals were made at a White House conference. However, State Department press officer Michael J. McDermott said an "exhaustive search" of records failed to uncover any evidence of such a conference. Neither Acheson nor Jessup, McDermott said, had "recollection of such a meeting."

"There has never been any proposal to abolish aid to Nationalist China by Secretary Acheson, by Ambassador Jessup, or by any other authorized official of the State Department," McDermott said.

Referring to the 1949 conference on Asia, McDermott said the stenographic transcript of the meeting showed that 18 members of the panel spoke. He said Lattimore and Lawrence Rosinger, a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, urged recognition of Red China, and that 11 others believed 'recognition could not be withheld for an indefinite period."

"Five, including Mr. Stassen, recommended that recognition not be considered at that time," McDermott said.

Rosinger, whom Stassen testified joined Lattimore in offering the 10-point program, said in New York last night that Stassen's statement was "simply untrue."

Mr. STASSEN. I will present this official release for a part of the record, but it says in it, and, of course, the press is familiar with it:

Secretary Acheson has no recollection of such a meeting. Ambassador Jessup has no recollection of such a meeting. We have checked the records at the White House thoroughly. We have checked the Secretary's records and find nothing.

Then it goes on:

Moreover, there has never been any proposal—

et cetera.

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Senator, of course, when that ticker was brought to me I realized that I faced a very grave and very fundamental situation, a matter that I had testified to before this committee that was of great consequence, and it had been directly denied and denied from records.

Of course, that went in the press across the country. There was just a trace of double talk in the release and so what I immediately did at 10:15 a. m., on October 1, when this was brought to me, I said this to the press:

My attention has been called to the State Department's release of October 2. I will make a more complete statement later, but I immediately ask this direct specific question of Secretary Acheson:

"Do you deny that you were at the conference with President Truman and Senator Vandenberg in 1949, at which you recommended cutting off all military supplies for the China Nationalists and at which Senator Vandenberg opposed such action?"

The CHAIRMAN. That was a wire from you to the Secretary of State?

Mr. STASSEN. That was a statement to the press immediately when they brought this ticker to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Stassen.

Mr. Chairman, we have here the press release Mr. Stassen read from. Should that be made part of the public record?

The CHAIRMAN. I think this is a matter that Mr. Stassen has testified to and I do not know whether the whole wire should be made a part, or not.

I already put the ticker in. It illustrates the testimony of the witness.

In regard to the press release, I will pass on that later.

Mr. MORRIS. The last is the question addressed to Secretary Acheson. I think the testimony covers that completely.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a statement given to the press, according to the witness, in which it propounds a question through the press to the Secretary; is that correct?

Mr. STASSEN. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. There would not be any necessity for putting that in the record. He has read it.

Mr. STASSEN. I read it. It is just there for reference.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get an answer, a direct answer to this, Governor?

Mr. STASSEN. No, I have not received a direct answer to it. There is an indirect answer that I will refer to.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Governor.

Mr. STASSEN. Then, of course, realizing this was a grave situation, I immediately relived in my memory that conference with Senator Vandenberg in order that I might there explore for sources of confirmation and corroboration. At the same time I asked my secretary to look in our files with reference to the conference itself with Senator Vandenberg.

Since the basic statement that my memory was playing tricks was involved, I felt that was material. They imediately came back from the files with a copy of a telegram from Senator Vandenberg to me on November 17, 1950, which reads:

Anent your visit tomorrow, are you arriving by plane? Happy to have my chauffeur meet you if you will advise the hour.

Sincerely,

A. H. VANDENBERG.

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This is sent from Grand Rapids.

My secretary also produced the stub of my airline ticket which shows my routing to Minneapolis, to Milwaukee, to Grand Rapids, to Ypsilanti, to Pittsburgh, and back to Philadelphia, and also a copy of the letter that I wrote then a week later to Senator Vandenberg saying:

I deeply appreciate having had the opportunity to see you. My visits with you are always stimulating and inspiring.

I will look forward to seeing you again upon my return from Asia.

My very best wishes.

That is a comparatively minor point, but it definitely corroborates what my memory was, that I had seen him in November of 1950, the exact date being November 18, 1950.

I present these three things for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they may go in the record.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibits Nos. 322, 323, and 324," and filed for the record.)

Mr. STASSEN. Then as I reflected and relived in my memory this conference, I recall Senator Vandenberg had said that it had been subsequent to some serious reverses of Chiang's forces and that it was at a time when an effort was underway to establish unity between the China Nationalists and the China Communists in the war.

Therefore, referring out our own chronological memorandum regarding the development of the war, I placed that as being in February, March, or April of 1949, although I emphasize Senator Vandenberg had not told me when it was, but he said it was in 1949, as I testified here.

Then, in reflecting, I further recalled he said that the meeting had documentation; that is, that when he arrived for the meeting some of the members of the Cabinet were present; that there was a formal presentation of the proposal; that the documents were ready to put it into effect, and there was documentation to support it.

With these two clues, I then said to my secretary, "Locate Arthur Vandenberg's son, Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., and get him on the phone."

In due course, perhaps an hour, my secretary said that Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., was in South America.

I said, "Try to reach him there."

Then he came back and said they had located him at another place. He had just recently returned and that he was on the phone.

So I told him of my testimony here; told him that it would involve, as I saw it, February, March, or April of 1949, and asked him if Senator Vandenberg had any diary or memorandum that might bear on this situation.

Within a short time he advised me that the Senator did have such a diary; that the date was February 5, 1949; that the conference was held in the White House; that the essential facts that I testified to could be corroborated in Senator Vandenberg's diary.

He told me further that Senator Vandenberg's diary was kept by the Senator himself, typing it on his own typewriter with his own hands, following conferences such as this, and that the specific reference for February 5, 1949, is there in these documents; that it is there in Senator Vandenberg's own typing, and that he had the document.

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I then asked as to getting it, or getting a copy of it. He said that he has sold the rights on it to the New York Herald Tribune and to the Houghton, Mifflin Book Co. and that, therefore, it would be necessary that it be subpenaed to produce it.

The CHAIRMAN. That would have to be subpenaed?

Mr. STASSEN. It would be necessary, as I see it, to subpena Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., the syndicate editor of the New York Herald Tribune, and the book editor of the Houghton, Mifflin Co., and ask that they produce the Vandenberg diary for February 5, 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the owners have the copyright.

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering who had possession. Whoever has possession should be subpenaed.

Mr. STASSEN. I assume it is a situation in which Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., is working on the papers, but they are in the legal custody of those who have purchased the rights. So I think the subpena must be joint. I would request that it be done and that this committee and the public might have that vital corroborating evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Mr. Arthur Vandenberg, Jr.?

Mr. STASSEN. He is in New York City.

Let me consult my secretary.

My secretary will check and get the phone number at which he is finally reached and locate him.

Mr. SOURWINE. The address would be more helpful.

Mr. STASSEN. He undoubtedly could also be reached through the New York Herald Tribune syndicate editor because they are in active work on the diary.

My secretary will get the exact location where he can be reached.

The CHAIRMAN. The matter of issuing a subpena will be submitted to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, the other day you testified I think in the record that Senator Vandenberg had stated as part of the conversation that this was the only consultation he had on the Far East.

Do you recall that?

Mr. STASSEN. On Asiatic policy.

Here are my exact records and this is what he told me. Senator Vandenberg told me in this conference that he was called into, which he said was the only conference he had been called into on Asiatic policy,

It was there proposed by Secretary Acheson—

et cetera.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, do you care to make a ruling with regard to the Department of State release to which Mr. Stassen referred?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the release should be submitted. I think the members of the committee will agree it should go in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I see one thing in the release that I would like to say something on.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me rule on this first.

Senator WATKINS. I think it ought to be in.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

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(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 325," and is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—FOR THE PRESS—NO. 895, OCTOBER 2, 1951

ORAL STATEMENT BY MICHAEL J. M'DERMOTT REGARDING TESTIMONY OF MR. HAROLD STASSEN ON OCTOBER 1 BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

I have been getting questions all day about the testimony yesterday of Mr. Harold Stassen and his allegations, which summarized were—

1. That Secretary Acheson, according to the late Senator Vandenburg, proposed in November 1950 the cutting off of aid to Nationalist China in a dramatic move "toward world peace."

2. That at the October 1949 round table, Lattimore and Lawrence K. Rosinger headed the "prevailing group" which recommended the recognition of Red China at an early date and other moves favorable to Red China.

3. That the State Department tended to "implement" the "Lattimore-Rosinger recommendations" and to ignore those presented by Mr. Stassen and others.

4. That Ambassador Jessup, who presided at some of the meeting, told Mr. Stassen, who appealed to him against the "recommendations" of the "prevailing group," that there was "greater logic" on the Lattimore side.

In taking them up, one by one, with respect to the allegations of Mr. Stassen that Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Jessup at a White House meeting proposed the cutting off of aid to Nationalist China in a dramatic move "toward world peace," I fear that Mr. Stassen's memory is playing him tricks. An exhaustive search of the records has been made and no record can be found of any such meeting ever having taken place. Secretary Acheson has no recollection of such a meeting. Ambassador Jessup has no recollection of such a meeting. We have checked the records at the White House thoroughly. We have checked the Secretary's records and find nothing.

Moreover, there has never been any proposal to abolish economic aid to Nationalist China by Secretary Acheson, by Ambassador Jessup, or by any other authorized official of the Department of State. Insofar as military aid is concerned, this was covered by the President's statement of January 5, 1950, and exhaustively covered by Secretary Acheson and others during the course of the MacArthur hearings.

2. About the "prevailing group": While the Department must, in fairness to the confidential pledge given participants in the round table, adhere to that pledge, it can state—following a close study of the stenographic transcript—the following:

Eighteen members of the panel spoke on the subject of recognition of Red China. Of these, two—Messrs. Lattimore and Rosinger—recommended that recognition be extended to Red China. The consensus among 11 others was that the situation obtaining at that time (1949) was such that recognition could not be withheld for an indefinite period. In general, they expressed the view that this was largely a matter of timing in the light of future developments. Five, including Mr. Stassen, recommended that recognition not be considered at that time.

3. Mr. Stassen's allegation that the Department tended to implement what he (Stassen) refers to as "the Lattimore-Rosinger recommendations" not only is not confirmed by history, but history proves that the policy of the Department tended in the opposite direction. One may quibble over impressions, but there is no quibbling with facts. These are—

The United States has not recognized Red China. As you gentlemen know, the Secretary at various press conferences stated that nothing would be done with respect to that question without full consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress. Similar assurances were given the committees themselves.

Mr. Stassen admits that the point in the "Lattimore-Rosinger proposal" regarding United States recognition of the Chinese Communists was not implemented. He charges that a "collateral Lattimore proposal" that this country encourage the British and others to give that recognition was carried out. This charge is absolutely without basis in fact. The record shows that this Government not only made it clear to the Britsh Government that in the United States view recognition of Communist China was unwise and could not be given consideration by the United States, but it repeatedly instructed United States diplomatic representatives abroad to make this view known to governments to which they were accredited.

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Another point which, according to Mr. Stassen, was proposed by Lattimore and Rosinger and, by implication, adopted by the State Departmen was that "it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communist Government." It has at no time been United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communists and the Department of State has at no time suggested or advocated this policy.

Here again the facts of history refute such an implication. As the Secretary and others pointed out in great detail during the course of the MacArthur hearings the policy of this Government was to prevent the fall of Formosa to the Chinese Reds. The decision of the Joint Chiefs, however, was that no United States forces should be used in this undertaking and that, therefore, the implementation of this policy must rest upon diplomatic and economic means.

Under the circumstances set forth by the President in his statement of January 5, 1950, and subsequently set forth in greater detail, a decision was made not to provide additional military aid to Formosa. The accent there is on the word "additional"—not to provide additional military aid to Formosa. However, existing programs of military assistance were continued to completion and the press carried stories and photographs of shipments of military supplies under existing programs shortly following the President's statement.

Until the assignment of the Seventh Fleet to the protection of Formosa, and the provision of additional military aid to Nationalist forces on the island, the policy of preventing the fall of Formosa to Communist hands was pressed with vigor through diplomatic and economic means. The indisputable facts are that Formosa remains in Nationalist hands and that the United States lent diplomatic economic, and military aid in assuring the retention of the island in Nationalist hands.

Nor is there any basis in fact for the implication by Mr. Stassen that "it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they insisted." I can state categorically that this has never been United States policy, and the State Department has never advocated that it should be.

Now, with respect to "breaking the Chinese blockade," I think you gentlemen are fully aware of our position on that. The port-closure orders of the Chinese National Government did not meet the legal requirements of a blockade and the United States did not recognize it as such. Moreover, the Chinese National Government itself did not claim that it constituted a blockade. The United States Government, in accordance with its obligations to protect American shipping, protested to the Chinese Government certain cases in which it considered these rights violated.

The United States Government, in accordance with its obligations to protect American shipping, protested to the Chinese Government certain cases in which it considered these rights violated. However, and I should like particularly to emphasize this: The United States Government repeatedly warned American masters of the danger of entering closed ports and in practice followed the general policy of doing nothing to lessen the effectiveness of the Chinese Government's port-closure order.

4. That Ambassador Jessup, who presided at some of the meetings, told Stassen, who appealed to him against the recommendations of the "prevailing group," that there was "greater logic" on the Lattimore side; with respect to that, Ambassador Jessup has no recollection of ever having made any such remark. When questioned about this, Ambassador Jessup pointed out that the purpose of the round table was to get the independent views of a well-rounded group of consultants with varying points of view. Accordingly he did not consider it appropriate, nor did he express any opinions, regarding the views expressed by individual members of the panel.

Mr. Stassen, by implication, alleges the adoption by the Department of other points which he described as the Lattimore "proposals." These were that Asia should be considered as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred, that priority be given to Europe, and that aid to Asia not be started until after long and careful study.

The record is clear that the United States has exercised and is now exercising through the Marshall plan, NATO, and the European defense force its leadership in welding the forces of free Europe against the threat of Soviet aggression. But that does not for an instant mean that it has adopted a policy of deferring coming to grips with the problems of Asia. You will recall the efforts of the administration, and particularly of Secretary Acheson, in getting through the Congress the aid bill for Korea. You will recall that that bill was defeated in the House over the vehement protestations of the Secretary. It was subse-

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quently passed. You will recall the Griffin mission to the Philippines and southeast Asia in the spring of 1950 in preparation for a program of economic aid to the countries of that area. You will also recall the MDAP mission to the same area in the summer of 1950.

Again Mr. Stassen implies that United States policy was based on the assumption that the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire. This implication is refuted by the facts. The Marshall plan, the NATO, MDAP, the security treaties with the Philippines, with Australia and New Zealand, the bilateral agreement with Japan, all go to show the concern of this country against the threat of Communist subversion and actual hostilities. Moreover, it should be clear to all that this Government recognized and now recognizes that the fifth-column activities of the Communists were and are more menacing than the fifth column activities of the Nazis.

Finally, it is obviously not appropriate for me to comment on any implications of how this Government should regard the Prime Minister of India. Suffice it to say that the policy of this Government with respect to India is well known.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

Insofar as military aid is concerned, this was covered by the President's statement of January 5, 1950, and exhaustively covered by Secretary Acheson and others during the course of the MacArthur hearings.

I would like to have the committee get in touch by subpena, or otherwise, with the State Department to get a copy of the message that was sent to the Nationalist Government in the month of October 1949. It was along the line that no further military aid would be given to the Nationalist Government so far as Formosa was concerned, and that message was sent to the Nationalist Government.

I can now state upon the record that I first learned of that message from the Vice President of China in the month of November 1949. He described it to me and the contents in Hong Kong in a hospital room where he was ill. I then saw a copy of that message in the Embassy office in Hong Kong.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean our embassy?

Senator FERGUSON. The American Embassy in Hong Kong.

So that it is in conflict with this.

The CHAIRMAN. You are requesting a subpena be issued for this document?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. This press release says the only thing done in relation to that was in January 1950.

If Louis Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, kept notes, a report was made of this document and this meeting with the Vice President when I returned from my trip from the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been suggested we ask the State Department for the delivery of a foreign affairs document. I think, Senator, we had better take it up in executive session. It will be the intent of the chairman to issue the subpena if it can be issued properly. If not, we can get at it some other way.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want the record to show information concerning the press release.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, have you any further information with respect to that particular conference which you learned about from the late Senator Vandenberg?

Mr. STASSEN. I have further corrobration which I will now develop.

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Might I first state that the essential points of that conference, as I see it, are these, and I give them because I believe our issue here concerned is much broader than any one individual or any two individuals.

We are dealing with grave questions of policy of our country with relationship to 300 millions of people and with relation to the whole world.

So, I think the essential points of the February 5, 1949, meeting are these:

Was the meeting held?

Was it conducted by the President?

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the meeting that is related to have taken place in the White House?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Executive Office?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Was it conducted by the President?

In that respect, I might say the President is reported to have said in his press conference the day before yesterday he had no recollection of such a meeting.

Third, at that meeting was the proposal made that all further military aid to the Chinese Nationalists be stopped?

Four. Did Senator Vandenberg there oppose the proposal with vigor?

Five. Was the proposal then not ordered?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a little bit greater significance than that. The question involved here is: Who proposed it and what movement was behind the proposition?

Mr. STASSEN. I will now develop that, Senator.

I think further in understanding it it is important to recall the situation as of February 5, 1949. In this respect, Senator, Mr. Robert Matteson, of my staff, has prepared a rough map of the situation in China on February 5, 1949.

I would like permission now to present it before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. STASSEN. I think we might first present it on the table and then put it up on the easel.

I now have before you a map of Greater China and the lines of red and blue alongside are approximately the lines of the status between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists in February 5, 1949, the date of the White House conference.

You will note that the line here is north of the Yangtze River. They had not yet driven down to the Yangtze River.

You will note that the line cups up here across the Yellow River near Kuei-sui and takes in only the border Provinces here.

So all of south China, a part of the central Yangtze Basin, all of west China, Singkiang, Chinghai, all of those that border on Tibet specifically were still in Nationalists hands.

This was the situation on the night of February 5, 1949, when the White House conference was held. That means that about two-thirds of the peoples of China were in Nationalist hands and about one-third were in Communist hands.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, gentlemen of the committee, that the map used by the witness at this time is of great importance and if it is pos

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sible to have the map reduced so that it may become a part of the record of this committee, the Chairman intends to have it inserted in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. If it is necessary to have a motion, I so move that it be incorporated into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether we can have it done, or not, but I think that we can.

(Map referred to is Appendix I and faces p. 1250.)

Mr. STASSEN. As I indicated, I recall Senator Vandenberg telling me there was documentation that the proposal was ready for action if he approved that night. So, therefore, as I sought avenues of corroboration, again on that day still facing the situation of the denial that even such conference had taken place, I thought of Secretary Forrestal still having been Secretary of Defense. I thought of the Forrestal Diaries. So then I obtained through a book reviewer the information of the editor of the Forrestal Diaries. I phoned Walter Millis, got him on the phone in New York City. I said to him that I was on the trail of documentation with reference to stopping of aid of a military nature to Nationalist China in late 1948 or early 1949, and did the Forrestal Diaries, which are not yet published, give any light on that matter, and could I see the Forrestal Diaries.

He told me the diaries themselves had been returned to the White House and are in the custody of the White House under the original arrangement of the estate and the White House and the screening for security.

He said he had gone through them and from them had prepared the book, which would soon be out, about a week, I believe he said.

Then he read to me certain passages he had reduced into the book from the diaries themselves.

I think that about carries me through Tuesday, then up to the point where the State Department said they were making a new search.

Then came their subsequent partial admission that I was right about the conference; that it had occurred on February 5, 1949, and I do not have a copy of that release, but that then indicated that the presentation of the proposal was made by a General Barr and seemed to endeavor to place—I will let the release speak for itself.

I would ask the committee to secure, or my staff will secure—we have not been able to yet—the transcript of that next State Department conference with reference to Barr.

I see that I have an unofficial report of it. I had a person take it down.

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend at this time for a few minutes. I have a call from the State Department.

(A short recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Pursuant to the direction of the committee, the chairman has just talked with Secretary Webb in the Department of State. He stated that in keeping with my letter and with an idea of whether or not there would be a compliance wtih my request, a conference was held yesterday in the State Department and that certain individuals of the State Department were directed to communicate with the several people who had been present at the conference to determine whether

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or not they would consent to have the minutes of that conference released, and that they would let me know either this afternoon or Monday.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, two people have stated in the press, Rosinger and Lattimore, as to their statements, and Lattimore specifically, that he wanted his released. So I think then there should be no question. If anybody objects, at least we ought to have Rosinger's and Lattimore's statements.

I think it would be advisable that we try to have that accomplished this morning so that the Governor would have those releases before him so that we may complete the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it, Senator, from the statement made to me by Mr. Webb just now, it would be impossible to get a conference with those who have the matter in hand down there today, this being Saturday, but that they will call me either this afternoon or Monday and let me know.

I want to say that statement to me by Mr. Webb over the phone was confirmed by another individual from the State Department earlier this morning.

In other words, to make it specific, the State Department is now endeavoring to get a release from the various participants in that conference.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the conference of October 6, 7, and 8, 1949?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the conference to which Governor Stassen has testified.

I told Mr. Webb that the Governor was here before the committee and testifying, and that we would be glad to have the minutes if we could get them.

You may proceed.

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, my secretary has now brought in the information in regard to Mr. Arthur Vandenberg, Jr's. address. His office is 5101–30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. His private office phone is Judson 6–2560. His home telephone is LeHigh 46–689.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask the committee to pause just a minute until I take another phone call.

(A short recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed.

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, the press and radio news comments that I last referred to was on October 3, 1951. This is now the follow-up from the State Department.

I would like to file later when we can get a hold of one, an official copy of it. I have an unofficial transcript which does indicate that the press stated to Mr. McDemott that he still had not answered my question; that he had partially reversed himself, but had not answered my specific question of Secretary Acheson.

Following, as I indicated, my search for corroboration in the grave picture I found myself, and recalling Senator Vandenberg's reference to the documentation and the preparation for an order to carry out the recommendation, and getting a hold of the Forrestal Diaries, having followed that lead as I earlier indicated to you, I found that on page 534 of the book "The Forrestal Diaries," which has not yet been released—it is to be out some time in a week, edited by Walter

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Millis with the collaboration of E. S. Duffield, issued by the Viking Press, there is a significant item.

Mr. Chairman, I fear you should have this item. I wired the publisher for permission to present it, notwithstanding copyright.

The publisher phoned and said he had no objection, but that it must be cleared with the newspaper syndicate. So I called the New York Herald Tribune Newspaper Syndicate. They advised that the rights had been sold to 109 newspapers. Obviously I could not get permission in 24 hours from 109 newspapers to release the copyright.

Of course, the book is almost off. It is to be out in a week. I got a hold of a review copy.

Now I am under subpena and I am at this committee's command. I have ready to present to you a photostatic copy of page 534 of the Forrestal Diaries and then certain other pages as we go along.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a copy which I have sent for. If there is any question about the use of this copy that came from a reviewer that may feel he did not want this copy used, I would be glad to see that my copy is made part of the record, this page and these photostats.

Mr. STASSEN. I think the legal situation is clearly these newspapers would give their consent, and I think we can assume it.

But I think the committee should specifically request me to present it.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, what is your pleasure?

Senator FERGUSON. My copy has no strings on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see why any copy should have.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not, either. It may be the reviewer.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, the reviewer gives his consent.

Mr. STASSEN. The publisher, provided you clear it with the newspapers. I could have gotten that if it had not been sold to 109 newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator from Michigan has it, that makes 110 newspapers.

Senator WATKINS. Probably some more Senators have copies.

Senator FERGUSON. I move we go ahead with this photostatic copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

You may proceed.

Mr. STASSEN. I then proceed with a copy of page 534 of the Forrestal Diaries.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, my remark might have appeared to be offensive, but I did not mean it that way. I meant it to be a compliment.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not take any offense at it.

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, in the middle of page 534 of the Forrestal Diaries in the part that is underlined by me, we read this:

> Marshall read a paper from some office people in the State Department who advocated going to the American public now to explain the inadequacies of the Chiang Kai-shek government. This paper stated we had two alternatives: (1) To follow this course. or (2) to continue to do all we can to support Chiang and accept the embarrassment that will accompany the disintegration of China.
>
> With the President's approval, Marshall said that he felt that he would reject his department's paper advocating criticism of Chiang. He felt that this would administer the final coup de grâce to Chiang's government, and this, he felt, we could not do.

This is of the date of November 26, 1948.

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Now, Mr. Chairman, this is a corroboration of the existence of documentation on this subject and the other stories and Senator Vandenberg's report indicate that this matter, subsequent to Secretary Marshall leaving the State Department, then was reactivated, came up before the National Security Council and came from there to the conference on February 5, 1949.

Secretary Marshall left the State Department on January 21, 1949.

In other words, it is about 7 weeks after Senator Marshall rejects this recommendation. Then it is about 3 weeks later under Secretary Acheson that the February 5, 1949, conference is held.

Then in the surrounding circumstance there is another important matter. That deals with the Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Right at that point, Governor Stassen, the significant part of this is the first three lines:

Marshall read a paper from some office people in the State Department who advocated going to the American public now to explain the inadequacies of the Chiang Kai-shek government.

It seems to me those lines are the significant lines as far as corroboration is concerned.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. Then it is very significant that Secretary Marshall rejected that proposal and that he characterized it—you understand these are the words written in his diary by Mr. James Forrestal at the time it happened and are now in the diary in the White House.

In other words, I should explain that the format of this book, the matter that is in the size type such as I have outlined is the matter that is in Mr. Forrestal's words in his diary. The smaller type which you see below is Mr. Walter Millis' comment, and is not from the Forrestal diaries themselves.

Then you go down below to further explain a conversation—"The President." That, again, is Mr. Forrestal's words for his diaries.

A further relevant and corroborating fact affecting this entire situation is found on page 532 and page 533 of the book, the Forrestal Diaries, and I now present those two pages under the same understanding of the previous pages.

On these pages you have the reports of these reverses that Chiang Kai-shek had suffered which Senator Vandenberg had told me had been in that conference.

Then you have the reference to the Cabinet meeting on November 26, 1948.

At the bottom of the page you have this:

Marshall referred to the suggestion that I—

and that is Forrestal—

made to Lovett on Thursday evening that we explore the reactivation of the AVG (American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers, who provided air support for the Chinese armies prior to Pearl Harbor), and that we get a formal invitation from the Chinese Government to remain at Tsing Tao. Marshall said the latter would be easy to get, but he was fearful of the conditions that might accompany such an invitation.

Now, then, Senator, we have this situation established, but before I say that, let me further refer to Secretary Forrestal.

Secretary Forrestal was notified by the President that his resignation was going to be accepted on January 28, 1949. He actually then

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stepped out of office on March 28, 1949, at a brief ceremony in the central court of the Pentagon Building.

Now, we have established I believe beyond denial by anyone that on the 5th of February 1949 the Secretary of Defense was opposed to any stoppage of aid to China Nationalists and was, in fact, exploring in that period reactivation of greater aid in some such steps of even going to the extent of reactivating the Flying Tigers of General Chennault.

Mr. MORRIS. The Secretary of Defense being Mr. Forrestal?

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Forrestal through this period.

We have further established that Under Secretary Lovett was conferring with him in a similar vein and that Under Secretary Lovett of the State Department had left the State Department at about the same time that General Marshall left the State Department, he then being succeeded by Mr. Webb as Under Secretary.

It is thus a simple fact that a proposal to stop military aid to the China Nationalists would not have been presented to Senator Vandenberg and the President in form ready for order unless it had the support of and was presented by the State Department .

I think that is elementary in the governmental structure of our country.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, is it not a fact that Secretary of State Acheson became Secretary on January 11, 1949, which was right before this meeting?

Mr. STASSEN. I think it was the 21st. It is right in there.

Senator FERGUSON. In January of 1949?

Mr. STASSEN. He might be announced on the 11th and sworn in on the 21st, or something of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. So, this relation to Secretary Marshall, he was then Secretary of State?

Mr. STASSEN. Secretary Marshall was Secretary of State in November of 1948 when he turned down this recommendation.

I respectfully request the committee to request of the President the minutes of the February 5, 1949, conference held in the White House.

I further request this committee to request of the President the minutes insofar as they refer to China, the minutes of the November 26, 1948, meeting of the Cabinet.

I respectfully request the committee to request of the National Security Council the minutes of the meeting between November 26, 1948, and February 5, 1949, at which the documentation that was presented on February 5, 1949, was acted on.

I further respectfully request of the committee that they request of the National Security Council, of the State Department, and of the President, copies of the documentation that was prepared in connection with the Cabinet meeting of November 26, 1948, affecting China and the Vandenberg conference of February 5, 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. Your request in that respect will be made before the committee in executive session, and the chairman will abide by the order of the committee.

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I further say, Mr. Chairman, that if it is your wish when those documents are produced, that I should return for further examination upon them, I would, of course, be at your command because of the double reason of the very great importance of this whole matter of

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policy, and because of the reason that I am now completely confident and I feel I have demonstrated that my testimony before this committee was exactly right and true, and that I have been wrongly assailed by the State Department as being a man whose memory plays him tricks.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish to say in that regard, so far as the Chairman is concerned, it would be my judgment that the request of the witness be carried out and that the request be made on the executive branch for the instruments suggested.

I, however, will submit the matter to my committee in executive session. I think the whole matter should be made clear to the American public. I do not think the State Department, or any other department, should deliberately accuse any witness before this committee of falsifying unless they know what they are talking about.

It looks to me in this instance they did not exactly know what they were talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. They should be willing to bring the evidence before the committee and show what the facts are.

The CHAIRMAN. In justice to the committee and justice to any witness, they should be perfectly willing to bring the matter before the committee. They should not brand a witness before this committee, or any committee as testifying falsely when, as a matter of fact, they have the facts and documents in their possession which would give them access to the truth.

Senator WATKINS. You have in mind bringing it before the full Judiciary Committee, or just this subcommittee?

The CHAIRMAN. This subcommittee is handling this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Might we have an executive meeting at the close of this meeting?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

I would like to have some more members present, but it is all right. Those who are present will act on the matter.

You may proceed if you have anything further to state.

Mr. STASSEN. I do have further evidence, Senator. In fact, I am prepared to develop the evidence which I believe will convince any impartial person of the truth of everything I said to this committee on Monday.

Senator, the State Department release which is now in evidence endeavors to indicate that the references to recognition of Communist China in the October 1949 conference were rather incidental to a discussion of all of Asia policy.

I, of course, testified that there were many other points discussed, and I presented the 10 points that were there recommended by them and the 7 points concerning those that were associated with me, without any prearrangement whatsoever; but during the course of the discussion, I might say specifically for the record, that I did not confer in advance of that October 1949 conference with any of the members.

The CHAIRMAN. You made a statement in your testimony on Monday, Governor, that has lingered in my mind, as I recall it. I at that time intended to question you about it. My recollection is you stated that before that meeting certain briefing took place.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you kindly develop that? Who did the briefing, and where, and what was done and said?

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Mr. STASSEN. Yes. At the opening of the conference there was a briefing by Mr. Butterworth, who at that time had a responsible position in the State Department in the Asiatic Section. I testified on Monday with reference to his briefing, as follows:

On page 1999 of your own official transcript:

Mr. STASSEN. In the conference Mr. Butterworth of the State Department said that when the Communist Chinese crossed the Yangtze River, which as I recall would have been about April of 1949, that then this Government had approached these other governments as to their views about recognizing the Chinese Communists.

May I respectfully call your attention, Senator, to the fact that the reason the State Department has given for not releasing this transcript has been that nonofficials of the Government had been called in on a confidential basis for consultation.

Now, clearly, that reason then does not apply at all to what Mr. Butterworth said in his briefing. So that I would suggest, without waiting to find out whether 25 private citizens will all consent, those portions of the transcript that showed what Mr. Butterworth told that conference—he then being an official of the State Department; he now being an official of the State Department—would clearly not have any justification from being withheld from this committee or any other committee of the Congress.

Mr. Butterworth went at some length into the matter of recognition and the various theories of recognition. Mr. Kennan gave a broad briefing on the policy of the Soviet Union and their analysis of it, our own objectives.

An officer, whom I did not know and whose name I do not recall, gave a briefing on the then military situation, as he described it, in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a military officer?

Mr. STASSEN. He was presented to us as a military officer; yes.

As I recall it, he was a junior officer, or he might have been as much as a colonel. But I think he was of lower rank than a colonel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in uniform, sir?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; I did not know him. I do not recall that his name was mentioned or understood.

Then, after that briefing, the discussion opened and proceeded. So, there is a whole early part of this transcript in which there are no statements of any private citizens and to which, clearly, would not apply their own rule of withholding.

I think the only thing you will find in that early part of the transcript is my personal insistence that I be promised a copy of my own remarks before I would participate.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us make it clear that, from the beginning and during the briefings until the conclusion, a record was made?

Mr. STASSEN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether a stenographic record was taken, Governor, of these briefings?

Mr. STASSEN. A stenotype was operating at all times on the table. In fact, the stenotypist was near my seat. I was a little bit to the head table side of center, and on Dr. Jessup's right I would say about four seats down on the right-hand side of the table, and General Marshall was on the other extreme end of the table just opposite Dr.

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Jessup and Dr. Fosdick. The stenotypist was along about half way down the table, right up against the table, much as this young man has been here.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there is some testimony by Professor Colegrove which bears on this point of briefing, and I think it might be appropriate at this time if we addressed a question or two to Governor Stassen on this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. During the open session of September 25, 1951, when Prof. Kenneth Colegrove was on the stand, the following colloquy took place:

Senator FERGUSON. I want to go back to this question of the experts being briefed at the meeting in the State Department. Was that briefing before you were asked to give your opinion?

Mr. COLEGROVE. It began with a briefing by George Kennan on the very first day, and the rest of it was interspersed. I was very much disappointed in the briefing by George Kennan. This was a conference upon the Far East, and George Kennan didn't tell us anything that we hadn't known or thought about for years and years and years. I thought George Kennan just wasted the time of the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You got a kind of feeling that the briefing was to give you some propaganda to take back to the people?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt distinctly that the briefing by Cora Dubois was of that kind. The briefing done on the military situation by Colonel McCann didn't give us anything we had not already read in the New York Times.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get an impression from this conference on the Far East, which you said was in your estimation propaganda, that it was the desire of the State Department to have a policy of great leniency at least toward the Communists in China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The State Department didn't tip its hand in this respect. I indicated that Ambassador Jessup——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about his action but the lady who briefed you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I would like to have him conclude his sentence there. It would be interesting. You said "didn't tip its hand"?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Didn't tip its hand, and Ambassador Jessup is a very clever and able presiding officer. He didn't disclose his own views, but the briefing by Cora Dubois was a briefing very sympathetic toward the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Those were the kind of questions that were being brought up in the meeting?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when her briefing took place?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I think her briefing took place in the second session.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the question discussed on the recognition of China by the United States?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Curiously enough, that was discussed in every session but particularly emphasized in what would be the second session.

Senator FERGUSON. How did this lady who briefed you stand on that question? Did she express herself?

Mr. COLEGROVE. She was talking only about southeast Asia and did not cover other subjects.

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Morris, may I say, since you have read that testimony, that I do not associate myself with Dr. Colegrove's remarks about Mr. Kennan's briefing. In other words, I thought that Mr. Kennan's briefing was worth while. While I didn't agree with every particular of it, I thought it was a good briefing.

Also, I want to point out, in accordance with my previous testimony, I was not present on the second day when apparently Cora Dubois did her briefing. So I cannot comment upon that.

But I do want to make it clear that I am not adopting or associating myself with the words of Dr. Colegrove, one way or the other.

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Senator FERGUSON. I do not know that he was criticizing what Mr. Kennan said, but he indicated here that he knew it.

Mr. STASSEN. I didn't want any inference to draw from the reading of the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think in the transcript, if we ever get it, there should be included the statements by Cora Dubois in connection with this testimony by Mr. Colegrove.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Governor, you may proceed. I think you stepped off your line a little.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, Senator.

Senator, in this matter of what the nature of the discussion was on recognition and as to whether my description of it as having been the prevailing view that had developed under the leadership in the discussion of Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger, in the presentation to me of the transcript of my remarks there are a few instances in which there is some material of the transcript on the same pages stated by others, and it just so happens, as I reviewed this matter after the challenge by the State Department on Tuesday, that I found two significant examples of that.

I now present to you page D–6 of the official State Department transcript of this October 1949 conference.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a transcript of your own participation?

Mr. STASSEN. On the top three lines you will see three lines with a pencil mark drawn through them. That pencil line was drawn through by me when I asked my secretary then to run off just my own testimony. In other words, the top three lines are not my words. You read there:

* * * the conditions are that condition our foreign policy, so I doubt if there would be a very serious explosion upon recognition if that were proposed in this country.

So that is confirmation that by this third day of the conference the prevailing talk was so much in the direction of recognition, that one of those who associated with me in objecting to it, said that you would get a very strong public adverse reaction to recognition. This, then, was an argument that they doubted if there would be a very serious explosion upon recognition if that were proposed in this country.

Now, then, that led to my really insistent appeal, which is then found on the following pages, that we should not recognize, and you find that going on through these next pages.

I think that then my remarks with that opening introduction, with those first three lines, are an important corroboration of the whole analysis that I presented to the committee on Monday.

So I present to you photostats of the following pages, D–7, D–8, and D–9, which follow along and you can see how I picked up and went forward from that point.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, you do not know whose testimony is concluded at the top of page D–6?

The CHAIRMAN. On page D–6, referring to the three lines through which pencil marks have been drawn, the transcription shows this:

Governor STASSEN. Dr. Jessup, I might say first that I regret very much that I have not been able to sit through the entire conference * * *

which would indicate that the three lines that were not the words of the witness were the words of Dr. Jessup. Is that a fair inference?

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Mr. STASSEN. Not necessarily, Senator. I could have addressed the chairman even though some other participant had been immediately preceding. So I do not present that as evidence that those former three lines were stated by Dr. Jessup. The transcript itself in full will show. You see, I do not have the preceding page; it was never given to me, therefore I do not know for certain whose words those were. They are corroboration of what I said of how the discussion went, of such a prevailing nature that we were going to recognize in a comparatively short time, and that it is corroborated by that little pickup of three lines, and then it is corroborated, I think, as you can see, by my plea from that time on that we must not make this tragic mistake, and so forth.

I do not think that any impartial person could read those pages without realizing that they do reflect the kind of circumstance that I described on Monday.

Senator FERGUSON. They indicate clearly that someone in the meeting had used the language other than you.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That it was proposed there would not be very serious explosions in this country. I think that is clear, Mr. Chairman, from the memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Governor.

Mr. STASSEN. Now, then, it has also been contended in these State Department statements and denials issued since I testified that after all, in effect, this was just a consultation with a group of people and that it was not really a part of policy formation.

I have here a newspaper story of Monday, November 21, 1949, in the St. Paul Pioneer Press, which refers to an official State Department release. I have photostatic copies of that, the significant language of which I have underlined. This is the first disclosure by the State Department that this October 1949 conference had taken place and it is an announcement by the State Department that it had taken place, that General Marshall and myself were present, and then it says, down at the bottom of the first column:

> There were among a group of 25 men who participated in a recent closed-door, 3-day session called to aid the work of shaping a current revision of American policy, which now is apparently in its final stages.
>
> What to do about recognizing the new Communist regime and halting the advance of communism to the rest of the Far East were among questions put up to them by Secretary Acheson.

Now, then, have in mind that it has been testified that our Government never considered recognizing Red China and it has also been testified or stated by others that this conference really was just a place where a group of outside people were talking.

Here is a story from an official State Department release which said they "were called to aid the work of shaping a current revision of American policy, which now is apparently in its final stages."

It says:

> What to do about recognizing the new Communist regime and halting the advance of communism to the rest of the Far East were among questions put up to them by Secretary Acheson.

Now, then, I think it is significant to look at what was the circumstance when this release——

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Senator FERGUSON. Might we make this a part of the record at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record in facsimile.

(The document referred to, in facsimile, is as follows:)

STASSEN, DR. QUIGLEY SIT IN AT CHINA POLICY PARLEY

[Monday, November 21, 1949, St. Paul Pioneer Press]

WASHINGTON (AP).—State Department officials disclosed Sunday former Secretary George C. Marshall, Harold Stassen and other American leaders outside the Government have been called in to help find answers to the Chinese Communist upheaval.

Another Minnesotan, Dr. Harold S. Quigley of the University of Minnesota's department of political science, also took part in the conference.

These were among a group of 25 men who participated in a recent closed-door 3-day session called to aid the work of shaping a current revision of American policy, which now is apparently in its final stages.

What to do about recognizing the new Communist regime and halting the advance of communism to the rest of the Far East were among questions put up to them by Secretary Acheson. Their views were not disclosed but officials said they were taken fully into account by Acheson and others involved in the China problem.

SETS PRECEDENCE

The State Department has had frequent meetings with representatives of organizations concerned with foreign policy, beginning with the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on the United Nations in 1944 when there were 44 civilian consultants. But calling in leading Americans for advice while the specific policy is in a formative stage is a new departure.

In addition, a 3-day conference under direction of Francis H. Russell, Director of the Department's Office of Public Affairs, on means of strengthening the United Nations was concluded Saturday at the State Department.

MEETING IN OCTOBER

The China meeting was held October 6–8. Aside from Marshall and Stassen, those taking part included university specialists on oriental affairs, officials of international business firms, bankers, and a representative of the Army War College. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, is now president of the University of Pennsylvania. Another college president who served as a temporary consultant was Arthur G. Coons, Occidental College, Los Angeles.

They were asked to make no formal recommendations but to state their views fully and frankly.

This conference was independent of the specialized study of the problem being made by a three-man group of consultants to Acheson, headed by Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup.

Senator WATKINS. I call your attention, Governor, to the paragraph following which indicates this is a new departure from the policy and they are calling them in now for advice. This is in the article from the newspaper to which you have just called our attention.

Mr. STASSEN. Now, the situation that existed on November 21, 1949, is important in that it says it is now approaching a final determination.

On November 16, 1949, Mr. Acheson protested the China Nationalists' firing on the *Flying Cloud* ship which was running the blockade. That, I pointed out the other day, was one of the things that had been recommended by this conference in the prevailing group but which was objected to by me and by others.

And on that day or the next day—I am not clear—Bevin, in the House of Commons, said they were waiting for a decision of the United States and others to join on the question of recognition of

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Red China. Mr. Acheson said that recognition was out of the question until the Communists released Angus Ward.

Then on November 21, you have the release of the story about the study.

On December 3, Mr. Acheson said the United States did not recognize the legality of the Nationalists' blockade and protested the shelling of another United States ship of the Isbrandtsen Line.

On December 30, India recognized Red China. On January 5, Britain recognized Red China, and on December 23, right in that period just immediately in advance of that, that memorandum about Formosa was issued by the State Department to all of its embassies and the Voice of America all over the world.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, were you familiar with General Fortier's testimony that he had a conversation with Dr. Jessup when he was out in Japan in January?

Mr. STASSEN. I was told of it here in my hearing the other day.

Senator FERGUSON. About the recognition that might take place?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In 2 or 3 weeks?

Mr. MORRIS. In 2 or 3 weeks was the testimony.

Mr. STASSEN. Now, then, I have another item. Even though I stated that I would be meticulous to stay within the exact statement of facts and not to make characterizations or conclusions, it has been said that when I testified here on Monday there was inference of the intentions of this prevailing group under Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger which was false and unfair. I do not wish to be unfair to any one but I do feel that I must state the facts in this vital matter, and I did point out that during the conference and in Mr. Lattimore's presence, I said to Mr. Lattimore and the others that the steps that they were advocating could best be characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. So that right in the conference in 1949, and the transcript shows it and you now have page D–6, as a photostat that statement is made and relevant to this question of what the intention was in advocating these things.

As a matter of fact, I think it is a document of value to this committee to note the cover on Mr. Owen Lattimore's book, Solution in Asia. It is regular publishing practice that the cover of a book is cleared with the author as to its contents.

I have here a photostatic copy of the cover of the book and on this matter of characterization there is this one sentence which says:

> He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas.

This book was published in 1945. So that the characterization that I gave to his testimony in his presence and which I reported has a relevancy in its fairness to this document which I now present to you, and I emphasize that except in reference to what I said at the conference in his presence, I have not, and I will not make any characterization of what any of these gentlemen did, because it is, of course, true that men can for perfectly good motives and men can for a perfectly justified judgment on their part of what facts mean and policies ought to be, take divergent positions.

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My situation is that I have been reporting to this committee on the facts as I knew them and not in any instance testifying as to characterization or conclusions or as to accusations or to clearances.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there are a number of exhibits you have that have not been inserted in the record.

Those pages, D–6, D–7, D–8, and D–9, it seems to me, should go into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. The whole transcript did go into the record the other day.

Mr. STASSEN. A mimeographed copy of it but not the transcript itself. There you have photostats of the State Department documents themselves.

Mr. MORRIS. This is different from the one introduced in the record the other day.

Senator FERGUSON. I move, Mr. Chairman, that they be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. I point out one sentence in support of Mr. Stassen's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from page D–6.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

I think that would be the correct characterization of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date.

And, Mr. Chairman, that would indicate that there had been advance testimony, recommendations along the lines of Governor Stassen's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. The four pages, D–6, D–7, D–8, and D–9 of the State Department transcript and the book cover of Mr. Lattimore's book Solution in Asia, will be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to are as follows:)

Governor STASSEN. Dr. Jessup, I might say first that I regret very much that I have not been able to sit through the entire conference. I made the greatest possible readjustment of my schedule when I received the invitation to be here and I will address myself very concisely to the point now under discussion and through the kind assistance of Dr. Talbot, I had some briefing of the discussion, and particularly of General Marshall's able presentation this morning.

I stated on Thursday that I was opposed to recognition of the north Government in China at this time and not at least for a question of a couple of years. I want to go into that a little more thoroughly because at that time I merely stated my position on it.

My first comment is on some of the related discussion this morning that has been advanced that along with recognition other steps we ought to take were proposed. These steps I say, frankly, to me could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. I think that would be the correct characterization of the related steps that have been advanced along with the urging of recognition at the earliest possible date.

To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy. If we recognize the Communist Government of China now, clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other Government—the Nationalist Government—but that we must then join in affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no half-way measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we are a great leading nation, take a different position to that. Nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So, we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations, with our great prestige, and throw out from that

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United Nations the representative of whatever you may wish to call them—the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think will for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance to the Communist areas.

Now, to put ourselves in that position in my mind, cannot be countenanced and I might urge, as I go forward, and respectfully submit that there have been some implications that perhaps those that oppose recognition are trying to play the popular tune in America, and the high view of statesmanship is the contrary and difficult and unpopular course. I will not attempt to draw any cloak of statesmanship about me this morning, or any other time, but I would modestly state that the steps that I took in the early days of opposition to Hitler and of supporting lend-lease and on the whole question of isolation and world trade have not been popular courses at the time they were taken particularly in my home part of the country. To the greatest degree it is possible, I approach these policies from the standpoint of what is right in the long view for our country and our ideals, rather than what is the current popular view. In fact, I have such faith in democracy that if a policy is right, then I am certain you can interpret it to the American people and convince the majority of them it is right.

Going to the specifics of recognition, it seems to me that taking the affirmative stand of ejecting the Nationalist Government from the United Nations and placing in its stead the Communist Government of the north would be a clear invitation to a disregard of our fundamental ideals and objectives in the world picture. Whatever else may be said about the Nationalist Government, it seems to me that there has been a greater measure of democracy, a greater measure of individual freedom, the right of free expression, of a free press, of the communication of news in that area than there has been in any of the Communist areas of the world.

I might project my views of the Communist Government of North China. I believe that in the early stages they have brought in some of those who are not Communists into leadership—some of those we might call moderates. In the early stages they will say to the American businessman, if your country treats us better and recognizes us that will facilitate your doing business here. However, you will find quite rapidly as they consolidate their control over the country and as they introduce people into these industries and businesses who learn something about them, they will proceed to throw out the moderates from the government and will tighten up and possibly expropriate and take over the businesses and that process will move forward steadily.

Solution in Asia

(By Owen Lattimore)

Mr. Lattimore has at last taken the lid off his vast and exclusive knowledge of Asia. What he says will have a direct effect on the war and the peace since it will be read in foreign offices throughout the world. (Mr. Lattimore's right to speak for Asia will be readily apparent from the biographical sketch printed on the back of this jacket.)

In this book he points out the road American policy must take to achieve a victory for democracy in Asia. He discusses China, Japan, and all the other eastern areas from their real basis, the people in them. He shows how the "experts" have covered their ignorance with such dogmas and clichés as the myth that the Chinese are enigmatic, that the Japanese Emperor is an ancient Japanese deity, that the Chinese are incapable of democratic government. He says bluntly that Japan's exploitation of China was aided and abetted by the United States and Britain on condition that they receive their share of the loot. He shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism. He warns us that if we help the European powers revive sahib rule in the colonies, we shall be classed as imperialists no matter what we do in the Philippines. He inclines to support American newspapermen who report that the only real democracy in China is found in Communist areas. Finally he shows what United States policy should be in Asia and why the solution is political and economic rather than military.

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JACKET DRAWING BY EDWARD A. KARR

(Atlantic-Little, Brown books are published by Little, Brown & Co., in association with the Atlantic Monthly Press)

The format of this book is designed to save paper, which is now rationed, as well as other materials. In 1941 this volume would have been larger, or thicker, or heavier, and perhaps all three of these, and might have been set in a larger type face with wider margins to the page. The size and the weight of books have increased steadily since the end of World War I; now, in World War II, the process must be reversed. But the value of a book is not to be measured by its dimensions or its weight, though it is important that it be printed in clear, readable type. What does count is its content, whether it provides good entertainment or sound information to the reader, whether it stimulates the mind, whether it is first class of its kind.

This company's policy of publishing "fewer and better books" has never been more strictly followed than during this period of world crisis. We hope you will find this book helpful or entertaining. If you do not wish to add it to your permanent library, why not give it to a member of our Armed Forces?

The Council on Books in Wartime, an organization made up of publishers, booksellers, librarians and other groups believing that some books are weapons in the war of ideas, from time to time recommends books which it considers important to the war effort or the planning of a proper peace. We urge you to read these books.

OWEN LATTIMORE

Mr. Lattimore is often called "the best-informed American on Asiatic affairs living today." For 22 years he has been absorbing knowledge about Asia as businessman, newspaperman, editor, traveler, scholar, and research scientist. In the last 4 years he has held official positions in both the American and the Chinese Governments:—

1. As political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, on the recommendation of President Roosevelt, for two war-torn years (1941–42).

2. Until recently as Director of Pacific Operations for the OWI.

The following shows how well his career had fitted him for these important posts:—

Engaged in business, Shanghai, 1920.

Newspaper work, Tientsin, 1921.

In export business, Tientsin and Peking, 1922–26.

Social Science Research Council, Manchuria, 1929–30.

In Peiping under Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1930–31; under Guggenheim Foundation 1931–33.

Field work in Mongolia and research in Peiping for Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934–35.

Editor Pacific Affairs, 1934–41.

Director Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 1938—

Mr. Lattimore is the author of seven previous books on the Far East and has written widely for the Atlantic Monthly, National Geographic magazine, Asia, and other periodicals.

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, I have presented now, I believe, supporting evidence on every point on which my testimony was challenged, at least in its main aspects, and I have indicated the documents which I hope the committee will decide to ask for and my willingness to return further at your call and again under oath at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. May it be understood that if we are successful in getting any of the transcripts of either the State Department officials or Mr. Lattimore, or Mr. Rosinger, who have apparently consented, that we allow the Governor to see them and then determine at that time whether or not he is to return for testimony.

As was indicated, it does appear at least to the Senator from Michigan that if we are going to conduct our hearings and have the State Department, who have the record, dispute the testimony that we are

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receiving in evidence, at least they ought to be willing to come up and produce the official records rather than a statement from some one in the State Department not under oath that the records do dispute the witness. I think that is only fair to the committee and fair to the witnesses that they at least do that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, we have requested, after the committee made the decision, the State Department for a transcript of another conference, a conference that was held in September 1949 at which were present three officials of the American Federation of Labor and two officials of the CIO.

The CHAIRMAN. That request has gone down?

Mr. MORRIS. That has gone down, and again that would be particularly appropriate, Senator Ferguson's request would be particularly appropriate, so that we do not now have to proceed to take testimony on what happened at that conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

There were some requests that have been suggested this morning by the witness that, of course, have not been made up to date.

Mr. MORRIS. I have made a record of those.

Governor Stassen, you testified on Monday that at the termination of the conference you had a discussion with the presiding officer, Dr. Jessup, and that during that conference he stated to you that the greater logic was on the side of what you characterized as the prevailing opinion.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of any subsequent developments, do you care to affirm your testimony on that score?

Mr. STASSEN. My memory is very clear upon it, and of course, all of these subsequent events which I have verified this morning by corroborating evidence all give further evidence that Mr. Jessup did act in accordance with a judgment on his part that the greater logic was on the other view.

You do have the protests of the shelling of the ships, you do have General Fortier's testimony as to his statements when he arrived in Japan a few months later, you do have the statements of Senator Alexander Smith before the committee yesterday that it was his distinct impression—and I do not quote him exactly but I think I accurately paraphrase it—that in November 1949, Dr. Jessup gave him the distinct impression that they were moving on recognition; and I do not know of anything that has been presented by anyone between October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean war that would indicate that Dr. Jessup did anything other than act in accordance with what I say he told me, that the greater logic was on that other view. My own recollection of that conversation is very clear.

The CHAIRMAN. That, of course, would not be a part of the record?

Mr. STASSEN. No; that was at recess.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no possibility, is there, that you are assuming that he took the position of where the logic lay because of any other actions or because of any other answer; that is a recital by you of words that he spoke to you; is that right?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; because, further, as I testified, when he said that, then I pleaded with him to go and see General MacArthur before they acted in accordance with that other prevailing group's view.

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I don't know whether he was asked whether he recalled my suggestion to him to go see General MacArthur. I don't know whether that was gone into with him, but my memory is very clear on that and the following circumstances and all the surrounding bases show it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Mr. STASSEN. I think I should add to that that in so stating I am simply stating the fact of a conversation as I recall it. I do not state anything as to what the motivation of Dr. Jessup was in making that statement to me at that time. I only state the fact that he said that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are stating that he did make that statement to you?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not something that he might have said to you; it is something that you remember he did say?

Mr. STASSEN. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Senators?

All right, Governor. Thank you.

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you. I shall be at your call if these documents arrive.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a. m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 11:20 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. James O. Eastland, presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland, O'Conor, Smith, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I should like to show in the record that I am appearing for Mr. Holland, as well as the Institute of Pacific Relations.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY EDGAR G. CROSSMAN, OF DAVIS, POLK, WARDWELL, SUNDERLAND & KIENDL, COUNSEL

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, may I ask your permission to make, sometime during the course of the hearings today, a somewhat extended statement?

I have just reported to Mr. Morris my desire to do this as a matter of courtesy, and I now ask this request of you.

Senator EASTLAND. When was it filed?

Mr. MORRIS. It was not filed.

Senator EASTLAND. Under the Reorganization Act, Mr. Holland, it has to be filed 24 hours in advance.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I have just looked at that part of the statute, which does not say anything about 24 hours. It says:

> Each such standing committee shall so far as practicable require all witnesses to appear before it to file in advance written statement of their proposed testimony.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the committee rule?

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Mr. SOURWINE. Twenty-four hours, Mr. Chairman, under the theory that less than that would not be in substantial compliance with the statute.

Senator EASTLAND. That is the committee rule?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Judiciary Committee?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

It has been waived by the committee when the committee considered the circumstances warranted.

The language of the statute permits waiving.

Could I inquire by question or two with regard to this statement, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has the statement been released to the press yet, or given to the press for future release?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; it has not.

My purpose in asking the question is that I do not wish to give it to the press in advance.

May I also assume for your own reasons you do not wish me to read the statement now?

Senator EASTLAND. It is simply a matter for the committee to determine. I could not determine.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I was talking to someone else when I came in.

Senator EASTLAND. He has an extended statement that he wanted to read during the course of his testimony. I knew that under the Reorganization Act it was a rule of the committee that it has to be filed 24 hours in advance.

Now, I judge the committee has the authority to waive the rule. It is something that as acting chairman I could not pass upon. The committee has to pass upon it.

Senator SMITH. Is Mr. Holland under subpena of the committee, or testifying at his request?

Mr. SOURWINE. He is under subpena.

Senator SMITH. It seems to me, first, he should be required to answer the questions asked by the committee. Certainly we have no control over Mr. Holland's giving any statement to the press.

Senator EASTLAND. He desires to read his statement.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to read the statement to the committee at sometime during the testimony.

Of course, the committee would determine when that time comes.

Senator SMITH. I would not be insistent on the 24-hour rule if it seems that is something that Mr. Holland wanted to do, and it is fair to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. The purpose of the law is to permit the staff of the committee, which is by law directed to do it, to analyze the statement and boil it down for the benefit of the committee, so they might inquire regarding the statement.

Senator SMITH. I imagine it is so the witness may be cross-examined on the statement because it takes at least 24 hours for a staff member to see whether or not such a statement is borne out or has any information in it.

Senator O'CONOR. I do not think we ought to stand on the 24-hour rule providing the witness submits the statement to the committee in

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advance, because entirely apart from this instant case, it may very well be that the witness could come here and could talk about things entirely irrelevant and foreign to the matter under consideration and we do not feel that that should be permitted, but I think if the witness submits the statement and a proper opportunity given to the staff to analyze it and the committee to see it, that the rule should not be pressed.

Senator EASTLAND. Suppose we just pass the matter over for a while.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I inquire further, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hold a press conference this morning, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I did not, Mr. Chairman. I spoke to two members of the press at my hotel this morning, telling them briefly I intended to make this request. I did not give them a copy of this statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that it was on the news ticker yesterday evening that you were having a press conference?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I announced it at the time of the press conference given by my chairman in New York. I announced that I would appear this morning here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any announcement to anyone that you were holding a press conference at 9:15, or any time this morning?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge, I said I would like to meet two representatives of the press at my hotel room this morning to tell them what I wished to request.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom did you say that?

Mr. HOLLAND. I spoke to the representatives of the Herald Tribune and the Washington Post.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were the two people to whom you spoke?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Marder and Mr. Irwin.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were the only two that you notified of the conference this morning?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not consider it a conference, but I notified my counsel here, Mr. Crossman.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant newspapermen, sir.

Mr. HOLLAND. I asked a friend here in Washington to say that I wished to speak to a number of newspapermen about this.

Senator EASTLAND. I will say this right now, that while it is a matter that the committee has to determine, I think it is very improper for a witness who is under subpena and brought down here to be asked questions, to try to break into the press and discredit the investigation.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I quite agree with you, because it is perfectly apparent to anybody who has had experience in public life at all, that one of the objectives of some people is to try to discredit this investigation.

Now, I am not accusing anybody for the moment. I would not hesitate to when some particular individual appears to me to justify criticism. But we subpena a man to come here to give testimony along the lines we want to inquire about.

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Now I think every one of us wishes to be absolutely fair to everybody. I think we have demonstrated that to the satisfaction of fair-minded people.

When a witness is subpenaed to answer a certain line of questions, I do not think it is a fair thing for a witness to try to catch the attention of the public press and get his story of the things he wants to tell in print ahead of the hearing.

I do not think it is a fair thing to do, and I do not think we should be a party to it.

When he asks to be allowed to testify, then I concede he can give anything he wants to the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one or two questions.

Would you tell the committee who it was you asked in your behalf to give notice of the conference this morning?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I asked Mrs. Owen Lattimore if she would speak to one or two of the newspapermen. The names I recall, besides the two I spoke of, were a representative of the Associated Press and a representative of the New York Times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify whom you wanted notified on behalf of the Associated Press?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you specify whom you wanted notified on behalf of the New York Times?

Mr. HOLLAND. I said preferably Mr. White.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you had specified Mr. Marder and Mr. Irwin?

Mr. HOLLAND. I said someone from the Washington Post and the New York Herald Tribune, preferably Mr. Marder and Mr. Irwin.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you call anyone yourself?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You limited your request to the four you mentioned?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was not instructed to call the United Press?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was not instructed to call the International News Service?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you select the four you named?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because these happened to be people I had had the privilege of meeting personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wait a minute. You had not specified any person. You mean you have met the entire staff of the Associated Press?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have seen these people and read their reports and spoken to them casually in previous hearings of these sessions.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you had confidence in them?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe their reports have been fair and they have seemed to take an interest in the proceedings of this subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not think that is true of the United Press and International News Service?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have not had the privilege of speaking to the other gentlemen.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out why you did not notify the other two news services.

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Mr. HOLLAND. Simply because I am not well in touch with the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this your own idea to call this press conference?

Mr. HOLLAND. Entirely my own idea.

I do not regard it as a press conference, Mr. Chairman, for the simple reason that my sole purpose was not to say anything about the content of my statement, but simply to notify these gentlemen that I wished to request the privilege of making an extended statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you happen to call on Mrs. Lattimore to act as your agent in notifying those whom you wished to meet with you this morning?

Mr. HOLLAND. A very simple reason. I tried through my office to make hotel reservations at about six hotels in Washington, and was not able to get a room. I therefore called Mrs. Lattimore and asked her if she would be kind enough to do some telephoning around Washington, and since she was doing that, if she would also mind notifying these representatives of the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions on that point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if it is the decision of the committee that they will not permit me to make this statement?

Senator EASTLAND. No, that is my idea.

Mr. HOLLAND. Your ruling, sir?

Senator EASTLAND. I have made no ruling.

Senator O'CONOR. I understand that it has been held in reservation.

Senator EASTLAND. The acting chairman of the committee cannot waive a rule of the committee. The committee itself might do it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, since I do wish to be fair and courteous to this subcommittee, may I then ask whether you will have any objection to my making available to the press the text of this statement either during this morning's session, or at the end of this morning's session?

I do not wish to do anything which you feel is improper or discourteous.

Senator EASTLAND. I think we had better get on with the questions. Mr. Morris has some questions. You were brought here under subpena and I want you to answer them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, there are a few preliminary matters before we get into the substance of the examination.

I called you last week, as you may recall, in connection with the testimony that Professor Colegrove and Professor Stassen gave in connection with a round-table conference.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Twenty-five people participated in that conference and we asked you if you would inform us, if you would come down and testify and tell us how many of these 25 people were members of the Institute of Pacific Relations in this conference. You said it would be inconvenient for you to come down and that you would send the names down and their associations with the institute and the first time you were down here you would put those statements under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

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Mr. MORRIS. I now offer you your letter to me, Mr. Holland, of September 28, 1951, where you do set forth the IPR associations of the various people connected with the institute.

Will you now make that a part of the official records?

Mr. HOLLAND. I confirm this letter, Mr. Chairman. If you wish, I will read the text of the covering letter, but otherwise I am prepared to say this is a true statement, to the best of my recollection and belief.

Senator SMITH. I wish you would examine each of those pages, to see that they are copies of the letter you sent.

Senator EASTLAND. He testified they were.

Senator SMITH. I heard him say it, but I noticed that he did not turn his sheets and look. I want to be certain that there is no question about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Since it is a short covering letter, I think I might read it.

Senator EASTLAND. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Why not read the covering letter?

Mr. HOLLAND (reading):

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In accordance with your telephoned request, I send you herewith a memorandum indicating as precisely as possible the IPR connections of the persons who attended the State Department conference on Far Eastern policy, October 6–8, 1949.

You will note on pages 3 and 4 that Messrs. Brody, Colegrove, Holcomb, McNaughton, Murphy, Quigley, Reischauer, and Stassen were not members of or actively participating in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time of the State Department conference.

Would you kindly notify Senator McCarran of my desire that this statement be made part of the record of the hearings and indicate that on a later occasion I will be glad to confirm the memorandum as part of my sworn testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Then the list does show that 17 of the 25 people were at that time associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a fair statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Mr. Chairman, the question has come up as to how the Stassen testimony is related to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In this 3-day conference, of the 25 people called in to engage in that discussion, 17 of the 25 were then active members of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator EASTLAND. The testimony has been that that list was made up by Dr. Jessup; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. The conference was under his direction.

Senator EASTLAND. The testimony was that the list of those provided was made up by him.

I think this information should be given to the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. MORRIS. It shall be done.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand he testified that he did not compile that list largely from people affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, but from the heads of the departments of political science in the different universities of the country.

I do not know whether it is true, or not.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, I did understand Mr. Holland to have some comment to make. I thought it was audible that you did

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indicate some opinion as to whether or not that compilation was made under the circumstances, did you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not clear, Mr. Chairman, which compilation you are talking about. Do you mean the original list of people who came to the State Department conference?

Senator EASTLAND. Who were invited.

Mr. HOLLAND. I had no knowledge of, or connection with, that conference; absolutely none. All I have done in response to Mr. Morris' request is to take the list of names he sent me, look into our files and record, and indicate what connection those people have, and as he points out, 17 of them had some kind of connection.

Now, the nature of the connection is indicated in this memorandum. Some were officers; most were just ordinary members. Some had been contributors to IPR publications. A few had attended IPR conferences.

But the precise nature of their connection is indicated in the memorandum, and I do not think it is necessary to read it.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Holland, I notice, however, that you did not give the IPR association of the board of three people who were appointed by Dean Acheson to run this conference. That is Mr. Jessup, Mr. Case, and Mr. Fosdick.

Are you prepared to testify as to the connection of those three gentlemen?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am prepared. I think I gave one of your staff information informally over the telephone.

Dr. Jessup's connection, I think is well known. I don't think I need take your time. As you know, at one time he was the chairman of our international governing body of the Pacific Council.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time was that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. He was chairman of our international governing body of the Pacific Council from 1939 to 1942.

In addition, at a later date, he was chairman of the American Institute of Pacific Relations from 1939 to 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he chairman of the research committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Jessup was chairman of the research advisory committee of the American Institute of Pacific Relations for a brief period in 1944.

He severed any activity; he withdrew from any activity, and active participation in the Institute when he went into the State Department in 1946, but he is still an ordinary member.

Senator EASTAND. Between 1944 and 1946, what was his connection with the Institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. He was an ordinary member, and may still have been trustee. I am afraid I don't have the information.

Senator EASTLAND. He was active in the affairs of the Institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. In 1944 and 1946, I would say not active, Mr. Chairman, because at that time he was doing a number of consultant jobs for the Government in connection with UNRRA, I think, and such things. Nevertheless, he was a member and may have been consulted on IPR affairs occasionally. I cannot speak from direct knowledge on that.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the association of Mr. Case?

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Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Everett Case of Colgate University, had been a treasurer of the American Institute of Pacific Relations from 1932 to 1934. He is still an ordinary member.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Fosdick?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Fosdick at an early period, about 1933, appears in our records as having been invited to membership. The membership card is not clear that he paid any dues. That may well have been because he was a high official of the Rockefeller Foundation at the time and we, therefore, did not dun him.

He also appears to have been invited to serve on the board of trustees in 1934, but, again, we have no records of his having attended the meetings.

My own belief is that he considered it would not usually be appropriate for him since he had by then become president of the Rockefeller Foundation, but he at least seems to have had that nominal connection back in 1933, 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, we have had testimony about a briefiing at this conference by a person named Cora Dubois. Was she active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. Miss Dubois is an ordinary dues-paying member. She has never been an officer or trustee, and, to the best of my knowledge, has never taken any active part in meetings or conferences of the institute. She has been asked to review books by us, and I think has been invited to write articles, but I do not believe she has actually contributed, although I am not sure on the last point.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one question?

Mr. Holland, just now the committee's counsel made the statement and you answered it; have you read all the testimony that has been taken in this case that is available to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I have not been able to read it all. As you know, it has been very voluminous.

Senator SMITH. You know that these people who testified had been sworn?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not quite clear what testimony you are referring to.

Senator SMITH. With respect to just what you finished answering.

Mr. HOLLAND. About the connections of these people?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I know I am saying it under oath.

Senator SMITH. You know that what Mr. Morris stated and asked you about has also been testified to under oath?

Mr. MORRIS. By Mr. Stassen and by Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. HOLLAND. I see what you mean.

Senator SMITH. The reason I say that is that I notice some person in the paper this morning referred to unsupported statements which the committee counsel made. I want to make it clear that Mr. Morris made that statement as to what was testified to under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. I understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into evidence?

Senator EASTLAND. What is it?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the list which was sent in by Mr. Holland.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it identified by him?

Mr. MORRIS. He identified it.

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Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted into evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. He affirmed the underlying facts in that letter.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 326" and is as follows:)

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
New York 22, N. Y., September 28, 1951.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Counsel, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In accordance with your telephoned request, I send you herewith a memorandum indicating as precisely as possible the IPR connections of the persons who attended the State Department conference on far eastern policy, October 6–8, 1949.

You will note on pages 3 and 4 that Messrs. Brodie, Colegrove, Holcombe, MacNaughton, Murphy, Quigley, Reischauer, and Stassen were not members of or actively participating in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time of the State Department conference.

Would you kindly notify Senator McCarran of my desire that this statement be made part of the record of the hearings and indicate that on a later occasion I will be glad to confirm the memorandum as part of my sworn testimony.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

IPR CONNECTIONS OF PERSONS ATTENDING STATE DEPARTMENT CONFERENCE ON FAR EASTERN POLICY OCTOBER 6–8, 1949

Joseph W. Ballantine: Trustee, American IPR, February 1949 to present; member, American IPR, 1948–?; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1948 and 1950.

Claude A. Buss: Member, American IPR, 1945–?; active in San Francisco Bay region; contributor to Far Eastern Survey; attended International IPR Conference, 1947; attended American IPR National Conference, 1947.

Arthur G. Coons: Trustee, American IPR, February 1947 to present; member, American IPR, 1935–?; active in southern California; attended American IPR National Conference, 1947.

John W. Decker: Member, American IPR, 1938–?; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1946.

John K. Fairbank: Trustee, American IPR, April 1944–March 1946, February 1947 to present; member, American IPR, 1936–?; contributor to Pacific Affairs, September 1949; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1947, 1948 and 1949; author of American Education in the Far East (1942, reprint from Social Education); What Can the United States Do in China? (1949, 16 pp.); Next Step in Asia (1949), contributor; attended International IPR Conferences in 1945 and 1947.

William R. Herod: Trustee, American IPR, February 1940–December 1942, January 1946–February 1951; member, American IPR Executive Committee, November 1940–December 1942; vice chairman, American IPR, November 1940–April 1942; member, American IPR, 1938–?; attended IPR International Conference, 1939.

Benjamin H. Kizer: Trustee, American IPR, December 1935–March 1946, February 1947 to present; member, American IPR Executive Committee, 1936–39; vice chairman, American IPR, March 1943–March 1946; member, American IPR, 1933–?; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1944; author of North Pacific International Planning Board, data paper, 1942; United States-Canadian Northwest, 1943; attended IPR International Conferences in 1933, 1936, 1942, 1945; attended India-America Conference, 1949; active in Pacific Northwest.

Owen Lattimore: Editor, Pacific Affairs, 1933–July 1941; author of Inner Asian Frontiers of China 1940 and 1951; Empire in the East (chapter), 1936; Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict, 1935; Mongols of Manchuria, 1934; trustee, American IPR, February 1943 to present; non-quorum member, American IPR Executive Committee, 1946–1949; chairman, American IPR Research Advisory Committee, March 1946–March 1951; Member, American IPR, 1936–?; attended IPR International Conferences in 1933, 1936, 1939, 1942, 1945, 1947; attended India-America Conference, 1949.

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George C. Marshall: trustee American IPR, April 1949 to present.

Nathaniel Peffer: Member, American IPR, 1937–?; contributor to Pacific Affairs, September 1935 and March 1937; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1946, 1947; author of Prerequisites for Peace in the Far East (Inquiry Series); Basis for Peace in the Far East; attended IPR International Conference in 1936.

W. S. Robertson: member, American IPR, 1939–?; helpful in financial solicitation in New York.

John D. Rockefeller 3d: member, American IPR, 1933–?; spoke at Bankers Club lunch in 1949; attended IPR International Conference, 1929, in American Secretariat.

Lawrence K. Rosinger: fellowship holder, American IPR, 1939–40; Research staff, American IPR, July 1948–September 1950; author of Deadlock in China, 1940; China's Wartime Politics, 1937–44, 1944; India and the United States; 1950; State of Asia, 1951; co-author and editor; attended IPR International Conferences, 1939 and 1945; attended India-America Conference 1949.

Eugene Staley: trustee, American IPR, February 1942–February 1943; chairman, American IPR Research Committee, April 1941–March 1943; member, American IPR, 1937–48; Director, Bay Region Division, American IPR—subsequently World Affairs Council of Northern California; attended IPR International Conferences, 1939 and 1945.

Phillips Talbot: Member, American IPR, 1947–?; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1950; author, India and Pakistan (FPA report) 1949; attended India-American Conference 1949.

George E. Taylor: Trustee, American IPR, March 1946–February 1947, February 1948 to present; member, American IPR, 1941–?; contributor to Pacific Affairs, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1941, 1942; author of Struggle for North China (inquiry series), 1940; Changing China (Webster school pamphlet) 1942; America in the New Pacific, 1942; Reconstruction Movement in China, 1936 (35 pp.); Some Aspects of China's Economic Reconstruction (in Japanese) 1937; What Can the United States Do in China, 1949 (16 pp.); attended IPR International Conference, 1939; fellowship holder, American IPR, 1941–42.

Harold M. Vinacke: Member, American IPR, 1933–51; contributor to Pacific Affairs, December 1946; author of the United States and the Far East data paper, 1950; Far Eastern Policy of the United States (FPA report) 1951; attended several regional American IPR conferences.

The following were not members of and were not actively participating in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time of the State Department Conference:

Bernard Brodie: Member, American IPR, 1943–47.

Kenneth Colegrove: Member, American IPR, 1938–47 (was assigned to write a report for the IPR inquiry series, but never delivered).

Arthur N. Holcombe: Member, American IPR, 1932–48; member, American IPR Research Committee, 1930–32 or 1934; attended several regional American IPR conferences.

Ernest MacNaughton: Member, American IPR, 1936–42.

J. Morden Murphy: Trustee American IPR, February 1950 to present; member, American IPR Executive Committee, March 1951–?; attended India-American Conference, December 1949.

Harold J. Quigley: Member, American IPR, 1931–43; member, American IPR Research Committee, 1930–32 or 1934; contributor to Pacific Affairs, September 1937 and September 1947; author of Chinese Politics and Foreign Powers, 1927; attended IPR International Conference, 1931.

Edwin O. Reischauer: Member, American IPR, 1944–48; contributor to Far Eastern Survey, 1948; coauthor of Next Step in Asia.

Harold E. Stassen: Elected to membership, American IPR, September 1938, and again in March 1940. Regretted April 1940; invited to attend India-America Conference, December 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, there have been some actions taken on the part of the staff in connection with the last open hearing that we had here. We were directed to issue a subpena in connection with the Vandenberg diaries about which the last witness before the committee made certain recommendations.

I would like to report that a subpena has been issued to Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., the New York Herald Tribune, and the Houghton Mifflin Publishing Co. that they make available the diary of the late

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Senator Vandenberg from January 1, 1947, to July 1, 1950, that that be made available to the committee.

In connection with the other request, we have sent two letters to the President and one letter to the Secretary of State in relation to that open hearing.

I wondered if you would like to have them in the record at this time.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. Will you read them?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

OCTOBER 8, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During recent testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee there was extensive reference to a Cabinet meeting held at the White House on February 5, 1949, at which was present the late Senator Vandenberg.

It is respectfully requested that the minutes of that meeting be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

OCTOBER 8, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During recent testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, there was reference to a Cabinet meeting held on November 26, 1948, during which the late Secretary of Defense James Forrestal made recommendations that the AVG be reactivated.

It is respectfully requested that the minutes of this Cabinet meeting be made available to the Senate Internal Security Committee.

Very sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

OCTOBER 8, 1951.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During the recent testimony of former Gov. Harold Stassen before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on October 6, 1951, Senator Homer Ferguson of this committee related that he had seen, in the American Embassy in Hong Kong, a copy of a message from the State Department that was sent to the Nationalist Government in the month of October 1949, and which stated, according to Senator Ferguson, that no further military aid would be given the Nationalist Government as far as Formosa was concerned.

It is respectfully suggested that a copy of this message be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Senator EASTLAND. They will be admitted in evidence.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibits Nos. 327, 328, 329," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. On September 28, 1951, Senator McCarran sent to the President the following letter, to which we received a reply yesterday.

Mr. MANDEL. This is dated September 28, 1951.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House:

A letter from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, dated July 13, 1951, contains the following statement about Ellen Van Zyll de Jong Atkinson:

"Ellen Van Zyll de Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an

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application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved."

Inasmuch as Ellen Atkinson was a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations which is presently under inquiry, it would be appreciated if her file were made available to this committee.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Here is the reply, dated October 8, 1951, from the White House:

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I acknowledge your letter of September 28, 1951, requesting the file of Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson be made available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

I am requesting the Secretary of the Army to make Mrs. Atkinson's employment record available to the subcommittee. However, in conformity with the position I have heretofore stated on several occasions, I do not feel that the information so made available to the subcommittee should include investigative data of a confidential nature.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Senator EASTLAND. They may be admitted in evidence.

(Documents referred to and read in full were marked "Exhibits Nos. 330–A and 330–B," and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, what is your present position in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. My position is secretary-general of the International Institute of Pacific Relations, and also concurrently and temporarily executive vice chairman of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held both positions?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have been secretary-general since March 1946, and I have been executive vice chairman of the American Institute since, I believe, August 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your association with the institute prior to that time, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. My association is quite long, Mr. Chairman. I began as a junior research assistant in Honolulu which was then the international headquarters, in January 1929.

From 1931 to 1933, I was acting international research secretary of the institute, and from 1933 to 1944, I was the international research secretary, which is equivalent to research director, of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Holland, are you in a position to tell us what the principal sources of revenue have been for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us as fully as possible, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. May I divide my answer into two parts, first, relating to the international institute, and, second to the American.

I think it is known, Mr. Chairman, that the institute is a loose association of independent national organizations called national councils in 10 countries, each with their own independent offices and programs and organization.

The sources of funds of the International Institute of Pacific Relations consists of donations, or, rather, of contributions supplied by

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each of the national councils. A quota is worked out every 2 or 3 years and as far as possible each national council tries to pay that quota.

In addition, the International Institute of Pacific Relations receives and has received over a considerable period substantial grants from American foundations, say the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp.

In addition, one or two large firms, chiefly outside the United States, have occasionally made contributions direct to the International Institute of Pacific Relations.

At the present time, Lever Bros., London, does that.

Finally, some small income, I say net income, is received from the sale of publications and from the sales of our quarterly journal, Pacific Affairs.

The financial sources of the American Institute of Pacific Relations are, first, substantial contributions by leading American companies. I won't give you the list, but they include major corporations, such as the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., the International General Electric, the Chase Bank, the National City Bank, and some 40 or 50 similar well-known corporations.

In addition, funds are received from ordinary individual gifts. There are a considerable number of wealthy persons who have given liberally at various times to the Institute. They range all the way from Mr. Thomas W. Lamont to Mr. Frederick V. Field, and both of those contributions have been mentioned in the press already.

Next are ordinary membership subscriptions. The membership consists today of about 1,100 people.

The minimum membership is $7.50 a year. The ordinary membership fee is $15 a year. Then there are, I think, two other categories, contributing and supporting membership.

Then finally there are, of course, substantial contributions also to the American Institute of Pacific Relations from the big foundations, and there, again, the principal ones have been the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us substantially what the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations contribute each year to the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a very detailed statement on that. It will take a long time to give it. I would be glad to supply it to the committee. I can give you totals approximately, but it extends over a very long period of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Give us a rough estimate. If you want to give it in detail, we will put that in the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. The record shows in the 26 years since the American IPR has been operating, but let me begin with the International IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. HOLLAND. In the 26 years since the International IPR has been operating total receipts amount to about two and a half million dollars, actually $2,569,000, which is an average of about $100,000 a year.

Of this, 48 percent came from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. together. I don't have immediately the breakdown between those two.

About 30 percent came from the national council quotas, and about 9 percent from publication sales, and 3 percent from miscellaneous sources.

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In answer to your question on the foundations, if we include grants made to the American IPR, the contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation to the work of the IPR through 1950 totals $2,176,000. Our latest grant in 1950 consisted of a 2-year grant from the Rockefeller Foundation of $60,000; that is to say, $30,000 a year for the International IPR.

I am sorry. Fifty thousand dollars for the International IPR divided into two installments of $20,000 and $30,000, and $60,000 to the American IPR divided into two installments of $30,000 each.

Mr. MORRIS. You are going to supplement that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I will be glad to. We have a full record of the sources for each foundation.

Senator SMITH. Is that sort of a handbook?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do have copies of this, which is just a brief description of the organization. I will be glad to make additional copies available.

Senator EASTLAND. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. How many members are there in the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. At the present time approximately 1,100.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you aid individuals in obtaining grants from the various foundations to do research work?

Mr. HOLLAND. At times we have done this.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. On a number of occasions in addition to requesting funds for ourselves or for our own research program, the institute offices have brought to the attention of various foundations the fact that some university or research institution or some individual scholar is working on a particular piece of research which is in general related to the problems that the institute itself is interested in.

That is to say political, economic, and cultural conditions in the Far East. On a number of occasions, therefore, we have actually requested and sometimes recommended to the foundation officers that they should make grants directly to those institutions or individuals.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you estimate the number of people who obtained grants through your intercession in that way, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Speaking for myself I would estimate I suppose between 10 and 15 over the whole period of my connection as a research officer back to 1933. If you wish, I can give you one or two examples that I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. I have a list here. How about Robert W. Barnett?

Mr. HOLLAND. I myself did not take part in this, but I can tell you the circumstances. This was not so much a direct request for funds. At that time the Rockefeller Foundation indicated that they would be prepared to give every year to the American IPR a fellowship for one or two qualified young men to get training in far-eastern studies. The procedure was that the American IPR executive committee would consider various candidates and then nominate several names to the Rockefeller Foundation.

The foundation would then select the one or two that they thought were suitable and award them a fellowship usually of about $1,800 or $2,500 a year. Mr. Barnett held one of those fellowships.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else have held those?

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Mr. HOLLAND. Another man that I recall—I speak only from memory because this was the American IPR—was Mr. Walter Radius, of Stanford University. Another one was Mr. Lawrence Rosinger, who was being connected with the institute on another occasion. There were four or five. If you have the names, I would be glad to confirm them.

Mr. MORRIS. T. A. Bisson?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Bisson's case was different. Mr. Bisson's was more recent and was an example of where a specific grant was made to his university, the University of California, on a recommendation jointly from me and Professor Odegard, the head of his department at the university. This was about 2 or 3 years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Grajdansev?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Grajdanzev, who goes under the name of Andrew Grad, is also a case of a special grant being made by the foundation to the IPR, but on the understanding—I should say to the international IPR—on the understanding it was to be used for his specific projects, namely, a very detailed sociological survey of a Japanese town. This was made on my recommendation supported, as always, by the chairman of my international research committee, Sir George Sansom.

Mr. MORRIS. You yourself had a grant, did you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. Well, I am not sure, but I can explain the circumstances. I went on leave from the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of 1 year between 1931 and 1933. My purpose of going on leave was to take one of the regular Rockefeller Foundation social science fellowships for foreign study. I was entirely separated then from the institute.

This is part of the foundation regular fellowship series. It was not made to the IPR. It was awarded to me specifically in order to allow me to study in Cambridge, England.

Mr. MORRIS. How about E. Herbert Norman?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not recall the circumstances. I think it is quite possible he was given a special Rockefeller Foundation grant at the suggestion of Mr. Edward C. Carter, but I cannot be absolutely sure of that. I do know that Mr. Norman worked as a temporary research member of the international secretariat roughly about 1938 writing a book on Japanese economic history.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, how is it decided by the institute or how was it decided by the institute who should be selected for these various grants? Start with the case of Mr. Norman. How was the selection of Norman determined?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I can speak only from imperfect recollection here, but I am reasonably certain my account is accurate.

We needed an author for our inquiry series, which was to be a series of books designed to provide background information on the Sino-Japanese conflict on the possibility there might be a Sino-Japanese peace conference for which a great many background studies would be useful, not for the Government, but just for the general public.

As part of the series of reports on Japan we thought it was desirable to have a historical study showing how the Japanese system of government had evolved out of the old medieval system which came to an end with the restoration in 1868.

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Mr. Norman had recently completed a graduate course at Harvard University under the great Japanese scholar, Mr. Elizayev, in specializing on the history of the Meiji period of Japan. That was the period of the restoration.

He had made a very exhaustive survey of all of the Japanese literature, was very familiar with Japanese language materials. We were informed by a number of experts in the Japanese field that he was uniquely qualified to write in this particular field. I know that Mr. Carter therefore approached him with a request that he should prepare this volume for us.

As I have said before, I believe it may have been in that connection that he asked the Rockefeller Foundation to give Mr. Norman a fellowship to enable him to work in our office preparing this book. This was in 1938. It was at this time when he was doing this research—Mr. Norman did most of his work in the Columbia University library.

I understand it was there that he first made the acquaintance or first saw and probably spoke to Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who has previously testified here.

Mr. MORRIS. You are an expert in the field of Chinese political affairs, are you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I would not say that. My own training has been in economics. If I have any specialty at all, it is in far eastern general economic problems. I have some knowledge of Chinese economic problems and as a research director I have had to generally familiarize myself with Chinese politics, too. But I do not consider myself a specialist in that field.

Mr. MORRIS. You also have had to deal with various organizations, particularly around New York City, that have to do with Chinese research?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with an organization called the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am acquainted with it only in the sense that I have learned about it in very recent months. I knew it as the name of an organization, I suppose, as far back as 1941 or perhaps before that, just before Pearl Harbor, because I vaguely remember it as one of the organizations which was active in trying to organize American feeling to launch a boycott against Japan.

For some reason I have been looking in my own records. I seem to have had no connection with it and therefore in answer to Mr. Morris' question, it is only since my executive session before this committee some weeks ago when the question arose that I have taken the trouble to inquire a little about it. In that sense I have since become familiar.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you find the political nature of that organization to be?

Mr. HOLLAND. I find considerable disagreement. I find some people who say that it contained a number of left-wing people who urged policies of rather vigorous anti-Japanese character at that time, which some people today say were in line with the views of the Communists.

I found other people who say they knew about it who said that it was a mixed organization containing quite a number of eminent and well-known people who had quite different political points of view.

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I cannot myself say that I am satisfied as to which is the more correct organization. Obviously it was a mixed organization. To what extent it could be properly called a Communist-front organization, I really have not been able to decide in my own mind.

Mr. MORRIS. People active in the IPR were very active in American Friends of the Chinese People, and in its journal, China Today; is that the fact?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't China Today the publication? I mean the publication of The American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, this again is a fact which I have ascertained for myself since just within the last year. I know that I had ascertained it before my executive session, but just precisely when —in any case in fairly recent years I knew of the existence of the publication China Today, but I had not collected it in my mind as being the official publication of this organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Frederick Field was secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations at a time when he was one of the editors of China Today, was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have also tried to get some information on this because a similar question was asked me by Mr. Morris in the executive session. I myself knew that after 1945 that Mr. Field had this connection with the magazine China Today. I put it in that way for a very special reason.

When I say after 1945, I mean that at that time I was on Government duty in China. As you know, at about that time, sometime in 1945, the Amerasia case broke. After I returned to this country, I was curious to read more about it. In the course of inquiring about this, because I think it was in that connection that this matter was raised, I asked a number of people whether this had been a fact that Mr. Field had been editor of the magazine China Today.

A number of these people said yes, but they understood he wrote under a pseudonym. I am not sure whether he was ever on the magazine, on the masthead of the magazine, under his own name because I have not had a chance to look through the files.

Senator SMITH. Was he trying to hide who he was in writing these materials on account of his relationship with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I really don't know. I am not even sure whether this related to the period of after he had ceased to be an employee of the IPR, which was in 1940. So I am afraid I do not know the answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Holland, your reply seems to indicate that you mean to convey the idea you were not familiar with the publication China Today prior to the time when, being in China, you made these inquiries; is that correct?

Mr. HOLLAND. I made the inquiries after I returned from China at the end of 1945. The answer to your question is essentially "Yes," but I did know of the existence of this magazine. I am sure that I must have seen it occasionally in the library. But I have recently taken the trouble to look at one or two of the bound volumes which we still have in our library. I find I really was not familiar with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The bound volumes were in your library at the time?

Mr. HOLLAND. Only 2 years. I don't know how that happened.

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Mr. SOURWINE. What were those years?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't recall now, but I did take the trouble—I looked up in connection with another name which you may be asking me about later.

Mr. SOURWINE. You want the committee to understand it was not a magazine which you habitually read or frequently read or which you were at that time familiar with?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is quite true.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you said Mr. Field used a pseudonym in China Today. Do you know what pseudonym?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think I said I was told Mr. Field used a pseudonym. I was told at that time that his pseudonym was Frederick Spencer.

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). Was any explanation given as to the reason for his use of the pseudonym?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; there was not, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. At that time did you hear any discussion at all as to why he was using it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I did not, Mr. Chairman, and I am afraid I did not at that time ask the question. If I may continue a moment, Mr. Chairman, since I do want to give a full picture and since I have said I have recently tried to find out a little bit more more of the facts of this matter, I was told just the other day by a person in New York who said that he knew the actual circumstances of these pseudonyms that this information which I have just said that Mr. Field used the name of Frederick Spencer was in fact not correct; that Mr. Field actually wrote under the pseudonym of Lawrence Hearn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who told you that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Philip Jaffe told me this 2 or 3 days ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your intention to convey to the committee the impression that up until a few days ago you had no knowledge or information with regard to Mr. Field's using a pseudonym in writing for the publication China Today?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. As I have indicated, I learned about this fact shortly after my return from China in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prior to that time you had not known or heard of his using a pseudonym in writing for that magazine?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my recollection that is correct.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, had not you talked with Mr. Field after this inquiry began about the use he made of pseudonyms in writing those articles? Have you not discussed this with Mr. Field?

Mr. HOLLAND. Since this subcommittee's work began?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have not discussed this.

Senator SMITH. It has never been mentioned between you and Mr. Field?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. You have seen him frequently?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I have seen him twice since the seizure of our files in February.

Senator SMITH. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. The last 90 days he has been in jail.

Mr. HOLLAND. So I understand.

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I want to be perfectly frank. I did see him because he came one day to my office soon after the seizure to ask what in the world it was all about.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen him in prison?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have not. I saw him here. I was present in the audience the day he testified here.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified in executive session, I believe, that it was your understanding that Frederick Field wrote under the name of Frederick Spencer. Who told you that?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have been trying to recall, Mr. Chairman, because I did make the statement in executive session, and I am sorry I have not been able to recall whom I learned it from. I know I talked to a large number of people when I returned from China about November 1945.

I am sorry; I really made an effort to try and recall, but I cannot at the moment. There may have been evidence in our files which would indicate it, but I cannot recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it just so happens that we had a sample copy of China Today ready for presentation today. I notice that on the cover the first article is Whither American Policy in China, by Lawrence Hearn, which Mr. Holland just testified that Mr. Jaffe said was the pen name of Frederick Field in China Today.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I ask the date, Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, March 1936.

Did you wish to examine it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it possible Mr. Field might have written for that publication under both pseudonyms?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I can't answer. Obviously it is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had at one time been told that he used the other pseudonym.

Mr. HOLLAND. As I say, late in 1945 I was told that he had used the name of Frederick Spencer, but apparently, according to Mr. Jaffe, that was wrong information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Jaffe tell you that was wrong and he never used that name?

Mr. HOLLAND. What he told me was that the real fact was that the pseudonym used by Field was Lawrence Hearn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your understanding was he intended to tell you he had never used the Spencer pseudonym?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. He didn't put it in so many words, but I interpreted him as meaning the previous statement that Field used the name of Spencer and that was wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. In fairness to Mr. Jaffe and your other informant, whose name you can't recall, you cannot say now that Mr. Jaffe definitely did deny that he had ever used the name of Spencer?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; he did not deny it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That he was meant to refer to Mr. Field?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice one of the editors of China Today is a man named Hansu Chan. Do you know who he is?

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Mr. HOLLAND. I have also learned what some people have said is the real identity of Hansu Chan, namely, that it was Mr. Chao-ting Chi, whose name has appeared in these hearings before. I learned this fact also after I returned from China at the end of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Mr. Chi now?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chi, I am told, is somewhere in China as an official of one of the central banks in the Communist Government of China.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he is a Chinese Communist official now?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I am not in a position to answer that, Mr. Chairman. I know he is a high official of a Chinese Communist bank.

Senator O'CONOR. Under the Communist regime?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I have no knowledge of whether he is a Communist Party member or not.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would describe him better as a temporary research worker, as I have indicated before. We kept a rather small regular staff, but we would engage specific research workers on a fee basis to write a particular report for us.

Senator O'CONOR. Over what period did that extend in his case?

Mr. HOLLAND. In Mr. Chi's case—I think I have the actual records—they are not here, but I know it was approximately between 1939 and 1941, probably in the middle, after which time Mr. Chi left us, leaving his work unfinished, I am sorry to say, in order to take a job with the Chinese National Government Currency Stabilization Board.

Mr. MORRIS. But, Mr. Holland, you will concede his association with the Institute of Pacific Relations was substantial? Mr. Mandel and I have gone through your files and noticed extremely frequent letters to and from Mr. Chi and continual references to Mr. Chi throughout. Will you make that concession?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I do not feel I should make that concession. If counsel will ask me more precise questions, I will be glad to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. Just what in your opinion was the extent of his association?

Mr. HOLLAND. The extent of his association, Mr. Chairman, was that, as I have described, of a research worker engaged for this period to write a specific book on China's wartime economic problems, which unfortunately he never finished.

In addition, he was, I think, prior to that, an occasional contributor to our magazine and a book reviewer. I think there is a record of his having attended one or more of our international conferences. I recall he was at our conference in 1936, I believe, in California.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you keep track of him after he left the institute, sir?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure I would say "kept track." I certainly knew about his work because I was interested as an economist in the work of the Currency Stabilization Board.

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I also saw Mr. Chi later when I visited in China, Chungking, in the middle of the war in 1943. At that time he had become a senior official in the Ministry of Finance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you correspond with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it is almost certain I did for the very simple reason I was very angry he had not finished up his report, and I was trying to get him to at least complete a portion of it which would not have the material that it would embarrass him as a government official, which we could get out. He eventually did succeed in that. We published in proof form only 100 copies of parts of his report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, subsequent to the war, continue to keep in touch with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not keep in touch with him. When I went to China, visited Shanghai in 1937, I called on a number of officials in the——

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking about subsequent to the war.

Mr. HOLLAND. I meant 1947. In 1947 I visited a number of Chinese officials in Shanghai including leading members of the banks there. At that time I met Dr. Chi, who was then the director of research department of the Central Bank of China, which was still then a Nationalist organization. He was at that time very interested in having one of his associates prepare an economic history of the Manchu dynasty in China and wanted me to take it up with the Rockefeller Foundation, take up the question of whether some grant would be got for 24 scholars who had done a good deal of the work on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him at that time as Hansu Chan?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I must have known since, as I say, the name had been mentioned to me in 1945. I never thought of calling him because I had known him previously as Chi. We always called each other by the first name. I called him Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you continue contact with him after 1947?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not continue contact, but I think I wrote one letter to him some time between 1947 and probably 1949. I am afraid I don't recall that. It is possible because I was still curious to know whether he might still be in a position to give us something for the grant we made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you continue the relationship after that time, let us say after 1949, either personal contact or correspondence with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to the best of my recollections, Mr. Chairman, but again without looking at my files I can't be sure. I do want to say a word on the point which has already been brought into the hearings a little earlier in a letter. I think some time in early 1950 in one of the other hearings there is a reference to a letter from me to Mr. Ivison Macadam, the director of our British unit, in which I make a reference to Mr. Chi and describe him as someone who may be one of our most influential friends in China.

My reason for that was very simple. Mr. Macadam had written to me saying that a prominent official of the British-American Tobacco Co., who is one of his own board members, was going out to China shortly and wanted to visit a number of cities and also get in

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touch with a number of Chinese professors and research people, and asked me if I could give the names.

I gave the names of several professors in Peking and Shanghai who had previously been active in the China branch of the IPR. Also along with this list I mentioned Dr. Chi as the research director of this bank. I said that, "As you know, he has now become an official in the People's Bank of China and may be one of our more influential friends in China."

Mr. SOURWINE. At least you would not want the committee to understand that Mr. Chi was a person whose connection and importance was so negligible he dropped out of sight after he left the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't believe I could answer the question that way, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. It sounded a little bit as though you were attempting to make a point something like that earlier.

Mr. HOLLAND. I would like my testimony to stand as it is, indicating that I had a specific meeting with Dr. Chi in 1947, that I may have written him a letter between 1947 and 1949, and that I made a reference to him early in 1950 in writing to Mr. Macadam. I did not see Dr. Chi after 1947 because it was not possible to go back.

Mr. SOURWINE. The reference in 1950 was that you considered him one of IPR's more influential friends in China?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I did not put it that way. To the best of my recollection the phrase was "he may be one of our more influential friends in China."

Mr. SOURWINE. By "our" did you not mean the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I thought that is what I said.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Morris, I think there is a certain real distinction in my saying he may be one. I don't want to quibble about it, however.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just one more question. You have just recounted three specific instances of contact with Dr. Chi.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, correction, please. The last was not a contact, nor was the in-between one, which is a possibility of my having written a letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You however enumerated those instances in such a way that the impression might have been gathered that it was an exclusive list. In other words, that it included all of your contacts either in person or by correspondence. Did you intend it that way?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I think I have made it clear that so far as——

Mr. SOURWINE. You can answer that "Yes" or "No." Did you intend it that way? Did you intend that to be an exclusive list?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not intend it to be an exclusive list. Obviously it might have been.

Mr. MORRIS. May we get back to the American Friends of the Chinese People in China Today? We have mentioned two editors, two, I believe, of the three editors of that publication, Mr. Frederick Field, who was writing under the name of Lawrence Hearn, Mr. Chao-ting Chi, who was writing under the name of Hansu Chan.

The third was J. W. Phillips. Do you know who he was?

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Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I do not know from direct knowledge, or I do not know certainly, but I have a recollection—where I picked it up I don't know—that Mr. Phillips was in fact Mr. Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Philip Jaffe?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you he was Phillips?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't recall, but I have it somewhere in my mind. I put it that way because I think this question was asked me in the executive session earlier. Therefore, it has become part of my memory. I can't be quite sure whether I had it in my mind before that or only since.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Holland, in your recent conference with Mr. Jaffe in which he discussed the use by Field of a pseudonym, did he make any mention of the fact that he had been using one himself?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, he did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention here——

Senator SMITH. Do you have any doubt in your mind but that this pseudonym of Phillips for Mr. Jaffe was a pseudonym he used?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think, Senator, that it certainly is a very good presumption. I am under oath. Therefore, when you ask me something specific I try to make it. Certainly my own general feeling, since whenever this recent date was, has been that Mr. Jaffe wrote under the name of Phillips.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were talking with Mr. Jaffe about Mr. Field's pseudonym, or at any other time, had you discussed with him the question of pseudonyms he himself, Mr. Jaffe, might have used?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have never heard him state whether he did or did not use a pseudonym in writing?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have not heard him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do have the letter that we both made reference to here. It has already been introduced as an exhibit. It is exhibit 1–A. It is dated February 10, 1950. It is from Mr. Holland to Mr. Macadam and the last paragraph reads:

> If Loudon goes to Shanghai I hope he will see Chi Chao-ting, vice president of the Bank of China who has recently been named as Chinese Communist delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. You may remember that Chi was attached to the IPR International Secretariat in 1940 and wrote one of the inquiry reports on China's economic development (distributed only in brief form because it was incomplete). He may well prove to be one of our more influential friends in China.

That is 1950.

Just bearing on the reputation of this American Friends of the Chinese People organization, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention the fact that it has been cited as a Communist front by two particular organizations. I don't want to accept this as conclusive, but I would like it accepted on the general reputation of the American Friends of the Chinese People.

Mr. Mandel, will you read that into the record?

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question first?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, the last paragraph of this letter of February 10, 1950, which Mr. Morris just read to you, shows that you

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say that this man Chi has recently been named as a Chinese Communist delegate to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Do you recall where you got that information?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; from the newspapers.

Senator SMITH. That is all?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You had not heard directly from Chi himself?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony of Mr. Field that it was through Mr. Chi he was appointed foreign agent of three Chinese Communist principals?

Mr. HOLLAND. I heard Mr. Field state that here in his testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. "American Friends of the Chinese People, also known as Friends of the Chinese People, has been cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities in its report of March 29, 1944," this being prior to the issuance of the Attorney General's list. This organization is of course no longer in existence. "It was also similarly cited by the California Committee on Un-American Activities in its report of 1948."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, will you therefore acknowledge that the three editors—Mr. Chi, Frederick V. Field, and Mr. Jaffe—were people who were active in the IPR during the time they were editors of China Today?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to answer if counsel will indicate the dates. I am not quite clear in my mind when they were active in China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here March 1935's list, Hansu Chan, editor, page 102 in the volume No. 6 of March 1935.

Mr. HOLLAND. So far as Dr. Chi is concerned, he was not active at all. As I have indicated, he was first employed by us in 1939, I believe. He may have contributed articles before that, but I can't recall definitely. Certainly I would say he was definitely not active in the institute as early as 1935.

This doesn't mean he could not have been a member or an occasional contributor.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Jaffe, to the best of my recollection, was also not active at all at that time. I can't again remember——

Mr. MORRIS. When did Mr. Jaffe become active?

Mr. HOLLAND. My best recollection was when I was invited to attend the only conference of ours which he attended, which was in 1939 at Virginia Beach. It is possible Mr. Jaffe may have been an ordinary member before 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here in a list of things just casually made up by Mr. Mandel that Mr. Chi had an article in March 1936 in your publication, Pacific Affairs.

Mr. HOLLAND. As I have indicated, Mr. Chairman, it is quite possible that Dr. Chi contributed to our publications before 1939 when he was engaged by us to write his book. I would not say he was active at all. I do emphasize that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You do concede, however, that the three of them were active in China Today and in the IPR?

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Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I do not concede that blanket statement because, as I indicated previously, by any reasonable meaning of the word Dr. Chi was not active. When I use the word "active" I think most reasonable people would say you were dealing with people over a considerable period of time who were taking a leading part in the committees of the institute or attending a great number of its conferences and writing very frequently for its publications.

Senator O'CONOR. In that connection do you agree with the observation that Mr. Morris made before that the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations reveal considerable correspondence and other indications of the activity of Mr. Chi?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of course I acknowledge that. As much of this correspondence was somewhat of a quarrel between me and Mr. Chi as to when he was going to finish his book, I don't think that it necessarily indicates he was actively associated in the ordinary sense of the word. I don't want to extend this conference or to quibble, but I think it is a valid distinction.

Senator O'CONOR. I think you have made it quite clear.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the volumes of China Today that you do have in your office?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I am sorry I have not read them. I looked at them rather quickly to get some idea of the kind of people who contributed to them and also to see if it was true that these pseudonyms appeared on the masthead.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, on the basis of everything will you give us an estimate on your part as to whether or not you think this organization, the American Friends of the Chinese People, publishing as it did China Today, was an organization that was friendly to the Communists? Will you concede that much?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I think I indicated before that I got two rather contradictory impressions from the people I asked about this. My own feeling is that it is not possible to make the statement which counsel has made. I think it is clear that one can find in this magazine a number of articles which are sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

As I said, I only looked at it rather hastily. I don't recall noting any articles which were sympathetic to communism in general or to Russia because I think it dealt chiefly with the Far East. Undoubtedly there were, I think, articles which were sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

Also I have noticed that the magazine carried articles by people who were obviously not Communists, one of them being Senator Schwellenbach, of Washington, another Mr. George Fitch, of the YMCA in China, who has subsequently, as many people know, become one of the most ardent opponents of communism and a most vigorous spokesman for the Chinese Nationalists, and his wife, Mrs. Geraldine Fitch, together with a number of others. I just recall those three at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. You have made a survey of China Today to the extent you know about those people?

Mr. HOLLAND. As I indicated, I looked hastily through the volume just at the title pages and content pages to get a quick idea of what

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sort of names appeared on the front and only for these two volumes.

Mr. MORRIS. You claim you are in no position to say that China Today is a pro-Communist publication?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; that is my considered judgment.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the Canadian affiliate of the American Friends of the Chinese People, called the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. HOLLAND. I know this only by having heard it mentioned in the testimony, I think, related to one of the earlier sessions here, and I have forgotten which one.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Mr. HOLLAND. It had some connection with Dr. Norman, but I don't recall which session it was brought up in.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think this item has come up. We are introducing this item for the first time today.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have been under the impression that Mr. Norman was described somewhere as the secretary or had some connection with the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People, and the name of that organization came to me then very recently as a surprise because I had not heard of it before.

I am perfectly willing to give another possible reason for my knowing this because I am trying to be very candid. My recollection was, as I indicated, but it is also true that Mr. Jaffe in the course of talking to me about this matter of Frederick Field's pseudonym said that—I don't know whether he he said he knew or he had heard Mr. Norman had been a member of the organization called the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. It sticks in my mind because it came as a surprise to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you he was secretary?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe he did, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what connection did Mr. Jaffe bring that up?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Jaffe told me this—I am a little embarrassed at having to tell this, but since you have asked it I will put it quite frankly—Mr. Jaffe came to tell me that Mr. Morris had been to see him to ask if Mr. Jaffe would cooperate with this committee in providing all the information he knew about either people in the Institute of Pacific Relations or people in the various Communist organizations.

Mr. Jaffee told me he had met with Mr. Morris at lunch with his lawyer and that they had discussed a number of these questions. He did not indicate that he had discussed Mr. Field's—yes, I think he did. He indicated a question of Mr. Field's pseudonym had been discussed. I can't recall whether he said that the question of the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People had been discussed.

I think it was at this conference that Mr. Jaffe himself probably told me. I say probably because I am not absolutely sure in my mind. I have the recollection, as I stated first, that I had learned of this through hearing it in the testimony. That is very natural because I have been trying to study this voluminous testimony for the last several weeks. It is certainly hard for me to remember exactly where I learned each particular item.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Jaffe mention to you that Mr. Morris discussed with him the question of his, Jaffe's, own use of a pseudonym?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't believe he did, Mr. Sourwine.

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Senator SMITH. When did this conversation with Mr. Jaffe take place, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it was about 7 to 10 days ago, to the best of my recollection.

Senator SMITH. Where did it take place?

Mr. HOLLAND. In my office.

Senator SMITH. Did Mr. Jaffe come to your office?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Did he come voluntarily?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, he did.

Senator SMITH. You had not heard before about any conversations he had with Mr. Morris or anybody else about this matter?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. It came as rather a surprise to me. I have met Mr. Jaffe more on occasions in recent months because he and literally scores of other people who cannot afford to buy the transcript of these hearings just besieged my office asking if they could look at certain passages, particularly Mr. Budenz' numerous accusations. This is the reason for Mr. Jaffe having asked if he could see certain passages.

I do not recall his having—I have forgotten the original question.

Senator SMITH. The point I was trying to find out was whether or not Mr. Jaffe had come to your office to tell you about this conversation of his own accord or if you had heard about it and asked him to come?

Mr. HOLLAND. He came to tell me.

Senator SMITH. He did tell you about the conversation he had with Mr. Morris?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he indicate to you whether or not he was going to testify?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; he did not. I got the impression—I was still frankly rather—well, he did not. I am glad to tell you if you wish anything further, but the answer is "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. I think the the committee would be interested in the impression you got since you stated you got one.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection, but if my counsel wishes to advise me that it is not relevant——

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't think your counsel can rule on what is a germane question.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am quite willing to accept your wish.

Senator O'CONOR. We are not entirely interested in the matter of your opinion as we are in the matter of facts. If there are any facts on which you did base an opinion, it would certainly be relevant.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am glad to tell you facts that registered in my mind. This is why I said I was embarrassed: Because it seemed rather striking. I got the fairly definite impression from Mr. Jaffe's conversation that Mr. Morris had been hoping to get some cooperation from Mr. Jaffe on the ground if he testified he would be immune from any subsequent legal action because of a pending immunity law—I am not familiar with the details of it, but I have seen a discussion in the papers, by which certain witnesses if they agreed to testify would not be held liable subsequently for anything they might have said.

It was the first I heard of such a case, and therefore it stuck in my mind.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Does Mr. Jaffe make a practice of informing you with regard to contacts he may have in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations or related matters?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; it was very surprising. It is very rare indeed. I never had such an experience.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was the first instance in which Mr. Jaffe had made any such report to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have others who have been contacted by representatives of this committee come to you with reports of their contacts?

Mr. HOLLAND. I recall one other case, Mr. Raymond Dennett, who told me simply that he had been questioned in executive session and indicated that part of the questions dealt with the staff set-up when he was our executive secretary.

I must say in fairness to Mr. Dennett he did not give me any precise indication of the question, just indicated it covered that subject.

Mr. MORRIS. He went into a little more detail than that?

Mr. HOLLAND. He told me what his general attitude was, as I think you know from his testimony, and part of it concerned the question of the union of the employees.

Mr. MORRIS. You made a memorandum in fact of his conversation, did you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you make that memorandum available to this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I am glad to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Then we will note the precise extent to which he did relate the material of the conversation.

Mr. HOLLAND. It was on the telephone from Boston; therefore, I jotted down the main points.

Mr. MORRIS. We were at the point of discussing the various grants that had been given to individuals through the intervention and the aid of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We were discussing the fact that Herbert Norman had gotten a grant. That is how we got into this business of the American Friends of the Chinese People, "China Today" and the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People.

I notice the next name on this list is Mr. Walter Radius.

I think you mentioned him.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Lawrence K. Rosinger. Can you tell what Rosinger's associations with the IPR had been?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. Mr. Rosinger, I think then a recent graduate from Columbia, I believe was awarded one of the junior fellowships to work at the IPR by the Rockefeller Foundation probably back about 1939, 1938. I don't have the years because, as I say, I was not in the American IPR at that time. I did see him around the office. Then he left us after 1 year. I think he wrote one or two articles and a pamphlet at that time.

I believe he went to work for the Indian trade commissioner's office in New York. Subsequent to that I believe he went on the staff of the Foreign Policy Association. Then somewhere in 1943 while he was still employed, I think by the Foreign Policy Association, I invited him to prepare a short book for the Institute of Pacific Relations on China's wartime politics.

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This consisted of about 50 pages of a brief analysis and description followed by some 50 pages of documents about the Chinese Government set-up. This was published, I think, in 1944 or 1945 by the Princeton University Press and is still available. I think there are a few copies still on sale. It had a rather good reception, and it has for a long time been regarded as a useful reference work.

Then about 1948 when the Foreign Policy Association was going through rather drastic financial retrenchment and they decided to drop most of their research staff, I learned that Mr. Rosinger was going to be leaving and discussed with him the question of whether he would be prepared to undertake a research assignment for the Institute of Pacific Relations. He said that he would.

I therefore went to the Rockefeller Foundation officers and asked if they would be prepared to give a substantial grant—I think it was $6,000 or $9,000—to enable him to direct a rather large book on the postwar Far East. Originally it was planned as essentially a one-man job, but after a few months we realized it was too big a job for one man and therefore it eventually became a symposium by 13 authors and three of the chapters were written by Mr. Rosinger.

This book under the title "The State of Asia" was published last year by Alfred Knopf under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

So then Mr. Rosinger finished that assignment about September 1950 and went off our payroll and is no longer employed by the IPR. He went off and was awarded a rather generous what is called area training fellowship by the Social Science Research Council of Washington to complete a detailed study of the Chinese Renaissance, on which I believe he is still working.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Rosinger's role in your Indian conference in 1949?

Mr. HOLLAND. In 1949 we held a special conference in Delhi on Indian-American relations. This was financed in considerable part by the Carnegie Corp., which made rather large grants to, I think, seven or eight university presidents to go out to India in the belief that India was going to become suddenly much more important, and that not only should you send experts out there, but it was important to get the heads of universities to realize the importance of India and of Indian studies in their universities.

Among them was the new president of Cornell, President Malott; President Darden of the University of Virginia; President Hancher of Iowa, and a number of others.

It happened just before this conference was to start there was a reception at the Waldorf-Astoria for Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister Nehru. In the reception it happened that Mr. Barnard, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, was talking to Mr. Shiva Rao, who has been one of the long-time advisers of the Prime Minister. They got talking about this forthcoming conference.

Mr. Rao said, "I think it is important you ought to send out a number of younger people who are interested in specializing for some time in Indian affairs and also who know a good deal about east Asia because one of the big problems is that India has been so long cut off from east Asia we don't really have enough people who know about Japan and China."

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This conference I understand was subsequently followed up in the Rockefeller Foundation, and they called my predecessor, Mr. Clayton Lane, the secretary of the American IPR, to inquire whether it would serve the institute's purposes if a special grant were made available to enable Mr. Rosinger to go out to this conference and also to make a tour of India.

Mr. Lane naturally said "Yes," and I think a grant of something like $2,000 was made available for travel.

In connection with that conference also Mr. Rosinger wrote a report called Indian-American Relations. This was subsequently published by Macmillan under the title of "India and the United States." This volume here is the proceedings of this Indian-American conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you will notice in the report on the India-American Relations Conference, this digest here, that the rapporteur of the report was Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Mr. HOLLAND. That was true. As I indicated, he prepared one of the documents for this conference.

Mr. MORRIS. That indicates active participation in IPR affairs as late as 1949?

Mr. HOLLAND. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I noticed your press release. Did you read the testimony of Mr. Canning before our committee about Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure whether I read it. But I was here that morning, so I certainly heard the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Mr. Canning had identified Mr. Rosinger as a member of the Communist Party in 1940?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1940?

Mr. HOLLAND. Did I know in 1940?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he identified in 1940 Lawrence Rosinger as a member of the Communist Party at a time prior to that?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I did not. I heard it for the first time when he testified here a few weeks ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the record may be clear, let me rephrase the question.

Did you know that Mr. Canning had identified Mr. Rosinger as having been, in 1940, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I heard him say so here.

Mr. MORRIS. You did hear that he testified before this committee that Lawrence Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have already answered that. It was the same question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there was public testimony before the New York State legislative committee at that time that Lawrence Rosinger, according to the testimony of Mr. William Canning, was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. HOLLAND. This I did not know. I would have answered if you had made the thing clear.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Might I ask that you read what he said? I was there, and he said he couldn't tell whether he testified to that fact publicly or not. I heard him. He said he testified twice, once privately

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and once publicly. He couldn't remember whether he had testified to that fact publicly or not.

Mr. MORRIS. I had asked Mr. Holland the question whether he knew that Mr. Canning had identified Mr. Rosinger to have been a member of the Communist Party in 1940.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Publicly.

Mr. MORRIS. Publicly. The answer is——

Mr. CROSSMAN. He doesn't know; but I do remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman, please. I don't believe Mr. Crossman can testify for Mr. Holland or that he should on this record purport to correct and change Mr. Holland's testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; Mr. Holland has answered it.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I am not purporting to change it.

Senator O'CONOR. Proceed with the next question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in regard to this problem of identifying somebody to have been a member of the Communist Party, great care has to be exercised at all times. I think ordinarily we would not introduce the executive session which takes place prior to the full session into the public record. But I think I would like to reintroduce at this time the testimony of Mr. Canning at executive session in connection with Lawrence Rosinger's membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. Mandel, will you read into the record the testimony of Mr. Canning? Mr. William Canning had been a member of the City College unit of the Communist Party. He was on the staff of the City College at the time.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us, Mr. Canning, what you knew of a man named Lawrence Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. I knew Lawrence Rosinger at City College where in 1935 I became an instructor in history. Rosinger was a graduate of City College either of that year, 1935, or 1936. I knew him fairly well during the few years of my party membership.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him as a Communist Party member?

Mr. CANNING. I knew him as a Communist Party member.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. From his own discussions with me. He spoke frequently about his activities in the Communist unit at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in that unit, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. No; I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. In what unit were you at that time?

Mr. CANNING. I belonged to the City College of New York unit.

Mr. MORRIS. You disclosed to him you were in that unit?

Mr. CANNING. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. So that when you two discussed various political activities you discussed them as a member of one unit talking to a member of another unit?

Mr. CANNING. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give us his unit?

Mr. CANNING. The Columbia University unit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it customary for members of one Communist unit to disclose that fact to members of another Communist unit and discuss the activities?

Mr. CANNING. That happened quite frequently during that period. Possibly in later years there was more tightening up of secrecy.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Rosinger left the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No; I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Rosinger is doing now?

Mr. CANNING. So far as I know he is on the staff of the IPR.

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Mr. HOLLAND. What was the date of this, Mr. Chairman? Is it permissible to tell us the date?

Mr. MORRIS. I will strike out the last sentence if it is a question of whether he is a member of the Institute. Communist Party membership is what I am talking about.

Have you heard the testimony of Mr. Karl Wittfogel?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I was here.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony of Mr. Budenz about Mr. Rosinger being a member of the Communits Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I have not read that. I saw it reported in the paper. Mr. Budenz has named so many names I did not actually read the testimony, but I saw the report in the paper.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman,, I don't think it would be necessary to read Mr. Wittfogel's or Mr. Budenz's testimony at this point.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, before counsel finishes with this subject of Dr. Wittfogel's testimony, I would like to say a word or two regarding the allegations concerning Mr. Rosinger made by Dr. Wittfogel.

Senator O'CONOR. Inasmuch as you have been asked generally about the other session, you may do so.

Mr. HOLLAND. I say this because naturally I want to indicate that I have been taking the work of this committee seriously and quite naturally therefore I was very disturbed when Dr. Wittfogel, whom I have known a long time—we have been cordial friends for a long time, as late as last year I sublet his apartment. Therefore I was quite disturbed when he made the statement he considered Mr. Rosinger to be a Communist. I spoke to Mr. Rosinger about it afterward as soon as I could.

And particularly I was concerned about Dr. Wittfogel's statement that he apparently reached this conclusion in large part on the basis of certain of Mr. Rosinger's writings. Therefore, what my chief conconcern was, is there anything in Mr. Rosinger's two principal books for the IPR which would give ground for this?

I therefore asked Mr. Rosinger to talk to me about it. He did. He gave me a brief memorandum, which I will not read textually, but if you will permit me, I would like to look at it to refresh my memory as I talk to you.

Essentially, however, it was pointed out to me by Mr. Rosinger that he had not come in to the——

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering about this. Is that a proper way to get Mr. Rosinger's testimony in? If he wants to testify, I would be in favor of hearing him.

Senator O'CONOR. I do not think it is proper for one witness to testify for another.

Mr. HOLLAND. I would much prefer the other. My only point was that I felt some time in the hearings the rest of this story should be heard.

Senator SMITH. In other words, you think Mr. Rosinger would like to be heard here?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't answer that directly. All I was saying if there is to be testimony, certainly it would be better for him to testify.

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Senator O'CONOR. He should be given an opportunity, but if he wishes to deny it, he should come in person and take an oath and testify rather than do it through another person.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

May I add one point further, which I think is valid for me? My chief concern was the quality of the books he had written for the Institute of Pacific Relations because it is possible that he might have had other affiliations long before I knew him. I therefore did take the trouble to look at these publications. I do know with all sincerity and submit to the committee that any honest appraisal of these books I have mentioned—China's Wartime Politics and India and the United States—would show they are truly scholarly and balanced pieces of work.

This is certainly confirmed by a number of reviews in very reputable, scholarly publications. Not only that, this most recent book which is mentioned, namely The State of Asia, contains a chapter on China by Mr. Rosinger. Quite naturally there have been differing opinions on that particular chapter.

The New York Times was somewhat critical of it, called the book as a whole extremely good and included Mr. Rosinger's chapter on India, but was critical of the China chapter.

On the other hand, I find that the Catholic journal, Commonweal, praised the book very highly and particularly singled out the chapter on China as admirable, I don't want to always quote reviews, but it did seem this was a pertinent point from the point of view——

Senator SMITH. Have you the book?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't have it here.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as Mr. Holland has characterized the testimony of Mr. Wittfogel, at this time I think we should read it into the record. It is very brief. It amounts to about two lines.

Senator O'CONOR. From what page are you reading?

Mr. MANDEL. This is page 313 of the testimony of August 7, 1951:

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I met Rosinger there, and he was treated as a Communist and spoken of as a Communist by Finklestein.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read the preceding part?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us more about Lawrence Rosinger's experience at that time? You testified about Moses Finklestein's Communist study group and Rosinger was a member of that. Can you tell us anything further?

Mr. WITTFOGEL. I don't remember whether it was a permanent group. It was an institution. I was invited a very few times. I met Rosinger there and he was treated as a Communist and spoken of as a Communist by Finklestein. And afterward I met Rosinger a number of times and up to my formal break he was a very friendly man.

Mr. MORRIS. I introduce that in the record because Mr. Holland has said that Mr. Wittfogel has testified that Rosinger was a Communist from Rosinger's writings.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I am sure at a later stage in Dr. Wittfogel's remarks he did discuss Mr. Rosinger's writings. Specifically he said he had taken part in helping some people in Seattle and sent a memorandum to the executive secretary of the American IPR protesting against some of Mr. Rosinger's writings, or rather, protesting against his being engaged.

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If I may add one more point because I have taken the trouble to have this compiled, Mr. Rosinger's book China's Wartime Politics was described in the United States Quarterly Book List published by the Library of Congress as "One of the few dispassionate accounts of current Chinese politics to appear in English in recent years."

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read that book list?

Mr. HOLLAND. The quarterly book list?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have read the list. I have not seen this particular review. This is being compiled by my staff. I am willing to leave it out if you wish.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, I don't want to interrupt your line of questioning, but are we getting close to a recess?

Mr. MORRIS. I think so. On the question of the grants, who received the grants, I think I can put that off until a later time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one matter that will take a few minutes if the chairman will permit. I would like to close it up at this morning's session. It jumps quite a ways from anything we have discussed before.

I have here, which I will hand you in a moment, a clipping from the Washington Post of February 10, 1951, being an Associated Press story—that was the time of the subpenaing before this committee of the records of the IPR—and I call your attention to the two marked paragraphs which I will now read:

As for the subcommittee's seeing the files, Holland said "We have no objection to their being seen by any properly accredited agency provided they are used fairly and nothing is quoted out of context."

He said the IPR voluntarily opened all its files to the FBI last summer when McCarthy's charges were first made. He said an FBI team spent several weeks examining them.

I would like to ask you, sir, if you would examine that news story and tell the committee if it reports in substantially accurate fashion what you said to the newspaper men at that time.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it does.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold here in my hand, and I will show you this in a moment, a press release headed:

For immediate release, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, Telephone Eldorado 5-1759, Statement of IPR Secretary General on Seizure of Institute's Back Files.

I want to read from that, but first I will ask you if that is a press release which you issued. The first page is all I will ask you to identify. That is all I will read from at this time.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I identify this.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to read from it.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just check the date? I am afraid it is not given.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read the first page?

Mr. HOLLAND (reading):

Statement of IPR secretary general on Seizure of the Institute's Back Files—

dated 2/9/50. That is February 9, 1950.

Commenting on the statement of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee investigating un-American activities—

I am afraid I didn't have the title exact then.

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Senator SMITH. Was that 1950 or 1951?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is obviously a mistake, Mr. Chairman. It refers to this year—

* * * that it had subpenaed "several thousand documents belonging to the IPR," Mr. William L. Holland, secretary general of the Institute stated today that these documents consisted of old correspondence files mostly relating to the years 1925 to 1945. He denied that these files had "recently been transferred" from New York, but said that they were moved during the summer of 1949 in order to make space in the Institute's overcrowded files at its New York office. To avoid storage charges, the Institute, he said, asked Mr. Edward C. Carter, the former secretary general of the Institute from 1933 to 1946, to store them in the barn belonging to his summer home in Lee, Mass.

Holland stated that the contents of these files had been well known to the FBI since the summer of 1950 at which time he and Mr. Clayton Lane, then an executive of the American IPR, wrote Mr. J. Edgar Hoover inviting the FBI to make a thorough investigation of all the IPR files and records both in New York and in Lee. Holland said that he and Mr. Lane took this action because the IPR's work has always been open in the matter of public record. During subsequent weeks. a group of FBI agents made a thorough search of all the IPR files and were given full permission to copy or photostat any material they wished to reproduce.

Holland said that the institute's officers had no objection to making these files of the institute available to any accredited United States agency, but said he felt the Senate subcommittee should have served the subpena on the institute's officers who are the proper custodians.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you, sir, again, if that is a press release which you issued?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are the statements therein true?

Mr. HOLLAND. They were true, to the best of my belief and conviction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now believe them to have been true at the time they were made?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated that the files had recently been transferred from New York, or rather you denied that the files had been transferred from New York but said they were moved during the summer of 1949 in order to make space in the institute's overcrowded files at its New York office.

Senator O'CONOR. Will you answer audibly so the reporter can get it?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is the statement in my press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement necessarily implies, does it not, that the files were moved out of the institute's New York office and up to Lee, Mass.?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; it does, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what actually happened?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. If I may explain the exact circumstances, I will be glad to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were moved to Lee directly?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; not directly but first to a warehouse in the Bronx where some older files had also been stored for a time. These, in turn, were put together and put on a truck and sent to Lee.

Mr. MORRIS. What warehouse was that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry; I don't recall it. I gave the name to the FBI. I know we have a record.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a commercial warehouse where you rented space?

Mr. HOLLAND. The reason was this, Mr. Chairman: that warehouse, I understand, had stored a great deal of bulky goods for Russian war relief during the war and thus was known to Mr. Edward C. Carter. When we were looking for a place to put some of our old files when we moved from our previous office in 1943—I think it was at 129 East Fifty-second Street—Mr. Carter spoke to the manager of this warehouse who agreed that since they had so much business through Mr. Carter, they would give us free storage for this relatively small amount of stuff.

Mr. MORRIS. What kind of business had they from Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. He was president of Russian War Relief. They had thousands of tons of clothing they were shipping to Russia.

So this material in 1943 was sent to this warehouse. In 1948, rather. We had two floors in our present building. But for reasons of financial retrenchment we decided to give up one and consolidate on one. That meant there was a problem of excessive overcrowding of files. So, therefore, we said, "Why don't we move some of our back files here," and at the same time or approximately that time, the manager of the warehouse said "I am sorry, I have got a lot of business now and I don't believe I can go on giving you free storage."

So we decided we would have to put them somewhere else.

At this stage, Mr. Carter said, "Why not—since we are not going to be using them, and I will probably want to consult them in writing my memoirs and looking over the stuff for the proposed history of the IPR—send them up to my barn?" His barn, by the way, is not a barn in the ordinary sense of the word. It has been renovated and consists of offices and a library and a regular study room.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has all the usual appurtenances of a barn, does it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say it is anything but typical of a barn. It is made over to look like an office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have they removed the manure chute?

Mr. HOLLAND. I'm not sure. I didn't examine it the last time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean your reference to that manure chute was without knowledge as to whether there was one?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do know there was a pile at the back of the barn. Whether the chute is there, I cannot say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. Somewhere in the summer—I don't recall the exact month—the old files already in the Bronx warehouse together with some of the files in our present office were put on a truck and sent up to Mr. Carter's place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this your testimony: The movement was from the Institute of Pacific Relations' overcrowded office in New York to the warehouse and almost immediately thereafter up to Lee?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator SMITH. How long did they stay in the warehouse?

Mr. HOLLAND. You mean at this immediate period?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't say. It was a short time. It was just a matter of getting a truck to take them up. I could find out, I am sure. It may have been the same truck that took the stuff

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from our office, went up to the Bronx, loaded the stuff on and took it to Lee.

Senator SMITH. When they were moved from the warehouse in the Bronx to Lee, Mass., did that take place about the time a rumor got out that this committee was looking for those files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure when the rumor was.

Senator SMITH. Did you not know some days before?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, very definitely. This was the middle of 1949, to the best of my recollection. These rumors you speak of—at least the talks about leaks from the files which, I suppose, is what you mean—they came shortly before the actual seizure which was February 1951. This was the middle of 1949. They went up to Lee. They remained there untouched certainly, because Mr. Carter had no time to look at them.

When Senator McCarthy began making his charges about Mr. Lattimore and the IPR in 1950, then Mr. Lane, who was then the executive secretary of the American IPR, after talking to me, invited the FBI to come and make a search.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the second point in this statement. May I question you about that? Before we do that, I want to sum up and be sure I understand your testimony.

These files were at either your own office, in the warehouse of which you speak, or at Lee, Mass., or en route from one of those places to the other?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge, they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not out of your custody and control at any time?

Mr. HOLLAND. The files in the warehouse, as far as I know, were untouched. I was not responsible for having moved them.

Mr. SOURWINE. With your knowledge and consent they were not out of your control?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. How long were the records in the warehouse with the Russian War Relief goods?

Mr. HOLLAND. From some time in 1943 to the middle of 1949.

Senator SMITH. Did you check them during that time?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether any records that have not been produced here of the IPR were packed with goods going to Russia and shipped to Russia?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, Senator Smith, I am sure this is not true because the reason we could store the things free was because all the stuff had gone, and, therefore, the warehouse was empty.

Senator SMITH. All the Russian war relief goods had gone. I thought you said they were there.

Mr. HOLLAND. This warehouse had a great deal of business. The stuff had all been shipped as far as I know.

I must say I am not speaking from direct knowledge because it was Mr. Carter who handled those things.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may go back to the statement which you have repeated here in different words but which, in the press release, was set forth:

Holland stated the contents of these files have been well known to the FBI since the Summer of 1950 at which time Mr. Clayton Lane, executive secretary

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of the IPR, wrote Mr. J. Edgar Hoover inviting the FBI to make a thorough investigation of all the IPR files and records both in New York and in Lee.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did make such an offer?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. You say "you." Mr. Clayton Lane actually made it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant you and Mr. Clayton Lane.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that offer made in good faith?

Mr. HOLLAND. It certainly was.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the last part you have this sentence:

During subsequent weeks a group of FBI agents made a thorough search of all of the IPR files and were given full permission to copy or photostat any material they wished to reproduce.

Was that a correct statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it was a correct statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made available to the FBI at that time all of your files, that is, the ones in your office, the ones in the warehouse and the ones at Lee, Mass.?

Mr. HOLLAND. We did. The way it was done was this way: We notified the FBI of our wish to have them come and look. They learned from us some were in Lee. They asked if they might go there. Mr. Carter provided them with the key to the barn. They worked there for something like 3 weeks, a team of them. He provided them with a heater to keep warm because it got cold up there. They took out several hundred documents which they thought were pertinent.

Mr. SOURWINE. They had access not only to your files at Lee but to all your other files?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of course. Another team worked for many weeks in our office in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made available to the FBI all the files you had? You did not hold out anything?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, did the Institute of Pacific Relations, your international organization, or any part of your organization, have any activities in any of the European countries other than Russia?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, indeed. We had one of the constituent national councils in England, another in France, and another in Holland.

Senator SMITH. In any of the Central European countries?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. The basis for membership is either the country is in the Pacific area or the Far East or has possessions there.

Senator SMITH. So your group had no work in any of the Central European countries?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. I believe you said you had a conference in Delhi, India?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any work done by your association in Mongolia or China?

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Mr. HOLLAND. There was never any branch in Mongolia, which you know is an inaccessible sort of country. In China, we had from the beginning an active branch. The Chinese are one of the charter members. The China council continued in operation up until quite recently, I think 1949 or '50.

Senator SMITH. Did any of your representatives or officials or interested members travel in Mongolia and do any work of any sort there?

Mr. HOLLAND. Only one, to my knowledge, Mr. Lattimore, but I am certain that—if we are speaking about Inner Mongolia, yes. He did travel there while working part time as an editor of our magazine. I don't believe he traveled through Outer Mongolia, the Russian satellite state. Certainly he did not travel there while working for the Institute of Pacific Relations. He visited over there with Vice President Wallace.

Senator SMITH. What about Mr. Carter? Did he travel through?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Carter has traveled across the trans-Siberian railway but never been to Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to be sure I understand you correctly so I can close this matter in my own mind as well as in the record.

Is it your intent to testify here that at the time you issued this press release in February—I believe February 9 of this year—you had already given the FBI access to and they had examined all of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can certainly say that the first part of your statement is correct. We had given them access. I personally did not see whether they literally went through every folder.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean that as a catch question.

Mr. HOLLAND. There is one important point, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to give you a full picture. Mr. Sourwine has not asked me the question, but I think it is only fair to say that this is what I have told the FBI: a few days later—I think it was 3 days later—Mr. Field came to my office on a Saturday morning and said——

Mr. SOURWINE. You finally figured out what I was driving at.

Mr. HOLLAND. I was not sure until you asked me about the date.

I wish to tell you frankly that Mr. Field came to my office and said:

I don't know whether you know it, but ever since 1941 or 1943 there have been some old files of the IPR sitting in my cellar. There were a number of old vouchers and accounts which were sent down there in 1941 or 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did Mr. Field have in the institute at that time?

Senator O'CONOR. I do think he ought to complete the answer now.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Field said:

I have absolutely forgotten all about these until I read the news about this seizure. Then I looked through my own files because I was naturally curious to know what in the files there might be that would affect me. I found, along with a number of my own personal files in the cellar, several cartons—I think 20 or 24—of old Institute of Pacific Relations files.

I was considerably upset about this, and said, "Well, I hate to learn this now, but it seems to me the only thing to do is to bring them up to the IPR." This I did. They are still there in the IPR offices and I have asked the FBI to examine them, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were they integrated?

Mr. HOLLAND. They have not been integrated.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Are they included in the files you have made available to representatives of this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. They are right there in the office. I am glad to make them available at any time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have they before now been pointed out?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you tell the FBI about these files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I should think about 2 weeks ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that square up with all the other answers you have been giving here today?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it does, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator O'CONOR. Is there any explanation why the FBI was not notified until 2 weeks ago of the existence of the additional files that Mr. Field had when they had been notified of course, long since, of the existence of the others?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. What is the explanation?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is something I am somewhat concerned about. The simple reason is I looked them over hastily myself by opening the tops of the cartons. As far as I could see, there were a lot of old vouchers of paid bills there. It was only 2 weeks ago when someone else on my staff—I have forgotten who it was—asked: "Where are we going to put these?" To maintain our record of frankness with the FBI, I should at least tell them that these are here and ask them if they would come up. Mr. Guiliano, one of the agents of the FBI, who had looked through the previous file, came up with two or three of his men and went through all of them. They took out a few letters, memoranda, and some bills. I noticed one of the things he took out was a check paid to Mr. Stanley Hornbeck of the State Department with travel expenses to one of our meetings and a few other things, took them away and I presume photostated them and returned them to me a few days alter.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many cases or boxes of files are in that category?

Mr. HOLLAND. These are in cartons. Approximately, I should think, 16 to 20. I haven't actually counted them.

Mr. SOURWINE. With 16 or 20 cartons of papers and correspondence, bills and receipts, perhaps other memoranda and documents which had not been shown to the FBI in February or indeed until some 2 weeks ago, do you think it is a fair statement to say all of the files had been made available to the FBI?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I do, for this reason: I am convinced from my looking at the thing and my subsequent looking over the stuff, that the FBI took out, this is practically all duplication of what was in our files. It was our practice to send carbon copies of our things to a number of people. There are a great deal of duplications. If you were to look in our San Francisco office you would find many more. We don't have a San Francisco branch, so technically I made all the files available to the FBI. There are some in Honolulu and San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. These were in your New York office and they were duplicates and that is why the FBI had all the files?

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Mr. HOLLAND. The reason was the one which I gave before: That I had looked at these and considered there was nothing there of importance.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was on that basis you testify today the FBI had all the files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't get your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are testifying today that the FBI had been given all the files. That was based, you said, did you not, on your own opinion that the material and these 16 or 20 cartons duplicated matter which had already been made available to the FBI?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please restate it in your own language.

Mr. HOLLAND. The point is at the time you were asking me about this press release, when I made that answer that was my honest conviction.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified this morning that it was the truth and that you still believed it to be the truth. You testified this morning without regard to the press release, except as background, that the FBI had been given all of the files of the institute, had been given access to them.

You think that was an accurate statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it is an accurate statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why do you think so?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because, first of all, I was answering the question of the press release at the time. That was a true statement then. I have subsequently, on my own initiative, volunteered this information which makes it completely true, that the FBI has seen all the files.

Senator SMITH. That is not the point as I understand Mr. Sourwine's question. The point he is making, this morning when you testified that everything had been turned over that was a true statement. So far as we knew, it was not a true statement. I never heard, and I don't suppose a good many of us have heard about these additional files.

Why did you testify this morning when your statement, when made, was a true statement and still was a true statement that the FBI had all the files?

Mr. HOLLAND. Your question was: my statement when made was a true statement. That is, I consider true. I came down here perfectly expecting this question to be asked. That is why, when I finally got the idea of what Mr. Sourwine was getting at about the date that I volunteered the information. This is a true statement of the facts. When I issued that release, that was a true statement, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean at that time the files were still in Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir, they were, because it was a day or two later——

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know it?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had any other files been moved out of Mr. Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge.

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Mr. SOURWINE. These 16 cartons are the only files of the institute which ever were in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't know, but to the best of my knowledge, that is true. I did not have anything to do with moving of those files. I can only report what happened, to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to these files, I believe you testified they had been in Mr. Field's basement since 1943 or thereabouts.

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe so. It was 1941 or 1943. I'm not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still say it is your opinion that these files are duplicates of material already made available to the FBI?

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot say they are all duplicates, because I have not been through them all myself. I do know from looking at a few of them they are duplicates.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did I understand you correctly when you said a moment ago that the reason you did not call them to the attention of the FBI was because you thought they were duplicates?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it was not just that. I didn't say that.

My first statement was that I looked these over. From looking in the tops of the cartons I could see that nearly all of them were old vouchers and bills. I, therefore, really felt there was no significant material in them. It was only more recently when someone on my staff asked about moving them that I thought, just to make our record complete, I should at least tell the FBI about these and have them look at them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You noticed, did you not, they were not, as a matter of fact, duplicates?

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot say.

Mr. SOURWINE. You should know that from the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, according to your testimony, has taken certain items out to have them photostated and have them returned to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. This is obviously true of the vouchers, but whether they have found any correspondence which is not duplicates, I cannot say, because I don't know what they took.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask two more questions, if I may.

Was it your intention to tell this committee or its representatives about these files?

Mr. HOLLAND. It was my intention to show these files to Mr. Morris, because, as you may recall, Mr. Morris, you told me that tomorrow you hoped to come up and make a further examination.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you form the intention to tell us about them?

Mr. HOLLAND. At the time when the FBI people came to look them over. It was when they picked out a few things which they indicated they wanted to look at that it was clear to me that there conceivably was material here of substance which the subcommittee should see.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not consciously withholding the information from this committee or its representatives that these files existed?

Mr. HOLLAND. Certainly not. I want to make this final statement: I have made a very conscious effort throughout the whole of this business and with some considerable effort, and at times embarrassment, to play fair with this committee to show where our files are, to volunteer information to Mr. Morris and his staff. This has been the line we have taken all along. I am sorry that I did not call the FBI to

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look at this material immediately at the time. I ask you to believe what a whirlwind of work and activity I have been going through. I am the only senior executive officer at the present time.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, one question there, because I am sure the committee does not want to be unfair to you.

As I understand you to answer Mr. Sourwine, Mr. Field acquainted you with the fact just 2 or 3 days after seizure?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator SMITH. That there were these files in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. That was about when?

Mr. HOLLAND. It was on a Saturday about 3 or 4 days later than the seizure.

Senator SMITH. That was along in last January or February?

Mr. HOLLAND. The seizure was on February 8. My release was next day, February 9.

Senator SMITH. So you are saying about the 12th or 15th of February you knew that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You had from the 12th or the 15th up to now?

Mr. HOLLAND. Two weeks ago.

Senator SMITH. And you have been here before this committee and have never, until now, volunteered to us the story about the extra files that Mr. Field had in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Why didn't you disclose to us months ago when you learned of these additional files that you did have them?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because, Senator, I looked at this material, saw that it was old vouchers. There are other vouchers and old boxes in our office yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you had not looked at it until a couple of weeks ago.

Mr. HOLLAND. You are wrong. I did, as I indicated, look hastily in the tops of the cartons at the time when the stuff was brought up. It seemed to me that this was, as far as I could see, old files.

I would be the first to admit, Senator Smith, if I had been alert I should have notified the counsel immediately at that time. I had no intention of concealing it.

The fact is this material had been in our office. Mr. Morris has not asked me to just indicate this or that folder. If he goes through our files—he was coming up tomorrow literally fishing for whatever he could find. He was, I am sure, going to look in any other parts of the office when he got around to it.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask this further question: Where else are there files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. Today?

Senator SMITH. Today. You said in San Francisco just now, I believe.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, when you say "of the IPR," I meant in previous years we had branch offices in San Francisco, in Seattle, and in Honolulu.

Senator SMITH. Are their files there?

Mr. HOLLAND. These branches were independent. I have no direct knowledge of where they are.

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Some of them may be in San Francisco. In San Francisco, for instance, the IPR was dissolved some years ago and now taken over by the Northern California Council of World Affairs.

Senator SMITH. Who has control of those files?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, I don't know. We did not have control of those outside offices. They operated independently.

I am sure there are some files today in Honolulu because that was the origin of the IPR. Mr. Loomis, the executive secretary, no doubt has them.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any more files at your home?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. Does Mr. Field have any more in his home?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge.

Senator SMITH. Does Mr. Carter have any?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure, Senator. I think it is quite possible Mr. Carter has some, again, duplicates of things which he has kept for his own memoirs.

Senator SMITH. They might be, in your eyes, duplicates and not duplicates in the eyes of the committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. I agree. I cannot say for sure about Mr. Carter.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we ought to ask Mr. Carter and maybe some of these other people under oath as to any other files that they may have that we ought to have.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I continue with a few points on this at the next session?

Senator O'CONOR. I do think you can after recess.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you made a great point of the fact that Mr. Field resigned as secretary in 1940.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I didn't make a point of it; I just reported.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were files put in his basement in 1941 or 1943?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't know the answer, Mr. Chairman. I was not, at that time, in the IPR. It is a fact that Mr. Field remained a trustee and a member of the executive committee of the American IPR. I am sure there are people in the office who can probably remember why that was done.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you endeavor, during the recess, to find out what other files were put in Mr. Field's home, other than the ones you have just described, the 16 or 20 boxes, after 1940 when Field resigned as secretary?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I would certainly try. I can only ask if anybody in my office remembers what was sent there.

Mr. Field may have had other things.

Senator SMITH. He has not got any of them with him.

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't know.

Senator O'CONOR. The committee will stand in recess for 1 hour.

(Whereupon, at 1:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:40 p. m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The hearing reconvened at 2:40 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

Senator SMITH (presiding). We will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to say for the record in case there was any misconception about it that there was no intention on my part this

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morning, nor, I am sure, on the part of the committee, in asking about the meeting Mr. Holland held this morning with certain members of the press, to imply in any way that there was anything wrong about reporters going to that conference or to such a conference.

As a matter of fact, the committee, of course, understands that when a reporter is asked to attend a conference at which he has reason to believe some news may be produced or released, it is his duty to attend; it is part of his job, and it might be pointed out that the committee has no reason to question that news coverage by any of the news services or newspapers mentioned has been anything but fair and objective.

Before you start, Mr. Morris, the line of questioning that you have before this afternoon, I would like to wind up one last thread with regard to the matter we were talking about at the conclusion of this morning's session.

Did I understand you correctly, Mr. Holland, that these files which had been in Mr. Field's basement came back to you, that is, back to the offices of the Institute of Pacific Relations on approximately the 12th of February, some 3 or 4 days after you had issued your press release of February 9?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true. I think it was February 12. It was a Monday morning, because I went down myself over the Saturday and Sunday and got myself filthy putting these dusty files into cartons.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not in cartons in the basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. They were sitting there in old transfer cases too bulky for me to carry upstairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. You actually put them in the cartons and then moved the cartons?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So at that time you issued your press release of February 9 you did not know the existence of these files in the basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I did not. It was a great bombshell to me when Mr. Fields came in the following Saturday and told me.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been able to ascertain what other files Mr. Fields kept in his home?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I telephoned during the lunch hour and so far as my staff know there were no other files.

I can actually give you a much more precise statement of when things were moved there, and, if you wish, or if you prefer, I will put that in a memorandum, just as you wish, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I gave this very precisely to the FBI and I am glad to give it to the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to find out whether there were other files of the institute put down in Mr. Field's basement, or where ever they were, subsequent to 1940 when he resigned as secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. HOLLAND. Let me give you the story because I know it quite clear.

I think it will take just 5 or 6 minutes, Senator.

As indicated, the reason for all this moving of files was in 1943 when the institute decided to move from its old offices at 159 East Fifty-Second Street, to its new and present office in 1 East Fifty-

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fourth Street—there are two organizations, the International IPR and the American IPR, both separate, but both using the same offices—in 1943 the old American IPR files from about 1927, the beginning, right up to 1942—in other words, all except the current files which they needed—were moved to Mr. Field's cellar.

Mr. MORRIS. All of them were put there?

Mr. HOLLAND. All the IPR stuff at that time was sent to Mr. Field's cellar.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is somewhat different from what you told us this morning.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. This now is in 1942?

Mr. HOLLAND. 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. And this is a time when Field is no longer secretary?

Mr. HOLLAND. Field was a member of the executive committee, but had resigned from the secretaryship a few years before.

At the same date all the opened files of the International IPR, namely, from 1925 right up to 1943, were sent to our new office, which was of the International IPR, which was on the fourth floor of our present building, namely, East Fifty-Fourth Street.

The American IPR had the fifth floor. They only took over what current files they needed, whereas the Pacific Council, which was separate, at that time brought all its files.

Now, that was the situation until 1947. In '47 while I and most of the international senior officers were away at a conference in England——

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, you say that was the situation until 1947. I take it by that you mean that from 1943 until 1947 all of the files of the American Council of IPR which you had felt you get along without and which had in 1943 been moved to Mr. Field's basement, remained there in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Where was his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is in his home somewhere on West Twelfth Street. I forget the exact number.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people in the institute knew these files were there?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't say. Of my present staff I would say that probably—I think only two people.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the board of trustees? Did they know?

Mr. HOLLAND. I really cannot say. I am sure that some former employees must have known because certainly there was nothing surprising about it then.

As I understand it, the reason Mr. Field offered was simply because he had been secretary, was still active on the executive committee, and he offered them the free storage there, but I must say this: I had no direct information about this.

I am only reporting what I have learned.

Mr. MORRIS. But the fact here is that Mr. Field at that time was an open contributor to the Daily Worker and therefore an open Communist, and was it not of some concern to the institute that all their files were in his basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. So far as I know no such concern was expressed, but, as I say, I cannot speak from direct knowledge then, because the Inter-

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national IPR which I was connected with brought all its files over and we were not involved in that.

Mr. Carter at this time was in the International also.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter knew they were there, did he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't say for sure, Senator, because he was also, like me, in the International IPR and I don't know whether he had anything to do with the arrangement to send them to Mr. Field.

At that time in 1943 I believe the Secretary of the IPR was Mr. William Lockwood, now at Princeton University.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know they were there?

Mr. HOLLAND. I learned they were there, I think in 1949, as you will see if you will allow me to finish my statement of what actually happened. May I go on?

Senator SMITH. Yes; go ahead.

Mr. HOLLAND. As I said, that was the situation until 1947. Then sometime in the fall of 1947 while I was away and Mr. Carter and several of the international officers were away in England at a conference, it was decided, because we knew our budget for next year was going to be cut, to consolidate the two floors in our present office. This meant that the International IPR on the fourth floor decided to move upstairs to the slightly larger office on the fifth.

That meant that we had to do something about our files and also our furniture. It was for this reason, I find upon talking on the phone, that all the files from 1925 up to that date, namely, up to 1945, everything prior to my tenure, of the International IPR, was sent to this warehouse in the Bronx, together with a lot of our furniture, and this was apparently the chief reason for sending it to a warehouse.

We had so much furniture and stuff besides files. This takes care of 1947, so that now you have the situation that the International IPR's files, the old files, are up in the Bronx warehouse.

The old files of the American IPR are still in Mr. Field's cellar.

Now, in 1949, the warehouseman told us that we would have to take our stuff out or else start paying storage fees. So we decided that we would ship it up to Mr. Carter's, but, at the same time, they decided that since there was a great deal of historical material in the old American IPR files, namely, Mr. Field's cellar, they should take that, too, so what happened was that a truck was sent down to Mr. Field's place, and they took the old files from there with one exception, which I will explain in a moment, sent the truck up to the warehouse, loaded all the old International files there on a truck; disposed of the furniture, and sent all those files up to Lee, so that therefore, you had sent up to Lee the old International files from 1925 to 1945, and most of the old American IPR files from 1927 to 1943.

Now, the exception is that in going through these files in Mr. Field's cellar, the girls—I don't know who they were, junior typists, and so on—they went down and saw there were several cartons—I mean transfer cases—there of old vouchers and of stuff that looked like duplicates and which seemed to have no value whatever for historical purposes.

This was left behind in Mr. Field's cellar, and I believe the idea was that it should be just thrown away. It was, therefore, a complete accident that this stuff which should have been thrown away lay there and whether Mr. Field was supposed to get rid of it, or somebody else,

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is not clear, but in any case, it was forgotten about and it was only when this seizure of the files took place in February 1951 that Mr. Field in the process of going down to his cellar to look at his own personal records there, saw this stack of stuff and immediately notified me.

I think that is as accurate an account as I can give of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did not learn that those files were in there, in Mr. Field's cellar, until 1949?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did learn it in 1949?

Mr. HOLLAND. I say I must have heard it then. I do not recall it.

The only thing which brought it back to my memory was this bombshell of Mr. Field coming in and telling me, but I am sure I must have heard it talked about because I remember vaguely the circumstances of sending the stuff out.

Mr. SOURWINE. But what Mr. Field did just a few weeks ago——

Mr. HOLLAND. In February, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Then you recalled the circumstances of——

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; but I did not recall all the steps which I have outlined here because that has only been given to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us why you testified this morning that the 16 cartons were the only files that had ever been in Mr. Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because this is what I considered to be a fair statement of the case.

In other words, the files in Lee and the files which I learned were in Mr. Field's cellar comprised the whole of the IPR files so far as I know.

This precise step I learned about by telephoning at lunch time.

Mr. SOURWINE. In fairness to you, in view of the fact that you have testified that at the time you issued your February 9 press release, you did not know that these other files existed?

Mr. HOLLAND. These remaining files which Mr. Field told me about?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you to say whether if you had at the time you had issued the press release known they existed, would you still have said in the press release that all of the IPR files had been made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. HOLLAND. My honest answer is I think I probably would have because I am afraid I was acting with some indignation at this moment and I felt in any reasonable sense of the word we had shown the FBI all our files, but as I indicated this morning, later on when, as I said, 2 weeks ago—actually I found the date was about September 14—that one of the girls in the office asked me, "Well, where do you want all these cartons put?" that I recognized to be literally true, and to be literally in accordance with the line we had been taking of showing the FBI everything, that I should ask them to come and look at it, which they did, and I find they actually came and inspected on September 20.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you if this I hand you is a press release which you issued?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; it is.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look at the last page and tell me the date on which it was issued?

Mr. HOLLAND. This says February 16, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you any question that that is the date when it was issued?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I believe it is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. That contains this paragraph on the first page of the release:

A wholly misleading impression has been created by some recent press reports to the effect that Senator McCarthy "supplied a tip" which led to the seizure of certain IPR correspondence files by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee investigating un-American activities. I therefore wish to point out again that there was never any secret or mystery about the presence of these files at the house of Mr. Edward C. Carter (former secretary general of the IPR) in Lee, Mass. The location and contents of these files were known not only to several IPR officers and staff members but also to a group of at least a dozen FBI agents, who at the explicit invitation of the institute's executive officers studied the IPR files and financial records in Lee, and also in New York, for a period of 6 or 7 weeks during April, May, and June, 1950. The agents were freely authorized by the IPR officers and by Mr. Carter himself to make notes or copies of any materials they considered of interest, and did so. They also had numerous discussions with present and past officers or staff members of the institute to elucidate questions arising out of the correspondence files.

All these facts were made known at the time to the trustees of the IPR; and, in a letter published in the May 29, 1950, issue of Newsweek, Mr. Clayton Lane, then executive secretary of the American IPR, stated that "The FBI has inspected the institute's files thoroughly on my invitation."

I ask you was that statement to the best of your knowledge and belief accurate at the time it was made?

Mr. HOLLAND. I consider it was accurate for the reason that I mentioned this morning: that, as far as I know, even though I had been told of this stuff in Mr. Field's files, from my cursory look at the cartons I had no reason to believe that the FBI had not seen all the files.

Senator EASTLAND. You said you believed it was accurate. In reality, was it accurate?

The question was not whether you believed. Was it accurate?

Mr. HOLLAND. I consider it was accurate, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. This statement includes two sentences I would like to ask you about. This sentence—the quotes are mine—says:

They also had numerous discussions with present and past officers or staff members of the institute to elucidate questions arising out of the correspondence files.

"They" obviously refers to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether in the course of any of those discussions the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was called to any of the files that were in Mr. Field's basement, or that had been in Mr. Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not know for sure. I do believe that in discussing how the files got to Lee the FBI was told, as I have indicated here, they previously had been stored there from 1943 to 1947.

What the FBI, I think, was not told was that part of them had been left behind.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you could not have told the FBI about it at that time because, according to your testimony here, you did not know it at that time.

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Mr. HOLLAND. I do not get your question, Mr. Sourwine. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time that the FBI——

Mr. HOLLAND. That was 1950, of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. You could not have told them about the files in the basement because you did not know about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. You keep saying "the files in the basement." You mean the stuff that was left behind?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that is right, the 16 to 20 cartons.

Mr. HOLLAND. These conversations with the FBI in 1950 were not concerned primarily with how the files got there. What they wanted to know was what did Mr. Lattimore mean when he wrote this letter, or who was he writing to. It was chiefly Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. You state in the release that all these facts were made known at the time to the trustees of the IPR.

Can you tell us whether the trustees of the IPR were at the time apprised of the fact that files were in or had been in Mr. Field's basement?

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot remember that because Mr. Clayton Lane was then the executive secretary of the American IPR and the one who reported it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the files ever authorized to be placed in Mr. Field's basement by vote or direction of the trustees?

Mr. HOLLAND. That I cannot say. It was 1943, you see, and I am afraid I was not in the American IPR then. I don't know.

Senator Smith, may I add, with reference to the release there, what I think is a pertinent point?

I think you or Senator O'Conor was asking me about other IPR files in other places at the present time. As I indicated, I think it is very likely there are some in what used to be our San Francisco branch office, in our Seattle branch office, and in our Honolulu branch office.

One other point I think is very important to make here to give a full picture. I hope you will allow me to explain it clearly.

I have some serious doubt about whether the files when they were seized by your committee in February 1951 in Lee were complete. I say this because, as you yourself indicated, sir, there were some rumors in the press that there had been some mysterious leakages in the press, and I actually wrote a letter, I think, to Senator Ferguson, saying I was puzzled about this——

Senator EASTLAND. You say there was leakage to the press?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

The Washington Daily News and the New York Mirror published what they said were excerpts of these files. They did almost the day after.

Senator EASTLAND. They could not have gotten anything from the committee.

Mr. HOLLAND. That was exactly it.

Senator EASTLAND. They were 2 days getting down here and under Treasury guard.

Mr. HOLLAND. I didn't know that, and I was frankly puzzled and I therefore wrote a letter, I believe to Senator Ferguson, in which I rather protested about this, feeling that perhaps there had been some

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accidental leakage here, and he assured me to the best of his knowledge there was not.

That left me even more mystified.

Just recently, I think 3 or 4 weeks ago, I read a newspaper story in the New York Post which stated very precisely that several months before this subcommittee's seizure was made these files had been previously rifled by—I must quote what the story said—Senator McCarthy's agent, Mr. Surine; Mr. Schroeder, who was the man that made your seizure, and some local neighborhood farm boy up there, and this story said that these materials——

Mr. MORRIS. You say "this story." What do you mean?

Mr. HOLLAND. The New York Post reported that these were brought to New York and shown to Mr. J. B. Matthews of the Hearst press there, and that also Senator Mundt was told about them, and the story in the New York Post said that Senator Mundt advised that the material should be sent back to Lee and that this was done, and he also advised that your subcommittee should make the seizure and should serve the subpena duces tecum on the neighboring lady, Mrs. Markham.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote that story, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. A man called Mr. Shannon. I can't remember his name. Mr. W. Shannon, I think, of the New York Post.

I mention this, Mr. Chairman, only because it cleared up—at least, it seemed to be a possible explanation of something that had puzzled me very much as to how this leakage might have occurred.

I don't know whether they are the true facts or not, but I felt I ought to report it to you.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you a question.

From the evidence that has come out before this committee, has there been any single case of any document being offered here that was not genuine so far as you know?

Mr. HOLLAND. By your committee?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I have seen none; no.

Senator SMITH. If there was any tampering with any of those records, there was nothing put in there which would tend to falsify the particulars and then afterward presented to this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge; and perhaps I should say, when Senator Ferguson wrote assuring me that there would be no leakage from this committee so far as he knew, that made me more puzzled.

Mr. SMITH. Did you ever visit Mr. Carter's barn yourself?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I have been there many times over the years, because it was used as a place for weekly conferences or discussions on Far East affairs.

Senator EASTLAND. The barn?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. It was remodeled to have a meeting room and library. A barn is a misleading word for it.

Senator SMITH. How many times did you say you visited this barn? How many times after the records were carried there had you been there up to the time of the seizure?

Mr. HOLLAND. The records were carried there in 1949. Not very often. I should think pobably not more than two or three times.

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Senator SMITH. Had you had access to the records in the barn?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would have any time I wanted to, but I do not believe I ever opened them. I saw them standing there.

As you know, there were 60 cases or so.

Senator SMITH. If you had occasion to try to verify some statement you did have the right and privilege of going there and examining the files?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Who else besides yourself had that privilege?

Mr. HOLLAND. There was no rule about it, Senator, but I am sure if I had asked one of my staff to go there and look something up that Mr. Carter would have raised no question whatever.

Senator SMITH. So that a good many people had access to this barn and to these papers?

Mr. HOLLAND. They could have had access; I can't say they did.

As a matter of fact—I am sure this would be confirmed—no one did, because the simple fact was that Mr. Carter remained busy on other things and never did get started seriously on the work of writing——

Senator EASTLAND. Who had access to that barn in Mr. Carter's absence?

Mr. HOLLAND. Members of his family, certainly, because Mrs. Carter often stayed up there.

Senator EASTLAND. There was a caretaker there who had keys; was there not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No one was ever appointed as caretaker or designated by that. I think Mr. Carter testified here that this neighborly lady, Mrs. Markham, was given the key, as he explained, so that in case there was any emergency, particularly a fire, they could open the door. The chief purpose of giving her the keys, they were all on a ring covering the house and the barn and everything—they used to do their housecleaning.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever go in Mr. Field's basement yourself?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did on this one occasion when——

Senator SMITH. Except this one time.

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. That was the only time you ever went there?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. It was a very uninviting place.

Senator SMITH. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished examining on that statement, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we receive Mr. Holland's statement, reserving, however, the right to examine it. I know I have not had a chance to examine them, and you can imagine how unfair it would be.

Mr. HOLLAND. I very much appreciate Mr. Morris' suggestion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would concur in that, but I have not had an opportunity to examine this as it has only been in my hands about the last 20 minutes and I would, therefore, like to ask a couple of questions about it as a foundation for introducing it in the record.

This is in very good form and begins with what is titled "Introductory Statement by William L. Holland."

Did you write or introduce that statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I did.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Would the same be true with regard to all the rest of the statement, or was some of it prepared by others?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can indicate the parts which were specifically—to answer your question quickly, some parts of it were drafted by others and gone over by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. To aid the committee in evaluation of it, as you say, will you run through it and indicate?

Mr. HOLLAND. I dictated "My own role in the IPR."

I dictated "Some points not brought out by the McCarran subcommittee."

This consists largely of a description of the IPR and is practically a summary of what is in that pamphlet which was circulated this morning.

I just simply asked one of my assistants to go through the pamphlet and pick out the salient points.

The next section, "Who were 'associated' with the IPR," I prepared that myself, on page 10.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are two subheadings, one on page 7, "The international IPR," and one on page 9, "How the institute is financed."

Were those dictated by you?

Mr. HOLLAND. These were also summaries of that pamphlet.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prepared by someone else in your office?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Page 10, "Who were 'associated' with the IPR," I prepared that myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that page, sir, about the twelfth or thirteenth line from the bottom—it is in the fourth paragraph on the page—there is a name which has been stricken out. Can you tell us who that was whose name was stricken out?

Mr. HOLLAND. The name was Moses Finkelstein. It was pointed out to me rather late last night that it was rather erroneous. This is a category of people whom I said had nothing whatever to do with the institute, and then I said the following are examples, but in picking out the examples I find that I included practically all people who have been alleged to be Communists or spies, rather, it says there, "had numerous connections with various Communist agents, Soviet officials, and persons alleged to have transmitted official secrets to Communist couriers."

It was pointed out to me that it was not particularly true of Moses Finkelstein.

Mr. SOURWINE. You eliminated his name not because he was connected with the IPR, but you did not want to assert that he was in the category of those named?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is right.

The rest of that statement I prepared.

Page 12 is simply a list of the people who have ever served on the executive committee of the IPR and was compiled by my staff from my records.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it include all of such people?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, if you and Senator Eastland would like to have a copy of the statement, I would be glad to give you one.

Senator SMITH. If you have an extra copy.

Mr. MORRIS. On the third item of that you said:

Some points not brought out by the McCarran subcommittee.

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You said an assistant of yours aided you in the prepartion of that. Will you name that assistant?

That is the third item on page 6.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; Miss Miriam Farley, editor of the Far Eastern, but, as you can see from that whole text, it is chiefly an excerpt of this pamphlet I circulated this morning, Understanding Asia.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I had asked the question whether this list included all of the committee members during the period covered.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. This is an attempt to state every one who has ever served on the executive committee of the American IPR.

Page 14 is a list of 20 distinguished Americans active in the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that indicate that this earlier list of executive committee members may include some who did not actively participate?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it does not, and my purpose for including the members of the executive committee was because by definition—at least by my belief—if you are an executive or if you are on an executive committee, you are active in a real sense, whereas, if you are a trustee, you may be somewhat inactive.

The selection on page 14 is somewhat arbitrary, but I just picked out rather hurriedly a number of distinguished names that I could remember with their connections.

Page 16, "IPR publications and publication policies," I prepared myself.

On page 17, you will notice a partial list of anti-Communist writers in IPR publications.

Senator EASTLAND. In your judgment, was Mr. Frederick V. Field a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. My judgment, Senator Eastland, is that he was not a Communist up to 1940, at which time——

Senator EASTLAND. All right, is he a Communist today, in your judgment?

Mr. HOLLAND. My judgment on that is that I do not know that he is a Communist, but I feel that he is a 100-percent Communist sympathizer and supporter, and has been, probably since about 1947.

Senator EASTLAND. Let us say, not card-carrying member—but a Communist sympathizer and supporter. How many other Communist sympathizers and supporters are there in the IPR in the American section?

Mr. HOLLAND. Are you speaking of the organization today?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my belief and knowledge, none.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think Owen Lattimore is a Communist sympathizer?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not, sir. He is not on the staff of the IPR and has not been——

Senator EASTLAND. In the past 5 years how many Communist sympathizers and supporters were connected with the American section of the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. Past 5 years, 1945 or 1946. Again may I ask, Senator Eastland, you are speaking of the American IPR staff?

Senator EASTLAND. Connected with it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the Senator means by "connected." This word has been so loosely used

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that I am not sure what he means. I think I can give a little time and give my opinion so far as staff or employees are concerned.

Senator EASTLAND. I am at a loss to learn why so many Communists were connected with your organization and why action was not taken to put them out.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I cannot honestly say that I feel a large number or a large proportion of Communists were connected with the IPR. I do not deny that some may have been, or some secret Communists whom we don't know about, or didn't know about—you asked about what steps were taken.

The only case I can report is that, as you well know, Mr. Field in 1947 was asked by the trustees of the organization to resign, and I think that was based on the belief that whether he was a Communist member, he was a Communist sympathizer.

Senator SMITH. Your board of trustees asked Mr. Field to resign?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. In what year?

Mr. HOLLAND. Perhaps I should say—I think it was the executive committee.

Senator SMITH. And when was that?

Mr. HOLLAND. In 1947.

Senator SMITH. When was it that Mr. Field was allowed to take the records to his house, or they were sent there?

Mr. HOLLAND. 1943.

Senator EASTLAND. Some of those records were left there until 1949, were they not?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator EASTLAND. What about Joe Barnes? Do you have any reason to believe he was a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I do not.

I feel I can speak with some knowledge here because I do know Mr. Barnes.

Senator EASTLAND. You know that we have had five people who swore he was a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I have noticed that from the reports.

I don't know whether it is pertinent now, Mr. Chairman, but I do have with me a letter from Mr. Barnes in which he not only denies that charge, but does explain the actual facts about his connection with the IPR. I don't wish to introduce it if you don't want it.

Senator EASTLAND. He says he is not guilty.

Mr. HOLLAND. I see you do not want it, so I will not introduce it.

May I finish answering on Mr. Barnes? I said I do feel I do have some basis for knowledge here. I knew Mr. Barnes when he was a colleague in the IPR in 1934. I had not seen him very frequently from 1934 up to about 1947, but I read his writing in the Herald Tribune, and it seemed to me inconceivable that a man who wrote as he did about Russia, and who I know got in the bad graces of the Soviet censors, could be a Communist or Communist sympathizer.

Now, in the past 6 weeks I had occasion to talk to Mr. Barnes.

Senator SMITH. Would you tell us how you knew he got in the bad graces of the Soviet censors? Did Mr. Barnes tell you that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, he did. Not tell me directly, but he stated, I think, in his press release.

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Senator SMITH. That was the basis of your testimony there? That is all you knew about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You did not talk to the Soviet censors themselves?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I did not.

As I was just saying, I have also seen Mr. Barnes on a good many occasions during the past 2 months, and in fact, for about 2 or 3 weeks I stayed at his house in New York because I was moving from my apartment and I, therefore, had many occasions to hear his views and I just feel personally very strongly that not only is he not a Communist or Communist sympathizer, but it is almost inconceivable that he could be.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, you do not believe that Alger Hiss was a Communist or Communist sympathizer.

Mr. HOLLAND. I was never asked my opinion on that. If you ask me to answer that directly, I will.

Senator EASTLAND. Here is a list of 37 names connected with your organization who have been identified as Communists or under Communist discipline, and I would like to know how so many people that were generally known to be Communists would get places in that organization with you and the other officials not knowing anything about it, that is, if you were not going along with the Communists.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, may I begin by saying first that I do not accept the accuracy of the word "identification" as it has been stated here.

Senator EASTLAND. There has been testimony here under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I would stick to my statement on that. I have tried to answer by way of some very concrete facts in my statement in this section, "Who were 'associated' with the IPR," and I think you will see there what I think are very accurate statements about a number of these people.

Therefore, I do not accept the statement that an excessively or in any sense even an unusually large number of people in the Institute of Pacific Relations have been Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. How about Len De Caux? He was kicked out of the CIO as a Communist. He was a member of your board of trustees; was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not personally acquainted with Mr. Len De Caux, and I was not in the IPR when he was a trustee. I will only report that at that time the CIO was a very well-known and reputable union, that at that time Mr. Len De Caux was the international educational director of the CIO and it was therefore nothing very surprising that he should have been asked to be a trustee of an organization like this.

Senator EASTLAND. What about Israel Epstein?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am prepared to make a statement about Israel Epstein, if you wish, now.

Mr. Epstein is a case of someone who did contribute a publication on Chinese labor problems to the IPR. This may take perhaps 5 or 7 minutes, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. No; it is not worth it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not know that he is a Communist. I believe from his writings in the last 2 or 3 years that he is a certainly strong Communist sympathizer, but from the time I met him and commis-

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sioned him to write a report for us, which is 1943 in Chungking up to about 1948 or 1949, when he finally, after much delay finished this report, I had no evidence to suggest that he was a Communist, or anything more than a rather strong critic of the Chinese Nationalist regime.

After that time he showed himself rather clearly in his activities in New York to be a very strong pro-Communist sympathizer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you are aware of the time we examined Mr. Carter—you thought unfairly—on the question of a letter that he wrote in which he was urging the leaders of our Congress and the leaders of our State Department that they do everything possible to read Israel Epstein's book so that they might be swayed by it.

How do you reconcile that statement to what you have just said?

Mr. HOLLAND. I will answer first by saying that I did not make the statement, that is, that was Mr. Carter's statement, and, as far as I can see, it had no connection with Mr. Epstein's role in the IPR, what you just said. It was just one report. It started in 1943 and was completed about 1947.

If you would ask me my opinion, Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to give it.

Mr. MORRIS. We had this letter which was introduced into the record which was written by Mr. Carter in his official capacity as secretary general of the IPR in 1947——

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Morris, I was secretary general in 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. What role did he have then?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think he was executive officer of the American IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. He was telling of the extensive efforts that he was then making to get Epstein's book in the hands of the State Department and the leaders of the Eightieth Congress so that he could sway American policy along the lines of Israel Epstein's book.

I think I could get the letter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLLAND. I would rather have the letter because the last clause that the counsel has just said is misleading. I don't believe there was anything in the letter or testimony which indicated Mr. Carter was doing this in order to sway——

Senator SMITH. Why would he have been doing it?

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know traitor Harry Dexter White?

Mr. HOLLAND. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, if the Senator would state his question again?

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know traitor Harry Dexter White?

Mr. HOLLAND. I certainly cannot answer that question, Mr. Chairman, because I have no knowledge that Mr. White was a traitor.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know him?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I never met Mr. Harry White. I know he was invited to one IPR conference, but he did not come.

Senator EASTLAND. The information is that he was at the head of an espionage ring in Washington. That is true, is it not, in the Government in Washington?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no evidence which would make me believe——

Senator EASTLAND. You read that?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have read the story, but do not consider it at all convincing, but, Mr. Chairman, may I say the Senator said, "You know that is true, do you not?"

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I wish it to be understood that I do not know it is true.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, Harry Dexter White was an active supporter of the institute, was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman——

Senator EASTLAND. Look at me and answer my question.

Mr. HOLLAND. No, no.

Senator EASTLAND. What about William Mandel?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Mandel was employed to write one book for the IPR back about 1942 or 1943 on Soviet Central Asia.

Senator EASTLAND. Why was a Communist employed to write that book?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not know whether Mr. Mandel is a Communist. Certainly at the time we had no reason to believe that he was a Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Holland, do you not think that it is sinister? Here is an organization that attracts Communists from all over the country and they participate in it and the officials do not know that they are Communists. They do not know anything about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I will answer that by saying that the Senator's first remark is completely erroneous and misleading. There is no evidence whatever to suggest that the Institute of Pacific Relations attracted Communists from all over the country.

Senator EASTLAND. Here they are.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully submit that that is a gratuitous slander on a reputable organization.

Senator EASTLAND. There they are.

Mr. HOLLAND. They are mere allegations, many of which in my opinion——

Senator SMITH. They have been sworn to.

Mr. HOLLAND. These have been sworn statements by witnesses appearing before you. I do not believe that the evidence which they have given would stand up in the courts of this country.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think for a minute, Mr. Holland, that that was a conspiracy by a great number of people to come before this committee and to commit perjury against those people in order to injure the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not make any such statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, you do not. You really think that is true, but yet if they were not Communists——

Mr. HOLLAND. Senator Eastland is repeatedly putting words in my mouth. If he will ask me specific questions, I will answer them.

Senator SMITH. I do not believe you have allowed him to do that up to now.

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir; he certainly has not.

Mr. HOLLAND. Thank you, but I do not consider—this is my first time before any such committee, Mr. Chairman. If I speak too much, please tell me so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I get into this point about Israel Epstein?

Senator SMITH. Let me ask him one question.

I understood you to say just now that from what you had seen of Mr. Barnes and had talked to him in these recent months, you were not willing to say that he was Communist or Communist-dominated, or a Communist sympathizer.

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Mr. HOLLAND. Or even a Communist sympathizer; that is true.

Senator SMITH. That is the idea you got from your contacts with Mr. Barnes during the last few months?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. How long have you known Mr. Barnes?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have known Mr. Barnes since approximately 1931. I knew him fairly closely from 1931 to 1934, as a colleague in the office, and I certainly had that impression then.

I will tell you in all candor that I was somewhat curious in view of these allegations to see if there was anything in his present conversation which would give me any grounds for doubting my earlier opinion, and I did not find them.

Senator SMITH. If he had been a Communist in the past you would not expect him to talk like a Communist while this investigation was going on, would you?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; that is true. I would agree. I would not, no; but having known him previously as a close friend, I would think that it would be unlikely that he would start acting as if he were a new person.

Mr. MORRIS. You indicated that I did not state the case properly when I said the Institute of Pacific Relations was endeavoring to sway the opinion of the United States Government by Israel Epstein's book.

I would like to read from a letter which has been introduced in evidence as exhibit No. 116 from Mr. Carter.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Carter acknowledge writing that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, he did.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date, among others, by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department.

This is June 12, 1947 and they are the leaders of the Government at that time. They are the leaders of the Eightieth Congress and the leaders of the State Department.

You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China.

Then it goes on to say:

Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who would get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the forbidden list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Am-

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bassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand, and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madam Sun Yat-sen, and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

Now, if you concede, Mr. Holland, that Israel Epstein is a man who has Communist sympathies, would you not admit that Mr. Carter in his official capacity, whatever it was, in the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time was endeavoring to influence the course of our foreign relations at that time?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I would not make that admission. It is perfectly clear from the statement that Mr. Carter hoped that these officials would read the book, but it is also perfectly clear that Mr. Carter knows that high officials of this kind have to take into account thousands of other factors, and particularly the secret intelligence which they have at their disposal, before they can make up their minds, and to suggest that this one book by a man which Mr. Carter says himself is obviously somewhat biased would sway the opinion of these high government officials seems to me to be preposterous.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that book Communist propaganda?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry to say I have not read Mr. Epstein's book. I am willing to say on the basis of what has been indicated in Mr. Carter's letter that it certainly was sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; to the Chinese Communists; then, to plant that book in the hands of the Secretary of State and officials of the American Government was an attempt to influence them by Communist propaganda, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe I can accept that. It was not an attempt to plant a book. This was published and sold in thousands throughout this country.

Senator EASTLAND. If it was not the influence, then why was it given to them?

Mr. HOLLAND. For this very reason: To provide a lot of important facts which would enable General Marshall and these other people to know what they were going to be up against.

Senator EASTLAND. Important facts from the Communist viewpoint, were they not?

Mr. HOLLAND. A description of what was happening in China as reported by a pro-Communist writer.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that Mr. Carter could have expected that this book contained facts and information that was not readily available to the State Department with all of its resources for gathering information?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't know what was in his mind, but, as he indicated in the letter there, he says something about not having seen it put together in this way.

Senator EASTLAND. He gave them the book to influence them, did he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I did not write the letter. I cannot say what was in Mr. Carter's mind.

Senator EASTLAND. That is your judgment, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. As I indicated, I do not believe that is true.

Senator EASTLAND. That was bound to be the purpose.

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Mr. HOLLAND. I have already said I do not believe that to be the case.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not think he wanted to influence them?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I think he simply wanted them to see a number of facts.

Senator SMITH. Did you discuss with Mr. Carter who was to circulate this book among these men at that time?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; at the time I did not know they had done it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Senators have finished that line, perhaps we can get back and run through this statement and get on to other matters.

Senator SMITH. I have one question before I forget it.

I believe you told us that the files were put in Mr. Field's basement in 1943?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator SMITH. That was after Mr. Field had come to be known as a Communist, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't answer——

Senator SMITH. Well, the record will show.

Mr. HOLLAND. My own recollection is that Mr. Field became fairly generally recognized as a Communist because he wrote in the New Masses about 1945. I say that because I was out of this country in China through 1944 and 1945, but you may be more correct than I am.

Senator SMITH. Were you connected with the institute in 1940?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And Mr. Field resigned as secretary——

Mr. HOLLAND. In that year.

Senator SMITH. In 1940.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. So after he had resigned as secretary, 3 years after that, these files of the IPR were stored in his basement.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

As I indicated, he was still a member of the executive committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. We had, I think, reached page 17, in discussing this statement. Is that correct?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you tell us who, if anyone, helped in the preparation of that paragraph that begins under that heading, "Anti-Communist writers in IPR publications," I wish you would look up the last sentence of the first paragraph on that page in which you say that no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because you yourself a moment ago made a distinction with regard to who might have been in the IPR.

I am wondering if what you mean there, perhaps, is not this: That no IPR publication has urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs as such?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman; I appreciate Mr. Sourwine's attempt, but this is my own statement, and I would rather not have it——

Senator SMITH. You do not like those words "as such"?

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Mr. HOLLAND. I don't ever like that phrase.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say that you can positively state yourself that no IPR publication has ever urged acceptance of any policy or program which was at the time it was so urged a policy or program urged and advanced by the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I cannot say that because it is a complete restatement and misinterpretation of my sentence here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Obviously, I cannot say that. I want to know what you mean precisely by your language here. I do not want to trick you.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do feel that I took some time writing this sentence. It reads:

> But no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs.

I believe that to be a fair statement. I may be wrong and I will be glad to be shown if I am wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are challenging what you mean by it, and not challenging whether it is fair, or not.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I meant what I said here.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a quibble and I am not engaging in semantics with you.

Senator SMITH. So we may get the idea you attempted to convey, just what did you mean?

Mr. HOLLAND. I thought about this rather carefully and I meant that no IPR publication, to the best of my knowledge and belief—and I have known them for a long time—has ever advocated communism or has urged the acceptance of it.

In other words, has urged anyone, the reader, to accept Communist policies or programs, and I say that in any country.

Senator SMITH. Are you attempting to differentiate between a writer in your publication and the publication?

Mr. HOLLAND. I say publication, sir; that is what I mean.

Senator SMITH. No publication of its own does anything except editorially; is that what you mean?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, sir. If this book contains a statement that we should recognize and approve the policies of the Chinese communism, I say that publication advocates, but no IPR publication does that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be advocating communism as such. I am sure we can reach an understanding as to what the question is.

Will you define what you mean by Communist policies or programs as you use the phrase in that sentence?

Mr. HOLLAND. I mean official policies or programs as stated by either Communist leaders, that is to say, leaders of Communist parties or important leaders in countries which have Communist Governments.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean the essence of the statement itself, or the statement as quoting such leaders?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry. I do not grasp that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is a statement of a policy by a known Communist leader a Communist policy within the meaning of the phrase as you use it only when it is attributed to that leader, or is it a Communist policy within the meaning of the phrase as you use it whenever it is advanced by anyone as a proposal?

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Mr. HOLLAND. I would say that the latter part of your statement is not correct——

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not make a statement; I asked you a question.

Mr. HOLLAND. Then, I cannot answer the question because you stated it in a way in which I cannot give the answer.

Senator SMITH. Try to give him another question.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

You have stated, sir, that you include in the phrase: "Communist policies or programs," as you have used them, a policy which was enunciated and urged by a known and recognized Communist leader.

I believe you also used the word "official."

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. First, will you drop the word official and say, "a policy enunciated and urged by a recognized world leader in the Communist movement is a Communist policy." Is that what you mean?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still call it a Communist policy if Joe Blow, who is not a Communist leader, picks it up and restates it and urges the same or approximately the same as the Communist leader who originally enunciated it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; sometimes it would be, and sometimes it would not be.

May I illustrate? We are making this unnecessarily difficult, Senator.

Senator SMITH. We are for me.

Mr. HOLLAND. If Joe Blow has learned that reform in China is a good thing and is long overdue, and it ought to have been started long ago, that is in some respects similar to what Communists have been saying, but it does not in any sense make Joe Blow a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. No one says it does.

I am still simply trying to define your statement when you use the term "Communist policies or programs." You mean only a policy or program which is not only favorable to communism, but which is enunciated by a Communist, which is labeled as a Communist policy or a Communist program; is that not a fair statement?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I am sorry; it is not. Let me give you an illustration again. Let us take Mr. Epstein, for example, since we have been talking about him.

If Mr. Epstein in the book we have been talking about says, "I think the Chinese program of redistributing lands is a good thing and that the American people ought to support it," I say that he is advocating a Communist policy. Mr. Epstein may not be a Communist himself, but this is simply a matter of using common sense, but if some well-known leader—and I can think of some connected with our own ECA program—say that we think land reform in certain parts of China ought to have been carried out a long time ago, that is just common sense in their opinion, and because the Communist leaders have been saying the same thing in other years or today, it has absolutely no bearing whatever on whether he is or is not a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the question of whether it is a Communist program depends upon who utters it?

Mr. HOLLAND. And, most of all, it depends on the contention on which he is using the argument.

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Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, so it is in that restricted sense that you have made the statement that no IPR publication has urged the acceptance of Communist policies or programs?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not accept Mr. Sourwine's statement that it is restricted in any significance or meaningful sense of the word "restricted."

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you trying to say that no IPR publication has ever contained a representation favorable to the Communists, or that no IPR publication has ever urged acceptance of a policy or program which was at that time an avowed policy or program of the Communist Party?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did not, obviously, make such a statement. My statement stands as it is, Mr. Chairman. I think I have made it very clear.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with Israel Epstein's the Unfinished Revolution in China, we have had three witnesses identify Israel Epstein as a Communist. Elizabeth Bentley said he was a Soviet agent.

In addition to that, we have introduced into the record his writings in the Communist press. Would you say that his Unfinished Revolution in China, is a Communist book?

Mr. HOLLAND. On those grounds, no. There may be other evidence which would convince me that his book is essentially a Communist book, but, as I have said, I have not read it, so I can't give a judgment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could we continue now, sir? I think we were up to page 17.

Mr. HOLLAND. Page 17, the middle of the page, is a partial list of writers well known for their active opposition to communism, whose work the IPR has published.

This particular list I compiled from two sources: One, my own memory, and second, Mr. Morris some weeks ago asked me if I would send down to him a list of writers or articles in our journal which, in our opinion, were anti-Soviet, and so it is a mixture of those two, but it is my selection and it is a partial one.

If I had time I could think of others.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Chamberlin write an article?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chamberlin wrote a very important textbook for us on Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. When he wrote an article for you, you repudiated it?

Mr. HOLLAND. I, no.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean the IPR.

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I am sorry, the IPR did not repudiate Chamberlin. We published a note by Mr. Chamberlin in our journal in Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you say?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, I don't recall it. I was not connected with it at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 18, sir——

Mr. HOLLAND. The institute is not partisan. This was written in first draft by me and polished up here and there as to English and arrangement by Miss Farley.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on page 20.

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Mr. HOLLAND. Page 20, "Some false impressions." This went through three drafts, the first of which was mine; second of which was Miss Farley's, and I finally revised it again, the third draft.

The next page, "The Soviet Council of the IPR." This is my own work, part of it based on material in this pamphlet which was circulated.

Page 23 was my own work, and is now. I think it is important. It is a statement of rather specific, and I think, vituperative, criticism of the Institute of Pacific Relations by Tass and by the Soviet radio, particularly relating to our conference in India in 1950, and a violent attack on a book one of our people published written as a review, written in 1949, which the Soviet historical review denounced as an example of imperialist objectivity.

Mr. SOURWINE. That runs over to page 24.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that is a result of your own research?

Mr. HOLLAND. You see, most of it is quotations from the Soviet press and radio and it is of my own work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Some of it from the book by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; on page 24 there is a quotation on Lattimore's book on The Making of Modern China, but that is not a reference by a reviewer.

Page 25 is headed "Frederick V. Field's role in the institute." That was also written by me in first draft and was revised, I think once, by Miss Farley, and then finally completed the final draft myself 2 or 3 nights ago.

On page 26 there is a brief statement by the institute on Amerasia, which I wrote myself.

On page 27, "The institute did not 'smear' Nationalist China," is my own work.

Mr. MORRIS. Whoever used the word "smear"?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Alfred Kohlberg.

Mr. MORRIS. What has that to do with this investigation?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because a great part of the stories coming out of this investigation have paralleled to an extraordinary degree the precise nature of the charges brought by Mr. Kohlberg against the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. Has Mr. Kohlberg testified before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. He has not testified before this committee, and this is entirely irrelevant thinking Mr. Holland is bringing into this thing.

Mr. HOLLAND. I will accept your correction on this.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew very well that was the case. You knew he has not testified before this committee?

Senator SMITH. Let him answer.

Did you know whether or not Mr. Kohlberg had testified before this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I didn't know whether he had, or not. I know he has not testified in public, but I think, Mr. Chairman, you will recognize that it is only reasonable that there has been widespread public discussion throughout the press and for months now, and even

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in your own sessions here, that testimony has been given indicating that IPR writers, and particularly Mr. Bisson, violently attacked and criticized Nationalist China.

Mr. MORRIS. No assertions whatever, Mr. Holland. We put his writing right in the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. I maintain, Mr. Chairman, that other witnesses here have certainly given the impression that they considered the Institute of Pacific Relations has unfairly attacked Nationalist China, and I think the use of the word "smear" there is a popular and reasonable interpretation of the word.

In my section I specifically mention this incident of Mr. Bisson, and I point out that Mr. Bisson certainly wrote this article in the Far Eastern Survey. It was immediately followed by an immediate rebuttal of a vigorous Chinese Nationalist official, which we printed at the same time other magazines, namely, Life, the New York Times, and the Reader's Digest, were also publishing very strong criticism of the Chinese national war effort at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that section was your own work?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; it was.

Senator WATKINS. Is there any ruling on the withdrawal of this material by Mr. Holland, this particular one?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think the report is not being accepted by the subcommittee yet.

Senator SMITH. I thought that Mr. Holland admitted that he did not know of Mr. Kohlberg having testified, and the statement was made by Mr. Morris that Mr. Kohlberg had not testified. That should certainly show that there is no place for this particular language to be in here.

Senator WATKINS. The point I want to make is this: That in this hearing we receive different points of view and if that is his point of view, I do not see why we should not take it. I surely would not vote to have it excluded.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate Senator Watkins' remarks, and I would certainly only want it understood as my belief.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Holland, do you feel that in a hearing of this sort, which has been going on for a good many months, the committee when it is taking testimony from witnesses who are sworn to tell the truth, is being fair in requiring testimony to be sworn to?

Mr. HOLLAND. I certainly do, and I admire the procedure the committee has followed.

Senator SMITH. Do you know of anything the committee may do to conduct a fairer hearing?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; to call more witnesses who would give a more accurate and informed picture of this organization, and I appreciate the fact that you have allowed me to do it today.

Senator SMITH. Of course, you realize that we cannot take but one at a time.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do, and I appreciate the very fair hearing you have given me today.

Senator SMITH. Would you like to give Mr. Morris a list of names that you think should be called?

Mr. HOLLAND. Senator McCarran has already asked for a list of that sort, and we are prepared to give you such a list.

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Senator SMITH. Do you know of any testimony that has been taken by this committee unfairly, or any witnesses treated unfairly, so far as the committee is concerned?

Mr. HOLLAND. There are a number of cases, Mr. Chairman, which I say apologetically. I feel that Mr. Morris, no doubt inadvertently or accidentally, has both asked unfair questions and occasionally made unsworn statements himself which I think tend to give a slightly misleading impression.

Mr. MORRIS. Ask him for an example.

Mr. SOURWINE. In defense of Mr. Morris, may I ask, Mr. Chairman, that if counsel is going to continue the practice of constantly coaching the witness, he at least move far enough away so that it will be audible and go on the record?

Mr. CROSSMAN. I thought I had a right to communicate.

Senator SMITH. I think so, but there has been some little complaint about your whispering to the witness, and I think when he is asked a question you ought to let him answer.

Mr. CROSSMAN. But do I have a right to communicate with him possibly before he answers the question?

Senator SMITH. Strictly speaking, the committee could conduct the hearing without any counsel, but out of an abundance of caution we do not want any witness to testify to something that would be unfair to him or that would be prejudicial to him personally. We have adopted this practice of letting counsel come in, but I think objecting to a question that might be asked him and then questioning whether or not you should suggest an answer is quite a different thing.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I would be quite glad if I could conduct myself as I do in court, and I did not know that I had that privilege.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know of any court that would permit you to tell a witness how to answer a question. It is never permitted in any court that I know anything about.

Senator SMITH. That is right. I do not believe our courts would allow one of us to go up and prompt the witness while he was on the stand, but I can understand that this is a little unusual proceeding.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Mr. Davis, in the senatorial investigations, was allowed to communicate in the course of the proceeding.

Senator WATKINS. That is, with respect to whether he ought to answer. He certainly was not allowed to go so far as to tell him what he ought to answer.

The witness is sworn to tell the truth and not the counsel.

Mr. HOLLAND. I assure you on my oath that at no time today has Mr. Crossman told me what to say. Once or twice he has said, "I wish you wouldn't answer."

Senator SMITH. I do not believe he should whisper, in any event. He could advise you not to answer questions.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Of course, I object to the form of the questions sometimes.

Senator SMITH. As to the form, if it is capable of being understood by Mr. Holland, I do not think there would be too much to that because this is strictly not a court procedure and no attempt is made to conform to court rules.

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Mr. SOURWINE. I interjected because—perhaps I was mistaken—it appeared to me at the time the witness had been asked for an example to support the charge that he had made that Mr. Morris was making testimony unsworn, which was inaccurate or incorrect, that Mr. Crossman had leaned over to whisper to him and suggesting something for the witness to say.

Mr. HOLLAND. That was not so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I apologize to Mr. Crossman.

Mr. HOLLAND. In the rather limited time we have had to examine the transcript, we have found—and I say "we" because I have had the assistance of counsel in this—a number of cases in which we feel that an inaccurate or misleading, or, in some cases, false impression has been given as a result of the methods adopted by the counsel.

Now, in many cases, I feel certain that Mr. Morris has done this inadvertently, but it is something we feel that we should like to submit to you later on as a memorandum.

Senator SMITH. Could you illustrate just what you mean? I know that no counsel I have ever seen has done that when he has asked a question.

Every once in a while there may be an objection so far as the form is concerned.

Will you point out to Mr. Morris what statements he has made that are incorrect?

I had understood that where Mr. Morris has made statements, as he has done upon several occasions today, he was speaking from sworn testimony hitherto introduced here and he was reading it or paraphrasing it.

Mr. HOLLAND. In those cases, I think that is certainly Mr. Morris' intention, but we have found in the transcript——

Senator SMITH. Can you tell us about them?

Mr. HOLLAND. A number of cases.

Mr. HOLLAND. I can remember one. You will excuse me. There are many. There was a hearing in which the discussion of Mr. Harry White's connection with the IPR was under discussion. And the statement appears in the transcript, that is, from Mr. Morris, that, well, he was a delegate at an IPR conference.

Well, that is a statement, and it happens to be an incorrect statement.

Senator SMITH. Was that a statement, or a question?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I took particular notice, and it was in the form of a statement, and it was construed by the witness as a statement.

Senator SMITH. Have you not many times heard a lawyer ask a question in just that way?

Mr. HOLLAND. But in this case, you see, it was not only a statement but it was an inaccurate one and had a rather serious bearing, because, as I pointed out, Mr. White was not a delegate to an IPR conference. This was not asked in the form of a question.

Senator SMITH. It was the witness' privilege to answer it either way, affirmatively or negatively, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it wasn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we introduced a letter here recently by Mr. Jessup, wherein he recommended, among others, 10 people who had been identified before this committee as members of the Communist Party, a Harry Dexter White.

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Senator SMITH. That has been sworn testimony before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. The letter mentioned a group of people, and 10 of them had been identified before this committee by sworn testimony, and Jessup was recommending that this man, Harry Dexter White, be made a delegate to the Hot Springs convention in 1945.

Was that the incident?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it was an earlier incident in the hearing, I think. This was an earlier occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Here he was being proposed as a delegate to the Hot Springs convention.

Mr. HOLLAND. I cite this as only one instance from memory.

I have three or four pages, which I honestly feel—and all I ask is that you allow us to submit these to you. I do not make any unfair allegations against the counsel. I just say that sometimes an unfair implication has been given as a result of that.

Senator SMITH. Anyone can understand how lawyers can ask questions sometimes. They do not always ask them perfectly.

Now, then, you have made a very careful study and analysis of the transcript in this case?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not all of it, because it is too much for me to keep up with, but up to 2 or 3 weeks ago, yes.

Senator SMITH. Have you been the source of some of the statements received by this committee alleging that this committee is receiving demonstrably false testimony and statements from the counsel?

Have you been the one making those statements to newspaper men?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not believe, sir, that I have used those words.

I have certainly said to a number of friends, and I may have said it in certain press releases, that I consider some aspects of the committee's procedure up to now to have been unfair, chiefly because I feel we have not been given a proper chance until now to state our case. And I felt that for 12 or 13 weeks now nothing but adverse testimony against this organization has been spread over the newspapers of the country.

Senator SMITH. Did you know, Mr. Holland, that Mr. Carter was examined here for days and days? He is one of your main men.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Carter, sir, was, I think, examined in three sessions and was given practically no opportunity to make the kind of lengthy explanatory statements that you kindly allowed me to do today.

Even now, sir,. you have not allowed me to make anything like a full or even a reasonably rounded statement of what the IPR really is. But I appreciate your willingness to permit me to make my statement.

Senator SMITH. You realize, do you not, that when people are being investigated the committee is first entitled to have answers to questions put to them.

Mr. HOLLAND. I realize that.

Senator SMITH. You realize that if you started an investigation any other way, the party being investigated could talk forever and never get to the point being inquired about.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate that, sir, very fully.

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But you used an argument on me, or at least Senator Watkins did, that Mr. Carter was given his chance.

All I was saying was that Mr. Carter was not given anything like the chance you have kindly given me.

Senator SMITH. Has Mr. Carter ever stated to this committee that he never had a chance to express himself? I did not think so.

Mr. MORRIS. No, Senator. We also had Mr. Field here, and we gave him ample opportunity to speak.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Field was a worn-out man taken from jail at 5 o'clock in the morning and perhaps practically on the point of collapse, because he said he hadn't eaten. But I do appreciate Senator Watkins' point, and certainly you have asked Mr. Carter a great many questions, and he has tried to give answers, but he is not an officer of the institute today.

And yet much of the effect of this unfavorable testimony reflects on the organization today.

Therefore, it is only proper, I think, that people who are in positions to have responsibility in the organization today and over the past 2 or 3 years should be given a full chance to testify.

That is why I appreciate your offer to us to name other witnesses. We are very glad to have that opportunity.

Senator SMITH. I want to know whether or not you subscribe to the testimony earlier given to this committee by Mr. Carter with respect to its accuracy.

Mr. HOLLAND. With respect to what, sir?

Senator SMITH. With respect to the accuracy of his testimony. Do you say Mr. Carter did not tell us the truth and give us the facts?

Mr. HOLLAND. Oh, no, sir. I make no such charge. I only said he did not have anything like an opportunity to explain and give positive statements. In other words, you carefully selected bits of the evidence and confined him to answering those, and did not give him anything like an opportunity——

Senator SMITH. I do not recall anything other than that Mr. Carter was given a full opportunity to say everything he wanted to say.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, sir. I disagree with you on that.

Senator SMITH. Otherwise, I am persuaded that the tactics you could try to adopt is to go so far afield with extraneous statements that this whole matter will be clouded. Is that your point?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. I want you to have a perfectly fair hearing.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do appreciate that, and I think today you have given me the kind of opportunity we have been wanting and which we think should have been accorded to us perhaps 5 or 6 weeks ago.

Senator SMITH. I think perhaps all of us have had enough experience to know that the witness prefers to say what he wishes to say on extraneous matters if he can, if he can get the examiner off of the subject.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just say that my reason, or my main reason, for making these remarks, sir, is not in any way to imply hostility or criticism, but I am constantly reminded of the very inspiring remarks which Senator McCarran made at the beginning of this investigation, in which he said that the subcommittee would conduct a full and impartial hearing and would seek only facts, not headlines.

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And I believe that by calling me today, and other witnesses whom you have now kindly asked us to suggest, you will get—a little overdue, but you will get—a much more accurate and useful picture of this organization than has hitherto emerged.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Holland, I note that you said you should have been called weeks ago. Would you think that it would have been proper for us to call you in every time some one said something that you thought was damaging?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not at all, sir.

Senator WATKINS. To run in and give some more testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not at all, sir.

Senator WATKINS. We have to take this in a sort of organized, systematized way, and as we were going into this you could not be permitted to run in every time we had a witness who was unfavorable.

I think probably the development has reached the stage where you should be in, and I personally want everybody connected with the institute that can throw any light on its conduct to come and testify.

I am willing to sit here for the rest of the year if necessary to hear them.

Senator SMITH. I may say that I do not think you need be too concerned as to the fairness or unfairness of this committee, when we learned today, after much prodding by Mr. Sourwine of Mr. Holland, that there were 16 packages of papers about the IPR in Mr. Field's basement of which we had not heard until today, or at least I had not heard until today.

Senator WATKINS. How does that fit in with the statement of the institute officials that everything had been made available to the FBI and this committee?

Senator SMITH. I mention that to bring you up to date.

Senator WATKINS. But I wanted it understood as far as I am concerned, and I think the committee is acquainted with my thought on the matter, because it happens to coincide with theirs, that it is proper that in every case you hear one side until they get through, and then the other side comes in. You may have to wait 2 months before you get to that point, because we do not work everyday.

From what I can see of the conduct of the counsel in this case, it has been absolutely fair.

Personally, I hope we will go on and get all these people in here that know anything about this.

Mr. SOURWINE. We were on page 28, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. There is a short heading there, "The institute has not been listed as a subversive organization," which I prepared, and at the bottom something about "the myth of the 'powerful combine'," which I prepared.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the end of page 28.

Mr. HOLLAND. And "The institute welcomes constructive criticism," which I also prepared.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just one or two questions on that subject.

As you have indicated in the number of cases here, you prepared an original draft, Miss Farley went over that, and you went over it again. So it is obvious this must have been under preparation for quite some time; it that right?

Mr. HOLLAND. Portions of it have, I should say for perhaps a month or 6 weeks. But most of the parts which I say I wrote myself I have

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done under very considerable pressure, in fact up to almost midnight last night.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I want to ask: Have you told us about everybody who has assisted in the preparation of this?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe I have, sir, with the one exception that my counsel has seen various drafts at various times and also suggested changes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you mentioned something about having recently had a fairly close connection with Mr. Joseph Barnes. Would you repeat again what that was?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I forget how long ago, but——

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to get. How long ago.

Mr. HOLLAND. It was some time, I think, in the first half of August. I saw Mr. Barnes in a restaurant on the other side of the room, and I had not seen him for a very considerable time, so I went over and spoke to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in New York City?

Mr. HOLLAND. In New York City. And he asked me what I was doing for the summer. I said, "I am here on my own. My wife is away in California." He said, "I am also on my own. My wife is in the country. Why don't you come over and stay at my place." So for a period of—I don't know—2 weeks or 2½ weeks, I spent quite a number of nights at his place.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you move out? How recently? Last month? In September?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, it was some time in September.

Mr. SOURWINE. Past the middle of September?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I think it was probably in the first half. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be fair to say that portions at least of this statement were under preparation at the time you were living in Mr. Barnes' quarters?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I think so, because, as I have indicated, considerable portions are taken directly from this earlier pamphlet we published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss that with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. I told him I was preparing it. I can say, however, that he gave me no advice, did no drafting for me on this particular document. He did give me some suggestions as to how it possibly might be made more—how a press release on it might eventually be written. He said it was too long and dull.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you didn't consider the advice in connection with the preparation of it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, Mr. Barnes hasn't had any contact directly with the IPR for a long time and therefore isn't in a position to know about a lot of these details here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss this or the preparation of it with Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. Mr. Carter knew I was working on it, but I never consulted him about the text of it.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in connection with preparing this avail yourself of the knowledge or advice of Mr. Lattimore or Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I did not. They knew I was preparing it. My hesitation was simply that I have, of course, discussed many other things with Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore; but looking down these headings here, I know I didn't consult them on this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they read this before you came to testify here today?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. They have seen certain portions of it, namely, the sections which are in the other pamphlet.

Mr. SOURWINE. But they did not see them as portions prepared for inclusion in this?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, these documents were stapled together late last night and were brought down on the midnight train.

Mr. SOURWINE. When I say "prepared for inclusion in this," I didn't mean physically for inclusion in this paper. I mean the draft after it had occurred to you that this was eventually to be a press statement.

Mr. HOLLAND. No, to the best of my knowledge they weren't consulted on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions on that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. I want to ask him a few.

Mr. Holland, you say this was in preparation over how long a time? I have forgotten.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I have forgotten what I said, myself. But it has been probably——

Senator SMITH. Several weeks?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And several drafts were made of different portions of it?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And this was gone over very carefully by you?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my ability; because I was working under very great pressure in the past weeks.

Senator SMITH. And you prepared it for presentation here today?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you want to have it just exactly right from your standpoint?

Mr. HOLLAND. Within the limits of the time available to me; yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. You want to have it just exactly right from your standpoint. That is what you are trying to do.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could this be admitted, now, Mr. Chairman, with the understanding that the committee reserves the right to question Mr. Holland about it further?

Senator SMITH. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 331" and is as follows:)

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FACT AND FICTION ABOUT THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS—STATEMENT BY WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, SECRETARY GENERAL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS; EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, OCTOBER 10, 1951

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY WILLIAM L. HOLLAND

I have prepared this statement as a supplement to the testimony which I expect to give in response to questions directed to me by members of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in a public hearing on October 10. I have prepared it because this will be the first occasion on which a responsible officer of the Institue of Pacific Relations has had any opportunity to describe the real facts about the organization, aims, and activities of the institute and to answer some of the numerous misleading or erroneous statements about it which have been made in previous hearings.

The present statement is by no means to be interpreted as a full and final answer to these misstatements and misleading allegations. To deal fully with them would take much more space than is available here and would require at least a month's intensive work after the subcommittee had finished taking testimony from witnesses.

Because of this, I wish to repeat here the request which was made on August 10 by the institute's legal counsel, namely that the institute's officers and counsel be given access to the IPR files which the subcommittee seized last February and has withheld from the institute ever since, and also that the institute's officers and legal counsel be given at least one month to study the whole record with a view to suggesting further evidence or providing a statement to form part of the subcommittee's record or both. These were eminently reasonable requests, but the subcommittee has ignored them.

The present statement is intended chiefly for the following purposes:

(1) To provide a clearer and more balanced account than has thus far emerged from the subcommittee hearings as to the aims, methods, activities, publications and personnel of the Institute.

(2) To explain or refute some of the more serious cases of misstatements and misleading allegations which have been made either deliberately or inadvertently by certain witnesses, but which have gone uncorrected in the record.

(3) To indicate how some of the procedures adopted by the subcommittee thus far have inevitably led to the presentation of a very distorted picture of the institute and to suggest some corrective steps which should be taken if the subcommittee is to live up to the opening statement made by its chairman. In that statement, he stressed that it intended to conduct its investigation in a fair and impartial manner, adopting a truly objective approach and seeking facts rather than publicity.

Since I am speaking as the executive officer of both the international IPR and the American IPR, and as a person who has been closely connected with the institute's work and staff for a very long period, I wish to add a few statements about my own role in the institute and to answer some of the questions which may be asked about me in the hearings. I mention this because I am concerned that the members of the IPR and the general public, as well as the Senators on the subcommittee, should understand my position and responsibility, past and present. I also want to show that the institute's officers are completely sincere in saying that, despite the unfair allegations thus far made, they welcome an investigation of the IPR, provided only that it is fair and comprehensive.

I stress this fact because the impression has been given in certain newspapers that the institute has concealed many suspicious or discreditable facts about itself. This has tended to lend color to the false rumors maliciously spread by a few unprincipled persons that the institute has been an agency or tool of the Communists or a channel for Soviet espionage activities or a sinister, secret pressure group influencing the development of far eastern policy.

To the thousands of loyal and well-informed people who have been thoroughly familiar with the institute and its activities over the past 26 years, these stories are slanderous and manifestly absurd. But in these days when public thinking and feeling about Russia, China, and the Far East generally have become so charged with emotion, even the most fantastic rumors tend to be taken seriously; and it therefore becomes necessary to refute them in a careful and detailed manner.

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MY OWN ROLE IN THE IPR

My work for the IPR began in January 1929 when I came from New Zealand to work as a junior research assistant and private secretary to Dr. J. B. Condliffe, the research secretary of the international headquarters of the IPR, then located in Honolulu. After attending the Kyoto (Japan) conference of the IPR in 1929, I worked in north China in 1930 as a research assistant to Prof. R. H. Tawney in the preparation of his noted IPR book, Land and Labour in China.

I was acting international research secretary of the IPR from 1931 to 1932. After a year's leave of absence for study in England, I became international research secretary in 1933 and held this position until 1944, frequently visiting the Far East and Western Europe (though not Russia). During 1943 and 1944, I was editor of Pacific Affairs. I was given leave in 1944 to work for the OSS and the OWI in Washington and New York. I became a naturalized American citizen in July 1944. From February to October 1945, I was acting director of the China division of the United States Office of War Information in Chungking.

In March 1946 I was appointed secretary general of the international IPR, succeeding Mr. Edward C. Carter who had held that position since 1933. For a brief period in 1948 and again from August 1950 to the present, I have also acted temporarily as executive vice chairman of the American IPR concurrently with my position as international secretary general. I have also taken over the functions of the international research secretary.

I thus carry a complicated set of responsibilities. Some responsibilities are to the American IPR, some to the other nine national councils of the institute, some to the foundations and corporations which contribute generously to both the American and international budgets of the IPR, and some to the individual research workers and contributors to the IPR journals.

These diverse responsibilities are not always easy to harmonize. This problem has grown increasingly acute as public controversy, especially in the United States, has become more bitter over the trend of events in the Far East and as sharp differences have appeared between the foreign policies of such countries as the United States, Britain, India, and the U. S. S. R. toward developments in China, Korea, Japan, and southeast Asia.

This point needs to be kept in mind because it serves to explain the peculiar limitations imposed on the international officers of a nonpartisan organization like the IPR which is international but nonofficial and is simply a loose confederation of completely autonomous national societies, each differing somewhat in organization and activities. It should never be forgotten that the international IPR is not a unitary, monolithic organization with national branches controlled by a central headquarters. Nor is it even a federation of identical or like-minded societies such as Rotary International or the International YMCA.

The autonomous national councils of the IPR, though differing in their programs and constitutional structure, have nearly all sought a wide diversity of interests and attitudes among their members. They are not groups of like-minded persons, linked by common political attitudes or professional interests. For the most part they are united only by a belief that the unfettered nonpartisan collection of facts and discussion about the problems of the Far East and the Pacific area is important and that (because the truth in these complex problems is inevitably many-sided) it is wise to seek a diversity of opinions and interpretations, including the views of persons with whom one sharply disagrees.

Even more striking is the absence of any common ideology or philosophical approach as between IPR members in one country and those in another. This difference is often vividly revealed in the frank but friendly clash of opinion which occurs in the private international conferences of the institute, such as the one held in Lucknow in October 1950. Any attempt to force this great diversity of views into one philosophical mold or conceptual scheme would be fruitless and ridiculous. This fact has always been recognized by the national councils and individual members of the institute and differences of opinion and even vigorous disagreements have always been welcomed, not only in the conference round tables, but in the conference preparatory papers and in the larger scholarly research volumes and magazine articles published under the institute's auspices.

All this is familiar enough to IPR members, but it is apt to be forgotten at a time when the institute has been dragged by partisan extremists into the middle

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of a nation-wide American political controversy over far-eastern policy which is itself becoming more and more a football of 1952 election campaign politics.

As the servant of both a far-flung and diversified international organization and of an American society of some 1,100 persons with widely differing and strongly felt opinions, I, as the executive officer of the IPR, have to serve many masters. I must try to do this without allowing the institute to degenerate into the condition where the attempt to compromise and please all conflicting points of view results in mere confusion and ineffectualness. At the same time, I must always strive to see that important points of view of varying schools of opinion find expression in the institute's activities and publications and not use the fact of conflicting opinions and counsel as an excuse for imposing my own ideas or pet theories on the conduct and content of the institute's work.

Having been so long connected with the institute and so largely responsible for the administration of its research, I cannot dissociate myself from its past activities, nor would I want to. I feel considerable pride in having been associated with it, though I would be the last to assert that the institute's officers have never made errors in judgment or that in particular my own decisions, looked at in retrospect, have always been wise. Nor could I in good conscience give the impression that the institute today has been radically transformed, when, in fact, I believe that it has always been basically committed to the principles of freedom of scholarly inquiry and diversity of opinion.

Those principles remain as valid and important as ever. It has simply become more difficult to apply them, because of the great change which Soviet postwar policy has produced in the whole climate of opinion on the crucial problems of communism and nationalism which beset the Far East and the far eastern policies of the western nations.

At the same time, as an executive officer of an organization which has some responsibility to the general public, and which depends for its existence on its public reputation as well as on the financial support of foundations and corporations, I have to be realistic. In particular, I have to take account of the honestly held views of well-informed, genuine friends of the IPR concerning the present-day activities of the institute and the policies which it must follow if it is to keep or regain the financial support and confidence of the individuals and foundations that make its existence possible.

To steer a wise course in such conflicting currents is not easy. I can only say that I have made an honest effort to serve the over-all interests of the institute. Whether I have succeeded or will succeed in this is for others to judge. I appeal to both the subcommittee members and the general public to have understanding of the job which Mr. Swope and I (and the other institute officers, who give generously of their time and energy) are trying to do. We are concerned with an area of the world where the need for facts and for cool heads as well as warm hearts was never greater than it is today.

As for my "associations" outside the IPR, I must admit that I have not been a great "joiner." Before I became an American citizen, I was a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Today I am an ordinary member of the Foreign Policy Association and of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. I am a member of the board of the Public Affairs Committee, New York, and of United Service to China. From 1944 I have been a board member of the China Aid Council (now inactive). I have been a director and am still a member of the Far Eastern Association. I am not active in politics but registered as a Democrat in New York City for the last two presidential elections. I am neither a Communist nor an ex-Communist, nor a Communist fellow traveler. To the best of my knowledge, I have not been accused of Communist "associations." In Chungking in 1945, I met Mao Tse-tung, at the time when he was brought down from Yenan by Ambassador Patrick Hurley. I also met Chou En-lai then, at a reception given by Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer.

Some points not brought out by the McCarran subcommittee

The institute should be judged by its record as a whole, not by bits and pieces culled from its files. For example, the contents of the 28 volumes in its "inquiry" series are more important evidence of the nature of its activities than an informal comment on tentative plans for this project in an intraoffice letter which the committee has publicized. It should be judged primarily by what it has done, not by speculations about projected programs. The contents of the two-hundred-

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odd research volumes and conference reports published by the institute are a better index of its influence on American thinking than allegations by ex-Communists who had nothing to do with this organization's program and publications.

There is not space here to present the institute's full record of achievement in four continents over the last 26 years. A brief summary of this record is given in the pamphlet, Understanding Asia, issued by the institute in June 1951.[1] Four points only will be stressed here: (1) The institute is an international organization. (2) It is a nonpartisan organization. (3) It has never tried to influence the actions of governments. (4) The character of its work has been determined not by Communists, but by the hundreds of eminent citizens and scholars who have taken an active part in the institute as officers of the organization, as delegates to its conferences, or as writers of books and articles which it has published.

What the institute is

The Institute of Pacific Relations is an association composed of national councils in 10 countries. Each national council is autonomous and carries on its own work in its own distinctive way. Together they cooperate in an international IPR program of research, publications, and conferences. This program is directed by a Pacific Council in which each national council is represented, and administered by a small international secretariat working in New York under the direction of the Pacific Council.

The institute at present consists of the following independent national councils:

American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Canadian Institute of International Affairs
Comité d'Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique (France)
Indian Council of World Affairs
Japan Institute of Pacific Relations
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Philippine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Great Britain)

The institute was founded in 1925 at a conference in Honolulu of religious leaders, scholars and businessmen from various countries of the Pacific area, who, even then, realized the need for greater knowledge and frank discussion of the problems of Asia and the relations of Asia and the West. The impetus came in part from leaders of the YMCA.

At this first conference it was realized that intelligent discussion was impossible on many subjects because many basic facts were lacking about the peoples, resources, trade, and politics of the Pacific area. This led to the inauguration by the international IPR of a large and continuing research program which subsequently received generous support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. The IPR has played an important part in increasing available knowledge about Asia in the United States and other countries. The Rockefeller Foundation has called the institute "the most important single source of independent studies of the Pacific area and the Far East."

Since 1925 the institute has held 11 international but nonofficial conferences, the latest having taken place at Lucknow, India, in 1950. Conference membership is usually about a hundred, and consists of delegates chosen by each national council. The agenda is carefully prepared and full documentation is provided in the form of data papers compiled by the international secretariat and the national councils. While the conferences are private and the press is excluded to assure full freedom of discussion, reports of the discussion are subsequently published.

Dr. Ralph Bunche, the distinguished United Nations official and Nobel prize winner, attended his first international conference as a member of the American group at the Eighth IPR Conference, held at Mount Tremblant in Canada in 1942. He recently said: "Although I have participated in a great many international conferences since, I have never experienced a more profitable one than the Mount Tremblant Conference, or one that was better conducted."

[1] Available on request from the American IPR, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

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The International IPR

Following are the names of the chairmen of the Pacific Council, international governing body of the institute, from 1925 to the present:

1925–29: Ray Lyman Wilbur (United States), frormer Secretary of the Interior
1929–33: Jerome D. Greene (United States), former member of the firm of Lee, Higginson & Co.
1933–36: Hon. Newton D. Baker (United States), former United States Secretary of War
1936–39: J. W. Dafoe (Canada), former editor, Winnipeg Free Press
1939–42: Philip C. Jessup (United States), professor of international law, Columbia University
1942–45: Edgar J. Tarr (Canada), former president, Monarch Life Assurance Co.
1945–47: Percy E. Corbett (Canada), professor of government, Yale University
1947–50: Huntington Gilchrist (United States), American Cyanamid Co.
1950: Arthur H. Dean, attorney, Sullivan and Cromwell, New York

The following persons, as chairmen of the international research committee, have directed the international research program of the institute from 1925 to the present:

Prof. James T. Shotwell, Columbia University
Prof. Charles P. Howland, Yale University
Dr. Carl L. Alsberg, Food Research Institute, Stanford University
Prof. J. B. Condliffe, University of California
Sir George Sansom, East Asian Institute, Columbia University.

Other prominent persons who have taken an active leadership in the work of the IPR outside the United States include the following:

Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander, former Minister of Defense, Great Britain
Dr. Horace Belshaw, Professor of Economics, Victoria College, Wellington, New Zealand
R. J. F. Boyer, Australian Broadcasting Commission
K. P. Chen, president, Shanghai Commercial Bank, China
Dr. Chiang Mon-Lin, former Minister of Education, China
Rt. Hon. Arthur Creech-Jones, former Minister of Colonies, Great Britain
Lionel Curtis, All Souls College, Oxford
J. W. Dafoe, former editor, Winnipeg Free Press, Canada
Sir Frederic Eggleston, former Australian Ambassador to the United States
Pierre Gourou, professor of geography, Sorbonne, Paris
Dr. Hu Shih, former Chinese Ambassador to the United States
Junnosuke Inouye, former Premier of Japan
Viscount K. Ishii, former member, House of Peers, Japan
Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister, Pakistan
Pandit H. N. Kunzru, Servants of India Society, India
K. C. Li, Wah Chang Trading Co., New York
Yoshisaburo Matsukata, general manager, Kyodo News Agency, Japan
Sir Andrew McFadyean, president, Liberal Party, Great Britain
Walter Nash, former Finance Minister, New Zealand
Dr. Inazo Nitobe, former member, House of Peers, Japan
Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Indian Ambassador to the United States
Archibald Rose, British American Tobacco Co.
Hon. Newton W. Rowell, former President of the Privy Council, Canada
Albert Sarraut, former Premier of France
Hon. W. Downie Stewart, former Minister of Defense, New Zealand
Arnold J. Toynbee, director of studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain
Sir Frederick Whyte, former president, Indian Legislative Assembly
W. W. Yen, former Chinese Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.

The American Institute of Pacific Relations, one of the national councils of the IPR, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization composed of about 1,100 businessmen, scholars, teachers, journalists, Government officials, community leaders, and others interested in contemporary Far Eastern problems. Membership is open to anyone but voting rights are limited to American citizens. The American Institute is governed by a board of about 60 trustees who are elected by the membership and who in turn elect the officers and members of the executive committee which supervises the work of the staff. Besides cooperating in the international IPR research and conference program, the American Institute publishes the fortnightly Far Eastern Survey, publishes books, pamphlets,

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reading lists and other educational materials, holds meetings, conferences and study groups, and in various ways, often in cooperation with other organizations, works to promote the study and discussion of Far Eastern problems in the United States.

A list of the members who have been executive committee members and of prominent Americans who have actively taken part in the work of the American IPR is given elsewhere in this statement.

How the institute is financed

The work of the international Institute of Pacific Relations is financed principally by contributions from its national councils and by grants from foundations. In the 26 years from 1925 through 1950 total receipts amounted to $2,569,000, an average of about $100,000 a year. Of this total, 48 percent came from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp., 40 percent from the national councils, 9 percent from sales of publications, and 3 percent from miscellaneous sources. The American IPR contributed 29 percent of the total receipts, the British and Canadian national councils 3 percent each, the China council 2 percent, and the Japanese council 1 percent; the eight other national councils each contributed less than 1 percent. Thus United States sources, including foundations, supplied 77 percent of the organization's income. If grants to the American IPR are included, the contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. to the work of the IPR through 1950 totals $2,176,000. In 1950 the Rockefeller Foundation voted a new grant of $50,000 to the international institute and $60,000 to the American IPR.

The American Institute of Pacific Relations derives its funds from membership subscriptions, gifts from individuals and corporations, and grants from foundations. From 1925 through 1950 its total net income was $2,536,000, of which 50 percent came from foundations (chiefly the Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Corp. and Carnegie Endowment), 33 percent from individual and corporate contributions, 12 percent from sales of publications, and 5 percent from miscellaneous sources. Leading contributors to the American IPR today include the Standard-Vacuum Oil Co., International General Electric Co., National City Bank, Chase National Bank, Bankers Trust Co., International Business Machines Corp., International Telephone and Telegraph Co., Electric Bond and Share Co., and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Lever Brothers (London) is a major contributor to the international IPR.

Among other large corporate contributors have been Alexander & Baldwin, American Trust Co., Castle & Cooke, Time Inc., J. P. Morgan, Studebaker Corp., Reader's Digest, American President Lines, Matson Steamship Co., Bank of Hawaii, Pan American Airways, Bank of America, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Shell Oil Co., National Cash Register, Wilbur Ellis Co., Bank of California, American Foreign Power Co.

Major individual contributors to the IPR have included the late Frank C. Atherton, Juan Trippe, Henry R. Luce, Jerome D. Greene, Mrs. Thomas W. Lamont, the late Joseph P. Chamberlain, Mrs. Frances Bolton, Joseph E. Davies, Mrs. Wallace Alexander, Mrs. Frank Gerbode, Arthur H. Dean and Gerard Swope. The large contributions of Frederick V. Field (total $60,000) and of the late Thomas W. Lamont (total $14,700) have already been reported in the press.

WHO WERE "ASSOCIATED" WITH THE IPR?—STATEMENT BY WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

The counsel for the McCarran subcommittee has made great efforts to show that numerous persons, many of whom are alleged to be Communist agents or sympathizers, were "associated" or "connected" with the IPR. Early in the hearings he required Mr. E. C. Carter to give quick "yes" or "no" answers on whether some 80 people on a list were "connected" in any way with the institute. In subsequent hearings, he has often said that certain persons had been shown to be "connected" with the institute. This "guilt by association" technique is so misleading and unfair that one must attempt to make some meaningful distinction between those who were closely and significantly associated with the IPR and those who had only marginal or negligible contacts.

Senator Ferguson has recently given a somewhat apologetic explanation of the fact that he was a member of the American IPR for 10 years and paid dues for 7. He described his association as merely "nominal" but it was certainly closer than that of some of the persons named in the testimony. However, he

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hardly need feel apologetic because he was in good company. Many other Senators and Congressmen, including Senators Flanders, Elbert Thomas, Thomas Hart, and Representatives such as Mrs. Frances Bolton, have been IPR members, have taken an active part in its meetings and contributed to its budget. Moreover, their associations extended over the period when Mr. Frederick V. Field was still active in the American IPR either as executive secretary (1934–40) or as a member of the executive committee (1941–47).

It should be noted first that dozens of people who have had no contact or association of any kind with the IPR have been named in the hearings. Only in a few cases has the subcommittee counsel troubled to point out that these people had nothing whatever to do with the institute. He has thus left the impression in the minds of the public that the IPR had numerous connections with various Communist agents, Soviet officials, and persons alleged to have transmitted official secrets to Communist couriers. Persons in this category include Nathan Silvermaster, Noel Field, J. Peters, Elizabeth Bentley and her lover Golos, Theodore Geiger, Jack Stachel, Louis Budenz, Louis Balemuth, Mary Price, Victor Perlo, Harrison George, General Berzin, General Krivitsky, and many others.

Second, many other people named as "associated" with the IPR have had only the most marginal, insignificant, contacts with it and have exerted no influence whatever on its activities or publications. Persons in this category include Duncan Lee, Solomon Adler, Harry White, Agnes Smedley, Mildred Price, John Service, John P. Davies, Lawrence Duggan, Frank Coe. Some of these people were ordinary dues-paying members for varying periods; some were personally acquainted with IPR staff members; some attended occasional IPR meetings. None of these persons were ever officers, trustees, or employees of the institute, or contributors to its publications, and none ever had any influence in the formulation or execution of its policies or programs. (The subcommittee's counsel made a labored effort to show the "association" of Agnes Smedley, an acknowledged Chinese Communist sympathizer though not herself a Communist Party member, with the IPR simply because she wrote a letter to the institute in 1941 asking IPR officers to request the International Red Cross to try to get a Chinese friend released from a Japanese internment camp in Hong Kong.)

The subcommittee has tried to make much of the institute's alleged associations with two well-known former Government officials, Lawrence Duggan and Harry White, both of them now dead, and unable to answer the charges of disloyalty brought against them by ex-Communists. The IPR never had the active cooperation of Mr. Duggan and Mr. White in its program. Neither was even an ordinary member of the institute. The subcommittee counsel has described Mr. White as a delegate to one of the IPR international conferences, whereas he was one of those invited but unable to accept. Mr. Duggan, as a State Department official, was informally consulted a few times about the possibility of establishing IPR groups in certain Latin-American countries.

The preposterous allegation has been made by Elizabeth Bentley that Mildred Price (for many years executive secretary of the China Aid Council, a well-known philanthropic society and one of the constituent agencies of United China Relief) was in charge of a Communist "unit" which had responsibility for the IPR and certain other Far East organizations. The facts are that Miss Price has played no part whatever in the institute's work. She has been an ordinary dues-paying member but has never been active in IPR affairs. She has never been a trustee, or served on IPR committees, or been a substantial financial contributor, or worked as an employee or advisor of the IPR or attended its conferences. She has very rarely even visited the IPR offices or been invited to meetings. At no time has she been in a position to know in detail anything of the program or administration of the institute. It is thus quite impossible for her to have been "responsible" for the IPR or to have influenced its policies, activities, or publications, even had she been inclined to do so (and there is certainly nothing in her conduct or attitudes to suggest that she would be).

Far more meaningful evidence of who were really "associated" with the IPR and really in a position to control, influence, and supervise its activities, were the able and loyal citizens who have served as active IPR officers and members of its executive committee and other major committees. The attached lists of members of the American IPR executive committee and members of other major comittees over the past 25 years or so gives an infinitely more authentic picture of who controlled and shaped the institute's policies and programs than the grotesque caricature painted in the subcommittee hearings. These people were not "dupes" or "window dressing" but actively participated in the American institute's affairs.

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AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC., EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS, 1927–51

Initials at end of line indicate member is or was at one time: C—chairman, American IPR; VC—vice chairman; T—treasurer; S—secretary.

Dates of committee membership

1929–39: Wallace M. Alexander,[1] Alexander & Baldwin Ltd., San Francisco (VC)
1947–48: Edward W. Allen,[1] Allen, Froude, Hilen & DeGarmo, Seattle
1948–51: Raymond B. Allen,[1] President, University of Washington, Seattle (VC)
1929–39: Carl L. Alsberg,[2] director, Food Research Institute, Stanford University (C)
1932–36: Newton D. Baker,[2] former United States Secretary of War (C)
1943–46: Eugene E. Barnett, international committee, YMCA
1948–49: Edward W. Beltz, Standard-Vacuum Oil Co.
1928–30: George H. Blakeslee, professor of international relations, Clark University
1949: Hugh Borton, East Asian Institute, Columbia University
1947: Lincoln C. Brownell, American Bank Note Co.
1943–45: Robert D. Calkins, School of Business, Columbia University
1927–32, 1940–44, 1946–51: Edward C. Carter, former secretary general, IPR (VC and S)
1932–34: Everett Case, president, Colgate University (T)
1932–42: Joseph P. Chamberlain,[2] professor of public law, Columbia University (VC)
1947–48: Dwight L. Clark,[1] Occidental Life Insurance Co., Los Angeles
1927–40, 1944–46: Ada L. Comstock (Notestein), former president, Radcliffe College (VC)
1932–36: George S. Counts, Teachers College, Columbia University
1946–47: John L. Curtis, National City Bank of New York
1946–50: Arthur H. Dean, partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York (VC)
1944–46: Raymond Dennett, World Peace Foundation, Boston (S)
1947–51: Walter F. Dillingham,[1] Oahu Land & Railway Co., Honolulu (VC)
1927–32: Stephen P. Duggan,[2] Institute of International Education
1934–47: Frederick V. Field, secretary, American IPR, 1934–40 (S)
1929–32, 1936–39: Galen M. Fisher, specialist on Japanese civilization, Berkeley
1946–48: Huntington Gilchrist, American Cyanamid Co.
1951: L. Carrington Goodrich, professor of Chinese, Columbia University
1927–39: Jerome D. Greene, former partner, Lee Higginson & Co. (C)
1939–42: Francis S. Harmon, Motion Picture Producers & Distributors of America (T)
1940–42: W. R. Herod, president, International General Electric Co. (VC)
1946, 1948, 1950: William L. Holland, secretary general, IPR (VC)
1927–32: Charles P. Howland,[2] professor of international relations, Yale University.
1943–46: G. Ellsworth Huggins,[2] Catlin, Farrish & Co. (T)
1927–32: Edward H. Hume, medical missionary in China
1936–40, 1944–46: Philip C. Jessup, professor of international law, Columbia University (C)
1932–36: Frederick P. Keppel,[2] president, Carnegie Corp. of New York
1927–32: William H. Kilpatrick, professor of education, Columbia University
1936–39: Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane (VC)
1927–30: Thomas W. Lamont,[2] J. P. Morgan & Co. (VC)
1948–50: Clayton Lane, executive secretary, American IPR, 1948–50 (S)
1949–51: Lewis Lapham, president, American Hawaiian Steamship Co.
1946–49: Owen Lattimore,[2] Walter Hines Page School of International Relations
1942–44, 1946–51: William W. Lockwood, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (S)
1950: James A. Mackay, National City Bank of New York
1950: Clifford B. Marshall, Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. (T)
1943–46: James L. McConaughy,[2] president, United China Relief
1929–32: Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, civic leader, San Francisco
1936–39: James D. Mooney, General Motors Export Corp.

[1] Regional nonquorum member.
[2] Deceased.

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Dates of committee membership

1941–43, 1946: Harriet L. Moore, research director, American Russian Institute (S)
1944–47: Lawrence Morris, Hawkins, Delafield & Wood, New York
1932–39: Mrs. James W. Morrisson, active in League of Women Voters (VC)
1951: J. Morden Murphy, Bankers Trust Co.
1937–42: Philo W. Parker, Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. (VC)
1936–38: Charles J. Rhoads, formerly Brown Bros. & Co., Philadelphia (T)
1927–32: Henry M. Robinson,[2] Security First National Bank, Los Angeles
1929–36: Chester Rowell,[2] San Francisco Chronicle
1943–46: Lawrence D. Seymour, Dodge & Seymour
1936–39: David L. Shillinglaw, David L. Shillinglaw & Co., Chicago
1927–36: James T. Shotwell, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1927–36: Mrs. F. Louis Slade,[2] active in League of Women Voters (VC)
1927–36: George Soule, editor, New Republic, 1924–47
1943–48: Robert Gordon Sproul, president, University of California (C)
1946: Donald B. Straus, Management Employee Relations, Inc. (T)
1950: Gerard Swope, honorary president, General Electric Co. (C)
1947–49, 1950: Donald G. Tewksbury, Teachers College, Columbia University
1932–36: Mrs. John Paul Welling, formerly vice president, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (VC)
1947–48: Lynn White, Jr.,[1] president, Mills College
1927–29, 1937–42, 1948–49: Ray Lyman Wilbur,[2] chancelor, Stanford University (C)
1951: Heaton L. Wrenn,[1] Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks, Honolulu (VC)

TWENTY DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS WHO HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS (EXCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE)

Carroll Binder, editorial editor, Minneapolis Tribune, Minneapolis; trustee, 1935–45; delegate, first and sixth IPR conferences; vice chairman, 1943–46.

Isaiah Bowman (deceased), geographer; formerly president, the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore; trustee, 1931–41; member, AIPR Research Committee, 1929–32.

Ralph J. Bunche, top-ranking director, Division of Trusteeship, United Nations; acting mediator on Palestine, United Nations; New York; Nobel Peace Prize; delegate, eighth and ninth IPR conferences; active in Washington IPR branch.

Brooks Emeny, president, Foreign Policy Association, New York; trustee, 1938 to date; delegate, sixth, seventh, and eighth IPR conferences; vice chairman, 1947–48.

Harold H. Fisher, chairman, Hoover War Library, Stanford University, Calif.; formerly, director, School of Naval Administration; chairman, American delegation, eleventh IPR conference. Member, AIPR Research Committee, 1948–51.

Henry F. Grady, formerly United States Ambassador to Iran; formerly president, American President Lines, San Francisco; trustee, 1941–49; active in San Francisco Bay region IPR work.

Mortimer Graves, administrative secretary, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington; delegate, ninth IPR conference; trustee, 1943–49; vice chairman, 1946–47.

Mrs. Edward H. Heller, member, Democratic National Committee; Democratic National Committeewoman for California, 1944–48; education secretary, War Finance Division, United States Treasury, northern California and Massachusetts, 1941–45; trustee, 1938–45; delegate, sixth IPR conference; active in San Francisco Bay region IPR branch.

Felix M. Keesing, executive head, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Stanford University, Calif.; United States Senior Commissioner, South Pacific Commission; delegate, fourth and ninth IPR conferences; member, AIPR Research Committee, 1945–48; author of three IPR research volumes.

Grayson Kirk, vice president and provost, Columbia University, New York; executive officer, Third Commission, San Francisco Conference, 1945; delegate, ninth IPR conference; member, AIPR Research Committee, 1944–48; chairman, International Program Committee, IPR, 1946.

[1] Regional nonquorum member.
[2] Deceased.

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Henry R. Luce, publisher, Time, Life, and Fortune, New York; director, United China Relief, and Yenching University, China; trustee, 1933–47; delegate, fifth IPR conference; vice chairman, 1946–47; member, finance committee, 1938–46.

Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, chairman, Far Eastern Commission, Washington; formerly president, Foreign Policy Association, New York; trustee, 1940–46; delegate, seventh, eighth, and ninth IPR conferences.

James G. McDonald, first United States Ambassador to Israel; formerly chairman of the board and honoray chairman, Foreign Policy Association, New York; formerly High Commissioner for Refugees From Germany; trustee, 1929–40; delegate, third and sixth IPR conferences; member, IPR Education Committee. 1929–30.

Donald M. Nelson, formerly Chairman, War Production Board, Washington; formerly president, Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers, Los Angeles; trustee, 1946–50; vice chairman, 1947–48; active in Los Angeles IPR branch.

Mrs. Aurelia Henry Reinhardt (deceased), formerly president, Mills College, Oakland, Calif.; trustee, 1927–44; delegate, third IPR conference; active in San Francisco Bay region IPR work.

W. W. Waymack, formerly vice president and editor, Des Moines Register and Tribune; formerly member, United States Atomic Energy Commission; Pulitzer Prize winner; trustee, 1941–43, 1951 to date; delegate, ninth IPR conference.

Sumner Welles, former Secretary of State, Washington; trustee, 1946 to date; vice chairman, 1947–48; chairman, Washington IPR branch, 1946–47.

Brayton Wilbur, Wilbur Ellis Co., San Francisco; trustee, 1943 to date; delegate, eighth IPR conference; member, nominating committee, 1943–46; treasurer, San Francisco Bay region division, IPR, 1942–46.

Quincy Wright, professor of international law, University of Chicago; formerly consultant, Foreign Economic Administration and Department of State; formerly technical adviser to American member, International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Germany; trustee, 1935–40; delegate, first, second, fifth, sixth, and seventh IPR conferences; member, AIPR Research Committee, 1928–32, 1938.

Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, United States Navy, retired; formerly commander in chief, United States Asiatic Fleet; trustee, 1940–46; delegate, seventh and eighth IPR conferences; vice chairman, 1943–46.

IPR PUBLICATIONS AND PUBLICATION POLICIES

Since 1925 the IPR has published about 220 major research volumes, written by scholars from a dozen or more countries, which may be found in libraries throughout the world, and which are recognized as standard works in their fields. They deal with such subjects as population problems, land utilization, agrarian problems, industrialization of eastern countries, the family, colonial administration, nationalist movements, labor problems, international politics, and international trade and investment in the Pacific area. In addition, several hundred monographs, data papers, pamphlets, and other smaller studies have been issued. The international institute publishes a quarterly magazine, Pacific Affairs, and several of the national councils issue their own periodicals.

The following titles, taken at random from the long IPR publications list, illustrate the character of its research and publications:

British Economic Interests in the Far East, by E. M. Gull (1943)
Commodity Control in the Pacific Area edited by W. L. Holland
Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific by Philip Wright (1935)
British Rule in Eastern Asia by Lennox A. Mills (1942)
The State of Asia by Lawrence K. Rosinger
Asia and the West by Maurice Zinkin
China's Economic Stabilization and Reconstruction by D. K. Lieu (1948)
Banking and Finance in China by Frank M. Tamagna (1942)
Land Utilization in China by J. Lossing Buck (1937)
History of Press and Public Opinion in China by Lin Yu-tang (1936)
Land and Labor in China by R. H. Tawney (1932)
China, the Land and the People by Gerald Winfield (1948)
The Struggle for North China by George E. Taylor (1940)
Essays on the Manchurian Problem by Shuhsi Hsu (1932)
The Western World and Japan by Sir George Sansom (1950)
Japanese Industry by G. C. Allen (1940)
Western Influences on Modern Japan by I. Nitobe and others (1931)
Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction by Jerome S. Cohen (1949)

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Government in Japan by C. B. Fahs (1940)
Japan's Emergence as a Modern State by E. Herbert Norman (1940)
The Chinese in Southeast Asia by Victor Purcell (1951)
Colonial Policy and Practice by J. S. Furnivall (1948)
The Economic Development of French Indochina by Charles Robequain (1944)
The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy by J. H. Boeke (1942)
The Left Wing in Southeast Asia by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (1950)
Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia by Rupert Emerson and others (1942)
Thailand, the New Siam by Virginia Thompson (1941)
The South Seas in the Modern World by Felix M. Keesing (1941)
Agricultural Organization in New Zealand by Horace Belshaw (1936)
Australia and the Far East edited by I. Clunies Ross (1936)

A fuller list is available in the printed catalog issued regularly by the IPR.

It is worth noting that most of the studies published by the institute are purely factual and descriptive, expressing no political judgments or sympathies. Among the few that are concerned with political and ideological problems, there are some which describe the methods of the Communists in Asia and the ways in which they try, sometimes successfully, to appeal to Asian peoples. In a few articles or chapters, some writers in IPR publications have described the earlier phases of Chinese Communist activities in a relatively sympathetic way. Other IPR articles or reports have, of course, been highly critical of Communist policies and practices. But no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs.

It is worth noting also that very few of the institute's publications deal with Russia. The institute has not concerned itself with internal conditions in the U. S. S. R. as a whole, but only with Soviet Asia and Soviet relations with far eastern countries. Similarly, publications on China form only a fraction of the institute's total output. The great majority of its publications deal with Japan, India, southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and the far eastern interests or policies of North American or Western European nations. Publications on China and Russia together form probably less than 20 percent of the institute's total product.

Manuscripts of IPR publications are always submitted before publication for comment and criticism by competent authorities. The author is requested to take such comments carefully into account in revising his study, though he himself naturally makes the decision and accepts responsibility for his final text.

ANTI-COMMUNIST WRITERS IN IPR PUBLICATIONS

Following is a partial list of writers well known for their active opposition to communism, whose work the IPR has published. This should dispel any notion that the IPR tended to favor authors sympathetic to communism.

Edwin M. Borchard
Joseph W. Ballantine
Jan O. M. Broek
Kurt Bloch
William Henry Chamberlin
George B. Cressey
J. B. Condliffe
C. B. Fahs
Randall Gould
Robert J. Kerner
Paul M. A. Linebarger
Paul Langer
Herrymon Maurer
Robert C. North
David N. Rowe
Rodger Swearingen
Benjamin Schwartz
H. Arthur Steiner
Milton Sacks
George E. Taylor
Gerald F. Winfield
John N. Washburn
Hu Shih
Franklin Ho
Lin Yutang
Chiang Mon-lin
Shuhsi Hsu
Max Beloff
L. E. Hubbard
Sir Frederic Eggleston
Victor Purcell
Gerard Friters
Roger Levy
H. J. van Mook
M. R. Masani
J. Lossing Buck
Percy E. Corbett
Lenox A. Mills
Shiroshi Nasu
E. Stuart Kirby
Sir George Sansom
Robert A. Fearey
Sir Frederick Whyte
C. M. Chang
Walter H. Millis
Arnold J. Toynbee
D. K. Lieu

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THE INSTITUTE IS NONPARTISAN

At the outset of its existence, the institute adopted the principle of complete nonpartisanship. The constitutions of the international institute and of all its national councils provide that the organization shall advocate no policies and express no opinions on public issues. This does not mean that individual members of the institute, or delegates to its conferences, or writers for its publication, may not express their personal opinions. On the contrary, a major purpose of the institute is to provide a forum in which issues of the day may be debated from all points of view.

Thus the institute is not a society of like-minded people interested in advancing some particular philosophy or policy. It is not even a federation of like-minded groups, for there are wide differences in national outlook, organizational structure, and operative methods among its national councils. Its membership is very diverse, including people of many different professional and business interests and of nearly all shades of political opinion. This is true to a degree which would be hard to find in an organization promoting some particular cause or "line."

Moreover, since it is international, the IPR membership represents different national viewpoints as well. Institute conferences are invariably marked by frequent differences of opinion, often among the delegates from a single country. The one thing that all institute members agree on is that reliable and up-to-date information about the Pacific area is urgently needed if the citizens and governments of that area are to adopt and carry out wise policies. To the advancement of such knowledge, the institute has devoted itself for the past 26 years.

In its research program the institute uses the best professionally qualified people it can find. Because it has always recognized the importance of having the facts analyzed from a variety of viewpoints, it has never been identified with any one school of thought, with any political faction, or with any one national outlook. It has permitted writers of very diverse opinions to express their own views about any problem or government, but has insisted that these opinions be clearly indicated as those of the writer alone, not of the institute.

Perhaps, the best evidence that the institute has been truly nonpartisan is in the character of the criticism which it has received in the 26 years of its existence. This has come from many directions. For example, before the war the institute was criticized by Japanese writers for allegedly favoring the cause of Nationalist China against Japan. Since the war it has been attacked by certain partisan critics in the United States for allegedly helping to ruin Nationalist China. It has also been denounced by Russian writers in Soviet publications who have called it a mouthpiece of Wall Street imperialism and similar epithets. Its initials were once interpreted by an Australian Communist publication as standing for "Institute of Pirates and Robbers," because the Rockefeller Foundation gave it such large financial support.

THE INSTITUTE DOES NOT TRY TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The claim that the institute has exerted a strong influence on the Department of State is unfounded. Many of its publications have of course been read by officers of the Department, but its publications represent no consensus of views. For the institute is not an "action" organization. It takes no stand on public issues. It does not pass resolutions and it does not engage in lobbying. It makes no attempt to influence in any way the policy of the United States or any other government.

Specific evidence on this point is given by Joseph W. Ballantine, who was a member of the Department of State from 1937 to 1946, serving as Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Deputy Director and later Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Mr. Ballantine says in a recent letter:

"During the period that I served in the Department of State I never sought or received any advice on United States far eastern policy from the Institute of Pacific Relations; nor am I aware of any attempts being made during that period by the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence United States foreign policy. May I add that over an even longer period covering my acquaintance with the Institute of Pacific Relations, so far as I know it has consistently adhered to its avowed aim of serving as a nonpartisan research agency and to a policy of not engaging in action movements or in sponsoring any particular doctrine or policy."

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But, it may be asked, even if the institute as such does not push particular policies, what about its members; what about its publications? The answer is that people of diametrically opposite opinions may be found among the members of the American Institute and also among those who write for it. If the Department of State had adopted all of the suggestions that have been put forward individually by institute members or by writers in institute publications, it would have found itself moving in a great many different directions at the same time.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that officers of the institute have had occasional contact with members of the Department of State. Such contacts are regularly maintained by every large American organization in business, education, and other fields. Nor is it remarkable, much less a matter for censure, that several former officers and staff members of the American Institute have entered Government service. During the war, in particular, many such persons were glad to place their special training and knowledge at the disposal of their country, and the institute was proud that it had helped to train a good many younger specialists who were available when the country needed them. The institute is not alone in this distinction. It is equally true of such institutions as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, and the Foreign Policy Association. Indeed, the first of these has always had much closer and more lasting relations with the State Department than the IPR. There is hardly a university or a large business firm in the country which has not likewise furnished specialized talent to the Army, Navy, State Department, or other Government agencies. This is evidence that the institute has performed a valuable public service; it is not evidence of insidious "infiltration."

SOME FALSE IMPRESSIONS

To answer all of the false or misleading statements that have been made about the institute would require a book. The following paragraphs deal with only a few major allegations that have been mentioned in the press.

WAS THE INSTITUTE CONTROLLED BY COMMUNISTS?

Few people who look at the facts would claim that the institute is under Communist influence today. The ex-Communist Louis Budenz has recently made the palpably absurd statement that it is a "captive" organization "completely controlled" by the Communists. Last year, however, he made the contradictory assertion before the Tydings committee that it was not a Communist organization. He alleged, however, that in earlier years, especially in the late thirties and early forties, Communists "infiltrated" the organization, set up a "Red cell centering round the IPR," and used institute publications as a channel for spreading Communist propaganda.

Budenz' testimony has been specifically refuted by his former Communist associates, Earl Browder and Bella Dodd. Nevertheless this story has come to be regarded as plausible by some people, who say: "Well, the Reds probably did plant a few of their people in the IPR and did use it for their purposes in past years, but these people were mostly cleaned out several years ago, especially in 1947 when Frederick V. Field was asked to resign from the board of the American IPR."

Because this view is held by some responsible persons, even by some friends of the institute, it merits careful consideration. But evidence to prove it is hard to find. If Communists had succeeded in infiltrating the institute and controlling its policies, would not the institute's publications have given clear evidence of Communist influence? But analysis of its publications in this period demonstrates that the institute was, as usual, publishing a large variety of materials on many subjects, reflecting many points of view, and written by qualified writers of many schools of opinion, including known anti-Communists. Even on the controversial topic of China's internal politics, which is discussed at more length below, institute publications did not support any one interpretation of China's problems; some of them, indeed, were written by supporters of the Nationalist Government.

No two scholars, probably, would agree exactly in their evaluation of institute publications in this period. Some people may honestly believe that several of these publications are open to criticism in the light of information that is available today. Others may feel that they have found what they consider evidence of bias in a very few of the institute's many publications. Other equally eminent scholars have not found such bias. Some experts would express

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criticisms which are in complete contradiction to those voiced by others. It seems clear that whatever differences of opinion may exist about this or that book or article, there was no deliberate or consistent attempt on the part of the institute to slant its research material in one particular direction. Such an attempt could not have escaped detection by the institute's officers, who have always been alert to see that the institute's objective and nonpartisan character was maintained.

The Soviet Council of the IPR

Stories have appeared in the press to the effect that the institute files seized by the McCarran subcommittee "revealed" a contribution of $2,500 from "Moscow" to the institute, with the implication that the institute was a paid agent of Soviet propaganda. There is no truth whatever in this implication.

The institute has never made any attempt to conceal the sources of its funds, which have been published in its official reports. They were fully investigated by the FBI and by the Tydings committee in 1950, and the facts were made public at that time.

The international work of the institute is supported by contributions from its affiliated national councils, together with foundation grants. A Russian scientific society, the Pacific Institute, was admitted as a national council in 1934. It was made up of representatives of leading Soviet scientific societies concerned with the Far East, and headed by a leading geographer, Prof. V. E. Motylev of the institute of the Soviet World Atlas. The Russians were never active, however, except on one occasion, in 1936, they sent no delegates to institute conferences, nor did they seem interested in cooperating in its research program. After 1939 they took no part in the institute's activities, neglecting to answer even routine correspondence. In 1950 the institute learned from reports in the Soviet press that the Pacific Institute in Russia had been dissolved.

The only IPR publications originating with the Soviet Council were one article on The Sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, published in Pacific Affairs in 1935, and five descriptive pamphlets on economic aspects of the Soviet Far East, submitted to an IPR conference in 1936. In other words, the Russians made almost no attempt themselves to present their policy and views through the medium of the institute.

Between 1935 and 1939 the Soviet Council, like other national councils, contributed annually to the institute, its contributions ranging from $2,000 to $3,000. These contributions were unconditional and had no strings attached. The total annual budget of the institute in these years ran from $90,000 to $100,000, of which contributions from the Soviet Council represented 2 to 3 percent. After 1939 no funds were received from Soviet sources.

From its foundation in 1925 through 1950 the total income of the international Institute of Pacific Relations amounted, in round figures, to $2,569,000, an average of about $100,000 per year. Of this total, Soviet contributions represented one-half of 1 percent.

The statement of Gen. Alexander Barmine before the McCarran subcommittee to the effect that in 1933 Soviet military intelligence officers used the institute as "cover" for obtaining secret military intelligence, was the rankest hearsay. There is not a shred of evidence to support it, much less to justify the outrageous insinuation that institute staff members would have been willing to act as agents for Soviet military intelligence. General Barmine himself clearly showed while giving his testimony that he had serious doubts as to the validity of this so-called evidence. When asked by a Senator whether the FBI had the "evidence" that Barmine had just given to the subcommittee, he replied, "Well, if you call it evidence * * *."

The publications of the institute are found in many libraries and are available for sale to anyone. They have been widely used as reference works by teachers, journalists, and Government officials, including military intelligence officers of many countries. Russian officers may have used them in this way, but there is nothing sinister in that. The institute is not in any sense an agency for collecting secret or confidential information. Its reference files are open and so are its library and publications. It has never been in the employ or under the control of any government and has never been an agent of any government's intelligence service.

Soviet criticism of the IPR

There is documentary evidence which shows the type of attack to which the IPR has been subjected in the Soviet Union. A Soviet propaganda campaign was carried on against the eleventh IPR conference held at Lucknow, India,

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in 1950. Articles attacking the conference appeared in Izvestia and in Tass releases repeatedly, and were broadcast by the Moscow radio. The IPR was said to be an organization financed by American industrialists who were using the conference to see how they could capture the "enormous markets and sources of raw materials" of the Far East that they were in the process of losing. The aim of the conference was also, it was said, to find "methods and means by which the national liberation movement can be undermined from within, and 'nationalism' can be used for the struggle against the Communist parties." The following are other typical quotations:

"The eleventh conference on Pacific problems has opened at Lucknow. Such conferences are being convened once every 3 years by the Institute of Pacific Relations, a private organization, the center of which is in the United States of America. The institute exists on donations from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Trust and from large United States entrepreneurs, who are interested in the exploitation of the natural resources of the countries of Asia and the Pacific area. The leaders of this institute, which acts under the dictation of the State Department, are using the conferences which are being convened for them for working on the public opinion of eastern countries in the interests of American imperialism. The conference in Lucknow debated the question of nationalism in the Far East and its international importance. A leading role in the conference is being played by William Holland, American secretary general of the Pacific Council—a sort of executive body of the institute.

"Judging by press reports, the discussion centers on the question of the methods and means by which the national liberation movement can be undermined from within, and 'nationalism'—the desire of the people of these countries for national independence—can be used for the struggle against Communist parties, which are marching in the vanguard of the national movement. For instance, Holland proposed that the reactionary governments of Asia should use religion in the struggle against the growing influence of the Communist parties. He also hinted at the desirability of those countries employing experienced administrators—in other words American advisers and consultants. At the conference several round-table groups have been formed for discussing questions connected with the situation in individual countries.

"It emerges from press reports that the meetings of these groups are largely devoted to questions of struggle against the Communist parties of various countries of Asia. From the rostrum at Lucknow speeches are made which contain slanderous attacks against the U. S. S. R. and C. P. R. The conference is also debating the question of a peace treaty with Japan and the Constitution of Japan and it is assumed that a discussion will be held on the Korean question" (Tass, October 7, 1950).

"Reviewing international events, 'Izvestia' today carries an article on the Lucknow conference, saying that the conference on Pacific problems in Lucknow, serves as a striking illustration of the fact that the Asian peoples do not believe a single word when the representatives of American imperialism say that they wish well toward the countries of Asia.

"Between October 3 and 15, the so-called Institute of Pacific Relations, whose permanent secretariat is in New York, held its eleventh conference in Lucknow.

"This institute is one of the unofficial channels by which American imperialism exercises influence over the Asian countries.

"The conference was attended by some 150 delegates from 11 countries, not yet free of imperialist influences. The aims of the conference, and its real sponsors, were very obvious from the agenda.

"It is enough to mention here that the Lucknow conference discussed the question of combating the democratic movement in the countries of southeast Asia, and what is called regional cooperation among the southeast Asian countries, as well as 'American economic aid,' and so on.

"It is not difficult to guess that the American imperialists sought to utilize the conference as a subsidiary organ for preparing the ground to hammer together under United States aegis another aggressive military bloc, this time for southeast and south Asia" (Moscow Radio Voice English 2130-hours, October 26, 1950, beamed to southeast Asia).

Another example of Soviet criticism is to be found in an article which appeared in 1949 in Voprosy Istorii, the leading historical journal of the Soviet Union. This was a 24-page article attacking American historians for falsifying American policy in China. Fifteen pages were devoted to violently criticizing a book (American Policy and the Chinese Revolution) published by the IPR in

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1947, written by Dr. Dorothy Borg. At the outset, the article stated that: "The American Institute of Pacific Relations * * * invariably mentions in the introductions to its publications its alleged objectivity * * *. The example of the Borg book shows perhaps especially clearly the true value of this imperialist objectivity." In the same article the writer also denounces Owen Lattimore's analysis of the Chinese bourgeoisie as follows:

"The desire to blacken and slander the struggle of the working people of China during the revolution of 1925–27 is explained not only by the quite understandable hatred of revolutionary movements of the masses on the part of the learned lackeys of imperialism. Slander in this case is also used for the purpose of representing, contrary to truth, the Chinese bourgeoisie, which has betrayed the country's national interest, as the progressive force in the Chinese national liberation movement.

"In one form or another this little idea can be found in the works of all the above-named authors. Most clearly it has been formulated by Chiang Kai-shek's former American adviser during the Second World War, Lattimore. Lattimore declared the Chiang Kai-shek clique to be 'the bearer of the revolutionary traditions' of the Chinese people. The bought rulers of Kuomintang China, according to Lattimore, are 'the sons and disciples of the Chinese revolutionaries of 20 or 30 years ago.'[1] As for the betrayal of revolution by the Kuomintang in 1927, Lattimore considered it to be only a sensible desire to make a certain 'pause' in order to 'consolidate its already impressive victories (?!) and try to win by negotiation (with foreign powers—author) the rest of what had yet to be won.'"[2]

Frederick V. Field's role in the institute

But what about Frederick V. Field? Mr. Field has not been active in the American IPR since 1947, when he was requested to resign from the board of trustees. He had been executive secretary of the American Institute from 1934 to 1940. Whether Mr. Field was secretly a Communist while he was a member of the institute staff cannot be ascertained, but his actions suggest that it was only after he resigned his institute job that he began to engage in outside pro-Communist activities. There is widespread agreement that as secretary of the American Institute Mr. Field was scrupulously correct and impartial in his research work and administration.

Many people can testify to this from personal knowledge. When, in June 1940, Mr. Field expressed a desire to resign as secretary, many distinguished members of the American Institute expressed, in more than formal terms, their admiration for the work he had done in the IPR. These included Frank C. Atherton of Castle and Cooke, Honolulu; D. G. Crawford, president of the University of Hawaii; Prof. Philip C. Jessup, of Columbia University; F. P. Keppel, president of the Carnegie Corp.; Mrs. Ada McComstock Notestein, president of Radcliffe College; Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, president of Stanford University; and Prof. Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago.

When, in September, Mr. Field definitely submitted his resignation, the executive committee accepted it only after satisfying themselves that he could not be induced to reconsider his decision. The chairman of the executive committee at that time was Philo W. Parker, president of the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Subsequently the board of trustees adopted a resolution commending his many services to the institute, which concluded:

"Throughout his connection with the institute he has been most scrupulous and exacting in maintaining the highest objective standards for his own IPR writing and that of his colleagues. * * * The board of trustees desire that the officers assure Mr. Field that he will be eagerly welcomed back to the active staff of the American Council when he completes his present work."

Similarly, between 1940 and 1947, when he was a trustee of the American Institute and a member of its executive committee, those who were associated with him testify that he never tried to inject pro-Communist views into the publications or meetings of the institute, but always supported its traditional policy of nonpartisan research. Even though many other trustees and members of the executive committee were strongly opposed to his outside political activities (after his resignation from the staff), they found nothing to censure in his conduct within and concerning the institute.

[1] Lattimore, Owen and Eleanor, The Making of Modern China, p. 183, London, 1945.
[2] Lattimore, ibid., p. 138. Here are clearly to be seen the causes of Lattimore's friendliness for Chiang Kai-shek and company. He is being attracted by the refusal of this clique of traitors to oppose imperialist expansion or to struggle for the genuine national liberation of China.

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In retrospect many members of the American Institute naturally feel today that Mr. Field should have withdrawn from the board of trustees several years earlier than 1947. There was no valid legal ground for ousting him from the board (to which he had been duly elected by vote of the membership). However, after considerable discussion the officers of the American Institute pressed him in 1947 to resign, not because of any unbecoming conduct on his part within the organization, but because his pro-Communist outside activities seemed likely to damage the institute's public reputation.

The scholarly quality and objectivity of Mr. Field's research work for the institute are clearly shown in his two major publications, American Participation in the China Consortiums (1931), a specialized monograph, and the Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area (1934), a widely used factual reference work. Examination of these books will demonstrate their scholarly and objective character. Mr. Field may well be criticized for his subsequent pro-Communist activities and writings after he left the institute staff. But it is clear that these books are not vehicles of Communist propaganda.

Mr. Field's financial contributions to the American Institute formed only a small fraction of its total income. His gifts were all unconditional. They amounted to $60,000, contributed mostly between 1934 and 1947. This represented about 3 percent of the American Institute's total receipts in that period. On the other hand, during much of the period 1934–40 Mr. Field drew a salary from the American Institute. It is worth noting that several other individuals also contributed very large sums over considerable periods to the institute, and during the years when Mr. Field was secretary.

The institute and Amerasia

It is sometimes thought that the magazine Amerasia was sponsored by the institute. This is not the case. Amerasia was independently financed, chiefly by Philip Jaffe. Founded in 1937, it was recognized for at least 5 years thereafter as a useful journal of opinion on far eastern topics, reflecting many points of view. Its board of editors included several of the leading, and by no means pro-Communist, far eastern specialists in the United States, and it published articles from a large number of reputable scholars, businessmen, and journalists of differing nationality and point of view.

In its early years Amerasia carried articles by many well-known non-Communist writers, some of whom also wrote at various times for the Institute of Pacific Relations. Several members of its editorial board had also served for varying periods on the staff or on the board of trustees of the American Institute. Many institute members wrote for it, as did most of the far eastern specialists in the country at one time or another.

After about 1943, when it became clear that Mr. Jaffe wished to use the magazine chiefly to advance his own ideas, most of the members of the editorial board resigned, and in 1944 it appeared under the sole editorship of Mr. Jaffe and Miss Kate Mitchell. Mr. Jaffe is a member of the American Institute but was never an officer, a trustee, or a member of its staff, nor did he ever hold any position in the International Institute. He never served on IPR committees or played any part in formulating IPR programs.

The institute did not "smear" Nationalist China

Recent charges that the institute, at the instigation of Communists, began a "smear campaign" against Nationalist China are merely a rehash of earlier, discredited allegations made in 1944 by Alfred Kohlberg. They were fully investigated at the time by the executive committee of the American Institute, which concluded that they were without foundation. This conclusion was endorsed in 1947 by an overwhelming vote of the membership. Nevertheless these discredited allegations were repeated and circulated by Mr. Kohlberg long after their falsity had been demonstrated. They were then picked up by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in his attacks on Owen Lattimore and Dr. Philip C. Jessup in 1950. They were rehashed again in Miss Freda Utley's book, The China Story, and now they are being repeated once more before the McCarran subcommittee.

Mr. Kohlberg's accusations referred to writings and statements made as far back as 1938. Yet until Mr. Kohlberg made his charges, toward the end of 1944, at a time when American policy toward China was becoming the subject of controversy in the United States, no one had ever seriously suggested that the institute was under Communist control. On the contrary, institute publications were being praised in many countries, including Nationalist China, and the China Council of the institute continued its active participation in the IPR and made generous contributions to the institute's international budget right up to

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1949. It is surely astonishing that among the whole body of far eastern specialists who were thoroughly familiar with the IPR and its publications, none detected this alleged following of the Communist party line by the IPR, and that only Mr. Kohlberg made this "discovery."

Examination of institute publications on China between 1938 and 1944 reveals many which were pro-China in the sense of exposing Japanese aggressive operations against China, but nothing even remotely resembling a "campaign" against the Chinese Nationalist Government. Numerous books, pamphlets, and articles on China were issued in this period by the institute's international secretariat and its national councils. Several of them were written by leading Chinese Nationalist scholars. Most were purely descriptive. A few were in part critical of conditions in Nationalist China, but also praised China's resistance to Japan.

Particular mention has been made of one article published in the Far Eastern Survey in 1943, by T. A. Bisson, a well known far eastern expert, who criticized certain aspects of the Nationalist Government and spoke favorably of some features of then small Communist areas of China. Mr. Bisson has categorically denied the allegation that he wrote this article at the behest of American Communist leaders. It was followed in the next issue by a vigorous rebuttal of Mr. Bisson's article from the pen of Dr. C. L. Hsia, a Nationalist Government official. At this same period Life magazine, the New York Times, the Reader's Digest and other periodicals were publishing much more outspoken criticisms of corruption and military incompetence in Nationalist China, written by Pearl Buck, Brooks Atkinson, Hanson Baldwin, and others. Indeed, it can be argued that the institute, partly out of deference to the feelings of its China council, failed to publish as much as it might have done on the internal deterioration of Nationalist China after about 1943, which is now admitted even by many Chinese Nationalist writers.

This point deserves notice because today we are beginning to see the development of situations in other parts of Asia where ominous internal situations may have to be reported bluntly and honestly if the public is to get a realistic understanding of the problems of Asia with which the United States Government must deal. If an independent organization like the Institute of Pacific Relations is to do its job effectively in such a vital area and at such a critical period as the present, it cannot evade the frank but informed and balanced discussion of these controversial issues. Its duty indeed is to analyze such issues and present the facts as objectively as possible before the problems come into the headlines, so that editorial writers, commentators, and lecturers can have the benefit of accurate and reliable background studies on which to base their own writing or speaking.

The institute has not advocated Chinese Communist policies or published propaganda for the Chinese Communists. It has published a few factual reports analyzing Chinese communism, which have described its sources of strength as well as its sources of weakness. Such realistic appraisals are indispensable if we are to deal intelligently with the problem of communism. The IPR did not start or promote the theory that the Chinese Communists were "mere agrarian reformers." Probably the most prominent person to assert that the Chinese Communists were not "real" Communists was Ambassador Patrick Hurley.

No doubt many authors who wrote on China for the institute in the early 1940's would revise some of their judgments in the light of today's knowledge. How good a job the institute has done in covering the complex and changing problems of China will always be a matter of individual opinion. But the evidence does not support charges of a smear campaign against the National Government or of pro-Communist bias.

The institute has not been listed as a subversive organization

The name of the Institute of Pacific Relations has never appeared on the list of subversive organizations issued by the Attorney General.

In 1948 the institute was improperly included in a list of hundreds of so-called "subversive" organizations compiled by the California Senate Committee on Un-American Activities (the Tenney committee). This listing was made, without hearings or other proper investigation, on the basis of the unsubstantiated allegations made earlier by Alfred Kohlberg. As a result of protests from the institute, the Tenney committee removed the institute's name from its list in its 1949 report.

In March 1951, however, the Committee on Un-American Activities of the United States House of Representatives issued a Guide to Subversive Organizations which included the institute on the basis of its 1948 listing by the California committee, ignoring the fact that the California committee had changed its

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mind in 1949, although the institute had brought this fact to the attention of the House committee.

The myth of the "powerful combine"

In her book, The China Story, Miss Freda Utley speaks of a "powerful combine," including the Institute of Pacific Relations and various other groups and individuals, which "exerted paramount influence on the press and radio and on lecture platforms * * * to spread the gospel according to Mao Tse-tung." According to Miss Utley this combine exerted a controlling influence over the book-review columns of the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, and the Saturday Review of Literature; over Harper's magazine and the Atlantic Monthly, which "rarely if ever published articles on the Far East unfavorable to the Communist cause"; and even over the eminent columnist Walter Lippman, one of the many publicists who, according to Miss Utley, followed the "IPR-State Department line."

In all this farrago about combines and interlocking directorates there is just one grain of truth, which Miss Utley and others have seen fit to distort for their own purposes. This is that most of the leading American students of the contemporary Far East having during the past 25 years been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations in one way or another. A list of Americans whose books, articles, or special studies have been published by the institute would almost constitute a Who's Who of the outstanding scholars in the field. As pointed out above, these men and women represented a wide diversity of views. When the institute is described as a "powerful combine" pushing some particular "line" of thought or action, the scholars who know its work best are either angry or amused.

But while differing among themselves, as a group these writers have reflected the scholarly opinion of their day. The institute, in other words, is one of the organs through which American—and world—scholarship on contemporary Asia has found expression. Insofar as its publications show a changing emphasis over the years, this reflects changes in the currents of scholarly interest and informed opinion in the United States and other countries. The institute reflects such currents; it does not create them.

As William W. Lockwood has pointed out in a recent letter to the New York Times, the attack on the institute by Senator McCarthy and others is an attack on a whole generation of American scholarship on the Far East. Such an attack has ominous implications for American democracy both at home and abroad. As Mr. Lockwood says:

"There are no easy answers to the problems of Asia. But the least we can do in our own interest is to encourage American officials, journalists, scholars, and businessmen to report freely and honestly their findings, without fear of being irresponsibly labeled as Communists, black reactionaries, or anything else. Otherwise we shall sacrifice one of the chief assets of democracy in its struggle against communism."

The institute welcomes constructive criticism

The institute has no objection whatever to constructive criticism of its work; on the contrary it has always welcomed such criticism. But constructive criticism is very different from irresponsible allegations of disloyalty and treason.

The institute does not contend that in the administration of an extremely large and varied program of research, publications and conferences in many countries over a period of 26 years, in which a great many people have taken part, none of its officers or staff members ever made any mistakes. In evaluating the institute's record there is room for differences of opinion. The institute has been criticized by some for being too academic and specialized in its research, by others for being too concerned with current, quasi-journalistic studies of contemporary events, by others for not focusing on a few basic topics, and by still others for not trying to exert a direct influence on the formation of public opinion at the grass roots level. There is some basis for all of these criticisms and institute officers constantly try to take them into account, within the limits of the institute's modest budget.

The institute does not claim that none of its voluminous publications is open to criticism, but it does indignantly repudiate the suggestion that it has deliberately departed from the principle of nonpartisanship which is basic to its very existence. It specifically denies the untrue and insulting allegation that its policies have been secretly determined by the Communist Party or any other political group. An analysis of its record demonstrates the falsity of this outrageous charge.

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In these days there is sometimes a temptation to go to absurd lengths to prove that an organization or an individual is not Communist. It is a fact that none of the institute's officers are Communists. The institute's officers do not maintain that the institute has never had any Communists or Communist sympathizers among its dues-paying members or among the contributors to its periodicals. Anyone, whatever his political affiliations, can become a member of the American Institute by paying his membership fee, just as anyone can join the National Geographic Society. The institute, like other similar organizations, has accepted articles and manuscripts on their professional merits and has not conducted special investigations into the open or clandestine political affiliations of their authors.

Finally, it is important for westerners and especially for Americans to remember that the institute is an international organization which has many members in Asia. In most Asian countries its reputation today stands high because it has refused to become a platform for the prevailing views of any one nation, but has tried to remain a forum for the expression of different national attitudes. Strange as it may seem to Americans today, one of the risks that the institute runs is that its repute among leading non-Communist Asians may suffer because they feel it is becoming too much subject to the pressures of American party politics and to the pressure of pro-Chinese Nationalist groups in the United States.

Against this danger and against the risk of allowing the institute to be used as an instrument for either left-wing or right-wing partisan groups, the institute's officers will continue to be vigilant. They believe that both institute members and the general public will recognize the value of an organization which does not preach or propagandize but simply tries to supply accurate and up-to-date information about that crucially important part of the human race which lives in the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, just to show how impossible it is to ask any questions on that press release today, there is a reference in there about Mr. William Henry Chamberlin being a writer for the IPR. He is cited as somebody who is anti-Communist, has a reputation for being anti-Communist. Well, there is, for instance, a report in the files, just as an example, where Mr. Carter admitted in a meeting in Moscow that it was a mistake for William Chamberlin's article to have appeared in Pacific Affairs, and we also have Pacific Affairs here with Owen Lattimore, then the editor, repudiating the article officially in his publication. I don't know how many other instances of unfair allegations are made in that statement, but it is impossible for the staff to be given a press release today and for them to be able to ask Mr. Holland any questions on it.

I cite that as one of the examples of the impossibility of this and of the wisdom of the committee rule that such a statement should be submitted well in advance.

Mr. SOURWINE. The point you are making, Mr. Morris, is, is it not, that the placing of it in the record now in this way without asking further questions about it is not to be taken as an indication that there may not be subsequent challenge to any or all of the statements.

Mr. HOLLAND. I accept that.

Senator WATKINS. That is really a brief, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I do not consider it a brief, because I unfortunately have not had the time as yet to deal with any of the scores of——

Senator WATKINS. As far as it goes?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, Mr. Chairman, I would say that it is much more a general introductory factual statement. If you will allow me later the privilege of dealing with many of the specific statements which have been made which I consider incorrect or misleading, I would certainly love to do that.

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Senator SMITH. Are there incorrect or misleading statements in here? Did you say you want to have the chance to correct incorrect or misleading statements contained herein?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I mean if you will allow me later to correct——

Senator SMITH. In other words, you stand for the truthfulness of every statement of fact made herein?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my knowledge and belief, yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you are willing to affirm every statement contained herein as true, the same as if you made it verbally here in this hearing?

You are willing to swear to the truth of the statements here contained?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure of the procedures involved here. I have already told you that I considered this to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator SMITH. I want to know if this is a statement that you are willing to stand on as a statement of facts sworn to.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I consult on that?

(Brief consultation with Mr. Crossman.)

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir; certainly.

Senator WATKINS. You want that to be considered as a part of your sworn testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. My hesitation was because I thought there was a legal problem involved.

Senator SMITH. What I want to know is whether you want that to be considered as a part of your sworn testimony subject to the penalties of perjury.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And, as counsel has suggested, you would be willing to read it into the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. And I suggest that it be made a part of the printed record.

Senator WATKINS. As if you had read it as part of your testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it upset you, Mr. Morris, if I started a new line very briefly?

Mr. MORRIS. No. That is all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar, Mr. Holland, with the press release issued by Mr. Girard Swope attacking this committee and its procedure?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am familiar with the release. I was present at the press conference when it was given.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist in the preparation of that press release?

Mr. HOLLAND. To a slight degree I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us any others who assisted in the preparation of that press release?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say principal assistance came from our legal counsel, Mr. Wardwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of anyone not in the employ of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as counsel or otherwise, who did assist in the preparation of it?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not in the employ of the institute?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

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Mr. HOLLAND. No, I don't know anyone.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Barnes didn't assist in any way in the preparation of that?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor did Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. How old is Mr. Swope, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think he is either 74 or 75, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now, where were you when you had the conference with him?

Mr. HOLLAND. This conference was had in the Broad Street Club, downtown New York, immediately following one of our regular large discussion luncheon meetings, at which a great many heads of big corporations had come for a talk on India.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you suggest to Mr. Swope that he give out this interview, this press release?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have been one of many people who have been discussing with Mr. Swope the desirability of issuing a statement on some aspect of this subcommittee for some considerable time, and this includes our counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was because of Mr. Swope's prominence as a business man and a good citizen of America, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say primarily because he is the senior officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he take any active part in the activities of the institute now?

Mr. HOLLAND. Oh, certainly. He keeps me jumping.

Mr. SOURWINE. How often does he come to the office?

Mr. HOLLAND. I suppose he doesn't come to the office more than once in every 2 or 3 weeks, but he makes me go to his office twice a week without fail, and sometimes oftener.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which came first, Mr. Swope's decision that he would give this press conference and issue this press release, or the issuance of the press release itself?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not quite sure that I got the point. Which came——

Mr. SOURWINE. Which came first, Mr. Swope's decision that he would give this press conference and issue the press release, or the preparation of the press release?

Mr. HOLLAND. I would say the decision to give a press conference. Whether he decided that it would be this particular one on this particular date and that particular place, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that decided, as far as you know?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think it was decided about 4 weeks ago. I say that because one reason why it was given now is that Mr. Swope had been away on Cape Cod for something like 3 weeks, and this was the first opportunity after he got back to meet, come downtown.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean by that that the fact that you were to be here to testify today had no connection with his decision to make the press release when he made it?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't say that it had no bearing on it, Mr. Sourwine, but I do say that the question of a press conference has been under discussion for many weeks. In fact, I may say, as you can

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well understand, that a great many friends of the IPR have been saying quitely frankly, "You should have had such a press conference long ago."

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; they have been urging Mr. Swope to have such a conference, have they not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I should say they have been urging me, because I am the executive officer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you passed it on to Mr. Swope?

Mr. HOLLAND. To a limited extent I have. But I also had an appreciation of his position, the fact that he was away on Cape Cod, and also the fact that he, and not only he but I, too, wanted to give what we thought was a reasonable period for the subcommittee to conduct its hearings before we raised what we think are rather fair criticisms.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long had Mr. Swope been up on Cape Cod?

Mr. HOLLAND. As I said, I think it was about 3 weeks before last Sunday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then it must have been just before he went to Cape Cod that he decided to give a press conference when he came back; is that right?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; the decision as to the date was not made. It was simply that there would have to be in his opinion a press conference.

I think it is possible that under some circumstances if he had come down for some urgent business before, he would have given it then. In fact, I hoped he would have given it earlier.

I will personally tell you, Senator, that I was a little unhappy at the fact that it came only the day before I was called. I would have preferred the two things to be quite distinct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing further on that line, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have a few things to finish up here, and the hour is getting late, but I had only finished 2 of my 14 points, and I estimated the 14 could have been covered today.

Senator SMITH. You were an optimist, were you not?

Mr. MORRIS. I think I was.

Mr. Chairman, I think we had gotten off the line of questioning. We had been discussing the grants made by the Rockefeller Foundation to various individuals at the intervention of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Now, I would like to have introduced into the record this whole letter from Mr. Chester Barnard of the Rockefeller Foundation to Senator McCarran, of September 20, 1951.

In addition to giving the amount of contributions to the institute, it also indicates the names of 11 people in the institute who have received these grants.

We had discussed Mr. Norman and Mr. Rosinger, and I had just gotten to that point, and I had introduced into the record the testimony of three witnesses on Lawrence Rosinger's membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. Holland, at that point, undertook to cite a few newspaper book reviews to refute the sworn testimony of three witnesses. It was not my intention, Mr. Chairman, to introduce any book reviews about Rosinger's books into the record today, but inasmuch as Mr. Holland has elected to do that, I would just like to introduce one book review.

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Senator SMITH. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a book review from the Daily Worker of August 3, 1945, by Samuel Sillin. It appears on page 11. The first paragraph begins as follows:

> Interest in China as the pivot in the war against Japan has been registered during the past year in a number of stimulating books by Harrison Forman, T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimore, Edgar Snow, and other American observers. These authors, riddling the heavy fog of Kuomintang censorship, have played an important part in enlightening the American reading public on the Far East. They have persuasively refuted the lies of Lin Yutang regarding the Chinese Communists. They have urged a consistent American policy of encouragement to the democratic, unifying forces in China as the key to a quick victory in the Pacific.
>
> To the impressive list of informed books on the Far East may now be added Lawrence K. Rosinger's scholarly, readable volume, China's Crisis. * * *

I think that is the pertinent point.

It goes on to give a little biographical sketch of Rosinger.

But, as I say, Mr. Holland has elected to give book reviews, and I would like to offer this book review for the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just state for the record that China's Crisis was not published by or under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. He did not say that.

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I just want that noted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this whole communication from the Rockefeller Foundation to go into the record in its entirety.

Senator SMITH. Suppose you look at that and see if you have any doubt about its genuineness.

Mr. HOLLAND. Oh, sir, I would never question Mr. Chester Barnard's——

Senator SMITH. All right. That will go in.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 332" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 332

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION,
New York, N. Y., September 20, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: As you requested in your letter of September 10, I am sending you herewith a list of appropriations made by the Rockefeller Foundation, as well as by the former Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (which was consolidated with the foundation in 1929), to the Institute of Pacific Relations. The grants are classified according to the recipient named in the appropriation. You will note that in some instances the recipient, in the early years, was simply the Institute of Pacific Relations. Subsequently grants were made to the Pacific Council of the Institute or to its international secretariat, and to the American Council, which later changed its name to the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I am also sending you a list of persons who received fellowship awards from the foundation and who in the course of their fellowship periods spent some time in study and training at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

For a number of years the Rockefeller Foundation has supported studies in the field of international relations. It has also supported studies of the languages and cultures of various areas of the world heretofore relatively neglected in American scholarship. In this connection, it has made grants to many organizations here and in other countries. Some of these doubtless cooperated with the Institute of Pacific Relations on various projects; a few were affiliated with the institute in the sense that, while established as independent organizations with programs only in part concerned with the Pacific area, they served as national

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constituent members of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The affiliated organizations to which the foundation made grants for a variety of projects are:

The Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, Australia.
The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, Canada.
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England.

If you wish a record of grants to these affiliated organizations, we shall be glad to prepare it for you.

In preparing the lists enclosed, we have exercised the utmost care and believe them to be complete. I trust this letter and the lists will provide you with the information you require.

Sincerely yours,

CHESTER I. BARNARD.

LIST OF ALL APPROPRIATIONS MADE FOR THE WORK OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS BY THE FORMER LAURA SPELMAN ROCKEFELLER MEMORIAL AND BY THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

NOTE.—Appropriations noted below have all been listed and described in annual reports to the public issued by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and by the Rockefeller Foundation. Until recently small grants in aid have not been described in detail but have been grouped under the general heading grants-in-aid in each division of program. In addition to its annual reports, beginning with 1950, the foundation has issued quarterly reports on its appropriations. In 1929 the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was consolidated with the Rockefeller Foundation.

APPROPRIATED BY THE LAURA SPELMAN ROCKEFELLER MEMORIAL

Year of action	Purpose	Appropriation	Expenditures	Balance
	Institute of Pacific Relations—American Council:[1]			
1926	For research activities, July 1, 1926, to June 30, 1927, conditional on $50,000 being obtained from other sources toward American quota of institute.	$10,000	$10,000	----------
1927	For research activities, to be paid $15,000 a year in 1927, 1928, and 1929 on condition $50,000 in cash from other sources be secured in each of these years, exclusive of bequests, for consolidated expenditure budget for work of central international headquarters of institute in Honolulu and for work of American group in continental America.	45,000	45,000	----------
	Institute of Pacific Relations:			
1928	Toward its international program of research in the social sciences in 1928, 1929, and 1930.	60,000	60,000	----------
1928	Toward its international program of research in the social sciences, payable 1929 $25,000 on basis of $1 for each $1 secured in cash from other contributing sources for same purpose during 1929; 1930, $25,000 on basis of $1 for each $2 secured in cash from other contributing sources for same purpose during 1930.	50,000	50,000	----------
	Total	165,000	165,000	----------

APPROPRIATED BY THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

	Institute of Pacific Relations—Continued			
1929	For research activities during 1929	$35,000	$35,000.00	----------
1930	Toward its international program of research in the social sciences:			
1931 1932 1933	$25,000 outright per year $25,000—$1 for each $2 collected, per year.			
1934 1935	$25,000 outright per year $25,000—$1 for each $3 collected per year	250,000	250,000.00	----------
	Special projects and programs:			
1940	Expenses of R. Barnett's trip to China to make study of Shanghai and East China for institute, Aug. 15, 1940, to Oct. 14, 1941.	800	800.00	----------
1943	Stipend for Dr. Jan O. E. Broek to permit him to complete study of economic geography of southeastern Asia, Jan. 1, 1943, to July 31, 1944.	5,278	4,797.95	[2] $480.05
1948	Study of Japanese town by Dr. A. J. Grad; available to Mar. 31, 1951.	7,400	7,400.00	----------

See footnotes at end of table.

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APPROPRIATED BY THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION—Continued

Year of action	Purpose	Appropriation	Expenditures	Balance
	Institute of Pacific Relations—Continued			
	Special projects and programs—Continued			
1949	Preparation of short geography of Korea; available to Mar. 31, 1951.	$2,000		[2] $2,000.00
1949	Study of Philippine rural economic problems—Prof. J. Spencer; available to Nov. 10, 1951.	1,200	$1,200.00	
1950	Completion of study of Japanese communism; Langer and Swearingen; available to Sept. 30, 1950.	500	500.00	
	Institute of Pacific Relations—Pacific Council:			
	For general expenses and research programs for—			
1935	1936, 1937, 1938	135,000	135,000.00	
1938	1939, 1940	80,000	80,000.00	
1940	1941, 1942	89,000	89,000.00	
1942	1943, 1944	107,000	107,000.00	
1943	1945	41,000	41,000.00	
1946	1946–50	173,000	173,000.00	
1949	Period ending Mar. 31, 1950	25,000	25,000.00	
1950	Period ending Dec. 31, 1952	50,000	20,000.00	30,000.00
1947	For expenses of tenth conference, to be held in Stratford-on-Avon; available to Dec. 31, 1947.	4,000	4,000.00	
	Institute of Pacific Relations—international secretariat:			
	Studies and surveys:			
1938	For studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East, Feb. 15, 1938, to Dec. 31, 1940.	90,000	90,000.00	
1950	For a political and economic survey of southeast Asia, by Dr. V. Purcell, for period ending Nov. 30, 1950.	2,081	2,066.40	[2] 14.60
	Institute of Pacific Relations—American Council: [1]			
	For general expenses:			
1931	For use in 1930	30,000	30,000.00	
1931	For use in 1931, 1932, 1933	60,000	60,000.00	
1933	Additional in 1933	20,000	20,000.00	
1933	For use in 1934	25,000	25,000.00	
1934	For use in 1935	25,000	25,000.00	
1935	For use in 1936, 1937, 1938	47,500	47,500.00	
1938	For use in 1939, 1940	30,000	30,000.00	
1940	For use in 1941, 1942	30,000	30,000.00	
1942	For use in 1943, 1944	30,000	30,000.00	
1943	For use in 1945	15,000	15,000.00	
1946	For use in 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950	60,000	60,000.00	
1950	For period ending Sept. 30, 1952	60,000	30,000.00	30,000.00
	For special projects and programs:			
1934	Language School at Harvard University for intensive study of Russian language; 1934.	2,500	2,500.00	
1934	Development of instruction in Russian language at Columbia University; 1935.	5,000	5,000.00	
1935	Experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language to English-speaking students, Jan. 1, 1936, to Dec. 31, 1938.	17,500	17,305.00	[2] 195.00
1939	To permit council to act as host and participate in 1939 study meeting of Institute of Pacific Relations; available to Dec. 31, 1939.	2,500	2,500.00	
	English translations of source material on Chinese history:			
1939	July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1942	31,700	31,649.09	[2] 50.91
1942	July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1945	56,100	56,067.45	[2] 32.55
1945	July 1, 1945, to Dec. 31, 1946	25,000	25,000.00	
1946	July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1947	25,000	24,997.42	[2] 2.58
1943	Sept. 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944	4,000	4,000.00	
1944	To enable Columbia University to invite Chinese professors to join faculty for 1 year during the period—			
	July 15, 1944, to Oct. 14, 1946	5,500	5,500.00	
	July 15, 1944, to Jan. 15, 1947	5,500	4,978.13	[2] 521.87
1948	Annual review of American, Far Eastern policy; available to Aug. 31, 1949.	7,000	7,000.00	
1949	Toward the expenses of Prof. Owen Lattimore's attendance at the New Delhi conference; available to Jan. 31, 1950.[3]	1,500	1,500.00	
1949	Expenses of L. K. Rosinger's attendance at New Delhi conference; available to Jan. 31, 1950.	2,000	2,000.00	
1950	Travel and living expenses of Prof. Tadao Yanaihara; available to July 31, 1950.	300	285.35	[2] 14.65
	Total	1,721,859	1,658,546.79	63,312.21

[1] The name of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations was changed in 1946 to the American Institute of Pacific Relations.
[2] Lapsed.
[3] This grant was made to the Johns Hopkins University.

Prepared Sept. 19, 1951.

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Persons who received Rockefeller Foundation fellowship awards who spent some of their fellowship period in study and training at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Name of fellow and last address on foundation's file	Period of fellowship	Field of interest
Barnett, Robert W., Chief, Economics Branch of the Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C.	Sept. 1, 1939 to Aug. 31, 1940	International relations.
Belshaw, Horace, Director, Rural Welfare Division, Food and Agricultural Organization of UN, 1201 Connecticut Ave., Washington, D. C.	Jan. 13 to Nov. 12, 1936	Economics.
Bonnet, Henri, Ambassador from France to the United States, 2221 Kalorama Rd., Washington, D. C.[1]	Aug. 11 to Sept. 11, 1936	International relations.
Broek, Jan O. M., professor of geography, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.	Sept. 15 to Dec. 31, 1942	Economic geography.
Hanwell, Norman D. (deceased 1941)	June 10, 1938 to June 9, 1939	International relations.
Norman, Egerton H., Minister, Canadian Liaison Mission, Tokyo, Japan.	Sept. 15, 1936 to June 18, 1939	Chinese and Japanese languages.
Radius, Walter A., Director, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State, Washington, D. C.	Jan. 11, 1938 to Jan. 10, 1939	International relations.
Rosinger, Lawrence K., editorial and consulting work for Prentice-Hall and McGraw Hill; home address, 2775 Morris Ave., Bronx, N. Y.	Sept. 12, 1939 to Sept. 11, 1940	Do.
Taylor, George E., Director, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.	Aug. 1, 1941 to Aug. 31, 1942	Do.

[1] Part of fellowship period spent in attendance at the California Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held in August 1936.

In addition, fellowships were awarded to Russell G. Shiman, and William Holland, who were at the time members of the staff of the American Council of Pacific Relations.

Name of fellow and last address on foundation's file	Period of fellowship	Field of interest
Shiman, G. Russell, consultant economist, Oldwick, N. J.	Aug. 1, 1937 to Jan. 31, 1938	International relations in the Far East.
Holland, William L., secretary-general, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th St., New York, 22, N. Y.	Sept. 27, 1932 to June 17, 1933	Economics (studied in Europe).

Prepared: Sept. 19, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. And on the question of Mr. Rosinger's books, I would like this to go into the record, too, without its being read.

Senator SMITH. What is that?

Mr. MORRIS. That is from the New York Times.

Mr. HOLLAND. May we just know what this particular review is?

Senator SMITH. We will show it to you.

Mr. HOLLAND. If it is the one I think it is, it will be all right. We can identify it quickly. This is the New York Times magazine, is it?

Yes, I know it. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. These reviews may go in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 333 and 334," and are as follows:)

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[Daily Worker, August 3, 1945, p. 11]

ROSINGER'S CHINA BOOK AIDS DEMOCRATIC FORCES

(By Samuel Sillen)

Interest in China as the pivot in the war against Japan has been registered during the past year in a number of stimulating books by Harrison Forman, T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimore, Edgar Snow, and other American observers. These authors, riddling the heavy fog of Kuomintang censorship, have played an important part in enlightening the American reading public on the Far East. They have persuasively refuted the lies of Lin Yutang regarding the Chinese Communists. They have urged a consistent American policy of encouragement to the democratic, unifying forces in China as the key to a quick victory in the Pacific.

To the impressive list of informed books on the Far East may now be added Lawrence K. Rosinger's scholarly, readable volume, China's Crisis (Knopf, $3). Mr. Rosinger, Far East research associate of the Foreign Policy Association, is the author of another valuable study, China's Wartime Politics: 1937–44. A young man (30), his reputation as a sound, level-headed commentator will be further strengthened by the new book.

For China's Crisis is a carefully documented analysis which maintains the right balance between a hard-hitting criticism of the Kuomintang and a firm defense of our alliance with the Chinese people. Rosinger warns that "No matter how disheartening current developments in China may be, it is in the fundamental self-interest of the United States to work for a strong progressive China and not to write off China as a factor in the war." His book, therefore, avoids a cynical approach as well as an overoptimistic attitude toward the serious problems in the Far East.

The central problem, as Rosinger says, is "whether China's war effort shall continue and gather strength or disintegrate further, as it is doing at present." Clearly, the answer to this question deeply affects the speed and thoroughness with which Japanese imperialism is defeated.

In the months since Rosinger wrote his preface (dated April 11), the situation inside China, and also in regard to certain American policies toward China, has further deteriorated rather than improved. This lends added urgency to Rosinger's conclusion that China can overcome her crisis only through democracy, which is the precondition of unity.

Rosinger warns that Chungking's "present policy of suppression, a wartime version of civil-war practices prevailing before resistance, is a sterile course of action. It can lead only to ineffectiveness in carrying on the struggle with Japan and to internal strife after Japan's defeat. The alternative policy, which Chungking has so far rejected, is to recognize the legal equality of all groups, to incorporate them at once in a genuine coalition government, and to institute democratic political, economic, and military reforms for the country at large."

This means, in the first place, that Chungking must abandon its reactionary policy toward the Chinese Communists. On the Chinese Communists, Rosinger makes several important observations. He emphasizes that they are "deeply rooted in Chinese political life and their political stability and power arise from inside China." At the same time he very properly corrects the widespread impression that the Chinese Communists are not really Communists, but "agrarian democrats." This does not, of course, alter the fact that, while their ultimate desire is for a Socialist China, the Communists support a progressive program within the framework of a modified capitalism.

Rosinger concludes his book on this note, distinctly worth repeating today: "There is dynamite in Chinese politics, and we may have to make at short notice many crucial decisions, affecting our relations not only with China, but also with the Soviet Union. It will, therefore, be necessary for the United States to be ready to implement or modify its policies rapidly. The greater our flexibility, the greater will be our ability to promote progressive trends in wartime and postwar China."

The main point to be remembered, he says, above all transitory developments, is that "only a progressive China working in harmony with its Allies in war and peace can serve the interests of this country."

Rosinger's book ably supports this thesis, which needs to be driven home to the American people at this hour.

China's Crisis is a serious contribution to our understanding of the Far East, an important challenge to those policy makers who are supporting the divisive, reactionary forces in China.

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ASIA IN UPHEAVAL

THE STATE OF ASIA, BY LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, REVIEWED BY RICHARD L. WALKER

The first two chapters are the exceptions to the uniform excellence of the volume. These are by Mr. Rosinger, author of China's Crisis and other books, whose work does not measure up to that of his associates. In his introductory summary chapter he does not point out the pattern of an integrated Communist movement in southeast Asia—a pattern which emerges clearly from a reading of the other chapters. Nor does he consider communism a really serious threat. He fails to note the continued close dependence on the west of the new states for whom national self-determination has not proved a panacea, a dependence which gives them a very vital stake in the cold war.

In his chapter on China Mr. Rosinger's analysis of the Communist regime, based on published plans, regulations, constitutions, proclamations, Communist statistics, and percentage figures, is comparable to an attempt to describe the Government of the Soviet Union on the basis of the 1936 constitution. The violent anti-United States propaganda, militarism, Soviet imperialism, and penetration, and the compulsory apparatus to which Mr. Rosinger gives little attention were all apparent even in the honeymoon period to which he limits himself.

He leaves with the reader the impression that the peaceful intentions and uniformly excellent plans of the Chinese Communists were unfortunately disrupted by the promotion of the war in Korea in which they had no part. Mr. Rosinger uses loose terminology, presentation of false alternatives, and innuendo to present a one-sided picture of the Chinese Communist regime. We wonder, for example, just who are the "politically conscious" Chinese and Asians to whom he refers so frequently or just what is a "right-wing Asian point of view."

Mr. Rosinger's chapters, however, must not be allowed to detract from the high standards set by the other writers. The State of Asia is a real contribution to our understanding of a vitally important area in the world of today and tomorrow.

Mr. MORRIS. There are several other things we would like to clear up.

Mr. Holland, are you presently the secretary of the China Aid Council?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am the honorary secretary. Whether I am or not, I am in doubt, because the organization is in—I don't know what you would call it, but it is not active. It has ceased operating.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator McCarran received a letter on the letterhead of the China Aid Council, Inc., on October 9, 1951. On the letterhead the officers listed include a William L. Holland, secretary.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are you acquainted with this letter that was written to Senator McCarran in connection with the testimony before this committee?

Mr. HOLLAND. May I see the letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir; I am acquainted with this. I had not seen this letter before, but I did see a preliminary draft which was discussed by some members of this organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Who prepared the draft?

Mr. HOLLAND. It was the work of several people. The president, Dr. Ernest Osborne, did some of it. A portion of it was prepared by Mrs. Edward C. Carter. And I think two or three paragraphs of it were drafted by me. And then the whole thing was discussed in a meeting—I have forgotten exactly when, probably a week or 10 days ago—of those people, plus three or four other members of the board, including Mr. Stanley Isaacs, of the New York City board, and Dr. Heaton and two or three others. And this meeting agreed that this letter should be sent to Senator McCarran, because they felt that references to the China Aid Council in earlier sessions of this sub-

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committee hearing had given an incorrect impression, and particularly they felt the statement that it was a Communist front was seriously misleading and, in fact, highly unfair, because this has long been known as a reputable philanthropic organization, which is one of the original constituent agencies which made up United China Relief.

I don't want to take your time on this, Mr. Chairman, because Dr. Jessup, I think, gave a lengthy explanation of it the other day and it was reported somewhat in the press.

Mr. MORRIS. Don't you know, Mr. Holland. that this was originally a part of the American League for Peace and Democracy, which I think you will acknowledge was a Communist organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I have learned that the China Aid Council, at least an organization under that name, at an early date, I think prior to 1939, was in some way affiliated to this American League.

As to the second part of Mr. Morris' statement, I do not know, though I have heard it said, that the American League for Peace and Democracy was a Communist organization.

I might say that the China Aid Council ever since I have known it, which was since 1944, when I came in, and certainly ever since 1940, when it became a new organization, by the amalgamation of the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans and the old China Aid Council, has not been a Communist organization.

It could not conceivably have been recognized as the national constituent agency of United China Relief had it been a Communist organization, and I think you will see attached to that letter, sir, a letter from the national secretary of the United China Relief, which gives the facts, the financial statement, and indicates what a very valuable and substantial contribution the China Aid Council made to the war effort of China, all China.

This was during the war against Japan.

Senator WATKINS. I just glanced at that letter.

As I recall, part of it was objecting to the committee receiving evidence that reflects upon this council. You do not, certainly, take the position that we cannot take evidence that reflects on anybody here. We would never get anywhere in investigating.

Mr. HOLLAND. I agree, sir.

Senator WATKINS. That seems to be a protest against receiving such evidence.

Senator SMITH. You attempted to draw some distinction between "secretary" and "honorary secretary" when Mr. Morris asked you the question if you were not secretary.

Well, now, a simple answer to that would have been "Yes" or "No," would it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am perfectly willing to say "Yes," sir.

Senator SMITH. Now, for some reason or other, you attempted to draw a distinction between a secretary and an honorary secretary and say that you were honorary secretary.

Is not your name shown on this letterhead as "secretary," without any suggestion that you are honorary or otherwise.

Mr. HOLLAND. It is, sir. You will also see on there that there is something called executive director at the bottom, and everyone knows that that title means the person who runs the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that person?

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Mr. HOLLAND. Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard the testimony before the committee that Mildred Price is a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have heard the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is detailed testimony, is it not, by a person who was, according to the testimony, working very closely with Mildred Price in a Communist organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure. Are you referring to Elizabeth Bentley's testimony?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. HOLLAND. I saw it. It did not seem to establish that she was working with Mildred Price closely, but rather her sister, Mary Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Shall we read the testimony of Mildred Price?

Mr. SOURWINE. The testimony is in the record, Mr. Morris.

Mr. HOLLAND. I used the term "honorary secretary," because, as you know, I was a New Zealander and brought up in the literary tradition there, and the customary phrase was "honorary secretary."

Senator SMITH. How long have you been in America?

Mr. HOLLAND. Since 1930 or thereabouts.

Senator SMITH. Well, you know what a secretary is.

And you know your name was printed there as secretary, do you not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir. And it is also clear from that letter that the executive secretary, who is called executive director, at the bottom of the page, there, is someone else. That was my sole purpose.

Senator SMITH. I do not see anything about executive secretary.

Mr. HOLLAND. I see executive director there.

Senator SMITH. That is Mildred Price.

Mr. HOLLAND. Which means the person who ran the office, sir.

Senator SMITH. We did not ask you about executive director.

We asked you where on there there is any reference made to honorary secretary.

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I am glad to withdraw the word "honorary" secretary, sir. My duties as secretary were simply to attend meetings and to sign minutes of the annual meeting once a year.

I received no compensation.

Senator SMITH. Then why were you so anxious to draw a distinction between a secretary and an honorary secretary?

Mr. HOLLAND. For the good reason, sir, that in most people's mind when you say "the secretary of an organization"—most people think it is the operating person, the one who runs the show, and in this case my duties were so nominal—now, I am not disassociating myself from the organization. I am glad to belong to it. But it is just as a matter of fact.

This is a reasonable statement, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you exceed your duties when you participated in the drafting of this letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir; because I am a member of the board and just like any of the other people.

Mr. MORRIS. Just a few things. Now, Mr. Chairman, I have here a handbill of the China Aid Council, which shows that it was at the time affiliated with the American League for Peace and Democracy. [Handing to witness.]

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Mr. HOLLAND. May I just ask if there is any indication of the date to which this applies, and may I ask where it comes from? It is hard to tell what that is.

Is it an announcement of some meeting, or what?

Mr. MANDEL. I can say that there are dated materials that give that association, letterheads.

This one is not dated.

Mr. MORRIS. Why don't we get it? We can get it before the hearing is over.

Senator SMITH. I thought he asked you whether you had ever seen one of these before.

Do you know what it is?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Senator SMITH. Do you know where it came from?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you know anything at all about it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir. As I indicated, my association with this organization began in 1944, and there was absolutely no question of any affiliation with a communist organization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could the record show that the witness' answers and the questions put to him were in connection with exhibit 100 in this record?

Senator SMITH. All right. Let the record so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Holland, we have asked you to supply a list of staff members of the IPR.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have prepared this. As you know, your request was just a few days ago.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. And therefore I have brought you a great many pages giving you all the employees of the institute so far as my staff had time to go through the cards.

For the American IPR it covers all the people that we can get cards on for 1944 to 1951. For the international IPR it covers all we can get for the period 1943 to 1951.

For the earlier years, in a reasonably short time I can give you most of the other information.

I have indicated here not merely the list of names but the date when their employment began, the date when it ended, and the nature of their position. I am glad to turn that over.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that this compilation is accurate, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. HOLLAND. It is. It has been compiled by members of my staff, but I believe it to be accurate as far as I can judge.

Mr. MORRIS. May that not be introduced into the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, but be turned over to the staff?

Mr. HOLLAND. Until it is complete.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I would like introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, this letter, which is on the letterhead of the China Aid Council, over the signature of Ernest G. Osborne, president, to the Honorable Patrick McCarran, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., dated October 9, 1951.

This purports to be a protest on the part of the China Aid Council against certain statements made before this committee.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, show that again to the witness. I want to be sure that the record shows that this is the letter concerning which, the presiding officer, Senator Smith, questioned him, and concerning which there was some previous testimony as to his name appearing on the letterhead as secretary.

Senator SMITH. What is the date of that?

Mr. HOLLAND. October 9, 1951.

Senator WATKINS. That is the letter you were talking about?

Mr. HOLLAND. I saw an earlier draft discussed at this meeting. I had nothing to do with the sending or the typing and have never seen this letter before. But substantially, it seems to be the same as the draft which we discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew enough about it to know that it had an enclosure with it, financial statements, and so forth, because you volunteered that.

Mr. HOLLAND. Certainly.

Senator WATKINS. I wish the witness would pick out that part which he said he drafted.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure I can identify it, because it was discussed and rehashed so many times in the meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. There are quite a few members of the Institute of Pacific Relations on that board, are there not, Mr. Holland?

Why don't you quickly run through that list of members there and tell us which ones are active in the IPR?

Mr. CROSSMAN. Which is he to do first?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry.

Mr. CROSSMAN. He can't do both.

Senator WATKINS. That is right. We understand.

Mr. HOLLAND. I will just mark in pencil down the side those parts which I had a substantial part in drafting.

Senator SMITH. Just the initials.

Mr. HOLLAND. The point is that they were subsequently revised and discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, for convenience in the record, would you wish to order that when this letter is printed in the record the paragraphs which have been initialed should be printed in italics?

Senator SMITH. Or otherwise identified. That will be all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have marked, Mr. Chairman, the parts that I distinctly remember. It is certainly possible that I had some small part in the discussion of the other things, but the final draft was done outside my office and without my knowledge. This does not necessarily mean that I wrote exactly those words, but the substance of them I helped to draft, mostly orally, in the meeting.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have anything to do with the last paragraph?

Mr. HOLLAND. May I just see it again, sir?

I do not believe, sir, that I drafted this, but I remember distinctly taking part in the discussion of it, and on the whole I agree.

Senator WATKINS. It represents your idea?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir; as in this particular case.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you one or two questions. I notice on the letterhead beside your name, being shown as secretary, is the name of Mrs. Edward C. Carter.

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Is that the name of the Mrs. Carter who testified?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; it is, sir.

Senator SMITH. I notice also several other members mentioned here. Israel Epstein?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is the man we have been talking about, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. How about John K. Fairbank? Is he active in the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. He is a trustee of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Friedman, as you know from earlier testimony, wrote a report for the IPR. I am not sure whether he is a member or not.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Talitha Gerlach?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure. I don't know whether she is a member.

Senator SMITH. You know her, do you?

Mr. HOLLAND. I met her in meetings here. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that I have a short statement which I prepared myself on the China Aid Council, which I would be glad to give at another time if you wish.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Philip J. Jaffe?

Mr. HOLLAND. Jaffe has been quite active on the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Arthur Upham Pope?

Mr. HOLLAND. He has been completely inactive.

Mr. CROSSMAN. I am not sure about that "Jaffe has been quite active on the board."

Mr. SOURWINE. If you please, you are not under oath, sir.

Mr. CROSSMAN. No; but I am entitled to object to the form of questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are objecting to an answer.

Senator SMITH. Will you read back the last portion, Mr. Reporter?

(The reporter read, as directed.)

Mr. HOLLAND. To make that clear, when I said Jaffe has been quite active on the board, I meant, of course, on the board of the China Aid Council.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Chairman, the record shows that counsel objected to the answer of the witness and put words in the witness' mouth, and the witness has now corrected his testimony in accordance with the instructions of his counsel.

I don't believe that is proper, and I would ask the Chair to rule on it.

Mr. CROSSMAN. Well, Senator, I don't think that is a correct statement of the thing.

I think that Mr. Holland was thrown off, and when he said that Jaffe was a member of the board, he had obviously forgotten what the previous question had been. He has now made a correct answer.

Senator SMITH. A member of the board of what?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of the China Aid Council. There is no ambiguity here at all, really, because he has never been a member of the board of the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Has he been a member of the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. He has been a member of the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Has he participated in the meetings of the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the extent I indicated earlier. He has attended one conference and has contributed.

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Senator SMITH. Has contributed to the IPR publications?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I meant contributed to the IPR.

Sentor SMITH. Has he ever contributed to its publications?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't be sure of that, sir. It is conceivable that he has written a book review for us, but I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mildred Price?

Mr. HOLLAND. Would you ask your question precisely?

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mildred Price active as a member of the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she a member?

Mr. HOLLAND. She is a member but has taken practically no part in meetings and has never served on committees or been a trustee or employee and in fact has had only a very slight connection with any part of the work of the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Has she been to the office?

Mr. HOLLAND. She has been to the office a number of times to see me in connection with the work of the China Aid Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Has Helen Schneider been a member of your staff?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; Miss Helen Schneider was a member of our staff in the capacity of production manager or distribution manager, I think the title was, of our magazine Pacific Affairs.

I mean, you will find the dates given in the second part of that statement, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, she is listed in here?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; with the dates and the nature of the job. I may say she worked in the international secretariat, that is to say, the international part of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that at the same time she was an employee of Amerasia?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. The reason was that she was very unhappy in Amerasia and let us know that she would like to have a change of job, and my colleague, the then editor of Pacific Affairs, Mr. Lilienthal, talked to her one day and found that she was willing to take a job as proofreader and distribution manager, and so engaged her as his assistant on the magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to start another point.

I am offering this letter from the China Aid Council, dated October 9, 1951, for the record.

Senator SMITH. It is received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 335" and is as follows:)

CHINA AID COUNCIL, INC.,
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS
AND CHINA CHILD WELFARE,
New York, N. Y., October 9, 1951.

HON. PATRICK MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have learned with astonishment and indignation that in the hearings of your Subcommittee on Internal Security, statements have been made by Elizabeth Bentley and others to the effect that the China Aid Council was a communist or communist-front organization. These

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misrepresentations have been repeated in connection with Dr. Jessup. On behalf of the Board of the China Aid Council I desire to make the following statement:

The China Aid Council (CAC) is a well-known and reputable philanthropic organization. It has functioned since 1941 as one of the original constituent agencies of United China Relief (later named United Service to China, Inc.) It was formed by the amalgamation in 1940 of an earlier organization known as the China Aid Council with The American Committee for Chinese War Orphans.

The CAC was purely a non-partisan welfare, health, and educational organization, and at no time did it interest itself or take part in political activities or advocate communist policies.

The CAC devoted itself to two main lines of aid to China, first and principally, to support of orphanages and other child welfare activities in all parts of China; secondly, to support of the several International Peace Hospitals in the communist areas of Northwest China. These activities were part of a wide-spread American movement to give aid to all Chinese areas and groups in the struggle against Japanese aggression.

As a recognized agency of UCR the CAC derived nearly all its funds from UCR and regularly had its program and budgets approved by the officers and directors of UCR. During the three years in which UCR was part of the National War Fund, the CAC programs and budgets were also included in the total UCR budgets approved by the officers of the National War Fund. The relationship of CAC to UCR is confirmed in the enclosed letter and summary of expenditures submitted by Mr. B. A. Garside, principal executive officer of UCR throughout its existence.

As will be seen from the enclosed auditor's summaries of the CAC funds sent to various institutions in China, the amounts going to Nationalist areas were considerably in excess of those sent to Communist areas.[1]

Mildred Price served very capably and devotedly as Executive Secretary of CAC from September 1939 to May 1950. At no time did the Board members of CAC see anything in her administration of the CAC, or in her conduct or conversation to suggest that she was a communist. Many of them had ample opportunities to observe her work at close hand and to know her personally and never found any reason to suspect her of partisanship or of trying to use the CAC for communist purposes or as a communist front. It is their conviction that she is not a communist and that she is a loyal American citizen.

In the spring of 1949 a request came from China that all CAC expenditures should be henceforth channeled exclusively through Mme. Sun Yat-sen's China Welfare Fund. This request led to disagreements in the Board of CAC but Mildred Price together with a majority of the Board refused to accede to this demand and insisted that the CAC should maintain its traditional policy of giving aid to both nationalist and communist areas solely on the basis of human need. As a result this remained the policy of the CAC and Mme. Sun requested that no further funds be sent by the CAC to her organization.

After the communists came to power in the Chinese mainland, conditions were such that it became impracticable for the CAC to continue supporting the institutions which it had previously aided. It therefore decided to suspend operations indefinitely.

As loyal citizens and representatives of a reputable philanthropic body which has given funds impartially to relieve human suffering and help orphaned children in China, we wish emphatically to repudiate the unfounded and insulting allegations that the CAC was a communist or subversive organization.

By allowing such a base allegation to go without question into the testimony, your Subcommittee has done us and the CAC a grave injustice. As a matter of elementary fairness we ask you to acknowledge this letter publicly and to see that it is inserted in the record of your subcommittee's hearings together with the enclosed letter from Mr. Garside and the attached financial statements.

Very truly yours,

ERNEST G. OSBORNE, *President.*

EGO: kl
Enclosures (3)

[1] Italics were indicated by initials WLH.

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UNITED SERVICE TO CHINA, INC.,
New York, N. Y., August 17, 1951.

Dr. ERNEST G. OSBORNE,
President, China Aid Council,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR DR. OSBORNE: The enclosed tabulation shows that during the ten-year period between January 1, 1941, and December 31, 1950, the amount expended by the China Aid Council in carrying on its work in China, as reported to this organization, was $5,111,612.01.

Of this amount, approximately four million dollars was spent by CAC during the years of World War II in carrying on its services, with major emphasis on child welfare, in all accessible parts of China, and among all classes, creeds, and parties.

The remainder was expended after the war on similar forms of aid to the Chinese people as they attempted to rebuild their war-shattered country—an attempt that has now been tragically halted by Communist aggression.

During the past decade China Aid Council rendered services of great and permanent value to the Chinese people and to the cause of Chinese-American friendship and cooperation. We earnestly hope that further opportunities for such cooperative efforts may again arise.

Sincerely yours,

B. A. GARSIDE,
Executive Vice President.

Enc.

UNITED SERVICE TO CHINA

(Formerly United China Relief)

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Summary of expenditures from funds raised through united efforts of UCR-USC and member agencies, Jan. 1, 1941–Dec. 31, 1950, by China Aid Council

Year	(1) For China program			(2) Administration and promotion—received from UCR-USC	Grand totals
	Received by CAC direct	Received from UCR-USC	Total		
1941 [1]	$40,528.43	$11,713.72	$52,242.15	$15,511.23	$67,753.38
1942	22,814.68	664,493.73	687,308.41	16,062.98	703,371.39
1943	10,637.30	903,096.50	913,733.80	15,970.90	929,704.70
1944	18,970.63	1,079,526.04	1,098,496.67	18,689.31	1,117,185.98
1945	11,858.05	1,226,120.42	1,337,978.47	23,460.96	1,261,439.43
1946	12,163.98	675,204.95	688,368.93	26,797.90	715,166.83
1947	7,313.40	113,162.16	120,475.56	28,742.39	149,217.95
1948	37,468.24	78,472.25	115,940.49	19,878.34	135,818.83
1949	19,875.36	10,578.16	30,453.52		30,453.52
	181,630.07	4,763,367.93	4,944,998.00	165,114.01	5,110,112.01
1950 (special payment)		1,500.00	1,500.00		1,500.00
Total	181,630.07	4,764,867.93	4,946,498.00	165,114.01	5,111,612.01

[1] Expenditures for 1941 are made up of the total received direct by the agency during the year, plus the remainder actually spent from UCR funds. They do not include any balance brought forward by CAC 1940, nor the balance it had in hand or in transit at the end of 1941.

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China Aid Council—financial report on 10 years of work, Dec. 31, 1938–Dec. 31, 1948

Cash on hand, Jan. 1, 1939	$1,011.61	
Receipts (10-year period)	5,171,885.74	
Total accounted for below		$5,172,897.35
Disbursed for relief, rehabilitation, and education (10-year period)	$4,975,150.59	
Disbursed for administrative expenses	188,167.41	
Total accounted for below		5,163,318.00
Relief funds on hand Dec. 31, 1949		9,579.35
Breakdown of receipts:		
1. From United Service to China:		
(a) Contributions for China work	$4,779,946.71	
(b) Toward administrative expenses	141,325.12	
2. China Child Welfare	7,000.75	
3. Direct contributions	7,000.75	
4. Benefits and merchandise sales	32,964.67	
Total		5,171,885.74
Breakdown of disbursements:		
To China:		
1. China Welfare Fund (formerly China Defense League) [1]	$1,952,666.28	
2. Yu Tsai School for Talented Children	166,476.89	
3. Nurtitional Aid Council	8,460.23	
4. Children's work in Nationalist China [2]	2,844,740.72	
5. Miscellaneous	2,806.47	
		4,975,150.59
In United States of America:		
Includes operating expenses such as salaries, employment retirement plan, traveling, and miscellaneous office expenses		188,167.41
Total		5,163,318.00

[1] Includes International Peace Hospitals, Cave Nurseries, CWF administrative expenses.
[2] Includes Madame Chiang's orphanages, YWCA nurseries, Canton Children's Center, Hsiang Shan's Children's Home, Peiping Yu Ying Tang.

This statement was prepared by the auditor of the China Aid Council, Mr. Joseph Robbins, 505 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one thing I would like to mention here, before we conclude for the day: that Senator McCarran has received from the State Department a copy of the transcript of the October 6, 7, and 8 round table discussion on far eastern policy held in the Office of the Secretary of State.

We have hurriedly looked that thing through, Mr. Chairman. I do know, however, that the list of questions that is being discussed by the conferees is not given in full, and in running through the transcript quickly, I see that there is no compilation of the questions.

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So I was wondering if the chairman would authorize a request of the State Department that that list of questions to which the people at the conference, the conferees, addressed themselves be made available to this committee.

Senator SMITH. All right.

It is so ordered.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, as you can see, we have only gotten through a very little of this proposed hearing today, and I would like to know when we can resume again.

Senator SMITH. We have another hearing tomorrow, our Judiciary Committee does.

Mr. MORRIS. And Friday we have another hearing planned here.

It would have to be some day next week, then, Mr. Holland.

Senator SMITH. You will have to have some time to look through this, because it may be more or less burdensome in getting down through it.

You can advise him when you are ready as much in advance as possible, so that he can arrange his affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I have always tried to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Have you anything else this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. Nothing else this afternoon, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Then we can recess until further call.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

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

GREATER CHINA

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY

PROVINCIAL CAPITAL

0 200 400 600 800 MILES

0 200 400 600 800 KILOMETERS

U. S. S. R.

Lake Baikal

Amur River

HEILUNGKIANG (MANCHURIA)

Lung-chiang

Harbin

KIRIN

Kirin

LIAONING

Mukden

Urga

MONGOLIA

Ti-hua

SINKIANG

CHAHAR

JEHOL

Wan-ch'üan

Ch'eng-te

SUIYÜAN

Kuei-sui

Pei-p'ing

Dairen

KANSU

NINGSIA

(Yellow River) Ho Huang

Ch'ing-yüan

T'ien-ching (Tientsin)

HOPEH

SHENSI

T'ai-yüan

Ning-hsia

SHANTUNG

Chi-nan

YELLOW SEA

SEA OF JAPAN

KOREA (CHOSEN)

TSINGHAI

Hsi-ning

Lan-chou

(Before 1938)

SAISHO-TO

JAPAN

K'ai-feng

KIANGSU

Ch'ang-an (Hsi-an)

HONAN

(Since 1938)

Chen-chiang

ANHWEI

Nan-ching (Nanking)

Shang-hai

EAST CHINA SEA

TIBET

SZECHWAN

HUPEH

Wu-ch'ang

Huai-ning

Hang-chou

CHEKIANG

Brahmaputra River

Lhasa

SIKANG

Ch'eng-tu

Pa-an

CH'UNG-CH'ING (CHUNGKING)

Ch'ang Chiang (Yangtze River)

Tung-t'ing Hu

Nan-ch'ang

KIANGSI

Ch'ang-sha

NEPAL

BHUTAN

INDIA

HUNAN

KWEICHOW

Fu-chou

FUKIEN

Kuei-yang

Hsia-men (Amoy)

K'un-ming (Yünnan)

Kwei-lin

YÜNNAN

KWANGSI

FORMOSA (TAIWAN)

BURMA

KWANGTUNG

Kuang-chou (Canton)

Hong Kong (Br.)

FRENCH INDO-CHINA

Hsi-ying (Fort Bayard) (Fr.)

SOUTH CHINA SEA

THAILAND

HAI-NAN

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INDEX TO PART IV

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index

A

Page

Acheson, Dean---------- 982, 1038, 1040–1042, 1049, 1065, 1067, 1068, 1075, 1112, 1113, 1115, 1117, 1118, 1123, 1125, 1126, 1131–1133, 1145, 1149
Adler, Solomon---------- 1027, 1218
Adloff, Richard---------- 1222
AEC (*see* U. S. Atomic Energy Commission).
A. F. L. (*see* American Federation of Labor).
AIPR Research Committee---------- 1220, 1221
Airport Hotel (Seimchan, Soviet China)---------- 1106
Alexander & Baldwin---------- 1217, 1219
Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V---------- 1216
Alexander, Wallace M---------- 1217, 1219
Allen, Edward W---------- 995, 1219
Allen, G. C---------- 1221
Allen, Hilen, Frouds & DeGarmo---------- 995
Allen, Raymond B---------- 1219
Allied Powers---------- 1027, 1030, 1239
All Souls College (Oxford)---------- 1216
Alsberg, Dr. Carl L---------- 1216, 1219
AMCO (*see* Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council).
Amerasia---------- 955, 1155, 1203, 1228, 1229
American Bank Note Co---------- 1219
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans---------- 1241, 1246, 1247
American Council of Learned Societies---------- 1220
American Cyanamid Co---------- 996, 1216, 1219
American Embassy (Hong Kong)---------- 1120
American Embassy (London)---------- 1037
American Embassy (Nanking)---------- 1026, 1027
American Federation of Labor (AFL)---------- 1075, 1100, 1102, 1104, 1137
American Foreign Power Co---------- 1217
American Friends of the Chinese People---------- 1154. 1155. 1160–1164. 1166
American Hawaiian Steamship Co---------- 1219
American Institute of Pacific Relations (*see* Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council).
American League for Peace and Democracy---------- 1078, 1241, 1242
American President Lines---------- 1217, 1220
American Radio Association---------- 946
American-Russian Institute---------- 988, 1220
American Trust Co---------- 1216
American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers)---------- 1125, 1126, 1149
Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks (Honolulu)---------- 1220
Anglo-Chinese College (Foochow)---------- 996
AP (*see* Associated Press).
Armed Services Committee (House)---------- 1026, 1041, 1049, 1064
Army Military Mission (China)---------- 1026, 1069
Army War College---------- 1132
Asia---------- 1136
Asiatic Fleet (U. S.)---------- 995
Asiaticus (Heinz Moeller) (Hans Mueller)---------- 973, 974, 1012
Associated Press (AP)---------- 1094, 1132, 1142, 1172
Atherton, Frank C---------- 1217, 1227
Atkinson, Brooks---------- 1229

Digitized by Google

Page
Atkinson, Ellen Van Zyll De Jong 1004, 1083, 1034, 1149, 1150
Atlantic Monthly 1136, 1230
Atlantic Monthly Press 1136
Atlantic Pact 1065
Atomic Energy Commission (*see* U. S. Atomic Energy Commission).
Austern, Hilda (*see* Hilda Austern Bretholtz).
Australian Broadcasting Commission 1216
Australian Institute of International Affairs 1215, 1236
Australian Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc 1215
Axis 1015, 1104

B

Baker, Newton D 1216, 1219
Baldwin (*see* Alexander & Baldwin).
Baldwin, Hanson 1229
Balemuth, Louis 1218
Ballentine, Joseph W 1147, 1222, 1223
Bank of America 1217
Bank of California 1217
Bank of China 1161
Bank of Hawaii 1217
Bankers Club 1148
Bankers Trust Co 1217, 1220
Barmine, Gen. Alexander 1225
Barnard, Chester 1167, 1234–1236
Barnes, Joseph 980, 1108, 1193, 1197, 1210
Barnes, Kathleen 945
Barnett, Eugene E 970, 971, 1219
Barnett, Robert W 1152, 1236
Barr, General 1122
Beloff, Max 1222
Belshaw, Horace 957, 1216, 1222
Beltz, Edward W 1219
Benes, President 1057
Bentley, Elizabeth 1202, 1218, 1242, 1246
Berlin University 1008
Berzin, General 1218
Bevin, Mr 1061, 1132
Biddle, Francis 1101
Big Four 993
Biggerstaff, Knight 998
Binder, Carroll 1220
Bissell, Gen. Clayton 1004
Bisson, T. A 957, 994, 995, 1017–1019, 1025, 1153, 1204, 1229, 1235, 1239
Blakeslee, George H 1219
Bloch, Kurt 1222
Bluementhal, Annette 938
Boeke, J. H 1222
Bolles, Blair 976
Bolton, Mrs. Frances P 995, 1217, 1218
Book and Magazine Guild 941, 942, 945
Borchard, Edwin M 1222
Borg, Dorothy 996, 1227
Borton, Hugh 1219
Bowman, Isaiah 1220
Boyer, Raymond 1000, 1001
Boyer, R. J. F 1216
Bradley, General 1065
Bradley, Lt. Robert J 998
Bretholtz, Hilda Austern 945, 956, 957, 998
Bricker, Governor 1098
British-American Tobacco Co 1159, 1216
British Espionage Act 1033
British Foreign Office 1033
British Government 1118

Digitized by Google

	Page
British Joint Chiefs of Staff	1033
British Liberal Party	1216
British Tories	1013
Broad Street Club (New York City)	1233
Brodie, Bernard	1144, 1147, 1148
Broek, Jan O. M	1222, 1236
Bronx Warehouse	1174
Brookings Institution	996, 1224
Brooklyn Interracial Assembly	1105
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes	1104
Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks	1104
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen	1104
Brotherhood of Teamsters (AFL)	1104
Browder, Earl	1012, 1088, 1090, 1099, 1106, 1108, 1224
Brown Bros. & Co. (Philadelphia)	1220
Brown, Harvey	1104
Brown, Dr. Norman	1071
Brownell, Lincoln C	1219
Buck, J. Lossing	1221, 1222
Buck, Pearl	1229
Bucyrus-Erie Co	996
Budenz, Louis F	1077–1110, 1112, 1165, 1170, 1218, 1224
Bunche, Ralph	990, 993–995, 1036, 1215, 1220
Buss, Claude A	1147
Butterworth	1062, 1128
Byrnes, James F	1101

C

Cabinet (*see* President's Cabinet).	
CAC (*see* China Aid Council).	
California College	995
California Committee on Un-American Activities	1162, 1229
California University	995, 1216, 1220
Calkins, Robert D	970, 971, 995, 1219
Cambridge College (England)	1153
Canadian Friends of the Chinese People	1164, 1166
Canadian Institute of International Affairs	1215, 1236
Canadian Royal Commission	999, 1001
Canning, William	1168, 1169
Carey	1075
Carnegie Corp	1151, 1167, 1215, 1217, 1219, 1227
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	1220
Carnegie Foundation	1152, 1217
Carr, Sam	999
Carter, Edward C	937, 957, 964–967, 982, 983, 985, 988, 994, 997, 998, 1002, 1012, 1013, 1153, 1154, 1173–1175, 1182, 1185, 1187, 1189, 1190, 1195, 1197, 1199, 1207, 1208, 1210, 1213, 1219, 1231, 1240, 1243–1245.
Carter, Mrs. Edward C	1190
Case, Everett	1038, 1145, 1146, 1219
Castle & Cooke	1217, 1227
Catholic Journal	1171
Catlin, Farrish & Co	1219
Central Bank of China	1159
Chamberlain, Joseph P	970, 1202, 1217, 1219
Chamberlin, William Henry	1222, 1231
Chan, Hansu (*see* Chao-ting Chi).	
Chang, C. M	1222
Chang, P. H	1094
Chao-ting Chi (Hansu Chan)	1012, 1157–1163
Chapman, Agatha	1000, 1001
Chase, Mr	990
Chase Bank	1151, 1217
Chen, Han-seng	1012

Digitized by Google

Page
Chen, K. P. 1216
Chen Li-fu 1094
Cheng, Chen 1087, 1094
Chennault, General 1024, 1025, 1031, 1086, 1087, 1126
Chi, Chao-ting (Hansu Chan) 1012, 1157–1163
Chiang Fa-kwei 1087
Chiang Mon-lin 1216, 1222
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1220
Chicago Tribune 1105
Chicago University 996, 1221, 1227
China Aid Council 1214, 1218, 1240–1249
China Defense League 1249
China Desk (State Department) 982
China Foundation 995
China Today 1155, 1157, 1162–1164, 1166
China Welfare Fund 1247, 1249
China white paper 1049, 1076, 1091, 1092
Chinese armies (pre-Pearl Harbor) 1125
Chinese Communist Army 1057, 1058, 1087
Chinese Communist People's Republic 1041, 1045, 1049, 1056–1058, 1061, 1063, 1065, 1070, 1083, 1119, 1131, 1133–1135, 1158, 1226.
Chinese Eastern Railway 1225
Chinese guerrillas 1069
Chinese National Government Currency Stabilization Board 1158
Chinese Nationalist blockade 1068, 1119, 1133
Chinese Nationalist Government 950, 991, 992, 994, 1022, 1023, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1043, 1045, 1047, 1049, 1051–1058, 1064, 1067–1070, 1083, 1087, 1094, 1111–1126, 1132–1136, 1149, 1158, 1163, 1167, 1195, 1203, 1204, 1228, 1229, 1231, 1249.
Chinese Nationalist Navy 1068
Chou, Enlai 1010, 1094, 1214
Chung-Hsi, Pai 1087
Chungking government 990, 992
Churchill, Winston 1014, 1024, 1031, 1037, 1087
Church of the Master (New York City) 1106
CIO (*see* Congress of Industrial Organizations).
CIO News 995
City College (*see* College of the City of New York).
Civil Affairs Division (U. S. War Department) 995
Civil Service Commission (United States) 1033, 1034, 1149
Clarion 1000, 1001
Clark, Dwight L. 1219
Clark University 1219
Clayton, William 980, 981
Clubb, Edmund O. (J. E. N.) 974
Coe, Frank 980, 981, 985, 990, 992–995, 1218
Cohen, Jerome S 1221
Colegrove, Kenneth W 963, 1007, 1008, 1075, 1076, 1129, 1130, 1143, 1144, 1146–1148
Colgate University 1146, 1219
College of the City of New York (City College) 1169
Collins, Charles A 1105
Columbia University 995, 996, 1154, 1169, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1227, 1237
Commerce Department 1104, 1106
Comité d'Etudes des Problèmes du Pacifique (France) 1215
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 1017
Commonweal 1171
"Communist" (*see* Political Affairs).
Communist International 1010, 1100
Communist Party 945–950, 954, 957, 962–968, 974, 977, 985–991, 1000–1034, 1037–1048, 1065–1110, 1114, 1116, 1118–1121, 1127–1129, 1131–1135, 1154, 1155, 1158, 1161, 1163, 1164, 1168–1170, 1191–1202, 1206, 1212, 1215, 1218, 1222, 1226–1231, 1234, 1235, 1239–1242, 1247
Communist Party (Canada) 1000, 1001,

Digitized by Google

Page

Communist Party (China) 950, 991, 1009–1011, 1013, 1016, 1021–1024, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1041, 1048–1050, 1052, 1054–1058, 1060–1062, 1064–1067, 1069, 1070, 1082–1084, 1086, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1094, 1096, 1097, 1107, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1121, 1127–1135, 1158, 1161, 1163, 1164, 1198, 1200, 1218, 1222, 1229, 1235, 1239
Communist Party (France) 1106, 1108
Communist Party (Japan) 1072
Communist Party (Korea) 1027
Communist Party (Poland) 1003
Communist Party (Russia) 1031, 1044, 1045, 1049, 1050, 1058–1060, 1067, 1120, 1212
Communist Party (United States) 945–948, 954, 957, 963, 965–968, 974, 985–988, 1007, 1025, 1078, 1101, 1103, 1108, 1168, 1170, 1192–1197, 1199, 1206, 1215, 1227–1229, 1234, 1242
Communist People's Republic Government 1041, 1045, 1049, 1056–1058, 1061, 1063, 1065, 1070, 1083, 1119, 1131, 1133–1135, 1158, 1226
Comstock, Ada L. (*see* Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein).
Condliffe, Dr. J. B 1213, 1216, 1222
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 938–942, 945–947, 995, 1075, 1100–1102, 1104, 1137
Congress of Industrial Organizations (Eleventh Convention) 946
Congress of the United States (*see* United States Congress).
Connally, Senator Tom 1071, 1072
Cooke (*see* Castle & Cooke).
Coons, Arthur G 994, 995, 1132, 1147
Corbett, P. E 994, 1216, 1222
Cornell University 1167
Council for Pan-American Democracy 995
Council on African Affairs 1106
Council on Books in Wartime 1136
Council on Foreign Relations (New York City) 1214, 1224
Counts, George S 1219
County Court of Ottawa 1005
Cowles brothers 1104
Crawford, D. G 1227
Creech-Jones, Arthur 1216
Cressey, George B 1222
Cromwell (*see* Sullivan & Cromwell).
Curran, Joseph 1104
Currency Stabilization Board (*see* Chinese National Government Currency Stabilization Board).
Currie, Lauchlin 979–985, 987, 988
Curtis, John L 1219
Curtis, Lionel 1216

D

DaFoe, J. W 1216
Daily Worker 954, 955, 1012, 1017, 1024, 1077, 1084, 1088–1090, 1092, 1094, 1095, 1097, 1099–1103, 1106, 1184, 1235, 1239.
Darden 1167
Davies, John P 1218
Davies, Joseph E 1217
Davis, John Patton, Jr 1021, 1022, 1025, 1079
Dean, Arthur H 977, 1216, 1217, 1219
Dean, Mrs. Vera Micheles 976
DeCaux, Len 979, 990, 993, 995, 1194
Decker, John W 1147
Defense Department 1027, 1065
DeGarmo (*see* Edward W. Allen).
Delafield & Wood 1220
Delany 1075
Democratic Convention (1944) 1097, 1099, 1100
Democratic Party 1097–1100, 1220

Digitized by Google

Page
Democratic National Committee 1220
Dennett, Raymond 937–1005, 1166, 1219
Des Moines Register and Tribune 996, 1104, 1221
Dewey, Governor 1097, 1102, 1105
Dillingham, Walter F 1219
Dodd, Bella 1224
Dodge & Seymour 1220
Donovan, Gen. "Big Bill" 1002
Dooman, Eugene C 980, 981, 1016
Douglas, William O 1100
Doull, Lieutenant 998
Downie, W 1216
Dubois, Cora 1129, 1130, 1146
Duclos, Jacques 1106, 1108, 1109
Duffield, E. S 1124
Duggan, Lawrence 1218
Duggan, Stephen P 1219
Dulles, John Foster 1197
Dumbarton Oaks 993, 995, 996, 1032, 1132

E

East Asian Institute (Columbia University) 1216, 1219
ECA (*see* Economic Cooperation Administration).
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 1161, 1162
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 1072, 1201
Economic Policy Committee 996
Eggleston, Sir Frederic 1216, 1222
Electric Bond & Share Co 1217
Elizayev 1154
Ellis Co., Wilbur 1217, 1227
Embick, General 1022, 1023, 1032, 1033
Emeny, Brooks 1220
Emerson, Rupert 980, 981, 994, 995, 1007, 1008, 1222
Employee loyalty investigation (State Department) 1007
Enlai, Chou 1010, 1094, 1214
Epstein, Israel 1194, 1195, 1197, 1198, 1201, 1202
Espionage Act 1033, 1042

F

Fahey, Col. Daniel D., Jr 995
Fahs, C. B 1222
Fairbank, John K 1025, 1147, 1245
Fairbank, Wilma 1025
Fairbanks, Mr 998
Fairchild, General 1022
Fa-kwei, Gen. Chiang 1087
Far Eastern 1192
Far Eastern Association 1214
Far Eastern Commission 1071, 1221
Far Eastern Survey 938, 949, 970, 971, 996, 1147, 1148, 1204, 1216, 1229
Farley, Hugh D 998
Farley, Miriam 938, 940, 945, 950, 952, 990 ,992, 993, 996, 1192, 1202, 1203, 1209
Farrish (*see* Catlin, Farrish & Co.).
Fascist Party 946, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1108
Faymonville, Col. Philip R 980, 985, 988
FBI (*see* Federal Bureau of Investigation).
FEA (*see* Foreign Economic Administration).
Fearey, Robert A 1222
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 956
1044, 1079, 1080, 1172, 1173, 1175–1180, 1183, 1186–1188, 1225
Federal Service (*see* U. S. Goverment).
Ferris, General 1030
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt (Frederick Spencer, Lawrence Hearn) 940,
947, 953–955, 970, 971, 980, 986, 990, 992–995, 1088, 1089, 1091–1094,
1151, 1155–1157, 1160, 1162, 1164, 1177, 1179–1188, 1190, 1192, 1193,
1199, 1203, 1208, 1209, 1217–1219, 1224, 1227–1229.

Digitized by Google

Page
Field, Noel ... 1218
Finkelstein, Moses ... 1171, 1191
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co ... 1217
Fischl, Margaret ... 996
Fisher, Galen M ... 1219
Fisher, Harold H ... 1220
Fitch, George ... 1163
Fitch, Mrs. Geraldine ... 1163
Flanders, Ralph E ... 1218
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ... 996
Flying Cloud (steamship) ... 1067, 1132
Flying Tigers (American volunteer group) ... 1125, 1126, 1149
Fo, Sun ... 1021
Food Research Institute (Stanford University) ... 1219
Foreign Affairs ... 973
Foreign Affairs Committee (House) ... 1009, 1010, 1019, 1026, 1029
Foreign and Domestic Commerce Committee (House) ... 1026
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) ... 980, 981, 994, 995, 1221
Foreign Policy Association (FPA) ... 976, 966, 1148, 1166, 1167, 1214, 1220, 1221, 1239
Foreign Relations (Chicago Council) ... 1220
Foreign Relations Committee (Senate) ... 1027, 1041, 1049, 1065, 1071, 1072, 1079, 1144
Forman, Harrison ... 1235, 1239
Forrestal, James ... 1122–1125, 1149
Forrestal Diaries ... 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125
Fortier, General ... 1062, 1133, 1137
Fortune ... 1221
Fosdick, Dr ... 1038, 1039, 1050, 1054, 1056, 1063, 1129, 1145, 1146
Fourth Army Headquarters (Presidio) ... 988
FPA (*see* Foreign Policy Association).
Frank, Mark ... 1000, 1001
Franklin, William E ... 998
Fraser, H. W ... 1104
Friedman, Irving ... 1002
Friedman, Julian R ... 1245
Friters, Gerard ... 1222
Froude (*see* Edward W. Allen).
Furnivall, J. S ... 1222

G

Garside, B. A ... 1247, 1248
Geiger, Theodore ... 1218
General Electric Co ... 1220
General Motors Export Corp ... 1219
General Staff (U. S. War Department) ... 995, 1032
George, Daisy ... 1105
George, Harrison ... 1218
George Washington University ... 976, 996
Gerbode, Mrs. Frank A. (Martha) ... 965, 996, 1217
Gerig, Benjamin ... 1036
Gerlach, Talitha ... 1245
Gilchrist, Huntington ... 970, 971, 996, 1003, 1216, 1219
Goglidze, Sergei Arsenvich ... 1107
Golos, Jacob ... 1218
Goodrich, L. Carrington ... 1219
G. O. P. (*see* Republican Party).
Gordon, Eugene ... 1105
Gould, Randall ... 977, 1222
Gourou, Pierre ... 1216
Gouzenko ... 999
Grad, Andrew (*see* Andrew Grajdanzev).
Grady, Henry F ... 1220
Grajdanzev, Andrew ... 957, 994, 995, 1153, 1236
Graves (*see* Kizer & Graves).

Digitized by Google

Page
Graves, Mortimer 1220
Greenberg, Michael 1002
Greene, Jerome D 1216, 1217, 1219
Greene, Katrine R. C 945
Greenslade, Admiral John W 975
Griffin Philippines Mission 1120
Grew, Joseph B 980–985
Guam (U. S. Naval Government) 996
Guffey, Joseph 1100
Guggenheim Foundation 1136
Guiliano 1178
Gull, E. M 1221

H

Halsey, Admiral William F 1036, 1064, 1072
Hamilton, Maxwell 1071
Hancher 1167
Han-seng, Gen. Chen 1012
Hansu Chan (*see* Chao-ting Chi).
Harmon, Francis S 1219
Harper's magazine 1230
Harrison, George M 1104
Hart, Admiral T. C 994, 995
Hart, Thomas 1218
Harvard University 995, 1007, 1008, 1025, 1054, 1076, 1136, 1154, 1237
Harvard-Yenching Institute 1136
Hawaii University 996, 1227
Hazard, John N 1108
Hearn, Lawrence (*see* Frederick Vanderbilt Field).
Hearst Press 1189
Heaton, Claude E 1240
Heller, Mrs. Edward H 1220
Herald Tribune (New York City) 1141, 1148, 1193
Herod, William R 1147, 1219
Hickenlooper, Senator 1079
Higginson & Co. (*see* Lee, Higginson & Co.).
Hilen (*see* Edward W. Allen).
Hillman, Sidney 1101
Hirohito, Emperor 994, 1016, 1019–1021, 1135
Hiss, Alger 980, 1032, 1194
Hiss, Donald 1079
Hitler, Adolph 1045, 1049, 1051, 1057, 1060, 1083, 1135
Ho Chi Minh 1031
Ho, Franklin 1222
Hoffman, Paul 1054, 1060
Holcombe, Arthur N 1144, 1147, 1148
Holland, William L 957, 1036, 1134–1250
Holmes, Julius 1037, 1042
Homer, Mrs. Dorothy Robinson 1106
Hoover, Herbert 1102, 1220
Hoover, J. Edgar 1173, 1176
Hoover War Library (Stanford University) 1220
Hornbeck, Stanley K 980–983, 1032, 1178
Horne, Admiral F. J 997, 998
Hotel and Club Employees Union (AFL), Local 6, New York City 1105
Hot Springs Conference (IPR) 968, 969, 975–980, 884, 986, 987, 989, 991–993, 995, 998, 1000, 1002, 1004, 1005, 1207.
Houghton, Mifflin Publishing Co 1117, 1148
Houk, John L 969
House Armed Services Committee 1026, 1041, 1049, 1064
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 1009, 1010, 1019, 1026, 1029
House Committee on Foreign and Domestic Commerce 1026
House of Commons 1061, 1132
House of Peers (Japan) 1216

Digitized by Google

Page
Howland, Charles P---- 1216, 1219
Ho Yin-ching---- 1094
Hsia, C. L---- 1229
Hsiang Shan's Children's Home (Peiping)---- 1249
Hsu, Shuhsi---- 1221, 1222
Hubbard, L. E---- 1222
Huggins, G. Ellsworth---- 970, 971, 976, 1003, 1219
Hull, Cordell---- 980, 981, 982, 985
Hume, Edward H---- 1219
Hunton, Alpheus---- 1106
Hurley, Gen. Patrick---- 1022, 1214, 1229
Hu Shih---- 1216, 1222

I

Ickes, Harold---- 1104
Independent Motion Picture Producers---- 1221
India-American Conference---- 1147, 1148, 1168
Indian Council of World Affairs---- 1215
Indian Legislative Assembly---- 1216
Inouye, Junnosuke---- 1216
Institute of International Education---- 1219
Institute of Pacific Relations---- 937–942, 1004, 1013, 1014, 1032, 1033, 1035–1037, 1071, 1088, 1090, 1093, 1108, 1110, 1144–1148, 1150, 1153, 1155, 1158, 1160–1177, 1181–1188, 1191, 1199, 1200–1206, 1209, 1212–1225, 1227–1235, 1237, 1238, 1244–1246.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council)---- 937–942, 945–951, 957–962, 968–984, 988–997, 1002, 1003, 1144–1148, 1150–1153, 1166–1168, 1171–1175, 1184, 1188, 1192, 1212–1225, 1227–1235, 1237, 1238, 1244–1246.
Institute of Pacific Relations (British Council)---- 1217
Institute of Pacific Relations (Canadian delegation)---- 997, 998, 1217
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chicago office)---- 938
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese Council)---- 989, 1160, 1217, 1228
Institute of Pacific Relations (Education Committee)---- 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Eighth Conference)---- 1215, 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Eleventh Conference)---- 1220, 1225
Institute of Pacific Relations (Fifth Conference)---- 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Fourth Conference)---- 1220
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Conference)---- 1148, 1150–1152, 1216, 1228
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Finance Committee)---- 976, 1147
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Program Committee)---- 976, 1220
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Research Committee)---- 976
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japanese Council)---- 989, 1213, 1217
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York office)---- 938, 942
Institute of Pacific Relations (Ninth Conference)---- 968, 969, 975–980, 984, 986, 987, 989, 991, 992, 993, 995, 998, 1000, 1002, 1004, 1005, 1078, 1136, 1143, 1185, 1207, 1220, 1221.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council)---- 957, 971, 976–978, 995, 1003, 1145, 1184, 1215, 1216, 1225, 1226, 1235, 1237
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine Council)---- 1215
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco Bay region)---- 976, 996, 1147, 1148, 1220, 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco Conference)---- 939, 954, 995, 996, 1220
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco office)---- 939, 996
Institute of Pacific Relations (Seattle office)---- 938
Institute of Pacific Relations (Seventh Conference)---- 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Sixth Conference)---- 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Soviet Council)---- 1203, 1225
Institute of Pacific Relations (Third Conference)---- 1221
Institute of Pacific Relations (Virginia Beach Conference)---- 1162
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington office)---- 938, 939, 951, 955, 956, 984
Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva)---- 996

Digitized by Google

Page
Intelligence (Naval) 1080, 1081, 1112
Intelligence Branch (Royal Canadian Air Force) 999, 1001
Interdepartmental Psychological Warfare Committee (Canada) 999, 1000
Interior Department (United States) 1104
International Association of Machinists (AFL) 1104
International Business Machines Corp 1217
International Civil Aviation Conference (Chicago) 996
International Conference (IPR) 1148, 1151, 1152
International Education Institute 1219
International General Electric 1151, 1217, 1219
International Labor Conference (Philadelphia) 995
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) 1221
International News Service (INS) 1142
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission 995
International Peace Hospitals 1247
International Red Cross 1218
International Rotary 1213
International Secretariat 956, 957, 967, 978, 998, 1235
International Telephone & Telegraph Co 1217
International Workers Order 1103
International YMCA 1213, 1215
Iowa University 1167
Irwin, Mr 1141, 1142
Isaacs, Stanley 1240
Isbrandtsen Steamship Line 1067, 1133
Ishii, Viscount K 1216
Istorii, Voprosy 1226
Ives, Senator 1197
Izvestia 1226

J

Jackson, Mrs. Ada 1105
Jaffe, Philip J 956, 1156, 1157, 1161, 1162, 1164–1166, 1206, 1229, 1245
Jan, Lieutenant 998
Japan Institute of Pacific Relations 1215
Japanese Cabinet 1018
Japanese Diet 1018
Japanese Government 1019, 1072
Japanese House of Peers 1216
Japanese Liberal Party 1018
Japanese Progressive Party 1018
Japanese Social Democratic Party 1018
JCS (*see* Joint Chiefs of Staff).
J. E. N. (*see* Edmund O. Clubb).
Jenkins, Mrs 950
Jenkins, Shirley 940, 996
Jenks (*see* Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks).
Jessup Commission 1075
Jessup, Dr. Philip C 970, 971, 979, 985–989, 991–995, 1003, 1004, 1037–1039, 1046, 1054, 1056, 1059, 1062–1065, 1068, 1075, 1113, 1114, 1118, 1119, 1128–1134, 1137, 1138, 1145, 1216, 1219, 1227, 1228, 1247.
Johns Hopkins University 996, 1136, 1220, 1237
Johnson, James B 1106
Johnson, Louis 1120
Johnstone, William C 938, 976, 980, 984, 990, 994, 996
Johnstone, Mrs. William C 996
Johnstone, William C., Jr 976
Joint Chiefs of Staff 1015–1017, 1021, 1023–1025, 1087, 1088, 1119
Joint Intelligence Committee 1015, 1022
Joint Strategic Survey Committee 1015, 1021, 1022
Joint War Plans Committee 1023
Jones, Jesse 1101, 1102, 1104, 1105
Jordan, Myra 1108
Judd, Congressman Walter 1027, 1071

Digitized by Google

K

Page

Kai-shek, Chiang ... 988, 992, 996, 1011–1015, 1017, 1021, 1023–1025, 1029–1031, 1045, 1047, 1049, 1058, 1064, 1067–1069, 1082–1085, 1087, 1091, 1093–1096, 1109, 1113, 1116, 1124, 1125, 1136, 1227.
Kai-shek, Mme. Chiang ... 1249
Keesing, Felix M ... 976, 996, 1220, 1222
Kennan, George ... 973, 1050–1052, 1128, 1129
Keppel, Frederick P ... 1219, 1227
Kerensky, Alexander ... 962
Kerner, Robert J ... 1222
Khan, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah ... 1216
Kilpatrick, William H ... 1219
Kirby, E. Stuart ... 1222
Kirk, Grayson ... 970, 996, 1220
Kizer, Benjamin H ... 979, 1147, 1219
Kizer, Carolyn ... 989, 996
Kizer & Graves (Spokane) ... 1219
Knight, Felix ... 1104
Knopf, Alfred ... 1167, 1239
Knowles, Col. Kennith ... 1108
Kohlberg, Alfred ... 974–978, 1203, 1204, 1228, 1229
Kremlin ... 1009, 1051
Krivitsky, General ... 1218
Kung, H. H ... 1094
Kunzru, Pandit H. N ... 1216
Kuomintang government ... 989, 991, 1030, 1056, 1083, 1085, 1086, 1090, 1093, 1094, 1097, 1197, 1227, 1239
Kyodo News Agency (J'apan) ... 1216

L

Labour-Progressive Party ... 1000, 1001
Lamont, Thomas W ... 1151, 1217, 1219
Lamont, Mrs. Thomas W ... 1217
Lane, Clayton ... 1168, 1173, 1175, 1176, 1187, 1188, 1219
Langer, Paul ... 1222
Lapham, Lewis ... 1219
Lapin, Adam ... 1100
Larson, Ed ... 1038
Lasker, Bruno ... 945, 996
Lattimore, Owen ... 938, 951, 963, 967, 970, 979, 988, 989, 991–994, 996, 1003, 1004, 1010–1017, 1019–1021, 1025, 1027–1029, 1044–1047, 1049, 1050, 1054, 1060–1063, 1066, 1067, 1069–1071, 1075, 1076, 1079, 1085, 1107, 1108, 1114, 1118, 1119, 1123, 1130, 1131, 1133–1136, 1147, 1177, 1188, 1192, 1197, 1203, 1210, 1219, 1227, 1228, 1233, 1235, 1237, 1239.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) ... 951–953, 996, 1142, 1143, 1203, 1210, 1227, 1233
Lawson, William T ... 1000
Leadership School (Young Communist League) ... 1000, 1001
League of Nations ... 996, 1003
League of Women Voters ... 1220
Lee, Duncan ... 1002, 1218
Lee, Higginson, & Co ... 1216, 1219
Lee, Michael ... 997
Lee, Rosamund ... 938
Lenin ... 1089, 1108
Lever Bros. (London) ... 1151, 1217
Levy, Roger ... 1222
L'Heureux, H. J ... 1003
Li, K. C ... 1216
Liberal Party (British) ... 1216
Liberated Areas Branch (FEA) ... 995
Library of Congress ... 962, 969, 1172
Lieu, D. K ... 1221, 1222
Life ... 1204, 1221

Digitized by Google

Page
Li-fu, Chen ---- 1094
Lilienthal, Philip E ---- 1246
Lincoln, Abraham ---- 994, 1099
Linebarger, Paul M. A ---- 1222
Lin Yu-tang ---- 1221, 1222, 1235, 1239
Lippmann, Walter ---- 1098, 1230
Little, Brown & Co ---- 1020, 1136
Lockwood, William W ---- 937, 938, 945, 1185, 1219, 1230
London University ---- 1009
Loomis, Charles F ---- 997, 1182
Loudon ---- 1161
Lovestone ---- 1075
Lovett ---- 1125, 1126
Lucas, General ---- 1026, 1027
Luce, Henry R ---- 1217, 1221
Ludden, Raymond ---- 1026

M

Macadam, Ivison ---- 1159, 1160
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas ---- 1018
1036, 1042, 1046, 1062–1065, 1113, 1118–1120, 1137, 1138
MacArthur hearings ---- 1113, 1118–1120
Machinists International Association (AFL) ---- 1104
MacKay, J. A ---- 996, 1219
Macmillan publishers ---- 1168
MacNaughton, Ernest ---- 1144, 1147, 1148
Maintenance of Way Employes Brotherhood ---- 1104
Malott ---- 1167
Management Employee Relations, Inc ---- 1220
Manchu dynasty ---- 1159
Mandel, William ---- 1196
Marder, Mr ---- 1141, 1142
Markham, Mrs ---- 1189, 1190
Marshall, Clifford B ---- 1219
Marshall, Gen. George C ---- 1024, 1049, 1051, 1052, 1054, 1056, 1060, 1063, 1086, 1087, 1119, 1120, 1124, 1126, 1128, 1131, 1132, 1134, 1148, 1198
Marshall plan ---- 1049, 1051, 1052, 1054, 1060, 1119, 1120
Marx, Karl ---- 1010, 1013, 1089, 1106, 1108
Masani, M. R ---- 1222
Matson Steamship Co ---- 1217
Matsukata, Yoshisaburo ---- 1216
Matteson, Robert ---- 1039, 1121
Matthews, J. B ---- 1189
Maurer, Herrymon ---- 1222
Mayflower Hotel ---- 988
McCann, Colonel ---- 1129
McCarthy, Joseph R ---- 1172, 1175, 1187, 1189, 1228, 1230
McConaughy, Dr. James L ---- 970, 971, 1219
McCoy, Maj. Gen. Frank R ---- 966, 1071, 1221
McDermott, Mr ---- 1118, 1123
McDonald, James G ---- 1221
McFadyean, Sir Andrew ---- 1216
McGovern, William Montgomery ---- 1007–1034, 1069, 1087, 1088
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred ---- 1219
McMahon, Senator ---- 1079
MDAP Philippines Mission ---- 1120
Mead, Senator ---- 1104
Meaney ---- 1075
Mickle, J. J ---- 997
Midston House (New York City) ---- 970, 971
Mikado (*see* Emperor Hirohito).
Mikolajczyk ---- 1083
Military mission (China) ---- 1026, 1069
Milliman, E. E ---- 1104
Millis, Walter H ---- 1122, 1124, 1125, 1222
Mills College (*see* Mills Summer Institute).

Digitized by Google

Page
Mills, Harriett ---- 989, 997
Mills, Lennox A ---- 1221, 1222
Mills, Saul ---- 1104
Mills Summer Institute ---- 1220, 1221
Minarovich, Michael ---- 945
Minh, Ho Chi ---- 1031
Minneapolis Tribune ---- 1220
Minnesota University ---- 1036, 1050, 1132
MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ---- 1037
Mitchell, Kate ---- 955, 956, 1228, 1229
Moeller, Heinz (Asiaticus) (Hans Mueller) ---- 973, 974, 1012
Monarch Life Assurance Co ---- 1216
Mon-lin, Dr. Chiang ---- 1216, 1222
Mont Tremblant ---- 978, 982, 993, 997, 1215
Mooney, James D ---- 1219
Moore, Harriet L ---- 937, 938, 988, 1108, 1220
Morgan, J. P ---- 1217, 1219
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr ---- 1017, 1028, 1029
Morgenthau plan ---- 1017, 1028, 1029
Morris, Lawrence ---- 970, 971, 1220
Morris, Robert ---- 1080
Morrison, George Abbot ---- 996
Morrisson, Mrs. James W ---- 1220
Morse, Senator ---- 1197
Moscow Conference ---- 1089
Moscow Radio ---- 1226
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America ---- 1219
Motylev, V. E ---- 1225
Mueller, Hans (*see* Heinz Moeller).
Mundt, Senator Karl E ---- 1189
Murphy, J. Morden ---- 1144, 1147, 1148, 1220
Murray, Philip ---- 946, 947, 1100, 1104
Murray, W ---- 1100, 1101

N

Nash, Walter ---- 1216
Nasu, Shiroshi ---- 1222
National Board (Politburo) ---- 1078, 1079, 1084, 1085, 1088, 1091, 1099, 1101, 1103, 1109
National Cash Register ---- 1217
National City Bank (New York) ---- 996, 1151, 1217, 1219
National Geographic Magazine ---- 1136
National Geographic Society ---- 1231
National Republican Program Committee ---- 995
National Resources Planning Board ---- 995
National Security Council ---- 1125, 1126
National War Fund ---- 1247
Nationalist China
Nationalist Blockade (China) ---- 1068, 1119, 1133
Nationalist Chinese Government ---- 950, 991, 992, 994, 1022, 1023, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1043, 1045, 1047, 1049, 1051–1058, 1064, 1067–1070, 1083, 1087, 1094, 1113–1126, 1132–1136, 1158, 1167, 1163 1195, 1203, 1204, 1228, 1229, 1231, 1249.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ---- 1119, 1120
Naval Intelligence ---- 1080, 1081, 1112
Navy Department (United States) ---- 995, 996, 998, 1026, 1080, 1112, 1221, 1224
Navy General Board (United States) ---- 995
Navy Mission (China) ---- 1026
Nazi Party ---- 1120
Negro Labor Victory Committee ---- 1105
Nehru, Pandit Jawaharial ---- 1045, 1049, 1050, 1053, 1055, 1066, 1067, 1167
Nelson, Donald M ---- 1221
New Advance ---- 1000, 1001
New Delhi Conference ---- 1237
New Masses ---- 1199

Digitized by Google

Page
New Republic ---- 1220
Newsweek ---- 1187
New York Age ---- 1106
New York Council on Foreign Relations ---- 1214
New York Herald Tribune ---- 1117, 1124, 1141, 1148, 1193, 1230
New York Herald Tribune Newspaper Syndicate ---- 1124
New York Mirror ---- 1188
New York News ---- 1105
New York Post ---- 1105, 1189
New York Public Affairs Committee ---- 1214
New York Public Library ---- 1106
New York State Department of Labor ---- 994
New York State Legislative Committee ---- 1168
New York Times ---- 955, 1007, 1008, 1105, 1129, 1142, 1171, 1197, 1204, 1229, 1230
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs ---- 1215
Nightingale ---- 1000, 1001
Nimitz, Admiral Chester ---- 1071
Nitobe, Dr. Inazo ---- 1216, 1221
NKVD (*see* OGPU).
Nobel prize ---- 1215, 1220
Norman, E. Herbert ---- 1153, 1154, 1164, 1166, 1222, 1234
Northern California Council of World Affairs ---- 1182
North Korea People's Army ---- 1028
North Pacific International Planning Board ---- 1147
North, Robert C ---- 1222
Northwestern University ---- 1007–1010, 1069, 1088
Notestein, Mrs. Ada Comstock ---- 940, 970, 977, 1219, 1227

O

Oahu Land & Railway Co ---- 1219
Occidental College (Los Angeles) ---- 995, 1132
Occidental Life Insurance Co ---- 1219
Odegard, Professor ---- 1153
OEEC ---- 1056
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation ---- 937
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) ---- 1002, 1015, 1025, 1033
Office of War Information (OWI) ---- 938, 996, 1004, 1015, 1021, 1025, 1033, 1034, 1136, 1150, 1213
OFRRA ---- 995
OGPU (Soviet Military Intelligence) ---- 999, 1001
Olson, Culbert L ---- 1100
Order of Railway Conductors ---- 1104
Osborne, Ernest ---- 1240, 1243, 1247, 1248
OSS (*see* Office of Strategic Services).
Oumansky, Constantine ---- 988
OWI (*see* Office of War Information).
Oxford University ---- 1008, 1009

P

Pacific Affairs ---- 957, 967, 1013, 1136, 1147, 1148, 1151, 1162, 1202, 1213, 1221, 1225, 1231, 1246
Pacific Coast Regional Committee of Social Science ---- 995
Pacific Pact ---- 1056
Page, Walter Hines ---- 996, 1136, 1219
Pai, Chung-Hsi ---- 1087
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs ---- 1215
Pan American Airways ---- 1217
Pandit, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi ---- 1216
Parker, Harriet H ---- 997
Parker, Philo W ---- 1220, 1227
Parsons, Rudy ---- 1079
Pauley report ---- 1027
Pavlov ---- 1001
Pearl Harbor ---- 972, 989, 991, 1012, 1154
Peking University ---- 996

Digitized by Google

Page
Pennsylvania newspaper editors ... 1047
Pennsylvania University ... 1035, 1071, 1111, 1114, 1132
Pentagon Building ... 1126
People's Bank of China ... 1160
Perlo, Victor ... 1218
Peters, J ... 1218
Petrov, Ivan Petrovich ... 961
Philippine Council (Institute of Pacific Relations) ... 1215
Phillips, J. W ... 1160, 1161
PM ... 1105
Poland, Fred W ... 998, 999, 1000, 1001, 1004
Polish Communist Government ... 1003
Politburo (*see* National Board).
Political Action Committee (CIO) ... 1100
Political Action Committee (Wayne County) (Detroit) ... 1104
Political Affairs, formerly "Communist" ... 1106, 1108
Pope, Arthur Upham ... 1245
Porter, Mrs. Catherine ... 938, 945
President's Cabinet ... 1105, 1106, 1113, 1116, 1126, 1149
Press Club ... 1065
Price, Mary ... 1218, 1242
Price, Mildred ... 1218, 1242, 1246, 1247
Princeton University ... 1185, 1219
Princeton University Press ... 1167
Privy Council (Canada) ... 1216
Progressive Party ... 1106
Public Affairs Committee (New York) ... 1214
Pulitzer prize ... 1221
Purcell, Victor ... 1222, 1237

Q

Quigley, Dr. Harold S ... 1050, 1132, 1144, 1147, 1148
Quirino ... 1053

R

Radcliffe College ... 1219, 1227
Radius, Walter ... 1153, 1166
Railroad Clerks Brotherhood ... 1104
Railway Carmen Brotherhood ... 1104
Railway Conductors Order ... 1104
Rajchman, Ludwig ... 1003
Ramspeck, Robert ... 1033, 1034, 1149
Rand, Christopher ... 1198
Randolph, Jeannette ... 945
Rao, Shiva ... 1167
Raymond, Elizabeth ... 945
RCAF (*see* Royal Canadian Air Force).
Reader's Digest ... 1204, 1217, 1229
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) ... 1104
Red Army (Russia) ... 1084
Red Cross (International) ... 1218
Red Guards (Russian) ... 961
Reinhardt, Mrs. Aurelia Henry ... 1221
Reischauer, Edwin O ... 1025, 1144, 1147, 1148
Reorganization Act ... 1139, 1140
Republican Herald Tribune ... 1105
Republican Party (G. O. P.) ... 1097, 1102, 1104–1106, 1114
Research Advisory Committee (American IPR) ... 1147, 1148
RFC (*see* Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
Rhee ... 1053
Rheinische Zeitung (Cologne) ... 1013
Rhoads, Charles J ... 1220
Rieve, Emil ... 946
Rishauer, Professor (Reischaver) ... 1076

Digitized by Google

Page
Robbins, Joseph 1249
Robequain, Charles 1222
Robertson, W. S 1148
Robinson, Henry M 1220
Rockefeller Foundation 1146, 1151–1154, 1159, 1166–1168, 1215, 1217, 1223, 1234–1236, 1237
Rockefeller, John D., III 1148
Roosevelt, President 985, 1014, 1016, 1023, 1024, 1030, 1085, 1087, 1092, 1094, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1102, 1104–1106, 1109, 1113, 1136
Root, Elihu 995
Rose, Archibald 1216
Rosinger, Lawrence K 997, 1044–1046, 1049, 1050, 1069, 1070, 1076–1078, 1118, 1119, 1123, 1130, 1133, 1136, 1148, 1167–1172, 1221, 1234, 1235, 1237, 1239, 1240.
Ross, L. Clunies 1075, 1222
Rotary International 1213
Roth, Andrew 955, 997, 998
Rowe, David N 976, 1071, 1222
Rowell, Chester 1220
Rowell, Newton, W 1216
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 999, 1000, 1001
Royal Institute of International Affairs (London) 1214–1216, 1236
Russell, Francis H 1042, 1132
Russian Red Army 1084
Russian War Relief 1174, 1175

S

Sacks, Milton 1222
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1105
St. Paul Pioneer Press 1131, 1133
Salem Methodist Church (New York City) 1105
Salisbury, Laurence E 950, 971, 996
San Francisco Chronicle 1014, 1220
San Francisco Examiner 965
San Francisco Regional Labor Board 995
Sansom, Sir George 1153, 1216, 1221, 1222
Sarrant, Albert 1216
Saturday Review of Literature 1230
Sayre, Harry 946
SCAP 1027
Schneider, Mr 1077
Schneider, Helen 1077, 1078, 1246
School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, D. C.) 996
School of Business (Columbia University) 1219
School of Oriental Studies (London University) 1009
Schroeder 1189
Schwartz Benjamin 1222
Schwellenbach, Lewis B 1163
Seattle Chamber of Commerce 995
Secretariat (American) 996
Secretariat (IPR) 994, 997, 998
Secretariat (League of Nations) 996
Security Council (United Nations) 1053
Security First National Bank (Los Angeles) 1220
Sen, Sun Yat 1096
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1027, 1041, 1049, 1065, 1071, 1072, 1079, 1144
Senate of the United States (*see* U. S. Senate).
Servants of India Society 1216
Service, John Stewart 955, 956, 1021–1023, 1025, 1026, 1078, 1218
Seventh Fleet (United States) 1067, 1069, 1119
Seymour, Lawrence D 1003, 1220
Shahn, Tillie G 938
Shan, Hsiang 1249
Shanghai Commercial Bank (China) 1216
Shannon, W 1189

Digitized by Google

Page
Sharpe, Frances 997
Shell Oil Co 1217
Sherman, Stirling & Wright 977
Shih, Hu 1216, 1222
Shillinglaw, David L., & Co 1220
Shiman, Russell G 945
Shotwell, James T 1216, 1220
Shuhsi Hsu 1221, 1222
Sillin, Samuel 1235, 1239
Silvermaster, Nathan 1218
Sino-Soviet treaties 949
Slade, Mrs. F. Louis 1220
Smedley, Agnes 1218
Smith, Alexander 1137
Smith, Dr. Tredwell 1108
Snow, Edgar 1235, 1239
Social Democratic Party (Japan) 1018
Social Science Research Council 1136, 1167
Socialist Party (China) 1239
Socialist Revolution (Russian) 962
Society for Applied Anthropology 996
Soong, T. V 1087
Sorbonne (Paris) 1008
Soule, George 1220
South Pacific Commission 1220
Soviet Asia Mission 1085, 1106–1109
Soviet Council (IPR) 1203, 1225
Soviet press 1225
Soviet radio 1203, 1226
Soviet Union 949–954, 958–961, 964, 968, 969, 973, 983, 985–987, 999, 1001, 1013, 1015, 1024, 1028, 1034, 1041, 1049–1053, 1055, 1057–1060, 1082, 1084, 1085, 1087, 1090, 1092, 1093, 1096, 1099, 1102, 1106, 1107, 1109, 1119, 1128, 1193, 1202, 1212, 1213, 1216, 1218, 1222, 1225, 1226, 1240.
Soviet World Atlas 1225
Special Committee on Un-American Activities 1162
Spelman, Laura (Rockefeller Memorial) 1235, 1236
Spencer, Frederick (*see* Frederick Vanderbilt Field).
Spencer, J 1237
Spotlight on the Far East 1017
Sproul, Dr. Robert G 976, 1220
Stachel, Jack 1218
Staley, Dr. Eugene 976, 996, 1148
Stalin, Joseph 1010, 1012, 1014, 1057, 1107
Standard-Vacuum Oil Co 1151, 1217, 1219, 1220, 1227
Stanford University 976, 996, 1153, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1227
Starobin, Joseph 1095
Stassen, Harold E 1035–1075, 1111–1138, 1143, 1144, 1146, 1149
State Department 976, 980–985, 995–997, 1003, 1007, 1008, 1015, 1016, 1021, 1027, 1028, 1032–1038, 1041–1043, 1046–1050, 1059, 1060, 1062, 1064–1068, 1071–1076, 1091, 1092, 1112–1134, 1136, 1137, 1144, 1145, 1147, 1148, 1178, 1195, 1198, 1218, 1221, 1223, 1224, 1226, 1230, 1249.
State Department (Asiatic Section) 1128
State Department (China Desk) 982
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs) 983, 996, 1092
State Department (Division of Far Eastern Affairs) 1123
State Department (employee loyalty investigation) 1007
State Department (Office of Public Affairs) 1132
State Department (Office of Special Political Affairs) 995
State Department (Visa Division) 1003
Steele, Arch 1198
Steiger, Andrew J 1108
Stein, Gunther 1005
Steiner, Dr. Arthur 1071, 1222
Stewart, Maxwell S 960, 1076, 1077

Digitized by Google

Page
Stewart, Mrs. Maxwell S. (Marguerite) ---- 938, 940, 950, 957, 958, 960, 962, 964–966, 974, 975, 978, 987, 997
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph ---- 1021, 1025, 1030, 1031, 1094
Stirling (*see* Sherman, Stirling & Wright).
Straus, Donald B ---- 1220
Stuart, Leighton ---- 1026, 1198
Studebaker, Corp ---- 1217
Sullivan & Cromwell ---- 977, 1216, 1219
Sun Fo ---- 1021, 1198
Sun Yat-sen ---- 1096
Sun Yat-sen, Mme ---- 1198, 1247
Supreme Court (United States) ---- 1100
Surine ---- 1189
Swearingen, Rodger ---- 1222
Swope, Gerard ---- 1217, 1220, 1232–1234

T

Talbot, Dr. Phillips ---- 1056, 1134, 1148
Tamagna, Frank M ---- 994, 1221
Tang, Yu Ying ---- 1249
Tarr, Edgar J ---- 1216
Tass ---- 1203, 1226
Tawney, R. H ---- 1213, 1221
Taylor, Mr ---- 1055
Taylor, George E ---- 1148, 1221, 1222
Taylor, Margaret R ---- 945
Teachers College (Columbia University) ---- 1219, 1220
Teamsters Brotherhood (AFL) ---- 1104
Tenney committee (*see* California Committee on Un-American Activities).
Tewksbury, Donald G ---- 1220
Textile Workers Union of America ---- 946
Third Naval District (United States) ---- 1112
Thomas, Elbert ---- 1218
Thompson, Laura ---- 996
Thompson, Virginia ---- 1222
Time, Inc ---- 1217, 1221
Tito, Marshal ---- 1055
Toronto Board of Education ---- 1000, 1001
Toynbee, Arnold J ---- 1216, 1222
Treasury Department (*see* U. S. Treasury).
Trigg, Charles Y ---- 1105
Trippe, Juan ---- 1217
Trotsky ---- 1012
Truman, President ---- 1032, 1033, 1062, 1065, 1068, 1112, 1115, 1119–1121, 1124–1126, 1149, 1150
Truman, Senator Harry ---- 1101
Tsai, Yu ---- 1249
Tse-tung, Mao ---- 1010, 1012, 1014, 1021, 1045, 1049, 1061, 1214
Twaddell, Emily C ---- 945
Tydings committee ---- 1080, 1081, 1224, 1225
Tydings, Millard ---- 1078, 1079
Tydings report ---- 1007

U

UCLA (*see* University of California at Los Angeles).
UCR (*see* United China Relief).
Un-American Activities California Committee ---- 1162
Un-American Activities Special Committee (House of Representatives) ---- 1162, 1229, 1230
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA) ---- 938–941, 945–947
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America (Local 18, New York City) ---- 938–941
United China Relief ---- 1218, 1219, 1221, 1241, 1247, 1248
United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers ---- 946

Digitized by Google

Page
United Nations ..... 968, 969, 973, 975, 977, 979, 993, 1003, 1021, 1032, 1036, 1053, 1056–1058, 1061, 1070, 1072, 1073, 1088, 1090, 1096, 1098, 1132, 1134, 1135, 1161, 1162, 1215, 1220.
United Nations (armies and navies) 968, 969
United Nations Charter 1036
United Nations (Children's Emergency Fund) 1003
United Nations Conference (1945) 975–977, 979, 1032, 1036, 1072, 1073
United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) 1161, 1162
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 937, 995, 996
United Nations (Security Council) 1053
United Paperworkers of America 946
United Press (UP) 1113, 1114, 1142
United Service to China 1214, 1247–1249
United States Army ..... 958, 959, 962, 964, 970–972, 988, 996, 997, 1026, 1030, 1031, 1060, 1086, 1132, 1136, 1221, 1224.
United States Army (Educational and Information Branch) 959
United States Asiatic Fleet 995, 1221
United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 1221
United States Civil Service Commission 1033, 1034, 1149
United States Congress 995, 1026, 1043, 1049, 1055, 1069, 1071, 1098, 1118, 1119, 1128, 1195, 1197
United States Department of Commerce 1104, 1106
United States Government ..... 981, 989, 991, 997, 1033, 1034, 1042, 1043, 1047, 1051, 1062, 1098, 1099, 1119, 1120, 1128, 1136, 1150, 1153, 1195, 1197, 1198, 1224, 1229.
United States House of Representatives 1039, 1073
United States Interior Department 1104
United States Navy 958, 959, 962, 964, 970–972, 995–998, 1026, 1067, 1080, 1112, 1136, 1221, 1224
United States Navy General Board 995
United States Quarterly Book List 1172
United States Seventh Fleet 1067, 1069, 1119
United States Supreme Court 1100
United States Treasury 1002, 1188, 1220
United States War Department 965, 995, 1004, 1034, 1149
University of Berlin 1008
University of California 995, 1216, 1220
University of California at Los Angeles 1071
University of Cambridge (England) 1153
University of Chicago 996, 1221, 1227
University of Cornell 1167
University of Harvard 995, 1007, 1008, 1025, 1054, 1076, 1136, 1154, 1237
University of Hawaii 996, 1227
University of Iowa 1167
University of London 1009
University of Minnesota 1036, 1050, 1132
University of Oxford 1008, 1009
University of Peking 996
University of Pennsylvania 1035, 1071, 1111, 1114, 1132
University of Princeton 1185, 1219
University of Princeton Press 1167
University of Stanford 976, 996, 1153, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1227
University of Virginia 1167
University of Washington 1219
University of Yale 996, 1071, 1216, 1219
University of Yenching 1221
UNRRA 937, 995, 996, 1058, 1145
UOPWA (*see* Union of Office and Professional Workers of America).
UP (*see* United Press).
Ussachevsky, Mrs. Betty 956

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Page
U. S. S. R. 949–954, 958–961, 964, 968, 969, 973, 983, 985–987, 999, 1001, 1013, 1015, 1024, 1028, 1034, 1041, 1049–1053, 1055, 1057–1060, 1082, 1084, 1085, 1087, 1090, 1092, 1093, 1096, 1099, 1102, 1106, 1107, 1109, 1119, 1128, 1193, 1202, 1212, 1213, 1216, 1218, 1222, 1225, 1226, 1240.
Utley, Freda 1228, 1230

V

Vandenberg, Arthur 1039, 1041, 1049, 1068, 1072, 1113–1118, 1120–1123, 1125, 1126, 1148, 1149, 1197
Vandenberg, Arthur, Jr 1116, 1117, 1123, 1148
Vandenberg Diary 1116, 1117, 1148
Van Mook, H. J 1222
Van Zandt, J. Parker 996
Velebit, General 1055
Victoria College (Wellington, New Zealand) 1216
Viking Press 1124
Vinacke, Harold M 1148
Vincent, John Carter 979–981, 983, 996, 1025, 1079–1081, 1085, 1085, 1092, 1107, 1112, 1197
Virginia University 1167
Voice of America 1064, 1133
Voprosy Economiki 1067
Wagner, Senator 1104
Wagner, Martin 946
Wah Chang Trading Co. (New York City) 1216
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel 1092, 1167
Walker, Frank 1101
Walker, Richard L 1240
Wallace, Henry 950–953, 959, 1023–1025, 1030, 1081, 1084, 1085, 1087–1093, 1095–1106, 1108, 1110, 1177.
Wallace Mission (*see* Soviet Asia Mission).
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations 996, 1136, 1219
War Department (United States) 965, 995, 1004, 1034, 1149
War Department (U. S. Civil Affairs Division) 995
War Production Board 1221
Ward, Angus 1133
Ward, Harry F 1078
Wartime Information Board (Canada) 999, 1000
Washburn, John N 1222
Washington Daily News 1188
Washington Post 1141, 1142, 1172
Washington University 1219
Waymack, W. W 996, 1221
Wayne County (Detroit) Political Action Committee 1104
Webb 1122, 1123, 1126
Webster Publishing Co 957–959, 962, 968, 969
Webster School 1148
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert 1022–1025, 1031, 1071, 1086, 1087, 1091, 1093–1095, 1214
Welles, Benjamin 1198
Welles, Sumner 1221
Welling, Mrs. John Paul 1220
Werner, Ludlow 1105
Willkie, Wendell 1098
White 1142
White, Harry Dexter 979–981, 984, 985, 1002, 1017, 1195, 1196, 1206, 1207, 1218
White House 981, 983–985, 1068, 1069, 1112, 1113, 1116, 1118, 1121, 1122, 1125, 1126, 1149, 1150.
White, Lynn, Jr 1220
White paper 1049, 1076, 1091, 1092

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Page
Whyte, Sir Frederick 1216, 1222
Wilbur, Brayton 1221
Wilbur Ellis Co. (San Francisco) 1217, 1221
Wilbur, Ray Lyman 975, 1216, 1220, 1227
Williams, Albert Rhys 1108
Wilson, Admiral 1022
Wilson, General 1032
Winfield, Gerald F 1221, 1222
Winnipeg Free Press 1216
Wiss, Helen 945
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl 1154, 1170
Wood (*see* Deiafield & Wood).
Wood-Forbes Philippines Mission 996
Woodrow Wilson School (Princeton University) 1219
Worker 1103
World Affairs Council of Northern California 1148
World Court 995
World Peace Foundation 937, 1219
World War I 1136
World War II 1136, 1227, 1248
Wrenn, Heaton L 1220
Wright (*see* Sherman, Stirling & Wright).
Wright, Philip 1221
Wright, Quincy 1221, 1227

Y

Yakobson, Sergius 969
Yale Institute of International Studies 976
Yale University 996, 1071, 1216, 1219
Yalta Agreement 949, 979, 1108
Yanaihara, Tadao 1237
Yardumian, Rose 938, 956, 957, 997, 1003
Yarnell, Admiral H. E 990, 992, 993, 1221
Yat-sen, Sun 1096
Yat-sen, Mme. Sun 1198, 1247
Yen, W. W 1216
Yenching University 1221
Yin-ching, Ho 1094
YMCA (China) 1163
YMCA (International) 1213, 1215, 1219
Yoshida Cabinet 1018
Young Communist League 1000, 1001
Young Men's Christian Association (China) 1163
Young Women's Christian Association (China) 1249
Yu-tang, Lin 1221, 1222, 1235, 1239
Yu Tsai School for Talented Children 1249
Yu Ying Tang 1249
WCA (China) 1249

Z

Zabotin, Colonel 999–1001
Zaibatsu 1017–1019, 1021
Zinkin, Maurice 1221

○

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A 175. B
11

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
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 5

OCTOBER 12, 17, 18, AND 19, 1951

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

Library Business Branch
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CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Alsop, Joseph	1403
Colegrove, Kenneth C	1277
Cooke, Charles Maynard, Admiral USN (retired)	1491
Stassen, Harold E	1252
Wallace, Henry A	1297
Appendix—Transcript of Round Table Discussion on American Policy toward China held in Department of State, October 6, 7, and 8, 1949	1551

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, and Ferguson.

Also present: Senator Millikin; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and Prof. Kenneth Colegrove, Northwestern University.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I believe Governor Stassen has been sworn.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor Stassen has been sworn, not once, but twice to my certain knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. And pursuant to direction we had Governor Stassen recalled in order that he might make an analysis of the transcript which was released yesterday by the State Department and make comparisons between the transcript and his testimony, and for that reason he has been called here this morning, to show whether or not the transcript justifies his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this letter that you prepared is now ready, and it bears on this matter, so I think it would be just as well to read it at the outset. [Reading:]

OCTOBER 12, 1951.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for making available to the Internal Security Subcommittee a transcript of the October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, round-table conference.

I notice that the list of questions submitted to the conferees does not appear in the transcript. Inasmuch as this is an integral part of the record, will you make this available?

The Internal Security Subcommittee would also like to have a copy of the memoranda submitted by individuals, together with a list of those submitting memoranda, and a list of those invited to the conference.

Your kind cooperation will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, have you had an opportunity to study the transcript made available to you?

TESTIMONY OF HAROLD E. STASSEN, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. STASSEN. I had a limited opportunity to study it last night, Mr. Morris and Senator, and we have gone through it quite thoroughly within the limitations of time.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, will you point out to us that portion of the transcript which bears out the testimony that you have given before this subcommittee?

Mr. STASSEN. Senator and gentlemen of the committee, I would like to state first that I appear in response to your request that I return for further examination by you upon the transcript which is now released of the October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, conference at the State Department.

I wish to commend you, if I may, sir, on your successful effort in getting this to be a public record, and I would respectfully suggest for your consideration that it ought at some time to become printed so that it would be available in the academic circles in the country as a minimum.

I say to you again that I will endeavor to answer your questions fairly and objectively from the facts as I know them. I will refer frequently to the transcript this morning, and as a witness I will not assess motives to anyone. I am not here as an associate of anyone else, nor for the purpose of attacking anyone else. I responded to your subpena, and I will answer fully and carefully because of the great importance of the subject under inquiry.

You will recall that I testified on October 1, 1951, that the prevailing group in the conference was led in the discussions by Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger. You will also recall that the State Department on the next morning issued a press release which denied my testimony and that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger also issued press releases which denied my testimony; and you will also be aware that this morning the papers carry a State Department press release which says that I am "factually incorrect."

Therefore, I will proceed to carefully analyze the transcript in relation to my previous testimony, but more important than that, also in relation to the basic issues which were then and are now before the country, because I should like to state, sir, that my greatest interest in this matter is because of my extreme concern that I can see now in its early stages a similar world-wide pattern of action which would have as its consequence the undermining of the Congress Party of India and of Premier Nehru and the turning of India to the domination of the Communist Party of India, and all over the world men who participated in the pattern of action with relation to China are now shifting to India, so that is the background from which we now proceed, with your permission, Senator, in this very careful analysis of this paper on our China policy.

The transcript, now at long last released, clearly proves the correctness of my memory of the conference and the truth of my description of it. I testified as this prevailing group, and I might just make this first comment, not that this in itself is important proof, but it is a detail.

Through this transcript you will find, sir, that Mr. Owen Lattimore, exclusive of questions during the briefing by the military, spoke 19

times, of which 8 times were substantial, and that Mr. Lawrence Rosinger spoke 11 times, of which 5 times were substantial, and you will not find any twin participation in major degree similar to that on the part of any other of the 30 or so participants.

That, of course, is just broad background for the analysis that I now present.

Mr. MORRIS. And that shows, Governor Stassen, that they led the conference; is that right, sir?

Mr. STASSEN. That is just one factor to consider, of course. The volubility alone would not be proof of leading a discussion, as we all know, but it is one factor. It does, though, bear out the testimony that I gave earlier on your examination at a time when I did not have the transcript. You asked how frequently did Lattimore speak while I was present, and I said, "I would say eight or nine times and Rosinger five or six times," so the transcript now released bears out that testimony of mine and the testimony of Dr. Colegrove, which was given before I appeared on the scene, before you subpenaed me.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were present 2 of the 3 days, were you not?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

I testified before you, sir, on October 1 that this prevailing group recommended that the United States should recognize the Communist People's Republic Government of China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung at an early date. The key session of the conference on this subject was on the third day, October 8, 1949, beginning at 9 a. m.

The transcript has an ink number, No. 15–E—I don't know what that means—but in any event it is the transcript under date of October 8, 1949, beginning at 9 a. m., and in this transcript, if you turn beyond where General Marshall was speaking, you come down to the point at which the most important section of the transcript on this particular issue and on some other issues is found.

The CHAIRMAN. That is on what page of the transcript, Governor?

Mr. STASSEN. We now turn to page 31 of this transcript for the 8th of October, beginning at 9 a. m., page 31 on the right-hand side, B–1 in the center. It has a double label. The chairman who is speaking here is Dr. Jessup, so on top of the page where it says "Chairman" that is Dr. Jessup, and you will see that he says this:

> Gentlemen, in the time which is left to us, with your permission what I would like to do would be to see if we can get your views rather specifically on a number of issues. * * *

And then you run down to the beginning of the second paragraph and he said:

> I would like to suggest that we might have a few minutes taking up the question of the recognition of the Communist Government in China. * * *

So that this discussion which follows arose as the direct result of the request of Dr. Jessup that we focus on that specific issue. You will recall that many releases and statements have indicated that the discussion of recognition was a sort of incidental thing while 30 men were discussing many problems.

This then definitely pins that this discussion came about as the request of Dr. Jessup focusing the whole group specifically on this problem, and I think this record should also show that in the testimony before the Sparkman committee Dr. Jessup testified that the United States had not considered or contemplated—he used both words—the recognition of Communist China.

Now, then, the key discussion of this follows in these pages and for any real analysis everything from this page 31 on through should be read, but I will now point to high lights in order to focus on what is involved.

On page 40 Dr. Nathaniel Peffer on the bottom of the page begins some of the most significant statements. You will see that Mr. Nathaniel Peffer says this:

I would also make it a matter of timing and I would wait. I would wait 4 weeks or 5 or 6 weeks * * *.

Then he goes on to say:

I don't know when the Communists will get to Canton, but I would guess not over 6 or 7 weeks. The only other Chinese regime will be in Formosa, which is, at least technically, not Chinese territory. It is still Japanese.

Then he goes on.

On page 43 you find an important thing. Now, some of those who were arguing against recognition as they saw the prevailing opinion developing the other way urged that furthermore, beyond everything else, there was a strong opinion in the country and in Congress against the recognition.

This was not the sole basis of opposition to the recognition, but it was one of the arguments advanced, so here you see Mr. Peffer taking up that argument. He says on page 43, the second paragraph, page B-13, second paragraph:

If this country—the most powerful in the world at the most dangerous time in the world—is at a stage in which the Government is hog-tied against its better judgment because some people are going to blow up, then God alone help the Republic. That is all.

And then the stenographer records applause to that. In other words, this was a sharp rejoinder to those in the minority who had pleaded that there should not be recognition, and the stenographer records applause, and applause was of course rare—in fact, almost unheard of—in this kind of a conference with 30 men sitting around the table.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other occasions where there was an applause?

Mr. STASSEN. There was one time. There was a comment of "Hear, hear," or something of a similar vein from the floor.

Senator FERGUSON. But no applause like this?

Mr. STASSEN. I think there was an applause when General Marshall concluded his report; instances of that kind. I do not know of any other instance than this one and the "Hear, hear" when a substantive statement of policy was greeted with applause as distinguished from greeting some individual with applause or some courtesy with applause.

If I may just conclude that, on page 42 you find that Mr. Peffer says:

Let us say that there is an American Congress—and I don't know that they are synonymous—and suppose it is true the State of Oregon blows up. Well, it will settle * * *.

And on page 43, the end of the first paragraph, you will find him saying this:

There is no real argument against real recognition except that a lot of people are going to blow up.

It is after he has said these things and concludes that there is the applause from this conference.

Senator SMITH. I want to ask you about an item on page 41, the beginning of the paragraph on that page:

Another matter. Tell me, is not the burden of proving on those who don't want to recognize? The Communists are there. They are going to take 20, 30, 40 years. Who knows? What do you lose by recognizing?

I was wondering if that was part of the statement that got the applause.

Mr. STASSEN. Those two and a half pages was his statement, and what you just read was included, which winds up with the applause.

If I may, I would like to go on to page 48 where Owen Lattimore is speaking, and he opens it up:

Mr. Chairman—

they are addressing Dr. Jessup—

I think I am definitely encouraged by the evident trend this morning, which shows that we should proceed from facts rather than from subjective attitudes. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. What page is that?

Mr. STASSEN. Page 48, C–1.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of them are not numbered the same.

Mr. STASSEN. It says:

CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore.

He is being called on, and his first sentence is:

Mr. Chairman, I think I am definitely encouraged by the evident trend this morning, which shows that we should proceed from facts rather than from subjective attitudes. I hope the Department feels its hand strengthened, but if we * * *.

And so on, and then he goes on with his argument.

Mr. MORRIS. Does he argue that we should recognize Communist China at that point?

Mr. STASSEN. Clearly in the context, and then he goes beyond that. I might say the State Department release this morning admits that Mr. Lattimore did urge recognition.

Then on the bottom of page 49, about eight lines up from the bottom, he says:

Overhaste in recognizing the new situation might indicate panic * * *.

And he goes on and discusses that, and then he says:

On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our prestige in Asia that in the long run would be more damaging to us because there would be the feeling that while a new situation has developed and in spite of the fact, as Mr. Peffer cogently pointed out—

I might say that refers directly back to the discussion just a few minutes earlier by Mr. Peffer that we have been discussing—

that that really doesn't alter the mechanics of how we handle things in the United Nations; for instance, the veto ratio is changed but the veto situation is not changed * * *.

In other words, it was another argument against that of those opposing recognition had made, that that was not just a question of recognizing the country, but you would hand to that Communist government a veto in the United Nations as one of the major nations in the

world, that that was a serious matter, and this argument, along with the others in here, was—

> Well, after all, Russia had one veto now. What if you did give the Communists two vetoes? Two vetoes wouldn't do them any more good than one in that we still had one veto—

so that Mr. Lattimore directly associates himself with the argument that while this would give the Communists two vetoes, that, as he puts it—

> that doesn't really alter the mechanics of how we handle things in the United Nations; for instance, the veto ratio is changed—

which means two vetoes for the Communists instead of one—

> but the veto situation is not changed—

because they could still veto with only one veto.

That is trying to demolish our own insistence that there should not be prompt recognition because it would be very upsetting in the United Nations.

Senator SMITH. On page 49, and you read a part of it:

> Overhaste in recognizing the new situation * * *.

That meant the recognition of Communist China? Is that what that meant?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator SMITH. There is no doubt about that?

Mr. STASSEN. As I say, I really would urge that any of you gentlemen, any editor who is going to analyze or comment on this as a student, ought to take this morning's session, and from the time General Marshall finishes to the close of the session, and read every line of it.

Senator SMITH. Then he says in the next sentence:

> On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our prestige in Asia * * *.

That means too much delay in the recognition; is that right?

Mr. STASSEN. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor Stassen, your reference to the veto is to the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council do have the right to veto and that China is one of the five nations with that veto power.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right. You see, there had been references in the discussion to the old recognition policy in relationship to South American countries, and so forth, and some of us presented the plea that that did not apply when you were considering a major nation with two contesting governments and with the matter of a veto seat.

We said there was no real precedent for this; this has to be analyzed on the basis of the current world situation and what you knew about China.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that recognition of Communist China by the United States was in effect a recognition that they were entitled to the seat because we would have to break off the recognition of the Nationalist Government, which would give them no place in the United Nations as far as we were concerned?

Mr. STASSEN. I not only felt that, Senator, but I said it very specifically before that morning session was over, and you will find it later in the transcript. I said it very directly on that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore in effect you had two recognitions. If you recognized them as a nation and as a government, it meant that following that you would by necessity have to recognize them in the United Nations and they would become part of the Security Council with the right of the veto?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Then following through on page 54, you find comments by Mr. William S. Robertson, and he associates himself with those who are recommending recognition, and then on page 55 he reads a letter, which is a significant document. Starting before that, he said:

> We have in China, as our chief executive, a man named Paul Hopkins, who is known, I think, to a good many of the people here. I think while his chief interest, of course, lies in us, I am quite sure from my knowledge of him that he is a good, loyal, and patriotic American, and he has no particular reason to like the Communists.
>
> If I may, I would like to read to you, confidentially, from a letter which I got from him under date of September 21, which gives something of his experience in dealing with the Communists in connection with our own business. I thought it might be illuminating if that sort of thing might be put in the record.
>
> After talking about our own affairs, he says:
>
> "The authorities are all significantly honest, hard-working individuals who live on the barest essentials of food and clothing. They practice austerity to the point of not using electric fans or elevators in the buildings which they occupy as offices or residences. In my opinion, the extreme privation of these officers will have serious effect upon their health, particularly those with tubercular tendencies. I have found them all intelligent, very frank in discussing problems and most of them with a good sense of humor.
>
> "There is no question but that it is a new type of people who, if not subject to outside pressure, will ultimately bring great progress to China.
>
> "To my mind, the pessimistic future stems from the increasing breach which has developed between China and America. There are arguments on both sides, but, in my opinion, the passage of time has seemed to confuse the issue and eliminate realistic thinking, which bodes ill for everyone. I may be too close to the picture and has lost perspective. The almost daily bombing activity of the KMT—

which was the China Nationalist Force—

> "and the increased miseries caused the Chinese people by those activities against nonmilitary objectives constantly irritate an open sore. Grant it be un-Anglo-Saxon to deny an ex-war partner, but evidence would seem adequate that that partner has for several years served its people so ill that it has been rejected by its own people. America is now contributing indirectly to the miseries of those people. Recognition should be withdrawn—

that is recognition from the China Nationalists—

> "and the blockade of the coast broken." I thought that might be useful to the committee.

Of course, reiterating what I said before, I do not know the motives of the man who wrote the letter. I do not know whether he wrote it while he was himself under Communist domination in a Chinese city, whether he was then mistaken or mistakenly advised, or what.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that not appear to be from the expressions of Mr. Rosinger? At the very end there it says, "Thank you very much, Mr. Rosinger."

Mr. STASSEN. No. He is calling Mr. Rosinger next. The Chairman is thanking Mr. Robertson and then he calls on Mr. Rosinger. That is the way you interpret that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Governor Stassen, are you about to go to a new point?

Mr. STASSEN. A new individual on the same point.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to interrupt your train of thought, and I had a question I would like to ask about it.
Would it interrupt you if I did so?

Mr. STASSEN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 53 Mr. Talbot was recognized and said:

I merely wanted to ask a question as to what the relations may be between this question of recognition of China, the Chinese Communist regime, and the Japanese Peace Treaty.

And the Chairman said:

I am not quite sure that I understand your point.

Was Mr. Jessup in the chair at that time? Mr. Talbot said:

I am sorry. I was wondering whether the negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty would be materially affected by the question of whether or not we recognize, before negotiating that peace treaty, the Communist regime in China.

And the Chairman said:

Could we hold that a minute until I go through my list, and come back to your question?

And then he recognized Mr. Herod. Could you tell me whether he did come back to Mr. Talbot's question?

Mr. STASSEN. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you come to that point will you comment on this?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, I will. I might say, as is indicated right here and will be found in other places, Mr. Talbot was one of those who expressed the gravest concern about the recognition recommendations. He was also one of those who made a really brilliant presentation regarding India and Nehru, which was then counterattacked by others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the State Department has just sent down a list of questions submitted to the conferees to the conference. They just arrived this minute.

Mr. STASSEN. I might say I have a copy of that list of questions, too.

On page 57 we come to the comment on this particular session by Mr. Rosinger, and he starts up on the middle of page 57:

I'd like to associate myself with the view frequently expressed around this table that we should extend recognition. My own personal feeling is that the recognition should come as early as possible * * *

Then he goes on with his discussion.

On page 59 you will find in the middle of the page, and the sentence starts in the middle:

I, personally, as I have suggested, would be in favor of recognizing at the earliest feasible moment.

And then he continues on top of page 60 regarding the Isbrandtsen ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Governor Stassen, that the expression following what you quoted on page 59 is significant:

I think, though, that in terms of preparing American public opinion for recognition, there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists, which can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent that we disentangle ourselves from the Chinese Nationalists, we lay the basis for recognition.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

On page 61 he goes into the matter of the Isbrandtsen ships and down about eight lines you will find him saying this—remember, these Isbrandtsen ships were taking supplies, including military supplies, to the Chinese Communists through the blockade or port closure which the Chinese Nationalists were then enforcing—and Mr. Rosinger there says:

Had action been taken—again I won't try to define it, I don't know the technical details—but had action been taken to defend the right of these American ships to trade through a blockade, which is not a blockade but technically a port closure, a port closure which we have already asserted we don't recognize as a blockade, had action been taken to defend the right of these ships to go through, I think it would have been very difficult for any opponents of the process of moving toward recognition to say "this shall not be done," * * *.

Then, on the bottom of that page Dr. Jessup makes a comment. Right at the bottom he said:

Gentlemen, I hate to suggest any limitation on our discussion because it is extremely valuable and I think this morning has been very much to the point and extremely useful, but we do want to cover a number of other topics before we break up. I would suggest that, if we could proceed under informal, 5-minute rule and make our remarks as concentrated as possible, we can finish up this recognition question. I thought when I opened it we'd do it in half an hour—we have already spent little over an hour on it—but I don't want to cut off the others who have indicated they want to speak. I would just ask their indulgence in winding it up quickly.

Senator FERGUSON. Up to that point, Governor, was the majority discussion for recognition, or against recognition?

Mr. STASSEN. Overwhelmingly for recognition and I myself and most of those who opposed it had not yet been recognized to speak and that was when the 5-minute rule was put into effect.

Senator SMITH. Just preceding the part that you quoted, Governor, Mr. Rosinger is shown, as I understand his testimony:

Therefore, I'd like to suggest—

that is at the bottom of page 61—

as a generalization, that the process of disentanglement be carried forward as rapidly as we can carry it forward, as a basis for preparing public opinion as a basis for early recognition.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right. That is Mr. Rosinger, who I said was one of the leaders of the Communists.

Senator SMITH. Right after that Mr. Jessup spoke. That is what you quoted.

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Then on page 65 Mr. Reischauer speaks, at the bottom of the page. He begins there, and the significant sentence—it is all in line with this—but on the bottom of the page, that is, page 66, the sixth line up, he says this:

We seem to be in very general agreement about the desirability of recognizing the Communist government in China and recognizing it fairly soon.

I trust you will recall that it was denied when I said that there was a prevailing opinion in this direction in this conference.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 65 at the bottom it says that the Communist government is a de facto government and be prepared to recognize it whether we like it or not.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes. I might say further that there was no question involved here of de factor or de jure recognition. I, of course, have noticed that some of the press have endeavored to interpret some of these comments that it might have been de facto. Dr. Jessup himself clearly indicated at the opening of this discussion that it had to be de jure, that you could not consider de facto of a Communist regime because they would not accept a de facto recognition.

Senator FERGUSON. This was only speaking, though, about a de facto government?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right, but it was speaking of a de jure recognition of a de facto government.

On page 33, to go back just on this point since you raise it, on the bottom of the page Dr. Jessup is speaking. Mr. Staley has raised the question. He said just ahead of that:

I think some of us assumed there might be some difference as alternatives between de facto and de jure recognition, but from what he said—

that is, referring back to Butterworth—

I gather it comes down to whether we go whole hog or not—

this is before all this discussion takes place—

that is, he indicated that the Chinese Communists would not play ball on any other basis but the full de jure recognition, so that was really the only alternative open to us.

Now, this is before all this discussion, so it is clear from this whole transcript that all this discussion of recognition is on the basis of a de jure recognition of the Chinese Communists, and the chairman himself says at that point, Dr. Jessup:

I think in terms of what we know about the Communist position it is true what we have had frequently in the past is a situation in which by admitting certain authorities are de facto authorities in the area you can do business with them and we have operated through consular officers and so de facto basis with us involves a question of de jure recognition.

Now, there seems to be some words skipped there; and then he says this:

It is indicated by the current Chinese Communist position that they are not ready to shift their attitude. They refuse to acknowledge representatives or foreign consular authorities on any basis on de facto basis in Shanghai—in that or any other place—and until the de jure recognition is extended they will continue their policy of discrimination.

There is further discussion of that, but I think anyone can read through a number of pages, and it is very clear that this whole discussion as indicated by Dr. Jessup himself was of de jure recognition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Governor, you read a moment ago a statement by Mr. Reischauer. Who was Mr. Reischauer?

Mr. STASSEN. He is a professor, the department of far eastern languages, at Harvard; on the faculty there.

Going over to page 66, I read to you that "We seem to be in very general agreement * * *" and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was from the testimony of Mr.——

Mr. STASSEN. Reischauer.

Then comes a significant section from him on page 67, the second paragraph:

I'd like to offer one practical suggestion, would it be possible to act in conjunction with a country like India? I think that would make it more palatable to our own people and more palatable in Asia, * * *

The next thing of significance is on page 70 by Mr. Benjamin Kizer. Mr. Kizer says in the middle of the page:

I should like to follow Mr. Lattimore with the suggestion to go on trading before recognition.

This was a matter of continuing the American trade of goods to Communist China in the period of the weeks before you recognized.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you now going into a second point?

Mr. STASSEN. They are so interlocked; I will come back and tie them together.

Then he said—here is another part you will find in here. Dr. Holcombe of Harvard, had suggested that before we go on and recognize this government we ought to insist on some reform, some assurance that the minority parties in China will have a chance, that they will not all be liquidated—and Mr. Kizer says:

I couldn't go as far as Dr. Holcombe's suggestion that they reform their government by recognizing various parties.

He said:

That is a matter of scuttling recognition and introducing conflict where we should introduce agreement.

In other words, he does not want to introduce a conflict with Chinese Communists by insisting that they have to have some minority party representation. He wants to have agreement with the Chinese Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. They seem to, down at the bottom, also say that you recognize a country and you lift the iron curtain as far as that country is concerned.

Mr. STASSEN. He made an argument of that.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

If we long withhold recognition, we shall be contributing to an iron curtain between ourselves and China; therefore, I would like to see that recognition come just as quickly as the facts of life reached by Congress and the American people permit it.

The American people will rather quickly adapt themselves to it.

As a matter of fact, that has not happened in the country?

Mr. STASSEN. It was pointed out by others in the conference that recognition did not open up iron curtains, that many countries recognized that where the curtain had been at that time it continued to cut us off from them.

Then on page 71, the second paragraph, still Mr. Kizer speaking, he says:

One thing further, and here I follow Mr. Robertson.

You remember the letter I read you on that matter of trade—

I think we should make a public disavowal of the blockade Chiang Kai-shek is conducting with respect to China, and I would like to see that followed up at an early date with the withdrawal of recognition.

That means withdrawal of recognition from Chiang Kai-shek and the China Nationalists. It was after all of this that I then spoke on the top of page 73. I refer to it now simply to confirm that I had directly raised these issues and spoken at that time.

In the third paragraph down of my first direct comment on it, I said:

> On some of the related discussion this morning that has been advanced along with recognition or steps we ought to take, which I say frankly to me could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government.

There confirmed in the official State Department transcript now released to the committee are those words of mine spoken across the table following all the things we have covered in this transcript this morning, and you can search this transcript and you will find no one deny at that time or counter my characterization at that time of the steps that were taken being advocated.

Then I say:

> To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy.

This goes to the point that Senator Ferguson made a moment ago. It is on the top of page 74.

> If we recognize the Communist government of China, now clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other government, the Nationalist Government, but we must then join in an affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no half-way measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we are a great and leading Nation, take a different position to that; nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations with our great prestige and throw out from that United Nations the representatives or whatever you may wish to call them, the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China, one-third of its people, and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance of the Communist areas.

Then I continue to put ourselves in that position, which in my mind cannot be countenanced.

Gentlemen, from an extensive, even though rapid, analysis of this transcript since it was released I make these comments which I believe are carefully objective and factual. It will be found throughout the transcript that a group of men stayed very close together and that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger led their discussion with the numbers of times spoken, as I indicated, and that these men frequently supported each other directly with comments. They never differed with one another in the 3 days on any important point.

These men were about 12 in number. In the most active part of them, those that made the sharpest statements and spoke the most repeatedly, are Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Lawrence Rosinger, Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, Mr. William S. Robertson, Mr. Edmund Reischauer, and Mr. Benjamin Kizer.

On presenting these facts to you I say again that I do not attempt to assess motives. I specifically decline to do so. I am bringing these facts out because not only that they have been challenged in these deceptive releases by the State Department, but because these same men in part are now active in writing about India and have been playing a part in Indian affairs.

Senator SMITH. Governor, you said about a dozen of those men who participated in that conference did not vary in their feeling?

Mr. STASSEN. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Do you interpret that as meaning that they had, prior to this conference, discussed these matters and reached a common conclusion for a course they should pursue in discussion?

Mr. STASSEN. I do not draw any conclusion. I do not feel it is my place as a witness to draw conclusions. I am testifying simply as to fact and endeavoring to do it as objectively as I can in view of my great feeling in this issue affecting our country.

I might say here again what I said to the Sparkman committee the other day as to these participants in the pattern of action that has led to this disaster for our country and for China. I said then there can be no question but that many of the participants had the best of intentions and good motives. There can be no question that many of the participants—this was not the total pattern of action I am talking about—but there can be no question that many of the participants were such, due to ignorance or misunderstanding of the vital facts, and there can be no question that many of the participants were patriotic citizens of this country who made errors of judgment.

There can be no question but that many of the participants were knowing associates of the Communist design in connection with the pattern.

Those are the four classifications which I believe are comprehensive as to the way in which men could play a part in a pattern of action which has led to a major disaster for our country.

Senator FERGUSON. Governor, I noticed in your remarks now you have indicated that you did not want to draw any inference on the relation to these men who were before the conference. But when you came to the question of what the State Department has done recently do you feel the same way about their conduct in the releases they have made on your testimony?

Mr. STASSEN. I feel as a witness that I am not to draw conclusions; that I can state the simple fact that during the last 10 days it has now been proved and admitted that a whole series of statements in State Department releases were false and deceptive when they were made.

Senator, we have now sort of brought into focus this crucial point of recognition and one of the central points in my testimony, and I had some of the leading development in the prevailing group in my testimony.

With your permission I would like to go through and tie together the other points of the 10 which I said came up to the surface during this discussion. From a standpoint of this analysis, as you are aware, I took up the matter of recognition first because it seemed to fit the best in the analysis of the transcript.

My first presentation of the 10 points I gave is as to the fourth point. Then as the fifth point I said at that time that the United States, this group had urged, should encourage the recognition of the Communist People's Republic government by Britain and India and follow with its own recognition soon thereafter.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, before you go into that, I would like to ask a question following your last statement.

During the course of your statements you have stated that at one time at a recess you said to the chairman, Dr. Jessup, and I am expressing it liberally and not quoting, that you hoped that this movement of recognition would not prevail.

And he said to you in return that the greater logic was in favor of those who favored recognition. That is the substance of what you said. Did you at any time during the course of that hearing hear Dr. Jessup make any further statement along that same line?

Mr. STASSEN. No, Senator. That discussion took place following this comment that we have gone into here this morning. In other words, everything that I have thus far given you and more came into this morning's session—I can give you the point of the break for luncheon. This was the third day.

You recall on page 61 Dr. Jessup said, after there had been much of this prorecognition talk—

I hate to suggest any limitation on your discussion because it is extremely valuable, and I think this morning has been very much to the point and extremely useful, but we do want to cover a number of other subjects before we break up.

Then that was approaching noon. I am looking for the point in the record. I do not see it immediately.

But after that presentation we have been covering, as I testified on October 1, and my feeling is reflected in what I had said, and my feeling is my alarm was raised by this statement we just read that Dr. Jessup had made at the conference. I stepped up and said I hoped they would not follow the line developed by the Lattimore group.

That is when he said to me he felt the greater logic was in that group. Then I pleaded with him not to proceed with that without first going out to see General MacArthur. That was when I made that plea then, at noon hour on this day of October 8.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever contend that was on the record?

Mr. STASSEN. No. I made it clear here it was in recess when I stepped up to him.

Senator FERGUSON. I find a headline in the newspaper—I don't find the part of the text of the article—but it is in the fourth headline: "Round-table transcript fails to support Stassen's charge of softness by Jessup."

Had you ever contended outside of the statement here in regard to your discussion with Jessup that more logic was with the opposing force?

Mr. STASSEN. No. I developed these facts in the first hearing; that that conversation took place at recess and that the supplementary implementation of what was recommended by the opposing group was a further fact indicating they did move to implement the opposing group.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever contended that the transcript did show the Jessup was soft?

Mr. STASSEN. Quite the contrary; I made it clear this was a recess discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. That it never was on the transcript?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Had you better not point that out?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the page of his own testimony.

Senator SMITH. That would indicate he was talking at a recess, not on the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume this headline was not written by the man who wrote the article because it is not in the article.

Mr. STASSEN. That is a continuing problem with reporters and the press and everybody else.

Mr. SOURWINE. This whole document is the morning session on Saturday, the 8th, is it not?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The adjournment was at the end of this particular document?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; I see that now.

The CHAIRMAN. I had one other question I wanted to ask the Governor following the former question.

Did you ever hear Dr. Jessup during the course of those hearings, or during the course of those meetings, recede from the position that he had evinced to you when he said that the greater logic was in favor of the other side?

Mr. STASSEN. No. In fact, he never expressed any opinion different than that he said that the greater logic was on that side. As I say, I followed closely in the succeeding months what was happening and concluded then that they were moving to implement that other group policy that has been advanced.

I think we can demonstrate that more this morning. This finally led me by April of the next year to ask Senator Connally whether I could not come to the executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee on this matter. My feeling is they were moving to implement the opposing group, and it is not a feeling I now have alone. It is a feeling that I had as the events moved, and I demonstrated I had it by pleading with Senator Connally to hear me on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Governor, if the statement Mr. Jessup made to you in response to your statement to him about who had the logic occurred at the end of the morning session on Saturday, the 8th, it then occurred after the conclusion of this entire conference?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was not the morning session of Saturday the last session of the conference ?

Mr. STASSEN. I believe it ran over a bit. I don't think we came back. I am not quite sure on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The transcript shows the adjournment was at 12:55 and concludes by words from Dr. Jessup which appear to be a sort of a bon voyage to the conferees.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; you are right, adjourned at 12:55. We ran over about an hour in order to conclude. That concluded it at 12:55.

Mr. SOURWINE. So what he said was at the conclusion of the entire conference?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you cite your previous testimony showing that you did not contend that the conversation with Jessup about the logic of the argument was on the record, but you specifically stated it was off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. No; he did not. He was looking for the place.

Mr. MORRIS. It is on page 17.

Mr. STASSEN. Of your mimeographed copy.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. STASSEN. I know it was touched on a number of times. On page 17 of the mimeographed transcript Mr. Morris says:

> It was subsequent to all of this that you say that Ambassador Jessup said he thought greater logic was on the side of Lattimore and Rosinger?
> Mr. STASSEN. I think you have sensed some of my feelings.

I stepped up to Dr. Jessup and the conversation I earlier described took place.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on your first day here before this committee?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, on Monday, October 1.

Senator FERGUSON. So you never did contend it took place on the record?

Mr. STASSEN. I always made it clear it was a recess discussion.

Senator SMITH. Did Dr. Jessup ever deny such a conversation took place?

Mr. STASSEN. He testified to the Sparkman committee—you had better get that exact testimony. I believe he said he had no recollection of such a conversation. I believe he also said that it could not have taken place because he was always against recognition of Communist China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not present at the Sparkman committee hearings?

Mr. STASSEN. Not when he was there. I was there later. I emphasize : You ought to get the exact testimony.

The second point that I would like to take up is what I call point No. 5 because it ties in logically that this group developed that the United States should encourage the recognition of the Communist People's Republic Government by Britain and Indian and follow with its own recognition soon thereafter.

On October 6, 1949, the a. m. transcript on page 29, the second page numbered 29, the third paragraph, you have Mr. Kizer, whom you will recall is one of those I have stated was one of this leading prevailing group. As I say, this is October 6. It is the opening transcript. Mr. Kizer speaks, in the third paragraph :

> Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask Mr. Butterworth a question. I'm wondering if there would not be an advantage to the United States and to relationships if we were to say to the British at the appropriate moment we are not ready to recognize the Communist Government, but since your interests are larger than ours, there may be some advantage in your recognizing it because of your interests there. Then we will take out time with it ourselves.

Then on the discussion we had just been in you will recall the moving with India by Dr. Reischauer on page 65 of the other transcript, that is, the transcript of October 8, a. m. session.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you going to come back to the blockade part of it later?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Reischauer starts on the bottom of the page, and you go over to page 67.

Senator SMITH. That is October 6?

Mr. STASSEN. That is October 8, 1949. At the end of Reischauer's testimony, page 67 :

I'd like to offer one practical suggestion. Would it be possible to act in conjunction with a country like India? I think that would make it more palatable to our own people and more palatable in Asia.

You will find a couple of other minor references to moving with Britain and India. Those are the most direct. You will find that Mr. Decker, who was there through the 3 days, commented, page G–3, 124, in other words, near the end of the transcript of October 8. He refers back to Dr. Reischauer's recommendation that in the recognition of the Chinese Government very great care should be taken to at least consult with India beforehand.

Then he said :

I am very certain—

on the bottom of that page—

that is in the minds of the officers of the State Department, that every effort will be made to keep the great English-speaking peoples in step, which is, I think, a very important objective to be sought.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever seen a news item in relation to Italy's recognition that it was claimed that we had no objection to Italy recognizing Communist China?

Mr. STASSEN. I have not seen that, but we have found out interesting evidence. In the discussions of the House of Commons on April 6, 1950, page 1385 of the British reports of the discussions, and remember, that it was January 5, 1950, the British had recognized Red China and Parliament was not in session. It came in session some time not long before April 5, 1950. I think it was in March.

At that time Mr. Thomas Reid, who is a member of the Labor Party and somewhat of a specialist on far-eastern affairs—he had long service in the Indian and eastern civil service, and he said, on page 1385:

As I understand it, the American Government was consulted from start to finish, and I think I am right in saying that the American Government raised no opposition at all to the recognition of the Communist Government by Britain.

We have followed through those debates on that day, and we find no dissent from any of the Ministers or anybody to that comment on the floor of the House of Commons by one of the well-informed Labor M. P.'s in the Far Eastern Section.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to put in the record at this place the New York Times article of Saturday, November 11, 1950. I do not necessarily want to put the headlines in, but I would like to put the article in. It is from Rome. However, I will read the headlines, "Sforza Hints Soviet Offered Italy-China U. N. Entry Deal."

I ask that the entire article be made part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want the whole article?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and take the headlines, too. I said not necessarily, but take them.

The CHAIRMAN. It will go in.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

SFORZA HINTS SOVIET OFFERED ITALY-CHINA U. N. ENTRY DEAL

ROME, November 10.—Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza told the Chamber of Deputies today that the Italian Government had been considering recognition of Mao Tse-tung's regime, but that after the intervention of Communist Chinese troops in Korea it had postponed a final decision.

The Italian attitude on that question, Count Sforza indicated, also had been influenced strongly by some alluring suggestions he said had been made to him by "very responsible quarters" during his trip to the United States last September. These suggestions, he continued, were that the Soviet Union would not veto Italy's admission to the United Nations if the United States and other member States would not veto the admission of Communist China.

Count Sforza abstained from saying who was the author of the suggestion, but he made it clear that the Italian Government had not yet abandoned the hope of overcoming the Soviet opposition. Italy, he said, felt that the Peiping regime was "undoubtedly the government representing the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people." There were two other reasons, he continued, that had determined the Italian attitude: commercial interests and plight of Roman Catholic missions in China.

Commercially, Italy had an appreciable volume of trade with China that she would like to reestablish, Count Sforza said. He did not explain why diplomatic relations with Communist China would affect the religious missions, but it was assumed that he was concerned with the fate of many Italian-born members of the Catholic clergy who are now without protection of any kind because of the lack of Italian representation in China.

A motion by the extreme left wing designed to reopen the whole question of Italy's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty caused today's foreign policy debate. The motion was defeated, 268 to 132.

The Foreign Minister denied Communist contentions that the Italian Government has assumed new political and military commitments during Atlantic Pact meetings held recently in Washington. Both he and Randolfo Pacciardi, Minister of Defense, merely acted in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Treaty, he said.

Italy, be continued, was one of the countries most exposed in case of aggression and she therefore was deeply interested in promoting European defense.

Count Sforza asserted the Communist idea was that in case Italy or any other Atlantic nation were attacked the Italian Parliament should decide whether aggression really existed. This would enable the Communist parliamentary minority to use obstructionist tactics and permit the aggressor to take advantage of Italian military inactivity, he added.

"If there is aggression, it is clear that the first task and the supreme duty of the Government is that of defense, both individual and collective, in accordance with the treaty," he said. "Parliament, of course, will discuss the situation and the political decisions that must be made, as envisaged by the Italian Constitution, which gives it that supreme right. But this cannot retard—as the Communists desire—the deployment of military forces, which alone would enable us not to be defeated immediately at the opening of hostilities."

Mr. MORRIS. The point here is this paragraph which reads:

The Italian attitude on that question, Count Sforza indicated, also had been influenced strongly by some alluring suggestions he said had been made to him by "very responsible quarters" during his trip to the United States last September. These suggestions, he continued, were that the Soviet Union would not veto Italy's admission to the United Nations if the United States and other member states would not veto the admission of Communist China.

That is the pertinent paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. STASSEN. I further stated as one of the 10 points, in fact No. 10 of the points, that no aid should be sent to the non-Communist Chinese guerrillas as were in the south of China, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces and the military supplies en route to them should be cut off. That was another one of those 10 points urged by this prevailing group.

Mr. Chairman, you have already picked up this comment of Mr. Rosinger on page 60 of the October 8 transcript. At the bottom of page 59:

I think, though, that in terms of preparing American public opinion for recognition there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists which can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent we disentangle ourselves from the Chinese Nationalists we lay the basis for recognition.

As a matter of fact, if we were to recognize today, assuming that were possible, we would be in a highly contradictory situation of recognizing at the time that we were delivering through ECA supplies to Formosa—

and so on.

We have not yet cleared ourselves from the entanglement, from the Nationalists. I'd like to suggest, although I am not informed on the technical questions and the problems of carrying out some of these actions, that we end our ECA assistance as soon as possible to the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists.

That is Lawrence Rosinger on the top of page 60 of this transcript. I say here again: You can search this prevailing group through this conference, and you will find no dissent from this that is advanced by Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor, do you recall that Paul Hoffman, who was the head of ECA, had made a similar recommendation publicly?

Mr. STASSEN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know he made a speech in which he advocated the furnishing of aid to Communist China? I would like to get the date and put it in the record.

Mr. STASSEN. I do not know of that. I do not know that I want to associate myself with that comment because I don't recall it. I think there was a conference.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put the date in later, Mr. Chairman.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

December 13, 1948.

Mr. STASSEN. Are you sure that was not part of the earlier situation?

Senator FERGUSON. In 1948.

Mr. STASSEN. There were some major conferences at different times about aid to China. I don't recall it in this period. I was watching things very closely in this period.

Senator FERGUSON. I think it was December 1948.

Mr. STASSEN. I want to be sure not to associate myself with that characterization.

Senator FERGUSON. I just take it as part of the policy that was being advocated.

Mr. STASSEN. I am not sure it was in the period subsequent to October 1949's conference.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to get that information and put it in, as I said before.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Governor Stassen, do you know of your own knowledge or from any information given to you that is authentic as to how Dr. Jessup came to be chairman of this meeting that took place?

Mr. STASSEN. It was publicly announced that on July 27, 1949, Dr. Jessup would be in charge of a review of our policy in China and the Far East, and the announcement was by Dean Acheson. Then a few days later it was announced that Dr. Fosdick and Dr. Case would assist him as a committee of three in the review.

The CHAIRMAN. But as to his presiding over the meeting, did you know anything further as to how it was brought about? In other words, was there any action?

Mr. STASSEN. There was testimony from Jessup in the Sparkman hearings on it. I would prefer you get that testimony of his as to how the conference was developed and how he chairmaned it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the fact there had been another conference on this question where members of labor were called in and consulted?

Mr. STASSEN. I had no information on that until I was informed here at the committee hearing the other day there had been another conference with labor. I had never heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask counsel if we have received the statements taken at that conference?

Mr. MORRIS. We have asked the State Department to make that transcript available, but as yet we have not had a reply. That letter, I believe, went out someday last week.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, the chairman must go on the floor. Would you kindly take the Chair?

Mr. STASSEN. You will recall as the first two points that I said that the prevailing group had developed in the recommendations was that Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied and deferred; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated first on Western Europe with its industrial strength; that the United States should likewise give priority to Europe and, second, that an aid to Asia program should not be started by the United States until after long and careful study because of the complexity of Asia and the dangers of a Communist charge of United States imperialism.

Then further, to evaluate that part of the transcript, the transcript does show, as I stated, that I had urged a prompt aid to Asia program with the headquarters in Bangkok and a parallel to the Marshall plan to fill the vacuum that existed in south Asia and had expressed the view that the Communists would be pushing in if any such vacuum were left.

Mr. Nathaniel Peffer on October 7, 1949, in the a. m. session directly begins to counter my proposal. Mr. Lattimore had also begun to counter it the day before. Mr. Peffer steps in on October 7, 1949, in the a. m. session, page E–9, the third paragraph. I might say the discussion sort of varied between the matter of an association together and an economic group like the Marshall plan, the forming of some kind of an alliance, but there was considerable discussion of some positive action linking together in some way the non-Communist nations of south Asia and strengthening them against the Communist threat.

Here is what Mr. Peffer said:

> Would there be any chance of such an alliance?

He goes on to discuss it. He says, at the bottom of the page:

> You ask yourself: "Would there be any such a pact without our encouragement and support?"

He means American encouragement and support.

> If there would not be, I should say that would fairly well define it as unnatural and not very likely to survive, in which case we are associated with something that is going down. I think we ought to give up. If it goes on its

own momentum, if it grows out of its Asian Congress, well and good; but otherwise, no. We ought to keep out until it is started under its own genius and power.

I recall the whole beginning of the Marshall plan because of Secretary Marshall's address at Harvard that gave the impetus and the push to that development there. Here is the opposing statement that we should stay out unless it develops, et cetera.

Following that through on page E–11 immediately after that Dr. Coons says this:

May I conclude that this discussion with reference to regional association is almost entirely at the political level and that we really haven't discussed the question of the economic side that there is conceivably much to be said on the aspect of a regional economic approach, somewhat after the manner of what we were talking yesterday in reply to Mr. Stassen's discussion.

Chairman Jessup said:

We might come back to that after lunch.

Then after lunch Mr. S. C. Brown is brought in as an official of the State Department to breif the conference on this matter of the regional-economic-aid approach. You will find that on the p. m. session of October 7, page A–3. Here, of course, I am very greatly concerned because here we are moving right over into the Indian situation, which is the matter that gives me the greater concern at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Governor. You did not testify concerning this particular phase.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, I did. I said that the prevailing group recommended 10 points.

Mr. MORRIS. But this afternoon session of the 7th, were you present at that time?

Mr. STASSEN. No; but in the subsequent discussions, and of course in the briefing that I received as I would come back from being out of the room, there were men, Dr. Talbot particularly, so then I kept a sequence of the development of the whole discussion, even though I had to move out and in a bit.

On page A–3 as Mr. Brown begins his briefing, down at the bottom he says:

Now, the other thing which has appeared to us in our consideration of the matter is this—

this is now talking about south Asia regional economic action—

That, as Mr. DuBois said this morning, the economies of those areas are not interdependent in the same way that economies of Europe are, for instance, and you would not in all probability get in those areas through the expenditure of aid funds on a large scale the accumulative and multiplying effect that you get by expenditure of similar funds in Europe?

Then I continue on page A–5. He gives a considerable discussion of reasons and down on line 9 he says:

Now for these reasons, among others, we have been inclined, I think, to go slow in that concept of an over-all program of the Marshall type in that part of the world. The reasons may not be conclusive. I don't know. But I just wanted to indicate that we have given that type of thing some consideration.

There was the "go slow," and you will find it in the expressions of "It is very complex, and it is very confused," that you must go slow, and the total transcript read will confirm that the prevailing opinion was to go slow on aid and the organization of a regional program in the south of Asia against communism.

Of course, as I countered that, I directly pointed out while we were going slow the Communists were going fast, and that was the thing that bothered me so much at that time.

My recollection of the point that the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military action to expand their empire had its origin in Mr. Kennan's briefing on the first morning, page 19. He says:

I think there is a distinction between these Russian leaders and people like Hitler and the Japanese leaders of the twenties and thirties.

On page B–17 he said:

* * * never in Russian history have the Russians ever, that I can remember, been enthused about any deliberate aggressive action of their own outside of Russia.

Then he discusses the different ideologies and the policies in relation thereto.

Then you will find in my response to Mr. Kennan at that time I said that I felt that they were just as aggressive as Hitler and would prove to be so.

On the Indián point, page 8, that Prime Minister Nehru had shown reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia, we find in October 8, 1949, the a. m. session—I would first like to point out that Mr. Talbot, beginning on page 110 makes a brilliant presentation, I feel, of the India situation and of the policy we ought to have toward India; that his presentation goes on through a number of pages. Then as he concludes, Mr. Murphy, on page 122, says this:

As a minor note of warning with respect to Mr. Nehru's visit here next week I would like to say that, in my opinion, and it is an obvious remark, the Indian people are not strong and practical people in our definition as we define it here and that despite Mr. Talbot's glowing presentation of the opportunities and the resources and the potentialities in India, nevertheless * * *.

And he goes into an international-bank question, and so on.

On page 123 he said, down at the bottom, that—

* * * Yet with respect to the three problems that they now have at issue with Pakistan, of Kashmir, of the refugee properties and the water rights in west Punjab, in each of those three preponderantly it seems to me the Indians are acting in an arbitrary manner, reactionary and arbitrary manner.

Then I say I want to associate myself with Dr. Talbot, and so on. Then on the top of the page 122 you will find that after that discussion by Dr. Talbot of the importance of moving affirmatively on India and of developing a favorable Indian reaction, Mr. Lattimore says:

In Mongolian in the expression of gratitude a grateful man is practically indistinguishable from the expression "a pack animal loaded with a burden."

Mr. MORRIS. What is the point of that?

Mr. STASSEN. It is a very negative kind of comment regarding Dr. Talbot's very able presentation. That is the only response that came at that time to that plea for moving forward in India. Then Mr. Murphy follows up with this note of warning and this comment about reactionary and arbitrary.

On Formosa you will find Mr. Fairbank on October 6, 1949, in the p. m. session, page B–11, saying:

To hold Formosa would defeat our ends by a miscalculation of the response in China. * * *

* * * * * * *

I wouldn't hold Formosa—

And so on. You will find none of this prevailing group at any time urging that we hold Formosa. The whole implication is to the contrary.

Then that it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong if they inisted. You will find one of the questions put up to us specifically was: What should be the attitude of the United States toward the status of Hong Kong? You will find I made a strong plea that we must back up the British in their decision. It is in the October 6 transcript.

You will find Mr. Butterworth says that the British had not asked us to help them in Hong Kong. October 6, 1949, the a. m. session, page C–3:

The British "have not sought any particular assistance through us" for the defense of Hong Kong.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in response to the point you made?

Mr. STASSEN. It was in response to the question raised in the advance questions that were put out and in response to the general discussion of how firm an attitude should the United States be taking in Asia at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You had advocated a strong position?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right. My advocation of a strong position came later.

Another reason I had advocated the strong position was the story 2 days before in the New York Times by Mr. James Reston, who, as I said the other day, I always found was a very accurate reporter in foreign policy. The story on that day said:

There is no reason to believe that the United States will participate in any show of force in the protection of Hong Kong, the British possession off the coast of China, but respect for the sovereignty of this base certainly will be regarded as one of the tests employed by the United States to determine whether the Chinese Communists are prepared to respect the undertakings of China under the Charter of the United Nations.

You will find in the general discussions in the committee the whole atmosphere of the United States not taking a firm stand aaginst the Communist advance in China. Hong Kong was one of the specific points in regard to that.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, I have made reference to all of these 10 points. There are many corroborating references in here. I might, for example, point to the October 7 p. m. session, page D–19, the middle of the page, where Dr. Fairbank says:

For the record, also, the line of anticommunism in Asia is not a very good line. It is a subjective projection of our own view. The main question, it is much better to be anti-Russian and a few other things to be anti. That is just an example of what Mr. Taylor was talking about.

On page B–12 Mr. McNaughton says this:

We will never get this world going unless we start trade, and I would start trade with Communists in China until I found out they were impossible to do business with.

Mr. Murphy says:

I feel that if we don't trade with the Communists in China it is pretty obvious that since they have a very crying need for goods it simply amounts to forcing them to trade with Russia on Russia's terms.

I think, Senator, in my first necessarily concentrated work on this transcript that fairly completes my presentation this morning in response to your inquiry. I respectfully submit that as to all of these comments I have today testified to from the transcript of these other gentlemen, when I first appeared here I was testifying from a recollection of a conference 2 years old.

I believe that I have now demonstrated by recitation to the official transcript now at this late date released that every factor in my recollection can be substantiated from the direct references to recorded statements made at the time, even getting into such details as this matter of encouraging Britain and India to lead off and matters of stopping the supplies to the Chinese Nationalists in that remaining period, and factors of that kind.

As I say, I respectfully submit that if careful students of an impartial nature are set to work to read through this entire transcript that they will not find that this key group in the discussion ever differed with each other on any important point, and they will find that they, in various ways, gave support to one another, and that the total policy there recommended added up on each of the 10 points that I had originally presented from recollection that I now have confirmed by referring to the transcript.

Senator SMITH. In other words, Governor, your statement there means so far as you have been able to ascertain from examining the transcript in the short space of time you had there are no discrepancies in substance between what you testified to at your first appearance before this committee and what the transcript now bears out?

Mr. STASSEN. None whatsoever, not only no discrepancies but a great amount of corroboration.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one question which may or not be connected with this conference?

Was it shortly thereafter someone in the State Department made a speech about the defense perimeter of America not including Formosa or certain portions of China, Hong Kong, and Korea?

Mr. STASSEN. That is right. Secretary Acheson made that speech.

Senator FERGUSON. It was January 20, was it not?

Mr. STASSEN. January 12, I believe, 1950, right after the British recognition. I went into that sequence of supplementary events considerably in my first testimony, but it does have a relevancy now that we have reestablished from the transcript what this conference's recommendations were.

For example, on the matter of the protests on the Isbrandtsen Line ships and not recognizing the Chinese Nationalists' blockade, you will find that Secretary Acheson did those very things in the following months. On November 16, 1949—in other words, 6 weeks after this conference Mr. Acheson protested the Nationalists' firing on the *Fly-*

ing Cloud running the blockade, which is directly what Mr. Kizer suggested during the conference.

Again on December 5, 1949, Mr. Acheson said that the United States did not recognize the legality of the Nationalist blockade and protested the shelling of the United States ship of the Isbrandtsen Line.

On December 23, 1949, that very controversial statement to the Voice of America and the information service about the anticipated fall of Formosa was given. On January 5, 1950, the President and Mr. Acheson announced:

> The United States had no intention of providing military aid or advice to the Nationalists on Formosa or of using its Armed Forces to interfere there.

That was then characterized as the abandonment of Formosa, which was in line with what Dr. Fairbank and others said at this conference.

On January 12, I believe, a speech at the Press Club here in Washington was made that the line was drawn that left Formosa on the other side of the line.

Senator SMITH. Those five as I counted them—those five instances seemed to carry out the principles that had been discussed and agreed to by this group at this conference that you have been testifying about?

Mr. STASSEN. There were more. There was then the basic fact that the aid-to-Asia program did not move. That disturbed me more than anything in that period. There was nothing really forthcoming. Then Mr. Jessup made his trip leaving the west coast, I think, about December 21, 1949, getting into Tokyo about January 5, 1950, going on through Asia and around the world with a conference in Bangkok and getting back in March.

In the latter part of March 1950 they had the conference at the State Department of organization leaders, which I testified the other day I then went and attended in my relationship to the Council of Religious Education, because I was so concerned to know what was going to be the policy.

When that conference ended with no definitive recognition of really moving forward in an Asia program, that is when I wrote to Senator Connally and subsequently to Senator Vandenberg that I was so deeply concerned we were moving in the wrong direction in Asia, that there was a vacuum that the Communists would move in.

Senator SMITH. After this conference what if anything did Dr. Jessup say or do relating back to this conference if you recall?

Mr. STASSEN. Well, his report to the State Department conference in March of organized leaders, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and then publicly was in substantial accord so far as the Asiatic situation was concerned with this conference on the economic subjects. That is, with this prevailing group in the conference.

As I recall, at that time Mr. Reston characterized that speech as being that very little could be done for India and Pakistan and that whole atmosphere came from Mr. Jessup's report when he returned. It was right in the subsequent period that the matters came up in the United Nations as to the resolutions of the Chinese Nationalists over this issue of recognition.

Dr. Jessup was on the floor of the United Nations speaking on those issues November 28, 1949. In other words, I do feel that it is a fact that up to the outbreak of the Korean war Dr. Jessup said or did nothing that was inconsistent with the 10 points made by the prevailing group that I know of publicly.

Of course, I mean studying the public reflections of this situation.

Mr. MORRIS. Governor, I don't know whether you read in the papers or not, but we have issued a subpena for the Vandenberg diaries from January 1, 1947, to July 1950. We have not as yet issued a subpena for the Forrestal diaries. We are deciding who the addresses in that case will be. I do want to let you know we have subpenaed the Vandenberg diaries. You originally made the recommendation.

Mr. STASSEN. I made the recommendation that you ask for the day of February 5, 1949. If you would permit me to do so, I would not want to think you would want to call that entire diary out of the hands of Mr. Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., who is working over it for publication. I don't think it would be reasonable you should pull the whole diary out of his hands. I think it should be for specific days, February 5, 1949. Then when it was published in the Herald Tribune I suggest you send for a photostatic copy of that page. I would think that would be a better procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. The whole thing is within the scope of the committee, and any individual item can then be brought into the record. In this case if it is the one particular conference we can use that.

Senator SMITH. He was talking about the inconvenience to Mr. Vandenberg.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes; plus the matter of reasonableness of asking for the diary for a whole period. The same thing is true for the Forrestal diary. I think those dates around November 1948 and things like that we know from the published diary are significant, and it would be important to have someone look at the original Forrestal diary in this period.

I notice in Mr. Acheson's most recent press statement where he now admits the correctness of the question I posed to him on October 2 when their Department had first denied he knew anything about such a conference. In the most recent press release he says Mr. Forrestal, on February 2, 1949, had brought the matter to the National Security Council. Mr. Forrestal was notified that his resignation was going to be accepted. He got the notice on January 28 of 1949. So I would think that period and in view of all the other revelations of mistaken press releases from the State Department, Mr. Forrestal's diary ought to be collected very carefully.

Mr. MORRIS. If we have these legally within the jurisdiction of the committee, then we may take any one particular item we wish. That is why we have it over a long period.

Mr. STASSEN. The committee decisions are your decisions, but I want to make it clear my suggestion was that you ask for Senator Vandenberg's diary of February 5, 1949, which corroborates the essential basic policy facts of my original recollection of what Senator Vandenberg told me, but which did not indicate who was present.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any opinion as to whether or not the speech of Secretary Acheson of January 5, 1950, in which he outlined the defense perimeter, did not extend to Formosa and Korea, and

maybe he mentioned Hong Kong or some other island—do you think that had any effect on the Communists moving into Korea?

Mr. STASSEN. Senator, as a witness I would prefer not to endeavor to give conclusions but more to confine myself to facts. There are other occasions when I think I can properly draw inferences and discuss conclusions, but I don't think this is one of them.

Senator SMITH. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I have no questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STASSEN. I might say on the other question that arose out of your subpena of me obliquely the matter of February 5, 1949, conferences, and then the entire question of Mr. Jessup, that we are pursuing our investigation of those points. The may lead to further testimony before the Sparkman committee next week.

Senator FERGUSON. May it be understood if the Governor finds in a resurvey of these documents, since he just had overnight to look into them, that he wants to put something else into the record that he may do so?

Mr. STASSEN. I would put it the other way. If you hear from any other witnesses that cause this committee to have any doubt of the accuracy and fairness of what I have testified to, then I would respond to your summons to return to you. These are very grave matters of policy. I opened them in the first instance on your subpena because of my grave concern for our country's future. I will continue to function as close to that as I possibly can in the buffeting situation that naturally arises in the country at this period.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Professor Colegrove did not receive a copy of the transcript until between 10 and 10:30 this morning. He is now here. When is it your wish to hear him?

Senator SMITH. We will recess until 2:30 and hear him then.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m. Friday, October 12, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH (presiding). The hearing will come to order. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we might have the witness sworn, although he had been sworn before.

Senator SMITH. You solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this hearing of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH C. COLEGROVE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILL.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show that Professor Colegrove was called last night and asked to come down here and testify in connection with the transcript released by the State Department yesterday.

Professor Colegrove traveled all night and did not see the transcript until 10 o'clock this morning.

I would like the record to show that at the outset.

Professor, did you testify before this committee on the 25th of September 1951?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify on that occasion, Professor, that there was a group present at the 3-day round table conference at the State Department that was "sympathetic to Red China," that this group dominated the conference?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Morris. That is in the record. I so testified.

By using that term, I did not say any of these gentlemen were Communists. I said their advice was pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. I used your words there, Professor Colegrove.

You said on page 1719:

I felt that the group that was sympathetic to Red China dominated the conference.

Mr. COLEGROVE. That is the fact.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, have you had an opportunity to examine the transcript and are you in a position to state now whether or not the transcript does, in effect, show that was the case?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Chairman, I have examined the transcript as rapidly as I could since 10 o'clock this morning, at the same time listening to Governor Stassen as he testified. It appears to me that my testimony is consistent with the transcript.

I might also add that the brilliant testimony of Governor Stassen this morning was also consistent with the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Colegrove, you testified that in that group that did dominate the conference, Prof. Owen Lattimore was the leader of that group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you checked on that fact?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; I have checked on that fact, Mr. Counsel. My first impression is also my second impression: that Owen Lattimore was the leader of the group well admitted by Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything you can point out to us at this time to support that testimony where Governor Stassen this morning noted that Lattimore had spoken 19 times at the conference? Have you made any such check?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; I checked, too. I thought that Governor Stassen's checking was correct. I believe that Governor Stassen indicated that the group which gave pro-Communist advice includes Lattimore, Rosinger, Professor Peffer, William S. Robertson, Professor Reischauer, and Benjamin Kizer.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, would it not be better if we took the group you mentioned in your testimony, and I will ask you questions and find out whether or not the testimony actually supports your testimony on that occasion. May I do it that way?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose is to determine—your testimony concides with the transcript. May I follow your open testimony?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here page 1716 of your open testimony. Senator Eastland says:

Who was that group?

That is, the group sympathetic to Communist China.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I would say the leader of that group, if you considered he was a leader, was Professor Lattimore.

May we address ourselves to that? I will go into the other names as they come up.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I checked the transcript, and I would agree that the statements which Mr. Lattimore made in the conference indicate that his views were consistently pro-Communist, and this advice was given on a number of occasions.

Senator SMITH. When you refer to the transcript, you mean the State Department transcript?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Of the conference.

The statement by Mr. Lattimore in volume 3, page C–2, which reads:

On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our prestige in Asia—

he is asking for early recognition.

Mr. MORRIS. Of Communist China?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I won't read the whole passage, but the record of the State Department conference indicates that Mr. Lattimore was in favor of very early recognition of Red China.

There are quite a number of references that could be made to Mr. Lattimore's testimony, but I think that is sufficient.

Mr. MORRIS. You also put in this group, Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you had a chance to look at the transcript to determine whether or not Lawrence Rosinger did take the position you have testified in open session?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Counsel. Mr. Rosinger, in volume 3 [October 8, 1949], page C–10, used the following words:

I'd like to associate myself with the view frequently expressed around this table that we should extend recognition.

He means to Red China. [Continues reading:]

My own personal feeling is that the recognition should come as early as possible—

he then says.

Then, on page 59, he again repeats:

As I have suggested, the recognition should come at the earliest feasible moment.

On the same page, Mr. Rosinger proposes that we should end all ECA assistance to the Chinese Nationalists immediately. You recall from the testimony he, of course, made a strong plea for breaking the Nationalist blockade of Shanghai.

There are numerous other references; but, since Governor Stassen covered the same material, it would be repetitious to give the whole list.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the third person you put in that group with the qualification more or less was Prof. John K. Fairbank. You said he was more or less in that particular prevailing group?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you dwell upon that?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I included John K. Fairbank in this list. I believe that Governor Stassen did not include him in his entire list. Let me call attention to Fairbank's proposal to abandon Formosa. That is made in volume 1, pages B–10 and B–11. Would you want me to read that?

Mr. MORRIS. If you will, please, Professor.

When Professor Colegrove testified in open session, he did not have the benefit of any notes or any transcript, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. You are trying to confirm what he said by the transcript from the State Department?

Mr. MORRIS. We are asking him if now that he sees the transcript does it bear out his recollection of the meeting as he testified in open session on September 25, 1951. He had testified previously in executive session.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I dislike to take the time of the committee in checking my notes here. I have had only 2 hours to go over this. I fear that I have made an error in my notations in regard to volume No. 1, pages B–10 and B–11.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a reference to Formosa, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. COLEGROVE. If one of my students at the university made notes such as I have here, I would flunk him.

I guess this is volume 2.

Senator SMITH. I can testify for you. There is a little confusion the way these volumes are numbered. If you need any witness to help you out, let me know.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I must say the State Department has not helped us much in this pagination.

It was volume No. 2 [October 6, 1949, p. m. session] page B–10. Professor Fairbank says:

> To try to hold Formosa with troops would give so much ideological ammunition to the Chinese Communists that it would unite China more readily against us. The more pressure we bring, the more we can expect hostility in return.

Then he goes on on the next page to say:

> To hold Formosa would defeat our ends by a miscalculation of the response in China, just as our military support of Chiang Kai-shek defeated our ends because we couldn't foresee his inefficiency and that Chiang would have a lack of support.

I think that indicates clearly enough that Professor Fairbank was in favor of immediate abandonment of the Nationalist Government on Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you care to say anything more on that score, Professor Colegrove?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I don't think it is necessary to take the time of the committee. There are other citations that can be made, but that is characteristic.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear the testimony of Mr. Stassen this morning?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. I listened to that testimony. I thought that was an excellent analysis.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that confirm the testimony that you gave in open session here?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Decidedly so. I thought everything that Governor Stassen testified to, this morning, completely corroborated my testimony when I first appeared before this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you feel that your testimony and his originally was very much along the same lines?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You heard him give instances from the transcript today in support of his testimony and you feel they also, ipso facto, would support yours?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, on page 1716:

To some extent Professor Reischauer of Harvard and Professor Peffer of Columbia University expressed views that were favorable to the Chinese Communists.

Mr. COLEGROVE. As to the views of Professor Reischauer, I must say that I regretted to find that he and I differed so frequently. We are graduates from the same university. Professor Reischauer took the position on October 7, 1949, at the morning conference, on page C–15, where he uses these expressions:

I would certainly agree with Mr. Rosinger about the importance of deeds.

He is referring here to the abandonment of the Nationalist Government on Formosa.

I think that was somewhat typical of all of the testimony of Professor Reischauer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear Governor Stassen's testimony this morning about Professor Reischauer?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned that Benjamin Kizer of the west coast generally was in that group. Have you been able to find anything in the transcript that would support your testimony along those lines, Professor?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Counsel. Benjamin Kizer, on October 7, 1949 [a. m. session], on page B–23, used the following expression:

I tend to go along with what Mr. Peffer has well said, not that we should go whole hog in recognition—neither Mr. Peffer nor myself meant that—but when it becomes apparent, as I think it has become apparent in Indochina, that the days of France are numbered, and that the revolution is on its way toward control, we ought to be sensitive and not take sides in any such situation.

In other words, he is arguing for recognition of the revolutionary government as soon as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else you would like to have us take notice of on that score?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I thought that characteristic of Mr. Kizer's statement. I have not had opportunity to check every one of them. That is the only one I have been able in my limited time to select.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we are confronted with the problem of what to do about this transcript. Should we put that all in our record, the entire transcript?

Senator SMITH. You mean the State Department transcript?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. It will be available to be included. Why do we not consider that the transcript is available for the record if and when it is decided it should be put in? We can treat it as we treated those other volumes. We will not actually copy it into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. In fairness to everybody, Mr. Chairman, the whole transcript of what everybody said should be in our records.

Senator SMITH. You mean the State Department transcript?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. That does not mean that we have to print it here in the first instance.

Senator SMITH. All right.

(The material referred to appears in the appendix of this part.)

Mr. MORRIS. I think we should have everybody's remarks in the record.

Another point in your open testimony, Professor, you said that a briefing done by Cora Dubois was a briefing very sympathetic toward the Communists. Cora Dubois was the State Department officer who briefed the conferees.

Can you find anything there in the testimony to support that testimony, Professor Colegrove?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Morris, I was disappointed in the briefing by Dr. Dubois. Her briefing occurred at the opening of the second session.

It was a brilliant and scintillating analysis of the problem situation in southeast Asia, and it presented to the uninitiated every appearance of objectivity, but nevertheless it was a very decided slanted testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you develop that for us?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. The briefing played down Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist influence in southeast Asia. It implied that the revolution in southeast Asia was a wholly native spontaneous revolution with no leadership from the Soviet Russian Government or Red China.

I will quote you from volume 3 [October 7, 1949, a. m. session], page A-3. Dr. Dubois says:

> Despite the diversity which does occur "in Southeast Asia," a few generalizations, it seems to me, can be risked The first and the broadest is one which was discussed at the very beginning of yesterday's meeting and agreed upon, namely, that there is a revolution in progress in southeast Asia, and that that revolution is not coevil with United States-U. S. S. R. tensions. It is a revolution certainly of 50 years' duration.

I will not go on any further.

We will have to say from the study of history that this revolution was also going on in China probably for a hundred years, the T'ai P'ing rebellion and the revolution under Sun Yat-sen.

But in China, everyone would agree the revolution was captured by the Chinese Communists. They took over the revolution, Mao Tze-tung and the Chinese Communists.

In this briefing that Dr. Dubois made, she says nothing about Ho Chi Minh, the Moscow-trained Chinese Communists who has taken over revolution in the Viet-Nam in Indochina. I was amazed at a briefing on southeast Asia that had no mention whatsoever of the Chinese Communist leaders whose personalities men respect as great as Mao Tze-tung and who directs the revolution in southeast Asia. He is a European, Moscow and French-trained Communist and directs that revolution.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the next sentence, there? It almost negates its existence, does it not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. You mean "it has affected more or less * * *"?

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

For the United States to interpret the southeast Asian scene solely in terms of its own preoccupation with anticommunism is to run the risk of seriously misunderstanding the forces at work in southeast Asia and thereby of alienating the all-important leadership of the area.

Mr. COLEGROVE. It is simply amazing that statement should be made of what was supposedly the scholarly presentation of the situation.

Again, let me call attention to page A–19 where the briefing refers to the United States and Communist China. The briefing reads as follows:

The U. S. S. R. and Communist China are still only potential forces perhaps brighter for being less manifest—

which is an amazing statement. The French who have been fighting the Communists in Indochina, I think, will hardly believe an American scholar would make such a statement as that, because it is so completely in disagreement with the facts.

Let me go back to page A–12. On page A–12, Dr. Dubois says:

Communist propaganda from Peiping is ineffective.

Reports that we have from the press indicate the propaganda was effective from the very beginning, the beginning of the so-called people's government of China.

With reference to this briefing, Mr. Morris, I was regretful to see Dr. Dubois belittle Governor Stassen's proposal of a propaganda center in Bangkok. That was an important feature of the program which Governor Stassen laid before the conference. This proposal is ridiculed in this briefing.

I think I need not take more time in indicating the character of this briefing. It was a very clever statement but very definitely slanted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if the entire transcript is not going into the record, may the briefing go in the record?

That runs no more than—how many pages?

Mr. COLEGROVE. The conversation about it runs 26 pages.

Senator SMITH. You mean, to be copied in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That would be printed in the record. It wouldn't be printed here. We will lay it in here, because when these hearings are being prepared, it will be printed.

Senator SMITH. All right.

(The material referred to follows:)

Miss DUBOIS. Unfortunately the discussion which you carried on yesterday seemed to me so lively and so excellent that it cut the ground out pretty completely from under this briefing paper which I had prepared. I shall go ahead with it, however, largely as a résumé and as a summary of most of the points that you raised yesterday and then we can go on from there.

The countries of Southeast Asia vary so greatly that it seems to me any estimate of that or any specific program of action in Southeast Asia which can be phrased, which is phrased for the region as a whole, will need reinterpretation when applied to a particular country. It seems to me that a simple program or estimate for Indonesia and Thailand would be as inappropriate as a single estimate or program for, let's say, Korea and Japan. The differences are of that magnitude.

Despite the diversity which does occur, a few generalizations, it seems to me, can be risked. The first and the broadest is one which was discussed at the

very beginning of yesterday's meeting, and agreed upon, namely, that there is a revolution in progress in Southeast Asia and that that revolution is not coeval with U. S.–U. S. S. R. tensions. It is a revolution certainly of 50 years duration. It has affected more or less acutely all functions of the cultural lives of these disparate peoples. Yet it is a revolution which has not always been disorderly and simultaneously, I think one should remember in dealing with Southeast Asia that not all disorders are necessarily revolutionary. For the United States to interpret the Southeast Asia scene solely in terms of its own preoccupations with anticommunism is to run the risk of seriously misunderstanding the forces at work in Southeast Asia and thereby of alienating the all-important leadership of the area.

Fortunately the U. S. S. R. seems to be making this very error in Southeast Asia. The reasons, we may assume, are the doctrinaire quality of its Southeast Asian advisers who impress one as being either fairly incompetent or too intimidating to render an honest judgment on the scene.

Now the revolution which is taking place in Southeast Asia can be subsumed under three major blanket terms: Nationalism in its political thinking, socialism in its economic aspirations, and humanitarianism in its social program. These, of course, are direct reflections of western democratic thought, although certainly their appearance in contemporary Southeast Asia lags behind their fullest manifestations in Europe. That these three major trends are western European in origin gives the United States a tremendous psychological advantage in dealing with Southeast Asian leaders. However, I think it would be a mistake to expect no mutations in these major trends in the course of being transplanted.

Thus, the nationalism which is at the moment the major preoccupation is still phrased to a large extent as antiimperialism. Furthermore, nationalist leaders have problems of unifying the nations that they aspire to create which are as great, certainly, as our forebears had in the eighteenth century. Sovereignty neither in its internal nor external aspects is yet a deeply experienced and internal force. I would expect, therefore, that their nationalism would be easily directed into international channels as soon as the threats of imperialism are removed and hypersensitivities on this score are respected. Once unity in these severely splintered countries—and I exclude the Philippines and Thailand—is established, international preoccupations will appear more consistently and frequently. However, until that time internal problems will seem more urgent than external ones in each of these countries. This complicates the situation. It means that the United States has to deal with five or six separate entities instead of one. It may retard cooperation between the countries of this area, and then, of course, there is the danger that splintered nations may more easily be exploited by those who enjoy fishing irresponsibly in troubled waters.

Socialism—to take the second main theme in Southeast Asia—is still more an aspiration than a fact. It is closely associated with the desire, however unrealistic, to industrialize and achieve some degree of autarchy. In part, these desires stem from the realization of how vulnerable the export economy developed by European nations have made these areas to fluctuations in the world market. I need scarcely say the depressions of the 1930's was a very bitter experience in this part of the world. Another contributing factor is the knowledge that they lack investment capital and they need such capital from European sources, but that in acquiring it they do not wish to exchange economic controls for the political freedom which they have just acquired. On the whole, therefore, the preference is for intergovernment loans and government-controlled enterprises.

The third main strain in the Southeast Asian revolution, the humanitarian one, is for the moment represented by a remarkable eagerness for education and for the development of literacy in the area. This, of course, was of value in the European nations where most of the southeastern leadership studied. It appears to them a sine qua non of intelligent and enlightened sovereignty. It is a force which, I believe, most nearly represents a mass movement in contemporary Southeast Asia today. That highly literate populations like those of Germany and Japan have been no insurance against political abuse seems to escape most people's attention.

Associated with this trend is, of course, the desire for a higher standard of living and great admiration for American technology. I feel that our propaganda does not need to stress our technical competence or our standard of living anywhere in the world. It has already been sold and resold. It is a revolutionary force, some writers claim, which makes communism a pale and reactionary phenomenon by comparison. Although we do not need to sell the superiority of our technology it may be wise of us in Southeast Asia not to rub in the dif-

ferences in standards of living, and above all not to appear niggardly in sharing our greatly admired know-how. It may be unwise to arouse envy and undesirable to trade on strength which, though greatly admired, is admired in Southeast Asia when well encased in velvet.

If the main elements then of the Southeast Asian revolution have been correctly appraised, the next question which arises is, "Where are the fulcrums for the effective exercise of influence by the United States?"

In terms of the class structure the major locus of power is the present leadership. It is predominantly western educated and western oriented in its thinking. The overt leaders who fell under the leadership of Moscow and remained there can be counted practically on the fingers of both hands. Furthermore, the peasant masses of Southeast Asia are still largely politically unawakened, although that situation is changing faster than we may like to realize in countries like Indochina and Indonesia, which have had to fight for their independence. In dealing with these leaders we shall have to appreciate that they, like all politicians, will be under local pressures from their own peoples, which we here in the United States only vaguely understand and probably frequently do not appreciate. We must realize, however, that the greatest danger to us in Southeast Asia is that the armed and aroused peasants may escape from under the control of leaders essentially friendly to the west and become the pawns of Communist agitators.

An early and equitable settlement of disorders in Southeast Asia and every effort to strengthen the present leadership in its unification of these countries appears to me to be an essential to United States interests. It is recognized that such leadership may not always be to our taste, however.

A second point d'appui open to the United States has already been suggested. It is the generous sharing of our technology. Here a generous technical assistance program was conceived. The realization by our economists that on its present scale it will not fundamentally alter even in a generation the Southeast Asian standard of living had led to the suggestion that private capital is needed but naturally it must be provided safeguards. Actually whether such safeguards will coax American capital into underdeveloped areas may be worth pondering. The Bell Act which has been a thorn in Philippine national pride has not deluged the Philippines with American enterprises. In any event, the United States with its evaluation of private enterprise runs squarely against the state socialism of Southeast Asian leadership. Already fears have been expressed in the region about our intentions on that score. Undoubtedly to secure our assistance the Southeast Asians will temporize with their aspirations, but the attendant frustrations and resentments should not be ignored, should be carefully weighed against the chances of success in getting American private capital into the area.

A third and closely related lever available to the United States in Southeast Asia is the previously mentioned desire for education. The Fulbright Act was probably one of the most constructive long-run measures for Southeast Asia enacted in postwar years. However, it is limited to only three countries in the region, it has been slow in getting under way, it has been loosely coordinated with other policies subsequently developed like the technical assistance program, and has been nibbled away by other interests, lack of suitable personnel, and the innumerable difficulties that always seem to beset the best of intentions. The Fulbright Act, however, is miniscule by comparison to the needs and aspirations of these areas. I feel that any guidance that this group could offer in refining and enlarging our United States informational and educational program and in enlisting our private educational groups in a multitude of both advanced and elementary programs, an education might be amply repaid in terms of long-run national interests.

Now these are some of the assets we possess in Southeast Asia. Where, then, are the weak points in our potentialities? Here I would like to consider two types of weaknesses, those which are inherent in Southeast Asia and those which are inherently our own.

It seems a justifiable assumption that the Chinese Communists will continue their push into the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia. What their reactions will be will depend upon the nature of the push. Let us suppose that it would be directly military and would be limited to the land approaches.

Mr. Furnivall, an outstanding British expert sympathetic to the present Burmese Government, is convinced nothing would heal the present schisms in Burma more effectively than an armed Chinese incursion along the northern Sino-Burmese border.

In Indochina the dislike of the Chinese is traditional. It has been reinforced by the postwar Chinese occupation of northern Indochina. Any Vietnamese Communist leadership in the Republic of Vietnam which would encourage or

condone Chinese military incursions would be widely discredited and might make more friends for Bao Dai than the French or the Emperor himself have yet been able to win.

Thailand's traditional nationalism and anti-Chinese position is presently more overt than ever under the authoritarian Premier Phibul. In fact, Phibul has recently stated that Thailand would welcome British and American troops on Thai soil in the event of a Communist invasion.

All of these factors are not unknown to the Chinese Communists and it seems improbably, therefore, that they would take the risks involved in direct military action even though they might be militarily successful. Also, it is still far from clear that the U. S. S. R. trusts the Chinese Communists sufficiently to use them as their "running dogs" in Southeast Asia.

Obviously, however, direct military incursion is not the only instrument at the disposal of the Chinese Communists. Chinese governments have traditionally taken a proprietary attitude toward their 6,000,000 overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Such attentions have never been welcomed by the government of any region. Among the people of the area, justly or unjustly, the Chinese have always been suspect. This position is intensified at present for the Chinese have held aloof from the nationalist struggle. The increased nationalist sensitivities in these countries since the war is likely to make Chinese Communists' appeals to their overseas dependents as obnoxious as those of Nationalist China. This, however, is certainly no adequate discouragement to the Chinese Communists.

If no direct military action is likely, what are the Chinese Communist potentials? Opening propaganda, which has already been launched from Peiping on Southeast Asia will undoubtedly be intensified, but in my estimation it is of dubious effectiveness. I suspect—and this is highly intuitive judgment—that shrill propaganda may be one of those self-defeating techniques whose effectiveness is already largely exhausted. However, it may be unwise to underestimate it too soon at least in these so-called marginal areas of the world, but our own information services, expanded, more astute—certainly more repetitive—would probably stalemate the line coming out of Moscow and Peiping.

Far more sinister, it seems to me, are the possibilities of clandestine infiltration and activities whose goal will be to intensify destructively every possible grievance, racial discrimination, minority frictions, pay differentials, poverty, police measures, national aspirations, and that whole host of evils which exist today in Southeast Asia.

These clandestine efforts will certainly be facilitated if the countries of Southeast Asia will recognize the Peoples Republic of China. Chinese Communists diplomats will afford the opportunity to shout at clandestine operators, to bribe and to terrorize the resident Chinese in Southeast Asia who have always been noted for their practicality in such matters rather than for the strength of their moral convictions. Furthermore, to the extent that the Peoples Republic of China gains a position on the international forum its strident eachoes of the U. S. S. R. on the subject of Anglo-American imperialism will have the weight of an Asian voice which has been "successful" in its revolution. I think that we should not underestimate the fact that the Communist success in China is seen as a successful revolution in many parts of Asia. It seems to be that in a case of that sort on the international forum our best defense will be the kind of diplomatic astuteness which Mr. Henderson has had in India and above all our actual record about which it seems to me we insist on being far too modest.

In my opinion this question of the overseas Chinese and the opportunity they offer Communist China for clandestine and diplomatic infiltrations in Southeast Asia is one of the greatest hazards to United States interests in the area. Unfortunately, in terms of other considerations, recognition may have to be granted to the Peoples Republic and the attendant liabilities reckoned with.

In addition to the difficulties posed by the overseas Chinese and the recognition of Communist China which are immediate there are long-range difficulties. The population problem, particularly in relation to the food supply, is perhaps one of the major ones. The Far East as a whole occupies a unique position in world economies by being predominantly agricultural, and yet being on the whole a food-deficit area. Based with this gross problem the impulse is to encourage rice-producing areas like Thailand to produce as great as exportable surplus as possible. If the Office of Intelligence Research estimates are correct there is little likelihood that any foreseeable amount of encouragement to rice production will result in more rice than the Far East can sell at a good price until 1960. However, by 1970 it is estimated the population and food production may

once more be unbalanced as they are today. It is also estimated that the Chinese Communists will still be in control in China in 1970. It is here again that bold new plans seem as urgent to the United States interests as they are urgent to Asian leadership.

Here, perhaps, modest industrialization and economic diversification might concern us with equal seriousness and simultaneously with the food-population equation. Certainly in an area as large and diversified as Southeast Asia any simple unilateral approach would not be adequate.

Now it is not my function to dwell elaborately on the difficulties inherent in the Southeast Asian scene. It may be more appropriate now to pass on to inherently American difficulties when we operate in the region. The first two difficulties seem to me closely related—indifference and commitments elsewhere. At the beginning of World War II, China "specialists" were practically a dime a dozen compared to those on South Asia. Since the war Japan "specialists" seem to outnumber even those on China. Persons interested in the Far East are termed "specialists" while every fifth person in the United States has no hesitancy about speaking authoritatively on Europe. He may do it even in fluent French or German. It is not astonishing, therefore, that in both our war and peace strategies our concern has been primarily for Europe. It is undoubtedly both practically and emotionally an area requiring urgent and vigorous effort. If, however, we are not to go on waiting for crises to develop before we become aware of them it will be necessary to act like the U. S. S. R. on a global basis. In respect to Southeast Asia we are on the fringes of crisis. The initiative I consider is still narrowed on our side. Specifically, what this may mean is Will the United States—and here I don't mean just the policy makers—be rich enough and above all willing and foresighted enough to apply preventive measures before South Asian opportunities are squandered?

In our preoccupations with Europe and our heavy and legitimate responsibilities there the weight of European arguments may cloud our judgments. For example, the interests and stability of France and the Netherlands, close and familiar as they are, may serve to throw out of perspective our very real interests in Indochina and Indonesia. Traditionally British preeminence in South Asia may have made us careless of developments in the region.

To continue with this weighing of Europe versus Asia, the question of the Pacific versus the Atlantic Pact is another case in point. If the Atlantic Pact is obviously in our immediate interest is a Pacific Pact less in our long-range interest? Or, to narrow the matter down, can we judge whether military support to the Northeast Asian group, Korea, Formosa, Japan, and the Philippines is more effective than support to the Southwest Pacific group, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, perhaps plus other commonwealth nations? Or, thirdly, is it more effective to support the more nebulous Indian Ocean bloc? Do United States interests lie in consolidating the Indian Ocean bloc with the two Pacific arcs or do our interests lie in two or more such aggregations in the far eastern periphery? If one or the other courses seems wise to us what means can be applied to implement them? These are questions which I assume this group will discuss in the course of the day.

In discussing United States weaknesses in the Far East I have raised two related issues, our preponderant interest in Europe and therefore the degree to which we have as a people concentrated our eggs in one basket.

The last point I should like to raise in respect to Southeast Asia is even more unabashedly a valued judgment. It has to do with our moral leadership in the area. If we wish to be seriously hard-headed about the Southeast Asian scene it is necessary to realize that their moral values are still potent and prized factors. Their leadership was primarily trained in our founding faith. The streets of Saigon and Batavia were plastered with slogans from Jefferson, from Lincoln, from the Declaration of Independence, from the Constitution and from the Atlantic Charter when the allied troops arrived in September 1945. In our commitments to Europe and our antagonism to the U. S. S. R. we may appear in that area to have temporized with the idealistic and perhaps naive expectations of Southeast Asians. Whether it was avoidable or unavoidable we certainly lost much of our influence in the area. Whether or not we personally as individuals prize our traditional morality or have been won over to *real politik* is not relevant sociologically. What is relevant is to the extent that the United States temporizes with its own principles it is abandoning an instrument of great political force in Southeast Asia. The U. S. S. R., were it in a similar position of active responsibility, would undoubtedly be even more gross by contrast, but so far we are in Southeast Asia, at least to some extent.

We have the initiative. The U. S. S. R. and Communist China are still only potential forces, perhaps brighter for being less manifest.

This much is clear: Whatever our priorities in the short run, however coldly calculated in power terms, they must be compensated for by long-range encouragement, reassurances and planning with and for the South Asians if we are to counteract Communist intrusions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Miss DuBois.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, did you testify whatever at any time during your open session testimony, about Ruppert Emerson?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No. I never mentioned the name of Prof. Ruppert Emerson. I am very sure that I did not hear that name mentioned by any of the Senators on the subcommittee.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you prepared a careful scrutiny of Professor Colegrove's open testimony?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does the name Ruppert Emerson appear?

Mr. MANDEL. It does not appear anywhere in his testimony.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I was amazed to have a deluge of letters from my colleagues at Harvard University, including Professor Emerson himself, bitterly chiding me for having mentioned his name as a member of the conference. I was testifying, Mr. Morris, with a list of the membership before me, so it would seem almost impossible to give his name.

Senator SMITH. How did his name come in?

Mr. MORRIS. Considerable press report the next day reported Professor Colegrove said Prof. Ruppert Emerson was among the pro-Chinese Communist group. Professor Emerson wrote a letter of protest to the committee.

We informed him that his name had not come up in the testimony and that we would put the letter in the record to show that fact.

Senator SMITH. Do you know how his name got into the paper?

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently, it must have been a mistake. Professor Colegrove wanted the record to show he did not mention his name. We put the list of the 25 people who did attend the conference in and Ruppert Emerson's name was not on that.

Mr. COLEGROVE. It was not a mistake in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Is there anything else about your testimony, Professor Colegrove, in your open testimony? I have tried to take the high lights.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Would it be permissible, Mr. Chairman, for me to make a few remarks regarding my own remarks at the conference?

Would it be in order for me to illustrate the reactions to some of my own remarks in the conference?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I think that is appropriate. In other words, you want to show that your testimony concerning your own remarks at the conference was borne out by reading the transcript?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

In the first session, which was on October 6, 1949, page D–10, Mr. McNaughton, who was one of the members of the conference, made a very pessimistic speech in which he said:

> I think we are all washed up in China.

He proposes getting out of all of China, and he intended to include Formosa, too. That gave a very pessimistic beginning to the discussion. This was practically at the beginning of the conference, because others agreed with him. I took exception to this view.

I said:

Dr. Fosdick—

who was presiding—

I would not agree at all that we are washed up in China nor that the Nationalist Government on Formosa is washed up.

I went on to point out that there were spots of resistance in China at this time, and I called attention to General Chennault's plan for assisting Chiang Kai-shek logistically to make a landing on Fukien and the continent of China and to assist the elements of revolt against the Communists there existing.

This view that I proposed then was rather warmly condemned by several members of the conference, and in particular by Mr. Murphy and by Owen Lattimore.

I won't go into the quotations, except to say that Mr. Murphy and Owen Lattimore at very considerable length took exception to my proposal that we give military aid to Chiang Kai-shek to assist him to recover the southern part of China and to neutralize the Chinese Communists.

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I suggested to the chairman of the conference that the conference ought to have a briefing on the military situation in China.

Shortly afterward, we were given a briefing by an officer—I am not sure whether he was from the Army or whether he was from the Central Intelligence Agency. He was Colonel McCann.

At another point, it seemed to me that the State Department was making the best of a bad situation with reference to the withdrawal of our consulates from China.

This discussion occurs in volume 1, page C–8. It involves a short controversy between myself and Mr. Butterworth, who was speaking for the State Department in this matter.

It seemed to me that the withdrawal of our consulates in China left us in a very awkward position. We lost listening posts. There were, of course, and still are, adventurous young men in the Foreign Service who would have been willing to stay on and try to serve their Government and collect information.

Mr. MORRIS. This came up in the transcript?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. This comes up in the transcript.

Discussion begins in volume 1, page C–8.

Again, we have quite a number of facets concerning the recognition of Red China in volume 5, page B–4, and again at page 34, covers part of this controversy. Let me read one section here. These volumes are not easily handled.

The question has arisen with reference to possible recognition of Red China de facto or de jure. My position had been that we should not accord them either de facto or de jure recognition. At the same time, however, I felt that the situation in Japan was such that there would have to be eventually some trade between China or North China and Japan because Japan has been, for years, dependent upon certain resources from Manchuria. In order to avoid a recognition of Red China but at the same time permit trade between Japan and China, I proposed a modus vivendi which might be an arrangement from day to day, week to week, or month to month, for exchange of raw ma-

terials and finished products between Manchuria and Japan without recognition.

In the matter of recognizing Red China, I tried to make the point that recognizing a Communist government would not bring about the blessings which so many people fondly expected to accrue from such recognition. Communist countries do not subscribe to the underlying principle of our international society, namely, sanctity of treaties and good faith in observing treaties.

I pointed out that the State Department itself in the person of Chip Bohlen, a specialist in Russia, had indicated that the philosophy of Soviet Russia and the philosophy of Marxian countries was such that they did not subscribe to the sanctity of treaties.

That being the case, what advantage could there be from recognition of a country which would not admit that it was bound by laws of international law?

Still, again, one thing that amazed me in this conference which was on China, there was so little reference to the traditional American policy in Asia. That traditional policy was the open-door policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this your conclusion after reading the transcript, or just your recollection?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I am referring to my argument that recognition of Red China would not insure that the open-door policy would be observed by Red China and it was useless, therefore, to recognize her, because we would have none of the advantages of former policy which was generally accepted by the nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Does the transcript bear out your recollection?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. Do you want me to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Mr. COLEGROVE. It covers pages 32 and 35.

I might add, Mr. Morris, it is also carried on to pages 68 and 69.

Mr. MORRIS. You testify that there was no discussion encouraging the State Department's white paper. Does reading the transcript bear out that testimony?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Counsel, I was looking for that point just as the hearing began. I have not had time to verify all of these. My recollection was that Mr. Jessup or, rather, Mr. Fosdick who presided over the first session, told the conference that the State Department was not interested in getting our views on the white paper of China.

Mr. MORRIS. You have not found that in the transcript?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I have not found it. Probably in a minute or two, I could find it.

Mr. MORRIS. You can point it out to us later.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I can probably find it.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other points in your testimony that are borne out by the transcript?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Counsel, there is nothing else. I agree heartily with the analysis which Governor Stassen made this morning.

I thought that analysis was very complete and very accurate.

Mr. MORRIS. We will have some letters to go into the record.

Senator SMITH. After this conference, do you recall that you or Governor Stassen discussed this meeting, or was it not supposed to be discussed publicly?

Mr. COLEGROVE. It was not supposed to be discussed. The presiding officer, Dr. Fosdick, the first morning, indicated that the discussions were to be confidential.

Senator SMITH. At or about that time there were a great many other American citizens besides Dr. Jessup, Dr. Lattimore, and the people there, who were advocating the same thing they were advocating, were there not?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. In other words, a great many people had gotten, as we would say in common parlance, disgusted with the Nationalist Government because of the chicanery and the defaults and promises by reason of embezzlements and those things?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Is not that one of the things that caused some citizens to feel that the Nationalists could not be trusted any more than the Communist government?

Mr. COLEGROVE. I felt that a great deal of what was said about Chiang Kai-shek was pure propaganda.

Of course, there was the Chinese squeeze. The Chinese squeeze is two or three thousand years old. I may say in talking about politics that in Chicago I find there is a Chicago squeeze, too.

Senator SMITH. We are talking about Chinese politics now?

Mr. COLEGROVE. There was a squeeze in Chicago just as there is a Chinese squeeze.

Senator SMITH. What I mean is this: As to the position that you took and Governor Stassen took, a great many people have taken that position, and likewise a great many people have taken the opposite position.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And that, in itself, does not mean too much one way or another, except that those were the views of groups.

Mr. COLEGREVE. I was rather surprised when I came to Washington to attend this conference to find so many members of the conference who had been among the group who were partly responsible for the fall of Chiang Kai-shek and the victory of the Communists.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Now, did you feel that conference was rigged, so as to have that type or that group predominate? Was that your feeling at the time?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Definitely, Senator, that was my feeling. I thought the conference should have included quite a number of men who were left out, but who were, you might say, in favor of the Chiang Kai-shek government, men like Stanley Hornbeck, who had long experience, and were available, or men like William McGovern, or Eugene Dooman, or a Yale professor by the name of David Rowe.

I expected to see a more even balance.

Senator SMITH. Did you have the feeling at that time that those men or those types of men had been purposely left out so as not to have a full argument on the other side?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Definitely so.

Senator SMITH. Now, did you have any specific evidence that would justify you, other than just the general feeling?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, the only evidence would be the number of pro-Communist experts invited to the conference and the smallness of the number of anti-Communist experts on the other side.

Senator SMITH. Did you have anything further?

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

We have some letters I would like to introduce into the record.

Senator SMITH. Will you identify them properly?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. There is one that I think should be read, Mr. Chairman, because it bears on this.

Senator SMITH. There is one other question I wanted to ask you, Mr. Colegrove.

Did you or Governor Stassen, so far as you know, make any public speeches or write anything in magazines or newspapers or give any press releases that bore out your ideas about this situation; without referring to the conference, I meant?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes, very frequently. And numerous talks. In numerous talks that I have made I have expressed my views, with reference to aid to the Nationalist Government.

I think that most of the members of the conference never quoted what was said in the conference until some of us were asked under oath and under subpena to appear before this committee and indicate what the discussions were.

Senator SMITH. You know, there is such a thing as hindsight and foresight, and I was just trying to get to the point as to whether there was any expression by you or Governor Stassen at that time that would indicate that that was then your opinion, and that you so expressed it.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Outside the conference?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Oh, yes. I can't speak for Governor Stassen, but I would say his numerous speeches reiterated the very same thing he said at the conference.

And I am sure my addresses have done the same thing.

Senator SMITH. In other words, it is possible, though, and that is what I was pointing up to, that a great many things said about Russia, before Russia became our ally, were things which the people recanted after Russia became our ally, and then when it became the enemy they took up the old line.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, that commonly occurs.

Senator SMITH. So what I want to do is to get this oriented in the light of what was the condition at that time.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, I think the opinions expressed at the conference were frequently and publicly expressed by almost every member of the conference.

Senator SMITH. Now, then, what is the next thing?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read our letter of October 5, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter of October 5, 1951, to Hon. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State:

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you make available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee a transcript of the minutes of a conference held by the Jessup Commission, presided over by Philip C. Jessup, on September 14, 1949, in Washington, at which were present Messrs. Meaney, Delany, and Lovestone of the American Federation of Labor, and Messrs. Carey and Ross of the CIO?

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Letter of October 11, 1951, on letterhead of the Department of State:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have your letter of October 5 to the Secretary requesting "a transcript of the minutes of a conference held by the Jessup Commission, presided over by Philip C. Jessup, on September 14, 1949, in Washington, at which were present Messrs. Meaney, Delany, and Lovestone of the American Federation of Labor, and Messrs. Carey and Ross of the CIO."

No stenographic transcript of this meeting was made, but the Department's files do contain a four-page summary record of the conference in the form of a memorandum, subject: Views of Organized Labor With Respect to United States Policy in Asia. This brief summary memorandum does not quote any participants directly nor does it spell out in detail the views and opinions of individual participants. It is in fact merely an informal record of the sense of the meeting and hence has not even been verified by the participants.

The September 14, 1949, meeting was called by the Department as a means of conferring with representatives of organized labor and of obtaining their concrete suggestions for United States policy in Asia.

The Department has followed the practice of conducting such conferences with representative groups in regard to each area of the world in order to ascertain the views of experts and open leaders in all walks of American life. The Department has learned from experience that great benefit is derived from face-to-face informal conferences with truly representative persons from business, farm, labor, veterans, religious, and other important groups. To ignore the contribution these citizens are capable of making, in the Department's judgment, is to encourage "ivory tower" policy making and narrowness of view.

It is also pointed out that since the sole purpose of these meetings is to obtain the best private thinking available on various problems of foreign affairs and not to either formulate or to promote policies, a completely frank and uninhibited exchange of views and ideas is essential. This can be made possible only if the participants are assured that their remarks will be held in complete confidence. The Department has provided this assurance and has done so in good faith.

Under these circumstances, the Department would be guilty of a breach of confidence were the informal record of the September 1949 conference made available to the committee without the prior approval of the participants. Should the committee wish the Department to place the matter before the organized labor representatives who attended the meeting, however, the Department will do so.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Senator SMITH. What is the purpose of that letter in this record? Just to show you have called for this memorandum and did not get it?

Mr. MORRIS. The idea is that the committee may decide to take some testimony on what happened at that conference.

Senator SMITH. I suppose we can do that, can we not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I mean, what is the point of putting that letter in here?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, the request is in the record, Senator, and I think since the request is in, we should have the answer of the State Department.

Senator SMITH. I do not see how that serves as evidence in this hearing, except that you may want to call on them and have a hearing, subpena these witnesses, and so on.

But what point does that serve in having it go in here?

Mr. MORRIS. If the request of Senator McCarran asking for that is in the record, I think in all fairness to everybody, the reply on the part of the State Department should go in.

Senator SMITH. I have no objection to having it go in, but I do not see any point in it, particularly.

Mr. MORRIS. It is the background, Senator. If the decision is now made that we should have to take some testimony, it is because we were not able to get the transcript.

You see, in connection with this, Senator, if this transcript had been made available to the committee some weeks ago, when we brought Mr. Colegrove down three times and Mr. Stassen three times, to testify as to what happened at this particular conference, all of that would not have been necessary. It all could have been obviated if we had had the transcripts.

Senator SMITH. What else do you have?

Mr. MANDEL. On September 25, 1951, exhibits 266 and 267 were two letters, one addressed by Senator McCarran to Hon. Dean Acheson, asking for details in reference to a conference held on October 12, 1942, in regard to which we have received testimony.

Then the reply was also made an exhibit, dated September 1, 1951, and in this reply the Department letter, signed by Jack K. McFall, says that:

> These efforts to obtain information respecting the meeting were complicated by the fact that the departmental officers who reportedly participated were no longer with the Department.
>
> The Department will again examine its files with a view to obtaining information bearing on the specific questions in your letter of August 27 and will write you further upon completion of this reexamination.

Now, we have received a letter with regard to that conference, signed by Sumner Welles on his own personal letterhead. This letter has been directed to Mr. Victor Lasky, and we have a letter from Mr. Victor Lasky permitting us to make this part of our records, and if you will permit, I will read the excerpt from the letter of Mr. Welles pertaining to this conference.

Senator SMITH. What conference was that?

Mr. MORRIS. That came up in previous testimony, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Has that been referred to heretofore?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; several witnesses have testified, and this letter is probative, has some evidentiary bearing on that testimony.

Senator SMITH. Has the other letter been challenged by the State Department?

Mr. MORRIS. No; the only trouble is that no records of it can be found.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the letter of Sumner Welles, addressed to Mr. Victor Lasky, dated August 24, 1950, and I read a part of the letter:

> To the best of my recollection I saw Mr. Earl Browder, whom I had not previously met, twice at my office in the State Department, the first time at my request and the second time at his request.
>
> We were very much interested in the State Department at that time——

Senator SMITH. It says "concerned."

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

> We were very much concerned in the State Department at that time lest the armies of the Chinese Nationalist Government and the armed forces opposed to the Nationalist Government expend their energies on fighting each other rather than on fighting the Japanese invaders. My recollection is that the first

interview with Mr. Browder was suggested by the White House as a result of an article that had appeared in the Daily Worker, which gave a wholly false account of American policy with regard to China and which it was believed might do harm in China by provoking an even more acute crisis between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists. It was for that purpose that Mr. Browder was requested to come to see me. My recollection further is that a correction was, in fact, later made in the Daily Worker. I believe further that my second and final interview with Mr. Browder had to do with the same matter and was held after the correction in the Daily Worker had been made.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept those into the record?

Senator SMITH. I do not see much point to it, but anyhow, they can go in.

(The communications referred to were marked "Exhibit 336" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 336

OCTOBER 10, 1951.

ROBERT MORRIS,
Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: Concerning your letter of October 7, in which you request correspondence sent me by Mr. Sumner Welles, please find enclosed said correspondence. I have no hesitation about turning it over to you as Mr. Welles, I believe, understood that it was meant for publication. However, I would appreciate your notifying Mr. Welles that you have obtained same.

Sincerely,

VICTOR LASKY.

BAR HARBOR, MAINE, *August 24, 1950.*

Mr. VICTOR LASKY,
New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. LASKY: Your letter of August 17 has been forwarded to me. Since I am here in Maine and all of my personal memoranda and files are at my house in Maryland, it is not possible for me to consult the latter with regard to the inquiry you make of me. After my return home early in October I will be glad to give you the detailed information which you request if that will not be too late for your purposes.

As you will understand after an interval of some 10 years I do not remember the details offhand.

To the best of my recollection I saw Mr. Earl Browder, whom I had not previously met, twice at my office in the State Department, the first time at my request and the second time at his request.

We were very much concerned in the State Department at that time lest the armies of the Chinese Nationalist Government and the armed forces opposed to the Nationalist Government expend their energies on fighting each other rather than on fighting the Japanese invaders. My recollection is that the first interview with Mr. Browder was suggested by the White House as a result of an article that had appeared in the Daily Worker, which gave a wholly false account of American policy with regard to China and which it was believed might do harm in China by provoking an even more acute crisis between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists. It was for that purpose that Mr. Browder was requested to come to see me. My recollection further is that a correction was, in fact, later made in the Daily Worker. I believe further that my second and final interview with Mr. Browder had to do with the same matter and was held after the correction in the Daily Worker had been made.

Believe me.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all we have today, then, Mr. Chairman. The full Judiciary Committee meets tomorrow, I understand, and Monday, and we have four executive sessions scheduled for Tuesday,

so I think the next open hearing we will be able to have will be Wednesday.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Alsop have both asked that they be permitted to appear in open session, and I think Senator McCarran is trying to work out an open hearing for them on Wednesday.

Senator SMITH. If they have any information to give us, all right.

If there is nothing further, then, the hearing is in recess.

(Whereupon, at 4:05 p. m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: Senators McMahon and McCarthy; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

I am sorry the room has to be crowded as much as it is. I hope you will assist us in keeping it as quiet as possible.

Let me say at the outset that it is quite customary where two or more witnesses are to be in attendance under a general orderly procedure to have the witnesses not before the tribunal or before the committee excluded from the room. It is the judgment of the committee that in this case that rule will be waived. Mr. Alsop is here, and he may remain here.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace has not been sworn, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WALLACE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. WALLACE, SALEM, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE W. BALL, COUNSEL

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, is it true that you asked to come before this body because public testimony has been given to the effect that you were guided by Communists?

Mr. WALLACE. That is my understanding of the testimony of Mr. Budenz.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am asking if you will receive in evidence today the testimony of Mr. Wallace for that limited purpose, namely, Mr. Wallace feels that testimony before this committee is of

such a nature that his character and reputation has been damaged, and he would like to testify before this body.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, he has that right.

Mr. MORRIS. In addition, Senator, there are certain aspects of Mr. Wallace's testimony that relate to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and we would like to have that accepted in the ordinary course of this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. You can bring that up in your questions as you see fit.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Senator, I would like to go into the latter at the outset.

Mr. Wallace, did you write a booklet for the Institute of Pacific Relations at any time?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, in April and May of 1944 I wrote a booklet entitled "Our Job in the Pacific."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate to us the circumstances preceding your writing that booklet?

Mr. WALLACE. After it had become public knowledge that I had been designated by President Roosevelt to go on a mission to China, a representative or representatives of the Institute, and I do not know which——

Mr. MORRIS. You do not know who they were?

Mr. WALLACE. I do not know which, whether it was one or whether it was more than one who called on me, and I do not have any way of ascertaining unless that could be obtained from the institute.

I do remember very clearly that sometime in March or early April Mrs. Lattimore did call on me with the proposal that I write the pamphlet, and I indicated that I was very short of time with this trip coming on, that I couldn't take the time to write the pamphlet, that I did have certain ideas that I would very much wish to get on the record, that I was honored by the—I am not sure I said that I was honored by it, but in retrospect I would say I was honored by the request.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she indicate she was representing the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; that was very clear she was representing the Institute of Pacific Relations.

So we did work together. I dictated quite a mass of material to Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. You dictated it to Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did she take it down in shorthand?

Mr. WALLACE. No, she took it down in outline. I don't think she is an expert in shorthand. She may be. I don't know as to that. Anyhow, I did dictate a mass of material in outline to Mrs. Lattimore. I got various friends to work on certain other aspects of the important investment problem in China, that is, people who had been in the Board of Economic Warfare when I was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify those for the committee, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember their names. I remember they were in the Board of Economic Warfare. It may be that I just sent the word out to get that material. I don't think it is relevant to what you are after here because I don't think there is any discussion with

regard to the nature of that material and the section on investment. So far as I know, there is not, so I think it would be quite proper not to go into that side of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, one of the issues here concerning the testimony was whether or not you were guided by Communists.

Mr. WALLACE. I can assure you that nobody who gave me this information on investments was a Communist or ever mentioned as a Communist, I can assure you that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether there were any in your department?

Mr. WALLACE. The Board of Economic Warfare?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE. I did not know at the time. I have been told since that there were. As a matter of fact, I have been trying to get information on that on this trip, but so far I have not been able to do it.

I do know that Mr. Dies alleged there were. I do know one of the men he mentioned threatened suit against Mr. Dies, and Mr. Dies withdrew the allegation on the floor of the House, and the House recompensed him to the extent of attorney's fees amount to $800 or $900 for the damage he had done this man.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that one of the men who furnished any of the material?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think this man was. I am quite sure he was not because he was in an administrative position.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of what we have just said, you will agree that was a proper inquiry?

Mr. WALLACE. I will agree that it is a proper inquiry, but I am sure you will also agree that in a public hearing damage could be done to any people that might be mentioned in connection with this particular matter even though there is absolutely nothing that is valid, absolutely nothing, and I think if you will read the section on investment you will agree.

There is no valid criticism or there can be no suggestion by anyone there is anything of a Communist nature in the section on investments. As a matter of fact, it stands out quite clearly, you might say, as a free-enterprise proposal with regard to investments.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no fear, have you, that the naming of someone as a person who helped you prepare material for this booklet would damage that person in any way?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, I would say, with the type of publicity that has been current and with the atmosphere that exists in Washington today, that would tend to be the net effect. That is really what I feel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want the committee to understand that you are going to decline to answer questions with regard to matters which you do not consider relevant?

Mr. WALLACE. Now I certainly shall not do anything to stand in contempt of the committee or, as a matter of fact, to make a statement which the committee would feel is not cooperative. I just urge on this committee this point of view, and I think the committee will agree it is a just view.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. With reference to counsel, you have a right, but you are not going to sit alongside of the witness and whisper to him what his answers are going to be.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I know that we do not want to have a continual disturbance here, and I am sure counsel does not want to, either. What about having counsel sit at some little distance from the witness so he can object at the proper time when anything is asked and do it on the record?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Wallace, you said just then, and I quite appreciate what you have in mind, that whenever you make a statement, a public record, it could hurt somebody under the present state of the public mind.

Now does that not in your opinion, as has been the opinion of the committee, justify some sessions of this committee in executive session for the purpose of seeing whether or not there is any real background?

Mr. WALLACE. I quite appreciate the feeling of the committee with regard to holding closed sessions in order to protect the reputations of people, and I have heard the committee so state, and the counsel of the committee so state. I think it is a fine thing that the committee is taking this enlightened position, and in accordance with this enlightened position I feel if the committee feels there is anything in this section dealing with investments that bears on the case in point, why, I shall certainly be most glad to answer.

But unless you do feel that, I would hope that you will let my refusal to answer stand.

Senator SMITH. In other words, in that connection there may be instances in which you would feel that a public disclosure of a person's name might do him some damage, and therefore you would prefer to answer a question of that sort in executive session where he could be protected?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I think that would be fair to the people involved.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire as to whether Mrs. Lattimore, or anyone in the Institute of Pacific Relations, indicated what they wanted you to write about?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember exactly what she or they, as the case may have been, might have said. I do know that I had long had an interest in this part of the world.

As a matter of fact, it is my recollection I gave to President Roosevelt back in 1933 or 1934 a book by one of the witnesses before this committee, Professor McGovern, an outline of the history of China. It is my recollection he was the author of this particular book, and I called attention to certain segments of this book dealing with China. So my interest was long standing.

So when I was going to go on this trip to China, I felt it was a unique opportunity, since the institute had indicated their interest, to put certain of my views on the record.

Senator FERGUSON. But they came to you and initiated the project?

Mr. WALLACE. They initiated it. I did not initiate it.

Mr. MORRIS. So that the record may be accurate on this, Mr. Wallace, I think the question addressed to you was, Do you know the names of the people who supplied this information from the Board of Economic Warfare?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Senator McMahon, will you have that seat at that separate table?

Mr. WALLACE. I can remember one name.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us that name in executive session?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, of course I will give you that name in executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall any other names?

Mr. WALLACE. No, I don't. He worked with the various people. Of course, at that time it was the FEA; it was not the Board of Economic Warfare. He may have consulted with men who were in the FEA. I don't know whether he was in FEA at that time or not—I have forgotten—but he had been in FEA, I know, and in the Board of Economic Warfare, and I wanted to get this highly technical material. This man saw that I did get it.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I think we ought to have a clear understanding about this. Mr. Wallace has said that he will give this name and other names in executive session. I presume that all of us understand that anything given in executive session may, upon a decision by the committee, be thereafter used, after consideration is given to it?

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct, the witness should know that.

Senator FERGUSON. Otherwise we could not write a report.

Mr. WALLACE. I may say, however, that you will find in reading over this section there is no reason in the world for incorporating it in any report of any nature. I think you will agree with me, if you will look into the facts, that there is absolutely no purpose to be served, and I suspect you will not care to press the matter in executive session if you will look into the data in this particular segment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, in justice to Mr. Wallace, I think it should be made clear that he has not refused to tell the committee here. He has simply requested the opportunity to defer that answer until we have an executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very clear and very well understood.

Senator SMITH. If that is his judgment, I am willing to abide by that for the present in order that those persons may be protected.

The CHAIRMAN. The very aim and object of the committee in holding executive sessions was to weed out and eliminate any possible testimony that might do injury to an innocent person. We have been criticized for that procedure very severely. But we will persist in that procedure nevertheless with the hope that we may eventually work out something that the American public and the Congress of the United States may have confidence in.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the designated sections from that pamphlet that we have introduced in executive session?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from page 14 of Our Job in the Pacific, by Henry A. Wallace:

> Today the peoples of the east are on the march. We can date the beginning of that march from 1911 when the revolutionary movement among the Chinese people, inspired by the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, overthrew the Manchu dynasty and established a republic. This was the first time in the vast and culturally rich history of Asia that an Asiatic people turned its back on the whole principle of monarchy and hereditary rule and, in spite of the difficulties and obstacles that still remained, set out courageously toward the attainment of democracy—government of the people, by the people, for the people, through the elected representatives of the people. The march was joined later by the Russians, and the many non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union who link Europe with Asia across the greatest land mass of the earth, when the October revolution opened the way for the peasant to move in and begin to take over his own land.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue reading those excerpts, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. On page 24 of the same pamphlet, speaking of free Asia when the war ends:

Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a "freedom bloc," which it is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact.

Then on page 28:

The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs.

Then on page 30:

Russian interest in the Far East is not likely to be that of territorial expansion.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, I understand from your testimony in executive session that there are certain passages in that pamphlet you would like to call to the attention of the committee.

Mr. WALLACE. Following the hearing in executive session—let me put it this way—in the first place, not all these passages were introduced in executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. You did read from your pamphlet in executive session?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I did read in response to a question from Senator Watkins, I believe, who read the first part of the section quoted on page 14, and I read the remaining part, as is my recollection.

The other pages were not introduced in executive session, I think you will find, although I think it is your intent to have them, and I think it is quite agreeable to me to comment on them now.

Pursuant to the question raised by Senator Watkins, who felt that this must not be my idea but must be somebody else's, I wrote him a letter on October 11. I suggest that this letter be introduced in the record, and now might be a proper time to introduce it in the record.

DEAR SENATOR WATKINS: I feel I must clear up any question of my responsibility for the thoughts expressed on page 14 of the pamphlet Our Job in the Pacific.

If you can have your secretary get from the Congressional Library the little pamphlet the Price of Free World Victory, by Henry A. Wallace, you will note on page 15 a very similar idea expressed. Then if you will read the comments at the end of this very short pamphlet [it was really a reprint of my May 8, 1942, speech] you will gather from George Fielding Elliott, Raymond Clapper, and Dorothy Thompson an insight into the temper of the times.

We were fighting for our lives, and the Senate of the United States had authorized the President to do everything he could in cooperation with England and Russia to defeat Germany.

As it is put on page 525 of Henry Stimson's book on active service: "The central political decision of World War II was that it must be fought in an alliance as close as possible with Great Britain and Soviet Russia." Not once during the war was this decision questioned or any modification of it seriously considered by Stimson or by any man whose views he knew among the leaders of the administration.

The three nations and America form the indispensable team for victory over Germany together. With or without welcomed and helpful accessions of strength from smaller nations they could not lose. Apart or at cross purposes or with any of them defeated, they could—

there is a word left out here—

hardly fail to win. It was thus the constant purpose of the American Government to do all that would achieve a cherished cordial unity of action and so to reinforce its two great allies from the vast American reservoir of material wealth, that each would press on with increasing power to a final combined victory.

I did all I could to "achieve a cherished cordial unity of action." In so doing I was carrying out the policy of the Commander in Chief of the United States and the Senate.

Today the situation has changed radically in many ways. We must remember that 1942, 1943, and 1944 were totally different in policy requirements than either 1933 or 1951.

Sincerely yours.

Now, gentlemen, if you wish me to quote with regard to this particular section, which you will find has a remarkable likeness to my speech of May 8, 1942.

Now, the next part you call attention to is on page 24. This, as I remember, had been brought up by witnesses before the committee but not called to my attention in executive session. I will now deal with it.

Where did your quotation begin, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. The second paragraph.

Mr. WALLACE. Now if you will read the whole page, you will discover it is the third paragraph I used the words "subject Asia" as synonymous with "colonial Asia" and this whole discussion is in terms of whether or not a land is in a colonial possession.

You will also note with regard to the freedom of individual peoples, that that is to some degree at least—the word can be used in different senses, but with regard to freedom of individual peoples, that to some extent was in my mind because I say in the part Mr. Mandel quoted:

Free Asia will include, first of all, China and Soviet Russia, which will form a great area of freedom, and potentially a freedom bloc, which is to our interest to have a freedom bloc in fact.

Certainly the Soviet Union, although I was not fully aware of it at that time—I was to a considerable extent aware of it—but the Soviet Union was certainly not practicing freedom with regard to many millions of individuals in Soviet Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not say that, though, Mr. Wallace.

Mr. WALLACE. No, but what I am saying here is "which is to our interest to have a freedom bloc in fact." I do say it is not a freedom bloc. The inference is that there is not a freedom bloc at that time, but it is to our interest to have a freedom bloc in fact.

Obviously, if the object of all my endeavors at this time was what Stimson said his object was, to create maximum and cordial unity, I would not, while in the process of fighting a war authorized by the United States Senate in cooperation with Russia, go out of my way to antagonize that nation.

That simply was not in the cards in 1944. I just was not going to do that. So I think the sense in which "free" is used here, you will find if you read it over, is referring to whether or not a country is in a colonial status.

Now what was the other page?

Mr. MANDEL. Page 28.

Mr. WALLACE. Where does that begin?

Mr. MANDEL. The first paragraph.

Mr. WALLACE. You mean—

The Russians had demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by refraining from intervening in China's internal affairs.

That was definitely true at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. What about the activities of the Chinese Communist Party. Do you not feel they were the actions of the Soviet Government?

Mr. WALLACE. That would require a great deal of testimony by people who have been on the ground a long time, and there is conflicting testimony, very definitely conflicting testimony. That is, there is testimony to the effect that Stalin did not like Mao Tse-tung at this time at all. You can find testimony from the very highest sources that Stalin called the Chinese Communists "brigands, robbers, and Fascists," and many other names.

I am not going to quote this highest authority, but I can assure you this quotation is an accurate one from the very highest authority.

Mr. MORRIS. At least you concede there is a conflict on this?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't say there is a conflict with regard to Russia's interfering in China's internal affairs at that time. I don't think there is conflict with regard to the accuracy of the statement appearing in the pamphlet.

You are asking the question: "Were the Chinese Communists in 1944 controlled from Russia?"

In reply to your question, not with regard to what is in the pamphlet, but in reply to your question, I will say there is conflict of testimony as to the extent to which Chinese Communists at that time were controlled from Russia. I think you ought to have somebody much more expert than I in that field testify on that particular point.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, you say here

The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from interfering in China's internal affairs.

The question is, did not the activities of the Chinese Communists at that particular time represent intervention on the part of the Soviets? Your answer is unqualifiedly "No." You later say there is conflict in testimony. Did that conflict exist as of that time or is it a conflict which exists at the present time?

Mr. WALLACE. The American observers, so far as I know—as far as I can remember talking with them at the American Embassy—did not feel that the Chinese Communists were under the control of Russia.

Now that is the best authority I know.

The CHAIRMAN. What time was this?

Mr. WALLACE. That was in June of 1944. That was the feeling they had at the Embassy, that they were not under the control of Russia. It may be that they were. I just don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You made the flat assertion in that booklet.

Mr. WALLACE. That is the best knowledge I had. I did know that the Russians had pulled out of Sinkiang, and it was to the best of my knowledge that the Russians were not interfering at that time, that the Chinese Communists were more or less autonomous.

Now subsequently events have happened more recently, and I don't think they have a bearing on what I wrote there. Subsequently events indicate that in many cases Chinese Communists that people thought were independent have not proved to be independent. I am quite willing to say that. But at this time this was my belief, that Russia was not intervening in the internal affairs of China, and you can find very reputable testimony to that effect, I am sure.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Wallace mentioned the Embassy. Do you mean the American Embassy?

Mr. WALLACE. In Chungking.

Senator SMITH. Was there any division of opinion among the people at the Embassy?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember any on this particular point.

Mr. MORRIS. Who are the people who advocated the interpretation you rendered?

Mr. WALLACE. Of course, when you try to reconstruct the specific conversations 7 years ago, you can't.

Mr. MORRIS. We do not want you to do that.

Mr. WALLACE. It would be my recollection that Ambassador Gauss believed this very strongly. That is Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss, our Ambassador at Chungking. That would be my recollection. Of course, I did not have the benefit of his judgment at this date because this was written in April of 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Before you went to China?

Mr. WALLACE. Before I went to China, so that does not enter into this picture. I think we really ought to confine it to a discussion of the pamphlet and the information I had available to me at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Who, if anyone, accompanied you on that Chinese trip?

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Chairman, should we finish up the other points with regard to the pamphlet or not? I am quite willing to go over this if you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. I have to leave. I want to ask that question, who, if anyone, accompanied you on that trip?

Mr. WALLACE. There was the crew of the plane. There was Owen Lattimore. There was John Carter Vincent. There was John Hazard. Those were the three I remember.

The CHAIRMAN. For some portion of the trip Mr. Alsop accompanied you?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; he was on the plane, as I remember it, when we flew from Kunming to Kweilin.

The CHAIRMAN. Alsop was designated by General Chennault, was he not?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. They accompanied you on this trip?

Mr. WALLACE. The only air part of the trip they accompanied me on, so far as I recollect, is from Kunming to Kweilin.

The CHAIRMAN. Who in that group you mentioned were most in your company during the entire trip?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say John Carter Vincent was for most of my trip. When we went through Soviet Asia John Hazard was most of my company.

Senator SMITH. Did they all leave with you, or did you meet some of them over there?

Mr. WALLACE. These three gentlemen left on May 20 here in Washington on the airplane to go over there.

Senator SMITH. From questions asked it sounded like they might have met you on the way.

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Alsop met me at Kunming and accompanied me to Kweilin and back.

The CHAIRMAN. I ask to be excused. I have to make a call.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at some time before Mr. Wallace leaves the question of the pamphlet and without breaking into Mr. Morris' questions, I have a series of questions to ask.

Senator SMITH. You may reserve your right to ask them.

Mr. WALLACE. Now what was the next page?

Mr. MANDEL. Page 30, Russian interest.
Mr. WALLACE. Where is that on the page?
Mr. MANDEL. Right in the middle of the page.
Mr. WALLACE. Yes; the third paragraph.

Russian interest in the Far East is not likely to be that of territorial expansion

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the next sentence?
Mr. WALLACE (reading):

The Russians certainly want a friendly government in China and a friendly government in Korea just as we do.

You see, at that time and for a number of years thereafter I felt it altogether improbable that the Chinese and the Russians would join up. I felt it improbable because I studied the history of that part of the world to some extent and assumed that the Chinese having seen the Russians in that steady march across Siberia, taking over some land that had been inhabited by Chinese, would feel with regard to Russia, especially the Northern Chinese would feel with regard to Russia, in the same way that the Mexican people have felt in regard to the United States; and that from any long-run point of view it was altogether improbable that there would be an effective continuing cooperation between the Chinese and the Russians.

I felt that very strongly, and I felt at this time very strongly that the Russians, knowing the attitude of the Northern Chinese with regard to them and having had that experience under Borodin interfering in Chinese affairs, an experience that proved very disastrous from the Russian point of view, would not engage in any type of territorial expansion which would awaken the sleeping might of China.

It begins to look, for the time being at any rate, that my size-up as made in 1944 was incorrect. However, history is not yet fully in, and there are fundamental forces at work there which I think are yet to express themselves.

Now with regard to the Russians certainly wanting a friendly government in China and a friendly government in Korea just as we do, that means exactly what it says, and I think with regard to its signifiicance we only have to think of our own situation where we would like to have friendly governments on our borders, and we can postulate that another great nation would feel the same way.

I go further and say that we, the United States, also want a friendly government in China and Korea. I think it is important that the governments of China and Korea be as friendly, if there is going to be peace in the world, be as friendly to the United States as Russia.

Russia will continue to insist on friendly governments, but we also should insist on friendly governments there, if we can do it without the loss of American boys.

Is there another page, by the way, Mr. Mandel?
Mr. MANDEL. No.
Mr. WALLACE. Are there any other questions on Our Job in the Pacific?
Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that you were not influenced in any way by Communist propaganda by writing that pamphlet?
Mr. WALLACE. The ideas are my own, so far as I can discover. I have no reason for thinking that Mrs. Lattimore influenced what I

said in the direction of Communist propaganda, and I would cite specifically the same thing I cited in the executive hearing.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean to imply, Mr. Wallace, that any influence Mrs. Lattimore may have had on your writing would be Communist propaganda?

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't mean to insinuate——

Mr. MORRIS. I think the record would give that impression.

Mr. WALLACE. I certainly want to straighten that out because I don't have any reason whatsoever for thinking that Mrs. Lattimore was representing Communist propaganda. You gentlemen have met her face to face, and I think you will agree she makes a very favorable impression face to face.

I should like to introduce in the record at this time as an indication that if there was any Communist influence on the pamphlet, and I don't see any evidence of it, that surely they were not influencing what I said about Chiang Kai-shek on page 29, in which I say:

> The steadfast leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek, which has already made China a world power, is an assurance that China's political aspirations are not limited to her own, but stand for the hopes and the progress of all Asiatic peoples.

Again it is a little hard to believe that if there were a Communist in some mysterious way, not Mrs. Lattimore but say somebody else, somebody elsewhere in the institute might have been reading the manuscript proof and decided to eliminate or insert something, it is a little hard to see how they could, if they were really on the job, how they could have let get by on page 40 my statement with regard to our strategic needs where I say:

> It is probably safe to assume that the thought uppermost in the minds of our Navy after the war will concern the importance of securing naval and air bases which will insure our strategic control of the Pacific. Such bases would in all likelihood be situated on small islands like the Japanese mandate.
>
> These bases need not become an imperial menace to Asia. Our liberation of the Philippines will outweigh our acquisition of new islands, and, unlike Japan, we have neither the will nor the interest to project control over the mainland of Asia.
>
> Neither would our new island possessions mean a new colonialism, for their population is so small and scattered that instead of problems of local nationalism we would have problems of local trusteeship and economic welfare.

That is, I can't imagine anyone, who was really representing Russia anywhere, wanting me to come out on the eve of this trip across from Soviet Asia to China, with a statement for American bases on the Japanese mandated islands.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to have in the record at this time the official Communist estimate, at least the estimate of the pamphlet we have been discussing as it appeared in the Daily Worker under the byline of Frederick V. Field.

Mr. Mandel, will you read from the article?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the Daily Worker of June 24, 1944, page 7, headed "Today's guest column, Vice President Wallace's pamphlet on the Pacific, by Frederick V. Field." I quote:

> Vice President Wallace's pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, just published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, is a progressive and statesmanlike approach to problems of our foreign policy.

He says that there is a "free Asia" and a "subject Asia" or "colonial Asia." "It is to our advantage," Mr. Wallace says, "not to perpetuate this division but to see an orderly process of transition so that the area of free Asia will grow and the area of subject Asia continually diminish."

Then further Mr. Field says:

I have studied and compared these sections of the Wallace pamphlet with the chapter on national liberation in Asia in Earl Browder's Teheran, Our Past in War and Peace. Both stand for the most rapid reconstruction of the colonial system consistent with the maintenance of unity among the United Nations.

Mr. Browder, however, carries the analysis several steps beyond where the Vice President leaves off.

And finally in this review:

These two publications—

meaning Mr. Browder's and Mr. Wallace's—

mark an advance in the American thinking on the highly controversial problem of colonies.

Mr. WALLACE. I might say with regard to this, which was read from the Daily Worker, first, that I never read the Daily Worker; I couldn't have read this at this particular time even if somebody had called it to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you could not have read it if someone had called it to your attention?

Mr. WALLACE. I couldn't have read it even if someone had called it to my attention because I wasn't in the country. Occasionally people have called my attention to something that is in the Daily Worker, but I have never read it myself, and they might have called this to my attention if I had been in the country, but it was not called to my attention. This is the first time I have heard it.

I might say that the indication is that Mr. Field was following the Wallace line and not Mr. Wallace following the Field line, because most of that is a direct quotation from the pamphlet itself.

Now it is not a new thing for the Communists to try to get aboard something and ride it for all they can. Anything which they may think is respectable they will get aboard and try to ride it if they can do so. So I attach nothing significant whatsoever to Mr. Field's effort.

Senator SMITH. You had not heard that before?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether Mr. Budenz at that time was editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, Mr. Budenz was editor of the Daily Worker in 1944. I have discovered that in some of my recent researches.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace, there may be some confusion in the minds of those who will read this record between the question of the influence which the Institute of Pacific Relations had on this pamphlet and the influence which the Communists had on the pamphlet.

I should like to direct myself, without any statement or implication as to the relationship between those two questions, solely to the question of the influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations on this pamphlet.

Mr. WALLACE. I hope you will also ask what influence I had on the pamphlet.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think there are some loose ends hanging, sir.

Mr. WALLACE. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could Mrs. Lattimore have been the first person to contact you about this pamphlet?

Mr. WALLACE. Frankly I don't know. She is the first person I happened to remember, but I just don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you stated in executive session you could not say whether she was or whether she was not.

Mr. WALLACE. She was the first person I remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. She could have made the initial contact?

Mr. WALLACE. She could have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you known Mrs. Lattimore before the time she contacted you?

Mr. WALLACE. To the best of my recollection I did not. I might have met her socially.

Mr. SOURWINE. When she came to you initially in connection with this pamphlet, so far as you recall now, was the first time you had met her?

Mr. WALLACE. That would be my impression.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just when was it that you were asked by Mrs. Lattimore or someone else on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations to write this pamphlet?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say the precise date, but I would say in late March or early April.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of 1944?

Mr. WALLACE. Of 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. You gathered a substantial amount of statistics in connection with your portion of the pamphlet about the national income as it affects the amount of imports into the United States and exports from the United States to the Orient?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct. That was not done through Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir; it is understood that was not, but I think you testified you did do considerable research in the work.

Mr. WALLACE. It was a field in which I personally was very much interested. You see, I have had the view for many years, ever since 1909, in fact, that eventually the west coast would have as great a significance for this Nation as the east coast. I gained that in talking with a Mr. Beard, of the Sacramento Bee, who had served on the Country Life Commission with my grandfather in 1908.

I traveled through the West, and in talking with Mr. Beard he let his imagination loose as to what would have happened if the Pilgrim Fathers had landed on the west coast. I have always believed that the west coast will have as great a significance to this Nation as the east coast.

I had studied the figures very carefully as to the mounting percentage of our imports coming from the Far East and the possibility of our exports to the Far East mounting through the west coast ports, and entering into the rate of growth would be the volume of our capital exports because obviously the United States would be the only country that could furnish the volume of capital exports that would get this area of the world really clicking in a way it should click.

So that and the discussion of agriculture I very much wanted to get across in this pamphlet in the most vigorous way possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have expressed in this pamphlet your theories about the west coast and its probable ascendancy over the east coast?

Mr. WALLACE. No, I don't put it that way.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since it is entirely collateral to this discussion, may I go on just a minute? I was only interested in the question of the fact.

Mr. WALLACE. I am not saying ascendency; I am saying equally important.

Mr. SOURWINE. But that question which you have now discussed——

Mr. WALLACE. Was a little bit to one side.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is not contained in the pamphlet.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't believe so. It was in my motivation. I guess you don't care to discuss motivation.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no objection, but at the moment I should like to go ahead with these questions which I believe can be answered rather quickly.

It took you how long, would you say, to gather these statistics that you used in this pamphlet?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say roughly 2 or 3 weeks.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us how long it took you to dictate the pamphlet to Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I was with her I would guess four different times.

Mr. SOURWINE. About four times?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know. It is a guess.

Mr. SOURWINE. She came to see you on four different occasions?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say roughly. Of course when you are under oath you get a little cautious about precise numbers.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, and all we want is your best recollection. Was it a full day's session each time or a half-day or afternoon?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say roughly 2 or 3 hours would be my guess.

Mr. SOURWINE. Two or three hours at a session?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you had 8 to 12 hours of dictation to her approximately?

Mr. WALLACE. That would be my rough recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Over what period of time did you dictate to her? Was it all consecutive, day after day?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she come once or twice a week?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember. It was strung throughout the month of April, it would be my recollection, and early May.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, there is a slight conflict in your testimony here and your testimony in the executive session with regard to the matter of whether Mrs. Lattimore took down what you said, and with the permission of the chairman I should like to read about a quarter of a page from the executive session testimony and ask the witness to comment upon it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have the original manuscript, the original draft of your dictation on this, by any chance, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. I do not. I am positive I don't have.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not remember to whom you dictated it first?

Mr. WALLACE. To Mrs. Lattimore.
Mr. MORRIS. She took it down?
Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

That is on pages 21 and 22.

Would you comment on that testimony?

Mr. WALLACE. That is accurate.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "she took it down" you do not mean she took it down verbatim, that she took down verbatim what you dictated?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was simply making notes with regard to what you had told her your views were?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your testimony today makes it clear that that was what you intended.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, sir, did Mrs. Lattimore thereafter produce in draft form a draft comprising her expansion of what you had given her as the ideas you wanted to go in the pamphlet?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you recall when she gave that to you, sir?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I would say it finally was finished up along, I would think, about the 10th of May. That is very rough.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, have her draft for your examination before this thing went into proof?

Mr. WALLACE. It is my recollection that it was in manuscript form. It might possibly have been in proof form, but I would think it was in manuscript form because the time factor was very close, and it was not finally published until after I had gone on my trip.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was only one draft then, probably in manuscript, but either in manuscript or in proof?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right. I wouldn't say one draft. Maybe there was a carbon copy. I don't know as to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean that. Carbons would still be the same draft. I do not want to quibble with you. I am trying to find out whether it is possible you saw both a draft and a proof. I believe you established at the executive session that you saw only one and you thought it was a manuscript draft.

Mr. WALLACE. I think it was a manuscript draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not see both the manuscript and the proof?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say positively on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember only one?

Mr. WALLACE. I just don't know. It was one or the other or both. I think we will have to leave it that way.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was submitted to you about the 10th of May?

Mr. WALLACE. Shortly before I left is all I can say.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you leave?

Mr. WALLACE. On May 20.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now how long did it take you to go over that draft after it was submitted to you, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know. I have no idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it take you a matter of weeks?

Mr. WALLACE. Obviously not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it take you a matter of days?

Mr. WALLACE. My guess is that I spent an evening or two evenings on it; that is the way I usually do that kind of thing. That is all I can say. That is my ordinary custom.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make extensive changes in it?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember any changes you made?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you did make any changes?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say "yes" or "no." I just don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You cannot say you did not make any?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say I made any.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, it is possible that you made no changes in the draft which was submitted to you?

Mr. WALLACE. It is possible I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. So it is possible that beginning with your dictation over a period of 8 to 12 hours to Mrs. Lattimore of the ideas which you wanted expressed in this, she subsequently returned with a draft on which you spent an evening, and in which you may not——

Mr. WALLACE. An evening or two. I just have no recollection of it. I am simply reconstituting this as best as I can from my habits, not from positive recollection. I almost invariably do make changes in this kind of thing—almost invariably do.

I would say on this occasion I did. After 7 years you cannot swear positively as to just exactly what you did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been Mr. Owen Lattimore who first asked you to do this pamphlet for the institute?

Mr. WALLACE. I really don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, it could have been?

Mr. WALLACE. It could have been; I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know anyone else in the Institute of Pacific Relations besides Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. WALLACE. The only other person I remember knowing was Edward C. Carter, whom I had known since 1929.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it Mr. Carter who asked you to do this work?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think so. He might have instigated it because he did know me, and I think he had a respect for my agricultural interest in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you had not known Mrs. Lattimore before she came to you with regard to this pamphlet?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think I had met her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you known Mr. Lattimore before then?

Mr. WALLACE. I had met him once just before he went as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. So far as I know, that is the only time I met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. That covers the point I wanted in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, can you recall where these evening sessions took place?

Mr. WALLACE. I said I must have read it over—no, as far as I can recollect the meetings with Mrs. Lattimore were in my office here in the Senate Office Building or over in the office in the Capitol. I don't remember specifically which. Mrs. Lattimore was not with me when I read over the manuscript, as nearly as I can remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is all we have on the question of the booklet.

Mr. Wallace, you have been a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WALLACE. I was so informed. I have never checked this for myself. I have never attended any board meeting. I was informed by Alfred Kohlberg. He had written me in August 1950, that I had been a trustee of the Board of the Institute of Pacific Relations for at least 2 years.

In 1950, when he wrote me, I had no recollection of it whatsoever and wrote him to that effect I had none. He said I had been in 1946 and one other year. I suppose in that case it might have been 1945, and probably they asked me to go on as a result of the trip to Asia.

I do know that a list of the board of trustees in 1947 shows I was not a member, and apparently when I retired from the Cabinet they felt I was no longer of service to them and dropped me from membership at that time. I never attended any meeting of the trustees of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, purely for the purpose of the record, I would like to introduce a photostatic copy of the list of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the year 1946, which shows, among many others, Henry A. Wallace under the heading "Board of Trustees."

Senator SMITH. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 337" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 337

AMERICAN COUNCIL INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Chairman: Robert Gordon Sproul, Executive vice chairman: Edward C. Carter, Treasurer: Brooks Emeny, Assistant Treasurer: Tillie G. Shahn, Secretary: Marguerite Ann Stewart,

Chairman, research advisory committee: Owen Lattimore
Vice chairman, research advisory committee: Eugene Staley

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Abbott Low Moffat
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Lawrence Morris
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Chester Rowell
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G. Nye Steiger
Donald Straus
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Henry A. Wallace
Sumner Welles
Lynn White, Jr.
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Mrs. Louise L. Wright

INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS

Percy E. Corbett, *Chairman, Pacific Council*

Sir George Sansom, *Chairman, Research Committee*

J. J. L. Duyvendak, *Vice Chairman, Research Committee*

Grayson Kirk, *Chairman, Program Committee*

Edward C. Carter, *Chairman, Finance Committee*

William L. Holland, *Secretary General*

Mr. WALLACE. May I add many other respectable names.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, have you written a book entitled "Soviet Asia Mission"?

Mr. WALLACE. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you address yourself to the author's note? Will you read that for us, please?

Mr. WALLACE (reading):

In acknowledgement of invaluable assistance in preparing the manuschipt of Soviet Asia Mission, my sincere thanks are extended to: John Hazard, Owen Lattimore, and Capt. Kennith Knowles for intimate observations of life in east Asia today; Joseph Barnes, Harriet Moore, Albert Rhys Williams, Dr. Tredwell Smith, and Myra Jordan for reading the text and offering editorial suggestions; and to Andrew J. Steiger, who compiled the book from the diary I wrote during the trip and from the other factual material supplied him by me.

HENRY A. WALLACE.

Mr. MORRIS. Is your testimony that the people named in this author's note did aid in the preparation of this book?

Mr. WALLACE. All I know is what Steiger told me. I did not take the manuscript to any of these people myself. Steiger took it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, Mr. Wallace, there is testimony before this committee that four of the people so named there are Communists?

Mr. WALLACE. You have so stated. I did not so know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you wish to make any observation one way or the other on that?

Mr. WALLACE. I merely say I myself did not come in contact with these people and did not know three of these people; had never met them, and to the best of my knowledge still have never met them.

Senator SMITH. Is that sworn testimony?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, before this committee.

Senator SMITH. It did not come by way of letters?

Mr. MORRIS. That is sworn testimony before the committee.

Mr. Wallace, therefore, is it your testimony that this author's note is not your own testimony, but it is what Andrew J. Steiger told you about the preparation of this book?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct. Andrew J. Steiger got the information for this book—you will note that the foreword says "with the collaboration of Andrew J. Steiger."

The part of this book I wrote in its entirety has to do with agriculture.

Mr. MORRIS. Other than that, everything in the book was written by Mr. Steiger?

Mr. WALLACE. I wrote, I think, a part of the introductory notes and one or two other spots, but the part that I remember I did write in its entirety has to do with agriculture.

Steiger for the rest not merely relied on the notes that I furnished him, but also used notes that he could get from other people on the trip and anybody else that he felt was an expert in this field. It was in that connection apparently he had gone to these various people and got them to read the manuscript to find if this was accurate or that was accurate.

I did not take the manuscript to any of these people myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you select Andrew J. Steiger to prepare a book that was going to be published in your name?

Mr. WALLACE. Andrew J. Steiger came to me as a newspaperman and a broadcaster who had lived for some years in the Soviet Union as a correspondent for certain of the American press, and I don't remember now. I looked him up to this degree: to find who his antecedents had been, and they were Americans for some generations, and that he had been raised in the Lutheran Church, and I think had been with either the Evangelical or Lutheran Evangelical Church.

He seemed to be a man of deep religious convictions and felt that bringing out my observations on this trip across the Soviet Union would further the friendly relationship between the United States and Russia.

I felt very strongly on that subject myself, that everything possible should be done to cultivate the friendly attitude in the postwar period, and agreed with him that something of the sort would be helpful.

I don't just know when he came to see me. It was probably in late 1944 or early 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone recommend him to you?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. It was a newspaper publisher who recommended him to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Mr. WALLACE. I again hate to embarrass anybody, but the newspaper publisher who did recommend him to me was a Mr. Charles Marsh, who publishes a number of papers in the South. Mr. Charles Marsh had called my attention to a book by Steiger. This was prior to my trip; that Mr. Steiger had written a book with regard to the growth of industry in the Soviet Asia in collaboration with somebody else, whose name I have forgotten.

As I remember it, he gave me a copy of this book.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know the name of that book?

Mr. WALLACE. No. It can readily be ascertained. It dealt with the rapid expansion of population and industry and agriculture. I have not read it since 1944.

After I returned, this newspaperman said—

I have gotten in touch with this man who wrote that book about the Soviet Asia, and he would like very much to take any notes that you may have and bring history up to date.

So, it rather embarrassed me. As I said in executive session, the first draft of this which must have been gotten together sometime in early 1945 was altogether unacceptable to the publisher and was unacceptable to me because it was bad English.

It was not because of any particular bias one way or the other. That is from my point of view, because I was for cultivating the maximum friendly relations with Russia at that time, very strongly for it.

So, he did the job over again. He put a great deal of time on it.

As I stated in executive session, it is my recollection I turned over to him any royalties that had come from the book because he had done practically all the work on it.

Mr. MORRIS. In your check of Andrew J. Steiger, did you discover that he had written for the Daily Worker?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate if we put an article by Andrew J. Steiger appearing in the Daily Worker in the record, preceding the time of this incident we are taking testimony on now. Would you accept into the record an item entitled "May Day at Magnitogorsk"—and it is dated April 28, 1934, page 11, of the Daily Worker?

Senator SMITH. For the purpose of identifying what?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace has testified he made a check of the qualifications of Andrew J. Steiger to prepare a book in Mr. Wallace's name.

I asked Mr. Wallace if in making that check he had known that Andrew J. Steiger had written for the Daily Worker. Mr. Wallace said he did not.

I think it is appropriate that that article should go into the record at this time.

Mr. SOURWINE. To establish you were not asking a question about a fact that was nonexistent.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Not for the purpose of connecting Mr. Wallace with this particular article.

Mr. MORRIS. To bear on the pertinency of my question.

Senator SMITH. That is all right.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 338" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 338

[From the Daily Worker, New York, April 28, 1934]

MAY DAY AT MAGNITOGORSK

(By Andrew J. Steiger)

Magnitogorsk in bold relief is charted by a mountain, a blast furnace, and workers. A metallurgist could estimate the quality of magnetic ore in its mountain; an engineer would evaluate the technical excellence of the blast furnace, which is smelting the mountain of ore; but a visiting traveler singles out the workers, the builders and operators of the ore crushers, blast furnaces, rolling mill, railroad yards, coke plant, and socialist city. This is especially true if one visits Magnitogorsk on May Day, the international holiday of labor.

TRIUMPHANT EVENING

The celebration of May Day begins the evening before May 1, a time of sober reflections, exchange of compliments, awarding of honors for work well done. By 9 p. m. the workers of Magnitogorsk are gathered in the circular auditorium of the circus. Lusty voiced young pioneers, on one side of the circus ring, sing out the Song of the Drummer. The baritone voices of German foreign workers, standing with upraised fist, answer them from the opposite side, singing the Rote Front. Speches begin, but somehow, content is unimportant; while the ceremony of the celebration impresses the workers and engrosses the visitors. Representatives of the Society of Old Bolsheviks present a banner to the Magitogorsk group of young Communists (Komsomols).

Comrade Sverdlova tells the Komsomols: "We cannot build slowly and easily in the present day; we must build quickly, insanely fast. The deepening crises

abroad, the threat of war, the quickened tempo of life, all demand that we work speedily and create that which will counteract the dangers around us."

This fighter of the old generation of Bolsheviks challenges the eager youngsters of the new.

Fadeev, leader of the local branch of the Young Communist League, responds, "In our ranks," he says, "there is not one member who has failed to fulfill his duties. All have gone over the work norms set up for them in the production plan. The lowest percentage we have made is 123 percent and the highest is 190 percent. The brigade of Komsomols working on the excavator are the best workers in the plant. Our members have done exemplary work in mastering new knowledge and getting familiar with the new technique."

The banner to be presented to the Komsomols bears a quotation from Lenin, the slogan, "Learn to build; in building, learn."

AN OLD BOLSHEVIK SPEAKS

Koksovaret, a whiskered warrior of the old generation, presents the banner. With ardent fervor, he exclaims: "As I rode across the vacant steppe toward Magnitogorsk and passed the ridge of the mountain, from where the smoking forest of your furnace chimneys hove into view spreading over the rolling plain, I was filled with ecstasy. This city of 250,000 persons, this expanse of mills, factories, furnaces, have all appeared since I was last here in 1928: when, with other Bolshevik planners, I looked across a naked plain sloping away to the west from an ore-ridged mountain. I thought of how governments built fortresses to secure political fortunes, and of how we have built here an immense industrial stronghold, ribbed by iron mountains, surrounded by treeless steppe. But, the work of building is nearly over, now; as patrons of Magnitogorsk Kombinat, we we must set new tasks for you. You now face the job of maintaing pig iron production in the front ranks of world producers."

The ceremonial part of the celebration was concluded by Mueshkov, head of Magnitogorsk Kombinat, who said:

"All the duties set us by the Society of Bolshevik Veterans will be unconditionally fulfilled. Although our plan this year was larger than in 1931, we fulfilled it 106 percent by April. We now bend every effort to complete the rolling mill so that we may turn the pig iron into rails and other fabricated steel products. We plan to make many products now imported from abroad."

The ceremony of the giving of the banner is brief. The workers are awarded for a task well done, the completion of the construction of a steel plant as large as the United States Steel Corporation's plants in Gary, Ind. Those workers who have built this giant of the 5-year plan, in the past 4 years now face a new period in their collective life, a period in which they will master the huge productive equipment which they have built.

Time slips by at 12 o'clock, a new day, May Day, begins with an artistic performance. A pageant is staged portraying the history of May Day in the growth of the working-class movements. It was a Red Day of struggle, sorrow, and oppression. In pantomime the players depict the arrest of workers who distribute leaflets advertising May Day celebrations, show the raids of police on May Day picnic outings of workers held in the forests, and the shooting of workers in a street demonstration. Such was the past, but not all. For the first May Day celebration at Magnitogorsk was held 4 years ago; not a long time since that day, when the pioneer workers gathered here to celebrate May Day on the empty steppe where they were to build this roaring giant. May Day at Mangnitogorsk in 1933 is suggested by a triumphal procession of workers led by children, pioneers, and Komsomols. Youth takes the lead in this young Socialist city with its young blast furnace; youth celebrates the victory of the proletariat.

We file out the doors of the circus at 2:30 a. m., May 1. Clouds of smoke float over the city and the stars of a clear night are thinly veiled. The noise of gas exhausts and steam blowers is heard. An iridescent glow from molten metal, fired to a high temperature, lights up the outlines of the blast furnace. This child of technique, born in the womb of the 5-year plan, charges on day and night in the first flush of fiery youth, not stopping to rest or celebrate. The workers who attend it this night are paid double wages.

THE DEMONSTRATION

In no other country can one see peaceful parades of workers, marching men and women, where mere size, mere bulk of living bodies is so impressive. We, visitors, stand on the grandstand with the party leaders and the plant managers.

Along the unpaved road on the right hillside, a marching line comes swinging down, a line of people two and a half kilometers long. In the bright morning sunshine, they march and sing, men, women, children; pregnant women, women with babes in arms, youth; rarely does one see an old or crippled person.

All are young, with flushed and eager faces, with healthy, muscled bodies dressed in bright garments and sport costumes. They march in from the left across the center of the square. They come from all directions, along unpaved roads whose mud is hard-stamped by the pounding of many feet. They file by the grandstand in a line four abreast, in a steady stream for 1 hour and a quarter, a line of 90,000 persons, over one-half the population of Magnitogorsk, an assembly of the labor force which operates this great blast furnace, this mechanical tool for smelting one-third the pig iron cast in the Urals.

MANY GROUPS TAKE PART

Looking steadily into the moving stream of persons passing by in front of the grandstand, one sees banners flare up, sees the mass of people break down to individuals, till separate groups of workers are identified and hailed by those on the reviewing stand. The physical culturists in blue jerseys and dark trunks pass by with springing steps or pedaling bicycles. Next, the metal workers appear, those workers who are rushing the rolling-mill section to completion. A rousing cheer is raised for them. Then come the workers who built a dam more than a kilometer long and 10 meters high, taking only 465 days to do it or less by 3 months of the time given them to do it. The dam forms a lake 25 kilometers long; when building it, these men, working knee-deep in mud and water, and when the temperature went as low as 35 below zero, poured concrete into the dam foundations which had been heated by steam pressure.

A group of assemblers file past, the welders who, hanging onto icy scaffolds and facing a bitter winter wind that tore in from the open steppe, welded the joints for the blast furnace gas lines. Some of them had slipped off and did not march today; they were killed outright on the scrap iron cluttered about the construction. Another one of those absent today had fallen off the scaffold unnoticed by the night shift and froze to death before aid reached him in the morning. The section hands file past, builders of railroads and in their midst are the Mongolian, oval faces of the Khirghizes, nomads of the steppes of the Urals, and of Kazakstan, tribesmen of Ghenghis Khan who, caught in the enthusiasm of socialist construction, drifted to Magnitogorsk and now flow past in this demonstration of the power of the workers' government.

FOREIGN WORKERS MARCH

Here comes the American, German, Polish, Italian workers and specialists, who likewise were absorbed in the new fever of construction which goes on here and everywhere in the Soviet Union. The first-aid ambulance goes by, representatives of medical science stamping out filth and vermin, the breeders of typhus, that dread disease which raked the population of the Socialist city. Although there is a circus here also, with camels and band wagons, the children are not following it. The children are ahead, they lead the parade, they form perhaps one-third of all those marching, they come from nurseries, kindergartens, 7-year schools, factory-workshop schools, Technikums, etc.

Going by the grandstand, they proudly lift their banners, on which are inscribed their school records, exhibited for the inspection of Comrade Tarakanova of the city committee of the Communist Party. He shouts from the grandstand, "be prepared." A roar of strident voices from the marching line answers back, "Always ready."

Watching this demonstration, which lacks all suggestion of cheap exhibitionism, with ears tuned to the strains of brass bands and the steady beat of marching feet, one catches notes struck off the holiday key. A locomotive whistles on the mountain to the left; a trainload of crushed ore is ready to descend to the blast furnace. The ore crushers rumble faintly in the distance; they dig into the mountain of magnetic ore estimated to last for 40 to 70 years. The blowing of gas pipes and the signals of the skip hoist mingle with the beat of marching workers' feet. The blast furnace, a colt in years, is snorting and blowing, charging into the mountain of ore; it has a generation to smelt it down to pig iron and fabricated steel. One feels the throb of tremendous forces let loose on this prairielike parade ground. The ore will be smelted by the power of the toiling masses who march by in this seemingly inexhaustible stream of humanity.

WORLD PROLETARIAT

On the evening of May 1 the foreign workers and specialists gather with Russian comrades to celebrate International May Day. They gather in a large banquet hall, where pickled fish and cold meats are spread out beside bottles of beers and light wines. The evening is one of noise making; yet, withall, a few speeches are made and heard. An Italian specialist speaks in Italian. Although none could understand more than two words of what he said, these two words were enough to understand what he meant. He denounced the "fasciato" fiercely and pleaded for the "proletariata." When the speech was translated into English and German and Russian all were reassured that the ideas of fascism and communism are sufficiently opposed and international to have meanings above barriers of language and country.

A German worker speaks, an American, a Russian, all give a toast to International May Day and wish long life to the world proletariat. They point out that workers abroad were not free to celebrate as we do today; that the working class there is still under the heel of capitalism; while here, the proletariat is creating a new society, a new industrial order. Notes of warning are struck off. Wreckers had been discovered amidst those engaged in socialist construction. They charged all to be on their guard against the enemy abroad and within the gates; to be vigilant against those who would destroy the creations of the proletariat. The banquet ends; the music strikes up; the guests dance in hilarious fun making.

ON TO NEW YORK

Three of us go out into the cool night air. May 1 is over. It is 12 o'clock. We walk toward the glow of the blast furnace. A guard halts us. We are without passes. The Russian comrade speaks to the guard; we pass on. At the furnace, the gas exhausts thunder, deafening the ears. One cannot hear a human voice shouted within 3 inches of the ear. The molten stream of metal is pouring from the belly of the plugged giant, a stream of molten iron so hot it burns through steel columns, iron rails, concrete blocks; anything but fire clay it ignites and reduces to ashes. The furnace has been working all day, it does not sleep at night, nor do the guardians of the workers' land.

An official comes in. He lifts a telephone receiver and informs headquarters: "Today, May 1, the first shift poured 476 tons of pig iron and the second shift poured 625 tons." Over 1,000 tons of pig iron poured while the workers were on their holidays. While they rested and celebrated, the blast furnace was busy smelting, smelting a mountain of ore, and the OGPU watched how many tons it melted. We are dismissed. The blast furnace steams and smokes, blows and flames, gobbles up carloads of ore and pours out a stream of molten iron. When all four units are in operation it will melt in 1 year enough pig iron to lay a railroad track around the world or more track than existed in all Russia before the Revolution.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might this be a good place to revert just a moment to another matter which could be taken up, with Mr. Morris' permission?

If I may distract your attention from that, Mr. Wallace for——

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; go right ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to give you the opportunity to comment upon one short excerpt of your executive testimony with respect to which there might be some confusion in the face of your testimony today, and ask you to comment on it.

In executive session Mr. Morris asked:

How is it that Eleanor Lattimore came into the picture?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't really know. She came to see me, I know. She must have been speaking for someone higher up in the institute, but who I don't know, saying what a fine thing it would be to come out with my general expression of views.

Then just a couple of questions after that, Mr. Wallace, I asked you:

Could it have been Mr. Wallace, that Mrs. Lattimore was the first person to contact you about this book on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WALLACE. It could be.
Mr. SOURWINE. Had you known her before?
Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

That appears to be a conflict.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know that I knew her before. I think there must have been an error because I couldn't have said "yes," and I couldn't have been positive. It is probable I didn't know her before.

Mr. SOURWINE. That should be pointed out.

Mr. WALLACE. I think that should be corrected.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to point out the pertinency of this book to the inquiries into the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The acknowledgment here mentions Owen Lattimore, Joseph Barnes, and Harriett Moore. That has already been read.

As a result of this trip, and this book is purportedly a report on that trip, Mr. Wallace, having become a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations——

Mr. WALLACE. Did you say I became a member of the board of trustees as a result of this book?

Mr. MORRIS. As a result of the trip. Didn't you say, Mr. Wallace, that you supposed because of the fact you were taking this trip the institute had asked you to become a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; that is what I said. Possibly it is stating it a little too bluntly. Should we say because of my sudden emergence because of the trip I had begun to appear in their eyes as someone that would be good to have on the board of trustees.

I also testified in executive session, you may remember, that Edward Carter had asked me to go to a meeting of the institute in 1929 in Japan. So perhaps it was not exclusively as a result of the trip, because Edward Carter had felt that I was an appropriate person to be connected with the institute for a number of years, apparently.

It goes back as early as 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. Also, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wallace, I would like to point out, has asked for this hearing today principally because of some testimony concerning the trip of which this book is a report.

Mr. WALLACE. However, this book is a report not of the section concerning which I asked to be heard. This book is a report of the trip through Soviet Asia and the part which has been brought up before this committee has to do with my trip in China. The book says very little about the trip to China.

Senator SMITH. Have you finished, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. I was making the point that I am not coming here as a result of what I am writing, what is written in this book on the mission to Soviet Asia. My appearance before the committee is because of certain statements that have been made with regard to my trip to China, not with regard to my trip to Soviet Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. I do not think your testimony restricted your trip to China. We are talking about the fact that there were Communists guiding you on your trip. I do not think the testimony restricted any part of the trip.

I think it referred to the whole trip.

Mr. WALLACE. I have not had the advantage of going over the testimony in detail. I had my counsel consult the record to get certain points, to get as much as they could in the short space of time available.

So I am not familiar with your full record.

Mr. MORRIS. You purported to quote from the testimony of one of the witnesses concerning this trip.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I got from the newspapers a certain amount of the testimony, but it seemed to have to do with China rather than with my trip to Soviet Asia.

That was the part I had.

Senator SMITH. Can we not have the understanding that if, upon further examination of the record, there is anything in there that Mr. Wallace wishes to testify about, that he will be given an opportunity to do so?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read certain portions of that book that we have decided to put into the record today?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from Soviet Asia Mission, by Henry A. Wallace, published in 1946, page 117.

Mr. WALLACE. On the front it is by Henry A. Wallace "with the collaboration of Andrew J. Steiger." That is the way it appears here, if you will notice.

Mr. MANDEL. The portion reads:

The spirit and meaning of life in Siberia today is certainly not to be compared to that of the old exile days.

Mr. MORRIS. What page is that?

Mr. MANDEL. Page 117. [Reading:]

Before 1900 one foreign gentleman of respected nationality visited Siberia and returned to the Western World converted to the benefits of the Czarist system of exile. The political prisoners, he maintained, were a shiftless lot of vagabonds who, to avoid the righteous discipline of hard work, fled into the woods where they did nothing but rest. (Stalin escaped from exile seven times.) The Russians generally, this gentleman felt, were a lazy people without enough seichas in them. Even in the Siberian mines he found this true; the convicts loafed in chains. To his way of thinking Czarism was too soft in its treatment. The convicts should be forced to work harder. To be whipped was good for their erring souls, the reverend gentleman said. The people of Siberia today are a hearty, vigorous race, but not because they are whipped into submission. The only whip driving them is the necessity to master a vast new land. In the past all of Russia, not just the miserable convicts in Siberia, was beaten time and again as Stalin has never ceased saying, by its economic and political backwardness, by being 50 years behind the times. The need to catch up with the advanced industrial nations is the force behind the great stirring movement among all the people of today's Soviet Asia. Awareness of that need is what makes them work so hard. But they also know how to laugh and play and sing, as we learned during our leisure hours among them.

Mr. WALLACE. Could I comment seriatim instead of having a lot of it piled up?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE. I may say, so far as I know, this was written by Andrew Steiger. He was the one who used the phrase "seichas," continually. He used it in several places in the book. Just what precisely the translation of "seichas" is, I don't know. It is a very clear indication to me that Andrew Steiger wrote this as he did practically all of the book.

I may say, to me when I read the book over, as I read it over on the job in the Pacific that this reflected the situation as I saw it when I was there.

I may say that the book by Elinor Lipper, I have no doubt is substantially correct.

Incidentally, I may say the original book in German is a much fairer book, so far as I am concerned, than the translation into English. I have had that checked.

With regard to slave-labor camps in Magadan, she calls it Potemkin Village in the German, which is the correct name. She does not indicate anyway in which I could have known that there was slave labor at Magadan.

My object on the trip in conformity with the spirit indicated by Secretary Stimson was to promulgate the maximum of friendship and the maximum of war effort on the part of the Russians.

I was not going out of my way to find slave labor, even if I had thought there was slave labor there at that time. There was no evidence that I could see slave labor at Magadan where Elinor Lipper was. I do not question the accuracy of Elinor Lipper's testimony.

There is no question whatever but what the Russians did everything they could to impress the Vice President of the Nation which had helped them save their lives, as in fact, we had by our many billion dollars of lend-lease. They were going all out to impress me.

I don't know to what extent they saw that at every stage of the road there were people present who could convey this kind of impression, but they did wherever I was.

I visited experiment station after experiment station, and collective farm after collective farm. Always it created a favorable and a free impression that—well, Willkie testified in exactly the same way that they were a pioneer people just like the kind of people he had known in the Middle West back in the time of his boyhood; that Mike Cowles, who accompanied Wendell Willkie, testified they were a magnificent pioneer race.

So this statement of Andrew Steiger is not necessarily the exclusive possession as of 1944 of Communists. This attitude is not necessarily the exclusive possession of Communists because you know from talking with Willkie and Mike Cowles on their return that they had an attitude very similar to that.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else was with them?

Mr. WALLACE. Joe Barnes was with them. It may be Joe Barnes politically and utterly subverted Wendell Willkie. There is always that possibility. I don't think we ought to agree to that offhand.

Mr. MORRIS. You made reference to Elinor Lipper's book. I would like to read into the record that portion of a book that relates to your trip to Magadan.

Mr. WALLACE. I might say that after you introduce that, I would like to introduce into the record an article in the Catholic Digest that it printed in justice to me with regard to Elinor Lipper, the Catholic Digest of October. It is up at the farm. I would like to get it to you to introduce.

I see that I have a copy here. I can turn it over to the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the portions designated in that extract of the Lipper book?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from a reprint from the Reader's Digest of June 1951 from an article entitled "Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps," a condensation from the book by Elinor Lipper. I read from pages 12 and 13:

No other visit ever aroused so much excitement as Henry Wallace's visit to Kolyma during the war. Some time before, a persistent rumor warmed the

souls of the freezing prisoners; in return for help in the war, the Soviet Union was going to cede Kolyma to the United States. Even the soberest and most reasonable of the prisoners conceded the possibility, and long discussions were held as to whether the prisoners would also be turned over to America. It was a typical prisoners' fairy tale, as absurd as it was tenacious. And it received a tremendous stimulus when news came of the impending visit of the American Vice President.

The NKVD carried off its job with flying colors—Mr. Wallace saw nothing at all of this frozen hell with its hundreds of thousands of the damned. In honor of Mr. Wallace the wooden watchtowers were razed in a single night. Every one of the thousand prisoners in the camp at the port of Magadan at the time owed Mr. Wallace a debt of gratitude. For it was owing to his visit that for the first and last time the prisoners had three successive holidays. During his stay, not a single prisoner was allowed to leave the camp.

This was not enough. Although the route for Mr. Wallace and his suite was carefully prepared in advance, there was still the possibility that by mischance the visitor would catch sight of the prisoners in the camp yard—which would not have been an edifying spectacle. Therefore, on orders from above, movies were shown to the prisoners from morning till night for 3 days. No prisoners went walking in the yard.

Then further, I read:

Mr. Wallace was also gratified to note the rich assortment of Russian merchandise in the shop windows of Magadan. He made a point of going into a store to examine the Russian products. But the citizenry of Magadan were even more amazed than Mr. Wallace at the Russian goods that appeared overnight in the shop windows, because for the past 2 years all the—strictly rationed—goods which could be bought had been of American origin.

Then further:

In his book Soviet Asia Mission, Mr. Wallace speaks with admiration of the mushroom growth of Magadan; he does not say—or does not know—that this city was built solely by prisoners working under inhuman conditions. He also admires the 350-mile Kolyma Road that runs from the port northward over the mountains; he does not say—or does not know—that tens of thousands of prisoners had given their lives in building it.

Mr. Wallace says that NKVD Camp Commander Ivan Nikishov "gamboled about, enjoying the wonderful air immensely." It is too bad that Wallace never saw him "gamboling about" on one of his drunken rages around the prison camps; raining filthy, savage language upon the heads of the exhausted starving prisoners; having them locked up in solitary confinement for no offense whatsoever.

Further:

In the party accompanying Mr. Wallace was Dr. Owen Lattimore, who represented the Office of War Information.

An article New Road to Asia, written by Dr. Lattimore, was published several months after his return in the National Geographic Magazine (December 1944). In it Dr. Lattimore says:

"Political oppression under the czars——

Mr. WALLACE. Could I interrupt to ask you if it is really pertinent to read that about Lattimore?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, it is.

Senator SMITH. We will see in a minute.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

"Political oppression under the czars was so harsh that the mildest liberals were often sent into distant exile. For this reason university professors, doctors, and scientists and intellectuals of all kinds were among the earliest exile prisoners of Siberia."

If Dr. Lattimore was really interested in political oppression, why did he not inspect the hundreds of camps in Kolyma where contemporary "pioneers of Siberia" are starving to death? Why did he not ask the present-day "intellectuals of all kinds" why they are being physically and mentally crushed in the gold mines of Kolyma? Nowhere on the face of the earth is there a country

like Kolyma, where the entire population is made up of victims of political oppression.

Senator SMITH. Who wrote that?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a condensation from a book by Elinor Lipper. We have the book. It is entitled "Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps."

Senator SMITH. She was an inmate?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. She wrote that after?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. After reading Mr. Wallace's book?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. She is now in this country.

Senator SMITH. We are not going to charge her statements in there against Mr. Wallace, are we? What has that got to do with this particular inquiry?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wallace has asked to testify concerning the fact that Communists guided him on his trip through Asia and China. This is one episode in Mr. Wallace's trip through Asia. It bears on that point.

Senator SMITH. I was thinking that might be comparable to one of us being conducted through one of the Federal prison camps. Certainly the keepers of the prison would not show us the disagreeable things—those things they would not want us to see.

Mr. WALLACE. I think it is right to have this in the record, provided I am allowed to make a comment.

Senator SMITH. Certainly. I am trying to get the connection of her statement with this hearing.

Mr. WALLACE. I am glad to have it in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we should have that last section more fully, the part about Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MANDEL. I read from page 114 of the book, "Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps", by Elinor Lipper, entitled "Owen Lattimore's Report":

> An article New Road to Asia, written by Dr. Lattimore, was published several months after his return in the National Geographic Magazine, December 1944, pages 641 to 676. If his report to the Office of War Information was in substance the same as this article, the Office could scarcely have profited by his work. Since it cannot be assumed that Lattimore is naturally a poor observer, he must on this trip have voluntarily refrained from making use of his talent for observation. Instead of telling us what he has seen, he hands out unexamined Soviet propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. This, Mr. Chairman, bears on whether or not on this trip Mr. Wallace was subjected to Communist influence.

Senator SMITH. This woman is not sworn here. She had not been brought here to testify where she got this information.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a narrative of her experiences in the camp.

Senator SMITH. It is unsworn. If it is of any probative value at all, and I have not seen where it is—maybe it does have some relationship—should we not have the woman sworn rather than taking her unsupported statement?

Mr. MORRIS. We called her yesterday and asked if necessary would she be available for testimony. Actually the International Relief Committee now is taking her around the country. They have protested our calling her.

If you so direct, I will send a subpena to her and have her come in.

Senator SMITH. They are going to take her around and show her the good parts.

If Mr. Wallace has no objection and wants to answer, he may.

Mr. MORRIS. If Mr. Wallace thinks it is necessary, we will have her come in.

Mr. WALLACE. I do not think it is necessary to have her come in. I do not question the accuracy of what she testified.

There is only one point and that was not read, the accuracy of which I would question. That is where she says I was deceived by certain of the people on a hog farm. I know something about hogs and I do not think Mrs. Lipper was there at the hog farm. I think she is a little bit outside her field of competence on that.

Aside from that I don't have any reason to doubt her testimony.

Senator SMITH. She is trying to hit you on your strong point.

Mr. WALLACE. The point I wanted to make was there was an article on page 44 of the Catholic Digest of last July which in the way it was handled indicated that I should have been able to see the evidence of slave labor at Magadan. It was essentially the same article that appeared in the Reader's Digest, but there was some caption that indicated I should have been able to see what was going on.

I went around out West to see Father Bussard who published the Catholic Digest at St. Paul and talked with him. I found him a very fine gentleman. He agreed to publish my statement and indicated that he himself had been at Buchenwald before World War came and it was all remarkably sanitary and fine and there was no way to tell at that time what it was later to be.

It was one of the German concentration camps. He was in complete sympathy with what I had said. This is what he printed on page 44 of the October issue of the Catholic Digest, headed, "Henry Wallace states the facts." [Reading:]

(The article, Wallace in Sovietland, in the July Catholic Digest, p. 46, implied that the slave-labor camps should have been recognized by the American party that visited it. This note from Mr. Wallace explains why it was not.—Ed.)

There was not the slightest evidence of a slave-labor camp at Magadan when I was there in May of 1944. Elinor Lipper is very careful to avoid saying that I saw or could have seen any evidence of a slave-labor camp. I am sure that the editors of the Catholic Digest could not have seen any evidence of a slave-labor camp if they had been in our party.

I went to Magadan on my way to China in 1944 because John Hazard, liaison officer of the Division of Soviet Supply in Lend-Lease, wanted to see how it was being handled. Hazard spoke Russian, and we went together to the warehouses and docks to see how the material was being handled. Undoubtedly the Russians went all out to make a favorable impression on the Vice President of the Nation which had supplied them with so many billions of dollars of vital goods in their hour of greatest need.

Owen Lattimore was not a member of my personal staff. He was selected and sent with us by Elmer Davis to represent the Office of War Information.

In those days, Roosevelt, not knowing whether the atom bomb would go off and not knowing whether the second front in France would be a success, was gravely concerned as to what would happen to our long-time, over-all strategy if Russo-Jap hostilities broke out before Germany was defeated. My purpose in visiting China via Soviet Asia in 1944 was to win the war against Germany and Japan and not to engage in espionage nor investigate slave-labor camps. It was not until long afterward that testimony began to pile up from those who had formerly been in these camps. It now seems to be clear that the Soviets treat political prisoners in a severer way than the czarist regime.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any questions in connection with Mr. Wallace's trip, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a few questions in connection with the trip. They do not have anything to do with Magadan.

How long before May 20 when you left did you know you were going to go?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say it would be early March that I learned that I was going to go.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew you were going to go before you were approached with regard to this pamphlet?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, definitely.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned the name of Joe Barnes a moment ago and his presence with Mr. Willkie on his trip around the world.

I believe in executive session you testified that you had seen Mr. Barnes only two or three times between the time of his return from the Willkie trip and the time when he visited you just before you left on your trip.

Mr. WALLACE. That would be my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Barnes was not a close friend of yours?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us why Mr. Barnes visited you just before you left on your trip?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember. The only thing I remember about it was we spent our time talking about Alaska. That was because he had brought in the general who had constructed the Alcan Highway in Alaska. I have forgotten his name. The general had left with me the diary of the man who had built the telegraph line in 1866 or thereabouts across Alaska and also in Soviet Asia with the idea that they were going to get communications across that way instead of by the under-water cable that was a little later laid.

His contact with me at that time was with regard to Alaska, which he knew was a passion with me, that I felt it was vital we get Alaska filled up with people as fast as we could.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Barnes' visit, then, did not have anything to do with your forthcoming mission?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I can't say that positively. I have no recollection of anything except Alaska with regard to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified in executive session, did you not, that you saw Mr. Lattimore in connection with your China mission in April 1944?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I think I must have seen him in April 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time did you know he was going with you?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know when I learned. I know very early in the game President Roosevelt suggested he was a great expert on that long boundary line and the way in which the tribes had operated back and forth across that line would likely affect the future peace of the world. He thought Lattimore was a great expert in that field. I am sure Roosevelt suggested Lattimore's coming with me, that he was the first. I am sure he was the first to suggest that Lattimore go with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was, you think, perhaps as early as April or before that time?

Mr. WALLACE. I would think it would be some time in April. It might have been in March. He was very keen about Lattimore going.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore's contact with you in 1944, then, which you testified, was his first contact since 1941 and was a renewal in contemplation of the trip you were to make together?

Mr. WALLACE. Of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any other Institute of Pacific Relations people who came along to see you about that time?

Mr. WALLACE. I was not acquainted with the group aside from Edward Carter and one contact with Owen Lattimore, then the contact with Mrs. Lattimore.

I do not know that I could name any others I knew at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew Mrs. Lattimore was IPR, of course?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Lattimore was IPR?

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't think of him in that connection. I couldn't say positively I knew he was IPR at that time. It would seem to me in retrospect I ought to have known and possibly did know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Barnes was connected?

Mr. WALLACE. No, until you stated in executive session.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is your testimony now you do not recall any other persons who came to see you about that time whom you knew to be connected with the IPR?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I can't remember a single point.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there are several other extracts I would like to have read at this time and one in particular I should like to have Mr. Wallace answer some questions on.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. I read from page 142 of the same book, Soviet Asia Mission. These are excerpts from an address on June 15, 1944.

Preceding that, we find that it says in printing this talk the Soviet press noted that the audience followed it with rapt attention and greeted the concluding words with prolonged applause. The speech says, in part:

> Under Marshal Stalin's wise leadership and inspired by the patriotic will to improve the life of the homeland the multinational Soviet peoples have shown that for them nothing is impossible. For a long time the world has known of their high morale and democratic aspirations. In your land you have cherished science, literature, and art, raising them to unrivaled heights, and the great men you respect belong to all humanity.

Mr. WALLACE. Please continue to read the next paragraph, if you will.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

> People everywhere in the world honor Mendeleyev, Machnikov, Pushkin, Leo Tolstoy, Glinka, Moussorgsky, Tschaikovsky.

I might say these are all non-Soviet writers and artists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the book from which you are reading?

Mr. MANDEL. I am reading from Soviet Asia Mission, by Henry A. Wallace and Andrew J. Steiger.

Mr. WALLACE. Page 142.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

I read now from page 147 of the same book.

> ALMA-ATA, June 19 (Tass).—The Vice President of the United States of America released the following statement for publication in the press:
>
> "On my departure from your hospitable country, I want to express my hearty thanks for the cordial reception shown me everywhere. I am especially grateful for the thoughtful courtesy shown by S. A. Goglidze, representing the Khabarovsk Territorial Executive Committee; by L. A. Malinin, representing the Novo-

Sibirsk *oblast* Executive Committee; by A. Z. Kobulov, representing the Uzbek Government, and by D. S. Chuvakhin and G. G. Dolbin, representing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that part about the toast that Mr. Goglidze proposed?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE. Shall we clean this up first?

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead.

Mr. WALLACE. These are extracts from speeches I made with the object of cultivating the greatest possible friendship with the Russian people in order to get them to put forth the greatest magnitude of war effort. They had been pushed back so far in European Russia that it was especially important to strengthen the morale in Asiatic Russia.

I was going all out to do that in the kind of language which they understand, which is a very extravagant kind of language. That is exactly what I was doing here. I don't think there is any other comment necessary except it was completely in line, except what I thought was necessary for the war effort.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the date of that release?

Mr. WALLACE. The date of the release——

Mr. MANDEL. June 19, 1944.

Mr. WALLACE. Shall we go to the other one now?

Mr. MANDEL. On page 172 of the same book:

One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast to the modernization of China. Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify who Goglidze is?

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Goglidze was the head of the whole far-eastern area. He was a Georgian who was said to be a close friend of Stalin. I do not know that there is anything further to say about him except he was the top man in that part of the world.

Senator FERGUSON. A Communist?

Mr. WALLACE. I did not conduct an investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. You assumed that? I did not ask you whether you conducted an investigation.

Mr. WALLACE. I assumed everyone with me was a devoted Communist in the very highest graces with the Politburo.

Senator SMITH. That Georgian you were talking about was Georgia, Russia, and not Georgia south of Carolina.

Mr. WALLACE. Maybe for purposes of the record, if you do not object to these interpolations, that everybody designated by the Russian Foreign Office to come with me must have been not merely a Communist but a man whom they had double checked as being the very best kind of a person to send with me.

Senator FERGUSON. For propaganda purposes?

Mr. WALLACE. For all purposes. One for this, one for that and the other. That is to be expected.

When any man goes to any foreign nation you expect that.

Senator SMITH. Just like we would send good Democrats if we wanted to show off here to some stranger.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification: "May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese militarism, China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John

Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future.

Then, on the next page, 173, I read one more excerpt. The future of Japan was the topic of discussion which John Carter Vincent wants initiated.

"What should be done with Japan after the war?" he asked.

"The same as with Germany," one Russian present replied.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Wallace, do you consider this toast of sufficient importance that you must have made a memorandum of it at the time that it was made?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

I may say that insofar as I can find in my memorandum the word "significant" was not mine. It was Steiger's.

Senator FERGUSON. You approved the script, and outside the word "significant"——

Mr. WALLACE. They were not in my notes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were impressed at the time this Russian was proposing a toast?

Mr. WALLACE. I may say Goglidze made three or four other toasts, one to me, one to Roosevelt, and they went the rounds. It was one of those regular Russian situations where you toast everybody under the sun.

Senator FERGUSON. That is to enable you to consume the vodka?

Mr. WALLACE. I had begged off on that, I may say.

Mr. SOURWINE. In line with Senator Ferguson may I read two questions of the executive testimony and ask Mr. Wallace to reaffirm them here?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This episode had been discussed and Mr. Morris said to the witness: "Can you recall that episode?"

Mr. Wallace had stated:

I am sure this is taken directly. I am sure Goglidze gave just exactly that toast.

Mr. Morris said:

That quotation is from notes you gave Steiger?
Mr. WALLACE. It must have been.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the episode?
Senator FERGUSON. It happened, did it not?
Mr. WALLACE. Yes; it happened.

Mr. WALLACE. That is all quite accurate. I did not put on the word "significant."

Senator FERGUSON. It impressed you this Russian Communist was toasting these two men in relation to their work?

Mr. WALLACE. As he did everybody else.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not then put in your book the other toasts?

Mr. WALLACE. Because I didn't know about this hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the only reason? Do you think if you thought there would have been a hearing here you would have put the other toasts in?

Mr. WALLACE. I think in all fairness—I would say the other toasts ought to have been put in. If it were going to be a documentary affair, the whole thing should have been included.

There were a vast number.

Incidentally, Goglidze did this very subversive thing. He toasted the reelection of Roosevelt. It was a terrible kind of thing to do, but he toasted his reelection.

Senator FERGUSON. I do think there is some significance to this particular toast. Here was a man in Russia that was toasting men in relation to their work in China. I am going to ask you whether or not he included in the toast that he proposed for you anything about your work in China?

Mr. WALLACE. I do not remember that he included about my work in China. I think his toast to me was: "May Mr. Wallace come to Moscow after the war."

I came back with, "May you come to Washington after the war."

Mr. MORRIS. Was that selection of the toast for the book your selection or Steiger's selection?

Mr. WALLACE. Steiger's. It was not my selection.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I offer, as we have before, a short quotation from the executive testimony?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was addressed to you, Mr. Wallace:

Did you transcribe in your notes the text of all the toasts, 20 or 30 toasts given that evening?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

You were selective about it and you put this one in your notes so it must have impressed you at the time as being of some significance?

Mr. WALLACE. It must have.

Mr. WALLACE. There were several other toasts I put into my notes.

Mr. MORRIS. You agree this was the significant one?

Mr. WALLACE. Steiger thought so.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you agree you also thought it was significant on the basis of what Mr. Sourwine just read?

Mr. WALLACE. That is neither here nor there because I have verified there were other toasts.

I wasn't positive at that time. There were other toasts.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, do you know what was meant by the expression "on whom rests great responsibility for China's future"?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't read his mind.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not know what he meant?

Mr. WALLACE. Of course not. Who knows what anybody means at one of these toasting affairs?

Mr. MORRIS. You testified that was a significant toast.

Mr. WALLACE. It is significant that Steiger selected it. That is the significant thing, and that he put the word "significant" in. I think that is significant. What it proves, I don't know.

Senator JENNER. I would like to have the executive hearings read on this whole thing about the toast, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. If you could tell at what hour of the evening these toasts were given, that might give some insight, too.

Senator JENNER. The first part you read, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. WALLACE. I will venture to say I was the only one there that would remember.

Senator SMITH. Let him read that part.

Mr. SOURWINE. I read from page 40 of the executive hearings:

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, there is just one point I would like to ask you about in this work. On page 172 you make reference here to a dinner at which Mr.

Goglidze, an intimate friend of Stalin, offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."

Can you recall that episode?

Mr. WALLACE. I am sure this is taken directly. I am sure that Goglidze gave just exactly that toast.

Mr. MORRIS. That quotation is from notes you gave Steiger?

Mr. WALLACE. It must have been.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the episode itself?

Senator FERGUSON. It happened, did it not?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; it happened.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall anything more about it?

Mr. WALLACE. As I remember it, we had been in China and we were trying to get back to the United States as fast as we could. We had to go through Soviet Asia to get back. The moment we touched Soviet Asia a Russian had to be aboard. They wouldn't allow an American plane to go across there without a Russian aboard. Also, they wanted to bid us farewell. They had accompanied us as we had gone across Soviet Asia. That is described here in this book.

Now we were leaving and this was a sort of farewell, bidding farewell, and Goglidze gave this toast.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a friend of Lattimore and Vincent?

Mr. WALLACE. He was.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know whether he was a prior friend?

Mr. WALLACE. That is not a complete transcript of what I said. The stenographer must have failed to take down part of what I said.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to add something?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I remember this quite clearly. Maybe you get it from an expression in the words, but I know you have the inference very strongly when you spoke that Vincent and/or Lattimore must have known Goglidze before. Maybe that appears subsequent in the testimony. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you told us that before.

Mr. WALLACE. I said no, I did not mean that he had known them before. There is no indication whatsoever that Goglidze had known them before. Perhaps that is covered later.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Senator JENNER. Let him testify and we will go ahead with the record.

Mr. WALLACE. I just merely wanted to say there was no evidence whatsoever they were friends except insofar as when you travel in the same plane for some time you naturally engage in friendship as anyone would in the give-and-take conversation.

If you do not mind my continuing with this, I would say it was very natural. When I was going through Soviet Asia I was relying continuously on John Hazard, and paying no attention to either Owen Lattimore or John Carter Vincent. When I was going through China, going along the border—we came across Sinkiang—I was paying a great deal of attention to Owen Lattimore. I looked on him as an expert.

As we went further, it was John Carter Vincent.

As far as the Russians were concerned, Lattimore and John Carter Vincent were with me to handle Chinese matters. It was altogether appropriate I should look on them as Chinese experts.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, there was no indication he had known them prior to the time that you met?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, anything that he was saying about them was in prior knowledge, because nothing happened at the meeting which would indicate that he would use this language?

Mr. WALLACE. There is no indication whatever that either Lattimore or Vincent had known Goglidze prior to the time of my trip.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Sourwine, resume, if you will, please.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace was speaking:

Now we were leaving and this was a sort of farewell, bidding farewell, and Goglidze gave this toast.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a friend of Lattimore and Vincent?

Mr. WALLACE. He was.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know whether he was a prior friend?

Mr. WALLACE. It is possible.

Mr. WALLACE. Did I say that?

Senator JENNER. Let's hear the record, and then you can talk.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Senator FERGUSON. Did he include you in the toast?

Mr. WALLACE. In all of these Russian dinners they give about 30 toasts. I am sure he must have given me a toast as well.

Senator FERGUSON. It appears that he joined these two in a significant toast. I wondered how he left you out of that significant one.

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say.

Senator FERGUSON. That indicated to me that he was a friend of theirs, that he had known them before.

Mr. WALLACE. The preceding part there, I am sure, is Steiger's phraseology, that is the introduction to that I am sure is Steiger's.

As I say, I didn't write any of this book except the agricultural part and a little of the introductory passages. So that while this, I am sure, took place as described, I suspect the whole truth would indicate there were many other toasts. I may not have mentioned them to Steiger, but I know this one took place.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask one thing. This toast was "on whom rests great responsibility for China's future." What did Lattimore have to do with the future of China?

Mr. WALLACE. Let me tell you about Lattimore, so far as I could observe him on this trip. He was spending all his time in the plane sweating excessively, and he sweats very easily, and reading Chinese classics out of which occasionally he would read something, and when we were over ground we went over parts where he had walked on foot, he would tell us about that.

When there would be a museum he was always on hand with the archeologist.

He was looked on as a very great expert in the history of China and the relationship of the Chinese tribes with the Chinese agriculturalists. He may have been looked on by Goglidze as a man of far greater importance than he was on the trip. I don't know as to that, but Lattimore did speak a little Russian and Goglidze might have felt a little closer to Lattimore on that account.

I think probably you are reading more into that than is warranted.

Mr. MORRIS. You have to concede, Mr. Wallace, that Goglidze did consider him an important person?

Mr. WALLACE. This toast would indicate it.

Mr. MORRIS. And a person on whom rested the responsibility of China?

Mr. WALLACE. That may be what Goglidze believed, but Goglidze believed a lot of things, as Russians often do.

I do want to make this completely clear. I am not appearing here on behalf of any person or any organization or any party. I am not associated with any person or party or organization, and I have no intention of becoming associated with any. I think that ought to be very clear, that I am not here to defend anybody and I am not here to criticize anybody or any organization or party.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Wallace, at the time that toast was given you did not give it any particular significance?

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't; no. I don't know why Steiger picked it up out of my notes.

Senator JENNER. In the light of recent events, how would you interpret that toast, rather accurate or not?

Mr. WALLACE. So far as I know, Lattimore had no particular—I just don't know about recent developments. I haven't had the benefit of your hearings. I haven't asked for any in regard of me. I don't know what the hearings showed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you transcribe into your notes the text of all the toasts, 20 or 30 toasts, given that evening?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were selective about it and you put this one in your notes, so it must have impressed you at the time as being of some significance?

Mr. WALLACE. It must have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, in connection with our testimony here, the testimony of Mr. Budenz, you released a report you had given to President Roosevelt some time back.

Then he went on to another matter.

Mr. WALLACE. I think that is substantially accurate.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, shall we go on, or shall we have a break?

Senator SMITH. Let us go on for a while.

Mr. WALLACE. I would like to clean it up before lunch.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, did you make a report to President Roosevelt after you returned from this trip?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. If you are starting on that, could I read this statement? This gives it more or less seriatim.

Mr. MORRIS. I would rather you answer the questions if the chairman will agree.

Senator SMITH. You can ask the question and if Mr. Wallace wants to put this in, he can.

Mr. WALLACE. I did receive some assurance from the chairman in regard to reading this statement.

Senator SMITH. He wants to ask some specific questions first.

Mr. WALLACE. I made a report face to face with President Roosevelt on July 10, 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make a prior report?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; a cable prepared in Kunming in June 26, 1944, and flown over the Hump and then sent by cable from New Delhi on June 28, 1944, to President Roosevelt.

Mr. MORRIS. Were these classified reports?

Mr. WALLACE. The one that was sent by cable was classified simply because it had been sent over the air. I think it had top secret, or something like that, on the top. I did not get the text finally until sometime in August 1944.

That particular document I sent to President Truman. It has the date of the receipt and the various things at the top.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you sent that from Kunming?

Mr. WALLACE. That was prepared in Kunming and taken from Kunming—probably it was prepared in Kunming on the twenty-sixth and was sent from New Delhi on the 28th of June 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you send it from New Delhi and not from Kunming?

Mr. WALLACE. You could not.

Mr. MORRIS. Why?

Mr. WALLACE. You couldn't get it to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. There was no transmission facility?

Mr. WALLACE. That was the Army's judgment as to the best way to get it.

Mr. MORRIS. So you say the Kunming cables were classified but the report to the President was not?

Mr. WALLACE. That was my own document. I would have been the one who would have classified it. I do not have any marking on it saying that it was classified. It was a confidential report. I had been sent as a Presidential emissary. I did look on it as a secret document. I did not actually mark it as such, although I was Vice President of the United States.

I was not doing that kind of thing. This was a very special report directly to President Roosevelt. I looked on it as a secret document. It was not released and apparently not sent by President Roosevelt to the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. This was July 10?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first release it?

Mr. WALLACE. Senator O'Conor wrote me in December of 1949 asking for a copy of this. Apparently there had been some agitation going on about the report. I do not think he mentioned the agitation, but he just asked for it. I promptly mailed it to him in December 1949.

Then the agitation became stronger.

I think Senator Ferguson referred to a report which he understood was in the War Department. As a result the reporters called me and asked did I know anything about such a report. I said yes, I had sent such a report to Senator O'Conor and they could doubtless get it from him.

Then the report was published.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony that the report was made public for the first time in December 1949 when you released it?

Mr. WALLACE. It was not actually made public at that time. It was sent to Senator O'Conor at that time, in December 1949. I did make some comment when the white paper came out expressing surprise that my report was not included.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you make that comment? Is there a record of that?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know. I expressed it to some newspapermen. I think it was printed somewhere in the press rather inconspicuously.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of a publication called the Far East Spotlight, which is published by the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record a citation by the Attorney General showing that the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy is a subversive organization and Far East Spotlight is the publication of that committee.

I would like to call Mr. Wallace's attention to a copy of this publication date July–September 1949. On page 5 of that publication, Mr. Wallace, there is an article by you in which you quote rather extensively from the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, that is an article which purports to be by Mr. Wallace as far as this record shows now. It has not been established as yet as by him.

Senator SMITH. Let Mr. Wallace see that.

Mr. WALLACE. I can say this: I don't remember ever preparing any article of this sort. Maybe some reporter came in and asked me the questions that are listed. These are the views I held in 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean that is something done without your authorization?

Mr. WALLACE. It sounds to me like some reporter came in and asked me questions. That is what it sounds like.

Mr. MORRIS. It is what professes to be your by line.

Mr. WALLACE. It is put in the form of questions. "Question," and then "Mr. Wallace." It sounds like some reporter had either mailed in a series of questions or had come in for an interview and I had dictated it to him.

Mr. MORRIS. It could have been a Communist reporter?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't have the slightest idea.

Mr. MORRIS. You will note in your answer to the first question you quoted extensively from this report we have been discussing.

Mr. WALLACE. I quote a few sentences from it. I don't know whether this is before or after the white paper. Yes, it is after.

I had expressed already, I may say, somewhere in the press, the regret that the white paper had not included my report, and I think had substantially used these same sentences elsewhere.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified you did not release this report until December 1949. This is a publication, a Communist publication, July–September 1949 and it quotes extracts from your report.

Mr. WALLACE. The extracts they quote are this:

Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution and it now seems more likely the latter.

That is the only quotation from the report. I think that I did give substantially this quotation elsewhere in the press. That is my recollection, that I think I expressed a question mark as to why the State Department had not included. That is the extent of the quotation.

I think you must admit it is not a very extensive quotation from my report.

Mr. MORRIS. It was made available to the Communist publication.

Mr. BALL. I would like to call attention that quotation is from the July 10 report which is the one Mr. Wallace made directly to the President and which he has testified he did not classify.

Mr. MORRIS. I think the record will show that. It has been clear all along.

Mr. WALLACE. Could I say this: To the best of my knowledge this is the first time I ever saw this publication; to the best of my knowledge I knew nothing about the antecedents of the man nor the organization that asked me those questions.

I can say this is the kind of thing I would be saying at this time if I were asked the questions.

Mr. MORRIS. You have written other articles for that publication?

Mr. WALLACE. Not that I know of. I have no awareness of it whatsoever. It is the first time I ever saw the publication.

Mr. MORRIS. There is the Spotlight for April 1948, Mr. Wallace. They print your statement there in its entirety.

Mr. WALLACE. I was never aware of writing for this publication. This publication to which you call my attention has a heading "The following statement was issued by Henry Wallace through the National Wallace for President Committee in New York on February 23, 1948." It is quite possible this other series of questions was prepared by somebody else and issued generally and only printed by this organization.

Mr. MORRIS. The Spotlight of December 1949, January 1950, on its masthead, lists you as a recent contributor.

Mr. WALLACE. I suppose they are referring to this; I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. At least they considered it a contribution.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know a thing about it.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that masthead in the record.

Senator SMITH. Let Mr. Wallace examine it first.

Mr. WALLACE. Have you been able to find in going over the issues of the Spotlight as to whether there is any other communication that purports to be from me?

Mr. MORRIS. We will do that. The record will show the result.

Mr. WALLACE. I assume you must be referring back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you offer for the record that first volume of the Spotlight which you discussed?

Mr. WALLACE. Somebody offered it, I think.

Senator JENNER. It has not gone in.

Senator SMITH. You want this to go in also?

Mr. MORRIS Yes.

Senator SMITH. All right, without objection they will be made part of the record.

(Documents referred to were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 339 and 340," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 339

WHAT NEXT IN ASIA?

(By Henry A. Wallace)

(The leader of the Progressive Party, who as Vice President of the United States headed a special mission sent to China by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944, answers three questions by Spotlight. He evaluates the white paper, sketches future possibilities, and recommends democratic policy goals with regard to China and the rest of Asia.)

Question.—The State Department's white paper on China says repeatedly, in reports dating back to 1944, that the Chiang Kai-shek government has been corrupt and unwanted by the Chinese people. It also concedes that the Communists have brought "modern dynamic, popular government." Secretary of State Acheson's letter of presentation says "nonetheless we continued, for obvious reasons, to direct all aid to the Central (Chiang) Government" and intimates that future United States policy will be directed toward the overthrow of the new coalition government about to be formed in China. What accounts for this contradiction?

Mr. WALLACE. As long as the administration and the bipartisan leaders of our foreign policy are obsessed by hatred of Soviet Russia and determined to pursue the cold war they will always find themselves in the contradiction you point out. In the name of supporting and extending democracy, we have consistently supported antidemocratic governments. In the name of opposing interference in the internal affairs of nations, we have consistently interfered ourselves.

After I visited China in 1944, I reported to President Roosevelt: "Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter." Everyone who knew anything about China knew this.

Mr. Acheson admits that what has happened was inevitable because of the corruption, the backwardness, the reactionary nature of Chiang's regime.

The Chinese Communists are triumphing because they offer land reform and other basic social changes needed by the Chinese people. They would be winning even if the Soviet Union did not exist. To call their victory a victory for Soviet imperialism is of course typical of the incredible hypocrisy that pervades our national leadership today. As long as the bipartisan leaders identify all movements of social reform and change with Soviet foreign policy, we will find ourselves being allied with forces of reaction all over the world and we will incure the enmity of people everywhere.

Question.—Secretary Acheson's statement as to future policy in Asia indicates that the United States will back and arm a Pacific pact, including the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, as requested by Philippine President Quirino on his visit to Washington. Could such a pact succeed? Would it accord with the interests of the American people?

Mr. WALLACE. I certainly do not believe that a Pacific pact will succeed any more than the Atlantic pact will and I most emphatically believe both to be contrary to the interests of the American people. All the shipments of arms in the world won't give the people of Asia tools to cultivate their lands with, or food to feed their families with, or clothes to hide their nakedness. Yet tools, food, clothes are what the Asiatic peoples desperately need, not tanks and guns.

A Pacific pact is supposed to halt aggression and strengthen democracy. Actually, of course, it will weaken democracy. It will saddle the impoverished men and women of the Pacific with armaments programs they can ill afford. It will stimulate the real aggressor—poverty. It will thus increase discontent. which will in turn spur more arms shipments to the Pacific and divert more of Asia's resources to military use. It will thus engender a vicious circle that will defeat the very ends a Pacific pact is ostensibly supposed to gain.

If the administration really wanted to see Asia prosper—and wanted to serve the cause of international peace—it would immediately propose and back to the limit a world development fund to be administered by and through the United Nations, to build up the economies and industrial potential of the nations of Asia, and provide a huge market for American goods. It would cost a fraction of what we and other nations are spending on the arms race. It would serve the interests of the American people—and all the peoples of the world.

Question.—Do you think the United States should apply a blockade and economic boycott against the new China, as now seems certain? Or should it seek diplomatic and trade relations with it?

Mr. WALLACE. The only honorable and practical course first, is to establish normal diplomatic relations with the new government as soon as it is stabilized, and second, to enter into negotiations for trade as quickly as possible.

As I write this, there are over 5,000,000 unemployed in the United States. China offers a huge potential market for our goods—offers a trade that can mean jobs for American factory workers and maritime workers. West coast shipping would get out of the doldrums. It would be good business for us. And at the same time it would help stabilize conditions in China and make it less difficult to carry out economic and social reforms so badly needed by the Chinese people. The beneficial effects would be felt throughout the entire Far East.

A blockade and economic boycott, on the other hand, would be both criminal and stupid. It would create needless misery both in China and here at home, and would contribute immeasurably to the instability which the administration theoretically wants to end.

EXHIBIT No. 340

FAR EAST SPOTLIGHT

(A monthly report on United States policy and internal events in China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, southeast Asia, and India)

December 1949, January 1950

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Mr. WALLACE. I may say at that time, and for sometime prior to this, I was very greatly concerned that the United States would become embroiled in war with China.

As a matter of fact, that went back for several years prior to this, that we would become embroiled in a war supporting the Chiang Kai-shek regime which I thought was on its way out and if we stepped in to support it, we would be in grave danger of getting into war with Soviet Russia.

I just did not want American boys to be spilling their blood in China. I went all out to prevent that. My reason for getting into the race in 1948, the Presidential race, was to do everything I could to bring the issue of peace to the foreground.

I looked on the Asian situation as full of dynamite. Since then the Forrestal diaries came out to give an indication of the atmosphere that we had lived in since the fall of 1945.

You will find in November of 1945 Forrestal refers to a communication from Wedemeyer in which he indicates that as early as that if we go all out for Chiang Kai-shek there is serious danger of war with Soviet Union and we should consider it, and whether or not our forces are adequate to warrant taking the risk.

That was the situation as described in the Forrestal diaries in November of 1945.

Of course, that situation became progressively worse as time went on. The possibility of supporting Chiang successfully became increasingly improbable.

When I took my action then I was not only concerned with the danger of the lives of American boys, I was also under the belief that it was altogether improbable that China and Russia could get together.

That was the belief in which I operated at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, did anyone aid you in the preparation of your July 10 report?

Mr. WALLACE. I have no recollection of anybody aiding me in the preparation of the July 10 report.

Mr. MORRIS. So the whole report is your report?

Mr. WALLACE. That is my report.

Mr. MORRIS. What date did you issue that?

Mr. WALLACE. It was not issued; it was given to President Roosevelt face to face on July 10.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you arrive at Great Falls, Mont.?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember exactly; say along about the 7th of July; something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you broadcast from Seattle on July 9?

Mr. WALLACE. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you on July 10?

Mr. WALLACE. I was in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you prepare the report, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. I prepared a considerable part of it at Great Falls. I don't say that from memory, but it would——

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you in Great Falls?

Mr. WALLACE. Two or three days, and then two or three days in Canada.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you arrive at Great Falls on July 8?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember the precise date. It is my recollection that I had several days in Canada and at Great Falls.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember making a speech in Seattle on July 9?

Mr. WALLACE. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that you prepared the report sometime between your arrival in the country and——

Mr. WALLACE. I had been working on it for some time. I finished it up in Canada and in Great Falls.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you had been working on it for some time, when were you working on it? While in the air?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. There was a great deal of time in the air. I happened to know the Seattle speech was written at Krasnoyarsk because I ran across the handwritten copy of it the other day.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony after your arrival in the United States——

Mr. WALLACE. That I polished the thing up at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you prepare it?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say, sir. Obviously, I was sent there as a Presidential emissary. It was the big moment of the trip, giving the President the report.

Undoubtedly I had been working on it for some time. I was polishing it up in Canada and at Great Falls, Mont.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you testify whether or not anyone aided you in preparing that?

Mr. WALLACE. To the best of my recollection I cannot testify that anybody aided me. I had a great variety of memoranda that had been submitted to me. The one who influenced me most was Ambassador Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may break in, Mr. Morris, it may be that the line of questioning is too much with regard to conclusion, and not specific enough to do justice to the facts that you are trying to present to the committee.

Preparation, for instance, encompasses a great many things.

Is it a fair assumption that at some time or another portions of this report were written out by you in longhand?

Mr. WALLACE. I assume they might have been. I really don't know. I did run across this Krasnoyarsk thing in longhand or the Seattle thing, which was written at Krasnoyarsk.

I have gone through my records and I find nothing in longhand on this.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wasn't asking about your records; just your memory. Do you remember writing any of this report out in longhand?

Mr. WALLACE. I must have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know specifically. I was utterly surprised to see I had written the Seattle thing in longhand. If anybody asked me about that, I wouldn't have remembered it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember, Mr. Wallace, whether any of this report was written out on a typewriter?

Mr. WALLACE. I am sure it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write any of it out on a typewriter?

Mr. WALLACE. I think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you write some of it out on a typewriter?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have access to a typewriter on the airplane coming across back to this country?

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't use a typewriter on the airplane myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have access?

Mr. WALLACE. I am not sure. There must have been a typewriter there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether they did or did not have one?

Mr. WALLACE. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you use it?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone else type any portions of this on a typewriter on the way back?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say no one did?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean someone might have typed it?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do yon know whether any of it was typed before you started back?

Mr. WALLACE. I would think it must have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Let me illustrate how difficult it is to remember specifically on a thing of this sort. There has been certain discussion as to what transpired at a Cabinet meeting back in September of 1945. I have called up one person who was there who certainly should remember it and can't even remember the incident at a very important Cabinet meeting. That illustrates what I mean. This is a man who is much younger than I. That illustrates how impossible it is to remember with accuracy, and how impossible it is to draw conclusions from

yesses or noes this way, that way, or the other way, no matter how the questions are answered.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not attempting to draw conclusions, nor am I challenging your memory, sir. I am trying to assist it by asking questions you might recall.

Was there eventually a typewritten draft of this which you could and did go over?

Mr. WALLACE. I presented a typewritten copy to President Roosevelt. That is all I can say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly you know whether you went over that typewritten copy before you presented it?

Mr. WALLACE. Of course, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there was at that time a typewritten draft which you went over?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

But you say "was there a typewriter on the plane."

Mr. SOURWINE. That was a previous question.

Mr. WALLACE. I say I assume there was a typewriter on the plane. Whether it was typewritten with a typewriter on the plane, or a typewriter that was at Great Falls, or a typewriter that was at Great Prairie, or at Edmonston, in Canada, or whether it was typewriter that was available some place else, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure we can get a little further along on this. We have established there was a typewritten draft of the report which you went over before you presented it to the President?

Mr. WALLACE. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was a clean copy?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not have presented one that was messed up or a rough draft?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us where you got that clean copy?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you type it yourself?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did type it?

Mr. WALLACE. That was too clean a typing job for me. No, I can't testify as to that. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any idea as to who might have typed it?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that someone presented you with a clean draft of a message, a report you were going to give the President of the United States and you have not any idea where it came from?

Mr. WALLACE. That has happened perhaps 5,000 times in my Washington life.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace, do you recall whether there was any prior draft, a rough draft of any sort, of this report?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall ever having seen a prior draft of it?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was with you on the trip at that time, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. As I was saying, the people on the trip, and it was the same personnel throughout except inside excursions in China——

Mr. MORRIS. But the trip from Great Falls to——

Mr. WALLACE. The same people. You had John Hazard, Owen Lattimore, John Carter Vincent, and the members of the crew.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, they left here and made the whole trip with you?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, they made the whole trip.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one or two more.

I don't mean to be unduly repetitious, but sometimes a memory will come back if you try to think about it. I am sure it must be as incredible to you as to us that you have no memory whatsoever of whether you saw a rough draft of the statement, or not.

Mr. WALLACE. I do not think it is incredible in the slightest, sir. I have been so active over so many years that with regard to a minor matter of this sort, I see nothing incredible about it.

I would say it would be remarkable if I did remember. If you were in a similar position—I judge you are about the same age as I—and you were testifying, you would find yourself in the same situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure I am not asking you to testify beyond your best recollection.

Mr. WALLACE. I can't; that is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. This report was handed to the President on what date?

Mr. WALLACE. On July 10, 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you any idea how long this report had been in preparation?

Mr. WALLACE. I really can't say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been in preparation as long as 2 weeks?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been in preparation as long as 3 weeks?

Mr. WALLACE. That is pure supposition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. You would have to consult the dates.

Mr. SOURWINE. What dates do we have to consult?

Mr. WALLACE. The dates when I was in China. It could not have been in preparation longer than June 20.

Mr. SOURWINE. It could not have been in preparation longer than June 20?

Mr. WALLACE. That was, roughly, the day I arrived in China. I began taking notes when I arrived in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do remember the notes that you took. What did you do with the notes as you took them?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you stuff them in a pocket, or hand them to somebody to put away? You kept your notes?

Mr. WALLACE. I did until I got this out of my system.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where you kept them?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any particular place where you accumulated your notes?

Mr. WALLACE. I stuffed them away in a bag I had with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember at any time ever taking them out of that bag?

Mr. WALLACE. I have no recollection at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. You must have taken them out if at some time you used them.

Mr. WALLACE. Sir, I just don't know. That is all I have to say. Your questions, no matter how they are phrased, will get no other answer, because I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you, sir, but pardon me if I keep trying. You will recognize that you must have taken the notes out of that bag at some time.

Mr. WALLACE. The answer to that is obvious.

Mr. SOURWINE. Obviously you did? Is that true?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't want to be impolite, sir. What are you really getting at? What are you trying to do?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out if we cannot recapture one fragment of your memory with regard to when and under what circumstances you began the preparation of the first rough draft of this report from your notes.

Mr. WALLACE. I just don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was trying to establish if you recognize the fact that you must have taken these accumulated notes out of the bag at some time and perhaps you could remember where or when?

Mr. WALLACE. I just don't know.

Senator SMITH. Is it not possible that his secretary might have taken them out? I have handed my bag to my secretary and then when I got back to the office I had things taken out.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was trying to avoid making suggestions as to possibilities.

Senator SMITH. That is understandable to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been in preparation, this draft, all the time from the time that you got to China until you presented it to the President?

Mr. WALLACE. Obviously it would be continuously in preparation.

The final shaping up, I would say, just looking at the time factor, must have taken place in Canada and at Great Falls. That is not on the basis of memory, but on the basis of time.

This whole thing is simply logical reasoning back on the basis of time and not on the basis of memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I am trying to do, reason back.

Was it prepared subsequent to the Kunming cables, sir?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say that part of it must have been. It might have been that part of it was prepared at Kunming because I did have some time there.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Kunming cables, I think you have stated—and I do not want to go into this fully—but is it not true in connection with the Kunming cables you consulted with Vincent to some considerable extent?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Could I get around to this statement pretty soon?

Mr. SOURWINE. Your statement shows you did.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that connection you have testified that with regard to this report you did not consult anyone about it and no one aided in the preparation of it?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was on that basis I was assuming it was prepared after the Kunming cables.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't mean to make an assumption if it is improper. It does not necessarily follow.

Mr. SOURWINE. You might have that report and had been working on it all the time, but not consulted anyone when you were consulting about the Kunming cables.

Mr. WALLACE. It is quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Although the report follows and summarizes?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. After all, there is quite an extended discussion of what took place in the Province of Sinkiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you made a real effort to recall any circumstances about that report that you could along the line of the questions?

Mr. WALLACE. I have given you all that I can.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made a real effort to recall and you can't?

Mr. WALLACE. I just don't know.

Senator SMITH. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. The cables seem clear to you at the present time as to how they were prepared?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. That was a very dramatic moment. I have had conferences with Mr. Alsop with regard to that and have verified my memory by consulting with him. I first consulted with him at the time Mr. Kohlberg wrote me in August 1950, with regard to it. I called up Joe Alsop at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had your memory refreshed on the Kohlberg letter?

Mr. WALLACE. My memory had been very abundantly refreshed because of this correspondence with Kohlberg and by calling up Joe Alsop, and Joe Alsop is a younger man than I.

The Kunming thing occupied a more important part in his life than mine. That was a high point, to be sitting in with the Vice President and working with him. No doubt his memory is very accurate in that respect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he have memoranda when he came to you in relation to refreshing your memory?

Mr. WALLACE. When I phoned him with regard to Kohlberg's letter?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't see him face to face at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You talked on the phone?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Recently has he had any memoranda to refresh your memory on——

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think so. He was so much an intimate part of that whole China picture for so many years, I don't think he needed my memoranda.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you consulted Owen Lattimore in relation to this?

Mr. WALLACE. Not at any time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you consulted Vincent?

Mr. WALLACE. Not at any time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hazard?

Mr. WALLACE. Not at any time with regard to this. Yes, with regard to another point.

Mr. SOURWINE. So, you have consulted just one. That is why you have a clear memory on the cables?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I have had abundant check and cross-check on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not try to check with anyone about the message to the President?

Mr. WALLACE. I understand that Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent have testified or written that they had nothing to do with it. I don't know just how correct that is. I don't know whether it was in the press or where. I saw it somewhere.

Mr. SOURWINE. So there will be no false implication, what you mean is you have no idea how true it is whether they so testified?

Mr. WALLACE. I really don't know whether they so testified. It was in one of the newspaper columns. I saw it stated that John Carter Vincent had written somebody, probably Kohlberg, saying he had not taken part.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it has——

Mr. WALLACE. I have no recollection of John Carter Vincent working with me on this report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. WALLACE. Or Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had testified no one worked with you?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I have no recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall they were on the plane?

Mr. WALLACE. They were, definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. With respect to the Kunming cables about which you have a vivid recollection at the time of their preparation, what about those?

Mr. WALLACE. That was a rather dramatic occasion, because it was at Kunming after talking with General Chennault that I appreciated how terrifically serious the Chinese situation was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it July 10 you did not consider that report serious?

Mr. WALLACE. The big point of the trip was the call to action. I was there on a military mission essentially.

When I sent that statement, I was suggesting very specific action that I thought could save the military situation. The report of July 10 was more or less a narrative, a rather simple narrative discussion of where we went and what we found.

It is a travelog kind of thing. I have been engaged in travelog descriptions ever since 1909. I have written them up for the papers, gone here and there. This is largely a travelog thing, except the conclusion.

There was a specific suggestion with regard to how the Kuomintang government could have been saved if liberal elements, not Communists, were brought in.

It is rather a simple kind of report. All you need is to have somebody give you the spelling of the Chinese names.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that the contents of the Kunming cables were dictated by you?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who aided you in the preparation of those cables?

Mr. WALLACE. There were two men that were present, Joe Alsop and John Carter Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Joe Alsop aid you in the preparation of those cables?

Mr. WALLACE. He was using the typewriter. I verified that from him.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he the amanuensis?

Mr. WALLACE. He was chiefly an amanuensis. He suggested some changes in phraseology.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not dictating to Mr. Alsop for him to take down verbatim; were you?

Mr. WALLACE. I would not say absolutely verbatim, but it was one of those situations where you would go a sentence and stop and discuss.

As I testified in executive session, the three of us batted back and forth for quite a bit. It was a serious thing, and we were determined to do everything possible for the war effort.

I was inspired by the dilemma in which Chiang Kai-shek had found himself in his request that I intercede with Roosevelt.

Afresh from that impact with the additional impact from General Chennault—I was facing a war situation that was going bad and something had to be done about it at once. It was the kind of thing that tends to stir up your memory. My memory is not so very good on things that far back; so, I did talk to Joe Alsop about it in 1950. I talked to him about it in September of this year.

Mr. SOURWINE. All I am trying to get is the distinction between these two kinds of dictation to a man at a typewriter. I don't mean in either case to ask you if you said these actual words, but I want to find out which of these two patterns you followed:

After this had been batted back and forth, which you say, "All right, I know what we are going to say. Now take this down," and then you would dictate a sentence?

On the other hand, would you say something like this: "We are all agreed on that. Tell him so-and-so"?

Mr. WALLACE. It would be more nearly the latter, I would say, in all probability.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you were doing was deciding as to substance rather than dictating the words which followed one another?

Mr. WALLACE. That may be carrying it a little too far, but it is more in that category, I would say. You can consult Mr. Alsop with regard to that.

I may say Mr. Lattimore, to the best of my knowledge, never knew this cable was sent.

Mr. MORRIS. Exactly what role did John Carter Vincent have at this episode?

Mr. WALLACE. As I testified in executive session, he was present. He did not initiate the idea, to the best of my recollection. The initiation came from me. He did engage in the conversation. He did engage in batting it back and forth.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't say. There is no possible way by which I can remember a conversation of that sort. It is utterly impossible.

All I can say is this: Sometimes in a situation of this kind it is easier to remember, you might say, the flash of an eye or the attitude

of a face than any words. I can say that I gathered it from his attitude and I can't remember a single solitary sentence, a phrase, a fragment of a phrase, but I gathered it from his attitude.

It would just be that I can just remember the flash of his face that this is the thing to do. "Let's go, boys." That is roughly the feeling I had about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have just three question more.

Is it the substance of your testimony that you can't point to any particular paragraph or any particular idea in these cables and say that was Mr. Vincent's idea?

Mr. WALLACE. No, or that it is Mr. Alsop's idea, or mine. It would be impossible to separate it out on that basis.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it true you can't point to anything in the cable and say Mr. Vincent was against that?

Mr. WALLACE. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it because he was against anything, or is it because what was in the cable was something that met the joint approval of the three of you that were there?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say it is something we talked out and agreed to.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, he did not disagree to anything in the cable?

Mr. WALLACE. I have absolutely no recollection of anything he disagreed to in the cable or——

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Mr. WALLACE. I was going to say is there any other question? Could I get to work on this statement?

Mr. MORRIS. I have some questions in connection with this. I would like to take the passage in the Kunming cables which reads:

> But the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.

Do you know whether John Carter Vincent agreed with that expression?

Mr. WALLACE. I think my general statement is the only statement I can make.

Mr. MORRIS. We have to talk in concrete terms.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace has testified there wasn't anything in the cable Mr. Vincent disagreed with. They talked it out.

If there was disagreement, they made adjustments. There wasn't anything in the cable Mr. Vincent disagreed with; is that correct?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Wallace, when that cable was sent, did you carefully read the last draft of the cable, if there was more than one draft?

Mr. WALLACE. Of course, That was a part of it. This was continuous hard, sweating work.

That is what this one was. It was to meet a great emergency. I can't emphasize how great the emergency was felt at that time.

Senator SMITH. I was wondering whether or not you said to Mr. Alsop, "Here is what we agreed upon," and prepared a cable and whether thereafter there was any change in the language of the cable that was finally sent.

Mr. WALLACE. This was something I was an intimate part of.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with that sentence which I read, do you testify that is an anti-Communist statement?

Mr. WALLACE. I think it might save time if we go from the executive session in which I say point after point this is factual, then at the finish say this is definitely anti-Communist.

It was not prepared with the idea that it was anti-Communist at the time. It was prepared at the time with the idea of saving a war situation.

We were not thinking about that. We can say definitely today that the concluding sentences of that Kunming cable were definitely anti-Communist, and we can say that the other sentences are factual. That is what I so testify.

If you want to include the executive-session hearings at this point, I think it would save time, so I could get on with the reading of my statement.

Mr. MORRIS. There were six points here. I would like to bring them out. You can lay stress on any one. I would like to find your attitude.

The first is [reading]:

But the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.

Mr. WALLACE. The same answer as in the executive hearing.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

Mr. WALLACE. The same answer as in the executive hearing.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not significantly anti-Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. WALLACE. The same answer as in the executive hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it?

Mr. WALLACE. The answer I gave in the executive hearing to all of these preliminary sentences. The answer was: This is a factual statement.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't care to characterize it as an anti-Communist or pro-Communist statement?

Mr. WALLACE. I simply say it is a factual statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Without characterizing it?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do, and the Chinese appear incapable of coping with it.

Mr. WALLACE. That is a factual statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you mention the rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang.

Mr. WALLACE. That is a factual statement.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available information to show you how serious the situation is.

Mr. WALLACE. Factual.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least a semblance of a united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

Mr. WALLACE. A factual statement.

That had reference, of course, to the military. I was not there to have anything to do with establishing a coalition government between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. You wanted a coalition of military forces?

Mr. WALLACE. It was a question of interchange of military information and a united effort against the Japanese; this is all factual stuff. It does not have anything to do with anti-Communist or pro-Communist. It is simply factual.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement by itself on its face could not have been factual. It is an expression of opinion; is it not?

Mr. WALLACE. What does it say?

Mr. SOURWINE. You said "it should."

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least a semblance of a united front necessary to the resoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

Mr. WALLACE. I would call it a factual statement. If you want to call it opinion, all right. It looks like a factual statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was the view you held on the basis of the factors you were familiar with?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

I thought it was possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Next here it says:

As I took leave of Chiang he—

Chiang Kai-shek—

requested me to ask you to appoint a personal representative to serve as liaison between you and him.

Then you go on to recommend.

Mr. WALLACE. To Chungking. Did you read it correctly. I took leave of what?

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton DeWiart occupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military situation.

An American general officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political consideration. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake the assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence, but he should not be removed from his present military position.

The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions; (2) command all American forces in China, and (3) bring about a full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command American forces in China because, without this, his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal directly with the White House on political questions, or China may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.

Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation here to drift continuously from bad to worse.

I believe a representative should be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is finally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far.

While I do not feel competent to propose any officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

Do you contend that is an anti-Communist recommendation?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Of all the statements here that is the one you contend is anti-Communist?

Mr. WALLACE. I contend so far as action was concerned, the whole effect of the cable was definitely and conclusively anti-Communist because it suggested the replacement of Stilwell.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not necessarily a replacement. The man you proposed could be a subordinate, you say.

Mr. WALLACE. But with complete liberty with regard to political action in China which is the key to the whole situation.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contend that is an anti-Communist act?

Mr. WALLACE. I do most profoundly so contend.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not the Communist Party through its official publications protested the removal of Stilwell?

Mr. WALLACE. I am not an expert on the Communist Party. I do not read their publications and don't know what they are up to.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you not set yourself forth as an expert here when you said John Carter Vincent did not object to this so he couldn't have been a Communist? Do you not by that very fact set yourself up as an expert?

Mr. WALLACE. No. Let us put it this way: Mr. Budenz has testified——

Mr. BALL. May I interrupt for a moment? It seems to me that question is directed to things which are in Mr. Wallace's statement which is not yet in the record.

Senator SMITH. We are asking about it. We are not going to preclude him from putting in the statement.

Mr. BALL. The form of Mr. Morris' question indicated that Mr. Wallace has testified to things which he has not testified to, because they have not been put in the record.

Senator SMITH. It is the committee's privilege to ask questions. We are not precluding Mr. Wallace from giving answers.

Mr. WALLACE. This will be a repetition of what I have in my statement, if you don't object.

Senator SMITH. It may be. I think the committee should have the right to ask you in what form they wish the questions to be answered.

Mr. WALLACE. There have been witnesses before the committee who have testified with regard to what the Communist attitude was at that time. When I said I was not an expert on Communist attitude in 1944, I was speaking advisedly. I am not an expert on Communist attitude in 1944; have never claimed to be an expert on Communist attitude at any time. I just don't know because it is such a wavering kind of line.

The only word I can take as to what Communist attitude in 1944 was is testimony by Mr. Budenz who indicates that the Communist attitude in 1944 was to tear down Chiang Kai-shek. That is his testimony.

I say that what I recommended in terms of action, and this was the only thing effective in terms of action and the only way in which there could be expression, was through Roosevelt in terms of action.

The only thing I recommended in terms of action to Roosevelt was an action which built up Chiang Kai-shek and went against, judging from the testimony of Budenz, what was the Communist line at that time.

Again, I say I am in no sense an expert on the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not know, then, what the Communist attitude was with respect to the items we read in the Kunming cables?

Mr. WALLACE. I was sent specifically, specifically instructed by Roosevelt not to get in touch with Communists. I was sent on a misison to Chiang Kai-shek; not to the Communists.

So I don't know what the Communists stood for, whether they were Chinese or Russian or American, in 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, you must testify that you do not know whether or not the recommendation set forth in the Kunming cables was or was not consistent with Communist policy?

Mr. WALLACE. I have to take, except insofar as Mr. Budenz so testified—I am accepting him as the expert. It may be later on we will discover that the Communists were strong for building up Chiang Kai-shek. It is quite possible you will discover that later.

You can't tell about the turnings of the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. If you are accepting him as the expert, he has testified this Kunming cable is not an anti-Communist document.

Mr. WALLACE. I am accepting him as an expert in his field of competence, and not in his field of incompetence.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't understand the distinction.

Mr. WALLACE. He was trained for many long years in teaching the authoritarian dictatorship of the Communist Party, and ought to know the Communist Party, and that when he spoke there he spoke as an authority and when he spoke on my Kunming cable, he spoke as a man completely without knowledge and authority.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the editor of the publication setting forth the Communist view on it at the time?

Mr. WALLACE. I am accepting his testimony as to what he said the Communists wanted with regard to Chiang Kai-shek. I will proceed to show in my statement that Mr. Budenz was in error, very definitely, when he said things in regard to my cable. I will say he was imposing on the high dignity of this committee when he testified as he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Testified to what?

Mr. WALLACE. When he testified to the effect that my cable was not anti-Communist in its effect. Could I be allowed finally to read my statement?

Senator SMITH. Right in that connection there are two or three questions that I would like to ask you. I think you can answer very quickly.

In connection with Mr. Budenz' testimony, I assume you are in sympathy with the over-all objective of this committee's activities in tracking down Communists in the Government if there are any?

Mr. WALLACE. Of course. I agree completely that the world situation as it is, it is a very important function indeed.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that is a field within which the committee ought to operate to secure such evidence as it can?

Mr. WALLACE. Of course.

Senator SMITH. Do you feel now from published reports and information you have there are any Communists or Communist sympathizers in America? Is there any doubt in your mind about that?

Mr. WALLACE. They seem to have gotten into various places. They even got into the Manhattan project, if you may remember. They have a capacity to get around that is altogether astounding and which has been well demonstrated it seems to me by documented evidence.

Senator SMITH. I am asking these questions manifestly for the purpose of establishing the good faith of your mind and what you feel in regard to this committee's activities.

You feel that these Communists, as such, as you have just mentioned should be tracked down, if possible?

Mr. WALLACE. Certainly. If there is real trouble going to break out, there is no question as to where their allegiance will lie.

Senator SMITH. There is no question that this committee, if it can be of assistance, should attempt to keep that sort of people out of government?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I agree.

Senator SMITH. When we call people as witnesses either by subpena or voluntarily on their part, you feel we should hear whatever a witness is testifying to under oath?

Mr. WALLACE. I hope so.

Senator SMITH. In that connection, if a witness should come here and testify under oath and it later turned out he did not tell the truth, you do not think that should be any reflection upon this committee or its members?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I don't. I just feel that the committee has perhaps been imposed on.

Senator SMITH. That goes back to the efforts that the committee has made to take testimony in executive session to test witnesses before the open session and to protect a person who might be innocent. You agree on that?

Mr. WALLACE. I do, sir.

Senator SMITH. You, of course, realize always that the committee cannot hear but one person at a time, and it takes a good deal of time on each person?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any personal complaint against the committee either for its subpenaing you or for its failure to hear you?

Mr. WALLACE. As a matter of fact, I wrote Senator Ferguson sometime in early September. I had quite a little correspondence with him in which I indicated if there was any way in which I could be of service to him personally or through the committee, I would be glad to do so. I was a little bit surprised to receive a subpena on my farm directing me to be at Foley Square on 18 hours' notice. That is the only point at which I felt that I was a little bit up against the gun, because I had a personal situation that was very difficult to meet.

At that time I may say I was assured that it would only take a half or three-quarters of an hour to take my testimony.

Senator SMITH. You were talking to an optimist.

Mr. WALLACE. Then a little later I talked to Mr. Sourwine, and he was utterly cordial. This was about midnight. At that time there were only 8 hours separating me from the necessity of catching a train, and those were hours of sleep.

Mr. Sourwine was so cordial and so completely agreeable that I should have the necessary time to get counsel that I have no complaint against the committee at all, although I had some uneasy moments the evening of October 3 when I was trying to arrange my affairs to see whether or not I could get down to New York City the following morning at 11 o'clock.

Senator SMITH. I did, too, but I was scheduled to hold that hearing and could not go.

Mr. WALLACE. So I frankly have no complaint against the committee except this one, and that was a passing minor irritation.

Senator O'CONOR. It does seem to me Mr. Wallace has several times emphasized that there should be given an opportunity to him to put a statement in. I think that should be granted.

Senator SMITH. We have told him that this morning.

Senator O'CONOR. I think he should if there has been extensive interrogation. He should read the statement.

Senator SMITH. We assured him this morning that would be done.

Senator O'CONOR. I did understand him to say he did want to get along with it now.

Senator SMITH. The question was whether or not the plan of examination was going to be followed first, because he had a certain line prepared. Then Mr. Wallace would have a chance to put this in.

Then the committee would wish to properly call Mr. Wallace back, or give him a chance to come back on anything.

Mr. WALLACE. It would save expense if we can complete it now.

Mr. MORRIS. We have rule 6 of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary which reads:

> The committee shall, as far as practicable, require all witnesses appearing before it to file in advance written statements of their proposed testimony at least 24 hours before hearing and to limit their oral presentation to brief summaries of their argument.

I would just like to call attention of the chairman to that rule.

Senator SMITH. Is that rule applicable to witnesses that the committee subpenas or to witnesses that offer to come here?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. The rule is intended to be applicable to voluntary statements. The witness subpenaed is here to answer questions and does not have a voluntary statement.

Senator SMITH. Is that not the reason we waived the rule as to this statement, so that it could be put in today rather than at a later hearing?

Mr. SOURWINE. That rule of the committee as the chairman knows, stems from the requirement of the Legislative Reorganization Act in section 133 (e) that each standing committee shall, as far as practicable, require all witnesses appearing before it to file in advance written statements of their proposed testimony and to limit their oral presentation to brief summaries of their argument.

The committee fixed 24 hours under a sort of de minimis rule that anything less would not be the filing in advance that was contemplated by the statute.

The rule has been waived by the committee. It is a question of what is desired.

Senator SMITH. I thought it should be because we subpenaed him to come here. Therefore, he was not coming, while no doubt he would have of his own volition. The statement which he has, while not meeting that rule, it seems to me we were acting quite properly in waiving any rule about 24 hours so he could offer this statement.

Senator O'CONOR. I do not think the committee wants to be in the position of precluding or in any sense of stopping the witness from presenting it. I think he has answered very fully. I think he should be given opportunity to proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may make a further statement since this statement is in the form of a press release, and I presume will be released through the press, or has been, perhaps he should not be interrupted for questioning.

If you desire to have it read instead of placing it in the record, that is. If we did it, it would spoil the continuity of it. The statement would not represent precisely what he testified to.

If he wants the statement to represent what he testifies to, the committee should let him read it without interruption.

Mr. MORRIS. May I, for the record, point out the unfairness of the failure on the part of witnesses to comply with this rule. As counsel and Mr. Mandel as research director, we have the obligation of extracting or refuting some of the statements there.

I have not read the statement. I would like to be in a position to answer if any follow-up questions are asked or to introduce any refutation of the facts that Mr. Wallace has gratuitously set forth.

Mr. WALLACE. I might say, Mr. Counsel, that this follows much the line of the statement that I released the other day, but it brings in also reference to Mr. Budenz.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since that statement has been mentioned, if the chairman will indulge me for just a moment, I would like to combine a statement and a few questions to you.

There has been a great deal of criticism of this committee in the press and otherwise for failing to permit the previous statement to go in the record. I think in fairness to the committee there should be an understanding of what the situation was. If I misstate anything, I ask you to please call my attention to it.

When we approached the noon hour, or the hour of recess, you called attention of the committee to the fact that you had a statement and you would like to put it in the record. Is that correct?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was stated by you or your counsel that the statement had already been given to the press for release at the conclusion of the hearing?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was at that point that a number of the members of the committee who were familiar with the history of your request that the session be made public instead of executive, and the chairman's telegram to you denying that and saying that it was to be executive—it was a number of the members of the committee who were familiar with that history who then expressed the view that since you had come there with a statement which had already been sent on its way to the press to be released as what took place in execu-

tive session that the statement should not then and there be permitted to be put in.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Subsequent to that it was found it actually had not gotten out to the press, and I met with counsel after the meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. You advised the committee of that fact at the end?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. BALL. I advised the committee because I called my office to make sure that it had been delivered or to ascertain definitely whether or not it had been delivered to the Senate Press Gallery.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your understanding, in connection with having advised the committee it had not been delivered, that you intended to convey the idea to the committee you had stopped it and would not release it?

Mr. BALL. No. I have conveyed, and we have looked at the record because I was very much surprised afterward there was some indication that the committee felt I had made a promise on Mr. Wallace's behalf in that regard.

I don't have the exact words of what I said here—yes; here they are:

> For the committee's information—and I have not had an opportunity to tell Mr. Wallace—I checked with my office. I found they were on the way with the statement up here. I have recalled them, and the statement has not been released to the press.

I certainly did not intend by that to give any assurance to the committee that the statement would not be released to the press after I had an opportunity to consult.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time at the tail end of the hearing and up to that time, the committee had no reason to think but that if this statement went into the record would subsequently be released as Mr. Wallace's statement to the committee in executive session; is that correct?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE. Counsel and I met, Mr. Ball and I, for some time that afternoon to decide whether or not to then release it to the press. This was along about 4 o'clock. At that time we had no assurance there would be an open hearing; and, because of the feeling there might not be an open hearing and because certain things had been said about me along the line you mentioned in opening up the hearing, I felt my only chance, knowing the way the press works when things are hot, to get certain information into the press was to make the release then.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not intend to say anything that might sound critical of your issuing the release. That is not my province.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't want our action to impugn the good faith of the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was attempting to justify the committee action, at least to explain on the record the committee's refusal to permit the previous statement to go into its executive record.

That is the whole purpose.

Mr. WALLACE. It seems to me we are in accord as to the facts.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not promise at the termination of the last hearing that you would not release this statement after the hearing?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I don't have any recollection.

Mr. BALL. I have no recollection of any such promise. In fact, I have very definitely in my mind not making such a promise until I had an opportunity to consult.

Senator SMITH. The record will show what was said.

Mr. MORRIS. No. This statement I refer to was made after the termination of the record.

Mr. WALLACE. It had to do with what we would say to the newspapermen at the door.

Mr. MORRIS. That no statements would be made.

Mr. WALLACE. I asked you to accompany me. I told them that I could not say whether or not there would be a subsequent statement. The newspapermen can probably deny or confirm this.

Senator SMITH. It did not seem to me that the release of it was anything of great moment, because Mr. Wallace had a right to say what he wished to the press.

I realize Mr. Wallace never had it occur to him that he was going to be in executive session.

Mr. WALLACE. I was not fully aware of the very serious way in which you are approaching the whole technique. I knew in a general way about it, but I had not been fully cognizant of your method of approach.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record, I believe I should state that the executive record shows that I stated then what had taken place previously, to wit, that Mr. Wallace's attorney had inquired of me with respect to this matter and had been told in response to his inquiry that the committee hoped and expected that its witnesses would respect the executive character of the hearings, but that there was, of course, no way in which the committee could compel that kind of action.

Mr. Wallace's attorney, so the record shows, indicated that was a correct statement and he accepted it as made.

Mr. WALLACE. We changed the top heading. I felt I was quite justified in putting it out that afternoon because it then appeared very clearly this had not been presented before the committee.

You have the exact heading there. I felt the heading took care of the proprieties of the situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made it very clear it was a statement which had been offered to the committee and the receipt of which had been refused, and perhaps in a short paragraph you did not have space to explain why.

Mr. WALLACE. Now could I get on with this?

Senator SMITH. It is now 1:25. What is the pleasure of the committee?

Senator O'CONOR. It may be he thinks it should go in at this juncture for possible press release or other purposes. I would think there ought to be opportunity given to the witness to put it in now.

Mr. WALLACE. Maybe you could hear me in relays so that you can get lunch.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have copies been given to the press?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Would it be in order to consider it having been introduced in full so it may be possible to release it?

Senator SMITH. You may wish to read it and interpolate.

It ought to be read so that the committee's counsel, who has not had a chance to read it, so he can make such notes as he goes along, but

with the understanding the committee's counsel may have the right to examine this and ask further questions. He has not had a chance to see it.

Mr. WALLACE. Maybe counsel could spell each other.

Senator SMITH. The point is whether or not there was something in here that they would have to do a little research on before they could ask you what they deem would be proper questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. We could better do research during a recess than while sitting here.

Senator O'CONOR. That is the reason I suggested if the whole statement were put in in toto and then take a recess, then counsel could interrogate.

Mr. WALLACE. Could we get back fairly early?

Senator SMITH. We will recess until 2:15.

(Thereupon, at 1:30 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2:15 p. m. same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Wallace, you may proceed now with your recital of the statement.

Mr. WALLACE. On several occasions in the past few months this committee has heard testimony in public session from a man named Louis Budenz, who was, I understand, a leading American Communist. On August 23, 1951, Budenz testified that a mission to China which I undertook in 1944 at President Roosevelt's request was "followed by the Communists with a great deal of interest in discussions in the Politburo."

According to Budenz' testimony it was pointed out in these Politburo discussions that I "was more or less under good influences from the Communist viewpoint" because I was accompanied on that mission by Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. John Carter Vincent, "both of whom were described as being in line with the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it, and that they would guide [me] largely along those paths."

Subsequent to this testimony I wrote to President Truman enclosing the two reports that I had made to President Roosevelt with regard to my mission. After the White House had released those two reports, Budenz discussed them before this committee on October 5, 1951.

In the course of his testimony Budenz characterized those reports in various ways, but all with the same implication. They were, he said, "in accord with the Communist policies at that time." Again he said, "these messages, in the light of the period, were what the Communists wanted presented." The "document," according to Budenz, "gives aid to the Communists in the policies they were forwarding at that time."

Since these remarks are coupled with the statement that "the Politburo was very pleased with the fact that Lattimore and Vincent were present," inuendo is clear that I was somehow influenced by one or both of those gentlemen to follow the Communist line. I shall discuss these and other charges fully in the course of my statement.

I am grateful to this committee for permitting me to appear this afternoon in public session in order to state the true facts concerning

my mission to China. From these facts it will be apparent to anyone that, far from following a line favorable to the Communists, my mission resulted in recommendations to the President which, if promptly followed, would have been most harmful to the Communist cause in China in 1944 as defined by Budenz. From these facts it will be apparent that the accusations which Budenz has made about my mission constitute a grave slander.

This committee is quite rightly concerned about the loss of influence which the United States has suffered in the Far East, and about the peril to our security in that part of the world from a Communist-dominated China under the direct influence of Russia. I am testifying before you this morning as a man who in another time of great peril presided over the most powerful body in the world, the United States Senate. It was during my tenure as Vice President and President of the Senate that war was declared against the Fascist powers and that the United States put forth the most magnificent war effort that any nation ever demonstrated. I had an intimate part in that effort.

As Secretary of Agriculture I proposed the legislation that made it possible to build up enormous supplies of food and cotton in the ever-normal granary.

As Secretary of Agriculture I initiated the trade of a part of our cotton for a large amount of rubber in 1939.

As Vice President I was asked by President Roosevelt to use the prestige of my high office to straighten out tangles in our production effort during the period just prior to our entry into the war.

I became Chairman of the Supplies, Priorities, and Allocations Board during the critical period when we were converting our automobile facilities to the all-out production of tanks and airplanes.

In 1941 President Roosevelt asked me to head what later became the Board of Economic Warfare. This Board had a large part to play in the control of exports, the stimulation of imports needed in the war effort, and the selection of the most vital bombing targets in enemy lands.

In 1943 I was asked by the President to make a good-will trip to Latin America to stimulate the maximum production of strategic materials which we needed.

I cite this record not from vanity—although I am proud of the part which I was able to play in the war—but to show the background for the mission to China which I undertook in the spring of 1944.

President Roosevelt suggested that mission. The President had long been concerned over the military situation in China, and we had watched it progressively deteriorate. In the spring of 1944 it was especially necessary that nothing happen which would aggravate the Allied military situation in any part of the world.

All of our effort was then being concentrated on the landings in Normandy. Those landings, which were to be attempted at the beginning of June, represented the central point of a strategy for which the western allies had been long preparing. They represented not only the fulfillment of our military build-up but also the answer to Marshal Stalin's persistent request for the opening of a second front.

In view of the way Russia has behaved since the war and of the way Soviet communism is now menacing the peace of the world, it is difficult for us to think back clearly to the summer of 1944. At that time, however, everyone concerned with our military effort recognized

that we needed the full cooperation not only of our western allies but of the Russians as well if the great gamble that was to begin on D-day was to succeed. We needed to do everything possible to insure that the Russians would maintain their pressure on the eastern front so that they would continue to impose the wastage which was beginning to strain both German manpower and German war production. The possibility of a separate peace between Russia and Germany was a nightmare that haunted the dreams of everyone responsible for fighting the war.

It was in the context of this world situation that the President asked me to undertake a mission to China. He wanted me to discuss directly with Gen. Chiang Kai-shek the factors which were permitting the Japanese to make such tremendous advances into eastern China.

In preparation for the mission, I first talked with Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, since the purposes of the mission were primarily military.

Secretary Stimson described the Chinese situation as the thorniest problem he had and stated that there was a serious mix-up between various members of the Soong and Chiang families. Burma was the worst front that our Army had. He was deeply concerned about the graft which resulted from the black market and the way in which our airports were built.

General Marshall was somewhat more optimistic. He also spoke, however, of the graft in the construction of our airports as well as of the antagonisms within the chief families of China.

Upon completing these conversations, I spoke with Secretary Hull, who indicated much the same concern as had Secretary Stimson and General Marshall. He recommended particularly that I rely on Clarence E. Gauss, who was then our Ambassador to China and in whom he had great confidence.

At Secretary Hull's request I also talked with Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, a far eastern expert in the State Department, as well as with Dr. Isaiah Bowman, a world-famous geographer, who was then adviser to the Secretary of State.

In my farewell meeting with President Roosevelt a few days before I left, he placed great emphasis on solving the problem of inflation and on getting both sides in China to concentrate on fighting the Japanese instead of each other. He said he would be glad to sit in as a friend to get both sides together; all that he wanted was results in terms of fighting the common enemy. He did not suggest that I try to bring about a coalition government between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists; in fact, he asked me not to see the Communists at all, since a visit by the Vice President of the United States might be misunderstood as indicating that our country favored the Communist cause.

He did urge, however, as did Isaiah Bowman, that every effort be made to bring about a settlement of pending differences between China and Soviet Russia as soon as possible in order to prevent Soviet Russia from having a pretext for taking over domination of China after the war. It was with the background of these instructions, which were chiefly military, that I went to China.

Accompanying me on my China mission was Mr. John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, who was assigned to the

mission by Secretary Hull to represent the State Department. Also accompanying me was Mr. Owen Lattimore, of the Office of War Information, who was assigned by and at the suggestion of Mr. Elmer Davis, then head of OWI.

If I may interpolate here, it is my recollection that Mr. Owen Lattimore's name was first brought up by President Roosevelt, who was enormously interested in Mr. Lattimore's knowledge of the problems along the 5,000-mile border between China and Russia, his knowledge of the way in which the nomadic tribes wandered back and forth along that border; and, as I remember it, President Roosevelt, who often talked to me about this area of the world, mentioned at this time that there were great potentialities for the future involved in any dispute along that area.

It does happen to be the longest frontier between two nations of any place in the world, and there are many ancient relationships there about which very few Americans have first-hand information. That is my recollection of President Roosevelt.

However, when I talked to Elmer Davis, he made it clear that Owen Lattimore was loaned to me as a member of OWI and not of my staff. He did not give up his status in OWI to go with me. He went as a representative of OWI. That was made very clear by Mr. Davis.

I think the way it is here in the prepared statement it does not give the complete picture because President Roosevelt was greatly interested in Owen Lattimore's accompanying me.

Mr. Lattimore spoke Chinese and Mongolian and had a lifelong acquaintance with China. The President had previously mentioned him to me favorably. As the OWI representative on the mission, Mr. Lattimore was expected to assist our group in its relations with the press. That would be in China, of course, and not in Russia.

In order to put what happened later in sensible perspective, I think I should explain the situation that confronted me when I reached Chungking. A political crisis some time earlier had concentrated all influence and power in the hands of the backward-looking antiwestern group of the generalissimo's followers. Ambassador Gauss emphasized to me at great length the dangers of this political development, and how unfortunate it was that such modern-minded, pro-American Chinese leaders as Dr. T. V. Soong were being entirely excluded from the real conduct of affairs.

At the same time the Japanese had started a major offensive in east China. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, the American commander in the China-Burma-India theater, was wholly preoccupied with the campaign in Burma. The Chinese armies being attacked by the Japanese had received no American aid to strengthen them.

The Generalissimo complained to me that even the air support for them was limited by General Stilwell's policies. There had already begun a series of shattering defeats of Chiang Kai-shek's forces which were inevitably having sharp political repercussions that threatened in the future to become violent. In the view of practically every American and Chinese I talked to in China, the Generalissimo's government was already in serious danger.

I may add here this danger was especially underlined and emphasized when I reached Kunming.

My conversations with the Generalissimo have already been reported in some detail in the State Department white paper, but there are two points which have a special relevance to Budenz' charges.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire there as to whether or not when you came back you reported those conversations with the Generalissimo and filed them with the State Department?

Mr. WALLACE. I did not file them with the State Department, but I did incorporate a copy of them with my July 10 report, which I handed to the President on July 10, and it appears from the documentation in the white paper that John Carter Vincent filed them because, according to the white paper, he prepared the entire account of conversations.

However, I may say that the last conversation is almost word for word as I took it down. John Carter Vincent was not present on that occasion, and I turned that memorandum over to John Carter Vincent to incorporate with the other conversations.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how it came that the State Department did not get your report? If the President had your conversations with the Generalissimo and he turned them over to the State Department, do you know why the report was not turned over?

Mr. WALLACE. I am quite sure that Vincent turned over the conversations directly to the State Department, and in all probability the President did not turn over my copy of the conversations to the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Vincent's assignment required him to keep memorandums of your own conversations?

Mr. WALLACE. There certainly wasn't any written document as to what he was supposed to do and what he was supposed not to do. In my conversation with Chiang Kai-shek it was obviously very difficult for me to keep a record because I was doing the speaking. Therefore, it worked out perfectly naturally.

As to whether I told him to do it, I don't know, but it must have been that I did ask him to keep a record while I was engaged in the conversation. It is the only thing that could have been done.

Senator FERGUSON. He kept the record rather than for you after the conversation to write up a memorandum?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. BALL. Mr. Wallace has testified with the exception of the last conversation with the Generalissimo, which occurred, as explained in the statement, in the car going to the airport where John Carter Vincent was not present.

Mr. WALLACE. That is with the exception of the last memorandum which from the standpoint of future action was the most important of all the conversations.

Senator FERGUSON. I think at one time you expressed surprise that your report to the President had not been in the State Department.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I did. It didn't get into the press very widely, but I did express surprise that it hadn't gotten to the State Department. The first knowledge I had that it got to the State Department, that it was finally in the hands of the State Department, was the letter I received from Dean Rusk on December 27 of 1950 in which he said he understood this was in the Secretary's office.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do you know where that copy came from?

Mr. WALLACE. I have no idea where it came from.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not furnish it?

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't furnish it; no. I was never asked by the State Department to furnish it. The only request that came to me for that specifically was the request from Senator O'Conor in December of 1949.

Senator O'CONOR. I might say that you complied with that very willingly and instantly when I did make the request of you.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; of course.

First, as I look back, I think I must say that the Generalissimo and I talked somewhat at cross purposes in our discussion of the Communist problem. In the win-the-war atmosphere of that time, it was hard for me to believe that the Nationalists and Communists could not at least exchange military information in order to defeat the Japanese, just as the Western Allies were working with the Russians although representing opposing political philosophies. I had in mind the sort of thing President Roosevelt had talked to me about; exchanges of intelligence, combined efforts against Japanese forces, and the like.

The Generalissimo, on the other hand, must have assumed that military cooperation was impossible without political cooperation, to which he was strongly opposed. Hence, on this point, as I wired President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek seemed to me imbued with prejudice. I could not see at that time why he was opposed to reforming the common Chinese military front against the Japanese which had existed at the start of the war. That is, the Chinese-Japanese war.

Second, and most important, as my cable indicates, the Generalissimo said to me very frankly that he lacked confidence in General Stilwell while he had high confidence in General Chennault. His stated reason for his lack of confidence in General Stilwell was Stilwell's poor understanding of political problems.

In any case, it was very clear to me, from the tone and language of the Generalissimo, that he and Stilwell could not cooperate. It seemed to me further it was an unmanageable situation to have an American commander in China who did not enjoy the Generalissimo's confidence and could not achieve friendly cooperation with him. The military situation in China was already critical.

In fact, Chiang Kai-shek gave me the impression, also indicated in my cable to the President, of hardly knowing which way to turn. This greatly increased the importance of having an American commander in China who could win the confidence that Stilwell had not won, and could genuinely help the Generalissimo in the hard times through which he was passing.

When the Generalissimo took me to the airport at Chungking, he and I were alone in the car with Mme. Chiang, who served as interpreter. He spent the entire hour—it might have been a little longer than an hour—while we were together giving me a personal message to President Roosevelt. His mind worked with great clarity, and I took down his words most faithfully; they are found as he gave them to me, as nearly as the speed of my pencil could permit, on page 559 of the white paper.

So far as action is concerned, the althogether significant part is item 9 on page 559, which gives Chiang Kai-shek's views on June 24, 1944, as to how Roosevelt could help him.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I just inquire now, Mr. Wallace, as to whether or not you know how that particular memorandum in relation to your conversation while you were with the Generalissimo alone, and which you handed to the President, got into the white paper, and your report did not?

Mr. WALLACE. The white paper reported all the conversations I had with Chiang Kai-shek. I dictated, I presume to Owen Lattimore, anyhow I put in Owen Lattimore's hands—I don't mean Owen Lattimore; I mean John Carter Vincent's hands—as quickly as I could after this ride to the airport exactly what took place on the ride to the airport so he could include it in the report which he would later make to the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were reporting that kind of conversation to the State Department, then why didn't you file a copy of your report to the President with the State Department?

Mr. WALLACE. They were two altogether separate things. The report to the President was a summary of the trip, and this was a series of conversations with Chiang Kai-shek on the diplomatic level, which were properly the property of the State Department. I suppose you could quibble and say this was in a little different category than the other diplomatic conversations, but all I can say is that I did not so regard it at the time, and I immediately, as fast as I could, passed it on to John Carter Vincent to include it in the other conversations.

Chiang Kai-shek wanted a contact man with the President who could handle both political and military matters. He criticized Stilwell and praised Chennault, as he had before.

With these thoughts in mind I went on to Kunming, where John Carter Vincent and I were the guests of General Chennault. General Chennault's simple outline of the dangers and threats of the Japanese offensive in east China further drove home the critical nature of the situation.

I resolved, therefore, to send an immediate message to the President, briefly reporting on my talks with the Generalissimo, describing the crisis in China, and suggesting corrective action. The best corrective I could think of was to provide the Generalissimo with an American commander in China who would really work with and support him. Hence it seemed to me necessary to recommend the relief of General Stilwell.

On June 26 at General Chennault's house I went over the whole problem with John Carter Vincent and Joseph Alsop, whom General Chennault had assigned to act as my escort. In the course of a long evening of discussion the three of us batted the whole problem back and forth. With the wholehearted concurrence of both Alsop and Vincent, I decided upon a cable to the President suggesting that General Stilwell be replaced in command in China.

Also, with their concurrence I decided that the new commander in China ought to be given political authority as the President's personal representative. The Generalissimo had asked for this, and it seemed to me that the American commander must have this direct authority from the President in order to obtain Chiang's full confidence. Vincent went along with this view.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I discuss with you this last paragraph? Did you ask Vincent for his suggestions on other matters; for instance, in relation to your report to the President?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember whether I did or not. It is quite possible I might have asked for suggestions. I would think I would, but I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss with Mr. Alsop any of the other problems besides the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. WALLACE. With Alsop I discussed fully and completely the whole military situation in the area for which General Chennault was responsible. I had very extended conversations with Mr. Alsop.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Alsop was assigned as an escort?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his rank at the time?

Mr. WALLACE. The committee asked that before, and I didn't remember. I have inquired since, and I find he was a lieutenant.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt free to discuss with a lieutenant, Mr. Alsop, this important problem of the removal of a general from the theater in China?

Mr. WALLACE. I have never been a stickler for rank, sir. His rank, so far as I was concerned, was as an escort assigned to me by General Chennault, and it appeared—and this is the altogether important thing—that he had the complete confidence of General Chennault.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consult with General Chennault as to the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consult any other general?

Mr. WALLACE. I am sure I didn't consult any other general. This was too delicate a matter to consult with generals.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wondering on this delicate matter why you consulted with a lieutenant. I should like to have an explanation of it.

Mr. WALLACE. The explanation is very simple. I had known Alsop before. He was the escort assigned by General Chennault. He enjoyed the complete confidence of General Chennault, and his presentation was succinct and made sense to me. That was what I wanted. Obviously this was the kind of thing you just simply couldn't talk about outside the smallest possible circle, and I did not.

Now Mr. Alsop may have passed the information on to General Chennault, but to the best of my knowledge I didn't say a word to General Chennault about it, and to the best of my recollection General Chennault said nothing in any way impugning or discrediting General Stilwell.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then that the only military man consulted and the only State Department man consulted outside of the Chinese were Mr. Alsop and Mr. Vincent?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You did consider this a very important matter?

Mr. WALLACE. I considered it a top-secret matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consult with Mr. Owen Lattimore about it?

Mr. WALLACE. No; to the best of my knowledge he never knew about this until it was released in the press this September.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it your conversation with the Generalissimo in the car alone that led you to the conclusion you should look into this matter about the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. WALLACE. That was the completely dominating factor, reinforced by the increasing seriousness of the military situation which I found when I came to Kunming.

First was the very human need of the Generalissimo, as expressed on the way to the airport, as I described it in the last memorandum in the white paper and, second, was the fact that the military situation was even more serious than I thought, as developed by General Chennault at Kunming.

So I felt that there was no time to lose, and I moved into action as fast as I could.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Vincent and Mr. Alsop agree on what should be done about General Stilwell?

Mr. WALLACE. I think you were absent when we went over all of this this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to cover it if you did.

Mr. WALLACE. I think we went over all of it this morning. I indicated we batted it back and forth and arrived at a unanimity of opinion, and I remember no exception which either one of them took to the proposals.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want the record to show that I had a conference with the House this morning and was unable to be present.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was testimony this morning by Mr. Wallace, in response to questioning, that there was nothing in this cable that Mr. Vincent objected to in any way, that whenever there was an objection they would talk it out and square it up, and it did not go in if there was any objection to it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read the record.

Mr. WALLACE. I was reluctant, however, to suggest the replacement of Stilwell without offering someone who could fill his place. My first notion was to recommend General Chennault, in view of the Generalissimo's avowed confidence in him and the impression he had made on me.

Vincent raised no objection to this proposal. It was Alsop, a member of Chennault's staff, who spoke against it. As I recall he offered two main reasons for not recommending Chennault: (1) Chennault could not be spared from his job in Kunming of directing the air effort which was then the sole support of the hard-pressed Chinese armies, and, (2) the name of Chennault, who was unpopular in the Pentagon, would never be approved by the Army staff and would only raise prejudice against my recommendation to replace Stilwell. These seemed sound objections.

Finally, I decided to suggest General Wedemeyer as a man for whom the Generalissimo had expressed admiration, and as a logical candidate in view of his record and position as deputy commander in the Southeast Asia theater.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Alsop explain what the Pentagon's objection was?

Mr. WALLACE. He probably didn't use any phraseology of that kind. I can't recall any phraseology. It was just merely probably some such phrase as "It would raise hell in Washington" or something to that effect. This is what it meant.

Senator FERGUSON. This was the substance?

Mr. WALLACE. This would be what it would mean.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it impress you that this would be a valid objection?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; it did impress me that it would be a valid objection.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, if the Pentagon did not want him——

Mr. WALLACE. It just simply was not the wise thing to do.

Senator O'CONOR. May I interrupt to ask you there if the suggestion as to General Wedemeyer's availability and desirability was first made by you?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I don't think it was made by me. I found out from someone that he was agreeable to Chiang Kai-shek. As I have previously testified—I don't know whether it was Chiang Kai-shek himself, whether it was T. V. Soong, whether it was Joe Alsop—but all I remember is that somebody told me, and I think it appears in the cable, that he was persona grata to Chiang Kai-shek. From whom I obtained the information I can't say.

Mr. Alsop may have some recollection on that. I don't think I have asked him on that particular point, but he may have some recollection.

Senator O'CONOR. I knew you had previously expressed some doubt, but I thought you had possibly refreshed your recollection on it.

Mr. WALLACE. No; I don't know. It could quite possibly be Mr. Alsop. I knew it couldn't get outside of this circle because of the delicacy of the situation. That circle would be the Generalissimo, T. V. Soong, Madame Chiang, and Joseph Alsop. It couldn't have been outside of that circle. I don't believe it could.

I might possibly include Clarence Gauss in that circle, also, with whom I had a very confidential relationship, but I can't say as to that, and this is just merely reasoning in retrospect and not on the basis of memory.

My cable was sent from Kunming that evening, and relayed from New Delhi to Washington on June 28. It was not shown to, or discussed with, anyone except Vincent and Alsop.

This is the story of the Kunming cable which comprised my main action recommendations to the President. It is significant that Budenz in commenting on my June 26 cable, has studiously refrained from referring to what was by far the most important recommendation of that cable—the removal of General Stilwell from command in China.

That recommendation was made, as I have shown, almost wholly on the basis of a complaint by Gen. Chiang Kai-shek. The recommendation that Stilwell's successor be a personal representative of the President was specifically in response to the Generalissimo's request.

If my recommendation for the removal of General Stilwell, made as a result of the Generalissimo's request, was following the Communist line, then the Generalissimo was himself following the Communist line in making that request. This illustrates the utter absurdity of the testimony which Budenz has given.

Budenz has testified that "the Communists were very much opposed to General Chennault and didn't want him in the picture at all."

However, as I have shown, I initially proposed to recommend the appointment of General Chennault as General Stilwell's assistant and this proposal was concurred in by John Carter Vincent who, Budenz implied, was influencing me to follow a Communist line. It was only after considering the advice of a member of General Chennault's own staff, Mr. Alsop, that I eliminated the Chennault proposal.

I think anyone who reads both of my reports must conclude that I was interested only in winning the war and that I felt the Generalissimo must be supported in order to accomplish this. My second report, dated July 10, 1944, was made to the President on my return to the United States. To the best of my recollection I consulted no one in the course of its preparation although I did study various memoranda which had accumulated on my trip.

In that report I emphasized specifically not only the views of Ambassador Gauss, but the views expressed to me by T. V. Soong. Soong, as this committee knows, was always a great friend of the United States, and was subsequently Premier of China under the Generalissimo; he was certainly not in any way pro-Communist.

In my report I stated that Soong was "quite outspoken, saying that it was essential that something 'dramatic' be done to save the situation in China, that it was '5 minutes to midnight' for the Chungking Government." Without being specific he spoke of "need for greatly increased United States Army air activity in China and for reformation of the Chungking Government." He said that "Chiang was bewildered and that there were already signs of disintegration of his authority."

Budenz has testified that my criticism of the Generalissimo's government was in accord with the objectives of the Communists. He implies that the sending of any indication to Washington that the Generalissimo "was incapable of controlling the situation for a long period of time" was one of the central objectives of the Communists, who wanted to use this as an opening wedge for a coalition government. Budenz suggests that anyone who criticized the Generalissimo's government to Washington was thereby furthering the Communists' ends.

This is nonsense. Anyone who knew anything about China at that time—and this included General Chennault—was aware that if the Generalissimo's government were to be saved from ultimate and total collapse that government had to be reformed drastically and without delay. The best way to insure its ultimate collapse and a Communist take-over, was to let it continue in its state of physical and spiritual anemia.

It was in recognition of this convinction, which I shared with almost anyone who knew anything about China at that time, whether American or Chinese, that I set forth at the end of my July 10 report a "possible policy line relative to liberal elements in China."

As a part of that line of policy I advocated support of Chiang combined with support of a new and more liberal coalition to which I hoped Chiang would then swing over in the best interests of the Chinese people, as well as the best national interest of the United States.

The political coalition which I recommended that we foster in China was not a coalition with the Chinese Communists, but a coali-

tion, recruited from within the area controlled by the Chungking Government, consisting as I put it, of—

> progressive banking and commercial leaders of the K. P. Chen type, with a competent understanding both of their own country and of the contemporary western world; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not limited to perpetuation of the old landlord-dominated rural society of China; and the considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry.

Generals of this type are named in the earlier part of the report—Generals Chen Cheng, Chang Fa-Kwei and Pai Chunghsi.

It is significant that, in the years which have passed since then, not a single one of them has deserted to the Communist cause. Indeed, General Chen Cheng is now prime minister of the Nationalist Government on Formosa.

My intention was to urge American support for a return to power of the more modern-minded, pro-American Nationalist leaders whose loss of power had been so much deplored by Ambassador Gauss during my talks with him in Chungking.

While it is all too easy to second-guess events, I feel that if the course of action which I recommended in my cable had been promptly followed, the situation in China would have been improved.

I feel further that the policy which I recommended in my letter offered the best hope for strengthening the position of the Nationalist Government of China and preventing the kind of "political vacuum" which, as I warned the President in my report, would be "filled in ways which you will understand." By that I meant, of course, a Communist take-over.

I refuse to believe that members of a great and powerful body, the most distinguished legislative body in the entire world, can possibly fall for testimony that it was following the Communist line to recommend that Stilwell be replaced by Wedemeyer in 1944. Never have I seen such unmitigated gall as that of this man in coming before a committee of the United States Senate to utter such nonsense. I say it is an affront to the dignity of a great and honorable body, over which I had the honor of presiding for 4 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, as personal representative of President Roosevelt, having visited Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was it necessary for you to follow out the recommendation of Chiang Kai-shek to the President of the United States?

Mr. WALLACE. Was it necessary for me to?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE. Obligatory?

Mr. MORRIS. Characterize it any way you want.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think it was obligatory. I think it was common sense to pass on to the President the cry of one of our leading allies in time of need.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you doing anything more than that when you made that recommendation that General Stilwell be removed? Were you doing anything more than relaying the recommendation or desire of the Generalissimo to the President?

Mr. WALLACE. I can say this. I was deeply moved, as I stated in the hearing before the executive committee, by the cry of a man in deep trouble. I may not have put it exactly that way, but that is essentially what I say. I was deeply moved by the cry of a man in

great trouble, and I was moved to start in to help him as soon as possible.

If you say I am doing this pro forma, I would merely say if I were doing it pro forma, would I have moved with such exceeding speed? I would say that I moved with really exceptional speed to get this to the President, so I would say it was going beyond, shall we say, in view of the difficulties of communications existing out there, it was going beyond the action of simple duty. It was really moving with speed and impetus.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, did the Communists object to the recommendation that General Stilwell be removed?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know what the Communists did during this period.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they object to his actual removal?

Mr. WALLACE. I have no idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it not the heart of your contention that anyone who did not object to the removal of General Stilwell must necessarily have been a non-Communist. Is that not your whole case, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. Well, I am just going by Budenz's testimony. He claims that the Communists were not opposed to Wedemeyer at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. We are talking about General Stilwell's removal.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, Stilwell's removal. I will say that I have found out recently that they were definitely and clearly opposed.

Mr. MORRIS. How did they oppose it? Will you give us the evidence, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, I can give you the evidence. I don't know that we have it with us, but that can be obtained, that they clearly and definitely opposed it.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that not the whole issue?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, I think that is the whole issue; and I think that ought to be put in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you have that in writing?

Mr. BALL. Yes; we can supply that.

Mr. WALLACE. I have asked Mr. Ball to get the full evidence along this line because it is the very heart of the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose at that point? I don't mean to stop Mr. Morris from anything he has to introduce, but it does seem it might be suggested for the record that the question of determining who was or was not a Communist on the basis of an act or acts which might have been performed at a specified time, while it may be pertinent and relevant, is not the whole question.

There were two prongs of the question which is raised with regard to possible influence over Mr. Wallace, and in justice to Mr. Wallace I believe it should be pointed out that the question on the first part is, "Was Mr. Wallace influenced by anybody?" And that question has to be answered before you can ask the question whether he was influenced by a Communist or any other political viewpoint.

I should also think, in justice to Mr. Wallace, that the testimony so far shows very clearly that Mr. Wallace has stated repeatedly that John Carter Vincent did have a part in the formulation of these cables, that it was thoroughly discussed with him, that when he raised objection the thing was talked out and the cable eventually contained nothing to which he did object; and, therefore, it would seem perfectly

clear that there was influence, that Mr. John Carter Vincent did have a part in this whole thing.

Is that not correct, sir?

Mr. WALLACE. John Carter Vincent undoubtedly had a part in the discussion of the cables.

Mr. SOURWINE. Right.

Mr. WALLACE. As to just what part he had, all I can say is that I remember we continually batted back and forth what was to go into the cables. Whether he objected to anything, he might remember. I don't remember of his objecting to anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Wallace, this removal of General Stilwell was of such importance that you took it up immediately instead of waiting to come back to the United States?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And this cable that you sent would be secret and would go through the Army communications?

Mr. WALLACE. It did.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it coded or not?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; it was coded.

Senator FERGUSON. With the State Department code or somebody else's?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know. I suppose it might have been in Army code. I don't know anything about that. The only reason I know it was coded is because when I came to send the document to President Truman I found it so stated.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you keep a copy of it?

Mr. WALLACE. I think I have a copy, but this one is the one apparently that was received by me from the War Department in August of 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this cable in the white paper?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a secret document?

Mr. WALLACE. It was so marked at the time, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it still a secret document?

Mr. WALLACE. I wouldn't think so under the circumstances.

Senator FERGUSON. It came through the Army?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; it came through the Army.

Senator FERGUSON. So, they knew you were recommending the removal of a major general in a theater?

Mr. WALLACE. Somebody in New Delhi may have learned it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it came through their cable. Their translaters here would catch it.

Mr. WALLACE. Of course, I was not particularly aware at the time as to how it would be transmitted. I learned it after the fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You were recommending with the advice of Mr. Alsop and Mr. Vincent the removal of a major general in a theater?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And outside of Chiang Kai-shek you had no other military advisers except Mr. Alsop, who was then in the military?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You were doing that through the channels of the Army. Now, did you assign your reasons in this cable?

Mr. WALLACE. Well, it is spelled out in the closing part of the cable, if you care to read it.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume this cable is a copy from your file?

Mr. WALLACE. This comes from what I transmitted to the President, and I believe the White House must have had this mimeographed directly from my files; yes.

I say in the closing part of this cable, after describing the seriousness of the situation:

> An American general officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not enpoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political considerations. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake the assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence, but he should not be removed from his present military position.
>
> The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions, (2) command all American forces in China, and (3) bring about full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command American forces in China because, without this, his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal directly with the White House on political questions, or China may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.

I think that gives the reasons.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you stated in the record what these political considerations were about which you are talking?

Mr. WALLACE. So far as the record in 1944 is concerned, the closest I came to it is referring to the vacuum that will exist in case the deterioration continues, the vacuum which I stated in 1944 would "be filled in ways which you will understand." That is so far as the record in 1944.

Do you want something in addition to that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I do along this line. General Stilwell and the Generalissimo did not agree on political questions. Now, what was that political question?

Mr. WALLACE. General Stilwell believed that more could be gotten out of the military effort against the Japanese if the Chinese Communists received a considerable percentage of American arms.

Senator FERGUSON. So, there was a question there of communism?

Mr. WALLACE. Chiang felt that was a political matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. As you testified here, sir, in your prepared statement:

> At the same time the Japanese had started a major offensive in east China. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, the American commander in the China-Burma-India theater, was wholly preoccupied with the campaign in Burma. The Chinese Armies being attacked by the Japanese had received no American aid to strengthen them. The Generalissimo complained to me that even the air support for them was limited by General Stilwell's policies.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that represent a direct complaint from Chiang to you?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was this question of aid or no aid to the Communists involved in the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. WALLACE. I may say that when a Vice President goes into a foreign land and Americans with different points of view approach

the Vice President they are very cautious in saying anything against the opposing point of view, and to the best of my recollection no one attached to General Stilwell said anything against General Chennault, and nobody attached to General Chennault said anything against General Stilwell. I didn't learn much in China about this situation. I have learned it after the fact for the most part.

I got a glimmering of it from Chiang; but, so far as the Americans in China were concerned, they were exceedingly polite.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to the political question——

Mr. WALLACE. I got a glimmer of that before I went out there, I may say, just a glimmer of it from someone who called on me. This was a gentleman who was associated with T. V. Soong, who tipped me off, who knew a little about it.

Senator FERGUSON. But the question was involved as to the amount of aid or the nature of the aid to be given to the Communists?

Mr. WALLACE. In retrospect it seems to me that was the issue, but I think I will have to say that was chiefly in retrospect.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that question discussed with Mr. Vincent?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I have no recollection of it. As I say, it is in retrospect that I have this knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not discuss with John Carter Vincent the question of why they wanted to remove General Stilwell?

Mr. WALLACE. I have no recollection of any such conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, how could he aid you in the question of the removal of General Stilwell if you did not tell him why he was to be removed?

Mr. WALLACE. As I have said, this whole thing came from my initiative growing out of my conversation with Chiang Kai-shek, and I got into action as soon as I possibly could after I left Chiang Kai-shek.

After I had the conversation with him, I left that afternoon for Kunming. The next day, the 25th—I was getting briefed by Chennault on the 25th—and then I got into action at the earliest possible moment, and it wasn't on the basis—frankly, it was on the basis of who Chiang could get along with to do a job. That was the basis.

There was no need for John Carter Vincent—John Carter Vincent may have said something. I have no recollection of what it was, not the slightest.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out what you told Vincent. Did you not tell him the political question involved between Stilwell and the generalissimo was that of the furnishing of supplies or equipment to the Communists?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think I even knew it at the time. I am sure I didn't know it.

Senator FERGUSON. Your wire indicates a political question.

Mr. WALLACE. The Generalissimo had said—and you will find it, I think, in the last part of the conversations—whether it is in there or not, he had said that he had no political confidence in Stilwell.

Now, I didn't know at that time, I am sure, what was the basis of his lack of confidence, and so far as I could remember I did not inquire as to the basis of his lack of confidence. I took the words down. This is what I took down; this is practically verbatim, from

what the Generalissimo said on the way to the airport: "Stilwell has improved but has no understanding of political matters."

Senator FERGUSON. You did not question him on what those political matters were?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. So, really, what you consulted Mr. Alsop and Mr. Vincent about is how Chiang Kai-shek did not want this man as the general in the theater, were you to recommend his removal and the replacement by another general?

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't see how the Generalissimo and his forces could get results in cooperation with the Americans unless he had someone in whom he had complete confidence, not only in military matters but in political matters.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did the name of Wedemeyer come into the conversation or into the analysis?

Mr. WALLACE. Obviously, if I was going to recommend someone to carry out these three specifications, to fulfill them, I, knowing how Roosevelt's mind worked, felt it essential to have another name. That is always in government; if you suggest dropping someone, you have to have a name.

So, I turned around to get a name. Whether I had been given that name earlier or whether I got it from Joe Alsop, I can't positively say, but anyhow the name was there, and it was the only name, I may say—after Chennault's name was eliminated in the manner I described—it was the only name that any of us could think of. That is the name we put forward.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Wedemeyer's assignment at that time?

Mr. WALLACE. Well, he had been a deputy with Stilwell, I believe. I have forgotten what he was at that specific moment. It can readily be ascertained.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you met him?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him?

Mr. WALLACE. I have never met him. I have a close friend in Des Moines who went to West Point with him, who thinks very highly of him. But I had never met him.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he in the Chinese theater at that time?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; he had been. I already so stated. You see, I have already stated [reading]:

> Finally, I decided to suggest General Wedemeyer as a man for whom the Generalissimo had expressed admiration, and as a logical candidate in view of his record and position as deputy commander in the Southeast Asia theater.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you raised the name of Wedemeyer first?

Mr. WALLACE. I would very much doubt it, because I didn't know him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think Mr. Alsop did?

Mr. WALLACE. It would seem to me it was either Mr. Alsop or the Generalissimo or Mme. Chiang or T. V. Soong.

Senator FERGUSON. Your message on what was said by the Generalissimo on this question of Stilwell when you were riding in the car and otherwise did not mention the Wedemeyer name?

Mr. WALLACE. No; it didn't mention the Wedemeyer name.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not indicate that he did not mention it?

Mr. WALLACE. It does not necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you were rather accurate in taking that down at that time?

Mr. WALLACE. I said as fast as the speed of my pencil permits. I wouldn't claim I could take down everything that was said in a car going to the airport. I did it as fast as I could. That is, it is impossible to swear absolutely where I got the name Wedemeyer, but it would be my impression I got it from Alsop.

Senator FERGUSON. From Alsop?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; but I do not exclude the other possibility.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is one thing that might help on that, Mr. Wallace, in line with Senator Ferguson's question. If you had asked the Generalissimo who he would like in place of Stilwell, that would have been something that you would have noted down because you would have had your pencil poised for it when you asked that question.

Mr. WALLACE. I am sure I did not ask a question of that sort of Chiang Kai-shek because I would have looked upon it as an exceedingly improper question to ask of the Generalissimo.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Mr. Wallace, you were asked to remove a man and the principal ground was that he did not agree with the Generalissimo, and now you are asking that that man be removed from his high position, a major general.

Mr. WALLACE. I wasn't asking that he be removed from his position as major general.

Senator FERGUSON. Major general in the theater.

Mr. WALLACE. That he be removed from his position of running things in China.

Senator FERGUSON. You are recommending a man to fill a position where you did not know whether or not he was in the good graces of the Generalissimo. Is that not a fact?

Mr. WALLACE. I state in my cablegram that I am informed he is persona grata with the Generalissimo.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that information?

Mr. WALLACE. This is what it says in the cable.

> While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

Senator FERGUSON. That indicates it was not your idea; somebody else recommended him?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get the information he was friendly to the Generalissimo?

Mr. WALLACE. I have given you all the information I have and I can't give you any more.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the same person who recommended him, would you say?

Mr. WALLACE. Not necessarily, but I just simply don't have further recollection. I can't say; I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, the only person whom Chiang indicated as perhaps acceptable in place of Stilwell was General Chennault, was it not?

Mr. WALLACE. You see, he wasn't asking for the replacement of General Stilwell. All these people were exceedingly proper.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course.

Mr. WALLACE. And he wasn't asking for it, but he came as close to asking for it as he could and observing the ordinary diplomatic proprieties.

Mr. SOURWINE. He made it clear to you that he would like Stilwell replaced?

Mr. WALLACE. In interpreting diplomatic proprieties, he was obviously asking for the replacement of Stilwell, but he didn't do it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he not also come as close as he could within the proprieties to suggesting General Chennault as Stilwell's replacement?

Mr. WALLACE. It might be. As a matter of fact, it would seem to me from my cable that must have been true, because the first person that—well, I mentioned Chennault as the person who would naturally come to mind. I went into the question of Chennault as the man when I got there and, as I say, Mr. Alsop demurred.

Mr. SOURWINE. I realize that, but I was asking my question not on that basis, which is corroborative evidence, but on the basis of your own statement which shows that Chiang spoke to you of his distrust, if I may use that word, which is not perfectly descriptive of General Stilwell, and in the same breath, almost at the same time, the same occasion, praised Chennault. Since he was not directly asking for Stilwell's removal or replacement, did you not take it that his expressions with regard to Chennault in the same breath were an indication he would favor Chennault as the successor?

Mr. WALLACE. I undoubtedly did take it in that sense.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to know if the Generalissimo recommended in effect Chennault.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, I would interpret it that way, that he would have been very happy if Chennault could have been the man.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and then you were suggesting someone to be removed because he was not agreeable to the Generalissimo. Then on the say of Mr. Alsop—as I understand it, that was the only objection made to Chennault—you recommended another man whom you had not discussed or do not remember discussing with the Generalissimo. Is that a fair analysis?

Mr. WALLACE. No, I don't think it is an analysis.

Senator FERGUSON. What is wrong?

Mr. WALLACE. I make it very clear in the cable that Wedemeyer was persona grata with the Generalissimo. That is a very important point to observe. That is in the cable, that he is persona grata with the Generalissimo.

Senator FERGUSON. There are only three people you could have gotten that from, the Generalissimo, Mr. Alsop, or Mr. Vincent.

Mr. WALLACE. Or Mr. T. V. Soong.

Senator FERGUSON. T. V. Soong. Now can you recall where you got it?

Mr. WALLACE. I think the probabilities would be Mr. Alsop, but I can't swear to it.

Senator FERGUSON. The same man that recommended that they do not appoint his superior officer, who was Chennault at the time?

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Alsop may have talked to General Chennault about it, but I don't know anything about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been Mr. Vincent who first suggested General Wedemeyer's name?

Mr. WALLACE. My recollection would be that Mr. Vincent had nothing to do with that. My recollection is that he did not object to anything, of Mr. Wedemeyer's name.

Could I continue? I think you started out by saying that I would not be interrupted.

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry; I thought you had finished the testimony.

Mr. WALLACE. No, I mean the reading of the testimony; Senator Ferguson was not here at the time, and the chairman suggested that I read through, and have these questions afterward.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have finished, have you not?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right; I have finished. I beg your pardon.

Senator SMITH. There could be a second edition of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, when the Senators are through questioning for a moment, I have a list of questions that will take about 10 minutes, that I would like to pursue.

Mr. MORRIS. May I introduce at this time the official Communist reactions to the removal of Stilwell? Would you consider that pertinent at this time?

Senator SMITH. Yes; unless what Mr. Sourwine had ought to come ahead of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; Mr. Chairman, the offer of it and the introduction makes no difference in regard to my questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the two reactions of the Daily Worker to the removal of Stilwell?

Mr. MANDEL. The New York Times registered the relieving of Stilwell on October 29, 1944. We thereupon looked through the Daily Worker subsequent to that. The first reference to the Stilwell recall occurs in the Daily Worker on November 1, 1944, on page 8, in an article written by Joseph Starobin who is the leading writer of the Daily Worker on foreign affairs, in a section headed "Stilwell's recall."

He says the following:

> Stilwell's recall is sensational because it cracks open the dismal story of what has really been happening in China.

now, further, he says:

> I disagree with Brooks Atkinson of the Times in only one respect.

on the same page of the Daily Worker is an article quoting Brooks Atkinson's reaction to the removal, and Brooks Atkinson is critical of the removal.

Now, this is the statement of Starobin in reference to Brooks Atkinson's article:

> I disagree with Brooks Atkinson of the Times in only one respect. To him Stilwell's withdrawal was a mere negative action, leaving Chungking to stew in its own mess. But I see out of this negative act something basic and positive and decisive for all of Asia.

Then in the Daily Worker, somewhat later, is an article by Frederic Vanderbilt Field, dated December 2, 1944, on page 7, in his Today's Guest column. He says:

> At the time of General Stilwell's recall, a press reported reliably, in my opinion, that the United States had conveyed to the Chinese Government three conditions for effective coalition warfare against Japan. These were, first, that the Chinese high command undertake a thorough reorganization of its armies in order to make them effective fighting units; second, that the military effort of the Kuomintang and Communist-led armies be unified and, third, that an American be named commander in chief of all allied forces in China. What is the status of these conditions—not ultimate, for coalition warfare? I believe that the first two remain intact and that progress is being made to carry them out. As to the third, we know only that there was a breakdown of the particular person nominated as commander in chief, General Stilwell, and that President Roosevelt wisely and quickly compromised on that point. There is no indication that the general proposition of an American commander has been refused.

Senator SMITH. Where is that from?

Mr. MANDEL. That is from the Daily Worker, December 2, 1944, by Frederick V. Field.

Mr. WALLACE. Gentlemen, I would like to make this comment, that any statement with regard to Stilwell, as far as I am concerned, should go back to the period with which I am concerned, which is in June of 1944, and not in October or December of 1944; that the Communist line changes very rapidly, indeed; that the Communist line—and I gather this not from the Daily Worker, but from a Washington paper quoting the Daily Worker—the Communist line in early 1944 was strong praise of the clear-headed men of Wall Street; so the line changed in many very unusual ways, and I would like to reserve the right to introduce into the record material which my counsel has found with regard to what the Daily Worker was saying at the period under consideration, which is June of 1944 and not October of 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. Those are a few days after the removal of Stilwell.

Mr. WALLACE. But you see, I was recommending Stilwell's removal in June of 1944, and it actually took place, not because of my recommendation, but for other reasons, in the late fall of 1944. I think, in view of these very rapid twists and turns in the Communist line, that it is important at this time, in view of the fact that this is introduced into the record that certain other material be introduced into the record that my counsel has found in the Daily Worker, earlier in the year.

I think it is important, in view of the many twists and turns that the Communists take to present not only one presentation—because you can get anything—you can get from the Communists this: That the Chinese Communists, that is, you can get from the top command in Russia, that the Chinese Communists, at this period, were brigands, robbers and Fascists, and that the only hope was in Chiang Kai-shek.

Now, the question is: When was that turn? It is an in-and-out proposition continually, all the time, and you cannot put your finger on them. You take just merely one of their presentations, it means nothing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, you must admit the only time you get a comment on the removal of Stilwell was when he was actually removed.

Mr. WALLACE. With regard to that, I would simply say this: that at that time the war was coming to its concluding phase, that their supreme purpose was to do everything they could to save Russian lives. I think that was what animated the American Communists, was to save Russian lives; that in order to save Russian lives, they would go to very extreme lengths to promote the maximum unity and they might conceivably come out very vigorously, once it was a fait accompli, for what they previously opposed very, very strongly—and we will introduce evidence as to that—they did not want this, after it was a fait accompli, because they were so eager to save Russian lives, they would say "Yes, sure, this is fine."

I think you have to keep this in mind in analyzing anything of this sort. It is the over-all picture, not isolated material which you can give out.

My attorney seems to be uneasy.

Mr. BALL. I was just going to suggest, in commenting on Mr. Morris' statement for the committee's benefit, that it is possible to find in the Daily Worker around about the time that Mr. Wallace was in China and when these decisions were made, so far as he was concerned, comments with respect to General Stilwell, and I think that the suggestion that Mr. Wallace made is a very valid one, that there was 5 months or more to intervene here, and it was very possible for the line to change materially.

But, in any event, we will submit the material.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have it here?

Mr. WALLACE. We do not have it here, unfortunately, but we will be glad to give it to you.

Senator O'CONOR. It is a fact that there were publications to indicate that their policy was of a different nature, as of June or thereabouts?

Mr. BALL. There are publications which indicate a view of General Stilwell.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not the point. It is General Stilwell's removal, is it not, that we are talking about?

Mr. BALL. I do not think you can disassociate those questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Ball, do you contend that the Daily Worker——

Senator SMITH. Wait a minute. If you are going to examine Mr. Ball, should we not swear him? If his testimony is going on, should we not swear him?

Senator FERGUSON. It is just a statement. I do not care if you swear him.

Senator SMITH. All right; you may go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to ask a question.

Is it your contention that the Daily Worker back in June was for or against Stilwell?

Mr. BALL. From the investigations that we have made, sir, it would indicate that they were in favor of General Stilwell. There is a reference—and I am sorry to speak without the material in front of me—but there is a reference where they refer to him, I believe, as "Our favorite American general." There are one or two other references.

Senator FERGUSON. So back in June they were in favor of General Stilwell?

Mr. BALL. That would be the inference we would draw from it. But we will submit the material to the committee, and the committee can value it as it sees fit.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no objection to its submission. But perhaps I should state for the record that the question of what the Communists thought of General Stilwell prior to the time of Mr. Wallace's recommendation cannot have very much to do with Mr. Wallace's state of mind at the time, since he has testified that he did not know at that time what the Communists thought of General Stilwell.

Is that not correct, Mr. Wallace?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is true, that he did not know what they thought, at least, that did not influence you?

Mr. WALLACE. No; that did not have influence.

Mr. MORRIS. And may I point out that the issue is the removal of Stilwell, and not what the Communists thought of Stilwell.

Senator SMITH. Do you have some questions that you want to ask?

Mr. SOURWINE. If I might, Mr. Chairman, I do have some questions.

I would like first to pick up the thread and find out what happened to Mr. Lattimore. Where was he when the Kuoming cables were written?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know where he was. Maybe Mr. Alsop would remember. But he wasn't with us.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will ask Mr. Alsop when he comes on as a witness.

Mr. WALLACE. He may remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether Mr. Lattimore absented himself from your party before you got to Kuoming?

Mr. WALLACE. I really don't know that. Usually he was with us, but he might, because of the fact that the OWI had an office in Chungking. He might have stayed over.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did come back with you in the same plane, though?

Mr. WALLACE. In the same plane, yes—and usually he was with us. But he did have some special duties in connection with the OWI in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you have testified that in regard to the Kuoming cables, you did not consult Mr. Lattimore and you do not think he knew about them?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is true; even though Mr. Lattimore was a man who had been praised to you by the President, whose choice for this mission to accompany you on this mission, you think was the President's initiation?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did not consult with him with regard to it?

Mr. WALLACE. No. The President's reference to him was as a specialist on this northern border.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE. And the tribes that wandered back and forth along that northern border of China. I did not look upon him as a political adviser, but merely as an adviser with regard to that one situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are primarily making the point, are you not,

that Mr. Budenz was wrong when he stated or implied that you were influenced by Communists on your mission?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I do so state.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, there were only two men whom Mr. Budenz mentioned in that connection, were there not?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Vincent?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to Mr. Lattimore, the essence of your contention is that he could not have influenced you because he did not have anything to do with this matter, is that correct?

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in regard to Mr. Vincent, are you willing to let the record stand as it is on the question of whether he influenced you in connection with these cables?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I think it is correct to let the record stand as it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge as to whether Mr. Vincent is or was a Communist?

Mr. WALLACE. None whatsoever. That is, as I said in executive hearing, I am not here on behalf of any person, any organization, any party, or in criticism of any person, any party, or any organization. I am very glad to have no connection with any of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a few questions which leave that point, Mr. Chairman, if I may be indulged for a moment.

Just running through this statement as it stands, first, Mr. Wallace, who, if anyone, helped you in the preparation of this statement that we have here?

Mr. WALLACE. This here?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; the one you offered and read today.

Mr. WALLACE. Well, I typewrote out the first draft of this myself up at the farm, and then I came down and yesterday went over it with Mr. Ball, and we spent, I would say, the greater part of yesterday working on it. I had, in my particular draft which I had made at the farm, I had not dealt with the material that was in the release of the other day, and so Mr. Ball and I addressed ourselves to the problem of combining the two, because we thought there should be introduced into the record only one statement, and not an effort to introduce the other statement which had been released to the press. That is the account of how this was formed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Alsop assist at all in the preparation of this statement?

Mr. WALLACE. No; in no way whatsoever.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he see it before it was released?

Mr. WALLACE. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the previous statement that you had with you, which was denied admission, did Mr. Alsop assist in the preparation of that?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know whether he did or not. Do you know?

Mr. BALL. No; we consulted him on questions of recollection. You consulted him and talked to him.

Mr. WALLACE. Well, now, I don't know whether it was on this occasion or not. I remember I was much interested at one time or another with Mr. Alsop in finding out just what became of these

Chinese generals, and this banker, and so on. I really had quite a curiosity about that, and I wanted to look into that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wondered if you had asked Mr. Alsop's advice about the release, or about what should go into the release, or about the timing of the release, or anything of that nature?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think so.

Mr. BALL. No; I will take the responsibility for that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consult in connection with either of these two releases, or assist in connection with either of these two releases, assisted by anyone connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, so far as you know?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jumping to another point, you made the comment here a moment ago, some little time ago, when you were reading from page 7 of your statement, after you had read this sentence:

> As the OWI representative on the mission, Mr. Lattimore was expected to assist our group in its relations with the press.

you had made the comment out of context of the statement: "that was in China, not in Russia."

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, why did you make that distinction?

Mr. WALLACE. Just simply because there wasn't any press in Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. They did not have newspapers?

Mr. WALLACE. Well, they had newspapers, but I mean it is senseless to think that anybody could contact the press in Russia, in the sense in which we think of press contacts in the United States. In China it was another matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. The press relations that Mr. Lattimore was handling, then, were with the local papers, and not with the papers back in the United States?

Mr. WALLACE. It was working through the local OWI office, as I remember it, with the Chinese press.

Mr. SOURWINE. The OWI did not have any office in Russia, did they?

Mr. WALLACE. I would be quite sure they did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether or not Mr. Lattimore spoke Russian?

Mr. WALLACE. As I testified in executive session, I think he spoke some, not much. I would call it archeological Russian. In one case, of rather stumbling along with Russian, it was with the director of an archeological museum, at Minisinsk, and I think what he did was to take a scientific word and put a "ski" on the end of it. But in the scientific realm it is quite possible, because there is a sort of international language there, if you have just a little fragment of information to get along. I don't know how well he spoke it, but that is the one time when I remember that he seemed to get something out of an old lady who was directing the museum.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do regard Mr. Lattimore as a scholar?

Mr. WALLACE. I do regard him as a scholar, and it may be that he knows Russian better than I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your statement about taking words and putting a "ski" on the end was a jest?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I mean to say that when you are dealing with scientific matters it is easier to get along than you realize.

Mr. SOURWINE. But Mr. Lattimore would probably have known the proper archeological terms for anything that he wanted to discuss?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know as to that. But, at any rate, he seemed to get along with this old lady, after a fashion, and to tell us that this is from the Bronze Age, and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your statment on page 10 you have this sentence at the top of the page:

> With these thoughts in mind, I went on to Kuoming, where John Carter Vincent and I were the guests of General Chennault.

Where did you go to there from?

Mr. WALLACE. From Chungking. As I remember, we left there in the early afternoon and got there some time that same day.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned that John Carter Vincent and you "were the guests of General Chennault." That seems to imply that Mr. Lattimore was not with you.

Mr. WALLACE. I just don't know. Mr. Alsop may have recollection on that point. I just don't know. It is just simply because of the fact that it was John Carter Vincent and I who had this conference with Alsop, and I don't know what happened to Mr. Lattimore at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 14 of your memorandum, sir, near the top of the page again, by coincidence, you say—

> The best way to insure its ultimate collapse and a Communist take-over * * *

that is, the Chiang regime—

> best way to insure its ultimate collapse and a Communist take-over, was to let it continue in its state of physical and spiritual anemia.

Now, by "physical anemia" I take it you mean lack of material, lack of supplies, and that type of thing?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And by "spiritual anemia" what do you mean?

Mr. WALLACE. I mean that as a result of this very great lack of supplies, as a result of their weak budgetary and currency situation, there was an enormous inflation which so deprived the ordinary leadership in a local way of the means of life, that they had lost, that they had become so preoccupied with the terrific problem of keeping alive that they were begining to lose their will to fight. They had been in the war for 7 years, and the situation which these people, who ordinarily would be leading in the local community, had become so impoverished that the spiritual lifeblood had been veritably sucked out of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the whole thing, then, reverts back primarily to that lack of physical material?

Mr. WALLACE. There is always a relation between the spiritual and the physical which you cannot separate.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

> The best way to insure its ultimate collapse and a Communist take-over, was to let it continue in its state of physical and spiritual anemia.
>
> It was in recognition of this conviction, which I shared with almost anyone who knew anything about China at that time—

and so forth.

So I take it that it is a fair conclusion that it was your feeling that it was true that the best way to insure the collapse of the Chiang regime was to let that physical and spiritual anemia continue?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what was there in your recommendations, in your July 10 report, which was designed to alleviate that physical anemia?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember. Have you got the July 10 report? I would say the chief thing probably had to do with——

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you recommending additional supplies to be furnished by us to the Chiang regime?

Mr. WALLACE. You might look over there and see whether it is in that report.

I can say this: that I had, before I went over there, and I am not sure whether I was able to follow this up afterward—I know I was able to, to some extent, later on—I had gone into the question of substituting C–54's for C–47's, because I had discovered that one C–54 would carry seven times as much goods as one C–47.

We had been using C–47's over the hump, and I had been informed that 1 month's output of C–54's in the United States would carry as much in the way of goods as the entire Burma Road.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon my interruption, sir; but, if you please——

Mr. WALLACE. And I had pushed on that particular front. Now, as I say, I don't remember to what extent I had pushed before I went over, or to what extent afterward. Is there anything in here on that?

Mr. BALL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, sir; go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace, if you do not mind, instead of asking Mr. Ball if there is anything in it, we can refer to this—I want to make this clear, sir. I do not mean to contend about anything that you may have done before, but I am particularly interested in this particular time.

You have a paragraph here—it is your own voluntary statement—you have said that you felt that the best way to insure the ultimate collapse and a Communist take-over of the Chiang regime was to let it continue in its then—you have said—

> it was in recognition of this conviction, which I shared with almost anyone who knew anything about China at that time, whether American or Chinese, that I set forth at the end of my July 10 report a "possible policy line relative to liberal elements in China."

I am trying to find out what there was in that possible policy line which was a recommendation by you for the alleviation of the Chiang regime.

Mr. WALLACE. Just a little earlier—I would call attention to this paragraph, that we should bear constantly in mind that the Chinese, a nonfighting people, have resisted the Japanese for 7 years; economic hardship and uninspiring leadership have introduced something akin to spiritual and physical anemia.

There is a widespread popular dislike for the Kuomintang Government. There is also strong popular dislike for the Japanese and the confidence in victory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that answers my question?

Mr. WALLACE. It didn't give a specific program with regard to C–54's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hear the question, sir?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I heard the question. But this is, really, in the main, in the nature of a travelogue, and a suggestion for political action, and not a detailed—this particular report is not a detailed discussion of economic methods of alleviating the difficulty in China. I am not saying that this is the proper place to engage in that discussion. It was something that was close to my heart and on which I did take action. But it is not in this report to any greater degree than merely the recognition that there was an economic problem.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace, I have not picked out a portion of your report at random and asked you what was included in it. I am asking you about the portion of the report in which you, yourself, in your own statement, have directed attention, in connection with your statement, about what was the best way to insure the collapse of the Chiang regime.

Mr. WALLACE. I may say that I am very proud of this report.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not attacking the report, sir. I am asking you, since you have said that it was in recognition of your conviction that the best way to insure the collapse of the Chiang regime was to let it continue in its then present state of physical and spiritual anemia—in view of that fact, and your statement that it was in recognition of that conviction that you set forth at the end of your July 10 report a possible policy line relative to liberal elements in China, what there was in that policy line, if anything, that was designed to relieve or alleviate the state of physical anemia?

Mr. WALLACE. All right. Let's read over this possible policy line:

Our policy, at the present time, should not be limited to support of the Government. It is essential to remember that we have, in fact, not simply been supporting Chiang, but a coalition headed by Chiang——

Mr. SOURWINE. From what are you reading?

Mr. WALLACE. Possible policy line relative to——

Mr. SOURWINE. From the end of your July 10 report?

Mr. WALLACE (reading):

but a coalition headed by Chiang and supported by the landlords, the warlord group most closely associated with landlords, and the Chiang group of bankers. We can, as an alternative, support those elements which are capable of supporting a new coalition, better able to carry the war to a conclusion, and better qualified for the postwar needs of China. Such a coalition was to be of progressive banking and commercial leaders of the K. P. Chen type, with a competent understanding, both of their own country and of the contemporary Western World; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not limited to perpetuation of the old landlord-dominated rural society of China; and the considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry.

The emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting both military aid and economic aid and by the formulation and statement of American political aims and sympathies, both in China and in regions adjacent to China. The future of Chiang would then be determined by Chiang himself. If he retains the political sensitivity and the ability to call the turn which originally brought him to power, he will swing over to the new coalition and head it. If not, the new coalition, in the natural course of events, will produce its own leader.

This statement is a very clear cut answer to the question that you raise. While the point I was making about getting more C–54's on the run over the Hump, it would have been of some help, it would have been infinitesimal compared to the economic help that would have flowed from this recommendation here.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wish you would explain, the economic help that would have flowed from this recommenation.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. As a matter of fact, this was the only way in which you could get substantial economic help, because, and I call your attention—

the emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting both military aid and economic aid and by the formulation and statement of American political aims and sympathies, both in China and the regions adjacent to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a statement. If you please, sir, at that point—is that not a statement that the method of allotting physical aid could help to bring about what you call a coalition government, a new group of some sort?

Mr. WALLACE. That is exactly the point that I am making.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not the reverse, is it? That is not the statement that the new group will bring about more aid to China, is it?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; definitely so, sir. And this I brought out in some detail in executive session. I would call your attention to that fact, that it would operate in this manner:

T. V. Soong apparently has lost out with Chiang and found himself in a very perilous position in late 1943 and early 1944, because he had been the spokesman of the Kuomingtang in the United States, and Chiang thought that he had not been able to bring the help to China that he should have brought to China; that America had not brought the help to China, and, therefore, T. V. Soong was retired, practically, from circulation and was in a very perilous situation, indeed, so Ambassador Gauss told me.

So my proposition, as contained in the paragraph I have read, clearly amounts to this: that the United States, in allotting the aid, should build up the American-minded Chinese, the Western Chinese, so that we would raise, in the estimation of Chiang, and, simultaneously, you would have China getting goods, but getting goods in a way that would strengthen the pro-American element in the Kuomintang. That enlightened element was the only element in the Kuomintang that had the knowledge of modern industrial and financial forces, as they operate in the economic field, to solve the very serious problem in which the Generalissimo found himself.

I say that this is 100 to 1 compared with my other recommendation with regard to C–54's, important as that was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that this that you have read here, and which you are now discussing, is a recommendation for additional aid to the Chiang regime, additional material aid?

Mr. WALLACE. I do, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did so intend it?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you stating that you did not intend this as a recommendation or diversion of some of the aid that otherwise would go to Chiang to some new group?

Mr. WALLACE. No; this was to be Chiang heading the show, but a pro-American show, and not an anti-American show.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you intend that some of the aid should be put at the disposal of Soong, so as to build him up?

Mr. WALLACE. I am just using that as an illustration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you so intend?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say he would be No. 1 on the list; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you have put the aid at his disposal? Did you have any thought about that?

Mr. WALLACE. It is one of those things that happened all the time in China, that that was the way you operated. That is all there is to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not familiar with how things operate in China; that is why I am asking you, sir.

Mr. WALLACE. I am not an expert in the field, but it is quite a system over there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did contemplate that the aid would be put at the disposal of Soong, and I presume others?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say pro-American Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a label.

Mr. WALLACE. In the Kuomintang group.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; they were people who were not then in favor with Chiang?

Mr. WALLACE. They had fallen out of favor in late 1943 and early 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not in favor?

Mr. WALLACE. Not in favor.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were going to place at their disposal some of the aid available from America, instead of giving it to Chiang?

Mr. WALLACE. Is it the kind of thing that the State Department does all the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Leaving that aside, it was the thing that you then were recommending?

Mr. WALLACE. Absolutely.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were going to divert a portion that would otherwise have gone to Chiang?

Mr. WALLACE. It is not "otherwise," it is the way the thing goes all the time. People under Chiang operated under this all the time. The question is, Who they would be.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were going to raise a group within the Kuomintang, who were at that time out of favor with Chiang?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right; a more liberal group.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or were placing available to them, or at their election, a portion of the aid that America could furnish?

Mr. WALLACE. That is my proposal; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And are you testifying that it is your belief now, and it was your belief then, that was a recommendation for increasing the physical aid to China, the Chiang regime?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; that is my contention, and if any real help was to be brought to China, it was very vital that that be done.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the only recommendation in here?

Mr. WALLACE. It is the all-important recommendation.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the only recommendation in this portion that you have read here, this possible policy line, which you point to as a recommendation for alleviating the physical anemia of the Chiang regime?

Mr. WALLACE. That is the all-important recommendation, sir.

Senator SMITH. Is that all?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all on that point. I have one or two more questions.

Have you testified, Mr. Wallace, that Mr. Alsop wanted you again and again to print the Kuoming cables, or to release them?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know whether I testified that he did. I don't know whether "again and again" is specifically the right phrase, but several times he wanted me to release them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the question of releasing them on those occasions—was it raised by him or by you?

Mr. WALLACE. Well, in the first place, when I first got in touch—when Kohlberg wrote me, I think at this time I phoned Mr. Alsop and he said, "Well, why don't you release the whole thing?"

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the first time Mr. Alsop had asked you to release them?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; that is correct—in 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. And subsequently, on other occasions, when he asked you to release them, had you called him to ask him about it as you did in the first case, or did he call you or bring it up with you?

Mr. WALLACE. The next time—the first time, Mr. Alsop had been in touch with me, or I had been in touch with him since I left Washington in 1946, was in 1950, on the Kohlberg thing. Then, did he call me or did I call him? I think he called me. Frankly, I have been testifying so long that I can't be sure. I just can't be sure. I mean, it is the kind of thing that, if I had some time off, I could verify it. But whether I called him or he called me, right at the moment I am just——

Mr. SOURWINE. But he did several times express the wish?

Mr. WALLACE. He expressed the wish, and in the first instance I passed on to him very much the same material I had passed on to Kohlberg. I had not, I believe, in 1950, passed on to him the material that I passed on to Kohlberg. He knew that I had done that with Kohlberg, and so I read to him over the telephone. He must have phoned me some time in early September asking if I could give him that letter, and I read it to him over the phone. I can testify under oath to this. I think that on that occasion the initiative did come from him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Wallace, when you prepared the statement which you used in connection with the release of the Kuoming cables—that is, the statement that you sent to the White House—did Mr. Alsop assist you in connection with that?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; to a degree he did. I had especially wanted to get in touch with Mr. Alsop with regard to the final outcome of some of the generals, how they had finally turned out. That was my big object in seeing Mr. Alsop. I saw Mr. Alsop on this occasion, and I may say that Mr. Alsop did not have the slightest notion that I was going to write it to the President.

What Mr. Alsop was advocating was a press release, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, he was treating it as though it was not a restricted document, but one that you had a right to release directly.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. Of course, in view of the lapse of time, I don't think there was any breaking of any code, and that is the only thing that the military was concerned with, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. You felt that the lapse of time gave you the right to declassify it?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I felt that I would get in no trouble with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. WALLACE. I wanted to, if there was to be a press release, I wanted to get the benefit of Mr. Alsop's recollection, and again it was very much the same situation at Kuoming.

Mr. Alsop had a typewriter, and batting back and forth, with my taking the initiative——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you come down to where he lives, or did he come up to where you live?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I came into New York. I met with him in some hotel where he had a room. I don't remember the name of the hotel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who suggested the meeting and that you come up—you or he?

Mr. WALLACE. Well, I think that my guess is that he suggested it, but I wouldn't be sure. It might have been me, because I was very much interested in how these various names turned out. I didn't know. I had no idea, because I had not maintained, you might say, a close, intimate knowledge of China and the personalities of China after 1944. I had no idea how these names had turned out, and I know that Joe had maintained a very close and intimate relationship, and I very much wanted to talk with him about it. So it might have been my initiative. I might say at the moment I just can't say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you discussed——

Mr. WALLACE. That is my interest with regard to these names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Alsop, if I understand you correctly, initially was thinking in terms of a press release, and it was your idea that it should be sent to the White House?

Mr. WALLACE. It was completely and exclusively my idea that it be sent to the White House. I felt that that was the proper thing, that the reports had been submitted to the White House.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did he know that it was to go to the White House—after he got to New York or before he got to New York?

Mr. WALLACE. He very much wanted to know what I was going to do. I may say that the final draft I typewrote myself, to President Truman, and I typewrote it several times, I played with ideas of sending it elsewhere but finally decided on that. Joe did not know that I had decided on that, and he had asked me to phone him as to when I was going to release it.

So I phoned him and told him that I was going to send it to the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, what you had worked out with him, and what he had typed out at your dictation in this hotel room in New York was for the basis of a press release?

Mr. WALLACE. That is what he had in mind, and I revised it materially to put in letter form to President Truman.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were dictating, you said it was just as to Kuoming. You were not dictating verbatim, word for word, but just the gist for the ideas that were to go down?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I have on that subject. I will proceed to another subject, Mr. Chairman.

What was Mr. John Carter Vincent's position at the time he was designated by Secretary Hull to accompany you?

Mr. WALLACE. I think he was called head of the China Division in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was a very important official in the State Department?

Mr. WALLACE. He was head of the China Division, which, in view of this trip, would mean that he was the top man.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was thoroughly conversant with Chinese political problems?

Mr. WALLACE. I would assume he would be; otherwise he wouldn't be the head.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was recommended to you as such, let us say?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE Now, Mr. Wallace, he was not——

Mr. WALLACE. He was assigned by the State Department, so I assume that he had their complete confidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did the State Department assign him to you, sir; do you know?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know the full sequence.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean for what purpose was he assigned to you?

Mr. WALLACE. To accompany me on the trip.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was not just to be a bodyguard, was he?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I think in the first instance I wrote Cordell Hull in March asking him to assign somebody, and he spoke of Ambassador Gauss; and later Vincent, as head of the China Division, was assigned to go along with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you asked him to assign somebody, why did you want somebody to be assigned?

Mr. WALLACE. I had found that in traveling in a foreign country it is very useful in having somebody from the Washington office—that is, the headquarters in Washington—to make contacts with the American Ambassador in the field.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not want more than contacts? As a matter of fact, there are no tricks to this question. Did you not, as a matter of fact, want the best advice you could have, want somebody along that was more thoroughly familiar with the political situation?

Mr. WALLACE. Naturally I wanted to get all of the information I could.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it was for that purpose that Mr. Vincent was assigned, was it not?

Mr. WALLACE. You will have to ask the State Department on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not so assume?

Mr. WALLACE. I assumed he was conversant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he not there to be available for guidance if, as, and when you wanted it?

Mr. WALLACE. As I remember, in Secretary Hull's letter he urged me to rely on the guidance of Ambassador Gauss, as I remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not urge you not to rely on Mr. Vincent, did he? Nor imply it?

Mr. WALLACE. No; but he did mention Ambassador Gauss as the man to consult.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not feel that Mr. Vincent was there to give you such advice as you would ask for?

Mr. WALLACE. Undoubtedly. He was very helpful in many ways. He did accumulate a very great variety of material. As a matter of

fact, he sent over material to me before I went to China, and I might say of the whole range of the political spectrum.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did he not continue to give you——

Mr. WALLACE. He did not try to influence my judgment, to the best of my knowledge. What he did try to do was to get all kinds of material to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not ask you the question. I ask you if he did not give you the benefit of his best judgment and of his knowledge whenever you asked for it?

Mr. WALLACE. He must have, but I don't remember. You would have to ask John Carter Vincent as to whether he gave me the advantage of his best judgment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not ever ask him for anything?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't remember any specific conversations. I don't remember any specific conversations; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. We will pass that one.

This may seem somewhat off the course, but it is the last question I have to ask here, Mr. Chairman.

Do you recall, Mr. Wallace, ever making the point that the Mongols and the Chinese did not get along because the Mongols were livestock people and the Chinese were farmers?

Mr. WALLACE. It seems to me I made that statement somewhere; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It does not sound funny, does it? I notice that we had some laughs here; not by Senators, I might say.

Mr. WALLACE. No. Well, I guess the newspaper people are laughing because they think it is funny that farmers of different occupations should be fighting against each other; but it is true that that is a very ancient warfare between the nomadic livestock people and the settled agricultural people, and it was a key to a large part of what happened in that western part of China, and it was a key to endless political difficulties.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace, can you tell us where you got your information about the Mongols in that regard?

Mr. WALLACE. That information came from Owen Lattimore, sir. Owen Lattimore was a very great expert in that field. He spoke Mongolian, and he had walked over the ground himself on foot in Sinkiang, and his observations with regard to those nomadic peoples in their relationship to the settled peoples made complete sense to me because I knew analogous situations in this country.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, sir.

Senator SMITH. Have you something else?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you have anything?

Senator FERGUSON. I wondered, Mr. Wallace, if you have checked your statement, or any of your facts that you are giving us, with the State Department?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I have not been in touch with the State Department for any of this material.

Senator FERGUSON. Or with Mr. Vincent?

Mr. WALLACE. Nor with Mr. Vincent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Ball, if you will have the evidence relating to the Communist reaction to Stilwell's removal, we will have that in evidence.

Mr. BALL. We will try to send it.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that that is on the point of what they thought of Stilwell rather than on the question of the removal in June.

Mr. BALL. That is what I understand. We may not be able to have it the first thing in the morning, because we have to have photostats of the material made.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you contend that that is in point here?

Mr. BALL. Because obviously the only contemporaneous evidence in June as to what their reaction toward Stilwell's removal at that time might be must necessarily be what they thought of Stilwell at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not the issue. The Daily Worker indicated there that the question was a compromise. I think everyone grants that the Communists favored General Stilwell.

It is whether or not a recommendation and a concurrence of his removal was an anti-Communist act. That is the heart of the issue, Mr. Ball, and that is the evidence we would like to have.

Mr. BALL. I would suggest this, if I may, to the committee: that we submit the evidence, and it may be that we would like to submit at that time a memorandum pointing out the relevancy.

Mr. WALLACE. I would express the hope that you would see fit to include it even if you yourself may register a dissent as to the relevancy.

Mr. MORRIS. I want you to send it in.

Mr. BALL. We will probably not be able to do that until sometime late tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that will be very voluminous?

Mr. BALL. Not very voluminous.

Senator FERGUSON. You will photostat that?

Mr. BALL. Yes; we will photostat the articles.

(The material referred to is as follows:)

CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, FRIENDLY & BALL,
Washington, D. C., October 24, 1951.

Senator PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Judiciary Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: When Mr. Henry A. Wallace last appeared before the Subcommittee on Internal Security on October 17, 1951, some question was raised as to the attitude taken by the Communist press in the United States toward the dismissal of General Stilwell from command in China. At that time I offered to produce for the attention of the subcommittee extracts from the New York Daily Worker, showing how highly the Worker valued General Stilwell. As I remember, I expressed the belief that those extracts would date from June 1944, which was the approximate time of Mr. Wallace's visit to China and of his cabled recommendation to President Roosevelt that General Stilwell be replaced or removed from control of political matters connected with Chiang Kai-shek.

I now find, however, that my recollection was in error and that there were no significant references to General Stilwell in the Worker until his dismissal, which occurred late in October 1944. The references to him in November 1944, do, I believe, sustain the view that the initial reaction of the American Communists to the news of General Stilwell's dismissal was one of shock and dismay, which they subsequently moderated in order to make the best of a bad situation. On reading the record of the testimony given by Mr. Joseph Alsop before your

subcommittee on October 18, 1951, in open session, I find that the relevant articles from the Worker were offered by Mr. Alsop in the record, namely:

November 1, 1944, page 6, article by Starobin: Record, page 2839.
November 1, 1944, page 8, quotations from Atkinson: Record, page 2839.
November 4, 1944, page 8, article by Starobin: Record, page 2841.
November 4, 1944, page 9, article by Field: Record, page 2841.
November 5, 1944, page 4, article by Allen: Record, page 2841.
November 5, 1944, page 8, article by Browder: Record, page 2841.

As these articles already have been pointed out to the subcommittee, no purpose would be served by our submitting them again. I understand that you have available to you the issues of the Worker for that period, including the full text of these articles as well as several others relating to General Stilwell's recall. Mr. Morris, counsel for the subcommittee, referred to certain portions of the November 1 article by Starobin and of the December 2 article by Field as "the official Communist reactions to the removal of Stilwell" and "the two reactions of the Daily Worker to the removal of Stilwell" (pp. 2650 and 2651, respectively, of the typewritten record). Any implications from this that those two fragments were the only Communist "reactions" would appear to be erroneous, since they must be considered in their context and together with such other articles as Starobin's and Field's on November 4, 1944, and Allen's and Browder's on November 5, 1944, as cited above.

In the course of these hearings it has been suggested that Amerasia may have reflected the Communist line. While we have no independent information on this question the committee may, in the light of these accusations, be interested in an article in Amerasia dated November 17, 1944, entitled "Stilwell's Recall." In particular, I should like to draw the attention of the subcommittee to the last page of the article (331), in which the editors of Amerasia, after setting out what they believed should be the objective of the United States in China, wrote as follows:

"These are the objectives of America in China. They are the objectives of all liberal forces in China that have repeatedly urged Chiang Kai-shek to take the lead in forming a genuinely representative government in order that Chinese unity may be strengthened and that China may play a major part in the final and decisive offensive against Japan and thus insure for herself a powerful voice at the peace table. Finally, these are the objectives for which General Stilwell worked unceasingly during his 2 years of service in China. It may be that he did not always present his case with the greatest possible tact, since he was notably a 'direct actionist' and plain speaker rather than a diplomat. But there is no question that he fought consistently for the best interests of both the American and the Chinese people, *and that his departure was deeply regretted by all those Chinese leaders who have been working for a more liberalized regime.* No man has displayed greater confidence in the abilities of the Chinese people and their armies, given proper training and equipment. No man has shown a stronger conviction that the Chinese themselves must be helped to play a leading role in winning their own war of national liberation. The American Government could pay no better tribute to the Chinese people, and offer no more convincing proof that it had their best interests at heart, than to place General Stilwell in command of the American forces that will ultimately land on China's shore to drive the Japanese from the continent of Asia." [Italics added.]

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE W. BALL.

[From Amerasia—a Fortnightly Review of America and Asia, November 17, 1944]

STILWELL'S RECALL—THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS

The recall of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell from the China-India-Burma front and the resignation of the American Ambassador to Chungking, Clarence E. Gauss, have served to focus widespread American attention on the serious internal situation in China. In the flood of newspaper and radio comment evoked by Stilwell's recall, the general American public has for the first time been made thoroughly aware of the darker side of the picture as far as China's political and military situation is concerned—a side long familiar to close students of the far-eastern situation.

It was unfortunate that much of the publicity accorded to the return of General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss made it appear that some sudden and disastrous crisis had arisen in China. And it was also unfortunate that some opponents

of the administration seized upon the Stilwell incident as proof that the Government was pursuing a dangerous and ill-conceived policy in China. Senator Robert Reynolds, for example, accused the Government of playing two Chinese factions "against the middle." Other antiadministration spokesmen sought to put the blame on the shoulders of Harry Hopkins who was accused of interfering with the efforts of Donald Nelson and General Hurley to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to adopt measures for strengthening China's participation in the war. Even Congressman Walter H. Judd, a long-time advocate of American-Chinese friendship, promptly charged without qualification that Stilwell had delivered a White House "ultimatum" to the Generalissimo which demanded that Stilwell be made commander of all Chinese armed forces, and that consequently Chiang Kai-shek very justifiably "blew up" and demanded Stilwell's recall.

Perhaps the most amazing examples of unsubstantiated reasoning on the question of American-Chinese relations appeared in the November 13, 1944, issues of both Time and Life. We recommend to the editors of these magazines that they reread their own editorial comment in the May 1, 1944, issue of Life, containing the following: "The first-hand report on China by Theodore H. White, which begins on page 98 of this issue of Life, will shock a great many Americans. It will especially shock those * * * who think of China solely in terms of her charm, eloquence, and idealism. * * * The White report is not just a muckraking job. It is a balanced attempt by an able journalist who loves China, to give a true picture of China and its government today. * * * Perhaps the most disturbing thing about White's report is the bitter chauvinism it reveals in high quarters in Chungking. National unity has long been China's greatest need. * * * But some Chinese have perverted it into a bitter contempt for all foreigners. * * * We need China because she is a great potential force for freedom and democracy in Asia. If China should cease to be that, and go the way Japan went, we could not long stay friends. * * * The United States cannot ignore the fact that if China's government should become a fascistic, power-hungry, repressive, landlord's-and-usurers' government, it is all too likely to get into trouble with Russia; whereas a government which stands for freedom, reform, and international cooperation is not. Under no circumstances would the American people ever wish to be embroiled with the Soviet Union in a struggle in which they would feel politically on the wrong side. But the freedom-loving, progressive China which some of her leaders are still trying to bring to birth would merit our support against the world. And it would need very little of it, for it would have the support of every other peace-loving nation in the world."

Such a statement as the foregoing is in startling contradiction to the opinions expressed in the pages of the same magazine of November 13, 1944. We know of no facts that could justify such a sharp reversal. On the contrary, during the intervening period an impressive number of foreign correspondents, American military and political observers, as well as returned civilians have uniformly added evidence that gives overwhelming support to Theodore White's May 1944 analysis and Life's editorial comment on it in the same issue. What has happened between May and November? Not even the editors of Life and Time can play with impunity with news and comment that is not supported by even a semblance of fact. They owe it to their readers and to the American people as a whole to print the facts on which they base their change of reasoning and conclusions. Otherwise, it will be easier to give credence to Drew Pearson's report published in his column of October 15, in which Roy Larsen of Time is reported "to be preparing to continue it [Time's] Russia-baiting policy, launched recently with the attacks on Russia by ex-Ambassador Bullitt." According to Pearson: "Word of this leaked out over a couple of highballs in a Washington hotel recently when Time's copublisher Roy Larsen conferred with War Production Board officials * * * of the paper branch. In a talkative mood, Larsen expounded Time's plan to go out against Stalin and his reds." Such strategy would fit well into Chungking's own aim of alienating the Soviet Union at all costs from America and Great Britain in all matters pertaining to the Pacific and Asia.

To return to discussion of Stilwell's recall and the crisis in the American-Chinese relations, all the facts in the case substantiate the conclusion that it was not provoked by tactless and unskilled diplomacy on the part of the American Government. Actually, as most of the thoughtful newspaper comments pointed out, the situation in China that led up to General Stilwell's recall was not a new development, nor was it the product of unwarranted American interference in China's internal affairs. At the risk of repeating much that has already appeared in the pages of Amerasia, it is necessary to reexamine briefly the situation with which General Stilwell was confronted.

Since 1940, a process of economic and military deterioration had been going on in China that had seriously undermined her powers of resistance. In part, this deterioration was the result of conditions that were beyond China's power to control: the capture or destruction of her industries and railways, the blockade of her ports that cut her off from all sources of outside aid except that which could be flown over the "hump," the hideous devastation wrought by a brutal and ruthless enemy, coupled with the ravages of famine and disease, the skyrocketing inflation resulting from the acute shortages of all forms of goods. But this deterioration was also due in large measure to the fact that control of the Chinese Government was monopolized by a small ruling clique representing the most conservative wing of the Kuomintang, China's only legal party. This clique derived its power from the feudal-minded landed gentry who were chiefly concerned with preserving the outmoded and oppressive agrarian system that was their only source of power. Hence their spokesmen in the Government were opposed to the extension of political democracy, to the development of free industrial enterprise, and to reforms in the system of land tenure and taxation. In other words, their desire to maintain a monopoly of political and economic power made them adamant opponents of all measures that might have served to mobilize the united support of the Chinese people in the war against Japan.

The methods used by the ruling clique to suppress all political opposition are now common knowledge, thanks to the detailed reports of such able observers as Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times* and many others: the widespread use of secret police, the refusal to initiate democratic procedures, the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press, the toleration of hoarding and speculation on the part of the influential landlords and merchants, and the failure to make effective use of even the limited supplies of materials and machinery available in order to increase production. Mr. Atkinson describes the present regime in Chungking as "a moribund antidemocratic regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China," and this opinion, which is shared by many other competent observers, does much to illuminate the basic cause of General Stilwell's inability to cooperate effectively with the Chungking Government.

In the military sphere, for example, the reluctance of the Chungking regime to undertake real popular mobilization, which would have required far-reaching economic and political reforms, was reflected in a corrupt and tyrannical system of conscription and the shocking maltreatment of many of the Government's armies. Peasants were forcibly seized from their homes or fields and impressed into military service, while those with sufficient funds or political influence could easily buy immunity. The troops were very poorly fed, with the result that in many cases they were compelled to plunder and pillage the areas in which they were billeted. As a consequence of this maltreatment as well as the poor quality of much of China's military leadership, the morale of the armies deteriorated rapidly while the relationship between the troops and the civilian population in some areas actually reached the point of open conflict.

A number of important battles were lost in China as a result not only of the Government's failure to supply the troops with adequate food or munitions but also because of the active hostility of the peasants in the combat areas. During the Honan campaign earlier this year, for example, when an estimated 50 to 75 thousand Japanese troops defeated and completely annihilated 700,000 Chinese troops under the command of General Tang En-po, the peasants had been so enraged by the ruthlessness with which Tang En-po's troops had collected rice during the famine years that when the Japanese launched their attack against Honan they organized guerrilla bands under the slogan "better the Japanese than Tang En-po" and disarmed and sometimes killed many of their own soldiers.

In addition to the generally lowered morale of the underfed, ill-equipped Chinese armies and their failure to win the support of the of the civilian population, China's military operations were still further handicapped by the military blockade against the guerrilla areas of north China by approximately half a million of the government's best armed and best trained troops. This blockade, in effect since early in 1940, was perhaps the outstanding single piece of evidence that the Chungking regime was thinking more of preserving its political and military power after the war than of driving the Japanese out of China. The Chinese guerrillas, under the leadership of the Eighth Route Army, had done a remarkable job in mobilizing the people for active resistance and

preventing the Japanese from establishing effective control in the areas that their armies had overrun. Cut off from all sources of outside aid, including the rest of Free China, and forced to depend almost entirely on munitions captured from the Japanese, they had managed to establish Chinese Governments behind and between Japanese-held communication lines and garrison centers, and to enlist the support of millions of partisan fighters and civilian militia.

The success of the guerrillas, however, was based on a program of popular education and political and economic reform that was anathema to the Chungking bureaucrats because it involved democratic political procedures and agrarian reforms designed to improve the condition of the peasants. All foreign visitors to the guerrilla areas have testified to the fact that this program was in no sense Communist, even though the Chinese Communist Party had taken the lead in its formulation. On the contrary, they have reported that the guerrilla leaders have no intention of seeking to establish a Communist system of government in China, that they are completely loyal to the ideal of a national united front with the Kuomintang and other political groups, that they recognize the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and that their program is designed simply and solely to enlist the support of all sections of the population in the war for national independence and to lay the basis for the development of a democratic and economically progressive nation after the war.

But to the landlords and bureaucrats controlling the Chungking regime, it was obvious that the extension of such reforms throughout China would mean the end of their monopoly of power. In their view, the growth of the guerrilla forces to some 500,000 regular troops supported by 2,000,000 partisans and hundreds of thousands of civilian militia did not represent added strength in the war against Japan but a serious menace to their own power in the postwar period. They therefore rejected all appeals from the border-region governments for the formation of a coalition government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, for a genuine mobilization of the Chinese people, and for a united effort on the part of all China's armed forces against the Japanese. Instead they maintained a rigid blockade of the guerrilla areas and began to save up munitions, supplies, and troops for a final show-down with the Communists after China's allies had attended to Japan's defeat.

STILWELL'S STRATEGY

It was this situation that confronted General Stilwell when he arrived in China in the spring of 1942 to take up his duties as chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek and commander of American forces in the China-India-Burma theater. Stilwell had previously spent more than 10 years in China. He had taken the trouble to learn no less than 11 Chinese dialects. He knew and admired the Chinese people. He was also convinced that the Chinese armies could and should be trained and equipped to play a major role in the defeat of Japan on the Asiatic Continent. In his view this strategy would not only be the quickest and most effective method of achieving an Allied victory against Japan but would also serve to unite and strengthen China so that she would be able to play her rightful part as one of the four leading powers in the postwar world.

Starting from this initial premise that the Chinese armies must be aided to play a more active part in the campaign against Japan, Stilwell's main objectives were (1) to see that the best possible use was made of the limited resources that China possessed, and (2) to get more supplies into China by reopening a land route through Burma. From the outset, however, he encountered serious obstacles—the principal one being the fact that the Chungking Government had no desire to risk its armies in battle against the Japanese because it wished to save them to insure its political power after the war. For this reason Chinese officials were far more inclined to favor the strategy advocated by General Chennault, commander of the United States Fourteenth Air Force. Chennault and his fliers were naturally heroes to the Chinese for their work in defending Chungking and other Chinese cities from Japanese bombings, their amazingly effective air support of Chinese troops, and their attacks on Japanese shipping and communications. An additional source of their popularity, however, was the fact that Chennault believed that the main effort against Japan in China should be made by air power, and therefore that the greater part of the limited supplies reaching the China theater should be used to strengthen his air force. All he asked of the Chinese was food and airfields, and he did not concern himself specifically with the use which the Chinese made of their land forces. This strategy of relying on American air power to do the job of defeating Japan in China was, of course, entirely agreeable to the Chinese Government and received its full support.

Better to retain control of a devitalized and weak China, protected by a ring of American bombers, than to risk losing control of a strong and united nation exerting all its energy in freeing itself from its enemy. Such are the mental operations of a landed bureaucracy fearful of losing power and distrustful of its own people.

General Stilwell, on the other hand, believed that it was essential to improve China's combat efficiency, reopen a road through Burma, and get China back into the war as an effective fighting force. He viewed this as a purely military problem, but it immediately compelled him to cope with delicate and complicated political issues. In his efforts to develop the Chinese armies into an efficient and unified fighting force, he was confronted with the fact that supplies intended for the fighting fronts were being diverted to the troops blockading the guerrilla areas or were being hoarded for future use. The blockade itself prevented American forces from making use of the highly strategic areas controlled by the Chinese guerrillas and also served to immobilize large numbers of Chinese troops that might otherwise have been fighting Japan. Stilwell was also handicapped in his efforts to reopen a supply route through Burma by the failure of the British to undertake a large-scale amphibious campaign or to give full support to his proposed land offensive.

The failure to undertake amphibious operations against Burma was generally attributed to the lack of adequate shipping and naval strength, but it was also known that the British authorities were not overly enthusiastic about Stilwell's idea of a land offensive because they did not want to take Burma back with the aid of the Americans and Chinese nor, for that matter, with the aid of the Burmese, factors that would lessen British prestige and encourage Burmese nationalist sentiment. British strategy was reported to call for the defeat of Japan by naval and air power first and then the recovery of Japanese-occupied territories without disturbing the internal political situation in those areas more than was absolutely necessary. But despite the lack of British encouragement General Stilwell fought his way back into Burma with the small American-Chinese force which he had trained and equipped in India, thus demonstrating his contention that the defeat of Japan by land was feasible.

General Stilwell was fully aware, however, that the internal political situation in China constituted the most serious obstacle in his aim of revitalizing the Chinese armies as an effective fighting force. He recognized also that unless the internal disunity that was hamstringing China's war effort was replaced by a genuinely united effort, the war against Japan would be greatly prolonged and lives of thousands of American soldiers needlessly sacrificed. Consequently, he had no alternative but to put the issue squarely up to Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the Chinese Government and the acknowledged leader of all parties and groups in China.

Thus General Stilwell continued to urge that all China's fighting forces—the guerillas as well as the Central Government's troops—be united in a single striking force against the Japanese; that the blockade against the strategic guerrilla areas be lifted; that the United States be permitted to supply the guerrillas with a minimum of equipment, and that steps be taken to establish air bases in the guerrilla areas. In the political field, Ambassador Gauss also urged the need for establishing unity and for measures to counteract the growing opposition to the Chungking regime that was developing throughout free China as a result of the Government's dictatorial and repressive policies. The Ambassador is reported to have suggested to Chiang Kai-shek that one means for allaying this popular discontent and providing the basis for a united war effort would be the establishment of a representative war council in which all groups would share responsibility for the conduct of the war. This proposal, which seemed like a very workable compromise between the Yenan demand for a genuinely representative coalition government and the Kuomintang's insistence on the maintenance of one-party rule, was at first looked upon favorably by Chiang Kai-shek but was later rejected.

These negotiations between Stilwell and Gauss on the one hand and the Generalissimo on the other continued for almost 2 years, and a good deal of personal bitterness was inevitably engendered in the process, as the requests of the two American officials were repeatedly refused and Chiang Kai-shek came to feel that the American Government was attempting to dictate Chinese policy. Finally, an impasse was reached when it became obvious that it would be futile for either of the two men to continue their efforts in the face of adamant opposition. General Stilwell was then recalled and Ambassador Gauss' resignation was accepted.

AMERICAN AIMS IN CHINA

It must be emphasized, however, that these two events do not mark a change in American policy, nor do they prove that the United States Government is now tacitly acquiescing in the existence of a regime in Chungking that does not represent the Chinese people and that pursues policies that are detrimental to their interests as well as to our own. The American Government for some time has been eagerly hoping for a change in the internal situation in China that would place Chiang Kai-shek at the head of a united nation, that would strengthen China's fighting powers, and that would enable her to emerge from the war a strong and prosperous nation on which we could pin our hopes for enduring peace in the Far East. To explore the possiblities of such a change, such eminent administration spokesmen as Vice President Henry Wallace, War Production Chief Donald Nelson, and Maj. Gen. Patrick Hurley visited China as the President's personal representatives. Mr. Wallace expressed, as clearly as he could under the circumstances, the desire of the American people for a strong, united, and democratic China, and specifically called attention to the fact that no country "can be industrially sound or strong unless both its agricultural technique and the agricultural part of its society are progressive and prosperous"—a statement which may be construed as a direct criticism of the economic policies of the Chungking regime.

Similarly, the chief purpose of Mr. Nelson's visit was to put the following propositions before Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek: that the American Government is eager to have China emerge as the leading power in Asia and is prepared to give China extensive assistance in achieving this goal; that America hopes to see Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of this new and powerful China; and, third, that American aid in achieving this position of primacy for Chiang Kai-shek in China and for China in Asia must of necessity be contingent on a thoroughgoing house cleaning in Chungking. Mr. Nelson apparently did not go into the political aspect of this last condition but is reported to have indicated to Chiang exactly what was meant as far as China's industrial organization was concerned. Previous to conferring with the generalissimo, Mr. Nelson inspected Chinese industries in and around Chungking. On the basis of these observation, he concluded that the Chinese were making only partial use of the industrial equipment they already possessed and that a higher rate of production had not been achieved because of inefficiency, nepotism, and factional disputes between various cliques within the Kuomintang. Mr. Nelson reported these conclusions to the generalissimo and declared that China could not expect any industrial equipment from the United States so long as she was not making effective use of what she already had. Chiang Kai-shek expressed amazement at Mr. Nelson's findings and invited him to return to China as head of a newly established Chinese War Production Board.

General Hurley's activities in Chungking have been less publicized, but it is understood that he is working on the military aspect of the situation, presumably with a view to persuading the Generalissimo of the importance of more active Chinese participation in the war. The fact that General Hurley is still in Chungking and that Mr. Nelson is returning shortly accompanied by a group of experts in iron and steel production to aid in organizing a Chinese War Production Board and stimulating Chinese industrial production is sufficient proof that, though in one sense General Stilwell's recall represents a crisis in American-Chinese relations, it is not the disaster that some commentators have made it out to be. It could only become a disaster if we allowed it to develop into a wholly unwarranted anti-Chinese feeling in this country, overshadowing the great debt which we owe to the Chinese people for their continued resistance to our common enemy against far greater odds than we have ever been called upon to face. Any wholesale condemnation of the Chinese would simply play into the hands of those in the United States who favor a soft peace with Japan on the grounds that Japan must be maintained as a balancing force in the Far East, and who make good use of Chinese weakness and disunity to support their argument.

It is true, of course, that Mr. Nelson and General Hurley are confronted with the same difficulties that faced General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss. Unless Chiang Kai-shek can be persuaded to broaden the political basis of his regime, they will have to work within the existing bureaucratic framework and will be faced with the same political obstacles.

It is reported, for example, that Mr. Nelson intends to recommend the appointment of Tseng Yang-fu as head of the proposed Chinese War Production Board.

Mr. Tseng, a graduate in engineering from the University of Pittsburgh, has been Minister of Communications in the Chinese Government and has been officially responsible for the construction of airfields in China. He is also, however, a classmate of Chen Li-fu and a prominent member of the highly reactionary CC clique. One may legitimately ask how a program of increased industrial production can be effectively carried out by a leading member of a bureaucracy that has for so long deliberately stifled such efforts.

But despite these difficulties Mr. Nelson's return to China holds out the promise of an improvement in the basic situation that has disturbed American-Chinese relations. For it is certain that a determined effort to stimulate industrial production and curtail hoarding and speculation in essential raw materials would do much to revive Chinese morale, check the disastrous spiral of inflation, and break the paralyzing grip of the landed bureaucracy. It is to be hoped that in addition to this measure on behalf of strenghtening China's economic structure, the American Government will send as our new Ambassador to China a high-ranking diplomat of proven ability who will be able to contribute to a solution of the Chinese political crisis by convincing the Chinese Government that, on the one hand, we recognize China as an important independent power and that, on the other, it is in China's interests as well as our own that she should participate more actively in the forthcoming offensive against Japan.

The United States has no desire to dictate to the Chinese Government. We owe a great debt to China because despite all hardships and handicaps she has steadfastly refused to seek peace with Japan. We have no ulterior designs on China; all we want is that China shall emerge from this war a free, strong, and friendly ally. But it is clearly the responsibility of the American Government to do everything possible to ensure a speedy end to the war in Asia and to make certain that the lives of American soldiers are not needlessly sacrificed. When American forces eventually land on the coast of China, for example, it is imperative that they find a friendly population, able and willing to give them strong support. It so happens that the Chungking government at present has no control over these coastal areas, but that the Chinese guerrillas have. Similarly, if our Air Force in China is to operate effectively against Japanese industrial centers in Manchuria and north China, it must have the use of bases in the guerrilla-controlled areas in the north.

It is for this reason that American officials in China have urged and must continue to urge that some compromise be reached between the guerrilla forces and Chungking that will enable American arms and technical aid to be supplied to all sections of China's fighting forces. It is for this reason that we may be compelled to supply aid to the guerrillas, even without Chungking's approval, if no such compromise is forthcoming. It is for this reason that we cannot allow American supplies to be hoarded for use in a future civil war.

The task of the American Government is to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to respond to the unanimous demand of all non-Kuomintang groups in China that he become the leader of a genuinely united China instead of ruling in the name of a single party. The New York Times in a recent editorial summed up the hope of all sincere friends of China when it declared that, while we must and should accept Chiang Kai-shek as the acknowledged leader of China, we can and should "make it clear to Chiang that his prestige will be enhanced, not diminished, if he takes certain steps: If he accepts American military guidance in return for American military help; if he throws the whole weight of his armies against the Japanese instead of holding a great part of them inactive or on guard duty against his political opponents; if he makes a genuine truce with the Chinese Communists; if he consents to take into his Government members of the representative groups and parties; and if he permits the freedom of the press and of discussion which is the only possible basis for the democracy to which he has again and again pledged himself. * * * Peace in the Orient without a stable and prosperous China is unthinkable. But it is time to speak frankly in the interests of that stability, that prosperity, and the freedom without which neither can be attained."

These are the objectives of America in China. They are the objectives of all liberal forces in China that have repeatedly urged Chiang Kai-shek to take the lead in forming a genuinely representative government in order that Chinese unity may be strengthened and that China may play a major part in the final and decisive offensive against Japan and thus insure for herself a powerful voice at the peace table. Finally, these are the objectives for which General Stilwell worked unceasingly during his 2 years of service in China. It may be that he did not always present his case with the greatest possible tact, since he was notably

a direct actionist and plain speaker rather than a diplomat. But there is no question that he fought consistently for the best interests of both the American and the Chinese people and that his departure was deeply regretted by all those Chinese leaders who have been working for a more liberalized regime. No man has displayed greater confidence in the abilities of the Chinese people and their armies, given proper training and equipment. No man has shown a stronger conviction that the Chinese themselves must be helped to play a leading role in winning their own war of national liberation. The American Government could pay no better tribute to the Chinese people and offer no more convincing proof that it had their best interests at heart than to place General Stilwell in command of the American forces that will ultimately land on China's shores to drive the Japanese from the continent of Asia.

Senator SMITH. Otherwise it might be possible to just flood the record.

Mr. BALL. No; it will be quite factual.

Mr. WALLACE. I hope I will be absolved of any guilt of an endeavor to flood the record today.

Senator SMITH. Do you have anything else?

Mr. MORRIS. That is all. Thank you very much, Mr. Wallace.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you want to put in any part of that statement from the other day into the record, or did you include it?

Mr. WALLACE. No; that is included in here. I deliberately framed this so it would be included.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Wallace, did you indicate in the executive session the other day that you were going to make available the memorandum in connection with the talk you had with Mr. Holland?

Mr. BALL. Yes; I have that here today. Mr. Wallace brought it down. It is not a memorandum that Mr. Wallace made, but it is a memorandum which was supplied to Mr. Wallace by Mr. Holland after the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are two memorandums that are to come to the committee, are there not?

Was not one the memorandum that Mr. Holland gave you with regard to certain portions of your pamphlet?

Mr. BALL. No; it is the testimony of the pamphlet, as I recall.

Mr. WALLACE. That is the only one I have, at any rate.

Senator SMITH. What is the other one?

Mr. SOURWINE. It just runs in my mind that Mr. Holland also furnished him a memorandum about the testimony of Mr. Dennett, and that he was going to furnish us with it.

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not testify that Mr. Holland had furnished you with a memorandum with regard to Dennett's testimony before this committee?

Mr. BALL. That is right; and this is Dennett's testimony before the committee with respect to the pamphlet. It combines both of those things.

This is a memorandum criticizing Dennett's testimony with respect to the pamphlet.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, the memorandum that Mr. Holland gave you when he came up to the farm is this, and there were not two separate memorandums?

Mr. WALLACE. Just this.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right; I am sorry.

Senator SMITH. That will be placed in the record.
(The information referred to is as follows:)

COMMENTS ON WALLACE PAMPHLET

(Dennett testimony, hearings, vol. 17. pp. 1763–1771)

1. Dennett himself states (pp. 1763, 1770-1771) that publication of a pamphlet by Mr. Wallace was discussed in the executive committee and approved by them.

2. The account of the origin of the pamphlet given by Dennett (p. 1763) and by Mrs. Lattimore (testimony in executive session, quoted in Dennett volume, p. 1767) is incomplete. Dennett says: "Early in 1945 (error; he meant 1944) I received word from the Washington office that Owen Lattimore believed that Mr. Wallace might be willing to write a pamphlet * * *" Mrs. Lattimore says the pamphlet "originated because Mr. Wallace, who was the Vice President of the United States, had become interested in the Far East, and had some ideas about the Far East, and so the IPR thought it would be very interesting to have a pamphlet written by him."

The genesis of the pamphlet goes much further back than this. For a long time Miss Miriam S. Farley, the editor of the IPR popular pamphlet series, had urged that several nationally known persons be invited to write pamphlets for the series, with a view to promoting the sale of the series as a whole. In this connection a good many names were canvassed, and two were finally selected: Vice President Wallace and Mr. Eric Johnston. The selection was made on two grounds: (1) both men were qualified to write on the subjects chosen; (2) both were men whom the IPR was able to approach through mutual friends who might be instrumental in persuading them to write.

The approach to Mr. Wallace was made with the aid of Owen Lattimore; the approach to Mr. Johnston was made with the aid of Benjamin H. Kizer, of Spokane. Mr. Wallace was asked to write on the post war far eastern policy of the United States, and Mr. Johnston on the post war economic relations between the United States and the Far East. Both men accepted the IPR's invitation. In Mr. Wallace's case the pamphlet was written and published. To the IPR's regret, Mr. Johnston later found that he did not have time to write a pamphlet, so this project did not materialize. Thus circumstances made it impossible to carry out the original aim of publishing two pamphlets by men of national reputation but representing different points of view.

3. During Dennett's testimony, Mr. Mandel, of the subcommittee's staff, read the following quotations from the Wallace pamphlet:

(*a*) "Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact * * *" (p. 24).

This quotation is torn from its context in such a way as to completely distort its meaning. In this passage, Mr. Wallace was drawing a contrast between the countries of Asia which were independent, that is free, and those which at that time were still under colonial rule. He recommended that the United States encourage an orderly development toward greater self-government and eventual independence for colonial peoples. This is made clear when the entire passage is quoted:

"Whereas after the war we shall find Asia economically still largely in a stage of primitive agriculture, politically we shall find it divided into two parts: Free Asia and subject Asia. While Lincoln's phrase cannot be applied literally, yet in the larger sense it is true that neither a country nor a region can indefinitely continue to exist half slave and half free.

" 'Free Asia' will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact. It will include the Philippines, which has been promised its independence, Korea, which has also been promised freedom 'in due course,' and Thailand, which though independent before Japan's conquest, is one of the small countries which could probably not preserve its freedom except as part of a larger structure of free nations.

"Subject Asia or colonial Asia will include the countries whose present rulers have not yet committed themselves to definite dates for the emancipation of their colonial subjects. If peace came tomorrow this would include India, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya, Indochina, and a great many small Pacific islands.

"This large bloc cannot be described as 'antifreedom' but rather as 'not yet having freedom.' It is to our advantage not to perpetuate this division but to see an orderly process of transition so that the area of free Asia will grow and the area of subject Asia continually diminish."

(*b*) "The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs * * *" (p. 28).

At the time Mr. Wallace wrote (1944) the Russians were not intervening in China's internal affairs. The passage quoted by Mandel is immediately preceded by a quotation from Dr. Hu Shih, former Ambassador to the United States of the Chinese Nationalist Government, as follows:

"It is my sincere hope that the time will come when China and the Soviet Union may work shoulder to shoulder not only in fighting a common foe, but in all time to come * * *. The peace and prosperity of Asia demand such a mutual understanding between these two great countries which comprise three-quarters of the continent."

(*c*) The three other passages quoted by Mandel do not seem worth commenting on. But it should be noted that the five short passages which he quotes, all of which mention Russia, are not representative of the contents of the pamphlet, which devotes only a small amount of space to Russia—approximately 3 pages out of 43. The principal argument advanced in the pamphlet is in favor of a program of economic aid to Asia, with main emphasis on agriculture. Many other postwar problems are also discussed, including the colonial problem (see above), the future of Japan, America's strategic needs in the Pacific, international organization, etc. The entire text of the pamphlet was incorporated in the record as exhibit No. 284. But at the public hearing Mandel quoted only passages dealing with Russia, including one (see (*a*) above) which was completely distorted, but was picked up by many newspapers and thus gave the newspaper public a completely false idea of the nature of the pamphlet.

Senator SMITH. Do you have anything else?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing more, sir. That was the last point I wished to cover.

Senator SMITH. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir; we have nothing more.

Mr. Joseph Alsop is the next witness, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. We will extend to Mr. Wallace the same courtesy we did to Mr. Alsop; we will let him sit here and listen.

Mr. WALLACE. I, unfortunately, have another commitment.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I make this statement on behalf of Mr. Alsop:

It is my understanding that he wants to make a presentation of some length in connection with which he would like to choose his own order of comment.

I do not believe Mr. Alsop desires to have his testimony broken into on the two sessions.

I do not know how long the committee intends to sit, but I suggest consideration might be given, with the discretion here with Mr. Alsop, to what courtesies might be extended to him in connection with his testimony.

Senator SMITH. It is 20 minutes past 4 now, and so far as I am concerned, it is all right.

We will recess later. What is your pleasure, Mr. Alsop?

Mr. ALSOP. I would much rather appear tomorrow, Senator, because this is a most complex subject and unless you are prepared to sit here very late at night, you will not be able to get the story into the record as one story.

I would much rather recess, if I may.

Senator SMITH. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator SMITH. On the record. If there is nothing else, we will recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., Wednesday, October 17, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 9:30 a. m., Thursday, October 18, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 9:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Watkins, and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). The committee will come to order.

You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States, to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ALSOP. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH ALSOP, ACCOMPANIED BY GANSON PURCELL

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any evidence that bears on the inquiry that is underway by this committee?

Mr. ALSOP. I have a substantial amount of evidence which I will put in the record as I continue with my statement if I may.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you present the evidence to the committee?

Mr. ALSOP. I have a statement, if I may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Chairman, I have come before you voluntarily to testify that certain sworn evidence by Louis Budenz is misleading and untruthful. This evidence concerned former Vice President Wallace's trip to China in the spring of 1944 and the part played on that trip by the State Department official, John Carter Vincent.

With your permission I will follow the orderly system which your committee counsel suggested to Mr. Budenz on his last appearance before you.

As Mr. Budenz analyzed the documents produced by Mr. Wallace's mission point by point, I should like to analyze Mr. Budenz' testimony in the same manner, setting forth what he has said under oath against the actual facts as shown to me and shown by documents.

The basic statements by Mr. Budenz which I now challenge can be very quickly summarized. In his first testimony before your commit-

tee on this subject of John Carter Vincent and Mr. Vincent's role in Mr. Wallace's trip to China, Mr. Budenz stated affirmatively that Mr. Vincent was "a member of the Communist Party at that time."

He testified further that the Politburo of the American Communist Party relied on Mr. Vincent, and again I quote Mr. Budenz, "to guide Mr. Wallace largely along the paths", of the Communist Party line during this trip to China.

In his second testimony given more recently Mr. Budenz added that the Communist leaders were pleased with the Wallace mission.

Under questioning by you, Senator Ferguson, he expanded on this. I quote:

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communist Party Politburo, from its vantage point, thought that the Wallace mission to Soviet Asia and China was being properly guided and would end in the way they wished it would end. They have to appreciate what that objective of theirs was, knowing their objective during that particular period of time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel their objective was carried out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely. It was carried out.

On the basis of this testimony of Mr. Budenz, I have written to your committee's chairman that Mr. Budenz was guilty of three untruths.

The first and basic untruth was Mr. Budenz's assertion that the Wallace mission to China carried out a Communist objective. In fact, it did the precise contrary.

The second untruth was that Mr. Vincent guided Mr. Wallace toward any Communist objective. In fact, he did the precise contrary.

The third untruth was that Mr. Vincent was a party member at that time.

The weight of contrary evidence is such as to make this undoubtedly unsupported allegation inherently incredible. It is first necessary, therefore, to examine Mr. Budenz's statement that the Wallace mission carried out a Communist objective.

Fortunately, this can easily be tested against the only important results of the Wallace mission to China which are now upon the public record. These results were a cable from Mr. Wallace to President Roosevelt sent from Kunming via New Delhi on June 26, 1944, and a final report to President Roosevelt delivered by Mr. Wallace at the White House on July 10, 1944.

In these two documents there is much historical and reportorial matter which Mr. Budenz has seen fit to describe as pro-Communist in character.

If the committee so desires, I am prepared to prove that in these passages of his testimony Mr. Budenz has been guilty of gross distortion and deception, but the really relevant and striking feature of these two documents is not this historical and reportorial matter.

The really striking feature is the recommendation to the President contained in the Kunming cable of June 26 that Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell be dismissed forthwith from command in China and that the command be given to Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I interrupt for just a moment?

Mr. ALSOP. Certainly. I hope you will stop me at any time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure you made mention there you would offer some proof if the committee so desired and you did not mean to imply any question as to whether the committee wanted the full facts with regard to what you are concerned with?

Mr. ALSOP. No; not for 1 minute.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee does want all the evidence.

Mr. ALSOP. I hope you will feel when you have seen the evidence against Mr. Budenz's basic assertions that you have very little doubt he has deceived the committee with respect to this historical and reportorial matter which is subordinate.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought it should be made clear that the committee desires all the testimony and evidence that you can give to throw light on the situation.

Mr. ALSOP. That was my only intention.

This recommendation for the replacement of General Stilwell by General Wedemeyer was always regarded as the central and decisive passage of this Kunming cable both by Mr. Wallace and by Mr. Vincent.

I can so testify because I was present and took part in all the preliminary discussions with Mr. Wallace and the accused man, Mr. Vincent.

In his first testimony Mr. Budenz made no mention whatever of this chief result of the Wallace mission. When recalled to the stand to defend his previous testimony, Mr. Budenz oddly sought to show that the nomination of General Wedemeyer was a pro-Communist act, but again Mr. Budenz entirely passed over with no mention at all what was really significant; namely, the recommendation that General Stilwell be dismissed from command in China.

This was the point that Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent discussed longest and weighed most carefully. This recommendation to dismiss General Stilwell and not the nomination of General Wedemeyer was the truly drastic step that Mr. Wallace took, and I think I can show the committee that this recommendation to dismiss General Stilwell in which the accused man, Mr. Vincent, participated and concurred was the heaviest blow to the Communist cause in China that could be struck at that time.

Basically this was true because General Stilwell was strongly gripped with certain attitudes highly favorable to the Chinese Communist cause and because with his vast authority as theater commander was able to give effect to those attitudes.

Since he is no longer here to speak in his own defense, I shall, if the committee will permit me, try to develop what those attitudes of General Stilwell's were from documents penned by General Stilwell himself.

The series of documents begins in 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, Mr. Alsop. From what are you reading?

Mr. ALSOP. I am reading from a presentation, Senator, which I made in order to organize the evidence and which the committee agreed yesterday I could read.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was present at that time?

Mr. ALSOP. Senator Ferguson and Senator Smith of North Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. They agreed you should read this statement?

Mr. ALSOP. Certainly.

Mr. Sourwine also agreed.

The CHAIRMAN. Without cross-examination?

Mr. ALSOP. No. I [illegible]te questions in the course of the presentation, sir. [illegible]air

The CHAIRMAN. [illegible]ther you are running this committee or the committee is runni[illegible]elf is a matter to be determined very shortly.

Mr. ALSOP. I am n[illegible]trying to run the committee in the least.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are. You are proposing to quote something now that isn't in your statement and isn't your statement at all. It is a hearsay matter. What are you going to do with that? Are you going to be cross-examined on it and, if so, how?

Mr. ALSOP. I am not going to quote anything that isn't a public document.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you to say you are going to quote from someone who is not here.

Mr. ALSOP. I am going to quote from a series of public documents, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I will let you go along a while, but I am going to find out what is going on.

Mr. ALSOP. The series of documents begins in 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the authenticity of these documents?

Mr. ALSOP. If you will wait, Senator, I will try and tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know where you got them before you read them.

Mr. ALSOP. This happens to be a House or Senate document.

The CHAIRMAN. On what number?

Mr. ALSOP. It appears in a publication by the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, December 31, 1948.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. ALSOP. The series of documents begins in 1938 when General Stilwell was an obscure colonel assigned as an intelligence officer in China. At that time he sent the War Department a commentary on the situation after the fall of Nanking, which turned up, interestingly enough, in Whittaker Chambers pumpkin papers.

In this document published by the House of Representatives which I now offer as the first exhibit, Stilwell wrote:

> On the Chinese side only the Reds have a definite plan, the essence of which is the adoption of guerrilla warfare on a large scale and the mobilization of the masses. The Kuomintang leaders have been forced to take notice, since they can suggest nothing better, but they are not pushing the program in a wholehearted way because its success will mean the passing of power to the Reds.

In this Stilwell report of 1938 you will notice what may be called the germ of a military prejudice in favor of the Communists and against the Nationalists.

This germ, in turn, became a violent infection when General Stilwell was brought into sharp collision with the Generalissimo by his wartime assignment in China.

From almost the beginning there were bitter disagreements between the two men which ultimately generated a consuming hatred of Chiang Kai-shek in General Stilwell's mind as I shall now seek to demonstrate in General Stilwell's personal papers, published by William Sloane Associates in New York after being arranged and edited by Theodore H. White.

The bulk of this publication consists of selections from General Stilwell's diaries and letters arranged and organized by Mr. White

under the guidance of Mrs. Stilwell. You can trace the development of General Stilwell's attitude——

Mr. MORRIS. May the record show, Mr. Chairman, that these documents are being passed around this morning and they are being seen by the Senators here and the staff for the first time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The record may show if that is the fact. That is the reason I am drawing attention. I am wondering what this is all about.

Mr. MORRIS. It is completely without precedent we should take documents in open session we have never seen in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. It is without precedent we should be taking this statement. I would like to know how this came about, by what authority. We should have the documents before they are presented.

Mr. MORRIS. These were not mentioned in executive session.

Mr. PURCELL. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are you, please? Will you please sit remote from the witness?

Mr. PURCELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When we want you to answer a question, we will ask you.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand these are just excerpts from this book.

Mr. ALSOP. It is marked in the book if there is any desire to check as to the authenticity of the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. There will be a desire, of course. Why not?

Mr. ALSOP. You can trace the development of General Stilwell's attitude in these posthumously personal papers of his.

In June 1942 only a few months after taking command in China General Stilwell was already writing in his diary that the Generalissimo was a—

> stupid little ass and that the Chinese Government was a structure based on fear and favor in the hands of an ignorant, arbitrary, and stubborn man.

About the same time in a letter headed "The Manure Pile," his name for the Generalissimo's wartime capital, he wrote that:

> This is the most dreary type of maneuvering I've ever done, trying to guide and influence a stubborn, ignorant, prejudiced, conceited despot.

The first mention of the Communists appears in September of the same year when he satirically summarizes a Chinese intelligence estimate including the statement that:

> The Communists are raising hell. One-third of the 49 armies in the north have to oppose them.

This estimate he dismisses as "pure crap."

This is significant in view of Mr. Budenz' testimony in 1944 the Communist line was "to end the blockade of the northwest."

Or, in other words, because these Chinese armies containing the Communists in the north were to be used in some other manner.

Almost from the first General Stilwell maintained that by seeking to contain the Communists the Generalissimo proved he was not going all out to "beat the Japs," and he endlessly badgered Chiang Kai-shek to transfer these troops from the north down to the Burma forces in the south.

In short, General Stilwell was hammering on the same theme sometime before the Communists raised their slogan.

To go back to the documents, by January 1943, General Stilwell was noting:

What a fight the Russians have made. The nation has obviously found itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have the quote from Budenz' testimony?

Mr. ALSOP. I would have to look through it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you quote it there?

Mr. ALSOP. I think I accurately said what was the main slogan.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read it again?

Mr. ALSOP. He testified on his second appearance on the stand that the Communist policy was to end the blockade of the northwest, which was their name for the Generalissimo's effort to contain the Chinese Communist armies.

Senator FERGUSON. It is that that you are answering?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

By January 1943 General Stilwell was noting:

What a fight the Russians have made. The nation has obviously found itself. Twenty years of work and struggle. Results: Tough physique; unity of purpose; pride in their accomplishments; determination to win.

This Soviet success he then compared with:

The Chinese cesspool, a gang of thugs with the one idea of perpetuating themselves and their machine.

And General Stilwell concluded angrily:

We are maneuvered into the position of having to support this rotten regime and glorify its figurehead, the all-wise great patriot and soldier-peanut. My God.

Peanut was General Stilwell's customary name for the Generalissimo.

In a note written in July of the same year General Stilwell achieved his most complete collection of unflattering adjectives for Chiang Kai-shek—

Obstinate, pigheaded, ignorant, intolerant, arbitrary, unreasonable, illogical, ungrateful, grasping.

By 1944 when Mr. Wallace came to China the political note was being strongly struck by General Stilwell. In an undated note placed in 1944 by the editors of the Stilwell papers, the following appears:

I judge Kuomintang and Kungchantang (which is the Communist Party) by what I saw: Kuomintang—corruption, neglect, chaos, economy, taxes, words and deeds; hoarding, black market, trading with enemy.
Communist program——

Mr. MORRIS. May I at this time ask you the relevancy of what you are reading?

Mr. ALSOP. This was the man being dismissed. It shows he was not only hostile to the Generalissimo, but very friendly to the Communists, if you will allow me to continue.

Mr. MORRIS. Has any witness before this committee said that General Stilwell was not friendly to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. ALSOP. A witness before this committee has alleged that a Communist objective was carried out by the dismissal of General Stilwell.

Mr. MORRIS. We had evidence——

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a minute, Mr. Morris. I would be very much interested in having Mr. Alsop show the testimony on the point he just indicated. I don't recall a witness testifying that a Communist objective was carried out through the dismissal of General Stilwell.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Budenz said——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's get the record.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Budenz said——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's see what he said.

Mr. ALSOP. I can read it.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the official record. I don't want your notes.

Mr. ALSOP. Please give me the record and I will read it to you. Sorry, Senator. This is directly from the record. It will take me a little time to find it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, find it. If you had submitted your statement before, we would not have had to take the time to find it.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Sourwine, with whom I discussed it, did not ask me to do so, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Alsop, you told me you had no statement, that you would have no prepared statement, you were simply working from notes.

Mr. ALSOP. I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you cannot expect me to ask you for your notes. You didn't tell me you had a statement.

Mr. ALSOP. I have an orderly presentation which I was told I would be permitted to offer.

This is page 2098 of Mr. Budenz' second testimony. Mr. Budenz said, concerning the relationship of the Wallace mission to Communist policy:

> These documents are presented, as I said, are only part of what could have been presented to this committee, and they confirm my contention, which was the Communist Party Politburo from its vantage point thought that the Wallace mission to Soviet Asia and China was being properly guided and would end the way they wished it would end. We have to appreciate what that objective of theirs was, knowing their objective during that particular period of time.
>
> Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel their objective was carried out?
>
> Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely. It was carried out.

The chief results of Mr. Wallace's mission——

The CHAIRMAN. Now, just read your statement and never mind the chief result of Mr. Wallace's mission. What was your statement that was challenged here by counsel? Read your statement.

Mr. ALSOP. My statement was that——

The CHAIRMAN. Read the statement.

Mr. ALSOP. The record will have to be read back.

The CHAIRMAN. You have the notes before you.

Mr. ALSOP. I was not speaking from my notes. I was trying to answer Mr. Morris' question.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you speak from your notes and when not?

Mr. ALSOP. It depends on whether I'm being questioned or not.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not being questioned.

Mr. ALSOP. I was.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have a quotation, I will read back from the record, or you read it from your notes. You are not going to make ad libitum statements here and not have them challenged.

Mr. ALSOP. The stenographer will have to read back.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The record was thereupon read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed with your question, counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. It seemed to me that the witness had made a statement concerning something which he said a prior witness before this committee stated. I don't recall any prior witness who so stated it.

What he has read from Mr. Budenz's testimony is not what he said a witness stated.

Mr. ALSOP. Let me——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Conclude your statement or your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not think Mr. Alsop should paraphrase what a prior witness said when his specific purpose is to accuse the prior witness of perjury before the committee.

I think in quoting what a prior witness said he should be careful to quote exactly from the testimony before the committee.

Mr. ALSOP. May I continue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but you have your warning. Do not paraphrase. You will not get it again.

Mr. ALSOP. I have already given the extremely disagreeable description of the Kuomintang program. I now quote from General Stilwell's description of the Communist program:

> Reduce taxes, rents, interest; raise production and standard of living; participate in government; practice what they preach.

In another undated paper of the same period General Stilwell noted that—

> The mass of the Chinese people welcome the Reds as being the only visible hope of relief.

And in still another he wrote that—

> The cure for China's trouble is the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek.

The committee will recall the enormous latitude conferred during the last war on American theater commanders. I need hardly point out to the committee that from the very first it was a positive danger to the Generalissimo to have to rely for his American support on a theatre commander who regarded him as a despot and a fool and his government as a monstrosity.

I need hardly point out, either, that this danger to the Generalissimo had become extremely acute by the time Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent reached China for this American theater commander to whom Chaing Kai-shek looked for aid was actually calling for Chiang's "elimination" and describing the Chinese Communists as the "only hope of the Chinese masses."

It did not end there, however. Mr Budenz has testified that the rather pale and moderate description of China's political-economic-military crisis in 1944 contained in the Wallace cable was calculated to "discredit the Generalissimo."

And that this cable, therefore, followed the Communist Party line. In fact, however, if the Communists wished to discredit Chiang Kai-shek and shake American confidence in him, General Stilwell, the chief American representative in China, whose removal Mr. Wallace recommended, was the ideal instrument.

The attacks on Chiang I have quoted were not confided to General Stilwell's diary alone. He never tired of describing the Generalissimo in the same terms to the highest officials of the American Government whose sole important source of information on China he then was. There were excellent reasons to believe, as the committee will later see, that General Stilwell actually encouraged and instructed his staff to denigrate and belittle Chiang Kai-shek in the same manner.

Furthermore, and this is the crucial point, General Stilwell had a plan for giving practical effect to his preference for the Chinese Communists which he was maturing just the moment when Mr. Wallace reached China.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever directly worked under Stilwell?

Mr. ALSOP. No. I have known him rather well. I worked under General Chennault, but I was fairly familiar with all the military affairs of the theater because one of my assignments from General Chennault was to know about them.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not work under him.

Mr. ALSOP. I worked with him——

The CHAIRMAN. You did not work under him?

Mr. ALSOP. I did not, but I was familiar with the theater plans.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know his official records? Did you have access to them?

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, as you know——

The CHAIRMAN. Will you answer my question? Never mind evading.

Mr. ALSOP. If you will permit me, I shall try to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have access to his official records?

Mr. ALSOP. I had access to some of his official records.

The CHAIRMAN. General Stilwell?

Mr. ALSOP. General Stilwell's telegrams were frequently repeated to the Fourteenth Air Force as is usually the military custom.

The CHAIRMAN. You had access to them?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were all?

Mr. ALSOP. No, because I knew members of his staff extremely well.

The CHAIRMAN. And they gave you his official records? Is that the idea you wish to convey?

Mr. ALSOP. They did not, but they gave me extremely clear and positive information about General Stilwell's policy line, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You got it from his subordinates?

Mr. ALSOP. I got it from his subordinates, and telegrams.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you are testifying, what you got from General Stilwell's subordinates? Is that what you are testifying to under oath here?

Mr. ALSOP. I am testifying——

The CHAIRMAN. Will you answer? Is that what you are testifying to under oath?

Mr. ALSOP. I am testifying to information which I received from many different sources.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about General Stilwell.

Mr. ALSOP. My information from him does not come from his subordinates only. It comes from different sources, from General Chennault, from the Chinese. It comes from newspapermen with

whom General Stilwell spoke very freely. It comes from many different sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Just so long as we know where you are getting this. That was the question propounded by Senator Ferguson.

Mr. ALSOP. I am anxious to tell you.

General Stilwell had a plan for giving practical effect to his preference for the Chinese Communists which he was actually maturing at the moment when Mr. Wallace reached China.

In Mr. Wallace's cable the committee will have noted that a Japanese offensive was then inflicting disastrous defeats on the Generalissimo's armies in the east China area.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us whether or not anyone else had sent the information which is indicated here to the Pentagon or to the President about the conditions in China and General Stilwell's attitude on those conditions?

Mr. ALSOP. I think I can give you a very interesting history on that effort.

What actually happened was this: When the Japanese offensive commenced, General Stilwell's intelligence—we used to receive copies of the intelligence report—described it as a rice raid. In its first phase the offensive overran in 3 weeks the great and very rich Province of Honan, completely destroyed the armies of Gen. Tankg En Po.

Gen. Tang En Po had an estimated several hundred thousand Chinese troops—I think I said in my executive session testimony 700,000. I think that was rather high. It was nearer 400,000.

At any rate, it was one of the major Army groups of the Chinese Nationalists.

They then came down to Changsha on the Yangtze River. General Stilwell's intelligence was still treating this episode as minor. They said the armies of Tang En Po had just fallen to pieces of themselves and that anything that happened before Changsha would be a rice raid.

The defender of Changsha was a Gen. Shueh Yueh. Changsha fell and the Japanese began to drive south of Changsha toward the even more vital area in Kiangsi Province.

The situation began to look very black. I was told at the time by a member of General Stilwell's staff—General Stilwell, I should say, during this period, was in Burma, and after the fall of Changsha the intelligence reports took a completely different turn and the offensive that had previously been treated as a rice raid became absolutely unstoppable.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you talking about intelligence reports returned to Washington, returned to the Pentagon?

Mr. ALSOP. The circulation, unless I am very incorrectly informed—I think I am quite correct—was that we would get one, the Delhi headquarters would get one, and they would be forwarded to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you attempting to answer Senator Ferguson's question as to whether this situation with respect to Stilwell's attitudes, policies, and plans was reported to Washington?

Mr. ALSOP. I don't think General Stilwell's plan was—Senator Ferguson, if we have to read the record——

Senator FERGUSON. I am anxious to know if what you say now about Stilwell was all known and came to Mr. Wallace's attention and it took from July until about November—am I right when Stilwell was removed?

Mr. MORRIS. Late October.

Senator FERGUSON. Why we allowed a condition as you are describing here to exist in the Chinese theater without him being removed without the effort of Mr. Wallace?

Mr. ALSOP. I think I can explain that to you. I would like to do it later. It is a rather major subject actually. I would like to finish with these situation reports.

Senator FERGUSON. You will explain that as to why they did not act in Washington without Mr. Wallace's recommendation?

Mr. ALSOP. They did act in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Without Mr. Wallace's recommendation?

Mr. ALSOP. No. They acted on this problem of the Japanese offensive which you originally questioned me about.

Senator FERGUSON. I was also questioning you about whether or not Washington knew what was going on as far as our commander was concerned.

Mr. ALSOP. I don't think they clearly understood what was going on. I can't testify to that as a matter of knowledge, naturally. I can give you a fairly clear opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Chiang had given a message to anyone else besides Wallace that he wanted Stilwell removed?

Mr. ALSOP. Well——

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that?

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, if you want, I will tell you——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Do you know?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not Chiang gave any word to anyone else other than Henry Wallace that he wanted Stilwell removed? Wallace indicated yesterday that Chiang wanted Stilwell removed.

Mr. ALSOP. He did not testify, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's get back to Senator Ferguson's question.

Senator FERGUSON. To your knowledge, did Chiang Kai-shek give any words or any message to anyone other than Henry Wallace that he wanted Stilwell removed?

Mr. ALSOP. It is an extremely long and complicated story.

The CHAIRMAN. Answer it.

Mr. ALSOP. Which I shall be glad to tell you.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it a "Yes" or "No" answer, with an explanation?

Mr. ALSOP. The answer is "Yes," with an explanation.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us have the explanation now.

Mr. ALSOP. It is long. It is as follows:

At the end of the Trident Conference in the spring of 1943 in Washington, at which General Stilwell had publicly abused the Generalissimo before the entire assembly of allied commanders, and Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. The Generalissimo naturally heard of this incident. I think he probably heard about it from the British who were probably trying to make trouble, requested Dr. Soong to arrange with the President for the recall of General Stilwell, on the grounds that the relationship was nonviable.

General Stilwell returned to China after Trident. Dr. Soong remained in Washington. He did arrange through Mr. Hopkins with the President that Stilwell would be recalled if the Generalissimo formally requested that he be recalled.

In October of 1943 Dr. Soong returned to Chungking to prepare for the conference there at which Admiral Mountbatten was going to take command in southeast Asia. He got there about 2 days after Admiral Mountbatten.

At that time I was serving Dr. Soong as adviser. I was thoroughly familiar with all the circumstances. He brought word if the Generalissimo presented a formal request rather than this informal message through Dr. Soong, the President would immediately and automatically recall General Stilwell.

In my opinion the President's purpose was to appoint General Wedemeyer who had already been sent out as Deputy Commander to Mountbatten.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me have that statement, that last statement, just from "my opinion."

(The record was thereupon read by the reporter.)

Mr. ALSOP. I say that because Dr. Soong thought that at the time and he was familiar with the atmosphere in the White House since he had been negotiating this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Soong was of the opinion that Wedemeyer was being sent there for the purpose of——

Mr. ALSOP. No, he was not being sent there for the purpose of, but he was the most probable replacement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Dr. Soong tell you that the President had indicated that to him in any way?

Mr. ALSOP. No, he did not. He said he thought Wedemeyer was the most likely bet if Stilwell was recalled.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was just expressing his own opinion?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, but it was an informed opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. But not based on anything the President had said to him?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes. I have no idea how it was based.

Senator FERGUSON. We have Wedemeyer out there and Soong. You are adviser to Soong. What happened?

Mr. ALSOP. As you will find in General Stilwell's diary, General Stilwell had made a personal alliance—I can find the passage for you if you are interested—with Madam Chiang and Madam Kung, who belonged to the opposite political faction from their brother, Dr. Soong, and were reluctant to see him rise in power and influence to the extent that he would have done if General Stilwell had been replaced by his arrangement.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you clarify your statement where you say they belonged to different political factions? Please designate.

Mr. ALSOP. It was a very curious situation in China. Madam Kung was the most powerful single personality in the more conservative, the more reactionary group in the Kuomintang.

Dr. Soong was the most important single personality in the more progressive or more modern minded group.

Madam Chiang allied herself with Madam Kung because she didn't like Dr. Soong, and finally, Madam Sun Yat-sen, the fourth signifi-

cant member of the family was, in fact, as it now turns out, a Communist Asian. She was already overtly a Communist sympathizer.

The family feuds of that particular family more or less summed up the politics of China.

The CHAIRMAN. What relation were these ladies to each other, sisters?

Mr. ALSOP. They were sisters.

The CHAIRMAN. All you have mentioned were sisters and they had taken up with different political factions?

Mr. ALSOP. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. They are following that same line?

Mr. ALSOP. Madam Sun Yat-sen is now, I believe, a member of the executive committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. How did she stand at that time as regards the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party?

Mr. ALSOP. You mean how did which one stand?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you mention which one belonged to the Communist Party at that time?

Mr. ALSOP. Madam Chiang, Madam Kung, and Dr. Soong were all very eminent members of the National Party; whereas, Madam Sun Yat-sen was ostensibly a member of the Kuomintang. She was officially a member of the Kuomintang which her late husband had founded, but, in fact, she was a strong overt Communist sympathizer, and as I say, has now turned up on the executive committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Peiping.

General Stilwell had made an offensive and defensive alliance—the event is described in his book—with the two ladies, Madam Kung and Madam Chiang.

When Dr. Soong returned from Washington with this assurance from the President that General Stilwell would be recalled in response to a personal request, Madam Chiang and Madam Kung started a tremendous family fight which went on for about 2 days in the generalissimo's villa up on the hill.

I can recall Dr. Soong coming back from these sessions in a state of complete exhaustion. Madam Kung and Madam Chiang, for reasons of internal Chinese politics, maintained the position which was not true as it turned out when General Wedemeyer was appointed, that American aid for China depended on General Stilwell; that he had been so built up by the press as an American hero, that he had such influence at the War Department, that all supplies and aid for China would be cut off if the generalissimo presented this request for General Stilwell's recall.

Senator FERGUSON. What part of the press was advocating that kind of idea? Was it the Chinese press?

Mr. ALSOP. No; the American press had built up General Stilwell as a hero. The ladies said that "If you throw this American hero out of command in China, you will become very unpopular with the United States and you won't get any aeroplanes and any guns, or anything else."

Mr. SOURWINE. Just to get the chronology straight, you knew at this time of the President's assurance to Dr. Soong that if a request were made personally by Chiang there would be a removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. ALSOP. I did, indeed.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was at what time?

Mr. ALSOP. This was about the middle of October 1943. All the Generalissimo had to do was send a simple telegram saying, I request General Stilwell's recall." The Generalissimo was a very wise and great leader in my opinion. He suffered from one defect, as I had reason to observe myself, because I sometimes worked with him also. He was completely unfamiliar with the Western World, and he was impressed by this argument that Mme. Chiang and Mme. Kung made.

However, at the end of the first stage of the family fight, which was just before Admiral Mountbatten reached Chungking, he agreed that he would support Dr. Soong and would present the request for General Stilwell's recall.

When Admiral Mountbatten reached Chungking accompanied by General Wedemeyer and General Somervell, he did present this request to General Somervell.

Senator FERGUSON. What month?

Mr. ALSOP. October 1943. This was done, if I recall the circumstances of the time correctly, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. General Somervell, because General Stilwell was a friend of his, expressed regret that the Generalissimo felt that he could no longer carry on with General Stilwell.

The ladies then rushed in and said, "Now, you see Somervell is for Stilwell, too. It proves everything we have said."

They turned the Generalissimo around. Stilwell was then brought in and made to promise the Generalissimo that he would obey him. It was a rather humiliating scene about which Mme. Kung actually boasted the next morning to General Chennault.

When General Stilwell gave the Generalissimo this promise, the Generallissimo then sent for General Somervell, who was at dinner at General Ho Ying-chin's, and told him not to send the telegram. He did this without telling Dr. Soong. He called in Dr. Soong the next morning at 9 o'clock. He told him then.

Dr. Soong objected bitterly. The Generalissimo was always suspicious of Dr. Soong, and then had a terrible fight with Dr. Soong. He actually threw his teacup on the floor and broke it into quite a number of pieces.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, just for the sake of the record. You say "actually." Were you there?

Mr. ALSOP. No, but I saw Dr. Soong immediately afterward and heard about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are reporting what Dr. Soong told you?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes. Naturally, I wasn't sitting under the table watching the teacup crash down around them.

This incident originated the greatest Chinese political crisis of that month of October 1943.

Dr. Soong, being the leader of a more progressive group in the Kuomintang which had been rising in esteem and influence, had now quarreled irrevocably with the Generalissimo. When he returned to his house he was actually under a kind of modified house arrest; so, during the ensuing months I was one of the very few people in Chungking who actually saw him at all, regularly. I used to go out for walks with him because he was so lonely.

Meanwhile, the Kung group, which through Mme. Kung engineered this coup, swept the board. General Ho Ying-chin overcame all his opposition in the military machine so that General Chen Cheng, who is now Prime Minister on Formosa, was dismissed from command; but, according to a well-authenticated Chungking report, he was also under house arrest.

The Bank of China, which was the biggest institution in China independent of the Kung banking group, was swept into Dr. Soong's control.

The only opposition to the CC group in the Kuomintang headed by Chang Chunnganu—he used a Cantonese spelling; I don't understand the Cantonese—was stamped out. You had this tremendous reactionary triumph in the Chinese Government of which in some sense the Generalissimo was thereafter a prisoner because he had made the wrong decision. He had committed himself into General Stilwell's hands.

General Stilwell turned around and ceased to obey him himself immediately after that event. They began quarrelling again right away, as you can see in General Stilwell's diaries.

Meanwhile the success of these reactionary groups caused the most serious demoralization in the whole Chinese governmental structure.

To give you one example of that, the commander of the defending armies, the most important defending army in east China, General Shueh Yueh, whom I have already mentioned, was a member of the more modern-minded and progressive faction. He was detested by General Ho Ying-chin.

According to our Intelligence, a month or so before the Japanese offensive actually commenced, General Ho Ying-chin, who did not have quite the power to dismiss General Shueh Yueh because he had strong provincial roots, attempted to prepare for the dismissal of General Shueh Yueh by cutting off all money and supplies from him.

So that these armies that were defending east China for the Generalissimo were cut off from money and supplies by the Generalissimo's own war minister at the moment when the Japanese attacked.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you proceeding with your own presentation?

Senator FERGUSON. He is answering my question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I just wondered what is the question.

Senator FERGUSON. The question was this: Did Chiang Kai-shek give notice to anyone other than Henry Wallace that he wanted Stilwell removed.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I thought your question was. I was trying to correlate it.

Senator FERGUSON. I still remember my question.

I wonder whether or not I can get this in a couple of minutes. I have to leave the hearing.

Up to that point he gave a message to Somervell. Somervell returned it to him?

Mr. ALSOP. The most important message he gave was to Dr. Soong. Dr. Soong received from the President a promise, if he asked for his removal—Stilwell's removal—Stilwell would be removed.

He was then very forcefully informed by the two ladies and was induced not to request Stilwell's removal.

Having given way at this time and failed to carry out his agreement with the President, he then no longer dared to ask overtly for Stilwell's removal.

Furthermore, his adviser, Dr. Soong, having been driven from the circle around him, had to stick to this information that they had told the Generalissimo that General Stilwell was essential to them.

Therefore, General Stilwell, in a sense, made the Generalissimo his prisoner.

Senator FERGUSON. Then no message is given until Henry Wallace really gets it in the car from the General in a personal conversation?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, and I think——

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the answer?

Mr. ALSOP. I would argue——

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want you to argue.

Mr. ALSOP. In order to answer—I am trying to answer accurately, if you will permit me to do so.

Senator, I think Mr. Wallace testified——

The CHAIRMAN. Will you just listen to the question?

Senator FERGUSON. As far as your knowledge was concerned, was that the first request?

Mr. ALSOP. I do not think it was a request. I think Mr. Wallace testified, if you will recall, that the Generalissimo did not overtly request General Stilwell's recall. He indicated he would like General Stilwell's recall.

Senator FERGUSON. The substance was he wanted him out?

Mr. AISOP. That he did not like him.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the first really that you would consider a request?

Mr. ALSOP. That I know about.

Senator FERGUSON. I have to go to conference.

The CHAIRMAN. I have to go to the same conference. I cannot get anyone to come here. Everybody else is in some meeting or another. It is imperative we be there, I do not know just what to do.

Senator FERGUSON. It is so important we get this conference out.

The CHAIRMAN. There is going to be no recess if we do not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why we started early, thinking that we could get someone to continue at 10:30.

Mr. ALSOP. Senator O'Conor said he could.

The CHAIRMAN. He has been notified.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will call him again.

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest you just recess to see whether or not we have the other people coming in.

Mr. MORRIS. While we are waiting, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You realize the issue about Mr. Budenz' testimony is simply this: Mr. Budenz has testified that the removal of Stilwell was looked upon by the Communists as a wise compromise.

Therefore, the evidence that you produce about the Communists' favorable reaction to Stilwell and his favorable response to them is not in issue at all?

Don't you realize that?

Mr. ALSOP. I can't agree with your interpretation of Mr. Budenz' testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. ALSOP. I am trying to show that the removal of General Stilwell was something that no Communist in his senses could conceivably have desired at the moment when Mr. Wallace recommended it.

Mr. MORRIS. You heard Mr. Budenz' testimony?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Budenz has testified on a whole series of points.

Mr. MORRIS. On this point?

Mr. ALSOP. I would have to call your attention to quite a number of other passages of Mr. Budenz's testimony. I do not agree with your interpretation of Mr. Budenz's testimony.

I recall the testimony you refer to. It is one part of Mr. Budenz's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. If I understand the situation correctly, this witness has publicly stated and privately stated that Mr. Budenz has been guilty of perjury before this committee. That is the reason for his presence here. He should state wherein Mr. Budenz has been guilty.

Then he should state the fact that contradicts Mr. Budenz. Anything else means just a running line of theory and opinion, and so forth.

The whole situation should be boiled down to an issue. If Mr. Budenz has lied, this committee wants to know it. We want to know wherein he has lied, and we want this witness to state wherein he has lied, because this is the challenging witness.

He has stated publicly, and that has been put in the record on the floor of the Senate, that Mr. Budenz has been guilty of perjury, and he has intimated that this committee has been guilty of subornation of perjury.

Mr. ALSOP. I do not intimate that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was in your column, and the Senator from New York put it in the record.

Mr. ALSOP. It was not intended to be in there.

The CHAIRMAN. It was, just the same.

I understand that Senator O'Conor may come here. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. On page 2072 of Mr. Budenz' testimony, he quoted from the Daily Worker. This is his testimony:

> Then this is the important part I wish to call to your attention. He—

Frederick Vanderbilt Field writing in the Daily Worker of December 2, 1944—

> mentions three conditions, but the third is the one important to the question of General Wedemeyer:
>
> "* * * as to the third, we know only that there was a breakdown over the particular person nominated as commander in chief, General Stilwell, and that President Roosevelt wisely and quickly compromised on that point. There is no indication that the general proposition for an American commander has been refused."

Mr. ALSOP. May I go back in the record, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. ALSOP. I don't have to read the record again. We just read the portion, but I will do so.

Mr. MORRIS. You understand that Mr. Budenz there testified that the official Communist reaction to Stilwell's removal was that they considered it a wise compromise.

Is it not implicit in that that the concession is someone is friendly to the Communists?

Mr. ALSOP. I do not agree with your interpretation of Mr. Budenz' testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not answer the question, Mr. Alsop. You argue and you go into long tirades of discussion, but the question is propounded to you by the counsel and why don't you answer?

Mr. ALSOP. My answer to the question is I do not agree with Mr. Morris' interpretation, or Mr. Budenz' interpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. But the record is read to you. Whether you agree to it, or not, the record is read.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Budenz has carefully in that part of the record selected one article from the Daily Worker which appeared 1 month after the dismissal of General Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. That is his testimony before this committee.

Mr. ALSOP. I am challenging that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now state the fact.

Mr. ALSOP. If you will permit me, I shall bring a series of documents to show——

Mr. MORRIS. I quoted the December 2 Daily Worker. I have a November 1 issue just 2 days after the dismissal all saying the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Dwell on what you have already asked and ask him if he contradicts that and why.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a question of veracity here wherein the veracity of a witness coming before this committee is challenged by this gentleman.

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, I am well aware of that. It is a point that I hoped to come to later on.

Senator SMITH. What is the question?

Mr. ALSOP. My understanding from Mr. Sourwine was that I would be permitted to take up these points in the order in which they seemed to me most logical.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us have that statement correct, if I may make a statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had no understanding with Mr. Alsop. I was present with Mr. Alsop at a conference between him and his attorney in Senator O'Conor's office with Senator O'Conor, at which time Mr. Alsop stated what he would like to do in the way of proceeding here, and the substance of that was he would like to be able to proceed with a presentation of his points, point by point, and that he would welcome questioning as he went along.

It was my understanding that Senator O'Conor took the view that was a reasonable way to proceed. I do not recall that I gave Mr. Alsop any commitments. I am sure Senator O'Conor told him he was expressing only a personal view and that the matter, if a point were raised with regard to procedure, would have to be determined by the committee.

Is that not reasonably accurate?

Mr. ALSOP. I don't think it is quite accurate. In fact, you asked me whether I wouldn't prefer to be asked any questions. I said I would welcome questions. You then suggested that the questioning

be limited until each section or to the close of each section of my presentation.

Mr. Purcell, who is here and who was present at this meeting will, I am sure, recall that you said precisely that. I think it is immaterial.

I would like to come to Mr. Morris' point on which I have considerable documentation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris asked you a question. Let's get back to a starting point. He asked you a question based on Mr. Budenz's testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you realize that we know the witness, Louis Budenz, has testified that the Communist looked upon General Stilwell's dismissal as a wise compromise?

Mr. ALSOP. I do realize that.

I think when Mr. Budenz said so, he distorted fact, Mr. Morris. I shall attempt to prove it to you, if you will permit me to do so.

I am now attempting to give my answer to your question.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Smith, the witness here has just said that Mr. Budenz has distorted the evidence. I think, therefore, we have to go to the evidence. Therefore, we go to the Frederick V. Field column of December 2, 1944, in the Daily Worker, and read it.

Mr. ALSOP. I would like it to be read from the beginning.

Mr. MORRIS. Read any part you like.

Mr. ALSOP. Could I have it?

Mr. MORRIS. I think you have it here. There it is right there in the record.

Mr. ALSOP. That is the part of it Mr. Budenz chose to quote.

Mr. MORRIS. There is the whole article.

Mr. ALSOP. I would have you note what Mr. Budenz chose to quote.

Senator SMITH (presiding). I do not think that is answering the question. We want to get the facts here. That is a matter of record. If that is what he said, that is what he said.

What do you want to say?

Mr. ALSOP. I have a long answer to Mr. Morris' question.

Mr. MORRIS. If he distorted, the evidence being Frederick V. Field's guest column in the Daily Worker of December 2, 1944——

Mr. ALSOP. Let me——

Senator SMITH. Just a minute. You are not going to run this show.

Mr. MORRIS. If Mr. Budenz distorted the evidence, the evidence being Frederick V. Field's guest column, will you tell this committee how he did it, using the evidence as the direct source?

Senator SMITH. That gives you full leeway.

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, I mean Mr. Budenz distorted the evidence in the sense he left out a whole series of other publications of the same period in the Daily Worker which point in a different direction.

He even left out the beginning in his actual testimony. The article itself is in the record. The beginning of this column which is:

> I disagree with those who take an entirely pessimistic view regarding recent developments in China.

That to me means that a great many members of the Communist Party to whom Mr. Field was addressing himself were very much worried about General Stilwell's dismissal and he was seeking to reassure them.

Mr. MORRIS. Reassure them what?

Mr. ALSOP. As to the significance of General Stilwell's dismissal.

If you will permit me, I will try to give you the rest of my answer.

There were 2 documents in the record on Mr. Budenz's side as to the interpretation. There are 2 documents in the record which partly support Mr. Budenz's interpretation of the Communist response to General Stilwell's dismissal. These were the guest column of Frederick Field written a month after the fact already quoted and an article on page 8 of the Daily Worker, issue of November 1, 1944, by Joseph Starobin.

I, myself, as a member of the columning trade would classify these articles under a heading of our business which is, "Don't let's cry too publicly over spilled milk."

I must tell the committee in publicizing these particular comments on the dismissal of General Stilwell a quite remarkable degree of selectivity was shown.

In point of fact the November 1 issue of the Daily Worker in which the Starobin article already in the record appears, shows every sign of being one of those rather frequent Worker issues when the Worker is caught with its party line down, to use Mr. Luce's phrase.

On page 3 of the November 1 issue appears the UP dispatch from Washington describing Stilwell's recall. On page 8 appears the Starobin article already in the record, the theme of which is:

Stilwell's dismissal disclosed the scandalous state of affairs in China and would therefore generate pressure for a Chinese coalition.

On the same page appear selections from Brooks Atkinson's very critical report on Stilwell's dismissal in the New York Times, including a paragraph implying the President did wrong to recall General Stilwell.

Under the cartoon on the editorial page appears a far more important article again by Mr. Starobin. In this article, in the special spot, where I am told readers of the Worker are taught to expect to find the pure distilled milk of truth, Starobin expressed "grave concern" about the dismissal of Stilwell, lauded the General and called him "our favorite General."

We are to believe that the Communist leaders genuinely desired the dismissal of their favorite General?

I suggest to the committee——

Mr. MORRIS. Was that your remark or the remark from Starobin?

Mr. ALSOP. I ended the quote; "our favorite General" is the quotation.

Mr. MORRIS. Read his testimony.

Mr. ALSOP. My testimony says: "Are we to believe"——

Mr. MORRIS. Read the record back.

(The record was thereupon read by the reporter)

Mr. ALSOP. I was reading from my testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Won't you read back that part just to see whether you have "grave" in quotes?

Mr. ALSOP. "Grave" should not be in quotes. Nor did I put it in quotes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It sounded as though you said he expressed "grave concern".

Mr. ALSOP. I used the word "concern".

May I continue?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

The last observation you made was a matter of argument and not a statement of fact. It seems to me we ought not to load down this record with your conclusions, your arguments about the matter.

Rather, you should give us the benefit of the facts. If you will read the last thing you said, it was clearly argument.

Mr. ALSOP. It was my attempt to answer.

Senator SMITH. Let's read back the answer just now at the end of his answer, just the one last sentence.

(The record was thereupon read by the reporter, as follows:)

Are we to believe that the Communist leaders genuinely desired the dismissal of their favorite general?

Senator SMITH. We want the facts.

Mr. ALSOP. That seems to me responsive to Mr. Morris' question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we go beyond that point, there is something I think should be focused and that goes back to a previous colloquy which I had with the witness.

I mean at a time when he had stated that Mr. Budenz had made the assertion that the Stilwell dismissal was something desired by the Communists.

At that time the witness attempted to find that statement in Mr. Budenz' testimony and it did not turn up in Mr. Budenz' testimony.

Now, the focus is on the question of whether the Communists desired the dismissal of General Stilwell. Since Mr. Budenz never said they did, I am wondering about the pertinency of this particular testimony. It seems the focus is off.

Mr. ALSOP. I am trying to show the Communists very much did not want the dismissal of General Stilwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Assuming you show it, what does it prove with regard to your general thesis here?

Mr. ALSOP. It proves the main act of Mr. Wallace's mission in which Mr. Vincent participated which Mr. Budenz has testified carried out a Communist objective was something that the Communists did not want and could not have wanted.

It seems to me very pertinent.

Mr. MORRIS. With particularity, Mr. Alsop, when he came to talking about the Stilwell release, he said that they looked upon the thing as a wise compromise?

Mr. ALSOP. There is a great deal more evidence I would like to put in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what we are waiting for.

You are reading now from the Daily Worker?

Mr. ALSOP. I read from the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Of November 1, 1944, the Starobin article?

Mr. ALSOP. There are a series of others.

Mr. MORRIS. That begins—

The sudden withdrawal of Gen. Joseph Stilwell from his Burma-China post has won outstanding merit.

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, and read it on.

Mr. MORRIS. What part do you want?

Mr. ALSOP. The part where it says, and I will read it for you:

An American general who got his four stars only last August, is removed from a theater which he knows well from a country where he has fought a successful campaign, and Americans are concerned. They obviously have every right to be concerned.

I continue:

We don't know the facts, of course, but one more thing is significant. Vinegar Joe Stilwell had years of experience working with the Chungking authorities as well as the British India Command. He knows the situation from the Burma-Southern China end of it. He has not been in the Communist area of China at all, yet he must have arrived at the conclusions very similar to those our military mission in Yenan will reach. Something is rotten in Chungking and that something stems from the blockade against Yenan—

which Stilwell was working very hard, may I interpose, to lift.

Then he continues——

Mr. MORRIS. Does that not go to establish Budenz's testimony that they looked upon it as a wise compromise?

Mr. ALSOP. It does not, in my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. If something is a wise compromise, there are some advantages given up.

Mr. ALSOP. Here he said:

You realize to what depths the corruption and political oppression have driven free China. This is the heart of the problem. It will hardly be cured by the withdrawal of our favorite American general, although this withdrawal may precipitate the changes that are overdue in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you quote that in support of, or in opposition to?

Mr. ALSOP. I quote that in opposition to Mr. Budenz' testimony.

I would like to continue with my analysis.

Senator SMITH. I want you to say everything you want to say and present the facts. I believe you say that Mr. Budenz perjured himself. Isn't that what you said?

Mr. ALSOP. I said he had not told the truth.

Senator SMITH. You know he was under oath?

Mr. ALSOP. Perjury is a technical, legal matter.

Senator SMITH. Anything that you want to say bearing on that point, I want to give you full leeway, because you have made a serious charge against Mr. Budenz. I want you to have full chance to vindicate yourself and to condemn him, if you can.

My remark was it seemed you make one statement of fact a quasi-statement of fact and then you go into argument. The argument is something we want to leave out of the record.

I realize there will be times when it is hard to distinguish.

In these cases where you are discussing the nature of the Communist Party line, it is practically impossible to leave the argument out of the record.

Mr. ALSOP. My interpretation of this November 1 issue of the Worker is very simple. I suggested to the committee in this issue of the Worker, having been caught without a clear party line, the editor, Mr. Budenz, put in a little bit of everything all the way from the Atkinson condemnation of Stilwell's dismissal to the main Starobin article on the editorial page lauding General Stilwell, to the Starobin article on page 8, in which he says that perhaps Stilwell's dismissal

might be a good thing, because it will blow the roof off in China and force reforms.

Mr. MORRIS. Then at that point will you not concede that Joseph Starobin is the authority in the Daily Worker and not Brooks Atkinson's news report?

Mr. ALSOP. Will you not concede——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you answer the question?

Mr. ALSOP. I said "Yes." Will you not concede that the article on the editorial page which describes General Stilwell as "our favorite general" is in Daily Worker usage a much more important article in terms of instructing people as to the party line than the article on page 8.

Mr. MORRIS. Should I be sworn, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. I do not know that that is up to you to answer that, Mr. Morris.

Mr. ALSOP. This is a matter of common knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interject, I think it will help, I hope it will, because the issues are getting fogged. We have been down some alleys a few times this morning, but perhaps I should say we have been chasing upstairs to go after the little boys in the windows with pea shooters when we should be marching on down the street with the parade.

I would like to get this thesis of Mr. Alsop's laid out before us.

Mr. ALSOP. Now that we have started this story, if I may interject, I would just as soon end the issue of what the Daily Worker said.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure you would. I think this would be helpful.

Assuming that for the sake of argument that it is established that the Daily Worker and the Communist Party did not desire the replacement of General Stilwell, that would be one of the points you are trying to establish?

Mr. ALSOP. That would be a very mild way of putting a point I am trying to establish. I am trying to make the point that the removal of General Stilwell which Mr. Wallace recommended, with Mr. Vincent's concurrence, was the very last thing the Communist Party desired.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am glad you stated it that way. Assuming the removal of Stilwell is the last thing they desired, and assuming that Mr. Vincent did have a part in the recommendations made by Mr. Wallace in his Kunming cables, necessarily in order to establish, even with those two facts, that Mr. Budenz was lying, you must also establish that it was the influence of Mr. Vincent which resulted in the removal of General Stilwell, or the recommendation for his removal.

Is that not correct?

Mr. ALSOP. I don't think it is quite an accurate way of putting the situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a minute, sir. Suppose, Mr. Alsop, that the decision to convey to the President the Generalissimo's desire that General Stilwell be replaced had been made by Mr. Wallace. At that moment, what would the Communist line have been?

Mr. ALSOP. I think the Communist line at the time of Mr. Wallace's recommendation to the President was quite opposite to Mr. Wallace's recommendation in a most violent way.

I shall try to prove that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand that. We have had no testimony from Mr. Budenz that the Communist line was in favor of, or was not opposed to the removal of General Stilwell.

Mr. ALSOP. We have had testimony from Mr. Budenz.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record of Mr. Budenz——

Mr. ALSOP. May I finish my answer, Mr. Sourwine?

We have had testimony from Mr. Budenz Mr. Wallace's mission carried out the Communist objective under the guidance of John Carter Vincent who was a member of the Communist Party.

I am trying to show the committee that it did not carry it out.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are addressing yourself entirely on the assumption that the particular Communist objective referred to was the dismissal of General Stilwell.

I am attempting to show there may be another possibility.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Sourwine, there may be another possibility. If we could get to that in an orderly way, I would like to comment on it, if you feel it is necessary.

The subject before us is the heart of Mr. Budenz' testimony, which is the Wallace mission "carried out" a Communist objective and again I quote:

> toward which Mr. Wallace was guided by Mr. Vincent who was a member of the Communist Party.

I submit to you that it is quite irrelevant whether Mr. Budenz has testified, or hasn't testified about the party line at the time that Mr. Wallace was in China.

I feel further, if I may say so, that the Communist reaction to the fait accompli of General Stilwell's dismissal does not give very much light on what the party line was at the time when Mr. Wallace made his recommendation.

Mr. SOURWINE. What difference does it make?

Mr. ALSOP. Since Mr. Morris has raised this question about the Communist reaction, I think a distorted picture has been given. I am trying to correct that picture.

Mr. MORRIS. I did not raise it. Mr. Chairman, will the record show I did not raise it? It is Mr. Budenz' testimony that Mr. Alsop is endeavoring to challenge.

Mr. ALSOP. It was brought into the hearing this morning by you.

Senator SMITH. It seems to me that you are challenging the testimony of Mr. Budenz. Manifestly the Chair does not know whether Mr. Budenz told the truth or not. He was sworn here to tell the truth just like you were sworn to tell the truth. I assume you were sworn this morning. You challenge what Mr. Budenz said.

Can you not confine yourself to correcting what you say is an erroneous statement by Mr. Budenz without a great deal of argument and extraneous talk? That is what I am interested in, the facts.

Mr. ALSOP. When you are talking about Mr. Budenz' testimony, he is not testifying as to fact, if I may say so. He has testified as to the interpretation to be placed on the Daily Worker.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Budenz has not testified as to fact, he cannot be accused of perjury.

Mr. ALSOP. In the specific passage that Mr. Morris has brought into the hearing this morning Mr. Budenz sought to show by interpreting an article in the Daily Worker that a certain thing was the fact,

namely, that the Communists were not displeased by the dismissal of General Stilwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz did not attempt to show that, did he?

Mr. ALSOP. It is my understanding.

Senator SMITH. You say you read Mr. Budenz' verbatim testimony.

Mr. ALSOP. I listened to it.

Senator SMITH. Were you here the day he testified?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; I was, sir.

If it is agreed that the Communists were deeply displeased by the dismissal of General Stilwell, then I think we can drop this whole subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Alsop and Mr. Chairman, if the Chair please for just a moment now, the contention has revolved around a statement made by Mr. Budenz which has been read by the witness several times to the effect that on Mr. Wallace's mission he was guided by two named persons, Lattimore and Vincent, and, by Mr. Budenz' statement, that in the opinion of the Politburo they did their job well.

Mr. Alsop is attempting to challenge that on the grounds that a specific recommendation as he interprets——

Senator SMITH. Let me ask right there; there is nothing in the testimony that Mr. Wallace was knowingly influenced by them, is there?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir; there was not, and that is the point.

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, I put it to you, sir——

Senator SMITH. Let him finish the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you are challenging Mr. Budenz' statement that the Politburo was satisfied with the guidance given Mr. Wallace, is it not necessary, in order for you to successfully challenge that, to show that there was nothing accomplished by Mr. Lattimore and/or Mr. Vincent which was in favor of the Communists?

Do you feel you can successfully challenge Mr. Budenz' statement by showing that Mr. Wallace did something that was not in complete accord with the Communist line?

Mr. ALSOP. I think I can successfully challenge Mr. Budenz' statement by showing that the chief result——

Mr. SOURWINE. No, answer my question.

Mr. ALSOP. I am trying to answer your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not trying to answer it; you are trying to evade it.

Mr. ALSOP. I am not trying to evade it. If you will allow me to complete my sentence, I believe you will find I am trying to answer it.

Senator SMITH. Will the reporter read the question back?

(The question was read back by the reporter.)

Mr. ALSOP. I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that if you can show the main result of the Wallace mission was a profoundly anti-Communism act, you successfully challenge Mr. Budenz' evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not unless you show that everything Mr. Wallace did was the result of the influence of Mr. Vincent or Mr. Lattimore. If Mr. Wallace did anything independently on his own, if he was not a complete stooge of the Communists or a Communist agent—and no one is alleging that and no one has alleged it—then what you have just said is not the logical fact.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Vincent participated and joined in this recommendation for the dismissal of General Stilwell. This was the extent of guidance that Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is different testimony. If that was the complete extent of the guidance Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace, then you are coming around to the theory which was advanced, to wit, that there was nothing accomplished which would have been pleasing to the Communists.

Mr. ALSOP. If you will excuse me, Mr. Sourwine, I am saying what was accomplished with Mr. Vincent's participation and concurrence was profoundly displeasing to the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Put it this way: If Mr. Vincent through his influence on Mr. Wallace accomplished anything which was pleasing to the Communists, then Mr. Budenz' statement cannot be said to be perjury. Is that not accurate?

Mr. ALSOP. Could you repeat that? You are getting so complicated, Mr. Sourwine, I did not understand your question.

Senator SMITH. I am certain I do not understand either one of you.

Do you want the question read back, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not desire it.

Senator SMITH. Will the reporter read it back?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. ALSOP. I would not say that that was accurate because it is a substantial disproof of Mr. Budenz' statement that Mr. Vincent guided Mr. Wallace toward the Communist objective. The principal guidance that Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace was toward a profoundly anti-Communist objective.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was no named objective, was there, Mr. Alsop?

Mr. ALSOP. Well, Mr. Sourwine, what I am trying to show is that the main result of Mr. Wallace's mission was profoundly anti-Communist.

I think if you will permit me to proceed with the presentation of the very large quantity of documentation that I have, you will be convinced.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you contend that Mr. Wallace's mission and its results were controlled entirely and shaped entirely by Mr. Vincent?

Mr. ALSOP. I do not so contend. I think Mr. Budenz grossly exaggerated in that report.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Vincent did not control what Mr. Wallace did, then nothing that Mr. Wallace did can be attributed to Mr. Vincent's influence, can it?

Mr. ALSOP. That is a question to me, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ALSOP. I cannot possibly agree with that because Mr. Vincent did in fact join in guiding Mr. Wallace or influencing Mr. Wallace toward a profoundly anti-Communist act. This is the essence of the whole situation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be pertinent to bring this out at this time since we are talking about Mr. Wallace.

Mr. Alsop, did you testify in executive session that Henry Wallace was for a period of time the stooge of the American Communists?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; I have written that publicly.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you contend he was not a stooge for the Communists at this particular time?

Mr. ALSOP. Because I saw him not being a stooge.

Mr. MORRIS. The time he was a stooge was a later time?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

May I proceed with this very complex presentation? I am desperately sincere. I completely believe in the committee's good faith. These are very complicated facts, and unless they are presented in an orderly manner, it is very hard for them to be related to one another. I have made rough notes for the specific purpose of presenting it to the committee in the least time-consuming way possible.

Senator SMITH. As I understand, Mr. Alsop, you requested to be heard by the committee?

Mr. ALSOP. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. So I consider that to be slightly different from a person we have subpenaed here to ask specific questions. Unless there are some questions from Senator O'Conor, we will let Mr. Alsop proceed in the way he wishes to proceed. Mr. Sourwine and Mr. Morris can make notes of questions they want to come back and ask him as on cross-examination.

Senator O'CONOR. I quite agree, Mr. Chairman. I think that is the orderly way. I think it will enable us expeditiously to get to the end. I did, however, understand Mr. Alsop to suggest himself that he would welcome interrogatories at any time.

Senator SMITH. I know, Mr. Alsop, in the first place if we are going to examine witnesses that we subpena to get precise facts from, the committee's counsel has to do it in the way that seems the most logical to him to bring out the facts that he wishes to ascertain.

By the same token, when you come in asking to be heard we want to give you a chance to express in your own way and as you deem logical—whether in fact it is logical or not—to develop the facts you are going to give us. It is perfectly all right with me and Senator O'Conor. We do not want to load the record down with a lot of extraneous arguments and conclusions. We want as near facts as can be given.

Mr. ALSOP. I will attempt not to.

Mr. MORRIS. May I point out that the reason for my inquisition was that Mr. Alsop is making frequent references to General Stilwell, and with respect to that particular part of Budenz' statement that related to General Stilwell, I wanted the testimony read into the record.

Senator SMITH. I was not here when that took place. As I understood, there was some question as to whether or not Mr. Alsop was referring to testimony actually in the record by Mr. Budenz.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. When we talk about General Stilwell we should address ourselves to Budenz' Stilwell testimony.

Senator SMITH. All right, start from here.

Mr. ALSOP. I have already shown, Senator, that on the basis of General Stilwell's own papers, that at that time when Mr. Wallace recommended General Stilwell's dismissal, with the concurrence and approval of Mr. Vincent, with the encouragement, I might say, of Mr. Vincent, General Stilwell believed that the only cure for China's troubles was "to eliminate" Chiang Kai-shek and that he regarded the Chinese Communists as "the only hope" of the Chinese masses.

This is General Stilwell's attitude which he was expressing to the home authorities and which he encouraged his staff—to which I can

testify from personal knowledge because they used to say they were encouraged by him—to disseminate throughout Chungking, with grave damage to the Generalissimo's prestige.

Furthermore, and this is the crucial point, General Stilwell, the man whose dismissal Mr. Wallace recommended, had a plan for giving practical effect to his preference for the Chinese Communists, which was maturing just at the moment when Mr. Wallace reached China.

In Mr. Wallace's cable the committee would have noted that the Japanese offensive was inflicting disastrous defeats on the Generalissimo's armies in east China and these defeats were weakening the generalissimo's position. General Stilwell's plan was to exploit this weakness of Chiang Kai-shek in order to extort for himself a further great increase of power in China.

General Stilwell further intended to use this increase of his own power in China in order to give American arms to the Chinese Communists. He went to very great lengths to further this plan of his to increase his own power in order to arm the Communists.

I can recall, for example, an occasion in July when General Chennault urgently asked General Stilwell for permission to divert 1,000 tons of Fourteenth Air Force ammunition and other supplies to the hard-pressed, naked, and exhausted Chinese troops who were fighting the Japanese in the eastern provinces.

General Stilwell's chief of staff replied after long delay that the boss was working on a proposition which might give this spot (namely the generalissimo's government) a real face-losing and concluded that while this proposition was pending the Chinese armies could be granted no aid.

I should interpose here, Senator, that I testify here from my own knowledge. We were so astonished by this telegram refusing aid to the Chinese armies in order to promote this proposition that we had inquiries made in Chungking and we learned from official sources in General Stilwell's staff that General Stilwell was planning to ask for this great increase in power, that he thought he would be more likely to get the increase in power if the generalissimo's position were weakened by defeat and therefore he would not aid the Chinese armies.

Senator SMITH. Now were the Chinese armies to which you refer the Nationalist forces or the Communist forces?

Mr. ALSOP. They were the Chinese Nationalist forces.

Senator SMITH. Very clearly?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; and at that time they were engaged in a great battle in east China against the Japanese, and the defeats in east China, as Mr. Wallace's cables show, had gravely undermined the political and economic strength of the generalissimo's regime.

I should say that when I quote this telegram I do so from memory. I was so shocked at the exact language it stuck in my mind for these 7 years. I think it is verbatim. I suppose the War Department files, if you dug through them, would show it.

That summer General Stilwell's prestige at home had been greatly increased by his victory in Burma, while the generalissimo's standing had suffered greatly from the east China disaster, which General Stilwell had in turn painted in the darkest light of the American Government, placing the blame on Chiang Kai-shek.

Thus, although President Roosevelt had always been uneasy about General Stilwell's qualifications, as shown by his earlier willingness to recall him if the generalissimo so requested, the President was induced in the summer of 1944 to ask the generalissimo to grant to General Stilwell the desired large increase in his powers in China.

Major General Hurley as was sent to Chungking as the President's "personal representative" to secure Chiang Kai-shek's consent to this increase in General Stilwell's powers.

Senator SMITH. How do you know that last statement to be a statement of fact? Were you there or is it something that Major General Hurley said?

Mr. ALSOP. I was there. I heard about it from General Hurley. I also heard about it later from Dr. Soong, who participated in the negotiations.

Senator SMITH. I am pointing that question to what you heard yesterday about introducing evidence here that is statements of somebody that has not been sworn to by anybody. I want to make certain that you did know about that to your own knowledge or sufficiently close to your knowledge that we should accept it.

Mr. ALSOP. Dr. Soong gave me a full account of what happened at this time, and he was one of the participants in the negotiations before I left China in 1945.

In the Hurley-Chiang negotiations the great sticking point was the control of military lend-lease, for Stilwell needed to have full authority over lend-lease distribution in order to be able to arm the Chinese Communists.

A Stilwell diary entry, dated September 16, 1944, tells the story:

The Generalissimo insists on control of lend-lease, our stuff that we are giving him. T. V. says that we must remember the dignity of a great nation, which would be affronted if I controlled the distribution.

"I" being General Stilwell—

Pat Hurley told him, "Horsefeathers. Remember, Dr. Soong"—

here he is quoting General Hurley—

"that is our property. We made it and we own it and we can give it to whom we please." Hooray for Pat. If the Generalissimo controls distribution, I—

again being General Stilwell—

am sunk. The Reds will get nothing. Only the Generalissimo's henchmen will be supplied, and my troops—

here he was referring to the personal Chinese force under his general command—

will suck the hind teat.

A few days earlier Hurley had succeeded in getting for Stilwell the desired grant of great additional power, but a personal crisis between General Stilwell and the Generalissimo fortunately blew up at the last moment causing the Generalissimo to change his mind completely and to ask the President for General Stilwell's recall.

I should say here that General Hurley, having finally observed General Stilwell's real method of dealing with the Generalissimo, then supported the request for General Stilwell's recall.

On September 26, after his recall had been requested, General Stilwell wired the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and here I quote from the State Department white paper, in which these papers do appear:

> Chiang Kai-shek has no intention of making further efforts to prosecute the war. He himself is the main obstacle to the unification of China and her cooperation in a real effort against Japan. I am now convinced the United States will not get any real cooperation while Chiang Kai-shek is in power.

Later, after he had been dismissed and returned to Washington, General Stilwell concluded his final official report to the War Department by advising an American policy in China of—

> exerting pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to cooperate and achieve national unity and if he proved unable to do this, then supporting those elements in China which gave promise of such development.

Just which elements General Stilwell referred to may be guessed from the curious appearance in the first issue of Johannes Steel's fellow-traveling report on World Affairs of a letter that General Stilwell wrote on April 16, 1946, shortly before he died.

In this letter General Stilwell declared that he itched—

> to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh.

For the committee's information, Chu Teh was the most conspicuous Communist commander actually engaged in the civil war against the Chinese Nationalists.

I no longer have this letter of General Stilwell's, which was originally included in the Steel report, although the committee's research staff can no doubt secure one, but I offer for the record Johannes Steel's commentary including the passage I have quoted, together with the pertinent excerpts from General Stilwell's wire to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a report to the War Department which appear in full in the State Department's white paper; the pertinent excerpts from the Stilwell papers including many which I have not burdened the committee's time with; and a copy of Stilwell's intelligence report in 1938 taken from the Whittaker Chambers' pumpkin papers.

These documents tell Stilwell's story succinctly, clearly, and irrefutably.

I must say to the committee in all honesty and frankness I do not for one moment believe that the story these documents tell is one of active conscious disloyalty to the United States. Here, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I am engaging in an opinion because I don't want to blacken the name of a dead man.

There is a distinction too little made nowadays between disloyalty and bad judgment. General Stilwell was a passionately loyal American, a brave leader of troops in the field, a man with many fine qualities that commanded confidence from many different kinds of men. His weaknesses, which did not appear on the surface when he was selected to command in China, because Gen. Hugh Drum did not want to go out, were an astonishing capacity for hatred and the worst imaginable political judgment.

Because of his bad judgment, General Stilwell could see no American interest in China except to use the Chinese to "beat the Japs," a favorite phrase of his. Because he continually disagreed with the Generalissimo on how the Chinese were to be used to beat the Japs, he came to hate Chiang Kai-shek with a consuming hatred, which is revealed in what he wrote about him.

Because he so hated Chiang Kai-shek, because he imagined the Chinese Communists were really fighting the Japanese, and because he could see no long-range American interest in China, he came to wish for and even to work for the triumph of the Chinese Communists in China, and in all this General Stilwell largely carried most members of his staff along with him, and again I feel they were completely loyal, as theater commanders are apt to carry along their staffs in wartime.

At the same time the committee must see from the evidence already placed in the record that General Stilwell was an invaluable and incalculable and irreplaceable asset to the Chinese Communists. This was the man whose dismissal from China was the main act of the Wallace mission to China which is supposed to have attained the Communist objective under the guidance of Mr. Vincent, who concurred in the recommendation that General Stilwell be dismissed.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Alsop, with reference to the statements you have made, if General Stilwell were living today, do you suppose he would agree with your statements on that or deny them?

Mr. ALSOP. The damaging statements I have made on Stilwell are taken from papers he has actually written. I think he would certainly say he was a loyal American.

Senator SMITH. Did he say he was working for the Communist cause over there in China? Did he ever make that statement?

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, he desired to arm the Chinese Communists, and he wrote that the only cure for China's trouble, and here I quote, "was to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek," and he also wrote, and again I quote, "the only hope of the Chinese mass was the Chinese Communists."

You take it all together, and I think you have a very consistent picture that should appeal to your legal mind.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any evidence that he did anything for the purpose of helping the Chinese Communists control China?

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, I think that offering to arm the Chinese Communists and refusing to arm the Generalissimo is about as direct a contribution as you could possibly make to that.

Senator SMITH. That might have been because of his hatred of Chiang Kai-shek. Sometimes you hate somebody so badly that you are willing to do something against somebody you do not hate quite as bad.

Mr. ALSOP. I departed from my agreement with you, sir, to indulge in commentary in order to say that General Stilwell in my opinion was a passionately loyal American who did not understand the political significance of this policy that he was developing.

Senator SMITH. There were a great many other Americans, and some very prominent ones, who agreed thatChiang Kai-shek was not handling his forces or the supplies we sent him in a proper manner.

Mr. ALSOP. It was all perfectly understandable except that I think in the light of the record you have to agree that General Stilwell was a very major Communist asset in China. That is the only point I am trying to make.

Mr. MORRIS. Which point, you understand, is not in issue here because it is conceded by all parties.

Mr. ALSOP. There is further documentary evidence of a very impressive kind for the position that I have put forward, Mr. Chairman.

I refer to a very remarkable letter from Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault dated July 6, 1945, requesting General Wedemeyer to relieve him of command in China.

I should like to give this letter to the chairman because it is a personal and unhappy letter, and it refers to a lot of ugly ghosts from the past, and I don't think it ought to go in the record except where the passages are pertinent.

Senator SMITH. I would have to have counsel for the committee to pass on whether or not there is anything pertinent here that ought to be put in the record. Now I do not think you should offer it unless you are willing to have the whole thing go in the record if it appears pertinent.

Mr. ALSOP. In that case I will withdraw it.

Senator SMITH. I do not want the responsibility of saying whether it should be put in or not.

Mr. ALSOP. It is a sad document with much that is irrelevant to this inquiry. As I understand it, your committee does not want a lot of unnecessary personality.

If I may, since I drafted the letter for General Chennault, I would like to testify as to the pertinent passages. Is that permissible?

Senator SMITH. I do not think it is unless you are going to offer the letter for us to examine to decide whether or not we think there are other pertinent passages. Manifestly if you are going to offer one part, we ought to have a chance to see it and decide whether or not another part is pertinent.

Mr. ALSOP. Well, I withdraw it. I don't think it is necessary to sustain the point any further that General Stilwell was of great value to the Communists in China.

Mr. MORRIS. In that connection, Mr. Alsop, just to aid you in that narrative, you wrote in the Saturday Evening Post of January 7, 1950, the following passage on page 17:

> Throughout the fateful years in China, the American representatives there actively favored the Chinese Communists. They also contributed to the weakness, both political and military, of the National Government. And in the end they came close to offering China up to the Communists, like a trussed bird on a platter, over 4 years before the eventual Communist triumph.

Was Mr. Vincent one of the American representatives indicated in that?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. John Carter Vincent had no part in this at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the American representatives?

Mr. ALSOP. If you will read the rest of that article, you will find that the article concerns General Stilwell almost exclusively, and this was a description of General Stilwell's plan.

There is a very false impression that has got abroad that the State Department and the representatives in the State Department had very much influence on American policy in China. Actually they had almost none.

I can recall Ambassador Gauss telling me—I am sure he was exaggerating greatly, but it indicates the mood in which they lived—that he sent a report every spring, and he sent them a message the next January reminding them that he had been right, and that was as far as he troubled to go because he knew it wasn't any use at all.

Mr. Vincent during this period under discussion was in China very briefly or relatively briefly, to my knowledge—he may have been there

earlier—in the Chungking Embassy. He was removed and replaced by Mr. George Acheson long before the Chiang-Stilwell relationship had become absolutely critical. I think he left in the winter of 1943, and 1944 was the crucial year referred to in this passage that you have just introduced, which states more accurately than I can, giving testimony in this manner, the real effects of General Stilwell in China.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say the American representatives there, precisely whom do you mean?

Mr. ALSOP. I mean Stilwell and his staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was on his staff?

Mr. ALSOP. General Stilwell had, I think, six staffs, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. To whom are you referring when you make the statement?

Mr. ALSOP. I meant General Stilwell and his staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you name the staff?

Mr. ALSOP. I can't possibly name his staff. He had six staffs.

Senator SMITH. How do you know his staffs were included in this group if you did not know them?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Chairman, I was there at the time.

Senator SMITH. But that is a statement of fact that you made in this article. Now Mr. Morris is asking you who were the individuals to which you referred. Now I think that is something you ought to be able to tell us.

Mr. ALSOP. General Stilwell's chief staff officers in Chungking at the time under reference were General Hearn, who sent the telegram I have already quoted from about the proposition, and General Ferris, who was a rather meaningless man. Most of them, Mr. Chairman, were people—in fact, all of them were people—who simply did exactly what General Stilwell told them.

Senator SMITH. He is asking you who are the parties to which you referred. I think that is a fair question. You have made a statement in a written article in which you have said, "The American representatives." Who are those persons to which you referred besides the ones you mentioned?

Mr. MORRIS. In aid of Mr. Alsop's memory, I should like to point out on that same page, page 17, he points out that—

> It resulted in political intelligence so bad that Stilwell's chief political adviser, John P. Davies, Jr., once seriously accused the Generalissimo of traffic with the Japanese, on the odd authority of the vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Chou-En-lai.

Therefore, you are clearly talking about political intelligence, are you not?

Mr. ALSOP. I am not talking about political intelligence at all, Mr. Morris. Your deductions are very far-fetched indeed. I am talking about the over-all effect of General Stilwell and his staff.

Now that you have brought Mr. Davies in, if you will allow me to say, the most gross injustice has been done to Mr. Davies and also to Mr. Service, not in the sense of saying that their policy was wrong, because I cannot say that their policy was wrong because I took the lead in fighting it, and not in the sense——

Senator SMITH. Now are we going afield when we get into those names and what they did? I think we had better stick to the subject we have before us. I should like to have you tell Mr. Morris who the persons are to whom you referred.

Mr. ALSOP. I referred to General Stilwell and his whole staff, including, of course, his political advisers.

Senator SMITH. Now, can you tell us who they were?

Mr. ALSOP. His political advisers shifted from time to time. Mr. Davies and Mr. Service were the chief ones.

Senator SMITH. If you make a statement of that sort, do you not think the men who were on his staff should have a chance to be called here to say what they did?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Morris made the statement.

Senator SMITH. But it is your statement.

Mr. ALSOP. It is a magazine article that I wrote some time ago. I particularly did not want him to introduce Mr. Davies and Mr. Service because that is a separate and very complex subject all of its own, and I think they were also, like General Stilwell, passionately loyal but mistaken Americans.

Now a man is not to be denounced as disloyal because he has made a mistake. It is a very unpleasant thing. It is not relevant to the inquiry.

Senator SMITH. Did you not say in this article in the Saturday Evening Post that—

The main contributors were Stilwell himself, John Davies, and probably Davies' assistants, John S. Service and Raymond Ludden.

Mr. ALSOP. Ludden was also one of his political advisers.

Senator SMITH. Now can you think of any other names of those on his staff that you referred to in this article?

Mr. ALSOP. I referred to General Hearn and others.

Senator SMITH. Who else?

Mr. ALSOP. I referred to General Dorn. He was a strongly prejudiced man. There was a whole series of them.

I think it is very unfortunate, Mr. Chairman, to bring these men's names into this open hearing because I do not think they were disloyal. I thought they were very mistaken. I testified I did not think that General Stilwell, who completely dominated all of them, as disloyal. I thought that he was mistaken. The source of their error was General Stillwell's error.

Senator SMITH. Do you not think there were more people with bad judgment than disloyalty in all of these matters?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, but unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, these men have been attacked as disloyal.

As long as their names are mentioned, I feel I must say to the committee I don't think they were disloyal. At the same time, it seems to me this inquiry is not germane to Mr. Budenz' truth or untruth.

Senator SMITH. A lot of this is not germane, I think, in a lot of testimony discussed.

Were there any persons on Stilwell's staff or any of his staff that you would say were not misguided and who did have the right idea about how to approach the problem in China?

Mr. ALSOP. There was General Merrill, who was a very wise and able officer, who constantly tried to patch things up and never quite succeeded in doing. There was a very brilliant leader of Chinese troops in the field, Colonel Condon.

General Stilwell had a very curious habit of surrounding himself by people who never disagreed with him at all. His intelligence officer at the end of his service in China was Colonel Dickey. You didn't

hear much dissent from General Stilwell's views from members of General Stilwell's staff. If you had heard it, they would have ceased to be members of General Stilwell's staff as soon as it got to his ears, and like all staffs everyone was telling tales on everyone else.

Senator SMITH. That is true politically also.

Mr. ALSOP. I agree this is an ordinary human trait.

May I continue, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MORRIS. May I point out the relevancy of this? Mr. Alsop has stated it was unfair to introduce his own writings at this open hearing. Now the particular question I asked him was with reference to the statement—

> Throughout the fateful years in China, the American representatives there actively favored the Chinese Communists.

I asked Mr. Alsop if one of the American representatives there was John Carter Vincent.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Morris, you also brought out later——

Senator SMITH. Could you answer that question there?

Mr. MORRIS. Was John Carter Vincent one of the American representatives there?

Mr. ALSOP. He was not one of those intended to be included under the heading of this sentence torn from context that you have quoted, Mr. Morris, and I think if you will read the whole article you will find very clearly he was not so included.

Mr. MORRIS. So when you talk about the American representatives you mean some American representatives?

Mr. ALSOP. What I mean—and it is not always possible to treat an American magazine like a legal record—what I said was American representatives who had power to influence events, people who did something. I knew Mr. Vincent when he was chargé d'affaires in China.

Mr. MORRIS. He was not an influence?

Mr. ALSOP. He did not attempt to influence events when he was chargé d'affaires in China. General Stilwell had already taken over. It was like heading into buzz saw, and he did not try to argue with him.

Senator SMITH. You mean then that if the whole article is read, it would indicate you did not mean to include Mr. Vincent in that group. Now I have not read the article, but can you tell us whether or not there is anything in here to negative the idea that you included Vincent along with the rest of them in there?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Vincent is not mentioned in the article, Mr. Chairman. He was mentioned in a note which I appended to the original——

Senator SMITH. You said a moment ago that if Mr. Morris had read the whole document he would see you did not mean to include Mr. Vincent in this group. Now is there any mention of Mr. Vincent one way or another in here?

Mr. ALSOP. There is no mention.

Senator SMITH. Then he could not have been excluded any more than have been included by name in there.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Chairman, I think if you read the whole article—and I wouldn't recommend your boring yourself with such an old publication—you will find that the idea is clearly stated in the article that General Stilwell and his staff were the effective American repre-

sentatives in China, and this passage refers back, of course, to that explanation that in wartime the theater commander and his staff were the dominant and effective American representatives, and the Embassy might just as well have been a ghost town.

Senator SMITH. All right, let Mr. Alsop proceed uninterruptedly, if possible.

Mr. ALSOP. Such is the massive documentation of the true, immensely far-reaching import of Mr. Wallace's recommendation to dismiss General Stilwell in which Mr. Vincent concurred and joined.

We have already discussed, Senator, Mr. Budenz's attempt to show that from a quotation from the Daily Worker—the only one that Mr. Budenz himself introduced—appearing a month after the event of General Stilwell's actual dismissal, and that the Communist Party was not displeased by the replacement of General Stilwell by General Wedemeyer.

Mr. MORRIS. You know, do you not, that yesterday we introduced an item dated November 1, which was 2 days later?

Mr. ALSOP. I am well aware of that. If you will have the record read back, Mr. Morris, you will find that I specified that the Vanderbilt Field column of December 2 was the only item introduced by Mr. Budenz.

Mr. MORRIS. To complete the record, I am saying there was a November 1, 1944, Daily Worker item introduced yesterday while you were here.

Mr. ALSOP. I have already shown, Senator, that on the same date, November 1, 1944, in another article in the Daily Worker, General Stilwell was described by Mr. Joseph Starobin as "our favorite general." And Mr. Starobin expressed grave concern about the dismissal of General Stilwell.

If you will study the Daily Worker of this period—it is not an agreeable study—I think you will find a sort of general conflict of attitude toward the dismissal of General Stilwell which persists for a considerable period of time.

There are a couple more Starobin articles in which he refused to attack, in which he did not attack President Roosevelt for dismissing Stilwell but again lauded Stilwell to the skies.

Then on November 4 there was a guest column by Frederick Vanderbilt Field clearly showing the Communist attitude toward Stilwell. It viciously attacked Governor Dewey's foreign policy and its touching climax is an imaginary speech by a Chinese soldier who is represented as sadly discouraged by the thought of Governor Dewey in the White House.

The soldier is made to inquire gloomily,

> Will not Dewey inevitably be against the Stilwells, the Sonfus, the Madame Sun Yat-sens, the patriots, who struggled for national unity whereby we may fight against and defeat our common enemy?

There was also an article on this same line by Earl Browder himself.

I do not want to burden the record with any more of this dreary stuff, which really genuinely seems to me about the same as a debate on how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, but there is a long

article by James S. Allen in the Daily Worker of November 5. This man Allen states that "the most reactionary, imperialist, anti-Roosevelt forces within the United States were responsible for General Stilwell's recall," which was about the equivalent in the Daily Worker saying that the professional murders could not have done worse.

Almost in the same breath Allen praises the mission to China of Mr. Wallace, who recommended General Stilwell's recall, General Hurley, who also recommended General Stilwell's recall, and Mr. Donald Nelson.

I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that this suggests how much value should be attached to Mr. Budenz's ex post facto exposition of these peculiar Communist scriptures.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you say praised Henry Wallace's mission?

Mr. ALSOP. It praised Henry Wallace's mission, yes. It praised, right after saying that the dismissal of General Stilwell was the work of—I will quote again for you,

the most reactionary, imperialist, anti-Roosevelt forces in the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that shows that Allen did not know what was going on?

Mr. ALSOP. I think it shows very clearly that Mr. Allen didn't know what was going on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Mr. Allen?

Mr. ALSOP. A regular writer of the Daily Worker, I assume a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Budenz testified that every article that appeared in the Daily Worker was carefully reviewed and represented the party line in toto.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that Mr. Allen reflected the Communist Party viewpoint in his writings?

Mr. ALSOP. I believe Mr. Budenz testified that nothing appeared in the Daily Worker that did not represent the Communist Party viewpoint.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask you what you think. Do you think he reflected the Communist Party viewpoint in his writings?

Mr. ALSOP. I assume he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he did?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you must admit that if that is true, the Communist Party viewpoint at this time must have been the same as Mr. Allen's, to wit, they had praise for Mr. Wallace. Is that not right?

Mr. ALSOP. No; I wouldn't attempt to dispute for one moment——

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that not substantially what Mr. Budenz testified to?

Mr. ALSOP. It is not substantially what Mr. Budenz testified to. It is only part of what Mr. Budenz testified to, and by far the least important part, in my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, since we mentioned James S. Allen here, there is another article in the Daily Worker of November 26 on this particular point by James S. Allen.

Mr. Mandel, will you read the designated portions in the record?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the Daily Worker of November 26, 1944, page 3, by James S. Allen, the section marked "United States policy":

Another very important factor is the continued pressure by the United States for a positive solution of the crisis—

and in heavy type—

it is clear that the recall of General Stilwell did not mark the end of one phase and the beginning of a contrary phase in American policy. If anything, the unity policy is being urged more energetically than in the past. In his first interview in Chungking General Wedemeyer made it clear that his policy was the same as that of his predecessor, General Stilwell. He emphasized the serious threat of the Japanese armies in the south, called for unity of all the Chinese fighting forces and their concentration upon fighting the Japanese and urged Kuomintang-Communist unity.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might it be pointed out for the record that that passage is evidence only of what the Communists were thinking, not of what the facts were.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that whole article and not just the portions read by Mr. Mandel be introduced in the record?

Senator SMITH. I suppose it would be proper to introduce it since the man's name has been brought into it, but again, as I pointed out, as Mr. Sourwine suggests, as to whether or not that represents any fact at all I do not know that it has any probative value. Anyhow, we will put it in the record. It will have plenty of company there with extraneous matter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 341" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 341

[From the Worker, New York, November 26, 1944]

CHUNGKING MUST MAKE A DECISION

(By James S. Allen)

The changes in the Chungking Cabinet, announced Monday by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, are still far from the drastic reorganization required by the crisis. But they do mean that the catastrophe now threatening China is loosening up and beginning to disrupt the stubborn alliance of reactionary forces which hold the regime in its grip.

Chiang is impelled to move. The Cabinet shifts are in admission that changes are necessary and possible. A real shake-up is in the offing. The advance of a powerful Japanese Army into the heart of free China makes a basic change hourly more imperative.

For China is on the verge of a catastrophe more serious than any which has threatened during the Sino-Japanese War.

It took the kidnaping of Chiang in 1936 and the Japanese invasion in 1937 to end the civil war and open the road to unity. The present disastrous crisis must force a decided advance toward democracy and unity within China on a scale which will turn the tide of war in Asia.

THE MILITARY THREAT

A well-equipped Japanese Army of 250,000 men has cut off the entire south China coastal area from central China, established a continuous area of occupation from Nanking almost to the Indochina border, engulfed vital food-producing areas, taken command of strategic railroads and forced the bases of the United States Air Forces far back into the interior.

And, most menacing of all, the Japanese now threaten Kweiyang, the capture of which would cut the Burma Road on the way to Chungking. They are in a position to completely isolate or launch a drive from a number of directions on Chungking itself.

The Chungking regime is now faced with a decision which it can no longer postpone. This is the crisis from which there can be no turning back. It lives

as a completely revitalized force, or its dies clearing the way for a completely new government capable of rallying and leading the Chinese people to victory.

THE DEFEATIST TRIO

The recent changes in the Chinese Cabinet must be viewed with hope. They are the advance rumblings of a political earthquake which will shake the whole regime out of its feudal lethargy.

In his shifts, the Generalissimo put his finger on the three Cabinet members who represent the most reactionary and retarding influences in China.

Gen. Ho Ying-chin, removed as War Minister but permitted to retain his post as chief of staff, is the top man of the ancient war-lord clique which views the Communists as the main danger, blocks every effort by able and progressive generals to come to the fore in the war, and seeks to suppress every force within free China working for democratic unity.

Ho and his generals are directly responsible for maintaining the blockade of the Communist-led armies and for inciting civil war against them.

As recently as August of this year his clique of generals was charged with attacking the Eighth Route Army in Shansi Province, the New Fourth in Hupeh and the People's Militia in Kwangtung, where they were harassing the new Japanese advance toward Kweilin.

THE FEUDAL KINGPIN

H. H. Kung, removed as Minister of Finance, is the pivot in the Government of the most reactionary groups connected with China's feudal agrarian economy. As such he has fiercely resisted every economic measure which would strengthen China's industrial capacity for war or grant relief to the people from the runaway speculation of his associates in foodstuffs and inflated currency.

Kung still retains his post as Vice Chairman of the Executive Yuan. The Chinese War Production Board, which the Nelson mission is now attempting to develop, is under the direction of the Executive Yuan.

THE CC CHIEF

Chen Li-fu, removed as Minister of Education, specialized in suppression of the democratic elements within the Kuomintang and in free China. He is leader of the notorious CC clique, which has kept an iron hand on the Kuomintang Executive. Through his secret police he has imprisoned thousands of democratic, anti-Japanese leaders and terrorized progressive elements.

Chen is moved to the head of the organization department of the Kuomintang. His place as Education Minister is taken by Dr. Chu Chiahua, himself educated in Germany and a leader of a pro-Nazi group in China.

The new Finance Minister is considered one of Kung's satellites.

Outside of Gen. Chen Cheng, who becomes War Minister, no new force is added in the Chungking set-up. General Chen, leader of the victorious Chinese forces in the Burma campaign, is considered one of China's most able military leaders.

At the least, the very shifting of the trio whose influence must be entirely destroyed, serves to emphasize the direction in which further changes may be looked for. The important thing is that military, political, and diplomatic pressure is forcing the Generalissimo to acknowledge that change is necessary at the top, and to begin to move.

MORE ENERGY NEEDED

But he has to move much more energetically and in a more pronounced democratic direction, and quickly.

In addition to the military imperative, a number of other important forces converge at this moment to force a decision at Chungking.

The Cabinet shifts will not placate or in any way deceive the people and the anti-Japanese forces. If anything, they will be encouraged by the new development and press their demands more vigorously.

The unity program to save China was summed up by Lin Tso-han, president of the northwest border region and Communist representative in the negotiations with the Kuomintang which were broken off in October.

At that time, he declared in a letter to Kuomintang leaders that the only way to rescue China from her crisis is to put an end to one-party dictatorship and establish a coalition government to carry out thorough military, political, eco-

nomic, and cultural reforms. He urged the immediate convening of an emergency national conference of all anti-Japanese groups and parties to form such a government.

The demand for a coalition government of this kind is shared by progressives in the Kuomintang, the League of Democratic Parties, the anti-Japanese military leaders within the central government armies and all popular forces.

The fact that General Chou En-lai has returned to Chungking to resume talks for unity, together with the generalissimo's reiteration that differences will continue to be solved through political means," bodes well in the present situation.

UNITED STATES POLICY

Another very important factor is the continued pressure by the United States for a positive solution of the crisis.

It is clear that the recall of General Stilwell did not mark the end of one phase and the beginning of a contrary phase in American policy. If anything, the unity policy is being urged more energetically than in the past.

In his first interview in Chungking, General Wedemeyer made it clear that his policy was the same as that of his predecessor, General Stilwell. He emphasized the serious threat of the Japanese armies in the south, called for unity of all the Chinese fighting forces and their concentration upon fighting the Japanese, and urged Kuomintang-Communist unity.

In fact, unity has become imperative also from the viewpoint of the American military contributions to the war. The Communist-democratic area of the northwest is fast becoming the only safe area in which to base the Fourteenth United States Air Force for attacks upon the Japanese held interior and upon Japan proper.

An American military mission, headed by Col. Davis Barrett, is now in Yennan. One can surmise that it is investigating just this possibility. But as long as Chungkink maintains its blockade of the northwest it would be extremely difficult to supply American air bases in that area.

Also consider the fact that Donald Nelson, now heading the war production mission to Chungking, has just been given full Cabinet rank by President Roosevelt. This serves to emphasize the importance which the President places upon his mission and upon the policies which he conveys.

No one, in Washington or elsewhere, can now claim that he speaks with greater authority and attempt to cancel the instructions from the White House.

EFFECT OF NOVEMBER 7 VICTORY

And to all this must be added another extremely vital fact. President Roosevelt is eminently victorious in the elections, with a powerful popular mandate for his foreign policies.

No one can now counsel Chiang Kai-shek to wait in the hope that a political overturn in the United States would strengthen the hand of the reactionary and defeatist forces in his Chungking entourage.

The elections show that the policies advocated by the administration before November will be pursued after November. The Ho-Kunk-Chen trio is beginning to feel the effects of that.

The sands are shifting in Chungking. The old, rotten props of the regime are beginning to give way. A new resurgence of strength and unity, in the fate of impending disaster, will save China.

Mr. ALSOP. Let me say to you, Mr. Chairman, that it seems to me the attempt to prove that the Communists liked the recall of General Stilwell and his replacement by General Wedemeyer from articles written before the event is a misleading attempt. But even in these articles which have been put in, written after the event, I think you can see a great conflict of attitude as to this great event, great development of the recall of General Stilwell.

I would like to submit to the Chair that the real response of the Communist leaders was as follows: First, as indicated in the Starobin article expressing concern and calling General Stilwell "our favorite general," the Communist leaders were horrified and downcast by Stil-

well's dismissal, this great asset which was a sure bird in hand was lost to them.

Second, however, they were presented with a fait accompli, and this fait accompli was also the handwork of President Roosevelt. "Beat Dewey" was then the overriding party line, and this deterred any criticism of the President's decision and even caused Stilwell's dismissal to be blamed on "anti-Roosevelt reactionaries."

Third and finally, the Field guest column belatedly told the leaders to stop worrying about Stilwell's dismissal, indicating, incidentally, that the Communists had previously been very worried indeed because the Communist Party perhaps genuinely hoped that Stilwell's policy really would be carried on in China as they kept assuring themselves and their readers.

Here you have to consider the circumstances of the times Mr. Budenz has also forgotten. First, the conservative press was teeming with such anti-Chiang reports as that of Brooks Atkinson, which has been introduced, and the President was subject to much partisan criticism by the Republicans for bringing General Stilwell home.

Second, General Wedemeyer had said pro forma on taking command that he would carry on where General Stilwell left off, and even before December 2 when Field wrote the column quoted by Budenz, Major General Hurley had inaugurated the effort to promote a Chinese Nationalist-Communist political coalition, which he carried on for many months thereafter.

In fact, however, the wartime turning point in China was the removal of General Stilwell, the man who wished to eliminate the Generalissimo and described the Chinese Communists as the only hope of the Chinese masses.

With General Stilwell in command I would remind the committee the Communists would have received American arms while the Generalissimo's armies got few or none. They would have been supported by our Government at home while the Generalissimo was villified by the American theater commander. Their claims would have been recognized as just while the Generalissimo was pressured into entering unequal partnership with them.

General Hurley, although he pressed for a coalition to avert civil war, did not press for a coalition in the Stilwell spirit of wishing to eliminate the Generalissimo, and General Wedemeyer in seeking to invigorate the Chinese forces in order to beat the Japs showed leadership that sent a new thrill of confidence, a strong surge of regeneration throughout the whole nationalist structure.

With General Stilwell gone, the Chinese Communists' high hopes of coming to power during the war, which in my opinion they would have done if General Stilwell had not been dismissed, fell finally to the ground.

Such are the documented facts of history. I leave it to the committee to judge in the light of these facts whether a Communist objective was carried out, as Mr. Budenz has testified, by this mission of Mr. Wallace, who so strongly recommended the dismissal of General Stilwell, with the concurrence and approval of the accused man, Mr. Vincent.

It is not I who convicts Mr. Budenz of untruth; it is the facts that convict him.

I now come to the way that Mr. Vincent actually guided Mr. Wallace and the manner in which Mr. Wallace was steered along the paths of the party line, of which I was a witness. On this head, beside giving the testimony I have briefly quoted from, Mr. Budenz elaborated considerably when he returned to the stand. He said—

General Wedemeyer when he first came into public notice was not opposed by the Communists. Indeed, the Communists felt that the compromise made with Wedemeyer was a good compromise.

Again he said—

The Communists were very much opposed to General Chennault and didn't want him in the picture at all. They thought Wedemeyer was a better choice.

Again he said—

They thought he—

referring to Wedemeyer—

was a good compromise since it excluded General Chennault.

It is downright startling to contrast this Budenz testimony with the actual facts. When the Wallace party reached Kumming to visit General Chennault, I was serving on the general's staff. I had known Mr. Wallace before the war, and General Chennault therefore told me to serve as Mr. Wallace's escort.

If I recall correctly, both Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent stayed in General Chennault's house, where I also lived. At any rate, I was with Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent almost continuously while they were visiting the Fourteenth Air Force except during Mr. Wallace's rather frequent bouts of violent exercise—he was always playing volley ball—when I was left alone with Mr. Vincent.

At this distance in time I cannot attempt to reconstruct every detail of this episode, but I have, first, a general recollection that General Chennault gave Mr. Wallace the customary VIP map talk on the military situation. As a result of the Japanese offensive in east China, the picture of the military situation was very dark and somber, and Mr. Wallace seemed much impressed by the urgency of the military problem.

Second, I have a general recollection that Mr. Wallace asked my opinion of the political situation in China. I can recall making two points: That the Generalissimo's Government was suffering gravely from general demoralization resulting from the triumph of the reactionary faction of the Kuomintang in the internal political crisis in October 1943; and, point 2, that the shocks administered to this already demoralized government by the terrible defeats in east China, which I may say largely resulted from General Stilwell's military policy, might well be enough to bring the whole structure down.

On the American role in the Chinese political situation I expressed to Mr. Wallace approximately the views contained in the passages, in certain passages from General Chennault's letter in which General Chennault, I should explain, took this line that the defeats in east China were what undermined, or were at that time undermining, the Generalissimo's regime and producing a serious danger of Communist victory in China.

These were General Chennault's views at that time, as I knew because I was living in the house with him.

I emphasize particularly the point that America could not hope to shore up and strengthen the Generalissimo's Government unless the American representatives in China were prepared to work with Chiang Kai-shek at least on the basis of honorable equality. Again I had the impression that Mr. Wallace was considerably impressed.

Third, I also have a general recollection of talking over the Chinese situation with Mr. Vincent during one of Mr. Wallace's exercise periods. As nearly as I can bring it back, the conversation followed much the same pattern as that with Mr. Wallace already mentioned, at which Mr. Vincent in fact was probably present.

In these days I was obsessed by the risks we were running in China, and I am afraid I had a tendency to repeat myself. At any rate, the importance of this recollection of the talk with Mr. Vincent is that I remembered being pleased to find he agreed rather completely with my own view that the Generalissimo had to be given someone who would work with him, who would command his confidence, who would genuinely seek to support him, if he wanted American interests in China to be safeguarded by the improvement and strengthening of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Finally, I have a clearer recollection of the circumstances in which the cable recommending General Stilwell's recall was decided upon and drafted. Mr. Wallace, Mr. Vincent, and I were all together in General Chennault's house. The subject of the crisis in China was raised, and although I do not precisely remember what any single individual said, I do recall very clearly the position taken by all three of us. This is natural in a long and complex conversation. You don't recall quotations from each person, but you do know which side each person was on.

I feel pretty sure for myself that I expressed the view that somebody had better do something drastic about the crisis without further delay in order to give the Generalissimo adequate military aid or we would encounter a real disaster.

As I said, I felt very strongly about the problem in those days. Attempting to reconstruct the ensuing conversation as best I can, I think it soon became apparent that Mr. Wallace had come from his conversation with Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking with the inclination to feel that General Stilwell could not do the job in China but with no decision to take any positive action.

I think also that the impression made on Mr. Wallace by General Chennault's presentation of the urgency of the military problem had strengthened this inclination that Mr. Wallace brought from Chungking.

At any rate, there was a general discussion back and forth between the three of us. I particularly recall that Mr. Vincent affirmatively participated in the decision that concluded this discussion.

Senator SMITH. Where was Mr. Lattimore all this time?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Lattimore there wasn't room in the house for, and he lived down in Chungking, and we hardly saw him. He turned up at the end.

Senator SMITH. You three got together and left him out?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; I recall. I know he was there because I happen to have a photograph that he took of me with a little Chinese baby that was a sort of pet of the troops—General Chennault's chauffeur's daughter, as a matter of fact.

It was at the end of his time, and he was never with us at all. I think he may have come to one luncheon or dinner with General Chennault because I think I also recall sitting next to him, and I happened to be very interested in the history of the Chinese Empire, and he did a remarkable learned turn about the Chinese tribute system, which stuck in my mind, and that is the last time I had a serious talk with him.

I particularly recall that Mr. Vincent affirmatively participated in the decision that concluded this discussion between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent and myself, the decision in short by Mr. Wallace to take action forthwith by recommending the dismissal of General Stilwell.

I remember this for a rather special reason. In the early part of the discussion they had been talking about whether or not Mr. Wallace should take this rather drastic step, and the objections to it were of course canvassed. Mr. Wallace wanted to do it. Mr. Vincent thought he ought to do it; and, God knows, I thought he ought to do it.

Then in the second part of the discussion there was this one point that Mr. Wallace had a tendency to stick on, and I feared very much that it would be raised and would prevent action at this time. In brief, Mr. Wallace had not seen General Stilwell and was unable to go to Chabua to meet him.

One of the points that worried Mr. Wallace most was the desirability of recommending General Stilwell's recall without giving General Stilwell an opportunity to present his side, which he was unable to do. Mr. Vincent was, after all, a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats don't usually like drastic measures. And I remember thinking that, although I knew very well what Mr. Vincent's position was, the usual feeling that if you don't do anything at least you haven't made a mistake might well prevail and he would make a big issue of this matter of Mr. Wallace's inability to see General Stilwell.

Instead of which, as I have said, contrary to my fears, he affirmatively participated in the discussion, and I think it would be accurate to say encouraged Mr. Wallace in his inclination to send this message to the President recommending General Stilwell's dismissal.

I also have a distinctly vivid recollection of the way in which General Wedemeyer came to be suggested as General Stilwell's replacement.

Senator SMITH. Now, just a minute. Did I understand you to say that Mr. Wallace did not see General Stilwell or talk to him about this matter?

Mr. ALSOP. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. About the China situation while he was there?

Mr. ALSOP. General Stilwell was in Burma and inaccessible.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Morris see Davies, Service, and Ludden?

Mr. ALSOP. As far as I know, no. He could not have seen Davies—yes; he did see Davies, I am wrong. Davies was in Chungking with an invitation from General Stilwell to go to Chabua; had been sent up for that purpose. He presented his invitation. I was present at every conversation between Mr. Davies and Mr. Wallace.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Davies influence Mr. Wallace at all?

Mr. ALSOP. He presented General Stilwell's invitation to go to Chabua, which General Stilwell had ordered him to do. He fulfilled his instructions, and that was about the net of what he did.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Service and Ludden?

Mr. ALSOP. They were not there. Ludden was at the consulate, but Mr. Wallace did not see him, as far as I recollect. Service, I don't know where he was—I believe in Chungking.

Senator SMITH. Before Mr. Wallace's cables were sent, was there anyone to talk to him on behalf of General Stilwell to give his side of the picture?

Mr. ALSOP. He had seen General Stilwell's staff in Chungking, I believe, Mr. Chairman, and it is in the record that the then head of General Stilwell's staff in Chungking, General Ferris, had, I believe, presented to Mr. Wallace the memorandum urging him to ask the Generalissimo's permission to open an American military mission, a liaison mission, at the Communist capital in Yenan; and, if the usual procedure was followed—I cannot testify to this from my personal knowledge—General Ferris undoubtedly gave Mr. Wallace a presentation of the military situation, because the first thing anyone did with a VIP in those days was drag him before a map and tell him where everybody was and who was doing what to whom.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Wallace go to Yenan?

Mr. ALSOP. No.

Senator SMITH. The point I am getting at is whether there were three or four of you there with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. ALSOP. Three of us.

Senator SMITH. Each of you trying to influence Mr. Wallace to request General Stilwell's recall?

Mr. ALSOP. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Did Mr. Wallace talk with anybody who would take opposite views as to General Stilwell's recall before he sent the cable?

Mr. ALSOP. I wouldn't be able to testify as to that.

Senator SMITH. So far as you know.

Mr. ALSOP. I do know whom he saw in Kunming more or less, because I was with him all the time except when he was playing volleyball. He was in Chungking, you see, for some days.

Senator SMITH. Did he not say yesterday that he did not discuss his recommendations as contained in the cables with anyone else except you three?

Mr. ALSOP. That is his testimony, but I cannot testify to that on my personal knowledge.

I also have a rather vivid recollection as to how General Wedemeyer came to be suggested for Stilwell's replacement. In brief, Mr. Wallace's first idea was to recommend General Chennault, of whom the Generalissimo had spoken to him highly and by whom he had been much impressed.

I looked to Mr. Vincent, hoping that he might interpose some objection to this suggestion of my own boss, but he went along with Mr. Wallace. That is why I remember Mr. Vincent's view on this thing.

So, it was left to me, who had served General Chennault since before Pearl Harbor, to oppose General Chennault's nomination as commander in chief in China. I had two reasons for doing so.

First, only General Chennault knew how to run an air force on a shoestring. Our shoestring was getting very thin. In those days the Fourteenth Air Force was the sole force in being to prevent thorough

military disintegration in China. As Mr. Wallace later put it in this cable, General Chennault was needed on the job he was doing.

Second, and more important, General Stilwell had gone to very great lengths to blacken General Chennault's name at the Pentagon. Even if President Roosevelt decided to act on Wallace's recommendation, there was no hope at all that the President could ever persuade the Army and Air Staff to put General Chennault in Stilwell's place.

General Wedemeyer, who had great influence at the Pentagon, later I believe recommended General Chennault's promotion to lieutenant general, and it was refused.

The recommendation to recall Stilwell was certain to make enough row all by itself. If this recommendation was coupled with a nomination of General Chennault, the roof was quite sure to blow off. Hence, Mr. Wallace's idea was self-defeating.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent accepted these practical arguments of mine as being compelling, and thus it was I who "excluded General Chennault," to quote Mr. Budenz, and meanwhile the alleged Communist, Mr. Vincent, in fact approved the suggestion of this man whom "the Communists were very much opposed to and did not want at all," to quote Mr. Budenz again.

With General Chennault out of the picture, General Wedemeyer, whom I had seen in action when he visited Chungking in his then capacity as Lord Louis Mountbatten's deputy, was at length decided on. Thus Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable was at last roughed out in this discussion with Wallace, Vincent, and me. We drafted it together. I had a typewriter in the house and did the typing.

After Mr. Wallace signed it, the cable was sent through the consulate in Kunming, if I remember correctly. Mr. Wallace does not know how it was sent, as far as I recall. I took the signed draft off.

This was the way the accused man, Mr. Vincent, "guided" Mr. Wallace "along the paths" of the party line.

Again I ask the committee to weigh Mr. Budenz' wholly unsupported testimony as to Mr. Vincent against these facts which I have presented.

Again I say it is not I who convicts Mr. Budenz of untruth; it is the facts that convict him.

To document this account I have given this committee, I have also consulted the memoirs of General Chennault and Mr. Willauer, who in 1944 was a high adviser of the Chinese Government and is now General Chennault's business partner. Naturally, I recounted to General Chennault everything that had been said and done as soon as I found an opportunity immediately after the sending of the Wallace cable. Mr. Willauer and I had worked very closely together when I, too, was adviser to Dr. T. V. Soong in the previous period, and when Mr. Willauer passed through Kunming that summer I also reported what happened to him—in strict confidence, of course.

I now offer for the record telegrams to me from General Chennault and Mr. Willauer, giving their best recollection of what I told them long ago. I would like to read them.

Senator SMITH. Are those recent telegrams?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; they have just been received. The dates are on them [reading]:

Reference your cable inquiring Wallace and Vincent attitude in Kunming on subject replacement of Stilwell, I have following recollection: First, you told

me Wallace cabled F. D. R. recommending Stilwell replacement and I recall Wedemeyer among candidates, and that he was only one currently available. Second, I recall Vincent, assigned as political adviser to Wallace, constantly with Wallace, must have concurred or had knowledge any recommendations cabled by Wallace. At the time of Wallace visit, Stilwell was actively supporting program to rearm Communists and refusing Nationalists arms anywhere east of Salween River on Burma Road front.

That was anywhere in China proper virtually. [Continues reading:]

When Wedemeyer finally replaced Stilwell, central China was lost to Japs and Nationalist Government greatly deteriorated. Wedemeyer appointment and policy thereafter revived National Government strength, political and military; and, if his policies had been implemented sooner and continued postwar, I think there would have been no—repeat—no Communist conquest of China.

CHENNAULT.

(The cable referred to is as follows:)

CABLE FROM MAJ. GEN. C. L. CHENNAULT TO J. W. ALSOP

HONG KONG VIA COMPACIFIC, *September 22.*

ALSOP, *Washington, D. C.:*

Reference your cable inquiring Wallace and Vincent attitude in Kunming on subject replacement Stilwell, I have following recollection: First you told me Wallace cabled F. D. R. recommending Stilwell replacement, and I recall Wedemeyer among candidates, and that he was only one currently available. Second, I recall Vincent, assigned as political adviser to Wallace, constantly with Wallace, must have concurred or had knowledge any recommendations cabled by Wallace. At the time of Wallace visit, Stilwell was actively supporting program to rearm Communists and refusing Nationalist arms anywhere east of Salween River on Burma Road front. When Wedemeyer finally replaced Stilwell, central China was lost to Japs and Nationalist Government greatly deteriorated. Wedemeyer appointment and policy thereafter revived National Government strength, political and military; and, if his policies had been implemented sooner and continued postwar, I think there would have been no—repeat—no Communist conquest of China.

CHENNAULT.

That is General Chennault's commentary on this episode of Mr. Wallace's cable.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean you introduce that in refutation of something Mr. Budenz said?

Mr. ALSOP. I introduce that in support of my own evidence, if you don't mind.

Mr. Willauer's wire (reading):

Reference your cable, I recall visiting you at Kunming shortly after Wallace. Because my responsibility as director, Far East—

there is a misprint in the telegram—

for CDS—

which was China Defense Supplies—

remember my gratification because hope from info re Wallace and Vincent attitude replacement Stilwell, who completely misunderstood logistics economics supply problems into and within China. Cannot state Wallace-Vincent attitude except second-hand—

that is from me—

but replacement of Stilwell by Wedemeyer overnight restored Chinese morale and effectiveness and cut out most of previous pro-Communist attitude of theater staff.

(The cable referred to is as follows:)

CABLE FROM WHITING WILLAUER, FORMER ADVISER TO CHINESE GOVERNMENT, NOW PARTNER OF GENERAL CHENNAULT, TO J. W. ALSOP

HONGKONG VIA COMPACIFIC, *September 22.*

YOUNGMAN FOR ALSOP, *Washington, D. C.:*

Reference your cable, I recall visiting you Kunming shortly after Wallace. Because my responsibility Director, Far East for * * * [garbled] remember my gratification because hope from info re Wallace and Vincent attitude replacement Stilwell, who completely misunderstood logistics economics supply problems into and within China. Cannot state Wallace-Vincent attitude except second-hand, but replacement of Stilwell by Wedemeyer overnight restored Chinese morale and effectiveness and cut out most of previous pro-Communist attitude of theater staff.

WILLAUER.

These are relevant as indicating that this account that I have given of this conversation in Kunming is not something that I have made up or done anything to for this occasion. These telegrams show that I told General Chennault and Mr. Willauer exactly what I am telling the committee, in 1944, and that seems to me relevant evidence.

Senator SMITH. The telegram does show that Vincent was assigned as adviser to Wallace and was constantly with him.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Willauer's telegram is chiefly interesting because General Chennault's does not make it clear he absolutely knew from me that Mr. Vincent joined and concurred, whereas Mr. Willauer's telegram—which is very hard to understand because he saved money on the cable—if you read it carefully, it does make it clear that he knew Vincent's attitude as well as Wallace's.

Senator SMITH. Now at the time General Stilwell was relieved was that before or after General Marshall went to China on his mission?

Mr. ALSOP. That was long before. General Stilwell was relieved in October 1944 and General Marshall's mission, if I recall correctly, began sometime in 1946 after the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think this conference that took place between yourself and Mr. Vincent and Mr. Wallace was the primary reason for the eventual replacement of General Stilwell?

Mr. ALSOP. No, Mr. Sourwine. Here we are talking about what I can't testify to as a matter of personal knowledge. Bob Sherwood, who prepared the Hopkins papers, has told me that Mr. Wallace's recommendation helped to influence the President's attitude when the issue of General Stilwell's recall finally became acute, which is when the Generalissimo asked for General Stilwell's recall. There was a considerable dispute in Washington at that time because Mr. Stimson was inclined to support General Stilwell against the Generalissimo.

There was a discussion between the White House and Mr. Stimson, which is recorded in Mr. Stimson's book, and the President after some hesitation, because it was a very explosive thing to do, to remove an American theater commander—and his policy always was to support them—finally decided in favor of General Stilwell's recall.

I think it is fair to say that Mr. Wallace's telegram probably contributed to that, but I cannot testify to that. In any case the question is: Was Mr. Wallace's telegram, which was the main result of his mission, carrying out a Communist objective?

Mr. SOURWINE. In any event, you make this clear, that Mr. John Carter Vincent did have material influence upon Vice President Wallace.

Mr. ALSOP. I wouldn't say material influence. You would have to define "material."

Mr. SOURWINE. You said he did have a definite part in influencing Mr. Wallace with regard to his recommendations in his Kunming cables.

Mr. ALSOP. Let me try to be more precise for you, Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Vincent, if he had taken a negative attitude, could have prevented, undoubtedly have prevented, sending of the cable. He took an affirmative attitude. I do not think that Mr. Vincent's affirmative attitude influenced Mr. Wallace as much as perhaps even my rather strong——

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us leave out degrees of influence. Is it your contention that Vincent did influence Mr. Wallace?

Mr. ALSOP. I think it is fair to say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore influenced Mr. Wallace?

Mr. ALSOP. I couldn't possibly testify as to that. I believe Mr. Wallace testified he didn't discuss the subject with Lattimore. He couldn't have done it in Kunming, at any rate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge as to whether Vincent was or was not a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. ALSOP. I have no personal knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge as to whether Mr. John Carter Vincent was accepting in any way instructions from the Communist Party?

Mr. ALSOP. I feel very certain he wasn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge whether he wasn't?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Sourwine——

Mr. SOURWINE. Please, I have only one more question. It is obvious what the answer is.

Mr. ALSOP. No; I have no personal knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge as to what the Politburo thought with regard to either the activities of John Carter Vincent or the activities of Mr. Wallace in China?

Mr. ALSOP. We have the testimony of Mr. Budenz.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge? I know we have Mr. Budenz' testimony.

Mr. ALSOP. Obviously I wasn't in consultation with the Politburo.

Mr. SOURWINE. The answer is "No," is it not?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes. It seems to me the question is irrelevant. I should like to have that put in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we should not be argumentative. The record will speak for itself.

Senator SMITH. I think it speaks for itself, all right. He said "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz made a statement which Mr. Alsop has challenged the accuracy of. The statement concerned influence on Mr. Wallace and how the Politburo regarded that influence, and the statement also concerned whether Mr. John Carter Vincent was a Communist.

Senator SMITH. I understand Mr. Alsop says he had no personal knowledge on either of those things. That is what you said, you had no personal knowledge of either of those? Did you say you did not have?

Mr. ALSOP. I have no personal knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. You did say that was not a pertinent question, Mr. Alsop.

Mr. ALSOP. It doesn't seem to me whether I have personal knowledge of the inner workings of the Politburo is.

Senator SMITH. I think you have answered it, and I think it is all right if that is what you said. Mr. Budenz made a statement. As I understood it, you challenged it, but now you say you did not have any personal knowledge of it, so that leaves it just where it was.

Mr. ALSOP. May I explain what I am trying to say, Mr. Chairman?

I did not have, naturally, any personal knowledge of the inner workings of the Politburo, but I did see Mr. Vincent, charged with being a Communist Party member commissioned to guide Mr. Wallace along Communist lines, actually guide Mr. Wallace toward the most anti-Communist act that was done in China during my time there until General Wedemeyer took command.

Senator SMITH. That is your judgment about it?

Mr. ALSOP. I think that is what the facts show.

Senator SMITH. That is your judgment on that point?

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean what you just said is a statement of fact in your opinion?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; and may I introduce for the record the attached letter of General Wedemeyer, since my capacity to judge has been challenged? You will see that he thought at any rate that I had a very clear idea of what Communist interests were and weren't in China while I was there.

Senator SMITH. It is a very nice letter for you to use as a recommendation. I would so agree at the time.

Mr. ALSOP. Since you say what I say is a matter of judgment it should be permitted——

Senator SMITH. When you make a statement that is your judgment and understanding as to what the facts are. I said that is your judgment. Somebody else might disagree. They might take a different viewpoint.

Mr. ALSOP. I do think it is relevant, since the question of my judgment is brought up, for me to offer such evidence I may have.

Senator SMITH. That is not about your judgment; that is about your enthusiasm for China.

Mr. ALSOP. General Wedemeyer says here:

> I felt you understood perhaps better than any other American in the China theater at that time the full implications of the Communist movement, which was active but which was at least held in abeyance by the policies of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Senator SMITH. That has no place in the record. I said that was your judgment, whether it was good or bad. I am not questioning that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have one question here at this point.

Mr. ALSOP. I think it is relevant to show what General Wedemeyer thought my judgment was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Alsop, I am going to read you a passage from your article which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of Jan-

uary 21, 1950, and ask you if you could testify to that statement today. It is right in point.

General Marshall used all his vast influence to keep Stilwell in China despite the generalissimo. This could only have meant an open Sino-American break. But Harry L. Hopkins pointed out that a theater commander who was persona non grata could hardly be forced upon an Allied chief of state. Hurley sensibly advised that the Sino-American war effort could not well be conducted by two men who were not on speaking terms. The generalissimo stood firm. In mid-October, President Roosevelt at length consented to recall Stilwell and replace him with Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.

Would you testify to that statement today?

Mr. ALSOP. If you add General Marshall to Colonel Stimson, who was the active man in this argument with the White House but was representing General Marshall's views, influenced by General Marshall, this is a correct statement of what occurred.

Mr. MORRIS. You will testify to that?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Since you brought up General Marshall's name, Mr. Morris, I would like to testify a little further on this subject, if I may.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this connection——

Mr. ALSOP. I had thought it was the committee's policy, when they brought names in, to try to define and explain their role in common justice to the individuals named.

Mr. MORRIS. I have one question in that connection. In view of the statement of facts you present here, namely, that—

Harry L. Hopkins pointed out that a theater commander who was personna non grata could hardly be forced upon an allied chief of state.

will you say that the Communists at that time, no matter how much they liked General Stilwell, would have been desirous of an open Sino-American break at that time?

Mr. ALSOP. I think they would have been perfectly delighted by an open Sino-American break on this subject, Mr. Morris, and so would anyone who studied the record. It would hand all of China over to the Communists tomorrow morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the excerpt in the Daily Worker which said the big policy at that time was to achieve unity to defeat the Japanese? You said you went through the Daily Worker for that period, Mr. Alsop.

Mr. ALSOP. If we are going to go on discussing the Daily Worker, I think I had better introduce expert evidence.

Senator SMITH. The question is whether or not you read the statement.

Mr. ALSOP. I read the statement, but I should like to elaborate.

Throughout Mr. Budenz' testimony on this Wallace mission to China there is also a farrago of distortions and misrepresentation which I hope the committee will question me about later. I had best confine my testimony to Mr. Budenz' actual untruths, of which the third in my judgment is his statement that Mr. Vincent was a Communist Party member.

Mr. SOURWINE. You cannot testify with regard to that. You have already stated you have no personal knowledge.

Mr. ALSOP. Allow me to continue, Mr. Chairman. I am about to state that.

Of course I cannot give the committee documentary evidence that Mr. Vincent did not belong to the Communist Party. I do not know what forms such evidence would take. Of course I cannot tell the committee that I know as a matter of positive fact that Mr. Vincent was not a Communist. No man can know what may be found in the secret hearts of men, but I put it to the committee Mr. Vincent joined and concurred in the most profoundly anti-Communist act that could have been attempted in China at that time.

I say to the committee that the overwhelming weight of the evidence is against Mr. Budenz and convicts him of untruth in this also.

Senator SMITH. You are correct that you could not prove that he was not a Communist, but Mr. Budenz, assuming he was truthful when he testified that Mr. Vincent was a Communist, could come nearer knowing if he himself was a member and they worked together than you could come near not knowing

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Chairman, you are a former president, I believe, of the American Bar Association. What would be your judgment? Unsupported allegation for which not one shred of documentary evidence has been introduced stands on one side, and on the other side there is a mass of documentary evidence that the man behaved in the most contrary manner possible to that indicated by the unsupported allegation.

Senator SMITH. That is a matter of judgment, but if Mr. Budenz knew for a fact that he and Mr. Vincent were Communists, that they belonged to the same group, they swapped information, they consulted about Communist matters, whatever they did—I am not saying what is or is not because I do not know—but if Mr. Budenz said he was, people may not believe Mr. Budenz, you may not believe him and others may not believe him, but that is some evidence, at least, that Mr. Vincent was, according to what he said.

Mr. ALSOP. I say the overwhelming weight of the evidence is against Mr. Budenz.

Senator SMITH. That is your judgment. It may be mine.

Mr. ALSOP. I wish to end my testimony here, but there is what I am afraid, what I regard as a rather darker side to this business, which I think must be ventilated in view of the importance of determining the reliability of Mr. Budenz' numerous charges against other American citizens.

In brief, in August 1950, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, who is no doubt known to the committee, wrote Mr. Wallace asking for a copy of his report on China to President Roosevelt. Mr. Wallace replied to Mr. Kohlberg with a letter including the main substance of the Kunming cable of June 26, 1944, and specifically the recommendation for the dismissal of Stilwell, which I now offer to the committee. This is a photostat that Mr. Kohlberg sent me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace did that on your recommendation, Mr. Alsop?

Mr. ALSOP. He consulted me about it. I urged him to make public the full text of the telegram, which he did not do.

Mr. Kohlberg replied to Mr. Wallace on August 22, 1950, with a friendly and somewhat confused answer, thanking him for his kindness, stating that "the wisdom of your recommendations was quickly

proven by history," and ending by asking Mr. Wallace to do an article for his magazine, the Freeman.

Mr. Wallace has lent me a copy of this Kohlberg letter of August 1950, which I also offer for the record.

Finally, I offer a copy of a third letter dated September 14, 1951, from Mr. Kohlberg to me. In this letter Mr. Kohlberg alleges that in August 1950, immediately after complimenting Mr. Wallace on the wisdom of his recommendaton to dismiss General Stilwell, he showed to Mr. Budenz the Wallace letter, giving the substance of the Kunming recommendations, including, of course, the recommendation to dismiss General Stilwell.

If this be true, if Mr. Budenz indeed gave his testimony before this committee with full knowledge of the real outcome of the Wallace mission to China, which he completely failed to mention in his first appearance on the stand, I may add his case, in my judgment, should be submitted to the Justice Department for appropriate action.

Senator SMITH. That completes your statement?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now we will recess. We have another Judiciary Committee meeting at 12:30. I do not know how long we are going to be there. We will reconvene at 2:30. I think we can be back by that time.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

Senator SMITH (presiding). The committee will come to order.

Mr. PURCELL. Before the end of the morning session, Mr. Alsop presented three letters, two written by Mr. Alfred Kohlberg and one written by Mr. Henry Wallace, and asked that they be received in the record.

I wanted to be sure they had been received.

Mr. ALSOP. May I say, Senator, I regard these as important parts of the record, because they have contributed greatly to my belief that the case of Mr. Budenz should be investigated by the Justice Department to see whether a charge of perjury exists.

Mr. PURCELL. Have they been received?

Senator SMITH. Was that while I was presiding?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

I have the original here.

Senator SMITH. Is this the group of all of them, or just one?

Mr. ALSOP. All.

Senator SMITH. They will be received and placed in the record.

(Documents referred to were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 342, 343, and 344," and filed for the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 342

Mr. ALFRED KOHLBERG,
New York 18, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KOHLBERG: I am pleased to acknowledge reception of your letter of August 9. Right now I am so overwhelmed by correspondence and performance

of my duties around the farm that it seems to be impossible to arrange to get the necessary time to see you.

I was not aware that I am or had been a trustee of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Certainly I never attended any meeting of the board of trustees.

It has been suggested in the press that you feel Owen Lattimore wrote my report to President Roosevelt. This is not true. Owen Lattimore has denied it under oath and I deny it. Lattimore came along with me on my trip to China in 1944 because OWI felt there should be someone along to handle public relations in China having to do with the press.

You might be interested in the following statement which I sent Roosevelt from Kunming in late June of 1944 with regard to Chiang's desire to have a liaison officer who was more acceptable to him than Stilwell:

"Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should not be removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions; (2) command all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with the right to deal directly with the White House on political questions or China may be separated from General Stilwell's present command. Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a representative should be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is finally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far.

"While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

"I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular, I regret not having been able to see General Stilwell and get his views."

Sincerely yours,

H. A. WALLACE.

EXHIBIT No. 343

AUGUST 22, 1950.

Mr. HENRY A. WALLACE,
Farvue, South Salem, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. WALLACE: I greatly appreciate your courtesy in responding to mine of the 9th, and particularly for extract from your Kunming report. The wisdom of your recommendations was quickly proven by history. Too bad that your reports were omitted from the white paper and that the portion you quoted to me was even omitted from the Summary Notes of Conversations on pages 551 and 552 of the white paper, which give a very different impression of what your attitude really was.

In Windows on the Pacific—Biennial Report of American Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944–46, a pamphlet of 63 pages, the 1946 board of trustees is listed on pages 3, 4 and 5. On page 5 I find "Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, Washington, D. C." You are also shown as trustee another year. I am informed that the board met only annually and that a quorum consisted of 12 of the 50 members.

I am happy to have your assurance that Owen Lattimore did not write any of your reports. I knew that he had so testified, but did not accept that as conclusive. I am quite sure that I have never stated that he did as a fact, but suggested that he might have. I did this for several reasons.

1. In the fall of 1944 John Carter Vincent told me you did not write the pamphlet published by I. P. R. eariler that year, over your signature, entitled, I think, "Our Job in the Pacific."

2. State Department denial of the existence of your reports, both in the white paper on page 549 and in the statement of Secretary Acheson in release No. 645 of August 24, 1949. Referring to Congressman Judd's demand that your report "must be produced from wherever it is and published." Mr. Acheson then states: "The Department reiterates in the plainest language that it does not have in its files and does not know of the existence of any report of the nature suggested by Mr. Judd."

The release by you, shortly thereafter, of part of your report revealed the untruthfulness of this statement. By putting 2 and 2 together, I thought it possible that both Mr. Lattimore and the Department were not strictly truthful and suggested the possibility that he had had a hand in writing your report, especially as Mr. Vincent wrote me last fall that he had nothing to do with it and, in fact, had never seen your report. As Mr. Hazard was not a China expert, this left only Mr. Lattimore as the probable author or assistant in its preparation.

Now, however, that I have your assurance, I accept it without question and only hope that any previous doubts and questioning may not have been taken as conclusive.

One more item added to the confusion. General Hurley stated that in June or July 1945 he received a cable signed "Grew" asking him to follow your report as a guide to United States Policy in China.

This confusion leads me to the following suggestion for your consideration:

A new fortnightly magazine entitled "The Freeman" will appear in October. I am treasurer of the corporation. It will be the successor to "Plain Talk" but in addition to the exposure of Communist activities will cover the field of comment on current events and have articles on economics, art, literature, etc. It may be called, in the popular jargon of the day, a magazine of opinion on the "right."

My suggestion would be an article by you covering your reports from China. While the reports are too long for full coverage, liberal quotations would be useful. I suggest our magazine, because of its coloration, as the most useful medium. I believe such an article would be useful to your countrymen in the present far eastern crisis, and would tend to correct misunderstanding both of your attitude and the importance of your part in our China policy.

While I am sure we would disagree on the China situation, it would be useful to our country to shed as much light as possible. Long continuance of the present policy of keeping facts and decisions from the public, particularly in the present public war psychology, can only lead to disastrous consequences, I fear.

The editors of The Freeman have authorized me to make this suggestion to you in the hope that you would consider it a service to your fellow Americans.

I beg to remain,

Very sincerely yours,

ALFRED KOHLBERG.

EXHIBIT No. 344

SEPTEMBER 14, 1951.

Mr. JOSEPH ALSOP,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. ALSOP: In your column of September 5 you state you personally saw John Carter Vincent approve Vice President Wallace's report to President Roosevelt recommending the recall of General Stilwell from command in China. In your column of September 12 you contend this proves that Louis Budenz perjured himself when he named Vincent as a Communist. You state the Wallace report is top secret and was unpublished until revealed by you.

1. This Wallace report was known to Mr. Budenz in August 1950, as I showed him the enclosed letter from Henry Wallace—that was 1 year before he testified before the McCarran committee.

2. As per enclosed photostat of letter from Mr. Vincent, dated October 11, 1949, Mr. Vincent denies your statement that he participated in the Wallace report.

3. Under date of April 18, 1947, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote Senator George, referring to a charge that Mr. Vincent had assisted in the preparation of the Wallace report, as follows:

"Comment: Mr. Vincent was assigned by the Secretary of State to accompany Mr. Wallace, the Vice President of the United States, on the journey mentioned. Mr. Vincent did not prepare or assist in the preparation of the report and does not know what recommendations it contained. Mr. Vincent had never met Mr. Wallace prior to the trip to China, saw him only a few times on official business after their return, and has had no contact with him since his resignation from the Government."

4. Mr. Wallace's several reports to President Roosevelt (he made at least three) all sing the general tune of "Chiang must go." In another letter to me Mr. Wallace hinted that the report you quote was not sent from Kumming but was referred to General Stilwell at New Delhi and dispatched from there.

In short, the Wallace reports were pro-Communist, except for the recommendation for the replacement of Stilwell; the real explanation of which you seem to miss. Furthermore, both Mr. Vincent and Secretary Acheson deny that Vincent had anything to do with them. Yet on this flimsy evidence you charge Louis Budenz, who testified from inside Communist knowledge, with perjury.

It is apparent that somebody is misstating the facts. Either you, on the one side, or Vincent and Acheson on the other. Why not ask Wallace?

If I were a member of your "Bleeding Hearts, Inc.," seeking to cry "Witch-hunt" I could not find a better example of a vicious charge, without factual basis, than yours.

Very truly yours,

ALFRED KOHLBERG.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before questioning Mr. Alsop this afternoon with regard to his testimony this morning, I would like to find out what this is.

I hold in my hand a statement. Maybe Mr. Alsop can tell us. I think it is being passed out by you.

Mr. ALSOP. That is correct. I told the chairman about it before I gave it to the press. I spoke to the committee from rough notes. I drew up a statement. The mimeograph people made a mistake here. It is a simply coherent presentation of what I said this morning.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it purport to be your testimony this morning?

Mr. ALSOP. It does not and I have so warned the members of the press. Parts of it where I had prepared my notes carefully and read directly from them do represent what is already in the record. Other parts do not, obviously.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it represent or include any of the questions that were asked you this morning?

Mr. ALSOP. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor any of your answers to those questions, except where you followed a prepared text?

Mr. ALSOP. That is correct. It is my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you didn't have a statement; didn't you?

Mr. ALSOP. I said I was not going to make a statement to the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you had no press release.

Mr. ALSOP. I said I had no press release at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. We now have one?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It does not represent your testimony this morning?

Mr. ALSOP. In part, it does.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a statement which includes portions of your testimony this morning presented in the manner in which you desire to present it to the press?

Mr. ALSOP. It is a coherent relation of the various points I was attempting to make.

Mr. SOURWINE. It doesn't represent a presentation in a manner in which you do not desire to present to the press?

Mr. ALSOP. No.

Senator SMITH. It is a statement without some of the testimony mentioned this morning?

Mr. ALSOP. With some other, too.

Senator SMITH. With some other?

Mr. ALSOP. There are some passages in there I did not get in the record.

Senator SMITH. This is merely a statement to the press and not intended to be a résumé or statement of what you testified to before the committee?

Mr. ALSOP. No.

Senator SMITH. You started off: "Mr. Chairman and members of the committee."

Mr. ALSOP. I warned the press this was an error.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who made the error?

Mr. ALSOP. I couldn't possibly tell you. I didn't make the arrangements.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you have no knowledge as to where this was mimeographed?

Mr. ALSOP. My secretary handles the mimeographing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to where this was mimeographed? You just testified you couldn't tell us.

Mr. ALSOP. If you will just be calm for one moment, I gave instructions that the thing be mimeographed as a statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I have a yes or no answer?

Senator SMITH. I thought he was going to answer.

Mr. ALSOP. I gave instructions that the thing be mimeographed as a statement, and the instructions were unfortunately not followed. I don't know what mimeographing company did it. I don't handle those things.

Senator SMITH. As I understand, Mr. Sourwine asked you if you knew who mimeographed this statement that you are presenting.

Mr. ALSOP. I think it is a company called Bowman. I don't choose who mimeographs this.

Senator SMITH. You made it clear the statement does not represent a summary of the testimony you gave this morning in some portions of it?

Mr. ALSOP. Some portions it follows, and others it includes other things.

Senator SMITH. It is sort of like a lawyer's brief. He mentions his sides of the case that are most important.

Mr. ALSOP. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Did you say you had another statement you wish to make?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, sir; because Mr. Budenz—I wonder if I can borrow a copy of the record of Mr. Budenz's second testimony from Mr. Mandel. I wonder if you have one without all of those documents in it. I am afraid I will lose my place and lose them.

Where does the second testimony begin?

The paging does not come out right with the copy Mr. Morris gave me this morning. I wonder if you have that copy.

Mr. MORRIS. He wants the third.

Mr. ALSOP. The third on which the question of Mr. Wallace's mission came up. It was the one Mr. Morris gave me this morning. It was a much thinner one than this.

Thank you, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. Budenz addressed himself to proving there was a pro-Communist tendency in the part of Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable which I joined in writing which did not relate to the recall of General Stilwell from China.

This was an historical and reportorial statement to the President summarizing the main points of Mr. Wallace's conversation with the Generalissimo and describing the situation in China as he found it at that time.

Mr. Budenz first came to the passage at the beginning of the cable, and I quote:

> The discussion between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking, but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.
>
> Mr. Morris. Is that an anti-Communist expression, Mr. Budenz?
>
> Mr. Budenz. Most decidedly not. It helps the Communists—

and so on.

On that point, Mr. Chairman, I think you have to put this statement of Mr. Wallace's in its historical background in order to see how misleading, in fact, it was.

The implication there was a pro-Communist tendency behind these sentences which I actually wrote, I mean.

In the first place, you must remember that the Chinese Communists and the National Government had been in partnership in the prosecution of the war against Japan and the Communist armies had been employed under the direct command of the Generalissimo from the outbreak of the war immediately after the Marco Polo Bridge incident in about 1940-41.

At that time the partnership broke down.

In the second place, you have got to remember that Americans in that period were a little bit naive about politics and that the primary emphasis was given in those days to winning the war.

The Chinese Communists at that time occupied a vital area of China in the northwest. The B-29s which had just come into Chendoo, a great project that cost us $2 billion for bombing Japan, operated exclusively over northwest China.

The Fourteenth Air Force operated very much over the northwest of China. It was vital to have intelligence in the fullest measure from northwest China.

It was also highly desirable from the standpoint of operations inside China to have a working military understanding between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese nationalists.

To give you one example: Had there been such a working understanding even without any political liaison whatsoever, the Japanese offensive, which I testified about this morning, which had to be based in Peking and all the supplies which had to be carried down through Communist territory, could have been impeded greatly by Communist attacks on the Japanese supply lines.

There was nothing short of a great need for straight, simple military cooperation. The Generalissimo at the time that Mr. Wallace is reporting on had for internal political reasons on his own motions inaugurated the talks with Communist representatives—I believe the Communist representative was Chou En Lai—looking forward to some kind of an understanding.

What Mr. Wallace was really saying here was these talks were going very badly. The reason they were going very badly was that Chiang realized the political importance of dealings with the Communists; whereas, most Americans, including, I must say, General Chennault, could not see why the Communists and the nationalists

could not get together and work together on the straight milita level as they had for, I think, 3 years, at the beginning of the war.

This phrase "imbued with prejudice" relates to that. I think it is an unfortunately chosen phrase by hindsight, but I see nothing helpful to the Communists about it. It is a report of the situation, at least so far as motive was concerned, and there was nothing helpful to the Communists about it. It is a report of the situation as Mr. Wallace knew it at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it an anti-Communist declaration?

Mr. ALSOP. No; it is not anti-Communist. Mr. Wallace has not contended, nor do I contend this reportorial part of the cable is either pro or anti-Communist, except in one passage which I shall come to.

The anti-Communist part of the cable is the part where General Stilwell's dismissal is recommended. I am attempting to refute Mr. Budenz's testimony that this helps the Communists or was intended to help them.

Senator SMITH. In other words, Mr. Budenz said one way and you said the other, based on your conclusions on the same language?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, but I was there when the thing was written, so perhaps my evidence on the situation and its origination——

Senator SMITH. You know under the law any instrument is construed against the man who writes it, so that will not do you any good.

Mr. ALSOP. The second point Mr. Budenz makes is the sentence:

I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

This goes on:

This was the first point in the Communist drive at that time in their literature—

et cetera.

A Sino-Russian understanding may well have been the first point in the Communist drive at that time, but I can assure the chairman from personnal discussions with Dr. T. V. Soong, who was Foreign Minister of China, it was also one of the two or three first points in Chinese policy. It was also a first point in American policy.

Obviously, if a Sino-Russian understanding could possibly be arranged, a great deal of trouble was bound to be avoided.

It seems to me Mr. Budenz might have put in some of those facts when he commented on this passage in Mr. Wallace's cable.

I should add the Chinese desire for a Sino-Russian understanding reached the stage a little earlier than this point where they tried very hard to go around behind the back of the American Government and make it a Sino-Russian understanding independently and on their own without telling their people they were having negotiations with the Soviet Union.

This was the Generalissimo's government that did it, and the Generalissimo, I was informed, although he did not tell me, was fully aware of the attempt.

Senator WATKINS. Where did you get your information?

Mr. ALSOP. From Dr. Soong, sir. He was Foreign Minister of China.

Senator WATKINS. Direct conversations?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, sir. I worked with, and even lived in the house of Dr. Soong for very long periods of time. There was a very long period when he was, owing to a political crisis which I testified about

earlier this morning, under house arrest. He had very few other people to talk to. He had no means of exercise, except to drive out of Chungking a couple of miles, under guard, and walk up and down in those rice paddies, those miserable paddies.

I used to be his companion. Consequently, he confided a great many things to me, although I was his close adviser, a great many things otherwise he might not have told me. He was in great agony of soul at that time.

Senator SMITH. Where is he now?

Mr. ALSOP. In New York, sir.

There is just one more point here which I am having difficulty finding. I cannot find the passage, but I think Mr. Morris will not dispute it, that one of the main Communist aims was also to discredit and undermine the Generalissimo. On this point he addressed himself to another passage of Mr. Wallace's cable.

Mr. BUDENZ. Thirdly, and I consider this very important in view of what the Communists were driving for at that time——

Namely, to discredit and undermine the Generalissimo—

instability and tenseness characterized the political situation with the rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang.

That again I think very emphatically represents Chiang Kai-shek as incapable of coping with the situation. This is expressed still further when it says Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation, bewildered regarding the economic situation, and while expressing confidence in the army, distressed regarding military development. This is the picture the Communists were trying to have presented of Chiang Kai-shek, as incompetent and incapable of handling the situation. There is no mention here of the long struggle of Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese

and so forth.

As a man who was there at the time and who saw all the intelligence reports at least that were available to the Fourteenth Air Force, who was in the very close touch by the nature of my duties with General Chennault with the developments of Chinese politics, I want to assure you that this was a rather pale and moderate reportorial description of what was going on in China at that time.

You must recall that the Government of China in 1943, October 1943, had come into the hands, by an unfortunate crisis, of an extremely competent, excessively corrupt reactionary clique. They had played a trick on the Generalissimo and had got power.

For the sake of the Senator here, who was not here this morning, I will say that their character was symbolized by the fact that for political and factional reasons, money and arms were denied to the forces of the chief Chinese general in east China resisting the Japanese attack because he belonged to the opposite faction.

Senator WATKINS. Was that within their own party?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, the Nationalists. You had this terrible political problem on the one hand, which I may say the Generalissimo moved to cure very shortly after Mr. Wallace left China.

On the other hand, you had these series of shattering military defeats. The whole armies in Honan, several hundred thousand men, completely destroyed in a matter of 3 weeks.

Changsha, which is the great center on the Yantze, had fallen in a matter of days. The Japanese driving south of Changsha to the vital

cities of east China and the air fields in east China of the Fourteenth Air Force.

These disasters were sending through China a terrible surge of disintegration and weakness. I can recall General Chennault, aftergoing to Chungking and talking to the Generalissimo, coming back and telling me how worried he was about the Generalissimo whom he had admired more than any man because the weight of this burden, the terrible situation which Chiang Kai-shek found himself in and getting no aid from General Stilwell, was really telling on him.

I think Mr. Wallace's description was perhaps exaggerated, but this was not Communist propaganda. This is a verbatim construction of the situation in China as it existed at that time and it does not tell half of it.

I would finally point out, Senator, that the aim of painting this dark picture was to bring home to the President the great gravity of the situation and, therefore, to induce him to replace General Stilwell, take this last drastic action of replacing General Stilwell, so that Chiang Kai-shek might have adequate aid and support in these desperate situations in which he found himself.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether or not there was anyone advising with General Stilwell as to what was going on and that his recall had been recommended?

Mr. ALSOP. Recommended by Mr. Wallace?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. ALSOP. I wouldn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your contention that that Kunming cable was a document of such a nature that anybody concurring in the issuing of that report would, ipso facto, be anti-Communist?

Mr. ALSOP. Providing he knew anything at all about the situation in China.

Mr. Vincent was Chief of the China Division of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you further testimony that John Carter Vincent did concur in the issuance of that report?

Mr. ALSOP. Not only concurred, but contributed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that the anti-Communist essence of that report is the dismissal of General Stilwell?

Mr. ALSOP. I do. General Stilwell was the chief asset of the Communists in China, not because he was disloyal, because he hated the Generalissimo and had no political judgment, followed certain policies which assisted the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. This morning we had read into the record three Daily Worker articles that showed that the Daily Worker concurred in the dismissal of General Stilwell. Haven't you, therefore, simply testified that John Carter Vincent took the same reaction to the Stilwell cables as the Daily Worker took?

Mr. ALSOP. I have testified no such thing, Mr. Morris. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak to this point since it has been discussed so much in regard to these Daily Worker articles.

In the first place, I would like to request that there also be——

Mr. MORRIS. What is there about the question?

Mr. ALSOP. Do I have permission to answer?

Senator SMITH. I think if you can answer the question he asked you, if you understood the question.

Senator WATKINS. The answer did not seem to be quite responsive to the question.

Senator SMITH. Let us see if Mr. Morris can ask the question again, or do you wish to have it read back?

Mr. MORRIS. Read it back.

(The record was thereupon read by the reporter.)

Mr. ALSOP. May I attempt to answer, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. ALSOP. My answer is, I have not testified in that sense in the first place.

In the second place I consider that Mr. Morris is making a very misleading use of these Daily Worker articles. I would like to speak to that point if the chairman will permit me.

Senator SMITH. Certainly; but as I understood Mr. Morris' question it was rather simple. If the reaction on Mr. Vincent wasn't the same as the reaction on the Daily Worker.

Is that not your question?

Mr. MORRIS. They concurred.

Mr. ALSOP. I consider the question is inherently misleading because it addresses itself to so tiny a part of the truth that it is inherently misleading.

I would like to address myself to this subject of these Daily Worker articles, if I have your permission.

Senator SMITH. We want you to come back after you have addressed yourself to answer the question whether or not they did not concur in the final conclusion regardless of what prompted them to do that. If the Daily Worker and if Mr. Vincent did not finally have the same reaction, that amounted to a concurrence, I mean.

Mr. ALSOP. I think it can be shown they did not.

As to these articles, I think the first thing to remember they are articles written after the fact.

The second thing, when the Communists were, much to their surprise I am confident, confronted with this rather shattering fait accompli of the loss of their greatest asset in China, namely, General Stilwell, the question was: How were they going to respond to their loss?

There are many other Daily Worker articles from which I quoted which show they placed the highest value on General Stilwell at the time even after he was actually dismissed and ceased to be of any value to them.

One of them, for the information of the Senator here, described him specifically as "our favorite general."

I submit first that this indicates what the party line probably was at the time when Mr. Vincent concurred in the recommendation for this dismissal of General Stilwell, which was some months earlier.

An active member of the Communist Party you can't feel somehow would have gone to work and helped to arrange a Vice Presidential recommendation for the dismissal of our favorite general.

In the second place, there is the problem of the nature of a Communist reaction to an event after they are confronted with the fait accompli.

On this point I have consulted Dr. Franz Borkenau, who is, without any question, the greatest world authority on the International Communist Party. If I am not incorrect, Dr. Borkenau was not only a member of the inner group of the Politburo of the German Party,

he was also an official of the Comintern itself and in short, one of the really eminent figures in the Communist movement.

I believe on the whole that from the standpoint of the Communist Party organization he was the most eminent single Communist who has ever deserted. He has since occupied himself with writing the history of the world Communist Party.

When this point of the Daily Worker was raised here yesterday by Mr. Morris in Mr. Wallace's testimony, I called up Dr. Borkenau, who is now living a studious and retired life here in Washington, and asked him about this matter. He said a great deal of documentation could be provided if need be and when the libraries were open, on the way that the Communists handle a fait accompli, but that he could give me just off the top of his head one example from the period under discussion, namely, November 1944.

At that time there was a great crisis in France and Belgium. The French and Belgian Communist Parties simultaneously threatened on November 2, 1944, an armed rising if the Governments decrees, the French and Belgian Governments, ordering disbandment of the Communist militias that were then operating in France and Belgium were carried through.

In Belgium the issue was so acute that the British troops actually had to shoot armed Communist demonstrators carrying before them women and children as a screen.

Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons commented that there was no doubt that the Communist attempt to capture power had been put down.

When the rising had been defeated, the Communist ministers who had previously resigned from the cabinets in France and Belgium, and had declared they would never return unless this project for disbanding the Communist militias was abandoned quietly walked back into the cabinets with their hats in their hands and said, "Well, now let's forget about the whole business."

That was what happened in France. I am not so sure about Belgium.

Mr. SOURWINE. How are you so sure about France?

Mr. ALSOP. I have Dr. Borkenau's information on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you about the "hats in their hands"?

Mr. ALSOP. If you wish me to document the story, I can do so in a most extensive manner.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am endeavoring to find out what efforts you made to document. Where did you get the stuff about "hats in hands"?

Mr. ALSOP. You will recognize that was a figurative expression.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I do so recognize, but you were giving it as testimony as to the matter of historical fact.

Mr. ALSOP. I had assumed from your question that you had not recognized it as a figurative expression. I should have thought anyone would have.

They came back into the cabinet and were very glad to come back into the cabinet.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you know that?

Mr. ALSOP. Because they said so.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom did they say it?

Mr. ALSOP. Let's not dispute this matter. If you want any further documentation, I can go to the Congressional Library and submit to the committee the most extensive extract files of L'Humanité.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the testimony to which you are testifying under oath and it is not impertinent to ask you how you know about it. It is obviously hearsay from Dr. Borkenau, but you have not stated he told you that somebody told him.

Senator SMITH. I think we had better limit the testimony or have this gentleman come here and testify under oath on that particular phase of it, since he is convenient to the committee in Washington.

Mr. ALSOP. I am reluctant to drag him before you.

Senator SMITH. I think he is making statements. They are statements upon which we are supposed to base some credence and he ought to come before the committee so that we might do what Mr. Sourwine suggests.

One of the privileges is always to have cross-examination of a witness who makes a statement. That is the only way you can get at the final truth.

Mr. ALSOP. May I withdraw Dr. Borkenau as my witness and offer to substantiate any testimony in full from the files of the French Communist newspaper, L'Humanité, which occupied toward the French Communist Party the same relationship as the Daily Worker does here.

Dr. Borkenau is not a young man. He is a studious man. He is in no sense in public life. The whole story is told in the files of L'Humanité.

Senator WATKINS. You have copies?

Mr. ALSOP. They are in the Congressional Library.

Mr. MORRIS. The question before the committee is: Did the Daily Worker concur in the dismissal of General Stillwell?

Mr. ALSOP. If Mr. Morris will excuse me, the chairman has given me permission to address myself to the problem of these Daily Worker articles. I am trying to show the chairman what the Communists do when they are confronted with a fait accompli.

An armed rising was attempted. The Communist ministers left the cabinet. Their troops were involved. The rising was put down. This is the Daily Worker's comment on the final result on November 4.

The whole thing happened very briefly. Communists were most critical of the Government fearing that the achievements of the existence would be undermined if the old Vichy police were permitted to take over the——

Senator SMITH. That is in France?

Mr. ALSOP. Our Daily Worker. Yes, what the Daily Worker is to America, L'Humanité is in France.

Senator SMITH. We have enough in China now.

Mr. ALSOP. I am trying to say, sir, here you have Mr. Morris bringing into the record articles which show Communist treatment of a political fait accompli which they could not get over, around or under.

I am trying to give you a parallel case in which they were again confronted with the fait accompli, and which they responded to by accepting it.

Senator SMITH. This is a simple question, it seems to me, to answer. Mr. Morris has asked you in effect, one, that the Daily Worker had approved of the recall, or reacted favorably to the recall of General Stilwell.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Two, that Mr. John Carter Vincent reacted favorably to the recall of General Stilwell.

Is that not true from the evidence before us?

Mr. ALSOP. I do not think it is a true statement of the facts, sir. In the first place, it is incorrect to say that the Daily Worker reacted favorably to the recall of General Stilwell. They sought to pass off the recall of General Stilwell as unimportant while giving clear evidence at the same time by calling him "our favorite general" and in other ways.

This was an event they greatly regretted.

Senator SMITH. Certain people have called other persons "my favorite candidate for election coming up." They do not mean they approve of them.

Mr. ALSOP. Taken in conjunction with the rest of the evidence concerning General Stilwell's value to the Communists, I think you can see why they called him "our favorite general."

Mr. MORRIS. When you bring up the point about the Communists considering General Stilwell their favorite general, you understand that your testimony along those lines coincides exactly with Mr. Budenz; do you not?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Budenz did not read the Starobin article which I introduced.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no question of what Budenz' thinking was in regard to the favorite general of the Communists?

Mr. ALSOP. My position on this is very simple. In the first place, I think it is perfectly irrelevant what the Daily Worker said about Stilwell's recall after he was recalled. The time Mr. Vincent concurred and joined in a recommendation for Stilwell's recall was in June 1944. At that time Stilwell was an invaluable asset to the Communists. I cannot believe that a Communist would have joined and concurred in the recommendation for his recall.

When the Communists were confronted with the fait accompli of his recall, they produced a rather mixed reaction, as they frequently do, and as Henry Luce says, "They got caught with their party line down."

After about a month they shook down in the direction of passing it off and said they hoped the Stilwell policies would be continued?

Senator WATKINS. Could they not have been rejoicing that General Chennault was not chosen?

Mr. ALSOP. I have already testified that Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent wanted to nominate General Chennault and I prevented them from doing so.

Senator WATKINS. Could not the Daily Worker have been happy that Chennault was not chosen?

Mr. ALSOP. That doesn't appear in the Daily Worker.

Senator WATKINS. All their motives possibly do not appear in the article.

Senator SMITH. You say Mr. Vincent approved of the recall of General Stilwell?

Mr. ALSOP. I say he concurred; joined and concurred in a recommendation for it.

Senator SMITH. I assume he approved.

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Without a play on precisely the words. The Daily Worker articles had been read, some of them. Not saying whether I believe them, but some of the Daily Worker articles also approved of Stilwell's recall if they were writing the truth there that they felt that way.

Mr. ALSOP. May I say I do not consider this is an accurate version of the Daily Worker's reaction if you take all the Daily Worker articles that were published together, put them down side by side.

Senator SMITH. The point is, did not some of their articles approve of Stilwell's recall? Those that were read here?

Mr. ALSOP. I cannot say that I agree with that, Mr. Chairman, because I do not.

Senator WATKINS. Will not the record show whether they did or did not, without having this witness trying to throw light one way or the other?

Senator SMITH. I think so.

Mr. ALSOP. Since so much has been made of these articles, I would like to have introduced into the record the other articles such as that by Starobin, in which Stilwell is described as "our favorite general," and that Mr. Budenz rather conspicuously did not bring forward.

Senator SMITH. That is something you thought of he did not.

Mr. ALSOP. I have them marked here.

Senator WATKINS. Do we have the Daily Worker articles in the record to which Mr. Alsop has been referring?

Mr. ALSOP. You have the Daily Worker articles in the record in which it is contended—in my opinion, they do not—they sustain the case of Mr. Budenz.

You do not have those which take an opposite line.

Senator WATKINS. Do we have the articles that seem to be somewhat of a reaction one way or the other to the recall of General Stilwell?

Mr. ALSOP. You only have some of them.

Senator WATKINS. I am asking the clerk. I do not think you probably know whether they do.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Morris offered in evidence here in the testimony certain editorials from the Daily Worker in which is the foundation for the question that the reaction of the Daily Worker to General Stilwell's recall was the same reaction that Mr. John Carter Vincent had from Stilwell's recall.

Therefore, the idea that the Daily Worker or the Communists, were glad of General Stilwell's recall. We do have some of those articles in evidence, as I understand.

Senator WATKINS. If there are any more of them that reflect the attitude of the Daily Worker, as one member of the committee, I think we ought to have them before us. I think the entire file of the Daily Worker ought to be here because we can check on anything, then.

Senator SMITH. That is right. Anybody that has any editorials they wish to present, just name them.

Mr. ALSOP. I would like to have included in the record—I will keep only to the relevant ones—the article by Joseph Starobin in in what is well known to be the most important spot in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Of what date?

Mr. ALSOP. November 1, 1944, page 6.

Senator WATKINS. What is that spot?

Mr. ALSOP. It is the spot under the cartoon. I believe Mr. Budenz himself has written this is where the boys look to find out what the milk of the truth really is.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Budenz has testified that this Daily Worker is the telegraph line from Moscow to its followers here in the United States. All of it is important, I guess.

Mr. ALSOP. This is regarded as the most important part.

Mr. MORRIS Mr. Budenz himself has quoted from Mr. Starobin, so there is no issue.

Senator SMITH. Let him put in whatever he wants.

Mr. ALSOP. I would like to have it stated for the record, Mr. Budenz did not quote from Mr. Starobin. There was only one article he put in. That was the article by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, published over a month after General Stilwell's recall.

It was Mr. Morris, the committee counsel, who put in Mr. Starobin's article.

Senator WATKINS. The record will show for itself. It is hardly necessary to tell what is in, and not.

Mr. ALSOP. This is the Starobin article on page 6 of November 1.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the one that begins:

> The sudden withdrawal of Gen. Joseph C. Stilwell from Burma-China has won outstanding merit.

Mr. ALSOP. That is the one that describes him as "our favorite general."

Mr. SOURWINE. Could that whole article go in?

Senator WATKINS. Let us have them filed for the record.

Senator SMITH. We will consider them by reference, so they can be referred to and if any points come up, we can check.

Mr. ALSOP. I would like to have in the record by reference the selection of extracts from Brooks Atkinson's report on the Stilwell recall in the New York Times which the Daily Worker republished on that same day, November 1, on page 8, containing the paragraph:

> Now General Stilwell has been forced out of China by the political system that has been consistently blocking him and America is acquiescing in a system that is undemocratic in spirit as well as fact and is also unrepresentative of the Chinese people who are good allies.

Senator SMITH. Was not that the view also expressed by many other Americans that had no connection whatever with the Communists?

Mr. ALSOP. Exactly.

Senator SMITH. There was a great deal of sympathy for General Stilwell and a great deal of feeling that it was not wise to replace him regardless of Communist or anti-Communist, or what not?

Mr. ALSOP. Although it couldn't possibly make up for the recall of General Stilwell, this was in the eyes of the Communist, a sort of silver lining to the dark cloud of their loss because they had reason to hope that pressure would be brought on Chiang Kai-shek because of the public commitment.

There never could have been as much pressure as General Stilwell brought.

Mr. MORRIS. In all fairness, you will want to call attention to Mr. Joseph Starobin's article where he mentions:

> I disagree with Brooks Atkinson of the Times in only one respect—

et cetera.

Mr. ALSOP. That is the silver lining of the cloud. I call that whistling in the dark.

I would also like to have included the article on the editorial page, page 8, I think, of the issue of November 4, by Mr. Starobin, entitled "China Regained," in which there is a great deal more praise for General Stilwell. The guest column of that issue, by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, is on page 9, where Mr. Field speaks of the Stilwell's, the Sun Fo's, the Madam Sun Yat-sen's, the patriots, who struggle for a national unity whereby we may fight against and defeat our hated enemy.

I would like to also have included in the record the article by James S. Allen on page 4 of the issue of November 5, entitled "The Hand of GOP Reaction Helps Shape China's Crisis."

Stilwell's recall, writes Mr. Allen, and the crises revealed by it, are at least in part the work of the most reactionary imperialist anti-Roosevelt forces within the United States.

As I testified this morning, that is equivalent to saying it is a job done by murderers in Daily Workerese.

I would like to have included in the record from that same issue of November 5, 1944, the article by Earl Browder himself on the editorial page, which is page 8.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date?

Mr. ALSOP. It is called "Dewey Reveals His Foreign Policy," in which Mr. Browder remarks:

> His, Governor Dewey's lieutenants, have openly supported Chiang Kai-shek's disunity of policy in China which brought about the recall of General Stilwell.

That is by implication a strong indication of displeasure.

I think those are enough to burden the record with. They should also be enough to show that this final acceptance of the fait accompli by Frederick V. Field or rather this tentative first article by Starobin, could not in any way bear out what must have been the Communist Party line relative to General Stilwell when Mr. Vincent joined and concurred in recommending the dismissal of this general, who was, in fact, the most invaluable asset the Communists in China had.

This I would also like to point out occurred 6 months prior to the publication of these articles and before the fait accompli.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any direct evidence that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. ALSOP. The chairman and I went over that this morning, Mr. Morris.

In my opinion, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is against it, but, obviously, as I cannot read the mind of another man, and I don't know of any way to prove that a man by documents is not a member of the Communist Party, I have no such direct evidence.

I would like to ask you: Can you think of any document except a document over and above the document involving a very powerful anti-Communist agent, that would disprove an allegation of membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. MORRIS. Should I be sworn?

Senator SMITH. No. I do not want to get you to swearing. We have enough already.

Mr. ALSOP. Let me put it to you. You might have a document showing that Mr. Vincent was in the pay of the FBI as an agent to spy

upon the Communists, and it would be quite possible and anyone who has any knowledge of intelligence procedures might know this man was hired by the FBI to spy upon the Communists, but was a double agent and was really working for the Communists and spying on the FBI.

It is a familiar intelligence procedure.

Senator WATKINS. On this matter of evidence of whether or not Mr. Vincent was a Communist, it is one of those things we are investigating as we go along. Whatever evidence there is against them being a Communist, of course, we ought to receive.

As I understand, Mr. Alsop came here to contradict and impeach the evidence given by Mr. Budenz. Mr. Budenz, as I understand from his testimony, was in the inner workings of the American Politburo or the American Communist Party which was in direct communication with Moscow and under its control.

He testified from the inside this man was considered as a Communist. That was his evidence; what he heard. I take it for granted it would probably be assumed any man trying to represent the American Government and at the same time being a Communist, was not going to do a lot of things every day in the year to indicate he was a Communist.

He was at least going to try to fool them some of the time. That was one of the possibilities that may enter into the picture.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz's statement and say, " I am not a Communist." That draws the issue.

One says he is, and one says he is not.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Budenz is only testifying from what was considered from within the party, that he was one of their men. No matter what the documents may show or what was said on the outside, it is still possible he may be still telling the truth.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Budenz' testimony goes further than you say. I read it specifically.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports that I have received, he was.

Senator WATKINS. Within the party it was officially reported to him he was.

Mr. ALSOP. There is another grave aspect of this matter, Senator, and that is Mr. Kohlberg has stated in a letter to me that Mr. Budenz, when he so testified before your committee, had been made aware by him, Mr. Kohlberg, that Mr. Vincent and Mr. Wallace had participated in this profoundly anti-Communist act.

It seems to me that it puts Mr. Budenz in a very peculiar position, if he came before this committee and testified that Mr. Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, that he guided Mr. Wallace toward a Communist objective, at the same time suppressing the knowledge which Mr. Kohlberg has written me that Mr. Budenz had, that Mr. Vincent participated in this profoundly anti-Communist act which was the main result of the Wallace mission.

Senator WATKINS. You have a right to your conclusion. He is testifying as a member of a secret organization that is supposed to know members of the party.

Speaking from what was given to him then, what he heard, and the official reports you have referred to, he came to the conclusion, and so testified, that he was one of their members, a member of the Communist Party. Whatever he did on the outside can be used one way or the other and should be carefully weighed to determine whether he was or was not a Communist agent.

The mere fact he did some things that would be contrary to the Communist line would be some evidence, but it might not be the controlling evidence in the end that he was anti-Communist because spies and people who are working that way, of course, will perform many things to mislead the people with whom they are working.

We take that into consideration in weighing the evidence. It is not an indication that Mr. Budenz was lying when he said from the knowledge that he had, from the secret inner workings, the secret meetings of the Politburo he got that information and he was cured.

I cannot say what you said contradicts what he has told us.

Mr. ALSOP. There are certain other points you have to consider. For example, these are that before Mr. Budenz had learned that Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent had wanted to nominate General Chennault, he testified before this committee on his second appearance on this particular matter, that they were pleased with the nomination of General Wedemeyer for the specific reason that it had excluded General Chennault.

This was proof this was a Communist act.

Senator WATKINS. Before you leave this matter of General Wedemeyer, did you know at the time General Wedemeyer's views on communism and on what ought to be done over there to save the situation from the Communists?

Mr. ALSOP. I knew General Wedemeyer was a very able and a very far from pro-Communist officer.

Senator WATKINS. Did you know what position he had taken on any argument he presented?

Mr. ALSOP. I had reason to believe he was very dissatisfied with General Stilwell's policies.

Senator WATKINS. He may have been, but we asked in executive session—and I think since Mr. Wallace has testified in public session that I can refer to it—he said he did not know the views of General Wedemeyer at that time.

Mr. ALSOP. I, however, was in China.

Senator WATKINS. He said he did not know. It may have been from the Communist point of view they had someone who would be fair to them and they were not disturbed.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Vincent, I think, would have known.

Senator SMITH. Is Mr. Vincent still living?

Mr. ALSOP. I believe he has just returned from Tangiers.

Senator SMITH. He knows what he has said.

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Why can he not tell the committee?

Mr. ALSOP. I should imagine that would be the best evidence.

Senator SMITH. I do not see any need of us fussing about whether he was or was not a Communist, because we cannot determine that. I think it is up to Mr. Vincent if he wants to come here to give us testi-

mony with such corroborating circumstances and documentary evidence as he wishes. We will certainly investigate it.

I do not see any need of us arguing about whether or not he was a Communist.

What is the next, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Is it not true you have stated in one of your columns that Mr. Budenz has given untruthful testimony in connection with John Carter Vincent being a member of the Communist Party, and you use as a basis of that conclusion the fact that he did not so testify last year before he came before the Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. ALSOP. I would like to see that column.

That is quite correct, nor did he before that committee.

Senator SMITH. Did he say anything that was contrary to what he said before us, or it was something he did not mention?

Mr. ALSOP. It is a very peculiar part of the record I have studied very carefully. Mr. Budenz was asked by Senator McMahon whether John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party. He replied: "This is a serious charge," and that he did not wish to make it without further consideration.

In other words, he was not at that time sure.

Senator SMITH. No; that does not necessarily follow. He might have been sure, but he might not have felt he should expose him.

Mr. ALSOP. He said he was preparing a list of members of the Communist Party.

Toward the end of these hearings Senator Lodge asked him if he had prepared this list and urged him to present it to the committee.

He said that he was not ready with a list. He subsequently testified before this committee that he told Mr. Morris privately on the phone that Mr. Morris was a Reserve officer in the Naval Intelligence and that, therefore, as one or two removes a part of the security apparatus of our Government and that Mr. Vincent was a Communist at that time.

That was not known to me when I wrote my column. I had only available the public records in which he had been twice publicly asked to name Mr. Vincent as a Communist, first directly, and, second, in the form of a request for this list which as far as I know, he has never yet produced.

Both times he had refused. Therefore, I wrote in my column what was the literal fact that he had refused to identify Mr. Vincent as a Communist before the Tydings committee.

Senator WATKINS. A better word would have been "hesitated."

Mr. ALSOP. He refused, sir.

Senator SMITH. I see how a man might know a friend of his, or somebody he knew, was a Communist, and yet not want to say so. He might say, "Let somebody else do it." I can see how you do not want to disclose about someone else unless it falls in line with your duty.

Anyhow, that was the basis of your statement?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at that time on that occasion of Mr. Budenz's testimony, the committee directed that a letter be sent to the White House to ask if there was such a report in the intelligence files. We received this morning a letter dated October 17, 1951, from Matthew J. Connelly, secretary to the President. It reads:

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In response to your letter of October 5, 1951, in which you requested a report concerning Mr. John Carter Vincent, said to have been filed through the District Intelligence Office of the Third Naval District, I wish to inform you that the files of the Navy Department have been checked. The report to which you refer was dated May 1, 1950.

It then goes on to say I was the reporting officer. Mr. Budenz had told me and I had made a report. I would like that whole letter in evidence.

Senator SMITH. Let us have the whole letter read.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

It consists solely of the statement that an unidentified Naval Reserve officer had advised the District Intelligence Office of the Third Naval District that he had received information to the effect that Mr. John Carter Vincent was a Communist Party member. The source of the information does not appear, and no evidence to support this assertion appears in the report.

The Reserve officer in question was subsequently identified on May 22, 1950, by the District Intelligence Office of the Third Naval District as Lt. Commdr. Robert Morris, said to be special counsel to the Republican members of the Senate subcommittee investigating charges of communism in the State Department.

Inasmuch as the Robert Morris who was responsible for this report on Mr. Vincent appears to be the same Robert Morris who is now counsel to the Senate subcommittee of which you are chairman, and inasmuch as the report does not indicate that he revealed the source of his information or provided any evidence to support it, it is suggested that you may wish to inquire of him as to his source and the evidence which led him to initiate the report.

Very truly yours,

MATTHEW J. CONNELLY,
Secretary to the President.

That is evidence of the fact Mr. Budenz did make the report.

Senator SMITH. It is received.

(Document referred to and read in full was marked "Exhibit No. 345," and filed for the record.)

Senator SMITH. Is that referring to the incident Mr. Budenz testified to?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Budenz is not mentioned, however, in this report.

Senator SMITH. Is there anything else?

Mr. ALSOP. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have some questions, Mr. Chairman, if it is all right.

I would like to request that unless the witness or his attorney has reason to believe that any of the questions are unfair or unfairly phrased, that the witness be instructed to make his answers as responsive as possible, or keep them down to a minimum. They do not always have to be a yes or no, but we are getting along in time here. I would like to cover a little bit of area.

Mr. PURCELL. May I make a statement?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. PURCELL. I am sure the witness will reply as briefly as possible. When he is asked to answer yes or no, I am sure he will do that.

You understand yes or no answers do not always tell the whole story.

Senator SMITH. I can understand how any commentator wants to comment on something he is asked about. So we will excuse him for that tendency, but we may have to hold you down to answering the question.

Mr. ALSOP. I am willing to let you be the judge, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, Mr. Alsop, whether Mr. Budenz, in his official capacity as a Communist, ever had any official papers dealing in any way with the status of John Carter Vincent?

Mr. ALSOP. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he ever did have any such papers, did you know what they contained, or what they might have contained?

Mr. ALSOP. Clearly I couldn't possibly know if I don't know he had any papers. I couldn't know anything about that.

Senator WATKINS. The answer would be "No."

Mr. ALSOP. I would say he has not produced such papers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the Communists fixed or set, or had any objective for Mr. Wallace in connection with his visit to Asia?

Mr. ALSOP. I assume that the Communist objective was to support their general program in Asia and Mr. Budenz testified at some length on the subject. It sounded to me as though his testimony was tailor-made to support his previous assertions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, Mr. Alsop, whether the Communist Party fixed or set, or had any objective for Mr. Wallace in connection with his trip to Asia?

Mr. ALSOP. I know nothing about the inner workings of the Communist Party of the United States. I was in China at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the Communist Party fixed or had or set any objective for Mr. Wallace's mission to Asia?

Mr. ALSOP. I will reply again: I know nothing about the inner workings of the Communist Party in America in 1944, because I was in China at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an aversion to using the simple Anglo-Saxon negative?

(No answer.)

Mr. SOURWINE. The answer is "No"; is that not it?

Mr. ALSOP. The answer is what I have given, Mr. Sourwine, and I would like to have it stand in the record.

Senator WATKINS. I think the record will show when he analyzed what it said, it was "No," but it was around and around.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not a direct answer to the question that was asked.

Mr. ALSOP. I presume if I confine myself to one sentence, that is adequate.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Communist Party had any objective with regard to Mr. Wallace's trip, do you know what it was?

Mr. ALSOP. I do not know about the inner workings of the Communist Party, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Communist Party had any objective with regard to Mr. Wallace's trip, and you have no knowledge of what such an objective might be, or whether there was such an objective, can you say whether such an objective, if there was one, was attained?

Mr. ALSOP. Could I have that question read back?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. ALSOP. These questions are so complex and so apparently irrelevant I want to understand them very clearly before I answer.

(The record was thereupon read by the reporter.)

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sourwine has in that question used the language what such an objective might be.

On that I do have some knowledge.

One of the objectives undoubtedly might have been and in the greatest possible probability was to sustain General Stilwell who was working at that time in such a way that if he had not subsequently been dismissed, I think the record would show beyond doubt that the Communists would probably have come to power in China before the end of the war. That is my answer to that question.

Senator SMITH. If that had happened, it could not have been any worse than it is?

Mr. ALSOP. I think it could have been substantially worse, because at that time we were less well prepared for the situation that we find ourselves in than we are now. I think Indochina, Burma, and Malaya would undoubtely have been swept into the vortex, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You expressed the opinion that that question was irrelevant. Do you recall having told the committee that one of the three contentions of Mr. Budenz which you intended to prove false was his contention that the Wallace mission attained the objectives set for it by the Communist Party?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Sourwine, I shall answer that question "Yes," but I should like to add something to my answer if the Chairman will permit.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. ALSOP. I have attempted to prove before this committee that unless the Communist Party is stark, staring, raving mad, which I assume it is not, they could not have possibly wanted anything but the continuance in command of General Stilwell. He was their greatest asset in China. The sense of Mr. Budenz' testimony is that a recommendation for the dismissal of General Stilwell, who was the greatest Communist asset in China, attained, or, in fact, the actual language is "Carried out the objective of the Communist Party."

I submit to you that this has some bearing on the assertion that I have made.

Senator WATKINS. We seem to have done very well without General Stilwell.

Mr. ALSOP. I would like to say to you, sir, that General Wedemeyer who replaced General Stilwell, came very close to rescuing the situation, came very close to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, can I bring this back for just a moment, with the permission of the witness?

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Alsop, if you have no knowledge of any Communist objective, if there was one, how can you testify that Mr. Budenz swore falsely when he said there was an objective and that it was attained?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Sourwine, if you will examine the record, I think you will find that I have repeatedly testified I had no knowledge of the objectives of the Communist Party in the United States. I had very considerable knowledge, if I may say I had in some measure expert knowledge of the objectives of the Communist Party in China, which was the area to which Mr. Vincent's action related. I have as evidence

of this knowledge this letter of General Wedemeyer which I offered for the record this morning, in which he states:

> I felt that you understood perhaps better than any other American in China theater at that time the full implications of the Communist movement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, is that letter evidence of what General Wedemeyer thought of Mr. Alsop?

I have no desire, and I am sure this committee has no desire, to demean Mr. Alsop's knowledge on any subject.

I submit further that the witness' statement just now points up what I said before that his repetition of the statement that he knew nothing about Communist objectives was not an answer to the particular question which I asked. That is, because he is now qualifying in effect that previous answer.

Mr. ALSOP. I said, to quote myself, and I dislike having to do so all this time, I knew nothing about the inner workings of the Communist Party in the United States. I specifically wanted to put it that way in order to give you an accurate answer to your question.

I knew very well the Communist objectives in China. In the international Communist movement, if it operates the way it is supposed to operate, the Communist Party in the United States accepted the Communist Party objectives in China and worked to further them.

As to that I cannot testify from personal knowledge. That is precisely why I so phrased my answer in the way you objected.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Sourwine is asking the question: How can you testify to what Mr. Budenz said on that point if you had no knowledge?

Is that not what you said?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the substance.

Mr. ALSOP. Let me say I had a different kind of knowledge from what Mr. Sourwine specified, so I could not reply I had no knowledge.

I knew Communist objectives in China. I do not know the inner workings of the American Communist Party. I assume it shared and tended to promote the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party, which were well known.

Senator WATKINS. What you are giving is opinion evidence. That is your judgment?

Mr. ALSOP. No.

Senator WATKINS. You do not pretend you were in the confidence of the Communist regime in Moscow?

Mr. ALSOP. There were Communist representatives at Chungking.

Senator WATKINS. Do you think they would tell you their exact objectives?

Mr. ALSOP. They were very frank about their objectives.

Senator WATKINS. You think they could be believed?

Mr. ALSOP. As their objectives were to get American arms and to force the Generalissimo into an unequal coalition with them, at least you could believe they wanted to go that far.

Senator WATKINS. I am talking about the long-range objectives.

Mr. ALSOP. It was very clear to me that what they wanted to do was to take power which they have now done.

Senator WATKINS. It seems to me from what you have said it is largely opinion evidence based on what you have read and seen and heard.

I mean the same kind of evidence you have been condemning in Mr. Budenz.

Mr. ALSOP. No, sir; it is not opinion evidence. I saw Madam Sun Yat-sen not so very long after General Stilwell had been dismissed. She was, I suppose, a Communist agent in Chungking since she is now a member of the executive committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Senator SMITH. She is a sister of Madam Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Senator SMITH. They are working both sides of the street.

Mr. ALSOP. They were on all three sides of the street.

Senator WATKINS. That is the first time I knew a street had three sides.

Mr. ALSOP. Madam Sun Yat-sen lamented in the most vivid and clearest language the loss of General Stilwell which she said would be irreparable and specifically stated that all the projects that were being matured under General Stilwell's regime would probably not go through now that this change in command occurred.

Senator SMITH. Let us get back to the question Mr. Sourwine asked you, which was, in substance, as I recall, how can you say Mr. Budenz had not correctly stated the aims or objectives of the Communist Party, or whatever it was he was mentioning at the time, if you did not have some knowledge?

If you had no knowledge, how can you deny what he said?

Mr. ALSOP. I have been trying to suggest I had a different kind of knowledge which also bore very directly on the question.

Senator SMITH. I do not quite understand that answer.

Senator WATKINS. It seems to me the questions and answers are largely argumentative and matters of opinion. The committee will have to decide on whatever facts we can get.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am attempting to limit the questions to questions which are not argumentative and questions which are those of fact.

If I can proceed with a few questions and have the witness answer them briefly and succinctly, I believe I will be through.

I am not intending to argue.

I will go back to the beginning, if I may.

Do you recall having stated that one of the three points that you intended to disprove in Mr. Budenz' testimony was that the Wallace mission obtained the objective set forth by the Communist Party?

Mr. ALSOP. I would like to have my testimony read on that point. I don't think I phrased it just that way. I believe I said that it was inconceivable that—well, I will accept that statement. All right, go on. I think it is a slightly incorrect phrasing of what I did say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the American Politburo ever discussed or planned any objective for the Wallace mission for the possibility of controlling or influencing the Wallace mission in any way?

Mr. ALSOP. I have no knowledge of the workings of the American Politburo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a satisfactory answer to the committee?

Senator WATKINS. If that is the truth, that is a satisfactory answer.

Senator SMITH. Is that not equivalent to "no"?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it, Mr. Alsop?

Mr. ALSOP. I want it specified in the record I am talking about the American Politburo.

Senator WATKINS. That is what the question is about.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that point, Mr. Alsop, have you any fact not already cited by you which you want to advance to the committee in contravention to what Mr. Budenz said with respect to that particular point?

Senator SMITH. Will you read that question back, please?

(The question was read back by the reporter.)

Mr. ALSOP. May I inquire which point you are talking about?

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically the point that the Wallace mission obtained the objective set forth by the Communist Party.

Mr. ALSOP. No; I have no further evidence on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall this morning, sir, stating that one of the three points you intended to disprove was the assertion by Mr. Budenz that this was—that is referring to the first point—because the Wallace mission had been guided by John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. ALSOP. I don't understand your question. You will have to read it back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall that this morning you cited as one of the three points of Mr. Budenz testimony which you would demonstrate as false the statement that the Wallace mission attained its objective, the objective set forth by the Communist Pary, because Mr. Wallace was guided by John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. ALSOP. This question is so confusing I would like to reply by suggesting that whatever I said this morning be just read back into the record. I still do not understand the question. I don't want to seem contentious.

Senator SMITH. Let us have it again or have it read back.

(The question was read back by the reporter.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I am content that the record should stand on that. I do not mean to be contentious.

Mr. ALSOP. I will attempt to answer the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a memory that you made three points this morning in this order: You said that Mr. Budenz had testified falsely in at least three regards, and you were going to demonstrate the falseness thereof—you named them—(1) that the Wallace mission attained the objective set forth by the Communist Party; (2) because Mr. Wallace had been guided by John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore; and, (3) that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. ALSOP. Let me correct you, Mr. Sourwine. What I testified to this morning was that Mr. Budenz had said the Wallace mission had carried out a Communist objective. I commented on that, that it did precisely the contrary.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean what you are challenging is Mr. Budenz' statement that the Wallace mission attained a Communist objective?

Mr. ALSOP. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that that is false testimony because the Wallace mission did not obtain a Communist objective?

Mr. ALSOP. It did precisely the contrary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because it did not obtain a Communist objective?

Mr. ALSOP. I repeat my previous testimony, it did precisely the contrary.

Senator WATKINS. It is the same thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is conceivable that the Wallace mission could have obtained both Communist and non-Communist objectives in different matters. The witness has pinned that point down to the precise point which he wishes to argue, namely, that Mr. Budenz was wrong when he said the Wallace mission obtained an objective set forth by the Communist Party.

Therefore, the reverse is that he did not obtain any objective set forth by the Communist Party.

Mr. ALSOP. I believe that to be true, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I wanted.

Now the second point which we were discussing before was whether you took issue with Mr. Budenz in his statement that Mr. Wallace was guided by John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore.

Mr. ALSOP. Toward the Communist objective.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. ALSOP. I did not testify about Mr. Lattimore. I should like to have that appear in the record.

In the second place, I said Mr. Vincent did not guide Mr. Wallace toward the Communist objective. Again, he did precisely the contrary.

Mr. SOURWINE. The third point of yours was that Mr. Budenz had testified falsely when he said John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. ALSOP. As to that, I said the overwhelming weight of the evidence was against it in view of the fact that Mr. Vincent joined and concurred in striking the heaviest blow that could be struck the Communist cause in China at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you, Mr. Alsop, any additional facts beyond those already testified to by you which you want to tell the committee bearing on the question of Mr. Budenz' veracity in either of the last two points?

Mr. ALSOP. I don't think it is necessary to add anything to the testimony I have given already, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator WATKINS. Why not make it broader and ask does he know any other facts? You ask, does he want to tell? He may have some he does not want to tell. I would like to make it broad enough to cover anything he knows.

Mr. ALSOP. Don't put the question in that form because I spent 4 years in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. He has an encyclopedic knowledge.

Senator WATKINS. I want to get at the truth.

Mr. ALSOP. I was constantly in touch with the whole situation that involved almost the history of the Chinese situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Alsop, during Mr. Wallace's testimony you may remember that he testified with respect to your desire that he should print the Kunming cables and suggested that we ask you about that when you came on the stand, and with the record in that state I think we should ask you: Is it true that you recommended to Mr. Wallace on several occasions that he release the full text of or print the Kunming cables?

Mr. ALSOP. I recommended to him on two occasions, Mr. Sourwine, first when Mr. Kohlberg wrote him in August 1950 asking for the text of the Kunming cables. On that occasion Mr. Wallace did not follow my advice.

The second occasion was after Senator Lehman made something of an issue of this matter in the Senate. I believe it was the Washington Times-Herald sent Mr. Wallace a telegram of inquiry. Mr. Wallace telephoned me and told me that he had this telegram of inquiry and said he was considering putting out a statement giving the whole story and that there were certain points, as he testified, relative to the complex affairs of China that he was doubtful about.

I said, after all, since my columns had gotten him into this trouble, I would go up to New York and talk to him. It seemed to be the least I could do.

From there on it went on as Mr. Wallace testified except I did urge him, of course, to get the whole story on the public record. I thought it very proper that it should be.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you testified in executive session, and I wish you would repeat in substance now, with regard to typing a text out in a hotel room.

Mr. ALSOP. It was the story that Mr. Wallace told yesterday. We met in my room at the Carlton House, and first of all discussed these points that Mr. Wallace wanted cleared up, and he gave me an idea of the sort of statement he wanted to make. I always travel with a typewriter, being a newspaperman—in fact, I had just finished writing a column when he turned up—and he wanted to get the thing written there and then, so I sat down at the typewriter.

I don't like to use the word "dictate" because, as I told you, I can't take dictation on the typewriter. He said what he wanted to say. Broadly the language was his. Inevitably some of the connective tissue was mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it correct at that time what he was dictating generally and what you were putting down specifically was for the purpose of a press release rather than transmittal to the White House?

Mr. ALSOP. As far as I can understand, testifying from my own knowledge, I was not clear how he intended to use this statement of the facts. I urged him to make it a press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was Mr. John Carter Vincent's position at the time he was designated by Secretary Hull to accompany Mr. Wallace on the Asian trip?

Mr. ALSOP. I can't testify to that on direct knowledge, but I believe he was Chief of the China Division, or whatever they called it at that time, of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the reason why he was designated by the State Department to accompany Mr. Wallace?

Mr. ALSOP. I don't know of direct knowledge. He would be the obvious man to choose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is a fair assumption he was there for the purpose of giving Mr. Wallace the best advice that he could when Mr. Wallace asked for it and to give Mr. Wallace the benefit of his knowledge and information with respect to China and Chinese affairs?

Mr. ALSOP. I assume so: yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he did give Mr. Wallace such advice?

Mr. ALSOP. I can't testify to that except to the one occasion that I observed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were together a good deal, were you not, the three of you?

Mr. ALSOP. We were together, Mr. Sourwine, but you know what a VIP program is like, and if you had seen Mr. Wallace's tendency toward violent exercise, you would know that the VIP program was rather crowded.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to be sure I understand you.

Mr. ALSOP. We were together, but there was almost always someone else there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony that excepting one instance you did not during the time you were together see or hear Mr. Vincent give Mr. Wallace any advice?

Mr. ALSOP. I would say I am not at all sure that Mr. Vincent was not present when Mr. Wallace consulted me or rather asked my opinion —I think would be a more accurate way to put it—as to the political situation in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you are not sure he was not present?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; he probably was present. I can't say positively because my recollection is not exact. If he was present, I am sure he joined in that conversation, but I have no recollection of it.

I will say this, though, Mr. Sourwine, he had no serious opportunity to offer Mr. Wallace advice except for this very long time when we were together at General Chennault's house.

Mr. SOURWINE. When he did offer Mr. Wallace advice did Mr. Wallace listen to him?

Mr. ALSOP. Very much because we were all there in the discussion together.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace gave him the respect you would expect to be given under circumstances of that kind?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that the circumstances were such that Mr. Vincent would have been expected to express his disapproval of anything Mr. Wallace proposed, if he did in fact disapprove?

Mr. ALSOP. I very much fear that he would express his disapproval, as I testified this morning, Mr. Sourwine, not because he was in any way in disagreement with the desirability of getting rid of General Stilwell but because he thought it might have been out of line or improper for Mr. Wallace to take this rather drastic step and involve him in responsibility for a recommendation which was impinging on the military and might get the State Department in a row with the War Department.

You know all those considerations that inevitably weigh on any official's mind. He was not, however, moved by those considerations, I am happy to say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us, Mr. Alsop, what part, if any, you had in preparing Mr. Wallace's statement or statements before this committee? Was your advice sought in regard to those, the press release?

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Wallace saw me when he came down here, and we talked. I couldn't say specifically that my advice was sought with regard to the press release. We talked about the story that the press release covered, as we had done before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk about the advisability of issuing it?

Mr. ALSOP. I urged him to get the whole story on the record; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the day that Mr. Wallace testified in executive session, did you see him subsequent to his testimony?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, I did. Mr. Ball, his lawyer, said he had done a good job, so I congratulated him.

Mr. SOURWINE. And before he had issued his release?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the release again the subject of discussion between you at that time?

Mr. ALSOP. It was the subject of discussion between Mr. Ball and Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Alsop, do you know whether Henry Wallace visited Madam Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. ALSOP. I believe he did. It appears in one of his cables, I think, or some way or other.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know how much time he spent with Madam Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. ALSOP. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Madam Sun Yat-sen said anything to influence him?

Mr. ALSOP. I couldn't possibly testify. I think all that appears in the record is that she was a woman of great charm, which indeed she was, I can assure you. She was much the more attractive of the three sisters.

Mr. MORRIS. Apart from her political views?

Mr. ALSOP. Apart from her political views, which were not as clearly apparent to the uninformed eye in those days as they are now.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Alsop, do you know whether John P. Davies concurred in the recommendation of Stilwell's removal?

Mr. ALSOP. He knew nothing about it as far as I know, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. John S. Service concurred in the recommendations?

Mr. ALSOP. He couldn't have known anything about it because he wasn't in Kunming.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Raymond Ludden concurred in the recommendations?

Mr. ALSOP. I have no idea. I didn't discuss it with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record at this time, because of its relevancy, an article by Mao Tse-tung entitled "China Needs Democracy and Unity." The date of this is January 1945, but it was written by Mao Tse-tung on June 12, 1944, and it appears in Political Affairs, of January 1945.

I introduce it in the record to set forth the official Communist Party view at that time with respect to the issue discussed today. It bears on the question that the Communist Party policy at that time concentrated on unity.

I would like to have it in the record at this time.

Mr. ALSOP. Certainly I would like to put something further in the record, Mr. Chairman, as a comment on this article.

Senator SMITH. Have you identified just what part you want to go in, Mr. Morris? Let us get that straight.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it is only 2½ pages. I would like the whole thing to go in the record.

Senator SMITH. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 346" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 346

[From Political Affairs, January 1945—reprinted from People's War, Bombay, August 20, 1944]

CHINA NEEDS DEMOCRACY AND UNITY

(By Mao Tse-tung)

We publish here an important interview given on June 12 by Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, to Chinese and foreign correspondents visiting Yenan, the capital of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region. In view of recent developments in China, it has special world significance, throwing further light on the position of the Chinese Communist Party and on the needed policies for effecting China's unity and liberation.

"I heartily welcome you all coming to Yenan. Our war aim is the same as ever, and the same as that of the entire people of the world—to defeat Japanese militarism, to defeat the Fascists. The whole of China, as the whole of the world, is united on this issue.

"Your visit to Yenan coincides with the opening of the second front in Europe. This is an historic moment for the whole world, because the second front will have profound influence not only upon Europe but upon the Pacific and Chinese theaters of war as well. China together with the rest of the world is anxious to go forward, to achieve the final victory.

"All the anti-Japanese forces in China must now concentrate their entire efforts on fighting the Japanese militarists side by side with this decisive offensive in Europe. The present offers a great opportunity to us.

"You must all be very anxious to learn about the internal situation in China. Here I shall speak a few words: the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party toward Kuomintang-Communist relations has been defined over and over again in the declarations and manifestoes of the Chinese Communist Party and its organs. I shall repeat them here again:

"The Chinese Communist Party has never wavered from its policy of supporting Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the policy of continuing the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the entire people, and the policy of defeating Japanese imperialism and struggle for the building of free democratic China. This was true in the first stages of resistance. This was true in the second stage of the war. This is also true today, because this is and has always been the wish of the entire Chinese people.

"But China has draw-backs and they are serious ones. They can be summed up in one phrase—the lack of democracy. The Chinese people are badly in need of democracy, because through democracy alone can the anti-Japanese war gain strength, China's internal and external relations be put on a proper basis, the victory of the war of resistance insured and the country be built upon sound foundations. It is democracy too that can insure China's postwar unity."

Questioned by the correspondents, Mao announced that the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party have been going on for a long time and he hoped that there would be fruitful results out of the negotiations. He could add nothing new for the present.

As for the second front, he added:

"In future it will be seen that the repercussions of the second front are felt in the Pacific as well. Apparently at the moment it might seem that its effects on China are not direct. But China's problems have to be settled by the Chinese themselves. The improvement of the situation outside by itself cannot solve China's own problems.

"In order to defeat the common enemy, to achieve sound and peaceful internal relations and also sound and peaceful international relations, we hope that the National Government and the Kuomintang and other parties will carry out a thoroughly democratic policy in different spheres. The whole world is in the midst of the war. The war in Europe has entered a decisive phase, while decisive battles are also approaching in the Far East.

"But China is still in need of more democracy, which is necessary to further the anti-Japanese war. Only through democracy can our resistance be strengthened. This has been proved by the experience of the U. S. S. R., U. S. A., and Great Britain. The experiences in the past and particularly of the last 7 years of resistance have also proved it.

"Democracy must be all-sided—political, military, economic and cultural, as also in party affairs and internationally. All these spheres must be democratized and everything must be unified. But this unity must be based on democratic foundations.

"Political unification is necessary, but only on the basis of freedom of press, platform and organization. Only a government based on democratic franchise can strengthen the political unification of the country.

"No doubt, unity in the military sphere is more necessary, but even this could be achieved only on democratic principles. If there is no democratic life inside the army, democratic relations between the officers and men, between soldiers and the people, and also between the different armies, then such armies cannot be unified.

"As to economic democracy, what is meant is the introduction of an economic system which is not based on restriction of production and lack of provision for consumption by the vast mass of the people; but one which will give impetus to further production and insure proper distribution and uniform consumption.

"And only democracy can promote the development of education, thought, the press and the arts. This is cultural democracy.

"Party democracy means that there should be democratic relations inside the party and among the different parties.

"I repeat that we are today badly in need of unity, but only the unity that is based on democracy can be real and abiding. It is true for China's internal problems, but it is equally true for the coming League of Nations. Only by democratic unification can fascism be uprooted and a new China and a new world be established. That is why we stand for the Atlantic Charter, and the declarations of the Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran Conferences. And these are what we expect of the National Government, the Kuomintang and other parties and other people's organizations.

"These aims are what the Chinese Communist Party itself is striving to achieve. In our efforts to defeat the Japanese imperialists, we, the Chinese Communists, have introduced a new spirit of democratic centralism in all our work.

"It is on this basis that we can build a new China, defeat our enemies and build in the future sound and peaceful internal and external relations."

Mr. ALSOP. Mr. Chairman, glancing briefly at this article, it relates to an address of welcome to the American liaison group going to Yenan, which was the Communist capital. The testimony is already in the record that Mr. Wallace was requested to establish this liaison group by General Stilwell's headquarters.

As an instance of the Communist view of General Stilwell at that time in China, I may tell you that one of the very first results of this liaison mission was a formal offer by Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders to place their Communist armies under the personal command of General Stilwell.

I think that that is a necessary commentary on that article and indicates very clearly that the dismissal of General Stilwell can hardly have been in accord with any Communist objectives.

Senator SMITH. You had seen this before, had you?

Mr. ALSOP. I had read that article in Political Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to say that my introduction of this in the record was completely apart from the remarks made by Mr. Alsop.

Senator SMITH. I think we understood. You wanted to put this in, and he had something to say about it.

Mr. ALSOP. I think it is a necessary commentary on the article.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Alsop, do you see any difference between testifying you do not believe a man and testifying he is a liar?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, I see a considerable difference, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to Mr. Budenz, have you been attempting to testify you did not believe him or to testify that he is a liar?

Mr. ALSOP. I am attempting to testify that he is guilty of untruth, the language I wrote to the committee, and in the letter I wrote to the chairman I called him a liar. I think he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not because you disbelieve him but on the basis of facts you brought to the committee?

Mr. ALSOP. The overwhelming evidence before the committee indicates he lied on this occasion.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Alsop, there are two or three questions I should like to ask you.

Now if there are any Communists in America, you agree, do you not, that they should be tracked down and exposed?

Mr. ALSOP. I do, fully, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Now do you have any doubt in your mind that there are at least some Communists in the country?

Mr. ALSOP. I have none at all, Senator.

Senator SMITH. You have no doubt about it?

Mr. ALSOP. None at all.

Senator SMITH. I believe Mr. Hoover said there are some 50,000 or more that he mentioned.

Mr. ALSOP. Something on that order, I recall.

Senator SMITH. Now do you think they should be ferreted out by some Government agency, if possible?

Mr. ALSOP. I agree with you completely, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that Congress as one arm of the Government should make efforts to do that?

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, we are getting now into a question of my view about proper——

Senator SMITH. This is very simple.

Mr. ALSOP. I believe that Congress as one arm of the Government should promote efforts to do that, but I doubt very much whether a legislative body is well fitted, in view of the enormous burden placed on the time of the Members by the business of legislation, to ferret into a question so complex and so difficult as to the kind of questions we have been discussing here.

Senator SMITH. How would you do it if the legislative body did not do it?

Mr. ALSOP. I think I would possibly pass legislation either creating an agency of a semijudicial nature or with some kind of semijudicial adjunct that would be charged with doing it, or you could put it under the FBI or in some other way, make it an expert task.

I don't mean to say for a moment that I impugn the motives of this committee or the kind of efforts that are being made. I just think the other procedure is a better one.

Senator SMITH. That would require activity by the legislative branch of the Government?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Senator SMITH. One way or another it has to be done by the legislative branch?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Senator SMITH. How do you approve of the system which we have attempted to use here, of conducting executive sessions where we think that an individual's name may be mentioned for the first time in con-

nection with some possible Communist activities in order that his name may be protected unless there is real evidence?

Mr. ALSOP. Senator, in that connection I want to make two confessions, not just one.

First, I thought that the system was wrong until I experienced it.

In the second place, and this relates to something that Senator McCarran said this morning, I also thought when I wrote my first columns that the committee itself had had some part in encouraging Mr. Budenz to give what seemed to me demonstrably false testimony. I would like now to say for the record that after seeing Mr. Budenz in his second appearance on the stand, I think it was Mr. Budenz that misled the committee and not the committee that encouraged Mr. Budenz. I consider that Mr. Budenz is the only man who has been in any way at fault in this matter.

Senator SMITH. Now, you realize in that connection this committee or any investigating committee cannot hear but one witness at a time?

Mr. ALSOP. I agree with that.

Senator SMITH. You were present during part of Mr. Budenz public testimony?

Mr. ALSOP. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Now, as I recall, you were given the privilege of testifying immediately following Mr. Budenz—were you not?—if that suited your convenience.

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, and I told Senator Ferguson that it would be impossible, or I indicated to Senator Ferguson that I wasn't ready, and you can see the mass of documentation; I couldn't testify in any serious way at that time.

Senator SMITH. So, you have no fault to find with the committee hearing you today instead of some preceding day?

Mr. ALSOP. None at all.

Senator SMITH. That was for your convenience as well as the committee's?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now, I believe you did refer in one of your articles, which was read on the Senate floor by Senator Lehman, to the fact that the committee was guilty of accepting demonstrably false testimony. Now, you explained that a moment ago, as I understood.

Mr. ALSOP. Yes. I would say this also, Senator: that it seems to me that it makes the point that I made earlier against this kind of procedure: that these facts as to the real outcome of Mr. Wallace's mission were easily ascertainable by a properly expert procedure, and this testimony, I feel quite confident, would then have not been given; and it demonstrates, I think, the need for a larger expert apparatus to do this work less in the glare of publicity and with more attention to the background facts, which suggests the value or absence of value of the testimony of a man who comes now very close to being a professional informer.

Senator SMITH. You realize—do you not—that the courts in accepting testimony first have witnesses sworn?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Therefore, the court has to rely upon the witness being sworn and thereupon telling the truth?

Mr. ALSOP. I agree with that.

Senator SMITH. That does not guarantee the accuracy or the truthfulness of the witness?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes; that is true.

Senator SMITH. You realize that is what this committee is attempting to do in swearing the witness?

Mr. ALSOP. I withdraw any criticism of the committee.

Senator SMITH. You would not say that the committee was chargeable because a witness swore falsely here?

Mr. ALSOP. I think the procedure is at fault and not the committee.

Senator SMITH. You would not blame the committee if a witness has testified erroneously or untruthfully here?

Mr. ALSOP. Let me put it this way, Senator: Your excellent system of holding executive hearings is intended to avoid false accusations against innocent persons. In the present case, in my opinion, a wholly false accusation has been brought against an innocent person, Mr. Vincent.

I do believe, with a different kind of procedure and with a larger range of prior investigation and a lesser tendency to accept, without inquiry, the allegations of a man who is by now almost a professional informer, the background of the Wallace mission to China would have been looked into; and, if Mr. Budenz had testified as he did, he would have been subjected to more careful questioning, greater knowledge being in the hands of the committee, and a different impression would in the end have been made.

It is all a matter of procedure.

Senator SMITH. You realize—do you not—that even in conducting hearings in executive session the committee has to be careful less they be accused of attempting to suppress information on someone? That is true; is it not?

Mr. ALSOP. I agree with that.

Senator SMITH. You agree generally that, where possible, where there is reasonable basis, we may say, a hearing involving public interest to such extent as this should be conducted in the open where everybody interested could see it?

Mr. ALSOP. I agree.

Senator SMITH. Now, I believe that Senator Lehman on the floor of the Senate made some statements to the effect that some very grave charges had been made against this committee and in effect said it was a slander upon the Senate. Now, those were not your words; were they?

Mr. ALSOP. No; I think they are a fair representation of what I had written at that time, which I have now withdrawn because, having seen Mr. Budenz in performance the second time, I am convinced the fault was his and not the committee's.

Senator SMITH. You do not subscribe to the statement made by Senator Lehman on the floor of the Senate?

Mr. ALSOP. Let me say, sir, I would have to qualify my reply to that because Senator Lehman gave a perfectly accurate summary of the articles which I then wrote, and Senator Lehman, if I am correct—and I have read the record—did not in any sense take responsibility for the accuracy of my statements.

Senator SMITH. I understood that.

Mr. ALSOP. He asked instead for an investigation of their truth or falsehood.

I have withdrawn the statement, withdrawn any implication that the committee purposely encouraged this false evidence. I say now that the man who is at fault was Mr. Budenz. So, I couldn't say that Senator Lehman didn't accurately reproduce what I wrote, because I think I was in error.

Senator SMITH. Now, I have one other question, and then I am through. Do you feel now, Mr. Alsop, that there is anything else you wish to say to this committee or any other evidence you wish to introduce?

Mr. ALSOP. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Up to now?

Mr. ALSOP. I think we have covered the story very completely.

Senator SMITH. I think you understood today, from what the chairman said, that if something else did develop which in your mind ought to be presented, and that if you would let us know, we would be glad to let you present it? You understood that?

Mr. ALSOP. I don't mean there isn't a lot of evidence, but it does seem to me the story is complete, and there is no use burdening the time of this committee with repetition.

Senator SMITH. Then you understand we will receive any other evidence?

Mr. ALSOP. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Now, do you have any complaint against the conduct of this hearing so far as you are concerned?

Mr. ALSOP. On the contrary, I think it has been most fair.

Senator SMITH. Don't you forget your column is carried in my home-town paper.

The committee will be in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m. Friday, October 19, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 11:25 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senators Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke has been sworn in executive session. I think it will be well to swear him again for this public session.

Senator WATKINS. Do you solemnly swear the testimony given in the matter now pending before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. COOKE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES MAYNARD COOKE, ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES NAVY (RETIRED)

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and residence to the reporter?

Mr. COOKE. Charles Maynard Cooke. My permanent residence is in Sonoma, Calif. The last 2 years I have been living in Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present military status, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. I am a retired admiral, United States Navy.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you retire from the United States Navy?

Mr. COOKE. The 1st of May 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, will you tell us what your present occupation is?

Mr. COOKE. My present occupation is that I have just terminated a tour of service as an employee of the Commerce International-China, which has been furnishing technical services to the Chinese in Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that an American corporation, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position with that corporation?

Mr. COOKE. I occupied a position of coordinator of this group of technicians that served in Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were those technicians, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. They were some retired officers, some Reserve officers, some ex-officers of the services of the United States, and some enlisted men, too.

Mr. MORRIS. They are all United States citizens?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. They were all employees of Commerce International-China?

Mr. COOKE. Yes; CIC, as it is referred to.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, have you ever been in the employ of the Chinese Government?

Mr. COOKE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, I wonder if you will give us a brief sketch of your experience in the United States Navy for background purposes?

Mr. COOKE. At the time of Pearl Harbor I was commander of the *Pennsylvania*, and shortly after Pearl Harbor I came to Washington, first as assistant chief of staff in charge of plans under Admiral King, who was the commander in chief of the Navy.

Later I became deputy chief of staff, and later the chief of staff to Admiral King, in which capacity I was serving when the war terminated.

During that period I served as chief strategic and policy adviser during the entire war to Admiral King and served with him in the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings, and the meetings of the heads of the governments around the world.

During 1945, as the war was terminating, I participated in the formulation of the policy of the United States regarding the Far East.

Do you want me to go on with that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I wish you would develop that briefly.

Mr. COOKE. And we recognized that the dominating power in Asia—Japan was about to be defeated, and there was great danger that Russia would move in. So our view was that the Chinese power had to build up, that China had to be made a prosperous nation.

In carrying out that policy, we expressed our views or formulated our views in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the original drafting of a law to reconstitute the Chinese Navy. China was about to end up the war with a fairly good-sized army, somewhat of an air force, and zero navy.

So it was the view of the Chiefs of Staff that the United States should prepare legislation to build up their navy, in which I participated in doing. About December of 1945 I terminated my duty with Admiral King and proceeded to China in command of the Seventh Fleet, which was our fleet stationed in Chinese waters, and was in command of that fleet for about 2 years and 2 months.

During that period I was directly concerned with building up a Chinese Navy under orders of the Navy Department and later in accordance with the terms of the Law 502, which was passed by the Congress to establish a Chinese Navy, passed July 16, 1946, but formulated before I had left Washington in general terms.

I was in command of all our combat forces in China after the departure of General Wedemeyer about April 1946, which included our marines in Tsingtao, Tientsin, and Peiping. In February 1947 I

was called back to confer with the Navy Department and the State Department about our policy regarding marines staying in Tsingtao.

At that time I also conferred with the President about the situation out there. I proceeded back to China and completed my duty there in February 1948. I was due to retire for age in 1948 and came back and retired on the 1st of May 1948.

After retirement I was called on to talk about the situation in China over various parts of the United States, which I did, until about October 1949. At that time the Chinese People's Republic was formed, and on October 3 the Russians recognized it.

In my opinion the situation had then become extremely critical to the United States in that there might be the loss of Formosa where the Chinese Nationalist Government was moving, either preceded or followed by recognition of Communist China, which from my experience that I had had dealing with the situation in the Far East for a number of years would be very disastrous.

I had been recommending for a long period a military mission out there, which was not established——

Mr. MORRIS. This is now what year, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. This is now after October 3, 1949, when the Russians recognized the People's Government of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you stationed then, Admiral?

Mr. COOKE. I was retired then. I had retired the 1st of May, and I was living in California, and I proceeded east here to go into this question of what could be done about that. So I went into the question of the Chinese themselves hiring officers, retired officers, under permissive action of the President.

Senator FERGUSON. They had to have consent to waive the law which prohibits that?

Mr. COOKE. The Constitution says that they must have the sanction of Congress. The sanction of Congress existed, but through the discretion of the President.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the point, that you had to get the President to exercise the discretion?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have to, but the Chinese Government if they wanted to have a mission of American people?

Mr. COOKE. Well, not necessarily the Chinese Government, Senator; just so it existed.

Senator FERGUSON. It could not exist if somebody did not do it?

Mr. COOKE. That is right. Actually a recommendation to that effect, that one be formed, was sent in to the State Department by Mr. Pauley.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you when General Marshall went on his mission in 1946?

Mr. COOKE. He went in 1945, Senator. I was just terminating my duty with the commander in Washington, and shortly to proceed myself—I arrived out there about a month after General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see him in China?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation with him?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. As to his mission?

Mr. Cooke. I had to do with the general business of what the Navy was doing. When I first went out there we were helping the Chinese to establish navy yards there that would assist us in maintaining our own ships on minor overhaul and repair; and then I had to do with him in connection with the Anping incident. I had to do with him in connection with the building up of the Chinese Navy itself, and I had to do with him in connection with the embargo and with our policy in China.

Senator Ferguson. You would have to know what the policy was in China in order that you might carry out your duties as an admiral for the United States Navy?

Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you find out what our mission was? If so, what was it?

Mr. Cooke. Our general mission was to assist the Chinese in accepting the surrender of the Japanese, to reconstitute a free China, a strong China, and to avoid participating in fraticidal warfare.

Senator Ferguson. What were you to do with the Nationalist Army in China?

Mr. Cooke. Of course, I didn't have much to do with the Army myself.

Senator Ferguson. As to the mission, your conversation with General Marshall.

Mr. Cooke. I can say this, Senator. In the beginning I was working hard to reestablish the Chinese Navy. There seemed to be a little bit vagueness about what we were to do with the Chinese Navy, and General Marshall at one time asked me how did I know that it was the policy of the United States to reconstitute the Chinese Navy. My answer was that the Congress had passed a bill to that effect, and I assumed it to be the policy for China. There was no further answer to that.

Senator Ferguson. So that ended that?

Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What about the Army?

Mr. Cooke. There were no Army combat troops there, but there was a sort of mission whose chief function was to advise the Chinese Government about the establishment of their Army command in Nanking. In other words, so far as I know, they participated in no operational advice to the Chinese Army.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know anything about the consolidation of the Nationalists and the Communists in one government?

Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.

Seantor Ferguson. Was that discussed with you?

Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was said?

Mr. Cooke. I was more immediately involved in the operation to bring Chinese divisions into the Chinese Nationalist Army. There were about 20 divisions, as I remember it, of Communist divisions, that would be brought into the Chinese Army, and to carry that out there were American field officers established around the various parts of China and an executive headquarters established in Peiping consisting of the representatives of the Communists, the Nationalist Government, and of the United States. That was under General Marshall, and immediately under Mr. Walter Robertson who was a

Minister representing the United States and stationed in Peiping.

Now I knew about this in general, and I got to know about it very acutely in particular because we had marines in Peiping, supporting them, we had marines in Tientsin. We moved supplies to support this mission, and the marines, too, of course, from Tientsin to Peiping.

On the 29th of July 1946 our Marine convoy of trucks moving supplies up there, guarded by 42 marines, was ambushed by about 600 Communists and 4 of them killed, including the officer in command.

Mr. MORRIS. They were under your command, were they, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. Their mission was to convoy supplies from Tientsin to 42 in the group.

Mr. MORRIS. What was their mission?

Mr. COOKE. Their mission was to convoy supplies from Tiensin to Peiping to support the executive headquarters and our marines stationed in Peiping.

Mr. MORRIS. The executive headquarters were the National Government headquarters?

Mr. COOKE. It was the headquarters established under the general direction of General Marshall. It had Nationalist representatives, Communist representatives, and United States representatives. It was for the purpose of bringing these two armies together to form a combined army, you might say, under the Chinese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not accomplish that?

Mr. COOKE. Never could get an agreement. Of course, it was not under me, but there never was any agreement on it. The terms of it were never completely agreed to.

Senator FERGUSON. You went there after Wedemeyer left?

Mr. COOKE. No, sir; I went there before.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you got there did he leave?

Mr. COOKE. About 3 months.

Senator FERGUSON. About 3 months?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know anything about the supply of ammunition to the Nationalist troops?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. After he left, around the 1st of August 1946, the supply was cut off.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. COOKE. Well, I didn't do it, and I can't say why.

Senator FERGUSON. Did General Marshall ever discuss that with you?

Mr. COOKE. He discussed it in general without making too much comment except that he made the observation to me that we, meaning the United States, had armed the Chinese, and now we were disarming them. In other words, we had undertaken to equip thirty-odd Chinese divisions, equip them with guns and things of that kind, and then we stopped the flow of ammunition and made a complete embargo, so we didn't supply it or wouldn't let them buy it for a period of about 10 months, I believe. He just made that observation to me, that is all. He wasn't called on to do it, but he did do it.

Senator FERGUSON. It amounted to disarming them because they were not getting the ammunition for the weapons we had supplied them?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What effect would the arming of the Nationalists have had as far as the Communists were concerned?

Mr. COOKE. Of course, the Communists were being very well supplied in Manchuria by the Russians from arsenals and from captured Japanese guns and ammunition. We were practically certain that was going on, and of course in our white paper reported from our diplomatic representatives in Moscow that it was going on.

Senator FERGUSON. So we knew that the Communists were getting arms and ammunition and also it was our policy, we put it into effect, to put an embargo on the Nationalists?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And General Marshall had told you that of course that amounted to the disarming of the Nationalists?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There was no doubt about that, either?

Mr. COOKE. I must interject there; whether General Marshall considered the Russian and Japanese arms were going to the Communists I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. But you said our Government knew it.

Mr. COOKE. Our Government knew it because I have now read it since then in the white paper that it was reported to them; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But the part that General Marshall told you was that it amounted to a disarming of the Nationalists?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, is that correct?

Mr. COOKE. Largely so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If a man has a rifle and he has no ammunition for it, and you have the ammunition, you are disarming him, are you not?

Mr. COOKE. You can't make it quite that. Of course, they had ammunition on hand. It was gradually getting very scarce, and eventually to a point almost of desperation, but not immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. So in effect in the end it disarmed them; is that it, or what are the facts?

Mr. COOKE. Disarmament as far as our guns were concerned. They had guns of their own manufacture they had been fighting the Japs with, and they had their arsenals. They were still using their own guns and their own ammunition, but the divisions that were equipped with American guns were, as long as they used those guns, in effect gradually disarmed.

Senator FERGUSON. How many divisions were armed with American weapons?

Mr. COOKE. I can't answer that. The program was never completed, and just what the actual number was I don't know.

Senator WATKINS. Did you say a moment ago that there were thirty-odd divisions?

Mr. COOKE. That was the program.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that Wedemeyer's program?

Mr. COOKE. It was formulated during his command, and he was acting chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, that program and that mission which was headed by General Wedemeyer had the assignment of arming 39 Chinese divisions?

Mr. COOKE. I remember it was thirty-odd. It could be 39; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that include any Chinese Communist divisions?

Mr. COOKE. Not at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. So that was the policy in China when you arrived there; is that right, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequent to that time the Marshall mission arrived in China?

Mr. COOKE. No; the Marshall mission arrived there before I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequent to General Wedemeyer's mission?

Mr. COOKE. Well, General Wedemeyer was still there. There is an overlap there. General Wedemeyer was still there. He was in command of our ground forces up until about April 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the transition between the prevailing policy of General Wedemeyer and the subsequent prevailing policy of General Marshall?

Mr. COOKE. Well, after General Marshall's arrival there in December 1945 it is my opinion that General Wedemeyer was working to support General Marshall's mission exactly the way he wanted it supported. Now we actually moved troops, my ships moved troops about, we had to take Japanese back to the mainland, and we moved Chinese troops to receive the surrender of Japanese troops, and we also moved some Chinese troops to Manchuria.

Senator FERGUSON. Chinese Nationalist troops?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did the plan first arise to bring about a coalition between the Chinese Nationalist armies and the Chinese Communist armies? How did that develop, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. I can't speak positively of that. My impression is that that developed about January 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in China at that time, were you not?

Mr. COOKE. Yes; but I didn't have anything necessarily directly to do with that.

Mr. MORRIS. But you did know that the plan was going on?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The thing you are uncertain about is the particular time when it commenced?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, will you develop for us how that plan of bringing about a coalition or merger between the Chinese Nationalist armies and the Chinese Communist armies was attempted?

Mr. COOKE. There was an arrangement set up in negotiations between the Communists and the Nationalists and General Marshall to bring in a certain number of Communist divisions into the Chinese Government army. The proportion I am not sure of here, it may have been 1 to 4, 1 to 3, or 1 to 2.

I did know, but I have forgotten the exact figures now. There were United States Army officers stationed around various parts of China, North China, where this would actually be implemented. We had to do a certain amount of supplying them. Just the exact workings of that I can't testify to.

Senator FERGUSON. What instructions did you get from General Marshall on that?

Mr. Cooke. I had nothing to do with that except to support it logistically. It had nothing to do with the Navy at all, so I had nothing to do with that, the actual implementation.

Mr. Morris. One of the consequences of that was an embargo, was it not, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. Cooke. Well, that is just a question of opinion. The embargo eventually took place quite a bit later; it had to do not necessarily with just the armies, it had to do with the bringing of the two together, as I understood it, and the embargo actually operated as a sort of pressure on the Nationalist Government to conform to the recommendations that had been given them as to what they should do.

I mean that is opinion here now. I didn't sit in the councils to know the answer to that.

Senator Ferguson. But the embargo took place?

Mr. Cooke. The embargo took place definitely.

Mr. Morris. It is not your opinion that the embargo took place?

Mr. Cooke. I know the embargo took place.

Mr. Morris. What was the nature of the embargo, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. Cooke. The United States would supply no combat equipment of any kind, including ammunition, and they wouldn't allow the Chinese to buy any in the United States. Eventually I think they bought some spare parts and maybe some transport planes, no combat planes but transport planes like C–47's, and C–46's.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us when this embargo went into effect?

Mr. Cooke. I can't tell you exactly, but it was about the 1st of August, 1946.

Mr. Morris. How long did that stay in force?

Mr. Cooke. Until the following May.

Mr. Morris. May 1947?

Mr. Cooke. Yes.

Mr. Morris. During the time that that was in force was the Chinese Government able to buy any equipment in the United States?

Mr. Cooke. Not so far as I know. I am fairly sure not.

Mr. Morris. Did the United States send any equipment to the Chinese Government during that period?

Mr. Cooke. No combat equipment. Let me modify that. That is a question that comes up here about delivery of this obsolete ammunition in Tsingtao in February of 1947, which is an item I can go into if you wish me to do it at this time.

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to know.

Mr. Cooke. Of course, the number of marines in China gradually decreased. They had ammunition there for carrying on combat operations, much more than they needed, and some of it getting old and beyond the standards acceptable to the United States. So, some of this obsolescent ammunition in Tsingtao became due for disposal.

I didn't want to haul it through the town of Tsingtao in order to load it on ships, and the only other way to dispose of it was just dump it somewhere or to blow it up. Blowing up thousands of rounds of ammunition is not a very easy thing.

So when I came back in 1947 to talk to the State Department here and the Navy Department about the number of marines in Tsingtao,

the question also came up about this ammunition, as to whether to dump it or not.

Senator FERGUSON. How much was there of it?

Mr. COOKE. I can't remember, Senator. It was something that is substantial.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a large number?

Mr. COOKE. It is a large number. It wouldn't run the Army a definite period, but it was a substantial amount. It was ground force ammunition.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not give it to the Chinese Nationalists that had weapons in which to use it?

Mr. COOKE. I am going into that.

So, then, we had this conference with the State Department, including General Marshall and Mr. Vincent.

Senator FERGUSON. That is John Carter Vincent?

Mr. COOKE. John Carter Vincent.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position with the State Department at that time, if you know?

Mr. COOKE. He was the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, the same as Mr. Rusk now is.

Senator FERGUSON. You took it up with General Marshall. Was he then Secretary of State?

Mr. COOKE. He was Secretary of State. The Secretary of Navy was there, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Marshall, Secretary Marshall, and Mr. Vincent.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us about the conversation you had?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. I was of the view that we should take it out there and dump it and the Nationalists come and get it. They were desperately short of ammunition then. I considered it would be good for them to have it. Furthermore, I didn't think it was very practicable to dispose of it in any other way. In the discussion that ensued Mr. Vincent opposed that.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. COOKE. He just said we ought to figure out a way to destroy it.

Senator FERGUSON. And not give it to the Nationalists?

Mr. COOKE. That is right. General Marshall recognized the problem and said he considered it was a very difficult problem to destroy it, and he approved my recommendation on it, which was carried out.

Senator FERGUSON. That was carried out?

Mr. COOKE. Actually we designated a place there where we were going to take it, and we told them we were going to put it there. We didn't tell them we were going to give it to them, but we were putting it in this place, and they did come and get it, and of course they did use it.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of that?

Mr. COOKE. That was in February 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did that conference take place?

Mr. COOKE. In the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Vincent assign any reason for not giving it to the Chinese Nationalists in the way you proposed?

Mr. COOKE. He just indicated it was undesirable to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anybody else in the State Department discuss this problem?

Mr. COOKE. I don't recall anybody else at this meeting except Admiral Sherman was there, Admiral Nimitz, Secretary Forrestal, General Marshall, Mr. Vincent, and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand then the only opposition really to doing what you did do, allowing the Nationalists to get it, came from Mr. Vincent?

Mr. COOKE. The only one at this conference; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who outside of the conference opposed it?

Mr. COOKE. I didn't discuss it any place else myself.

Senator FERGUSON. He was the only person in the conference who opposed it?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. During that period of time did you encounter Mr. Butterworth, during that general period of time?

Mr. COOKE. After my return to China I did go down to see Mr. Butterworth, and Ambassador Stuart, regarding their views of our activities in China. I had heard that Mr. Butterworth opposed our having marines in Tsingtao and also opposed our having a Navy in China.

As I had to go ahead carrying out what I was doing, I went down there to talk to him and at that time he agreed that he opposed the marines staying there, which we had an agreement with the State Department about doing. He disavowed that he wanted the Navy to leave China. It had been reported reliably to me that he had opposed our Navy staying out there, so that was the reason I went down there to confer with him about it.

Mr. MORRIS. He thought the marines should get out of China?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. We had a certain number of battalions in Tsingtao to maintain the security of the place. We were carrying on activities there. That is the best port I guess in China, and we were still carrying out training on shore of the Chinese Navy. So we had marines there, and the number we had there was the result of an agreement between the Navy Department and the State Department represented by Secretary Marshall.

Mr. MORRIS. When did Mr. Butterworth have this conversation with you, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. In March 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did he hold at that time?

Mr. COOKE. He was the counselor to the Embassy, the Ambassador being Ambassador Stuart.

Senator FERGUSON. You were then in China?

Mr. COOKE. I was in China; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You remained there how long?

Mr. COOKE. I remained there until the latter part of February 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. In this same mission?

Mr. COOKE. I was in command of the fleet there; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in charge of all American forces in China at that time?

Mr. COOKE. All combat forces. The Army mission and the Air Force mission in Nanking were not under me, but the Navy mission, such as it was, was essentially under me.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Admiral Cooke, can you relate to us the nature and the effect of the embargo that we have discussed very briefly here? Can you develop that for us?

Senator SMITH. Could I ask him a question before you go into that?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any information that anyone else in the State Department, whether at the conference or not, other than Mr. Vincent opposed the delivery of or making available of this ammunition to the Chinese Nationalists?

Mr. COOKE. No, sir; I had no information about it, no real information.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, where did this conversation with Mr. Vincent and General Marshall take place?

Mr. COOKE. You mean about the ammunition in Tsingtao?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. COOKE. That was in the State Department here in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the month of that conversation?

Mr. COOKE. February 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been back then at that time?

Mr. COOKE. I was called back to discuss the number of marines that we would have to have if we stayed in Tsingtao.

Senator FERGUSON. The pending question was now the effect of the embargo that we had put on arms and ammunition to Nationalist China.

Mr. COOKE. While I was here in February there was a very serious defeat imposed upon the Nationalists in Shantung Province.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you take the ammunition out and allow the Nationalists to get their hands on it?

Mr. COOKE. I can't give the exact date, but it was after I returned to China, probably March or April 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was this ammunition?

Mr. COOKE. It was in Tsingtao.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did we not allow them to go there and get it?

Mr. COOKE. We did. We just went out in the country there, about 5 or 10 miles, and dumped it there. They did get it there.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did we not let them get it where it was stationed? Why did we spend the money removing it to a place 8 or 10 miles away? Was it because we had an embargo on and we wanted to technically violate the embargo?

Mr. COOKE. I think that was undoubtedly considered. Actually, I would have preferred them not to come into our magazines, anyhow. I would have done it that way whatever the policy was, as far as my handling of the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt they should not have come into the magazines?

Mr. COOKE. That is right. We wouldn't have wanted them to do that. The way we did it I consider was the correct way to do it.

Senator FERGUSON. But was that not a technical violation of the embargo?

Mr. COOKE. I don't think so. We had a right to take our obsolescent ammunition further away from Tsingtao and dump it somewhere, where it could blow up if it wanted to blow up.

Senator WATKINS. Was it not somewhat of a subterfuge?

Mr. COOKE. It may have been.

Senator WATKINS. You knew where it was going when you put it out there?

Mr. COOKE. That is right. I called in the Chinese general and told him I was going to put it there. Of course, I was going to put it in Chinese Nationalist territory that belonged to them, and it was proper for me to inform them I was doing it.

Senator FERGUSON. How far was the Chinese Army from there?

Mr. COOKE. They had army units right in Tsingtao.

Senator FERGUSON. So they could go and get it very easily?

Mr. COOKE. Yes; there was a lot of fighting going on in Shantung Province, of which Tsingtao was the port.

Senator SMITH. How long did it take them to get it?

Mr. COOKE. It didn't take them very long. I think it took us 2 or 3 days to dump it, and they got it about as fast as we dumped it.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, with respect to the equipment and the guns that we had supplied them by the Wedemeyer mission, was the Chinese Army hampered in the use of that equipment because of the subsequent embargo?

Mr. COOKE. I was just going into that.

While I was there in February the Nationalists suffered a very serious defeat in the western part of Shantung Province, of which Tsingtao is the port, and they lost about seven divisions. It was reported to me—of course, I was not there—that a number of divisions were the best divisions equipped with our guns and a very serious shortage of ammunition. That was in February 1947.

Now, it is my view that part of that debacle was caused by inept Nationalist leadership, but the loss of as many divisions, I was informed by a number of people whom I can't recall now, was also due to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Lack of ammunition?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, sir.

Now, regarding the effect later on of their defeat in Manchuria and so on, which took place after I left, before the ammunition you appropriated for in 1948 had gotten out there, I can't say.

Now, I could tell you, of course, there had been subsequent withholding of ammunition; for instance, in 1949 and after they moved on to Formosa.

Senator SMITH. Is it your feeling, Admiral Cooke, that if there had been ample ammunition, to be used in the guns that we had furnished them, the Nationalists would have been able to stand their ground?

Mr. COOKE. Senator, that is a very complicated question, and I can answer it; but, if I answer that it was due entirely to ammunition, that would be wrong. It would not be true; not in my view. If you wish me to answer it more, I can.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. COOKE. The Nationalist defeat was due to so many things. One of them was due to the fact that when they about had the Communists licked, a truce took place one way or the other because the Commies would say, "Well, we are going to play ball now."

Senator FERGUSON. When did that take place?

Mr. COOKE. That took place several times in 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Who brought about that truce?

Mr. COOKE. In 1947, too.

It was the result of our policy there to negotiate to get successful negotiations beween the Communists and the Nationalists.

Senator FERGUSON. Were we then in China with the policy of getting them together?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the truce called for the purpose of getting them together?

Mr. COOKE. It was the result of that.

To answer the Senator's question, it was also caused, in my view, by very inept leadership on the part of the Nationalists. There is no question about that.

Now, it has been my opinion—and it has been repeated by Admiral Badger to me, who was my successor, and by General Wedemeyer—that, if we had given them technical advice and the ammunition, these things would not have happened; but we don't make it exclusive on ammunition.

I wanted to answer your question so you would get the correct answer.

Senator SMITH. You said something that prompts this question. It was about the time that the Nationalists had the Communists whipped; that then the Communists started this series of seeking truces.

Mr. COOKE. That is right; that happened two or three times.

Senator SMITH. That is one of the tricks or policies of the Communist leadership, would you say?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Even in Korea, or do you not want to go that far?

Mr. COOKE. I go that far. I think it not only pertains to Korea and China; it does everywhere.

Senator FERGUSON. It enables them to build up.

Mr. COOKE. Let me say this, Senator. When the war was over, there were no Communists in Manchuria. The Japanese were there, and they didn't allow Communists around. Now, the Russians, of course, had come into Manchuria. The Nationalists were faced with a very serious dilemma. If they didn't go into Manchuria, they allowed the Communists to go there and get possession of all the arsenals, all the contacts with Russia, all the ammunition and guns and so on.

If they did go into Manchuria, instead of trying to take north China, they always had a chance of being defeated by the fact that the Communists would be armed more rapidly.

Now, there was considerable dispute as to whether it was strategically wise to go into Manchuria or not. It was my view, with what happened, it would have been disastrous either way, considering no ammunition and no technical advice and so on. If they had gotten into Manchuria without a truce so the Communists couldn't get in themselves and rearm, then I think the Communists would have lost.

Senator SMITH. In other words, you think if we had supported the Nationalists to that point we might have prevented what took place in Manchuria?

Mr. COOKE. Definitely.

Senator SMITH. With some leadership and ammunition and supplies?

Mr. COOKE. And no truces.

Senator FERGUSON. What about embargoes?

Mr. COOKE. The embargo came into it later, but that, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was responsible for the embargo? Who in the United States put it into effect?

Mr. COOKE. I don't know, sir. I don't know the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Who told you about it?

Mr. COOKE. It was all known out there in implementing, but General Marshall and the people out there told me about it. Who initiated it, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you got your word about it from General Marshall?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That we were not going to furnish them any more?

Mr. COOKE. We got into the question of the deficiency of ammunition which extended on to a later date. In 1948 the Congress passed a law giving them $125,000,000 for military supplies which arrived there rather late in December 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us about that delay in giving them that ammunition?

Mr. COOKE. I can't testify first-hand because I retired in the meantime. I just followed it in the press. I know that a delay occurred. Badger told me about it in detail. But I assume you would rather get it from him directly.

Senator FERGUSON. But he told you there was a delay in the delivery of $125,000,000?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. He spoke of the fact that the guns that got up to Fu Tso-yi, who was in command in north China, not only got up there very late but got up there without the bolts; so, when they got it, it wasn't ready to use, and they had to surrender. That was, of course, about 8 or 10 months after I left. I am just repeating second-hand information on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Admiral Badger tell you who caused the delay?

Mr. COOKE. No; he didn't know. But I became very much concerned about Communist China being recognized and Formosa falling.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. COOKE. After the People's Republic was declared and the Russians recognized it in October 1949. I came here, was in the East about 2 months.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to anybody here about your fear of recognition of Red China and the fall of Formosa?

Mr. COOKE. I talked to everybody. I was on Town Hall on the subject, and I made lots of speeches on it, on that definite subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the service then?

Mr. COOKE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to anybody in the State Department about it? Did you go see anybody?

Mr. COOKE. No. I talked to them about the situation in June before that.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom did you talk?

Mr. COOKE. I talked to Mr. George Kennan and to Mr. Rusk and to Mr. John Davies.

Senator FERGUSON. What about it?

Mr. COOKE. I did practically all the talking.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you trying to convince them on?

Mr. COOKE. I was trying to convince them about the importance of not allowing the Communists to take over China.

Senator FERGUSON. And what about recognition?

Mr. COOKE. The People's Republic had not been established at that time. The recognition question had not come up.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk about recognition with anybody in the State Department or the fall of Formosa in 1949?

Mr. COOKE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any conversations with Philip Jessup on this score?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he with the State Department?

Mr. COOKE. No. I can tell you about my conversation with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he with the State Department?

Mr. COOKE. He was going out on this mission to the Bangkok Conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he connected with the State Department?

Mr. COOKE. He was being sent out there by the State Department on this mission. On his connection with the State Department, of course he was connected, represented the United States in the United Nations. I knew those two things.

Senator FERGUSON. You misunderstood then. You thought he was a representative to the United Nations?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. What time is that?

Mr. COOKE. That was in November 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. About what did you talk?

Mr. COOKE. I had understood the result of the ECA mission out there, headed by Mr. Lapham and Mr. Griffin, that the view was expressed that the way to save Indochina was economic help and teaching them democratic ideology. I had heard that Mr. Jessup was going out there. It was published he was going out there. I expressed the view to a friend of mine that I would like to talk to him about it.

So he got in touch with Mr. Jessup, who sent word to me—I was in Washington, and he was in New York at the time—he would welcome my coming up to talk to him about it.

I proceeded up there and got there on Sunday, November 28, I think, of 1949 and talked to Mr. Jessup about an hour and a half, setting forth my own background and what I considered to be the interest and the objectives of the United States, or what they should be, and I expressed to him that I considered that giving economic help to Indochina would not save the situation, we would certainly lose if that was restricted to that. But, further, we would have to give some help in opposing communism in China itself.

He contributed very little to the conversation, but he did then say rather emphatically, asked me whether I advocated working with and assisting the Chiang Kai-shek government. I told him that I considered that if the interest of the United States was served by giving him support, we ought to do that; if by giving him no support, we ought to do that, whatever was the interest of the United States.

It was my view to accomplish the objective we had to assist. So the only two things that I can relate about my conversation with Mr.

Jessup, who listened to me very attentively, is that he did indicate very positively that he was not in favor of any working with or assisting the Chiang Kai-shek government.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the 29th of November?

Mr. COOKE. The 28th or 29th.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that about the 26th of October our Government sent to the Nationalist Government a message that we were not going to furnish any more munitions and aid to the Nationalist Government as far as Formosa was concerned?

Mr. COOKE. I didn't know of any definitive action. I knew that was the policy indicated around the Defense Department.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not know of that message?

Mr. COOKE. I know nothing of that message except what I have read in your own hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do know now and you say definitely that Mr. Jessup opposed cooperation or aid to the Nationalist Government on November 29, 1949?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. He left no doubt in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. That was his conversation?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you express to him an intention on your part to help the Chinese Nationalists at that time?

Mr. COOKE. No; I didn't have any concrete scheme of doing anything at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he surprised that you had taken the position you did?

Mr. COOKE. Well, I was, you might say, disappointed because I told him, "If you go out there, you are not helping the Chinese against the Communists, and we are not going to give any military help to Indochina, it is my view," as expressed to him, "you will be sitting on an inquest down there."

Senator SMITH. That is what we all are.

Senator FERGUSON. Rather than on a victory?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Now did Mr. Jessup agree with you on that policy you had mentioned as being for the benefit of the United States? Did he agree on any policy?

Mr. COOKE. On the over-all thing I set forth the view that the United States must oppose communism everywhere, and I expressed the view that the key place in east Asia was China. Now he agreed in the over-all policy, but in the way to implement it he did not express himself. He was not called on to do so because I was just a private individual, and he was an official, and I set forth my views. He did not have to express himself to me, naturally. Neither did I call on him to do so. He didn't say one way or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. He did tell you he did not think we should aid the Nationalist Government?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Was not the Nationalist Government the only impediment to the Chinese Communists at that time, for whatever it might have been worth?

Mr. COOKE. That is right, and in my opinion it was a very important one.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been there and you knew the Nationalist Government, you knew the Communist government?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You represented the United States there as a naval officer?

Mr. COOKE. Up to February 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, are you acquainted with the military set-up that existed in Hainan prior to its fall?

Mr. COOKE. I will be glad to tell you any of these things. It will take a little time. The Nationalist troops coming out of south China, quite a number of them, got into Hainan. There were quite a number of Communists there also. It was quite a burden with the Nationalists to hold on to the island, both economically and militarily. There had been advocacy of giving it up. It wasn't important to the defense of Formosa, but it was important to the defense of Indochina.

So the question came up of how much they could allot down there to their naval forces, their air forces, possibly their ground forces, to hold the island. Their view was that they couldn't augment them at all.

Now it was my view—I was down there—that with a few additional air and naval forces they could hold it. The Communists invaded it about 11 times and finally invaded it in considerable force about the middle of April 1950, and eventually captured it.

It was my view that if they had had one or two more ships there, and 3-inch ammunition, which they were critically short of at the time, they would probably have been able to hold the island.

Did I speak about these frigates that the Russians had returned?

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session.

Mr. COOKE. I was concerned here about what was going on. I was here in Washington. I found that the Russians had returned 27 frigates, lend-lease ships, to Tokyo. I asked the naval people in authority what the Navy was going to do with these frigates, and they said, "We are going to scrap them," that the Navy had no use for them.

I said in my view it would be very good to give some of these ships, 8 to possibly 12, to the Chinese Nationalists to hold on to Formosa, knowing that was not in accordance with policy, but they were available.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom were you talking?

Mr. COOKE. I was talking to officers in Naval Operations that handled that kind of thing.

Then later I got the International News Service to send me out there. I wanted to see what was going on and see what I could do to help. I went to Tokyo. These ships were there. I went down to inspect them to see about their suitability, the same as DE's that we had given them.

Now Congress had passed a law to give them up to 271 ships, and we had given them 138, including mostly boats, ships and boats. So that there was permissive legislation which would allow passing these on to the Nationalists if we wanted to do so.

When I was down there looking at these ships in Yokosuka they were unloading the 3-inch ammunition, 20 millimeter and 40 millimeter, and I told them I had recommended to the Navy Department that consideration be given to the United States Government to pass

these ships to China. They said they were sorry, that it wasn't done, that they were burdened with handling this ammunition, which was below standard. It had not been cared for very well by the Russians.

So I went on down to Formosa. I found that there was a critical shortage of 3-inch ammunition. That was the most critical shortage they had at that time. That was about February or March 1950.

Then they commissioned the United States firm with whom I later became associated to see if they could find some surplus 3-inch ammunition for them somewhere. I suggested they might be able to get this 3-inch ammunition that was being taken off these frigates. That was made in March.

That went on for several months, and eventually after the Korean war started the ammunition was released, first by the Navy Department and later by the State Department, and they did purchase this ammunition.

Senator FERGUSON. What month?

Mr. COOKE. July 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. After Korea?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They got most of the ammunition?

Mr. COOKE. Some was held there by the United States Government in case they would run short in Japan, but eventually most of that was released. They had wanted to get 20,000 rounds of ammunition. They eventually got about 21,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Was July 1950 the date of transfer or the date of negotiation?

Mr. COOKE. That was the date of the completed negotiations, and I think the transfer took place about that time.

Mr. MORRIS. When had negotiations commenced?

Mr. COOKE. I didn't participate. I think they probably started in April. When I first mentioned it I thought they would be available in March 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, are you acquainted with what has been termed a blockade that the Nationalist Government imposed on China's coast?

Mr. COOKE. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that properly a blockade?

Mr. COOKE. No; it was not. The Nationalist Government, a little bit before they left Canton, and of course subsequently after, in Formosa, closed their own ports. I mean they just closed their ports, otherwise not international waters but territorial waters, and they had of course closed ports even when I was out there in command. They closed the port of Tsingtao a couple of times. They closed ports like the port of Shanghai and the port of Canton, and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Were those ports occupied by the Communists?

Mr. COOKE. The ports themselves were, but these entrances, the Nationalists had their own ships where they exercised their sovereignty in closing the port.

Mr. MORRIS. So rather than being a blockade on the part of the Nationalist Government, you would term it a closing of their own ports?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You considered those their own ports because they still had territorial jurisdiction?

Mr. COOKE. They had recognized sovereignty. For instance, if we could put ships in close enough to Charleston during the Civil War in territorial waters, it would be a closure of the port. If we exercised the blockade, it would be on international waters that nobody could approach the port even on international waters, which is a recognized international procedure.

This was not a blockade. They did not declare it a blockade.

Mr. MORRIS. That term "blockade" has been used in the press.

Mr. COOKE. That is right, and it is not correct.

Let me say this, that they could have declared a blockade. It would have been internationally correct under the terms of international law to do so, but they did not do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, I wonder if you would on the basis of your experience as a military man define the importance of Formosa, first of all to our national security.

Mr. COOKE. As I said earlier, I was the chief strategic adviser to the Navy during the war and we set at that time a project for the capture of Formosa, and at one time we were going to bypass the Philippines and take Formosa and just cut the Philippines off. Later we found we could go into the Philippines a little sooner than we could in Formosa, and we changed our policy.

Instead of doing that, we did the Philippines and then Okinawa. So that brought me, of course, in touch with the strategic aspect of Formosa. Now I consider that Formosa is extremely valuable and necessary to our position in the western Pacific if there is a hostile power going to be on the mainland, both in a negative sense and a positive sense.

In other words, in a negative sense we don't want the enemy to have it so as to cut our communications and project their air and submarine strength out eastward; and in a positive sense in that it is the focus of all of those in eastern Asia, particularly in China, who are resisting communism, which I consider our objective.

Mr. MORRIS. You say focus?

Mr. COOKE. It constitutes the sort of hope and spark plug and focus of all the latent and active opposition to communism in eastern Asia, particularly China. So that it serves to give them hope. They are gradually being forced into a hopeless situation, as you know. But it serves to keep their hopes alive and some possibility of getting free of Russian communism.

So I consider it is important in a positive assertion of United States policy vis-á-vis communism in eastern Asia, more important that way than it is in the negative sense, and I think the Communists so regard it.

Mr. MORRIS. Now have you had any opportunity to observe the government administration on the island of Formosa at present?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly something about that, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. I might go back and say one concern in my going out there was that reports were coming out that it was about to fall, collapse. As a matter of fact, our American citizens were ordered out twice, once before I went and once after I was there. They weren't exactly ordered, but they were warned to leave because of collapse internally and maybe externally also.

I didn't find any such situation existed at any time that I have been out there, for 20 months. The government is much better than any I ever saw on the mainland of China. The people support the government. There is order there. There is very little stealing. There is very little begging. There is an increasing appreciation on the part of the Taiwanese of their position in this over-all picture.

As you probably recall, Formosa was surrendered to the Japanese in 1895, and during the Japanese tenure they improved the island very much, increased the population, increased the production, but they did not allow the Taiwanese to have any of the positions in the government or managerial positions in the industrial picture. Now they do have. The Taiwanese were not suited for it, but they were being brought more and more into it in all the provincial governments and the city governments and so forth.

So that I have not myself—and I have been around the island many times—observed any indication of subversive or revolutionary tendency in opposition to the Nationalist government.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, what are the objectives of the United States mission in Formosa? Do the security regulations permit you to discuss those?

Mr. COOKE. They have been published by the mission and also by the United States Government. They are sent out there to assist the Chinese in maintaining internal security and external security of the island of Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you discuss the extent to which that is being implemented?

Mr. COOKE. Perhaps it would be best for me not to go into that too much. It might be considered a security thing from the military point of view. That objective is the objective of the group that is out there. That completes the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. In your opinion is it adequate, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. No. I consider that if the Communists consolidate their position—really, finally consolidate their position on the mainland—then eventually they will take southeast Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. If the Chinese Communists consolidate on the mainland?

Mr. COOKE. Finally consolidate so there is no hope, then they will consolidate their position in southeast Asia, considering there is no debacle in the Communists behind the iron curtain. If they do that, eventually Formosa will have to be surrendered to the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is that, Admiral Cooke?

Mr. COOKE. Because I just can't see it sitting out there like that indefinitely.

So that if we obtain security now, it is always going to be the Chinese population, the Taiwanese or Chinese. The Fulkinese come from an adjacent province across the strait.

I cannot see Formosa being by itself indefinitely. It will fall. I feel that. Then I think there will be a tendency also for Japan, maybe Japan first and Formosa second. So I feel in accomplishing our interest a restricted objective of that kind is incorrect.

Now it has this further effect. When you have a fairly large military establishment neutralized, completely stagnated, then their spirit gradually must go down; it makes no difference what they do to try to whip it up. If we don't allow Chinese troops in Korea and we have this very restricted objective in Formosa, then more and more

the defense tends to fall on us because they gradually sit back there, and they have nothing to do. So I think we should go much further. If we are sending supplies with high priority to Korea, which we should, and sending supplies with high priority to Indochina, which I think we should, then the question comes up, What are we doing with these supplies that are going to Formosa to accomplish the over-all objective, when the strength that Korea rests on, that Indochina rests on, is the mainland of China?

In other words, by these supplies and technical ability we more or less neutralize our own forces there instead of its being injected in the over-all picture.

Mr. MORRIS. Have the Communists been able to use Hainan?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. Hainan is reported to be occupied by quite a lot of Russian advisers and by the Communists, and they are reported even to have a submarine base in Yulin, which is at the southern base of Hainan. Of course, it is a base—if they carry out an over-all movement into Indochina, then it is a natural base to support that movement on the sea side.

Mr. MORRIS. Have the Communists used that as a base against the Indochinese?

Mr. COOKE. There has been some report of it. I can't vouch for it because the adjacent coast at the time is largely controlled by the French, and the Chinese Communists do not have too much of a Navy. Now, whether it is going to be built up, and how fast it is going to be built up, and the use of Hainan as a base for that, I don't know. They use it for junks moving in there from that island and adjacent islands, from Hainan into Indochina.

Mr. MORRIS. If Hainan were in our hands now would it aid us in our resistance to the Communists in Indochina?

Mr. COOKE. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think it could have been saved?

Mr. COOKE. I think it could. I don't think the Nationalist Government could very well afford to devote very much military effort as long as Formosa itself was in a certain degree of jeopardy.

Mr. MORRIS. Could it have been protected by the Chinese navy?

Mr. COOKE. If they had had enough to distribute around.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any evidence that the Chinese Communists had been using our proximity fuzes?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. When the final attack took place on Hainan, the few Chinese ships that were there were pretty badly shot up, and some of their planes were hit. They didn't have many planes there, nor many ships. I inspected these ships that were shot and questioned them about the nature of the explosions that had taken place, and it led to a conviction in my mind that they were using on the Luichow Peninsula, which is right across the strait from Hainan, influence fuzes or proximity fuzes which we used, and carried very secretly during the war.

I reported that fact to our attachés so that it would come to the United States that it was my conviction.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, have you been in touch with T. A. Bisson, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, at any time?

Senator SMITH. Before you ask that question; Admiral, you are familiar with some of the statements made with respect to our policy toward Formosa and Korea, including the announcement made in

January of 1950 that Formosa and Korea were beyond our defense perimeter?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Do you subscribe to that theory?

Mr. COOKE. No, sir. I may say that I took occasion to say to our people in the Navy Department that I considered it to be utterly wrong. I happened to be here at that time. I came East here because that happened.

Senator SMITH. Do you still regard it that way?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now before that policy was announced, I believe in January 1950, had there been any movement in North Korea, so far as you know, to go down into South Korea with the Communists?

Mr. COOKE. Senator, I don't believe I know enough about that first-hand to testify about that.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, have you ever encountered Mr. T. A. Bisson, who has been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. COOKE. Only briefly. In December 1949 there was a meeting of the World Affairs Council of Northern California, of which I had become a member. I was invited to attend this seminar, you might call it, composed mostly of members of World Affairs Council of Northern California and others that were invited in, and among those that appeared there, the first time I had seen him, was Mr. Bisson, who participated in this conference, which lasted a few days.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he express himself on these problems we are discussing today?

Mr. COOKE. He and nearly 90 percent of the membership there were in favor of recognizing Communist China.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he express himself along those lines?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, he expressed himself. He left no doubt in my mind how he stood on it.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Eugene Staley, also in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. COOKE. Yes; the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. He expressed himself?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. I didn't hear him directly. It was reported to me. He didn't speak in the plenary session.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Admiral Cooke, did you ever encounter Raymond Ludden in China?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, he was a member of the Embassy, I don't remember just what section, in Nanking, and I was present at one or two meetings that he was present at, including the one that General Wedemeyer held when he came out there with this mission. I did make those contacts with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Cooke arrived here last night. We did not have an extended executive session. We have covered these points. I wonder if you would allow us to have another executive session and decide whether or not we want to go on this afternoon?

Senator SMITH. What time this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will know by 2 o'clock whether we will have another session this afternoon. You can set it for any time you like.

Senator SMITH. Make it 2:30 or 3 o'clock because some of us have to be on the floor. Shall we say 3 o'clock?

Mr. MORRIS. Very good, sir. I think we will be able to decide by 2 o'clock whether we shall have another session.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 3 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we would like to put in the record two routine letters, one dated October 11, 1951, addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran and signed by Ernest G. Osborne, president of the China Aid Council, Inc.

Senator WATKINS. Does this have an exhibit number?

Mr. MORRIS. This is a supplement to an exhibit already in evidence.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 347" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 347

Exhibit 347 - open hearing - 10/19/51

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China Aid Council, Inc. = Includes

AID WITH A PURPOSE

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MILDRED PRICE
Executive Director

October 11, 1951

The Hon. Patrick McCarran
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator McCarran:

I understand that in your absence yesterday at the hearings of your Committee the letter addressed to you by me was discussed.

One of the points made was that certain members listed on the Board of Directors are reputed to have communist connections.

For the sake of the record I should probably have indicated which of the directors withdrew when the majority refused to let CAC expenditures be used exclusively for Mme. Sun Yat-sen's China Welfare Fund.

The following are those who did withdraw from the Board:

Dr. Arthur W. Chung
Israel Epstein
Stephen H. Fritchman
Talitha Gerlach
Dr. Roger A. Lewis

Very truly yours,

Ernest Osborne
Ernest G. Osborne
President

EGO:kl

357

Mr. MORRIS. And also I should like to present as an exhibit a letter dated June 11, 1938, signed by Anna H. Rubio of the China Aid Council and addressed to Miss Jane Swanhauser.

Senator WATKINS. This will be received. Make it a consecutive number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 348" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 348

CHINA AID COUNCIL

AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

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Katherine Terrill
Chu Tong
Rabbi Stephen S. Wise
Dr. Max Yergen

Champaign-Urbana Branch
June, 11, 1938

Miss Jane Swanhauser,
Chicago, Ill.
Dear Miss Swanhauser:

Since you give us the choice of day for Dr. Su I will ask for Friday June 24 or Sat. June 25 I still leave it to you to decide which of these two days since I feel it is possible some other branch may have spoken already for one of these two dates I name. Kindly write at once which date I may count upon and send me first of all any particulars about Dr. Su that I may use in publicity. Also tell me if this trip is to raise money for I must pay $15 flat if I use a University Hall and make any sort of collection. We have little hope of raising much here as the Bowl of Rice drive is now on but we feel that if Dr. Su can speak to the 3000 students of the summer school who come many of them from country regions they will carry the idea of boycott etc. back to their homes and spread the idea. I am sure you will consider even this worth while. I shall not be able to do any advertising until I hear from you so please write as soon as possible

Sincerely. Anna H Rubio 206 E. Springfield Ave. Champaign

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, you testified this morning in connection with your experiences in the Far East and in connection with many of your views that you have made known. Now have you gone on record in the past as having expressed yourself on the particular subjects you testified to today?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, I have, on a great many occasions. I might mention there is one rather important occasion perhaps, which was when I came to the United States to discuss the question of Marines in Tsingtao, and I conferred with the President. Admiral Leahy was present.

I expressed the view to the President that we did need a mission there, including an operational mission, that it had to be guided by a definite policy of the United States, and in order to set that up I recommended that a very high powered mission with sufficient prestige be sent out to China, including political representatives, economic representatives, and particularly military representatives in order to recommend to the United States Government the policy that should be followed.

After my meeting with the President, the Secretary of the Navy asked me about my conference, and I set forth what I had recommended about the mission, and he directed me to give him a memorandum in detail of what should be done, and how it should be done, which I did. This was in February of 1947.

Whether that influenced the sending of the Wedemeyer mission out there later, of course I don't know except that it did come. It wasn't quite as big a mission as I had hoped for, nor was it allowed to stay there as long as it was required.

However, I was directed to appear before it as the military commander of our United States forces in the area, which I did, and during that meeting with this Wedemeyer mission I gave them about 10 pages of notes setting forth my view of the situation in China and what needed to be done.

I amplified that, of course, in talking to them. I drew them a map. I sketched on a regular map of China what would happen if we did not take definite action at that time. I have those with me. That was in July 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, will you leave that with the committee so that we can have a copy for our record?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. We will make a copy and return the original to you.

Mr. COOKE. I don't know whether the Senator would like to see the map or not.

Senator WATKINS. I think I would.

Mr. COOKE. I used this in amplifying the presentation, and of course the remarks illustrate it, but I hatched in what had happened and what was going to happen at that time, not later. I hatched in this area here down through here. This has to do with eastern Siberia and this with China, and I put blue marks around what would be in the hands of the United States. I left out Formosa, either hatching or blue marks, because I was uncertain what would probably happen.

Now, of course, since then this has taken place. These are the remarks that go with it, that were prepared at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. These are your own notes?

Mr. COOKE. These are my own notes.

Mr. MORRIS. So there is no question of classification involved?

Mr. COOKE. No. Of course, it was secret at the time, but since then the Wedemeyer report has been published and insofar as this may have affected their conclusions, of course I don't know, but that is what was given them in conjunction with amplifying remarks.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go in the record?

Senator WATKINS. That may be made a part of the record. Do you wish to take the map with you or do you want to leave it with us?

Mr. COOKE. If it is useful to the committee, I will be glad to leave it.

Senator WATKINS. We can file it as an exhibit, of course, without attempting to have it in the record actually. It is subject to withdrawal if you wish to withdraw it.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we can file it and make it a part of our appendix.

Senator WATKINS. That will be all right.

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing involved in security here?

Mr. COOKE. No.

(The documents referred to were marked as "Exhibits 349–A and 349–B." Exhibit No. 349–A the map referred to is by reference and is in the committee's files. Exhibit No. 349–B is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 349–B

NOTES FROM ADMIRAL COOKE FOR FACT FINDING COMMISSION ON CHINA, HEADED BY LT. GEN. A. G. WEDEMEYER

The establishment of facts and factors pertaining to the situation in China appears to be not too difficult. But the determinaiton of the proper course of action for the United States to meet the needs of the situation is, of course, extremely difficult. There are obvious objections or impracticabilities that attach to each of the alternate courses of action that can be considered, and none appears to be, at first glance, acceptable.

However, some course of action must be adopted, even though it be none other than a watch-and-wait action, somewhat as is going on at the present time. If a change of policy appears to be required, appears to be urgent, the degree of urgency must be in our minds when we consider the factors bearing on the alternative courses.

During the last 100 years China has been under the impact, in increasing degree, of western civilization. Whatever the differences or whatever the relative merits of the different civilizations, China has been forced to adjust her culture to the persistent intensity of this impact. For at least 50 years the United States has felt called upon to interpose American offices against the undue intrusion by forces of other western powers and of Japan:

(*a*) The open-door policy.

(*b*) The protection against the Japanese aggression of the Twenty-One Demands at the time of the First World War.

(*c*) Diplomatic efforts to resist Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931.

(*d*) Resistance to Japanese aggression caused by the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937.

Note should be taken here of the time element bearing on this situation with regard to the stimulation and initiation of Japanese activities. The Japanese power position in the western Pacific had been relatively strengthened by the naval military arms limitation treaty of 1922, and further improved by the treaty of 1930. By 1931, Japan had undoubtedly decided to terminate the treaty in 1936 (this in accord with treaty provisions). This meant that the differential of power in favor of Japan in the western Pacific could begin to change to Japan's disadvantage in 1941.

Further, Soviet Russia was steadily growing stronger as was demonstrated by tests of this growing strength in the border incidents around Mongolia.

In the meantime, beginning in the 1920's, China was taking effective steps toward Chinese unification and modernization of the Chinese Army and Air Forces.

The serious impairment of British power, demonstrated in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis Italy, and demonstrated by the failure to prevent German aggression against Austria and Czechoslovakia, and by the abject appeasement at Munich, gave evidence of the inability of Britain to participate effectively in opposing Japanese intentions in China and in eastern Asia in general.

It is unnecessary to state categorically that Japan evaluated completely and accurately all these factors. Suffice it to say that in general they offered sufficient promise toward Japanese success to bolster the persuasions of those urging acceleration of the Japanese aggressive program. They, the factors enumerated,

aggregated into an explosive situation which was very dangerous to peace in the western Pacific and to the world. Looking backward it is difficult, and it may be profitless, to say just what timely remedial steps could or should have been taken by the United States and other democratic powers opposed to this totalitarian aggression. It can be stated, however, that there were extremely few who appreciated the need or necessity for action, both with regard to the extent of action and to the compelling aspects of timely action.

Failure of the Nine Power Pact to stop Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 greatly encouraged totalitarian powers, and lowered prestige of the western democracies in the eyes of the Asiatics.

Now once more political and ideological totalitarianism is on the march, on the march energized by the conviction of providential appointment to save the world, to save mankind by the establishment of institutions with which all other institutions, including those democratic, are entirely incompatible. That this is so has made itself apparent to the entire democratic world by innumerable facts apparently incontrovertible. But what to do about them, what to do to forestall if possible a world conflagration, does not appear to be so clear.

During the first 40 years of the twentieth century, China constituted the power vacuum in the western Pacific. Japan was the major expanding power pressing to fill this vacuum. At the present time China is still a vacuum, and the space formerly occupied by the Japanese power in the Japanese homeland and in southern Korea has been filled temporarily at least by the United States, and by Soviet Russia in northern Korea. The fact that Soviet Russia occupies Korea north of latitude 38 and occupies Port Arthur and Dairen is one for which the United States must accept a large part of the responsibility. Of vital concern to the future strategic situation is the question as to just where in this area Soviet power will become more or less stabilized. Shall it remain confined to the present Soviet Maritime Provinces, or must we accept the prospect of its extension to include Inner as well as Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea, and north China, including Shantung and Hopei?

These two alternatives have an important bearing on the world's strategic picture. If the Soviet position in the maritime provinces is not integrated to the industrial and agricultural support of Manchuria, not supported by the strategic reinforcement of warm-water ports of Port Arthur, Dairen, and northern Korea, and is forced to continue to be dependent upon a line of supplies over the trans-Siberian railway, the maritime province position continues to be a source of weakness and vulnerability to Russia, particularly as long as American military power, navy, air, and land, are sufficiently maintained in the Western Pacific. In other words, Soviet aggressive action to exploit favorable prospects in central Europe would tend to be restrained by the comparatively weak position in eastern Asia.

If, however, Soviet eastern Asia becomes self-sufficient by the addition and development of Manchuria, Korea, and parts of north China, Soviet Asia can then become an element of strength in the over-all Soviet power structure rather than weakness. Japanese military power has, at least for the present, been terminated. Presumably a helpless Japan, as well as a helpless China, is to be protected against aggression, against the forcible intrusion of totalitarianism ideologies, such as communism, by the United States or possibly by the United Nations. At present the Soviet base for attack it at the end of the trans-Siberian Railway in Vladivostok, it is narrow and limited in strength. If it is extended to include Korea and broadened to include Manchuria and possibly Hopei and Shantung, it appears probable that the situation will devolop in which the balance of power has been moved from the side of the democratic powers to that of Soviet Russia and her satellites. Such a possibility faces us at this time. If it eventuates either the United States must maintain or build up considerable military power in Japan and in China, or it will have to resign itself to secondary influence in this area.

In the end, diplomatic strength and strategic potential rests on the ability to carry on a total war. For eastern Asia this means for the United States her ability to project effective armed strength to the land masses of eastern Asia.

The ability to do this rests, as has been amply demonstrated, upon naval power controlling the sea lanes through which the strength must be projected, upon land power, including air, to be projected, and upon beachheads upon which to project them.

At the present time we still possess potential beachheads, we still have the naval power, we still have major elements of sea power, but we do not have a United States base nearer than Guam, 2,000 miles away, and our land and air power capable of being projected, is, at the moment, in a perilous condition.

True, for the moment, we have bases in Japan; we have an air base in Okinawa. Whether or not we will have our Japanese bases 15 years from now is another question.

Also, at the moment, we have an anchorage, plus certain minor facilities in Tsingtao. Our position in Tsingtao and in Japan constitute our immediate steps to occupy by the American Navy the naval vacuum in this critical area, created by the elimination of the Japanese Navy.

There appear to be five alternative procedures for solving the Chinese problem:

(*a*) A composition of differences between the Nationalists and Communists.

(*b*) Leaving the problem to be settled by the Chinese amongst themselves.

(*c*) Assistance to the Communists.

(*d*) Assistance to the Nationalist Government, chiefly materials and advisers.

(*e*) Settlement by agreement of the civil war in a certain province, such as Shantung, in a manner that would provide largely for worthy Communist objectives in that area in a way that would separate the Communists from the Moscow guided or controlled hierarchy, and that would serve as an inspiration to additional piecemeal settlements by provinces in north China and possibly Manchuria.

Before giving detailed consideration to these alternatives, it is well to review briefly the general situation now obtaining. In November 1946 the Nationalist forces had the initiative and the position of the Communists was steadily deteriorating. It was at this moment, on November 12, that the cease-fire order was issued by the Generalissimo in order to promote attendance by all parties at the National Constitutional Convention about to convene in Nanking. The Nationalists lost the initiative with the issuance of the cease-fire order, and gave the Communists the opportunity to recoup their losses and gain strength for renewed efforts. Since that time the Nationalist position, economic as well as military, has deteriorated at a constantly accelerating rate, despite gains in northern Kiangsu and the political victory at Yenan.

In November 1946, the Nationalist position in Shantung was quite favorable. The railroad from Tsingtao to Tainan had been opened and was being reconstructed. Coal shipments were shortly to get under way from the Poshan mines. The Nationalist forces had the initiative. As elsewhere, their situation has deteriorated rapidly since that time. The Communists have built up their strength, both from the adjacent western provinces and from Dairen and Port Arthur. Unless the course of events of the past 6 months is definitely reversed, it is probable that the Communists, if they so desire, can take Tsingtao in a few months' time in the event that United States forces there are withdrawn.

The Nationalist strength in Manchuria was built up largely with American aid, and built up in spite of Soviet obstruction and assistance to the Communist efforts in that area. There appears to be little concrete evidence of the supply of Russian arms and Russian equipment to the Communists. There is, however, much evidence of the direct and indirect assistance in passing Japanese arms to the Communists. Further, Russian ships have in fact transported supplies from Dairen and Port Arthur to Chefoo.

The recent Communist drive against the Nationalist position in southern Manchuria was a strong one. For the first time the Communists were provided with artillery in quantity and established a line of supplies which permitted their attack against strong Nationalist-defended positions.

It seems probable that the situation at this time is that the Nationalists cannot hold Manchuria beyond October or November, unless they are given outside assistance and maybe not even then. If the Nationalists should attempt to hold Manchuria and lose their armed forces in that area so that they would not be available for use in Shantung, it seems not improbable that Shantung will be lost, and probably Hopei also. If the Nationalists lose Hopei, resulting in the cutting off of the coal supply from Chinwangtao, the Nationalists position, even along the Yangtze River, will become critical. In such a situation it would appear that the Nationalists would be forced to give in to Communist demands, a breakdown into regional governments with those in the north under Communist control would result.

So far the Nationalists have been unable to oppose the Communist guerrilla tactics by active mobile countermeasures. This is due, among others, to the following factors:

(*a*) Nationalist ineptitude of leadership.

(*b*) Absence of concern by the officers for the welfare of the men. This has caused lukewarmness amongst the soldiers and prevents subdivision of the Nationalist armies into small mobile groups that could be depended upon to carry out successful counter-guerrilla warfare.

(*c*) The Nationalist armies, particularly the best Nationalist armies, have been trained in mass organized operations.

(*d*) The Nationalists have been equipped with mechanical transportation, unsuited for cross-country use for which the Communists use carts. Further, though they have been equipped with mechanical transportation, they do not have the organization, ability, or enterprise to keep their equipment operable.

(*e*) Ineptitude of leadership, coupled with lukewarmness of troops with lack of a good intelligence system, has caused the Nationalists to suffer reverses on many occasions when they have ventured out on mobile operations and has caused them to lose equipment and ammunition to the Communists. The guns and ammunition captured from Nationalists, plus those acquired from the Japanese surrender (surrender to the Russians and others) have kept the Communists supplied with means for carrying on the war.

Returning to the alternatives listed above,

"(*a*) A composition of differences between the Communists and Nationalists": It was necessary in the beginning that the greatest efforts possible be made to this most logical solution to the differences between the Nationalists and Communists. I believe this step was necessary, even had it been known in the beginning that it was not destined to success, because it served clearly to establish the ideals and real objectives of the opposing factions.

At this time, it appears clear that the Communist hierarchy never intended a real composition of differences. In July and August 1946 this was convincingly demonstrated by the An Ping incident, in which the Communists deliberately attacked a movement of supplies to the executive arbitration headquarters, and in the ensuing weeks and months resisted all efforts to get on with the joint investigation to establish the facts as to what had taken place.

"(*b*) Leaving the problem to be settled by the Chinese amongst themselves": This policy may appear, on the surface, to be the least costly one to be followed. In following it, however, it would appear to me that we tend to commit ourselves to adhere to it whatever may befall. The situation would get must worse before it could improve.

The probable result would be a continuation of the civil war with rapid diminution of National military effort and progressive worsening of the economic situation until the government fell apart. The Communists would then emerge as the strongest force in China.

At some point, peace negotiations might be instituted. The most that could be hoped for from such negotiations would be a compromise that would leave China disunited, weak, and helpless, a state in which communism of the Russian variety thrives.

The Chinese Communist program in Manchuria and north China has in recent months grown stronger. It appears to be moving in accordance with a definite plan approved and supported from Moscow. At the present time it seems probable that it will continue to gain in vigor and to have increasing chances of success.

We are now faced with the difficult problems that will be presented by the collapse of Nationalist power in Manchuria, Shantung, and Hopei, with the consequent loss of the coal supply from Chinwangtao, and perhaps with the collapse of the Nationalist Government. Such a situation would present such dangers to China, to the United States, and to the world in general, that it appears to me, much as we might like to do so, we cannot accept a policy of laissez faire.

A complete laissez faire policy could involve the total withdrawal from the China theater of all our miltary forces. This is a step that appears to be advocated in some quarters. If this step is taken, it might well precipitate the collapse of the central government that is referred to above.

"(*c*) Assistance to the Communists": There is no doubt but what the Communist movement in China has demonstrated many virtues and has put into effect desirable reforms:

(*a*) Passing land ownership to the farmers themselves and away from absentee land owners.

(*b*) Better relationship between officers and men.

(*c*) Caring for soldiers' families.

(*d*) Fostering education.

There is reason to believe, however, that these improvements that have been observed in some areas by no means obtain in all. In many cases owners have been dispossessed and ownership passed to racketeers rather than a distribution to appropriate receivers.

The Communists have refrained from taking large cities, because they seem not capable of holding them, and even if they could, they are not capable of running large cities and industries. Differing from the Communist government in Russia, the movement in China stems not from the needs of industrial workers, but from the needs of the peasant farmers.

Even if it were otherwise desirable, even if the establishment of Communist influence throughout was acceptable, it is believed impossible for them to set up a modern China fitted to take its place in the international structure.

"(*d*) Assistance to the Nationalist Government, chiefly materials and advisers": The present Chinese Government is permeated with inefficiency, corruption, and reactionary tendencies. It is stymied by poor military leadership. There naturally exist serious objections to extending material help on a major scale to the maintenance and establishment in full authority of such a regime.

I am, however, convinced that the vital and immediate need for China, for the United States, and for the world in general, is for the establishment of peace. Any immediate attempts to reform or liberalize the Chinese Government should have as their immediate objectives the establishment of peace. Reforms and attempts at democratization that do not contribute to that end should be deferred, although promises of future action along these lines may properly be exacted as the price of our help. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the Chinese masses are not sufficiently advanced to make a democracy, in the sense that we know it, a working institution.

It appears to be impracticable and inadvisable that any help given to the Chinese Government should go beyond financial, material, and advisory assistance. One important aspect of the material assistance to be rendered is the resupply of ammunition for the guns with which a large part of the effective Chinese forces have been equipped by the United States. By supplying them with guns and later denying them ammunition, we have in effect armed them and then turned around and disarmed them.

If we give the Chinese material, including ammunition, we will, of course, open ourselves to very serious criticism for supplying ammunition to shoot down liberal elements amongst the Chinese. Further, such help to the Nationalists may cause counteraction by Russia in the way of furnishing supplies to the Communists or to bringing the matter up for United Nations consideration. With regard to the last, however, Russia is probably already extending assistance, and would therefore not desire United Nations inquiry. Russia has already made her plans. It seems probable that Russia will do no more and no less than already provided for in plans regardless to what we do. Russia's ability to assist the CCP is limited by her own urgent needs.

If we should decide on this step, we should make definite provisions for concrete measures to improve the Chinese Government. Measures that would be designed not only to eliminate corruption and forestall or minimize antagonism on the part of liberals, but also to attract to the support of the Nationalist Government elements that at the present time remain aloof or estranged.

These would be reform steps with the definite objective of strengthening the forces endeavoring to bring about peace and weakening those in armed rebellion.

If this step is decided, I think there should be specific engagements on the part of both parties; in other words, the United States state what it is prepared to do in the way of furnishing materials and advice (both must be furnished if effective assistance is to be given) and the Chinese on the other hand must engage to follow the advice of the advisers and engage to institute specified

reforms in the Nationalist Government and in the provincial and municipal administrations.

"(*e*) Settlement by agreement of the civil war in a certain province, such as Shantung. * * *."

All efforts to solve the Chinese problem in the past and the alternatives discussed above, have been on a wholesale simultaneous settlement. In July of last year I informed both General Marshall and the Generalissimo that in the event it was desired to arrange a meeting between Communist and Nationalist field generals, such as those in Shantung, I would make available the ESTES in a port such as Chefoo, a neutral place, directly accessible to both Nationalists and Communists without their having to go through territory under oppositions control to carry out negotiations. In talking this over with General Marshall, I explained that I had in mind that it might be found desirable, instead of making a wholesale arrangement, to effect a partial settlement in a province like Shantung, settling it to the advantage of both parties and to the advantage of all of the inhabitants of Shantung. The settlement to be carried out in good faith, in such a manner as to provide a guide and incentive to peace in other warring provinces along similar lines. At that time there was some reason to believe that the Communist command in Shantung might have gone along with such a proposal, especially if it had had some way of being assured of the good faith of the Nationalists. This proposition, however, did not work out.

It seems at the present time that the possibility of such a step is considerably more remote than it was a year ago. It may be completely impossible, but even with the remoteness of possibility it may be the only effective way of getting on with the job. It would involve, of course, a willingness on the part of the local Communists to separate themselves from the control of the Communist hierarchy of Mao Tse-dung and other Communist leaders. It would involve good faith on the part of the Nationalist authorities toward all inhabitants of Shantung, either Communist or otherwise. Possibly the only way such a guaranty of good faith could be provided would be through the good offices of officials of the United States.

I feel that this alternative should be explored. It might be explored in connection with either (*d*) or (*b*).

Serious impracticabilities or objections attach to all of the alternatives that have been here suggested. This does not mean, however, that we should end up with a policy of drift, because we do not know what to do. We must weigh the dangers and objections to drift with the same objectivity that we explore the other alternatives. We must recognize that the decision to drift is itself just as much a definite step as any of the others. We must recognize that if drift is for us prospectively a more dangerous policy that we may have already delayed almost too long in adopting an alternative.

Mr. COOKE. Now you ask me a question about expression of views. During the period after retirement and before 1950 I was called on to address various groups, including the National Staff College, and in various parts of the United States. In most cases the remarks I made there go along the same line, but I do not know that there is any record of them.

However, I did address the Economic Club of Detroit—all of these, of course, on their invitation—in a speech in September 1950, which was later published in the Vital Speeches of the Day, and therefore became available to me, and I have printed it, and I have given you a copy of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have that with you, Admiral?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you make that a part of your record?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That is Our Policies and Prospects in the Far East, a copy of extemporaneous speech made by Admiral Cooke in

September 1949 published in December issue of Vital Speeches of the Day. It may be made a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 350" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 350

OUR POLICIES AND PROSPECTS IN THE FAR EAST—COPY OF EXTEMPORANEOUS SPEECH MADE BY ADMIRAL COOKE IN SEPTEMBER 1949 PUBLISHED IN DECEMBER ISSUE OF VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY

(The Disaster in Pacific Far Greater Than Pearl Harbor, by Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., United States Navy, Retired, Sonoma, Calif.; former commander Seventh Fleet, Western Pacific, including United States naval forces operating along the China coast and ashore in China, delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Mich., September 26, 1949)

Gentlemen, I do not know how much all of you appreciate how vital the subject I am to discuss is to the welfare of the United States and to the world, as well as to China and the Far East. If, here in Detroit, one section of your city had a bad epidemic of bubonic plague, all you gentlemen in this city, the whole State, the whole United States, would be concerned, concerned with stopping it, with helping the people stop it, exploring where and how the contagion originated, concerned with checking its spread, and so on. Now, that may seem like an exaggerated analogy with regard to the blight, the disease, that has descended on eastern Asia, but there is really not so much exaggeration in it.

In eastern Asia, half the population of the world is emerging from an ancient or older civilization, trying to take on the habiliments of western civilization and take a proper place in the world, proper not only for itself, but for the world. We say that authoritarian communism is a disease—the Russians would probably say that we are the disease. Of major importance to every district in the United States, including Detroit, is the situation in China because the genesis of the war that we have just fought took place in China, as I will explain later to those who may not already know it.

When the war was over, in most circles including Government officials, it was thought that the Russians, who had been brought in contact with the Western World in the latter part of the war, and immediately after the peace, would have looked upon the green pastures of our Western world, our capitalistic world, with such avid eyes that they would no longer willingly accept the ruthless restrictions of communism. We were wrong. Some of us began to find it out pretty soon. We had thought at first that, even if the Politburo wanted to push these, their people, back behind an iron curtain, that they would not be able to do so. We were wrong. Many of us began to discover our error both in the Far East and in Europe, in the summer of 1946.

In Europe our position vis-à-vis the Communists stiffened; we were ready to make decisions; we were ready to send help, as time went on, to Greece, Italy, France, to all the western part of Europe. It mattered not that such action involved us in fratricidal warfare, as it did in Greece, or possibly in the revolutions that might occur in Italy or France, nor did we restrict our action because of fear of hostilities that might develop over the Berlin airlift, which lifted the Berlin blockade.

Looking not only into the past, but also into the future, we resolutely came to decisions, and took action. It is that kind of action which not only prevents the spread of disease into weakened nations, but provides a basis for the disruption such as later occurred in Yugoslavia. But for that display of firmness and strength, these disruptions that we welcome would not have taken place. Without a manifestation of decision and resolution disruption of Communist enslavement will not take place in the Far East.

In Europe, I would like to use, to express my view of what we did, the words of Mr. Stimson who, in 1947, wrote these two sentences. He said:

"I have served as Secretary of State in a time of frightened isolationism, and as Secretary of War in a time of brave and generous action. I know the withering effects of limited commitments, and I know the regenerative power of full action."

Now, different views from the above prevailed in the Far East, with a different result. We had gone to war to maintain or reestablish an independent, free, and prosperous China. I had a lot to do, as Admiral Doyle has just said, with planning that war. You gentlemen here contributed in major degree to its execution, its successful prosecution. Over 100,000 lives were spent marching

across the Pacific, and over $150 billion. We won our object of establishing a free and independent China. Now we have lost it—lost not only what we fought for and won but more. We're much worse off than we were on December 7, 1941.

Much criticism has arisen in the United States regarding this peacetime defeat. The State Department, feeling itself under attack, has published a white paper. most papers of that kind are published by one government vis-à-vis other governments, in which, naturally, they set forth everything in the best light possible. But this paper is one that is directed internally. It's pointed to the people of the United States. When the lawyer consults with his own side he necessarily must not, or should not, hide or blink any of the facts. In the letter of transmittal of this paper to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State includes this statement: "That nothing that this country did or could have done affected this result. Nothing that this country failed to do contributed to it in any way." This statement adds up to the fact that we have suffered a catastrophic defeat, but we did not contribute to it, that we were not at fault in the least particular. I quote this statement of view because if it should be literally accepted, if it is true, then, it is not much use for us to try to find means of doing something in the Far East under the conditions that now exist. Because if we, in fact, did not help bring this thing about, if, in fact there was nothing we could do when the Nationalists were on top, which they were 2½, 3 years ago, then what can we do now? My feeling is that before we resign ourselves to such a state of helplessness we must look into the picture of of what brought this on, of how it came about, of our commitments and obligations, in order to determine what we could do or should do, or must do at this time, late as it is. An examination of what has taken place is necessary but we must do more than merely to look in the past. In Europe we looked into the past and we looked into the future. Can we in the Far East afford to be like the fabulous "futalive" bird which always flew backward in order that he could always see where he had been, and not look where he was going. We will have to look back first to seek the answers to some of the questions I have raised.

We go back to 1922. Most people consider that World War II had its genesis in the seizure of Manchuria by Japan in 1931. With this I agree, but we must go back a little further for the foundations of the situation which led the Japanese to its seizure. World War I came to be declared to be a war to end all wars. After it was over, peace and justice were to reign without support of power and force. Along that line, the United States, which you might say at that time was first entering its position as being a world power, exerting influence all over the world—we were novices, there was much we didn't know, there was much idealism—proposed scrapping half our Navy. The ratio of our naval strength to that of Japan was about 10 to 3. We said, "Well reduce it to 5 to 3." Even that the Japanese didn't want to accept. They said, "If we agree to such a fixed disparity we will forever more be at the mercy of the United States." They said "You, as well as the British, must agree to the nonfortification, nondevelopment of all bases in the western Pacific." So we said, "We can agree to that except that it would leave China at your mercy." They replied, "Oh, no! we will guarantee by solemn treaty to respect the integrity and welfare of China." So we bought this treaty of nonaggression against China with a quid pro quo of scrapped ships that would cost over a billion dollars at this time, and thereby we sacrificed a balance of power that had been a major controlling force in east Asia.

There are many people who even yet condemn the "balance of power" principle. Many even say that World War I was caused by it. World War I came in spite of it. Balance of power is an instrument of peace and justice and freedom, properly used. Balance of power is something that applies domestically, as well as internationally. You have a police force that's balanced to meet the incidence of and inclination toward crime. If you withdraw your police force, as happened in the Boston police strike in 1919, the criminal elements, the rowdy elements, the hooligans, take charge. They are the minority but they take charge. On the other hand, if you have too large a police force, you get a police state. You can overbalance it either way. The balance of power that we had exercised for over 20 years in eastern Asia had prevented unrestrained aggression by Russia and Japan, in turn. They had taken some parts of China, but they were kept from taking north China by the international balance of power, the main element of which was provided by the United States. We gave that up. I am not so much concerned about the limitation of the Navy, but by the reduction of our power, which caused an unbalancing of power in the western

Pacific and laid the foundation for the seizure of Manchuria, for World War II, for Pearl Harbor.

China, at this time, was going through very strenuous rebirth pains. Sun Yat-sen had died in 1925. Chiang Kai-shek had taken over. He was making much headway toward unifying China, educating China, eliminating communism—making great progress in spite of the Japanese attack and the Japanese partial closing of the "open door." He kept going ahead, improving, headed hopefully toward an eventual restoration of a balance of power through the strengthening of China itself. But Japan was not going to let any such thing happen, and in 1937, as you know, she attacked China in the so-called incident. Chiang Kai-shek, the unifying force, the motivating force of China, held China against this totalitarian attack for 4 years after the invasion started. Mind you, France in 1940 had folded after 2 months of invasion. I'm not talking about France—I'm only answering the criticisms of those who feel very critical of what the Chinese don't do now and what Chiang Kai-shek doesn't succeed in doing now. After 4 years of this one-sided struggle came Pearl Harbor. We came into the war. When we did so a major problem confronting us was keeping Great Britain, Russia, and China in the war. We gave Great Britain $31 billion worth of lend-lease, Russia, $11 billion, China $1 billion—we couldn't get more to China. But in spite of the meagerness of help, China held on for 4 years more—once more, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, good or as bad as it might be—only to end up in 1945 confronting a dangerous enemy that had been built up in China's midst—communism.

Now I must go back to indicate how communism got there. After World War I a few Communists had trickled into China. Sun Yat-sen, recognizing that the big problem was that China must be westernized and would require western help in the way of men and money and materials of every kind, sought help in the United States and in Western Europe. He could not get it and, at the suggestion of Russian agents, in China at the time, he brought in a Russian mission. That is the way that communism got started in China. The mission was there from 1923 to 1927, under the direct orders all the time of Moscow as to the development of the Communist movement in China and in detail as to what they should do. In those days, Russia feared Japan. As a counter against Japanese power Russia wanted a fairly strong China. The Chinese Communists were directed to enter the Kuomintang under whatever terms they could arrange with Sun Yat-sen. This they did. Of interest is that the Trotskyites, who were in China as well as Russia, opposed this Moscow-directed policy. They did not want to compromise even in the small degree of joining the Kuomintang—they were all purged on Moscow orders. But in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek decided he could not go along with communism any longer. He evicted the Russian mission, he liquidated many of the Chinese Communists. Those that escaped bedded down in Kwangsi Province in south China. If the Japanese had not attacked in 1937, he would probably eventually have ended communism because there were not too many Communists in China. However, in 1934, in a celebrated trek, the Communists moved from Kwangsi to north China, Shensi Province, where they were to be close to Russia and could get Russian help and Russian guidance. They were not then spread over north China, and they were not, of course, in Manchuria, which was controlled by Japan.

On their invasion of China, the Japanese occupied the railroads and the cities but did not try to occupy the pockets in between. The Nationalist armies fell back to the westward while the Communists infiltrated into the vacated pockets no longer susceptible to Nationalist control, developed their cells, developed their guerrilla warfare groups, throughout north China during this period of 1937 to 1945. During part of the war, particularly around 1942 when Russia was still weak, under Russian direction the Chinese Communists fought the Japs. In the latter part of the war, when Russia was stronger and Japan was approaching defeat, the Communists fought the Japs only intermittently and just enough to support their claim for American arms. At this juncture, a number of our representatives in China, including Mr. Wallace, said that the Communists were fine people, that they were the regenerative power for China, that they must be brought into the Chinese Government. Some of our people even went so far as to say that the United States should get aboard the Communist bandwagon.

General Hurley was our Ambassador to China. He first thought that we could do business with the Communists. Later he changed his mind, but some of his subordinates did not change their minds. He had them detached. But

they went to Washington, returning to duty in the State Department itself, and were there in a position to issue directives guiding General Hurley himself. As you know, General Hurley resigned and was replaced by General Marshall. General Marshall brought with him to China the statement of policy of the United States, which was that the United States desired to rehabilitate China, to restore it to prosperity, establish a unified, peaceful, strong China, under a government composed of all elements. And, of course, the major element outside of the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party itself, was the Communist element. This policy went on to say that the United States stood ready to assist any government so constituted. Of course, the Communists would never have a government so constituted except on their own Communist terms.

China had ended the war with its armies in the south, the economy disrupted by 8 years of war, no transportation, no merchant marine, no navy. She had to handle all the jobs of rehabilitating, of receiving the surrender of the Japanese armies throughout China, had to try to reestablish the economy, try to take over areas that had fallen into Communist hands during the war, all in a very short space of time. We helped them somewhat. We equipped some of their armies. We transported some of their troops north. We helped feed some of the famine areas such as Hunan in central China. But we contributed to the infliction on China of a very serious situation in Manchuria. There were no Communists in Manchuria at the end of the war, except the Russians. Manchuria was a great arsenal. The industrial capacity of Manchuria is much greater than that of all of China. At Yalta, as you know, we had agreed to Russia's taking over certain parts of Manchuria—the railroads and to a certain extent Dairen and Port Arthur. Just before VJ-day, we more or less directed the Chinese to negotiate a formalizing treaty with the Russians, which they did, in early August 1945. We said—and I quote again from the white paper—we said that in the treaty being negotiated between the Chinese and the Russians, the agreements established in Yalta must be followed, no more, no less. The treaty that was negotiated guaranteed sovereignty in Manchuria to the Nationalist government, including sovereignty over Darien and over all Manchuria. So, it's hard to see how we were not a party to it. Of course, the treaty was never observed by the Russians.

There's been much criticism of the strategical error of the Nationalist government in entering Manchuria. But the Nationalists faced a dilemma. The Communists were not yet in Manchuria. If the Nationalists did not go immediately to take over this, their own area, the Communists would, and would come into possession of Japanese arms and ammunition and arsenals. So, if the Nationalists went to North China and not to Manchuria they would allow to fall to the Communists in Manchuria, a supply of arms and ammunition to carry on the war. Naturally the Nationalists rushed to Manchuria. But what the Russians were doing at that time was ostensibly patting the Nationalist government on the back with one hand, while with the other hand they were beckoning the Communists to make all haste to come in and occupy Manchuria themselves. That this was going on was reported at the time by our Embassy in Moscow to our Government—according to the white paper.

General Marshall, as the President's special envoy, operating under the directive of the State Department, and making a strong effort to solve the situation by bringing the Communists into the Government found himself confronted with Communist negotiators who needed to stall for time to build up and arm their armies and to get their armies into Manchuria. From time to time, as hostilities continued the Nationalist armies succeeded in placing an effective squeeze on the Communists. At such times the Communists would dangle forth hopes of their coming into the Government under the proposed conditions, and General Marshall would persuade Chiang Kai-shek to accept a truce. This happened a number of times. Since then Chiang has made the observation that he, Chiang Kai-shek, had made many blunders, but that the greatest blunder that he had made was when he was persuaded to stay his hand when he was winning.

As I have said, the arms and ammunition of the Japanese, and the arsenals in northern Manchuria were being passed over to the Communists. At the same time we, whose declared policy was to avoid participation in fratricidal warfare in China—which was a controlling policy, you might say—declared an embargo on ammunition to the Nationalists. During the war we had armed and equipped 30 divisions, trained them, had American advisors for them, in order to fight the Japs. They were the best Chinese divisions. They were equipped with American arms, required American ammunition. General Marshall himself observed to

me, at the time we declared this embargo, that we had armed the Chinese and then we had disarmed them. These factors had a decisive effect on the situation during the critical years of 1946 and 1947.

The Chinese had some inept leadership. There was some corruption, it is true. Much has been said about the corruption. Who is free from corruption? Probably the Chinese are somewhat on a par with the Greeks. We decided to help Greece. We found that the help we gave them—materials, the financial help—was not sufficient. We had to send advisory help. In any country of this kind the most important help that we can send is men—men of experience, ability, force, integrity. Such advisors are able to place a premium upon performance, on efficiency, and on honesty, of the best Chinese or best Greeks, and at the same time to put a damper on nonperformance and dishonesty. The furnishing of advisory help is the one thing that we have not done at any time. We withheld help for China for a long time, but finally passed an act in 1948, providing military help which began to arrive in China in November, 1948, when the battle was practically over. But even that act had the string tied on it that there should be no advisory help—added to the House bill by the Senate at the State Department's behest.

Another thing I might mention is the frequently asserted "billions poured down the rathole to help the Chinese fight the Communists but it didn't do any good." Included in the claim of "billions" is UNRRA. UNRRA went to relieve the destitution left by the war, and also to feed the hundreds of thousands of refugees that moved ahead of the Communist advance, wherever it took place. I helped feed 300,000 in Tsingtao. When the Nationalists advanced there was no movement ahead of them. When the Communists advanced many were driven out and much of the UNRRA supplies had to go to feed them and to feed famine districts. Some of it actually went to feed the Communists. With my planes I dropped a million pounds in the Communist area, an operation arranged with the Nationalist permission. It was all taken by the Communist armies and did not any of it go to the destitute for whom it was intended. We know that. The State Department knows that.

Acually, what we have contributed to fight the Communists, is less, in my opinion, than the contributions made to fight the Communists in Greece. The white paper states that "We could not extend the same kind of help to China that we did to Greece because China was many times bigger"—therefore, though it was right for Greece, it was wrong for China.

I personally consider that effective help to China was never in conflict with what we did in Europe. It was complementary to it. If we put $10 billion to stop communism, which we have done, it's better to expend it both in Europe and in Asia, mostly, maybe, in Europe. Our efforts in Europe would have been reenforced and supported if we had wisely directed purposeful help to China.

So, the Communists moved on. They have taken over most of China. I'm convinced they could have been stopped in 1946 and 1947 if we had provided ammunition and advisory help. General Wedemeyer is convinced of that. Many, both in the military and outside of the military, have considered that if we had committed ourself to a definite objective, and supported it as we had in Greece, the fall of China to the Communists did not need to take place.

The Communists will probably take over practically all of China—mainland China. There will be a question about Formosa. Communism will probably move on to the borders of Burma and Indonesia. The letter of transmittal of the white paper ends up: "If the Communists should decide to undertake aggression against their neighbors, then we, ourselves and the other nations in the United Nations, will be confronted with a situation violative of the United Nations Charter." What that is intended to add up to, if anything, I don't know. It's not clear because there has already been Communist aggression against these neighboring countries. It got under way during the Japanese occupation. The United States, ending up the war, adopted the policy of favoring the termination in large degree of the colonial regimes that existed in Indochina, Indonesia, and so forth. That was a worthy objective. The question always arises, though: "Just how do you get from one place to another?" "What kind of and how long a transition period is needed?" Japanese authority directed only to the support of the Japanese war, replaced the French, the British, and the Dutch authority. When the Japanese authority was suddenly terminated a chaotic condition ensued in which the greatest danger was the Communist cells that had been built up during the war. It's always a question, How fast can a country move from a condition of complete dependence into complete independence? In the Philip-

pines we took a period of 1916 to 1946, 30 years, and I think that long a period of transition is needed under the conditions that existed.

Many people say that if a country is going to attain the liberty status, it must learn to walk, and even though it may fall, that's the only way it can learn to walk. When a child learns to walk, he falls now and then. We must expect that he will fall. But we don't have to let him get out in traffic by himself. So, I feel that when we want to do our best for the movement of these people, these populations of Indonesia and Indochina, into a free world that is going our way instead of the Communist way, we should not foster too rapid a transition period.

Now, to return briefly to Japan. Japan, a nation of 80 million people, must depend on an outside food supply of about 20 percent; that is, food for 16 million people. They must get it from somewhere, and the normal place to get it is from east Asia. Japan, on the other hand, must pay for that by industrial production and by services. They've got the know-how, they can produce and ship manufactured goods. They must get food. We cannot continue indefinitely to supply the food they need. If all the Chinese in Indonesia and Indochina join in with the Chinese Communists to establish a Communist regime throughout Far East Asia, then the pressure on Japan to enter the Communist orbit will be tremendous. It will be very difficult to resist it.

Many people say the Chinese have always absorbed or driven out aliens. That is true. They have. But they, those they absorbed or drove out, were of an inferior culture and it took time to absorb them. The absorption or expulsion required generations to complete, and the movement had to have a starting point. Those who are going to oppose communism need a rallying point. I consider that we still have to support the only rallying point possible; namely, the Nationalist Government. We must do it primarily with advisors. We should not send a dollar to China, or any material, without the guidance of American advisors. We never should send divisions of troops. That wouldn't work.

Now, I have one more observation to make. I was at Pearl Harbor, in command of the *Pennsylvania*. I was in drydock. All my propellers were off the ship. Two destroyers were in there with me. I was hit by bombs. The destroyers were hit. Both of them burned up. One of them blew up. The oil in the dock got on fire. Ships were rolling over and sinking and blowing up around me. A tremendous ordeal to you and the country, but more to us who were witnessing it. Pearl Harbor took about 2 hours. The commanders in chief could do nothing after it started other than what they did do. Suppose Pearl Harbor had taken 4 years, and that these commanders had done nothing—how much more culpable would they be? And I assure you that I consider the disaster that has overcome us in the Pacific during the past 4 years is far greater than Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was but the culminating climax of something that had been going on before, and was really a blessing in disguise because, if it had not brought us into the war at that time, we would have gotten into the war much later. Under much more adverse conditions we would not have won it. During the period before Pearl Harbor, to use a biblical expression, we were "looking into a glass darkly," and Pearl Harbor brought us "face to face." With what is going on now, the people must look at it, but not continue to look at it "darkly." We want to bring it "face to face" before a catastrophic explosion much greater than Pearl Harbor takes place at some future date.

I thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, these are put in the record to show that Admiral Cooke's views have been uniformly the same on the subject.

Mr. COOKE. The only thing I have record of that I can recall at the moment is that I was called on to represent the negative on Town Hall in December 1949 as to whether the United States should recognize Communist China.

Mr. MORRIS. Who also was on the negative?

Mr. COOKE. Senator Bridges.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was on the affirmative side?

Mr. COOKE. Mr. John Fairbank and Mr. Cobean.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you a copy of that transcript?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be made a part of the record?

Senator WATKINS. It will be made a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 351" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 351

[From Town Meeting, bulletin of America's Town Meeting of the Air, George V. Denny, Jr., moderator, December 6, 1949]

SHOULD WE RECOGNIZE THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT?

ANNOUNCER. America's Town Meeting of the Air is but one of the many activities presented by Town Hall as part of its nonpartisan, nonsectarian, educational program. In Town Hall's own five-story building, just off Times Square in the heart of Manhattan, you'll find a diversified series of events. The Town Hall morning lecture series, for example, continues to generate the kind of intellectual energy that has made it the outstanding program of its kind in the Nation. Our morning lectures are in their fifty-sixth season.

Busy New Yorkers also take advantage of the Town Hall short courses presented daily at 5:30 p. m. and during the evening hours. These courses offer a variety of subjects.

Town Hall, of course, is a world-famous center of music. Last season, 91 musicians made their debuts on the Town Hall stage—a stage which has been the setting for the initial performances of such celebrated artists as Nelson Eddy, Marian Anderson, Eugene List, James Melton, Dorothy Maynor, and others. We hope you'll pay a visit to Town Hall on your next trip to New York.

Now to preside over our discussion, here is your moderator, the president of Town Hall and founder of America's Town Meeting, George V. Denny, Jr. Mr. Denny. [Applause.]

Moderator DENNY. Good evening, neighbors. After last week's broadcast when we announced tonight's topic, a member of the audience asked me the question, "Why do you spend time discussing what government we should recognize in China when we have so many more important subjects here at home. What do we care about the kind of government they have so long as they let us alone?"

I reminded our friend that this was the kind of talk we heard about Germany, Italy, and Japan before the last war, and that there was no subject in the world more important than that of trying to prevent another war.

We're discussing tonight's question because we are beginning to realize that it does make a difference what kind of government a nation has if that government happens to be aggressively totalitarian. Our entire Marshall plan is based on that assumption, as were our activities in the last Italian elections and our aid to Greece and Turkey.

However, except for the case of Soviet Russia, from the period 1917 to 1933, and the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition of Japanese conquests, we have not used nonrecognition as an expression of disapproval of an established government.

We have hundreds of missionaries and extensive business interests in China. Do conditions under which the Chinese Communists have set up their regime justify our withholding recognition at this time or recognizing them?

Would the highest interests of this country and the peace of the world best be served by recognition or nonrecognition of the Communist Chinese government?

Also there is the question of timing. If we should recognize the Communist regime, should we do it now or later?

What we decide to do about this question has far-reaching implications, as China is said to have the largest population of any country in the world, and it's a fact that in the United Nations, China is one of the permanent members of the Security Council which may exercise the right of veto.

So whatever we do—withhold recognition or give recognition—it will have far-reaching effects of vital interest to the American people.

We're extremely fortunate in being able to bring you the counsel of four outstanding leaders who know China well—a United States Senator, an admiral who commanded our military forces in China from 1946 to 1948, an American businessman who has just returned from an 8-month trip around the world, and a professor of history at Harvard University, who's an outstanding authority on China.

We'll hear first from Mr. George C. Cobean, partner in the 117-year-old firm of Bulkley, Dunton Paper Co., New York; president of the foreign trading concern of Bulkley, Dunton Paper Co., which has markets in Latin America, Asia, and

South Africa. Mr. Cobean on his recent trip spent much of his time in the Far East, including China. Incidentally, the currency for the Chinese Nationalist Government was printed on paper manufactured by Mr. Cobean's company. Mr. George C. Cobean. [Applause.]

Mr. COBEAN. I contend that the United States should recognize the Chinese Communist government. It is now dominant and in control of virtually all of China.

I take this position because recognition does not mean or even imply our approval of that government. We have recognized many Latin-American governments which came into power by overthrowing the duly elected and constituted governments. In practically all such cases, our recognition has not carried with it our approval of the new government.

Any government recognizes a rebel or insurgent regime because it can then do more to protect its own citizens and their property located in the area. It is only after it has been recognized that such a government bears any responsibility under international law for any injury done to foreign citizens or to their property in the areas controlled by it.

The unrecognized Chinese Government was evidently relying on this point for immunity from liability when they held American Counsul Ward and his associates in jail at Mukden. Any damages or redress to the United States for any injuries to Ward would, under international law, be recoverable only from the recognized Nationalist China Government, because the United States has failed to recognize the de facto Chinese Communist government. Everyone knows that the former government was entirely powerless to extend any protection to Ward.

My primary interest in this matter is that of a foreign trader with a lifetime of experience in travel and commercial pursuits in foreign markets, principally engaged in the promotion and sale of American products. I hope I may be considered as speaking on behalf of the thousands of American citizens similarly engaged.

For more than a century extending back even prior to the romantic era of our clipper ships, the United States has enjoyed commercial relations with China, and there has been created during this period great prestige for American products, valuable business contacts and warm personal friendship for the Chinese citizens.

Is is unthinkable that this should be abandoned to our competitors—the Russians, British, or other Europeans. I believe this will definitely be the result if we refuse to recognize the Chinese Government now in control in that country. It is persistently rumored that Great Britain fully intends to do so very soon.

The importance of our commerce with China, the welfare and prosperity of the people in American communities and in many of our industries are not generally appreciated. The San Francisco Chronicle recently published an article in which the statement was made that formerly 50 percent of the foreign trade of that port was with China.

My knowledge of individual Chinese causes me to believe few of them will ever become sincere Communists. The Chinese is definitely an individualist primarily interested in the welfare of himself and family. It is inconceivable that he should ever submit to becoming a chattel of the state and embrace communistic ideology in his heart.

Certainly the most effective procedure for hindering and halting the diffusion of communism in China is not for the democratic powers of the world to isolate and ostracize the Chinese people by refraining from recognizing the only government now existing in their country but to grant such recognition as a means to the ends of maintaining and developing friendly relations with the Chinese people, the most intelligent, industrious, long-suffering, and patient people in all Asia.

Refusal to recognize this government would deprive us of contact with the Chinese, and this would create an ideal atmosphere for the spread of communism throughout China. Free contact with democratic nations is evidently not a healthy condition for the spread of communism. An appreciation of this fact by the Russians is demonstrated by their zeal in keeping the iron curtain shut down tight.

For the democratic nations to refuse to deal with the present Chinese Government would undoubtedly please the Cominform immensely, for then they would have the field to themselves, unmolested in their efforts to subjugate the intelligent Chinese people under the yoke of communism.

Coincident with our recognition, we should be able to negotiate a treaty with this new government whereby guaranties are given that our properties and the lives and freedom of our citizens in China shall be adequately protected.

We should be in the position of demanding definite quid pro quo guaranties to this effect. It would seem logical that a clear-cut and definite understanding could be reached at this time for the protection of our rights, rather than at some later date after our active and realistic competitors have largely displaced us in that great world market. Eventually, we will attempt to do this anyhow, but it may then be tragically too late. [Applause.]

Moderator DENNY. Thank you Mr. Cobean. Our second speaker has a long and distinguished naval career. In 1945, with the rank of admiral, he was appointed commander of the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, including naval forces operating along the China coast and in China. Incidentally, during that period, he transported some of the money made by Mr. Cobean's firm—Chinese money.

Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., United States Navy, Retired, who was in command of the United States Steamship *Pennsylvania* when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, attended all eight conferences of the Allied Heads of Government. In 1944, he was designated Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King.

Let's now hear from Admiral Charles M. Cooke, who is now a retired naval officer and naturally speaks for himself and not the United States Navy. Admiral Cooke. [Applause.]

Admiral COOKE. If we are really to save American interests and help the Chinese people, Mr. Cobean, we must review the past. In March 1917 the Russian people overthrew the rule of the Czars and established their freedom. Their freedom was short-lived. A militant Bolshevik minority led by Lenin and Stalin soon took over, mounting to rule of fear, hate, and treachery, a regime dedicated to world conquest and headed toward world slavery.

Hitler imitated and adopted Stalin's methods. He told the world what he was going to do. But with a mixture of fatuous complacency and fright, the democratic nations allowed Hitler to swallow up his democratic neighbors.

With Hitler's defeat, Stalin resumed his march, overthrowing the liberal majorities of satellite countries in Europe, executing their leaders, and shackling all liberty.

What good has recognition of these Communist regimes produced?

From the beginning, Chinese communism has been Moscow-controlled and directed. Proof is abundant. The Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tze-tung, states, "The Chinese Communist Party was born with the help of the Communist International. It grew up under the guidance of the Communist International, and the Chinese revolution developed under the guidance of the Communist International. To carry out the international line and to be loyal to the Communist International is to guarantee the success of the Chinese revolution."

Last July, Chu Teh, the Communist commander in chief, stated, "It can be easily seen that the victory of the Chinese people's democratic revolution is inseparable from the friendly aid of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union does not exist, if there is no victory under the leadership of the Soviet Union, if there is no such development of the world democratic peace front under the leadership of the Soviet Union, the rapid and quick victory of the Chinese revolution as it is today would have been impossible. Even if we were to succeed, it would be impossible to consolidate our gains."

Four hundred and fifty million freedom-loving Chinese are passing into bondage under Communist Party leaders. I, too, Mr. Cobean, am fond of the Chinese people. I cannot go along with certifying this bondage.

Abraham Lincoln declared that the United States could not continue half free and half slave—all should be free. For the Politburo, the world cannot be half free and half slave—it shall all be slave.

Recognition of Communist China would serve to confirm and hasten Communist world enslavement. Can it be doubted that recognition would spread dismay among the real liberals in southeast Asia and Japan, while strengthening the hands and plans of communism?

There are those who would have us continue in a state of indecision and inaction, while millions in Asia are forced behind the curtain. But we must remember that the United States is denounced as the No. 1 and ultimate enemy.

Are we then to wait for decision and action to be forced upon us, as was done for England at Dunkirk, and for us at Pearl Harbor?

Are we to linger on, waiting to be awakened by some future, much bloodier, much more disastrous Pearl Harbor? The ghosts of 100,000 dead soldiers and sailors rise up from the islands of the Pacific to shout "No."

They are speaking to you and me—to the American people. Not only are we free to lift our voices in protest; we're duty-bound to do so. Not only should we not recognize the Communist government in China, but, in line with our policy in Europe, we should declare support of those who oppose it. [Applause.]

Moderator DENNY. Thank you, Admiral Cooke. Our third speaker is Dr. John K. Fairbank, professor of history at Harvard University, who served as special assistant to the American Ambassador in China in 1942 and 1943, who was director of the United States Information Service in China in 1945 and 1946, and is the author of many books, among them The United States and China. We take pleasure in welcoming back to Town Hall Dr. John K. Fairbank. [Applause].

Dr. FAIRBANK. Admiral Cooke suggests that, in order to exert our leadership of the non-Communist world, we should lift our voices in protest and shout "No." He says we should declare support of those who oppose Chinese communism.

After the build-up you gave us in the first part of your speech, Admiral, this shouting "No," even if very loud, sounds like an anticlimax, another mere declaration of anticommunism from us. A refusal to recognize realities in China, while Great Britain, Australia, India, and other countries do so, might indeed spread dismay about our capacity for positive leadership.

Actually, I think recognition, sooner or later, will be a necessary first step toward a constructive, bipartisan China policy. It's the first step toward supporting our century-old interests in China—the American colleges, missionaries, hospitals, and business firms there.

When you say recognition will serve no useful purpose, Admiral Cooke, I wonder if you realize that there are over 1,000 American missionaries at their posts in Communist China right now tonight. A dozen Protestant Christian colleges, two Catholic colleges are open and at work educating about a tenth of China's college students.

These Americans are all going to be subject to increasing Communist pressure. They need our Government's support, which can only be given if we recognize.

Of course, we all know, as Admiral Cooke has pointed out, that the Chinese Communists are real Communists and admire Russia. They are committed to totalitarian communism and the police state, which we Americans can never approve.

But I'm afraid the Chinese situation is even worse than Admiral Cooke realizes. The Chinese Communists are not Russian puppets, but Russian ideological disciples. They have come to power mainly through their own efforts, with very little Russian aid. Thus far, they've been largely running their own show, and, incidentally, doing a better job for the Chinese people, thus far, than their predecessors, the Nationalists. It's not yet certain how far the Chinese Communists will accept Russian domination inside China.

Well, what should we do about this regime, which is both Chinese and Communist—stronger than a mere Russian puppet, and yet firmly in the Russian camp?

I think recognition is necessary to support our interests in China, as I have said. But there's a second very practical reason, too. We need official contact with any Communist government just to know what's going on within its curtain of censorship and exclusion.

We still recognize Soviet Russia. I doubt if even Senator Bridges wants to withdraw our Embassy from Moscow. We need it there to report on Russia, to negotiate. The same applies to China.

The opponents of recognition have a genuine concern about Russian Communist expansion which we all share, but, in fact, our nonrecognition of China will probably help Russia. We can assume that Russia wants the Chinese Communists to cut the Chinese people off from American contact. Why should we play Russia's game? Why create our own iron curtain? Nonrecognition by us would play into Russian hands.

Then there are some Americans, I'm afraid, who would like to play politics. There's an old Chinese custom: When the weather is bad, blame it on the Emperor in Peking. Some people want to blame the revolution in China on the Democrats in Washington. Since 1947, the China interest of Governor Dewey and others has seemed to a nonpolitician, like myself, to be unexpectedly sudden.

I'm sure Senator Bridges, however, favors a real bipartisan policy on China.

Finally, some Americans want to fight communist in Asia with arms. We

tried sending arms to Chiang Kai-shek. Today the Chinese Communists are using those arms against Chiang. Why? Because Chiang has lost popular support. His troops don't want to fight. Chiang still has plenty of American arms left on Formosa, but he lacks his Chinese support—not American arms.

For us to try to hold Formosa by force could only help the Communists unify all patriotic Chinese permanently against us. Intervention by us will not disillusion the Chinese people about communism. They must learn for themselves.

Meanwhile, recognition, whenever our Government can work it out, will help maintain our contact with the Chinese people. I should like to ask Senator Bridges how else would you propose to do it? [Applause.]

Moderator DENNY. Thank you, Dr. Fairbank. Well, the situation becomes more complex as we hear each new speaker. But stick by—we'll clear it all up at the end of this hour.

Our next speaker has always been deeply interested in China and our stake in Asia. He's a member of the Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, the distinguished Republican Senator from New Hampshire—the Honorable Styles Bridges. Senator Bridges. [Applause.]

Senator BRIDGES. The real question being discussed is "Should the United States of America recognize Moscow as the governing authority in China?" That's the issue. [Applause.]

My answer, and it should be sufficient for any thoughtful American—even some of those in the third grade, for example—is "No!" Whether they know what the word "no" means up at Harvard, where Professor Fairbank comes from, or not, I don't know. But I say "No!" And I criticize his attempt to criticize Admiral Cooke in that direction. [Applause.]

The struggle in China is not a civil war. It's a foreign aggression of the Soviet Union against China—a violation of Russia's solemn pledges, including Russia's oath to support the Charter of the United Nations.

This is the most treacherous invasion the world has ever seen. It is incited from Moscow, directed from Moscow, and officered from Moscow, and fought only in the front lines by the Chinese.

Now our own State Department, weak and unfriendly as it is to Nationalist China, acknowledges that this is Russia's war against China. Why, Professor Fairbank, even the Chinese Communists themselves admit that they belong to the Kremlin. They are united with Russia, not only in ideology but in any future war.

Wherever communism appears, even the hope of democracy disappears. Wherever Russia rules, the people are forced to surrender their freedom to a police state.

I firmly believe that Americans will insist on withholding even tacit approval of Moscow in China. But there are even greater, more urgent, more selfish reasons why the United States should continue to support and recognize the Nationalist Government of China. There's a deadly parallel between the aggressions of Soviet Russia in Europe and Asia today and the aggressions of Axis Germany and Hitler 10 years ago. Remember, we were the intended victims then. We are the potential victims now. Why, I'm amazed, Mr. Cobean, that you don't see this.

Ultimately, our democracy is in peril, our homes are in danger. With the Soviet Union in possession of the atom bomb, all our concepts of security must change. We must learn that we have no time to barter away like Chamberlain did with his umbrella diplomacy.

At this moment, Russia is under indictment before the United Nations for having violated its treaty with China and the Charter of the United Nations by trying to overthrow the Nationalist Government. We now recognize that overthrow as a fact—which it is not—and we whitewash the Soviet Government. We place in the Security Council Russia's puppet delegates from China, and remove from the United Nations those of Nationalist China which is prosecuting the charges against Russia.

In other words, we remove a friend and substitute an enemy. Why, even a moron in this country should be able to understand that.

The last time we were slow to recognize the aggressive pattern. This time let us be sure that what we do is large enough and soon enough to prevent world war III. Remember its seeds are already sprouting in the fertile fields in China.

Why does it make sense to spend billions of dollars in Europe on aid and on our foreign arms program for member nations of the Atlantic Pact?

What sense does it make to do that all in the name of containing Russia and at the same time ignoring Asia? I said Asia because the Soviet scheme does not stop with China. Remember this, if China falls, the other countries of Asia will

topple like bowling pins—Indochina, Burma, Malaya, India, and the next to go will be our islands in the far Pacific, which have become the outer rim of our defense.

We must draw the line now. We have nothing to gain by the appeasement and recognition of Red rule in China. [Applause.]

Moderator DENNY. Thank you, Senator Bridges. Now, gentlemen, will you join me up here around the microphone for a little discussion before we take the questions from the audience. Mr. Cobean, has anything provoked you to a question?

Mr. COBEAN. It has. Yes. I'd like to ask Senator Bridges, particularly, and also Admiral Cooke, if they're not failing to take a realistic view of the conditions in China. China has already fallen. China is in the hands of the Communist Party. We have a realistic condition there, and I maintain that if we fail to recognize the Communist government, we are abandoning the Chinese people and have no means of contacting them.

Senator BRIDGES. I think, Mr. Cobean, that's bunk—plain, undiluted bunk. They still have a Government in China. We still recognize that Government. They're still fighting on. [Laughter.] Remember, Mr. Cobean, that after—now, just a minute before some of you pro-Communists laugh out here [laughter]—that in World War II, and leading up to that, when France fell, when Belgium fell, when Holland fell, we didn't immediately recognize the Nazis.

No, what did we do?

We recognized the Government even when it was driven out of that country, when it was in exile.

Now I tell you today that we still have a Government in China fighting on, and I'm for anybody that is fighting the Communists and carrying on in this country. [Applause.]

Dr. FAIRBANK. Senator Bridges, I'd like to make peace with you. I'm not sure we have time right here now the way we're going, but I would like to raise one question. You say the government is fighting on. Why is it constantly retreating so fast that the Communists can't catch up with it? [Applause.]

Then another question comes to my mind. You have spoken very eloquently of how you dislike communism. I trust you will give Mr. Cobean and me the benefit of our assertions that we dislike it, also. [Applause.]

I trust you will note that we are devoting ourselves to the problem of how to deal with a Communist China, not merely to an eloquent description of its dangers to us.

So the question I would like to ask, Senator Bridges, is how do you propose specifically to support a thousand or more missionaries in China and all these other interests that we have there who are exposed to Chinese communism now and who need recognition to help them along?

Senator BRIDGES. When you talk about our missionaries in China and how we've got to recognize the Communist government of China in order to protect the missionaries, I think that you lose sight, Professor Fairbank, that when the Communists first come in they are tolerant, then they control, and then they subdue by any method within their power.

Now we have recognized and we do recognize Hungary, but what has happened to people like Cardinal Mindszenty and other people who are outstanding questions in a great country like Hungary? [Applause.]

I don't think that, if China comes under the complete domination of the Communists—which that section certainly will be, that is controlled today—we can hope for a great deal of their help in maintaining Christianity as we know it when the history and the records of the other Communist countries are such.

Mr. DENNY. Thank you. Dr. Fairbank?

Dr. FAIRBANK. To reply to that, Senator Bridges, on the one hand you want to fight the Communist menace in China. You described in great detail how your emotions are very combative toward it, which I am sure is the case with many of us. Now you want to fight it, you want to resist it. At the same time, you're willing to write off these thousands of American missionaries I have spoken of—write off all the other Americans who are in China in this exposed position, give them no support, give the whole game over to the Communists in China. Now how do you answer that? [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Admiral Cooke, do you want to take that on?

Admiral COOKE. No; I was going to ask a question after that.

Mr. DENNY. Let the Senator answer, then.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, the only difference between us—I don't want to give over China to the Communists.

Dr. FAIRBANK. Not at all.

Senator BRIDGES. Yes, you are; you're in favor of giving it over in order to protect the missionaries.

Dr. FAIRBANK. I'm sorry.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, we differ. I recognize that communism is an international conspiracy, and a Communist looks the same to me no matter where he comes from, and I recognize the pattern is the same in all these countries. I'm not going to be fooled by what is going on in China today. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. As I understand it, Dr. Fairbank, you think that the best interests of the missionaries and the American businessmen over there would be served by recognition, and Senator Bridges thinks that the best interests will not be served by recognition, is that right?

Dr. FAIRBANK. Yes: I'd like to say more on that in a moment.

Mr. DENNY. Well, let's get Admiral Cooke in on this discussion. We haven't heard from him yet.

Admiral COOKE. Well, I want to address this question to Dr. Fairbank—with regard to the realities of the situation. The white paper has been praised by Dr. Fairbank, and I guess he considers it pretty good. This is the recognition of the Secretary of State of the situation in his letter of transmittal of the white paper.

He says this " * * * the Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power—Russia—which, during the last 50 years, under czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to extend its control in the Far East."

Now the Japanese established a puppet regime in Manchukuo. The Japanese established a puppet regime in China itself. We did not recognize it. We went to war about it.

Now the Secretary of State says, in effect, that the Russians have established a puppet regime in China. Are we, then, to call on the people of the United States, who sacrificed everything to oppose the Japanese puppet state in China, to now recognize the Russian puppet state in China? [Applause.]

Dr. FAIRBANK. Admiral Cooke, may I say that I think the white paper that Mr. Acheson put out, which you can get for $3 from the Superintendent of Documents in Washington (1,000 pages), was a great vote of confidence in the democratic process in this country. Now on the question you've raised: The white paper says that the Chinese Communists are pro-Russian. Does it say that they are puppets? Have you perhaps expanded the idea?

Aren't we up against the situation where the Chinese Communists are definitely in the Russian camp and will play along with the Russians, and yet they have only just come into power in China, and the Chinese people who can be led by these Chinese Communists are still not communized, and we still have a foot in the door?

Now, of course, the example of Eastern Europe is extremely discouraging. In Eastern Europe, we haven't been able to prevent the completion of this communization process. In China, perhaps we have a chance, and we ought to take that chance. We've got to play for that chance. What else can we do?

Who wants to go there and fight? If we're going to fight, let's go fight the Russians. There's no use fighting in China. It's a mess you can bog down in. If you're going to attack this Chinese Communist regime, you've got to do it with nonmilitary means. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. All right, thank you. One more question. Yes, sir?

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Cobean says that we should sign a treaty with China in order that our rights might be protected. Now we have recognized Russia, and I just want to ask you, Mr. Cobean, how you think Russia respects our rights and whether we'd get the same kind of treatment from the puppets as we do from the mother country?

Mr. COBEAN. Senator, my opinion is that we would get a much fairer treatment from the Chinese people than we get from the Russian people. At least, we would be on a basis where we could talk to them, where we could exercise not only our arguments, but we can also put pressure on them, if we have recognized them. If we have not recognized them, we are isolating them; we are out of contact with them, and we have no means of approaching them. That's my contention. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. All right now, while we get ready for our question period, we have a special message for our listening audience.

ANNOUNCER. From historic Town Hall in New York City, the American Broadcasting Co. is presenting America's Town Meeting of the Air. Our subject

is, "Should we recognize the Chinese Communist government?" Our speakers include Dr. John K. Fairbank, professor of history at Harvard University; George G. Cobean, president of one of America's largest paper-manufacturing companies; Senator Styles Bridges, Republican, of New Hampshire, and Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., United States Navy, retired, who commanded military forces in China in 1946–48.

Tonight's program will be published in full in the Town Meeting Bulletin, and you may secure a copy by sending 10 cents to Town Hall, New York 18, N. Y., requesting the discussion on China. Please send 10 cents in coin, not stamps.

By the way, here's a suggestion for your Christmas list. Why not subscribe to the Town Meeting Bulletin for your friends? The subscription rate is $4.50 per year. If you will send your gift subscriptions directly to Mr. Denny, he will write a personal note to the person you designate saying that the Bulletin is coming as a Christmas gift from you. This applies only to gift subscriptions on a yearly basis—52 issues of the Town Meeting Bulletin for $4.50. Send your remittance and the name and address of the person you wish to receive the Bulletin directly to Mr. Denny, Town Hall, New York 18, N. Y.)

Our Town Hall audience is now ready with the questions, so for our question period, we return you to Mr. Denny.

QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. DENNY. We start with a question from the balcony, the gentleman upstairs.

MAN. Mr. Cobean, I have a question: How does life of the Chinese differ under the Communist government compared with under the Nationalist Government?

Mr. DENNY. How does life differ under the Communist regime than under the Nationalist?

Mr. COBEAN. Well, I could not answer that question because I have not been in China since the Communists have taken over. I was there this time last year when the Nationalist Government was still in charge. I couldn't answer that question.

Mr. DENNY. Thank you. Anybody care to answer that up here on the platform? If not, we'll take the next question.

MAN. I state my question to Senator Bridges. Do you think that this Chinese government, so recently born, will eventually become another Russian satellite?

Senator BRIDGES. I certainly do. Yes.

Mr. DENNY. Thank you. The lady over here.

LADY. Dr. Fairbank, how is Communist China different from the U. S. S. R., Spain, Argentina, Poland, Portugal, or Czechoslovakia in totalitarianism?

Mr. DENNY. Dr. Fairbank. How does it differ from all these countries in totalitarianism?

Dr. FAIRBANK. Well, it's different in being Chinese. Also, totalitarianism can be in many countries. Democracy in Britain is different from democracy in the United States, I suppose you would say. Totalitarianism in China is trying to get its feet on the ground. The Kuomintang was totalitarian behind a facade of democracy; the Communists behind a facade of democracy are also totalitarian. They're doing what they can.

Our need is to get in there to support our people. That's why I'm talking about recognition. I assume you're referring to that. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you. The gentleman in the balcony.

MAN. Admiral Cooke, as commander of the Asiatic Fleet, what do you believe would be the effect of recognition of the Chinese Communists on our strategic position in the Pacific?

Admiral COOKE. I consider that that's a very important question. We haven't touched upon it. Before the Russians moved out of Siberia they were in a vulnerable position in the Far East. When they took over Manchuria and China they were in a position to develop a self-sufficient agricultural, industrial, and military economy. Furthermore, they are in a position to provide submarine bases, not just out of Vladivostok and the Vladivostok region and, possibly added onto that, Dairen and Port Arthur, but all along the coast of China.

Now everybody knows that the best way to stop submarines is to stop them at the bases they are going to start from. You people here in New York who were short of fuel oil in 1942 and 1943 would not have been so short if the German submarines had been confined to the North Sea. Instead of that they expanded to Norway and to France, and it was impossible to stop them from going across the Atlantic. That's the position that we face in the Pacific. We have the strategic responsibility for the Pacific. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you, Admiral Cooke. The gentleman in the balcony.

MAN. My question is to Senator Bridges. I import from Communist China and pay dollars with which they buy oil, tools, etc. This is fine for me. Is it good for America?

Senator BRIDGES. No; it's not good for America. These dealings that we have take me back to the days of the scrap iron and steel, when we were sending them to Japan. [Applause.] Let me talk just a minute on that. Professor Fairbank said about some of the Republicans coming lately to this China policy. In 1937 I introduced a resolution to prohibit the shipment of scrap iron and steel to Japan [applause], and, if it had been adopted, thousands of American boys wouldn't have lost their lives when the Sixth Avenue elevated remnants of scrap iron came home to them in bombs and shrapnel at Pearl Harbor and in the other islands of the Pacific. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you. Dr. Fairbank has something on that.

Dr. FAIRBANK. May I just comment on that, Senator Bridges, if you had, in 1947 and 1948, voted against giving further military aid to Chiang Kai-shek, whom we all knew, if we knew anything, couldn't win his civil war because he was too incompetent—if you had voted against giving that extra military aid, the Chinese Communists today would not have the best-armed Chinese Army in Chinese history. [Applause.]

Senator BRIDGES. I not only voted for that, I helped sponsor it; I'm proud I did, I'd do it over again. The reference you made, "if anybody knew anything, they'd know that"—well, of course, we've got to excuse that as coming from Harvard. [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Admiral Cooke. Admiral Cooke has a comment.

Admiral COOKE. Let me say this, that we armed or started to arm 30 Chinese divisions to fight the Japanese. They fought the Japanese for 4 years without any help and 4 more years without very much help. In 1946, these arms that the United States had furnished these divisions to fight the Japanese were not allowed to have any ammunition. We declared an embargo on it. At that same time and on the reports of the Embassy in Moscow, the Russians were arming the Communists in Manchuria, not only with arms but with ammunition. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you. The lady here in the center. Yes?

LADY. Mr. Cobean. This is a woman's question. The wife of the British consul general in Shanghai is a friend of mine. I have not been able to get a letter from her in over a year. Her first letter to me came out with an American air-mail stamp on. It was smuggled out of Shanghai. Her instructions to me to write her are to send my letters to Government House in Hong Kong and it will be smuggled in to her.

Why, when the Communist government in Shanghai will not permit recognition of the British consul general in the consulate in Shanghai, why should we recognize the Reds when they won't recognize a stable government like that and permit them to have their mail go out?

Mr. COBEAN. This may not be an answer to your question, but I'll say that one means of securing interchange of mail would be recognition of the present Chinese government, so that it would then have stamps and be recognized as a member of the international postal union and mail could then come out. Today it cannot. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you. Admiral Zacharias has a question.

Admiral ZACHARIAS. Addressed to Admiral Cooke. Every one of our military leaders on shore has pointed out the futility of trying to get Chiang Kai-shek to go along with our ideas and do something for the Chinese people. Why should we sit on the sidelines of a desperate, hungry China with a bear at the door, when we've demonstrated the effectiveness of driving a wedge between Communist Yugoslavia and Moscow?

Admiral COOKE. Let me point out the sequence of events. In Europe, we gave help to Greece. There weren't as many guerrillas in Greece as there were Communists in China, but we gave help to Greece. We gave help to Italy. We had an Atlantic Pact and a Marshall plan. We demonstrated resolution; we demonstrated strength. It was after that that Tito decided he could successfully withstand Moscow.

Now if we demonstrate the same resolution in China and the Far East, I think possibly, at some future date, we may have some success there, but I don't think it's very probable.

Mr. DENNY. All right. Dr. Fairbank, do you want to comment?

Dr. FAIRBANK. Well, could I just ask Admiral Cooke what positive steps does he advocate? I asked that before but neither he nor Senator Bridges answered it.

Mr. DENNY. What positive steps do you advocate in this connection? I think the whole discussion centers around, is it possible that Communist China may turn out to be a Tito ally of Russia?

Admiral COOKE. I don't think, as I said, that's very probable. I think that we should demonstrate, assert, state our support of all those who oppose communism, as we did in Europe, showing that we mean business out there. I don't mean to send divisions out there, but take a positive stand. Then those in Communist China who are not Communists, or dissidents, will have a rallying point. I don't think we can convert the Mao Tze-tungs and the Chu Tehs. Not possibly. They are Moscow-trained Communists and they are disciples of the Cominform. But those who oppose it, those who want to go our way, who want to practice freedom, then they will have a rallying point. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you. All right, Dr. Fairbank.

Dr. FAIRBANK. That sounds, Admiral Cooke, as though you would like to have continued contact with the Chinese people.

Admiral COOKE. I think that everything we've experienced in Europe with the countries that we have recognized there proves that recognition is not going to bring contact with the Chinese people behind the curtain. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. All right, now. This question from the lady on the aisle.

LADY. Dr. Fairbank, do we not give more encouragement to the people of China to throw off the power of communism by not recognizing the Communist Chinese government?

Dr. FAIRBANK. No, I don't think so. I think we have to maintain contact with them as best we can. At present, we are in contact. I think we've got to keep that up as much as we can. Recognition, I think, will help.

Could I just add something? Mr. Bridges and I have been sort of throwing remarks at each other and I would like to say I'm not—I just work at Harvard University—I don't represent it. [Laughter and applause.]

Senator BRIDGES. I'm sure there's no real reference, Professor Fairbank, to Harvard University. It was just that the word "no," I thought, might be taught a little more frequently there. That's all—no personal element in it.

Mr. DENNY. All right. Why don't we toss this one around? Senator, will you and Mr. Fairbank come up here, because I'm confused. I'd like to have you all straighten us out on this.

Now, these people on my right over here, Dr. Fairbank and Mr. Cobean, maintain that recognition would mean contact with the Chinese people. You and Admiral Cooke seem to think that that would not. Will you just straighten us out on that? What is your opinion of this particular question, because that's what we're discussing tonight—the recognition of the Chinese Communist government. Will it give us the contact that we want, or will it not?

Senator BRIDGES. Well, my statement, Mr. Denny, is that there are two very concrete things it will give us. It will give us another veto to work beside Russia by adding the Communist vote to the Security Council of the United Nations. That's one great contribution it will make to the world, is to give that.

The second, it would provide the Communists in control of every diplomatic office of Communist China all over the world and give them an avenue for feeding out Communist propaganda and gathering information. Those are the two very tangible things that we would gain from the recognition of Communist China, which I don't want to see.

Mr. DENNY. All right, Dr. Fairbank. Yes, sir.

Dr. FAIRBANK. Those are, of course, two points to take into consideration. Now consider what they mean. A second veto is no more of a veto than a first veto. The Russians can veto any time they want to. [Applause.]

Second, take a look at this proposition of Chinese diplomats coming abroad. The chief trouble with the Chinese Communists in their minds now is that they don't know anything about us. They are befogged with all this Marxist propaganda and stuff that they have been taking in and putting out for all these years. A little contact with us in this country might open their minds, not to make them non-Communists by any means. I don't think there's hope of that. But it would give them more sense of reality.

Now, for example, what do Chinese Communists tell themselves today in their own propaganda? They say we're having a tremendous depression in this country. Why? Because Marxism says there must be a depression in this country.

They don't know the facts here; they don't have contact with us. If they had diplomats here, they might find out some of those things. [Applause.]

Senator BRIDGES. Dr. Fairbank, do you think that if they should be recognized that they'd tell the truth any more? Isn't it the record that in every Communist

country on the face of the globe that the thing that they do is to lie and spread misinformation and propaganda? Would you see a sudden change of face or front, if we recognized them? [Applause.]

Dr. FAIRBANK. No, I don't. I think they'd keep right on lying. My point is they'd lie a bit more realistically. [Laughter.] They'd know what the situation was, they wouldn't make mistakes based on misinformation in their own minds. These are the Communist leaders I'm talking about.

Mr. DENNY. Now, while our speakers prepare their summaries of tonight's discussion, here's a special message of interest to you, our listeners.

ANNOUNCER. Our four speakers will summarize their viewpoints in just a moment. Two weeks ago we asked you to suggest your favorite topics for future discussion on Town Meeting.

Our mail has been so heavy that it would be impossible to acknowledge each and every suggestion, but we do want you to know that we are most appreciative of your interest and we received many worth-while ideas. Mr. Denny and his associates thank you for taking the time to write.

We are always glad to have your comments on each program and we're anxious to know what subjects and speakers you like to hear on Town Meeting—your Town Meeting.

Your letters of comment after each discussion serve a useful purpose. All our mail is analyzed for listener reaction. It gives us an indication of what a representative cross section of the American public thinks about the particular topics and it helps us to plan future subjects. We look forward to hearing from you. Address your comments on tonight's program to Mr. Denny, in care of Town Hall, New York 18, N. Y.

Now for the summaries of tonight's question we return you to Mr. Denny.

Mr. DENNY. Our first summary comes from Senator Styles Bridges.

Senator BRIDGES. We've heard the proponents of Red China. They've misstated the facts, attempting to make it appear that the decision in China has been reached and that it is final. They have advanced not a single principle on which the United States might be guided in recognizing Red China. They have, however, mentioned convenience and expediency.

They want to commit the United States to recognize Red China for the benefit of a few hundred businessmen of selfish interests and missionaries trying the impossible to maintain Christianity in a Communist police state. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you, Senator Bridges, Dr. Fairbank.

Dr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Denny, I feel like saying just the opposite of everything that Mr. Bridges just said about me and Mr. Cobean. We're not proponents of Red China. We have heard Senator Bridges and Admiral Cooke say "No, no" about recognition, but we haven't heard them say "Yes, yes" about anything else. If they're against communism like the rest of us, what are they for, as a constructive policy? They haven't said. Of course, any soft-minded, overfriendly appeasement of Chinese Communists is useless. We know that. We must try to maintain contact with the Chinese people on a basis of hard bargaining with the new government. For this hard bargaining and continued contact, recognition is a necessary, practical first step. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you, Dr. Fairbank. Now Admiral Cooke.

Admiral COOKE. The record shows that a recognition of the Communist Chinese government will serve no useful purpose in our relations with China. It shows on the testimony of all concerned that the Communist regime is a Russian puppet regime. Its recognition would greatly strengthen the onward march of communism toward world conquest and would spread dismay among freedom-seeking people who depend on the United States for strength and leadership. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you, Admiral Cooke. Mr. Cobean.

Mr. COBEAN. In voicing their condemnation of communism, I assure our opponents that my colleague and I have no quarrel whatsoever. However, it is my humble opinion they have missed the point under debate and have failed to take a realistic view of the present Chinese situation. For reasons obviously beyond our control, the Communistic Chinese government has gained control of practically all of China and is the only government with which we can now deal for protection of the persons and property of American citizens in China. [Applause.]

Mr. DENNY. Thank you, Mr. Cobean, Admiral Cooke, Dr. Fairbank, and Senator Bridges. Well, my friends, you see that this is a very complex and complicated subject, and we have had both sides ably presented by our four speakers. This is one of the most vital questions before the American people today.

The State Department had announced through the press that this Department is deeply interested in knowing the views of the American people. We would like to present them with the views of Town Meeting listeners all over this country who have heard both sides, so we suggest that you sit down tonight and write a post card, a telegram, or a letter, and let us know what you think. Send these letters, telegrams, and post cards to Town Hall, New York 18, N. Y. That's all you have to remember, Town Hall, New York 18, N. Y. We'll tabulate the results, indicating from whence came your wires and telegrams and letters. We'll let you know what the results are if you send in your response before next Wednesday. We urge you to do it now, for we cannot count letters that reach us after Wednesday.

Next week we'll discuss another very debatable question. "Is our present policy toward Western Germany sound?" Our speakers will be Dr. James K. Pollock, professor of political science of the University of Michigan; Dr. Edward H. Litchfield, former Director of Civil Affairs in the American military government under Gen. Lucius Clay; Charles M. LaFollette, national director of Americans for Democratic Action; and Telford Taylor, attorney and Chief of the Council for War Crimes at Nuremburg.

So plan to be with us next week and every week at the sound of the crier's bell.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of your Town Hall discussion?

Mr. COOKE. I have the original booklet sent out by Town Hall, which is complete, and then I had made a copy of the excerpts of my own remarks. Probably you would rather have this.

Mr. MORRIS. Put the complete one in.

What were some of your reactions after returning to Formosa, after retirement from active service?

Mr. COOKE. My chief concern, as I think I testified to before, was to assist in any way I could to prevent the fall of Formosa and in connection therewith of course to prevent the recognition, forestalling any recognition of Communist China. But in addition I learned that many reports were coming here to the Government in Washington of the imminent fall of Formosa from internal action.

These reports became known to me as a retired naval officer, but when I got to Formosa later they were repeated to me by the members of the press practically the same as I knew from reading them.

I had not disclosed them to anybody because they had come to me in a sort of confidential way. However, I considered that they were incorrect. They were founded on incorrect information, based on my knowledge of the situation, on reports I had received from others.

So in order to satisfy myself and to guide my own actions, whatever I could take, I decided to go out to Formosa. When I got to Tokyo I talked to the people in the Seventh Fleet, and in General MacArthur's headquarters, and in the Seventh Fleet I got the same general kind of report, but they admitted none of their own intelligence people were in Formosa—and the same thing by the intelligence staff of General MacArthur.

So when I got on Formosa I found out that the reports were incorrect, and from what I could gather, founded on reports of various individuals that set forth certain points of view which may have been favorably received, the kind of view that they wanted to be expressed. Anyhow, they did not represent the situation.

There was not any prospective revolutionary action there that would overturn the Government, so far as I could discover, and I talked with people of various kinds. I got some reports along that line, but they apparently indicated the views of certain groups who either advocated independence of the Taiwanese or who may have had malicious reasons, being guided by Communist propaganda.

At that time I was representing International News Service, and I was sending back both features and news reports to refute intelligence reports that had come in. About December, before I went out there, all the Americans had been warned to leave Formosa because of the danger it was going to fall very shortly.

Then in May of 1950 another warning went out, which I will describe later as to what led up to it, warning all to leave Formosa, including myself, and all the women that were in the employ of the United States Government were directed to leave, either to proceed to Saigon in Indochina or to Korea.

Now these had come from reports which I knew were not correct. I was in a position to know it, and I did know it. Before that I had gone to Hainan when Hainan fell, and when I got back I got hold of our military and naval attachés and gave them the picture of what had happened there and they accepted it without attempting to refute it. It seemed to meet their views.

Then a month later it became evident there that if the Chinese did not evacuate the Chosen Archipelago, which they held in considerable strength off the Yangtze River, a very serious debacle would be likely to take place caused by the attack of the Communists, which would in all probability cause the loss of Formosa itself.

This was caused by the fact that the Russians working with the Communists had established airfields around Shanghai, brought in various kinds of planes, included jets, of which there was positive information. There were about 10 airfields in that area opposed to one Nationalist airfield in the Chosen Archipelago, and in some places the opposing islands held by the opposing forces were only a few thousand yards apart, a very dangerous situation.

The Nationalists had about 125,000 troops there. They decided to evacuate them before a debacle did take place and could take place, and they did it without anybody having knowledge of it beforehand. They did not lose any troops. They did not lose any equipment. And they retired this force, which about doubled the strength of the forces in Formosa itself.

Shortly after they got back the group there of United States military attachés and diplomatic representatives were presented information that a debacle had taken place there, that many troops had been lost, and much destruction, which was entirely incorrect. They also got a report and considered it accurate that the Nationalist forces had been withdrawn from the island of Kinmen, which was just off Amoy, where there were about 60,000 troops that had been withdrawn, and therefore Formosa would fall probably before the 15th of July.

This was supposed to be a secret meeting, but somebody got information of it, including some of the press representatives, and passed it on to me, and I asked the attachés to come around, and I would give them the picture.

I told them it was evident to me that they had a very bad source of information, maybe malicious, maybe just wrong, but anyhow certainly incorrect, that no debacle had taken place in Chosen and that Kinmen was not being evacuated. They did not choose to believe this, and they carried out the recommendation and warned Americans to leave there. They just said I was wrong.

So I wrote then myself a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations to tell them what had actually occurred. There again my view is that a situation was set up in which the very dangerous, critical condition that existed must have come to be believed by the Government here, and I don't say all of it wasn't honestly believed. I think they had very poor informants.

Now Kinmen has not been evacuated yet, much over a year later, never was evacuated, but they reported that such an evacuation had taken place. So that having all happened just about a month before Korea, there must have been in the minds of the United States Government a view of the situation there which in my mind, knowing as I did, was not true.

Mr. MORRIS. In this case you just cite the effect of that misinformation is to weaken the place, is it not?

Mr. COOKE. Very much. Of course, when you order evacuation of a place like Formosa, which is under threat of attack, it weakens the confidence of the people in the government, and it weakens the confidence of the people on the mainland who are resisting.

Now we can take parallel cases. For instance, Tassigny, the French commander who arrived in Indochina, immediately countermanded an order previously issued for all the foreign nationalists, including particularly the women, to be evacuated from Hanoi, this in order to strengthen the ones who were resisting communism. I was confronted with the same situation in Tsingtao when I was there. Several times there was urging for us to evacuate our people from Tsingtao, which I said will just weaken the Nationalist Government if we do it, and I don't think we have to do it now, I don't think a dangerous situation exists. Actually it didn't exist at that time, and we continued on for about a year and a half or so longer.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this misinformation uniformly of a certain bias?

Mr. COOKE. The misinformation that confronted me there, yes, but I should add, Senator, that sometimes that kind of information tends to be magnified by those who take counsel of their fears. You see a situation, imagine what the enemy can do, and they tend to magnify it in their own minds as to what can take place.

We have seen that happen in Tsingtao and also down there in Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, do you know anything of the guerrilla forces that are operating on the mainland of China?

Mr. COOKE. Yes; I have quite a bit of information. The guerrillas there are both what you might call semiorganized and some that are more distant that there is not much contact with. The actual number it is impossible to say exactly. I would say there are between 500,000 and 1,000,000 with whom there is a certain amount of contact and quite a number otherwise.

Now there is a certain amount of inflow and outflow in the guerrillas. Some guerrillas are better than others. A great many of them are just determinedly against communism. They are having difficulty now because of the very drastic countermeasures that were set up about February or March of this year following the Chinese Communist attack on Korea.

The Communists have set up militia and quite a number of regular troops to suppress the guerrilla movement. Right now the execu-

tions are mounting up in the hundreds of thousands, even by the reports of the Communists themselves.

They have two very important reasons. One is that anybody that is possibly a sympathizer, who may oppose the Communist ideology, who may help the guerrillas, is included in a group, and so in order to be sure to get rid of those who might be dangerous they will execute maybe 10 times that number, a much larger number, in order to get anybody that could possibly oppose communism.

Another reason for the method of doing it has to do with possible future enemies. In other words, they will take a man whom they want to execute or a hundred men they want to execute, varying numbers, and they will bring them before a people's court, and they will get them all steamed up and ask them whether this man or this bunch of men should be executed, and they all yell, of course, to kill him, execute him right away. They, the people, don't dare to do otherwise.

Then when they have done that, these people that have executed them are less likely to defect over to the Nationalist side because they have already helped in the execution of some Nationalists or Nationalist sympathizers.

So that this suppression that is going on now and has been going on for quite a number of months is having quite an effect.

Now there are more people turning against communism all the time. The Communists are destroying their family life and everything like that on the one hand. On the other hand, the starvation, the fear of death, holds the people in line.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask you how you know these things?

Mr. COOKE. I have gotten them from various sources. I can't reveal the sources, but they are fairly authoritative.

Senator WATKINS. You regard them as being authentic?

Mr. COOKE. That is right. This has been coming to me over a long period of time.

Mr. MORRIS. You learned these things on Formosa?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, and a great deal of it is confirmed by the Communists. The number of executions and the use of people's courts are all confirmed by the Communists. I have known about them before, but there have been many times they have been publicized deliberately.

Another thing they do, they don't want the farmers or Chinese populace to give food to the guerrillas, so they put the food in depots and to each family they will issue enough food for maybe 2 or 3 days. Of course they can always withhold it.

These methods are rather effective, all right. They are very hard. But that is going on.

Now the guerrillas, particularly in the eastern provinces, have to divide into rather small groups in order to protect themselves. In the western provinces they are in larger groups. You probably read recently where there was a group that moved up from Burma and took part of Yunnan. That was a large group. Whether it will be successful there is a doubt, but anyhow that is all going on.

Now if there is a cease-fire and the number of Communist troops can be augmented, the number that are suppressing guerrillas, then the suppression will become very much more effective and much more severe.

Senator WATKINS. Do you mean that the cease-fire in Korea will release a lot of Chinese troops?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, do you know whether or not the Chinese forces are now conducting raids on the mainland?

Mr. COOKE. I am practically positive that they are not. That is contrary to the arrangement that was made when the Seventh Fleet was put in the picture shortly after the beginning of the Korean war. There are raids that take place from islands occupied by guerrillas on to the mainland, by guerrillas. So far as I know, and I am fairly positive that it is correct, there are no raids by the Nationalist forces.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is that?

Mr. COOKE. Well, that is included in the arrangement of putting the Seventh Fleet into the picture of neutralizing China. It is also precluded now by the equipment that is going out there, or is intended to go out there, for the official group, for being used for any purpose other than the direct defense of Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. And to conduct such offensive operations is not considered a part of the defense of Formosa?

Mr. COOKE. Defense, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Such offensive operations are not considered a part of the defense of Formosa?

Mr. COOKE. That is right. Now, the Nationalists occupy three islands. Well, they are all fairly strategic, Kinmen Island, off the harbor of Amoy, which is right opposite Formosa, which prevents the build-up of an invasion force in that port.

Then they also occupy an island off Foochow and one off further north of Wenchow.

Now those islands have been occupied by them right along, and when Formosa was neutralized, the neutralization was extended to include the Pescadores. But so far as I know nothing special was done regarding these outlying bastions which are, of course, part of the defense of Formosa.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Admiral Cooke, are any Chinese troops sent into Korea at all?

Mr. COOKE. No, no troops going to Korea.

Senator WATKINS. You mean Nationalist, do you not?

Mr. COOKE. Nationalist troops, yes. Nationalist troops, you mean?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. COOKE. No, none have gone.

Mr. MORRIS. Have the Chinese volunteered to send any to Korea?

Mr. COOKE. Yes. Of course, that is a matter of public knowledge, and they offered to send them there a few days after the war broke out.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Well, I am asking you, Admiral Cooke, if you have any special knowledge since then.

Mr. COOKE. Except this: That they had it under immediate consideration as soon as the news of the invasion of Korea took place. The actual offer was made that week, I think a few days later, and after the Seventh Fleet was put in the picture.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Cooke, do you think that Chinese forces should be sent to Korea?

Mr. COOKE. Very much so, for a number of reasons. Would you like for me to——

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I would like you to recite them, Admiral.

Mr. COOKE. Well, the first is that I consider that China is a proper member and a faithful member of the United Nations, and should support the opposition to aggression in Korea, which was a continuance of the Russian aggression in China itself.

Secondly, I felt that it would very much improve the efficiency of the Chinese troops.

In other words, I feel, and I suppose most of us do, that the efficiency of our own divisions will be doubled or certainly very much increased by the war experience. Of the Chinese Army, there were the three divisions which were offered to be sent up there, and had they been up there during this time, or had any experience up there, it would improve very materially their capability of defending Formosa itself.

In other words, we are now spending money to improve the defense of Formosa. We would probably double the effectiveness of their defending army if we had had some Chinese troops, say of the strength of an army, about 30,000 men—in Korea during this period.

There was another thing that bore on the subject. When the question was being considered of offering troops to go there, there was doubt expressed among Chinese and, I suppose, among the people here—I was in Formosa at the time—that it might bring the Chinese Communists into the Korean war. It was my view—to those Chinese I talked to, and I stated it—that I didn't think it would have any effect on it whatsoever.

If the Chinese Communists were going in—they were moving troops up there anyhow at that time—it would take place regardless of what the Nationalist troops did.

Well, the offer was made; and, of course, it was not accepted. One other aspect that developed after the Chinese Communists did come into the war, in late November, was that this would be the means to encourage disaffections from the Chinese Communists back to the Nationalist side, because some of them had previously been Nationalist troops, among other things.

Mr. MORRIS. It would be a greater inducement to surrender to a Chinese troop than an American?

Mr. COOKE. That is a matter of speculation, but it is a view that was shared by most people.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, have you any questions?

Senator WATKINS. I am wondering if there is any reason why he cannot tell us what the present situation is in Formosa with respect to these Nationalist troops.

Mr. COOKE. Well, that question was asked, in part, this morning.

Senator WATKINS. It is regretted that I could not stay all morning.

Mr. COOKE. Well, in part, I felt that I probably shouldn't answer that. The United States is sending equipment out there to reinforce the strength, and just what equipment they are sending and how strong it is, I thought, maybe, was a confidential matter of security, and I should not touch upon it.

Senator WATKINS. I would not insist upon it.

Mr. COOKE. But I would go on to say this: That the troops have very fine spirit. There is no question about that in my mind; they are good fighters. Their equipment, of course, has got to be reinforced.

The British, for instance, left the mainland at Dunkirk and didn't take much equipment with them. The Chinese, coming over to For-

mosa, did take more with them, but still they didn't have enough anyhow, and they didn't get it all over there, and so they are deficient. Their organization and training can be improved. It is improving, but it needs more improvement. Our people are engaged in doing that, as some of my group were beforehand.

Senator WATKINS. Is it not, as a matter of fact, the largest group of anti-Communist forces in Asia?

Mr. COOKE. I think so.

Senator WATKINS. That is from outside of the United Nations?

Mr. COOKE. Yes; definitely.

Senator WATKINS. The regular troops.

Mr. COOKE. Yes; a very large group. The fighting spirit of the men is very good. The caliber of the leadership, in which they have been deficient in the past, is improving, and so they have a very fine force, a very fine body of men, I think, which, with certain amount of war experiences, such as in Korea, or maybe reactivation on the mainland, would come up to a very high style. It will not be the same as an American division; no, but they will be as good as the Communist divisions.

Senator WATKINS. Do you believe that we should have an American Ambassador to the Nationalist Government in Formosa?

Mr. COOKE. I believe that very much would improve our United States position, and the position of the free world, and the Chinese very much. Now, the American Ambassador to China was Mr. Leighton Stuart. He came back here when the mainland fell, and whether or not he is still Ambassador technically I don't know. Of course, I have been away, and I don't get all the news. I think there should be an active Ambassador out there.

China is a present member of the Security Council of the United Nations, and as long as it continues in that, and we wish to support it, it would have a tremendous moral effect on the people in Formosa and on the mainland if we had an Ambassador there.

Now, our representative there is a Minister, Mr. Rankin, and a very good man. This is no reflection on him. But there should be somebody there with the rank of Ambassador.

Senator WATKINS. What about the natives in Formosa; are they more or less loyal now or in support of the Nationalists?

Mr. COOKE. I would say almost completely very loyal.

Senator WATKINS. There is not any counterrevolutionary movement?

Mr. COOKE. No. Up in the mountains there are around 170,000 or 200,000 aborigines who used to cause the Japanese quite a bit of trouble. Even they are very loyal to the Government; and the Taiwanese—I have testified to that this morning—are now occupying positions in the Provincial government and in the city government. That is something that they never did before. They are quite loyal.

Now, there are some groups who left Formosa, and a certain small cell of them, you might say, in Japan, who still advocate independence of Formosa. But I don't think that represents very much of a section of the population.

Senator WATKINS. How are the people getting along with their economic situation?

Mr. COOKE. Well, they are doing very well, considering. However, with an island that is only 14,000 square miles, say one-twelfth of the

size of California, supporting troops which we can put in rough numbers at one-half million, and a national government, the pressure on the economy is terrific. The United States has been giving them help with ECA, which has been very well conducted and it has been very important to their continuance.

The help of the ECA has increased very much during the last year. Before that it was not very great because of the reports that Formosa was going to fall all the time; because of them, there was nothing in any capital or replacement assistance which was extended. Some of that is now being done. So that we are supporting the economic situation in Formosa—that is, the United States—and it is very important that we do at least as much as we do, and perhaps a little more.

Senator WATKINS. What is the food situation with respect to native production?

Mr. COOKE. The rice production is very good. They produced last year and this year about 1,500,000 tons of rice, which gives them some to export, and the sustenance as regards rice of the troops and the populace is very good.

You see no beggars in Formosa. But, for meats and fish and things of that kind, it is not too good—a little bit under, particularly for the troops. They could take a little bit better nourishment than they are getting. The populace in general are well fed.

Senator WATKINS. How does the Generalissimo stand with the people there?

Mr. COOKE. The Generalissimo stands very high with the people. He is the only man that can tie the thing together as far as I heard anybody ever try to point out. There are certain of the people that work for him who are not too highly regarded; but, on the whole, he has the best assistants that they have had during my experience. It could be better, but the Chinese culture is not one which develops leaders like we develop them; so, there are not too many to call that are really efficient.

I think it could be improved somewhat. It has been improved somewhat already, but they need guidance and help from us. They are getting some and probably need some more.

Senator WATKINS. Do you think that a change in the leadership would help some over there?

Mr. COOKE. There could be no change, so far as I know, in the top-side leadership.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I am referring to, the top-side.

Mr. COOKE. I don't think so. The Generalissimo is a very able man, in my opinion. He is not what you would call a modern Chinese. Some of them are extremely modern and westernized. He is one that can tie the people who are coming along a little bit more slowly to the people who are going along a little bit faster. It would be better, I think, if he were a little more westernized, but he is an able man and the only one who can take the job now.

Senator WATKINS. You are acquainted with him personally?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. How long has it been since you left Formosa?

Mr. COOKE. I left there Tuesday.

Senator WATKINS. You were there for a rather extended stay this last time?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have an opportunity to freely observe and make investigations as to what was going on?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Were you hampered in any way at all?

Mr. COOKE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Is your testimony today, Admiral Cooke, based on your recent 20 months' tour in Formosa and your previous experience in the United States Navy as chief of staff to Admiral Ernest King and head of the China fleet?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I have just one more question, Admiral Cooke. At the present time are the Formosans being armed?

Mr. COOKE. Being armed?

Mr. MORRIS. Are they being armed?

Mr. COOKE. They recruited about 3,000 in January 1950 for training. They had planned to recruit more. They could do it, but their economy is such that, at the present time at least, it is difficult for them to support a larger armed force than they are now supporting. They could get more troops so far as the Formosans are concerned.

Senator WATKINS. If the United States fleet were not there to exercise coercion upon the Formosans and upon the Nationalists, is there any probability that they would be attacking the mainland with raids?

Mr. COOKE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. They are equipped so that they could do that?

Mr. COOKE. Not much more than raids. Nothing much more than raids. A major attack would require quite a bit of assistance.

Senator WATKINS. In the way of equipment and shipping, I suppose, to get them to the place for the attack?

Mr. COOKE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Would raids aid the guerrilla morale?

Mr. COOKE. Yes, very much.

Senator WATKINS. What seems to be the opinion of the people there with respect to our order neutralizing Formosa and the Chinese forces?

Mr. COOKE. Well, I don't think they like that. They have accepted that.

Senator WATKINS. Pretty much because they had to, I suppose.

Mr. COOKE. Well, added to that, yes. I think it acts as, you might say, a wet blanket on the spirit. If you have an armed force in existence for a long time, and your relatives, mothers, and fathers, and all, are being slaughtered on the mainland and you can't do anything about it, you get depressed.

Now, they counteract that as well as they can, but you run into few mainland Chinese, which may be a million there, who have not relatives that have been executed on the mainland. You run across very few I know. Of course, the extent of my control is limited, but people I know all have. They all have friends and everything like that.

So, a lot of them are just burning with the desire to return to the mainland, to liberate their fellow countrymen. But as time goes on, if they get too much of a hopeless feeling, then that tends to die down; it gets quenched somewhat.

Senator WATKINS. Should our policy change in Korea with respect to the use of the Chinese forces? Would there be a formidable force

there, without revealing any secrets, ready to go into Korea on very short notice?

Mr. COOKE. They would have to be equipped just like some of the other contingents have been equipped. They wouldn't be equipped to do it.

Senator WATKINS. I understand we are now sending them equipment and help.

Mr. COOKE. Well, it is not arriving there very fast.

Senator WATKINS. What do you mean by "fast"? That is an indefinite term.

Mr. COOKE. Well, we have other places to send it, you know, to Europe. We are spending a lot of money on rearming Europe; we send it to Korea, and we send it to Indochina. So it is not inconsistent with the policy that exists to keep that on a not too high priority. If we are attacking north in Korea and south, somewhat, in Indochina—I am talking about the free world now, including the United Nations—and we use what we put into Formosa to push in the center, then it would immediately call for higher priority in my opinion. If it is just going to be utilized on Formosa, maybe then it will not need such high priority.

You see, that is the picture. Now, I couldn't know the priorities.

Senator WATKINS. You do not know the priorities, but you do know from what you have seen just how it is working out.

Mr. COOKE. Coming slow.

Senator WATKINS. Is it coming in enough quantity that, within a reasonable time, these forces could be prepared for action?

Mr. COOKE. I can't say that. I am not enough on the inside of that and, further, if I did know much, probably I would have to consider it confidential. Just what their plans are there now—and it is handled by an official group—and when it will get there, I don't know. And I don't know that they even know.

Senator WATKINS. I say with all the experience that you have had you would be in a position to say whether or not it would be to our advantage to have them armed and to use them as soon as possible.

Mr. COOKE. Well, in conjunction with what I would consider to be a correct objective, yes.

Senator WATKINS. What do you say to be a correct objective?

Mr. COOKE. I think they ought to be free to attack on the mainland.

Senator WATKINS. That would be even better than sending them into Korea itself?

Mr. COOKE. Well, I would send them immediately into Korea so they could get war experience in conjunction with our troops, and they would come up. I would do both if our forces in Korea need them. Of focurse, it would take them a few months to get up to the standard of the troops over there. But I would do both.

Senator WATKINS. I have been under the impression that the United States, as its national policy now, has been rather pushing the equipment and arming and the training of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa since, at least, last year. I wonder whether that is a correct position.

Mr. COOKE. I wouldn't say that that is necessarily not the policy. Let me say this: I was the chief strategic adviser for the Navy dur-

ing the war, and there are different views that prevailed as to how to distribute our armed strength. We immediately declared the Atlantic and European theater the primary theater, and Germany the main enemy.

Now that was interpreted by different people in different ways. The British interpreted it that everything we got had to come over that way, "Don't do anything in the Pacific, just let it be where it is."

The United States Navy, in particular, did not agree with that. We said there was a war going on in the Pacific, too. So you ran into the question of absolute priorities or adjusted priorities. In other words, under the consideration of the absolute priority, the fellow who stands one, he gets everything, and the other fellow gets nothing.

Adjusted, you realize that there is a fire going on around the world, and you may send the majority to Europe, but you send something the other way.

Now when you come to sending arms to Formosa, Korea, and Indochina, and some even to Siam and to the various places in Europe, Greece, Turkey, you undoubtedly run into interpretation of implementation of the thing, such as "How do you do it?" Just how that is being done, I wouldn't know. I know how I would do it. I would get it going to Formosa.

Senator WATKINS. You would probably say that it would be cheaper for the United States to train those Nationalists, apply them over there where they are, than to train the boys over here who are brought in with the draft, and then sent over there to fight.

Mr. COOKE. The Chinese want to do their own fighting as far as the ground troops are concerned.

Senator WATKINS. Up to the present time we do not let them?

Mr. COOKE. And they feel that they have enough bodies to do the thing, and they want technical help and material help.

Senator WATKINS. I would say to you that only within the last 2 or 3 days the people of my State are protesting very vigorously over the taking of men who are trained in the National Guard in artillery and making infantry of them overnight. That is the thing that is going on at the present time, and then they are sending them to Korea. Some of them have been killed within 4 or 5 days after transferring them from the artillery to the infantry over there.

The American people are becoming very much concerned, I think, over the policy we have of letting those people stay idle nearby, and who have very personal and national interests for fighting the fight, and in sending our own over there in that condition.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show that Admiral Cooke has come a long way to testify here today.

Senator WATKINS. Did he come directly from Formosa?

Mr. MORRIS. From Formosa; yes, sir. Much of this testimony this afternoon is purely for background purposes, and we are taking it into the record so that it may be integrated in later phases of our investigation.

Senator WATKINS. I realize that. Of course, he has testified on nothing, since I have been here, with relation to the Institute of Pacific Relations, but this committee has a broad field to work, the Internal Security Subcommittee, and the questions that I have been asking

now, and which counsel have been asking this afternoon, with respect to the actual situation over there, are very helpful to the committee and should be to the Congress and to the American people.

We do not often have a man with a background that you have, and a man who has been there recently and in a position to know who comes in and tells us what we believe to be the truth about that, and expressing an independent judgment.

We thank you very much for coming, Admiral, and we greatly appreciate your sacrifice.

Mr. COOKE. I am glad to do it. Anything that I can do for the national defense, that is my job.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., Friday, October 19, 1951, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX

TRANSCRIPT OF ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA HELD IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OCTOBER 6, 7, AND 8, 1949

List of Participants in Round-Table Discussion on American Policy Toward China

Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institution
Bernard Brodie, Yale University
Claude A. Buss, Army War College
Kenneth Colegrove, Northwestern University
Arthur G. Coons, Occidental College
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council
John K. Fairbank, Harvard University
William R. Herod, International General Electric Co.
Arthur N. Holcombe, Harvard University
Benjamin H. Kizer, lawyer, formerly director, China office, UNRRA
Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins University
Ernest R. MacNaughton, First National Bank of Portland, Oreg.
George C. Marshall, American Red Cross
J. Morden Murphy, banker
Nathaniel Peffer, Columbia University
Harold S. Quigley, University of Minnesota
Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University
William S. Robertson, American & Foreign Power Co.
John D. Rockefeller III, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations
Eugene Staley, World Affairs Council of Northern California
Harold Stassen, University of Pennsylvania
Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago
George E. Taylor, University of Washington
Harold M. Vinacke, University of Cincinnati

Problems of United States Policy in China[1]

1. To what extent should American foreign policy in the Far East be directed toward saving China from a totalitarian regime and being used as an instrument of international Communist aggression; or to what extent should American efforts assume Russian domination of China and therefore be directed primarily toward preventing the speed of Communist domination over other countries in the Far East?

2. In view of the shortcomings of the National Government and its defeats at the hands of the Communist forces, what should be the United States policy regarding further assistance to the Nationalist regime?

3. Are there any other healthy forces of resistance in China capable of exercising effective leadership and to which United States support should be given?

4. If so, what form should such assistance take and how could it be made available?

5. If the Chinese Communists unite all of China under their aegis, what should be the United States policy toward recognition, including representation in the U. N., and toward trade relations?

6. Should the United States take steps to prevent the Communists from seizing Taiwan (Formosa)?

7. What should be the attitude of the United States toward the status of Hong Kong?

[1] Suggested questions for discussion at round table, Department of State, October 6, 7, 8, 1949.

8. If the Soviets recognize a separate political regime in Manchuria, what should be the policy of the United States regarding that situation?

9. Assuming Communist control of China, to what extent would the government be dependent on outside trade and financial relations for the internal development of the country?

10. Can it be anticipated that the United States would be able to influence Chinese Government policies through economic and financial measures?

11. Assuming the conquest of China by the Communists, what are the presumptions as to the relations between the U. S. S. R. and China? Can it be anticipated that Titoism will develop in Communist China?

12. Under the most favorable circumstances for those in control of China, how significant a military potential could that country develop in the next 5 years? The next 10 years? The next 20 years?

13. If China falls under Soviet-dominated communism, how will that affect the free government of southern Korea and the prospect for the attainment of Korean unity?

14. If China remains Communist, under Soviet domination or otherwise, what repercussions may be anticipated on Japan?

15. How will they affect the economic relations between China and Japan?

16. How should these repercussions affect our occupation policy in Japan?

17. How should they affect our policy regarding the conclusion of a peace treaty affecting Japan?

18. How should they affect our economic policies toward Japan?

19. Can Japan be safeguarded as a barrier against Soviet communism?

20. If the Communists consolidate their control over China, should it be assumed that they will continue their push into neighboring countries in southeast Asia—that is, Indochina, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, India, Indonesia?

21. To what extent are these neighboring countries in a position to resist Communist pressures?

22. To what extent is the upheaval in China and elsewhere in the Far East a predominantly political movement, and to what extent is it the expression of deep-rooted forces arising out of social and economic conditions?

23. To what extent can the menace of political upheaval threatened by the Communist movement in that area be met by military action and to what extent must it be met by measures of economic and social improvement?

24. What steps should be taken to improve the economic and social conditions of the Asiatic peoples? How could the point 4 program apply to that area?

25. What should be the policy of the United States toward the conclusion of a Pacific Pact for mutual security?

26. How should Communist developments in China affect our policy regarding naval bases in the Philippines, Singapore, and elsewhere?

27. What role should India play in the crisis arising out of developments in China and the Far East?

28. What role should Australia and New Zealand play in the struggle against disruptive economic and political forces in China and the Far East?

29. What informational policies with regard to the peoples of China and the Far East would be most appropriate with a view to strengthening the forces alined against Soviet communism and economic and political disintegration?

30. What is likely to be the impact of each of the various possible courses of United States action toward China upon the majority of thinking Chinese?

Transcript of Proceedings

(October 6, 1949)

(The meeting was opened at 9:05 a. m., Mr. Fosdick presiding as chairman.)

Mr. Francis Russell. Gentlemen, if I may I should like to open the meeting with a few housekeeping remarks before we get down to the main purpose of the sessions. The main purpose of this meeting is to bring around this table the expression of as many helpful, valuable points of view with respect to the general subject under discussion during the sessions today and the next 2 days as possible. There will be no effort to arrive at a set of resolutions or recommendations or even a consensus of views, or even to try to persuade anyone of anything. It will be simply to lay on the table and make available to the policy officers here in the Department that are charged with the responsibility of formulating the Department's views with respect to our policies toward China

the thinking of you gentlemen, who have given this subject a considerable amount of your attention.

In order to make the meetings of as much value as possible there will be a stenographic record kept of what is said. That, however, will not be made available to people outside of the Department, and the present thinking is that it will not even be made available to those who are here around the table. It is for the benefit of those in the Government who will be working on the problem, but in order to make that as valuable as possible I would suggest that anyone when he speaks, no matter if it is the fifteenth or twentith time, just mention his name at the very beginning so that it will appear from the record who it was that said what, so that in making any remarks, just say, "Jones" and then go on and make the remark.

No report has been made to the press of this meeting. Undoubtedly some members of the press will hear about it. All that the State Department is saying is that this is in the regular course of business of the Department, that the Department does this from time to time, people have gathered here to discuss the problem of China, and that will be all. If you are approached by the press, I suggest that you make some statement of a similar nature. The press will be told that anything that has been said up here is wholly confidential and is between the participants and the State Department.

As you have been informed, I think, in letters that you have received, there is a room available for your purposes. You can have telephone calls received there if you wish and there will be stenographers there to take any letters that you may want to get out during the time that you are here.

With respect to lunch, arrangements have been made in the executive dining room on the second floor. It is a cafeteria, you grab a platter, go through the line. We will try to have some tables reserved. Or if you want to go to some other part of the town, there will be taxies at the front of the building.

With respect to transportation requests and reimbursement for that, I have been asked to urge that you take care of that either today or tomorrow in room 725–A. It will not be possible to take care of it on Saturday. You are also asked to fill out registration cards in that room and a salary waiver, which you will find at your places here. Your connection with the salary, I am sure, is so intangible that what you are waiving won't be anything of great substance.

Mr. Jessup, who has been asked by the Secretary to be in charge of this general effort, is in New York and is attending a meeting of the General Assembly on the Italian Colonies this morning. He will be here this afternoon and will be here on Friday and Saturday. Until he arrives, Mr. Raymond Fosdick, who is working with Mr. Jessup, also with Mr. Everett Case, will be in charge of the meeting, which I will turn over at this point to Mr. Fosdick.

Mr. STASSEN. May I raise a question first? It would seem to me if you are taking a stenographic record that we ought to have a copy of our own remarks at least, even though we do not have a transcript of the whole proceedings.

Mr. RUSSELL. All right, sir; we would be glad to do that.

Mr. HEROD. I think it would be wise, likewise, to indicate who is here.

Mr. RUSSELL. I think you have it in front of you, a very brief statement about the positions presently held by each person.

One other item. I think you have received or will receive an invitation from Mr. Webb to attend a cocktail party at 6 this afternoon at the Mayflower Hotel in the north room.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. FOSDICK). Well, gentlemen, I think we might start by asking if there are any questions in relation to any of the announcements that Mr. Russell has made about the housekeeping end of it.

I am pinch hitting for Ambassador Jessup, as Mr. Russell has said, and we expect him down or hope that he will be down this afternoon.

I think I might say a word in addition to what Mr. Russell has said about the purpose of this meeting. As you know, the Secretary of State appointed some consultants in connection with the far-eastern question to come in and help to focus the attention of the public on these matters of urgency in the Far East. I want to stress our own modest part in this business. Mr. Case and I are outsiders, and we are here merely to be of any possible assistance we can to the officers of the State Department. I find that we are variously known around the Department as "Phil Jessup's boys," or by the newspapermen, as the "Bethlehem boys": that is, apparently "the hopes and fears of all the years are met in Thee." [Laughter.]

The reason, of course, for the appointment of these consultants and for the concentration of the interests of the Department at the moment on this far-eastern situation is that we have come to the end of an era. The white paper was issued by the Department in an attempt to give the public a complete statement of everything that had happened on the theory that the public was entitled to all the facts as to the past situation.

The Secretary said very frankly that he had not yet formulated a policy and it is the hope and expectation that with the aid of such groups as this we can get light in the formulation of a new policy. That is, it is a blank sheet of paper, a white page upon which the future is to be written. There is a great amount of interest as you know in this question, public and congressional, and in the 8 or 9 weeks that the consultants have been working here we have been trying to get all the information we could from people like yourselves that have had wide experience in the Far East. This meeting was called primarily with the idea of seeing if we couldn't focus that interest on a set of questions so that the thinking could be brought perhaps more sharply into perspective.

These questions are suggestive only—this list of questions. The purpose or the hope was that perhaps they might be of some service in guiding the discussion. There was no intention that the questions should limit the discussion. If there are any questions over and above those that are here on these pages, I hope that the members of this conference will not hesitate to raise them. We want to discuss the whole thing with complete frankness, and I think that there is no reason why we should not be absolutely frank. I think we will probably discover that there is going to be wide divergences of opinion. We want to explore those divergences, and I hope that nobody will "pull his punches" on expressing his own point of view on this controversial set of problems that is in front of us.

There are several ways in which we could take up these questions. We could take them up one by one, or we could group them under appropriate headings. That is, as we went over these yesterday, Mr. Russell and I, it seemed to us that perhaps the first four questions held together in a set. The difficulty would be, if we take them up one by one, that a single question naturally spills over into another question, and it might be that the discussion would take on a rather limited form unless there was some latitude. On the other hand, if there is too much latitude, I know from my own experience and you know from your experience that the discussion is apt to wander from a particular point. So it seemed to us that there might be some advantage in grouping the questions.

Perhaps the first 4 questions might hang together rather easily, and then 5 through 10 would form another group of more or less related questions. I am just making this suggestion. Questions 11 through 13 would perhaps form another group; 14 through 19 a fourth group; and 20 through 24; and then 25 through 30.

We can take these up in any way you like. Perhaps as a matter of policy it might be a good idea to try this out on a grouping principle and see how it works out. If it does not work out very well, we will take it on another basis. These questions, as I say, are just to promote the discussion. I hope that there will be no hesitancy on the part of any member of the group to introduce other questions or other points of view that are not mentioned in these pages here. On the other hand, there is a necessity, as you readily realize, of concentrating our attention as far as we can on the matter under discussion.

We thought that a very helpful approach to this whole general set of questions could be made if in the beginning we were briefed by officers of the Department who have had long and intimate contact with some of these questions. Mr. George Kennan, head of the Plans and Policies Division, will I think start off the briefing this morning on the general subject of China in the world picture. He will be followed by Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Butterworth, head of the Far Eastern Division, on a briefing of the general policy of the United States in China. I would expect that these two briefings would take perhaps about half an hour each and that they would form an appropriate background which would perhaps make our discussion of these questions a little more up to date and constructive.

We are waiting for Acting Secretary of State Mr. Webb, who is going to be with us in just a minute to extend the official greeting of the Department. I suggest that just for a minute we take a recess unless there is some comment on any of the suggestions that have been made.

Mr. ROSINGER. I have been wondering about the order of the questions. That is, it seems to me that perhaps logically the first thing to do is to turn to something like 22 and 23, which are rather basic questions on the nature of the far

eastern situation as it confronts us before getting into some of the more specific aspects of China policy and policy in southeast Asia, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. It is entirely up to the members, it is entirely agreeable to the Department; 22 and 23 are rather general questions, as you will see.

"To what extent is the upheaval in China and elsewhere in the Far East a predominantly political movement, and to what extent is it the expression of deep-rooted forces arising out of social and economic conditions?" That is question 22. Then question 23: "To what extent can the menace of political upheaval threatened by the Communist movement in that area be met by military action and to what extent must it be met by measures of economic and social improvement?"

Those are general questions. Would you see an advantage in discussing those first before we get into the particulars? There is no reason in the world why we shouldn't do it that way.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Dr. Fosdick, this series of questions serves more or less as the agenda, doesn't it? I suppose in the final analysis the Department may want an exchange of views with reference to recognition of the Chinese Communists or the formulation of a modus vivendi for trade and other relations without recognition. The State Department would like to have our views on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Where would that come in the agenda?

Mr. STALEY. In five.

The CHAIRMAN. In five, I think. That would be under question 5.

Mr. COLEGROVE. And that specifically includes the nature of a modus vivendi short of recognition?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. De facto and de jure, surely.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I would venture to say that the nature of that modus vivendi would overshadow in large respect all of our discussions, will it not?

The CHAIRMAN. It would be an important aspect of the thing, surely.

(At this point Acting Secretary Webb entered the meeting.)

The CHAIRMAN. May I present the Acting Secretary, Mr. Webb.

Acting Secretary WEBB. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I feel very inadequate to welcome you into the Department of State with General Marshall present in this group, because he has meant so much not only throughout Government but to this Department that all of us who are trying to carry on in his absence feel very humble about it, but we do particularly appreciate your coming here today.

Mr. Acheson regretted very much that he could not be here to participate with you. As you know, he is at the sessions of the United Nations. He has taken, I think, perhaps more of his own personal time on the subject of China since he has been Secretary of State than perhaps any other issue, although he has had such very great problems as the inauguration of the Atlantic pact, the working out of the military-assistance program, and many other matters affecting other parts of the world.

We feel here that we have come to a point where we do need very much to have the kind of discussions that we have asked you to come here today to participate in and we do want you to know that the Secretary himself will go very carefully over the work that you have done and it will have a very direct bearing and effect on his own thinking as the big decisions that we have to reach over the next couple of years are brought into focus.

I might say as a start that perhaps no single aspect of our foreign policy has been subject to so much public conjecture, criticism, and discussion as the policy toward China. We also feel that how the United States handles the problems involved in China is of very great importance to the democratic world. We think here in the Department, very frankly, that too often people have jumped to conclusions based on emotion rather than on clear reflective thinking, and that is one of the reasons that we were particularly anxious at this time to have this meeting with you.

I also would like to say that we recognize here that we do not have any monopoly on intelligence about China. In your presence we humbly bow and say that we know that in this group there is perhaps the greatest aggregation of intelligent thinkers that there is in this country on this subject, and we feel that in working out the program of the Department we will undoubtedly be able to derive great benefit from these discussions. We hope that your contact with some of our people who have been working in this field will bring about perhaps a better result than either group working and thinking independently could

achieve. Certainly you should know that after you have gone the notes and minutes and results of these discussions will be important and will be most carefully considered in everything we do for an extended period of time.

I would like to add one or two other points. We do not expect any dramatic announcement that can be put out to the world at the end of these conferences saying that our policy in China has been reversed or changed or perhaps even slightly altered. The formulation of basic policy in such a problem as this is a very long and time-consuming process. Over the next few months we assure you that everything that is involved in this great question will be gone over most carefully from not only the political but the economic and security standpoints, that within the Government procedures are being worked out, arrangements are getting reduced to habits of thought and habits of work between the White House, this Department and the Defense Department that have a very great significance in bringing about a perhaps more thoughtful thorough-going approach from those three standpoints than we have had since the war, due to the fact that it takes a long time to get a postwar organization shaken down and particularly due to the fact that in the Department of State we now have what we would call certain operating parts of the organization that have freed up the policy-making agencies.

Another point which I think you would wish to know is that we do not view these meetings as an effort to arrive at a consensus of opinion. We are most anxious to have aired here phases and segments of opinion and are more interested in seeing the variety than we are in trying to reduce them to some common denominator. We believe that that will, from the standpoint of each individual here, make the conferences also more productive and may give you a little chance to speak more freely where you have a variety of opinion than if you felt that you were speaking against a common view.

The last point I would like to make is that we are not in these sessions going to try to present you or sell you a China policy, or what we might consider to be a China policy. Our broad policy in the Department remains the same for China as for all the rest of the world. Briefly we are working toward a world in which democracy can express itself, where human liberties are respected, where people can enjoy a decent standard of living, and that means a world of peace. In the case of China, there are many unanswered questions in our own minds, including many you will discuss here. Our final policy toward China will emerge from the answers to these questions, and that is why we feel that these meetings have such great importance for us.

Again, on behalf of Mr. Acheson and myself, I welcome you to the Department and say we very much appreciate your coming here to help us with this program.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. WEBB. May I stay here for a little while? I am going to have to go to another meeting, but I will stay for a short time.

The CHAIRMAN. As I said to the group a few minutes ago, we thought our discussions would be more helpful and of more benefit if we could have the briefing of some of the officers who have been long in contemplation of the problem. Mr. George Kennan, of the Plans and Policies Division of the Department of State, is the first officer who will take up the load, briefing us on the general question of China and the world picture.

Mr. Kennan.

Mr. KENNAN. Gentlemen, I have not prepared anything formal for this presentation. That is in accordance with the understanding that Phil Jessup gave me of the nature of the gathering and the way in which he wanted discussion to proceed, so I am just going to talk to you in a very informal way about what seems to us to be the relationship between the problem of China we are here to deal with and our general foreign policy.

That term, "general policy," does not signify any paper that anybody here can take out of a drawer and lay on the table as the measuring stick against which we have to stack up the component parts of policies, such as the problem of China. There can't be any such paper and none of us here who have this status of planners can attempt to do anything to write anything of that sort. General policy in this country has to spring basically from the ideas and aspirations, from the actions of the people and of Congress and of the executive branch of the Government. It is a constantly changing thing. It is not a static thing which you can fix in any one paper at any one time, and it is not a finished thing. It is, particularly at present, I think, in a state of high flux, and we only know a part of it.

Naturally we here have to use a certain rule of thumb, we have to have some guidance ourselves as we go along, and I can try to give you a picture of what

that rule of thumb is as we see it. I emphasize again it is not one we make entirely, it is one we have to try to figure out ourselves from what the country actually does in foreign affairs and from the aspirations of public and congressional opinions we get, as well as from our own judgment.

As we see it the problem of general foreign policy breaks down really into two segments. The first of those is the more narrow and immediate and more concrete question of the preservation of the security of this country in a world where there are a great many weapons in other peoples' hands and where there is a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding, and violence, fanaticism, and ill will. It is not a safe world these days for anybody to live in, and we have, as I say, the relatively well-defined problem of how you preserve the national security in these circumstances.

The second problem goes far beyond that, is a much more profound one, and one to which none of us is going to to find the answer, I think, or any definite answer to at any early date, and that is the question of what it is really, assuming that the national security is cared for, taken care of in one way or another, that this country wants to do, how it views its mission or its role in world affairs, what it is after in dealing with its world environment.

(Mr. Webb left the conference at this point.)

Mr. KENNAN (continuing). The answers to that are by no means as clear as they might seem when you pose the question, and it is there that I think our ideas today are in a particularly high state of flux. I will return to that a little later.

Now from the standpoint of world security, of our national security in its world terms, that is a subject which, of course, is on everyone's mind at this particular time on account of the news that there had been an atomic explosion in Russia and the implications which that bears for many people. Actually, I don't think that the pattern of our world security has been very greatly altered by that fact. Certainly it is a development which should have been fully taken into account in our planning to date, and I think largely has been.

As we see it, we do not feel to this day that the Russians have the intention or expectation or desire to launch a great sudden military onslaught on the west. That is not to say that there is not a basic conflict of view between themselves and the western countries, and it is not to say that for other reasons they might not come to the conclusion that a war is necessary, but what I am driving at is that I think there is a distinction between these Russian leaders and people like Hitler and the Japanese leaders of the twenties and thirties. I do not think that in their own minds they have conceded that a great, aggressive, open war was the way in which their aims were to be achieved. I think that remains true today even when they have this bomb.

Remember, they have a theory that capitalism bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction, that it must disintegrate. They see an important role for local Communist parties in hastening that disintegration, in acting, as they say, as midwives at the birth of a new order, but that is an entirely different thing from saying it is the purpose and mission for the Red army to move out and conquer the rest of the world for the sake of imposing communism. That would be actually illogical from the standpoint of their doctrine and also their national tradition. Russian expansionism has been a history of gradual, rather cautious, patient, bit-by-bit expansion, always directed to what lay immediately beyond their land frontiers in Europe and Asia. We do not underrate the importance and wish of their political expansionist tendencies and of their ambitions, which undoubtedly they have, to see Communist regimes which would be more or less subservient to them or take their inspiration from them established certainly throughout most of Eurasia, and I think all of Eurasia, which I think they had high hopes that a lot of that would happen when the recent war came to an end.

That does appear to us to have in it really great danger, particularly in connection with Europe, because if you look at the geography of the world from the standpoint of military and industrial potential, I think it is fair to say that outside of our own military and industrial complex here in the United States, there are only four such aggregations of manpower and skills and industrial strength, there are only four aggregations which are major ones from the standpoint of strategic realities in the world. Two of those lie off the shores of the Eurasian land mass. Those are Japan and England, and two of them lie on the Eurasian land mass. One is the Soviet Union and the other is that of central Europe, of Germany and the industrial areas immediately contiguous to Germany and the Rhine, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, and in Silesia.

Viewed in absolute terms, I think the greatest danger that could confront the United States security would be a combination and working together for pur-

poses hostile to us of the central European and the Russian military-industrial potentials. They would really create an entity, the two of them together, which could overshadow in a strategic sense even our own power. It is not anything, I think, which would be as easy of achievement as people often portray it as being here. I am not sure the Russians have the genius for holding all that together. The Germans apparently didn't, although they tried it. Still, they have the tendency of political thought, of Communist political expansion, which causes us to concentrate on that problem and do our best to prevent such a combination in coming about in a spirit and form which could be hostile to us. That does create—and I would point out and the reason I mention it—a real distinction from our standpoint between the situation of Europe and the situation of China and of Asia. It was not only by design and because of that distinction that we have done what we have done and had, I think, the political success that we have had in Europe.

When we talk about helping people to resist pressures, such as those that come from Moscow, it is not something we can do by our own policy alone. We can get success only by interaction between our policy and what already exists in the way of natural will and ability to resistance in other countries. It did happen that in the European countries there was a strong enough attachment to national independence as such, a strong enough repugnance to the sort of thing that was being thrust upon countries by the Russians, strong enough will to hold out against that to enable us with our assistance to be of real political value there. It was partly because those prerequisites existed that we have been able to follow a program in Europe which proved, I think much more successful and which looked much more purposeful, much more well-designed probably than what we have done in Asia, but there is also the fact that it does seem to us a more serious prospect that the Russians should get hold of central Europe from the sheer military standpoint of national security than it does that they should get hold of China and Asia.

That does not mean that we underrate the importance of a Communist advance in Asia. We do not even underrate, I hope, the military importance of China. We realize that in some respects the Chinese have formidable military capabilities, although they seem to us to be ones that express themselves more in the defensive than anything that could make up amphibious strength or strength which could be projected beyond the borders of China.

You have to take in, of course, in that respect, and we hope you will give attention to this, the question of Chinese resources, Chinese possibilities of becoming an industrial power, and particularly the possibilities of doing that in conjunction with Russia. It has been my own thought that the Russians are perhaps the people least able to combine with the Chinese in developing the resources of China and producing anything which in a physical sense would be dangerous to us. The Japanese provide, it seems to us, far more the natural workshop for the Far East in general and for China, and whereas China is a competititor with Soviet Siberia for such things as the Soviet Government may have to give—and I have heard Stalin express this same thought and I think with complete sincerity—Japan is not exactly in that position and Japan can supplement the mainland much more.

This problem you will be facing with respect to China is for that reason, I think, inextricably intertwined with the problem of Japan, and I hope you won't feel under any compulsion to exclude Japan from your attention as we go along here. We have got there what seems to us to be a terrible dilemma on our hands and we need all the guidance we can get. The outcome of the recent war and the settlements that were made with respect to northeast Asia do seem to have excluded the Japanese for the time being from any extensive participation on the mainland short of a war or of some dicker with the Russians which would enable the Russians to feel they can readmit at least the Japanese technological and administrative and business skills into that area safely for themselves.

On the other hand you have the terrific problem of how then the Japanese are going to get along unless they again reopen some sort of empire toward the south. Clearly we have got, if we are going to retain any hope of having healthy, stable civilization in Japan in this coming period, to achieve opening up of trade possibilities, commercial possibilites for Japan on a scale very far greater than anythng Japan knew before. It is a formidable task.

On the other hand, it seems to me absolutely inevitable that we must keep completely the maritime and air controls as a means of holding our—of keeping control of the situation with respect to Japanese in all eventualities. The

very fact that the Japanese face an appalling problem of economic adjustment in this coming period and are probably destined to go through a phase of rather intense national frustration, which will incline them rather to the devices of despair, than toward a good-natured sort of policy. All that makes it all the more imperative that we retain the ability to control their situation by controlling the overseas sources of supply and the naval power and the air power without which it cannot become again aggressive; that is, without challenging which it cannot become aggressive.

It will be, I think, part of your task here to assess the possibilities for United States policy with respect to Japan in the light of those factors, the possibilities for the development of Japan's economic relationships again with the mainland, the extent to which the Japanese can afford not to trade with the mainland, with north China, but again the extent to which north China can afford not to trade with the Japanese, try to strike a balance between bargaining power and with what it supplies to us.

For the sake of our own national security, I would say relationship of Japan toward China is fully important and perhaps more so despite all alarms and exercises of the moment to the relationships of Moscow and that should not be forgotten here.

Turning now to the other and broader question of United States foreign policy, the one that goes beyond the limits of simple national security in the short-term sense and which addresses itself to what it is really, which we regard as our function in the world, it seems to me that there we really have, rather than in the problem of security, the root of the causes of all the acrimony and difference of opinion and anguish of spirit and searching of souls that is going on over policy in China in the last 2 or 3 years. I believe that it is in that realm of thought that the confusion must lie, because it could only have been a great confusion which could have produced some of the acute differences and acute feelings among our people here. On that we really are in a state of flux.

The traditional concepts of Americans, which we knew from the nineteenth century, as to what was the role of the United States in world affairs are beginning to wear thin in many respects and prove to be inadequate. They were, of course, first of all, I think, looking back, the concept that we should preserve our freedom to go ahead and develop this continent without any interference or trouble from other people, and, secondly, that we should achieve the most favorable possible juridical framework for the activities of our traders and our citizens abroad. That was the mercantile-labor concept of foreign policy which prevailed among ourselves and largely among British and other great trading countries in the nineteenth century.

Both of those are proving to be inadequate because we find that as far as preserving our right to go ahead and develop our internal life, our ability to do it without outside interference, that that no longer can be accomplished with coastal batteries, that there is no security in the purely defensive attitude toward the world, that security really only lies in a vigorous and active and flexible offense of some sort. I don't mean a military one: I mean a political ideology, one that you are safest when you are trying to accomplish something instead of waiting for somebody else to come and try to accomplish something in regard to you. Therefore, even that concept of keeping ourselves free to pursue our domestic aspirations here brings us out into the rest of the world and means we have got to want things, we have got to be trying to do things in other parts of the world. The whole thing has gone into a realm of depth which it didn't used to have, and defense in the deepest sense is a very profound concept which plunges away across the world.

As far as protecting citizens abroad, I think we are all beginning to realize that there are national interests that do rise way above the interests of the individual, that you cannot fix a foreign policy today on just the commercial privileges of the individual American trader, that there is need for national policies, need for the defending of what are the interests of the American public as a whole. Those who engage in business abroad and those who don't, their argument, the old concept, proved inadequate.

Now there are various ideas current in our people today as to what really it is that we are trying to achieve in the long-term international affairs. Some of them see it as a quest for the strengthening of peace through the achievement of some universal juridical pattern which will make aggression impossible. That is what many of them see in the United Nations, in the Charter of the United Nations, what we are doing under that. I am not sure that that is a wide enough view myself, but that is what a lot of people want, and what they

look to Asia for is to see the Asiatic peoples take their place if they will do it more or less as good schoolboys on the bench here and to vote the right way and to pursue as we do a stable world in which there will be pretty much a preservation of the status quo through juridical promises not to be violated.

Others look to economic development, to the raising of the standard of living as the thing which is going to metamorphize the world, make it a better world to live in, create a better international climate, and in Europe and Asia, too, they address themselves to this problem of how we can do two things, how we can bring about economic development. They expect from that material improvement things will flow which will achieve the deepest objectives of American policy in Europe.

Others see the thing that needs to be done in the extension to Asiatic countries of American institutions and patterns of life and feel that if the other people can only be brought to take the same attitude toward themselves and their society that people do in this country, the things that make them troublesome in world affairs would be largely removed. I think there has been a good deal of that type of thinking in our occupational regimes in Germany and Japan and the feeling that if you could transplant some of our institutions to these people you would have achieved something which you could achieve in no other way.

Finally we have had the missionary concept that in our Christian ethic conception again we had something which could do the trick in that area of the world and that the task was to bring those to the peoples there. I sometimes think perhaps our confusion today and our feeling of frustration with regard to Asia comes from the fact that to date none of these things have really been successfully applied and all of them have produced disappointments to various groups of our people here at home. I think probably that they are, all of them, all of those hopes and aspirations are placed in too narrow concepts and that they don't pay enough attention to the nature of our own society at home and to our concepts of what it is we are trying to do, achieve domestically in this country, because I am convinced that those two things are very closely connected, much more closely than most people think here, that you cannot have foreign policy which is out of context with what you might call the national trend domestically, the things you really want to achieve domestically, and I think we have got to rethink all these problems from that standpoint.

This inquiry, as I understand it, was addressed to China. China of course is not all of Asia, but China really is a tremendous nation. It very often seems to me that two-thirds of our problems with respect to the rest of the world today is to determine what is really the desirable and advisable stance of a "have" nation to "have-not" nations, because a very large part of the world is composed of "have-nots" not just in Asia but elsewhere, and this is a very, very bitter problem. We were talking about it the other day, with a congressional committee down here. I said it reminds me of the biblical saying that, "Easier shall it be for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to pass through the gates of heaven." Well, I think it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a country like our own to find language and approach to people who have very little and chance of little more which will be useful and satisfactory to both parties involved. In that problem China has a place of peculiar importance. It can be regarded as the most "have-not" of all the "have-not" countries, and if we can find the answer with regard to China I am sure we have found three-fourths of the answer with respect to any other areas of the world, not only in Asia. I don't mean to say that China is like India, that there are not very significant differences, and that sort of thing, but embraced in this Chinese problem is one of the deepest dilemmas of American relationship to her world environment today, and if we can make any progress in getting into that dilemma, in straightening that out, you will have performed what I think will probably be the greatest single service to the United States foreign policy which you could perform.

I think, Mr. Fosdick, that is all I might say on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kennan, have you time to answer some questions?

Mr. KENNAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I know how rushed you are.

Mr. KENNAN. I would be very glad to answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, are there any questions anybody would like to ask Mr. Kennan on his presentation this morning?

Mr. KENNAN. I realize I have talked in almost impossibly broad terms here. I don't want to inflict that same weakness on the rest of you. But I'll be perfectly happy to answer questions.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Kennan about his views regarding potential areas of industrial development? He named four, and three of them were in the Western World, one in the Asiatic world. What are the most important potential areas in the future?

Mr. KENNAN. You mean as distinct from the existing ones today?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes. for instance. India and its relations to China.

Mr. KENNAN. Those are problems, of course, not only of resources that exist—and it isn't absolutely necessary that resources should exist on a territory for it to develop military industrial potential. England, of course, today has in twentieth-century terms—as distinct from nineteenth-century terms—relatively little in the sense of resources. I think the answer to that question lies very largely in social and political conditions in the Asiatic countries and in the question of whether they are going to be able to develop a stable enough society, administratively stable enough, to provide a framework for world trade. That is, for overseas trade, plus sort of the moderation of approach to other nations which seems to be necessary to have overseas trade. And whether they are going to be able to develop within themselves the necessary accumulation of capital to build up what is necessary for a military industrial potential.

Now in China I must say that looks to us very far off. China's resources, as far as I know, aren't very great in any of the things which we regard as the guts of industrial power. Her coal resources are meager compared to those of the Soviet Union or the United States or Europe, Western Europe that is. Her oil resources are almost nonexistent compared to the known reserves in the Soviet Union and the United States. Iron also does not compare and, as went down the list of things, it's my recollection you found China having anywhere from 15 to 35 percent of the raw material resources of these other areas. Now, as I have said, you can import these things but then you have got to have something internally which China has not got and that is the ability for capital accumulation. I believe it is true in China it takes three peasant families to nourish one family not on the land, where here the relationship is just about reversed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Four to one.

Mr. KENNAN. Oh, four to one. In those circumstances it seems to me the possibilities for accumulation of capital are tremendously diminished. I don't know what the mathematical factor would be as compared with ourselves but it's a tremendous one and it must proceed very, very slowly. And I believe that India would have, from what I'm told—I spent night before last talking with our Ambassador out there—the capacity to become a very considerable agricultural country and probably eventually industrial too, although apparently the Indian leaders themselves are beginning to swing rather to the idea that they would do better to develop their country agriculturally.

Almost everyone else has wanted industries with an almost childlike absorption with the sort of romance of having great industrial plants on your territory in an undeveloped nation. I do think the possibilities are greater in India than they are in China and if India, which is almost a blank check to us today, can create the prerequisites to be a world trading power, develop her agriculture, handling her demographic problem, I believe then you could get certainly a fifth world industrial center of great importance.

Mr. COONS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Kennan if he would explore just for a moment a little further his conclusion that the relationship of Japan to China is more important potentially from the standpoint of the utilization of resources and the combination, I suppose, of capital and labor, than the Soviet Union to China. You mean now in the very immediate future, or over a long period?

Mr. KENNAN. I mean now. There are many factors that enter in there. One is the existing industrial plants, skills of Japan, the fact that those are surplus to Japan itself, and have to find some sphere in both the sources of raw materials and markets. In other words, Japan's industrial strength has got to operate in a realm much wider than the Japanese islands themselves, as does that of the British Isles. That is not true of the Russian economy and will not be for I think a long time. Vast sections of the Soviet Union today need very much the same sort of development that China needs and the things they have to offer to the Soviet Government in the way of manpower, and so forth, are also similar. I mean the Soviet Government is in no great real shortage of manpower, which would be what China has to offer.

The transportation from the east to west in the Soviet Union is still in a very primitive state and I really believe that it would be a very serious problem there were the Soviet Government ever to attempt to do much in the way of inter-

twining its economy with that of China. Of course, as highways might be constructed, you would have something perhaps comparable to what exists in this country but all that has to run through areas which are far less developed, and in many ways far more difficult in operation than areas you have to cross in this country.

The possibilities for maritime connection are still very rudimentary and poor. I was thinking primarily today than in terms of the next 10 or 20 years, it will take that time for Russia to build a modern transportation system if all goes well and it will take certainly that time for her to develop her Far East.

I remember Stalin one time snorting rather contemptuously and vigorously because one of our people asked them what they were going to give to China when this was over and he said in effect, "What the hell do you think we can give to China." He said, "We have a hundred cities of our own to build in the Soviet Far East. If anybody is going to give anything to the Far East, I think it's you." And I think he was speaking quite sincerely.

Now, that is a very real factor. The Russians are trying to build cities like Komsomolsk, Yakutsk, and other cities way up to the Far Custa Republic. They are trying to develop that whole area and there are a thousand demands daily on the Soviet Government which it can't possibly supply. Many of them are for housing and things which vitally affect the living standards and not only that but the working efficiency of the people they have got out there. When similar demands come from China they have to allot priorities and I believe, from what Stalin said, those priorities will normally and naturally be given to the Soviet Far East.

That is not the case with Japan. And Japan has better communications to China by far than the Soviet Union to the perhaps most important districts of China, let us say, commercially, economically.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions? Mr. Stayley.

Mr. STAYLEY. No; Mr. Murphy was first.

Mr. MURPHY. In contrasting the various power areas and the possible combinations which would be a threat to us, you made the point, I think, that the combination of Russia and central Europe would be a more effective and more dangerous threat than the combination of Russia and China; I think you said because central Europe was a more homogenous group, a more uniform group. Is that right?

Mr. KENNAN. It's a very powerful military industrial unit in its own right, central Europe, and that was demonstrated during the last war. If you think what the Germans were able to develop and maintain over a series of years over the way of military forces, it was terrific! And if you add that to the Russian potential, if anybody could, Russians or Germans contrive to combine—if only for a decade—politically those two potentials you would be faced, well, that is about the only combination I think that would give you something in absolute terms considerably more powerful than what we have here in North America. That was my point.

Mr. STAYLEY. May I ask your comment on this line of thought: What is the Russian view of the importance of China and Asia in the world political struggle as you gather it (*a*) in relation to military power in the narrower sense, and (*b*) in relation to the political infiltration sort of struggle which I judge from your remarks you might think would be more important in their view? And may I preface it further with this observation that it would seem the old Marxist doctrine that the countries of most advanced capitalism would be the first to go to maturity and have their proletarian revolutions—that has been a great failure as a forecast. In no country of really advanced industrial development has there been a revolution of that type.

And the revolutions that have been successful from the point of view of proletarian dictatorship have occurred in the so-called backward countries. They still predict we have our contradictions that will lead us to eventual revolution but now isn't it true that the emphasis in this thinking perhaps has shifted to the so-called exploited underdeveloped countries and they may put more emphasis on them now realistically in their strategic planning.

Mr. KENNAN. I think that is quite true. I think militarily they do not look to the Chinese for very much except on a local scale. That is, I would say that if you were probably able to take them apart in the minds of people in the Kremlin on this subject you would find that the role they allotted in their minds to the Chinese Communist military forces was one of assuring the exclusion of ourselves and other imperialist elements from those areas contiguous to the borders of the Soviet Union and that they would be relying still basically on the

Red army for their security. I mean they would allot a sort of a role of provincial legionnaires to the Chinese Communist forces in their minds and not a major role. I doubt that they would want them to become, even if they could, a major military power.

Politically I think you have quite a different pattern and what you have said is very interesting and very true. Events are proving the Marxist analysis of what was going to happen to capitalism and people's reactions to capitalism to be correct almost everywhere where capitalism is not very far developed and not correct in the countries where it is. And I believe there has been a considerable amount of soul searching ideologically within the Communist movement to find a rationalization and to find ways of explaining how it is that colonial countries—I'm speaking here from the standpoint of Marxist ideology—can step from the feudal or precapitalistic stage into the people's republic stage.

I think they are rationalizing that in China and I believe that that is where they are going to have their great political successes or may have them if they are successful in establishing themselves, and in establishing their ideology, as to the foundation for what I described as the have-not psychology in the world. I think that offers great possibilities to them. I wouldn't underrate it for a minute.

How that will work out in terms of relationship between them and regimes like the Chinese Communist regime I don't know. That will be a problem similar to the interrelationships within great religious movements of the past. But that this Marxist analysis, with all its oversimplification and what seems to me to be really its phony qualities, has huge emotional appeal for peoples I believe is a fact.

Now, there is where I think they place their great hopes but at the same time they will be extremely cautious about it in Asia because they are very, very well aware of the fact that if you cannot overshadow a country militarily, ideology is in itself an untrustworthy means with which to hold them. It's a good beginning and it's fine to have them inspired your way but it's not a guarantee against Titoism and I don't know, and I don't think they know, of anything really except the shadow or the reality of military domination.

Again I'd just like to say by the same note, I'm not predicting a repetition in China of what happened in Yugoslavia. I'm only saying that I think the Russians are very alive to the fact that you can get a lot of people, ideologically, on your side and still the logic of power compulsions can cause them to challenge your physical authority at some stage along the way. For that reason they will be very careful in handling this thing in Asia.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to ask Mr. Kennan a question to tie together two things that he made in his introductory statement. Mr. Kennan, you pointed out quite likely that Japan already has the industrial set-up; what it needs is a wider sphere of activity for it. Then separately you mentioned the defense and security requirement, of being able to maintain air-seas supervision over Japan's strategic position. Japan's industrial power grew up very largely by the importation of energy and supplies from the north of China and Manchuria. And that was done under conditions where the Japanese not only had the industrial relationship but the strategic control of the industrial relationship. Now, if they are to resume their access to those sources, the operation of which they are familiar with, the strategic control would remain with a China which is going to be either Communist or Communist dominated. And the Chinese would have at least the option of rationing their supplies to Japan. They would say, we supply you so much on condition we get back an import from you of machines and so on, leaving no margin for you to build up a kind of power that has strategic power over us. In other words, the Chinese may be in a position to make an effort to interdict the military side of this Japanese military industrial potential in such a way that it would strongly affect this concept of a military industrial potential in Japan-controlled areas at long range by the United States.

Mr. KENNAN. There are two or three things that I think ought to be taken into consideration on that. Again I raise the question of whether the Chinese Communists are going to be economically so much in the driver's seat that they can sit back with equanimity and grant or decline to grant favors economically to Japan on how much that is going to be a two-way proposition. I think what you say is quite correct, in both the mainland of Asia—not only, of course, China but also Korea being under Russian domination and Manchuria. And we ourselves as the major maritime power in the Pacific have holds on Japan which can amount to perhaps almost a veto power on Japan's again becoming a great military power.

This makes me think of something I found in a statement of Theodore Roosevelt which seemed to me to have relevance just to that problem. He said "Of course, if Japan were content to abandon all hope and influence upon the continent of Asia and tried to become a great maritime power she might ally herself to Russia to menace the United States. But in any such alliance between Russia and Japan do not forget what surely the Japanese would think of, viz, whereas the sea powers could do little damage to Russia they could do enormous damage to Japan and might well destroy Russia and blockade the Japanese islands."

I think it remains today that Japan is a valuable new power from the standpoint of whoever controls the seas and the air today in the Pacific region, and there are raw materials which she cannot get, I'm sure, from north China or Manchuria on which she will be vitally dependent. If we really in the Western World could work out controls, I suppose, adept enough and foolproof enough and cleverly enough exercised really to have power over what Japan imports in the way of oil and such other things as she has got to get from overseas, we would have a veto power on what she does need in the military and industrial field as great as that, I think that is not incorrect.

Mr. HEROD. I'd like to ask Mr. Kennan one query in regard to the question of China allying to Russia or Russia being a less likely proposition with Japan as it pertains to the military industrial potential. In our observation, from the standpoint of scientists, Russia has some very good ones. So has Japan. From the standpoint of engineers they have got very good ones. As far as industrialization is concerned, Russia was estimated as having 17 percent of the world's manufactures just before the World War as against less than 5 percent in Japan. As far as steel production, as far as power production and coal production is concerned, Russia exceeds Japan's production many times.

And it would seem to me that whether there is a likelihood of Russia allying with China depends to a certain extent upon Russia's size-up of her objective and the degree to which Russia sizes up the indigestability of China, granted there is a great shortage in Russia against a surplus of these facilities and techniques and technology in Japan. But Japan hasn't a free choice and Russia has, and Russia has been known to divert her attention at the expense of her domestic market and at the expense of her own people into foreign channels when she had an objective that looked as if it were worth while to do it.

I don't believe we can count upon it being a more dangerous or a more critical proposition for us to give consideration to the Japanese relationships with China. I think we can count upon it for the short term because I think it's expedient in Russia but if such expediency should change or if Russia should get—which I don't think it's liable to do—an idea that China could be used for some particular purpose rather than being—well, I think Russia's idea is, just leave it and let it stew in its own juice. without a strain on Russia's resources.

If she felt she could use it as a jumping off point, I think Russia, having these resources, could divert them to China as well as Japan could divert them at the expense of her own people, which I believe the Kremlin would do if she felt the price were worth it.

Mr. KENNAN. Well, I think here you're raising questions which I would rather you answer than I answer. And I wouldn't attempt to give an answer to that. I would only point out these things, that while what you say about the Russian industrial potential may, allowing for a certain amount of padding—which I suspect there usually is in Soviet stakes; Russia has, of course, double the population and far more in the way of territory than Japan has, the whole trend of Russian economy in the past 40 years I think since the revolution has been away from that of a trading nation which had surpluses to give to the rest of the world and rather toward one which had a hard enough time supplying her own needs—while the Russian Government is capable of allotting priorities of very formidable intensity and therefore achieving given objectives in fields which it marks out for itself as of great importance, it does that at the cost of huge sacrifice. Its economy is conducted the hard way and the wasteful way and I don't think there is a great margin with which to play except in cases of tremendous national emergency.

Now, you may say that Asia might become of such importance to Russia that it would be equivalent to one of those periods of great national emergency and that they would say this is the time to do what we did during the World War, to push living standards ruthlessly down and free a surplus of the labor of the people to use for national purposes of this sort. That is possible at a later date. Right now I think most of us tend to forget how deep and how raw are still the scars of the last war in Russia, how little of the damage done really has

been repaired, despite the fact that production has been brought up. That does not mean the things the Germans destroyed have been rebuilt yet.

It also means that there is still a certain ritual I think in the readiness of great peoples to go through the ordeal of a war; and, if that is true, the Russian people are no way near the term of that rhythmic swing which would put them in a frame of mind again to enter in a contest. I would also add to that: Let's remember that never in Russian history have the Russians ever, that I can remember, been enthused about any deliberate aggressive action of their own outside of Russia. The things which have really caused the Russian people to get down and work and show this tremendous spirit of sacrifice and endurance and enthusiasm have been the attempts of foreign powers to plunge into the heart of the country and the folly of foreign powers in giving the Russians the feeling that they regarded them as dumb, second-rate people who could be pushed around that way. That really arouses Russian national spirit more than anything else. But, whether anybody will ever be able to arouse the Russian spirit for different sorts of ventures, I'm just not sure; and I'll pass that question for one that could also be aired.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to bring this to a close because these questions and answers are highly illuminating, but let us put it this way: are there any urgent questions you would like to ask Mr. Kennan before he goes? I don't think we can take advantage of him too long. If there are no questions, thank you very much, Mr. Kennan.

Mr. KENNAN. Yes.

(At this point Mr. Kennan was excused from the meeting.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will pass to the second briefing which I mentioned earlier, on the United States policy in China by Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Butterworth.

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. As I understand it, Mr. Kennan's remarks were designed to put into a larger framework of world policy the problems which center around China. And Ambassador Jessup, together with Dr. Fosdick and perhaps Dr. Case—who have since mid-August been giving the Secretary of State the benefit of their consideration of these problems—will this afternoon, I believe, discuss with you the pros and cons of the larger policies as they have been considering them from all points of view. It therefore devolves upon me, perhaps somewhat out of turn, to give you some background on our current operations, these matters of immediate concern, many of which carry important policy considerations but with which we have to deal with on a day-to-day basis and which we will, as they develop, need your advice in terms of your consideration of these larger problems.

Perhaps the most timely one is to discuss this question of recognition, since the Chinese Communist authorities have now announced that they have organized themselves as a government and they have addressed communications in a rather terse fashion to the other powers. About the time that the Communist forces crossed the Yangtze we made our first approach to the other powers about this question of recognition. The unexpected ease with which the Communist armies swept down from Mukden to the Yangtze upset not only the plans and concepts of the Nationalist Government, but those of the Communists, political and military authorities as well. But it is quite clear they never expected the kind of collapse that in fact took place.

So, they began revising their own political timetable, and it became clear to us that about this time they would organize themselves as a government and invite recognition. As a matter of fact, we picked out the arbitrary date of the double 10, and that might well have been the date. I have the feeling myself that the action of the Chinese in Lake Success in bringing forth this case may well have had the effect of hastening as much as possible that timetable.

But about this time, when Shanghai was being menaced, through Ambassador Stuart at Nanking and through our envoys in the friendly capitals, we broached the question of recognition with the friendly countries. We pointed out to them that we did not think this was an immediate problem and that we did not expect that it would in practice arise, although the world press and particularly the American press wanted to force this problem onto us immediately. We expressed our view that we thought it would be desirable for the powers who were sufficiently interested in China to have diplomatic representation there to consult with each other; that we for our part were quite ready and willing to do so. Our own view was that no benefit would be derived by any hasty individual act; that the first come would not in fact be the better served, and that we thought

that this was a problem of sufficient complexity and seriousness that it should be approached with great caution and with no sense of haste.

We found general agreement with those views with two possible exceptions. Australia did not share these views apparently at all and believed that the Chinese Communist regime, when it was set up, should be recognized at the earliest moment. And I think Dr. Evatt made a public statement subsequently along those lines. The Indian Government apparently was thinking along the lines at that time of what it called de facto recognition of the northern Communist regime.

Well, as we pursued this we found that they had an idea, but they didn't seem very clear in their own minds or ours exactly what they meant by it because there was no regime as a government in northern China at the time, and their views about the de facto recognition seemed—well, they in turn agreed that some consultation should take place, but quite frankly it left us with the sense that they would be more willing to act readily when a government was set up than would ourselves or some other power.

As you know, Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman have been here, and the question of what should be done when this matter of recognition arose was likewise discussed. And here again all parties concerned agreed that consultations should take place. I think I should call your attention, though, to the wording of the communiqué which was issued after the conversations between Secretary Acheson and Mr. Bevin. It referred to the common objectives which the British and ourselves share, but it pointed out that in some of the countries in the Far East and Middle East are situations which are not exactly the same.

Now, it is quite true that we unbalance trade with China and the British, not only trade with China but in China at that time. Unlike us, they have large investments there with firms like the Jarden Matthewson Firm, who not only have agencies for British manufacturing concerns but they own docks and breweries and textile mills, and they operate on joint account with the Chinese interests in a number of concerns. So that the question of whether they cut their losses for a period or whether they fold up for a time and come back, they are faced with problems which are not the same as ours.

There is no doubt that the British are more anxious to trade therefore, more anxious to regularize their situation with a Chinese Communist regime than our interests necessarily persuade us to do. I'll touch on that a little later, but that is the position today. We still believe that this problem should not be pursued with any great haste; that there is no great urgency; and, in fact, the Chinese Communists do not control a substantial part of China; and, furthermore, they have given no indication of their willingness to undertake the type of responsibilities which are required of international obligations which normally devolve upon a government.

Their propaganda over many months has contained references to their desire to abrogate what they call the Kuomintang treaties. But the Chinese Communist propaganda veered away a little bit from that, and the latest line is that they are going to look and see what treaties are justified, what are just treaties. But it's quite clear and it's significant that in their recent note they made no reference to this matter, and that is a point which, of course, we are concerned about and which I suppose would concern all friendly countries having interests in China.

Concurrently, I might mention this question of trade, which is likewise a contentious issue. Our general analysis of the export-import situation in China is that, although China requires imports of a considerable variety of products, her very size and the agricultural nature of the country make her relatively self-sufficient. That is, she does not produce enough cotton, although she produces a good deal of cotton, and so on. Her deficiencies lie mainly in the importation of machinery and in oil.

China is not one of the countries that you would select if you were going through the list of countries that would be particularly vulnerable, we will say, in time of war, to the economic welfare. That is, although the cutting off of her imports would entail a good deal of suffering and a good deal of dislocation, it would not necessarily strike at her vitals.

Now, nevertheless, in February we decided to approach the British Government in anticipation of the onward sweep of the Chinese Communist armies and discuss with the British, in the first instance, the question of the imposition of controls on trade wtih China. It seemed perfectly clear that we should not let the products which were being restrained in terms of east-west European trade from reaching Russia and the satellite countries—that those arrangements the categories which fall under the heading of 1–A items.

We likewise thought that a selected number of 1–B items should likewise be put under control so that we would have the option of modifying, restraining, or allowing products to go as determined by the events. Until our position was clear with the British, there was obviously no purpose given to have discussions with other interested powers such as the smaller producers of western Europe, of the eastern European Continent producers.

The British have been very reluctant to put under control 1–B items with the exception of oil. They do not feel that 1–B items moving into China can in the present circumstances do very much harm. They are keenly aware of the importance to trade, their Tientsin and Shanghai entrances, and they are acutely sensitive to the fact that Hong Kong's future is inextricably bound with its hinterland. They are, of course, in agreement about the 1–A items. And these discussions are going on, and other countries will be approached on this same basis.

The blockade port closure, of course, has produced a new situation which was not counted upon. Communist propaganda has it that it was an American idea. I think it was a complete accident myself. An airplane, as far as I can gather, flew over the entrance to the river and saw a ship zigzagging in a queer way; and the pilot, when he got into Shanghai, began talking about this matter and said "Perhaps this ship was laying mines." This got into the North China Daily News and they published it as a report, and the port of Shanghai suddenly then closed, because everybody then assumed that the Yangtze was being mined.

The Communists were furious and made an attack on the Daily News. But, nevertheless, shipping stopped for several days until small ships could be got out into the Yangtze and attempts made to find these mines. No mines were ever found. The idea had obviously had a wider currency, and the Nationalist Government then sought the possibility of this port closure. The order which they circulated to all shipping friendly countries, particularly those having shipping companies, very carefully avoids the word "blockade." It calls it a "port closure." But, nevertheless, it seems to require of second countries behavior similar to that which would be entailed if a blockade had been proclaimed.

Now, our traditional policy has been over the years to proclaim that a blockade be declared and made effective. Furthermore, in our present position as the greatest naval power in the world—with England practically the only other naval power in the world—it would not be in our strategic interests to see countries with a few ships and a few airplanes suddenly declaring large parts of the coast line as blockaded. We have to some extent a monopoly on blockades, and we keep that monopoly at rather heavy expense and are not prepared to give it up rather readily. At the name time, we obviously do not want to be the means by which this blockade in Shanghai is broken. That is not our affair. That is the problem which concerns the two warring elements of China.

Now, considerable complications have ensued as a result of rugged individuals on the part of one of our shipping companies. For a long time the underwriters kept their rates very high. Therefore, no ships found it in their interest to go in. And then the underwriting rates from London were considerably reduced and one of our shipping companies went in. The first two ships that went in were met at the entrance of the Yangtze by a nationalist warship and there ensued an interchange between the captains of the first ship and the warship, which had a little bit of the spirit of the Yankee Clippers in it but, nevertheless, unbalanced. They said they were going in and asked for their position, and unbalanced they seemed to get what seemed enough.

However, in about 2 hours after arriving in the port of Shanghai this same ship came in and was turned over to the Chinese Communists. They unloaded their cargo and took on passengers. We had our consul to notify all Americans they would be ill-advised to travel on this ship, that it was going through dangerous waters. And previously we had the Maritime Commission circulate to all the shipping companies the notice of port closure of the Chinese Government and when Mr. Isbrandtsen, of the Isbrandtsen Steamship Co., saw the naval escort for these ships he made it very clear to us that he would not have this naval escort and influentially we were not predisposed to this voyage and these vessels have now been seized and taken to port in one of the contiguous islands.

In the meantime a third boat was approaching the mouth of the Yangtze when these first two were caught. It was warned off by the Chinese Nationalist Government. It went away for about 12 miles and, as far as I could see when the

naval escort was taking these other vessels away, it slipped into Shanghai. I would like to have your advice on these conciliations and would be glad to have you help me draft some communications that I send to China.

Mr. KIZER. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask Mr. Butterworth a question. I'm wondering if there would not be an advantage to the United States and to relationships if we were to say to the British, at the appropriate moment, we are not ready to recognize the Communist government but since your interests are larger than ours there may be some advantage in your recognizing it because of your interests there. Then we will take our time with it ourselves.

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. I don't really see how it's particularly in our interests to do so because at the moment the notification of the Chinese Communist authorities is an inadequate one in any one's point of view regardless of their interest and until that is somewhat clarified, including the Chinese Communist behavior to diplomatic and consular representatives which lacked a good deal, particularly in our case, I shouldn't have thought it was in anybody's interest to recognize them.

Mr. KIZER. I didn't mean we should advise the British, but when they are ready to do it we might well say don't wait for us but go ahead when you want to.

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. It seems to me when they are ready to do it they are going to suggest to us what you suggested saying to them.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Fosdick, if Mr. Butterworth hasn't finished, I'd like to ask if he would be willing to give us information regarding the withdrawal of American consulates throughout north China—how many have been withdrawn and from what places and why were they withdrawn.

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. That was one of the subjects I was trying to touch on.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we let Mr. Butterworth conclude his remarks before the questions begin.

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. The first consulate we decided to withdraw was the consulate general at Mukden, for the reason that for the first 3 weeks of the Communist occupation of Mukden our people were properly treated and were even allowed radio communication with us, but suddenly all smiles ceased to go and they were put in their compounds and were being held more or less incommunicado since that date. It was obvious that we had no option but to withdraw them. They were not being allowed to perform their functions and were living under circumstances of hardship and indignity. So we gave instructions to have them withdrawn. We took the matter up with Peiping with the Communist authorities as to Dr. Stewart in Nanking and received assurances from them that our consul general and his staff would be provided with American facilities and they would be permitted to leave. That was some months ago and these assurances have not yet been implemented.

Mr. DECKER. They are still there?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Yes. The next step that we took was to meet with the business and missionary interests and discuss with them our decision to close the offices at Chungking, Kunming, and possibly Canton before those cities were overrun by the Chinese Communists.

There are not large numbers of American citizens in those areas and there are very comparatively few American interests. Communications have been extremely difficult even with the favorable facilities that we have had in China from the end of the war until a comparatively recent date when we had a military and air advisory group which had airplanes there and we could fly in supplies. Places like Kunming, for example, we only reopened—I believe it was closed in the middle twenties and I reopened it in 1937 in anticipation of the Generalissimo's moving the capital there. It was not one of our traditional posts.

We felt from the point of view of their utility to us and facilities that would probably be accorded them, it would not be worth our while to keep them. We debated about the question of Canton, because Canton is a long-established office and we consulted with the missionary and business interests as to whether they thought that we could be of particular aid and assistance to them. It transpires that most American businessmen are going to remain in Canton after the Communists come in and we were advised that the presence of our consulate would not necessarily act adversely on their interests. Somewhat the same attitude was taken by the missionary groups, although not quite so clear-cut in every instance, so given the presence of Hong Kong and its proximity we decided we would close the office at Canton, although we still keep there our chargé d'affaires until such time as the capital moves elsewhere.

Likewise, we are going to close out the offices at Dairen and and Tsingtao: In Dairen because our people are so circumscribed that they are leading a quite

impossible life and are of very little or no utility to us, and at Tsingtao because with the departure of our fleet there it is a very dead place and our consulate serves little or no purpose there. There are very few Americans and all that are there want to leave too and our staff will leave when they do. Therefore we will keep the traditional service at Peking, Tsientsin, and Shanghai, Nanking, and Hong Kong, and we have no intention of closing those. Hankow is also being closed on account of the communications problem.

I think before the questions I might just touch on one other problem and that is the question of Hong Kong. I think I should tell you, again in confidence, that the British have advised us that they are quite confident that they now have the means of defending Hong Kong and that they propose to do so. They do not propose to announce this in the papers, and so on, and I am asking that this be treated in the strictest confidence, and they feel they have the means of handing both external aggression and internal sabotage of the 1926–27 variety. They have not sought any particular assistance through us except that we should live up to our obligations under the United Nations Charter, which we would clearly do and which we have affirmed in the Secretary of State's introduction and letter of transmission to the President of the white paper.

Now I am through.

Mr. HEROD. Were the consulates in Shanghai recognized? Are they recognized?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. No; the Communist authorities have steadfastly adhered to the rule that they would not recognize not only the mission, they continued to address Dr. Stuart as a professor or former ambassador but they have not recognized what normally governments do recognize, which is the continuance of consular authorities within their consular district and their traditional functions of protection, and so on.

Communication, however, does go on despite these frictions. Mind you, our own consulates were under instructions in all these cities before the take-over not to address any of these authorities by their official titles and not to appear at official functions which would in any way be interpreted as a suggestion of action of recognition on our part, so in a certain sense the Communist authorities and ourselves are of the same mind in principle. They carry the matter, though, to what we regard as the raductio ad absurdum level. However, the necessities of circumstances break down these rules, as you know, and our authorities have been in communication with them about matters of mutual concern.

We are not, however, able to protect American citizens in the way we traditionally do because when we try to take up the case of Mr. X and Mr. Y, they listen to you and say, "Have Mr. X and Mr. Y come to see me," but nevertheless something spills over that may be helpful.

Mr. DECKER. I think Mr. Butterworth would be the first to recognize that in his remarks about the missionaries withdrawing from Canton, that he did a little bit less than justice to the number that are staying.

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. I didn't mean the missionaries were going, were withdrawing. I meant our people were withdrawing. If I gave another impression, I am sorry.

Mr. DECKER. You said "businessmen" and then the way your remarks went—I am sure there was no intention.

That was not the thing I wanted to ask. What I should like Mr. Butterworth to discuss with us is the question of de jure and de facto recognition, that is, degrees of recognition, what the implications of those alternative courses would mean, and another very important question, it seems to me, what the implications would be for the existing Nationalist Government, assuming that the Government stays in possession of at least a substantial segment of China, as it is at the present time, would recognition of the Communists as a regime imply the withdrawal of recognition from the Nationalists, and what would be the result of that? A third point, the question of recognition in its relationship to the U. N. and their arrangements in the Security Council. I think those are all the questions we would like to have him discuss.

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. If I could touch on the first two, I think in a way it is theoretical to discuss the variations between the de facto and de jure recognition because it seems quite clear to us the Chinese Communist authorities would not be prepared to accept what is commonly called de facto recognition, and I feel quite sure that a condition precedent to the exchange of envoys and the usual things that take place on the occasion of recognition would be in their mind a withdrawal of recognition from the Nationalist Government, so I think in practice the problem that faces the United States and faces the other powers is whether or at what time to accord normal de jure recognition, and I think it is because they have held this view, that they have been so arbitrary, narrow in

their interpretation during this pregovernment period of the status of all foreign envoys and representatives, consular and otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you want to comment on the third question?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. I would like to comment on the third one as an amateur, because if you are going to talk about the United Nations you have to devote a good deal of your time on that and General Marshall will bear me out on the technicalities of that. One or two broad things seem clear, that the question of recognition will probably arise in the Security Council and then possibly move to the General Assembly, which is the higher court of appeals. The whole is no greater than the sum of its parts in this instance, because a large part of the territory still lies within the jurisdiction, nominal and otherwise, of the National Government, and therefore you cannot at this stage of the game get a repetition of the Czech case, where, you will recall, the credentials of the outgoing government were withdrawn largely on the initiative of the Secretariat on the basis of the fact that the United Nations does not recognize regimes as such, it recognizes states, but here is a state that at the moment is a divided one, so that would not seem to apply, so that being so, the question would move on the attitude of the several powers in this question.

Mr. DECKER. I should like to pursue that a bit further in the matter of recognition. Are we then to assume that we really have a take-it-or-leave-it proposition so far as the Communists are concerned in their demanding de jure recognition, setting limitations? Is there any situation in which we unilaterally grant one or the other?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Our recognition is not a unilateral matter, it is a mutual matter, their exact terms are by no means clear from this brief and somewhat tersely, curtly worded note and it is certainly not clear—it is clear they do not encompass by any means all of the territory of China yet. It is not at all clear what their attitude is designed to be toward aliens obligations.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a question, Mr. Colegrove?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Fosdick, I would like to ask one more question with reference to the consulates. It is true that businessmen and missionaries should be consulted with reference to the need of consulates in any foreign country, but did not the State Department throw away a strategic advantage in withdrawing these consulates? There are of course adventuresome young men in the Foreign Service who are willing to take the risk and there are of course experienced consuls who know how to get along in countries like China even though they have little contact with their Government. We know how difficult it is to resume consular relations with Communist countries. We have had some unpleasant experiences about that. Would it not have been better to have left these consulates scattered through China as listening posts or as posts which we already hold even during a time when we have little communications with Communist China, and still again, are we not going to have a great deal of difficulty in reopening these consulates after we try to get a modus vivendi for trade with Communist China sometime in the near future?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. I shouldn't imagine that if it is the policy of the Chinese Communist government to have foreign consulates in these places, and that is not clear yet, whether they would propose to follow the Russian pattern or follow a pattern of their own, I shouldn't imagine it would be difficult should recognition take place to obtain the same facilities that other powers have. On the other hand, your reference to listening posts really gets to the heart of the problem. The utility of a listening post is not only that you can listen but also that you can purvey what you have heard to somebody else, and our experience does not lead us to believe that is so. Furthermore, we have good reason to believe that our adventuresome young men would have very great difficulty in getting into these places, that it would be a question of maintaining our staff at the places rather than rotating or sending new ones there.

Furthermore, there is the general concept, I think, among a great many Chinese, and particularly strongly held by the Communist Chinese, and you find it in trade, that they have the concept that really the western powers in general and the United States in particular is extraordinarily dependent upon its relationship with China both in trade and in other things and it is an extremely valuable market to us, and these mysterious foreigners coming there, and exactly how they make this money which allows them to live on the scale of merchant princes even though they are clerks is not wholly clear to the average Chinese in the street, but he feels obviously something is being taken out of China in very large measure and China is extremely important and we get the most extraordinary allegations from the Chinese Communists as to what has happened in the last 5 or 10 years. You would never have thought

that we had imported gratis into China the thousands of tons of foodstuffs and other material, whether through UNRRA or our own organizations we have. I for one am not at all sure that psychologically it is a bad thing to have restricted our representation. I would think it would be a mistake if we voluntarily withdrew our consulates in these traditional cities where we have always been, but places like Chungking and Kunming, we have not always been there, but the expansion was a result of wartime days when the hump operation was going on and because of special circumstances which didn't recede until recently. But of course, if our representatives are treated a certain way in the days to come, when recognition is not readily forthcoming, we will have no option but to withdraw them, and I myself would favor a policy of withdrawing them rather than to allow them to remain and serving no purpose but to be suffering indignities which do not reflect well upon any of us.

Mr. VINACKE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask in that connection whether there is any evidence of an intention on the part of a Chinese Communist to spread the view that the American consulates with consular officers, etc., are essentially centers of espionage with a view really to forcing them out rather than it being our decision whether they should remain or not?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. There has been a good deal of propaganda along that line centered around Mukden.

Mr. VINACKE. It has really been an official propagation rather than expression of opinion?

Mr. HEROD. Has the State Department adopted any policy with reference (*a*) to visas for businessmen back in the Communist areas, such as Shanghai, and (*b*) for their wives?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. We have adopted a policy as regards their wives. We have not been encouraging people to take their wives. We have been prepared to look upon these businessmen and upon missionaries, people who have direct special interests which require them to go to China, we view those cases on their merits and we have given visas to missionaries, for example, who have been to west China, established people, and who know the conditions, who have lived there before, and so on, but it would not be logical or right for us to set down a rule, a widespread rule when we are undertaking very hazardous operations in trying to get the people out who want to come out.

I might just review that for a minute. At the time of the fall of Mukden in November a year ago, we made our first announcements in the Peking and Tientsin areas suggesting to those Americans who did not have compelling reasons to remain—in other words, that they consider leaving while transportation was still available to do so. We had the idea that the port would be frozen quite soon; that would mean unless they left very soon they would have to go by air lift. The air facilities is some ways out of town from both Peking and Tientsin. As far as Peking was concerned there was sporadic fighting around the airports not infrequently. That was followed in a week or 10 days later by warnings in Shanghai, Nanking, and Hankow, and these warnings were repeated. At that time there was a shipping strike, as you will recall, and so we got the Navy to provide emergency shipping facilities and airplane companies to put on more planes to help people get out. A good many people left, a good many people remained, partly because they had in the past always stayed during periods of civil strife and let the waves of war flow over them and go about their immediate concerns, partly because they were optimistic and that under some changed conditions things might be better. The last ship that left Shanghai or naval vessel that had facilities for I think 500 to 600 people left with 7 people, so very adequate opportunity and very serious warnings were given to the people as to the desirability of the people to leave who did not have compelling reasons to remain.

We did not attempt to define what "compelling reasons" were and we made that quite clear both to the people in China and to their principals back here. Once before the United States in a moment of aberration in Mexico had quite illegally forced Americans to leave the country and when they returned, the states they found their property in led them to bring claims against the United States Government, which this Government has been entertaining for some time.

Furthermore, we recognized that there was a grave situation, both in the immediate take-over period and in the longer-range period which we could not predict. We had no pattern on which to go and certainly in places like Shanghai there was a very formidable situation for ill will which fortunately didn't develop. So that we did not try to either force our people out or to urge them to remain, but we provided them facilities to leave if they so wished to and we warned them of the dangers, actual and potential, and we said we would stay in there ourselves and help them insofar as we could.

We have had the *General Gordon* which went in there and took out about 400 Americans, 700 other foreigners, and most Americans who wanted to leave the central part of China have gone. Those who wanted to leave the Tientsin area have been able to go on the ships because the blockade really is not effective in that area.

In our warnings to the people in west China and Canton area we added a new note to the warnings that we had given in central and northern China. That note was based upon our actual experience, and we had to call attention to the fact that the Communist authorities on some occasions had not behaved with respect to international law in the protection of foreigners in their rights and in the traditional way nor had they permitted our consuls to exercise the functions which normally they would under such circumstances. The British warnings in the Canton area followed along those same lines.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Conditions seem to vary so much from country to country both in countries of continuing consular practice and in situations where there is a change of regime that I should like to ask a couple of questions for clarification. What I want to know is whether it is either (*a*) the generally recognized international standard in these respects or (*b*) does the United States have a standard of its own which it tries to apply in all cases as far as possible? That is a general way of putting it. Specifically, for instance, you mentioned the radio facilities of our consulate in Mukden. Is there any generally recognized standard about when foreign consulates maintain their own radio facilities and in the country to which they are accredited or when they simply code their dispatches and deliver them to the local radio facilities? Secondly, you mentioned the question of specific instructions to American consular representatives not to address the incoming authorities by their official titles. Is that also a general practice, general international practice, or specifically an American practice?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. No, as you know, international law is not always absolutely clear and precise on every point because it is a growing thing, but it is generally accepted and our views and practices of law run along the general lines that if there is a change of regime and there is nonrecognition, we will say, in a Latin-American country, the consuls continue to function uninterruptedly, deal with the local authorities in the normal way except that they do not address them in their official capacity nor are they addressed in their official capacity, and they don't flaunt themselves by attending official receptions and that kind of thing, in other words, which will be interactions which would have more than a local significance in terms of the general and normal evolved functions of consuls all over the world which have come down through the centuries. Likewise, dealings take place with the mission but on an informal basis and we followed that practice here. As a matter of fact, as regards China, you have the situation in Manchukuo where our representatives dealt with the Manchukuo authorities over a period of years, but the consul general in Mukden was called "Mr. So-and-so" and that applied to the British as well, and so on.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did they address local authorities by their official designations?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. No, by their person. That is the normal practice, and I am sure every one of the western powers gave instructions not dissimilar to the ones we gave our consular authorities before the war in any of these cities as how they should conduct themselves.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The radio?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. The historical and normal thing is that the local authorities provide you with telegraphic facilities that are of a reasonably good and rapid kind and do not in any way interfere with your sending codes or ciphers. In countries where those facilities are not sufficient and in countries where bilateral arrangements made that, the modern practice is for missions quite frequently or consulates to have radio facilities. In China, for example, when I was there 2 years ago, it took telegrams to go from Nanking to Tientsin 3 or 4 days. In fact, occasionally we sent over our facilities messages for them.

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to ask two questions. First of all, in our review what is the importance to Britain of its economic stake in China—that is in terms of the British home economy; and, secondly, what particular obligations do we have in mind in connection with the Communist assumption of Chinese obligations?

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. I might indicate on the most obvious ones or the rest, for the treaty obligations which they inherit and the idea that we should in effect agree to the abrogation of treaties or provide terms under which the abrogation should take place, is out of the question. Secondly, on the question of the treatment, of normal treatment accorded to foreign residents and officials, ready travel, access, the operation of courts of justice which are effective, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Again I don't want to curtail discussion, but I don't think we can impose on a busy man like Mr. Butterworth too long, and unless there are urgent questions that somebody would like to ask him, I suggest that we get on with the general discussion. Are there urgent questions somebody would like to ask Mr. Butterworth while he is here?

Thank you very much, Mr. Butterworth.

Now it has been suggested that we start with questions Nos. 22 and 23. I think Mr. Coons made that suggestion.

Mr. COONS. No, I don't think it was I.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, Mr. Rosinger, and perhaps you would like to take up the discussion as long as you made the suggestion.

Mr. ROSINGER. I suppose I asked for it. I didn't have anything very extensive to say. It just seemed to me that by a certain logic that they apply to the general situation, and that they might be considered first. On question 22, "To what extent is the upheaval in China and elsewhere in the Far East a predominantly political movement, and to what extent is it the expression of deep-rooted forces arising out of social and economic conditions?" I think it is rather clear that while the political aspect is important as the international situation in the Soviet Union and United States, while the functioning of particular parties—in the case of China the Communists and Kuomintang—are extremely important, the situations would not be the same if those parties did not exist in their present form, that nevertheless we are facing pretty deep-rooted social and economic conditions in the region, that even given a change in the existing political set-up, the existing political movements which are available for expressions of opinion and action in those countries, you would have the gravest kind of discontent, the gravest kind of political upset, because of the general poverty of the area, because of the unresolved social and economic conditions which have the character of a long-term revolutionary process which started a long time back and will not be completed in our time.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone want to comment?

Mr. DECKER. I should like very heartily to second that. It seems to me that events in China have progressed almost with the course of a comic tragedy in that the underlying forces have been the terrific want, the privations and disappointments under which the Chinese people have suffered through these years. When we think back on the constructive measures which the Nationalist Government did, that in a certain period in its existence, say from 1930 to 1937, and then its rejection just a few years later, I think we must recognize that they have been the victims in a measure of circumstances beyond their control which relate in precisely these things. It was the ill fate of the Kuomintang to have had the responsibility at a time when China was passing through a frightful experience which registered in the food and the clothing or the lack of them that the great mass of the people had available and that more than political maneuverings have been responsible for the outcome.

The CHAIRMAN. Any comment on that point?

Mr. VINACKE. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone can disagree with the fact that you have your political movements rooted in the social and economic causes. At the same time, you also have to recognize, it seems to me, that there is the political expression at a given moment of these economic and social causes of concern to us outside of China, and consequently we might come to an agreement on this proposition, but I don't see that it adds up to very much as far as the position of the United States and the needs and interest of the United States at the present moment or at any given moment in time in relation to the situation in China.

Mr. COONS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that probably half to two-thirds of the people around this table have probably written in the vein of the deep-rooted forces, of the total social and economic and political revolution in China [laughter], but I should like to throw my influence in the same line as Mr. Vinacke. After all, we are facing a political movement and we need to analyze it, the significance of the deep-rooted forces, in terms of whatever it may reveal for us, in terms of the meaning of the present political movement and whether or not and what—and this comes on to the question 23—we do about it. Let us all admit the history and move on to the question of what we do from now on.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, these questions seem to raise the problem of long-term and short-term discussion, and would we get along faster if we tried to divide our deliberations between long-term and short-term in some way?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a very pertinent point, Mr. Fairbank. Would you like to elaborate that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Presumably the professors present will be interested in the long-term, since operations are a matter of immediate knowledge and knowledge which the Department has here much better than any of us. I think, myself, that our main lack is not on the side of operations but on the side of long-term understanding.

Mr. VINACKE. Mr. Chairman, would Mr. Fairbank be able to make that the long-term understanding not of the situation in China as it affects the Chinese but of the long-term understanding of our relationship to that situation, that is that we are concerned here with the United States and American interests in relation to this situation in the short run and also in the long run?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I add, also, Mr. Chairman, the relation of Russia to China and ourselves?

Mr. VINACKE. And of ourselves in relation to Russia as affected by the situation in China.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, as to the acclamation of generalizations to which we have just listened, I wonder—with all of which I agree—whether I could point up the subject by making one or two flat statements. If this question 22 means anything at all, it raises in my mind the question of the nature of the Communist movement in China today and of the KMT. If you put it in the way that these are all deep-rooted forces and therefore can't be dug up but must be allowed to grow as they now are, you get into a frame of mind where you say, this will happen, you can't stop it, here it is and you might just as well be scholarly and recognize deep-rooted forces when you see them. It is my impression that the political form that these deep-rooted forces are taking in China today is a very specific one and one that can be described and should be. I think it is a political movement. It is one which is using deep-rooted political forces. The Communist movement in China today is one which is taking advantage of a situation which is not new, which has existed there for a very long time, and it should be analyzed as such. It is a political power movement. It is using propaganda which includes the idea of social reform, and so on, but basically the motives behind it I believe are definitely political, connected with an international organization although taking place in China, that this is occurring in a country where this sort of thing fits extremely well. Nothing fits in China quite so well as a bureaucratic, one-party monopoly government.

You are not dealing with a feudal society. The Russian position is that this is a feudal country. If I may refer to my colleague, Mr. Fairbank's excellent book, I think that shows very well indeed that that idea that this is feudal has got to be discarded. It is a society in which this type of one-party political bureaucrat program fits so perfectly that very few Chinese will have any particular intellectual difficulty in accepting it.

I don't know whether that is enough to start the ball rolling.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Since we are more or less in agreement, I think Mr. Taylor has summed it up very well on this question 22. Could we go back to questions 1, 2, 3, and 4?

The CHAIRMAN. I think so, because I think we will probably be coming back to question 23; but question 22 I think is a natural introduction to the first four questions on this list. Would you agree, gentlemen, that we could go back to our first four questions here and perhaps that would help center the discussion?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I just raise another procedural question, whether we are aiming to just keep ourselves going with talk or to formulate agreed conclusions of any kind just as a group. Do we go through certain phases in these 3 days or is it all the same from first to last? That is, should we aim to try to settle some of these questions as we go along? Do we, therefore, want a procedure of stages?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as the Under Secretary said in his opening remarks, I don't think the Department is going to look for any agreed conclusions by this group. Am I right in that?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. I think that the general feeling of the Under Secretary and Mr. Jessup was that we would not make any effort to try and get common agreement here, that there were different points of view and that it would be valuable to have those brought out and discussed and the positions of some might result in interesting or helpful positions by others.

We were planning at the end of the discussion this afternoon to raise the question with you as to whether tomorrow we might do one of three things. The first would be to continue a general discussion along the lines of the questions

you have in front of you. The second would be to break up, possibly into two groups, one of which might discuss possible courses of action, possible programs with respect to China alone; the second would discuss possible courses of action with respect to the rest of the Pacific area, possibly on the basic assumption that China was beyond immediate help or immediate effective action and that we should build our defenses of democracy in the area around China. Those two groups might consider those two problems.

A third possibility might be that we might break up into still smaller groups, three, four, or five, one of which might discuss possible political action in the whole area; a second, possible economic actions; and a third, information actions. And then those groups would get down to very specific suggestions. We had planned to leave that until 4 or 5 o'clock this afternoon, possibly proceed this morning and this afternoon to discuss the questions of the general nature that we have been the last half hour, and then leave it to the group as a whole on the basis of that discussion to decide whether it would be more fruitful tomorrow and Saturday to continue that way.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I suggest that I'm afraid as we go into specific questions various ones of us will approach from the different assumptions, slightly different assumptions, of this general nature. And I'm a little fearful as to whether we want to waste our time by just lining up on arguments and specific points, not having taken a longer view. What was just said, it seems to me, was what we all agreed with, what Mr. Colegrove was saying and yet not perhaps a complete statement of the course of history in China and if we are trying to have a long-term approach, don't we need an agenda which gives us long-term conclusions at one point and then specific discussion at another?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Chairman, may I speak again on this subject?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLEGROVE. I think the division of remedies on long-term proposals and short-term proposals is very good, but I don't see why we can't discuss long-term and short-term proposals at the same time. They are intimately related to each other. A short-term proposal of course should be in line with long-term policy. And if I may make a remark with reference to question No. 1, as the question before us at the present time, it seems I think to a large number of people in the United States, a large growing public opinion, not merely experts but of opinion of colleges and universities and press and the forums, that the United States foreign policy should be a global policy and there ought not to be a sharp difference between our policy in the Orient and our policy in Europe—and for Latin America for that matter.

This first question uses the term "totalitarian regime". At the present time our policy toward Europe is a policy of trying to keep countries like Greece and Italy free so that they can practice democracy without being submerged and oppressed by aggressive nations that are trying to force another system upon them. If that is our policy in Europe, and I think we agreed that it was, why shouldn't that be our policy in China? Why shouldn't we have the same global policy in all parts of the world? It seems to me that our foreign policy should be made consistent in that respect.

Mr. BRODIE. Mr. Chairman, with regard to this distinction between long-term and short-term problems, it seems to me we have, first of all, to settle the question which I see in No. 1. I believe this refers to the precedural question which was raised as to whether we should divide it into two groups. The question, as I see it, is, Do we have to assume now that China is lost to the Communists or do we not? The tenor of the white paper, as I see it, is that it is. I should like to know from the experts who are around this table whether there is general agreement on that particular conclusion. It seems to me that is essential to everything else we have to discuss.

Mr. MURPHY. With respect to the procedural question that Mr. Fairbank raised, it was my impression that in the beginning Mr. Russell said that Mr. Fosdick and Mr. Jessup and possibly Dr. Case would outline their findings to date or their general impressions before the general discussion was made.

Mr. RUSSELL. No, I didn't intend to say that at all. What we have had in mind in connection with the briefing is that there would be only two general statements which you have already heard for the purpose of providing basic factual information. Now, there are additional persons who will be available to give even more brief briefings on particular problems, such as the military problem, the economic situation, the situation in Japan, the situation in southeast Asia, etc.; so that as this group gets around to those problems we will have the experts to answer questions on those. But aside from what has already taken place and aside from that, the ball is already in your hands.

I would only make one more point and that is with respect to Mr. Fairbank's statement. It seems to me that the questions that you have here are pretty specific questions. They look into the future. They ask what should be done. Here are questions that are pretty important from the point of view of taking policy steps during the coming months and years and, while there may be some here—the list is rather long—that you may dispose of rather easily, if there should be expressions of opinion by those around the table on most of these questions I think the group as a whole would have gone a fairly long distance in laying the basis for policy steps that might be taken.

Mr. STAYLEY. It seems to me—and this is in support, I believe, of what Mr. Fairbank said—that in answering these specific questions any divisions of opinion that would develop would probably be traceable to differences of view with respect to two types of underlying questions. I'm suggesting that maybe it might be worth while to examine those underlying questions a little bit at the outset.

The questions that occur to me are these: First of all, what are the interests of the United States in relation to China on certain points, particularly what are our interests in the internal organization and the external relations of China? Are we interested in keeping China from having a, let's say, socialist government or a collectivist type of economic system, or something of that sort? Is that a strong American interest? Are we interested in whether or not China has a, what you might call, totalitarian government, distinguishing between totalitarianism and collectivism, which at least a good many people think might be a form of collectivist, a socialist versus Communist distinction?

Thirdly, are we interested in whether or not China's regime is tied to the apron strings of Russia? Among those three things, which is our dominant concern, expressing my own view it would be the last, from the point of view of the United States policy that what we are mainly interested in is the power of the Soviet Union should not be augmented by having subservient regimes in China and all through Asia and that if the regime in China and other parts of Asia is not subservient to the Soviet Union that it's still a pretty strong interest of ours that it shouldn't be totalitarian because we think that is likely to lead to aggression and it's not good for our general objectives in the world, so we have a considerable interest in the second point that I mentioned too.

On the first point, I would say our interest is much less, that is a particular form by which they organize their economic system; that I just give my own views there in order to show the nature of the question, not to settle the problem.

Then, if we could clear our minds a little on what our stake is, so to speak, with respect to these things—what our major interests are—then there is the other basic question that would seem to underly our answers to a great many of these specific questions, and that is, How do we assess the situation in China now with respect particularly to the realities of the power situation there? Is it or is it not feasible now to do anything to stop the Communist control of all of China? That is one basic question.

Secondly, how do we assess the nature and the prospects of the Communist Party in China? Is it the best bet that the Communist Party consists at the top of a group of determined men who have available modern techniques of control of communications with which they can so mold men's minds that they can and will make it into a totalitarian regime subservient to the Soviet Union; or is it a better bet that at least in China that won't work so well, that the Chinese are very individualistic, that even with modern propaganda techniques and thought control devices and so on, that that isn't too great a danger in China, and that it's more likely that with the help of some mistakes that the Russians may make the Chinese Communist Party will be more Chinese than Russian Communist and, therefore, it's best to put our money on the possibility that the Chinese regime may be weaned away a bit from Russian influence? It seems to me those are two interlocking sets of fundamental questions that personally I have firm convictions on that second sort of thing, and we might well discuss a little bit as precedent to some of the specific problems.

Mr. BALLENTINE. Mr. Chairman, I think that the points that have been raised by Mr. Stayley are all very important but I wonder if they wouldn't emerge as we go along, as we approach these specific questions. I'd like very much to follow Mr. Brodie's suggestion and deal with that first question in the manner that he suggested because I think that that will lead us to these very important points that Mr. Stayley brought out.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a feeling that unless we get down to the concrete essence of these questions we are going to perhaps get into fog here and spend the day on trying to define our presuppositions before we get into the realities.

Mr. MacNaughton. I'm just a plain businessman. This talkie-talkie gets me all up in the air. I'll give you my answer to the first question. Presently I think we are all washed up in China. Secondly, I think we ought to do what we can to keep the rest of the east from going the way China did. Now, shoot that full of holes.

The Chairman. Now, that is a concrete position. That is in line with what Mr. Ballentine was suggesting and in line with the question asked by Mr. Brodie. Now, can we begin at that? Can we begin with what Mr. MacNaughton said? His position was, as I understand it, that we are washed up in China and—what was your second point?

Mr. MacNaughton. And we do what we can to keep the rest of the east from going the same way.

The Chairman. Now, there is something to get our teeth into. Personally, I'd like to hear the testimony of this group on those two points.

Mr. Ballentine. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to modify that point a little bit. I think that even if we assume that Russian domination of China is an accomplished fact we shouldn't accept that as final.

Mr. MacNaughton. I said "presently," sir.

Mr. Ballentine. I said some modification, perhaps a little explanation of your views. I wasn't taking issue with you. That if it is conceivable that China if disillusioned will free itself from the toils thus presenting a situation which we can help, that is all the more important since were China lost to the free world the problem of wresting the further expansion of Communist expansion in the Far East will be much more difficult.

We must always bear in mind that there are at least 6 million overseas Chinese in the territories of southeast Asia and they are bound to go the same way eventually as their people at home and they would constitute a tremendous force and influence towards undermining the efforts, our efforts, to arrest the advance of communism, if we didn't try to take care of the situation in China when and as we have the opportunity.

Mr. Colegrove. Dr. Fosdick, I would not agree at all that we are so-called washed up in China and neither that the Nationalist Government is washed up either. These four questions include the question No. 3, which asks whether there are other healthy forms of resistance in China capable of exercising effective leadership to which the United States could give support.

Now, Mr. Kennan, this morning in his very able, cool, calm, deliberated, comprehensive statement that he made before us in opening this conference, said that the Chinese Communists did not control at the present time a one-half, or what he used was a major part, of China. The fact, of course, is a fact and we might as well operate upon it. Are there other healthy forces that are still resisting the Chinese Communists? Well, to name one, there is General Uai, who has according to our latest information controlled at least three Mohammedan provinces—and we know how Mohammedan countries look at communism. It seems to me that General Pai Chung who still is loyal to the Nationalist Government, is one healthy source still remaining which deserves the assistance of the United States.

I take the position, also, of course that General Chiang still deserves our support. We have, of course, General Chennault's plan whereby he thinks that he could save a large part of China with the expenditure of not more than $200 million, following tactics which he used during the world war. I won't agree at all that we are washed up in China. There are healthy spots which will still resist the Chinese Communists and which deserve our attention. Of course, my assumption is that our policy in China should be the same sort of policy in Europe, viz, to resist totalitarian regimes which carry on aggressions very much like the aggressions which Hitler carried on at the beginning of the world war.

Mr. Brodie. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me this is one of the several questions on which we would particularly benefit from the views of General Marshall.

The Chairman. I haven't ventured to call on General Marshall because I didn't know whether he wanted to participate in the discussion or not.

General Marshall. I think it would be very much better, on account of my intimate connection with the operation as you well know, if I didn't do any talking yet.

Mr. Coons. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest an alternative. It seems to me that some of us, even the professors, may desire some briefing from intelligent sources as to whether or not it is conceived in a military fashion or politically that there may be healthy forces of resistance in south China that are capable of exercising some effective leadership into which support can be given. For example, I for one had in my mind the question of just what is the station of

General Pai Chung Hsi. What is the organization of the situation at the present time? I think that that may be a set of facts that the State Department might wish to brief us on. I rather imagined that Mr. Butterworth would do that, but we didn't have that.

May I, before closing, just add a facetious note. Question 3 reads "Are there any other healthy forces * * *?" and in the light of question 2 in the white paper that seems just a little funny. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I might say in answer to your question on the military situation Colonel McCann is here prepared to brief us on that question. I suggest that that go over until this afternoon and I think that, although there are certain questions of security that will have to be taken into consideration, Colonel McCann can be fairly frank with us on that point.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, just a point of information. I thought I heard Mr. Colegrove say that General Pai Hsi controlled three Mohammedan provinces. I was wondering if he would name them for us.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, Mr. Lattimore, I didn't want to put up any military information that the State Department has, but it is reported in the press that General Pai is still holding Mohammedan provinces. I don't know whether that is correct or not, and that is one thing we would like to be briefed on.

Mr. DECKER. I would agree that we are by no means washed up in China. I think it's very important for us to keep that constantly in mind. I do so, however, for a different set of reasons than those I believe Mr. Colegrove advanced. I think there is no doubt whatever but that the leadership, the present political leadership, of the present regime in China is Communist and certainly for the time being at least is thoroughly committed to a Russian line. I think it would be very foolish if we were to assume anything else. But it's yet to be seen how effective that group is going to make that control of China itself.

Those of us who went through the revolution of 1925 to '27 or '28 know how quickly these enthusiasms can spread in China and how quickly disillusionment can follow. And I do not think it is wishful thinking to point out that the Communist Party has got to navigate the same waters that wrecked the Kuomintang and if we have got to look any further than the end of our noses I'm very sure that we ought not to assume here that it is going to be able to make China as a whole an effective cat's-paw of Russian policy or that it is going to be able to set up and to maintain a stable effective government over the continent of China.

Then there is another thing. Experience in one of these revolutions has taught us how quickly an anti-American or antiforeign or antieverything else kind of a movement can change into something that is very different. And I for one don't for a minute believe that the good will toward America that has been such a fact in China in past years has all been dissipated. Some of it has been dissipated. We have suffered seriously. There is no question about that. But that it has been completely dissipated, I think is not in accord with the facts.

Then, too, we know what a tremendous place the American people and the American institutions have had in the training of the only effective Chinese leadership that the Chinese people have, politically conscious people, people who have ideas of modern government and who will have to be depended upon to be the backbone of any government which is to emerge in China.

The contributions of those who have been trained in Russia have also got to be reckoned with. But it is going to take more than a decade of this kind of a regime to persuade me that the effects of that good work that we have done in the past has been totally lost and so, if the first question assumes that the present regime in China is bound—it may be I admit that, but that it is bound to be a cat's paw of Russian Communist imperialism I think we are basing our argument on a false assumption.

Mr. MURPHY. On the question of whether we are washed up in China, if by being washed up in China means that we have lost the capability to make China completely an instrument of our own policy, as is the complacent attitude of a great many Americans, I think we are washed up. But I don't think we can—and I don't think basically that is a justifiable assumption. Just after the question of being washed up was made, somebody made the remark that we could assume that Russian influence would automatically predominate in China. I think that is a very unsound assumption. I think it's a matter that we can spend a great deal of time investigating and discussing.

Mr. Colegrove raised the point of the three Mohammedan provinces that were run by General Pai Chung Hsi and the question of using various other Kuomintang forces in China as a point against the Communists. I would say that his

newspaper information was probably about 2 weeks out of date because the newspapers in articles for the last 2 weeks have carried, it seems to me, a continuous report of the going-over of all those provinces into the other capital (?). And the Foreign Trade Council just this week put out a memorial reporting a statement made by the American Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai which was sent here to the State Department in which our businessmen in Shanghai stated among other things that the Nationalist government is finished for the foreseeable future and please—so their throats won't be cut—don't send any more money over there for the central government, such as the $12 million just that week, 2 or 3 months ago, that has been sent over for military supplies going to them.

Mr. MACNAUGHTON. Doesn't that maintain my point that at the present they are washed up?

Mr. MURPHY. If that meant we had the capability of using China narrowly as an instrument of our own foreign policy.

Mr. KIZER. Mr. Chairman, in the sense that Mr. MacNaughton used the word, I agree with him heartily that we are washed up in China. I take it that Mr. MacNaughton meant that the policy of pouring lavishly arms and support in the hands of the Generalissimo has been demonstrated to be a complete failure, that we ought to think our policy out in new terms. As to Dr. Colegrove's suggestion that there are healthy sources of resistance, I suggest that they only appear healthy in areas where they have not yet been effectively challenged by the Communist group. There are no, under the Nationalist Government as far as I know, healthy sources of resistance, particularly once the Communists have made such a display of military force as they have made. Whenever those are approached I believe they will do just what the others have done, they will surrender. And I think we ought not to rely upon it. Anyone, it seems to me, who has read the report of Major General Barr and the JUSMAG group in the white paper, anyone who has read the report of General Wedemeyer on what Chung Hai did in Formosa must, I think, come to the conclusion that the use of military force or assistance by us to resisting groups in China is a tragic mistake, that the quicker we drop it and move to other resources we have in our hands the better we will be off. We have succeeded to a large degree in Europe because of the effectiveness of the Marshall plan and the use of economic and social forces. We couldn't use those in China because such as we sent over under UNRRA and under our assistance simply were used as instruments of war by the Generalissimo. We haven't done anything in that sense for China except on a very small scale.

I'm in hearty sympathy with what Mr. Decker has said about the potential sources of support for us that exist individually in China, what has been done there. I think that United Service to China, I think that what the missionaries have done, have created many places of good will. I know now that there are missionaries of ours in China, and I speak as one not interested in the missionary movement except in an economic and political sense, operating in China behind the Communist lines that have established sources of friendship there and are getting on in a way that is surprising. And I know that that sort of thing can be continued.

When we come to the economic and social assistance that we can render in the Far East I should want to speak again, but just for the present I do want to emphasize the fact that our military assistance to the Generalissimo as a policy is completely washed up, as I see it.

Mr. BUSS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to observe that Mr. MacNaughton's remarks and Mr. Murphy's remarks were not the same. Mr. MacNaughton said "we are washed up in China." The Foreign Trade Council's report is that the Nationalist Government is washed up in China. It's a dangerous identity to put ourselves "we, as the Nationalist Government."

Mr. VINACKE. I'd just like to make my position clear by reformulating the first question. It seems to me that American policy should be directed toward maintaining normal access to China but not in establishing or seeking to save China for or against any particular type of regime. Beyond that, American policy, it seems to me, should be directed toward the trying to insure that any regime in China, as far as we can, is independent of any external control including our own.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, gentlemen, it's quarter past 12 and that was the hour we set for the reason that we will have better luck at the lunchroom on the second floor if we go down there early. May we adjourn now? Do you have something to say, Mr. Russell?

Mr. RUSSELL. I would like to call your attention, please, again to the essentiality of visiting room 7258, which is two floors above this, either during the luncheon period today or tomorrow in connection with the transportation and other bookkeeping items. Then we are going to meet here again at 2 this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we will reassemble in this room this afternoon at 2 o'clock.

(The meeting adjourned at 12:20 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. RAYMOND FOSDICK (chairman). Gentlemen, we agreed this morning that we would start off this afternoon with a briefing on the military situation by Colonel McCann, who comes from Central Intelligence. Colonel McCann, will you take over.

Colonel MCCANN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, this map shows the general military situation in China with China orientated in relation to the rest of the Far East.

The total opposing forces in this situation are on the order of 4,000,000 Communists and something less than 1½ million Nationalists. The Communist forces are divided approximately equally between irregulars and regular combat forces. The latter, generally speaking, are well-led and well-equipped. They enjoy high morale, high combat effectiveness, and have demonstrated a particular mobility in their operatitons.

The Nationalists, which total something under 1½ million, include a disproportionately large percentage of service forces which are not used in combat. The combat forces include a small navy and air force, totalling something between 800,000 and 900,000. The Nationalist forces are characterized by professional ineffectiveness and, generally speaking, they lack the will to fight. The low morale of the Nationalist forces invites Communist subversive activities.

Added to the numerical and qualitative supremacy of the Communist forces is the geographical isolation of the major groups of residual forces. This enhances the Communist capabilities for eliminating those residual forces successively or simultaneously.

There are a maximum of 100,000 force in the northwest which have withdrawn before a Communist advance of over 700 miles which has over-run most of Chinghai Province and parts of Ningsia and Kansu Provinces in 3 months.

The forces apparently available for the defense of Szechwan and Yunnan Provinces in the west and southwest total about 200,000. These are under the nominal centralized control of Chang Chun. Actually, the great bulk of these forces are loyal only to their immediate war-lord commander. Even for a brief defense of Szechwan Province there are probably not over 50,000 troops.

As to Yunnan Province there are already good indications that the local authorities there are not to be depended upon in a show-down. The recent publicity on Governor Lu Han's coup, or attempted coup, indicates that on the surface the Generalissimo has settled that problem. However, it appears to be a temporary settlement of expediency on the part of Lu. Already there are considerable areas in the provinces which are under control of the pro-Communists and bandit groups.

In the general area of Canton there are three commands. The bulk of the forces are under command of General Pai Chung-hsi and occupy the northern sector in the Kwangtung territory.

The Communists have been maintaining pressure on the defenses of Canton as noted by a succession of probing attacks and advanced operations by irregular forces operating in front of the regular combat forces. The Communists are believed to have the necessary preponderance of military strength in this area to mount an assault at a time of their own choosing.

It is currently reported that the forces on General Pai's right flank in this approximate area have been ordered to withdraw into Canton even prior to the Communist assault on orders of the Generalissimo. If this withdrawal takes place it will expose Pai's right flank and expose him to being cut off from the coastal area. It would appear that he would then have to make an early decision between holding his position and fighting out a decisive but losing battle in his present area of occupation.

The alternatives that are available to him appear to be to withdraw into Kuang-si Province and postpone the final decision, or, secondly, to make a deal with the Communists.

This latest of the Generalissimo's interference in mainland military operations has followed his refusal to afford assistance to the mainland commanders since the fall of Shanghai in May. It is on this point that the residual commanders frequently tend to blame their reverses. None of them seemingly take into account the fact that in this interim none has attempted to provide an inspiring leadership to cooperate among themselves in a joint effort.

In the east China-Taiwan area we find the region of the Generalissimo's particular concern. In this area he has approximately 300,000 troops, including navy and air force. This area is under his personal command and that of his most trusted general.

Numerically this force is probably adequate to defend the island of Taiwan indefinitely. I should say that most of these forces are in Taiwan itself and numerically the garrison is probably adequate to defend the island. Moreover, the Nationalists, with their navy and air force, have a considerable capacity for resistance to the very limited Communist amphibious capabilities against Taiwan. This despite the fact that there is a low percentage of combat effectives in the Nationalist garrison in Taiwan and despite the fact that defense preparations are not in evidence. The Communist capabilities for taking Taiwan are greatest in causing the fall of the island from within.

The discipline and morale of the troops is at a low ebb. It is the result of past defeats and inadequate leadership.

These factors create a situation in which active Communist subversive activity is effective. The Communists are already known to be infiltrating the island.

There is another factor on Taiwan. The excesses of the Nationalist administration in Taiwan since VJ-day have earned for the Chiang Kai-shek regime the earnest hatred of the Taiwanese. This has a twofold effect. First of all it has a bearing on the probable effectiveness of the troops in the garrison there. Secondly, it provides a second fruitful field for Communist subversive activity on the island.

In the light of all these considerations, it seems probable that a Communist take-over of Taiwan probably would not be preceded by a major military assault of the island.

In summation, the life expectancy of organized Nationalist military resistance in China is extremely short. Generally speaking, the Communists will set the time table. Not only do they possess the predominant military power but more importantly they will not rely on military force alone to achieve their objective of extending their control over all China.

Mr. HEROD. I would like to ask, is there any information or intelligence that leads you to believe any munitions—arms—or military support, if not generalship, is coming from Russia?

Colonel MCCANN. There have been numerous reports to that effect as the Communists have advanced. It is becoming increasingly difficult to get exact information. While we had representatives in north China and Manchuria, United States representatives when confronted with this proposition by the Nationalists, asked for proof. They were not given substantial proof of the allegations. At the time the Communists took over in the Peiping-Tientsin area there were observed some Russian-type trucks and vehicles but in such small quantities as probably to be insignificant.

Mr. COLEGROVE. May I ask Colonel McCann what is the position of the Red army in North Korea? Has it withdrawn, and, if so, what is the character of the Korean Army?

Colonel MCCANN. The Soviet Army announced its withdrawal last December from Northern Korea. As far as I know, it has been substantially carried out. The Northern Korean forces received a degree of training and secondary equipment from the Russians prior to their withdrawal. There might be still an advisory mission there.

Mr. HEROD. To what extent have American munitions and instruments of war found their way into Communist hands?

Colonel MCCANN. There again we lack the facilities to make an accurate survey and come up with current figures. I can give you indications of it. The Communist forces that took over Tientisin were so completely equipped with American equipment that they appeared to be American-equipped units. Certain Nationalist units that had been United States equipped some months back were defeated or surrendered, and something like three-quarters of their equipment fell into the hands of the Communists.

Mr. PHILLIPS TALBOT. Is there an available estimate of the magnitude of American aid that would be required to extend the indicated life expectancy of Nationalist resistance, if such a policy were determined upon?

Colonel McCann. Such an estimate would have to be based on who are we going to support and to what purpose—what are the means available for getting the material to them—how soon can you get it to them—under what circumstances will they use it?

Mr. Talbot. Your statement of indicated life expectancy of the Nationalist forces was based on present American policy in relation to Nationalist forces. Is that correct?

Colonel McCann. Yes; necessarily so.

Mr. John W. Decker. I wanted to ask, Is there any evidence the Communists will develop a reconnaissance or tactical air force?

Colonel McCann. No Communist aircraft have ever appeared over combat areas. It is known that they have acquired through capture or defection—captured on the ground or actual defection—small numbers of Nationalist aircraft, and they claim some thousands of Nationalist air force personnel have gone over to them, but their claims in that respect may be exaggerated, but so far there have been no indications that they have any effective air arm at all.

Mr. Taylor. Could you tell us about the oil supply of the Communist armies? According to our observers, they are well disciplined, highly mobile, and highly mechanized. Where do they get their oil?

Colonel McCann. I would agree with you on all points except that they are highly mechanized. While they are highly mobile, it is by marching rather than by any mechanization.

Mr. Stassen. To what extent are the commanders of these 2,000,000 Communist forces decentralized and to what extent is there an effective centralized command; in other words, are there a series of units under separate command or are they very clearly under one centralized control?

Colonel McCann. In the operations prior to the crossing of the Yangtze River, the major field commanders apparently had considerable independence in the conduct of their operations. Subsequent to that time there are indications of increasing centralized control of those major field commanders.

Mr. Stassen. Is there any information as to how that centralized control is being equipped?

Colonel McCann. As far as I know it is being equipped.

Mr. Stassen. Are there any significant Nationalist generals who are still in command of troops that have gone over?

Colonel McCann. None have appeared so far as I know. I think it is likely that these troops have been taken and used in the Communist forces but not as units.

Mr. Stassen. At the end of the war with Japan, what was your estimate of the Nationalist armed forces and of the Communist armed forces in numbers?

Colonel McCann. At that time the Communist forces were estimated in the neighborhood of 800,000. Of those, not much more than half were considered to be adequately armed even with rifles. The Nationalist forces at that time totaled something in the neighborhood of 2¾ millions.

Mr. Vinacke. The 300,000 Communist troops—are they indoctrinated or are they professional soldiers working temporarily under Communist Party control?

Colonel McCann. I think it has been a feature of the Communist program to indoctrinate anybody coming under their control and going about it rather thoroughly.

Mr. Vinacke. And it has been done thoroughly in the case of Chinese troops?

Colonel McCann. Things have expanded rapidly, but the troops under their control are becoming more thoroughly indoctrinated every day.

Mr. Vinacke. How much use is made of the political commissar in connection with the command of the Communist armed forces?

Colonel McCann. I believe they follow that pattern.

Mr. Stassen. What is the nature of the terrain on the southwestern half roughly of China, compared to the northeasterly half so far as military operations are concerned?

Colonel McCann. The answer to that is that it would have been possible to present quite a clear-cut picture a few months ago. In general, it would have been possible to say that the Manchurian area and not the China area is fairly level and militarily favorable to operate in that area.

Mr. Stassen. How does their advance now compare to the Japanese advance at the high point of the war?

Colonel McCann. The Japanese on an east-west general line were in about that far. The Communists had moved into this area and somewhat down into here, and in the east China section there was a considerable area that the Japa-

nese had moved through but did not hold. That is generally believed to be under Communist control at this time.

Mr. BERNARD BRODIE. To make what is admittedly a far-fetched assumption, supposing a change in American policy should somehow enthuse a new spirit in the Nationalist armies in the south, are there any reserves, or any men having some amount of training, that might be called upon to fill out those numbers that are indicated on the map? Do those figures represent existing combat effectives or do they take into account what might be considered available reserves.

Colonel MCCANN. Those figures represent the strength of the so-called combat units. They are not necessarily indicative of combat effectives. As to the reserves and even the troops here in question, I think the problem of turning them into effective forces would require, among many other things, starting from scratch with the individual soldier.

Mr. BRODIE. In other words, there are no men not already in the army service who have some military training in the area still under control of the Nationalist armies.

Colonel MCCANN. I would say they have no effective military training.

The CHAIRMAN. A week or two ago Governor Stassen came down to see us, and we had an interesting talk with him. I suggest at this time that we ask him, if he will, to talk to us so we can have the benefit of his counsel before he has to leave us.

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you, Doctor. I might say that it is with considerable reluctance that I explain my position before all these experts. I am willing to do it with the same motives I discussed with Dr. Jessup's committee in September. I state my views in the hope that I might contribute something toward thinking through to a new policy in Asia. I understand that is the process now going on.

I might say that my reluctance to state my views is increased by the fact that present at this table is the man who many years ago attempted to give me my first information about China and Asia—Dr. Harold Quigley. I add with a smile, that he will in no sense be responsible for what I say today, even though he did stimulate my original interest in Asia many years ago at the University of Minnesota.

I am willing to give my tentative views very frankly and precisely in order that it might contribute toward seeing where we are at in Asiatic policy.

I have been listening with a great deal of interest to the discussion thus far and will participate as much as I can throughout the remainder of the conferences. I am gravely concerned about the future of our American policy in Asia—perhaps more so than I should be—but I give you the basis for my deep concern for your own evaluation.

In my judgment, Asia is No. 1 on Russia's board. I think that Russia puts Asia up in first place in her considerations. I say that notwithstanding the other recognized centers of industrial power in the world that Mr. Kennan discussed this morning. I say that because the geography of the situation is such that Asia is the under belly of vast Russia. Russia has one projection out toward Europe, and the other projection out toward Alaska, and the under belly is Asia. The Russians are very security-conscious, but I do not agree with Mr. Kennan that you can consider that their thinking is different from Hitler's; that is, I do not feel it is correct to say the Communists are less aggressive in their tendencies than Hitler was.

While it is true the Communists consider that capitalism has the seeds of its own destruction, I understand their doctrine to be that, when capitalism sees it is about to be destroyed by those seeds, capitalism will begin an imperialist war. The Communists have demonstrated before, in the case of Finland, that they will take aggressive advance action, in an effort, as they see it, to prepare themselves for an inevitable capitalistic imperialistic war. Thus I say that in our world strategy we should consider aggressive action by the Soviet Union as one of the definite alternative possibilities. In that sense I put a different interpretation than Mr. Kennan does on the world picture.

Looking at the over-all objectives of our country on a world basis, it seems to me that clearly these objectives are to advance the standards of living and the freedom of peoples throughout the world; and to do so in a world at peace. We are going to have peace, for a generation at least, unless Russia commits aggression. I see very little possibility that there would be any war on this earth of any consequence in the next generation unless Russia commits an act of aggression. Therefore, the great problem of peace in the atomic period focuses down

to our key consideration of what will affect the policies of the leaders of the Soviet Union. I believe that, so long as the Kremlin leaders are uncertain about the future of Asia and of Asia's attitude, they are not very likely to commit aggression. That is why they are at this time giving great concentration to Asia.

They are starting with their infiltration methods throughout Asia—and not just in China.

I do not feel that within a generation anyone will draw from Asia any great forces or any military potential to play a part in aggressive action toward some other continent. But I do feel that the question of whether the military forces of Asia, limited in their military effectiveness though they may be, need to be contained by one side or the other in a world struggle, might be crucial in a future war. That status of these Asiatic military forces therefore might be crucial in a decision by the Kremlin as to whether or not a war should be attempted. That is one reason why there are many indications of concentration on the part of Russia upon Asia as No. 1. They are now in the early stages of their concentrated attempt to consolidate the vast area of Asia.

Moving on from that analysis, it therefore follows that very high American policy should be the determination to prevent Russian consolidation of Asia. I have the strong feeling that we are spending altogether too much time thinking of a China policy as a separate matter. I think that is a very unfortunate aspect of our thinking in these recent months and years. I emphasize also that, as I see it, we are not meeting to either approve or condone any past act, but the question is, Where do we go from here.

I think it is of vital importance that our country adopt a comprehensive Asiatic policy, of which the Chinese situation is an important part but definitely a subordinate part of the whole Asiatic approach. It is not quite so significant how far the Communists advance in China, or just exactly what happens in the Nationalist Government or the Communist government of China. The question is, rather, how does this all affect the whole vast area of Asia. As we all know, more than half the peoples of Asia are outside of China—in Malaya, Siam, Burma, India, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippine Islands.

Looking at the total situation, our country should at the earliest date, which presumably would be after Congress meets in January, initiate an economic aid-to-Asia program. The exact framework and details must be developed as time goes on, but I think some comment could be made on details at this time.

If we continue for a long period an atmosphere that the United States is awaiting to see what happens in Asia, the result is a vacuum. Certainly all the lessons show that the Communists thrive on vacuum. They push into a vacuum with rapidity. So far as possible, we must not permit vacuums to be present in Asia. Therefore, we should establish an aid-to-Asia program and we should decide, considering all the total demands upon our resources, what we can afford to spend in Asia. Clearly our own defense forces, the Marshall plan, and the arms for the Atlantic Pact members must all be firm and prior commitments. Our own internal problems of social security for our own people and of expenses of our Government are also demands upon our resources.

Furthermore, there is a limit to our resources. But it seems to me, when you add all those things up and look at the world picture, we not only can afford up to one-fortieth of our national budget for Asia, or one two-hundredth part of our year's annual income, which is one billion dollars a year, but we cannot afford not to do it. We should also establish a headquarters in Asia for the program.

It is my feeling that Bangkok in Siam would be the best headquarters for an American office for an aid-to-Asia program. From this headquarters this affirmative aid program for whatever area remains not under Communist domination in China and in the rest of Asia should be carried on.

In many respects it should be similar to that superb plan in Europe which is named for the distinguished American that sits at this table, the plan that has done so much for the advancement of the world's peace—the Marshall plan. Of course, in other respects it must be very different because the conditions in Asia are so different.

I would say it should be a firm rule of that plan that we do not hand out any aid to or through any governments in Asia because of the experience and the knowledge of the corruption and weakness of those governments. We should consult with governments as to what is to be done, and we should have joint committees for operation; but the aid must be handed out directly through American agents, having in mind not only the corruption but also the great importance of evidence of aid from the standpoint of good will among the peoples.

In this positive program for China and for the rest of Asia, I would try to do such things as the drilling of wells in those plateaus that have good water—with good well-drilling equipment, the development of land use in conservation and fertilization. Admittedly this would make a small dent on that vast area, but those are the types of constructive things that should be carried on. A portion of the program should include underwriting American private capital in going in and developing some of the natural resources of Asia. Underwriting under point 4 or a clause similar to the Marshall-plan provision would be appropriate. From the special headquarters in Bangkok, selected for its central location and stability, an air service should be instituted with planes with American flags on them flying once again throughout Asia, carrying officials and some of the minor supplies. Some newsprint and informational services throughout the whole of the Asiatic area should be provided. Of course, measures having to do with health and with education would be included.

In other words, the immediate and the long term to me are not two separate problems in Asia, because there is only one kind of program you can have in Asia and that is a long-term one, because it is a long-term continent as I see it and its position with reference to Russia.

Now, then, this economic aid-to-Asia program I would put up first and carry on regardless of what happens in China. From the military side, which clearly should be a separate program and should be under the direction of our own military leadership, I would emphasize here that there may well be intelligence information which I do not have, and do not seek to have, which would vitiate the position I take.

I do not feel anyone can be certain that you can write off non-Communist China at this time. I think there should be encouragement to opposition to the Communist advance anywhere in Asia, and with the rough terrain to the south you might well find there would be considerable pockets of opposition that would continue on for a number of years. During those years of time the problems of the Communists in the rest of China will clearly multiply.

Mr. Kennan has correctly said that China is the most have-not of the have-not nations. This is the first time that the Communists have taken over a have-not nation. We all recognize that Russia has tremendous resources. When the Communists took over Russia with its great fields of grain, and mineral resources, and coal mines, they had within their borders a lot of natural resources. Now they are taking over in China what clearly should be characterized, in relation to numbers of population, a have-not nation. The likelihood is that in these next 2 or 3 years, while the pockets of resistance would continue in the non-Communist China, a great amount of difficulty will arise in those areas under Communist domination, possibly leading to starvation within the Communist area and riots causing great difficulties that no one can foresee.

I had a conversation with one of the men most informed about the whole of China and of Asia. When I asked him at the end of the war what would happen in China, he said: "Governor, if anybody asks you what will happen in China, don't answer him." There is a lot to that kind of advice. Nobody can draw a blueprint for the future of China.

I do know that in some respects the Communist advance through south China has been slower than it was estimated; the advance up in northwest China is faster than it was estimated. We are inclined to think, from our standpoint, that the withdrawal of forces show weaknesses. But, if you are facing a million men with 250,000 men and with lack of morale, maybe the best thing you can do is try to keep your men intact and keep on withdrawing until you get to the very nethermost areas of your country. I mean China is so different that you should not attempt to appraise it from our standards. I think there is every indication that if we have a basic policy of opposition to the Communist advance, and opposition to the Communist consolidation of Asia, that then we should play out every card of opposition. That, of course, means that it would be unthinkable to recognize the Communist government in China and to withdraw recognition from the National Government. Even though the last vestige of military opposition disappears, in my feeling, very strongly, a number of years should still go by before we recognize that new government. We must remember that the recognition of the new government would have a tremendous impact throughout Asia. It would place the new government with a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations, with full veto power. In my judgment it would be one of the most tragic moves we could make in the long-term world strategy. I feel very strongly that we should not recognize the Communist government in China even though they go on and consolidate

the remaining area, which may still be a long way off in the very rugged terrain of the south of China. I am thinking again from an Asiatic and a world-wide policy rather than exclusively the China policy.

On the other military question, I am inclined to feel that Formosa is an important strategic area for our own outer perimeter. Here again the military judgment should carry. There are excellent airfields in Formosa. If antagonistic air bases exist on Formosa, the Philippine Islands and Japan are quite effectively severed from each other. Formosa is immediately astride of the airway and direct seaway. We should have in mind the psychological effect of a firm position and the fact that Formosa is still in an uncertain legal position because, when the war ended, China was not given the Nationalist Government.

China was only given the right to go on Formosa to disarm the Japanese. There had been no peace treaty, no decision handing Formosa to China. The legal situation as to Formosa is an uncertain one and an undecided one. In view of that and in view of the picture in China, I feel that we ought to ask the United Nations to take the position that an attack on Formosa would not be countenanced at this time. Obviously, the United Nations could not take such action under the veto of Russia. We should then announce that we consider Formosa a very vital part of our perimeter and that we would not permit an exterior armed assault on Formosa. That is a very firm position to take. I think the whole picture requires some of that kind of firmness. If Formosa falls by internal infiltration, I feel we should not and cannot take action to counteract that. We should not land troops on Formosa, but we should take a firm position against assault from the mainland of China upon Formosa.

I think if the British take a stand in Hong Kong we ought to back the British up with everything they want us to back them up with in Hong Kong. These are matters of alternative, and if the British, who must be our close partner in this world picture, decide they are going to stand and fight, what do we do? Do we appear before the world as weak and indecisive? Do we back away from our British friends, or do we send ships and give them some air cover and do that sort of thing and indicate that we stand with them in a firm position against the Communist assault in Hong Kong? I grant these are grave decisions, but I think the whole picture demands that kind of very firm action. This military side leads to the question of Pacific pact. I know of these statements of Quirino and Rhee, and others. I cannot see that an affirmative Pacific pact of the nature of the Atlantic Pact can be solidly formed at this time, because I do not believe that India could join such a pact now, and I think that India must be a major consideration in our Pacific policy. Therefore I think we ought to say to Quirino and Rhee that we do not think they should take action unless Nehru joins in it, and that will automatically defer it and cause a more gradual policy in that area. It ought to be our position that as far as association of the non-Communist area of Asia, it should not move any faster than Nehru is willing and India is willing to go along with it. We should develop an economic relationship in India which, I understand, the British have made more open to us now, by sending in equipment to assist in the development of hydroelectric power and of dams, engineers, and capital and supplies and all that that involves. With these measures should be included constant pressure, not too great, but definite, upon the Dutch and the French to work out their situations in Indochina and in the Indies on a favorable basis. Perhaps if the Dutch policy now evolves into fair stability that pattern might be the basis of pressure on the French to try to move in the same direction. It will be slow and difficult; there will be set-backs; but I think it is the unending kind of thing we must do in Asia. I do feel strongly that adopting an over-all coordinated policy and putting it under able men who are out there in a headquarters at Bangkok, and who then will give it body and sinew and detail—much as did General Marshall and then Paul Hoffman in the Marshall plan—that kind of a development out of the beginnings of a broad policy will lead to a hopeful situation. I am perfectly willing to contemplate that the Communist advance might go a lot further before it subsides, and the question of its subsiding is really the question of our own fundamental future.

That's an outline of my thinking and I state it, not with an attitude that here are the answers, but more to expose in definite form a set of thinking that has developed over a period of years so that it might be differed with, it might be modified, and we might contribute toward an answer. I have purposely refrained from discussing the situation publicly since the white paper was published because I felt that by direct conferences with Dr. Jessup and such as this there might be a better chance of developing governmental policy than by any public debate at this stage, at least, on the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Governor, that's very helpful and it is right in line with what we were beginning to talk about this morning when we adjourned. I haven't the slightest doubt that there are questions and comments on the Governor's proposal and also growing out of the point that we were discussing this morning.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, I agreed so much with the intent and some of the first part of Governor Stassen's statement and not with the latter part, so that I hope that he stays here long enough and we can discuss things back and forth, because I think the intent is part of our American tradition that we help Asia to help itself and thereby help ourselves, and yet I think some of the practical measures that Governor Stassen mentioned are not the way to operate to reach this intent. Rather than take them up as incidental items, I would generalize that we have to approach Asia in such a way that we get the majority of Asia working with us. That means that we are working with them. The Communist and the Marxist approach and the Russian approach is succeeding because it is getting into a rapport with these revolutionary forces in Asia, of question 22, which we are not equally in rapport with, and our problem is to ally ourselves with the forces of the future in Asia, which I think we can do. The peasant, for instance, is there to be organized, revolution is there to be led, and our problem is to relate ourselves to these movements in Asia, not try to do the job alone, and that is the specific aspect of Mr. Stassen's remarks that it seemed to me to be difficult that many things he mentioned would be things that we would be trying to do alone or that we would be trying to take a leadership which might not carry people along with us.

Mr. STASSEN. In what respect? I didn't mean such an aspect to it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. For example, setting up a headquarters in Bangkok might be difficult, and a headquarters anywhere might be a target which the Communists could bedevil us with and we wouldn't get out of it as much as we would lose by it. For instance, the suggestion of an air service with the American flag might antagonize the nationalist feeling of countries and make them feel threatened more than it would impress them and bring them to our side. And similarly, the manner of our doing it, it seems to me, is most important. It has to be done in a way to conciliate, persuade, and push the Asiatic forward. The further factor in all of this, I think, is the world view on which we operate, and I bring that up because we are up against Marxism. The Marxists have a world view and they sell it and it is being accepted, and, as Mr. Kennan pointed out, so much of it is phony and yet succeeds or works along at least for a while. The Chinese intellectuals are accepting Marxism; they are accepting the Russian world view that we are imperialists, and for certain reasons which we cannot help. This Marxist world view is an explanation of the world's evils; it is an explanation of our activities; it is an explanation of how we can be such good people individually and have the good intentions which Governor Stassen has mentioned, which we share, and yet be imperialists. It is all consistent in this Marxist world view. We have to recognize that we are working not to get control over territory or supplies or anything else, but to get the allegiance or the alliance and get into our camp the minds and beliefs of these Asiatics.

Well, now, it seems to me we have not competed on the side that Marxism is so successful on—the ideological side. Our difficulty is that as has been said, Asia is so different that the things that seem obvious to us do not seem obvious to them; the things we want perhaps they don't think of. To take one example: The white paper, in the letter of transmittal, referred to the support of democratic individualism—the democratic individualism of China. Well, now, that phrase translated as "democratic individualism" into Chinese is not a golden word but a garbage word to the people in Peking, because "individualism" interpreted in their present lingo means the chaotic, selfish, personal, family centered antisocial activity of individuals rather than what we think it means—the development of the individual as we would like to see it, which is one of our great ideals. So that the word has turned turtle on us and that phrase has been picked out of Mr. Acheson's letter and used against us by the Marxist and the Chinese Communists. And, therefore, in the realm of operation we have the mechanics, logistics, supplies, and the know-how and economic development potentialities, but to put these things together it seems to me we must aim primarily at getting a world view formulated more specifically for Asiatic consumption. And, of course, as a liberal country we have many world views, many formulations, no party line, yet it is possible for us, I think, to pay more attention to our view of how the world is going and be more specific in offering alternatives to its going in a Marxist direction. Well, now, this world view applies directly to the way

we operate. You see, we can so easily do something which is absolutely sound from our point of view, which is operationally correct, unselfish, which is aiming at an excellent objective in Asia, yet can be labeled "imperialist" and turned against us unless we have this ideological context properly under control. And it seems to me that the way we are losing is that the Russians, being closer to the Asiatic scene as a peasant, undeveloped area, have at present got the jump on us in the ideological context on how to interpret our activity, and so this is partly just ideological warfare, but it is also a vital link in the whole chain of getting those people on our side or keep them out of the other side.

Mr. STASSEN. I still don't see how you would differ in how you move on your economic aid. Would you give economic aid to the area?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would start off at the other side of Asia. I would go to Indochina and I wouldn't hold Formosa against the Chinese Nationalists. I think we must play a long game for China. We have got to play it for the long term. To try to hold Formosa with troops would give so much ideological ammunition to the Chinese Communists that it would unite China more readily against us. The more pressure we bring, the more we can expect hostility in return. The Chinese Communists are prone to regard us as imperialists who are threatening them; they are suspicious of us; they are always talking about spies and saboteurs coming from us, and they have got to have us as enemies to hold their system together. The more we play the role of enemy the more we play into their hands in that respect. Now if Formosa were an absolute life-and-death matter to us, that would perhaps take precedence, but I think we have got to consider all of Asia as a life-and-death proposition. We have got go into places like India. To hold Formosa would defeat our ends by a miscalculation of the response in China, just as our military support of Chiang Kai-shek defeated our ends because we couldn't foresee his inefficiency and that Chiang would have a lack of support, and so on. That's a specific example on Formosa.

In the case of economic development, it seems to me we must give these Asiatic peoples the feeling that they will have a chance to use our resources and aid without getting too much involved in trade with us nor tied up with our economic nexus. They have in mind, from the Communist stuff that has been fed them, that we are dangerous economically because we go into depressions, and that's a theory we have got to combat. We have combatted it because we haven't got into depressions, but still Marxism feeds them that line. The intellectuals in Peking are being told now that the United States is in a depression; it must be, because it is a capitalist country. And so a certain kind of economic connection may seem dangerous to them.

Mr. STASSEN. We might focus on that economic thing for a bit. Suppose, as I envisage it, that in various areas of south Asia American economic aid is coming in and getting some results in improved crops, in slightly better living conditions, in improved water and irrigation, and all that goes with it, whereas up in the Communist area of China they are going into a really economic tailspin. Isn't that the kind of thing that over a period of a few years would begin to make some sense and give some answer to the great promises and claims of the Communists in Asia? I don't see where you have really differed in your specifics to that kind of an approach, and I do emphasize that if we pour in large sums of money in the hands of governments it is very unlikely that it gets right out to the peasants. So what I am emphasizing is that what we do should be in terms of simple farm implements and of well-drilling equipment and of the simplest kinds of things put directly in the hands of the people without charge. Then it would be very hard for them to label that as imperialistic.

Mr. FAIRBANK. My objection is not to the economic development idea, which I think is absolutely necessary, but merely by itself I think it is incomplete and might be disastrous because it wouldn't take account of the Nationalist political feelings and the nationalism of the area and might not take account of ideological ideas that I have mentioned, and there is also a large social problem. You would have to see that you didn't step on the toes of the native peoples and by your economic aid not to throw certain people out of employment who went Communist against you. In other words, it is a total operation we must perform in all aspects of society and it must be in a proportion which does not let it get too heavily military or economic which might upset the other aspects of it. So we have to study these things as they would apply in the Asiatic scene to have a program which is in proportion—the economic side must be related to social changes which will occur because of people changing their livelihood or because of a certain class being better off or certain politicians not getting their cut, and we must take account of national independence, and those things must be put

together. And having been in the information business in China, I was always very unhappy—in 1945 and 1946—in the way our information network wasn't in a game of really trying to put across our American policies as fully as they could be. It wasn't being used as an arm as fully as it might have been used because we stopped psychological warfare for the wartime. We haven't been carrying that on in China since. We do not do the things ideologically that we did before, that we could do.

Mr. TALBOT. I would merely like to say that the economic development of this area would seem to me to be fundamental if we are going to have a long-range counterattack to the Communists. However, because of the considerations which you have mentioned, and particularly Mr. Fairbank, it could very easily go wrong if there should develop in that area a feeling that our economic aid is linked to an anti-Communist strategy. In India, for example, obviously Nehru is one of the strongest persons in the whole of Asia, from our point of view and for the future of the type of Asia that we are interested in, the type of world we are interested in. In order to get over his internal difficulties—his internal economic difficulties—he stands in serious need of economic help both in the large-level building of tanks and at the small level of improving the bombs. But the way we could destroy Nehru most rapidly would be to make him appear to some of his own people to be an American puppet. It seems to me the question of giving economic aid to this part of the world—we must very carefully consider whether we are putting up political strings at the same time; whether we are saying to these people so long as you do not recognize Chinese communism, so long as you take a strong anti-Communist stand, we will help you, but you must do that in order to qualify for our aid. If, on the other hand, we could say to them we believe that a generation hence the world will be better if the peoples of south Asia have more to eat, better places to live, and we are prepared to support that, then I think there is a chance for that sort of local cooperation in consonance with national integrity and national pride and we stand the prospect of making some progress and having a successful policy in that area.

Mr. STASSEN. I agree that you should not require that they have an affirmative anti-Communist program politically as a prerequisite for economic aid; you should simply require that they be non-Communist-dominated and on that basis move on your economic aid.

Mr. TALBOT. I wonder whether you would feel that the solution of the colonial problem in the area would be not a solution of all the problems but a prerequisite to effective influence of the American point of view in that area.

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Fosdick, to answer that I would say that it is very important, but I don't say that it is a prerequisite. In other words, I feel that the whole of Asia is such a vast problem that you can't say anything is a prerequisite to the program. Just as in the matter of studying just how you do these economic things, granted they need continuing study, but if we wait until we conclude our studies until we act, why we will be dead before there is any action. So my feeling is that nobody could have painted out the Marshall plan when Dr. Marshall made that great presentation at Harvard, but after exchange of study and exchange of views and men getting to be in charge of the program, then study and the action went forward together, and that's what I feel is needed in Asia—a study and action going on at the same time.

Mr. VINACKE. I think to answer the question that was bothering me, Governor Stassen, in what you said in your original comment, it seems to me that you were saying that we would take American materials, American this and that, in disregard of the attitude of the governments with colonial or nationalist governments, and establish a direct contact with the peoples. Well, now, there, it seems to me, you apparently did not have that in mind.

Mr. STASSEN. Of course not.

Mr. VINACKE. The same problem there as on the European side. The first problem is insuring that the governments, whether they are independent governments or combinations of colonial governments and nationalist regions where there is conflict going on, themselves have the feeling that they have worked out the plan that is suitable for them and that we will support them; that their efforts are related to our efforts rather than our just going in, which is what I think Mr. Fairbank also got from your original statement—our going in on an American basis in terms of American conditions. It seems to me in this whole southeast Asia area one place where we did that was the Philippines, and it seems to me we might very well make a very excellent start in reestablishing our position if we said frankly we made a mistake in the Philippines in insist-

ing that you people should amend your constitution so that American businessmen should have a preferential position as against others. It is that sort of thing that leads to the charge of imperialism, you see, and if we could straighten out on an independent basis some aspects of our Philippine relationships and say we propose to go into Siam and some of these other areas on invitation of the people concerned to enable them to help themselves, then I think you have met the objections Mr. Fairbanks raised; whereas, if you are proposing to do it as an American operation because we have this power to save these people in spite of themselves, I think you are going to run up against the objections.

Mr. STASSEN. I, of course, don't mean we go in in spite of local governments or use American power to force our way in on the economic program, but that we go in with the permission and with joint working arrangements with the local governments, as we have in fact done in some of the South American countries, but that there should be this distinction in the actual distribution of material—that is, that the prerequisite of our reaching agreement with the local government is that we be on hand in the distribution so that it doesn't go into the black market and doesn't get dissipated as so much of that economic aid did get in Asia.

Mr. BALLANTINE. Mr. Chairman, I feel that there is one approach along which we should move simultaneously with moving along the economic front. One of the difficulties that we have to overcome in Asia is the idea among a great many Asian people that our motivation is to build them up either as a first line of defense against the Soviet Union or to build them up as a place in which we can have a beachhead for assault and that it wasn't to be used by us for any such purposes. I think, first of all, we have to convince the people of Asia that that is not our motivation; that our motivation is to build a world in which all people are free from aggression, free to enjoy the four freedoms and have an opportunity to contribute to creating an era of peace and stability in the world. And if we can start building that idea among the Asian people that we are not just trying to use them, I think we can do a great deal in the economic field.

I have two particular things in mind. There are large areas in China that today cannot be utilized under the traditional horticultural methods of the Chinese people but would yield to tractor cultivation. In Kwangsi Province—I have traveled all through that province and have seen millions of acres lying idle because they can't be tilled under traditional Chinese methods. They could graze tremendous numbers of cattle and horses if they could get the place clear of rinderpest, if you could have American veterinarians come in and help them. The second line is industrialization, to reduce that tremendous pressure of population upon the land that you have in the river valleys and the plains and coastal areas in these far-eastern countries. Now instead of starting on a tremendous hydroelectric project and shoe factories and a great many things that are unrelated to their standard of living, why not make simple beginnings along developing export industry, such as the British and Americans did a century ago when they started in trading: redevelop again and expand these cottage industries, these handicraft industries, such as the making of embroideries and straw braids and paper braids and mattings and decorated porcelains, and all these things that require the minimum amount of capital and give employment to the maximum amount of people, and those industries developed would be export industries which would export to the United States and other rich countries and get the foreign exchange with which to buy the things they need. You have to make small beginnings before you can go on a very large way.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, the discussion thus far seems to show that the theory (why we think certain peoples and countries are the way they are) and method (how we do what we intend to do) are very delicately connected with each other. The recent discussion has waivered back and forth between certain things which we could do and the reasons why we should do them. I would like to make a few off-the-cuff remarks about that, but I should like to point out, for instance, that the theory that governments in Asia are so corrupt that American aid should be kept in American hands until channeled directly to the recipient is hardly an adequate answer. There is no such thing, I believe, as, especially in those circumstances, a million dollars that is not political, and a billion dollars is a thousand times as political as a million dollars. In such countries whoever gets that money becomes politically important in his country. So you do interfere in the politics, especially of backward countries, when you undertake to alter their economic conditions by the action of American money.

Another point is that we cannot rely simply on joint action between American money and American know-how. Know-how exists on several levels and it isn't an American monopoly. There may be levels of know-how which are rather low as compared with American levels but are sufficient to defeat American purposes. I think one of the very significant lessons of recent years is, for instance, that American equipment intended for use by the Kuomintang for one purpose was inefficiently used and the same equipment when it passed into Communist hands was much more efficiently used—not efficiently from an American level, but much more efficiently from a Chinese level—than the people into whose hands we had originally given it. In that connection, a pamphlet has just been published by the Harvard University Press containing a very interesting contribution by Mr. Fairbank, who is here today, and also an extremely important and very short treatment of the economic problem by Mr. Cleveland, who has been in charge of the China Branch of the ECA, in which he takes up the question of the ability to absorb that aspect that has been neglected in this discussion so far. It is not only the American ability to give; it is the ability to absorb. The general trend in Asia since the end of the war is that in some way the ability to absorb is very closely related with domestic political changes in the country concerned, so great as to amount to revolution, whether the revolution be military or peaceful in form. I think that that indicates that one of the guiding principles in channeling American aid is that aid should go in the largest quantities and most promptly to those countries which by modernization of their political forms have created the political condition under which economic improvement can be carried forward. That is one of the reasons why India is so important.

Then another thing which has been totally neglected so far, and something which I think could do great damage to the American interests, is that we have been talking about Asia, the American problem. Since when and by whom was Asia given to America to solve all its problems? We have undertaken very considerable programs with very heartening results in Europe. We still have to integrate our European problem with our problem in Asia. Many parts of Asia have European roots in them that are much deeper than our American roots. One of the economic problems, precisely, is to restore the flow of investment one way and trade the other way between Europe and Asia as well as between America and Asia, and this much more complex problem, at least three-way problem, can only be solved if everybody concerned is convinced that what he is getting out of it is conditioned by the fact that the other two partners must get something out of it, too. There must be a realization that anything that is undertaken is for the joint benefit of Europe, Asia, and America and cannot succeed unless the mutual benefits are reasonably distributed. And in that connection we come to the final point I want to make in very strong endorsement of what Mr. Talbot said just now on the subject of not making some kind of political hostility to some other country or some system. Then there was a little interchange and one opinion was no, you mustn't make hostility to Russia a condition but you must make absence of Communists or Communist threats from government a condition.

I doubt if that is a workable condition in view of the present world distribution of power. It seems to me that what we can do above all other countries is to show countries in Asia, as in Europe, that it is possible to do without Russia to precisely the extent that you are on good terms and mutually beneficial terms with the United States. I think that to make the condition, for instances, everybody in Asia accepting Communist China will not be admitted to American trade, and so on, would be ideologically disastrous for our cause. It would look like punishing the people of China for having a government that wasn't approved in advance by the United States. It also goes against the basic human principles of bargaining. If you say to people you must have this or not have that before you get American aid, it simply enables them to turn to the Russians with a better bargaining position against us. It could strengthen their position. Whereas, on the other hand, if a country like China, in spite of its Communists in the Government, is shown that certain conditions of prosperity go better and faster by friendly association with the United States, that is something that automatically weakens the Chinese connection with Russia. Therefore, it seems to me that the conditions for American aid should be ability of the country to absorb the aid, making the necessary reforms to accomplish the absorption of the aid, if that is necessary, and the principle of mutuality—many-sided mutuality—not only between individual countries and the United States, but individual countries and the European-American-Asian complex, of which the United States is so important a part.

Mr. TAYLOR. It seemed to me two generalizations have come out of the discussion that we have just listened to: One is that the major force in Asia that can be used against communism is nationalism. I don't know whether you would agree with this, but this generalization came to me anyway, and we can and should use nationalism against communism and separate the two. It seems to me that in China the Communists are using Chinese nationalism and riding it for their own purposes, and the Chinese are beginning to find out and will find out in large quantities during the next few years. I thoroughly agree with Mr. Fairbank and, I think, with Mr. Lattimore, that there is no way of dealing with these people except that they are nationalists, they have national pride, and they have to be dealt with as independent people. But the other generalization that came out, particularly out of Fairbank's talk, is that the Russians are fighting us on a good many levels, and, as an old frustrated OWI man, I certainly underline everything he said about the ideological level. It seems to me we have lost a big propaganda battle in the Far East. When Russia takes two billion worth of material out of China and we put two billion in and we are left with the reputation we have, there is something missing on the propaganda front. They are fighting us on the ideological level, institutional level, military level. We have to meet them on all levels, and it seems to me what you are feeling for was some way of integrating all these things together at the same time. I think he put it very well that in some cases you have to judge whether your military considerations warrant an ideological defeat or whether in other cases it may be the other way around. The map of the world, from a military point of view, ideological point of view, the institutional point of view—you don't have one fitting on the other exactly. So I would endorse very strongly, Mr. Chairman, a feeling around for and a discussion of the many levels upon which this conflict is going and a pulling together of our discussion into a long range and short range. The first answer to China is outside of China. I think we have come to that conclusion. There is not a lot left in China, from a military view, that we can save. From my view it would be foolish. The second answer would be in China itself, as what we do inside begins to have its effect in China. It seems to me that is the point our discussions have reached.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid what I intended to say has already been covered, but I would like to say that nothing that I have heard here this morning has been more reassuring than the very clear recognition of the fact which came from Mr. Kennan that our basic problem and basic problem of the United States was the consideration of the "have" nation—a great "have" nation—against all of the "have-nots." Now I have been devoting my life to an interest that has been assaying the task of adjusting that balance, and I will tell you that it is one of the most difficult and one of the most discouraging and one of the most delicate tasks that one can undertake. And so that by way of general comment. The next thing I should like to say is that I do not believe that our plans for the rest of Asia should be shaped so that in effect they give up the present Communist-dominated China; that is to say, if we draw our lines and make our arrangements so that we throw ourselves over against that part of China—the new regime in China—we shall make it very much more difficult to achieve what I think can be achieved, namely, the recovery of that part of the world—of a lot of our influence in that part of the world. Another thing I should like to note is that this area that we are assaying to deal with is one that has known colonialism, has been burned by it, has come into a new freedom in nationalism, and so whatever plans are made have got to be extremely carefully laid at that point.

We cannot afford to formulate any plans which seem to mean an extension of American imperialism—the substance of a new imperialism for others from which they have just fled themselves. Now that makes this area of the world very different from the countries that we have been dealing with in Western Europe. We have been accused in Italy and we have been accused in France of carrying on a program of American imperialism, but France and Italy have both been independent enough countries, stable enough countries so that they need not be terrified of their fate by that accusation, but repeat that accusation in Indochina, in Burma, or in India and it will carry a very great deal more weight. Now that fact is a basic fact which must condition all of our efforts to put up anything like a Marshall plan in this section of the world as successful, and we rejoice in it, as that plan has been in Western Europe. I was very much struck, too, with the comment that Mr. Ballantine made. Many of our efforts in assisting in Asia have begun at too ambitious a level. They need to be carried down to the level of the people—in the improvements of the lot of the individual farmer, the improvement of the health in the villages—rather

than in great hydroelectric projects or the importation of American goods or even American services. Those services have got somehow to get down to the roots of the people. But our basic difficulty is going to be this one of setting up an American headquarters in Bangkok dealing with those sensitive, newly liberated peoples in that section of the world without laying ourselves open to the devastating charge of a new imperialism.

Mr. KIZER. Mr. Chairman, I am in strong sympathy with Governor Stassen, yet his dislike is a purely negative policy. I see the strong desirability of a positive policy, and it warms my heart considerably to see how many of you around this table are turning your minds to a discussion of some kind of economic aid. I would like to back up what Dr. Decker has just said about the inadvisability, however, of moving into Bangkok. That, I think, would be one of the poorest places to select, and I would suggest that wherever we go, as Mr. Lattimore has suggested, we move in where the government is one that we can come most nearly trading with. Having dealt somewhat with relief in the Far East, I realize the extraordinary difficulty there is in building up a distribution of economic aid or assistance in that area without dealing almost directly with the government. If you lean the least bit away from the government it reflects itself in the minds of the people. You have to have a government you can work with. Therefore, I would like to support what Mr. Lattimore has said about working in India. Now some steps have already been taken with regard to India in the last 5 weeks. The first loan made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was $34 million, made the last of August, for the purpose of enabling the Indian people to have locomotive parts and boilers. Now that kind of a loan creates the income from which the loan can be paid itself. A second loan has been made of $10 million, and $10 million, I understand, is the cost of clearing an acre of jungle and bringing it into food production. And while I sympathize generally with what was said about ambitious hydroelectric projects, there are in India smaller projects that irrigate the land and bring new lands under cultivation, and that type of loan is also submitted to the bank.

Now Mr. Nehru is coming here next week and I am sure he has a portfolio of that sort, and we must not rush in, we must see that what he is proposing is sensible. But food will win this thing more than any other project, and if we can help India to become self-sufficient in food, we can help her to become sufficient in food so that she doesn't need to import it, that means a greater annual income for her government, it means greater education for her people, and promotes the whole Indian welfare. The Chinese are smart; they will catch on fast enough what we are doing there, and that's the kind of progress we can make to very great advantage. There is another thing that I would like Governor Stassen to reflect upon. He said he would like to see us play out every card of opposition we can to communism in the Far East. I don't want us to be too afraid of communism in the Far East. We can overestimate its potentialities of danger if we are not careful. On the other hand, by playing out every card of opposition, we do build up what Mr. Fairbank laid special emphasis upon, and that is the thought in the minds of the people in the Far East that we are an imperialist Nation. We are a great asset to communsim now because they can accuse us of imperialism. We must withdraw that and we must strike where we are strongest in the economic field, not in the military sense, and I believe, as far as possible, we should attempt to ignore that aspect of it and work in the economic field and bring that area up. No country in the world can equal the United States in that field, and that, it seems to me, is what we should do. I agree, too, that we must not approach this program on too ambitious or too vast a level; we must work by degrees and to refine some projects, and in that way we can win that struggle.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to say this: There are five names I have down here of people that want to speak. It was suggested this morning that a 5-minute intermission in the middle of the session would be advantageous. I think probably the time has come. It is 4 o'clock. We will reassemble here.

(Recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, shall we resume? The first name on the top of the list is Governor Stassen.

Mr. STASSEN. Dr. Fosdick, I wanted to clarify my position. I think Mr. Lattimore was under a misapprehension. What I said regarding American aid, I didn't mean to indicate that Asia was an exclusive problem of our country and fully realized the interrelation of Europe and Asia and the whole world, but what I wish to emphasize is that when we are the country that has the most.

when we actually with about one-sixteenth of the world's people produce one-third of the world's goods and services, that we do have a very heavy responsibility toward this great continent and its have-not peoples there.

It has key relevance in the world-security aspect with reference to Russia, and also I do not indicate that we try to pass upon whether there are any Communist tendencies in any country before giving economic aid but I do feel strongly that if there is Communist dominance of a country, we should not go in with an economical-aid program.

I feel that you do have a great class of ways of life that has great implications for the future and that it is foolhardy for us to pour in what is admittedly a limited resource into the area under Communist dominance. I not only feel that from a positive program but I think that in fact it would be quite academic to argue to the contrary. We must remember the realities that we are talking about a program that will require congressional action for money and you will never get through Congress——

FROM THE FLOOR. Would you condone the Yugoslav policy?

Mr. STASSEN. I will get to that in a minute. You will never get through Congress a program that would permit the permission to give economic aid to the Communist-dominated sectors of China. There are those who advocate for aid to the Communist areas of China in the hope there would develop a form of economic Titoism there. That has a false promise. Tito did not move away from Russia because of any promise of aid on the part of this country toward him. As a matter of fact, he moved away at a time when we had been the firmest with him following the shooting down of United States planes, etc., and that as long as he could follow a position of in effect taking direction from Russia and taking resources from us, that was the role he played, but that when he had to choose and then came up against the result of his choice and tightening of the screws by Russia, then that famous break came.

I actually asked him in March of 1947 whether he was going to take his economic direction from the Soviet Union and he got up from the luncheon table and paced up and down and said, "We are learning much from the socialist experience of the Soviet, but Yugoslavia is a country. We fought in the mountains—General Mihailovich fought in the mountains." He was agitating on the nationalist angle, and now he having made the break, then I think it is right that we should be able to give some limited aid. I think we should couple it with some insistence there be a gradual moving toward more freedom in Yugoslavia at the same time, even though very slow and very gradual, but the direction of movement of a government should be toward the freedom of its people while receiving American aid, and clearly that aid should not go in when the direction of the movement or government is to the contrary.

When it is the over-all aspect of security and the problem of Russia, then we need to think of the world strategy that is involved so that I definitely do not agree that any softness toward the Communists of China will give a better prospect of Titoism developing. I say it should be firm and clear: If you are under Communist dominance, you don't qualify for American generosity and if you break with communism, then there will be American generosity. I think that should be clearly our action in this economic aid struggle.

As to being accused of imperialism, I think it is elementary that as long as we are producing more than the rest of the countries and living at a higher standard of living, we are going to be accused of imperialism in every argument that comes up all over the world regardless of what you do, and if you let the accusation of imperialism stop you from a clearly indicated program of action, then it would be a sad day.

So you need to move carefully with all possible consideration of utilizing the Nationalists Mr. Taylor emphasized but definitely move and in your movement try to negate the charge of imperialism, but don't let that charge stop you from moving.

There has been mention made of India as a center of Asiatic operation. As I indicated before, I agree on Nehru being a name and India being a great importance but it is a mistake to put our Asiatic headquarters in India because on the one hand there is the sensitivity of India toward the British, just having come out from under, and a greater sensitivity there toward others coming in than there would be in other areas of Asia.

Then you get into the question of India and Pakistan and the Hindu and Moslem religious issue which might be questioned in having our headquarters in India.

Someone suggested that our headquarters should be in Manila. The atmosphere then would be that we were returning to Manila rather than beginning a

new Asiatic program. There isn't the degree of democracy you would want in Siam. The strong man's record with reference to the Japanese in early 1942 is not good but when you consider that Siam with approximately 17,000,000 people has one of the least dense populations and best food sources and greatest element of stability and good location for travel by sea and air, I think you will come to feel that Bangkok is the logical center on the mainland of Asia for a long-term American program. Also, you have the fact that the terrain is additional security as to both Burma and Malaya, so for the greatest possible Communist onslaught Bangkok would apparently be the last place to fall either by attack or infiltration, even if you take a black look at the future, and that is why I am inclined to feel for a center of Asiatic economic aid Bangkok is the place.

I emphasize that it is not to be a unilateral program and not to be one that we in America will do alone. It must be an aid to the people in Asia that help themselves, but let us be sure it will get to the people and not corrupt elements in the Government. It will be a delicate operation and let us be certain we do not become involved in a joint operation with the British or French in a way that would bring to us the onus of their past colonial position. We do have a more favorable reputation in most of Asia than they do. While we must work closely with them in the world picture, let us not give ourselves this integration in a new aid program by tying ourselves too closely to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Staley.

Mr. EUGENE STALEY. I wanted to raise a question. I am particularly interested to hear Mr. Stassen's views, what I missed in the exposition—what struck me—a broad and constructive concept—though I share on the question about methods of implementing—I missed any reference to the role of the United Nations or United Nations specialized agencies such as the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, or the Economic Commission for Aid in the Far East, which I believe is now located in Bangkok. I am wondering if you located an American headquarters in Bangkok the psychological effect would be, here the Americans are, moving in. It is the Americans in place of the United Nations, and so I raise the question that maybe we haven't more to gain from the standpoint of American interests in setting up as against a Marxist internationalism the United Nations type of more voluntary internationalism and doing everything we can to boost that, and wouldn't some phases of this scheme actually go in the other direction?

Mr. STASSEN. Dr. Fosdick, I would say that clearly there should be consultation with the United Nations agencies and the utilization of them at every possible turn, but I cannot conceive that you could turn over the substance of American aid to be decided by United Nations agencies in Asia for a number of reasons. One is the aspect of the colonial powers being in there. The other is the amount of aid we give would fall so far short of what could well be used that I do not feel you could have the division of allocation that would parallel the European—the OEC in Europe. So that I think we would need to keep a greater area of detailed control of the funds and of the goods in Asia than we do in Europe. I do grant and would urge that the United Nations agencies should be used to every degree possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. J. MORDEN MURPHY. I would like to support the last remarks of Mr. Kizer before we adjourn with respect to the hysteria or hysterical tendency of fear of Russia and the effect it has on our policy. Governor Stassen referred in his original remarks to the Soviet underbelly of Russia. There is no doubt about it, Russia is unprotected for a great many thousands of miles in the Asiatic mainland, but the theory that because she is unprotected she has unlimited or strong capabilities there is somewhat hypothetical, I think.

Early in the last war, after the Germans had invaded Poland and finally France, the general impression in this country, and even to an extent, the military impression, was that she was practically unbeatable. At that time the Russians, until Stalingrad, were poorly rated. Later the Japanese made stands in all the islands after Pearl Harbor, and the general feeling was that the Japanese were very, very strong.

When the war was over it turned out that Japan had not been so strong as we thought she was potentially. The Germans we managed to beat despite the fact that they looked unbeatable for quite a while, and my feeling is, after the war that Russia went through and after the devastation the country was subjected to, I doubt that she has quite the capabilities, aside from the atom bomb, that are attributed to her. I would like to make that point that possibly sometimes we rather hysterically exaggerate her capabilities and in our reactions to them distort our own true policies.

I would like to make one further remark. It is my understanding that the expression "Titoism" refers not to aid to Tito but to a national desire to prevent the domination by a foreign power and in that respect I would say that the Chinese have very, very strong capabilities of Titoism because I think they are very nationalistic and very much nurtured their independence.

With respect to Bangkok and the Government there, I would say that the present head of the Government had not only a bad record against the Japanese during the war but has had a bad record against his own people or against a substantial segment of his own people in the last years and that there is a very excellent chance of an upset on the part of the Free Thai group and which might come at any time. It is not a stable situation in my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coons.

Mr. ARTHUR COONS. I wanted to make the remark both to Mr. Stassen and to the group, with reference to this question of whether or no any aid should go to a Communist-dominated government, that it seemed to me that in the inception of the Marshall plan in Europe that Secretary Marshall and the State Department and Government placed our country on a high level of statesmanship in making that aid, at least at the beginning, potentially available to any country of Europe, whether Communist-dominated or not, which might join with the organization of European states and which might agree to certain standards, with reference to the distribution of that aid, that we might write down.

Furthermore, it seems to me that with reference to the Far East, particularly where there is a very sensitive nationalism, as we have all remarked, we might be on very much stronger ground if we should not distribute our aid until after we should have had a conference of the states and should have had an inclusive invitation to all states in the same manner we did in Europe. I think that would have an appeal to the American public opinion.

It may be that certain states might themselves voluntarily withdraw and this in itself may indicate the fact that they were Soviet-dominated. I wonder if we are safe in assuming every Communist-dominated government is absolutely a tool of Moscow. We all say that commonly in our speech but a fundamental element of American policy must be to resist international communism and resist the imperial encroachment of the Soviet Union. I should not wish to make the mistake of assuming that every Communist-labeled Nationalist movement in the Far East were necessarily so, and even if there were a lot of voices that seemed to sound like Moscow voices, ultimately to be classified that way.

I just wanted to remind us of the breadth of the approach to the European scene and the desirability perhaps in a policy of following a similar line in the Far East. It might very well be that events would take care of themselves and the fact that we would set down certain standards would mean administratively we might not be distributing as much aid that we would want to distribute it to reflect we would have the frame of reference on record that would be broad and inclusive.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. KENNETH COLEGROVE. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, in Governor Stassen's plan of aid to Asia, he referred to technical and educational aid and, I believe, in the so-called MacArthur plan, which we offered several months ago, and probably something was said about educational aid.

I am inclined to think that that is one of the fields in which we could give great aid to Asia and great aid to world peace and even to world trade by including in any economic plan of this sort. Nelson Johnson and others frequently have pointed out to us that in the great conflict in China the men who advised the Chinese Communists and Mao Tze-tung were educated in Moscow, and many of the men who directed the Kuomintang had received their education in large part in the United States and England and other western countries. Maybe that suggests that something is defective in our education if the men who led the cause which has been recently defeated received their education here, but on the other hand, I think we should remember that the men who have made the Philippine Republic were men who received a large part of their education in the United States in the years 1900 and 1901.

The United States sent each year a hundred young men from the Philippines to be educated in the United States, among them such men as Santos who became such a great Philippine leader and, of course, the Japanese, who are taking a leading part in the experiment in democracy in Japan at the present time, received their education in the United States.

I would like to close with this idea that any plan for economic rehabilitation in Asia should also include a large plan of education—of bringing large num-

bers of young men and women from Asiatic countries to receive their education in the United States and then go back and try to carry on the democratic experiment in cooperation with our ideas. Of course, that is the long-term project. It would be 10, 15, or 20 years before such a group of educated young men and women could become effective in their own countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Herod.

Mr. WILLIAM R. HEROD. There is one point I would like to stress. I happen to be one of the lowly business people and by popular vote apparently my hydroelectric project has been thrown out the window at this conference which I object to very much, but in spite of that I think we all agree with Dr. Stassen that what we want, if we can get it, is a positive policy but I would like to suggest from a businessman's standpoint, particularly in Asia, that American economic aid, particularly if free, should be given most sparingly and most highly selectively.

With the differences in culture and a marginal civilization as far as economic opportunity is concerned, I don't think we get the reaction from them for a democracy and I don't think we get the reaction from them against communism that we get in Europe and I believe I personally am opposed very much to the increase of statism—of having our Government go into the business of dispensing our resources other than certain humanitarian cases except where it looks like there will be a real return and self-liquidating venture.

Private capital can take up a great many things if the people at the other end would be square about letting it work and I don't believe we will increase the world trade a great deal in those areas. It is very interesting to note that world trade in finished goods in 1948 was no greater than in 1913 and if you compare that with the decade of 1870, a period of somewhere in the neighborhood of seven to eight decades, world manufacture increased seven times as a multiple but world trade in finished goods only two and a half, and in raw materials less than four and United States trade in spite of our increase in population and imports was only running $14 to $18 per capita against $12 per capita back 150 years ago in 1790. So I think you have the historic trend against you.

We have to work I think for industrialization because that is the biggest source for wealth and we have to balance our hydroelectric projects along with cottage industries but I think we have to be very skeptical in the dispensing of free aid, particularly to Asiatics who do not understand it and don't show their gratitude. I believe in Hindustani there is no such word for "gratitude" in that language. They inherently believe there must be some strings attached to it and I am not keen on dispensing American resources in the hope that will stave off communism at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Holcomb.

Mr. ARTHUR HOLCOMB. After listening to discussions around this table for several hours, there is a great deal I would like to say. However, I am going to resist the professor's temptation to start out on an hour's discourse, but that obviously is out of place here and I want to make some remarks very briefly even though I run the risk of not making my meaning clear.

I would like to take off from the proposition that a policy of containing communism or containing Russia offers an excessively narrow basis for a satisfactory American policy in China. I won't attempt to argue that proposition. That would certainly get me into the use of much more time than I intend to take, but I would like to offer in support of that proposition two observations which again rest largely on faith and yet I may offer them for whatever they may be worth. The first is that it is likely that a Communist regime in China will be supported by all kinds of Chinese and not merely by Communists, and the second observation is that it is not at all certain and indeed, one might say it is very likely, that in the long run a government at Moscow would not find such a government an altogether reliable instrument for its own purpose.

I don't want to say very much in support of those propositions but everybody's opinions are influenced a great deal by one's own experience. I am sure mine are to some extent, probably unconsciously, but my experience is that of a college professor who had a sabbatical coming and wanted to go somewhere in the world and see a revolution. I read about them in books but I had never seen one so I inquired of my friends where there was likely to be a good revolution—that was in 1927 and 1928 which was the year I was going to be away—and they said perhaps distance lends enchantment to the view in some cases and so why don't you go to China. So, I said, all right, I would go to China, and I went to China, and while I was looking on the revolution revolved and it was an exceedingly interesting experience, and as I look back on it now with

the great advantage of 22 years of hindsight, I am struck by the many parallels between the revolution in 1927 or 1928 and what we see going on today.

First, take the most striking parallel in the field of military operations. I remember one night having a long talk with an American attaché. Perhaps I better not say whether military or naval as he might be identified. But I had a long talk with him on the eve of the beginning of the northern exposition of the Nationalists against the militarists in Peiping, and he was explaining to me how the Nationalists could not win. He said the northern militarists had a large number of soldiers under their command, they were better armed and equipped; they were fighting nearer their bases; that their bases had better facilities for the production of equipment, they enjoyed the advantages of interior lines of communication. He went on with all the many advantages which the northern militarists possessed and he predicted that the Nationalists would not reach Peiping.

Everybody knows that they did reach Peiping even though the Japanese offered some aid to the northern militarists and it is quite evident what was lacking in the analysis of the situation, there was not a proper appreciation of the intangible and the moral factor. We have seen that happen all over again in the last year. The Nationalist Government possessed all those military advantages but the other side wins. It would seem as if these intangible and moral factors are more important than is commonly recognized. However; that is hindsight.

Back 21 years ago when I was sitting around in Nanking waiting for Chiang Kai-shek to take off, there were not many people with whom I could talk and I naturally talked as much as I could with my own former students. I suppose every teacher has that experience. My own former students, especially the Chinese students, always received their old teacher very hospitably and what struck me and greatly influenced my thinking, quite unconsciously—what struck me was practically all my former students were on the side of the Nationalists.

As I recall now there were only two of them who had been rated high for general intelligence and qualities of character. There were only two who were on that side. There was one taking the Communist side when the split came and went off to Moscow, and there was one other who would not choose between the sides—a left-wing Nationalist. He remained out of politics for many years; but all the others took the Nationalist side and I know that unconsciously or subconsciously I was greatly influenced in my attempt to appraise the forces involved in that revolution by the circumstances that such a preponderant portion of my own students, especially those I respected most for their intelligence and qualities of character, were on that side.

What do we see today? We see the same thing happening again. These men who were not Communists—we didn't teach them to be Communists. We have been turning out Chinese students, among others, during these years since 1928, but they are trying to work under the Communists in a striking preponderance of cases. And knowing the peculiar position of scholars in Chinese tradition and the common assumption the Chinese scholars make that they have a peculiar role and duty to perform in politics, it seems to me an augury of how things will go. I think we are bound to assume that most Chinese are going to accept the new regime, as most Chinese 20 years ago accepted the Nationalists, as a fact, a given condition in the problem, something they had to reckon on at least for the near future, and I think most of them are going to try working with it, and that means that the Communists as they build up their institutions, like the Nationalists 21 years ago, are going to become dependent upon the collaboration of considerable numbers of persons who don't share their ideology but who feel constrained by circumstances to try to make a go of the regime. And however difficult it may be for outsiders like ourselves to deal with such a regime in its early phases, I believe that in the long run it offers the prospect of a regime with which we can deal and that in the long run it is by no means certain that Moscow will find it a better agent of its purposes than we found the Nationalist Government to be of our purposes. The temptation to argue some of these propositions—but I think I had better stop right there. My feeling is that we ought not to assume a position at the outset of unchangeable hostility to the new regime; we should adopt a policy of watchful waiting, if I can use that expression without getting into trouble, in the hope that presently it will prove possible not only for our missionaries and our educators but for our businessmen to find there some opportunity for resuming their activities. The new China, like the old, will need certain things from us. I think we should keep ourselves, if possible, in the position to give those things whenever they are willing to accept them from us.

Mr. ROSSINGER. I would like to express my approval of a great deal of what has been just said and to add a few remarks of my own. There have been a number of suggestions this afternoon concerning the possibility of blocking China off or, to put it differently, writing China off. The assumption seems to have been that, for one thing, the Chinese Communists and the Communist-dominated regime could be allowed to stew in its own juices, get into increasing dilemmas, and finally after the passage of years finally to be overthrown or come to the United States and ask for the assistance it must have under those conditions in order to continue. The second assumption seems to have been that in the meantime we could, undisturbed, except perhaps by certain local phenomena, build up our position and the position of friendly groups in the countries of southeast Asia and interest India and Pakistan; therefore, that we would have great freedom of action, that the Chinese Communists would have an increasing lack of freedom of action. A number of the questions involved in these two assumptions, I think, will be discussed in the course of these 3 days. I don't want to go into them in any thorough way, but I would like to throw out the possibility that the Chinese Communists, while facing extremely serious problems—and I think they are rather obvious to us—may solve those problems in fair degree; that is, that the view that they will be unable to solve these problems is of the present moment an assumption. There are several evidences which would tend to support that assumption; there are others which would tend to oppose that assumption, and the assumption itself needs to be analyzed very seriously.

With regard to the second point about our own ability to act relatively unimpeded in southeast Asia, I think there is an assumption there that the new regime in China will simply accept this situation of blockade and do nothing to counter it. My reading of the present situation in southeast Asia is that the western powers with interests there are extremely vulnerable; that the British and Dutch are having problems and the French are having problems in various areas; that the ability of the United States to influence the situation in those places decisively cannot be taken for granted at this moment. I think if we look at the existence of Chinese populations in a number of the countries of southeast Asia, if we look at a certain community of economic conditions, a certain community of political outlook—I don't mean on the Communist ideological level but on the ideological level of nationalism and unsolved economic problems which give rise to certain political attitudes—that there is a significant community between China as today constituted and various countries of western Asia.

I would go further and say that if the relations between the United States and this new China are utterly hostile that we would have to expect that every possible instrument would be used against us in these areas of southeast Asia and against nations closely associated and allied with us. Therefore, I think it is dangerous to look at this as a one-sided proposition in which the other side stands still, is confounded, faces dilemmas, while we act. It is an interacting situation and we ought to weigh very carefully the question of whether our power to harass, simply to put it on that plain and blunt level, is equivalent to the power of others to harass us. I am not at all sure that the answer is that our power is greater in this respect. This brings me to a further point. I don't think we can write China off, and we need to have a constructive policy towards southeast Asia and India. By all means, we must promote the economic recovery of those areas, we must promote their alinement with us, no question about it. I don't think that can be pursued most constructively if China is imagined as utterly outside this plain as an area with which we are completely hostile. I would like to suggest then, that the normalization of our relations with China—it isn't going to happen next month or perhaps 6 months from now, but that the normalization of China, the establishment of some kind of situation in which feelings run cordial, at least relations are correct—is an important prerequisite to effective action on our part in other sections of Asia.

To put it in a slightly different way: That our ability to be constructive, let's say, in India is not something which can be considered independent of our relationship with China. My own view is that the normalization of relations with China is essential in fair degree to the development of constructive relations with India. Or, to put it still another way: That the development of relations satisfactory to ourselves with a non-Communist India, which we wish to see continue non-Communist, depends upon some kind of correct relations with the China which is presently Communist and which presumably will continue to

have such a political make-up for a long time to come or at least as long as we can now foresee.

Mr. QUIGLEY. I suppose Minnesota men should stand together, and in certain respects I certainly stand with President Stassen. I think that there is a field for governmental assistance to the peoples of Asia through direct relationships, though, of course, I agree with Professor Lattimore that that cannot be arranged except with the consent of Government. But I can't go with my friend Stassen into India and southeast Asia, and so on, unless he goes with me into China also. It seems to me that we cannot conclude, any of us who have lived in China for any length of time—I have only had 2 years there—we cannot conclude, however, that communism in China will be the same thing as communism in Russia, and it seems to me we must distinguish, therefore, in our national policy between countries that are Communist of their own choice, as far as we can tell, and those that are dominated from outside. And at the present time I would be inclined to say that the burden of proof that communism in China is merely another brand of Russian is on the person who makes that allegation. I would also like to raise the question as to whether we may expect that other countries of Asia will be favorable toward a program which will not contemplate aid to China as well as to them. I rather doubt it. There has been developing, as all of you here know, an inter-Asianism, a sort of one-Asiaism sense of a common interest, common concern which seems to work against a program that did not take all countries into account, and I rather think that Nehru would have that feeling with regard to China. I would like, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to ask if it is proper that we call upon Dr. Stuart on this point of the possibilities of resistance to outside control of Chinese thought that are latent in Chinese culture. I am sure nobody here is better qualified than Dr. Stuart, and if he would care to give us his opinion on that——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, would you be willing to comment on that?

Mr. STUART. Mr. Chairman, it has been a very pleasant experience for me to listen to other people talk about China and to learn what Americans are thinking about our policy toward China. I would rather confine my part to answering questions growing out of my experience, at this stage, at any rate.

Mr. QUIGLEY. I don't want to press it, but if that isn't a question that would enable him to speak out of his experience, I don't imagine——

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps if you will frame your question a little more precisely we could get an answer.

Mr. QUIGLEY. All right. My question is: Do you think that Chinese culture contains powerful forces of resistance to domination by any outside culture?

Mr. STUART. Yes, emphatically. We have in China a fascinating sociological laboratory. Communism is being tried out in a country very different from anything where it has been in control before. I don't think anyone can prophesy just what will emerge from it, but it will be something that is distinctively Chinese.

Mr. VINACKE. May I ask, following the same line, if the Ambassador would comment or give his explanation, from his contacts with the student class—his explanation of an apparent complete swing of the student class in China away from the United States, toward the Soviet Union in the recent years?

Mr. STUART. The student class, as I understand it, has been in revolt against the Kuomintang because it had failed to carry out the social program that they looked for and which is all in the three principles of Sun Yat-sen. They turned to communism as highly organized, efficient, and as promising to make those social reforms, and we were identified with the corrupt, and not so much corrupt as inefficient, Kuomintang government which had swung back to the old dynastic traditions of self-aggrandizement and ostentation rather than the reforms for the welfare of the common people. It wasn't Marxist ideology originally that took them over; it was this revolutionary movement which they looked for in the Kuomintang and were disappointed in not having. Here was a promise of a thorough-going, smashing social revolution. We were identified with what seemed to them the reactionary forces.

Mr. BRODIE. I should like to climb aboard the Stassen bandwagon. It seems to me one of the issues which we have completely one might say almost deliberately side-stepped is the issue of the peculiar nature of communism today and how it affects the pattern of the problem we are dealing with. Now, for example, I do not believe that at least our experience thus far with communism in European countries would argue that the particular cultural pattern of the people upon whom communism is imposed has relatively little to do with the matter. I had assumed that by this time it was trite that communism of the Russian-inspired

pattern depends very heavily on coercion, thought control, etc. That somehow seems not to have entered into the thinking, at least, of our deliberations this afternoon. Secondly, it appears to me that we have to recognize that whether we like it or not we are facing conflict with Russian-inspired communism, and it seems to me one of the questions we might ask ourselves is what opportunities, if any, will be permitted to us to do the various good things we want to about China once the Communists take over. I throw that in only as a reminder, perhaps, that we are overlooking one essential ingredient of this problem.

Mr. TAYLOR. I just wanted to say that the question of whether the Chinese Communists resent outside interference is one thing, and I agree that they, no more than any other people, like to be ruled by everybody else, but that's a very different question whether communism—and I agree with your definition of it very strongly—whether communism of the present sort fits into China, and I argue that it fits extremely well. There is certainly very little cultural basis to it, and what there was was destroyed by the Japanese. I am still wondering about Mr. Rossinger's argument that we must ask the Chinese Communists before we do anything in India. I think they have some intentions of their own in southeast Asia whatever we do, and I would like to put up the counter-proposition that they are in alliance with—they are not satellites, they are in alliance with—a very powerful country which is out, by its own admission, for as much territory and as many people as it can possibly get; it is one of the facts of life.

Mr. ROSSINGER. The statement that I thought we should ask the Chinese Communists about their Indian policy before proceeding on it represents a misunderstanding of what I said. My point was that I felt that the normalization of relations with China was an important element in our carrying on an effective policy in other parts of Asia, not that we need ask permission.

Mr. VINACKE. Mr. Chairman, I think that really brings us back to one proposition that wasn't developed, but it carries us further back to the discussion this morning of the recognition. On what terms will relations with China, controlled by the Communists, be normalized or regularized? On the normal basis of interstate relationhips between independent states as a consequence of our relationship, or on a legal basis before an independent state and a dependent state? It seems to me one thing we ought to concern ourselves with very specifically is the problem of recognition and whether it is possible to find the conditions antecedent to recognition in the present situation in China which would or would not justify the United States according recognition and in accordance with normal international standards. Personally, I don't think we can.

Mr. STUART. I just want to add one sentence to make it perfectly clear that whatever may develop in China under Communist control the present Communist leaders are determined to carry out all the techniques of orthodox communism as they have learned it from Russia. The question of whether they succeed or not——

Mr. BRODIE. It seems to me that, so far as our interest in this problem is concerned, I am certainly sympathetic to what one might label as the altruistic motives which have been so generously supported here, but it seems to me also the question in its more critical sense, at any rate, is what are the external alinements of China going to be, and I say again in that respect whether communism succeeds or not in China is comparatively irrelevant. They may fail, but nevertheless, so far as our security interests are concerned, the alinement remains very closely Russian and very definitely hostile.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, gentlemen, it is after 5 o'clock. My experiences with this kind of round-table taught me that nothing much happens after 5 o'clock, and I think probably we had better adjourn until tomorrow. I want to again say what was said to you by the Secretary this morning, to underscore how valuable this kind of a conference is to all of us who are working here in the Department on this problem. Everything that has been said has been taken down, and I can tell you I assure you that it will be referred to more than once after the adjournment of this conference as we go back to refresh our recollection on what was said on particular points by particular people, and this has been a very valuable discussion. I have been delighted with the way the differences of opinion have been batted back and forth across the table, and I think it has been a very healthy and inspiring occasion.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Fosdick, there was a cartoon in the New Yorker a short time ago, in which a bartender, leaning toward another bartender, said, "Say, Joe, have you noticed how it takes more drinks now before they know the answers to the international question?" And I suppose it is on that theory that the Acting Secretary has asked this group to join him in the North Room of the

Mayflower at 6 o'clock. We will meet here again tomorrow at 9 o'clock. We stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 p. m., the meeting was adjourned, to reconvene at 9 a. m., October 7, 1949.)

(Friday, October 7, 1949)

(The meeting convened at 9:15 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Jessup). Gentlemen, I am awfully sorry that I had to miss your sessions yesterday. I have gotten a very quick briefing on them and I'd like to suggest, on the basis of your conversations yesterday and a little talk we have just had in the staff, to you a possible procedure this morning if it commends itself to you and go ahead on that basis. I understand that your discussion yesterday dealt very largely with the China scene and we thought it might be useful this morning if we could open up a southeast Asia picture, introduce into our conversations the problems of southeast Asia and the position of India with reference to the whole far-eastern picture, and that that discussion might properly lead us into a consideration of the various proposals for some kind of regional pact or union in the area. Of course those proposals are not confined to southeast Asia but I think it is a problem that arises from a consideration of that area, and I should hope that our discussion might then lead us into a consideration of a problem which has been raised with us by a good many people who have written in, and that is the relative position in terms of American policy of three possible centers of power and influence in the Far East, that is, Japan, China, and India, the question of the relative importance which we should attach, the extent to which our policy should be directed toward reestablishing or strengthening or maintaining close ties with one or more of those countries.

May I ask if that seems to you to be a useful way to start off or whether you prefer to start on some other line?

Mr. COLEGROVE. That sounds very good, Mr. Ambassador. Could I ask, will we have time to brief sometime on Japan?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. If it meets with your approval suppose we open up the southeast Asian thing and we will come later, perhaps this afternoon, depending on how the discussion goes, to the Japanese series. Is that satisfactory?

Dr. DuBois, will you go ahead?

Miss DUBOIS. Unfortunately the discussion which you carried on yesterday seemed to me so lively and so excellent that it cut the ground out pretty completely from under this briefing paper which I had prepared. I shall go ahead with it, however, largely as a résumé and as a summary of most of the points that you raised yesterday and then we can go on from there.

The countries of southeast Asia vary so greatly that it seems to me any estimate of that or any specific program of action in southeast Asia which can be phrased, which is phrased for the region as a whole, will need reinterpretation when applied to a particular country. It seems to me that a simple program or estimate for Indonesia and Thailand would be as inappropriate as a single estimate or program for, let's say, Korea and Japan. The differences are of that magnitude.

Despite the diversity which does occur, a few generalizations, it seems to me, can be risked. The first and the broadest is one which was discussed at the very beginning of yesterday's meeting, and agreed upon, namely, that there is a revolution in progress in southeast Asia and that that revolution is not co-eval with United States-U. S. R. R. tensions. It is a revolution certainly of 50 years' duration. It has affected more or less acutely all functions of the cultural lives of these disparate peoples. Yet it is a revolution which has not always been disorderly and simultaneously, I think one should remember in dealing with southeast Asia that not all disorders are necessarily revolutionary. For the United States to interpret the southeast Asian scene solely in terms of its own preoccupations with anticommunism is to run the risk of seriously misunderstanding the forces at work in southeast Asia and thereby of alienating the all-important leadership of the area.

Fortunately the U. S. S. R. seems to be making this very error in southeast Asia. The reasons, we may assume, are the doctrinaire quality of its southeast Asian advisers who impress one as being either fairly incompetent or too intimidating to render an honest judgment on the scene.

Now the revolution which is taking place in southeast Asia can be subsumed under three major blanket terms: nationalism in its political thinking, socialism in its economic aspirations, and humanitarianism in its social program. These,

of course, are direct reflections of western democratic thought, although certainly their appearance in contemporary southeast Asia lags behind their fullest manifestations in Europe. That these three major trends are western European in origin gives the United States a tremendous psychological advantage in dealing with southeast Asian leaders. However, I think it would be a mistake to expect no mutations in these major trends in the course of being transplanted.

Thus, the nationalism which is at the moment the major preoccupation is still phrased to a large extent as anti-imperialism. Furthermore, nationalist leaders have problems of unifying the nations that they aspire to create which are as great, certainly, as our forebears had in the eighteenth century. Sovereignty neither in its internal nor external aspects is yet a deeply experienced and internal force. I would expect, therefore, that their nationalism would be easily directed into international channels as soon as the threats of imperialism are removed and hypersensitivities on this score are respected. Once unity in these severely splintered countries—and I exclude the Philippines and Thailand—is established, international preoccupations will appear more consistently and frequently. However, until that time internal problems will seem more urgent than external ones in each of these countries. This complicates the situation. It means that the United States has to deal with five or six separate entities instead of one. It may retard cooperation between the countries of this area, and then of course there is the danger that splintered nations may more easily be exploited by those who enjoy fishing irresponsibly in troubled waters.

Socialism—to take the second main theme in southeast Asia—is still more an aspiration than a fact. It is closely associated with the desire, however unrealistic, to industrialize and achieve some degree of autarchy. In part, these desires stem from the realization of how vulnerable the export economy developed by European nations have made these areas to fluctuations in the world market. I need scarcely say the depressions of the 1930's was a very bitter experience in this part of the world. Another contributing factor is the knowledge that they lack investment capital and they need such capital from European sources, but that in acquiring it they do not wish to exchange economic controls for the political freedom which they have just acquired. On the whole, therefore, the preference is for intergovernment loans and government-controlled enterprises.

The third main strain in the southeast Asian revolution, the humanitarian one, is for the moment represented by a remarkable eagerness for education and for the development of literacy in the area. This, of course, was of value in the European nations where most of the southeastern leadership studied. It appears to them a sine qua non of intelligent and enlightened sovereignty. It is a force which, I believe, most nearly represents a mass movement in contemporary southeast Asia today. That highly literate populations like those of German and Japan have been no insurance against political abuse seems to escape most people's attention.

Associated with this trend is, of course, the desire for a higher standard of living and great admiration for American technology. I feel that our propaganda does not need to stress our technical competence or our standard of living anywhere in the world. It has already been sold and resold. It is a revolutionary force, some writers claim, which makes communism a pale and reactionary phenomenon by comparison. Although we do not need to sell the superiority of our technology it may be wise of us in southeast Asia not to rub in the differences in standards of living, and above all not to appear niggardly in sharing our greatly admired know-how. It may be unwise to arouse envy and undesirable to trade on strength which, though greatly admired, is admired in southeast Asia when well encased in velvet.

If the main elements then of the southeast Asian revolution have been correctly appraised, the next question which arises is, where are the fulcrums for the effective exercise of influence by the United States?

In terms of the class structure the major locus of power is the present leadership. It is predominantly western educated and western oriented in its thinking. The overt leaders who fell under the leadership of Moscow and remained there can be counted practically on the fingers of both hands. Furthermore, the peasant masses of southeast Asia are still largely politically unawakened, although that situation is changing faster than we may like to realize in countries like Indochina and Indonesia, which have had to fight for their independence. In dealing with these leaders we shall have to appreciate that they, like all politicians, will be under local pressures from their own peoples, which we

here in the United States only vaguely understand and probably frequently do not appreciate. We must realize, however, that the greatest danger to us in southeast Asia is that the armed and aroused peasants may escape from under the control of leaders essentially friendly to the west and become the pawns of Communist agitators.

An early and equitable settlement of disorders in southeast Asia and every effort to strengthen the present leadership in its unification of these countries appears to me to be an essential to United States interests. It is recognized that such leadership may not always be to our taste, however.

A second point d'appui open to the United States has already been suggested. It is the generous sharing of our technology. Here a generous technical assistance program was conceived. The realization by our economists that on its present scale it will not fundamentally alter even in a generation the southeast Asian standard of living had led to the suggestion that private capital is needed but naturally it must be provided safeguards. Actually whether such safeguards will coax American capital into underdeveloped areas may be worth pondering. The Bell Act which has been a thorn in Philippine national pride has not deluged the Philippines with American enterprises. In any event, the United States with its evaluation of private enterprise runs squarely against the state socialism of southeast Asian leadership. Already fears have been expressed in the region about our intentions on that score. Undoubtedly to secure our assistance the southeast Asians will temporize with their aspirations, but the attendant frustrations and resentments should not be ignored, should be carefully weighed against the chances of success in getting American private capital into the area.

A third and closely related lever available to the United States in southeast Asia is the previously mentioned desire for education. The Fulbright Act was probably one of the most constructive long-run measures for southeast Asia enacted in postwar years. However, it is limited to only three countries in the region, it has been slow in getting under way, it has been loosely coordinated with other policies subsequently developed like the technical assistance program, and has been nibbled away by other interests, lack of suitable personnel and the innumerable difficulties that always seem to beset the best of intentions. The Fulbright Act, however, is miniscule by comparison to the needs and aspirations of these areas. I feel that any guidance that this group could offer in refining and enlarging our United States informational and educational program and in enlisting our private educational groups in a multitude of both advanced and elementary programs, an education might be amply repaid in terms of long-run national interests.

Now these are some of the assets we possess in southeast Asia. Where, then, are the weak points in our potentialities? Here I would like to consider two types of weaknesses, those which are inherent in southeast Asia and those which are inherently our own.

It seems a justifiable assumption that the Chinese Communists will continue their push into the neighboring countries of southeast Asia. What their reactions will be will depend upon the nature of the push. Let us suppose that it would be directly military and would be limited to the land approaches.

Mr. Furnivall, an outstanding British expert sympathetic to the present Burmese Government, is convinced nothing would heal the present schisms in Burma more effectively than an armed Chinese incursion along the northern Sino-Burmese border.

In Indochina the dislike of the Chinese is traditional. It has been reinforced by the postwar Chinese occupation of northern Indochina. Any Vietnamese Communist leadership in the Republic of Vietnam which would encourage or condone Chinese military incursions would be widely discredited and might make more friends for Bao Dai than the French or the Emperor himself have yet been able to win.

Thailand's traditional nationalism and anti-Chinese position is presently more overt than ever under the authoritarian Premier Phibul. In fact, Phibul has recently stated that Thailand would welcome British and American troops on Thai soil in the event of a Communist invasion.

All of these factors are not unknown to the Chinese Communists and it seems improbable, therefore, that they would take the risks involved in direct military action even though they might be militarily successful. Also, it is still far from clear that the U. S. S. R. trusts the Chinese Communists sufficiently to use them as their "running dogs" in southeast Asia.

Obviously, however, direct military incursion is not the only instrument at the disposal of the Chinese Communists. Chinese governments have traditionally

taken a proprietary attitude toward their 6 million overseas Chinese in southeast Asia. Such attentions have never been welcomed by the government of any region. Among the people of the area, justly or unjustly, the Chinese have always been suspect. This position is intensified at present for the Chinese have held aloof from the nationalist struggle. The increased nationalist sensitivities in these countries since the war is likely to make Chinese Communists' appeals to their overseas dependents as obnoxious as those of Nationalist China. This, however, is certainly no adequate discouragement to the Chinese Communists.

If no direct military action is likely, what are the Chinese Communist potentials? Opening propaganda, which has already been launched from Peiping on southeast Asia will undoubtedly be intensified, but in my estimation it is of dubious effectiveness. I suspect—and this is highly intuitive judgment—that shrill propaganda may be one of those self-defeating techniques whose effectiveness is already largely exhausted. However, it may be unwise to underestimate it too soon at least in these so-called marginal areas of the world, but our own information services, expanded, more astute, certainly more repetitive, would probably stalemate the line coming out of Moscow and Peiping.

Far more sinister, it seems to me, are the possibilities of clandestine infiltration and activities whose goal will be to intensify destructively every possible grievance, racial discrimination, minority frictions, pay differentials, poverty, police measures, national aspirations and that whole host of evils which exist today in southeast Asia.

These clandestine efforts will certainly be facilitated if the countries of southeast Asia will recognize the Peoples Republic of China. Chinese Communist diplomats will afford the opportunity to shout at clandestine operators, to bribe and to terrorize the resident Chinese in southeast Asia who have always been noted for their practicality in such matters rather than for the strength of their moral convictions. Furthermore, to the extent that the Peoples Republic of China gains a position on the international forum its strident echoes of the U. S. S. R. on the subject of Anglo-American imperialism will have the weight of an Asian voice which has been "successful" in its revolution. I think that we should not underestimate the fact that the Communist success in China is seen as a successful revolution in many parts of Asia. It seems to be that in a case of that sort on the international forum our best defense will be the kind of diplomatic astuteness which Mr. Henderson has had in India and above all our actual record about which it seems to me we insist on being far too modest.

In my opinion this question of the overseas Chinese and the opportunity they offer Communist China for clandestine and diplomatic infiltrations in southeast Asia is one of the greatest hazards to United States interests in the area. Unfortunately, in terms of other considerations, recognition may have to be granted to the Peoples Republic and the attendant liabilities reckoned with.

In addition to the difficulties posed by the overseas Chinese and the recognition of Communist China which are immediate there are long-range difficulties. The population problem, particularly in relation to the food supply, is perhaps one of the major ones. The Far East as a whole occupies a unique position in world economies by being predominantly agricultural, and yet being on the whole a food deficit area. Faced with this gross problem the impulse is to encourage rice-producing areas like Thailand to produce as great as exportable surplus as possible. If the Office of Intelligence Research estimates are correct there is little likelihood that any foreseeable amount of encouragement to rice production will result in more rice than the Far East sell at a good price until 1960. However, by 1970 it is estimated the population and food production may once more be unbalanced as they are today. It is also estimated that the Chinese Communists will still be in control in China in 1970. It is here again that bold new plans seem as urgent to the United States interests as they are urgent to Asian leadership.

Here, perhaps, modest industrialization and economic diversification might concern us with equal seriousness and simultaneously with the food population equation. Certainly in an area as large and diversified as southeast Asia any simple unilateral approach would not be adequate.

Now it is not my function to dwell elaborately on the difficulties inherent in the southeast Asian scene. It may be more appropriate now to pass on to inherently American difficulties when we cooperate in the region. The first two difficulties seem to me closely related—indifference and commitments elsewhere. At the beginning of World War II China specialists were practically a dime a dozen compared to those on south Asia. Since the war Japan specialists seem to outnumber even those on China. Persons interested in the Far East are

termed specialists while every fifth person in the United States has no hesitancy about speaking authoritatively on Europe. He may do it even in fluent French or German. It is not astonishing, therefore, that in both our war and peace strategies our concern has been primarily for Europe. It is undoubtedly both practically and emotionally an area requiring urgent and vigorous effort. If, however, we are not to go on waiting for crises to develop before we become aware of them it will be necessary to act like the U. S. S. R. on a global basis. In respect to southeast Asia we are on the fringes of crisis. The initiative I consider is still narrowed on our side. Specifically, what this may mean is will the United States—and here I don't mean just the policy makers—be rich enough and above all willing and foresighted enough to apply preventive measures before south Asian opportunities are squandered

In our preoccupations with Europe and our heavy and legitimate responsibilities there the weight of European arguments may cloud our judgments. For example, the interests and stability of France and the Netherlands, close and familiar as they are, may serve to throw out of perspective our very real interests in Indochina and Indonesia. Traditional British preeminence in south Asia may have made us careless of developments in the region.

To continue with this weighing of Europe versus Asia, the question of the Pacific versus the Atlantic Pact is another case in point. If the Atlantic Pact is obviously in our immediate interest is a Pacific pact less in our long-range interest? Or, to narrow the matter down, can we judge whether military support to the northeast Asian group, Korea, Formosa, Japan, and the Philippines, is more effective than support to the southwest Pacific group, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, perhaps plus other commonwealth nations? Or, thirdly, is it more effective to support the more nebulous Indian Ocean bloc? Do United States interests lie in consolidating the Indian Ocean bloc with the two Pacific arcs or do our interests lie in two or more such aggretations in the Far Eastern periphery? If one or the other courses seems wise to us what means can be applied to implement them? These are questions which I assume this group will discuss in the course of the day.

In discussing United States weaknesses in the Far East I have raised two related issues, our preponderant interest in Europe and therefore the degree to which we have as a people concentrated our eggs in one basket.

The last point I should like to raise in respect to southeast Asia is even more unabashedly a valued judgment. It has to do with our moral leadership in the area. If we wish to be seriously hard-headed about the southeast Asian scene it is necessary to realize that their moral values are still potent and prized factors. Their leadership was primarily trained in our founding faith. The streets of Saigon and Batavia were plastered with slogans from Jefferson, from Lincoln, from the Declaration of Independence, from the Constitution, and from the Atlantic Charter when the allied troops arrived in September 1945. In our commitments to Europe and our antagonism to the U. S. S. R. we may appear in that area to have temporized with the idealistic and perhaps naive expectations of southeast Asians. Whether it was avoidable or unavoidable we certainly lost much of our influence in the area. Whether or not we personally as individuals prize our traditional morality or have been won over to real politik is not relevant socialogically. What is relevant is to the extent that the United States temporizes with its own principles it is abandoning the instrument of great political force in southeast Asia. The U. S. S. R., were it in a similar position of active responsibility, would undoubtedly be even more gross by contrast, but as far we are in southeast Asia, at least to some extent. We have the initiative. The U. S. S. R. and Communist China are still only potential forces, perhaps brighter for being less manifest.

This much is clear: Whatever our priorities in the short run, however coldly calculated in power terms, they must be compensated for by long-range encouragement, reassurances, and planning with and for the south Asians if we are to counteract Communist intrusions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Miss DuBois.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Ambassador, may I ask you whether Miss DuBois would be willing to comment on Governor Stassen's proposal for an American propaganda center at Bangkok?

Miss DUBOIS. Siam has always, of course, been very sensitive to the fact that it has been the one independent nation in southeast Asia that has not fallen directly under colonial control. India considers Siam today a rather insignificant and reactionary country. Bangkok is not an awfully pleasant climate. The port is not a very good one; it has only north-south transportation

on land at least. I should think if one has to have an American capital in southeast Asia it might at least find a more salubrious point.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Where would you have the capital if not at Bangkok, or would you have a capital?

Miss DUBOIS. I would not.

Mr. DECKER. I would like to ask Miss DuBois to comment briefly on the relationship of the American position in the Philippines to this southeast Asia mass. We have had some experience in the Philippines and I happen to know that many of those areas do look with considerable interest to what is going on in the Philippines. I wonder if that gives us an advantage or disadvantage.

Miss DUBOIS. I think our records in the Philippines stands us in very, very good stead in southeast Asia. I mean that is an honorable record and that is always quoted and that is of great advantage.

Mr. DECKER. In spite of the Bell Act?

Miss DUBOIS. Yes.

Mr. VINACKE. I wonder if she would develop a little further the leadership potentials in these countries. How far is there leadership politically and administratively at the present time?

Miss DUBOIS. I would say the administrative and politically competent leaders in that area are very, very few. That is one of the very great weaknesses, but those who are the leaders by and large, with some exceptions that can be named, are very strongly on our side.

Mr. VINACKE. How far do they have mass following?

Miss DUBOIS. I think that varies tremendously. I can't make a generalization for southeast Asia. I would have to go over it country by country.

Mr. KIZER. This master elucidation of the southeast is intellectually so compact that some of it slops over. I wonder if copies of it could be furnished. I know a number of the men around the table are looking to that for further aid. Is it possible to have them?

Mr. BALLANTINE. I would like to make a suggestion to Mr. Kizer. Miss DuBois has written a very excellent book on southeast Asia which I have read with a great deal of interest and also the contribution that she made last summer at the Harris Memorial Foundation in Chicago was also an outstanding contribution. That leads me to one question that I would like to ask Miss DuBois. The question is that I gather the distinct impression from reading the record of that conference that the basis for a regional security pact in southeast Asia didn't exist because economically the region was competitive rather than complementary, socially and politically there was a conflict between the interests of colonialism and of nationalism and also there was a fear on the part of these countries of southeast Asia that they were Balkanized, that they were in danger of being overwhelmed and inundated by China and for that reason those conflicting interests didn't leave a strong basis for a regional pact. That was the impression that I got from reading that study as a whole.

Miss DUBOIS. I would feel that that was pretty much the conclusion of the conference, wouldn't you, Mr. Talbot?

Mr. TALBOT. There was a very strong feeling in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. We will see what we can do with this and see if we can reproduce it.

Mr. HEROD. I would like to ask Dr. DuBois—maybe she answered this before I came—but General Winfield in his book on China gave some very plausible arguments for increased food production by a lot less people by a large distribution of land rather than smaller ones and certain other changes. Does Dr. DuBois see the possibilities in southeast Asia and also in China of any corresponding increase in food production to change that equation?

Mis DUBOIS. I think there will be no difficulty, once political settlements have come, in increasing the rice production of southeast Asia.

Mr. HEROD. Also China?

Miss DUBOIS. I have no judgment on that, I am sorry. But even with no very elaborate large-scale rice culture which has been experimented, I am told, in the Philippines by UNRRA, even using the old techniques with slight improvements in strains and fertilizers, that rice production in southeast Asia could be practically doubled. You see, all the surpluses of Indochina, for instance, aren't available now. That is almost a million tons prewar that was exported. That is not on the market now. It would save India a great deal if they could buy that Chinese rice.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In connection with the lack of leaders in southeast Asia, don't we have a great danger from the corresponding lack of American personnel who

are able to maintain real contact with those few leaders that are there. It seems to me in all of Asia we suffer if we rely only on our embassies and consulates to maintain contact with the native leadership because if you want contact with the revolutionists and you are in diplomatic channels in credit to the local regime it is difficult. We need certainly a great many more Americans like Mr. Talbot, if I may take an example, who has had personal experience in the field. He is an unusual and almost unique individual because a particular foundation saw to it that he spent some time seeing people as a private citizen in those countries.

One thing it seems to me this conference might consider is the need of getting more Americans into the far eastern scene outside of diplomatic channels which handicap their contacts and more freedom to develop an association or understanding of the native leadership.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Miss DuBois, you made it quite clear that you thought it was impossible for the Chinese Communist armies to spill over into the Burmese and French Indochinese area, in effect they compromise themselves by propaganda.

Miss DUBOIS. I don't think so. I said if the Chinese should make a military push it would unify the feelings.

Mr. REISCHAUER. They could push across but they would nullify their efforts on the propaganda side. Do you think there is any danger when they reach the borders they could pass over to groups on the other side with whom they are in sympathy matériel and so forth? Would that change the balance of military power across the border?

Miss DUBOIS. What you are thinking of specifically is will the Chinese Communists pass arms to the Vietnam resistance. Yes, I should think they would put then the passage of arms over that border on a smuggled and purchased basis would be very active. It would be nothing new except perhaps in magnitude. Arms are going in and out at a great rate over southeast Asia, of course, only they are paying for it perhaps a little bit more and getting a bit fewer.

Mr. MURPHY. On that score I just want to point out that we spent a good deal of time during the war passing arms and support to Ho Chi Minh, the gentleman in question, for about 2 or 3 years over that border.

Mr. COLGROVE. Mr. Ambassador, may I ask Dr. DuBois one question regarding trade between Japan and southeast Asia? If Japan revives economically and lessens the burden on the American taxpayer Japan must have markets. One market, of course, would have to be Manchuria and not China and we hope Indonesia and possibly a revival of the old trade with Burma, Siam, and other southeast Asian countries. I believe the figures before the war were about 15 percent of Japanese imports came from southeast Asia. Does Dr. DuBois think that trade could be revived and expanded?

Miss DUBOIS. I think that the Department will bend every effort to encourage the development of Japanese-southeast Asian trade, Japanese consumer goods, things of that sort in return for southeast Asian rice.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Will southeast Asia take Japanese exports?

Miss DUBOIS. I think they would.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vinacke.

Mr. VINACKE. I was just wondering whether your last reference meant that the heat would be put on by the United States; for instance, until we compel the Philippine Government to go further than it has been willing to go under certain pressures up to the present time in reopening trade with Japan on a basis that leaves the trade open to Japan rather than on any other basis. Was that the implication when you said the Department was going to open up trade.

Miss DUBOIS. Now I was saying they would do everything to facilitate the surplus trade rather than our shipping in costly dollar wheat. It was in the food for consumers trade.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to have Dr. DuBois comment on the present appalling conflict in Burma—to what extent she sees that as an evidence of Communist influence, infiltration? To what degree is it domestic to Burma, and does she see any solution of it?

Miss DUBOIS. Burma is not the field that I watch from day to day, Mr. Decker. I can here only quote Mr. Furnivall's opinions, and Mr. Furnivall is of the opinion that communism today in Burma is not a menace; that you are seeing characteristic interim disorders that have been traditional in Burmese history. Mr. Furnivall is of the opinion that the Kerens for more than the various splintered so-called Trotskists and Stalinists groups—that the Keren uprising is more important than the Communists, and certainly the Kerens are not a radical

group. In fact, one of the things they are protesting is the radicalism of the present government of Burma. It seems to be simmering down. I suspect that you are going to have in maybe 4 or 5 years a reasonably stabilizing Burma under a fairly socialistic government.

Mr. DECKER. I agree with you entirely.

Mr. TALBOT. At this point I merely wanted to add a footnote that the south Asian demand for Japanese trade at the present time has swung over to a different line than it did before the war. Textiles are no longer the big demand from Japan; now it is more machinery, machine tools, and semiproductive equipment. Many of the south Asian countries are concerned with producing their own textiles, so that the nature of the trade may be somewhat different even though the trade itself may come to approximate what it was before.

Mr. COLEGROVE. What percent textiles are domestically made in southeast Asia, what percent of the market?

Mr. TALBOT. I don't have any idea. India is a strong textile country. I couldn't answer you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Staley.

Mr. STALEY. I would like to ask with reference to the possibility that the United States might start, say, in the fairly near future, a program along the lines of point 4 in this area, what particular countries do you feel would at present be the best places to start? Some of them I suppose you just couldn't start very effectively in now, in terms of leadership available, willingness, desire for this sort of thing, and all the other factors, one would have to take into account.

Miss DUBOIS. Well, actually, as long as the settlement is not reached in Indonesia, as long as the war continues, as long as the disorders continue in Burmese, these are not profitable places to start a point 4 program. We have put a good deal of aid into the Philippines already, and we consider our record there on the point 4 level is very good already. It leaves practically nothing but Thailand, if you included India, of course. So, Thailand is one of the places where we can start moving immediately, let's say, and, in fact, we have in terms of the International Bank loans and so on, that sort of thing is moving along. Indonesia will offer tremendous possibilities if all goes well, say by mid 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rockefeller.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Miss DuBois has implied we were somewhat modest in letting South Asia know about American accomplishments. I was wondering how extensive, if at all, is the United States Information Service in southeast Asia?

Miss DUBOIS. There is quite a big shop in Bangkok. Perhaps somebody from the Information Service here will have these figures more readily at his disposal than I.

A VOICE. They will be given this afternoon.

Miss DUBOIS. All right. The thing, for instance, that occurs to me, and Mr. Jessup spoke of it before the General Assembly, and it was a tremendous feather in our cap in southeast Asia. It was quoted but just once. It should go back and back and back—I mean excerpts from that speech should be referred to, should be released at every opportunity. The people there treated it as a news item rather than as a piece of propaganda.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. But is the service in each country—I mean do we have a network?

Miss DUBOIS. Yes, you have a network service in all countries.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have further views this afternoon from Mr. Sargeant on the details of our operation.

Mr. ROSINGER. Could you give us some impression of the situation in and of China?

Miss DUBOIS. The March 8 agreement with Bao Dai has moved very, very slowly toward a computation only beginning in September with the 10 subcommissions set up to begin discussing further carrying out of the March 8 agreement. The first priority was given to the transfer of the courts of justice in the theater and seems to have led to a good deal of difficulty. Those negotiations promise to drag on, well, if the Indonesian negotiations are any criterion, for years if the Bao Dai regime lasts that long. The Republic of Mentnow (?) is granting Bao Dai a traitor and a puppet of the French. There are estimates which are very discouraging to the success of the Bao Dai experiment. I think that most of the western European nations, including ourselves, hope that the Bao Dai experiment will work, that Bao Dai will be able to set up an effective government and gain considerable popular support, but I think it is only a hope and far from an assurance.

Mr. ROSINGER. I was thinking particularly about the present military situation. The question was raised as to what effect arms from across the border would have, which you answered in part by saying that arms have been smuggled through for some time, but let's say, to what extent increased arms from across the border would have when the Chinese Communists reach that frontier—how would it affect the Indochinese military situation?

Miss DUBOIS. I would rather have Colonel McCann answer that. I don't feel too competent on military questions of this sort.

Colonel MCCANN. I think in a way there would be considerable political implications which might not be as pronounced as if the Chinese Communists tried to get into the area themselves, but I don't quite visualize their just giving this stuff gratis to the Ho Chi Minh elements in Yetnom. There would be some quid pro quo involved, I believe. However, I think, in general, it is a fair assumption that the arms traffic would increase. Another aspect is, of course, that as the French might expand all their military resources, and they might become increasingly unable to cope with the seaborne arms traffic which is going on in the area, the Ho Chi Minh forces have achieved at least a stalemate in the area, and continued French military—there is a continued French effort to achieve a military solution, it is not a self-liquidating proposition. In fact, it inherently increases the opposition that that military strength must encounter. How far the French can expand their military effort depends upon a lot of questions: their problems in north Africa, their commitments in western Europe, and the extent to which the United States is willing to back a military solution in Indochina, even though indirectly through the western European organization. Now, those are some of the considerations. Does that give you something to raise a precise question that you might have in mind?

Mr. ROSINGER. It does, but the particular question I had in mind was this: My impression, which I offer very tentatively, is that the military situation in Indochina, granting a number of differences, might be compared roughly with the position of the Generalissimo's forces in China itself, let us say in 1947 or possibly early 1948. In other words, I am wondering whether the French prospect there is of the same general character as Jung's prospect was a year or a year and a half ago.

Colonel MCCANN. There are aspects of similarity, certainly, one, of which I have mentioned—that seeking a military solution sows the seeds of its own failure. There is another similarity in the military situation—that the French are holding principal cities by military force, and attempting to keep open certain major lines of communication, which is a very costly sort of an operation against a Keren opposition. That is one of the things that makes the French job so costly in military terms.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Would you go so far as to say, Colonel, that the only sure way of guaranteeing a really large supply of really good arms would be to furnish them to the French or to Bao Dai?

Colonel MCCANN. On the basis of my knowledge I don't think the turn-over supply operation has been anywhere near as extensive in that area as it was in China, I mean if we are drawing a comparison.

Miss DUBOIS. Colonel McCann, wasn't there a recent news report by Steele, an interview with Ho in which Ho claimed that three-quarters of his arms were captured from the French—whether that is true, I don't know.

Colonel MCCANN. I don't know that I have read that particular article, but if we are drawing this comparison between the situation in China and the one in Indochina I would still say that even if it were true that the whole forces are using French arms they have probably captured them rather than acquired them by turn-over, which, I thought, was Mr. Lattimore's point.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask Miss DuBois' opinion of the political effect in China of the Atlantic Pact arms turning up there in the hands of the French?

Miss DUBOIS. First of all, the French have had American equipment there, you know, in addition to which there was left-over stuff; in addition we have already had ECA materials leaking into Indochina which has been observed and criticized. Officially Ho at least has taken an astoundingly moderate attitude toward ECA and toward the Atlantic Pact. It has been quite un-Kremlinish. He has said: "Well, sure we understand the United States wants to help its friend, France. Why not? We don't begrudge France's attempt to get back on its feet" and so on. It is only when the stuff begins to appear in Indochina that then you get expressions of resentment toward the United States, and since the stuff has been coming in one form or another either through ECA or lend-lease, and the old wartime arms and so on, I don't think it will come as anything new or shocking.

Mr. MURPHY. Except that there will be a good deal of new reference to it within Indochina. I believe there has been already, which might make the situation comparable to this 1947 Chiank Kai-shek episode in China.

Miss DUBOIS. We haven't been increasing love in Indochina, but oddly enough we have not been as disliked as we might have expected, and it is quite astonishing in reading the extreme right and the extreme left press in China to find them almost indistinguishable in their anti-Americanism. There is the strong colonial forces in Indochina, the reactionary forces have been as bitterly anti-American and have thrown the reaction of American imperialism as rashly and as frequently as the extreme left press has.

Mr. HEROD. What is the present status of the policy of ECA aid in the Netherlands East Indies in the light of the Hague Conference?

Miss DUBOIS. The ECA cancellation of aid to Indonesia still holds until, presumably, an agreement has been reached and the nature of the agreement reached at The Hague.

Mr. HEROD. Does that mean we are going to back——

Miss DUBOIS. I think our position has been impeccably neutral. By and large our negotiators have been remarkably impartial in trying to get a settlement. I mean they pressured both sides depending which side at the moment needed most pressuring in seeking agreement. I have the greatest respect for Mr. Cochran's astuteness and impartiality.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we may turn the table a little and ask some questions from this end of the other end, and I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore if he would care to follow the implications of his question, and suggest what he thinks our attitude should be toward the Indochinese situation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On Indochina I think I must echo what Miss DuBois said about Burma in the field of my competence, so I am answering the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, there is a very real and current problem there in regard to the attitude of the United States vis-à-vis the Bao Dai Government, and any suggestions that any of you have on that would be extremely welcome.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, as a general view, Mr. Chairman, I think that Miss DuBois made a very important point when she said that in relation to the general situation in the rest of Asia there is a tendency to emphasize the fact that the Chinese revolution has been successful rather than the fact that it is Communist—is that quoting you correctly, Miss DuBois?

Miss DUBOIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I think that one of the things which we must face very realistically, therefore, is that American propaganda throughout Asia emphasizing the Kremlin sympathies and Kremlin ties of the new Chinese Communist regime may be less effective than the tendencies of nationalist movements of all colors in Indonesia in proportion as they tend to become militant to imitate what has been done in China because it has been successful rather than because of the source of its origin.

The CHAIRMAN. And what conclusion would you draw from that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One conclusion I would draw is that Colonel McCann has shown us a military situation in Indochina which in a general way, allowing for differences between the two countries, resembles the military situation in China, say, a year and a half ago, and I would not be surprised if the military stalemate which Colonel McCann says Ho Chi Minh has achieved in Indochina might, if it goes on long enough, cease to be static and lead to the beginning of her turn-over movements in Indochina which he says have not become manifest yet.

Mr. MCCANN. Excuse me, could I footnote that? The turn-over was, speaking purely as military units.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what I mean: That you might easily get a situation in which if the French pressed by their difficulties elsewhere, to which Colonel McCann alluded, felt themselves forced to try to operate in Indochina by arming Bao Dai units rather than French units those units might begin to turn over as units.

Mr. PEFFER. Unlike Mr. Lattimore, I am more interested than competent. I agree with Dr. DuBois, you have to look at this as all of Asia, now as always. I think from Burma up to Vladivostok everything will turn on how we act toward China, the moral effect of the Chinese revolution is, of course, as liquid as the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. As she also said, there is a considerable whispering campaign. I guess it begins in Bombay and goes to Vladivostok, about America having grown up and being, like all grown-ups, bad. It is a great power, so it is a great empire. That is probably not true, but it is a good talking point. If we take the position with reference to China that we are

obstructing everything, that we refuse to recognize—I am using "recognize" now in the technical sense—that we refuse to acknowledge what has happened in China, if we attempt to sabotage right away or even to oppose, to cut off, to ostracize, to expel, I think certainly from India on it will be said by the Ho Chi Minhs, by the Siamese, by the Burmese, by the Serkenos (?): "Well, you see the Russians are right, the Americans are just imperialists." We have stood historically in that part of the world largely out of our Philippines record. We have stood historically as anti-imperialists, as equitable with respect to Asiatic people, that is at least in question now in the minds of all these people. No matter how much USIS, no matter how much propaganda you have got, official propaganda, it will do you no good as long as we give at least the impression that we have changed, we are no longer the country that freed the Philippines and which sent the school teachers instead of the soldiers and that we are out, one, to keep the status quo of 5 years ago, and, two, to use any power in Asia with regard to our larger political purposes, that is, our opposition to Russia. She touched on that too which, I think, is the essential.

If we are at least neutral about China, and are not hypersensitive about measures of socialization, Siam—if there are any, there are none yet, I guess, Indochina, Indo-Asia. If we recognize, first that these people are going to have to get their independence sooner or later and if we don't blackball them, even if their ideas are different, I think we can hold them, I mean by that we can keep them from going to Russia. I think the key will be taken by what we do in China. The odds are against us now and we lose part of Asia. I think we can turn the odds, first, at least neutrality about Communist China; second, no obstruction to either the Nationalist movement which has got to win sooner or later, and two measures for economic and social change.

With respect to the danger, the sort of magnetic danger from China, the Chinese Communists, the fear that they are going to come in, I am not so sure they won't try to come in. The Chinese have a way of losing their heads when successful, they proved that in 1927 and 1929, but maybe not. As for their pouring arms into Indochina, Indonesia, Burma, Siam, elsewhere, where are they going to get the arms now. Not from us any longer, that's true. They are not going to be operating on a surplus economy, are they? I don't think there is much danger from that. I think the question is largely a moral question. They will be with us or against us according as they think we are for the status quo and anti 1939, and they will make up their mind, I think, in accordance with what we do about China.

Mr. VINACKE. I think the question I was going to raise has been partially raised in what Mr. Peffer just said as his conclusion. His conclusion, or apparently this implication of it is that the American foreign policy in the east, that the expense, or without necessarily having at this stage come to the cost in relation to Europe, the United States should direct all of its efforts, put all of its efforts directly behind revolutionary movements wherever they appear, if they are to have any sort of mass foundation. That is, there should be no neutrality in relation to nationalism in Indonesia as against the Dutch. No neutrality as against nationalism in Indonesia as against the French. No neutrality in relationships in China itself where there is an apparent possibility in long-run historical terms of a local nationalist movement being successful, then our policy should be directed toward assuring that it will be successful so far as possible, is that the implication?

Mr. PEFFER. I wouldn't go that far. I wouldn't go pell-mell to making revolutions because even if they are right they cause embarrassment and we have got enough embarrassment.

Mr. VINACKE. Where they exist you would support them, rather than be neutral.

Mr. PEFFER. I wouldn't be obstructive. I don't think I would go looking for Ho Chi Minhs where they didn't exist. I mean just merely on the principle that the less trouble there is the less trouble we have got, but I would not obstruct.

Mr. VINACKE. The most stabilization is a status quo situation, not a revolutionary situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a difficulty in determining whether a Ho Chi Minh, using that as an engineering term, is really an indigenous leader of a foreign revolution or whether he is a foreign agent.

Mr. PEFFER. Isn't he generally both?

The CHAIRMAN. You have to take that into account.

Mr. PEFFER. But if he is enough of a local leader I would say you might as well swallow with bad grace, if necessary, but swallow the fact that he is also a foreign agent and by not antagonizing stand as well in with him as the foreign guy does, he being Joe Stalin. In most cases I think there is a double implication,

and that can't be blinked, it looks as it too piously to say that these people are only democratic, they are democratic as well as Cominform, but we can stand in as well as the Cominform. We are fairly confident they are going to win anyway.

Mr. DECKER. I don't know whether I understood Mr. Vinacke a moment ago. But he wouldn't suggest that status quo is stable when a revolution is going on at the same time in the country.

Mr. VINACKE. If we can stabilize conditions you have more stabilization than if you have a continuing revolutionary situation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On this question of the local leader or some other leader who is also to some extent a foreign agent don't we have to go a little further into the background than that? It seems to me that the fundamental fact is that in our time there has been a basic shift in all Asia which consists of the fact that before 1918 there was no really effective way in which the peoples of Asia could play off the great Western Powers against each other. Since then, growing after the First World War, and increasing very rapidly after the Second World War, there exists a situation in which nothing that we can do can prevent these Nationalist leaders from profiting by the fact that the U. S. S. R. exists, and that they can play the rivalry between the U. S. S. R. and the United States and make a percentage on it; that that creates a kind of leverage and ranging from leverage to negotiating, bargaining power, which they have and which we can't take away from them.

Now some of those leaders and negotiators may like and admire the Russians whose existence they are using. The others may be using them without particularly liking or admiring them. But the fact is that all of them can use that existing situation.

Mr. MURPHY. With respect to this dual relationship that we have just been discussing, one thing we have to consider is which is the No. 1 motivation in which the second—taking Ho Chi Minh, for instance: Some people consider him a patriot. Some people consider him an agent of Stalin. There is always the possibility that he is a patriot, No. 1, and a Stalin agent, No. 2, and that if he can advance his program and be successful on a national basis he would prefer it. But if he ends up in a stalemate then he takes the aid of Stalin. With respect to this playing off of one against another I think Dr. DuBois will agree that in Thailand, for instance, for the last 30 years until this postwar period, it was a definite and a well-recognized technique to play off the British against the French. Three or four years ago at the end of the war suddenly the Americans appeared and so the Thais all sat back and said: "Here is another element that we can use."

I think with respect to all of southeast Asia there is no doubt about it that in almost all the countries, and I would include Mr. Nehru's Government, there is a spiritual affiliation, though not necessarily a political affiliation, with the Chinese Communist movement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't want to talk too much but may I just supplement that because the phrase used by Mr. Murphy seemed to me very significant. He spoke of spiritual affiliation and he took Ho Chi Minh as a type of example. I am not sure Ho Chi Minh is a general type but let's follow that up for a minute. It is very pertinent to this question of spiritual affiliation, and the question whether a man's loyalty is fundamentally to the Kremlin or to his own country. A man like Ho Chi Minh is inevitably referred to as Moscow-trained, but if we go back in his personal history we find that he began as a French colonial intellectual who went to France, became affiliated with the French Socialist movement and at the end of the First World War followed the European Left Socialists who took over and joined the Bolsheviks, Communists. He then went to Russia and got some Russian training. But if we are thinking of our own problem, which is basically more significant, the relatively short Moscow training, or the relatively long French training, which is more significant in colonial politics—the spiritual affiliation with Moscow, or Peking, or the spiritual difficulties, affiliation of the progressive colonial Asian intellectual who takes a try at the best that the west has to offer, and then goes on down and down the ladder until he gets off the ladder altogether and starts up the Moscow ladder. That is a problem which is our problem and with which our policy can deal.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to suggest we take a 5-minute interval and reassemble in 5 minutes.

(After a 5-minute recess the meeting reconvened).

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brodie.

Mr. BRODIE. Of course, I am a complete layman with respect to the area we are discussing today. But I must say I was rather disturbed in reference to the last few comments that were made before we recessed—I was quite disturbed at the lightness with which connections with Stalin were apparently taken. It seems to me we know enough now about the manner in which the Cominform operates to realize that the Cominform is not as opportunistic as one might infer from some of the statements made. It is rather evident that they have something to do with choosing the leadership of these revolutionary movements rather than merely with discovering it. It seems to me also that very definitely there is a price to pay on the part of the leader of a successful revolution under Communist auspices. He has a boss. So much for elements in which American interests are very directly involved.

I would say, secondly, and here I have reference particularly to the implementation of a point 4 program, it makes a great deal of difference to this country what the character of the leadership of a revolutionary movement is. In that respect I think one might profitably contrast the situation in India with that in Burma. India is clearly a country today in which the implementation of the point 4 program would be meaningful. Burma, so far as I can see, and, again, I speak with a very large measure of ignorance, but again it seems to me quite clear that Burma is not such a country, and the difference is very largely in respect to the character of the leadership of the revolution movements in both countries.

I think Mr. Vinacke had a point which probably he spoke on too briefly to get across, and that is that in order to do our utmost and exercise and utilize our resources, intellectual and moral as well as economic, in those areas in the manner which helps them and thus indirectly us, we are very concerned with achieving a situation of genuine stability, and that in many instances such stability seems to be better implemented by supporting the regimes which are presently in control even though they have the bad onus of being colonial regimes. I wouldn't want to stress that point, but I would certainly feel that the mere fact that there is a revolutionary ferment in the area, the mere fact that colonialism is definitely passé so far as moral hold is concerned, etc., does not by any means argue that it is in the American interests to go whole hog for any revolutionary movement that appears regardless of the character of its leadership regardless of the character of its popular following and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kizer.

Mr. KIZER. I recall that in the white paper of the Department back in 1944 Mr. Davis, who was then associated with the theater commander as an observer, I assume drawn from the State Department, warned us rather carefully that the policies we were engaged in supporting wholeheartedly with various military supplies, the Nationalist Government during the war, and doing nothing with respect to the Chinese Communists, about what is bound to drive them into the hands of Russia. I think we ought to bear in mind that we have done a good deal in that way in driving potential movements into the arms of Russia, and for that reason I tend to go along with what Mr. Peffer has well said, and I bear in mind what the last speaker, Mr. Brodie, has also said, not that we should go whole hog, neither Mr. Peffer nor myself mean that. But when it becomes apparent, as I think it has become apparent in Indochina, that the days of France are numbered, and that the revolution is on its way toward control, it means to me we ought to be quite sensitive and watch for that situation, and, in the first place, not take sides unless we are compelled to, and see to it that we don't drive the revolutionary movement again into the arms of Moscow.

On that subject I think Miss DuBois put the matter very well when you said that Russia's doctrinisms put Russia at a great disadvantage in understanding or dealing with the complex problems of the Far East. That is not her exact phrase, but I trust it is a close paraphrasing. We must in our turn be careful our dogmatisms don't drive away that revolutionary ferment from us and into the arms of Russia. Careful sensitiveness as to what is going on in the Far East, on both sides, and when the issue is in doubt aloofness from taking sides, I think is pretty desirable in all of this situation.

We were discussing yesterday what we could do in India to strengthen that situation. If India becomes, which it may during this period of confusion, the leader of the Far East in any policies that we frame with the Far East, it seems to me we would do well to learn as much as we can from Indian leadership as to what is going on in the Far East. A number of their leaders are men very acutely intelligent and observant and our policies will have to be made, it seems to me, in the Far East to some extent as well as in Washington. I, therefore,

strongly support what Mr. Lattimore was saying about the need to have men like Mr. Talbot, for instance, who are individual observers and bring back the news of what is actually going on under the smooth, official surface of public life.

Mr. TAYLOR. May I go ahead?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I am speaking right next door to Mr. Talbot and he can correct me immediately if I am wrong, but I am under the impression that Mr. Nehru's attitude toward Communists is not like the one you refer to in the white paper—apparently he puts them in prison and breaks up conspiracies. Apparently he does not feel they are for sale, or they can be bought, or influenced by favor or torn from the loving arms of Russia. So I wonder how your two basic ideas fit together? Is that correct about Nehru's attitude?

Mr. TALBOT. Mr. Chairman, I take it this morning we are concentrating on the countries of southeast Asia and that India may come into a fuller discussion later, is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. The point was raised, and I would be glad to have you answer Mr. Taylor's question.

Mr. TALBOT. I would be glad to make a comment on that. I think they would indeed be grateful for American advice on what to do about the internal Communist problem. On the external scene, the problem doesn't appear to them, it seems to me, in quite the same perspective. They have felt Russia is a large country and a close neighbor and they must somehow live with Russia to a degree. My impression is that many of them now feel that the new regime in China, more adequately reflects the social forces and other forces at work in China than the old regime has done, and that for that reason India must get along with that neighbor too, and adjustments must be made with that neighbor, and with that new regime. I would be very surprised to see the Indian Government pursue the same type of attitude toward the Chinese Communist regime that it does toward the local Indian Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if I might pick up and see if we can be a little specific about a point which has been raised by a number of people. I think Mr. Fairbank brought it up first, and that is the queston of the recruiting and introduction into the area of more American personnel, not in terms of augmenting the Foreign Service, but ways in which we can get more people out there. I gather from one point of emphasis with the idea of reporting from Mr. Fairbank's point of view, I think rather a broader activity was envisaged, and perhaps Mr. Fairbank could elaborate on that. But I do think that the Department would be very grateful for any practical suggestions, first, where will we find more Mr. Talbot's; second, how we get them to go to the area, and perhaps we could open a recruiting office here and see how many of those around the table would be glad to volunteer, and some flitting hikers who would scour the area for us.

I wonder if I may pick up and see if we can be a little specific.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, ever since I came back from China in 1936 and was told I was a far-eastern expert I have been afraid for the destiny of the Nation because I was in a state of considerable confusion and, just as I look around the table, perhaps judging others by myself. I don't feel that any of us here would claim that we have the "expertese" even though we may be the best that you could get together to guide the Nation and support the Department of State, which has its problems. Now, to contrast this problem of personnel very briefly, we have to seek personnel to conduct relations with revolutions, not relations with governments. The Foreign Service is for the purpose of relations with governments. We are dealing with revolutionary situation, as we have all said. That requires, I think, a new approach to the problem of personnel.

Very briefly, a man who is to deal with a revolution, to have ideas about our relations with it, must of course begin with the local language. That is very difficult to come by in southeast Asia. Further, he must know the local culture, really how the people live and think; he must, in other words, live and think with them as a Cominform agent would do. Third, he must know the local personalities so he can really look at the politics in operational terms, and he must know local conditions from contact. To do this, in my view, one must develop personnel who understand in detail the aspirations of the people who are trying to remake their countries, we call them revolutionary not in a bad or good sense, so that this country can get on the same beam, find a common beam with this native leadership that has been referred to.

I would say further that our objective there is to formulate an alternative to the Marxism which provides them with a world-view spiritual dynamic, or the like. The United States, it seems to me, is short on that side, say, of a country not in a revolutionary ferment. Our ideology is very rich and we are very much devoted to it but we do not have it as an export product, it seems to me, in an organized form for the present day. We have started a revolution in Asia but we are not now the guiding force in it from the outside.

To carry out this project of persons who can put the Asiatic revolution in terms that make sense both in terms of the Asiatic and to us; these personnel must have nonofficial status first of all, it seems to me. They must be in these regions not with the responsibilities of Government status, and, of course, they must have on-the-spot operational contact, be there not just as students wandering about, but doing something with the local people. Further, they must have freedom to think and develop their ideas in any way that the situation seems to call for. Perhaps in a very critical way toward our own Government, we need that, that is part of our strength that we seek that kind of freedom of thought and criticism to guide us. Continually if we want people in this kind of free contact in Asia it seems to me we must look to private agencies in this country and that we very practically could ask a number of specific private agencies what might be proposed as personnel programs; educational institutions, for example, can develop a very extensive contact, a youth organization, a YMCA, that sort of thing might be tried and possibly develop personnel programs. In general this need reflects the fact that in Europe we have a vast reservoir of personnel. Think of the hundreds if not thousands of young American personnel who have been in Europe this summer with intimate contact in their cultural background and people who are now available for programs that we may have there and compare that with Asia.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Ambassador, I am sure everyone around this table knows a lot about the potentialities of the missionary movement in this respect. Certainly one would not claim for the missionary movement that it represents in every case people who are aware of the wider context and are thinking sufficiently intensively, exploring sufficiently deeply, sufficiently widely to be of much use. But nevertheless there do emerge from time to time a great many individuals who are located in these countries in very active and very intimate contact with the people there who know in great detail and in clear outline what they are thinking and whose contributions would be extremely valuable from time to time. I have only to refer to the distinguished Ambassador from China who is here to me like ——— ——— in Nanking, to use names, George C. ———, who formerly served in Shanghai, and the names of many others, Walter Zimmerman, for instance, in Siam, the names of many others who would be sources of information.

Now it must be said that the missionary movement is very sensitive about being used as the cat's-paw of the American century or of American colonialism or imperialism, or what you will. It is there for its own moral and spiritual purposes and it cannot be expected to be untrue to its guiding principles. At the same time I do think that I know that these leaders are always ready to share what they see to be the truth with people who are seeking the truth, and I think that better ways could be devised whereby the Department of State could from time to time consult with some of these people and get the benefit of the truth as they see it. They will usually be fully ready to share it with you.

Mr. TAYLOR. I am sure that Mr. Fairbank would agree with an addition to his list of people who might be used, and that would be people from the labor unions of this country. The fact that one dislikes communism doesn't mean that one doesn't deal with it. They have done as good a job in dealing with it as anyone here, and understand it very well indeed. I would be very happy to live in a world which is three-quarters Communist if I could live peacefully with it. My basic feeling is that we have no choice in that matter, that the fight is on, and we have to carry it on. Therefore, I would strongly encourage the labor unions to send as many people over as they can. They have already taken the * * *, as a matter of fact, in many countries of the world.

The second short comment, again on Mr. Fairbank's point, is that ideological one. That is extremely important for an additional reason that I would add to all of his, and that is this, that so much of the discussion, even discussion around this table, goes on in categories which do not belong to us, categories furnished us by other people. Imperialism, for example, what is your definition? Is it the Leninist definition which you could shoot holes into at any moment? Colonialism? These categories that we use we do need a cleaning up of our own ideology

and let it be our own, and if we use their terminology, for heaven's sake let us understand what they mean by it.

Mr. TALBOT. Having been put in an embarrassing position in the beginning, I would like to take the opportunity to make one or two comments on the experience of the Institute of Current World Affairs, which is the organization that sponsored various young men in studies of this kind. First, is the comment that Mr. Taylor made sotto voce a moment ago, that we not only have to have men who know something about the area but they have to make a living when they get home. But it has been the experience of this institute that it takes 5 to 6 years of fairly concentrated work in a given area before the first three qualifications Mr. Fairbank mentioned can begin to be absorbed. The tourist traffic to Europe is a fine thing because of our cultural connections. To Asia that same thing rarely holds. The problem is complicated and is extraordinarily difficult. For twenty-odd years this industry has been sending out such young Americans, giving them an opportunity to operate entirely independently. I would merely say in this connection that the thoughts coming around this table are the thoughts of that particular organization, and they are now making an effort to expand their very limited resources and trying to send more people than they have in the past.

Mr. HEROD. I would like to again, being a lowly businessman, merely refer to the fact that business generally pays these bills. Business is the one in addition to the missionary and the educational fellows that have permanent men out there and I should think with the American shipping companies, the American airlines, the American oil, the American import people, the American communications people, none of whom are represented at this table, who have the highest investments in China, the biggest permanent personnel in China, that it would be wise to include some of their viewpoints and give business some expression. I don't mean by any means that business should have the sole expression, but I think that you will find that some of the business people have some ideas that are worthwhile and that you cannot be completely oblivious to the fact that business is the one that is making the subscription to most of these other things to carry them on as well as the fact that we have some problems out there which many times we feel government pays no attention to.

I would like to register that for the record so that a little shift in the balance can be obtained and not be completely oblivious to the fact that the economic aspect is one thing in which business people are interested and we, as broad-minded people, are likewise interested in some of the other things but do not want to be entirely forgotten in this personnel.

I have a letter illustrating some of these problems of getting men. This letter is dated September 27 and is from a permanent resident of China. He says that visas were refused on the grounds that settlement had not been made with the workers and they have offered the workers 15 months' salary because there are no raw materials and of course they did not accept it. Settlement has not been made with the workers. The control would permit no closure, no dismissals, no salary cuts and gave no promise of any change in attitude in this connection. Negotiations with the workers have come to a standstill at present and there seems no possibility of getting the Chinese to take over the advantage and they will simply have to await developments. Life at Shanghai seems to be rather grim but there is no great danger of his personnel dealing with the labor crowd. In other words, families find life rather barren. The rest of the letter is detail.

You can't get men out when you get them in. You can't induce new men to go and you can't get them out. You can't with Government guarantees as to investments deal with particular men on the particular basis. These problems have to be considered as the things that are stifling investment, stifling trade and economy and they have to be given good, serious, thorough consideration with Government support.

The CHAIRMAN. I would just like to say as a footnote that despite your modesty we feel that with you here and with Mr. MacNaughton and Mr. Murphy and Mr. Rosinger we have admirable representation of the American business point of view but we are also disappointed that a number of others who were invited were unable to come. I just wanted to let you know that we weren't unmindful of the value that we could derive from all of you here and from others we had hoped also to come.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Ambassador, you have generalized by saying we need more Mr. Talbots, and I would like to add we also need more Mr. Cranes, who put up the money for this Institute of Current Affairs, and I might call your attention to the fact that Mr. Crane comes from Chicago, the capital of the isolationist belt of the United States. One fine feature of such organizations as the Institute

of World Affairs is the fact it is a private institution, not a Government institution. Young men who are sent out by governments are, of course, necessarily indoctrinated by the Government. Young men who are sent out by private institutions such as the World Institute of Current Affairs or the Rockefeller Foundation or the admirable work that was done by the American Council of Learned Societies is conducive to training a large number of experts who can take a detached and scholarly attitude toward the problems of the United States such as Mr. Talbot and other young men have done who have taken advantage of Mr. Crane's generosity. In this matter of promoting private enterprise, in educating young men, it may be simply a lost cause, but I would like to see the United States Government make a more generous exemption in income-tax allowances for funds which are given to such purpose. I suppose we could never persuade Congress to do that, but it would be a step in the right direction if we could do such a thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coons.

Mr. COONS. Before I came, Mr. Jessup, I prepared a little comment here that I am going to take the liberty of speaking to. It is along the line of what Mr. Herod has said. It seems to me that either before the far-eastern policy of this Government which your committee is working on shall have been formulated or subsequent to its formulation and announcement there would be very real wisdom in drawing up a consultative committee of representatives of all American business interests that deal with Indonesia, southeast Asia, China, and Japan and seeing whether there may not be ways and means whereby we could utilize some of the resources of American business leadership to implement and to strengthen whatever foreign policy is developed. One of the objectives that we have not discussed here is the exploration of how we can build up the middle class, let's call it the petite bourgeois of the countries where we are dealing. We have been talking here pretty much in peasant terms, in terms of the agricultural characteristics of the Far East, but as industry and business grow there will necessarily come an increasingly middle-class group. On whose side will this group be? Those contacts that will be established will be with American business firms, American Government representatives, commercial representatives of other countries. We might ask American companies operating abroad to increase the number of native employees rather than to rest upon an ancient British principle of utilizing only the British-supported intellectual and of implementing the point 4 program by something like our World War II training-within-industry program, of setting up schemes of communication, of the techniques and requirements of management, sharing with native peoples more of these aspects of organization and of operation and some of the requisites of the economic operation in the modern world.

Now this, of course, is a long-term proposition but I think I see in it—maybe I am wrong—some opportunity to build up the strength of an economic group which may have ultimate political significance in certain countries. I throw it out for what value it may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Quigley.

Mr. QUIGLEY. We are developing, as you know, Mr. Chairman, in our universities the type of program known as area study and I think it won't be very long before we will have reached the point of saturation of the field with our students, graduates. I have wondered whether it would be possible for business firms to give more consideration to the employment of such men after they have completed their work or while they are, say, in the period between master's and doctor's degrees and maintain for them for a period of years partly in their employ, partly for the purpose of continuing their education. They would be in a sense cultural attachés of business concerns. I haven't lived in the Orient myself for a good while but when I was there the general impression that we had was that American young men in business in China didn't stay very long. They went out for the voyage, you might say, and to test the liquor and it was the Englishmen and the Dutchmen and Frenchmen who really stayed on. Indeer, when I was in Peking the chairman of our leading American bank in Peking was an Englishman, a very able man too. But it seems to me that if that situation still prevails there is an opportunity for associating graduates of these area study programs with business concerns.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I just wanted to make one comment on what Mr. Fairbank said. I am sympathetic to the idea of people going out as suggested, but I was a little concerned by the indication that he would go out as a specialist in the revolutionary contacts mentioned. He mentioned that they would not have contacts with government because government was already in contact

with our government. I just think there is real danger in going out on too limited a basis and coming back with a one-sided viewpoint.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, compression leads to distortion in my remarks. By "revolutionary" I meant they should look at society as a whole and have broad contacts and not be in Government jobs themselves so that I thoroughly agree with your viewpoint.

Mr. VINACKE. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to come back to your original query and deal specifically with one side of the problem, with people going out, for instance under Fulbright grants, that sort of thing. That takes you pretty much into the university field. It takes you also, I think, in the underdevelopment, of the futility of that type of problem, into the problem of administration as much as anything else. It seems to me that if you are going to get people that you want, students or members of faculties, or people in the general community, you have to find some way of administratively to gear their movement to their career program. That is to say, the tendency now is to have a person make application for a grant on certain assumptions with respect to which he is supposed to adjust his affairs.

None of those assumptions are ever realized, apparently, at the present time, at least in the far eastern side of the program, with the possible exception of Burma. So after a person has committed himself to his university for the next year, then he suddenly gets a notification that he is to go out within 48 hours and then he adjusts to the 48-hour schedule and then he finds that he can't get transportation, that nobody knows how he is to go and how long it is going to take him. Until the administrative side of a program of that sort is worked out, not fitted into the needs of the Department and civil-service procedures and so on, but into the American community from the standpoint of responsibilities of people, I don't think you can lick the problem. It is administrative there.

Mr. BUSS. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that this thinking all proceeds from a premise that there is something to be gained on our part in combatting the position of the Communists or the revolutionists or whatever you wish to call them in this area. I think as far as our policy is concerned it is quite clear to me that we all feel that there is much to be gained in some sort of a program, in some sort of encouragement in young Americans to go on. I should like to go on from there. Assuming that more activity is in order on our part, I think it becomes very pertinent now, from the standpoint of what our policy should be, what is the nature of this enemy that we are contesting with which has already gained a hold in some of the revolutionary movements in this country?

If I may go back to things in these countries in southeast Asia, if I may go back to some things that Mr. Lattimore said a few minutes ago, Mr. Brodie commented on a little bit later, I assume it is a good thing for us to be thinking in terms of combating against these movements there, but I should like to know more about the nature of the hold on the leadership in these revolutionary movements in these areas already. I think it is in order to question the assumptions on which some of our observations are made. Specifically, if I may, I should like to ask Mr. Brodie the assumptions on which he made this statement, as nearly as I can recall: "We mustn't overlook the hold that the Cominform has on Longnin." My thought is that I want to go on into the nature of the control of these revolutionary movements and then try to think our policy should be to get a better hold as far as we are concerned.

Mr. BRODIE. I prefaced my remarks by saying I was in complete agreement with respect to southeast Asia. I should have added I don't know what hold the Cominform has on Longnin. It seems to me there has been made public a good deal of investigation of general activities of the Cominform. I have a colleague who has made an extremely intensive study of that, among other aspects of the activities of the Soviet elite, and I was citing what I presumed to be in the public domain concerning general information as of this date of how the Cominform operates concerning its local leadership; that is, it is one very largely of control and again the Tito episode which incidentally we must remember was precipitated by Moscow, not by Tito, indicates that a freedom is not one of the major commodities exported by Moscow to its local leaders.

Also, I think we can see from what has happened to leadership in various countries, that is Communist leadership in various countries, including our own, that Moscow has a good deal to say about who carries the banner for their movements. Again I say I defer to real experts in the field, which I am not. I hope some are present and will address themselves further on this particular point. But certainly I agree with your point that we have to know a good deal, not only about the areas concerned, but also about the character of the Moscow operations which are expressed in these areas. It does no good to send the

person out to Indonesia, let's say, and to learn all about the Indonesian culture, and so forth, without knowing something about how communism operates with its local revolutionaries in the local area.

Mr. REISCHAUER. The discussion so far this morning has emphasized the intelligence aspect of the problem. That is absolutely essential to a good defense, there is no doubt about that. As Mr. Fairbank brought up the problem yesterday, though he emphasized, let's say, the offensive a little bit more, the ideological concept there, which is an entirely different thing but closely related to the whole problem, and Mr. Taylor touched on it briefly. I might start with reference to Japan where the point is probably particularly clear. We have carried out in reality, or at least attempted to carry out, a sweeping social revolution in Japan. We have done things more revolutionary than anything the Communists have tried in Asia. At the same time we have not presented an ideology to go along with the practical measures we have taken there. As a result the Japanese people often grasp for an ideology and while going through our type of transformation are grasping at the Communist ideology, which really doesn't fit with the thing. They are asking for an ideology. We have in many ways failed to give it to them. There is a crying need for people to give our ideology. We aren't in the habit of giving it. We haven't been thinking in those terms for a long time. We have the ideology but we aren't presenting it to other people. The same thing applies throughout Asia, perhaps not as keenly as in Japan where you do have a largely literate populace, and possibly people that are inclined a little bit more, that is, comparable to our European theoretical approach than you find in the Far East. Still I think the thing does apply there. They are obviously grasping for ideologies in lack of any other expressed ideology. They grasp at communism when we have something I think that would really appeal very much more to them, as long as they are reaching for the stars they might reach for the real stars that we represent.

Mr. PEFFER. If we have got back to the general question as we appear to, and you raise the question of personnel understanding the kind of people Ho Chi Minh is, and so forth, could you not start with a base point of reference as to what they are? Couldn't you agree on the basis of Asiatic history in the last generation—that if there had never been a Cominform, if there had never been a Lenin, if there had never been a Stalin, if Nicholas II were still in St. Petersburg there would still be a Ho Chi Minh, a sub carno amal do ding or three fellows with different names doing exactly the same thing. Do you have to know those people? You don't. The fact is that these movements would all have come about as they have come about because we let it go by default. They have got a kind of, more than a kind, they have no doubt got a Russian inflection by default, since there would have existed anyway that Russian inflection it is not necessarily fatalistically permanent, but you will never understand those people and what they stand for if you think of them only in terms of Cominform. They are what they are by Asiatic birth, and nothing could have changed them. If there had never been a Russia they would have had perhaps other ideologies and would have been just as disagreeable to us of the Western World. I mean by "disagreeable" they would have caused us just as much embarrassment. I don't think that you need to send people out for 5 or 10 or 20 years to worry about Ho Chi Minh and the Cominform. You had better just worry about Ho Chi Minh and Asia.

Mr. STALEY. I would like to suggest, in connection with the problem of personnel, some of the opportunities offered by the point 4 type of program, if it can be vigorously implemented in this area. Parenthetically, I think we should recognize, first of all, that the point 4 type of program has considerable potentialities in helping to make social change in the area evolutionary and constructive rather than explosive and revolutionary in the narrow sense. In other words, it is a strategy of attempting to help lead the revolution this time in the broad sense. We all recognize what is underway there. But on the point of the relation of the point 4 type of program to the problem of personnel I think there are certain things that are pretty important that can be said. As part of that kind of effort, presumably a good many technical people of various types will be going out, sent by private business, private investors, sent by the United States Government, or they may be Americans sent by international agencies, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the International Bank, and so on, for various purposes, temporary or long term, and I assume they will be men of many different types, like engineers skilled in highway design and construction or public-health people, or agricultural people like veterinarians, or educational people who might be asked to help set up technical training institutes or mass education developments.

Now in working through these people to help the leadership of Asia we can at the same time derive very great political values for the United States. We can give certain ideas through these people informally, just through their presence and contacts there, and we can also gather ideas and impressions, which is the thing we have been talking about more specifically here the last half-hour or so, but to be effective in these two aspects of the personnel contacts that the point 4 people could develop it seems to me that we need to be careful on certain points to take pretty careful thought. One is on the question of selection of the people who go out. I recall vividly a conversation I had out in China in 1944 with a man who was at that time out for the Lend-Lease Administration and was helping the Chinese to try to keep trucks running. He had originally gone to China with a contingent of men sent to help speed up truck traffic on the Burma Road, and he told me that he had been a truck maintenance supervisor or foreman, I believe, with the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey. He said he was recruited to go out there and help on the Burma Road truck problem, and he said when he got on board ship and came in contact with a group of men that were to go along with him he almost turned around to go back. He said if he hadn't said "goodby" to verybody, and made all his commitments he almost would have quit right then because he said most of the men had no idea of what they were getting into, and were taking it kind of as a big lark, and they were mainly interested—they were mostly drunk before the ship sailed and when they got out in India, and then over into China the majority of them actually had to be sent back to avoid making very bad relations with the local people. The selection hadn't been thought through at all in terms of contacts with the local people, and his point that he was making very strongly to me was that if UNRRA was going to send any people out in that area they ought to think further ahead about the recruitment and the type of person and get people who could fit in. That is on selection. I imagine the people who would have anything to do with the point 4 program are pretty well aware of this now with the experience we have had.

Then, secondly, I would like to raise the question of what could be done through training, not in the specialist himself, of the people who go out as technical experts. I don't mean train a man to be a better highway engineer. Presumably, you would select a man who has good skills in public health or whatever it is. But don't we need to think of some additional training for these specialists to fit them for this kind of work? Specially, it seems to me there are these three things which brief courses—I am thinking in terms of a few weeks, probably all you could get for this sort of thing—some of these things might be hit in preembarkation briefing courses. One, would be, of course, background on the area that they are going to. At least enough to arouse their sympathetic interest in the culture and make them notice other things than just the absence of bathtubs and that kind of thing. Really put them in a better position so they can learn when they do get there and give them a little before they start in culture, economics, and some of the area, perhaps how to go about learning a language. Secondly, if they are going out on the point 4 type of program I think they would benefit from a briefing on the inner relations of the various specialists to economic development in that particular area, so that the highway construction man and the public health man, and the veterinarian, all have some elementary knowledge of economic development—oh, for instance, things like the population problem, or the problem of accumulation of local capital and things of that kind.

And, thirdly and finally, it would seem quite appropriate to arrange some sort of a briefing for them on political matters. That is, the kind of attitudes they will find toward the United States as they get to talking with people, the kind of attitudes they will find toward Russia, what the Russian propaganda has been in the area, and perhaps give them some actual texts of documents and so on, and what the United States policy has been in the area, not that we try to urge them to go and follow a kind of party line for us. At least so they will be informed so that in a cafe one day if it is thrown up to them that the United States has consistently tried to dominate the country and a lot of misinformation is involved in it at least they know some of the elementary answers to it.

I throw that out as the type of suggestion that would seem to be fairly practical, at least on the margin of what we were talking about.

Mr. VINACKE. Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether I should interrupt the development along this line or not. I wanted to come back to Mr. Peffer's remark, and if it will interrupt consecutive development of the discussion I would not want to do that, so I would not go on.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to speak specifically on the personnel training, and so forth?

Mr. COLEGROVE. No; I want to make some comments on Mr. Reischauer's comments and Mr. Brodie's comments.

The CHAIRMAN. You had better keep your chair.

Mr. VINACKE. Since we are going to move away from the Stalin line I don't think what I say would be too disruptive of the general line of our development. But one thing, it seems to me, that has been introduced by Mr. Peffer was the question of historical perspective. But there is one side of the historical picture, it seems to me, he completely left out—possibly because it isn't history, it is the present—in relation to these national movements. It seems to me that we have lost sight of the fact that there has been a war, and that during the course of that war these countries were under Japanese occupation, and that as a result of the conditions at the end of the war a nationalism in southeastern Asia that hadn't gone very far in the maturing of its leadership, in the establishment of a mass basis for revolution was put in a position to temporarily assert itself, rather than the present assertions of nationalism in Indonesia, which I think have a rather moving revelation of the experience of a revolutionist in the book Out of Exile by an Indonesian leader.

All of these things indicate to me that we are possibly on a long-run basis exaggerating the extent to which there has been developed and disseminated throughout these countries a nationalist expression that is purely loyal and that assumed power because of its local rootings rather than because of the situation created, partly deliberately, it seems to me, by Japan; partly inadvertently in the course of the war, and that, it seems to me, ought to be kept in mind when we proceed on the assumption, on the historical assumption that here you have a constant accelerated interference of its own forces, the development in these countries. I think it has been something that has been created in part as a result of a war situation.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Ambassador, I think the remarks that Mr. Reischauer made in reference to Mr. Brodie bring out the fact that there are two procedures reference to this great problem of totalitarianism in the world, and ideology. One was an attack upon communism as an ideology, the other is a promotion of democracy as an ideology. Mr. Reischauer referred to Japan where, it seems to me, promotion of democracy as an ideology has been very well carried out. Let me call attention to just one book. It is a textbook which was written by a Japanese for Japanese schools called Premier on Democracy. It was written at the suggestion and part supervision of the headquarters of SCAP in Tokyo, but it was written by Japanese scholars for Japanese students in the public schools. This edition of the Premier on Democracy has now been printed and it numbers about 3,000,000, and it later will be expanded for upper forms and contracted for lower forms to go all through the Japanese schools.

Now I think one test of the excellence of this textbook, this Premier on Democracy, is the violent, vehement, and distorted attack which the Communist Party in Japan has made upon this textbook. The very fact that they have singled it out for such rabid assaults indicates that the Communists themselves, who are very skillful in promoting ideology, see the excellence of that type of textbook.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brodie.

Mr. BRODIE. Mr. Chairman, I was going to address myself to the remarks of Mr. Peffer primarily, and part of what I wanted to say has been covered in a very different way from what I would have, but a much superior one, by Mr. Vinacke. I would like to add two brief points: One, I am reminded of what Mr. Taylor said yesterday when the point was made that we are after all dealing with very deep-seated social and political movements in the Far East; his reply was, "To be sure, but also we are dealing with very specific movements, which are only one of numerous conceivable realizations of those aspirations."

Secondly, and related to this, I think we have to realize that we are in an age when revolution, or at least one kind of revolution is a reactionary, and it seems to me we have to distinguish very carefully, again for our own interests as well as those of the people involved, between revolutions which are reactionary—and I would say a revolution which aims at imposing dictatorship is reactionary—and those which are truly liberal.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I wanted to make a brief remark with reference to Mr. Brodie's question of the degree of control by the Cominform of these revolutionary leaders in the various countries. We were talking about Ho Chi Minh. Mr. Lattimore gave something of his background—many years of French socialism, and a short period of Moscow indoctrinationism. During the war I was in China in the Army. We were engaged only in fighting the Japanese. We had certain people down with Ho Chi Minh who spent at least 2 years in contact with him, and at

least one of these people had 6 months of constant association with him in the jungle, a few miles from the Japanese all the while, and for what it was worth, and granted that we are not naive enough to believe that Ho Chi Minh couldn't have had private thoughts, nevertheless 6 months in the jungle is a long and arduous period, and my friends who were with him have continuously ever since maintained that he was at least 90 percent patriot; that they didn't believe his ties with Russia were the predominant motivation in his life.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to speak briefly on a question of ideology. We have had some discussion this morning of the importance of having more Americans familiar or become familiar with Asia and there is certainly no question of that. We have had some discussion of the importance of how the United States speaks to Asia, and I think that subject is also significant, but I would like to suggest that our ideology in Asia is basically the sum total of our actions in Asia, and the generalization is that the people of the various Asian countries form about us, our way of operating, our way of thinking and doing things, on the basis of these actions; that is, that any emphasis on words alone is misleading and deceiving to ourselves unless, let us say, in Indonesia, Indonesian nationalists feel that American policy is really promoting Indonesian independence, if that happens to be the kind of appeal we wish to make. In other words, that we have to think primarily on the action level, primarily on the level of what policy actually does. I don't believe for a moment, for example, that it would be possible to sell to the bulk of the Chinese people, or the bulk of Chinese intellectuals, or the Chinese middle class hostility toward the United States just on the basis of words. There must have been something in their own experiences they saw which made them receptive to that kind of approach, and, therefore, it is to the actions and not to the question of words, even though words can be persuasive for a time, that we must primarily address ourselves.

I would like to mention one concrete question which I had hoped to bring up before in connection with Miss DuBois' presentation. There has been an item in the press in the past few days to the effect that gold from Japan is going to be transferred to France in the name of Indochina in connection, I believe, with reparations arrangements. I don't know whether that gold is to be used in Indochina by the French or whether it is to be used in France. That would be a significant question. From the news reports, which were brief, it is to be assigned to the Bank of Indochina in some form. I would suggest that nothing we can say to the gretnemas is one-hundreth as important as the concrete question of whether a certain number of millions of dollars of gold is going to used in Indochina for French purposes, and then without considering the further question of the particular use that is made of that gold.

In other words, I don't think, to sum up, that we can consider this simply on a verbal level. I defer to Mr. Reischauer on the question of Japan, and I would certainly agree that Japan is certainly more ideologically conscious than China or the areas of south Asia. But taking China, taking the areas of south Asia, and taking even Japan in the sense, I believe, that the Japanese people are considered highly practical as well as theoretical, I think actions come first. If the actions appeal then you have a marvelous talking point. They can be played up in extremely persuasive ways. But they are basic.

The CHAIRMAN. I have got two people who have asked to speak. I would suggest that while we are in a most interesting discussion of what is a vital problem, our time is somewhat limited, and if you agree after we have had these two speakers I am going to suggest we talk about one other topic for a few minutes before we break up for lunch.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I would certainly agree with Mr. Rosinger about the importance of deeds. There is no doubt about that, and it is hard to carry out a word propaganda without the deeds to go with them. However, no one can say that the Russian actions toward China have strengthened their ideological cause, and yet the ideological cause has gone ahead in spite of the robbing of Manchuria and the Dairen business and all that. There are two levels and they can't get too far out of step with each other without serious danger. Mr. Colegrove referred to the excellent Primer of Democracy. At the working level in lower education we have done very good work. It is hardly ideological, it is more practical. You have to have textbooks in the school; therefore, we went about doing it. At the same time in the university level, and that represents a generation which will be effective a little bit sooner that the generation in primary school, that is at the purely ideological level. We have the

Japanese university schools and the recent graduates from higher schools and another all crying for ideologies and we have not answered that on the crass sort of Communist argument that is going to the Japanese intellectual, economic, and political theory of the Communist sort which is presented as the latest in western science. Well, almost any American intellectual could argue against that very effectively. All we have been doing is frowning though we have not argued on that level, even though the arguments are all on our side. I think that is a better comparison with the situation in western Asia than the school book problem is. We are in a position, though, to send people over there. I think the audience would be extremely receptive. If you think back a decade or two at the time when John Dewey and people like that went over, a program like that expanded, I am sure, would have great effect. Of course, a reverse program of bringing Asiatic students here is the same thing done a different way.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Ambassador, the discussion at this point seems to make it desirable to bring in another aspect of the personnel question which hasn't been touched on yet. Yesterday, Mr. Holcombe, discussing his experiences in China previous to acute revolutionary phase nearly a quarter of a century ago, mentioned that almost all of his previous students in America went along with the revolution, but went along with the right wing of the revolution. There were only a couple, one of whom went with the Communists, and one who was rather sympathetic to the Communists, but didn't go over.

In that connection, we have had a profound change which I think we should think about on the policy level and on the operations level. From 1945 until 1949 one of the principal products of Ambassador Stuart's American University in Peiping has been youngsters who after graduating, or sometimes even before graduating from an American western, not entirely American but over-all western type of education, were crossing the lines to do their postgraduate work on the Communist side. We have, obviously, got a very tangled problem of the total impact of deeds and also the total impact of ideas. It isn't entirely what people do; it isn't entirely the persuasiveness of words. Somebody else said yesterday we put $2,000,000,000 into China and the Russians took $2,000,000,000 out of Manchuria, and still the tide is running in the Russian favor. But it is something to be looked into. It is our aspect of the same problem as the bright intellectual products of the colonial countries of Europe turn away from Western Europe and turn toward Marxism.

Quite recently I was talking to a young man, this time from a Near East country, who has been in this country for a good many years and has received highly skilled technical training of a very practical kind that would be useful for a "point 4" type of program in his country. He said that he was going back to his country and he was going to work very hard for the program of cooperation with America on American lines, but he said: "I know my chief difficulty." He said: "My country happens to have a Cominform frontier with Russia, and too much of the American approach is in the form of telling my people how much better America is and how much better it is to work with America." He said: "My people don't know America. I know America, and I am sold on it, but America is just not America; it is just not in the horizon of my people, and those who come back over the border all rub in the fact that things are better on the Russian side of the border." He said: "I know that the comparison between the Russian standard and the American standard is completely laughable, but in my country that isn't the point—in my country not that Russia is so much behind America but that Russia is so much ahead of them." He said: "I am going to work for the American program, but I am very lucky because I was foresighted enough to marry an American wife, and if the thing goes flop I can go back on her passport. But I know a number of people who are members of my own influential plan, and if the American program is a flop they are going with the pro-Russian movement." That is some of the reality of the kind of thing we are up against.

The CHAIRMAN. I do want to raise another topic, as I suggested, but I would like to ask Ambassador Stuart if he wants to comment on this point of view Mr. Lattimore has just raised.

Mr. STUART. My impression is that the students that went from that university were primarily disappointed in the failure of the commandant to carry out the social reforms that were part of its program. It was not American or Russian as such. It was Russian against commandant failures that was the primary factor in going over. Once they got there, they were indoctrinated. That is another matter.

The CHAIRMAN. We have just about 15 minutes before we recess for lunch. There is one point which has been raised several times earlier this morning and is an issue on which we would very much like your views, and that has to do with this question of any kind of association of the southeast Asian states or of the states of the Pacific or the whole area. The thesis which is constantly presented is this: that, if the United States should seek to stimulate any such organization or grouping that would be self-defeating, we would then not have a useful grouping of states and it would be merely thought that the United States was trying to line up a group of alies that would not in the long run be useful either to the people in the area or to the United States. The corollary to that is that any such movement should be an indigenous movement. The question is as to whether there is really in the area the seeds of a consciousness of a regional solidarity and a mutuality of interests there.

Secondly, in terms of the interests of people and in the interests of the United States, is there a definite advantage in their coming closer together in some kind of pact or union or association of whatever character? We could have some more expressions of views on that general problem that would be extremely helpful.

Mr. KIZER. Mr. Chairman, why limit it to southeast Asia? Why does it not include south Asia as well?

The CHAIRMAN. I tried to suggest that one of the plans which has been discussed is a southeast Asian union; another is a Pacific pact, and there are various variations of that. I would like to open the whole thing as to what is the area that might be dealt with.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask you with reference to the Pacific pact and its connection with the southeast Asian pact, is it not true that the Philippine Government as well as the Government of South Korea, which are independent governments, actually expect the United States to promote a Pacific pact and whether they would not be greatly disappointed if we do not promote that pact? What are the facts on that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the situation on that is that there are undoubtedly a number who look for some kind of Pacific pact comparable to the Atlantic Pact, which would be a pact of military guaranties and everything of that kind. The Secretary of State made a statement, I think it was in May, indicating that we did not contemplate entering into any such pact at this time. That is still the position which we have taken. I think that is fully understood in the Philippine circles, at least, and I think also in Korean circles. We still have an interest in it there, and I think some interest in it in Australia and New Zealand as a long-term proposition. But, as you know, after the original Quirino-Chiang talks the Philippine Government did publish the instructions which they gave to Ambassador Romulo, which suggested a less detailed military pact for the Pacific and a more general cultural economic political association.

Mr. COLEGROVE. My impression seems to be that our allies, so-called allies, in the Pacific will—and this will have repercussions upon Japan, too—feel that we have let them down; that we are practically abandoning them if we do not look favorably upon a pact of this sort. We would rather have a strong pact.

Mr. HEROD. Mr. Ambassador, on the basis of just a few little personal observations, having been through that area last year in a matter of several months, I met a good many of these people in connection with our interests in those areas, and I would be inclined to say that the leadership seems to me to have an increasing cognizance of the mutuality of interests, but as you drop from the leadership down to the masses I would say it is noticeable how the consciousness decreases and that the masses as a whole have very, very little recognition or aspirations toward regional direction.

Mr. KIZER. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if we are to have the regional pact in that area it should be on a rather broad basis rather than on a narrow one; that Australia and New Zealand, which have within my personal experience a keen interest in Asia, should be included in it along with India, Pakistan, and the southeastern countries. I suggest further that it should sheer away as much as possible from any military assistance and be placed squarely upon a study of their economic situation as to what they can do to help each other and what in turn we can do to help them. If we follow out pretty much the Marshall plan in that respect and keep away from the military aspects of the Atlantic Union, I think we will go much further and tend to rob that sort of association of its unpleasant Yankee imperialistic aspects. In that field we must look for leadership. I am not sure that we have yet found the leader, although I have suggested earlier that India at least for the time might be that leader. But I think Australia has a very keen interest in that area and would

help very greatly. Our experience with the Australians that came into China with UNRRA was that they were some of the best people we had, and they came because of the extreme interest of the Australian people in the Far East. I know they are eager to work in that context. With that sort of broad union, looking to a solution of the economic problems which press so greatly, particularly the food problems, I think we might give encouragement. I feel there has been such a complete bankruptcy of military assistance in that area that to the greatest degree we should sheer away from that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Holcombe, would you be willing to comment on this?

Mr. HOLCOMBE. It seems to me that a regional pact derives much of its value from the relations between its members, and that for the best results those relationships should be the relationships that can be established among members who are not too unequal in strength and political experience, and applying that test—that is not the only one to apply—but applying that test there are very great differences between the conditions under which the Atlantic Pact was negotiated and the conditions under which any Pacific pact might be negotiated. It seems to me that we would run the risk of being misunderstood if we should attempt to negotiate a Pacific pact without explaining very carefully that we had something quite else in mind than we had when we negotiated the Atlantic Pact. I think Mr. Kiser has stressed some very important factors in the problem which make it a different one, and obviously that is only the beginning of an analysis of the situation, but my own view is that the Department has been well advised in going slowly in that direction.

Mr. BUSS. Day before yesterday a Philippine official in the Embassy said: "No Filipino could possibly oppose the fact we have nothing to lose by it, and if it is a means of getting us closer to the United States anybody would be for it."

I would suggest on a pact that there are two regional groupings, at least, which would have to be taken into consideration if you are going to negotiate for a Pacific pact. I am thinking of the southeast pact which stems from the original Australian-New Zealand agreement. You can't ignore the existence of the Asian Congresses. I think the two meetings they have had show those groupings must be had in mind. A caution which would also be in order would be the very precarious nature at this point of all three proponents who have been identified with the Pacific pact to this point. Either Quirino in the Philippines or ——— in Thailand or Chiang in China would be very wobbly props for a Pacific-pact policy.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, would not a major obstacle be the very disturbed condition, to put it mildly, of that whole peninsula of Burma, Siam—I don't agree that Siam is a stable situation by any means—Indochina and Indonesia? It would seem to me until there has been some clarification in that area, some stabilization, that anything approaching a political pact might very well leave us holding the bag for a reactionary regime or a regime which would be shortly repudiated by the people themselves. It isn't clear yet what the people of Indochina want or what they are going to get, nor is it true of Burma nor Indonesia. Until those factors are clear, it doesn't seem to me we have a sound political basis for this kind of move. Some loose cultural association might be in order, some association of certain types of mutual assistance, but certainly not something that would tie us down to governments now existing in a number of these countries.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Along that line of thought shouldn't we consider that perhaps in China by aiding a regime which faced a revolution we contributed to its downfall because we let it rely upon our aid instead of meeting its problem of revolution? Don't we face the difficulty that if we do support a regime in any country which is going through rapid changes, unless our support is in a very wide and proportionate manner in all aspects of the society, not just in politics, we run the danger of supporting it as an alternative to its solution of its problems and it begins to rely upon us instead of coming to terms with its revolution. So that we can be the kiss of death in a purely political arrangement. Consequently, our political arrangement must be part of a much broader approach on economic lines too.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that lead you to say if there were a continuance of movement in the area for some such grouping that it would be better for the United States not to be part of the group, to perhaps encourage them to go ahead, but to keep out?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I should think it would be excellent for us to keep out as far as we possibly can; that is, keep our political connections minima so we maintain maximum flexibility regarding any particular regime which we begin to support when it looks excellent, if we support it too strongly, may become reactionary in

the sense of not keeping up with its own situation. We can't afford to tie ourselves, it seems to me, to political regimes beyond the minimal point to get the result you want.

Mr. PEFFER. Don't you first have to ask this question, Mr. Ambassador: Would there be any chance of such an alliance? I am impressed by what Mr. Herod found by his own observation, the lack of any mutuality. Is there any mutuality there except one: a fear of communism and reliance on America? Americans may give the kiss of death, but can there be any birth without America? If that is true, is there anything genuine, aside from Mr. Buss's point, if we let it go? Under certain auspices we kill it right away. You ask yourself, Would there be such a pact without our encouragement and support? If there would not be, I should say that would fairly well define it as unnatural and not very likely to survive; in which case, we are associated with something that is going down. I think we ought to give up. If it goes on its own momentum, if it grows out of its Asian Congress, well and good; but, otherwise, no. We ought to keep out until it is started under its own genius and power.

Mr. MURPHY. I would agree with Dr. Peffer and also with Mr. Decker that the political times are not propitious for either a Pacific pact or for a Southeast Asian group. I think it is quite clear that Australia, primarily, and New Zealand behind her have been very, very anxious for a Pacific pact. They had a very narrow squeak during the war when the Japanese practically came into Australia, and they don't want that to happen again. Obviously the Australians would be the first to oppose an association such as what is proposed by Chiang Kai-shek recently. I don't think such an arrangement between Australia and New Zealand and the three who were recently promoting a pact would be feasible. In Southeast Asia most of the countries are in a great state of flux and I don't believe would be stable enough to support such a pact.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other comment on this before we recess for lunch?

Mr. TALBOT. Only one: that the history of the entire people's relations since that Congress in New Delhi in 1947 has suggested that there is no effective basis for strong political operation with various countries, but at the same time the leaderships are groping toward some sort of mutuality, but in groping they have a very strong psychological feeling that this is their own groping. The greatest point of pride in New Dehli in 1947 was the fact "We are doing it now." Asians have previously met under the aegis of European countries and what have you, but this is the first time in 200 years they have come together. It seems to me the flowering of that spirit has to precede any effective grouping of these countries.

Mr. COONS. May I conclude that this discussion with reference to regional association is almost entirely at the political level and that we really haven't discussed the question of the economic side, that there is conceivably much to be said on the aspect of a regional economic approach, somewhat after the manner of what we were talking yesterday in reply to Mr. Stassen's discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. We might come back to that after lunch. Mr. Brown, I think, can give us a little background on that. We can get off into that economic side. We meet again at 2 o'clock here.

We stand adjourned then until 2 o'clock.

(The meeting adjourned at 12:15 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Jessup). May I make one announcement. We were discussing with some members of the group just as we broke up this morning their own travel plans and the question of a termination of these sessions. As you know, we had left in abeyance the question whether you wanted to continue Saturday afternoon or terminate tomorrow morning. Since the decision needs to be made for some persons, at least, we decided that probably the best thing to do would be to have a long session tomorrow morning, running through to, say, 1:30, which would enable any of you who need to get away in the afternoon to get away, rather than terminating at 12 and then coming back for an afternoon session. So if that is agreeable we will start at 9 tomorrow and take maybe a 15-minute break in the middle of the morning and continue through till 1:30 and have that the termination of the meeting. I am sorry to say I have to leave before our meeting is over this afternoon; I have got to go to a meeting in New York and I will be back tomorrow morning. Before we start on Mr. Brown's presentation on economic problems, Mr. Ballantine has a footnote on our morning proceedings.

Mr. BALLANTINE. Having a bearing on what Dr. Reischauer said this morning, it happened that Horinouchi, a former Ambassador to the United States, who

was lunching with us today at Brookings, and right out of a clear sky Ambassador Horinouchi said, "I wish you would send some professors to Japan so as to help our young men in developing a democratic ideology, especially in the university, because that is what they lack more than anything else." So this bears out Mr. Reischauer's standing as a prophet.

Mr. S. C. BROWN. Mr. Ambassador, I was under the impression that my remarks were to be confined principally to the province of the Chinese Communists—economic problems—but I understand you would also like a few words said about this general southeast Asian question. I am not prepared on that, of course, so I am afraid that many of your questons I won't be able to answer. But I would like to say that this concept of a Marshall-aid program for Asia is not altogether new to the Department; it has come up indirectly, you might say, in meetings of the Economic Commisson for Asia and the Far East. That United Nations body has concerned itself very largely with the industrial needs of Asia, and something like a year ago they appointed a committee which summarized the reconstruction and development programs of Asia and the Far East, based altogether on local and national programs, and they came up with a figure, I think it was $13 billion, as being the requirements in terms of United States dollars. Now, of that, $6 billion was required in foreign exchange, and it was perfectly obvious that they expected that $6 billion to come from the United States. It also appeared that these respective national programs had not been drawn up with much regard for realism. They were expressions of hope rather than any blueprints for something useful. We have constantly in this Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East had to face just that problem of these countries—you might say in a sense trying to put us on the spot. They drew their requests for the industrial items they needed to the industrial powers—the western industrial powers, they say—but it is quite evident that by "western powers" they mean the United States. Well, that is one aspect of it—I mean their idea of the magnitude of their needs and where they expect to get them from.

Now the other thing which has appeared to us in our consideration of the matter is this: That, as Dr. DuBois said this morning, the economics of those areas are not interdependent in the same way that the economies of Europe are, for instance, and you would not in all probability get in those areas through the expenditure of aid funds on a large scale the accumulative and multiplying effect that you get by expenditure of similar funds in Europe. The third point, which I think has been overlooked in discussion of this problem here previously, is the effect internally in each of the economies of the expenditure of large sums in a program of that kind, because when you are putting something like, say $6 billion of foreign exchange in goods into an economy it does require a very large expenditure concurrently of local funds. In other words, you are creating an inflationary situation which might have very serious effects. Now, finally, the fourth point which has appeared in our consideration of the matter is this: That even assuming that you might be able effectively to industrialize, say, India and southeast Asia and those regions, you cannot be by any means certain that you will actually make them any better off, because of the population problem. I am sure by the time your process of industrialization is completed your population may well have caught up with it or even gone beyond it. Now those are major considerations in our thinking about this problem.

There is another aspect, and that is this: A tendency which has appeared in this ECAFE body to regard the region too much in regional terms. We feel there may be a tendency for them to think of themselves as a more or less closed economic unit, and we, on the other hand, are very much interested in integrating that region into the world trade picture. I am sure it is quite apparent to all of you that in prewar days, by and large, the trade of the United States, particularly with southeast Asia, was the balancing factor in our trade with Europe. Now if southeast Asia is to become more or less a self-contained unit, that is likely, certainly, to have effects elsewhere which would not be altogether desirable. Now, for these reasons, among others, we have been inclined, I think, to go slow in that concept of an over-all program of the Marshall type in that part of the world. The reasons may not be conclusive. I don't know. But I just wanted to indicate that we have given that type of thing some consideration.

Now I think that will conclude about all I have to say on the question of economic aid to southeast Asia, and I should like to devote the rest of my briefing to the question of China. In discussing that I shall try to avoid detail and merely to get at the heart of the economic problems of the Chinese Communists as they appear to us. Now the basic fact about the Chinese economy is the fact which, I think, has been implicit in all the discussions at this table, and that is

China's poverty. From 1910 to 1937 China had an annual deficit—an average annual deficit—on merchandise balance of trade of 135 million. In normal times that was, of course, made up by remittances from emigrants abroad, by expenditures in the country, by foreign missions and diplomatic, consular, and military establishments and things of that kind. Moreover, it is not only the general trade deficit that is important but it is the particular commodities in which these deficits occur. For instance, in the 5 years from 1933 to 1937 China averaged annual imports of over half a million tons of wheat, or nearly 900,000 tons of rice. In other words, it is a deficit economy over the years in foodstuffs as well as in other things.

Now another point to keep in mind is that China's exports as of now are in a relatively weak position in the world market. There is nothing that China supplies to the world for which there are not alternative suppliers or adequate substitutes, and I think that was made quite clear by the experience during the last war, when we got practically nothing out of China. Now I have spoken about China being a deficit economy even in the sense of foodstuffs. That is perfectly true. But we shouldn't forget that during the war also China got along without imports of food from the rest of the world. In other words, by taking a lower standard of living they can survive. Now that is a situation that the Commies are taking over. They are taking over responsibility for that kind of economy. Now their program, avowedly, is a program of industrialization. They say they intend to raise China from an agricultural to an industrial state rapidly. Some of the more hopeful of the party leaders speak of 10 to 15 years; others speak of longer periods. Now their policies with that end in view are very interesting. They have not attempted to socialize or communize the whole economy. What they are doing is to introduce what might be called a mixed economy. They have taken over all the enterprises which were formerly in the hands of the National Government, and that covered a good sector of the economy. They are also confiscating what they call bureaucratic capital, which accounts for another substantial part of the economy. But they say that they intend to protect and encourage private enterprise at the same time, and their reason is very logical because they say production comes first. That is the emphasis of their whole program.

Mr. STALEY. Would you explain at that point what they mean by "bureaucratic capital"?

Mr. BROWN. It has never been carefully defined, but it appears to mean the enterprises owned by the Chiangs, the Kungs, the Sungs, and the Chens. They speak of the four bureaucratic families, and I presume there are some fringes around that too which they include. In that connection, they have said that they intend to respect the private ownership of shares in enterprises which are jointly operated by government and private capital. Now whether they are doing that I am not in a position to say. As I have said, they say that they intend to encourage and promote both private enterprise and state enterprise with the intention of maximizing production. In fact, what they have done up to now has hardly been encouraging to private enterprise. That may be because of circumstances which they couldn't change, I don't know, but there has been heavy taxation and, of course, there has been a stagnation of business due to the practical cessation of foreign trade and to the blockade. There have been labor difficulties affecting both foreign and Chinese firms. The Communist propaganda, of course, led labor to believe that it would definitely have the upper hand and there are indications that even the Communists themselves may be somewhat disturbed at some of the excesses.

But in any case two very important difficulties, I think, must be faced by the Communists as a result of the poverty of the country and of their program as they have expounded it. The first has to do with their relations with the industrial laboring classes. They emphasize production at all costs. That means, of course, that the workmen have got to become more efficient and take less perhaps in the way of wages than their bargaining strength which Communist support might otherwise enable them to get. The other problem is the problem of financing the necessary imports of capital goods to proceed with this industrialization program. At present the Communists have no foreign exchange reserves to speak of that we know of. They have no gold reserve. It would appear, therefore, that they will have to finance these imports almost entirely by the proceeds of current exports. Now the bulk of current exports is very likely to be the product of the farms. I mean they will rely on the Manchurian soybeans, they will rely on bristles, they will rely on tung oil, and things of that kind. It will mean that by one means or another they will

have to acquire from the peasants sufficient quantities of these goods at a low enough price to enable them to pay for the necessary imports. Now if they intend to industrialize at a rapid rate, that means, of course, that they will have to exercise ever greater pressure on the farming population to get what they need, or else they will have to seek foreign loans and credits or admit private investments into the country, and the last two alternatives seem to be directly contrary to their program and their party principles.

So, as I see it, they are in a very difficult position. It doesn't mean to say that they might not succeed over the long run if they are willing to take a less rapid recovery at pace of industrial development. It does not mean that economic pressure denying them these industrial goods or even the other imports would necessarily succeed in overthrowing the government. But with or without that they are still in a very difficult position. Now that does have some bearing on what we might do about it. It would depend, what we want to do, I think, on our estimate of the effects of various courses that we might take, and, as we see it, there are, broadly, three alternatives: We might try to restrict supplies of goods to China to such an extent that it would endanger the stability of their Government or compel them to come to us, or we might display what I sometimes think of as a judicious disinterest in their problems—buy from them what we find useful and sell to them what they can afford to pay for—make no loans or investments; in other words, let them stand on their own feet and otherwise at most take the necessary precautions to prevent the Russians from using them as purchasing agents to get what they can't get directly from us. Now the third alternative would be, of course, the other extreme, and that would be to lend such assistance as we can to them in stabilizing the economy and rehabilitating them. It would not necessarily mean helping them to expand it; it would mean such things as encouraging trade, encouraging long private loans and investments where possible; it might even include government assistance, say, through resumption of ECA aid or possibly point 4 assistance. Well, those, roughly, are the three alternatives.

Now the first alternative—that of restriction—has got to be considered in line with the facts, and the facts are these, I think: That if you really want to restrict China's trade for the purpose of upsetting the Government you have got to restrict such things as wheat, cotton, the whole range of commodities. And the second point is even such a policy or a somewhat less restrictive policy would not be effective unless we could obtain the cooperation of other suppliers to China, which is highly unlikely. We have been, of course, a large supplier of manufactured goods and petroleum to China, but we are not the only supplier, and if we should cut off our trade while the others permit theirs to go freely, it is likely that we would not impede in any significant way the progress of restoration of the economy, while we would at the same time put our people—our nationals out there—in a very difficult position and cut off our businessmen from legitimate trade.

The second alternative would mean merely that we would stop the back door of Russia, you might say, to the flow of these strategic commodities, as I believe Mr. Butterworth put it yesterday, but otherwise we would not take too great an interest in what the Chinese obtain. There are sound arguments in favor of that. In the first place, the Chinese economy is at such a level that it could hardly be developed in any short time in a way that would be dangerous to us. On the other side, there is the argument, of course, which I believe Governor Stassen put yesterday, that if we want to detach the Chinese from the Russians the way to do it is to shut them off completely and show them what they are missing. But that could be effective only if they actually do miss it, which, as I have said, is unlikely.

Now the third alternative—that of actively assisting them—it seems to me, proceeds on the assumption, to put it bluntly, that you can buy the friendship of people who are your avowed opponents. There are other arguments in favor of it, perhaps—the humanitarian argument and all of that—but in the present situation, where we don't know quite where they stand, it seems perhaps unwise to make a bet on where they will stand eventually.

Well, those are the three alternatives, and there are, of course, variations of each position, but there is another consideration that I would like to mention, and that is this: That in a situation of uncertainty, such as this is, and in circumstances apparently where we cannot affect it directly, it would seem advisable not to get ourselves into too definite a position until we know what developments will be, but at the same time to put ourselves in such a position that we can immediately take advantage of what developments may occur.

Well, that, roughly, is what I have to say about the problems of the Chinese Communists. I realize it has been very brief and concise and I mentioned practically no facts, and all that, but I am at your disposal for questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. Before we get into detailed discussion of Mr. Brown's briefing, I wonder if I might first ask Mr. Cleveland if he would tell us very briefly about the rural reconstruction program in China—the ECA—if we could have that as additional briefing before we get into our discussion.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Well, there are probably several people in the room who know at least as much about the Rural Reconstruction Commission as I do, since I have been watching it from Washington, which is quite a ways away. One of the real experts on the subject is, of course, Ambassador Stuart. I might sketch in very briefly the present status of the aid program in the Far East, or at least as far as ECA is concerned. Leaving aside, therefore, the special assistance that has been given to the Philippines and the continuing military assistance to Japan, ECA's incidence in the Far East is really in four different ways: through the China program; through the Korea program, which in effect is a take-over of what the Army was doing there; through a program now suspended for the time being to Indonesia; and through assistance to the colonies—the dependencies of Marshall-plan countries, which, of course, are just as much part of the ERP area as the metropolitan countries of Europe. The Rural Reconstruction Commission fits in as a portion of the China program which consisted also, of course, of the provision of some commodities, the commodities being primarily food and cotton, some fertilizer and petroleum, and consisted of some industrial plans which were never, of course, put into active practice because of the way the situation developed in China.

The Rural Reconstruction Commission, which we regarded as one of the three main parts of the China program, was started really at the initiative of Congress and to a considerable extent stemmed from the widespread knowledge and approval in this country of the program that has been carried on in several different places at various times over a period of some 25 years by Dr. James Y. C. Yen, better known as Jimmie Yen, known as the mass education movement. It also stemmed from recommendations that were made in 1946, I believe it was, of the Sino-American Agricultural Commission, which was a joint commission that studied potentialities of agricultural production and development in China and made a number of rather far reaching recommendations. The Commission then, which was added to the China Aid Act in the House Foreign Affairs Committee—the nature of the Commission was set up in the act itself; that is, that it should consist of five members, three Chinese and two American, of which the chairman should be one of the three Chinese members, and given in the act a rather broad area to operate in, defined really as the whole field of improvement of the lot of rural people in China, which is quite a big order.

The Commission was set up after some negotiations and agreement was arrived at and the members were appointed. The Commission had its first meeting on the 1st of October, a little more than a year ago. The Chairman was, and still is—this is still going on—Chiang Mon-lin, who was an old-time member of the Kuomintang and quite close to a number of the leaders in the Nationalist Government. And the other two Chinese members were T. H. Shen, who had a very great reputation in the agricultural field, and Jimmie Yen himself. The American members were Raymond Moyer, who had been on the Sino-American Agricultural Commission and had been for a good part of his life in agricultural work and agricultural education and had also worked on some joint projects of agricultural improvement in South America in connection with the Department of Agriculture, and John Earl Baker, who is also very well known in China and by people interested in China—a former railway adviser and relief executive in China for a period of many years. This group got together on October 1, a year ago, and it took them several months, and they were quite anxious months for people interested in the fate of this project, really to come to agreement among themselves as to what it was they were up to. The frame of reference in which they were supposed to work was so broad, encompassing anything that would be of some assistance to Chinese farmers, who constitute some 80 percent, or whatever it is, of the population, and that it was really quite difficult for this group of people with quite varying backgrounds to come to agreement.

The fact that they did come to agreement is itself a significant fact. They started in a sense almost before they had come to an agreement on the general nature of their work with rather an ambitious program of agricultural im-

provements, and particularly irrigation and flood control. I think that they started with that list because it was decided that that was priority No. 1 and because it is the traditional form of assistance to rural people in China. Some irrigation and flood-control projects were either assisted or in a few cases started anew by the Commission. The Commission set itself up on a regional basis and hired Chinese staff and brought in some American technicians to work with it, but it was really 6 months or more after it was originally established before the Commission's thinking really jelled on what it was up to, and by that time I think it is fair to say that they had come to a number of conclusions which have been now tested in practice and which, I think, are particularly important in connection with consideration of measures that may be helpful in this problem of recapturing the initiative in other parts of Asia and in connection with a practical approach to these taproot social forces which were discussed some yesterday and which appear in several of the points for discussion for this meeting. The first of these conclusions that I have referred to is that the most important single thing they eventually concluded that could be done in China was a real attack on the problem which has been called land reform, but that is such a fuzzy term that I will try to redefine it a little further: A redistribution of land, but more particularly tenure relationships between landlords and tenants.

They came, I think, to the conclusion—and this appears more from what has been done than what has been said—that the important thing in many areas of China was not to work on the theory of giving everybody a piece of land that he could call his own, but to make real progress in the direction of rent reduction and contract extension. As you know, the Kuomintang had had placed on the statute books some pretty far reaching land reform measures particularly, and both the National Government and provincial governments in many cases had passed laws and rules and regulations to the general effect that rent ought to be low, specified as 37½ percent, or to the percentages varying by provinces, but nothing particularly significant had been done to put these laws really into practice. So the last job they tackled in point of time, but the first job they would have tackled now if they were starting all over again, was trying to put some real spin on the enforcement and carrying through of existing land reform measures. To this end the Commission would operate in the following way: Go into a province—and this has been particularly done in Fukien before the Communists came in, in Szechwan, in Kwangsi, and on the island of Taiwan—they would go to the provincial authorities in Szechwan or in Taiwan to Gen. Chang Chun and sell the authorities first on the importance of making real progress along these lines.

They found, I believe, some considerable resistance, of course, but also in some quarters surprising support for the idea of making real strides in this direction, primarily from people who had come to the same conclusion that the Commission had come to, namely, that real steps had to be taken in this direction if there was to be an answer in social policy to the tremendous appeal that the Communists had had through their rather more drastic and, in at least some places, less economic ways of redistributing agricultural income. After an arrangement with the provincial authorities and the setting of what was regarded as adequate standards, let's say, in a typical example, 37½ percent as the maximum rent and 3 years as the minimum length of contract, it then became a matter for the provincial authorities to carry through, but the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction—JCRR—was able to help in several significant ways. In the first place, it could help by helping to educate and publicize and propagandize the measures. In the second place, it could help by providing loan currency to the provincial authorities or to special bodies set up to go from county to county to carry out the orders. And in the third place, it could keep track of the enterprise and continue to push and shove at every possible point where that might be helpful. It represented, in other words, an outside force speaking in a sense on behalf of the people, which was a constant check on the tendency to slow up or to stop entirely.

I have put, probably, too much emphasis on what has apparently become known in Taiwan as the 375 program and is referred to as that by the farmers, but because I think it is the most significant and also the newest type of activity associated with an aid program. But I don't want to leave you the impression that that is the only job or even that it is the main job in terms of the number of people and the amount of funds spent for the rural reconstruction activity. Irrigation and flood control have been important activities in terms of the funds spent and in terms of several areas, particularly in the Tung Ting Lake area in Hunan, in terms of results. There have been some important though modest

steps taken in the direction of setting up seed multiplication stations, in the direction of better use of fertilizers, demonstration projects showing how much better a commercial fertilizer is than the local manure, and an assortment of other activities in the realm of agricultural improvement. There have also been supported some very significant activities in what is known in China as mass education—literacy and other types of education. The only place where the emphasis on that has been very important, however, is in the Province of Szechwan, where Jimmie Yen, of course, was already established during the war, and where the program was a going concern it received financial assistance from the JCRR.

I would like to refer to one or two other points in this connection which are of particular significance for other areas and even for China still. One is the financial problem. This program was able to be financed during the period when the Chinese currency meant anything at all—it was able to be financed almost entirely from local currency—that is to say, from the Chinese currency counterpart of the ECA supplies that were sent. It meant, therefore, that when you put rice in for the ration program in Canton or Shanghai you put cotton in for the textile need for the production of the mills first and then for the textile needs of the cities, that in that program you had limited yourself really to meeting the needs of coastal urban areas. In that connection, through the JCRR particularly and through some other projects outside the JCRR, it was possible to take the local currency and have some effect also in the interior. This, I think, has in it a particularly important idea: That it makes no sense, for example, to bring food into most areas of Asia and transport it to any extent inland. That has been done, of course, in the past to some extent, and in some cases effectively, but I think UNRRA's experience certainly was that it cost more and was more trouble and got into more difficulties than it was worth. On the other hand, if you can use the food where the shortage, at least in China, exists—namely, on the coast—and then use the local currency counterpart, the proceeds of sale, in effect, for benefiting the hinterland, you have got a balance in in the program that makes the most sense.

Of course, Chinese currency after a while got so that it wasn't, broadly speaking, worth anything and the Chinese Government was quite unable to meet the requests for funds made to it under the ECA bilateral agreement, and after a while, when the Nationalist Government got down to Canton, they went over to a proceeds-of-sale basis and that's silver yuan now, that is actually received for the food in Canton and is again reused immediately. That has meant to some extent that we have had to use United States-appropriated funds for internal expenses in China. The JCRR program in Szechwan, for example, has used some silver dollars in connection with its program, which is about the only acceptable currency out, which are the direct product of either buying silver dollars and minting them, or buying the silver dollars locally with ECA funds. This is a departure from the normal ECA practice that local expenses are met in local currency, a departure in a sense forced on us by the situation and the lack of either a local currency that meant anything or a government that could produce local currency on request.

The other main point I would like to mention is what a number of us have called the principle of jointness. The very set-up of the JCRR was a vote in favor of the theory that you can best work with the Chinese by joint arrangements rather than by arm's-length negotiation.

There is much to be said on both sides of that question, but I think that the experience of the Commission after a rather slow process of becoming joint, shall we say, has been extremely happy in that regard. The members have generally gotten on well, they have got to understand each other, and things have been accomplished by the Chinese members. For example, Chiang Mon-lin's remarkable feat of converting General Chung to be so enthusiastic an advocate of land reform that he went personally to every hsien in Taiwan preaching the gospel. That type of persuasion is simply outside the realm of what any American, no matter how astute and no matter how long resident in China, would have been able to do. I think the results also tend to pay off in more purely political terms.

And just to finish off, I would like to read you two short excerpts from the report from one of the top people in the JCRR organization—an American—specifically on the question of how good is this kind of program as insurance against communism. One of these reports reads this way:

"Nearly $1 million was spent in repairing the dikes with the expectation of increasing rice production in 1949 over that of 1948 by an amount roughly equal

to that imported by ECA into China. The political effect of this type of work was best shown in late spring, when most of western Hunan rose up in rebellion against the Government. The rebellion was one primarily rising out of poverty from the floods rather than by Communist instigation. Only one part of western Hunan did not rise up, and oddly enough at first glance it was the area which had been most severely hit by the 1948 floods—that around the Tung Ting Lakes. Questioning of local authorities brought out two reasons for this. First, during the desperate winter months JCRR money had served as work relief for this area of several million people; second, with the dikes repaired the farmers had hopes for a good crop this summer."

The other report reads this way:

"In April support was started for a land reform (i. e., redistribution) program in southwestern Fukien, enlarging a previously started hsien-size program to cover the seven hsien in the prefecture. Land reform in that one hsien had wide popular appeal and had resulted in a virtual elimination of all banditry in an area which had been sorely afflicted with it for years. The political effect of this type of program was clearly shown when the prefectural commissioner led a pro-Communist revolt in late May—the most important part of the prefecture not joining in the revolt was that section in which land reform had been completed."

Mr. COONS. My question was simply one directed to Mr. Brown here. His last comment was about keeping ourselves flexible and it struck me as a sort of a springboard policy. I couldn't quite visualize it, I couldn't quite imagine what you were thinking in contrast to the other three alternatives you were talking about.

Mr. BROWN. What I had in mind there was not suggesting that as an alternative policy but something to be kept in mind. That alternative should be chosen, in other words, if that is a consideration as well as these considerations of effectiveness, and so on.

Mr. STALEY. It is in favor of No. 2; isn't it?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. I wonder if we didn't underestimate in some remarks to some extent the strength of the position in respect to the rest of Asia. Perhaps that was deliberately left out. It seems to me in relation to Japan they can put us on the spot, they are in a very powerful position. The coke and coal, I understand, for Japanese industries has to come from China. I believe you said there were alternative supplies or substitutes for all Chinese exports. I suppose you could get coke and coal elsewhere but it would have to come a long way. China is a natural market for Japan. That is another reason why they would be in an extremely powerful position.

Thirdly, they are in a position to whip anti-Japanese feeling in all parts of Asia, and in that way embarrass any effort we might make toward extension of Japanese products to other parts of Asia, which of course is necessary to ever get rid of the $450,000,000 a year that we pay into Japan now. It seems to me from that point of view they have a good many bargaining positions on their side.

Mr. BROWN. I recognize that and not intentionally but inadvertently I did omit another consideration in determining our policy, and that is the fact that it cannot I think be determined solely on the effect of our trade with Japan, what we might do. There is also the question of Japan and our obligation to Japan, and, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to suggest that Mr. Barnett over here might have something to say on that question of Sino-Japanese economic relations.

Mr. JESSUP. We will call on Mr. Barnett in a minute. Mr. Decker.

Mr. DECKER. My question, Mr. Amassador had to do with Mr. Cleveland's discussion. I think we had better save that.

Mr. JESSUP. We will come back to you. Bob, do you want to say something?

Mr. BARNETT. I think what George Taylor has pointed to is certainly an important problem for the United States and for Japan and for China. We all know that about 40 percent of Japan's prewar trade was with Manchuria, North China, China, Korea, and Formosa. That trade since the end of the war has practically dried up for a number of obvious reasons.

It is our conclusion, having made various projects for the development of Japanese trade over the future, that Japan must trade with North China and Manchuria and Korea and Formosa if it is to become self-supporting again. At the present time we are meeting the Japanese trade deficit to the tune of about $400 million a year. We are making, in cooperation with the Japanese, constructive efforts to enlarge Japanese trade. This spring and summer, for instance, a mission was sent to South America and a series of negotiations resulted in the

general conclusion that if all goes well there may be a flow of trade of $100 million each way into South America, which is about 400 percent more than prewar. There is a demand in South America for Japanese goods.

A sterling agreement was worked out by the Japanese and the British Commonwealth, which ran into, I think, about 120 million sterling. The difficulty there is that whereas the Japanese can provide the exports, the sterling area has not been able to provide the means for payment, and at the present time Japan is holding a very large sterling balance.

There is some trade between Japan and India, and in this connection I wanted to mention this morning that in India and southeast Asia as a whole there is very little reluctance, in fact there is no evidence of any reluctance to buy Japanese goods, very surprisingly, and with one exception which is the Philippine Islands. In India there is a good deal of interest to get from Japan technical assistance of the point 4 variety.

Having added up all these very optimistic prospects for Japanese imports and exports and bearing in mind the loss of the silk market in this country, we still feel Japan cannot balance her trade without substantial resumption of commercial operations with the continent. As to the risk which Mr. Taylor pointed to—the risk, that is, of an unwholesome dependence of Japan upon the raw materials of the continent—some of us feel that an economy which is 85 percent agricultural is a very sluggish economy, and benefits from trade with Japan will be benefits realized arithmetically, as it were, slowly over a period of 15 or 20 years, whereas Japan's benefits from resumption of trade would be instantaneous and geometric, in a sense.

Now Japan needs to have a degree of internal stability and a degree of normalization of her over-all economic relations abroad in order to develop export markets which can in the long run be alternative to the China market and give her an independence in dealing with China in the long run. Therefore our feeling in the short run is that Japan stands probably more to gain from a continuation or a resumption of trade relations with China than through attempting at this time to get along without China and continue to depend exclusively upon the United States subsidy.

The CHAIRMAN. Having in mind these considerations which Mr. Brown and Mr. Barnett have laid before us, including the stake we have in the Japanese picture, and the other considerations which have been brought out and which are known to you in connection with the China picture, I wonder if we could address ourselves to the question in the Department, and that is, I think, without trying to formulate it in exact terms or cover all possible alternatives, what should be the attitude of the United States toward American trade with Communist China? Should we discourage it? Should we prevent it? Should we encourage it? Should we tolerate it? And there are various other verbs that you can put in. There is a central problem there which I think is obvious to all of you and which does confront the Department. I think if we can address ourselves to that issue for a few minutes it would be very useful.

Mr. BRODIE. Isn't there another question which belongs with that: What are our expectations concerning Communist Chinese willingness to trade with Japan except on terms which may be from our point of view unacceptable?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but I don't think all heard that. Mr. Brodie's suggestion is there is another aspect of the question and that is: What is Communist China's willingness to trade with Japan except on terms which might not be acceptable to us?

Mr. BRODIE. Or to the Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. Or to the Japanese.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Ambassador, touching upon the general subject that you have mentioned, and Mr. Brodie's question, it is rather interesting to note that within the last 3 weeks a leading Japanese columnist by the name of Nosaka, who is one of the three leaders of the Communist Party in Japan, made a public announcement to the effect that he personally, representing the Communist Party, would be able to bring Japanese merchants into touch with Chinese merchants to establish trade relations. This would indicate that the Communist Party in Japan was trying to jump the gun on SCAP or the American Government, in establishing such trade. Now, I think it is generally agreed that if Japan is going to rehabilitate her industrial position it is going to be absolutely necessary to have these markets. Mr. Barnett said 40 percent of the imports of Japan came from China and Manchuria before the war. I think it is even a little more than that, about 42 percent, and that is a market that can't be ignored. Japan will have difficulty enough in getting new markets or refinding her old markets in the United States, now the silk trade has

collapsed; so I think we can go on the assumption that trade must be revived between China and Japan.

If that is the case, it will be better for us to try to get ahead of the Communists in making these trade agreements, and I think Nosaka's assurance that he could arrange trade personally between or officially with the Communist Party between Japanese merchants and Chinese Communists shows that there is willingness among Chinese Communists to enter such trade.

Mr. VINACKE. On Chinese Communist terms?

Mr. COLEGROVE. Probably.

Mr. VINACKE. That is quite important, I think, to keep in mind. A broader proposition was: Can this trade be opened or reopened from a Chinese Communist side on terms that would be acceptable to us, the opposite of which is on terms acceptable to them?

Mr. BRODIE. I gather from what Mr. Barnett said that the Japanese are much more dependent on trade with China than Chinese are on trade with Japan. It seems to me that is an exceedingly important part of this problem.

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think we can find out whether Chinese Communist terms are acceptable until trade is actually launched as a real possibility, because my impression is that in all trade with the United States, between the United States and other countries, and so on, you first have to have an actual proposition come forward and then you reach your decision. I think it would be very unfortunate if, on the basis of a possibility that Chinese Communists' terms might be unacceptable, we didn't find out what those terms actually were. I think another consideration is that my impression is that in most trade that goes on you will find some terms acceptable and some not, so that would seem a day-to-day process of bargaining on the part of the people, private and official, who are actually negotiating the trade.

Mr. BARNETT. Mr. Rosinger theoretically has pointed to something which is factual, and that is that certain commercial relations are under consideration now between Communist China and Japan. The relations are not direct; they are through commercial agencies, some of them in Hong Kong and some elsewhere, who have contacts with the Japanese and contacts with the Chinese Communists in Tientsin. The question therefore poses itself, not whether there will be contact between Communists in Japan but whether there will be steps taken to prevent a flow of commerce which makes sense in terms of private profit for private or governmental agencies acting on behalf of their principals.

As to the bargaining position of Chinese Communists and the Japanese, I would say bargaining position of the Japanese at the present time was much stronger than that of the Chinese. In the long-term thing the considerations which Mr. Brown has mentioned might make the Chinese Communists' bargaining position stronger, but now the Chinese Communists' modern economy is practically prostrate. Its transportation system is worn out; its communications system is worn out; its factories lack spare parts; its generators are wearing out; their spare parts for the rehabilitation of the minimum modern equipment for a modern economy must be found in Japan, and the bargaining position of the Chinese who have not restored their mines into operation, have not restored transportation system to a point where they have large stockpiles in the ports, et cetera, is comparatively weak. So, in the short run, the bargaining position is not in favor of Chinese Communists.

Mr. BROWN. May I add something to that? The point of fact which I did not mention is simply this: that in this past year that Chinese Communists have had some of the most serious natural calamities that have ever befallen China in the past 30 years. They have had one of the most serious droughts in north China and north Manchuria in 30 years. That was followed by serious floods both in the north and along the Yangtze, and they are in an extremely difficult position at the moment. We have information, for instance, that they are desperate for such things as raw cotton, rail materials, and gasoline and things of that kind, and they have not got the exchange to buy it. They want to barter of course.

The CHAIRMAN. I will recognize Mr. Ballantine, and then I hope that we might have some expression of view from the representatives of business and banking interests.

Mr. BALLANTINE. What I was going to say: Mr. Barnett jumped guns on me. I was going to make a comment to the effect that I thought the situation today—Japan's bargaining power—was better than that of Communist China. There is only one other point I would like to add. I don't know what the present policy of the Government is toward the question of export of Japanese

technological know-how to China. I know that during the period of the late days of the war, just before Japan surrendered, there was strong feeling in the State Department that we should do everything we could to discourage it. What the situation is today I don't know, but I think that from our point of view, from our interest, from the point of view of having a commodity that the Japanese can export of very great value, there should be no restrictions on export of Japanese technological know-how to China, especially channeling of trade, handling of foreign exchange, banks, and in addition to industrial know-how.

Mr. MACNAUGHTON. Well, a long time ago we were on paper money in this country and somebody said we ought to resume specie payment. Cleveland. I think, said the way to resume is to resume. We will never get this world going unless we start trade, and I would start trade with Communists in China until I found out they were impossible to do business with.

Mr. MURPHY. I feel that if we don't trade with the Communists in China it is pretty obvious that, since they have a very crying need for goods, it simply amounts to forcing them to trade with Russia on Russia's terms. Russia, I think, has a very comparatively small surplus of goods to give China. Therefore, I think she will be for giving them and sure that she gets the best possible terms for them.

Secondly, our trade with Communist China in the beginning, so far as we can see, will be fraught with great difficulty. The Communists seem to be doing all that they can to insult us verbally—at least verbally. I think we would be very foolish and lacking in poise if we allowed that to be a consideration as long as we are not physically barred out. I think that the Communists in China are going to have a very hard time establishing themselves throughout the country and among all the people. I think that before they do establish themselves they will have had to modify their program very materially. Where that will end up in the course of a number of years nobody here I think can now foresee, but if we disregard insults and difficulties and are still in there then we stand to benefit from any modification of the Communist program that is forced on them. If, alternatively, we withdraw, then when the modification has taken place we will not be there to benefit by it, and possibly the modification will not take place because the Russians will be in there a great deal more securely than they would be had we stayed in.

Mr. HEROD. Mr. Ambassador, I have a very definite feeling that we should not discourage United States trade with China because its political government happens to be Communist, except insofar as those particular war or strategic materials are concerned which might be used in a military sense against us. I think it would be most ill-advised to do it.

First, I don't think you could do it effectively to the disadvantage of the Chinese. I think the absence of oil would be an inconvenience, and I think that the Chinese standard of living and of life is such that it would be one more irritation on the part of a few concerned. I think you cannot dissociate completely this question of trade from the question of investments. We happen to trade in China. At the outbreak of the Japanese war, my own companies had about 2,400 employees in China. We have never since the war gotten up to more than about 800 employees. Trade is very difficult at the present time, but we shipped 10 days ago a power plant for Yu Fung, a cotton mill down on the Yangtze up to Tientsin. The thing is there and we have received the dollars, and I would be inclined to think that that would be a legitimate sort of thing to undertake and do. We likewise received an order last week with corresponding dollars from Kunming, and I won't tell you the name of the customer because somebody will tell my competitor, that some trade is going on. It is a mere trickle, and I think it would be highly undesirable to cut that trade on private account or to discourage it, and I think it would be ineffective to discourage it, as I don't believe it would obtain a political objective of any greater security for the United States or following any objective of the United States there.

As to Japanese-Chinese trade, I also have some pretty positive ideas which may not be right, but nevertheless I feel it. I had a long talk with General MacArthur. I was in Japan twice last year in regard to some of the situations there; and, as some of you probably noticed from the paper, we have decided we would not take back at the present time our investments in Japan. A portion of that is due to United States policy. United States policy is not sufficiently clear to know, for us to have any expectancy that we would not be sticking our neck out under a guillotine if we did that. The companies with which we are associated—were associated—within Japan rose to approximately

100,000 employees during the war. When I was there last year it totaled 34,000 employees, and they have now got—oh, I don't know—perhaps 25,000. They have been ordered by the new law that has gone through of deconcentration of industry to divest themselves of 27 of their 41 plants. They have been ordered by the law, which was put through by Americans going around to the Diet and telling the Diet that it should be put through, and the hands of the clock of the great parliamentary chamber were stopped in order that they could do it, to likewise sell machinery and go out of business in certain particular lines. They had been ordered in accordance with the law of Japan, which the Americans have not been wholly oblivious to and have had some irons in the fire in putting through, not to have interest in any other companies until the attraction to private people such as ourselves to go back to Japan under some of the things—the new ideas the United States Government has been insisting on in Japan have unfortunately been a deterrent to many of us to go in.

General MacArthur was kind in inviting me to go out, writing a letter asking us to come without technology, was very kind in expressing appreciation; and, when I gave an interview indicating I thought the situation was not right, it was not an hour and a half until the Prime Minister of Japan sent his automobile asking me to come to see him. The governor of the Bank of Japan asked me to come to see him. I had more automobiles than I could travel in. They were extremely interested, but we by our own actions are urging rather deterrent things to the economic rehabilitation.

We have discussed this with the State Department and the Department of the Army, and I think very constructive steps are now being taken to try to correct some of them, but I think we are going to have to let Japan as a low-margin country trade with China. I think we are going to have to let Japan develop a merchant marine, because Japan's shipping has been one of her prominent elements of her competitive position in the past. She has been able to buy cotton from India and other places, China, and bring it into Japan in her own ships, work it up into textiles, and ship it back into India at lower prices than the British could ship and a lower price than even the Indians could make in some particular cases, and our own former associated company in Japan I just mentioned a minute ago has had a technical mission out and been requested by the Indians to turn over their techniques. They have asked us about it. We have said it is a good thing to go ahead and do it. I think you have got to have the market for Asia open, whether it is going to be Communist-dominated or not as far as political government is concerned, to the private traders, to let the Japanese recover, to let the world recover, and I wouldn't handicap that too much. I would be a little bit more liberal in permitting Japan to trade with China than I would United States trade if the necessity arose because Japan is a lower-margin country than the United States. We can afford to do a lot of things which some of the other countries can't always afford to do, and I feel very positively it would be unwise to limit that trade other than in certain strategic things where an element of security might be involved.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if Mr. MacNaughton and Mr. Murphy would hold their additional statements until after a 5-minute recess and then we will resume.

(Recess from 3 : 30 to 3 : 40. When the meeting resumed, Mr. Fosdick assumed chairmanship.)

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. Fosdick). Gentlemen, shall we resume the discussion on this economic situation. I was going to call on Mr. MacNaughton first. He raised his hand just before Mr. Jessup went out.

Mr. MACNAUGHTON. On what Mr. Murphy said about not being frightened off by Communists, I was reminded of a case in the bank. We had a customer to whom we had loaned a good deal of money. He had machinery to sell; tried to sell it to a mill man. He came to me and said, "I had a terrible time." He said, "He called me an s.o.b., but he did it in a nice way, so I sold it to him anyway." You let trade alone. As long as it makes a deal that is a deal that will stand up, we will take care of ourselves.

Mr. MURPHY. I was jut interested in a point Mr. Herod made when he talked about an installation he had made recently in Kunming after we were talking about our consulates in China and which ones we were keeping open and which ones would close, and among the ones being closed was the one in Kunming. Mr. Butterworth, when he was discussing it, said several times, well, we had not had a consulate in Kunming in the years 1920 to 1930 or thereabouts, and that seemed to be a consideration. I have just wanted to raise the point that Kunming in the early 1920's and Kunming, I would say, today were two entirely different places. In the early 1920's Kunming was almost absolutely isolated. The only approach

was by French railway from Hanoi. Since then, the Burma Road has come in. The road to Chungking, if it was a road in those days, has certainly been improved. The road to the east, to the north, south, Hankow, Canton railway, and the railroad into Guajo Province have been built since then, and I would say Kunming is much more open place—with its tin and other resources, the Province of Hunan today than it was then. I was just making that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I will see that Mr. Butterworth gets that comment. I know he will be glad to have it.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we have two basic possibilities in China. One is condemning communism and the other is to look to us instead of Russia. As I see it, problems that come up under one heading may be in conflict with the other heading, and I think that is true with the problem of trade. It seems to me we have to weigh in our own minds as to which is the most important and then have the courage to act.

On United States trade with China, my own reaction is that it should be limited. It seems to me that the fastest way to contain communism is to discredit it in the eyes of the people of China. It seems to me if the economy worsens, that this will arouse opposition to it, and as I see it, the opposition is essential if new leadership is to develop in China, and I do feel that this new leadership is tremendously important. I appreciate that curtailing trade will be a source of propaganda for the Communists to use. They will say we are starving the Chinese people by not continuing our trade, but it seems to me whatever position we take in China, the Chinese Communists will develop propaganda that will be against us, and certainly if by trading with China the Chinese people generally, we do help conditions there, the Communists will be the last to give us any credit for it.

I realize this is a negative approach to the problem in China and I dislike very much negative approaches. Therefore, it would seem to me this would only be part of a broader approach which would be of a positive, constructive character, of the type that has been discussed here in the last 2 days, the type of economic aid in the Far East generally, educational assistance, information service, things of that type.

Finally, I would say I realize this trade matter is one that is very difficult for us to take a position on by ourselves. It would seem to me basically important that we be in touch with the British and work out some kind of common procedure with them.

Mr. PEFFER. Mr. Chairman, if we restrict China trade, there is no use doing it unless we can do it enough to hurt, and hurt mortally. There is no use doing it unless thereby we can materially contribute to the downfall of the Chinese Communist regime. If we do that, if we can—I don't know that we can, I don't think we can—if we can, that fact will be just as evident to the Chinese people as it is to us, whether the Chinese people are Communists or just ordinary Shanghai traders—your customers, Mr. Herod—they will all know it, won't they? If we know we have been able to hurt them enough to cripple them, they will know it. If they know, and crippling their economy is not an abstract matter for a textbook, it means millions of people don't eat. If millions of people in China know they don't eat because of America, now tell me which will that discredit the most, the Chinese Communists or Americans? If it discredits the Americans most, then does that discredit the Russians even more? Undoubtedly, whether we wish to contain communism or not, we wish to keep Russia out, don't we? Shall we as Americans do most to keep Russia out by making ourselves as disagreeable as possible, by hanging on us the onus of having starved the Chinese? Is this not, as Mr. Munphy said before, God's gift to Mr. Stalin? I think it is.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Dr. Fosdick, it seems to me that the remarks by Mr. Herod were extremely realistic. The point that we are interested in right now is reviving Japanese trade, which we agree is necessary. Japan needs food from China. On the other hand, she needs a market in China for her textiles and other manufactures. Now, if we are going to revive trade in Japan, manufacturing in Japan, we will have to, it seems to me, relax some of the interior controls which have been set up under SCAP. One of these controls unfortunately is the Zaibatsu legislation, to which reference was made, and another is the unfortunate extent of the purge under military occupation. We have purged well over 200,000 of the best brains in politics and the best brains in industry, and Japanese industry is going to find it extremely difficult to revive and expand and carry on an external import policy with the lack of the good brains which have been purged.

One thing I think is quite clear. At this time under the Yoshida Government if the United States should withdraw from Japan at the present time, one of the first things that government would do would be to repeal the Zaibatsu legislation, and of course to "unpurge" the purgees, especially the brains of industry, which have been purged. This should be taken into consideration with reference to our Chinese policy and its respect to reviving trade relations between Japan and China. One other thing with reference to the Zaibatsu legislation, I regret to say and I hope you will pardon me for saying it, that legislation originated, I am sorry to say, among the trust busters in our own Department of Justice. It was a great mistake that this was a policy forced upon Japan.

I call attention to the fact that Japan was able to capture a large part of the textile markets in Asia. In 1929, 1930, and 1931 by very peaceful invasion of those markets under the Zaibatsu economy which existed at that time. That economy eliminated a certain kind of competition, it introduced a better system of manufacturing, so that the Japanese were manufacturing cotton goods even below the cost of the British manufacturing. They had the advantage of course of being nearer the markets in Asia. It seems to me that the time has come when our Government should direct SCAP to relax the Zaibatsu legislation and to unpurge a large part of the purgees.

Mr. KIZER. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the time is ripe for a review of some of the difficulties that face the Chinese Communists themselves. What is going to be their position? If they could have moved on, province by province and locality by locality, they might have rationalized the agricultural economy with fair success, but they face pretty much the same difficulty, the same difficulty comes to them that came originally to the Kuomintang in that they have all China rather suddenly placed in their lap with very great difficulties indeed. Late reports indicate ——— is coming back into Peiping in the Communist government, that unemployment is on the increase, that inflation is now entering into their currency, as is only natural in carrying on a war on a great plane, much larger than they have heretofore been carrying it on. To meet that inflation which arises—of course they are spending more than they can possibly raise by taxation—they must as quickly as possible begin to discharge men from their armies and put them back to work, and there will probably not be farms or land for them to work.

I surmise when that time comes we will see some of these elements running into the hills and taking up the ancient and honorable practice of banditry and there will be confronting the Chinese Communists not only these immediate difficulties but permanent difficulties of trying to solve the problems of a country that has more and deeper and bigger problems than any other country. The Communists have certain promises out which they must redeem and which they will have very great difficulty in redeeming. I doubt if it is necessary for us to try to bring pressure from the outside to disillusion the Chinese people and their leaders about what communism can do for them. I think if we will go on and keep on as reasonably friendly a basis as we can, along the lines of trade such as Mr. Herod and Mr. MacNaughton and Mr. Murphy have pictured, I think we then won't need to take the onus.

Let us be sure that we don't intensify world antagonisms in what we do. World antagonisms are the climate in which Russia trades to best advantage. To the extent that we can bring about world reconciliation, we are doing more than in any other way to establish our own democratic procedures and our own welfare and I don't put my trust in any respect in the increase of antagonisms in this world.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, on just one point about Zaibatsu, I understand the policy has already been relaxed upon that. Correct me if I am mistaken. As a friend of mine put it, we are putting the cartel before the hearse. I am not quite sure where the argument is now, but it seems to me that there is a link between what we are saying this afternoon and what we said at the end of this morning, and that is the possibility of alinement in the Far East. Whether that should be military or not I wouldn't like to comment on, because I don't know all the military factors involved. They are more obvious in Europe, not quite so obvious in the Far East. It does seem to me that this struggle is going on in so many levels that we might pay attention to some of them, and in this economic discussion it does seem to me to be important in that respect. Would it not be best to conceive of a kind of Zollverein in the Far East, an economic customs union between as many countries as possible? India has been mentioned as the pivot of an Asiatic policy, and I thoroughly agree with that, but Japan has got to be brought in, too. We can anticipate within 6 months a fierce propaganda move

on the part of the Chinese Communists to whip up anti-Japanese feeling everywhere else in Asia. I think we have got to face it head-on. We have got to get Japan back into, I am afraid, the old cold-prosperity sphere and include India in it. If you build up a sort of economic arrangement between as many countries as possible, I believe in trade with the Communist China on conditions certainly not giving them material for militarization, which will be one of their first objectives, in such a way that there will be a growing contrast between this economic union and China, always leaving it possible, as we invited countries in Europe to enter the Marshall plan, always leaving the possibility for them to come into this on proper conditions. Thinking along those lines, and particularly of propaganda lines, as the way in which, of the many levels on which we are struggling with the Soviet Union, in this particular area we can do it most effectively.

Mr. VINACKE. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I am not sure that I want to be associated with Mr. Colegrove's "we" with respect to the general agreement that it is indispensable to the United States to revive completely the Japanese economy. It depends on the conditions under which it revives, on the condition of its relationship with other economies in the Far East. I just wanted to make that position clear. When Mr. Colegrove said "we are agreed," I am not in that area of agreement.

Beyond that I would like to come back to the alternatives suggested to us by Mr. Brown. It seems to me that in relation to trade with Communist China his second alternative is the one certainly which commends itself to me. That is to say, I don't think for a minute that there should be on the part of the United States any financing of the trade with Communist China on a credit basis. Any trade that is financed along the lines of Mr. Herod's suggestions, where there is a demand for American products which are paid for cash-on-the-line and not with any legacy left over of the problem of collections and cancellations, and so on; no restrictions on trade but no fostering of trade except in terms of a day-to-day mutuality of interest it seems to me that is the one way in which we can move economically without putting ourselves in a very bad position with respect to the Chinese, and, it seems to me, at the same time may keep ourselves in a position to move, as Mr. Brown suggested, flexibly as the situation develops.

Mr. STALEY. I, too, was going to turn to the alternatives which it seems to me Mr. Brown laid out in very fair manner, pictured accurately. As far as I can assess the situation and attempting to sum up a little bit some of the considerations that have come out of this discussion as affecting those alternatives, it would look this way. On alternative one, that is trying to restrict Chinese Communist economy by restricting trade and attempting to make its economic situation worse politically, if we succeed in restricting trade with them, we get the blame for any failures of the Chinese economically, probably, rather than the Chinese Communists themselves. If we don't succeed but try and they come through and their economy revives and gets better, they get the credit for it and still we have the onus of having attempted and failed. On the economic side it looks as though this alternative one couldn't be done anyway as long as you have Hong Kong and the problems of alternative sources of supply for almost everything we could try to shut off. It would be a pretty difficult operation unless we were willing to go into all the apparatus of economic warfare and could persuade most of the other important countries to go along with us, so it seems pretty impossible anyway. And from the side of domestic political considerations here, which the Government would certainly have to take account of, we haven't discussed those but it would seem rather doubtful whether this policy would be very well accepted in the United States after a while in view of the fact that this would tend to restrict things like probably wheat and cotton, too.

On the third alternative, skipping the second one—I think we can rule that out pretty quickly. Nobody has spoken in favor of active assistance to the Chinese Communists. Also on this score of domestic political considerations that wouldn't go anyway, so that it would look as though what he called judicious disinterestedness would be about the best pattern. Let private trade operate, do not attempt to impede economic progress in Communist China, but don't go out of our way to help them to develop their economy. In other words, help the countries more that are more friendly with us.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, I don't believe it is entirely naive or a piece of overrosy idealism to draw a distinction at times between the Chinese people and the Chinese Government. I do believe that that distinction is a valid one. I see the Chinese people as still cherishing down in the bottom of their hearts, most of them, a very high regard for the United States. They have been caught in a maelstrom of very tragic circumstances and they have been faced with the

impossible dilemmas, and had we been faced with the dilemmas in the same terms and with the same influence which they had, I am not at all certain that our decisions would not have been the same as theirs. Now I know how difficult it is to support the Chinese people or to assist the Chinese people without in indirect ways assisting the Communist government, but I do believe that we can leave time and the undoubted difficulties that the Communist regime will meet in China to deal largely with that question. And so I hope very much that not only in the realm of private trade but in the realm of private relief or reconstruction work that may be undertaken by private agencies in China that the door will be left open. Now, mind you, I am not optimistic about the immediate prospects for being able to extend a large measure of that sort of aid or relief to the Chinese. For one thing, we have got to justify it with the American people, and the American people simply will not furnish that relief if it has to be furnished on unreasonable terms. But let's not in our policy in any way close the door for that effort.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say we will have to pass on to another question. There is another important question that we are very anxious to get your opinion about, and, with your permission, I think we will say that Mr. Coons is our last speaker on that. I don't like to close the discussion; it is very important; it is perhaps as single an item of importance as any question that has come before us in these last 2 days, and it may be that we can resume on this tomorrow morning, if there is more to be said. But I think because we have Mr. Sargeant of the Public Affairs Division to go into this new question, it would be well just temporarily at least to close with Mr. Coons.

Mr. COONS. As far as I am concerned, Mr. Chairman, you can skip this one and go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, we want to give you a picture of what the overseas information policy toward the Far East has been and is because we need your advice and counsel on this. Mr. Sargeant, who is connected with Mr. Allen's division, will present the briefing. Mr. Sargeant.

Mr. SARGEANT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am asked to make one announcement: Yankees 4, Brooklyn 3. [Laughter.] That is the final score.

I speak with some diffidence on the problem of information, propaganda, the psychological warfare, cultural relations, educational exchange for China and the Far East, as we have a lot of people around this table who are expert in the field of information policy in the Far East. In fact, I talked with them last night—a few of them—so I think I will be rather brief in presenting the general remarks that I would like to give you as the framework for at least two, possibly three, major problems that I would like to pose to this group for their discussion.

I think to start out with I'll make one remark, which I am told by a friend of mine who heard me talk at the National Foreign Trade Council last November is the only thing he had ever remembered of several speeches he heard me make. I asked him what this significant piece of wisdom was, and he said, "You made a statement referring to propaganda; 'Because a cat has kittens in the oven does not make them biscuits.' I have always remembered that."

To some extent, in posing problems to you this afternoon in terms of information policy, I realize that we are posing problems which can only be settled as people who think about problems of military relationships, economic relationships, the other symbols of our relationships with the Far East begin to hammer out decisions about which we can say something or do something, so I lay that as the basic premise.

Very briefly, what the Department is now doing in the Far East, including southeast Asia, is roughly divisible in four or five categories. First, why are we doing anything at all? That seems to me to be obvious. I think perhaps General Marshall pinned it down extremely accurately when he said that first we must provide a source of truthful information—truthful information about ourselves, our policies, about world affairs. Second, I think we have to provide factual information about the United States—very specifically about the United States. The time is passed when this country could afford to ignore or be unconcerned about what other people think about us. We have found, and I think we are finding, this more true every day, that we can't be unaware of nor can we simply ignore the misrepresentations, the distortions, the hostile propaganda directed against the United States and its policies.

Now our immediate objective in the program of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Service, I think, are of two kinds. First, we are attempting to aline public opinion throughout the world on the side of the United States, the policies that we stand for, and it has two aspects to it: A positive side, in which we are trying to demonstrate that United States policies are in

effect to the self-interest of other nations and other peoples; it is to their advantage to support these policies. I think there is a negative side. I think that is the demonstration of what the U. S. S. R. and specifically those aspects of communism which are represented by imperialism, aggression, brutality, etc., really mean in terms of the lives and futures of entire peoples and nations.

Now in the Far East I will pose perhaps five or six different kinds of specific goals that we are inclined to think we are striving for. When I say "we are inclined to think" I put it in these terms because manifestly what we attempt to do with these instruments is dependent upon basic policy decisions; where is this country going to go in its relations with the Far East? But tentatively, and so that you will have a feeling of some concreteness, these are the kinds of things we are thinking of as specific goals at the present time, and I hope they will be among the things you discuss. I think, for one thing, that we are trying to drive home to the peoples of the Far East the fact that there is an imminent danger of Communist penetration and of possible conquest; that this does not mean what they have been led to believe of a Soviet paradise, the folklore and myth. I think we have to tell them very directly what has been found to be the case in satellite countries in Europe under communism. I think, secondly, that we have to let the people of the Far East know what constitutes the fertile growing grounds for communism.

I think we have to mark those things out clearly. I would hope that our policies are so shaped that we will be prepared to do things which correct those conditions under which communism can grow and can spread. I think further that we are attempting to encourage certain types of tendencies to separate and divide among the Chinese Communists and other known Communist parties. I think in part we place some emphasis on what has happened in Yugoslavia and other tendencies in Western Europe. Further, we are inclined to believe that we are hitting at a myth that is held too widely in the world—the belief that the United States in some ways is really the proponent of reaction, that we are really the people that want to perpetuate the system of absentee landlordism or the exploitation of the masses by a small reactionary clique. I hope that our policies will speak so clearly that when this cat has kittens it will be perfectly evident in the instruments of propaganda that we are saying what in fact our deeds reflect, that we are: a champion of liberalism and freedom, the rights of an individual. I know we profess that, but we must make the deeds square with the words.

I think, of course, further that we are very much concerned with convincing the peoples in the Far East that their ultimate salvation does lie in close cooperation with the countries of the west; that the western countries are in fact in sympathy with their national aspirations. I think there are other things that I might bring to your mind. I use these as illustrative of the specific kinds of things which I hope this group will direct its attention to.

I would like to summarize very quickly what our program now looks like in China and the Far East. We are operating in more areas in the world principally through five major media: press and publications, radio, motion pictures, libraries and cultural institutes, exchange of persons programs, very broadly considered. Now in China at the present time you would have to say this program, except for radio, is practically nonexistent; it has been cut down, cut out; we are not doing in China many of the things that people in this room know at first hand. We have been dislocated, practically abrogated, by the political upheaval. We are digging in to some extent on Formosa; we are expanding the staff there. I don't know how long we can keep that up. I don't know how effective we can be from there. We are continuing to distribute materials from Chungking and from Kunming, but communications are difficult and we haven't really abandoned those in places of operations. We were formerly operating in Hankow, Mukden, and Canton. These are all closed, and closed when the consulates in these cities were removed. Although we can't operate in these areas where the Communists control, we do have at least one officer of USIE who is retained. They do handle certain reporting and caretaking functions, but there is no program of the kind that you people have known in the past. Our principal effort there at present is radio. We are carrying 3¾ hours a day in English, being both directly from short wave, from stateside transmitters, by relays in Honolulu and Manila, which now include medium-wave relay, which does reach certain areas of China. We have, in addition, 2 hours a day in Mandarin, we have a half hour a day in Cantonese. Most of those programs would be heard in the Far East in the evening hours between 6 and 10 o'clock at night, but we do have a couple of morning breakfast-time shows. Now this is a small program that we are able to retain in China. We are doing things

to establish ourselves in Hong Kong, where in addition to a local program we hope to have a regional center for distribution of materials to operate as a production and distribution point not only to China but to other areas that are nearby, where very important elements to reach will be those Chinese elements in the local population.

To give you some idea of what it means to cut the China program back, in Korea we still have one of the most extensive country programs that we are operating anywhere in the world. This is a program which, as you know, we have recently inherited. We have inherited it from the time of the military occupation. We are spending a little under $2 million in the current year in Korea alone. We operate nine information centers there. We have special publications, including weekly newsletters, fortnightly, a world news periodical, a monthly magazine; we carry a rebroadcast over an 11-station network; the Korean broadcast, the Voice of America; we have locally produced news commentaries; we have a very large motion-picture program, including mobile units to take it out to local centers of the population; we have a Fulbright agreement which has been drawn up but not yet signed, to expand the relatively small exchange-of-persons program in Korea. The current estimates are that these nine information centers are being patronized by an average of 1 million Koreans a month. Now that's the other end of the scale from China, and I introduce Korea into our thinking so that you can see how at the present time we have relatively little ability other than by raido to affect the Chinese people and the Chinese thinking.

I would like now to turn, if I may, Mr. Chairman, very quickly to at least two major problems that I would like to leave with the group of consultants who are sitting around this table. First, the program for which the Department is responsible—information and educational exchange—is a program that does stem out of the work done by the Office of War Information and in Latin America by the Office of Inter-American Affairs. From 1945 until 1948, it is not an exaggeration to say that from one week to another the betting odds would shift perceptibly as to whether this infant would live at all. In 1948, before the basic legislation, the Smith-Mundt Act, was passed, it was practically a liquidated if not a liquidated operation, and in the past year, 1949, it has been built up in many areas of the world, but it does not represent even yet the kind of a base that you would have had if you had continued directly from the foundation laid during the war, continued with a firm objective in mind that this was going to be a necessary peacetime activity. Now the legislation itself in its history thoroughly shows that what the Congress had in mind was not a psychological warfare device; it did not plan that this particular operation should be engaged in black or even gray activities; it was designed as an open information and educational exchange operation. I think the problem that we in the Department now face and one on which this group will have views—given the conditions we now have in China and that we will have in the foreseeable future, is it practicable to expect that any major onslaught can be made in ideological campaigns by purely open overt means?

I am not suggesting any answer one way or the other, but it is a problem broad in its dimensions. A number of people who have thought deeply and who have had profound experience in this field are inclined to believe that the operation must shift from the completely open basis to one that does operate, at least in part, on a clandestine basis.

There are others who feel deeply and with equal conviction that you cannot fight communism, whether it be Russian communism, Chinese communism, or any other form of communism, by these particular techniques. They think this permits the opponent to choose the terrain and they feel basically that we are not going to succeed by the use of such strategy. This extends, of course, beyond China itself; it extends to other areas of southeast Asia—those areas adjoining Japan. If, for example, we are able to maintain an effective information program with the Chinese elements in neighboring countries, to what extent is this Government and the United States concerned to see that that information and some of those materials do reach the interior of China—reach thinking Chinese in the Communist-held areas? I think that is one of our big problems—how the emphasis should be placed in the future in developing in this particular area.

Now, second, I want to bring you back from China to the second big problem. This problem is not yet in China; this problem is here and it is on our doorsteps; it is in the institutions with which some of you are connected. I am talking about the somewhat more than 4,000 Chinese students that are here in this country. It is a problem with which my part of the Department has been

peculiarly concerned since, roughly, September 1948. At that time foreign-student advisers began to tell us that it would not be long before many of these Chinese students would be completely cut off from any funds or resources; that they would either be thrown upon the slender resources of the educational institutions, they would have to return to China, or in some cases they would become desperate and they would violate some of the immigration regulations under which they have been permitted to enter and we would really have a very unhappy situation. Very briefly, a lot of cooperative effort went into the temporary solution to the problem. The colleges and universities dug very deep into their cash boxes and they put up a very considerable amount of money to tide these students through another emergency period. The members of the Congress individually supported very strongly action by the executive branch. We did get an allocation of a half million dollars transferred from the ECA appropriation to the Department which we began to use in the spring of this year and we were able to assist somewhere in the neighborhood of 600 Chinese students out of a total of, I believe, 2,200 who applied to us for assistance.

Subsequently, in May of this year, we became convinced that the problem would not be solved by the half million dollars, and with great support from educational institutions, from Members of Congress, we have endorsed a transfer of $4 million from ECA appropriations to the Department. Now the technical status of this is that both Houses of Congress have approved the use of $4 million to assist these Chinese students. They have eliminated the former restrictive provisions which limited the aid to those students who might qualify as being here for technical or other courses of study which could be related to economic development and thus could be brought within the purview of the ECA statute broadly interpreted. The appropriation bill has not as yet, however, been finally acted on by the Congress, but there is every asurance that $4 million will soon be available. Now the problem, I think, is this: You can take the $4 million and you can do a very considerable amount to relieve the financial plight of these students. I think that you will be able to have most of them complete at least those courses of study for which they originally came to the United States.

I think it is estimated that 300 would complete those courses by February 1950, and then over a period of sucessive academic semesters more and more would be completing their studies for which they came here. I think there is a very considerable problem involved in the future of these Chinese students. There are those who hold the view that we should immediately take these students out of the institutions in which they are or at least provide for leaves of absence for them, bring them to some type of established training centers, and that we should very intensively attempt to indoctrinate them in the American way of life, basic tenets of democracy, and so forth. I don't happen to agree with that particular approach, but it has been suggested. Others believe that they should be left where they are; that they should complete their courses of study; that there should be no attempt to indoctrinate the students. There seems to be some general area of agreement that it will be desirable both for the peoples of China and the peoples of the United States that as many of these students as possible will in fact return to China to interpret the skills that they have learned when they have been in this country.

There is a feeling that something, however, must be done before very much time passes so that these particular Chinese students will have some understanding of the conditions that really obtain in China, the conditions that are now prevailing in the Communist-held areas, and that without briefing them, without indoctrinating them, that some personal approach be made to the students which helps them in their thinking at a time when I am sure it must be extremely difficult for a fellow who is trained to be a sanitary engineer or doctor or public servant, who may be truly a democrat with a small "d", thinking of what the possibilities are in the immediate future, to return to China and make the kind of contribution that he has had on his mind. I have no solution to the problem, but I assure you that I think it is one of the most immediate, and can be one of the most important, with which we are faced in this general field.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to leave this presentation at that point and leave those two major problems as those for which I frankly don't think we have solutions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sargeant. Now there are two questions that Mr. Sargeant has posed. First, the usefulness, practicability and relevancy of the present information program, and secondly, the question of the

Chinese 4,000 students in this country. I suggest we separate those and take the discussion of the first question first. That is, what is the answer to the question as to the usefulness and practicability of our present information program. What do you gentlemen think about that? Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, I assume there is very little question about an information program being needed, and, I am afraid my own mind is fairly closed, that it is absolutely essential and ought to be much larger than it has been. It has to grow slowly, you can't expand overnight with personnel and operations, but that should keep on expanding because it is lacking largely in all those operations.

As a country we approach Asia, it seems to me, with much more concern for economic and material and military matters, at which we are good, and much less concern than we ought to have for intellectual matters. I would like to raise a question as to the meaning of the term "clandestine." I would hope that would not mean MO or something more than OWI agencies during the war but more to the pyschological warfare type of operation that is being put out, of comment which is prepared to be put out instead of just being drawn from the press.

Mr. SARGEANT. Actually my intent was to pose the whole problem. I didn't mean simply to suggest that you should put out a type of commentary that you and I might both know as of the psychological warfare kind. I am thinking specifically that you may have problems in China in which no statement made by a western democracy is going to carry conviction, yet statements ought to be made. Perhaps the statements should be actually attributed to a source other than the one which is preparing it. Perhaps the distribution should not be related to any government, whether western or eastern. Perhaps you would have to have a system of completely clandestine distribution, clandestine in the sense that the material is being distributed in areas in which its distribution is prohibited and for that reason must be done in ways which are not open ways. I really meant my question to refer to the whole gamut of activity.

Mr. FAIRBANK. If I may answer that directly, I would be rather loath to see that started without a good deal of preparation. It would seem to me most of that black propaganda during the war was quite ineffective except when it was geared up with wartime conditions and an army operating along with it, military controls, and so on, and some of that kind of thing could backfire much more than it would help us.

Mr. MURPHY. I feel strongly as Mr. Fairbank does that in peacetime black-gray programs are very dangerous and can very much boomerang against us. I believe that our programs should be restricted to what Mr. Sargeant said General Marshall referred to as truthful information. I agree very much with what was said this morning, that repetition is necessary, pounding it in, but I believe that it should be on none but a dignified basis; that is, we should not take the tone from the Communists, from either Russian or more recently the Chinese Communists. I agree with Mr. Sergeant that there can be, if clandestine means getting information into places where otherwise we couldn't get the information in there, that in that sense it can be clandestine but it should be restricted to straight information.

Mr. COLEGROVE. May I ask a question for a little further information. You mentioned Korea as one of our points where this sort of information is given from the nine stations. Do the broadcasting and most of the operations, are they in the hands of native Koreans who are working for the United States? If that is the case, how are those Koreans trained for this task? Do you train them in the United States or do you recruit them in Korea?

Mr. SARGEANT. The problem is of two kinds. First, there are a considerable group of productions which originate here stateside. For example, there are broadcasts which originate with the New York studios of our International Broadcasting Division on Korea. Often the master material is prepared by a central source section. It is in fact processed by people who have familiarity with Korea and the Korean language. I do not know how many of those at present are actually citizens of Korea rather than the United States. We used to have two members of that desk who were not United States citizens. Comparable material might be developed here in the United States as basic pamphlet information or motion-picture films and the sound track in the local language would in fact be processed here in many instances.

In addition to that, in Korea itself there will be a program of which the directing heads are Americans, United States citizens. You will have a considerably larger number of local Koreans there. Some of the Koreans have been trained

in the United States universities, came through our educational system, many others worked with the military authorities during occupation of Korea.

Mr. COLEGROVE. And as to libraries, are we doing anything with libraries like the Benjamin Franklin Library in Mexico City?

Mr. SARGEANT. You pick on the one library, the Benjamin Franklin Library, for which we have almost no duplicate. That is a very remarkable institution, built up now to about 25,000 volumes. But in the Far East we do have a number of information centers. They are libraries, they will run from two to seven or eight thousand volumes with current reference material on the United States. They will have from 60 to 150 different periodicals, carrying some of the news type like Life, Time, and so forth, down to the specialized ones, Architectural Forum, Journal of American Surgeons, and so forth. In Korea I think we are now maintaining approximately nine of those.

Mr. HEROD. I don't know whether any observations of my own in this connection would be of any value, but in this last 4 months I have been east of the iron curtain in Europe, trying to look out for some things, and we likewise had six of our men who finally got out of Russia within the last year, and my own observations in the countries in which I have been this last summer or this last few months, as well as their observations, and I have talked to several of them rather extensively, has been that in general the programs when they are heard are heard by a very small percentage of the people. To our true friends they are a confirmation, but as a proselytizing agency to make converts they have not been very effective. Secondly, insofar as facts and information handled with a certain amount of dignity are concerned, there seems to be a feeling that they have been constructive; insofar as they tend to become a propaganda instrument particularly identified with anti-Communist thoughts or showing up what we think is the true situation in the Communist countries and in the lies that they tell about us, they are discounted about 100 percent as being foreign stuff inspired by our own objectives and the agencies of propaganda within those countries are sufficient that they take precedence over anything that we can do.

I haven't had the pleasure of investigating it in Asia, because I haven't been in Asia now for a matter of almost a year, but in the Eastern Europe those are my observations, and our fellows that have been in Russia and have come out have had those observations.

Mr. VINACKE. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that in this I think you have to make a little different breakdown than is represented simply by the use of the word "information" and then going into the classical media. You can have two types of information program, it seems to me, each of which is distinguishable from what might be called political warfare program. Two types of information program which may be called a passive information program or an active information program. In general terms that information type of program it seems to me is what we have tried to set up in countries where we started on the basis of some assurance of friendship, whereas political or what was, in my opinion, improperly called psychological warfare program is directed against those whom you want to influence in some direction and who are certain to view with suspicion what you say from the very start. It is comparatively easy to operate negatively, that is to say, passively an information program or frequently it is easy to get it set up. The Dutch, for instance, in Indonesia toward the end of the war were prepared to view with a good deal of sympathy the establishment of an information program provided it was to be understood that it would be passive in the sense that the United States would assemble materials in libraries, would make no effort to get any of those materials out of the libraries but would sit there waiting for people to come and inform themselves as to the United States. That sort of thing is what I would describe as passive information program.

The active program is apt to get you into contact with a good many more groups in the country, it is apt to be a good deal more difficult to operate, and it is apt to be, if successfully operated, a good deal more effective in getting a point of view from the United States into the community, but it demands a different type of set-up, a different type of skill, but neither the passive nor active program, it seems to me, is designed to serve the purpose in China at the present time or in many of the oriental countries. What is required there, it seems to me, is not information in the sense of giving to them an understanding or making available to the peoples an understanding of what is in American libraries or what we are viewing in the movies, and so on, but something that is pointed up and sharpened in relation to American political purposes in that area.

If that type of program is going to be operated successfully, it has to be operated in very close coordination with the political agencies of the American Government. For example, without wanting to speak too sharply from the standpoint of propaganda in China, the white paper was one of the most unfortunate documents, in my opinion, that could have been issued at this particular time because of the materials that it gives to the foreign propagandists and because there is no material in it that I can see that would be useful to the American propagandists trying to get support for American policy in China. I am not suggesting that the white paper should not have been issued, but I am raising a question as to whether there is a degree of coordination with respect to publications of that sort between the information agencies in the Department and the political agencies of the Department, so that the question is raised with respect to every move we make in advance of taking the move, "Is this move viewable in terms of propaganda value or propaganda advantage?" The answer may be that it is not, but it has to be made anyway. Then your propagandists have to make the best of it, but at least he hasn't been caught off base, he knows what he has got to deal with in terms of preparing the grounds of accepting policy and that is the basis of psychological warfare.

Mr. SARGEANT. I would be happy to comment on that. I would say this roughly, that Mr. Vinacke knows that he is posing a hypothetical question, because he went through this just as I have been through it. Actually there is a tremendous problem of coordinating information policies and program with what is generally described as political decisions. I think, frankly, over the last 2 years we have made more progress in this field than I thought we would. It is something our Advisory Commission on Information—including Mark Etheridge, Canham, Justin Miller, May, and others—have been interested in, but we still haven't reached that point, and unless there is a new technique of administration, frankly, we are not going to reach it, at which each decision, each formulation of policy is in fact subjected to the ideal test, to which Mr. Vinacke suggests it should be. I thoroughly agree with it, that it should be, but so far as I know no one has yet devised the administrative machinery for doing it. Dean Rusk and I were talking about this a couple weeks ago at lunch, and we agreed that although you might get a climate of understanding and support for it in an agency, we still weren't quite sure how you could accomplish it at all levels. We thought at first you had to work on certain control points. I think on control points we have done very well. I think you would be assured, Mr. Vinacke, of the progress that has been made.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think this group would be in general agreement that a proposition of a program of some sort is needed and should be expanded. The problem is how to do it most effectively; in view of the great interest in China in rumors you might say it would be more effective to go in for underground information than above-board information. They might enjoy a rumor that tells a truth more than they do a straight news story.

The real point I want to bring up is the problem of the special place of the scholarly classes in the Far East, particularly in the area of China, Korea, Japan, the area affected by Chinese civilization. I do not know whether it applies to other areas of the Far East as much. If we exploit the special prestige position of the scholar, intellectual group in that area, it would seem to me that propaganda work, information aimed primarily at them would be most effective kind of information work. It might be advisable to try to put American professors in every university to the extent that universities can absorb them. I am sure there are many places in the Far East where they would like to have good American professors if we can get right in there. To what extent have we been bringing future intellectual leaders of that area to this country for extensive training? Japan affords an extreme case probably, but I think the situation there in intellectual classes, which are the key classes, is that they have asked for ideas and we have given them bread. They really would prefer the ideas in this case instead of the bread.

Mr. BUSS. I should like to ask Howland if he would tell us something about information programs from the standpoint of the operators.

Mr. GRONDAHL. I would rather have you define that a little bit more.

Mr. BUSS. What are problems, as you see it, of our information program in southeast Asia?

Mr. GRONDAHL. A very long discussion would be involved if we were going to go into all the problems. You mean in relation to the facilities for putting them out of relationship of the people we deal with or lack of funds?

The CHAIRMAN. I really think we had better not get off on that just at this moment.

Mr. GRONDAHL. I am a little bit worried that it might require 3 or 4 hours of discussion which this group could probably do little about.

The CHAIRMAN. If you don't mind, Mr. Buss?

Mr. BUSS. I have one other thought. I understood that was the problem that is being tossed to this group. Is that not the thing we are interested in, the problems of our United States Information Service in Asia? I went about in Korea and in the Philippines recently and I am very much impressed with a great many of the things that are being done, also with the things not being done. I should like to ask particularly what is being done in Japan, for instance.

Mr. SARGEANT. Of course, you know, Mr. Buss, that we have no program as the State Department in Japan. That is an Army show, a military occupation one, just as Korea was until fairly recently. I think probably Teg can tell you something about the Japanese program, but it is not one for which my people have responsibility. Teg, can you add anything?

Mr. GRONDAHL. The Army program in Japan is somewhat like the USIE program in other areas of Asia, and they do a great deal more, of course, still in control of information and that sort of thing, but the same effort at exchange of persons is carried on and although it has not actually been in my field—it has been handled by another man apart from our Department—there is a good deal of coordination between the Army and the State Department on the upper levels, so that there is an exchange of ideas on what should be done. Of course, you all know that the Japanese situation is very different from other areas of the Far East, and General MacArthur is in a good deal of control.

Mr. BALLANTINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to supplement something that Mr. Vinacke has said. I feel very strongly that one, if not the, most important items of content of our information message should be to convince the people of Asia that we are not going to use military strength, force, or our economic force to coerce them into ideas, into adopting a political, social, and economic pattern to our liking, not through those agencies, we are going to restrict ourselves to moral information, to suggestion and example. Of course, I don't want to be too unkind about this thing, but I think it might be rather difficult to do this in the light of some of the things that we have done in Japan and also in the light of some of the suggestions that emanate from this country, but I would think we could counteract these suggestions that come from this country by meeting that and saying, "Of course, some people in America suggest so-and-so, but that is not the feeling of the American people." I think it is to counteract that Soviet propaganda, that Soviet claim that we are forcing our imperialism upon those people of Asia—I don't know of anything that is more important to convince them of than that. I think we also ought to try to make it clear to them that when they realize the danger that they are facing from communism and feel that they must make sacrifices and must do something to meet it, to draw up, if and when they draw up programs of their own, economic and social, we will then see how we can fit into their programs, the ways that we can help because those programs involve choices that only they can make and we cannot make those choices for them. Therefore it is not up to us to initiate these programs for the uplifting of the Asian people.

Mr. TAYLOR. The subject is so big that it is difficult to know where to begin. I watched the development of the propaganda, that I insist upon calling it, the information program in the Department, with great interest during the last 2 or 3 years. I think, considering the difficulties that the Department has had to work through, that they have done an extremely good job, but having said that one can refer very specifically to the difficulties. They haven't had enough money and they haven't had enough policy. I know the problems of coordination are terrible but there has to be some, and it is better to have no information program at all than have one which is not to some extent linked with policy. I remember one time when the country was appealing for everyone to eat not more than two pieces of toast and the Department of Agriculture put on a pie-eating competition. That sort of lack of coordination is not so very good for a propagandist, and in thinking of China today obviously there is not much more you can do at the moment, I would say, than to hold the fort, than to establish—which I trust is established—to keep up its credibility. It is said that if you merely give a straight newscast that can be done. Anybody who is working in the business knows it is extremely difficult to get a straight news in the first place and to make it look straight when you get it out.

The problem of the propagandist is to state his case in terms of the other fellow's case and that is the most art of all. I think Mr. Fairbanks was talking about that to some extent yesterday, and it needs a great deal of work on material that doesn't look to the uninitiated always like propaganda, but if you are in the business of creating attitudes which lead to action, you have to decide what kind of action you want, and what kind of action do you want in China today? I don't know. What is our policy? Do we want the Chinese—you cannot create cleavages with propaganda but you can exploit them, make them bigger. You have to find out where they lie first. Do you want to increase any cleavage? Do you want to make them as unhappy as possible? What sort of action will make some groups turn away from the Government and other groups turn to other countries? What do you want? That has to be decided. I think at the moment that you are on the spot. You have no Chinese policy to speak of and not until you get one and decide what sort of action you want to create, to get moving, can you have a proper information policy. And so long as you are going on the miserable pittance you are working on now, I see no chance whatsoever of competing with our friends from the other side. If I were in the Kremlin, the first thing I would try to decide is what kind of war is the United States preparing for, and I would decide immediately that it was preparing for the last one.

The CHAIRMAN. The one before the last.

Mr. TAYLOR. They are not preparing for the war of ideas, and I would therefore fight the war of ideas and leave them with all their guns and B–36's and the rest of them, and let them get out of date. I would fight it on the word level. It seems to me we are not fighting it on that level. I don't think we should disarm—far from it—but for heaven's sake, let us arm ourselves with the best things we have. We have the best social science in this world, and the first job for the United States outfit, it seems to me, is to study. What is China today? Nothing like it used to be. What will it be under the Communists? We don't know how a system like this breaks down. We don't know how cleavages and lines run, and the chances of overthrowing it in my mind are almost negligible, but you can perhaps make it—perhaps if war should come you can perhaps do things with it. We have got to do things with it, but the first thing is to understand it and not to treat it as if it were a projection of American middle class, or a mirror of Americans. There is time to do that. You haven't got much money to do anything else with anyway, and there is time to study, to find out what your policy is and to devise the means through propaganda with which to implement it. Unless it is conceived of as an arm of policy and used that way it merely gets in your way.

Mr. MACNAUGHTON. I think it is time to call it a day.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I just support everything Mr. Taylor has said? I think it is very much on the beam and ought to be looked at with care. For the record, also, the line of anticommunism in Asia is not a very good line. It is a subjective projection of our own view. The main question, it is much better to be anti-Russian and a few other things to be anti. That is just an example of what Mr. Taylor was talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I think we have said all today we can say at this hour about this question of information. There remains the question of Chinese students, which Mr. Sargeant brought up. Do you want to take that up now for the next 15 minutes and discuss that question, or would you prefer to have that go over until tomorrow morning?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Tomorrow morning?

Mr. STALEY. What else have we for tomorrow morning?

The CHAIRMAN. There are a number of questions coming up, but I think if we run from 9 to 1 : 30 we can pretty well finish the schedule, and I don't think we need to spend a great deal of time on the Chinese student question.

Mr. BALLANTINE. If think if we all think over it overnight we will probably get all the answers right away.

The CHAIRMAN. Then tomorrow morning.

(The meeting was adjourned at 4 : 45 p. m.)

(October 8, 1949)

(The meeting was convened at 9 : 05 a. m.)

The CHAIRMAN (Ambassador JESSUP). May we begin? General Marshall is unable to be with us throughout the entire session this morning, so I am going

to give him an opportunity to say anything he would like to now at the outset of our discussion this morning.

General MARSHALL. I am not speaking formally when I tell you I have derived a great deal of information and satisfaction from listening to the discussion here. I should explain to you gentlemen that since last December I have been obtaining my information from the press and a white book and have not been briefed by the State Department, so my reactions, I would assume, would be very much the same as yours. There may be many things of which I am not aware between our Government and the Chinese Kuomintang Government, and between MacArthur and Japan and the State Department, and Indochina even and the Indonesian affair, with which I am familiar, the British and French particularly, and also with Australia and New Zealand. All those things come into the picture and are vitally concerned with what you are called upon to discuss here—for the State Department decision.

I was wondering driving in this morning just what would be the best line for me to take. I am a little embarrassed by reason of the fact that I have been debating intangibles both over there and over here. Dr. Fairbank and myself perspired together in Chungking; at least, he gave encouragement from time to time. I had a great deal to do with him in missionary fields; he and I picked up one of our greatest missionaries, I think, Dr. Stuart, over there.

(Discussion off the record.)

General MARSHALL. I was involved very heavily at the start, of course, with getting the Japanese out of the country; I had to get 3,000,000 out. I have been in Japan quite a little bit, before the war, just as I have been in the Philippines—as a matter of fact, I was in the tail end of the insurrections, the beginning of a building up of a basis for democratic government.

Now, the ordinary term, the "complexity" of the problem has been overused, but I have never known any problem that had so much complexity involved in it—because, you might say, the simplest part of it is the Chinese people themselves and the immediate situation in China—when you take the conditions in Japan; you take the situation in Indonesia; you take the situation in Indochina; you take the situation in India; then you introduce Pakistan just to help out a little bit; and then the British former economic, almost, domination in China, and the labor of the Labor Government to maintain itself and the reaction of the Conservatives against it, which affects what you are getting into; and the French with relation to Indochina; and then the Dutch in the western European compact, and then over in Indonesia in a sense doing something else; then Australia, very difficult, particularly difficult with respect to some special aspects which I won't name here.

I might say, not in the spirit of levity, the first week I was the Secretary of State, I was introduced to what was being made an international incident over one whaler going to the Antarctic—the Australian Ambassador came to see me three times in 4 days. To get a little off the center in this, I will say the issue was, MacArthur sent it down there to get some of the oils and fats they needed so much in Japan for various production purposes, and it was being resisted—the Japanese were defended before the war in their handling of their whaling industry—because no Japanese trade was to be permitted if it could be stopped. But there was no offer to pay what we were paying in Japan to keep the show going. So the variety of influences involved in this thing are just fantastic when you try to arrive at a sound basic decision.

Then, of course, you have your immediate action and then the longer view, and it is much easier to approach the longer view than the immediate action. In relation to the immediate action, I think we have to take this into consideration. I am going to ask you to pardon me for making military references because I am more familiar with them and when they furnish a parallel they are useful to me at the risk of boring you. But, at least to me, one of the great struggles of conducting the strategy in a large war is the political necessity for action as compared to the military necessity of making haste slowly. When you have a situation, to use as an example, like our channel crossing, we were over a year and a half getting ready for that. The great question was what did you do during the year and a half to keep the public quiet—the political leaders had to have some action. The dangerous factor was if you started action anywhere you immediately began with assurances of a minimum and ended up with a maximum, and something this and something that, and delayed your whole operation. I have been through all the agonies of that.

Now you have been confronted with that—the State Department has been—with the Chinese; they want action and they want it today, the political action.

That is the way a democracy goes and you cannot get away from it. There is no use in wrangling about it, that is a fact.

Now, at the same time, I must add that time is of vast importance in this affair; then, again, that goes to extremes. There is great danger of making the very serious error that I often think government departments make—I used to think the War Department made in the past—waiting until the situation built up against you and then you are on the defensive, and then move in. That is fatal. I always want to move in first. On the other hand, it is equally dangerous that the first doesn't get you in before it is the proper time to get in. So timing is a vital consideration in this.

Another thought that occurred to me, listening to your discussion, is the thought Governor Stassen made reference to, but I suggested the reference so I will take credit for it. A good many of the things I have heard proposed here, in my opinion, could not possibly be handled by our Congress.

Now, at the risk of appearing immodest, although I don't think it is anything to brag about, certainly up until recently I had the unenviable reputation of having been before more committees more times and more hours than any other person in America. [Laughter.] As a soldier, I speak not only of political but military and sociological considerations, and especially more recently of economic considerations. When I was turning over in my mind what I might say that would be helpful, and I have to be very careful because of my past responsibilities in connection with this matter—I am trying in a sense to get away from that—I arrived at what may seem to you a half-baked conclusion, that the best way would be to decide what is the idealistic solution.

Now, what is the idealistic solution to this business? After you have decided on that, we will mold that, trim it down and put it on a practical basis; there would be many amendments, many modifications, and some introductions. You have got to keep the idealistic in mind, there is the spiritual involved in this thing.

I have been tremendously impressed in our dealings with Turkey and Teheran, particularly in Turkey, with the effects of our missionary efforts and Roberts College in Turkey. That just meant everything to us in the associations we had with them in connection with the Soviet Union. I was very much interested in the resumption by the Methodist mission, I will call it the Methodist mission, for the reestablishment of schools around Teheran which the Government had taken over because that was erecting a barrier of a kind that is acceptable to the world and has great strength in the root it establishes. Of course, that takes a long time; you cannot put it up tomorrow and have it effective the day after tomorrow, but those considerations must be taken into account.

You have an immediate situation in China that is closely related to the current situation in Japan because of the economic factors involved. I am going to turn over to Japan for a minute because I think it is very much concerned in our relationship to China. Japan is costing us a great deal of money; that cannot go on indefinitely. We have established this operation in Western Europe and we have done it on the basis of its reaching a termination in 1952. I am speaking purely for myself, and without the intimate knowledge of what has occurred behind the scenes in the last 10 months, but it ought to be terminated in 1952. Part of the reason why they imply it cannot be terminated then comes from the opponents of the present appropriations, and part comes from the foreign fellows who naturally would like to see it prolonged beyond 1952, but you have got to stop somewhere. It is a very serious matter, not political generalization, that this Government remain strong, so there has to be a very definite limit. You get the man to a certain point and then he has to do, and he has to know he has to do.

When you come to this Japanese affair, you have a very serious affair on your hands which has to do with the question of trade between Japan and China—trade with the Communist government—and when we have General MacArthur out there, in a sense as head of the Japanese Government, certainly dominating the Japanese Government, I feel that we just cannot go on putting out large sums of money indefinitely into Japan. You have got this much smaller area into which we have poured many more Japanese; in other words, we have greatly increased the density of population there. There has been taken away from them Manchuria, with all of its rich contributions to the economy of the country, Korea, Formosa, and the general trade with China. We have increased the population very decidedly, reduced the area, and even involved their fishing rights in the Kurile Islands because of Russian problems of interference there, and that poses an economic problem of which I

would not attempt to predict the outcome. But I do know this—with the opposition we find further south in Australia, and possibly so long as the Dutch have a certain control in Indonesia, and the feeling is well understood with the Filipinos with regard to the Japanese—there has to be some outlet and some import-export, particularly import in raw materials and export of finished goods, in relation to Japan because that, I don't think, can go on indefinitely.

What we have to be so on our guard against is that we don't weaken ourselves economically so that the whole structure collapses. I am just as much opposed to sitting still and letting the world revolve around us; I am opposed naturally to that, but at the same time I am equally opposed to going along and dripping and dripping, it isn't dripping, it is bucketfuls and we find our own economic position in danger.

Now you are all pretty much familiar, I guess, with these factors. When you come back to the question of Chinese-Japanese trade, I certainly think it should be permitted. Mr. Herod commented that if you leave the businessman alone he probably will promote the business if you don't get in his way—I don't know what that does to the conceptions of the State Department, it is just my kind of thinking. Something of that kind has to be done.

I might say when I was talking about putting whatever policies were decided upon on a practical basis, I didn't mean that you submit to the practice of just not doing anything, we will say, or a good thing, because you think the other fellow is going to oppose it. Of course you will have opposition, opposition to practically everything that is put up, but I think we must be very careful that we don't produce a "must" situation unless it is a "must."

For example, to go back into the experiences I have had with Congress, take the war situation, the extension of the draft. Well, that was termed by the political leaders all around, by all parties, as being an absolute impossibility but it was a must. It could not be anything else, it was a must. We couldn't have everything we had dissolving in face of the world as it was. How did you go about to meet it? You have to do that, but you have to be careful. If it is a must, make clear to everybody it is a must and not a question of this judgment or that judgment. I don't think you can call the Japanese-Chinese trade exactly a must but it comes pretty close to being that. We are not going to go on forever providing the goods, the foods, and the money that has been necessary to keep Japan afloat, unless we are going to have a condition of riot, starvation, and things the American Government cannot tolerate within its control areas.

I have sort of indicated my thoughts at the moment, regarding the government proclaimed by the Chinese Communists, in saying there is a great question of timing involved in this thing on one side or the other—it is kind of a fine balance with the political pressures that are coming on. Also involved in that is the British attitude and the French attitude. I don't know what they are, I have not been in the conferences. I don't know how the pressures go, one way or another, and I am glad I don't know, but we have got to proceed very carefully and not be plunged by political momentary pressures into action that we may find later was highly inadvisable.

I will just interject for a moment some of my reactions at the time I was in China regarding these fellows that are at the head of the Chinese Communist government—Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai—and everybody, but those two I knew better than any of the rest. I had officers pretty much all over north China, along the Yangtze and in Manchuria, and I always felt that the reports I got were far better than those the Generalissimo received. He was being fooled time and again because the fellow would defend himself, if he withdrew in an ignominious fashion, he always made it a great battle with Russian tanks and Russian soldiers. The only thing they did not introduce was the Russian paratroops; they had everything else. I would find out from my people it was a patrol encounter, and that went on all the time. Always I was trying to find out anything you could put your finger on that was authentic as to the Soviet influence or Soviet help in all this; I never got anything except the influence of what I would call the spiritual, or something akin to that.

They had Soviet advisers in Yenan—I think they gave me the citizenship of Yenan once; I am not quite certain—but we had them too. But they were more closely in contact than our people. They made no pretense about being aloof from the Soviet Union; they had Stalin's picture and Lenin's picture over the theater there when they entertained me with a very finished performance of about 3 or 4 hours. (Discussion off the record.)

General MARSHALL. I never could get my hands on the thing. As I say, they had no reservation at all; they were Marxist Communists and bitterly resented implications that they were agrarian Communists of the new stripe. They were Marxist Communists. I remember Chou En-lai startled my wife—we had no place to go and had lunch with him—and he was telling her just what he was and that was it, and she had never heard anything like that before. They appealed to me to stop the procedure of dragging Stalin's painting through the street in the mud. They did not make any pretense of their association with the Communists of Russia; that was rather natural. They were Communists; they were Marxists, and that was the seat of all that development.

When it came to Soviet assistance at all, I never could get my hands on it. I was given all sorts of schedules but, in the opinion of all my advisers and Intelligence, they were not supporting them. Sometimes they were records of little conferences, but you could change a single sentence and change the whole impression of that particular affair. What did worry me more seriously than anything else was it seemed apparent to me that the Soviets were leaning over backward, except as to Dairen, in their attitude out there. Now, they were not supporting their treaty obligations, but there is a great difference between actually supporting the thing and just remaining quiescent. Well, they were remaining quiescent with their treaty agreement to support the Generalissimo's Government, but they went much farther than that. In connection with the railroad in Manchuria, where they had a right to 50 percent of the employees and the Kuomintang government was obligated to protect the railroad, it did not protect the railroad, and the Russians withdrew all of their railroad personnel. Well, as far as I could see, what they were preparing themselves for was a case before the United Nations, where they could appear as clean as the driven snow and we would have our hands muddied by every bit of propaganda they could put on it. I would probably be the particular lump of mud they would throw on it, and that worried me.

Now, I am not talking about the ravaging of Mukden. That was a booty transaction under their claim, just the same as we had it in parts of Europe, in the enemy countries. I am talking about the procedure that followed that under the treaty. I was always concerned, and I think it is still going to show up here when they get to this, that they will make a case that they sat back and gave the Generalissimo a wide sweep of opportunity and look at what has happened—the United States interfered and brought about this catastrophe. They could accomplish almost all their purposes by negative action. All they had to do was to abandon the dumps, leave them to fall into the hands of the other fellows. All they had to do was to make it impossible for the Nationalist Government to use the railroad, and yet not introduce any complications about the movements of Communist troops that were moving in and getting set up in Manchuria, we will say, for later action. But that worried me a great deal, and I think that is a consideration you have to have in mind here because I think you will hear from it later.

As to Formosa, I heard that discussed here at the table, and I am not in a position to discuss that. I would have to talk with the Department and find out what has happened, what is the precise situation, and what are the relationships we have had with the British, and so forth. I think that is a dangerous situation, in one sense, because Formosa lies in the general direction from Japan to the Philippines, and if it were taken over by infiltration, as it well might be, it might be very serious. I don't know what we will do about that.

I will say right now in connection with that, though I have been in accord with most of the comments that I have heard around the table as to the futility of military support at the present time, and the great importance of immediate economic considerations dominating part of the thing, as well as the sociological and the spiritual, that leads me to this thought: I don't know at all what the Department thinks about this. Certainly, they would have a very much more reasoned-out opinion; but it seemed to me, when I was listening to Governor Stassen's talk about establishing an American center in Bangkok, that the psychological focus for the United States in approaching this area, if it did through any such procedure, is the Philippines. I may be entirely wrong about this because I don't know enough of what is happening in the Philippines, or other aspects, and about Bangkok, too, for that matter, but all of the Far East looks on the Philippines as a manifestation of the square deal. We certainly went through with it there.

There was a great deal of propaganda about all the reservations we put into it, in the way of bases and things of that sort—and we ended up, I think, with practically keeping none of them. I don't know who did that. I think

we overdid that vastly in requirements, but meanwhile matters changed just as they did in the far southwest Pacific, the Admiralty Islands, and things of that sort, where ideas got boiled down to the practicality of peacetime.

But the Filipinos, of course, realize that their dependence for security rests very heavily on us. They, of themselves, would have a terrible time. But I am quite certain that if the people, say the have-nots of Indonesia, ask us for independence—the spirit of nationalism has been rapidly developing and all those people look to America as it relates to their action in the Philippines—it might be turned the other way: that we have come there and that we have got the Philippine Government under our domination.

I don't know, but I think there is great significance to our action in the Philippines which affects all those people. I have talked to some of the Philippine leaders and they have emphasized that pretty much to me. I am on dangerous ground now because I have not been fully enough informed, but that is my own reaction.

When I was thinking of Bangkok, I was thinking, just as I left as Secretary of State, the Soviets had established an embassy there with, I think, 50 persons in their little spot. So, they have a command post, as we say in the Army, already established in Bangkok. How wise it is for us to establish a post across the street, I don't know; but, with the data on hand, the State Department could tell you much more about that.

It is difficult for me to get into the general Asian picture because I don't know enough at the moment about the progression of events in Indonesia. Apparently right now it is headed along toward a desirable settlement, or it seems so from what I have read in the papers. If we can untwist that, with the Philippines right above it, and get Japan reasonably established so it does not burden us to death, you are beginning to get a front.

Now you turn over to Indochina. To be honest with you, my principal concern about Indochina after I got out of China—well, I will give you a little color. The very instant the war terminated in the Pacific and our Chinese divisions, that we had been responsible for training, got into Indochina, we had a strenuous demand from the French to get the American officers out of there. So, the first thing that happened the first week was to get every American officer, that had been advising these divisions, away from them. We had to do that and, moreover, there we were getting it from the French, and up north we were getting it from the Communists. It was twisted all over the place. One of our generals said "good morning" to somebody and that was reflected in all the papers as a hideous example of our duplicity. I am exaggerating a little bit. But he is an old friend of mine and I sympathize with him. So we began with that.

Then my next intimate contact with the affair—of course, I had heard quite a bit about China—was when we reached the problem of increasing the security of Western Europe. I found all the French troops of any quality were all out in Indochina, and I found the Dutch troops of any quality were out in Indonesia, and the one place they were not was in Western Europe. So, it left us in an extraordinarily weak position there because we just did not have anything there to make a front to the threats, the bluffing—I hope we can call it that—of the Soviet Union.

I don't know enough about the Indonesian question to comment on what I have heard here, and I might be very misleading if I did comment; so, I will refrain from that.

The general picture indicates to me what would seem to be more desirable is the slow build-up in the actions we take, not big things but many little things. Your greatest difficulty is keeping that out of the debates. The debates are essential to democracy, but they certainly can make you lots of trouble when you try to skate along this thin ice. You have the perimeter of the various affected countries with all the involvements, economic and sociological.

In that respect I would like to add it has seemed to me for quite a long time that we are in the midst of a world revolution and you cannot confine it to what you are thinking about in the Pacific. You have got to come back and think very carefully about Latin America, and when you talk about the absence of the middle class you put your finger right on Latin America, and that is much closer to home. That can affect us in the Far East because there is no doubt in my mind that there is a great sort of world revolution, and I think someone said here that the communistic factor was more or less of an incident but it was riding on that flood. Well, the actions we take, I think, have to be adapted somewhat to the fact that is the temper of people all over the world, of the have-nots as has been characterized here, and we cannot ignore that.

Thinking here hurriedly of what I have said, I don't think I have contributed anything in the way of a definite recommendation, but it is a very difficult thing to do unless you are pretty sure of all your factors. I have learned through dealing with big organizations that about the time I decide this must be done they come in and prove to me it just cannot possibly be done because I didn't understand this and I didn't understand that, and I find out it is so time after time; so, I have gotten rather sensitive about declaring myself. Maybe if I were political I would be a little bit more free-handed. [Laughter.] Without having the various factors—and there are so many in this—I believe in the end it is a fairly sensible selection to figure out what is your ideal, and then trim that down to its practical application, and with amendments it is pretty hard to recognize, but our Constitution was so established and it has done pretty well. I am sorry I have talked so long.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Do you object if anyone wishes to ask any questions?

General MARSHALL. Certainly not.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any points which anyone would like to raise?

Mr. HEROD. I would like to ask the General one question, if he would care to indicate his own opinion of it. Do you feel that Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai would accept Moscow or Kremlin dictation when it went, against their own size-up of their advantage or the advantage of their own group?

General MARSHALL. Well, it would just be the wildest guess on that. I would say that it would depend on how seriously the decision affected their own thinking. I am rather inclined to think there would not be the same domination, but I would say that with a great many qualifications. They had always been behind that—the fact that the Soviet borders right on their state—and what the Soviet could do to help them if it chooses to denude itself to some extent, it can be done very quickly and that would always have an influence, the threat, not the threat so much as the offer to do this or do that, would have quite an important effect.

As to Chou En-lai, he is a very able negotiator. In a great deal of his negotiating with me—and I went to about 600 different meetings—he seemed to be really negotiating. There is a great difference between that and a man who has strict orders and can only do what he is ordered and nothing else. On the other hand, you would come to some things when it was quite evident that he was just speaking a piece. I know he several times brought me back from Yenan the statement from Mao Tze-tung that they were determined to establish a Marxist Communist regime in China but they realized that could not be done in a minute and felt it would have to pass through the American democratic procedure first on the way to the Marxist conception, but he would say that so often that it was reciting. I could see that. On the other hand, it got to the point with me that I virtually had to intercede with Mao Tze-tung to continue him in his position as negotiator, because it looked for a while that they would relieve him. They thought he compromised too much.

Mao Tze-tung I could not penetrate. That is a real iron curtain when you get there. We had some very frank talking but when he talked I didn't get anything from it at all; it was just talk. I was reminded of it very forcibly with Molotov at times. [Laughter.] Chou En-lai was a negotiator, and he made many more compromises.

Of course, there I would have to take into careful consideration that they undoubtedly felt that they could win politically and, therefore, if they could avoid the military effort, they were very much better off politically because they had discipline and indoctrination and they had a solid party; whereas they felt the Kuomintang was just an icing on the top and all its foundations of public support had become almost nonexistent or at least hostile, so if they could ever get the thing in the political arena they would win, and unless they were divided into separate groups and they brought them together as they thought they could, it would not have been so hard but a rather easy thing for the Communists to dominate the government. But they undoubtedly were after a peaceful settlement on political lines and then the turns the affair took, it ended up in a line that you are familiar with. I couldn't answer that any better than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Quigley.

Mr. QUIGLEY. General, was there any suggestion on their part, or on any part, of Russian participation at this stage of mediation?

General MARSHALL. On the part of Mao Tze-tung?

Mr. QUIGLEY. Yes.

General MARSHALL. No, no, not at all. I don't recall they ever made such a proposal. The record will show that because there was a stenographic record of all our conferences.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Ambassador Jessup, may I ask General Marshall whether I heard him correctly to say that he actually did say that the unusual help that the United States is now giving the Philippines, especially with regard to food, should terminate about the year 1952?

General MARSHALL. No, you are confused, sir. You confused what I said about Western Europe in 1952; that is, the European recovery program. You said the Philippines—you mean Japan, I think.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

General MARSHALL. What I said was we could not continue that indefinitely because—I don't know what the amount is now. It was a billion a year.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COLEGROVE. Your view is, then, that American aid to Japan should continue as long as it seems necessary to keep the population from starving—and getting on their feet industrially?

General MARSHALL. I would say so, but the qualification there is, "as long as it seems necessary," I would have to look at that through a magnifying glass because you just cannot continue this thing indefinitely. It just cannot be done. It cannot be done politically, for one thing, and it cannot be done economically, I think, for another.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Decker.

Mr. DECKER. General Marshall, it seems to me that one of the very serious political obstacles that we are going to meet in attempting a settlement with China; that is, political from the standpoint of sentiment in the United States, is that long period when we had the support of Chiang Kai-shek and he was the one hope of continuing China in the war. That was in our dark hour and we were very dependent on him, and what he represented, to keep China in line. Now, there is a moral situation involved there as well. I would like you to, if you can and if you will, comment on what the abandonment of Chiang Kai-shek is going to mean, what its significance may mean politically.

General MARSHALL. Well, I would say there that so far as I could see, we did our best in spite of action that ruined that best in its application to the situation. Throughout all of this procedure there was continuous pressure to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek, but no one ever suggested anyone could take his place; at least, they never made a suggestion to me, that made any impression on my mind, of a man who could handle the situation. It was a great problem and Dr. Stewart can talk to you more intimately on that than I can, to get him to move in a channel that was workable for the future.

I might say this, by way of partial explanation or what I have just been saying: You have the great moment of his career, I think about 1927, when he was a great inspiration, when the Nationalists came up from the south, the way these various things were handled, and then you go through a transition when these young military subordinates of his, that did such a fine job, had become corroded by long tenure of office without any opposition whatsoever, and the procedure lent itself to an exaggeration of weaknesses of such procedures in China more than almost any other country. It has just got worse and worse and worse, and it was very hard to realize sometimes that this man that we were dealing with, we will say in conversation, had been this other fellow when he was a young man not in civil office. So the Generalissimo had a great struggle because of his tenuous control of so many people and because they were in power, and "in power" with them meant everything. It meant your very existence so far as your financial and other manifestations were concerned.

The procedure that was agreed upon by this political consultative conference was accepted by all the various representatives of the various parties. Now, the great problem of the Generalissimo was to have that procedure carried out. When it came to that, it meant these officials of the Kuomintang had to give up their power—had to give up their incomes, in a large measure.

I read yesterday of the death of Hannegan, the former chairman of the Democratic National Committee. He came out to China and I asked him: "Did you ever know anybody in political life that gave up something unless he just had to?" He said, no, off-hand he couldn't think of anyone.

Well, here was a whole party being asked to give up the position they were in and admit a two-party procedure of government. Now, when I say "give-up"

you see, it differs from the ordinary two-party situation in this country, because the man held sort of a double office. He might be a general in the army but he is also, well, he is also the national committee which really determines laws, and he was enjoying the preferment of pay and everything of that sort.

(Discussion off the record.)

General MARSHALL. We do have the charge that he has gone through the war and endured long years of very pathetic support on our part, due to the fact that he only had a lifeline over the mountains. Following the war, a great deal was done in China to try to help the situation out in every conceivable way that was politically and financially possible. I think that is the best way I can answer your question.

Mr. DECKER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

General MARSHALL. I apologize for running off.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, in the time which is left to us, with your permission what I would like to do would be to see if we can get your views rather specifically on a number of issues. I think all of them have been touched on in our discussions during the last 2 days but I think there are a number of them where it would be very helpful to sharpen up any views or conclusions which you have individually. That is what we particularly hope for and already have received to a very large extent out of this meeting—to get the value of your ideas and thinking on some of the issues which are pressing or will be pressing very shortly for decision and action.

I would like to suggest that we might have a few minutes taking up the question of the recognition of the Communist government in China. May I just mention a few of the factors as they confront the Department in connection with this, illustrating again what General Marshall said about the complexities of the issues that enter into the situation.

I think in some of the discussion of recognition there is some confusion between the short-term and long-term aspects. There is the question of whether you recognize the Communist government immediately on the one hand, on the other hand, there is the picture or the phantom of a duplication of the situation which existed with respect to the Soviet Union over a period of 15 years practically in which we said it did not exist when it did exist and you know the complications which arose from that.

In terms of the short-run picture you have the complication of the situation in the General Assembly of the United Nations and a great deal of speculation at Lake Success as to whether a Communist delegation will suddenly turn up at Lake Success and get into gate 5 early and sit down in the seat of the Chinese delegate and say, we are it. There are a lot of technical problems there as to how the General Assembly acts in terms of conflicting claimants to representation of a member state.

Mr. BRODIE. Mr. Secretary, don't we have a border patrol in this country any more? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. We have I think in connection with the recognition problem also a good many of the elements which we have discussed in connection with the business of trading with the Communist areas in terms of immediate action. You have also I think to weigh, as General Marshall pointed out, in other connections the attitudes of other governments and the effects on other governments of action by the United States. On the other hand, you have the possibility that a great many other states might recognize the Communist government and what would be the resulting position if the United States is one of a small minority which does not. On the other hand you may have many states withholding recognition and the question of the extension of recognition by the United States Government and its effect on thinking in southeast Asia, for instance, where communism seems to them to present a serious local problem is another fact.

I just want to throw out some of those points and to ask you to address yourselves for a short time to this problem of recognition.

Mr. EUGENE STALEY. Might I ask one question? A point that Mr. Butterworth made the other day semed very interesting and important. I think some of us assumed there might be some difference as alternatives between de facto and de jure recognition but from what he said I gather it comes down to whether we go whole hog or not; that is, he indicated that the Chinese Communists would not play ball on any other basis but the full de jure recognition so that was really the only alternative open to us.

The CHAIRMAN. I think in terms of what we know about the Communist position it is true what we have had frequently in the past is a situation in

which by admitting certain authorities are de facto authorities in the area you can do business with them and we have operated through consular officers and so on. De facto basis with us involves a question of de jure recognition. It is indicated by the current Chinese Communist position that they are not ready to shift their attitude. They refuse to acknowledge representatives or foreign consular authorities on any basis on de facto basis in Shanghai—in that or any other place—and until the de jure recognition is extended they will continue their policy of discrimination. The latest is banning of newspapermen of any country that has not extended recognition, so I think we may be confronted there with a situation in which de facto recognition does not enable us to move forward the way we have in similar situations in other countries in the past.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Ambassador, it would be helpful to me personally if we could be briefed on the attitude on international law with reference to the de jure recognition and the de facto recognition and perhaps other situations which we might call modus vivendi—relying upon that address which Mr. Boland gave in New York, I believe, on the 19th of January this year, in which he said that our Government had come to the conclusion that Soviet Russia would not keep treaties and our only recourse was a day-to-day arrangement with Soviet Russia which would not be necessarily a long-term legal agreement but merely a day-to-day modus vivendi.

Now, presumably Russian-trained Communists in Communist China would follow somewhat the same tactics of the Kremlin. The point I am asking is this: Is it possible to have a modus vivendi for trade and communications with Communist China without giving either de facto or de jure recognition?

The CHAIRMAN. I think personally, Mr. Colegrove, the answer is the same as that question which Mr. Staley raised. They are not satisfied with half-way measures. It may be they will become so. I think the present indication is that they want all or nothing.

Mr. STALEY. They gave me to understand definitely that they wanted nothing but de jure recognition.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MacNaughton.

Mr. MACNAUGHTON. Sitting in this room arguing and listening, I think I would say we had come to a state of mind where we would recognize the Communist Government in China but General Marshall has been whispering in my ear for the last few days that a lot of things we were talking about now you cannot get the American public to take right now or the Congress to take and, therefore, the reasoning in a vacuum here among ourselves, facing a practical problem. I thing the procedure would be to watch and wait.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking as a representative of the American public in a particular area of the country, do you think recognition would go down in your area?

Mr. MACNAUGHTON. I think they would blow up.

Mr. BENJAMIN KIZER. As of today but what they will do tomorrow is another story.

Mr. WILLIAM R. HEROD. I would hazard a suggestion, Mr. Ambassador, that we should not recognize today because there is still civil war going on and the Communists have not got the machinery of state except in certain areas but I would be inclined to think we should prepare ourselves to recognize the fact that if they do obtain the machinery of state that then we should be prepared to recognize them.

I think it is rather amusing. We recognized Russia and Yugoslavia. We recognized everybody else. It has not been a question of Communists as Communists that has prevented our recognition. Much of it has been some of the despicable things some of the gangsters in some of the countries have done. I understand it took 26 years for the Russians to recognize us after our revolution. They did not recognize those terribly rebellious colonies until 1807. It did not do the Russians any good and it did not do us any good or any harm.

I would suggest that we watch the situation daily and if and when the Nationalists lose control completely and the Communists attain the position of having machinery of state that we at that time accord them recognition unless in the meantime there has been some other factor.

I think you have to take this present situation that there is a definite rejection by the Chinese people of the Nationalists independent of any Russian connection whatsoever. The military figures cited by Colonel McCann the other day indicated at the end of the war the Nationalists had the armies, the equipment, and they had the facilities. Today the preponderance has entirely shifted.

My own experiences in China since the war have indicated that the Chinese people, with whom I have had very many contacts, even though not Commu-

nists, are so fed up with the former Nationalist regime that they definitely want that out no matter what happens and I don't think we should be hitching our wagon to a descending star on any ideological basis. I think we have to be right and practical people——

FROM THE FLOOR. Hear! Hear!

Mr. MURPHY. I strongly second Mr. Herod's remarks about the attitude of the Chinese people toward the Nationalist Government and to the present Communist group but with regard to the United Nations, the most frequently attributed reason for the failure of the League of Nations was the interference of Britain and France in the critical years of the League—the making of the League an instrument of their private policy.

With respect to the United Nations, there is no doubt in my mind that the Russians have weakened the United Nations by following in general the procedure that was attributed to Britain and France with respect to the League of Nations. Therefore, I think that however inconvenient in the Council and in the Assembly the presence of Chinese Communist members may be, I think we have to take our chances when the time comes.

Mr. HAROLD VINACKE. I would like to associate myself with what Mr. Herod said but I would like to put a further proposition in there. I think under the present circumstances it is very important that if we are going to follow the policy of the recognition whenever the civil war is over, that that should be made very clear at the present time rather than waiting without any indication as to the circumstances under which we will or will not recognize. I think that is very important domestically and in the preparing around. I think we have to recognize the Chinese Communist Government on the assumptions just set forth and I think it is equally important in the attempt to influence a full movement in the Far East either in connection with this or other questions that may arise. We are in a posiion at the present time where as far as immediate recognition is concerned, there are all the advantages of immediate recognition having been secured by the Soviet Union. All we can now do is avoid getting ourselves in the position where whatever we do is thrown back at us as something we have been forced to do rather than something we attempted to do in terms of principles as we ourselves established the principle.

The part of the principle it seems to me is when we have recognized or when we are prepared to recognize, we should expect the Chinese Communist Party to show a willingness to meet the ordinary tests of government in the treatment of nationals of other states or territories they have under their control. I think those things should be put in a definite statement of policy with respect to recognition when it occurs.

Mr. JOHN W. DECKER. I would associate myself with those favoring recognition although I want to say something about timing. That recognition would rest on the fundamental fact of the importance of the Chinese people in the world—our historical relation to them and the fact—and this is the central fact—that the Chinese people have repudiated the Nationalist Government. That repudiation is a fact that is at least 5 years old at the present time. We have just begun to see it.

Some questions are raised in my mind about the existing Nationalist Government which was our wartime ally and friend and the question of what it would mean for that government as long as it holds on to a substantial part of China. That is a question of timing. I think a rejection to the present Nationalist Government would make your present political problem considerably more difficult.

Mr. NATHANIEL PEFFER. I would also make it a matter of timing and I would wait. I would wait 4 weeks or 5 or 6 weeks. I don't know when the Communists will get to Canton, but I would guess not over 6 or 7 weeks. The only other Chinese regime will be in Formosa which is, at least technically, not Chinese territory. It is still Japanese.

Another matter. Tell me, is not the burden of proving on those who don't want to recognize? The Communists are there. They are going to take 20, 30, 40 years. Who knows? What do you lose by recognizing? What do you gain by not recognizing? The only really serious thing I suppose is what Ambassador Jessup has said, that sometime soon Chou En-lai will sneak into Lake Success before Dr. Tsiang and take a seat in the General Council. What about it? What can Chou En-lai do to embarrass Ambassador Jessup that Vishinski cannot do better? He vetoes on the Council. What about it. One is enough, isn't it, for technical purposes? They have one, haven't they, and suppose they do gang up and by some miracle get a third on their support—we have one too. Tell me, what is there to be lost?

Now, the argument against it. There is a great deal to be said for General Marshall's very mellow and very wise recognition that there is an American public opinion. I think there might be an amendment to that. Let us say that there is an American Congress—and I don't know that they are synonymous—and suppose it is true the State of Oregon blows up. Well, it will settle. Is it not a very dangerous principle now when the world is as tense as it is that we are going to surrender by default to the guy who is the best lobbyist and does the best propaganda, even when surrendering by default is against the best judgment of those who know most about it? Haven't we a lesson on that?

This is no secret state. The people professionally engaged about the Far East, diplomatic, military, journalistic, scholarly, commerce—and I think Mr. Herod, the businessman, will bear that out—have all known for 2 or 3 years—certainly for 2 years that what we were doing in China had not the slightest basis in sense, fact, or reality—not the slightest, and yet the people in the building in which are now sitting—if they had not had their way in accordance with their best judgment, there would have been no difference whatever except about a billion and a half which we would have had which we haven't got.

We gave them what help we could morally and otherwise—presumably in a moral obligation—and they sank. If we had not given it to them they would have sunk too. It would have made a difference of 4, 5, or 6 weeks. Are we going to go along against our better judgment because momentarily Portland, Seattle, Chicago, and one building in Rockwell Center—you know what I mean—lifetime fortunes—because they will blow up. Let them blow. After all, democracy does not mean a surrender at once, does it? There is no real argument against real recognition except that a lot of people are going to blow up.

If this country—the most powerful in the world at the most dangerous time in the world—is at a stage in which the Government is hog-tied against its better judgment because some people are going to blow up, then God alone help the Republic. That is all. [Applause.]

Mr. Arthur Holcomb. I go along with those who have spoken and I guess most of us do—perhaps all—on the question of recognition and the question of timing and I take it that most of those who have spoken would also add that since to get exactly the right time is exceedingly difficult, it is better to be too early than too late. At any rate, that would be my view. It seems to me the reluctance to face that issue springs from misgivings respecting the political situation. My belief is that those misgivings are exaggerated.

I think we have been very fortunate in the start that has already been made in preparing the public for an honest reappraisal of the situation. The publication of the white paper which came out was a shock to many of the public at the time. At the same time it was an exceedingly wise and fortunate and well-timed move: Honest confession is good for the soul and that goes for nations as well as individuals and I think our people are in a much better position to understand and to support the next step because of the candor and courage which the Government showed in showing its hand at the time when it did.

Of course there will be a good deal made by critics of the Government of the opportunity for criticism but I believe the public, once convinced that it is being treated honestly by people in power—and they should be easily convinced of that—I believe the public would follow and that the difficulties growing out of domestic politics will prove to be much less serious than has been apprehended. The white paper is a good beginning and if the administration follows in the same spirit, timing moves as best it can, I think it will get public support. I am sure it will in my section of the country.

Mr. Arthur Coons. I should like to inquire whether it is thought a matter of practicality to utilize the suggestion of Mr. Vinacke that our recognition of the Chinese Communist Government should proceed at a time or after there shall be evidence on their part that they are accepting the standards of any government that behaves within the society of nations. To what extent is the question of recognition, sir, a matter of negotiation or are we so over the barrel that we either have to do or not do it? I am interested in that angle of the question because it seems to me—although I associate myself with the view we shall recognize them sooner or later—maybe they realize that and maybe they realize that we will do it sooner or later and, therefore, they will not be party to any negotiation.

How practical is that aspect and I should wish we could get recognition of certain historic treaties. Is it too much to ask this question?

The CHAIRMAN. Very briefly, as you know, the whole history of our recognition policy has been one of fluctuation if you take the entire period of the country. The outstanding position of the Department on recognition ties in particularly with two things; first, it is a question of view as to whether it is the government of the country running it; second, if it is the government will to carry out international obligations. Those are the two key points I think in our standing recognition policy.

Mr. COONS. May I ask another question? After a considerable time yesterday we were talking about the desirability of allowing trade to proceed with the Communist areas of China. Let us say we will, from the standpoint of timing, withhold recognition of China's Communist government for matters of weeks or months. In the meanwhile is it possible for us to have a policy? Is there any practicality in allowing a laissez faire relationship with American trade and vis-à-vis those areas under control of the Chinese Communists, or does that also seem to be tied up with the question of political recognition? This ties back a little bit with the modus vivendi of Mr. Colegrove.

The CHAIRMAN. On that, if I may express a personal opinion—the question of trade is not now, with the matter of recognition, following the line discussed yesterday of permitting business to trade. That can be done with an unrecognized as well as a recognized area.

Mr. J. W. BALLANTINE. I would like to raise a small voice toward putting a brake on this band wagon. I think we need to recognize facts. We cannot get away from facts but I do think that if we are confronted with a dilemma here—if we immediately accept the idea that we have to recognize right away or feel we have to jump before we are forced into jumping, I think that we lose a great deal of bargaining power. We lose an opportunity to get conditions we want. The Soviet bloc has blocked the admission into the United Nations of a number of states.

I think there is a good deal of room for interpretation as to what constitutes the Communists having an effective government in all China. There is room for interpretation as to our judgment as to their ability to carry out international obligations and I don't think that we should make any statement or make any public announcement at this time as a sort of preparatory step toward getting into this thing because then we will be open immediately to the charge we have further prejudiced the position of the Nationalist Government of China and that we have contributed to their downfall. I think that the more that we can keep people guessing—the more we can still make them believe that there is a possibility there—the better terms we are going to get and that is a point we should consider in this picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I think I am definitely encouraged by the evident trend this morning which shows that we should proceed from facts rather than from subjective attitudes. I hope the Department feels its hand strengthened but if we, representing the different points of view that we do represent, are to be of any service to the Department, it seems to me that we should come back once more, more closely to the point raised by General Marshall that timing is all important in what you can get through the necessary and basically desirable process of debate. And I think that while the recent speakers have all spoken directly to the point of China, we should look a little more widely and take in the rest of Asia as well, and the relationship of politics and prestige in the whole of Asia to the process by which policy is formulated, debated and put into effect in this country. It seems to me there is a sort of scissors diagram here. On the one side domestically in the United States, we have a situation in which one of the most important political maneuvering devices is that each of the two great parties feels continuously under pressure to demonstrate to the Nation as a whole that it is not less anti-Russian and anti-Communist and antiappeasement than the other great party. Therefore, the party which controls the administration must present any policies they advocate in such a manner as to expose itself to the minimum to the charge of appeasement.

The other blade of the scissors tends to get neglected. What is likely to be the reaction in other countries in Asia to American speed or American delay in recognizing what almost all of us here appear to recognize as the facts of life in China? I think under the nineteenth century standards of international prestige that the time of your willingness to recognize a new state was extremely important. I think since the two World Wars, those standards of prestige have changed somewhat. We have to face the fact not only in Asia but throughout the world that what has happened in China is regarded as a set-back to American

policy and the diminution of American prestige. The question is how to minimize that. Ovehaste in recognizing the new situation might indicate panic, indicate to people in Asia that we have been panicked into a big over-all retreat and that would certainly draw in with criticism in the Congress and in the press in this country. On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our prestige in Asia that in the long run would be more damaging to us because there would be the feeling that while a new situation has developed and in spite of the fact, as Mr. Peffer cogently pointed out, that that doesn't really alter the mechanics of how we handle things in the United Nations, for instance, the veto ratio is changed but the veto situation is not changed; in spite of that fact the Americans appear to be so baffled that they don't know what to do. We give the impression of being thrown off balance, flustered, having lost our heads, incapable of facing a surrogate Vishinsky in addition to the original Vishinsky, and that, I think, would be a very bad situation for us to handle.

In this connection I should like to speak on the point on which I should be more carefully briefed than I am, but I should like to put forward the suggestion that we have missed one important opportunity which could have enabled us to ease the general situation in our favor. Before the recent United Nations meeting opened, the Secretary General, Trygve Lie, referred to a list of nations coming up for admission and said that, in his opinion, this particular list should be admitted. By and large, that is the list that has brought a division each time—we reject certain applications and the Russians reject certain applications. As the list now stands, it is slightly in our favor. I think that if we had indicated a willingness to admit the whole slate if the Russians would also admit the whole slate, we would have been much better off. The list would have included completely satellite Communist-dominated countries like Outer Mongolia, the Mongolian people's republic, but there is a Soviet satellite that has been in existence for a long time and has not particularly changed the balance between Russia and ourselves in any way, and the willingness to admit such countries would have been a willingness to recognize existing facts without any loss of prestige on our part. If we had taken a list such as this, then we would have been greatly strengthened in being deliberate about recognition of the new regime in China because we would then be clearly on the record that we were advocating an oppositely ideological position, that our position was related to changing facts in the structure of the world as well as to our own particular ideological preferences.

In view of that, couldn't we consider the desirability of an American approach to the problem of recognizing the new regime in China that would throw other things into the bargain as well as this particular problem. It is very much like the old technique of buying curios in Peking. There is some one thing that you particularly want, the dealer knows you want it and he puts on it a price higher than you are willing to pay. The way you get it is to buy not only that thing but a number of other things, then you make a lump price and he cuts his price somewhat and you come up somewhat; eventually you get what you really want and he gets what he really wants for that main object, but neither person has lost face because he says, "Well, I got a lot more than some of those things were worth," and you say to yourself, "Well, I paid a little more for these things but that didn't matter, look at this one real thing, that was a bargain," so everyone is satisfied.

Therefore couldn't we couple recognizing the new regime in China with a number of positive steps in Asia as a whole, showing American initiative and desire to get things done in the improvement of various situations, such as those in Indochina and Indonesia, possibly Burma, whatever we can do in India and Pakistan, to show that the United States is not against changes in the status quo as such, but on the contrary is anxious to get the most progressive and liberal settlement possible, and that the United States stops short of wanting to aid or encourage the development of communism but is eager to promote alternatives which are acceptable to the maximum number of people in Asia and Europe. If we could handle the question of China in that wider context of an active American policy elsewhere in Asia, it seems to me that we could do a great deal to retrieve the prestige situation and consolidate the actual power situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Talbot.

Mr. TALBOT. I merely wanted to ask a question as to what the relations may be between this question of recognition of China, the Chinese Communist regime, and the Japanese peace treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not quite sure that I understand your point.

Mr. TALBOT. I am sorry. I was wondering whether the negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty would be materially affected by the question of whether or not we recognize, before negotiating that peace treaty, the Communist regime in China.

The CHAIRMAN. Could we hold that a minute until I go through my list, and come back to your question? Mr. Herod.

Mr. HEROD. Mr. Ambassador, may I make just one comment which I think may be constructive. The statement was made that, independent of recognition, trade could go on. That statement is probably correct. On the other hand, I don't think that this group wants to minimize that without recognition the effort which will be exerted by American traders will be frought with additional uncertainties as a result of which trade will not be as great, and certainly there will be less credit, and certainly there will be less investment, and certainly there will be more uncertainty from the trader standpoint as to what the American attitude will be, which with export licenses and the ability of the American Government to prevent your shipping for some reason, that they will pull out due to the political situation domestically, is a factor at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. I hoped we might conclude our discussion on this recognition question before our recess, but I have already got six more names on my list and I am going to suggest, therefore, that we take a 10 minute recess and come back to it with fresh vigor.

(After the recess, the meeting continued.)

The CHAIRMAN. May we come to order. Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to associate myself with Mr. Herod in this question of recognition. I agree that the question of timing is of the utmost importance. Dr. Fairbank said yesterday that he thought the value of direct contacts with people who had been in these parts would be of interest and valuable to the committee. We have in China, as our chief executive, a man named Paul Hopkins, who is known, I think, to a good many of the people here. I think while his chief interest, of course, lies in us, I am quite sure from my knowledge of him that he is a good, loyal, and patriotic American, and he has no particular reason to like the Communists. If I may, I would like to read to you, confidentially, from a letter which I got from him under date of September 21, which gives something of his experience in dealing with the Communists in connection with our own business. I thought it might be illuminating if that sort of thing might be put in the record.

After talking about our own affairs, he says:

"The authorities are all significantly honest, hard-working individuals, who live on the barest essentials of food and clothing. They practice austerity to the point of not using electric fans or elevators in the buildings which they occupy as offices or residences. In my opinion, the extreme privation of these officers will have serious effect upon their health, particularly those with tubercular tendencies. I have found them all intelligent, very frank in discussing problems, and most of them with a good sense of humor.

"There is no question but that it is a new type of people who, if not subject to outside pressure, will ultimately bring great progress to China.

"To my mind, the pessimistic future stems from the increasing breach which has developed between China and America. There are arguments on both sides, but, in my opinion, the passage of time has seemed to confuse the issue and eliminate realistic thinking which bodes ill for everyone. I may be too close to the picture and have lost perspective. The almost daily bombing activity of the KMT, and the increased miseries caused the Chinese people by those activities against nonmilitary objectives constantly irritate an open sore. Grant it be un-Anglo-Saxon to deny an ex-war partner, but evidence would seem adequate that that partner has for several years served its people so ill that it has been rejected by its own people. America is now contributing indirectly to the miseries of those people. Recognition should be withdrawn and the blockade of the coast broken."

I thought that might be useful to the committee as the evidence from people, from one man who is particularly competent to judge the Chinese situation due to the fact he was born in China, he is the son of a medical missionary, and, as I say, he has no reason to love the Communists. He applied for an exit visa some time ago to come back and visit his people—he had been interned during the Japanese war. It was denied him and it was only after we arranged to have somebody else take his place as a hostage that they finally consented to let him go and that with the understanding he was going back again inside of 6 months. So, as I say, he has no particular reason to love the Communists and I think this is good ex parte evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. ROSINGER. I'd like to associate myself with the view frequently expressed around this table that we should extend recognition. My own personal feeling is that the recognition should come as early as possible. At the same time, I recognize that within this country there are certain practical problems to be faced politically in this connection. The question of timing has been referred to frequently; I think that is extremely important. I think there is a period, it is hard to define in advance, but a period of perhaps 3, 6, maybe 9 months, in which recognition by the United States will have a certain value in terms of Chinese opinion and will not simply be a reluctant, grudging following after the facts and after the actions of other countries which will have recognized before us. I would not agree with the statement that with recognition of the new Chinese Government by Russia all the advantages of recognition are lost to other countries. I think that is not so, and the reason why I state this opinion is that I think we have to look at the state of Chinese public opinion. As I see it, the bulk of politically conscious Chinese opinion is not to the extent that it is hostile to the United States, hostile because it is pro-Russian; its anti-Americanism is not pro-Sovietism, by and large, regardless of what the situation may be in connection with particular individuals or leaders.

As I see it, Chinese public opinion, politically conscious public opinion, is not by and large hostile to individual Americans, regardless of particular incidents, it is not by and large hostile to the United States as a country, but rather hostile on rather pragmatic grounds to particular phases of American policy as experienced and perceived in China over the past few years. If that is so, then there is a stake to be won in considering this state of Chinese public opinion. If it is not now, by and large, pro-Russian in its anti-Americanism, then there is a much more favorable basis for returning it to some kind of friendly attitude toward the United States than if, let's say, its anti-Americanism were identical with a pro-Soviet approach.

I might add as a footnote that I think that in a country of 450 million people such as China, in which only a small percentage of the population, even the politically conscious, have a clear-cut, fixed ideology, that this question of how people feel on grounds of personal reaction to the policy of a foreign power, in this case the United States, is very important. I, personally, as I have suggested, would be in favor of recognizing at the earliest feasible moment. I think, though, that in terms of preparing American public opinion for recognition, there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists which can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent that we disentangle ourselves from the Chinese Nationalists, we lay the basis for recognition.

As a matter of fact, if we were to recognize today, assuming that were possible, we would be in a highly contradictory situation of recognizing at the time that we were delivering through ECA supplies to Formosa, and so on. We have not yet cleared ourselves from the entanglement with the Nationalists. I'd like to suggest, although I am not informed on the technical questions, problems of carrying out some of these actions, that we end our ECA assistance as soon as possible to the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists. I'd like to suggest that one important question would be the position we take at the United Nations in connection with the resolutions or the proposals of the Chinese Nationalists. I think to the extent that we associate ourselves at the United Nations with their position, we make it very difficult to move toward recognition. I would be in favor of keeping ourselves as clear as possible from association with the Chinese Nationalist position at the United Nations. I think the question of the blockade is extremely important. I was particularly interested in the phrase from the letter of Mr. Hopkins, just read by Mr. Robertson, to the effect that we should actively break the blockade. Regardless of the phrase that is used, I think it is rather obvious that the blockade could not continue if the United States and Britain took an active position against it. The blockade, let's say, arose independently of our will, but its continuance is dependent on the assumption of a certain position of acquiescence on our part.

In this connection, I have been struck by the whole issue of the Isbrandtsen ships, in the stopping and seizure of two of them by the Chinese Nationalists. It seems to me that one of the questions that are most easily understood by the American public and not just recently but all the way back, is the question of the right of American ships to trade freely in various parts of the world. Had action been taken—again I won't try to define it, I don't know the technical details—but had action been taken to defend the right of these American ships to trade through a blockade, which is not a blockade but technically a port closure, a port course which we have already asserted we don't recognize

as a blockade, had action been taken to defend the right of these ships to go through, I think it would have been very difficult for any opponents of the process of moving toward recognition to say "this shall not be done," because this kind of action is highly intelligible to the broadest kind of American public opinion.

Therefore, I'd like to suggest, as a generalization, that the process of disentanglement be carried forward as rapidly as we can carry it forward, as a basis for preparing public opinion as a basis for early recognition.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I hate to suggest any limitation on our discussion because it is extremely valuable and I think this morning has been very much to the point and extremely useful, but we do want to cover a number of other topics before we break up. I would suggest that, if we could proceed under informal, 5-minute rule and make our remarks as concentrated as possible, we can finish up this recognition question. I thought when I opened it we'd do it in half an hour—we have already spent a little over an hour on it—but I don't want to cut off the others who have indicated they want to speak. I would just ask their indulgence in winding it up quickly.

Mr. Staley.

Mr. STALEY. I will be very brief, Mr. Chairman, I just want to add a little information that may be of use on the question of public opinion. In general, the view that Mr. Herod first expressed, and expressed very ably, seems right to me, so I am not going to discuss that any more. But on whether public opinion will take it, I perhaps have been in a position to see a little bit of that recently better than some of the rest of you, because the World Affairs Council of Northern California has been planning its annual conference for December, which is to be on China policy, and we have been having some committee meetings prior to that and it gives us a little chance to see how people look at the thing. I can tell you better after next week end what their reaction will be on this sort of thing, because we are having sort of a preconference discussion of the agenda with a lot of them. But on what I have seen of people's reaction so far, and our area may be untypical because it is interested in international trade in the Pacific area more than most areas of the country, I wouldn't be quite so afraid of popular uprising as some people seem to be, if recognition were extended at the proper time and with the proper explanation of the reasons.

It seems to me in this connection that it might be valuable to get out at some point a statement that would make the points that our chairman mentioned about our traditional policy on recognition, before taking any final action here. I don't know just what the best technique would be, whether a direct statement or an inspired statement of some sort, but to get across to the public that traditionally the United States recognizes the regime that controls the country and shows indication of willingness and ability to live up to its international obligations. Let people kick that around for awhile and maybe that will prepare the way for the conclusion on the part of the public that the informed group represented here seems to be reaching.

One further note on the drift of public opinion in our area—as you know, Roger Lapham has recently returned from China where he was head of the ECA mission, and he is a former mayor of San Francisco. He gave a speech a couple of weeks ago out there before the Commonwealth Club, and everybody knows, of course, that he is completely unsympathetic to the Communists, but he came out rather directly and emphatically for recognition, going a good deal farther than most people have been going in speaking on the subject.

Subsequently, the World Trade Association of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce considered in their executive committee, the four points that Roger Lapham had suggested in his speech, of which the fourth said that we will have to recognize the Chinese Communists, and they agreed with his views and passed them on to the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce which, I am informed, just recently has taken an official stand as a body supporting that general view. The four points that they agreed with, that Lapham put forth originally were:

1. To continue American private business with the Chinese, as far as it may be possible, in such a way as not to enhance to any dangerous degree the very limited war potential of the country.

2. To extend all possible help to American privately endowed enterprises—educational, medical and missionary—efforts being made to promote the continuance of the private support which these enterprises have received in the past.

3. To keep open our Embassy and consulates in China, staffing them with the ablest personnel procurable in order that we may pit our best capacities against the serious problems still to be faced.

4. The only practical way to keep the door open, as well as to listen and observe what goes on behind the bamboo curtain, is acceptance of the fact that we may soon have to recognize, in such areas as they control, the Communist government as the de facto government, and be prepared to recognize it whether we like it or not.

They went on to point out that we already recognize the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and other countries whose regimes we don't particularly admire.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reischauer.

Mr. REISCHAUER. The question has been brought up as to whether the recognition of China would have any influence on a peace treaty with Japan. I presume the question means if recognition of China should come before a peace treaty has been made with Japan, would that have an adverse influence on the negotiation of such a treaty. I personally feel it would have very little effect on it. Abstention by the Soviet Union from such a peace treaty would already break up its international character. The Soviet Union, if you had a veto system, would already have a veto; I cannot see why the addition of a Communist China to such a peace treaty would have a great influence. On the other hand, if you negotiated a peace treaty with a rump Kuomintang Government having membership at the table, I think it would only have an adverse influence on China. The Communists would be less likely to accept the results of that treaty. So, does that answer your question, Mr. Talbot? I don't think there is any reason for holding up recognition on that score. We seem to be in very general agreement about the desirability of recognizing the Communist government in China and recognizing it fairly soon. I should like to say, however, that I see no reason for unseemly haste in doing it; there is nothing dignified in jumping on the bandwagon in its last lap and I don't think we gain anything psychologically, in fact, I think we might lose psychologically by doing it in haste. We would be "panicked" as it were, at least that would be the interpretation on the part of the Chinese.

I'd like to offer one practical suggestion, would it be possible to act in conjunction with a country like India? I think that would make it more palatable to our own people and more palatable in Asia, if we took an attitude actually giving India a large part in determining the time, saying "you are a great Asiatic country, we want to be friendly with Asiatics, your decision on this is something that really influences our thinking, we would like to go along with you on the matter."

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Mr. Ambassador, I will keep within the 3-mile limit, I think, of your book on territorial waters.

At an early stage of the discussion on recognition, President Coons and Mr. Ballantine called attention to the fact that we must not lose the bargaining opportunity in recognition and I think it is very important to us that we should remember that. We are in a game of power politics, no matter what we may think we are doing and in power politics we should of course play for stakes.

In this connection it might be appropriate for the United States Government perhaps, in cooperation with England and India, to make a public statement as to our terms of recognition, even during negotiations over those terms.

It is rather odd in this conference that we have not mentioned, except on one occasion so far, the traditional American policy in the Far East and that traditional policy has been the open-door policy enunciated by Secretary John Hay and repeated again by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in negotiations with Japan before the Second World War.

Any bargaining with the Communist government or recognition it seems to me ought to include an attempt to get complete recognition of our old traditional policy on the open door.

While Chiang's government existed, we urged upon the Nationalist government the necessity for a real democratic form of government and not having a government that was controlled by one party like the Kuomintang. One reason probably why Chiang failed—one of the main reasons—was the fact that we tried to make him take Communists into his government. Why shouldn't we insist, in the new Communist government, that democracy is not promoted by a one-party government and that there should be many parties represented in the new Communist regime.

That of course is a propaganda point that we ought not to lose and I regret to see the light treatment that was made of the effects of recognition of the Chinese Communists within the United Nations. The General Assembly has become a great propaganda forum and the words spoken there are repeated

all over the world. Bringing the Chinese Communists into a seat in the United Nations would make us listen to a lot more Communist propaganda which was repeated widely throughout the globe.

Mr. BENJAMIN KIZER. Mr. Ambassador, I should like to second the suggestion made by Dr. Holcomb about the white paper. I have taken occasion to read it over and I find it a fascinating document, and it contains good material and good sections with some sandy strips, of course, in between. I suggest that it would be highly enlightening to the American people—because it is obvious none of our newspaper writers read it—to have that white paper reviewed briefly and in sections by a well-known publicist in magazine articles, independent of the State Department, so that some of the more fascinating parts of the document can be called to the attention of the American people who have not become acquainted with it—if we could do something to make our American people acquainted with it.

I should like to follow Mr. Lattimore with the suggestion to go on trading before recognition. I couldn't go as far as Dr. Holcomb's suggestion that they reform their government by recognizing various parties. That is a matter of scuttling recognition and introducing conflict where we should introduce agreement. I should be, on the contrary, inclined to any negotiation we should make that would lead toward relaxation of the iron curtain is desirable.

If we long withhold recognition we shall be contributing to an iron curtain between ourselves and China. Therefore, I would like to see that recognition come just as quickly as the facts of life reached by Congress and the American people permitted. The American people will rather quickly adapt themselves to it.

One thing further, and here I follow Mr. Robertson closely. I think we should make a public disavowal of the blockade Chiang Kai-shek is conducting with respect to China, and I would like to see that followed up at an early date with a withdrawal of recognition. It does seem to me that that bombing that he is doing is so heedless and so sacrificial of human life without any objective that the blockade is not a real blockade but a nuisance designed to hurt people he does not like and accomplishes no purpose for him; and if we withdraw recognition of him, or to a lesser degree repudiated the idea that we were associated with it, it would be to our advantage.

Mr. HAROLD S. QUIGLEY. I would like to join in the general support of the policy of recognition in accordance with the early precedents of the United States. I think the departures from those precedents we have tried by the use of [inaudible] recognition have not worked, and they would not work in this case. I think that recognition is essential to trade, because I doubt if the Chinese will trade without recognition; and, in view of the fact that China is there and there is no alternative in dealing with China than through this new government, it seems to me that we have no alternative.

With reference to the sentiment of the country, I have been quite surprised in my area of Minnesota at a shift of sentiment that has taken place within the last year or two. I think perhaps a vote which I took in my class in Far East politics last Monday is somewhat indicative of that shift. Mind you, there had been no propaganda from the instructor prior to the vote. A notice came out in the paper that day and so before beginning the day's discussion I said: "How many in this class [of about 36 students] would be in favor of recognition of the Communist government?" Nineteen raised their hands without considering. They just popped up. I said: "How many opposed?"—and I got six hands—and I said: "Is there any other way I can ask you what you think?" We had to assume the others did not know.

That is an astonishing thing to me, and it is partly due to a shift in the sentiment of the missionary people of this country. We are a great exporting area, as you know, of missionaries, and I suppose the Middle West is better informed on the Far East than it is on any other phase of our foreign policy; at least, what the conditions are that condition our foreign policy. So, I doubt if there would be a very serious explosion upon recognition if that were proposed in this country.

Governor STASSEN. Dr. Jessup, I might say first that I regret very much that I have not been able to sit through the entire conference. I made the greatest possible readjustment of my schedule when I received the invitation to be here, and I will address myself very concisely to the point now under discussion. Through the kind assistance of Dr. Talbot, I had some briefing of the discussion, particularly of General Marshall's able presentation this morning.

I stated on Thursday that I was opposed to recognition of the north government in China at this time and not at least for a question of a couple of years. I

want to go into that a little more thoroughly because at that time I stated a position on it.

My first comment is on some of the related discussion this morning that has been advanced along with recognition or steps we ought to take, which I say, frankly, to me could be best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government. I think that would be the correct characterization of the related things that have been advanced along with recognition at the earliest possible date.

To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy. If we recognize the Communist government of China now, clearly that does mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other government—the Nationalist Government—but that we must then join in affirmative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations. There are no half-way measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a government in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we are a great leading nation, take a different position to that, nor should we possibly abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So, we would then be in the position of going into the United Nations, with our great prestige, and throw out from that United Nations the representative of whatever you may wish to call them—the remnants of a former government that still has now, and I think will for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people and that is continuing to put up some form of resistance to the Communist areas.

Now, to put ourselves in that position, in my mind, cannot be countenanced, and I might urge as I go forward, and respectfully submit, that there have been some implications that perhaps those that oppose recognition are trying to play the popular tune in America. That might be their motivation.

The great view of statesmanship is the contrary and difficult and unpopular course. I will not attempt to draw any cloak of statesmanship about me this morning or any other time, but I would modestly state that the steps that I took in the early days of opposition to Hitler and lend-lease and the whole question of isolation and world trade have not been popular courses at the time they were taken, particularly in my home part of the country, so that to the greatest degree it is possible. So, to the greatest degree it is possible, I approach these policies from the standpoint of what is right in the long view for our country and our ideals rather than what is the current popular view; in fact, I have such faith in democracy that if a policy is right then I am certain you can interpret it to the American people and convince the majority of them it is right and that it should be taken.

Going to the specifics of recognition, it seems to me that taking the affirmative stand of ejecting the Nationalist Government from the United Nations and placing in its stead the Communist government of the north would be a clear invitation to a disregard of our fundamental ideals and objectives in the world picture. Whatever else may be said about the Nationalist Government, it seems to me that there has been a greater measure of democracy, a greater measure of individual freedom, the right of free expression, of a free press, of the communication of news in that area then there has been in any of the Communist areas of the world.

I might project my views of the Communist government of north China. I believe that in the early stages they have brought some of those who are not Communists into leadership—some of those we might call moderates. In the early stages they will say to the American businessman: "If your country treats us better and recognizes us, that will facilitate your doing business here." However, you will find quite rapidly, as they consolidate their control over the country and as they introduce people into these industries and businesses who learn something about them, they will proceed to throw out the moderates from the government and will tighten up and possibly expropriate and take over the business, and that process will move forward steadily.

In saying that, I will anticipate that the pattern followed in Communist China will be the same as the Communist pattern in the Balkan area. I have a vivid recollection of a conference with President Benes of Czechoslovakia 2½ years ago, in which he stated that Czechoslovakia was cooperating with the Soviet Union. He thought it was the best policy and that they were seeking to build a bridge between East and West and had pledged cooperation with Stalin, and he thought it was the right policy for his country and that Stalin had pledged to him that Czechoslovakia could work out its solution in the broad democratic framework.

I think it is quite clear now that approach was used to Benes and other people of Czechoslovakia as a means of getting control, first of the police and of the Department of Industries and then getting the men into the various industries and then working on week after week and month after month to obliterate human rights and control over the country and bring it under iron-handed dictatorship. The record in Poland has been similar to that.

If that effort is made in China, I believe you will find then disaffection of some of the generals in the Communist armies of China which will have to be met by rapid liquidation and new leaders being placed in, or it might involve a real split-up and further division with that vast area of China in its leadership. This process, as I vision it, while the armies are in being and still moving about, would take place within the next few years, and I would think it would be to be regretted if we added to the prestige of the Communist government of China and then a process of this kind began to take place and we in fact would be in the position of always strengthening the hand of the new Communist government, which would be successively wiping out the liberties, freedoms, and opportunities of the Chinese people and would be putting down the efforts of those who wanted some nationalism in China and who wanted some independence and who were breaking away from the Communist leadership; in fact, help them put down that situation.

In my mind the pluses are very large on the side of either saying "try having it as a reserve policy that we want to watch this picture for a couple of years before we recognize the Communist government of China." We may well find that, just as the experts' anticipations have been unfounded so many times in China, the anticipation and prediction now that the Communist armies can consolidate all China on their own timetable may meet many a reverse in some of the mountain passès by some of the troops who begin to defend their own territory as compared with defending an area far away from home.

Nobody knows the frailties of the human race. Chiang Kai-shek in more recent months and years has been an unfortunate conclusion of what in many respects was a brilliant and remarkable career. Who knows but that Chiang at his age may pass from the picture and others may rise to the future in the uncertain period of a few years and that in that we might find grounds perhaps, first, for a withdrawal of the full powers of the Nationalist Government in the United Nations, and perhaps even a request for a United Nations commission to study the situation in China; that we might thereby gain time and we might serve notice we are observing what the new government is doing in the matter of observing the recognized international amities and how it is treating American businessmen and others who are there and missionaries and how it is going about the abrogation of international obligations before we move in to recognize and to urge their seating in the United Nations.

I regret that I have not heard in detail the other arguments; but just what could be gained in that kind of picture by a rapid recognition I cannot evaluate as a counterbalance, but it seems to me the great weight of strength would be at some period in which you can look at it and then perhaps assemble a group of men such as this to reevaluate such a situation; and, on the matter of moving away from Russian dominance, let the question of the independence of this area and their not being under any other nation's control be one of the factors we are studying and it is known we are studying it.

Certainly the situation as to Tito was no indication that you move people away from the Soviet Union by being generous to them. He moved away at a time when we were being the firmest and clearly classifying him in that area and he on the other hand was greatly professing his association with the Soviet Union at a time when he could do it and still retain full American aid and full American assistance and that was the time clearly that there was no reason for him to take any other position, but when he had to make a choice with the increasing tightening up of the screws becoming apparent from the Soviet Union, then he made the choice to move away.

If there are indications of moving away from Moscow and of a greater recognition of rights of people within north China, that would be the moment at which we might decide to recognize and send assistance but at a time when all statements being made by the leaders and the Communist government are insulting and attacking our country, when the treatment of nationals is at a low ebb, clearly that is not a time to think of recognition and I do not agree that our prestige is involved in the question of recognition. I think our prestige is involved in all of Asia and all we have done and all we will do.

I make the further point on this that by all means we should have a new aid-to-Asia economic program under way, functioning before we recognize the Communist government of the north of China.

If at a stage when the world says "What is America's Asia policy?"—if there is such a stage, the one outstanding fact that we recognized the Communist government of north China and joined in throwing out of the United Nations that nation that stood firm in years of Japanese invasions, if that would be the one thing we did in Asia, I think the result would be very sad, but if we start a new affirmative approach of aid to Asia in a positive way and if your program and policy begins to project itself and be understood—if at that stage we find the intelligence officers' reports are of complete consolidation and if at that stage we find there is an element of increasing stability and respect for rights rather than the reverse in the north of China, then at that stage I think recognition should be given after a full consideration but not before.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Governor Stassen. Before going on to another topic I am going to ask Mr. Russell if he will read part of a telegram which we received from General Wedemeyer expressing his regrets that he could not be here and giving some of his views on some of the questions coming up.

Mr. RUSSELL. General Wedemeyer says:

"The United States should not surrender the initiative in any field of international endeavor, in any area of the world. The timing, the scope, and the character of our efforts in one area—in this instance, the Far East—should be carefully coordinated and integrated with our efforts in other areas of the world; for example, Western Europe, Central Europe, Middle East, etc. To insure economy of means and to make our efforts more purposeful to all nations our efforts should be integrated and coordinated with those nations and peoples having objectives comparable with our own.

"Specifically with reference to policies and objectives in China the following ideas appear pertinent:

"1. The pronounced and progressive deterioration of China's political and economic structures, also the impotence of government military forces, render it impractical at this time to provide large-scale material aid. The remaining Chinese non-Communist forces or elements, with or without national government's cognizance, are not organized or equipped to assimilate or to use effectively large-scale material aid.

"2. The Chinese people, individually and collectively, would receive a tremendous uplift in morale and would derive strength and hope for the future if the United States, also Great Britain, France, and other friendly countries publicly affirmed the determination to support anti-Communists or non-Communist elements in China throughout the Far East. Such a public pronouncement by the President or the Secretary of State would provide the morale support so urgently needed by bewildered millions not only in the Far East but in other important areas of the world.

"3. Material aid to Chinese leaders, communities, provinces, or specific areas, actively resisting or tangibly striving to generate realistic opposition to communism, should be given by the United States on an evaluated scale, carefully supervised by United States representatives, progressively increased in scope if developments warrant. In this connection military equipment, propaganda, media, medical equipment, food, and clothing might be distributed at times, in areas, and in quantities determined by careful evaluation of the existing and development situation. Our initial objectives should be to restrict and harass the military and economic activities of the Communists and concomitantly to confute the refuted ideas, the ideals and the ideologies of the Communist political and cultural forces.

"4. Continued observation and evaluation of the results attained by the above unequivocal moral support accompanied by evaluated material aid, might justify later greatly increased material aid in certain localities as, for example, in support of indigent movements that give tangible evidence of momentum and substance in their struggle against Communist domination."

The CHAIRMAN. I asked Mr. Russell to read it because if General Wedemeyer had been able to attend he undoubtedly would have expressed those same opinions himself and we have tried as you know here to get all possible points of view from those highly qualified to speak.

We are not engaged in a debate and I know that as we end up each topic many of those who spoke at the beginning of the discussion would like to start

in and discuss some of the ideas expressed later in the discussion. I don't think we have time for that and whether one point of view or another point of view is expressed early in our discussion or late in our discussion is immaterial to the general process, which is to elicit from all of you all the points of view you care to express on the issue before us.

I am going to ask you now if you would be willing to discuss for a while the particular problem which seems to me to merge in connection with a Japanese peace treaty.

I think in some of the earlier discussions in which the question of Japan has been touched on, a number of people at least have expressed a point of view which amounts to a suggestion that a termination of occupation of Japan as soon as practicable would be desirable and Japan should be started out again free from an occupation.

The problem which arises in connection with the conclusion of a peace treaty and on which I hope you may be willing to express opinions is this: It is quite within the realm of contemplation that assuming we get over the procedural difficulties of arranging a conference to conclude a peace treaty, that it might be feasible to reconcile the points of view of the Soviet Union and other powers as to the terms of the treaty. We have had some difficulty in concluding peace treaties in other parts of the world. The question is: If such a situation develops, is it more desirable to continue with our occupation and with no peace treaty or have those states who can agree on a peace treaty to go ahead and conclude a peace treaty of their own with Japan even assuming other states refrain from ratifying it and therefore remain technically in a state of war with Japan or may conclude their own peace arrangements with Japan.

That issue of a separate peace treaty if no unanimous decision can be reached, or if no peace treaty on how the situation should be liquidated, is one which I think requires very careful decision and I hope that we might address ourselves to that for the next period of our conference.

Mr. Johnson, would you care to make some comments on that to begin with?

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Jessup, as you know, I believe that a peace treaty with Japan should be negotiated as soon as possible. I feel that the only way that you can free Japan to enable Japan to take the part that she has to take in the trade in the Far East, which is necessary to put her on her economic feet, is to have this peace treaty. I know the difficulties that we have had up to the present time; we haven't gotten over the procedural hurdle. I, myself, feel that it is rather sad that we can't get across that hurdle. My own personal belief is that enough of the nations, that have been participating in the discussions at the Far Eastern Commission, would go with us on a peace treaty to make it worth while doing it even if Russia was not a party to it. I profess to no knowledge of Russia and I don't know much about it, but I have a feeling that if we could start in on this thing, Russia probably would come along with us; because I don't think they could afford, or would feel that they could afford, to let the majority of the nations of the Pacific go forward in this matter and not participate in it in some way.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reischauer.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you have opened up a very broad subject here; if we take into consideration all the problems within Japan, it is somewhat separate from what we have been discussing. I might dwell particularly on the influence of the China situation on the Japanese situation. I think the Communist success in China does make it more imperative, you might say the word "more imperative," to make a peace treaty with Japan quickly, if a suitable peace treaty can be made. Of course, a peace treaty made without the participation of certain great countries like the U. S. S. R. would be a blow at international cooperation; we'd have to recognize it as such. That is a serious loss. A peace treaty in which we had to sacrifice certain essential points would be disastrous; that is, if we made a peace treaty in which Japan could not maintain a viable economy, why, we'd be worse off than we were before.

There has been much reference to the American record in the Philippines as being our greatest asset. I think, in a sense, the American record in Japan is, or at least will be superseding the record in the Philippines. The record in the Philippines is a colonial record for the colonial period; we had very clean skirts in the colonial period. Asia is moving out of the colonial period into something else. Wittingly or unwittingly, we have tried to democratize Japan; there is no doubt about the effort and there is no doubt in the minds of any people that that is what we tried. If Japan cannot live economically, of course,

that great experiment will collapse and it will backfire in a tremendous way. I think it would be accepted as proof-positive that the American way, the American concept for Asia, is meaningless—enough Asiatics probably believe that already. We put ourselves way out on a limb in Japan sometimes without recognizing it, but we are out there just the same; we almost have to succeed.

Unfortunately, I think we would all agree, our position in Japan is definitely deteriorating. I think it has been deteriorating for some time. You do not, in the long run, create a strong democracy through military dictatorship and we must admit to ourselves that our methods inevitably have been those of dictatorship, we have told them what to do. There is, in the long run, a conflict between the ultimate objectives and immediate methods; that conflict has grown year by year. At a certain point it became so great, I put it in the past tense; it became so great that we began to lose ground rather than to gain ground in Japan; particularly with the Chinese victory, a Communist victory in China, I think we will begin to lose ground, we will accelerate in our losing of ground. I say this because the area in which we are losing ground, I think, is in the ideological one primarily. There is, after a period of years, a growing resentment on the part of the Japanese toward dictation, insofar as they have imbibed some of the ideas of democracy, that irritation is all the stronger; it is natural to people with democratic ideas, so far as those have gone across.

There is an idea in the mind of the Japanese that they must live with the Chinese. The Russians exert a negative pull there, Russia is highly unpopular, Communism is popular in certain groups in Japan despite the Russians, not because of them. In the intellectual vacuum that Japan is, I think the Japanese have quite successfully put them into two different compartments, Russia and communism. It seems incredible to us because we usually define communism in terms of what exists in Russia; that is quite different in Japan, they define communism as a theory; it is on a very high level. Russia is something else, they don't like Russia.

In the case of China, a Communist China exerts a different pull on the Japanese public, I think. They are in a state of mind where they have always been great admirers of China despite all they have done. Today, after their great defeat, I think they are in a position of being in greater admiration of China than ever before, despite the situation in China today. They feel that they must go along with China to a certain extent.

I think it would be a highly disastrous situation if we seemed to be creating a wall between Japan and China. Communistic China then would really exert a strong pull on the Japanese imagination. Communism is unquestionably growing in Japan, growing very fast, and I think we, ourselves, are the chief stimulus to its growth. The army of occupation is the type of thing that does produce that. Therefore, the Communist victory in China makes it necessary for us to move all the more rapidly than before.

The matter of trade has been brought up several times, in terms of whether or not trade is more vital to Japan or to China, I should say the answer is very definitely it is more vital to Japan. China is on a different time schedule, in fact, all our thinking about China and the rest of Asia is on a different time schedule from our thinking about Japan and Western Europe. Those are industrialized countries, as Mr. Kennan pointed out the other day, Japan is one of the potential areas for war power, for industrial power, it is in a different category from the rest of Asia, something that can be put into power terms within a matter of a year or two, Asia can only be put in those terms in a matter of decades.

I think in much of our discussion, when we said, "Asia," we meant Asia minus Japan, Japan is in that different time schedule. It makes no difference, really, whether the Chinese Communists succeed in 20 years to industrialize, or 10 years, they are out on a very long-range program, say 50 years if you want. China is not going to be a menace to us for decades. Japan has to live immediately, it is an industrial power, in Communist hands it would be a menace to us. Its economic power can build up China and can help us greatly in reviving the economy of the whole Far East. I mean this whole concept of production of rice in Siam and Indochina is premised on the supposition it can be exchanged for Japanese industrial goods, I believe. We have to succeed in Japan immediately; the Communists don't have to succeed in China for decades. From their point of view, I think the trade, insofar as it is an essential part of the Japanese economics, is more important to Japan than to China. Any feeling on the part of Japan that we are stopping that trade, would be disastrous to us on the ideological ground as well.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you one other question to complete your remarks. How do you envisage the position of Japan, say, in 1960 in the Far East?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Do you mean economically or politically?

The CHAIRMAN. Both, in terms of influence, economic and political.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Well, either Japan is going to live economically or else it is going to be a catastrophe. If she is living economically that means she is living on exports, now, not on so much of consumer goods as capital goods, the whole shift of postwar years has been in that direction and that is what the Asiatics want from Japan and Japan can provide these capital goods to the rest of Asia much more cheaply than anyone else can, in most categories. If it succeeds, why I should imagine in 1960 Japan would be a very important part of the economy of the whole Far East. It is pump-priming mechanism, actually that is the thing that gets the rest of the Far East going.

Politically, you have the question, Does Japan remain a peaceful nation, a nation attempting to carry out a democratic program or swing to something else, the problem is what else would it swing to? I think the history of modern Japan would indicate clearly there are only two possibilities in Japan, either a democracy or back to the totalitarian pattern. The whole try from 1890 on is a swing between the two, they have grown out of the modern Japan—a pull toward democracy, which many of us underestimate in Japan, and a pull toward totalitarianism which finally won out—they are products of the modern age. Japan is going to swing between the two. The question is what kind of totalitarianism; that is academic. Totalitarian means pretty much the same thing, I think in Japan it would have to be red because that is the only line possible; it would be red in the sense it had a Communist ideology and a great number of old army officers running it, they would flock into that, it would be the only solution for them. That would be a rather curious red, but it doesn't make any difference to them whether it is emperor oriented or something else. We have that choice, If the thing succeeded, we have a chance to keep it democratic and we have to work for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. COLEGROVE. Dr. Jessup, there is, of course, no doubt of the fact that the longer our military occupation remains in Japan, the more unpopular the United States becomes with the Japanese people. We have been extremely popular in Japan, the military occupation has been very fortunate under General MacArthur and I think that, from the very beginning, we had the great bulk of the Japanese people behind the American experiment in democracy, partly through the devotion that the Japanese people have to the emperor, because the emperor asked the Japanese people to give support to General MacArthur, and because of the wisdom of the administration that we have carried on in Japan. But a military government is always unpopular and no matter how far we go in relaxing the immediate direction of governmental affairs in Japan to any government like the Yoshida government, which is very favorable to the United States, nevertheless, we increase our unpopularity in remaining. On the other hand, I think that we might well keep in mind that the ideal procedure for a peace conference on the Japanese peace would be a conference of the 11 nations represented in the Far Eastern Commission, but if Soviet Russia will not cooperate in negotiating a peace in a conference of the 11 nations plus Japan, herself, making 12, then wisdom would seem to call for a conference of the ten remaining nations plus Japan. But one thing will have to be clear with reference to the American position and that is the problem of security in this great game of power politics.

In other words, does the United States have the basis to resist a Communist, or, again, a Russian invasion not merely of Japan but also of South Korea? If we withdrew without having it clear to the entire world that we are ready to immediately oppose a Communist invasion of South Korea, and again a Communist invasion of Japan, then, of course, we greatly have weakened our position and strategy, not only in the Pacific, but I think even in Europe, itself. In other words, South Korea today, its independence, is completely dependent upon the support of the United States; so it would be a great strategic mistake for the United States, even with an early peace treaty, to withdraw unless we may have taken a strong position with reference to strategy.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Decker.

Mr. DECKER. I imagine that a good many other people around this table have had the same experience that I had in getting it from the horse's mouth, namely, from General MacArthur, that he considered that military dictatorship, occupation, could be successful. He said a study of history disclosed it. I

haven't studied all that history but presumably he had. A study of history disclosed military occupations could only be successful for a maximum of from 3 to 5 years, and the occupation began in 1945.

The second thing I should like to say is I think it is very important that we should be prepared to follow the logic of democracy and to accept its hazards as well as the benefits that we so profoundly believe in; accept its points of weakness as well as the strength in which we have confidence, and that requires that the Japanese people should, at the earliest possible moment, get on their own.

The third thing that it seems to me is completely obvious, is one of the very critical points is going to be Japan's viable economy and how that can be achieved without opening up trade between Japan and China, it seems to me that is a question that can only be answered in one way.

Then there is a further thing that I think we ought to constantly keep in mind and that is the traditional fear which the Japanese have entertained toward the Russians. Whatever communism may do in Japan, whatever may be the result of the Communist success in China, I do not believe that they will eliminate from the Japanese mind and heart that rather deep-seated and well-founded distrust of Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. In consideration of a peace treaty with Japan, I think there are two major considerations, first, on the political level, the danger of our being responsible for or underwriting the Japanese political situation for a prolonged, indefinite, future period, and of the economic level, whether we can afford the nearly half billion dollars which we are being forced to contribute to their economy, a contribution which there is no evidence, no good evidence, it won't continue indefinitely; and secondly, the effect on the Japanese effort to make itself self-sustaining of our continuing to hold it back in that manner.

With regard to our occupation on the whole, although there have been numerous mistakes made or claimed to have been made, on the whole the occupation has on balance been quite successful, but there is no guaranty that at some near future time we may not begin to make serious mistakes; as Mr. Reischauer says, the situation tends to deteriorate.

When I was in Japan not very long ago, the general feeling as reported to me there by both Japanese and Americans was from the very end of the war the Japanese were waiting to see us get out, much as they had unexpectedly liked us in the beginning and up to the present time. Nevertheless, they were withholding all kinds of plans for the time when we got out. The question of reparations is pretty well settled by now but it was a great draw-back and hold-back on Japanese plans for at least 2 years. There are other restraints on them which our continued occupation and the lack of a peace treaty impose on them.

With regard to the militarily strategic position, it seems a very, very doubtful thing whether we would be in a position to hold Japan if we became involved in war with Russia, and whether we were able to hold Japan or not and in holding it be responsible for 80 million people, I think it is generally conceded that we'd have almost the same advantages in the islands like Okinawa, Tinian, and Saipan that we have in holding the islands of Japan. For that reason, I'd be strongly in favor of our moving toward a peace treaty with or without Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vinacke.

Mr. VINACKE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise questions rather than present a point of view. I think we are making certain assumptions in our approach to this question, one of which is that a Japan restored in her independence as a result of a peace treaty would automatically thereby have facilitated her access to the position which she must have economically if she is going to retain her economic position in Manchuria, in Korea, in north China, and in her trade relations with the southern Asian countries and with the Philippines.

Now, it seems to me that a great deal depends on the circumstances and the nature of the Japan which regains her freedom of action, as to the attitude or reaction of the peoples that are governed throughout the area, through the resumption of trade relations on terms regarded by the Japanese as suitable, or we would regard as suitable in terms of the economic objective of restoring Japanese power. I am afraid that under those circumstances, as well as under present circumstances, we would find ourselves in the position of being expected to exert considerable pressure in support of Japan on the states, it is not altogether clear yet whether they are prepared to make a peace treaty with Japan on the assumption that Japan is going to be a relatively economically strong Japan

and, therefore, not in an equal trading position with themselves, but really in a dominant trading position with themselves.

I wonder whether we won't be in a better position to approach a peace treaty with Japan on a basis of negotiation, if the negotiations were deferred to the time when we could look at Japan as a factor in far eastern politics, rather than a factor in the American-U. S. S. R. relationship, which is obviously, it seems to me, what we are doing now and what we have to do. I think we are in a much better position in the present state of our relationships with the Soviet Union to deal with Russia from Japan as a country that is not independent than we would be if Japan had regained her freedom of action.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coons.

Mr. COONS. My remarks are a little bit along the same vein Mr. Vinacke has just brought forward. Supposing that we shall have signed a treaty with Japan, we shall still be having the Japanese on our minds and hearts as a concern with reference to their economy, and there is still the real responsibility that, if not from governmental sources, at least from the capital markets of this country, equal amounts of money will flow toward Japan. Now, we know a good many of the countries of the whole Pacific basin have been concerned about the drift of policy on our part with reference to the revival of Japanese economic strength, a policy which we have had to take for various reasons, and quite legitimately. Would it not be wise for us, before undertaking the negotiation of the Japanese treaty and recognizing the concern that they have that we will either privately or publicly finance the Japanese hegemony and economy in the Far East, to do these two things we have talked about before. Namely, try to have some greater regional considerations of the flow of trade, and have a policy of economic aids such as Mr. Stassen has referred to, which are already a part of the record, to mollify that concern that is wholly legitimate on the part of many of our Pacific confreres.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ballantine.

Mr. BALLANTINE. Mr. Chairman, I think that many of us Americans, in thinking of a peace treaty, we have a concept that you conclude a peace treaty and then you settle everything for the rest of time and Japan will be off our necks, we no longer have any responsibility toward Japan. Now, I think that we have to conceive of this problem of a peace treaty as related to our ultimate objectives in Japan. I might express our ultimate objectives in these terms: We want to see emerge in Japan a country that will play a constructive part in the family of peaceful nations. In other words, that means we want a Japan that is going to be on our side. Now, if we want a Japan that is going to be on our side, we have got to make it to the interest of the Japanese people to be on our side. We want them to be democratic. Well, if we want them to be democratic, we want to convince them that that is a better way of life than the kind of life that they have had before.

Now, if we should conclude a peace treaty and Japan should be left completely defenseless and still have failed to achieve a viable economy, we will earn recriminations to the rest of time; if Japan should find herself defenseless against the Soviet Union, if Japan should find herself unable to make ends meet, that would certainly turn her into the hands of the Soviet Union. I think we must realize that we have a continuing responsibility even though we don't have any occupation forces, even though we don't have any tutelage carrying on we do have a moral position that we must continue to maintain in Japan, continue to help Japan to arraign herself on our side, to make it to Japan's interest to remain on our side. I just wanted to inject that note as an important consideration that we must keep in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyone else wanting to speak?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The dilemma of our position in Japan can be stated in a way slightly different from any statement made so far. Either we have a Japan which before a treaty or after a treaty is primarily dependent on the kind of American economic blood transfusions which General Marshall this morning said represented—I cannot recall exactly but something like an intolerable drain in the long run—something that has to be diminished, that kind of Japan either under continuing occupation or a free nation which may take on the very deceptive appearance of a reliable ally but in fact it represents a dangerous commitment of enormous American resources in a distant part of the world which may not be the decisive theater of power settlement.

The other kind of Japan is one—the only other possible kind of Japan is one which does not in fact depend on American subsidies. Such a Japan is inevitably going to be a bargaining Japan and inevitably a bargaining Japan must bargain with the counters it has at its disposal and among the most important of those

counters are its possibilities of friendly relations with a Communist Russia and a China under increasingly strong Communist control.

These are unpleasant facts but we have got to face them. There is no way of getting a really free and independent Japan that is not also a Japan capable of bargaining against us at our expense. There is no way of having a dependent Japan that is not an embarrassing drain on us. Those are the two horns of the dilemma and there is absolutely no other way of stating the facts.

In this connection—if I might add—in view of some remarks made earlier—very important ones I think—about the necessity of sufficiently disengaging yourself from an old situation before you commit yourself to a new situation, I think we ought to give a little more attention to the problem of Korea. Korea appears to be of such minor importance that it tends to get overlooked but Korea may turn out to be a country that has more effect upon the situation than its apparent weight would indicate.

I don't know how it can be done but I should feel very much easier about the prospects of success of American policy in the Far East as a whole if we can proceed or arrange our new relationship with Japan, whatever it turns out to be, by disengaging ourselves as far as possible from southern Korea.

It has been widely stated and I don't know if it is true but it may be open to criticism—that Korea is not a decisive strategic position. Certainly on the political side Korea is likely to be an increasing embarrassment. Southern Korea unfortunately is an extremely unsavory police state. The chief power is concentrated in the hands of the people who were the collaborators of Japan and therefore Korea represents something which does not exist in Manchuria and North China; namely, if the Chinese are willing to trade with Japan it is because they no longer fear that trade with Japan means Japanese strategic control.

Southern Korea, under the present regime, could not resume closer economic relations with Japan without a complete reinfiltration of the old Japanese control and associations.

Korea is a danger to us in other respects. I think that throughout Asia the potential democracies—people who would like to be democratic if they could are more numerous and important than the actual democrats. The kind of regime that exists in southern Korea is a terrible discouragement to would-be democrats throughout Asia who would like to become democrats by association with the United States. Korea stands as a terrible warning of what can happen.

Mr. QUIGLEY. Mr. Ambassador, I must say that I don't feel at all sure in my mind of the answer to your question but I would like to contribute a little from my experience. I suppose we could say that the program of the occupation has two main phases—as a police phase or military control phase, established in order that certain settlements might be reached and the other, a totality or reformist phase which might or might not have been undertaken but which we have undertaken and it seems to me that we leave out the question of international complications—that probably on both of these aspects of the occupational program we would have to say that the time has come to withdraw and to end the occupation.

I agree with Mr. Reischauer's estimate of the trend in the Japanese attitude toward us and wish there were time to discuss the reasons for it but of course there isn't time. The cost of the occupation is of course tremendous for us and it is also tremendous for the Japanese and it is to some extent delaying their economic recovery. I would think though that we are faced by a situation prompted by the new constitution which will require us to set up a condition in the treaty which the Russians will not accept and I don't know whether that is the main reason for their apparent determination to have a veto in the conference but that perhaps you could tell us, Mr. Chairman. We have in the constitution, as everyone knows, required Japan to disarm and to remain disarmed permanently and the Japanese probably don't have the unanimous feeling as to just what obligations that leaves us under but I know some factors of our public opinion would feel if we withdrew from Japan before this had been changed, that we would be failing to discharge a moral responsibility for their protection.

Perhaps other sectors of Japanese public opinion would say, we prefer you to withdraw even so, and how the majority would go I don't know but we are faced by a problem there which I would like to see discussed. I don't know what the answer to it is myself. Certainly it will take, if we do desire to have that provision of the constitution or otherwise, considerable time to put them back into the military column. So far there has been no public expression or any desire to see that constitution changed. Of course we know what the Japanese will do—I think we do—the moment we withdraw. It is more or less aca-

demic as to what we think about it except for the matter of the treaty and I don't know the answer. I like to throw it out as a question.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if I may ask you to make a jump to what you might consider the other side of China. We have had some discussion of India. As you know, Mr. Nehru will be here next week on his first visit to the United States. It will be an opportunity for the first time for an exchange of views between the officials of the United States Government and Mr. Nehru. There is a great deal of speculation as to what the future relationship should be between India and the United States. It depends in part I suppose on the evaluation of the future role of India in the whole Asian and far eastern scene and if you would give us your thoughts as to what is the position of India today—what it is likely to be—what the relationships of the United States to India should be—it would be extremely helpful and very timely for us now.

I think one of the characteristics of the Indian situation is that because of the recent emergence into independent life, we approach the problem of India without the background of the historic context which is considered in relations with Japan and with China. Mr. Talbot, I wonder if you would like to say something on this subject.

Mr. TALBOT. Thank you. I have found myself in an odd position at this table. In a very modest way for a few years I have been climbing stairs and walking down halls and knocking on doors and saying, "Remember there is India and in this world we have to think about that part too." Now things have happened elsewhere in Asia and we come to a moment when there is recognition of a country called India and there is a sudden jump and India is the new bastion of democracy and India is the place where our policy, which had so many difficulties in eastern Asia, can be retained and again I am afraid that I find myself in the minority in having to suggest that there are a great many risks in the Indian situation which have to be considered carefully before we take such a long leap in the very new political situation that you speak of.

There is an inherent regime and administration in that country which was badly fractured by participation and independence. It is too early to judge what is going on and how effective the new implementation or new administration measure may be.

In the matter of top personalities, Nehru, the Prime Minister, is the boy of the crowd. He was 20 years younger than Ghandi and younger than practically every other leader on the first team and yet he is 60 today, having led the sort of life which has given a great many men a degree of longevity than they might have experienced otherwise. Within the next relatively few years we have to count on a complete turn-over and wonder what sort of change will come after that.

The Indians still have the problem of their relations with Pakistan, with all the troubling difficulties existing there and the uncertainties as to what may develop over Kashmir. Economically, there is the basic problem of feeding people—the food which has to be met if the country is to be held together politically, and it is still quite uncertain as to how it will go on. They have had productive difficulties and a strike in capital and a strike in labor which has been plaguing them. They have had many other difficulties. Socially they are going through a period when the old stabilizing factor, the caste system, is breaking around the edges, and while social change is desirable, it does not always come at a steady pace and it is difficult to tell what will happen. Psychologically there is a great danger.

Somebody commented the other day that one of the features of a conference is when a man has an idea he usually tries to express it twice and I would like to say again I think I would be the first today to say that there is very great danger in putting Nehru in the position of being an American puppet. There is no better way to take the ground out from under him than that.

India is a risk, to my way of thinking, that is worth taking and in considering the problems we should think of it from India's point of view—if we were the Indian Government, where we would go to get aid—coming back to the food question which is primarily first. We, the Indians, must get food to carry over the next couple of years. If we don't, the political and economic integration will be set back, and where do we go? Wherever we can get it. We don't ask for ideology. We go to Argentina or southeast Asia and come to the United States. Because of pride we don't ask for grants but we know the United States has a surplus in grains and in some way our pride could be saved—we could make a borrowing arrangement in surplusses that would help us.

Again, from the Indian point of view, on the longer term, there is a great deal to be done in the increase of food production. Again there are many countries

to whom the Indians might go for aid. They will try to get what they can from Japan and see if they can get help in materials for wells and fertilizer from this country or if they can get it cheaper or better from European countries or Australia and in land reform, they will tackle it themselves.

Then there are a great many other prospects for economic viability. The Indians are thinking in terms: How will we stabilize our position? and not, How do we fit into the American-Russian picture, but how to get our own problems settled. In line with that thinking, there is a great deal of help Americans can give to the Indian invitation and there are large-scale utilities that are needed. They require not only capital goods but if you give them a big machine you have to train the people to operate it. There has been some stocking of the steel mills by the British Commonwealth, run by Indians, trained by Americans; similarly with aircraft and similarly with dam projects. There are small-scale businesses that Indians might invite.

The Government people don't like the attitude of their own capitalists and they would not object to seeing American or European business on a small scale there. They are proceeding with village and urban planning and again at their initiative I think they might very well derive some help. I don't know how wide it is known that the Gandhi spinning wheel, which is a symbol of India, has been considerably developed and refined by a Pole over the last 15 years.

The contributions of Americans on reconstruction have been helpful so long as they have been at the Indian invitation. Similarly in training of administrators they may want help and there may be a place for outsiders to help—university projects were mentioned—scientific training and others.

Returning to my role as an American, it seems to me that because of the present situation in a country like India, we don't want an American policy which says we must line up India on our side as an informational policy. As an American, I would like to see diversity in the world and people developing as Indians are developing, in their own way. We take the risk. It is a lesser risk than if we try to people India to our pattern and let them develop at their own way and if we get that diversity I think we may some day profit from it. As Mr. Lattimore says, we run the risk that India will turn against us, but where don't we run the risk?

In considering the problem of India, we have to think of Pakistan which is overshadowed by India. It is smaller and it is divided, one might say, hopelessly, geographically speaking, but confronted with other countries of Asia, it is a large and important country and I think in our fascination for a new role of India, we must be very careful in our treatment of Pakistan.

The Indian Prime Minister is coming to this country next week. It is very important and it is very good but we cannot forget that the Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, is going to Moscow in the next few weeks and there are suggestions that the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow is a direct reaction of sensitiveness and irritation at our having glamorized India and having ignored to some extent the potentialities of Pakistan.

I think that there is a great deal we can do to strengthen Indian society. I think we can help them strengthen it. There is a good case for doing it. India does represent potential stability and the more stable it is, the more likely it is that it would be nearer to us than the other side. We don't have to be suckers for the ECAPE plans Mr. Brown mentioned—so badly organized. On the other hand, the World Bank and others found it is possible to get good plans and support those and give the Indians a feeling they are putting up a businesslike proposition and we are doing business with them. That would encourage their morale and give them a sense of belonging to your world if anything does.

India's importance is growing if it can achieve internal stability. If all these risks I mentioned can be surmounted, the role it will play in south Asia will be very important and I think that, generally speaking, it is likely to be nearer our side than the other although certainly rarely entirely on our side.

As a final comment I might observe that last night a senior British official in Washington at dinner with the Indian Ambassador, Mrs. Pandit, was speaking about Kashmir. He over simplified the case and said Kashmir is the central problem in the world and not the atom bomb because if India and Pakistan go to war over Kashmir they would bring chaos resulting in communism in India which would extend to the Middle East, which would extend to Africa, and then would overflow Europe.

Later an officer of the Indian Embassy commented that that presentation had probably done as much to irritate Mrs. Pandit and presumably the Indian Government as anything could. He said: "We don't like the Kashmir problem. It is something that bothers us. We want Kashmir but we don't like the way the thing is shaping up; but if people would only help us—why don't they say, Here is some way to approach the Kashmir problem? That will help the Indians. Why do they have to say, You are the spearhead and the end of the weapon for European communism. If they looked at it from our point of view we might make progress.

Mr. COLEGROVE. May I ask a question at this point? What encouragement and aid is being given to bring Pakistan students to the United States to study? I know we have a large number of Indian students coming to the United States but probably very few Pakistan students. Is there any program for bringing young men and women from Pakistan to study in our universities?

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask Mr. Johnstone to answer that.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes, we are negotiating Fulbright agreements with Pakistan at the present time as well as with India and there are more Pakistan students in this country than one would realize and they have been sent over here by private resources and by the Pakistan Government, so I would say in general the flow of students to this country is increasing.

Mr. HEROD. From purely a business and industrial standpoint a few observations on India may be in order. I personally have not been in India for a little while. We have branches there naturally and we do a considerable amount of business there. As we look around Asia, with the exception of Japan, India has the greatest installation of electric power of any nation. It has a greater chance of stability than most of the other countries and having inherited an Indian civil service, it offers tremendous potentialities and although our observations indicate the virility or vitality of the individual Indian is not as great as the individual vitality of the Chinese, the Indians are going some place whereas the Chinese are going less rapidly, let us say, in a roundabout direction. They have many plans and the future of those plans seem to be possible and reliable but I don't think we want to go over the barrel with our so-called aid to everybody.

We are getting the psychology that we can extend our patrimony and they will have gratitude. They will not, in my opinion, and we will be dispersing our resources.

There are good prospects in India for credit extension and likewise for loans self-liquidated which they can have and if we approach India on a business proposition and try not to weave it into a division between Moscow and Washington, I think we will get further along.

Also, I think we should do a little clarification of our thinking. If our objective in India and Japan is constructive influence among peace-loving nations—maybe democracy is only a means to that end—it imposes on democracy certain standards—something which is a desire to peace and I think we want to go easy on trying to jam down the neck of people abroad some conception we have got—as to the way Hague in Jersey City or Huey Long in Louisiana or some other one of our politicians feel—that so-called western democracy is necessarily the best one to use or even democracy as we know it is the best instrument to use in some countries in different stages of development.

I think we should approach the Indian situation on the basis of here is a tremendous country which at the present time and for the foreseeable future has the greatest potentialities in Asia—second only to Japan—but I don't believe the potentialities are going to be realized. The realization of those potentialities I think will be dependent to a maximum extent upon the Indians themselves and when there is a great confidence and a great many in good positions.

The present laws and tendencies toward laws are such as to frighten capital—our private investment. They are far more socialistic or communistic in their verbiage than in some cases in the Communist countries. I think you will find a great deal of difficulty in attracting private capital, but just because private capital does not flow, I would urge caution on the part of government to become the instrument which in defiance of good business prudence says, for some altruistic reasons we will extend the loans and do these things to try to help out, because I don't believe they are appreciated.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In Mongolian, in the expression of gratitude, "a grateful man" is practically indistinguishable from the expression "a pack animal loaded with a burden."

Mr. HEROD. I understand there is no such word in Hindustani.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. As a minor note of warning with respect to Mr. Nehru's visit here next week, I would like to say that, in my opinion and it is an obvious remark, the Indian people are not a strong and practical people, in our definition as we define it here, and that despite Mr. Talbot's glowing presentation of the opportunities and the resources and the potentialities in India; nevertheless, within the last few months, when the International Bank sent a mission, a representative and assistants, out there to examine all of the loan possibilities and programs that the Indians were putting forth, after he came back I was told by the head of the mission that the Indians had actually put before them no important proposal which was a finished proposal; that is, it lacked some characteristic—each such proposal lacked some characteristic either of using the power that was to be generated in the area in which the power installation was to be placed, or some other practical element which made the proposal not a satisfactory one for the bank. They ended up by saying we will make some small loans in order to save face; but there is that danger that must be faced that the Indians want a great deal of support from us but there is the question of how fast we can go along in giving that support in a practical manner.

The second observation I wish to make is, with respect to Mr. Nehru. Mr. Nehru is one of the great spiritual forces of the world and his government is generally considered to be a democratic and a humanitarian government, and yet with respect to the three problems that they now have at issue with Pakistan—of Kashmir, of the refugee properties, and of the water rights in West Punjab—in each of those three preponderantly it seems to me the Indians are acting in an arbitrary manner—reactionary and arbitrary manner.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor Stassen.

Governor STASSEN. I just want to say that I associate myself with Dr. Talbot and others who say that we must not try to have the Indians take sides between the Communist question and ourselves. I think we must let that picture develop on pretty much their own pattern, and I also emphasize the view that you should try to get the greatest amount of the business approach into the situation, more of the underwriting of the point 4 and self-respect approach of the Indians. That is why, too, the Pacific pact thing, which might cause India to be outside of it, would be a very bad move, in my judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other comments on India? Mr. Decker.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, I was very much struck with the possible wisdom—I am not sufficiently informed to go further than that, but it certainly seemed to me to be something to be explored—the suggestion made by Dr. Reischauer that in the recognition of the Chinese Government very great care be taken to at least consult with India beforehand. We may not be able to synchronize any such recognition or to adopt entirely parallel courses, but that seems to me a suggestion that is very well worthy of exploration.

I might add that I have been rather surprised here in this conference that we have not had more discussion of the question of the parallel action between ourselves and Britain on other matters, particularly on the matter of recognition, and the more specific things we have discussed which pertain to China. I am very certain that is in the minds of the officers of the State Department and that every effort will be made to keep the great English-speaking peoples in step, which is, I think a very important objective to be sought.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vinacke.

Mr. VINACKE. One of the comments General Marshall made with respect to the Philippines, it seems to me there is to be association in advance of the action. We ought to keep clearly in mind that the Philippines is an independent state, through which and in cooperation with which we could act very effectively.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one question which I think you discussed more when I wasn't here, which was left a little bit hanging; I don't know whether any of you want to return to it, that was the question of the Chinese students in this country and the role which they might play. I don't know whether it was brought out in the discussion, but I think you all are aware of the fact that a bill is before Congress for the appropriation of $4,000,000 to take care of the Chinese students in this country. I believe that is well along toward passage. I think it hasn't been finally acted on on the floor yet but reported by both committees. Isn't that right Mr. Johnstone?

Mr. JOHNSTONE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. COLEGROVE. The question of Chinese students in the United States is really a very pressing question and it may be that $4,000,000 is altogether too small an amount. The shock that so many Chinese students in our universities and colleges receive, when they are confronted with the situation that their support from home was cut off, is extremely demoralizing and I fear that we didn't act as promptly as we should to help those young men and women. I think we should try to keep all of these Chinese students in our universities and, in fact, invite more to come over. At the same time, since they are here and are learning American technology and, again, learning something about our democracy, our program should encourage them, after they have completed their education in the United States, not to remain in the United States but to return to their native land and take part in promoting world peace and world prosperity by means of the technology and other parts of their education required in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I hope that Mr. Sargeant's reference yesterday to the possibility of the indoctrination of Chinese students in democracy will not be followed out in any way that I have ever heard that indoctrination would be conducted. You may recall that Chiang Kai-shek had an indoctrination program for his own officers, his indoctrination of intellectuals seemed to backfire pretty regularly; and any effort that we might make through government agencies to give Chinese students in this country more conviction of the supremacy of democracy, and so forth, couldn't be very effective if you know anything about Chinese students. There could, however, be an energetic effort through universities to try to make them a little more comfortable while they are here, that is an opportunity, it seems to me, for the Department to stimulate and energize educational institutions who would then do something in their best judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Decker.

Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, the missionary interests have strengthened and are planning further to strengthen the work of the committee on friendly relations among foreign students. We have new and very promising leadership in it and I think that that suggests a field where we can operate without fear of running into the dangers to which Dr. Fairbank rightly refers; that is to say, to increase the opportunities for the ordinary friendly contact of the students as persons with American persons and families, the more intimate side of American life. Now, there is, to my way of thinking, the key to the student problem; it is not necessarily in the amount of money that we have available for scholarships, that is important, but it does hinge on the opportunities that are given them for intimate personal knowledge of the deeper qualities of American life.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cleveland.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Chairman, if I am not mistaken, I think that provision for the transfer of $4 million from the China aid economic program to the State Department was included in the ECA program bill signed by the President a couple days ago; so I don't know whether the State Department physically has the money, but it is there.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnstone.

Mr. JOHNSTONE. We don't have the money but there are details to be worked out and a clearance with the Appropriations Committee to be worked out on the final transfer.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, the Department of State does not issue diplomas for courses of this kind; if it did, it would issue them to the members of the Department who have been sitting at your feet for great profit for 3 days. However, by virtue of the authority vested in me, I confer upon all of you the right of extension of remarks, with all of its privileges and immunities, and I hope that you will take advantage of it to send us in writing any further observations which you may care to make, and particularly I think we would find it very valuable if, in the light of our conversations here during these 3 days, you would take another look at the list of questions which were distributed and see whether you would care, either in yes and no fashion or in an amplified form, to let us have with reference to those questions the views which you would like to express.

I want to say for my own part and for the part of the Department, not only those who are here but those who will have an opportunity to study the record of our discussions, that we are extremely grateful to you for coming. It has been most helpful to us and I hope that we will have other occasions to meet with you and to discuss some of these problems as the scene develops. Thank you very much.

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index)

A

Page

Acheson, Dean ---- 1251, 1269, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1294, 1336, 1337, 1425, 1457, 1458, 1534, 1555, 1556, 1566, 1587
Acheson, George ---- 1435
Adams, Charlotte ---- 1513
Advisory Commission on Information ---- 1648
AFL. (*See* American Federation of Labor.)
Agriculture Department. (*See* U. S. Department of Agriculture.)
Air Force (United States) ---- 1395, 1398, 1411, 1430, 1440, 1442, 1444, 1447, 1448, 1460, 1462, 1463, 1500
Alcan Highway ---- 1326
Ali Khan, Liaquat ---- 1679
Allen, Edward W ---- 1313
Allen, James S ---- 1439, 1440, 1470, 1642
Allen, Raymond B ---- 1313, 1392
Allied Powers ---- 1358, 1362, 1395, 1453, 1530, 1613
Alsop, Joseph ---- 1296, 1305, 1344, 1346, 1347, 1363, 1364, 1365, 1366, 1367, 1370, 1373, 1374, 1375, 1376, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1387, 1388, 1391, 1392, 1401, 1402
Amerasia ---- 1392, 1393
American Bar Association ---- 1454
American Broadcasting Co ---- 1534
American Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai ---- 1579
American Civil War ---- 1509
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans. (*See* China Aid Council, Inc.)
American Embassy (Chungking) ---- 1304, 1435
American Embassy (Moscow) ---- 1525, 1531, 1536
American Federation of Labor (AFL) ---- 1292
American & Foreign Power Co ---- 1551
American Government ---- 1302, 1392, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1411, 1443, 1471, 1473, 1496, 1507, 1508, 1510, 1515, 1525, 1531, 1540, 1556, 1571, 1597, 1616, 1618, 1620, 1635, 1638.
American League for Peace and Democracy. (*See* China Aid Council.)
American Red Cross ---- 1551
American University (Peiping) ---- 1624
Americans for Democratic Action ---- 1539
Anderson, Marian ---- 1528
Anderson, Sherwood ---- 1514
Andrews, Clark ---- 1513
Appropriations Committee of the Senate ---- 1532
Architectual Forum ---- 1647
Armed Forces. (*See* United States Army.)
Armed Services Committee of the Senate ---- 1532
Army War College ---- 1551
Arndt, Christian ---- 1313
Asian Congresses ---- 1271, 1626, 1627
Asiatic Russia ---- 1328
Atkinson, Brooks ---- 1376, 1392, 1394, 1422, 1424, 1443, 1459
Atkinson, Henry A ---- 1513

Page
Atlantic Pact 1268, 1287, 1337, 1485, 1532, 1536, 1555, 1584, 1586, 1606, 1610, 1625, 1626
Axis 1532
Babcock, Mrs. W. R 1513
Bachman, Paul S 1313
Badger, Admiral 1503
Baker, Frank 1514
Baker, John Earl 1631
Ball. (*See* Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, and Ball.)
Ball, George W 1392, 1483
Ballantine, Joseph W 1551, 1576, 1577, 1590, 1592, 1607, 1627, 1636, 1649, 1650, 1662, 1637, 1676
Bangkok Conference 1505
Bank of China 1417
Bank of Indochina 1623
Bao Dai 1286, 1604, 1609, 1610, 1611
Barlow, Samuel L. M 1513
Barnes, Joseph 1314, 1320, 1322, 1326
Barnett 1634, 1635, 1636
Barr, Major General 1579
Barrett, Col. Davis 1442
Baumgartner, Dr. Leona 1513
Beard 1309
Bell Act 1285, 1604, 1607
Benes, President 1669, 1670
Benjamin Franklin Library (Mexico City) 1647
Bevin 1566
Bibby, Dr. Henry L 1513, 1514
Bidien, Charles 1338
Bishop, Shelton Hale 1514
Bisson, T. A 1511, 1512
Board of Economic Warware 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1358
Bohlen, Chip 1290
Bolsheviks 1316, 1317, 1530, 1613
Borcic, Dr. B 1514
Borkenau, Dr. Franz 1464, 1465, 1466
Borodin 1306
Bowman, Isaiah 1359
Bowman Mimeographing Co 1459
Bridges, Senator Styles 1531, 1532, 1533, 1534, 1535, 1536, 1551, 1538
British Commonwealth 1635, 1679
British Conservative Party 1651
British India Command 1424
British Labor Government 1267, 1651
Brodie, Bernard 1551, 1575, 1576, 1583, 1600, 1601, 1613, 1614, 1619, 1622, 1635, 1636, 1658
Brookings Institution 1551, 1628
Browder, Earl 1294, 1295, 1308, 1392, 1438, 1470
Brown, S. C 1271, 1627, 1628, 1631, 1634, 1636, 1641, 1679
Bryson, Hugh 1338
Buck, Pearl S 1313
Budenz, Louis Francis 1297, 1308, 1333, 1350, 1354, 1357, 1358, 1361, 1366, 1367, 1380, 1403–1410, 1418–1424, 1426, 1428, 1429, 1436, 1438, 1439, 1443, 1444, 1448, 1449, 1451–1455, 1457–1462, 1467–1469, 1471–1480, 1486–1489.
Bulkley, Dunton Paper Co. (NYC) 1528
Bullitt, Ex-Ambassador 1393
Burma Road 1383, 1440, 1621, 1639
Burmese Government 1604
Buss, Claude A 1551, 1579, 1619, 1626, 1627, 1648, 1649
Bussard, Father 1325
Butterworth 1260, 1266, 1273, 1289, 1351, 1500, 1554, 1565, 1568, 1569, 1570, 1571, 1572, 1573, 1578, 1630, 1638, 1639, 1658

C

Page
Cairo Conference 1485
Cameron, George 1313
Canham 1648
Capitman, William 1338
Carey 1292, 1293
Carlton House 1481
Carter, Edward C 1312, 1313, 1314, 1320, 1327, 1513
Case, Everett 1269, 1553, 1575
Catholic Digest 1322, 1325
C. C. Clique 1398, 1417, 1441
CDS (China Defense Supplies) 1449
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 1289, 1580
Chamber of Commerce (San Francisco) 1666
Chamber of Deputies (Italy) 1268
Chamberlain, Joseph P 1313
Chambers, Whittaker 1406
Chang Chun 1632
Chang Chunnganu 1417
Chang Fa-kwei 1368
Chao Ting Chi 1514
Chapman, Abraham 1338
Charles, Allen E 1313
Chen Cheng 1368, 1417, 1441
Chen, Miss Chi Yi 1514
Chen Group 1629
Chen, K. P 1368, 1384
Chen Li-fu 1398, 1441
Chen, Si-lan 1514
Cheng, Chen 1368, 1417, 1441
Chennault, Gen. C. L 1289, 1305, 1345, 1349, 1362, 1363, 1364, 1365, 1366, 1367, 1371, 1372, 1373, 1374, 1375, 1376, 1382, 1395, 1411, 1416, 1430, 1434, 1444, 1445, 1446, 1447, 1448, 1449, 1450, 1456, 1460, 1462, 1463, 1467, 1472, 1482, 1577.
Chi, Dr. Chao Ting 1514
Chiahua, Dr. Chu 1441
Chiang Family 1359
Chicago University 1551
Chiefs of Staff 1432, 1492
China Aid Act 1631
China Aid Council, Inc 1513, 1514
China Defense Supplies (CDS) 1449
China Mission 1359
China National Constitutional Convention 1518
Chinese Air Force 1516
Chinese Cabinet 1441
Chinese Communist Army 1268, 1360, 1371, 1377, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1398, 1407, 1408, 1430, 1460, 1485, 1494, 1497, 1562, 1580, 1582, 1608, 1670
Chinese Empire 1446
Chinese Fourth Army 1441, 1562, 1582, 1608, 1670
Chinese Nationalist Army 1257, 1360, 1371, 1377, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1398, 1412, 1430, 1494, 1495, 1497, 1499, 1502, 1516, 1525, 1536, 1543, 1582, 1583, 1659.
Chinese Nationalist blockade 1274, 1275, 1279
Chinese Nationalist Government 1254–1262, 1267, 1269, 1274–1295, 1359–1362, 1368, 1377, 1394–1401, 1406, 1407, 1412–1417, 1422, 1443–1452, 1460, 1462, 1484, 1485, 1492–1511, 1518–1535, 1540, 1552, 1565, 1567, 1569, 1570, 1573, 1577, 1579–1585, 1588, 1592, 1594, 1598, 1605, 1612. 1614, 1629, 1631–1633, 1641, 1654, 1657, 1659, 1660, 1662, 1665, 1667, 1669, 1670.
Chinese Navy 1492, 1494, 1500, 1510
Chinese People's Republic 1253, 1263, 1266, 1268, 1269, 1278, 1279, 1286, 1293, 1504, 1505, 1605
Chinese War Production Board 1397, 1441
Chou En-lai 1435, 1442, 1460, 1653, 1654, 1656, 1660

Page
Chu Chiahua---- 1441
Chun, Chang---- 1632
Chung, Dr. Arthur W.---- 1513
Chung, Hai---- 1579
Chung, Pai General---- 1577, 1633
Chung-hsi, Pai---- 1580
Chungking Cabinet---- 1440
Chungking Government--- 1367, 1368, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1398, 1424, 1430, 1431, 1440
Chunnganu, Chang---- 1417
Churchill, Winston---- 1349, 1413, 1465
Chu Teh---- 1432, 1530, 1537
Chu Tong---- 1338, 1514
Chuvakhin, D. S---- 1328
CIA. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency.)
CIC. (*See* Commerce International-China.)
Cincinnati University---- 1551
CIO. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
Civil War (United States)---- 1509
Clapper, Raymond---- 1302
Clay, Gen. Lucius---- 1539
Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, and Ball---- 1391
Cleveland---- 1591, 1631, 1682
Cobean, George C--- 1527, 1528, 1529, 1530, 1532, 1533, 1534, 1535, 1536, 1537, 1538
Cochran---- 1611
Colegrove, Kenneth C---- 1251
1253, 1277–1296, 1551, 1555, 1561, 1568, 1570, 1574, 1575, 1577–1579, 1581, 1596, 1602, 1606–1609, 1617, 1622, 1623, 1625, 1635, 1639, 1641, 1646, 1647, 1657, 1658, 1662, 1667, 1674, 1680–1682.
Columbia University---- 1281, 1551
Cominform---- 1613, 1614, 1615, 1619, 1620, 1624
Comintern---- 1465
Commerce International-China---- 1491, 1492
Committee for Far Eastern Democratic Policy---- 1334, 1338
Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate)---- 1265, 1275
Commonwealth Club (San Francisco)---- 1666
Communism in the State Department Committee (Senate)---- 1474
Communist International---- 1464, 1477
Communist Party---- 1252–1263, 1266–1279, 1308, 1316–1324, 1328, 1329, 1335–1337, 1348–1352, 1357–1362, 1366–1372, 1376–1383, 1390–1398, 1404–1470, 1476–1487, 1494–1497, 1503–1512, 1518–1545, 1551, 1552, 1563–1616, 1620, 1628–1647, 1653–1674, 1677, 1680.
Communist Party (Belgium)---- 1465
Communist Party (China)---- 1252–1263, 1266–1279, 1308, 1337, 1359, 1362, 1371, 1372, 1377–1383, 1390–1398, 1405–1422, 1424–1453, 1460, 1464, 1467–1470, 1476, 1477, 1478, 1484, 1485, 1494, 1497, 1503, 1512, 1518–1545, 1551, 1563–1616, 1620, 1628–1647, 1653–1674.
Communist Party (France)---- 1465, 1466
Communist Party (India)---- 1252
Communist Party (Japan)---- 1635
Communist Party (Republic of Vietnam)---- 1285
Communist Party (Russia)---- 1270, 1272, 1329, 1531, 1552, 1578, 1654, 1677
Communist Party (United States)---- 1357, 1378, 1404, 1428, 1471, 1475, 1476, 1477, 1486
Communist People's Republic of China---- 1253, 1263, 1266, 1268, 1269, 1278, 1279, 1286, 1493, 1504, 1505
Condon, Colonel---- 1436
Congress. (*See* United States Congress.)
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)---- 1292, 1293
Congress Party of India---- 1252
Congressional Library---- 1302, 1465, 1466
Connally, Tom---- 1265, 1275
Connelly, Matthew J---- 1474
Constitution. (*See* United States Constitution.)

Page
Cooke, Charles Maynard ---- 1491–1550
Coons, Arthur G ---- 1271, 1551,
1561, 1573, 1577, 1596, 1618, 1627, 1634, 1642, 1661, 1662, 1667, 1676
Corbett, Percy E ---- 1314
Cotton, Mrs. Elizabeth B ---- 1513
Council of Religious Education ---- 1275
Council for War Crimes at Nuremburg ---- 1539
Country Life Commission ---- 1309
Cowles, Mike ---- 1322
Crane ---- 1617, 1618
Cronin, Kathleen ---- 1338
Currie, Laughlin ---- 1313
Curtis, John L ---- 1313
Custa Republic ---- 1562
Dai, Bao ---- 1286, 1604, 1609, 1610, 1611
Daily Worker ---- 1295, 1307, 1308, 1316, 1376,
1377, 1391, 1392, 1419–1422, 1425, 1426, 1438–1440, 1453, 1463–1470
Daily News. (*See* North China Daily News.)
Davidson, Louis R ---- 1514
Davies, John P ---- 1435, 1436, 1446, 1483, 1504
Davis, Elmer ---- 1325, 1360
Davis, John P ---- 1514
Davis, Joseph S ---- 1313
Dawes, Ambassador ---- 1385
Dean, A. L ---- 1313
Deane, Hugh ---- 1338
DeCaux, Len ---- 1313
Decker, John W ---- 1267, 1551,
1568, 1569, 1570, 1573, 1578, 1579, 1582, 1592, 1593, 1607, 1608, 1609,
1613, 1616, 1626, 1627, 1634, 1641, 1657, 1658, 1660, 1674, 1681, 1682
Declaration of Independence (United States) ---- 1287, 1606
Delany ---- 1292, 1293
Democratic National Committee ---- 1657
Democratic Party ---- 1328, 1657
Dennett, Raymond ---- 1399, 1400
Denny ---- 1530, 1531, 1532, 1534, 1535, 1536, 1537, 1538
Department of Defense ---- 1506, 1556
Department of Industries (Czechoslovakia) ---- 1670
Department of Justice ---- 1455, 1532, 1640
Dewey, John ---- 1624
Dewey, Thomas E ---- 1438, 1443, 1470, 1531
DeWiart, Carton ---- 1349
DeWitt, Dale ---- 1514
Dickey, Colonel ---- 1436
Dies ---- 1299
District Intelligence Office (Third Naval District) ---- 1474
Dodd, William E ---- 1514
Dolbin, G. G ---- 1328
Dooman, Eugene ---- 1291
Dorn, General ---- 1436
Douglas, Dorothy ---- 1313
Drum, Gen. Hugh ---- 1432
Dubois, Cora ---- 1271,
1282, 1283, 1602, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1613 ,1614, 1623, 1628
Duyvendak, J. J. L ---- 1314

E

ECA. (*See* Economic Cooperation Administration.)
ECAPE ---- 1679
Economic Club of Detroit ---- 1521, 1522
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East ---- 1595, 1628
Economic Cooperation Administration ---- 1269,
1279, 1505, 1546, 1591, 1610, 1611, 1630, 1631, 1633, 1634, 1645, 1665, 1682
Eddy, Nelson ---- 1528
Eddy, Sherwood ---- 1514

Page
Educational Exchange Service---- 1642
Eighth Route Army---- 1394, 1441, 1562, 1582, 1608, 1670
Elliott, George Fielding---- 1302
Emeny, Brooks---- 1313
Emerson, Ruppert---- 1288
En-lai, Chou---- 1435, 1442, 1460, 1653, 1654, 1656, 1660
En-po, General Tang---- 1394, 1412
Epstein, Israel---- 1513
ERP---- 1631
Etheridge, Mark---- 1648
Evangelical Church---- 1315
Evatt, Dr---- 1566

F

Fact Finding Commission on China---- 1516
Fadeev---- 1317
Fairbank, John K---- 1273, 1275, 1280, 1513, 1527, 1531, 1532, 1534–1538, 1551, 1573–1576, 1587–1593, 1607, 1615–1620, 1626, 1646, 1650, 1651, 1664, 1682.
Fa-kwei, Chang---- 1368
Far Custa Republic---- 1562
Far East Spotlight---- 1334, 1336, 1338
Far Eastern Affairs---- 1499
Far Eastern Commission---- 1672, 1674
Farley, Miss Miriam S---- 1400
Fascists---- 1304, 1319, 1358, 1377, 1484
FBI (*see* Federal Bureau of Investigation)---- 1470, 1471
FEA. (*See* Foreign Economic Administration.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation---- 1470, 1486
Ferris, General---- 1435, 1447
Field, Frederick V---- 1307, 1308, 1313, 1377, 1392, 1419, 1421, 1422, 1438, 1443, 1469, 1470
Field, Henry---- 1313
First National Bank of Portland, Oreg---- 1551
Fisher, Galen M---- 1313
Fisher, G. W---- 1313
Fleming, Daniel J---- 1514
Flying Cloud (steamship)---- 1275
Foley Square---- 1352
Foreign Affairs Committee (House)---- 1631
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA)---- 1301
Foreign Relations Committee (Senate)---- 1265, 1275, 1473
Foreign Service. (*See* United States Foreign Service.)
Foreign Trade Council---- 1579
Forrestal Diaries---- 1276, 1338
Forrestal, James---- 1276, 1338, 1500
Forsyth, Margaret---- 1514
Fosdick, Raymond---- 1269, 1289–1291, 1552, 1553, 1555, 1560, 1565, 1568, 1570, 1575, 1577, 1580, 1589, 1593, 1595, 1601, 1638, 1639
Fourteenth Air Force (United States)---- 1395, 1411, 1430, 1442, 1444, 1447, 1460, 1462, 1463
Fourth Chinese Army---- 1441
Free China---- 1395, 1440, 1441
Freeman---- 1455, 1457
French Socialist Party---- 1613
Friedman, Julian R---- 1513
Friendly. (*See* Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, and Ball.)
Frink, Angelika W---- 1513
Fritchman, Stephen H---- 1513
Fujii, Shuji---- 1338
Fulbright Act---- 1285, 1604
Fulbright agreements---- 1619, 1680
Fulbright, J. William---- 1285, 1604, 1680
Fung, Yu---- 1637
Furnivall, L. S---- 1285, 1604, 1608
Fu Tso-Yi---- 1504

G

Gamble, Charles K---- 1313
Gandhi, Mahatma---- 1678, 1679
Gaus, Clarence E---- 1305, 1339, 1359, 1360, 1366, 1367, 1368, 1389, 1392, 1396, 1397
General Gordon (steamship)---- 1572
Gerbode, Mrs. Frank---- 1313
Gerlach, Talitha---- 1513
German Politburo---- 1464
Gesell, Dr. Arnold---- 1513
Gilchrist, Huntington---- 1313
Goglidze, S. A.---- 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332
Goodrich, Carrington---- 1313
Gottlieb. (*See* Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, and Ball.)
Government House (Hong Kong)---- 1536
Grady, Henry F---- 1313
Graham, Frank---- 1514
Graves, Mortimer---- 1313
Greenslade, John W---- 1313
Grew, Joseph C---- 1457
Griffin---- 1505
Grondahl---- 1648, 1649
Guggenheimer, Mrs. J. C---- 1514
Guilford, Elizabeth---- 1513
Hagelberg, Gerhard---- 1338
Hague Conference---- 1611
Hague, Frank---- 1680
Hai, Chung---- 1579
Han, Lu---- 1580
Hannegan---- 1657
Harris, Helen M---- 1513
Harris Memorial Foundation (Chicago)---- 1607
Harvard University---- 1260, 1261, 1271, 1281, 1288, 1528, 1531, 1532, 1535, 1536, 1537, 1551, 1589, 1591
Harvard University Press---- 1591
Haskell, Oliver---- 1514
Hay, John---- 1667
Hazard, John---- 1305, 1314, 1325, 1331, 1342, 1345, 1457
Hearn, General---- 1435, 1436
Heaton, Claude E---- 1513
Heaton, Mrs. Claude E---- 1513
Henderson---- 1286, 1605
Herald Tribune (New York)---- 1276
Hernandez, Amado V---- 1338
Herod, William R---- 1258, 1313, 1551, 1553, 1564, 1569, 1571, 1581, 1597, 1607, 1611, 1617, 1618, 1625, 1627, 1637, 1638, 1639, 1640, 1641, 1647, 1653, 1656, 1659, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1666, 1680, 1681.
Hersey, John---- 1313
Hickman, Dr. Emily---- 1514
Hinckley, William---- 1514
Hitler, Adolph---- 1272, 1530, 1532, 1557, 1577, 1583, 1669
Ho Chi Minh---- 1282, 1610, 1612, 1613, 1620, 1622, 1623
Hoffman, Paul G---- 1269, 1313, 1586
Holcombe, Arthur N---- 1261, 1551, 1597, 1624, 1626, 1661, 1668
Holland, William L---- 1314, 1399, 1513
Hoover, J. Edgar---- 1486
Hopkins, Harry---- 1393, 1414, 1450, 1453, 1664, 1665
Hopkins Papers---- 1450
Hopkirk, Howard W---- 1513
Horinouchi---- 1627, 1628
Hornbeck, Stanley---- 1291, 1359
House Committee on Foreign Affairs---- 1631
House Committee on Un-Ameircan Activities---- 1406
House of Commons---- 1267, 1465,
House of Representatives (United States)---- 1299, 1365, 1406
Howland---- 1648
Ho Ying-chin---- 1416, 1417, 1441

Page
Hsi, Pai Chung ---- 1368, 1578
Hull, Cordell ---- 1359, 1360, 1388, 1389, 1481, 1667
Humelsine, Carlisle H ---- 1293
Hurley, Gen. Patrick ---- 1393, 1397, 1431, 1443, 1453, 1457, 1524, 1525
Hu Shih ---- 1401

I

Imes, William Lloyd ---- 1514
India Congress Party ---- 1252
Indian Government ---- 1566, 1678, 1680
Institute of Current World Affairs ---- 1617, 1618
Institute of Pacific Relations ---- 1298, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1319, 1320, 1327, 1381, 1400, 1456, 1511, 1512, 1549, 1551
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) ---- 1313, 1456, 1551
Institute of Pacific Relations (Finance Committee) ---- 1314
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) ---- 1314
Institute of Pacific Relations (Program Committee) ---- 1314
Institute of Pacific Relations (Research Committee) ---- 1314
Intelligence Research Office ---- 1286
International Bank ---- 1609, 1620
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ---- 1593
International Broadcasting Division on Korea ---- 1646
International General Electric Co ---- 1551
International Missionary Council ---- 1551
International News Service ---- 1507, 1540
International Relief Committee ---- 1324
Isaacs, Stanley M ---- 1513
Isbrandtsen Steamship Line ---- 1258, 1259, 1274, 1567
Italian Chamber of Deputies ---- 1268
Italian Government ---- 1268
Italian Parliament ---- 1268
Jacoby, Annalee ---- 1513
Jaffe, Philip J ---- 1513, 1514
Japanese Army ---- 1440
Japanese Diet ---- 1638
Japanese Government ---- 1652
Japanese Navy ---- 1518
Jarden Matthewson Firm ---- 1566
JCRR. (*See* Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction.)
Jefferson, Thomas ---- 1287, 1606
Jessup Commission ---- 1293
Jessup, Philip C ---- 1253, 1255, 1258–1260, 1264–1266, 1269–1271, 1275–1277, 1290–1293, 1505, 1506, 1553, 1556, 1565, 1574, 1575, 1583, 1586, 1602, 1609, 1618, 1627, 1634, 1650, 1657, 1660, 1668, 1672, 1674.
Johns Hopkins University ---- 1551
Johnson ---- 1672
Johnston, Eric ---- 1400
Johnstone, William C ---- 1313, 1680, 1681, 1682
Joint Chiefs of Staff ---- 1432, 1492
Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (Jerr) ---- 1632, 1633, 1634
Jordan, Myra ---- 1314
Journal of American Surgeons ---- 1647
Judd, Walter H ---- 1393, 1456
Jung ---- 1610
JUSMAG ---- 1579
Justice Department ---- 1455, 1532, 1640

K

Kai-shek, Chiang ---- 1261, 1262, 1268, 1280, 1289, 1291, 1307, 1335–1338, 1346–1348, 1350, 1351, 1359–1364, 1366–1368, 1370–1375, 1382–1386, 1391–1393, 1395–1398, 1406–1408, 1410–1414, 1416–1418, 1425, 1429–1433, 1435, 1440–1445, 1447, 1450, 1456, 1457, 1460–1463, 1469, 1477, 1484, 1496, 1505, 1506, 1518, 1521, 1524, 1525, 1532, 1536, 1546, 1468, 1577, 1579, 1581, 1588, 1598, 1611, 1626, 1627, 1629, 1653, 1654, 1657, 1667, 1668, 1670, 1682

Page
Kai-shek, Madam Chiang---- 1362, 1366, 1373, 1414, 1415, 1416, 1478
Kates, Beatrice---- 1513
Kemp, Maude---- 1513
Kennan, George---- 1272, 1504, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1560, 1561, 1562, 1563, 1564, 1565, 1577, 1583, 1585, 1587, 1592, 1673
Khabarovsk Territorial Executive Committee---- 1327
King, Admiral Ernest J---- 1492, 1530, 1547
Kizer, Benjamin H---- 1261, 1262, 1275, 1278, 1281, 1400, 1551, 1568, 1579, 1593, 1595, 1607, 1614, 1625, 1626, 1640, 1659, 1668
Klein, Dr. Isadore---- 1513
KMT---- 1257, 1574, 1664
Knowles, Capt. Kennith---- 1314
Kobulov, A. Z---- 1328
Kohlberg, Alfred---- 1313, 1344, 1345, 1387, 1454, 1455, 1457, 1458, 1471, 1480
Koksovaret---- 1317
Kolyma, Road (Russia)---- 1323
Komsomols. (*See* Communist Party.)
Korean Army---- 1581
Kremlin---- 1532, 1562, 1564, 1584, 1611, 1613, 1650, 1656
Kung, Madam---- 1414, 1415, 1416, 1417
Kung Group---- 1415, 1416, 1417, 1441, 1629
Kung, H. H---- 1441
Kuo, Mrs. Moh Rio---- 1514
Kuomintang Government---- 1345, 1348, 1377, 1383, 1385, 1386, 1394–1398, 1406, 1408, 1410, 1414–1417, 1440–1442, 1444, 1462, 1484, 1485, 1524, 1525, 1566, 1573, 1578, 1590, 1596, 1600, 1631, 1632, 1640, 1651, 1656, 1657, 1667.
Kwantung People's Militia---- 1441
Labor Party (British)---- 1267
LaFollette, Charles M---- 1539
Lapham, Roger---- 1505, 1666,
Larsen, Roy---- 1393
Lash, Joseph---- 1514
Lasky, Victor---- 1294, 1295
Lattimore, Owen---- 1252, 1253, 1255, 1261, 1262, 1264, 1266, 1270, 1272, 1278, 1289, 1291, 1305, 1312–1314, 1320, 1323–1328, 1331, 1332, 1342, 1344, 1345, 1357, 1360, 1363, 1364, 1379–1382, 1390, 1400, 1427, 1445, 1456, 1457, 1479, 1480, 1551, 1561, 1563, 1572, 1578, 1590, 1592, 1593, 1600, 1610, 1611, 1613, 1615, 1619, 1622, 1624, 1662, 1668, 1676, 1679, 1680.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor)---- 1298, 1300, 1306, 1307, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1319, 1400
Lattimore Report---- 1224
Lauterbach, Richard E---- 1513
League of Democratic Parties (China)---- 1442
League of Nations---- 1485, 1660
Leahy, Admiral---- 1515
Lealtad, Catherine D---- 1513
Left Wing Socialists---- 1613
Legislative Reorganization Act---- 1353
Lehman, Herbert H---- 1481, 1487, 1488
Lend-Lease Administration---- 1325, 1621
Lend-Lease (Division of Soviet Supply)---- 1325
Lenin---- 1530, 1616, 1620, 1653
Lewis, Roger A---- 1513
L'Humanite---- 1465, 1466
Lie, Trygve---- 1663
Life---- 1393, 1647
Lin-fu, Chen---- 1398, 1441
Lim, Robert---- 1514
Lincoln, Abraham---- 1287, 1400, 1530, 1606
Lindeman, Edward C---- 1514
Lin Tso-han---- 1441
Lipper, Elinor---- 1321, 1322, 1324, 1325
List, Eugene---- 1528
Litchfield, Edward H---- 1539

Page

Little, Herbert S---- 1313
Long, Huey---- 1680
Longnin---- 1619
Loomis, Charles F---- 1313
Lovestone---- 1292, 1293
Lowrey, Lawson G---- 1513
Luce, Henry R---- 1313, 1422, 1467
Ludden, Raymond---- 1436, 1446, 1447, 1483, 1512
Lu Han---- 1580
Lutheran Evangelical Church---- 1315

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas---- 1264, 1539, 1596, 1637, 1638, 1649, 1651, 1652, 1674
MacNaughton, Ernest R---- 1551, 1576, 1579, 1617, 1637, 1638, 1640, 1650, 1659
Magnitogorsk Kombinat---- 1317
Malinin, L. A---- 1327
Manchu Dynasty---- 1301
Manhattan Project---- 1352
Mao Tse-tung---- 1253, 1268, 1282, 1304, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1521, 1537, 1596, 1653, 1656
Marco Polo Bridge---- 1460, 1516
Maritime Commission (United States)---- 1567
Marsh, Charles---- 1315
Marshall, George C---- 1253, 1254, 1256, 1270, 1271, 1359, 1450, 1452, 1493–1497, 1499–1501, 1504, 1521, 1525, 1528, 1536, 1551, 1555, 1570, 1577, 1579, 1585, 1586, 1589, 1596, 1616, 1628, 1631, 1641, 1642, 1646, 1650, 1651, 1654, 1656, 1659, 1661, 1668, 1676, 1681
Marshall Mission---- 1450, 1493, 1497, 1628
Marshall plan---- 1270, 1271, 1528, 1536, 1579, 1585, 1586, 1589, 1625, 1631, 1641
Martin, Charles E---- 1313
Marx, Karl---- 1290, 1562, 1563, 1587, 1588, 1600, 1616, 1654
Matthewson, Jarden---- 1566
May ---- 1648
May Day---- 1316, 1317, 1319
Mayflower Hotel---- 1553, 1602
Maynor, Dorothy---- 1528
McCann, Colonel---- 1289, 1578, 1580, 1581, 1582, 1583, 1610, 1611
McConnell, Francis J---- 1504
McFall, Jack K---- 1294
McGovern, William---- 1291, 1300
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred---- 1313
McNaughton---- 1274, 1288
Meaney---- 1292, 1293
Melton, James---- 1528
Mentnow (Republic)---- 1609
Merrill, General---- 1436
Merrell, Elinor---- 1513
Methodist Mission---- 1652
Michigan University---- 1539
Mikhailovich, General---- 1594
Miller, Clyde---- 1514
Miller, Justin---- 1648
Mindszenty, Cardinal---- 1533
Minh, Ho Chi---- 1282, 1610, 1612, 1613, 1620, 1622
Minnesota University---- 1551, 1583
MO ---- 1646
Moffat, Abbott Low---- 1313
Monlin, Chiang---- 1631, 1633
Moore, Harriet L---- 1313, 1314, 1320
Morison, George Abbot---- 1313
Morris, Lawrence---- 1313
Morris, Robert---- 1474
Moscow Conference---- 1485
Mountbatten, Lord Louis---- 1414, 1416, 1448
Moyer, Raymond---- 1631

Page
Mueshkov ---- 1317
Murphy ---- 1272, 1274, 1289
Murphy, J. Morden ---- 1551, 1562, 1575, 1578, 1579, 1595, 1608, 1610, 1611, 1613, 1617, 1622, 1627, 1637, 1638, 1639, 1640, 1646, 1660, 1675.

N

National Board (Politburo) ---- 1328, 1357, 1404, 1409, 1427, 1451, 1452, 1464, 1471, 1478, 1522
National Constitutional Convention (China) ---- 1518
National Geographic magazine ---- 1323, 1324
National Security Council ---- 1276
National Staff College ---- 1521
National Wallace for President Committee ---- 1336
Nationalist Chinese blockade ---- 1274, 1275, 1279
Nationalist Chinese Government ---- 1254–1262, 1267, 1269, 1274–1295, 1359–1362, 1377, 1394–1401, 1406, 1407, 1412–1417, 1422, 1443–1452, 1460, 1462, 1484, 1485, 1492–1511, 1518–1535, 1540–1552, 1565, 1567, 1569, 1570, 1573, 1577, 1579–1585, 1588, 1592, 1594, 1598, 1605, 1612, 1614, 1629, 1631–1633, 1641, 1654, 1657, 1659, 1660, 1662, 1665, 1667, 1669, 1670.
Naval Intelligence ---- 1473, 1474
Naval Military Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922 ---- 1514
Naval Military Arms Limitation Treaty of 1930 ---- 1514
Navy Department ---- 1474, 1492, 1493, 1498, 1500, 1507, 1508, 1512
Navy, (United States) ---- 1307, 1473, 1474, 1491–1493, 1498–1500, 1507–1509, 1512, 1518, 1522, 1523, 1530, 1535, 1539, 1547–1549, 1571.
Nazi Party ---- 1441, 1533
Nehru, Jawaharlal Pandit ---- 1252, 1258, 1272, 1586, 1589, 1593, 1594, 1600, 1613, 1615, 1678, 1681
Nelson, Donald ---- 1393, 1397, 1398, 1439, 1441, 1442
Nelson mission ---- 1441
New Delhi Congress ---- 1627
New York Herald Tribune ---- 1276
New York Times ---- 1267, 1273, 1376, 1394, 1398, 1469
New Yorker ---- 1601
Nicholas II ---- 1620
Niebuhr, Reinhold ---- 1514
Nikishov, Ivan ---- 1323
Nimitz, Admiral ---- 1500
Nine Power Pact ---- 1517
NKVD. (*See* Ogpu.)
North Atlantic Treaty ---- 1268
North China Daily News ---- 1567
Northern California World Affairs Council ---- 1512, 1551, 1666
Northern Chinese ---- 1306
Northern Korean forces ---- 1581
Northwestern University ---- 1251, 1277, 1551
Nosaka ---- 1635, 1636
Nov-Sibirsk oblast executive committee ---- 1328

O

Occidental College ---- 1551
O'Connor, Harvey ---- 1514
OEC. (*See* Office of Export Control.)
Office of Export Control (OEC) ---- 1595
Office of Intelligence Research ---- 1286
Office of Inter-American Affairs ---- 1644
Office of War Information (OWI) ---- 1323, 1324, 1325, 1360, 1379, 1381, 1592, 1644, 1646
Ogpu (Soviet Military Intelligence) ---- 1319, 1323
Osborne, Ernest G. ---- 1513
Owen, Mrs. Monica B. ---- 1513
OWI. (*See* Office of War Information.)

P

Pacciardi, Randolfo ---- 1268
Pacific Pact ---- 1287, 1337, 1552, 1586, 1626, 1627
Paddock, Robert L. ---- 1514
Pai Chung ---- 1577, 1633
Pai Chung Hsi ---- 1368, 1578
Pakistan Government ---- 1663, 1678, 1679, 1680, 1681
Pandit, Mrs ---- 1679, 1680
Parliament ---- 1267
Pearl Harbor ---- 1447, 1492, 1522, 1524, 1527, 1530, 1531, 1536, 1595
Pearson, Drew ---- 1393
Peffer, Dr. Nathaniel ---- 1254, 1255, 1262, 1270, 1278, 1281, 1551, 1611, 1612, 1614, 1620, 1621, 1622, 1627, 1639, 1660, 1663.
Pennsylvania (United States steamship) ---- 1527, 1530
Pennsylvania University ---- 1252, 1551
Pentagon ---- 1365, 1366, 1412
People's Communist Republic of China ---- 1253, 1263, 1266, 1268, 1269, 1275, 1279, 1286, 1493, 1504, 1505, 1605
People's Government of China ---- 1253, 1253, 1263, 1266, 1268, 1269, 1278, 1279, 1286, 1293, 1504, 1505, 1605
People's Militia (Kwantung) ---- 1441
Phibul, Premier ---- 1286
Philippine Republic ---- 1596, 1608, 1625, 1655
Ping, T'ai ---- 1282
Pittsburgh University ---- 1398
Plain Talk ---- 1457
Point 4 program ---- 1552, 1621
Politburo. (*See* National Board.)
Political Affairs ---- 1483, 1484, 1485
Pope, Arthur Upham ---- 1513
Powell, Clayton, Jr ---- 1514
Pratt, Eliot D ---- 1514
President's Cabinet ---- 1340
Press Club (Washington) ---- 1275
Price, Mildred ---- 1513
Progressive Party ---- 1336
Purcell ---- 1421

Q

Quigley, Harold S ---- 1551, 1583, 1600, 1618, 1656, 1668, 1677
Quirino, President (Philippines) ---- 1337, 1586, 1626

R

Randolph, A. Philip ---- 1514
Rankin ---- 1545
Reader's Digest ---- 1322, 1325
Red Army (Russia) ---- 1557, 1563
Red Cross (American) ---- 1551
Reese, Curtis W ---- 1514
Reid, Thomas ---- 1267
Reischauer, Edmund ---- 1259, 1260, 1262, 1266, 1267, 1278, 1281, 1623, 1627, 1628, 1648, 1667, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1681
Reischauer, Edwin O ---- 1551, 1608, 1620
Republic of Mentnow ---- 1609
Republic of Vietnam ---- 1285, 1604, 1608
Republican Party (GOP) ---- 1443, 1470, 1474, 1535, 1536
Reston, James ---- 1273, 1275
Reynolds, Robert ---- 1393
Rhee ---- 1586
Robertson, A. W ---- 1313
Robertson, Walter ---- 1494
Robertson, William S ---- 1257, 1261, 1262, 1278, 1551, 1664, 1665, 1668
Rockefeller, John D. III ---- 1551, 1609, 1618, 1639
Rockefeller Brothers' Fund ---- 1551
Rockefeller Foundation ---- 1618

Page
Romulo, Ambassador 1625
Roosevelt, President 1298, 1300, 1325, 1326, 1329, 1330, 1333, 1334, 1336–1338, 1341, 1342, 1346, 1351, 1357–1359, 1361–1364, 1366–1368, 1377, 1391, 1397, 1404, 1412–1415, 1417–1419, 1425, 1431, 1438, 1439, 1442, 1443, 1446, 1448–1450, 1453, 1454, 1456, 1457, 1460, 1463, 1470, 1623
Roosevelt, Theodore 1564
Roots, Miss Frances 1514
Rosinger, Lawrence K 1252, 1253, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1262, 1266, 1269, 1278, 1279, 1513, 1551, 1554, 1572, 1573, 1599, 1601, 1609, 1610, 1617, 1636, 1665.
Ross 1292, 1293
Rowe, David 1291
Rowell, Chester 1313
Rubio, Anna H 1514
Rural Reconstruction Commission 1631
Rusk, Dean 1499, 1504, 1648
Russell, Francis 1552, 1553, 1554, 1574, 1575, 1579, 1580, 1601, 1671
Russell, Maud 1514
Russian Foreign Office 1328
Russian Revolution 1319

S

Sacks, Michael R 1513
Sacramento Bee 1309
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce 1666
San Francisco Chronicle 1529
Sansom, Sir George 1314
Sargeant 1609, 1642, 1645, 1646, 1647, 1648, 1650, 1682
Saturday Evening Post 1434, 1436, 1452
SCAP 1622, 1635, 1639, 1640
Schuman 1566
Schuman, Frederick L 1514
Security Council. (*See* United Nations Security Council.)
Seeman, Bernard 1338
Selsbee, Elizabeth 1338
Senate Appropriations Committee 1532
Senate Committee on Armed Services 1532
Senate Committee Investigating Communism in the State Department 1474
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1265, 1275, 1473
Senate of the United States 1302, 1303, 1419, 1481, 1487, 1488, 1526
Senate Press Gallery 1355
Service, John Stewart 1436, 1446, 1447, 1483
Seventh Fleet 1492, 1522, 1530, 1539, 1543
Sforza, Count Carlo 1267,1268
Shahn, Tillie G 1313
Shen, T. H 1631
Sherman, Admiral 1500
Sherwood, Bob 1450
Shih, Hu 1401
Shipler, Guy Emery 1514
Shueh Yueh 1412, 1417
Shuji, Fujii 1338
Si-lan Chen 1514
Sino-American Agricultural Commission 1631, 1632, 1633
Sloane, William 1406
Smedley, Agnes 1338
Smith, Dr. Tredwell 1314
Smith-Mundt Act 1644
Snow, Edgar 1514
Socialist Party 1317, 1613
Society of Old Bolsheviks 1316, 1317
Somervell, General 1416, 1417
Sonfu 1438

Page
Soong Family 1359, 1360, 1366, 1367, 1372, 1373, 1375, 1385, 1414, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1418, 1431, 1448, 1461, 1514.
Soong, T. V. 1360, 1366, 1367, 1372, 1373, 1375, 1385, 1414, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1418, 1431, 1448, 1461, 1514.
Southeast Asian Revolution 1284, 1285
South Korean Government 1625
Soviet Asia Mission 1314, 1321, 1323, 1326
Soviet Military Intelligence (OGPU) 1319
Soviet Union 1256, 1268, 1274, 1282–1284, 1286–1288, 1290, 1292, 1301–1307, 1315–1318, 1323, 1325, 1327, 1328, 1330, 1331, 1337, 1338, 1358, 1359, 1362, 1377, 1381, 1393, 1401, 1408, 1461, 1484, 1492, 1496, 1503, 1504, 1507, 1508, 1517, 1519, 1522–1525, 1528–1532, 1534, 1537, 1540, 1552, 1557, 1558, 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565, 1573, 1574, 1576, 1581, 1583–1585, 1590, 1591, 1594, 1595, 1597, 1600–1606, 1611, 1615, 1620–1624, 1630, 1537, 1638, 1641, 1643, 1647, 1649, 1652–1655, 1660, 1662, 1663, 1665, 1667, 1669, 1670, 1672–1674, 1676, 1677.
Sparkman committee 1253, 1266, 1270, 1277
Spofford, William N 1514
Spotlight 1334, 1336, 1338
Sproul, Robert Gordon 1313
Staley, Eugene 1260, 1313, 1512, 1514, 1551, 1555, 1562, 1576, 1595, 1609, 1620, 1629, 1634, 1641, 1650, 1658, 1659, 1666
Stalin, Joseph 1304, 1321, 1327, 1331, 1358, 1393, 1530, 1558, 1562, 1608, 1612–1614, 1620, 1639, 1653, 1654, 1669
Standard Oil Co., N. J 1621
Starobin, Joseph 1376, 1392, 1422, 1424, 1425, 1438, 1469, 1470
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs) 1359, 1389, 1463, 1481
Stassen, Harold E 1251–1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1283, 1290–1294, 1551, 1553, 1582, 1583, 1586–1590, 1593–1597, 1600, 1627, 1630, 1652, 1654, 1668, 1671, 1676
State Department 1251, 1252, 1255, 1258, 1262, 1263, 1267, 1270, 1271, 1274–1282, 1289, 1290, 1293–1295, 1334–1336, 1359–1364, 1370, 1386, 1389, 1403, 1432, 1434, 1456, 1457, 1463, 1481, 1482, 1493, 1498–1501, 1504, 1505, 1508, 1523, 1525, 1526, 1532, 1534, 1539, 1551, 1553–1556, 1570, 1571, 1578, 1579, 1587, 1596, 1608, 1614–1616, 1619, 1628, 1635, 1637, 1638, 1642, 1644, 1645, 1648, 1649, 1651, 1654, 1655, 1662, 1668, 1681, 1683.
State Department (Far Eastern Division) 1554
State Department (Foreign Service) 1289
State Department (Plans and Policies Division) 1554, 1556
State Department (Public Affairs Division) 1642
State Department (white paper) 1290, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1432, 1456, 1523, 1526, 1534, 1579, 1587, 1615.
Steel, Johannes 1432
Steiger, Andrew J 1314, 1315, 1316, 1320, 1322, 1327, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332
Steiger, G. Nye 1313
Stewart, Mrs. Donald Ogden 1514
Stewart, Marguerite Ann 1313
Stewart, Maxwell 1514
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph 1349, 1350, 1360, 1362–1379, 1390–1399, 1404–1440, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1445, 1446, 1448–1450, 1453–1472, 1478, 1483, 1485.
Stilwell, Mrs 1407
Stilwell Papers 1408, 1432
Stimson, Colonel 1453
Stimson, Secretary 1302, 1322, 1359, 1450, 1522, 1528
Straus, Donald 1313
Struik, Dirk J 1338
Stuart, Leighton 1500, 1545, 1565, 1568, 1569, 1600, 1601, 1624, 1631, 1651
Su, Doctor 1514
Sues, Ilona Ralf 1338

Page
Sun Fo ---- 1470
Sun Yat-sen ---- 1282, 1301
Sun Yat-sen, Madam ---- 1414, 1415, 1438, 1470, 1478, 1483
Sung ---- 1629
Supplies, Priorities and Allocations Board ---- 1358
Sverdlova ---- 1316
Swan, Joseph E ---- 1513
Swanhauser, Miss Jane ---- 1514

T

T'ai Ping ---- 1282
Talbot, Phillips ---- 1258, 1271, 1272, 1551, 1581, 1582, 1588, 1591, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1615, 1617, 1618, 1627, 1663, 1664, 1667, 1668, 1678, 1681.
Tang En-po ---- 1394, 1412
Tarakanova ---- 1318
Tass ---- 1327
Taylor, Frank ---- 1513
Taylor, George E ---- 1273, 1313, 1551, 1574, 1582, 1592, 1594, 1601, 1615, 1616, 1620, 1634, 1635, 1640, 1649, 1650
Taylor, Telford ---- 1539
Tee-Van, Mrs. John ---- 1513
Teh, Chu ---- 1432, 1530, 1537
Tehran Conference ---- 1485
Teng, Mrs. Ying Chow ---- 1514
Terrill, Katherine ---- 1514
Tewksbury, Donald G ---- 1338
Thompson, Dorothy ---- 1392
Time ---- 1393, 1647
Times-Herald (Washington) ---- 1481
Tito, Marshal ---- 1537, 1552, 1563, 1594, 1596, 1619
Tong, Chu ---- 1338, 1514
Town Hall ---- 1504, 1527, 1528, 1531, 1534, 1535, 1538, 1539
Town Meeting Bulletin ---- 1535
Trans-Siberian Railway ---- 1517
Trident Conference ---- 1413, 1414
Trippe, Juan ---- 1313
Trotsky, Leon ---- 1524, 1608
Truman, President ---- 1275, 1333, 1357, 1370, 1388, 1493, 1515, 1523, 1525, 1671
Tse-tung, Mao ---- 1253, 1268, 1282, 1301, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1521, 1537, 1596, 1653, 1656
Tseng Yang-fu ---- 1397, 1398
Tsiang, Dr ---- 1660
Tso-han, Lin ---- 1441
Tso-yi, Fu ---- 1504
Tung Ting Lake Area ---- 1632, 1634
Turner, Clair E ---- 1513
Tydings committee ---- 1473

U

Un-American Activities Committee ---- 1406
United Nations ---- 1255–1257, 1262, 1267, 1268, 1273, 1275, 1276, 1308, 1337, 1505, 1517, 1526, 1528, 1532, 1544, 1545, 1551, 1552, 1555, 1559, 1565, 1569, 1570, 1585, 1586, 1595, 1609, 1620, 1628, 1654, 1658, 1660, 1662, 1663, 1665, 1667, 1668–1671.
United Nations (Charter) ---- 1273, 1532, 1559, 1569
United Nations (Economic Commission for Aid in the Far East) ---- 1595, 1628
United Nations (Food and Agricultural Organization) ---- 1595, 1620
United Nations (General Assembly) ---- 1570, 1609, 1658, 1660, 1667
United Nations (Security Council) ---- 1256, 1257, 1528, 1545, 1569, 1570, 1585, 1660
United Nations (World Health Organization) ---- 1595
United Service to China ---- 1579
United States Air Force ---- 1395, 1398, 1411, 1430, 1440, 1442, 1444, 1447, 1448, 1460, 1462, 1463, 1500

Page
United States Army 1275, 1289, 1333, 1359, 1365, 1367, 1370, 1448, 1497, 1500, 1551, 1638, 1649
United States China Fleet 1547
United States Congress 1254, 1261, 1301, 1486, 1493, 1494, 1504, 1507, 1550, 1556, 1584, 1618, 1644, 1645, 1652, 1653, 1659, 1661, 1681.
United States Constitution 1287, 1606
United States Declaration of Independence 1287, 1606
United States Department of Agriculture 1631, 1649
United States Fleet 1530, 1547
United States Foreign Service 1570, 1615
United States Fourteenth Air Force 1395, 1430, 1442, 1444, 1447, 1460, 1462, 1463
United States Government 1302, 1392, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1443, 1471, 1473, 1496, 1507, 1508, 1510, 1515, 1525, 1531, 1540, 1556, 1571, 1597, 1616, 1618, 1620, 1635, 1638, 1658.
United States House of Representatives 1406, 1411
United States Information Service 1509, 1531, 1642, 1649
United States Maritime Commission 1567
United States Naval Intelligence 1473, 1474
United States Navy 1307, 1473, 1474, 1491, 1492, 1493, 1498, 1499, 1500, 1507, 1508, 1509, 1512, 1518, 1522, 1523, 1530, 1535, 1539, 1547, 1548, 1549, 1571.
United States Navy Department 1474, 1492, 1493, 1498, 1500, 1507, 1508, 1512
United States Senate 1302, 1303, 1419, 1481, 1487, 1488, 1526
United States Steel Corp 1317
United States War Department 1334, 1370, 1406, 1415, 1430, 1432, 1482, 1652
University of Chicago 1551
University of Cincinnati 1551
University of Harvard 1260, 1261, 1271, 1281, 1288, 1528, 1531, 1521, 1535, 1536, 1537, 1551, 1589, 1591
University of Michigan 1539
University of Minnesota 1551, 1583
University of Pennsylvania 1252, 1551
University of Pittsburgh 1398
University of Washington 1551
University of Yale 1291, 1551
UNRRA 1526, 1551, 1571, 1579, 1607, 1621, 1626, 1633
USIE 1643, 1649
USIS 1612
U. S. S. R 1246, 1268, 1274, 1282–1284, 1286–1288, 1290, 1292, 1301–1307, 1315–1318, 1323, 1325, 1327, 1328, 1330, 1331, 1337, 1338, 1358, 1359, 1362, 1377, 1381, 1393, 1401, 1408, 1461, 1484, 1492, 1496, 1503, 1504, 1507, 1508, 1517, 1519, 1522, 1525, 1528–1532, 1534, 1537, 1540, 1552, 1557, 1558, 1561, 1562, 1564, 1564, 1565, 1573, 1574, 1576, 1581, 1583–1585, 1590, 1591, 1594, 1595, 1597, 1600–1606, 1611–1615, 1620–1624, 1630, 1637, 1638, 1641, 1643, 1647, 1649, 1652–1655, 1660, 1662, 1663, 1665, 1667, 1669, 1670, 1672–1674, 1676, 1677.

V

Vandenberg, Arthur H 1275, 1276
Vandenberg Diaries 1275, 1276
Vietnam (Republic) 1285, 1604, 1608
Vinacke, Harold M 1551, 1571, 1573, 1579, 1582, 1589, 1601, 1607, 1608, 1612–1614, 1619, 1621, 1636, 1641, 1647–1649, 1660, 1661, 1675, 1676, 1681
Vincent, John Carter 1305, 1329, 1331, 1332, 1342, 1344–1347, 1350, 1357, 1359, 1361, 1363–1367, 1369, 1370, 1372, 1373, 1375, 1376, 1380, 1382, 1388–1390, 1403–1405, 1410, 1423, 1425–1429, 1433, 1434, 1437, 1438, 1443–1454, 1456, 1458, 1463, 1464, 1467, 1468, 1470–1476, 1479–1482, 1488, 1499–1501.
Vishinsky 1663
Vital Speeches of the Day 1521, 1522
Voice of America 1644

W

Page
Wall Street ---- 1377
Wallace, Henry A ---- 1296, 1297–1402, 1403–1405, 1408–1413, 1417–1419, 1423, 1425–1430, 1433, 1438, 1439, 1443–1452, 1454–1462, 1467, 1471, 1472, 1475, 1476, 1478, 1480–1483, 1485, 1487, 1488, 1524.
Wallace Mission ---- 1404, 1405, 1409, 1426, 1427, 1433, 1444, 1457, 1458, 1459, 1471, 1476, 1478, 1480, 1488
War Department (United States) ---- 1334, 1370, 1406, 1415, 1430, 1432, 1482, 1652
War Production Board ---- 1393
Ward, American Consul ---- 1529
Warren, Susan ---- 1338
Washington Times-Herald ---- 1481
Washington University ---- 1551
Watts, Richard, Jr ---- 1338
Webb ---- 1553, 1554, 1555, 1556, 1557
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert ---- 1338, 1365, 1368, 1373, 1374, 1376, 1404, 1405, 1414, 1416, 1419, 1434, 1438, 1440, 1442–1444, 1447, 1448, 1450, 1452, 1453, 1456, 1472, 1476, 1477, 1492, 1495–1497, 1503, 1512, 1515, 1516, 1526, 1579, 1671
Welles, Sumner ---- 1294, 1295, 1313
Western Powers ---- 1613
Wheatley, George M ---- 1513
White, Lynn, Jr ---- 1313
White, Theodore H ---- 1393, 1406
White House ---- 1295, 1349, 1357, 1371, 1387, 1388, 1393, 1404, 1414, 1438, 1442, 1450, 1453, 1456, 1473, 1481
White paper (*see* State Department) ---- 1290
White Report ---- 1393
Wilbur, Brayton ---- 1313
Willauer, Whiting ---- 1448, 1450
William Sloane Associates ---- 1406
Williams, Albert Rhys ---- 1314
Williamson, Pauline B ---- 1513
Willkie, Wendell ---- 1322, 1326
Wise, James Waterman ---- 1514
Wise, Rabbi Stephen S ---- 1514
Wood, Herbert J ---- 1313
Worker ---- 1392, 1440
World Affairs Council of Northern California ---- 1512, 1551, 1666
World Institute of Current Affairs ---- 1617, 1618
World Trade Association (San Francisco) ---- 1666
World War I ---- 1516, 1523, 1613
World War II ---- 1287, 1302, 1325, 1523, 1524, 1533, 1564, 1605, 1613, 1618, 1667
World war III ---- 1532
Wright, Mrs. Louise L ---- 1313

Y

Yale University ---- 1291, 1551
Yalta agreement ---- 1525
Yang-fu, Tseng ---- 1397, 1398
Yat-sen, Sun ---- 1282, 1301
Yat-sen, Madam Sun ---- 1414, 1415, 1438, 1470, 1478, 1483
Yen, Dr. James Y. C. (Jimmie) ---- 1631, 1633
Yergen, Max ---- 1514
Ying-chin, General Ho ---- 1416, 1417, 1441
YMCA ---- 1616
Yoshida, Baron ---- 1640
Yoshida government ---- 1640
Young Communist League ---- 1317
Yu Fung ---- 1637
Yueh, Gen. Shueh ---- 1412, 1417

Z

	Page
Zacharias, Admiral	1536
Zaibatsu	1563, 1639, 1640
Zeserson, Fred	1338
Zimmerman, Walter	1616

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

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 6

JANUARY 24, 25, 26, AND 30, 1952

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

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CONTENTS

Testimony of—
Page
Vincent, John Carter 1683–1996
For appendix I see part 7, page 2286.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

RESOLUTION

Whereas testimony of John Carter Vincent was received in executive sessions of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on each of 3 days, January 24, 25, and 26, 1952; after which Mr. Vincent testified in public session on 4 days, January 30, 31, and February 1 and 2, 1952; and

Whereas repetition in public session of all of the testimony given in executive session was deemed undesirable, from the standpoint of efficiency and economy; and, therefore, substantial areas of the testimony given in executive session were not again traversed in the public sessions which followed; and

Whereas before the decision was made not to repeat all of the executive testimony at the public sessions, the question of making the executive testimony public was discussed with the witness and his counsel; and

Whereas the witness, John Carter Vincent, and his counsel after having opportunity to read the record of the aforesaid 3 days of executive sessions, stated on the record, during one of the subsequent public sessions, that they had no objection to the public disclosure of the testimony taken in executive session; and

Whereas the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary deems the release of such executive testimony to be in the public interest: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, That the testimony of John Carter Vincent taken at the executive sessions of the subcommittee on January 24, 25, and 26, 1952, be released from the injunction of executive secrecy, and be printed and made public together with the public hearings held on January 30 and 31 and February 1 and 2, 1952.

PAT MCCARRAN.
JAMES O. EASTLAND.
HERBERT R. O'CONOR.
WILLIS SMITH.
HOMER FERGUSON.
W. E. JENNER.
ARTHUR V. WATKINS.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL

The subcommittee met, at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, and Ferguson.

Present also: Senators Magnuson and Hendrickson; J. G. Sourwine, counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent is the witness, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please proceed, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, newspaper stories which preceded your return to this country indicated, quoting friends of yours, that your primary desire when you got back here was a full hearing which would give you an opportunity to clear your name in the public eye. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you appear here today because you want to be here and you want to testify and cooperate with the committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I do. I have confirmed that in letters to the committee, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. The committee will shortly give you an opportunity to make such statement as you want to volunteer. I would like to ask at the outset, so that the record may show: when you were subpenaed to this hearing, were you requested to bring certain documents?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have those documents with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You referred the letter of request to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have here a letter from the State Department of which a copy has been sent to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I have a copy, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it is respectfully suggested that for the purpose of saving time today the traverse of this State Department letter be saved and we will put the letter into the record of the public hearing and then go into detail as to the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. The gist of the letter is that the State Department has already furnished documents such as press releases and has declined to provide the others on the ground that to do so would inhibit free and frank expressions by Foreign Service officers.

Mr. VINCENT. May I say that I do have copies of those documents which the State Department sent. They had an extra copy made for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have, sir, any of the documents which the State Department did not include?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. They mention several which they say their files do not contain. Do you have any of those?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it that the State Department says, you mentioned there once, as to letters that they are not sending on here?

Mr. SOURWINE. I will read an excerpt from the State Department's letter, sir:

> With respect to the remainder of the requests it is noted that they call for a large number of internal documents of the Department of State. In many cases these are reports from the field. It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting by departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. It is equally important to protect the integrity of the internal memoranda in which views are exchanged in the formation of policy. The release of these documents would undoubtedly inhibit the free and frank expression of views by the officers of the Department. For these reasons, the request for these internal papers presents such serious questions of policy and principle that it has been felt necessary to refer the matter to the White House for reply.
>
> Your request for the loyalty file on Mr. Vincent has also been referred to the White House as required by the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the White House refuse?

Mr. SOURWINE. We have no word from the White House. This letter is dated January 22 and was delivered this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether the State Department also has ever considered the fact that, if these are held forever secret, you lose something, in that a man can falsely report and he is never called to task for it. It appears to me that that is a big thing in this question of reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I think right off the bat it puts this witness in a light that perhaps he should not be in, because it can be assumed that there is something there which may not be there at all, that they do not want to disclose with reference to this witness.

To my way of thinking that is a very unfortunate situation. What is more, their excuse for not giving us that seems to me the most flimsy in the world.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand, the witness has not claimed that these ought to be secret?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say, on the contrary, it is the State Department's statement, in the letter, that Mr. Vincent has requested the Department to cooperate in making the documents available.

Senator FERGUSON. So he wants these delivered?

Mr. SOURWINE. The situation was that the committee wrote separate letters to Mr. Vincent and to the State Department asking for the documents in each of these 32 categories. Mr. Vincent referred his letter to the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter we will have to deal with at a later time. I think the State Department has forgotten the principal point of this matter, that national defense, the internal security of this country, means more than anything internal in the State Department. If this country is to be protected and secured internally everything in every Department should be made available if necessary so that security may be obtained.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel now, Mr. Vincent, because of the writing of this letter that you cannot disclose to this committee the

contents of reports and so forth that you may have made to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as my memory would enable me to recall actions of mine, but I do not think I could disclose the contents of reports, sir, as an employee of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. It leaves you in the position that you really cannot testify on these matters?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as it is necessary to have those documents; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I know, but the contents of the documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I see what you mean.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are four documents mentioned here which the Department says do not appear in its records, thereby implying that they are personal to Mr. Vincent. I would like to ask about those four. One is referred to as a statement criticizing the statement of six members of the House Military Affairs Committee regarding Soviet intentions in the Far East. Do you recall such a statement, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir. I went over that and we looked over the statement of the six members but we found nothing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never made a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I never made a statement to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. The text of a speech made at a conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Hot Springs, Va.?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of making a speech there. I took part in panel discussions but nothing in the way of a formal speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is nothing in your files such as a copy of a speech?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. A statement of November 4, 1946, concerning General MacArthur. Did you make a statement on or about that date?

Mr. VINCENT. What date?

Mr. SOURWINE. November 4, 1946.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of making such a statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. The text of an address delivered by you at Cornell University, January 21, 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. That was made from notes, Mr. Sourwine, and I may say that it followed very closely a speech that I had made at Wellesly College which has been published in a little book by Rutgers Press, but the other speech made at Cornell was made from notes which I do not have but which may be in Tangiers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that speech reported?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was not reported to the press. It was a closed—not a closed—but not a meeting for the public.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I am jumping toward a conclusion for the purpose of saving time. Are you in your own opinion an expert on the Far East and far eastern affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say, I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spent a substantial part——

Mr. VINCENT. As regards different areas, my primary activity has been as you know China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spent a good deal of your life in China and in dealing with Far Eastern affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the purposes of this hearing is the committee satisfied with that brief qualification of Mr. Vincent?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I think it might be appropriate at this time to let you make any voluntary statement that you came here to make.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you, sir. I would like to read this statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long is it, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. It will take me exactly 5 minutes, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought if it were long we could get copies.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I have no extra copies of it except for this one. May I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

I have requested an opportunity to meet with you for two reasons. First, to repudiate under oath certain irresponsible but very grave allegations made against me before this committee: and secondly, to give the committee whatever assistance I may in the conduct of its investigation.

On August 23, 1951, before this subcommittee, Mr. Morris asked a witness, Louis Budenz, the following question:

Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz replied:

From official reports I have received, he was.

Insofar as the printed record shows, Mr. Budenz did not produce or describe the "official reports" to which he referred.

Later Mr. Morris again inquired:

Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

"Yes, sir," replied Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Budenz also testified that I was described "as being in line with the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it." When questioned as to his source, he answered:

That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel.

I have never met either Browder or Stachel, but it is pertinent to recall that Mr. Browder testified before the Tydings committee that he knew of no connection that I had with the Communist Party either directly or indirectly.

On October 5, 1951, Mr. Budenz again appeared before the subcommittee.

Mr. Morris asked:

Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party before this committee?

Mr. Budenz replied:

Yes, sir, from official communications.

Later, during this same hearing, Mr. Morris said that—

Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a naval intelligence officer, the fact that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on that fact.

Gentlemen, anyone, including Budenz, who before this subcommittee or anywhere else, testifies that I was at any time a member of the Communist Party is bearing false witness; he is, to put it bluntly, lying. I do not pretend to know what motives guide Mr. Budenz. In my own case, his motives seem to be clearly malicious. He has endeavored before this subcommittee to support his allegations by strained suggestions and devious insinuation.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am not a Communist and have never been a member of the Communist Party. I have never sympathized with the aims of communism. On the contrary, I have worked loyally throughout the 27 years of my foreign service career in the interest of our own Government and people. I am strongly attached to the principle of representative democracy and to our system of free enterprise. These being the facts, the members of the committee will appreciate, I am sure, how disagreeable it is for me to find it necessary to affirm my devotion to our democratic institutions because of unfounded allegations made by Budenz or anyone else.

We cannot dismiss the Budenz testimony as a "mistake." Any attempt through malicious testimony to cause the American people to lose confidence in their officials, or in each other, is in itself subversive to the interests and security of our country. When, as in my case, the official represents his country abroad, the effect may be doubly harmful.

I am in full accord with the objectives of this subcommittee. The internal security of the United States, now probably more than ever before in our history, is vitally important to all of us. Our American way of life is threatened from within as well as from without. But we cannot, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman, on November 9, defend democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies. And I wish to state, not as an official of our Government who has been falsely accused, but as a citizen who is deeply concerned for the welfare and security of his country, that irresponsible testimony such as Mr. Budenz is wont to give, might have its use in a totalitarian state but has no place in our American democracy.

Mr. Budenz has made other allegations concerning me which are equally untrue though less material. Other witnesses have appeared before your committee and made statements concerning me which are factually incorrect. Mr. Eugene Dooman's testimony concerning the formulation of a postwar surrender policy for Japan is most inaccurate; in fact, some of the policies which Mr. Dooman charges that I formulated were actually formulated under his chairmanship of the committee dealing with the problem, or by Governmental agencies in which I had no responsibility. Admiral Cook's testimony about my attitude toward making available certain ammunition to the Nationalist Government of China is in error. I wish to assure you that I am prepared to discuss and correct all such testimony and discuss any other issues which this committee may wish to consider.

But, gentlemen, my main purpose in seeking an opportunity to come before you has been accomplished. At the subcommittee hearings of October 5, 1951, Senator Smith is reported as saying:

Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz' statement and say "I am not a Communist." That draws the issue.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I now solemnly repeat: I am not and never have been a member of the Communist Party. I so draw the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to you, Mr. Vincent, that it is not alone membership in the Communist Party that constitutes a threat to the internal security of this country; it is sympathy with the Communist movement that raises one of the gravest threats that we have.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I think I said in here that I had no sympathy with the aims of the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, that raises a question, if I might ask. Membership in the Communist Party is pretty difficult to determine, is it not? You have had experience with Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would not say that I had enough experience with the Communist Party to know whether membership is difficult or not to determine.

Senator FERGUSON. To prove?

Mr. VINCENT. To prove whether one is or is not. I suppose one could prove very easily that one was a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is easy for a person to prove——

Mr. VINCENT. One could prove it I suppose by producing a Communist Party card.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you not realize that many members do not carry a card, never have a card?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true as far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. You are now saying in this testimony that you are not a card-carrying member and you have never been a member in any form, directly or indirectly, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, sir, and that I have had no sympathy with the aims of the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, as an expert on the Far East do you recognize that communism is one of the major problems in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly do, Mr. Sourwine, and have recognized it for some time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever seen or read the Communist Manifesto, by Marx and Engels?

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen it but have not read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever seen or read State and Revolution, by Lenin?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever seen or read Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, by Lenin?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't ever heard of that last one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read Foundations of Leninism, by Stalin?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall having heard of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read Problems of Leninism, by Stalin?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, authorized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution, third American edition?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any edition?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, a resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, I haven't. My reading of Communist documents has not been broad.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be able to characterize those documents as a group at all? Do you know what they represent?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say from the titles, and I can only speak from the titles, that they represented the Communist point of view on various and sundry subjects, as you mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be all you know about them?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be all I know about them and I would gather that from the titles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I have here a list of names of a number of individuals.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to simplify the questioning. The first question we want to ask is, Did you or do you know the individual named?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Second, Did you know, under any other name, an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Third, if so, what were your associations with the individual? Fourth, did you know at any time that the individual was connected with the Communist movement? If so, in what way, to your knowledge, was the individual connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understand that is the information we want about each one of these persons?

Mr. VINCENT. And you will ask the questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. If agreeable with you I will simply read the names and it is intended to cover the first two questions: Did you or do you know the individual named? Did you know, under any other name, an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you say "No" when I read the name you are answering "No" to both the questions?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you say "Yes" we will go into it. A "No" answer is a denial that you ever knew the individual or that you ever knew an individual whom you now believe to be the person referred to.

Solomon Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were your associations with Mr. Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. I have a piece here on Solomon Adler because I anticipated that, if you let me. I don't like to be inaccurate as to dates because there are many people.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Mr. VINCENT. These are notes, Mr. Chairman, that I made in anticipation because I haven't too good a memory for dates and people that I have known in the dim, distant past.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those notes made by yourself?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they all made by you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I had assistance in getting the facts together.

The CHAIRMAN. You had assistance in getting the facts together?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, from Mr. Surrey.

The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you that assistance?

Mr. VINCENT. People in the State Department who would look up and find out as to when and where I had met somebody if I did not recall the circumstances. You see, many of these concern places and people whose service has not exactly coincided with mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now here testifying as to Mr. Adler and the others on the basis of your own recollection, as refreshed?

Mr. VINCENT. As refreshed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not simply telling the committee this is what somebody in the State Department says is the facts?

Mr. VINCENT: No (reading): I first met Mr. Adler in Chungking and that was in 1942, early 1942. It may have been late 1941. He came out as an assistant to Dr. Manuel Fox, who died some months later, in the matter of administering our interest in the Chinese currency stabilization loan, I think, of about half a billion dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what department or authority did he come out?

Mr. VINCENT (reading): He came out under the authority of the Treasury Department, Mr. Chairman. I at that time was counselor of our Embassy in Chungking. In the course of the natural business between the Embassy and these people with the Treasury Department I did see Mr. Adler from time to time during that year and a half.

I was transferred back to Washington and did not see Mr. Adler

again until sometime in 1945. I think he made a trip home. I saw him once or twice then on business connected with China.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1945 or 1946, I wouldn't be sure (reading): He at that time had become Treasury attaché. I then went to Bern as Minister. I did not see Mr. Adler again and have not seen him since that time. At Bern I remember receiving a letter from him in which, and I do not recall the exact contents, he asked me to give some estimate of his work at Chungking when he was associated there with me.

I did and replied that he had been, as far as I knew, a conscientious and hard-working Government employee and that I had no reason whatsoever to question his loyalty. I assumed from the character of his request that at that time, although I cannot testify to this, he was being examined by the Treasury Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was when?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in either late 1948 or early 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Mr. Adler is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I have heard from someone that he is teaching school somewhere, but I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who introduced you to Mr. Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say that Dr. Manuel Fox introduced him because he came after Fox.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever heard of him before that?

Mr. VINCENT. I had not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have told the committee your full associations with him?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that Mr. Adler was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have reason to believe that he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know or have any reason to believe that he is or ever was in the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Adler in Bern asked you to make some kind of a statement as to his loyalty; is that true?

Mr. VINCENT. As to his work at Chungking.

The CHAIRMAN. And at that time did he give you a reason for his request or why he was seeking such a statement from you?

Mr. VINCENT. He did, sir. He indicated that the Treasury Department wanted a statement from me on his work because he was—here I must testify completely from memory—that investigation was being made into his work while he was in Chungking.

Senator FERGUSON. Loyalty? Work?

Mr. VINCENT. His work. I would not say the letter said "loyalty"; but I do not deny it might have.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, you were familiar with the loyalty program?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I heard of it but had no familiarity.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that different departments were making inquiry about the loyalty of their members?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. This indicated to you then that this was a loyalty investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. It indicated to me that there might have been a loyalty investigation into Mr. Adler, but my testimony on him was solely as to his work and my estimate of his work in Chungking.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not put in the reply that you believed him to be loyal? Did you not cover the question of loyalty?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would have to have a copy of the letter which I don't have to be able to answer that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think they would have been able to judge his work on other questions? They would have been able to determine what he had accomplished and so forth as far as being a representative of the Treasury?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I will say this: That I would have, and may have been perfectly free to say that I had no reason while Mr. Adler was working in Chungking to question his loyalty.

The CHAIRMAN. Right there, Senator, may I interrupt you? I am called away and I believe we might suspend for a few minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Let the record show that the committee will recess until 3 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 3 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH. We will come to order.

Mr. Sourwine?

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we were discussing various names. I assume that the witness does remember the questions but it has been some time; this is an unusually long recess. The mention of the name is intended to ask these two questions: Did you or do you know the individual named and did you know under any other name an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to?

I believe we had completed the discussion of Mr. Solomon Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Robert W. Barnett?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were your associations with Mr. Barnett?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my recollection (reading): Mr. Barnett came to China, Chungking, in 1942 with the OSS I believe on a very short mission. It's the first time I ever saw Bob Barnett. Then later, back in the Department of State after the war was over he came into the State Department to do some kind of economic work. He was never to my knowledge—I was in the Far Eastern Division and my associations with him were not close, primarily because our jobs were of a different character. He was an economist and still is in the State Department.

I saw him here some days ago in the State Department, but as I say he was a man that I met casually from time to time and may have been on committees where I served, but I didn't know him very well ever.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is not a social acquaintance of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. Never. I don't know his wife, I don't think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that Mr. Barnett was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I ask you that question with regard to Mr. Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. You did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time know that Mr. Adler was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Joseph Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first hear Mr. Adler's name connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I never have heard his name connected with the Communist Party, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. You are not acquainted with the testimony taken by this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am not.

Senator SMITH. Where is Mr. Barnett? Is he here now?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was not his father a missionary to China?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was. Most of those boys were sons of missionaries to China.

Senator SMITH. I used to know his father years ago.

Mr. VINCENT. It is surprising how many of them are sons of missionaries and some day somebody can write a book on the influence of the sons of missionaries in the Far East.

Senator SMITH. This is a man who used to go to student conventions down in South Carolina during the summer?

Mr. SOURWINE. Joseph Barnes?

Mr. VINCENT. Joseph Barnes. Let me see. I have never had much association with Mr. Barnes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I know him. I just want to see the dates.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is Mr. Barnes?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Barnes, when I knew him, was a newspaperman. Yes; here I have a note jotted down (reading): I met Mr. Barnes first in 1942 when he came to China with Wendell Willkie. Subsequently on my return to Washington I probably saw Mr. Barnes once or twice. I met him socially in New York, I think, on one occasion. I have forgotten what the occasion was.

I have never met Mrs. Barnes, and we were not close associates.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was the last time you saw him, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. The last time I saw him, my guess would be, was in 1946, but it might turn out to be 1947. It was at some time when I was in New York making a speech and there was a dinner afterward and he was present after the dinner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been in his home?

Mr. VINCENT. Never.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he married?

Mr. VINCENT. I am told he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Adler is married?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Adler is married, or was married the last time I met him, because he told me he had a new wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever met his wife?

Mr. VINCENT. No; but I think I met her when he came back here.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was the last time he visited Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection would be that he was here some time before I departed for China and after the war closed, which would be in 1946, more likely than not, if that is when he married. I don't know when he married, but at the time I learned he was married was the last time.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was the occasion when he told you he had a new wife?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I think I either had lunch with him or saw him at the Cosmos Club, because I have a recollection of seeing his wife and was introduced to her as the new wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who else was present on that occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say offhand that it was just the three of us, although my wife may have been present. It was one of these downtown lunches.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give the party or did he?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did. I think I did because I don't think he is a member of the Cosmos Club. I may have told him to meet me at the Cosmos Club.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is Mr. Barnett married?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he is, but I don't know his wife, at least I don't recall his wife, although I may have met her.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, when you said you met Mr. Barnes at a dinner in New York, under what auspices was that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. I think he came in after dinner some time.

Mr. MORRIS. You said you were the speaker?

Mr. VINCENT. No, no, it was at a time when I was in New York making a speech and stayed on in New York. I was never given a dinner.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was the speech given?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been my speech before the National Trade Council or it may have been the speech I made before the foreign affairs group.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. VINCENT. I made one. I was up there three or four times during the year. If I could recall I would tell you which one. I didn't usually go up to New York except to go up there to make a speech. I couldn't afford going up there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any correspondence with Mr. Barnes?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that Mr. Barnes was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Dr. Norman Bethune, B-e-t-h-u-n-e.

Mr. VINCENT. I can't, Mr. Sourwine, recall knowing Mr. Bethune, yet the name rings a mild bell somewhere. If you could possibly aid my memory in what connection I may have known him I might be able to contribute something.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, I could not, naturally, make a suggestion in that regard.

Mr. VINCENT. Then my testimony is that I don't recall Mr. Bethune and yet there were so many people in and out of Chungking and in and out of my office that Bethune was somebody that I might have known.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I refresh your memory?

Mr. VINCENT. You could.

Mr. MANDEL. He was the head of a hospital in China. He is engaged in medical relief in China.

Mr. VINCENT. Chong Chow? There was a hospital that I was in myself in 1937. In Peking? There was the Peking Medical Society Hospital, a Rockefeller hospital, but I don't recall any association with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is T. A. Bisson, B-i-s-s-o-n.

Mr. VINCENT. I have a note here on Bisson, I think, if I may refer to it as to when I met him. The note here, well, could I say I have a recollection of meeting Bisson on several occasions? The one that is the most prominent in my memory, the others have faded away, is the IPR conference in Hot Springs in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Mr. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Bisson at that time was connected with the IPR in some capacity and wrote for the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. What has been your association with Mr. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. Very slight indeed, as I have put here. As I say (reading) : I may have met him on half a dozen occasions. These people came into the office on one matter or another. I don't know a Mrs. Bisson, I don't know where he lives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say you don't know Mrs. Bisson or a Mrs. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know a Mrs. Bisson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he married?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you corresponded with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. At any time?

Mr. VINCENT. There may have been an exchange of letters during 1944 or 1945 during that period when I was connected with the IPR, but as I say I don't recall any correspondence or the nature of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have not corresponded with him at any other time?

Mr. VINCENT. No. He may have written me a letter while I was in China and I didn't know him. He may have written while I was consul in Dairen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't say that I did. But people would write you letters wanting to know what is going on in Mukden or Dairen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where you met Mr. Bisson, first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it you don't recall how you met him?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Bisson didn't make much of an impression on me, but I do know he was at the Hot Springs conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the last time you saw him?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to testify that was the last time, that was the last time according to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not make any appointment with him for a meeting at any subsequent time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. I never sought him out.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you met he sought you out?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my testimony based on my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or a chance meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Earl Browder?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never met to my knowledge Earl Browder.

Mr. SOURWINE. I forgot to ask the standard question, sir, with regard to Mr. Bisson. Did you know at any time that Mr. Bisson was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Evans F. Carlson, C-a-r-l-s-o-n.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever meeting Evans Carlson at all. I have heard of him and understand he wrote a book, which I never read, but I never met him to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. We come now to the first of what will, before we are through, be many Chinese names. I do not speak the language, and I must apologize for what will undoubtedly be improper pronunciation in many cases.

Mr. VINCENT. May I apologize, too, that there are going to be many of these names that will be Chus or Yus or Yings and Yangs who just not through a lack of desire to be helpful but that I won't be able to place unless you can place them for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. The first name I have here is with my inadequate pronunciation, I will spell it—C-h-e-n H-a-n-s-e-n-g.

Mr. VINCENT. Chen Han-seng. I don't recall meeting Chen Han-seng. I knew him by repute in China, a professor there, but I don't recall my meeting with him. I want to continue that testimony. You meet many Chinese and I want to be quite frank with you that Chen Han-seng may have been in a meeting at Chungking or when I was in Kunming or he may have come here to the State Department with other Chinese but I don't recall meeting him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he was a professor?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought he was down in Kunming.

Mr. SOURWINE. About what time was that?

Mr. VINCENT. It would be the time when I was in China, which would be the last time, 1941 to 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the present connections of Chen Han-seng?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that he was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name I have here is Ch'ao Ting Chi, C-h-'-a-o T-i-n-g C-h-i. Or perhaps the Chi should come first?

Mr. VINCENT. Chi. I have met Chi (reading) : I met him in Chungking when he was acting as assistant to Dr. H. H. Kung, K-u-n-g, when he was assistant to Dr. Kung and also was connected with the Stabilization Board. I saw him from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him before that?

Mr. VINCENT. I had not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who introduced you to him?

Mr. VINCENT. My thought would be that the logical person would have been either Dr. Kung or Manuel Fox, who was head of the Stabilization Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether it was the logical person who did introduce you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not remember whether it was the logical person.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know, in other words, who did introduce you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I met him frequently on social occasions in the house of General Chiang Kai-shek because he was also a man who was there at any social functions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet him socially elsewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. Probably in Chinese homes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you yourself have any personal social intercourse with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in your home or you in his?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have been in Dr. Gauss' home. We invited Chinese over to have lunch once a week and he may have been one of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any correspondence with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any correspondence with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall when or approximately when is the last time you saw him?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I haven't seen him since I left China, but if he came to the States and was around at large functions such as they have in New York, Dr. Chi may have been there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a doctor?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I think we called him Dr. Chi because he is a professor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a Ph. D?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. I fell into the "Doctor" because he was a professor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall when you last heard about him from anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you heard anything from him in the last 2 or 3 years?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I haven't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know and do now know that at any time Dr. Chi was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. Judging by the closeness he had with Chiang Kai-shek and H. H. Kung I would certainly have thought he was the opposite.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would be surprised to know that he was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. The association that I had with him was in Chungking where he was almost a habitue of Chiang Kai-shek and Kung's home.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read any of the hearings of this subcommittee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have read those that were particularly pertaining to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you find out which were the ones particularly pertaining to you?

Mr. VINCENT. By going through and picking up my name; that on August 3 Mr. Bundez testified about me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who would tell you that?

Mr. VINCENT. Who would tell me? The books are up in the State Department, the three books that are now——

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought that in going through the books you had checked the subject index and read the pages where your name appeared?

Mr. VINCENT. I did in the first and in the second.

Senator FERGUSON. Has the State Department anyone working on these records?

Mr. VINCENT. What records?

Senator FERGUSON. Our hearing.

Mr. VINCENT. The books are all down there in the legal adviser's office and I have access to these books.

Senator FERGUSON. But is there any particular person working on it down there that helps you?

Mr. VINCENT. Several people who helped me, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is assigned to the task for instance?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no particular person assigned to the task. It is a matter where if we are trying to recollect a situation or something.

Senator FERGUSON. I meant for instance you say that in the legal department. Is there anyone there that reads them daily and digests them and gets in touch——

Mr. VINCENT. With me?

Senator FERGUSON. Or with somebody?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or with whoever is mentioned?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know of anybody like that?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. The gentleman with you is your counsel?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Private personal counsel?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Not from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you want the committee to understand that you have, with respect to the first two volumes, read those portions and only those portions which were listed in the index as pertaining to you and that with respect to the third volume you have read some portions pertaining to you and that you have not read the fourth or subsequent volumes yet?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I would want the committee to know that I read, I believe, the volume of August 23. Is that not the date? I ran through, I believe, the index afterward of that one. How thoroughly I ran through the index of the next two volumes as they came out printed, I wouldn't know.

I read pretty thoroughly the volume of Admiral Cooke and the volume in which Mr. Budenz made his second appearance. There are many of the volumes that I have not gone through.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how many volumes there are as of now that have been released?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I don't, Mr. Sourwine. I would guess about 12, but that may be wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you reading them in manuscript form?

Mr. VINCENT. If you mean by manuscript form——

Mr. SOURWINE. Typescript.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not reading the printed record? It's typescript, in the form of duplication.

Mr. VINCENT. Typescript, but I had already read the August 23 one, but when the typed one came out I probably referred to the typed one because the typed one has some of the exhibits in it, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should point out that if you are reading them in the—that is, the 8-by-11 or 8-by-11½ size sheet, there is no index in those, so I have been talking about something that is nonexistent. When I was talking about the index I was talking about the printed volumes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I am aware that the printed volumes have an index where my name occurs.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have not had occasion, or for some other reason, you have not read those through?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not read those through. I have no doubt the first volume, which I think carries the Budenz testimony, I again went through it to the extent of trying to see what exhibits were put in.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you read the original through? You are not saying that you read all of the originals through or all of the original through?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I do not recall seeing any mention in any of the volumes I read of Dr. Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I meant. There is mention of him in those hearings.

Mr. VINCENT. If I saw it, it didn't ring a bell.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name I have here is spelled Chou En-lai, C-h-o-u E-n-l-a-i.

Mr. VINCENT. It is pronounced Chou En-lai, the present Premier of Communist China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I did know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us to what extent and what was the nature of your association?

Mr. VINCENT. If I may check here because I would like to refer to these notes on him. Yes, here I have jotted down these things as exactly as I can (reading) : As consul of the American Embassy I met Chou En-lai in Chungking several times. He was the representative in Chungking of the Chinese Communists, who had their seat of government at Yenan. He had an official position recognized by Chiang Kai-shek, and it may have been a reception at Chiang's where I first met Chou.

I recall also meeting him at a luncheon in the home of an American manager of the British-American Tobacco Co. Also I met him when he made a courtesy call on Ambassador Gauss soon after Gauss' arrival and my own in the summer of 1941.

The last time I saw him was before my departure for the United States in May 1943. He called at the Embassy as I was leaving to meet George Atcheson, who was taking my place as chargé at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see you are using your notes for that?

Mr. VINCENT. Other things reminded me of that. I got the date for that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you attempted in those notes to set down, and have you attempted here in telling us about it to tell us about, all of the instances and occasions when you met Chou En-lai?

Mr. VINCENT. I have named so far all of the instances that I can recall of meeting Chou En-lai. I have another note here that (reading) my few conversations with Chou concerned conditions in the areas of North China occupied by the Communists. That would have been a logical topic of conversation, in particular, the conduct of military operations against the Japanese.

The information obtained by me and by other officers of the embassy was of considerable value to us in evaluating conditions in an area to which we had no access whatsoever at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he go out into the field himself?

Mr. VINCENT. Chou?

Senator FERGUSON. Would he?

Mr. VINCENT. He could have gone to Yenan from time to time. Whether he did pass backward and forward I don't know, I would think he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever had any private conferences with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I never had a private conference with him in the sense of the two of us getting together. He was at the luncheon I speak of. He came and told me goodby when I was leaving. He met Atcheson. I recall it was made the subject of a memorandum, what he was describing as conditions, and I believe it must have certainly been submitted to the Department after my departure because I would have been home.

Senator FERGUSON. That would have been one of the papers sent by you, an appraisal of the Communists after you conferred with him?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been a paper sent by me. To the extent

it would have been a factual report, it would have been what he had to say. I was more of a reporter than I was an appraiser.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have a conference with him at which you were the highest-ranking State Department official present?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, Mr. Sourwine, I wouldn't call them conferences, but I was probably the highest-ranking State Department official when the British-American Tobacco man gave his luncheon, which was the first time I recall meeting him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was not referring to that kind of conference.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that the conference when he came over and called to say good-by, that Atcheson was senior to me. We were both the same grade, but he had assumed charge of the Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was not Dean Acheson but another?

Mr. VINCENT. George Atcheson, now dead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever participate in a conference with Chou at his headquarters or at his office?

Mr. VINCENT. I never was in his office that I can recall at all. I never made a call on him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever participate in a conference with him at his home?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have been in his home one time when he was there, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever participate in a conference with him away from American official premises and not in connection with some social gathering?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, Mr. Sourwine. I can give an all-embracing answer, I never had a secretive conference with Chou. That wasn't your question, but I can assure you I didn't have that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Never.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you answered fully in your opinion the question of whether you know that at any time he was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I know he was connected with the Communist movement.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have known that since you first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. When I met him he was a known Communist representative.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his official title, if you have it?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall, Senator, but it was something of the order of Representative of the District Government of Northern Shensi, and the Chinese were careful not to use the word Communist too much.

You see, the theory was maintained always, even the theory, that there was an official connection between Chungking and Yenan during those years.

Senator FERGUSON. Even the Communists let that be believed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. As a matter of fact, the Communist Army was described under the same general designation as other armies in China, I have forgotten, something like the Eighth Route Armies or Sixth Route Army. The Chinese Armies were given the designation "Route Army."

Senator FERGUSON. The Communists wouldn't say "Communist Army," they would refer to it as the Eighth Route?

Mr. VINCENT. They would refer to it as the Eighth Route Army or the Shensi Border Army or some title of that kind. No, officially it was not called the Communist Army.

Senator FERGUSON. Was their government called the Chinese Government?

Mr. VINCENT. No, it was called, I think—you are speaking now of what, the Chinese?

Senator FERGUSON. Chou's Government.

Mr. VINCENT. I think the Chinese would have referred to it as Shensi. Shensi is the province where the Yenan Government was located. We called it the Chinese Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not deceived from the fact that it was the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not, I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. So he was known to be a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. They were not, as I say, I recall quite distinctly myself that they were not agrarian democrats.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you refer to them as agrarian farmers?

Mr. VINCENT. I never did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will go on to the next name here, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Sourwine, may I ask one question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you describe the nature of the luncheon with the British-American Tobacco official?

Mr. VINCENT. I can describe it only that there were probably half a dozen people there and the only person I can remember is the host himself and the fact that Chou was there, which made quite an impression on me. The host was Dick Smith, Richard Smith, manager for the British-American Tobacco Co.

Mr. MANDEL. Is it not rather curious that you should be invited together with Chou En-lai? What was the purpose of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. Smith spoke Chinese. I didn't speak Chinese well. Chou speaks some English, and he was up there on business, just that kind of luncheon. I would like to be able to tell you that it had some special significance, but it didn't have any special significance to my mind.

I had, as I say, met Chou at a reception of Chiang Kai-shek before this luncheon, and he had made a courtesy call on Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that luncheon at the home of the host?

Mr. VINCENT. At the home of Mr. Smith.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name I have here would be, I imagine, Chu Teh, C-h-u T-e-h.

Mr. VINCENT. It's Chu Teh. I know he was head of the Chinese Communist Army. He never came to Chungking to my knowledge, and I was never in Yenan.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is O. Edmund Clubb. I have these alphabetically, which accounts for the intermixture.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I put it down so I could be sure and tell you where Clubb's service and mine were together.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say that we deliberately put these alphabetically so there would be no possible parallelism.

Mr. VINCENT. Mine are not in alphabetical order (reading): I find that I first met Edmund Clubb when he was assigned for language study in Peking in 1929. I was a student of Chinese there from 1928 to 1930, and our duties overlapped for about 9 months.

Our paths have crossed from time to time during the next 10 years, but we did not have service together again until 1941. In 1941 I stopped in Shanghai briefly on the way to Chungking as a consul and was later assigned to Chungking. I wanted to make a note that he was in Shanghai for those few months I was there.

I was a consul and Mr. Clubb came to Chungking after the people were let out of Shanghai by the Japanese, and he was assigned by the secretary to the Embassy in Chungking in 1942. I recall that his job at that time, which he was briefly there, was looking after our relations with the OWI activities.

Subsequently he was assigned to Tihwa in Sinkiang. Mr. Clubb served briefly with me in the Department during the period of 1943–44 before he was assigned to Vladivostok. I believe he was home on leave once before I left for Switzerland in 1947 and I no doubt saw him when he was about the Department.

That is a record of any associations I have had. I may add there that I have had associations with these younger officers from time to time. My association with Clubb probably has been less than with any others through no design of my own, but we just haven't been together in places and socially we never have been close.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it that with regard to what you have just testified to, it was more from notes than from memory. You are stating facts that you would not be expected to remember, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. For instance, if I did not have these notes, if I had not looked up Clubb's history, I would have forgotten that Clubb was there when I went to Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you testified to is merely what the records of the State Department show?

Mr. VINCENT. And what his duties were. His duties in Chungking were with OWI.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would you find this kind of information in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I found this in the record of Edmund Clubb's biographic career.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the Official Register of the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. As to when he was at a certain place?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But that would not tell you that you met him at this spot and at this luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. No, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall the last time you talked with Mr. Clubb?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, Mr. Sourwine, but I would imagine it was when he was home on leave in between his coming from China and going to Vladivostok.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he now?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know he is here in the city.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen him since you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't seen him since I got back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember corresponding with him?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I do not remember corresponding with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk over the subject of communism with Clubb?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe I ever did talk over the subject of communism with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel that you have a real knowledge of communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I have a real knowledge of communism in the sense that I have seen it operate in China. As I indicated this morning, I am not a student of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice you haven't read even the manifesto?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. How can a man be a Foreign Service officer these days and not know about communism?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, that is a very difficult question, but I have to answer the question that I am not.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering how a man could be a Foreign Service officer and not understand communism.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I just have to reply that it's part of my education that has been limited. While I was in the State Department I was busy and haven't had an interest.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am talking as part of your work. How can a man really do the job as a Foreign Service officer in the State Department and not know communism, not know what it is?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean not be a student of it?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, know what its aims are and what it is doing and everything.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say, Senator, that, without having read these books that were listed this morning, that just by watching it in China I had a pretty clear idea of what its aims were.

Senator FERGUSON. What books have you read on communism or Marxism?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't recall of any that I have read. I probably have read one, but I can't recall one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it is possible that some of your acts, some of your statements, may be in line with this philosophy and you not know it?

Mr. VINCENT. Some of my acts?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. If you have not been a student of it, could it be that you may be paralleling it in some lines and not know it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is certainly a possibility. As I say, I have to testify that I have not made myself a student of communism, and I have not read to any extent at all Communist books.

Senator FERGUSON. So your knowledge of communism is based on how the Communists acted in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. To follow Senator Ferguson's thoughts, have you read the two publications of the House Un-American Activities Committee on communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the American Bar Association brief on communism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know they had a brief on communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name I have here is Frank V. Coe, C-o-e.

Mr. VINCENT. Frank V. Coe, I recall, was in the Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon; I forgot to ask you the question whether you knew at any time that Mr. Clubb was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now go ahead with Mr. Coe.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Coe, I recall, was an officer of some sort in the Foreign Economic Administration during the—well, how long he was there I don't know, but I was there from October until January—that is, October 1943 into January of 1944 when he was over in the Economic Cooperation Administration under Mr. Crowley. There is where I first met him, and as far as I can recall it's the last I met him until he, I believe, was a delegate at the IRP conference.

I could tell quickly whether or not he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only one you ever attended?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only one I ever attended.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you yield for a moment?

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Senator would pardon me for just a moment?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the end of your association with Coe?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the end of my association with Coe.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You were asked a question by me about the Communists, and you indicated that you had knowledge of what they were, what they stood for and did in China, and then you were asked the question about Mr. Clubb, I think it was, as to whether or not you knew he was a Communist or sympathetic to the Communists, and your answer was "No."

Would you state for the record what were the principles of the Communists in China at the time you knew them and if they changed? Tell us what the change was.

Mr. VINCENT. The principles of the Communists as I first knew them in China, and that would have to be dated 1941, the announced ones were the unification of China and resistance to Japan. I am speaking now of what were their announced objectives.

At that time when I was there——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean unification because China was separated?

Mr. VINCENT. Separated because Manchuria was in the hands of the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean unification under Chinese Communist domination, do you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was coming to that. They were not announcing they wanted unification under Communist domination. It became

apparent, as you went along and became more conscious of what they were doing in China, that their objective was not simply the creation, as they professed, of a unified democratic China, but it was a China which insofar as they could bring it about would be controlled by them.

In other words, it was a matter of wanting power. It was not so clear at that time how they meant to get the power.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was true; and their desire and objective was clear even as early as 1940 to you, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1940 I would have not reached that conclusion so quickly, because in 1940 the unity between the Generalissimo and the Communists had not broken down. You may recall, Mr. Sourwine, from 1937 to 1940 there was a fairly close military cooperation between the two, and it looked like the objective was as stated for the two to work together for defeating the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want the committee to understand that you, despite all your prior years in China and your familiarity with what was going on out there, did not until 1940 know the true nature and objectives of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. The true nature of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. SOURWINE. The true nature of the objectives of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't want the committee to get that impression. I realize that a Communist Party was out to seize power. I saw it in 1930—not 1930—in 1926 when the wrangle came up between the two, and they tried there at Hankow and Canton to seize power.

Chiang Kai-shek eventually triumphed in 1927 over the Communists, and you had the other thing. There was clear evidence of what they wanted. I was speaking, when I said the other, the obvious thing when you were out in 1941 there was a certain unity in trying to defeat the enemy.

Mr. SOURWINE. That unity, that rapprochement, was a partial victory and a step toward total victory?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my interpretation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that not recognized by you and other well-informed persons?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Communists, if the opportunity presented, would seize power.

Mr. SOURWINE. That that was their objective?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. There was one other thing along that same line. They had two known things in mind, and that was, you say, in uniting of China, which would be getting back from Japan Manchuria, and the defeat of the Japanese?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was really one; defeat of the Japanese would have accomplished both of them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How was that made known? Was that a published fact, or was that said in their open speeches?

Mr. VINCENT. On the contrary, their open speeches, as I can recall them, it was always based upon the desire for national unity in order to defeat the Japanese at that time. The Communists themselves, insofar as I can recall, never made an open declaration of a desire to achieve full power in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Not full power, but to have the land, not indicating who was to control it; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first come to the conclusion that the Communists of China were part and parcel of the Communists of Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say that I never came to a definite conclusion, and I will frankly admit that there were many of us who hoped they never would for a long time. But it became, I believe, clearer toward the end of 1942 and 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Mao's position in the Chinese Army?

Mr. VINCENT. Mao was always the head of the government.

Senator FERGUSON. Head of the Communist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. Up in Yenan where they had their seat; Mao Tse-tung.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you not known that he had been a Russian Communist, had been to Moscow?

Mr. VINCENT. He had been to Moscow, but Chiang Kai-shek had been to Moscow. I am not saying that Mao Tse-tung was not a Communist. I knew he was a Communist from the way he acted and talked. He never made any bones about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they talk about Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. In those days?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, but I never had any conversation with Mao.

Senator FERGUSON. You have never seen Mao?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never seen Mao.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any doubt back at the earliest time that there were Communists trying to dominate in China; that they were the regular Communists with headquarters in Moscow.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would not be able to answer that question fairly in saying that—did I ever have any doubt that they were Communists and had their headquarters in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say that you had?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't say that I had knowledge that they were regular Communists with headquarters in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that now?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly take it for granted. I don't know it as a positive fact. I think they take their direction from Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to that conclusion that they were Communists and that they had their headquarters in Russia and were part of the regular Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I came to that definite conclusion sometime during the period of General Marshall's mission to China in 1946; that I was also convinced that it was a Communist movement which wanted to achieve power in China, but it was only after the war that it became clear to my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time of the Marshall mission, what brought you to the conclusion that they were then under Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it seemed to me that the difficulties which General Marshall was having with his mission out there clearly indicated that the Communists were getting support from just not themselves; that they were, if you want to put it, being guided by Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did the Communists do to make General Marshall's mission difficult?

Mr. VINCENT. By holding out for terms. You may recall—I may have to be a little lengthy there, and I am speaking purely from memory. You will recall that General Marshall went out in early 1946. There was at that time called by the Chinese, you remember, a constitutional convention or a people's political council, I thing it was, as a preliminary thing to which the Communists were to send delegates.

When General Marshall arrived, I think that thing was about to be convoked or had been; and he had a certain degree of success, you may recall, in the first 3 months in bringing about a truce which was, I know as a matter of fact, one of the main objectives of General Marshall to try to stop civil war.

I mention civil war because in my mind, correctly or incorrectly, the worst that could happen in China in those days was the all-out civil war. As the negotiations went on after the spring, it became more and more apparent from General Marshall's telegrams back—we sent very few to him because he was in charge; it was his own show—that the Communists were making it more and more difficult in trying to get not a majority position in this so-called constitutional government but a position of greater influence than they were warranted in having, plus the fact that there was a certain amount of anti-Marshall propaganda that came out from time to time from the Communists that seemed to be inspired from elsewhere, it appeared to me.

I make that statement from memory because I do recall at one time Marshall complaining.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did the propaganda come from?

Mr. VINCENT. From the Communists in China. One or another would make a statement or speech throwing, or casting, some doubt on the sincerity of General Marshall in trying to undertake his mission to bring about peace.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that was inspired by Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you think that?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it seemed to have the flavor of propaganda that was coming out of a place not Chinese. That is hard to explain, but at the initial stages, in the initial stages, the Communists had seemed from Marshall's report to be quite agreeable to calling off war and of sitting down and talking things over with the Generalissimo, which is just what the Generalissimo wanted.

But in the spring it seemed to me that situation changed. Now I have purely a surmise, Senator. You recall I think it was in March that Mr. Byrnes—Secretary Byrnes, Jimmy Byrnes—was at a foreign ministers' conference in London; and at that conference, I think it was, it was the first time that the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of Russia—mind you, the war was only over 4 months, 6 months—really got to calling each other names.

It was a very uncongenial conference. I have, as I say, in trying to piece these matters together, thought that at that moment the chances of success of Marshall's mission were certainly lessened tremendously because of the animosity that was developing between us and the Russians.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then you felt that Russia was in complete charge at that time of China's policy—that is, the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That is I think difficult: saying Russia was in complete charge. I think at that time Russian influence on what Chinese Communists did or did not do increased.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your position in China when Marshall came out?

Mr. VINCENT. I was back here in the States, Mr. Senator, I was back in the Department of State.

Senator FERGUSON. You were back in the Department of State?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the memorandum as to what his mission was?

Mr. VINCENT. I was, sir. You mean the one that had been called the directive?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Were you familiar with that?

Mr. VINCENT. I was familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. Who drafted it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was drafted, I believe, in the War Department. If you wish I have dates and I can read a 2-page memo I have to be sure that I know what the sequence was.

Senator FERGUSON. What about that mission? When did it first come to your attention?

Mr. VINCENT. When did what come to my attention?

Senator FERGUSON. The Marshall mission.

Mr. VINCENT. The Marshall mission came to my attention for the first time when as you recall at the end of November General Hurley resigned, and the next day the President appointed or requested Marshall to go to China.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; now when did Hurley resign?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can recall Hurley resigned on November 26.

Senator FERGUSON. November 26?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I have that here. I don't want to tell you the twenty-sixth when it really was the twenty-seventh. Yes, on November 27 the President asked General Marshall to undertake a mission for him. General Hurley had submitted his resignation as Ambassador the day before.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. On the twenty-sixth he resigned, and on the twenty-seventh the President asked General Marshall to go?

Mr. VINCENT. Undertake a mission, not as an Ambassador.

Senator FERGUSON. No. When did you first hear about the directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I first heard about the directive in the sense that it came over from the War Department. I was asked on the 28th of November to draw together quickly something on the basis of which Byrnes could talk to General Marshall about what was his general idea of his mission.

Senator FERGUSON. You were asked to draw up a memorandum for Byrnes so that Byrnes could have a conversation with Marshall as to his mission on the twenty-eighth?

Mr. VINCENT. As to what were the Department's general ideas on the thing. It was not a directive.

Senator FERGUSON. It was getting in line for a directive?

Mr. VINCENT. Marshall had to have something as a background.

Senator FERGUSON. So the next day after his naming Marshall—was that a public naming on the twenty-seventh?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It was public?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. George Marshall was then testifying before a joint committee here in the Senate?

Mr. VINCENT. On Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. He was then under cross-examination.

Mr. VINCENT. I remember that.

Senator FERGUSON. He was named and indicated that he had to leave immediately for China; is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. He left on the fifteenth of December, I think; that is true. Up until the day almost that he left I am told he was with the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you draw a memorandum as to what a directive should contain?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as to what the directive should contain because I want to be exact. I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, if you want to.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to as a matter of history. The following is my recollection of the development of the directive to General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon the interruption, did your counsel assist you in that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, this is from my own memory in getting dates. You will find at times I couldn't even get a date.

In the autumn of 1945 we in the Department were becoming increasingly concerned over developments in China. It looked as though China were heading rapidly toward a general civil war. There was much press and public criticism over the stationing of our marines in North China. Disarmament and repatriation of Japanese soldiers in China was moving slowly.

We had flown three or four of Chiang Kai-shek's divisions from South and Central China to North China, mostly to the Peking-Tientsin area. The objective of this move was to place Chiang's troops in the position to take the surrender of Japanese troops. But there was strong indication that the Nationalist Army was finding it difficult if not impossible to gain control of rural areas held by Communists.

Our marines had to be used directly in effecting surrender of Japanese troops.

I have that as a background [reading]:

In late October or early November I was asked to prepare a memorandum regarding the situation and what we could do about it. This I did, setting forth four alternative procedures which may be briefly described as follows:

(*a*) All-out support for the government of Chiang Kai-shek;

(*b*) Normal diplomatic relations with the National Government while refraining from taking any part in internal affairs;

(*c*) Assistance to the Chinese Government in bringing about a settlement with non-Kuomintang groups including the Communists in order to avoid general civil war (at this time discussions were under way among the various Chinese political groups with that idea in mind, but they were making little headway);

(*d*) An international conference of interested powers to seek a solution.

Senator FERGUSON. Those are the four?

Mr. VINCENT. Those are the four. That was a memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a memorandum that you had prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a memorandum that I had prepared.

Senator FERGUSON. That was while Hurley was still in China?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make a recommendation on any of those?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have never seen that memorandum. I did it over a week end and haven't seen it since that day.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long it was before the 28th?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been done the latter part of October or the early part of November, probably the latter part of October, so probably it would be a month before Hurley resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. Now on the 20th did you prepare a new memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. This memorandum was submitted to the Secretary of State, to the White House, and to the War Department. Procedure (*c*) was chosen as furnishing the most practical approach to the existing problem.

Senator FERGUSON. Was (*c*) the one?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; (*c*) was the one chosen to assist the Chinese Government and avoid civil war. In other words, to bring about a settlement with the non-Kuomintang groups, including the Communists, in order to avoid civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, in your memorandum in the last part of October did you recommend a taking of the Communists into the Chiang Kai-shek government?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; these were four alternative procedures that I set forth as clearly as I could, and I was never consulted at any time as to the selection of (*c*).

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that they had chosen (*c*)? Your (*c*) is so indefinite I would not know how a man would take that and say that it was a consolidation of the two governments.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am trying to do this from memory because I haven't seen that document since I wrote it 5 years ago, but that was the general tenor of it, assistance to the Chinese Government in bringing about a settlement with non-Kuomintang groups, including the Communists, in order to avoid civil war.

It was not a new idea. It was an idea that General Hurley had pursued during his Ambassadorship of trying to bring about some kind of settlement during the war for military cooperation.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 28th what did you do?

Mr. VINCENT. I had better read here.

General Hurley had submitted his resignation as Ambassador the day before. On November 28 I was asked to prepare something to indicate to General Marshall our line of thinking in the Department. That was the first time that I realized——

Senator FERGUSON. When did you prepare that?

Mr. VINCENT. That was when it was indicated to me that that was going to be prepared along the lines of my point (*c*). This I did in the form of a rough outline of possible courses of action. This memorandum was, I believe, handed to General Marshall on November 28 or 29 by Mr. Byrnes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not take long to draw that up?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was a rough memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you recommend?

Mr. VINCENT. In my memorandum I suggested assistance to Chiang in recovering Manchuria and steps to assist the Chinese in bringing about a military truce and a settlement of political difficulties through a general political conference.

I also stated that political peace in China was impossible as long as there existed autonomous armies such as the Communists had, and suggested that all armies be united and organized under the National Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you recommend the taking of the Communists into the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. The Communists were included in my statement here, "a settlement of political difficulties through a general political conference."

Now whether that would have resulted in the Communists coming into the Government or not I wouldn't know, but it was in my mind, I can assure you that.

Senator FERGUSON. It was?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you recommend in this memorandum the taking of the Communists into the Nationalists?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that I recommended specifically, but when I said taking other political parties in I had the Communists in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You had the Communists in mind. Did you not indicate that the Communists if they went in wanted such power that they would in effect take it over?

Mr. VINCENT. That brings up a question of tactics which I would be glad to explain. We were, as I say, terribly concerned over the results of an outbreak of general civil war in China. I was particularly. I had been in China and had seen the effects of civil war on the country.

Senator FERGUSON. But coming back, I understood you to tell me before that you knew that if you took the Communists in that they wanted a greater power than they were entitled to, indicated to you that Russia was in command?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is what I was coming to, Senator, was in my conception that you had a better chance of taking the Communists in in more ways than one by bringing them into a government

on a minority basis, not against the wishes of Chiang Kai-shek's government, but they themselves were at that time negotiating.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, you told me in the meeting in London it was clear to you then that they wanted a domination. Prior to that, were you not also of the opinion that if you ever took the Communists in they would dominate the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have been willing to say that the Communists would try to dominate the Government, but I still believed that you could have taken them in, not forced them on Chiang, but Chiang could have taken them in in more ways than one on a minority basis.

There were at the time Communists in the Italian and French Governments who were eliminated. But I was trying to avoid what I thought honestly was the worst possible disaster that could come to Chiang, which was the outbreak of general civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that be any worse as far as America was concerned than to have the Communists take over the government and not have a civil war?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, my concept was that the Communists would come into the Government on a minority basis and that we could, through support of the Chiang Kai-shek government, and I think you will find this philosophy stated in my memorandum, that with help from us we could eventually strengthen the Chinese Government enough to eliminate the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. To kick them out?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I stated that in so many words.

Senator FERGUSON. In this memorandum of the 28th did you state that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, but I did in the subsequent memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after that?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say some time in the spring or summer of 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. When did this memorandum come over, back from the Army?

Mr. VINCENT. The memorandum came back from the Army—this memorandum, as far as I can recall, was handed by Mr. Byrnes to General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. On the 28th or 29th?

Mr. VINCENT. On the 28th or 29th. Subsequent to that, some time in the following week, a memorandum came back from the War Department which General Marshall either drafted or had drafted. This statement then came back. Mine had been entitled "Rough Outline."

This one came back as Statement of Policy Toward China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Beyond the change in titles what difference was there?

Mr. VINCENT. There was a vast difference. It was a memorandum, as I have said here, and some of the phraseology and thought in my memorandum was there, but it was in composition and character a much bigger paper. Mine ran to two pages, I think, and this one ran to probably six, and mine was not a directive.

I didn't realize that Marshall was going to want a directive. This was jotting down the ideas that I thought were important.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Marshall drafted his own directive?

Mr. VINCENT. Marshall drafted or had drafted. I would doubt that General Marshall, as busy as he was with the committee, had drafted it.

Senator FERGUSON. Somebody in his Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Somebody at the War Department, if he did not himself, drafted this long statement.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that if it had been drafted in the State Department that you would have been part of it?

Mr. VINCENT. If it had been drafted in the State Department, as Director of the Far Eastern Office I would certainly have had something to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you called in conference at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I want to finish this (reading): That memorandum came back to the State Department sometime during the first week of——

Senator FERGUSON. December?

Mr. VINCENT. December [reading]: There were some changes and I can't recall them, but they were not changes of any great merit. This was already Marshall's idea. Some additions were made for clarification and then it was sent back again to the War Department during the first week of December.

Then the next thing, and the last thing I had anything to do with it, was on December 9, as I think both General Marshall and Mr. Acheson testified. There was a meeting in Byrnes' office to go over the final draft of this statement of policy toward China, which has been called the Marshall directive, and it was agreed upon by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any changes made at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. At that meeting I don't recall any other drafting.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you present?

Mr. VINCENT. I was present, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Hull, and General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it appears that here when there was a grave diplomatic move to be made that the Army dictated that move. It was their directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say that the Army dictated that move. but I am sure that General Marshall, who then considered himself as a civilian, had ag reat deal to do, not with the drafting, but with the general ideas.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he know about the situation in China? Here was a memorandum drafted in the War Department, you assumed in your answer, and said it was Marshall that directed it. What did he know about the conditions in China?

Mr. VINCENT. He probably had kept up with them as well as any intelligent man would, but he had in the War Department, I am quite sure, officers who had just come back from service in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who they were?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you feel that you had a grasp of the situation in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Both politically and militarily?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as I could trust the information that was coming to me. I hadn't been in China for some time.

Senator FERGUSON. For how long?

Mr. VINCENT. I hadn't been there since 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. You left there in 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. I left there in 1943, and this was in 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Who in the State Department knew more about conditions in China at that time, at the time of the drafting of this document, than you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a difficult question, Senator, to say. Let me think of the people who might have known more of conditions than I. We all read the same papers and had the same information.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you the top man?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the Director of the Far Eastern Office.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So it would be natural that they would come to you as the man who had the most knowledge and the best insight into the whole problem; is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now did you sanction and agree that the Marshall directive as drafted by the War Department was the way to solve this problem?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. I was consulted, the memorandum, as I say, came back, and we saw the full draft. There were some minor changes made in it, but I want to say that I was fully in support of the objectives of what General Marshall was going to try to do.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you were?

Mr. VINCENT. I was.

Senator FERGUSON. You say the objectives, did you believe in the method that was laid down to do it, of taking them in?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you believe that if you ever took them in you could get them out?

Mr. VINCENT. What made me believe that was the fact that they were going to come in on a minority basis; that was clear all the time. The Chiang Kai-shek government was to be strengthened, not publicly, through assistance, and that there would be positions where, as I have stated before, and I have this on record some place or another, that the idea was to take them in in more ways than one.

Let me make this clear about Marshall's mission. One of the main things was the stopping of the civil war. As I say, I don't know that I was right or wrong in that, but I dreaded the idea of China being embroiled in the civil war immediately after the war.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you argue the point that you always had to keep Chiang Kai-shek's government in the forefront with aid and support?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In such a way that this other would always be a minority?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, so much to the point that I said it to a member of the Chinese Embassy here in this city.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no, but did you say it to Marshall?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So he understood how you felt about it, that if they did not dominate the situation they would lose this thing, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. That the Chinese had to dominate.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, the Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. And in the last analysis that is what—I am working from memory here now—what in the last analysis broke it down was the excessive demands of the Communists as to representation in a new government.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, you did not know anything about the strategy in the military situation over there?

Mr. VINCENT. In what military situation, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. In China?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean in the military situation, the war was over.

Senator FERGUSON. Between the Nationalists and the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. We knew that, as I have testified here, that in north China Chiang was having a terrible time taking over those areas from the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Then did you not know that if you stopped that, that you might give the Communists a great edge over Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. If you stopped this war?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Marshall tell you that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he know anything about the conditions there?

Mr. VINCENT. He found out very quickly, and an indication of that is that General Marshall immediately set about organizing these truce teams to stop the fighting; that was his own idea.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out about giving aid. What did you know about that?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not taken into consideration that you were actually aiding the Communists by preventing a civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever consulted after the final draft of the Marshall document?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Acheson present at the final draft?

Mr. VINCENT. I had already taken off for Moscow with Mr. Byrnes. The final draft, when it was adopted in the White House and handed to General Marshall, if that is what you mean, that was on the 14th.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Dean Acheson in the Department with you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he consent to this draft?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Byrnes consent to it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, on the 9th, and a day later he was over to the White House, took it over to the President and the President approved it. It was approved by General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any argument at all to the effect that once you put the Communists into this Government there was a probability that it would be the government of the future?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, no argument that I heard of because it was based probably mostly on the hope that this plan would succeed in subordinating the Communists in the Government rather than making a trial of arms and civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you do not solve problems by hopes, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. I know you don't, but I will say that was the estimate you had to operate on.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the military upper hand was in the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. The upper hand insofar as Chiang holding central and south China?

Senator FERGUSON. The upper hand was held by the Communists in north China?

Mr. VINCENT. We had assistance. We helped Chiang in taking over Tientsin and Peking by flying his divisions over there.

Senator FERGUSON. After Marshall left here with the directive you did not know whether or not the State Department was consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. Consulted in what manner?

Senator FERGUSON. As they were going along?

Mr. VINCENT. On the general operation of his mission? No. General Marshall, under the directive, had, I should say, a free hand.

Senator FERGUSON. And exercised it?

Mr. VINCENT. And exercised it.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you stay in Russia? Did you go over with Byrnes?

Mr. VINCENT. I went over with Byrnes in December for that short conference at Christmas time with the Russians and came back.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a very short time?

Mr. VINCENT. Half a month.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Marshall consult the State Department at all?

Mr. VINCENT. After he went to China?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not recall. My general impression is that we did not have telegrams from him asking for advice. He kept us very well informed in telegrams of about once every 10 days or 2 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. But not asking for advice, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. When did he come back?

Mr. VINCENT. He came home in March, and there were conferences that he had with Byrnes, but they were not in the sense of conferences having to do with what he could do.

Senator FERGUSON. Telling you what he had done? When did he make the statement to the effect, "Plague on both your houses"?

Mr. VINCENT. He made that, I should say, in the first week of January 1947, after he came home.

Senator FERGUSON. After he finally came home?

Mr. VINCENT. After he finally came home. Whether he had assumed the secretary of stateship by that time or not I don't recall, but it was all in that week.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you leave this China desk or the Far East desk?

Mr. VINCENT. I left the Far East desk July of 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were in all the time?

Mr. VINCENT. All the time the mission was out there and after Marshall came back.

Senator FERGUSON. And there was no advice sought from your desk on the situation?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. VINCENT. When I make a positive statement like that there may have been questions as to this, that, or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not recall any of them?

Mr. VINCENT. On the over-all policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a series of questions?

Senator FERGUSON. You go right ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since this subject has been opened up I would like to ask a series of questions. Going back, sir, you said you had prepared a memorandum on the situation?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was prior to the directive, it was not a directive, it was what you got together hurriedly, as you say?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to distinguish between that one I made at the end of October and the one I made at the end of November.

Mr. SOURWINE. The rough draft for the use of Mr. Byrnes?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was sent over to the State Department and subsequently a draft came back which was a much longer draft, in pages about a 2 to 6 ratio?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want you to tell the committee what, if anything, there was in the Marshall draft—that is, the one that came from the War Department—that was at variance with any of the concepts or suggestions that were in your rough memorandum.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think there were any.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was merely an expansion then?

Mr. VINCENT. The Marshall draft came back incorporating this idea of trying to seek a truce; that was one of the ideas. It had more ideas than mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But there was no variance?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say there were some changes by way of clarification before it went back to the War Department the second time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you participate in making any of those changes?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew then that there were changes, but they were not of any consequence?

Mr. VINCENT. They were not of any consequence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then the final draft came back?

Mr. VINCENT. The War Department got it, and they brought it over to this meeting of December 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had they again made further changes?

Mr. VINCENT. I think they did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they of any consequence?

Mr. VINCENT. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. You sat in on the conference approving the final draft?

Mr. VINCENT. Approving the final draft insofar as Byrnes and General Marshall were concerned. The President finally approved it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had three cracks at it? First, you prepared the rough draft memorandum; and, after that had been expanded but without in any way changing your concepts or suggestions, you had a chance to make further suggestions and did make or approve some; and then you were present and concurred in the final approval?

Mr. VINCENT. My concurrence was not necessary in the final approval when General Marshall and Mr. Byrnes were there.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to interfere with your line of thought, I just wanted to know when George Marshall left the War Department.

Mr. VINCENT. Let me see. That is a question that I will just have to guess on here. My recollection is that he left almost immediately after the war was over with Japan. At least he hadn't been out more than 2 or 3 months when he was asked to come back.

Senator FERGUSON. But he was not in the Government at the time the President asked him to come back?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for the fact that the War Department, of all departments, was drafting a diplomatic document and implementing and saying how it should be implemented? You did not have any implementation in it at all. How do you account for the War Department, of all departments, drafting a diplomatic document and handling its implementation?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, there were many people over in the War Department who had a great familiarity with the situation. There was still in China—our own forces which had not been deactivated. I want to be fair to the Army. There were many people over in the Pentagon Building who had a very up-to-date and clear idea of the situation in China, which even still was military in the sense of the surrender of the Japanese troops.

I don't know how many there were, but it was something over a million.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was that great diplomatic problem of the negotiation between the Communists and the non-Communists. You had had an Ambassador, you had had a Department of State staff there, and you were head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Here was the Army drawing the directive and the implementation of a directive, taken out of your hands really; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I hate to testify that it was taken out of my hands, because they did send it back and give us a crack at it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not taken very far out of your hands when you had initiated the policy, and had one chance to correct it, and saw it at the finish?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. Not just I, but Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was speaking specifically of you because it was from you virtually alone that the initial rough draft came?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. As I testified, I had no argument with the document as it came over.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you confer with any of these Army people?

Mr. VINCENT. No. While it was being drafted?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not confer with them?

Mr. VINCENT. No; except on the 9th when General Marshall came over.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made a very interesting statement, sir, in the course of your discourse with Senator Ferguson and in response to his questions you said, speaking, I presume, of yourself and others, "We all read the same papers, we all had the same information."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What papers and what information are you talking about?

Mr. VINCENT. I am speaking of information coming in from reports. I think we will have to go back and remember what Senator Ferguson's question was. Who did I consider the best-informed person on the Far East? When I say "we all," I have in mind my own Deputy Director, who is Mr. Penfield.

Anything of importance was read by Mr. Acheson; and the Chief of the China Division, who was Mr. Drumright at that time, would read them. These were not immature people, I mean. Everybody in the State Department had access to them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that include reports from Mr. John Stewart Service?

Mr. VINCENT. That would include whatever reports came in. John Stewart Service during this time was not in China; he had already been sent to Tokyo.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was not thinking of a particular period.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would include such reports as were coming back. In other words, would it be correct to say that the thinking not only of yourself, ex officio, so to speak, but of the others around you in the State Department was conditioned by the reports that came in that you all saw?

You all depended primarily on the reports you saw from the field; therefore, you and the others around you could be expected to have substantially the same views about the matters which you were considering?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and we also saw reports from General Wedemeyer. His reports were made available to us, too. I will say that in an operation of that kind we didn't depend entirely on reports from the field for making up our minds on things. It was a case of bringing our experience to bear and using the reports to reach a decision.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the reports or memoranda were in the Department, would they also circulate the same way so that they would all see them?

Mr. VINCENT. They would in the Far Eastern Office. Any person with sufficient rank to merit having it. For instance, General Marshall's reports back were seen only by General Carter, who was in the

State Department as his assistant; myself; Dean Acheson; and the Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, to turn to another point, you have three times used the phrase, "take the Communists in in more ways than one." I got the feeling that you perhaps had used that phrase yourself at an earlier time either in arguments or something you had written.

Mr, VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where you used it?

Mr. VINCENT. I used it, and I have to—before I left China in 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a phrase you have used often?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I know it was a concept I had that the best way to take the Communists in—and it is based on the knowledge of fighting and civil war—was to take them in.

Mr. SOURWINE. We were discussing your use of the phrase "take the Communists in in more ways than one."

Mr.. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You intended, did you, by the use of that phrase on various occasions, as you have here, to suggest that there was some advantage to the Nationalist Government, some disadvantage to the Communist Government, in bringing the Communist Government into a coalition government?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, through the avoidance of civil war and the other component part of this, which was the dissolution of a Communist army and integration into a national army.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to examine that a little bit. You spoke of your first point there, the avoidance of a civil war?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is actually merely a matter of inducement; that is a club because a civil war would not have been a direct disadvantage to the Chinese Communists, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. A civil war?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. A civil war, I believe, would have been a direct advantage to the Communists; it would have stirred up more trouble in China. I couldn't foresee any conclusive——

Mr. SOURWINE. It was an alternative, was it not, civil war or bring them into the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. It was an alternative to bring them into the Government and dissolve this army; they were supposed to dovetail.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think the Communists would give up their power in the north to any government that they did not control or expect to control?

Mr. VINCENT. I did assume that they would if given a part in government. They had said they would and joined in conferences to that effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you believe them?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I hoped they would. Yes; I will say that I believed that General Marshall going out there could bring about this kind of a solution. I don't believe I could have, but I thought General Marshall could.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of what you have testified to today with regard to your knowledge, going back a long way, as to the nature of the Chinese Communists and their objectives, you never did believe,

did you, that the Communists would give up their power in the north to a government that they did not control or expect to control?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And give up that advantage that you said they had?

Mr. VINCENT. The advantage militarily?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. It was an advantage of creating or continuing to create disorder in the country.

Mr. SOURWINE. You thought really that you would be putting something over on the Chinese Communists by bringing them into a coalition government?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time you felt that they had the upper hand in north China?

Mr. VINCENT. In the rural districts, Senator, and they had had this kind of advantage even over the Japanese. We watched this, and it was tremendously difficult to deal with the guerrilla operation that they carried on.

Senator FERGUSON. And they would give that up?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And become a minority in a government and give that up?

Mr. SOURWINE. In justice to yourself, sir, is it possible that you would like to amend that, that you thought that would be so if the Nationalist Government retained the upper hand in the coalition?

Mr. VINCENT. That was implicit in all of the negotiations that they had had with the Communists and the minor parties. It was on that point, as I say, that I believed the negotiations finally broke down.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Nationalist Government was not to have the upper hand, then bringing the Communists into a coalition government would not be putting anything over on the Communists, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you state that again, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Nationalist Government was not to have the upper hand in the coalition, bringing the Communists into the coalition government would certainly not be putting anything over on the Communists, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would not be taking them in in any sense except by bringing them into the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and the point was always that the National Government was the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek, which was to be organized under a constitutional form and in which there would be some minor—I think the highest figure ever used was that the Communists would have 7 or 8, and I am just calling on memory now, out of a possible 21 in a provisional government.

Mr. SOURWINE. But, regardless of the form of the government or mere matters of form, it was absolutely essential that the Nationalist Government retain control of the coalition; otherwise the Communists by getting the coalition won a great victory?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true, sir, and General Marshall never thought in any other terms.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you, sir, point out what there is in the Marshall directive or in any official statement of the State Department at or about that time which says or implies that it is important or essential that Chiang retain control of the coalition government?

Mr. VINCENT. There is a paragraph in the Marshall directive which, I recall, says just exactly that, that we continue to recognize and support the National Government of China, which is the Government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Get us that, please.

Mr. VINCENT. We don't have the Marshall directive here. Is there a copy of the famous book, the White Paper, here? I am sure it is in there, and I can produce it tomorrow if necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you say "the famous book, the White Paper"?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it has been referred to, and I had a part in it, and it has become rather famous, in my opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I refer to that particular language. Do you believe that that particular language clearly expresses the view that in any coalition government Chiang would have to control and the Communists would have to have a minority interest?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe it does, and added to——

Mr. SOURWINE. Actually, if there was a coalition government and it was called the Nationalist Government of China, even though the Communists took over that government and maintained control of that government, it would still come within the phrase which you have cited?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe so, but we are both—at least I would have said it was the Nationalist Government of China under Chiang Kai-shek. I will go on to say from my memory of General Marshall's telegram back that it was very clear that at no time did he ever conceive of the Communists getting a majority control of the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you talked about the Nationalist Government of China you meant the Chiang Kai-shek government?

Mr. VINCENT. The Kuomintang government, whether Chiang Kai-shek——

Mr. SOURWINE. Kuomintang government would have been whatever Government was controlled by the Kuomintang regardless of who composed the Kuomintang and whether or not Chiang still had a part in it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that all that that part of the directive said was that the United States Government should continue to support the National Chinese Government without regard to whether Chiang was in it or not?

Mr. VINCENT. Support the National Government. It was Chiang Kai-shek's party. The Kuomintang was Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was at that time.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your conception that the directive was making it clear that we were to maintain it as Chiang's Government?

Mr. VINCENT. To maintain it as a Kuomintang government under Chiang.

Senator FERGUSON. We were to maintain it as a Kuomintang government under Chiang. In other words, we were to continue to maintain Chiang as over that particular government?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, we were supporting Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. We were supporting Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. And we were continuing——

Mr. VINCENT. If Chiang Kai-shek had resigned as head of the Kuomintang and somebody else had taken over that position as head of the Kuomintang, Dr. Kung or T. V. Soong, it wouldn't have meant that we wouldn't support that government.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. Suppose that Chou En-lai had taken over instead of Mr. Soong, would it have meant that we would not support that?

Mr. VINCENT. We certainly would not have to do that because Chou En-lai couldn't have taken over a Government of the Kuomintang, could he?

Mr. SOURWINE. Assume that the Government was taken over by some Communist as the result of bringing into the Kuomintang of a majority of Communists or pro-Communist elements. If it were still in the form of the Kuomintang government and still called the Nationalist Government of China, would not the United States have felt itself committed to cooperate and to support that government under the Marshall directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so, it would change its entire character.

Mr. SOURWINE. It certainly would have. Are you saying that it was your conception, that it was the conception of the State Department, that it was the conception of General Marshall, that it was intended to continue to support in power Chiang Kai-shek as the head of the Chinese National Government?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what we were committed to do?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what we were committed to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. We were going to assist in the attaining of that objective by bringing the Communists into the coalition government?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And we were going to take the whole Army?

Mr. VINCENT. We were going to amalgamate the Army and call it the National Chinese Army.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you thought it was a feasible program?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought it was a feasible program.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, that perhaps is a good note on which to recess.

Senator FERGUSON. I think so. We will resume tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 9 a. m., Friday, January 25, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL

The subcommittee met at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Vincent, you have been previously sworn.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe I asked you about Frank V. Coe.

Mr. VINCENT. You had.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. VINCENT. May I consult my book here?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT (reading): I first met Dr. Currie in 1936 or 1937 when he was an officer with the Federal Reserve Board. I saw him occasionally during the next 2 years prior to my departure for Geneva in 1939. Upon my return from Switzerland late in 1940 en route to China I saw Dr. Currie several times. He was then an administrative assistant to President Roosevelt. He was interested in China officially and he was a White House representative. We had several discussions on the matter of financial aid to the Chinese Government. The currency stabilization loan at that time either had just been passed or was being passed.

In 1942 President Roosevelt sent Dr. Currie to China to see Chiang Kai-shek and consult the Chinese Government officials on matters of common interest regarding the war. I saw him several times there. I gathered his conversations were largely on financial and economic matters. I did not participate in the conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you attend any conferences with Currie and any Chinese?

Mr. VINCENT. No (reading): When I returned to Washington in 1943 I was loaned by the State Department for several months to the newly-established Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got back when, December 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. No, June, and had a vacation, a couple of months in the far eastern office and went over there for a matter of 4 months. (reading): Dr. Currie was Deputy Administrator of the FEA. I saw him directly during this period. After I returned to State in February of 1944, I had little occasion for contact with Dr. Currie.

In 1945 he left the Government and went into business in New York. The last time I saw him was in New York in 1949 when I had lunch with him and Mrs. Currie at the Metropolitan Club. I was home for a brief period of consultation in Washington at that time. I have not seen him since this meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall how you met or who introduced you?

Mr. VINCENT. He was up in New Hampshire where he had a little farm. I was with Mr. Grew. He had a farm and had loaned his farm to my wife and children. They had one at Hancock.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have covered fully your associations with him?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I can recall them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he had any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he did. I never connected him in my own mind with the Institute. He wasn't at the one meeting I went to at Hot Springs that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever consult with him and with persons known to you to be members of the Institute?

Mr. VINCENT. With him at the same time as other members?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any such consultation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall ever being asked by the IPR, or someone representing it, to talk with Mr. Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. About any specific subject?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time know or have reason to believe that Mr. Currie was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name here is John P. Davies.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). I first met Davies when he was a language student in Peking. I was consul in Dairen. That was in 1932 or 1933. Our paths no doubt crossed from time to time during the next 10 years, but we did not serve together.

In 1942 Mr. Davies was assigned to China while I was counselor of the Embassy. His job was, he said, a sort of political adviser to General Stilwell. He was not directly connected with the Embassy. I saw him from time to time during this period.

Also after I returned to Washington, Mr. Davies would come in to see me when he was on home leave or on assignment by General Stilwell to Washington I would see him. In December 1945, I again saw Mr. Davies in Moscow when he was Secretary of the Embassy

there. We were having the Moscow conference of the foreign secretaries. I saw him last in Washington in 1949 briefly when I came home on consultation. I have not seen him since.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time if Mr. Davies had any connection with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Eugene Dennis?

Mr. VINCENT. Eugene Dennis, I do not know him, and I have not followed matters well enough to know who he is; but I know who he is now. He was Secretary of the Communist Party, but I don't know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Laurence Duggan?

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Laurence Duggan was in the State Department at the same time I was in 1936 to 1939. I don't recall any contact with him. I was junior to him. He was concerned with Latin-American affairs and I was assistant desk officer in the far eastern office. I can recall no association with him, other than I might have met him at some meetings that did take place in the Department or something where I would see him casually in the hall. He was not a person with whom I had any reason to have official contact, and I had no social contact with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time that Mr. Duggan was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. John K. Emmerson.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). He is a junior officer in the State Department who had specialized, I believe, in Japanese affairs rather than Chinese. I cannot recall when I first met Emmerson. He served in the far eastern office sometime during the period 1944 to 1945, maybe somewhat earlier than that.

He was in China, I think, just at the end of my term of duty. I can recall no specific meeting with him. I have seen him since I came back this time. He is now an officer there in the State Department.

I have seen him once or twice casually, but I had not anticipated his name, so I have not got the State Department register to see about him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any reason to believe he was connected with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wilma Fairbank.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). She is the wife of John K. Fairbank. I first met her—I may say I met her because he was in China, but I think I first met her at the IPR conference where she was either on the secretariat or a delegate. From that time on we saw her from time to time. My wife was a good friend of hers while they were stationed here. We visited them once before he went off to Switzerland in 1946 or 1947, I should say, and the last time I saw them was when I was passing through Cambridge. I had come back from visiting my son at Exeter. We visited the Fairbanks in Cambridge then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe that she was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miriam S. Farley.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no clear recollection of having met Miriam Farley, but I probably did see her at the IPR conference. I wouldn't know her now if I saw her.

Mr. SOURWINE. What position did she hold with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I think she was a member of the secretariat. I no doubt met her in that capacity.

As I say, if I saw her I don't believe I would know her. She may have written at some time or called. It is purely a name to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time or have reason to believe that she was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Frederick V. Field?

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Frederick V. Field I met casually and briefly at a large cocktail party at the IPR conference. That is the only time I have a distinct recollection of having met him. I do recall there was a preparatory meeting of the American delegation that went to the IPR conference. He may have been there. If he was, it made no impression on my mind.

I never had any vis-à-vis conversations with him or any contact with him other than through that conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you asked to assist in any way when Mr. Field was trying to get a commission in the Army?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know he tried to get a commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time or have reason to believe that Mr. Field was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. At the time I knew him I had no reason to believe he was connected with the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Friedman was a young fellow assigned to the Far Eastern Division and assigned to my office in the China Division in 1944. I had nothing to do with his assignment either to the divsion or to my division. He worked there in the division for a matter of, I should say, a year. He was then particularly interested in the field of labor and had, I think, come to that division from the Labor Division, as it was called, in the State Department, primarily because he had indicated an interest in the Far East and China, and had hoped to get an assignment as a labor attaché as soon as the war was over, attaché to China.

He got the assignment in the fall, I think, of 1945, at the end of the war. I don't recall having seen him since then. The last recollection I have of him was his sending me a notice he had gotten married when I was in Switzerland. His duties in the China Division were those of a junior officer who was a leg man. He went to the IPR conference as a member of the secretariat and he was also out in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference.

Senator FERGUSON. How would a man like that get to the United Nations Conference and the IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Take the second one. I don't know how he got there. I know there was a notice that went around that they needed

young people on the secretariat at San Francisco. He, being an energetic young man, probably went down and applied for a job on the secretariat. I did not recommend him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they not look into these people to see whether or not they had Communist leanings? Did they not in the State Department have any idea that there might be disloyalty?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say as to that. I had no suspicions of Friedman.

Senator FERGUSON. Or anybody else?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a very active young man probably with free ideas. I disagreed with him, but I did not suspect him of having Communist leanings.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it ever enter your mind while in the service during these days we are talking about that the Russians might be trying to penetrate our Foreign Service and our diplomatic service?

Mr. VINCENT. No evidence of it ever came to my attention.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not conscious of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not look into that question at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It never entered your mind, in fact?

Mr. VINCENT. Do you say "it never entered my mind"? I can vouch that it never entered my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall of any instance you may have thought well, now, this person or that person may be working for the Kremlin, for the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It never entered your mind?

Mr. VINCENT. But there were several divisions in the State Department that were supposed to look into that.

Senator FERGUSON. But in the Far East situation nothing ever entered your mind that there could be an influence of the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. Within the Foreign Service?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Even as far as Friedman was concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. I never suspected Friedman at any time or any of my associates there in the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you at the United Nations?

Mr. VINCENT. I was part time.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Friedman do out there?

Mr. VINCENT. He was working down on the secretariat and keeping contact with the various labor organizations represented out there.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not have been a good place to put a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. To have contact with the labor unions there?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. It probably would.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it not have been a good place to put a Communist in relation to the work of our delegation?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say it would have been a very good thing for the Communists to try to plant people there.

Senator FERGUSON. You never thought about it at that time, never thought about questioning any of these people?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or to look into the records or anything of that kind?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I may say again we had security divisions that were supposed to look into these people.

Senator FERGUSON. When were you first questioned on security?

Mr. VINCENT. Myself you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know I was ever questioned as to security; never in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wondered whether they questioned everybody.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you sure that you have not understated Mr. Friedman's importance in any way? Was he in any sense more than a fetcher and carrier?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know that is all he was. I can't recall the particular assignments he had. He sat in a far corner of the room. I had a big office there. He looked over the papers that came in with regard to labor conditions. I can recall of no major assignment Friedman had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he work directly under you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, in the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. You supervised his work?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any official in the echelon between you and him, or did you supervise his work directly?

Mr. VINCENT. I had an Assistant Chief of the China Division who probably exercised supervision over him as well as I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he actually exercise supervision over him?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say to what extent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the Assistant Chief?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Paul Meyer. I would have to consult the register, but the period in there is somewhat vague.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman was never given any real responsibility?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never substituted for you or acted as your deputy in any matter?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Meyer act as your deputy?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, occasionally. I think what you have in mind is some area committee that Mr. Dooman has mentioned where he went in. He was not my deputy or representative. He was simply there. I went sometimes myself to this area committee. Mr. Dooman has testified on that, but not in the capacity as my deputy. He had started going to those meetings when he was still in the Labor Division and continued to go. I attended them very seldom.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are referring to the meetings of the Far Eastern Committee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. No, he never went to the SWNCC committees. There was a rather vague committee called the Area Committee that various

divisions would sit in on and discuss problems in a general way. He attended those from time to time so I am now told or gather from the testimony. I would not recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he never did attend the meetings of the Far Eastern Committee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor ever had any authority to represent you there?

Mr. VINCENT. In the SWNCC meetings?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no record of his ever going to the SWNCC meetings. I think he had left the Department for China before I ever became connected with SWNCC.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did he leave?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall the date. I would have to have the register, but my recollection is the early autumn as soon as the war was over.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Friedman was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason so to believe?

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen nothing that would indicate it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Mark J. Gayn.

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know him and I have never met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know who he is?

Mr. VINCENT. He was with Amerasia. The name clicks in that way that he was connected with Amerasia, but I never met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether that name sticks in your memory because associates or persons might have mentioned him to you, or did you read it in the newspapers?

Mr. VINCENT. I read it in the newspapers. I am trying to remember; that is where he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mark Ginsbourg.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I have no recollection of a Mark Ginsbourg.

Mr. SOURWINE. Louis Gibarti?

Mr. VINCENT. No recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harold Glasser?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes [reading]: He was with the Treasury Department. I met him, I should say, once or twice on Treasury business that had to do with State. He was at the UNNRA conference, if I recall correctly, at Atlantic City. That was in 1944. I had very little contact with Glasser.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where you first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. My estimate would be it was at the conference at Atlantic City, but it may have been earlier.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your association with him was very slender after that?

Mr. VINCENT. Very.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not on a friendly social basis?

Mr. VINCENT. I never saw him socially that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe he was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think I stated this before but I will ask again that question. I mean no implication that these people were, or are, Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. I was hoping my answer was also that I did not then, but in most of these cases and in all of them I had no idea then or now.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think the question is quite broad enough to cover that. It is so intended. I asked it specifically, notwithstanding, in the one case of Mr. Friedman, the discussion which had gone on which might have left an implication that you have some such feeling.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to say that being out of the country since 1947 almost continually, things may have happened here that I should have been aware of that I am not. Four years' absence means I have not followed it. Somebody may have admitted he was one and I wouldn't know it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The committee will not hold you responsible for knowing who is and who is not a Communist in every instance. We are trying to find out what you do know.

Grace Maul Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know Grace Maul Granich. I know that she is the wife of Max Granich who was out in Shanghai. I never knew her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Max Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I never knew Max Granich except by name.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him to be a Communist, by name?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And in any way connected with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. We have reports. The Chinese gave reports that they thought he was connected with the Communist Party. Mr. Gauss, the consul general at that time in Shanghai, asked the Chinese to produce evidence. The Chinese were unable to produce it, but that did not destroy the suspicion that they were connected with the Communist Party. They were certainly left wing.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any of these other people you may have mentioned you did not know to be Communist left-wingers?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I have gone through so far.

Senator FERGUSON. Even Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. Friedman I would have called a New Dealer of an extreme sort.

Senator FERGUSON. But not a left-winger?

Mr. VINCENT. You have to define that. I have described him as a young New Dealer.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not unusual to find those people?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Foreign Service?

Mr. VINCENT. In the Foreign Service. You have the whole political pattern from one extreme to the other in the Foreign Service.

Mr. SOURWINE. Michael Greenberg?

Mr. VINCENT. Michael Greenberg, I think, was at one time an assistant to Lauchlin Currie when Lauchlin Currie was a Special Assistant to the President in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Lauchlin Currie to be a New Dealer?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly have associated Lauchlin Currie with the New Deal.

Senator FERGUSON. And Michael Greenberg?

Mr. VINCENT. I know nothing about his political views, but I would have thought if he was working for Currie he would have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say either one of those were left-wingers?

Mr. VINCENT. Not from my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any association with Greenberg?

Mr. VINCENT. None other than the fact that he was an assistant to Currie at a time when Currie was handling far-eastern affairs. They had a little office. From time to time I would see him. I don't recall having any discussions with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say from what you knew about him or even reports from the Chinese Government that he was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I never saw any reports from the Chinese Government on Michael Greenberg.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you on any of these other people, other than the ones you have mentioned, Granich, Max Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I mentioned him, but I would not say I saw any report on him.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any others?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did on Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he not operating some kind of a paper?

Mr. VINCENT. He was operating something called the Voice of China, which was highly propagandistic in character, as a magazine, in Shanghai.

Senator FERGUSON. What language?

Mr. VINCENT. In English. I had no first-hand knowledge of that in the sense he was operating in Shanghai and I was in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Joseph Gregg?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever meeting anyone by that name. The name doesn't ring any bell.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know anybody by that name who might have been known by some other name?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Alger Hiss?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I might like to refer to these papers [reading]:

My first recollection of meeting Alger Hiss was in 1940 when he had become assistant or special assistant to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, who at that time was political adviser for the Far East. I may have met him in the halls or elsewhere before that because he was working for Mr. Sayre, but I have no recollection of that. I am giving my first meeting where I recollect.

I was home en route to China and he was assistant to Mr. Hornback. I went to China and did not see him again until I came back in 1943. I had occasional meetings with him. All business with Hornbeck had to pass through Mr. Hiss. When Dr. Hornbeck left the

far eastern office some time in the spring of 1944, Mr. Hiss became, as far as I can recall, interested in the work preparatory to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference which was the prelude to the United Nations Conference. I saw him, frankly, not at all then.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you see him then?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at all. I don't recall seeing him; I may have seen him in the halls, but I had no business with him. Once he left I had no business with him.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were in the Far East you had quite a bit of dealing with him?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in Washington and I was in the Far East. Therefore, he presumably saw the reports I wrote in, but I never saw him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever talk with you about a report?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know on any occasion he wrote you directly about a report you had made, not agreeing with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever having any correspondence with Alger Hiss about any reports I made or he made.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have any correspondence or cablegrams or any communication with Hornbeck about these?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean when I was in China and Hornbeck was here? I would not have been able to tell about telegrams coming out from Hornbeck, because they would have been signed by the Secretary, and I have no recollection of personal correspondence between myself and Hornbeck about myself or about official matters.

The Senator had asked me whether I had any correspondence while in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. About his reports, Mr. Sourwine. He has testified the fact that Hiss was assistant to Hornbeck and therefore matters would be through Hiss to Hornbeck, the reports.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I had not finished with this paper. I said that [reading] he left far eastern affairs and went with some group that was preparing for Dumbarton Oaks and later I saw him only as he was Secretary General of the Conference in San Francisco and was very busy. I had no contact other than to know he was there.

After that he came back to the Department and was made, in the autumn of 1945, I believe, the chief or the director of the newly created United Nations office. In that capacity he attended staff meetings which I also attended where we were discussing matters where we would cut across them on United Nations affairs, far eastern affairs, European affairs. I saw him in that capacity for just a year before he resigned and went with the Carnegie Institute. I have not seen him since.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet with Mr. Hiss outside the State Department, or otherwise than on official duties?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of it. I believe that no doubt we attended dinner parties where he was present. I may have gone to a cocktail party at his house, but I had no intimate, outside-of-office associations with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at any time Mr. Hiss was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or have any reason to believe it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no reason to suspect him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you have stipulated your answers bring it down to the present time, do you have any reason now to believe that Mr. Hiss was ever connected in any way with the Communist party?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you believe he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't say I believe he was, but I have reason to suspect that he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a belief in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether Mr. Hiss was a Communist or was connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say he was at one time in his life.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name here I will ask you to pronounce. It is Ho Chi Minh.

Mr. MANDEL. May I refresh your memory? He is the leader of the forces in Indochina.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. No, I never had any contact with him. I certainly knew him by reputation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to know or believe that he is in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say most definitely I think he is connected with the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Philip Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. I never knew Mr. Jaffe, never met him knowingly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever had any communication with him?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send him any messages or receive any from him?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I don't think there was correspondence between him and me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk with him over the telephone?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you answer further, who was Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Jaffe was, as I recall it, connected with the Amerasia magazine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that before having read it in the papers, or otherwise?

Mr. VINCENT. From the papers. I don't think I knew Jaffe was on Amerasia until the case broke.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the Amerasia magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. Very slightly. I remember seeing it from time to time. I read it from time to time.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a subscriber of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the State Department get you a copy?

Mr. VINCENT. It would come into the State Department, or people would bring it. I can't say whether the State Department subscribed to it or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get any idea it was a left-wing magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no thought at the time I was reading it. I don't recall reading it. I remember the first issue. I thought it was a rather good magazine. Dr. Hornbeck contributed an article to it, but I didn't follow the magazine.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever contribute to it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever asked to contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I can do Owen Lattimore [reading]: I first met Lattimore probably in 1930 when he was in Peking. At that time I believe he was connected with some scholarship that he had; whether it was the Crane Foundation or something else. Our paths from then on might have crossed. I have no recollection. I was not an intimate friend of his.

My recollection of meeting him was when he came to China in 1941 in the late autumn or early spring as the President had sent him out to be a special—I don't know his title, but he was supposed to be an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. I did not see him very often at that time primarily because he was connected with Chiang Kai-shek and I believe Lattimore himself thought that too close an association with the Embassy would probably not be conducive to his good relations with the Generalissimo. He would think he was reporting backwards and forwards.

I did not know his work. I would see him in Chungking from time to time. He left Chungking before I did.

When I came back here, I found that Lattimore had become, I think, Deputy Director of OWI for the Pacific, for matters in connection with the Pacific area under Elmer Davis. We no doubt had contact, although it was not close, because he was busy. I was busy, and the liaison between the State Department and its various divisions and OWI was carried on by an office especially designated for that purpose. I recall Mr. Merrill Meyers was our liaison with OWI. He would keep them currently informed and point out what they were doing in the way of their programs.

My next association with Lattimore was on the trip to China with Mr. Wallace. He, as you know, was a member of that group. I saw him, of course, there, when we were in a plane for 50 days, with great frequency. I would say in passing that in Siberia and Central Asia Lattimore interested himself primarily in visiting museums, educational institutions, whereas I stayed more closely with Wallace in visiting agricultural places, industrial things, and attending social affairs in the evening that were usually given for us.

We returned from that trip, and I think soon thereafter Lattimore resigned. I don't know at what time he went back to his work at Johns Hopkins. I can't recall. I wasn't keeping in close enough touch to remember when he quit OWI. It is in his own record.

I saw him from time to time. We knew his wife, Mrs. Lattimore. I remember visiting them once in Towson, Md., and Baltimore.

The question has arisen, and we might as well deal with it now, of the matter of a proposal that he become a consultant in the State Department. I would just as soon make that statement now. In the early spring of 1945 Mr. Lattimore had a form made out, and I don't know what the form of employment was, for consultant in

the State Department on a per diem basis. I thought it was a good idea. We needed somebody who as a tactical expert would give us information or prepare background data on those borders and areas of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia.

He had written a book called the Inner Asian Frontiers of China, I think is the name of it, and was in my estimation the foremost expert on that area in the States. We had at that time Dr. Kennedy, the late Dr. Kennedy, of Yale, who was furnishing in the far eastern office similar information and background work done for Indonesia, and I think also other Southeast Asian areas.

So I recommended, if you want to call it "recommended," Mr. Lattimore be taken on in this job. The recommendation was approved by my chief, who was then Mr. Ballentine. Mr. Grew, however, told me he did not think it was a good idea to hire a man who was engaged in publicity to the degree that Lattimore was at that time. He was contributing to magazines and other things. There the matter was dropped. I did not know——

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the only reason he assigned?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only reason he assigned to me.

Senator FERGUSON. I would think that was the kind of man you wanted.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Grew put it on the basis of "who was engaged in publicity." I think Lattimore was writing articles for maybe the Baltimore Sun or something else, contributing once or twice a week. He was certainly a contributor to magazines.

Subsequently I have learned through seeing Mr. Dooman's testimony that he took it up with Mr. Grew and had it stopped. But Mr. Grew did not tell me that then.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any reason to believe he should not have come with the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; as a matter of fact, I thought as a man to work on a tactical subject he was ideally suited, and those areas were little known to us.

Senator FERGUSON. What would he have received in compensation?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what the per diem was. I know it probably ran—I just don't know what it was. I knew Dr. Kennedy was getting a per diem.

Senator FERGUSON. How much; $50?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not as high as $50. The financial side of it would not have been an inducement for anybody to come down.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it Mr. Lattimore's idea, or someone else's, that he apply for this position with the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. It was the result of discussions between Mr. Lattimore and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. That I would not recall, whether I suggested it or he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask him if he would accept one of these jobs that had no financial inducement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say the financial inducement was not a consideration. We discussed the matter of needing a better source of information on these areas which were certainly going to come up in any subsequent negotiations of a peace treaty. I may add this: That at the time we discussed that, neither I nor he, or anybody else, any-

body else on my level in the State Department, knew that the Yalta agreement was going on and you might say certain disposition was being made there, particularly with regard to Outer Mongolia. That did not become known to me until June 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where this conference with Mr. Lattimore took place at which you asked him if he would accept a job with the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I don't recall whether I asked him or whether he indicated it was a job he thought should be done.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand you to testify——

Mr. VINCENT. It came out in a conversation with him. I am perfectly willing to say I may have asked him to accept the job and he may have accepted the job and I said "Yes, it is a good idea." Who produced the idea I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, or whether it was on the week end in Towson. We went up Saturday night and came back Sunday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that week end before or after this occasion? Can you definitely place it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it only the one week end?

Mr. VICENT. With Lattimore, that is the only week end I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not in the habit of interchanging visits with him or you and your wife with him and his wife?

Mr. VINCENT. No. He could not have spent a week end with us because we did not have any place to put him up. He was down in Washington and would probably call up and say, "I am here. Won't you have lunch with me?" My relations with Lattimore were of that sort.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are or were quite friendly over a long period of time?

Mr. VINCENT. He would certainly let me know. Over the period I would say of 1941 on down——

Mr. SOURWINE. You first knew him as early as 1930?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not say you have been unfriendly since then?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been friendly since then?

Mr. VINCENT. There was a whole gap of 10 years when I saw him. When we were associated it was after he had an official position in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. We don't have to see a man every day to be good friends, do we?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore is your good friend?

Mr. VICENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you undoubtedly saw him on enough occasions outside the office so that you would not be able to pinpoint any particular one or necessarily remember the sequence of all of them?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Lattimore was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know him to be a left-winger?

Mr. VINCENT. Again I would say I felt Lattimore was a person of New Deal complexion. He was a man with liberal ideas rather than a left-winger.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings up the definition of liberal. What is a liberal in your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you said he was a man with liberal ideas.

Mr. VINCENT. I confess I don't have any definition ready for a liberal.

Senator FERGUSON. I claim to be a liberal and my views are entirely opposite to that of Lattimore. I want to know what your definition of a liberal is.

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose the best way to put it would be if a person is looking for means and ways of improving and changing conditions as they exist where he finds them unsatisfactory that he is liberal in his views, because he is not tied to any preconceived ideas as to exactly how our democratic things work. That would be the best definition I can give. Maybe I am getting confused with a humanitarian.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say a man who works to relieve people from activities of Government was a liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't quite understand what you mean by the activities of Government.

Senator FERGUSON. The Government dictating the policies and doing things for everybody.

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly say a person could be a liberal and still resent that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think a liberal would be the man who would want the Government to do things?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not Owen Lattimore that kind of a man?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. He was a person who believed in the Government. You have got to define what you mean by the Government doing things.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us not talk about Mr. Lattimore in the past tense. I think he is still very much alive and you have not ceased to know him or associate with him.

Mr. VINCENT. I have not seen him since 1947. I would rather not try to discuss Mr. Lattimore as a liberal.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he not the kind of man that wanted the Government to do everything?

Mr. VINCENT. You are getting me into an area now——

Senator FERGUSON. You said he was a liberal. You class New Dealers as liberals. You said he was a New Dealer and a liberal. You used the term, not me.

I want to know what it is now. Here is a man that you describe as a liberal. What was he?

Mr. VINCENT. I described it here as a man who was not tied to a preconceived idea of how things should be done but was looking for ways to improve Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call communism liberalism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call Marxism liberalism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call socialism liberalism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call New Dealers liberals?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the difference between New Dealers and socialism?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think the New Dealer ever—I should not get into this because I am not a political philosopher. The New Dealer, to my mind, never, as I saw it, wanted to bring about Government ownership. There may have been cases where the New Deal did in a broad sense. I know there was TVA. Government ownership of the means of production I do not think was ever the program of the New Deal.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a New Dealer?

Mr. VINCENT. I would describe myself as being in favor of some of the New Deal's policies.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the policies you were in favor of? What were they?

Mr. VINCENT. Such things as banking and insurance. I was not mixed up in the New Deal at all. I was opposed, for instance, to the Supreme Court, if you want to call that New Deal.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean packing the Supreme Court?

Mr. VINCENT. That was one thing. I would not know. You would have to name what measures.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not the idea of packing the Supreme Court to give the Government power over people?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't like the means at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not that the idea?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know the objective at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that was a liberal movement to pack the Supreme Court?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, and I was opposed to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us any more information as to what Lattimore was?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a New Dealer and a liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that Lattimore himself would call himself a New Dealer. I find myself in a disagreeable position because our conversation was about China and not about internal politics.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you describe him as a humanitarian?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think so. There again I don't want to be put in the position of having to describe a humanitarian.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you estimate precisely and briefly the authority of Owen Lattimore in the field of far-eastern affairs according to your own personal opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. As an authority?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I think he has been a very serious student of Far Eastern affairs. I have not any exact recollection now just what the thesis is in his book, the last book he wrote on the Far East. I found myself in agreement with some of his ideas in that book and in disagreement with others. That would not mean I didn't think he was an authoritative writer on the Far East, but some of his ideas I have found to be not in agreement with mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you intending to hedge on Lattimore? Did not you call him earlier the outstanding authority on the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. On these inner areas. I thought we were covering a much broader subject. I did. I would get around to that.

That was his principal field of claiming to be an expert. As to the Far East, he certainly has already lived there all his life, and I have looked at him as a man having a certain knowledge about the Far East.

Mr. MANDEL. You read all his books?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have glanced through and read the Inner Asian Frontiers and that other book I am trying to recall. I do not recall reading anything else.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read Solution in Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I am talking about. I know certain parts of that I was not too much impressed with. There were others I thought were sound. I would have to have the book to know what I was talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to ask some question about Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have an additional line of questioning about him.

Senator FERGUSON. I will come back to that, then.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will ask one question out of order.

Do you know what a Communist means when he refers to someone as a liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name here is Duncan Chapin Lee.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall meeting him. He may have been a person who came into my office or may have been in the Far East at one time. I don't recall him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Michael Lee?

Mr. VINCENT. If that is the man I think it is [reading] down in FEA at one time when I was there for a short time, I saw him in and out of FEA during that period in 1943 through January of 1944 when I was there. I don't recall seeing him since.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know him well at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I heard at one time he went to the Department of Commerce after I left Washington, or even before, maybe.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about Li Shao Chi?

Mr. VINCENT. Li Shao Chi—I don't recall meeting anybody by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the name mean anything to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. There are many Li's whose last names I would not have known.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I come back to Michael Lee for a moment? Michael Lee was in charge of far-eastern shipments in the Department of Commerce. Wouldn't it be logical to believe he was in touch with the State Department on matters pertaining to the Far East and in touch with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think while I was there—he may have been in touch with the State Department, but while I was there I was not in

touch with him. I don't think he was in charge of that operation while I was in Washington. I left in early 1947 or the middle of 1947. I can't quite place Michael Lee as of the time he went into Commerce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Ludden?

Mr. VINCENT. He is a young Foreign Service officer. I think I have him just for dates here in my book [reading]: He was a junior officer whom I may have met from time to time, but my first association with him which I recall was when he was assigned to China in 1943 somewhat before my departure for America.

I met him casually since then. He was assigned to China at Kunming. I recall in 1950 I had met him in Brussels when he was there with Mr. Bob Murphy as Ambassador and had dinner at Mr. Murphy's with him. He is back in America now and I saw him once in the State Department since he has been back. He is not one of the junior officers I have known as well as some of the others like Davies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember reading any of his reports?

Mr. VINCENT. He made reports from time to time from Kunming which I no doubt read. They don't stick in my memory, though.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will ask this question and go back on it: Did you know or did you ever have any reason to believe that Mr. Ludden was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or did you ever have any reason to believe that Michael Lee was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I ask you that question about Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe you did. I am sure you did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Selden Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. That name recalls something if you will give me a minute. I have not thought of the name in years. Can I put it in the form of a question? Was he connected with radio broadcasting? I am trying to place him as a young man.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is.

Mr. VINCENT. He was a young man who used to come in and assist during a period when we were using these broadcasts on various and sundry subjects in the State Department. If I am not mistaken, he was working with Fischer of NBC, and arranged the broadcast which General Hildring and someone else and I gave on Korea and on Japan.

I think there was a series of about four. To what extent Menefee each time was engaged in this—I would say that he came in and tried to piece these things together because they were prearranged debates on Far Eastern policy. He would get my ideas, Hildring's ideas, and patch them together, and he was an arranger of radio programs.

Mr. SOURWINE. He wrote the scripts?

Mr. VINCENT. He wrote some of them. I wrote most of mine, but he would fit it in. If you mean he arranged the scripts, he may have written some of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. In a sense of writing the script, the man who writes it is the man who puts down the words in the order in which they were said. Did you write the script or prepare a memorandum of the ideas you wished to express?

Mr. VINCENT. Menefee would come in and interview me, get that, and take out of it what I said and rearrange it to make it in the form of a conversation among the three of us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Inserting questions by others or responses by them to questions by you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that script then submitted to you for approval before you went on the air with it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it submitted also for the approval of the other participants?

Mr. VINCENT. I assume it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. As far as you know was the procedure the same in the case of the others that Mr. Menefee would interview them and then write the script?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not suggest what the others on the program should say?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know, but I don't recall in these meetings we ever met together to arrange a program.

Mr. SOURWINE. You met for the first time at the radio station?

Mr. VINCENT. In the case of Hildring we were meeting in the State Department, but insofar as the program was concerned——

Mr. SOURWINE. You would see the whole script in advance for approval?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make any suggestions in any of those scripts for changes in what any of the others said?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make suggestions for changes with regard to your own, or did Mr. Menefee do a good job of putting on paper what you had told him?

Mr. VINCENT. I no doubt made changes in the way he had put it down as to what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the scripts when they went on the air were made up of your language and not his?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as I recall they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe Mr. Menefee was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. William Mandel.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't—the first name?

Mr. MANDEL. He is an expert on the Soviet Far East, a writer, a lecturer.

Mr. VINCENT. He wrote a book which I think had to do with the Soviet, with Siberia, the Soviet eastern Siberia area. I never met him, and I don't know whether I read the book or not. I can't recall. That is the man. Thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. VINCENT. General Hurley used to call him "Mouse Tung." No; I never met him.

Mr. MANDEL. Have you read any of his works?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have reason to believe that he is connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is that connection?

Mr. VINCENT. He is now president of the Communist regime, if that is the title they use. He may be chairman of the board or chairman of the party as well.

Mr. SOURWINE. In China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he an active Communist at the time you were in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him as such then?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew him as such.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Kate Mitchell?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I never met Kate Mitchell to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know who she was?

Mr. VINCENT. She also I think was connected with the Amerasia matter, wasn't she?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that only from reading about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. V. E. Motylev? But, before you go to that name, do you know or did you have any reason to believe Kate Mitchell was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. V. E. Motylev?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have no recollection of meeting anybody by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Constantine Oumansky?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a Soviet, either chargé or ambassador, for a period. I never met him other than I think I attended the Soviet big to-do and this annual celebration where I shook his hand one time. Otherwise I had no contact with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no conferences with him on any other occasions?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or participated in conferences that he was participating in?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. J. Peters?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

You don't want me to recall when I might have met him? The name means nothing. If I met him, it made no impression.

Mr. SOURWINE. When I name one of these names—it will do no harm to refresh your recollection—I am asking two questions: Did you or do you know the individual named? Did you know by any other name an individual whom you now know or believe to be the person referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I didn't know him.

I may say we skipped that other one frequently: Did I know anybody by any other name? That is understood, is it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is understood in each case.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I don't know anybody that I might have known under some other name at other times other than somebody who might have gotten married.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mildred Price?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I ever met Mildred Price.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who she is?

Mr. VINCENT. May I look here? I went through some of those names.

Mr. MANDEL. May I refresh Mr. Vincent's memory?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I wish you would.

Mr. MANDEL. She was executive secretary of the China Aid Council.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I ever met her. If she had turned up at the IPR conference, I don't know. She may have been at a function, but I never had any contact that made any impression on my memory of her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ludwig Rajchman?

Mr. VINCENT. Ludwig Rajchman was a man out in China and associated with Mr. T. V. Soong. I think I met him here in Washington once or twice at social functions. I don't recall ever having any conferences with him on any business. He was a name well known to me in China because he was in Nanking but never when I was stationed there. He came out with the League of Nations in the first instance, or maybe not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he was ever connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Vladimir Rogoff?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall having a luncheon at the Cosmos Club in January 1944 with Rogoff and some other people. At the present time my recollection is that Bill Johnstone, of George Washington University, was there. Rogoff had some connection with Tass News Agency, I believe, and had been recently in China. I don't recall who arranged the luncheon. I did not. It could not have been Rogoff, because it was at the Cosmos Club. It was probably Johnstone. I never met him before or since.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you a member of the Cosmos Club?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

The conversation was of a general character, and it did not make such impression on me as to recall now what it was about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a long luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. It lasted longer than a luncheon would normally last. We had that little room, I think, in the Cosmos Club where you don't sit completely apart but have a little room there, and we probably stayed on, instead of 1 hour, 2 hours.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who else was there?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall other than Bill Johnstone was there. I remember talking with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Lattimore there?

Mr. VINCENT. If he was, I don't recall it. Maybe the testimony of these hearings has indicated who it was, but I don't recall who else was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought perhaps from your consultation of your notes, which you told us were prepared by people who had access to the hearings, that the notes covered what had been said in the hearings about that particular conference.

Mr. VINCENT. I have made no record here of who else was there. I remember Johnstone. I do recall other people were there, but I don't recall the names.

Mr. SOURWINE. These notes are intended to cover instances which have been made mention of in our hearings? That is, concerning you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. That is the reason some of them I have and some I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will come back to that last conference later, Mr. Chairman.

Vladimir Romm?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall. Could I ask my other question as to how I may have met him? I just don't recall him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me go back to Rogoff. Did you know or have reason to believe that he was connected in any way with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly have thought he was connected with the Communist Party, since he was a Tass correspondent.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean a Tass correspondent has to be a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't say he has to, but I would say I assume he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he has to be?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Roth?

Mr. MANDEL. You skipped Romm.

Mr. VINCENT. I said I didn't know him. Mr. Mandel had something to offer there?

Mr. MANDEL. He was the Tass correspondent sometime prior to Rogoff and was purged subsequently in Russia. He was Tass correspondent in Washington for a number of years.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever meeting him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT (reading): Andrew Roth was a young man who was in the Navy who first came to my attention when the Amerasia case broke. I don't think I knew of him before that time. I don't think I ever met Roth more than two or three times in my life, never had any business dealings with him, but know the name, and met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him before the Amerasia case broke?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall meeting him before that. He may have come into the office on one thing or another. He was particularly interested in Japan. He may have been in, but it made no impression on me. He was a man who would go around. I never had any what you would say business dealings with him that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe Mr. Roth was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. Have you read his book, Dilemma in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have not. His very recent book?

Mr. MANDEL. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Laurence Salisbury?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes [reading]: Laurence Salisbury is or was a Foreign Service officer whom I met from time to time as our paths crossed as Foreign Service officers. The first time I recall serving with Salisbury was in Nanking, China. No; he was not there. He was in Peking but came to Nanking frequently. We had a double Embassy office there. He was in Peking, and I was in Nanking. He would come down to Nanking.

I had met him before, but that was casually. When I came back to the Department in 1943, Salisbury was in the Far Eastern Office. I suppose he was handling Japanese affairs because that was his specialty. He had studied Japanese.

I will go back and say he was with the Lytton Commission that came to Manchuria in 1936. I met him there. I never saw the Lytton Commission, but I saw him. I think that would be the first time I met him.

In 1944 Salisbury became, in the reorganization, Chief of the Southeast Asian Office of the State Department. He resigned some months after that. My recollection would be either in the summer or autumn of 1944 Salisbury retired; and now he is living, so far as I know, in retirement in Connecticut. I have not seen him for many years. I have not seen him since I went to Switzerland, and I don't recall seeing him since he retired.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. There might have been correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have reason to believe he was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Stewart Service?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I have something on him [reading]: Service was a junior secretary. I was going to precede it with the fact that, Service being in the Foreign Service, I no doubt run across him in the State Department, but I am limiting myself to periods when we served together. He may have been in Shanghai for that brief 2 months I spent there, but I don't recall. I do know he came to Chungking and worked when I was there as consul under Mr. Gauss. He was one of the secretaries, the second or third.

For a while during this period he lived with Mr. Gauss and me for a short time. He was an active and intelligent young officer. I do not recall the exact date of his assignment. In 1943 Service went to General Stilwell's headquarters on loan as a sort of political adviser in the same way that Davies was lent. I don't know whether you are familiar with that arrangement, but there were about five or six of these young officers who were attached to Stilwell's headquarters to assist him in any way they could. I probably should not emphasize the word "political," although that was what they were called.

My next contact with him was in 1944 when he came home on a short vacation, and that was purely seeing him in the Department. In 1945 he was in Washington again. He was assigned at that time to the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service doing

some kind of administrative work. It was this time that the Amerasia case broke. I never discussed the case with Service, nor did I have anything to do with the Amerasia case. I did, along with some other friends, make a small contribution to assist him in the business of obtaining legal counsel at that time. I believe he repaid me.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us how that was brought about. Did he solicit you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have forgotten who did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did somebody?

Mr. VINCENT. Somebody must have started the idea of trying to get him some money. I remember Mr. Gauss was one of them that contributed. I was one, and I wouldn't know who else.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten, but it was not more than $50, and it may have been $40 or something like that. I think Service repaid it.

Mr. MANDEL. Was it an interdepartment project, or did Mortimer Graves——

Mr. VINCENT. He was another contributor.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he solicit you?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have. He may have been the person who conceived the idea of getting money for Service, although I wasn't one who would have to be prodded or solicited on the thing if I thought he needed any money.

Senator FERGUSON. What was he being accused of?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time I think the accusation was espionage.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean as a Foreign Service officer you would not need to know any of the facts but that a fellow employee in the Department was accused of espionage and that you would contribute to his defense?

Mr. VINCENT. I contributed toward helping him get a lawyer for his defense. That is exactly the case. He was not guilty.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. Did you know anything about the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. Only what I read in the papers. I had no consultation with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would you in your position contribute to a man when you didn't know whether he was guilty or not?

Mr. VINCENT. Because of a matter of friendship.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you contribute to a man who was guilty if the facts showed he was guilty?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contribute any to the Hiss defense?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked to?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To any other defense?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you made a contribution of $50, I think.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I said $40 or $50.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it paid back?

Mr. VINCENT. I could not recall, but I think Service paid it back.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion for Service paying it back?

Mr. VINCENT. He did not have any money at the time. He later got money to pay it back. I am testifying that I think he paid it back.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the only time in your life, is it, that you ever contributed to a fund for a man's defense?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know any more about it than you are telling us now?

Mr. VINCENT. Any more about what?

Senator FERGUSON. The contribution.

Mr. VINCENT. All I know is what I am telling you.

Senator FERGUSON. You certainly are not clear on what you did, when you got it back, what the facts are. You do not know who solicited you? You mean to tell us this is the only occasion and your memory is no better on this than you are giving us?

Mr. VINCENT. My memory is no better than I am giving you here.

Senator FERGUSON. Think a minute about this fund. Who solicited you?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Mandel——

Senator FERGUSON. He is not trying to——

Mr. VINCENT. I know he is not. I don't recall who solicited me. If he said Mortimer Graves solicited me, he may have.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to Graves about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Graves say about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Graves had been in touch with Service and said he needed money.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ask you for a certain amount?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask him what the facts were?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the case?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not care whether he was guilty or not? You were going to contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. I was going to contribute to a man who was in trouble who had been a friend of mine, who lived with me in Chungking just as the Ambassador did the same thing. If he had been proved guilty, but he had no money to even hire counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not a question of that. I wanted to know whether or not you asked anything about the facts before you contributed. You were a United States official, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. He was then being accused of betraying the very Government that was hiring you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you made no inquiry as to his guilt or innocence?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you contributed?

Mr. VINCENT. Before I contributed to his defense, to hiring a lawyer for his defense.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew who the lawyer was?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion for you being repaid?
Mr. VINCENT. I have said I don't recall whether I was.
Senator FERGUSON. Why?
Mr. VINCENT. If I was, I don't recall whether he did or not. I think he did. Probably he simply repaid the money when he was able. He was home on leave and had no money.
Senator FERGUSON. You don't even recall whether you were repaid this money, you say?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether I was paid it. My impression was he did repay it.
Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall the facts of the repayment?
Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you really think that is possible, that a man who once in his life makes a contribution cannot recall whether or not it was repaid to him?
Mr. VINCENT. That is my testimony, sir, that I do not recall whether Service repaid it. My impression is he did.
Senator FERGUSON. He did.
Mr. VINCENT. He did.
Senator FERGUSON. Where, here?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.
Senator FERGUSON. Your memory is blotted out as to where he may have repaid it?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes; if he repaid it. I never asked him to repay it.
Senator FERGUSON. When you made the donation or gave the money, was it understood it would be repaid?
Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. You cannot give us any more light?
Mr. VINCENT. It was not contributed with the idea it would be repaid.
Senator FERGUSON. That is all you know about it?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Service was connected in any way with the Communist movement?
Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute. If he took papers and gave them to the Communist movement, and that is what you were paying the money for, to get him a lawyer, to defend him on that, do you want your answer to stand to that last question?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. As to whether or not you knew or had any knowledge?
Mr. VINCENT. Would you read the question again, please?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Senator FERGUSON. The fact that the United States Government was accusing him, did that not raise any suspicion in your mind at all? It is your Government and mine.
Mr. VINCENT. Just a minute. At that time it was not even established, as I recall, that Amerasia itself was connected with the Communist movement.
Senator FERGUSON. No, but the fact that he was being accused of espionage, it had to be connected with some other government. You

are a Foreign Service officer, an employee of the United States. Here was the United States Government accusing a newspaper or a magazine of espionage, and Mr. Service, another Foreign Service officer, was accused in the same conspiracy. You knew that the espionage was with Russia did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew there could be espionage. I knew of none.

Senator FERGUSON. But if it was true it would be with Russia? That was the claim?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not make any inquiry about what Service was charged with?

Mr. VINCENT. Except I saw it in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not tell you?

Mr. VINCENT. It told the case.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that bring anything to your mind at all that Service may have had some connection with the Soviet?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Service in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I have just testified to that.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew him well?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

(Off the record discussion followed.)

Mr. MANDEL. Did you know he lived with Solomon Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. In China?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. If he lived with him, it was after I left Chungking. I think he was living with Mr. Gauss and myself up to the time we left.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, as a Government employee, if a man did get papers from the State Department that would get into the hands, or that he knew might get into the hands, of the Soviet Government, you would then say that if you had that knowledge that he was in some way connected with the Communists, but in this case you made no inquiry from the State Department itself whether or not Mr. Service could have taken those papers out?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You now know that the Loyalty Board has found that he did take the papers?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. And he did give them to Amerasia?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that lead you to believe on this question that he had any connection with the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. This recent thing?

Senator FERGUSON. This question is not only past, it is present.

Mr. VINCENT. If it is present, then certainly this last finding of the committee would indicate that he had this connection.

Mr. SOURWINE. With the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. Not with the Communist movement. I still do not think he thought he was having a connection with the Communist movement.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say that when the facts are that he gave it, the information, to aid the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe, sir, that Service knew when he gave those papers he was giving them aid, but I have not read his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you made inquiry?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not read the hearings of the Review Board that came out. I am here simply stating that I do not believe that Service at the time he did that felt that he was aiding the Communist Party,

Senator FERGUSON. The way you have acted in this case, with your donation and everything, you would say that it would be very difficult for the State Department itself to get the facts so that it would ever be convincing that a man had any connection with the Communist Party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. You would have to restate that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will strike that out.

You won't now believe and you have not gone into the facts to ascertain whether or not a fellow officer had any connection with the Communist Party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. You are speaking of Service?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You cannot believe that Service——

Mr. VINCENT. I find it extremely difficult to believe that Service purposely did this in order to aid the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to ask this question: You would be one of the people that the Government might want to get evidence from as to whether or not Service was connected with the Communists and took these papers out and gave them to Jaffe or Amerasia; is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you learned anything about the facts or were consulted, you made a donation to his defense?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. How would you ever be a witness in that kind of a case?

Mr. VINCENT. When you have a friend such as he was who was in trouble, I don't know that you would prejudice the case or your own attitude toward it by contributing something for him to hire legal defense when he did not have the money to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. I believe firmly in the idea that a man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but you were a fellow employee in the very Department where these papers were taken from. They were far-eastern papers and they were given to an agent of the Communists and that was the charge by your Government for which you were working. I cannot understand why you would not make some inquiry about that before you would take such a definite stand as to make a donation. I really cannot.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I am sorry I can't——

Senator FERGUSON. You made no inquiry. If you had made an inquiry and convinced yourself that he was right, then I can see why you would have donated all the money. You would have gone and testified for him.

But you were connected with the very Department that these papers came from.

Mr. VINCENT. I can only say this: That you have got to put this on the basis that he was my friend and innocent until he was proved guilty.

Senator FERGUSON. But the facts now prove that the Loyalty Board found that he did take the papers out.

Mr. VINCENT. The grand jury acquitted him at the time on the charge that was made against him insofar as——

Senator FERGUSON. Before you gave the money they had not acquitted him.

Mr. VINCENT. No, but they did afterward.

Senator FERGUSON. But you made no inquiry.

Mr. VINCENT. There was an agency in the State Department handling the whole matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you inquire from them?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anybody inquire from you about the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anybody ask whether or not you knew any papers were taken out?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, he was under you, was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How was he connected with you?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in the administrative section under the Director General of Foreign Service. He had been assigned to that division.

Senator FERGUSON. He had far eastern duties?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. He was purely in an administrative job in Selden Chapin's office.

Senator FERGUSON. How would he get his hands on the papers from the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. Most of the papers he had were his own memoranda and notes that he kept with them.

Senator FERGUSON. From the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the custom when you make a report to keep a copy?

Mr. VINCENT. It never has been my custom.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. A new name, Agnes Smedley?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall ever meeting Agnes Smedley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who she was?

Mr. VINCENT. Wasn't she a missionary? In China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to know or believe that she was ever connected in any way with the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Richard Sorge?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Mr. Mandel, does that—the name does not mean anything to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to know or believe that Mr. Sorge was ever connected with the Communist Party or with Communist activities?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I don't know him, and I therefore don't know who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is not one of the people you have read about in the papers?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Gunther Stein?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in Chungking at one time or another during the period I was there—as a newspaper man, as I recall it. I didn't see much of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where you first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. In Chungking, at what they called the press hostel there, where the newspaper people stay. I think he was again at the IPR conference, although I have no recollection of meeting him there. I just reviewed who was there and noticed he was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him socially at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond with him?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason to believe he was connected in any way with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. May I ask one question? Have you read his books and articles?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. William T. Stone?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in the State Department under William, now Senator, Benton at the time I was stationed in the State Department. I think that was his position there. I saw him from time to time on official business. I don't know that I ever saw him socially out. He was an acquaintance, you might call it, a friend in the State Department, a fellow officer.

But my associations with him were not such as to make any meeting with him stand out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or have any reason to believe he was in any way connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I know who she was, but I don't have any recollection of ever meeting her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was she?

Mr. VINCENT. She was a woman we all suspected of being a Communist out in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. VINCENT. It was while I was in Washington. I could not recall any date of when people are suspected of being a Communist. She may have declared herself to be a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say, "we all suspected her of being a Communist out in China," you mean those in the State Department here suspected that she was in China as a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know her in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know her here at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No. She may have been at one time or another at a social function or a cocktail party. She was around. She was an American citizen, but I have no recollection of ever meeting her.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what basis was she suspected of being a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say. I have no exact knowledge as to on what basis she was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say, "we all thought she was"?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge as to why.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was "we all" the whole State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. The people in the Far Eastern office who thought that Anna Louise Strong was generally considered to be, if not a Communist, very much in sympathy with them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know on what basis?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I suppose it was her associates out in China. I don't know right to this day whether she ever went up to Yenan or ever had any contacts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know her associates and who they were in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have no clear recollection of Anna Louise Strong's activities. I can tell you that it was the general impression she was either a Communist or a sympathizer.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have no facts, it must have been the case someone told you that she was suspected of being a Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not remember anybody telling me. It was just a general impression that one got of Anna Louise Strong. If you asked me the question, Do I recall anybody telling me she was a Communist——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know with whom she associated?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out how you got your general impression. It was the process of osmosis in the Far Eastern division?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall. There were no doubt instances of somebody saying that she has an association with this or that person, but I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it was a matter of inferences which you drew from specific information that at one time you had?

Mr. VINCENT. That at one time may have come to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Laurence Todd?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't recall knowing Laurence Todd.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here is another Chinese name, Tung Pi-wu?

Mr. VINCENT. Oh, yes. He was the Chinese Communist that Chiang Kai-shek sent to San Francisco for the United Nations Conference, and I recall meeting him out there along with the other Chinese delegates. I don't recall having any close association with him and wouldn't know him if I saw him now, but he was a member of the Chinese delegation to the U. N. I think I met him with others of the general delegation because my job was to keep in contact with the delegates from China and from other countries.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him before that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Julian Wadleigh?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall him or ever having met him.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Paul Walsh?
Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I don't recall him.
Mr. SOURWINE. Harry Dexter White?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes [reading]: He was, as you know, in the Treasury Department. My first distinct recollection of meeting him was when I came back from Geneva in 1945, and again it was the discussion of the Chinese stabilization loan. I may have met him before then, but I had no business with him. I may have met him at a luncheon but was not socially acquainted. I don't think I ever met his wife, never was in his home.

But we did have discussions then. After I came back from China, there was from time to time matters concerning China of a financial character which we went over. I remember one conference in Secretary Morgenthau's office which was concerned with assistance to China of one form or another. Outside of that I think the last time I ever saw him—maybe I saw him later—was at the Bretton Woods Conference when I went there just for one day to discuss a matter of paying for an airfield with the Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have reason to believe that he was in any way connected with the Communist movement?
Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now I have a much shorter list of names. Some of them are names we have mentioned. The question is, What position did you take in reference to the loyalty status of this individual in the State Department?
Mr. VINCENT. What position did I take?
Mr. SOURWINE. If you took any position at any time with reference to the loyalty of the person named, please say so. If you did take a position, please explain fully what the circumstances were.
Alger Hiss?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Cora DuBois?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. John K. Emmerson?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Robert W. Barnett?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Julian R. Friedman?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. John P. Davies?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Wilma Fairbank?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Laurence Salisbury?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. John Stewart Service?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Ludden?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. William T. Stone?
Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. By your answers do you mean you never at any time were asked regarding the loyalty of any of those persons questioned in that connection?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was never questioned.

Senator FERGUSON. You never expressed an opinion in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you were never questioned.

Were you ever questioned?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never questioned as to the status of their loyalty.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to their loyalty?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You were never questioned in the Service loyalty hearings?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You would recall that?

Mr. VINCENT. That I certainly would.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not serve with Service and Davies in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Nobody ever asked you a question about them?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you were never approached by the FBI with regard to the loyalty of any of these persons?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Really, I cannot understand this.

Mr. SOURWINE. They must have gone around Mr. Vincent, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Here you were, a fellow working out in the Far East with these people. It is notorious now that they have had charges before the Department as well as before the Loyalty Board. You have never been consulted about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Throughout this whole period of these loyalty hearings I have been in Switzerland, and no one ever approached me with regard to any one of them.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not have a case before the Loyalty Board?

Mr. VINCENT. My case before the Loyalty Board?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a case before the Loyalty Board?

Mr. VINCENT. Mine is finished now.

Senator FERGUSON. You did have one?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. No one asked you any questions about these other people?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Or about any person in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In connection with their loyalty?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall anybody approaching me, in Switzerland, since I have come back, or before, regarding the loyalty status of anyone.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew at the time of Service's arrest there was a Loyalty Board?

Mr. VINCENT. Was there one in 1945?
Senator FERGUSON. Was there not?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so.
Senator FERGUSON. Not in the Department?
Mr. VINCENT. No; not that I recall. I think the Loyalty Board system came into existence after 1945.
Mr. MANDEL. There was a Security Board in the Department, was there not?
Mr. VINCENT. There was a Security Office or Division there.
Mr. SOURWINE. This question and your answer to it included even the Security Office or officer of the Department?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. We have concluded that list of names. Do you have any names in your memoranda that we have not asked you about?
Mr. VINCENT. I will check on it. I went through some of these.
Mr. SOURWINE. I want to give you an opportunity to get them in, and this is a good time for it.
Mr. VINCENT. Let me ask you, because I notice that T. A. Bisson was mentioned in connection with me. Did you ask me about Bisson?
Mr. SOURWINE. I believe so.
Mr. VINCENT. I know, because you asked something about it yesterday.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Bisson was on this list of names?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether you ever asked me whether I had any acquaintance with Mr. Edward C. Carter.
Mr. SOURWINE. No.
Mr. VINCENT. I have him here [reading]: My acquaintance with him has been slight and brief. My first recollection of meeting him was in 1943 when I returned from Chungking. He came into the office and wanted to talk about China. That was when I attended the Hot Springs conference of the IPR.
Mr. SOURWINE. Please go through your notes now. Are there any others?
Mr. VINCENT. You asked me about Wilma Fairbank. Did you ask about her husband?
Mr. SOURWINE. John? No.
Mr. VINCENT (reading). I met Dr. Fairbank when he was in China in 1942. I believe he was with OSS and later with OWI. We saw each other in Chungking socially and on official business.
Later in Washington I believe he was with OWI. I saw him from time to time.
As I testified, my wife was a good friend of his wife. We visited Dr. Fairbank at Harvard when he passed through Cambridge last year. I made that testimony also.
Senator FERGUSON. You never knew he had any connection with the Communist Party?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator FERGUSON. Or you had no reason to believe that he did?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know him to be a left-winger?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator FERGUSON. A New Dealer?
Mr. VINCENT. I suppose he was sympathic with the New Deal. I don't know. I never discussed it.

I have made notes here if you want them on where and when I have met Dr. Jessup. You have not asked me about him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wish you would go through your notes and pick up any names you have not been asked about.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). My first recollection of meeting Dr. Jessup was at the Hot Springs conference of the IPR in 1945, or perhaps at a preliminary conference of the American delegation to that conference in the autumn of 1944. It is quite possible I met Dr. Jessup from time to time after that, either in Washington or New York, but I do not recall the occasions.

I last saw Dr. Jessup in Paris in May 1951, when he was attending the conference there on the agenda of the foreign ministers.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one question on Fairbank. Did you ever know him to be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know Owen Lattimore to be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many of these people outside of Mao Tse-tung and the ones you said you knew to be Communists did you know to be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have called any of them pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Even Julian Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. None of them were pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Did you mention Dr. Johnstone? We have mentioned him from time to time here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whom do you mean?

Mr. VINCENT. William Johnstone of George Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned him.

Mr. VINCENT. I have just a brief note on him [reading]: I knew him as dean of George Washington University and as head of the Washington office of the IPR for a while.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of what is he a doctor?

Mr. VINCENT. He is just a Ph. D., I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is is a young man?

Mr. VINCENT. Forty-five, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. It has become the habit that you call almost everyone doctor in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I don't think so. He is not in the State Department. He was dean of George Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean IPR and people connected with that. You have named some of the others doctor.

Mr. VINCENT. Dr. Chi. He has his doctor's degree from one of the Peking universities. At least he was called doctor there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Johnstone, dean did you say?

Mr. VINCENT. At George Washington University, sir. Whether he is there now, I do not know, because I haven't seen him for years. He was at the IPR conference at Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was also at this luncheon at the Cosmos Club?

Mr. VINCENT. He was also at the luncheon at the Cosmos Club.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, you think he was the man that invited you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I haven't seen him since those days. I have here another Chinese whose name has been mentioned in connection also with Chou En Lai, Lin Piao.

I might say, since we are mentioning that, do you want me to say also that I had never reason to believe that Dr. Johnstone was connected with the Communist Party or a pro-Communist?

Mr. SOURWINE. If that is the fact, I wish you would.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, suppose I put it this way: If they are Communists I will say I knew them to be Communists, and the ones I have here, I do know to be Communists [reading]:

He was in Chungking during the winter, Gen. Lin Piao, incidentally, he was in Chungking during the winter of 1942–43 while I was there. He was there at the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek to discuss measures of military cooperation in fighting the Japanese.

I have no clear recollection of meeting him, but it was quite possible I did. Perhaps at a reception at Chiang Kai-shek's, or perhaps at some other function.

I do not recall any conversations with him.

I do recall a report made by one of our young officers on the conversation with Lin Piao, the primary object of which was to get information regarding the military situation in Communist areas. I didn't speak Chinese well enough to talk with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a man by the name of Asiaticus?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. Could I look at it?

No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you pronounce that?

Mr. MANDEL. Asiaticus.

Mr. VINCENT. It isn't anybody's name.

Mr. MANDEL. Also known as Hans Moeller or Heinz Moeller.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Heinz Moeller?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Han Seng?

Mr. VINCENT. No; that is a name that has something in my mind, but I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. That name was on the list, and Mr. Vincent was asked about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Chi?

Mr. VINCENT. He is the man I was asked about; he was Dr. Chi, if he is a doctor.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say about a person who would write this language:

> I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the Chinese section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspect, but can be depended upon to do it with the right touch.

What would that convey to you?

Mr. VINCENT. That, I think, is a part of that letter that was read into the record, wasn't it? The whole letter?

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with the letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What does that convey to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Taken out of context, it would certainly convey to me, and I don't recall the whole letter——

Senator FERGUSON. There is the paragraph. That is not taking it out of context.

Mr. VINCENT. But my recollection is, Senator, that there was some other paragraph in it that indicated that the intent of it was entirely different. But if you asked me, I think that that would indicate that the people, taking that out of context, that the people writing it had some—I don't know what you call it—ideas in mind, which were somewhat "subterfugeous."

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean that they were trying to get across something. Would you read that again?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the Chinese section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would say that I have no opinion on that, without seeing the whole letter, Senator, because I don't know quite what he means by the radical aspects of it, or the right touch.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think a person was pro-Communist that would write that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. A person that would bring out the radical, would do it with the right touch?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I wouldn't necessarily call him pro-Communist. I already testified that I didn't have knowledge that Chi was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that some of these persons he was talking about were Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes?

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified that I don't know Chi was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Or that Han-seng was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I didn't know Chen Han-seng, and I think I testified that I knew of him only as a professor.

Is that the whole letter?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I have the whole letter. That is all, go ahead.

Mr. VINCENT. The name occurred somewhere of James S. Allen, and I simply say I haven't any knowledge of ever having met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he was?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your notes do not indicate it?

Mr. VINCENT. No. To the best of my knowledge I have never met James Allen and don't have any recollection of who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. I have the name here of Hilda Austern and I say she, I have learned, was Mr. Carter's secretary. I may have met her in Hot Springs conference. I have no recollection of her or any meeting.

I have testified on Edmund Clubb, haven't we?

We have testified on Ludden.

Did you ask me about a man named Little?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. I have him here for some reason, and have said I haven't any recollection of having met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not ask you.

Mr. VINCENT. And Ford. I don't recall why I have it here.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is Little's name?

Mr. VINCENT. Ballard.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not know anything about him except that you have a note on him that you don't know him, and never did?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know him, and never did.

You asked me about Earl Browder, didn't you?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. What was the name after Mr. Little?

Mr. VINCENT. Anne Ford.

Mr. SOURWINE. A woman?

Mr. VINCENT. A woman, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. A-n-n?

Mr. VINCENT. A-n-n-e.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was she?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Except that you have a note that you know nothing about her?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Somewhere the name cropped up.

Mr. SURREY. I think the name was in the committee hearings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are those notes in your handwriting?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not know in what connection the name Anne Ford came to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have no idea. But I believe it was a name that came up in these hearings.

You have asked me about Robert Barnett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Evans Carlson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I think you asked me about a fellow named Abraham Chapman.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. You didn't?

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was he?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know him, and I don't know why he was mentioned.

Mr. SURREY. That was another name that came up in the hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all. That concludes your recounting of the names in your list that we did not ask you about?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, sir, whether Mr. Owen Lattimore was ever called in to advise the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he ever came in to advise the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might he have come in to advise the Secretary without your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. He could have easily come in to the Secretary without my knowledge. Are you speaking of the current Secretary, or at any time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Ex officio, or any time.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever advise you?

Mr. VINCENT. When you say advise me, he came into my office when he was OWI Director of Pacific Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he advise with you?

Mr. VINCENT. He advised with me on the program of the OWI in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he advised the Secretary of State on the same thing?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever ask him to advise you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever ask his advice about anything?

Mr. VINCENT. Probably on far eastern matters, on China matters; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You considered him as an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. On these areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had been available to you, you would have asked him; wouldn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. You probably would have taken it?

Mr. VINCENT. That would depend on the character of the advice.

Mr. SOURWINE. Expert advice?

Mr. VINCENT. Expert advice on these Inner Asian frontiers, yes; I would have taken the advice.

Mr. SOURWINE. His advice would have weighed most heavily in your mind on any far eastern matters, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly have paid attention to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, when the occasion presented itself, as often as you had opportunity, you did discuss with him matters about which you could use or needed such expert advice?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, have you completed a full discussion of any efforts that you ever made to assist in securing an appointment for Mr. Lattimore to a job in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you stated that Mr. Ballantine approved that appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection. I haven't seen it, but it would normally go through with him, and I am sure it did go through him. He was the director of the Far Eastern Office at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that involve any recommendation by you for appointment of Mr. Lattimore in any capacity or to perform any work or duties in or with the China subdivision of the Far Eastern section?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the general idea, that he would come in for a day or so a week and prepare background material, as Dr. Kennedy was doing, on these Inner Asia areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is where he was to work as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. When he came from Baltimore; yes, sir. In the Far Eastern office. But he probably would have worked in the China division, where the Inner Asian frontiers were in my division at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Lattimore the fact that his application had been rejected after the rejection had taken place?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did. He probably wanted to know why and I told him why.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you told him what had been told you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I told him he couldn't have it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any present recollection of that conversation or conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have my mind refreshed, because I don't think I knew at the time; but I am talking about the president of Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to distinguish in your testimony between what might have happened and what you remember happened.

I wish, if it meets the Chairman's pleasure, that the witness would endeavor not to say "this might have happened" or "that might have happened," unless he remembers that it did happen, or he has some reason to believe that it did happen. That is, please do not use that phrase as pure speculation, as a hypothesis without any basis.

Mr. VINCENT. All right; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That should make the record clear.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Lattimore received an appointment and served as adviser to Mr. Pauley in connection with his so-called repatriation mission to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that at a time when you were head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What, if anything, did you have to do with Mr. Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Pauley?

Mr. VINCENT. Nothing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not for my approval.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about it at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did recommend him?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how it came about?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or whether Lattimore asked for it, or initiated it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss it with Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk with Lattimore about it after he left the university for the Pauley mission?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you discuss with Lattimore the Pauley report after he got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no independent recollection of it in either case?

Mr. VINCENT. No; after Lattimore got back, I do recall that Lattimore came in and I was obviously anxious to find out what the conditions were out there, and we had a discussion about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not discuss the Pauley report as such?

Mr. VINCENT. No doubt, but I don't recall discussing the Pauley report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore had a hand in writing that report; did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And when talking about it, did you not discuss his handiwork, as one expert to another, discuss his craftsmanship in that report?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of the discussion itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection of the discussion having taken place?

Mr. VINCENT. No, but as I say no doubt one took place. I am trying to make a distinction between what you asked me now, if I have a recollection of, you might say, a discussion at a particular time. But I would say that it no doubt took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record will not carry implications that are not testified, do you even know whether Mr. Lattimore had anything to do with the Pauley report?

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified that he certainly must have had something to do with it. He went with Mr. Pauley; he was with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. He could have been with him without having anything to do with the report; could he not? That could have been one of those things that could have been.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say to what extent he participated in drafting the report, but I say I assume that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out whether you discussed it, or whether it was another thing that might have happened.

Mr. VINCENT. It might have happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not recall discussing it with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that we discussed drafting the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was a good friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he did participate, he had a hand in the drafting; but you have no memory of discussing that job?

Mr. VINCENT. No memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Even saying "That was a fine job"?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't recall saying it was a fine job.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read the report?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't—I don't recall reading it; but I certainly must have read the Pauley report in the office.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not so clear on the answer that you gave that the Secretary of State would not hire Lattimore in the Department.

Why did he say he would not hire him?

Mr. VINCENT. It wasn't the Secretary at that time, Senator. It was Mr. Grew who was Under Secretary. Mr. Grew told me that he could not approve the job for him because he was engaged in publicity to the extent that he thought it would be unwise to have a man in the State Department who was doing that publicity. He was writing for a couple of newspapers or so, and he was contributing articles.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, to be afraid that he would leak things out in these articles?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, he wasn't going to give up his articles, and that therefore it was a situation that——

Senator FERGUSON. That could be the reason; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That could be the reason. I don't know that he would have.

Senator FERGUSON. But that was Grew's attitude in saying "Now, this man is writing for these articles, and so forth, and we cannot have him here because he will get information that he may use in the articles"; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore ever delivered a lecture to personnel of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any occasion of his delivering a lecture to the personnel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Suppose we say the word "lecture" is broad enough to include talks, briefings, informative addresses.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; as I say, it is quite possible he did, but I don't recall the occasion of Mr. Lattimore delivering an address.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you recall the occasion of his having delivered more than one? Or how many?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have anything to do with arranging or approving any such lecture or lectures?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall approving a lecture.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever instruct any of your subordinates to attend such a lecture?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Roswell Hartsen Whitson?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he was?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Whitson is a man who is alleged to have made a written report to the State Department stating that General MacArthur could not be trusted for either ability or knowledge of affairs in the Far East. Did you ever see or hear of such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there had been such a report officially transmitted through channels to the State Department, you would have seen it, if it had come in during the period you were head of the Far Eastern division; would you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily.

Do you mean General MacArthur was writing to him?

Mr. SOURWINE. This was supposed to be a report by Mr. Whitson.

Mr. VINCENT. You don't know the period of that?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am attempting to ascertain whether you can give us the date.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know the name, and I have no recollection of such a report.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would be a fairly sure thing, then, that you never recommended Mr. Whitson for employment?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly would be, if I don't know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or for promotion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is Kim Koo-sek?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, he is a Korean. That I can tell from the name. But I don't know him, Kim Koo-sek. He had something to do with the general political situation, either in Korea or when there were a bunch of Koreans up in Yenan.

But I can't place Kim Koo-sek at this moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for employment?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for a promotion?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him to replace Syngman Rhee on any mission or trip?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, or have you any reason to believe, that Kim Koo-sek is or was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No; was he?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not know, or did you not know, that he was a Moscow-trained Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I would have to go back over the whole record. I may at one time have known him, but you are asking me now what I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am making an effort not to be argumentative in any of these questions. We simply want to ask them and get your answer.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When did leave the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. In the middle of 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of an order going out, or instructions, to General Hodge to advise the Koreans that they had to take Communists into their Government?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know anything about that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't remember any order telling that.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever consulted about that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, it happened in China. You said the instructions that went out for Marshall were that he was to take them in and consolidate, and so forth. Did you know the same thing that happened in there?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me go back. No instructions went out to Marshall to take the Communists into the Government. It was his own directive.

Senator FERGUSON. It was his directive, you said, to take them in?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether a directive to General Hodge, or any other public official in Korea, to take them in in Korea was made?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the International Assets Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean the International Assets Commission in Switzerland? It is not called that there, I don't think.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is it called?

Mr. VINCENT. It has no name, as I recollect. But I have a paper on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there an organization which comes to your mind when I say "What is the International Assets Commission"?

Mr. VINCENT. There is.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is that organization?

Mr. VINCENT. It is not an organization; but it is a committee in Bern made up of the representatives of the four legations there. I have it right here, and I can give you a statement on that [reading]:

After the Japanese surrender the Japanese Government, pursuant to SCAP directive, instructed its missions in neutral countries to turn over all Japanese state property to the custody of the neutral governments for eventual transfer to representatives of the Allied Powers.

In February of 1946 the Swiss Government transferred the Japanese Legation and Archives in Bern and all Japanese state funds in Switzerland to the custody of the United States, British, and Chinese Legations in Bern.

Sometime later, when Switzerland accorded recognition to the U. S. S. R., and the U. S. S. R. established a legation in Bern, the Russians were admitted into this group on their insistence. This is all something that happened before I went to Switzerland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the French a part of that group?

Mr. VINCENT. The French were not.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the Chinese were?

Mr. VINCENT. They were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the Nationalist Chinese?

Mr. VINCENT. That was [reading]:

By agreement, the British assumed the duties of day-to-day administration of the assets. I might define them a little more clearly. It was not just the Japanese Legation, but there was a certain amount of money in the bank that the Japanese had there.

Whenever any relatively important operation was to be carried out, such as major repairs to the Japanese Legation, it was accomplished after agreement by all four legations on the steps to be taken. This was sort of a rent contract. The Chinese were paying for the Legation.

The various legations were represented in these affairs by first or second secretaries. I never attended one. The meetings of these representatives were informal and, in general, when action was taken, it was taken by unanimous agreement.

There were never any formal rules laid down for these proceedings. It was no doubt tacitly assumed by all representatives that each legation had the power of veto.

This matter, however, was never put to test until the arrival in Bern of the diplomatic mission of the Chinese Peoples Republic.

Following the departure of the Japanese diplomats from Bern, their premises were rented by the Chinese Nationalist Government for its Legation.

The Chinese Nationalist mission left Bern in February of 1950, shortly after the recognition by the Swiss Government of the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communists, however, did not send a mission to Bern until December of 1950.

At this time, the former Japanese Legation premises were vacant, although efforts had been made to rent them after the departure of the Chinese Nationalists.

Our Legation learned informally from the Swiss Foreign Office through the British Legation, as administrator of the property, that the Chinese Communists were interested in renting the property. The British were not enthusiastic about the prospect of renting the property to them, but the British were being pressed by the Swiss Foreign Office, which was under a duty to use its best efforts to find space for the Chinese mission.

The British had recognized Communist China a year or so before.

Our Legation reported the matter to the Department of State before the question was raised in a meeting of the interested powers in Bern. We stated that normally we would maintain a united front with the British on these things, but that there might be objections in this case. We requested the Department's instructions.

We were informed that the Department definitely opposed the renting of the former Japanese Legation to Chinese Communists.

About a month later, our Legation received a letter from the British Legation enclosing a note from the Swiss Foreign Office requesting an agreement to rent the Japanese Legation to the Chinese Communists. The British were told that we were opposed to this.

At the same time, the Chief of the Foreign Office—that is what we would call the Secretary of State—interceded in an interview with me. He called me to his office. I told him that we were opposed to renting the building to the Chinese Communists.

In view, however, of the fact that the Chief of the Swiss Foreign Office had made a personal approach on this matter, I told him that I would send his request to the Department of State. This was done, and the Department replied that they were opposed to renting the Legation to the Communists and would interpose a veto if necessary.

Another question arose after this. The British Foreign Office authorized the British Legation to treat the Chinese Communist representatives as entitled to have a voice in the administration of the Japanese state property in Switzerland. One was the Legation, it was state property, and there was also money in the bank which we didn't do much about. It was just there.

I reported this to the Department, and adding that unless instructed to the contrary, I intended to inform the British that the United State could not approve of such action. That ended the matter,

and since that time the administration of Japanese assets in Switzerland have been carried on with the participation of only the United States, British, and Soviet Legations.

The former Japanese Legation, the last time I heard of it, had no tenant.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not at any time a member of the organization?

Mr. VINCENT. As Minister I was head of the Legation and the secretary who attended these meetings was sent by me. I never attended a meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there never were any Chinese assets turned over or former Japanese assets turned over to the Chinese Communist Government as a result of any action taken by that organization?

Mr. VINCENT. No; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor any such turning over in which you concurred?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

And before I left Bern, the Chinese Communist group has found some other place to live, as I gather. I may add in that connection, to show my relation, I was the only person who gave a farewell reception for the Chinese Nationalist Minister, Dr. Wu.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in what year?

Mr. VINCENT. That was 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean in regard to Mr. Wu.

Mr. VINCENT. I mean in regard to all this thing coming up here. It was late 1950 and 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am jumping around here a bit, necessarily. I have some matters that I have no date on. I cannot put them in chronologically.

What, if anything, do you know about a plan or plans, or concerted movements, to remove various officers from positions in the Department of State connected with far-eastern affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, now, that brings up two questions. I mean, two people. I have seen Mr. Dooman's testimony, and I would be glad to explain that. I am thinking now of Mr. Dooman's testimony that I was at least a part in the removal of Mr. Dooman, Mr. Ballantine, and Mr. Grew.

Nothing could be further from the truth. I was in Potsdam with Mr. Dooman during July, at the Potsdam Conference. He and I were rather close together. Such a scheme as removing anybody was never mentioned to me and between us. He and I traveled back together to London to attend a short UNRRA conference as far-eastern people. We both came home, sometime in the middle of August.

I saw him one day coming into the Department with a suitcase, and I remember saying to him, "I thought you were going in the other direction."

With that, he passed on by. I asked for, and got permission, to take leave in New Hampshire. I went up there to a place, up around Hancock and some other little place, and only 3 days after I had been there—and I say this as indicating how ignorant I was of how developments were—and having spent money to get up there, I had a telephone call from Mr. Ballantine to come back; that I was wanted in Washington.

He did not explain what it was. When I came back he told me, and later Acheson told me, that they wanted me to be Director of the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when that was?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in the latter part of August. It wasn't early September, because I was back here by the end of August.

I had, as I say, only 2 days' leave up there. I was ignorant as anybody could have been of what the plans were for my future. I was at that time Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got back here?

Mr. VINCENT. And in August, when I got back from Potsdam, I took off, I should say, within a few days because I had already gotten permission to be away for a short vacation with my wife in New Hampshire. I didn't see Acheson except a short time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were called back from that vacation and stepped into Mr. Dooman's shoes, so to speak?

Mr. VINCENT. I took over Mr. Dooman's job at the end of August, as Chairman of the FESWNCC, and on the 19th or 20th of September, I took over Mr. Ballantine's job, and he was made special assistant to the Secretary.

Mr. Dooman resigned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has there ever been any controversy anywhere about those dates?

Mr. VINCENT. About those particular dates?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, when you took over from Mr. Dooman, either at SWNCC or head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as far as I am concerned. But I know that the record shows that I attended the first SWNCC meeting, subcommittee of the SWNCC on, I think September 1.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in that position as head of the Far Eastern Committee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. In that position, I was ex officio head of the FESWNCC Committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to repeat that question about controversy, because it could be that you misunderstood it.

To your knowledge, has any controversy arisen about those dates, when you took over from Mr. Dooman, either as head of the FESWNCC Committee, or as head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it a controversy. I know what you are referring to because at one time, in a situation which I think that you know about, I had thought that my position and duties as head of SWNCC were coincidental of my becoming head of the Far Eastern Office. I later checked the record and found that I became head of SWNCC earlier than I became head of the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify before the Loyalty Board, as you have testified here, with regard to those dates?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified before the Loyalty Board that I did not recall becoming head of SWNCC until I became director.

I subsequently checked on the record and corrected that testimony, which is now that I chairmaned the meeting on the first.

Mr. SOURWINE. The correct date now on all records is as you have given it here?

Mr. VINCENT. There was never any formal appointment. But I found that I did attend as chairman a meeting on the first of September.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know of any plan or plans or movement with regard to the removal of Mr. Dooman or getting rid of Mr. Dooman?

Mr. VINCENT. No, and I had nothing to do with it.

I would like to put this on the record, that I considered myself a friend of Eugene Dooman. We were very close at Potsdam. I suppose we spent more time together than any other two people, because we didn't have much to do. We were not called on to attend the conference or anything else.

I never realized that Mr. Dooman had resentment against me. I may be naive.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a question I would like to ask.

You brought up this morning in your testimony about your loyalty board. What were the charges against you at the loyalty hearing?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I am not at liberty, I am told, to reveal the charges against me.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean you are forbidden by the Secretary of State; is that it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that the revelation of the thing is in order at all. I have to say that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you say you are forbidden.

Mr. VINCENT. You see, there has not been any decision in the case yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you know what you are charged with.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but I am not at liberty to reveal anything about the Loyalty Board hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking about the hearings.

You did reveal here something about the testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. The charge is a part of the hearings. I did that simply to correct a misapprehension.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand that you are not allowed to disclose what you are charged with?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Who told you that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know who told me that, but I don't think it is in order to disclose them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you consulted counsel about that, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. SURREY. I consulted the Loyalty Board, and we were advised that we were not to reveal, not in connection with this hearing, not to reveal anything connected with the Board hearings except on their approval, and they included "or anything on the record of the Board hearings."

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chairman has asked a specific question. The witness has stated in several different terms what appears to be his intention not to answer. I think it is understood, or should be clear, that that is, in fact, a refusal to answer the question, a respectful and polite refusal, but a refusal to answer the question.

I am trying to find out on what basis that refusal is made, and I am asking the witness, if you do not mind, whether the witness has consulted counsel in connection with his refusal.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what basis do you base that refusal?

Mr. VINCENT. I base it on the fact that any proceedings of the Loyalty Board or the charges are not a basis for this discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, your refusal is a challenge to the right of this committee to ask the question?

Mr. VINCENT. You are using legal language.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are an extremely intelligent man, sir, and I am sure I am not using language beyond your comprehension when I say you are basing it as a challenge to the authority of this committee, rather than claiming the privilege. You know what I mean by challenge to the authority of this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I know that I am not at liberty to reveal hearings before the Loyalty Review Board, of which the charges are a part.

Mr. SOURWINE. You feel that this committee does not have the right to compel you to answer the question?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know about the jurisdiction of the committee to compel me to answer the question, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are refusing to answer, and you do not mean to be contemptuous of the committee, I am sure.

Mr. VINCENT. Certainly I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the committee has the power to require you to answer that question, and you refuse, you are being contemptuous of the committee. You would realize that, would you not?

Mr. VINCENT. You have turned that around there where I can't answer.

All I know is that I have to go back to my original statement that, from my understanding of the statement, I am not at liberty to reveal the hearings before the Board, which would include, to my mind, the charges themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you intending to claim your privilege under the fifth amendment, your privilege against self-incrimination?

I am not trying to trap you, sir. If you intend to claim that privilege, you have to so state. Otherwise, it is not a claim of that privilege. I am not urging you to claim that privilege. Your counsel is there, and I suggest you consult with him and then advise the committee on what basis you are refusing to answer the question. Take as long as you want.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your answer?

Mr. VINCENT. (after conferring with counsel). My answer is I don't want to claim immunity under the fifth amendment and that as far as I know the documents which brought the charges against me would come under a category the same as the State Department documents, and that I will ask permission to reveal to the committee, if they want, the charges that were brought against me.

I have no desire, particularly, to hide them myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you receive a specification of charges in writing?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they marked as classified when you received them?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall, sir. I don't recall whether it was confidential, but I imagine it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you do not recall that it was classified, how can you claim that it was classified?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was classified, then.

Mr. SOURWINE. How was it classified?

Mr. VINCENT. Confidential.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your contention that this committee, in executive session, has no right to question you about matters which are classified as confidential?

Mr. VINCENT. I should not say that; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you contending that you are refusing to answer this question because the matter was classified or confidential?

Mr. VINCENT. I am refusing because of my original statement, that I didn't think I was at liberty to reveal them. I have no objection myself to revealing them to this committee, and we have gone over them here quite extensively, what the charges were.

I think they extend in large measure from the same things we have gone over here.

If I just consulted my own self, and I have not a clear knowledge of this Loyalty Board business, I would not have the slightest objection to telling you what the general charges were.

But I would like to clarify it with the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have arrived at a situation, by the asking of the question, and the witness' reluctance to answer it, which challenges the jurisdiction of the committee. I feel it is my duty to make a full record on it here for whatever consideration the committee might want to give to it later.

I want to give the witness every opportunity to consult with counsel and place his refusal, if he persists, on whatever basis he wishes.

As it stands now, I would say it appears that the basis of the refusal is simply that the witness does not want to answer. If there is another basis, if you have received orders or instructions not to answer such questions, or questions of this particular class, I wish you would tell the committee so.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I can find out from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not the question.

Have you been instructed not to answer that question?

Mr. VINCENT. It is my impression, as I go back again, that anything connected with my Loyalty Board hearing are not for——

Senator FERGUSON. Who told you that?

Mr. VINCENT. The legal adviser in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is that?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Fisher.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Fisher told you that you were not to answer any question relating to anything that concerned the Loyalty Board hearings?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Loyalty Board hearings were not to be released.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you discuss with Mr. Fisher your appearance before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I discussed it with him from time to time during the last month, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask his advice, or did he give it unasked?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall the definite advice. Are you speaking of the specific question?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am speaking about advice in connection with your appearance before this committee. Did you ask his advice, or did he volunteer?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall. But I recall the letter which the State Department wrote that the loyalty trial, of which I considered the charges to be a part, is one that only the President can release.

Mr. SOURWINE. What letter do you refer to?

Mr. VINCENT. I refer to the letter which the committee received from the State Department just the day before yesterday, or whenever it was, the letter from the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department has refused the committee certain files, but we are not asking you for any files. We are asking you for a matter that is within your knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Not what is in the file—what is in your knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. But I simply am at a loss to know whether the charges are a part of the loyalty file. If they are a part of the loyalty file——

Senator FERGUSON. We are not asking for the files.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will have another opportunity to testify before us, sir, and I will simply ask this: At the present time, for the record, do you want your respectful refusal to answer that question to stand?

Mr. VINCENT. I want at least an opportunity to review the thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not going to answer the question now, are you? I am trying to give you every possible opportunity.

Mr. SURREY. May I consult with him a minute?

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course.

Mr. VINCENT (after conferring with counsel). I would not want to put a respectful refusal, but to have an opportunity to find out whether the Presidential order with regard to releasing loyalty files includes those charges.

Senator FERGUSON. Includes your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; includes my knowledge of the thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not the custodian of any loyalty files, are you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, we cannot tell now, but you may have avoided many answers here on the grounds that there is something in the loyalty proceedings about it.

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir. I have not.

Senator FERGUSON. But I say you could under this arrangement.

Mr. SOURWINE. This particular question, however, at this time, the witness respectfully refuses to answer. I do not mean to put words in your mouth, but is that the way you want the record to stand?

Mr. VINCENT. May I consult counsel, because I don't know whether that is considered to be contempt of the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will put it another way: The question has been asked; will you now answer it? Will you say "Yes" or "No"? Will you answer the question?

Mr. VINCENT. My counsel has now told me, and which clarifies matters considerably, that, if you wish, I will be glad to tell you the three or four questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the question. The question itself is much less material than the refusal to answer.

Mr. VINCENT. It was divided into three questions, three statements: One, that I was pro-Communist, according to reports that had been received, I assume, through the FBI investigation.

The second one was that I was a member of the Communist Party. There was no indication in these letters as to what that springs from, but I assume it comes from testimony of Mr. Budenz.

The third one was association with people about whom the Department had derogatory information. I can't recall the names, but I am sure that every one of them has been gone over here.

There was Lattimore, Currie—I would have to get the list there. But, as I say, there were five or six names. Those are the three charges that I had to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anybody else besides Lattimore and Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. I could look at the letter. I think every one of them would come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. They have been covered here, anyway?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Adler—I am guessing now. Let me look at this. There were Adler, Currie, Field, Strong—Anna Louise Strong——

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think you put Lattimore in that last answer.

Mr. VINCENT. Lattimore was one of them; Adler was one of them; Field was one of them; Rogoff may have been one of them; I don't know, but I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified, sir, with regard to many of those persons.

Mr. VINCENT. I can assure you that if I got the letter that I have testified to with regard every one of them, because it is a limited number of eight. With the number we have gone over here, I am quite sure we covered those eight.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was phrasing the question a little bit differently. You have testified with regard to a number of those persons that you do not know or have any reason to believe that they were in any way connected with the Communist activities or the Communist movement.

Now, you want that question to stand as of the present time, in view of the fact that some of these names are names which have been included as Communist or pro-Communists in charges against you?

Mr. VINCENT. They were not called Communists or pro-Communists, but about whom the Department—I recall the phrase—"had derogatory information."

I gave the same testimony with regard to them that I have given here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I just wanted to be sure that you did not want to make any change in your testimony in that regard.

Senator FERGUSON. And you know of no derogatory information as far as these men are concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I know of none now. But what information the Department had——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you what they had, but to your knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Well, Senator, let me correct that in connection with Anna Louise Strong. She was one covered. I said that I never knew her.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have made clear testimony in that regard.

Mr. VINCENT. But the Senator asked me if I myself had any knowledge of derogatory information.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think he meant with respect to those that you have so testified to today.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did not know her?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you say, when you did associate with Field, you did not know anything derogatory about him?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And the same way with any of them? You did not know of anything derogatory when you were associated with them; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you complete your answer to the question whether you knew of any plan or concerted movement for the removal or displacement of Mr. Dooman?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew of no plan or concerted plan. I thought I had finished that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was not sure. It was some time ago. Therefore, obviously, you could not have taken any part in such a plan?

Mr. VINCENT. I took no part in such a plan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know of any such plan or movement with regard to Mr. Ballantine?

Mr. VINCENT. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to Mr. Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. VINCENT. With regard to Mr. Hornbeck, there was no plan or concerted plan to remove Dr. Hornbeck. I will give you that story, if you wish to have it, about the misunderstanding on Dr. Hornbeck.

Dr. Hornbeck himself has thought—I don't think he does now—that there was a concerted plan to get rid of him.

In 1943, when the Department was undergoing a reorganization—1944, please—there was a general feeling that Dr. Hornbeck, who had been in the Department as chief of things for 15 years, had, you might say, been under a considerable strain. That was my feeling, anyway.

But I was assigned to FEA and knew nothing about it except that I saw him when I came back after having been closely associated with him for about 4 years, from 1936 to 1939, very closely associated with him, because he and I were both very much in favor of giving things to China during that period of our time of helping Chiang Kai-shek out against the others.

Dr. Hornbeck was to become Director of the newly formed far-eastern office—at that time he was political adviser—he was to become Director of the newly formed far-eastern office. He did become Director of that.

There were two officers in the State Department who did not want to serve under Dr. Hornbeck. They indicated that to the Secretary of State or to the chief of personnel, I don't know which.

I did not participate in that. I did write a letter to the chief of personnel telling the chief of personnel that I did not want to take a job which would have been Chief of the China Division which a friend of mine had, for reasons that I had to respect—had known him for so many years—did not want to take it. In other words, I did not want to replace him.

No attention was paid to my letter and I did become Chief of the China Division in January or February. Dr. Hornbeck did become Director of the Far Eastern Office and remained there until May when he was made a Special Assistant to the Secretary and sent out as Ambassador to The Hague.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were the two employees who declined to serve under Dr. Hornbeck?

Mr. VINCENT. One of them is Mr. Salisbury, whom we have now already mentioned. The other was Mr. Stanton, who is now Ambassador to Siam.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there any others?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what was the basis for the friction in connection with these two gentlemen?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no certain knowledge of it, because I don't know what they put into their memorandum to them.

But my recollection is that it was based on the fact that Dr. Hornbeck was under a strain; that Dr. Hornbeck, as Director of the Office, was an excellent man for political thinking, but as an administrator, I think that these two fellows did not want to work under him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was more personal than a matter of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I am quite sure that it was more personal than a matter of policy, and I might add that all three of us worked under Dr. Hornbeck.

Salisbury subsequently retired. Stanton continued on as a special assistant in the Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Personal frictions can arise in any office, even in the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. They arise far too often in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. That Department is not exempt from office politics, I take it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid it was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, has it been reported to you at any time that your name has been mentioned in connection with the disappearance of three CIA agents in Bulgaria?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been questioned about that matter?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever had any connection with the editorial board of Amerasia magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. No, none whatsoever.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any connection with the magazine itself?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you play any part at all in the Amerasia case, so-called?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you defend any of the individuals involved?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you did contribute to the defense of Mr. Service, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, when you say "defend," I didn't appear in any defense of any one of them. I contributed $50 to a friend who didn't have any money in order for him to hire counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Words can have many connotations. I do not mean to fence with you. But we will have fewer semantic difficulties if you will accept my words in the broadest sense. If it seems to you they should be narrowed, go ahead and narrow them down.

I meant, by defense, did you speak in his behalf; did you take up the cudgel for him? Anything that might be constituted as defensive?

Mr. VINCENT. I might say that I kept myself completely apart from the trial of him, other than contributing $50 to assist him in hiring counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know now the story of the Amerasia case? Do you know what the facts were in that case?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall them from memory; no. I would have to see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write for publication under a pen name or a pseudonym?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in China, did you know Edgar Snow?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a writer. Do you want me to comment?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him only as a writer?

Mr. VINCENT. I only knew him as a writer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not know him as a person?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him first in Mukden, during the Japanese trouble of 1931. He came up to cover that and I met him.

As far as I know, I didn't meet him again until he came to Chungking—well, I would say in Mukden I have forgotten what press agency he was with. When he came to Chungking, in 1942 or 1943, he was then, I think, associated with the Saturday Evening Post.

He was in Europe at one time, getting a story, and came in to see me at Bern. I saw him again at a large cocktail party in New York last autumn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say he was a friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. A personal friend?

Mr. VINCENT. Personal friend, but not a close one, very personal friend. We have never had any business dealings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of his books?
Mr. VINCENT. I read The Red Star Over China.
Mr. SOURWINE. What did you think of it?
Mr. VINCENT. At the time?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. VINCENT. I thought it was a fairly good presentation of the case.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still think so?
Mr. VINCENT. I haven't reread it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think it was biased in any way?
Mr. VINCENT. I would say he took a sympathetic point of view toward the regime there.
Mr. SOURWINE. Toward the Chinese Communists?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge, or any basis for belief, that he was connected in any way with the Communist movement?
Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think he was a pro-Communist?
Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did not his book indicate that?
Mr. VINCENT. I would not say. I think it was biased from a factual point of view, from presenting the Communist point of the case.
Mr. SOURWINE. It was not pro-Communist?
Mr. VINCENT. He was writing about the Communists.
Senator FERGUSON. But he was biased on the facts, you said.
Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the facts. No, I said it presented them in, what shall you say, a favorable light.
Mr. SOURWINE. And not completely an objective report, perhaps?
Mr. VINCENT. I would want to read it again and see if it was an objective report. It gave the Chinese Communist side of the case.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean to imply that it was unduly favorable or unjustifiably favorable to the Communists?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your impression that it was not unduly favorable to the Communists or unjustifiably favorable to them?
Mr. VINCENT. I would have to read the book again, but you asked for my impression. I again state that it was stating the case of the Chinese Communists.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did it purport to be a statement of the case of the Chinese Communists?
Mr. VINCENT. It purported to be, as I understood it, a case of what was the situation with regard to the Chinese Communists.
Mr. SOURWINE. It reported to be a factual and objective statement, did it not?
Mr. VINCENT. It did.
Mr. SOURWINE. It did not purport to be a brief for the Chinese Communists, or a statement of their side of the case?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. But was it, in fact, a statement of their side of the case?
Mr. VINCENT. To my recollection it was a statement of their side of the case, because it was the first book given about it, because he had been to Yenan, and I suppose he was giving factual statements of the situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without regard to his mind, but considering it as a book, with regard to what you know and knew about the Far East, was it factual or was it pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have thought it was factual at the time, but I had no way to check the facts.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. MANDEL. I just wanted to know whether Mr. Vincent knew Mrs. Snow.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I may have met her sometime, but I wouldn't have known her at all. She may have been to cocktail parties. I don't know Mrs. Snow in the sense that I would know her if I saw her. There is a new Mrs. Snow that I met in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. He has two wives; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I met his new wife in New York at this cocktail party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the name Nym Wales mean anything?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the name she went under.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was his first or second wife?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the old one. I don't know the name of his new wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew she used that name?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read any of the works of the Chinese Communist leaders, their writings?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read any of the published works of Israel Epstein?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I never read that. I don't recall the book. It was a book he wrote, and I did not read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read any of the published works of Owen Lattimore, other than the two mentioned here?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any of them. I recall reading his column from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you read the published works of any other IPR writers?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall from the testimony given here that I am supposed to have reviewed or read a book of Rosinger's.

I have no recollection of reading that book, but it is quite possible I had, that these books came into the office and if that is the book that I have in mind, which I reviewed, I have no recollection of the book, but some review that he had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the IPR in the habit of sending you books to review or read?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think they came from the IPR. They came from the individuals. I am quite sure David Rowe sent me his on China and the Powers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether I read the manuscript or the other. John Fairbank—I have a copy of his book. That came out after I left the States. I read it, though.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you testified that you do not know Agnes Smedley?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Never met her?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of her books?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, or do you, know Harry B. Price?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have a note here on Harry B. Price.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have been through that list and you gave us the names of everybody you had a note on that we had not asked you about, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have a note on one of the Prices. There are two Prices. Yes, I have one here on Harry B. Price, which is in the back thing, which simply says that [reading] Mr. Price was, I recall, with the China Defense Supplies during the war. I have no doubt met him from time to time, but I do not recall the specific occasions of our meetings. That is all I have on Mr. Price.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether he ever worked for the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall his ever working for the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know where he did work?

Mr. VINCENT. I said here that he did work for China Defense Supplies, but I have forgotten since that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you knew Mildred Price?

Mr. VINCENT. I think you did, and I said I didn't know. Is Mildred Price his wife?

Mr. SOURWINE. I was going to ask you.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mrs. Price, his wife?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't recall ever having met her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you would not know anything of her associations, if you do not know her; would you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mrs. Price, Elizabeth Rugh?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Elizabeth Rugh?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she was ever employed by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if she is employed there now?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any hand in getting her employed there?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Our information, Mr. Chairman, is that Elizabeth Rugh is currently employed by the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m., same day).

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, before we resume the questioning of the witness I have here a letter addressed by the witness to the Chairman in response to the request that he bring with him certain documents. In that connection a letter from the State Department has been discussed at these hearings.

I would respectfully suggest that an order be entered that this letter may be placed in the record at the same point where the State letter which was discussed is inserted, if counsel has no objection.

Mr. SURREY. No objection.

The CHAIRMAN. It is over the signature of the witness?

Mr. SOURWINE. It is over the signature of the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

(The document referred to appears hereafter, at p. 2092.)

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Sourwine, does that include our request?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, it does not. Would the Chairman deem it desirable that our letter of request be placed at the same point in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department letter is also to be placed in the record at that point.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to do so.

(The document referred to appears hereafter, at p. 2092.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, have you ever read the book Inter-Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who wrote that book?

Mr. VINCENT. Owen Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever asked to review that book for the publication Pacific Affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever review any book for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what the publication Pacific Affairs was?

Mr. VINCENT. Pacific Affairs I think was a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations; was it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your memory?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the editor of that publication?

Mr. VINCENT. The only time that I knew exactly who was the editor was Salisbury, I think it was, who was the editor at one time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Owen Lattimore ever the editor of that publication?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe at a very early date he must have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have known it at the time if he had been?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe I would have. I would not have known his exact position. That is the reason I am trying to refresh my memory, but it seems to me that some time in the thirties he was the editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he was editor of Pacific Affairs at the time he wrote Inter-Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say with exactness because I have forgotten when.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been in 1940.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I don't know when he wrote Inter-Asian Frontiers of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been in 1940. I believe it was 1940.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know when he began or when he ceased being editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that book in your opinion a good objective analysis of the subject with which it dealt?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought it was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You so regarded it at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And still so regard it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall now the exact nature of the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now I believe that you may have covered some of these questions in previous testimony. I ask that you forgive any repetition, but I want to set them in here all together.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet Mr. Laughlin Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. I first met Laughlin Currie as I have testified either in 1936 or 1937. I have forgotten the year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. That is not where I met him, but he was in Chungking in 1942 when I was counselor of the Embassy there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were given leave to handle work in the Office of the Director of Foreign Economic Administration, or assigned to that Administration—which was the case?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I was assigned or detailed. I was still paid by the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time did Mr. Currie have anything to do with that assignment or detail?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he asked me whether I would come over; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was at that time in what position with the FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. He was just organizing it or helping organize it under Crowley, and he was one of the deputies or the deputy of FEA.

Mr. SOURWINE. FEA had just been created?

Mr. VINCENT. FEA had just been created in that autumn. BEW had gone out of business.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know Mr. Currie at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew him, I should say, well, not very well, but well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Socially as well as professionally?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; my wife was a friend of his wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you, prior to that time, ever consulted Mr. Currie with regard to matters of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. On the Far East?

Mr. SOURWINE. On anything.

Mr. VINCENT. I had, I suppose, on the Far East, but he was in Chungking and he, no doubt, from time to time would ask me about the situation in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your consultations with him on matters of policy limit themselves to far-eastern matters?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; except for FEA where I was in there for a short period.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time he was in a sense your superior?

Mr. VINCENT. He was my superior.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subsequent to that detail and after you had returned to the Department, did you continue to consult Mr. Currie with regard to matters of policy from time to time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you intending to testify that after you returned to the Department from FEA you did not thereafter consult with Mr. Currie concerning any matters of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall that he ever contacted you thereafter—that is, after you got back from FEA, with regard to matters of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. He might have, but I don't recall the instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now I believe you already testified with regard to your knowledge or acquaintanceship with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified who they were?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you restate that for the record at this point?

Mr. VINCENT. Chou En-lai at that time was the representative of the so-called Communist government.

Mr. SOURWINE. At what time?

Mr. VINCENT. At the time that I had any association with him in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. About 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. About 1942 over to the middle of 1943. He was the representative, officially recognized, in Chungking of what we called the Yenan Government or the Communist government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now Lin Piao?

Mr. VINCENT. Lin Piao was a general, as I recollect, who had come down to Chungking also at the end of 1942 at the request of Chiang Kai-shek to discuss matters of interest in trying to get the two armies together to fight the Japanese. I don't know the nature of the discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you testified about whether you ever met them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet them?

Mr. VINCENT. I did meet both of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee where and when?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to this just exactly the same as I did before [reading]:

As counselor of the Embassy at Chungking I met Chou En-lai several times. He was the representative in Chungking of the Chinese

Communists at Yenan. He had an official position recognized by Chiang Kai-shek and it may have been at Chiang's where I first met Chou En-lai. I also recall meeting him at a luncheon in the home of an American manager of the British-American Tobacco Co.

Also I met him when he made a courtesy call on Ambassador Gauss. The last time I saw him was just before my departure for the United States in May 1943. He called at the Embassy to meet George Atcheson, who was taking my place.

My few conversations with Chou concerned conditions in North China, areas occupied by the Communists, and in particular the conduct of military operations against the Japanese. The information obtained by me and by other officers of the Embassy was of considerable value to us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any conferences with Mr. Chou En-lai?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified that I never had any conferences with Chou En-lai other than these conversations I have just mentioned here. I did recall I think in the testimony this morning, or was it yesterday afternoon, that there may have been a luncheon party that I attended given by the Chinese, whether it was at a house I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever consult with or meet with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao together?

Mr. VINCENT. No; although let me say it would have been quite natural for them to be together. I don't recall the occasion of ever meeting Lin Piao. I might have met him at Chiang's or elsewhere. Whereas, I have a distinct recollection of the places where I met Chou I have no recollection of occasions when I met Lin Piao.

Mr. SOURWINE. The occasions when you met Chou were either social or as you have testified to?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Mr. John Stewart Service ever have a conversation with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. I will amend that, Service may have been present at this luncheon I mentioned at the British-American Tobacco Co.'s place.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I was unable to recall it yesterday, and I can't recall it today, but I would say at the end of 1942 or early 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been later, as late as July of 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that?

Mr. VINCENT. Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as late at August 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I say it could have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as late as September 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have been as late as November or December of 1942 because I was still there. Are you speaking now of the luncheon?

Mr. SOURWINE. The luncheon.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it was before then, but I say I have no recollection—that it was before the autumn of 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been on November 20, 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. One of these occasions might have been in November, but I would not say this luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. One of what occasions?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was in the autumn.

The CHAIRMAN. What occasion? You say "one of those occasions."

Mr. VINCENT. I have named those occasions when he called on Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am inquiring now about an occasion, if there was one, when you and Mr. John Stewart Service had a conference with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao.

Mr. VINCENT. A conference with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao? I said I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you said such conference could only have occurred if you had met them all together at a luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I say it might have occurred at the luncheon. Lin Piao was not at the British-American Tobacco Co. luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you could not have had a conference with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao at that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Lin Piao did not arrive in Chungking until the autumn of 1942. If I had a conference with him, it was not in connection with the British-American Tobacco Co. luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and John Stewart Service have a conference or conversation with Chou En-lai and Lin Piao on or about November 20, 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. It could possibly be so. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where would you have had such a conference?

Mr. VINCENT. That may have been the reference I have had here to having a luncheon at Chou En-lai's.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you stated that Lin Piao was not at the luncheon, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have stated that Lin Piao was not at the luncheon given by the British-American Tobacco Co.

Mr. SOURWINE. What luncheon did you mean?

Mr. VINCENT. The luncheon given by the Chinese, which may have been Chou En-lai. It was an invitation to a Chinese lunch.

Mr. SOURWINE. You and Mr. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that Service was there, but he could have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am endeavoring to find out is whether there was a meeting of that nature at which yourself and Mr. Service and Chou En-lai and Lin Piao were present at which time they, meaning Chou and Lin, made certain suggestions to you with regard to American policy. Was there such a conference?

Mr. VINCENT. And I am trying to be helpful, and I cannot recall the conference; but, as I say, a conference of that kind could be not a conference but a meeting, which, as I say, I do not recollect the meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then if there was such a conference or conversation, you would be unable at this time to testify concerning any suggestions that may have been made; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly would not be able to testify as to suggestions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any memory of any suggestions made to you and Mr. Service by Chou and/or Lin about American policy?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have testified already that from my recollection our conversations were on the matter of conditions in Yenan and fighting of Japanese and the whole military situation in north China as they knew it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If such suggestions had been made at such a conference, would you have felt that you should transmit a memorandum concerning them to the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say——

The CHAIRMAN. Even though these conversations may have been at a social gathering such as a luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; where we thought there was sufficient amount of importance to a conversation at a social gathering, we made a memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you would have transmitted them if there had been such conversations, such recommendations?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say "Yes," that we probably would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that so strongly that you would be willing to say that if you made no such report to the State Department there was no such conversation and there was no such suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not be willing to say. In other words, if the conversations were not of such importance that I considered them so that I would not have burdened the Department with the report. But, if I considered them of sufficient importance to have the Department have the information, then I would have reported, or it would have been reported, as you stated here; Service may have done it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have called to your attention the report made by Mr. Service under date of January 23, 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that report it is stated, and I read from page 792 of our hearings, part 3:

> The Communists themselves, Chou En-lai and Lin Piao, in a conversation with John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942, considered that foreign influence, obviously American, with the Kuomintang, is the only force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how tactfully made, but they believe that the reflection of a better-informed foreign opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more farsighted elements of the leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the generalissimo.

Then it continues. Does that refresh your recollection at all?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid it doesn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having heard such views expressed by Chou or Lin?

Mr. VINCENT. No. But I say I have simply forgotten the occasion. I am not denying the occasion, because Service was an exact reporter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember it. You say he was an exact reporter?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought he was an exact reporter at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that answer. You thought what?

Mr. VINCENT. I was saying that in connection with this instance I think he was an exact reporter there of a conversation of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next paragraph of the report reads as follows:

> The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government and in our propa-

ganda to China of the political nature of the world conflict, democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China. Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist army receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves, but there is no doubt that they would welcome such action.

Your memory remains unrefreshed?

Mr. VINCENT. My memory remains unrefreshed, but that was a question that was discussed continually in Chungking at the time and subsequently by Mr. Hurley and all of us as trying to get a more effective cooperation. Chiang Kai-shek himself had Lin down to do that in fighting the Japs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this an accurate statement of what the Communist objectives and desires were?

Mr. VINCENT. If you would read it again? I don't want to be caught up on anything, but I think it probably was the Communist desire to get American assistance, if that was one of the points.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will read it rapidly, if I may. Please listen with the idea that I want you to tell us whether this, which is in Mr. Service's report, is a fair and accurate statement of the Communist desires, Communist objectives at the time:

The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government and in our propaganda to China of the political nature of the world conflict, democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China. Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist army receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area. I have not heard this proposed by the Communists themselves, but there is no doubt that they would welcome such action.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that was a fairly accurate statement of what the Communist Government at that time wanted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those were, as Mr. Service has reported, the recommendations of Chou and Lin with regard to American policy. Now, to what extent were those suggestions followed; do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, let me see. Taking the last one, there was an American military mission sent to Yenan in 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. You favored that, and, as a matter of fact, urged it at the time, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. The President favored it; Mr. Wallace favored it; and the military. As a matter of fact, it was initiated by the military in Chungking, our own American military, of trying to get some intelligence group up into that area. The objective was to get

intelligence for our own Air Force, which were flying bombing missions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us not lose sight of the fact that I am trying to find out, with regard to the specific recommendations of the Communists, which ones we followed.

Mr. VINCENT. There never was, to my knowledge, any arms or ammunition supplied to the Communists by us that I know of. There may have been some supplied in a manner through OSS or something, but I don't recall it. Isn't that one of the points, too?

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us take it seriatim. In our dealings with the Chinese Government was it emphasized, and in our propaganda to China was it emphasized, that this was, this Chinese situation, part of a world conflict of a political nature?

Mr. VINCENT. Was it emphasized?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Did I emphasize it, or was that realized?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that become a part of American policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did those in power in the State Department, in positions of influence in the State Department both here and in China, emphasize, in dealings with the Chinese Government and in propaganda to China, the political nature of the conflict?

Mr. VINCENT. They did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there repeated reiteration of "American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy" in China?

Mr. VINCENT. There was.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement is necessarily in derogation of any claims to democracy of the then-existing Government, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not in derogation. It was that the Chinese should have a constitutional government, which they themselves spoke of more often than we did.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you say that you hope a country will someday have all of this development of genuine democracy, you are saying it is something that an existing government does not have?

Mr. VINCENT. The existing Government made no pretension to having a democracy; it was a one-party tutelage under the Kuomintang.

Mr. SOURWINE. The conclusion seems so clear.

Mr. VINCENT. I was thinking of representative democracy, and they certainly did not have that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there ever a specification that the Communist armies receive an apportioned share of American supplies sent to China?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that ever recommended?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot testify to that. I don't know whether General Stilwell did or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with such a recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever assent to such a recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Wallace make such a recommendation in his Kunming cable?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. I do not think so. That a proportionate amount of supplies be sent to the Communists? No; he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read Mr. Wallace's testimony before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you might be asked this question again, sir, and I suggest you read this testimony between now and the time you come back in public session.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to belabor that point, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That testimony of Mr. Wallace's can be made available to the witness.

Mr. VINCENT. Your question was whether Mr. Wallace in his Kunming cable recommended, and I do not recall that it did. I haven't read his testimony before this committee completely. I have looked at it, but looked at it where it concerned me personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have stated earlier, Mr. Chairman, it is not the endeavor here, the objective here, to become argumentative. We are trying to traverse the area.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record and the chairman's information at this point, the witness has already testified that he has access to the hearings of this committee—that they are available at some place in the State Department. Incidentally, they are available down there in manuscript form, are they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Wallace's testimony is available?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace's testimony is available.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first come into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I have that here; and, if you like, for precision I would like to read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. We would be glad, of course, Mr. Chairman, to supply any copies of printed record that the witness may wish.

Mr. SURREY. We appreciate that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the witness desires to add a parenthetical clause to his testimony of a moment ago.

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to this because it is primarily a statement of my early association with General Wedemeyer.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that raised?

Mr. SOURWINE. As I understand it, the point the witness wants to make, and correct me if I am incorrect, he wants no inference by his answer with regard to Mr. Wallace's recommendations in the Kunming cable, he wants no inference that the question of aid to the Chinese Communists did not come up later. I think he wants to expand on that.

Mr. VINCENT (reading): In the late autumn or probably winter of 1944, in December, it was generally understood in the State Department—I was in the State Department then—that there was possibly going to be an American landing on the north coast of China. That area was largely occupied by Chinese Communist guerrillas.

It became apparent to us, and by "us" I include Mr. Grew, who himself at the time was anxious that any forces that could aid us in

fighting the Japanese should be utilized, and this would. Also, we assumed it would save American lives if we would utilize the Communists.

I went to call on General Wedemeyer in March of 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. VINCENT. Here in Washington, sir [reading]: He was home on leave. It was my first meeting with General Wedemeyer. I brought the problem to his attention, making it clear to him that it was after all a military problem to be decided by military officers, but that in the State Department we had felt that if we could get some arms to these people it would be of assistance.

General Wedemeyer and I discussed the matter, and he said that he would go back and look into it. He said, and I agreed with him, that he did not believe in just arming the Communists, nor did I. Nothing was done about it, and I subsequently learned that it was about that time that any idea of landing on the Chinese coast had been abandoned for the general landing that was going to be made in October in the southern island of Japan.

I just wanted to add that to it, that that is my recollection of it when getting arms to the Communists did arise and not during the Wallace mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your answer to the question as to whether the question of the extension of a portion of our aid, military and otherwise, to the Chinese Communists was raised?

Mr. VINCENT. What is my answer?

Mr. SOURWINE. To the question as to whether that question was raised?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not raised to my knowledge during the Wallace mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it raised at all? We had a statement that there had been a recommendation with regard to policy by the Communist leaders and that that was one of the things that the Communist leaders urged that we do. Now I am asking whether by anyone in the Department, in a position of authority or responsibility, that was subsequently urged—that is, the extension of aid to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Not outside the context of what I have mentioned here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not outside of your discussion with General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not otherwise recommended by you, or, to your knowledge, by anyone in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first come into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment there. There is perhaps something that I have not connected up in my mind. My recollection is that the witness testified that he was in the State Department at that time and that it was discussed in the State Department. If I misquote him I want to be corrected. And that following the discussion between himself and some other member of the State Department——

Mr. VINCENT. No, I mentioned Mr. Grew. Mr. Grew was Under Secretary and it didn't result from the discussion, it was his attitude.

The CHAIRMAN. A discussion as to arming the Reds. You called on General Wedemeyer, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then there was a discussion in the State Department on the question of arming the Reds?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. For the specific purpose that I have mentioned, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As I understand it, it is your testimony that that was the only time when there was such a discussion?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can recall, of getting arms to the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first come into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I first came into contact with Mr. Henry Wallace in 1944 just prior to the mission. I went out with him in May 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know him in 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1943 I had not met Mr. Wallace; no. May I, just to keep my memory fresher, describe what I have here [reading]:

In the spring of 1944, probably April, I met Mr. Wallace at his request. I had never met him previously. I was then Chief of the China Division in the State Department. I had spent 2 years, 1942–43, in Chungking and was on good terms with the Chinese officials there. No one in the Department at that time had had similar experience.

Mr. Wallace told me of his plan to visit China at the President's suggestion. He wanted information regarding China. He also talked with Mr. Ballantine, Deputy Director of the Foreign Office, and I believe Mr. Grew, the Director. Subsequently, Mr. Wallace asked Secretary Hull to allow me to accompany him on the mission. Mr. Hull agreed and instructed me to make the trip.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me get that straight. Mr. Wallace talked with you about his trip before there was any request that you accompany him?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can recall it was first going over conditions in China. The President had just asked him to go, according to his statements to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he and you talk about the possibility that you might go with him?

Mr. VINCENT. We possibly did; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who broached that possibility first, you or he?

Mr. VINCENT. He did. I was just about to say that I had no desire to go to China again. I had been away from my family 2½ years and I may admit that I didn't like flying for 51 days, so I had no desire to make that trip. But I considered it my duty to make it on the basis of what I have just said, that it was a logical selection for me to go if someone was going, that it be a man who had been in China the previous 2 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were you assigned to work in the office of FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. In either September or October.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the Director of FEA at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Crowley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace had left when the BEW had ceased to exist?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I recollect the BEW had ceased. I think he left before the BEW ceased to exist.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Board of Economic Warfare became the Office of Economic Warfare as part of the Office of Emergency Management and Mr. Wallace went out at that time, July 15. That is the record I have. Does that accord with your recollection?

Mr. VINCENT. I had just gotten back.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was subsequent, September 25, 1943, that what was then the Office of Economic Warfare of the Office of Emergency Management became the FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who initiated the request for your assignment to FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Currie, I testified this morning.

Mr. SOURWINE. He initiated it himself?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. who?

Mr. VINCENT. Currie, Laughlin Currie.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall a series of meetings organized or arranged by Laughlin Currie in 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us about those?

Mr. VINCENT. Why, I never did quite know what the purport was, but apparently, before he went with FEA, as a Presidential assistant he had been given general, some general, job in connection with Far Eastern affairs. He had made a trip to China and interested himself very much in China.

When I got back from China in 1943, the summer, I found that these meetings went on from time to time. I don't know to what extent, what their regular frequency was. I recall attending one or two in Currie's office. There would be an OWI person present, probably a military man, people interested in China who were there to sit and discuss problems in Currie's office which he had in the State Department at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a case of Mr. Currie calling together people who were in various departments of Government who were functionally concerned with China?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my understanding of the meeting. As I say, it went out of business more or less when he went over to FEA, and he went over to FEA the next month after I got back.

Mr. SOURWINE. How often did such meetings occur?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I couldn't say because I don't think I attended more than two or three, and whether it was a weekly or monthly or semimonthly thing I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Who were the attendants at these meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, as I say, it was people interested in China from various departments of Government. My recollection is vague on that because I didn't attend many meetings, but I would say that there would be an OWI man and an officer from the War Department particularly interested in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who was present at any of the meetings you attended?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your deputy attend any of those meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't have a deputy at that time because I was just back and was assistant, or had the title of assistant, in the Far Eastern Office and didn't have a deputy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Friedman in the office at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not think so. He was not; he did not come in until 1944 as far as my office was concerned. He may have been in the Labor Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything more about the purport of those meetings than you have testified to?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever prepare any memorandum or instructions in connection with any of those meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you became Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs August 21, 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. That will come from the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. That date is taken from the State Department register. I am in a chronological portion of the inquiry.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you stated that you did know Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you stated that you read his book, Wartime Politics in China; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the title. I recall a book which he wrote which covered the period from, I would say, 1923 up to the beginning of the war, if that is Wartime Politics in China, which was supposed to cover that period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only book of Mr. Rosinger's you ever read?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only book of Mr. Rosinger's that I have read.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you come to read that one?

Mr. VINCENT. It was either furnished me or, as somebody has testified, I was furnished a manuscript. I wouldn't want to say I didn't. I know I have read the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the risk of repetition will you testify how well you knew Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know Mr. Rosinger well. Mr. Rosinger was a casual acquaintance whom I had met at one time or another; I didn't even know what he did at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his official position at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, Senator, that he even had an official position. If he did it escaped my attention.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at that time that he was connected with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume I did know that he was connected with the IPR and was writing, contributing articles, I think, to the IPR publication. I don't recall reading them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that something that we could eliminate assumption on, and find out whether you remember that you did know, or you do not remember whether you knew?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, because my recollection is that Mr. Rosinger was at the Hot Springs conference in 1945 as a member of the American delegation.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are now talking about November 1943.

Mr. VINCENT. We are?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at that time know that he was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge that I did know at that time he was connected with the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. The IPR had no evil connotation for you at that time, did it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to be perfectly clear with you as to whether Mr. Rosinger was connected with the IPR in November 1943. I couldn't give you exact testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend meetings or conferences at which Mr. Rosinger was present?

Mr. VINCENT. I attended a conference, as I have just testified, in Hot Springs in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than the conference at Hot Springs?

Mr. VINCENT. He was probably at a preparatory conference for the American delegation before he went down to the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, but again I assume he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend any other conference or meeting at which he was present?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have, but I do not recall them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recall no such other meeting or conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that mean it is your testimony that you never attended any meetings of the Institute of Pacific Relations or any functions under the sponsorship of that organization at which Mr. Rosinger was present except the Hot Springs conference and possibly a meeting of a delegation in advance of that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not because I think there has been testimony here that I attended a conference of the IPR in 1938.

Mr. SOURWINE. At which Mr. Rosinger was present?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether he was present, but I have no recollection that he was present. My testimony is that I would not recall if he was there. I thought you were limiting it to these two cases of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, but at which Mr. Rosinger was present.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend any other meetings or functions of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I may have attended this one in 1938, it would have been natural for me to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Then let us close that incident. Let us see if we can get at it. The only time that you remember meeting with Mr. Rosinger was at the Hot Springs meeting and another meeting at some other place?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Two meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. That is, the only ones I recall. I have testified, I think, before that Mr. Rosinger was a person who may have come to my office, and I may have met socially elsewhere, but I am testifying to where I know I met him.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew, however, that he was writing for the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you first meet Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I cannot recall how I first met Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could he have been introduced to you by the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. I would consider it most unlikely that Mr. Hull introduced me to Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could he have been introduced to you by Mr. E. C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. He could, although I never met Mr. Carter until 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you really have no recollection at all about your first meeting with Mr. Rosinger; you might have known him always?

Mr. VINCENT. I might. I would like to just say that during this period there were so many people that came into my office, people interested in the Far East, people who came to the Far East when I was in Chungking, that I don't want the inference that I would be able to tell you every time I met Mr. Rosinger. Mr. Rosinger, and I don't want to be immodest, probably has a better recollection of when I met him than I have of when I met him, and that would apply to a great many of these other people.

If I could recall the occasions that I met Mr. Rosinger or any of these other people I would be glad to do so because it is in no sense trying to avoid indicating when or when I did not meet them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now you have stated, have you, that you read his book, Wartime Politics in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Try very hard to recall whether you read it in book form or in manuscript form.

Mr. VINCENT. I have said that I cannot recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you did have the manuscript at one time?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did have the manuscript at one time and I don't recall whether I read it or not in manuscript, but it would have been perfectly natural for me to have it in manuscript, I think, and look it over. I had just come back from China. I think the book was published in 1943, was it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. Why would it have been natural for you to have the book in manuscript?

Mr. VINCENT. Because as a person just back from China frequently people would come to me with articles and books on China. Here was a man writing me to see whether there was factual data that was incorrect. I had been in China for the previous 15 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in the habit of going over manuscripts for people that you did not know?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not in the habit of it; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have many people bring you book manuscripts to go over and correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I did, but there were occasional ones. I testified this morning that I think David Rowe sent me one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anybody bring you a book manuscript for correction outside of the IPR or the channels of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I think Mr. David Rowe sent me his China Among the Powers.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that he had no connection with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I knew of at that time. Did he?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you for your testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I cannot testify to the ultimate fact of what you knew, only you can do that.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that it has been stated that Mr. Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was sent to you for criticism by an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I have seen that testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the truth?

Mr. VINCENT. That—I have no distinct recollection of it, but it may have been the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you doubt that?

Mr. VINCENT. I have read the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you doubt that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't doubt it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why do you suggest that it may have been brought to you by Mr. Rosinger himself?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't suggest.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, I misunderstood.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall Mr. Rosinger bringing it in himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said people were frequently bringing such things in to you, and I thought you meant the authors were bringing them in.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Rosinger himself did not bring it in to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I say, I don't recall whether Mr. Rosinger brought it himself or whether it was sent through the mails or whether somebody else brought it.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment there. You left the impression with the chairman that Mr. Rosinger brought it in because you said many people came to your office; that you had been in the Orient for 15 years and that many people came to your office and discussed matters with you and left manuscript with you or otherwise.

I took it from that that you regarded Rosinger as one of many who left his manuscript with you.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. When I say "many" I say people would come in to discuss conditions in the Far East. As I say, the only manuscript, the only other manuscript, that I can recall is China Among the Powers. How I came into physical possession of the manuscript—I have already testified that I have no clear memory of how I got the manuscript.

The whole case is something I would like to be clear on, but the only thing I can say is that I have a knowledge of the book, knew the book,

and whether I read it in manuscript or not and how I got it is a matter I would like to be clear on, but I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the record of this committee includes a letter to you from Mr. T. A. Bisson of the Institute of Pacific Relations asking you to return the manuscript?

The CHAIRMAN. Asking what?

Mr. SOURWINE. Asking the witness to return this manuscript of Mr. Rosinger's book, Wartime Politics in China.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I had read that, and I had no recollection of that incident at all when I read it in the thing. That is the reason I would say that I assumed that the thing had come to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that you did return the manuscript at Mr. Bisson's request?

Mr. VINCENT. Did I?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; did you?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I did. I would have no reason for keeping it.

Mr. SURREY. You mean Mr. Bisson's request?

Mr. SOURWINE. I intended to say, and I hope that the record will read, that I asked if you think you did return the manuscript of Mr. Rosinger's book at Mr. Bisson's request.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were with the Board of Economic Warfare on detail—let me ask this foundation question first.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever assigned or detailed to work with the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with the meetings of the so-called Interdepartmental Regional Committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir. May I amend that previous statement? When you say "any connection with the Board of Economic Warfare," I was while we were waiting to get somebody to China, I acted on the BEW in addition to my duties as counselor before we procured somebody for BEW.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what the Interdepartmental Regional Committee was?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, no sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wouldn't be able to tell us what if anything that committee or such a committee had to do with the Board of Economic Warfare, or vice versa?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I have one question?

Mr. SOURWINE. By all means break in any time you want.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Rosinger was a delegate to the conference, an IPR conference, at New Delhi, India, in 1949?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. Did that conference or his attendance at the conference have any direct or indirect approval of the State Department or support from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Mandel, I couldn't say, give any answer to that, because I was in Bern, Switzerland, and completely out of the picture at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified I believe that you knew Vladimir Rogoff?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; on one occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the risk of repetition, where did you meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him at the Cosmos Club in January 1944, I think I have testified, at a luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that on January 20?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know the exact date, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify that was a luncheon to which you were invited by Mr. Bill Johnstone?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I think Bill Johnstone was the host at the luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. William L. Holland at that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Holland?

Mr. VINCENT. I know Mr. Holland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Owen Lattimore at that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I think this morning I said I did not recall. I have seen the manuscript as you call it, but made no note of who was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was C. F. Remer at that luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. He might easily have been, he was interested in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Remer?

Mr. VINCENT. I have met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was at one time with the OSS. I don't recall when I first met Remer.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his position there in January of 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that was the period, but here I can't be exact, when he had come over to the State Department and had some position in the economic work as a man studying capital investment or investment of one sort or another.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. William Lockwood at this luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall Lockwood, sir, but I, as I say——

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell us about the luncheon? What was its purpose? What was discussed?

Mr. VINCENT. The purpose of the luncheon insofar as I knew was to find out from Rogoff what he knew about China. That was my recollection of it, that Rogoff had come back from China as a Tass correspondent, and these people wanted to find out from him what he, a Tass agent, had to say about China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were seeking information that would be useful to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I was seeking information that would have been useful to me; that would have been something that I would have gone to in the normal course of my duties to find out what was going on in China from his angle.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you were invited to that luncheon by a telephone call?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I can't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been a telephone call from someone in the IPR office speaking on behalf of Mr. Johnstone?

Mr. VINCENT. It could easily have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anything more than you have told us about what took place at the luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anything about anything that Mr. Rogoff said?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. Unfortunately, I do not recall any details.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. To my knowledge I did not make any memorandum?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mrs. E. C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think I have ever met Mrs. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who she is?

Mr. VINCENT. I would amend that to say that if she was at the IPR conference in 1945 and I may have met her at some social gathering. No; I don't know. You mean, who she is other than the wife of Mr. E. C. Carter?

Mr. SOURWINE. The wife.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about her connection, if any, with the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any connection with the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not recall having personally known Mrs. E. C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. In any relationship; if she was at the IPR conference I would probably have met her at a social gathering there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever correspond?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever ask her to send your regards to Madam Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Madam Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have asked mutual friends to tender regards?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did not regard Mrs. Carter as such a mutual friend?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not regard Mrs. Carter as a mutual friend.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that you never made such a request to her—that is, to convey your regards to Madame Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say that I have no recollection of asking Mrs. Carter to convey my regards.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had done so you would probably have remembered; would you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I would, if somebody came in casually and said, "I am going to China and seeing Madame Sun Yat-sen." I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not constantly sending your regards to Madame Sun Yet-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. No, Mr. Sourwine, but I don't know what the period was.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1944, about June?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, something that happened 7 years ago, whether I sent my regards to Madame Sun Yat-sen or not through Mrs. Carter I don't want to say because I don't remember.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you regard Madam Sun Yat-sen as pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would regard her as pro-Communist. I haven't seen her since 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she is a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. She was in Peking and I would assume she is with the party.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no more information than that answer implies?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything to prepare or condition Mr. Wallace for his mission to China?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have already testified, he and I met on two or three occasions prior to our departure in May, and I no doubt brought him up to date on conditions in China. There were not memoranda made of that, and I don't recall the exact nature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not supply him with certain material in advance of the trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you did?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember whether I did or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet with him prior to that trip?

The CHAIRMAN. That is rather perplexing, Mr. Vincent. This is a very important occasion that you were going on for you to say that you don't remember whether or not you supplied material to Mr. Wallace.

Mr. VINCENT. But, Mr. Chairman, I thought I had just testified that I probably did, but I don't remember the nature of what I may have supplied him.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the way I caught it.

Mr. VINCENT. Whether I did it orally or in writing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified that you did meet with him and did have oral discussions?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, and they may have resulted in preparing him with written material on China.

Mr. SOURWINE. The purpose of the discussions was to help prepare him or condition him for the trip, but whether there was any writing you do not know?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the occasions when you met with Mr. Wallace to discuss his forthcoming trip to China, did any of those meetings take place outside the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In his office. In the building here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of those meetings take place anywhere else?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did the first meeting take place; here in his office?

Mr. VINCENT. Not the first meeting. I recall it was in the office in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he come up there?

Mr. VINCENT. He came up there and I said, "I am coming up to see you," and he said, "No, I am coming up to the State Department." He didn't come to my office, he came to the little office occupied by Currie.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you went over and met him there?

Mr. VINCENT. I went over and met him there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Currie have anything to do with arranging that first conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that he did. Wallace has testified that Mr. Currie had a great deal to do with arranging the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you from the basis of your recollection.

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that Mr. Wallace called me for a meeting and that Mr. Wallace then said he would come to the Department and meet me there. What part Currie had I don't know; that was the first time I recalled meeting the Vice President of the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the first mention that was made to you of such a meeting, when he called you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't think so, but I don't recall any other mention. I don't know when that meeting took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you think there was mention before Mr. Wallace called you of the possibility of your meeting with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know who that was mentioned by?

Mr. VINCENT. I think probably that Currie himself told me that the President had proposed to Wallace to go to China and that Wallace wanted to meet me and talk about China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, consult with Owen Lattimore to make any preliminary arrangements for the Wallace trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of a consultation between Lattimore and myself on making the arrangements, but I would certainly expect that they would have taken place with him and possibly with John Hazard, who also made the trip.

The CHAIRMAN. Who?

Mr. VINCENT. John Hazard, who was another member of the party, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss the forthcoming trip with Mr. Lattimore at any time before his appointment was announced?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I have no distinct recollection of discussing it, but as I say it would stand to reason that I did. It was not announced until just before we left, so there would have been considerable discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you did discuss it with Mr. Lattimore for some time before you left on the trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I am quite sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that discussion?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it in Baltimore?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have been at one of the meetings that I went down to in Mr. Wallace's office.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not connected with the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. He was connected with the Office of War Information at that time, he was Deputy Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss it—that is, the forthcoming trip, with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having any discussion with him before I discussed it with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say you did not discuss it with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I would consider it most unlikely that I would discuss it with Mr. Lattimore before I discussed it with Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. Because my recollection of my first meeting with Mr. Wallace was for the very purpose of discussing his trip to China and whether I would go.

Mr. SOURWINE. But that was not the first you had heard about this mission?

Mr. VINCENT. I had heard about it before that from Currie.

Mr. SOURWINE. I attimore was your good friend and Mr. Wallace you had never seen before?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why is it unlikely that you would have discussed it with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I didn't think at that time there was any certainty that I was going.

Mr. SOURWINE. As long as we have gotten into the matter of probabilities, why do you consider it improbable that you would have discussed it with Mr. Lattimore before you discussed it with Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Because my recollection of the meeting with Wallace is that that was the first time there was any definite idea that I was going.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't say that——

Mr. VINCENT. I will amend that to say that it is probable that I did meet with Lattimore before.

Mr. SOURWINE. It's not what I want, it's what you want to testify to?

Mr. VINCENT. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I express incredulity it is only for the purposes of straightening out the record.

Mr. VINCENT. I appreciate that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at all the talks between Mr. Wallace and Gen. Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. All except the first one and the last one going over in the car to the airport. I think that is considered as one of the conversations.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you learn about what took place at the two talks at which you were not present?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace told me after the first one and Mr. Wallace told me as soon as we got into the airplane of the second one that I hadn't taken part in.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he give you written memoranda of those talks?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that he gave me no written memoranda of the first one; of the second one he had scribbled some notes which he gave me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he supplement those notes with an oral recounting of what had taken place?

Mr. VINCENT. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make written memoranda with regard to the talks at which you were present?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; at Mr. Wallace's request.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; I do not mean to suggest for a moment that there is anything improper about that.

Mr. VINCENT. They are all in the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was some written memorandum with regard to each of the talks, except for the first one, then, in your possession before you started back for America?

Mr. VINCENT. They were in my possession at Kunming where I transcribed them into the notes as you now know them in the White Book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wait a minute; that was done at Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your notes of the conversations?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; let me say that what I had was—I am not a stenographer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Mr. VINCENT. What I had was rough notes taken at the conferences.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Mr. VINCENT. Immediately we got to Kunming I sat down and using my memory and these notes and names, expanded them into what were the reports of each meeting, with Mr. Wallace present at Kunming to aid me.

Mr. SOURWINE. What became of those reports, or what ultimately became reports? Did you actually send those from Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. We brought those home with us.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not change them or expand them after you left Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As prepared at Kunming is the way they were submitted?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you do with your original memoranda, the rough memoranda? Were they discarded?

Mr. VINCENT. They were discarded. They were written in a little book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say they were destroyed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consciously destroy them?

Mr. VINCENT. I might have destroyed it because I don't possess it now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you not have consciously and deliberately destroyed it, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

The CHAIRMAN. What he means by that last answer is that he consciously destroyed the original notes that he made at the respective conferences; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. I have no recollection of the physical process of destroying them, but I don't have them.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you did destroy them? It is a very positive statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you have just thrown them in the wastebasket somewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I could have thrown them in the wastebasket.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hand them to somebody and say, "Take care of these"? Could you have left them in the bureau drawer? Could you have left them in a trunk? Could you have left them in the pocket of an old coat? In a duffle bag? Or on the airplane? Are any of those things possibilities?

Mr. VINCENT. All of those things are possibilities because as I say I don't have a distinct recollection of taking those notes and in any manner destroying them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to embarrass you, Mr. Vincent, but how long had you been in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I had been in the State Department for 20 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those were notes of a very highly restricted conference; were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those notes were classified material?

Mr. VINCENT. They were. They weren't at that moment but should have been classified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you not have felt that it was your absolute obligation to either guard those most carefully or personally destroy them?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had let them out of your possession, would you not have classified them very highly?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have, but I am not a classifier. I don't know whether I would have put "confidential" on them, but I would have indicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have classified those notes as only confidential?

Mr. VINCENT. I am only using the word in its general sense.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not have classified them as secret?

Mr. VINCENT. I use the word simply to indicate. Whether I would have classified them confidential or secret——

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a lot of difference between secret and confidential, is there not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have considered them secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or perhaps even top secret?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or perhaps even "eyes only"? No, it would not be a message, so it would not be that. All right, sir, you have no memory of precisely what you did with them?

Mr. VINCENT. Precisely?

The CHAIRMAN. To straighten this thing out, he said he destroyed them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand that the witness says he has no memory as to what he did with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Then he says he has no memory of what he did with them. He says positively that he destroyed them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought he said any number of things was possible.

The CHAIRMAN. After that he said any number of things was possible.

Mr. VINCENT. The Senator is right, but as I say, under further questioning I have no memory of any physical disposition that I made of those things.

Mr. SOURWINE. In any event at Chungking they became the basis for the reports on the talks?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your memoranda on the talks which are now part of the White Paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anywhere at any time in any written memorandum or oral statement to you from Mr. Wallace any reference to a request by Chiang Kai-shek for the assignment of General Wedemeyer as the representative of President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. My only recollection in connection with that is that after we reached Kunming the name of General Wedemeyer was suggested as a good man to take the place of general over-all command of the troops of American forces in China and the statement was made that when General Wedemeyer made a trip to China at some time earlier the Generalissimo had been well impressed by him.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement was made when?

Mr. VINCENT. That doesn't answer your question. I am telling you all I know about the relationship of Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. That statement was made when?

Mr. VINCENT. That was made when we were in Kunming in June, 1944 after we had left Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it was made by whom?

Mr. VINCENT. It was made to me by either Alsop or Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know which?

Mr. VINCENT. No. My recollection is that T. V. Soong, who was also at one time on the plane with us, may have made the statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. As far as you know was that the first mention of that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I do not recall it ever coming up in the conversation at Chungking, the name Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then it was not included in any of the oral or written reports that Mr. Wallace gave you about his conferences with the Generalissimo?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Owen Lattimore have anything to do with the transmission to you of any report or memorandum concerning any conversation of General Chiang with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that he had anything to do with it. He was present at several of the meetings with Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him what took place at any of those meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. I say, he was at three or four of them, and I may have discussed them with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not think you ever discussed with him——

Mr. VINCENT. A meeting at which he was not present.

Mr. SOURWINE. A meeting where he was present or was not present?

Mr. VINCENT. I did have discussion on the plane but not after the meeting that we left Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, after the meeting had taken place, did you not on some occasions discuss the meeting with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. But I have no distinct recollection of any of those occasions where I would have discussed with him. It was a natural thing to have discussed it with him, he was a member of the party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever give you a memorandum of his recollection of what took place?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whatever discussions you had with him were prior to the time you prepared your memoranda, which was at another place?

Mr. VINCENT. Which was at Kunming.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I recall no assistance that he gave me because these were supposed to be factual memoranda insofar as I could reconstruct them from my notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, sir, while you were with Mr. Wallace on this mission did you feel it was your duty to make available to the Vice President your 20 years or so of experience in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make that experience available to him to the best of your ability?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my ability I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take advantage of every opportunity to make that experience available to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any unasked advice?

Mr. VINCENT. That is difficult to say, but I imagine I did give him unasked advice.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom are you referring now?

Mr. SOURWINE. The Vice President when he was on his mission to China. You were there as a matter of fact for the purpose of proffering advice when it was needed? You were his adviser, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your usefulness would have been severely restricted if you had only spoken when you were spoken to?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not feel that you were in that position?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did speak out whenever you felt that you had information to give him that would be of value?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or advice that would be to his interest or to the interest of the mission?

Mr. VINCENT. Aid his mission.

The CHAIRMAN. At all of the meetings that the Vice President was present in Asia was Mr. Lattimore present also?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Lattimore was present at—there were probably five meetings, and Mr. Lattimore was present at two or three of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the places where he was present?

Mr. VINCENT. The meetings, all of them, except the first one and the last one, which I did not attend, took place in Chiang Kai-shek's home out in the hills.

The CHAIRMAN. Lattimore was there?

Mr. VINCENT. Lattimore was there.

The CHAIRMAN. Who else was in your party besides Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. John Hazard.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he there?

Mr. VINCENT. He was not there because he was a Russian expert.

The CHAIRMAN. He was what?

Mr. VINCENT. He was the Russian expert who went along with Wallace.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was an expert, he was not himself a Russian?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he attend any of the talks with Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refresh myself from the talks to see. He may have come into one of them. He was not consciously present, he certainly took no part in them that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who initiated with Mr. Currie the request for your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Who initiated with Mr. Currie?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. The request?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might have been Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. It might have been Mr. Wallace in discussion with Currie; that would have been my impression.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might have been somebody else?

Mr. VINCENT. It might have been somebody else, but I would say that Currie, who knew Wallace—either way.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was between them, for all you know Mr. Currie may have initiated?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or the President? Or somebody else?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. At least you did not? When you first learned of it, it came from Mr. Currie; and who initiated it, you do not know, it might have been himself?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might have been spontaneous?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Hull sent you with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. My only knowledge as to why Mr. Hull sent me with Mr. Wallace was to make available to Mr. Wallace the experience that I had had recently in Kunming and over a period of 20 years in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear any other reason given as to why Mr. Hull sent you to Mr. Wallace, with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I think, and here I am having to call very largely on my memory, there was a small conversation between Mr.

Hull and myself just before I went out at which Mr. Hull very briefly said, "Vincent, you are going." He said that he hoped Mr. Wallace would not make any promises to the Chinese that we couldn't live up to.

Mr. Wallace had just come back from a trip the year previous to South America. There had been some feeling that Wallace had been expansive in his promises of aid there and Mr. Hull was himself a little concerned about whether Mr. Wallace was going to overdo it.

The CHAIRMAN. That wish was expressed by Mr. Hull to you?

Mr. VINCENT. That idea was expressed by him to me, as I recall it. As I say, there I am drawing on a memory that isn't too good on a situation long ago. I do remember seeing Mr. Hull, and that is my recollection. There may have been something else said.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you were afraid that Mr. Wallace might make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities?

Mr. VINCENT. I was aware of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were specifically charged by the Secretary with doing what you could to avoid that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Hull tell you he had picked you to accompany Mr. Wallace in order to hold him down?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any such language as that, but——

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your understanding that you were to serve as a restraining influence over him in the event he endeavored to make unjudicious or injudicious commitments to the Chinese Government?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be what I would gather from this conversation I vaguely remember. I may say, in adding there, that I did not find it necessary to hold him down. He didn't become expansive in China so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he make any commitments to Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. None other than saying, as I think was reported in one of these conversations, that we would do our best to aid and support them in their conduct. But so far as a specific promise to Chiang, which we had to live up to, I don't recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it only to Chiang that Mr. Hull was afraid Mr. Wallace might make injudicious or elaborate promises?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; so far as I know he had in mind the National Government of China under Chiang and not any other group.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had no thought of any promises or commitments that might be made elsewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would General Chennault have been either desirable or acceptable as the President's personal representative to Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that General Chennault would have been most acceptable to the Generalissimo as his adviser.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would he have been either desirable or acceptable to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony would be that he would be desirable and acceptable. I had a great admiration for him myself. I don't know to what extent the State Department knew him as a man that might have been acceptable or desirable or fit for that job, but to my own estimate he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would he have been desirable or acceptable to the War Department in that job?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express any view in that connection, that is, with regard to his desirability or acceptability on behalf of anyone to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. When we were in Kunming, after we left Chungking, I recall suggesting that General Chennault might be the man he wanted for the job of being adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. It was hardly the matter of adviser. It was taking over the general control of the American Armed Forces in China and maintaining close contact with the Generalissimo, so that we had a coordinated military effort.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was far more than adviser, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was more than adviser, and at that time I think the title of Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo was being used.

I do know, as a matter of fact, that Wedemeyer did, when he took over the job, have the title of Chief of Staff. He was also Commander, but he had the title of Chief of Staff. I am getting into military things now.

Mr. SOURWINE. But that was not proposed by either you or Mr. Wallace at that time, was it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not at that time, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Senator O'Conor, we are discussing at the moment the Wallace mission to China.

"Would General Chennault have been either desirable or acceptable as the President's personal emissary to Chiang" was the subject, and the witness has testified that in his opinion he would have been acceptable and desirable to Chiang, that he would have been acceptable to the State Department. He does not know whether he would have been acceptable to the War Department.

Did you testify, sir, that it was your suggestion to Mr. Wallace at Kunming that perhaps General Chennault was the man to be recommended for the job of the President's personal emissary to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I recommended Chennault as the man to take over the control of the forces in China, which carried with it also this idea of being the adviser to Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that connection, did you recommend the replacement of Stilwell by Chennault?

Mr. VINCENT. In that connection, the recommendation was one which was not entirely one, in its inception, of getting Stilwell out of the command. It was possibly leaving Stilwell in the over-all command militarily in the whole China-Burma theater area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you recommend the removal of Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me please continue here. It was thought possible at that time to make the recommendation that Chennault would take over the China thing and be on his own as the political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, commanding troops there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it that you were trying to accomplish the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. What we were trying to do was accomplish the removal of General Stilwell from the position he occupied in China as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "we," you mean you and Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the general idea here, and I think it is stated here in the cable.

Mr. SOURWINE. But I am asking for your memory of the purpose.

Mr. VINCENT. The purpose was to replace Stilwell in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your recommendation was that Chennault was the man for that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did Mr. Wallace say about that recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. Of Chennault? I do not know what he said, but it became clear in the conversations that General Chennault himself did not feel that he wished to take the job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, how did that become clear? Did Mr. Alsop make that clear?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it was Alsop, sir, or, since we were living in General Chennault's house, whether he made it clear to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't discuss this Kunming cable with Chennault, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor did Mr. Wallace, so far as you know?

Mr. VINCENT. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did discuss it with Mr. Alsop?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Alsop was on General Chennault's staff?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You certainly didn't know that General Chennault was unwilling to take that assignment, or you shouldn't have made the suggestion; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then the word that General Chennault was unwilling to take that assignment must have come either from Mr. Wallace or Mr. Alsop. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. It probably came from Mr. Alsop.

Mr. SOURWINE. It must have come from either Mr. Wallace or Mr. Alsop? There were only the three of you there, and it wasn't you, so it was either Mr. Wallace or Mr. Alsop?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So, on that basis, what is your memory as to who made the statement?

Mr. VINCENT. My present memory would be that Alsop made the statement.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I ask a couple of questions there?

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. Did Mr. Wallace or any of his group of advisers consult with any of the Chinese Communist leaders in reference to the matter of the replacement of Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall. I don't think that Mr. Wallace or any of his advisers saw the Chinese Communists during this mission out there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that all you had?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who first suggested General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified before that I can't recall whether it was T. V. Soong or whether it was Alsop.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; I mean at the conference with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. VINCENT. At the conference with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. At which, of course, T. V. Soong was not present. I would say it was probably Alsop, although it may have been as a result of a conversation that Mr. Wallace had had coming down on the plane with T. V. Soong. It could easily be Mr. Wallace recalling.

Mr. SOURWINE. The objective was to secure the removal of Stilwell; you recommended Chennault as the man to replace him; and either Alsop or Wallace suggested Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. There may have been something previously placed in the mind by somebody.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wouldn't know who placed the suggestion in Mr. Alsop's mind?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your comment when General Wedemeyer's name was suggested?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't recall my exact comment.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the nature of it?

Mr. VINCENT. The nature of my comment, if it was any comment at all, was that we needed a man, and I knew General Wedemeyer by reputation, and he would make a good man. But I had no way of knowing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think he was a better man for the job than Chennault?

Mr. VINCENT. I made no comparison in my mind as to his being a better or a worse man than Chennault.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having recommended Chennault, did you thereafter assent entirely in the suggestion of Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in China with Mr. Wallace, did you have a conference with General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any knowledge of a conference between General Stilwell and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it, then, that your answer would be "No" to the question, Did you and Mr. Lattimore have a conference with General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. The answer is "No." General Stilwell, insofar as I can recall, remained in north Burma or India and did not come to Kunming, and none of us went in the opposite direction, as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are stating this definitely now? This is a matter of memory and not a matter of what might have happened? You are stating that you did not have a conference with General Stilwell and that you and Owen Lattimore did not have a conference with General Stilwell in June of 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. We did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Service or anyone else reported the results of such a conference, how would you characterize the report?

Mr. VINCENT. If Mr. Service or anyone else said that I had a conference with General Stilwell during this trip, I would have to characterize it as a complete misstatement of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, were you in China with Mr. Wallace on or about June 20, 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. I was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you and Mr. Wallace arrived in Chungking, did the two of you go to visit Mme. Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not identify her as a Communist at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now?

Mr. VINCENT. I gather that she is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now identify her as having been a Communist at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified earlier that she was probably pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you square that with your recent testimony that neither Mr. Wallace nor either of his advisers consulted with Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it would square on the basis that I had no knowledge that she was a Communist, but we thought she had Communist leanings at that time. She certainly was sympathetic. And he called on her, Mr. Wallace called on her, as the widow of Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say she certainly was sympathetic. You mean at that time she was sympathetic to the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my understanding.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew that at the time, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. May I interrupt there to ask, Upon what would you base your statement of belief that she was favorable? From any expressions on her part?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I would see her from time to time. She was living with either Chiang Kai-shek or with the Kungs—I forget—one or the other. And it was a matter that we had social gatherings together, and Mme. Sun Yat-sen always took the more extreme view with regard to assisting the Communists in getting on with the war against the Japanese and things like that. We did not have many political conversations. I am giving an impression based upon the fact that as you will recall Mme. Chiang Kai-shek also in 1926 or 1927 disassociated herself, when Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking about 1944.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. But, as I say, I am giving you the reasons that I have the impression that she was sympathetic toward the Communists, and it goes back as far as 1926.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just expand a little bit on the point you are trying to make when you talk about Mme. Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. Why did you drag her in at this point? What is the point you are trying to make?

Mr. VINCENT. No; Mme. Sun Yat-sen. Did I say "Mme. Chiang Kai-shek"? Will you correct that?

I know she wasn't pro-Communist in 1927.

Mr. SOURWINE. I didn't know anything except what you said. I had to go by that.

Mr. VINCENT. But you can have a slip in names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; but you can recognize it was rather startling testimony at the moment.

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

Senator O'CONOR. You will have the opportunity to clear that up if there was any slip of the tongue.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was well known to you in 1944 that Mme. Sun Yat-sen was definitely pro-Communist, and that was known to you and, I presume, to Mr. Wallace when you went to visit her?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you went to visit her on or about the morning of June 21, 1944. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. It would be that date. We were there between the 21st and 24th.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who went with you? Do you remember?

Mr. VINCENT. There was one other Chinese present, and I do not recall his name. It may have been her own brother, Sun Fo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there a Caucasian present?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I can recall. I think it was Mr. Wallace and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Atcheson, from the Embassy, accompany you on the visit to Mme. Sun Yat-Sen?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he did, sir; but he may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it a fact that he went with you to Mme. Sun's residence and was asked to retire during the actual conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of such an incident at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what can you tell us about the meeting, or the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say that it was a conversation of a very general character, and I don't recall any of it. It was more or less, as I have stated, a courtesy call on the part of Wallace to call on the widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen as far as I had any knowledge of its objective.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory that Mr. Atcheson was present at the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no memory of that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say he was not present?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not say he was not present. As I say, the only people I recall being there were Wallace, myself, Mme. Sun Yat-sen, and one Chinese, maybe Sun Fo.

Mr. SOURWINE. For how long did you talk together?

Mr. VINCENT. I would estimate it was anywhere from 20 minutes to a half an hour.

Mr. SOURWINE. No longer than half an hour?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mme. Sun request Mr. Wallace and America to help the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that she did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that she didn't?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say that she did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was in existence a report of that conference that said that she did, would you challenge it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever report on that conference to anyone?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall a report on that conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you report to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall reporting to the State Department. But I may have after we got back. I did not report from Chungking on it. It may have been that Atcheson, who was present, reported on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you don't know whether he was present or not, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I don't know whether he was present, but one could easily have gone back and told Atcheson what the conference was about, and he might have reported on it.

Senator O'CONOR. Specifically, Mr. Vincent, what was taken up with her directly?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't recall what was taken up, as I say. It was a mission to go over there to call on the widow of Sun Yat-sen, and as far as the conversation was concerned, to my recollection, it was a general conversation. If there exists, as you say, reports here that she asked Wallace to help the Chinese Communists, I have just said that I would not deny that she did. But I don't recall it.

Senator O'CONOR. Have you any recollection, though, of any specific matter which was taken up or about which you and Mr. Wallace went to see her?

Mr. VINCENT. Unfortunately, I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she indicate that she regarded the Chinese Communists as the oppressed?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall that she did, but, as I say, I have indicated already that I can't recall the specific character of the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, even so, I hope I don't insult you by asking specific questions, because the question itself might refresh your memory.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I am glad you are.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was well known as her view at the time, was it not, that the Chinese Communists were the oppressed?

Mr. VINCENT. She never, to my knowledge, told me that she thought the Chinese Communists were the oppressed. Madame Chiang's principal line——

Mr. SOURWINE. Madame Sun, you mean?

Mr. VINCENT. Madame Sun's. Most of the time, was for bringing about a greater degree of unity, political and military, among the Chinese, among which, of course, she included the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she express, on the occasion of the meeting of yourself and Mr. Wallace with her, any views in regard to broadening the political power of the Communists in China and permitting them to participate in the government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that she certainly would have. I don't, as I say, recall the nature of it, but it would have been a very logical thing to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall the nature of the meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall anything about the dwelling in which it took place?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you recall anything about the room in which it took place? Was it a room with small windows?

Mr. VINCENT. It probably did have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she seated or standing during the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think that she was seated, and that it was in Sun Fo's home.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she behind a desk, or in a chair, or on a divan?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether she was on a chair or on a divan.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to recall it for you.

Mr. VINCENT. I know, but the position of Madame Sun Yat-Sen at this meeting I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you don't recall your own position, what you sat on?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly remember it if I stood the whole time, but I must have sat.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you have to do with the preparation of Mr. Wallace's report to the President on his China mission?

Mr. VINCENT. We are speaking now of the telegram from Kunming?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about his report, if there is a distinction. Was that telegram from Kunming a report?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to make a distinction between what was a telegram from Chungking on or about——

Mr. SOURWINE. From Kunming, you mean?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean from Kunming. On or about June the 26th, and a report which Mr. Wallace made to the President after he returned here from his mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he make two reports, then, one in the form of a cable from Kunming and one in the form of a written report after he came back?

Mr. VINCENT. He has so stated, that he made one after he came back. I don't know of my own knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know on the basis of your own knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. I had no knowledge at the time that he made a report on the mission to the President in writing or orally, although he said he was going to see the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the submission of any report or memoranda by Mr. Wallace to the President other than the Kunming cable?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace ever ask you for suggestions with regard to any such report, oral or written?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him the subject of such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who typed his report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a rough draft of such a report, or of memoranda prepared for such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever submit any suggested language, orally or in writing, for possible inclusion in such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, did Owen Lattimore ever submit any suggested language for possible inclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you were, as you have testified, present with Mr. Wallace, as an adviser, as his chief adviser. You were the man who knew China.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wouldn't it have been in your contemplation the most important thing about his whole mission, to make a report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have certainly thought it was, and he told me he was going over to see the President and talk to him, but I was not present at the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you account for the fact that throughout the whole mission you never discussed with him or touched on in your conversations with him the possibility of a report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, he told me he was going over to see the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was after you got back. I am saying, all the way along, all the way on the trip, the airplane trip, and across the country, and until you got back, you never touched upon the question, with him, of a report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. We touched upon the matter of his going in to see the President and talk to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that? Was it before you got back to Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. On the plane from time to time he would tell me he was going in to see the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never talked about what he would say?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor did he, or whether he would file a written report or an oral report?

Mr. VINCENT. He never told me he was going to file a written report.

Mr. SOURWINE. But when you talked about it, you never talked about whether he was going to file a written report or an oral report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you find yourself in entire accord with Mr. Wallace in his verbal expressions concerning what he had found out?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean his verbal expressions after he came back here, or during the trip?

Senator O'CONOR. No, en route, during the trip back.

Mr. VINCENT. One doesn't always find oneself in entire accord with anyone, and I would say there probably were differences of opinion. I don't recall them.

Senator O'CONOR. Were there any marked differences?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall any marked differences, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would have thought the question of a report to the Chief Executive would have been uppermost both in your mind and in Mr. Wallace's. How do you account for the fact that it wasn't?

Mr. VINCENT. I can account for it as far as I can. I myself told you, and I have said before, I didn't ever know he made a written report to the President until here within the last few months.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; that doesn't account for anything. Excuse me. I interrupted you.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I was about to say we had sent in a telegram, which was two or three pages long, from Kunming, to bring to the President's attention the situtaion as it was seen by Mr. Wallace in China. There was also the transcript of the notes which I had made in the conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those had already been transmitted to the State Department; hadn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. The notes were brought home by me and typed after they got back to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you said they were prepared at Kunming.

Mr. VINCENT. They were prepared at Kunming, but brought home by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. They weren't typed at Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether they were in longhand or whether they were typed at Kunming, I don't recall, but my recollection would be that they were in long hand.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you testified that they were unchanged from the time you prepared them at Kunming until you submitted them.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I mean unchanged in form, because they were retyped here in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. But unchanged in context?

Mr. VINCENT. Unchanged in context. I simply came in, just to keep the record completely straight, and then there was a digest made of them, which reduced them down from 20 pages to 3, in the State Department, for Mr. Hull's attention, and I have no certain knowledge whether they ever went over and were read by the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are back to the question of how you account for the fact that you and Mr. Wallace didn't even discuss this subject of a possible report to the President. Have you said all you want to on that subject?

Mr. VINCENT. I have. I was just saying it is possible that he considered—he always told me he was going in to see the President; and that was his affair.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he say, "that is my affair"?

Mr. VINCENT. No, he didn't say "that is my affair." He simply didn't take me into his confidence about going to the President at any time, once we arrived back in this city.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never broached the subject?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had known that he had no thought of making a report to the President, would it have concerned you at all?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it would have concerned me. But he had told me he was going to see the President and talk over the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it didn't concern you whether he would make an oral or a written report?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no interest in ascertaining which he was going to do?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator O'Conor. Did you subsequently inquire?

Mr. Vincent. I did not.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with anyone the question of whether he would make a written or an oral report to the President, or any such report that was to be made?

Mr. Vincent. I recall no conversation. And I want to reemphasize that from a certain point of view the telegram from Kunming, which was our last stop, might have been considered as my last participation in the thing.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you so consider it?

Mr. Vincent. I did so consider it, once we got back to Washington.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, on the plane, on the way back, did Mr. Wallace do any typing?

Mr. Vincent. He presumably did. He kept a typewriter with him, or we had a stenographer, an Army officer, a young fellow in the Army.

Mr. Sourwine. On the plane?

Mr. Vincent. On the plane.

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wallace dictate to him on the way back?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. And he had a typewriter?

Mr. Vincent. Well, whether Mr. Wallace had a typewriter, I don't recall. I don't know whether Mr. Wallace can type.

Mr. Sourwine. I mean the young Army officer. Well, you never saw Mr. Wallace typing, then, or you would know whether he could type. But you never saw him typing on the plane?

Mr. Vincent. I never saw him typing; no.

Mr. Sourwine. What kind of a plane was this?

Mr. Vincent. A DC–4, four motor.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it all compartmented up, or one large compartment?

Mr. Vincent. There was a compartment forward, with a bed here, and a bed there, and aft it was all one compartment.

Mr. Sourwine. So if Mr. Wallace had been typing on the plane, you would have seen him?

Mr. Vincent. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. The conclusion, then, is inescapable that he didn't do any typing on the plane.

Mr. Vincent. He certainly made notes, but he didn't do any typing. I would say here that quite apart from the question of any report to the President, Mr. Wallace was getting ready at that time for a speech which he was scheduled to make immediately on his return at Seattle. And I was busy with that, contributing whatever little share I had in it, and Wallace was busy writing his report—I mean, writing this speech which he subsequently gave in Seattle about the 10th of July.

Mr. Sourwine. On the way back, then, you were working on the Seattle speech?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Together?

Mr. Vincent. All of us were working on it.

Mr. Sourwine. The young Army officer, the stenographer, too?

Mr. Vincent. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wouldn't have had much time to work on a report on the plane, then, would you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any other representative of the American Government get an expression of views from any Chinese Communist source on General Stilwell's removal?

Mr. VINCENT. None to me. When you name other people——

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge, did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any other representative of the American Government get an expression of views from any Chinese Government source on the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. I can state that I got none. I can state that as a positive fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you a little more than that. I am asking you whether to your knowledge anyone else did.

Mr. VINCENT. To my knowledge, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you send in separate reports to the State Department or to the President while you were in China with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You sent no reports to the Department from China?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. And when you got back, did you submit any reports other than your memoranda of the conversations?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only report I submitted that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you submit any oral reports to your superiors in the Department after you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I undoubtedly talked the mission over with Mr. Grew and with Mr. Ballantine. Both were my immediate chiefs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express——

Mr. VINCENT. Just a moment. I went in with Mr. Wallace when he called on Mr. Stettinius, who was Under Secretary then, and just as a junior person present listened to that conversation. I don't recall what it was, but it was mostly just how the trip came out.

We also went with him when he called on Secretary Hull, just to report that he was back and on the mission. That was a very brief conversation, which developed nothing beyond what we had already reported.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time express any dissatisfaction with or disapproval of any of the views Mr. Wallace had expressed?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Sergei Goglidze—G-o-g-l-i-d-z-e?

Mr. VINCENT. The Russian? The man of the toast?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. If I have mispronounced it, correct me.

Mr. VINCENT. The man that gave the toast; yes sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Identify him, will you? Who was he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was the Russian official who was sent to join the Wallace party when we arrived in eastern Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he sent to join the party, or was he there when you got there?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether he met us when we first came down on Russian soil; I don't recall. There was a Russian Army officer who met us when we came down, but whether Goglidze met us a day or so later, I don't recall. But he was with us most of the time we were in eastern Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a commander in that area?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he was a political man in what they called the Department of Maritime Provinces.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he hold army rank?

Mr. VINCENT. If he did, I knew nothing of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a Georgian?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a Georgian, so he told me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a friend of Stalin?

Mr. VINCENT. So he himself stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you first meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him when he came aboard the train or met him at their various hostels we stayed at along the way. But I would presumably have met him the first night, because everybody sat down in these hostels together.

Mr. SOURWINE. We keep getting presumably mixed with recollection. I know it is very difficult. But do you recall when you first met?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who introduced you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that he introduced himself, because we had nobody on the plane to introduce him to us, because none of us on the same plane had ever met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore didn't introduce him to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I remember; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned a toast. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. And I don't remember the occasion, but, as I say, I seem to think that it was when we were about to leave Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was at a dinner, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was at a dinner. And it was, I think, about the time we were leaving. I would not have recalled that toast, if I may say, had not Mr. Wallace made a record of it. It made no impression on me at the time, either mental or otherwise, and I made no note of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you speak Russian?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were all of the toasts at this dinner translated?

Mr. VINCENT. Goglidze, I think, could speak a little English, and it may have been that in this case he tried to speak a little English.

Mr. SOURWINE. This toast was in English?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall. But he could speak a little English, and I couldn't speak a word of Russian, and I know from time to time he and Mr. Wallace were talking.

Mr. SOURWINE. He praised you rather highly in the toast, didn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether you would call it praise or not. There were those overstatements. I saw no significance in it, even though Mr. Wallace's book writer did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is possible that you might be more familiar with such things than Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. What things, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Such encomiums.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it is the nature of toast-makers to always overstate the case; but in this particular instance my recollection is that he said I had great responsibility with respect to China. Now, the factual thing is that I was the chief of the China Division in the State Department. Therefore I did have some responsibility with regard to China. So it reduces itself down to analysis of what he meant by "great," and I can't put it——

Mr. SOURWINE. What he said was, "For China's future," wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't got the toast here.

Mr. SOURWINE. "To Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think he was talking about your duties and responsibilities in the American State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was; yes. I don't want to deny—but all of the implications that this toast had any ulterior significance or anything else were completely wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember it as ever having been given?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't even remember the toast and would not have remembered had not Mr. Wallace made a record of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you remember it after you read his record of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I still don't remember. I don't remember the occasion. I know that toasts were made, but this particular toast—I rely completely on Mr. Wallace's book for knowing that a toast was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take part in the drafting or preparation of a message to Chiang Kai-shek for the signature of President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. In the fall of 1944, there was a telegram that went out to Chiang Kai-shek. Now, this is a matter of State Department archives, and I do recall the occasion, that I took part in the drafting of a telegram. Now, whether that is still classified material, I don't know, but I judge there is no harm in my saying here—I don't recall the exact contents of the telegram, but there was a telegram. Since you remind me of it, about the President participating in signing it, there was a message that went out in the fall to Gauss, which, my recollection is—that is the reason I remember it, because it was one of the few telegrams that went out. It was signed by Hull, incidentally. It said the President and I were authorizing Gauss, in response to a telegram he had sent, to go over and speak very frankly to the Generalissimo about the urgent need of trying to bring about a greater amount of unity in the military command in China. Now, without consulting that telegram, which has now been drafted 7 years ago, I am trying to give you as best I can recall that that was the general nature of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand.

Mr. VINCENT. There was also an idea that Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador at that time, who had very much on his mind, was trying to bring about some kind of military council, which would have the same objective as I have just mentioned, which would have in mind having a more effective prosecution of the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. What part did you take in drafting that telegram?

Mr. VINCENT. That I could not say, what part. I was one of the drafters.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare a draft?

Mr. VINCENT. I prepared a draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. How close was your draft to the final draft?

Mr. VINCENT. That I wouldn't have any recollection of, how close the final draft was to my draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see the final draft before it went out?

Mr. VINCENT. I did. I myself, as I recall it, took it down to Mr. Hull.

Mr. SOURWINE. The final draft came to you for at least review before it went out, and you took it to Mr. Hull?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he sent it?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Hull took it over to the President, as I recall, and the President approved it, and Mr. Hull took it back and sent it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't see it after it came back from the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. MANDEL. Could I add a question on the Wallace mission for a moment?

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you definitely say that at the session with Mme. Sun Yat-sen and Sun Fo, no mention was made of the Stilwell matter?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say definitely there was no mention made of the Stilwell matter, insofar as I can recall, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. What attitude or responsibility would you take for the book of Wallace, Soviet Asia Mission?

Mr. VINCENT. None, Mr. Mandel. I was only sent a copy of it after Mr. Wallace finished it. I didn't know who wrote it. I didn't know until I saw this testimony that someone else wrote it for him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read it?

Mr. VINCENT. I never read it. I have glanced through the pictures. I am ashamed to admit I never read through the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who initiated the contents of the draft which you prepared of this telegram that you prepared? Were they your own thoughts?

Mr. VINCENT. We haven't got the telegram here. We are speaking of a document I haven't seen. But I was in full accord; that is, the initiation of the telegram was in response to a telegram from Ambassador Gauss, who was pointing out that there was an urgent need for a greater degree of unity of command.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I mean is, can you recall whether having Ambassador Gauss' telegram it occurred to you it was desirable to respond to it, and perhaps in a certain way, or whether the request came down to you from a higher echelon to prepare a draft of response to this message from Gauss?

Mr. VINCENT. Now, I am just reconstructing purely from logic, knowing how things were handled in the Far Eastern Office at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. First, do you remember?

Mr. VINCENT. Do I remember that I drafted the first draft?

Mr. SOURWINE. No; do you remember which of the two theories of initiation was correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that the theory of an initiation in the Far Eastern Office is the one that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it wasn't my office then. In 1944, it was Grew's and Mr. Ballantine's.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean a higher echelon than you at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Proceed.

Mr. VINCENT. I was about to say that if the thing worked as it logically would in those things, it resulted from a conference between Ballantine, Stanton, and myself. I think Stanton was in the Department at that time, but a telegram of that kind would have been of general discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have called a conference on Gauss' message, and a reply would come out of that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. And somebody would have assumed the duty of drafting the telegram, and it quite probably would have been me. I don't think it would have been Ballantine, because he did not do much drafting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee what part, if any, you had in the drafting or preparation or submission of the message under date of July 14, 1944, the text of which appears on page 560 of the State Department white paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Have we got the white book?

Mr. SOURWINE. Have we the white paper here? I will defer that question until we get it here. I am sorry I asked it without the volume. I thought we had one here.

Did you have anything to do with the preparation or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944, quoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of any such telegram. I could not say; as being in the Far Eastern Office at that time. If such a telegram existed, I did not have a part in drafting it, but you ring no bell in my memory there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of preparing it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of approving it or of having seen it?

Mr. VINCENT. None at all. But I cannot say that such a telegram did not go out.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wish you would try to search your memory on that point. We will ask you about it again later. It is possible that if you think about it something might come back to you about it.

Mr. SURREY. What is the date, again?

Mr. SOURWINE. July 25, 1944.

Mr. SURREY. On Amerasia?

Mr. SOURWINE. A message paraphrasing or quoting from Amerasia. If there is anything you can do to refresh your memory on that, we would like to have you do it.

Senator O'CONOR. Before going off that point, and returning again to the consideration of the part played by the several individuals, and specifically on the return journey on the plane, either in connection with the preparation of the Seattle speech or the prospective

report or anything of that kind, what part did Professor Lattimore take in it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am speaking now without exact memory of the thing. Professor Lattimore probably gave him information about central Asia, where he had taken notes. We had visited Tashkent and other places in central Asia. He probably gave him the benefit of the notes he had taken in Siberia. I had taken none there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say "he," you mean Professor Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That he gave to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I have no exact memory or knowledge of it, but that would be my recollection of how the thing came together. It is a speech which I haven't read in a long time, but it had a great deal of emphasis on the commercial relations between the Pacific area, China, Siberia, and others, and our own west coast. It was a speech given in Seattle, and it was given with that general idea in mind, of envisaging the great opening up of trade relations across the Pacific. It was a political speech, I should say, though it didn't take up politics.

Senator O'CONOR. Are we to understand that much of the factual information or the detailed information upon which the speech was based was furnished by Professor Lattimore from the notes that he had made?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say, Senator, that the Vice President, himself, so far as Siberia was concerned, supplied most of his own information, because he had also taken very copious notes on agricultural development, on the whole industrial development of Siberia. He was very industrious in taking those notes. I had taken none. Therefore, I am assuming he did most of his own work but was assisted in that part of it by Lattimore and Hazard, who were people who did take notes on the trip.

Mr. SOURWINE. Apart from the Vice President's notes, are you clear that there had been a substantial quantity of notes taken by Professor Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified earlier that Professor Lattimore didn't go with us on many of these missions. He went to educational places, museums, when we would take off elsewhere. I would say the major portion——

Mr. SOURWINE. In those instances, though, when he went alone, I have no doubt that on the return his information that he had gathered on his exclusive mission, so to speak, was accepted; because that is what he went for.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I interrupted you in what you started to say.

Mr. VINCENT. I started to say that I omitted Mr. Hazard, too, because Mr. Hazard spoke in Russian, too, and he was at Mr. Wallace's side on the Siberian trip, and it was a matter of all of us getting together and trying to throw together a speech. My contribution was what I could recall of trade relations with China. It was not one taking up policy, had nothing to do with these other matters we have just gone into, but the possible trade relations between the west coast and Asia.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have been asked to inquire: What was the date of that message to Ambassador Gauss, the "President and I" message?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you gave the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hull's message to Gauss said, "The President and I."

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection. But I thought you gave the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; I didn't give the date. And do you know just what the date was? You said the fall of 1944.

Mr. VINCENT. That is as near as I can identify it. And Mr. Gauss himself retired around the 1st of November, so it couldn't have been later than that. And I was out of the Department on leave during most of that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't think it was in the summer?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it was in the summer. I would identify it as best I could as in September, but I am not sure, and I don't know where I could check to find out.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know about a struggle over policy within the State Department on the question of whether there should be a hard peace or a soft peace with Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. That brings up presumably testimony by Mr. Dooman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, my question was only: What do you know? The question doesn't necessarily bring up any testimony by anybody.

Mr. VINCENT. Then I would say that in my position at that time, as chief of the China office, I had no direct knowledge of a struggle going on in the State Department over a hard peace or a soft peace with Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. You played no part in any difference of opinion over that matter of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Not over that matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you an advocate of a hard peace, so-called, with Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I would probably have been called an advocate of a firm peace with Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. I am sorry. I didn't mean to be at all harsh a moment ago.

Mr. VINCENT. My advocacy was not one that would be heard in any committee meetings or anything else.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure the committee would be glad to have you volunteer any comments you want to make with regard to Mr. Dooman's testimony. I didn't mean to foreclose you on that.

Mr. VINCENT. This morning I think I testified with regard to my relations with Mr. Dooman that I had nothing to do with getting him out of the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. I only jumped a little bit when you said that that brings up the Dooman testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. Well, I have traced that to Dooman in my own mind and in recollection of his testimony, but I have no exact recollection of what Dooman said about a hard peace or a soft peace. I do remember it was discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what he said a "hard peace" means?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that your advocacy of a firm peace was in line with what he called a hard peace? Or did you mean to make a distinction between hard peace and firm peace?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably meant to make a distinction between a hard peace, which some people wanted for Japan—I have even heard the statement used, and I don't recall where it was, at the end of the war, and as a matter of fact, feeling was running very high, that the thing to do was to "let Japan stew in its own juice," after the war was over. That seemed to me a very short-sighted view.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were the principal points in the firm peace that you would like to have seen, that you wanted?

Mr. VINCENT. Disarmament of Japan; breaking up of the large cartels, called the Zaibatzu, would be another one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, this Zaibatzu, is that a word that is translated "large cartels," or is it more broad and more inclusive?

Mr. VINCENT. It is more inclusive. It is a matter of the interrelation, however, of the large families, such as the Mitsubishi, the Mitsui, and so on. I am not, I may say, an expert on all of the internal matters in Japan, because I have never lived there in my life.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you spoke of the breaking up of that class, did you mean to include only the breaking up of the large families, such as the Mitsubishi, or did you mean the manufacturing and mercantile class, the business class generally?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not mean to include those. I meant the large families, which it seemed to us had almost a virtual monopoly of a certain type of Japanese economic activity; to what extent they were also the controlling element in manufacturing in Japan, I really don't know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in favor of the breaking up, removing from power or authority, of all those having anything to do with controlling large business interests, banks, and industrial concerns in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you oppose it?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not in a position to oppose it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You took no position on that point?

Mr. VINCENT. Because those were all matters that took place before I came into it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you favored breaking up the Zaibatzu. In favoring that, you said that you did not favor breaking up all these groups

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, when you vocally espoused the breaking up of the Zaibatzu, did you make the distinction that you didn't include all these groups in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; to use a word Mr. Dooman used, I certainly was not in favor of an atomization of Japanese industry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you favor the deposing of the Emperor?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir. Let me continue, there. I expressed it that, as one who had considerable feeling about the war with Japan, I would have hoped, as I say, that the Japanese might have established a republican form of government. But in a speech I made and in other things, I was not in favor of deposing the Emperor against the wishes of the Japanese and trying him as a war criminal.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say for the record that I now have the White Paper, and I ask you if this message. beginning on page 563, is the one that we talked about as Secretary Hull's cable to Gauss.

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can remember, this is the telegram we have spoken of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, will you turn back to page 560? That is the one I asked you about at the time when I didn't have this volume before us. I will ask the question again.

What part, if any, did you have in the drafting or preparation or submission of that message under date of July 14, 1944, which appears to have been signed by President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you give me a chance to read this?

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course.

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, as I say, I either drafted this or had a part in drafting it. It is one of those kinds of messages, where a request would come from the White House or from Wallace, which I do not recall, and I was told to draft the message.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember any more about it than that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any more about it than that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anything about the documents that that message itself refers to?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't.

Do you mean where it says, "The Vice President handed me your telegram of July 8"?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that. "And in reply to a letter to you of June 27. * * *"

Mr. SOURWINE. Those are the two documents then. You must have had those.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any letters that Mr. Wallace wrote the Generalissimo, which is apparently what this was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You must have had those documents, in order to prepare a draft of this. Correct?

Mr. VINCENT. But as I have told you, I do not recall those two messages. I am not giving that testimony because they have not been found, but——

Mr. SOURWINE. It should be obvious that you must have had them in order to prepare the draft, is that right? That draft couldn't have been prepared without it.

Mr. VINCENT. No, unless Mr. Wallace simply told me that he had received a letter and had replied to Chiang Kai-shek. But that seems wholly improbable.

Mr. SOURWINE. The draftsman would almost have to see the letter. You don't know what happened to them?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. May I have that volume?

Were you ever a member of the board of trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. May I here refresh my memory, if this is going to be about the IPR?

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course. Were you a member of that board in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as being a member of the board and being on a letterhead. I do not recall ever attending any board meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what other years you were a member of that board?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never a member of that board except during the year 1945. It may have gone over into 1946, before I was apparently not reselected, but I had nothing to do with my selection on it or nothing to do with my selection off it.

Senator O'CONOR. Were you consulted before your name was added?

Mr. VINCENT. I was consulted. A letter or telegram, as I recall, came, and I asked Mr. Grew if it would be all right to be on that board.

Senator O'CONOR. From whom did the letter come?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall. It may have come from the secretary or from E. C. Carter or a man named Dennett. Dennett, at that time, I think, was secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you contribute to the American Council of the IPR during 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you contribute during any other year?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you given to understand that even though you were a member of the board of trustees you were not expected to contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I was told that I was not expected to contribute. I did not contribute, and I have no recollection of anybody asking me to contribute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you were the only member of the board of trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1945 who was listed as a complimentary member.

Mr. VINCENT. I knew it after reading the testimony here, but I was not aware then. I was aware that I had not contributed anything to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why it was that you were listed as a complimentary member?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir. I know why I didn't contribute; as I didn't have any funds to contribute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a nominee on the 1945 IPR ballot for board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean to carry over into 1946? I was on in 1945, in the best of my recollection. But you mean a nominee of 1945 to become one for 1946?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, the ballot that elected the trustees for 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably was. I don't know how they elect their trustees, so you are giving me new information.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't recall having seen the ballot?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know, then, whether it is true that your name was one of six on that ballot under the subheading "Washington" with the instruction "vote for 6"?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What duties did you perform as a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. None whatsoever, as I recall. Outside of it it was a duty I performed in the American delegation; but I was never called upon to perform any duties as a trustee.

Mr. SOURWINE. What other official positions did you ever hold as a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I recall, except on the American delegation to IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. If that is official. Did you ever hear that the Institute of Pacific Relations was controlled by a Communist group or groups?

Mr. VINCENT. Not during that period.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you see evidences of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you still affiliated with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend a conference of the IPR in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you invited to attend that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a member of the American delegation?

Mr. VINCENT. As a member of the American delegation, and was sent by the State Department, under State Department instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you went as an official representative of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No; but I asked whether I could go, and, as I say, I was not under instruction to go as an official.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you were sent by the State Department. Do you mean the State Department paid your expenses?

Mr. VINCENT. They didn't pay my expenses.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your expenses were not paid by IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how it was that you were invited to attend that conference as a member of the American delegation?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no memory of the background. I was Chief of the China Division in the State Department at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Philip C. Jessup had recommended you for an inclusion in the American delegation to this conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember his mentioning it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. No one else told you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any recollection of making a speech in the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I took part in the panel discussions in a rather desultory way, but I made no speeches.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified here with regard to your acquaintanceship with Julian Friedman.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Friedman the question of what material might be given or shown to Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have any recollection of any such discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you testified that Mr. Friedman occupied a desk in your office. Was that a large office, physically speaking?

Mr. VINCENT. That was an office about two-thirds the size of this, in old State. He sat down in one corner. I sat down in the other corner. The situation changed as soon as we got new quarters.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those opposite corners?

Mr. VINCENT. Opposite corners.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or corners along the same wall?

Mr. VINCENT. Along the same line. But that was for a short period, and when I came back from the IPR, which had nothing to do with the IPR, new quarters had been given us in the north side of the building, where I had a private office of my own.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he sit in an outer office there?

Mr. VINCENT. There he sat in another office. I don't know where he sat then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it an office connecting with yours?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where you were both in the same office, was there a door between you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the door of entry to the room was not between you?

Mr. VINCENT. The door of entry to the room? You came into the room at the side, and I moved forward to my desk, which was up in the corner by the window. He went back across to the rear end of the room, to his desk.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, the door was in the wall opposite the wall along which your two desks were situated?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that a person coming in the door could look in one direction toward your desk and in the other toward his. They were corners opposite the door?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. But as I say, I am not making a factual thing about it. We have gone into the details of that office so much. As I say, a month later we did get a new set-up, where we had to put in partitions, and so forth.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you only occupied office space with Mr. Friedman for 1 month?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have forgotten how long it was, during the fall of '44. But in the spring of '45, we moved out of this big room.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is this 1 month period? One month from what?

Mr. VINCENT. From the return from the IPR conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. VINCENT. It was over about the middle of June.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman occupied office space with you for some time before that?

Mr. VINCENT. In the autumn of '44; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that, who else occupied space with you?

Mr. VINCENT. No one. Because we didn't have that office. When we moved into that office, that was another move. I moved three times, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you moved into that office, he moved with you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you have anything to do with the appointment of Mr. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. I had nothing to do with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or his assignment or detail in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you describe for this committee his full duties while he was occupying office space with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I think this morning I went into that. He was a sort of an odd-job man, but he took a particular interest in whatever matters came into the Division on labor problems. He was trying his best to equip himself to go to China as a labor attaché, which he eventually did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was material coming to your desk routed across his?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was material leaving your desk routed across his desk?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. Unless it was a matter that particularly concerned him. But there was no automatic routing to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. It didn't go to him unless you so marked it? Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that would be correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anything ever come to your desk from his?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me say here that routing of stuff that came into the China Division was not done by me. It was done by an administrative officer, or the assistant chief; I don't recall which.

Mr. SOURWINE. The routing of material that left your desk was done by you, was it?

Mr. VINCENT. The routing from my desk was sent off by me; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Material leaving your desk never went to his unless you so directed?

Mr. VINCENT. Unless I so directed, insofar as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you normally so direct?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not normally so direct.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that he was not generally familiar with what came on and went off your desk?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say he was generally familiar.

He certainly was not familiar with memoranda and things that I might write to my superiors, because he had no part in that.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was not a party to the routine of your office, and of your job?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was not in any sense your understudy or your deputy or your assistant?

Mr. VINCENT. He was not my deputy or my assistant. He was just a man who had been assigned to my Division, and physically occupied that space, because he were so crowded.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever investigate his loyalty revord?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever call for his file, his security file?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said, I think, this morning or yesterday, last I heard of him he was in London. He sent me a notice that he was going to get married, and that is the last I ever heard of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you hear from him since he got back to the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Since he got back here? No; I haven't heard from him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't hear that he was out in the University of California?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should rephrase that. Do you know he is out in the University of California?

Mr. VINCENT. The first I heard he was back in the United States was when I heard he was going to appear before this committee. The last I had heard from him, he was at the London School of Economics in London.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why was he dropped from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I had already left Washington. I do not know why he was dropped.

The CHAIRMAN. We will pause there. The committee will recess until tomorrow at 10.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., Friday, January 25, 1952, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 26, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, JANUARY 26, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order. Mr. Vincent, you have been previously sworn. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY WALTER STERLING SURREY, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I am informed that I failed to ask a pertinent question yesterday. I cannot understand how it happened. I am told that in the discussion of the trip with Mr. Wallace, when Mr. Hazard was mentioned, I did not ask you to characterize Mr. Hazard as pro-Communist or anti-Communist, as the case might be, or neutral, if that was the fact. Would you express an opinion on that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would express an opinion, yes, that I have no knowledge at all that he was pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what his views were with regard to communism?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see any evidences during the trip that he was pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, you know I spoke to you the other day about your knowledge of communism. Do you think that at that time you were competent to tell whether a person was pro-Communist or not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I would be able to tell if he gave very clear evidence of it. But I would not call myself an expert on being able to detect whether a person was pro-Communist or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Having in mind what I call the "cagey" letter, and you know the letter——

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The way that Mr. Lattimore indicated that certain things were to be done, in other words, you were to do things but you were to make it appear that that just was not your purpose, and that was not what you were doing, do you not think at times it is a little difficult to tell when a person is advocating the Communist line?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly agree with that, sir, that it would be difficult for me to detect.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am getting at. Some of these people that we are going over here, if you had close contact with them, I wonder whether you were able to judge whether or not they were pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. I have said, sir, that I would not call myself a person competent to judge, except on the most obvious evidence, whether a person was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Back in those days, did you appreciate the fraud and deceit with which communism worked?

Mr. VINCENT. Not in the degree I do now. I was anti-Communist in the sense I did not like Communists, but I certainly was not aware, as I am today, of the manner in which they worked. I certainly was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with their technique of penetration?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wondered about your knowledge, what it was with respect to communism in those days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, what was SWNCC? The initials are S-W-N-C-C; right?

Mr. VINCENT. SWNCC was the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the purpose of that committee?

Mr. VINCENT. The purpose of the committee was to examine various and sundry problems that came up that cut across the lines of State, War, and Navy at that time, to formulate papers to go for general approval by the three Secretaries.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a high level policy committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I would call it so; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your connection with SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. My connection with SWNCC began at the end of August 1945, when I assumed the chairmanship for the first time, on September 1, of the FE, what we called Far East subcommittee of SWNCC.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had not been represented at all, or a member, or an attendant, at the committee meetings before that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no recollection of having attended a meeting before that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subsequent to that time, were you ever represented on SWNCC by anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of being represented, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Julian Friedman ever represent you on SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. SURREY. Do you mean SWNCC or the subcommittee of SWNCC?

Senator FERGUSON. What does the witness mean, that is more important.

Mr. VINCENT. I think Mr. Sourwine is always speaking, with reference to me, as being a member or represented on the Far East Subcommittee. But I was never a member of the top level SWNCC. That was composed of the Assistant Secretaries of State, War and Navy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never attended a meeting of that?

Mr. VINCENT. I attended meetings of that from time to time, when invited, after I became the chairman of the Far East Subcommitee.

Mr. SOURWINE. But not before that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not before that time to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Either on SWNCC itself or on the Far East Subcommittee, were you ever represented by anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Either on SWNCC itself or the Far East Subcommittee, were you ever represented by anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. By whom were you represented?

Mr. VINCENT. Very shortly after I became chairman, my duties elsewhere became so pressing that at one time or another Penfield, who was my deputy, represented me; also Mr. Hugh Borton.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you spell Penfield, one "n" or two?

Mr. VINCENT. P-e-n-f-i-e-l-d.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember his first name?

Mr. VINCENT. James K. Penfield. I think that at other times Mr. Hugh Borton, the Chief of the Japan Division, would represent me. There may have been others, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would Mr. Friedman have been one of those others at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, that Mr. Friedman has ever been a representative of me on the F. E. SWNCC, or attended the SWNCC meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him authority to do so, or to represent himself, at either one of those organizations' meetings, as representing you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever report to you concerning what went on at meetings of the Far East Area Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. I think there that you are confusing two things unintentionally. It is that there was an area committee which was not, to my knowledge, a committee of SWNCC. It was an area committee which had been formed on a different basis in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that a committee of?

Mr. VINCENT. What?

Mr. SOURWINE. What was it a committee of?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a committee of representatives, also, who gathered, I think, from other departments. But it was mostly State people who came from different divisions to discuss area problems that cut across divisional and office lines.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it also a high level policy committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my recollection; it wasn't. I didn't attend it more than once or twice. That doesn't keep it from being high level.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the difference?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the two?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I must say that my memory on just exactly what the area committee did other than just discuss interdivisional problems, I don't know what its origin was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say it was an interdepartmental committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether any other departmental—I mean, outside of the departments. It may have been intra.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you sure that it had nothing to do with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection was that it was not related to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What became of the recommendations, if any, of the area committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose that they were sent to the chiefs of whatever divisions or offices were interested in the particular problem discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see any such recommendations?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the recommendations of the area committee. I am speaking of the area committee now.

Mr. SOURWINE. You brought this subject up when I was discussing Julian Friedman and asked about him. Am I to understand that you want the committee to understand that Mr. Friedman represented you on the area committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say that he represented me on the area committee. I think my former testimony was that my recollection had been that he attended at the area committee meetings while he was still with the Division of Labor or the Labor Division of the State Department, and that he continued to attend them after he was assigned to the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that he did not attend in your stead, or as your deputy?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my statement, sir. I don't ever recall instructing him to attend them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Friedman ever report to you concerning what went on at meetings of the area committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that he probably did, but I have no recollection of his reports on those meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Orally, or in writing?

Mr. VINCENT. Orally, as far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give to another person or persons information that Mr. Friedman had given you about what took place in those meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I did not reveal information that took place in those meetings. I make that as a general statement because I just testified that I do not recall the information.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was not anything in that question about revealing it outside, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question simply was did you ever give to any other person or persons information which Mr. Friedman had given you about what took place in meetings of that committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought the implication was the other. But I would certainly, if I thought it was important enough, discussed it with Mr. Grew or Mr. Ballantine, who were my chiefs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Again you are in the realm of speculation.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no specific memory as to what happened in regards to the discussions of this area committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether you discussed it with any other person, or, if so, with whom?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I may add there that my recollection is that Mr. Stanton, who was also a person of my same rank, attended those area meetings far more often than I did, as a man to speak for China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give information about the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee to The Nation, or representatives of that publication?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give to The Nation, or representatives of that publication, information about the so-called area committee?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the phrase Far East Area Subcommittee of SWNCC a misnomer?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection would be that the name of the committee was the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.

Senator FERGUSON. The way that Mr. Sourwine put it would not mislead anyone? It would be the same thing?

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, if I may interpose before the witness answers, it might mislead someone if there was a Far East area subcommittee somewhere else, and I understand there was.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it was called the subcommittee. It was the Far East Area Committee. But there I am speaking only from memory. What the exact title was I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the Far East Area Committee had nothing to do with SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Far East Area Subcommittee was the one which you became the active head of on the 1st of September?

Mr. VINCENT. I became the ex officio head of it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is clear now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give information about either of the two committees we are discussing, the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC or the Far East Area Committee, to the New Republic?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To PM?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To Amerasia?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear reports that information from SWNCC or the Far East Subcommittee thereof was leaking out?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't hear it at the time. I have since seen from testimony here in the hearing room, that it did leak out.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not hear about it at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have no recollection of hearing about it at the time. But my testimony is that I do now know that Mr. Dooman has testified that it did leak out.

Mr. SOURWINE. But knowing nothing about it at the time, you did nothing about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I may express my disappointment that Mr. Dooman didn't come to me at that time, according to his testimony, and say something to me about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is the first that you ever heard of that in the testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I can recall, sir, I never heard of any accusation that it was leaking.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think you would recall an important matter like that?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I would; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you could say that was the first, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give or arrange a luncheon for members of the IPR at the Blair Lee House?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall arranging any luncheon. I don't recall it; no. I don't recall ever giving a luncheon at the Blair Lee House, but I may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember discussing such a luncheon with Mr. Raymond Dennett, secretary of IPR, in January 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. About January 1945, which would have been before or after the IPR conference at Hot Springs. The Hot Springs conference took place—I am trying to remember whether——

Mr. SOURWINE. I give you that date to refresh your memory. The question is whether you ever discussed such a luncheon with Mr. Dennett.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember receiving a letter from him under date of December 19, 1944, with regard to that matter?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not remember receiving it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was such a luncheon actually held?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to recall the two or three occasions that I was in the Blair Lee House. I am coming to this because I do believe a luncheon was held in the Blair Lee House. Whether I gave the luncheon or not, and who was present, I am trying to recall—whether it was specifically a luncheon for IPR people or whether it was a luncheon at which there were IPR people. There was a luncheon or dinner about the same time, along at that time, for the Vice President of the Philippines. I can recall that one.

I can't testify with any clarity whether I believed that a luncheon was held there and whether it was specifically to entertain IPR people or not. I can't say.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recall no further details?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no details, except that there was a luncheon at the Blair Lee House in which I participated. Whether I gave it or not, whether I got the permission of the State Department to use the Blair Lee House, I don't recall.

Anything given in the Blair Lee House was always an arrangement by the State Department, and it was given under the State Department auspices and was paid for by the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that if there was such a luncheon or dinner, the most that could be said on your participation would be that you arranged it? You would not have given it, really, because the State Department would have been giving it?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department. But somebody had to be host; but I don't recall being host. I may have arranged it, but I don't think I was host.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, in 1945 express the view that Chiang Kai-shek must be gotten rid of?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you concur in that view?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever informed that you were being investigated or had been investigated by the State Department Security Division or security officers with respect to your connection with the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was never informed that I was being investigated by them in connection with the Amerasia case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether, in fact, you were so investigated?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, as a matter of fact, whether I ever was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever told that you were suspected of responsibility for leaks in the State Department in connection with the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. No one ever told me that I was suspected of being responsible for them; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That includes down to the present time; does it?

Mr. VINCENT. I seem to have read somewhere that my name had been mentioned in connection with the possible leaks of the Amerasia case, but nobody told me at the time and nobody told me directly since.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "read it," do you mean in the newspaper?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether I read it in the newspapers or in hearings of the committee, or one place or the other, I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it would be one of those two places?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see Andrew Roth in your suite of offices at the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was in there; yes, sir. I don't know when, but some time.

Mr. SOURWIN. How often?

Mr. VINCENT. Not often. As a matter of fact, I don't even recall the instances when I saw him. But I know that I have seen Andrew Roth in the State Department and in the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. More than once?

Mr. VINCENT. Probably more than once.

Mr. SOURWINE. More than twice?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't think so. I mean, I would say several times, but my testimony would be——

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position when he was in the office?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was a young naval officer at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. What duties would bring him into that office?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall what brought him in. I think he was a friend of Friedman's.

Senator FERGUSON. If he was a young naval officer, had he any duties in the Navy that would bring him in there for information?

Mr. VINCENT. He had no duties in connection with my Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Friedman introduce him to you?

Mr. VINCENT. He did; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your office?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, in my direct office or in some office of his where I ran into him.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was this office?

Mr. VINCENT. In the old State Building, sir.

Seantor FERGUSON. Did Roth ever visit you in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Miss Rose Yardumian, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, ever arrange an appointment with you for Mr. Raymond Dennett, of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of her arranging it, but I had meetings with Mr. Ray Dennett, of IPR, and I believe that Miss Yardumian was the person who arranged those, because she was in charge of some office of the secretaries here in Washington, over on Madison Place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she arranged an appointment for Mr. Dennett with you within the week immediately following February 5, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of that. That might have been the time, but, as I say, you pin it down to that point and I don't recall whether I saw Mr. Dennett through arrangements with her at that time or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Miss Yardumian other than as a voice over the telephone?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; because I think she was down at the IPR conference in Hot Springs. I think I have seen her. I don't think I would recognize her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet her at any other time?

Mr. VINCENT. I think there was a meeting up in the American headquarters of the IPR when she was secretary there, and I probably met her there.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been after the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been before or it may have been after. I believe there was a preparatory meeting of the American delegation, of which she probably acted as secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet her after the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall meeting her after the Hot Springs conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not meet her socially?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall meeting her socially.
Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever an officer of the IPR?
Mr. VINCENT. I was a trustee during the year 1945.
Senator FERGUSON. And you were then a State employee?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get consent to be a trustee?
Mr. VINCENT. I took the matter up with Mr. Grew, yes, sir, who was then my chief, and he said it was agreeable with him.
Senator FERGUSON. What was the IPR as far as you knew?
Mr. VINCENT. At that time?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes; or at any time.
Mr. VINCENT. It was a research organization in which there was a tremendous number of academic people, and was not connected with the Far East, as far as I knew. I had no great familiarity with it.
Senator FERGUSON. You were trustee?
Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I never attended a trustees' meeting, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. You never attended a trustees' meeting?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator FERGUSON. What were they trying to do; just get names?
Mr. VINCENT. That would be my assumption. General Marshall was a trustee at one time. Henry Grady was a trustee.
Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate, as being a trustee, that you had something to do with the policy.
Mr. VINCENT. It would indicate it, but I didn't; no, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. And do you know how many trustees they had on the basis of your connection, that like you were just figureheads, letterheads of it? Letterheads would be better than figureheads.
Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't think I can say how many they had on that basis. I would have to see a list of them.
Senator FERGUSON. Would you think George Marshall was one?
Mr. VINCENT. I would think George Marshall never took any part at all in the policy of the IPR.
Senator FERGUSON. You thought it was a research agency; is that right?
Mr. VINCENT. That is right.
Senator FERGUSON. Doing research in the Far East?
Mr. VINCENT. Doing research in the Pacific area and handling publications.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you think it had an influence?
Mr. VINCENT. I thought it had an influence in the matter of investigating into the problems of the Far East; yes. Its publications came out and people read them.
Senator FERGUSON. You think it is well now for a man to serve as a trustee as a letterhead?
Mr. VINCENT. I do not; no sir.
Senator FERGUSON. You would say now, if you were asked, you would not go on?
Mr. VINCENT. If I were asked, I would say I would not go on as a trustee of the IPR.
Senator FERGUSON. Because it might leave a wrong impression that the State Department was interested in the particular policies that they were carrying out; is that not right?
Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Gen. George Marshall when he was a trustee?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a trustee in 1949, I notice. That would have been while he was Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. He would have been Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. When did George Marshall become Secretary? No; he was not. He had ceased to be Secretary of State at the beginning of 1949. He retired.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he is an ex-Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he had retired. He was head of the Red Cross.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But when you were trustee, you were then on the desk for the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would give prestige to a publication to read that one of the trustees for that publication was a member of the State Department desk of the Far East, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; just as it gave prestige—I mean, Dr. Hornbeck, who had been my predecessor, had been a trustee. Henry Luce was a trustee at the same time I was. Henry Grady was a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think, looking back as an officer in the State Department, that communism would want to penetrate the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that, with the objectives of communism, they would try to penetrate most anything they could, and that the IPR would be one of the organizations they might try to penetrate.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know a more fertile field for penetration than the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I wouldn't want to put the comparison on that there might be more fertile fields. It would be a fertile field.

Senator FERGUSON. What would be a more fertile field? Would there be any publications of the State Department that would be more fertile than the IPR's?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't get that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any publications of the State Department that would be more fertile than the IPR publications?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know of any State Department publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they not have publications? They are spending thousands of dollars every year on publications.

Mr. VINCENT. You mean the bulletin from the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I should say that if Communists could infiltrate and influence the publications of the State Department, that would be more effective.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that would be more effective than the IPR books?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think that the IPR would probably come next?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would say if the Communists could infiltrate the Luce publications, it would be more influential than infiltrating the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean by that Life and Time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And Fortune?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. They are far more widely read. I find it difficult to make these comparisons.

Mr. SOURWINE. Life, Time, and Fortune never have been regarded as the expression of the views and opinions and knowledge of experts on the Far East, have they?

Mr. VINCENT. We are limiting ourselves to the Far East?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VIFCENT. If we limit ourselves to the Far East, the answer to the question would be "Yes." I know of nothing that limited itself to the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Life and Time and Fortune have never been considered technical publications in any field, have they?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And many of the publications of the IPR were so considered, were they not, by you and others in the State Department, as authoritative, expert publications in the field?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would not say that you and George Marshall would go on those as letterhead trustees, on Life and Time and Fortune?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And they were not considered as expert opinions?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But this IPR was considered so, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it have an influence in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge. Obviously, people read the articles that were in there, and if there were facts or opinions in there——

Mr. SOURWINE. If the chairman will permit, that is a question which calls for such a broad conclusion; if I might ask one or two questions sort of underlying that, it would be better.

You have just stated that you read Red Star Over Asia by Mr. Snow.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And at the time you believed it to be a factual and objective treatment of the subject?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you read Mr. Lattimore's books, or some of them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you considered them highly expert?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think you answered that last question. I think you mumbled the answer.

Mr. VINCENT. We were making a distinction between inner-Asian frontiers of China, which I did think was an expert piece of factual work.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you testified, did you not, that you would give great weight to any views that Mr. Lattimore expressed about the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not willing to say that he was the outstanding expert outside of that one area, but you said in the entire Far East you would give great weight to his views?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, you thought so much of him that you wanted to hire him, but in the context of an expert of these inner-Asian frontiers.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, these publications of the IPR were then, were they not, considered as the opinions of experts on the field?

Mr. VINCENT. And they were, as I say.

Mr. SOURWINE. And they were rather widely read by people who were in positions of authority dealing with those matters? Now on the other hand, you have not read, although you considered communism one of the important problems in the east, you had not read any of the basic Communist documents, so that your ideas about communism and its influence and its objectives, so far as you got them from books, were gathered at least in part from IPR publications? Is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they widely read in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I couldn't say whether they were widely read. It was generally read, I suppose, in the far-eastern office when there was an article that was of particular interest to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, they covered just the Far East, did they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of a more influential publication than the IPR is on the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it aimed to influence public opinion as well as State Department opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that any magazine published, of that kind, was aimed to influence the readers, and the readers were the public.

Senator FERGUSON. And the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. And the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think they would have wasted all their efforts just on the public, Joe Doaks, reading it? They, in fact, distributed them free to you people, did they not, in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether a copy came to us free or whether it was subscribed to——

Senator FERGUSON. Well, either one. But do you not think that all of these publications on the Far East came to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I am quite sure they did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and they would be distributed among the members of the Far East Division. Is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. This was not just to influence the opinion of Joe Doaks in Detroit?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would not say that they particularly slanted themselves toward the State Department. But they certainly would have figured that the State Department would have read their publications.

Senator FERGUSON. And be influenced by them. That was part of the policy, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, the policy of any publication is to influence its readers. I can't say for IPR whether it aimed particularly and especially at influencing the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that one of the things that made you feel that Owen Lattimore was an expert on certain parts of the Far East was what he said in publications of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, you got more knowledge from those publications than any other way about Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. During the period that Owen Lattimore was editor of the Pacific Relations, I don't recall having a great deal of contact with the magazine itself. I was speaking of the period when I was back here, and at that time when I knew him—well, I had hardly known him intimately before, but when I knew him here on an official basis as head of OWI he was at that time not editor.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. Pacific Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not get your knowledge about his expertness in the Far East from the OWI work, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I got it partially from that, in conversations with him, when we were discussing far-eastern policy as the OWI was supposed to carry it out.

Senator FERGUSON. And the reading of these books, is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever come to the conclusion that Frederick Vanderbilt Field knew anything about the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I never had any conversation with Frederick Vanderbilt Field about the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read any publication in the IPR written by Field?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever having read an article by Field in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know the IPR was using aliases to write articles?

Mr. VINCENT. I never knew that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you believe that the people writing those articles were the real people that signed them?

Mr. VINCENT. If I read an article signed by somebody, I assumed so, unless it was an obvious pseudonym. I was not, I may say, a regular reader of Pacific Affairs at the time. I am just saying not as a factual statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but these books came out. Is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say now about a publication like the IPR writing either articles or books under fictitious names?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't like it in the IPR or in any magazine, to have fictitious names.

Senator FERGUSON. Clearly fictitious. If they were marked Mr. X, or something like that.

Mr. VINCENT. I wasn't thinking of Mr. X. You mean clearly fictitious to mislead the reader?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I mean clearly fictitious not to mislead the reader. Say Mr. X writes this. You would think that they should not use another name indicating another writer was writing it.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say they certainly should not.

Senator FERGUSON. Or a fictitious name.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any of these names out of the "cagey" letter? For instance, the "Asiaticus." Was that a fictitious name?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it was fictitious.

Senator FERGUSON. Were the other two fictitious?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten the other names.

Senator FERGUSON. One was Chi.

Mr. VINCENT. No; they were not fictitious names.

Senator FERGUSON. What is Chi now?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. I have had no contact with Dr. Chi since I was in Chungking. I haven't seen him in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what he is now, what his position is?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Has he any position with the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at Yalta?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write a memorandum about the Yalta Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; not before the Yalta Conference. Are you making your question clear? Did I write a memorandum about the Yalta Conference?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. That is the question. I asked that after you had testified that you were not at Yalta.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us about that memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. May I read these notes?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would rather have you answer the question.

Mr. VINCENT. You say did I ever write a memorandum. I am now going to describe the memorandum I wrote. I made no contribution to Yalta. I did not know the conference was going on until after it was over, and I knew nothing about the contents of the agreement on China until after several months, I should say, in June 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me see, you were then on the Far East desk?

Mr. VINCENT. I was Chief of the China Division, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, of the Far East Office.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And was there anybody higher except the Secretary of State? Who was your next one?

Mr. VINCENT. The Deputy Director for the Far East Office, and after him the Director.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was that?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time in 1944 it would have been Ballantine as Director of the Far Eastern Office, and Stanton was Deputy Director.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Deputy Director?

Mr. VINCENT. Stanton.

Senator FERGUSON. He was over you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he was over me.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were never consulted or knew that they were going to deal with the China situation at Yalta?

Mr. VINCENT. Never, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for not being consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would say the secrecy with which the whole Yalta Conference was conducted.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Ballantine considered a Far Eastern expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had he served as much as you had in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. More, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He had served more?

Mr. VINCENT. He was an older man.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Stanton an expert in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether either one of those were consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know that they were consulted. But I don't believe they were, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn about the Yalta agreements?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, in June or just before the Potsdam conference.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get knowledge of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Just before we went to Potsdam, I have forgotten now who told me, we were told before we went to Potsdam about the Yalta Agreement. I was on the delegation to Potsdam, with Mr. Byrnes.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know who told you about the Yalta agreements?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't recall. It may have been someone in the delegation. It may have been, as I say, Mr. Bohlen, Charles Bohlen. It may have been someone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you then learn about what we had done, as far as Yalta was concerned, about China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. And it was my first knowledge of it, and it came to me as a great shock.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a shock?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you feel that Yalta was a mistake?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I considered that the word "shock" indicated a mistake rather than you were delighted. It was a shock rather than being delighted?

Mr. VINCENT. Without being there, I don't know what all of the considerations were that caused them to have Yalta. But just seeing the bare agreement was a shock to me.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you thought it was a grave mistake?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I didn't pretend to know what my superiors had in their minds in reaching that conclusion, whether it was a good bargain or a bad bargain.

Senator FERGUSON. No; but to you it was a shock and a mistake; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

May I go on? I am getting to this memorandum, if that is all right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead. I am hopeful we can get along and get through by noon.

Mr. VINCENT. This is just this page.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good, sir.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Some factual papers were prepared in the Far East Area Committee for use at Potsdam. They were not, to my knowledge, used. As far as I know, any discussions of far eastern policy at Potsdam were purely incidental to the main consideration of matters concerning Europe.

While at Potsdam, we received the State Department report on the conversation which Dr. T. V. Soong had had just prior to Potsdam with Stalin and Molotov, in regard to the Sino-Soviet treaty.

I addressed several memoranda to Mr. Dunn, now American Ambassador in Italy, and at that time Assistant Secretary of State, who was assisting Mr. Byrnes at Potsdam and the President. I expressed my concern over the character of the discussions that had taken place at Moscow. The Yalta Agreement, insofar as it concerned China, had shocked me. I considered it retrogressive and a threat to our interests and security in the Far East.

I felt that it was inconsistent with China's sovereignty. However, it was an agreement between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin and, therefore, from my point of view, a part of policy.

But I was alarmed to find that the Russians were going even beyond the agreement in their demands. I suggested that Soong be asked to come to Moscow where he could have our support in talking with Stalin. The suggestion was not acted upon, I suppose for the reason that it was not on the agenda of the Potsdam Conference, and they were busy with other matters.

That is the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that you thought the Yalta Agreement should be changed, and you might do something about it at Potsdam?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I considered that the Russians were overreaching themselves, even considering that the Yalta Agreement, in my mind, was no contribution to peace and security in the Far East, but even so within the framework of the Yalta Agreement, from the reports that we got. The Russian demands and requests of Soong, to my mind, went beyond even Yalta.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at any conference or conferences between Gen. Patrick Hurley and General Wedemeyer in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I had a conference with General Wedemeyer in 1945, and in which General Hurley was not present. I do not recall any conference between Hurley and Wedemeyer and myself, but it is probably simply a faulty memory because it could have easily happened during that time.

They were both home, back from China, in March and April 1945, and it would have been most natural if the three of us had met. I don't recall the occasion. The one I recall, sir, is the conversation with General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare a memorandum with respect to a conference with General Hurley and General Wedemeyer, or with General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I prepared a memorandum with respect to a conference I had in the Pentagon Building with General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only memorandum of a conference with General Wedemeyer that you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. It is the only one that I recall, sir. Are you interested in the conference I had with Wedemeyer? I think I covered it yesterday. Yes, I think we discussed Wedemeyer yesterday, and it has to do—yes, as I testified—it has to do with the matter of the landings on the China coast which never took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is any more comprehensive memorandum of that conference in existence than the one you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you furnish this committee with a copy of the memorandum you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. It is a part of the State Department documents, and I would have to refer your request to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a copy of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that conference or your memorandum on it with Mr. Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you furnish him with a copy of your memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who got copies of your memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that the copies, if there were copies, were given to no one. They were kept in the State Department. I may have shown one to Hurley, and no doubt did.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not circulated?

Mr. VINCENT. Not out of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who in the office would have received copies of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Grew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Stanton would have received it. Would he receive a copy or not? He would have received it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. If the Secretary was there at the time he would have probably seen it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give any IPR authors access to State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically did you ever give such access to Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To Mark Gayn?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To T. A. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Mr. VINCENT. A policy that would have been drafted where, in the State Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would rather read the question back, because I cannot testify to where such a thing was drafted, if it existed. I want to find out whether it was drafted, if we can, from you. Do you know, or did you know, anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I did. It is the SWNCC papers that were drafted and called the Post Surrender Policy for Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you speaking now of a draft that was submitted to and considered by the Policy Committee of the State Department on or about May 24, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I am not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered, having been submitted to, and considered by, the Policy Committee of the State Department on or about May 24, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge of that, sir. I may add that at that time I had no direct or, as I can recall, indirect relation to policy regarding Japan. I was Chief of the China Office and didn't have any responsibility nor any connection with Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was such a draft, you might not have known about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I might not have known about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss the question of such a draft, or of any proposed policy with regard to the possible Japanese surrender, with anyone, at any time, between May 24, 1945, and July 29, 1945, approximately a 2 months' period in there?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall discussing it with anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. And during that time you did not know of any paper or memorandum on the subject of a proposed policy in the event of the surrender of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I found out about it—I think we may refer there to the Potsdam declaration. I only heard about it after I went to Potsdam, with regard to the terms of surrender which was issued from Potsdam. Prior to going to Potsdam, I had no knowledge of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what view General Marshall took with regard to any proposed policy to be followed by the United States in

the event Japan surrendered, at about this time, that is, late May, early June and July of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. He was Chief of Staff then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what view Owen Lattimore took?

Mr. VINCENT. On the surrender of Japan, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that matter with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn that Mr. Lattimore went to see the President about this proposed policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I never knew, to my recollection I never knew, that he went to see the President about the proposed plan.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not read that in our hearings?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with anyone in the IPR the question of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing it with anyone in the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at the Potsdam Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What agreements with respect to China were made at that Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any secret agreements entered into by or on behalf of the United States at Potsdam?

Mr. VINCENT. With respect to China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any secret agreements entered into by or on behalf of the United States at Potsdam?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know of, but I would not have been in a position to know then because I was there purely——

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any secret agreements entered into concerning China?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of a letter by Mr. John M. Patterson, Acting Division Chief of the Department of Public Liaison of the Department of State, addressed to the American-China Policy Association, in which it was stated that no secret agreements concerning China were concluded at the Potsdam Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, I have no recollection of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Letters prepared by the Public Liaison Division would not necessarily be checked with you even though they dealt with the subject under your jurisdiction?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, they would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I find out whether your answer includes in the term "agreements" an understanding between governments?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it does, sir. You mean the previous question there?

Senator FERGUSON. It would include the word "understandings"?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Mr. Theodore White?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him, please?

Mr. VINCENT. As a newspaperman, who visited China from time to time, while I was out there as counsel of our Embassy. My recollection is that Theodore White at that time was writing for the Luce publications.

Mr. SOURWINE. What time was this?

Mr. VINCENT. This would be from 1941 until the spring of 1943. He was there after the war broke out, as I recall it, which would be 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him personally?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew him personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. A friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. A friend of mine, not a close friend, but a friend of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he or was he connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the connection of White with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him or with anyone else the question of Mr. White's discharge by Mr. Henry Luce?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think I discussed it with anyone.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never talked with you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever write to you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no record of his writing to me about it at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember that he ever did?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember that he ever did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that he did not?

Mr. VINCENT. Drawing on my memory, I can say that I don't recall that he did, but I can't say that he didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he send any message to you about it through someone else?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any message.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never discussed his discharge with anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever urge or recommend that T. V. Soong and Foreign Minister Wang Shi-shueh, or either of them, go to Moscow?

Mr. VINCENT. There is a record in the State Department that in the spring of 1945 the matter was discussed with Hurley, who was then in China, that Soong had planned to go to Moscow to discuss matters with Stalin, a matter of an agreement. I just try to draw on my memory, but I have no clear recollection of the incident, nor do I know whether he ever went, nor do I recall any part I had in it other than the telegrams coming in, and a telegram would presumably have gone back to Mr. Hurley who reported Soong's intention, as I recall it, to go.

I don't recall that Soong did go to Moscow until after he found out about the Yalta agreement, which he was told of, it seems to me, sometime in May 1945.

Is that responsive to your question, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Partially, sir. Now, how about the question of whether you ever urged or recommended that Soong and Wang Shi-shueh——

Mr. VINCENT. Well, there was a man named Wang Shi-shueh who was, I think, either Acting or Foreign Minister at that time, and he did go to Moscow at the time the Sino-Soviet treaty was discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you spell that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would spell it W-a-n-g S-h-i-s-h-u-e-h.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it be H-s-u-e-h?

Mr. VINCENT. It could be, because the Chinese words vary. But I think that is the man we have in mind, because I think at that moment he was Foreign Minister of China or Acting Foreign Minister.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is described as Foreign Minister, so that is the man. May we call them Soong and Wang?

Mr. VINCENT. And I have no clear recollection of having urged that Soong and Wang go to Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or recommending them?

Mr. VINCENT. Or recommending them. My only recollection, as I say, is a report from Chungking to the Department that Soong had discussed the matter with Ambassador Hurley, and Hurley reported on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they in fact go to Moscow?

Mr. VINCENT. They did, in fact, go to Moscow in early July to discuss the Sino-Soviet treaty. Whether they went prior to this——

Mr. SOURWINE. After they got to Moscow, were additional demands made upon them by the Russians?

Mr. VINCENT. I have just testified with regard to my attitude toward the Yalta agreements, and it was my impression that the Russians went beyond my interpretation at least of the Yalta agreement in making their demands. Both the length of the leases and the joint agreement on the railways, of what they demanded of half of the port facilities at Dairen, I recall, and the extent of the naval report agreement all seemed to be excessive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is, then, that the Russians did make additional demands upon Soong and Wang?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be a matter of interpretation.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your interpretation?

Mr. VINCENT. My interpretation; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Chinese Government appeal to Ambassador Hurley to mediate?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall if they did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never learned that they had made that request?

Mr. VINCENT. That they had Hurley to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear that they asked Ambassador Hurley for any assistance at all in connection with their conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't recall their asking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of any instructions sent by the Department to Mr. Hurley in that connection?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, now, there are two matters here, Mr. Sourwine: One is when Soong and Wang Shi-shueh went over to Moscow as a result of having been informed of the Yalta agreement, and one of the conditions in the Yalta agreement was that the Russians and the Chinese would negotiate a treaty. My recollection is that prior to that, and even prior to Soong having any knowledge, insofar as I

knew, of the Yalta agreement, there was also a plan in Chungking reported to us in the Department by Ambassador Hurley that they had intentions of going.

If they had any knowledge of the Yalta agreement at that time, I didn't know that they had it, and I had no knowledge of the Yalta agreement.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I was attempting to reach——

Mr. VINCENT. So, my first testimony was with regard to a reported intention of T. V. Soong to go to Moscow at a time when, as I say, I didn't know about the Yalta agreement, and I don't believe he did. I don't think he went to Moscow, but I can't recall. He went to Moscow later when he found out about the Yalta agreement.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I was attempting to reach with my question was this: Whether you knew or were aware of any instructions from the Department to Mr. Hurley in connection with his assistance to the Chinese delegation in their negotiations with Moscow, or in connection with his response to a request that he mediate or assist at that time.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I recall, and I recall it not too distinctly, a telegram from Hurley giving what was a proposed agenda that Soong had proposed to take up with Stalin if he went to Moscow at this time, prior to the knowledge of the Yalta agreement.

I recollect, too, that there was a telegram that went back telling Hurley that we appreciated getting that telegram and the information on it. I don't recall the rest of the telegram. It might have had in the telegram a suggestion by Hurley that he mediate or go along with Soong. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. It might have had that in it?

Mr. VINCENT. It might have had something in it, and the telegram that went back which may have been sent by me or anybody else, may have suggested. I would have to refresh my memory from the State Department, which I would be glad to do. It may have told him that we didn't want him to be in the position of mediator between Russian and Chinese Governments.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering whether your telegram did not say that, to tell him to stay out of it.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to see the telegram before I testify here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean it may have said either, for all you know, it could have approved his mediation or it could have prohibited it?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection, without referring to it now, would be that it did not approve any mediation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You started out by saying that it might include approval.

Senator FERGUSON. You said it might. Now which did it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I haven't got the telegram here, and I haven't see it for some time.

Senator FERGUSON. But is that not a very important matter, and would you not remember a thing like that?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollecetion is, and I don't know whether I drafted it or not, that Ambassador Hurley was told that we didn't wish him to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you use the words "it might have been"; do you mean it is theoretically possible, or do you mean there is some likelihood?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I mean this: From the best that I can recall, the attitude in the State Department at that time was not to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese in coming to an agreement. Therefore, it could have been put in a telegram quite easily. I have asked that I would like to refresh my memory with the telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. A moment ago, when you used the phrase "it might have been", as referring to words of approval of such mediation, were you discussing that as a possibility or as a probability, or as a likelihood, or were you discussing it merely as something which theoretically could have happened, all other considerations aside?

Mr. VINCENT. I was discussing it as something that would have been a logical position to take in the State Department at that time, that it was not desirable to mediate between the Russians and the Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember saying that this message in response to Hurley's telegram might have approved his mediation, might have told him to go on with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall making that testimony, Mr. Sourwine. If I did, it is incorrect, because I said it approved the idea of discussing the matter with Soong, and expressed appreciation, if I can recall it at all, of getting these five points. But so far as I can recall, it did not approve the idea of mediating.

Mr. SOURWINE. All that concerned me was the semantics problem. We have a record here which is full of your saying "this might have been" or "that might have been." I wanted to find out clearly whether, when you used that phrase, you meant something which in your opinion was likely, something which in your opinion was logical under the circumstances.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you have meant here when you used that phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. That it was logical?

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say "it might have happened," did you mean that to you it seemed logical under the circumstances?

Mr. VINCENT. That Hurley would have been advised not to mediate.

Mr. SOURWINE. At any time when you used that phrase, you used it to mean something that to you was logical?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And something that you did not know did not occur?

Mr. VINCENT. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the text of a cable to Ambassador Hurley in August of 1945, signed by Grew, conveying the idea or instruction that Hurley was not to advise, mediate, or otherwise assist in Chinese-Russian negotiations?

Mr. VINCENT. In August 1945? I do not recall any such telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall such a cable at any time prior to August 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I just recalled this cable that we are speaking of here, the exchange of cables which took place in the spring.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that signed by Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't know whether it was signed Grew or not without seeing the telegram, Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Byrnes was Secre-

tary of State at that time, and if Byrnes was there it would have been signed by Byrnes. If Mr. Grew was acting, it would have been signed by Grew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation or approval of that cable?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I have said that I don't recall the telegram, and therefore I can't say whether I had anything to do with the preparation of it. I just don't recall those circumstances. I do the earlier one, but I don't recall this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was composed by Under Secretary Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would be unable to testify further with regard to it unless we can get the document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have an opportunity or means for refreshing your memory by access to the document, other than through this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I could ask the State Department if they would let me see the telegram, if you will give me the date of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. All I can ask you about is a cable on or before August of 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. That could easily have been the telegram we have been discussing, if it is on or before August. It could be the one of the spring we have just discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was one in the spring and there was none later, that is what this committee would like to establish. If there was a telegram in the spring and a reiteration of the policy later in response to a specific request from Hurley, that is what the committee would like to establish.

Have you any thought of what the fact might be in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. My thought would be that when you are speaking of this telegram, we are speaking of the same telegram, just on a knowledge that by the 8th or the 10th of August the Sino-Soviet agreement or treaty had already been signed, or maybe the 15th of August. But the first half of August the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed, and there would be no need for mediation then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your best recollection is that there was only one such cablegram?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was in the spring of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you advised about sending that cable?

Mr. VINCENT. The one I have testified to originally?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I knew about that exchange.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advise against mediation or Hurley having anything to do with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably would have advised against mediation. I have no distinct recollection of whether I advised or not, but I knew it was the policy in the State Department at that time not to interfere in these negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. We thought it was better for the Russians and the Chinese to work out their own arrangement. I had no knowledge at that time——

Senator FERGUSON. You said you were violently opposed to what happened to China. Notwithstanding that, you were against any change?

Mr. VINCENT. At the moment of this telegram, Senator, I had no knowledge of the Yalta agreement. I didn't have any knowledge of the Yalta agreement until June or early July, just before Potsdam. There were presumably other officers in the State Department who did know about the Yalta agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the message in May had nothing to do with the Yalta agreement?

Mr. VINCENT. If it was in May—it would be earlier than that, I think, because I think Soong himself was already advised. This was early in spring, or May.

But to answer your question, it is that the message at that time had nothing to do with the Yalta agreement. It was a plan of Soong's, as I recall it, to go to Moscow to discuss with them, at a time when I was ignorant, and I believe Soong was ignorant, of the existence of the Yalta agreement.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to mediation: would such a question of policy, established at that time, with regard to mediation, necessarily have controlled at a conference subsequent and after it had been made necessary by the Yalta agreement?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it would, sir. You mean after the Yalta agreement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. We had ourselves so completely, you might say, laid down a line for China to follow that it would have, to my mind, altered the situation completely.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it did, in fact, control, and that policy was adhered to and persisted in, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Susumu Okano?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess, and convene again at 1 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11: 15 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

Senator FERGUSON. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, the last question asked before the recess was whether you knew Susumu Okano, and you replied "No."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is or was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Susumu Okano is a Japanese Communist leader.

Did you, Mr. Vincent, know that Susumu Okano had been flown from China to Japan after the conclusion of hostilities in the Japanese war?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having knowledge of that; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you have to do with the preparation or approval of a paper entitled "The United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan"?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to these notes?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you, sir [reading]:

Mr. Dooman, before this committee in September, discussed the policy entitled "The United States Post Surrender Policy for Japan." He said that this paper was adopted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on August 29, 1945, but that the paper had been reported reopened prior to its release on the 22d of September by the White House.

Actually, the records show that the paper was reviewed by the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC, of which Mr. Dooman was chairman, not by SWNCC itself, on August 29, and the paper was not finally adopted by the top-level over-all SWNCC committee until August 31, 1945.

Both Mr. Dooman and I attended this meeting on August 31, although it was Mr. James Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, who officially represented the State Department.

Mr. Dooman has placed particular significance on the fact that he had retired as chairman of the Far East Committee and had been replaced as chairman by me prior to September 6, when the paper was approved by the President.

His principal charge was that I had primary responsibility for this paper and that certain important changes were made in it following its approval during the last days of his tenure as chairman of the Far East Committee.

In connection with these statements, Mr. Dooman had read into the record several paragraphs taken from this document which he said subsequently were used as the basis of work undertaken to destroy and eliminate the capitalist class in Japan.

When asked by Senator Eastland whether this was the work of John Carter Vincent, Mr. Dooman replied that I was chairman of the Far East Subcommittee at the time, and the implication clearly was that I had instigated the changes in this important document that would pave the way for communism in Japan.

First, I wish to inform the committee that the paragraphs which Mr. Dooman read into the record as changes were not written by me.

Secondly, I am prepared to testify here on the basis of an examination of the record that the language which Mr. Dooman implied had been changed following his resignation as chairman of the subcommittee was not changed, but, in fact, appeared in the document when it was before the subcommittee under his chairmanship on August 29, and again when it was approved at a meeting of SWNCC which he attended on August 31.

Finally, I would like to show that the paragraph read by Mr. Dooman, far from being intended to destroy capitalism in Japan, was an expression of general policy to foster the peaceful and democratic development of Japan's postwar economy.

Here is the language from the document entitled, "United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan," which Mr. Dooman read into the record as changes made in the paper after its adoption in the last days of August 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have that document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SURREY. We have the document that was released on September 22.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade * * * To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

"(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for place of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic efforts solely toward peaceful ends; and

"(b) To favor the program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry."

I should like to refer to a photostatic copy of the press release of United States Post Surrender Policy for Japan, dated September 22, 1945. Beginning at the bottom of page 4, under the heading of "Promotion of democratic forces," the first sentence reads:

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis.

Immediately following this sentence appears the first sentence quoted by Mr. Dooman:

Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Following this sentence there appears another important sentence which Mr. Dooman did not see fit to use in this quotation. I shall quote it here because I believe that the entire substance of the paragraph which he has quoted relates very closely to this sentence. The sentence reads:

Those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activities in support of military ends.

The remainder of the language quoted by Mr. Dooman then follows.

I do not place special significance on the fact that Mr. Dooman did not quote in full from the document, but I think it is important that the committee have the full text. What is of utmost importance for this committee to know is that this very language which Mr. Dooman alleged was changed, in fact appeared in this document as early as mid-August 1945, and remained unchanged when released by the White House September 22, 1945.

I have reviewed the changes made in the document. The changes made in the document subsquent to its approval on August 29 by the subcommittee, chairmaned by Mr. Dooman, were:

1. In the first paragraph headed "Purpose of this document" minor changes were made by the subcommittee after I became chairman, but these changes were made at the request of the SWNCC committee at the meeting at which Mr. Dooman and I were both present, that is the meeting on August 31.

For example, the original document contained the clause, "Following Presidential approval", and the revision made by the committee, of which I was chairman, read: "It has been approved by the President."

In the first document it is not specifically stated that distribution should include General MacArthur in Japan. The revision made by the subcommittee, of which I was chairman, made clear that the document had been distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate United States departments and agencies for their guidance.

I think that the committee will agree that these modifications in no way changed the basic meaning of the document.

The second modification concerns military training in the Japanese school system. The record shows that the change was offered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a meeting attended by Mr. Dooman. The change itself merely makes clear that the paragraph refers to career military and naval officers and not to all Japanese who had served in such capacity.

The record also shows that Mr. Dooman attended the meeting at which this change was made.

The next modification concerns the section dealing with "Encouragement of desire for individual liberties and democratic processes."

In the first paragraph an additional sentence was added, which reads as follows:

> At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

In the second paragraph the words "other United Nations" was changed to read "other democracies."

Mr. Dooman attended the meeting at which these minor changes were made.

The final modification had to do with exports from Japan and according to the minutes of the meeting was intended to strengthen the hands of the occupying authority in the control of exports. The suggestion for this modification had been originally made at a meeting of the subcommittee, but was not acted upon at that time because it was deemed appropriated for this to be taken up at the top SWNCC level.

This change, which was in line with current policy at the time, can hardly be interpreted as seeking to destroy capitalism in Japan.

Without wishing to burden this committee with further analysis of these documents, I would like to point out that the only changes made following its adoption on August 31 at a meeting of SWNCC, attended by Mr. Dooman and me, were very minor modifications in the first paragraph and the modifications in the paragraph on reparations.

I submit again for the consideration of this committee that these changes were important, but they were not changes which carry the implication read into them by Mr. Dooman.

The records prove beyond any question that the language which Mr. Dooman asserted was an example of changes made actually appeared in the document prepared by the subcommittee when he was chairman and were approved by the higher level SWNCC at a meeting which he attended.

Insofar as the document itself is concerned, I should like to emphasize that it was a broad, general document, which in no way spelled out specific measures. General MacArthur himself urged its publication.

In line with a policy of promoting a strong middle class in Japan, our Government then proposed that it be the policy of the Supreme Commander in Japan to suppress the activities of those who in the words of the document "do not direct future Japanese economic efforts solely toward peaceful ends."

I do not believe that anyone familiar with the prewar economic structure of Japan would quarrel with that statement. I think that the results of the program carried out by General MacArthur under this policy statement bear out the wisdom of our initial approach to the problem.

The second policy given General MacArthur in this section was one of breaking up the large family combines and cartels which for so long had dominated Japanese life. It was these groups primarily who had succeeded in making Japan a war-making aggressor in the thirties.

Without the support of these combines the Japanese militarists would not have been able to conquer half of Asia and bring about Pearl Harbor.

The program developed under this second policy was largely implemented by the Japanese themselves, with the approval of General MacArthur. To a degree it paralleled our own antitrust program in this country; in some cases I understand it went further.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, it went a good deal further, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Than our own antitrust program?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say in its application to Japan it did go further.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want the committee to understand that you think there is a paralled between the program in Japan toward the elimination of the Zaibatsu and our own antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Not exactly parallel.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much is it paralled?

Mr. VINCENT. Parallel to the extent of where there was interlocking directorates on banks, shipping companies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Parallel to the extent only, is it not true, that they both dealt with the industrial class, really?

Mr. VINCENT. With industrial combines, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. They both dealt with industrial combines, but they did not have the same objective, did they?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And they were not carried out in the same way?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with our own antitrust laws?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am not familiar with our antitrust laws, particularly.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you state that they were in effect parallel to our own antitrust program?

Mr. VINCENT. I state just as a layman who understood that the antitrust laws are to prevent large combines from controlling large areas of the banking and industrial life of our country, and my own understanding that that is what the Zaibatsu and Mitsui combines in Japan did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that they put into effect an order that no rice paddies could be owned by one individual of greater than 2½ acres?

Mr. VINCENT. Of that land program, I know. I am not familiar with the details of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that kind of thing is in compliance with this program?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not think it was in compliance with this. It was not in connection with this program. I have a paper on that here, if you would let me present it, on land reform.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the education of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. The educational system?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, as a matter of fact, that we placed in the schools the Communists of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never heard that, sir.

Mr. FERGUSON. You have never heard that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you heard now that the real Communist menace in Japan is in two places, the labor unions and the educational system of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not heard that. I do not deny it, but I have been out of the country for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who had charge of the taking over of the schools and changing of the teachers and so forth?

Mr. VINCENT. Under General MacArthur?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that a State Department function?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was not. It was a function under General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. Military function?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a function in the educational program of SCAP, was it not?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you.

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is the author of this document?

Mr. VINCENT. Of this document here?

Mr. FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir. It was virtually in its form there before I ever became a part of SWNCC. It was drawn up in large measure at the time when Mr. Dooman was chairman of the SWNCC.

Senator FERGUSON. Who drew it up? The State Department, the Army, or who?

Mr. VINCENT. It was drawn up by F. E. SWNCC, which means that State, War, and Navy, in the SWNCC committee collaborated in drawing it up.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you consider this a military document?

Mr. VINCENT. I consider it a SWNCC document.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not a Government policy program, and not military?

Mr. VINCENT. It is a Government policy program, coming out of the SWNCC committee, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think military men would be competent to draft such a political document?

Mr. VINCENT. I think we had quite a few military men.

Senator FERGUSON. Many of these men even take pride in the fact that they have never voted in an election. Do you say that men who are not allowed to take any part in our civilian government are competent to lay out a program for the future of the Nation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any of their names, Senator, but I do know quite a few competent military men.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they not all barred from taking any part in political activities, and so forth?

Mr. VINCENT. But they were assigned to this committee by the Assistant Secretary of Navy who was the top SWNCC man.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question.

Mr. VINCENT. Aren't they barred from taking any part in political activities?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; by their own regulation.

Mr. VINCENT. Barred, I would not say. I don't know that a military man can't vote. They can vote, I know, but he certainly could not run for political office and would not be expected to take part in political activities in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not that a State Department function to lay out the future of Japan's political life?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the very purpose for which the SWNCC thing was created, to get State, War, and Navy joint action on matters of this kind.

I was not there when SWNCC was created, but that was my impression of the objective of the creating of the SWNCC committee, was for State, Navy, and War to cooperate.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this document intact when you first came in contact with it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was intact when I first came in contact with the exception of a few minor changes which I just said were put in it to make it clearer.

Senator FERGUSON. Who in the State Department was in higher position than you who had control of this document?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Dooman was higher than I was and was chairman of the SWNCC committee at the time this document was drawn up.

Senator FERGUSON. So it was either your responsibility or Dooman's to approve this?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it would have had to have been approved by the top SWNCC, I have to refer to that, which was made up of the Assistant Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of War, and the Assistant Secretary of Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not make any changes in it, though?

Mr. VINCENT. They made no changes insofar as I know, but I was not in SWNCC in the month in August, and I believe July, when this was being discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in when it was issued?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel you were responsible for this document?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I would have approved that document.

Senator FERGUSON. There is nothing in this that you disapprove of?

Mr. VINCENT. There is nothing in that that I disapprove of.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this be offered for the record?

(The document identified by Mr. Vincent, entitled "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," was marked "Exhibit No. 376A" and is as follows:)

[Immediate release, September 22, 1945]

The following is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender prepared jointly by the Department of State, the War Department, and the Navy Department and approved by the President on Sept. 6. The document in substance was sent to General MacArthur by radio on Aug. 29 and, after approval by the President, by messenger on Sept. 6. The text follows:

No. 273

UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is a statement of general initial policy relating to Japan after surrender. It has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate U. S. departments and agencies for their guidance. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately.

PART I—ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES

The ultimated objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to which policies in the initial period must conform, are:

(*a*) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

(*b*) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.

These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:

(*a*) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United States is or may be a party.

(*b*) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

(*c*) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

(*d*) The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met.

PART II—ALLIED AUTHORITY

1. MILITARY OCCUPATION

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the principal allied powers acting in the interests of the United Nations at war with Japan. For that reason, participation of the forces of

other nations that have taken a leading part in the war against Japan will be welcomed and expected. The occupation forces will be under the command of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States.

Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern.

2. RELATIONSHIP TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States objectives. The Japanese Government will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration. This policy, however, will be subject to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to require changes in governmental machinery or personnel or to act directly if the Emperor or other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward the attainment of United States objectives. The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of Government initiated by the Japanese people or government in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. In the event that the effectuation of such changes involves the use of force by the Japanese people or government against persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander should intervene only where necessary to ensure the security of his forces and the attainment of all other objectives of the occupation.

3. PUBLICITY AS TO POLICIES

The Japanese people, and the world at large, shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of progress made in their fulfilment.

PART III— POLITICAL

1. DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people the part played by the military and naval leaders, and those who collaborated with them, in bringing about the existing and future distress of the people.

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air, and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff, and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval matériel, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and military, naval, and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

Militarism and ultranationalism, in doctrine and practice, including paramilitary training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and noncommissioned, and all other exponents of militarism and ultranationalism shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

2. WAR CRIMINALS

Persons charged by the Supreme Commander or appropriate United Nations agencies with being war criminals, including those charged with having visited cruelties upon United Nations prisoners or other nationals, shall be arrested, tried, and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals, shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nation.

3. ENCOURAGEMENT OF DESIRE FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly on occupation. At the same time it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultranationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States and the other democracies. Association of personnel of the occupation forces with the Japanese population should be controlled, only to the extent necessary, to further the policies and objectives of the occupation.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discriminations on ground of race, nationality, creed, or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended, or amended as required; and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal and police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies set forth in Articles 1 and 3 of this Part III and thereafter shall be progressively influenced, to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

PART IV—ECONOMIC

1. ECONOMIC DEMILITARIZATION

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others; the immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon any specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those selected industries or branches of production whose chief value to Japan is in preparing for war; the prohibition of specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power; and the limitation of the size and character of Japan's heavy industries to its future peaceful requirements, and restriction of Japanese merchant shipping to the extent required to accomplish the objectives of demilitarization.

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with this program, as between conversion to other uses, transfer abroad, and scrapping will be determined after inventory. Pending decision, facilities readily convertible for civilian production should not be destroyed, except in emergency situations.

2. PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES

Encouragement shall be given and favor shown to the development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis. Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Those forms of economic activity, organization, and leadership shall be favored that are deemed likely to strengthen the peaceful disposition of the Japanese people, and to make it difficult to command or direct economic activity in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

(*a*) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends; and

(*b*) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry.

3. RESUMPTION OF PEACEFUL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with the prospect of economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction, deeply to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions, and to find useful employment for their people along lines adapted to and devoted to peace. The Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease, and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop, and enforce programs that serve the following purposes:

(*a*) To avoid acute economic distress.

(*b*) To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

(*c*) To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries agreed upon by the Allied Governments.

(*d*) To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.

In this connection, the Japanese authorities on their own responsibility shall be permitted to establish and administer controls over economic activities, including essential national public services, finance, banking, and production and distribution of essential commodities, subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander in order to assure their conformity with the objectives of the occupation.

4. REPARATIONS AND RESTITUTION

Reparations

Reparations for Japanese aggression shall be made:

(*a*) Through the transfer—as may be determined by the appropriate Allied authorities—of Japanese property located outside of the territories to be retained by Japan.

(*b*) Through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparation account or as restitution may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange. No form of reparation shall be exacted which will interfere with or prejudice the program for Japan's demilitarization.

Restitution

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable looted property.

5. FISCAL, MONETARY, AND BANKING POLICIES

The Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies subject to the approval and review of the Supreme Commander.

6. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS

Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world. During occupation and under suitable controls, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes, and to export goods to pay for approved imports.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods, and foreign exchange and financial transactions. Both the policies followed in the exercise of these controls and their actual administration shall be subject to the approval and supervision of the Supreme Commander in order to make sure that they are not contrary to the policies of the occupying authorities, and in particular that all foreign purchasing power that Japan may acquire is utilized only for essential needs.

7. JAPANESE PROPERTY LOCATED ABROAD

Existing Japanese external assets and existing Japanese assets located in territories detached from Japan under the terms of surrender, including assets owned in whole or part by the Imperial Household and Government, shall be revealed to the occupying authorities and held for disposition according to the decision of the Allied authorities.

8. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR FOREIGN ENTERPRISE WITHIN JAPAN

The Japanese authorities shall not give, or permit any Japanese business organization to give, exclusive or preferential opportunity or terms to the enterprise of any foreign country, or cede to such enterprise control of any important branch of economic activity.

9. IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY

Imperial Household property shall not be exempted from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we go further with that statement of yours, let me ask this question:

Mr. VINCENT. I am through with it—it is just 10 more lines.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, get your 10 lines in and then I will go back to the point I want to make.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

I would like to make it clear that this broad directive had my concurrence in September 1945. It had the approval of Secretary Stimson. It had the approval of Secretary Forrestal, and the approval of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes. It had the approval of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It had the approval of the President.

Although I have not had the opportunity to follow events in Japan closely since 1945 when I went to Bern, I am sure there has been general approval in this country of the occupation under General MacArthur.

To imply that this general policy statement under which General MacArthur carried out the occupation, was a document that was calculated to promote the destruction of the Japanese capitalist class seems to me childish. I think that the facts completely refute Mr. Dooman's references.

At this point, I would like to emphasize particularly that my testimony today on the Japanese directive is offered here for the purpose of setting the facts straight and correcting the statements made by Mr. Dooman. Accordingly, I have pointed out that I was not the author of the changes under discussion, but I do not wish to disassociate myself from the document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that statement your own?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that statement wholly prepared by you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Now, because you raised the subject, I had assistance in getting the information together, because I was not familiar with that whole document after 5 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the language is yours, the content is yours?

Mr. VINCENT. In large part.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not prepared from somebody's outline and suggestions? It is the argument that you yourself want to make?

Mr. VINCENT. It is the argument I am making.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because you raised the question of parallelism between the activity in the elimination of the Zaibatsu, and our own antitrust program, I would like to ask you this: Do you know of any elements of confiscation in the antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Of confiscation of property?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any element of confiscation in what was regarded the Zaibatsu in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no element of confiscation except as the testimony of Dooman, of the capital levy or of everything over a thousand, but the combines were broken up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that the capital levy of everything over a thousand was confiscatory?

I am not asking whether it was justified as a confiscatory measure, but was it confiscatory?

Mr. VINCENT. Everything over a thousand?

Mr. SOURWINE. It was confiscatory?

Mr. VINCENT. In a sense; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you had one element, that of confiscation, which was present over there which was not present in our own antitrust program?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of anything arbitrary in our antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anything arbitrary in this program in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. It was arbitrary, as a military program would be.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that is another difference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any element of proscription in our antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you define "proscription"?

Mr. SOURWINE. Prohibiting people from engaging in any particular activities.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was such an element in the program in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. The people who might endanger the——

Mr. SOURWINE. There was a class of people, a substantial number of persons who were proscribed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything in the nature of attainder in our antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. What is attainder? I don't think there is; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Attainder would be the placing of burdens upon those who come after the original wrongdoer.

Mr. Surrey, would you like to try a better explanation?

Mr. SURREY. That is good enough.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not trying to give a technical, but an untechnical definition. What is your answer?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there attainder, in that sense, in the program in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was not?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of.

State that again, will you please, because you were talking to Mr. Surrey and I didn't get what you said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me start over again without the use of that technical phrase.

In our antitrust program in the United States, do you know of anything which prohibits a man from engaging in lawful business because he may have been convicted in a prior antitrust action, or once had an antitrust case against him?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not familiar with our antitrust laws, but I wouldn't think there would be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anything of that nature in the Japanese program?

Mr. VINCENT. There was.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that would be another difference, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, on the basis of those differences, sir, would you like in any way to revise your suggestion of parallelism between this program against the Zaibutsu and the antitrust program in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I would, to this extent, to point out that I used the term in a general character without any specific knowledge of the antitrust program in this country. I had just the general objective of a layman's idea of breaking up large trusts which were inimical.

Mr. SOURWINE. Merely for the purpose of argument?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that your own conception to use that argument as parallel?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I would have thought that combines here and the Zaibutsu both might have a strangling effect on business.

Mr. SOURWINE. As you testified before, the Zaibutsu is a broader term than merely combines?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It includes the capitalist class, the industrialist class?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but it generally referred to the large combines, the Mitsubishi and others.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have constantly been brought up in connection with it, and it certainly had an impact upon them, but it was not exclusively an impact on them, was it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has a much broader impact?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what has happened to the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't followed it, sir. I haven't followed specifically what has come out of this, because I left the country in 1947 and only came back a few months ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether any of those who were of the Japanese capitalist class before the war are still so engaged in industry in Japan today?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir, whether they are still engaged in industry.

Mr. SOURWINE. There could not be very many of them, under the program which was undertaken, could there?

Mr. VINCENT. My impression was that many of them had returned to industry.

Mr. SOURWINE. The whole purpose of the program was to eliminate them from influence and power, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It was to break up the large combines.

Mr. SOURWINE. You took all property away from a man over 100,000, did you not? That was true, was it not? That was the confiscation feature we have just been talking about?

Senator FERGUSON. $100,000.

Mr. VINCENT. 100,000 yen.

Senator FERGUSON. How many dollars was that?

Mr. VINCENT. The official rate was 15 to 1. Probably the rate at the time was anywhere from 50 to 70 to 1.

I am not saying the effect was the same, but to be precise my recollection of this, then, was that the 100,000 yen was left intact and there was a graduated scale up to a million or more, at 25 percent of the first 10,000, or 10 percent of the first 10,000, but it was a graduated scale.

Mr. SOURWINE. The whole operating effect and intent of that program was to eliminate anybody as a large industrialist, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It would seem to be, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because he could not continue to be one after you took his property away?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Furthermore, the man who had been the head of a business was proscribed, he was kept from continuing that business, or from returning in that field, was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been an after effect of it, that I could not testify on, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made mention toward the end of your statement about the Japanese capitalist class. Would you go back and read it again, that sentence where you mentioned the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. Toward the end, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, in what you described as the last 10 lines.

Mr. VINCENT. This is the only reference I see:

To imply that this general policy statement under which General MacArthur carried out the occupation was a document that was calculated to promote the destruction of the Japanese capitalist class is not correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you please tell us what it was calculated to do, if it was not calculated to promote the destruction of the capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean by confiscating?

I cannot testify to that, the program which has been spoken of here as taking everything over 100 million or taxing it was put into effect as strenuously as we have been led to believe here.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this 100.000,000, or is it 100,000?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection, it is 100,000; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the first place, what do you mean by "calculated"? Do you mean "designed for" or "adopted to the purpose of"?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not believe it was designed for the destruction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean "calculated" in the sense of "designed for"?

Mr. VINCENT. Not "designed for." That was not the intention.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean it was not intended?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not mean to say that it was not adopted for that purpose? Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you admit that this whole program was well adapted to the destruction of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have been used to destroy the capitalist class if the program of taking everything over 100 million yen applied to property, capital, and everything else.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us leave the "ifs" out.

Mr. VINCENT. My understanding of this program, which I say I did not have anything to do with formulating, was to stop currency inflation, and my impression, if I must give the impression I have, was that this was directed primarily against currency inflation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with this program, are you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are familiar with this document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have reviewed it recently?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, are you contending that that program as it was laid down and recommended was not well adapted to the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class, or are you willing to admit that that program was in fact well adapted to the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have been adapted to the elimination of the capitalist class.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean it could have been used for the elimination of them?

Mr. VINCENT. I hate to use "if," but my understanding is that it was a plan for currency, to stop currency inflation, and the 100 million was money that people had, rather than property.

Mr. SOURWINE. This program could have been used to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class, will you admit that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have said, then, and that coincides with what you did say, that when you used the word "calculated," you meant intended or designed for, and what you are contending, then, is that

this program was not intended or designed for that purpose of eliminating the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. What I have said here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. You are saying that this program was not intended or designed for eliminating the capitalist class in Japan.

Mr. VINCENT. That was not my idea.

Mr. SURREY. By "this program," you mean this document?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, the program espoused in this document.

Mr. VINCENT. The program espoused? This document is not specific. The program grew out of a later mission that went out in the fall of 1945 or the early spring.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Now, do you think that the people who formulated this program, this document, were aware that that program was well adapted for the purpose of eliminating the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. The people who made this document?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not think they thought they were going to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class in drawing up this document here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think they knew that it could be used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class? In other words, that it was well adapted for that purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. I could not testify what was in their minds, whether they knew, or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were at least informed as much about this matter as you were, were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have said you know it could have been used for that purpose.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but it was not used.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not suppose they knew it could have been used for this purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify as to whether they knew it would be used for the purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it is possible that this program was put on paper this way; that this document was prepared and promulgated, without a realization on the part of those who had a part in this that this could be used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, you are asking me that and I would say that I do not believe any man who participated in the preparation of this document intended that it was to be used to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time you approved that, did you know it could have been used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. That has been an afterthought?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there at any time in connection with that document any representation going along with it, in the way of memorandum or otherwise, cautioning that this program was one which

could be used to eliminate the Japanese capitalist class, or disavowing an intent that it should be so used?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I recall, but I was not there in the preparation of the document, except its final adoption.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it been used for the elimination of the Japanese capitalist class?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that opinion in the sense that there is always a capitalist class in any country, and, therefore, we still have one in Japan, or are you referring specifically to those who composed the capitalist class in Japan prior to the end of the war?

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to that class which this document refers to here.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a class?

Mr. VINCENT. Of those whose economic activities were inimical to peace. I think there is a statement in there.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a different category, if you please.

Senator FERGUSON. You might say that all capitalists were inimical to peace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communists hold that all capitalists are inimical to peace, do they not?

Mr. VINCENT. What?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do not Communists hold that all capitalist classes are inimical to peace?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So without getting into the semantics of where a capitalist class stands, what is your answer to the question?

Mr. VINCENT. Without getting into the semantics of where the capitalist class stands, what is my answer to your question?

I would like to have the question again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that opinion in the sense that there is always a capitalist class in any country, and, therefore, we still have one in Japan, or are you referring specifically to those who composed the capitalist class in Japan prior to the end of the war?

Mr. VINCENT. My answer would be that I had reference to the people who composed the capitalist class before the end of the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you are saying that the group of people who composed the capitalist class before the war have not been destroyed as the capitalist class of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, and I do not know what you mean by "destroyed." The combines, they are probably destroyed, but as a class, I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do the same people who controlled the industry and capital of Japan, before the war, control it still?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir. They certainly do not control it in the same extent, but whether they are in business, or not, I could not say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you do not care?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not want to say I don't care. If you mean somebody who was in Mitsubishi before the war is still back in business in Japan, and I would care or not——

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps I should not have asked the question that way.

Is it your testimony, sir, that you have no knowledge as to the extent to which the capitalist class of Japan, as it existed before the end of the war, has been eliminated as such?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we pass that point, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who was Yoshio Shiga?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who was Kyuichi Tokuda?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the name. I don't know who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it refresh your memory if I said that they were Japanese Communists, Japanese Communist leaders?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the names of them as Japanese Communist leaders.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read a report about Shiga and Tokuda being released from jail and returned to their homes at the conclusion of the war?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or of that having been done by United States personnel in a United States car?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall a report made by Gen. John S. Hodge, then commanding general in Korea, relating to the situation in Korea, the report being made to SCAP in Tokyo late in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall the report to SCAP in late 1945, that General Hodge made.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the best of your knowledge, you have not seen such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge, I have not seen such a report.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there had been such a report, and it had borne the endorsement by John S. Service, would you have been likely to remember that fact?

Mr. VINCENT. I would, I suppose. I couldn't tell you without seeing the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having seen a report bearing the endorsement by Mr. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall a request from General Hodge, directly or indirectly, that Syngman Rhee be flown out from Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall the incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of any State Department objection to a request, by General Hodge or anyone else, that Syngman Rhee be flown out from Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the circumstances under which Mr. Rhee, in the fall or later of 1945, was flown out to Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make a recommendation for someone to go to Korea instead of Mr. Rhee?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make a recommendation that Kim Koo-sek be sent to Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall Kim Koo-sek or the recommendation I made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now perhaps we had better clear this point up because a question has been presented here. Is the statement by President Truman on United States policy toward China, under date of December 15, 1945, the same statement that has been referred to throughout these sessions with you as the Marshall directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I have referred to that, yes, sir; as the Marshall directive. It is carelessly referred to as that, but it is the one that is generally spoken of as the directive, as it was generally understood at that time. It was the same statement made public on December 15, to which I testified yesterday or before, in the preparation thereof.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say it was made public on the 15th?

Mr. VINCENT. The President made it public.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was dated December 15, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I think it was made public the same day, sir. I was in Moscow at the time, but I think it was made public the same day.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether that directive, or any draft of that directive, was at any time submitted to Mr. Ben Cohen?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To Mr. Dean Acheson?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it was submitted to Mr. Dean Acheson. We went over it at that conference on December 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that, do you know whether it was submitted to Mr. Acheson?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no positive knowledge that it was, but I would assume that it passed through his hands.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether Mr. Cohen ever saw it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know Joseph Gregg?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I knew Joseph Gregg, sir. The name doesn't make any response at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Joseph Gregg was ever in your home?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall Mr. Joseph Gregg. I don't recall his ever being in my home.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a security file or investigation file on Mr. Gregg?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any information of a confidential or a security nature?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any information with the knowledge or expectation or with reason to believe it would be passed on, directly or indirectly, to the Soviet Government, or an agent thereof?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or to the Communist Party of the United States, or any foreign nation?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about an effort or movement to force Patrick J. Hurley out of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I know of no such movement. I would want to review the matter, as a matter of dates, but I know of no movement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know the name of Guesev, G-u-e-s-e-v, or Gussev, G-u-s-s-e-v?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man connected with the Russian Embassy whose name was similar to Gussev, or who used the name of Gussev or some similar name, as an alias?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the Far East Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. The Far East Commission was a Commission of 11 nations first formed in the fall of 1945. But as the Far East Advisory Commission at the Moscow conference in December 1945, there was an agreement reached there with the British and the Russians, and endorsed by the Chinese and the other nations, for the establishment of a Far East Commission. It was established in the spring or earlier, 1945, under the chairmanship of Gen. Frank McCoy, and functioned in a manner that was to more or less supervise or go into the matter of the control—not control, because the word "control" was never used—of relationships between the various governments and SCAP.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a few questions here, a series of questions.

I suspect it is possible you may have a prepared statement on the subject.

After you have answered these questions, if there is any further statement that you would like to make, I shall be glad to have you make it on the record.

Mr. VINCENT. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a paper known as Far East Commission 230, FEC–230?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir, and I have a paper on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that paper submitted to the Far East Commission for consideration?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it ever adopted by the Far East Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who submitted that paper?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the paper that grew out of the trip of Mr. Edwards to Japan in the fall of 1945, and was acted upon in the SWNCC Committee some time after his return.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who prepared that paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Members of the SWNCC Committee, so far as I know. I would like to refer to the statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. I shall be glad to have you refer to it, but just at the moment——

Mr. SURREY. For the purpose of answering the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; I understand.

Mr. VINCENT. I have here the mission went out in 1945. I testified it went out in autumn. It went out in 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are referring now to the State Department document known as FEC–230?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the one I am referring to here, and I have here the statement [reading]: "The recommendations of this mission became the basis of a paper prepared by the working group of the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC."

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was not prepared by the Far East Commission, then?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it ever get the name "Far East Commission 230"?

Mr. VINCENT. It was submitted over there as such a document and numbered as such, but never adopted by the Far East Commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was submitted to the Far East Commission for consideration, then, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. A moment ago I asked you whether it was, and you said "No".

Mr. VINCENT. I said the Edwards report.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if this paper, FEC–230, was submitted to the Far East Commission for consideration, and I understood you to say "No."

Mr. VINCENT. I am sorry; but it is a fact that I did know it was never approved by the Far East Commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had two separate questions. It was submitted?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was never adopted by them?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who submitted it?

Mr. VINCENT. The SWNCC Committee, I imagine it submitted it, after the working committee had prepared it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was prepared by the working committee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was prepared by that working committee. Do you mean the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. A working committee of the Far East Committee; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be under your control?

Mr. VINCENT. I was chairman of the FE Committee, and it would be under my general control, but this particular working committee was under my control in an ex officio way.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve the document before submission to the Far East Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. How could it have been submitted to the Far East Commission without your approval?

Mr. VINCENT. It had to be submitted through SWNCC and top SWNCC would have been the one that submitted it.

Mr. SOURWINE. They did not go around you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. The FE Subcommittee of SWNCC would have taken it up with SWNCC.

Mr. SOURWINE. You headed that subcommittee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have had to approve it before it got to SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that basis, did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. I did approve it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was submitted by SWNCC to the Far East Commission; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. By SWNCC to the Far East Commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean it was approved by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten what the exact formula was, whether it was submitted to FE, whether it was submitted to FEC by SWNCC purely for consideration, or whether it went over with an approval of SWNCC. I can't testify as to whether it was sent over to them for their consideration, but without any advance approval by SWNCC or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you testify in any event it was ordered transmitted to FEC by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, who were the members of the working group who prepared that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who any of them were?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall a one of them; no sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how many of them there were?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many were there on the Far East Committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I could find out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how many men there were on the Far East Committee who might have worked on it?

Mr. VINCENT. There would have been economists, and I can't tell what the number would have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you can find out, try to do so before we come in on public session.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how that paper reached Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. The paper reached Japan by being sent out informally to SCAP.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who sent it out?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not?

Mr. VINCENT. It was usually sent out by the War Department—the War Department, usually—but the communications between SCAP and Washington were almost always through the War Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, it was sent by the War Department, and not by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know, it was sent out by the War Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say it was not sent out by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say it was not, because my memory is not exact enough to know, but there was no implication there that the State Department did not know it was being sent out. I am just speaking of a channel of communication.

Senator FERGUSON. You are speaking of the means of communication?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the channel of communication.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not an official publication by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Although it had been transmitted officially from the SWNCC committee to FEC?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had not been ordered by FEC to be disseminated or transmitted to SCAP, had it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone who sent this paper, or a copy of it, to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know anyone who sent it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone in Japan to whom a copy of this was transmitted?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, other than to SCAP.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone who gave this paper, or a copy of it, to anyone to be taken or transmitted to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would a document of that nature have required your endorsement as Chief of the Office of Far East Affairs if it was to be issued or circulated as a State Department document?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it would not have required my endorsement. An economic paper of that kind might have had my endorsement. It might not have required my endorsement. It could have been the endorsement of the Assistant Secretary of State, the endorsement of Will Clayton.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have required your approval?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not have required my approval. It would have been normal to have my approval.

Mr. SOURWINE. If such a paper were to be distributed through State Department channels would it have been normal to have cleared that circulation or distribution with you?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been normal, except where it might have been an economic paper—that had to be through Mr. Will Clayton; it might equally have not been sent through me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether this paper was circulated or distributed by or within the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was so circulated, what would be your opinion as to whether you knew of and approved of that circulation at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. Of circulation in the State Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. In or by the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. What do you mean by "circulation"?

Mr. SOURWINE. I use "circulation" in the technical sense of copies prepared, a notation at the bottom, usually at the lower left-hand corner, as to whom it is circulated to.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have thought, and I am speaking here purely from memory, that the paper was in a form to be circulated through the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Such circulation might have a half-dozen names, or 20. It might have distribution symbols. You are familiar with all the possibilities there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have marked papers for distribution?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is quite a wide range. You can put a couple of initials, or a half-dozen initials, which mean it will go to several hundred places.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, it normally would have been your function to mark for distribution such a paper, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Not a paper coming out like that, on economics. It probably would have gone to a division there which was handling Japan and Korean affairs at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you did mark this paper for distribution?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say whether I did or did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the same paper, is it, that was subsequently printed by Mr. James Lee Kuffman, a New York lawyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge of that. I have read in the hearings that the testimony has been to the effect that he did print it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a copy of this document, FEC–230, the document about which we are talking?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that document instruct General MacArthur to "effect wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade"?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to see the document, Mr. Sourwine, to be able to testify exactly to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you have anything that you want to contribute voluntarily in addition to the answers that you have given to the questions asked?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been said, Mr. Vincent, that you have been falsely charged with being one of those who was deluded by the belief that the Chinese Communists were just agrarian reformers. Do you want to comment on that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to comment on that, sir.

Since I returned to America here, I have gone through some papers and find that it is on record that I have stated that the Chinese Communists were real Communists, and they were not agrarian democrats, and I have made that statement many times; but I have one factual statement to that effect but I never was deluded into thinking that they were agrarian reformers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever believe that the Chinese Communists were just agrarian reformers?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall at any time that I thought the leaders of the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers.

The fact that they used agrarian reform as one of their methods of popularizing themselves is a distinct matter from whether they were Communists, and I would have called them Communists, utilizing agrarian reform as a tool.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have never yourself believed, have you, nor attempted to spread the doctrine, that the Communists were just agrarian reformers?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I interrupt you? Did you want to read a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, in a speech before the Foreign Policy Association Forum in New York City, on October 20, state that?—

at the throat of Chinese difficulties is the need for certain economic reforms, particularly in the agrarian field, and in the field of taxation.

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to see that speech. That is a Foreign Policy Association speech and I would have to see whether that is an exact quotation, but I may say that I felt very much that the Nationalist Government of China could have strengthened its position tremendously by taking some reforms in the agrarian field.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making this statement in that same speech?—

Much is written about the industrialization of China, but without reforms, one of the primary objectives which would be to increase the individual incomes of the Chinese farmers, and without an expanded transportation and a sound currency, industrial development would be meaningless to the Chinese people.

Mr. VINCENT. I do recall—I assume you have the exact words.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is substantially the view you had?

Mr. VINCENT. That is substantially the view. I would like to expand on that in two sentences.

Mr. SOURWINE. You shall have that privilege.

Mr. VINCENT. My idea at the time was that you had to have a public in China to absorb the product of industry. There was a strong feeling at the time that when the war was over—these were discussions concerning postwar economic developments—that the Chinese should go about increasing the purchasing power of the mass of people which were the farmers, as a corollary, to go with industrial development, rather than have industrial development come ahead of that and simply have the products coming out of Chinese factories that were exported, rather than to be bought by the Chinese people. That was my philosophy behind that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The philosophy, in other words, of creating the market first before you produce the goods?

Mr. VINCENT. Create it simultaneously, anyway. I am not an economist, but that seemed to be sound common sense in China at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have a slightly different theory in this country, do we not?

Mr. VINCENT. That production creates the market?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is not our industrial advancement built rather largely on the principle of make all you can as good as you can, and then go out and sell it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, we have not been faced with the same situation as there is in China, with a buying public that did not have 2 pennies to rub together.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was a diversion, I admit, and we got a little bit away from the scene of this conference.

Did you on or about February 23, 1946, write a letter under that date to Mr. Edward C. Carter, executive vice chairman of the American Council of the IPR, advising him you did not feel you could accept nomination for a second term as a member of the board of trustees of the American Council?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I did not accept it, but I do not recall writing him the letter I wouldn't accept it. If you would ask me to rely on my memory as such, I would have said that I simply did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will tell you now that we have such a letter from the files of the IPR. I do not have it now, but at the public hearing we will produce it, and you will have an opportunity to look at it, and I will ask you the question again with the letter in your hands.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your reason for not wanting to continue? Did you state it in your letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I do not recall the letter, Senator, so I don't know what my reason was at the time. I have an idea that a part of it was that I just didn't have time to bother with anything connected with the IPR because I was awfully busy.

Mr. FERGUSON. Was it because of any communistic tendency on the part of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was not based on any suspicion I had then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the newspaperman who telephoned you on September 2, 1946, on behalf of the New York Herald Tribune, to ask you what you thought of the statement that had just been issued by General MacArthur personally known to you?

Mr. VINCENT. He was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was that newspaperman?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a man named Metcalf. I had not met him often, but I knew who he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did this newspaperman subsequently apologize to you and acknowledge to you that the story he had written was untrue?

Mr. VINCENT. He did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Arthur C. Bunce?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall him. Could I ask where I would have known him? If you will give me a minute, I will try to think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Bunce was an economic adviser.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; to Korea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know him but you now know who he was?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I met him once or twice in my office before he went out to take up his duties in Korea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember an article or dispatch transmitted from Mr. Bunce criticizing both the military government and the United States policy in Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether a copy of such an article or dispatch was requested by Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Mr. Lilienthal was?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he connected with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, but I am not saying he was not. I don't know of his connection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a copy of such a report from Mr. Bunce requested by anyone else connected with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you furnish a copy of that report pursuant to any such request?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in the habit of furnishing information to Lilienthal?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or anyone else in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already testified that Mr. Penfield, who was your deputy for a period——

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether he had any connection with the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I know of no connection that Penfield ever had with the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a statement issued by General MacArthur on or before September 11, 1946, in the nature of a warning with respect to the danger of communism in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall the statement. That couldn't be the same statement that you have just referred to here, of Metcalf printing an incorrect article?

Mr. SOURWINE. It could be; the times are very close together. I would not be surprised if that was the article.

Mr. VINCENT. I am assuming you recall the circumstances, or should I recall them, of the Metcalf article?

He called me on the telephone and asked had I read a statement by General MacArthur.

My recollection was that it was about Labor Day that I was working, around Labor Day, the early part of September.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I told him I had not read it and then he went on to talk about Japan policy, not about the statement, and asked me whether there had been any change in our policy toward the Far East, toward Japan, and I told him I knew of no changes that had been made. That may be the statement of General MacArthur's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who recommended your appointment as head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Director of Far Eastern Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon.

Mr. VINCENT. I was not correcting you—I was just thinking.

The first person to mention my appointment to me of Director was Mr. Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State. I was appointed by Mr. Byrnes and I had already known Mr. Byrnes——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Mr. Acheson recommended your appointment to that post?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not positive knowledge that he recommended my appointment to that post.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time he mentioned it to you, was it already a fait accompli?

Mr. VINCENT. That brings up the testimony I gave yesterday of being out of the city off on vacation, when I was called back suddenly, and it was a fait accompli, because I was called back from this and told I was going to be—I was not then Director, and I was not immediately made Director of the Far East Office; I was not made Director until the 19th of December—but Mr. Acheson told me that was the reason he was calling me back, to get myself ready to be Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was before Mr. Byrnes had actually made the appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, was not your appointment as head of the Far Eastern Division one of Mr. Acheson's first acts after he became Under Secretary?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have a hard time testifying to that, but it was very early after he became Under Secretary of State, but whether it was one of his first acts, I wouldn't say.

Senator JENNER. What year was that?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in 1945. I became Director in September 1945. Have you got 1946?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry. Your testimony is unquestionably correct on that point. I did not mean to challenge it, but I was trying to think of when Mr. Acheson was appointed. His appointment had been less than a month before that time, had it not? He was appointed toward the end of August?

Mr. VINCENT. He was appointed, I should say, around the middle of August.

Mr. SOURWINE. Around the middle of August and you were called back from your vacation before the end of August?

Mr. VINCENT. The circumstances were, you may recall, that Acheson had tendered his resignation as Assistant Secretary of State, and when Mr. Byrnes got back from Potsdam, he called him back and told him he was going to be Under Secretary of State, or asked him to be Under Secretary of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, moving up to the fall of 1946, did you at that time draft or assist in drafting a statement designed to be issued in case General Marshall should admit failure of his efforts to end the civil war in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't quite get the connotation of failure, but I am fully aware of the circumstances we are talking about, that in the late autumn of 1946 it became more and more apparent to all of us that General Marshall's mission was not going to succeed. So where the instructions came from, whether it came from Mr. Byrnes, whether it came from the White House or where, or whether General Marshall asked us to prepare something of the sort, there was a document which eventually became public on December 18, which was a general review, economic, military, and otherwise, of our relations with China during and since the war, and of developments there.

Senator JENNER. May I ask a question right there?

Having missed his previous testimony with reference to Marshall's mission to China, has that been gone into?

Mr. SOURWINE. Very thoroughly.

Senator JENNER. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will summarize it for the Senator.

The gist of the witness' testimony in that regard, as he himself assented to a summary of it here, was that he had three cracks at it. He prepared an original rough draft. After certain changes had been made in that rough draft over at the War Department, it came back for his perusal, the second time; and then, before ultimate final approval he saw it again.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator JENNER. Did Marshall see it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

May I straighten out one thing? I prepared, not a rough draft of the directive but a rough draft of what were the problems, and of the manner in which I thought they should be attacked in China.

It was handed to General Marshall. It was not in the form he wanted it, and then a statement of China policy was drafted under General Marshall's direction.

Senator FERGUSON. In the War Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In the War Department. And this other draft, although it had some of the phraseology and the thought of my much shorter rough draft, is in itself a completely different document in intent, as well as in language.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said your document was about two pages, and the one that came back is about six?

Mr. VINCENT. We have it there.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, do you have your document?

Mr. VINCENT. It is in the files of the State Department. I shall be glad to try to procure it for you.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am surprised at the addition now to your statement: "It was much different in intent."

Mr. VINCENT. I said "content."

Mr. SOURWINE. Since I understood your statement to be initially that what did come back from the War Department contained a number of the phrases or phraseology and ideas that were in yours, and contained nothing at odds with or in derogation of what was originally proposed.

Mr. VINCENT. What I meant by "intent" I had not intended when I wrote a rough draft to draft something called a directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is understood.

Mr. VINCENT. I was writing something for Mr. Byrnes to talk with Mr. Marshall about. I did not conceive it in the terms of a directive, and if we could produce it you could easily see it had no relationship to being a directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not recognize the child when he came back?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I was able to recognize some phraseology.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, sir, who did take part in originating the idea of that draft?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know. As I say, I have just testified that there was a general feeling, and I know that the White House shared that feeling that we must be prepared to issue something for General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone who took part in drafting that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that the boys in the Far Eastern Office, under me, that they consulted—you can look at the content, they must have consulted the War Department people and the economic people, and it was a composite document of some five or six pages which was preparatory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take any part in the preparation of that?

Mr. VINCENT. I no doubt did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not remember what I may have contributed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it in a sense your responsibility, since it was being done under you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I had the principal responsibility to see that it was done.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you then instrumental in presenting that draft to Secretary Byrnes?

Mr. VINCENT. I no doubt was. I don't remember the physical process of presenting it to Mr. Byrnes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The routine procedure would have been for you to transmit it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. It would have gone down under my initials.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that draft statement recommend withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I haven't reread it for some time. I am testifying from memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it contain any recommendation of that nature?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that draft statement approved?

Mr. VINCENT. It was approved and issued as a press release on December 18.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose that draft?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of. I know that it was sent out to General Marshall and he approved it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there a draft in October which was disapproved, or which the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making more than one address at Cornell University?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The only address you made there was on or about January 21, 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to check the date. I have never been to Cornell but once, and the address we spoke of yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether, in the course of that address, you stated that it would be advantageous for our defense to throw our weight on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall making any such statement as that, throw our weight on the side of the status quo——

Mr. SOURWINE. In China.

Mr. VINCENT. In January——

Mr. SOURWINE. 1947.

Mr. VINCENT. In January 1947? No; I don't recall making such a statement. You would have to define the status quo. The status

quo was that Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government was in control of the country politically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall in that address saying, or that you said, anything about throwing our weight or influence on the side of the status quo?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have been possible that in that address you said that it would not be advantageous to our defense to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I made that statement either. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be surprised to learn that you had made that statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would be surprised to learn that I made the statement that we should not throw our weight behind the status quo because the status quo was that Chiang Kai-shek was in control of the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you made a statement at that time that it would not be advantageous for us to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo, that was a statement against Chiang Kai-shek, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember participating in the briefing of General Wedemeyer and his staff before they left for the Far East in July 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; there was a meeting of a few of us which General Wedemeyer himself had requested. It was not in the sense of any exhaustive briefing.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long did it take?

Mr. VINCENT. Not more than 20 minutes or a half hour.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was it held?

Mr. VINCENT. In my office in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. You not only participated, then, but you were one of the chief participants in that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call myself the chief participator, except it was called to my office. I was packing my suitcase to go to Switzerland. I don't recall. A naval officer was there who was going to accompany General Wedemeyer. Mr. Sprouse, chosen by the State Department was there. Some Army officer was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they merely drop into your office to get any suggestions you might have?

Mr. VINCENT. No. General Wedemeyer himself suggested that they meet in my office, just to go over the general—there was a discussion among them more than any briefing by anybody like myself, as to what they were supposed to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been the customary thing, with anybody undertaking a mission, to get an expression of views, from the head of the Far Eastern Division; would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. But General Wedemeyer had his discussions before that with General Marshall, and his relation with General Marshall was one that he hardly required briefing from me at any high level. I remember at the meeting that General Wedemeyer asked me: "Is there any intention here that I shall have any responsibility to try to carry on the objective of the Marshall mission?"

I said, "None whatsoever," that that is, so far as I am concerned, a "dead duck."

He was going out on a fact-finding mission and not any mission to get together with the Nationalists and Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. The directive, as such, was it a "dead duck" in 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. The directive to General Marshall?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. General Marshall having come back and given up the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. As we pointed out, that was a public statement by the President of the United States.

Mr. VINCENT. The directive to General Marshall?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. It was not withdrawn or renounced?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as General Marshall's attempts to implement that statement of policy, he was back here and he had made his statement of January 7.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the policy had not been recanted?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not telling General Wedemeyer that the policy, as such, was a "dead duck"; you were simply telling him that, in your opinion, he had no duties with respect to affirmatively seeking to implement that policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, at the time of that briefing or conversation with General Wedemeyer and others, emphasize the necessity for introducing a liberal element into the Chinese Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean by "liberal element"?

Mr. VINCENT. I meant exactly the same thing that General Marshall had meant when he finally left China, which was that it would be a very good idea to have a liberal business, broad-minded group in there. As you know, at that time there was considerable criticism of some of the old-line Kuomintang officials, who were retarding progress.

General Marshall and I thought K. P. Chiang and John Chiang and some of the more broader-minded Chinese should come into the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider the Chinese Communists as among the "liberals" who should be introduced?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that when a Communist says "liberal" he means Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know it now? I am not stating it. I am asking you if you know that is true.

Mr. VINCENT. As a matter of exact knowledge, I do not know when a Communist says a person is "liberal" it means that he is a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or a pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who initiated your appointment as Minister to Switzerland?

Mr. VINCENT. The first discussion I had about it was with Mr. Acheson—I had to leave the Department at the end of 4 years—some time in the late spring.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean the selection of Switzerland. Do you know whose thought that was, Mr. Acheson's or yours?

Mr. VINCENT. It was Mr. Acheson's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Acheson's?

Mr. VINCENT. I can recall that exactly. He said, "Where would you like to go?"

I said, "I would like to go anywhere, from New Zealand to Norway, provided I can take my family with me," because I had been absent from them 2½ years during the war. I meant to eliminate the Far East, from which families were barred.

He said: "How would you like to go to Switzerland?" I said I would be delighted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who initiated the statement on China policy made by President Truman on December 15, 1949?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, that is the same thing that is mistakenly referred to as the directive.

It was a published statement, but General Marshall considered that a directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have been asked to ask you this question:

Sir, do you own a home in Sarasota, Fla.?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you buying a home there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you plan to live there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Maybe the Florida Chamber of Commerce has an interest in you.

Mr. VINCENT. I find that is the most curious question that has been asked here. I am not indicating here that I would not like to have a home there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were you transferred to Tangiers?

Mr. VINCENT. I was transferred to Tangiers—I went to Tangiers in June 1951, just this past year. The actual transfer order came—there was 3 months' difference between the time I got my order to go. I had to stay in Switzerland to finish the matter of the German assets. The transfer to Tangiers came to me sometime in February, and I went to Tangiers in early June.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why you were transferred?

Mr. VINCENT. I was transferred because I had already been in Switzerland 3½ or 4 years. Mr. Patterson had been assigned to Switzerland as Minister. Therefore, it was necessary to find a place for me to go, and Tangiers was chosen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has anyone in the State Department ever expressed an opinion to you as to why Tangiers was chosen as the next position?

Mr. VINCENT. They have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you were transferred to Tangiers, had you any expectation of being transferred to some other post?

Mr. VINCENT. There was talk of going to Costa Rica, as Ambassador.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had expected to leave Switzerland, in any event; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I had already indicated I would like to leave when my children were leaving, at the end of 4 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever receive from Secretary Acheson any communication with regard to your appointment to Tangiers?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have never had any communication with Mr. Acheson regarding my appointment to Tangiers, unless the travel order may have been signed by him, which I doubt.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever informed that you had been suspected of or charged with revealing to Russia, to the Communists, the identities of American agents in Eastern Europe?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I never have been. I never have and I never have been informed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever propose or recommend the inclusion of Chinese Communists, or their representatives, in the Economic Commission in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; Chinese Communists or Japanese Communists?

Mr. SOURWINE. Chinese Communists or their representatives, in the Economic Commission.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or Japanese Communists or their representatives?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know any of those, either. I was trying to think—What was the Economic Commission for Japan?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. John McJennett?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; he works in the legal adviser's office in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a personal friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. I just met him since I came back from Tangiers this time for the first time, but I would call him a personal friend.

Mr. SOURWINE. What part, if any, did he play in the release of your letter of November 9th, to Senator McCarran?

Mr. VINCENT. I understand he telephoned the release was going to be made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you understand that from what I told you or did you have any prior understanding?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew that he was going to let Senator McCarran's office know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask him to do so?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I asked him to do so, or we agreed it was to be done. I was perfectly agreeable for it to be done.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you specify whom he was to call?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or that he was to get the message to Senator McCarran, or something of that sort?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that the message was to be gotten to Senator McCarran's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time that Senator McCarran was ill and in the hospital in Nevada?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. McJennett had called on a Saturday afternoon, to the Judiciary Committee here, and had spoken with Mr. Mandel, rather than calling Senator McCarran's office?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know who Mr. McJennett called.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your request to him was simply what?

Mr. VINCENT. To let Senator McCarran's office know that this was to be issued on the following Monday. November 9th was the date of the letter, and this took place some 10 days later, which would make it the 20th.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think it was the 17th.

Mr. VINCENT. Saturday was the 17th.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your letter to Senator McCarran was addressed to him where?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall the envelope. I know it was delivered to the Senator's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was addressed to him?

Mr. VINCENT. It was delivered to him here by hand; and, therefore, it must have been addressed here.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. And you knew at the time that he was in Nevada?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. There were two copies delivered, one for him and one for whoever was in charge of the office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Knowing that the letter was delivered here on the 9th—if that was the case; certainly not earlier than the 9th, because it was dated the 9th—yet as early as the 16th you were already pressing for a reply, although you knew he had gone to the hospital in Nevada?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were making a point of it and suggested that the Department make it a point on his failure to reply by the 16th?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not suggesting that the Department make a point of his not replying. I myself, maybe naively, would have thought that his office itself would have made a reply on his behalf. That is my own feeling: That the letter would be sent out to him, but the staff here would be in a position to make a reply.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry that things are not run up here as perhaps they are in the State Department, but up here there is nobody who can answer for a Senator on a matter where the Senator has to make a decision, at least until he has made the decision.

Mr. VINCENT. I am simply giving you my belief that I would have thought it could have been answered.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see the State Department release on that letter before it was issued?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not see the actual release, I do not believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss it with Mr. McJennett?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not prepare that release?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask that it be prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. I asked that it be prepared.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now have any feeling that Senator McCarran was dilatory or discourteous?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have any feeling that he was dilatory in replying to that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions of this witness. We hope to be able to have him back here in public session on Wednesday of next week, if that might be the order, subject to a possible contingency that we cannot now foresee.

Mr. VINCENT. Did you say 10 or 10:30 on Wednesday?

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be subject to the Chair. I would think we should start at 10 o'clock and try to get through if we can.

Senator JENNER (presiding). If there is no objection, that will be the order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is also this matter which has been discussed with the witness, and counsel.

This examination has taken much longer than any of us anticipated. We have been at it 3 days and the record is quite large.

Among other things there was a long list of names about which Mr. Vincent was asked, and each one of which required substantial comment.

The thought has been advanced that a great deal of time could be saved all around if, prior to going into the public session on Wednesday, it might be the order of the committee that the executive record be opened.

That would permit us to refer to specific portions of it, to place matter in the record. It would give the witness an opportunity, which he desires, to make the most public possible denial of these charges that have been made against him and, at the same time, it would give us some hope of getting through in a day or so.

It is my understanding that the witness and counsel have no objection to that, if they can be allowed to see the record; and while they recognize they have no right to control the committee in that regard, they would like to have an opportunity, if there is any portion of the executive record they would not like to make public, to make expression to the committee before it is ordered to be made public.

Senator JENNER. That is a reasonable request, and we will make that an order.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will have this record back here on Monday.

I regret that there was a resolution of the committee, with regard to these records, and I cannot send it out.

Mr. SURREY. Is it all right for someone to be here in my behalf?

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone by authority of your firm may have access to it here.

Mr. VINCENT. Do you know whether a meeting is scheduled in here Monday morning?

Mr. SOURWINE. The full committee is meeting here Monday, but we will give you a desk in one of these other rooms and do what we can to make you comfortable.

If this committee may stand in recess, with the assent of the witness, he may return at the public session at 10 o'clock on next Wednesday morning.

Senator JENNER. That is agreeable.

(Whereupon, the executive session was concluded at 2:40 p. m.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m. pursuant to recess, Senator Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Conor, Ferguson, and Jenner.

Also present: Senators George, Hayden, Hendrickson, Millikin, and McCarthy.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research for the subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want the witness sworn?

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness has been sworn, sir, in executive session. If the record may show that, I don't think another swearing would be essential.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the witness had better be sworn again. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I believe the record should show that the unanimous consent of the Senate was granted yesterday to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate meeting while the Senate is in session this afternoon, that is, Wednesday, today, and during the remainder of this week. As the chairman knows, that consent was granted at the chairman's request.

Mr. Vincent, you are here today at your own request for the purpose primarily of denying any and all charges that may have been brought against you in connection with communism, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It will be the purpose of the committee to give you the fullest possible opportunity to make your denial in this regard as complete and comprehensive and explicit as you may wish.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To that end a series of questions will now be put to you which are not intended as either argumentative or repetitive. They merely cover different facets of the issue. Do you understand that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any objection to that procedure?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the conclusion of this opening series of questions, if you have anything you want to add in the way of a prepared statement, or an impromptu statement, you will be given an opportunity to read it into the record or make it.

Mr. VINCENT. At the conclusion?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a few questions; not the conclusion of the hearing, but of this series of questions.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party of the United States or a member of the Communist Party of any other country?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been under Communist discipline?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever knowingly assisted the Communist Party of any country or any person or persons known to you to be Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been asked to do so?

Mr. VINCENT. I never have been asked to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever received any orders or instructions or suggestions, directly or indirectly, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever made any suggestions to a Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever conferred with Communists or persons known to you to be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been asked, or invited, or urged, to join the Communist Party of any country?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been in contact with any members of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other country?

Mr. VINCENT. I have in my official duties from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than——

Mr. VINCENT. Officials of other countries, not members of the American Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is that you have not been in contact with any members of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever received any advice, or directives, on policy, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever received any money, reward, emolument, decoration, or praise from any Communist government or its representative at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever visited any Communist country?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I visited Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. Siberia once, and I was on the conference with Mr. Byrnes in Moscow in 1945, December.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than those two occasions?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to recall whether recently in Europe. No; I never visited any of the Communist countries in Europe.

Mr. SOURWINE. On August 30, 1948, Mr. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities that there was a group in the State Department opposed to the idea that the Russians were not going to be sympathetic or cooperative and that they indicated a very aggressive policy, and that this group, Mr. Acheson's group, as he described it, with Mr. Hiss as his principal assistant in the matter, won out in the State Department. Would you consider yourself a part of the group there referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever attended any discussions, group meetings, or social gatherings with Communists or pro-Communists, either in the United States or in any other country?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever consciously conformed your actions or your expression of opinion with any Communist policy or Communist directive?

Mr. VINCENT. Not consciously, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever express publicly or privately sympathy for Communist aims and ideology?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever doing so, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that cover the question of expression of sympathy for Communist aims or ideology in China or in Asia, generally?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is no in that regard also?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment or transfer to China, or to Japan, of any person whom you knew or had reason to believe was Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the transfer to the Far East of Mr. John S. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. I had nothing to do with Mr. John S. Service's transfers in any way, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the return to the Far East of Mr. John S. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment of Miriam Farley to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment of T. A. Bisson to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a part of any Communist organization, apparatus, or network?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever under Communist discipline?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever agree to accept Communist discipline?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have a statement that you want to make, sir, now is a good time to do it.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to ask just one question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. He asked you if you had approved the transfer of Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mr. John S. Service, and other people to the Far East. Your answer was that you had nothing to do with that. Do you know who did?

Mr. VINCENT. In the case of Mr. T. A. Bisson, I don't know of his ever having been transferred to the Far East in any official capacity, so my answer would be that I wouldn't know that anybody had transferred him to the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you stressing the word "transfer"?

Mr. VINCENT. Or the assignment.

Mr. SOURWINE. I intended the question to include assignment also. May I ask that question again with regard to Mr. Bisson: Did you ever advise, recommend, or approve the assignment of Mr. Bisson to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend or approve the assignment of Miriam Farley to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. The answer again is no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever advise, recommend or approve the assignment of Mr. John S. Service to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Now, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer to that?

Mr. VINCENT. To the last one?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, do you know who did?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would say it was the Personnel Division of the Department of State in the case of Service's assignments.

Senator EASTLAND. What individual down there was behind this assignment to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Let's go back. Are we speaking of the recent period of history?

Senator EASTLAND. We are speaking of the period he spoke of in those questions.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I think, covers the whole period.

Senator EASTLAND. That is what I want you to cover.

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot recall, Senator, who were the heads of the Personnel Division in the State Department at the time that Mr.

Service was assigned at one time or another, but his most recent assignment to the Far East was when he went out to General MacArthur, which I recall, and that was just an assignment by the Personnel Division, and at that time I would say that a man named Pen Davis was Chief of Personnel.

Senator EASTLAND. Are you saying that Mr. Davis was responsible for Mr. Service's assignment? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. VINCENT. I am saying so far as I know the Chief of Personnel technically was the responsible man for the assignment of personnel to the field.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the way it is carried out in the State Department, that the Chief of Personnel makes the assignments to the major places?

Mr. VINCENT. The Chief of Personnel, acting under the Administrative Assistant Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the Administrative Assistant Secretary during this time?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been in 1945. I should think it would have been Mr. Donald Russell, the Assistant Secretary to Mr. James Byrnes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Mr. Service was being assigned to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean in this particular assignment?

Mr. MORRIS. 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I knew that he was being assigned to General MacArthur's headquarters.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in any discussions concerning that transfer?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you known at that time that Mr. Service had gotten into difficulties in the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. I had known that; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator?

Senator EASTLAND. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had been the purpose to go into some of these matters more fully at a later time, I might say, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all right. I will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the witness has a statement, and you say this is the proper time for him to make it?

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe so, sir, since I understand it has to do with subject matter of the series of questions just asked and answered.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You may proceed.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have requested an opportunity to meet with you for two reasons. First, to repudiate under oath certain irresponsible but very grave allegations made against me before this committee, and secondly, to give the committee whatever other assistance I may in the conduct of its investigation.

On August 23, 1951, before this subcommittee, Mr. Morris asked a witness, Louis Budenz, the following question:

Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Budenz replied:

From official reports I have received, he was.

Insofar as the printed record shows, Mr. Budenz did not produce or or describe the "official reports" to which he referred.

Later Mr. Morris again inquired:

Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

"Yes, sir," replied Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Budenz also testified that I was described "as being in line with the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it." When questioned as to his source, he answered:

That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel.

I have never met either Browder or Stachel, but it is pertinent to recall that Mr. Browder testified before the Tydings committee that he knew of no connection that I had with the Communist Party either directly or indirectly.

On October 5, 1951, Mr. Budenz again appeared before this committee. Mr. Morris asked:

Mr. Budenz, have you identified John Carter Vincent to be a member of the Communist Party before this committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; from official communications.

Later, during the same hearing, Mr. Morris said that:

Mr. Budenz reported to me, as a Naval Intelligence officer, the fact that John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party, and I made a report on that fact.

Gentlemen, anyone, including Budenz, who before this subcommittee or anywhere else, testifies that I was at any time a member of the Communist Party is bearing false witness; he is, to put it bluntly, lying. I do not pretend to know what motives guide Mr. Budenz. In my own case, his motives seem to be clearly malicious. He has endeavored before this subcommittee to support his allegations by strained suggestion and devious insinuation.

Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am not a Communist and have never been a member of the Communist Party. I have never sympathized with the aims of communism. On the contrary, I have worked loyally throughout the 27 years of my Foreign Service career in the interest of our own Government and people. I am strongly attached to the principle of representative democracy and to our system of free enterprise. These being the facts, the members of the committee will appreciate, I am sure, how disagreeable it is for me to find it necessary to affirm my devotion to our democratic institutions because of unfounded allegations made by Budenz or anyone else.

We cannot dismiss the Budenz testimony as a mistake. Any attempt through malicious testimony to cause the American people to lose confidence in their officials or in each other is in itself subversive to the interests and security of our country. When, as in my case, the official represents his country abroad, the effect may be doubly harmful.

I am in full accord with the objectives of this subcommittee. The internal security of the United States, now probably more than at any

other time in our history, is vitally important to all of us. Our American way of life is threatened from within as well as from without. But we cannot, as I wrote you, Mr. Chairman, on November 9, defend democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies. And I wish to state, not as an official of our Government who has been falsely accused, but as a citizen who is deeply concerned for the welfare and security of his country, that irresponsible testimony, such as Mr. Budenz is wont to give, might have its use in a totalitarian state but has no place in our American democracy.

Mr. Budenz has made other allegations concerning me which are equally untrue though less material. Other witnesses have appeared before your committee and made statements concerning me which are factually incorrect. Mr. Eugene Dooman's testimony concerning the formulation of a postwar surrender policy for Japan is most inaccurate. In fact, some of the policies which Mr. Dooman charges that I formulated were actually formulated under his chairmanship of the committee dealing with the problem or by governmental agencies in which I had no responsibility. Admiral Cooke's testimony about my attitude toward making available certain ammunition to the Nationalist Government of China is in error. I wish to assure you that I am prepared to discuss and correct all such testimony and discuss any other issues which this committee may wish to consider.

But, gentlemen, my main purpose in seeking this opportunity to come before you has been accomplished. At the subcommittee hearings of October 5, 1951, Senator Smith is reported as saying:

> Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr. Budenz' statement and say "I am not a Communist." That draws the issue.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I now solemnly repeat: I am not and never have been a Communist. I so draw the issue.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Sourwine, here is a letter which I wrote to the Honorable John Peurifoy, at that time Under Secretary of State, and which was submitted to the committee by the State Department which I would like an opportunity to read. It will take an additional 3 minutes. Mr. Chairman, may I?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. What date is that?

Mr. VINCENT. This is March 7, 1950. It is addressed to John Peurifoy.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it pertinent to this issue?

Mr. VINCENT. It is pertinent to this issue, sir.

You will note that the date is about the time of the hearings in the Tydings committee and I wrote him when I was Minister at Bern.

Mr. SOURWINE. This document, Mr. Chairman, is one of several documents which the State Department furnished in response to the committee's request for a much longer list. We will go into that a little later. It might be well at this time to point out that this is the only one of the documents furnished by the State Department which had not theretofore been made public.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

> DEAR JACK: I am sorry about all of the trouble that is being raised for you as a result of charges made against the Department. You and the Secretary have my full confidence and support, if needed.
>
> A friend has sent me a copy of the Congressional Record of February 20. I gather that I have been "identified" in the press as Senator McCarthy's case

No. 2. I am, in fact, one of our "foreign ministers" although the job is hardly what I would call "high brass." Also, I did misplace a piece of clothing one time in 1946. But I must profess myself amazed that the incident became a matter of record, if in fact it has as Senator McCarthy's story would seem to imply. It was not my piece of clothing. It was a raincoat which some visitor left behind in the Far Eastern Office, of which I was Director at the time, and which hung there for weeks. One rainy day, having no coat with me, I put this raincoat on to go to lunch. Returning, I stopped at the Department washroom and forgot to take the raincoat when I left. Some days later, I recalled the oversight and called the building guard office, where I learned that the coat had been found and turned over to the Department's Security or Control Office. I have forgotten with whom I spoke in that office, but he informed me that there was a piece of paper in the inside breast pocket containing writing in what looked like Russian. I explained the history of the coat and asked whether the writing gave a clue to ownership. He did not know, but subsequent examination showed the writing, as I recall it, to be a practice or exercise in Russian word endings or suffixes, presumably the work of someone studying Russian. The coat was returned to the Far Eastern Office. When we moved from Old State to New State in 1947, I appropriated the coat and still have it. That is the history of the "clothing." I shall be glad to return the raincoat to the real owner, should his memory as to where he left it be revived by Senator McCarthy's story.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you say you did with the coat? Will you kindly go back just a little way when you moved from the old State Department to the new?

Mr. VINCENT. When we moved from Old State over to New State in 1947 I appropriated the coat and still have it, no one having called for it in a matter of a year.

May I continue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, surely.

Mr. VINCENT (continuing):

As to the main portion of the Senator's statement I must profess complete ignorance. I have never acted directly or indirectly to provide espionage agents of Russia, or any other country, with information in the State Department or from any other governmental source. Therefore, the Senator's story, if it is intended to apply to me, is simply not true. Furthermore, I do not believe there were people in the Far Eastern Office capable of such action. No case of the kind ever came or was brought to my attention.

So much for that. I do not know whether the Department has a "case history" on me, but I would like to take this opportunity to let you have briefly a few facts concerning me which may be unknown to you, and to state that there are no other facts pertinent to the situation which is troubling Senator McCarthy.

As to family, just in case the question should arise: My mother died when I was a child. My father died in 1938. He was a real-estate agent and an active member of the Baptist Church. My stepmother is 76; lives in Macon, Ga.; and is as active in the Baptist Church as her age (76) will permit. My brother is a banker in Spartanburg, S. C. My sister is married to Rear Adm. Allan E. Smith, United States Navy, who recently rescued the U. S. S. *Missouri*. I have various and sundry cousins with whom I have virtually lost contact, but I have never heard anything derogatory regarding them. I have two nephews who served in the Armed Forces during the late war.

My wife has two brothers, John and Fred Slagle. They are in the insurance business, one at Chicago and the other at Kansas City. Both, as I understand it, are respected and sturdy Republicans. My wife's parents have been dead for many years. So much for family.

As for myself: I have never joined any political organization, "front" or otherwise. For 1 year, I think it was 1945, I was made an honorary or noncontributing member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Service abroad has made it impracticable to join a political party. I am a Jeffersonian Democrat, a Lincolnian Republican, and an admirer since youth of Woodrow Wilson. I am a member of the Cosmos Club, Washington, the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity, and the Baptist Church.

I have never knowingly associated with American Communists or Communist sympathizers. I say "American," because my official duties have from time to time caused me to be in contact with foreign Communists. Chou En-lai, for instance (the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime.) I met in the house of Chiang Kai-shek. He was head of a liaison mission to the Chungking Government during the war. Here and in Washington, before my assignment here, and at other posts abroad, I have met foreign Communists at official or social functions. Our relationships have been perfunctory, except where official business had to be transacted.

In 1944, I accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on a mission to China. I went under instructions from the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The purpose in sending me was to make available to the Vice President my experience in China, extending back over 20 years.

As you know, my association with Far Eastern affairs has been a subject of intermittent press criticism. This was especially true while I was Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (September 1945 to August 1947). During that time I served under Mr. James Byrnes and General Marshall, as Secretaries of State. My job was to implement the Government's policies, not to make them. It is immaterial that I found myself in accord with those policies. Had I not, I would have still attempted to carry them out or asked to be removed from a position where it was incumbent upon me to do so.

Any American, in public or private life, has a right to criticize our policies toward China and in the Far East and elsewhere. He does not have the right to impugn, simply on the basis of disagreeing with the policies themselves, the motives or character of those who are charged with the duty of implementing them. I have taken the oath of allegiance and loyalty to my country many times during my 25 years of service. The last time was in 1947, as United States Minister to Switzerland, after the Senate had confirmed my appointment. One is free to question my ability; but they cannot, in truth, question my loyalty. My record of public service is clear and so is my conscience.

I regret very much the circumstances that have caused me to feel it necessary to make this protest of innocence and loyalty but it is my belief that you and, if you approve, the public, have a right to expect a statement from me.

With best regards and best wishes.

Sincerely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, when was that letter written?

Mr. VINCENT. That letter was written on March 7, 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. How was it transmitted?

Mr. VINCENT. It was transmitted in the normal mail.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it requested by one of your superiors?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it indicated to you that you should write such a letter?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was your own desire to write such a letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Voluntarily submitted by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that seem to you to indicate that you had heard certain charges had been made against you?

Mr. VINCENT. I had read some of the testimony that was being made in Congress in the press, press reports.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was solely on the basis of the testimony in Congress and statements in the press that you wrote this letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This letter was written before or after the Budenz testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. This letter was written before the Budenz testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. This letter was written in 1950, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VINCENT. March 7, 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, I might say that there may be occasions when counsel or members of the committee——

Mr. VINCENT. Did you say "Mr. Budenz"?

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon, sir. If I did it was a slip of the tongue.

Mr. Vincent, there may be occasions when counsel or members of the committee may not feel that they agree wholly with your answer to some question, but we will not always on that occasion challenge you then and there with regard to it. I don't want the next few questions to be taken as an indication of policy as to how the hearing will be conducted, but some matters have been brought up that perhaps should be gone into right now.

You mentioned the fact in that letter to Mr. Peurifoy that you were a noncontributing member to the IPR. That makes it obvious that as early as 1950 you knew that you were a noncontributing member, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall discussing that question in executive session here earlier?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the exact discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall having been asked if you knew that you were a noncontributing member?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us now when you first came to know that you were a noncontributing member?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew that I was a noncontributing member because I never contributed so far as I could recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you were the only noncontributing member of the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were a member of the board of trustees of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that?

Mr. VINCENT. I was notified of that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned the matter of a coat.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been asked any questions about that coat in this committee in executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are volunteering that here?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your intent to testify with regard to the coat in question that you had left it somewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And where did you leave it?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said in this letter, I left it in a washroom in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long after that did you remember that you had left it in the washroom?

Mr. VINCENT. It must have been a matter of a week, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who did you call?

Mr. VINCENT. I called the police guard that was in charge in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you say to them?

Mr. VINCENT. I said, "Have you found a raincoat," and tried to describe it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What kind of a description did you give them with regard to the coat?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't have a very clear idea because I had just taken the coat out that one time, but it was one of these ordinary brown-colored raincoats.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you were able to tell them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it the custom of the guards in the guardroom at the State Department when a person is attempting to identify lost or stolen property over the telephone to help them out by telling them what is in the pockets?

Mr. VINCENT. No; and he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you know about the Russian papers in the pockets?

Mr. VINCENT. You may recall, as I say, that the police guard said he had turned it over to the security officer in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the security officer volunteer to you what was in the pockets?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made no statement to him?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made no statement to the guard that you called first with regard to what was in the pockets of the coat?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not. I did not know that there was anything in the pockets.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked several questions here, Mr. Vincent, and I bring this up not for the purpose of quibbling with you but for the purpose of impressing upon you the desire of the committee—and I am sure it will be your own desire—to testify quite factually and give no wrong impressions with regard to anything. You were asked a number of fairly broad questions at the outset of the hearing. You were asked, for instance, if you had ever received any orders or instructions or suggestions directly or indirectly from any Communist or pro-Communist source.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have received suggestions from many people, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't doubt that I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have received suggestions through the reading of many books and other writings, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you in a position to state categorically that none of the people from whom you received suggestions and none of the writings that you read in that connection were either Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, in the absence of being able to recall exactly what I have read, but it would be a very broad statement to say that I have never received any suggestions from anything I have read, and I have read not consciously, if I have ever read what you call pro-Communist literature.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was whether you are in a position to state categorically that no person who has ever given you a suggestion was Communist or pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot state categorically.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that is obvious. Your answer to this question was a little bit too broad, then, was it not? The committee is not trying to trap you, Mr. Vincent. If a question is asked that it too broad, narrow it down. We will go into it and straighten out all the semantic difficulties and be sure that we understand your testimony and that you understand the questions.

As a matter of fact, you have through the years received suggestions from members of the IPR, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Through their writings and through conversations with them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Right. Are you in a position to state categorically that none of those members of the IPR were Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I could not state categorically that they are not pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your opinion as to whether the IPR was Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not consider the IPR Communist or pro-Communist at the time I had any association with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your present opinion, if it has changed in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. From the testimony I have heard and seen here, I would say that it certainly had a pro-Communist slant at times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you know now that the IPR had a pro-Communist slant at times, and you know now that at times you received suggestions from IPR personnel and IPR writings?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall direct suggestions from them, but I have testified that in reading their writings and in conversations with them there is no doubt that there were suggestions.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean to labor——

Mr. VINCENT. I don't quite get what you mean by suggestions, whether you mean by suggestions that they came to me suggesting or whether I read or in conversation with them myself drew inferences from what they were saying.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you stated that both had occurred.

Mr. VINCENT. I think we understand each other, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked the question have you ever been in contact with any members of the Communist Party of the United States.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The most that a man could say to that would be, not knowingly, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated categorically that you had not been.

Mr. VINCENT. Didn't I add to the best of my knowledge and belief?

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked if you had ever received advice on policy from any Communist or pro-Communist source. You have received advice on policy from people connected with the IPR, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Now you are bringing the word "advice" in rather than suggestions; that I could not say that I have received advice from members of the IPR or from the IPR itself?

Mr. SOURWINE. Persons connected with the IPR, was the question.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't doubt that from time to time in conversing with those people that they have attempted to give advice on matters of policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. You were asked if you had ever received any praise from any Communist government or its representative at any time.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said "No."

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember Sergei Goglidze?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will go into that more fully later, but Mr. Goglidze did praise you, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say in connection with that toast he might have considered that praise.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is an incident in the record of a statement by Mr. Sergei Goglidze which highly praised Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Vincent.

Mr. Goglidze was at that time a representative of the Communist government, was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you answered that question categorically, then, your answer was a little too broad, at least, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not thinking in terms of that toast as praise.

Mr. SOURWINE. I won't reiterate on all of these questions, but you were asked whether you had attended any social gatherings with Communists or pro-Communists in the United States or any other country and you said "No." You did attend at least one, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Then I didn't understand the question, because I have attended social gatherings. I have attended receptions at the——

Mr. SOURWINE. Any time you don't understand the question please ask to have it repeated because your answers are going to be binding upon you, sir, and if the question is too broad we want you to narrow it down. If you don't understand it make sure you do. If you don't understand the meaning of a word, let's be sure that the understanding is there. For instance, in the executive sessions we had the understanding—and I would like to have it here—that if you use the phrase "it might have been," you mean it in the sense of something which you feel was logical under all the facts known to you and which you did not know did not happen, is that clear?

Mr. VINCENT. That is clear; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will not use the phrase "it might have been" merely in the sense of a hypothesis, the truth of which you have no knowledge or belief with regard to?

Mr. VINCENT. I will try not to, if it confuses you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very well. If it strikes counsel that you are so using it we will certainly bring it up and straighten it out.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for these digressions, but it is going to be a long hearing and I think perhaps that foundation will be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the executive sessions—as the chairman knows, there were 3 days of executive sessions—a number of questions were asked which were necessarily tedious. Mr. Vincent and counsel have stated, and I ask them to reaffirm it here—that they have no objection to having those hearings or any part of them made public if the committee so rules. The committee of course has the right to remove the executive injunction from those at its option but I thought the record should show that Mr. Vincent and counsel have voiced no objection after having read the testimony.

You were asked, sir, were you not, at the executive sessions with regard to what position you took in reference to the loyalty status of certain named individuals in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to go through that list again. The question with respect to each name is this: What position, if any, did you take in reference to the loyalty status of this particular individual in the State Department?

That is a fairly inclusive question. Take your time in answering.

Alger Hiss.

Mr. VINCENT. I recall taking no position on the loyalty status of Hiss.

Mr. SOURWINE. Cora DuBois.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of taking any.

Mr. SOURWINE. John K. Emmerson.

Senator EASTLAND. Give him time to answer the question.

Mr. VINCENT. John K. Emmerson. I have no recollection of taking any position on the loyalty status of Emmerson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Robert W. Barnett.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I have not; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Julian R. Friedman.

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge have I taken a position.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you ever hear of any charges against Mr. Friedman, any suspicion about him, any suggestions that he ought to be investigated or checked?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have, but I took no position on Friedman. No inquiry was ever made of me as to the loyalty status of Friedman that I recollect.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him finish his answer.

Mr. VINCENT. That I recollect. I don't recall ever being questioned regarding the loyalty or taking a position on the loyalty of Friedman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't anyone ever come to you with allegations against Mr. Friedman, with the statement or urging that they should be investigated?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall anything coming to me, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. John P. Davies.

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wilma Fairbank.

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Stewart Service?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Get this all clear. You are going back to your original question that he had taken no position and expressed nothing with reference to each one of these.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct.

That brings up, before I go through with the rest of these names, your answer to Senator Eastland's question with regard to Mr. Service. As a matter of fact, do you know who made the telephone call to Mr. Service in California to tell him to go back to China, that he was going to work with General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you make that telephone call?

Mr. VINCENT. It could be logical that I did, but you are asking me if I recall, and I don't recall telephoning him to go on back to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understand that you stated categorically in response to several questions along that line that you had nothing whatsoever to do with Mr. Service's assignment or reassignment or instructions to return to China.

Mr. VINCENT. That was my testimony, sir, and based on my memory I have no recollection of having anything to do with Service's returning to China. He was already assigned to China in 1944. It was a mere matter of his returning, was it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the occasion on which Mr. Service, then in California, was instructed to return to China and told that he was going to be attached to General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that, sir. I knew he was going to be attached, but I don't recall this particular occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that he had been back to the United States and did return to China and was thereafter attached to General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. He had been attached previously to General Stilwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any circumstances at all about his return to China and his attachment to General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I do not, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Service himself had made a statement with regard to that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read the hearings of the State Department employee loyalty investigation before a subcommittee of the Senate on Foreign Relations of the Eighty-first Congress?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have here a copy of those hearings. They contain a paragraph which I shall ask the permission of the Chair to read. It is on page 1998 of the printed hearings, part 2, appendix.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, if it is pertinent to the matter we are discussing.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a transcript of an oral statement made by Mr. Service before the Department of State Loyalty Board.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a statement made under oath?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. Referring to the telephone call we have just been discussing, which told Mr. Service that he was to go back to

China, the chairman said, "Who in the State Department made that telephone call?" Answer, "Mr. John Carter Vincent."

Do you have anything you want to add at this time to the statement you have made in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have anything to add, sir. I simply do not recall telephoning Service. I recall that Service went back, but the fact that I made the telephone call has completely slipped my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is and was a friend of yours?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. I don't even recall that there was an issue as to whether he was to go back.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is Laurence Salisbury.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Mr. Sourwine, you had better connect up there again.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question asked with regard to this name, as in the case of each of the other names, is, What position did you take in reference to the loyalty status of this individual in the State Department, Laurence Salisbury?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall taking no position with reference to his loyalty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Ludden.

Mr. VINCENT. I took no position that I recall in connection with the loyalty status of Ludden.

Mr. SOURWINE. William T. Stone.

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a point, sir, that perhaps should be cleared up. Newspaper accounts have differed with respect to your comment on the testimony of Louis Budenz. Many newspapers and all of the national wire services have referred to the fact that you called Mr. Budenz' testimony false. Certain other publications, including the New York Compass and the Daily Worker, have specifically used the word "perjury." You have made a statement here today which dealt with the matter. Would you tell the committee whether you wish to be understood as declaring Mr. Budenz' testimony to be in error because of faulty memory or improper recollection or hallucinations or the drawing of unjustifiable conclusions or any similar noncriminal reason or whether you wish to charge Mr. Budenz specifically with willful perjury?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not wish to charge Mr. Budenz with willful perjury.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were subpenaed to attend this hearing were you requested to bring with you certain documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you bring them?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give the committee an explanation for not bringing them?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that explanation?

Mr. VINCENT. I said I requested the State Department permission to bring them and the State Department said they could not release the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the record on that with reference to the State Department, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the letter of the chairman to the State Department requesting 32 categories of documents is already referred to in the record, together with the State Department's reply.

The CHAIRMAN. In the record in executive session?

Mr. SOURWINE. In the record in executive session. It will be the recommendation of the staff that that record be opened up as a public record and be made a part of the printed record of the examination of Mr. Vincent. With that in mind we are not immediately prepared to put that letter in the record again. The State Department took the position that most of the documents could not be turned over and they were therefore refused on the grounds that to turn them over would hamper the free flow and interchange of information at various levels in the State Department.

There is here, Mr. Chairman, a list of the 32 documents which were requested of the State Department, and if desired it can go in the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it should go in the record at this time. I think the answer of the State Department should follow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good, sir. Will you order that it be laid in at the proper place in the record? The question I was asking Mr. Vincent was his own answer with regard to these documents because the request was made separately to him and to the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. He seemed to be inclined—at least he had no objection to bringing the instruments requested, but the State Department refused to permit him to bring them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that substantially your statement?

Mr. VINCENT. That is substantially correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You felt you had no authority to bring any of those documents without the State Department's authorization?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. I had no possession of them.

(The documents referred were marked "Exhibits No. 376 and No. 377," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 376

JANUARY 2, 1952.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State
State Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Due to unforseen circumstances, the appearance of John Carter Vincent before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will have to be postponed from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25.

In the interests of full justice to Mr. Vincent and in order to safeguard against any possible misinterpretation of his position or that of the Department of State, we are asking him to bring with him the enclosed documents. It would undoubtedly expedite matters if the State Department made all the necessary arrangements for obtaining these documents from its files for use at this hearing.

It would further expedite the situation if the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee were given access to the loyalty file of Mr. Vincent.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

JOHN CARTER VINCENT—DOCUMENTS REQUESTED

1. Correspondence with United States Embassy staff in Chungking from July 1 to December 30, 1945.
2. Copy of statement issued criticizing statement of six members of the House Military Affairs Committee regarding Soviet intentions in the Far East—

House Members' statement published September 10, 1946—Vincent statement subsequent.

3. Drafts of all statements prepared by Vincent for General Marshall.
4. Draft of statement for Secretary Byrnes in the fall of 1946 recommending withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government of China.
5. Copy of speech delivered before the Far East luncheon of the National Foreign Trade Council on November 11, 1946, stating that it is unsound to invest capital in countries with corrupt regimes.
6. Drafts of all memos prepared for Henry A. Wallace, or correspondence with him.
7. Copies of all recommendations made to Yalta and Potsdam Conferences.
8. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Julian R. Friedman, Harry B. Price, Philip Jaffe.
9. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Alger Hiss, Hugh DeLacy, Frederick V. Field.
10. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with John P. Davies, Raymond Ludden, John S. Service, T. A. Bisson, Edward C. Carter, Miriam Farley, John K. Fairbank.
11. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Patrick J. Hurley.
12. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Owen Lattimore, Lauchlin Currie, Solomon Adler.
13. Draft presented to Secretary of State in the fall of 1946 used as a basis for the President's statement of December 18, 1946.
14. Letter of Vincent to John E. Peurifoy dated March 7, 1950, from American Legation at Bern.
15. Copy of speech made at IPR (Institute of Pacific Relations) conference at Hot Springs, Va., in 1945.
16. Memorandum prepared for Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the late autumn of 1945, later submitted to the Secretary of State and the White House.
17. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer and Gen. Joseph Stilwell.
18. Drafts of all memos on Japanese Peace Treaty and surrender conditions.
19. Recommendations on the supply of arms to the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists; also all estimates and recommendations regarding the Chinese Communists.
20. All memoranda and correspondence with or dealing with John N. Hazard, Joseph Barnes, Vladimir Rogoff.
21. Full statement published in the New York Herald Tribune September 4, 1946, attacking MacArthur for violation of State Department directives re "building a bridge of friendship to the Soviet Union."
22. Statement authorized by Vincent in the latter part of 1946 re American naval vessel being summarily ordered out of Dairen by Soviet commander in violation of Yalta Pact and Sino-Soviet Pact of 1945.
23. Copy of address at Cornell University January 21, 1947, indirectly attacking Chinese Nationalist Government.
24. All documents in connection with Vincent's change from Minister to Switzerland to the position of diplomatic agent and consul general at Tangier.
25. A full record of votes by Vincent before the International Assets Commission which voted on the question of turning over the assets of the Chinese Nationalist Government to the Chinese Communists.
26. Copies of all cables sent by Vincent to the State Department in June 1943.
27. Broadcast speech contained in State Department Bulletin October 7, 1945, page 538.
28. Vincent recommendations regarding the setting up of the Korean government.
29. Memorandum prepared by Vincent about March or April 1945, regarding conferences with Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer held in Washington.
30. Vincent report of conversation with Chou-En-lai and Lin Piao on November 20, 1942, and any other conversations with Communist leaders in China. (See p. 3, Subject: Kuomintang-Communist situation—probably Service document.)
31. All memoranda furnished by Mr. Vincent to Mr. Wallace in connection with the latter's mission to China in 1944 and in connection with subsequent reports on the mission.
32. All memoranda furnished by Mr. Vincent to President Truman relative to the latter's statement on China policy made December 15, 1949.

EXHIBIT No. 377

JANUARY 22, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This is in reply to your letter of January 2, 1952, requesting that the Department of State transmit to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 32 categories of documents from its files relating to Mr. John Carter Vincent and to the policy of the Department of State with respect to the Far East.

Mr. Vincent has referred to us your letter to him dated January 2, 1952, in which you also requested the same 32 categories of documents, and has requested the Department to cooperate to the fullest extent practicable in making the documents available.

The Department is happy to cooperate to the fullest extent that its regulations and policies permit.

There is transmitted herewith a copy of the speech delivered by Mr. Vincent before the National Foreign Trade Council on November 12, 1946, summary notes of conversations between Vice President Wallace and President Chiang Kai-shek prepared by Mr. Vincent, a copy of a letter from Mr. Vincent to Mr. John E. Peurifoy, dated March 7, 1950, a press release issued by the Department of State January 6, 1947, on the status and control of the port of Dairen, and a press release of October 5, 1945, on a radio forum concerning our occupation policy for Japan. There is also enclosed a paraphrase of the telegrams sent by Vice President Wallace to President Roosevelt as a result of Vice President Wallace's mission to the Far East, a mission on which he was accompanied by Mr. Vincent. These telegrams deal with both General Stilwell and General Wedemeyer.

The records of the Department do not disclose any statement criticizing the statement of six members of the House Military Affairs Committee regarding Soviet intentions in the Far East, the text of any speech made at the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Hot Springs, Va. in January 1945, any statement of November 4, 1946, concerning General MacArthur, or the text of an address delivered by Mr. Vincent at Cornell on January 21, 1947.

With respect to the remainder of the requests, it is noted that they call for a large number of internal documents of the Department of State. In many cases these are reports from the field. It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting by departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. It is equally important to protect the integrity of internal memoranda in which views are exchanged in the formation of policy. The release of these documents would undoubtedly inhibit the free and frank expression of views by the officers of the Department. For these reasons, the request for these internal papers presents such serious questions of policy and principle that it has been felt necessary to refer the matter to the White House for reply.

Your request for the loyalty file on Mr. Vincent has also been referred to the White House as required by the Presidential directive of March 13, 1948.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,
Deputy Under Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

Enclosures: As stated above.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you were qualified as an expert on the Far East by more than 20 years of training and experience, is that correct?

Mr. VINCEN. That is correct, with the modification that my training and experience have been primarily in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified, I believe, that you considered yourself an expert on the Far East, particularly with regard to China?

Mr. VINCENT. Particularly with regard to China, because I have not had actual physical service outside of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the committee satisfied with this qualification of Mr. Vincent or does it desire further questions asked? We will go more into his experience as the examination progresses.

Did you or do you know Mortimer Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him here in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify Mortimer Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I first met Mortimer Graves when I came back from China in 1943. I don't believe I met him before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is or was Mortimer Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. Mortimer Graves was a member of something called the Learned Societies. I don't recall the exact title he had here. He was working at the time I met him in connection with some kind of study of languages for the Government, I believe. I am testifying here completely from memory because Mr. Mortimer Graves was not a close friend of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you continued the acquaintanceship since 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw him probably from time to time between 1943 and 1945. I don't recall seeing him subsequent to 1945 or 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you carry on a correspondence with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of a correspondence with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Edwin M. Martin?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him?

Mr. VINCENT. He is an economist in the State Department whom I met first, I would say, when I came back from China, either in 1943 or 1944, some time during the period of my service in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he ever Chief, Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs for the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my recollection that was his title. He was in it, whether he was chief or not I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been—I am now testifying purely from memory—in 1945, I should think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at that time Chief of the Far Eastern Division, Director?

Mr. VINCENT. I became Director of the Far Eastern Office in September 1945. Prior to that I had been Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs under the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a separate division?

Mr. VINCENT. Under Mr. Will Clayton.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Martin, then, at the time you were Director of the Far Eastern Division, was on a level with you in the State Department echelon?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't give exact testimony to that because he didn't have the title of Director, so I doubt whether he would be technically considered on the same echelon. He would have been considered the same echelon when I was Chief of the China Division, but he would not have been——

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he then your subordinate?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in any sense your protégé?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not say so. Mr. Edwin Martin was never a protégé of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he work under you?

Mr. VINCENT. He worked with me from time to time, but he did not work under me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever seek your advice or counsel with regard to his work?

Mr. VINCENT. I should think he would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did very frequently?

Mr. VINCENT. It would be logical for him. I don't recall. We will use your word logical. It certainly would have been logical for him in the economics office, and there were always committee meetings and consultations.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your memory serve you that he did or that he did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have thought that he would have sought my advice.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it is logical. What is your memory?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I have no distinct recollection of his seeking my advice, sir, but it would have been logical for him to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, he conferred with you with considerable frequency, didn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but I was saying I was not able to recall specific instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do know that he did confer with you frequently?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you know that Mr. Martin was a speaker much sought after by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never knew that he made speeches for the Institute or at their request?

Mr. VINCENT. Edwin Martin? I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was Mr. Martin's position with regard to General MacArthur and his activities?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his attitude on General MacArthur and his activities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know him to or hear him express himself with regard to General MacArthur's staff?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't have any recollection of Martin discussing General MacArthur's staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say it was not common knowledge in the State Department what attitude and opinion Mr. Martin held with regard to General MacArthur's staff?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say it was common opinion because it certainly wasn't common to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it was not common knowledge in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Martin ever express himself to you or in your hearing with regard to officials in Korea who are opposed or were opposed then to the left-wing element?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of his making such a statement, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever express himself with regard to the Korean Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall his expressing himself to me. To what Korean Commission would that be, sir? I am trying to get that precisely. I have no recollection of his making any comments to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having raised the question, let's get it precise. How many Korean Commissions were there?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to get myself what is the Korean Commission at this time. I have been out of this country for 6 years. I was trying to remember what was the Korean Commission. If you have data——

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't place the Korean Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't at this moment place the Korean Commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is possible that counsel has used a misnomer. Do you know whether he ever characterized the Korean Commission or any agency that he referred to as the Korean Commission as right-wing reactionaries?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his making such a statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. There has been some discussion with regard to Mr. John Stewart Service. To be sure your testimony is complete on that point, will you identify him and tell the committee when and where you met him?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to these notes I have here just so it is in accord with the facts and the dates?

Mr. SOURWINE. Are those the same notes you had at the executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. The same notes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you augmented them in any regard?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no names in there now that you didn't have in the original notes?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you have, then, already commented to the committee in the executive session on each of the names that you have in that notebook, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; as far as I recall. I haven't added any names to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is understood, Mr. Chairman—it was understood in the executive session and I will ask Mr. Vincent to agree to this—that when he uses this notebook it is for the purpose of refreshing his recollection. He is not reading the notebook and saying this is what the notebook says. He is saying this is my testimony, having been refreshed from notes which I have myself made.

The CHAIRMAN. These notes are of his own making?

Mr. SOURWINE. They are of your own making? That is your testimony, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; and in looking up to find out what times or places Service may have served.

The CHAIRMAN. How did it come about that you prepared these notes preliminary to the executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I went through some of the hearings of the committee and people who may have been mentioned in connection with me, I anticipated that there probably would be a request for testimony, and my purpose was solely to have as nearly exact informa-

tion as I could get as to what my associations were with these various people.

The CHAIRMAN. In making the notes did you confer with others or did you confer with records?

Mr. VINCENT. I conferred with records.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vincent brought out in the executive session that the State Department has in its library a complete file of the hearings of this committee in the manuscript form, that is, a file purchased from the reporter. He didn't have to wait until the printed record came out. The State Department purchased that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. Do you want me to give this data?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let's have the question, please.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is to identify Mr. John Stewart Service and tell the committee when and where you first met him.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). Service was a junior secretary at our Embassy in Chungking when I was counselor under Ambassador Gauss from May 1941 to May 1943. For a while during this period he lived in the house with Ambassador Gauss and me. He was an active and intelligent young officer. I do not recall the exact nature of his assignments. In 1943, Service was lent to General Stilwell's headquarters as a sort of political adviser. Several other junior officers were similarly assigned.

My next contact with Service was in 1944 when he came home on a short vacation. In 1945 he was in Washington again. He was assigned to the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service doing some kind of administrative work. It was at this time that the Amerasia case broke. I never discussed the case with Service, nor did I have anything to do with the Amerasia case, but I did, along with other friends, make a small contribution to help him hire legal counsel. I believe he repaid me.

After the grand jury dismissed the case against Service, he was assigned to General MacArthur's headquarters, and I do not believe I saw him again before my departure for Switzerland in 1947. When I came home in 1949 for 10 days' consultation, Service was in Washington and we and other friends had lunch together.

Since my return to Washington I have seen Service once in the halls of the State Department. We chatted briefly. I have not seen him since.

I do not mean to imply by the foregoing that I have avoided Service. It was simply a matter of no time for social meeting and we both had other business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you intend that statement, Mr. Vincent, to be a full and complete disclosure to the committee of your association with Mr. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I could add to it that without doubt I may have seen Service at other places prior to 1942, but—he may have been in Shanghai at the time I was there. Or our paths may have crossed elsewhere.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well do you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. Quite well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You still know him quite well?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for employment?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of recommending him. He was already employed when I met him. You mean as to assignment? He was employed when I met him first. He was already employed with the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is that you never recommended him for employment?

Mr. VINCENT. Employment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for assignment to any particular post?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall ever recommending him for assignment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for promotion?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me see. No, I have no recollection of recommending him for promotion.

The CHAIRMAN. Who effected or brought about his being lent to General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I would say General Stilwell did himself. I think General Stilwell made a request of the State Department to assign to him certain officers in 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Stilwell select or name the officers that he wanted?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say whether General Stilwell actually selected them or not.

The CHAIRMAN. He was at that time housed with you and someone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Ambassador Gauss. Ambassador Gauss and I during my period in Chungking lived together, and some time during that period a short time Service was also there.

The CHAIRMAN. It was during that period that he was lent to General Stilwell ?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. He was lent to General Stilwell, and I think in that period he then moved out and another young secretary moved in with Ambassador Gauss and myself.

The CHAIRMAN. His being lent to General Stilwell must have come from some State Department authority?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department would have had to approve his being loaned to him. He still continued to be on the State Department payroll and continued to have the title, I think, of third or second secretary with the Embassy. But his work was with General Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with his going with General Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir. General Stilwell I think chose his own people. Service was already in China and was known to Stilwell.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever arrange for Mr. Service to make a talk for the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall that he made a talk before the IPR, and I don't recall any recollection of my arranging for him making a talk.

The CHAIRMAN. That wasn't the question. What is that question again?

Mr. VINCENT. The question is did I ever arrange for him to talk, and I said that I had no recollection of making arrangements for his talking or of his talking before the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Following Mr. Service's return to Washington in 1944 did someone in the IPR ask you whether it would be possible to have Mr. Service come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of the IPR people in their Washington office?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of such an instance, but again I will say that it would be logical for somebody to ask me whether a returning officer could come over and make a talk. I say I have no memory of the incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you arrange talks for the IPR so frequently that they didn't make any mental impression on you, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not. I don't recall ever making arrangements for talks with the IPR, even this one that you mention here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Service has himself stated that the circumstances were substantially as indicated in my question, that is that someone in the IPR asked if it would be possible for him to come over and make a talk and cleared it with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of that incident. It would be logical for them to call me.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to get the information connected with his joining IPR. Who sponsored him? Would you ask him those questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir; I have a series of questions on it. I will be glad to ask them now if the Senator wishes.

Senator EASTLAND. No. Go ahead, that is all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who would have arranged for Mr. Service to make a talk before the IPR, if it was to be arranged from a State Department source? Who had the authority?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say who would have the authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had it, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. If I had the authority—I would not have thought it would take authority for him to make an off-the-record talk.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know whether you had that authority or not?

Mr. VINCENT. To allow him? He was not under my control.

Mr. SOURWINE. A moment ago you said it would have been logical for him to come to you. Why would it have been logical for him to come to you?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been logical because I was Chief of the China Division at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You were his superior, too.

Mr. VINCENT. You have there to go into the whole matter of the arrangements in the State Department. I was a senior officer, but not in any sense his superior in the sense that I gave him instructions what to do or not to do, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. Because he was working at that time under General Stilwell, loaned by the State Department to General Stilwell, and was home, as I gather it, on leave.

The CHAIRMAN. That isn't the time referred to in the question.

Mr. VINCENT. What is the time?

The CHAIRMAN. Back to the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Following Mr. Service's return to Washington in 1944.

Mr. VINCENT. At that time he was assigned to General Stilwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was a man in a lower echelon from the State Department who desired a clearance at a higher level with regard to making a speech outside the Department and he did come to you, would you have had authority to express an opinion as to whether he could or could not properly make that speech?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a difficult question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have hesitated to express an opinion in such a case?

Mr. VINCENT. I would probably have told—as I said, I am testifying—I probably would have told him I saw no objection to his going over and making a talk before them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you would have told him that as a matter of course, without investigating the circumstances, or going into where he was going to make the speech or who the people were?

Mr. VINCENT. No. If he told me where he was going or if he just told me the IPR, I would have had no objection at the time to his going before the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Mr. Service any papers to be taken or delivered to anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever giving Service papers to be delivered elsewhere.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Mr. Service any papers to be given to Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of your associates or subordinates do so?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think they did, but I have no exact knowledge on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you instruct anyone directly or indirectly to give Mr. Service any papers to take to Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did he get those papers? Did they come from your department?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time, at the time of the Amerasia case, he was working down in the administrative office. How he ever got those papers——

Senator EASTLAND. Was he in your department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, he was not in my Division. He was working in the Administrative Division of the State Department in 1945. He was not in the Far Eastern Office at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. Those papers were under your charge, were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. They were not. They were under my charge in the sense that I was Chief of the China Division.

Senator EASTLAND. That is what I mean. They were under your charge. Did he have access to them?

Mr. VINCENT. He probably did. As a China service man and officer in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. They were reports on conditions in China, weren't they, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the nature of these. I haven't read the Service testimony and I don't recall the nature of the documents.

But it is correct to say that they were in the charge of the Far Eastern Office, and I was the Chief of the China Division.

Senator EASTLAND. They were under you.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you say he had access to those papers?

Mr. VINCENT. He could have come up and seen papers because he was a member——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's get your statement there. The question of the Senator is did he have access? You can answer that "yes or "no."

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, he can answer it "yes" or "no."

Mr. VINCENT. I have answered that he would have had access to the papers up in the Far Eastern Office.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator EASTLAND. Who sponsored you for membership in the IPR, Mr. Vincent.

Mr. VINCENT. I have learned lately that it was Dr. Philip Jessup. I did not know it at the time or didn't recall that I was sponsored by anyone. But I have seen somewhere——

Senator EASTLAND. Didn't you attempt to find out who sponsored you for membership when they asked you to join?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not.

Senator EASTLAND. How long were you a member before you were put on the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I wasn't a member before I was put on the board of trustees.

Senator EASTLAND. When you became a member you were put on the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. How were you notified of membership?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of a letter being served, but I imagine I was notified that I had been made a trustee.

Senator EASTLAND. By whom? Who notified you?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Jessup?

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen somewhere that Mr. Jessup was the one who recommended me.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Mr. Lattimore have anything to do with it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator EASTLAND. You were a friend of Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I was a friend of Mr. Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. You are a friend of his now?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, when you were in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department you were friendly with Mr. Lattimore, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. How long were you a member of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Just that 1 year—1945.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you quit?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I was just not rechosen as a trustee or a member.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, didn't you decline to serve for a second term?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection on that, but my point is that I didn't become a member again and I presume I did decline.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a little different from not being chosen again, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember why you declined?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall. You have said that you could refresh my memory on that, I think, in executive hearing.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Mr. Lattimore discuss with you our China policies?

Mr. VINCENT. He did from time to time, Senator, when he was Deputy Director of the OWI, the Office of War Information. During what period that was I don't know.

Senator EASTLAND. Did he advise with you about our policies in China and Asia at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. He almost had to, if I may add. He almost had to as Deputy of OWI. There were conferences all the time because they had to keep in touch with us in the State Department on what was the general line.

Senator EASTLAND. That is what I asked you. What you are saying is that he was attempting to find out what your policies were. Did he advise you what those policies should be?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his advising me as to what our policies should be. He advised with us as to what policies were, and then through the mechanism of the OWI they were trying to work out their matter of bringing information to the Far East during that period of 1944, I think it was, that he was Deputy Director of OWI.

The CHAIRMAN. The policy was made in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; not in OWI.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in OWI, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, weren't you considered by the IPR as a "trusted" member of the IPR, and I use that word in quotes?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge that they considered me a trusted member of the IPR. I never had had any association with the IPR to any extent prior to my choice or election as a trustee. I had known the IPR members, but I had not followed the affairs of the IPR with any closeness.

The CHAIRMAN. As the picture stands now, as I view it—and I wish you would correct me if I am wrong—that you became a member, and when you became a member you became a trustee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Immediately on your being selected?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never a member other than the period when I was a trustee.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Then you failed to be a member and was no longer on the board of trustees, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. And I may add there that the board of trustees, if it met, I never met with it during the time I was a trustee. I didn't participate in whatever deliberations there were expected of trustees. I don't know what deliberations were expected of trustees.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know Freddie Field?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him once or twice.

Senator EASTLAND. Where?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him for the first time, I think, at an IPR conference at Hot Springs in January 1945, at a social gathering. I may have met him at a meeting here in Washington of the American delegation. I was on the American delegation to the IPR conference in Hot Springs in 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you recall having seen a report on the subject of The Need of an American Policy Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, a report indicating that the Communists are about one-fifth of the population and that they were going to have a definite influence on the future of China?

Mr. VINCENT. Will you state your question again, sir? Do I recall seeing such a document?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall seeing such a document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that that was one of the so-called Amerasia papers?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know to this day that that is one of the Amerasia papers; no sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall having seen a document, a report on the subject The Growth of the New Fourth Army, an Example of the Popular Democratic Appeal of the Chinese Communists, indicating that the popular support of the Chinese Communists shows their policies and methods are democratic?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall such a document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall having seen a document entitled The Views of Mao Tse-tung, America and China, dated in March of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. My answer again is I do not recall the document. My testimony is that I do not recall the document. If I saw the document, it was one of many that passed across my desk as Chief of the China Division, but I have no present recollection of those documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that all three of those documents I mentioned were among the so-called Amerasia papers?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any information or knowledge as to how any of those documents could have gotten into the possession of Amerasia?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, except that the testimony is that Service was the man who brought them there, so the testimony is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, did you ever give confidential and specific advice to the Institute of Pacific Relations in connection with the advisability of their publishing a controversial report on the Chinese situation written by Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Morris, I have no recollection of giving such advice on the report. I don't even recall the report. I do not recall ever having any confidential conversations with regard to such report.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Service, did you ever hear——

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Vincent, please.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever hear the view expressed that the Chinese Communists had a non-Russian orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. I have heard that view expressed, yes, because in China frequently we would use the term "Chinese Chinese Communists" and "Russian Chinese Communists." I don't recall any particular Chinese called by one or the other of those names, but there was an impression that some of the Communists in Yenan were more Russian in their viewpoint than some of the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., ever espouse the view that the Chinese Communists had a non-Russian orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his expressing such a view, but I do recall that Davies was one of them also who referred to what you would call Chinese Communists and Russian Chinese Communists. I wouldn't be surprised if he wasn't the one that created that idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever express or approve the view that the Chinese Communists had a non-Russian orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall expressing such a view, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. What were your views?

Mr. VINCENT. My views were that some of the Chinese Communists were not as closely allied to the Russians as some of the others.

Senator EASTLAND. What about the leadership?

Mr. VINCENT. The leadership of Mao Tse-tung we considered to be out-and-out Communist, and some of the people under him. I recall, I think it was Chu Teh, the head of the army, was not considered to be as much of a pro-Russian Communist, but there was never any question but what they were Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. They were not agricultural reformers?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear or see the view expressed that the Chinese Communists were pursuing a policy of self-limitation so far as the postwar period was concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. Of self-limitation? No; I don't recall such a report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. John Paton Davies ever expressed that view?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know as a matter of fact whether he ever expressed that view.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a memorandum in which he expressed that view?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall seeing the memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what is meant by that phrase, that the Chinese Communists were pursuing a policy of self-limitation?

Mr. VINCENT. I must confess I don't know what he meant unless he meant that in the postwar period they were not going to try to take over the power.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what it was used to mean, isn't it, that the program of the Reds after the war was to make sure for communism the areas they had already taken over, but that they did not contemplate further expansion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't that a view held by Mr. Davies, among others?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know that that was a view held by Mr. Davies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that that was a view held by anybody?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall anyone expressing that view to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Ambassador Gauss agree with that view?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't know whether Ambassador Gauss agreed with that view or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you agree with it?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attach a memorandum to a report by Mr. Service expressing that viewpoint, stating therein or indicating in it agreement with Mr. Service's views in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall such an incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Speaking of Mr. Service, you stated here a moment ago that Mr. Service was and is your good friend, and yet you stated you had never discussed with him the matter of the Amerasia case. How do you account for the fact that in the case of a good friend of yours, who had serious accusations made against him, you never so much as slapped him on the back and said, "I am for you, old boy" or "I don't believe it," or give any other expression about him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any——

Senator EASTLAND. He put up money for him, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't. As a matter of fact, during that period—we are speaking of the period when he was under charge, before he went before the grand jury——

Mr. SOURWINE. You said "never." You said you never discussed with him the question of the Amerasia case.

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to correct that to say that after the grand jury released him, then I am quite sure that he or I discussed the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you never discussed it with him during the time that he was under suspicion, so to speak?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall discussing it with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that because you were cautious?

Mr. VINCENT. It was because I thought that he should keep away and not discuss it with anyone, just go and get a lawyer. As I say, he may have popped into the State Department one time or another but I have no recollection of discussing the case with him while it was pending.

Mr. SOURWINE. It wasn't because he kept away. It was because you thought he should stay away?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know that I thought he should stay away, but I thought he should consult counsel and handle the case that way rather than consult people in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you as a matter of fact avoid him?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not avoid him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send word to him or notification that you didn't want to see him or it would be better if he didn't see you?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall telling him not to come to see me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have?

Mr. VINCENT. I just simply say I don't recall it, but I don't think that the issue arose of telling him not to come.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did hold the view that he shouldn't be seen around the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I did hold that view while the case was pending. Whether he came around the State Department I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever try to get Owen Lattimore appointed to a job in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified on that, sir, and I would be glad to do so again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Please.

Mr. VINCENT. In the early spring of 1945 the question arose of getting someone in the State Department—as I have testified before, whether it was Mr. Lattimore who first suggested it or myself—to come in on a consultancy basis and furnish background technical information on the border areas of China, meaning by that Mongolia, Sinkiang, and possibly Manchuria. Mr. Lattimore had written a book called Inner Asian Frontiers of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the book [indicating]?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let the record show that counsel is showing the witness a book.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is the book.

I considered Mr. Lattimore an expert on this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you read this book?

Mr. VINCENT. I had read the book, not carefully, but I had gone through the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. You read it carefully enough to satisfy yourself that he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I had also discussed the area with Mr. Lattimore when we traveled through a large portion of it during the trip with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. How carefully do you have to read a book to satisfy yourself that the writer is an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't answer that, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you don't have to read it very carefully to reach that conclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. In connection with Mr. Lattimore, having already talked to him in China and seen him in action and seen what he did know about Sinkiang and what he did know about Outer Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are the one who brought up the book. If you mean you knew he was an expert before you read the book, that is one thing. If you concluded he was an expert from reading the book, that is another thing. I am trying to find out what the fact is.

Mr. VINCENT. The fact is, I concluded he was an expert from the reading of the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that you didn't know he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know he was an expert on that. I knew he traveled in those areas. I knew he had been in Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you say you didn't read the book very carefully.

Mr. VINCENT. I read the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said, "I didn't read it very carefully."

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nevertheless, from your reading of the book you concluded he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, on page 101 of this book there is a paragraph which I ask——

The CHAIRMAN. What book are you referring to?

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the book I showed the witness and identified by him as Inner Asian Frontiers of China, by Owen Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. Let him finish his answer about Lattimore's job in the State Department. Had you finished that?

Mr. VINCENT. I hadn't finished that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg the Senator's pardon.

Mr. VINCENT. At that time in the State Department we also had in the Far Eastern Office the late Dr. Kennedy of Yale, who was performing similar services with regard to Indonesia and some of the southeast Asian areas. The way the system operated these people would come down 1 or 2 days a week on a per diem basis and prepare background material that might be needed.

Senator EASTLAND. And advise you about what our policy should be there?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not conceived as a policy job particularly, Senator, although that certainly would come out.

The CHAIRMAN. It was partly a policy job, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. There was prepared a form in the State Department which was to authorize the per diem employment of Mr. Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. What were you going to pay him?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't know; what the prevailing——

Senator EASTLAND. You have read Mr. Lattimore's books, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew him, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew Lattimore intimately, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew Lattimore had always followed the Communist line, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you studied Mr. Lattimore's books?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say I have studied Mr. Lattimore's books.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not say you have studied them?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, and I don't know that I would say that he has followed the Communist line. I have no feeling that Mr. Lattimore has followed a Communist line.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read enough of Mr. Lattimore's books to satisfy yourself with regard to a conclusion as to whether he is merely liberal or pro-Communist?

Senator EASTLAND. Or worse.

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified that I have read through this book and I have seen Solution in Asia, and I have not drawn the conclusion that Mr. Lattimore was Communist or pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have drawn no conclusion at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you state you had studied Mr. Lattimore's books and from your study you had concluded he was merely a liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I stated here to the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here in this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Didn't I state that here?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you. Don't you remember where you stated it?

Mr. VINCENT. I stated here in this committee what my recollection is. I haven't the testimony before me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you just state you had not studied Mr. Lattimore's books, that you would not say you had studied his books?

Mr. VINCENT. I am using the word "studied." I haven't studied them. I have read this book.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew Mr. Lattimore's views. You knew his views on problems in Asia, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. More or less; yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You discussed them with him?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. I don't know whether he answered that question or not. You discussed them with him. You have a habit of grunting at it, and I take it the reporter is getting your answers.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have discussed it.

Senator EASTLAND. You have been intimately associated with him?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Can you tell us, knowing his view, knowing his writings, that he was not attempting to promote the Communist line in Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. That—I was never conscious that Mr. Lattimore in his discussions with me was trying to promote the Communist line in Russia.

Senator EASTLAND. In Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. In Asia.

Senator EASTLAND. You didn't get that idea from his books?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not get that idea from his books.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, earlier today you acknowledged that the Institute of Pacific Relations was pro-Communist in its orientation.

Mr. VINCENT. I said that at the time I was with it I was not conscious of that, but from these committee hearings and others there are certainly people in it now who at that time I had no suspicion were pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, was not Mr. Lattimore one of the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time.

Mr. VINCENT. At what time?

Mr. MORRIS. At the time you now realize it was pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. MORRIS. He was not one of the leaders?

Mr VINCENT. I don't know that he was one of the leaders now but at the time I knew the IPR and at the time I knew Lattimore, I never thought the IPR was pro-Communist or that Lattimore was.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; but you have admitted, Mr. Vincent, that you have changed your mind about the pro-Communist slant of IPR, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Exactly right.

Mr. MORRIS. You have now decided from the additional evidence that has been brought to your attention that the IPR was at some time in the past pro-Communist in its orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Inasmuch as Owen Lattimore was the leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations at the time that you had dealings with the Institute of Pacific Relations do you also consider that he too was pro-Communist in his orientation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think Mr. Lattimore is pro-Communist in his orientation.

Mr. MORRIS. So you make a distinction between Mr. Lattimore and the other leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that your position?

Mr. VINCENT. I was thinking more in terms of some of the people who were associated.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Do you make a distinction between Mr. Lattimore and other people in IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Mr. Vincent, Mr. Dennett, who was the Secretary of IPR during the war years, has testified that the two leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations, No. 1 and No. 2 leaders of the IPR, were Philip Jessup and Owen Lattimore.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I think in reverse order, Owen Lattimore and Philip Jessup. I am wondering to what extent you consider, now that you recognize the IPR was pro-Communist, that the same label was attached to the two leaders of the IPR.

(No response.)

Senator EASTLAND. Who were the pro-Communists in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I am trying to recall now. It is just a matter of referring to the testimony before this committee. I have no distinct recollection of how I came about the conclusion that there were pro-Communists in it.

Senator EASTLAND. You reach the conclusion now, you say, that it was pro-Communist. Who were those pro-Communists who fixed their policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I would have to refer to the membership, and I am not trying to be evasive.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course you would have to refer to the membership. Who were they?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I have no distinct recollection of the membership now.

Senator EASTLAND. Was Mr. Jessup pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Jessup is not pro-Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. You said Mr. Lattimore was not pro-Communist. Was Mr. Carter pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not believe he was.

Mr. MORRIS. They were the three outstanding leaders of the IPR, were they not ?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, Field was certainly a leader.

Mr. MORRIS. He was also one of the leaders of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Did Field fix the IPR policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether Field fixed the IPR policy or not.

Senator EASTLAND. You don't think he did, do you? Now do you think Jessup fixed the policy of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think Field had any influence on Jessup.

Senator EASTLAND. Would he control Lattimore's policies in IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't think he would, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. How could he fix the policies of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No; you asked me, I thought, whether I could recollect any of them in the IPR who were pro-Communist, and I would say that Mr. Field was pro-Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to tell us frankly, and you can do it, who the pro-Communists were who fixed those polices. You say that you are now convinced it is a pro-Communist organization. Who were those pro-Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have tried to think of names, and I have thought of Field, and I can't think of any others.

Senator EASTLAND. Here is an organization in which you say that Dr. Jessup would fix the policy, that Mr. Carter would fix the policy, and that Lattimore would fix its policy. Then you say Field, the only pro-Communist, couldn't fix their policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't said that Field could not fix their policies. I have no exact knowledge as to how the policies of the IPR were fixed.

Senator EASTLAND. You said Field couldn't fix Jessup's policy.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say that Field would fix Jessup's policy, but to what extent he would fix IPR policies I don't know because I don't know how the IPR adopted policies.

Senator EASTLAND. It is bound to be Jessup's policies when he is one of the leaders in it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, if you say on the over-all basis that the Institute of Pacific Relations was pro-Communist, then you are saying either the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations are pro-Communists or they are influenced by Communists; are you not, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you repeat that question?

Mr. MORRIS. I am submitting to you, Mr. Vincent—if the chairman thinks it is appropriate, I think Mr. Vincent should have an opportunity of clearing up any possible ambiguity that may reside in the record. If, Mr. Vincent, you say that the Institute of Pacific Relations as a whole was pro-Communist at that time——

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think my testimony was, and if it is that the Institute of Pacific Relations as a whole was pro-Communist——

Mr. MORRIS. Exactly what was your testimony, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony I thought was—but the chairman has reminded me that it was not—that there were pro-Communist elements in the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. That was not what you said.

The CHAIRMAN. That wasn't your testimony at all. Your testimony was, in direct answer to Mr. Sourwine, that the Institute of Pacific Relations was pro-Communist, that you had come to that conclusion.

Mr. VINCENT. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. The leaders of IPR have been referred to here. Where was the policy fixed, if not in the leadership?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, my testimony is that there were pro-Communist elements in the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to change your testimony now from what you gave this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly change it and say that it was my intent then to indicate that because of testimony I had read before this committee I have become conscious that there were pro-Communist elements in the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it because of the mention of these names that you wish to change it?

Mr. VINCENT. It is not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you want to change it from what you gave this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it would be a more exact statement of what my feeling is about the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The major question we started out with was whether you ever tried to get Owen Lattimore appointed to a job in the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. We haven't finished that yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes or no, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. Did you want me to finish with that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. VINCENT. I think when we broke off that testimony I was speaking of a form that had to be submitted for Lattimore to become employed. I have no exact recollection, but it is quite possible that I myself was one who signed the slip to go down for the employment. It was approved by the then Director of the Far Eastern Office, Mr. Ballentine. It went to Mr. Grew. Some time later Mr. Grew called me down and told me that he did not think Lattimore should be brought into the State Department because he was engaging in publicity at the time; I think he was writing for a newspaper. There the matter closed as far as I was concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had Mr. Lattimore applied to you for a job?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have testified, I don't know whether Mr. Lattimore applied or whether Mr. Lattimore suggested it and I went ahead and had the form filled out.

Mr. SOURWINE. In any event, it originated with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You weren't drafting him into State Department service.

Mr. VINCENT. I was not drafting him into the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were carrying out his wish to come in, whether it was in his formal application or his suggestion to you and then you filling out the form?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did what you could to make it easy up to the point of getting it up to your superior?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I thought that it was something that was needed in the Far Eastern Office at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated, have you not, that you thought then and think now that he was and is one of the outstanding experts in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time when this recommendation for Mr. Owen Lattimore's employment was under consideration you stated Mr. Ballentine was head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Office, but that is all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss the matter of Mr. Lattimore's appointment with Mr. Ballentine?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of any discussion with him. The form would have had to go through him as Director of the Far Eastern Office, and in that way I may have mentioned it.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he didn't discuss it with you at all?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall discussing with Mr. Ballentine, Mr. Lattimore, but I am saying it would have been logical for there to have been a discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. It must have gone up to him with your favorable recommendation, didn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Mr. Lattimore subsequently received an appointment and served as adviser to Mr. Pauley in connection with his mission to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that at a time when you were head of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to place the dates. I was either still Chief of the China Division or I had become Director of the Far Eastern Office. The probability is that I was head of the Far Eastern Office because I think the Pauley mission went out to Japan and Korea and Manchuria in the latter part of 1945, and I became Director of the Far Eastern Office in September 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. What, if anything, did you have to do with Mr. Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Mr. Pauley?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no connection that I had with his appointment to Mr. Pauley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I recommended him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. The mission was drawn up, I think, under the White House auspices, and I don't believe I had anything to do with his appointment or the appointment of anybody on the Pauley Mission.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know who did?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you discuss that matter with Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. I may have but I have no recollection of discussing it with Lauchlin Currie. At that time he was in FEA.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was Lauchlin Currie at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten exactly when Lauchlin Currie quit the Government and went to New York in business, but it must have been some time right after the conclusion of the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask a question: During Lauchlin Currie's work at the White House did you consult him on matters?

Mr. VINCENT. I probably did, Senator. I have no recollection. We held these meetings——

Senator FERGUSON. That is pretty indefinite, "probably."

Mr. VINCENT. Let's put it this way: I was back here, I came back here in June 1943, and by September Currie had gone over as Deputy Director of the Foreign Economic Administration, FEA, under Crowley. So my period——

Senator FERGUSON. Then when did he go back to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think he ever went back to the White House.

I think when FEA was dissolved he went out into business. Went to New York. I think he went directly from FEA to New York.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consult with him while you were in Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. From time to time; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. On what matters?

Mr. VINCENT. On far eastern matters, China.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. He was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you consult with him if he was not an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Because some time during the period 1940 or 1941 he had apparently been designated by the President as a Presidential man to handle far eastern affairs. He had come to China in 1942 at the request of the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the only reason why you consulted him, because you thought he was close to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. No. He himself had a position which was well-known in the State Department as a man in the White House who was handling far eastern matters, particularly China matters, from the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us anything you consulted him on?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall any specific instance of consulting him on matters.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss with Mr. Lattimore the matter of his appointment as adviser to Mr. Pauley?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall discussing it with him. As I say, I might easily have, but I do not recall discussing the matter. The Pauley Mission, as I said, from what I can recall, was something that was organized and put forward without any consultation as far as I can recall, with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about Mr. Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Mr. Pauley at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I knew he was going out with Mr. Pauley.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, was the Pauley Mission under the State Department payroll?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know who paid the Pauley Mission.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, would it be appropriate to ask a question at that time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Any time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, I think in fairness to the record and in fairness to you, in connection with the question I asked you a while ago with reference to whether or not you had been consulted by the Institute of Pacific Relations with respect to the advisability of publishing a controversial manuscript or pamphlet by Maxwell Stewart, you stated that it was your recollection that you could not recall being consulted by people in the Institute about the advisability of publishing that. That is your testimony, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my testimony. I have no recollection of any instance of being consulted on a publication. I don't know that I have ever met Maxwell Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read at this time for us exhibit No. 176, which does appear in the record. As you know, Mr. Vincent, there is a conflict between that and your testimony at this time.

Mr. MANDEL. I read exhibit No. 176, which is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 4, 1944, marked "W. L. H." presumably William L. Holland——

Mr. SOURWINE. Which appears at what point in our record?

Mr. MANDEL. It appears on page 629 of part 2. From M. S. F., presumably Miriam S. Farley, "copy to H. M.," presumably Harriet Moore.

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence) and with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommending rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on point of detail. I am now editing the Ms. in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent, and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless, I am making some changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not, likely, enough to satisfy him completely. My position is that I am willing, in fact, anxious, to go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, provided this does not destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it.

Personally I doubt that the China Council will leave the IPR because of this or anything else in similar vein. They have more to lose than the IPR by such action, though naturally they will use threats for what they are worth. I am inclined to agree with Max that they respect us more if we don't knuckle under to them.

The American Council is, of course, prepared to take full responsibility for this pamphlet, and will quite understand if the Secretariat wishes to disown it. Nevertheless, we should welcome yours views. Perhaps I have assumed too much from the meagerness of your comments on the original Ms.; if so, please let me know. I shall be glad to show you the revised Ms. if you care to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, do you know now that Maxwell Stewart is or was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever suspect that he was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't even recall ever meeting him, sir, and I have heard nothing about Maxwell Stewart, whether he is a Communist or not.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean in view of the letter that has just been read, Mr. Vincent, can you recall reading that particular pamphlet?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony, without having had my memory refreshed, is that I would not have recalled that particular instance of reading that particular pamphlet.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you now recall?

Mr. VINCENT. I actually now do not recall the instance, but I see they have used my name, but I do not recall the instance even now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you willing to accept that letter as expressing a fact, to wit, that you did read the manuscript and did express the opinion which is there attributed to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not willing to testify on the basis of that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. I said do you accept it as a fact.
Mr. VINCENT. I do not accept it as a fact.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you challenge it as a fact?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't challenge it either, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. You don't contend that you did not read the manuscript?
Mr. VINCENT. Even the reading of the thing here does not refresh my memory as to an instance of that kind.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you contend that you did not express an opinion with regard to the manuscript as outlined in that letter?
Mr. VINCENT. I do not contend that I did not.
Mr. SOURWINE. You might have?
Mr. VINCENT. I might have.
Senator EASTLAND. Do you know Agnes Smedley?
Mr. VINCENT. I never met her.
Senator EASTLAND. Have you ever talked with her?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any IPR writings or publications that were submitted to you prior to publication?
Mr. VINCENT. IPR publications?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes.
Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any.
Senator FERGUSON. None whatever?
Mr. VINCENT. None whatever that I recall.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that the testimony from the witness yesterday, Larry Rosinger, indicates that they did submit documents, papers, and writing to members of the State Department for criticism prior to publication?
Mr. VINCENT. I didn't read his testimony and didn't hear his testimony yesterday. That is what Rosinger said yesterday?
Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall on any occasion seeing an IPR document, while you were trustee of the IPR, prior to its publication?
Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any.
Senator FERGUSON. None whatever?
Mr. VINCENT. No.
Senator FERGUSON. Does this refresh your memory at all?
Mr. VINCENT. This doesn't refresh my memory at all. There has been testimony that Mr. Rosinger submitted a manuscript to me, but that was not an IPR document, I believe. That was a book.
Senator FERGUSON. It was published by IPR, wasn't it?
Mr. VINCENT. I don't know who published it, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that document?
Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the document. I presumably sometime saw the Rosinger book, but I do not recall the instance. It is in the record apparently that it was sent to me and he had to ask for it back.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any recollection at all of this document that they are now talking about, this manuscript?
Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. That Max Stewart manuscript?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes.
Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not.
Senator FERGUSON. You haven't the slightest recollection of it?
Mr. VINCENT. I haven't the slightest recollection of what these peo-

ple are talking about that manuscript, of its being changed here and being modified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Owen Lattimore ever delivered a lecture to personnel of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he delivered more than one such lecture?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any time that Mr. Lattimore delivered lectures to the State Department. It is logical that he may have, but I do not recall Mr. Lattimore making lectures to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to how many times he delivered lectures to personnel of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with arranging or approving any such lectures?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of arranging or approving lectures for Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had arranged it or approved it you would remember it, wouldn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that answer?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I would not necessarily remember that I had. We are dealing with a period back 7 years ago. I say that I would not now want to say that I would naturally remember arranging for a lecture for Mr. Lattimore to speak before Foreign Service people or in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever instruct any of your subordinates to attend a lecture by Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of instructing my subordinates to attend a lecture by Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to deny that you ever did instruct them?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean to say just what I said, that I have no recollection of ever instructing my subordinates to attend a lecture.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had instructed them to attend a lecture by Owen Lattimore, would you remember it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say this again as I said to the other question, that in the first place I would not have instructed them to attend a lecture but I——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you testify that you did not?

Mr. VINCENT. But I could have suggested that somebody attend a lecture by Mr. Lattimore but I have no recollection of having done so.

Mr. SOURWINE. A suggestion by you as head of the Division to a subordinate would have been tantamount to a command, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would State Department personnel have felt completely free to disregard such a suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. They certainly would. In other words, I wouldn't have instructed and I would not have said—I might have suggested that they attend, but I don't even recall either instructing or suggesting that they go to——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to deny that you did instruct or suggest that they attend such a lecture?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I mean to say that I have no recollection of having instructed anyone or suggested that they attend a lecture.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a common thing for you to instruct or suggest your subordinates to attend a function of that nature?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was an uncommon thing, don't you think if you had done it you would remember it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think I would remember an instance of that kind of telling somebody I thought it was a good idea, if it occurred.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which of Mr. Lattimore's books have you read?

Mr. VINCENT. I said that I had read the Inner Asian Frontiers and that I had read solution in Asia, at one time or another.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is all?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I can recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You certainly did not make a study of Mr. Lattimore's books at any time, then, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I would not say that I had made a study of his books; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not be able to say that you could form a conclusion on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I said that I formed a conclusion on the basis of the knowledge of this book here; that he was, in addition to what else I knew, a man who knew the subject of the inner Asian frontiers of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was whether you feel it would be right and proper for you to state that on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books you had formed any conclusion at all with regard to his writings.

Mr. VINCENT. Formed any conclusion of any kind?

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you made a study of Mr. Lattimore's books?

Mr. VINCENT. I said I have not made a study of Lattimore's books.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have not made a study of Mr. Lattimore's books, would it be proper for you to state that on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books you had reached thus and thus a conclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. It could not be made. If I haven't made a study of them I couldn't reach a conclusion on the basis of a study.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have made such a statement you were wrong; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. If I have made such a statement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you say now, if you have said that on the basis of a study of Mr. Lattimore's books you reached certain conclusions about his writings, that was a statement which was not true? Will you say that now?

Mr. VINCENT. It was certainly a statement which was not factually correct as far as I can figure. It may have been an opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the difference between not being factually correct and not being true?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no difference.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire? Did you ever have anyone in the State Department make a survey of Mr. Lattimore's writings prior to the time that you recommended him as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. So without an examination of his writings and without causing an examination to be made for your advice, you still recommended him as an adviser to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a customary thing?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't say it was customary. I will say here that my knowledge of Mr. Lattimore is derived from having seen him from time to time when he was director of OWI and when he went on the Wallace mission, as much as on his books.

Senator FERGUSON. But without examining what he had written you recommended him; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I read two of his books.

The CHAIRMAN. He testified he read them. Let us straighten it out with the Chair a little bit. I understood that you had read the book that is referred to here, by Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you recommend him for a place in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that enter into your recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You believed because of that book that he should be recommended?

Mr. VINCENT. Because of that book and because of the knowledge I had of Mr. Lattimore that he would be an excellent technical expert to come into the State Department to assist us on these areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you testify, sir, that before you read this book you didn't consider him an expert, that it was on the basis of this book that you concluded he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't believe I testified to that, and if I did I was incorrect because I knew already that Lattimore had traveled extensively through——

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean before you read this book you had your mind all made up that Lattimore was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. You are using the word "expert" there. I knew Lattimore was well informed with regard to those areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any opinion as to whether he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. You would have to define an expert.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have been talking about that word "expert" for quite a while now. What definition did you intend it to have when you were using it?

Mr. VINCENT. I considered him an expert. If a man wrote a book like that on those areas, I considered him an expert on those areas. Prior to that time I also had an opinion on him because I knew he was making travels through those areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now wish to testify that before you read this book you knew him to be an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. On those areas?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say I—there again you are getting into the matter of definition of an expert. I knew he was a man familiar with those areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's define "expert" and then we will use it with your definition. What do you mean expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that an expert is—a man who could write as exhaustive a book as that became an expert on those areas, but prior to that I had no knowledge he was an expert.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the exhaustiveness of the book the mark of an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily.

Mr. SOURWINE. What precisely do you mean, since you have raised the point of definition?

Mr. VINCENT. Because he was a man who had had extensive travels in those areas and so far as I knew was a man who knew more about those areas than anyone at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is an expert a man who, as you say, knows the subject thoroughly, is preeminent in the field, and writes well and factually about it? Will you accept that definition?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no objection to that definition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Using that definition of expert, did you consider Mr. Lattimore to be an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I considered Mr. Lattimore to be an expert on those areas; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider him to be an expert on those areas before you read this book, meaning the book Inner Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have thought him an expert. He was a man well informed on the areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you didn't consider him an expert until you read this book?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, the thought of considering him an expert or not an expert would never have come to my mind until you make this statement here, but a man who writes a book of this kind I would consider an expert.

Mr. SOURWINE. You brought up the question of the book and said that after reading that book you were sure he was an expert; didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I said he was an expert.

Senator FERGUSON. If he wasn't an expert, why did you want him as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not saying he was not an expert. The point I am getting at here is there is a differentiation trying to be made between before and after he made the book as to whether he is an expert. I don't know quite——

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know whether the book is what made up your mind that he was an expert.

Mr. VINCENT. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is now your testimony that it was your reading of this book that convinced you that Mr. Lattimore was an expert.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; on those areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not convinced before reading this book?

Mr. VINCENT. The matter of not being convinced whether he was an expert had not arisen. I knew he was a man well informed on the area. I knew he traveled in the area.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you knew about him before you read the book.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I read a brief paragraph from page 101 from this book that I want to ask the witness about:

Actually a return to the past was inhibited by the new forces that had penetrated both Mongolia and China. Instead, Outer Mongolia was first made a victim of Tsarist Russian imperialism and then set free by the nonexploitative policy of the Soviet Union toward the Mongol Peoples Republic, the granting of loans without interest, economic aid, technical help, and the creation of an army trained and equipped by the Soviet Union but not officered by the Soviet Union or under its orders.

Do you consider that an informed and factual statement, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is page 101.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is, "I do not"?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's go over to page 202. That is twice as many.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you leave that, on the basis of that statement did you want the man who wrote that as a consultant in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, at the time I wanted him as a consultant in the State Department I had read this book several years before, I had no recollection of that particular paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. Now what would you say after its being read to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say after having that read to me, that he could not serve well as a consultant if he took that attitude toward Outer Mongolia being now free.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a strongly pro-Communist statement, that paragraph I read, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would not recommend him today after hearing that statement in the book?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It may be redundant but I would like to read one more paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I just didn't want to leave that paragraph without following it up.

Mr. SOURWINE. From page 202:

Again, since these changes are visibly progressive, since they have been expedited by active Soviet policy, since the Soviet Union has not taken advantage of its power to fasten an "imperial" control on the Province—

referring to the Province of Sinkiang.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

And since the Soviet Union has not taken advantage of its power to fasten "imperial" control on the Province, and since Soviet trade remains important in keeping up the progress that has been begun, the total result has not been to fasten Soviet control on the Province but to set up in the Province itself a drift toward the Soviet Union. This, which I have elsewhere described as the phenomenon of "negative accretion" results in a wide expansion of the influence of the Soviet Union beyond its own borders, not by a process of acquisition and control but by the action of the peoples who come within reach of Soviet policy. Finding that they are not subordinated either economically or politically to the Soviet Union but are helped to help themselves these peoples continue of their own accord to seek a closer association.

Is that a fair and factual and objective statement, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call that a fair and factual statement on the situation there, but I was not familiar with the situation in Sinkiang at that time. I did know that the Russians had moved in. That is the reason I gave the positive answer on the other one, that the Russians had moved into Outer Mongolia. In Sinkiang they had not come in to the same extent.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the Senate is in session. The Chair would like to be on the floor.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you let me have one question before you adjourn.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that that fairly represents the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Mongolia or the Province there?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Hearing that read, would you now recommend the author of that paragraph as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we will resume this afternoon. I don't know that the present chairman can preside this afternoon. Senator Ferguson, how are you fixed for this afternoon?

Senator FERGUSON. If the time was about 2 o'clock.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like very much to go all afternoon and possibly have an evening session. It is going much slower than anticipated, and we have a short time schedule.

Senator FERGUSON. I could make it about 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. If you will do that I will appreciate it.

Senator FERGUSON. With the right to close to go over on any vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon the committee was recessed until 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). The committee will come to order. Mr. Sourwine, I have several questions I would like to ask.

You are familiar with the last two quotations read from this book that you had read?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not familiar with those quotations——

Senator FERGUSON. I mean you are now familiar with them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you or would you not say that the writer of those quotations was pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Taken in the way they were read, Mr. Senator, I wouldn't; no.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not describe them as pro-Communist. I would like to refresh my memory on the whole book to see how.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about the quotations.

Mr. VINCENT. Take, for instance, the one on the Province of Sinkiang. So far as I know, it may have been quite a factual statement of the situation there at the time, because I was not familiar with conditions in Outer Mongolia or Sinkiang at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your reason for answering the questions, then that I gave to you as to whether or not you would

have recommended him for the position as being consultant, that you would not after hearing these read?

Mr. VINCENT. After hearing the first one read, I thought there was an attitude there regarding the area—not an attitude but a description there that I would have thought now would not be one which would not have accurately recognized the real dangers in there of a Communist control of Outer Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. Then would it not be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not describe it particularly as pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not at this morning's session admit that that was a definitely pro-Communist statement, that paragraph, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recollect saying that in so many words; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did admit it this morning, did you mean to, or was it a slip of the tongue?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that this morning showed a misconception of the dangers of communism in that area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not remember, sir, what you testified to this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't remember the exact words that I testified to this morning. If they would read them back——

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that either one of these statements was anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say they were anti-Communist; no.

Senator FERGUSON. They do not represent the facts? That is, in your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I did not know what the factual situation was in Sinkiang, therefore, whether this does represent the facts at that time I do not know. The conditions—I am talking about the conditions.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you tell us, then, that if you had known of these two statements you would not have recommended him as a consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. I spoke of that as regards to the first statement. I thought it showed a misconception. The first one was on Outer Mongolia. I would have to have it read back to me.

There were certain statements there which I thought showed a misconception of the real situation in Outer Mongolia at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you wish it read or simply pointed out to the witness?

Senator FERGUSON. Just let the witness see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the paragraph, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. I think you must have read more than this, did you not, Mr. Sourwine? That is, more than that paragraph that you have marked here?

Mr. SOURWINE. I read that paragraph this morning from page 101.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. Is that the only one you read?

Mr. SOURWINE. Since there is a question about what I read, you had better let me read it again, sir, or perhaps if you would read that marked paragraph, the one that you expressed doubt if I read any more, the record will show what you are talking about and what I was reading this morning.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

Actually, a return to the past was inhibited by the new forces that had penetrated both Mongolia and China. Instead, Outer Mongolia was first a victim of Czarist Russian imperialism and then set free by the nonexploitive policy of the Soviet Union toward the Mongol People's Republic. The granting of loans without interest and economic aid, technical help and the creation of an army trained and equipped by the Soviet Union, but not officered by the Soviet Union, or under its order.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the paragraph where you expressed doubt?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the paragraph as I read it aloud here that Outer Mongolia was first a victim of the—"Outer Mongolia was first a victim of Czarist Russian imperialism and then set free," that is the phrase in there that would have given me the idea that there was not a complete understanding of the policy there or the policy of the Soviet Union. But I would not necessarily—and I do not say that a person could be in error making a statement that because of that it was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar at that time with the policies of communism?

Mr. VINCENT. As familiar, probably, as just the ordinary man in the street was. But I was not a student of the policies of communism; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you were representing the United States on the desk of the far eastern or the China desk and you want to tell us now, this committee, that you were no more familiar with the principles of communism than the average man on the street. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Are you speaking of the time this book was written or 1945?

Senator FERGUSON. No; in 1945 when you recommended him to be an adviser to the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you were speaking about the time I read this book. In 1945 I had just been in China and I had a fairly clear idea of what the policies were of communism in that area. I have testified heretofore that I was not familiar.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you read the book?

Mr. VINCENT. I read the book sometime early in the 1940's. I don't know when.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you, I think, stated that the reason for recommending him as an expert was your reading of the book?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. That was one of the reasons I gave, as reading the book, otherwise it was my general knowledge of the man.

Senator FERGUSON. You had it clearly in mind at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not have the book clearly in mind at that time. It was just my impression of the book which I had read 4 or 5 years before, but I say I would not have recalled at the time I recommended Mr. Lattimore for the job these particular paragraphs in that book, and I didn't reread the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing what you know about communism as of today, would you or would you not say that that or was not a pro-Communist statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it was a statement which showed a lack of knowledge of what the Communists were up to.

Senator FERGUSON. A lack of knowledge of what the Communists were up to?

Mr. VINCENT. That seems to me to be the principal thing you can keep out of that, a lack of understanding at that time of what was the real intent and the real danger of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that Mr. Lattimore at that time, at the time he wrote the book, did not know what the Communists were up to?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I cannot testify as to what Mr. Lattimore thought.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought he was an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought he was an expert.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think an expert would know as of the time he wrote that book what the Communists were up to?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that he was an expert on those areas, but I don't know that I would call him——

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about what the Communists were up to in that area.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say that Mr. Lattimore was an expert on communism. I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say he was an expert on communism, is that your answer?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say because I just don't know. I say I couldn't say whether he was an expert on communism or not, because I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at the time you read that book what was going on in this territory that this statement was written about?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you working at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I was working at that time in Geneva, Switzerland, as consul there.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a far-eastern expert then?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you been in the Far East, dealing with the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Prior to 1940? I had been in the Far East and dealing with the Far East for the previous 12 or 15 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to 1940?

Mr. VINCENT. Prior to 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. And as such an expert, did you try to find out what the Communists really were doing and had in mind in relation to this territory that is written about?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no knowledge of what was going on in Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to find out, as an expert? That is part of the Far East, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. You are assigned to various and sundry tasks, and my task never carried me into a place where I would be expected to find out, if I could find out, what was going on in Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think today you know what communism really is in the world?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe I do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you acquire your knowledge of knowing what communism was?

Mr. VINCENT. I became fully conscious of it when the war was going on and at the conclusion of the war. I would say before this time I wasn't aware of the real menace of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not conscious of the real menace until after the war was over?

Mr. VINCENT. I was conscious that the Communist ideology was a menace, but I am talking about the machine as we have now seen the expansive power and aggressiveness of the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you. The Chair may desire to have placed in the record at this time a reply from Mr. Carlisle Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State, to a request transmitted to the State Department for certain documents in connection with or relating to Mr. Vincent.

Mr. Humelsine sends with his letter a photostat of a letter to the Secretary of State from the President. The Chair might wish those read.

Senator FERGUSON. You may read them into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is in response to Senator McCarran's letter to Mr. Acheson, which is already referred to in the record, requesting these 32 categories of information.

It will be recalled that the State Department, over Mr. Humelsine's signature, had earlier sent a few of them and said that the request was being referred to the White House. I believe this would be a good place in the record to insert the chairman's request and that earlier reply.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be inserted. The documents supplied by the Department will be printed in the appendix.

(The documents referred to appear in the appendix, beginning at p. 2286.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Humelsine now says in his letter of January 30, 1952:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I am enclosing for your information a photostatic copy of a letter to the Secretary from the President in regard to your letter of January 2, in which you requested certain departmental files relating to Mr. John Carter Vincent.

If I may be of any further assistance to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on me.

The photostat letter is dated January 24, and reads:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have given very careful consideration to Mr. Humelsine's memorandum of January 22, relating to Senator McCarran's request for the loyalty file of John Carter Vincent, and for certain other papers and reports from the internal files of the State Department. It is understood that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee desires these documents for the protection of Mr. Vincent against misinterpretations of his position, and that Mr. Vincent for

the same reason has urged compliance with this request. While it is earnestly desired to accommodate Mr. Vincent and the subcommittee to the maximum extent possible, the paramount consideration in ruling upon this matter must be the protection of the interests of the United States.

The surrender to a legislative investigating committee of this type of report and other documents from the confidential files of the State Department would create a serious danger of intimidation and demoralization of Foreign Service personnel. It is of overriding importance to our national security, internal as well as external, that officers of the Foreign Service are free to present their reports and express their views as to problems of international relations, without fear or favor, completely and honestly, as they see them at the time, and not in anticipation of the possible reaction of some future investigating committee which might hold opposing views. Accordingly, it is considered that it would be clearly contrary to the public interest to furnish these documents.

The release of individual loyalty files to congressional committees has consistently been denied under terms of my directive of March 13, 1948, as contrary to the public interest in that it would involve the disclosure of confidential information and sources of information and would tend to undermine the integrity of the loyalty program. The request for Mr. Vincent's loyalty file should be denied.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Is it desired for insertion?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it will be inserted. The reporter will compare this actual letter and enclosure with your reading of them, to be sure they appear accurately in the record.

I want to ask you another question.

You have heard the President's letter read. Do you think that that keeps you from testifying in relation to the matters that were asked for?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not?

Mr. VINCENT. Except where there may be confidential documents that I couldn't reveal the subject matter of.

Senator FERGUSON. Are there any of them that you cannot reveal the contents of?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say there would be quite a few of them, sir. I should say there would be quite a few of them that were confidential, that were still classified documents, as you call them.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that recently the State Department released an opinion of the Appeal Board, of the Loyalty Appeal Board?

Mr. VINCENT. In the case of Service, I think that was it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen that in the paper. I didn't see the opinion, but I know they released it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that that places you now in the position as indicating that if yours is not released, the matters that are asked for, there where it was felt that they were favorable to the State Department they were released and now they do not release yours.

Mr. VINCENT. Would you state that question again?

Senator FERGUSON. I say do you not think it puts you in an unfavorable light for the President to deny those documents to this Committee when, in the Service case, the State Department itself released the opinion of the Loyalty Board?

Mr. VINCENT. After the loyalty case had been closed?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you see that report?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that they did not release, however, the men's names who signed it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not know what they did not release. I am not familiar with the document. As I told you, I know it was released, but I did not read the document that was released in the case of Service.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no reasons to keep or suppress the evidence asked for, have you?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no reason to suppress it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it would embarrass you or any other foreign officer in the future if that was released to this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. It might conceivably embarrass somebody.

Senator EASTLAND. How could it?

Mr. VINCENT. Because there might be other names, there might be situations which are still current in the documents, Senator, that might be embarrassing to the Government. The President here has given his reasons.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the President saw the documents before he wrote the letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether he saw them or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that the State Department has possibly foreseen a question as to whether the President did, in fact, send them this letter, because they sent us not just a copy of it but a photostatic copy of the President's letter to the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not questioning the President's signature at all. I do not mean that; but it is as to whether or not the President saw the documents, not the letter. You may have misunderstood.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon.

Mr. VINCENT. No, my answer was "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Are there any other questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. May I proceed?

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. We were discussing Mr. Lattimore. Have you read his book Solution in Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I think I read a copy of it when it first came out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know about when that was?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it came out in the spring of 1945; is that correct?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct.

Mr. Chairman, it is copyrighted 1944, 1945, and it is marked "Published February 1945, reprinted February 1945."

Did that book in any way change your opinion of Mr. Lattimore as an expert?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that Mr. Lattimore was an expert, in my opinion, on the inner Asian frontiers. I would not want to say that this book here changed my ideas by reading the book, because I have no clear recollection of the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. So, at that time you got just the general impression? You did read it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read it carefully?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not read it carefully.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read it as carefully as you read Inner Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. VINCENT. About the same way as that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I want to know, did that reading in any way affect that opinion, the opinion you then held of Mr. Lattimore as an expert in certain fields?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall it affecting my opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it, then, that you did not recognize any of the passages in this book which you chanced to read as pro-Communist? They did not so affect you?

Mr. VINCENT. They did not so affect me at that time, sir, or I have no recollection of their affecting me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember reading this passage, from the bottom of page 16 of this volume and running over to the top of page 17:

In the whole record of our protests to Japan, Britain and America never once contested Japan's right to make demands on China. We only protested that privileges acquired by Japan should not exclude us.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it read, does it have any connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I read from page 23, this sentence:

For well over a hundred years we have taken for granted the ascendancy of capitalist thought as the civilized mode of thought.

Do you remember reading that?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't remember reading that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the following paragraph:

Capitalist ascendancy of this kind is no longer unchallenged. Marxist thought is now as fluently and as cogently expressed in such Asiatic languages as Buryat-Mongol, Kazakh, Uzbek, and Tajik as it is in Russian or Ukranian, because Marxist thought has rooted itself as firmly in the minds of these people as it has in the minds of the Russians and Ukranians. In most territories adjoining the Soviet frontier, Marxist thought cannot be dismissed as merely "subversive propaganda." It is no longer subversive but competitive.

Do you remember reading that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember reading that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say, as you have read it there—I would have to read it more carefully—as you have read it there, it would seem to me that it was a fair analysis of what he observed in the area. It is an observation.

Mr. SOURWINE. It impressed you as a fair, factual analysis?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I didn't say that. I said it impressed me as to what he observed in the area. In other words, he had just been to Asia, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. It impressed you as an expression of opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. It impressed me as an expression of his opinion, and the best of his judgment, as to what was the situation there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Even with that in mind, does it, in your mind, have any connotation of whether it is pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 24:

The prestige of Soviet industrial production has increased with every victory won by weapons made in Soviet factories, and this prestige extends to the system of production as well as to the things produced. Along the inland frontiers of Asia we may expect to see Soviet engineers increasingly consulted where formerly the only engineers consulted were European or American. If we are politically intelligent we may expect the Soviet engineers to be consulted on the organization and management of production, as well as the design of machines and the lay-out of factories. We may count on seeing, over wide areas, the partial acceptance of Marxist ideas and the adoption of one or another part of the Soviet system.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the bottom of page 67, and over to the top of page 68:

Into this complicated situation there intruded the influence of the Russian revolution, the effects of which were felt all over Asia. We in America have never yet properly grasped the character of that influence. Wherever we see Russian influence we still tend to look for Russian agitators, upsetting the minds of people who would not make trouble if they were not stirred up by troublemakers. We cannot understand either the Asia of yesterday or the Asia of today and tomorrow if we resort to such absurd simplifications.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It appears to me as just an opinion of Mr. Lattimore's on the situation as he observed it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it have any connotation as either pro-Communist or anti-Communist to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 69:

One of the most powerful, brutal, and insensitive of the master people, the Russians had overthrown its own masters, had summoned all other peoples to do the same, and was now held at bay by the remaining master peoples. In this observation of big, simple ideas, the people of Asia saw, or hoped that they saw, a community of interest between themselves and the Russians.

Do you remember reading that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it read, sir, does it have, in your mind, any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not have a pro-Communist connotation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anti?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading on page 73:

China, struggling to throw off the economic control of the great capitalist countries, had a natural community of interests with Russia politically and economically blockaded by the same countries.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it read, does it have in your mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 74:

> With the advantage of hindsight, we can see that the Russian policy was reasonable and realistic, since the powers which were trying to hamstring the Chinese revolution were also the powers which were trying to wreck the Russian revolution.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, sir, does it have in your mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it pro-Communist or anti.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 99:

> During this period, the Communists pressed and propagandized for a negotiated end to the civil war and a full stand against Japan at the earliest possible moment rather than the last possible moment. By so doing they invested themselves with a new political character. They ceased to be merely a policy which opposed the policy of the Government, and became a party with a policy alternative to that of the Government. Furthermore, although they remained a one doctrine party and could not yet broaden out into a coalition, they became potentially the focus of a new coalition because a number of movements outside of Communist territory and not in the least Communist in character began to urge the national government to accede to the policy advocated by the Communists.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have, in your mind, either a pro-Communist or anti-Communist connotation?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it is a factual statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that, as well as I can recall it, it seemed to describe the situation that was present at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it has any bias in it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that is a biased statement, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you realize that this statement says, in essence, that the Nationalist Government of China was opposed to fighting a war against Japan, to making a stand against Japan.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't recall you reading that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize that this statement says that it was the Communist government and not the Nationalist Government that was making a stand and wanted to make a stand against Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. It does?

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you realized it?

Mr. VINCENT. From my recollection of the situation in China at that time, I was not in China, that could be a conclusion that one could reach, that Mr. Lattimore could reach.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you realize that this paragraph was stating that conclusion, was advancing that theory, that thesis?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did, that the Communists themselves were urging greater resistance to Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me read that paragraph again.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that true, did you observe it in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not in China at the time, sir. But I think the reports back from China generally gave that impression, the factual reports back, that the Communists were through their organizations urging resistance to Japan. Chiang Kai-shek at that time made a visit, if I recall, in 1936, and was arrested, held in house arrest, for a short time, and because at that time some of his armies in the south and the Communists were urging greater resistance to Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you place this in 1936, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I placed it in 1936 because I have a clear recollection of General Chiang Kai-shek's arrest at Ceylon. I don't place this in 1936. I was just simply saying, referring to an incident at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was not Senator Eastland's question addressed to the period of this presentation?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't get when this period was, but I gathered that this is describing the situation in China around 1936 or 1937.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recognize it as a description of the situation in China in 1936?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I would have thought that was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are thinking about the situation in China in 1936 being in such close terms as this that you recognize that area of time by what was said here?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my general impression.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 110:

The coalition trend of the Communists has put them in a strong position to make a bid for wider allegiances when on the heels of the Japanese their columns marched parallel with those of the National Government into recovered territory.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind of being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 121:

The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory they control * * *.

Mr. Chairman, my reference is wrong. I am beginning on page 120 and carrying over to page 121:

* * * The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory they control not because they subdued the people by armed force but because the people support them. Basic economic conditions as to food and clothing are better in Communist-controlled China than in Kuomintang-controlled China. The incident of conscription and taxation is more equally distributed in Communist-controlled territory than in Kuomintang-controlled territory. Many progressive, educated, middle-class Chinese have somehow got through the blockade into Communist territory, but not many have fled from that territory. The political structure under the Communists is more nearly democratic than it is under the Kuomintang. It is a fact that governing committees and representative committees are elected and that the Communists limit themselves to one-third of the representation; whereas, in Kuomintang territory it is increasingly difficult to hold a public position without joining the Kuomintang and accepting its discipline.

Do you remember reading that passage?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind of being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it is a factual statement?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as I can recall, it was a statement that described the situation there. I was never in that area. Other people, I don't recall who, newspaper people, were there who came back with similar stories.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, you believed it when you read it, and you are willing to believe it now?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time, it was fairly as accurate a statement as one could get out, with the knowledge you had of the place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the bottom of page 121 and over to the top of page 122:

> Representatives of the minor parties which have no armed forces and no rights are inclined to believe that it is only because the Communists have armed forces that people in the Communist area have political rights and liberties. They assume that if the Communists lose control of their armed forces the people would lose their political freedom. They therefore support as openly as it is possible for them to do so demands for freedom to organize political bodies and the right to elect members of political bodies with real functions and authority, and do not demand that the Communists should first submit to military control. Pending the development of a larger body of knowledge about the Communist area, certain tentative conclusions can be drawn. The Communists have done well enough in the territory they control to stand comparison with the Kuomintang. There is a case for negotiating a political compromise with the Communists before pressing the question of military control.

Do you recall having read that passage?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having heard it read, sir, does it have in your mind any connotation as being either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it impress you as a factual statement?

Mr. VINCENT. It impresses me as a report on conditions in China at that time, one man's report, and his opinion which could have been held by him and other people.

Mr. SOURWINE. The passage I have just read, and immediately preceding, do they strike you as being unrealistic?

Mr. VINCENT. I think now that you use that word "unrealistic"—I think you would have to read them again, sir, for me to say whether I would describe them as unrealistic, because of the many statements there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are an expert on China?

Mr. VINCENT. But I don't recall from the reading of those two passages, and applying the one idea "unrealistic."

Mr. SOURWINE. I will read the one before last, and you listen:

> The Communists have survived and have even expanded the territory they control, not because they subdued the people by armed force, but because the people will support them. Basic economic conditions as to food and clothing are better in Communist-controlled China than in Kuomintang-controlled China. The incidence of conscription and taxation is more equally distributed in Communist-controlled territory than in Kuomintang-controlled territory. Many progressive, educated, middle-class Chinese have somehow gotten through the blockade into Communist territory, but not many have fled from that territory. The political structure under the Communists is more nearly democratic than it is under the Kuomintang. It is a fact that governing committees and representa-

tive committees are elected and that the Communists limit themselves to one-third of the representation; whereas, in Kuomintang-controlled territory it is increasingly difficult to hold a public position without joining the Kuomintang and accepting its discipline.

Do you find anything that strikes you as unrealistic in that passage?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would say that that passage there, without being able to check the facts because I was never in the area, seems in some measure to be unrealistic.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, did any of these statements influence you in determining your foreign policy?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have said I don't recall that. Most of this was information that he has written here, and was already more or less available, in different form, to us in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that what influenced you to act? You say it was already available in the State Department, that which was read.

Did that influence you in acting, that information?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have influenced me, but one way or the other I didn't accept it. I don't accept it all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you accept any of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, as reports from China on a situation there in North China. But you would have to say in what way, I am afraid, that it influenced me to act. I can't now say how my actions might have been influenced.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read a statement:

During the 15 years of its existence, the Communist Party of China has grown up into a powerful revolutionary party, steeled in the fire of its Chinese revolution in one of the best sections of the Comintern, and has succeeded in establishing Soviet districts in the armed forces of the revolution, the Red Army, which is displaying miracles of heroism, and which the seven campaigns of the enemy have not succeeded in breaking.

Would you say that statement was or was not pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't say that statement was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say. Do you know who wrote that statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know who wrote that statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say it was anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say it was anti-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Georgi Dimitrov?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of him?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that he was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have never heard of him?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, there are so many Russian officials. I mean, Dimitrov may have been a Russian official, but I don't recall him now.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the bottom of page——

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute. Did you know that he was head of the Communist Internationale?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't, no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the botton of page 129, and continuing to the top of the next page:

As industrialization passed from experiment and many local mistakes and failures to general and increasing success and prosperity, Russia began to acquire a reputation for stability, reinforced later by her firm handling of Japan, and especially her decisive repulse of Japanese incursions against her frontiers.

Do you remember reading that passage?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, sir, does it have in your mind any connotation of either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 134:

In Asia, the Soviet Union has a major power of attraction, backed by a history of development and a body of precedents.

Do you recall reading that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 135:

There then began the process of reintegration into a federative Soviet Union. This was not done all at once or by degree. From 1918 to 1924 there was a complicated grouping and regrouping. The Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic was, from the beginning, the major unit. Other Republics split off from it, but made agreements of various kinds with it and with each other. After a number of preliminary steps, not all of them simultaneous, the main Russian Republic combined with about six other Republics to form the Soviet Union, whose first constitution was approved in 1924.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connection in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is primarily historical, is it? That is, in your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Not having any familiarity with the history of the time, that is what it sounds like to me, as an account of what actually happened. But I couldn't check into whether it is an account.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you do not have sufficient familiarity of the history of Russia at that period to know whether this is a factual account?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are willing to accept it as a factual account because he wrote it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am not willing to accept it because I have not——

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore is an expert, in your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but Mr. Lattimore could be easily wrong on his facts. I have no reason to accept that as being facts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he is the kind of an expert that could be wrong in his facts in a book that he has written?

Mr. VINCENT. I think any expert could be wrong.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you think Lattimore is the type that could be wrong in what he has written in this book?

Mr. VINCENT. He could be wrong, but I have no reason to challenge it.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand you have read this book that is now being quoted to you prior to your recommendation that he be hired in the State Department as a consultant to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator Ferguson, I have no recollection as to what time I read this book. I think we said it was published in February. I have already testified that I do not know what exact time was the recommending of Mr. Lattimore, so I couldn't testify as to whether I had read this book before or after that.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Chairman, is the witness trying to say to this committee that he does not know what is pro-Communist and what is anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, no, I am not trying to say that. I am being asked here to identify these as anti- or pro-Communist, and most of them seem to be the opinions of a man with regard to a situation at that time in China.

Senator JENNER. I know, but Senator Ferguson just read you a passage from the Secretary General of the Communist International, and you did not recognize it as pro-Communistic.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I thought that was a statement of the describing of a situation.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Vincent, you are the head of the Far Eastern Division of our Government, in the State Department. How long has that been?

Mr. VINCENT. I was from 1945 to 1947.

Senator JENNER. 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. Late 1945 until the middle of 1947.

Senator JENNER. Then would you think this would be a fair statement of the appraisal of the Far Eastern Division: That they did not know what was pro-Communist down there and what was anti-Communist during that period of time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I would not; no.

Senator JENNER. Would you think this would be a fair statement of the Far Eastern Division of our State Department: That up until the Korean war, and that includes the time you were head of the Far Eastern Division——

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was already in Switzerland.

Senator JENNER. But 1945–47, from that time on up into the Korean war, would you say that the pro-Communist influence in the State Department of our Government was predominant?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not, sir.

Senator JENNER. Are you acquainted with John Foster Dulles?

Mr. VINCENT. I am.

Senator JENNER. Are you well acquainted?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never met John Foster Dulles.

Senator JENNER. If John Foster Dulles made that statement, would it have any effect upon your thinking?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not, sir, because when I was in the State Department I did not myself detect any procommunism in the State Department.

Senator JENNER. Do you know what is procommunism? In these readings you say you do not think they are procommunistic and yet history has proven that they are procommunistic.

Mr. VINCENT. They are, to my mind, Mr. Lattimore's opinion of a situation as he thought. I wouldn't want to describe this as pro-Communist or anti-Communist. Almost every one of those is one man's opinion of a situation that existed at that time.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Chairman, my point is, if the witness does not know what is procommunistic and anticommunistic——

Mr. SOURWINE. If it might be suggested to the Senator, the record will speak for itself on such a question. All the committee can attempt to do is to find out what the witness' opinions are.

Senator EASTLAND (presiding). Mr. Vincent, how long were you at the head of the far-eastern desk in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. From September 1945 until July 1947.

Senator EASTLAND. What was the American policy toward China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, that would take a long time, but the American policy toward China at that time was primarily expressed in the mission of General Marshall to China, which that directive describes.

Senator EASTLAND. You can just explain it now in a few words.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. One of the principal preoccupations at that time, or let us say when I walked into the office, the war was over—that was September of 1945—was the imminent danger of civil war breaking out again in China. Another preoccupation at that time——

Senator EASTLAND. Was there not a question of who would win that war, if civil war did break out in China?

Mr. VINCENT. There certainly was a question.

Senator EASTLAND. Who did you want to win that war?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly wanted Chiang Kai-shek to win the war if it broke out, and for the Communists to be defeated.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Mr. VINCENT. But there was a serious doubt in many people's minds, not my own, but people in the State Department and in the Pentagon Building, that the outbreak of civil war, after the Chinese had already been undergoing 8 years of war, would make conditions in China even worse than they were at the end of the war, and would be conducive, even, to the future spread of turmoil from which the Communists themselves could take advantage. It was far from clear to anyone at the time that the National Government of China was going to be able to completely militarily defeat the Chinese Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. On the basis of the historical analogy, the Japanese had been trying to defeat the Chinese Communists for the previous 7 years.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know that Russia was arming and equipping Chinese Communists at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. The only knowledge we had at that time of the Chinese Communists getting anything from the Russians was what they were able to pick up from Japanese arms in Manchuria.

Senator EASTLAND. That was considerable.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say whether it was considerable or not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You knew in reality that hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers had surrendered to the Russians, and that their

equipment was being turned over to the Chinese Communists. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. So the cure for that situation was to take those Communists into the government and form a united front between Chiang and the Communists, was that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I think, Senator, that is an oversimplification of it. The idea then was, and the Chinese themselves, the National Government was holding conferences trying to bring about a peaceful solution of their difficulties.

Senator EASTLAND. I know, but those conferences, what you were doing was telling Chiang to take Communists into his government. Is that true or is it false?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that General Marshall ever told the Chinese Government to take the Communists into the government. They were already discussing the matter of some kind of peaceful solution of a political difficulty. There had been a political conference at which the Communists were already present and discussing things when General Marshall went to China.

Senator EASTLAND. You say our Government did not pressure Chiang to take Communists into the Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not saying—the word "pressure" I think is an incorrect one. I don't know to what extent General Marshall used his influence, but that was one of the things in his directive, which was to go out and assist the Chinese.

Senator EASTLAND. You agreed with that policy, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. That Communists should have been taken into the Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I made the statement several times that it seemed that that was a less violent way than to go ahead and carry on civil war. But I made the statement many times that the idea was to take them in in more ways than one, as Mr. Sourwine will recall, on a minority basis.

Senator EASTLAND. And it has always wound up one way: That is a Communist stepping-stone to take a country over. That was an identical system that Communists used all over Europe. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have already testified here, and I was at that time not an authority on Europe, but in that particular time the French had Communists in the government, the Italians had Communists, and were able to eliminate them.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand, but that was a common front in the satellite states. It wound up that they became nothing but satellite states of Moscow. Why is it that you had adopted that Communist tactic and was pressuring it on Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said before, it was the understanding not of myself but of a policy adopted by the entire administration that, taking the Chinese Communists into the government on a minority basis, for the time being, was a better solution and gave a better chance of putting them in a subordinate position than carrying on civil war.

Senator EASTLAND. In other words, it would permit them to take over China without a big war. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, that was not in anybody's mind, that it was going to permit them to take over China.

Senator EASTLAND. You have testified that you knew, and that the State Department knew, that the Chinese Communists were being equipped by the Russians with captured Japanese equipment.

It appears to me that this would call for equipment from this country. Did we attempt to equip the Nationalist forces of China?

Mr. VINCENT. We did, during that period. In the fall of 1945 we had already equipped, I think it was, 39 divisions of Chinese troops. We flew Chinese troops from south China to north China to help take over the areas there.

Senator EASTLAND. But were we giving them the arms and equipment, now, to win the war and to match what Russia was giving the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. We had given and were giving during that period, turning over arms to the Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Not after the decision was made that there should be a coalition government.

Mr. VINCENT. After General Marshall went out, I do not know the degree to which arms were still turned over to the Chinese. But at that time the Chinese had received arms from us, with the possible exception of those troops that we transported to Manchuria. They were also armed by us.

Senator EASTLAND. Did we furnish them equipment to meet the aggression caused by Russian equipment given to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, we had virtually equipped the Chinese Army during the war, and were still equipping them when the war ended in 1945.

Senator EASTLAND. When did we stop equipping them?

Mr. VINCENT. When General Marshall went out for a short period.

Senator EASTLAND. When was that?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in January 1946.

Senator EASTLAND. And that caused the fall of China, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Chiang Kai-shek was never short of arms during that period. He was well equipped. We carried his troops to Manchuria and north China, and they were also equipped. I think people much better than I on it have said that Chiang Kai-shek's troops were always sufficiently equipped.

Senator EASTLAND. We stopped giving them war equipment in 1946. When did we resume?

Mr. VINCENT. We resumed in 1947 at a time when, I would say, the military position of Chiang Kai-shek was stronger than it had ever been before, when he was in north Manchuria and elsewhere in north China.

Senator EASTLAND. What did he get, what was the equipment he got?

Mr. VINCENT. Specifically I can't recall. I remember that arms were turned over to him from certain ammunition dumps in China. I know that air equipment was given to him, transport planes, during 1947.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know whether it was an appreciable amount, enough to offer serious opposition, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was an amount sufficient to offer opposition, which is what he had done and was doing at that time. I left the

Department in July of 1947 and don't know how the thing developed after that.

Senator JENNER. During that crucial period, was there not a 15-month period there when we withheld aid from Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. During the period 1946, military aid as such—it was the policy of the Government not to give military aid. General Marshall was out there trying to carry out a mission to assist the Chinese in settling their differences without civil war.

Senator JENNER. What were the Chinese Communists doing during that 15-month period? Were they demobilizing?

Mr. VINCENT. The Chinese Communists during the latter part of that period, Senator Jenner, were actually being defeated by the Chiang Kai-shek forces. As I have just said, the Chinese Government forces expanded their area of control considerably during the period 1946 through to 1947 in the summer. They controlled a larger area of China at that time than they had at any time previously.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 144:

> Soviet policy in outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It certainly establishes a standard with which other nations must compete, if they wish to practice a policy of attraction in Asia. Russo-Mongol relations in Asia, like Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe deserve careful and respectful study.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as being either pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the reference to the careful and respectful study which Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe deserve is a realtistic one?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know about the word "respectful," but I would certainly say that one should very carefully study the relations between any country and the Soviet Union.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, now, do any of these passages, do you think they connote that they are pro-Communist, any of the passages he has read?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Taking them altogether, do they raise any question in your mind?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it is an attempt on the part, and these are read out of context, an attempt on the part of Lattimore, as it seems to me, to analyze the situation from which he might arrive at a completely——

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, Lattimore is your close friend, and you do not want to say that you think he is a Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You were his protégé, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I was not a protégé.

Senator EASTLAND. Did he recommend you for appointment to the Far Eastern desk?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; never.

Senator EASTLAND. Who did?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I just simply came up to it as a matter of promotion in the State Department. I mean, I was head of the China

division. Then I was appointed Director of the Far Eastern Office in 1945. So far as I know, Mr. Acheson was the first one to tell me that I was going to be Director of the Far Eastern Office. Mr. James Byrnes appointed me the Director of the Far Eastern Office, and I knew Mr. Byrnes. So I couldn't say that Mr. Acheson recommended to Mr. Byrnes, or Mr. Byrnes himself——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not say it was one of Mr. Acheson's first acts after he became Under Secretary?

Mr. VINCENT. I did. I testified that I was called back from leave.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from page 187:

As a matter of political prophecy, I agree that the Japanese people are likely to overturn the throne unless we prevent them. As a matter of political principle, I think we should make the worst possible mistake in trying to use for our own purposes either the present Emperor or a successor nominated by us.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it strike you as realistic and factual?

Mr. VINCENT. It is an expression of an opinion, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now I have one more I would like to read, Mr. Chairman, from page 139:

The fact that the Soviet Union always stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things. Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy. If China or Russia or some other alien people does not measure up to the standards of the particular American modification of Anglo-Saxon democracy, we say that it is not democratic. We are going to find ourselves boxing with shadows instead of maneuvering in politics if we stick to this habit. The fact is that for most of the people in the world today what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant. What moves people to act, to try to line up with one party or country and not with another is the difference between what is more democratic and less democratic in practice.

Do you remember having read that?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that you have heard it, does it have any connotation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that was a misconception of communism.

Senator EASTLAND. Answer his question. He asked you whether it was pro or anti.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would say that that, to my mind, is a pure misconception of communism, to describe it as democracy.

May I continue, sir? But to say that it therefore constitutes a pro-Communist statement in the mind of Mr. Lattimore, or that other, it is just simply a misconception of what is communism.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a man who wrote that and meant it is an expert on communism in the Far East or anywhere else?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it could have been written by Mr. Lattimore with the knowledge that it was not the exact truth?

Mr. VINCENT. That I cannot testify.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you think the man who wrote that and knew it, should be an American adviser on far eastern affairs in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't get your question.

Senator EASTLAND. I said, do you think that a man who wrote that and meant it should be an adviser to our State Department on China policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Taking these things out of context, they would seem to leave the impression that he should not.

Senator EASTLAND. Then why did you want to employ him?

Mr. VINCENT. I wanted to employ him, as I testified before, Mr. Chairman, because he was an expert on these fringe areas in China. He was the only person that I knew, or who was known in the State Department, who was familiar with conditions in Outer Mongolia in Sinkiang and these other things.

We took it for granted that he was a technical expert and he was coming in to do a technical job.

Senator EASTLAND. I think you also said it would be broader than that.

Mr. VINCENT. He was coming in on a per diem basis.

Senator EASTLAND. And adviser, too. He was going to advise you on policy.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, that was the purpose of his coming in.

Senator EASTLAND. Policy adviser?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would give you the answer, then, that Mr. Kennedy who was preparing papers and doing things with regard to Indonesia, and what not, never, to my knowledge, never assumed to advise policy. He gave factual reports on what he knew of conditions in those areas, and that was what was anticipated that Mr. Lattimore could do with regard to these other areas.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course, the facts that he alleges to give are colored, or tainted, from the Communist point of view, the policy that emerges must be a pro-Communist policy, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. If, as you say, they are tainted. But I have not, myself, felt that his facts were tainted. He was trying, in his opinion, to give a factual picture of the situation there.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take Mr. Lattimore to see the President on the question of declaring the Japanese Emperor to be a war criminal?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he ever went to see the President about that question?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have any recollection of Mr. Lattimore going to see the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Lattimore the fact that he had gone or what took place?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing with him a visit to the President. He was a good friend—I don't know whether the testimony is pertinent, but I knew that he was a friend of the President, the President himself——

Mr. SOURWINE. Which President are you talking about?

Mr. VINCENT. I am talking about President Roosevelt now.

Mr. SOURWINE. The President himself had what?

Mr. VINCENT. The President himself, according to Mr. Wallace, had himself suggested that Mr. Lattimore come on the mission with us to China in 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about any testimony in which Mr. Currie had suggested it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not know of any testimony there may be. I know only Mr. Wallace's statement that the President had several times suggested that Mr. Lattimore come on the trip with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I give you this, which is the biographic register of the Department of State, with the thought that it may be useful to you.

As we go through here I will ask you questions about where you were, and what your assignments were. I understand that volume gives dates, but not dates of arrival. From that, or what memoranda you have, it might help you to refresh your recollection.

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking about me now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. When I ask you about a biographical fact, I give you that to assist you, if you need it. But I would like to have you give us the facts as you know them rather than say "this is what I read somewhere."

How old are you, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. Fifty-one.

Mr. SOURWINE. And where were you born?

Mr. VINCENT. I was born in Seneca, Kans.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your early education?

Mr. VINCENT. My early education was in Macon, Ga.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you go to secondary school?

Mr. VINCENT. Macon, Ga.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go to college?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What degrees?

Mr. VINCENT. A. B.

Mr. SOURWINE. From where?

Mr. VINCENT. From Mercer University, Macon, Ga.

Mr. SOURWINE. When?

Mr. VINCENT. From 1919 to 1923. I graduated in 1923.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hold any jobs after graduation before you were appointed to Changsha?

Mr. VINCENT. I worked with my father for a year in the real-estate business.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were appointed a clerk in the American Consulate in Changsha on April 4, 1924?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you went out to the Orient soon after?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you married at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge that he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. I met him some time in 1929 or 1930 in Peking.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not meet him any earlier?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he was in business with Arnold & Co., Ltd., at Tientsin and Peking from 1922 to 1926?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know at the time. I have later heard that he was in business.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know now?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I knew he was in business with someone and I assumed it was Arnold & Co.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have occasion, between 1922 and 1926, to visit Tientsin or Peking?

Mr. VINCENT. I never visited Tientsin until 1928.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed foreign-service officer, unclassified, vice consul of career, and vice consul at Changsha on May 12, 1925?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know he was a draftsman in China in 1925 and 1926?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't referred to his record, so I wouldn't know. I didn't know him. I knew he was the son of a missionary or the son of a YMCA man, and therefore he might be in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know him in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your paths may have crossed, but nothing that you remember?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed vice consul at Swatow temporarily on May 28, 1927?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; I was appointed, but never went to Swatow.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never spent any time there?

Mr. VINCENT. No; by that time they canceled the vice consul.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed to Foreign Service School October 10, 1927?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you return to this country for that purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I came not for that purpose; no. I came home on leave, and after coming home, I was given an appointment to the school.

Mr. SOURWINE. By that time had you met Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet him while you were here in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed vice consul at Hankow on February 4, 1928?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And language officer at Peking on October 1, 1928?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Foreign Service officer, class 8, and appointed consul December 19, 1929?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Paton Davies, Jr., in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know he was at Yenching University, Peking, 1929 and 1930?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know it, sir, and I did not know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Lattimore in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in China at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was doing research in Manchuria under the Social Science Research Council, was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not know the exact organization, but I understood he was doing research work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him that early?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I met him some time in 1929.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember where?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or the circumstances?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or who introduced you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I may add that I have very little recollection of my early meetings with Mr. Lattimore. It was social until 1940.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in China, did you know Edgar Snow?

Mr. VINCENT. I first met Edgar Snow when he visited Manchuria, during the time the Japanese were taking over Manchuria. I forgot what newspaper he was with, but I saw him there with other newspaper people.

Mr. SOURWINE. What year would that be?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be either late 1931 or 1932.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know him?

Mr. VINCENT. Not well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you form a friendship then?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know John K. Fairbank in 1930?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not met him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you meet him?

Mr. VINCENT. My first recollection of meeting Fairbank is when he was assigned to Chungking, in 1942, I think it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed consul at Tsinan August 7, 1930?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I presume he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I already said I met him in Peking, but I never saw him in Tsinan. I asumed he continued on in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were appointed consul at Mukden January 28, 1931?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And foreign Service officer, class 7, July 1, 1931?

Mr. VINCENT. You are losing the place here, but assume that is factually correct here; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Consul at Nanking June 23, 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Raymond Paul Ludden in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall. I hadn't met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet Mr. Ludden?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection of our first meeting, or our paths may have crossed, was somewhere when he was a junior officer when he came to China in 1942, I believe, and was assigned as secretary of the embassy and as consul in Kunming.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., in China at that time; that is, 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to turn over here to see whether Davies at that time had begun his language work in Peiping. I don't think he had, sir; therefore, I don't know where he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Owen Lattimore in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in 1932?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I can't gave any exact statement on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he not in Peiping under the Harvard Yenching Institute?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or had he come under the Guggenheim Memorial Foundation at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking information about him that I really don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated that you had not met Mr. Ludden in China at that time, in 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. Had not met Mr. who?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Ludden, Raymond Paul Ludden.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I had not; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at Yenan in 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. I was in Yenan from the fall of—was I in Yenan in 1932? No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you leave? You were appointed consul at Tsinan August 7, 1930.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. And I left there in April 1931.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you go, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I went to Mukden.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Ludden was appointed vice consul at Tsinan in December 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any distinct recollection of it, but if it is in the biographical—do you want me to refer to see?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I just want to know if you knew it.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. These dates, I might say, for the benefit of the chairman, are dates which I myself have copied out of the State Department Register. I do not vouch for their absolute accuracy, and I am simply using them to find out from the witness what the connection was, if any, with these people.

You were named consul at Dairen September 13, 1932?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long were you at Dairen?

Mr. VINCENT. I was in Dairen for 2½ years, approximately.

Mr. SOURWINE. 1932 to 1934, approximately?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I did not leave. You see, that is where you get these dates. I did not leave November 30, 1934, which would indicate when I left for Nanking. I left in either January or February 1935.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you after that, at any time, stationed at Dairen?

Mr. VINCENT. After?

Mr. SOURWINE. After 1935, after you left to go to Nanking?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were consul at Dairen, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was consul at Dairen.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were consul at Dairen, were you married?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When had you married in the interim?

Mr. VINCENT. I married in Tsinan just before I left for Mukden.

Mr. SOURWINE. While at Dairen was your wife living with you at that post?

Mr. VINCENT. She was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else was a part of your household?

Mr. VINCENT. My children and the Chinese servants. My child, I should say, and the Chinese living in the house, and a Chinese servant out behind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your wife have a companion living with you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, no companion lived in the house with us.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1933, was John Stewart Service in China? Do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this book to see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having met him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Paul Ludden?

Mr. VINCENT. I had not met him at that time, as far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know this Mr. Service had been appointed clerk in the American Consul in Yunnanfu in 1933?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this to know, but I have no knowledge of Mr. Service's appointments.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no connection with the consulate at Yunnanfu?

Mr. VINCENT. Did you say Yunnanfu or Tsinan?

Mr. SOURWINE. Y-u-n-n-a-n-f-u.

Mr. VINCENT. That is the other name for the city we have been calling Kunming around here. That name was changed to Kunming some time during the last 5 or 6 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, in 1933, Service was at Kunming, and Davies was at Kunming, later going to Peiping. Did you know that at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know it at the time. I know at some time in there Davies was appointed a language student at Peiping.

Mr. SOURWINE. In August of 1933. Is that about when you first met him?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that is when I first met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Owen Lattimore was in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know Lattimore was in China at that time. I may have seen him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any contact with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall contact with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he was doing work with the Guggenheim Foundation?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no familiarity with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was in Peiping?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said, sometime in there he started becoming a writer for the Pacific Affairs. I don't know the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named secretary of the diplomatic service and consul at Nanking, November 7, 1934?

Mr. VINCENT. I was named such.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was vice consul at Yunnanfu or, as you say, Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Raymond Paul Ludden was at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know where he was at that time, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Owen Lattimore was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that not the year that he did field work in Mongolia?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named second secretary at Nanking on November 30, 1934?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Second secretary to the Department, September 11, 1935?

Mr. VINCENT. I am just trying to be exact here. To the Department on September 11, 1935, is what I have here. But not as a second secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Foreign Service officer, class 6, October 1, 1935?

Mr. VINCENT. October 1, 1935; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were stationed at Nanking at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was stationed——

Mr. SOURWINE. You had come to Nanking?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to figure when I left Nanking, but I don't know exactly when I left Nanking.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had been named second secretary at Nanking November 30, 1934?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, these dates here—I mean, I was named second secretary whether that date is correct or not. I might say, from my own, that I left Nanking on transfer back to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were detailed for special study at the Georgetown University February 12, 1937?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where John Stewart Service was then?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall where he was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Ludden was then?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know that Mr. Service was at Peiping and Mr. Ludden and Davies at Mukden?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not. I didn't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Mr. John Kenneth Emmerson was at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I would say he must have been in Japan, if he joined the service.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him yet?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long were you at Georgetown?

Mr. VINCENT. During two sessions, I think; that is, 2 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you study there?

Mr. VINCENT. I studied Latin-American history under Mr. Culbertson at one time, and I studied a course called geopolitics under a Hungarian professor whose name I have forgotten. There may have been another course, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever study the Russian language?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you speak Russian?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Max Granich is?

Mr. VINCENT. I do know who he is; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. VINCENT. He is an American that went out to Shanghai in 1935, I think, with his wife, and published a magazine called the Voice of China there for a period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that he was Mike Gold's brother?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Mike Gold is?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I don't, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel has been sworn previously for the duration of these hearings for the purpose of giving expert testimony.

Is it proper if I direct a question to him without reswearing him?

Senator JENNER (presiding). You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee, of your own knowledge, who Mike Gold is?

Mr. MANDEL. Mike Gold has been for a number of years a regular Communist writer for the official organ of the Communist Party, the Daily Worker, and his name appears there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Max Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know him?

Mr. VINCENT. I never met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know Mike Gold?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know Max Granich's wife?

Mr. VINCENT. Never knew Max Granich's wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she the former Grace Maul?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify as to whether she was or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know of Mr. Granich's connection with the Voice of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I know that in 1935 he was editor and, I suppose, owner of the Voice of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was managing editor; was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't define it as managing editor—whether he was owner, editor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had been managing editor of China Today?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that publication, China Today?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that it was the official organ of the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that the American Friends of the Chinese People is a Communist-front organization?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of the fact that Grace Maul was a contributor of articles to the Party Organizer issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge that that was the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that brought to your attention at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been in some of the documents which I read over before I went down on the Granich case, before the un-American Activities Committee, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time check, or cause to be checked, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the records of either Max Granich or his wife?

Mr. VINCENT. I myself? No; I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see an FBI report or other security report on either one of those persons?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall seeing one, but there may have been one in a large file I read in the State Department.

You realize, when I am giving this testimony, that I was in Washington when the Granichs were in Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Did you ever ask for an FBI report or other security file on either Max Granich or his wife, Grace Maul Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall asking for that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think you asked for one?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall asking for one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee, please, about your activities, if any, as a State Department official, in connection with the message to the American consular general in Shanghai which has been referred to occasionally, at least, as a reprimand, for harassing the activities of Granich?

Give us the correct version of that, please.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I can give you the story of that.

Sometime in 1935 Granich arrived in Shanghai, but I don't know at what time. I don't recall from memory what time he was there, he and his wife.

They applied for registration at the consular general for a publishing company which was to publish cultural matters and things in regard to China. I do not recall the name of what they called the publishing company. I recall the name of the Voice of China, which was the magazine.

Mr. Gauss, after seeing one or two publications, realized that it was engaging in what he called radical propaganda, directed against stirring the Chinese up against the Japanese. I am testifying here from memory, from what I can remember from these documents I

have seen. Otherwise, I would not have had this memory of that particular instance.

Mr. Gauss canceled the registration of this firm which was publishing the Voice of China. Registration, I may say here, is an act which is done in China where a company will come in and register simply to have its name in the consulate in case of difficulties. It is not obligatory to register, nor is a lack of registration a particular handicap to the company, although some of them think it is, like the Standard Oil Co. would register.

He canceled that because he did not think that the magazine was carrying the kind of material which Granich had originally indicated to him it was going to carry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that why he said he canceled it?

Mr. VINCENT. Why Mr. Gauss said he canceled it? Because he thought it was not doing what Mr. Granich had originally held out that he was there to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only reason he gave?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only reason I know he gave at the time.

The Chinese then complained to Mr. Gauss, the Chinese police, that Mr. Granich was—I have forgotten now, whether they said pro-Communist, Communist, or a member of the Comintern.

Mr. Gauss wrote back, and I am recollecting these things from this file, and asked the police for any information that they may have to support this evidence that he was a member of the Comintern.

The Chinese police did not furnish him with this information. The next thing that happened in this case was that Granich came in and told Mr. Gauss, or somebody in Mr. Gauss's office, that some of his magazines had been seized out of a book store.

Mr. Gauss told him that he should take whatever recourse that he should in getting these magazines back.

The next time I have any recollection now of the case really coming up was when we were notified by Mr. Gauss that Granich had had—I forget now how many copies, probably 1,000 or 2,000 copies of his magazine seized by the Chinese from the Chinese post office.

Mr. Gauss informed us in the Department—this was in 1930, by then, I believe—Mr. Gauss then informed us that he had not taken any action in this case to get the man to recover his goods.

At this time, the case was referred down to what we call the Legal Division to get an opinion on whether Granich's property under the extraterritorial treaty should be given protection.

The Legal Division of the State Department ruled that, irrespective of the character of the magazine, since Granich was an American and since this was American property, at least a gesture should be made to assist him in recovering the magazines.

That was put in the form of a dispatch. Mr. Gauss was told that, whereas Granich deserved no diplomatic protection, the State Department was in sympathy with his general attitude toward Granich, but from a purely legal point of view Mr. Granich had a right to what we would call his treaty rights under the extraterritorial treaty, to expect the consulate to make some effort to recover the magazines.

Mr. Gauss, I think, has already testified that he did not consider that a reprimand.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say he was told that the State Department was in sympathy with his viewpoint?

Mr. VINCENT. That the State Department was in sympathy with his general attitude on Granich, but on this legal point, for fear of establishing a precedent, for fear of, in those days, admitting to the Chinese that they had a right to seize American property, no matter whether it was property which we had no sympathy with ourselves, it was property.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the police memorandum; that is, the memorandum prepared by the Shanghai police dated January 12, 1937, covering the activities of Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably did when I read that file. I have no distinct recollection of the police memorandum. But I think the Chinese police themselves recited the matter as to his Communist affiliations. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Gauss accuse him of any Communist affiliations?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall Mr. Gauss accusing him of Communist affiliations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Gauss forward the Shanghai police file?

Mr. VINCENT. I believe he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. For informing the Department as to the man, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. He wanted you to read it and know what was in it? And it contained allegations with regard to communism?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say Mr. Gauss did not make any allegations?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Gauss, the only thing I recollect in this big file was his statement that whereas he realized that the man was carrying on activities of a radical character, which would have stirred up the Chinese people, that he was being critical of the Nanking Government, the Chinese Government, that he had had no positive evidence that he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare or approve the instructions sent by pouch under date of July 12, and signed by Sumner Welles, regarding the disposition of that Eastern Publishing Co. matter, that being the name of Granich's firm?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I was the final drafter on that thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare the telegram of May 13 to the United States consular general at Shanghai, that is, to Gauss, asking an explanatory statement as to why the consular general declined to intercede on behalf of Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. There I cannot, from memory, say that I did. I know that I was in the final drafting, not final, but I was the one that put together the ideas in the dispatch.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare a memorandum of June 12, 1936, stating that the Voice of China, upon examination, did not show that it was carrying out Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that based on a study which you yourself had made of the magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. Somebody in the office, it may have been myself, had looked at the magazine, and Mr. Gauss himself had also reported that the magazine did not carry Communist propaganda.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not reporting Mr. Gauss' conclusion, were you, in this memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. That I cannot say at the time, or whether I was reporting his conclusions, because I recall that memorandum was a summary of the case up to the time, and whether I was reporting information which I myself arrived at or whether I was reporting that as simply what Mr. Gauss had done. I think you will find that the date of that, as I just arrived back from Washington, I was just given the job of reviewing the Granich case when it came up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not in that memorandum state it as your opinion that an examination of the magazine Voice of China did not show it was carrying out Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did state that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As your opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as my opinion. This was a summary, if I recall that memorandum correctly. It started out and gave a complete review of the case of the Voice. Whether I was summarizing there an opinion of Mr. Gauss, or whether I was stating an opinion of my own, or examination of the magazine, I cannot state.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what you were purporting to state in the memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I know in the memorandum I was purporting to review for superior officers the present status of the case, based upon what I had there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were trying to give them facts, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to give them the facts at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what you would try to give your superior officers, the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. A factual summary of the Granich case in order for them to reach a decision; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All the facts that they would need to reach an intelligent decision?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were then giving them the fact that the Voice of China did not appear to be carrying propaganda; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I was giving them that either as a fact taken from Mr. Gauss' report or from reading it there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you ever examined a copy of the Voice of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of having examined a copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had examined it, do you think you would have been competent to state whether it was carrying out Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. That would depend entirely on the magazine at the time. I can't say whether I would have been competent to judge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Upon what basis or in what frame of reference would you decide that anything was or was not Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. In this particular case, I would decide it was or was not, because Mr. Gauss himself had reported that an examination of the magazine showed it was not Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that Mr. Gauss' expression of opinion in that regard would have been conclusive with you?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without an examination of the document?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. That explains, then, how you could reach such a conclusion in this case.

Generally, do you feel that you yourself are competent, from examination, to determine whether something is Communist or non-Communist, pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly, as I testified before—I am not an expert on communism. I would have to probably have the thing to see what magazine you had, to see whether I could determine whether it was Communist or anti-Communist. I am no expert.

Mr. SOURWINE. What frame of reference do you have to determine whether anything is Communist or non-Communist, pro-Communist or anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I will have to answer there, sir, that I have no frame of reference, particularly, on which I would decide it. I mean, if this magazine had carried on at that time propaganda in favor of the Chinese Communists, then I would have thought it was pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you recognize propaganda in favor of the Chinese Communists? Did you know what the propaganda line was?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then how would you recognize propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I am simply stating that if the magazine had come out speaking favorably of the Chinese Communists in China, then I would have certainly known it was pro-Communist. But I am not testifying that I would have been able to adopt a subtle line of approach.

Mr. MORRIS. On that last point, may I ask a question, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. MORRIS. I think the last thing you said, Mr. Vincent, was that you set up the standard that if something spoke favorably of the Chinese Communists therefore it was pro-Communist in its orientation.

Mr. Vincent, is that a fair appraisal of your testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. I said if the Voice of China had come out with propaganda for the Chinese Communists, then I would call it a Communist magazine.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had recognized something in that magazine as Communist propaganda you would have said it was pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you might not have recognized it because you didn't know what the Communist line was?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, I would like to read just one paragraph from a volume here, Wartime China, by Maxwell Stewart:

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries, and you can also find resemblances to the grass roots populace movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progres-

sive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices.

Would you call that pro-Communist propaganda according to your definition?

Mr. VINCENT. I would call it a misconception of Communists in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that conform to the definition you just gave of the standard of recognizing pro-Communist writing?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that is Mr.—what's his name?

Mr. MORRIS. Maxwell Stewart.

Mr. VINCENT. Maxwell Stewart's interpretation of what the Communists were up to in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You would not, employing your standard, call that procommunism?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as it is just his analysis of it, it is an incorrect analysis, whether or not you want to call it incorrect or his opinion, as to the Chinese Communists in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You recognize that is the pamphlet, Mr. Vincent, about which we had evidence this morning which you said you were not able to deny?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Which reads:

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent, among others. Vincent said (in confidence), and with a certain emphasis that he thought it good and well worth publishing.

You recognize that that is the same publication?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not until you tell me now, because I testified this morning that I had no recollection of this particular incident and when you read this I do not recall that as the memorandum which these people say I read.

Mr. MORRIS. Yet this morning you did not deny it?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not deny that I had read this.

Mr. SOURWINE. With whom, sir, did you discuss this matter of the Voice of China, Max Granich's publication?

Mr. VINCENT. I discussed it with the legal adviser, one person in the legal adviser's office, Mr. Francis Xavier Ward, who was a good friend of mine there and who was in charge of far eastern matters in the legal adviser's office. It was discussed also with my chiefs at the time and went out under their initials. The chiefs at the time if I may recall from memory, were Mr.—let me see. This was in 1936. Maxwell Hamilton would have been Deputy Director and Dr. Stanley Hornbeck would have been Director. If my recollection is correct both of them initialed that before it was sent out under the signature, I think, from my recollection of the document, under the signature of Sumner Welles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that matter with anyone outside of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall discussing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall discussing it with Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the decision with regard to the memorandum which you prepared on the nature of the magazine wholly your own decision?

Mr. VINCENT. On the nature of the magazine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, that it was non-Communist, that it did not appear to be putting out Communist propaganda.

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified already, I think, sir, that my conclusion as to the nature of the magazine was derived from Mr. Gauss' own statement on the magazine, which was that it was carrying out radical propaganda——

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps it is a quibble, but what I am trying to get at is this: Let me see if I can get more apt language: Whether the decision to characterize it as non-Communist, on whatever basis you chose to make that decision, was your own decision, or were you instructed in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified, sir, that this memorandum I wrote here was a summation or summary of the case for my superior officers and was based upon the report of Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not instructed, then?

Mr. VINCENT. Nobody instructed me to include a statement in my memorandum, although if I had left it out I would have felt that I was lacking in my duty because that was a part of the record which I was summarizing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were, about June 1, 1937, made Foreign Service officer, class 5; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I assume so, sir. May I refer to this again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. VINCENT. Where are we down to?

Mr. SOURWINE. 1937.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1938 where were you?

Mr. VINCENT. I was still in the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remained there through 1938, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend a discussion conference of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, in Washington, on or about December 9 and 10, 1938?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified in executive session on that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. That I have no recollection of that meeting, but that it is quite possible I did attend.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know how you attended that conference or what was the subject of the conference or what part, if any, you took in it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid that I don't recall that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know the names of anyone else in the Department who attended the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not. I know that—I think Dr. Hornbeck might have attended it. Dr. Hornbeck was a trustee of the organization about that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean to be unduly repetitious, but you remember you were asked to try to scrape your memory on this one. Do you remember whether Mr. Alger Hiss was in attendance?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether Mr. James Penfield attended?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether Owen Lattimore was there?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether Mr. and/or Mrs. Steve Raushenbush was there?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall. I simply don't recall the occasion. I think I have testified that as far as being attending there, I would have considered it part of my job to keep up——

Mr. SOURWINE. You know the record shows you did attend?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You simply have no memory of having attended?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named consul at Geneva February 1, 1939?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Messrs. Service, Ludden, Davies, and Emmerson were at that time? Was Mr. Service at Shanghai?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I do not recall. If you want me to refer to this, or if you have already done that I will take your word.

Mr. SOURWINE. My notes here indicated that Mr. Service was at Shanghai, Mr. Ludden was at Peping, Mr. Davies was at Hankow, and Mr. Emmerson was at Osaki, first at Taiheku temporarily and then at Osaki, Japan.

Mr. VINCENT. If you have referred to this I don't think I should take the committee's time——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have connections with any of those gentlemen at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you notify any of them when you were leaving for Geneva——

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And give them your new address?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that it would have been in the Gazette, but I may have. I certainly would not have notified Emmerson because I don't know him. I don't think I knew Ludden, so I wouldn't have notified him. I don't think at that time I knew Service so I hardly would have notified him. I had met Davies, according to my recollection, at that time, but it is highly improbable I would have taken the trouble to notify him I was going to Geneva.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named Foreign Service officer class 4 November 16, 1939, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't find that one. I will take your word for it. I don't see why we should take the time for it. I was named class 4 at some time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Class 4. Do you remember going——

Mr. VINCENT. Class 4; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember going to Geneva in the spring of 1940?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you get back?

Mr. VINCENT. Get back where?

Mr. SOURWINE. From Geneva.

Mr. VINCENT. I think I got back from Geneva in the latter part of November 1940, yes, 1940.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't go over for just a short trip and then come right back and go over again?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What time did you leave to go over there, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I took a sailing in May.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had left the country by the 1st of June?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I was already in Switzerland by the 1st of June.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you got back did you get in touch with Mr. Owen Lattimore immediately after you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of getting in touch with Mr. Lattimore when I got back. I may testify there that our relations were not one where I would have felt it incumbent upon me to get in touch with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. How soon after you got back was the first time that you saw Mr. Lattimore?

I will rephrase the question. It is not very well stated. How soon after you got back did you see Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection, I would say, of seeing him at all. I came here to Washington for I think a week or 10 days' consultation. I went from here to Chicago and spent Christmas with my wife and family. I went from there out to the west coast to spend time with my brother-in-law, Admiral Smith, and sailed for Shanghai in January some time, or maybe early February.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in Washington did you speak to Mr. Lattimore by telephone?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any recollection of speaking to Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection of speaking with him in person during that period?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were away did you write to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of corresponding with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. After you got back did you write to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall writing to Mr. Lattimore; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you receive any letters from him?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in the habit of keeping in touch with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at that time; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Lattimore should feel that you would get in touch with him as soon as you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. Not unless at that time he was being considered by the President, which eventually came through, for appointment as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and that may be the reason that he may have seen me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you identify that as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph from this letter and ask that the whole letter be made a part of the record at this point.

Senator JENNER. It may go in.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 378" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 378

Cable: Pacaf, Baltimore Telephone: UNiversity 0100, Ext. 43

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

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JUNE 7, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

DEAR CARTER: I have now looked up the book on "The Geology of China" by J. S. Lee. It turns out to be a textbook, and as such is hardly suitable for review in Pacific Affairs, crowded as we are. Nor do I think you really need it for the International Secretariat library, unless for the rather artificial point of having such a book by a Chinese author. You already have Cressey's "Geographic Foundations," which will give you all the references that you could get from the book by Lee.

I have not yet been able to read Buell's "Isolated America," and hardly think that I am the one to do the suggested review. There are a number of other books, on subjects that I know more about, which I ought to review first, and Pacific Affairs ought not to be overloaded with my reviews. On the other hand, I should think that you yourself are just the man who ought to review this book. You have the particular link with the Far East, and you have a broader outlook than most of us who have specialized on the Far East, through constantly being in touch with international organizations.

I am sorry that Gauss would not take on the review of "Inner Asian Frontiers of China." I am pretty sure that John Carter Vincent is not back from Geneva, or we should have heard. Moreover, as a member of the State Department, he would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book.

The trouble is that the best of the "specialists" available in America—Wittfogel, Wang Yu-Chaun, Feng Chia-sheng, Bishop, Creel—have all been so heavily quoted and directly acknowledged that they can hardly review the book in a publication which is edited by the author of the book. That is why Gauss would have been good, if he had not been so confoundedly modest. He is a man of great general knowledge, and an acute comparative knowledge of theory.

Do you know what I think would be an excellent idea, if you could persuade him to do it? Get Field to write the review. It's a little bit in the family, of course, but Field has the qualifications. He is not himself a specialist on ancient history, of course, but why should he be? There are other things in the book. And Field is interested in, and knows a lot about, theories of historical origins, the interaction of society and environment, and so on.

I'll also scratch the part of my head where the bald spot is rapidly spreading, and let you know if I can excavate by this method any further bright ideas, if Field should prove to be obstinate.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] Owen Lattimore
OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a letter on the lettehead of Pacific Affairs. It is dated at 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., June 7, 1940, and is addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations. The third paragraph reads as follows:

> I am sorry that Gauss would not take on the review of Inner Asian Frontiers of China. I am pretty sure that John Carter Vincent is not back from Geneva or we should have heard. Moreover, as a member of the State Department, he would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book.

Would you say, Mr. Vincent, that Mr. Lattimore's apparent expectation that you would get in touch with him as soon as you got back from Geneva was completely unfounded?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were friends, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. We were friends, but as I say at that time not, or we never have been close friends. At that time I would not have looked up Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think this might indicate that he was keeping tabs on where you were and was going to look you up as soon as you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly draw that inference from the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he in fact look you up when you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said, I do not recall seeing Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Lattimore meant when he said here, "as a member of the State Department, he," referring to you, sir, "would probably have to pussyfoot in commenting on political parts of the book," referring by "book" to "Inner Asian Frontiers of China"?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not. I don't know what was in his mind that I would have to pussyfoot in commenting or what his idea was for me to review his book. I never reviewed the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that his book?

Mr. VINCENT. Inner Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never did review the book. Were you ever asked to review it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever being asked to review it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in a position at that time, that is, in 1940, where you could have written a completely frank review about a book no matter what your views on it were for publication?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean for publication?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would have to refer to the State Department, and I myself would naturally have not wanted to appear in public press in reviewing a book about the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anything you had written in the way of a review of a book would have had to accord with State Department policy or at least not be violently at odds therewith; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but I would say according to personal policy and other things I wouldn't have gone into the business of publicly reviewing books.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read the book Inner Asian Frontiers of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named consul at Shanghai August 10, 1940?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. You ought to correct your records there. I left very much later.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to find out approximately when you got to Shanghai.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't leave Geneva, for instance, until November, although this shows I was appointed consul in Shanghai. I came home and, as I said, did not leave the United States for Shanghai until the latter part of January or early February, and more likely February. Then I would have arrived in Shanghai late in February or early March.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of 1941?

Mr. VINCENT. Of 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remained at Shanghai until you were appointed first secretary at Nanking in June; is that right, temporarily?

Mr. VINCENT. No. That is purely a technicality there. Nanking was occupied by the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never changed your duty station?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I stayed in Shanghai but the appointment to Nanking, may I explain there just for your record, the appointment to Nanking was a technicality because theoretically the Chinese Government was still supposed to be at Nanking, but when you were appointed to Nanking you went to Chungking where the government was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you leave Shanghai and go to Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I left Shanghai and went to Chungking, my recollection is, in May, but this doesn't show it here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Stewart Service in China at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to turn to this. Whether John Service was in Shanghai during those few months I was there I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't he third secretary at Nanking prior to about April, and named vice consul at Shanghai in April?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this, sir. My first distinct recollection of Service is when he was in Chungking at the same time I was counselor there with Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember having met him earlier at Shanghai?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall exactly but I think he was in Shanghai at that time and I would have met him if he was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Mr. Raymond Paul Ludden was at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I can look it up for you, sir, but I don't recall. Do you want me to look it up?

Mr. SOURWINE. The note I have here is that he was vice consul at Canton. Would you have had contact with him if he was there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have never visited Canton in my life.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know from memory where Mr. John Paton Davies was at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he was still at Hankow, as seems to be indicated, would you have had contact with him there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named first secretary at technically Nanking but actually Chungking June 3, 1941?

Mr. VINCENT. That must be the date; yes. Then I would like to correct that testimony. I wasn't named until June. I probably didn't leave Shanghai until June.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that about the time you first met Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I didn't meet Lauchlin Currie there. He came up later to Chungking. I didn't meet him in Shanghai. I have testified that I first met Mr. Currie up in New Hampshire when he had a little farm there and we had been loaned a little house at Hancock by Mr. Grew. That was 1936 or 1937. I have testified to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see him in Chungking in 1941 or 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't see him in 1941, as I recollect, but did see him in 1942. I think the 1941 visit was made prior to my arrival in Chungking but I couldn't testify exactly to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know him in Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew him fairly well in Chunking. He was there. I had met him before. I saw him from time to time. I think I have testified before that I was not taken with him on conferences because he stayed with the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were given leave to handle work in the office of the Director of the Foreign Economic Administration did Mr. Currie have anything to do with that assignment?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. He asked me to come over there for a while.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was then in what position?

Mr. VINCENT. He was Deputy Director of the FEA, Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. You covered here the question, either in the executive session or here today, the question of your social intercourse with Mr. Currie and of consulting him on matters of policy and so forth?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated, I believe, that you had visited him on a number of occasions, both at his office and at his home; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I saw him from time to time, not frequently but from time to time socially when we were in the FEA. I saw him from time to time during the short period I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember if you went to see Mr. Currie soon after your return from Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say from memory whether I saw him soon after I came back from Chungking or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you receive an invitation from him to come see him shortly after you got back from Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I have used the phrase before: it would have been logical that I would have seen him but I have no recollection of meeting him at that time. As I testified before he was a White House man who was handling China affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was Mr. Lattimore at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. This would be now in 1943, I gather.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in 1941–42, wasn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. He left China sometime in 1942. It may have been early 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. And became Deputy Director of OWI in early 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't the exact information on that. He became the Deputy Director sometime.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was then in charge of Pacific operations for OWI?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether it was late 1942 or early 1943 I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any contact with him while he was in that job?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that contact——

Mr. VINCENT. Not frequently, but I would see him from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a telephone contact with him from time to time?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of it, but it would be logical that I would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. And correspondence passed between you?

Mr. VINCENT. Correspondence of an official nature. I don't recall any personal.

Mr. SOURWINE. Solely official?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know. There may have been correspondence. I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that in November 1941 Mr. Lattimore had sent a message to Lauchlin Currie at the White House indicating a violent adverse reaction by Chiang Kai-shek to the proposed modus vivendi for Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you read that again, because I want to be sure of this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me start over again. Do you know what I refer to when I speak of a proposed modus vivendi for Japan, circa 1941?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I think I do, but I know it from——

Mr. SOUREWINE. You know what I am referring to?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I do; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that in November 1941 Mr. Lattimore had sent a message to Lauchlin Currie at the White House indicating a violent adverse reaction by Chiang Kai-shek to that proposed modus vivendi for Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know he had sent one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Lattimore had urged that the President be told about Chiang's adverse reaction?

(Senator Ferguson took the chair.)

Mr. VINCENT. If we are speaking of that situation I don't know that it had to be urged. The answer to that is that I do not recall. But Mr. Gauss and I informed the White House, the State Department, of the very strong adverse reaction to the modus vivendi on the part of either Chiang Kai-shek or the foreign secretary at that time, Quotai Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time that Mr. Lattimore had sent or intended to send such a message?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss it with him at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing it with Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you say that you and Ambassador Gauss had sent such a message, will you tell us what was the proposed modus vivendi and why it was opposed by Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact memory on that modus vivendi, and I would have to go back into documents to see, but I can tell you why Chiang Kai-shek, I can tell you enough to know why Chiang Kai-shek had a violent reaction to it, because this proposed modus vivendi, which I don't know whether it ever was a proposal, had something to do with advising the Chinese and the Japanese to give up their war status; it had something to do with our calling off the oil embargo on Japan, provided Japan would agree not to move any farther south in French Indochina and eventually get out of French Indochina.

As I say, without being able to refer to that specific modus vivendi, I know that his reaction was violent and that Mr. Gauss reported it. I say Mr. Gauss and I because I was present when the Generalissimo or the Foreign Secretary—I forget which—had this. It was brought to their attention not by Mr. Gauss and myself, mind you. It was brought to their attention by their own Ambassador here in Washington, and one or the other of them called Mr. Gauss and me in to give their violent reaction to this proposed modus vivendi.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did inform the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. We did inform the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What if anything do you know about the origin of that proposed modus vivendi?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid that I don't know anything about the origin of the proposed modus vivendi. It came out, I believe, of talks that Mr. Hull was having with Nomura at the time, but from here I am speaking from memory. I was in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named Foreign Service officer, class 3, February 1, 1942.

Mr. VINCENT. I assume that you are correct because you copied it from out of here. Class 3, February 1, 1942; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And consul of Embassy, actually at Chungking, March 17, 1942.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Stewart Service was third secretary at Chungking from about July 1942. Did you know him there?

Mr. VINCENT. I did know him there, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond Paul Ludden was second secretary at Chungking from about July 31, 1942, and later division consul at Kunming October 1942. Did you know him there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. John Patton Davies was consular officer at Kunming, for duty as second secretary, temporarily, at Kunming, beginning at the end of April 1942. Did you know him there?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met John K. Emmerson?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not believe I had yet met Emmerson, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named Counselor of Embassy at Chungking July 1, 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought we read that first. That is changing the order to Chungking, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify for the committee Chou En-lai and Lin Pao?

Mr. VINCENT. Chou En-laid is the present member and Foreign Secretary of the Kuomintang regime in China. He was the representative of the Communist group in Yenan stationed at Chungking. It was a position of, I suppose, liaison character. I never knew how it was described, but he was there in a capacity recognized by the Chinese Government. As I have testified before, I met him at Chiang Kai-shek's. I am describing their character. Lin Pao to the best of my recollection was a general who came to Chungking in the fall, I believe, of 1942 to discuss with Chiang Kai-shek the possibilities of settling their differences and having a better coordinated military campaign against the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet those gentlemen?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have testified in executive session, yes, I have met En-lai when he paid a courtesy call on Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador. As I say, I met him at a reception at Chiang Kai-shek's. I had a lunch with him and the head of the British-American Tobacco Co. at Nanking. I testified also that I met him somewhere at some time at a Chinese residence.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you keep your voice up a little.

Mr. VINCENT. Excuse me, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically, did you testify concerning whether you ever met them together and had a conference with them together?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not specifically testify to that because I had no recollection of meeting the two of them together.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify as to whether you and Mr. John Stewart Service together had a conversation with Chou En-lai and Lin Pao in November 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not testify that I recalled such a meeting. I notice now that Mr. Service has himself, in a memorandum which he wrote, said that he and I did meet them, under what circumstances I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked to check up on that, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I saw it on the page that you mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you refreshed your memory in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid after even reading the memorandum here, I don't recall the circumstances of that meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of that meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of that meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. The paragraph you are talking about appears on page 792, part 3, exhibit No. 249 of the hearings of this committee. Mr. John Stewart Service in that report stated:

> The Communists themselves (Chou En-lai and Lin Pao in a conversation with John Carter Vincent and the undersigned about November 20, 1942) consider that foreign influence (obviously American) with the Kuomintang is the only force that may be able to improve the situation. They admit the difficulty of successful foreign suggestions regarding China's internal affairs no matter how tactfully made. But they believe that the reflection of a better informed foreign opinion, official and public, would have some effect on the more far-sighted elements of leadership in the Kuomintang, such as the Generalissimo.
>
> The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem—

and so on.

Are you sure you have no memory of any such meeting at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't have. As I say, that meeting, which I gather here he reported on 2 months later, I just don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you two had had a meeting like that it would have been in line with your official duty, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. And there would have been an obligation to report upon it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have searched through the files of the State Department and can't find that I ever reported on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would there have been an obligation on you to report on it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, there wouldn't have been an obligation to report on it if I did not consider it of sufficient importance to report on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it took place as Mr. Service had described it, it would have been of sufficient importance to report on, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have seemed to me to be, but I cannot find any report I made on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that event would it have been your duty to report or would the joint duty of yourself and Mr. Service have been discharged by his report?

Mr. VINCENT. The joint duty would have been discharged by Mr. Service's reporting on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether you knew about it or not?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have had to report on it, and at that time—here you have to get into the matter of assignments again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Whether or not he was at that time, and I think he had become, adviser to Stilwell or not, I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he was adviser to Stilwell and was making his report to Stilwell that wouldn't have discharged your duty of reporting, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have made a copy of the report to Stilwell, presumably, available to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would he have made a copy available to you?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you knew that he was reporting it to Stilwell and a copy to the State Department you would have had no obligation to report, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have had no obligation to report, but as I say, whether he reported through the Embassy or whether he reported through Stilwell, I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have read this account. Do you have any opinion as to whether it happened as Mr. Service reported it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not have, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doesn't the mere fact that Mr. Service reported it at least lead you to the prima facie supposition that it happened?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly does. You asked me whether I had a memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do have an opinion whether it happened?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have an opinion, but I don't recall the instance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it happened as Mr. Service reported?

Mr. VINCENT. I am inclined to think it did happen as Mr. Service reported it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no reason to doubt Mr. Service's accuracy or veracity?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I would say one thing on the question of my recollection of it, that Mr. Lin Pao or Gen. Lin Pao spoke only Chinese and Mr. Service spoke Chinese well, whether the conversation which I say is one that I cannot recall whether it was in Chinese which I did not myself understand well. I just give that as a circumstance in this meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading further from this report:

> The Communists suggest several approaches to the problem. One would be the emphasizing in our dealings with the Chinese Government, and in our propaganda to China, of the political nature of the world conflict; democracy against fascism. This would include constant reiteration of the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China. It should imply to the Kuomintang our knowledge of and concern over the situation in China.

Was that suggestion carried out in American policy?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was American policy such as to be in accordance with the expression contained in that suggestion, whether wittingly or otherwise?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say it was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, wasn't there a great deal of stressing by the State Department of the "political nature of the world conflict," and a good deal of reiteration, almost constant reiteration, of the American hope of "seeing the development of genuine democracy in China"?

Mr. VINCENT. Of genuine democracy in China, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there was, as a matter of American policy, precisely what the Communists here suggested as one of their approaches, was there not?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me read again [referring to document]. Well, yes. When you say that you get on to the matter of democracy in China——

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't want to get on to the question of democracy in China, please. I only want to get on to the question of what the State Department was stressing in its propaganda.

Mr. VINCENT. Let's take first the word "propaganda." The State Department, I don't think, had any propaganda at that time, but if you are speaking of what was the policy which Mr. Gauss and I were supposed to carry out, it was to try to get the Communists and Kuomintang to settle their differences so they would both fight the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't believe there will be any difference here if we will get our words together so they mean the same thing. I mean no evil inference when I use the word "propaganda." I mean propaganda as an expression of opinion which it is desired that others shall hear and react to. In that regard the State Department engages in propaganda every day, isn't that true? On the basis of that kind of definition.

Mr. VINCENT. On that definition.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the basis of that kind of definition of propaganda what Mr. Service says Chou En-lai and Lin Pao were suggesting here was actually a particular type of propaganda, was it not? They were suggesting that the State Department reiterate the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether they meant by democracy what we mean, or whether they meant by democracy what the State Department would mean, or what Soviet Russia would mean, is not the question. They were asking for a specific phrase to become a part of State Department propaganda, were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. According to this, they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. That phrase did become a part of the State Department propaganda, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I again object to the word "propaganda."

Mr. SOURWINE. We have defined "propaganda" in a manner acceptable to both of us, and I use it in that sense.

Mr. VINCENT. It was the policy of the Embassy to try to bring about as much as we could an improvement in the Chinese Government. Whether we were stressing at that time democracy I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department at Washington did reiterate on numerous occasions the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China; didn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wrote memoranda with that phrase or substantially that phrase in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. For signature by the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those memoranda were so signed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Others in the State Department used the same phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. Genuine democracy in China; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. An expression, a reiteration of the American hope of seeing the development of genuine democracy in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to pin this down to a particular period of 1942, and I do not know that it was being reiterated at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was being done all the way through; it was still being done in 1945 and 1946; wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very strongly in 1945 and 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. By which time you had a strong hand in the matter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it conceivable to you that that phrase may have had in China the impact which the Communists, Lin Pao and Chou En-lai, desired, whatever it may have meant to the people who heard it used back home?

Mr. VINCENT. The impact that Chou En-lai and Lin Pao desired?

Mr. SOURWINE. I will simplify that question.

Mr. VINCENT. I wish you would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Obviously if Lin and Chou desired that this particular phrase be reiterated by the State Department, they had a reason for that; didn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That reason must have been the impact that they felt it would have in China; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. They felt that the use of that phrase by the State Department would have an impact in China which would be helpful to them; isn't that right?

Mr. VINCENT. To broaden the Government——

Mr. SOURWINE. Can't you conceive that when the phrase was used by the State Department it did have an impact in China?

Mr. VINCENT. It never had much impact in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your opinion? When the State Department used that phrase and reiterated it they were not at any time careful to include a parenthetical statement, "We do not mean by this phrase what Lin Pao and Chou En-lai might like to think we mean," did they?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. They simply used the phrase and let it go out over the wires.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What kind of an impact do you think that had in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I have just said it had very little impact at this particular period because the Chinese Government did not bring it about.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a criticism of the then government.

Mr. VINCENT. It was what we considered a constructive criticism of the then existing Kuomintang government, which was a one-party government.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say it had no impact at what time? You mean in 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. 1942 up to the time I left it had produced no results that I knew of.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had no impact in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. It had an impact in 1945, bringing about the Marshall mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had an impact in 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1946 it didn't have any results.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had had its result by that time, had it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It didn't even have a result by that time because even then it didn't result in anything other than a falling out among the various parties, but it did eventually bring about a constitutional regime.

Mr. SOURWINE. Its impact had certainly been felt by 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next paragraph [reading]:

> Another suggestion is some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist Army as a participant in the war against fascism. The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army. The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.

Let's take the first sentence of that:

> some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist Army as a participant in the war against fascism.

Did you ever advocate that?

Mr. VINCENT. I never did advocate participation of the Chinese Communist Army in the war with Japan other than that what they were doing, except as all of us wished that the Kuomintang and the

Communists could bring about some kind of coordinated military effort. In that context, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, ever advocate some sort of recognition of the Chinese Communist army as participant in the war against Fascists?

Mr. VINCENT. Some kind, we certainly did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course you did.

Mr. VINCENT. We advocated that Chinese Communist army be brought into some kind of coordinated position with the Kuomintang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, and that was the State Department position, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's take the second sentence:

The United States might intervene to the end that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued and support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army.

Did the United States ever intervene to that end?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that we ever intervened to that end.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the United States ever ask that the Kuomintang blockade be discontinued?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the United States ever ask that support be given by the Central Government to the Eighteenth Group Army?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall its ever taking that up with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any expressions by the State Department, official or semiofficial, in favor of that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall now; yes, they were in favor, as I have said before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly.

Mr. VINCENT. They were in favor of these people settling their differences and fighting on a united front against the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. They did express themselves in favor of that. Certainly they did.

Mr. VINCENT. I am confining that now to their intervening with Chiang Kai-shek to get him to do it. I don't recall any official intervention on the part of Mr. Gauss to get them to do it.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. The next sentence:

The Communists hope this might include a specification that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China.

Did you ever recommend anything along that line?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have already testified, sir, that I don't recall ever recommending that they get a proportionate share. May I clarify that. To what extent Chiang Kai-shek would have given them their proportionate share had they settled their differences and had they fought under one command, I don't know, but I never recommended that they get an independent——

Mr. SOURWINE. You concurred in Mr. Wallace's recommendation in that regard, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. We discussed that in executive session.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you to read Mr. Wallace's testimony, you remember.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't find anything in Mr. Wallace's testimony about his saying that they were getting a proportionate share. Is it in the testimony there? I glanced through it hurriedly but I don't recall it. You recall at the meeting here you said it was in his telegram from Kuomintang and I couldn't find it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it still your statement, having read that, and having read Mr. Wallace's testimony, that in your opinion there was nothing in there which involved giving a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China to the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. After we talked about that in the testimony, I say that I glanced through it hurriedly and I left here and I did not see anything in there where he said that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record speaks for itself; so I don't mean to argue with you about the record. I didn't want you to make a record of a statement in conflict or in apparent conflict with the record without having the chance to look at it. That is why I asked you the other day to look at the record.

Mr. VINCENT. I glanced through it—I won't say I read the whole thing—and did not find any such statement.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

> Another way of making our interest in the situation known to the Kuomintang would be to send American representatives to visit the Communist area.

Was that ever proposed or urged by anybody?

Mr. VINCENT. That was proposed and urged by the Vice President at the request of the President when Mr. Wallace made his mission during 1944. That was the first I heard of it. The American Army authorities were the ones who were anxious that they get some kind of observer group up there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can't say for sure that that was the first you ever heard of it, can you, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say for sure, but I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have admitted that probably you heard it first from Chou En-lai and Lin Pao in 1942 as reported by Mr. Service.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but I don't think that Mr. Service—is he now still saying that this is what?

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't know what Mr. Service is saying now, but this is his report of January 23, 1943, to what occurred in 1942, and you have stated you think it probably did occur that way.

Mr. VINCENT. You have said that Mr. Chou En-lai and Lin Pao suggested that, but the next sentence says, "I have not heard this sponsored by the Communists themselves." I am not here now trying to dispute the testimony, but it seems to me that Mr. Service is implying that this is something he was suggesting.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that is entirely his suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so from a reading of the context of this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a suggestion in which you concurred?

Mr. VINCENT. I later concurred in it, but as I say I had no recollection of this memorandum here, but the sending of a military mission to Yenan to find out what conditions were was in people's minds from time to time and I am not myself denying here that the suggestion may not have been made.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was strongly urged upon Chiang during Mr. Wallace's visit, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is quite right.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you yourself brought it up at least three times and shifted the conversation to that subject.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And were extremely anxious that he should make a decision to permit that mission to go, holding all other matters in abeyance.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I was no more anxious for it than the American Army was at the time, which wanted to get intelligence out of Yenan, the Communist area.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

I am through with that phase.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m. the committee was recessed until 9:30 a. m., Thursday, January 31, 1952.)

22848—52—pt. 6——21

INDEX

[NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.]

A

Page

Acheson, Dean 1702, 1715, 1717, 1720–1722, 1773, 1880, 1888, 1889, 1894, 1895, 1901, 1915, 1916, 1963
Adler, Solomon 1691–1695, 1753, 1778, 1916
Allen, James S. (Sol Auerbach) 1763
Allied Powers 1770, 1864, 1868, 1869, 1871
Alsop, Joseph 1809, 1814, 1815
Amerasia 1733, 1737, 1746, 1748, 1750, 1752–1754, 1780, 1781, 1827, 1841, 1843, 1903, 1921, 1924, 1927, 1929
American Bar Association 1706
American-China Policy Association 1855
American Council (IPR) 1831, 1832
American Delegation (IPR) 1730, 1761, 1798, 1832, 1833, 1844 1927
American Forces (China) 1809, 1813
American Friends of the Chinese People 1973
American Government 1688, 1720, 1724, 1728, 1741, 1742, 1751, 1752, 1754, 1823, 1855, 1865, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1951, 1959, 1963, 1992
American Red Cross 1846
Area Committee (SWNCC) 1732, 1733
Armed Forces (United States) ..... 1710, 1712, 1714, 1715, 1719, 1721, 1730, 1748, 1791, 1792, 1809, 1812, 1813, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1883, 1890, 1891, 1906, 1995.
Arnold & Co., Ltd 1967
Asiaticus (Hans Moeller) (Heinz Moeller) 1762, 1763, 1850
Atcheson, George 1701, 1702, 1788, 1817, 1818
Atlantic City UNRRA Conference 1733
Austern, Hilda (Bretholtz) 1763

B

Ballantine, Joseph W 1739, 1765, 1772, 1773, 1779, 1795, 1823, 1827, 1841, 1851, 1853, 1935, 1936
Ballard (Little) 1764
Baptist Church 1906
Barnes, Joseph 1694, 1695, 1916
Barnett, Robert W 1693, 1694, 1695, 1758, 1764, 1912
Benton, Senator William 1756
Berle, Adolf A., Jr 1901
Bethune, Norman 1696
Bishop 1982
Bisson, T. A 1696, 1697, 1760, 1801, 1902, 1916
Bisson, Mrs. T. A 1696
Blair Lee House 1842, 1843
Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) 1786, 1796, 1801
Bohlen, Charles 1851
Borton, Hugh 1839
Bretton Woods Conference 1758
British-American Tobacco Co 1701, 1702, 1703, 1788, 1789, 1988
British Foreign Office 1771
British Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1771, 1772
Browder, Earl 1687, 1697, 1764
Budenz, Louis 1687, 1688, 1689, 1699, 1700, 1778, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1914
Buell, Raymond Leslie 1982

Page
Bulgarian Government 1780
Bulletin (State Department) 1916
Bunce, Arthur C 1887, 1888
Byrnes, Secretary James 1709, 1710, 1713–1715, 1717–1720, 1851, 1852, 1859, 1860, 1872, 1888–1891, 1901, 1903, 1907, 1916, 1963

C

Cairo Declaration 1868
California University 1836
Carlson, Evans F 1697, 1764
Carnegie Institute 1736
Carter, Edward C 1760, 1763, 1799, 1803, 1832, 1887, 1916, 1934, 1982
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 1803, 1804, 1934, 1983
Carter, General 1721
Central Committee (Communist Party) 1690, 1973
Central Government (China) 1791, 1993
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 1780
Chamber of Commerce of Florida 1894
Changsha Consulate 1966, 1967
Chao-ting, Chi. (*See* Chi, Chao-ting.)
Chapin, Selden 1755
Chapman, Abraham 1764
Charter (United Nations) 1868
Chen, Han-seng 1697, 1762, 1763
Chennault, Gen. C. L 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815
Chi, Dr. Chao-ting 1698–1700, 1761–1763, 1850
Chi, Li Shao 1743
Chiang, John 1893
Chiang, K. P 1893
Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo ..... 1698, 1699, 1701, 1703, 1707–1709, 1711–1714, 1716–1718, 1724, 1725, 1727, 1738, 1757, 1762, 1779, 1787, 1788, 1791, 1806, 1809, 1811, 1812, 1816, 1821, 1825, 1831, 1892, 1907, 1917, 1955, 1960, 1962, 1963, 1986–1988, 1993, 1994.
Chiang Kai-shek, Madam 1816, 1818, 1963, 1985
Chia-sheng, Feng. (*See* Feng, Chia-sheng.)
China Aid Council 1747, 1803
China Among the Powers 1783, 1800
China-Burma Theater 1813
China Defense Supplies 1784
China Today 1973
Chinese Armies 1702, 1703, 1708, 1711, 1725, 1791, 1792, 1928, 1962, 1991, 1992, 1993
Chinese Central Government 1791, 1993
Chinese Civil War 1709, 1713, 1717, 1722, 1960
Chinese Communist Army 1702, 1703, 1741, 1792, 1928, 1992, 1993
Chinese Communist Government 1708, 1722, 1771, 1787, 1791, 1793, 1907, 1911, 1955
Chinese Communist Premier 1700
Chinese Currency Stabilization Loan 1691
Chinese Embassy (Washington) 1716
Chinese Legation (Bern Switzerland) 1770, 1771
Chinese Nationalist Army 1711, 1725, 1962
Chinese Nationalist Government ..... 1688, 1711, 1714, 1717, 1722–1725, 1727, 1735, 1770–1772, 1790–1792, 1812, 1823, 1858–1861, 1881, 1886, 1891–1893, 1905, 1916, 1954, 1955, 1960, 1961, 1975, 1984, 1988, 1990–1992.
Chinese Nationalist Mission (Bern, Switzerland) 1771
Chinese Peoples Republic 1771
Chinese Red Army 1957
Chinese Revolution 1954
Chinese-Russian Negotiations 1859, 1861
Chinese Stabilization Loan 1758
Chou, En-Lai 1700–1703, 1725, 1762, 1787–1791, 1907, 1916, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994
Chungking Embassy 1691, 1701, 1702, 1704, 1729, 1738, 1786, 1787, 1817, 1856, 1915, 1921, 1922, 1985, 7987
Chungking Government 1907

Page
Churchill, Winston ---- 1852
Chu, Teh ---- 1703, 1928
CIA: (*See* Central Intelligence Agency.)
Civil War (China) ---- 1709, 1713, 1717, 1722, 1960
Clayton, Will ---- 1884, 1918
Clubb, O. Edmund ---- 1703, 1704, 1705, 1706, 1764
Coe, Frank V ---- 1706, 1727
Cohen, Ben ---- 1880
Comintern (Communist Party) ---- 1690, 1957, 1974
Comintern (Sixth World Congress) ---- 1690
Commerce Department ---- 1743, 1744
Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate) ---- 1913
Committee on Military Affairs (House) ---- 1686, 1915, 1916, 1917
Communist Chinese Army ---- 1702, 1703, 1791, 1792, 1928, 1992, 1993
Communist Government (China) ---- 1708, 1722, 1771, 1787, 1791, 1893, 1907, 1911, 1955
Communist International ---- 1690, 1957, 1959
Communist Left-wingers ---- 1734
Communist Manifesto ---- 1689
Communist Party ---- 1687–1690, 1692–1697, 1714, 1717–1725, 1728–1740, 1743–1748, 1752–1763, 1769–1772, 1778, 1782, 1783, 1788–1795, 1840, 1814–1818, 1823, 1833, 1837, 1838, 1846–1850, 1861–1866, 1878–1880, 1885, 1886, 1893, 1895, 1900–1911, 1916, 1927–1934, 1938, 1944–1949, 1952–1962, 1964, 1965, 1972–1979, 1988, 1990–1994.
Communist Party (Central Committee) ---- 1690, 1973
Communist Party (China) ---- 1700–1729, 1746, 1757, 1771, 1772, 1782–1783, 1788–1795, 1804, 1814–1818, 1823, 1850, 1885, 1886, 1893, 1895, 1907, 1911, 1916, 1927, 1928, 1948, 1954–1962, 1977, 1979, 1988, 1991–1994.
Communist Party (Comintern) ---- 1690, 1974
Communist Party (France) ---- 1714, 1961
Communist Party (Italy) ---- 1714, 1961
Communist Party (Japan) ---- 1861, 1866, 1879, 1895
Communist Party (Korea) ---- 1769, 1770
Communist Party (Russia) ---- 1708, 1748, 1895
Communist Party (Russian Chinese) ---- 1928
Communist Party (United States) ---- 1687–1689, 1694, 1706, 1730–1737, 1740, 1744, 1745, 1755–1762, 1778, 1837, 1846, 1880, 1900, 1903–1907, 1910, 1911, 1938, 1973.
Compass (New York) ---- 1914
Conference of Foreign Ministers (Paris, 1951) ---- 1761
Congress (United States) ---- 1905, 1907
Congressional Record ---- 1905
Consulate (Darien) ---- 1696
Cooke, Admiral Charles Maynard ---- 1688, 1700, 1905
Cornell University ---- 1686, 1891, 1916, 1917
Cosmos Club ---- 1695, 1747, 1761, 1762, 1802, 1906
Crane Foundation ---- 1738
Creel ---- 1982
Cressey, George B ---- 1982
Crowley, Mr ---- 1706, 1796, 1936
Culbertson, Mr ---- 1972
Currie, Lauchlin ---- 1727, 1728 1734, 1735, 1786, 1787, 1796, 1805, 1806, 1811, 1916, 1936, 1985, 1986
Currie, Mrs. Lauchlin ---- 1728, 1778

D

Daily Worker ---- 1914, 1972
Darien Embassy ---- 1696, 1969, 1970
Davies, John P ---- 1728, 1729, 1744 1758, 1759, 1912, 1916, 1928, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1980, 1984, 1987
Davis, Elmer ---- 1738
Davis, Ben ---- 1903
DeLacy, Hugh ---- 1916
Democratic Party ---- 1906
Dennett, Raymond ---- 1832, 1844

Page
Dennis, Eugene (*see also* Paul Walsh) 1729
Department of Maritime Provinces (Russia) 1824
Dilemma in Japan 1748
Dimitrov, Georgi 1957
Dooman, Eugene 1688, 1732, 1739, 1772–1774, 1779, 1829, 1830, 1842, 1863, 1864, 1866, 1867, 1872, 1873, 1905
Drumright, Mr. Everett Francis 1721
DuBois, Cora 1758, 1912
Duggan, Laurence 1729
Dulles, John Foster 1959
Dumbarton Oaks Conference 1736
Dunn, James C 1852, 1862

E

Eastern Publishing Co 1975
Eastland, James O 1862
Economic Commission for Japan 1895
Economic Cooperation Administrator 1706
Edwards, Mr 1881, 1882
Edwards' Report 1882
Eighteenth Group Army 1791, 1992, 1993
Eighth Route Army 1702, 1703
Emmerson, John K 1729, 1758, 1912, 1972, 1980, 1987
Emperor of Japan 1830, 1864, 1869, 1965
Employee Loyalty Investigations (State Department) 1774, 1776, 1777, 1913
Engels 1689
En-lai, Chou (*See* Chou, En-Lai.)
Epstein, Israel 1783
Exeter 1729

F

Fairbank, John K 1729, 1760, 1761, 1783, 1916, 1938, 1968, 1978
Fairbank, Wilma 1729, 1758, 1760, 1912
Far East Advisory Commission 1881
Far East Commission. (*See* State Department, FEC 230.)
Far East State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (FESWNCC) 1732, 1733, 1773, 1838, 1839, 1841, 1852, 1862, 1866, 1882, 1883
Farley, Miriam S 1729, 1730, 1901, 1902, 1916, 1938
Fascist Party 1993
FBI. (*See* Federal Bureau of Investigation.)
FEA. (*See* Foreign Economic Administration.)
FEC–230. (*See* State Department, FEC–230.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 1759, 1778, 1973
Federal Reserve Board 1727
Feng, Chia-sheng 1982
FESWNCC. (*See* Far East State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt 1730, 1778, 1779, 1849, 1916, 1926, 1933, 1934, 1982
Fisher, Mr. Adrian 1776, 1777
Florida Chamber of Commerce 1894
Ford, Anne 1764
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) 1706, 1728, 1743, 1779, 1786, 1787, 1795, 1796, 1936, 1937, 1985
Foreign Ministers Conference (Paris, 1951) 1761
Foreign Office (Britain) 1771
Foreign Office (Switzerland) 1771
Foreign Policy Association 1695, 1886
Foreign Policy Association Forum 1886
Foreign Service. (*See* United States Foreign Service.)
Forrestal, James 1872
Fortune 1846, 1847
Fo, Sun (Sun, Fo)
Foundations of Leninism 1690
Fourth Army 1927
Fox, Manuel 1691, 1692, 1698
French Government 1714

G

Page
Friedman, Julian R---- 1730, 1731, 1732, 1734, 1758, 1761, 1797, 1833, 1834, 1838, 1839, 1841, 1844, 1912, 1916.
Gauss, Clarence E---- 1698, 1701, 1703, 1734, 1749, 1750, 1788, 1789, 1825, 1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, 1921, 1922, 1928, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1993.
Gayn, Mark J---- 1733
Gazette---- 1980
General Staff (Japanese)---- 1869
Geology of China---- 1982
Georgetown University---- 1971, 1972
George Washington University---- 1747, 1761
Gibarti, Louis---- 1733
Gilman Hall (Johns Hopkins University)---- 1982, 1983
Ginsbourg, Mark. (*See* Mark J. Gayn.)
Glasser, Harold---- 1733
Goglidze, Sergei---- 1823, 1824, 1911
Gold, Mike---- 1972
Government of Bulgaria---- 1780
Government of Japan---- 1770, 1869, 1872
Government of Korea---- 1769, 1770, 1916
Government of Siam---- 1780
Government of Switzerland---- 1770, 1771
Government of the United States---- 1688, 1720, 1724, 1728, 1741, 1742, 1751, 1752, 1754, 1823, 1855, 1865, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1951, 1959, 1963, 1992
Grady, Henry---- 1845, 1846
Granich, Grace Maul---- 1734
Granich, Max---- 1734, 1735, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978
Granich, Mrs. Max (Grace Maul)---- 1972, 1973
Graves, Mortimer---- 1750, 1751, 1918
Greenberg, Michael---- 1734, 1735
Gregg, Joseph---- 1735, 1880
Grew, Joseph C---- 1728, 1739, 1768, 1772, 1779, 1793, 1795, 1823, 1827, 1832, 1841, 1845, 1853, 1859, 1860, 1935, 1985
Growth of the New Fourth Army (a report)---- 1927
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation---- 1969
Gung. (*See Kung.*)
Gussev---- 1881

H

Hague---- 1780
Hamilton, Maxwell---- 1978
Han-seng, Chen. (*See* Chen, Han-seng.)
Harvard University---- 1760
Harvard Yenching Institute---- 1969
Hazard, John---- 1805, 1811, 1828, 1837, 1916
Headquarters (Japanese Imperial General)---- 1869
Herald Tribune (New York)---- 1887, 1916
Hildring, Gen. John H---- 1744, 1745
Hiss, Alger---- 1735, 1736, 1737, 1750, 1758, 1901, 1912, 1916, 1979
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union---- 1690
Ho Chi Minh---- 1737
Hodge, Gen. John S---- 1769, 1770, 1879
Hodge Report---- 1879
Holland, William L---- 1802, 1938
Hornbeck, Dr. Stanley---- 1735, 1736, 1738, 1779, 1780, 1846, 1978, 1979
Hot Springs Conference (IPR)---- 1686, 1696, 1697, 1706, 1728, 1760, 1763, 1798, 1842, 1844, 1916, 1917
House Military Affairs Committee---- 1686, 1915, 1917
House of Representatives (United States)---- 1915, 1916
House Un-American Activities Committee---- 1705, 1901
Hull, Cordell---- 1715, 1795, 1799, 1811, 1812, 1821, 1823, 1825, 1826, 1829, 1830, 1907, 1987
Humelsine, Carlisle H---- 1917, 1949
Hurley, Gen. Patrick---- 1710, 1712, 1713, 1745, 1791, 1853, 1856, 1858, 1860, 1916

I

Page
Imperial General Headquarters (Japan) 1869
Imperial Household (Japan) 1872
Inner Asian Frontiers of China 1739, 1785, 1786, 1930, 1941, 1943, 1951, 1952, 1982, 1983, 1984
Institute of Pacific Relations 1686, 1696, 1706, 1728–1730, 1756, 1760–1763, 1783, 1785, 1797–1803, 1831–1834, 1842–1850, 1854–1856, 1887, 1906–1927, 1932–1939, 1979–1983
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 1831, 1832, 1887, 1888, 1938, 1979
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Delegation) 1730, 1761, 1798, 1832, 1833, 1844, 1927
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Headquarters) 1844
Institute of Pacific Relations (China Council) 1938
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference) 1686, 1696, 1697, 1706, 1728, 1760, 1761, 1763, 1798, 1842, 1844, 1916, 1017, 1927
Institute of Pacific Relations (New Delhi, India Conference) 1801
Institute of Pacific Relations (Secretariat) 1938
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington Office) 1761, 1923
Intelligence Group (United States Air Force) 1791, 1792
Interdepartmental Regional Committee 1801
International Assets Commission 1770, 1916
International Secretariat 1982
International (Communist) 1690, 1957, 1959
Isolated America 1982
Italian Government 1714

J

Jaffe, Philip 1737, 1754, 1916, 1924
Japan (United States Post Surrender Policy) 1862, 1863, 1868, 1905
Japanese Archives (Bern, Switzerland) 1770
Japanese Emperor 1830, 1869, 1964, 1965
Japanese General Staff 1869
Japanese Government 1770, 1869, 1872
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters 1869
Japanese Imperial Household 1872
Japanese Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1772
Japanese Oil Embargo 1987
Japanese Peace Treaty 1916
Japanese State Funds (Switzerland) 1770, 1772
Japanese State Property (Switzerland) 1771, 1772
Jessup, Philip C 1761, 1833, 1925, 1933, 1934
Johns Hopkins University 1738, 1766, 1982, 1983
Johnstone, Dr. William (Bill) 1747, 1748, 1761, 1762, 1802
Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States) 1864, 1872, 1891

K

Kennedy, Dr 1739, 1765, 1931, 1965
Koo-sek, Kim 1769, 1880
Korean Commission 1920
Korean Government 1769, 1770, 1916
Korean War 1959
Kremlin 1731
Kuffman, James Lee 1885
Kung, Dr. H. H 1698, 1699, 1725
Kung Group 1816
Kunming Embassy 1969, 1970, 1987
Kuomintang Blockade 1992, 1993
Kuomintang Government 1712, 1724, 1725, 1790, 1791, 1792, 1916, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994
Kyuichi, Tokuda. (*See* Tokuda, Kyuichi.)

L

Page
Lattimore, Owen ---- 1737, 1738, 1740–1744, 1747, 1764–1768, 1778, 1783, 1785, 1802, 1805, 1806, 1809–1811, 1815, 1820, 1824, 1825, 1828, 1838, 1847, 1849, 1855, 1911, 1916, 1925, 1926, 1929–1933, 1935–1937, 1940–1943, 1947, 1948, 1951–1954, 1958–1960, 1963–1971, 1978, 1980–1983, 1985–1987.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) ---- 1738, 1740, 1785
League of Nations ---- 1747
Lee, Duncan Chapin ---- 1743
Lee, J. S ---- 1982
Lee, Michael ---- 1743, 1744
Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder ---- 1689
Legation of Britain (Bern, Switzerland) ---- 1770, 1771
Legation of China (Bern, Switzerland) ---- 1770, 1771
Legation of Japan (Bern, Switzerland) ---- 1770, 1771
Legation of Russia (Bern, Switzerland) ---- 1770
Legation of United States (Bern, Switzerland) ---- 1692, 1770, 1771, 1772, 1916
Lenin, Vladimir I ---- 1689, 1690
Life ---- 1846, 1847
Lilienthal, Philip E ---- 1887
Lin, Piao ---- 1762, 1787, 1788, 1789, 1790, 1791, 1916, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994
Li, Shao Chi ---- 1743
Little (*See* Ballard).
Lockwood, William ---- 1802
London School of Economics ---- 1836
Loyalty Board ---- 1753, 1755, 1759, 1760, 1773, 1774, 1775, 1776, 1777, 1913, 1950
Loyalty Board Hearings ---- 1774, 1776, 1777, 1913
Luce, Henry ---- 1846, 1856
Luce Publications ---- 1846, 1856
Ludden, Raymond ---- 1744, 1758, 1764, 1914, 1916, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1980, 1984
Lytton Commission ---- 1749

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas ---- 1686, 1768, 1769, 1864, 1866, 1868, 1869, 1871, 1872, 1875, 1885, 1888, 1903, 1916, 1919, 1921
Mandel, William ---- 1745
Mao Tse-tung ---- 1708, 1745, 1761, 1927, 1928
Marshall Directive ---- 1716, 1718, 1719, 1724, 1725, 1880
Marshall, Gen. George C ---- 1708–1711, 1713–1725, 1769, 1845–1847, 1854, 1880, 1889, 1890, 1892, 1894, 1907, 1916, 1960–1962, 1992
Marshall Mission ---- 1708, 1709, 1710, 1716, 1719, 1889, 1960, 1992
Martin, Edwin M ---- 1918, 1919
Marx, Karl ---- 1689, 1741, 1952
Maul, Grace (Mrs. Max Granich) ---- 1972, 1973
McCarthy, Senator ---- 1905, 1906
McCoy, Gen. Frank ---- 1881
McJennett, John ---- 1895, 1896
Menefee, Selden ---- 1744, 1745
Mercer University ---- 1966
Metcalf ---- 1887, 1888
Metropolitan Club ---- 1728
Meyer, Paul ---- 1732
Meyers, Merrill ---- 1738
Military Affairs Committee (House) ---- 1686, 1915
Minh, Ho Chi. (*See* Ho, Chi Minh.)
Missouri (U. S. S.) ---- 1906
Mitchell, Kate ---- 1746
Mitsubishi ---- 1830, 1878
Mitsui ---- 1830, 1865
Moeller, Hans (Asiaticus) (Heinz Moeller) ---- 1762, 1763, 1850
Molotov ---- 1852
Mongol Peoples Republic ---- 1944, **1947**

Page
Moore, Harriet ---- 1938
Morgenthau, Secretary ---- 1758
Morris, Robert ---- 1687, 1688
Moscow Conference ---- 1881
Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries ---- 1729
Motylev, V. E ---- 1746
Murphy, Bob ---- 1744

N

Nanking Embassy ---- 1749, 1968, 1971, 1985
Nanking Government ---- 1975
Nation ---- 1841, 1867
National Board (Politburo) ---- 1687
National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) ---- 1744
National Foreign Trade Council ---- 1916, 1917
National Trade Council ---- 1795
NBC (National Broadcasting Co.) ---- 1744
Nationalist Chinese Army ---- 1711, 1725
Nationalist Chinese Government ---- 1688,
*1711–1714, 1717, 1722–1725, 1727, 1735, 1770–1772, 1790–1792, 1812, 1823, 1858–1861, 1881, 1886, 1891–1893, 1905, 1916, 1954, 1955, 1960, 1916, 1975, 1984, 1988, 1990–1992.
Nationalist Chinese Mission (Bern, Switzerland) ---- 1771
Naval Intelligence ---- 1688
Navy (United States) ---- 1748, 1809, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1906
Need of an American Policy Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party (a Report) ---- 1927
New Deal ---- 1735, 1741, 1742, 1760
New Dealer ---- 1734, 1735, 1741, 1742, 1760
New Delhi, India, Conference (IPR) ---- 1801
New Republic ---- 1841
New State Department Building ---- 1906
New York Compass ---- 1914
New York Herald Tribune ---- 1887, 1916
Nomura ---- 1987
Northern Shensi District Government (China) ---- 1702

O

Office of Economic Warfare (OEW) ---- 1796
Office of Emergency Management (OEM) ---- 1796
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) ---- 1693, 1760, 1792, 1802
Office of War Information (OWI) ---- 1704,
1738, 1760, 1765, 1796, 1805, 1849, 1926, 1942, 1986
Oil Embargo on Japan ---- 1987
Okano, Susumu ---- 1861
Old State Department Building ---- 1906
OSS. (*See* Office of Strategic Services.)
Oumansky, Constantine ---- 1746
OWI. (*See* Office of War Information.)
Outer Mongolia ---- 1740

P

Pacific Affairs ---- 1785, 1786, 1849, 1971, 1982, 1983
Party Organizer ---- 1973
Patterson, John M ---- 1855, 1894
Pauley, Ambassador Edwin ---- 1766, 1767, 1936, 1937
Pauley Mission ---- 1766, 1936, 1937
Pauley Report ---- 1767
Peace Treaty (Japan) ---- 1916
Pearl Harbor ---- 1711, 1865
Peking Medical Society Hospital ---- 1696
Penfield, Mr. James K ---- 1721, 1839, 1888, 1980
Pentagon Building ---- 1720, 1853, 1960
Peters, J ---- 1746
Peurifoy, John ---- 1905, 1908, 1916, 1917

Page

Piao, Gen. Lin. (*See* Lin Piao.)
Piwu, Tung. (*See* Tung, Pi-wu.)
PM ---- 1841
Politburo. (*See* National Board.)
Post Surrender Policy for Japan ---- 1854, 1862, 1863, 1868, 1905
Potsdam Conference ---- 1772, 1773, 1774, 1851, 1852, 1854, 1855, 1861, 1889, 1916
Premier (Communist China) ---- 1700
President and I (message) ---- 1828, 1829
Presidential Directive ---- 1685, 1777, 1917
Price, Harry B ---- 1784, 1916
Price, Mildred (Coy) ---- 1747, 1784
Problems of Leninism ---- 1690
Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution (third American edition) ---- 1690

R

Rajchman, Ludwig ---- 1747
Raushenbush, Steve ---- 1980
Raushenbush, Mrs. Steve ---- 1980
Red Army (China) ---- 1957
Red Cross ---- 1846
Red Star Over China ---- 1782, 1847
Register of State Department ---- 1704
Remer, C. F ---- 1802
Republican Party ---- 1906
Review Board ---- 1754
Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies (a resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern) ---- 1690
Rhee, Syngman ---- 1879
Rockefeller Foundation ---- 1696
Rogoff, Vladimir ---- 1747, 1748, 1778, 1801, 1802, 1916
Romm, Vladimir ---- 1748
Roosevelt, President ---- 1727, 1734, 1738, 1791, 1795, 1809, 1811, 1813, 1819, 1820, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1825, 1826, 1831, 1852, 1855, 1917, 1937, 1965, 1966, 1981, 1986, 1994.
Rosinger, Lawrence K ---- 1783, 1797, 1798, 1799, 1800, 1801, 1939
Roth, Andrew ---- 1748, 1833, 1843, 1844, 1853
Rowe, David ---- 1783, 1800
Rugh, Elizabeth ---- 1784
Russell, Donald ---- 1903
Russia ---- 1686, 1690, 1709, 1710, 1713, 1718, 1731, 1745, 1746, 1748, 1753, 1770, 1811, 1823, 1824, 1852, 1857–1859, 1861, 1880, 1881, 1895, 1901, 1906, 1908, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1927, 1944, 1945, 1947, 1952–1954, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1972, 1991.
Russian-Chinese Negotiations ---- 1859, 1861
Russian Legation (Bern, Switzerland) ---- 1770, 1772
Russian Revolution ---- 1953, 1954
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic ---- 1958
Rutgers Press ---- 1686

S

Salisbury, Laurence ---- 1749, 1758, 1780, 1785, 1914
Saturday Evening Post ---- 1781
Sayre, Francis B ---- 1735
SCAP ---- 1770, 1879, 1881, 1884
SCAP Directive ---- 1770
Secretariat ---- 1730, 1731, 1938, 1982
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ---- 1913
Service, John Stewart ---- 1721, 1749–51, 1753, 1754, 1758, 1759, 1781, 1788–1791, 1815, 1816, 1823, 1879, 1901–1903, 1912, 1913, 1916, 1920–1924, 1927, 1929, 1950, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1980, 1984, 1987, 1988–1990, 1994.
Shanghai Embassy ---- 1973, 1975, 1984
Shanghai Police ---- 1975

Page
Shensi Border Army ---- 1703
Shiga, Yoshio ---- 1879
Shi-shueh, Wang. (*See* Wang, Shi-shueh.)
Siam Government ---- 1780
Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity ---- 1906
Sino Soviet Treat ---- 1852, 1857, 1860, 1916
Sixth Route Army ---- 1702
Sixth World Congress (Comintern) ---- 1690
Slagel, Fred ---- 1806
Slagel, John ---- 1906
Smedley, Agnes ---- 1755, 1783, 1939
Smith, Rear Adm. Allan E ---- 1906, 1981
Smith, Richard ---- 1703
Smith, Senator ---- 1905
Smith, Willis ---- 1689
Snow, Edgar ---- 1781, 1783, 1847, 1968
Snow, Mrs. Edgar (Nym Wales) ---- 1783
Social Science Research Council ---- 1968
Solution in Asia ---- 1743, 1931
Soong, T. V ---- 1725, 1747, 1809, 1815, 1852, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1859, 1861
Sorge, Richard ---- 1755
Soviet Legation (Bern, Switzerland) ---- 1772
Soviet Union ---- 1686, 1690, 1790, 1710, 1713, 1718, 1731, 1745, 1746, 1748, 1753, 1770, 1811, 1823, 1824, 1852, 1857–1859, 1861, 1880, 1881, 1895, 1901, 1906, 1908, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1927, 1944, 1945, 1947, 1952–1954, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1972, 1991
Sprouse, Mr ---- 1892
Stabilization Board. (*See* United States Stabilization Board.)
Stachel, Jack ---- 1687, 1904
Stalin, Joseph ---- 1690, 1824, 1852, 1856, 1858
Standard Oil Co ---- 1974
Stanton, Mr ---- 1780, 1827, 1841, 1851, 1853
State and Revolution ---- 1689
State Department ---- 1684–1705, 1710–1733, 1736–1744, 1749–1761, 1766–1780, 1784–1787, 1790–1805, 1808, 1812, 1813, 1818, 1821–1827, 1829–1855, 1859–1862, 1866–1884, 1890–1896, 1901–1931, 1935–1951, 1957–1983, 1987–1993.
State Department (Administrative Division) ---- 1924
State Department (Bulletin) ---- 1916
State Department (China Desk) ---- 1947
State Department (China Division) ---- 1730, 1732, 1733, 1765, 1773, 1780, 1795, 1825, 1833, 1836, 1850, 1854, 1918, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1927, 1936.
State Department (Department of Public Liaison) ---- 1855
State Department (Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs) ---- 1918
State Department (Far East Desk) ---- 1718, 1719, 1846, 1850
State Department (Far Eastern Division) ---- 1693, 1720, 1730, 1757, 1765, 1766, 1768, 1769, 1773, 1797, 1848, 1888, 1889, 1892, 1918, 1925, 1935, 1936, 1959.
State Department (Far Eastern Office) ---- 1715, 1716, 1718, 1721, 1749, 1757, 1765, 1766, 1773, 1780, 1797, 1826, 1827, 1840, 1843, 1844, 1850, 1851, 1889, 1891, 1906, 1907, 1925, 1931, 1935, 1936, 1963.
State Department (FEC–230, Far East Commission) ---- 1881, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885
State Department (Foreign Office) ---- 1795, 1918
State Department (Japan Division) ---- 1839
State Department (Labor Division) ---- 1730, 1732, 1797, 1840
State Department (Legal Department) ---- 1699, 1974
State Department (Loyalty Appeal Board) ---- 1950
State Department (Loyalty Board) ---- 1753, 1755, 1759, 1760, 1773, 1774, 1775, 1776, 1950
State Department (Loyalty Board Hearings) ---- 1774, 1776, 1777, 1913
State Department (Office of Director General of Foreign Service) ---- 1749, 1755, 1884
State Department (Old and New Buildings) ---- 1906
State Department (Personnel Division) ---- 1902, 1903

Page
State Department (Policy Committee) 1854
State Department (Post Surrender Policy for Japan) 1854
State Department (Public Liaison Division) 1855
State Department (Register) 1704, 1797, 1969
State Department (Security Board) 1760
State Department (Security Office) 1760, 1843, 1906
State Department (Southeast Asian Office) 1749
State Department (White Paper) 1724, 1827
Statement of Policy Toward China 1714
State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 1732, 1733, 1773, 1838–1841, 1854, 1862–1864, 1866, 1867, 1872, 1881–1883
Stein, Gunther 1756
Stettinius 1823
Stewart, Maxwell 1927, 1937, 1939, 1977, 1978
Stilwell, General Joseph W 1728, 1749, 1792, 1813, 1814, 1815, 1816, 1823, 1826, 1916, 1917, 1921, 1922, 1924, 1989
Stimson, Secretary 1872
Stone, William T 1756, 1758, 1914
Strong, Anna Louise 1756, 1757, 1778, 1779
Sun Fo 1817, 1819, 1826
Sun Yat-sen 1816, 1817, 1818
Sun Yat-sen, Madam 1803, 1804, 1816, 1817, 1818, 1819, 1926
Supreme Court (United States) 1742
Surrey, Walter Sterling 1684, 1693, 1727, 1785, 1837, 1899
Susumu Okano. (*See* Okano, Susumo.)
Swing, Raymond Gram 1978
Swiss Foreign Office 1771
Swiss Government 1770, 1771
SWNCC. (*See* State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.) (SWINK)

T

Tangiers 1686
Tass News Agency 1747, 1748, 1802
Teh, Chu. (*See* Chu Teh.)
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 1742
Time 1846, 1847
Todd, Laurence 1757
Tokuda, Kyuichi 1879
Treasury Department (*see* United States Treasury) 1691
Tsarist Russia 1944, 1947
Tse-tung, Mao. (*See* Mao Tse-tung.)
Tsinan Embassy 1969
Truman, President 1685, 1710, 1717, 1720, 1777, 1855, 1862, 1863, 1868, 1872, 1894, 1917, 1949, 1950, 1951
Tung, Pi-wu 1757
TVA. (*See* Tennessee Valley Authority.)
Tydings Committee 1687, 1904

U

Un-American Activities Committee (House) 1705, 1901, 1973
United Nations 1731, 1757, 1864, 1868, 1870
United Nations (Charter) 1868
United Nations (Chinese Delegation, San Francisco Conference) 1757
United Nations Conference 1730, 1736, 1757
United Nations (Secretary General, San Francisco) 1736
United States Air Force (Intelligence Group) 1792, 1809
United States Armed Forces 1710, 1712, 1714, 1715, 1719, 1721, 1730, 1748 1791, 1792, 1809, 1812, 1813, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1883, 1890, 1891, 1906, 1995
United States Congress 1905, 1907
United States Consulate (Changsha) 1966, 1967
United States Department of Commerce 1743, 1744
United States Embassy (Chungking) 1691, 1701, 1702, 1704, 1729, 1738, 1786, 1787, 1817, 1856, 1915, 1921, 1922, 1985, 1987
United States Consulate (Dairen) 1696, 1969, 1970

Page
United States Consulate (Kunming) (same as Yunnanfu) 1969, 1970, 1971, 1897
United States Embassy (Nanking) 1749, 1968, 1971, 1985
United States Embassy (Shanghai) 1973, 1975, 1984
United States Consulate (Tsinan) 1969
United States Foreign Service 1684, 1688, 1705, 1731, 1734, 1744, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755, 1904, 1921, 1940, 1950, 1967, 1968, 1971, 1979, 1980, 1987
United States Foreign Service School 1967
United States Government 1688, 1720, 1724, 1728, 1741, 1742, 1751, 1752, 1754, 1823, 1855, 1865, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1951, 1959, 1963, 1992
United States House of Representatives 1915, 1916
United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan 1854, 1862, 1863, 1868
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 1864, 1872, 1891
United States Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1692, 1770, 1771, 1772, 1916
United States Naval Intelligence 1688
United States Navy 1748, 1809, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1906
United States Senate 1684, 1711, 1913, 1915, 1917
United States Stabilization Board 1698
United States Supreme Court 1742
United States Treasury 1691, 1692, 1693, 1733, 1758
University of California 1836
University of Yenching 1968
UNRRA 1733, 1772
UNRRA Conference (Atlantic City) 1733
UNRRA Conference (London) 1772
U. S. S. *Missouri* 1906
U. S. S. R. 1686, 1690, 1709, 1710, 1713, 1718, 1731, 1745, 1746, 1748, 1753, 1770, 1811, 1823, 1824, 1852, 1857–1859, 1861, 1880, 1881, 1895, 1901, 1906, 1908, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1927, 1944, 1945, 1947, 1952–1954, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1972, 1991

V

Vincent, John Carter 1684-1995
Voice of China 1735, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978

W

Wadleigh, Julian 1757
Wales, Nym. (*See* Mrs. Edgar Snow.)
Wallace, Henry A 1738, 1741 1743, 1792, 1794, 1795, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1812, 1813–1826, 1828, 1831, 1837, 1907, 1916, 1917, 1942, 1966, 1993, 1994
Wallace Mission 1738, 1794, 1804, 1805, 1806, 1810, 1813, 1814, 1819, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1824, 1825, 1826, 1828, 1907, 1917–42, 1966, 1994.
Wallace Mission (Goglidze Toast) 1824, 1825
Wallace Reports 1819, 1820, 1821, 1822, 1823
Walsh, Paul (*see also* Eugene Dennis) 1758
Wang, Shi-shueh 1856, 1857
Wang, Yu-chuan 1982
Ward, Francis Xavier 1978
War Department (United States) 1710, 1712, 1714, 1715, 1716, 1719, 1720, 1796, 1812, 1813, 1868, 1872, 1883, 1890, 1891
Wartime China 1977
Wartime Politics in China 1797, 1799, 1800, 1801
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert 1721, 1793, 1794, 1809, 1813, 1814, 1815, 1853, 1892, 1913, 1916, 1917
Welles, Sumner 1978
Wellesly College 1686
White Book 1807
White, Harry Dexter 1758
White House 1685, 1712, 1717, 1727, 1734, 1826, 1831, 1862, 1889, 1890, 1916, 1917, 1936, 1937, 1949, 1985, 1986.
White Paper. (*See* State Department.)
White, Theodore 1855, 1856

Page
Whitson, Roswell Hartsen ---- 1768
Willkie, Wendell ---- 1694
Wilson, Woodrow ---- 1906
Wittfogel, Karl August ---- 1982
Wu, Mr ---- 1772

Y

Yale University ---- 1739, 1931
Yalta Agreement ---- 1740, 1851, 1852, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1861, 1916
Yalta Conference ---- 1850, 1851, 1852, 1916
Yardumian, Miss Rose ---- 1844
Yat-sen, Sun. (*See* Sun, Yat-sen.)
Yat-sen, Madam Sun. (*See* Sun, Yat-sen.)
Yenan Government (Chinese Communist Government) ---- 1703, 1787
Yenching University ---- 1968
YMCA ---- 1967
Yoshio Shiga. (*See* Shiga, Yoshio.)
Yu-chuan, Wang. (*See* Wang, Yu-chuan.)
Yunnanfu Embassy. (*See* United States Consulate, Kunming.)

Z

Zaibatsu ---- 1830, 1865, 1873, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1877, 1878


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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

U.S. Congress Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 7

JANUARY 31, FEBRUARY 1 AND 2, 1952

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CONTENTS

	Page
Testimony of—	
Blenman, Commander William	2180
Stufflebeam, Robert E	2121
Vincent, John Carter	1997–2286
Appendix I:	
Correspondence from the President to the Vice President of September 22, 1951, and attachments thereto regarding former Vice President Henry A. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944	2286
Letter to Hon. John E. Peurifoy from John Carter Vincent, dated March 7, 1950	2294
State Department press release of January 6, 1947	2295
State Department press release of October 5, 1945	2296
Appendix II (printed as pt. 7A)	2305–2474

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 9:45 a. m., pursuant to recess, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran (chairman), Ferguson, Jenner, and Watkins.

Also Present: Senators Hayden, Knowland, and Welker; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND HOWARD REA, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, at the conclusion of the hearing yesterday we were up to the period of about December 1942.

Mr. VINCENT. You mean in reading over my—yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the extent that we were taking things chronologically we had about reached that point.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You may remember that during the afternoon session yesterday afternoon there was some questioning about your approval of a talk which was made by Mr. Service before the IPR or before a group of IPR people.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I remember that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Am I correct that it was your testimony that you remembered nothing about having authorized such a talk?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I had no recollection of that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, this is the State Department employee loyalty investigation hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate of the Eighty-first Congress, second session, part 2, appendix. On page 2234 appears the text of a document which was apparently entitled "Personal Statement of John S. Service—Part 2." I read this paragraph, Mr. Vincent, and ask if it refreshes your memory in that regard.

Shortly after my arrival—

and he is referring then to his return to the Department in April of 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record basis with the research staff of the IPR in New York. This invitation was in a brief letter addressed to me by Edward C. Carter. I discussed it with Mr. E. F. Stanton, Deputy and then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting. This meeting with the IPR took place on April 25. I believe that there were 10 or 12 people present. Practically all of them were writers, including T. A. Bisson, Laurence Rosinger, and a New Zealander named Belshaw. I did not give a prepared talk, and most of the time was spent in answering questions and in general discussion.

Did you know anything about that at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you Chief of the Division at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. I was Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs; yes, sir. What was the date of that?

Mr. SOURWINE. That was 1945, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. I mean the month.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been in April.

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten the exact date, but I left for San Francisco about the middle of April.

(Senator Ferguson took the chair.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there an earlier occasion on which you personally had approved Mr. Service's appearance before an IPR group?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said, sir, that I just don't recall any instance of that kind.

(Senator McCarran took the chair.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading from the same hearings, Mr. Chairman, from the transcript of proceedings before the State Department Loyalty Board, page 2051 of the hearings. This is Mr. Service talking:

The Washington branch of the IPR asked Mr. Vincent, who I believe was then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, if it would be possible for me to come over and give an informal off-the-record talk to some of their people in the Washington office. The first I knew of the matter was Mr. Vincent's telling me that he had received the invitation and had accepted and hoped it would be all right with me.

Question: In other words, your talk at the IPR was at the initiative of the IPR?

"Answer. That is right.

"Question. And authorized by the Department?

"Answer. That is correct, and it was quite a customary thing. We had a great many officers who did exactly the same when they came back from the field and had news, information of interest. I believe that Mr. Oliver Edmund Clubb had one of those meetings after he returned from Sinkiang. I know that Mr. Raymond P. Ludden was asked for and authorized to give a talk when he also returned from China in June, 1945, and I am sure that there are many other instances of Foreign Service officers being authorized by the Department to meet the research staff of the IPR in these off-the-record background sessions."

What would be your comments on that Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, Mr. Service apparently refreshed his memory. I don't recall these people going regularly over to the IPR. What Mr. Service says there is no doubt correct, that the people did talk to the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any doubt now, having heard this, that you did receive a request from the IPR with regard to Mr. Service and passed it on to him and told him it was all right to go?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no doubt that Service was testifying correctly.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that answer, please?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I originally said I had no recollection of this incident, but the question there is whether or not now, having heard this, I still have no recollection of that specific incident, but I am not doubting the fact that it occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. My understanding is that the question primarily was whether you had engaged in the discussion, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you have no doubt that you did?

Mr. VINCENT. According to that testimony now, I have no doubt that that incident occurred because Service remembers it better than I have.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to get your testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. On December 15, 1942, sir, you were——

Mr. VINCENT. Excuse me. Would you repeat that?

Mr. SOURWINE. On December 15, 1942, you were named counselor to the Department of State?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no such title.

Mr. SOURWINE. Counselor of Embassy, perhaps?

Mr. VINCENT. Counselor of Embassy in Chungking in 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what it was?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; if that was the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you back in the United States in 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you not know Jack Stachel?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who he is?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that?

Mr. VINCENT. From reading the hearings of this committee. I don't know his precise work even now from memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. All you know about him is what you have read in the hearings of this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you ever ate lunch in the Tally-Ho Restaurant in Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember eating there, but I could have eaten there. I don't remember any instance of eating there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having lunch there one day in April of 1943 with Mr. John Stewart Service and one or two other persons?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that instance. I have heard it referred to, but I still don't recall it. I may say there that I ate lunch every day with various and sundry people and I don't recall that luncheon that has been referred to here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did have lunch on at least one occasion in there with Mr. Service, did you say?

Mr. VINCENT. I mean I might have had lunch. I do not recall eating in the Tally-Ho with Mr. Service. I might have eaten elsewhere with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of any time when you did?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that particular one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether on the occasion referred to in April of 1943 or on any other occasion about that time you discussed with Mr. Service and one or two others ways and means of getting rid of Ambassador Hurley as Ambassador to China?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have any recollection of discussing getting rid of Ambassador Hurley at that time. As a matter of fact, I think, sir, that you will have to correct the date there because you said 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. Ambassador Hurley was not made Ambassador until the fall of 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be a good reason for stating that you did not discuss it on this date, wouldn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now so state?

Mr. VINCENT. I now so state.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember on the occasion of such a luncheon or a luncheon about that time discussing Mr. Hurley in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. Are you still using that date of April 1943?

Mr. SOURWINE. Still referring to April 1943.

Mr. VINCENT. April 1943?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I have no recollection of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you did or did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly did not. I didn't even know Ambassador Hurley and he wasn't Ambassador.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now we are talking simply about Mr. Hurley, whether he was discussed. Did you on the occasion of such a luncheon state that the up-and-coming political group in China was the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of making any such statement and don't think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you ever could have made such a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in June of 1943 or about that time while you were counselor to the American Embassy in China—were you counselor of the American Embassy in China in June of 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I had already left Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you leave Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I left Chungking the latter part of May 1943, or the middle of May. I don't recall the exact date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in the spring of 1943, while you were counselor to the American Embassy in China, cable to the Department of State with respect to an interview which you had had with Chou En-lai?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in that cable quote Chou as having said:

> Japan and Russia will not clash for the time being, but in the future will inevitably fight. Therefore, we welcome American forces to help our guerrillas in north China to prepare for joint opposition against Japan in the future. Now they, the guerrillas, have been dispatched to occupied territory for intense activity. It is hoped that the American leaders will adopt positive action and send an observer to North China.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify that that is the exact language of the telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the substance?

Mr. VINCENT. A telegram was sent, and I would have to refresh my memory on the telegram, sir, to be able to say whether that was what was actually said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the substance?

Mr. VINCENT. That was certainly what Chou would have said, I think, that he would have wanted somebody to be dispatched to North China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you remembered that you had sent such a telegram.

Mr. VINCENT. I remember such a telegram. I don't remember the substance of the telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember even the substance of the telegram? Do you remember whether in that cable you stated "The Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist leanings. Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method should be to disparage the Communists as much as possible and be sympathetic to the Nationalist Government. Then the request will be approved."

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no recollection of saying that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you did say that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I did say that.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that have been a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have to read that again. You mean the fellow who sent that should be pro-Nationalist in order——

Senator FERGUSON. No; to get the Nationalists to do it, to consent to it. Read it.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

The Nationalist Government is very fearful of any pro-Communist leanings. Therefore, if any observer is sent to North China, his method should be to disparage the Communists as much as possible and be sympathetic to the Nationalist Government. Then the request will be approved.

Mr. VINCENT. Now your question is could that——

Senator FERGUSON. No. Was that a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. It is a fact that certainly the Nationalist Government was very much anti-Communist and would have disliked any pro-Communist who was sent up there.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and if you had wanted to do it and have it approved you would have had to make it appear that he was pro-Nationalist.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think you would have had to do that kind of subterfuge. What you would have had done is send a man up there who was just a factual reporter on the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Then that was not a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. This statement here would be a fact, if it existed, that you would not send a pro-Communist to North China.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever send anyone up?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't, but they were sent there in 1944, after I left China.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that person pro-Nationalist?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten who was sent up there. There was an Army group sent up there in 1944, and then various and sundry other people from the State Department were sent up there in 1944, I mean people with Stilwell's headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that you now testify that you did not make such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall the substance of my telegram. I recall that a telegram was sent on the basis of Chou En-lai coming in and calling on me before I left Chungking in 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I was trying to find out if that was the fact and that could have been in the telegram. You see, this committee is handicapped that they can't get records, and they have to reply upon testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would have to refresh my memory by seeing the telegram before I could testify that that was in that telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. That telegram is one of the papers which the State Department has declined to give us and which the President has declined to permit the committee to have, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether the committee asked for it or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that it falls in that category of papers?

Mr. VINCENT. It would, I think, fall in that category.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that you would be able to see it and refresh your memory from it and come back and testify to the committee with regard to it?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I could; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you can see it in the State Department, can you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I can ask to see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you try to do that, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything else about that conference with Chou En-lai?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't have any other recollection except he called before I left to talk with me and to see Acheson, to meet Acheson for the first time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you become Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs August 21, 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. It was about that time; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were detailed to the office of the Foreign Economic Administration as special assistant to the Administrator October 25, 1943?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, according to this thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stayed there until February 25, 1944; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. About that time; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in the FEA office on detail, who was the Administrator?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Crowley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you work in his office?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he maintained an office up on Fourteenth Street, and I worked down in the temporary T or U Building on Constitution Avenue.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Currie with FEA at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Currie was Deputy Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did he maintain offices?

Mr. VINCENT. He maintained his office in temporary U or T, down on Constitution Avenue.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your work then closely associated with his?

Mr. VINCENT. What work I did; yes. It was not closely associated with his because I just did odd jobs down there for the time. I never took any active part in running FEA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your office close to Mr. Currie's office?

Mr. VINCENT. Across and down the hall.

Mr. SOURWINE. The same floor?

Mr. VINCENT. The same floor, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time, sir, was Mr. John Stewart Service in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this. He was assigned to China. Whether he had come home on leave I don't know. I think he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Mr. Raymond Paul Ludden was?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether Ludden was still in China or not. I would assume he was. If you will let me refer to this I will find out, but I would say he was still in Kunming or Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies, John Paton Davies, Jr., was also in Chungking at that time; wasn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was either in Chungking or New Delhi. He spent a great deal of time in New Delhi, India.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. John K. Emmerson was second secretary at Chungking in 1942?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to this, but he arrived after I left Chungking and must have been there.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Lattimore was Deputy Director of Pacific Operations, OWI?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1943?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall when Mr. Lattimore took on the job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in Washington at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. If he was Deputy Director of OWI, he would have been in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were with the FEA, sir, can you tell the committee just what functions or duties you did perform? What did you do over there?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be very difficult to say because I never had any definite functions. I can tell you what one of the principal things was, because I went up for Mr. Crowley to the UNRRA conference, simply as an observer at the UNRRA conference. That took, I should say, the better part of a month of this time. Otherwise, it was a matter of the area directors and what not in FEA coming in from time to time and asking me specific questions as to factual conditions. I was used more or less as a person to be consulted with on conditions in China for the brief period I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you were there as an expert, or were you there as an adviser and consultant?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I was there to be consulted by the FEA people as they might wish to on conditions in China, from which I had just returned.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were consulted?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was your immediate superior while you were with FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. My immediate superior would have been Currie in the position I held.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were your principal associates over at FEA?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to think who was over there. You see, I was there such a short time. There was a man named Riley, I recall his name, who worked with Crowley. I saw him from time to time at conference meetings. There was Oscar Cox, who was I think legal counsel for the FEA; I just don't recall the others who were over there to any great extent. I was trying to think of the area director, but I can't place him now.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already explained to the committee, have you not, how your detail to FEA was brought about by Mr. Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. I said Mr. Currie asked me to come over and the State Department detailed me.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know it was initiated by Mr. Currie?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already testified in executive session about your acquaintanceship with Mr. Lawrence Rosinger. You did know him, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. The only distinct recollection I have of meeting him, as I think I said, was at the IPR conference in 1945. He was there, as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him well at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him socially?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have business dealings with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I never recall having any business dealings with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he in your office in connection with your official duties?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall a call from him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Outside of the one meeting you have mentioned did you ever attend any meetings with him?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have been present at this meeting the nature of which I do not recall very clearly, of the American delegation to the conference which met some time in the late autumn of 1944 before the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here in Washington?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it met here in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the whole delegation?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the delegation; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend any meetings of the IPR or functions under the sponsorship of that organization at which Mr. Rosinger was present?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified, sir, that I did attend a meeting or that I don't have any recollection, but I probably did attend a meeting in 1938 if Mr. Rosinger was there—I have no recollection of his being there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then aside from the two meetings you have mentioned, one in 1945, the conference, and one in 1938, and the further

possibility that he might have been at a meeting of the delegates to the 1945 conference, is it your testimony that otherwise you never attended a meeting with Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of attending meetings with Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read his book, War Time Politics in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection distinctly of reading that book. I have seen the testimony that it was sent to me, and I apparently retained the manuscript and was asked by Mr. Bisson to send it back. That is in the testimony before this committee. I don't have any recollection of whether I read the book in manuscript or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have the book in manuscript form?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that I did. I would not have recalled it had I not noticed that—I mean I would not have known it or remembered it had I not noticed this letter from Bisson to me asking me to send it back. Therefore, I must have had it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no independent recollection of it now?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how that manuscript came to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Whether it was mailed to me, handed to me. I just don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it sent to you for criticism by the Institute of Pacific Relations or some official of that organization?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that the fact that he sent it to me in manuscript was for me to look it over and see if it had factual mistakes in it or something else. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you well acquainted with New York City?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not say I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been there a number of times?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I have been there a number of times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the Seville Hotel is located in New York City?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where Twenty-ninth and Madison would be in New York City?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I mean I would know——

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you have ever been to the Seville Hotel?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I don't ever recall having been at the Seville Hotel. It makes no impression on my memory at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you have ever stayed overnight there?

Mr. VINCENT. At the Seville?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say almost positively I never have stayed overnight at the Seville.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet anyone there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet Agnes Smedley there?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet Louis Gibarti there?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I don't know who Louis Gibarti is, but I didn't meet him there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that name before?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I haven't heard the name of Louis Gibarti.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone every tell you to go to the Seville Hotel?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever arrange to meet anyone there?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I never arranged to meet anyone there.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs January 15, 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. I was appointed to it. I see there is a conflict there. This would say that I left FEA in February. I became Chief of the Division about that time. It says I was with FEA until February, but it says I was appointed Chief of the China Division in February.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that impossible?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You could have had the title and rank and still be on detail, could you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Raymond Dennett, the secretary of the American Council of the IPR, the question of American policy in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection now of discussing it with him, but I would say it would be logical that Dennett as secretary would come down and discuss matters in China with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why would you discuss American policy in the Far East with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't say, sir, that I discussed American policy. I might have discussed matters concerning China, factually or otherwise, with Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to deny that you did discuss American policy in the Far East with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any distinct recollection of discussing policy with Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have discussed policy with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have discussed policy which was policy that should not be discussed with someone on the outside, but policy which was adopted I would have and it would have been carried out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett the so-called least common denominator of American policy in the Far East, that is, what could safely be said to be the minimum that the United States would demand?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing the least—or in those terms.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be the kind of policy that had been made and could properly be discussed with an outsider?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, you would have to be more precise, I think, as to what would be called a least common denominator of American foreign policy with regard to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have an opinion about that phrase; wouldn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. Just at this moment the meaning of the least common denominator doesn't even arouse in me any recollection of such an idea as a least common denominator.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question of what could safely be said to be the minimum that the United States would demand in its Far East policy—would that be a matter that could properly be discussed outside the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. It could be discussed speculatively with Mr. Dennett. To demand of whom? I am just trying to clarify that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to keep the questions reasonably short. Demand in general, or of particular nations, or in regard to particular situations. Does that clarification change your answer in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett specifically the alternative policies which branched out from the so-called common denominator, which were being seriously considered by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it, but as I say Mr. Dennett was a man whom I knew, not too well, but a man whom I knew and thought was a very intelligent man, and I may easily have discussed them with him in the matter of trying to get his views and benefit by them if he had any views on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would not be a matter of fixed policy or matters of policy that had been established; would it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; because I think from what you are saying here, this was looking into the future.

Mr. SOURWINE. These were matters which were being seriously considered by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Foreign policy with regard to the future in China was being considered seriously by the State Department, I should say, at all times.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it would have been entirely proper for you to have discussed with Mr. Dennett alternative policies which were being seriously considered by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. If they were not matters of secrecy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever tell Mr. Dennett or imply to him that American policy in the Far East might grow out of Navy demands rather than being founded upon a general plan or set of principles into which Navy demands would be integrated and by which Navy demands would be limited?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I couldn't say whether I discussed that thing with him or not. That seems to be a very involved matter. I imagine that you are referring to a memorandum or something that Mr. Dennett himself may have prepared as a result of a conversation with me. People came in and out quite frequently. I suppose they went out and said they had had a conversation with me; but I have no recollection of discussing a particular problem of that kind with Mr. Dennett.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of such a problem?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't even recall having in mind such a problem of the Navy and discussing the matter of policy with relation to the Navy in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard that there was a problem of Navy there?

Mr. VINCENT. There was a problem of the Navy in the postwar period, of what the position of the Navy was, but it was not one with which I was familiar.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you, as the head of this Division, pass on these questions if you weren't familiar with all the ramifications?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. How could you help to make policy if you didn't know?

Mr. VINCENT. I had a general idea of what was the policy and what we wanted out of the war, but as far as——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean you were making policy on just general ideas?

Mr. VINCENT. I wasn't making policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you helping to make policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I was helping to make policy.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you do it on general ideas? Didn't you lead this committee to believe that you didn't have all the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. It was the whole accumulated experience in the Far East on which I was depending, but I am not setting myself up here as an expert on naval relations in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. But if the Navy relations had something to do with the question you would have to consider that in order to advise on the policy?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give this committee any idea as to what the facts were about this Navy entering into this decision?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot from the reading of this question that we have here, and can't recall from recollection discussing with Mr. Dennett.

Senator FERGUSON. Or with anyone? I am not talking about Dennett now. I am talking about the facts.

Mr. VINCENT. He would have to read that question again.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could I ask a different question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, early in 1944 were the views and needs and pressures of the Navy an important factor with regard to United States policy in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. They certainly would have been; yes, sir. You are speaking now of the postwar period? You are speaking of the needs of the Navy in China at that particular time or with relation to the Far East?

Mr. SOURWINE. I will leave that to your definition. I believe my question is clear.

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly would have been of entirely different character while we were prosecuting the war, that is, for the next year, if this was in 1944; but in the postwar period certainly the position of the Navy in the Far East had to be given consideration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that help at all, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, you are again asking me to remember what I said to an individual that long ago, and I just do not recall the conversation with Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have so stated or intimated?

Mr. VINCENT. That China could not be considered a stabilizing power?

Mr. SOURWINE. That you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think that I said that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hold that view at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I held the view at that time, now that I recall it, which may have been misinterpreted here, which was that I did not think too much confidence could be placed or too much weight could be placed on China becoming the stabilizing influence in the Far East, that we would have to look to other means of having stabilization there because China was coming out of the war rather weakened.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you held the view substantially which you say you think you did not give to Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. That it would be a mistake to count too much on China being a stabilizing influence in the Far East at the end of the war?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether I expressed it to Mr. Dennett or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want us to understand that you think you did not express it to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I could easily have expressed it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that answer, please?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I could have expressed that opinion to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the difference between that opinion and the statement that you had no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin?

Mr. VINCENT. Because the statement taken like that out of context would mean that I had no confidence in China. This was, in the broad picture of China, that it would be a mistake in our policy to place too much confidence in China being the stabilizing influence, and I am accenting "the" because I just remember having held the view that China was coming out weakened from the war and that we could not count too much on China. Let's go back to history a little bit. There was entirely, it seemed to me, too much weight being placed on China for China's own good, that China was being ushered in as one of the great powers and that China was going to come out of the war in a weakened condition and we would have to do a great deal ourselves toward building up China.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question at that point. That didn't happen to be the view of Mr. Roosevelt, did it? He felt that China was to be one of the great powers and seemed to emphasize China's importance and her ability to carry on.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was Mr. Roosevelt's policy, to build China up as a great power.

Senator WATKINS. As I recall something has been said recently by Mr. Churchill or someone to the effect that they felt Mr. Roosevelt had placed too much faith in the ability of China.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't read Mr. Churchill's statement, but probably to come out of the war as the stabilizing influence in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. If China wasn't to be, what was to be the stabilizing influence in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. We would have to be the stabilizing influence in the Far East in combination with China.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you think we carried that policy out?

Mr. VINCENT. Of trying to be the stabilizing force?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I think we did.

Senator FERGUSON. With what we did with Nationalist China?

Mr. VINCENT. We tried to support the Nationalist Government of China.

Senator FERGUSON. You are familiar with the Marshall mission?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that that was support of the Nationalist Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. The whole intent of that mission certainly was to support the Nationalist Government of China by bringing about a cessation of civil war and bringing into the Government all of the dissident elements, including the Communists, but under the Nationalist Government of China and under Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing what you do about communism, do you think you could stabilize any government by taking the Commies into it?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified before it was a matter of alternatives, and I thought and the President thought and the Secretary of State thought that the best alternative was to try to bring about a cessation of civil war through the matter of some kind of political settlement under a constitutional government arranged by the Chinese which would have representation in it of the various non-Kuomintang policies.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is your contention now, you, knowing what communism is, that you can stabilize a government by putting the Commies in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, it wasn't stabilizing a government. It was stabilizing a situation, sir. Let me answer, please, sir. It was stabilizing a situation where your alternatives were civil war or trying to bring about some kind of political agreement. The Chinese themselves, the National Government, was trying to do just that.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you cite a case in history where Communists have been taken into a government and that that has stabilized conditions and that they didn't take it over or they had to kick them out; one of the two?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified here, sir, that it was in the back part——

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. My question is, you state a situation in past history where they were.

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified that in the French Government——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking about what you have already testified.

Mr. VINCENT. I say now, then, that an analogous situation is that the Communists came into the Government of France at the end of

the war, that the Communists came into Government of Italy, and were eventually kicked out.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You had in mind, then, that either you would have to kick them out or you can't stabilize the situation or they would take it over.

Mr. VINCENT. That would have depended entirely on how the Communists conducted themselves in the government.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of a case where they did conduct themselves such that you could stabilize the situation and not kick them out or they not take it over?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you think that it could be done in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it was an alternative to civil war in China and——

Senator FERGUSON. That wasn't my question. Why did you think it could be done in China, that you could stabilize it, and not kick them out or they not take it over?

Mr. VINCENT. Because you could stabilize the situation by the avoidance of civil war, by taking them in on a minority basis with the Kuomintang and the major parties maintaining control of the government. That would have been stabilization of a situation insofar as the avoidance of civil war was concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the Chinese Communists would ever have given up their position in the civil war on any philosophy such as you now say: that you would take them in and they would be in such a weakened condition that you could kick them out?

Mr. VINCENT. I not only thought that, sir——

Senator FERGUSON. And lose their position in their civil war.

Mr. VINCENT. I not only thought that, sir, but General Marshall thought it. It has turned out not to have been the case.

Senator FERGUSON. It turned out not to be true.

Mr. VINCENT. It turned out the Chinese Communists were not prepared to come into the government on a minority basis.

Senator FERGUSON. And on a basis that you could take over their position in the civil war and then kick them out.

Mr. VINCENT. But I will say this: that the Chinese Communists themselves had joined in these conferences with just that idea in mind, because, as I have repeated before, the conferences were going on among the various parties, including the Communists, before General Marshall ever reached China.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, don't you know that when the Chinese were negotiating, as you now say they were, they were negotiating to better their position in the civil war and to kick the Nationalists out, and not for the purpose that you and General Marshall were trying to have it done?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact information as to what were the ideas at that time of the Communists. I would say, from what I know now, that the Communists never intended to come in and let themselves be subordinated, because their very actions show they would not be subordinated to the Kuomintang.

The CHAIRMAN. Past history had proven at that time that that would be the very result that would follow.

Senator JENNER. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator JENNER. Taking that position and that attitude and that policy toward China, when General Marshall returned and made his report and that program had failed, then what was the next policy or position of the Far Eastern Division and our Government toward China or Marshall's report back that his mission had failed?

Mr. VINCENT. The next position of the Government toward China was to help the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator JENNER. All right, then, I want to ask you if it is not a fact that, although Congress had appropriated the money for military aid to Chiang Kai-shek, for the next 15 months after Marshall made his report, although the money was appropriated, this Government didn't do a single thing for Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, you are speaking of a period when I was not in America. I have no first-hand knowledge of that appropriation. I left in 1947. But I do know that arms were turned over to China, airplanes.

Senator JENNER. Following the Marshall mission?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1947, a considerable amount of arms.

Senator JENNER. When did Marshall return from China?

Mr. VINCENT. Marshall returned from China in January 1947.

Senator JENNER. And for the next 15 months we went ahead arming Chiang Kai-shek and giving him aid and support? You state that as a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. I can state as a fact that specific instances occur to me during the time I was still here, during half of 1947.

Senator JENNER. All right. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you testified—didn't you, Mr. Vincent, in the executive sessions—that the War Department, for General Marshall, made up the directive under which he went to China?

Mr. VINCENT. That directive was prepared over in the War Department.

Senator JENNER. In the War Department? General Marshall brought it to you made up?

Mr. VINCENT. I have described it. Do you want me to describe the various steps in that again?

Senator FERGUSON. Have you already in the open hearing described it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; we haven't discussed it in the open hearings.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have quite a series of questions on that a little later, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JENNER. I would like to return, Mr. Chairman, to one question. I would like to know what was done following Marshall's return from China and reporting that his mission had been a failure; that Chiang Kai-shek refused to take the Communists into his government. What did we then do to aid Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. I am working on memory here. One, there was a large amount of ammunition at Tsingtao in China.

Senator JENNER. What kind of ammunition?

Mr. VINCENT. Rifle ammunition, which was there and was surveyed and turned over to the Nationalist Government troops in the Province of Shantung.

Senator JENNER. Did they have rifles to shoot that ammunition with?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I think I testified yesterday, Senator, that people with much better knowledge of the situation in China have testified or stated that Chiang Kai-shek did not lack the military equipment in the year 1947 to carry on his campaign; that, as a matter of fact, during that year he was more successful than he had been at any time before or after in consolidating his position.

Senator JENNER. Who in the State Department could give us better information about what we did to aid China?

Mr. VINCENT. In the period 19——

Senator JENNER. Following the Marshall report back that it was a failure and that we would wash our hands of Chiang Kai-shek and that it was impossible.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say the Secretary of State could do that.

Senator JENNER. The Secretary of State. You know we had the same situation paralleled in Korea. We said we gave them aid, and I believe it came out in the evidence in some of the hearings that we did give them aid. We sent them some baling wire. I just wonder if that was the same policy followed in China. It is the fact that following that 15 months' lull there, during that period, the Chinese Communists organized in Manchuria and marched down and took over the Government. Isn't that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator JENNER. That is the result?

Mr. VINCENT. During 1948.

Senator JENNER. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask a question with respect to this ammunition. Were you referring to what I think one of the witnesses testified to, an incident in which the ammunition was placed out in a dump somewhere and indirectly or by some other means Chiang and his group were told it was there and they went and helped themselves to it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is one of the instances which I was speaking of.

Senator WATKINS. We had a witness as I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. That was Admiral Cooke's testimony, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Admiral Cooke said that is what happened. I think he also testified or someone testified on that point before this committee that they were short of ammunition in this period of time; that they didn't have more than about 2 rounds to fight with.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that testimony, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. Have you gone over the testimony before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Some of it. I haven't gone over all of it.

Senator WATKINS. I may be mistaken on that, but that is my memory.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States, with the tacit approval of Great Britain, and with the active support of Australia and New Zealand, would be the stabilizing power upon the Eastern Asian Continent?

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to testify again that I cannot recall a conversation with Mr. Dennett on that specific subject, but I would

say that that would seem to me to have been a logical position to take; that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia could stabilize conditions in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States needed to be prepared for what its prospective course of action in or with respect to Eastern Asia would cost?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall stating that to Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that the United States needed work on the development of a formula for the problems of the independent areas in Southeast Asia?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall stating that to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might you have stated that to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I might have stated that to him. We were very much preoccupied at that time with the postwar status of such areas as French Indochina, Indonesia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think the IPR might be an organization which would be a good one to assist in the formulation of that formula?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not thinking in terms of the IPR. If I was speaking to Mr. Dennett, I was speaking to a man who I considered to be intelligent and was discussing the matters with him. The idea of the IPR, with which my relations were not close except that one year, did not enter my mind as an instrument for bringing about that policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you remember talking with Mr. Dennett at a time when he was about to take a job with the American Council of the IPR and he said he needed to know what the outlook was, what the future of American policy was going to be, to decide what he was going to do?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee whether you ever stated or intimated to Mr. Dennett that you did not think Russia was a large factor in the eastern Asia picture?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not remember that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have been likely to have made such a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. It would sound most unlikely that I would say that Russia was not going to be a large factor. It would have to be considered in connection with the situation that might be described. I never in my life thought that Russia was not going to be a factor in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in January of 1944 hold the view that Russia was not a large factor in the eastern Asia picture?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall holding such a view or stating it to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state or intimate to Mr. Dennett that in your opinion Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and would probably not interfere to upset the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall making such a statement to Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you could have made such a statement?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't believe I could.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it was not a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not hold that view yourself?

(No response.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask Mr. Mandel, who has been sworn for the purpose of all of these hearings, if he can identify that as a photostat of a document taken from the IPR files.

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a document from the IPR files.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify it by the heading?

Mr. MANDEL. The heading is "Confidential," marked "R. Dennett, January 18, 1944, memorandum of conversation with John Carter Vincent."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, this memorandum of a conversation, as Mr. Vincent surmised, is the basis for the line of questions that have just been completed. I don't think it is necessary to take the time of the committee to read all of it. I would like to read from the last page five short paragraphs which are marked "Conclusions" and then ask that the entire document be placed in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Conclusions:

(1) Vincent certainly implied that American policy in the Far East may grow out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of principles into which Navy demands will be integrated or limited.

(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific basin, and questions its stabilizing influences upon the eastern Asiatic Continent.

(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing power.

(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for the problems of the dependent areas in the southeast Asia country.

(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture: Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would undoubtedly be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably not interfere too greatly to upset the applecart.

The CHAIRMAN. You want this instrument inserted in the record in toto?

Mr. SOURWINE. If the chairman please.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 380" is as follows:)

Confidential R. Dennett. January 18, 1944.

EXHIBIT No. 380

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH JOHN CARTER VINCENT

I explained to Mr. Vincent that I was considering a job with the American Council of the IPR, and that I thought it highly desirable to get some inkling of American policy in the Far East with a view to determining (1) the least common denominator of that policy—what, that is, everyone was agreed to as the minimum that the United States would demand, and (2) the alternative policies which branched out from the common denominator which were being seriously considered. My purpose, I explained, was to see what the minimum was which the American people would be called upon to support, so that I could

get a line on what educational work the American Council should be concerned with in the next few years, and to see, on possible future policy, what alternative proposals were being seriously considered so that IPR research could be geared as close to reality as possible. Mr. Vincent indicated the following:

(1) Consideration of American policy in the Far East is definitely "second drawer" and is the concern at the present time of relatively few people in the American Government. He personally, and he thought others in the Government, would welcome the publication of material which pointed out just what the situation was. Ed Snow has an article on southeast Asia which he cannot get published now because of the fear that it will give aid and comfort to the enemy. What Snow says in effect is that Japanese propaganda on increased nationalism is catching on in Burma and other areas. Vincent thinks that, through a slight feeling of guilt, Americans have been building up China in the past few years and are still a little ashamed of the small amount of aid going to that country. There is a vast difference, he feels, between having a feeling of this sort and allowing this feeling to keep (handwritten insert maybe us, not clear) from telling the American people what they ought to know.

(2) There seems to be a general agreement, undertaken at the instigation of the British, that dependent areas in southeast Asia will remain undisturbed after liberation, and that their future will be worked out at a later date. Vincent thinks that unless the United States gets on the ball and makes some definite suggestions for the record pretty soon, it may be too late as no one will have notice of what American policy might be.

(3) Vincent thinks that the first determinative on American policy will be the demands of the American Navy for what it considers it needs on the Pacific area in the way of bases for defensive purposes. He believes that they will want considerably more than they had before and that, in view of what happened in 1941, they will get a receptive hearing on the Hill. The result of their demands will be to bring out several consequential questions:

(*a*) Granted that the Navy gets what it wants, the first problem facing the United States will be to utilize those bases for other than purely negative influence of defense of the United States. Vincent believes that the demands of the Navy, when met will actually make the United States the "stabilizing power" in the Far East. We will be there, and we will have the power.

(*b*) So far as China is concerned, the problem of the United States far from being that of building up China to become the stabilizing power, will be to keep China from disintegrating. China cannot become industriaized in the modern sense unless the United States will literally give her the heavy capital machinery; it would, he believes, be possible to increase Chinese purchasing power through agrarian reform and improved communications to a point where China could support a light industrial economy which would assist in keeping her from disintegration. Whether the things that need to be done will be done by the conservative Kuomintang is doubtful. In essence, therefore, this means the development in China of a "welfare economy" rather than an "industrial economy."

(4) Vincent believed that the British would have no serious objection to the implication behind the probable United States Navy demands, that the primary interest of Britain would continue to be Western Europe, and that she was not prepared to equip and to maintain an adequate force in the Pacific to be the "stabilizing power," and that they would certainly prefer the United States in that position than China. This would, of course, mean that Australia and New Zealand would gravitate toward the United States in political interest.

(5) I raised the question as to where British and American interests might, in the outline he had presented, come to disagreement. I pointed out that the line between a stabilizing power and a dominating power was thin, and that if the United States failed to make some provision for dependent areas, or attempted by the possession of adequate power plus assistance from Australia and New Zealand to put the stopper on the development of nationalistic feeling in any of the far-eastern areas, the position of the United States as a stabilizing power changed to that of a dominating power. This, I suggested, Britain might not be opposed to. On the other hand, if the United States did take a lead in developing a formula providing expression for nationalistic feelings in southeast Asia, I wondered whether the United States and Great Britain might not fall out over India, which would, in this situation, certainly attempt to line up as a far-eastern nation in order to come under whatever formula the United States developed for other parts of southeast Asia.

Vincent stated that this was precisely the point at which he thought intelligent work was needed. It is very apparent that Britian is as unwilling to talk about

India as Russia is to talk about Poland—in fact the reason William Phillips is still in this country because the British convinced him of the validity of their position. Vincent felt that the Indian question might very well be the point of major disagreement between the United States and the United Kingdom.

(6) I raised the question whether, at this point in the line of reasoning so far pursued, it did not become apparent that some mechanism was needed in the form of a regional council at the very least, through which the pressures developed by nationalistic feelings could be siphoned off into discussion and open examination, and what the prevailing attitude, if any, was toward the British regional ideas.

At this point Vincent became vague. He indicated that few people other than Hornbeck and Blakeslee had done much thinking on the subject, and that Blakeslee was all in favor of some sort of international political machinery. The implication was that Hornbeck and he had their doubts. He did say that Hull was very sympathetic about the problem of dependent areas and thought that something should be done, but left the impression that very little had in fact been done. He thought that the British were, in all probability, through in Hong Kong, and that, although they had little enthusiasm for Hong Kong as a base, they might definitely want it developed to a free port. He thought that the question of face could be handled by letting British troops retake Hong Kong, although he admitted quite a situation would arise if, by any chance, the Chinese recaptured the area.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Vincent certainly implied that American policy in the Far East may grow out of Navy demands rather than be founded upon a general plan or set of principles into which Navy demands will be integrated and limited.

(2) Vincent has no confidence in China becoming the stabilizing power in the Pacific Basin, and questions its stabilizing influence upon the eastern Atlantic continent.

(3) He believes that the United States will, with the tacit approval of Great Britain and the active support of Australia and New Zealand, be the stabilizing power.

(4) The United States needs to be prepared for what this course of action will cost, and certainly needs some work on the development of a formula for the problems of the dependent areas in the southeast Asia country.

(5) Vincent did not think that Russia was a large factor in the picture: Russia would be primarily concerned with Europe and, while she would undoubtedly be sympathetic to popular movements in China, she would probably not interfere too greatly to upset the applecart.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of ever meeting Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of his writings?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall reading any of his writings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read in manuscript form anything that Mr. Stewart wrote?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of reading in manuscript form.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that a manuscript written by Mr. Stewart was not transmitted to you by Miriam S. Farley, of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of the incident.

The CHAIRMAN. Going back to this exhibit, Mr. Sourwine, should it not be further identified as to its date? It is dated January 18, 1944, headed "Memorandum of conversation with John Carter Vincent."

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chairman is correct.

You recall this incident was referred to yesterday by Mr. Morris.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; at which time I said I couldn't recall the incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want your testimony to imply that you find the incident incredible, or that you are willing to accept the possibility that this manuscript may have been transmitted to you, that you may

have read it and that you may have expressed an opinion with regard to it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would like my testimony to be that I have no recollection of the incident as it occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking now of what? You used the term "manuscript."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is in the record of the hearings as exhibit No. 176 (page 629, part 2,) a memorandum to W. L. H. from M. S. F., presumably to Mr. Holland from Miriam Farley, which reads:

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence) and with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommending rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on point of detail.

Then there is more to it, all of which is in our record. It was mentioned at yesterday's hearing. Mr. Morris asked some questions about it, and I was endeavoring to find out, thinking it over overnight, if there had been any recollection come to Mr. Vincent about it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand the witness to testify that he does not recall at all having the manuscript or going over it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; that is my testimony, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Would you go so far as to deny that you had such a manuscript?

Mr. VINCENT. I just said I do not consider it incredible that I might have.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a habit on the part of IPR people to send manuscripts to you for criticism and approval?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it a habit. I do not recall other manuscripts.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean, you would not call it a habit?

Mr. VINCENT. One would have to define habit.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it customary?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have to say I do not recall other manuscripts being sent to me. Apparently the Rosinger manuscript was sent to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that?

Mr. VINCENT. Now that this thing has been read, I don't recall the incident, but as I say, there was a letter written to me asking me to return it, and I have no reason to deny it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in a position to make policy as far as the Far East was concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have said many times I was in a position to suggest courses of action or policy to my superiors.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew that the IPR was interested in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. It was interested in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. What their people were writing for consumption here in America would be of interest to you as a foreign officer.

Mr. VINCENT. It would be. I never followed the IPR too closely.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought it was of interest because you became a trustee in the organization; is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The fact that there is evidence in the files that they sent you these before they were published would indicate to you that they had been sent to you?

Mr. VINCENT. It would indicate that they had been sent to me. I so testified.

Senator FERGUSON. And you believe that they were valuable, their works, in forming public opinion; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't use the word "valuable," no; but I think they were of use in forming the public opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that was of greater value in forming public opinion than these documents and books and papers being written by the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. What I would say offhand is that the IPR did not have too wide a circulation. Therefore, I would say that what was reported in the national press would probably have had a greater influence on public opinion with regard to the Far East than the IPR publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that some of these publications, and the speeches made from them, were getting into the public press?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say whether they were getting in the public press or not. It would certainly be logical to say they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Were not you watching the public press also for public opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but Senator, I could not now say whether I can recall whether the IPR was covered in the public press to any great extent. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not sound reasonable that if a publication came to your desk that could have some effect upon public opinion in manuscript form for your criticism that you would have read it or had somebody read it to report to you so that you could judge whether or not it was accurate and you felt that that should be used as a molder of public opinion? Does that not sound reasonable?

Mr. VINCENT. That sounds reasonable to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, can you explain where the other facts and testimony show that you were submitted these papers that you did not so act? Is it one of neglect? Is that what you are telling us?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't understand your question, Senator. One of neglect if I had not read them?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and did not have somebody read them to report to you. Would it not show now neglect on your part?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to have read them?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, or have somebody read them.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it neglect. It would depend on whether you had time to read them or not. I have already testified that I possibly read these publications. It is not incredible. But I have no recollection of reading them.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you do not swear now that you did not read them?

Mr. VINCENT. What?

Senator FERGUSON. You do not swear now that you did not read them?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not swear now that I did not read them.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever have any connection with the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Mrs. E. C. Carter, former president of the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I have no recollection of meeting Mrs. Carter, but that I probably did meet her at the IPR conference if she was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the Mrs. E. C. Carter, who was at one time president of the China Aid Council, the same Mrs. E. C. Carter who was the wife of E. C. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify on that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever ask Mrs. E. C. Carter to send your regards to Madam Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. You have made that question before and I have said I have no recollection of asking her to send it to her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I show you a publication headed "China Aid Council Newsletter," June 1944, and I ask you to look at the marked paragraph in the second column.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you see there a reference to yourself?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you read that paragraph, sir?

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

> John Carter Vincent, in charge of Chinese affairs for our State Department, asked Mrs. Carter to send his regards to Mme. Sun since he knew her well in Chungking, and both liked and respected her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that refresh your recollection in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not refresh my recollection, but I don't find it incredible that I would have sent my regards to Mme. Sun.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the last part of your answer?

Mr. VINCENT. That I might have sent such a letter of Mme. Sun.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you have communicated to Mrs. Carter your request that she give your regards to Mme. Sun?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I have no recollection of how I might have communicated that to her. I have already testified that the incident on my own memory, relying on it, I had no recollection of the incident. Therefore, I have no recollection of how I might have told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understood you, sir, in your answer to that question the first time to indicate that the only occasion on which you could have met Mrs. Carter was this IPR conference you attended.

Mr. VINCENT. I said that was the only occasion I had a recollection of meeting Mrs. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did have a recollection of meeting her there?

Mr. VINCENT. It was the only one I had any recollection of meeting her, at the IPR conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recollect that you did meet her at the IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no memory of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then it is not the only occasion you remember meeting her, because you don't remember meeting her at all, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. I wouldn't know Mrs. Carter if I saw her today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you send your greetings to Mme. Sun Yat-sen through someone you never met or saw before?

Mr. VINCENT. I say this is an incident I have completely forgotten about. When I say that I have no reason to doubt that at some time I may have told Mrs. Carter to give my regards to Mme. Sun, that does not alter my testimony that I don't know Mrs. Carter, or would not know her if I saw her today.

Mr. SOURWINE. The fact you have no recollection of her or would not know her if you saw her is not, in my mind, any reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement that you did ask her to give your regards to Mme. Sun.

Mr. VINCENT. I have said it is possible. I don't recall the incident at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was not whether it is possible. Is not the mere fact that you do not remember and would not know her if you saw her enough in your own mind to make you doubt somewhat the accuracy of this paragraph? Why do you say you have no doubt about this paragraph?

Mr. VINCENT. I just don't recall the incident at all. As I say, it is not incredible—put it on a matter of doubt—that I sometimes talked with Mrs. Carter, that at some time I met her, which I don't recall, and she may have said she was going to see Madame Sun, and I may have said, "Go ahead, and give her my regards." I say I have no recollection. I am simply speaking with regard to the possible rather than something I myself recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not even entertained the thought that this might be something made out of the whole cloth relating to a completely nonexistent message?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not considered it from that angle.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that this was in good faith?

Mr. VINCENT. I say again this is possible.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, do you have the same difficulty in your work in the State Department, advising with other officers, of remembering things that have happened as you have here on the witness stand?

Mr. VINCENT. If it is a matter of going back——

Senator FERGUSON. Are you as uncertain in your work there about what has happened as you are here?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, this all happened 7 or 8 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you answer that question?

The CHAIRMAN. You better answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. It is necessary for a foreign officer and a diplomat, such as you are, to remember things for 7 years, is it not? You have to keep them all in mind?

Mr. VINCENT. These incidents here, as I say, I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. But are you in as much doubt in conferring with State officials on things that have happened as you are before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, it is a matter of recalling what I would think now as details.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking, Are you usually in as much doubt?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a simple question and easily understood. Why do you not answer it?

Senator FERGUSON. Are you in as much doubt in advising on facts with the State officials as you are here in this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. If they were matters which I considered of as little importance as some of these things brought forward here, I would be in the same degree of doubt. In other words, whether or not I remembered would be a case whether I can remember them.

Senator FERGUSON. As to whether or not documents passed through your hands for criticism in manuscript form is not a minor matter, is it?

Mr. VINCENT. It is a matter—I do not know whether you call it minor at all. It is a matter which made no impression on me at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only answer you can give to my question as to whether or not you are as uncertain and lack as much knowledge in your advice to State officials as you do at this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, following up what Senator Ferguson has said, if we could return for just a moment to the Maxwell Stewart pamphlet, do I correctly understand your testimony with regard to that, that while you do not remember anything about the incident, you think it is possible that the manuscript was submitted to you, that you did read it and you did comment on it as indicated by the Miriam Farley memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I used your words. I think it was not incredible that I might have.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not know whether this has been called to your attention before. I think perhaps it may have been. I am reading, Mr. Chairman, from Wartime China by Maxwell Stewart, the pamphlet referred to in the memorandum which we are discussing. These paragraphs appear:

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass roots, populace movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices. In the past the Chinese Communists dealt very harshly and ruthlessly with landlords and others who they considered oppressors of the people and expropriated landlord estates in order to divide them up among the poor peasants. Today in the interests of the united front, the Communists have largely abandoned these extreme methods. Their present program is reformist rather than revolutionary. They no longer expropriate the property of landlords except that of traitors. In fact, they welcome the cooperation of landlords or anyone else who will help fight Japan. But they have lowered rents, taxes, and exorbitant interest rates, and encouraged education, cooperatives, and other measures of popular improvement. In addition they have developed a rough and ready system of local democracy in the villages under their control. Elected councils have been set up in village, town, and district, and the local executive officials are also chosen

by popular vote. Tax assessment committees made up of local farmers have been set up to assure fair administration of taxation. These measures reflecting the most deep-seated desires of the Communist peasant have given him the feeling of having a stake in the war and have thus succeeded in arousing the peasants for support of the war effort.

Having heard that read, I ask you, sir, does it appeal to you as a factual statement?

Mr. VINCENT. It seems to me to be a statement by Mr. Stewart of his opinion of what was the condition in Communist China.

The CHAIRMAN. That is scarcely an answer. That does not answer at all. The question is, Does it appeal to you as a factual statement.

Mr. VINCENT. It is certainly a statement of the conditions in that area insofar as Mr. Stewart knew them; and I didn't know, and I could not judge.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see why you want to evade the question. Why do you not answer it? The question is, is that a factual statement.

Mr. VINCENT. I would not be in a position to testify because I had never been in the area. I didn't know what the conditions were there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you, sir, consider it credible that you would have read that as part of the pamphlet and then reported that it was good and should be published?

Mr. VINCENT. As this man's statement of his opinion of what was happening in that area, that it could be published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you, Mr. Vincent, have read that and then reported that you thought it was good and should be published?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall saying whether it was good and should be published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you find it credible that you could have read that as part of this pamphlet, and then reported that you thought it was good and should be published?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought it was good and it should be published in bringing information about Communist China.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What did your counsel say to you?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't hear him.

Mr. SURREY. I don't believe that is the statement as to what he remembers, since he testified he did not remember the incident.

Senator FERGUSON. Hearing this statement, you want to say now that as a foreign officer in the State Department, and a former trustee of the IPR, that you would allow to go to the public a statement like that when you did not know whether it was a fact or not?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, it was not a case of my allowing it to go to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. If you were to criticize it in manuscript form before it was printed, were they not asking you in effect, "Do you approve this to be printed and circulated to the public?" Is that not what your criticism was asked for?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not my criticism. They might have completely rejected any criticism.

Senator FERGUSON. Surely, but you would have been on record as saying you did not agree with it because you either did not know what the facts were, or did not believe what he was saying. You

do not think they were submitting it to you just for the English, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. They were submitting it to me as they say there as to whether it would be good for this to be published. So they say in this memo.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is exactly it, whether or not it should be handed out to the American public to help crystallize public opinion, and here you were, a State official, and now you say that you would pass it because it was his word, and anything he would say you would pass, is that correct? Is that what you want to leave with this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not a case of my passing the thing. It was not my document. It was submitted to me to go over. It could be published whether I approved it or not.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you did not say anything to the contrary, the IPR would take for granted that you were approving it, is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not think so?

Mr. VINCENT. That I was approving it. My approval was not necessary to publish IPR documents.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you not mail it back and say to IPR, "I am not going to criticize your document. Print anything you want to, but I am not going to criticize it. I am not going to say whether it is good, bad, or indifferent"? Why did you not tell them that?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have just said, the whole matter is one I have no recollection of what attitude I took on it. I said it is not incredible that the incident occurred.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated that you are willing to accept the fact that it occurred?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The memo indicates that you have expressed your opinion in confidence. You were advising the IPR but you did not want the fact that you were expressing an opinion to go out. That is the implication of the memo. Does that change your testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. This memo was not written by me. I cannot myself vouch for what my exact attitude was at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. But you still find nothing incredible in the memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Except the matter of saying, "I have expressed in confidence" or the language of the thing, the existence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you deny that you expressed an opinion in confidence?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not deny that I told them that.

Senator FERGUSON. With your present knowledge, Mr. Vincent, having heard this read, do you say now that it accurately sets forth the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. I say now, sir, that I did not know the facts as they existed.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about now.

Mr. VINCENT. Whether now this was an accurate statement of what was happening?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, with your knowledge now is that or is that not an accurate statement of the facts?

Mr. VINCENT. Knowing what I do know about Communist China, I would not say that was a completely accurate statement of the conditions in Communist China at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say now with your present knowledge that that was a pro-Communist writing?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it was a writing which had a slant in favor of giving the Communists. I do not think it was pro-Communist. I don't even know that Stewart expected it to be. Stewart was writing what he considered to be an account of conditions in Communist China.

Senator FERGUSON. Why are you defending Stewart in this answer?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't even know Stewart.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing it is an inaccurate statement, which you have said, why do you doubt that Stewart was trying to put propaganda out in favor of the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call—I have no idea of what Stewart's motives were at that time. If he wrote a memorandum, I must assume that he was trying to write what he thought was a factual memo of conditions in Communist China.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose he was a Communist, would you still give that answer?

Mr. VINCENT. If he were a Communist, I would say certainly he was trying to slant it toward a better understanding of what was going on or a sympathetic understanding of what was going on in Communist China.

Senator FERGUSON. From that statement, have you any doubt that he was pro-Communist in the statement?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time? At the time he made the statement?

Senator FERGUSON. No, from what you know now.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say now on the basis of that statement that he probably was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that it is a fair statement to the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't know whether it was a fair statement because I have to go back again and say I was not familiar with conditions——

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about now. Your knowledge of the facts now.

Mr. VINCENT. From my knowledge of the facts now, I would say that was a statement which was slanted or sympathetic toward Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked the question, do you regard that as a fair statement to go to the American people.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it?

Mr. VINCENT. Is it now, or was it then?

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing what you do now, was it a fair statement to go to the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say as a statement of Maxwell Stewart, a man who was supposed to learn something about it, that it was not a case of it being a fair statement to go to the American public or not. It was a case of Maxwell Stewart putting out in IPR a statement. And its fairness does not seem to enter into it.

Senator FERGUSON. My question is, you as a State official, and a United States Government official, knowing what the facts are now, knowing what he said, was it or was it not a fair statement to the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a statement to the American people which could have misled them as to what conditions were in Communist China.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, not a fair statement to go to the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. I find trouble in saying what is fair when one man wants to report.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is misleading, it is not fair?

Mr. VINCENT. The American public, it would seem to me, would have a right to receive anybody's opinion through these kinds of things.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated in answer to Senator Ferguson that it was not a fair statement to go to the American people. Then it was misleading the American people, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have so testified that the statement itself, slanted as it was, would have misled the American people at the time as to conditions in Communist China.

Mr. SOURWINE. By your previous answer——

Mr. VINCENT. From what I know now.

Mr. SOURWINE. By your previous answer, one question ago, do you mean to say that you feel the American people have the inalienable right to be misled as far as the Communist writers want to mislead them?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly did not. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, was this statement Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. In my opinion at that time, I did not so consider it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about now.

Mr. VINCENT. Now I would say, as I look back on it and know about communism, it would have misled people as to conditions in Communist China. It was painting too rosy a picture of conditions there.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, would you say it was Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say it was Communist propaganda, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it pro-Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I said that the thing was slanted towards the Communists and giving an unduly rosy view of what was happening in Communist China as I look back on it now.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that regard, it was pro-Communist, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I find it difficult to define what you mean by pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. That phrase is used in the State Department commonly. How does the State Department use it?

Mr. VINCENT. Then it was in that sense. If it gave a rosy view it would be considered to be slanted toward the Communists and pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not call it propaganda in the sense that Mr. Stewart, as far as I know, was trying to report on the situation as he saw it.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have defined propaganda once.

Mr. VINCENT. Information.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, which is put out, which is propagated, with a view to creating an impact on the people to whom it is sent. In that sense this certainly was propaganda.

Mr. VINCENT. In that sense it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then it was pro-Communist propaganda, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it was pro-Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, do you find as much trouble among State officials as you are having here this morning on the question of pro-Communist propaganda? Do they all have as much trouble as you have here this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. In looking back upon other situations at times, and trying to described what was or was not a pro-Communist situation in 1943 or 1944, I couldn't answer that question, sir, whether they would or would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have trouble at that time in determining what was or was not pro-Communist or anti-Communist propaganda?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall an instance of having trouble.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not feel there was any trouble in determining that back in those days?

Mr. VINCENT. People may have had difficulties in determining what was Communist and what was pro-Communist or anti-Communist. I don't know that during the war, when they were fighting, that a great deal of emphasis was placed on that particular phase of the thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, when you say you had no trouble in distinguishing pro-Communist and non-pro-Communist matter, is that because you had no trouble making the distinction, that is, you were always readily able to make the distinction, or is it because you were not bothered very often trying to make the distinction?

Mr. VINCENT. I think trying to get it down to a fine point of what was or was not pro-Communist was not something that occupied one's thoughts too much at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. It did not occupy very much of your attention?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And that means that if it did not occupy your attention, it did not really occupy anyone's attention in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, that is not so.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose job was it to pay attention as to whether or not the people were being misled by Communist propaganda, if it was not yours?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't say that I was not occupied. I said we were not too much occupied.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by that?

Mr. VINCENT. That you didn't examine every document that passed over your desk to see whether it was pro-Communist or anti-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it would have been a very easy thing for Communists either in or out of the State Department to act with immunity and mislead the American people?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't agree with that, sir, because people were certainly conscious of the threat of communism. I was myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you not think that the head of a desk in the State Department, the director of a division, should be thoroughly conversant with the Communist objectives in the area under his jurisdiction, so that he would recognize almost instantly Communist propaganda, or their line, if it cropped up in anything that came to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I should think he should be alert to such a situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you were, while you were the Director of the Far Eastern Division, informed and so alerted with regard to Communist propaganda and the Communist line in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I endeavored to keep myself so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think, as an alert man, that this statement that has been read by Mr. Sourwine would go through your hands with approval?

Mr. VINCENT. I have already testified that it went through—it did not go through my hands with approval insofar as I recall, but I am perfectly willing to say that the thing went through.

Senator FERGUSON. With your approval.

Mr. VINCENT. Again, I don't use the word "approval."

Mr. MORRIS. The memorandum states that you said it was good and worth publishing.

Mr. VINCENT. I am not testifying that the report of what I said there is a factual statement of what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do not contest it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not find it incredible?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might turn to another line of questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Try to turn to something that the witness knows something about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, was Owen Lattimore an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek at the time he accompanied Mr. Wallace to China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had ceased to be adviser to Chiang Kai-shek some time before that, had he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he ceased to be adviser to Chiang in the fall of 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in China during the period when he was adviser to Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. During that period when Mr. Lattimore was adviser to Chiang, did he make reports directly to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say with any assurance which way he made his reports.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever consider the possibility that he was making reports directly to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I assumed that he was, since he was sent out by the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss this possibility with Ambassador Gauss?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall discussing it with Ambassador Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, is it not true that possibility was a source of irritation to Ambassador Gauss?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall that the Ambassador did not like the idea of having two people reporting out of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know he didn't like the idea if you never discussed it with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't say I didn't discuss it with Mr. Gauss.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you said you had no memory of discussing with Mr. Gauss the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was reporting directly to the White House.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember ever discussing with Mr. Gauss the possibility that Mr. Lattimore was reporting directly to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of any particular incident, but I do have a recollection that was his attitude at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was irritated at that possibility?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it irritate you?

Mr. VINCENT. It did me, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did it irritate you?

Mr. VINCENT. Because as Foreign Service officer in the field, it was somewhat difficult for us to have a separate reporting office out of China on conditions there, and not know what was going on in that reporting field.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore had not reported directly to the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have preferred it if Mr. Lattimore, under directions he had to report to the White House, showed us what he was reporting so we could know as well.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not show you any reports that he filed with the White House?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I ever recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, Mr. Vincent, do anything to condition Mr. Wallace for his mission to China?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified that we met not frequently but on several occasions before we started out. I have no distinct recollection of memory that I may have prepared him for the mission, but I may have; of factual conditions in China as I saw them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not indicate, in executive session, that you did supply him with material in advance of the trip?

Mr. VINCENT. That is just what I was testifying again now. I testified further that I had no distinct recollection of the exact character of the material.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you also testify in executive session that you had consulted with Owen Lattimore to make preliminary arrangements for the Wallace trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall my exact testimony in executive session, but I think it is quite logical that I would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, did you not say that you had discussed the trip with him before the appointment was announced?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I told you, sir, it was quite logical I did, but I can't recall any particular discussions with him. But as I say, it certainly would have been logical for Lattimore and myself, who were going out with him, to have had discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you influenced Mr. Wallace at all on his trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I should hardly see how it would have been impossible for me not to influence Mr. Wallace on the trip, since I had been in China for 20 years, with factual information.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can "hardly see how it would have been impossible" for you "not to influence"? Straighten that out.

Mr. VINCENT. I say it certainly would have been logical for me to have had some influence on Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you know you did influence him?

Mr. VINCENT. What I am trying to say is that I don't recall specific influences I had on him. I am trying to give the question or the answer a general character, rather than saying in what particular way I may or may not have influenced him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am perfectly willing to be general, but perhaps you can be a little more specific. Do you really mean that you cannot recall any instances in which you influenced him or might have influenced him? You do not mean that, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to recall specific instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Furnishing him material in advance of the trip is influencing him, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be giving information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Giving advice throughout the trip would be influencing him, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Talking with him one evening after having a conversation with Chiang and suggesting you take a certain line the next day is influencing him, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did that, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to consider specific instances.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a specific instance, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did talk to him and certainly he must have been to some degree influenced by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know he was, do you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He changed his line at least on one occasion because you suggested it, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Breaking in on conversations with Chiang to steer him in particular directions was influencing the mission was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did that, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there is not any question in your mind that you did influence Mr. Wallace in the course and direction of his mission, is there?

Mr. VINCENT. There certainly is no question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at all of the talks between Mr. Wallace and General Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I was present at all except the first and the last.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anywhere at any time, in any written memorandum or oral statement to you from Mr. Wallace, any reference to a request by General Chiang for the assignment of General Wedemeyer as the representative of President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall no memorandum. It was all oral discussion as far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace ever tell you orally that General Chiang had made a request for the assignment of General Wedemeyer or had indicated that he would like to have General Wedemeyer assigned as the President's representative to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall his ever telling me that the Generalissimo wanted General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where the first idea of having General Wedemeyer recommended originated?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection would be that it originated with Mr. Alsop. I didn't know Wedemeyer, and I think Mr. Wallace stated that he had never known General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. You and I have been over this, and I realize I am cutting corners on it. I simply wanted to traverse that here for the public record in case Senators who were not present at the executive session might want to ask questions.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you also testify that it was Mr. Alsop who had stopped the proposed recommendation of General Chennault for that job?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection of my testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that he had done so by saying that General Chennault did not want the job?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read Mr. Alsop's testimony before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not read it carefully; no, sir. I glanced through it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you discussed that matter at all in recent years with Mr. Alsop?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not, then, know whether what you have just testified was in any way at odds with what Mr. Alsop said?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify in executive session that Mr. Lauchlin Currie played a part in your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified that it was possible that Lauchlin Currie was the first one to mention to me that Mr. Wallace was going to China. If I could have the testimony I could——

Mr. SOURWINE. I just asked.

Mr. VINCENT. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified to a fact there. You testified to the same fact here. There cannot be any conflict in your testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, who initiated the request for your assignment to go with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know, Mr. Wallace initiated it.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that Mr. Wallace initiated it?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I testified that we had a conversation one time about conditions in China. He called me and we had this conversation regarding going to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that before Mr. Currie had mentioned to you the possibility of your going with Mr. Wallace on this mission?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the sequence as to whether Mr. Currie mentioned it first or Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first one to mention it to you?

Mr. VINCENT. That Mr. Wallace was going to China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not testify that Mr. Currie was the first one to mention to you that you would go along with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the testimony in executive session, but as I have said, it is possible that Mr. Currie was the first to mention the matter of going.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to distinguish between a knowledge that there was going to be a Wallace mission——

Mr. SOURWINE. Oh, yes?

Mr. VINCENT. And who first initiated the request that I go along. In any formal way Mr. Wallace initiated it insofar as the Secretary of State was concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. When Mr. Wallace talked to you about it, he came to your office, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. He came over to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. That meeting was arranged?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not come without an appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time the appointment was arranged you knew what he was going to talk about?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who arranged that appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that I have testified that Mr. Wallace called, and I said I would come over to his office, but he came over to the State Department. But Mr. Currie may have arranged the interview.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know at the time that Mr. Wallace called you on the phone that the thing he wanted to discuss with you was going on the mission?

Mr. VINCENT. I was sure of his going on the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; your going.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that I was, but as I say, it is logical. I am just trying to be factual in the testimony here. Whether Mr.

Wallace told me he was coming over to talk to me about going on the mission with him or whether he was coming to talk about going on the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. As of now, as of this morning, are you able to remember who first discussed with you the matter of you going on that mission with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. From my memory this morning I would have to repeat again that Mr. Currie was the first one to discuss with me the mission, but I do not recall whether Mr. Currie was the first one to discuss that I would go on the mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did Mr. Hull send you with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Hull sent me with Mr. Wallace as far as I know because I had had 20 years' experience in China, I had just come back from China, with 2 years' experience there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did he want to send anybody with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Putting it this way, that Mr. Wallace was the one wanting someone to be sent with him. I don't know that Mr. Hull wanted somebody to be sent with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember your testimony on this point in executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. I remember my testimony, but you put the question differently here. Why did Mr. Hull want somebody to go. I am saying after Mr. Wallace had asked for somebody to go, and I had been designated by Mr. Hull to go, I referred to a brief conversation which Mr. Hull had with me. I am using the word "want," why did Mr.——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not that conversation indicate to you why Mr. Hull wanted you to go?

Mr. VINCENT. I think you are using what Mr. Hull wanted me to be alert to, it already having been decided I was going.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Tell us about the conversation if you will.

Mr. VINCENT. It was a very brief conversation in which Mr. Hull told me to be careful not to let Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, make promises to the Chinese that we would be unable to fulfill.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that not mean to you that Mr. Hull was afraid that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified in executive session that there was a feeling, which I had no knowledge of, that Mr. Wallace in his trip to South America the year before had given the impression there that we were going to be of greater help to the South American countries than was possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. The answer to my question is what, then, yes or not?

Mr. VINCENT. What is your question, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Hull was afraid that Mr. Wallace would make elaborate promises to the Chinese authorities?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). Did Mr. Wallace make any promises?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you on any occasion have to warn him not to make promises?

Mr. VINCENT. I never had to warn him that I can recall not to make elaborate promises.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you call an elaborate promise?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say promises beyond our own possibility of performance; the matter of support to China——

Senator FERGUSON. What did he promise them that you thought was within our capabilities of carrying out?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace made no specific promises insofar as I can recall to General Chiang other than a continuation, and if possible, an augmentation of support for the Chiang Kai-shek government.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to say, Mr. Vincent, that Mr. Hull said elaborate promises?

Mr. VINCENT. No. You used that word. He just said don't make promises to the Chinese that we were unable to fulfill.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you know what we would or would not be able to fulfill? Did Mr. Hull tell you what we could or could not fulfill.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Hull was not specific in telling me that.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you be of any aid on that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would recognize with my knowledge of China that if Mr. Wallace were to go out there and make promises of support which could not be carried over the hump in the air, or further support of a military nature which was impossible—

Senator FERGUSON. Were you familiar with the military situation so that you could advise as to what we could or could not carry over the hump?

Mr. VINCENT. I was familiar enough to know what I would consider to be an unreasonable request and if I did, I would also be in touch with the military people in China who could give me any advice that they might wish to.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you never had to use this so-called warning?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall did I ever have to stop Mr. Wallace from doing something which I thought was going beyond our ability to fulfill.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he make any promises at all?

Mr. VINCENT. The only promises I recall he made was that we were going to try to go back and get support for General Chiang's government continued over the hump insofar as it was practical to send lend-lease.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only promise that he made?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only promise as I recall he made.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he promise to get him a representative—Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. No, he did not promise him so far as I know unless it took place in a conversation at which I was not present. It was only the fact that the Generalissimo had given Mr. Wallace the distinct impression that he could not get along with Stilwell. What promises he may have made in trying to alter that situation to Chiang Kai-shek, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not quite fill your mission for Mr. Hull, did you, when you allowed Mr. Wallace to meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the last occasion without you being present?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the United States then, and Chiang Kai-shek was President of China, and they got in a car and rode to the airport, and I rode in another car. I could hardly have insisted on riding with the Vice President when he did not invite me.

Senator FERGUSON. But Mr. Hull had told you that you were going for a specific purpose, and that was to watch Mr. Wallace so that he would not make promises to Chiang Kai-shek, is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. Not watch him so he would not.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you do?

Mr. VINCENT. I could not stay by Mr. Wallace's side all the time because as I say, Mr. Wallace was Vice President of the United States. I do not think Mr. Hull ever intended that I stick to his side in that way.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least you did not hear the last conversation.

Mr. VINCENT. I did not hear the last conversation, but Mr. Wallace to my recollection reported it to me going down in the plane.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you report to Mr. Hull that you had not been at the last conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. In my memorandum on the thing it shows very clearly I was not at the first or last conference.

Senator FERGUSON. You reported that to Mr. Hull?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to resort to the book, but I am quite sure it shows clearly in my memorandum that in the last conversation General Chiang and Mme. Chiang and Mr. Wallace occupied a car going to the airport, and I was not in the car.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not expect that if any promises were made, they may have been made on the last conversation just before he would leave?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not say whether they would be made then or at some other time.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you ever make, other than your original notes and the memoranda which are printed in the white paper, any other memoranda or narrative of the Wallace trip?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I recall, sir. I think I have testified that they were the first notes, which were then transcribed either in writing first and then on the typewriter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You kept a copy of what you filed with the Department in that regard, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I kept a copy?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall keeping a copy. I turned it over to the State Department when I got back here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had access to it subsequently?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not subsequently from those notes prepare in more narrative style a summary somewhat shorter of what took place on the Wallace mission, just a summary record?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I told you in executive session that a summary in shortened form was prepared in the State Department. I did not prepare it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did prepare it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall. It was probably Mr. Stanton who prepared it. I could refresh my memory by going up there to see whose initials were on it. Mine was a 20-page running thing. As usual, it was narrowed down to much shorter pages.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did prepare it if it was not Mr. Stanton?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I could name half a dozen people there. It was the kind of a thing that Mr. Stanton might have done, it is the kind of thing—who else was in the Division, this was in 1944—there was a Miss Ruth Bacon there who did that kind of thing quite frequently, of going through things, she had legal training, she would reduce things. I would have to see who the personnel was to guess who put the initials on. I do know it was reduced and summarized for the Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was prepared from your notes?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether a copy of that summary was ever given to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know as a matter of fact whether the summary was given to Mr. Wallace or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it would be given to Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it would be logical that it would be given.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having seen that summary?

Mr. VINCENT. I remember seeing the summary. I did not prepare it myself. It was prepared in the normal procedures of summarizing things.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you recognize that summary if you saw it again?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to ask you, if this, that I show you is in any way to you reminiscent of that summary.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what I have just shown you, does it appear to be a summary of the Vice President's trip?

Mr. VINCENT. No; this is not a summary of the trip insofar as I can see which has anything to do with the memo I wrote, which is a summary of the conversations.

Mr. SOURWINE. This that I have showed you refers to the Vice President in the third person, just as your notes did; does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I always referred to him as Mr. Wallace or the Vice President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. This is Henry Wallace's letter of July 10 to the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I have seen it—I have it right here myself—since it was published. I have never seen it before.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know how you know it was Henry Wallace's letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I know only by the fact it was published.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it published as Henry Wallace's letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I have to see what it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you have is a letter. What I have shown you is headed "Summary report of Vice President Wallace's visit in China," is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is dated the 10th of July 1944.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was transmitted apparently to the President with a note by Mr. Wallace: "Dear Mr. President: I am handing you herewith a report on my trip to the Far East. Sincerely yours, H. A. Wallace."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it does not say it is Henry Wallace's own report, does it? He says "a report."

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he does.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it is in the third person?

Mr. VINCENT. This?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. The report refers to Mr. Wallace in the third person?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As you said you referred to him in the notes?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that report?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not. I did not even know of its existence until this thing was published here, until the last 3 or 4 months. If there is any confusion in your mind about the relationship of that and the summarization of the memoranda of conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and the Vice President, this has no relation to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you sure?

Mr. VINCENT. I am sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. How can you be sure?

Mr. VINCENT. I can be sure because I have seen the summary of the memorandum that I wrote on the conversations and I have just testified it was prepared by some officer in the Far Eastern Office, and was a two or three page summarization of 20 pages, and it followed much the same lines as my own, that on such and such a day they talked and this was taken up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you account for the fact, if it was a fact, that Mr. Wallace in reporting to the President on his trip, would refer to himself in the third person?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not do that in the Kunming cables, did he?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here was the Vice President of the United States reporting to the President of the United States; do you think it is quite the logical thing to do that in a report which he himself had written he would refer to himself in the third person?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify on the basis of what the logic of Mr. Wallace was in using the third person.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the other hand, if a report had been prepared by someone else as a summary of your notes, such a report would have had to refer to Mr. Wallace in the third person, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you from those facts draw any conclusion as to whether the report transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President was written by himself or prepared by some other person?

Mr. VINCENT. I think the report prepared by Mr. Wallace was written by him. As I say, I cannot testify——

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, a report prepared by him was written by him. What I want to know is whether you have any conclusion, on the basis of the meager facts now at our joint disposal, as to whether this report, a copy of which you have just seen, a copy of which you have before you, was in fact prepared by Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. My belief is that it was in fact prepared by Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what do you base that belief?

Mr. VINCENT. Because Mr. Wallace transmitted it to the President on July 10, so he himself said.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not say it was "my report."

Mr. VINCENT. He said, "Here is a report."

Mr. SOURWINE. "Here is a report."

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge that Mr. Wallace himself prepared the report. My assumption is that Mr. Wallace did prepare the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. The heading on that report does not say, "Report by Henry Wallace," does it?

Mr. VINCENT. Counsel is just showing me a paragraph out of Mr. Wallace's letter to the President in which Mr. Wallace himself says here——

Mr. SOURWINE. What letter to the President? Is this what I have been referring to as the report?

Mr. VINCENT. No; this is the letter to President Truman of September 19, 1951, which Mr. Wallace says, "I wrote the July report myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the President."

Mr. SOURWINE. On that basis you are testifying this was Mr. Wallace's report?

Mr. VINCENT. I can reach no other assumption. I have no reason why Mr. Wallace should wish to deny or lead to any subterfuge on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it does not seem queer to you that the report was not headed "Report by Henry Wallace," but "Report of the Trip of Henry A. Wallace," and it did not refer to the Vice President in the first person, but in the third person.

Mr. VINCENT. It is not a matter of my thinking it is queer or not. Mr. Wallace has testified he wrote it. Why he may have used the third person with respect to himself instead of the first person, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You cannot account for that?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't account for it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not think it is queer?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it is queer or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not write a report like that?

Mr. VINCENT. I might under certain circumstances write a report like that and not use the first person.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. I would like to talk for just a little while about the conversations with General Chiang, using your notes as the basis.

Mr. VINCENT. Can I go back just to clear up this matter of the possible relationship of this to the summary?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. VINCENT. I hope it is clear to you that the summary of those conversations has no relation to this.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have so stated, sir, very clearly.

Mr. VINCENT. I just wanted you to be sure of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I presume you made that statement from your own personal knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. From my own personal knowledge, and I have tried to narrow down who it was in the Department that summarized my memoranda of the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you remember that summary well enough that you can say definitely it is not the basis for this report?

Mr. VINCENT. It has no relation to this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your memory in that regard is clear?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

Now I am reading the white paper, and if you would like to have it before you——

Mr. VINCENT. I have it, sir.

Mr. SURREY. Do you have another copy, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. The chairman has it now.

You will note on page 550, at the top of the page, you wrote:

> Mr. Wallace expressed the opinion that there should not be left pending any question which might result in conflict between China and the U. S. S. R. President Chiang suggested that President Roosevelt act as an arbiter or middleman between China and the U. S. S. R.
>
> NOTE.—President Chiang's suggestion was apparently prompted by Mr. Wallace's earlier statement that President Roosevelt was willing to act as an arbiter between the Communists and the Kuomintang. Mr. Wallace made no comment at the time.

By that you mean, unquestionably, that Mr. Wallace made no comment at the time of President Chiang's suggestion; but your own note suggests that Wallace previously made the statement that President Roosevelt was prepared to act as arbiter between the Communists and Kuomintang?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask if the record makes it clear that the white paper shows on page 549 that what you are reading was prepared by John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, on note 11 at the bottom of the page.

Mr. SOURWINE. These are his notes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. These are the notes I made.

Senator FERGUSON. So they are not Stanton's notes; they are your your notes.

Mr. VINCENT. No. This is the full text of the memorandum rather than the abbreviated form.

Senator FERGUSON. But these were made by you and not Stanton?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir—yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. They were made by——
Mr. VINCENT. They were made by me.
Mr. SOURWINE. Then the notes continue:

However, after discussing the matter with Mr. Vincent that evening, Mr. Wallace made it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R.

That was one occasion when you pulled the Vice President back from what might have been a commitment?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, because the Vice President himself had informed me of his conversation with the President in which he jotted down notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Which was that he could tell Chiang Kai-shek that he would be glad to be helpful in anyway to bring about a settlement of the difficulties between the Kuomintang and the Communists. That was his statement to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wanted Mr. Wallace to make it perfectly clear to Chiang that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. I wanted him to make it clear because he himself told me that was just exactly what the President wanted him to do, was to be an arbiter if it was needed or asked for between the Kuomintang and the Communists, and not between Russia and China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say that the President had told Mr. Wallace and that you knew about it that he, President Roosevelt, was willing—ready, willing and able, shall we say—to act as an arbiter between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what Mr. Wallace told me that the President told him. Whether he used the word "arbiter" or not——

Mr. SOURWINE. Intermediary?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, or help settle their difficulties.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you told Mr. Wallace about this situation and persuaded him to make it clear to President Chiang the next morning before breakfast that President Roosevelt had not suggested acting as arbiter between China and the U. S. S. R., did you also make it clear to him that the President was willing to act as arbiter between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I reminded Mr. Wallace that that was what he had told me and Chiang apparently misunderstood it to mean arbiter between Russia and China.

Mr. SOURWINE. But when Mr. Wallace made his position clear to President Chiang, the generalissimo, the next day before breakfast, did he express that distinction to him, or did he simply make it clear that Roosevelt was not available as an arbiter between China and Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not present at that conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You reported in your notes——

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace reported the conversation to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether Mr. Wallace made this clear to him. From his own statement to me of this conversation before breakfast——

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. VINCENT. He told me that he had made it clear to Chiang that the President had not intended to suggest that he be a mediator between China and Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your notes do not indicate anything beyond the unavailability of President Roosevelt as a mediator between Russia and China.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your notes do not indicate any availability as a mediator between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. The notes here state "President Chiang's suggestion was apparently prompted by Mr. Wallace's earlier statement that the President was willing to act as an arbiter between the Communists and the Kuomintang."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. So Mr. Wallace must have made an earlier statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. To the Generalissimo.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. Which, as far as I can figure here, was misinterpreted by the generalissimo because it says here, "Mr. Wallace made no comment at the time."

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am trying to get at is whether when he went to Chiang the next morning before breakfast to correct this false impression, against which you had warned him the night before, whether he did it in such terms as to negative his original statement with regard to President Roosevelt's availability as an arbiter between the Communists and the Kuomintang, or whether he made it clear that he was simply fearful that Chiang had broadened his statement to carry a meaning that he had not intended.

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot add anything to what is said here, but it would appear here that all he did was to straighten out the misconception that the President was willing to be a—what do you call it—a mediator between U. S. S. R. and China.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Bearing on the question of your influence on Mr. Wallace, which we discussed before, this is another incident where you did have a considerable influence, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. It is a case where Mr. Wallace had himself been misunderstood and I pointed out to him that the generalissimo had misunderstood him.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is evidence of the fact that Mr. Wallace was receiving and listening to your advice.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, we find this statement farther down on the same page, referring to a conversation which Mr. Wallace had had in Tashkent with Ambassador Harriman.

Mr. Wallace suggested that Dr. Soong discuss the matter with Mr. Vincent who had probably a better idea of the contents of the memorandum since he had had a number of conversations with Ambassador Harriman.

(NOTE.—That evening Dr. Soong asked Mr. Vincent about the matter, requesting to see any notes that Mr. Vincent might have made. Mr. Vincent said that he had only his memory to rely upon.)

Was that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no notes?

Mr. VINCENT. I had not made notes of the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

And informed Dr. Soong of those portions of the memorandum which he thought it appropriate and judicious to give him.

What portions of the memorandum did you withhold from Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the portions I withheld from him. I only recall what I had told him. There may have been things in Mr. Harriman's memorandum which were highly injudicious to show him. I had no memorandum. We are speaking now of Mr. Harriman's memo which he showed me in Tashkent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write this in your notes because you knew there had been portions of the memorandum which you thought it inappropriate or injudicious to give to Chiang and which you had therefore withheld, or did you merely use this language to protect yourself against any eventuality?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say from reading this that I had knowledge of some comments that were in Mr. Harriman's memo which would not have been wise to give him.

Mr. SOURWINE. At any rate, that is the impression intended to be conveyed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it at the time you were talking with Dr. Soong, the Harriman memo was clear in your mind?

Mr. VINCENT. Fairly clear, yes. I noted this——

Mr. SOURWINE. How long before had it been that you had seen that memo?

Mr. VINCENT. Possibly a week or 10 days.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was quite recent at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Sourwine, I do not see any other member of the committee here, and I want to be on the floor, so I will have to recess at this time. Senator McCarran and I have a meeting with other Senators at 2. I would have to put this at 2:30, so we will recess until 2:30.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask Mr. Vincent one question?

Mr. Vincent, you testified that you did not know Agnes Smedley?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at that picture, and see if you ever met that woman?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no recollection of meeting Agnes Smedley.

Mr. MORRIS. There is another picture here. According to the back she is identified as the first one on the lower left. That is the same woman?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the record show that these photographs and pictures which have been shown to Mr. Vincent are pictures of Agnes Smedley, if that is the fact?

Senator FERGUSON. I think there is testimony on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The pictures have not been identified.

Mr. MORRIS. The picture has the caption "Agnes Smedley" and there is a designation "Agnes."

Mr. SOURWINE. How can that be identified for our record? Will you read what is on the back of it?

Mr. VINCENT. "Front row, left to right, Agnes Smedley" and somebody else. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be marked an exhibit, and so will the pamphlet.

(The pictures referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 381 and 381A" and were filed for the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Just for the sake of the record, I want to ask Mr. Vincent if he will put his initials somewhere on the back of the picture as the picture shown here. That is for his protection.

Senator FERGUSON. And the same under her name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just on the back of that photograph, to identify that as the one that is shown you, and which you have not recognized.

Mr. SURREY. Put "Shown to me this date."

Mr. SOURWINE. Whatever you wish. Otherwise, we could put in any picture.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 2:30.

(Thereupon at 11:55 a. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). The committee will come to order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, at the noon recess, we were discussing the notes you made of the Wallace mission.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had read an excerpt from page 550 of the white paper with regard to a conversation you had with Mr. Soong, Dr. Soong, about the discussions of Mr. Wallace with Mr. Harriman, at Tashkent?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading further from your notes: "Specifically," meaning Mr. Vincent—

he told Dr. Soong that Mr. Stalin had agreed to President Roosevelt's point that support of President Chiang was advisable during the prosecution of the war, that Mr. Stalin had expressed a keen interest in there being reached a settlement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, basing his interest on the practical matter of more effective fighting against Japan rather than upon any ideological considerations; that Mr. Stalin had criticized the suspicious attitude of the Chinese regarding the Sakhalin agreement with Japan, and that Mr. Stalin felt the United States should assume a position of leadership in the Far East.

Is that your own best summary of what you told Dr. Soong at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my best summary of that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a present recollection of the Harriman conference with Stalin as it was recounted to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not present at that, were you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. And I haven't seen the memorandum of that conversation with Stalin since that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee, sir, whether, in saying in your notes that Stalin based his interest in a settlement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists on the practical matter of more effective fighting rather than upon any ideological considerations, you are stating something which Mr. Stalin himself had told Ambassador Harriman, or stating merely Ambassador Harri-

man's understanding of Stalin's attitude, or stating merely your own interpretation of it?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I was capable of remembering the memorandum, I was reporting what Mr. Harriman had told me had taken place in his conversation with Stalin.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, it is your impression, your understanding, that Stalin himself had made the distinction, had said, "I am interested in this from the standpoint of fighting the Japanese" rather than from the standpoint of any ideological consideration?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection of what Mr. Harriman told me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Going over to page 553 of the white paper, the paragraph that begins near the bottom of the page, we find this sentence: "Mr. Vincent inquired as to the progress of conversations between the Communist representative in Chungking"—how do you pronounce that name?

Mr. VINCENT. Lin Tso-han.

Mr. SOURWINE. "And the Kuomintang representatives of which Dr. Chiang Tse-che was chief."

You were, in other words, saying in effect, "Let's talk about the question of how the negotiations are getting along beteween the Nationalists and the Communists"?

Mr. VINCENT. We had an interest in how they were getting along. Mr. Gauss, the Ambassador, had indicated that they were talking.

Senator FERGUSON. They were what?

Mr. VINCENT. That they were discussing this matter among themselves. I hadn't been back for a year, but this Lin Tso-han—I don't know who he was, but apparently I was told that he was a Communist delegate at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just before that, a different matter had been under discussion; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to read this to see, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is a change of subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was then one of the occasions where you brought about a change of subject in the conversations; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I wouldn't say it was a very abrupt change in subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; I did not characterize it as abrupt. You were opening up a new subject; you were changing the focus at that point.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that because you did not want Mr. Wallace to discuss the other point?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I mean, I have no recollection of that being in my mind, to change the subject. The conversation may have lapsed.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was probably because this was a matter of particular interest to you and you wanted it brought up; right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any instructions as to what to discuss in China when Mr. Wallace was there?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean, did we receive any instructions from——

Senator FERGUSON. From the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No; the State Department gave me no specific instructions as to what line of instructions, line of conversations; no.

Senator FERGUSON. They had given you warning, Mr. Hull had, not to permit Mr. Wallace to make promises; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had no instructions as to what to take up?

Mr. VINCENT. Myself; no.

Senator FERGUSON. With the respective parties?

Mr. VINCENT. Ambassador Gauss himself was the Ambassador there, and any instructions about what was to be taken up would have come from him.

Senator FERGUSON. But he did not give you any instructions?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Gauss did not give me any instructions. I talked with him, when I got there.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you figure the Wallace mission was? What were you trying to accomplish?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I was told at the time, it was the return of the visit that Madame Chiang had made to the United States the year before. I never did know exactly what.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the only purpose; just a return courtesy call?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, then it was, too, just that occasion for Mr. Wallace to have conversations with Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. But what was he to accomplish? He was not to promise anything. What was he to accomplish?

Mr. VINCENT. You ask me something there, Mr. Chairman, that I don't know, what he was supposed to accomplish. He had himself a little note that he referred to from time to time, as to his conversations with Roosevelt before he left.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, whatever instructions he had came from the President?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And whatever instructions you had were that of a warning from the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Secretary of State had any mission for Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection that Mr. Wallace ever saw the Secretary of State before he went out. He may have; but I say I don't know what he did.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you know that, if Mr. Wallace, was making a promise, he did not have a direct authority from the President to make it?

Mr. VINCENT. Because from time to time Mr. Wallace would refer to these rough notes he had taken in his conversations with the President, and the main idea of this was to go out and talk to Chiang Kai-shek about the situation in China and bring it back and report to him, insofar as I knew.

Senator FERGUSON. What were some of the things that Mr. Wallace had on these notes that he was to accomplish in China?

Mr. VINCENT. There is only one of them that I recall right now, and that was to try to bring about some kind of cessation or better relations between the Chinese groups for more effective fighting in China.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, were you at that time to get a combination of the Nationalists and Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. For more effective military operations.

Senator FERGUSON. For more effective military operations?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the emphasis at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will the Senator pardon me?

Do you mean that Mr. Wallace had been given instructions, to your knowledge, by the President, which were, in effect, a forerunner of instructions given General Marshall?

Mr. VINCENT. My meaning there is that Mr. Wallace, himself, told me that the President had indicated to Chiang that he was prepared to act as adviser or mediator to get them together, which showed that the President even at that time had an interest in trying to settle the internal dispute in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, still on that same page, and going back just a little bit above the passage that I read in my last question, you were recounting the remarks of Chiang, were you not—"it was his statement * * *" to quote your words as a matter of fact—"the Communists follow the orders of the Third International." It that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't see that here. Yes, I do.

This is Chiang speaking?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you. It is not you speaking is it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I will have to read this to see.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it would not be Mr. Wallace, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is General Chiang speaking there.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing):

The Chinese Government cannot openly criticize the Communists for their connection with the Third International because it is afraid of offending the U. S. S. R. * * *.

That was Chiang himself, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a report as well as I understood Chiang's statement.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Mr. Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States—

That is Wallace speaking, your report of what he said?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing):

and said that he could not understand the attitude of the Chinese Communists as described by President Chiang. President Chiang said that this difference in the attitude of the American and the Chinese Communists might be explained by the fact that there was no possibility of the American Communists seizing power; whereas, the Chinese Communists definitely desired to do so in China.

Now, going back to your reference to Mr. Wallace, can you give us any further details about Mr. Wallace's reference to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No more than there is right there, sir. I was trying to be just an accurate reporter of the conversations that were taking place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just how did Mr. Wallace refer to it? Did he say, "In our country the Communists are patriotic," or do you remember just what kind of words he used?

Mr. VINCENT. Other than what I have here, at this time, I do not recall. This was put down at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a generalization of what he said?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, he probably had more words to say, but I put down here all I could recall at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. All you could recall at that time, and all you can recall now, is that he referred to the American Communists as patriotic?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what he meant by that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what he meant by that. That is his statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. He then said—and you are referring to Wallace—that "* * * the United States was far removed from the U. S. S. R." Is that Wallace or Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. That is Chiang, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is Chiang—"but that the U. S. S. R. would not feel safe if the Communists were not in power in China. He then laughingly remarked * * *." That is still Chiang, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

> * * * He then laughingly remarked that the Chinese Communists were more communistic than the Russian Communists.

Do you know why Generalissimo Chiang should laugh about that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did laugh?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your understanding that he was referring to the Chinese Communists being more communistic than the Russian Communists in the sense that they lived a more communal life, or that they were more indoctrinated with the principles of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist communism?

Just how did he refer to it?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't tell you. I don't know what was in the Generalissimo's mind at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you understand it?

Mr. VINCENT. I understood him to mean that they were more dangerous.

Mr. SOURWINE. More dangerous?

Mr. VINCENT. More communistic. It wasn't a case to my mind, but I was trying to remember here, that he wasn't referring to the fact that their doctrines were more of a Russian doctrine, but from his point of view they were a greater menace.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was saying that the Chinese Communists were more dangerous, more dangerous to him than the Russian Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was laughing about it?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, turning over to page 554, in the second paragraph, we find this sentence—and may I ask, sir, throughout these if, on any case in reading these, you feel that they are being taken out of context, will you please so say and indicate the whole context which should be read? These are necessarily notes which jumped around among a lot of subjects.

I am trying to read all of a note that had to do with a particular subject that was pertinent to the question.

If, in your opinion, I fail, please call attention to it.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think I have taken anything improperly out of context, so far?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that you did. I would have to read the whole thing, but it doesn't seem so to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. This sentence is on page 554:

President Roosevelt should bear in mind that the Communists could not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support, but that they could and did use the U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands.

That is a statement by Chiang, as you report it; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Wallace reported that to the President at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether Vice President——

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether Mr. Wallace, the Vice President, reported that to the President at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether he did or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not do so in his Kunming cable, did he?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not do so in this report which was transmitted under the January 10 date, did he?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to reread that to see. Do you want me to read that?

Mr. SOURWINE. No. Do you know whether he did?

I will rephrase the question. The report will speak for itself.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Do you think that was a fair statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was a statement of Chiang, and I think it was a fair statement from his point of view that that is what he thought actually at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without regard to what he thought, was it a fact at the time that the Communists could not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support but that they could and did use the U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that the Communists were using U. S. A. opinion to force the Kuomintang to accede to their demands.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think they were making any effort in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. They probably were,, which I don't recall. They probably were. At least, Chiang Kai-shek felt they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I am asking you what you thought.

Did you know of any efforts that the Communists were making in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you realize at that time that the Communists would like to have the force of the United States public opinion back of accession by the Kuomintang to Chinese Communist demands?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I think there were people reporting that. The press were reporting it.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I say, did you realize that that is what the Chinese Communists wanted?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I am trying to think whether I had any obvious reason for realizing it at that time, that this is a flat statement of Chiang Kai-shek, and I am trying to think of what other evidence there might be, I mean, that would have come to my attention.

And as I say, I can't think of any specific thing that the Communists were doing at that time to try to influence American opinion in their favor.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know, and you do not now recall, anything that the Communists were doing at that time to try to influence American public opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I'm afraid I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you keep close track of what the Communists were doing in America?

Mr. VINCENT. Of what the American Communists were doing in America?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To sway public opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. In this country?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You anticipated, from what was said here, that they apparently were doing something?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Communists were doing something, that the Chinese Communists were doing something?

Senator FERGUSON. No, that the Communists in this country were doing something to sway opinion here that would sway opinion over in China.

Mr. VINCENT. In this statement?

Senator FERGUSON. You do not find anything in there to that effect?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I thought we were talking about Chinese Communists in here, and I think that is what Chiang Kai-shek was talking about.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Chinese Communists. Were there any?

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to recall specific instances.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know any Chinese Communists in this country?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not at that time, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, going down to the bottom of page 554 of the White Paper, we find this paragraph——

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment.

Do you think the IPR might have been acting to sway public opinion, as a pro-Communist organization?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You found no evidence in any of these writings that have been shown to you or that you have read?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time? No.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time or up to that time.

Mr. VINCENT. Up to that time?

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing in any of these documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall anything up to that time of evidence that the IPR was trying to sway.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you known of any pro-Communist activities in America up until that time?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1944? No, I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, up to the time this trip was made. You did not know that the Communists had been active along any line?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not following Communist propaganda or lines at that time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you had no knowledge about any of their activities in America?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no knowledge of their activities in this country at that time, in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that generally true in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say it was generally true in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it true in your Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that it was generally true in my Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was assigned in your Department to keep track of what was going on among the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say no one was particularly assigned in the Far Eastern Office to keep track.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, as far as you know, there was not any one looking into that question at all?

Mr. VINCENT. In the Far Eastern Office, no, no one that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. No one that you knew. And do you not think you would know if there was someone?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I would know if there was someone in the Far Eastern Office specifically assigned to that task. There were people in the State Department who did have such jobs to do, I believe. They were security.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they report to your Department?

Mr. VINCENT. They didn't report to me. I don't know whether they reported to the higher-ups.

Senator FERGUSON. At least, in your Department, they did not report?

Mr. VINCENT. To me.

Senator FERGUSON. You said that there were people to look out for the security because of Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You know, then, they were a menace. Is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Communist ideal was a menace; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But no one was assigned to look into the problem as to what they may be doing to change opinion here in America as far as China was concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. Nobody in the Far Eastern Office that I knew of, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No one in the Far Eastern Office. And that covered China?

Mr. VINCENT. That covered China.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. The paragraph at the bottom of page 554, is:

> Mr. Wallace was asked whether it was not possible to reach an understanding on a lower level with a view to maximum use of forces in the north. Mr. Vincent asked what President Chiang thought would be the adverse effects of sending the United States Army Intelligence group to Communist areas now without awaiting settlement.

Now, that was another occasion, was it not, on which you shifted the focus of the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the next page, which is your account of the discussions of the morning of June 23:

> Mr. Wallace reported conversations with General Marshall and with Secretary Stimson before leaving America in regard to China's situation in an endeavor to persuade President Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, but are interested in the prosecution of the war. He and Mr. Vincent had decided upon this line of approach the night before in order to avoid further lengthy discussion of the Communists, per se.

That is, is it not, another instance in which you had guided the course of the conversation through a conference with Mr. Wallace alone, and not with Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, where I had given Mr. Wallace the best of my advice which I thought would save time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, and he had taken it?

Mr. VINCENT. But let me say here that these conversations are not fully reported because I didn't take a note on everything, and the conversation would go on for 3 hours. This is my quick note on what was said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. But you have, I am sure, endeavored to bring out all of the salient, all of the important points of the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. I had endeavored to; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were a trained observer in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So it is reasonable to assume that you have covered all of the important points, all of the salient points of the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't promise that I have covered every salient point, because, as I say, this whole thing can be read and these conversations covered 3 hours. I was trying to clarify, because there would be very lengthy discussions, which then had to be translated, on the Communists, per se.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did not deliberately leave anything out?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't deliberately leave anything out.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was a case where, the night before; that is, June 22, there had been a rather involved conversation about the Communists, per se; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you wanted to avoid the continuance of that discussion the next day, so you discussed with Mr. Wallace what kind of an opening approach could be made to avoid it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Wallace took that line in opening the conversation the next day?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what he was trying to do, according to your statement here, is to persuade President Chiang that we, that is, the United States; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That we, the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. That we are not interested in Chinese Communists, but are interested in the prosecution of the war. You mean only in the prosecution of the war; right?

Mr. VINCENT. Interested in the Communists from the standpoint of the prosecution of the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only from that standpoint?

Mr. VINCENT. Only from that standpoint.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so that the record can be completely clear, by saying that Mr. Wallace reported his conversations with General Marshall and Secretary Stimson in an endeavor to persuade President Chiang that we are not interested in Chinese Communists, and so forth, you do not mean any implication that he was just trying to persuade Chiang of something, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he reported it as a fact, and it was simply to get the conversations down to what he thought was some kind of progression along, to disabuse his mind of the fact that we were interested in communism and Communists in China, as such.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, you were not interested, Mr. Wallace was not interested, and the Government of this country was not interested in the Chinese Communists, per se, but only in the progress of the war against Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. That was what he had come out there to discuss, getting on with the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, from what was said on page 554, of what President Chiang had said about the Communists, particularly what they were doing in this country, did that not indicate to you that we should have an interest in it if we wanted a real prosecution of the war?

Mr. VINCENT. No; because at that time, Mr. Chairman, what we were trying our best to do was to get some kind of joint military activity.

The Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese, and the Kuomintang were fighting the Japanese, and it was the hope of Mr. Wallace, of me, of the Army authorities, and the President to get those groups fighting in some kind of joint effort.

Senator FERGUSON. But did he not indicate the fact that the Communists were acting as they were acting, that that was interfering with the prosecution of the war, and that they were trying to use America, or American Chinese, to influence the opinion in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. Influence opinion in the Far East, that is what his testimony, his statement, was here.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; after you heard that, and returned to this country, did you pay any attention to Communist activities in this country as far as they related to the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. To whatever came to my attention, I did; but I don't recall any specific instance of the Communist activity in this country, Chinese Communist activity.

Senator FERGUSON. You had great difficulty in determining whether or not propaganda or literature or statements were pro-Communist; have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I haven't; I don't think.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not? You would say this testimony did not indicate that you had difficulty in determining when a thing was pro-Communist?

When I read a Communist statement yesterday, you did not recognize it as pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified that I could not readily have a definition of what I would call procommunism.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know if the statement that I read to you yesterday did not indicate to you that it was pro-Communist? Would you tell me what procommunism was back at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I haven't got a ready definition of what one would call procommunism in 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you know what the State Department means when it uses the phrase "pro-Communist"?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you not heard that phrase used in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department uses it in many contexts, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. It does not always mean the same thing when used as a phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. It may mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what it would mean at any time.

Mr. SOURWINE. It does not mean that?

Mr. VINCENT. There is one time when procommunism might mean sympathy, or, at another time, people working for communism or Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, have you not had any warning in the State Department about what is or is not pro-Communist, so that you may guard against Communist activity in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, any warning that one had about what is procommunism.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think you have had any warning?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew it was a menace, because you had a Security Department; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you know of no instructions or warning as to what communism really was or its menace?

Mr. VINCENT. I know of no warnings that were given an officer in the State Department to alert him to what was a warning against communism or procommunism.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Communists might have been working right in the very Department.

Mr. VINCENT. But that was a matter of the Security Division, to try to find out whether Communists were working in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I see; so it was not up to the Department itself, it was up to some distant security officer——

Mr. VINCENT. No; that was an integral part of the Department, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many security officers worked in your Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any?

Mr. VINCENT. In my Division?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that any worked in my Division, because it was a separate Division.

Senator FERGUSON. How would they be able to tell whether or not you had pro-Communists or even Communists in your Department, if none of them worked in there?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that they made investigations of the people as they were employed.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you think that you can tell by an investigation when you employ a person as to whether or not he is a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know whether you can or not. That was the intent of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think that by asking a man if he was a Communist you would ascertain the fact as to whether or not he was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think you would, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think you would?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think you would; but there were security investigations even back in those days, I imagine.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you only imagining that there were security investigations back in those days?

Mr. VINCENT. I am saying that because I have not any direct familiarity with how the Security Division operated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, just to clear up one little point before we go back to your notes, is it your desire to leave the impression with the committee that the State Department considers that procommunism or the phrase "procommunism" is a relative phrase, that it covers a rather broad field of conduct, some of which is relatively harmless and some of which is serious?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I would want to leave that impression, but I just simply can't make what would be a definition of pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. When the State Department uses the appellation "pro-Communist," the State Department is always referring to a serious problem; is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department does not use the phrase "pro-Communist" to mean merely some one who has a slight ideological aberration from the normal; does it?

Mr. VINCENT. If they were using the phrase carelessly, I don't know. I mean that the common use——

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Department of State use the phrase "pro-Communist" carelessly?

Mr. VINCENT. What I was about to say, I don't recall frequent use of the phrase "pro-Communist" by the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question of frequency has not been asked, sir. The question is when the Department of State uses that phrase, if it does use that phrase, how is it meant?

Mr. VINCENT. It is meant to describe a person who is sympathetic with communism.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is all?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I would say would be a simple definition of "pro-Communist."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a definition. Now, can we talk about pro-communism in the frame of that definition from now on?

Mr. VINCENT. I should think we could; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, fine.

Now, reading from page 555 of the white paper:

> Mr. Vincent again stressed the point that whereas he appreciated that President Chiang was faced with a very real problem in handling negotiations for a settlement with the Communists, the American Army was also faced with a very real problem with regard to obtaining intelligence from North China.

That was, was it not, another occasion when you brought up in these conversations the matter of sending a mission to North China?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. I was doing it after conversations with the American military there in Chungking, with the full knowledge and agreement of Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now we find this sentence:

> He—

referring to you—

> pointed out that the American Army had no interest whatever in the Communists, but that it had for very urgent reasons an interest in carrying on the war against Japan from China.

Now, when you stated that the American Army had no interest whatever in Communists, did you mean to imply that the American Army had no interest either for or against the successes of the Communists in China?

Mr. VINCENT. What that meant, by that, is that the American Army, to disabuse Chiang's mind of anything, they had no interest in the support of the Chinese Communists, per se. They wanted to get intelligence out of North China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you realize at the time, did you feel at the time, that the American Army had any interest adverse to the success of the Chinese Communists in China?

Mr. VINCENT. The American Army's, at that time, interest was primarily, sir, the prosecution of the war against the Japanese, and I cannot vouch for what the Army's attitude was toward the Chinese Communists other than as the Chinese Communists were useful to the Army in prosecuting the war against the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then your answer must be, must it not, that you did not know at the time of any adverse interest which the Army had to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That the American Army at that time was not in the position to take an adverse attitude because the Chinese Communists themselves were fighting the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then what you were saying, is it not correct, is that the American Army had no interest either for or against the Chinese Communists at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. In taking a position against the Chinese Communists, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, going down into the next paragraph, sir, you were recounting what President Chiang had said, were you not, when you said this:

> Much pressure has been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists, but the United States Government has exerted no pressure upon the Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. That is a statement, as I can see—is that Chiang saying that?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking if it was not. I believe it was.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The sentence itself does not attribute it, but in context it seems clear you were reciting what Chiang had said.

He said that the American Government should issue a statement that the Communists should come to terms with the Chinese Government. He said that the United States Army attitude supported the Communists and requested Mr. Wallace, upon his return to America, to make it clear that the Communists should come to terms with the Chinese Government. That is all what Chiang said to Mr. Wallace and you, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, was Chiang stating matters factually as they then existed, when he said that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that Chiang was overstating the matter when he says that the American Army here—where is that statement?—that the United States Army attitude supported the Communists. I have no knowledge that that was a factual statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a factual statement that much pressure had been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that that is also an overstatement.

Mr. Gauss had frequently spoken to Chiang, and so had some of the military commanders, about the vital necessity of their getting together in a military way for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do not think that constituted much pressure?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think it would constitute much pressure. I mean, it wasn't pressure in the sense of intervening. It was just from time to time the Chinese themselves were trying to get together.

The pressure was brought to bear as much by Chinese leaders to bring about some settlement and that therefore we were not introducing any subject that the Chinese were not familiar, or not themselves anxious to accomplish.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question, sir, is not who else brought pressure, but whether the United States brought much pressure.

Mr. VINCENT. The United States had certainly expressed its interest in many cases. I think "pressure" would be an overstatement—had expressed its interest in some kind of a settlement.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, did you not tell us just a few minutes ago that Mr. Wallace's mission to China was to do that very thing?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Wallace's mission to China was to tell Chiang Kai-shek that the President was prepared, himself, if there was any opportunity for it—he would be glad to assist in getting them together; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not figure that that was some pressure, to send the Vice President out to see the President of China, to tell him to get together with the Communists, and if he could not do it alone, the President of the United States would mediate or help to get them together?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly say that was expressing an interest in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not more than an interest? Was it not indicating that that is what the President wanted done?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think that it is what you would call exerting pressure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did not the President of the United States at that time, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, hold a position in world affairs and in world esteem such that if he conveyed a message directly to the sovereign of another nation through the second executive officer of this Nation, it could not fail to have a profound effect?

Mr. VINCENT. It could not fail to have a profound effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then was that not exerting substantial pressure, when he so conveyed his wishes and expressed his desires?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it true, sir, that the United States Government had exerted no pressure upon the Communists to reach a settlement with the Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. The United States Government had no contact with the Communists, and I know of no pressure that was brought to bear on them.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a true statement, then, was it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Do you change your testimony? You say that the United States Government had no contact, when they sent the Vice President out there?

Mr. SOURWINE. This is with the Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. With the Communists in China.

Senator FERGUSON. But with the President of China.

Mr. VINCENT. With the Communists. The question here—would you restate your question?

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you want to let it stand that we did not exert, as a nation, any pressure on the Chinese Government—that is, the Nationalists?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I have just testified that we did exert pressure on them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we in any way see the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. We did not see the Communists at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Wallace see any Communists up there?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that Mr. Wallace saw any Communists on his visit to Chungking.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you think over and see whether or not he did while he was in China on this mission?

Mr. MORRIS. Did he see Madame Sun Yat-sen while he was there?

Mr. VINCENT. He saw Madame Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. MORRIS. She is a Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. She was not a Communist that he knew of at that time. I didn't know of her at that time as a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn she was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. When she first went to Peking, and when I heard that she was a Communist, I had no direct knowledge that she was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Wallace go to any place where the Communists were in domination?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, he did not go?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERUSON. Then as far as you know, he saw only Nationalist officials?

Mr. VINCENT. He saw only Nationalist and provincial officials, and American officials.

May I read from your own hearings here? This is Mr. Wallace's testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted your knowledge.

Mr. VINCENT. But I was saying, in fact:

He—

meaning the President—

asked me not to see the Communists at all, since a visit by the Vice President of the United States might be misunderstood as indicating that our country favored the Communist cause.

That is Mr. Wallace's testimony here.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any such instructions?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no such instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, Mr. Vincent, up until the time you left the Far Eastern desk, or had any connection with it, that there were Communist fronts in this country?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I would have known there were Communist fronts in this country. I don't know now what specifically they might have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any of them?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall them now. This would be in 1946–47.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you leave the Far Eastern desk?

Mr. VINCENT. I left in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. What part of 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. The middle of 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Up to that time, do you know of any?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't name any now.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Now that you mentioned it, I have heard of it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether or not that was a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. I have heard since it was; I don't know whether I knew then it was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't specify now that I did know at that time it was a Communist front.

Senator FERGUSON. You know now that the former Attorney General had found it to be a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I don't know at what time he found it to be a Communist front.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you name any?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the China Aid Council?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether the Chinese Aid Council was a Communist front at that time or not.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are unable to name any Communist fronts?

Mr. VINCENT. From the memory of that time, I probably knew of them, but from my memory now, I can't recall what you would call a Communist-front organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what a Communist-front organization is?

Mr. VINCENT. It is an organization which does not take on real Communist character, but it is a front for the Communists, just what it says.

Senator FERGUSON. You have read some articles and books and pamphlets by the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that they were or were not a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say they were Communist front, from what knowledge I had of them at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you that. I said, from what has been read here.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I would not say they were a Communist-front organization.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have established, then, have we not, Mr. Vincent, that in that one particular, that double-barreled statement, Chiang was correct when he said that pressure had been brought to bear by the United States Government to have the Chinese Government reach a settlement with the Communists, but that the United States Government had not exerted pressure upon the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, at the bottom of that paragraph, you will note the sentence:

Mr. Vincent again pointed out that solution of President Chiang's important problems of relations with the Communists and the U. S. S. R. need not precede the dispatch of military observers to North China.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was another occasion, was it not, on which you turned the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right. And I will tell you why, because I myself had been in contact with the Army, and it was a matter which appealed to me because of their advice as one of the utmost importance. I had just been in Chungju, where we had B–29's flying out. There I was told of the urgent need for getting people into North China, to get Intelligence there for them, and it seemed to me to be the most urgent problem there was at the time, to try to get some kind of military group into this North China area.

It was a vacuum in all of our Intelligence work.

Mr. SOURWINE. And at that time, that is, at the conclusion or very near the conclusion of the morning session of June 23, you finally won your point and President Chiang said that the military observers would be permitted to go. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, over on to page 556, in the third paragraph from the bottom, we find this statement:

Mr. Vincent suggested that the best defense against communism in China was agrarian reform.

That is another occasion on which you changed the focus of the conversation; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Where is that statement?

Mr. SOURWINE. It is just this far down the page, here.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is, I believe, the third sentence in the paragraph, but I began with it because it appears to be a new thought at that time, and I am trying to find out if that is right.

Mr. VINCENT. That is a statement that, as I say, I would have made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; it is another occasion on which you changed the focus of the conversation.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I think in that case Mr. Wallace said that unity should express itself in the welfare of the people if communism was to be avoided.

Now, this was when we were having a conversation and the welfare of the people was mentioned. It was largely an agrarian population, and I simply added to that that the best defense against communism would be agrarian reform, meaning the welfare of the people.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the first mention of agrarian reform at that point in the conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. Agrarian reform is not a change in the subject. It is discussing the same subject but introducing a new idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is, shall we say, a particularization of the general subject of the welfare of the people?

Mr. VINCENT. Just exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. And to that extent, can we agree that what you did was, if not to change the conversation, to narrow it down to the agrarian reform at that point?

Mr. VINCENT. To narrow it down or to add to it that, for the welfare of the people, being 80 percent agriculture, agrarian reform would certainly contribute to the welfare of the people.

Mr. SOURWINE. The welfare of the people is a broader term, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So when you spoke of agrarian reform, you were narrowing the subject, if the previous subject had been the welfare of the people; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I was interpreting it down, sir. I was interpreting what the welfare of the people was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean that welfare of the people was wholly agrarian reform?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then there must have been some area of welfare of the people outside of agrarian reform?

Mr. VINCENT. There would be, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then the term "agrarian reform" is narrower than the term "welfare of the people"; is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. In this context, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you were narrowing it down, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. If you wish it that way, it was narrowing it down, but not much, when you have 80 percent of your population that are agricultural.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not know why we quibble about this, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. Because, in my own mind, that was not. It was just simply an explanatory statement of whether it would be welfare rather than narrowing it down.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, if we will look at the very last sentence, beginning on page 556:

Mr. Vincent made a brief recapitulation of the morning's conversation, and asked President Chiang whether his understanding was correct that the observer group might proceed to North China as soon as it was organized.

That was another occasion on which you swung the conversation back to the matter of sending observers into Communist-held North China. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your purpose, I take it, was to be sure that the consent which Chiang had granted at the end of the morning session was nailed down, so to speak?

Mr. VINCENT. This was a summary of the morning conversation, and I inquired again whether I had correctly understood.

Mr. SOURWINE. That one point, you wanted to be sure there was no misunderstanding about it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 558, in the third paragraph from the top of the page, we find this:

A conference with regard to Pacific affairs was desirable, and the United States would be the logical place for such a conference.

Now, that was Chiang speaking; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't found that place yet, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Page 558, the third paragraph from the top.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, that is Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you say:

Madame Chiang interpolated to suggest that it be called the "North Pacific Conference." Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two re-

lated but separate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet representatives in regard to their problems, and a conference of nations bordering on the North Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said—

that is, you said, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE [reading]:

He said that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior to any North Pacific conference.

Now, that was another occasion in which you directed the trend of the conversation; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. And I directed it at that time in keeping with what was my earlier understanding we have spoken of here, that the President's indication was to keep out of—not keep out of, but to not be a mediator between the Chinese and the Russians, which I would have interpreted a North Pacific conference to have been at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, in effect, what you were telling Chiang, was it not, was this: that he would have to settle his differences with the Chinese Communists before he could expect any American help with regard to a North Pacific conference such as Madame Chiang and he were urging?

Mr. VINCENT. I was expressing the opinion that a conversation between the Chinese and Soviet—I am speaking of the U. S. S. R. now, not the Chinese Communists—that a Sino-Soviet negotiation would be preferable in advance of any North Pacific conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. I realize that that is what it says here, sir. But I had understood you, in your last answer, to say that you were following what you understood to be the President's desire to separate the question of conversations between the Chinese and Russia from the question of conversations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

Did I misunderstand you?

Mr. VINCENT. That was true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I misunderstand?

Mr. VINCENT. No. But here we are speaking of Chiang introducing the subject of conferences with the U. S. S. R., and here we are speaking of possible conferences between the U. S. S. R. and China.

Senator FERGUSON. Taking your last view, did you not know that the Communists of China were under the control and domination of the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time I did not know that they were under the control and domination of the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first come to that conclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified already it was about 1945 that I began to recognize the fact that the Chinese Communists were being directed from Moscow. As a matter of fact, in those days, Ambassador Hurley and the others had generally accepted the idea that the Russians were not interfering on the side of the Chinese Communists in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not believe Chiang when he told you and Mr. Wallace, when he told you that the Chinese Communists took their orders from the Third International?

Mr. VINCENT. We had no evidence that that was the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not consider Chiang's statement as evidence?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What had you to the contrary, that you did not believe Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. Because there had been visitors to Moscow, and Moscow had itself said several times that they were not interfering in China, and we saw no evidence of it at that time. They weren't getting material aid.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had Chiang's statement?

Mr. VINCENT. That they were supported?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Whose statement did you have that it was not a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. We had the statements of people who were observers that did not see any evidence of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Who?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I mean observers in China, that we saw no evidence that the Russians were in any way giving any aid to the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. John Stewart Service had so reported, had he not?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether he reported it or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Ludden, did he so report?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any report from Ludden.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Emmerson so report?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall those reports.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a view held by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a view of Edgar Snow?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the view of Edgar Snow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a view held by Israel Epstein?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't read Epstein's book, so I don't know.

I know 6 months later it was a view held by Ambassador Hurley when he came back from Moscow, when he reported they were not supporting the Communists. And we saw no visual evidence of it there. When you mention these people, did they report it, I do not recall it.

But it was a generally accepted view of Gauss and all others, and all of us there. Therefore, it could have been of the names that you have mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you felt Chiang was wrong?

Mr. VINCENT. That any direct aid was given to the Chinese Communists? We saw no evidence of it.

Senator FERGUSON. We were not talking about aid, we were talking about under the influence. Are you talking about aid?

Mr. VINCENT. I was talking about aid or influence.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us talk about influence?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what influence the Russians were exerting in Yenan at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. If any?

Mr. VINCENT. If any. I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Chiang said they were, is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to read his statement here to see whether he said they were influencing him or not. Do you recall what page that was on?

My recollection was that Chiang said that the Communists were not being aided by Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. Not openly.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, as I say, I can't find that quotation I was just trying to remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Here it is, on page 554:

Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need for settlement.

So Chiang did claim they were connected, did he not? He said they were linked.

Mr. VINCENT. The quotation I had in mind, or the reference I had in mind, Mr. Chairman, was:

President Roosevelt—

this is Chiang speaking—

should bear in mind that the Communists do not openly use the U. S. S. R. for support, but that they could and did use U. S. A.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, openly. But down at the next part, where Mr. Wallace pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked witih the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need for settlement.

That indicated clearly that they were so linked, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I mean, Mr. Wallace is certainly giving an "if" clause.

Senator FERGUSON. If they were as Chiang contended: Chiang was contending that they were linked.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you have any evidence that they were not?

Mr. VINCENT. That they were not linked?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You had at least Chiang's word that they were. Did you have any that they were not?

Mr. VINCENT. We were taking it purely from the standpoint of what was brought to them, and I don't recall any evidence that we had that they were getting support from——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about support. I am talking about being linked with them.

Mr. VINCENT. No; we had no evidence that I know of, other than Chiang's statement, that they were linked with them at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, you did not take that statement?

Mr. VINCENT. That statement, that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I just want to be sure that the record speaks truly with regard to this matter of a North Pacific conference.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. What page is that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Page 558. Your note says:

Mr. Vincent inquired whether they were not speaking of two related but separate matters, that is, discussions between Chinese and Soviet representatives in

regard to their problems, and a conference of nations bordering on the North Pacific to discuss more general problems. He said—

that is, you said—

that it would seem desirable to have the Sino-Soviet discussions prior to any North Pacific conference.

Now, in view of that whole conversation right at that point, what Chiang had said, what Mrs. Chiang had said, what you said, I ask you were you not, in effect, telling Generalissimo Chiang that his nation could not expect any United States aid in bringing about a North Pacific conference until it had first settled its matters with Soviet Russia?

Mr. VINCENT. I was indicating that it was preferable, from my mind, that they settle their own differences before they would call together a general North Pacific conference; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How does that differ from the way I phrased it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, you will have to rephrase.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you not getting across to him the idea that he had better settle his affairs with Soviet Russia before he could expect any aid from this country in setting up a North Pacific conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not want to say it that way. I much prefer to say it my own way. It is that I was expressing an opinion that it would be advisable for them to settle their own differences before you got into any general North Pacific conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you making it clear to him that that was only your own, individual opinion and you were not intending to reflect the opinion of the American Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that General Chiang himself would have taken it in this conversation as an expression of my opinion in any discussion carried on there.

Mr. SOURWINE. And not reflecting the opinion of your Government?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as reflecting it as the opinion of my Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean in such conversation, on a very high diplomatic level, you would ever be presumed to have expressed an opinion not in complete accordance with that of your Government?

Mr. VINCENT. He would expect it to be in accord, but he didn't at that time, I don't believe, because he simply introduced the subject that very morning and I couldn't have had any consultation with the Government and, therefore, be expected to express a Government opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not expressing a Government opinon in a strict diplomatic sense. But he did know, as you have said, that he had a right to expect what you said to be in accord with your Government's opinion, did he not?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have a right to expect, although he had no reason to expect, I had consulted the Government, and was therefore speaking a Government opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace was there. If there had been a Government opinion to be transmitted, protocol would have required transmission through Wallace, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you were the Chief of the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did General Chiang know that?

Mr. VINCENT. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. He would expect that you would be familiar with your Nation's policies, would he not, particularly in that field?

Mr. VINCENT. He would.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that when you expressed an opinion, he, having a right to expect that you would not have expressed an opinion which was at odds with your Nation's policies, and knowing that you knew what your Nation's policies were, would be expected to think that you were expressing an opinion which was, in essence, the policy of your country, would he not?

Mr. VINCENT. There, again, you have to go back to the nature of these conversations. He suddenly introduces a subject here, and there was no attempt on my part to give him the feeling I was speaking Government policy.

They had introduced, as a speculative idea, "Why not have a North Pacific conference?" I expressed an opinion, and he certainly knew that I had no chance to express Government opinion at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us ask this question: Were you telling him that in your opinion he had better settle his differences with Soviet Russia before he looked for any help from the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I was giving it as my opinion that it would be preferable for them to settle their own differences before we emerged in international conferences as suggested by him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were an expert on China?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To be an expert on China, do you think you should have known what was going on by the Communists in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I tried my best to keep myself informed on what was going on.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there was a volume in existence, Workers of All Countries, Unite, volume 7, Congress of the Communist International?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the volume. When was it published?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that there was such a book in 1939?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of the 23d to the 32d sittings, Continuation of Discussion on Comrade Dimitrov's Report? That is the manuscript cited to you yesterday and you couldn't recognize his pro-Communist leanings. Now I show you on page 293 of that, what the Communists in Russia themselves said about the Chinese Communists and ask you to read it into the record.

Mr. VINCENT. You mean right here?

The ideological, political, and organizational growth of the Communist Party in China is explained by the fact that it is being led by the Leninist Communist International, by the fact that it can utilize the experience of all sections of the Communist International and, primarily, the valuable experience

of the leading section of the Communist International—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. With that in mind you say you were correct in not giving any weight to Chiang's statement to Wallace and to you, as I read to you?

Mr. Wallace also pointed out that if, as President Chiang stated, the Chinese Communists were linked with the U. S. S. R., then there was even greater need for settlement—

and that you as an expert on China should have known that you should take Chiang's word?

Mr. VINCENT. If I read this——

Senator FERGUSON. Wasn't it the duty of someone in the State Department to know that, and to advise you as Chief of the section? That is what I am trying to get at.

Mr. VINCENT. I know that and I had no knowledge of this at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to find out what the Communists of China were?

Mr. VINCENT. When I was in China, certainly I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find out? That book was in existence then.

Mr. VINCENT. We were viewing the problem of the Communists in China at that time, not this time, at that time, from the standpoint of fact that both the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang were fighting the Japanese, and that was the context in which we viewed it.

Senator FERGUSON. We have gotten off the subject. Let us go back. They were talking about the Communists of China being agrarian reformers, isn't that true?

Mr. VINCENT. Who is "they"?

Senator FERGUSON. The people. Is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you heard it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had heard it; yes. I don't know whether you are speaking of Government people.

Senator FERGUSON. Here you have the writings of the Communist International telling you who the Chinese Communists are, Chiang telling you who they were, and you and Mr. Wallace came to the conclusion there was nothing in what Chiang told you, isn't that true?

Mr. VINCENT. That at that time that the Chinese Communists were not being directed from Moscow?

Senator FERGUSON. That was in 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that time there was a statement in the book by the Communist themselves, is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember, Mr. Vincent, testifying with regard to the question of any proposal that the Communists in China receive arms from America?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean testifying in executive session?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, or here.

Mr. VINCENT. In executive session. I don't recall down here. In executive session I remember testifying that toward the end of 1944

or early in 1945 the idea became generally bruited that we were going to try to make landings in north China, and my testimony upstairs in executive session was to that effect. I had a talk with General Wedemeyer in March of 1945 suggesting to him the possibility of getting arms to the Chinese Communists. That was the nature of the conversation. Mr. Grew himself had earlier in that year suggested that any troops that could be used to fight the Japanese should be used.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you know, as a matter of fact, that the proposal for arming the Communist Chinese was made formally and officially to Chiang within 2 weeks of the Wallace conversations with him.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall it was made formally and officially to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say it was not?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say that it was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it might have been?

Mr. VINCENT. Within 2 weeks of the Marshall mission?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, within 2 weeks of the Wallace mission.

Mr. VINCENT. I mean of the Wallace mission. I do not recall that it was formally made that there should be arms within 2 weeks of the Wallace mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall the date of Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable?

Mr. SOURWINE. The date of his Kunming cable was about June 26, I should say, is that right, or 28?

Mr. SOURWINE. It was drafted on the 26th and dispatched about the 28th, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that within less than 10 days after that message that the President of the United States sent a message to Chiang Kai-shek proposing the arming of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the message.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that there had been one sent?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the fact of a message telling them to arm the Chinese Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, did you ever write any memorandum that might have been used by the President, as to communism in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever asked or did you have supervision of any document or memorandum of advice to anyone on communism in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Reports were made from the field——

Senator FERGUSON. No, no; I am talking about you.

Mr. VINCENT. I know I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see a report on it?

Mr. VINCENT. On communism as such in China?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall a report on communism in China. Reports were made by officers who were out in the field from time to time. To what extent they got to the President——

Senator FERGUSON. But you never saw them?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw them, the dispatches coming in from the field reporting on conditions in China including conditions——

Senator FERGUSON. As to what communism was?

Mr. VINCENT. As to what their idea of communism was, yes. Are you—I am talking about conditions in Communist China as far——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about conditions. I am talking about the party activity and whether or not it was under——

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall anything like that?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you then help to make the policy of the United States toward the Communists in China if you didn't have any support?

Mr. VINCENT. You made up your mind that the Communists were in China because of the reports you got of conditions in the Chinese Comunist area.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't you look at what the Communists themselves said?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not studying that at that time. You mean the earlier documents?

Senator FERGUSON. How could you advise without studying it?

Mr. VINCENT. Because we were faced with the situation there. Again I say, the Communists of China were fighting the Japanese. We were not studying what their ideological content was at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't Chiang tell you there was a difference between the Communists in China, which wanted to take over the Government, and those in America? Now we find very little difference when we uncover what was going on in America, that they had the same intent there in China as they had here, to actually take over, but they had a much better chance in China. Isn't that what Chiang told you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You discounted that entirely?

Mr. VINCENT. No one discounted it; no, sir. What we were trying to get there was an agreement to fight against the Japanese. It wasn't a case of discounting or not discounting it.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you get that when the Chinese Communists wanted to become the government and were therefore fighting against Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but the Chinese Communists at that time were protesting that they did not want to take over the Government, not that that made it necessarily true, but the all-important fact was to utilize these Communist armies to fight the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. Today would you believe a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you back in those days?

Mr. VINCENT. I believed that the Chinese Communists were really fighting the Japanese and that is what we wanted them to do.

Senator FERGUSON. So you believed the Chinese Communists at that time——

Mr. VINCENT. Wanted to fight the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. Did you believe Chinese Communists back in those days?

Mr. VINCENT. When the Chinese Communists told me they were fighting the Japanese and we had visual evidence of it; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But the fact that they didn't want to take over the National Government of China or the Government of China—did you believe them?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that any of them protested they were not going to take over the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought you included that in one of your answers.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall including it. That the Chinese Communists had told me they did not want to take over the Government?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so the record may be clear, sir, did you have any visual evidence that the Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese?

Mr. VINCENT. Did I? No; I never visited the areas. But people who did visit the areas reported they were fighting the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had evidence of that kind in reports of witnesses? You used the phrase "visual," and I just wanted to clear that up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, who were some of these people who reported that the Chinese Communists were fighting the Japanese?

Mr. VINCENT. I remember one American coming down from the National City Bank, passing through, and he had seen conditions there. I don't recall what others.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he? Will you tell us who he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall his name. I don't recall his name.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you give us the name of anybody who visually saw the Chinese Communists fighting the Japanese?

Mr. VINCENT. I think this was a man from the National City Bank. Excuse me. I haven't finished my answer.

Mr. MORRIS. If you know of anybody who visually experienced the Chinese Communists fighting the Japanese, will you give us the names of those people?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall the names of those people, but there were people coming in and out, so far as I recall, who did make reports, and there were newspaper reports to that effect, also of battles here, there, and yonder.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, did you have any connection whatever or any cooperation between the military intelligence of the War Department and the State Department? Was there close cooperation during the war?

Mr. VINCENT. Between military intelligence in the War Department and the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I should say there would be. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I want to show you a page from the Chinese Communist Movement, dated July 5, 1945. That is before the war ended. "Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C." This is "d." I ask you to read what the military intelligence said about the Communists in China. I will ask you then what you know about it.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

The Chinese Communist movement is part of an international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies

follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy, which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have supported loyally and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you explain why you as an expert and the head of this Division didn't know what the military intelligence thought about the Communists of China?

Mr. VINCENT. What is the date of this?

Senator FERGUSON. July 5, 1945, but it says from the beginning it was that. Here is the front page.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether this was available to me or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever seen it before?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall seeing it before.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for at least that much cooperation between the State Department, which was making policy in relation to the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Communist government in China, that you wouldn't get that?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I don't recall seeing it. I am not saying I did never see this; but——

Senator FERGUSON. Was it, Mr. Vincent, that the State Department at that time was not even slightly interested in communism?

Mr. VINCENT. Certainly it is not the case. The State Department was interested in communism.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, then, why did you not know about what the Communists themselves had written, what our own G–2 in the War Department had written?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that you have to change your idea of what we were trying to do if we can pin this down to the specific situation we are talking about in China at that time, of trying to bring about some kind of military activity of a greater nature against the Japanese. That is what I am speaking of, a consciousness of what the international position of the Communists was——

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman——

Senator FERGUSON. You told me you discounted what Chiang said, that you and Mr. Wallace didn't believe what he said. Now I am showing you these two documents and ask you as an expert on China why you didn't have that evidence along with Chiang's statement and now why you would discount his statement. You would not do it today; would you?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I would not do it today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, now that his intelligence report has been brought up and since it has been declassified, may I respectfully suggest that it be ordered printed as an appendix to the hearings of this subcommittee.

Senator FERGUSON. It is too large——

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not elsewhere available, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the circumstances, if it is not available in any other form, I will receive it and have it in the appendix of this report, because I think this is the kind of thing that may convince the American people of what was going on.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is an important historical document.

Mr. MORRIS. There will be other references to it, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it in evidence now.

(The document referred to is printed as appendix II of this part.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you remember in discussing the matter of Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable, great stress was laid upon the recommendation that General Stilwell be replaced?

Mr. VINCENT. The necessity of replacing General Stilwell. Yes; that was in our minds something that was necessary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything as to what effect that may have had upon the President or upon American policy?

Mr. VINCENT. The effect of the recommendation?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I should think it was taken seriously by the President and the interested departments of government.

Mr. SOURWINE. What evidenced that?

Mr. VINCENT. The evidence of it was, so far as I can figure, that Stilwell was eventually relieved.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by eventually?

Mr. VINCENT. Within a matter of 2 or 3 months.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the President had very shortly after receiving the Kunming cable taken a step directly contrary to that recommendation, would that indicate to you that he was not very much impressed by the Wallace cable and the Wallace recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. It would. It would have to.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had taken such a step, that is, directly opposite to the Wallace recommendation, and then had a matter of 2 months or so after that changed his mind, would it indicate to you that it was something other than Mr. Wallace's recommendation that caused General Wedemeyer to be sent out?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it was taking Mr. Wallace's recommendation plus whatever other thing happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the President did in fact very soon after receiving the Kunming cable take a step contrary to the recommendation therein made with regard to Stilwell?

Mr. VINCENT. I do. I recall—and I think it was a War Department-White House matter—that Stilwell was authorized to go over to Chiang and see him and recommend a unified command of all troops in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did that mean?

Mr. VINCENT. That meant, so far as I can recollect, that Stilwell was to assume command of all forces in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't that necessary imply the arming of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. If Stilwell was going to take over all command?

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly.

Mr. VINCENT. It would imply the arming of them under his command and utilizing them as a unified army.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was, then, a proposal for arming the Chinese Communists, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. If it had been carried out in the way that I understood Stilwell wanted to carry it out, it would.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a proposal for arming the Chinese Communists, whether it was carried out or not, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a proposal that Stilwell would take command of all the troops, and I assume it would have followed from that that the Chinese Communists would have been utilized.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was necessarily implicit, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when that proposal was made?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall when it was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because of the question of how long after the Kunming cable it was made, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to refer to page 1970 of State Department employee loyalty investigation hearings, previously referred to here, part 2, appendix, where, from the personal statement of John Stewart Service, appears this paragraph [reading]:

On July 7 the headquarters received a telegram from President Roosevelt to be delivered personally to Chiang Kai-shek. This was the first of a series of messages recommending that, in view of the desperate military situation in China, Stilwell be placed in command of all Chinese armies. I have no knowledge of the background or origin of this recommendation. Stilwell himself was in Burma, and the chief of staff seemed to be surprised. The message was considered to be of such importance that the chief of staff determined that there should be no Chinese interpreter and that we should not follow the normal procedure of allowing the message to go through an intermediary. I was therefore ordered to accompany the chief of staff and to translate the telegram, phrase by phrase, to the Generalissimo himself. This was in effect a proposal that the Chinese Communists be armed, since it was taken for granted that if General Stilwell was to command all Chinese armies, this would include the Communists and that they would therefore be eligible to receive a share of American equipment. This was, so far as I know, the first such recommendation. On July 15—

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of this statement?

Mr. SOURWINE. The date of that was July 7, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Mr. SOURWINE. 1944. Which is 9 days after the Kunming cable was transmitted.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that while you were in China?

Mr. VINCENT. It was while I was on my way back. I think I arrived back on the 10th of July.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing reading):

On July 15 there was a second telegram from the President which I again was required to intepret for the Chief of Staff. I have been sure since then that my presence on these unpleasant occasions helped to contribute to Chinese animosity toward me and to their conviction that I was again the instigator of a very unwelcome demand.

It is understandable how General Chiang should have considered that an unwelcome demand, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. We had evidence later that it was an unwelcome demand.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Chief of Staff they were mentioning in there?

Mr. VINCENT. General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; it is the Chief of Staff of General Stilwell.

Mr. VINCENT. The Chinese Chief of Staff to Stilwell?

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been the American Chief of Staff.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall who the American Chief of Staff to Stilwell was at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Who do you think they were talking about in that cablegram there?

Mr. VINCENT. When they say Chief of Staff?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. If the Chief of Staff at that time was still Ho Ying Chin, it was Ho Ying Chin; but there was another man named Chen Cheng who was Chief of Staff at one time.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is not named in Mr. Service's statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, to revert to a subject that we previously discussed, you remember the question of whether you asked for or received any security information on Max Granich.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Then let me ask you this question: Did you at the time of the question of the treatment of Mr. Granich and his publication—do you recall that occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you at that time ask for or receive any security report on Mr. Granich?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall asking for any. I seem to recall somewhere that a security report was included in that large file. That was my testimony, I think, last time.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did testify that you neither asked for nor received a separate security report, was that testimony in error?

Mr. VINCENT. That if I asked for it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Or received a separate security report.

Mr. VINCENT. I said that so far as I can recall there was probably in that batch of papers, that I went over hurriedly, a security report on him. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am referring to such a security report as you would have had to sign for. You know what the procedure is in regard to that.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any security report that I had to sign for.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you ever sent for a security report that you had to sign for when you received it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never have?

Mr. VINCENT. Back in those days; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you on or about June 20, 1944, attend a conference at which John Stewart Service was present?

Mr. VINCENT. What time?

Mr. SOURWINE. About June 20, 1944. That would have been while you were in China with Mr. Wallace.

Mr. VINCENT. John Service would have been present at a conference that I would have had with General Ferris about this very mission into the north China area. But there was also the fact that Service himself attended one of the meetings in Chiang Kai-shek's house with General Ferris.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than those two occasions, did you on or about June 20, and while you were in China with Mr. Wallace, attend a conference at which John Stewart Service was present?

Mr. VINCENT. Those are the only two that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a conference at which John Stewart Service and General Stilwell were both present?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I do not recall, and I don't think he was in China during the period of our visit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember a conference at which John Stewart Service and Owen Lattimore were both present?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, unless Owen Lattimore was present at this conference with General Ferris about sending a mission into north China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say there was not a conference which you attended at which John Stewart Service, Owen Lattimore, and General Stilwell were all present?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say that the best I can recall I had a conference with General Ferris, but my recollection as to General Stilwell is that he never came north during this visit of ours, so that would eliminate him, and, insofar as whether Lattimore was present, I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. If John Stewart Service or anyone else has reported such a conference, would you accept the report as true?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that his memory was in error because my distinct recollection is that General Stilwell never set foot in China while the Wallace Mission was in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters at Yunnan while he was in China in 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a visit by the Vice President to Yunnan discussed at all while he was over there?

Mr. VINCENT. A visit to Yenan?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yunnan is what I am talking about.

Mr. VINCENT. Which is the same as Kunming. I want to get the Chinese straight. One of them is Yunnan, Y-u-n-n-a-n, which is another name frequently used for Kunming. Yenan, Y-e-n-a-n, was the capital of the Province of Shensi, of the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You had better repeat your question and spell the word.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters at Yenan, Y-e-n-a-n, while he was in China in 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace visit Communist headquarters at Yunnan, Y-u-n-n-a-n?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no Communist headquarters at Yunnan that I know of, and if there were I am quite sure Mr. Wallace didn't visit it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the question of a visit to Yenan discussed with Ambassador Gauss?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have been, but I don't know that it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he opposed to such a visit?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say Mr. Gauss would have been opposed to a visit to Yenan. By the Vice President, you are speaking of?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. We have already had the Vice President's testimony himself that he had been told by the President not to visit the Communist territory, and he did not visit it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who coded the Kunming cable for transmission?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not. It was sent out in Army code, so I assume that it was coded by some Army personnel.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that it was sent in Army code?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it was handed over to the Army and sent down to New Delhi for transmission from there.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom was it handed for transmission?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hand it over to somebody for transmission?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection would be that Mr. Alsop handed it over to whoever would transmit it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what became of the original copy?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Owen Lattimore accompany you and Mr. Wallace to Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he stay with you while you were there?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that Mr. Wallace and I stayed at Chennault's headquarters and that Mr. Lattimore stayed somewhere else, I don't know where.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would General Chennault have been either desirable or acceptable as the President's personal representative to Chiang so far as you know?

Mr. VINCENT. He would have been acceptable to General Chiang, as I have already testified. I don't know whether he would have been acceptable—Did you say to the President?

Mr. SOURWINE. No. Would he have been either desirable or acceptable from the standpoint of the War Department, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hear a view expressed with regard to that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't Mr. Alsop express the view that General Chennault would not have been acceptable?

Mr. VINCENT. To the War Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. If he did I don't recall it. It was the general understanding that General Chennault would stay where he was and do the flying there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you and Mr. Wallace arrived in Chungking, you stated that you did visit Madame Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Atcheson, the counsellor of the Embassy, go with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether Atcheson went with us or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Sun Fo at that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Sun Fo was, as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Wallace was there?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified to that. And I thought Sun Fo was present, and there was possibly another Chinese, but I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Madame Sun request Mr. Wallace and America to help the Chinese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refresh my memory on that, but Madame Sun I know was in favor of bringing about some kind of united front to fight the Japanese. Whether that would be construed as aiding the Communists I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she indicate that she regarded the Chinese Communists as the oppressed?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall such phraseology, but Madame Sun Yat-sen had such ideas with regard to oppressed peoples. She was a very humanitarian woman and would have felt keenly about people she felt were oppressed, but whether she specifically mentioned the Communists as being oppressed I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she express any views with regard to broadening the political power of the Communists in China and permitting them to participate in the government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think she did. I am testifying here from memory and also from my knowledge of Madame Sun Yat-sen, that she would have made such a suggestion.

Mr. SOURWINE. What views did she express in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the exact views, but she was in favor of broadening the base of the government, like many people elsewhere, and I would have assumed that that would include bringing in the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the question of replacing Stilwell discussed at all at that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall; but I say I am trusting to my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it might have been?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe Madame Sun Yat-sen would have raised the issue of replacing——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you raise it or Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think that the question would have been raised, of replacing Stilwell, at this meeting with Madame Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that Stilwell was not discussed?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot say from my memory that Stilwell was not discussed, but I think it would seem to me illogical that we would have discussed with Madame Sun Yat-sen the replacement of General Stilwell.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would it have been illogical?

Mr. VINCENT. Because Madame Sun at that time was a private citizen so far as we were concerned, and the whole problem of replacing General Stilwell would have been to my mind a very delicate one.

Senator FERGUSON. You were discussing the question of war and the relation of the Communists.

Mr. VINCENT. This involved the future of an American military officer there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you go to see Madame Sun?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified before that the President—and the Vice President himself was so anxious to meet her and wanted to make a courtesy call.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. Because she was the wife of the President of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was a very important person, was she not?

Mr. VINCENT. She was an important person, but not politically at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was not politically important?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't believe she would have been considered politically important at that time in China. She was an influence among

liberal groups, but politically insofar as the Government was concerned, she didn't have any position and I would not have considered that she was of great influence in the councils of the Government in China then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't she an outstanding spokesman, if not the outstanding spokesman, for the Chinese Communists at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have considered her such; that she was an outstanding spokesman for the improvement of conditions in China, but to say that she was an outstanding spokesman for the Communists as such I do not recall that she was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't it generally recognized in the diplomatic service at that time, particularly among those in China, in the Foreign Service, that Madame Sun was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think we recognized her as a Communist then. She had been associated with the Communists as early as 1926.

Mr. SOURWINE. And had never ceased that association, had she?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether she was a member of the Communist Party, I have testified before that we generally looked upon her as a person who was sympathetic toward the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. And had been since 1926; that is the date you mentioned?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, that is the date, but when the northern march came, in 1925 or '26.

Mr. SOURWINE. And had never ceased to be associated with them and sympathetic to them?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was well known?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was an outstanding figure in China?

Mr. VINCENT. She was a very—I don't know whether you call it outstanding. Yes; an outstanding figure. The wife of the former President was an outstanding figure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any woman in China who was more outstanding at that time than Madame Sun Yat-sen, with the exception of Madame Chiang?

Mr. VINCENT. And the possible exception of Madame H. H. Kung, her other sister. I would say that Madame Sun Yat-sen, depending on what group you are speaking of, would be looked upon as an outstanding woman, either before or after Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was certainly the outstanding pro-Communist woman in China, was she not?

Mr. VINCENT. She would have been so considered if you called her pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did call her pro-Communist?

Senator FERGUSON. You called her that.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she say anything at the meeting of you and Mr. Wallace to indicate she was anti-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. She did not, as I recall it, but as I say I am trying to recall the conversation from memory.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m. the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, February 1, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: Senator Knowland, Senator Kem; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The Committee will be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, did you in the summer of 1944 know that you had been recommended by Mr. Lauchlin Currie as one of the Government delegates to the IPR conference to be held the following winter?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that Mr. Lauchlin Currie recommended me as a delegate to the IPR conference in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would be the 1945 conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever talk to you about it at all, going as a Government delegate to that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall talking to him about going to the conference; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Dennett, the secretary of the IPR, was worried about whether Mr. Grew would let you attend that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I recall speaking to Mr. Grew about attending the conference, but I didn't know that Mr. Dennett was worried that I couldn't attend.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Grew had expressed the view to Mr. Dennett that, since the conference would be discussing postwar plans, he, Grew, didn't see how anyone in the Department could attend, even in their individual capacity, since they would naturally reflect the postwar planning of the State Department itself, upon which only Mr. Hull was competent to make statements?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know that Mr. Grew told that. Is that what Mr. Dennett told?

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was whether you knew of that.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know of that incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with anyone in the IPR the problem raised by Mr. Grew's attitude in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't think so. I sat in on a panel at the discussions there, at the IPR, and what turn those panel discussions took I could not possibly recall today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Dennett had written to Mr. William C. Johnstone of the IPR, stating that "either Grew has got to be changed or he might even refuse to let Vincent come?"

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. Come where?

Mr. VINCENT. To the IPR conferences, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether anything was done about changing Mr. Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Grew, when he spoke to you about the matter, express any objection to your attending the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that he did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did he say when he spoke to you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't recall, Mr. Sourwine, what Mr. Grew would have said. He made no objection to my going, because it was mentioned to him. It was cleared with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You volunteered that you did remember talking to Mr. Grew about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you remember about that conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. The only thing I remember is that I mentioned it to Mr. Grew, and Mr. Grew took no exception to my going.

Mr. SOURWINE. We mentioned yesterday the question of the report transmitted by Mr. Wallace to the President after he returned to this country from his mission to China.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Wallace ever ask you for any suggestions with regard to that report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never discussed it with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I never discussed that written report of his after he got back here with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never discussed with him at any time the question of whether he was going to make a report to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. Only that I testified in executive session that he told me he was going over to see the President when he got back.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never saw a rough draft of that report or notes for that report?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor ever suggested any language for possible inclusion?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall doing that.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, did Owen Lattimore see the report or suggest language for inclusion or submit language?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, wasn't it unusual for a man to go out on a foreign-policy matter like Mr. Wallace's trip and then make a report to the President, and no copy of that go to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have called that unusual; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be unusual.

Mr. VINCENT. It would seem to me to be unusual, and I was surprised that he had ever done it when the question arose as to whether he had made one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other occasions where people would be sent out, particularly not on a secret mission, because you went along, a State Department official who made reports to the President, and no copies or any reports went to the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. Could it have been that the President heard about the fact or something had happened about Mr. Grew's warning to you to not allow Mr. Wallace to make promises, that the report was not made back to Mr. Grew to ascertain whether promises were made?

Mr. VINCENT. You are talking about Mr. Hull. I don't think that that would be a connection, but I would just have to give that as an opinion, because I don't think anybody knew. I never told Mr. Wallace, for instance, that Mr. Hull had told me to see to that.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not tell Mr. Wallace that?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I didn't tell Mr. Wallace that Mr. Hull had made this one remark to me about his not——

Senator FERGUSON. Was this an unusual proceeding, to send a man out like that from the President? He had sent Mr. Lattimore at one time on the same kind of mission; had he not?

Mr. VINCENT. No. It was a different kind of mission. Chiang Kai-shek himself had asked for somebody, and Lattimore went out. The Vice President went out at the President's suggestion for a brief trip to consult with Chiang Kai-shek and to return, as I understood it, the courtesy call of Madame Chiang the year before.

Mr. MORRIS. Who recommended Mr. Lattimore for that trip, the 1941 trip, to the Generalissimo?

Mr. VINCENT. The President recommended him so far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the one who arranged for the appointment; do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know who arranged for his appointment to go out to be with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your testimony, Mr. Vincent, that you did not know who made the arrangements for Mr. Lattimore to go out?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know who made the arrangements for him to go out other than that the President sent him out at Chiang's request.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Mr. Currie made the recommendation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Mr. Currie had been sent out by the President at one time?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Currie was sent out by the President at one time while I was there.

Senator FERGUSON. While you were there. Did a report go back to the State Department from Mr. Currie on that trip?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't know, Mr. Chairman, whether one did or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever heard of one?

Mr. VINCENT. I myself never saw a report that Currie made of his trip to China in 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. How were you able to coordinate these matters in the field, in the State Department, and in the White House, if you did not know what these reports were showing or what these people found, or at least a report on that report telling you what they had found.

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me something that I don't really feel competent to say, what the relationship was with the White House. The Vice President had gone out under instructions of the President. I have testified that it seems to me to be curious that we did not see his report. But why it was not sent over, I don't know. I don't know about Mr. Currie's report. I never saw a report of Mr. Currie's when he went out in 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. You were head of the China desk?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a very important position?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now, looking back, that the whole China situation was handled properly by the State Department, given the attention it should have, and the care?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it was given as much attention as we were capable of giving it, sir; yes. I certainly gave it my full time and attention. I had nothing else to do but that.

Senator FERGUSON. But your information on communism as shown by yesterday's testimony was limited?

Mr. VINCENT. Was limited to the reports we got in from the field, I said yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were in the field, did you ever make a report on communism, when you were in the field in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have those reports?

Mr. VINCENT. There is one in the State Department that I recall now, made sometime in the year 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give us a little better description so that we may ask for it?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't give you the date, sir; but I know it was written in 1942, and I can tell you more or less what was said in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a rather long report, but I can remember some of the thoughts that were in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what was in it if you can.

Mr. VINCENT. That was a report which I wrote in which I distinctly recall saying that the Chinese Communist leaders were definitely Communists and not agrarian democrats. The general argumentation of the dispatch was to the effect that the Kuomintang or the National Government could cut the ground out from under the Communists if they would take some reform measures in the matter of land and in general handling of the popular difficulties of the Chinese people. I would have to reread it——

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the substance?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the general argumentation it was pointing out, as I said before and testified upstairs.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. We referred yesterday to your conversation with Madame Sun?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the question was asked, then as to whether General Stilwell had been discussed; and, as I recall it, you said you did not remember whether that had been discussed.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I said I did not remember that it was discussed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or Mr. Wallace or Mr. Service or any other representative of the American Government get an expression of view from any Chinese Communist source on Stilwell's removal?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not get any from any Communist source. I would doubt very seriously if Mr. Wallace got any expression of view on the removal of Stilwell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any other report from a Communist source that was received by an American representative on the question?

Mr. VINCENT. Expressing a view on the removal of Stilwell?

Mr. SOURWINE. On Stilwell's removal.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you send in separate reports to the State Department or to the President while you were in China with Mr. Wallace, that is, any reports other than the notes that you transmitted?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember Sergei Goglidze?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I remember Sergei Goglidze as the man who made the toast during the trip in Siberia at some time or other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now remember that toast?

Mr. VINCENT. I can look here and find it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that it was made?

Mr. VINCENT. I remember that the toast was made now. I would not have remembered it, as I testified in executive session, had not Mr. Wallace made a record of it in his book. There were hundreds of toasts made during that time, and it did not impress me.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many toasts were there at this particular dinner?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say there were probably as many toasts as there were guests, but I could not say with any exactitude.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a dozen, fifteen?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't even recall the occasion of the toast or the luncheon or the dinner, whichever it was. Usually in this group there were six or seven of us and probably an equal number of Russians, which would make as you say 12 people.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did they drink the toast in?

Mr. VINCENT. They drank the toast usually in vodka.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this particular toast to you and Mr. Lattimore the first toast that was drunk?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say, Mr. Sourwine, whether it was the first, the middle one——

Mr. SOURWINE. Or the fifth or the tenth?

Mr. VINCENT. I see your point, but I cannot say whether it was the last one or the first one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see where it is leading?

Mr. VINCENT. I see where it is leading.

Senator FERGUSON. We understood you then, the larger the dinner party, the more toasts, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. May I make the statement here that Mr. Wallace did not drink vodka.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is the fellow who reported the Goglidze toast in detail in his book.

Senator FERGUSON. He seems to be the only one who remembered it.

Mr. VINCENT. It made no impression on me, but I won't say it was because it was the tenth toast.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the way back from China, sir, did you and Mr. Wallace fly?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Lattimore with you in the plane?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you do on the way back? Did you work? Did you have work to do?

Mr. VINCENT. We worked as much as we could. We were doing fairly high flying and we were fairly sick one day flying back. We had to fly at 22,000 feet with no particular apparatus for it. But most of the time was taken up in assisting Mr. Wallace in writing a speech which he was to give in Seattle the first week of July. I have forgotten the date. We got back here by the 10th so he must have given the speech on the 8th or the 9th in Seattle.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, as soon as he got back he was to give this speech and you worked on that on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. We worked on that on the way back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Alsop with you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read the Wallace book, Mr. Vincent, where the toast was quoted?

Mr. VINCENT. I never read through it, sir. He sent me a copy and I regret to say I never did take the time to read that book.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not think that would be valuable in your position in the State Department? Here he had gone out and made this trip and came back.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I glanced through it but I never read it with any care. It was not concerned with my area. It was concerned with Siberia.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the record may be clear about the toast we are talking about, we are all referring to the toast where Goglidze said "To Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future." Is that right?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is the toast.

Mr. VINCENT. That is the toast as Mr. Wallace has reported it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you approve the book?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not approve the book. You mean did I approve of its contents or did I approve of it in advance of its publication?

Senator FERGUSON. No; its contents.

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to testify, because I have just said that I only glanced through it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know enough about it to approve or disapprove?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know enough about what Mr. Wallace had in the book.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think this toast meant when you heard it?

Mr. VINCENT. I simply thought it was the kind of a toast that a man would make as you usually make toasts, overstating the case but recognizing at least a fact which was that I at least—I don't know whether Lattimore did—had a certain amount of responsibility with regard to the future of China, since I was at that time Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon, sir, but I think your answer may give an impression that you don't intend. The chairman's question was, What did you think when you heard the toast? and you have testified here, as I understood it, that you don't remember hearing it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is quite correct. What I mean is what do I think of the toast now. At the time the toast was given, as I say, I have no recollection of the toast being given.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, those toasts were given at that dinner party, and I have no memory of it and would not have remembered it had not Mr. Wallace made a report of it in his book.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you at that time believe that you did share a great responsibility for the future of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't put it a great responsibility, but as Chief of the China Division I had some responsibility for the future of China insofar as American relations with China would have any effect on the future of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Were these people Communists who were giving this dinner?

Mr. VINCENT. Goglidze was a Communist. And I also assumed that any other Russian present, and there were usually a half dozen, were Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that he was pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I felt that he was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and therefore would be pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. We have found one man now who is really pro-Communist.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, he was a Communist, and I would naturally assume that he was pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore assisted at all with the preparation of Mr. Wallace's Seattle speech, the one that was prepared in the airplane on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of his helping, but I would say it was quite logical that Lattimore would have helped with it because a portion of the speech was given over to conditions as Mr. Wallace found them in Siberia. Mr. Wallace himself had made, as I have noted, as we went along, copious notes on his Siberian trip, and to what extent he relied upon Lattimore I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of the conversations with Chiang mentioned in the Seattle speech?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't recall. I would have to have the speech here, but I am quite sure they weren't. May I say that the speech, if you haven't seen it, I don't know whether I have it here or not, was taken up largely with an estimate of the postwar commercial relations between the west coast of the United States and the Pacific area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether the preparation of that speech took up your available work time while you were on the plane on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. Pretty much so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't have time to do any other work on the way back?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall doing any other work.

Mr. SOURWINE. After you got back from Chungking, sir, were you consulted about the question of establishing a Washington information center on the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; not to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Currie talk to you about that matter?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no present knowledge of his ever talking to me about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the Council of American Soviet Friendship had requested the establishment of such an information center?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, as far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go to see Mr. Currie soon after you got back from Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall the occurrence, but I would probably have seen Mr. Currie soon after I got back. I know one time was at one of the early meetings attended, was one of the meetings that he held in his office at the time he was still holding his meetings of far-eastern people.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was discussed?

Mr. VINCENT. In those meetings?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. General far eastern things. I don't think records were made of them or anything. I attended only one meeting, and it seemed to be, as I have testified in executive session, meetings of experts from various departments in regard to far eastern problems.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you state definitely that you did or did not meet with Mr. Currie soon after you got back from Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot state definitely. If you would like for me to say, I would have considered it logical that I did see him soon after I got back. He was the White House assistant who was at that time under presidential direction, I suppose, to inquire into far eastern matters.

Mr. SOURWINE. He naturally would have been interested in the results of your trip, would he not?

Mr. VINCENT. He certainly would have been. You mean after we got back from the Wallace trip?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he would have been interested.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had talked with you about it before you went?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was logical that he would talk with you about it after you got back?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mortimer Graves? I believe you have testified on that point.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I have met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember reading in the hearings of this committee, exhibit No. 177, page 631, part 2, introduced on August 25, 1951, being a note from Mr. Graves to ECC, presumably E. C. Carter, reading:

> I have been asked by Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call together a few people in Washington for a discussion of a Washington information center on the U. S. S. R. I can't spend any time on the matter myself, but am quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with Russian war relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, I won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent just back from Chungking.

Mr. VINCENT. Is that in 1943 or 1944?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am unable, sir, to place the date of this, and that is why I was asking you.

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you had said whether it was after I came back from the Wallace mission or whether it was when I came back from China for the first time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was simply asking you about the Wallace mission.

Mr. VINCENT. There is no date on it. What is your question, sir, or is that a question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether you had an appointment with Mr. Currie or an arrangement to see him after you did get back.

Mr. VINCENT. As I have just testified, I have no recollection of seeing him. You have read this. It would be logical for me to see him. I was trying to correct that in this sense, that in 1944, although Currie had still retained his White House position, at that time he was already operating as Deputy Director of the FEA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have been logical for Mr. Currie to have consulted you about the question of a Washington information center for U. S. S. R., if that matter had been brought to him?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not consider it logical, and I have no recollection of being consulted on that matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it probably was coincidental that in Mr. Graves' note that matter was mentioned in the same note with the sentence about Mr. Currie waiting to see you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the way I had interpreted this letter. I saw it in my hurried reading of the transcript.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how well Mr. Currie knew Mr. Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I couldn't testify on that. I don't know to what extent the relationship was, or the closeness of the relationship between those two.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever, Mr. Vincent, take part in the drafting or preparation of a message to Chiang Kai-shek for the signature of President Roosevelt?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. That is the message that we referred to in executive session, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you referring to the message which appears on page 560 of the white paper, the message under date of July 14, 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to the message which we discussed in the executive session, which I think is that message.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Would you see if that is the message you refer to?

Mr. VINCENT (after examining white paper). Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us, sir, what part you took in the drafting or preparation or submission of that message?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the drafting officer of that message. I would not want the inference drawn from that that I had the sole responsibility for its contents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it substantially changed after it left your hands?

Mr. VINCENT. No, it was not substantially changed as far as I can recall, but I am speaking now of in the matter of what kind of information was wanted in the message. I have no recollection of consultation with anybody, but I imagine that Mr. Wallace himself had in some way indicated to me what kind of message he wanted to go out, but I couldn't testify on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That message refers to two other documents, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any recollection of those two other documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. As I have testified before, sir, I see they are mentioned here but I have no recollection of the contents of those two documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the general tenor of those two other documents?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944, quoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine?

Mr. VINCENT. I have looked that up. You asked me that once before in the executive session. As I testified then, I have no recollection of that. I have looked it up now and have found that it was a message drafted in the special assistant's office in the State Department, Mr. McDermott, and that it passed through the China Division and was initialed by Mr. Chase, who was working for me, and by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had nothing that I recall to do with its preparation. It was prepared in the office of the special assistant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know it was going to be prepared before it was presented to you for initialing?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of having any knowledge of it before it was sent up to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was that message to be transmitted when you approved it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would be transmitted to Mr. Gauss, the American Ambassador in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anywhere else?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the only direction of it that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in any sense order the distribution of that document?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or direct where it should go?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not direct it or have anything to do with drafting it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this a copy of the document in question, sir?

Mr. VINCENT (witness examining document). I have a copy here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would much rather talk about your copy, if you have a copy here.

Mr. VINCENT. I have it here, if you would like to have it.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I see it, please?

Mr. VINCENT. That, I may explain, Mr. Sourwine, is a photostat of a press conference held by Mr. McDermott, the press man in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you have here, then, is not a copy. What you have here is a photostat of an actual transcript of a press conference at which Mr. McDermott read it, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Working from that may I ask the witness, is that paper of mine a copy of the document?

Mr. VINCENT. There are differences. The one I have here is longer than the report that you have here in this document.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have the copy that you have there. And will you tell us, Is that a photostat of the original State Department records?

Mr. VINCENT. This is a photostat of a press conference held by Mr. McDermott.

Mr. SOURWINE. A photostat of a transcript?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That transcript is in the official records of the State Department; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. Let me say this: This telegram as it is quoted here is quoted from the original telegram insofar as I am able to testify, but I haven't got the other telegram in front of me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was not present.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have that?

Mr. VINCENT. This was in 1950. I was in Switzerland when that happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is Mr. McDermott's press release of Friday, June 2, 1950?

Mr. SURREY. It begins on page 4 in connection with this item.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is addressed, Embassy, Chungking, from Hull, July 25, 1944.

July issue of Amerasia possibility of using Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano, in role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping Japanese people to establish Government that will discard aggressive aims of present ruling oligarchy. Magazine, however, voices uncertainty as to whether the American State Department "will support program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor the so-called 'liberal elements' in Japan's present ruling class."

Same issue proposes that opposition to Japan throughout eastern China should be strengthened by Allies' establishing close working relations with guerrilla forces that are now operating behind the Japanese lines, not only in north, but

also in central and southeast China, and to bolster their activities with material, technical, and financial aid. Article insists that there is no reason why United States and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen their war effort in Asia, simply out of deference to current political situation in Chungking. Amerasia advocates that Allies follow the policy adopted toward guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were eventually superseded by military necessity.

Magazine denounces "incredible and preposterous statement" of General Lo Tse-Kai that Eighth Route Army has never fought Japanese and condemns the Information Minister's attempt to put blame for Japan's victories in Honan on forces that for long have been prevented from fighting and have been steadfastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by Central Government. It is asserted that vital Honan campaign was won by only 40,000 Japanese, with not more than 116 tanks, at time when approximately 250,000 Central Government troops were stationed only short distance away in barracks that form iron ring blockading the Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to have information proving that northern guerrilla forces have carried on their resistance to Japanese and have persistently continued their work of educating people to participate in that resistance, despite constant "mopping up" campaigns by Japanese and hostility on part of Chinese Government. Article points out that though poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted enthusiastic support of local population. Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps, according to Amerasia, has won the support of local population sufficiently to enable them to withstand both Japanese "mopping up" campaigns and repeated efforts on part of Central Government to uproot them. So effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride Canton-Kowloon Railway, article reports, that although Japanese have controlled both terminals for over 2 years, they have not been able to run a single through train.

Amerasia contends that time has passed when internal political considerations can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists immediate recognition of potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of liaison officers, technical aid and munitions, has become of primary importance for success of our future offensive against Japanese.

Signed by Hull, HMB, SA/M.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the same, as I checked it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

You said it was longer. What did you have in mind that was in this that was not in the other?

There is a word or two variation, but not in length.

Would the only difference be that a few articles such as "the" and "a" have been left out in the cable text that was read?

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This does not purport to be a cable text, does it?

Mr. VINCENT. It doesn't seem to me to be, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the preparation of messages for sending by cable in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am not familiar with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you ever prepare messages for sending by cable?

Mr. VINCENT. I prepare messages for sending by cable, but so far as distribution; no. I just prepare the message on a cable form, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you prepare a message for sending by cable, do you abbreviate it? Do you use "cablese" or do you write the message out and leave it to someone else on the cable desk to abbreviate it?

Mr. VINCENT. I write it out in ordinary English except for the possibility of the elimination of some articles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't that the message as it was written out in ordinary English and perhaps what Mr. McDermott read at the press conference was the "cablese"?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't testify on that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us what those distribution symbols at the bottom of that message mean, or what any of them mean?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I could simply hazard the guess that these are distribution symbols which the office of Mr. McDermott used to put on them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know what they meant? Or what any of them mean?

Mr. VINCENT. I think that last, "State FC/L," is foreign liaison, but I couldn't be sure whether that is the designation or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this message may be put in the record at this point immediately following the text of Mr. McDermott's press conference which was read into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received, and it will show the variation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 387," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 387

Secret (JULY 28, 1944.)

(Message sent:) Chungking, China, July 25 (1005), Hull (Secretary)

FAR EAST

The July issue of the Amerasia suggests the possibility of using the Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping the Japanese people to establish a Government who will discard the aggressive aims of the present ruling oligarchy.—The magazine, however, voices uncertainty as to whether the U. S. State Department "will support the program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor the so-called 'liberal elements' in Japan's present ruling class."

The same issue proposed that the opposition to Japan throughout Eastern China should be strengthened by the Allies' establishing close working relations with the guerrilla forces now operating behind the Japanese lines, not only in the North, but also in Central and Southeast China, and to bolster their activities with material, technical, and financial aid. The article insists there is no reason the U. S. and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen their war effort in Asia, simply out of deference to the current political situation in Chungking. Amerasia advocates the Allies follow the policy adopted toward the guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were eventually superseded by military necessity.

The magazine denounces the "incredible and preposterous statement" of General Lo Tse-Kai that the Eighth Route Army has never fought the Japanese and condemns the Information Minister's attempt to put the blame for Japan's victories in Honan on forces that, for a long time, have been prevented from fighting and have been steadfastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by the Central Government. It is asserted the vital Honan campaign was won by only 40,000 Japanese, with not more than 116 tanks, at the time when approximately 250,000 Central Government troops were stationed only a short distance away in barracks that form an iron ring blockading the Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to have information proving the northern guerrilla forces have carried on their resistance to the Japanese and have persistently continued their work of educating the people to participate in that resistance, despite the constant "mopping up" campaigns by the Japanese and the hostility on the part of the Chinese Government. The article points out that though poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted the enthusiastic support of the local population. The Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps, according to Amerasia, has won the support of the local population sufficiently to enable them to withstand both the Japanese "mopping up" campaigns and the repeated efforts on the part of the Central Government to uproot them. So effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride the Canton-Kowloon railway, the article reports, that although the Japanese have controlled

both terminals for over two years, they have not been able to run a single through train.

Amerasia contends the time has passed when internal political considerations can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists immediate recognition of the potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of liaison officers, technical aid and munitions, has become of primary importance for the success of the U. S. future offensive against the Japanese.

GOMINCH F–0
GOMINCH F–20
Op–13
Op–16
Op–16–1
OP–16–F
OP–20–G
OP–16–A–3–1
State FC/L

EXHIBIT No. 377–A

JANUARY 2, 1952.

MR. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Due to unforeseen circumstances, your appearance before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee will have to be postponed from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25.

We had previously notified you that you would be asked to bring certain documents to enable the Committee to have full access to the facts. We are enclosing herewith a list of the documents which you are requested to bring with you.

We are notifying the State Department of our request in the interest of assuring full cooperation in the fulfillment of this request.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

(The 32 categories requested are the same as those appearing on pages 1915 and 1916.)

EXHIBIT No. 377–B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 14, 1952.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have received your letter of January 2, 1952, postponing the date of my meeting with your Subcommittee on Internal Security from January 11, 1952, to January 24 or 25.

On September 7, 1951, I wrote you from my post at Tangier, Morocco, denying the allegation made by Budenz before your Subcommittee that I was a member of the Communist Party. I also requested an opportunity to appear before your Subcommittee in the event that you had any doubts as to my loyalty. I received no reply to my letter.

On November 9, 1951, after my return to Washington on home leave, I wrote you again. I then advised you that I had had an opportunity to read not only Budenz' testimony of August 23, 1951, before your Subcommittee, but also his subsequent reiteration of the same allegations on October 5, 1951, and that I desired an opportunity to meet with your Subcommittee before Christmas, because of my scheduled return to Tangier at the beginning of the year, for the purpose of denying publicly under oath the false testimony of Budenz.

On December 3, 1951, in reply to your letter of November 30, I stated that I could postpone my departure for my post in order to meet with your Subcommittee on January 11.

In response to my request, the Department of State has again authorized a delay in my departure in order to meet with your Subcommittee on January 24 or 25. I hope there will be no further postponements. I consider it highly important in the public interest as well as my own that I meet with your Subcommittee, but it is also in the public interest that I resume my duties in Morocco as soon as practicable.

With regard to your request that I bring with me State Department documents designated under 32 separate categories, I have to inform you that this is a matter for consideration by the Department of State. My own desire is, as it has been from the beginning, to assure you and other members of the Subcommittee that I am and always have been a loyal American official and citizen and to make available to you any further information that I may have to assist your Subcommittee in its inquiries regarding the internal security of the United States.

Sincerely,

[s] John Carter Vincent.
JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should like to ask that instructions be given to the staff to ask the State Department to send down here someone who is familiar with their distribution symbols and can testify to what is meant by the distribution symbols at the bottom of this. May we ask that that person be down here at the beginning, if not before the conclusion this morning, at the beginning of the afternoon session?

Senator FERGUSON. If they can come down right away. See whether they can come immediately because it may help the witness on the matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we then pass over this until we have that testimony?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I would like to ask some questions, but I will reserve them until that goes in.

I notice it is marked "secret." How do you have a secret press release?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, the first time I ever saw this thing it would have been marked "secret." I have no explanation of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The press release was in 1950, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. The press conference was in 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. So Mr. McDermott, having read it to the press in 1950, removed the secrecy injunction and it need not be regarded?

Senator FERGUSON. At the time you understood it was a secret document?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I am quite surprised to see that document marked "secret." It may have been marked "restricted" when it went out. Usually telegrams from State going to Chungking at that time used naval radio, and they had to be sent out in some kind of code. I was surprised to see that thing marked "secret."

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you on or about August 18, 1944, write a letter dated that date, August 18, 1944, to Mr. Raymond Dennett accepting an invitation to become a member of the board of trustees of the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of the date, but I would say I must have written a letter accepting this invitation at some time. Therefore, I have no reason to question that the date is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you stated or implied here that your naming as a trustee was without your consent, that you had nothing to do with it, that they just named you and you learned about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. You mean that I had no idea that they were going to name me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have already testified that I had spoken to Mr. Grew about the matter of becoming a trustee. If I did not, in

executive session, it was my intention to. As I say, I testified that I had no recollection of a letter, but a letter may have been written and I don't deny that Mr. Dennett may have informed me that I was being elected or may have asked me wether I could be elected.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether instructions or orders were ever sent to Ambassador Hurley to stop trying to save the Chinese Nationalists?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I have no recollection of a telegram telling him to stop trying to save the Chinese Nationalists.

Mr. SOURWINE. "Instructions and orders" is a little more broad than "a telegram."

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection at all of Mr. Hurley being instructed or ordered.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send or assist in sending such orders or instructions to Mr. Hurley?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as far as I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it, in 1944 and 1945, a Communist objective or aim to achieve removal of the Japanese Emperor so as to give the Communist type of "democratic elements" an opportunity to move into the government of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Was it the Chinese Communist aim?

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1944, yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify as having any knowledge on that subject, sir. I have no knowledge now and don't recall ever having any that that was an objective of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it, at about that time, a policy objective or aim of the Communists to secure removal from participation in Japanese affairs of the existing business and political leaders, and the breaking up of large business organizations and existing financial control so as to bring about social and economic disorders and permit the communistic democratic elements to take over?

Mr. VINCENT. You asked me to testify and I have no personal knowledge of that aim.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know what the Communist aims and objectives were?

Mr. VINCENT. With regard to Japan at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you favor, or seek to further, either of the two objectives about which I have just inquired, that is, either the removal of the Emperor or the removal from participation in Japanese affairs of existing business and political leaders and the breaking up of large business organizations and existing financial control?

Mr. VINCENT. In my position after I came into the State Department as chairman of SWNCC, both matters were discussed. We will take the first one first, which is the removal of the Japanese Emperor. There was a great deal of discussion as to his standing——

Senator FERGUSON. Will you speak a little louder.

Mr. VINCENT. As to his standing trial as a war criminal. My recollection, without notes in front of me, is that my position was stated fairly clearly in a radio forum address in early October 1945, in which I said that the Japanese Emperor or the institution of the Emperor, if the Japanese decided to retain the Emperor must be radically modified. That is my attitude on the Emperor question.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean by radically modified?

Mr. VINCENT. I meant that the institution of the Emperor which theretofore or up to that time had been what we call an absolute mon-

archy would have to be modified into a constitutional monarchy if the Japanese retained the Emperor with responsibility to the elected representatives of the Japanese people.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to the matter of securing removal from participation in Japanese affairs of existing business and political leaders and the breaking up of large organizations, did you favor, or seek to further, that?

Mr. VINCENT. At the time I took over my chairmanship of SWNCC that was already adopted policy. I had no argument with the policy. I thought the breaking up of the large combines would further the economic development of Japan along democratic lines, along lines that would encourage the healthier economic development and away from what I would call the feudalistic capitalistic system of Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it clear, then, sir, to you, that although you do not remember having any knowledge as to whether either of these things were Communist aims or objectives, since you did favor them you must have felt at the time that they were not Communist objectives? Would that be correct?

To put it another way, sir, you would not have favored these two things knowing that they were Communist objectives, would you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have favored them because they were Communist objectives. I cannot be responsible for any coincidence of papers worked out in the State Department in which I had a part and what the Communists at that time wished to accomplish.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know anything about the withdrawal of the Marines from China?

Mr. VINCENT. The withdrawal of the Marines from China was a matter under discussion almost continuously during early 1946; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department have anything to do with that?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department from time to time under pressure from public opinion here was interested in withdrawal of the Marines as soon as it could be accomplished without endangering our position in North China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with that?

Mr. VINCENT. I presumably took a position as subordinate officer in the State Department on the withdrawal I knew that I favored it, but the actual withdrawal, which was not completely accomplished until after I left for Switzerland, I would not recall a specific instance of my favoring the withdrawal except under the circumstances in which as I say when they were no longer needed. That was reiterated and reiterated in press conferences I remember held by the Secretary and the Under Secretary in response to press questions, when are the Marines going to be withdrawn. The answer always was, when they can be spared. Chiang Kai-shek himself had welcomed their being in there, but he himself had also stated in public, as I recall, that they would be withdrawn as soon as they had accomplished whatever mission they were there for, one of which was to assist in the Japanese surrender.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, have you ever visited 155 East Forty-seventh Street in New York City, apartment 7–D, or any apartment in that building?

Mr. VINCENT. What would be the building? I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. 155 East Forty-seventh Street.

Mr. VINCENT. My knowledge of New York is not very clear, but I was just saying that I have visited people in New York—155 East——

Mr. SOURWINE. Forty-seventh Street.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of visiting anyone there. If you would try to refresh my memory——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet anyone there?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have a meal at Anthony's Steak House at 627 Lexington Avenue?

Mr. VINCENT. At Anthony's Steak House? I don't recall it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1944 and 1945 who in the State Department had authority with regard to the issuance of visas, do you recall?

Mr. VINCENT. I could look it up here, sir. I don't recall who the head of the Visa Department was.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was only a preliminary question. The second question is, did you ever have anything to do with instructing embassies to issue visas?

Mr. VINCENT Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever indirectly or directly instruct, that is, yourself or through your subordinates, the issuance of visas to any alien Communist writers?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony is that I do not recall ever giving any instructions or causing to be issued visas to anybody, including Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the year 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not a member of that board during any other year?

Mr. VINCENT. Not unless the trusteeship ran over to some period into 1946. I don't know when they changed their trustees.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not contribute to the American Council during 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I have any recollection of, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. During any other year?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I have any recollection of.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking leading questions because we are covering territory that has been covered in executive session.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you given to understand that even though you were a member of the board of trustees, you were not expected to contribute?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any definite statement being made to me that I would not be expected to contribute. I know I did not contribute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you were the only member of the Board of Trustees of the American Council of IPR in that year who was listed as a complimentary member?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know why it was that you were a complimentary member?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you think they wanted you on the board?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified in executive session, sir, that it was the kind of organization that would like to have in it somebody from the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did they want somebody from the State Department on the board?

Mr. VINCENT. Because they had had people from the State Department before. Dr. Hornbeck had been in it. They wanted somebody from the State Department. I don't know whether there was anybody else in that particular year from the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that to lead the public, which was reading their books, pamphlets, and so forth, to believe that it had the backing of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify to that, whether that was their intention.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you think they had in mind? Were you told?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never told what they had in mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you went on didn't you inquire anything about it? "Here, I am a trustee, and what am I to do?"

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not inquire what I was supposed to do. My understanding was that many people were trustees who never took any active part in the IPR trusteeship meetings. I don't even know whether they have trusteeship meetings. I presume they do have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you get that understanding?

Mr. VINCENT. From looking at the number of people who were on it, who couldn't possibly, it seems to me, be called together for trustee meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever attended a trustee meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever talked to anybody about a trustee meeting?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever asked anybody who attended trustee meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever asked anybody whether you would be expected to attend trustee meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many people did you know, approximately, having their names on the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall how many people there were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there as many as 50?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to see the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there as many as 500?

Mr. VINCENT. No; there wouldn't be 500.

Mr. SOURWINE. What difficulty would there have been about calling together any lesser number than 500?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say because the names they had, like for instance in 1949 General Marshall, I would assume that General Marshall didn't go to trusteeship meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never inquired?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know to this day whether he did or not; do you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your testimony is then, you want it to stand, that simply from the number of names on the board of trustees you assumed that it would not be an obligation of a trustee to attend meetings?

Mr. VINCENT. From the character of the names on there I would have assumed that not all the trustees went to the meetings, but I don't know. I would have to change the testimony, then, that I don't know who attended the meetings other than the fact that I didn't attend meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean there were names on that list of board of trustees who were obviously stooges or phoneys to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, they were prominent people who I would have thought didn't come all the way, or to a trusteeship meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see anything unusual about prominent people being members of the board of trustees of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it occur to you that prominent persons probably wouldn't attend the meetings of that board?

Mr. VINCENT. I am simply trying to explain now that there was no occurring to me at that time whether people did or did not attend. You were asking me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just stated that from a perusal of the list of the board of trustees you arrived at the conclusion that the trustees were not expected to attend meetings.

Mr. VINCENT. I only perused, so far as I can recall, the list of the board of trustees only after I came back to the United States this time, seeing a list of the board of trustees in the hearings exhibited here.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was not at the time that you had accepted trusteeship?

Mr. VINCENT. That I perused it and came to the conclusion.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time you had no knowledge whatsoever as to what the duties of a trustee were?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never inquired of anybody?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wrote a letter accepting trusteeship, membership on the board of trustees, with no knowledge as to what the duties were and without inquiring of anybody what the duties would be?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you think, Mr. Vincent, this name of yours, being in the State Department, at the China desk, conveyed to the public as a trustee of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. You have asked me that, sir, and I don't know what the public would derive from that.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think it would convey to the public when you accepted?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I did not think, in accepting, of any effect my name as a trustee would have on the public.

Senator FERGUSON. You never thought of that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not think of that. I did not take myself in a vein that the public would be impressed by my being on the board of trustees.

Mr. SOURWINE. You thought of yourself in terms of a State Department official when you thought of yourself as going on the board of trustees of IPR, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I was a State Department official.

Mr. SOURWINE. You thought of yourself in that connotation and not just as John Carter Vincent, private citizen; didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. That I wouldn't want to testify, whether I thought at all that that was the reason I was being put on there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you stated that you knew they wanted State Department people on?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew they had State Department people on there before. Dr. Hornbeck had been on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you state they wanted you because you were a State Department person?

Mr. VINCENT. Because I was in the China Division; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the State Department.

Mr. VINCENT. Because I knew China.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew China and they wanted to convey, apparently, the idea that they had a trustee on this board who knew China and who was an expert and was directly connected with the United States Government. That is apparent; isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would certainly be logical, but you asked me whether I thought in those terms in accepting it. I am not trying to quibble.

Senator FERGUSON. No; and I am not trying to quibble with you, but the only way I can get an answer is as to what you did think. If you didn't think, I am not going to get an answer. Did you think at that time what this would mean to the public?

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you, Mr. Chairman, I did not think of what it would mean to the public.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the IPR have a democratic method of electing its trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what method the IPR had for electing its trustees, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see any of the literature of the IPR as to how your name was listed? Isn't it true they put under your name that you were with the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never seen any of that literaturee, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, didn't you write to them to give instructions as to how your name was to be listed in the roll of those who attended the convention in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. How my name was to be listed?

Mr. SOURWINE. Exactly. Didn't you write to the IPR telling them that you were listed as (then giving your title) but that it was not necessary to use the whole title, including "Office of Far Eastern Affairs"?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall writing and telling them how to list me. I wouldn't have thought I had to write, but if I did it is certainly

something which has slipped my memory. They knew I was Chief of the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, of course they did, and they did list you that way, didn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, they did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you through, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the ballot for the election on which you were elected a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that your name was one of six names on that ballot under the subheading "Washington," with the instruction at the top, "vote for six"?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. What duties, if any, did you perform as a member of the board of trustees of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. As far as I can recall I performed no duties at all as a member of the board of trustees of IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have indicated that perhaps you were sought as a member of that board because of your expertness in your field. While you were a trustee did the IPR ever call upon you, as a trustee, for expert advice or opinion?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have already testified, I saw members of the IPR from time to time. Mr. Dennett, as I have already testified, came to see me. Whether they came to see me in my capacity as a trustee of the IPR, whether they came to see me simply to discuss, as many people did, conditions in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, IPR people came to see you before and after you were a trustee, didn't they?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any increase in the number of them that came to see you while you were trustee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of any increase or decrease of the numbers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any increase after you became or decrease after you ceased to be?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of any charges of the IPR being controlled by a Communist or pro-Communist group?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read a report on the IPR prepared by a State Department investigator?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see such a report?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know such a report had been made?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the present date do you know that such a report was made?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge even to the current date that such a report was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know the State Department had been called upon for such a report and had refused to produce it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the hearings of this committee with regard to the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not all of them, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time take any action for the purpose of bringing about a change or changes in the Department of State personnel assignments for the handling of far eastern matters?

Mr. VINCENT. The matter of changes in personnel in far-eastern matters was handled by the administrative section in personnel. I can't recall any instances of making their suggestions as to where people would go. I do recall that—I am thinking now of the ones that made an impression on me—remember recommending that Mr. Stanton be made Ambassador to Siam or Minister to Siam at the time, that was in 1945. But insofar as interfering or directing the assignment of people, I may have made recommendations from time to time as to assignments. I cannot recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were Director of the Far Eastern Division, were people hired in that Division without your knowledge, consent, or approval?

Mr. VINCENT. While I was Director?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I won't be consulted as Director of the Far Eastern Office in regard to people being hired unless it was a matter of hiring a new secretary or a higher officer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anyone who was going to deal with policy would have to have your approval, wouldn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Practically, yes; theoretically he wouldn't have to have my approval.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Secretary could always go over your head?

Mr. VINCENT. Go over my head and just send somebody in the office.

Mr. SOURWINE. But as a matter of form that wasn't done? You had the confidence of your superiors?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were therefore consulted about personnel changes in your department, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Of a major nature, of an important nature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which involved policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever initiate any such changes?

Mr. VINCENT. We are speaking of the Far Eastern Office, are we, when I was Director, that period?

Mr. SOURWINE. They are certainly people dealing with the handling of far eastern matters.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, but I mean, I am speaking of a period now, because when I was Director of the Far Eastern Office I had much more to do with the organization of that office that I did when I was Chief of the China Division, and there was a Director and an Assistant Director. I am speaking when I was Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that is obvious. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I recall recommending the man who took the China Division at that time, who was Mr. Bill Turner. I am trying to think of the organization of the office. He was a Foreign Service officer whom I suggested to take that job.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you made many recommendations, didn't you, during the course of your tenure?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you wanted me to recall them.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. I am just trying to establish the fact that you were the active head of that Office, that you were not a figurehead, that you did initiate recommendations, and pass on the recommendations of others.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give any information to any person or persons outside the Department of State regarding changes sought or effected in the State Department's assignment of personnel for the handling of far eastern matters.

Mr. VINCENT. Will you read that again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Did you ever give any information to any person or persons outside the State Department regarding changes sought or effected in the State Department's personnel assignments dealing with far eastern matters?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of such conversations outside.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of your associates do so with your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of their doing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall stating at a dinner in 1945 that "for 3 years I worked at nothing but to get the Communists and the Nationalist Government together in China."

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have said that?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I might have said that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have been a true statement at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been a true statement at that time; to get the Nationalists and the Communists to settle their differences.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever engage in a private correspondence with personnel of the Embassy staff in Chungking?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir. I am not much of a personal correspondent. At some time I exchanged a personal letter with somebody, George Atcheson or somebody else, but I have no recollection of personal correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever carry on such personal correspondence by way of the diplomatic pouch?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would there have been anything wrong with that if you had?

Mr. VINCENT. In getting things to Chungking it was about the only way we had of getting them there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything wrong in carrying personal stuff or sending personal stuff in a diplomatic pouch?

Mr. VINCENT. There is now, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there then?

Mr. VINCENT. To Chungking there was not because Chungking was an exception because it was so difficult to get in there. I don't know when the regulations were put in, but I know now you are expected not to use the pouch for purely personal matters, unless you put stamps on the letters; or, in some places, exception is made for it. I don't know what the regulations are.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had something when you were in China that you wanted to bring back with you, couldn't you have put it in a pouch and brought it back even though it was personal to you?

Mr. VINCENT. In Chungking during the war years you could.

Mr. SOURWINE. Couldn't you do that from another station?

Mr. VINCENT. Putting personal things in a Government pouch now is discouraged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Suppose you had a friend and he said, "I want to get this back to the States, and I am afraid if I carry it I will have trouble with the authorities or will lose it, I will be questioned about it, you take it back for me," would you not be authorized to do that?

Mr. VINCENT. You are speaking of when? During the war years in China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. In the war years in China people who were trusted, people who were Government people, did use the pouch for that purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. But currently you are not supposed to put things in the pouch.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean except in the China situation you couldn't do it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what prevailed in other areas. I am speaking only of the one that I had any knowledge of, that communications with Chungking were very difficult in those war years.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been at other stations, at other posts, was it permitted from other posts?

Mr. VINCENT. In Bern, where I most recently served, using the pouch for transmission of personal letters was discouraged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever use the pouch for bringing anything back to this country for a friend?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, but I may have from Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with bringing the manuscript of Berlin Diary back to this country?

Mr. VINCENT. I brought it through Spain; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you carry it?

Mr. VINCENT. I put it in my trunk.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who owned Berlin Diary at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. William Shirer was the author of the notes that I brought in my trunk through Spain in 1940.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a matter of accommodation?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a matter of accommodation, because at that time Shirer was afraid that if it came out in private hands, that the Spaniards would see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it correct to say you favored political settlement of the dispute between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Government in China?

Mr. VINCENT. It is correct to say so, and I may add that Chiang Kai-shek on numerous occasions said he favored political settlement.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean by that phrase, "political settlement"?

Mr. VINCENT. I meant that they would settle their differences in political conferences, as they were trying to, in order to avoid, as I say, a disastrous civil war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Chiang Kai-shek mean the same thing when he used the same phrase?

Mr. VINCENT. Chiang Kai-shek would mean the same thing, of bringing them into the Nationalist Government in some manner which would avoid conflict between them.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you attended that conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1945, did you do so as a member of the board of trustees or as a member of the American delegation to the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection, sir, is that I attended as just one member of the delegation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were invited to attend the conference sometime before you were elected a trustee, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. You have spoken to me of a letter here from Dennett in regard to my becoming a trustee and I don't recall whether I was asked to be a trustee before I was asked to go to the meeting. I would say that I was asked, my best recollection on attendance at the conference, being asked to be a trustee was somewhere near about the same time, but which came first or second, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you not invited to a conference in the late summer of 1944 or earlier?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have placed the time later but I have not clear memory as to what the time was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were given several months' notice, in any event?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Philip C. Jessup had recommended you for inclusion in that American delegation to the IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated you made no speech at the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I made no speech that I recall at the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make a lengthy statement, 10 minutes or longer, at any discussion at the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall making any lengthy discussion. I may have talked 5 minutes, and my recollection, as I testified in executive session, is that I took very little part in the panel discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. After you got to Hot Springs, were you included in any preliminary meetings of any groups other than the conference groups in the official meetings and sessions of the conference?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me to recall that?

I don't. I do not recall any political meeting. I should imagine the American group met. I don't know of any other meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. The American delegation group had met before you left to go to Hot Springs, had they not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified in regard to that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking of a meeting with not all but some members of the American group after you got to Hot Springs.

Mr. VINCENT. I think that the American delegation met, whether I attended all the meetings, every morning before the panel discussions took place, but whether every member of the American delegation was present at those morning meetings—I was not regularly present, but my memory as best as I can bring it to bear on this matter that I have

forgotten a great deal about, is that the American delegation did hold meetings preliminary to the day's discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Julian Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know about him?

Mr. VINCENT. I know that in 1944 Julian Friedman was assigned to the Far Eastern Office, that he worked in the China Division for a matter of about a year, and that subsequently he went to China as a labor attaché.

My recollection is that before he came into the Far Eastern Office, that he had worked in some other office or division in the State Department concerned with labor matters.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his position in the Far Eastern Office?

Mr. VINCENT. He was simply one of the junior members of the staff. He had no specific duties except that he was trying to learn something about China preparatory to going out to China as a labor attaché. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he not have a title of some kind? Was he just a clerk?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he was one of those types of people—I am trying to think now what we called them in those days. He was not a Foreign Service officer and he was not Foreign Service reserve, because that title was created later.

Foreign Service auxiliary, I think, is what they called it at that time, but I don't know whether he was Foreign Service auxiliary or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I read you a description of Mr. Friedman, and ask you if it is correct:

> Julian Friedman was born June 2, 1920, in New York City. Immediately upon graduation from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, he was hired by the State Department in 1943 as a junior divisional assistant in international economic affairs.

Mr. VINCENT. That was the job that he had before he came to the Far Eastern Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what the job was when he came to the Far Eastern Office?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether he had that title of junior divisional assistant, because it was a departmental title.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did that title mean?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it meant just what it says, a junior divisional assistant, somebody who assisted as a junior in a division.

As I say, I don't know what division he was in, but I think he was in that division of labor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it about equivalent to third assistant supervisor of auxiliary functions?

Mr. VINCENT. It would depend on the man, but it was just about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. He certainly took no demotion when he came into the Far Eastern Office, did he?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether his title was changed or not, I don't know, but I don't think he would have taken a demotion in salary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with bringing him into the Far Eastern Office?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve?

Mr. VINCENT. I neither approved nor disapproved. I don't think I was consulted. The first time I saw him, he was assigned to the office.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were Chief of the China Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Chief of the China Division. Assignments were made then to the Far Eastern Office, and people were assigned then to the Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean he was just foisted upon you without consultation with you at all?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of being consulted on the employment of Julian Friedman.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean in the State Department the superiors will say to the head of a division, "Move your desk over in the corner, we are going to put another desk in the opposite corner, we have a man that is coming in here who is going to work with you"?

Mr. VINCENT. No. You mean his employment and transfer to the Far Eastern Office. I had nothing to do with that. After he came into the Office, he was no doubt assigned to the China Division. I was probably consulted by Mr. Ballantine or Mr. Grew as to whether that was an assignment for him. I have no recollection of interfering with the assignment one way or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at least consulted, then, when they moved him into your office?

Mr. VINCENT. I must have been consulted.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean physically, the room that you occupied.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I would have been consulted. But you asked me whether I remember being consulted. I don't remember being consulted but it would be logical to be consulted.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did approve bringing him in?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony you did not initiate that in any way at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the suggestion for moving him into your office, for desk space roughly corresponding to your own, was not your suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. No. It came, I suppose, as a matter of discussion between Ballantine and myself or someone else as to whether I needed new personnel in the China Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. A person coming into that Office would have seen two desks, one on his right and one on his left, in the corners opposite the door?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether that was the Office—I know what you are speaking of now, when Friedman first joined the Division, but the Office when he occupied space with me was one of those large State rooms.

Mr. SOURWINE. A person coming in the door would have seen two desks, one on his right and one on his left?

Mr. VINCENT. People coming in the room would have seen a desk of a secretary immediately on the left. She did not have an outside room. They would have seen in the left-hand corner, as I recollect it, another desk. In the right-hand corner, on the far side, they would

have seen my desk and, as I recollect it, there was another desk against the wall immediately to the right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that being occupied?

Mr. VINCENT. That other desk was not occupied except as people came into the Division as visitors. General Hurley occupied it, incidentally, for a month.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Mr. Friedman share a secretary?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether he used the same secretary as I did or not, but if she wasn't busy, I would assume he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Who occupied that desk?

Mr. VINCENT. People would come in. I remember that General Hurley, when he visited the United States in March, General Hurley and I sat there in the room. I gave him my desk and I sat in the corner desk for about a month, but there would have been other people. We had very little room and there would have been other people to use that desk who were visiting from the field.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any security check that was ever made on Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't know of a security check on him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Friedman what material or information might be shown to Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you describe Mr. Friedman's full duties?

Mr. VINCENT. I have tried to do that in executive session, sir. I wound up with the fact that he did just whatever job was assigned to him from time to time, to read dispatches when they were of particular interest on social or labor matters.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anybody ever assign work to him, other than you, when he was occupying office space with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify exactly on that. I don't know whether the director or the deputy director would have assigned some. They could have assigned it to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mainly; and, insofar as you know, any assignment he got came from you?

Mr. VINCENT. Assignments he would have gotten were mainly from me.

Mr. SOURWINE. What kind of assignments did you give him?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, he just did what other people gave him, just worked in the office and did jobs of reading dispatches when they were of one concern or another.

Mr. SOURWINE. When he would read a dispatch, he would do it because you assigned him to do it?

Mr. VINCENT. Either I or my deputy, the Assistant Chief.

Mr. SOURWINE. Generally, you gave him most of the assignments?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to testify exactly on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just did testify on that. Did you not say that generally you gave him most of his assignments?

Mr. VINCENT. I said generally I would give him most of the assignments, or my deputy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did, on occasion, assign him to read dispatches; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you asked him to read a dispatch, why did you want him to read it?

Mr. VINCENT. In order for himself to become informed on it and, as the system was in those days, to put briefings on the dispatches so you would not have to read the whole dispatch.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was briefing dispatches for you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever prepare any memoranda for you on dispatches?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any memoranda, but he probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. The briefings did not constitute memoranda?

Mr. VINCENT. If you call a brief on the thing a memorandum. But sometimes, depending on the length, it would be a memorandum on one subject or another. but I don't remember any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever rough draft anything for you?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether he did or not. He had the work there and he could have.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he there in July 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. In July 1946?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to look up his record here, if you have that book; but I think he had already gone to Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever dictate to your secretary for your signature?

Mr. VINCENT. He probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had so dictated, would his initials ever appear anywhere on the letter or paper?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been normal procedure; if he had dictated a letter for my signature, it would have his initials in the lower left-hand corner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he not do that with some frequency?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether frequently or not, I assume he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had a man there who was in your Division whom you considered was competent to do the work. You gave him a lot of routine correspondence to handle for you?

Mr. VINCENT. Probably.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say "probably"?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, he was there; I don't recall any specific instance. I don't recall any general instance, but he certainly was there earning whatever he was making and doing work. I would have assigned him to answer this letter or that letter. The answer is "Yes."

Senator FERGUSON. You did do so?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not confine his assignments to reading dispatches and preparing briefings for you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You gave him other work?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that other work included the preparation of certain correspondence?

Mr. VINCENT. I can only say that it is logical to say that he would have prepared correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. What other kind of work did you give him?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't think of the specific types of work.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he kept busy?

Mr. VINCENT. He seemed to be busy to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have him run errands for you, personal errands?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever do any research for you?

Mr. VINCENT. That would have been possible, that I had asked him to look into something, read something, to let me know what was in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was one of his functions, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you stated that you never investigated his loyalty record.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I never have.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never asked for his loyalty file?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. His security file?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I think in executive session you, yourself, said he was in San Francisco, so I know it from your report that he was in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Independently of anything I might have said, do you have any knowledge as to where he is?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; because I testified in executive session I didn't know where he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record, on the question of what I said, I told you that information had come to the committee that he was at the University of California. That does not necessarily place him at San Francisco, but he might be only a "bay" away.

Mr. VINCENT. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why was he dropped or terminated at the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge as to why he was dropped or whether he himself resigned.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never discussed that matter with anyone?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall discussing it. I was in Bern and I don't know the date when he was dropped or resigned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone every tell you that Friedman was suspected of being the source of leaks?

Mr. VINCENT. No. I have seen that in the testimony here but at the time he was working with me nobody told me, as far as I know, that he was suspected of leaking.

Mr. SOURWINE. No one ever made those charges to you or told you about such charges or such suspicions?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall anybody coming to me and accusing him of leaking.

Senator FERGUSON. You were never questioned about leaks?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you not think you would recall an important matter like being questioned about leaks?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator FERGUSON. Think a moment. Were you ever, while you were in the State Department, questioned about leaks from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Questioned about leaks from the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. To my knowledge and belief, I don't recall being questioned about leaks from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever asked any questions about the loyalty of any employees in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. I have been questioned about the loyalty of people after I got out to Bern because we would get letters from the Security Division there about people who had served or who had lived in Switzerland.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what we are trying to get at.

Mr. VINCENT. That is a system that was initiated. I am describing now a system which the State Department has which you call checks on people who apply for jobs.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that start?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say definitely when it started.

Senator FERGUSON. About when?

Mr. VINCENT. It had started when I went to the field, when I went out to Bern in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Up until 1947, had you ever been questioned about leaks in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been questioned about the loyalty of any person in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, prior to going into the field in the middle of 1947.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall being questioned about leaks or loyalty of people in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Since you went to Bern, have you been questioned about leaks in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall. Our office used to get letters, but I don't recall being questioned about leaks in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You had charge of the Far East desk at one time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not true that in the Amerasia case the papers were taken from the State Department or had been in the State Department and got to Amerasia and were published?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. And found in their office?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever questioned by anyone about those papers or how they may have gotten out of that office?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to think whether I was or not.

The reason I am hesitating here is because I am trying to figure—it is a perfectly logical question—as to what the logical answer would be.

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest that you think about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say, Mr. Vincent, you were trying to think what a perfectly logical answer would be?

Mr. VINCENT. I said it is a logical question.

Senator FERGUSON. I have already given the question. Do not worry about the question being logical.

Mr. VINCENT. I was trying to think whether at the existing time——

Senator FERGUSON. Can you not remember a thing like that, as important as it would be, about leaks or about papers being taken from the State Department, that you were questioned about it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is just what I am trying to do, Senator, to see whether I can recall anybody asking me about the leaks in connection with the Service case, and I am trying to think of anybody I might have known in the Security Division that might have come up and questioned me about it. I think somebody did come up from the Security Division or somebody was sent up by the Security Division that did ask where papers were kept and asked about them at that time, what the files were.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what you know about that investigation.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of the thing except that it was on the matter of where files were kept.

Senator FERGUSON. Where files were kept. Anything else?

Mr. VINCENT. Where files were kept in connection with the availability of papers to one person or another.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the explanation now as to the questioning?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the explanation, as far as I can remember.

Senator FERGUSON. As to the investigation that was made?

Mr. VINCENT. As to the investigation, the only one I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did it take to complete the investigation, as far as you were concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't know whether it was 10 minutes, 20 minutes, 30 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you no recollection at all?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't recall back in 1945 how long a conversation I might have had.

Senator FERGUSON. You saw in the newspapers the question in the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that not refresh your memory? Was it not about that time you were questioned?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you meant the length of time. It was at the time of the Amerasia case, and I didn't even recall this in executive session, but I now think somebody came up.

Senator FERGUSON. You now only "think" there was some one. Do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall somebody came up. I am trying to think who it was that came up, whether he came from the Security Division, whether he was sent up from the Security Division to ask how we kept papers, and that is all I recall of that particular instance. I thought you asked me of the length of the conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. All they did was to come in and ask how you kept the papers?

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection of what the thing was about.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your best recollection?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all you can give this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I mean the whole investigation was in connection with the disappearance of papers from the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about your share in it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is my recollection of my share in it.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all you were questioned about?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I recall being questioned about.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that not an important matter to the State Department, papers being removed?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did some of them come out of your files?

Mr. VINCENT. I have since learned that some of them came out of my files; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And the only examination that was made is what you have told us about here this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. That somebody was sent up by the Security Division. I imagine I can add to that; they asked me whether——

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would do more than imagine.

Mr. VINCENT. I say it was in connection with the Amerasia case and in connection with the disappearance of these papers that the man came up.

Senator FERGUSON. First, when I asked the question, you had absolutely forgotten about that.

Mr. VINCENT. I had forgotten whether anybody had come up or not.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Amerasia case was so unimportant that you had forgotten anybody had asked you about papers or leaks or anything else?

Mr. VINCENT. The Amerasia case took place in 1945. I was trying to do my best to remember if in any way I was questioned about the Amerasia case, and I have told you all I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think it is possible you may have been a member of the Communist Party in 1945 and now have forgotten it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You think you would remember that?

Mr. VINCENT. I am sure I would remember that.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as you were concerned, did you make an investigation about the papers that were taken from your files? Whom did you question?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know at that time who, or what papers had been taken from the files, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. You mean they never told you what papers they were talking about when they investigated?

Mr. VINCENT. The FBI was keeping the papers, and I do not know what the exact papers were that were taken from the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to an FBI officer?

Mr. VINCENT. There may have been an FBI officer sent up by Security.

Senator FERGUSON. Just may have been? Do you not know if an FBI officer came in he would show you his picture and credentials?

Mr. VINCENT. No; because I don't recall being interviewed by an FBI officer except possibly on this one occasion.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get it a little more definite than "possibly." Did you make an investigation about the papers or the leaks in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not make an independent investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked to make an investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall being asked to make an investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. And the only thing that you can recall now is someone coming to you and asking where you kept the files; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. And who had access to the files.

Senator FERGUSON. And who had access to them. Is that all?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you as to whether or not you gave these papers to someone outside?

Mr. VINCENT. They might have, but I don't recall their asking me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think they might have?

Mr. VINCENT. I think they might have, and my answer would have been "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you as to whether or not you gave the papers to Roth or Jaffe?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me whether they did or didn't. I don't recall whether they did or didn't ask me whether I gave the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. They may have missed asking you that, the man in charge?

Mr. VINCENT. That may have been one of his questions, and my answer would have been "No."

Senator FERGUSON. It may have been. Did you know Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. I had seen Roth come in and out of the Department; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had he ever been in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. He had been in the office one time or another calling on Friedman.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you any questions about Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you any questions about Roth and Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether they did or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask you whether Roth had ever been in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't recall this conversation, whether they asked me specifically about Roth or not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the best you can do for this committee about this investigation of the leaks and the removal of papers from your files?

Mr. VINCENT. From my memory, that is the best I can do.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think this committee has been enlightened about this problem?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have liked to enlighten the committee more, but I do not recall exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ask whether John Service came in and out of your office?

Mr. VINCENT. They probably did.

Senator FERGUSON. Just probably?

Mr. VINCENT. When I say that, I am not recalling the conversation, but it certainly would have been logical to ask for the disappearance

of the papers whether Service could come in or out of my office, and my answer would have been "Yes."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have as much trouble giving the Department heads and so forth, in your office, information as you do this committee of happenings in the past?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, that question was asked me yesterday.

Senator FERGUSON. And I ask it again.

Mr. VINCENT. I answered it yesterday the same as I will answer today. If the Department asked me questions about something that happened 7 years ago, I would have equal difficulty.

Senator FERGUSON. This was an important matter, the removal of papers from your office.

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly was.

Senator FERGUSON. It cast a reflection on you personally: did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly could have.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all, just "could have"? Did you not take this matter seriously when this man came?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was it?

Mr. VINCENT. I said he was somebody sent up by the Security Division of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you question Friedman about the papers?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall interviewing Friedman about the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not strike you that, if Friedman was in the office and Roth came in to see Friedman and the papers were removed, you ought to ask Friedman about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That never struck you?

Mr. VINCENT. No. As I say, I wasn't, myself, conducting the investigation. As I say, I didn't interview or question Friedman about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though you were not conducting the examination, Mr. Vincent, I would have thought, and now think, that you would have been more interested in it than you have displayed to this committee. I must tell you frankly that I do not think you have been frank on this investigation that I have been asking you about.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have tried to be frank.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not believe you have been. I refer to the record, and the record will speak for itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, when was the so-called Amerasia case? When were the papers discovered in the office of Amerasia? Do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say the latter part of March or early April 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Toward the end of 1945, was there any fear in the Institute of Pacific Relations that there might be further investigations growing out of the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you repeat that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any fear in the Institute of Pacific Relations that there might be further investigations growing out of the Amerasia case?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall them, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever consulted by anyone connected with the Instiute of Pacific Relations about the possibility of surveillance or other activity which might drag the Institute of Pacific Relations into some kind of turmoil in connection with subversive charges?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge was I consulted about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically, did Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore or Mr. Lattimore ever see you about such a matter?

Mr. VINCENT. If they did, I am afraid I would have to make my usual statement, I don't recall their seeing me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel to state if what I hand him is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a carbon copy of a letter, is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And attached to it is an original of a letter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom is the carbon copy letter addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Signed by whom?

Mr. MANDEL. Signed, Mrs. Marguerite Ann Stewart, Acting Administrative Secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. How is the other letter addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. "Dear Peggy" and refers to Mrs. Marguerite Stewart, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. How is it signed?

Mr. MANDEL. Betty Ussachevsky.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I have those?

This letter, which is dated December 12, 1945, addressed to "Dear Eleanor," reads as follows:

I am going to read the whole letter, but we will get down to the meat in the coconut toward the end.

I have discussed the matter of your pinch hitter in Washington with ECC and he tells me that Phil Lilienthal is out of the picture. With Hilda gone, Pacco is too understaffed to spare him.

Do you know who Phil Lilienthal was?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified I have no recollection who Phil Lilienthal was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who the "Hilda" was that he referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. Not by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who it might have been?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. By that name or any other name?

Mr. VINCENT. Not unless you give the last name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Hilda Austern?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I testified I didn't know Hilda Austern. I said I thought she was secretary to Carter. I may be wrong on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Pacco is, that is referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reading the next paragraph of the letter:

As you surmised, he is not particularly interested in either Gretchen Green or Eleanor Perkins. I thought your suggestion about an old IPRite advisory

committee meeting at a regular weekly luncheon a masterful one, and think it should be started at once by you so that it will be in full swing for the newcomer. With regard to your accompanying suggestion of Ellen Atkinson, ECC asked how pink she is. I think this query was motivated by Betty's worries with regard to possible future trouble and, in that event, Carter does not favor Ellen's being associated with the IPR. He is, however, open to argument on this matter if you feel strongly that she has no pink reputation.

In the meantime, I have consulted the staff and Larry suggests Lillian Coville and Audrey Menefee, both of whom, I understand, have recently been let out of FCC.

Do you know Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I think, if the Audrey Menefee was connected as a script writer with NBC.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was Selden Menefee.

Mr. VINCENT. That I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Audrey Menefee is related to Selden Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Miss Coville, in particular, sounds rather good and has already told Larry she would like a job in the IPR. Enclosed is a bit of dope about these two prepared by Shirley and Larry. Will you be good enough to try to get in touch with them and interview them?

I just received a note to Eugene Staley from Betty. Please tell her that he is the executive secretary of our San Francisco office and, in future, mail to him should be directed there. I shall forward this letter.

Now we come to what I characterize as the meat in the coconut:

We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter, and I hope that you will have a discussion about this with Bill, and also with John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things.

Now, does that aid your recollection at all?

Mr. VINCENT. It does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Marguerite Ann Stewart, the acting administrative secretary of IPR, referred to you in a letter to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, American Council of IPR as a trusted friend who might be in the know?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. One of the "knows" was whether this party was pink or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what "these things" referred to?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Do let me know what you think of Coville and Menefee as soon as you have had a chance to sound them out.

As ever,

(Mrs.) MARGUERITE ANN STEWART,
Acting Administrative Secretary.

Did you know Marguerite Ann Stewart?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she is any relation to Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. This second letter addressed to "Dear Peggy" and dated December 5, is on the stationery of the American Council of

IPR. I will read the first paragraph. It appears to be of little relevance:

DEAR PEGGY: I was very horrified to discover that I had not sent one of the school orders to you with the batch that I sent after we had moved here. I am enclosing it in this letter. It is dated October 25. I discovered it in a file box which I have just got around to sorting out. I hope that you can feel assured that we won't have any more delays like this and I am very sorry. I would fill this out myself except that Eleanor's pamphlet is listed and I think it better that you handle that request; also, so far we have established no machinery to take care of school discounts. The latter is something I'll take up with Tillie soon. Also, today it is quite difficult to get at our publications because of some workmen who are tearing apart a floor. I won't go on about this difficulty; it makes me absolutely profane.

This is the paragraph which is referred to in the previous letter when they said:

We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter, and I hope that you will have a discussion about this with Bill, and also with John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things.

Now, I would like you to listen to this, if you will, and I am going to ask you when I am through whether you had any conversations or discussions about the subject matter of this letter with Mrs. Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, or anyone else connected with IPR.

Something that has been on my mind these last few days and which I haven't yet mentioned to Eleanor since she has been in Ruxton, is a bit of news that you should have. I was told that there would again be all the business that preceded the arrest of the six. The warning was that this time-tailing, midnight raids, et cetera, tapping of wires might get started in an effort to establish a "Communist ring" and that the IPR would definitely be on the list, and that people who had been questioned during the case would be on the list as possible suspects in this ring. I must say that this warning has only made me angry and it hasn't in any way, or won't stop normal business here. The office of course, is quite accessible for searching, but I am at a loss as to what can be construed that is in our possession as being evidence of communism. At the same time, it is good to know that this process is going on because it shows that the "open" fight over on the Hill is employing under-cover methods that are malicious in intent. If this report is true, I am not sure whether or not the under-cover activities are being instigated by a small group of Republicans, by the Un-American Committee whom Hurley has stirred up, or by the FBI itself. However, it is dirty and it is quite possible to believe that every attempt to distort and twist facts will occur, and because of that we should be prepared to be on the offensive. That this whole mess of name-calling, the obscuring of issues, and all the red herrings that have cluttered up the perspective in the past is emerging again has made me feel sick; however, Peggy, I hope that people like you can insist that we take a belligerent stand if we are dragged in. Of course, I am not sure whether this information is true, but I can well believe it.

Cordially,

[S] Betty.
BETTY USSACHEVSKY.

Now, did you ever discuss the subject matter of that letter as such or as a subject with Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, Mr. Owen Lattimore, or anyone else in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, discussing the subject matter of that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, can you not be more definite? Can you not be more definite after hearing that letter read?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge, I can be that definite, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not discuss the subject matter of that letter with anyone.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard of the subject of that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the subject of that letter?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not heard that the IPR was going to be under investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you heard of any of the other things?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore any question having to do with surveillance of IPR members, searching of the IPR offices, or possible attempts to check the IPR for communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no current knowledge of having such a conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have had such a conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't deny that the Lattimores may have mentioned to me at some time they were afraid of the IPR. I have to testify I have no knowledge at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I want that answer to my question read back.

(The answer referred to was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. What do you say now?

Mr. VINCENT. What I said then was, in answer to Mr. Sourwine's question, I do not deny it is possible they did discuss it with me.

Senator FERGUSON. Discuss what with you?

Mr. VINCENT. The fact that the IPR might have been under investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. This letter is dated December 5, 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the first mention of red herring, Mr. Vincent?

Senator FERGUSON. In connection with communism.

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify as to whether it was the first mention.

Senator FERGUSON. You know the words "red herring" in relation to investigations of communism became rather prominent later?

Mr. VINCENT. I heard that, yes, sir, when I was in Switzerland.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in Switzerland in 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was in 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here we have a girl who is worried about a possible investigation that might involve the IPR, using the phrase "red herring" in a letter to Mrs. Stewart. Mrs. Stewart forwards that letter to Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore and suggests that Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore get in touch with you about the matter.

Can you say definitely you never saw this letter of Betty Ussachevsky's?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say to the best of my knowledge and belief I never saw that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say definitely you never were told about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can say definitely I have no recollection of ever being told about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a different thing.

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to say to the best of my knowledge and belief I did not see that letter nor was I told about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think you would remember that letter if you saw it before?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I would, yes, and therefore I am testifying to the best of my knowledge and belief I didn't see that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. May these two letters be inserted in the record at this point?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, they will be received.

(The letters referred to are Exhibit No. 382–A and No. 382–B, and are read in full.)

Senator FERGUSON. You did have a conversation with one or both of the Lattimores?

Mr. VINCENT. From time to time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About the IPR and its connection with communism?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, my testimony was that I said it would have been possible to have had a conversation but I do not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not help this committee at all, that it could be possible that you had such a conversation. I am asking you, did you ever have a conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not, but I am also testifying in response to your question that they might have mentioned it to me at some time. I am speaking now from my memory of 5 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Which do you think is the more probable, that they did or did not? You have given both ways in the record, as I recall it. Which is right?

Did they ever talk to you about the IPR and communism?

Mr. VINCENT. I am testifying that I have no recollection of their talking to me about communism in the IPR, but I am saying I am not denying that such a thing is possible for them to have discussed it with me, but based on my memory, on my memory, I do not recall such a conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not a lawyer, are you?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not a lawyer.

Senator FERGUSON. You understand that you are under oath?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And have been under oath?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And are you giving now your best answer?

Mr. VINCENT. I am giving you the best answers.

Senator FERGUSON. The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. VINCENT. I am telling you I have no recollection about the conversation in regard to that.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you what the conversation was. I am asking you whether you ever had a conversation with both or either of the Lattimores about the IPR and communism.

Mr. VINCENT. I am telling you that I have no recollection of that conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not say that you did not have the conversation. It merely says now you have no recollection.

Mr. VINCENT. That is perfectly correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a mental reaction at the present time that you have no——

Mr. VINCENT. My memory does not inform me that I had a conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. So if we could prove you did, it would only be a matter that you did not remember it at this particular moment?

Mr. VINCENT. That is perfectly correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to clean up one thing about Mr. Friedman. I have read you part of a description of Mr. Friedman. I would like to read the rest of it and ask you if it is accurate, so far as you know.

At the time of the Amerasia investigation, he—

that is Friedman—

held the rating of Division Assistant in the office of John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the United States Department of State?

Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. What are you reading from, sir? I have already testified that he might have had the title of "Division Assistant." I did not recall his exact title.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Vincent, you were a pretty close friend of the Lattimores?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now, after hearing these letters read to you, that they should have come to you and discussed this matter with you?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, we can go back to that again. I have said already that it is quite possible that the Lattimores had discussed it with me, but I cannot recall the occasion of any such discussion.

It could have happened later, but I went to Moscow with Mr. Byrnes 4 or 5 days after that letter was written, but the conversation could have taken place after I returned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have Julian Friedman with you in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Julian Friedman was out in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference working on the Secretariat of the Conference.

I was assigned to the office that was set up under Mr. Ballantine to keep contact with the far eastern delegation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not have any contact with Mr. Friedman at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I saw Mr. Friedman at San Francisco. You asked me whether he was assigned to me at San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you whether you had him with you in San Francisco.

Mr. VINCENT. My answer is that he was in San Francisco at the same time I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the assignment to San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall having anything to do with it. He, himself, independently tried to get the job.

There was a notice around to try to get people on the Secretariat, and he got that job for himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that assignment away from your office?

Mr. VINCENT. That assignment was away from my office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you not asked to approve that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have had to be asked to approve it.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you know you did approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. Either I approved it or the Deputy Chief of the Division approved it. I don't know who approved it. He asked for permission to go to San Francisco, and he would have had to ask permission from me. Who actually signed the order for him to go to San Francisco, I don't know. It wouldn't have been me, to sign his orders.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess here until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, this morning it was ordered that a request be made of the State Department to send someone down here who was familiar with their distribution of documents and their distribution coding. I believe such a man is here. I would ask that he be sworn and that we hold Mr. Vincent on the stand while I ask a few questions of this gentleman from the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT E. STUFFLEBEAM, CHIEF, DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your name, sir?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. Robert Stufflebeam.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your position with the Department of State?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. Chief of the Division of Communications and Records.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Stufflebeam, I hand you a document which this morning was placed in the record of this committee. Will you read the heading?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. The underscored portion?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Just enough to identify what the document is.

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. This document is headed "Far East," and the first sentence reads:

> The July issue of the Amerasia suggests possibility of using the Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of a "Tito for Japan" in helping the Japanese people to establish government—

Is that sufficient?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a two-page paper, is that correct?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. That is a two-page paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. And in the lower left-hand corner of the second page appear some symbols?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. There are a number of symbols there, which appear to be Navy organizational units.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say those are distribution symbols, those are symbols indicating the distribution of this paper?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. If the Navy uses a system similar to the system used by the State Department, those would probably be distribution symbols.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those are not State Department distribution symbols?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. No. Navy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you sufficiently familiar with the Navy Department distribution symbols to tell us what those symbols mean?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. I am not familar enough to know what organizational units these would stand for.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it appears that we have gone to the wrong place for our information. Perhaps we owe Mr. Stufflebeam an apology. I would suggest that he be excused and that we make a request of the Navy Department that they send us a man to try to identify these symbols.

The CHAIRMAN. There are none of those symbols that you can identify, is that right?

Mr. STUFFLEBEAM. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it instructed, Mr. Chairman, that the staff request the Navy Department to send someone up here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we hold this matter in abeyance until the Navy Department man gets here?

The CHAIRMAN. The matter will stand in abeyance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, sir.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you remember testifying in executive session about the question of whether you ever gave or arranged a luncheon for members of the IPR at the Blair Lee House?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you briefly summarize your testimony in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. May I refer to the testimony? I think I testified then that I had no distinct recollection of it, that luncheons and dinners were given there, and that I did not know of any luncheon or dinner particularly that I had given.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify that you might have arranged such luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that if you had, while you would have been host, the State Department would have paid for the luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. If I said I was host, I might have been host.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you might have been?

Mr. VINCENT. I have since investigated to find out what this function is, which is the only one that I recall having any part in.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to find out, if you had checked up.

Mr. VINCENT. May I say that I found out that it occurred on January 23, 1945, after the termination of the IPR conference in Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. That is was a reception arranged primarily for the foreign delegates who had attended that conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, delegates from foreign nations?

Mr. VINCENT. Delegates from foreign nations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who had attended the IPR conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Who had attended the IPR conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. I said it was a reception. You mean it was a luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. No; a reception.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the Blair Lee House?

Mr. VINCENT. The one I have in mind now. I don't recall a luncheon. It was a reception at which Mr. Grew—because at that time Mr. Grew was Under Secretary but was familiar with the area and familiar with some of the people, that Mr. Grew would act as host to this group of I would say distinguished foreigners. I have copied down here the names of some of them. If you would like me to——

Mr. SOURWINE. We would like those in a moment, sir, but I would like to ask you first what did you have to do with arranging this luncheon.

Mr. VINCENT. As far as the record shows——

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg your pardon. This reception.

Mr. VINCENT. This reception. Insofar as the record will show, I asked that invitations be sent down to Hot Springs, and I think it was there that I gave these people their invitations to attend this reception. I may have made a preliminary survey to see whether they would be in Washington at that date rather than just asking them without any anticipation that they would be there.

Mr. SOURWINE. So while Mr. Grew was the host, you were the, shall we say, major-domo of the affair?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the fellow who arranged for the foreigners. There were Americans present, too, which Mr. Ballentine, in the State Department who was Director of the Far Eastern Office, kindly arranged there to get the foreigners together.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many people were there altogether, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. About 60, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anywhere in existence a guest list for that reception?

Mr. VINCENT. There is, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether we have it here or not. It is in existence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you furnish it to the committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I can furnish it to the committee, yes sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have copied off certain names?

Mr. VINCENT. I have copied off quickly certain of the names. Not all 60 of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am going on and ask you to give us those names in a moment, but would you agree now that you will furnish the committee with the complete guest list?

Mr. VINCENT. I agree to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. May it be ordered, Mr. Chairman, that that list when furnished be inserted in the record at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Such will be the order.

(The document referred to is Exhibit No. 383 and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 383

LIST OF GUESTS INVITED TO A RECEPTION TO BE GIVEN BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. GREW, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, IN HONOR OF DELEGATES TO THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, ON JANUARY 23, 1945, AT BLAIR-LEE HOUSE AT 6 O'CLOCK

IPR delegates and officials:	
Bailey, K. H. (Australia)	The Secretary
Bolton, Hon. Frances P. (United States)	The Under Secretary
Belshaw, Horace (New Zealand)	Mr. Dunn
Bunche, Ralph (United States)	Mr. McLeish
Carter, Edward C. (United States)	Mr. Acheson
Chiang, Mon-lin (China)	Mr. Clayton
Dennett, Raymond (United States)	Mr. Hackworth
Eggleston, Sir Frederic (Australia)	Mr. Pasvolsky
Farmer, Victor (United Kingdom)	Mr. Edwin Wilson
Gyaw, the Honorable Sir Htoon Aung (United Kingdom)	Mr. Mathews
Hart, Admiral T. C. (United States)	Mr. Blakeslee
Johnstone, Wililam C. (United States)	Mr. Ballantine
Kunzru, H. N. (India)	Mr. Dooman
McDougall, Sir Raibeart (United Kingdom)	Mr. Stanton
Morizon, Colonel Victor (France)	Mr. Lockhart
Naggiar, Paul Emile (France)	Mr. Dickover
Pramoj, M. R. Seni (Thailand)	Mr. Vincent
Rao, B. Shiva (India)	Mr. Meyer
Reid, E. (Canada)	Mr. Steintorf
Shao, Yu-lin (China)	Mr. Williams
Turner, Bruce (New Zealand)	Mr. Moffat
Visman, Franx H. (Netherlands)	Mr. Dickey
Watt, Alan S. (Australia)	Mr. Taft
Yang, Yun-chu (China)	Mr. Julius Holmes
Yeh, George (China)	Mr. Haley
Zafra, Urbano A. (Philippines)	Mr. Peck
	Mr. Fearey
	Mr. Friedman
	Mr. Sol Bloom
	Mr. Eaton
	Senator Connally
	Senator Hiram Johnson

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us the names you have copied off?

Mr. VINCENT. I have copied off some of the more prominent ones.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you see that list?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw that list a matter of 3 days ago, sometime this week after the question was raised.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got it from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I got it from the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, there were about 60 guests. The foreigners included, I shall say, Chiang Mon-lin, who was the principal Chinese delegate——

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you spell these names for the reporter?

Mr. VINCENT. Chiang Mon-lin—C-h-i-a-n-g M-o-n-l-i-n.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. VINCENT. He was the principal Chinese delegate, if I recollect. He was on the Chinese delegation.

Sir Andrew McFayden—M-c-F-a-y-d-e-n—I think that is the way it is spelled.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you talk about Mr. McFayden, was the Chinese gentleman you mentioned Nationalist Chinese or did he have some other connection?

Mr. VINCENT. He was Nationalist Chinese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he still?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know what position he occupies now. He was with the Nationalists and was an adviser. He is primarily an educationalist, who had been president of a university before the Japanese invasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. To save questions, as you mention each one of these names will you give a little thumbnail sketch about him and what his connection is so far as you know it?

Mr. VINCENT. Sir Andrew McFayden was the British or United Kingdom delegate. I had never met him before and don't know what his position was other than as a leading delegate for the British.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the IPR conference.

Mr. VINCENT. To the IPR. There was a Mr. Naggiar. He was French, and I don't know what his position was at that time, but he later became the French delegate to the Far Eastern Commission.

There was Sir Frederic Eggleston, who was at that time Australian Minister in Washington. He attended the conference.

There was a Mr. Zafra of the Philippine delegation. I know no more about him.

There was a Mr. George Yeh, of China. He came over from England and was at that time in the Chinese Embassy at Hongkong.

There was a Mr. Belshaw, of New Zealand, whom I cannot identify any further than that I recall the man.

There was a Mr. Bailey, of Australia. He was a member of the staff of the Australian legation, if I remember correctly.

There was a Mr. Reed, of Canada.

There was a Mr. Shao Yu-Lin, of China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you spell that?

Mr. VINCENT. Shao Yu-Lin; S-h-a-o Y-u-L-i-n. He was with the Chinese Government at that time and if he still occupies the same position he had when I was in China, he was with an information service with the government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he still occupies the same position that he had when you were in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know what position he occupies now, sir. I haven't heard of him for years. He was a friend of mine in Chungking, and my testimony was if when he came over here in 1945, he still occupied the position when I had known him in Chungking, it would have been in connection with some kind of information service in the government.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is just another way of testifying that at the time you knew him in Chungking he was in some kind of information service, right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I thought you asked me whether he was now in it; in the Chinese Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you didn't mean to suggest that you think he is?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. VINCENT. There was a Mr. Turner, of New Zealand; a Mr. Farmer, of the United Kingdom. There was a Mister or Sir, Sir I have it, Sir Gyaw, of Burma. There was Colonel Morizon, of France.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do any of those people have Communist connections?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything more about Mr. Belshaw than you have told us?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Belshaw?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not know any more than I have told you about him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know, then, whether he had any Communist connections?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the complete list as you copied it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the complete list. There were probably twice that many.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many names are there on that list?

Mr. VINCENT. There are 15, but there is a Mr. Pramoj of Siam, who I see I skipped.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what basis did you select the 16 names that you have there?

Mr. VINCENT. I have selected the 16 names primarily on the basis that they would be available to come to a reception in Washington. Many of them were going back to their homes.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. You are answering that question in the connotation of why did you select them to be invited.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am glad to have that information. But what I meant was when you copied these 16 names down from the list of 60 on what basis did you copy these 16? Were they the only 16 foreigners or were they the only 16 people whose invitations you were responsible for or in what other category did they fall that you chose to copy down these names?

Mr. VINCENT. I copied these names down, my recollection, as being a representative of the people who were there.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a representative list of the people who were there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. These approximately 25 percent is a cross-section of those who were there, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there any Americans there?

Mr VINCENT. I was coming to that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. There was also present Mr. Carter, Edward Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. Of IPR, Edward C. Carter. Mr. Dennett of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Raymond?

Mr. VINCENT. Raymond. There was present Admiral Hart, retired at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he connected with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. He was a member of the American delegation. That was the reason for his inclusion here.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that Tommy Hart, what is his first name?

Mr. VINCENT. The one who was in the Far East. I would not be able to know what his first name was.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a Senator at one time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, he was a Senator at one time.

Senator FERGUSON. Tom Hart, then.

Mr. VINCENT. There was Mr. Johnstone, William Johnstone, George Washington University.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. There was Mrs. Frances Bolton of the United States Congress.

Mr. SOURWINE. A Representative from Ohio?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, at that time, and a member of the American delegation to the IPR conference. There was Sol Bloom, Mr. Eaton, both of the United States Congress, House of Representatives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that Dr. Eaton?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. And there was Senator Connally.

I could not say with complete assurance that every one of these came because the check list I have did not show. I mention that simply because I do not have down Senator Johnson, Hiram Johnson, because there was a clear indication that he could not come.

From the Department we had besides Mr. Grew, who was host, and myself, there was Mr. Dunn and here I have given just a few of the names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that James C. Dunn?

Mr. VINCENT. James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary. There was Mr. Will Clayton, Under Secretary. There was Ballantine, of course. Mr. Dooman. Mr. Matthews, who at that time was Director of the European Office. Mr. Julius Holmes. There was Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Dean Acheson?

Mr. VINCENT. Assistant Secretary at that time; yes. There was Charles Taft.

Mr. SOURWINE. Charles P. Taft?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. And Mr. Hackworth.

That is all I have here. This is far from complete.

Mr. SOURWINE. George Hackworth?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; the American list, I mean the list from the State Department—I cannot be too sure how many of them came to it—was made up in the State Department and I don't know how many came. Looking back on it, I didn't even put the name down here. I think that the Secretary was included on the list but I would doubt that the Secretary got over to that reception.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was a very strong top-level representation from the State Department, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and for that reason I question whether every one of them came. My recollection is that Mr. Will Clayton came. I am sure Mr. Grew came. They were all invited.

Mr. SOURWINE. An effort was made to get them there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say the State Department paid for this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department. It was a State Department reception. I remember looking up, which I had not known before, how must it cost, and the reception for 59 or 60 people cost only $53, which was a fairly good bargain.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't serve any food; did you?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, we served food.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the decision as to who would be invited to this reception other than the suggestions that you have already said you made with regard to the foreign delegates?

Mr. VINCENT. To the ones who were down—No, I don't recall making any selection from the State Department people.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean did you designate or name or suggest any of those foreign delegates who were there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You made out that list?

Mr. VINCENT. I was the one who would have handed them their invitations. My recollection is that the list was made up down in the IPR there.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the list of people to be invited?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that include the IPR people, the Americans also?

Mr. VINCENT. It included those that I have mentioned here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. The IPR people that I have mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. And possibly some others.

Mr. VINCENT. Possibly some others.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there were any IPR people invited they were on the list that was made up down at the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the IPR didn't make up a list of the State Department people they wanted or did they?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not that I recall. The IPR did not make up the State Department list. In these papers I have seen the statement made that Mr. Ballentine said he would take care of the foreign list.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that at your request?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall. It would have been the normal thing, I think, to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who initiated the request for the State Department people?

Mr. VINCENT. There is no record up there that I initiated it, but Mr. Ballantine would have understood the idea was to have these foreigners entertained by State Department people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whose idea was that originally?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't remember. It could have been mine, but as I say, whether I initiated or thought up the idea or whether it was

somebody in the IPR who thought it would be an excellent idea or whether it was even Ballantine who thought it would be a good idea, but I think——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember receiving a letter, Mr. Vincent, in December of 1944 about the matter of this affair?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you identify that as a photostat of a letter from the IPR files?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a letter from the IPR files.

Mr. SOURWINE. I show you this, Mr. Vincent, and ask you——

The CHAIRMAN. Please identify it as to date.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was going to ask Mr. Vincent to read it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to identify it for the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a letter dated December 19, 1944, and signed Raymond Dennett, secretary, addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Would you read it, sir, and then tell us if that refreshes your recollection in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. Read it just to myself?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you wish, or aloud, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. (Examining document.)

Mr. SOURWINE. To what extent does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it refreshes my recollection to the extent that now that I see this letter it tells me how the matter was first initiated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us how the matter was first initiated.

Mr. VINCENT. This matter was first initiated presumably by my speaking to or writing to Mr. Dennett about the matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all that you can remember now?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all I can remember now.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, Mr. Chairman, would you prefer that this letter be read into the record now or would you rather have it inserted?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you might read it into the record now.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is fairly short, sir.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: I was very pleased indeed with your suggestion that you might be able to arrange either for Mr. Grew or yourself to have seven or eight of the top members of the conference to a luncheon at Blair-Lee House in the week following the conclusion of our meeting. If it is acceptable to you, I would suggest that you try for a reservation at the Blair-Lee House January 23 or 24, as Mr. Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee wishes to have a luncheon on the Hill on Monday, January 22.

If you could confirm which date you would like to have the luncheon, we can keep it open, making up our list after we look the situation over in Hot Springs. The reason I ask that you confirm some date is that I suspect that Tom Connally may want to have a similar meeting with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and I just don't want to get mixed up on our dates.

With cordial best wishes and sincerest thanks, I am,

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

He was secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations; was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you testify that your original suggestion was to have 7 or 8 of the top members of the conference to a luncheon?

Mr. VINCENT. I can testify after reading that letter, but I would not have distinguished between that and the reception, and my testi-

mony would be that somewhere along the line we decided to have many more than just a luncheon and decide to have a reception.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is perfectly clear. You originally suggested 7 or 8 of the top delegates and between then and the time you held it, it grew into a luncheon for 60 people?

Mr. VINCENT. Reception.

Mr. SOURWINE. Reception, and a number of IPR people and a number of top State Department people?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the suggestions for the growth came from you or from the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether they came from one or the other. I would imagine that in this case they came from me, thinking it would be a better idea to get that many people together to try to meet some of the State Department people rather than to try to be selective and get only a few.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said the IPR made out a list, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. No, my testimony was that down at Hot Springs, whether I conferred with IPR people or not, was that I would have remembered that I made out the list of these people.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understood you to say that the IPR made out a list of the people who were to be invited to this reception, that they put on that list the names of the foreign delegates and that they put on that list the names of any IPR people who were there, but that the names of the State Department people were added separately at the Department.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I think if you will check back here it was a slip of the tongue.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember testifying to that effect?

Mr. VINCENT. My recollection is that I testified that I chose the ones in Hot Springs and that Mr. Ballantine picked the foreign guests, I mean the American guests.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember testifying substantially as I just recited to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, and I think if you will check back I said that I picked out the ones down at the IPR conference, the members down there, and Mr. Ballantine chose the ones——

Mr. SOURWINE. The record, of course, will speak for itself, but I wanted to know what your memory at this time was.

Mr. VINCENT. My memory is that I, with probably some assistance from the IPR, went around and found out which ones of the delegates would be available for such a reception or luncheon, I don't know when the change from one to the other, to be given in Washington on or about the 23d.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who picked the IPR people to attend? Did you select those people?

Mr. VINCENT. That was my recollection, and that is what I thought I testified, that I picked them in consultation with, I suppose, these people themselves and with IPR people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the IPR give you a list of any kind?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall them giving me a list.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you testify that they didn't give you a list?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot testify they did not give me a list.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you definitely do not remember that there was any list of people from the IPR in connection with this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall; as I say, I do not recall who picked the list. I thought I had picked the list of people by asking them and——

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not now recall having had any list from the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall having had it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not now recall having testified here concerning any list from the IPR; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That a list was received by me from the IPR? I do not recall testifying that I received a list.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask you, Do you recall testifying here concerning any IPR list of people to be invited to this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony is that I do not recall receiving a list. The best of my recollection is that in consultation down there, presumably with other people, a list was made out more or less under my supervision.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall testifying here——

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire, Were you a trustee of the IPR at this time?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And listed on the letterhead of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I suppose I was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this part of your duties as trustee, do you think?

Mr. VINCENT. No. The whole inception of this thing from my point of view was to get some of these distinguished foreigners together with some of our State Department people who were handling far-eastern problems or European problems and to have them meet. The main idea was to give them a reception, to give them some entertainment here in Washington after the conclusion of the conference there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you originally suggested that, sir, and at that time you were suggesting a luncheon——

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you include in your suggestion among those to be invited Mr. Bloom and Mr. Connally and other Members of Congress?

Mr. VINCENT. No; my suggestions had only to do, as I recall it, with the foreigners, but again, if Mr. Dennett discussed it I would have said promptly it would have been a good idea to have members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had suggested it you would readily have acceded; would you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly would.

Mr. SOURWINE. In fact, did he suggest it or did you subsequently suggest that those men should be included?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as the papers in the State Department are concerned, I would have thought that Mr. Ballantine, who was in charge of getting invitations to the American guests, may have suggested it himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you think that this letter that you have just read and which I subsequently read aloud, indicates that in acknowledging your suggestion Mr. Dennett was already bringing in names

of that nature? He mentioned Mr. Bloom and mentioned Mr. Connally?

Mr. VINCENT. That he was trying to get them, but you are asking me whether I might have suggested to him originally to get them and he tried to get them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated, did you not, that you did not originally suggest them.

Mr. VINCENT. I said I had no recollection of originally recommending Members of the House.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then I asked you whether subsequently you first broached it or he did, and I understood you to start saying that you thought Mr. Ballantine first brought that subject up.

Mr. VINCENT. I said that I thought Mr. Ballantine, in accordance with the memorandum I have seen in the State Department, was left with the matter of choosing and getting invitations to the foreigners—I mean to the Americans.

Mr. SOURWINE. To what?

Mr. VINCENT. To the American members.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now testifying that it was Mr. Ballantine's decision and Mr. Ballantine's initiative with regard to all of the Americans who were invited to this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. Certainly the Americans that came from the State Department. I say, I don't see what the point here is, but if Mr. Dennett himself first suggested that we have Mr. Bloom and Senator Connally and the others, he would have had then to take it up with Mr. Ballantine because Mr. Ballantine was in charge of getting out the invitations.

Mr. SOURWINE. The point here is very clear, sir. I will try to make it apparent.

Mr. VINCENT. I wish you would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Here was a reception which was held by the State Department, as a State Department function, which brought together high officials of the IPR, high officials of the State Department, and foreign delegates to the IPR convention and certain important and influential Members of Congress?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This affair was brought about, you have testified, through your initiation originally.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right?

Mr. SOURWINE. The question arises whether the concept of the whole affair as it finally was held was yours or whether your initial concept was seized upon and, through suggestion or otherwise, expanded by the IPR. In other words, to what extent the IPR influenced what was ultimately decided with regard to this reception. That is what I am trying to get at. If you will address yourself to that we will be very grateful.

Mr. VINCENT. I have to address myself to it in the same way that I have, that from a reading of Mr. Dennett's letter it would appear that he was going to contact the Congressmen. From a reading of the memo that I have up in the State Department, that Mr. Ballantine was in charge of getting the Americans from the State Department, and that insofar as my recollection goes, the foreign guests at Hot Springs were chosen by me or in consultation with IPR people.

Mr. SOURWINE. That still leaves one category of guests at this reception, does it not, that you have not mentioned? To wit, the American IPR members.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who suggested their names? Who made up the list of American IPR people who were to be brought to this reception?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection. It might have been me. It might have been someone else. It might have been somebody down there. It would certainly have been very obvious to me to have Mrs. Bolton. I certainly would have quickly jumped at the suggestion of Mrs. Bolton. I certainly would have wanted to have Admiral Hart.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would Mrs. Bolton have come under the IPR group or under the congressional group?

Mr. VINCENT. Mrs. Bolton would have come under the American delegation group. She was down there in Hot Springs. She would have been one in Hot Springs that I would have contacted to find out whether she could come, and the invitation would have been delivered to her in Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about American IPR people who were neither State Department nor congressional? Who decided which of those people were going to come?

Mr. VINCENT. Who were neither IPR——

Mr. SOURWINE. IPR people who were neither State Department nor congressional.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know who made the final decision. As I say——

Mr. SOURWINE. If it wasn't you——

Mr. VINCENT. Mrs. Bolton. It would have been to me obvious to have Mrs. Bolton.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Bolton doesn't fall within that category, does she? Mrs. Bolton was congressional, wasn't she?

Mr. VINCENT. She was congressional but was a member of the American delegation and was at Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stressed that fact several times. I am attempting to talk about IPR people who were neither congressional nor State Department. There were such, were there not?

Mr. VINCENT. There were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Who decided which people, in that category, were to come?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know who decided. I would say it would have been quite easy for me to decide. The names here seem to me to be obvious people who would come.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a list that included all the IPR people who were there?

Mr. VINCENT. All of the IPR people so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. There will be no names on this list you are going to furnish us——

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't promise I might not have missed a name. The list will be furnished you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you consult with the IPR about what IPR people were going to be invited?

Mr. VINCENT. I would naturally have consulted with them. I said I consulted with the people down there as to who were to be invited,

but I say here are the people that I have on here. I have on here also Senator Connally in that group. He was not a member of the——

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course. It was their suggestion, that is the IPR's suggestion, as to what IPR people should be invited, wasn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. Whose suggestion?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I can't recall. It would be perfectly logical for the IPR to have suggested people who would be coming to this reception. As far as I can see here there are four of them who were suggested.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. You will furnish the full list?

Mr. VINCENT. Five of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will furnish the full list?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I will furnish the full list.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever discussed with Mr. Dennett plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't recall discussing that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Dennett the matter of IPR activity in connection with the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of it, but again I will say I quite easily might have discussed with him that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest to Mr. Dennett that it might be very desirable for the IPR to put on a series of small dinners during the course of the Conference, the San Francisco Conference, for the Far Eastern people at that conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever express an opinion to Mr. Dennett with regard to the necessity or desirability of the IPR providing a staff of specialists to be available for consultation during the United Nations Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, if I had a conversation of that kind with Mr. Dennett I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have had a conversation like that with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I could have had a conversation with him like that. I knew Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. At a time when the State Department was marshalling all of its own specialists to go to San Francisco, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It was, but not all of them. Many people went out to the San Francisco Conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly the Department sent its best qualified people out, didn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. The best available qualified people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might at that time have expressed to Mr. Dennett the desirability of necessity of IPR providing a staff of specialists for consultation?

Mr. VINCENT. Consultation at the United Nations?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I do not recall suggesting it to him. You mean for the United Nations?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. You mean to be on the staff of the United Nations?

Mr. SOURWINE. No. To be available for consultation during the Conference, an unofficial expert staff, so to speak.

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I have no recollection of an instance of that kind, but it would seem——

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it have been unusual?

Mr. VINCENT. It would not have been unusual to discuss with Mr. Dennett having people out there because there were many foreign delegates coming.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it be possible that you ever talked with Mr. Dennett about that matter in the presence of Alger Hiss?

Mr. VINCENT. Alger Hiss was Secretary-General of the Conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. You say could it be possible? I don't recall it, but it could be possible. He was in San Francisco if this conversation which I don't recall took place in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Mr. Hiss ever confer jointly here in Washington with Mr. Dennett about the matter of IPR activity at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall, sir, any conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say by that that you did not?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I said I do not recall such a conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you conferred with Mr. Dennett about the United Nations Conference, did you at that time know that Mr. Dennett had also conferred in that connection with Mr. Alger Hiss?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know that, so far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Hiss was, as you stated, in charge of arrangements for the UN Conference at San Francisco, wasn't he?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Hiss was Secretary General of the Conference, but I don't know whether he was in charge of arrangements in advance of the Conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether he was?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know as a matter of fact whether he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know to what extent Mr. Hiss' connection, if any, with the UN Conference at San Francisco was known early in March of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not. I have testified here that Mr. Hiss was at that time in charge of some kind of activities which had been connected with Dumbarton Oaks. He had left Dr. Hornbeck's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it public knowledge at that time that Mr. Hiss was in charge of arrangements for the UN Conference in San Francisco? That is, in March of 1945 was it know that Mr. Hiss was in charge of arrangements for the UN Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it was public knowledge or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it known to you?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say I don't recall myself whether he was actually in charge of arrangements or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss with Mr. Dennett probable length of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall discussing the probable length of the conference with him. As I say, I could have.

Mr. SOURWINE. In early March of 1945 was it the policy of the State Department to encourage or to discourage the plans of private organizations to be present at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify to that from exact knowledge, but I would say again that it was probably to encourage private organizations to come out to San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was State Department policy at that time to encourage private organizations to be present in San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge of it, but you are asking me whether I would have thought it would be and I say yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did talk with Mr. Dennett as the questions I have asked you would appear to indicate, and as you have not negatived, if you did so talk with Mr. Dennett, would you say that that was not contrary to any general rule or policy of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have. As I say, I don't recall the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you indicated to Mr. Dennett in March of 1945, early March, or about that time, that the State Department would welcome a move on the part of the Institution of Pacific Relations with regard to defining and making arrangements for the Institute's activity in San Francisco in connection with the UN Conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall the conversation, but again I say that it is a perfectly reasonable conversation to have had if the IPR were coming out to San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever assist or were you ever asked to assist in the securing of air priorities for Mr. Dennett or any other official or representative of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have assisted them in getting air priorities to go to San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know how I would have been able to get them air priorities, but if I did it would be the first time in my recollection I ever got air priorities for anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have been asked to assist them?

Mr. VINCENT. I might have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you identify this as having been taken from the files of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. This document dated March 5, 1945, addressed to Admiral John W. Greenslade, from Raymond Dennett, is a photostat of a document in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, this letter is two pages, but I think we should take the time to read it. May I have the permission of the Chair?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Saturday I had a talk with Alger Hiss, of the State Department, about the plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Hiss attended the Yalta Conference and will presumably be in charge of the arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco. The following information is pertinent to our plans.

I ask you again at that point, suspending the reading for a moment—the date of this letter is March 5—do you know whether on March 5, 1945, it was general knowledge that Alger Hiss was going to be in charge of the arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I still cannot say that I knew it was general knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I interrupt there. On March 5, 1945, did you know the contents of the Yalta agreement?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1945?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On March 5.

Mr. VINCENT. On March 5 I still did not know the contents. I have testified to that.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get the date.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether they had been published at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. The Yalta agreement?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I am quite certain it had not been published by March 5.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say now that the Yalta agreement or agreements were favorable to the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Senator, I testified in executive session that I did not think they were favorable. I described them as nearly as I could as setting the wheels back, that they were retrogressive, that they had the possibilities of setting up a preferential position in Manchuria for the Russians, and I spoke of them as agreements which would be inimical to our own foreign——

Senator FERGUSON. You were very critical of them?

Mr. VINCENT. That was in July.

Senator FERGUSON. When you learned about them you say now that you are very critical of their contents?

Mr. VINCENT. I told you that I was shocked.

Senator FERGUSON. You were shocked. Here is a letter indicating that they knew that Hiss had been at that meeting and they wanted in effect to make sure that they were going to San Francisco or that he would go there.

Mr. VINCENT. That who was making sure, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. The writer of this letter.

Mr. VINCENT. But the contents of the China portion of the Yalta agreement were not public knowledge then.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was known by the writer of this letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so. The writer of this letter is Mr. Dennett. I do not think so at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it indicate that it might be known by the writer of that letter that where Mr. Hiss had been there had been very favorable consideration to the Russians, to the Soviets? In fact, it was so favorable that you said it was even shocking to you.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You make take the witness, Mr. Sourwine.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that letter should be inserted in the record, and then you may read it. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 384," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 384

[Copy—For your information]

MARCH 5, 1945.

Admiral JOHN W. GREENSLADE,
1201 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Saturday, I had a talk with Alger Hiss, of the State Department, about the plans for the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Hiss attended the Yalta Conference and will presumably be in charge of the arrangements for the Secretariat at San Francisco. The following information is pertinent to our plans:

1. The State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer from the IPR to cooperate. This should include information regarding (*a*) library facilities, specifying in general terms the type of library material available, (*b*) office space, mentioning the number of rooms with their locations and how many people they might accommodate, (*c*) an offer of any equipment, particularly foreign-language typewriters that might be available, (*d*) the offer of any specific housing accommodations, either individual or group, which might be arranged through the Bay Region Committee.

2. I also had to talk with John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section, who suggested that it might be very desirable for the IPR, provided the budget could permit it, to put on a series of small dinners during the course of the Conference for the Far-Eastern people at the Conference. Although he did not specify the nature of these meetings, it was quite obvious that he felt that the IPR could be a very useful means of getting together some of the technical people and, possibly, some of the delegates to discuss informally some of the matters appearing on the agenda.

3. Neither Hiss nor Vincent thought that there was any necessity for the IPR to consider having a staff of specialists available for consultation during the Conference. They both felt that the individual delegations would come equipped with their own technicians and advisers, who would merely need access to library and other material.

4. Mr. Hiss stated that although the Department could not circulate copies of Security in the Pacific, the report of the January Conference, he thought it would be very desirable for us to see that the headquarters of each delegation received an appropriate number of copies early in the course of the Conference.

5. The general opinion in Washington is that the Conference will last a minimum of 8 weeks and may run into August. The agenda will be known somewhat in advance. There is no formal information yet as to the official delegations from the various countries, but such a list will be available in the reasonably near future. It is probable that the list of advisers to the Conference delegations will not be known until 10 days to 2 weeks before the Conference.

6. Hiss also stated that the Department is not officially encouraging private organizations to be present at the Conference and unofficially is doing its best to discourage them, primarily because of the housing shortage. It was quite apparent, however, that both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be useful since it was not a pressure group and did not have any particular axes to grind.

I would suggest, therefore, as an immediate step, that you have Mrs. Rauch send me immediately the following:

1. A description of the library facilities—not over 200 words in length.

2. A statement of whether any office space would be available. I would assume that one room at least could be loaned to the Conference, and possibly two, and that a total of six people could be given desks. The description should mention the size of the room and number of accommodations available.

3. It might be desirable to consider whether we should not state in the letter that a committee to assist in housing had been set up which could probably make arrangements to take care of some specified number of people in private houses, say 25 to 40, or whatever number seems most appropriate. We could then state that the committee will not go into action until we receive word that their services are desired.

4. It might be helpful to explore the possibilities of reserving rooms at some of the private clubs at 10-day to 2-week intervals, starting a week after the Conference opened, for possible dinners for groups of 15 or 25 people. These reservations might be made in advance to protect us in case it does seem desirable to have dinners of the kind suggested.

If you will have the information forwarded to me at once, I will see that the formal letter goes to the State Department. There is no assurance, of course, that they will accept any of our offers, but they obviously would welcome the move on our part.

Admiral Horne was not in his office, so I shall have to wait until next week to find out about air priority. It seems to me that the best procedure would be for me to come out for a week or 10 days later this month and help work out preliminary plans. I could then return to New York, keep in touch here, and return later to San Francisco during the Conference, making arrangements, if it seems desirable, for members of the international staff to come periodically to assist as well.

I am enclosing for your information a copy of a letter from the American Association for the United Nations, which indicates their plans for Conference participation. No doubt Mr. Rowell will be able to keep you in touch with developing plans which they may have.

With very cordial best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Enclosures.

(Enclosure sent with original only.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue to read, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subparagraph 1:

The State Department would be very glad to receive a formal offer from the IPR to cooperate. This should include information regarding (*a*) library facilities, specifying in general terms the type of library material available, (*b*) office space, mentioning the number of rooms with their locations and how many people they might accommodate, (*c*) an offer of any equipment, particularly foreign-language typewriters that might be available, (*d*) the offer of any specific housing accommodations, either individual or group, which might be arranged through the Bay Region Committee.

2. I also had to talk with John Carter Vincent, Chief of the China Section, who suggested that it might be very desirable for the IPR, provided the budget could permit it——

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest you listen to this, Mr. Vincent.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing):

to put on a series of small dinners during the course of the Conference for the far-eastern people at the Conference. Although he did not specify the nature of these meetings, it was quite obvious that he felt the IPR could be a very useful means of getting together some of the technical people and, possibly, some of the delegates to discuss informally some of the matters appearing on the agenda.

Suspending the reading for a moment, does that paragraph in any way refresh your recollection, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. To what extent?

Mr. VINCENT. To the extent that I have testified before, that it was quite possible that I could have talked to Mr. Dennett and now I find that I did talk to Mr. Dennett.

Mr. SOURWINE. You now have an independent recollection that you did talk with Mr. Dennett about this matter; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I still don't have any independent recollection of a meeting with Mr. Dennett in 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question. Read the question. Repeat the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am simply trying to determine, Mr. Chairman, whether Mr. Vincent's memory has in fact been refreshed or whether he simply having read this letter is willing to accept what Mr. Dennett wrote to Admiral Greenslade as a fact.

Mr. VINCENT. The latter is the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are willing to accept what Mr. Dennett wrote Admiral Greenslade as a fact?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subparagraph 3:

Neither Hiss nor Vincent thought that there was any necessity for the IPR to consider having a staff of specialists available for consultation during the Conference. They both felt that the individual delegations would come equipped with their own technicians and advisers, who would merely need access to library and other material.

4. Mr. Hiss stated that although the Department could not circulate copies of Security in the Pacific, the report of the January Conference—

He refers there to the conference of the IPR, does he not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I suppose he does.

Mr. SOURWINE. Security in the Pacific was the title of the report of the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the Hot Springs conference.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing):

he thought it would be very desirable for us to see that the headquarters of each delegation received an appropriate number of copies early in the course of the conference.

Conference there means the San Francisco Conference, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So what that states is that Alger Hiss recommended that each delegation to the San Francisco Conference receive an appropriate number of copies of the report of the IPR Hot Springs conference?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subparagraph 5:

The general opinion in Washington is that the Conference will last a minimum of 8 weeks and may run into August. The agenda will be known somewhat in advance—

You don't know whom he meant by that, do you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing the reading):

There is no formal information yet as to the official delegations from the various countries, but such a list will be available in the reasonably near future. It is probable that the list of advisers to the Conference delegations will not be known until 10 days to 2 weeks before the Conference.

Did you furnish to Mr. Dennett any of the information contained in that paragraph that I just read, the one that I designated as No. 5?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not, so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Subparagraph 6:

Hiss also stated that the Department is not officially encouraging private organizations to be present at the Conference and unofficially is doing its best to discourage them, primarily because of the housing shortage. It was quite apparent, however, that both Hiss and Vincent thought the IPR could be useful since it was not a pressure group and did not have any particular axes to grind.

Did you express that view to Mr. Dennett, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall expressing that view to him, but I might easily have made that expression to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that fall within your statement that you are willing to accept as fact what Mr. Dennett wrote to Admiral Greenslade?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it would fall within fact. I have no reason to deny it. I only say that I don't recall making it.

Mr. SOURWINE (continuing):

I would suggest, therefore, as an immediate step, that you have Mrs. Rauch send me immediately the following:

And thereafter, Mr. Chairman, follows some instructions with regard to material to be sent to Mr. Dennett. There is no further mention of this witness or of Mr. Hiss. The matter has been placed in the record and I suggest it need not be read.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, a question to the witness if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. This makes it quite clear that you were consulted about IPR going to San Francisco.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conference with Mr. Hiss about these problems?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall having any conference with Mr. Hiss—jointly with him. Mr. Hiss was in the Department and I might have had a conference with Mr. Hiss on these problems.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not this letter as a whole indicate that you and Hiss had conferred about it and had advised together?

Mr. VINCENT. Not from my recollection of the letter, sir. I would have thought here that Mr. Dennett came to see me and came to see Mr. Hiss, because there is reference in different paragraphs to what Mr. Hiss stated to him and what I said.

Senator FERGUSON. But apparently no conflict.

Mr. VINCENT. No conflict so far as I can see. I would have to read it again if there is a conflict in advice, but I don't see any. I don't recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. How many delegates had the IPR at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't state with any exactitude.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any idea?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no idea how many they sent out there.

Senator FERGUSON. You were there?

Mr. VINCENT. I was there. At the time this conversation took place I wasn't even expecting to go. It was probably the end of March or early April that I was designated to go out for the half time of the conference. I attended the first half of the conference and Mr. Stanton attended the second half as the assistant to Mr. Ballantine.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before I move to another subject I would like to revert to two matters. One, you remember I asked you about Mr. Belshaw.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the State Department Biographical Division would have had information on Mr. Belshaw in case you had wanted it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that the State Department had a Biographical Section at that time, but it might have, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know that the State Department main-maintained a Biographical Division?

Mr. VINCENT. I know that it does now, but I am trying to place the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn that the State Department maintained a Biographical Division?

Mr. VINCENT. I say I don't know when it may have started one. I know now that it had one when I went to the field, but I can't recall from memory——

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been since 1945 that you learned that the State Department had a Biographical Division, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify exactly when the State Department maintained a Biographical Section.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know when you were Director of the Far Eastern Division that the State Department had a Biographical Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Not as a positive fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. You called it a Biographical Section. Did you know there was a Biographical Section?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me to say whether I knew there was a Biographical Section?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I say I can't recall that there was. At the time I may have known it, but at the present moment I can't recall whether at that time I knew there was in existence a Biographical Section.

Mr. SOURWINE. You cannot say whether while you were Director of the Far Eastern Division you knew whether the State Department had a Biographical Division or a Biographical Section?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot at this moment say——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know it?

Mr. VINCENT. That at the time I was Chief of the Division I may have known it, but at the present moment I am trying tell you that I don't know from memory that the State Department had a Biographical Section.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it come into your knowledge that they do have a Biographical Section?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean to my positive knowledge?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I am saying now that when I was in the Far Eastern Office I would have known if there was one and may have known it, but I don't recall now whether I did know it.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know now?

Mr. VINCENT. I know now because when I went to the field in 1947 we were asked to send in biographical data on people abroad.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that time you don't know whether you knew it or not?

Mr. VINCENT. Before that time, as I say, I don't know now that I did know then, you see.

Mr. SOURWINE. As Director of the Far Eastern Division, the Office of Far Eastern Affairs or as Chief of the China Division, didn't you use the Biographical Division or Biographical Section of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I am trying to tell you that I don't recall now whether I did or did not use it or whether one existed, but I would be perfectly willing to say if one existed I would have used it and I am quite willing to say it would be perfectly logical for them

to have one but on the basis of my memory now I haven't a distinct recollection of a Biographical Section.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a fair inference that you did not seek information from the State Department's Biographical Section or Division with regard to any of these foreign delegates who were invited to the Blair-Lee House reception?

Mr. VINCENT. That is a fair assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the fact, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at any conference or conferences between Ambassador Patrick Hurley and General Wedemeyer in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified in executive session that General Wedemeyer and Mr. Hurley, Ambassador Hurley, came home in 1945, in March. I had a conference with General Wedemeyer which I have already described which had to do with the equipping of Chinese guerrilla Communist troops in north China and on the coast in anticipation of a landing of American troops in that area. General Wedemeyer and I had quite a discussion on that subject. Earlier that year, as I recall it, Mr. Grew had indicated that wherever we could use Chinese troops that might save American lives, they should be used. It was on that basis that I talked to him about it and mentioned that to him. I made it clear, however, in talking with General Wedemeyer that it was purely a military decision to be made in the event it was made. General Wedemeyer himself indicated that he had no clear knowledge of the problem of using them but that he would look into it when he got out to China, when he returned. Insofar as a conference jointly with Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, Ambassador Hurley occupied as I testified this morning, my desk in my office, and it is quite possible that there were meetings between General Wedemeyer, who was home, Mr. Hurley, who was in my office, and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. March or April of 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. In March or April of 1945. Mr. Hurley went back to China through Russia in April, I think it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a "Yes" answer to my question or a "No" answer or an answer "It is possible, but I don't remember"?

Mr. VINCENT. It is possible. I would say more than that. I do not remember the meeting. I remember the meeting with Wedemeyer. I do not remember a conference, but I am saying it is more than possible, it is probable that General Wedemeyer came into the office where Mr. Hurley was. He was Ambassador, and General Wedemeyer was in command of the troops.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you prepare a memo with respect to such a conference?

Mr. VINCENT. I prepared a memo with regard to the Wedemeyer conference. I do not recall preparing a memo with regard to a conference with Mr. Hurley and General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you prepared such a memorandum would it be in the State Department files?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have a copy?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have a copy? No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a copy?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have a copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of any such memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be able to furnish the committee with a copy of any such memorandum if it exists?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid that comes under the provisions of the letter from the President to the Secretary of State which we read and put into the record here—what day? Wednesday, or yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the release of a——

Mr. VINCENT. State Department document.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think the release of such a document as your report on a conference between yourself and Hurley and Wedemeyer here in Washington would hamper the free flow of information from the Foreign Service field.

Mr. VINCENT. I would be glad to ask the State Department whether they would make an exception.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask you what you think.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think so. You refer now to a memorandum of a conversation with Mr. Hurley and with General Wedemeyer and myself?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. VINCENT. I was referring to a memorandum of a conversation between General Wedemeyer and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out if you have participated in and subsequently prepared a memorandum with regard to a conference or conferences between General Hurley and General Wedemeyer in 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony is that I have no recollection of preparing such a memorandum. I was referring to the earlier memorandum of the conversation with General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss such a memorandum with Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I have no knowledge of having discussed that memorandum with Andrew Roth?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever furnish him with a copy of such memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give any of the IPR authors access to any State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge of having ever given any of them and I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Andrew Roth access to any State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Mark Gayn access to any State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters with Mark Gayn?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. With Andrew Roth?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Owen Lattimore access to any State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. None that I can ever recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters with Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. When Owen Lattimore was Director of the OWI or Deputy Director we would have discussed State Department matters.

Mr. SOURWINE. But at no other time?

Mr. VINCENT. Presumably when I would meet him from time to time, yes, we would discuss matters of China.

The CHAIRMAN. I can't hear you.

Mr. VINCENT. We would have discussed China whenever we met socially because he was very much interested in the area, but I would not have revealed to him confidential information in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your testimony is that you never did reveal to him any confidential information?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss State Department matters with T. A. Bisson?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not so far as I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him access to any State Department information?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about Lawrence Rosinger?

Mr. VINCENT. The same answer there, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I haven't given him any.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have never given her State Department information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to another subject now, the matter of the Japanese surrender policy. Mr. Vincent, did you or do you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether I might inquire.

Did any of these people who have been mentioned here as to whether or not you gave them confidential information of the State Department, not using each name but you remembering the names, did any of them ever ask for any confidential information?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of these mentioned here have asked me for confidential information of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you had Mr. Lattimore under consideration for an adviser in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that we had him under consideration only in the early spring of 19— or the late winter of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. 1945. He had quit OWI some time before that and had gone back to his work at Johns Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what time it was in 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I can only testify as to my memory, that it was in early 1945, January or February or March.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, early 1945.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is what I meant, early spring, or the late winter of 1944–45.

Senator FERGUSON. After you came home from the Far East with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he employed by the Government when he went out with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; he was Deputy Director of the Office of War Information.

Senator FERGUSON. When did he leave that department?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he employed in the spring of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he was at the Johns Hopkins University. He had gone back to teaching.

Senator FERGUSON. So at the time you recommended his coming back, he was employed by the Government?

Mr. VINCENT. He was not. He was back at his teaching job at Johns Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. While he was at Johns Hopkins and before you recommended him, did you discuss any of the Chinese problems with him in order to ascertain if he was the kind of a man that you would want?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I just testified, Senator, that I would have discussed Chinese problems with him because he was an old friend, and a friend who understood China from my point of view.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, would it not have been necessary to discuss what was secret?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; it would not have been necessary to discuss what was secret if we were discussing the matter of his coming into the State Department on a consultant basis and in a technical capacity.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss communism in China with him before you recommended that he be on the advisory staff?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of discussing that as a specific subject, but it could have been a subject of discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever discuss with anyone the question of communism in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are sure about that?

Mr. VINCENT. I am sure about that. I have no recollection of discussing communism in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, of course, you dispute what is in these letters that were exhibited here this morning?

Mr. VINCENT. The letter that was exhibited this morning—my testimony this morning was that I have no knowledge of those subjects discussed in that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that the part here indicating Carter—which would be you, would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I should think it would be Edward Carter, Edward C. Carter. People don't usually call me Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. They don't? You are named down below as John Carter Vincent.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. But as I say here—let me see the context.

Senator FERGUSON. You were considered at that time as a trusted friend about this question of communism in the Department, "trusted friends who might be in the know on these things," meaning communism in the IPR. Is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to read the whole letter. The language that these people use here, I am not responsible for at all, sir. It isn't in this letter. It isn't in this letter here what we are talking about. [Witness referring to another letter].

Senator FERGUSON. The letter we are talking about is an answer to another letter that did have it in it.

Mr. VINCENT. No, I would not say that statement there implies by its use, as they say, of "trusted friends" that I had a knowledge of what was in this paragraph here.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you think Margaret Ann Stewart was writing to Eleanor Lattimore about, that "John Carter Vincent, and any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things"?

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you, Senator, I cannot be responsible for the language of these people.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the sake of the record, Mr. Senator, may the record show, if it is correct, that when Mr. Vincent said "this paragraph here," he is talking about the last paragraph of Betty Ussachevsky's letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Next to the last paragraph of the December 12 letter.

Mr. VINCENT. You are talking about this letter, and I think Mr. Sourwine is talking about the long paragraph in this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. When he said, "this paragraph here," I think he referred to the long paragraph in the Betty Ussachevsky letter.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. The record shows that.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not also true that in the letter of December 12, in the next to the last paragraph, that that is what they were talking about, this long paragraph in the letter of December 5? Is it not clear that that is true? "We are somewhat worried about the possibilities outlined in Betty's letter." That is what was outlined in Bettys' letter, the long paragraph?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. About communism in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then she goes on and says, "I hope that you will have a discussion." That is to Eleanor Lattimore. She was a good, close friend of yours. "* * * have a discussion about this with Bill"——

Who is Bill? Do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. He would be the head of the American delegation, the American office here in Washington—Johnstone, as I called him.

Senator FERGUSON. Bill Johnstone. "And also with John Carter Vincent, and any other," indicating that you two were trusted friends, but "any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things."

Did you ever discuss with Eleanor Lattimore and/or Owen Lattimore, communism in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified this morning, Senator, and I testify again this evening, that I have no recollection of any such discussion. Soon after this letter was written, I left the country, and I do not recall any consultation or conversations I had with regard to the matter of communism in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. But at least by reputation, this letter would indicate, and as far as knowledge of Eleanor Lattimore would be concerned, that you were a trusted friend, and she could discuss communism in the IPR with you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the apparent intent of this, that I might be in the know about—whether it was communism in the IPR she has in mind, this covers quite a large field of subjects, this letter in the second paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that paragraph covers quite a bit, but it is principally concerning communism in the IPR, and the FBI investigation of it, and the stealing of papers from your Department which you indicated this morning.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. It refers to the papers that were taken out of your office, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to read it to see.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does it mean by the arrest of the six?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. The arrest of the six were the Amerasia group.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; for taking papers; and part of them were taken out of your office; is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct. Taken out of the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is a good friend of yours describing you in this language, that you are a trusted friend and that you might be consulted in regard to the taking of these papers and communism; is that not true? You do not think Eleanor Lattimore ever discussed it with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so, sir; and I cannot, as I have said before, be responsible for what a Mrs. Margaret Ann Stewart would put in that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not expect a good friend of yours to at least tell you that, "Here, your papers have come out of your office"?

Mr. VINCENT. I would. You are reverting back to the Amerasia case?

Senator FERGUSON. The Amerasia case. That is what we are talking about in these letters.

Mr. VINCENT. I knew, as I testified this morning, that there was an investigation to see how those papers came out.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, when was the investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. Of Service and the other group?

Senator FERGUSON. No; you. They investigated you, that is, they asked you questions. When was that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to fix the time of the Amerasia case. I think it was in April, and sometime during that period in April.

Senator FERGUSON. Of what year?

Mr. VINCENT. Of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. April 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. As I said this morning, it might have been the latter part of March. It could not have been much later than that, because I left for San Francisco, oh, I should say the 10th or 12th, for the United Nations conference.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, do you or did you know anything about a draft of a proposed policy to be followed by the United States in the event Japan surrendered?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I have testified on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Did you know that such a draft was submitted to and considered by the policy committee of the State Department on or about May 24, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified, I think, that I did not at that time have any first-hand knowledge of the handling of that paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know now that there was such a paper submitted to and considered by the policy committee of the Department on or about May 24, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss such a paper or such a proposed policy with anyone at any time, outside the Department, between May 24, 1945, and July 29, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no, sir. I would doubt that I had any knowledge of the paper, because I was not connected with the group that was drafting such a paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. What ultimately happened to that paper, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. That paper was ultimately adopted on the—let me see. I have it here. It was adopted by the SWNCC committee on August 31, earlier on August 29, but it had to be reopened. May I read this thing? No, I don't need to read this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a statement which you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. This is a statement which I read to you in the executive hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is in the record, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. I am just trying to place in here the date it was finally adopted. It was August 31, as I have just testified, it was adopted by the SWNCC committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was considerably changed between May of 1945 and the date of adoption, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify to that, because I have just testified that I had nothing to do with its formulation until I became—and there were no considerably changes in it after I became——

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not changed after August—what is the date there—31, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. August 31, except for some minor changes which, if you wish me to, I can reread them, but it would take a long time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified with regard to that.

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified there were only minor changes of phraseology after August 31.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prior to August 31, you had nothing to do with the far-eastern subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. That was the first meeting. I attended my first meeting of the subcommittee of SWNCC on September 1.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. You took over the next day from Mr. Dooman; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say what view General Marshall took with regard to this proposed policy as early as May or June of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. What attitude he took? No; I could not state that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what view Owen Lattimore took about it at any time prior to its adoption by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss the matter with Mr. Lattimore prior to August 31, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief did I discuss it with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn that Mr. Lattimore went to see the President about that proposed policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever learning that Mr. Lattimore went to see the President about that policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you say in executive session you had learned it from our hearings for the first time?

Mr. VINCENT. If I did, I will stand by that, but I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember ever having learned it or knowing it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss the matter of that proposed policy with anyone in the IPR or representing the IPR prior to the time it was adopted by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you thereafter?

Mr. VINCENT. Did I thereafter? No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mrs. Betty Ussachevsky, the Betty who wrote this letter we talked about earlier, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, ever arrange an appointment with you for Mr. Raymond Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact recollection of that, but I wouldn't know whether it would be Mrs. Ussachevsky or someone else who would arrange an appointment. I don't know what her position was at that time. If she was the secretary, I would say she might have arranged one.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw Mr. Dennett on a number of occasions, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many times, altogether, have you had interviews or conferences with Mr. Dennett?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no exact knowledge of the number of times, Mr. Sourwine, I have had interviews with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ten; a dozen?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say less than that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Less than 10?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever visit him in his office?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where else have you met him, outside your office?

Mr. VINCENT. I have met him at—I think he was down at the IPR

conference in January 1945, and I have testified also that he may have been present at a meeting of the American delegation prior to going to the IPR conference in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Mr. Theodore White?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, as a newspaperman in Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he your friend?

Mr. VINCENT. He is an acquaintance. I would not call him a friend.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know where White is now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what he he is doing now? I don't mean now in the sense of this instant, but generally this period.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't. I would assume he is in the newspaper business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he or was he connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that subject, whether he was with the Institute of Pacific Relations. During my time, I don't recall ever running across White.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him or with anyone else the question of Mr. White's discharge by Mr. Henry Luce?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never discussed with anyone the matter of Mr. White's discharge? Is that your testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I am trying to remember, but I can't recall any conversation I had with regard to Mr. White being discharged. I don't know at what time he was discharged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you ever discuss that matter with your superiors in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I will have to say again, I didn't discuss the discharge of White if he was discharged or when he was discharged. It didn't make any impression on my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never discussed the matter with you?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have come into the office and discussed it with me, but I am telling you frankly, I don't recall any conversation with Mr. White about a discussion with him over his being discharged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the charge that Mr. Luce was seeking a passport to go out to the Far East, and that you attempted to influence the denial of that passport?

Mr. VINCENT. Do I recall the charge?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't anybody ever discuss that with you before?

Mr. VINCENT. Nobody told me I ever tried to interfere with a passport for Mr. Luce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't the Secretary of State ever discuss with you or through an intermediary bring up with you, take up with you, have taken up with you, the problem presented by an allegation that you were somehow mixed up in the denial or refusal of a passport to Mr. Luce?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, not to the best of my knowledge and belief. It seems to me it is to my mind such an absurd story. There may have been an allegation of that kind, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Secretary of State ever quoted you in connection with that matter, he was misquoting you, then, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. In connection with denial of Luce's passport. There may have been an instance of some kind. I don't want to say here under oath that the Secretary of State would be misquoting me, but I am telling you that I have no recollection of an instance of my having anything to do with the denial of a passport to Mr. Luce.

Mr. SOURWINE. You apparently consider any such charge as absurd, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my position.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Secretary of State had taken up with you the matter of an absurd charge, you certainly would remember it, wouldn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly think I would remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then can't you testify here as to whether it ever was or ever was not taken up with you?

Mr. VINCENT. I can testify to the best of my knowledge and belief it never was taken up with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you can't testify positively that it was not?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot testify that it was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever called upon for an explanation of that matter by any official of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge, I never was called upon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or for a statement in connection with it?

Mr. VINCENT. For a statement in connection with it? No, sir, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs September 19, 1945, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. September 19.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was 19 days after you had succeeded Mr. Dooman as Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. We talked a little while ago about a paper circulating in May, whether there was a paper circulating in May of 1945 with regard to post-surrender policy for Japan. I am asking you now about a paper entitled, "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," which was an official State Department document. Do you know anything about that paper?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony on the other paper is exactly the same paper. So I must have given incorrect testimony before, because I had in mind that very paper, the Initial Post-Surrender Policy, as to when it was adopted by SWNCC. That is the paper I had in mind in the previous testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember testifying in executive session that that paper which was adopted August 31 had been in the course of preparation for 7 or 8 months?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall testifying. My recollection would be that I testified that I didn't know how long it had been in preparation, because I was not connected with the drafting of that paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that paper communicated to General MacArthur?

Mr. VINCENT. That paper, I think, was communicated to General MacArthur in the first week of September. I have the date here

somewhere. It was distributed to him, but I don't think I have the exact date. My belief would be it was circulated to him sometime between the first of September and the time that the President issued it with General MacArthur's approval on the——

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say it was not communicated to him until after it had become a firm United States policy?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my impression, that it was not circulated to him until after it had become a policy of the SWNCC Committee, but it had to be approved by the President and it was circulated to General MacArthur before it was released by the President and his consent or his approval to its issuance was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, General MacArthur's approval was secured?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That testimony would be, would it not, that the paper was not communicated, nor its contents communicated, to General MacArthur prior to the 31st of August 1945; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have no knowledge as to whether initial drafts or others were communicated to him. I can say that after I took over SWNCC, there was quite frequently drafts or suggestions requested of General MacArthur in regard to the drafting of a paper. The War Department member usually was the one who took the initiative in referring matters as we went along in drafting. I would assume that situation prevailed prior to my being Chairman as well as afterward.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether it was communicated to General MacArthur on the 29th of August?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I have no information here from which I could testify as to when it was, whether it was communicated to him before the 29th.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the paper was communicated to General MacArthur, was it changed in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. After it was communicated to him? I have just testified there were some minor changes, which I can read to you here.

Mr. SOURWINE. But only minor changes?

Mr. VINCENT. Only minor changes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember reading Mr. Dooman's testimony before this committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember his testimony with regard to this paper?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that he testified that this paper was adopted by SWNCC on the 29th of August, and was on that date telegraphed out to General MacArthur as a firm United States policy for Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Now that you read it, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you believe that testimony to be true and accurate?

Mr. VINCENT. For the first time it was telegraphed to him?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, I don't want to expand Mr. Dooman's testimony.

Mr. VINCENT. I do not have here the exact date when it was telegraphed out to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are referring to SWNCC?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that to be true and accurate? That is the question.

Mr. VINCENT. As to the exact date, I don't know whether it is accurate or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified it was communicated to General MacArthur after the 31st, and you have testified it was adopted by SWNCC on the 31st of August. Now, we have before us Mr. Dooman's testimony before this subcommittee that the paper was adopted by SWNCC on the 29th of August and was telegraphed out to General MacArthur on the 29th of August as a firm United States policy for Japan. I am asking you whether you believe that testimony by Mr. Dooman to be true and correct?

Mr. VINCENT. It is not correct insofar as the paper was not finally adopted by the top-level, over-all SWNCC Committee until August 31, 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was it adopted by the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. The paper was sent up by the SWNCC Committee, to the top SWNCC Committee by the other committee, sometime prior to the 31st.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that on the 29th?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that was on the 29th.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the paper was communicated to General MacArthur on the 29th as a firm United States policy for Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know as a fact the day it was communicated to General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was communicated to him at all on the 29th?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know. I have no positive knowledge of the day it was communicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was communicated on the 29th, would it be communicated again after the 31st?

Mr. VINCENT. My own recollection is that it was communicated to him as a policy paper that had been adopted by SWNCC, but as I say, I do not know the date it was communicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you could have been in error in testifying that it was communicated after the 31st; that it might have been communicated on the 29th?

Mr. VINCENT. It might have been before; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a single communication that we are talking about, regardless of whether it was the 29th, 31st, or some other date?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, with regard to the changes made in that document, do you remember what Mr. Dooman said about that?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall completely what he had to say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember he said, quoting from page 717 of our hearings:

These were among the changes that had been made in the paper after it had been adopted on the 29th of August (reading):

"Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander—

"(a) To prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends."

And then Mr. Dooman commented:

Please do not ask me to explain what that means.

Was that matter which was inserted in the document subsequent to the time of its communication to General MacArthur?

Mr. VINCENT. That matter was in the paper when it was communicated to General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. That matter was in the paper, was it, at the time it was approved by SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. That matter was in it by the time it was approved by SWNCC.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, in that regard you contradict Mr. Dooman's testimony, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Dooman said this:

(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a large part of Japan's trade and industry.

He was apparently citing that as one of the changes made in the paper after its adoption. Do you contradict his testimony in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I do, sir, and you will recall at the executive session I stated that that language occurred in the paper as early as mid-August.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do.

Did you make any changes or dictate or approve any changes or suggest any changes in that paper after you became head of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. Those are the minor changes which I have here of which I have been able to find a few. Would you like me to say what changes were made? I don't recall that I dictated them, but after I became Chairman of SWNCC there were some minor drafting changes made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you accepting responsibility for whatever changes were in fact made after you became head of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I am not accepting responsibility for any changes that were made. The top SWNCC Committee has to be responsible for any changes made. Some of those changes were made at top SWNCC level. Some of them were made at the SWNCC level. Some of them were made at the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if I recall. But I have the complete thing, if you would like me to read this, of how those minor changes came about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you testified as to that before?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. From this document here?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think we can avoid repetition on that point here. I think the record is clear on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been asked before if you know or have knowledge of Yoshio Shiga and Kyuchi Tokuda?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I did not know them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know that they were Communist leaders, Japanese Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not refreshed my memory on it at all. You have told me they were.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have no independent knowledge as to whether they were, or whether they were in jail in early October of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or as to how they got out of jail?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked in executive session whether you had heard the report that John K. Emmerson of the State Department, possibly accompanied by another person, went in a staff car to the prison on the day Shiga and Tokuda were released, and brought them back to their homes in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Did I testify that I knew of that incident?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I had no knowledge of that, so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have never heard that report?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never heard that report until you gave it to me here.

Mr. SOURWINE. If that action was taken, would it have had any effect on the Japanese people?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me a speculative question there, and I don't know that I can answer what effect it would have had for them to have been taken from prison at what time.

Mr. SOURWINE. If two Communist leaders who at the conclusion of the war were released from prison should be met at the prison gates by an official staff car with an official of the United States State Department, and in that staff car conveyed to their homes, would that have any effect on the Japanese people if that fact became generally known throughout Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. This was a period—wasn't it?—when we were releasing Japanese political prisoners.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that I could testify whether it would or would not have an effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are an expert on the Far East; are you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified I am an expert on China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what "face" means?

Mr. VINCENT. I know what the general oriental concept of "face" means.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that oriental concept held in Japan as well as in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't give you eact testimony on that, but I would say that the Japanese also have some idea of "face."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it would have given "face" to the Communists to have two of their leaders picked up in a staff car by a State Department official and taken to their homes as soon as they were released from prison?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that it would.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would, then, have had an impact on Japan if that fact had been known; would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. If the fact had been known that they were picked up like that, yes; I would say that it would.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have given prestige to Shiga and Tokuda—would it not?—both in their own party and among the Japanese people generally?

Mr. VINCENT. It is possible that it would have. It would depend on what Japanese were doing it, or what was the purpose of picking them up in the car.

Mr. SOURWINE. I cannot speak of the purpose and neither can you; but, knowing what you must know about "face" in the Orient, if the very unusual procedure of taking two released prisoners to their homes, convoyed by officials of the State Department in a staff car, had followed, it certainly would have given them face; would it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And to say "give them face" is the same as saying it would have enhanced their prestige and the respect in which they were held by their people; would it?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not know why we quibble about these things.

Do you recall a broadcast dealing with policy with respect to Japan, in which General Hilldring and Captain Dennison participated, along with yourself?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you participate in the broadcast?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you participate in the preparation of it?

Mr. VINCENT. Of my own script.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve of the entire script of that broadcast in advance of the broadcast?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think I did. The others approved theirs, and I approved mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have an opportunity in advance of the broadcast to see the whole script?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I had an opportunity to see the whole script when it was finally prepared.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what purpose was it shown to you?

Mr. VINCENT. To familiarize myself, to see how the thing was made up by Selden Menefee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he was a pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know whether he was a pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it was shown at the time prior to the broadcast, if you wanted changes made, could you have had them made?

Mr. VINCENT. In my own script.

Mr. SOURWINE. You could not have had them made in——

Mr. VINCENT. In General Hilldring's, or whoever was the third person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Captain Dennison.

Mr. VINCENT. Captain Dennison.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are stating that General Hilldring and Captain Dennison were solely responsible for what they said?

Mr. VINCENT. I am so stating, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this approved by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. These broadcasts were approved by the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. So, their broadcasts were approved, as well as yours?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who, for the State Department, approved this script?

Mr. VINCENT. The people in the Press Office. They went over them to see if they were all right, but not as to policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not approved as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. They were on a higher level.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did approve it as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say which man.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose job was it to approve as to policy? Who approved yours, as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Mine was submitted to whoever was above me at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was it that approved your script as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. On October 6th, who could have approved it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. It would be normally submitted to Assistant Secretary Benton. It could have been submitted to him because he was our public-relations man at that time. It could have been submitted to Mr. Acheson.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that a public-relations man would pass on the policy?

Mr. VINCENT. He would pass on the advisability of taking this thing and looking into it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that does not answer my question.

Mr. VINCENT. Whether Acheson approved this or not, I don't know. It was the policy not to go out and do things without some approval by the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose job was it to approve your script, and who did approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. In this particular case I don't recall who approved it. General Hilldring could have approved my script. I could not have approved his.

Senator FERGUSON. You were answering his questions.

Mr. VINCENT. General Hilldring at that time was already an Assistant Secretary of State, and he could, in his position, approve my script.

Mr. SOURWINE. As background, is it not true, sir, that you testified in executive session that you had had a session with Mr. Selden Menefee at which you had, simply talking to him, expressed your ideas, that he had made notes of that, that he had gone away and written a script and brought that back to you for approval?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way it was approved?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; but I am speaking now of the whole idea of making this kind of thing had to be approved above me.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you that question—who conceived the idea of making the statement. I was talking about the policy that was set forth in that broadcast.

Mr. VINCENT. Who approved the policy set forth in that broadcast?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. The policy set forth, as far as I am concerned in this broadcast, had already been approved, because you will find it was taken primarily from approved policy at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who cleared this script for policy?

Mr. VINCENT. For policy?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I have just stated that I don't know who would have cleared this script for policy. In this particular case it might have been left up to me to clear it. I was Director of the Far East Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what the Senator is trying to determine, whether you yourself, as the Director of the Far Eastern Office, could have taken responsibility for clearing the script for policy or that it had to go to a higher echelon for policy clearance.

Mr. VINCENT. That could have been decided on the basis of whether I thought it had to have policy clearance.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall whether this was submitted above me to Mr. Acheson to look over, or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you were making no departure from policy and making no new policy?

Mr. VINCENT. If I felt I was making new policy, I would have submitted it above, but I am testifying I don't know whether it was submitted above, to someone else. General Hilldring could have cleared the whole memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did submit it above, does that indicate you felt you were making new policy?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily. It would mean I was sending it to somebody to read to see what they felt about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was submitted any higher, or whether you yourself submitted it for policy?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it was submitted higher, or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that broadcast, sir, did you advocate changing the institution of Emperor?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I can almost quote it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want a lengthy answer if you can avoid it, sir. We are going to get down to this detailed broadcast.

Did you advocate changing the institution of Emperor?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that the policy of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in that broadcast serve notice that the Japanese Government would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that even the use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or other "liberals" would be permitted, so far as the United States is concerned?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to read the whole thing to find out whether that is in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it conceivable to you now that you did so state? Did you, in that broadcast, serve notice that the Japanese Government would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that even the use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or other "liberals" would be permitted?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not? That is a definite and unequivocal statement; you did not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, before we discuss this thing in detail, I would like to ask Mr. Mandel if there is in existence any public records with regard to Mr. Selden Menefee?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

In the Second Report on Un-American Activities in Washington State, 1948, Report of the Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, under the heading "Appendix—A Comparison of the Communist Party Line and the Activities and Affiliations of Certain Professors at the University of Washington and Officials of the Repertory Playhouse," we find a record of Selden Menefee on the following pages, which I offer for the record:

Pages 341, 344——

Senator FERGUSON. Before you read those, who was Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. Menefee was a young man I met at this time who came in and prepared the transcript for NBC.

Senator FERGUSON. He was working for NBC?

Mr. VINCENT. He was working for NBC, not for me.

Senator FERGUSON. Not for the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Not for the State Department.

Mr. MANDEL. 344, 345, 346, 347, 359, and 360.

I offer that for the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 385" and filed for the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 385

[Source: Second report Un-American Activities in Washington State, 1948. Report of the Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities)

[P. 341]

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES AND AFFILIATIONS, AUGUST 1935 TO SEPTEMBER 1939

February 7, 1936—Northwest Veteran—American Civil Liberties Union official speaks at auditorium.

Dr. Harry F. Ward, president of the American Civil Liberties Union, secretary of the Methodist Federation for Social Service and chairman of the American League Against War and Fascism, failed to speak on one of his advertised subjects, that of the undesirability of requiring school teachers to take an oath of allegiance to the National and State constitutions * * *. Included in the list of sponsors for the lecture were four members of the University of Washington faculty; namely, Farquharson, Tyler, Selden Menefee, and Hugh DeLacy.

[Pp. 344 and 345]

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[May 8, 1937—Sunday News—volume 3, No. 38, Seattle, Wash.]

TEACHERS FORM STATE FEDERATION

Affiliation with the Washington Commonwealth Federation was one of the first acts of the newly formed Washington State Federation of Teachers, com-

posed of teachers' unions from Seattle, Snohomish County, Tacoma, and Bremerton, when they convened in Seattle last Saturday to form their organization.

The new federation supersedes the smaller informal Washington Joint Council of Teachers, a committee formed a year ago to coordinate the program of teachers' unions in the public schools, the university, and the workers' education projects.

After adopting a constitution the group voted in Hugh DeLacy, councilman-elect and discharged university instructor, as president and Hallie Donaldson, of the West Seattle High School, as vice president * * *.

Resolutions adopted asked release of Tom Mooney; King Ramsey Connor; selection of State Superintendent of Public Instruction Stanley Atwood as speaker at the American Federation of Teachers' national convention; civil-service laws for teachers; and equalization program for State schools; repeal of the Washington, D. C., loyalty oath bill; continuation of WPA projects at union wages; a referendum on war.

* * * * * * *

The American Federation of Teachers is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Delegates to the Seattle AFL Central Labor Council for the teachers union were Selden Menefee, of the University of Washington, and Victor Hicks, of the WPA educational project.

Comment: Affiliation of Local 401, U. of W. Teachers' Union with the American Federation of Teachers; the Washington Commonwealth Federation and resolutions passed as indicated above, show the beginning of the pattern to be followed by them as their program adjusts to the changing pattern of the Communist Party line. The Washington State Un-American Activities Committee, as well as other agencies, have voluminous files on the radical activities of Selden Menefee, Victor Hicks, and Hugh DeLacy. The Sunday News was the official organ of the Washington Commonwealth Federation and its editorial board, according to its masthead on the above date, included among its members Prof. R. G. Tyler, Prof. Harold Eby, and ex-Prof. Hugh DeLacy, all of the University of Washington.

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[Pp. 346 and 347]

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[April 28, 1938, Daily Worker, statement by American Progressives on the Moscow trials]

(This statement also appeared in the May 3, 1938, issue of New Masses.)

Appendix IX, section 1–6, page 1617. The statement was obviously a document concocted in defense of the line of the Communist Party and undoubtedly originated in the headquarters of the Communist Party. The following excerpts from the statement seem significant: "We the undersigned, are fully aware of the confusion that exists with regard to the Moscow trials and the real facts about the situation of the Soviet Union * * *. The measures taken by the Soviet Union to preserve and extend its gains and its strength therefore find their echoes here, where we are staking the future of the American people on the preservation of progressive democracy and the unification of our efforts to prevent the Fascist from strangling the rights of the people. American liberals must not permit their outlook on these questions to be confused, nor allow their recognition of the place of the Soviet Union in the international fight of democracy against fascism to be destroyed. We call upon them to support the efforts of the Soviet Union to free itself from insidious internal dangers, and to rally support for the international fight against fascism, the principal menace to peace and democracy."

Comment: Among Seattle persons whose names were signed to this statement were the following: Dr. Garland Ethel, Selden Menefee, Albert Ottenheimer, Burton James, and Florence B. James.

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[Pp. 359 and 360]

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[August 31, 1941, Seattle Times]

An article in this issue reveals that Dr. Ralph H. Gundlach of the University of Washington was a visitor in Washington, D. C., the past week end. He attended

sessions of the American Federation of Teachers Convention at Detroit before going to Washington D. C. He will go from Wasington to Chicago to read a paper on peace movements before the annual sessions of the American Psychology Society. While in Wasington, D. C., Dr. Gundlach has been a guest at the home of Professor and Mrs. Selden Menefee, former University of Washington faculty members.

Comment: The files of the Washington State Un-American Activities are replete with information relative to activities and affiliations of Selden Menefee.

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Mr. SOURWINE. I offer and ask that it be inserted in the record, a photostatic copy of a document, and I ask Mr. Vincent if this is a photostatic copy of the State Department's publication of the text of this radio program.

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to compare it with this. [Examining document.]

The CHAIRMAN. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 386" and filed for the record and is as follows:)

(NOTE.—Department of State press release No. 732, text of broadcast appears in appendix.)

[Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1945]

OUR OCCUPATION POLICY FOR JAPAN

PARTICIPANTS

JOHN CARTER VINCENT, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Chairman, Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee

Maj. Gen. JOHN H. HILLDRING, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department

Capt. R. L. DENNISON, United States Navy, Representative of the Navy Department on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee

STERLING FISHER, Director, NBC, University of the Air

[Released to the press October 6]

ANNOUNCER. Here are headlines from Washington:

General Hilldring Says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese Big Business, Will Be Broken Up; States We Will Not Permit Japan To Rebuild Her Big Combines; Promises Protection of Japanese Democratic Groups Against Attacks by Military Fanatics.

John Carter Vincent of State Department Forecasts End of National Shinto; Says That the Institution of the Emporer Will Have To Be Radically Modified, and That Democratic Parties in Japan Will Be Assured Rights of Free Assembly and Free Discussion.

Captain Dennison of Navy Department Says Japan Will Not Be Allowed Civil Aviation; Predicts That Japanese Will Eventually Accept Democracy, and Emphasizes Naval Responsibility for Future Control of Japan.

ANNOUNCER. This is the thirty-fourth in a series of programs entitled "Our Foreign Policy," featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Government officials and Members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them.

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan". Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, U.S.N., Navy Department representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. They

will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. Mr. Fisher—

FISHER. No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio, and general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much of the confusion surrounding this debate.[1] But it also raised many questions—questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned—the State, War, and Navy Departments—to interpret further our Japan policy.

General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by tell us just how that policy is determined.

HILLDRING. Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will try to explain how it is made. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee—SWINC, we call it—formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions of basic importance. On the military aspects, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we think he is doing it very well.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern subcommittee of which you are chairman does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.

VINCENT. That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far Eastern policy and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with which General Hilldring is associated and with which Captain Dennison and I sit in an advisory capacity.

HILLDRING. The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the Secretaries of the three departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Artemus Gates.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, I'd like to know whether there is a—shall we say—strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.

VINCENT. No; there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.

FISHER. There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian advisers.

VINCENT. That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to send more and more such people out.

FISHER. As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern subcommittee, Captain Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and voice in, the policy for Japan.

DENNISON. We have a vital interest in it. The 2 million men and the 5,000 vessels of the United States Navy in the Pacific and the vital role they played in the defeat of Japan are a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country separated from us by 4,500 miles of ocean. Its continued control will always present a naval problem.

FISHER. What part is the Navy playing now in that control?

DENNISON. Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in civil-affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former Japanese mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.

FISHER. Does that include Okinawa?

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[1] Bulletin of Sept. 23, 1945, p. 423.

DENNISON. Yes.

FISHER. That's not generally known, is it?

DENNISON. No; I believe not. I'd like to add—besides these immediate duties the United States Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan long after our troops are withdrawn.

FISHER. Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as chairman of the subcommittee which drafts our occupational policy, can you give us a statement of our over-all objectives?

VINCENT. Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize Japan—to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

FISHER. And how long do you think that will take?

VINCENT. The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic tendencies.

FISHER. General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?

HILLDRING. To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clairvoyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish our aims. We *must* stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.

FISHER. To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and the Soviet Union, take part in formulating occupation policy?

HILLDRING. That is not a question which soldiers should decide. It involves matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.

FISHER. Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?

VINCENT. Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the United States proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission as a means of regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced recently that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies for the control of Japan.[2] In addition to the four principal powers in the Far East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the Commission.

FISHER. Coming back to our first objective—General Hilldring, what about the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?

HILLDRING. Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed soldiers to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.

FISHER. And what's being done about the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia?

HILLDRING. It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on shipping are urgent, and the return of our own troops is the highest priority. Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated; the return of Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.

FISHER. Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the Japanese forces scattered through Asia?

DENNISON. It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.

FISHER. And what is being done with the Japanese Navy?

DENNISON. The Japanese Navy has been almost completely erased. There's nothing left of it except a few battered hulks and these might well be destroyed.

FISHER. Now, there are some other, less obvious parts of the military system—the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecuting liberal, anti-militarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be done about that?

VINCENT. That vicious system will be abolished, Mr. Fisher. Not only the top chiefs but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its

[2] See p. 545.

hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have to be substituted for it.

DENNISON. We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and not an army in the guise of police.

HILLDRING. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already abolished the Kempai and political police.

FISHER. It seems to me that a key position in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese Government, from the Emperor on down.

VINCENT. Well, one of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the Constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the Constitution which would hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible to the people of Japan must be removed.

FISHER. Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?

VINCENT. The institution of the Emperor—if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it—will have to be radically modified, Mr. Fisher.

DENNISON: The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent to General MacArthur establish that point.

FISHER: Can you give us the substance of that directive that covers that point, Captain Dennison?

DENNISON: I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur said:

"1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force." [3] That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

FISHER. That's clear enough. * * * Now, General Hilldring, you have to do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference between them?

HILLDRING. Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Reduced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national Government, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government, and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.

FISHER. Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of the national Government in Japan?

HILLDRING. The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national Government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese Government available for our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of 70 million people. These people differ from us in language, customs, and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese Government machinery as a tool, we are saving time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications.

FISHER. But some people argue, General, that by utilizing the Japanese Government we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?

HILLDRING. Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japanese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed. The desires of the Japanese Government in this respect are immaterial. Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.

DENNISON. Our policy is to *use* the existing form of government in Japan, not to *support* it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to feel out the situation.

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[3] Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 480.

FISHER. Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?

DENNISON. In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has correspondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those polices.

FISHER. He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, Mr. Vincent? Some of them look pretty guilty to me.

VINCENT. Well, the Higashi-Kuni cabinet resigned this week. The report today that Shidehara has become Premier is encouraging. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, he will go out.

FISHER. Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni cabinet be tried as war criminals?

VINCENT. We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being war criminals will be arrested and tried. Cabinet status will be no protection.

HILLDRING. We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is applying in Germany are being used in Japan.

DENNISON. Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they are punished—not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.

FISHER. All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let me ask you this: Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu—the big industrialists—who have cooperated with the militarists and profited by the war, among the guilty?

DENNISON. We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.

FISHER. General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?

HILLDRING. Under our policy, all Fascists and jingos—militarists—will be removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines *must* be broken up. There's no other way to accomplish it.

FISHER. What do you say about the big industrialists, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT. Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hilldring has just said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.

FISHER. And the financial combines as well?

VINCENT. Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of their loot.

FISHER. Well, there's no feeling here of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu". Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?

DENNISON. There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about this war, whether he is of the Zaibatsu, or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war criminal.

FISHER. General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany has been to send Americans over to rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farbenindustrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in Japan. What about that?

HILLDRING. I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are *not* rebuilding the big trusts in Germany, we *have not* rebuilt them, and we *are not going to* rebuild them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only will we not *revive* these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans or the Japanese to do so.

FISHER. And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?

HILLDRING. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions, or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a

modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment, and automotive equipment.

VINCENT. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, won't this creat a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city. We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

FISHER. What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

VINCENT. They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

FISHER. They'll have to have *some* foreign trade of course to keep going.

VINCENT. Of course, but not the unhealthful sort they had before the war. A large portion of Japan's prewar foreign trade assets were used for military preparations, and not to support her internal economy; after all, scrap-iron and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign trade far below the prewar level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had before the war.

FISHER. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our policy be on food?

HILLDRING. General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.

FISHER. They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?

DENNISON. We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy—that's the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's imports, in order to keep her from rearming—and the best way to do that may be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.

FISHER. Then, Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some Japanese transport planes to resume operations.

DENNISON. That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General MacArthur's directive in this field, *no civil aviation* will be permitted in Japan.

VINCENT. Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.

FISHER. In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialists will be?

VINCENT. Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agriculture on a more democratic economic basis. Our policy favors a wider distribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself—and will, we expect.

FISHER. And the labor unions? What about them?

VINCENT. We'll encourage the development of trade-unionism, Mr. Fisher, because that's an essential part of democracy.

FISHER. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?

VINCENT. General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.

FISHER. That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?

DENNISON. Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a constructive reform program.

VINCENT. All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.

FISHER. I take all this to mean that the democratic and antimilitarist groups will be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

VINCENT. It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan." It also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored."

FISHER. And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain *their* objectives?

VINCENT. In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends the Japanese may even use force.

DENNISON. We are *not* interested in upholding the *status quo* in Japan, as such. I think we should make that doubly clear.

FISHER. One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting together in one party—a Socialist party. What stand will we take on that, General Hilldring?

HILLDRING. If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attack by military fanatics.

FISHER. You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for the democratic forces.

HILLDRING. We're prepared to support the development of democratic government even though some temporary disorder may result—so long as our troops and our over-all objectives are not endangered.

FISHER. I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that makes a religion of nationalism and which is called "National Shinto"?

VINCENT. Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, as a state-directed religion is to be done away with. People will not be taxed to support National Shinto, and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools.

FISHER. That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.

VINCENT. Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultranationalistic ideology in any form will be completely suppressed.

FISHER. And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.

VINCENT. Yes; but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalistic leanings are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.

DENNISON. That's where the real change must stem from—the school system. The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes for the older generation as well.

FISHER. And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.

DENNISON. How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through all channels—school texts, press, radio, and so on.

FISHER. What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?

DENNISON. Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many Japanese outside of Japan. Take for example the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. They used to send their children to Japan at the age of about 7, I think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life

they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during the war.

FISHER. What accounts for that loyalty?

DENNISON. Simply that they *like* the American way of life better. At seven, it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like, but as they get older they learn to understand and appreciate the more important things as well. I believe the people in Japan will like our ways too. I think once they have a taste of them—of real civil liberties—they'll never want to go back to their old ways.

HILLDRING. I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack—they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated with one basic idea: obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.

VINCENT. Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if there's to be a real, working democracy in Japan.

HILLDRING. I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese under the occupation?

VINCENT. The press has told you a lot, Mr. Fisher. I can say here that recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about the emergence of sound, democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle the East," or hustle General MacArthur. Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully fostered.

FISHER. Well, thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you, General Hilldring and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupation policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic policy—one that's aimed at giving *no* encouragement to the imperialists and *every possible* encouragement to the prodemocratic forces which are now beginning to reappear in Japan.

ANNOUNCER. That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department; and Capt. R. L. Dennison, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee. This was the thirty-fourth of a series of broadcasts on "Our Foreign Policy," presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at 10 cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of the broadcasts, send $1 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State Department program on our Latin-American policy, with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this important program * * * Kennedy Ludlam speaking from Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 386A

STATEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FAR EASTERN COMMISSION TO FORMULATE POLICIES FOR THE CARRYING OUT OF THE JAPANESE SURRENDER TERMS [1]

[Released to the press October 1]

Mr. James F. Byrnes, the Secretary of State of the United States, announced that he has received from Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign

[1] Issued by the Secretary of State in London on September 29, 1945.

Affairs of Great Britain, the consent of the British Government to the proposal made by the United States Government on August 22 for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to formulate policies for the carrying out of the Japanese surrender terms.

The Commission will also be asked to consider whether a Control Council should be established and if so the powers which should be vested in it.

The Soviet Union and China had already given their consent to the establishment of the Commission. France, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands will be invited to become members of the Commission. The first meeting of the Commission will be convened in Washington in the near future.

In agreeing to the establishment of the Commission Mr. Bevin stated it was his understanding that the Commission could determine whether it should meet in Washington or Tokyo. Secretary Byrnes confirmed Mr. Bevin's understanding and said that the United States representative would be instructed to vote that the Commission hold meetings in Tokyo.

Mr. Bevin also requested that India be invited to become a member of the Commission. Mr. Byrnes said the United States would agree to the request and that he would submit the request to the Governments of the Soviet Union and China for their approval.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recognize the format there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What publication is it?

Mr. VINCENT. State Department Bulletin.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is from the State Department Bulletin?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Mandel, will you state whether that is a photostat of certain pages from the State Department Bulletin?

Mr. MANDEL. That was ordered from the Library of Congress by me, to be photostated.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a photostat of certain pages of the State Department Bulletin?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in this speech say, Mr. Vincent, "The institution of the Emperor, if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it, will have to be radically modified."?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Captain Dennison then quoted part of the directive sent to General MacArthur; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Captain Dennison said:

The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the next paragraph?

Mr. VINCENT. I can quote a part of it to you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read the two paragraphs that Captain Dennison read with regard to the directive to General MacArthur?

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

"The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender.

"Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force."

That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

Mr. SOURWINE. That directive was in line with your own views; is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you, in that radio broadcast, state:

We have every intention or proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hildring has just said, we intend to break the hold these large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, to name the most prominent.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I stated that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not state further along——

This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Fisher asked:

Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

And you replied:

Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction work to do in every city.

Mr. VINCENT. Will you continue?

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

We have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; that is my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fisher then said:

What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

and you replied:

They'll have to find jobs in the light industries Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself, so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a delineation of a realistic policy?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a delineation of a realistic policy that we considered at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had considered that policy at that time to be realistic?

Mr. VINCENT. I considered that policy to be realistic; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the basis of all that you as an expert knew about the Orient?

Mr. VINCENT. On the basis of all that I knew about the Orient, I thought that was a realistic policy at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider it now to be realistic?

Mr. VINCENT. I think now that Japan has to get back its heavy industries, but at that time we had just finished a war against Japan,

where its heavy industries had been used against us for 4 years of war, and the objective and idea in mind in that statement was to reduce Japan's war-making potential in the future, and at the same time to try to provide the Japanese who had lived off those industries, other means of living, which, as I say, were light industries and other forms of economic activity.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your background and experience and knowledge with regard to Japan and the Orient generally lead you to believe that the Japanese nation could exist, turned in on itself, as you here referred to it?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not an economist, but that was my general belief, and it was the belief, I think also, of the people who drafted the postsurrender policy for Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly, in any event, that was the belief that you were conveying in this radio speech?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you further along state:

All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and free public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press?

Mr. VINCENT. Are you asking whether that was a statement by me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you include in your category of "all democratic parties" the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. Just what I have stated here, that it would place no obstruction in the way of organization of political parties, and that is, if not a quote, a paraphrase on the postwar surrender policy.

Senator FERGUSON. That would include the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. That would include the Communist Party. That would not exclude them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say "all democratic parties" using "democratic" as a generic phrase, all parties included within what you spoke of as democratic, including the Communist Party, will be encouraged, will be assured the rights of free assembly, and free public discussion, and the occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of their organization; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I have used the phrase here, "the organization of political parties."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Did you consider the Communist Party a political party?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was then included, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now did you, after Mr. Fisher said:

Then, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

state:

It would be suppressed. One of General MacArthur's policy guides calls for the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan. It also says that changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the Government are to be permitted and favored.

Is that what you said?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that not convey the implicit information that if the Government attempted by force to put down the Communists, that Government's effort would be suppressed?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not draw that inference from it, sir, no. Let me read it again. [Reading document.]

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; please do.

Mr. VINCENT. I would say here that the inference here is not the Government, but if a political group using gangster methods, were trying to interfere with the ideas expressed in the previous statement, which is that the Japanese would be free to organize political parties, that those gangster methods would be suppressed by General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you thing that Mr. Fisher meant by "gangster methods"? Did he not mean force?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say he meant force.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understood him to mean force, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the nationalistic groups that he spoke of, include the National Government of China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chinese Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I don't mean to say here that in Japan we are talking about a nationalistic group from China that was going to try to interfere, using gangster methods, in Japan; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were talking about the nationalistic group in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Talking about the old military group in Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were talking about any nationalistic group?

Mr. VINCENT. That was trying to use gangster methods.

Mr. SOURWINE. Meaning by that, force?

Mr. VINCENT. You are talking about Mr. Fisher here. I am trying to figure out what Mr. Fisher meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understood him to mean the use of force when you answered this question?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; gangster methods.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "gangster methods" you meant force?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you were saying was that no nationalistic group would be permitted to use force against a democratic party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what you could read into that; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The democratic parties, you have already testified, included the Communist Party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said that the organization of political parties would have included and not excluded the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said your use of the phrase "democratic parties" included the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are saying is that no nationalistic group would be permitted to use force against the Communist Party; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, Mr. Fisher has used the words "gangster methods." You are trying to draw this around to the idea that gangster methods mean force.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said that gangster methods meant force.

Mr. VINCENT. And the Government of Japan would not be allowed to suppress the Communist Party. That is not what this means at all, but gangster methods and nationalistic groups, using gangster methods at that time, would not have been what was expected to happen in Japan, and General MacArthur, according to his own directive—because I quote him here—also says:

> Changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the Government are to be permitted and favored.

Senator FERGUSON. You have answered now that the Communist Party back when you made that broadcast was a democratic party?

Mr. VINCENT. In the general sense of a political party.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, democratic political party.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

> The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties.

Senator FERGUSON. I am taking your answer that it was a democratic political party. Do you today hold the same belief?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not say here that I am calling the Communist Party a democratic party. It says:

> All democratic parties will be encouraged.

But later on it says:

> The occupation authorities are to plac eno obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you now want to have the record stand that the Communist Party was not a democratic party?

Mr. VINCENT. That the Communist Party was not considered, in my mind, to be a democratic party insofar as I can recall, but the use here would imply that.

Senator FERGUSON. You would include them?

Mr. VINCENT. You include them in the organization of political parties:

> The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Then if it had been a Fascist Party, an Emperor's party, they would have been welcome, because you did not use the word, you said, "democratic," so everything that could be called a political party was included there, is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

> All democratic parties will be encouraged.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we are going back to the word "democratic." That is in there, is it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, the Communists are included in the democratic parties?

Mr. VINCENT. In the context of this thing it would be assumed that the democratic parties at that time were considered to be——

Senator FERGUSON. We will start over again.

Are you of the same opinion now, that they are a democratic party?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have changed your mind?

Mr. VINCENT. I have changed my mind; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. These were words of art, were they not?

Mr. VINCENT. This was giving a broadcast.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, but in the context of this broadcast you meant to include the Communist Party among the democratic parties about which you were speaking; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be correct, sir, in the matter of broadcasting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now when Mr. Fisher said:

> And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain their objectives—

Did you reply to him:

> In that event, the Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces.

Did you say that?

Mr. VINCENT. I did say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now have you not stated there in two succeeding statements, with only one intervening question, that on the one hand, if a democratic political party, a democratic party—and in that connotation, that included the Communist Party—should be sought to be put down by a nationalistic group, the nationalistic group would be suppressed by the Supreme Commander; and then in the next breath you state that if a democratic party—and that included the Communist Party—sought to achieve its ends by force, our people would not interfere or intervene except where necessary to protect our own occupation forces? Is that not true?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what the language here said.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what you said?

Mr. VINCENT. But I think you are drawing some very wrong implications from the language here.

Mr. SOURWINE. What other implications do you draw?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly do not draw the implication that if the Communist Party became a menace in Japan, that General MacArthur would be prohibited from taking action against them, because, in the broadcast here I had mentioned the fact in a loose context the democratic parties will be encouraged.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you earlier if it was not true that in that broadcast you had served notice that the Japanese Government would not be allowed to obstruct the Communist Party and that even the use of force against the monarchy by the Communists or other liberals would be permitted.

I ask you again, is it not true you did?

Mr. VINCENT. I say that is a wrong inference from the language of this thing here, Mr. Sourwine, and you know that that is a wrong inference from this thing here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I do not know that is wrong, or I would not be urging it here.

Mr. VINCENT. I can tell you flatly, then, that irrespective of the language here, it was not the intention of this language to in any way

permit the Communist Party to take over control of Japan or to operate in a manner which would be inimical to the occupation of Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or to assist in that objective?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not in my mind, and I don't think it was in anybody's mind in drafting this.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can see, can you not, how the language can be so construed?

Mr. VINCENT. I can see how the language can be so construed.

Senator FERGUSON. This was cleared as to policy?

Mr. VINCENT. This was cleared—I have testified before that the language of this was not particularly cleared as to policy. I think you will find in the post-surrender paper that it also contains language like that.

Senator FERGUSON. If the language does not clear it, what was cleared? What would you clear in a broadcast if you did not clear the language?

Mr. VINCENT. I would clear whatever there was in over-all policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this state an over-all policy?

Mr. VINCENT. This states an over-all policy in the popular language of making a broadcast; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the policy of our Government at that time, that you made the broadcast, to get rid of the Emperor?

Mr. VINCENT. The policy of the Government to get rid of the Emperor?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it to allow the Communists to rise in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you not exclude the Communists from this "democratic political parties"?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, we were thinking, in those times, of the old totalitarian party in Japan, which had been running the Government. We were not thinking in terms here of making fine distinctions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you not saying in this speech that any liberal party in Japan would even be permitted to use force to gain its ends against the then existing Government?

Mr. VINCENT. Any liberal party?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I will have to read this again.

That is what I was saying here. He puts the words here in his mouth.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are words you put in your own mouth, are they not?

Mr. VINCENT. My reply to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said:

> This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese may even use force.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, that included "to achieve ascendancy of the Communist Party," did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. I say that the inference you are drawing from that, that there was any intention in my language or in the post-surrender

document—of which I think I have a copy here—in which you find similar language, and to draw the inference from that which can be drawn, is entirely correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, if you, sir, as a State Department official, had desired on a public broadcast to serve notice on the Japanese people that the Communists would be permitted to use force to gain their ends, and that the United States Government would not defend the monarchy, would you have dared to use any more explicit terms than were used in that broadcast?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no such intention of making any——

Mr. SOURWINE. Answer the question.

Mr. VINCENT. That if I had wanted——

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had desired to serve notice in that speech, would you have dared to be any more explicit about it than you were in that broadcast?

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking a hypothetical question.

Senator FERGUSON. You are an expert on the Far East. Answer it as an expert. It is a hypothetical one.

Mr. VINCENT. It is a hypothetical question. I don't know what I would have tried to do. How can I say what I would have tried to do it I were trying to get the Communists to take over China, which I was not doing?

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you at this time, October of 1945, have said in a radio broadcast that it was the policy of the Communist Party against the use of force by any nationalistic group in Japan, but that the Communist Party would be permitted to use force in the achievement of its ends? Would you have been able to say that? Could you have dared to say that in a radio broadcast at that time, in exactly those terms?

Mr. VINCENT. I would never have even thought of saying it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would not have been permitted, would it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would never have thought to say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been completely contrary to the policy of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. It would have been contrary to the policy of the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. What we have is a speech in which you used language which you now say could be construed in a manner which was, at that time, completely contrary to the policy of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I say that you are drawing an inference from statements here which were perfectly understandable at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how those statements were understood by the Japanese people?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not. I will say that I never had any objections to the speech from the Japanese, General MacArthur, or anyone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you infer now that Mr. Selden Menefee inserted this in or do you take full responsibility for this language?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Selden Menefee wrote the language, but I will take full responsibility, because I have already testified I went over this broadcast.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you seen this record on Mr. Selden Menefee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that may make a difference as to what he intended in this speech?

Mr. VINCENT. From what you have read there it could make a difference, but I doubt it.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that Amerasia back on July 28, 1944, was advocating allowing the Communist Party to cause an uprising and take over Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I remember, from that document there.

Senator FERGUSON. Who drew this document?

Mr. VINCENT. Who drew that document?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. In the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. It was drawn up in the special assistant's office, for relations with the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, since the chairman has referred to this, our specialist from the Navy Department is here. Would the chairman like to put him on?

Senator FERGUSON. I do. But first, did you approve it? I do not know the exhibit number, but I want to receive it as an exhibit. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. It passed over my desk and I initialed it.

Senator FERGUSON. It passed over your desk and you initialed it. I ask you whether or not you approved it?

Mr. VINCENT. My initialing of it would approve sending it to the field in response to requests that had come from the field for information as to what publications were saying.

I did not initiate the action.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean to say now that you only approved that it might be sent out?

Mr. VINCENT. We were sending out other articles. We were sending out newspaper clippings to Mr. Gauss, over the radio, because of a request from him to get reaction in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know who Susumu Okano was?

Mr. VINCENT. Susumu Okano?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. When I testified, I did not. I think Mr. Sourwine told me.

Senator FERGUSON. When you testified—that means before the executive session?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is within a week or 2 weeks?

Mr. VINCENT. A week ago.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know this man?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't know the man.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did approve language in this release, as of July 28, 1944?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that true?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. And this language clearly indicates he was a Communist, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it does.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any question about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you account for the fact in any way that you as an expert on the Far East did not know, certainly, one of the leading Communists, if not the leading Communist, of Japan, by name?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony to you was that I did not know him and I could not recall his name.

Mr. SOURWINE. I say: Do you account in any way for the fact that you did not?

Mr. VINCENT. I account for it by the fact that 7 years afterward I could not recall the name of a Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might the record show at this point, so there will be no false impression, that while this Amerasia document speaks of using the Japanese Communist Okano in the role of Tito for Japan, Tito at that time was in a much different position than what he is in at the present time?

Is that not true, Mr. Vincent, that at that time, in July of 1944, Tito was a Communist leader, there had been no break with Communist Russia in Yugoslavia at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. In 1944, Tito was, as I recall it, a guerrilla leader in Yugoslavia, but I can't give exact information on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was a Communist guerrilla leader?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was supported at that time by the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. VINCENT. He was supported at that time by the U. S. S. R. and, it is my recollection, by the United Kingdom.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes?

Senator FERGUSON. Now the second line in this describes Okano as a Japanese Communist, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. The second line in what, sir? I am trying to follow you.

Senator FERGUSON. In your release.

Mr. VINCENT. The second line from where?

Senator FERGUSON. The second line from the top.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, "using the Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He was a Japanese Communist; is that not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know then that Amerasia was a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think they meant by this statement, if it was not a Communist front?

Mr. VINCENT. This was simply, as the policy was, even in Yugoslavia, of using people anywhere we could, to fight the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. But this was to do more than fight the Japanese; it was to establish a Communist Government in Japan, was it not? You would not expect the Communists to establish any other kind of government than a Communist Government, would you?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you were advocating that they establish a Communist Government in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I was not advocating anything.

This was sent out.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that Amerasia was——

Mr. VINCENT. That Amerasia, in writing this article, had expressed that opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that be pro-Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly would be pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we have now our expert from the Navy Department, on distribution coding. May we have him as a witness?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Will you raise your right hand?

You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the United States you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Commander BLENMAN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER WILLIAM BLENMAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND PLANS DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT

Mr. SOURWINE. Commander, will you state your name for the record?

Commander BLENMAN. Commander William Blenman.

Mr. SOURWINE. What position do you hold in the Department?

Commander BLENMAN. I am the Assistant Director of the Administration and Plans Division in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hand you a document consisting of two pages. Will you read the first couple of lines so we may identify it?

Commander BLENMAN (reading):

> The July issue of the Amerasia suggests the possibility of using the Japanese Communist, Susumu Okano, in the role of * * *.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look at the lower left-hand corner of the bottom of the second page? Do you find there symbols indicating distribution?

Commander BLENMAN. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us what those symbols mean?

Commander BLENMAN. The first one, Comminch F–O means "commander in chief, and the Chief of Naval Operations."

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, first of all, does the presence of these symbols indicate to you that this document was sent to a number of places or a number of categories of places and persons?

Commander BLENMAN. It indicates to me that it received distribution within the Navy Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Within the Navy Department?

Commander BLENMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then these are people or officers within the Navy to whom it went?

Commander BLENMAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you please proceed?

Commander BLENMAN. First one, "Comminch F–O" is the commander in chief and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is the commander in chief?

Commander BLENMAN. This means the commander in chief of the Navy, sir, who was at that time Fleet Admiral E. J. King.

Senator FERGUSON. Admiral King, on July 28, 1944, was the commander in chief?

Commander BLENMAN. Yes, sir.

The next symbol "Comminch F–20" is the assistant for Combat Intelligence.

In July, 1944—I do not have the organization sheets of that particular month—so the incumbent at that time I do not know at present.

"Op–13" refers to the Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

"Op–13" is the Director of the Central Division.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who that was?

Commander BLENMAN. Reading from the sheet which is dated August 22, 1944, that was Capt. O. S. Colclough.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the next one?

Commander BLENMAN. "Op–16" is the Director of Naval Intelligence.

"Op–16–1" is the Deputy Director for Naval Intelligence.

"Op–16–F" is the Head of Intelligence Branch in the Naval Intelligence Division.

"Op–20–G" is the Communications Division, the Assistant Director for Communications and Intelligence.

The last I am unable to identify positively, but by the first "Op–16" it indicates that it belonged to the Naval Intelligence Division. I believe it was probably a mailing file section.

Mr. SOURWINE. Considering that paper as a whole, would you say that it is a copy of a State Department document which was circulated within the Navy Department, for the information of high-echelon officers and intelligence?

Commander BLENMAN. Judging from the distribution list, I would say "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. The document appears on its face to be originally a State Department document; is that right?

Commander BLENMAN. I would be unable to positively identify it as such.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the marking in the upper left-hand corner?

Commander BLENMAN. "Message sent, Chungking, China, July 25 (1005)."

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there a name there?

Commander BLENMAN. It says "Hull (Secretary)."

Mr. SOURWINE. He was Secretary of State?

Commander BLENMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Assuming this document was an official Navy Department document, the presence of that name would indicate it was originally a message sent by Mr. Hull to Chungking, would it not?

Commander BLENMAN. It would.

Senator FERGUSON. Over on the second page, does it not have under "OP–16–A–3–1" "State FC/L"?

Commander BLENMAN. That must be, I believe, some State Department distribution. It is not within the Navy.

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate that it was distributed in State, also?

Commander BLENMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, does it indicate in any place that that is a Navy document?

Commander BLENMAN. It has no indication of such.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Mr. Vincent, you concede that this was a State Department document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I don't think there is anything very mysterious there. Our communications with Chungking during the war, and the channels being confined, this was made over Navy radio. We have had Navy radio personnel in the Embassy at Chungking. This long-distribution symbol put on—it was put on as it went out over Navy radio.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean if something went out over Navy radio, they had a closed circuit of distribution there to the Navy Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; as the telegram goes from the Navy to the State Department, the State Department would not have put a distribution list for the Navy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be the practice in the Navy Department, if they sent a State Department message to Chungking, to circulate a copy of it?

Commander BLENMAN. I can't testify that was the procedure done in those days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know that to be done during your time?

Commander BLENMAN. I have no experience in that regard.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to put you on the spot, sir. I have no more questions.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, the date on this is July 28, 1944. The message purports to have been sent on July 25, 1944, to Chungking.

Do you know if that date is correct, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know that the date is absolutely correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have reason to believe it is not correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no reason to believe it is not correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you accept the fact that this document was circulated in the Navy Department about the 28th of July?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you know if this document quotes from the August 1944 issue of Amerasia? It states: "The July issue."

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge if it was quoting from the August issue. It says it was quoting from the July issue; as far as I know anything about it. It is right here, if you want me to read this.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is this?

Mr. VINCENT. This is a press release that I spoke of this morning.

Mr. SOURWINE. That has been ordered in the record, and this document has been ordered in the record, so they will both be in the record for whatever they may speak. But, I would like to ask: Did you not know that, in fact, the text quoted was not in the July issue of Amerasia but in the August issue of Amerasia?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was in the July issue?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I did not draft this. I have no recollection other than passing over my desk. I don't know whether it was in July. It says "July issue."

A telegram drafted in Mr. McDermott's office would be the July issue; that would be my assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall ever urging that China would be used as a bridge in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I recall making a speech some time or other using a phrase similar to that. I don't recall urging it. You will have to take that whole speech.

Senator FERGUSON. It looks as if we can finish this in 2 hours, but we are not going to try it tonight.

So we will start at 9:30 tomorrow morning and continue for 2 hours and see whether we can finish.

Mr. VINCENT. I have great confidence in Mr. Sourwine, but he has made those 2-hour promises——

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I have made no promises as to 2 hours or when we could conclude.

Mr. VINCENT. That is a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you say that I had made a promise of 2 hours?

Mr. VINCENT. I correct the statement. You have not made a promise. You have said at times you would hope to get through in 2 hours.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I have expressed that hope with the utmost sincerity, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I might suggest that if you will get a good night's rest and then answer these questions a little more directly, we might save some time.

Mr. VINCENT. Thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am informed that the actual order for admission into the record of this press conference transcript which Mr. Vincent has furnished, and this particular document referring to Amerasia, has not been made.

Would you care to make that order?

Senator FERGUSON. I am entering the order now and will also receive what Mr. Mandel read from the Second Report, Un-American Activities in Washington State, in the record.

(The document referring to Amerasia and the press conference transcript referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 387 (content of which appears on p. 2091; distribution numbers identified, beginning on p. 2180) and 388." No. 388 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 388

[Not for the press. For departmental use only]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, JUNE 2, 1950
12:20 PM, EDST

Mr. MCDERMOTT. We have a release on the employment of high-ranking scientists in top-level policy posts in the Department and in key foreign posts, which is being handed out to you. I think you will find it interesting (See press release No. 579). It is a nice story when you get it down to small print, and it may be that you would rather work from that and I think you will find something in it.

There is a story from London this morning to the effect that at the recent meeting in London the Western Big Three nations had agreed to let the Western German Government establish an armed federal police force, and I have had a lot of requests on that this morning. The comment on that is, the question of

strengthening police forces in Germany was raised during the meeting of the three Ministers in London. They did not feel, however, that they had sufficient data and information to reach a decision. The matter was therefore referred to the High Commission for study and discussion with the Germans. No decision was reached at London as to the nature or size of additional policy units for Germany.

Q. Mac, is that all?

A. That it all.

Q. What do they mean by saying that they didn't have sufficient data and information? As I recall, out of that three-power meeting there came a very detailed statement on the situation of Eastern Germany.

A. There was a lot of information came out about Eastern Germany, but these three Foreign Ministers felt that they didn't have enough information or data to reach a decision, so they referred it to the High Commission.

Q. There has been no decision as yet?

Q. These stories from London are pretty mutual on that.

A. Yes.

Q. Mac, who brought up the question. Schuman or who?

A. I dont' know who brought it up over there.

Q. Can we find out?

A. Yes.

Q. Isn't there any rule concerning armed police forces in Western Germany now? They have some sort of arms for the policy force.

A. I suppose so.

Q. They must have federal police forces.

A. I don't know just how the police do that.

Q. Who had the story, Mac?

A. It just came off the ticker and I think there was something before on the ticker about it.

Q. Can we get something about this eventually?

A. I would rather not express any opinion until McCloy has a chance to work it out with the others.

Q. Do they have authority to make any plan or do they have to make recommendations?

A. They will make recommendations which will be discussed with the Government.

Q. It was referred to them for study and discussion.

Q. Was there any decision reached as to the principle involved—whether there should be——

A. (Interposing). The whole thing was just turned over to the High Commission for study and report.

Q. It is under study by them and it looks as though there was agreement in principle.

A. It is under study by the High Commissioners until they make some report to us.

Q. Did the Commissioners receive any guidance at all?

A. Of course, they had the benefit of all the discussions between the Ministers.

Q. That wouldn't affect a policy against rearming Western Germany.

A. That is not the question. This question is about rearming Western Germany. That matter has not been discussed at all. What was covered here was the matter of arming some police.

Q. Is this a new thing? The question has been reported before, but what I can't get is—I can't get an answer to what our attitude is—if we are against the thing?

A. No; I won't even go that far. The whole thing is under discussion.

Q. The report from London was about federal police.

A. I will read the report from London if the UP will give me permission:

"(German Police) London—The Western Big Three Nations have agreed to let the West German Government establish an armed federal police force of about 5,000 men, informed sources said. These sources said the police would be equipped with light arms, including automatic weapons, and be about one-tenth the size of the militarized 'people's police' in the Soviet zone of Germany. Informed sources said the new force was designed to bolster the prestige of the West German Government and give it an instrument to help preserve domestic order. They said it was not designed as a reply to establishment of the Soviet zone 'peoples police.' Informants said the three allied High Commissioners in West Germany had been informed of the decision and instructed to begin dis-

cussions with the Federal German Government on establishment of the force. Negotiations will begin this month in Bonn, where the exact composition of the police will be worked out." (6/2-GM958A).

Q. Mac, you say then that there has been no decision up to the present time?

A. There has been no decision reached as to the size of the federal force.

Q. The idea of that is that there has been a decision to establish a police force?

A. There has not been any decision to establish or increase it—or how many.

Q. Are there federal police in Germany now?

A. No; there are no federal police.

Q. What was your answer to the query as to whether the Western German police now having arms?

A. I don't know what they carry.

Q. They must carry something.

A. They are not federal police, they are local police. They might have pistols.

Now I am going into a little discourse about practices in the State Department which most of us, of course, know but which some people outside do not. There are hundreds of telegrams in the Department every day. The Secretary of State does not sign all the telegrams but his name appears on every telegram. There are various officers in the Department authorized to sign the Secretary's name and put their own initials under it. That seems to be what happened in connection with a document being discussed in the papers the last two days. There are stores about a message in Chungking, concerning an article that appeared in Amerasia which interested me a lot. I found that the telegram referred to was written in my own office, that it was signed in my own office, and initialed in my own office, and went out as a matter of routine, following a procedure of long standing of keeping our missions abroad informed on what was appearing in the public print in the United States concerning their areas.

I ran through some of my flimsies and found that many for a certain period went to Chungking. These were not secret telegrams at all. The information in these papers has appeared in the newspapers in the United States.

Q. Did any of your telegrams express any information in the Amerasia case?

A. None whatever. Just let me continue. There had gone up to Yenan a couple of American newspaper correspondents. They were following their professions of observing what was going on. Their stories were reports of their observations to the American people.

Q. Yenan was the headquarters of the Chinese Communists.

A. I don't know what headquarters this was, but it was in that area. There were many stories written by these correspondents which appeared in the press. Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was well aware of the shift of the correspondents to that part of China. On July 10, he wired the Department——

Q. (Interposing.) What year?

A. 1944 (continuing) that the press correspondents had reportedly returned from their visit to Yenan and were en route to Chungking. The Embassy had not as yet received from the United States any copies of the press despatches or articles written by them, and accordingly did not know whether it had been possible for them to make comprehensive factual reports. That telegram was referred to my office for action, which consisted of clipping newspapers, leading articles, leading magazines, and writing a digest compressed into a despatch that could be sent by cable, sending the cable to Chungking, and wrapping up the despatches and articles and sending them by air mail. If you want me to, I will read a despatch—one of them: (Washington, July 19, 1944, AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING) "As indicated in following digest, press correspondents who traveled to Yenan were evidently allowed considerable latitude in their despatches and articles relating to their trip. (Embassy's telegram—July 10.)

"The correspondents in despatches to New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune, and Christian Science Monitor, praised Communists' industrial and agricultural achievements, and applauded fighting spirit and military achievements of Communist troops. New York Times' correspondent on July 1 reported finding in Yenan 'hatred of Japanese and determination to defend their achievements against all interference.' Same correspondent stressed finding realization of nearness of counteroffensive against Japan, in which Communist armies and guerrillas want to participate to fullest. He reported seeing how formerly barren country has been transformed into area of intensive cultivation, stock breeding, and handicraft industry. Harrison Forman in Herald-Tribune on June 23 described Yenan as 'magnificient symbol of tenacity and determination of people of this border region of China.' He described how this border area, forced by circumstances to become wholly self-reliant since it was cut off from outside world three years ago, 'encourages any and every industry,

small or large, even subsidizing some which admittedly would be unprofitable if products they yield could be imported,'Guenther Stein in Christian Science Monitor on June 27 declared that any Allied commander 'would be proud to command those tough, well-fed, hardened troops whose exercises show both high skill and spirit.'

"Harrison Forman in June 23 Herald-Tribune described refreshing, informal atmosphere of place, declaring: 'No one bothers about ceremony, styles of clothing or time. Everything is open and above board, with absolutely no control or restrictions on movements, discussions, interviews, visits or photographs, while every one, from highest government official to lowliest peasant worker, sincerely asks for criticism and advice for betterment of himself and of working conditions.'

"Harrison Forman reported in July 1 Herald-Tribune that Mao Tse-tung stated Communists' attitude on Kuomintang-Communist relations as follows: 'To support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to persist in Kuomintang cooperation as well as cooperation with whole people of China, to struggle for overthrow of Japanese imperialism and to build an independent and democratic China.' Guenther Stein quoted Wang Cheng in June 27 Monitor as asserting that everyone hopes for achievement of full understanding with Kuomintang, 'for we have never ceased to recognize Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as leader.' Communist spokesman, Chou En-lai, according to Harrison Forman in July 9 Herald-Tribune, declared that 'there is still considerable distance between national government's proposal and our suggestions.' Forman in same story says Yenan hopes that Chungking will send representatives to Yenan for closer examination of situation and to enter into more comprehensive discussion.

"Correspondents reported from Sian that that city had had three months' notice of their visit, and was 'on its toes.' Guenther Stein in June 1 Monitor related that beggars and dogs had been cleared out, and 'the usually clean city was cleaner than ever.' New York Times correspondent in June 3 despatch said Sian 'looks and feels like a political and military fortress.' He reported that 'one's actions are not one's private business. Everything is traced, checked and counterchecked.' He said he felt like 'a piece on a chess board, with his movements circumscribed by fixed rules.'

"General Hu Chung-nan's chief of staff, General Lo Tse-Kai, flatly told reporters, according to June 3 despatch to New York Times, that Eighth Route Army had never fought Japanese since war began, that they had done nothing except impede attack of Central Government troops, that all guerillas in Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung belonged to Kuomintang, and that if Chungking talks achieved any settlement, 'we don't hope that they will help us fight the Japanese because this is too much to expect. We only hope they will not interfere with us.'

"New York Times correspondent reported on June 2 that General Hu himself declined to answer a question about possible Government-Communist understanding, after representative of Chungking Ministry of Information, who was accompanying party, broke in to say that this question had already been answered by General Lo.

"Harrison Forman in June 4 despatch to Herald-Tribune described Kenanpo and unoccupied Shansi provincial areas still under Marshal Yen Hsi-shan's control as even more Communist than Communist districts adjacent, with which relations are strained, and there is little or no contact.

"Copies of the available despatches and articles are being air mailed to you.

"Hull
"(HMB)
"(SA/M)" (Homer M. Byington)

Q. Mac, was the correspondent for Amerasia in this group?

A. I don't know.

Q. What about this Amerasia telegram?

A. Then on July 25——

Q. (Interposing.) All these things that you have read to us have been by correspondents?

A. That is right.

Q. Did this include Amerasia? Did these reports include everything else that was written by all of them—or was Amerasia reporting?

A. I don't know whether Amerasia was there or not. All I have is the telegrams picked out of the file.

Following that then, the same people who drafted the telegram I have just read to you, and this was not a secret telegram. It was not in the public print. It was sent restricted and coded.

Q. What date was that?

A. July 25. It was about the Japanese——
Q. (Interposing.) Just a second, Mac. Did you say that has been printed?
A. It was printed in part. They have taken quotes out here and there.
Q. How long is it, Mac?
A. I will just read the whole thing to you, it is 2⅓ pages:

(AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING from Hull; July 25, 1944)

"July issue of Amerasia suggests possibility of using Japanese Communist Susumu Okano in role of a 'Tito for Japan' in helping Japanese people to establish government that will discard aggressive aims of present ruling oligarchy. Magazine, however, voices uncertainty as to whether the American State Department 'will support program advocated by Okano and his followers, or will prefer to favor the so-called liberal elements in Japan's present ruling class.'

"Same issue proposes that opposition to Japan throughout Eastern China should be strengthened by Allies' establishing close working relations with guerrilla forces that are now operating behind Japanese lines not only in North, but also in Central and Southeast China, and to bolster their activities with material, technical, and financial aid. Article insists that there is no reason why United States and Britain should refrain from any measure designed to strengthen their war effort in Asia simply out of deference to current political situation in Chungking. Amerasia advocates that Allies follow policy adopted toward guerrilla groups of Yugoslavia, where political considerations were eventually superseded by military necessity.

"Magazine denounces 'incredible and preposterous statement' of General Lo Tse-Kai that Eighth Route Army has never fought Japanese and condemns Information Minister's attempt to put blame for Japan's victories in Honan on forces that for long have been prevented from fighting and have been steadfastly refused munitions, medical supplies, and other essentials by Central Government. It is asserted that vital Honan campaign was won by only 40,000 Japanese with not more than 116 tanks, at time when approximately 250,000 Central Government troops were stationed only short distance away in barracks that form iron ring blockading Eighth Route Army. Amerasia claims to have information proving that northern guerilla forces have carried on their resistance to Japanese and have persistently continued their work of educating people to participate in that resistance, despite constant 'mopping up' campaigns by Japanese and hostility on part of Chinese government. Article points out that though poorly equipped, they enjoy one great advantage in that they have enlisted enthusiastic support of local population.

"Kwangtung Guerilla Corps, according to Amerasia, has won support of local population sufficiently to enable them to withstand both Japanese 'mopping up' campaigns and repeated efforts on part of Central Government to uproot them. So effectively have they defended their strategic positions astride Canton-Kowloon railway, article reports, that although Japanese have controlled both terminals for over two years, they have not been able to run a single through train.

"Amerasia contends that time has passed when internal political considerations can be allowed to supersede military necessity, and insists that immediate recognition of potential strength of these guerrilla forces, involving dispatch of liaison officers, technical aid, and munitions, has become of primary importance for success of our future offensive against Japanese.

"Hull
"(HMB)
"(SA/M)"

Q. Some of the press dispatches commented that this telegram was an instruction to the Embassy concerning action which might be taken against the Japanese.

A. The telegram was in no sense an instruction. It merely relayed to the Ambassador information which had appeared in the magazine Amerasia. I don't think there is any doubt that Ambassador Gauss knew the magazine Amerasia and this was merely a digest of an article in it. The telegram was drafted by a young lady in my office of Current Information and in no way could it be considered an instruction from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Gauss in Chungking.

Q. This was endorsed by the State Department?

A. It was in no sense an endorsement but a transmission of information which had appeared in that magazine.

Q. This is in no case a Department dispatch?

A. No, not at all in the sense you have in mind. It was just a report of what had appeared in the public press. I have gone into this in detail so you might see what the operation was—the Press Office keeping the Ambassador informed of what appeared in the American press.

Q. I noticed that correspondents in China were quoted in these press dispatches. Was Haldore Hanson one of them?

A. I don't know.

Q. I was looking for his name. They refer to an AP correspondent but didn't quote him by name.

Q. AP correspondent?

Q. Can you say why you should deny this so emphatically?

A. Now, look! I am not saying whether this telegram I have just read you exists in any file outside the State Department because I do not know. I do not know whether a copy of this telegram was in the Amerasia file or whether or not it was seized there. What I have is the official State Department file and I am giving you the information from that file.

Q. Would it be possible for Amerasia to obtain the file?

A. I don't see how.

Q. I was wondering what the operation was.

A. I do not make public press digests sent to the Embassy for their information.

Q. That was signed by Acheson, wasn't it?

A. No. It was signed by Hull.

Stories in the newspapers have said that this telegram was a secret one from Hull to Chungking. That is just not true, and I put emphasis on that. Off the record.

Q. What category would it appear in here, or would it be sent out with distinguishable instructions, or what?

A. It was marked restricted and not to be shown to anybody except in paraphrase. That was because the material was not secret, it having appeared in public print, but it was transmitted in code to save money. We did not want to prejudice the code; hence, the stamp that it was restricted.

Q. It was signed "Hull" though, wasn't it, Mac?

A. It was signed "Hull," just exactly at this one. They are all the same.

Mr. WHITE. Every telegram that has gone out of the State Department has been signed by the Secretary of State, so far as I know, from the inception of the Department.

Mr. MCDERMOTT. It has to be signed by the Secretary or the Acting Secretary in his place, or otherwise it doesn't go out.

Q. That doesn't mean that he sees everything with his signature?

A. He never sees them—he wouldn't have time. Mr. Hull never saw all the telegrams. The yellow telegrams are incoming, the green one are outgoing.

Mr. WHITE. The question was asked as to who brought up the question of the German police at London and whether the Ministers gave the High Commissioners any guidance.

Prior to the London meeting a letter had been received by the three Governments from Chancellor Adenauer requesting 25,000 central police. This letter had not been answered nor had it been discussed prior to the London meeting. At that meeting Chancellor Adenauer's letter was brought up by the British. Mac has told you the position that the Ministers took—namely, that they did not feel that they had sufficient information to make any decision on it whatsoever. Accordingly, the High Commissioners were asked to study the problem and to come up with recommendations. In other words, in answer to the second part of the question, the High Commissioners did not, NOT, receive any guidance from the Foreign Ministers.

Q. Link, have the High Commissioners been told to make any recommendations by any particular time?

A. So far as I know, no. The question was dumped in their lap and they were told to work it out.

Q. Thank you, sir.

M. J. MCDERMOTT.

* * * * * * *

SA/M: AW

Senator FERGUSON. We will now recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:30 a. m., Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN CARTER VINCENT, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, WALTER STERLING SURREY AND HOWARD REA, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, some of the newspapers report to have discovered what they appear to have thought was a contradiction in our testimony toward the end of yesterday's session. I don't believe it was, but I want to be sure that the record speaks true and that we have an opportunity to discuss it on that point. There also has been an indication that perhaps you were—on yesterday—bulldozed or browbeaten or overcome to the point where you said something you really didn't mean to say, and if that is the fact I want to give you an opportunity to correct it this morning. If I seem to you perhaps to oversimplify this, bear with me for a moment.

When you were making this talk that we discussed——

Senator FERGUSON. I think he ought to be given an opportunity now. Do you want to change or alter or make any explanation of any of your testimony as of yesterday?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I would like to see, if I can, the transcript, but it isn't here, is it, of my testimony yesterday?

Mr. SOURWINE. It has not been delivered yet. It should be here this morning by about 10 o'clock.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you may proceed. You may see the transcript.

Mr. SOURWINE. When we were talking about this radio speech on the occupation policy for Japan I had asked you about your use of the phrase "democratic parties," and again about your use of the

phrase "liberal parties," and whether that included the Communist Party of Japan. It is true, is it not, that at that time there were more than one political party in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in this speech endeavoring to divide the political parties of Japan roughly into two groups, the monarchistic-nationalistic on the one hand, and the democratic-liberal on the other; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't agree with me if it is not right.

Mr. VINCENT. That was my general intention, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You simply were using a label for each of those two groups?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You might have called them group A and group B, and written a long thesis about what you meant by group A; but you were making a radio speech and you chose a label for group A and a label for group B, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The label that you chose for one group was democratic parties or liberal parties.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The label you chose for the other group was monarchistic parties or nationalistic parties, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Is that the label I chose [referring to paper]? I was just wondering whether I used that or whether I used reactionary parties.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, reactionary parties; for the other group?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I used the word "nationalistic" here, I see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Right. In which of those two groups did you intend that the Communist Party of Japan should fall? In which of those two groups did you consider it to be, for the purpose of the discussion that you were here undertaking?

Mr. VINCENT. The Communist Party?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. If you are asking me in the context of this, I didn't consider that it fell in either.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what we are trying to find out, because subsequently you were asked if you thought that the Communist Party was democratic, and of course you very properly said you did not, but you were not then talking about the same thing as you were in this speech, were you?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you repeat that? I am just trying to get it straight.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, indeed. You were asked if you thought that the Communist Party of Japan was a democratic party, and you said you did not.

Mr. VINCENT. I correctly testified I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that sense you were not talking about the same thing as you were when in the speech you attempted to classify the parties of Japan into one of two groups, were you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So in that sense you were not contradicting yourself at all, were you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say I was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. No. When you say that the Communist Party does not fall in either of these two groups would you explain that a little?

Mr. VINCENT. I would explain that in this way: That in making this speech I did not have in mind the Communist Party as falling in either group. In other words, I was thinking of democratic parties as parties as we think of them, as democratic-liberal parties in this country, and in making this speech there was no intention in my mind to include Communist parties among democratic parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment, Mr. Vincent. You knew there were Communists in Japan.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that they wanted to bring back to Japan a Communist Japanese according to the press release that you had prepared and sent out.

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't prepare it, sir, but you are speaking of the Amerasia press release.

Senator FERGUSON. You approved it, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I had passed it; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Amerasia was advocating that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew there was a Communist Party in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew it was active?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you excluded it entirely?

Mr. VINCENT. In speaking of democratic parties I did not have it in mind. In speaking of political parties——

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you not exclude it by words? You told us yesterday, as I recall your testimony, that it was included in that.

Mr. VINCENT. Included among the political parties. That was my testimony yesterday, sir, that I did not have in mind—I haven't the testimony here now—that I did not have specifically in mind, but I did not exclude the Communist Party specifically as you have said, but I do not think that it can be interpreted here that because I did not exclude the Communist Party from a mention of democratic parties that it necessarily follows that I included it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it possible that the man who wrote that speech had something in mind different than what you had in mind?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't testify to that, sir, what he had in mind. It is possible, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it is fair to the people of the United States to have a State Department official, a high official have his broadcast written by a person connected with the radio station and then for him to repeat it on the radio?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, I think that is done quite frequently. As long as it is gone over.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking, do you think that is the proper thing to do?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think it is improper. I think it is done regularly.

Senator FERGUSON. You heard this read about the man who prepared your speech.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was a good thing to do it?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time I had no suspicion——

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about now. I am not talking about then.

Mr. VINCENT. I think now it would be, to have a man like that prepare a script.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it would be now?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, on the basis of the information I now have about Menefee.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you would do it now?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. So a man has to be careful who he has work on his speeches, isn't that true?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you don't want us to believe, do you, that in making this speech you were unaware of or unconscious of the existence of the Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not wish you to.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were attempting to draw a line, and it is always a very difficult thing to draw a line, but you were attempting to draw a line which would divide the political parties of Japan into two groups, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that you didn't mean to include the Communist Party of Japan in either of those two groups?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You certainly would not include the Communist Party of Japan in the monarchistic or nationalistic group, would you?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that the Communists in Japan, as elsewhere, always refer to themselves as democratic, the "real democrats," as the "true liberals," that the words "democratic" and "liberal" are always applied by the Communists to themselves?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I am; that they quite frequently do that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize that when they are used that way by the Communists they are understood as including the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. That when the Communist Party uses it, that they frequently refer to themselves as a democratic party.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Did you ever have any thought at all that your use of the words might be interpreted in Japan as including the Communist Party in this group that you call democratic or liberal?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it could have been interpreted as that, considering what you just said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without considering any argument that I may have made, on the basis of your own knowledge of Japan, of the Far East, do you think that the general use of the phrase "democratic parties" or "liberal parties" of Japan would be interpreted by the Japanese hearer or reader as including the Communist Party of Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it could have been interpreted as including it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, the subcommittee hearings mentioned the following published paragraph, that is, the hearings of this subcommittee on a previous date. I read:

> With the assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWNCC, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened. They were able to push through certain directives which had been held up in committee theretofore so that the set of directives for treatment of Japan which the White House recently released were even better than the original directives which had been flown over to MacArthur and apparently ignored somewhere on his desk or thereabouts.

If I tell you that that paragraph was published about October of 1945, could you comment on it.

Mr. VINCENT. I would comment on that paragraph as being a misstatement of fact. I testified yesterday with regard to the development of the postsurrender policy and I can testify again today if you would like me to. I testified also in executive hearing that that is not correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, sir, who could have revealed the information contained in that paragraph, that is, as to who was out and what directives were being held up and what was being forwarded?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I cannot.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what was referred to in that paragraph by the mention of "the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist"?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a part of the so-called anti-imperialist forces in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I know of no such designation, and I don't——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who replaced Mr. Dunn as Assistant Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think, sir, that anybody actually replaced Mr. Dunn.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who replaced Mr. Grew?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who replaced Mr. Dooman?

Mr. VINCENT. On the SWNCC committee, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the conclusion of the hearing yesterday I had just started to ask you about another address which you made. I refer now to the address which you made at the Foreign Policy Association forum in New York City on October 20, 1945. I believe the subject of the forum was Between War and Peace, and your address was called The Post War Period in the Far East. Do you recall that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in that address urge that China be used as a bridge in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union in the Far East?

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to get the exact phrase (referring to paper). Would you like to know exactly what I said or do you have it there?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a copy of the speech and intend to put it in the record, but I don't want to let that summary stand if you think it is an unfair summary.

Mr. VINCENT. What I said here is "China is in a position to form a buffer or a bridge in our relation to the Soviet Union in the Far East."

Mr. SOURWINE. Read a little more to get it in context.

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

> We will all agree, I believe, that the bridge concept is preeminently preferable and that that it should be our policy to make it a fact. I would go further and say that only through the cooperation of China, the U. S. S. R. and ourselves can the objectives of our policy in the Far East be achieved.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in that speech say anything that might be construed in China as semiofficial notice to the Chinese Nationalist government that the United States would never cooperate with that government in any move against the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to look at the speech, I do not recall saying any such thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in the speech say:

> In August the Chinese and Soviet Governments entered into certain agreements which we hope will stabilize the relations between those two countries. It will be our policy to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union for stability in the Far East. We will cooperate with neither of them in any policy directed against the other.

Mr. VINCENT (reading). "Antagonistic toward the other."

Mr. SOURWINE. You said, "Antagonistic toward the other"?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what this press release from the State Department has.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I see that, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What position would that place you in? We couldn't be anti-Communist, could we?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not speaking of anticommunism. I was speaking of the relations of states, Mr. Chairman, and I did not there have in mind any ideology. I had in mind that we did not wish to cooperate with China in a policy which would bring about friction or antagonism with the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. But don't you understand that the Russian State and communism are one thing?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, in this speech——

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. My question has nothing to do with the speech now. I just asked you the plain question whether or not the Russian State, the U. S. S. R. State, and communism are not one and the same thing.

Mr. VINCENT. It operates differently, but yes, it is one and the same thing in its effect.

Senator FERGUSON. In effect.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How would we fit our policy of not allowing communism to expand, if that was our policy in the State Department, and you use this language?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I am getting at here. We ourselves recognized the U. S. S. R., but we do not cooperate with communism. In this case I was speaking of the relations of states, which means China, Russia, and ourselves, in an attempt to avoid friction in the Far East. This was immediately at the close of the war, and anything that could have avoided friction and difficulty.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, that meant that we would have to play along with the Communists in China.

Mr. VINCENT. That was also a part of our policy at the time, of trying to get the National Government and the other parties to settle their political differences under the National Government of China. that was part of our policy.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you make this speech?

Mr. VINCENT. I made this speech on the 18th of October. I think it is——

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe it was the 20th, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The 20th of October. What year?

Mr. VINCENT. 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945. After the war was over.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That meant that our policy after the war, when the fighting was over, was to play along with the Communists in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't put it that way, sir. The policy was very clear. It has been put in General Marshall's directive, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you put it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would put it just as I have said before, that there was a serious threat in China, I will have to repeat this, of an outbreak of civil war which would have disturbed relations throughout the Far East, and which has disturbed them. At that time it was my idea and it was the idea of the other people in the Government of the United States, including the President and General Marshall, that the best way to avoid that kind of difficulty was to bring about some kind of political settlement in China.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I asked you this before, whether or not there were any places in history that you were able to consolidate Communists with anti-Communists in a government and not have the Communists take over.

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I have testified before that in France and in Italy at the conclusion of the war Communists came into both governments, and that they were eventually eliminated. I have testified also that there was never any intention to allow the Communists to take over control of the Chinese Government, and the very fact that the negotiations broke down was on the basis that the Communists were trying themselves to get a greater degree of power in the Government than we or the National Government of China, which was really conducting the negotiations, were prepared to grant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so that the record may speak very truly, will you look at this, which is—let me identify it first. Mr. Mandel, is that a photostat and of what publication?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Department of State Bulletin dated October 21, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Certain pages thereof?

Mr. MANDEL. Certain pages thereof.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look at that paragraph where we differed on the language? Will you look at it as it appears in the Department of State Bulletin, which is what I was quoting from, that paragraph that begins "In August." Will you read it as it appears there?

Mr. VINCENT (reading):

> In August the Chinese and Soviet Governments entered into certain agreements which we hope will stabilize the relations between those two countries. It will be our policy to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union for stability in the Far East. We will cooperate with neither of them in any policy directed against the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. I didn't know whether you had made any point of the difference of the words "directed against" or "antagonistic toward."

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not. I was just correcting your statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. You see I was reading from the Department of State Bulletin and you were reading from the mimeographed release, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they not both furnished by the Department of State. Do you know which was the way you spoke when you made the speech?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I made it the way it is here. It is much more like I made it the way it is here.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "here" you mean in the press release?

Mr. VINCENT. In the press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. Using the word antagonized?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of the State Department's instrument, the photostat?

Mr. VINCENT. It hasn't a date there.

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is marked on there in red pencil, I believe, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. You have "23½" in red pencil. This seems to have no date on it. Down at the bottom.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is hard to read. October 21, 1951. Is that the correct date of that instrument?

Senator FERGUSON. How could it be 1951?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the date of it, Mr. Mandel?

Senator FERGUSON. Unless they reprinted it, this was back in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. October 21, 1945, would be very close to being correct. It is certainly subsequent to the press release.

Senator FERGUSON. About the same time.

Mr. VINCENT. This was released to the press on the 18th of October but to be held until October 20, when the speech was given. I can't account for the discrepancy there. There may be other discrepancies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider it important?

Mr. VINCENT. I consider it of no great importance. I prefer the word antagonistic to that, and that is the one I used.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar, Mr. Vincent, with the statement by President Truman on United States policy toward China under date of December 15, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you referred to that here as being the same thing as the Marshall directive?

Mr. VINCENT. It is generally called the Marshall directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Marshall directive consisted really of several separate documents, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. It consisted of a memorandum to the War Department which was included with——

Mr. SOURWINE. From the Secretary of State?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And a letter to General Marshall?

Mr. VINCENT. And a letter to General Marshall from the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. And a statement by the President, a copy of which was included in the letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And a copy of a press release, I think, also.

Mr. VINCENT. The press release became, or the press release was, the directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Substantially the same. But Mr. Marshall, General Marshall, was given all three of the documents with his letter of transmittal; was he not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you stated what part you had in the drafting of that directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I have, in executive session.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does your testimony boil down in substance to this, that you initially prepared a rough draft, that that rough draft was taken over to the military, the War Department, that a new draft was prepared expanding your draft from two pages to about six pages, that that came back to the State Department and you had an opportunity to go over it for changes, and that some few changes were made in the State Department, that it then went up and when it came back for final approval you had a chance to see it again in its final form before it went to the White House.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. May I amend that in one respect just for clarity?

Mr. SOURWINE. Please do.

Mr. VINCENT. The paper that I drafted originally was drafted with a different idea in mind than what finally came out in the form of a press release or directive. I had drafted a short paper to have for Mr. Byrnes something as to a statement of what I considered to be the problems that faced us and how we might solve them in China, as a basis for his discussion. I am trying to get why the other was expanded because I didn't have in mind writing a directive for Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Yours did not purport to be a directive?

Mr. VINCENT. Mine did not purport to be a directive.

Senator FERGUSON. Alternatives?

Mr. VINCENT. Now you are speaking of a paper which I composed about a month earlier.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Which I would like to mention. That was not the one that I wrote as of November 28. I am speaking of the alternative one which set forth four alternatives for the Secretary with regard to what course we might follow in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. So there were two papers.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; there were two papers. The other one has no connection with the eventual directive other than the fact that one of these four alternatives was substantially chosen as a starting point for what developed into the policy under Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. When you drew the second paper did you choose the alternative that was put in the directive?

Mr. VINCENT. That had already been chosen.

Senator FERGUSON. Who chose it?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall except that I know it was submitted to the President. Whether the President chose it, whether General Marshall chose it, whether the Secretary of State chose it, or whether they chose it in consultation. I did not choose it; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then when it came back to you again, it came back from the War Department as a drafted directive?

Mr. VINCENT. It came back as a drafted directive, called United States policy toward China, as I recall it. I am trying to make that distinction, because that isn't what I called my small paper, which was just an outline.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did write a memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which was the basis for the approximately 6-page directive which came back from the War Department? Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. I am trying to get the word "basis." I want to be more exact. There has been so much discussion of this whole thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated, have you not, that you did write a two-page memorandum as to what should be in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that the six-page——

Mr. VINCENT. No; not what should be in it, but what should form the basis for a discussion between Mr. Byrnes and General Marshall.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have that two-page memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't, sir. It is among the papers in the State Department. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. In any event, you did write a two-page memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; and I have described what its contents were here before the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the directive which came back from the War Department——

Mr. VINCENT. I testified—and I would like to have it the same way—I testified that it did incorporate some of the phraseology and some of the ideas in my November 28 thing, but it was an expansion and it contained many other matters which were not taken up in mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have stated that it contained nothing which was contrary to or at odds with what had been your original memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. That is what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Did you also draft the memorandum which was signed by the Secretary of State, which was one of the three documents that went along with the letter of transmittal to General Marshall?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refresh my memory on that one.

I don't think I am going to be able to testify from knowledge whether I drafted, whether it was drafted in cooperation or after discussion with Army officers or not. If I knew factually whether I drafted it, I would tell you I drafted it, but then I would add also that it was a result of discussion which took place between State and War and General Marshall. I would make the same statement that if somebody else drafted it, I had also had a part in its preparation.

Senator FERGUSON. You never had any doubt that General Marshall understood and had a part in the drafting of his directive?

Mr. VINCENT. I never had any doubt but what General Marshall knew what was in the directive.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and had a part in drafting it.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Chairman, we sat for a matter of 3 hours on a Sunday morning in December discussing it with General Marshall. We read it over. There were minor phraseology changes made in it, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. He was part and parcel of the making of this directive; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there another question pending?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. He wants to know whether I drafted it, and I am afraid I cannot testify as to whether I drafted this memorandum by Secretary Byrnes for the War Department. I think a reading of it would make it clear that it is in a sense a military—it first sets forth what the Secretary of State had said. Then it goes on to enumerate certain things which were supposed to be a guide, I think, to General Wedemeyer, which came out of the discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean where it says:

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating——

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I recollect clearly that that also came into the discussion on this Sunday morning on December 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was strictly a State Department document, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. This memo, yes; except that it was discussed with General Marshall in that morning meeting there, because General Marshall also had quite an interest in what kind of directive or what kind of advice was going out to General Wedemeyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. This directive, though, did not go to the War Department for redrafting and then come back to State; did it?

Mr. VINCENT. That I cannot testify, whether the War Department had seen it or not. It was an attempt to get instructions out to Wedemeyer, and I would say just from knowledge of how things developed there, that the War Department did have, not, we will say, a matter of drafting, but that they had seen it before and it was a matter of agreement as to what kind of memorandum they were going to get as a basis for Wedemeyer to operate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you please from the white paper here identify by page which of these documents, or which two if more than one, you were referring to when you spoke of the expanded directive that came back from the State Department after your two-page memo had gone over? Is it that first one?

Mr. VINCENT. No; it is the one that is marked "62. Statement by President Truman on United States Policy Toward China."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the one that you wrote an original two-page memo that went to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. That went to the War Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Went to the War Department, came back to the State Department for changes?

Mr. VINCENT. Went back to the War Department and came back to State.

Mr. SOURWINE. Came back for a high-level conference at which it was approved in the State Department and then finally went to the President, Mr. Byrnes taking it over?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Byrnes taking it over.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think General Marshall went with him.

Mr. VINCENT. The two of them I think went over on whatever day it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you did write a two-page memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which dealt with the subject matter of this statement by President Truman, which contains some of the ideas that were found in this.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And with which the President's statement was not at odds or in controversy.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; as a matter of fact, as I said here in executive session, from recollection there was the matter of assisting the Chinese to take back Manchuria, the matter of the urgency of bringing about some kind of truce to stop the civil war, there was the matter of assisting the Chinese insofar as it was feasible to bring about a political settlement after they ceased fighting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what became of the original of your two-page memorandum?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the original?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I have seen testimony that Mr. Byrnes handed it to General Marshall and General Marshall took it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a photostat of a document, sir. I ask you if you recognize that document.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is that document?

Mr. VINCENT. This document is the memorandum by Secretary Byrnes to the War Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not the memorandum as so transmitted, is it? That is an earlier draft of the memorandum, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. This one?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that is, that is not the particular draft which was transmitted to the War Department, is it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to compare this word for word.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean that. I mean as a draft, this is a draft which preceded the formal document that was actually transmitted to the War Department, isn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. From my examination of this, this looks like it is the document which was transmitted.

Mr. SOURWINE. It looks like the document actually transmitted?

Mr. VINCENT. Because it is initialed by Mr. J. F. B.; whether there was a subsequent redrafting I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do your initials appear on that?

Mr. VINCENT. They do, as the drafting officer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you did draft that?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say I did draft it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is, then, the original of the document for the War Department which appears on page 606 of the white paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Insofar as I can testify. This looks exactly like it is it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you did draft two documents?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. A two-page memorandum which formed——

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I won't use the words "formed the basis". A two-page memorandum which was in some way, the ideas of which were, incorporated into the President's statement?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And this two-page memorandum for the War Department which the Secretary of State signed?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this memorandum may be laid in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It will become part of the record and received in evidence.

(The document referred to, marked "Exhibit No. 389," is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 389

[Declassified December 9, 1945]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT

The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on December 7, the Secretary of State said:

"During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united, and democratic China.

"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well-organized groups who are now without any voice in the government of China.

"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solution depends primarily upon the good will of the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions."

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his special representative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set forth above. Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the

Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that:

(1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops;

(2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater;

(3) Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance:

(4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (*a*) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (*b*) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

[s] J. F. B.

[s] JCV.
FE: VINCENT: ALM.
December 10, 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. I also ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to offer for the record a letter under date of October 3 addressed to Senator McCarran and signed by Mr. Humelsine of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was admitted as exhibit No. 390, and read in full as follows:)

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like permission to read this letter.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of September 19, 1951, requesting "A draft of General Marshall's directive which he took with him when he went to China in 1945" referred to by General Wedemeyer in his testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, September 15, 1950; and also the names of individuals who prepared this directive. According to your letter of September 19, General Wedemeyer testified that he saw the initials "J. C. V." on the requested directive.

I am enclosing a photostat of the Department's file copy of the memorandum to which, I believe, General Wedemeyer referred.

Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I want to state that this photostat which has just been offered for the record is the photostat which was submitted with this letter from the State Department.

This memorandum was one of the enclosures of the President's letter of December 15, 1945, to General Marshall. As you are aware, the President's letter of December 15, and its enclosures constituted General Marshall's written directive for a China mission.

A search of the Department's files reveal that none of the other documents of the Presidential directive which General Marshall took with him to China in 1945 bears the initials "J. C. V." or the name of Foreign Service Officer John Carter Vincent.

As to the authorship of the enclosed memorandum, it would be impossible for the Department to provide a list of all those who contributed to or edited the memorandum. At the time the memorandum was drafted, Mr. John Carter Vincent was the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and hence the responsible subordinate officer for the drafting of the memorandum. It should be pointed out, however, that in important memorandum of this kind it is generally the case that many officers participate in the drafting, even though the

record copies (such as the enclosed) only show the name of the responsible subordinate officer. Since this particular memorandum was addressed to the War Department and since it was signed by Secretary Byrnes and approved by the President, it is entirely possible that in addition to Mr. Vincent and other State Department officers, military officers as well as Secretary Byrnes and even the President may have had a hand in the drafting.

In this connection, Mr. Acheson's detailed account of the drafting of General Marshall's directive is contained on pages 1848 and 1849 of part 3, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

So presumably the two-page memorandum which was handed to General Marshall was never returned to the State Department file? Would you assume that from this letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that from this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. That memorandum did bear your initials or your name, did it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It did.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was not in the State Department files in October, so presumably it never came back to the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. The original never came back to the State Department, but let me testify here that in my search after I came back from leave this time I found a carbon copy of this November 28 document to which I refer, which was in the Far Eastern Office files and had never gone into the regular State Department files.

Mr. SOURWINE. How would you identify that so that we might request it?

Mr. VINCENT. I could identify it by date and I could describe it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you do that?

Mr. VINCENT. I will put it this way: You don't have to identify it, because I would like to have it now to complete this record of all the difficulty there has been about the draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure we all would because there has been a lot of confusion.

Mr. VINCENT. It would be well to have it in. I would like to have it. If you would write the State Department there will be no difficulty in identifying it as the document concerning which Mr. Vincent testified here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think there will be any difficulty in getting it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't promise that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You at least are anxious that we should have it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to have it now. That I think would clarify one other thing in General Wedemeyer's testimony, what document did General Wedemeyer see with my initials on it, and I am inclined to think that what he saw was my November 28 memo when he testified that he saw something over my initials.

Mr. SOURWINE. Rather than the one——

Mr. VINCENT. Rather than this, because although he may have seen this here, from the contents too great significance—and I am not trying to avoid responsibility—too great emphasis is being placed on the fact that my initials are on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the question of the significance of this, to what extent did you shape the requests of the War Department with regard

to the stipulations that they wanted made, the directive that they wanted given to General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say that I had my part in them, and I remember the discussion on the 9th of December, but I do not recall exactly which idea in there is mine and which is General Marshall's or——

Mr. SOURWINE. Just on the chance that you might recognize one of these paragraphs of one of the ideas advanced, it says:

> In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that:
>
> (1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops.

Did you have anything to do with putting that into this message?

Mr. VINCENT. As I have testified, that was one of the recommendations in my memorandum of November 28. Therefore, whether I put that in there or not, it was an idea that I had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your memorandum of November 28 a forerunner of this message of Secretary Byrnes as well as a forerunner of the President's statement of policy?

Mr. VINCENT. It was a forerunner in time, but I don't think that it was the memorandum that was consulted in connection with this. As I say, you asked if we were discussing the matter of should or should not we send troops to Manchuria, and I was already on record in my memorandum of November 28 as favoring that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be a fair assumption, then, that since you had placed that in your memorandum of the 28th of November, and since it is in here in a memorandum which you drafted, you can claim some substantial share of the credit for putting it in here?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I could claim some substantial share. I would like to have here what were General Wedemeyer's requests. You see, that refers to General Wedemeyer's telegram. General Wedemeyer probably could also claim a considerable share to everything that is in there, because I believe that that was something that General Wedemeyer wanted, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. These points were in compliance with his request, in other words?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Point 2:

> He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China Theater.

The same answer, it got in there the same way?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know how. That would be something I could have put in on anyone could have put in, because it was a matter of generally agreed policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Point 3:

> Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to North China, except as North China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance.

Mr. VINCENT. The same answer to that one, that it was a matter resulting from general discussion and I was in agreement with that

idea. Whether I proposed it, whether General Marshall proposed it or somebody else, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. That also was in response to a recommendation of General Wedemeyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I should say it was, but I say what we lack here is General Wedemeyer's telegram to see whether that was what he wanted to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Point 4:

Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into North China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (*a*) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (*b*) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, that resulted again from the discussion on December 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any——

Mr. VINCENT. From the general discussion on the 9th. I would say just purely hazarding a guess, that the latter one is no doubt, or seems to me to be, General Marshall's contribution primarily, because he was undertaking this mission and he wanted to know what were the circumstances under which he was going to undertake it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it the purpose or intent of the group that engaged in that general discussion to stymie General Wedemeyer in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it in anway the purpose or intent to give him unrealistic directives, directives which he could not successfully carry out or which, if carried out, would render ineffectual if not actually ineffective his efforts in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't think that crossed anybody's mind. There was no intent of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that this directive in any way ran at cross purposes to what General Wedemeyer had reported?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not, but I say in the absence of having General Wedemeyer's telegram, which we should have here, we can't reach any conclusion.

Mr SOURWINE. It was discussed at top level in the State Department in connection with General Wedemeyer's recommendations?

Mr. VINCENT. With General Wedemeyer's recommendations, and in connection with General Marshall's forthcoming mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hadn't General Wedemeyer, in point of fact, said that it was absolutely impossible for Chiang to make any success in Manchuria, that he should concentrate his efforts in North China?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that, Mr. Sourwine. I don't know whether he had or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had said that, what would be the effect of this directive which said he could proceed to take Chinese troops into Manchuria, but he couldn't take any into North China?

Mr. VINCENT. If he had said it this would be just the reverse effect of what he wanted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look at page 131 of the white paper, please, and follow as I read:

GENERAL WEDEMEYER'S REPORTS

On November 14, 1945, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, China Theater, reported to Washington that the National Government was completely unprepared for occupation of Manchuria in the face of Communist opposition. He also reported his recommendation to the Generalissimo that the Chinese should adopt the immediate objective of consolidating the areas south of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze and of securing the overland line of communications in that area prior to entry into Manchuria.

Again on November 20, 1945, he reported as follows:

"I have recommended to the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts upon establishing control in North China and upon the prompt execution of political and official reforms designed to remove the practice of corruption by officials and to eliminate prohibitive taxes."

General Wedemeyer also recommended the utilization of foreign executives and technicians, at least during the transition period. He then added:

"Chinese Communists guerrillas and saboteurs can and probably will, if present activities are reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly and extended campaign. * * * Logistical support for National governmental forces and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and the consolidation of his military and political position there prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed with this concept."

Among General Wedemeyer's conclusions at that time were the following:

"1. The Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in South China provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians and engages in political, economic, and social reforms through honest, competent, civilian officials.

"2. He will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China for months or perhaps even years unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists is achieved and followed up realistically by the kind of action suggested in paragraph 1.

"3. He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory agreements are reached with Russia and the Chinese Communists.

"4. Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communist and possibly their own plans in North China and Manchuria. These activities are violations of the recent Sino-Russian Treaty and related agreements.

"5. It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between Chinese Communists and the National Government."

How do you now, having read it, understand that report by General Wedemeyer? Do you think it counsels moving Chinese troops into Manchuria?

Mr. VINCENT. On the contrary, this counsels not sending them into Manchuria.

Mr. SOURWINE. And what did the directive from the War Department by the State Department say on that point?

Mr. VINCENT. It said it authorized moving troops into Manchuria. It told him also to proceed with his plans for North China, but not to operate under them until General Marshall had gotten out there and figured out the chances of his success.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did that overruling of General Wedemeyer originate; do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know. It was a military matter, I should think, and it was one of Pentagon Building or General Marshall himself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Couldn't it have originated with Chiang Kai-shek himself?

Mr. VINCENT. It could have. Chiang Kai-shek was anxious to move troops into Manchuria.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he is the one that overruled Wedemeyer in that regard?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't testify factually on that, whether the Generalissimo——

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that this directive here, which is made by the Secretary of State to the War Department, originated in the Pentagon or at a high military level?

Mr. VINCENT. I would think that those military provisions there were the result of discussion between the War Department and the State Department. You are speaking now of these four points there?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. And with General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wherever they originated, is there any question in your mind now that this directive was contrary to what General Wedemeyer had himself recommended?

Mr. VINCENT. It certainly was contrary to what he recommended here. Whether there was a subsequent recommendation from him I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you going to pass to another subject?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

(The material following was ordered printed in the record at this point, by the chairman on April 8, 1952.)

OUTLINE OF SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION IN CHINA

(Drafted by John Carter Vincent on November 28, 1945)

1A (1) The United States is prepared to assist the Chinese National Government in the transportation of troops to Manchurian ports to enable China to reestablish its administrative control over Manchuria as an integral part of China. The United States and the United Kingdom, by the Cairo Declaration, are committed to the return of Manchuria to China. The U. S. S. R., in adhering to the Potsdam Declaration, is also committed to the return of Manchuria to China; and by the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945 the U. S. S. R. pledges itself to respect Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. All of these Governments recognize the National Government of China as the only legal government in China. Resumption of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria can therefore be properly effected only through reestablishment by the recognized National Government of China of administrative control in Manchuria.

2A (2) The United States is prepared to assist the National Government of China in effecting the rapid demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops in north China. United States marines are in north China for that purpose and stand ready to act more directly and effectively in accomplishing that purpose. Quite apart from the United States commitment to assist the Chinese National Government in the demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops, the United States feels that it has a responsibility of its own, deriving from its adherence to the principles and policies which brought it into war against Japan, to effect the removal of Japanese troops from China.

3A (3) The United States recognizes and supports the National Government of China on an international level, but it cannot support that Government by military intervention in an internecine struggle.

4A (4) Therefore, an indispensable condition to the accomplishment of (2) above and a highly advantageous condition to the achievement of the ultimate objective of (1) above would be the declaration of a truce between the armies of the Nationalist Government and the armies of the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces. The United States is prepared to arrange,

if so requested by the National Government of China, for a truce between the opposing forses.

5A (5) The truce mentioned in (4) above could have long-term advantage for China only if accompanied by the immediate convocation of a national conference to seek and find a peaceful solution of China's present political strife. The United States is committed to assist the Chinese National Government, in every appropriate way, in the achievement of unity, stability, and democracy in China by methods of peaceful political negotiation. The United States is prepared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to reaffirm that they also are committed to such a policy. The United States is cognizant of the fact that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that it would be conducive to peace, unity, and democratic reform in China if the bases of that Government were broadened to include other political elements in the country. Furthermore, the United States is convinced that the existence of autonomous armies such as the army of the Communist Party, is inconsistent with and makes impossible political unity in China. It is for these reasons that the United States strongly advocates that the Chinese National Government call as soon as possible a conference of representatives of the major political elements in the country for the purpose of agreeing upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. To be consistent, the National Government should at the same time announce the termination of one-party "political tutelage." Upon the institution of a broadly representation government, the Chinese Communist forces should be integrated effectively into the Chinese National Government army.

6A (6) The United States is prepared to encourage and support the Chinese National Government in its endeavors to bring about peace and unity by the creation of a government representative of the various political elements in the country. It is also prepared to request the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom to give similar encouragement and support to the Chinese National Government.

7A If the Chinese Government is able to bring about peace and unity along the lines described, the United States is prepared to assist the Chinese Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, to initiate constructive measures for improvement and progress in the agrarian and industrial economy of the country, and to establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. Specifically, the United States is prepared to give favorable consideration to the establishment of an American military advisory group in China; to the dispatch of such other advisers in the economic and financial fields as the Chinese Government may need and which this Government can supply; and to Chinese requests for credits and loans, under reasonable conditions, for projects which contribute toward the development of a healthy economy in China and the development of healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

FE: J.C.Vincent: hst.
11–28–45.

Statement by President Truman on United States Policy Toward China, December 15, 1945

(Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945)

1B The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations Organization.

2B It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united, and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations. Events of this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by means of peaceful negotiation.

3B The Government of the United States believes it essential:

(1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces.

4B (2) That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strife—a solution which will bring about the unification of China.

5B The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China.

6B The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945, are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of China.

7B In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United States has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The United States marines are in North China for that purpose.

8B The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is convinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective achievement of this end. United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

9B The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a unified, democratic, and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in China.

10B The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity, and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party "political tutelage" established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.

11B The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army.

12B In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be marked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate. The United States Government feels, however, that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace, a responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese political and military groups.

13B As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above, the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial

economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. In furtherance of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

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Outline of Suggested Course of Action in China

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Outline of Suggested Course of Action in China—Continued

brought it into war against Japan, to effect the removal of Japanese troops from China.

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4A (4) Therefore, an indispensable condition to the accomplishment of (2) above and a highly advantageous condition to the achievement of the ultimate objective of (1) above would be the declaration of a truce between the armies of the National Government and the armies of the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces. The United States is prepared to arrange, if so requested by the National Government of China, for a truce between the opposing forces.

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Statement by President Truman on United States Policy Toward China, December 15, 1945—Con.

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OUTLINE OF SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION IN CHINA—Continued

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STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA, DECEMBER 15, 1945—Con.

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Senator FERGUSON. I would like to inquire about this: Yesterday I asked you some questions in relation to an investigation of the Amerasia case, that is, the taking of the paper from your office.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall when that investigation was made by the security office?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I testified yesterday, Mr. Chairman, that I could not recall the exact date of it, it was a matter of days after the Amerasia case broke, because I had left—this is my recollection now—that I had left for San Francisco by the middle of April. I don't think it took place after I returned.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us whether it was before or after you made the donation to the defense fund for Mr. Service?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I could not. No; I couldn't place the date.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that you would make a donation to a defense fund of Mr. Service, one of the people involved in the removal of the papers from your office if the security office was making an investigation of your office?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified that I among others made such a donation.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you donate?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified that I gave $40 or $50, among others, to assist him in hiring a lawyer.

Senator FERGUSON. That is his defense fund. I did not misname that; did I?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it was to defend him, to get a lawyer to defend him; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that you would give that money after your office was being investigated?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said I do not know when I gave it; yes. I would have given it——

Senator FERGUSON. Even after——

Mr. VINCENT. Because he was an old friend, because he had not yet been indicted. He was a man who was being accused.

Senator FERGUSON. You say he wasn't indicted?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; he was not. He was brought before—I am working on recollection—he was brought before the grand jury.

Senator FERGUSON. He was arrested.

Mr. VINCENT. He had been arrested; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after he was arrested——

Mr. VINCENT. That I couldn't say. I must have given it before I went to San Francisco. I would have to get the date of when he was arrested, but some time within a matter of a week or 10 days.

Senator FERGUSON. Within a week or 10 days after he was arrested.

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think your office was investigated during that period?

Mr. VINCENT. During that period, yes. I don't place the date.

Senator FERGUSON. Wouldn't it have been very embarrassing to you to be a witness in the case and at the same time be a donor to the defense of one of the defendants, you being a State official?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; it would not have been embarrassing.

Senator FERGUSON. It wouldn't have been?

Mr. VINCENT. A contribution to assist a man who had no funds to hire a lawyer would not have been embarrassing to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say who the lawyer was to be?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall who the lawyer was. Did who say?

Senator FERGUSON. The man who collected the fund.

Mr. VINCENT. No. I don't recall who the lawyer was, and I don't——

Senator FERGUSON. You couldn't give us the name before of the man who collected the funds.

Mr. VINCENT. I told you I did not recall it, but Mr. Mandel recalled it to me. That it was a man named Mortimer Graves.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember now that it was Mortimer Graves?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the incident of Mortimer Graves collecting it, but I am quite prepared to say that Mortimer Graves did collect it. As I told you before, I didn't recall who physically collected the money.

Senator FERGUSON. Overnight have you thought anything about the matter of the investigation in your office? Could you give us more help as to that investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, I am afraid I cannot.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, how well did you know Solomon Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. Solomon Adler I met first in 1941 or early 1942, when he came to China to be an assistant to Manuel Fox, who was handling the Stabilization Fund in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you get to know Solomon Adler well?

Mr. VINCENT. I knew Solomon Adler well, as one would knowing an official who was working with me in Chungking, where we were rather a small community.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn that Solomon Adler was a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I never learned that Solomon Adler was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not know of the testimony Miss Bentley gave before the Federal grand jury in 1947 to that effect?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall any testimony of Miss Bentley, but if she had given any it would not be indicative to me that he was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any information ever given to you while you were an officer in the State Department, from the Government, that certain people were or were not Communists or were not such that you should avoid them as Communists or Communist sympathizers?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no idea, then, that there may have been subversive agents around?

Mr. VINCENT. Nobody ever informed me. The State Department had its own Security Division, that was supposed to look into subversive agents in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. But a Security Division that does nothing would not help you, would it? I mean, as far as you were concerned, it did not give you the names of any people that were Communists or had Communist leanings?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall——

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall ever getting a name like Mr. Adler?

Mr. VINCENT. I am sure they never gave me Mr. Alder's name.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Vincent, Mr. Alder's name was mentioned in a public session of the House Un-American Activities Committee as a member of an espionage ring.

Mr. VINCENT. When?

Mr. MORRIS. In 1948.

Mr. VINCENT. You are asking me whether I knew Solomon Adler as a Communist? I did not know Solomon Adler as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hear that testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear Whittaker Chambers' testimony before this committee that Solomon Adler was a Communist?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, in executive session, do you remember being asked the question as to whether it was in any sense the tenor of the Marshall directive to invite the Republic of China to agree to the Communists' terms for a coalition government, or face the prospect of getting no more aid from the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall it in those terms; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, let me ask now: Was it implicit in this Marshall directive that the Chinese Nationalist Government should have pressure brought to bear on it to come to terms with the Communists, and was there the clear implication in the directive that until there had been a settlement with the Communists there would be no more aid from the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. Those were the general ideas under which General Marshall went out and started operating. When I say "no more aid,"

there was during that period, and I say this just to make the record clear, some aid given in south China. I remember money was given to build the railroad. But there was to be no military aid. It was to be withheld while General Marshall was carrying on. This is quite correct.

Mr. Sourwine. I was not talking about anything that happened afterward, but only about what was in the letter.

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment on that. Do I understand that the idea of the directive was that General Marshall was to go out there, and there was to be no aid to the Nationalists until he had made or carried out the directive of having a consolidation?

Mr. Vincent. The whole matter was entirely in General Marshall's hands, sir. And during the period that he was trying to assist the Chinese in getting together, military aid was not to be given.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I say.

Mr. Vincent. Unless he himself suggested it; other than the military aid of getting and assisting General Chiang Kai-shek to get troops into Manchuria.

Senator Ferguson. Outside of putting troops into Manchuria, the Nationalists were to get no aid.

Mr. Vincent. Of a military character.

Senator Ferguson. Of a military character, while this was going on.

Mr. Vincent. It was to be withheld until General Marshall himself changed. He was authorized to operate under that kind of basis.

Senator Ferguson. That would be quite a pressure, would it not, on a Nationalist Government?

Mr. Vincent. It would.

Senator Ferguson. To be told, "You either make this settlement, or else you do not get any military aid?" That is what it amounted to, is it not?

Mr. Vincent. That is correct.

Mr. Sourwine. And the putting of troops into Manchuria was simply putting the Nationalist forces in a position which, according to General Wedemeyer, was completely untenable, without a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists; isn't that right?

Mr. Vincent. That is what is in this telegram, as I recall it.

Mr. Sourwine. So that the record may show the portions of the directive which counsel had in mind in asking that question, I ask leave to read two paragraphs from President Roosevelt's letter of transmittal, which, together with the other documents, constituted the directive.

Senator Ferguson. Very well.

Mr. Sourwine (reading):

> Specifically I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and concurrently to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

He was telling them to stop fighting, wasn't he?

Mr. Vincent. Yes

Mr. Sourwine. And a little later on:

> In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders, you are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly you may state in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance, in the economic field, and military assistance—I have in mind the proposed United States military advisory group that I have approved in principle—that a China

disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a place for American assistance along the lines enumerated.

I say those are the particular paragraphs counsel had in mind. There are perhaps other passages which would carry out the same general intent. Is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think now, from your vantage point of the years, that it was correct to urge a coalition between the Nationalists and the Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. In the light of the situation as it obtained at that time, I still think it was the most feasible part of the policy.

I have testified many times that it was not the perfect solution, but it seemed in our minds, considering the situation in the best light we could, that it was better than civil war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Civil war was actually under way, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. It hadn't broken out all over the place yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the Communists weren't all over the place. They didn't get all over the place until after the truce was brought about in 1948. At this time the Communists were in north China.

Mr. VINCENT. And scattered around Manchuria.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is where the hostilities were going on?

Mr .VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And those were the hostilities that Chiang was told in this message to cease?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know, sir, that it was an official Soviet policy as early as 1938 to demand coalition in China?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I have no distinct knowledge of that being Soviet policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the Soviet Ambassador at that time had demanded such coalition as the price of Soviet aid?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that the Nationalist Government had refused?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, in 1938, the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists were cooperating to a rather effective degree in fighting the Japanese. I don't know whether you are speaking of coalition, now, in the form of bringing about a constitutional government, but so far as the military operations were concerned, in 1937 and 1938, and on into 1940, there was quite effective cooperation between the two military groups.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have stated, I believe, that you did not see, read, or know about, the G–2 report on the Communist Party which was delivered to the State Department on July 25, 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall seeing it. That was the one the chairman showed me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. That was made a part of the appendix of this record at an earlier session.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Mr. Byrnes' part was in this particular directive? Had you any personal knowledge about it? Or on what Wedemeyer was to do, or Wedemeyer's report, or anything else?

Mr. VINCENT. I know that he sat in and took part in the discussions on December 9, which finalized the documents, and he chairmanned that meeting. It was in his office. Other than that, I had no discussions with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that his language, or his thought, to your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. To my knowledge, I could not testify that Mr. Byrnes himself has language in here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, I would like to read, if the chairman will permit, one paragraph from page 88 of that G–2 report, which is already in the appendix to our record, because I want to ask you if this accords with what you knew to be the fact at that time.

Reports from Hankow at the end of 1937 stated that the Central Government military leaders hoped that if the Communists were admitted to the Government, Soviet Russia would come directly to China's aid. The correctness of this attitude toward the Kuomintang was confirmed in 1938 after the first rift in the united front. At that time, the Soviet Ambassador presented Chiang Kai-shek with five demands, of which one was that the Communist Party in China should be placed on an equal footing with the Kuomintang. In other words, that the Communists be admitted to the National Military Council, a promise which Chiang had made earlier in the year but failed to fulfill.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That does accord with your understanding of the situation at that time?

Mr. VINCENT. The situation at that time, yes. I think it does; although I have no distinct recollection of the situation at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this directive to General Marshall, or any part of it, or any draft in connection with it, submitted at any time to Mr. Dean Acheson?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Dean Acheson was present at the December 9 conference with General Marshall.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about before that time?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether he saw it. I would say it was certainly quite likely that he did see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it submitted at any time to Mr. Ben Cohen?

Mr. VINCENT. That I could not say. He was not at the meeting on the 9th, and I never heard of his name being mentioned in connection with the directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything, sir, of a Russian demand in 1945 that they participate in the occupation of Japan by sending an undetermined number of troops to Hokkaido?

Mr. VINCENT. Hokkaido?

Mr. SOURWINE. Hokkaido.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, at that time, I was not in charge of Japan affairs, but I do recall the whole matter of discussion as to the basis on which troops would be contributed to the general allied occupation of Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to revert for once, and I apologize to the witness for breaking the thread: I have a document that got out of place and should have been placed in the record when we were discussing the question of moving troops into Manchuria and north China. I hold in my hand a publication, American Policy Toward China, by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, statement before a joint Senate committee, June 4, 1951, Department of State Publication 4255, Far Eastern Series 43, released June 1951, and from page 24 thereof, I read:

The possibility of occupying north China became much dimmer; the possibility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent; and the possibility of really getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly diminished.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, although this is a transcript from a previous congressional hearing, to avoid reading at length here and so that there may be no question of taking out of context, that we insert in the record at this time, all of page 24, which will show the date and the context in which that paragraph appears.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be inserted.

(The material referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 391" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 391

By the end of 1946 we had removed 3 million Japanese, just a few thousand under 3 million, from China to Japan—one of the great mass movements of people.

After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists that I have spoken of in 1945, October 11, 1945, armed clashes broke out again between the two parties; and both the Government authorities, the Chinese Government authorities, and the American Government authorities, were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out.

If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear.

If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the Government forces and the Communist forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese either disappeared or was gravely diminished.

The possibility of occupying north China became much dimmer; the possibility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent; and the possibility of really getting any reforms in south China or any other part of China would be greatly diminished. So, the peace became a major objective of both the Chinese Government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese Government.

(Source: Department of State, Publication No. 4255, Far Eastern Series 43, Released June 1951, p. 24.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, reverting to the question of Hokkaido, sir, did you know whether advice was sought in the Department of State by Secretary Byrnes with regard to that demand, that is, the Russian demand of 1945 that they participate in the occupation of Japan by sending troops into Hokkaido?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no distinct recollection of it being sought.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever asked for advice on that point?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall being asked for advice. That was a period, I think, prior to my association with Japanese affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether that Russian demand was accepted?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became a Foreign Service officer, class I, in December 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, now, I would have to look that up. I assume you have looked up the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am simply trying to peg the chronology. That record was taken from the Department of State register.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know Frederick V. Field?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified before that I met him at the IPR conference in Hot Springs. I never knew him even well. I had no close association with him at all. I may have met him at a meeting preparatory to going down to Hot Springs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever visit your home?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever visit his home?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever visit you elsewhere?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him by appointment?

Mr. VINCENT. Never by appointment, sir, that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet with him on Forty-eighth Street in New York City?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I never met with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any information of a confidential or security nature?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him any information with the knowledge or expectation or reason to believe that it would be passed on directly or indirectly to the Soviet Government or to an agent of the Soviet Government or to the Communist Party?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir. I have testified that I never had any conversations with him other than just casual.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever discussed Japanese policy with him?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never discussed Japanese policy with him; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him for appointment, for promotion, or for a commission in the Armed Forces of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that he had made application for such a commission?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of his writings?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever reading anything that Field wrote, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified in executive session, have you not, with regard to your failure to recall a man by the name of Joseph Gregg?

Mr. VINCENT. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you asked whether you knew a man by the name of Joseph Greenstein?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean in executive session?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall your asking me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wasn't sure whether I had asked. I will tell you that Joseph Gregg and Joseph Greenstein are the same person. But did you know a man under the name of Joseph Greenstein?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of a plan to assassinate Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. VINCENT. No, unless they are speaking of the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek in Sian in 1936. But I didn't hear of any plan to assassinate him there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a memorandum or memoranda concerning such a plan in 1945 or 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall seeing such a memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge did such memorandum or memoranda ever circulate from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I have said I didn't recall it, so I can't say that I have any knowledge of it circulating.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think, Mr. Chairman, I should state this for the record, in fairness to Mr. Field. At occasions through this hearing, questions are asked which may to the witness seem preposterous. I do not mean by asking questions to make assertions. It was my understanding from the witness himself that he desired here an opportunity to testify with regard to any and every charge that had been made against him, and I want to say that so far as the staff of this committee is able to do so, we are throwing at him everything that we have found that has been thrown, and giving him an opportunity to answer with regard to it.

Mr. SURREY. Did you mean making it clear to Mr. Field?

Mr. VINCENT. I was going to correct that. You intended to say "Mr. Vincent."

Mr. SOURWINE. I intended to say "Mr. Vincent."

Senator FERGUSON. You understand that?

Mr. VINCENT. I understand that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the report made by Mr. Pauley after his visit to Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I have seen it. I am not familiar with it, now. It was an economic report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Generally speaking, what did that report propose?

Mr. VINCENT. Generally speaking it dealt with the matter of Japanese assets, as I recall it, in Manchuria.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't it propose reduction of Japan to an agricultural community, essentially, with only light industry?

Mr. VINCENT. I think you are using the same phraseology that was in my speech, there. I don't recall that phraseology in Pauley's report. I couldn't testify whether that is in his report or not, or whether it recommended that, sir, because I have no distinct recollection of his recommendations.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't attempt to quote either from Mr. Pauley's report or from your speech, and I don't want to foist that upon you. I intended merely to ask if that was a summarization of what the Pauley report recommended.

Mr. VINCENT. And I have testified that I am not familiar enough with it now, after 5 or 6 years, to say whether that was in it or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall now whether you had any reaction to that report at the time?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall now whether that report was in line with the views which you had expressed in your radio broadcast in October of 1945?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say that I do recall that it was in line with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of the Pauley report?

Mr. VINCENT. Not anything that I can recall sir, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of your associates have anything to do with that preparation?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean my associates in the State Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. Or elsewhere.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Owen Lattimore have anything to do with the preparation of that report?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, are you describing Mr. Owen Lattimore as an associate now? He was on the Pauley Commission, and I have testified in executive session that I had no knowledge as to what he had to do with the report, but I would assume since he accompanied him that he had some part in helping draft it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that report with Mr. Lattimore at anytime?

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you I never had any discussion with Lattimore on the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in any way responsible for Mr. T. A. Bisson's appointment to the Pauley staff?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, not that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the appointment of anyone else to Mr. Pauley's staff?

Mr. VINCENT. No, not that I can recall. I had nothing to do with the Pauley administration that I can think of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a man named DuBos, D-u-b-o-s?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know such a man.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a man named DuBois, Du-B-o-i-s?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my recollection, I don't know a man named DuBois.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember testifying with regard to Far East Commission 230?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a paper submitted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Far Eastern Commission?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean it was formally approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified, I think, that I have no recollection as to formal approval. Sometimes they went over to FEC, to the Far Eastern Commission, without formal approval, I don't recall whether it had what you would call formal approval. But normally it would have been sent over by General Hilldring to the FEC.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who prepared that document?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified, I think, that a working group in the FE., SWNCC, prepared it on the basis of Edwards' report back from Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it come before the Far Eastern Subcommittee?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that it did, but I would assume that it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had a deputy on the Far East Commission then, and he approved it or I approved it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the deputy?

Mr. VINCENT. Penfield was the man, James K. Penfield.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you identified him here?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did in executive session, yes, sir, as the Deputy Director of the Far East Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how this paper reached Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not know how it reached Japan, but I am trying now to recall the statements in executive session, where I made the assumption that it reached Japan through the War Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it supposed to reach Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. My understanding at the time was that the War Department kept General MacArthur pretty well informed step by step as to the type of thinking, the type of papers and the thinking on them.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was to reach Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it in any sense an official State Department paper?

Mr. VINCENT. You mean when it reached him? No, I would not call it official.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it ever made an official State Department paper?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall whether it would be called a State Department paper or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that designation, "FEC 230," indicate it had such status?

Mr. VINCENT. No, because FEC was not under the State Department. And, you see, all of this is a period after I left the Department, this whole matter of the FEC 230; and from knowledge of the way things went then, the designation of FEC 230 would not have made it a State Department document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anyone who sent this paper or a copy of it to Japan, or to anyone in Japan?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know. I have testified that is probably went through.

Mr. SOURWINE. Went through? Were you finished?

Mr. VINCENT. Went through the War Department channels, and the War Department kept in pretty close touch, so I understood at the time, with General MacArthur.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this the same document as the document known as State Department Document FEC 230?

Mr. VINCENT. I have never seen that designation of it, but if it was called State Department Document FEC 230, that would have been its designation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would such a document have required your endorsement as Chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have testified it would not have required it. It would have required the endorsement of the SWNCC committee, of which General Hilldring was the Chairman, the top committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did this contain clauses directing General MacArthur to effect wide distribution of income and of the means of ownership and trade?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to the document, sir, before I could say that it did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this document subsequently printed by James Lee Kauffman, a New York lawyer?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I have seen testimony to that effect, but I have no knowledge myself, that it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this, sir, a photostat of the document that we have been talking about?

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, were you familiar before with FEC 230?

Mr. SURREY. I never read it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that look like the document?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, I have no reason to believe this was not a photostat of it. I was not familiar with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I offer this document, with a letter of transmittal, showing how it came into the possession of the subcommittee, and I ask that they be put into the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. They may be received.

(The material referred to is marked Exhibit No. 392 and is as follows:)

Telephone Rector 2-6541
Cable Address: "KIVORLEE"

JAMES LEE KAUFFMAN

COUNSELLOR AT LAW

55 Liberty Street

NEW YORK 5, *January 29, 1952.*

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Room 424-C, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: At the request of Mr. Eugene H. Dooman I am enclosing a copy of FEC-230. When it has served its purpose I would appreciate your returning it to this office.

Sincerely,

(Signed) MARIA MCDERMOTT,
Secretary to Mr. Kauffman.

McD: MO
Enc.

FEC-230

Confidential
FEC-230
12 May 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICY ON EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATIONS OF ECONOMIC POWER IN JAPAN

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

1. The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States Representative, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission and is referred to COMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS.

2. Enclosure "A" is the statement of transmittal of the United States Government. Enclosure "B" is the text of the proposed policy.

3. The attention of all concerned is invited to the classification of this document which prohibits the dissemination of the information contained therein to unauthorized persons or to the press.

NELSON T. JOHNSON, *Secretary General.*

ENCLOSURE "A"

STATEMENT OF TRANSMITTAL

The United States Government desires to present herewith to the Far Eastern Commission a report of its mission on Japanese combines, and concurrently to recommend for adoption by the Commission certain policies with respect to the concentration of economic power in Japanese industry, finance, and trade.

It is the belief of this Government that the existence of the Zaibatsu, and the monopolistic controls exercised by these giant combines over Japanese economic life, have been a major factor in fostering and supporting Japanese aggression. The dissolution of excessive private concentrations of economic power is essential to the democratization of Japanese economic and political life. It therefore constitutes, in the United States view, one of the major objectives of the occupation.

This basic occupation policy with respect to the Zaibatsu is stated in *Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan* (FEC–014), and is reaffirmed in *Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP for the Occupation and Control of Japan* (FEC–015). Substantial steps to implement this policy have already been undertaken by the appropriate Japanese authorities, at the direction of or with the approval of SCAP, in the organization and operations of a Japanese Holding Company Liquidating Commission, in providing for an economic purge, and in initiating other measures with respect to combines, control associations, and cartel arrangements.

To aid in formulation of comprehensive policies, standards, and procedures a mission headed by Corwin D. Edwards was dispatched to Japan in January 1946. Its report is submitted herewith.

On the basis of that report, the United States Government has prepared the following statement of broad policy with respect to the Zaibatsu question, which it desires to submit for approval by the Far Eastern Commission. In many respects, this statement incorporates measures which already have been or are being implemented by the appropriate Japanese authorities at the direction of or with the approval of SCAP, in accordance with the directives referred to above.

ENCLOSURE "B"

POLICY ON EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATIONS OF ECONOMIC POWER IN JAPAN

1. *Objective.*—The over-all objective of occupation policy in dealing with excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan should be to destroy such concentrations as may now exist, and to prevent the future creation of new concentrations. Especial care should be taken to avoid the futile gesture of destroying one Zaibatsu class only to create another; a drastic change in the nature as well as the identity of the groups controlling Japanese industry and finance should therefore be effected. Realization of this change will require achievement of the following specific objectives:

a. Dissolution of all excessive concentrations of economic power, unless technological considerations require their continuation (paragraphs 2, 3, 4, below).

b. Elimination of the excessive economic power of persons formerly exercising control over these concentrations, and of certain individuals close to such persons (paragraphs 5, 6, below).

c. Support for varied and diffused types of private ownership of elements of these dissolved concentrations, as well as support for government ownership of such of these concentrations as cannot be dissolved and of such elements of the dissolved concentrations as do not lend themselves to competitive operation (paragraphs 7, 8, below).

d. Elimination of financial support for excessive concentrations—through the divesture of Zaibatsu holdings in banks and insurance companies, through an increase in the number of sources of credit, through the termination of alliances between financial and nonfinancial institutions, and through elimination of government favoritism toward certain financial institutions (paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, below).

e. Destruction of legal support for excessive concentrations—through the termination of control legislation, through the creation of an antitrust law, through changes in the patent law, through amendments to corporate law, and through alterations in current tax law and practices (paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, below).

f. Strengthening of the instruments necessary to effect the above policies—through financial and technical aid to preferred types of purchasers, through the creation of public support for anti-Zaibatsu actions of the Japanese Government, and through measures to assure the independence of government personnel from Zaibatsu influences (paragraphs 18, 19, 20, below).

It is considered that the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration will not have been fulfilled until the objectives listed above have been met through the application of measures specified in succeeding paragraphs. It is also considered,

however, that the means to be employed in compelling the Japanese Government to effectuate these measures, and the timing of such means, are matters for executive decision by SCAP. In general, the Japanese Government should be required to take such administrative, legislative and judicial measures as well be consistent with its structure and constitutional powers and will accomplish the policy set out herein.

2. *Definition of an excessive concentration.*—For purposes of the policies set forth in this paper, an excessive concentration of economic power should be defined as any private enterprise conducted for profit, or combination of such enterprises, which, by reason of its relative size in any line or the cumulative power of its position in many lines, restricts competition or impairs the opportunity for others to engage in business independently, in any important segment of business.

In applying this standard, it should be presumed, subject to refutation, that any private enterprise or combination operated for profit is an excessive concentration of economic power if its asset value is very large; or if its working force (i. e., the working force required to operate its facilities at capacity as evidenced by its peak past employment figure) is very large; or if, though somewhat smaller in assets or working force, it is engaged in business in various unrelated fields, or if it controls substantial financial institutions and/or substantial industrial or commercial ones; or if it controls a substantial number of other corporate enterprises; or if it produces, sells or distributes a large proportion of the total supply of the products of a major industry.

Absolute size, as well as position within a given industry, is to be considered grounds for defining a specified concentration as excessive. It is desired to eliminate not only monopolies but also aggregations of capital under the control of a given enterprise which are so large as to constitute a material potential threat to competitive enterprise.

All larger Japanese enterprises should immediately be surveyed by SCAP in the light of the above standards. Uncertainty as to whether any specified enterprise is covered by these standards should be resolved in favor of coverage since it is intended that ownership of the bulk of Japanese large-scale industry should be affected by the policies set forth in this paper. It is understood that SCAP's *Schedule of Restricted Concerns*, as amended from time to time in accordance with the procedures provided for that purpose, comprehends the Japanese enterprises considered to be excessive concentrations within the meaning of this paper.

3. *Dissolution vs. nondissolution of excessive concentrations.*—Excessive concentrations of economic power should immediately be dissolved into as many nonrelated units as possible, no one of which would be covered by any of the definitions of an excessive concentration presented in paragraph 2. Such dissolution should not be effected, however, where the technological need for large scale operation is such that dissolution would clearly cause a drastic reduction in operating efficiency. It should be presumed, subject to refutation, that such a drastic reduction would not result from the dissolution of holding companies; or from the severance of ties of ownership, directorship, and officership between operating companies; or from the severance from operating companies of portions of such companies, where these portions are in unrelated industries, or where they have had a separate corporate existence within the last five years, or where they are so separated from one another physically and technologically that they do not in fact have a common operating management. Treatment of concentrations which are to be dissolved is specified in paragraph 4; treatment of concentrations which are not to be dissolved is specified in subparagraph 8 *a*. The provisions of paragraph 5 should apply equally to persons and holdings in concentrations which are, and are not, to be dissolved.

4. *Policy with respect to excessive concentrations which are to be dissolved.*—The following measures should be undertaken with respect to excessive concentrations of economic power which are to be dissolved:

a. All concerns in these excessive concentrations which are merely holding companies should be dissolved and divested of their security and property holdings.

b. The units, other than those described under *a* above, into which these excessive concentrations are broken down should, in the case of nonfinancial enterprises (insurance companies being considered financial enterprises), be divested of any securities which they may hold in other concerns, including concerns not a part of any excessive concentration of economic power.

c. All officers (auditors are to be considered officers) and directors of these operating units, and of operating units in the financial field as well, should surrender all offices and directorships except those in the company in which they are principally engaged, and should be forbidden to acquire any offices and directorships outside of whatever company they may be principally engaged in at any time in the future, except as provided in paragraph 16. This policy does not apply to persons specified in paragraph 5, who will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that paragraph.

d. Certain contractual and service arrangements between the units into which these excessive concentrations have been dissolved should be terminated, including arrangements for performance of central office services, interchange of personnel, executive agency, and preferential or exclusive trading rights. Resumption of similar arrangements should be prohibited for a time sufficient to ensure bona fide severance of the arrangement.

e. The operating units into which these excessive concentrations are dissolved should grant licenses on nondiscriminatory terms to all applicants under patents which they now hold and under licenses which give them rights to sublicense; should surrender any exclusive or preferential rights which they now enjoy under patent licenses granted them by others; and during the period of transition, should make available to all comers on nondiscriminatory terms any technology and patent rights which they make available to other concerns which have been a part of the same combine. Where the units in question hold license under Japanese patents owned by foreigners under terms incompatible with the sense of this paragraph, these terms should be renegotiated. Where the licensor will not agree to renegotiation, the Japanese unit should cease utilizing the license, so that the Japanese government can cancel the patent or open up the patent to licensing on nondiscriminatory terms pursuant to Chapter II, Article 41 of the Patent Law.

f. Mergers of any portions of divested or dissolved concerns should be prohibited, except when permission is granted after an affirmative showing of public interest.

5. *Treatment of personnel in excessive concentrations.*—All individuals who have exercised controlling power in or over any excessive concentration of economic power, whether as creditors, stockholders, managers, or in any other capacity, should be:

a. Divested of all corporate security holdings, liquid assets, and business properties.

b. Ejected from all positions of business or governmental responsibility.

c. Forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings or from acquiring positions of business or governmental responsibility at any time during the next 10 years.

All other persons likely to act on behalf of the individuals described above should be subjected to the measures specified below. In determining who such persons may be, such factors as ties by blood, marriage, adoption or past personal relaship should be taken into account. (The phrase "past personal relationship" is used in the previous sentence chiefly in reference to persons who have been placed in positions of substantial responsibility in holding companies or their subsidiaries by the Zaibatsu families, but it should also be taken to refer to persons otherwise associated with the Zaibatsu whom SCAP may consider to be acting as "fronts" for the latter.) Such persons should be:

a. Divested of liquid assets and business properties, where they possess such assets or properties in amounts of any significance; and divested of all corporate security holdings in any excessive concentration of economic power and corporate security holdings representing an interest of more than 1 percent in any other major private enterprise.

b. Ejected from all positions in business or government which might be used to favor Zaibatsu interests.

c. Forbidden from purchasing corporate security holdings, or from acquiring positions in business or government which might be used to favor Zaibatsu interests at any time during the next 10 years.

Where any doubt exists as to whether a given person should be covered by the above policies, that doubt should be resolved by SCAP in favor of coverage, since it is desired to divest a sufficient number of holdings to effect a thoroughgoing transformation of the ownership and control of large-scale Japanese industry.

6. *Compensation of divested holdings.*—Individuals covered by the definitions in paragraph 5 above shall be indemnified, provided that such indemnification

shall be made in such manner and degree as will prohibit their buying back a place of power in the Japanese economy. In order to bring this about, it is essential that certain measures be taken in the dissolution of excessive concentrations and in the sale of the assets of these persons. The measures set out below have been designed with a view to preventing the payment of excessive indemnification to the persons covered in paragraph 5 without affecting to the same degree and manner the compensation of others who have invested in enterprises considered to be excessive concentrations. The determination of what is an excessive indemnification shall be made on the basis of the objectives of these measures. Accordingly:

a. Policies which facilitate the conveyance of divested holdings to new owners should not be modified by an effort to obtain any specified degree of compensation for the former owners of these holdings. The overriding objective should be to dispose of all the holdings in question as rapidly as possible to desirable purchasers; the objective should be achieved even if it requires that holdings be disposed of at a fraction of their real value. In negotiated sales of divested holdings to desirable types of purchasers, the purchasers's ability to pay, rather than the real value of the holding, should affect the fixing of prices and terms of payment.

b. A tax of not less than 90 percent should be levied on any amount by which the gross sales price exceeds the August 1945 market price (in the case of securities having a market), or the book value as of the same date (in the case of other securities or property). To prevent this tax from resulting in injury to non-Zaibatsu individuals, the following priority should govern the disposition of funds secured through the sale of divested assets:

First priority: All taxes due, other than the 90-percent tax referred to above, and all liabiilties should be paid in full.

Second priority: All non-Zaibatsu equity holders, where such exist should be paid up to the amount of the August 1945 market price of their holdings (or the August 1945 book value in the case of securities not having a market)

Third priority: The 90-percent tax described above should be paid in full.

Fourth priority: All the Zaibatsu equity holdings should be paid up to the amount of the August 1945 market price of their holdings (or the August 1945 book value in the case of securities not having a market), and remaining funds should be distributed among all equity holders in proportion to the amount of their holdings.

To prevent observance of the priorities cited above from resulting in total expropriation of Zaibatsu shareholders, proceeds of the 90-percent tax should be partially refunded to Zaibatsu shareholders where necessary to provide such shareholders with a total compensation not exceeding 15 percent of the August 1945 market value (or book value where no market existed) of their divested holdings.

In lieu of the 90-percent tax specified above, a steeply progressive tax may be specifically imposed (in addition to capital levy) on funds which are assigned to the individuals described in paragraph 5 as a result of the sale of assets divested from such individuals.

c. A 75-percent tax be levied on any gain realized through resale of divested holdings within 2 years and a 50-percent tax should be levied on any gain realized through resale within 4 years.

d. Sums credited to persons defined in paragraph 5 above as compensation should be invested in government bonds, whose total par value will not exceed the sum thus credited and which will pay a rate of interest no higher than the lowest rate being paid by comparable government bonds. Such bonds should not be saleable, transferable, or usable as collateral, but should be acceptable for taxes, when all other sources of liquid assets have been dissipated, for 10 years from the completion of the sale of such holdings. During this period, cash payments, even of interest, should be limited to sums required for accustomed living expenses, in order that there may be no surplus for investment.

e. After the process of dissolution and liquidation has been well advanced, and before the end of the 10-year freeze period, the program should be reviewed to determine whether the sums credited to persons defined in paragraph 5 above will be so large as to make probable a revival of Zaibatsu power. If it is determined that the probability of such a revival still exists, added measures appropriate to the circumstances existing at the time should be applied to remove the probability.

f. Before the freeze is terminated, succession by the owner's heirs should be required, coupled with payment of steeply graduated inheritance taxes.

7. *Liquidation of Divested Holdings.*—Liquidation of divested securities and properties should be effected rapidly in a period of about 2 years from the organization of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission. The plan of liquidation should allow for:

a. Pro rata distribution of security holdings to individual stockholders of the holding concern other than those specified in paragraph 4 (and in some cases to financial institutions which own the holding concern's stock).

b. Exchange and cancellation of securities between companies which hold each other's stock.

c. Negotiated sale of securities and properties.

d. If necessary to complete the liquidation within about 2 years, invitation of bids upon securities from eligible purchasers, and acceptance of the highest bids however low such bids may be.

Liquidation should be effected by the Holding Company Liquidation Commission, a wholly public agency of the Japanese Government operating under close supervision of SCAP. Especial care should be taken not to allow representatives of large-scale business, large-scale trade, or large-scale finance, or of political groups, sympathetic to such business, trade, or finance, to have any place on this Commission. All nominations to the Commission should be approved by SCAP, its personnel should be removable by SCAP, and it should be required that all sales effected by the Commission be revocable by SCAP. Public announcement should be made of the terms and conditions of all sales.

8. *Sale of divested holdings.*—In the sale of divested security and property holdings, the overriding objective should be to transfer ownership and control of these holdings to groups and individuals in such a way as to secure, in addition to the requisite managerial skill, protection against the future creation of excessive concentrations of economic power, through a wider distribution of income and of ownership of the means of production and trade. In order to achieve this objective, the following criteria are set forth as a guide to the selection of purchasers and should be given priority, in this connection, over the purchaser's present ability to pay:

a. Divested holdings in excessive concentrations of economic power which are not to be dissolved for technological reasons, and in other enterprises such as public utilities which do not lend themselves to competitive operation, may be subjected to purchase by the national and local governments of Japan, provided, such purchases are accomplished and approved through democratic processes. Where such concentrations or enterprises are not purchased by these governments, their rates and profits should be subjected to open and effective regulation by impartial public commissions. When the National Government or a local government purchases divested equity holdings in a given concern, it should also give consideration to the concomitant purchase of non-Zaibatsu equity holdings in that concern. Every effort should be made, however, to dissolve all excessive concentrations of economic power, rather than to assign them to government ownership or regulation, until and unless the democratization of the Japanese Government has proceeded sufficiently to render it a truly trustworthy instrument for economic control.

b. In connection with nongovernmental purchases, sales to wealthy and economically powerful persons and corporations should be held to a minimum, in order not to lay the groundwork for the creation of a new Zaibatsu class. A decided purchase preference, and the technical and financial aid necessary to take advantage of that preference, should be furnished to such persons as small or medium entrepreneurs and investors, and to such groups as agricultural or consumer cooperatives and trade unions; whose ownership of these holdings would contribute to the democratization of the Japanese economy. Every encouragement should be given such persons and groups to purchase divested holdings, even if they only wish to buy a small proportion of the holdings offered for sale in a given enterprise. In the case of negotiated sales, prices should be fixed with special reference to such purchasers' ability to pay, as should the time period allowed for payment of these prices.

c. No single person, or enterprise, or group of allied persons or enterprises, should be allowed to purchase a number of divested holdings so large as to render probable the future creation of a concentration of economic

power approaching in size or character those concentrations defined as excessive under paragraph 2.

d. The purchase of divested holdings in ex-Zaibatsu concerns by the employees of such concerns should be encouraged only if a vigorous effort is made to disperse ownership widely through the working force in question, rather than to concentrate it in a few top executives. To render such dispersion possible, provision should be made for financing these purchases at low prices over a long period of time, possibly through wage deductions. Especial care should be taken to prevent the use of groups of employees in ex-Zaibatsu concerns as purchasing screens for persons disqualified from making these purchases themselves.

e. All sales should be screened to exclude cloakes for Zaibatsu and for other groups who fall under way of any purge directives or purge paragraphs of the Basic Directive.

The criteria specified above should be adhered to regardless of the wishes of non-Zaibatsu stockholders in the enterprises concerned.

9. *Liquidation of Zaibatsu Financial Enterprises.*—Divested holdings in Zaibatsu financial and insurance enterprises should be liquidated and disposed of in accordance with the principles laid down in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 for the liquidation of nonfinancial enterprises. Policyholders in Zaibatsu insurance companies should be aided in buying stock of these concerns which is now owned by the Zaibatsu, where the condition of these concerns is sufficiently strong so that the policyholders desire to make such purchases. Purchase should be facilitated, under these circumstances, by liberal loans on policies, or payment should be permitted in the form of a reduction in the face value of policies. Zaibatsu insurance companies which are insolvent should be mutualized by cutting back the face amount of outstanding policies, where sufficient assets still exist to render this procedure practicable. In the reconstitution of insolvent financial enterprises, stock held by Zaibatsu holding companies and Zaibatsu individuals should be subordinated to that of other stockholders.

10. *Sources of credit.*—As a fundamental measure to encourage competitive operation of the Japanese economy, the number of independent sources of credit should be increased substantially, although not to the point where the individual banks would be so small as to be unable to secure the diversification of loans necessary to banking safety. The strengthening of local savings banks, and of rural and urban credit cooperatives, as well as of independent local banks, should be encouraged. To this end, the following policies, among others should be adopted:

a. Former owners of independent financial institutions which have been merged with Zaibatsu concerns should be encouraged to reestablish their old enterprises by forced divestitures. In this connection, a procedure should be set up whereby former owners of merged banks, trust companies, or insurance companies should have the opportunity, for a limited period of time, to compel the institutions into which their organizations were merged to divest themselves of assets and liabilities to the extent necessary to reconstitute the absorbed institutions in adequate size.

b. Banks over a size to be specified by SCAP should be required to split themselves into two or more independent units within a stated period, as should other banks deemed by SCAP to enjoy a monopolistic position in the field which they serve. The permissible size should be set at a level sufficiently low to force a significant number of such actions and thus greatly increase the number of independent sources of credit, but sufficiently high to guard against the dangers of financial insecurity associated with excessively small banks.

11. *Financial alliances.*—Alliances between any financial and nonfinancial enterprises, and alliances among any financial enterprises, should be broken. To this end:

a. Banks and trust companies should be prevented from investing more than 10 percent of their capital and reserves in the securities, loans, bills, advances, and overdrafts of any one company.

b. Such concerns should not be permitted to hold, either as an owner of record or as the holder of a beneficial interest, in their proper, savings, or trust accounts, the stock of any other company in an amount which exceeds 5 percent of the outstanding shares of that company, nor to vote any such stock which they may hold. Nor should they be permitted to own any stock in a competitor. Exemption should be made to the percentage rule for stock acquired in connection with bona fide underwritings and to the per-

centage and voting rules for stock acquired in default of loans, but any such exemptions should not run longer than one year.

c. Officers and directors of any bank or trust company, and persons holding 5 percent or more of the stock thereof, should be ineligible to hold any office or directorship or similarly large percentage of stock in any other company. Exception should be made for part-time non-policy-making employees, such as attorneys and certifying accountants, but such exceptions should be defined as narrowly as possible.

d. No bank or trust company should be allowed to redeposit more than 10 percent of its deposits in any one institution other than the Bank of Japan.

12. *Elimination of financial discrimination.*—To eliminate discrimination in favor of Zaibatsu banks:

a. A system of deposit insurance should be instituted, to diminish the belief among depositors that accounts in Zaibatsu banks are safer than elsewhere. A limit (e. g., of the order of magnitude of ten billion yen) should be set to the total amount of deposits which will be insured for a single bank. A limit should also be set to the amount of deposits which will be insured for a single account.

b. The Postal Savings System should ultimately be required to deposit its funds in ordinary banks, allocating at least 90 percent of what it receives in any regional grouping of prefectures among the banks having head offices in that region in proportion to the assets of such banks. A bank ineligible for deposit insurance should also be ineligible to receive the redeposits of the postal savings system.

c. Legislation should be introduced to improve the standard of commercial banking and to prevent banks from undertaking business considered unwise for commercial banks. (Performance of investment banking functions by commercial banks should not be prohibited, however, until suitable alternative agents for these functions become available.) Such legislation should also assign to the Bank of Japan, or to some other suitable public agency, powers of direction and inspection over other banks, whose activities would be required to conform to statutory provisions regarding capital, reserves, investment policy, and other matters. The discretion which the laws now entrust to the Minister of Finance, in this connection, should be greatly reduced, and his functions clearly defined by law and made subject to check and review by the Diet. His powers to legislate by ordinance and regulation should be strictly curtailed and limited to genuine emergencies. Bank examinations should take place at least every 2 years.

d. The functions and powers of special banks should be defined and limited by law, and these banks should not be allowed to engage in ordinary banking. The need for the existence of the special banks should be reviewed, in order to determine whether certain of these banks might not revert to the status of ordinary banks.

e. All vestiges of private ownership of the Bank of Japan should be eliminated. The Board of Directors should be made representative of finance, trade, industry, agriculture, and of large, medium, and smaller size business.

f. Competition among banks for customers should be restored through such measures as the abolition of the designated bank system and of the financial control associations.

g. Employees performing responsible functions in the Ministry of Finance and government banks should be forbidden to hold the securities of any financial institution, and should be ineligible for employment by private financial institutions for 2 years after they leave government employment.

13. *Government support of industrial monopolies.*—Laws and practices through which the Japanese Government has favored the growth of private monopolies should be terminated; although that Government should not be deprived of its power to regulate the Japanese economy in the public interest. To this end:

a. Laws and ordinances establishing existing control associations or special companies should be generally repealed and the associations or special companies abolished. The future assumption, by nongovernmental agencies, of powers formerly exercised under these laws, should be prohibited. The future assumption, by governmental agencies, of such of these powers as have no major use other than to support monopolistic bodies and practices

should also be prohibited. Necessary governmental functions formerly performed by control associations or special companies should be transferred to appropriate governmental agencies, which agencies should be created where they do not now exist. In cases where SCAP is satisfied that current conditions prevent the government from effectively performing these functions, and is further satisfied that effective performance of these functions is necessary for public purposes, he may allow temporary delegation of these functions by the government to the old control associations or special companies or to similar new quasi private bodies, provided that final decisions are made by the government and the rights of appeal to the government against abuse of powers are provided. All quasi private bodies exercising such delegated functions should be liquidated as soon as their functions can be transferred to appropriate government agencies, or at such sooner time as SCAP may find the exercise of their functions to be no longer necessary. (For example, where these functions relate to allocation, or price and trade control for reconversion purposes, their performance could be terminated upon the expiration of the reconversion period.)

b. All legislation which forbids, or requires governmental approval of, the entry of any new business into an industry, or the expansion of any business, should be terminated, except insofar as:

(1) The right to effect such a restriction is implicit in the antitrust legislation suggested below.

(2) The right to effect such a restriction is necessary in order to comply with SCAP directives dealing with industrial disarmament and other subjects.

(3) Nondiscriminatory restrictions for generally accepted public purposes, such as protecting the public against fraud, and protecting the public health, are concerned.

(4) Fields of business activity reserved to the national or local governments are concerned. In this connection, prewar laws which set up clear-cut government monopolies should be left undisturbed; but, to prevent the use of this type of law to evade other portions of the anti-Zaibatsu program, the creation of new government monopolies during the period of the occupation should be permitted only in cases where they are in the public interest or where their creation is in accordance with the policy for sale of divested holdings to the national and local governments described in paragraph 7*a* above. The petroleum and alcohol monopolies, which were instituted for war purposes, should be terminated as soon as possible.

c. All laws and practices under which the government has favored specific private or quasi private enterprises, to the deteriment of potentially or actually competitive enterprises, should be systematically reviewed, and such of these laws and practices as do not have a demonstrable public purpose should be terminated. Insofar as any subsidies are allowed to continue, or are granted in the future they should be controlled by the legislative branch of the government, and provision should be made that hereafter their amount, purpose, and effect be disclosed in public reports.

Principles such as those set forth in the preceding subparagraphs should be made effective, not only by changes in substantive law, but also by provisions giving aggrieved persons the right to attack in the courts any discriminatory subsidy, preference, or other practice.

14. *Antitrust law.*—A Japanese antitrust law should be enacted, prohibiting, among other things:

a. Concerted business activity which burdens trade, including, but not by way of limitation to, such activities as fixing of prices, restriction of sales or output, and allocation of markets, commodities, or customers.

b. Individual or concerted activity which has the purpose or effect of coercing business enterprises to conform to business policies, or participation in programs carried on by the coercing concern or group which are designed to drive selected enterprises out of any line of business, through means which include but are not limited to intimidation of a rival's customers or sale to a rival at discriminatory prices.

c. The creation of excessive concentrations of economic powers, as such concentrations are defined in paragraph 2; (where considerations of structural or technological unity require the creation of large concentrations,

government ownership or strict regulation of these concentrations should be provided for).

d. Types of industrial growth and of intercorporate connection which are particularly likely to lead to monopoly or to excessive size, including mergers (i. e., acquisition of any substantial portion of the capital assets) of going concerns of other than negligible size which are in competition with one another, or mergers of noncompeting concerns which might lead to the creation of large scale enterprises capable of developing into an excessive concentration of economic power, where such mergers are not explicitly found to be required in the public interest.

e. Types of intercorporate relations (e. g., those described in paragraph 4 d) which restrain competition.

This antitrust law should be enforced by a specialized agency operating at a high governmental level and exercising broad investigatory and remedial powers. Consideration should be given to including in this agency representatives of the groups most likely to be aggrieved by excessive corporate growth; in any event, special care should be taken not to allow representatives of large scale business, or of political groups sympathetic to large-scale business, to be named to this agency.

Exemption from the provisions of this law should be provided for the joint activities of cooperatives, where such activities are not coercive or monopolistic, and where they are conducted according to the democratic principles characteristic of genuine cooperatives. Similar exemption should be provided for labor activities other than those involving the restriction of commercial competition, and for natural monopolies and public utilities insofar as they are owned or closely regulated by the government.

15. *Patent law.*—The provisions and the manner of enforcing Japanese patent law should be revised to ensure that patents in Japan cannot be used to support the establishment or perpetuation of concentrations of economic power.

16. *Corporate Law.*—The following changes in Japanese corporate law should be effected:

a. Disclosure of relevant facts in selling corporate securities should be required, and the fraudulent practices in connection with such sales should be prohibited.

b. Before any call to a meeting of the stockholders of a corporation, the management of the corporation shall make full disclosure of all the facts necessary for the stockholders to appraise intelligently the proposals to be placed before the meeting.

c. Misleading practices in corporate accounting should be forbidden, and minimum standards of disclosure in such accounting should be required.

d. Interlocking officerships should be prohibited, and officers of one concern should be prohibited from serving as directors of another. Interlocking directorates should be prohibited in the case of competing concerns and in the case of concerns which rent, sell, or buy goods or services to or from each other in significant amounts. In the case of other concerns, interlocking directorates should be allowed to the point where no more than one-fourth of the members of any Board of Directors are at the same time directors of other corporations. No one person should, however, be allowed to serve on the Board of Directors of more than three corporations. Nothing in this paragraph should be taken as in any way modifying the provisions of paragraph 11 *c*. Officers and directors should be prevented from having holdings of shares in competing or supplying concerns, and should be prevented from having holdings of shares in any other enterprises representing more than 5 percent of their liquid assets or more than 5 percent of such other enterprises' outstanding shares. Officers, directors, and persons having a beneficial interest in or control of any equity issue of a corporation in excess of 1 percent of the total issue should be required to report their holdings and transactions in all issues of the corporations, and such reports should be publicized. Profits of corporate insiders derived from short-term transactions in the corporation's securities should be subject to recapture by the corporation.

e. An ultra vires action by a corporation should be grounds for remedial action by a stockholder or punitive action by a public agency. Moreover, a corporation should be specifically prohibited from entering partnerships, either directly or indirectly, or in other respects avoiding the limitations on intercorporate relationships.

f. It should be required that all shares having par value should be fully paid, and that equal voting rights attach to all shares of the same issue. The use of no par-value shares should be permitted; such shares to be offered for sale at any time at a value to be decided by the company's board of directors. All corporations should be required to adopt the principle of preemptive rights in offering new shares.

g. Every effort should be made to assure the independence of Japanese auditors, who should be prevented from having direct or indirect affiliations with management and from having conflicting interests in other concerns.

h. With stated exemptions for banks, investment trusts, insurance companies, and possibly other types of financial institutions, the Japanese company law should be amended to forbid one corporation from holding the stock of another. The use of 100 percent owned subsidiaries should be permitted, however (subject to the restrictions on mergers outlined under paragraph 14 *d*).

i. Stockholders should not be unduly hampered in bringing suits against management for money damages or for equitable remedies.

17. *Tax and inheritance laws.*—In connection with current and impending revisions of Japanese tax law, every effort should be made to favor the wide distribution of income and ownership envisaged in this paper, through the following means:

a. Income and inheritance taxes should be very much more steeply graduated than they are at present.

b. Property inherited by the head of a house should be subject to the tax rates applicable to other heirs.

c. Diffusion of inherited wealth should be assured by by provision for reasonably equal distribution among heirs, insofar as estates aggregating considerable wealth are concerned.

d. Members of a house should be prevented from deriving significant tax advantages from the insolvent status of other members of the house.

e. The present discretionary power of the Minister of Finance in tax matters should be greatly reduced. Tax rates should be fixed by the Diet.

18. *Policy concerning preferred purchasers.*—Measures specified below should be taken in order to strengthen and democratize preferred categories of purchasers of divested holdings:

a. In order to qualify Japanese cooperatives for purchase preference in connection with divested holdings, such cooperatives should be freed from governmental influence and should be relieved of public functions. They should be subject to government supervision, only insofar as such supervision is necessary to prevent fraud and to ensure compliance with the provisions of this paragraph. Membership in these cooperatives should be voluntary, and requirements for membership therein should be nondiscriminatory. (In this connection, the minimum contribution or entrance fee should be reduced to the point where it will form no obstacle to the membership of low income persons.) All participating members should have equal votes and officers should be selected by majority vote. The proceeds should be divided equally among members or in proportion to the relative volume of business, without allowance, beyond a low fixed dividend, for contribution of capital. In addition to being converted into genuinely democratic instruments through these and other changes, cooperatives should be freed from all legal restrictions which prevent them from engaging in various kinds of activities. Specifically, consumers' cooperative societies should be recognized and afforded the same type of privilege as other cooperative societies. The minimum number of members qualifying for registration under the Cooperative Societies Law should be raised from the present figure of seven to levels which will vary for different types of societies but which should be sufficiently high in each case to prevent domination by minorities. Genuine cooperative societies should receive such public financial technical aid as may be necessary to their expansion.

b. Where the possibility exists that trade unions might purchase Zaibatsu holdings, all possible technical and financial assistance should be furnished the trade unions concerned, provided that these unions are genuine labor organizations, and are not acting as cloaks for former owners. As a means of providing for trade union ownership of divested holdings, consideration should be given to assigning ownership of divested holdings to cooperative societies organized especially for this purpose, with a membership parallel to that of trade unions.

c. Small entrepreneurs desiring to purchase divested holdings should be given all possible public assistance so that they may compete on more advantageous terms with large scale business. The Japanese Ministry of Commerce should establish a bureau specifically devoted to aiding such small business. This bureau should give special support to the performance of joint activities of an unrestrictive character by such mutual-aid organizations of small entrepreneurs as manufactures' guilds and export guilds. Precautions should be taken, however, against domination of these guilds by the government or by the larger firms; nor should they be permitted to engage in such of their former activities as were in restraint of trade.

19. *Public support.*—Vigorous efforts should be made by SCAP to create Japanese public understanding of, and support for, the anti-Zaibatsu program through such means as:

a. Provision for access to recent literature in English about the problems of industrial organization.

b. Publication of SCAP's factual findings about the Zaibatsu.

c. Encouragement of the organization of a Japanese commission of inquiry, representative of a wide range of interests and opinions, to investigate the facts about the Zaibatsu and make public its recommendations.

d. Attention to the problems of industrial organization, and the dangers of monopoly and excessive concentration of economic power in the revision of the Japanese educational system.

e. Provision for contact between the Japanese antitrust agency and similar bodies in other countries.

A special attempt should be made to furnish relevant data to and to secure the support of, those groups whose economic interests are most actutely promoted by the dissolution of the Zaibatsu; consumers, small and medium-size businessmen, trade unions, and cooperatives.

20. *Japanese Government.*—An attempt should be made to deprive the Japanese Government of its former pro-Zaibatsu character, and to prevent renewed alliances between the bureaucracy and business interests:

a. SCAP should make every effort to see that new public agencies established in order to carry out the anti-Zaibatsu program envisaged in this paper are staffed with individuals not previously associated with or sympathetic to large scale business or its political spokesmen. Economist and other intellectuals or technical experts hitherto debarred from government work because of their anti-imperialist or anti-Zaibatsu views would be desirable recruits.

b. In view, however, of the limited availability of such persons, and of the uncertain political complexion of the present Japanese bureaucracy, SCAP should reduce the discretionary policy-making authority of that bureaucracy insofar as the more important issues related to this program are concerned. In economic matters at least, the Japanese bureaucracy should not be left in a position to usurp the functions of the legislative branch of the government.

c. Existing government officials performing responsible functions relating to the control or regulation of private industrial, commercial, or financial enterprises should be discharged where, because of their past employment in Zaibatsu concerns or other previous private or public actions, they are believed sympathetic to Zaibatsu interests.

d. Government officials performing responsible functions relating to the control or regulation of private commercial, industrial, or financial enterprises should be prohibited from holding the securities of any one such private enterprise in an amount which would represent more than 5 percent of the official's total wealth, or more than 1 percent of the enterpriser's capital value. Reports of all security holdings by such government officials should be made public. Such officials should also be prohibited within a period of 2 years after their leaving of government employ, from accepting private positions which involve their representing, directly or indirectly, private enterprises before the government bureaus with which they were formerly associated, or from holding positions in any private enterprise which is the object of legal action as a result of its alleged violation of any of the measures specified in this paper.

e. Special procedures should be set up to make public the names of government officials holding responsible positions relating to the control or regulation of private, commercial, industrial, or financial enterprises, so that anti-Zaibatsu groups and persons may scrutinize their past records and protest publicly against appointments which they consider unsuitable.

f. The principle of private redress for injury suffered as a result of governmental action should be recognized in Japanese law.

21. *United Nations and neutral interests.*—In the application of measures specified in this paper, SCAP should protect the interests of nationals of members of the United Nations in Japan, insofar as this can be accomplished without limiting the effectiveness of these measures. In general, his objective should be to provide adequate, prompt and effective indemnification for property taken from such interests to the extent feasible. He should also keep full records of any change in the status of such interests which may result from the application of these measures.

22. *Nonprofit corporations.*—An exception should be made to the provisions of this paper affecting interlocking officerships and directorates insofar as these provisions concern nonprofit corporations which are devoted to public, charitable and cultural purposes and which do not hold securities of other corporations.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that, as far as you know, this is the first time this has been made public?

Mr. VINCENT. So far as I know. I have never seen it outside of the State Department, and it has been years since I ever saw it. I am not familiar with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember being invited to speak at a rally——

Mr. VINCENT. Excuse me. The testimony here when asked if I had knowledge of MacArthur receiving FEC 230 in any form——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I ask you that?

Mr. VINCENT. I thought you did; the channels through which it went.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mentioned MacArthur? I would be glad to have your testimony on that point.

Mr. VINCENT. My purpose is here to show a letter which he wrote to Senator McMahon on the 1st of February 1948, in which he states that he had received FEC 230. This is a photostat of a letter from Douglas MacArthur to Senator McMahon.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a photostat of a printed copy of that letter, isn't it? Where was that copy printed?

Mr. SURREY. It is printed in the Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, at page 783 of the document appendix F.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Do you adopt that testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. I adopt the testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no objection to counsel stating the fact, but counsel hasn't been sworn. Where did you get this photostat?

Mr. VINCENT. In the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you order it made, or did someone make it and bring it to you?

Mr. VINCENT. The regular photostat work there; yes. I ordered having it made, from the regular people who make photostats.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had aid in the State Department in preparing your case here?

Mr. VINCENT. I have had aid in collecting documents.

Senator FERGUSON. You have had a private counsel as well as counsel in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see him between sessions?

Mr. VINCENT. I go back and see the people in the State Department; not regularly.

Senator FERGUSON. Have they a copy of the transcript?

Mr. VINCENT. That comes out from day to day? Yes, the State Department has gotten a copy of it.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you discuss with them the transcript?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't even seen this transcript, myself.

Senator FERGUSON. That wasn't my question.

Mr. VINCENT. I have not discussed the transcript with them.

Senator FERGUSON. When is the last you have been in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten. I didn't go yesterday. The day before yesterday, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the State Department's counsel?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw people in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. The counsel?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I wouldn't say the counsel. People in the Legal Advisers' Office.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask that this document that Mr. Vincent has just handed over and identified be placed in the record at this point. I have not seen it, but in justice to the witness, it should go in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it in the record right now.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 393" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 393

LETTER FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR TO SENATOR BRIEN MCMAHON FEBRUARY 1, 1948

Reproduced in "Political Orientation of Japan" [report of Government section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, September 1945–September 1948]

Appendix F: 43

LETTER TO SENATOR BRIEN M'MAHON DEFENDING ECONOMY POLICY

Tokyo, Japan,
1 February 1948.

DEAR SENATOR MCMAHON: I have your letter of January 22nd and the pages from the Congressional Record subsequently received under separate cover, for which I thank you.

The discussion of Senator Knowland covers a policy paper of the United States formulated by the State, War, and Navy Departments and referred to the Far Eastern Commission for consideration by the other ten governments represented on that body and to the supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for guidance. As the sources of origin, authorship and authority are all in Washington and my responsibility limited to the executive implementation of basic decisions formulated there, I am hardly in a position ten thousand miles away to participate in the debate.

For your information, however, I did publicly state my views with respect to the underlying purpose of the policy paper known as FEC 230 on New Year's Day last and subsequently on January 6th, 1948 at San Francisco the Secretary of the Army in an address before the Commwealth Club, with marked clarity summed up the situation as it presently exists. It is somewhat difficult to understand why these published views did not figure in the discussion of the subject matter upon the floor of the Senate, and against the possibility that the texts of such statements did not come to your attention I am inclosing herewith copies thereof which I should be only too glad to have inserted in the Record as you have suggested.

In any evaluation of the economic potential here in Japan it must be understood that the tearing down of the traditional pyramid of economic power which has given only a few Japanese families direct or indirect control over all commerce and industry, all raw materials, all transportation, internal and external, and all coal and other power resources. is the first essential step to the estab-

lishment here of an economic system based upon free private competitive enterprise which Japan has never before known. Even more it is indispensable to the growth of democratic government and life, as the abnormal economic system heretofore in existence can only thrive if the people are held in poverty and slavery.

The Japanese people, you may be sure, fully understand the nature of the forces which have so ruthlessly exploited them in the past. They understand that this economic concentration not only furnished the sinews for mounting the violence of war but that its leaders, in partnersip with the military, shaped the national will in the direction of war and conquest. And they understand no less fully that the material wealth comprising this vast concentration at war's start increased as war progressed, at the forfeiture of millions of Japanese lives, as resources of Japan theretofore only indirectly controlled came under direct control and ownership. Those things are so well understood by the Japanese people that apart from our desire to reshape Japanese life toward a capitalistic economy, if this concentration of economic power is not torn down and redistributed peacefully and in due order under the Occupation, there is no slightest doubt that its cleansing will eventually occur through a blood bath of revolutionary violence. For the Japanese people have tasted freedom under the American concept and they will not willingly return to the shackles of an authoritarian government and economy or resubmit otherwise to their discredited masters.

With expressions of cordiality.

Faithfully yours,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Mr. REA. That letter makes reference to——

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you going to testify?

Mr. REA. No, sir. I was just calling attention to the fact that that letter makes reference to a longer letter expanding on the views of the shorter one, of which you already have a copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your opinion that that also should be in the record at this point?

Mr. REA. I was going to suggest that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you identified yourself for the reporter?

Mr. REA. My name is Howard Rea.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you are associated with Mr. Surrey?

Mr. REA. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like to adopt that as my testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are offering is this entire three-page photostat? It comes from the same source; is that right, Mr. Rea?

Mr. REA. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember being invited to speak at a meeting of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you remember being asked to speak on behalf of the Department or to designate a speaker to discuss State Department policy toward Japan at that rally?

Mr. VINCENT. No, Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall it. I didn't speak before it, and I have no recollection of being asked to send somebody to speak before it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall a Mr. Hugh Borton?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Identify him.

Mr. VINCENT. He was an officer in the Far Eastern Office while I was Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Borton did speak at the rally of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. I have just testified that I have no recollection of his speaking before it. It is not a matter that is in my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you suggested to Mr. Borton that he make this speech?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is possible that you did.

Mr. VINCENT. I think it is possible I did. It certainly is quite possible that I had a discussion with him, because he was in my office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you referred to Mr. Borton a request which had come to your desk for a speaker to represent the Department at that rally?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't say that I have any recollection of it, but I am perfectly sure that if one came, I probably would have referred it to one or the other of the people in my office handling Japanese American affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at that time know that the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy was a Communist-front organization?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that the Department was at the time sending a speaker to a rally of a Communist-front organization?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't there an investigation of Mr. Borton as a result of his having made that speech?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir. When was that speech made? In 1946?

Mr. SOURWINE. January 24, 1946.

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Andrew Roth was going to be on the program of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the State Department cleared the speech which Mr. Borton gave on that occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. I simply don't recall the speech or the incident, so I don't know whether it was cleared or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you did not clear the speech before he gave it, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not recall clearing the speech before he gave it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see it?

Mr. VINCENT. I simply don't know, Mr. Sourwine. I just don't recall that whole incident.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recall ever having heard of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall, sir, having anything to do with that. As I say, Borton was in my office, and if you can refresh my memory, I would be perfectly happy to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a letter written by Mr. Hugh Borton to Mr. Victor Lasky of the New York World Telegram, under date of September 14, on the letterhead of Columbia University in the city of New York, dated September 14, 1950.

In answer to your inquiry of September 13, I am glad to have this opportunity of explaining the circumstances of my appearance at a rally of the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy on January 24, 1946. An invitation had been received in the Department some weeks earlier for a speaker at the meeting to speak on our policy toward Japan. My immediate superior in the Department, Mr. John Carter Vincent, was unable to go and referred the matter to me, suggesting that I make the speech. None of us in the Department were aware at that time that the committee was described as a Communist-front organization. It was with considerable embarrassment that upon arrival in New York upon the evening of the 24th I found that the Department was being accused of sending a speaker to a rally of a Communist-front organization. So far as I can remember, we were not aware in the Department that Mr. Roth was to be on the program. The speech which I gave on Japanese policy was cleared by the Department prior to my giving it in New York.

After my return to Washington, the Department was naturally upset over the matter, but it was too late to rectify the situation. As a result of the newspaper articles on the matter, it was read into the Congressional Record. The Department felt, therefore, that a further investigation of me was necessary. I was reinvestigated by the Department's security officers. I was not aware of this until after the investigation was over, as the Department did not take any action in reference to my position, because of the incident.

Hoping that this answers your questions and if not, you will communicate with me further, I am,

Sincerely yours,

HUGH BORTON.

Does that refresh your recollection in any way?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid it doesn't. That incident is completely out of my mind. It does to the extent that such an incident must have arisen. But Borton's letter——

Senator FERGUSON. January 24, 1946, you were there?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I was Director of the Far Eastern Office.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings up the same question I asked you this morning, about your Security Branch, whether or not there were any questions raised about Communist fronts or espionage or espionage agents, around the Department.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, as I say, I had no knowledge that this was a Communist-front organization or that there was an investigation going on of Mr. Borton.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was at the very least a teapot tempest at the time, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I should have remembered it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether anyone else in the State Department contributed to Mr. Service's defense fund?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall anybody else. I have mentioned Mr. Gauss, but he was outside the State Department at that time, Ambassador Gauss.

As to the others, I don't recall who may have contributed.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that there was a solicitation in the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. In the Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I recall there was something in the Foreign Service Journal about sending money to Jack Service.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, even the Foreign Service Journal——

Mr. VINCENT. Somebody wrote a letter in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Suggesting contributions from people in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Foreign Service officers.

Senator FERGUSON. And at that time there was an investigation of Mr. Service in relation to removing papers?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And Mr. Service now has been removed from his service in the Department; and I think, while the document will speak for itself, it shows that it was on account of giving unauthorized papers out in the Amerasia case.

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you that I have not read it, have not read the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I see. You do not know why he was removed, then?

Mr. VINCENT. I think he was removed for just the reasons you do.

Senator FERGUSON. For giving these papers; is that not right?

Mr. VINCENT. The ruling of the Loyalty Review Board that there was a reasonable doubt. And they based that as I understand it, on the Amerasia case.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you know that there was also a solicitation of funds in the State Department when Mr. Hiss was accused?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. And that certain donations were made by people in the State Department and other branches of the executive branch of tthe Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I was never solicited. I was in Switzerland. But I did not know there was any solicitation.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your security branch very active, to your knowledge?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it was active. I had no knowledge of its activities. It operated as a distinct branch in the State Department and carried on its activities without my knowledge, which I think would be the appropriate way for them to do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Had it ever struck your mind while you were in the Department that there may be Communist agents at least trying to get things out of the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. When you ask whether it ever struck my mind, yes. It is a reasonable question to ask. But I don't recall, myself, being conscious of the fact that there were or that there was a need for it. That was the Security Division's job.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the Security Division's job. Well, they didn't have a man in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. And it now turns out that Mr. Roth, who was connected with the Amerasia case, was coming into your Department to see Mr. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. But it never struck you that you would give it any care, about agents being around trying to get information?

Mr. VINCENT. I had no reason at that time to suspect Roth.

Senator FERGUSON. To even think about the matter. That is what I am getting at.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not think in terms of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other cases where they raised money in the State Department or put it in the Foreign Service Journal, to contribute to some one that was accused of a very serious matter like the removing of papers or information from the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. No, Senator, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything in the Journal about the Alger Hiss case?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You may take the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your testimony is that you recall nothing about any investigation of Mr. Borton in connection with attending this rally?

Mr. VINCENT. My testimony is that, sir. Until it was brought to my attention. I do now say that the instance is one that I was certainly conscious of at that time. You asked me now whether I could recall it, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can recall now that there was some measure of furor in the Department about this matter?

Mr. VINCENT. I can, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the question of the newspaper report of it, Mr. Chairman, I have an article which appeared in the New York World-Telegram of the 23d of January 1946, headed "State Department sending speaker to pink rally."

I ask that that be inserted in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 394," and is as follows:)

[New York World-Telegram, January 23, 1946, p. 1]

STATE DEPARTMENT SENDING SPEAKER TO PINK RALLY

(By Frederick Woltman, World-Telegram Staff Writer)

Possibly its right hand isn't aware of what its left hand is doing. Or maybe the State Department just thrives on punishment.

At any rate, the State Department is sending an official representative, Dr. Hugh Borton, to address a "Rally for a Democratic Japan" in Manhattan Center tomorrow night, where its policies are sure to be lambasted.

A cospeaker with him on the platform will be Andrew Roth, former lieutenant in Navy intelligence now awaiting trial in Washington on a Federal indictment charging him with conspiracy to take confidential Government military records. Mr. Roth was relieved of active duty last year following an FBI investigation instigated by the State Department itself.

The rally is being staged by the Japanese-American Committee for Democracy, which lately has been active in promoting the Japanese Communist movement, demanding the immediate recall of all American troops in China and assailing what it terms our undemocratic foreign policies in Asia.

The committee, which was started 3 years ago by loyal Japanese-Americans, has become heavily larded with Communist influence. Its advisers include such well-known Communists or fellow-travelers as Lewis Merrill, president of the CIO United Office and Professional Workers, Michael Obermeir, Katherine Terrill, Abner Green, and Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.

Its announcements list Dr. Borton, former teacher of Japanese at Columbia University, as representing the United States State Department.

In addition to five speakers, including Dr. Borton and Mr. Roth, there will be an added feature, a dramatized narration by Canada Lee, the actor. Mr. Lee's latest appearance was January 15, when he was given star billing in a Madison Square

Garden Lenin memorial meeting run by the New York State Committee of the Communist party.

The main speaker will be Representative John M. Coffee, Democrat, of Washington, who, with one or two exceptions, has managed to get his name on a greater number of Communist fronts than any Member of Congress.

Last summer he joined three other Representatives with the avowed aim of putting pressure on the State Department for a more pro-Soviet stand. This time, according to the JACD's announcement, Representative Coffee will take up the problems of the Indonesians, the Annamese, the people of India, Japan and China.

REGULAR TICKET OUTLET

To distribute tickets for the rally, the committee has chosen the regular bookshops which the Communists always use as outlets for their literature and ticket agencies for their affairs. These are the Worker's Bookshop at the party's headquarters, 50 East Thirteenth Street, the Jefferson Book Store of the party's Jefferson School, the Forty-fourth Street Book Fair and the Guild Book Center.

In its bimonthly News Letter, the JACD is strongly anti-Chiang Kai-shek and favors the Communist regime in China. Last November it protested to President Truman against the State Department's role in China as "in ugly contradiction between our stated policies and our actions."

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold in my hand a copy of the program for this rally, or what purports to be a copy of the program for this rally.

I will ask Mr. Mandel: Is that a photostat of the program for the rally in question?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of the announcement of the rally.

Mr. SOURWINE. I stand corrected. A photostat of the announcement for the rally. The second page says: "Program" and indicates that Dr. Hugh Borton, of the State Department was No. 3 on the program and the first speaker, that Andrew Roth, author of Dilemma in Japan, was No. 5 on the program and the second speaker; the space between them, No. 4 on the program being a soprano who was to give two selections. On the next page, endorsers include Israel Epstein, Michael Obermeir, and Max Yergan, among others. There is also a statement bearing beneath it the facsimile signature of Harold L. Ickes, saying:

There are those in Japan who are struggling to achieve a democratic type of government in place of the military tyranny which plunged the nation into war and led it down the path to defeat. It is deeply encouraging to me that many Japanese-Americans are anxious to further this movement to foster the growth of freedom in Japan. This "Rally for Democratic Japan" can be important in bringing about a better understanding between our countries, and in encouraging Japan on her new road. I send you my greetings and my hope that you will carry forward the ideal for which our soldiers fought and died, a world in which all people will live in freedom and without fear.

I don't offer that for the record, but on the basis of all of this there is no question in your mind, Mr. Vincent, that there was such a rally?

Mr. VINCENT. Now that you refresh my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or that Mr. Borton spoke?

Mr. VINCENT. That Mr. Borton spoke.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any question in your mind that he was subsequently investigated by the State Department, whether it was a thorough investigation or just a gesture that there was an investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any knowledge of that. You would have to ask the Security Division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Borton in your Division?

Mr. VINCENT. He was in the far-eastern office; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there had been an investigation of him at the time, would you have known about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not think I would have. Not necessarily. The Security Division procedures were not known to me. They carried out their investigations.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advise anyone in the Department at that time that you had suggested to Mr. Borton that he make the speech?

Mr. VINCENT. As I say, I can't recall the instance. I don't recall whether I told anybody I advised him to make the speech.

Senator FERGUSON. If there has been an investigation of this matter—and you assume here this morning that Mr. Borton was right, that you had received the invitation, and you could not go, and you had in effect obtained him as the speaker.

Mr. VINCENT. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. Should not that investigation have included what you knew about it, that you had the invitation? Why did you not know that this was a pink organization? And why did you ask one of the men under you to go and make this speech? Would not any kind of an investigation have included that?

Mr. VINCENT. Senator, you will have to get security people here to testify.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking about security. I am asking your opinion as a Foreign Service officer. Should not any investigation have included that much at least?

Mr. VINCENT. An inquiry?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; as to what you knew about it.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; it should have.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you were the man who had the invitation. You were the man who handed it over to Borton.

Now, could there have been an investigation without at least doing that much?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I can't testify on that, to say whether it should or shouldn't. The Security Division operated on its own.

Senator FERGUSON. What you are saying about the Security Division leaves this committee, as far as I am concerned, in the position that it certainly must conclude that Division was not functioning, when it would not make an investigation of this matter and at least ask you some very critical and personal questions. I cannot understand it. Can you understand it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have not testified that they did not ask me. I have no recollection of their asking me any questions.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot understand a man's memory on an important matter like that failing him. I do not understand your telling me that you cannot remember if they did. You would not say they did not. You would not say they did. Now, if you were questioned about sending a speaker to a pink organization, do you not think that you would remember it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I do not remember it. To ask me whether I think I would remember it or not is another question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, in justice to the witness, I think perhaps it should be pointed out that the only evidence we have that there was an investigation is a statement by Mr. Borton in a letter which is not under oath.

Senator FERGUSON. I am certainly trying to be fair to the witness. Borton wrote to the paper and said there was an investigation. And I think it is even worse for the State Department if there was not an investigation at all. I was giving them the benefit of the doubt, that they did conduct some kind of an examination.

If it turns out that they did not, I think it is even worse for the State Department and the Security Branch of it.

Do you not also?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, there was an investigation, according to Mr. Borton.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think there was, now?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no reason to doubt that there was one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in February 1946, attend a luncheon given by the American Council of the IPR in honor of Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, I think the record ought to be clear that any investigation that the State Department has made on the question of loyalty or communism is not available to this committee. We are helpless along that line.

Mr. VINCENT. It is not available to me, either, Senator.

You asked about a luncheon?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Did you, in February of 1946, attend a luncheon given by the American Council of IPR in honor of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I am afraid I have to testify again that I don't recall the luncheon. But I went to many luncheons, and I could easily have gone to this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not recall such a luncheon on February 21, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, no. There were many luncheons I don't recall, and I don't recall the occasion of this one.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many luncheons honoring Owen Lattimore have you ever attended?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not talking about honoring Owen Lattimore. I am just thinking of the luncheons one attends, and I don't recall this.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is your good friend, is he not? He is your longtime friend?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had attended a luncheon in his honor, do you not think you would have remembered it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not necessarily. I don't see why I should remember now, in 1952, a luncheon in honor of Lattimore. Whether I did or didn't is a matter——

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether you ever have attended any luncheons in honor of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall any luncheons in honor of Owen Lattimore, but I could easily have attended a luncheon in honor of Owen Lattimore, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean to be unduly repetitious. I am trying to help your memory on this. Do you remember a luncheon of that nature at which Mr. William L. Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations acted as chairman?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the luncheon?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember such a luncheon in the pan-American room of the Mayflower Hotel?

Mr. VINCENT. Now you have broadened my memory; yes. Because I was just in the Mayflower yesterday, and I, myself, was trying to recall the last occasion I was there, in the pan-American room.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember ever having been in the pan-American room of the Mayflower Hotel at a luncheon honoring Owen Lattimore?

Mr. VINCENT. When you say "honoring Owen Lattimore," I don't recall that it was honoring Owen Lattimore, but it may have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having been there in 1946 at a luncheon given by the IPR Council?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't remember the date, but I do know that on some occasion I was there in that Pan American room. I would be perfectly willing to tell you, "Yes, I have been there." But I am trying to tell you I don't recall the circumstances of the luncheon, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an appointment book? Do you keep an appointment book?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not keep an appointment book. When I am working in the office, I have a pad on my desk.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not keep a diary?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever kept one?

Mr. VINCENT. Not for many years. I kept one when I first went to China; in 1924.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you do not yourself remember attending this luncheon, it would be useless to ask you about any of the other officials of the Department who might have joined you at that time in paying tribute to Owen Lattimore, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, on or about February 23, write a letter under that date, to Mr. Edward Carter, executive vice chairman of the American Council of the IPR, advising him that you did not feel you could accept nomination for a second term as a member of the board of trustees of the American Council of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that I had no recollection of the particular method by which I ceased to be a member of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. I show you a photostat of a letter, and I ask you if it refreshes your recollection.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a letter which you wrote to Mr. E. C. Carter?

Mr. VINCENT. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have just read that letter. Did you in that letter state that it was your belief that it would not be to the best interests of the American Council to have on its board of trustees two official members from the same office in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the other official member from the same office in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. Abbott Moffat, who was mentioned there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter, of which I have a photostat, be placed in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 395" and is as follows):

EXHIBIT No. 395

Address Official Communications to the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 23, 1946.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Executive Vice Chairman, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I understand that my office has gotten in touch with your IPR office here in regard to my nomination for the Board of Directors of the American Council, but I shall confirm what I asked them to tell your office here.

I appreciate very much the nomination for a second term but feel that, in as much as Abbot Moffat has also been nominated and has been advised by me to accept the nomination, I should decline the nomination. I do this because of my belief that it would not be to the best interests of the American Council to have on its Board of Directors two official members from the same office in the State Department. I shall of course continue to follow with interest the work of the Council.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John Carter Vincent
JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in that letter, state that you would, of course, continue to follow with great interest the work of the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I think I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in fact, continue to follow that work with great interest?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not say I followed it with great interest; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you on or about April 1, 1946, asked to lend your name and support to a membership appeal by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't recall such an appeal.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in fact lend your name and support in the spring of 1946 to a membership appeal by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. VINCENT. Since I say I don't recall I was asking, I don't recall lending my name to it; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or the Washington advisory committee of IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Mandel what is that a photostat of?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a document headed "Meeting of Washington IPR advisory committee at the Lattimores' home, March 25, 1946," from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this the second page of that photostat, of the same document?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that these, as identified, may go in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 396" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 396

Meeting of Washington IPR Advisory Committee at the Lattimores' home, March 25, 1946

Present: Mr. and Mrs. Robert Barnett, Edward C. Carter, Mrs. Lilian Coville, Mrs. Shirley Jenkins, Mr. and Mrs. William Johnstone, Mr. and Mrs. Mortimer S. Graves, Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore, Abbott Low Moffat, Catherine Porter, Mrs. Elizabeth Ussachevsky, Mr. Pollard.

Main points discussed during the evening were:

1. A definite campaign should be developed to point up and increase the quality of the Washington program in order to—

(*a*) Bring in new members to increase the Washington total to approximately 500.

It was felt that many Government workers in the Far East field would join in response to a form letter or a personal request. The letter should indicate specifically what IPR has to offer this special group: inter alia, periodic publications and a list of books which are subject to members' discount.

Chairman of international relations committees of clubs and organizations, and members of local college and university faculties, could also be circularized.

We should consider a form of membership for people who could pay between $10 and $100 annually.

(*b*) Strive for income and a budget of from $15,000 (Johnstone) to $25,000 (Carter).

2. In order to get the funds needed for a full-scale program in Washington, it was suggested that—

(*a*) Several first-class programs be built around headliners and headline topics, such as:

Harold Ickes (or Abe Fortas), plus a Navy official (or Senator Hart) and Sir Carl Berendsen, to discuss Pacific Island bases. Invite, along with regular members, a selected group of prospective Supporting Members. (A possible alternative to an Ickes meeting would be to have a half dozen former Navy officers discuss the question, men who have seen service in the Pacific and are full of ideas. Miss Cora Du Bois at ORI or Miss Clare Holt could suggest people for this program.) John Usene and Lowell Hattery were mentioned, along with James Roosevelt.

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, perhaps on some phase of the colonial question. (E. C. Carter to invite by cable after Eleanor Lattimore consults John Carter Vincent.)

Clarence-Gauss on China; Benjamin Gerig on trusteeships; Clarence Ropes on the Soviet Far East.

Other speakers under (*a*), or under (*b*) following, might include: on Japan—Gen. Ken R. Dyke, John Emmerson, or John Embree (May); on China—Michael Lindsey or Edwin A. Locke; on Mongolia—Mr. Cammon (ask through George Harris); on Thailand—Kenneth Landon or Howard Palmer (May).

(*b*) Invitation luncheons (pay as you come) be arranged on other occasions if A–1 speakers and topics can be provided. Invited groups would include leading editors, writers, and radio and news commentators. Purpose: Attract new members from this group and strengthen IPR's "good press."

(*c*) New literature to be prepared, usable in Washington and other IPR centers, to help pave the way for showing membership prospects how IPR can serve them as it served the Government and regular members during and before the war.

3. That the whole financial and membership campaign be integrated by and be made the responsibility of Mr. Pollard, with the immediate help of a List Committee (Mrs. Bolton, Mr. and Mrs. Graves, Mrs. Lattimore, Mr. Moffat, Mrs. Moorhead, Mrs. Ussachevsky) and a Program Committee (Mr. Barnett, Mr. W. D. Carter, Mr. Johnstone, and Mrs. Lattimore).

4. That top sponsorship be provided by inviting Mr. Sumner Welles to be chairman of the Washington membership appeal; and that other leading foreign-affairs personnel, in and out of the Government, be asked to lend their names and support also.

A few such might include:

Frances P. Bolton
Marquis Childs
Helen Gahagan Douglas
Herbert Feis
Walter Lippmann
Eugene Meyer
Raymond Swing
Elbert D. Thomas
John Carter Vincent
Henry A. Wallace

Mr. SOURWINE. Because of the desire to conclude today, instead of laboring this point, I simply leave it as a part of the record. (Handing document to witness.)

(After pause, witness and counsel reading document.)

It seems that we gain nothing this way. We might as well read it.

Senator FERGUSON. It is pretty long. Let them read it. I think we can save time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps counsel can read it.

Now, do you remember whether you knew, or do you now know, Mr. Arthur C. Bunce, B-u-n-c-e?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified, I think, when you asked me—you helped my memory—that he was the economic man sent to Korea about the 1st of January, some time in 1946. I don't recall the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember an article or dispatch transmitted from Mr. Bunce in his capacity as economic adviser criticizing both the military government and United States policy in Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a copy of that dispatch requested by Mr. Philip Lilienthal?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Requested by anyone connected with IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a copy furnished pursuant to such a request?

Mr. VINCENT. I cannot testify, since I don't know about the incident.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in the habit of furnishing information to Mr. Lilienthal?

Mr. VINCENT. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. To others in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have already discussed Mr. Penfield, have you not?

Mr. VINCENT. James K. Penfield; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask Mr. Mandel what this is a photostat of.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations of a letter dated September 3, 1946, to Mr. Philip E. Lilienthal from Arthur C. Bunce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter, as identified, may go into the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 397" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 397

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADVISER,
September 3, 1946.

Mr. PHILIP E. LILIENTHAL,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LILIENTHAL: Your two letters of June 13 and June 22 were waiting for me when I returned from a brief trip back to Washington. If I had visited New York, I was planned to call on you; however, I did not have much time because I was recruiting civilians for Military Government in Korea and also for my staff.

When my staff arrives, I may find time to write an article for you dealing more narrowly with economic matters. At present, I am too rushed trying to catch up with affairs occurring in my absence. The reason that my article was not

acceptable for publication was that it criticized both Military Governments and United States policy as well as U. S. S. R. policies and programs. This was not felt to be desirable under the hope that the Joint Commission might reconvene. The article was sent to the Department as a despatch, however, and Mr. Vincent or Mr. Penfield might send you a copy for your own information if you asked them.

In reply to your letter of August 20, I believe I can help you considerably. There is a large amount of unclassified material available in the War Department and in the State Department. This material covers the monthly reports from Military Government, all press releases, translations of Korea press comments and reports on public opinion trends. I am sure these could be made available to anyone making a study of Korea.

A complete set of all unclassified materials has been sent to the Hoover Library of War Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, and you should contact Dr. H. H. Fisher regarding the use of this material. The first lot was shipped August 8 and additional shipments will follow every three months.

From your letter I was not sure whether you wanted materials available in the United States or in England. I have spoken to Mr. Carmode, the British Liaison Officer, and he tells me that he has not been forwarding materials in bulk to London. It would, therefore, appear essential for the study to be made in the United States unless the Royal Institute asked Mr. Carmode through the Foreign Office to supply them with a complete set of documents.

Mr. Sunages of the Public Information Division in the War Department is coming to Korea to see what further materials can be sent back to Washington in order that they may do a better job of informing the public about Korean affairs. I will show him your letter and ask him to do what he can to make materials available to you.

In addition, I am asking that the Institute be placed on the mailing list for current materials and that any available back issues be forwarded to you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Arthur C. Bunce
ARTHUR C. BUNCE, *Economic Adviser.*

Mr. SOURWINE. You have had a number of questions about Solomon Adler. I don't think you have been asked this question in just this way.

Do you now or did you ever know that he was a member of the Silvermaster spy group?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You took over from Mr. Dooman as head of the Far East Committee of SWNCC on the 1st of September, 1945; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the first time I acted as chairman of FE-SWNCC; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who recommended your appointment to that post?

Mr. VINCENT. The Secretary of State or Mr. Acheson; I don't recall which.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified you were called back from a vacation to take that job.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that Mr. Acheson was the first one to speak to you about it?

Mr. VINCENT. About the change.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am hurrying along here, and if I seem to give inadequate treatment to any of these, please stop me and expand as you think desirable.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in the fall of 1946, prepare or supervise the preparation of a draft statement designed to be issued in case General Marshall should admit failure of his efforts to stop the civil war in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. It was drafted in my office.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you anticipate he was going to fail?

Mr. VINCENT. In the fall of 1946, I did anticipate it, and others did, too.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after he had been out there did you anticipate that he was going to fail?

Mr. VINCENT. Some time during the summer or early autumn of 1946, I was afraid it was going to be a matter of failure, although I wouldn't want to say now that he was conscious he couldn't pull it out. But it looked like that then.

Senator FERGUSON. And he had been there how long then?

Mr. VINCENT. He had been there 9 months then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you present, or were you instrumental in presenting, a draft of such a statement to Secretary Byrnes?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified that it would have been logical for me to present that draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that draft recommend withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refresh my memory. The draft is right here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wish you would, and I wish you would identify the draft, if it is to be found in the white paper, as the one you prepared.

Mr. VINCENT. It was prepared, as I say, in the Far Eastern Office, but in consultation, as my testimony was before, with Army people, with economic people.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking now about a draft you prepared in the fall of 1946, if there was such a draft. Where is it to be found in the White Paper?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, we are talking about the paper here. I have told you before that the thing was a matter of consultation with economic people and covers a wide range of subjects. It is a general review.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, the draft that is in here is not a draft which is identifiable as something which you prepared, is it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't recall how many stages.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you identify that document in the white paper as the one that you prepared?

Mr. VINCENT. I can identify it that this was the draft that was prepared. When you speak of "draft," these things go through many drafts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's identify what you have in the white paper first, and then I think we can clear it up with a few questions. What page? Are you talking about document 63 on page 609? No; I am in error. Which one are you talking about?

Mr. VINCENT. I am talking about the document of December 18, 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where does it appear?

Mr. VINCENT. It appears on page 689.

Mr. SOURWINE. Document No. 114 in the white paper, a statement by President Truman on United States policy toward China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is its date?

Mr. SOURWINE. December 18, 1946.

Is that the one you are referring to?

Mr. VINCENT. That is the one I am referring to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, to what extent is that the outgrowth of fruition of any memorandum which you prepared in the fall of 1946, or any draft which you prepared in the fall of 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. I have testified several times that the draft was a composite thing that was prepared. I don't know just what would be the fruition of drafts that were prepared and finally approved.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it refresh your memory?

Mr. VINCENT. Does this? Yes. But you are speaking here of the draft that I prepared. What I am trying to get at is that this draft, by its very nature——

Mr. SOURWINE. You did prepare a draft in the fall of 1946, didn't you?

Mr. VINCENT. Of this?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, no.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall that I personally prepared a draft. It was a composite——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you personally, in the fall of 1946, as early as October or earlier, prepare or supervise the preparation of a draft statement designed to be issued in case General Marshall should admit failure of his effort to end the civil war in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall preparing the draft myself, but, yes, there was a draft prepared, in anticipation of this very thing that came out.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I was trying to get at. There was a draft prepared that early?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it was in your office?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you helped on it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no doubt I helped on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did that draft subsequently become the document you have identified, document 114 from the white paper?

Mr. VINCENT. It became, in substance, the document here in the white paper, so far as I can recall. You are speaking of a draft now that was prepared in anticipation of this, and this was the thing that was prepared at the time we realized Marshall was coming home.

Mr. SOURWINE. We realize that the draft prepared in your division in October may have been thrown in the wastebasket, and this substituted. Did that happen?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the draft prepared in your office in fact disapproved, rejected?

Senator FERGUSON. Or approved?

Mr. VINCENT. It may have gone through other drafts, and other drafts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the initial draft rejected? Or was it sent back for correction? Or did it go along up?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall the exact process of what happened to the drafts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Look at that document. Is that the substance of your draft? So that we can move along.

Mr. VINCENT. It is the result of the thinking that was done in the Department, in the War Department, and in the Economic Division,

as to what should be done. This is the result of the thinking. What form some of the earlier drafts took, I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the point I was getting at. This original draft, the first one submitted, back in October, prepared in your office under your direction; was that a draft which included a recommendation for withdrawal of all aid to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know, without seeing the document, whether it recommended that or not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can't say whether that was recommended?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you can't say whether that initial draft statement was in fact approved?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether that original draft statement was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The whole drafting business was a matter of give and take.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the draft of President Truman's letter to Chiang in August of 1946? That is on page 652 in the White Paper, Document No. 86.

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly think that I participated in the drafting of that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you approve it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was referred to in the fifth paragraph of that letter as the assassinations of distinguished Chinese Liberals at Kunming recently?

Mr. VINCENT. It referred to an incident in Kunming at that time where certain Chinese Liberals and intellectuals had been removed and killed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who were the intellectuals and liberals who were killed, assassinated?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have to refer to the files in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of them Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. That I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time whether any of them were Communists?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not know at the time whether any of them were Communists, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was a pretty tough letter, wasn't it?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know whether you would describe it as tough or not. It was drafted with the idea in mind of great disappointment over the failure or the apparent failure of General Marshall to achieve his objectives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Look at the sixth paragraph, where it says:

> There is a increasing awareness, however, that the hopes of the people of China are being thwarted by militarists and a small group of political reactionaries who are obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation by failure to understand the liberal trend of the times.

What persons or groups were referred to there?

Mr. VINCENT. What particular militarists were referred to I don't know. It would probably be such people as among the other groups; what we called the Chen Li-fu clique.

It would have been, we will say, Gen. Hoy Lee Chin.

I am just speaking from memory now of what groups we had in mind there. They probably had figured in General Marshall's reports back of his mission and would be the groups that he himself had indicated to us in his telegrams he thought were interfering.

Mr. SOURWINE. It refers to a small group of political reactionaries. Do you know who they were?

Mr. VINCENT. I just referred to some of them as, we will say, the Chen Li-fu group. I can't identify any others at the moment; but it would have been groups. Because, mind you, this is all based on General Marshall's own attitude and own thought of what was happening to his mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think there would have been any possibility that the Chinese Government construed this language as an intimation that the President of the United States regarded Chiang and his immediate surrounders as a small group of political reactionaries obstructing the advancement of the general good of the nation?

Mr. VINCENT. It could be so construed without the inclusion of Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it so intended?

Mr. VINCENT. It was so intended to indicate that there were small groups.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it intended to indicate to him that his government was being criticized by this sentence?

Mr. VINCENT. It was. And, as I say, based upon the disappointment of the failure of not accomplishing the objective.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a similar letter written to the head of the Communists criticizing them for not cooperating?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not think so, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Look at the last paragraph:

> It cannot be expected that American opinion will continue in its generous attitude toward your nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems. Furthermore, it will be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the people of America.

How do you interpret that statement, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. I interpret that statement to mean it is critical of the failure for them to get along, that Chiang Kai-shek, at that time, according to General Marshall's report, was himself, or his Government, responsible for the breakdown of the truce negotiations.

The truce negotiations had broken down, and it was the general feeling of Marshall and the rest of us that the responsibility for the reopening of the civil war at that time was with the National Government, more than it was with the——

Mr. SOURWINE. The President is saying there, is he not, "I hold you and your Government responsible for the failure to effect an agreement with the Communists and if the agreement is not effected pretty quick, I am going to tell the American people that that is the fact."

Mr. VINCENT. That was that the American people would have to know the facts, and which finally was drawn up in the September 18 memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Arthur Behrstock?

Mr. VINCENT. Arthur who?

Mr. SOURWINE. Behrstock, B-e-h-r-s-t-o-c-k.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir, not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. A former chief of the Planning Section, Civil Information and Education, Tokyo.

Mr. VINCENT. I have no recollection of knowing him.

Mr. SOURWINE. He never worked with you at any time?

Mr. VINCENT. Not at any time that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making an address at Cornell University on or about January 21, 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is the approximate time I made it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in the course of that address, state that it would be advantageous for our defense to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I made that speech from notes, and I think I have testified that I do not recall what I said in that speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have here a clipping of an Associated Press dispatch date-lined Ithaca, N. Y., January 22, and reading:

> John C. Vincent, head of the State Department Far Eastern Division, declared tonight that the United States should avoid relying on a preservation of the status quo in China and other areas.
>
> In an address at Cornell University, Mr. Vincent said, "We should use strength for our security on short-term expedience. There will be times" he said, "When in the short view it will seem advantageous for our defense to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo. Such a course," he added, "might prove short-sighted because it would fail to encourage progressive elements."

Do you think that is a fair report of your speech at Cornell, sir, so far as it goes?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I would say that is a fair report of the speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think you were accurately quoted, to the extent that you were quoted?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I think I was accurately quoted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you, in that speech, advising against throwing the weight of the United States and its influence on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not have China particularly in mind there. That was a generalized statement, and status quo, from my point of view, was economic as well as political.

It had to do with the areas of southwest Asia, where the colonial areas are, there. It was just a general philosophical approach to the problem that a continuation of the status quo, in the sense of not having progress, which is very clear there, was not good for the defense of the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you include China in your thinking in that connection?

Mr. VINCENT. The idea was directed primarily on the idea of Southeast Asia. But the status quo in China would have possibly had the same connotations there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it clear in your own mind that you did not intend to advocate that we should not throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo in China?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it depends on what you speak of as the status quo.

Mr. SOURWINE. The status quo was Chiang, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. We recognized the Government of Chiang Kai-shek, but we were at that time still working, or Marshall had gone there

with the very idea of assisting the Chinese in working out a coalition government, after adopting a constitution.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to argue with you. I am simply trying to find out whether you included China in your advice there, with regard to our not supporting the status quo, or whether it was clear in your own mind that you did not include China?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not include the National Government of China as something that was to be overthrown, if that is your implication. But certainly our own policy at that time was to assist the Chinese in bringing about a more progressive situation, both in the economic as well as in the political field, to adopt a constitution.

Mr. SOURWINE. Excuse me, sir.

Mr. VINCENT. Go ahead, I am through.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making a speech before a luncheon session of the thirty-third annual foreign trade commission on November 12, 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. National Foreign Trade Council?

Mr. SOURWINE. The Annual Foreign Trade Convention, I believe.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I know the speech you have in mind. It is the one on November 12?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I remember making a speech.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember in that speech stating:

> What is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital. It is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles, where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war exists, where tendencies toward government monopolization exclude American business, or where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I am just reading it here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. That was at a luncheon meeting at which Ambassador Wellington Koo was present, is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Ambassador Wellington Koo, as I recall it, also spoke.

Mr. SOURWINE. He followed you, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. Whether he came first or I came first, I think he was the main speaker.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you happen to have there the text of that address?

Mr. VINCENT. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you offer it for the record?

Mr. VINCENT. I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want that copy back?

Mr. VINCENT. Not particularly. I can get plenty more of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 397A," and is as follows:)

AMERICAN BUSINESS WITH THE FAR EAST

(Address by Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, before the Thirty-third Convention of the National Foreign Trade Council, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, Tuesday, November 12, 1946, at 2:00 p. m., E. S. T.)

American business with the Far East began 162 years ago. The *Empress of China*, out of New York, put into Canton on August 30, 1784, after making a tortuous six-month voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The vessel's cargo,

made up of furs, cotton, lead, and ginseng, was exchanged at Canton for tea, silk, and chinaware. The total investment in the venture was $120,000. The promoters cleared $30,000. This was good business; it was private enterprise; and it was mutually beneficial. I hasten to say here that I do not actually know how much the Chinese made out of the furs, cotton, lead, and ginseng, but having had some knowledge of Chinese businessmen, I still think I am safe in saying that the benefit was mutual.

In the course of the 19th century American business with the Far East expanded. Gradually our trade extended to other portions of the Far East: Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Siam, and adjoining areas of Southeast Asia. Throughout this period American trade with the Far East was based on sound business considerations. We asked for no concessions or special rights; nor were our business dealings based upon exploitation associated with political privilege or pressure.

During the 19th century the basic factor in our close ties with the Far East was trade. Our early treaties with China and Japan were framed largely with American business in mind. After the Spanish-American War and our assumption of territorial responsibilities in the Pacific, notably in the Philippines, political and strategic factors gained weight, but on into the 20th century commercial and cultural considerations were still to the fore in shaping our policies toward the Far East. Our enunciation of the Open Door and our insistence on nondiscriminatory and most-favored-nation treatment were motivated largely by a desire to promote American business and expand international trade relations.

In his radio address last month Secretary Byrnes gave voice to traditional American trade policy in the following words:

"The United States has never claimed the right to dictate to other countries how they should manage their own trade and commerce. We have simply urged in the interest of all peoples that no country should make trade discriminations in its relations with other countries."

By 1936 our foreign trade or business with the Far East was valued at close to one billion dollars. In the 20-year period from 1915–35 the Far East's share of our total exports increased from 5 percent to 16 percent. In 1936 our total direct investments in the Far East amounted to roughly $335,000,000.

In making this brief sketch, I have in mind a recent tendency toward taking an unbalanced viewpoint of our role in the Far East. Political and military considerations, as important as they are, seem to me to occupy a disproportionate share of present public attention. It is accepted that an all-important objective of our policies is to provide for the security of the United States and the maintenance of international peace, but I think we also have another objective of equal importance; that is, to bring about in the relations between ourselves and other states mutually beneficial commercial and cultural exchanges which will promote international welfare and understanding.

These are interrelated objectives. I feel strongly that we cannot be successful in achieving the kind of security we want, or in maintaining the kind of peace we want, unless we take an active and leading part in international commercial and cultural life. I will go further and say that a strong element in our security, and in the maintenance of peace, will be the development of commercial and cultural ties with other peoples.

At the same time, it is my conviction that a strong national defense is essential to the pursuit of our broader objective of developing commercial and cultural relations. We must be equal to the task of encouraging and supporting democracy and progress. There may be times and occasions when, in the short view, it will seem advantageous to our security to throw our weight or influence on the side of the status quo; on the side of those forces calculated to bring about immediate or early stability. But history, I believe, will show that strength lies on the side of progress.

In Chicago last April the President said:

"In the Far East, as elsewhere, we shall encourage the growth and the spread of democracy and civil liberties. * * * The roots of democracy, however, will not draw much nourishment in any nation from a soil of poverty and economic distress. It is a part of our strategy of peace, therefore, to assist in the rehabilitation and development of the Far Eastern countries."

Today we are faced with the problem of a return of American business to the Far East under conditions which are, to state it mildly, uninviting. Japan is a defeated country whose economy must perforce remain under Allied control for some time to come. Korea is a liberated country split in half at parallel 38 between us and the Russians. In China internal strife seriously retards steps

toward economic recovery. In the independent Philippine Republic we are faced with a new situation, to which we must adjust ourselves. In Indochina and Indonesia a return to normal trade conditions awaits a solution of problems presented by the self-governing aspirations of the peoples in those countries. In Siam—well, Siamese in Washington tell me that they will be glad to do business with any or all of you who will show an interest in their country.

But the over-all picture is not encouraging and it is not my intention to dress it up in attractive colors. In the brief time allotted me I want to say something of what we are doing in the various areas of the Far East to brighten the outlook.

General MacArthur has demilitarized Japan, but it is impossible to proceed with plans for postwar Japanese economy until some decision is reached with regard to the amount and types of industry that Japan will be allowed to retain and the amount that is subject to removal as reparations. We have reason to hope that a decision on the problem of reparations will be reached before the end of this year. Our main purpose shall be to achieve a healthy balance in Far Eastern economy for the benefit of commerce in the Far East and at the same time to insure the effective industrial disarmament of Japan.

As you know, Japanese overseas trade is controlled on a government-to-government basis. An Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan was recently established by the Far Eastern Commission at the request of the United States. Its purpose is to advise on the disposition of Japanese exports and on sources of imports.

Among the present obstacles to a change-over to private trading are in inflated and unstable currency and the inadequacy of transport and communications facilities. Although it is not possible to say how soon these obstacles can be overcome, I might hazard the guess that a resumption of private trade with Japan will be possible some time during the latter half of next year, possibly sooner.

In Korea, we are now estopped from putting into operation an over-all economic plan by the inability of the Russians and ourselves to reach agreement on a unified administration for the country. We want a united Korea and we want to assist the Koreans toward self-government and independence. But while we continue our efforts to bring about a resumption of discussions in the Joint Soviet-American Commission, we cannot mark time. Therefore, we are taking measures to improve economic conditions in southern Korea and to bring Koreans more and more directly into the administration of their country. In doing so, however, we do not lose sight of the fact that a united self-governing Korea is the goal we are determined to achieve.

From what I have said it will be apparent to you why private trading in Korea is not now feasible. But the development of a healthy trade relationship between Korea and Allied nations is our aim, and consideration is now being given to measures which may soon make possible limited trade relations between Korea and private business concerns. We hope that American business will take an active interest in Korea.

Foremost among the problems facing the Philippines is reconstruction. Congress has approved two measures: the Philippine Rehabilitation Act and the Philippine Trade Act of 1946.

The Rehabilitation Act authorizes a grant of $620,000,000 for the payment of war claims of private property holders, for various rehabilitation and training projects, and for purchase of surplus property. In addition, Congress has authorized a loan of $75,000,000 to the Philippine Government to enable it to meet a serious budgetary situation.

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The Philippine Trade Act provides that the Philippines shall continue to enjoy free trade with this country for a period of 8 years, after which a graduated tariff will apply until full duties are levied at the end of 20 years.

We expect to cooperate with the new Republic in meeting the manifold problems facing it as an independent state. It may be anticipated that, with a return to more normal conditions, the Philippines will again represent a substantial and expanding market for American products.

From the standpoint of business, the areas of Southeast Asia have been of interest to the United States primarily as a source of supply for such products as rubber, tin, and petroleum. Because of our large purchases of these items

our prewar trade was in a chronic state of imbalance, our sales in most years being only about one-tenth of our purchases.

You may recall a recent press statement by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. Will Clayton, to the effect that the United States should give greater support to foreign investments of its nationals in strategic minerals that are in short supply. This statement has a special application to the countries of Southeast Asia, and the Far East generally, as sources of supply of a number of strategic and critical materials. Investment along the lines proposed by Mr. Clayton should have the effect of increasing the importation of American materials into the areas concerned.

Last but far from least we have China.

We have signed with China a comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Most-favored-nation treatment is provided for individuals and corporations.

The Treaty is somewhat broader in scope than existing United States commercial treaties in a number of respects. For instance, Article 19 provides for fair and equitable treatment as regards the application of exchange controls and Article 20 embodies certain commitments with regard to monopolies. It is designed to meet the needs of present-day commercial relations with China.

China is expected to collaborate in the establishment of the proposed International Trade Organization and is one of the "nuclear" countries which have agreed to negotiate for the reduction of trade barriers. China will also be urged to enter into other multilateral economic conventions having as their objectives a promotion of international trade and the solution of international commercial problems through consultation and collaboration. Constant effort is being made to discourage other countries, including China, from adopting temporary measures in the fields of tariffs, trade barriers, and other domestic legislation of a type which might jeopardize the successful attainment of this long-range economic collaboration.

Restoration of stability and direction in Chinese economy is retarded by the unhappy politico-military situation. The press, I feel, has made abundantly clear to you the ups and downs of General Marshall's mission. The National Assembly is scheduled to meet in Nanking today for the purpose of considering a constitution and reaching certain political decisions in regard to government organization. General Marshall hopes, and so do we, that wise counsels—the wisdom of China—will prevent the disaster of continued civil discord. Chinese economy and the Chinese people are already suffering acutely from the ravages of 8 years of Japanese aggression and occupation. They cannot stand much more adversity.

Premier Soong has been reported recently as stating that upwards of 80 percent of China's expenditures are diverted to military purposes. Because of the wide gap between revenues and expenditures China has had to resort to large note issues with the inevitable result of accelerating inflation and a progressive rise in prices. The foreign exchange that might normally be expected to accrue from exports has been negligible in the relation to outgo for imports. Consequently China's current balance of payments position has continued to deteriorate.

The exchange and foreign trade regulations adopted by China, UNRRA's relief and rehabilitation program, and surplus sales and enemy property disposals are only temporary palliatives. The Chinese must resolve the present political impasse before any substantial improvement can be expected in China's economic situation.

In this connection I think it worth while to mention what I feel has been in some quarters a misinterpretation of General Marshall's mission as being solely political in its objective. Chinese economy is in a vicious circle. General Marshall is fully aware of this state of affairs and it has been his purpose to encourage the Chinese to break the vicious circle by reaching a political settlement that would result in a cessation of civil strife and make possible a revival of economic activity. Sooner or later this must be done, and be done by the Chinese.

Military measures will not accomplish an enduring settlement. That is why General Marshall has advocated with such persistency settlement by the democratic method of negotiation and agreement.

In making this brief sketch of current conditions in the Far East I cannot be accused of optimism. But I do think the potentialities of an expanding American business with the Far East exist and can be developed if we go about it in the right way. This brings me to a thought which I would like to express and

emphasize. When I use the term "American business" I have in mind all American business irrespective of whether it has a private, semiofficial, or official character. I do not believe that we can have one standard for private business and another standard for official business.

A recent editorial in the New York Times states that our Government should base a loan policy upon the important principle "that loans are not gifts, and that any country applying for a loan must furnish, like any prospective private borrower, convincing proof that by virtue of its political, economic, and trade policies it is a good credit risk."

Generally speaking, what is unsound for private capital is unsound for Government capital; that is, for the taxpayers' money. I believe it is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is wide-spread corruption in business and official circles, where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war exists, where tendencies toward government monopolization exclude American business, or where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling.

In expressing the foregoing views, I do not of course ignore the advantages of cooperation between government finance and private trade or the fact that there are fields for the investment of government capital into which it is not feasible or attractive for private capital to venture. I have in mind large-range and long-term projects, which are basic in character and are fundamentally sound from the standpoint of the economy of the country.

Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden stated some weeks ago in Chicago that "the purpose of lending should be to create a net increment to the economy of a borrowing country. Therefore, he went on to say, "loans should not be made if they enable another government to acquire or displace existing efficient free enterprises, whether they be American in ownership or not."

In stressing the economic and trade features of our position in the Far East, I do not wish to give the impression that I am overlooking other factors. In this complicated world in which we are living we must give full consideration to the interrelation of the political, cultural, economic, and security factors in our foreign policy. For our policy to be effective there must be harmony among all these factors—the teamwork we find in a good basketball team or a fine string quartet.

The President, in establishing the Committee for Financing Foreign Trade, said: "* * * I am anxious that there shall be fullest cooperation between governmental agencies and private industry and finance. Our common aim is return of our foreign commerce and investments to private channels as soon as possible."

I look upon this statement as a recognition of and a challenge to American business. I am in Washington to do my part in carrying out the cooperation of which the President speaks. Please call on me if I can be of help to you in meeting the challenge.

Mr. SOURWINE. In discussing that speech, sir, do you recall that the newspapers regarded that speech, and particularly the portion which I read, as being directed at China?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; some of the newspapers so interpreted it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it so intended?

Mr. VINCENT. It was intended to be a generalized statement which would include China as well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were simply stating, in general, certain truths about policies; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I was stating in general my attitude toward a general situation, which was the conditions under which you wouldn't invest capital.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to take just a few minutes to analyze that statement that I read. You said what is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital; is that right? You may use this [handing document].

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you not think that other factors should enter into government expenditure or investment than the factors which enter into private expenditure or investment?

Mr. VINCENT. I think there was a following statement right after the one you have quoted. Would you repeat your question?

Mr. SOURWINE. You said what is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital; did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I ask you, do you not think that other factors should enter into government expenditure or investment than the factors which enter into private expenditure and investment?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I do. But for a political reason. I am speaking here before a bunch of businessmen on the matter of investment of capital. This is a business meeting I was speaking at, and to my mind, if you will take it as a general statement, it was sound, that the government capital should not go into unsound investment.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were talking about government capital as against private capital?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you said what is unsound for private capital is unsound for government capital?

Mr. VINCENT. I still think that is true, unless there are political objectives to be attained, and then I would not call it investment, I would call it political assistance, such as the loans to Greece and Turkey.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recognize that there might be political considerations that would make a difference?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly do.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, dollars are frequently used as instruments of policy or economic warfare by this country?

Mr. VINCENT. They certainly are.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think we have made investments or loans to countries where, at the time, it was unsound policy to make investments?

Mr. VINCENT. I think we have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it been the policy of the State Department to recommend against such loans or policies in all cases, as a matter of principle?

Mr. VINCENT. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it been the State Department practice or policy to recommend against such loans or advances in all cases, as a matter of principle?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall; no, sir. The State Department, where there is a political objective to be attained—that is what the State Department would do—such as making advances to Greece or Turkey.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, would you not say now, that it is often entirely sound for Government capital to be invested in a place where the investment of private capital would be unsound?

Mr. VINCENT. Not from a businessman's point of view, and here I——

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you speaking up there as a businessman or as an official of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I was speaking to businessmen and trying to lay down what I thought were certain general ideas that would guide the investment of capital on the part of the taxpayer without any political connotations.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think you made that clear in the speech?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you said it is unsound to invest the private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles, is that correct?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that was true?

Mr. VINCENT. I certainly think it was true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want to qualify that statement now in any way? Do you still think it is true?

Mr. VINCENT. That it is unsound to invest——

Mr. SOURWINE. It is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles.

Mr. VINCENT. I think, as a general statement, it is quite true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has the United States ever invested public capital in loans or grants, or in any other form of assistance, in any such country?

Mr. VINCENT. I can't recall where you would make that description of the country.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that, in your opinion, in all of the countries to which the United States has provided military or economic assistance, loans, grants, or otherwise, they were countries where there was no corruption in business or government circles?

Mr. VINCENT. I couldn't say; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, what countries were you referring to?

Mr. VINCENT. I was making a generalized statement about the whole Far East, which would have included China, northeast Asia, Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. And any other countries?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, the Philippines are in the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said it is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What country were you referring to in that?

Mr. VINCENT. I am referring to just a general—I am making a generalized statement, and that would have applied, as you will see earlier in this dispatch, where the Chinese were using at least 80 percent of their entire budget in military expenditures.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you hold to that statement as true, that it is unsound to make public or private investments in countries where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament?

Mr. VINCENT. If you will define the word, and remember I am speaking to businessmen as a matter of investment, and I am trying to make clear that this was a matter of investment of capital rather than the use of capital for political objectives——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you made it clear in the speech?

Mr. VINCENT. Speaking to businessmen, I think they would have accepted it, that I was speaking of investment.

Mr. SOURWINE. What percentage of the total national income may a government spend for armament for the purpose of resisting, or pre-

paring to resist, Communist aggression without reaching the point of wasting its substance on excessive armament?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Sourwine, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. What percentage of its total national income does this Government spend on armament, present and past wars, do you know?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no figure that comes to my mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any idea?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to guess what it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any absolute standard with regard to what is wasting substance on excessive armament, or does it make a difference what the armament is for?

Mr. VINCENT. It would make a considerable difference as to what the armament was for.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider that factor, of what the armament was for, in connection with this speech?

Mr. VINCENT. No. Again, I was speaking of a generalized situation; I was generalizing here. The whole objective of this was, as I say, a speech before an American businessman, laying down certain general principles, and I did not have in mind political objectives or a political situation.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it, just a speech to please these businessmen?

Mr. VINCENT. This speech?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I would like for you to read the whole speech.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you, was that the purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. It was to respond to a group of American businessmen called the National Foreign Trade Council.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you say it to please them?

Mr. VINCENT. Most speeches are made with the idea of pleasing, but it was supposed to give some general ideas that I had.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were speaking on policy as a State Department official, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't call this policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated that it is unsound to invest private or public capital where the threat or fact of civil war exists; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that is a true statement?

Mr. VINCENT. I think it is a true statement, when you consider that you are speaking of investment of capital, private or public.

I am not now speaking of whether you might want to use political loans or other kind of loans that the Government would give.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, this Government does not have a policy of making investments for profit in foreign nations, does it?

Mr. VINCENT. Not for profit, but the Export-Import Bank, for instance, makes advances to countries, which you would call investment.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. For the specific purpose of promoting trade or development projects.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the Export-Import Bank in existence in 1946?

Mr. VINCENT. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And were you referring, then, to the Export-Import Bank when you made this statement?

Mr. VINCENT. Not specifically; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any other agency of the United States Government that invested public funds in a comparable manner?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you could not have been talking of the investment of public funds for profit in the same sense that private funds would be invested when you used the term "investment of public funds," could you?

Mr. VINCENT. Other than, we will say, like the Export-Import Bank would make funds available.

Mr. SOURWINE. The investment of public funds necessarily connotes a public purpose; does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The two are inseparable?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you stated that the investment of public funds is unsound where the threat or fact of civil war exists?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any nations to which the United States Government has extended economic or military aid at a time when the threat or fact of civil war existed in that nation?

Mr. VINCENT. Greece, for instance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yugoslavia?

Mr. VINCENT. But that was an appropriation in Congress, it was not an investment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department recommend against that appropriation?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department recommended for it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it was not an investment?

Mr. VINCENT. It was an investment from the standpoint of investment in policy. But it was not an investment from the standpoint of businessmen's idea of investments.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have stated that in connection with public funds there could not be investments from the businessmen's standpoint?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I said that the Export-Import Bank could make investments, not for profit.

Mr. SOURWINE. But for a public purpose?

Mr. VINCENT. For a public purpose, but governed by sound business principles.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about Yugoslavia?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true. We recently made an investment in Yugoslavia, as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that unsound?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about Korea?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that unsound?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said it was unsound to invest public or private capital where tendencies toward government monopolization excludes American business. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any country today where tendencies toward Government monopolization exclude American business?

Mr. VINCENT. You have just mentioned Yugoslavia. I don't know whether they exclude American business, but I can't imagine American business can get into Yugoslavia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any such tendency in Iran?

Mr. VINCENT. I am not familiar with conditions in Iran.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have we aided Iran?

Mr. VINCENT. We have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any such tendency in Egypt?

Mr. VINCENT. Of Government monopolization?

Mr. SOURWINE. Where tendencies toward Government monopolization exclude American business.

Mr. VINCENT. I am not familiar with conditions in Egypt.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any such tendency in Great Britain?

Mr. VINCENT. Not toward Government monopolization, I shouldn't say. Well, Government monopoly, yes, of the industries.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have aided Egypt, have we not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have aided Great Britain?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said it was unsound to invest public capital where undemocratic concepts of government are controlling. Is that still true?

Mr. VINCENT. You have just mentioned that we have invested money in Yugoslavia, so it is not still true. I don't think you can apply this paragraph——

Mr. SOURWINE. But it might be true, we still are making unsound investments?

I am asking whether you think it is still true, or whether you changed your mind about it?

Mr. VINCENT. Again I say that I am not speaking of political loans in this particular paragraph, and the whole tenor of things now is along the lines, more than it was then, of making loans.

We have had the Marshall plan—not loans but voting money. That was not in my mind in making this speech.

Senator FERGUSON. Could it be possible that you were just speaking of China?

Mr. VINCENT. I was speaking generally about the Far East. But the application to China is very obvious from the thing.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is not true that you, in this State Department memorandum, it was your idea since the Marshall mission had failed in China, that there was going to be no more aid?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And could that be the reason for making this speech, right about that time? Was it not that reason?

Mr. VINCENT. It was in line with that policy; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew at the time, or right after the speech had been made that it was widely interpreted in the press as directed at China, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything at that time to correct that misconception, if you thought it was a misconception?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified at length about Israel Epstein, have you not, and your lack of knowledge of him?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't testified at length. I don't know Israel Epstein, haven't read his book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he wrote a book called The Unfinished Revolution in China?

Mr. VINCENT. I had heard that he did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read the book?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have the manuscript of it?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have a copy of it?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall ever seeing a copy of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether a copy of that book was sent to you by someone in the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall their sending it to me, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything at all to assist in the preparation of that book?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't have any recollection of doing any assisting in that, not to my knowledge and belief.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you call that book to General Marshall's attention or direct it to his attention?

Mr. VINCENT. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say now that I am asking questions based on exhibit No. 116, page 464, par. 2, before this committee, put in the record on August 15.

Do you know whether General Marshall ever saw or read that book?

Mr. VINCENT. I do not know that he ever saw it or read it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see Owen Lattimore's review of the book?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall seeing his review.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recall seeing a review of the book by Frederick Vanderbilt Field in The New Masses?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any other writing by Mr. Epstein?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I do not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see or read an IPR publication Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, I don't remember reading it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that that study had a supplement called "Labor in Nationalist China," by Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Friedman call that to your attention?

Mr. VINCENT. He may have, but I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified here fully with regard to your participation in the briefing of General Wedemeyer and his staff before they left for the Far East in July of 1947.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were named Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland in July of 1947?

Mr. VINCENT. That is when I took the oath of office; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who initiated your appointment as Minister to Switzerland?

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Acheson.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became a part of the United States delegation to the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information at Geneva in 1948?

Mr. VINCENT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know that an investigation had been made by a State Department investigator, an investigation of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have asked you about that before, have I not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be surprised to learn that there had been such an investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. Investigations are carried on at all times.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of the fact that you had never seen it, if there had been one and it was not sent to you, would not that surprise you a little?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it would, if I had any connection with it at the time. But I don't know when the investigation you are speaking of took place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have here copies of, first, a letter addressed by the chairman of this committee to the Secretary of State under date of January 12, 1952, as follows. To save time, let me summarize this and then ask that both of these letters go into the record. I also have the reply of Mr. Humelsine under date of January 21.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received after you have summarized it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The chairman asked for a report submitted to the State Department as a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare of the State Department, an investigation of IPR, and the State Department reply indicates the existence of such an investigation, but says that, "The report in question contains investigative material of a confidential nature within the scope of the President's loyalty program, and hence is controlled by the President's directive of March 13, 1948."

(Letters referred to were marked "Exhibits 398 and 399" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 398

JANUARY 12, 1952.

The SECRETARY OF STATE,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am informed that in 1948 a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations was submitted to the State Department as a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare, an investigator for the State Department connected with its New York City office.

In view of the fact that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee now has the Institute of Pacific Relations under study, the State Department findings should be of considerable importance. We therefore make a formal request for a copy of this report.

Your cooperation in this matter will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 399

JANUARY 21, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 12, 1952, to the Secretary in which you requested "a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations" which "was submitted to the State Department as a result of the investigations of Mr. Clare, an investigator for the State Department connected with its New York City office."

The report in question contains investigative material of a confidential nature within the scope of the President's loyalty program and hence is controlled by the President's directive of March 13, 1948, a copy of which is attached.

In accordance with this directive, the Department must respectfully decline your request for a copy of the report and has referred your letter to the Office of the President.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know about that at all, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not know about it. I was in Switzerland, and I have no recollection of it having been brought to my attention.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not in Switzerland in January of 1952, at the time that this request was made?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was speaking—you said in 1948, and I told you I was in Switzerland in 1948.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then I intended to ask if you knew about this request and the State Department refusal.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why the State Department concludes that this report contains investigative material of a confidential nature?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was an investigation of the IPR, by its terms; would not that necessarily imply that that investigation of IPR concerned Government personnel?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't want to read any implication to the letter at all. I think it speaks for itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the President's directive that they referred to there?

Mr. VINCENT. The President's directive about loyalty files?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't read it recently, but I know what it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. It concerns loyalty files of Government employees and officials, does it not?

Mr. VINCENT. By its name I would think it does; but, as I say, I can't testify to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is in the record; is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; that is in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the State Department was making an investigation?

Mr. VINCENT. Of the IPR?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Mr. Clare?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge, I don't know a Mr. Clare.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you think the State Department would investigate the IPR? Have you any reasons for knowing?

Mr. VINCENT. I haven't any reason for knowing why they investigated the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a former trustee, were you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they consult you about making an investigation of the IPR?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anything that would lead you to believe that if the State Department did make an investigation it should be kept secret because it would disclose questions of loyalty as to State Department employees?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no knowledge on that subject, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you have discussed the notes that you prepared for the State Department on the Wallace mission.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in those notes, or in any memorandum to the Department, refer to the fact that Mr. Wallace had sent a cable to the President from Kunming?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. I don't recall that that is in the notes at all, because the notes were prepared purely on the basis of the conversation with Chiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in any other memorandum to the Department refer to the Kunming cable?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge. You mean from China?

Mr. SOURWINE. At any time.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I would have referred to it after I got back to the Department, in some memorandum or other, probably, using it as a reference or background.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, then, you did write at least one memorandum about the Wallace trip other than the notes which are printed in the white paper?

Mr. VINCENT. That is not the way you put the question, sir. I wrote the memorandum of the conversations.

What I said was that I had no recollection of any other memorandum on the Kunming cable. But it is quite possible that the contents of the Kunming cable were referred to, or something in them in subsequent memoranda of other telegrams referring to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not mention them in your notes that are printed in the white paper, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you did not mention the Kunming cable in those notes?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to find out if you did subsequently write a memorandum to inform the Department of the fact that the Vice President had sent a cable to the President from Kunming.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I do not recall doing that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any particular reason for wanting to keep the Department in the dark about that?

Mr. VINCENT. The Kunming cable had gone to the Department, sir, from Kunming. I am trying to get at what——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it go to the Department or to the President?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it was addressed to the President, but it certainly would have been distributed to the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been distributed to the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. That would be my assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that you did not find it necessary to make any separate reference to it at all?

Mr. VINCENT. I assumed that it would go to the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, is your testimony that, aside from the notes which are in the white paper, you made no other memorandum at all about the trip with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. VINCENT. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have discussed here already, sir, I believe, a number of basic Communist documents, and you were asked if you had read any of them. Do you remember that?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will not go over them individually. The list includes the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels; State and Revolution, by Lenin; Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder, by Lenin; Foundation of Leninism, by Stalin; Problems of Communism, by Stalin; History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), authored by the Central Committee of the CPSU; the Program of the Communist Internationale and Its Constitution.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, a Resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Comitern. You said you had seen none of them; is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified that I had no recollection of reading any of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you had not seen the G–2 report on communism?

Mr. VINCENT. It is the one that the chairman showed me? I had no recollection of seeing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see the American Bar Association brief on Communism-Marxism-Leninism?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall seeing it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a copy of it.

Have you ever recalled seeing it in that format or any other format?

Mr. VINCENT. Not to my knowledge have I even seen it in this form.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was printed previous to that time as part of the proceedings of the American Bar Association, I believe, which would be a different format.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of the writings of Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I don't recall reading it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked those questions, Mr. Chairman, because they go to the question of Mr. Vincent's knowledge of Communist documents and, in that sense at least, to the question of his knowledge of Communist principles, aims, and objectives.

It was not intended either as an implication that this committee felt he should have read those documents, or demands to know why he did not study communism, but simply to ascertain the fact of what information he had, as background?

When were you transferred to Tangiers, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. The transfer came through, I think, in February, but I didn't go until June.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has anyone in the State Department ever expressed an opinion to you as to why you were transferred to Tangiers?

Mr. VINCENT. No one expressed an opinion to me other than the—they expressed the opinion to me that Mr. Patterson was going to be assigned to Bern, and that I would have to leave.

Senator FERGUSON. You were named, were you not, as Minister to Switzerland?

Mr. VINCENT. At that time, I was Minister to Switzerland.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but your appointment was sent up to the Senate.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1947, as Minister to Switzerland?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was never approved?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir, it was approved, in 1947. I went to Switzerland as Minister, and was there for 3½ years.

Senator FERGUSON. You were named to some other post? Or were to be named to some other post?

Mr. VINCENT. You are speaking of the statement that I was going to be named to Costa Rica as Ambassador?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Had you heard that?

Mr. VINCENT. I had heard that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you been consulted about it?

Mr. VINCENT. I had been informed. I hadn't been consulted. I had been informed.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you named?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I was not named.

Senator FERGUSON. Your name was never sent to the Senate on that one?

Mr. VINCENT. My name was never sent to the Senate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has anyone in the State Department ever expressed an opinion to you as to why you were sent to Tangiers instead of to some other post?

Senator FERGUSON. Or to Costa Rica?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me see. I don't recall that they have.

Senator FERGUSON. There was no explanation, then?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, there was a great deal of press statement.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I am talking about the State Department or the Government. Did they ever tell you why you were not going to be sent to Costa Rica?

Mr. VINCENT. They simply told me they were not going to send my name up for confirmation in the Senate, and I would go to Tangiers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say why?

Mr. VINCENT. They did not say why, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is "they"?

Mr. VINCENT. The Chief of Personnel.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would that be?

Mr. VINCENT. No; not the Chief of Personnel. It would be Humelsine.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any correspondence on that?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any cablegrams on it?

Mr. VINCENT. No. There was a telephone conversation with Humelsine.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the telephone conversation?

Mr. VINCENT. Humelsine simply telephoned me that I was going to be sent to Tangiers, asked me if I was prepared to go to Tangiers, and I said I was. He said that the Costa Rica appointment was off.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all he told you?

Mr. VINCENT. That is all he told me.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not ask him why it was off? The ambassadorship was a much more important position than going to Tangiers, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, it was a more important job from the matter of title. But the Morrocan job is just as important.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a difference even in the salary, is there not?

Mr. VINCENT. There was no difference in salary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having achieved the rank of Minister, you retain that, do you not?

Mr. VINCENT. In Tangiers.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you are a career foreign officer, Foreign Service officer, are you not?

Mr. VINCENT. I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. And having obtained the rank of Minister, you retain it as Minister?

Mr. VINCENT. I remain a career Minister.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I mean.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your pay?

Mr. VINCENT. At the present, $15,000.

Senator FERGUSON. What would have been the pay as Ambassador?

Mr. VINCENT. $15,000.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you receive from Secretary Acheson a letter with regard to your appointment to Tangiers?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Or anyone else in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I received my orders to go to Tangiers, formal orders. I never received a letter from anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you get any communication from Mr. Acheson with regard to that matter, either before or after the fact?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you return to the United States from Tangiers on October 16, 1951?

Mr. VINCENT. 15, I think. But we will not quibble over that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you interviewed by reporters on that occasion?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; the reporters came to the boat.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you asked to comment on reports that you were returning to testify before this subcommittee?

Mr. VINCENT. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you then state that you were not in any defensive position?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you then state to reporters that you would be willing to testify if you were asked to do so, but that you had not been invited and that you would not volunteer?

Mr. VINSON. That I don't recall, whether I said all that to them or not. The general idea was that I had already written to—let me finish this—I had already written, as you know, to Senator McCarran expressing my willingness to testify.

Whether I, at that time, said to these people that I was not going to ask to testify or not, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You had already offered to testify?

Mr. VINCENT. I had already offered; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold here a newspaper story, an AP dispatch, and the particular clipping is from the Washington Star, and it is dated New York, October 16, AP. The headline is: "John Carter Vincent Back in United States—'not on defensive'."

John Carter Vincent, United States Minister to Tangiers, Morocco, charged with pro-Communist leanings by Senator McCarthy, returned yesterday on the liner *Constitution* and said he was "not in any defensive position." After conferring with a State Department official, he was asked about reports he was returning to testify at congressional hearings into internal security. "I am coming back strickly for a vacation after 4 years aboard," Mr. Vincent replied. Pressed further for comments on accusations that he was a Communist sympathizer, Mr. Vincent said, "I am not in any defensive position. I certainly would be willing to testify any time they wanted me to. I have not been asked yet, and I am not volunteering."

Do you think that is an accurate report, sir?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it is an accurate report of what I had in mind at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not a fact?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that was a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not write to the Senator before that?

Mr. VINCENT. I wrote to the Senator on September 7, expressing a willingness to appear before the committee. I had not at that time requested a hearing before the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. You say the willingness was different than a request. Did you ever request?

Mr. VINCENT. I made the request to the committee on November 9.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did send a letter to Senator McCarran under date of November 9, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that that letter, Mr. Chairman, be inserted in record.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be inserted.

(The letter referred was marked "Exhibit No. 400" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 400

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 9, 1951.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: You may recall that I wrote to you on September 7, 1951, from my post in Tangier in regard to Louis F. Budenz' testimony before your subcommittee on August 23, 1951. Budenz swore that from "official reports" he had received I was a member of the Communist Party. I assured you that I was not and never had been a Communist, that I had never worked in the interests of other than our own Government and people, and that, if you had any doubts on that score, I desired to appear before your committee. I have received no reply to my letter.

On October 5, 1951, Budenz, still under oath, repeated his allegations before the subcommittee.

I am now home on vacation and have had an opportunity to read the Budenz testimony. I am shocked at the devious manner in which he attempted to support his false testimony.

Convinced that establishment of the facts is essential in a democracy, I request and shall welcome an opportunity to meet with your subcommittee to testify publicly under oath.

I must return to my post and official duties after Christmas and therefore would appreciate your arranging a public hearing before members of the subcommittee some time this month or early in December.

Believe me, this is not simply a matter of self-defense. The issue far transcends personal considerations. We cannot defend democracy with perfidy or defeat communism with lies.

Sincerely yours,

[s] John Carter Vincent
JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

Mr. SOURWINE. That letter has been released by the State Department, has it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It has.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Senator McCarran reply under date of November 16, 1951?

Mr. VINCENT. He did. I assume you have the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the text of his reply?

Mr. VINCENT. I have it here. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that this be inserted in the record at this point.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 401" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 401

NOVEMBER 16, 1951.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
Office of the Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. VINCENT: Your letter of November 9 has been forwarded to me here in the hospital.

I would be happy to hear your testimony, but due to the fact that Congress is not in session it may be difficult to do it at the time you desire. I have, however, advised my staff of your request, and please be assured that if it is at all possible your request will be carried out.

Sincerely,

——— ———.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask you if that letter was mailed to Senator McCarran, the letter of the ninth, your letter of the ninth?

Mr. VINCENT. I testified before, and it is still my recollection, that it was brought down here to the office of Senator McCarran by hand.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Did you at that time know that Senator McCarran was ill in a hospital in Reno, Nev.?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any help in drafting that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. In drafting this letter of the ninth?

Mr. SOURWINE. Of November 9.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I had some help in drafting the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who helped you in drafting?

Mr. VINCENT. I made most of the draft myself, but the letter was drafted in the Legal Division of the State Department, there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who originally suggested drafting that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. With whom did you discuss the letter before it was sent, other than the Legal Division of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. With my own wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. With anyone else?

Mr. VINCENT. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you disclose to the Legal Division of the State Department that you knew Senator McCarran was in a hospital in Reno?

Mr. VINCENT. I didn't have to, sir. They knew it themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. If they knew it and you knew it, why did you send the letter down here instead of sending it out to Reno?

Mr. VINCENT. As I testified before, I thought that this was the best place to get it, quickly, to his office, where he had a staff here and they would see that it was transmitted to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the release of this letter by the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you did?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir. The State Department released it with my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you suggest the release of it, or did the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. I suggested the release of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when that release was decided upon?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. It must have been decided on at least as early as the 17th, must it not?

Mr. VINCENT. When was it released?

Mr. SOURWINE. The release was given to the press on the 17th for release on the 19th, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, it was. That would be a Saturday, I think it was. It was decided then——

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, to get the break in the Monday morning papers. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had had it delivered here on the 9th, is that right? The date that it was written?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had delivered it to Senator McCarran's office here on the 9th, a letter, knowing that he was in a hospital in Reno, and on the 17th you were consenting to a release of a protest to the Senator's failure to answer your letter. Is that right?

Mr. VINCENT. I wouldn't call it a protest. It was my request to appear before the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that the State Department release was not a protest against the failure to answer the letter? That is, the State Department release under the date of the 19th, which was handed to the press on the 17th? Was that not a protest against Senator McCarran's failure to answer your letter of the 9th?

Mr. VINCENT. I would not have qualified it as a protest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see the State Department release? (Pause.) Did you see that State Department release?

Mr. VINCENT. I saw the State Department release; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not that release state, in effect, that your letter was being released because of the Senator's failure to answer it?

Mr. VINCENT. I have forgotten. I didn't draft it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw it, did you not?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You assented to whatever was in it?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I assented.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was played up in the newspapers as a protest of the Senator's failure to answer your demand to be heard, was it not?

Mr. VINCENT. It was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not intend that it should be so played up?

Mr. VINCENT. No; I did not intend for it to be so played up. But it was played up that way.

What I wanted primarily to do was to put on notice the fact that I wanted to appear before the committee. Many people had asked me, "Why don't you appear before the committee; why don't you appear before the committee?" and I wanted it known that I had made a request. I don't like for it to be interpreted that it was a protest over the failure to release that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not think it was so intended by either you or the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. It was not intended as a protest against his failure to answer. It was intended by me to put on notice, through the papers, that I had made a request to appear before the committee.

Now, it could be interpreted that way, as you have, too, but I am speaking quite frankly here that my idea was to respond to what was a general desire that I let it be known that I wanted to come before the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you expect Senator McCarran to have an answer in your hands within a week after you delivered the letter here to his office, when he was in a hospital in Reno?

Mr. VINCENT. I have told you before that I thought probably the staff here in his office could give an answer by telephoning him, and giving an answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. That the staff would answer that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I suppose you thought that the staff would sign his name to it, too?

Mr. VINCENT. No, that the staff would notify me that I could appear and set a time. But I thought that 10 days was a sufficient time.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn of Mr. Budenz' testimony before this subcommittee on August 23?

Mr. VINCENT. I learned of it through the press in Tangiers, I should say, along the first week in September.

Mr. SOURWINE. And when did you learn of his testimony on August 5?

Mr. VINCENT. Pardon me. What was the first?

Mr. SOURWINE. He testified here twice, August 5 and August 23. Did you learn about his testimony on both occasions at the same time, or did you learn about it at two different times as it occurred, shortly after it occurred?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I don't know of the two, I don't know but two times that Budenz appeared before the committee, to my recollection, August 23 and again October 5.

But you, I think, identified them both as August, August 5 and August 23.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, if I am in error, when did you first learn about his testimony on October 5?

Mr. VINCENT. Let me see. When I got back to the States, in November; November 15, I was told.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not learn about it until you got back to the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I had no knowledge, as I recall it, because I had taken the boat on the 8th or 9th, and I did not know of the October 5, so far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. Had any testimony been sent to you?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir. In Tangiers?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You had never received any testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. No, I had never seen any of the records of this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Or reports of the testimony?

Mr. VINCENT. I think the first time was reports in the press.

Senator FERGUSON. Just press reports?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes. I had nothing from the State Department, unless there was something in the State Department bulletin at one time. But my recollection is that I saw it in the press.

Senator FERGUSON. When was his arrival?

Mr. SOURWINE. His arrival here was October 15.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, from October 15 to November 9, you did not make any request?

Mr. VINCENT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear that Senator McCarran, the chairman of this committee, went to the hospital?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, if you would identify the date, I would say I heard of it, reading in the papers, the day it was announced. I have forgotten the date that he went to the hospital.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before you wrote the letter of the 9th did he go to the hospital?

Mr. VINCENT. I would say it had been very few days before.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now that the fact that he went to the hospital had anything to do with your writing of that letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Nothing whatsoever, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing whatsoever?

Mr. VINCENT. Nothing whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not considered?

Mr. VINCENT. That was not considered. It was already decided to send the letter before we knew that he had gone to the hospital. I had.

Senator FERGUSON. You had. Had the Department?

Mr. VINCENT. The State Department did not make the decision. I made the decision.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not talk to them about it until after you knew he had gone to the hospital, did you?

Mr. VINCENT. If you would identify when he went to the hospital—I have forgotten.

Mr. SOURWINE. From your own memory.

Mr. VINCENT. That I did not talk with them until after he had gone to the hospital? Yes, I talked with them before he went to the hospital.

Mr. SOURWINE. About the matter of the release of this letter?

Mr. VINCENT. Also about the release of the letter, and the drafting of the letter. I can assure you that the release of the letter and the drafting of the letter did not have anything to do with Senator McCarran going to the hospital.

Mr. MORRIS. Did it have anything to do with the fact that the Senate was out of session, even though at the original time when the Senate was in session you said you were not requesting a hearing?

Mr. VINCENT. It had nothing to do with the fact that the Senate was out of session.

Senaor FERGUSON. Whom did you discuss it with in the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. People in the Legal Division, but discussed it not as to the decision.

Senator FERGUSON. Who? I want the name.

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. McJennett.

Senator FERGUSON. Anybody else?

Mr. VINCENT. A young man named Mr. Ousley. They are the only two that I remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they in the Legal Division of the State Department?

Mr. VINCENT. They are attached to it; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. They are not in the Public Relations Division?

Mr. VINCENT. They are attached to it. I don't know what their actual relationship comes from, but that is where I met Mr. McJennett and that is where I know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the Legal Division?

Mr. VINCENT. That is where I had seen him, the first I met him.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not an unusual thing, to put Public Relations people under the title of lawyers in the Legal Division, is it?

Mr. VINCENT. It is not unusual?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether it is unusual or usual, sir. I only know that I met Mr. McJennett in Mr. Fish's office.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought he was in the Legal Division?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I thought he was in the Legal Department. I, myself, have since heard that he draws his salary from some place else.

Senator FERGUSON. They usually do not put them under Public Relations, and it is easier to get them through the appropriation if they are in the Legal Division.

Mr. VINCENT. I also notified Mr Humelsine in the State Department I had intentions of doing this, and I also notified Mr. Webb.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Humelsine and Webb say?

Mr. VINCENT. I asked them if they had any objection to me, as a Foreign Service officer, taking this action. I wanted to clear with them first, and they said "No objection."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you show them the letter?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know whether they actually saw the letter, I have no recollection of showing it to Mr. Webb. I don't know whether it went to Humelsine.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them that the chairman of the committee was ill in the hospital?

Mr. VINCENT. Sir, I think they knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you talk about it?

Mr. VINCENT. No; we didn't talk about it.

Senator FERGUSON. You were just assuming, then, that they knew it?

Mr. VINCENT. I would have assumed that they read it in the papers, sir.

And I would like to make my testimony again as clear as I can, that the Senator being in the hospital had nothing to do with my decision to request an appearance before the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Carl Humelsine know about this release before it went out? Did he see it before it was released?

Mr. VINCENT. I don't know that Carl Humelsine saw it before it was released. I don't know whether he knew it was going to be released.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive those two letters for the record.

(The letters referred to appear on pp. 2273 and 2274.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a man can be an American Communist without being a traitor to the Government of the United States?

Mr. VINCENT. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a person who is an employee of the United States Government can be a Communist without being a traitor?

Mr. VINCENT. He cannot be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a person who is an official of the United States Government can be a Communist without being a traitor?

Mr. VINCENT. No; he cannot be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it then your belief and contention that to become or remain a Communist while an employee or an official of the Government of the United States is a traitorous act?

Mr. VINCENT. I would certainly say it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And by "traitorous act," you mean treason?

Mr. VINCENT. Well, now, I am not a legal person so I don't know what the charges would be on treason. But in a general sense.

Mr. SOURWINE. To you it means a traitorous act?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I think that this letter from Mr. Vincent to Senator McCarran should also be put into record; and it should be read, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. It is November 19, 1951?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 401A

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have been informed that you interpreted my action in making public the letter I addressed to you on November 9 as being in some way critical of the subcommittee. I regret that you had that impression.

As you know, Budenz has publicly and falsely called me a Communist in testimony before your committee. In my position as an official of the American Government his charge is tantamount to saying that I am a traitor. This, you will agree, is a very serious matter, not simply for me, for my country and my friends. Under such circumstances, I believe you will understand my motive

in making known that I am ready and anxious to appear publicly before your committee to refute under oath the Budenz allegations.

I trust you are recuperating from your illness and will soon be in good health.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

Mr. Vincent, before we close, and I have no more prepared questions for you, I will say to you that I would like to give you an opportunity to correct any false impressions that you think may have been created, if you recall any.

Mr. VINCENT. Over the length of the whole——

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; and I don't mean that I am trying to put you on the spot to remember all of the testimony. It is just if there is anything that rankles in your mind, I want to give you an opportunity.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't be too sure here that I have used the same phraseology in answering in the executive hearing and down here.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that that ought to be put in the record. You have no objection, have you, that the transcript of your executive session become part of the public record?

Mr. VINCENT. I have no objection, sir, but I am pointing out at this time that I can not say that in executive hearings of last week, which lasted 3 days, that I have answered exactly the same way.

Senator FERGUSON. I think we ought to make that part of the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been recommended by the staff and assented to by Mr. Vincent and his counsel. But the committee has to meet and act on it.

I believe it will take a majority of the committee to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will recommend to the committee that it be received.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent, you realize, do you not, that your testimony has, in some respects, contradicted the testimony of other witnesses, just as it has, in some respects, corroborated it?

Mr. VINCENT. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. That you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Wallace; that you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Alsop; that you have, in some respects, contradicted Mr. Budenz; that you have, in some respects, affirmed what Mr. Budenz says.

Mr. VINCENT. I don't recall affirming anything that Mr. Budenz says.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you realize that you have established, by your testimony here, that you did have a very substantial influence over Mr. Wallace and over the conduct of his mission?

Mr. VINCENT. True, that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. And which was one of the points that Mr. Budenz made, and something that Mr. Wallace appeared to seek to negative.

Mr. VINCENT. Did he? I have forgotten that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply mention those things.

Mr. VINCENT. Yes; I know. You are not trying to say that the influence I had over Mr. Wallace was of the nature of Mr. Budenz' statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am simply calling to your attention possible fields in which you might feel that further clarification was needed so that if you think you want that opportunity you can do it now.

Mr. VINCENT. No; I can't think of any particular.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter——

Mr. VINCENT. Mr. Vincent.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had a full hearing?

Mr. VINCENT. I have had a full hearing, sir.

I think I have had a very full hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that it was a fair hearing?

Mr. VINCENT. Yes, sir; in all intents and purposes a fair hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. And there is nothing that you know now that you would want to add?

I will give you this opportunity.

Mr. VINCENT. Well, I have nothing to add, sir, except that my counsel here failed to get these documents into the record. When we were speaking of that FEC and Japanese policy.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive them.

(The information referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 402" and is as follows:)

COMMENT OF FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICY DECISION*

13 JULY 1947.

The policy decision just adopted by the Far Eastern Commission dealing with the postsurrender treatment of the Japanese problem is one of the great state papers of modern history. It establishes definitely the type, the extent, and the scope of Japan's future, and the position the Japanese nation shall occupy in relation to the world at large. It not only ratifies the course which thus far has been taken, but signifies a complete unity of future purpose among the eleven nations and peoples concerned. It at once sweeps aside fears currently felt that the great nations of the world are unable to reconcile divergent views on such vital issues in the international sphere and demonstrates with decisive clarity that from an atmosphere of conflicting interests and opposing predilections may emerge common agreement founded upon experience and shaped to a realistic appreciation of world conditions and the basic requirements of a progressive civilization. For in this agreement have been firmly resisted two insidious concepts, poles apart but equally sinister—the one which would seek harsh and unjust treatment of our fallen foe, and the other which would seek partially to preserve and perpetuate institutions and leadership which bear responsibility of war guilt. The first would have produced a mendicant country dependent upon charity to live, while the second would have encouraged the regrowth of antidemocratic forces with the consequent revival of international distrust and suspicion. It confirms by the considered action of the representatives of the Allied Nations a sound moderate course based upon a concept embodying firmness but justice, disarmament but rehabilitation, lower standards but the opportunity for life—a concept shunning both the extreme right and the extreme left and providing for the great middle way of the ordinary man.

The basic and easily the most essential requirement of the policy—disarmament and demilitarization—has already been fully accomplished. Even were there no external controls, Japan could not rearm for modern war within a century. This primary objective has led all aims in the occupation of Japan. Japanese military forces have been disarmed, demobilized, and absorbed in peaceful pursuits, and Japan's remaining war potential has either been destroyed or completely neutralized. The political and economic phases of the disarmament program have been effected through the dissolution of the alliance long existing between government and industry, the breaking up of monopolistic combines and practices which have suppressed private enterprise, and the raising of the individual to a position of dignity and hope, with provision made for a new leadership untainted by war responsibility and both mentally and spiritually equipped to further democratic growth. The transition stage of destroying those evil influences which misguided Japan's past has been virtually completed and the course has been set upon which Japan is now embarked toward a peaceful and constructive future. We thus see here the transformation of a state which once proclaimed its mastery of war into one which from material impoverishment and spiritual dedication now seeks its destiny as a servant of peace.

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*The policy decision, adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947, as FEC 014/9 and transmitted to SCAP through the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS Directive Serial No. 82, is a restatement of the *United States Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan* of August 29, 1945 (Appendix A: 11).

This action representing the agreement of the Allied Nations engaged in the Pacific war not only confirms the postsurrender policies previously evolved and largely implemented, but it establishes at the same time a norm for the restoration of peace. Resting squarely upon those same principles and ideals written at Potsdam, reaffirmed on the *Missouri*, and subsequently translated into action in the occupation of Japan, this accord provides the entire framework for a treaty of peace—a treaty which, if it is to be faithfully honored, should constitute within itself a charter of human liberty to which the Japanese citizen will look for guidance and protection, rather than shun with the revulsion of shame—a treaty which, without yielding firmness in its essential mandates, should avoid punitive, arbitrary, and unrealistic provisions, and by its terms set the pattern for future peace throughout the world. It should in full reality mark the restoration of a peace based upon justice, goodwill, and human advancement. Such a treaty may now be approached with the assurance of complete understanding in principle and full unity of purpose evolving its detail.

Viewing this international accord in the light of the great strides made by the Japanese themselves toward the achievement of those very objectives which it prescribes, without confusion, without disorder, and with steady progress toward economic recovery despite the destruction of war and defeat, it becomes unmistakably clear that here in Japan we shall win the peace.

Appendix F: 39

NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

1 JANUARY 1948.

TO THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN:

The design of a remodeled and reconstructed Japan is nearing completion. The pattern has been etched, the path has been laid. The development now lies largely in your own hands. Success or failure will depend upon your ability to practice the simple yet transcendental principles which modern civilization demands.

No occupation, however benevolent and beneficial, can substitute for the spiritual uplift which alone can lead to an invincible determination to build a future based upon the immutable concepts of human freedom—a social status under which full consciousness of individual responsibility must ever remain the keystone to the arch of success and progress.

Individual hardship is inevitable. Your economy, due to the disastrous war decisions of your past leaders, is now impoverished. This can only be relieved by employment to the maximum of the energies of your people, by wisdom and determination on the part of your leaders, and by the restoration of peace with its removal of existing limitations upon international trade. So long as your needs continue to be greater than your productive capacity, controls upon your internal economy will be essential lest the weaker segments of your population perish. Such controls must, however, only be temporary and subject to ultimate removal in favor of free enterprise.

Economically, Allied policy has required the breaking up of that system which in the past has permitted the major part of the commerce and industry and natural resources of our country to be owned and controlled by a minority of feudal families and exploited for their exclusive benefit. The world has probably never seen a counterpart to so abnormal an economic system. It permitted exploitation of the many for the sole benefit of the few. The integration of these few with government was complete and their influence upon governmental policies inordinate, and set the course which ultimately led to war and destruction. It was indeed so complete a monopoly as to be in effect a form of socialism in private hands. Only through its dissolution could the way be cleared for the emergence of an economy conducive to the well-being of all the people—an economy embodying the principle of private capitalism, based upon free competitive enterprise—an economy which long experience has demonstrated alone provides the maximum incentive to the development of those fundamental requirements to human progress—individual initiative and individual energy.

Politically, progress toward reform has been equally encouraging. Your new constitution is now in full effect, and there is increasing evidence of a growing understanding of the great human ideals which it is designed to serve. Implementing laws have reoriented the entire fabric of your way of life to give emphasis to the increased responsibility, dignity and opportunity which the individual now holds and enjoys. Government has ceased to be totalitarian and

has become representative, with its functions decentralized to permit and encourage a maximum of individual thought and initiative and judgment in the management of community affairs. Control of every political segment has been shifted to permit the selection of a new leadership of your free choice capable of advancing democratic growth.

Socially, many of the shackels which traditionally have restricted individual thought and action have been severed and action has been taken to render the exercise of police power a matter for individual and community, rather than national, responsibility. The judicial system has been freed from executive and legislative controls, and laws have been enacted to temper inordinate bureaucratic power by requiring all public officials to justify the trust of public responsibility and answer for their acts directly to the people.

Every Japanese citizen can now for the first time do what he wants, and go where he wants, and say what he wants, within the liberal laws of his land. This means that you can select your own work, and when you have completed it you can choose your own method of relaxation and enjoyment, and on your day of rest you can worship as you please, and always you can criticize and express your views on the actions of your Government. This is liberty. Yet inherent in it are its obligations to act with decorum and self-restraint, and become acutely conscious of the responsibilities which a free society imposes upon its every segment.

The future therefore lies in your hands. If you remain true to the great spiritual revolution which you have undergone, your nation will emerge and go on—if you accept only its benefits without its obligations, it will wither and go under. The line of demarcation is a simple one, understandable to all men—the line between those things which are right and those things which are wrong. The way is long and hard and beset with difficulties and dangers, but it is my hope and belief and prayer this New Year's Day that you will not falter.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Appendix F: 42

REPLY TO CRITICISM OF ECONOMIC POLICY

1 FEBRUARY 1948.

(The following was sent as a letter to Mr. J. H. Gipson, The Caxton Printers, Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, under date of 24 January, 1948, in reply to Mr. Gipson's letter of 27 December 1947, relative to a December release from the Committee for Constitutional Government in New York stating that the Occupation is fostering socialization of Japanese industries, etc. Permission was later requested on 31 January 1948, by Mr. Gipson for release to the press and approval was radioed on 1 February 1948.)

Thank you so much for sending me the extract of comments on Japan from the December release of the Committee for Constitutional Government in New York, with your letter of December 27 which has just reached me.

I have never heard of this Committee and know nothing about its purpose or composition, but its estimate of the situation here is amazing in its complete inaccuracy. The existing Government of Japan is fully representative of the popular will, elected under throughly democratic processes in accordance with the provisions of a constitution patterned in essential respects after our own. The only "private enterprise" which has heretofore existed in Japan was neither free nor competitive—two fundamental qualifications of American economic philosophy which it is my firm purpose to see entrenched in the Japanese system before the occupation withdraws.

Japan has long had a system of "private enterprise"—but one which permitted ten family groups comprising only fifty-six Japanese families to control, directly or indirectly, every phase of commerce and industry; all media of transportation, both internal and external; all domestic raw materials; and all coal and other power resources. The "private enterprise" was thus limited to a few of feudal lineage, who exploited into virtual slavery the remainder of the Japanese people, permitted higher standards of life to others only through sufferance, and in search of further plunder abroad furnished the tools for the military to embark upon its ill-fated venture into world conquest. The record is thus one of economic oppression and exploitation at home, aggression and spoliation abroad. As early as 1930, these Japanese industrial combines veered in the direction of armaments production and geared the country for war. This portrays the private enterprise to which the Committee refers.

As you will see, the very start toward free enterprise is dependent upon tearing down so abnormal a structure. For so long as it remains undisturbed, it is a standing bid for State ownership, and a fruitful target for Communist propaganda and collectivist purposes. The Japanese people, with the exception of those who covet the opportunity to exploit this situation for ideological purposes, and those who have been entrenched within its orbit of political and economic power, are overwhelmingly in favor of destroying such a system, and unless its destruction is effected peacefully and in due order under the occupation, there is little doubt but that if necessary the way would be found even through the violence of revolutionary means once the occupation is withdrawn.

In all of these measures in the reformation of Japan, it must be clearly understood that we are here dealing with fundamental realities. It does not suffice merely to issue an edict that there shall be no socialism, or that there shall be no advance of communism or other ideologies opposed to the one in which we ourselves firmly believe. For the strength of such an edict would find its measure in the power of Allied bayonets alone. The need has called for positive action which, while we yet have time, will superimpose here upon a decadent and discredited past a system of government and economics which, because their very processes generate a more healthy and virile society, will even after our controls are lifted stand as an invincible buttress against the inroads of any conflicting philosophies of life.

In the accomplishment of this purpose, two difficult barriers have stood out to bar any progress. The one has dealt with the feudalistic system of land ownership under which practically all agricultural land has been owned by a relatively few persons of feudal heritage, with all agrarian workers exploited under conditions of practical serfdom. This archaic system of land ownership is being torn down in order that through sale in small lots those who long have worked the soil may have the opportunity substantially to profit from their toil. Thereby there will emerge in Japan, from a field theretofore fertile to the spread of communism, a new class of small capitalistic landowners which itself will stand firm against efforts to destroy the system of capitalistic economy of which it will then form an integral part. Needless to say, the communists and the land barons alone oppose this reform.

The other barrier is the one which I have heretofore described, popularly known as the Zaibatsu, and in neither case, even despite war enrichment at the sacrifice of American blood, has there been any confiscation of property, as the principle of just compensation throughout has governed, with untrammelled recourse left to judicial appeal in the Japanese courts. The effect of its dissolution will be to transform a small number of monopolistic combines into numerous competing units and to bring about widespread ownership of the instruments of production and trade, thereby erecting a solid bulwark against the spread of ideologies and systems destructive of both free enterprise and political freedom under democratic capitalism. Otherwise, if business in Japan were allowed to continue with its concentration of economic power, it would lead to concentration of power in government, and from there the transition to socialism of one form or another would be natural, easy of accomplishment, and inevitable.

The statement of the Committee that "prominent leaders including many outstanding friends of freedom have been ousted from the control of industry and their places have been taken by incompetent visionaries" finds no basis in fact. Apart from action taken with respect to the Zaibatsu, wherein the family members and their appointees are removed from positions of influence in the identical enterprises they have heretofore controlled, there have been in all less than two hundred and fifty persons removed under Allied policy from positions in the economy under the purge program. The removal of these persons was due to their close identity with the causes which led to war. In the implementation of this phase of the occupation program, I have in the exercise of the normal discretion accorded a field commander, pursued far less drastic measures than were called for by my policy directives from the Allied Powers, shifting the emphasis from punitive action to action merely designed to provide for a more healthy leadership and one unattainted by war responsibility. Even in those cases of persons removed from positions of power, involving the most aggravated circumstances, I have, against strong Allied opposition, permitted no property confiscation, no deprivation of liberty, no forfeiture of political rights, and where restriction upon future economic activity is involved embracing but a relatively few persons, I have insured that policy-makers rather than technicians were affected, and have left undisturbed a broad field of economic activity in which even they might continue to engage without the slightest

restriction. If within this small group of persons affected, there are any outstanding "friends of freedom," they are unknown to this headquarters, and all have had the opportunity, through exhaustively fair hearings before screening committees of the Japanese Government and on appeal, to prove any such contentions. The statement that the places of those few removed have been taken by incompetent visionaries is absurd. Such places have in all cases been filled by junior executives of long service in the enterprises concerned, who have moved up into opportunities which otherwise would not have been available to them.

The Committee's statement that "the government has been flooded with a horde of bureaucrats," not unlike the situation in other capitals, is probably true. Even so, on the national level of government there are less than 350,000 persons so employed, which is not disproportionate to Japan's population of seventy-eight million, should standards elsewhere be accepted as a general guide. It is not the quantity, however, which has given me most concern, but the quality and the inordinate power which the bureaucracy traditionally has arrogated to itself in Japan. To cope with this evil, we are now in the process of assisting the Japanese Government toward a civil service reform. The pattern already has been set through wise and farsighted legislation, the implementation of which will be completed within the present year. The basic purpose and effect of this reform is to require that all public officials justify the trust of public responsibility and answer for their acts directly to the people.

The general statement that the money is unsound, that foreign trade is restricted by a maze of regulations, and that production is paralyzed is wholly misrepresentative in its failure to recognize the following fundamental and controlling facts, i. e., (1) that Japan is a totally defeated nation, still technically at war with the Allied Powers and under the controls of military occupation; (2) that a primary objective of war and cause of defeat was the destruction of Japan's industrial capacity to wage war and ability to transport its sinews on the high seas; (3) that Japan has always been dependent for the bulk of the raw materials essential to sustain the industrial capacity upon procurement from abroad, now denied by the economic blockade inherent in the present situation; (4) that Japan's shipping afloat has been destroyed, and Manchuria, Formosa and Korea, former sources of direct procurement of essential raw materials, have been taken away; and (5) that Japanese money, not unlike that even of all of the victor nations, is suffering the severe strain of war-caused economic dislocations.

Finally, the statement that "the net result has been so to paralyze production as to leave the Japanese people on the verge of starvation, and that the Americans are now called upon to furnish hundreds of millions of dollars to relieve the hunger for which our representatives are primarily responsible" is completely lacking in realism and false as an indictment. The wonder is that despite the lack of needed raw materials, widespread destruction of plant facilities, and seizures under Allied policy for reparation payments, the industrial output has risen from complete paralysis at war's end to over 40 percent of prewar levels. It must be understood that the Japanese people before the war suffered a deficiency in indigenous food resources which compelled the importation from abroad of approximately 20 percent of food requirements. Add to this natural deficiency the fact that over six million Japanese citizens have been repatriated to the home islands, with none permitted to leave during the occupation, while Manchuria, Korea and Formosa have been removed as sources of food supply, and you can understand the actualities which exist. During the occupation we have contributed food partially to cover this deficiency, but such contribution has not even approximated the importations required during the prewar era when industry was at full capacity and there was a smaller population to feed. Such action has not been entirely altruistic as under Japan's present status the Japanese people are in all practical aspects our prisoners of war, and as such entitled to our protection under the international conventions which we ourselves historically have never failed to respect. Even so, the Japanese people have made diligent effort themselves to solve this deficiency problem, and once a healthier economic structure has been erected, there will be seen, through the release of long-suppressed energies of a people enslaved, the building of that higher productivity which alone comes from a people who are free.

The foregoing will give you the facts as they exist for comparison with those stated by the Committee, which you have been good enough to quote. The prescription for Japan's economic ills is as crystal clear as it is simple—a structural redesign to make possible the emergence of an economic system based not solely

upon the formula of "private enterprise" to which the Committee alludes, but to free private competitive enterprise which Japan has never before known, and which alone will maximize the energies of the people. Even more, the conclusion of a treaty of peace which would permit the reopening of the channels of trade and commerce to make available essential raw materials to feed the production lines, world markets to absorb the finished products, and food to sustain working energy.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a notebook. I wonder whether or not we could not receive that notebook. You have been reading from it as part of this record.

Mr. VINCENT. That notebook, sir, contains scratched out places and everything else. I would rather keep it to myself, because I have taken practically everything there is out of it. I would prefer to keep it to myself, as my own notes.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been reading from it.

Mr. VINCENT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that you do not want the notebook made part of the record?

Mr. VINCENT. I have made all of it that I want to as part of the record, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you let the committee have the notebook for study, Mr. Vincent?

Mr. VINCENT. If I do not need it, I have no objection. But I would rather not have it in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chairman, I think, was asking for it not to be made as part of the record, but asking for it just as the committee asks for certain other papers to be examined.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel can look at the notebook and may decide on more questioning, if he does.

We will now recess. Is there any particular time to reconvene?

Mr. MORRIS. I think Tuesday at 10 o'clock is the date, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. We will now recess until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., Saturday, February 2, 1952, the hearing was recessed to reconvene Tuesday, February 5, 1952, at 10 a. m.)

APPENDIX I

HOLD FOR RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL: The following correspondence from the President to the Vice President and attachments thereto are for automatic release at 7:00 p. m., E. D. T., Sunday, September 23, 1951. No portion, synopsis, or intimation may be published or broadcast before that time.

PLEASE GUARD AGAINST PREMATURE PUBLICATION OR ANNOUNCEMENT

JOSEPH SHORT,
Secretary to the President.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1951.

The Honorable the VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: I am sending you a copy of a letter, together with certain documents, which I recently received from Mr. Henry A. Wallace.

These papers deal with the facts of Mr. Wallace's trip to the Far East in 1944, and the part played by his advisers on that trip. These papers deal with certain matters which may be of interest to the Senate and its committees. I am there-

fore making Mr. Wallace's letter available to you for use in such ways as you deem appropriate.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

FARVUE, SOUTH SALEM, NEW YORK, *September 19, 1951.*

Honorable HARRY S. TRUMAN,
President of the United States, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: During the last three weeks there has been considerable newspaper and radio controversy as to what part John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore played in my trip to the Far East in 1944. This controversy arose from certain testimony before the Senate Committee on Internal Security during August. Therefore I have decided to make available to you for what disposition you care to make of it the complete file of my reports to President Roosevelt on my Far Eastern trip in 1944. Parts of these reports were at one time looked on as secret but with the situation as it is today there is no reason why these reports should not be made available to the public. I shall, of course, take no steps to publish this letter myself but I wish you to feel completely free to handle it in any way which you deem will best minister to the welfare of the United States.

The following comments as well as the documents themselves should clear up any confusion as to what I was trying to do in China. The part of various individuals in my trip will also be made more clear. In March of 1944 I wrote Secretary Hull asking him to designate someone to accompany me on the projected trip and the State Department named John Carter Vincent, then Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. The OWI sent Owen Lattimore to handle publicity matters in China. I passed through Soviet Asia on my way to China but China, where the situation was critical, formed the sole subject of my recommendations to President Roosevelt. These recommendations were contained in two related documents:

First, a message drafted in Kunming, China, on June 26, 1944, but which, because of difficulties of communication from Kunming, was cabled to the President from New Delhi on June 28, 1944. This was divided into two parts, the first part being a quick résumé of the political situation in China and of my talks in the days immediately preceding with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; and the second part, a résumé of the military situation, its implications and requirements.

Second, a formal report to President Roosevelt covering whole trip, including also certain longer term proposals about American policy in China which I presented in person at the White House on July 10, 1944.

These were the only documents originated by me and contained all recommendations of mine resulting from the trip. Mr. Vincent, of course, transmitted to the State Department the detailed, reportorial account of my conversations with the Generalissimo which have already been published in the State Department White Paper.

There has been testimony before the Senate Internal Security Committee that Messrs. Vincent and Lattimore were members of the Communist Party at that time and were relied on by the party leadership to "guide" me along the party line. Hence it is important to specify the parts that these two men took in the recommendations that I presented to President Roosevelt. As to Mr. Lattimore, he had no part whatever. He did not contribute to and to the best of my knowledge knew nothing about either the cable from New Delhi or the formal report to the President delivered in Washington. He offered me no political advice any time sufficiently significant to be recalled now, and when we were together, he talked chiefly about scholarly subjects of a common interest such as the history of Chinese agriculture and the relationship of the nomadic tribes with the settled peasantry.

Mr. Vincent as the designated representative of the State Department was naturally consulted by me when we were travelling together. Aside from serving as reporter at the meetings with Chiang Kai-shek, his most important part was his assistance in the preparation of the two-part cable sent from New Delhi. In Kuoming, the knowledge I had already gained in Chungking of the urgency of the Chinese situation, and of the grave dangers of the Japanese offensive then going on in East China was heavily underlined by General C. L. Chennault's presentation to me of the current military picture. In the light of this presentation and in response to Chinag Kai-shek's request made of me on June 24 I

decided to cable President Roosevelt on June 26. Mr. Vincent joined in the advance discussions of the projected cable, was present while it was drafted, and concurred in the result. The finished cable was, of course, mine but I was disturbed by the fact that I was making far-reaching recommendations without having had an opportunity to consult the Theater Commander, General Joseph Stilwell. My recommendations were so drastic that Vincent would certainly have urged that I get in touch with General Stilwell if he (Vincent) had had objections. Instead Vincent concurred in the cables of June 28.

On the other hand, as both Mr. Vincent and Secretary of State Dean Acheson have stated, Mr. Vincent took no part in the preparation of my formal report to President Roosevelt on July 10 and to the best of my knowledge was not aware of its contents. I wrote the July 10 report myself and went alone to the White House to present it to the President. In doing the work of writing I made use of various memoranda which had accumulated during the journey, some no doubt from Vincent. However, the strongest influence on me in preparing this final report of July 10 was my recollection of the analyses offered me by our then Ambassador to China, Clarence E. Gauss, who later occupied one of the Republican places on the Export-Import Bank Board.

With regard to the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28, it should be said that the military recommendations contained therein were the most important contribution I made while in China. These recommendations were that *China be separated* from the command of General Stillwell, that General Wedemeyer should be considered in the choice of a new military commander in China, and that the new commander should be given the additional assignment of "*Personal representative*" of the President of Chungking. The name and record of General Wedemeyer are enough to indicate that the purport of these recommendations was the opposite of pro-Communist.

Some months later the change of military command I proposed to the President was carried out at the most urgent plea of Chiang Kai-shek. History suggests that if my recommendations had been followed when made, the Generalissimo would have avoided the disasters resulting from the Japanese offensive in East China later that summer. And if Chiang's government had thus been spared the terrible enfeeblement resulting from the disasters, the chances are good the Generalissimo would have been ruling China today.

The political section of Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 should be read with the atmosphere of that time in mind. Much emphasis had been placed from the very beginning of the war on the primary importance of "beating the Japs," and by the spring of 1944 even the most conservative American publications were urging that the Chinese communists could contribute substantially to this end. Roosevelt talked to me before I left, not about political coalition in China, but about "getting the two groups together to fight the war." Chiang Kai-shek for internal political reasons had, on his own initiative so I was informed, opened talks between the Nationalists and the Communists but, so he told me, with no prospect for success. When I cabled the President that "the attitude of Chiang-Kai-shek towards the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long term settlement" I was referring not to "political coalition" but to this "military problem" of "getting the two groups together to fight the war." On the other hand, when I said that the disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand," I was, of course, warning against the possibility of a Communist political triumph in China.

The July 10 report does not recommend any political coalition between the government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinest communists. It was written, however, against a Chinese political background which is still quite unknown to most Americans. In brief, one of the worst of several ills from which the Chungking government was suffering at the time, was the absolute control of all positions of political, military, and economic power by an extreme pro-Asian anti-American group within the Kuomintang. This was much emphasized by Ambassador Gauss who plainly stated that this group in Chungking was doing the Chinese communists' work for them. The more Western-minded, more efficient and more pro-American Chinese Nationalist leaders had been so completely driven from power that Dr. T. V. Soong's appearance as interpreter at my talks with the Generalissimo was authoritatively reported to be his first emergence from a sort of informal house arrest, while the most highly praised of the Chinese Generals, General Chen Cheng, now Prime Minister in Formosa, had been dismissed from all command some months before. These factors are hinted at in my report to Roosevelt on July 10 in which it is noted as "significant" that

"T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions (with the Generalissimo) except as interpreter," while General Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Generals Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi as the sort of men who might rally the Chinese armies to greater efforts.

In this concluding section of this final report to President Roosevelt on July 10, a coalition is in fact suggested but not with the Communists. Instead President Roosevelt is urged to use American political influence to "support" the "progressive banking and commercial leaders," the "large group of western trained men," and the "considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry." In short I urged President Roosevelt to help the Genelarissimo's government to help itself, by bringing back to power the better men in the Chinese Nationalist ranks. These better and more enlightened Nationalists, being more able to stand on their own feet, were somewhere more independent of the Generalissimo than the extreme pro-Asia groups.Hence it was necessary to point out to President Roosevlt that if the desired changes were made in the Chinese Nationalist government, the Generalissimo's future would depend on his "political sensitivity," and his ability to make himself the real leader of the reconstituted administration. Internal reform at Chungking was, in short my proposed means of avoiding the "revolution" and insuring the "evolution" that are referred to earlier in this report of July 10. It is worth noting that the Generalissimo must have been thinking along parallel lines, since the extremists began to lose their control and Dr. Soong and General Chen Chang were brought back to power by the Generalissimo himself during the same month that I rendered my report to President Roosevelt.

Such were the recommendations, such was the direction of the influence of my trip to the Far East in the spring of 1944. During the years immediately following the end of the war my thinking about Chinese problems underwent a sharp change. My views during this later period are known as are now my views in 1944. Recent events have led me to the conclusion that my judgment in 1944 was the sound judgment. I append herewith a copy of the two-part Kunming-New Delhi cable of June 28 in the War Department paraphrase given to me when I returned to Washington and of the final report to President Roosevelt of July 10 as presented by me to him.

Wishing you health and strength in shouldering the tremendous burdens ahead, Mrs. Wallace joins me in asking you to convey to Mrs. Truman and Margaret our best regards,

Sincerely yours,

HENRY A. WALLACE.

JULY 10, 1944.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am handing you herewith a report on my trip to the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

H. A. WALLACE.

JULY 10, 1944.

SUMMARY REPORT OF VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S VISIT IN CHINA

Our first stop in China was at Tihua (Urumchi), capital of Sinkiang province. The Governor, General Sheng Shih-tsai, is a typical warlord. The Government is personal and carried out by thorough police surveillance. Ninety percent (90%) of the population is non-Chinese, mostly Uighur (Turki). Tension between Chinese and non-Chinese is growing with little or no evidence of ability to deal effectively with the problem. General Sheng, two years ago pro-Soviet, is now anti-Soviet, making life extremely difficult for the Soviet Consul General and Soviet citizens in Sinkiang.

There seems little reason to doubt that the difficulties in the early spring on the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia border were caused by Chinese attempts to resettle Kazak nomads who fled into Outer Mongolia, were followed by Chinese troops who were driven back by Mongols. The Soviet Minister in Outer Mongolia stated that Mongolian planes bombed points in Sinkiang in retaliation for Chinese bombings in Outer Mongolia. He did not appear concerned regarding the situation now.

Soviet officials placed primary responsibility on General Sheng for their difficulties in Sinkiang but our Consul at Tihua and our Embassy officials felt that Sheng was acting as a front for Chungking, willing or unwittingly. Sinkiang is an area which will bear close watching.

Due to bad weather at Chungking, we stopped for 2 hours at the large 20th Bomber Command (B–29) airfield near Chengtu. The first bombing of Japan had taken place only a few days before. We found morale good but complaint was freely made of inability to obtain intelligence regarding weather and Japanese positions in north China and leak of intelligence to the Japanese.

Summary of conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek is contained in a separate memorandum. Principal topics discussed were: (1) Adverse military situation which Chiang attributed to low morale due to economic difficulties and to failure to start an all-out Burma offensive in the spring as promised at Cairo; (2) Relations with the Soviet Union and need for their betterment in order to avoid possibility of conflict (Chiang, obviously motivated by necessity rather than conviction, admitted the desirability of understanding with USSR, and requested our good offices in arranging for conference); (3) Chinese Government-Communist relations, in regard to which Chiang showed himself so prejudiced against the Communists that there seems little prospect of satisfactory or enduring settlement as a result of the negotiations now under way in Chungking; (4) Dispatch of the United States Army Intelligence Group to north China, including Communist areas, to which Chiang was initially opposed but on last day agreed reluctantly but with apparent sincerity; (5) Need for reform in China, particularly agrarian reform, to which Chiang agreed without much indication of personal interest.

It was significant that T. V. Soong took no part in the discussions except as an interpreter. However, in subsequent conversations during visits outside of Chungking he was quite outspoken, saying that it was essential that something "dramatic" be done to save the situation in China, that is was "five minutes to midnight" for the Chungking government. Without being specific he spoke of need for greatly increased United States Army air activity in China and for reformation of Chungking government. He said that Chiang was bewildered and that there were already signs of disintegration of his authority. (Soong is greatly embittered by the treatment received from Chiang during the past half year.)

Conversations with Ambassador Gauss and other Americans indicated discouragement regarding the situation and need for positive American leadership in China.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent called on Dr. Sun Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun had little to contribute. He was obviously on guard. Madame Sun was outspoken. She described undemocratic conditions to which she ascribed lack of popular support for government; said that Dr. Sun Fo should be spokesman for liberals who could unite under his leadership; and advised Mr. Wallace to speak frankly to President Chiang who was not informed of conditions in China. Madame Sun's depth and sincerity of feeling is more impressive than her political acumen but she is significant as an inspiration to Chinese liberals. Dr. Sun Fo does not impress one as having strength of character required for leadership but the fact that he is the son of Sun Yat-sen makes him a potential front for liberals.

Mr. Vincent talked with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, former Foreign Minister and for many years Ambassador in London, and to K. P. Chen, leading banker. They see little hope in Chiang's leadership. Dr. Quo spoke in support of Sun Fo under whom he thought a liberal coalition was possible. Quo is an intelligent but not a strong character. K. P. Chen said that economic situation had resolved itself into a race against time; that new hope and help before the end of the year might be effective in holding things together.

Conversations with other Chinese officials in Chungking developed little of new interest. The Minister of Agriculture (Shen Hung-lieh, who incidentally knows little about agriculture) showed himself an outspoken anti-communist. General Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War, also an anti-communist, is influential as a political rather than a military general. Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, a leading reactionary party politician, also had little to say. Ironically, he took Mr. Wallace to visit the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives which he is endeavoring to bring under his control to prevent their becoming a liberalizing social influence.

Conversations with provincial government officials were also without much significance. As an indication of political trends, there were unconfirmed reports that the provincial officials in Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces were planning a coalition to meet the situation in the event of disintegration of central government control. In Szechuan province the Governor, Chang Chun, is a strong and loyal friend of President Chiang. The loyalty of military factions, however, is uncertain. In Kansu province the Governor, Ku Cheng-lun, is a mild appearing reactionary who, during his days as Police Commissioner in Nanking, earned the title of "bloody Ku."

Developments subsequent to conversations with General Chennault and Vincent in Kunming and Kweilin have confirmed their pessimism with regard to the military situation in east China. There was almost uniform agreement among our military officers that unification of the American military effort in China, and better coordination of our effort with that of the Chinese, was absolutely essential. It was also the general belief that, the Japanese having during recent months made China an active theatre of war, it was highly advisable to take more aggressive air action against such Japanese bases as Hankow, Canton, Nanking and Shanghai. However, the factor of loss of Chinese life at those places was recognized as an important consideration. It was the consensus that Chinese troops, when well fed, well equipped, and well led, can be effectively used. A number of Chinese generals were mentioned as potentially good leaders. Among them were Generals Chen Cheng, Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi.

In Outer-Mongolia there is considerable evidence of healthy progress, military preparedness, and nationalistic spirit. Soviet influence is without doubt strong but political and administrative control appear to be in the hands of the capable Mongols. Any thought of resumption of effective Chinese sovereignty would be unrealistic. On the contrary, it is well to anticipate considerable agitation in Inner-Mongolia for union with Outer-Mongolia after the war.

Specific conclusions and recommendations regarding the situation in China were incorporated in telegrams dispatched from New Delhi on June 28 (copies attached).

We should bear constantly in mind that the Chinese, a nonfighting people, have resisted the Japanese for seven years. Economic hardship and uninspiring leadership have induced something akin to physical and spiritual anemia. There is widespread popular dislike for the Kuomintang government But there is also strong popular dislike for the Japanese and confidence in victory.

Chiang, a man with an oriental military mind, sees his authority threatened by economic deterioration, which he does not understand, and by social unrest symbolized in Communism, which he thoroughly distrusts; and neither of which he can control by military commands. He hoped that aid from foreign allies would pull him out of the hole into which an unenlightened administration (supported by landlords, warlords and bankers) has sunk him and China.

Chiang is thorough "eastern" in thought and outlook. He is surrounded by a group of party stalwarts who are similar in character. He has also, reluctantly, placed confidence in westernized Chinese advisers (his wife and T. V. Soong are outstanding examples) with regard to foreign relations. Now he feels that foreign allies have failed him and seeks in that and the "communist menace" a scapegoat for his government's failure. His hatred of Chinese communists and distrust of the USSR cause him to shy away from liberals. The failure of foreign aid has caused him to turn away from his uncongenial "western" advisers and draw closer to the group of "eastern" advisers for whom he has a natural affinity and for whom he has been for years more a focal point and activating agent of policy than an actual leader.

At this time, there seems to be no alternative to support of Chiang. There is no Chinese leader or group now apparent of sufficient strength to take over the government. We can, however, while supporting Chiang, influence him in every possible way to adopt policies with the guidance of progressive Chinese which will inspire popular support and instill new vitality into China's war effort. At the same time, our attitude should be flexible enough to permit utilization of any other leader or group that might come forward offering greater promise.

Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely the latter.

Possible Policy Line Relative to Liberal Elements in China

Our policy at the present time should no tbe limited to support of Chiang. It is essential to remember that we have in fact not simply been supporting Chiang, but a coalition, headed by Chiang and supported by the landlords, the warlord group most closely associated with the landlords, and the Kung group of bankers.

We can, as an alternative, support those elements which are capable of forming a new coalition, better able to carry the war to a conclusion and better qualified for the postwar needs of China. Such a coalition could include progressive banking and commercial leaders, of the K. P. Chen type, with a competent understanding both of their own country and of the contemporary Western world; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not limited to perpetuation of the old, landlord-dominated rural society of China; and the considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither subservient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry.

The emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting both American military aid and economic aid, and by the formulation and statement of American political aims and sympathies, both in China and in regions adjacent to China.

The future of Chiang would then be determined by Chiang himself. If he retains the political sensitivity and the ability to call the turn which originally brought him to power, he will swing over to the new coalition and head it. If not, the new coalition will in the natural course of events produce its own leader.

Paraphrase of Vice President Wallace's Message to the President, Drafted in Kunming June 26 and Dispatched From New Delhi About June 28

Message No. 1

The discussions between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and those of the Chinese Government are taking place in Chungking but the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement. Chiang has assured me that only "political" measures will be used to reach a settlement.

Chiang expressed a desire for an improvement in relations with Russia and for our assistance in bringing about a meeting of representatives of China and Russia. I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.

The economic, political, and military situations in China are extremely discouraging. The morale of the Chinese is low and demoralization is a possibility with resulting disintegration of central authority. With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do, and the Chinese appear incapable of coping with it. However, a general collapse does not seem imminent. Instability and tenseness characterize the political situation with a rising lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the Kuomintang. With regard to the military situation, I can only say that it might be worse. It is critical in Hunan Province. Potentialities and plans are in existence for stiffening China's defense south of the city of Hengyang but there is a serious threat that east China may be severed from contact with west China. Morale in remaining free China would of course be affected by such a development.

Prior to the receipt of your message of June 23 on the subject of a U. S. Army observer group proceeding to north China to obtain military intelligence, Chiang had informed me of his agreement to the dispatch of the group as soon as it could be organized. After receipt of your telegram I again discussed the matter in detail with Chiang. General Ferris, Chief of Staff in charge of General Stilwell's Headquarters at Chungking, was present and we obtained what should prove to be the full cooperation of Chiang in arranging for the early dispatch and effective operation of the group.

Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation; bewildered regarding the economic situation, and, while expressing confidence in his army, distressed regarding military developments. Current military reverses are attributed by him to low morale caused by economic difficulties. He is convinced that a general offensive in Burma early this year would have bolstered the Chinese will to resistance and have prevented military reverses. He has assured me that the Chinese will continue to resist to the limit of their ability but he displays discouragement rather than optimism.

Our need is vital for a more vigorous and better coordinated United States Government representation in China. In its military and related political aspects our effort in China requires more positive direction and closer cooperation with the Chinese if this area is to be an effective basis of operations against the Japanese.

Message No. 2

There is a strong probability that east China will be severed from west China in the near future. It is the general opinion that such a development can only be prevented by unforeseeable chance. There are various estimates with regard to the rapidity with which the Japanese may be able to carry out their intentions. Although the time factor may be longer than most people seem to expect, I feel that we should be prepared to see all of east China in Japanese hands within three or four weeks.

The loss of east China will nullify our military effort in this area. It will also prove a violent political and economic shock to the Chungking regime.

China may be rendered almost valueless as an Allied military base unless determined steps are taken to halt the disintegrative process. Popular and military morale, both seriously impaired already, must somehow be strengthened. A new offensive effort must somehow be organized, primarily guerilla in character probably.

It is necessary also to consider political forces. Disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave in China a political vacuum which will be filled in ways which you will understand.

The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available information to show you how serious is the situation. However, the situation is far from hopeless and may actually be turned to both military and political advantage if the right steps are taken promptly. The Generalissimo is alarmed, anxious for guidance, and, I believe, prepared to make drastic changes if wisely approached. Insecurity has undermined vested interests in the Government. It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least the semblance of a united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton de Wiart occupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military situation.

An American General officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political considerations. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake the assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should not be removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions; (2) command all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with a right to deal directly with the White House on political questions or China may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.

Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation here to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a representative should be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is finally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it degenerates too far.

While I do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.

I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular, I regret not having been able to see General Stilwell and get his views. Nevertheless, I am convinced of the need for the decisive action summarized in the final paragraph of my previous message.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Bern, Switzerland, March 7, 1950.

Hon. JOHN E. PEURIFOY,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR JACK: I am sorry about all of the trouble that is being raised for you as a result of charges made against the Department. You and the Secretary have my full confidence and support, if needed.

A friend has sent me a copy of the Congressional Record of February 20. I gather that I have been "identified" in the press as Senator McCarthy's case No. 2. I am, in fact, one of our "foreign ministers" although the job is hardly what I would call "high brass." Also, I did misplace a piece of clothing one time in 1946. But I must profess myself amazed that the incident became a matter of record, if in fact it has as Senator McCarthy's story would seem to imply. It was not my piece of clothing. It was a raincoat which some visitor left behind in the Far Eastern Office, of which I was Director at the time, and which hung there for weeks. One rainy day, having no coat with me, I put this raincoat on to go to lunch. Returning, I stopped at a Department washroom and forgot to take the raincoat when I left. Some days later, I recalled the oversight and called the Building Guard Office, where I learned that the coat had been found and turned over to the Department's Security or Control Office. I have forgotten with whom I spoke in that office, but he informed me that there was a piece of paper in the inside breast pocket containing writing in what looked like Russian. I explained the history of the coat and asked whether the writing gave a clue to ownership. He did not know, but subsequent examination showed the writing, as I recall it, to be a practice or exercise in Russian word endings or suffixes, presumably the work of someone studying Russian. The coat was returned to the Far Eastern Office. When we moved from Old State to New State in 1947, I appropriated the coat and still have it. That is the history of the "clothing." I shall be glad to return the raincoat to the real owner, should his memory as to where he left it be revived by Senator McCarthy's story.

As to the main portion of the Senator's statement, I must profess complete ignorance. I have never acted directly or indirectly to provide espionage agents of Russia, or any other country, with information in the State Department or from any other governmental source. Therefore, the Senator's story, if it is intended to apply to me, is simply not true. Furthermore, I do not believe there were people in the Far Eastern Office capable of such action. No case of the kind ever came or was brought to my attention.

So much for that. I do not know whether the Department has a "case history" on me, but I would like to take this opportunity to let you have briefly a few facts concerning me which may be unknown to you, and to state that there are no other facts pertinent to the situation which is troubling Senator McCarthy.

As to family, just in case the question should arise: My mother died when I was a child. My father died in 1938. He was a real-estate agent and an active member of the Baptist Church. My stepmother is 76; lives in Macon, Georgia; and is as active in the Baptist Church as her age (76) will permit. My brother is a banker in Spartanburg, South Carolina. Sister is married to Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, USN, who recently rescued the USS *Missouri*. I have various and sundry cousins with whom I have virtually lost contact, but I have never heard anything derogatory regarding them. I have two nephews who served in the Armed Forces during the late war.

My wife has two brothers, John and Fred Slagle. They are in the insurance business, one at Chicago and the other at Kansas City. Both, as I understand it, are respected and sturdy Republicans. My wife's parents have been dead for many years. So much for family.

As for myself: I have never joined any political organization, "front" or otherwise. For one year, I think it was 1945, I was made an honorary or noncontributing member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Service abroad has made it impracticable to join a political party. I am a Jeffersonian democrat, a Lincolnian republican, and an admirer since youth of Woodrow Wilson. I am a member of the Cosmos Club, Washington, the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity, and the Baptist Church.

I have never knowingly associated with American Communists or Communist sympathizers. I say "American," because my official duties have from time to time caused me to be in contact with foreign Communists. Chou En-Lai, for instance (the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Regime), I met in the house of Chang Kai-shek. He was head of a Liaison Mission to the Chungking

Government during the war. Here and in Washington, before my assignment here, and at other posts abroad, I have met foreign Communists at official or social functions. Our relationships have been perfunctory, except where official business had to be transacted.

In 1944, I accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on a mission to China. I went under instructions from the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The purpose in sending me was to make available to the Vice President my experience in China, extending back over 20 years.

As you know, my association with Far Eastern affairs has been a subject of intermittent press criticism. This was especially true while I was Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (September 1945–August 1947). During that time I served under Mr. James Byrnes and General Marshall, as Secretaries of State. My job was to implement the Government's policies, not to make them. It is immaterial that I found myself in accord with those policies. Had I not, I would have still attempted to carry them out or asked to be removed from a position where it was incumbent upon me to do so.

Any American, in public or private life, has a right to criticize our policies toward China and in the Far East and elsewhere. He does not have the right to impugn, simply on the basis of disagreeing with the policies themselves, the motives or character of those who are charged with the duty of implementing them. I have taken the oath of allegiance and loyalty to my country many times during my twenty-five years of service. The last time was in 1947, as U. S. Minister to Switzerland, after the Senate had confirmed my appointment. One is free to question my ability; but they cannot, in truth, question my loyalty. My record of public service is clear and so is my conscience.

I regret very much the circumstances that have caused me to feel it necessary to make this protest of innocence and loyalty but it is my belief that you and, if you approve, the public, have a right to expect a statement from me.

With best regard and best wishes.

Sincerely,

JOHN CARTER VINCENT, *American Minister.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
January 6, 1947.

For the press. No. 8.

Following is the substance of a note delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow on January 3, 1947, to the Soviet Foreign Office. A similar note has also been delivered by the American Embassy at Nanking to the Chinese Foreign Office.

"The American Government considers it desirable that the current unsatisfactory situation with regard to the status and control of the port of Dairen be promptly considered by the Chinese and Soviet Governments with a view to the implementation of the pertinent provisions of the Soviet-Chinese agreement of August 14, 1945, in regard to Dairen. This Government perceives no reason why there should be further delay in reopening the port, under Chinese administration, to international commerce as contemplated in the aforementioned agreement.

"The Government of the United States, while fully appreciating that this is a matter for direct negotiation between the Chinese and Soviet Governments, feels that it has a responsibility to American interests in general to raise the question with the two directly interested Governments. It hopes that the abnormal conditions now prevailing at Dairen may be terminated at an early date and that normal conditions may be established which will permit American citizens to visit and reside at Dairen in pursuit of their legitimate activities.

"In the foregong connection this Government also wishes to express the hope that agreement can be reached soon for the resumption of traffic on the Chinese Changchun Railway.

"It is believed that prompt implementation of the agreements with regard to Dairen and the railway would constitute a major contribution to the reestablishment of normal conditions in the Far East and the revival of generally beneficial commercial activity. This Government therefore would be glad to have the assurance of the Chinese and Soviet Governments that all necessary steps to this end will be taken in the near future."

ENCLOSURE TO LETTER, JANUARY 22, 1952, TO SENATOR MCCARRAN REGARDING JOHN CARTER VINCENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
October 5, 1945.

For the press. No. 732

Confidential release for publication at 7 p. m., e. s. t., Saturday, October 6, 1945. Not to be previously published, quoted from, or used in any way

Following is the text of an NBC network broadcast from the State, War, and Navy Departments, the 34th in a series entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

Subject: "Our Occupation Policy for Japan."

Participants:

1. Major General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs for the War Department.
2. Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, and Chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.
3. Captain R. L. Dennison, U. S. Navy, representative of the Navy Department, on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee.
4. Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air.

ANNOUNCER. Here are headlines from Washington:

General Hilldring says the Zaibatsu, or Japanese big business, will be broken up; states we will not permit Japan to rebuild her big combines; promises protection of Japanese democratic groups against attacks by military fanatics.

John Carter Vincent of State Department forecasts end of National Shinto; says that the institution of the Emperor will have to be radically modified, and that democratic parties in Japan will be assured rights of free assembly and free discussion.

Captain Dennison of Navy Department says Japan will not be allowed civil aviation; predicts that Japanese will eventually accept democracy, and emphasizes naval responsibility for future control of Japan.

ANNOUNCER. This is the 34th in a series of programs entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY, featuring authoritative statements on international affairs by Government officials and members of Congress. The series is broadcast to the people of America by NBC's University of the Air, and to our service men and women overseas, wherever they are stationed, through the facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Service. Printed copies of these important discussions are also available. Listen to the closing announcement for instructions on how to obtain them.

This time we present a joint State, War, and Navy Department broadcast on "Our Occupation Policy for Japan." Participating are Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department; Major General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs in the War Department, and Captain R. L. Dennison, U. S. N., Navy Department representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee. They will be interviewed by Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. Mr. Fisher. * * *

FISHER. No subject has been debated more widely by the press, radio and general public in recent weeks than our occupation policy in Japan. That debate has served a very useful purpose. It has made millions of Americans conscious of the dangers and complications of our task in dealing with 70 million Japanese.

Publication by the White House of our basic policy for Japan removed much of the confusion surrounding this debate. But it also raised many questions—questions of how our policy will be applied. To answer some of these, we have asked representatives of the Departments directly concerned—the State, War, and Navy Departments—to interpret further our Japan policy. Here in the studio are three men who help to formulate or to execute this policy from day to day. General Hilldring is an executive in his capacity as Director of the War Department. Tonight the general is sustituting for the Honorable John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, who was originally scheduled to speak but who is not now in Washington. Mr. Vincent is chairman of the Far Eastern subcommittee which formulates our Japan policy for the approval of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee, and Captain Dennison is a Navy member of this same Subcommittee. All three of our guests are "up to their ears," so to speak, in the spadework of formulating our occupation policy for Japan.

General Hilldring, a great many people seemed to think, until recently at least, that General MacArthur was more or less a free agent in laying down our policy for the Japanese. Perhaps you would start by telling us just how that policy is determined.

HILLDRING. Well, although I help execute policy instead of making it, I will try to explain how it *is* made. The State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee—"SWINC," we call it—formulates policy for the President's approval, on questions of basic importance. On the military aspect, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are obtained and carefully considered. Directives which carry the approved policies are then drawn up, to be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur. As Supreme Commander of our occupation forces in Japan, he is charged with the responsibility for carrying them out. And we think he is doing it very well.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, the Far Eastern Subcommittee of which you are chairman does most of the work of drafting the policy directives, as I understand it.

VINCENT. That's right, Mr. Fisher. We devote our entire energies to Far Eastern policy, and meet twice a week to make decisions on important matters. We then submit our recommendations to the top Coordinating Committee, with which General Hilldring is associated and which Captain Dennison and I sit with in an advisory capacity.

HILLDRING. The key members of the Coordinating Committee, representing the Secretaries of the three Departments, are Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, Artemus Gates.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, a lot of people would like to know whether there is a—shall we say—strained relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department.

VINCENT. No; there is absolutely no basis for such reports, Mr. Fisher. There is, as a matter of fact, no direct relationship between General MacArthur and the State Department. I can assure you that General MacArthur is receiving our support and assistance in carrying out a very difficult assignment.

FISHER. There have been some reports that he has not welcomed civilian advisers.

VINCENT. That also is untrue. A number of civilian Far Eastern specialists have already been sent out to General MacArthur's headquarters, and he has welcomed them most cordially. We're trying right now to recruit people with specialized knowledge of Japan's economy, finances, and so on. We expect to send more and more such people out.

FISHER. As a Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee, Captain Dennison, I suppose you've had a good opportunity to evaluate the situation. Some people don't realize that the Navy Department has a direct interest in, and voice in, our policy for Japan.

DENNISON. We have a vital interest in it. The large part that the Navy was called upon to play in the defeat of Japan is a measure of that interest. Japan is an island country separated from us by a broad expanse of ocean. Its continued control will always present a naval problem.

FISHER. What part is the Navy playing now in that control?

DENNISON. Our ships are patrolling the coasts of Japan today, and in this duty they support the occupation force. Navy officers and men will aid General MacArthur ashore, in censorship (radio, telephone, and cable) and in Civil Affairs administration. The Navy is in charge of military government in the former Japanese Mandates in the Pacific and also in the Ryukyu Islands.

FISHER. Including Okinawa?

DENNISON. Yes.

FISHER. That's not generally known, is it?

DENNISON. No, I believe not. I'd like to add that besides these immediate duties, our Navy will have to exercise potential control over Japan, where necessary, long after our troops are withdrawn.

FISHER. Now, I'd like to ask you, Mr. Vincent, as Chairman of the Subcommittee which drafts our occupation policy, to give us in a word a statement of our over-all objectives.

VINCENT. Our immediate objective is to demobilize the Japanese armed forces and demilitarize Japan. Our long-range objective is to democratize Japan—to encourage democratic self-government. We must make sure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

FISHER. And how long do you think that will take, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT. The length of occupation will depend upon the degree to which the Japanese cooperate with us. I can tell you this: The occupation will continue

until demobilization and demilitarization are completed. And it will continue until there is assurance that Japan is well along the path of liberal reform. Its form of government will not necessarily be patterned exactly after American democracy, but it must be responsible self-government, stripped of all militaristic tendencies.

FISHER. General Hilldring, how long do you think we'll have to occupy Japan?

HILLDRING. To answer that question, Mr. Fisher, would require a degree of clairvoyance I don't possess. I just don't know how long it will take to accomplish our aims. We must stay in Japan, with whatever forces may be required, until we have accomplished the objectives Mr. Vincent has mentioned.

FISHER. To what extent will our Allies, such as China and Great Britain and the Soviet Union, participate in formulating occupation policy and in carrying out the actual occupation?

HILLDRING. That is not a question which the soldiers should decide. It involves matters of high policy on which the Army must look to the State Department. I believe Mr. Vincent should answer that question.

FISHER. Well, Mr. Vincent, how about it?

VINCENT. Immediately following the Japanese surrender the United States proposed the formation of a Far Eastern Commission as a means of regularizing and making orderly the methods of consulting with other countries interested in the occupation of Japan. And Secretary of State Byrnes announced from London that a Commission would be established for the formulation of policies for the control of Japan. In addition to the four principal powers in the Far East, a number of other powers are to be invited to have membership on the Commission.

FISHER. Coming back to our first objective—General Hilldring, what about the demobilization of the Japanese Army? How far has it gone?

HILLDRING. Disarmament of the Japanese forces in the four main islands is virtually complete, Mr. Fisher. Demobilization in the sense of returning disarmed troops to their homes is well under way, but bombed-out transport systems and food and housing problems are serious delaying factors.

FISHER. And the Japanese troops in other parts of Asia?

HILLDRING. It may take a long time for them all to get home. Demands on shipping are urgent and the return of our own troops is the highest proirity. Relief must also be carried to the countries we have liberated; the return of Japanese soldiers to their homes must take its proper place.

FISHER. Captain Dennison, how long do you think it will take to clean up the Japanese forces scattered through Asia?

DENNISON. It may take several years, Mr. Fisher. After all, there are close to three million Japanese scattered around eastern Asia and the Pacific, and for the most part it will be up to the Japanese themselves to ship them home.

FISHER. And what is to be done with the Japanese Navy?

DENNISON. Such remnants as are left might well be destroyed.

FISHER. Now, there are some other less obvious parts of the military system—the police system, for example. The Japanese secret police have been persecuting liberal, antimilitarist people for many years. Mr. Vincent, what will be done about that?

VINCENT. That vicious system will be abolished. Not only the top chiefs, but the whole organization must go. That's the only way to break its hold on the Japanese people. A civilian police force such as we have in America will have to be substituted for it.

DENNISON. We've got to make sure that what they have is a police force, and not an army in the guise of police.

HILLDRING. As a matter of fact, Mr. Fisher, General MacArthur has already abolished the Kempai and political police.

FISHER. It seems to me that a key question in this whole matter, Mr. Vincent, is the relationship of our occupation forces to the present Japanese government from the Emperor on down.

VINCENT. One of General MacArthur's tasks is to bring about changes in the constitution of Japan. Those provisions in the constitution which would hamper the establishment in Japan of a government which is responsible only to the people of Japan must be removed.

FISHER. Isn't the position of the Emperor a barrier to responsible government?

VINCENT. The institution of the Emperor—if the Japanese do not choose to get rid of it—will have to be radically modified.

DENNISON. The Emperor's authority is subject to General MacArthur and will not be permitted to stand as a barrier to responsible government. Directives sent to General MacArthur establish that point.

FISHER. Can you give us the sense of the directive that covers that point, Captain Dennison?

DENNISON. I can quote part of it to you. The message to General MacArthur said, "1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.

"2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force." That's the directive under which General MacArthur is operating.

FISHER. That's clear enough. Now, General Hilldring, you have to do with our occupation policy in both Germany and Japan. What is the main difference between them?

HILLDRING. Our purposes in Germany and Japan are not very different. Reduced to their simplest terms, they are to prevent either nation from again breaking the peace of the world. The difference is largely in the mechanism of control to achieve that purpose. In Japan there still exists a national government, which we are utilizing. In Germany there is no central government and our controls must, in general, be imposed locally.

FISHER. Are there advantages from your point of view in the existence of the national government in Japan?

HILLDRING. The advantages which are gained through the utilization of the national government of Japan are enormous. If there were no Japanese government available to our use, we would have to operate directly the whole complicated machine required for the administration of a country of seventy million people. These people differ from us in language, customs and attitudes. By cleaning up and using the Japanese government machinery as a tool, we are saving our time and our manpower and our resources. In other words, we are requiring the Japanese to do their own housecleaning, but we are providing the specifications.

FISHER. But some people argue, General, that by utilizing the Japanese government, we are committing ourselves to support it. If that's the case, wouldn't this interfere with our policy of removing from public office and from industry persons who were responsible for Japan's aggression?

HILLDRING. Not at all. We're not committing ourselves to support any Japanese groups or individuals, either in government or in industry. If our policy requires removal of any person from government or industry, he will be removed. The desires of the Japanese government in this respect are immaterial. Removals are being made daily by General MacArthur.

DENNISON. Our policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan, not to support it. It's largely a matter of timing. General MacArthur has had to feel out the situation.

FISHER. Would you say, Captain Dennison, that when our forces first went to Japan they were sitting on a keg of dynamite?

DENNISON. In a sense, yes. But our general policies were set before General MacArthur landed a single man. As he has brought in troops, he has correspondingly tightened his controls in order to carry out those policies.

FISHER. He certainly has, Captain. But what about the Japanese politicians, Mr Vincent. Some of them look pretty guilty to me.

VINCENT. The old gang is on its way out. The Higashi-Kuni Cabinet resigned this week, of course. It's too early to predict exactly what the next one will be like, but we have every reason to believe it will be an improvement over the last one. If any Japanese official is found by General MacArthur to be unfit to hold office, of course, he will go out.

FISHER. Will any of the members of the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet be tried as war criminals?

VINCENT. We can't talk about individuals here, for obvious reasons. But we can say this: All people who are charged by appropriate agencies with being war criminals will be arrested and tried. Even Cabinet status would be no protection.

HILLDRING. We are constantly adding to the list of war criminals, and they are being arrested every day. The same standards which Justice Jackson is applying in Germany are being used in Japan.

DENNISON. Our policy is to catch the war criminals and make sure that they are punished—not to talk about who is a war criminal and who is not.

FISHER. All right, Captain Dennison, leaving names out of the discussion, let me ask you this: Will we consider members of the Zaibatsu—the big industrialists—who have cooperated with the militarists, and profited by the war, among the guilty?

DENNISON. We'll follow the same basic policy as in Germany. You will recall that some industrialists there have been listed as war criminals.

FISHER. General Hilldring, what are we going to do about the big industrialists who have contributed so much to Japan's war-making power?

HILLDRING. Under our policy, all fascists and jingos—militarists—will be removed, not only from public office but from positions of trust in industry and education as well. As a matter of national policy, we are going to destroy Japan's war-making power. That means the big combines must be broken up. There's no other way to accomplish it.

FISHER. What do you say about the Zaibatsu, Mr. Vincent?

VINCENT. Two things. We have every intention of proceeding against those members of the Zaibatsu who are considered as war criminals. And, as General Hilldring has said, we intend to break the hold those large family combines have over the economy of Japan—combines such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, to name the most prominent.

FISHER. And the financial combines as well?

VINCENT. Yes. General MacArthur, as you've probably heard, has already taken steps to break the power of the big financial combines and strip them of their loot.

FISHER. Well, there's no feeling of "Don't let's be beastly to the Zaibatsu" here. * * * Captain Dennison, do you want to make it unanimous?

DENNISON. There's no disagreement on this point in our committee, Mr. Fisher. There has been a lot of premature criticism. But the discovery and arrest of all war criminals cannot be accomplished in the first few days of occupation. Our policy is fixed and definite. Anyone in Japan who brought about this war, the Zaibatsu or anyone else, is going to be arrested and tried as a war criminal.

FISHER. General Hilldring, one critic has charged that our policy in Germany has been to send Americans over to help rebuild the big trusts, like I. G. Farbenindustrie. He expressed the fear that a similar policy would be followed in Japan. What about that?

HILLDRING. I can say flatly, Mr. Fisher, that we are *not* rebuilding the big trusts in Germany, we ***have not*** rebuilt them, and we ***are not going to*** rebuild them in the future. The same policy will prevail in Japan. Moreover, not only will we not revive these big trusts but we do not propose to permit the Germans or Japanese to do so.

FISHER. And that applies to all industries that could be used for war purposes?

HILLDRING. The Japanese will be prohibited from producing, developing, or maintaining all forms of arms, ammunitions or implements of war, as well as naval vessels and aircraft. A major portion of this problem will involve the reduction or elimination of certain Japanese industries which are keys to a modern war economy. These industries include production of iron and steel, as well as chemicals, machine tools, electrical equipment and automotive equipment.

VINCENT. This, of course, implies a major reorientation of the Japanese economy, which for years has been geared to the requirements of total war. Under our close supervision, the Japanese will have to redirect their human and natural resources to the ends of peaceful living.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, won't this create a lot of unemployment? Is anything being done to combat unemployment—among the millions of demobilized soldiers, for example?

VINCENT. Our policy is to place responsibility on the Japanese for solving their economic problems. They should put emphasis on farming and fishing, and the production of consumer goods. They also have plenty of reconstruction

work to do in every city. And we have no intention of interfering with any attempts by the Japanese to help themselves along these lines. In fact, we'll give them all the encouragement we can.

FISHER. What do you think they'll do with the workers who are thrown out of heavy war industry?

VINCENT. They'll have to find jobs in the light industries that Japan is allowed to retain. The general objective of this revamping of Japan's industrial economy will be to turn that economy in on itself so that the Japanese will produce more and more for their domestic market.

FISHER. They'll have to have some foreign trade, of course, to keep going.

VINCENT. Of course, but not the unhealthful sort they had before the war. A large portion of Japan's prewar foreign trade assets were used for military preparations, and not to support her internal economy; after all, scrap iron and oil shipments didn't help the Japanese people. You could reduce Japan's foreign trade well below the prewar level and still have a standard of living comparable to what they had before the war.

FISHER. There have been some dire predictions about the food situation over there, and even some reports of rice riots. General Hilldring, what will our policy be on food?

HILLDRING. General MacArthur has notified the War Department that he does not expect to provide any supplies for the enemy population in Japan this winter. This statement is in harmony with the policy we have followed in other occupied enemy areas. That is to say, we will import supplies for enemy populations only where essential to avoid disease epidemics and serious unrest that might jeopardize our ability to carry out the purposes of the occupation. The Japanese will have to grow their own food or provide it from imports.

FISHER. They'll need some ships to do that. Captain Dennison, are we going to allow Japan to rebuild her merchant marine?

DENNISON. We've got to allow her to rebuild a peacetime economy—that's the price of disarming her. That means trade. But the question of whose ships shall carry this trade hasn't been decided yet. We know we must control Japan's imports, in order to keep her from rearming—and the best way to do that may be to carry a good part of her trade on Allied ships.

FISHER. Captain Dennison, what about Japan's civil aviation? A lot of people were quite surprised recently when General MacArthur allowed some Japanese transports planes to resume operations.

DENNISON. That will not be continued, Mr. Fisher. Under the terms of General MacArthur's directive in this field, *no civil aviation* will be permitted in Japan.

VINCENT. Such aviation as General MacArthur did allow was to meet a specific emergency. It will not be continued beyond that emergency.

FISHER. In this revamping of Japan's economy, Mr. Vincent, will the hold of the big landholders be broken, as you have said the power of the big industrialists will be?

VINCENT. Encouragement will be given to any movement to reorganize agriculture on a more democratic economic base. Our policy favors a wider distribution of land, income, and ownership of the means of production and trade. But those are things a democratic Japanese government should do for itself—and will, I have no doubt.

FISHER. And the labor unions? What about them?

VINCENT. We'll encourage the development of trade unionism, Mr. Fisher, because that's an essential part of democracy.

FISHER. I understand a lot of the former union leaders and political liberals are still in jail. What has been done to get them out?

VINCENT. General MacArthur has already ordered the release of all persons imprisoned for "dangerous thoughts" or for their political or religious beliefs.

FISHER. That ought to provide some new leadership for the democratic forces in Japan. Captain Dennison, to what extent are we going to help those forces?

DENNISON. Our policy is one of definitely encouraging liberal tendencies among the Japanese. We'll give them every opportunity to draw up and to adopt a constructive reform program.

VINCENT. All democratic parties will be encouraged. They will be assured the rights of free assembly and public discussion. The occupation authorities are to place no obstruction in the way of the organization of political parties. The Japanese Government has already been ordered to remove all barriers to freedom of religion, of thought, and of the press.

FISHER. I take all this to mean that all democratic and antimilitarist groups will all be allowed free rein. But, Mr. Vincent, suppose some nationalistic group tried to interfere with them, using gangster methods?

VINCENT. It would be wiped out. One of General MacArthur's directives calls for "the encouragement and support of liberal tendencies in Japan. It also says that "changes in the direction of modifying authoritarian tendencies of the government are to be permitted and favored."

FISHER. And if the democratic parties should find it necessary to use force to attain *their* objectives?

VINCENT. In that event, the U. S. Supreme Commander is to intervene only where necessary to protect our own occupation forces. This implies that to achieve liberal or democratic political ends, the Japanese may even use force.

DENNISON. We are *not* interested in upholding the status quo in Japan, as such. I think we should make that doubly clear.

FISHER. One of the most interesting developments in recent weeks has been the apparent revival of liberal and radical sentiment in Japan. I understand that the leaders of several former labor and socialist political groups are getting together in one party—a Socialist Party. What stand will we take on that, General Hilldring?

HILLDRING. If the development proves to be genuine, we will give it every encouragement, in line with our policy of favoring all democratic tendencies in Japan. And we'll protect all democratic groups against attacks by military fanatics.

FISHER. You intend to do anything that's necessary, then, to open the way for the democratic forces.

HILLDRING. We're prepared to support the development of democratic government even though some temporary disorder may result—so long as our troops and our over-all objectives are not endangered.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, will we do anything about reforming Japan's election laws?

VINCENT. The Japanese themselves have already advocated some reforms in the election laws, to reduce the age of male voters from 25 to 20, and to permit women of 25 years and over to vote. We'll give every encouragement to such reforms; but they can be brought about by the Japanese people themselves, if they have a government that does more than pay lip service to democracy.

FISHER. I have one more question of key importance, Mr. Vincent. What will be done about Shintoism, especially that branch of it that is called National Shinto?

VINCENT. Shintoism, insofar as it is a religion of individual Japanese, is not to be interfered with. Shintoism, however, insofar as it is directed by the Japanese Government, and is a measure enforced from above by the government, is to be done away with. People would not be taxed to support National Shinto and there will be no place for Shintoism in the schools. Shintoism as a state religion—National Shinto, that is—will go.

FISHER. That's the clearest statement I have heard on Shinto.

VINCENT. Our policy on this goes beyond Shinto, Mr. Fisher. The dissemination of Japanese militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in any form will be completely suppressed. And the Japanese Government will be required to cease financial and other support of Shinto establishments.

FISHER. And what about the clean-up of the Japanese school system? That will be quite a chore, Mr. Vincent.

VINCENT. Yes; but the Japanese are cooperating with us in cleaning up their schools. We will see to it that all teachers with extreme nationalist leanings are removed. The primary schools are being reopened as fast as possible.

DENNISON. That's where the real change must stem from—the school system. The younger generation must be taught to understand democracy. That goes for the older generation as well.

FISHER. And that may take a very long time, Captain Dennison.

DENNISON. How long depends on how fast we are able to put our directives into effect. It may take less time than you think, if we reach the people through all channels—school texts, press, radio, and so on.

FISHER. What's the basis for your optimism, Captain?

DENNISON. Well, Mr. Fisher, I've had opportunity to observe a good many Japanese outside of Japan. The Japanese-Americans in Hawaii used to send their children to Japan at the age of about seven, I think, to spend a year with their grandparents. The contrast between the life they found in Japan and the life they had in Hawaii was so clear that the great majority returned to Hawaii completely loyal to the United States. They proved their loyalty there during the war.

FISHER. What accounts for that loyalty?

DENNISON. Simply that they *like* life in America better. At that age, it's the ice cream, the movies, the funny papers they like. Well, I believe that the people in Japan will like our ways, too. I think once they have a taste of them—of real civil liberties—they'll never want to go back to their old ways.

HILLDRING. I'm inclined to agree, Captain. As a matter of fact, it's quite possible we may find Japan less of a problem than Germany, as far as retraining the people for democracy is concerned. The Nazis are hard nuts to crack—they've been propagandized so well, trained so well. The Japanese are indoctrinated with one basic idea: obedience. That makes it easier to deal with them.

VINCENT. Or it may make it more difficult, General. It depends on how you look at it. That trait of obedience has got to be replaced by some initiative, if they're to have a real, working democracy.

HILLDRING. I don't mean to say it will be easy. It won't be done overnight. And we'll have to stay on the job until we're sure the job is done.

FISHER. Mr. Vincent, what can you tell us about the attitudes of the Japanese under the occupation?

VINCENT. Well, recent indications are that the Japanese people are resigned to defeat, but anxious about the treatment to be given them. There is good evidence of a willingness to cooperate with the occupying forces. But, because of the long period of military domination they've undergone, only time and encouragement will bring about the emergence of sound democratic leadership. We shouldn't try to "hustle the East," or hustle General MacArthur, too much. Reform in the social, economic, and political structure must be a gradual process, wisely initiated and carefully fostered.

FISHER. Well thank you, Mr. Vincent, and thanks to you, General Hilldring and Captain Dennison, for a clear and interesting interpretation of our occupation policy for Japan. You've made it very plain that ours is a tough, realistic policy—one which is aimed at giving no encouragement to the imperialistic, and *every possible* encouragement to the prodemocratic forces which are now beginning to reappear in Japan.

ANNOUNCER. That was Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. He has been interviewing Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department; Major General John H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs, War Department; and Captain R. L. Dennison, Navy representative on the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee. The discussion was adapted for radio by Selden Menefee. * * * This was the 34th of a series of broadcasts on OUR FOREIGN POLICY, presented as a public service by the NBC University of the Air. You can obtain printed copies of these broadcasts at ten cents each in coin. If you would like to receive copies of the broadcasts, send $1.00 to cover the costs of printing and mailing. Special rates are available for large orders. Address your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. (Let me repeat that address for those of you who wish to write it down: Send your orders to the NBC University of the Air, Radio City, New York 20, New York. Ten cents in coin for one broadcast, $1.00 for a series of thirteen reprints.)

NBC also invites your questions and comments. Next week we expect to present a special State Department program on our Latin-American policy, with reference to Argentina and the postponement of the Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janiero. Our guests are to be Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, who has just returned from Buenos Aires, and Mr. Ellis O. Briggs, Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs. Listen in next week at the same time for this important program. Kennedy Ludlam speaking, from Washington, D. C. * * *

INDEX TO PART VII

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

Page

Acheson, Dean 2002, 2124, 2127, 2158, 2188, 2218, 2250, 2272, 2288
Adenauer, Chancellor 2188
Adler, Solomon 2214, 2215, 2250
AFL (American Federation of Labor) 2161
Allied High Commission 2184, 2188
Allied Powers 2089, 2090, 2091, 2164, 2167, 2170, 2184, 2186, 2187, 2236, 2237, 2281, 2282, 2284, 2285, 2298, 2299
Alsop, Joseph 2031, 2076, 2084, 2280
Amerasia 2088, 2089, 2090, 2092, 2110, 2111, 2114, 2120, 2121, 2148, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2182, 2183, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2191, 2213, 2241
American Association for the United Nations 2139
American B–29's 2060
American Bar Association 2270
American Civil Liberties Union 2160
American Council (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2006, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2093, 2096, 2115, 2116, 2133, 2245, 2246, 2247.
American Delegation (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2104, 2127, 2133
American Embassy (Moscow) 2295
American Federation of Labor (AFL) 2161
American Federation of Teachers National Convention 2161, 2162
American Government 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2026, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 2177, 2183, 2187, 2193, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2215, 2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295
American Legation (Bern) 2294
American Navy 2007, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 2203, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296
American Progressives 161
American Psychology Society 2162
Annual Foreign Trade Convention (Waldorf-Astoria Hotel) 2256
AP (Associated Press) 2188, 2255, 2273
Armed Forces Radio Service 2162, 2296
Army Intelligence Group (United States) 2051, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2290
Armed Forces (United States) 2001, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070–2072, 2075, 2076, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2167, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 2197–2199, 2200–2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2250, 2252, 2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301.
Associated Press (AP) 2188, 2255, 2273
Atcheson, George 2076, 2102
Atkinson, Ellen 2116
Atwood, Stanley 2161
Austern, Hilda 2115
Australian Government 2013–2016, 2170
Australian Legation (Washington) 2125

B

Bacon, Miss Ruth 2036
Bailey, K. H 2124, 2125
Ballantine, Joseph W 2106, 2120, 2123, 2124, 2127, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2141
Bank of Japan 2231

Page
Baptist Church 2294
Barnett, Robert W 2248
Barnett, Mrs. Robert W 2248
Bay Region Committee (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2138, 2139
Behrstock, Arthur 2254
Belshaw, Horace 2124, 2126, 2141
Bentley, Elizabeth 2215
Benton, Mr. William 2158
Berendsen, Sir Carl 2248
Berlin Diary 2103
Between War and Peace 2193
Bevin, Ernest 2169, 2170
Bisson, T. A 1998, 2005, 2222
Blair Lee House 2122, 2124, 2129, 2143
Blakeslee, George H 2017, 2124
Blenman, Commander William 2180–2182
Bloody Ku (Ku Cheng-lun) 2291
Bloom, Sol 2124, 2127, 2129, 2131, 2132
Bolshevik 2270
Bolton, Mrs. Frances 2124, 2127, 2133, 2248
Bomber Command (20th, Airfield) 2290
Borton, Hugh 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245
Braden, Spruille 2260, 2303
Briggs, Ellis O 2169, 2303
British Foreign Office 2250
British Government 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2090, 2091, 2125, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2187, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2265, 2297
British Troops (Hong Kong) 2017
Budenz, Louis Francis 2092, 2274, 2276, 2279, 2280
Bunce, Arthur C 2249, 2250
Bunche, Ralph 2124
Byington, Homer M 2186
Byrnes, James F. 2120, 2124, 2164, 2169, 2170, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2203, 2204, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2251, 2257, 2295, 2298

C

Cairo Declaration 2207, 2209, 2210
California University 2109
Cammon, Mr. Schuyler 2248
Canadian Government 2170
Canton-Kowloon Railway 2090, 2091
Carmode, Mr 2250
Carter, Edward C 1998, 2020, 2087, 2115, 2116, 2124, 2126, 2127, 2146, 2246, 2248
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 2020, 2021
Carter W. D 2248
Caxton Printers 2283
Central Chinese Government 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187, 2201, 2218
Central Committee (CPSU) 2270
Central Labor Council, AFL (Seattle Teachers Union) 2161
Chambers, Whittaker 2215
Changchun Railway 2295
Chang, Chun 2291
Chang, Fa-kwei 2289, 2291
Chase, Mr 2088
Chen, Cheng 2288, 2291
Chen, K. P 2290, 2292
Chen, Li-fu 2253, 2254, 2290
Chennault, Gen. C. L 2031, 2076, 2287, 2291, 2293
Chiang Kai-shek 2010, 2013, 2028, 2030, 2031, 2034, 2035, 2037, 2039, 2040–2043, 2045–2049, 2051, 2052, 2055–2061, 2063, 2064–2069, 2071–2074, 2081, 2086, 2087, 2095, 2103, 2104, 2186, 2201, 2206, 2207, 2216, 2217–2218, 2220, 2243, 2254, 2255, 2287–2294
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame 2045, 2061, 2062, 2065, 2078, 2081, 2291
Chiang, Mon-lin 2124, 2125
Childs, Marquis 2248

Page
China Aid Council 2020, 2059
China Mission (Henry Wallace Summary Report) 2037, 2038, 2080, 2081
Chinese Changchun Railway 2295
Chinese Communist Guerrilla Troops 2090, 2143, 2186, 2206, 2209, 2211
Chinese Embassy (Hong Kong) 2125
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 2290
Chinese National Assembly 2259
Chinese National Military Council 2218
Chinese Nationalist Army 2012, 2073, 2090, 2143, 2202, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212
Chinese Nationalist Goverment 2001, 2010–2013, 2044, 2046, 2056–2059, 2070, 2071, 2077, 2078, 2082, 2090, 2091, 2094, 2102, 2103–2126, 2170, 2173, 2186, 2187, 2194, 2196, 2202, 2204–2213, 2215–2217, 2219, 2250, 2253–2256, 2288, 2289, 2293, 2295
Chinese Republic 2209, 2210, 2212, 2215
Chinese Stabilization Fund 2214
Chou En-lai 2000, 2001, 2002, 2186, 2294
Christian Science Monitor 2185, 2186
Chungking Embassy 1999, 2000, 2076, 2089, 2102, 2182, 2185, 2187, 2188
Churchill, Winston 2009, 2293
CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) 2242
Civil Affairs (United States War Department) 2162, 2169, 2296, 2303
Civil Information and Education (Tokyo) 2255
Clare, Mr 2267
Clayton, Will 2124, 2127, 2128, 2259, 2268
Clubb, Oliver Edmund 1998
Coffee, John M 2243
Cohen, Ben 2218
Colclough, Capt. O. S 2181
Columbia University 2240
Combat Intelligence (Navy Department) 2181
Committee for Constitutional Government in New York 2283
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 2058
Committee on Foreign Affairs (United States House of Representatives 2129, 2131
Committee for Financing Foreign Trade 2260
Committee on Foreign Relations (United States Senate) 1997, 2129, 2131, 2201, 2203
Commonwealth Club (San Francisco) 2237
Communications Division (Navy Department) 2181
Communism-Marxism-Leninism 2270
Communist International 2066, 2067
Communist International (Workers of All Countries, United) 2066
Communist Manifesto 2270
Communist Party 2000, 2001, 2010, 2013, 2022, 2023, 2025, 2026–2028, 2039–2041, 2044–2055, 2057–2059, 2061–2064, 2066–2073, 2075–2078, 2082, 2083, 2085, 2089, 2091–2095, 2100–2103, 2112, 2121, 2126, 2146, 2156, 2157, 2160, 2161, 2172–2180, 2185–2187, 2190–2195, 2206–2209, 2211, 2212, 2214–2220, 2243, 2253, 2254, 2270, 2273, 2279, 2288, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295
Communist Party (China) 2000, 2001, 20010–2013, 2022–2026, 2039–2047, 2049, 2051–2078, 2061–2073, 2075–2078, 2082, 2083, 2094, 2102, 2103, 2146, 2177, 2185, 2186, 2195, 2206, 2212, 2216–2219, 2243, 2254, 2288, 2291, 2292, 2294.
Communist Party (France) 2010
Communist Party (Italy) 1011
Communist Party (Japan) 2089, 2091, 2121, 2160, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2185, 2187, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193.
Communist Party (New York State Committee) 2243
Communist Party (Russia) 2047, 2066, 2067, 2085, 2179, 2270
Communist Party (United States) 2046, 2047, 2049, 2053, 2054, 2112, 2160, 2161, 2214, 2215, 2243, 2279, 2294.

Page

Comparison of the Communist Party line and the activities and affiliations of certain professors at the University of Washington 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
Congress (United States) 2127, 2131, 2132, 2162, 2243, 2296
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 2242
Congressional Record 2237, 2294
Connally, Tom 2124, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2134
Connor, King Ramsey 2161
Constitution (SS) steamship 2273
Continuation of discussion on Comrade Dimitrov's report 2066
Cooke, Admiral Charles Maynard 2013
Cooperative Societies Law (Japan) 2234
Cornell University 2255
Cosmos Club 2294
Council of American-Soviet Friendship 2086, 2087
Coville, Lillian 2116, 2248
Cox, Oscar 2004
Currie, Lauchlin 2002, 2003, 2004, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2079, 2081, 2082, 2086, 2087
Crowley, George T 2004
Currie Report 2082

D

Daily Worker 2161
Davies, John Paton, Jr 2003
DeLacy, Hugh 2160, 2161
Democratic Party 2294
Dennett, Raymond 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2079, 2080, 2093, 2094, 2100, 2124, 2127, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2150.
Dennison, Capt. R. L 2157, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2296–2303.
Detroit American Federation of Teachers Convention 2162
Dickey, Mr 2124
Dickover, Mr 2124
Diet (Japan) 2231, 2234
Dilemma in Japan 2243
Dimitrov Report (continuation of discussion) 2066
Dooman, Eugene C 2124, 2127, 2153, 2155, 2193, 2250
Douglas, Helen Gahagan 2248
DuBois, Mr. (Josiah) 2222
DuBois, Miss Cora 2248
Dumbarton Oaks 2135
Dunn, James C 2124, 2127, 2163, 2193, 2297
Dyke, Gen. Ken R 2248

E

Eastern Germany 2184
Eaton, Mr 2124
Eby, Harold 2161
Edwards, Corwin D 2222, 2225
Edwards Report 2222, 2225
Eggleston, Sir Frederic 2124, 2125
Eighth Route Army 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187
Elliston, Herbert 2248
Embree, John 2248
Emmerson, John K 2003, 2063, 2156, 2248
Emperor of Japan 2094, 2095, 2159, 2162, 2165, 2170, 2174, 2176, 2296, 2298, 2299
Empress of China (SS) (steamship) 2256
Engels 2270
Epstein, Israel 2063, 2243, 2266
Ethel, Garland 2161
European Affairs Office (State Department) 2127
Export-Import Bank 2263, 2264, 2288

F

Page
Fairbank, John K---- 2018
Far East---- 2121
Far East Subcommittee of State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (FESWNCC)---- 2152, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297
Far Eastern Commission (FEC)---- 2125, 2164, 2169, 2170, 2222, 2224, 2236, 2237, 2258, 2281, 2298
Far Eastern Commission Policy (Economic Power in Japan)---- 2224
Farley, Miriam S---- 2017, 2018, 2022
Farmer, Victor---- 2124, 2125
Farquharson---- 2160
Fascist Party---- 2160, 2166, 2174
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)---- 2112, 2117, 2148, 2242
FEA (Foreign Economic Administration)---- 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2087
Fearey, Mr---- 2124
FEC (Far East Commission)---- 2125, 2164, 2169, 2170, 2222, 2224, 2236, 2237, 2258, 2281, 2298
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)---- 2112, 2117, 2148, 2242
Federal German Government---- 2185
Ferris, General---- 2074, 2075, 2292
FESWNCC (Far East Subcommittee of State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee)---- 2152, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297
Field, Frederick V---- 2219, 2220, 2221
Fish, Mr---- 2278
Fisher, Sterling---- 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2171, 2175, 2296, 2303
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy---- 2105
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA)---- 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2087
Foreign Policy Association---- 2193
Foreign Relations Committee (United States Senate)---- 1997
Foreign Service (United States)---- 2029, 2101, 2105, 2144, 2241, 2244, 2272
Foreign Service Journal---- 2240, 2242
Foreign Trade (Committee for Financing)---- 2260
Forman, Harrison---- 2185, 2186
Fortas, Abe---- 2248
Forty-fourth Street Book Fair---- 2243
Foundations of Leninism---- 2270
Fox, Manuel---- 2214
French Government---- 2010, 2170
Friedman, Julian R---- 2105, 2106, 2107, 2109, 2113, 2114, 2120, 2124, 2241, 2266

G

Gates, Artemus---- 2163, 2297
Gauss, Clarence E---- 2029, 2045, 2063, 2075, 2088, 2178, 2185, 2187, 2188, 2248, 2288, 2290
Gayn, Mark---- 2144
Geneva Conference (United Nations)---- 2267
George Washington University---- 2127
Gerig, Benjamin---- 2248
German Federal Government---- 2185
German Government (Western)---- 2184
German police---- 2184, 2185, 2188
German trusts---- 2166, 2300
Germany (Eastern)---- 2184
Germany (Soviet zone)---- 2184
Gibarti, Louis---- 2005, 2006
Gipson, J. H.---- 2283
Goglidze, Sergei---- 2083, 2084, 2085
Government of Australia---- 2013–2016, 2170
Government of Canada---- 2170
Government of France---- 2010, 2170
Government of Great Britain---- 2013–2017, 2090, 2091, 2125, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2187, 2207, 2208–2212, 2265, 2297
Government of Italy---- 2011
Government of Japan---- 2000, 2043, 2044, 2052, 2068, 2069, 2071, 2076, 2089, 2091, 2094, 2145, 2153, 2154, 2157, 2160, 2162, 2164, 2165, 2167, 2168, 2170, 2172–2176, 2208, 2226, 2229, 2231, 2235, 2283, 2285, 2299, 2301

Page
Government of the Netherlands 2170
Government of New Zealand 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2170
Government of the Philippines 2170, 2258
Government of the United States 2012, 2014, 2015–2017, 2026, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 2177, 2183, 2187, 2193, 2207, 2208–2213, 2215, 2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295
Government pouch 2103
Granich, Max 2074
Graves, Mortimer 2087, 2214, 2248
Graves, Mrs. Mortimer 2248
Great Wall of China 2206
Green, Abner 2242
Green, Gretchen 2115
Greenslade, Admiral John W 2136, 2138, 2139, 2140
Greenstein, Joseph 2220
Gregg, Joseph 2220
Grew, Joseph C 2068, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2106, 2123, 2124, 2127, 2129, 2143, 2193
Guerrilla troops (Chinese Communists) 2090, 2143, 2186, 2206, 2209, 2211
Guild Book Center 2243
Gundlach, Ralph H 2161, 2162
Gyaw, Sir Htoon Aung 2124, 2125

H

Hackwith, George 2124, 2127
Haley, Mr 2124
Harriman, Ambassador W. Averell 2041–2044
Harris, George 2248
Hart, Admiral T. C. (Senator) 2124, 2127, 2248
Hattery, Lowell 2248
Herald Tribune (New York) 2185, 2186
Hicks, Victor 2161
Higashi-Kuni Cabinet (Japan) 2166, 2299
Hilldring, Gen. John H 2157–2159, 2162–2169, 2171, 2222, 2223, 2296–2303
Hiss, Alger 2135, 2136–2138, 2140, 2141–2142, 2241
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 2270
Ho Ying-Chin 2074, 2290
Holding Company Liquidating Commission (Japan) 2225, 2229
Holland, W. L 2018, 2245
Holmes, Julius 2124, 2127
Holt, Miss Clare 2248
Honan campaign 2090, 2091
Hoover Library (Stanford University) 2250
Hornbeck, Stanley K 2017, 2097, 2099, 2135
Horne, Admiral F. J 2139
Hot Springs Conference (IPR) 2104, 2123, 2130, 2132, 2133, 2140, 2151, 2219
House of Representatives (United States) 2127, 2132
House Un-American Activities Committee 2117, 2160, 2215
Hoy Lee Chin, General 2253
Ho, Ying-Chin 2074, 2290
Hu, Chung-nan 2186
Hull, Cordell 2033–2035, 2045, 2079, 2081, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2181, 2187, 2188, 2287, 2295
Humelsine, Carlisle H 2202, 2203, 2267, 2268, 2271, 2272, 2278
Hurley, Ambassador 2000, 2063, 2094, 2107, 2117, 2143, 2144

I

Ickes, Harold L 2243, 2248
Institute of Pacific Relations 1997, 1998, 2004–2006, 2014–2020, 2023–2025, 2050, 2059, 2080, 2093, 2096, 2097–2101, 2104, 2114–2119, 2122–2124, 2127–2134, 2136, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2144, 2146–2148, 2150, 2151, 2219, 2245–2250, 2266–2269, 2294
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 2006, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2093, 2096, 2115, 2116, 2133, 2245, 2246, 2247

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (American delegation)------ 2104, 2127, 2133, 2147
Institute of Pacific Relations (Bay region committee)------ 2138, 2139
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs conference)------ 2104, 2123, 2130, 2132, 2133, 2140, 2151, 2219
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York research staff)------ 1998
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine delegation)------ 2125
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington branch)------ 1998, 2248
Intelligence Group (United States Army)------ 2051, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2290
Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan------ 2258
Inter-American Conference (Rio de Janiero)------ 2303
Italian Government------ 2011

J

Jaffe, Philip J------ 2113
James, Burton------ 2161
James, Florence B------ 2161
Japanese-American Committee for Democracy (JACD)------ 2238, 2239, 2240, 2242, 2243
Japanese-Americans (Hawaii)------ 2168, 2302
Japanese Army------ 2090, 2091, 2092, 2164, 2204, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2298
Japanese Cabinet (Higashi-Kuni)------ 2166, 2299
Japanese Cooperative Societies Law------ 2234
Japanese Diet------ 2231, 2234
Japanese Emperor-- 2094, 2095, 2159, 2162, 2165, 2170, 2174, 2176, 2296, 2298, 2299
Japanese Government------ 2000, 2043, 2044, 2052, 2068, 2069, 2071, 2076, 2089, 2091, 2094, 2145, 2153, 2154, 2157, 2160, 2162, 2164, 2165, 2167, 2168, 2170, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2208, 2226, 2229, 2231, 2235, 2283, 2285, 2299, 2301.
Japanese Holding Company Liquidating Commission------ 2225, 2229
Japanese Ministry of Finance------ 2231
Japanese Navy------ 2164, 2298
Japanese Postal Savings System------ 2231
Japanese school system------ 2168
Japanese secret police------ 2164, 2298
Japanese surrender policy------ 2145, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
Jefferson Book Store------ 2243
Jefferson School------ 2243
Jenkins, Mrs. Shirley------ 2248
Jessup, Philip C------ 2104
Johns Hopkins University------ 2145, 2146
Johnson, Hiram------ 2124, 2127
Johnson, Nelson T------ 2224
Johnstone, William C------ 2080, 2124, 2127, 2147, 2248
Johnstone, Mrs. William C------ 2248
Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States)------ 2155, 2163, 2253, 2281, 2297
Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities (Second Report of 1948 on Un-American Activities in the State of Washington)------ 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
Joint Soviet-American Commission------ 2258

K

Kauffman, James Lee------ 2223, 2224
Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark------ 2248
King, Fleet Admiral E. J------ 2181
Knowland, William F------ 2237
Koo, Ambassador Wellington------ 2256
Korean Military Government------ 2249, 2250
Ku, Cheng-lun (Bloody Ku)------ 2291
Kung Group------ 2292
Kung, Madam H. H------ 2078, 2292
Kunzru, H. N------ 2124
Kuomintang Government---- 2010, 2011, 2016, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2043, 2044, 2048, 2049, 2052, 2062, 2067, 2082, 2186, 2218, 2288, 2292
Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps------ 2090, 2187, 2206

L

Page
Labor in Nationalist China ---- 2266
Landon, Kenneth P ---- 2248
Larry ---- 2116
Lasky, Victor ---- 2240
Lattimore, Owen ---- 2003, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2063, 2075, 2076, 2080, 2081, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2115, 2117, 2118; 2119, 2120, 2145, 2147, 2150, 2222, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2266, 2287.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) ---- 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2145, 2147, 2148, 2247, 2248
League Against War and Fascism ---- 2160
Lee, Mr. Canada ---- 2242
Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder ---- 2270
Lenin ---- 2047, 2066, 2242, 2243, 2270
Lenin Memorial Meeting (Madison Square Garden) ---- 2242, 2243
Leninist Communist International ---- 2066
Library of Congress ---- 2170
Lilienthal, Philip E ---- 2115, 2249
Lin, Tso-han ---- 2044
Lindsey, Michael ---- 2248
Lippmann, Walter ---- 2248
Lo, Tse-Kai ---- 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187
Local 401, U. of W. Teachers Union ---- 2161
Locke, Edwin A ---- 2248
Lockhart, Mr ---- 2124
Luce, Henry ---- 2151, 2152
Ludden, Raymond P ---- 1998, 2003, 2063
Ludlam, Kennedy ---- 2169, 2303

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas ---- 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2158, 2163, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2172, 2174, 2175, 2177, 2193, 2223, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2283, 2286, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2301, 2302, 2303
MacLeish, Archibald ---- 2124
Madison Square Garden (Lenin Memorial Meeting) ---- 2242, 2243
Manhattan Center ---- 2242
Mao Tse-tung ---- 2186, 2270
Marines (United States) ---- 2095
Marshall Directive ---- 2195, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2202, 2203, 2215
Marshall, Gen. George C ---- 2011, 2012, 2013, 2046, 2051, 2052, 2068, 2073, 2098, 2150, 2195, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2215, 2216, 2218, 2250, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2259, 2265, 2266, 2295.
Marshall Mission ---- 2012, 2068, 2205, 2254, 2259, 2265
Marshall Plan ---- 2265
Marshall Report ---- 2013, 2254
Marx, Karl ---- 2022, 2047, 2270
Mathews, Mr ---- 2124, 2127
Mayflower Hotel (Pan American Room) ---- 2246
McCarthy, Senator Joseph M ---- 2294, 2298
McCloy, John J ---- 2163, 2184, 2296, 2297
McDermott, Mr. M. J ---- 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2183, 2184, 2186, 2187, 2188
McDermott, Maria ---- 2224
McDougall, Sir Raibeart ---- 2124
McFayden, Sir Andrew ---- 2125
McJennett, Mr ---- 2278
McMahon, Senator Brien ---- 2236, 2237
Menefee, Audrey ---- 2116, 2162
Menefee, Selden ---- 2116, 2158, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2169, 2177, 2303
Merrill, Lewis ---- 2242
Methodist Federation for Social Service ---- 2160
Meyer, Mr ---- 2124
Meyer, Eugene ---- 2248
Military Government (Korea) ---- 2249, 2250
Military Intelligence (War Department) ---- 2051, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2290

Page
Ministry of Finance (Japan) 2231
Missouri (USS) 2294
Mitsubishi (Japanese big business firms) 2166, 2171, 2300
Mitsui (Japanese big business firms) 2166, 2171, 2300
Moffat, Abbot Low 2124, 2246, 2247, 2248
Mooney, Tom 2161
Moorhead, Mrs 2248
Morizon, Col. Victor 2124, 2126

N

Naggiar, Paul Emile 2124, 2125
National Assembly (China) 2259
National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) 2116, 2160, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2296, 2303
National City Bank 2070
National Foreign Trade Council 2256, 2263
National Military Council (China) 2218
National Shinto (Japan) 2162, 2168, 2302
Nationalist Chinese Army 2012, 2073, 2090, 2143, 2202, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212
Nationalist Chinese Government 2001, 2010–2013, 2044, 2046, 2056–2059, 2070, 2071, 2077, 2078, 2082, 2090, 2091, 2094, 2102–2104, 2125, 2126, 2170, 2173, 2186, 2187, 2194, 2196, 2202, 2204, 2205–2217, 2219, 2250, 2253, 2254–2256, 2288, 2289, 2293, 2295
Naval Intelligence Division (Navy Department) 2181
Naval Operations (Office of Chief) 2180, 2181
Navy (United States) 2007, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 2202, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296
Navy radio personnel 2182
Nazi Party 2169, 2303
NBC (National Broadcasting Co) 2116, 2160, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2296, 2303
Netherlands Government 2170
New Masses 2161, 2266
News Letter (China Aid Council) 2020
News Letter (JACD) 2243
New York Committee for Constitutional Government 2283
New York Herald Tribune 2185, 2186
New York State Committee (Communist Party) 2243
New York Times 2185, 2186, 2260
New York World Telegram 2240, 2242
New Zealand Government 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2170
North Pacific Conference 2061, 2062, 2064, 2065, 2066
Northwest Veteran 2160
Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China 2266

O

Obermeir, Michael 2242, 2243
Office of War Information (OWI) 2003, 2145, 2146, 2287
Okano, Susumu 2089, 2091, 2121, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2187
Ottenheimer, Albert 2161
Our foreign policy 2162, 2169, 2296
Our occupation policy for Japan 2162, 2296
OWI (Office of War Information) 2003, 2145, 2146, 2287

P

Pacific Island bases 2248
Pai, Chung-hsi 2289, 2291
Palmer, Howard 2248
Pan American Room (Mayflower Hotel) 2246
Pasvolsky 2124
Patent law license 2227
Patterson, Mr 2271
Pauley, Edwin M 2221, 2222
Pauley Commission 2222
Pauley Report 2221
Peck, Mr 2124

Page
Penfield, James K---- 2222, 2249, 2250
Pentagon Building---- 2206
Perkins, Eleanor---- 2115
Penrifoy, John E---- 2294
Philippine Government---- 2170, 2258
Philippine Rehabilitation Act---- 2258
Philippine Trade Act of 1946---- 2258
Phillips, William---- 2017
Political Reorientation of Japan (Report)---- 2236, 2237
Pollard, Mr---- 2248
Porter, Catherine---- 2248
Postsurrender policy for Japan---- 2145, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
Postal Savings System (Japan)---- 2231
Postwar Period in the Far East---- 2193
Potsdam Declaration---- 2207, 2209, 2210, 2225, 2282
Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr---- 2242
Pramoj, M. R. Seni---- 2124, 2126
Presidential Directive---- 2202, 2267, 2268
President's Loyalty Program---- 2267, 2268
Press and Radio News Conference (State Department)---- 2183
Problems of Communism---- 2270
Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution---- 2270
Quo, Tai-chi---- 2290

R

Radio City---- 2169, 2303
Radio New Conference (State Department)---- 2183
Radio personnel (Navy)---- 2182
Radio service (United States Armed Forces)---- 2162
Rally for Democratic Japan---- 2242, 2243
Rao, B. Shiva---- 2124
Rauch, Mrs---- 2138, 2141
Rea, Howard---- 1997, 2079, 2122, 2189
Reid, E---- 2124, 2125
Repertory Playhouse (University of Washington, Un-American Activities of Certain Professors)---- 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
Republic of China---- 2209, 2210, 2212, 2215
Republican Party---- 2117, 2288, 2294
Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semicolonies, Resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern)---- 2270
Riley---- 2004
Roosevelt, President Franklin D---- 2002, 2009, 2010, 2029, 2031, 2037, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2045, 2046, 2048, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2062, 2064, 2068, 2072, 2073, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2080, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2144, 2216, 2269, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2292.
Roosevelt, James---- 2284
Ropes, Clarence---- 2248
Rosinger, Laurence---- 1998, 2004, 2005, 2018, 2145
Roth, Andrew---- 2107, 2113, 2114, 2144, 2239, 2241, 2242, 2243
Royal Institute---- 2250
Russia---- 2000, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2039–2041, 2046, 2047, 2059, 2062–2067, 2071, 2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 2193–2196, 2206–2212, 2217, 2218, 2220, 2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 2270, 2287, 2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297
Russian Troops---- 2218, 2219
Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa)---- 2163, 2297

S

Sakhalin Agreement---- 2043
SCAP (Supreme Commander Allied Powers)---- 2225, 2226, 2227, 2229, 2230, 2232, 2235, 2236, 2281
Schuman---- 2184
Seattle AFL Central Labor Council (Teachers Union)---- 2161
Secret Police (Japan)---- 2164, 2298

Page
Secretariat (United Nations Conference, San Francisco) 2120, 2121, 2135, 2136, 2138
Security in the Pacific 2138
Service, John S 1997, 1998, 1999, 2003, 2063, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2083, 2113, 2114, 2213, 2214, 2240, 2241
Seville Hotel 2005, 2006
Shao, Yu-lin 2124, 2125
Shen Hung-lieh 2290
Sheng, Shih-tsai 2289, 2290
Shiga, Yoshio 2155, 2156, 2157
Shinto, National (Japan) 2162, 2168, 2302
Shirer, William 2103
Shirley 2116
Short, Joseph 2286
Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity 2294
Silvermaster Spy Group 2250
Sino-Soviet Negotiations 2062, 2065, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210
Slagel, Fred 2294
Slagel, John 2294
Smedley, Agnes 2005, 2042, 2043
Smith, Rear Adm. Allan E 2294
Snow, Edgar 2016, 2063
Socialist Party (Japanese) 2168, 2302
Soong, T. V 2041, 2042, 2043, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291
Soviet-Chinese Agreement 2295
Soviet Union 2000, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2046, 2047, 2059, 2062–2067, 2071, 2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 2193–2196, 2206–2212, 2217, 2218, 2220, 2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 2270, 2287, 2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297.
Soviet Zone (Germany) 2184
Spanish-American War 2257
Stabilization Fund (China) 2214
Stachel, Jack 1999
Staley, Eugene 2116
Stalin, Joseph 2022, 2043, 2044, 2047, 2270
Stanford University (Hoover Library) 2250
Stanton, E. F 1998, 2036, 2039, 2101, 2124, 2141
State and Revolution 2270
State Department 1997–1999, 2001, 2002, 2006–2008, 2012, 2013, 2020–2023, 2026–2028, 2032, 2035–2037, 2039, 2044, 2045, 2050–2054, 2058, 2066, 2067, 2070, 2071, 2073, 2079, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2088–2095, 2097–2102, 2105, 2106, 2109–2112, 2114, 2120–2124, 2127–2133, 2136, 2138–2149, 2151, 2152, 2156, 2157–2160, 2162, 2169, 2170, 2177, 2178, 2181, 2183, 2185, 2187, 2188, 2191, 2193–2197, 2199, 2200, 2202, 2203–2208, 2210, 2215, 2217–2219, 2221–2224, 2236, 2237, 2239, 2240–2247, 2249–2253, 2255, 2256, 2261, 2264, 2267–2272, 2273–2275, 2277, 2278, 2287, 2294–2298, 2303.
State Department (Biographical Division) 2141, 2142, 2143
State Department (Building Guard Office) 2294
State Department (Bulletin) 2170, 2195, 2196, 2208, 2210, 2277
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs) 1998, 2006, 2008, 2020, 2039, 2066, 2082, 2088, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2105, 2106, 2120, 2142
State Department (Division of Communications and Records) 2121
State Department (Division of Far Eastern Affairs) 1998, 2002, 2012, 2028, 2037, 2050, 2051, 2058, 2066, 2071, 2099, 2101, 2105, 2106, 2110, 2120, 2123, 2142, 2152, 2159, 2162, 2169, 2202, 2203, 2219, 2222, 2239, 2240, 2243, 2251, 2255, 2256, 2294–2298, 2303.
State Department (Employee Loyalty Investigations) 1997, 1998, 2073, 2241
State Department (FEC 230) 2222, 2223, 2224, 2236, 2237
State Department (Legal Advisers Office) 2237, 2274, 2275, 2278
State Department (Loyalty Board) 1997, 1998, 2073, 2241
State Department (Office of American Republic Affairs) 2169, 2303
State Department (Office of Economic Adviser) 2249
State Department (Office of European Affairs) 2127
State Department (Press Office) 2158, 2188

Page
State Department (Press and Radio News Conference) 2183
State Department (Publication No. 4255, Far Eastern Series 43) 2218, 2219
State Department (Public Relations Division) 2278
State Department (Radio News Conference) 2183
State Department (Register) 2219
State Department (Security Division) 2054, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2215, 2240, 2241, 2243, 2244, 2245
State Department (White Paper) 2039, 2049, 2055, 2088, 2201, 2206, 2251, 2253, 2269, 2287
State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 2094, 2095, 2149, 2150, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2193, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297.
Steak House (Anthony's) 2096
Stein, Guenther 2186
Steintorf, Mr 2124
Stewart, Mrs. Marguerite Ann 2115, 2116, 2118, 2147, 2148
Stewart, Maxwell S 2017, 2018, 2022, 2023, 2025, 2057
Stilwell, General Joseph 2001, 2034, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2077, 2083, 2288, 2292, 2293
Stimson, Secretary Henry L 2051, 2052
Stufflebeam, Robert E 2121–2122
Sumitomo (Japanese big business) 2166, 2171
Sunages, Mr 2250
Sunday News 2161
Sun Fo 2076, 2290
Sun, Yat-sen, Dr 2077, 2209, 2212
Sun, Yat-sen, Madam 2020, 2021, 2058, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2290
Surrender Policy for Japan 2145, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
Surrey, Walter Sterling 1997, 2079, 2122, 2189
Swing, Raymond Gram 2022, 2248
SWNCC (State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee) 2094, 2095, 2149, 2150, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2193, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297.

T

Taft, Mr. Charles P 2124, 2127
Tally-Ho Restaurant (Washington) 1999
Terrill, Katherine 2242
Third International 2046, 2062
Thomas, Elbert D 2248
Tillie 2117
Times (New York 2185, 2186, 2260
Tito for Japan 2089, 2091, 2121, 2179, 2187
Tokuda, Kyuchi 2155, 2156, 2157
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (China) 2259
Truman, President 2038, 2153, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2208, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2243, 2251, 2253, 2254, 2257, 2260, 2268, 2286, 2287, 2289
Truman, Mrs. Harry 2289
Truman, Miss Margaret 2289
Trusts (German) 2166, 2300
Turner, Bill 2101, 2117
Turner, Bruce 2124, 2125
Twentieth Bomber Command 2290
Tyler, R. G 2160, 2161

U

Un-American Activities Committee (House) 2117, 2160, 2215
Un-American Activities in Washington State 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
Unfinished Revolution in China 2266
United Nations 2120, 2121, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2149, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2220, 2236, 2267
United Nations Conference (Freedom of Information, Geneva) 2267

Page
United Nations Conference(San Francisco) 2120, 2121, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2149, 2220
United Nations (Secretariat) 2120, 2121, 2135, 2136, 2138
United Office and Professional Workers (CIO) 2242
United Press (UP) 2184
United States Air Force (USAF) 2290
United States Armed Forces 2001, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070–2072, 2075, 2076, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2167, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 2197–2199, 2200–2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2250, 2252, 2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301.
United States Congress 2127, 2131, 2132, 2162, 2243, 2296
United States Embassy (Chungking) 1999, 2000, 2076, 2089, 2102, 2182, 2185, 2187, 2188
United States Embassy (Moscow) 2295
United States Foreign Service 2029, 2101, 2105, 2144, 2241, 2244, 2272
United States Government 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2026, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 2177, 2183, 2187, 2193, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2215, 2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295.
United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2129, 2131
United States House of Representatives 2127, 2132
United States Initial Postsurrender Policy for Japan 2145, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff 2155, 2163, 2253, 2281, 2297
United States Library of Congress 2170
United States Marines 2095, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2211
United States Navy 2007, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2193, 2203, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296.
United States Policy in Korea 2249
United States Policy toward China 2196, 2198, 2200, 2208, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2218, 2251
United States Senate 1997, 2127, 2218, 2268, 2271, 2286
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1997, 2129, 2131, 2201, 2203
United States War Department 2012, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2075, 2076, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2167, 2193, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2206, 2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2250, 2252, 2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301.
University of California 2109
University of Stanford (Leland Stanford) 2250
University of the Air (NBC) 2162, 2163, 2169, 2296, 2303
University of Washington (Un-American activities of certain professors) 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
UNRRA (United Nations Rehabilitation Relief) 2003, 2259
U. of W. Teachers Union (University of Washington) 2161
UP (United Press) 2184
USAF (United States Air Force) 2290
Usene, John 2248
Ussachevsky, Betty 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2147, 2150, 2248
U. S. S. R. 2000, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2046, 2047, 2059, 2062–2067, 2071, 2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 2193–2196, 2206–2212, 2217, 2218, 2220, 2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 2270, 2287, 2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297.

V

Vincent, John Carter 1997–2121, 2122–2180, 2182–2303
Visman, Franx H 2124

W

Page

Waldorf-Astoria Hotel (Annual Foreign Trade Convention) 2256
Wallace, Henry A 2029–2048, 2051, 2052, 2055–2058, 2060, 2064, 2065, 2067, 2068, 2071, 2072, 2074–2078, 2080, 2081, 2083, 2084–2088, 2146, 2248, 2269, 2270, 2280, 2286–2290, 2292, 2295.
Wallace, Henry (Summary Report of China Mission) 2037, 2038, 2080, 2081
Wallace, Henry A. (Truman letter) 2038
Wallace, Mrs. Henry A 2289
Wallace Mission 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036–2043, 2045–2058, 2075, 2080–2087, 2269, 2270, 2286, 2295.
Wallace Mission (Goglidze Toast) 2083, 2084
Wallace Seattle speech 2084, 2085
Wang, Cheng 2186
War Department (Civil Affairs) 2162, 2169, 2296, 2303
War Department (United States) 2012, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2075, 2076, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2167, 2193, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2206, 2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2250, 2252, 2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301.
Wartime China 2022
Wartime Politics in China 2005
Ward, Harry F. 2160
Washington Commonwealth Federation 2160, 2161
Washington Star 2273
Washington State Federation of Teachers 2160
Washington State Un-American Activities Committee (Second Report of 1948) 2160, 2161, 2162, 2183
Washington University (Un-American Activities of Certain Professors) 2160–2162, 2183
Watt, Alan S 2124
Webb, Mr 2278, 2279
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C 2031, 2068, 2072, 2143, 2144, 2199, 2202–2204, 2206, 2207, 2216, 2217, 2266, 2288, 2293
Wedemeyer Report 2217
West Seattle High School 2161
Western Big Three 2183, 2184
Western German Government 2183
White House 2028, 2029, 2038, 2072, 2082, 2086, 2087, 2163, 2193, 2287, 2289, 2293, 2296
White Paper (State Department) 2039, 2049, 2055, 2088, 2201, 2206, 2251, 2253, 2269, 2287
White, Theodore 2151
Williams, Mr 2124
Wilson, Edwin 2124
Wilson, Woodrow 2294
Woltman, Frederick 2242
Workers of All Countries, Unite (Communist International) 2066
Worker's Bookshop 2243
Works Progress Administration (WPA) 2161
World Telegram (New York) 2240, 2242

Y

Yalta Agreement 2137
Yalta Conference 2136, 2137, 2138
Yang, Yun-chu 2124
Yasuda (Japanese big business) 2300
Yeh, George 2124, 2125
Yergan, Max 2243
Yoshio, Shiga 2155, 2156, 2157

Z

Zafra, Urbano A 2124, 2125
Zaibatsu (big business in Japanese language) 2162, 2166, 2171, 2225, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2235, 2284, 2296, 2300

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

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APPENDIX II

(Appendix I is contained in pt. 7 beginning on p. 2286)

CONTENTS

Vol. I

Page

Report submitted by Brig. Gen. P. E. Peabody, Chief, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C. 2305
Statement of report and conclusions 2310
1. Characterization of the Chinese Communists:
A. Most effectively organized group in China 2314
B. How Red the Red?
(1) "Chinese Communists" a misnomer for "Agrarian Democrats," according to some 2314
(2) Those who believe that the Chinese Communists are not Communists are doomed to disillusionment 2315
(3) Chinese Communist tenets: Democracy a means to achieve socialism 2315
2. Outline history of the Chinese Communist movement:
A. Period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, 1923–27:
(1) Formation of Chinese Communist Party 2318
(2) The Soviet Russian-Chinese "Entente Cordiale" 2318
(3) Chinese Communists accepted into the Kuomintang 2319
(4) The Kuomintang-Communist split 2320
B. Period of Kuomintang-Communist civil war, 1927–36:
(1) Comintern orders policy of attack on cities by Chinese Reds 2321
(2) The Chinese Soviet peasant movement 2322
(3) Growth of the Red Army and of Soviet base areas 2324
(4) Beginning of Kuomintang "extermination" campaign 2324
(5) Defeat of Soviet movement in Central China 2325
(6) The long march 2326
C. Period of the United Front and after, 1937–45:
(1) Chinese Communist Party and Comintern sponsors of the united-front movement 2327
(2) The Sian incident—Formation of the united front 2330
(3) United-front action, 1937–40:
(a) Communists expand in North and Central China 2332
(b) Democracy as practiced by the Chinese Communists 2334
(c) The high point of the Kuomintang-Communist united front: The Hankow period, 1938 2340
(d) The war against Japan becomes subordinate to the "war within the war":
1. Basic principles of Kuomintang and Communist wartime policies toward each other 2344
2. The Kuomintang enforces a military blockade of the Communist area in the Shen-Kan-Ning border region, 1939 2345
3. The struggle between Chungking Government and Chinese Communist forces for possession of guerrilla bases in East China, 1937–40 2346
4. The New Fourth Army "incident" of January 1941 2350
5. A virtual truce with the "puppet" armies while the Chungking-Communist forces continue the "war within the war," 1942–45 2354

2. Outline history of the Chinese Communist movement—Continued
C. Period of the United Front and after, 1937–45—Continued Page
(4) The Chinese Communists' war against Japan 2363
(5) International implications of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle:
(a) Attitudes of the Kuomintang toward foreign powers 2373
(b) Attitude of the Chinese Communist toward foreign powers 2375
(c) Soviet Russia's attitude toward China 2382
(d) The American stake in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle 2387
3. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party and governments in Communist-controlled areas:
A. Chinese Communist Party 2398
B. Base areas 2400
C. Government in the border regions 2401
D. People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance 2402
4. Directory of the Chinese Communist Party and Border Region Government:
A. The Chinese Communist Party 2403
B. Border region governments 2405
5. Education in Communist-controlled base areas 2405
Appendix:
Party Statutes of the Chinese Communist Party (1928) translated from Chinese 2406

Vol. II

6. Economic situation in Chinese Communist areas:
A. Economic characteristics, area and population:
(1) General 2412
(2) Economic characteristics 2412
(3) Area and population 2412
B. Economic policy, program and achievements:
(1) Economic theory 2413
(2) Present economic policies 2414
(3) The program for increased production and self-sufficiency 2415
(4) Achievements of the production program: Living standards 2416
C. Agriculture and trade:
(1) Agriculture 2417
(2) Trade 2418
D. Industry and arms production:
(1) Industry 2418
(2) Arsenals 2418
E. Transportation and communications:
(1) General 2419
(2) Roads and trails 2419
(3) Equipment and methods 2419
(4) Interference with Japanese transportation 2420
(5) Radio 2420
(6) Telegraph 2420
(7) Air transport 2420
(8) Post office 2420
F. Currency and finance:
(1) Currency 2420
(2) Prices and inflation 2421
(3) Banking and finance 2421
(4) Interest and loans 2422
(5) Taxation 2422
(6) Government income 2422
G. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region:
(1) Agriculture—general 2423
(a) Agricultural education 2423
(b) Land reclamation 2423
(c) Food production 2423
(d) Cotton 2423
(e) Salt 2424
(f) Livestock 2424
(g) Opium 2424

6. Economic situation in Chinese Communist areas—Continued
G. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region—Continued Page
(2) Industry—general 2424
(a) Cooperatives 2424
(b) Textiles 2425
(c) Iron and steel 2425
(d) Coal 2425
(e) Printing and paper 2425
(f) Petroleum 2425
(g) Miscellaneous industries 2425
(h) Arsenals 2425
(3) Trade 2426
(4) Finance:
(a) Currency 2426
(b) Inflation and prices 2426
(c) Interest and loans 2427
(d) Taxation 2427
(e) Government revenue 2427
H. The Shansi-Suiyuan border region:
(1) General 2427
(2) Arsenals 2428
I. Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh-Hopeh border region:
(1) General economic features 2428
(2) Government economic program 2428
(3) Industry and arsenals 2429
(4) Currency and taxation 2429
J. The Chansi-Hopeh-Honan border region:
(1) General 2429
(2) Agriculture 2429
(3) Industry and arsenals 2430
K. The Hopeh-Shantung-Honan border region 2430
L. The Shantung base area 2430
M. The New Fourth Army area in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang 2431
N. The Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei base of the New Fourth Army 2431
O. Bases in Kwangtung Province 2432
P. Conclusion 2432
7. The Chinese Communist Army:
A. Strength and distribution of the Chinese Communist forces:
(1) General 2435
(2) Over-all strengths 2433
(3) 18th Group Army strength and distribution 2433
(4) New 4th Army strength and distribution 2433
(5) East River military region 2434
(6) Hainan Island military region 2434
B. Organization of the Chinese Communist Army:
(1) General 2435
(2) The High Command 2435
(3) Territorial organization 2435
(4) Organization of the Army 2436
(a) Field forces 2436
1. General 2436
2. Divisions 2436
3. Brigades 2436
4. Regiments 2436
a. Type A regiments 2436
b. Type B regiments 2436
c. Type C regiments 2436
5. Battalions 2436
6. Companies 2437
(b) The local forces, or guerrilla army 2437
(c) The People's Militia 2437
1. The Youth Vanguards 2437
2. The model detachments 2437
3. Self-defense detachments 2437
4. Womens' detachments 2437

7. The Chinese Communist Army—Continued
B. Organization of the Chinese Communist Army—Continued Page
(5) Air force 2437
(6) Navy 2437
(7) Organization of the service 2437
(a) Signal communications 2437
(b) Medical service 2438
C. Training of the Chinese Communist forces:
(1) General 2438
(2) Training in weapons
(a) The rifle 2438
(b) Machine guns 2438
(c) Hand grenades 2439
(d) Bayonet training 2439
(3) Unit training:
(a) Squads, sections, and companies 2439
(b) Regiments and brigades 2439
D. Tactics of the Chinese Communist military forces:
(1) General 2439
(2) The offensive:
(a) Large-scale operations 2439
(b) Attacks against fortified areas 2439
(c) Attacks against enemy troop concentrations 2439
(d) Small-scale operations 2439
(e) Demolitions 2440
(f) Use of propaganda 2440
(3) The defensive 2440
(4) Summary of Communist tactics 2440
(5) The People's Militia:
(a) General 2440
(b) Tactical doctrine 2440
(c) Training methods 2441
(d) Tactical employments 2441
(e) Tunnel warfare 2441
(f) Mine warfare 2441
(g) Harassing warfare 2441
(6) Communist army intelligence measures 2441
E. Military weapons of the Chinese Communists:
(1) General 2441
(2) Weapons:
(a) Rifles and bayonets 2441
(b) Light machine-guns 2441
(c) Grenade dischargers and hand grenades 2441
(d) Land mines 2442
(e) Mortars and antitank guns 2442
(f) Ammunition 2442
(g) Individual equipment 2442
F. Uniform and insignia of Chinese Communist forces:
(1) Uniform 2442
(2) Insignia 2442
7. The Chinese
G. Administration and logistics of Chinese Communist forces:
(1) General 2442
(2) Procurement of supplies:
(a) General 2442
(b) Food 2442
(c) Clothing 2443
(d) Arms and ammunition 2443
(e) Other supplies 2443
(3) Distribution and transportation of supplies 2443
(4) Maintenance requirements 2443

7. The Chinese—Continued
H. Medical organization and equipment of the Chinese Communist forces: Page
(1) General 2443
(2) Line of evacuation of the sick and wounded:
(a) Company first-aid men 2444
(b) Battalion medical station 2444
(c) Regimental medical station 2444
(d) Brigade field hospital 2444
(e) Divisional fixed hospital 2444
(3) Base medical service:
(a) Hospitals 2445
(b) Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital 2445
(4) Conclusions 2446
I. Conclusions 2446
8. Charts:
No. 1. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party and border region governments facing 2448
No. 2. Strength distribution of Chinese Communist Army 2448
No. 3. Organization of class A Regiment 2449
No. 4. Organization of class C Regiment 2450
9. Who's Who in Communist China 2451

Appendix II

(Secret classfication changed to Unclassified—authority Director of Intelligence, 23 August 1949)

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 5 JULY 1945

(Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.)

1. The Problem

The problem of the Chinese Communists is not merely one of how the Communists should be dealt with; even more difficult has been the problem of determining the facts. "Authorities" on both sides have disputed the most elementary statements of fact.

It was considered by the Military Intelligence Service that this state of affairs constituted an impediment to the effective prosecution of military operations in China and in the Pacific. A major project was therefore initiated at the end of 1944, under which the most competent analysts—both civilian and military—were assigned to the examination of *all* material available, and to the compilation of a report on the Chinese Communist movement. The preparation of the report involved the examination of over 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books.

2. Fundamental Conclusions

Careful study of these materials has led to a number of basic conclusions. Appropriate qualification and detailed authentication for these conclusions is contained in the full report. The most important conclusions may be summarized as follows: (1) The "democracy" of the Chinese Communists is Soviet democracy, (2) The Chinese Communist Movement is part of the international Communist movement, sponsored and guided by Moscow. (3) There is reason to believe that Soviet Russia plans to create Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria, Korea and probably North China. (4) A strong and stable China cannot exist without the natural resources of Manchuria and North China. (5) In order to prevent the separation of Manchuria and North China from China, it is essential that, if Soviet Russia participates in the war, China not be divided (like Europe) into American-British and Russian zones of military operations.

3. Précis of Conclusions

a. high morale

The Chinese Communists are the best led and most vigorous of present-day organizations in China. Their morale is high. Their policies are sharply defined, and carried out with a devotion which is fanatical.

b. policy of establishing communism through "democracy"

The Chinese Communists emphasize two stages in their revolutionary program: first, the change of the Chinese semi-feudal society into a "bourgeois" (or capitalist) democracy; second, the establishment of communism. The first is their present goal according to their own claims. They insist, however, that the "bourgeois democracy" must have "the support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance." This objective they have achieved in their areas of control; theirs is a one-party controlled "democracy".

c. "soviet democracy"

While the Chinese Communists call their present political system "democracy", the "democracy" which they sponsor is in fact "Soviet democracy" on the pattern of the U. S. S. R. rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist

Party than is the so-called "one-party dictatorship" of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). This is indicated by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, to maintain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while minority parties which wholeheartedly accept Communist leadership are tolerated in Communist-controlled China, real opposition parties and groups are summarily suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it is also true that the Communists will be still more intolerant if they ever obtain supreme power in China.

Nevertheless, since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially the laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunities than the Kuomintang Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the areas held by their own armies than do the Nationalists in their areas of control. This is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China.

D. PART OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The Chinese Communist movement is a part of the international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have loyally supported and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism."

E. DESIRE FOR U. S. SUPPORT AGAINST JAPAN AND THE KUOMINTANG

This does not prevent the Chinese Communists from maintaining a friendly attitude toward the United States. Their attitude toward us and all capitalist democracies is conditioned, however, by the extent to which they can obtain benefits from us in the furtherance of their own revolutionary aims; the subjugation of China under Communist rule and the development of a Communist-controlled "capitalist democracy" in China as a preliminary to the introduction of communism. They would use American support to further their struggle against both Japan and the Chungking Government.

F. DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE

The Chinese Communist movement today is not represented merely by a political party; it is represented by what is a state in all but name, possessing territory, (the combined area of which is about the size of France or one-fifth of China Proper), a population of probably more than 70,000,000 people, armies, law, and money of its own. The Chinese Communist state is economically primitive, but (at a primitive level) fairly self-sufficient.

G. RIVALRY WITH THE KUOMINTANG

(1) Failure of the "Entente Cordiale"

During the period of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale*, 1923–1927, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated. The Chinese Communists promised to support the revolutionary, national, democratic program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, urged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. In 1927 the Kuomintang therefore turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia.

(2) Development of the "united front" movement.

The ensuing civil war, 1927–1937, between the armies of the two Chinese parties was accompanied by the bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars. By 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. The latter was saved by the Kuomintang's acceptance of the idea of a "united front" with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea had been developed in Moscow. It applied to Communists in all countries and involved cooperation between Communists and non-Communist groups and parties

in the capitalist democracies, as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies.

Under the terms of the united front understanding in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves, as of 1937, to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish their separate government and administration, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.

(3) The "war within the war"

The Chinese Communists did not fulfill this promise. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. The Communists, however, refused to stay within their assigned zones. While the Kuomintang armies in obedience to the Chinese High Command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them their exceedingly limited resources they were called "traitors" by the Communists. When the National Government refused to grant the Communists permission to establish in Kuomintang areas their own separate civil administrations, called "united front governments," which flouted the national authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from the Communist capital, Yenan, the Communists accused the Kuomintang of being "anti-democratic" and the Kuomintang troops of being "experts in dissension." Such tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought in self-defense against both the Communists and the Japanese for the protection of their bases.

Internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-a-vis each other than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed victory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would obviously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.

II. ROLE IN WORLD WAR II

In spite of this internecine strife, or quasi-war, the Chinese Communists have contributed to the United Nations war against Japan. By organizing extensive guerrilla territories within areas enclosed by the Japanese Army they have prevented the full Japanese exploitation of North China's resources in foodstuffs, raw materials, and manpower. They have also rescued many American pilots who have been forced down in Communist-controlled areas.

Contrary to the widely advertised report of their sympathizers, the Chinese Communists have, however, fought the Japanese far less than have the National Government troops. The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and his followers have yielded ground politically and militarily to the Communists in order to avoid an open break; as a Nationalist, Chiang Kai-shek has been primarily interested in the war against Japan.

I. MILITARY CAPACITY SMALL

The Chinese Communists now claim to have an army of 910,000 troops in addition to local militia forces numbering about 2,000,000 men. However, in October 1944 the strength of the Chinese Communists regular forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The degree to which the increase since October of last year represents an actual increase in fighting capacity depends upon the number of rifles available. Rifles were available for only about 250,000 men in October 1944.

J. THE ALTERNATIVE SETTLEMENTS OF THE KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST PROBLEM

(1) General

As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists; a "settlement" which would be disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it might ultimately decide the question of which party shall rule; (2) institution of a National assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be

united in a loose "federation" represented by a "coalition government" of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations.

Many observers believe that neither of the latter two alternatives is feasible. Both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists aspire to supreme control over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.

(2) Generalissimo sponsors the National Assembly

Chiang Kai-shek has proposed the National Assembly, which is to convene on 12 November 1945, as the only possible means for a peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and for the re-establishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved so long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes compliance with this demand a prerequisite for any political settlement with the Communists.

(3) Chinese Communists sponsor idea of coalition government

The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solution of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established.

In view of this, the coalition government, were it to be established without the Communists being committed to a specific demarcation of their areas, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties, while leaving the Kuomintang part of the country open to further Communist infiltration through legal or illegal means. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a coalition government.

(4) Unity or permanent division of China, the issues at stake

Here the matter rests (3 July 1945). For the time being it is a question of the National Assembly versus the coalition government. The former provides a chance for unifying China by the agreement of the Chinese armed parties to submit to arbitration and law instead of force. The latter would continue into the postwar period the system of territorial division of China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists and the maintenance of separate party armies. Real unity cannot be achieved on this basis. Each party insists on its own plan.

K. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

(1) Common policy of U. S. and U. S. S. R.

It is generally believed that a peaceful inter-party settlement in China depends largely upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. Were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking Government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on.

(2) Uncertainty concerning Soviet aims in China

Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denouncing the "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. There are indications that Soviet Russia envisages the establishment of Soviet domination (along somewhat the same lines as in Outer Mongolia and in Eastern Europe), in the areas of North China adjacent to Soviet Russia ; that is in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also the northern provinces of China Proper. A typical statement in this regard is one by a Soviet Russian diplomat in China who emphasized that Soviet Russia is determined that all her border states should be "free from unhealthy combination or linkage with other great powers."

The Chinese Communists' plan for a coalition government would conceivably further this aim in that North China and Manchuria might "legally" become the exclusive spheres of influence of the Chinese Communists and hence come under a regime that would be wholly obedient to Soviet Russia. At the same time the coalition government, which would represent all groups in China, would lend China an outward appearance of unity.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union will try to improve relations with Chungking on the basis of the re-establishment of a "united front" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet Russia's experience in China that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists has always favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. By contrast, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists in an all-out civil war. It is possible that this is the explanation for Soviet's Russia's apparent willingness to welcome the visit of Dr. T. V. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government. He arrived in Moscow and was received by Stalin on 30 June. An agreement between Moscow and Chungking would have the advantage, for Soviet Russia, of reducing the danger of immediate disagreement between the U. S. S. R. and the United States.

(3) *The U. S. and the situation in China*

(a) *The post-war peace in the Far East depends on re-establishment of Chinese independence and unity.*—The type of peace we shall gain by our victory over Japan depends on our success in aiding the Chinese to regain complete independence and to establish unity. For China is the center of the Far East; political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always revolved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers by acquiring vast regions from China. Russia's growth as a Far Eastern power has depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Similarly, Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests in China Proper in the 1930's.

The independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, including Manchuria, have been key points of U. S. policy and interests in the Far East. During the past eighty-five years Russia, and during the past fifty years Russia and Japan, the two leading military land powers in Asia, have been the chief threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part of the international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance between these two powers. The sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America's concern in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China has been demonstrated several times. The rivalry between Russia and Japan has centered on Manchuria and Korea.

(b) *With the defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will emerge as the sole military land power in Asia.*—Necessary as is the defeat of Japan to the re-establishment of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in the Far East which was developed in the decades before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she started at the dawn of her modern era; a group of relatively worthless islands, populated by fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock will be turned back some eighty years, to the time when the rivalry between Russia and the Western democracies in China began. With the total defeat of Japan, Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time in the past.

(c) *Prevention of a repetition of the "Polish situation" in Manchuria and Korea is essential to post-war stability in the Far East.*—The problem of post-war peace in the Far East revolves, in so far as the United States is concerned, around two major questions: (1) How can the military-political vacuum in the Far East be filled following the defeat of Japan? (2) How can the United States promote internal unity in China?

The answer to both questions is vitally affected by the action of Soviet Russia, and by the arrangements in regard to the Far East that we can make with Soviet Russia. If it be assumed that Soviet Russia will join in the war against Japan, the solution of these questions will be greatly affected by the extent to which we can prevent the division of China along the same lines as Europe into

an American-British and a Soviet zone of military operations. For the elements of uncertainty as to Soviet Russia's intentions in China and in regard to the Chinese Communists are very similar to those in regard to Eastern Europe during 1943 and 1944. Many of the fears and speculations current at that time, to the effect that Soviet Russia intended to develop Eastern Europe as an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence, have proved to be right. There is justification for similar fears in regard to North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Just as Soviet Russia's plans in Eastern Europe have been favored by the absence of American and British forces in these areas, so also would Soviet Russia, if she does plan to create a Soviet sphere of influence in North China, Manchuria and Korea, find herself in a most favorable position if these areas were assigned to her exclusively or even predominantly as a zone of military operations against Japan.

On the other hand, if American forces cooperate on equal terms with Soviet Russian, Chinese, and British forces in the reconquest and occupation of North China, Manchuria, and Korea, a peace settlement in complete accord with the terms of the Cairo declaration of 1 December 1943 can much more readily be achieved. For it is clear that if the war were to end with us in control of Japan, and with Chungking-Chinese, American, and British forces in control of Central and South China, while Soviet Russian and Chinese Communist forces held the controlling power in Manchuria and Korea, a peace settlement in regard to these areas might entail a considerable compromise of the terms of the Cairo declaration. In that case, the plan of the Chinese Communists for a "coalition government" might well be the only feasible way of settling the situation in China; North China and probably also Manchuria and Korea would come under the control of native Communists dependent upon Soviet Russian support, and in these areas there would be established the now typical "united front" or "democratic" coalition administrations in which the Communists hold the dominant power. Deprived of the vast raw material resources of North China and Manchuria the present National Government of China would find itself unable to compete with the Communists in the North and to establish a strong and stable state. For this reason it is necessary, for the maintenance of peace in the Far East and for the long range interests of the United States, that the Cairo Declaration be implemented without modification.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2:

P. E. Peabody,
Brigadier General, GSC,
Chief, Military Intelligence Service.

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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, July 1945

(Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.)

STATEMENT OF REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Political

a. The Chinese Communists *are* Communists. They are the most effectively organized group in China.

b. The "democracy" which the Chinese Communists sponsor represents "Soviet democracy" on the pattern of the Soviet Union rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than is the so-called "one-party dictatorship"

of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). This is indicated by the fact that there have always been several groups in opposition to the Government in Kuomintang-controlled China, and in spite of severe Government restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech these opposition groups have always managed to make their voices heard. Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, to maintain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while small parties friendly to the CCP are permitted to exist in Communist-controlled China, real opposition groups are summarily suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it will be more true of the Communists if they ever attain supreme power in China.

c. The Kuomintang is a nationalist party. The CCP on the other hand is international; it is part of the international Communist movement which has been sponsored by the Soviet Union since 1919 when the Communist International was established. Although the Communist International has been dissolved, the CCP still follows the Soviet Russian "party line."

d. During the period of the Soviet-Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale* in the 1920's, the Kuomintang and the CCP cooperated with each other. The Communists promised to support the revolutionary program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, edged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. The Kuomintang, therefore, in 1927 turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia. The ensuing civil war between the armies of the two parties bore all the marks of bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars.

e. In 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. What save dit was the acceptance by the Kuomintang of the idea of a united front with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea, which applied to Communists in all countries, had been developed in Moscow as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies. Under the terms of the united front agreement in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves in 1937 to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish the Chinese Soviet Republic, to support the National Government, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.

f. This pledge was never kept. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. As a sign of its trust and goodwill the Government even established a new army composed of Communists, the New Fourth Army, to operate between Nanking and Shanghai. The leaders of the Kuomintang spoke highly of the Communist forces during the first year of the war. There was considerable cooperation between the armies of the two parties in fighting Japan. The Communist armies, however, refused to stay within their assigned defense areas. While the Kuomintang armies, in obedience to orders from the Supreme Command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang defense zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them the exceedingly limited resources of their base areas they were called "traitors" by the Communists. Whenever they refused to permit the Communists to set up, in Kuomintang areas, their own separate civil administration which flouted the authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from Yenan, the capital of the Chinese Communists, the Communists called the Kuomintang troops "anti-democratic" and "experts in dissension." These tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought against both the Communists and the Japanese for the defense of their bases.

g. This internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-a-vis each oher than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed victory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would, in their opinion, obviously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.

h. The expansion of Communist areas demonstrates the remarkable military and political skill of the Chinese Communists. But it has created an explosive situation between the Kuomintang and the CCP. The Kuomintang leaders feel that the Communists have cheated them in that they have used the united front as a means of fighting the Kuomintang rather than the Japanese. The Communists feel that they have been justified in their policy since the Kuomintang has, in their opinion, never intended to grant them legal rights and has been waiting for the end of the war against Japan to renew the civil war against the Communists.

i. As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and the CCP; a "settlement" which will be disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it may ultimately settle the question of which party shall rule; (2) institution of a National Assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be united in a loose "federation" represented by a "coalition government" of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations. (See p. 2394.)

Many observers believe that neither of these latter two alternatives is feasible of execution. Both the Kuomintang and the CCP aspire to supreme control over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.

The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, has proposed the National Assembly, which is to convene on 12 November 1945, as the only possible peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and the reestablishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved as long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes compliance to this demand conditional to any political settlement between the Kuomintang and the CCP.

The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solution of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established. While at present the Communists do not permit Kuomintang armies and anti-Communist Kuomintang members in their areas of control, they insist that the Kuomintang, in fulfillment of its promise to institute democracy, should permit Communists to operate freely in Kuomintang-controlled areas and should allow Communist armies to operate in Kuomintang defense zones. Following this practice, the coalition government, if established, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas of control would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties. But there is nothing indicating that this would mean that the Communists would accord legal status to present Kuomintang areas. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a coalition government.

j. Here the matter rests (4 June 1945). For the time being it is a question of the National Assembly versus the "coalition government." Both parties are insisting on their own plans. It is generally believed that a peaceful inter-party settlement depends greatly upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. For were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking Government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on. Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denouncing the "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. It seems possible, however, that the Soviet Union will try to improve relations with Chungking on the basis of the reestablishment of a "united front" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet Russia's experience in China that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP has always

favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. On the other hand, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists in an all-out civil war.

2. Economic

The Chinese Communists control a large area and considerable population behind the Japanese lines in north and central China. Economically their activities have been important because they have interfered with Japanese lines of communication and because they have kept cotton, food, other commercial crops and manpower out of Japanese hands. By so doing the Communists have prevented the Japanese from gaining the maximum advantage out of north and central China. The areas effectively controlled by the Communists, however, constitute the poorest agricultural and industrial areas behind the Japanese lines. The Communists have endeavored, rather successfully, to revitalize the spirit of the peasantry, to increase agricultural production, and to develop handicraft industries to meet civilian and military needs. As a result of their efforts most of the resistance bases may be said to be practically self-sufficient in terms of their relatively simple requirements.

Despite these developments, the Communist areas are economically very weak and undeveloped. Railroads are non-existent, roads and motor transport are practically non-existent, communication facilities—radio, telegraph, telephone—are hopelessly inadequate, and modern industry simply does not exist. Facilities for the production of weapons and munitions are small and primitive and unable adequately to meet the needs of extensive guerrilla warfare. Economically and geographically speaking, the Communist area is excellently suited to guerrilla warfare, and the relations between the peasantry and the Communist forces are good. However, the area lacks the economic strength and facilities to equip or maintain modern fighting forces capable of meeting the Japanese in open combat, and its present economic strength is not sufficient to enable existing Communist forces to maintain the pressure upon the Japanese which they could maintain if they were better equipped and supplied.

3. Military

In October 1944 the strength of the Chinese Communist Regular Forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The Communists claim in a press report of 17 May 1945 that their regular forces have been increased to 910,000. This increase has probably been achieved by incorporating part of the militia, which numbers more than 2,000,000 men, into the regular forces. The degree to which this increase of strength represents an actual increase in fighting potential depends, however, upon the number of rifles available: the militiamen have an undetermined number of old rifles. Rifles were available for only slightly more than half of the regular forces in October 1944.

The Communist Army is a volunteer force of comparatively young men in excellent physical condition, adequately clothed and fed. The troops are fairly well trained for their type of guerrilla warfare, and have considerable experience in it. Observers report a high level of general intelligence and morale is very high. Lack of equipment constitutes the most serious problem of the Communists.

Up to the present time, the scale of effort of the Communists has been extensive and of serious concern to the Japanese, but does not represent the maximum of which the Communists are capable. Operations have generally been purposely restricted in order to conserve arms and to avoid provoking the Japanese to strengthen the barriers protecting their lines of communications, which would further restrict Communist movement. Part of the Communist forces have also been engaged in fighting the Chungking forces rather than the Japanese.

Improvement in the Communist strategic position, either by receipt of supplies or by an operation which would destroy the strategic initiative of the Japanese in China, would doubtless result in an all-out effort on the part of the Communists. Their forces are not capable of decisive independent operations to drive out the Japanese, but are capable of rendering strong support to an Allied operation against the Japanese in China.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1919–1945, VOLUME I

1. Characterization of the Chinese Communists

A. MOST EFFECTIVELY ORGANIZED GROUP IN CHINA

A question of first importance in connection with the Chinese Communists is: how effective are they in comparison with the Nationalists of the Chungking Government, as an instrument for developing China into a strong, progressive nation? The answer to this question has almost uniformly been in favor of the Chinese Communists.

An American observer stated recently after his first meetings with the Chinese Communist leaders in Yenan, the Chinese Communist Capital, that "they are displaying a degree of initiative and planning ability which I have never before encountered in China." This observer has had long experience in China. Another American who visited Yenan at the end of 1944, summed up his impressions of the Chinese Communists by stating that he found himself "continually trying to find out just how Chinese these people are," and in another report commented, "Their manners, habits of thought, and direct handling of problems seem more American than oriental." He noted the open, direct, and friendly relations between the officials and the people. He saw no signs of desperate poverty. He emphasized that there is no defeatism, but rather confidence. "There is no war weariness . . . There is a surprising political consciousness . . . There is no tension in the local situation . . . There is no feeling of restraint or suppression . . . The leaders make excellent personal impressions. The military men look and act like capable military men." All of this contrasts sharply with conditions in Chungking-controlled China. The foregoing observer concluded: "I think now that further study and observation will confirm that what is seen at Yenan is a well integrated movement, with a political and economic program, which it is successfully carrying out under competent leaders. And that while the Kuomintang[1] has lost its early revolutionary character and with that loss disintegrated, the Communist Party, because of the struggle it has had to continue, has kept its revolutionary character, but has grown to a healthy and moderate maturity. One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is strong and successful, and that it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the people that it will not easily be killed."

Practically all impartial observers emphasize that the Chinese Communists comprise the most efficient, politically well-organized, disciplined, and constructive group in China today. This opinion is well supported by facts. It is largely because of their political and military skill, superior organization, and progressive attitude, which has won for them a popular support no other party or group in China can equal, that they have been expanding their influence throughout the past seven years. This expansion has now reached the point where many of the best informed observers believe that no anti-Communist group in China can longer hope to eliminate them. Some of the keenest observers go so far as to predict the ultimate ascendancy of the Chinese Communists in China "if the present reactionary groups in Chungking are allowed to continue in power." The present trend is definitely in favor of the Communists. The growth of Communist power has been perhaps the most outstanding factor in the development in China during the past two years. It has led several of our observers to question whether we are not "backing the wrong horse" in China.

B. HOW RED THE RED?

(1) "Chinese Communists" a misnomer for "Agrarian Democrats," according to some

If the Chinese Communists should develop into the leading political power in China, how would this affect American and British interests in the Far East; could we continue to deal with China as an independent nation, or would a Communist China find its political and economic interests to be linked, predominantly, with those of Soviet Russia?

There is no clear answer. The majority of Allied observers agree, however, that there seems to be little to fear on this account, because "the Chinese Communists are not Communists," they have given up their socialist revolutionary tenets and have become mere "reformers" who can in no way be compared with

[1] The Kuomintang (National People's Party) is the Chungking Government Party.

the bolsheviks of the Soviet Union. Thus the British Ambassador to China said in 1938 that the Chinese Communists are really Keir Hardeians,[2] and he added that it was regrettable that their name unnecessarily frightened conservatives. More recently Brooks Atkinson, N. Y. Times' correspondent in China, expressing a widely-held opinion, has emphasized that although the Chinese Communists "began as followers of the Russian system, they abandoned their sovietization program about eight years ago when they concluded that China was not ready for socialism and would not be for at least a half century . . . Their system now might be described as agrarian or peasant democracy, or as a farm labor party . . ." An American official report from Chungking, also reflecting a widely-held opinion, states that "it is unfortunate that the present day Communist Party [in China] bears that name. As a misnomer it conjures up all the hatred of the capitalistic nations—a bogey of yesterday—the 'Red Menace' that almost lost us Russia as an ally in this war. The [Chinese] Communists adhere more closely to the basic . . . fundamentals of Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles—Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood—than does the Kuomintang." Finally, Molotov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, subscribed to this opinion when he stated during the summer of 1944 that Chinese Communism was not Soviet Communism, and that when the Chinese Communists achieved a greater degree of economic prosperity they would no longer be Communists.

(2) *Those who believe that the Chinese Communists are not Communists are doomed to disillusionment*

If mere statements constitute proof, we have here ample proof that the Chinese Communists are not Communists but Democrats. There are, however, some who object strongly to this viewpoint. Edgar Snow, for instance, one of America's foremost sympathizers with the Chinese Communists who is considered by many an authority on them, wrote in 1941 that some Chinese publicists, foreign diplomats, missionaries, and other pro-China people "did their best [during the first years of the Sino-Japanese war] to convince the world that the Chinese Communists were 'not real Communists' . . . Some think that because the Chinese Reds are now fighting for democracy and national independence they cannot be bolsheviks but are 'only a peasant reform party.' How all these people reconcile such interpretations with the Chinese C. P.'s loyal adherence to the Comintern I do not know. But if I understand Mao Tse-tung [the leader of the Chinese Communist Party] correctly he would not be bothered about these aspersions cast upon his Marxism. He would chuckle and say that if it would solve the contradiction in the sentiments of liberals who want to be known as pro-China but anti-Stalin they might call him anything they liked—as long as they did something to . . . [help] China and the [Communist] Eight Route Army to win victories. My personal feeling in the matter is that liberals who build up hopes that the Communists of China are 'different' and 'only reformers' who have abandoned revolutionary methods to achieve their program, are doomed to ultimate disillusionment. These men are nationalists because they are in a nationalist united-front phase of revolution, and they are perhaps strong enough in their own right not to fear becoming submerged as puppets of anybody. But their religion remains international socialism and if conditions change they may adopt whatever methods they believe necessary in order 'to stay on the locomotive of history.' "

A Dutch refugee, who soon after Pearl Harbor escaped from Peiping through Communist areas in North China, stated that he gained a decided impression "that the Chinese Communist leaders, such as Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te [C-in-C of the Chinese Communist army], and in general the teachers, doctors, commissars, etc., are devoted Communists as we [Westerners] understand it, "but that this does not mean that they are convinced that their communistic ideas can be applied to China at present.

(3) *Chinese Communist tenets: democracy a means to achieve socialism*

A study of the writings of the Chinese Communist leaders themselves fully supports the above analysis. They themselves do not agree with the contention of some of our observers that they are not "real" Communists. In his booklet New Democracy, published in January 1941, Mao Tse-tung has given a frank

[2] The Keir Hardeians were nineteenth century constitutionalist labor reformers in Great Britain.

and accurate outline of the tenets and policies of the Chinese Communist Party. A reading of this booklet is as essential to an understanding of the Chinese Communists as is reading China's Destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek, to an understanding of the Kuomintang Nationalists. The following condensation of the New Democracy provides a basis for comparing, and judging the accuracy of, the various and conflicting characterizations of the Chinese Communist offered by foreign observers.

> China's revolution is part of the world revolution. But the Chinese revolution must pass through two stages: first, the change of our colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society into an independent democratic society; second, the establishment of a socialist society. The first is our present goal, a new borgeois-democratic revolution. But do not confuse this with the burgeois-democratic revolution in capitalist countries. Although the objective of the first stage of our revolution is the destruction of feudalism and imperialism and the development of capitalism, it is certainly not the establishment of a capitalist society dictated by the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, our objective is to establish a New Democracy based on an alliance of several revolutionary classes, but led wholly or partially by the proletariat. After the accomplishment of this first stage, the revolution will be developed into the second stage—the establishment of a socialist society in China.
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> The outline of and basis for the New Democracy is found in the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress in 1924, long forgotten by the present Kuomintang. This Manifesto embodies Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. It provides for democratic, representative government from lower grades to the higher, and for free universal suffrage. The same Manifesto lays out our economic platform. Big banks, industries and monopolistic enterprises are to be owned by the Republic, non-monopolistic private enterprises are to be free. Large landholdings are to be distributed to land-tilling peasants to hold as their own private, not communal, property.
>
> Now there are some "obstinate elements of the bourgeoisie" [the reactionary Knomintang elements] who come forward and say: "Well, since you [Chinese] Communists have put aside the social system of socialism for a later stage, and since you have declared 'The Three Principles of the People are a necessity today, and our party is willing to struggle for their thorough realization,' why then don't you pack up your Communism for a while?" This only shows the lack of common sense on the part of some bourgeois elements, for they should know from the history of the Chinese revolution that without the guidance of Communism, even the democratic revolution in China cannot be a success, not to mention the final stage of the revolution, socialism. Once Communism is "packed up" China will face ruin. The world now depends on Communism for its salvation, and so does China.
>
> We Chinese Communists must not neglect establishing a united front with the Chinese bourgeoisie, which still maintains to a certain degree the revolutionary characteristic of opposing imperialism as well as the bureaucratic warlord government of its own country [the Kuomintang dictatorship]. But it must be remembered that the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, even in the process of revolution, is never willing to break with the imperialists completely, nor to overthrow imperialism and feudalism thoroughly. For instance, from 1927 to 1936 the bourgeois elements surrender to the imperialists;[3] and allied themselves with the feudal forces and opposed the revolutionary people. Again, during the present anti-Japanese war, a part of the big bourgeoisie, represented by Wang Ching-wei, surrendered to the enemy, illustrating a new betrayal of that class. "In view of this, is it not a dream to expect that China can establish a [democratic] bourgeois society ruled by her own bourgeoisie?" The bourgeois revolution needs the support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance. It was with regard to this kind of united front between the Communists and the bourgeoisie that Sun Yat-sen said: "Communism is the good friend of the Three Principles of the People."

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[3] A reference to the change in China's policy after Chiang Kai-shek broke away from the anti-imperialist, pro-Soviet Russian Kuomintang-Communist government at Hankow during 1926. The new Kuomintang Government established by Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking adopted a friendly policy toward Great Britain and the United States and other imperialist and capitalist nations. It broke off relations with Soviet Russia.

[4] A reference to the landlord and merchant classes in China.

> The "obstinate elements" are practicing their principle of "one party" [the Kuomintang doctrine] and denying the united front today, so they utter such fatal absurdities as renunciation of Communism. "To tell you frankly, it is useless to urge us [Chinese Communists] to 'pack up.' It is much better to urge us to make a contest. If there is somebody who beats us in the race, we shall admit that it is our fate. If not, you had better 'pack up' your anti-democratic, 'one-principle' style as early as possible . . . Whoever prepares to oppose the Communists has to prepare to be crushed."
>
> Our [Communist] kind of democratic revolution is a great blow to imperialism and is therefore opposed by the imperialists. On the other hand, it is permitted by socialism and is assisted by the Socialist State and the international socialist proletariat. It is the result of the Russian October Revolution which, as Stalin said in 1918, ". . . promotes the liberation work of the Western and Eastern oppressed peoples, and attracts them into the common, victorious anti-imperialist course . . ."
>
> Mao Tse-tung concludes: "We [Chinese] cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union or from the victory of the anti-capitalist struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany . . . [The aid of] the Soviet Union [is] an indispensable condition for the final victory of China's war of resistance . . ." And, again, ". . . If we forsake the policy of allying with the Soviet Union and cooperate with imperialism instead, then the word 'revolution' may be cancelled, and the Three Principles of the People will become a reactionary doctrine."
>
> China's revolutionary policy must therefore be (1) alliance with the Soviet Union; (2) cooperation between the bourgeoisie and the Chinese Communists; (3) protection and assistance to the peasants and workers.

That this policy has not been changed even though the Comintern was dissolved in May 1943, was confirmed by Mao Tse-tung in the summer of 1944 when he told a British correspondent, then visiting Yenan, that "the Chinese Communist Party has not changed its fundamental policy which is "New Democracy . . ." General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Chinese Communist Army, made a special point of emphasizing after the dissolution of the Communist International that the "Chinese Communists are Marx-Leninists . . . The Chinese Communists will certainly continue to apply and develop Marxism-Leninism dialectically in accordance with our own conditions."

This does not, of course, prevent the Chinese Communists from taking a very strong pro-American attitude at present, and offering us full cooperation both in the war against Japan and in the postwar period. This is fully in line with Mao Tse-tung's statement in NEW DEMOCRACY that the Chinese Communist "revolution, due to the variations in the condition of the enemy [meaning the capitalist nations and the Chinese "big bourgeoisie"] and in the conditions of this alliance [between the Chinese Communists and the bourgeoisie] may be divided into a certain number of stages during its process, but no change will occur in its fundamental character, which will be the same until the arrival of the socialist revolution."

Strategic considerations may make it desirable for America to establish military cooperation with the Chinese Communists. Because of their political control over large areas of eastern China, it may also become desirable for us to establish some kind of official diplomatic relations with them. But it is obvious from the foregoing that it is completely unrealistic to deal with the Chinese Communists on the assumption that they are not Communists. If we speculate that it will take "at least half a century" before the Communists have achieved the objective of their present democratic bourgeois revolution, we may just as well speculate that it will take only five or ten years. We may even speculate that this democratic trend in Communist China may in time become so strong that the Communists can no longer control it and use it as a means of introducing communism in China. The Communists themselves realize this, and have stated that the only "danger" is that the country may "go democratic."

However, all that we know is that at present the democratic movement in Communist China is fully controlled by the Communists in fulfilment of the policy expressed in Mao Tse-tung's NEW DEMOCRACY. We have no reason to suppose that their policy has changed. In the words of Wang Chia-hsiang, at present Director of the Political Department of the Eighteenth Group Army: The Chinese Communists "will never abandon their ideals and the theories of

Marxism and Leninism . . . The whole program of the Chinese Communist Party consists of two parts: (1) the maximum program, for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism, and for racial emancipation through the elimination of classes; (2) the minimum immediate program of the national democratic revolution . . ."

2. Outline History of the Chinese Communist Movement

A. Period of Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation, 1923–27

(1) Formation of Chinese Communist Party

The Chinese Communist movement found its origin in the Student Movement of 1919, which reflected Chinese indignation against the decision of the "Big Four" of the Versailles Conference to concede to Japan all the rights which Germany held in Shantung Province before the outbreak of the first World War. It led to a new awakening of national consciousness, particularly among the Chinese literati, and focussed the attention of the students on the need of organized resistance against imperialist aggression, and of instituting reforms in the Chinese political and social system to start China on the road to modern progress. While most of the students entering political work enrolled with the Kuomintang, the Nationalist party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, many became imbued with Marxian doctrines and established small Socialist societies, which formed the nucleus of proletarian political organization in China. Many Chinese went to Moscow and Irkutsk to investigate the Soviet system of government. Many became Communists and entered Russian universities.

Then, in 1920, Soviet Russia determined to organize the Communist Movement in Asia. This decision was accepted at the Baku Congress of Nations of the Orient (Sept. 1920), presided over by Zinoviev, President of the Executive Committee of the Third or Communist International (Comintern). In the same year Lenin sent his secretary, Marin, to China as the first delegate of the Comintern in China. Marin secretly organized the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter written CCP) as a branch of the Communist International. In May 1921 the foundation meeting of the CCP was held in Shanghai. It was attended by 12 Chinese delegates, among them Mao Tse-tung, the present leader of the Communist Party in China. The first Central Party Committee established in Shanghai included Ch'en Tu-hsiu, scion of an Anhwei mandarin family and one of the foremost literary figures in China of his time. He was elected General Secretary of the Party. Another member of the Central Committee was Ch'en Kung-po, the present leader of the Nanking puppet government. CCP branches were also organized during 1921 and 1922 in several foreign countries. Among the founders were: in France, Chou En-lai, one of the most important Communist leaders today; in Germany, Chu Te, present C-in-C of the Chinese Communist armies; in Japan, Chou Fu-hai, at present one of the chief collaborators with Japan in the Nanking puppet government. The CCP was organized as a secret society. It started its activities by conducting an intensive campaign among students in Peking and laborers in Shanghai and Hong Kong.

(2) The Soviet Russian–Chinese "Entente Cordiale."

The first of the Communist Party's problems was the question of its relations to the bourgeois Nationalist Kuomintang. Cooperation with the Nationalists was considered essential, since the Comintern program was based on Lenin's thesis that, in the imperialist epoch, the national liberation movements in the colonial and semi-colonial countries could be led to merge with the main stream of the international proletarian revolutionary movement. After Sun Yet-sen had rejected the idea of a two-party Kuomintang-Communist alliance, Chinese Communists began at the end of 1922 to enter the Kuomintang while secretly maintaining their membership in the Communist Party. It was not until May 1926 that they appeared on the Kuomintang registration lists as Communists, after Chiang Kai-shek in an effort to counteract subversive activities of the Communists, had prevailed upon the Kuomintang to accept a ruling that the CCP should cease to be a secret organization and that a list of Communist members should be filed with the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

In 1922 the Soviet Government sent Adolf Joffe to China with the delicate mission of establishing official diplomatic relations with the internationally recognized Chinese Government in Peking while at the same time arranging for Soviet support of the revolutionary movement of the Kuomintang, which aimed at overthrowing the Peking Government. He did not meet with immediate

success in Peking, but during a meeting with Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai (Jan. 1923) he was able to arrange an *Entente Cordiale* between Soviet Russia and the Kuomintang. In talking with Chinese, Joffe made a point of "admitting" that what was in operation in Russia was not Communism. When a Chinese asked him whether Communism could be realized in Russia in ten years' time, Joffe said "No." "In twenty years?" "No." "In a hundred years?" "Perhaps," said Joffe. Joffe's method of assuaging Chinese fears of the "Red Menace" bears a strong resemblance to present Chinese Communist methods in regard to America. General Ch'en I, Acting Commander of the (Communist) New Fourth Army, said to an American official observer in Yenan (Sept. 1944): ". . . it will be many years before (Communism) can possibly be adopted in China. It may take a 100 years or more for China to achieve a state of democracy such as exists today in the United States . . ."

Joffe returned to Russia and was succeeded by Leo Karakhan, the foremost Soviet expert in Oriental diplomacy, who in 1924 obtained official recognition of the Soviet Union from the Peking Government. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen, having failed after repeated efforts to obtain any promise of aid from either Britain or America, wrote to Karakhan in Peking requesting him to send a representative with whom Sun might discuss mutual relations. Karakhan sent Michael Borodin, who arrived in October 1923 in Canton, where Sun had established a Kuomintang government. Soviet Russia now maintained two types of relations with China. The Soviet Government dealt with the Government in Peking on the basis of normal diplomatic relations. The Communist International dealt with the Kuomintang. Borodin's task was to reorganize and pump new life into the Kuomintang.

(3) Chinese Communists accepted into the Kuomintang

The first Kuomintang Party Congress in January 1924 endorsed the admission of Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang on condition that they accept Kuomintang principles. Great numbers of Communists now joined the Kuomintang while still secretly maintaining their Communist Party membership with Soviet Russian money and backing they organized and directed the Hong Kong strike against the British. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers left Hong Kong. The trade and shipping of the colony were practically brought to a standstill. The workers from Hong Kong were quartered in Canton where they served as a powerful weapon in the hands of the Communists against the Chinese merchants and the Kuomintang "reactionaries." The Communists likewise organized a nation-wide anti-British boycott and anti-foreign demonstrations and strikes in Shanghai and Canton. These led to clashes with British and French police and military forces—the "May 30 incident" (1925) in Shanghai, and the "June 23 incident" (1925) in Canton. The rapidly growing influence of the Communists alarmed many Chinese, however, and in August 1924 the first violent outbreaks occurred between pro- and anti-communist groups in Canton. Nevertheless, since Soviet Russia was the only power willing to support the Kuomintang, the Nationalists became increasingly dependent upon her aid. Because of this the Kuomintang had to accept Borodin's advice, even though many objected to the Russian-Chinese Communist influence. Borodin rose to the position of a quasi-dictator.

He saw that the first task was to reorganize the Kuomintang and forthwith reconstructed it along the lines of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia. Borodin was able to have young and hardy men, most of them Chinese Communists or men sympathetic toward the Communists, appointed to pivotal positions in the Kuomintang machine and in the new Nationalist army under Chiang Kai-shek. This army was being trained by Russian advisers, headed by General "Galen" (Vassily Bluecher) at the Whampoa Military Academy. Auxiliary societies were also organized to strengthen the Kuomintang, such as the "Federation of Farmers, Workers, Soldiers, and Students to Promote the Revolutionary Movement," "The Youth Movement," etc. In all of these the Chinese Communists obtained the leadership. Borodin also brought from Russia experts for each type of organization who trained the Chinese to assume new leadership in the Kuomintang.

In the years that followed, up to the spring of 1927, the revolutionary movement swept like wildfire over south and central China. It was focussed on two immediate objectives: first, the undermining of the influence of the Imperialist powers in China, foremost among them Great Britain; second the defeat of the independent warlords and the forces of the Peking Government. Before the advancing Nationalist armies, Kuomintang propaganda agents infiltrated into

the areas of the opposing forces. They concentrated their attention on organizing the impoverished peasants and laborers, and while the peasants were encouraged to loot and burn the estates of their landlords, strikes and boycotts were organized in the large industrial cities where foreign economic interests were concentrated. The Chinese Communists played the dominant role in organizing this popular unrest. It greatly contributed to the success of the Nationalist armies, since it disrupted the administration and the economic life in strategic areas of the opposing forces. Before the end of 1926 the revolutionary armies had reached the Yangtze River. The Kuomintang government was transferred to Hankow in November 1926.

(4) The Kuomintang-Communist split

The tensions within the Kuomintang between pro and anti-Communist groups had approached the breaking point. In the course of 1926 most of the Nationalists realized that the Communists were gaining the leadership over the revolution. The strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and violent acts of the mass organizations, which in 1924–25 had been directed primarily against British nationals and interests, in the course of 1926 became increasingly focussed on Chinese social classes with vested interests as well. This in turn led to a realization among the Chinese Nationalists that the Chinese revolution under Soviet Russian-Chinese Communist influence was rapidly turning into a social class war, or a Communist revolution, instead of a nationalist-democratic revolution as originally envisaged by Sun Yat-sen. The rapid increase of Communist influence was shown by the growth of the membership of the CCP from less than 1,000 in 1926 to 60,000 in April 1927.

Chiang Kai-shek[5] and the Kuomintang had never favored a course like this, and in 1926 Chiang began to take an open stand against the Communists. By the end of the year he had completely disassociated himself from the leftist Kuomintang government in Hankow. His headquarters at Nan-ch'ang (Kiangsi) assumed the status of a rival government, challenging the authority of the Hankow regime. While the Kuomintang leftists and the Communists rallied under Borodin, the conservatives rallied under Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang's forces occupied Greater Shanghai in March 1927, Chiang received from Chinese banking groups assurances of financial support which relieved him from any need of further reliance on Soviet Russia. After this it was only a matter of months before the power of the Hankow government was broken. Many of the political and military leaders of the Hankow regime shifted their loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek.

While Chiang Kai-shek initiated the policy of suppression of the Chinese Communists by force (beginning with the labor massacre in Shanghai, April 1927), neither he nor the conservative Kuomintang groups were chiefly responsible for the disintegration of Communist influence in the Hankow government. This was caused primarily by a split between leftist Kuomintang leaders and Communists, in the course of the first half of 1927. After Great Britain had signed, in February 1927, an agreement with the Hankow government for the restitution of the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang, several leftist Kuomintang leaders wanted to adopt a friendly policy toward Great Britain. Borodin opposed this. Opposition was also developing among leftist leaders against the Communist-sponsored policy of land confiscation, which was assuming increasingly violent forms. In May 1927 these confiscations led to anti-Communist riots among troops of the Hankow government at Changsha, and after this the movement against the Communists spread throughout China. Borodin lost his hold over the Hankow government and was treated with increasing distrust.

The anti-Communists movement also spread to North China, where the so-called Christian General, Feng Yü-hsiang, had been won over and converted to Communism. The Peking Government took drastic action against Soviet Russia. On 6 April 1927, armed with a warrant countersigned by the Dean of the Diplomatic Body, Chinese police and troops entered the Legation Quarter and raided the Soviet Embassy. Many documents were confiscated proving that Soviet diplomatic officials were actively supporting the Chinese Communists. On the same day, the Peking Government broke off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.

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[5] Chiang Kai-shek together with the leftist leader Wang Ching-wei had assumed leadership of the Kuomintang following Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925. At the beginning of the Northern Expedition from Canton in the spring of 1926, Chiang was appointed C-in-C of the Nationalist forces.

The final break with Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists came in July 1927 after an Indian representative of the Third International, M. N. Roy, had revealed a Soviet plot which practically amounted to ousting the Kuamintang from power. Roy confided to Wang Ching-wei, the Kuomintang leader in Hankow that he and Borodin had received orders from Stalin to instruct the CCP to push the policy of land confiscation. Stalin had also advised the reorganization of the Kuomintang Central Executive Comittee with a view to increasing the proportion of pro-Communist labor and peasant leaders. The CCP was advised to build up a regular army of its own of 20,000 men, in addition to forming a force of peasants and workers detachments, 50,000 strong, to be used against the loyal Kuomintang forces. Following this, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at Hankow formally adopted a resolution on 15 July for the expulsion of the Communists.[6] At this meeting Borodin's resignation was also accepted. With the growing anti-Communist movement, the Communist Party in Soviet Russia had begun a strong propaganda attack on the Kuomintang and the Hankow government; in view of this the leftist leaders in Hankow found the *entente* between the Kuomintang and Moscow impracticable.

At the end of 1927 Chiang Kai-shek had formed, at Nanking, a new Kuomintang government which started military operations against the leftist government at Hankow. Hankow fell to the Nanking forces in November 1927. In December Chiang ordered all Soviet Consulates in central and south China to be closed. By the end of the year thousands of Communists and their sympathizers among farmers and laborers had been killed throughout China. Most of the Communists had been routed from the large cities. Their labor and peasant unions had been dissolved. While many Communists fled to Russia, those remaining in China either went into hiding in the foreign concessions in the treaty ports or fled into rural districts to rally the support of the peasants. The period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was closed.

B. PERIOD OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CIVIL WAR, 1927–1936

(*1*) *Comintern orders policy of attack on cities by Chinese Reds*

When the great anti-Communist reaction set in during 1927, the Communists at first planned to occupy some of the larger cities and use them as bases from which to counter the armed opposition of the Kuomintang. They had become greatly impressed by their past successes and especially by the power they had wielded through the unions of peasants and workers. There were about 10,000,000 members in the peasant unions and nearly 3,000,000 workers in trade unions in 1927, and they counted upon these as effective instruments to maintain the power of the CCP. Some Communist leaders, among them Ch'en Tu-hsiu, did not consider the peasants' and workers' unions sufficiently strong to fight the well-armed forces of the Kuomintang without the support of an army, and therefore advised a policy of caution. But the majority of Communist leaders, following orders from Moscow, decided on a policy of "direct action," that is, in the words of the Comintern, "to unfold mass political strikes and demonstrations, to expand the partisan warfare . . . and to turn the militarist war into class civil war" for the establishment of the rule of the "Workers', Peasants', and soldiers' Delegate Councils," or Soviets.

In August 1927 Ch'en Tu-hsiu was ousted from the leadership of the CCP for his objection to this insurrectionist policy. In 1929 he was expelled from the Party and subsequently joined the small Trotskyist Left Opposition that developed in China during the early 1930's. He was succeeded as head of the CCP by Li Li-san who was assisted, among others, by Chou En-lai in the Political Bureau of the Party. The Comintern appointed Lominadze to succeed Borodin, and after him Heinz Neumann, to guide the Chinese Communists in organizing the insurrectionary movement for taking possession of city bases.

Until the end of 1930 the main attention of the Communists was focused on gaining control of such cities as Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, and other industrial and trading centers. While the Communists were comparatively successful in rural areas, where they established several bases and built up relatively strong peasant armies, they wasted the strength of these armies in costly attacks upon the cities. The majority of the Communists, though anxious to make use of the peasants in attacks upon the cities, actually despised the peasants, for they feared that the Communist movement might "degenerate" into a peasant move-

[6] In August 1927, the left-wing Kuomintang government in Hankow declared the CCP an illegal organization.

ment. They considered this as contrary to the aims of the international Communist movement which was to establish "proletarian hegemony," not "peasant hegemony." The peasant armies were scornfully referred to as "lumpen proletariat."

Futile attempts were made in 1927 to occupy Nan-ch'ang, Swatow, and Canton. Communist soldier and labor forces actually held Canton for three days in December 1927 before they were driven out by the combined armies of the Nationalists (Generals Li Chi-shen, Chang Fa-k'uei, and Hsüeh Yüeh). Some 600 people were reported killed during the days of the "Canton Commune," as the short-lived Communist regime was called. But after the Communists had been driven out, the Nationalists massacred thousands of the city's population (according to one account 5,700 men and women) in an effort to eradicate all Communists and Leftists. This was the pattern followed in all the cities and rural areas under Nationalist control. The Communist-sponsored labor and peasant movement was literally killed in blood purges of hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. Few were killed in the actual fighting between Communist and Kuomintang forces, in comparison with those killed in Kuomintang massacres.

The result was that the Communist labor movement of the 1920's collapsed within a few months. No one dared to belong to a Communist labor or peasant union. In spite of this the Communists continued their efforts to keep the labor movement alive. When the Kuomintang began to organize labor unions of its own, the Communists started a program of forming secret "red" unions in opposition to the "yellow" unions of the Kuomintang. But in their efforts to incite the workers to strikes and armed uprisings they alienated the sympathy of the workers, because of the terrible retribution from the Kuomintang authorities which every one of these uprisings caused. At the end of 1928 the Communists had to admit that "the trade union organizations have shrunk to almost nothing. The Party organizations in the cities are scattered and smashed. In the whole country there is not one healthy nucleus of industrial workers." In the summer of 1930 a Communist source claimed that there were some 64,000 members in the "red" trade union federation, but the totals for the principal cities amounted only to some 5,700. The rest were scattered throughout the country-side. These figures showed the staggering defeat of the peasant and worker union movement, which had been 13,000,000 strong in 1927. In the same year, 1930, Chou En-lai stated that the CCP numbered 120,000, among them only 2,000 factory workers.

The policy of "direct action" had proved a complete failure. Li Li-san was made the scape-goat. He was ousted from his position as head of the CCP by the Comintern Headquarters in Moscow and was replaced in January 1931 by Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), a special protegé of the Comintern.

(2) The Chinese Soviet peasant movement

Attention was shifted to the hitherto despised peasants, who from this time came to play the dominant role in the Chinese Communist movement. With this shift in policy, which gained Moscow's approval, the emphasis in the Chinese Communist movement was also directed toward the strengthening of the Red Army, rather than the development of peasant and labor unions, and the employment of this army in protecting Communist rural areas rather than in attacking the Kuomintang strongholds in the cities.

The Chinese Communist army had a humble beginning. When the anti-Communist terror began in 1927, scattered peasant and worker detachments in the Kuomintang labor corps fled to the hills and assumed the role of partisan bands. They joined with local bandits and with a few companies and regiments of Kuomintang soldiers who had mutinied and taken refuge in the mountains. From the fusion of these elements there emerged in 1927 and '28 a number of Red armies. The first and most important of these, the "First Peasants' and Workers' Army," was formed by Mao Tse-tung, who had fled from Hankow where he had served as the head of the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang. In 1927, with a motley force of peasants, bandits, workers, and soldiers he led the so-called Autumn Crop Uprising in Hunan, aimed at occupying Changsha and other larger Hunan cities. When it failed he led what was left of his band to the mountain stronghold of Ching-kan Shan on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. At this time his force numbered only about 1,000. Here the first Soviet in China was set up in November 1927 (in Tsalin), and the first Soviet Government was elected. In this Soviet the Communists promoted a more democratic program, with a moderate policy based on slow but regular development, and with emphasis on agrarian reform.

It was Mao Tse-tung who dictated this policy of moderation. He was aware that the Communists were not strong enough to launch attacks upon the cities and that their campaign for land confiscations, strikes, and widespread upheavals would only serve to intensify the Kuomintang terror and weaken the Communist forces in China. Born of a peasant family, he realized that China's strength was in her rural population, not in the insignificant industrial proletariat in the cities. He believed that only a movement for rural rehabilitation, combined with gradual elimination of the excessive abuses in the system of land ownership, could win for the Communists a wide-spread following among the Chinese people. Because of this he disagreed with the Comintern policy of centering attention on the conquest of the cities. He also opposed the policy of looting and burning the property of landlords, and urged a moderate policy in regard to land confiscation. He made an arbitrary distinction between big landlords and rich peasants. While he favored confiscation of the land of the big landlords, he counselled leniency toward the rich peasants. Until the Communists were strong enough to take charge of the political and economic administration of the country themselves they were still, in Mao Tse-tung's opinion, dependent upon the landlords and merchants, for they alone knew the intricate system of rural administration, and they controlled the tax collection, the money market and the trade. No matter how evil was the rule of the landlords, they were the only group with sufficient education to keep the administration and economy of the country running. To kill the landlords or to cause them to flee was tantamount to introducing anarchy, for whereas the ignorant peasants could loot and burn and confiscate the land of the landlords, they could not survey the land and re-divide it equitably, nor could they set up and run rural administration and economy by themselves.

The answer to these problems was the establishment of Soviets. But these Chinese Soviets could not entirely follow the pattern of the Russian Soviets, which provides a platform for discussion and the right of voting for workers and peasants only, for the establishment and maintenance of a Soviet government of the proletariat. In China the basis of the Soviet had to be broadened to include the landlords and other moneyed classes. In this respect the Chinese Soviets became more democratic than the Russian. The landlords were even admitted into the Party.

This policy of moderation was by no means adopted by all Chinese Soviet districts. Landlords, together with their families and their large retinue of tax collectors, police agents, court runners, servants, and friends were killed in most Soviet areas. In many cases the Communists perpetrated mass executions on a scale comparable to the Kuomintang massacres. But in the Kiangsi-Fukien area (the largest Communist base area) where Mao Tse-tung led the Soviet movement, his policy of moderation was practiced. It bore fruit in that in time many landlords came to cooperate with the Communists. Communist sources stated in 1931 that two-thirds of the Soviet Government in China was in the hands of rich peasants and that rich peasants were also in all the Party posts. Since they often favored their own interests at the expense of the poor peasants, Communist leaders complained frequently about their influence. Even Mao Tse-tung complained in 1934 that "Many landlords and rich peasants put on a revolutionary coloration. They are very active and rely on their historical advantages—'they can speak well and write well'—and consequently in the first period they steal the fruits of the agrarian revolution . . ." Party leaders frequently disciplined the landlords by seizing their land and imposing fines on them. On the whole, however, the system of democratic cooperation between landlords and peasants in the Soviet central district (Kiangsi) worked well. It should be emphasized that landlord participation in the Party and in the Soviet governments—both central and local governments—was permitted only as a temporary expedient during the "first period," or the "bourgeois-democratic period" of the revolution, until such time as the masses should be sufficiently educated to take over control by the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship.

Because he counselled moderation and a "go slow" policy, Mao Tse-tung earned the disfavor of Moscow. Soon after the failure of the Autumn Crop Uprising he was repudiated by the Central Committee of the CCP and dismissed from the Politburo, and also from the Party Front Committee. It was not until Mao's peasant movement had proved to be the only successful Communist movement that he was again accepted into the grace of the Party and rose to its highest leadership. It is not known when he succeeded Ch'en Shao-yü as Party leader. However, in September 1933 Ch'en himself referred to Mao Tse-tung as "Presi-

dent of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars."

The Chinese Soviet movement and the Chinese Red Army began under purely Chinese leadership. They did not, in fact, obtain Moscow's approval till after the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July 1928. Following this the Sixth Congress of the CCP, which was held in Moscow in July and August 1928, gave its approval of the agrarian movement. But the Party, obeying Moscow's dictates, persisted for two more years in its policy of using the peasant movement and peasant armies for the conquest of city bases.

(3) Growth of the Red Army and of Soviet base areas

In May 1928 Chu Te joined Mao Tse-tung at Ching-kan Shan with the remnant, less than 2,000 strong, of the forces which had participated in the attack on Swatow.[7] Mao and Chu combined their forces into the famous Fourth Red Army, of which Chu became commander and Mao political commissar. Another army, the 11th Red Army, was formed out of the remnant of the forces which took part in the Canton uprising. Uprisings in southern Kiangsi, around Chi-an, in the spring of 1928 led to the formation of still another army, the Third Red Army. More troops arrived at Ching-kan Shan in the winter of 1928, following uprisings and mutinies in General Ho Chien's Kuomintang army in Hunan, and out of these emerged the famous Fifth Red Army under P'eng Te-huai, a former Kuomintang officer. In the winter of 1927 other Communist armies were formed in eastern Hupeh under Ho Lung and in eastern Hupeh and southern Honan under Hsü Hai-tung. At the same time Soviet bases were established along the northeastern edge of Kiangsi, on the border of Fukien.

The armies at Ching-kan Shan broke through the cordon of Kuomintang troops at the beginning of 1929 and spread over southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. In the course of 1929 and '30 Communist power was consolidated in these areas as well as in large sectors of northern Kiangsi and Hunan. The army was constantly enlarged, drawing its recruits partly from the peasantry, partly from troops who left the Kuomintang army. By the beginning of 1930 Soviet power had been sufficiently consolidated in Kiangsi to permit the establishment of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government. The Red armies in Kiangsi, Hunan and Fukien were united into the First Front Army with Chu Te as C-in-C and Mao Tse-tung as Political Commissar.

With this growth of power, however, the Comintern and Li Li-san pressed for an early attack upon Changsha and Hankow to win the first large city bases. All available forces were concentrated upon Changsha, and the Fifth Red Army under P'eng Te-huai actually succeeded in occupying the city on 28 July 1930. But the Communists were soon driven back with heavy casualties. In this battle of Changsha, the foreign powers offered active support to the Kuomintang forces. American, British, Japanese, and Italian gunboats, having evacuated foreigners, steamed up the Hsiang River and bombarded the occupied city.

(4) Beginning of Kuomintang "extermination" campaign

The attack on Changsha marked the last attempt during the 1930's on the part of the Chinese Communists to invade any of the large cities. It also marked the end of the "Li Li-san line," as Mao Tse-tung scornfully called it, the Chinese policy laid down by the Comintern of "direct attack" upon Kuomintang forces.

In the years that followed the tactics of guerilla warfare as developed by Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung became standard for the Red Army. It was based on four principles:

(1) When the enemy advances, we retreat.
(2) When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them.
(3) When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack.
(4) When the enemy retreats, we pursue.

The warnings of Mao Tse-tung against the policy of "direct attack" were now amply justified. The attack on Changsha fully aroused the Kuomintang to the danger of the growing Communist power. Chiang Kai-shek began to pour reinforcements into Hunan and Kiangsi, and in December 1930 he began the "First Bandit Extermination Campaign" against the Red Army in Kiangsi. According to Mao Tse-tung the Kuomintang forces totalled over 100,000 troops, but were defeated in little more than a month by 40,000 Communist troops. In

[7] Chu Te's force comprised the remnants of the Kuomintang 20th Division under Ho Lung, and of the 4th Army (under Chiang Fa-k'uei), and Yeh Ting's Division of the 11th Army, which had revolted on 30 July 1927 and occupied Nan-ch'ang for a few days. Driven out of Nan-ch'ang, this force marched south and attacked Swatow where it was defeated.

May 1931 the Kuomintang launched its Second Extermination Campaign with forces exceeding 200,000 troops[8] under General Ho Ying-ch'in. It, too, was quickly defeated. In June 1931 Chiang himself took command of the Third Campaign with an army of 300,000 men.[8] He was assisted by Generals Ho Ying-ch'in, Chu Shao-liang, and Ch'en Ming-shu. By September this campaign had been successfully countered by the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek withdrew his troops.

The Red Army now entered a period of comparative peace. It had gained strength through the capture of vast quantities of modern equipment from the Kuomintang armies. The Red armies established their capital deep in the hills of south Kiangsi in the village of Jui-chin and there, on 7 November 1931, they proclaimed the creation of the "Chinese Soviet Republic." The First All-China Soviet Congress was called in December 1931, and the Central Soviet Government was established with Mao Tse-tung as chairman. Chu Te was elected C-in-C of the Red Army. "The Soviet Government in China," read the Constitution adopted by the First Congress, "declares its readiness to form a revolutionary united front with the world proletariat and all oppressed nations, and proclaims the Soviet Union, the land of proletarian dictatorship, to be its loyal ally."

In the same month in which the First All-China Soviet Congress was held, over 20,000 troops of the 28th Route Army of the Kuomintang revolted in Kiangsi and joined the Reds; they were reorganized into the Fifth Army Corps. The Red Army, now having a strength of five Army Corps, began small offensives of its own. It expanded into southern Fukien and northern Kwangtung. In this same year, 1931, Red forces became active in Shensi Province, where two years later a new Soviet base was established. This, the smallest of all Soviet bases, was destined to become the refuge of all Communist forces in China.

The pattern of the Communists' control in Kiangsi and neighboring provinces resembled their control in present Japanese-occupied areas. While Kuomintang troops held the roads and the main cities, defended by thousands of pillboxes, barbed wire and trenches, the Communists held surrounding rural areas. While the size of these areas was constantly changing with the fortunes of war, the Communists laid claim in 1932–33 to 70 of Kiangsi's 81 *hsien* (counties). The most important Red Army area, the "Central Soviet District," comprised 17 *hsien* astride the Kiangsi-Fukien border, with a total population of 3,000,000. The other Soviet districts, in the Hupeh-Hunan, Hunan-Kiangsi, NE Kiangsi, Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei, and Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi border areas, were all smaller, less stable, and more frequently compelled to dissolve under the pressure of repeated attacks.

The Red Armies, themselves varied no less in size and strength, both in their more or less regular formations and in the auxiliary corps of peasant Red Guards. In 1932 it was estimated that the grand total of all Red armies operating in all districts was 151,000, of whom only 97,500 had rifles. In 1934, at the beginning of the Nationalist Fifth Extermination Campaign, the Red Army in the Kiangsi-Fukien areas numbered 180,000 with perhaps 200,000 partison and Red Guards.[9] But altogether the Reds had only about 100,000 rifles. Ho Lung's forces in the Hupeh-Hunan area numbered about 10,000. The other scattered forces were even smaller. (79)

That these insignificant peasant forces could hold out for seven years in central China, against Kuomintang forces two to seven times their number and vastly superior in armaments, is strong testimony to the capable leadership of the Communist commanders and the loyalty they enjoyed from the people. It also goes to prove the remarkable endurance and fine soldierly quality of the Chinese peasant soldier when and if he is lead by capable officers, which has been commented upon by many American military observers.

(5) Defeat of Soviet movement in Central China

The continued growth of Communist power, however, prompted the Nationalists to renew their efforts to win back Kiangsi. In April 1933 they began the Fourth Extermination Campaign against the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek appointed his best field commander, General Ch'en Ch'eng, to direct the campaign. On the recommendation of the late Gen. Von Seeckt (former C-of-S of the German army and for a time chief military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek) Ch'en Ch'eng

[8] According to Mao Tse-tung.
[9] One Communist source claimed 350,000 "Red Army regulars" in 1933, and about 600,000 partisans. (154) These figures, however, seem too high.

began the use of the blockhouse and fortification system against the Communists. But this campaign failed like all the previous ones. Ch'en Ch'eng is said to have stated that fighting the Reds was a "life-time job" and a "life sentence."

Finally, in October 1933, the Fifth and last Extermination Campaign was launched. Communist sources claimed that Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 900,000 troops, of whom perhaps 400,000 actively took part in the campaign in Kiangsi-Fukien and Honan-Anhwei-Hupeh. This time Chiang Kai-shek built hundreds of miles of military roads and thousands of small fortifications, with interconnecting fields of machine-gun or artillery fire. His defensive-offensive strategy diminished the Reds' superiority in maneuvering, and emphasized the disadvantages of their smaller numbers and lack of resources. The Reds were unable to resist the slow advance of the Kuomintang forces which in effect ringed them in within a wall which gradually moved closer around their central base.

Nevertheless the Fifth Campaign proved inconclusive. The Kuomintang won back Kiangsi, but it failed to exterminate the Red Army. In January 1934 the Second All-China Soviet Congress convened at Juichin, and it was decided to transfer the Red Army to a new base. Preparations were made soon afterward for the "Long March." It began on 16 October 1934, just a year after Chiang Kai-shek launched his Fifth Campaign. The main forces of the Red Army, about 90,000 men, concentrated in southern Kiangsi, broke through the Kuomintang lines of fortifications in Hunan and Kwangtung, put the enemy to flight, and then started its long march westward.

The price in life paid for the reconquest of Kiangsi reached a staggering figure. The Red Army, according to Chou En-lai, suffered 60,000 casualties during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. There is no figure available for the Nationalist losses. But the military casualties were nothing compared with civilian casualties. The Kuomintang is reported to have admitted that about 1,000,000 people, mostly peasants, were killed or starved to death during the Fifth Campaign. Tang Yü-jen, Secretary of the Kuomintang Central Political Council, stated in May 1934 that 9,000,000 people had been killed in Kiangsi during the period of Kuomintang-Communist civil war. The Chinese Postal Administration estimated the population of Kiangsi as 27,560,000 in 1926, the Kuomintang Government estimated it as 20,320,000 in 1936—a decrease of 7,240,000.

(6) The Long March

After the break-through into Kwangtung and Hunan, the Red Army, accompanied by thousands of peasants, marched through Kwangtung and Hunan. It was under constant attack. By the time it reached Kweichow it had lost one-third of its troops. Prevented by Kuomintang forces from marching north for a crossing of the Yangtze River, the Red Army turned southward and in May 1935 entered Yunnan, where Chiang Kai-shek and Governor Lung Yün were preparing to ambush them. They passed within 10 miles of Kunming in their march toward a crossing of the Yangtze River. After a famous forced march of 85 miles in 24 hours to avoid and deceive the Nationalist forces, they suddenly descended on the Chou P'ing Fort at the Yangtze River, disarmed the unsuspecting Nationalist garrison, and secured a crossing of the river.

Thence they marched through the Lolo (aborigines) forest and mountain country in western Szechwan and Sikang. Befriending the Lolos and obtaining their aid as guides, they made a rapid march toward the Ta-tu River where they defeated the forces of the Szechwan warlord, Gen. Liu Wen-hui, at An-jen-ch'ang in present Sikang. While part of the army forced a crossing of the river at this point, the main body marched 130 miles west along the Ta-tu gorges and forced a crossing of the river over an old iron bridge. The crossing of the Ta-tu bridge has gone down as one of the most famous exploits of the Chinese Red Army, for it was done under constant attack by Kuomintang airplanes trying to bomb the bridge. The bridge also had to be conquered from wall emplaced opposing forces. Many a Chinese rebel army had met its end attempting to cross the turgid Ta-tu River in face of enemy opposition. Here the last of the T'ai-p'ing rebels, an army of 100,000 had been surrounded and destroyed in the 1860's. The Red Army was the first to have lived through a crossing of the Ta-tu while under fire.

From the Ta-tu River the Red forces continued their hurried march over the high mountains of western Szechwan. At Sung-p'an in northwestern Szechwan they finally paused for a rest (July 1935). The original force of 90,000 now numbered 45,000. Here the Reds reached a Soviet base which had been established in 1933 by partisan forces under Haü Hsiang-ch'ien of the Honan-Hupeh-Anhui Soviet district. Defeated by Kuomanting forces, they had marched across Honan

and Shensi to Szechwan. When the Kiangsi Reds arrived in Sung-p'an, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien commanded a force of 50,000, so that the combined Red force in western Szechwan in July 1935 was nearly 100,000.

In August 1935 the main force from Kiangsi, the First Front Army, continued its march northward. Chu Te and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, remained behind with Hsü's Fourth Front Army in Szechwan for another year, to be joined by Ho Lung's Second Front Army before undertaking a march northward to Shensi. With the First Front Army went Commanders Lin Piao, P'eng Te-huai, Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, and a majority of the members of the Central Committee of the Party. Under incredible difficulties, the Red forces marched through the grassland of southeastern Tsinghai, thence fighting their way through Kansu against the combined forces of the Kuomintang, the Moslems, and the "Tungpei" (northeastern) warlords in Shensi.

On 20 October 1935, one year after the start of the Long March, the Reds entered the Soviet base in northern Shensi, just below the Great Wall, and made contact with the Red armies of Shensi, 5,000 strong, under Liu Tzu-tan. The Red forces had marched 6,000 miles from their base in Kiangsi-Fukien. At their entry into Shensi they numbered less than 20,000. A year later, when Chu Te and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien brought the forces from Szechwan to north Shensi, the combined Red Army totalled 90,000. At the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, it numbered 100,000.

The Red Army had given a brilliant account of itself. It is doubtful, however, that it could have continued to maintain itself if the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, had pursued his policy of military annihilation of the Red forces. The only Soviet base which remained in 1936, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border area, was one of the poorest, most arid regions in China. At the end of 1936 the Generalissimo was preparing a new "blockhouse-fortress" campaign around the Soviet base in Shensi along the lines of the Fifth Campaign in Kiangsi. Had he decided to open this campaign, the Communist forces would almost certainly have been either "exterminated" or forced to begin a new "long march," probably across Mongolia to Soviet Russia.

What saved them was the growth of the United Front movement against Japan, and the acceptance by the Generalissimo at the beginning of 1937 of an all-party alliance in China for united resistance against Japan.

C. PERIOD OF THE UNITED FRONT AND AFTER, 1937–1945

(1) Chinese Communist Party and Comintern sponsors of the united front movement

The first suggestion of the united front idea in China came from the Chinese Communists following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. In April 1932 the Chinese Communists "declared war" on Japan. This was probably an effort to exploit the anti-Japanese sentiment in the Kuomintang armies, as a means of diverting their interest in continuing the anti-Communist campaigns. On 10 January 1933 the Chinese Red Army offered a united front to any armed force that would join it in battle against Japan. This offer was in line with the directive of the 12th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, September 1932. In regard to the Communist Party of China it directed, among other things, that it should "mobilize the masses under the slogan of the national revolutionary struggle against the Japanese and other imperialists and for the independence and integrity of China," and should work for the establishment of "an elected people's government."

These first suggestions for a united front in China did not, however, contemplate the inclusion of the Kuomintang. The program of the CCP as laid down after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria committed the Party to continue its fight for the "overthrow of the Kuomintang as the government of national betrayal" and at the same time to promote a movement for a "national revolutionary war of the armed nation against [Japan]." The Chinese Communists made it plain that they expected to emerge as the ultimate victors not only over the Kuomintang but also over Japan, for the Party declared in 1932 that "only the Soviet Government and the Red Army of China can . . . lead the national revolutionary war against the Japanese and other imperialisms and achieve full national liberation." In his report to the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July-August 1935, Ch'en Shao-yü made it plain that up to that time the Chinese Communists still did not contemplate any united front with the Kuomintang.

The Soviet Union was, however, adopting a different policy toward the Kuomintang, and in the end the Chinese Communists changed theirs to conform to

that of Soviet Russia. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a threat to Soviet Russia as much as to China proper, in addition the Soviet Union felt the threat of the rising tide of anti-Communist sentiment throughout the Western World. Therefore it became the object of Soviet diplomacy to ward off any possible attack on the Soviet Union. In the midst of her first Five-Year Plan, and seething with internal political unrest as a result of the Trotsky opposition and Kulak resistance to the collectivization campaign, Soviet Russia was in no position to take a strong stand against the aggressive nations on her frontiers in Europe and Asia. The Special Far Eastern Army of the Soviet Union was, in 1932, only three years old, and it had, so far, little industrial basis. The first Five-Year Plan, 1928–1933, aimed only to establish an industrial base in western Siberia. The industrial development of eastern Siberia was projected for the second Five-Year Plan. Soviet Russia needed time.

These factors induced Soviet Russia to give up, in 1928, her policy of inciting world-wide unrest. She became increasingly a sponsor of international peace. The Communist International accordingly lent its support by serving as an instrument to neutralize the growing anti-Soviet movement in capitalist countries, and to focus the attention of all groups in the democracies on the growing danger of fascism instead of communism. The Sixth World Congress of the Communist International (1928) gave the first hint of their methods of attaining these objectives, the development by the Communist proletariat of a "temporary cooperation with the bourgeoisie." This was the first indication of the Soviet-sponsored world-wide united front movement.

In regard to the Far East, this policy at first found its expression in the discontinuance of active Soviet participation in the internal political struggle in China, and likewise in a considerable decrease in direct support of the CCP by the Comintern. When, for instance, Mr. and Mrs. Noulens were arrested in Shanghai in 1932 and convicted in Nanking as chief Far Eastern agents of the Comintern, the complete evidence which the Chinese police produced showed that total outpayments for the whole Orient (not just China) had at most not exceeded the equivalent of about U. S. $15,000 per month. This was a pittance compared with the amounts expended during the time of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance. After 1928 the Comintern acted mainly as the directing agent, not the supporting agent, of the Communist Party of China. Following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, Soviet Russia began to temporize with Japan while at the same time adopting a conciliatory attitude toward the Kuomintang Government in China. The crisis in Manchuria also made the Kuomintang somewhat more favorably disposed toward Soviet Russia. Diplomatic relations between China and Soviet Russia were re-established in December 1932.

It would seem that both Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists believed in 1932 that Soviet China would soon emerge as the victor over Kuomintang China. The Comintern was at this time playing up the Chinese Communist movement as gaining tremendous victories, and although most of this was pure propaganda, the Chinese Red Army had proved its ability to defeat Kuomintang armies, and the new Soviet base in Kiangsi and Fukien was entering a period of considerable expansion.

However, by 1935 the world situation was developing unfavorably for the Soviet Union and Communism in general. Fascism, Nazism, and Japanese aggression were in the ascendancy. The power of the German Communist Party had been smashed by the rise of Hitler. The Chinese Red Army had been forced out of its base areas in central China. The tide against Communism and the Soviet Union was rising in all capitalist countries, with the fascist countries taking the lead in fomenting this anti-Communist movement. The fascist countries, therefore, became the chief threat to the Soviet Union and the Communist World Movement. Drastic measures were considered necessary by Communists all over the world to save the situation.

When the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International met in Moscow in July–August 1935, the united front idea was carefully developed. Among the many speeches and resolutions, the following extracts suffice to indicate the methods and aims of the united front. The "Communist International puts itself at the head of the campaign for the defense of peace and the Soviet Union." "If, thanks to the struggle for peace of the Soviet Union and the toilers of all capitalist countries, war can be delayed . . . this also will better enable the proletariat to strengthen its position in the capitalist countries, to strengthen the power of the Soviet Union . . ." While the united front movement aimed chiefly at establishing unity between all working class organizations, a prominent speaker at the Congress emphasized that ". . . under certain condi-

tions we [Communists] can and must bend our efforts to the task of drawing these parties and organizations [i. e. non-Communist organizations, rich peasants, big businessmen, petty shopkeepers, etc.] . . . to the side of the anti-facist people's front, despite their bourgeois leadership." Since fascism was the immediate threat, the point was to create a united front between the Soviet Union and the capitalist democracies to oppose fascism and thereby weaken the anti-Communist, anti-Soviet Union movement in the world. However, whatever the "temporary cooperation" with the bourgeoisie which the Communists might arrange, it "must never lead to renouncing the class struggle, i. e., it cannot and must not ever be a reformist cooperation. It is the more necessary to stress this because the bourgeoisie . . . even if it is compelled at a given moment to take up arms in defense of national independence . . . is always ready to go over to the camp of the adversary in face of the danger of the war being converted into a people's war and of a mighty upsurge of the masses." This point was, as we have seen (pp. 2315–2316), endorsed and developed by Mao Tse-tung in his outline of the policy of the CCP in his booklet NEW DEMOCRACY.

While the Communists were urged to unite temporarily with the democratic elements and even with "big business" in the capitalist countries, it was emphasized that this did not mean that the Communists would become bourgeois-democrats. "We [Communists] are adherents of Soviet democracy, the democracy of the toilers. . . But in the capitalist countries we defend and shall continue to defend every inch of bourgeois democracy, because the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate." This became a cardinal point in the united front movement of the Chinese Communists. While they offered their support even to the reactionary Kuomintang, they became the foremost advocates of democracy in China—but with the purpose of turning the democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

In regard to China, the Congress adopted a resolution stating that the CCP and the Chinese Red Army "must exert every effort to extend the front of the struggle for national liberation and to draw into it all the national forces that are ready to repulse the robber campaign of the Japanese and other imperialists." Ch'en Shao-yü explained in his report to the Congress that this was to be achieved by the organization of "an All-China United People's Government of National Defense and an All-China United Anti-Japanese National Defense Army."

The Congress elected Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-tao, and Mao Tse-tung members of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, with Po Ku and Kang Sin as alternate members. China and Soviet Russia had an equal (and the largest) number of representatives on the executive Committee, which shows the great importance attached to the Communist movement in China. Ch'en Shao-yü was elected a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee along with Stalin and 17 other members.

The united front principles of the Seventh World Congress of the Cominterm were soon put into practice by the Chinese Communists. During the time of the Long March (1935) they had tried in vain to build up a united front with the dissident Nationalist groups more or less opposed to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang dictatorship. Foremost among these groups were the Kuomintang liberals (Dr. Sun Fo, Mme. Sun Yat-sen and others), the Kuominchün (National People's Army) under Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang, the Kwangsi Military Clique under Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, and the Northeastern Army (Manchurian) under Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang. The failure of the united front movement in 1935 was not because of lack of response. The popular sentiment in China was strongly in favor of discontinuing the Government's anti-Communist campaign and concentrating the nation's united power against Japan. But none of the dissident Nationalist groups dared in 1935 to subscribe openly to the Communist idea of a united front. In so far as any one could see at that time the Chinese Communists were on the losing side. The Kuomintang was winning.

Following the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International the Chinese Communists changed their tactics. In January 1936 Mao Tse-tung publicly offered "the hand of friendship" to Chiang Kai-shek if he would take up arms against Japan. To those who expressed doubts concerning the avowed democratic spirit and sincerity of the Communists in offering a united front, Mao Tse-tung replied in August 1936 that the "Workers' and Peasants' Government had been renamed the People's Soviet Government" and that "the former laws about workers' control and leadership in the various enterprises have been repealed. The workers have been advised not to put up demands which may be in excess of what can be granted . . . In the non-Soviet districts it is our intention not to accentuate the anti-capitalist struggle, though we are in favor

of improving the standard of living of the workers . . ." On 26 August 1936, the Chinese Communist Party wrote the Kuomintang that "We are prepared to form a strong revolutionary united front with you as was the case during . . . the great Chinese Revolution of 1925–1927 . . . [That] is the only proper way to save our country to-day . . ."

(2) *The Sian incident. Formation of the United Front*

Chiang Kai-shek was still not willing to accept the united front idea, but many of his field commanders were. The army opposing the Communists in the Northwest was composed of two groups. One group consisted of regular Nanking, or Central Army troops; this was the First Army under General Hu Tsung-nan, an inveterate foe of the Communists. The other group comprised former independent provincial armies, the Northeastern ("Tungpei"—Manchurian) Army under Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, C-in-C of the "Bandit Suppression Commission," and the Northwestern Army ("Hsipei"—mainly Shensi provincials) under General Yang Hu-cheng. This latter group, comprising about 170,000 troops, strongly opposed continuing the anti-Communist campaign. A virtual truce with the Communists existed in their sectors, and they offered no support to the First Army in its campaign against the Communists. Partly as a result of this, the First Army suffered a severe defeat during November 1936.

A strong wave of nationalist feeling was sweeping through China at this time. The Japanese were continuing their invasion of Suiyuan Province of Inner Mongolia, which they had started in the spring of 1936, and they were expanding their influence in eastern Hopeh (including Peiping and Tientsin) and in Tsingtao. The anti-Japanese agitation among the Chinese people and Army rose to a new high pitch. The danger from the Japanese seemed much greater than that from the Communists, confined as they were to the semi-waste lands of north Shensi and adjacent areas in Kansu and Ningsia. In November, Chang Hsüeh-liang appealed to the Generalissimo to permit him to shift the Northeastern Army to the Suiyuan front to take up the defense against the Japanese.

The Generalissimo, however, insisted upon continuing the anti-Communist campaign. He had been preparing for several months for the Sixth Extermination campaign, planning to use the same blockhouse-fortress tactics as in the Fifth Campaign in Kiangsi in 1934. After Hu Tsung-nan's defeat in November 1936 Chiang Kai-shek became convinced that the only requirement for final success against the Communists was unity among the army groups opposing them. It was for this purpose that Chiang together with his whole personal staff arrived at army headquarters in Sian on 7 December 1936. He talked to the Tungpei and Hsipei commanders and tried to persuade them to "destroy the Reds." "I told them," said Chiang in his own diary, "that the bandit-suppression campaign had been prosecuted to such a stage that it would require only the last five minutes to achieve the final success."

Finding no response to this viewpoint, Chiang then decided to summon a General Staff Congress on 10 December. At this Congress final plans were formally adopted to push ahead with the Sixth Campaign. It was announced that a general mobilization order for the Tungpei, Hsipei, and Nanking troops in Kansu and Shensi was to be published on the 12th. It was also openly stated that if Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang refused to comply with these orders his troops would be disarmed by Nanking forces, and he himself would be dismissed from his command. On the 11th, Chang Hsüeh-liang conferred with the commanders of the Tungpei and Hsipei armies. They agreed to take matters into their own hands. Early in the morning of 12 December Sian was occupied by their troops. Chiang's personal staff (including many of the highest Government officials), the Governors of Shensi and Kansu, and a number of members of Chiang's secret police (the "Blueshirts") were arrested. A detachment of Tungpei and Hsipei troops went to the Lintung hot springs, 10 miles from Sian, where the Generalissimo stayed. He was captured and brought back to Sian where he became the involuntary guest of Marshal Chang and Gen. Yang Hu-cheng.

On the same day the rebel headquarters at Sian issued a circular telegram to the Chinese Government and people demanding among other things reorganization of the Government to admit all parties, an end of civil war and immediate adoption of a policy of armed resistance against Japan, the guarantee to the people of liberty of assembly and pardon of political prisoners. The Communists announced their support of this program. On the 14th the rebels announced from Sian that all orders for war against the Red Army were cancelled and that an

anti-Japanese Army had been formed comprising Tungpei, Hsipei and Red Army troops.

It is unnecessary to go into details on the events of the following days in Sian. Suffice it to state that Chiang Kai-shek for the first time in 10 years met with Communist delegates, among them Chou En-lai. Chou greeted him as C-in-C. Several conferences were held between 17 and 25 December between Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsüeh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng and the Communist delegates. Meanwhile negotiations were carried on between Sian and Nanking for an agreement on the Government's policy toward the rebels, the Communists, and Japan, and for the release of the Generalissimo. Among others, T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, arrived in Sian on 20 December. As a member of the liberal "American" group in the Kuomintang, which sympathized with the united front movement, he was favored by the rebels. On the 22nd Mme. Chiang Kai-shek also arrived in Sian. So also did Gen. Tai Li, the head of the "Blue Shirts." No details of the discussions have ever been officially released, but it seems certain that the rebels and the Communists received assurances from Chiang Kai-shek that the civil war would be stopped, and that Chiang would give his support to the united front movement. This being the case, the Communists and Chang Hsüeh-liang offered him their support. The Tungpei army officers were unwilling, however, to release Chiang. They demanded his death. The Communists dissuaded them. W. H. Donald, Chiang's Australian advisor, who was the first to arrive in Sian from Nanking to arrange for the Generalissimo's release, and who took a prominent part in the negotiations, has stated that Chou En-lai "was actually the one man who enabled Chiang to depart unharmed from the 1936 Sian kidnapping."

On 25 December Chiang Kai-shek flew back to Nanking accompanied by Chang Hsüeh-liang. Chang Hsüeh-liang went with the Generalissimo to the capital to "await punishment." It was a typical Chinese gesture aimed at giving the Generalissimo "face" after his humiliating experience in Sian. Chang has been held a prisoner ever since.

The sequel to this was the conclusion of the united front agreement, or rather "understanding" (no signed agreement seems to have been made). In March 1937 the Kuomintang, while announcing that it would continue its policy to "uproot the Communists," laid down its formal terms for accepting the Communists' submission: (1) Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the Government's Central Army under direct control of the Military Affairs Commission (National Military Council); (2) Dissolution of the Soviet Republic; (3) Cessation of all Communist propaganda; (4) Suspension of the class struggle. No written agreement seems to have been made for the recognition or legalization of the Communist party.[10] The Chinese Communists formally acceded to these terms on 15 March 1937.

The Chinese Communists did not, however, accede without Soviet Russian approval. In the Moscow magazine Bolshevik of 15 April 1937, Ch'en Shao-yü, member of the Presidium of the Comintern, presented an article giving Moscow's answer to Kuomintang's demands. Ch'en stated that Moscow would be willing to see the Chinese Red Army turned into a National Revolutionary Army, retaining its corps of officers and political workers, and to have it incorporated into a "Chinese United National Revolutionary Army, which would be subordinate to a single command." Moscow would be willing to see the Soviet power in China turned into a "general democratic power acting in concert with the United All-China Central Government," and to regard such a development as a real change in the character of the Chinese Soviets. Ch'en indicated that Moscow was ready to accept the demand for cessation of "red propaganda" provided the phrase would be taken to mean what it says and would not be applied to all sorts of views which have little or nothing to do with real Communism. In regard to the fourth point (suspension of the class struggle), Ch'en pointed out that the class struggle produced the Communist movement and not vice versa, and that "at the present time" the Communists were doing nothing to disunite Chinese society. An official American source commented that

[10] The documents concerning the united front negotiations between the Koumintang and the Communists have never been published. It seems, however, that the Communists believed for a time that the Kuomintang had extended legal recognition of the CCP. Mao Tse-tung said at the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP, 12 Oct. 1938: ". . . The next day [25 Sept. 1937] the Kuomintang, the Central Government, and the highest leader of the National Revolutionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek, made public the conversation in which the legal existence of the Communist Party of China was recognized and a united front for national salvation was formed."

Ch'en's article showed that the policy of the CCP not only enjoyed the support of Moscow "but was probably laid down in the Kremlin." Mao Tse-tung stated in 1928 that "the Communist International is in complete agreement with the new political line of the Communist Party of China. For the victory of the Chinese people, the Communist International has called upon all the Communist Parties of all nations to support and give aid to China's Anti-Japanese War."

Although no formal agreement seems to have been signed between the Communists and the Kuomintang,[11] the Red Army base was designated by the Chinese Government in September 1937 as a garrison area comprising 23 *hsien* (counties) and designated as the Shen-Ken-Ning Border Region.[12]

By order of the Central Government, the Red Army was reorganized as the Eighth Route Army with Chu Te and P'eng Te-huai as Commander and Vice Commander, and Lin Piao, Ho Lung, and Liu Po-ch'eng as division commanders. Chu Te was appointed Deputy Commander of the Second War Zone (including Shansi) under the Kuomintang General Wei Li-huang, in August 1937. The Central Government also decided that the Eighth Route Army should be organized into three divisions (known as the 115th (Lin Piao), 120th (Ho Lung), and 129th (Liu Po-ch'eng) divisions), and that it should be permitted to levy troops until its strength reached 45,000 men. The Government began paying a regular subsidy to the Eighth Route Army on the basis of this number of troops (CN $600,000 per month, the standard pay allowance for three divisions, plus a meager allowance of ammunition).[13]

Actually, however, the Eighth Route Army seems to have numbered around 100,000 men at the time. (The name of the army was later changed to Eighteenth Group Army, a name which the Communists have seldom used.)

On 22 September 1937 the Communists issued a proclamation from Yenan formally dissolving the Soviet Republic, and affirming their adherence to Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and their unity with the Kuomintang. The next day Chiang Kai-shek gave them his approval. By that time the Japanese armies had already spread far into north China and intense fighting raged in Shanghai. In this way the united front was established. It should be added, however, that already before the Kuomintang-Communist united front had been established in September 1937, other dissident Chinese groups had joined the Government for united resistance against Japan. Thus the united front included all resistance groups in China.

(*3*) *United Front action, 1937–1940*

(*a*) *Communists expand in North and Central China.*—Following the occupation of Peiping on 28 July 1937, the advance of the Japanese armies through North China was exceedingly rapid. By the end of the year all the main cities and their connecting railways in Hopeh, Shansi, and the provinces of Suiyuan and Chahar in Inner Mongolia had been taken by the Japanese. Tsinan, provincial capital of Shantung, was occupied on 27 December 1937, Tsingtao on 10 January 1938.

The collapse of the Chinese provincial and Central Government armies north and east of the Yellow River was nearly complete by the end of 1937. While the Japanese set up a Chinese puppet administration, and through this and their army authorities maintained a measure of order in their occupied zones in north China, the rural areas around these zones fell prey to ravaging hoards of Japanese soldiers engaged in grain confiscations and "mopping up" operations against Communists and remnants of Chinese provincial forces, roving units of disorganized Chinese soldiers who had turned bandits, and bandit groups formed out of peasants who had collected arms on various battle fields.

It was into this "no-man's land" that the (Communist) Eighth Rouse Army moved and began to restore order and unity. It fought the Japanese in cooperation with the forces of General Yen Hsi-shan (Governor of Shansi) and other non-Communist Chinese forces. For the most part, however, the Eighth Route Army fought on its own, even though it offered supporting action to other Chinese forces. The regular provincial and Central Army forces preferred to fight the

[11] Not having extended legal recognition of the CCP, the Kuomintang does not sign agreements with the CCP. It issues orders or demands which the Communists either accept or refuse.

[12] Between 1937 and '39, Central Government troops invaded and reoccupied five of these *hsien*. By November 1940, the Communists had full control over 16 *hsien* and partial control over 3 *hsien*—total 19—of which three *hsien* were in Kansu, one on the Shensi-Suiyuan border, the rest in North Shensi.

[13] This was the amount paid during the first three years of the war, until all payments were discontinued in 1940.

Japanese from fixed positions and prepared front-line defenses. This invariably led to their defeat and cost them tremendous casualties, because they had neither air support nor the modern mechanized equipment and artillery necessary to counter the Japanese superiority in fire power. The Communists refused to fight on these terms, and concentrated on the guerrilla tactics and mobile warfare which had gained them outstanding success in the past against the superior Kuomintang forces. In September 1937 the Eighth Route Army gained a victory over two Japanese divisions in the famous battle of P'ing-hsin Kuan (Pass) in eastern Shansi, which has been described by German military journals as "a classic of mobile warfare." This victory delayed the Japanese in their advance toward T'ai-yüan, capital of Shansi Province. It netted the Communists considerable quantities of arms.

It was, however, not so much occasional victories over the Japanese that contributed to the supply of arms to the Communist forces, as the defeats suffered by the regular Central Army and provincial forces which opposed the Japanese in the initial stage of the war. Tens of thousands of rifles were left by fallen and fleeing Chinese soldiers on the battle fields in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, and Suiyuan. The Chinese Communists collected vast quantities of these abandoned arms and munitions, and used them to replenish their own supplies and to arm guerrilla units and local self-defense corps which they organized among the peasants. Before the end of 1937 the Communist forces had infiltrated into and restored a measure of order in scattered guerrilla areas in northern and eastern Shansi, southern Suiyuan, southern Chahar, and Central and Southern Hopeh. By early spring of 1938 Eighth Route Army columns had entered Shantung east of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. This was outside the operational limits assigned to them by the National Government (North Shansi, part of Hopeh). At the same time five groups of Communist organizers were operating in the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhui area near Japanese-occupied zones. Next to the Japanese, the Communists held the dominant military power in Shansi and Hopeh.

The Eighth Route Army was, however, not the only factor in the restoration of order in North China outside Japanese-controlled areas, and the organization of guerrilla warfare and of base areas from which to carry on the struggle against Japan. When the provincial and Central Army forces fled, most of the higher government officials and the wealthy families also fled. With the advance of the Communist forces, many more wealthy families of merchants and landlords fled, fearing that they would be killed by the Communists. Most of these latter sought safety in Japanese-occupied cities. Left to themselves, the people improvised some organization. The villagers organized self-defense units against bandits, and in many places the leading men of the *hsien* (or county) called a meeting to elect a new *hsien* magistrate to replace the official who had fled. The National Salvation Association, formed by Mme. Sun Yat-sen and other patriotic leaders in 1932 as a non-partisan organization for the establishment of a united or "popular front" against Japan,[14] and other similar patriotic organizations, also played a considerable role in the re-establishment of order in rural areas outside Japanese-occupied zones. The Communist political agents got in touch with these patriotic societies to re-establish the *hsien* administration. The Communist Party and those patriotic societies became the nucleus for the Mobilization Committees (Tung Yuan Hui) which became the highest local government during the period of the war.

After the fall of T'ai-yüan in November 1937, some of the Shansi provincial leaders retreated with Governor Yen Hsi-shan to southern Shansi, while others fled to the Wu-t'ai Mountains in Northeastern Shansi, where the Eighth Route Army had established a base. One of these, Sung Shao-wen, the chairman of the Civil and Military Training Committee and of the Propaganda Section of the Shansi Provincial Government, conferred with General Nieh Jung-chen, the Communist commander of the region; together they developed the idea of forming a regional emergency government. They obtained Yen Hsi-shan's approval. This led to the famous Fu-p'ing Conference in the Wu-t'ai Mountain region of Western Hopeh, 9–15 January 1934. It was a united front conference attended by 148 delegates from 39 *hsien*, representing 28 organizations. Of the 28, the Communists appear to have had predominant influence in 19 organizations. These included 7 mass organizations (composed of peasants, workers and students),

[14] This organization was banned in Kuomintang-controlled China.

10 military organizations and mobilization committees, the Communist Party (1 vote), and "Local Communists" (1 vote). About 90 of the 148 delegates represented Communist-sponsored organizations. The Conference included delegates from Governor Yen Hsi-shan and from General Cheng Chien, Commander of the First War Zone (including Hopeh) and concurrently Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army. Although some delegates to this Conference were Kuomintang members, the Kuomintang Party as such was, significantly, not represented.

The Fu-p'ing Conference emphasized the opportunities for guerrilla warfare. Members of both the Kuomintang and the CCP spoke of the cooperation of their parties for the establishment of a free, independent, and democratic China. The Conference passed resolutions for the setting up of a "border government" comprising parts of Shansi, Hopeh, and Chahar provinces, with the status of a provincial government under the Central Government, and for the establishment of a united and armed people's self-defense army. It elected a Central Executive Committee of nine members for the new government with Sung Shao-wen, a non-partisan, as Chairman. Of the other eight members four were non-partisans, one a member of both the Kuomintang and the CCP, one a member of the Kuomintang exclusively, and two (including General Nieh Jung-chen) members of the CCP exclusively. A telegram approving the new government was received from Chiang Kai-shek on 30 January 1938; on 1 February Dr. H. H. Kung, newly appointed President of the Executive Yuan, wired the Government's confirmation.

Thus the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government (Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien Ch'ü) was established with its capital at Fu-p'ing. It was the first of several similar Communist-sponsored border governments to be established in North and Central China. Its titular leader was a non-partisan [15], but its real leader was the Communist General Nieh Jung-chen. In fact, an American newspaper correspondent who visited the Border Government area early in 1938 reported as his impression that the new organization was headed by General Nieh.

(*b*) *Democracy as practiced by the Chinese Communists.*—The system of democratic united front government introduced into the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region became the model for all Communist-led areas in China. The government was organized on a non-partisan basis; political parties could be represented, but the party line of each participating party was not stressed. No member of the government administration needed to reveal his party affiliation provided he was willing to cooperate in the anti-Japanese program. The system of government emphasized the principles of democracy, self-government, and united front action against Japan by all parties and population groups. The people were rallied under the slogan: "He who has strength gives strength, he who has money gives money, he who has knowledge gives skill in the united front against Japan."

The basic unit of the political organization was the village Mobilization Committee (variously called Village Committee For Armed Resistance Against Japan, Self Defense Government, People's Resistance Committee, People's Committee). The "village" is composed of approximately 3,000 people and includes between 1,500–2,000 voters. This "village" is the "administrative village" which consists of approximately 10 normal villages. The village Mobilization Committee had its counterpart in each higher administrative unit, the chü (town), the hsien, the sub-military region within each border region, and in the Border Region Government itself, where it was subordinate only to the Border Government Council. Members were elected and included gentry and peasants. In the village Committees only local people could serve. The Mobilization Committee held the supreme executive power. It had power within its area of control to requisition man power, skilled workers, money, food, clothing, and weapons. It fed and housed all loyal troops in its area of control. It maintained guards at every village and crossroad. The local militia was under its command. It issued passports to authorized travellers, and identification cards to local people. As the administration in the Communist-controlled areas became better organized many of the functions of the Mobilization Committees were taken over by the Village Delegates' Assembly.

Parallel to the Mobilization Committees, the Communists promoted the establishment of People's Congresses (or Citizens' General Assembly). Villagers elect their own Congress from among local people, several villages elect the members of the *chü* Congress, the people of the several *chü* comprising a *hsien* elect the members of the *hsien* Congress, and so on up to the Borden Region Congress. The Army also elects a few members to each of these Congresses. All elections

[15] Sung Shao-wen is still chairman of the Chin Ch'a Chi Border Government. Some reports list him as a Kuomintang member. By his own statement in 1938 he is a non-partisan.

are by secret ballot. It took several years, however, to develop the election system, and it was not until January 1943 that the first Congress of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, properly elected by all sub-districts, was held.

These People's Congresses provide a sounding board for public opinion. The Border Region Congress elects the members of the Border Government Council. It ratifies constitutions for various mass organizations. But in so far as is known the several Border Region Congresses have only a limited measure of legislative power, although they claim to exercise the highest legislative power within the Border Regions. Nominally the two main Border Region governments (Shensi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia, the only ones that have obtained official recognition from the National Government) are under the Government in Chungking and are independent of the CCP. Actually they are under the Communist Party, which holds the supreme power in all Communist-sponsored Border Regions. The Communist Party Headquarters (the Central Executive Committee and the Politbureau under the Central Executive Committee) at Yemen is the highest policy making organ. It is the highest authority over the Communist Army. It also plans the social, political, and economic life of the Borden Regions. These plans are not, however, handed down as orders to the Border Region Congresses; instead they are submitted through a Communist or pro-Communist member of the Border Region Congress concerned for a vote.

The civil government is linked with the Communist Party and Army by the Political Commissars, who rank with the Military Commanders of each Communist army unit. They represent the Communist Party. Beside their duties in the regular army units, they are responsible for the organization of the people's militia and for the supervision of the political training of the Army and the people in the areas behind the enemy lines. Thanks to this dual influence each Political Commissar occupies the Key position in controlling the military and civil administration of the area to which he is assigned. Thus he is able to insure that the decisions of the democratic border governments do not deviate from the policies laid down by the Communist Party. The strong influence of the Army Political Commissars over the civil government is shown by an example from the (Communist) New Fourth Army areas in Kiangsu Province. A report of conditions there in 1944 states that if two villages have some dispute which they are unable to decide between themselves, and which cannot be satisfactorily decided by the regional government, the matter will finally reach the Political Commissar of the New Fourth Army who will then make the final decision. This decision will be returned to the People's Congress and it in turn will vote upon the issue. The report states that the functions of the Political Commissar in such matters might be compared with that of a Supreme Court.

From the very beginning of the Communists' expansion into North China, they took a particularly active interest in the development of mass organizations. When the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government was formed, they had already established the Farmers' National Salvation Association, Women's National Salvation Association, Workers' National Salvation Association, Young Men's National Salvation Association, the Little Vanguards, and the People's Self-Defense Corps, embracing all men between the ages of 18 and 48. Later Communist-sponsored trade unions were developed which by now (March 1945) comprise about 600,000 members in all of China. The purpose of these organizations was to educate the farmers to defend themselves and to share their wealth with the Eighth Route Army. Already by early spring of 1938, after only four months of activities, it was estimated that about 1,000,000 people out of a total of 7,000,000 people in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region had been enrolled in the mass organizations, and that half a million men had been armed and were serving in the local militia forces.

The Communists were no less active in developing the educational system. They organized courses to teach the illiterate masses 1,000 characters which would enable them to read simple books and newspapers, and re-established schools for children, universities and military academies. All textbooks were edited by the CCP. A vast propaganda program was set in motion, utilizing mass meetings, propaganda posters, theatrical plays (probably the most effective method of indoctrinating the illiterate masses), and the dissemination of newspapers, magazines, and books. The central theme of this propaganda was anti-Japanism, but it also emphasized the meaning of the united front, democracy, and the struggle against imperialism and fascism. Eighth Route Army officers gave courses in guerrilla warfare in the towns and villages. Teachers and political propagandists were active throughout the Border Regions. "K'ai Hui" ("as-

semble for a meeting") became one of the most commonly heard phrases in Communist China. Every moment of spare time was used for political indoctrination, school work, and military training. The people came to see the need of these meetings, although at first some accepted them only as a wartime necessity. Questioned in 1938 by an American correspondent, the members of one Mobilization Committee said that the general opinion was that it was a good thing to give power to the people, but that in peace time they did not want to spend so much of their time at meetings.

What in the final analysis won the people for the Communists and the Eighth Route Army was, however, not so much their political program as their economic program. The abolition of the Communist program of land confiscation, as a condition for the conclusion of the united front with the Kuomintang, did not prevent the Red leaders from making some very shrewd bids for mass support. The land of all landlords who had fled to Peiping, Tientsin, T'ai-yuan, and the other large cities in Japanese-occupied China (and most of the big landlords had fled) was guaranteed to be the owner's property, but was "temporarily" used by the new Border Government. This land was distributed among the poor and among refugees from villages which the Japanese had burned. The Border Government collected the rents and promised to repay the landlord in full whenever he returned. These rents became a large source of revenue for the new government. The property of traitors who accepted office under the Japanese was confiscated by the Border Government and distributed among the poor. All rents were arbitrarily lowered 25 percent in some areas, more or less in others. A three-year moratorium on all debts was declared in 1938, and interest during the three-year period was fixed at only one percent annually. The maximum interest rate for new loans was set at 10 percent per year, which was a great reduction of the prevailing usury rates. The land of all farmers who had no animals was plowed by Eighth Route Army cavalry horses, and the farmers were assisted by Eighth Route Army troops. Any refugees within the Border Region areas who did not have enough food to last until the harvest were fed by the Mobilization Committee. The system of requisition used by the Mobilization Committee in collecting food and cloth for the army was so organized that the burden did not fall upon the poor. In some areas each member of a family was allowed three *mou* of land (about half an acre) unassessed. In other words, in a family of five, 15 *mou* (a large holding in China) bore no assessment. All people owning more than that minimum shared public expenses proportionately to their holdings. Since more than half of the population had less than the minimum amount of land, the burden of taxation fell on the well-to-do. The Communists called this "Ho Li Fu Tan" (reasonable bearing of responsibility). Without in any way violating the agreement of Kuomintang to abandon their radical land program, the Communists succeeded in winning the support of a large proportion of the poorest farmers, whose land holdings became dependent upon the maintenance of the Communist-sponsored government.

A new taxation system was introduced in 1942 based on a progressive income and property tax, with rates varying from 7 percent of income for the lowest tax paying group to 65 percent for the highest income group. In 1943 the exemption limit was lowered and the rate on high incomes reduced. The taxes were (and still are) payable largely in grain. It should be added that although these rates favor the poor they are not discriminatory against the rich. One wealthy landlord stated in 1943 that his taxes were lower than during the old regime.

As sponsors of such an economic program in a country where the overwhelming majority of the people were debt ridden, and impoverished by exhorbitant taxes and rents, the Chinese Communists could not fail to gain a tremendous popular following. The Eighth Route Army in North China came soon to be considered the benefactor and saviour of the people not only against the Japanese, but also against the rule of landlords and the former warlords who had held supreme sway over North China. As one official American observer in Communist-controlled North China recently said, the peasant appears not only willing but even enthusiastic about pay-taxes "because he is doing it for the Army, which is protecting him and his possessions, and for the first time in centuries he feels that he is getting something in return for his money or goods." It is not the ideology of Communism as such that impresses the people. It is the practical results of Communist leadership. A Communist leader said recently: "Communism to the people means freedom—freedom to have meetings, to discuss things with the landlord and government officials, freedom to elect their own representatives. This is a way of life they have never known, and they like it for it has done things for them. This is all that they can understand. This is all Communism really means to them." (142) (143)

The members of the mass organizations and local militia are certain to vote in favor of almost any plan the Communists sponsor. These plans have in general proved of benefit to the people.

The fact of the existence of a state of war helped the Communists to put their economic program into practice. Because of the war the entire economic effort could readily be focussed on support of the Eighth Route Army and other military forces in the Border Regions, for the defense of the people against the Japanese. Had the Japanese followed a policy of conciliation with the Chinese, and of economic reconstruction in ravaged areas, it is doubtful that the Communists could have succeeded so well as they did. There is no question that some of the Japanese military leaders genuinely desired to conciliate the people,

But their influence was not (and has never been) strong enough to enforce conciliatory behaviour in the Japanese Army. When Japanese troops entered a village, one of their first demands was for women. There was usually looting, and even when there was no resistance men of military age were frequently killed. As one private observer who visited the Shansi Chahar-Hopeh Border Region in 1938 stated: "If the Japanese had offered peace and security it would have been hard to rouse the peasants to patriotic self sacrifice, but refugees going to their relatives and friends have spread throughout the country the association of the Japanese with murder, rape, and looting, and the peasant is prepared to defend his home if not his country." The Japanese reply to guerrilla war was a policy of frightfulness. It drove the people into the arms of the Communists, because they undertook to organize the rural areas for defense after the regular Chinese armies had been defeated and had fled. The people subscribed fully to the Communists' answer to those who doubted their ability to fight the superior Japanese forces: "If we don't fight, what happens? The Japanese kill us anyway. If we fight, let's see what happens." By sustaining the anti-Japanese War the Communists won the people's sympathy, and gained immeasurably in political and military power through popular support.

The rapid rise of Communist power in North China induced an American official in China to remark at the beginning of 1938: "Thus the net result of Japan's 'holy war' to insure the peace of the orient by stamping out communism in China has apparently been to place the Chinese Reds in a position many times more favorable than they could ever have hoped to attain under the Chinese Government as it existed before the outbreak of hostilities."

The importance which the Communists attach to their economic program as a political weapon is shown by the fact that they consider it to be basic. The democratic self-government program plays a secondary, supporting role. It brings all classes together, and forces the landlord-merchant class into active participation in and hence support of the economic program. For if the landlords try to obstruct the economic program the people will vote against them and the landlords may lose whatever power and influence they possess. As one observer recently put it: "The landlord-capitalist group was driven to active participation to preserve its own interests."

This economic program explains, in large part, why the Communists can operate their democratic government system with a minimum of direct participation in government organs by Communist Party members, and why, during the first two years of the united front movement, they could leave considerable areas in North China under the control of cooperating Kuomintang generals and warlords without any danger of impairment of their own power.

An example (which may in part explain why Kuomintang generals now fear to engage in united front action with the Communists) is the experience of General Wan Fu-lin, then Commander of the 53rd Army, in the central Hopeh area of the Shinsa-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. He attended the Fu-p'ing Conference with the remnants of his troops in January 1938. General Wan was and old warlord from Manchuria, but a patriotic man who refused to compromise with the Japanese and put up a stubborn (and costly) resistance along the Peiping-Hankow Railway in Hopeh Province. Returning to Central Hopeh from the Fu-p'ing Conference, he was accompanied by a "political director" from the Eighth Route Army. Together they organized the area and recruited a new army. The work was as much political as military. In the suppression of banditry, at that time rampant in Central Hopeh, fighting was sometimes necessary. Some bandit groups were won over and incorporated into the army and the rest were forced to move east and north in advance of the new government forces. At the end of April 1938 only small areas in Central Hopeh still contained bandits. Simultaneous with this military occupation of Central Hopeh by Wan Fu-lin's forces, political organizers were sent to each village, and they

arranged for the election of Mobilization Committees, the formation of units of the People's Self-Defense Corps, and other mass organizations. These mass organizations gave such support to the Communist sponsored economic reforms that within about a year the Communists obtained the dominant position in Central Hopeh. And since the new 53rd Army was recruited from the local people and obtained its political indoctrination from the Communist political director, it became as loyal to the Communists as the people as a whole. Exactly what happened to General Wan in the course of 1938 is not known. In April 1939, however, he was reported to have been "relieved" from his command. By that time the Eighth Route Army was in full control of General Wan's former areas in Central Hopeh. In 1942 Wan was appointed a member of the National Military Council at Chungking. The remnants of the original (Manchurian) troops of the 53rd Army who refused to accept Communist control were driven out of North China by the Eighth Route Army. They reformed themselves as the 53rd Army in areas outside Communist control. In 1941 this army was in Hopeh. In 1944 and 1945 it fought on the Salween front. This anti-Japanese Manchurian army who had welcomed cooperation from the Communists was driven out from Manchuria by the Japanese in the early 1930's, and driven out from north China by the Japanese and the Communists in separate campaigns in the late 1930's. It marched clear across China toward Burma to continue its fight against Japan. There can be little wonder that experiences like this have made many leaders in the Chungking army distrustful of any united front arrangements with the Chinese Communists.

Units of Central Government forces have, on several occasions, cooperated with Communist forces in fighting the Japanese. But as a general rule, they have maintained their identity only when fighting in Central Government areas. But when they have tried to fight the Japanese in Communist-sponsored border region areas they have either lost their identity through absorption into Communist forces, or been expelled from the Communist areas. (134).

In the border regions it is only the Communist Party which has a large-scale party organization. At present this organization includes over 1,200,000 party members, of whom the Communists claim that more than half are peasants. (152) The Kuomintang is permitted to function in the border regions, and in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government there are still a number of Kuomintang representatives. As late as 1943 there was even a Kuomintang office which ranked as a provincial office, but it had very limited resources. Its only publication was a fortnightly paper which had a small circulation. The Kuomintang contested elections to the Border Region Congress in 1940 (the Congress was not convened until 1943) but it did not put forward any party candidates in the village elections. The Kuomintang lacks a well integrated organization in Communist areas, and since most of the initiative and most of the popular following lies with the Communist Party, it is doubtful that the Kuomintang could expand even if it adopted a liberal policy in Communist areas and tried, in this way, to compete with the Communists. Actually most Kuomintang members in the border region governments are liberals.

The policy of the Communists is to have one-third Communists, one-third upper-class individuals (landlords and merchants), and one-third Kuomintang and non-party progressives elected to government posts. In 1944, of the 47 members of the Yenan Municipal Council, seventeen were Communist party members, five Kuomintang members, twenty-one non-partisans or members of other parties and groups (or mass organizations), two protestants, and one Catholic.

This system supports the claim of the Communists that they are maintaining a democratic, united front government. But no real opposition toward the Communists could, it appears, develop from any other party or class or group, since the electoral vote is controlled by the masses and the masses are controlled by the Communists. Anyone is free to stand as a candidate, but in practice nearly all the candidates are proposed by the mass movement associations and the choice offered the electors is usually limited. For instance, in one *hsien* which elected six representatives to the Border Region Congress, there were only eight candidates.

The Communists' control of (or loyalty from) the masses, combined with universal suffrage, is the chief cause of Communist power and political and military control. It is also the cause of their great expansion of influence, for the masses welcome the Communists as their benefactors and will support them against their former rulers. But this type of democracy has by its very nature created an atmosphere which rules out opposition and makes it nearly impossible for any other party to exist except as a minority party. A capable

English observer, who is a strong sympathizer with the Chinese Communists and has lived in Communist areas since the end of 1941, recently commented upon the expansion of the influence of the Communists and their growing power in relation to the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government. He stated that "If the Kuomintang doesn't reform it seems to me that there is a very big probability of China coming under exclusive Communist control which would be a pity in many ways as I feel that the real weakness of the democratic system here [in Communist-controlled China] is that there is not enough real discussion which comes from having no real opposition party."

In the final analysis, the democratic system in the Communist-controlled Border Regions is predominantly a "democracy of the toilers" (see p. 2327) sponsored and led by the Communist Party. Members of the middle classes are permitted to vote and are not, in so far as is known, discriminated against or persecuted. But they have lost their pre-war positions of leadership, and must now follow the masses, who are under Communist guidance. In January 1941 Mao Tse-tung said that the "bourgeois revolution" should be supported and led by the proletariat under Communist guidance. This objective has been fulfilled.

Non-Communist parties are permitted to exist if they conform to the policies of the CCP as carried out through the Communist-controlled Border Governments. Thus the Kuomintang is permitted to function in the Border Regions. But it cannot establish itself as a party competing with the CCP. Furthermore, the Kuomintang members who participate in the Border Region governments are those in sympathy with the policy laid down by the CCP. Individuals who openly voice their opposition to the CCP and work against the Communists are outlawed. Even Communists must adhere to the prescribed "party line;" Trotskyites get short shrift. When Mao Tse-tung outlined the democratic policy of the CCP in 1938 he declared: "In the new situation of the war the traitors, spies, Trotskyites, and Japanophiles . . . must be suppressed according to law without leniency."

This insistence upon conformity has not been abandoned in the "democratic" program, nor do the Chinese Communists appear to consider it inconsistent with their claim that they permit freedom of thought and expression. A 20-point "Practical Political Program" which was ratified by the first formal People's Congress of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region in January 1943 included as point 6: "Guarantee freedom of speech, association, belief, press, residence; guarantee freedom from illegal arrest." But point 17 states: "Suppress followers of Wang Ch'ing-wei, Trotskyites, and other treacherous cliques. Confiscate and use their property." Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the former leader of the CCP, is a Trotskyite. He was released by Chang Kai-shek from a Kuomintang prison in 1937, but he remained until his death in 1942 in controlled China, in Szechwan. In Communist China his followers are outlaws.

The system of democratic united front government as introduced by the Communists emphasizes the political role of the mass organizations and trade unions, rather than of political parties. The mass organizations, in which the Communist Party has predominant influence, sponsor plans for political and economic reform which are then put to a vote in the various People's Congresses and government councils. There again the mass organizations and Communist sympathizers hold the controlling vote. Thanks to this system the Communist Party maintains absolute leadership. The close connection between the people and the Communist Army, and the important role of the Political Commissars of the Army as a link between the military and civil administration, provide additional safeguards for insuring the leadership of the CCP.

The Communists are able to maintain their position of control primarily because of the capable leadership and strong discipline existing within the CCP. In outlining the war-time functions of the CCP in 1938 Mao Tse-tung said: ". . . we [Communists] must have iron discipline in the Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Route Army. Discipline guarantees that we will adhere to our Party policies. Without discipline the Party cannot lead the army and the masses toward victory. . . . It is necessary to place the [Party] organization before the individual, the majority over the minority, upper Party functionaries over the lower, and the Central Committee over the entire Party. This is the Party's centralized democracy."

There is no question that the Chinese Communists have produced the best organized movement modern China has seen, and have knit the people together in support of the Communist Party and Army as no other government in modern China has been able to do. At the same time it is clear that the term "democracy,"

when used to describe the Communist regime, has a meaning different from the ordinary American understanding of the term. While the Chinese Communist system is not altogether a "dictatorship of the proletariat" it is far more akin to Soviet democracy, as outlined in the constitution of the Soviet Union, than to the democracy practiced in the United States and Britain.

(*c*) *The high point of the Kuomingtang-Communist united front; the Hankow Period, 1938.*—It was inevitable that the Chinese Communists, with their concept of a united front movement as involving economic reform, improvements of class relations, development of local self-government, formation of mass organizations of peasants, workers, and students, and democratic cooperation between these and all political resistance parties, should soon clash with the Kuomintang. There were many points in the Communist-sponsored program that agreed with the officially accepted policy of the Kuomintang as laid down in Sun Yet sen's *San Min Chu I* (Three Principles of the people—Nationalism, Democracy, People's Livelihood). In a sense the Communists also became more representative of the Kuomintang's officially accepted policy than the Kuomintang itself. For whereas the Communists acted, in many respects, in conformity with the Three Principles of the People, the Kuomintang not only did not put them into practice, but was opposed to any party or group which tried to do so. It had started as the leading revolutionary party of China. It led the great Kuomintang-Communist "united front" revolution of the 1920's. But beginning 1927, in the course of its struggle to prevent the Communists from gaining the leadership of the revolution, it ceased to be a revolutionary party. It became the leader of all the feudal, reactionary forces in China which it had originally set out to destroy. It persecuted and alienated from itself not only the Communists, but also the liberal-democratic groups within the Kuomintang and in Nationalist parties outside the Kuomintang. These groups were genuinely interested in putting the Three Principles of the People into practice, not, like the Communists, as a preliminary to the introduction of communism in China, but as a means of introducing democracy as an end in itself.

The characterization of the Kuomintang given by an American official in China in 1935 is worth quoting, not only because it holds true to this day, but also because it explains much of the inter-party friction which has characterized the united front from its beginning in 1937, and become increasingly acute with the passage of time. "Chiang Kai-shek," he wrote, "is no revolutionary and therein lies the reason for the decline of the Kuomintang as a revolutionary party. If Chiang was a revolutionary at any time he lost that character the instant he came to power or before. He undoubtedly longs for a great, free, and prosperous China. But China must arrive at this state under his personal control.

"What was the reaction upon the Kuomintang of this state of affairs? It was just what might have been expected. As soon as events demonstrated that the revolution was dead as far as the leader was concerned, the revolutionary spirit among the rank and file gave up the ghost. The real revolutionaries withdrew from party activity or went South to set up the rival Canton government of 1931,[16] and left control of the party to the 'practical politicans' and job seekers. The schism of 1931 left not a real revolutionary leader in the Central Kuomintang councils. All that remained at Nanking were personal henchmen of the dictator . . . Some of the old time revolutionists came back to the party after the rape of Manchuria in 1931, driven solely by their patriotic desire to unite in opposition to Japan. How they were betrayed at Nanking is a matter of history.

"To suppress whatever of the old revolutionary idea was left within the party the secret society known as the 'Blue Shirts' was organized within the party itself. This clique is supposed to be animated by but one purpose, complete and unquestioning support of Chiang Kai-shek as dictator. It conducts its operations after the fashion well exemplified by the fascist parties of the West, or better still by the old American Ku Klux Klan. Murder and threat of murder are used to bring into line such party members or officials as cherish ideas inimical to the dictator.

"The Kuomintang at present strongly resembles the political machines in the United States, such as Tammany Hall or the Republican clubs of Pennsylvania.

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[16] This refers to the Canton dissension movement which started in April 1931. Dr. Sun Fo and many other liberals left Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. Sun, Eugene Ch'en, Chou Lu, Wang Ching-wei (leader of the left-wing Kuomintang), T'ang Shao-yi, and other liberals established a new Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Canton, competing with that of the Kuomintang right-wing under Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. Peace between the two groups was re-established after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, following a promise by the Nanking Government that "elected representatives of the people" were to be included in the central political organs. The Nanking leaders never kept this promise.

Nominally devoted to the salvation of China through the principles of Sun Yat-sen it really concerns itself with nothing but the perpetuation in office of and division of political perquisites among its members."

To the Kuomintang the united front movement meant cooperation between all Chinese against Japan, on the basis of the integration of all military forces formerly independent of the Kuomintang into the Central Army, and the subordination of all political parties to the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang-controlled Central Government. Since the Government did not extend legal recognition to parties other than the Kuomintang, it did not deal with dissident parties as such. It could not ignore their *de facto* existence, but just as it worked for the elimination of all independent armies by integrating them with the Central Army, so it worked for the elimination of independent political parties through their integration with the Kuomintang. But it was not interested in democratic reforms or, for that matter, reforms of any kind. In the words of an American observer in China, commenting upon the united front negotiations in 1937: "The Kuomintang will fight for its position of authority and its accompanying perquisites of office, trimming where it has to, compromising when it must, but determined to hold the reins to the exclusion of all other factions."

The system of the united front government as it developed in Hankow during 1938, following the evacuation of Shanghai and Nanking, was also one of compromise, which affected the power of Chiang Kai-shek and his inner circle very little. On 1 January 1938 the Central Government in Hankow was reorganized on a basis that left all key positions with the right-wing Kuomintang members. The American Assistant Military Attaché in China cabled that the reorganization was welcomed as a definite triumph for the conservatives and that it put at rest the rumors that the new government was to include radicals. However, on 4 January Chiang Kai-shek announced his approval of a reorganization of the National Military Council on the basis of equal participation by Communists, the "Southwest Military Group" (Kwangsi-Kwangtung), and the Kuomintang "with all equally responsible" for continued resistance. The promise, or hope, that this approval conveyed was never carried out. The formerly dissident parties were never given "equal" responsibility with the Kuomintang. But for the moment Chiang's announcement helped to offset public reaction against the reorganization of the government on a conservative basis, An American observer in Hankow stated that it also satisfied the Communists, to whom "formal recognition was not vitally important since they had actually gained control of large areas of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopeh. On 5 January the Government announced that it had appointed K'ung Ho-ch'ung, a former Communist General who surrendered to the Kuomintang forces in 1934, as commander of all mobile units operating in North China. He had left for North China in December 1937.[17]

In the following months several moves were taken that seemed to promise a liberalization of the Kuomintang regime. A number of former dissident leaders were given positions in the Kuomintang, the Government, and the Central Army. Several Communist leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, Chou En-lai, Lin Tsu-han, and P'eng Te-huai were "reinstated" in the Kuomintang. Chou En-lai was appointed Deputy Director of the Political Training Department of the National Military Council, and the famous Communist guerrilla fighter, General Yeh Chien-ying, present C-of-S of the Eighth Route Army, was appointed adviser to the guerrilla school which Chiang Kai-shek established in Hankow.

In February 1938 the Supreme National Defense Council was established. It was to function as a supreme political and governmental organ for the duration of the war, providing a unified civilian military control. It was not, *de jure*, a part of the government, since it was established as the war-time replacement of the Kuomintang Central Political Council, the Party organ charged with exercise of the Party's sovereign powers in government. Since the composition of the Supreme National Defense Council was a war-time secret, no full list of its membership has been published. It is known, however, that right-wing Kuomintang members held the key positions. Several Communists, among them Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai, were reported to be members of the Council, although not of its Standing Committee. Already at the end of 1937 the Communists had been permitted by the Government to establish their own newspaper, the *Hsin Hua Jih Pao* (New China Daily), in Hankow. It was later moved to Chungking and is still published there.

[17] Apparently he never succeeded in taking command, at least not over the Communist forces. In 1943 he was reported to be a divisional commander in the 6th War Zone (Hupeh).

Between 29 March and 1 April 1938 an Extraordinary National Congress of Kuomintang delegates was convened. The Communist leader Chou En-lai was among the 17 members of its presidium. This Congress resolved that the system of Kuomintang leadership should "be firmly established and the Party Constitution be amended accordingly." It elected Chiang Kai-shek "Tung Ts'ai," or "Supreme Executive," of the Party. The Congress decided to postpone indefinitely the convening of a National Assembly (or National People's Congress) for the adoption of constitutional government. As a consolation to the Communists and democratic groups, who saw in this decision an attempt by the Kuomintang to maintain its dictatorial rule indefinitely, the Congress decided to convene immediately a People's Political Council, a rather powerless organization which was to function as an advisory organ to the Government. It held its first session in July 1938. While the Communist Party was not openly recognized or given official status, the Congress decided that "hereafter the people shall have absolute freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assemblage, and freedom in the formation of associations, provided such activities do not interfere with the war against Japan." The Communist Party organ, *Hsin Hua Jih Pao*, expressed great satisfaction with the results of the Congress. As an intersting sidelight on the general attitude of British and Americans toward the Chinese Communists in 1938 as compared with today, it may be mentioned that one American observer in Hankow, in commenting on the results of the Congress, stated that open recognition of the Communist Party "may possibly have been avoided for fear of possible alienation of support of China's cause by England and the United States." He could hardly have thought at that time that the American Government would one day send an American Military Observer Section to the Communist capital at Yenan.

The united front spirit was strong in Hankow during these days, and the feeling of unity between the Chinese led them to feel more optimistic concerning the future than actual circumstances warranted. The Central Army moved from one defeat to another. The Japanese Army was moving ever deeper toward the heart of China. But the momentary relaxation of the Kuomingtang dictatorship, with all its pre-war repressions of popular sentiment, and the genuinely cooperative war effort between all resistance groups in China imbued the people with the feeling that the war was worth its sacrifices. Chiang Kai-shek was hailed as the national leader who had risen above party politics and he emerged as the symbol of the people's aspiration for unity and victory. In the course of 1938 Mao Tse-tung developed a three-point strategy for the war which soon found acceptance among all Chinese resistance leaders and, in fact, became the theoretical basis for Chiang Kai-shek's war plans. Briefly, the theory of this plan, the "three-stage war," as Mao Tse-tung called it, was (1) Japanese offensive, Chinese "retreat in space but advance in time;" (2) Stalemate: The Japanese offensive attains its climax at the foothills of Western China, after which it reaches a standstill. China continues to mobilize while concentrating upon guerrilla warfare to hold the Japanese and diminish Japan's war energy; (3) Japan's internal and international complications reach a breaking point. China attains her maximum mobilization, followed by large-scale counteroffensive and victory. Both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek predicted a long war.

Even though this plan emphasized the responsibility of the Chinese to build up their own war potential, it counted upon foreign aid especially from Soviet Russia. In his outline of the "three-stage war" Mao Tse-tung said: "On the one hand we have the increasing movement of aid to China in foreign countries, the great power of the Soviet Union and her important aid to China, etc., and on the other, the menace of another European war, the tendency towards rapprochement between Britain and Japan, and the sale of munitions and war materials to Japan, etc."

It was not only the Communists who at this time looked primarily to Soviet Russia as their hope of victory against Japan. Their viewpoint was shared by most Chinese, including Kuomintang leaders.[18] The Soviet Union had entered into

[18] It was, however, not without fear that some Kuomintang leaders accepted the idea of Soviet Russian support. There was a powerful group in the Government, representing Wang Ching-wei, General Ho Ying-ch'in, and General Chang Ch'un, which advocated that China take steps to come to an understanding with Germany and Italy. They recommended this course of action during the last session of the People's Political Council, which met from 5 to 12 July 1938. This brought about an acrimonious dispute with the Communist delegates. One of them, Ch'en Shao-yü, hotly replied that Germany and Italy were allies of Japan and that any rapprochement with them would lead to capitulation to the Japanese. The Soviet Union, Ch'en declared, is the natural ally of China. One of the Nationalist delegates thereupon demanded of Ch'en Shao-yü: "Are you a Chinese or a Russian?" A scuffle was avoided only by the intercession of more temperate elements and the appeal of the Chairman, Dr. Chang Po-ling, to remember the united front. (184)

a treaty of non-aggression with China on 21 August 1937, within a few weeks of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. (This treaty is still in force.) Article I, which condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, was viewed by some as the Soviet justification for her policy of assisting China while remaining neutral. Although both the Chinese and Soviet governments denied that a secret agreement for Soviet military aid accompanied the treaty, such aid was given in a variety of forms. The Soviet Ambassador to China stated his Government's attitude at a celebration of the 21st anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, 7 November 1938, as follows: "Under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the great Chinese nation is now being united and has presented a united front to oppose the aggressor, and your struggle has won the whole-hearted sympathies of the whole Soviet people." The emphasis on the united front is worth noting.

It is true that America, Britain, Soviet Russia and other countries contributed considerable amounts to Chinese war relief. And an American Volunteer Aviation Corps, organized by Lt. General (then Major, Retired) Clair Lee Chennault (at that time Aviation Advisor to the Generalissimo), was actually fighting the Japanese in China. But Soviet Russian aid vastly surpassed that of any other country. Soviet planes were delivered to China in considerable quantities, and Soviet aviators served in the Chinese Army in a "private" capacity as volunteers. On 26 January 1938 the first recorded Chinese-employed all-Soviet Russian air raid was made on Japanese installations in Nanking. During these first years of the war Soviet Russian loans to China, in the form of barter agreements, were also considerably greater than those of any other country. Up to the time of Pearl Harbor, Soviet Russia is reported to have concluded barter agreements totalling the equivalent of US $300,000,000, compared with US $170,000,000 from the United States, and £18,000,000 from Great Britain. When the German military advisers headed by General von Falkenhausen were withdrawn from China in 1938 they were replaced by Soviet Russian military advisers. Not since the days of the Kuomintang-Communist revolution in the 1920's had there been so many Soviet advisers in China.

Although the Chinese were anxious to cultivate friendly relations with Britain and America and made several appeals to these two nations and to the League of Nations for greater support, the response from these quarters was small compared with that from the Soviet Union. The concensus of opinion in Government circles in Hankow was, according to some reports, that China's only hope lay in seeking closer collaboration with Soviet Russia. It was the compelling need of foreign aid, and the fact that Soviet Russia alone of all foreign powers was willing to extend aid in substantial quantities, that influenced the Kuomintang to take a conciliatory attitude toward the Chinese Communists. Reports from Hankow at the end of 1937 stated that "the Central Government military leaders hoped that if the Communists were admitted to the government, Soviet Russia might come definitely to China's aid." The correctness of this interpretation of the Soviet attitude toward the Kuomintang was confirmed in October 1938, after the first rift in the united front. At that time the Soviet Ambassador presented Chiang Kai-shek with five demands, of which one was that the Communist Party in China should be placed on an equal footing with the Kuomintang. Another was that the Communists be admitted to the National Military Council, a promise which Chiang had made earlier in the year but failed to fulfill. This showed that the policy of Soviet Russia toward the Kuomintang was basically the same in 1938 as in 1923-1927; Soviet Russian support of the Kuomintang was conditional upon Kuomintang cooperation with the CCP.

Soviet-Japanese relations were exceedingly tense in 1937 and 1938, partly as a result of Japanese objections against Soviet aid to China. The Changkufeng incident on the Manchurian-Siberian border in July 1938, involving heavy fighting between Japanese and Soviet forces, raised high hopes in Hankow that Russia had decided to go to war with Japan. Although these hopes were dashed by the news of the armistice on 11 August, the Chinese felt that Soviet Russia had too high a stake in China to permit Japan a free hand in the Far East.

Great as the spirit of the united front had been during the first part of 1938, it began to wane during the last months of the year. Already at the end of July the situation began to deteriorate. The Chinese Communists, availing themselves of the March 1938 resolution of the Kuomintang Congress granting freedom of speech and of formation of associations, etc., began to establish mass organizations in Hankow on the same pattern as in their guerrilla areas in North China. Within a few weeks after this Congress there appeared in Hankow the Communist-sponsored "Wuhan Youth National Salvation Corps", "The

National Emancipation Vanguards," and the "Ant Society." The Kuomintang authorities looked with apprehension on the growth of these mass organizations, well remembering the effective use the Communists had made of similar organizations in the 1920's, and knowing their current use of mass organizations in North China as a means of winning popular support. These organizations were also considered a threat to the development of the newly established *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps, a mass organization sponsored by Chiang Kai-shek to bolster popular support of the Kuomintang.

At the end of July the "Blue Shirts" were reported to be working against the Communists, and this led to a Communist protest in the *Hsin Hua Jih Pao.* At the end of August the Hankow-Wuchang Defense General Headquarters ordered the dissolution of the three Communist mass organizations mentioned above. The Communists announced that the step was a breach of good faith on the part of the Government and demanded, without result, the restoration of freedom of action to the three organizations.

This first open rift, combined with a return of restrictions on the non-Kuomintang press and increasing suppression of the right of assemblage of non-Kuomintang groups, was generally interpreted as a sign of the inability of the controlling reactionary elements in the Kuomintang to get along, not only with the Communists but also with the Kwangtung-Kwangsi liberal factions, the few Kuomintang liberals, and the large number of non-political military leaders who had united with the Government. With the transfer of the seat of Government to Chungking and the fall of Hankow in October 1938, the Kuomintang seemed to return more and more to its pre-war tactics of dictatorial rule. In October following the Soviet Russian Ambassador's demands, mentioned above, Chiang Kai-shek suppressed several more Communist organizations. As a result Soviet Russia withdrew some of her aid to China. Mao Tse-tung issued a warning from Yenan: "For the Kuomintang the most important link in the chain of progress is the democratization of its organizational form, making the party itself the people's alliance for resistance against the enemy and for national reconstruction. Judging from the present tendency of the war, if the Kuomintang does not open its doors and admit all the other patriotic parties and individuals . . . the tremendous task of resistance . . . will be too great a burden on the shoulders of the party.

The year closed with a bitter attack on Mao Tse-tung in the Central News, a Government organ, by a Kuomintang leader, Chang Chun-mai. He attacked Mao and the Communists for failure to turn over control of the Communist area in Shensi Province to the Central Government and for not allowing Chiang Kai-shek to command directly the Communist armies in the field, and to direct their training.

(D) THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN BECOMES SUBORDINATED TO THE "WAR WITHIN THE WAR"

1. Basic principles of Kuomintang and Communist wartime policies toward each other.

It is impossible within the limits of this study to enumerate all the incidents in the Kuomintang-Communist inter-party struggle that ensued in the years after 1938. The pattern of the struggle was set within the first 18 months of the war. It has not changed to this day. But the struggle has become more and more intense.

The Communists operated along two lines: (1) Expansion of their areas of military control, in which they established their own special form of democratic united front government, patterned after the "Soviet democracy of the toilers;" (2) Exertion of the utmost possible pressure upon the Kuomintang and the people in Kuomintang-controlled areas for the introduction of democracy more in the Anglo American than in the Soviet sense of the word. This paradoxical policy of the Communists toward the two separate areas of Communist and Kuomintang China was fully in line with the united front policy as laid down by the Congress of the Communist International in Moscow, 1935, which advocated a two-fold democratic program: "We [Communists] are adherents of Soviet democracy, the democracy of the toilers [in our areas of control] . . . But in the capitalist countries we defend and shall continue to defend every inch of bourgeois democracy, because the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate."

The basic principles of the policy of the Communists toward the Kuomintang were announced on 28 March 1938 in the *Hsin Hua Jih Pao,* Communist Party organ, as follows: "The permitting of existence to only one political party and refusing legal status to other parties is not justifiable, while the abolition of all parties and merging them into one [the Kuomintang] is impossible. Therefore, we propose the organization of a people's revolutionary alliance under the follow-

ing three principles: (1) A joint policy to be adopted by all parties, to be followed by individual parties; (2) Representatives of various parties to organize a united administration to formulate an anti-Japanese program and adjust party affairs; (3) All parties participating in the alliance to retain their political and organizational independence." To this should be added a fourth, and cardinal, point, namely that the Kuomintang and the CCP would maintain their separate armies.[19] There has been no change to this day of this policy of the Communists.

The Kuomintang's answer to this policy followed two main lines of action: (1) Restriction of Communist areas of military-political control; (2) Suppression of Communist activities in Kuomintang-controlled areas.

The one common policy of the two parties was that the war against Japan must be continued. This was the main factor in preventing the resumption of the Kuomintang-Communist civil war on the scale of pre-war days, and the reason why both parties tried to preserve, outwardly at least, the semblance of unity. The Kuomintang Government allowed a few Communist party members to reside in Chungking and some of the other larger cities in Free China, and the Communist newspaper in Chungking was permitted to continue publication, although under Kuomintang censorship. The Communists were also granted a small representation in the People' Political Council. The Communists accepted these "favors" for what they were worth. They gave them a chance to make their voice heard in the capital, to press their demands for democratic reforms and to maintain public interest in the united front idea. In the People's Political Council where Chou En-lai was one of the Communist members the Communists could, in an official capacity, present their criticism of the Kuomintang and the Government.

2. The Kuomintang enforces a military blockade of the Communist area in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, 1939

The Kuomintang-Communist inter-party relations in the capital, never friendly although moderately polite, were, however, only a faint reflection of the two-party relations in the provinces. For it was inevitable that the opposing policies of the two parties would lead to clashes between their armed forces. As the number of clashes increased from year to year, the military situation in China became more and more "a war within a war."

In the summer of 1939 the Chungking Government began to enforce a strict military blockade of the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. It had two objectives: first, the prevention of Communist military infiltration and elimination of Communist propaganda in Free China west and south of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region; second, the closing of any possible overland route between the Chinese Communist base areas in North China on the one hand, and Sinkiang and Soviet Russia on the other. The Japanese Army blocked all routes leading north through Inner Mongolia as far as to Pao-t'ou, the western terminal of the Ping-Sui Railway. From Pao-t'ou westwards the Chungking Government generals Fu Tso-i and Kao Kuei-tze maintained a blockade of the northern border of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. The northwestern border facing Ningsia and Kansu provinces was blockaded by Moslem troops of the three Ma Generals[20] who in 1937, before the conclusion of the united front, had inflicted on the Chinese Red Army one of its worst defeats. The Moslems in Kansu and Shensi provinces were reinforced by the First Group Army of General Hu Tsung-nan, allegedly the best equipped of all the Central Army forces. It had retreated to Shensi after its defeat and withdrawal from Shanghai at the end of 1937.

Soviet Russian aid to China was still continuing at this time. Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province, had become a great transportation center for Soviet supplies brought overland to the Chungking Government via Sinkiang. Since Sinkiang was under Soviet influence, the Kuomintang authorities feared an attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists to extend their influence toward Sinkiang with the view of establishing an over-land route to Soviet Russia. These were some of the factors that induced the Chungking Government to impose a blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Frequent border clashes

[19] Mao Tse-tung said in October 1938: "As a result of special historical conditions the Kuomintang and Communist Party have their own armies. This is not a defect but a good point. Their own armed forces enable them to effect a division of labor in the war of resistance so that each does its best to fulfill its own responsibility. They constantly help and encourage each other.

[20] Ma Hung-k'uei, Governor of Ningsia.
Ma Pu-fang, Governor of Tsinghai.
Ma Pi-ch'ing, Commander of Moslem troops in Kansu. He has since been forced out of Kansu by Chiang Kai-shek.

occurred. The Communists lost some districts. In time a net work of pill boxes was built by the Kuomintang forces along the southern and western approaches to the Communist base in Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. This blockade is still maintained although it has been slightly relaxed in the past few months.[21]

While the foregoing were important reasons for concentrating large forces of Government troops in the Northwest, not all the troops were there to oppose the Communists. A large part of Hu Tsung-nan's First Group Army was concentrated in the area south of the Yellow River bend to guard the vital Tung Kuan (Pass) against a Japanese offensive toward Siam.

3. The struggle between Chungking Government and Chinese Communist forces for possession of guerrilla bases in east China, 1937–1940

In the guerrilla areas of Eastern China frequent fighting between Kuomintang and Communist forces took place. Who was the actual attacker is in many cases impossible to determine, for both parties accused each other of breaking the peace, and no neutral observers, if present at the scenes of fighting, have submitted any reports of their impressions, in so far as is known. Two examples suffice to show the Communist method of presenting their case. In a press interview with Chinese reporters on 11 September 1939 Mao Tse-tung said: "In North China, Chang Yinwu and Chin Chi-yung are experts in dissension—the former in Hopeh and the latter in Shantung. They have become very rampant and their activities are scarcely different from those of traitors. They have spent very little time in engaging the enemy, but have devoted much time in fighting the Eighth Route Army. I obtained strong proofs in this regard, such as Chang's orders to his troops to attack the Eighth Route Army, et cetera, which we have submitted to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek."

Another typical statement by the Communists reads as follows: "Early in the summer [1940], disputes in North China [between Kuomintang and Communist forces] were fortunately solved through the demarcation of areas of operations [in Shansi and Hopeh] and the door to negotiations between the Kuomintang and Communist parties was thus reopened. Efforts were made in the following months to settle various issues, and the Eighteenth Group Army was doing its utmost to prepare the 100-regiment battle against the enemy. Unexpectedly, Shih Yü-san's troops, having obtained by deceit the support of the Central [Chungking] authorities, again crossed the [Yellow] River and entered Hopeh, and launched attacks in conjunction with the enemy and puppets. Disputes arose as fighting broke out."

This Communist story about Shih Yü-san is probably true. He was shot in 1940 by the Chungking commander, General Wei Li-huang, for working with the Japanese. Another Communist account of how his areas in Southern Hopeh were taken over by the Communists is given by a private foreign observer who has lived in Communist-controlled areas of North China for several years. According to his information, also derived from Communist sources, the army of Shih Yü-san in South Hopeh and Shantung was much better equipped than the Eighth Route Army forces but its leader was "distrustful of democratic mass organization." As a result he was not able to withstand a large-scale Japanese attack and the areas he occupied have now come under Eighth Route Army control.

This version accords with the explanation usually given by the Communists of how they have expanded their areas of control. Piecing together the two Communist stories about Shih Yü-san as quoted above and similar stories, each of which fits its particular case, it appears that (according to the Communists) the Japanese are in the habit of frequently attacking and defeating Kuomintang generals who have been fighting together with them against the Communists, whereupon the Communist armies move in, take over control of the rural areas and start organizing the people for guerrilla warfare.

Exactly why the Japanese should be interested in fighting Kuomingtang generals who are cooperating with them in fighting the Communists is not explained by the Communists!

The Communist versions of Kuomintang attacks upon their forces are, however, usually devoid of obvious propaganda distortion. On the other hand, Kuomintang accusations against the Communists are often so full of obvious misstatements that it frequently becomes impossible to distinguish between the

[21] In January 1945 it was reported that 200,000 Kuomintang troops were still blockading the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Since November 1944 about 20,000 troops had been moved south, presumably to Kweichow Province.

grain of truth and the mass of falsehood. This has, naturally, led to a tendency among many observers to trust statements by the Chinese Communists concerning Kuomintang activities, while almost entirely disregarding those of the Kuomintang concerning the Communists. Mao Tse-tung's statement about the two "experts in dissension" may be true. However, since we have definite proof that General Ch'eng Ch'ien, C-in-C of the North China war area in 1937 and 1938, and General Wan Fu-lin and his troops of the 53rd Army actively cooperated with the Communists in Hopeh, but that they later disappeared from Hopeh, the Kuomintang version of what happened to one of the "experts in dissension," Chang Yin-wu, deserves a hearing.

Chang had a good reputation before the war (and he probably still has) as an honest, simple, and upright person. The son of a Shansi peasant, he was known for his simple manners and lack of pretense. As Mayor of Peiping during the late 1920's and early 1930's he established an outstanding record for honest and progressive administration. Here is the Kuomintang version of what happened to him:

"Skipping over the [Kuomintang-Communist] clashes [in Hopeh] in 1938 . . . we find that large-scale systematic operations began in June 1939 and lasted till the end of March 1940. General Chang Yin-wu was C-in-C of the Hopeh People's Armies [Chungking guerrillas] and at the same time Commissioner of the Interior of the province. His troops occupied a circular area east of Chengting on the Peiping-Hankow Railway . . . It was a flat country; nevertheless the People's Armies had fought seven successful guerrilla encounters with the Japanese in this area. The Communists could and should have been useful allies.

"On the night of June 21, 1939, the headquarters of the People's Armies was suddenly surrounded by two Communist regiments under Ho Lung. The battle lasted two days and two nights until Chang's ammunition was exhausted and his troops were completely disarmed. Then the battle spread over 120 kilometers and over 40,000 Communist troops were employed, under Ho Lung, Liu Po-cheng, and Lü Cheng-chao. Chang's troops escaped toward west of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, but the 129th Division of Liu Po-cheng, the 120th Division of Ho Lung, and the Youth Guards of Lü Cheng-chao followed in hot pursuit until they completed the annihilation or disbandment of the People's Army. The Communists pushed further . . ."

It may be true that Chang Yin-wu was the initial attacker. But in the final instance Ho Lung seems just as responsible for the fighting as Chang Yin-wu since he drove Chang out of his war zone. And if we accept Mao Tse-tung's statement that Chang Yin-wu was an "expert in dissension" and that he fought the Eighth Route Army, it must also be agreed that Ho Lung was a more successful "expert in dissension" and fought the Kuomintang forces.

The Communists' version of the inter-party war, namely, that they have been innocent victims of Kuomintang attacks and have been forced to fight the Kuomintang forces in self-defense, has been accepted quite generally among foreign Allied observers. There can be no doubt that in many cases Kuomintang troops have attacked the Communists, forcing them to make counter-attacks in self-defense. In granting this it would seem, however, that simple logic would prove conclusively that the Communists have been the chief attackers against the Kuomintang forces throughout the past eight years. From its tiny original base in North Shansi the Eighth Route Army has spread out into vast areas of the coastal provinces of North China within and beyond the Great Wall, and the New Fourth Army has spread its influence over great areas of Central China. The Communist armies could not possibly be where they are today without having been on the offensive. And it is not without significance that the expansion of Communist control has been at the expense of Kuomintang areas far more than of Japanese-occupied areas.

The contention of the Communists, that they have throughout the war been forced to fight the Kuomintang forces in self-defense, implies that in order to defend their original wartime base area in North Shansi from Kuomintang attacks they had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of the greater part of Shansi and Hopeh. In order to defend their "united front" bases in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region from Kuomintang attacks, they had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of the greater parts of Shantung and Northern Honan and establish several new "united front" bases in these areas. And in order to defend their original base of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhwei and Southern Kiangsu from Kuomintang forces, the New Fourth Army had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of all of Kiangsu, great parts of Anhwei, Chekiang, Hupeh, and Southern Honan. If we accept the justice of this type of self-defense,

we must also concede that the Japanese were justified in conquering great parts of China, and in order to defend their home land and China were forced to conquer the Philippine Islands and Southeast Asia. For the Japanese, just as the Chinese Communists in regard to themselves, claim that they have been "forced" to undertake these conquests in "self-defense."

The Kuomintang and the National Government permitted the Chinese Communists considerable freedom of action at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. The Government assigned to the Communists certain war areas in which they were to cooperate with the regular Central Army troops in the defense against the Japanese. Thus North Shensi adjacent to the Communist base in the Shen-Kan-Ming Border Region was assigned to the Eighth Route Army. When the Eighth Route Army penetrated into Hopeh and began to organize a united front resistance after the collapse of organized resistance by the Central Army forces, the Government also sanctioned this move.

The Communists, however, continued to expand their areas of control, and it soon became evident to the Chungking authorities that they considered it within their right to expand into any war area of eastern China without previous permission of their C-in-C, Chiang Kai-shek, or even consultation with the National Military Council or with the Government-appointed war zone commanders. This was, of course, an open violation by the Communists of their united front agreement with the Kuomintang, for in March 1937 the Communists had formally accepted the Government's terms for a united front, among them the abolition of the Red Army "and its incorporation into the Government's Central Army under direct control of the National Military Council."

While the regular Central Army forces were distributed in the various front sectors according to the plan of the High Command in Chungking, the Communist forces moved anywhere they liked according to plans laid down in Yenan. And wherever they went they set up their own guerrilla bases and their own type of democratic united front governments which were linked up with Yenan instead of with Chungking. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that fighting with Government forces would develop. These latter had, after all, full right to be where they were, for they were there by order of the Government. The incursion of Communist power into their base areas and the establishment of a Communist-led administration which flouted the authority of the Chungking-appointed officials reduced the size of the areas of the Chungking forces on which they were dependent for their sources of supply. The Chungking forces became enraged over this invasion of their defense sectors. They had fought against the Japanese for the defense of their guerrilla bases. They fought against the Communists for the same reason, in self-defense.

Soon after the formation of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region in January 1938 (which did not include all areas within these provinces), Eighth Route Army forces under Ho Lung moved into Southeastern Shansi to the T'ai-heng Shan (Mt.) area. This lay outside their defense area assigned to them by the Government. Fighting broke out with the Government's forces in which the latter suffered several defeats. Intermittent fighting continued for several years.

During the latter part of 1938, Communist forces under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien invaded Northeastern Shantung and began establishing guerrilla bases on the Shantung promontory south of Chefoo and Lung-k'ou and in the areas around Tsinan, the Japanese-occupied capital of the province. This area also lay outside the defense zone assigned to the Communist forces by the Central Government. Fighting broke out with Government forces under Admiral Shen Hung-lieh and General Yü Hsüeh-chung who tried to defend their bases. This fighting continued with intermittent pauses until 1943, when the greater part of the Government's forces were withdrawn from Shantung.

After most of the Government's troops had been forced out of Hopeh Province (March 1940), the 115th Division (under Lin Piao) of the Eighth Route Army, supported by several independent detachments, crossed to the south bank of the Yellow River into Western Shantung. This, again, was an invasion of areas which the Government had never assigned to the Communists. Fighting with Government forces broke out. The latter were forced to retreat. Western Shantung became another Communist base.

Following this the Eighth Route Army forces invaded Eastern Honan and Northern Anhwei Provinces (early summer 1940) where they established contact with the forces of the New Fourth Army which had extended their influence northward from the Yangtze River. In August 1940 the Eighth Route Army forces in Northwestern Shantung combined with those under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien

in Northeastern Shantung, and under Hsü's command they launched an invasion of the southern part of the province, fighting the Chungking forces for possession of bases. In October 1940 these Eighth Route Army forces invaded Northern Kiangsu. In full coordination the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies gradually extended their areas of control in Shansi, Shantung, Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Honan, Chekiang and Hupeh. The Lunghai Railway became the dividing line between the areas of operations of the two armies.

The nucleus of another Communist armed force had been organized by the New Fourth Army in Kwangtung Province of South China during 1939. The leader of this force, the 3rd Detachment, was Tseng Sheng, a graduate of Chungshan University in Canton. After a short time his force was accepted into the Kwangtung Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps under the Chungking commander Hsiang Han-p'ing. The 3rd Detachment adopted the name of Hui-yang Pao-an Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps, indicating its area of operations in the Hong Kong region from the coast across the Hong Kong-Canton Railway to Hui-yang (Waiyeung). But in expanding its guerrilla areas it got into trouble with the Chungking forces and in March 1940 General Hsiang declared Tseng Sheng's guerrilla corps an "unauthorized party." Other Communist forces had meanwhile begun to establish guerrilla bases on Hainan Island.

This rapid expansion of Communist influence was new evidence of the capable leadership of the Communist army commanders, political commissars, propaganda workers, and mass mobilization organizers. But when stating this it must also be admitted that the Communist tactics were not conducive to the maintenance of the united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP. To the Communists any Chungking general who refused to welcome their armies into his defense zone and who fought against them for the defense of his base areas was a "traitor" and an "expert in dissension." On the other hand, the Chungking army leaders accused the Communists of unpardonable breaches of military discipline, and of supporting the Japanese by fighting the Government forces.

The Chungking Government repeatedly asked the Communists at least to agree to a clear demarcation of defense zones, as a means of avoiding the hopeless confusion created by the intrusion of Communist armies into the defense zones of Chungking Government forces, and averting the resultant inter-party fighting. The Government finally offered the Communists all of North China north of the Yellow River (that is, the pre-1938 bed of the Yellow River) except Southern Shansi, as their defense zone, provided they would withdraw the New Fourth Army to North China.

In September 1940 Chou En-lai also stated to an American observer in Chungking that although no formal agreement had been signed a settlement had been reached with the Government "to the satisfaction of both sides" involving a clear demarcation of defense areas, the size of the Eighth Route Army, and the exact number of *hsien* to be included in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. According to Chou the Government had agreed to hand over the area north of the Yellow River to the military control of the Eighth Route Army. The Communists had accepted this. But at the very time Chou En-lai made this statement Eighth Route Army forces were successfully fighting Government forces for the possession of their guerrilla bases in Southern Shantung.[22]

In December 1940 Generals Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, C-of-S and Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army respectively, sent a telegram to General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Eighteenth Group Army [Eighth Route Army], and General Yeh T'ing, C-in-C of the New Fourth Army, in answer to their complaints about

[22] Information obtained in Chungking at this time was often extremely misleading. Chou En-lai let it be known that the Communists were satisfied with the Government's behavior. The Government also seemed satisfied, because the Communists had "more or less" agreed to the transfer of the New Fourth Army from Central to North China. Chou En-lai indicated that the Communists had agreed to this, for he said (Sept. 1940) that the remaining problem to be solved was the transfer of the New Fourth Army to North China. The Government indicated its satisfaction over this settlement by appointing Chou En-lai to the post of Vice Director of the War Areas Kuomintang Affairs Board, an organization which maintains control of Chinese political affairs in occupied provinces of China. In view of this American observers commented that "present-day relations" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist party are highly satisfactory and that an open break is scarcely conceivable between the two groups so long as the Communists continue to afford General Chiang Kai-shek full support in his policy of resistance." And yet, at this very time fighting went on between Kuomintang and Communist troops in Shantung and Kiangsu, with the Communists expanding their influence in Shantung and Kiangsu instead of withdrawing to the North. Three months later in January 1941, Kuomintang and Communist troops were involved in the biggest clash of the war-period. (see page 109)

"attacks" of Kuomintang troops upon the Communists and their request that the Government order a cessation of the "attacks." The two Chungking generals said among other things:

> "Ever since the days when the present war broke out, the Eighteenth Group Army was included in the Order of Battle of the Second War Zone while the New Fourth Army was included in the Order of Battle of the Third War Zone immediately after the said Army was organized. They have each been given their respective operational areas, and definite operational objectives were assigned them as well. In fact you have failed to carry out the stipulations outlined in the order . . . On the contrary, your troops marched into Hopeh and Chahar without orders from the Government. Then a part of your troops were dispatched to Shantung and finally the New Fourth Army was secretly transferred from areas south of the Yangtze River to the north. As a next step, the troops which you sent to Shantung to create disturbances there were dispatched farther south and they, in coordination with other units of your forces, made a joint attack on Government troops stationed in North Kiangsu.
>
> "What we want to know is whose orders were you acting upon when you moved your troops away from your respective designated war areas and who ordered you to attack your friendly units . . . Whenever your troops went, they treated their comrade units as enemies and attacked them as such . . . Who ordered you to conduct this internecine war? . . . Your troops have succeeded in their plans of occupying territories and disorganizing Government troops to swell your own ranks and you, too, have succeeded in establishing an independent system of administration in the territory under your occupation. These were the actual causes of the so-called 'frictions, controversies, and complications' [of which you complain to the Government] . . . All these incidents [in 1940 of which you complain] occurred either in North Kiangsu or in South Shantung, which had nothing to do whatsoever with the operational areas assigned to the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army. If you could really obey orders of the Government . . . such frictions and controversies could never have occurred, a fact which is as plain as a book . . . By pursuing this policy of attacking your own countrymen in an effort to swell your own ranks you have virtually forgotten . . . that what is disadvantageous to us is advantageous to the enemy."

These statements were true. Had matters been reversed, with the CCP instead of the Kuomintang the dominant party in China in control of the Central Government, there can be little doubt that the Communists would have objected to having a Kuomintang army moving around through all the Communist anti-Japanese base areas demanding that the Communists make room for them and accept a Kuomintang-led united front administration.

4. The New Fourth Army "Incident" of January 1941

By the summer of 1939 it was apparent to everyone that the revolutionary struggle between the Kuomintang and the CCP had in no way ended with the united front; the contest between the two parties for the supreme control of China was continuing in the midst of the war against Japan. The Government was, however, at a disadvantage in countering the Communist threat, for it could take only limited action. It could not afford an all-out offensive against the Communists. Such a move would have meant the collapse of resistance against Japan and the loss of the war. And it would have deprived the Government of whatever popular following it had and would have incurred the condemnation of the whole world. But while both the Kuomintang and the Communists were determined to continue the war against Japan, it became obvious that each party was fighting to win the war in its own behalf.

In September 1939 General Chang Ch'ün, then Secretary-General of the Supreme National Defense Council, stated publicly that the united front no longer existed. This did not mean that the Government had broken off relations with the Communists. It continued to deal with them and even made some concessions to them. At times there was also active cooperation between Central Army and Communist forces against the Japanese. But the relations between the Government and the Communists assumed more and more the form of a temporary alliance. The united front was recognized for what it was, a truce. In October 1939 when an American observer asked General Chu Shih-ming, at that time Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how he thought the differences between the Central

Government and the Communists could be settled, General Chu said that he felt that when the war with Japan was over the Government would be able to "wipe out" the Communists.

In an interview with the American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, in September 1939, Mao Tse-tung indicated that the Communists did not recognize the existence of the united front more than the Kuomintang and that they were intent upon building up their own state organization that would challenge the authority of the Kuomintang. He said: "We [Chinese Communists] claim . . . leadership over the peasants and workers, and it is of two kinds, political and organizational. In the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and in the guerrilla districts under the Eighth Route Army we possess not only political leadership, but organizational hegemony." This was an open admission that the Communists had broken their pledge of 1937 not to maintain their own independent political organization but to recognize the authority of the National Government. In answer to Mr. Snow's question as to whether a united front really existed, and Snow's comment that General Chang Ch'ün had stated that no united front existed, Mao Tse-tung replied by referring to Hitler and Ah Q, a character in one of the stories by the famous Chinese Communist novelist Lu Hsün: "There is a certain group of people who attempt to ignore facts, like Ah Q and like Adolf Hitler. You know, Hitler said some time ago that the Soviet Union was only a name, and maintained that there was really no such country in the world. But after a while Hitler became more educated, and made some progress. On August 23, 1939, Hitler discovered not only the nominal existence of the USSR, but the reality of it."[23] The implication of this remark was, of course, that as the power of the Chinese Communists expanded and more and more areas in China came under their control, the Kuomintang would in time be forced to seek a compromise with them.

The Communists defended their actions in establishing independent base areas on the ground that the Kuomintang and the Government would not treat them as equals and would not accord them freedom of action within the limits of democratic rights. They pointed out that the Government refused to extend legal recognition to the CCP. It refused the Communists representation in the Government and in the National Military Council, in view of which they maintained that it was impossible for them to obtain assurance of a fair treatment. The Government, furthermore, refused to mobilize the people for prolonged resistance against Japan through what was, according to the Communists, the only means possible: "the development of partisan warfare, progress in the process of national democratization, [and] the growth and development of the people's movement."

No matter how justified the Communists may have been in these contentions it was inevitable that they would antagonize the Government, which had no interest in any "process of national democratization" and which saw in the expansion of the Communists' influence only an attempt on their part to use the united front and the war against Japan as a means of increasing and consolidating their power.

The bitter anti-Communist sentiment in Government circles found its most violent expression in the New Fourth Army "incident" in January 1941. The Headquarters of the New Fourth Army at Mao-lin in Southern Anhwei Province was attacked on 6 January by the Chungking forces of the 9th Army under General Ku Chu-tung, Commander of the Third War Zone, and General Shang-Kuan Yün-hsiang, Commander of all Government forces in South Anhwei Province. For eight days a battle raged between the Government forces, numbering nearly 80,000 troops according to a pro-Communist source, and the New Fourth Army Headquarters force, which included 4,000 troops, about 2,000 wounded soldiers and officers, and more than 3,000 political workers, cadets, medical service people and their families. More than 2,000 New Fourth Army fighters were killed and between 3,000 and 4,000 wounded. More than 2,000, including many political workers, were taken prisoner. Commander Yeh T'ing was wounded and taken prisoner (he is still being held) and the Deputy Commander, Hsiang Ying, was killed. The Government forces suffered more than 20,000 casualties according to the Hong Kong "Far Eastern Bulletin." It also reported that several thousand of the local residents were killed.

The New Fourth Army was created in October 1937 by order of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It was formed out of remnants of the former Red Army

[23] This refers to the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact.

which had been left behind in Kiangsi and Fukien after the Communists started the Long March in the fall of 1934. As late as the summer of 1937 these forces were still defending themselves against Kuomintang forces in the lower Yangtze valley. As a sign of his support of the united front, Chiang Kai-shek ordered these Communist guerrilla units to be formed into an army. He appointed General Yeh T'ing, a pro-Communist officer, as Commander of the New Fourth, with Hsiang Ying, an experienced Communist military leader, as Vice-Commander. The army was organized in February 1938 and went into action in April. Its strength at that time was reported as 12,000 officers and men.

Its first field of operation lay south of the Yangtze River in Kiangsi and Fukien. It was later ordered by the Government to operate in the Shanghai-Nanking area. A small force of the New Fourth was sent by General Yeh T'ing to the Tientsin-Pukow Railway front north of Nanking, without authorization from the Government. The Army became especially active in the areas between Shanghai and Wu-hu (southwest of Nanking).

It made an outstanding record. On 26 June 1938 General Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have addressed a telegram to Commander Yeh T'ing, stating: ". . . you have enjoined upon your subordinates the determination to advance but not to retreat. This precisely manifests your loyalty to the state. This is really worthy of praise and comfort." In December 1939 General Ku Chu-tung, under whom the New Fourth Army operated, sent a telegram of commendation to Yeh T'ing. The New Fourth was also highly commended in 1939 by General Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army. Like the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth received support in money and ammunition from the Central Government. The relations between the New Fourth and the Kuomintang armies in the lower Yangtze were comparatively good.

The New Fourth, however, adopted the same tactics in Central China as the Eighth Route Army used in the North. It began to introduce the familiar and successful system of united front democracy, of the same pattern the Communists were following in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region and elsewhere in North China. And the people willingly rallied to the side of the New Fourth Army, partly because of its struggle against the Japanese invaders, partly because of the economic-political program it enforced in areas under its control. In no area of China had the people been more heavily burdened by the abuses of landlords, usurers, and tax and rent collectors than in the thickly populated provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang. And in no areas of China had the Kuomintang been more powerful than in these two provinces. To the common man the Kuomintang was partly responsible for the misery of his existence, for the representatives of the Kuomintang, the Government and Central Army in most villages and towns were the close associates, friends, and protectors of the landlords. Many of them were landlords themselves. In its struggle against the abuses of the native landlord class and the Kuomintang, as well as against the Japanese, the New Fourth Army brought liberation to thousands.

As new areas were brought under its control, the New Fourth Army recruited more soldiers and began to arm the people. By 1939 its strength grew to 35,000. By May 1940 it had grown to over 100,000 troops. In addition some 500,000 guerrillas and local militia were operating under its command on both sides of the lower Yangtze. By January 1941 the regular army numbered 125,000 troops, according to one report. The New Fourth was beginning to assume the same kind of independence in its areas of control as the Eighth Route Army enjoyed in North China. In September 1940 the New Fourth Army was operating in various districts of Anhwei, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Hupeh. Thus it had not only expanded far beyond its operational base in the Third War Zone, assigned to it by the Government, but had invaded the Fifth War Zone in Anhwei and Hupeh where it began to compete with the Government's forces for operational bases.

This led to friction and clashes with Government troops who refused to evacuate their base areas to make room for the New Fourth. The Communist propaganda presented this as a case of Kuomintang "attacks" upon Communist troops and Kuomintang collaboration with the Japanese. The Government's viewpoint has been stated in the preceding section of this study: the behavior of the New Fourth Army was in violation of every agreement the Communists had made with the Government.

At the beginning of 1940 most of the New Fourth Army troops were south of the Yangtze River. In line with the informal agreement of 1940, referred to above for the withdrawal of the New Fourth Army to North China, units of the New Fourth began to cross to the north bank of the Yangtze River during the latter

part of 1940. By the end of 1940 they were reported to have transferred about three-fourths of their troops to the north side of the Yangtze and were proceeding north. The Government authorities, however, considered that the Communists were too slow in moving. On 9 December 1940 the National Military Council issued orders specifically directing the New Fourth Army to abandon its positions in the lower Yangtze region and remove northward to join the Eighth Route Army in Hopeh.

In acknowledging the receipt of this order General Yeh T'ing was reported to have requested CN$500,000 for a mobilization fund and 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition from the Government. Communist sources stated in December 1940 that the Government had made "certain grants" in money and ammunition after receipt of this request. At the same time the Eighth Route Army leaders reminded the Government that its allotments for their troops were several months in arrears and that they required increased supplies of equipment for military action against the Japanese forces. This latter request was ignored by the Government. By the end of December, the local Commanders of the Government forces in Anhwei and Kiangsu had become convinced that the New Fourth and Eighth Route Army leaders were not sincere in their promises to move north. Not only was Yeh T'ing remaining with his headquarters staff south of the Yangtze, but both New Fourth and Eighth Route Army forces were pressing their campaigns in North Kiangsu and South Shantung against Government troops for the possession of bases. On 6 January 1941 Government forces launched the attack, mentioned above, on General Yeh T'ing's headquarters. On 12 January 1941 the Government decreed that the New Fourth Army should be disbanded.

This attack was on such a large scale that it attracted nation-wide attention. It brought an avalanche of protests against the Government from the Communists and all liberal groups in Kuomintang-controlled China, who accused the Government of intending to start a civil war and of cooperating with the Japanese against the Communists. The foreign press reflected the same sentiment. When the People's Political Council was convened in Chungking on 1 March 1941, the seven Communist delegates failed to attend. But Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu, two of the Communist representatives of the Council, submitted by letter to the Secretariat of the Council 24 demands of the Communist Party, divided into two parts, "rehabilitation measures," and "measures for a provisional settlement."

The most important among the former included: demands for abolition of the one-party dictatorship and the introduction of democracy; realization of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People; formation of a combined committee of various political parties, each party and clique to have one delegate, of which the Kuomintang and Communist delegates were to be chairman and vice chairman respectively; appointment of a Communist to the Presidium of the People's Political Council; freedom of speech; release of all political prisoners; and discontinuance of Government censorship of the press.

The group of "measures for a provisional settlement" included demands for discontinuance of military attacks by Government troops against the Communists, withdrawal of the Government's "Communist Suppression Army" from Central China,[24] withdrawal of the Government's order to disband the New Fourth Army, punishment of the ringleaders of the New Fourth Army incident, Government sanction of the formation of a new Communist army corps in addition to the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army ("the CCP should control a total of 6 armies"), lifting of the military blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, and official recognition of the "anti-Japanese democratic political powers behind the enemy's lines." Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te had issued a joint statement in February 1941 stating that unless the New Fourth Army were reconstituted and its leader freed, and unless it were molested no further, the united front could no longer continue.

In a speech before the People's Political Council on 6 March 1941, the Generalissimo refuted these demands. He defended the attack on the New Fourth Army and stated that acceptance of the Communists' demands meant, in effect, that the Government would commit itself not to "suppress disobedient and rebellious troops and that the Government authorities should be punished for so doing." He emphasized that the Communists' demands also implied that "the Government should establish special areas outside the sphere of its authority and restrict its power to check illegal activities."

[24] There was no army specifically designated "Communist Suppression Army" in Central China.

In regard to the activities of the Communist armies Chiang Kai-shek said that "the consistent policy of the Government has been to nationalize our armies. That is, under the supreme command of the National Government there is but one system of individual parties or private persons . . . There can be but one source of command. Should a second presume to assert itself, it would be indistinguishable from the 'military council' of Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime . . . All that is required is a complete change in the attitude and actions of the Communist Party in no longer regarding the Eighteenth Group Army as its peculiar possession or as an instrument for the obstruction of other sections of the national forces to the detriment of resistance."

In regard to the Communists' demands for democracy Chiang said that "the political principle of the Government is to democratize the national political system. All citizens . . . should . . . possess all due freedom of action, but sovereignty is indivisible. If a second source of political authority were to be allowed to exist outside the Government—such, for example, as might be called '. . . a democratic authority behind the enemy lines,' mentioned in these [Communist] demands—it would not differ from the traitorous administration in Nanking and Manchuria. Although as a result of the nation's historical development there is now but one party exercising administrative power, while others of varying size and permanency are 'in opposition,' yet all parties exist in a spirit of equality . . ."

Here the matter rested. Chiang Kai-shek spoke from the point of view of a traditionalist who insists on his legal rights. The Communists insisted on their revolutionary right to question the moral value of the Government's legal rights. Throughout the following years in many negotiations between Kuomintang and Communist representatives for a settlement of their two-party problem, these demands and counter-demands as quoted above were repeated with monotonous sameness.

But while the two parties' representatives kept up their futile negotiations in Chungking, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army (under its Acting Commander, General Ch'en I who replaced Yeh T'ing) kept expanding their influence into Government areas, establishing new guerrilla bases wherever they went. The Chungking Government's armies were gradually being forced out of all the coastal provinces of East China north of the Yangtze River.

5. A virtual truce with the "puppet" armies while the Chungking-Communist forces continue the "war within the war," 1942–1945

In the years that followed the New Fourth Army incident the Kuomintang-controlled Government in Chungking centered its attention increasingly on the problem of conserving its military strength in order to strengthen its internal position, primarily against the Communists. To this end it became less and less willing to commit its best armies to fight the Japanese. This became especially noticeable after the entry of the United States into the war.

While the Government never ceased to resist the Communists in the war areas of east China, the burden of fighting them there tended to shift more and more to the Japanese and the Chinese puppet armies. Many Chungking Government troops (although few regular Central Army or Kuomintang troops) joined the puppet army to fight the Communists with Japanese support. Before the start of the Japanese offensive in China in 1944, a virtual truce between Chungking and Japanese-Chinese puppet troops had existed for several years along some front sectors. The majority of the Chungking armies in Shantung and Kiangsu withdrew in 1943 into areas of Free China in Honan and Anhwei, leaving only a few guerrilla units behind. As a result practically all of the coastal provinces of North China came under either Communist or Japanese control. Several times since 1943 Chungking troops have fought Communist forces attempting to expand their areas in Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Southern Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Kwangtung.

Meanwhile the Government has centered most of its attention on strengthening the blockade of Communist areas in the Northwest and on consolidating its power in West China. The Kuomintang had never been strong in this part of China. It felt its position endangered by a number of military leaders who, though loyal to the Government in supporting the war against Japan, felt no loyalty to the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang resumed its pre-war policy of intolerance toward all opposition groups. The reactionary elements gained supreme control, and the Government became increasingly oppressive and dictatorial. The result was that it lost most of the popular support it had enjoyed at the beginning of the war. Its intolerance has driven several of the minority groups in Chungking-controlled

China to consider the formation of a political coalition against Chungking. They seek American support for this coalition not so much as a means of overthrowing the Chungking Government as of forcing the Government to abandon its system of one-party dictatorship. Some of the minority groups within the coalition now contemplate forming a new united front with the Communists against both Chungking and Japan.

The Chinese Communists on their part have greatly expanded their areas of control since the New Fourth Army incident in 1941, partly at the expense of the Japanese but chiefly at the expense of Chungking-controlled areas. From control of about 35,000 square miles with a population of about 1,500,000 people at the beginning of 1937, the Communists have expanded their control to about 225,000 square miles with a population of about 85,000,000 people.[25] About 23,000,000 people have been added to their control in the past year alone, mostly through conquest of Chungking-controlled areas.

The Communists have also competed with the Chungking Government in winning the favor of the Chinese puppet forces, and have probably been as successful in this respect as Chungking. Just as in the case of several of the Chungking-Japanese front sectors before 1944, a virtual truce between the Communists and the Japanese has existed during the past two years on several of the Communist-Japanese front sectors.

The two chief factors contributing to the growth of Communist power and prestige in the past two years have been the growing anti-Kuomintang movement in Chungking-controlled China since 1943, and the Japanese offensive against the Chungking forces in 1944. Communist forces fought Chungking forces during the Japanese offensive last year. The latest information available indicates that they are at present fighting Chungking in several areas of East China.

The Chinese war effort against Japan became obscured by the intense inter-party rivalry going on in the midst of war. The history of this inter-party struggle, against the background of the war against Japan, presents both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in a most unfavorable light.

The Chungking Government's policy of conserving its military strength led it to keep many of its best armies away from the front in East China, and although some of its better armies were stationed in front areas, many of the front line troops represented military units which were undesirable to the Kuomintang; some were the troops of warlords, like P'ang Ping-hsün and Wu Hua-wen, others of Nationalist leaders who had formerly fought against Chiang Kai-shek, like Li Tsung-jen of the Kwangsi Military Clique, Yü Hsüeh-chung of the former Manchurian (Tungpei) army, and Hsüeh Yüeh of the Kwangtung Military Clique.

After the United States entered the war and American military aid was extended to China, Chungking's unwillingness to commit its best armies to fight the Japanese became even more apparent. American observers came to believe that many leading Chinese Government officials felt that China had done her part in fighting Japan and that it was henceforth up to the United States and Britain to defeat Japan. American officials in China repeatedly complained in their reports about the Chinese Government's lack of interest even in supporting the American war effort in China, and emphasized that Chinese troops "that could be used for the protection of our air bases are stationed elsewhere to blockade Chinese Communist areas." In September 1943 General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Secretary-General of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, agreed with an American observer in Chungking that it was "unfortunate" that so many Government troops were immobilized because of the Chinese Communists. He said that "about 20 divisions of good soldiers" were "prevented from fighting Japan." (222)

The prevailing attitude among many Chinese is well illustrated by the following examples. American officers have observed how Chinese troops stationed at American air bases have frequently refused to shoot at Japanese raiding planes. Asked by an American officer for the reason for this behavior a Chinese officer at Lao-ho-k'ou air base in Hupeh answered (November 1944): "Well you see, if we shot down a Jap plane, the Japs would be angry and would take revenge and return and bomb the city and do a lot of damage." Another Chinese officer expressed the opinion that "it is not necessary for the Chinese to take up an offensive against the Japs because soon the United States Forces will surround

[25] The Communists claim at present that they control 520,000 sq. miles with a population of about 100,000,000. These figures are considered too high, especially the figure for areas controlled.

Japan and then the Japs will have to retreat without fighting, and so it is better to leave them (Japs) alone, and get along as best we can as we are."

This remark not only shows the reliance which many Chinese have come to place upon the United States to relieve China of the presence of the Japanese, but also indicates the method by which the Japanese will withdraw from China according to the speculation of some Chinese. In August 1944 the *National Herald*, an English-language newspaper in Chungking (reputedly sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), expressed an opinion on this subject which is quite generally held among Chinese: "As we have already had occasion to point out in these columns before, the Japanese militarists will in all probability give up the struggle when Japan Proper has been invaded and they have been crushingly defeated by the Allies in their homeland. However, if the Japanese should keep on fighting on the Asiatic mainland even after their homeland has been occupied, the Allies of course must carry out a land campaign in China . . . Some Americans are right in saying that 'most infantry work can be done by the Chinese . . .' Nevertheless, the fact remains that the use of the newest weapons of war cannot be learned in a few days or weeks. By the time when it will be possible to bring these weapons to China in large quantities it will be too slow a process to teach the millions of Chinese troops how to use them . . . The best way, we believe, is for the United States to send a large expeditionary force—say, 1,000,000 men—to China as soon as landings in this country can be effected and immediately start to drive the Japanese into the sea."

This question of the withdrawal of the Japanese has occupied the thoughts of many Chinese leaders both in Chungking and in Yenan for many years, especially since the American Forces in the Pacific started their offensive against the Japanese. The ports on the China coast, the cities along the Yangtze River, the railroads, the mines, and the great agricultural plains in the coastal provinces of Central and North China comprise the heart of China. Their repossession means, to the Chungking Government, the consummation of victory over Japan. These areas, now held by the Japanese, are also essential to the Kuomintang as a base for carrying on the post-war struggle against the Communists.

The Chinese Communists, at present confined to scattered rural areas, also look forward to establishing their control over as many of these Japanese-occupied areas, cities, and transportation lines as possible. Control over these would not only give them the fruits of the victory over Japan, but also place them in an almost indomitable position vis-a-vis the Kuomintang.

Since many Chinese expect that the Japanese will withdraw without fighting from great parts of the areas they now hold in China, the question of whether these areas will go to Chungking or Yenan depends largely on which of the two armies, Chungking's or Yenan's, will be the first to move in and take over control.

This vital question has led to an intense competition between the Kuomintang and the Communists in preparing for the re-occupation of Japanese-controlled areas. Their attention has been centered on the Chinese puppet troops whom the Japanese have employed in increasing numbers, especially since the beginning of 1942. They are used mainly as garrison forces, together with Japanese troops, to maintain order in Japanese areas and guard them against attacks from either Chungking or Chinese Communist forces. It is assumed by both Kuomintang and Communist leaders that these puppet forces will remain, after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, in the areas now occupied by the Japanese. The Party that wins the favor of these troops may, therefore, be able to unite with the puppet forces and effect a peaceful occupation of the Japanese-controlled areas.

The puppet army is composed partly of Chinese recruited and trained by the Japanese, partly (and probably mainly) of deserters from the Chungking Government army, and partly of Communist troops. During the interminable struggle during the first four years of the war between Chungking and Communist forces in the guerrilla areas of East China it was inevitable that some of the Chungking Government commanders came to feel that they had here a common cause with Japan, for both they and the Japanese were fighting the Communists. This applies especially to the former warlords in North China who had first been swept away by the Japanese during their defense of the large cities and transportation lines and thereafter, in their efforts to maintain control over rural areas, had been faced by pressure and attacks from both the Communists and the Japanese. These warlords have little feeling of loyalty to anyone. Their main concern is the preservation of their own power. The Chungking Government had little use for them and left them without adequate support to fight either the Japanese or the Communists.

The Japanese, on the other hand, were anxious to develop a puppet army to support their anti-Communist campaigns and to maintain order within their occupied areas. They offered these warlords better pay and more prestige than did the Chungking Government. Denied adequate support from Chungking and unable to cope with the Communists and the Japanese at one and the same time, many of them joined the puppet forces to serve under the Japanese. This placed them in a far more advantageous position against the Communists whom they considered their chief enemy.

In the course of 1942 and 1943 a great number of these warlords joined the Japanese. Among them were the aforementioned General P'ang Ping-hsün, the Chungking appointed commander of the Hopeh-Chahar War Zone, and General Wu Hua-wen, who according to Japanese reports joined them with some 50,000 troops. In 1943 he was appointed commander of the puppet anti-Communist forces in Shantung.

The Chinese Communists maintain that the Chungking Government encouraged the desertion of troops to the Japanese in an effort to support the Japanese anti-Communist campaign. The composition of this anti-Communist puppet army, made up largely of troops who were disgruntled with the treatment accorded them by the Chungking Government, does not support this contention. But there are strong evidences that in the course of the mass desertions in 1942 and 1943 the Kuomintang leaders gradually developed a scheme for making use of the puppet troops, both as a means of fighting the Communists during the war and for gaining control of Japanese-occupied areas after the withdrawal of the Japanese from China. An American observer in China, in a report on the "willingness" of Chungking military leaders to become puppets, concludes that the "creation of an anti-Communist army in North China, eventually to be used by the Kuomintang, is probably more of a fortuitous development, as far as the Kuomintang is concerned, than a deep-laid Kuomintang plot with Japanese connivance."

It was apparent to the Kuomintang leaders that the warlords who had joined the Japanese, and their poorly disciplined troops, would hardly be able to defend themselves indefinitely against the Communists after the withdrawal of the Japanese from China. They might, therefore, be willing to reaffirm their loyalty to the Kuomintang Government as soon as the Japanese withdraw from China. Meanwhile these puppet forces, operating from Japanese bases and in conjunction with Japanese troops, are in a better position than the Chungking troops to fight the Communists. The North China warlords, who had been of little use to Chungking as long as they served in the Chungking army, became invaluable to Chungking after they joined the puppets.

In December 1943 General Hsi-En-sui, the Vice C-of-S of the First War Zone (including parts of Honan and Shansi), told an American observer that the Chungking Government would use puppet troops to oppose the Communists in North China. He said that General Chang-lan-fang, a former Chungking commander, commanded the best equipped, trained, and disciplined of the puppet forces, numbering about 50,000 troops. These were stationed in East Honan. He stated that General Chang was in close touch with Chungking Government armies and that he was very helpful in supplying Chungking armies with needed supplies and information. General Hsi also mentioned other puppet forces in North China with whom the Chungking Government maintained close relations. At the same time it was reported that on many sectors along the front between Chungking and Japanese-Chinese puppet troops there existed a "virtual truce."

The Chungking Government also adopted, officially, a lenient attitude toward the puppets who were considered pro-Chungking, anti-Communist, and in a sense also anti-Japanese. In February 1943 a Chungking army spokesman declared during a press conference that the Nanking puppet army of 300,000 men "is threatening to boomerang against the Japanese," because "Free Chinese have filtered into it." In November 1943 Dr. K. C. Wu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared during a foreign press conference that Chinese participating in the activities of the puppet regime in China were not regarded by the Chinese Government as war criminals.

This attitude toward the puppets led to a form of indirect collaboration between the Chungking Government and Japan against the Communists. The war areas of North China became more and more divided between the Japanese or their puppets and the Chinese Communists, with the Chungking Government forces either joining the puppets to fight the Communists or withdrawing into Free China areas within the provinces of Honan and Anhwei. Here they tried to stop the penetration of the Communists westward and southward into Chungking Government territories.

In March 1943 it was reported by Chinese sources in Chungking close to the Government that the Government had lost contact with the Kiangsu provincial government and that it was "feared" that the provincial leaders had gone over to the Japanese. In September 1943 General Han Te-Ch'in, the Governor of Kiangsu who was at that time a refugee at Kweiyang, stated during a press interview that "Central Government authority in Kiangsu is non-existent due to the withdrawal of Chungking troops from North Kiangsu to Anhwei in the summer of 1945" and that "Chungking has no intention of taking action against the Communists in Kiangsu at this time. Communist forces appear to be in complete control of all points not under Japanese occupation in that part of Kiangsu north of the Yangtze River and in the entire province of Shantung." Chinese sources at Sian stated that while in Kiangsu, General Han Te-ch'in had been taken prisoner by units of the New Fourth Army following a clash late in 1941.[26] He had subsequently been released and arrived at Sian in September 1943. Communist sources in Chungking confirmed this, adding that General Han Te-ch'in had been released after he had signed an agreement to withdraw his troops from Eastern Kiangsu north of the Yangtze River.

Han Te-ch'in's statement that Chungking no longer controlled any part of Shantung was confirmed in October 1943, when the American observers in Chungking reported that under orders of the Generalissimo the Chungking armies in Shantung were in process of withdrawal and that no regular troops were left north of the Yellow River, except for the small area in Southeastern Shansi where General Yen Hsi-shan maintains his base. The report emphasized that the important provinces of the north had thus been almost completely stripped of Chungking troops except for a few remaining guerrilla troops. The report sided that the military authorities in the Sian region "apparently" occupied themselves chiefly with more close relations with the puppet forces which, when they feel it is safe, will adhere to Chungking.

According to Communist sources, while in 1941 there were nearly 1,000,000 Chungking troops in the war areas of East China, by the summer of 1944 their number had been reduced to between 20,000 and 30,000. This presumably refers to the war areas in which the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies operate north of the Yangtze River. The Communists also maintained that time that 67 Chungking generals had gone over to the Japanese, and that no less than 62 percent of the puppet troops were former Chungking Government troops.[27] The Communists have also made a great propaganda issue of the desertion of Chungking officers and troops to the Japanese, accusing the Chungking Government itself of collaboration with the Japanese.

There is unquestionably a measure of truth in this, in that Chungking and Japan have indirectly cooperated against the Communists. But apparently this cooperation has always been through the puppets, or rather through those groups among the puppets who are anti-Communist. As far as the Chungking Government is concerned there is no indication that its cooperation with the puppets has signified any willingness to come to terms with the Japanese, except on condition that the Japanese withdraw from China. On many occasions, especially since the entry of the United States into the war, the Japanese have attempted, usually through the puppets, to negotiate peace with the Chungking Government. These attempts have always ended in failure.

Failure of the attempts at peace negotiations induced the Japanese in 1944 to launch their greatest offensive in China since 1938. It was, according to their own statements in July 1944, directed against the Anglo-American "encroachment" in China, not against the "Chungking related armies," which would be treated as friends if they would "cast off the Anglo-American yoke." The defense put up by the Chungking armies, especially by the units of the regular Kuomintang or Central Army, was according to all reports poorly planned and executed. There was considerable disunity among the Chinese commanders. But on several fronts, particularly in Hunan, the Chinese put up a stubborn defense which won the admiration of American Army observers. There is no available evidence that the Chungking Government ever considered surrendering to the Japanese during the critical days of 1944. It is important to remember this when faced with the Communist accusations against Chungking (often repeated by some official American observers in China), of "traitorous relations" with the Japanese.

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[26] Another source states that General Han Te-ch'in was captured by the New Fourth Army during an attack in Northern Kiangsu on Chungking forces in June 1943.

[27] Current (April 1945) estimate of the number of puppet troops in China proper is 910,000, of which 374,000 are in the "regular" puppet army and 536,000 in the provincial and local Peace Preservation Corps.

Nevertheless, the policy toward the puppets combined with that of concentrating hundreds of thousands of troops in rear areas, as a reserve against the Communists and other opposition groups in Free China, had disastrous results on the morale of the Chungking armies and people. For hundreds of miles along the front peaceful conditions prevailed for years until the outbreak of the Japanese offensive in 1944, and a flourishing smuggling trade developed which was controlled by the military authorities on both sides of the front. An American observer in Hunan reported in 1943 that "As far as the Chinese are concerned, the [Chungking] military appear to be only too pleased to continue the truce indefinitely, as they control the trade with occupied territory and are growing comfortably rich."

The Chungking armies, in the anti-Communist blockade zone in the Northwest and elsewhere, became an intolerable burden both to the Government and the people. Many of the troops lost their fighting spirit through long inactivity. And the Government lost much of the popular support it had had because of its heavy exactions from the people to maintain these idle troops. An American observer in Shansi-Province reported in March 1944 that the relations between the population and the Chinese military and civil authorities in the San-yuan area in the anti-Communist blockade zone in Shensi were extremely unsatisfactory due to the imposition of onerous grain and fuel taxes, miscellaneous exactions, and the ever-increasing corruption and graft on the part of officials. He concluded that "A continuation of the present practices of the officials is likely to result in the peasants' welcoming the Communists who went to great efforts to conciliate the populace when they were in this area in 1936 and 1937. The situation in San-yuan is typical of conditions in many other areas of Shensi, Honan, Anhwei, and other provinces."

When the Japanese launched their great offensive in 1944 the Chinese peasants in some areas turned on their own army. This was the case in Honan Province particularly, where the peasants began to disarm individual Chinese soldiers one by one, and finally began to unite into roving bands looking for smaller bands of soldiers. An American observer in North China stated in November 1944 that mal-administration by officers and lack of discipline of troops, which Chinese freely admit contributed to the loss by the Central Government of much of Honan to the Japanese, also create conditions favorable to the growth of Communist influence in that province. According to several reports, Communist guerrillas are slowly filtering in from north of the Yellow River, subduing robber bands and organizing the peasantry.

As compared with the charges made against the Kuomintang, there are few accusations on record that the Communists have had "traitorous relations" with the Japanese or their Chinese puppets. Nevertheless, when the vast amount of propaganda is eliminated from reports of conditions in Communist-Japanese front sectors, the policy and behavior of the Chinese Communists toward the Japanese appear very similar to those of the Kuomintang—no more, but no less "traitorous." Communist troops have joined the puppet army, although probably in smaller numbers than Chungking troops. While the Chungking Government appeals for the friendship of the commanders of the puppet forces, the Communists make their appeals to the soldiers. Some puppet troops have deserted the Japanese to join the Communists. Others show a decided friendliness toward the Communists. This applies especially to the puppet Peace Preservation Corps, as distinct from the "regular" puppet army in which the Chungking Government has its strongest following. The soldiers in the Peace Preservation Corps are recruited chiefly from the local population and share the general sympathy of the people for the Communists. They are usually poorly armed and serve as a police force. In areas where friendly relations exist between the Communists and the puppets there is a virtual truce, just as in the case of some of the Chungking-Chinese puppet front sectors.

A private foreign observer in Communist areas on North China reported in 1943 that puppet troops "will seldom oppose the passage of fairly strong Chinese [Communist] forces," and that "it is fairly certain that as soon as the Japanese seemed likely to be defeated almost all the puppet forces would change sides" [joining the Communists]. This referred to Hopeh and Shansi Provinces especially. An American missionary, repatriated in 1943, who had lived in Paoting, Japanese-occupied capital of Hopeh Province, stated that the puppet troops in the Peace Preservation Corps "seem to have an understanding of sort, or non-aggression pact, with the Eighth Route Army." Agents of Feng Yü-hsiang (the "Christian General") in the areas of Kiangsu Province north of the Yangtze River reported in 1943 that puppet troops and troops of the New Fourth Army in North

Kiangsu do not fight each other due to the fact that many of the men of the puppet forces belong to the New Fourth Army. These men were "ordered" by the New Fourth Army to join the puppets. An American missionary, repatriated in 1943, who had lived in Japanese-occupied areas in Kiangsu Province, reported that though the New Fourth Army forces in the areas between Shanghai and Nanking were effective in keeping the whole area "upset" and unpeaceful and were "a thorn in the side of the Japanese," they sought no trouble with the puppet forces of the Nanking regime

The foregoing are a few examples among many of the friendly relations, amounting to a virtual truce, that exists in some areas between Communist and puppet forces. This development of friendly relations began simultaneously with the similar development between Chungking Government and puppet forces, that is in the course of 1942, after the entry of the United States into the war.

In the course of 1943 insistent rumors began to circulate in Chungking-controlled China to the effect that there was a definite understanding of some sort between Nanking and Yenan. An American observer in Shansi reported in January 1944 that a "highly placed provincial official who is reputed to be very well informed in regard to Communist affairs" had stated that the local authorities had "conclusive proof" to the effect that an agent of Wang Ching-wei's[28] puppet regime, said to be residing in T'ai-yüan, Shansi Province, went regularly to Yenan to maintain contact with the Communist authorities. The same informant also asserted that the Communists had an agent representing them in Nanking. During March 1944, another American observer who had spent some time in Lanchow, reported that "there are, in this area, current rumors that the Communists have made an alliance, or have come to a working agreement, with Wang Ching-wei or elements associated with his regime." Chinese sources in Chungking stated that "news was current" that the Communists had come to terms with the "enemy and their puppets" not to attack one another in North China, and that in Central China the Japanese were said to have agreed to let the New Fourth Army remain where it was "for the time being," in return for a promise that the New Fourth Army would not hinder the movement of the Japanese Army, and would not assist the Chungking Government.

The American observer in Lanchow did not wholly discredit these rumors. He said that Wang Ching-wei and his associates were using, as a bargaining point to secure "forgiveness from Chungking, the threat of throwing in their lot with the Communists. He explained that his sources in Lanchow alleged that Wang was motivated both by fear of the treatment he might receive at the close of the war from a victorious Kuomintang Government, and by the leftist tendencies of which he had given evidence at various stages of his career.[29]

The Communists, of course, denied the truth of these rumors, just as the Chungking Government has denied similar rumors in regard to its relations with the puppets. And there is no evidence that the Communists, any more than the Kuomintang, have ever considered coming to terms with the Japanese, except on condition that the Japanese withdraw from China. But this does not preclude the possibility that they have played politics with the puppets for whatever advantages they could gain thereby. In May 1943 an American agency in Chungking, commenting on these rumors of cooperation between Yenan and Nanking, stated that "It would be surprising, therefore [in view of the anticipated efforts of the Kuomintang to seek the liquidation of the Communist Party and its army], if the Communist Party failed to utilize opportunities to undermine the Kuomintang, but it does not necessarily follow that the Chinese Communists would cooperate with the puppet elements in order to overthrow the Central Government."

There were elements in the Kuomintang-Communist situation in 1943 which favored the Japanese and mitigated the danger of large-scale Communist attacks against them. For in 1943 inter-party relations reached the greatest crisis

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[28] The late head of the Nanking puppet government.

[29] In this connection it is of significance that it is not those reactionary leaders of the Kuomintang, who are most strongly opposed to the Communists and who have been most commonly referred to as "appeasers," that have joined the Japanese to serve under them as puppets. On the contrary, it is so-called leftist leaders like Wang Ching-wei, and ex-Communists like Ch'en Kung-po and Chou Fu-hai, who have become the outstanding puppets. The Kuomintang officials who joined Wang Ching-wei in Nanking were for the most part his personal followers. Aside from them the majority of the puppet officials came from non-Kuomintang parties and groups.

since the New Fourth Army incident of 1941. In the spring of 1943 the Chungking Government began to increase its troop concentrations on the frontiers of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, and the Communists in turn withdrew some of their troops from guerrilla areas in North China to the Shen-Kan-Ning area. Throughout the year there was the serious threat of an all-out Kuomintang offensive against the Communists. In 1942 and 1943, while a virtual truce existed on several of the Communist-Japanese front sectors, the Communists had concentrated their attention on expanding their areas of control into Chungking Government areas. Clashes occurred in Shansi-Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh, and Chekiang, and the Communists scored several successes. The Kuomintang leaders became infuriated against the Communists for their "aggressive tactics against the Chungking forces," and their "intensified . . . activities, endangering the security of the State and sabotaging our [the Government's] war efforts."

It is against this background that the following Tokyo radio announcement made in March 1944, one month before the opening of the Japanese offensive against Chungking Government and American forces in China, assumes a particular significance. "The Sino-Reds recently adopted a '10–20–70 forward policy under which they use 10 percent of their power to deal with Japan, 20 percent for the protection of their bases, and the remaining 70 percent for the expansion of their influence. In order to counter . . . the new strategy mapped out by the Chinese Reds, the Chungking regime is putting into practice the dual policy of political and military pressure, carrying on political negotiations with the Communists, and simultaneously carrying out an encirclement offensive."

The events of 1944 up to the present, April 1945, do not contradict this statement. A report by the Kuomintang Headquarters in Chungking in August 1944, evaluated C–3 by an American observer in Chungking, stated that "Puppet-Communist cooperation since last January is becoming clear." In substantiation of this, the report stated that "The puppets have demilitarized fortifications in Hopeh, the construction of which was primarily an anti-Communist measure." The demilitarization of some fortifications in Hopeh Province has been confirmed by the Chinese Communists, although they do not, of course, state that this is the result of any "understanding" or "cooperation" with the puppets. Since the Japanese consider their areas in North China as vital to their empire defense, they would hardly abandon some of their defenses in North China unless they felt reasonably assured that this move would not endanger their position vis-a-vis the Communists.

There is no indication that the Chinese Communist forces made any effort to support the Chungking Government and American forces in China during the Japanese offensive in 1944. But there is evidence showing that the same kind of "non-aggression pact," which American missionaries reported to exist between Communist and puppet troops in 1942 and 1943, continued in some front sectors in 1944. Throughout 1944 the Communists also continued their campaigns against Chungking Government forces.

An American Army officer who spent three months, from August to November 1944, with the New Fourth Army in Kiangsu and Anhwei provinces reported that the railroads in Japanese-controlled areas in Kiangsu "are not diked or walled in order to prevent attack upon them [by New Fourth Army troops]. There appears to be a tacit arrangement between the New Fourth Army and the Japanese by which, and in return for the Communists not attacking the trains and railroads, the Japanese will not construct walls and dikes along the [Tientsin-Pukow] railroad [in Kiangsu] as they have done elsewhere, and which would make crossing by the Communists next to impossible." New Fourth Army leaders told the American officer that they would not attack the Japanese railroad until "such an attack would have a strategic or tactical bearing as a part of a specific military operation." They claimed that a premature attack on this railroad would achieve little of military value, and "at the same time such would make their own operations and movements considerably more hazardous and difficult."

The American Army officer mentioned above reported on the tense situation at the Chungking Government-Communist front in Anhwei, northwest of Nanking. Several small clashes had occurred there during 1944. In January 1945 an American Army officer observer in China reported that Kuomintang troops had "attacked" the Communists in Anhwei. He did not explain whether the "attack" was necessitated as a means of self-defense. That this was the case, if the Kuomintang forces actually launched an attack, is indicated by other reports. In January 1945 Chungking Government sources, reporting on the fighting in Anhwei, stated that between 2,000 to 3,000 troops of the New Fourth Army had crossed to

the south bank of the Yangtze River with the aim of joining up with Communist elements in Chekiang to prepare to "greet" an American landing. Another report by an American Army observer in Anhwei (February 1945) stated that fighting between Chungking and Communist troops was taking place in Northern Chekiang and that 8,000 Communist troops had crossed to the south bank of the Yangtze River during the past few months. An American representative of the air ground aid service in Anhwei stated that progress was being made by the Communists, that they were winning over more recruits, were getting increased support from the people, and that the New Fourth Army troops could not be halted by the troops of the Chungking Government. He said that southern Chekiang and the Northern Fukien coast were reported to be the objectives of the Communists. The available information seems to show clearly that, in general, it is the Communists rather than the Kuomintang who have been on the offensive.

As the Japanese campaign progressed with the Chungking forces routed in various sectons of China, clashes between Chungking and Communist forces were reported by Kuomintang, Chinese Communist, American, and Japanese sources to have taken place in Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Chekiang, and Kwangtung, with the Communists extending their areas of control into Chungking Government areas. According to Japanese sources the Communists have successfully penetrated into Western Kwangtung. A Tokyo broadcast of 19 February 1945 states that "the Chungking troops [in the area southwest of Canton] are being gradually and steadily pressed by 5,000 Yenan troops and the armed populace is aligning with the Yenan regime."

In October 1944 Mao-Tse-tung told an American observer in Yenan that the Communists would "recover any territory lost by the Kuomintang," and that Communist forces had already moved into East Honan from both North and South. He intimated that the Communists would also go into Southeast China if Kuomintang control there "disintegrated." But he insisted, said the American observer, that "the Communists will not compete with the Kuomintang for territory which it still holds, and while they recognize the Japanese crushing of the Kuomintang may mean eventual advantage, the Communists realize that this will be outweighed by immediate disadvantages to the Allied war against Japan."

The foregoing outline of the Kuomintang-Communist fighting shows how little truth there was in this statement by Mao Tse-tung. In Honan the Communists have undoubtedly occupied some areas evacuated by the Chungking forces after their crushing defeat in 1944, but even here they have clashed with Chungking troops trying to maintain their remaining areas of control. In Anhwei, Chekiang, Hupeh, and Kwangtung the inter-party fighting during 1944 and thus far in 1945 did not take place in areas where the control of the Chungking Government had "disintegrated" in the sense Mao Tse-ung implied, for had this been the case there would obviously have been no fighting.

The foregoing examples have not been quoted in order to belittle the value of the contribution of the Chinese Communists to the war against Japan, nor to create the impression that the virtual truce which has existed on several Communist-Japanese front sectors indicates that the Communists have shown any willingness to surrender or to stop fighting the Japanese. As the succeeding section of this study will show, there was considerable fighting between Communist and Japanese forces all through 1944, although it was not in any respect comparable to the great battles between Chungking Government and Japanese forces. (Section 2. (4))

Nevertheless, all evidence leads to the conclusion that while the Communists have been on the defensive against the Japanese, they have been on the offensive against the Chungking Government. Their refusal to accept any demarcation of Chungking Government and Communist defense areas, and their policy of moving into Chungking Government defense areas whenever they feel that they are strong enough to drive out the Chungking forces, is largely responsible for diverting the Chungking Government's attention from the war against Japan and for the confusion created by the constant inter-party fighting.

Careful and dispassionate examination of the record shows that statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the behavior of the Kuomintang toward the Communists has been more moderate than that of the Communists toward the Kuomintang. Several times during the war the Kuomintang has considered invading Communist defense areas in the same way that the Communists have actually invaded several Kuomintang defense areas. Some observers have maintained that the Kuomintang could have defeated the Communists. In October 1943, during a serious inter-party crisis, the American Military Attaché in China reported: "In point of fact, the Communists could be crushed by force of arms.

They have not had any equipment from the Central Government for four years. They have not had any pay for three." Nevertheless, no general Kuomintang offensive against the Communist areas has been launched; each crisis has been resolved through the moderating influence of the Generalissimo and others affiliated with Chungking, who have maintained that a civil war must be avoided at least until the end of the war against Japan. That the Kuomintang has proved more sensitive than the Communists to this latter consideration does not necessarily prove greater virtue on the part of the Kuomintang, nor less on the part of the Communists. Certainly a powerful factor in the situation has been the attitude of the United States, which has been the chief source of vital supplies to China. Both the United States Government and the press have made it very clear to the Kuomintang that a military liquidation of the Communists, during the war with Japan, would be frowned upon by American opinion. It does not appear, on the other hand, that the Communists have had to fear similar disapproval of their activities in extending their areas at the expense of the Kuomintang.

The record indicates that neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang have expended their main efforts against the Japanese, except as both have been compelled to defend themselves. Both have done everything they could to prepare to maintain their own positions after the war. The evidence substantiates the statement made by Congressman Mansfield in his report to the Congress in January this year, after his return from his Mission to China: "On the basis of information which I have been able to gather, it appears to me that both the Communists and the Kuomintang are more interested in preserving their respective parties at the present time, and have been for the past two years, than they are in carrying on the war against Japan. Each party is more interested in its own status because both feel that America will guarantee victory."

(*4*) *The Chinese Communists' war against Japan*

In August 1943 General Hata, at that time C-in-C of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, said during a press interview in Nanking that in North China, "the Communist bandits . . . are the chief disturbing factors endangering peace and order. They are not only handicapping the administrative progress but also undermining the work of reconstruction of a New China. Furthermore, under the pretext of offering resistence, the Communists are actually bent upon expanding their influence for selfish purposes. In the pacification of North China, suppression of the Communists is a matteer which should not be overlooked." In October 1943 a Tokyo broadcast to the home audience reported on fighting in Western Hopeh Province and the T'ai-heng Mountains of Southeastern Shansi Province. After repeating the usual claims of "destruction" of Communist bases, the Japanese announcer added the following unusual admission: "The work of detecting the fleeing enemy forces is not an easy matter even with the aid of the air units who report to us the positions of the enemy . . . Therefore, our forces are able to seek out only a small number at a time, and then pursue them. The hardships that our imperial forces are facing today may be well imagined."

To those who have followed the Japanese war communiques since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the frequent mention of battles with "bandits," "mopping up operations," and "pacification campaigns" in North China is strong testimony to the resistance offered by the Chinese Communists. This is confirmed by neutral observers, primarily by American and British missionaries, repatriated in 1943, who have lived in Japanese-occupied cities and towns and have had ample opportunities to witness the struggle between the Communist guerrilla forces [30] and the Japanese Imperial Army.

This does not mean that the resistance of the Communists has been strong in terms of military power, but rather in terms of political-economic subversive activities against the Japanese. The following statements are typical of the eyewitness accounts of the repatriated missionaries, which give a picture of the pattern of Communist guerrilla warfare. In regard to the border area between Shantung and Hopeh Provinces one Catholic priest stated: the Eighth Route Army forces "move from place to place constantly to elude Japanese watchfulness. Their influence is enough to cause constant worry to the Japanese, although their effectiveness remains small because they lack the necessary heavy arms . . .

[30] The Communists make a clear distinction between their regular army (Eighth Route and New Fourth armies), the guerrillas, and local militia. For convenience sake they are all referred to in this section as "guerrilla forces" since the methods of fighting of each group follow the pattern of guerrilla warfare.

Their hatred of the Japanese is real, and in equal combat they put up a good show. They specialize and excel in guerrilla fighting." Another Catholic priest from Shantung stated in regard to the Eighth Route Army forces in that province: "As soldiers they are not much, because their equipment is inferior to the Japanese. In one skirmish that I witnessed in November 1942, though the Communists outnumbered the Chinese puppet troops 4–1, the Communists fled without firing a shot. But their nuisance value is considerable, since the Japanese must constantly maintain garrisons in the region."

A Protestant missionary from Shantung reported: Formerly "I just thought of them [the Communists] only as a menace but their effectiveness [in Shantung] is now [1943] an established fact. They are fighting the Japanese and spreading their doctrine. I do not know about their numbers but they must be numerous because when the Japanese start one of their expeditions to 'mop up bandits,' they have to collect from 400 to 500 soldiers before they start out. The country people suffer most from these excursions because when the Japanese appear in force, the Communists simply melt away to reappear when the danger is past. Consequently the Japanese take it out on the village people. The 'Eighth Route' Army (Communists) are well disciplined and, where they have control, the common people enjoy a measure of security and of freedom from exhorbitant taxes . . . Where the Japanese are in control the taxes are lowest but personal security and freedom are much less. Their [the Communists'] propaganda is strong and is definitely Communistic when not forced by circumstances to be anti-Japanese."

A Protestant missionary from Anhwei stated: "The Chinese 'New Fourth Army' is active very near Su-hsien [in North Anhwei on the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad]. They carry on guerrilla activities and prey upon the Chinese people a great deal, taxation, etc. Every so often there are battles fought, but nothing is very effective. Near to the area strictly occupied by the Japanese (along Railroad, main motor roads, and principal cities) so many of the activities are just ordinary banditry and the well controlled groups are farther away." In regard to New Fourth Army activities in the Hankow area in Hupeh Province one Missionary from Han-yang, opposite Hankow, reported: "They [the Communists] are reported to have fought with the Japanese and even the regular 128th Chungking division in order to [obtain] local supremacy. [Their] spying system is very good. Sabotage—attacking Japanese shipping on the [Yangtze] River. This is not very helpful, for a shot will be fired and then they will run and the Japanese will take the particular village." A missionary physician from Ningpo reported: "A small group (1,000 perhaps) New Fourth Army Communists appeared in April [1943] in a sector of no-man's-land which lies between Shao hsing and Ningpo [in Chekiang Province] . . . They carried out the typical program of robbing the well-to-do and befriending the poor. They were to all reports not short of weapons or funds."

These statements which are confirmed by many other sources show that the policy of the Communists toward the Japanese is chiefly centered on winning the confidence of the people, "befriending the poor," and in this way extend their political-economic control in areas adjacent to Japanese-occupied zones. Through this policy, which was probably the only one possible in view of their poor arms and consequent inability to attack the Japanese and defeat them by military force, they have prevented the Japanese from deriving adequate economic benefits from their military conquests. Since both the Japanese-occupied zones and adjacent areas were originally under control of the National Government (Chungking), this policy of the Chinese Communists has inevitably involved alienation of the loyalty of the people from Chungking, as the initial step in establishing their anti-Japanese base areas. It led, as we have seen, to fighting between Chungking Government and Communist forces as well as between these forces and the Japanese. But whether the fighting represented the internal inter-party war in China or the Chinese war against Japan, the net result as far as the Japanese were concerned was that they never succeeded in consolidating their power.

It should be emphasized that the Communists were by no means the only ones who organized and maintained resistance in guerrilla areas. The Japanese have frequently, as late as 1944, mentioned Chungking guerrilla forces as fighting against them in Shantung, Shansi, and Hopeh, the three most important guerrilla areas of the Chinese Communists. And foreign missionaries repatriated in 1943, who reported on conditions in these three provinces during 1941, 1942, and part of 1943, were often unable to specify whether guerrilla operations in the areas in which they had lived were led by Chungking or Communist forces.

However, during the inter-party war that went on in guerrilla areas the Chungking forces in North China gradually lost out against the Communists. As from the end of 1943 the Communist forces were in unquestioned control of the Chinese resistance movement in North and Southeast Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, and Kiangsu, although a few Chungking guerrilla forces were (and still are) operating in these provinces. In several other areas both Chungking and Communist troops are leading the resistance movement against the Japanese, each group within its own areas of political-military control.

The Communists' resistance has been strongest in North China since they possess their largest bases here. It has been comparatively weaker in the Central China areas controlled by the New Fourth Army, partly because the New Fourth is weaker than the Eighth Route Army, partly because it has had far more trouble than the Eighth Route Army in North China in establishing and consolidating its base areas. The Chungking armies are stronger in Central than in North China, and therefore have been able to put up a more determined resistance against the New Fourth Army's attempts to secure bases than could the provincial forces in North China against the Eighth Route Army.

During the first three years of the war the Japanese employed, against the Communists in North China, tactics somewhat similar to those which Chiang Kai-shek had used against them in Kiangsi during his first four "Extermination Campaigns," 1931–1933. They launched out from their bases along the railways in several directions, trying to occupy as many places as possible in the guerrilla base areas. From these they made strong local encirclements against the scattered Communist forces.

But the latter avoided pitched battles with the Japanese. They developed an excellent intelligence system through the local militia forces and the Village Mobilization Committees. They also developed a telephone system for rapid transmission of information about the movement of Japanese troops. The wires were stolen from Japanese lines. The telephones were taken during raids on small Japanese positions or bought in the large port cities and smuggled out to the guerrillas. Eight months after the outbreak of war the Communists claimed that they possessed a telephone system with 2660 miles of wires and over 600 offices in Hopeh, in addition to 10 radio stations. The rural areas became honeycombed with Communist spies and observation posts. Simple looking farmers working in the fields or bringing food to the Japanese-occupied towns watched the concentrations and movements of the Japanese forces and transmitted their information to the guerrilla headquarters from hidden telephone posts in the fields and in the villages.

Communist intelligence agents also infiltrated into the cities, many of them obtaining employment by the Japanese as puppet officials, soldiers, police agents, servants, and laborers. The Communist secret service organization was developed by Hsieh K'ang-chih (Chao Jung, Kang Sang), who is variously mentioned as chief of the Central Political Protection Bureau of the CCP, head of the Central Social Affairs Department of the CCP and concurrently director of the Intelligence Department. Available reports confirm that the Communist secret service organization is at present one of the best organized and efficient in China with secret centers in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, and in many of the cities and towns in rural areas of East China. Part of its work consists of gathering intelligence, and part of organizing subversive activities against the Japanese.

Through their well developed underground system, the Communists were able to avoid encounters with superior Japanese forces. They attacked their supply columns, severed their communication lines, and raided small isolated Japanese outposts. They attacked only when assured that they commanded superior strength. Like a blind colossus the Japanese army struck out in all directions fumbling for its opponent but seldom finding him. After the Chinese Government and provincial forces in North China were defeated in large-scale battles against fortified points and along front-lines, the war deteriorated, for the Japanese strategists and tacticians, into an undignified game of "hide and seek."

The realization that the Communists were turning the war into a people's war induced the Japanese to turn their armed might against the people. They adopted a policy of trying to make guerrilla areas uninhabitable. They burnt houses, carried off or destroyed the crops. Men, women, and children were killed in droves. Thousands were drafted as laborers and sent to Manchuria. By the end of 1939 the Japanese held most of the *hsien* cities in North China

and motor roads connecting them. But they still could not prevent the movement of the Chinese forces. The Communists had even managed to infiltrate into areas north of Peiping, whence they moved into the wild mountain region of Southern Jehol. There they began to establish their first base area in "Manchukuo."

Lt. General Tada was C-in-C of the Japanese North China Expeditionary Forces at this time. In 1940 he developed the so-called "cage policy," or "fortress tactics." Deep and wide ditches or moats were dug and high walls built along the sides of the railways and highways in Central and Southern Hopeh in order to protect them from attacks and, more important, to blockade and to break up the Communist base areas. At the same time hundreds of miles of new roads with protecting ditches were built with the object of cutting up the guerrilla bases into small pieces which would then be destroyed one by one. The number of blockhouses along the railways and roads, manned by Japanese soldiers, was greatly increased.

This policy was an adaptation of Chiang Kai-shek's successful "fortress-blockhouse policy" used against the Communists in Kiangsi in 1934; Chiang had renewed this policy in the summer of 1939, although this time as a means of defense against and segregation of the Communists, in the military blockade of the Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. The Eighth Route Army clearly saw the danger of Tada's new tactics. On 20 August 1940 it launched the so-called "100-regiment offensive" in Hopeh and Shansi which lasted for three months. According to the Communists considerable damage was done to Japanese transportation and communication lines and to several coal mines near the railroads, including the important Ching-hsing coal mine on the Cheng-Tai Railroad in Shansi. The Communists claimed that over 20,000 Japanese were killed, over 5,000 puppet troops were killed and wounded, 281 Japanese officers and soldiers were captured, and some 18,000 puppet soldiers were captured. 2,993 Japanese forts and blockhouses were destroyed. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were captured.

This was probably the largest Communist campaign of the war. It was successful in that the Japanese had to go on the defensive temporarily. They were also forced to strengthen the defense of their transportation lines and to concentrate more troops in North China. But the offensive had been costly to the Communists both in ammunition and in casualties. They were unable to keep it up without supplies.

General Tada supplemented the "fortress tactics" with what the Communists called the "butcher knife tactics," which involved concentration of an overwhelming force in a sudden attack upon strongholds or important centers in Communist base areas. These attacks developed into virtual scorched earth campaigns when tens of thousands of the civilian population were killed and thousands of villages leveled to the ground. Foreign neutral travellers in the guerrilla areas in 1942 reported that it was rare to see a village in Hopeh and Shansi which had not been at least partially destroyed. Some areas in Northwest Shansi had been completely depopulated. In the districts west of Peiping it was estimated that two-thirds of all the houses had been destroyed.

With their base areas on the plain of Central Hopeh chipped into small segments by the Japanese fortified roads, rapid escape from areas threatened by superior Japanese raiding columns became increasingly difficult for the Communist forces. They suffered several defeats. Tada was replaced by General Okamura in the summer of 1941. He strengthened the "fortress tactics" by digging more ditches, walls, and blockhouses, and by extending the network of fortified roads in Hopeh, Shansi, and Shantung. At the end of 1942 the Eighth Route Army estimated that the Japanese had built 9,600 miles of walls and ditches throughout North China, 29,846 blockhouses, and 9,243 forts or strongholds. In the fall of 1941 General Okamura directed an army of more than 100,000 men, according to Communist statements, in an attack upon the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. In May 1942 he launched other offensives against the Communist guerrilla bases in the T'ai-heng Mountain region of Southeastern Shansi. During the latter part of 1942 similar campaigns were undertaken against Communist base areas in Southern Shantung. The Communists referred to these campaigns as General Okamura's "triple" or "three-all policy," that is kill all, burn all, and loot all. These campaigns achieved a measure of success. The Communists lost ground during 1941 and 1942 in both Hopeh and Shansi. But the Japanese campaigns were by no means conclusive. They aggravated the people's hatred of them and drove them into the arms of the Communists, who combined their efforts in fighting the Japanese with attempts to help the peasants in rehabilitating their devastated land.

The Communists had also been able to compensate for their losses of areas to the Japanese in Hopeh and Shansi by expansion into areas controlled by the Chungking Government. During the summer of 1941 they also began to expand into rural districts of Eastern Hopeh. There they laid the foundation for their political organization of the areas east of Peiping and Tientsin, preparatory to using this important area for guerrilla attacks against the Tientsin-Mukden Railway and for further penetration of Communist forces into "Manchukuo."

The Communists' answer to the Japanese "fortress policy" and their annihilation campaigns was the employment of land mines, which became one of their chief weapons. Every trail in the mountains was mined. Before the villagers fled into the fields or to the hills at the approach of Japanese raiding columns they mined the approaches to their village and placed "booby traps" in their homes, streets, wells, and courtyards. This caused a large number of casualties among the Japanese. In Central Hopeh they developed a new technique of underground fighting. The villagers built underground shelters where they could hide from the Japanese. Later these underground shelters were joined up by tunnels inside the village, and finally tunnels were built to connect several villages. These tunnels made it possible for the villagers and the guerrillas to escape from Japanese encirclements, and they enabled the guerrilla forces to cross underneath the fortified roads and railways and to attack the Japanese in villages which they believed to be deserted. The approaches to the tunnels were protected by land mines and "booby traps" which made the Japanese very unwilling to go near them. These tunnels played an important part in the Communist defense system during the campaigns in 1940 and 1941. Their usefulness became limited when the Japanese, according to Communist reports, started using poison gas. The anti-gas curtains which the villagers hung up at the entrances of the tunnels were not always effective.

Nevertheless, the Communists claim that their new technique placed the Japanese more and more on the defensive in the course of 1943. The Communists maintain that it became increasingly difficult for the Japanese to hold their widely-scattered *hsien* cities and to maintain the vast system of fortified roads. According to estimates published by the Eighth Route Army 10½ Japanese divisions were tied down in opposing the Communists in North China during 1942, in addition to 3 Japanese divisions engaged by the New Fourth Army in Central China. These made up 44 percent of the total of Japanese troops in China.

This explanation does not, however, seem wholly satisfactory. It fits part of the picture, but not all. It is questionable if the Communists actually "tied down" 13½ (and later more) Japanese divisions in China. Several observers have contended with a great deal of justification that the Japanese used China, and North China in particular (since they controlled larger areas in North China than elsewhere in China), as a proving ground for their troops. The numerous "annihilation campaigns" against both the Communists and Chungking Government forces were probably designed as much for the purpose of providing training for the Japanese troops as for defeating the Chinese. China, after all, was only a stepping stone for further Japanese conquests. The army that fought and conquered in China was designed for even greater conquests in other countries. The limited resistance offered by the Chinese provided an atmosphere of real war. The Japanese suffered casualties, but probably not so many as to render the annihilation campaigns truly costly to them. Because the Communist troops usually retreated before the Japanese few actual battles were fought during these campaigns. It was not the Communist armies that suffered so much as the people who were left a prey to Japanese vengeance. The Chungking armies when faced with these Japanese annihilation campaigns usually tried to defend their cities and areas. And as a result the Chungking armies also suffered far greater casualties than the Communist armies.

Many of the Japanese troops that have fought the Americans in the Pacific have had years of training in China. And as experienced Japanese troops have been shifted from China to the Pacific fronts, they have been replaced in great part with new Japanese recruits for training in China. Many foreign military observes came to view these Japanese annihilation campaigns in China as training campaigns without any other significance except possibly to loot and bring in grain for the Japanese Army. They were usually marked by a Japanese advance into the Chinese bases, destruction of these bases and the crops in rural areas, followed by a retreat to the original Japanese starting point. The pattern had been repeated so many times that some military observers failed for a long time to recognize the Japanese offensive against Chungking Government forces in 1944 as anything else than one of the "usual" training campaigns.

There were several indications that the Japanese defensive policy against the Communists which began in 1943 was induced by many other factors of greater importance than the one mentioned by the Communists, namely, the effectiveness of their new technique for fighting the Japanese. With the establishment of American air bases in China, Japanese military operations became increasingly centered on Chungking Government rather than Communist areas of control. Beginning with the Japanese spring offensive in 1942, following Lt. General (then Col.) J. H. Doolittle's raid on Tokyo, which had as one of its objects the destruction of Chinese-American air bases in Chekiang, the Japanese resumed, for the first time since 1939, offensive operations against Chungking with intent of conquering additional areas. In Communist areas the Japanese "training campaigns" continued through 1943 and 1944, although on a considerably smaller scale than before. But their campaigns in Chungking Government controlled areas assumed an increasingly serious nature far beyond the scope of mere "training" of troops.

Probably the most important factor in forcing the Japanese to reconsider their policy of large-scale annihilation campaigns into Communist areas was that the wholesale destruction of property and the mass slaughter of the people made it impossible for them to exploit the country adequately. They derived no more economic benefit than did the Communists from areas which had been laid waste. The Communists concentrated their efforts on fighting the Japanese in the guerrilla areas, the "no-man's land," between the Communist, Chung-king Goverment, and Japanese bases in which all three groups compete for control. It was therefore the guerrilla areas that suffered the greatest destruction. And since these were nearest the Japanese zones they were also the areas in which the Japanese were most interested, the pacification of which would have yielded them the greatest economic benefits.

There is no space here to go into the details of the economic problems that the destruction in the guerrilla areas caused to the Japanese. It reduced food production in North China considerably. The effect of this had not been felt so much by the Japanese and the people in their occupied areas so long as Australian and Canadian wheat could be imported. But from the end of 1942 when imported food supplies had been exhausted, the question of food control and production became one of the main problems of the Japanese and their puppet officials in China. The devastation in guerrilla areas also created a serious labor shortage for the Japanese in China and Manchuria. The question of filling the quota of labor for Manchuria, which before the war always came from North China. became increasingly difficult. During 1943 the labor emigration to Manchuria seems to have created such a manpower shortage in North China that it led to an actual clash between the puppet authorities in North China, trying to decrease the emigration, and the Japanese authorities trying to fill their Manchurian labor quota.

The North China Political Council announced during March 1943 that "in view of the increase in the number of laborers going to Manchuria, it would restrict the outflow . . . in order to insure . . . the agricultural production in North China." According to a Japanese statement, the emigration in 1942 from China to Manchuria was 1,086,000. This was 3 million below the number desired by the Japanese. In spite of strenuous efforts by Japanese labor recruitment agencies in North China and by the Japanese army the emigration during 1943 was considerably less than 1,000,000, probably less than 800,000. Even so many of the emigrants in 1942 and 1943 had been forcibly recruited from Central China. Central China had never before contributed to the Manchurian labor needs.

The emigration to Manchuria increased the acuteness of the labor shortage in Japanese-controlled areas of North China, where the demand for manpower became far above normal. There developed a shortage of farm labor because of the conscription of Chinese peasants for the puppet armies and for the construction of roads, defense walls, moats, fortifications, and other military works. Because of this there was also an industrial manpower shortage. In the end it became necessary to send laborers from Central China to North China and Inner Mongolia to fill the labor demands in those regions. And in order to relieve the food shortage in Japanese-occupied areas in North China food was imported from Central China.

Both the food and manpower shortages derived in great part from the comparative smallness of the Japanese-occupied areas. It is estimated that at the end of 1943 the total area of "Occupied" China proper, that is the areas behind the most advanced Japanese positions, was roughly 345,000 square miles. Out of this the Japanese controlled about 82,000 square miles. The guerrilla

areas ("no-man's-land") comprised about 67,000 square miles. The Communists controlled, roughly, 155,000 square miles (of which 110,000 square miles were in North China proper) comprising mostly thinly populated mountain regions. The balance, 41,000 square miles, represented Chungking-controlled areas. The Japanese-occupied and the guerrilla areas are the most fertile areas in China.

At the end of 1943 the total population of Occupied China was about 183,000,000 people. Of these about 70,000,000 lived in Japanese-occupied areas, and some 43,000,000 in guerrilla areas. About 54,000,000 lived in the Communist-controlled base areas, of which about 28,000,000 lived in North China. About 16,000,000 lived in Chungking-controlled areas.

These figures explain many of the difficulties with which the Japanese were (and still are) confronted in China. In 1943, with control over a population of only about 70,000,000 people in China proper, the Japanese had available as actual manpower only some 26,000,000 people. The difficulties the Japanese have had in supplying "Manchukuo" with one million immigrant laborers per year becomes apparent when it is realized that they have had to be recruited, chiefly, from Japanese-controlled areas. For example, the total population of Hopeh and Shantung, the two provinces from which most of the immigrants to "Manchukuo" have usually come, is about 70 million, of which, however, no more than about 27 million people have lived within Japanese-controlled areas. This represents a manpower capacity of barely 10 million employable people available to the Japanese in these two provinces.

The population and size of the different areas mentioned above varied constantly, of course, with the shifting fortunes of war. At all times the Japanese were able to supplement the resources of food, raw materials, and manpower in their occupied areas by drawing partially upon the food resources and manpower in the guerrilla areas, or no-man's-land.[31] But since the Japanese, Communist, and Chungking Government forces were all competing with each other for control over no-man's-land, the Japanese could never derive adequate benefits from these areas.

The outbreak of war with the United States made Japan more dependent than before upon the resources of China, especially after 1942 when American sinkings of Japanese ships began to reduce Japan's ability to exploit the Southeast Asia countries. In trying to find a solution for their problems in China the Japanese recognized that their annihilation campaigns had failed to crush the resistance of the Communists and the Chungking Government. Since the military campaigns had failed in their objectives, the Japanese decided to try diplomacy. The first announcement of the "New China Policy," or as it has also been called Japan's "appeasement policy" toward China, was made in November 1942 by Mamoru Shigemitsu, at that time Japanese Ambassador to the Chinese puppet government in Nanking. The chief objective of this policy was to establish better cooperation between the Japanese and the Chinese in Japanese-occupied areas of China so as to maintain and possibly increase the production of food and industrial raw materials.

At the beginning of 1943 the Nanking puppet government was reorganized. Three new Ministries were created, those of Social Affairs, Food Supply, and Construction. In addition several economic control agencies for food, labor, commerce, and industry had been established during 1942. Many more were created during 1943. This emphasis on economic and social control showed not only where the Japanese and the puppets faced their greatest difficulties, but also, of course, in what fields of activity they intended to exert special efforts at rehabilitation. On 1 January 1943 the Nanking government inaugurated the "New Citizen Movement" (Hsin Kuo Min) which was to be coordinated with the "Rural Pacification Movement" which had been inaugurated in May 1942. The task of these two movements was to increase agricultural production, to exercise thought control, to promote the cooperative movement among the peasants and to organize student and youth organizations.

The government reorganization in Nanking at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 also involved a change of the military affairs structure in which the puppet military leaders obtained a considerably greater influence. At the end of January 1943 the Nanking government promulgated a decree by which the provincial puppet governors and district magistrates were designated to hold concurrent positions as commanders of the provincial and local Peace Preserva-

[31] The Japanese also obtained considerable amounts of food and raw materials from the smuggling traffic with Free China.

tion Corps respectively. In the central government in Nanking the civilian puppet leaders continued to hold the dominant power, but in the provincial governments, the puppet military leaders obtained the dominant role. This change was of considerable significance. Since most of the puppet provincial governors were military men, the combining of both political and military authority in their hands added greatly to their prestige and power. It showed that the Japanese were placing increasing confidence in the puppet military leaders rather than, as before, in the civilian puppet leaders. The responsibility for garrisoning occupied areas was more and more shifted over from Japanese to puppet troops.

This was one of the outstanding military aspects of the New China policy which the Japanese adopted at the end of 1942. The second aspect was the shift in the use of Japanese and puppet troops. Instead of trying to hold as many fortified roads and towns as possible they concentrated on consolidating control in a few key agricultural areas. These areas were called "Model Peace Zones," and "Special Administrative Areas."

The first Model Peace Zone had been established in the summer of 1941 in the Soochow (Wu-hsien) area between Shanghai and Nanking. During the latter part of 1942 and 1943 Model Peace Zones were established along the entire railway line between Nanking and Shanghai, around Hangchow in Chekiang Province, in the Wuhan (Wuchang-Hankow) area in Hupeh, in the Canton area in Kwangtung, in Northeastern Hunan, in the rich Huai Hai agricultural area in Northeastern Kiangsu, and around Kaifeng, capital of Honan Province. The Japanese stated in August 1944 that the combined area of these Model Peace Zones was slightly more than 24,600 square miles, with a population of 13,818,000 people. In North China, Special Administrative areas were established during 1943 south of Peiping and west of Tientsin, and, in 1944, in East Hopeh.

Within the Model Peace Zones the Japanese concentrated their military effort on clearing out the Communists and keeping them out. As areas were "pacified" in this manner, the administration and policing of them was turned over to the puppet military forces. As more Model Peace Zones were established the principle of the old strategy of breaking up Communist areas through the occupation of as many cities and towns as possible and the construction of fortified roads between these was gradually relaxed. In the course of 1943 and 1944 the Japanese voluntarily withdrew from hundreds of villages and abandoned many of their blockhouses and fortresses, which were taken over by the Communists.

In some areas the Chinese Communists tried to prevent the Japanese from consolidating their power and developing the agricultural production within the Model Peace Zones. Their principal method was to prevent the Japanese from maintaining their census system, which plays an important role in the enforcement of peace and order. In Japanese controlled areas each Chinese is required to carry a Certificate of Residence and each household must keep hanging beside the door a small wooden board listing the persons who dwell therein. Persons without a Certificate of Residence are subject to execution as spies or bandits. Any household that fails to give the Japanese police an adequate explanation for an increase or decrease in the household faces drastic punishment. On some occasions the Communists on arriving at a village confiscate and destroy all Residence Certificates and household census boards. Villages so treated by the Communists tend to be forced into opposition to the Japanese. The young men are then recruited by the Communist army. Food supplies are taken by the Communists to prevent them falling into the hands of the Japanese. The Communists thereafter afford these villages such protection as they are able to give.

There are, however, indications that the Communists have abstained from violence in many of the Model Peace Zones. One report from Kwangtung Province, in February 1944, emphasized that the Communists did not constitute much danger to the Japanese "since the policy of the Reds is undoubtedly to concentrate on strengthening their own position and avoid direct action . . . with Japanese." Another report from 1943 concerning Central China emphasizes that the Communist guerrillas were welcomed by the country people in so far as was "consistent with safety wherever they go. And in view of the fact that Japanese reprisals are usually collective, the guerrillas keep this in mind in their activities and keep as far away as possible from villages" in Japanese-controlled areas.

This statement and similar ones suggest strongly that the Communists had learned, from their experiences in the late 1920's, the danger of needlessly causing bloodshed. Their policy at that time of encouraging and organizing

strikes among the workers in the large cities under Kuomintang control had caused massacres of thousands of these workers by Kuomintang troops and police. The result was not only that the Communist labor movement in the cities was crushed, but that the city workers came to fear the Communists. The Japanese policy toward the villagers in areas under their control was similar to that of the Kuomintang in the 1920's and early '30's toward the workers. The Communists, therefore, avoided inciting the Japanese needlessly into reprisals against the population in their areas of control.

A factor which undoubtedly favored the Japanese, after 1943, in consolidating their power in the Model Peace Zones and Special Administrative Areas was the increased attention which the Communists devoted, particularly in the New Fourth Army areas, to fighting Chungking Government troops. As we have seen, it was also during this time that the Communists began to compete with the Chungking Government in winning the friendship of the puppet troops. A virtual truce existed between the Communists and the puppet forces in some of the front sectors, particularly in Kiangsu and Anhwei. This undoubtedly favored the Japanese, and in September 1943 they turned over most of their defense sectors in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang to the puppet forces.

The new strategy of the Japanese was partially successful. The size of their areas of control within the Communist defense zones in Central and North China decreased, but conditions within these areas, especially within the Model Peace Zones, in Central China, became more orderly than before. The added attention given to agrarian improvements within these Model Peace Zones also led to an increase of production. A German source stated that, in 1942, 24 million piculs (1,320,000 short tons) of rice and 600,000 piculs (33,000 short tons) of cotton were harvested in the Model Peace Zones, which meant an increase of no less than 30 percent over the previous year. The German source stated that "the increase of production strengthens the Model [Peace] Zones in their self-sufficiency with regard to food, and also facilitates the food supply for the larger cities, especially Nanking and Shanghai." In 1943 the harvest was especially good in China, and the food production in Japanese areas of China were estimated to be about 30 percent greater than in 1942. Since the Japanese no longer pursued their annihilation campaigns as vigorously as before, there seems also to have been a greater degree of order in the guerrilla areas between Communist and Japanese base regions, especially in Central China. And it is probable that this enabled the Japanese to derive somewhat greater profit from the agricultural production in the guerrilla areas.

On the other hand, these improvements were offset by several other factors beyond the control of the Japanese. The most important factor was the decreasing confidence in a Japanese victory of the Chinese population in Japanese-occupied areas. This made the people highly distrustful of the value of the currency of the puppet regimes which was backed chiefly by Japanese bayonets. And this in turn led people to prefer exchanging their currency holdings into commodities. Hoarding of food and other commodities became even more prevalent in Japanese occupied areas than in Chungking Government areas. From 1943 on the currency inflation in Japanese occupied areas began to rival that in Chungking areas. Hoarding and inflation became important factors in preventing a normal development of trade, and made it increasingly difficult for the Japanese to finance their vast military and civilian undertakings in China. The inflation reached an acute stage during 1944; since that time it has been considerably worse than in Chungking areas.

Another important factor offsetting the advantages derived from increased agricultural production in the Model Peace Zones was the deterioration of the rolling stock on Japanese railways, which greatly hampered the movement of goods. Contributing factors were guerrilla activities against the railways, particularly in North China, and American bombings of Japanese railway bridges. American air attacks against Japanese shipping on the Yangtze and along the China coast further diminished the flow of Japanese inter-provincial traffic in China. As a result serious food shortages developed in the large cities in the occupied areas which are the centers of Japanese military and political control.

The withdrawal of Japanese forces from several fortified points led to a considerable increase of Communist areas in 1943 and especially in 1944. The Yenan radio announced in November 1944 that the Eighth Route Army had in 1944 "liberated" in Shantung eight county towns (*hsien* capitals), and an area of 11,100 square miles with a population of 5,000,000 people. Another announcement by the Yenen radio stated that nearly half of the population and territory of Shantung was still in Japanese hands, and that the Japanese were

holding the important communication lines and economic centers of the province. During 1944 the Eighth Route Army also began to use its growing strength in Shantung to attack the Japanese at several points. Its most notable victory was the occupation in November 1944 of Chü-hsien, an important city in Southeastern Shantung on the road from Tsingtao to Süchow. Throughout the past two years there has been considerable fighting in Shantung between Communist and Chinese puppet forces. On the basis of Japanese and Communist reports there has been more fighting in Shantung than in any other Communist-Japanese front sector.

Another area where the Eighth Route Army has been particularly active against the Japanese is in Shansi Province. The Yenan radio announced in December 1944 that between January and October the Eighth Route Army had taken 3,060 square miles of territory with a population of 259,600. The Eighth Route Army was also active in Shansi during 1944 in fighting Chungking Government forces of General Yen Hsi-shan.

Except for Northeastern Hopeh and the coastal region between Hopeh and Shantung, no large-scale fighting took place between Japanese and Eighth Route Army forces in this province during 1943 and 1944. Communists sources state that in February 1944 Eighth Route Army forces occupied a "strong point" near Hsi-feng K'ou, one of the two important passes between Hopeh and Jehol. In the course of 1943 and 1944 the Eighth Route Army also became active in the area northeast of Peiping and along the Hopeh section of the Japanese-held Tientsin-Mukden Railroad. Eighth Route Army forces also extended their operations in Chahar and Jehol during 1944 and penetrated into Liaoning Province in Manchuria. Here, however, they met such strong resistance from the Japanese and Manchurian puppet troops that the Communists stated in December 1944 that "further expansion in Manchuria is not feasible at the present time." It was reported in March 1945 that the "most important fighting" between Japanese and Communist troops in China was in East Hopeh, South Jehol and South Liaoning, where the Japanese had started a large-scale 'mopping-up campaign in order to clear out the Communist positions. An American observer in Yenan also reported that the Chinese Communists "seem to expect a strong Japanese effort to consolidate themselves in North China." The fighting in Eastern Hopeh, Chahar, and Liaoning "is apparently intended to establish a *cordon sanitaire* betweeen China and Manchuria and is being conducted with unusual determination and ferocity. The Communists claim that the whole areas are being either depopulated or made into fortified areas in which the whole population is concentrated into garrisoned villages—as was done in parts of Manchuria [during the 1930's]. Large-scale Communist movement southward shows not only a growing determination [by the Communists] to control China proper, but may also be an effort to get out from under an expected Japanese attempt to crush Communist strength in North China."

In Central China there was sporadic fighting during 1943 and 1944 between New Fourth Army forces and the Japanese, but most of the fighting was between Chungking Government and New Fourth Army forces, and most of the expansion of New Fourth Army influence was into base areas of the Chungking Government forces in Central China.

The combined effects of Communist gains against both the Japanese and Chungking Government forces in the past two years have been to instill in the Communists a self-assurance and confidence about their future position in China greater than at any previous time. The great defeats suffered by the Chungking Government forces during the Japanese campaign in 1944 have opened up for the Communists an opportunity to attempt to drive out all Chungking forces from Eastern China. This is part of the reason why there has been more fighting during the recent months between Communist and Chungking forces than between Communist and Japanese forces. An American observer in Yenan stated in February 1945 that Communist leaders point out "on numerous occasions" that Communist planning envisages the organization of Communist guerrilla units in all areas of Eastern China "evacuated by Kuomintang forces." He also stated that "Among the Communists there is no doubt as to their ability to repeat in other parts of China their North China feats of popular organization. In March 1945 General Ch'en I, Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army, stated to an American observer in Yenan that the New Fourth Army had reached a strength of 300,000 regulars, and can easily be expanded to 400,000. Other Communist leaders said: "Give us a year and we will have all of East China from the borders of Manchuria to Hainan [Island]. When that has been accomplished, the Communist forces will be at least as strong as those of the Central Government, and it will be the Kuomintang which will be blockaded."

The growing strength of the Chinese Communists is also reflected in their propaganda and in their official attitude toward the Chungking Government. They have begun to claim the role of representing the Chinese people as a whole rather than the Communist Party. At the end of April 1945, Mao Tse-tung, in his report to the Seventh Congress of the CCP at Yenan, referred to the Government in Chungking as "the illegal so-called National Government without popular support." The following passage in his report clearly expresses the consciousness among the Chinese Communists of their emergence into a position of power rivalling and possibly surpassing that of the Kuomintang: "Chinese [Communist] liberated areas have become a democratic pattern for China, and the center of gravity for cooperation with our Allies to drive out the Japanese aggressors and to liberate the Chinese people. The troops in the liberated areas have expanded to 910,000 [32] and the people's volunteers to over 2,200,000. These troops have become the main force in the war of resistance. And as soon as they receive modern equipment they will become still more invincible and able finally to defeat the Japanese aggressors." It was also pointed out during this Congress, the first Communist Party Congress held since 1928, that "the power of the Chinese Communist Party, the unity and solidarity within the Party and the Party's prestige among the people of China, are higher than at any period in the past."

At the beginning of May 1945 the Japanese admitted the growing power of the Chinese Communists in the following broadcast report from Tokyo quoting an article in *Mainichi Shimbun*: "During the past two years . . . the Yenan regime has stubbornly pushed a political offensive in Japanese occupied North China. But in reality no military offensive of a major scale has been undertaken. However, [Yenan's] . . . clever maneuver to win over the Chinese masses to its cause (is) by no means slighted. Along with the expansion of its political sphere of influence the Yenan regime strove hard to cultivate its fighting strength through an aggressive military enlargement program, as well as a production increase movement . . . Yenan's anti-Japanese general counter-offensive does not go beyond the scheme to strike the Japanese in the back in conjunction with the heralded American landing on the China coast."

(5) *International implications of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle*

(a) *Attitudes of the Kuomintang toward foreign powers.*—There are striking differences in the attitudes of the Kuomintang and the CCP toward foreign nations. The Kuomintang is a Nationalist party. The Communist Party is international. The Kuomintang argues that Communism is a foreign doctrine incompatible with Chinese tradition and temperament. The Communists charge that the Kuomintang represents and is supported by the capitalist class which exists at the expense of the masses, and therefore adheres to foreign capitalist nations and betrays the interests of China.

In regard to the Kuomintang, there are pro and anti American leaders in the Party, pro and anti British leaders, and pro and anti Soviet Russian leaders. But all of them are nationalists who, in their relations with foreign countries, place the interests of China first of all. They intensely resent foreign domination. Because Great Britain formerly represented imperialist domination in China they accepted Soviet Russian aid, in the 1920's to drive the British out of China. When Soviet Russia used her position in China to win a dominant position for herself, they turned against her and reestablished friendly relations with Great Britain. The CCP as developed by Soviet Russia had many of the features of a puppet organization, serving the interests of Sovet Russia. The Kuomintang turned against the Chinese Communists as well as against Soviet Russia. When Japan began to invade China, the Kuomintang was willing to accept the aid of Soviet Russia, America, and Great Britain.

The Kuomintang, of course, hailed America's entry into the war as China's salvation. It has welcomed American aid and has accepted American advisers to help the Government in Chungking to plan and organize Chinese resistance against Japan, just as it once accepted Soviet Russian advisers to organize Chinese resistance against Great Britain. But there can be little doubt that if the leaders of the Kuomintang were ever to feel that America was trying to dominate China, they would turn against us and would accept aid from any foreign power, even from Soviet Russia, to combat our influence.

China under the Kuomintang is willing to cooperate with any and all foreign powers that are willing to treat China as an equal, and willing to respect her sovereign rights.

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[32] In July 1944 the Communists claimed that their regular troops numbered 47,000.

This is why most of the Kuomintang leaders resent and fear Soviet Russia, for in their opinion Soviet Russia has not respected Chinese sovereign rights. She has established Soviet domination over Outer Mongolia. She exerted a dominant influence in Sinkiang, and even though she withdrew her military forces and economic interests from Sinkiang in 1943, she did not prevent Outer Mongolia from supporting the anti-Chinese Kazak rebellion in Sinkiang, which began in 1943 and still continues. An American observer in Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province in the Northwest, reported that in 1942 Chinese "continually spoke of Outer Mongolia as being just as much a part of China as Manchuria, and its recovery just as important . . . This determination to reestablish control over Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was, they had no hesitation in saying, the dominant reason for the great emphasis on the development of the Northwest, particularly the Kansu Corridor which is regarded because of its position as being of vital strategic importance."

The leaders of the Kuomintang have opposed any attempt to fetter China to the British imperialist world system. They have opposed China's inclusion in the Japanese imperialist system. Today they fear that it is Soviet Russia's intention to drag China into the Communist world system under Soviet Russian domination. And because the Chinese Communists have always been followers and supporters of Soviet Russia, most of the Kuomintang leaders think of the Chinese Communists as an instrument of Soviet Russian expansion into China.

The American Consul in Lanchow stated that Chinese with whom he had travelled through Kansu in 1942 commonly spoke of Great Britain as China's old enemy, Japan as her present enemy, and Soviet Russia as her future enemy. The C-of-S of the Eighth War Zone, including Kansu, Ningsia, and Sinkiang, said in 1943 that the Chinese in the Northwest are "faced on one side by Russia, and on the other side by the [Chinese] Communists." In August 1943, just before General Hsiung Shih-hui was appointed chief of the National Planning Board (mainly concerned with post-war plans), he told an American official that China's first problem after the war is over is "military security particularly in the north."

Many of the most influential Kuomintang leaders have been apprehensive about what might happen to China if Soviet Russia were to enter into the war against Japan. American observers in China reported in August 1943, during a crisis between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, that "reactionary Kuomintang circles" deeply distrusted Soviet intentions and good faith, arguing that the Chinese Communist problem should be resolved immediately by the use of force. Otherwise, they feared, if Soviet Russia entered the war against Japan, the Chinese Communists would take over North China while the Russians were sweeping through Korea and Manchuria. The tense situation in 1943 between the Kuomintang and the Communists, arising from the heavy concentration of Kuomintang troops in areas facing the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region in Shensi, Kansu, and Ningsia, was explained by an American agency in China as follows: "Kuomintang provincial officials in the Northwest are strongly suspicious of Soviet Russia and fear the occupation by the Chinese Communists of parts of Kansu and Ningsia. The Chungking Government has concentrated its forces in the Northwest not in preparation for an attack against the Chinese Communists, but rather because of fear that Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists possibly intend to establish land communications between their areas of control."

This fear of Soviet Russia increased during 1944 and 1945 with the successful Russian offensive into Germany and with Soviet Russia's denunciation of the Neutrality Pact with Japan on 5 April 1945. An official American source in Chungking reported on 15 April that "Although Chinese expressed approval of Soviet denunciation of the Japanese pact, there was also a question of when and how Russia will enter the war. Informed Chinese hope that the United States will be able to deal with Japan alone and are afraid that Russia will complicate Kuomintang-Chinese Communist relations and the future status of Manchuria and North China."

Most Kuomintang leaders, foremost among them the Generalissimo, maintain their suspicious attitude toward Soviet Russia and lean heavily on American support of the Chungking Government to counteract the growing power of the Chinese Communists and possible future Soviet domination of China. But some Kuomintang leaders, among them Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan and one of the leading spokesmen for the Chinese liberals, began in the course of 1944 to press for closer cooperation between the Chungking Government and Soviet Russia. They argued that it was futile to ignore the fact that after the

defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will emerge as the greatest land-power of Asia, and that it would be essential to the security of China that the Chungking Government establish friendly relations with Soviet Russia. These Kuomintang leaders also realize that the initial step toward winning Soviet Russia's good-will is the establishment of friendly relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

In April 1945 it was reported from Chungking that the "Sun Fo school of thought" is gaining in Chungking. "Chungking believes that unity with the [Chinese] Communists cannot be achieved unless Stalin gives the necessary orders to the Communists. If there is danger of U. S. agreeing to some deal with Russia on Manchuria in order to bring her into war against Japan, China would do better by bargaining direct with Stalin. Chang Kai-shek so far has refused to budge from his position."

(*b*) *Attitude of the Chinese Communists toward foreign powers.*—Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have consistently followed the Soviet Russian party line. In the course of the present war they have upheld every action of the Soviet Union, even though at times it has appeared difficult to reconcile these actions with the interests of China. But when the United States and Great Britain have taken somewhat similar action, the Chinese Communists have never failed to make their displeasure known. Thus they denounced the "capitalist nations" in 1938 for shipping "great quantities of munitions and war materials" to Japan. But they saw nothing wrong in Soviet Russia concluding a Neutrality Pact with Japan in 1941.

When the Soviet Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was concluded in August 1939, Mao Tse-tung said that it "strengthens the confidence of the whole of mankind in the possibility of winning freedom." He said that the pact

> " . . . has upset the plot of Chamberlain, Deladier and others who were engaged in transactions for the international reactionary bourgeoisie and who wished to provoke war between the U. S. S. R. and Germany. The Pact was a hard blow to Japan [since it exposed the "false character" of the Anti-Comintern bloc], helped China strengthen the position of the supporters of the war of emancipation and dealt a blow to Chinese capitulators . . .
>
> "As I have already said, Chamberlain and his policy will meet with the fate described in the proverb, 'He that mischief hatches, mischief catches.' . . . In order to deceive the people and mobilize public opinion, both belligerent sides [Germany and Great Britain who in the opinion of Mao Tse-tung would soon start a war against each other] will cynically declare that they are waging a just war, while others are waging an unjust war. But only a non-predatory war, a liberation war is a just war.
>
> "In the capitalist world, in addition to the above-mentioned two big groups, there is still a third group, namely, the states of America, headed by the United States. This group, guided by its own interests, has as yet not entered into the conflict. It can still, together with the U. S. S. R., call for the preservation of peace.
>
> "American imperialists intend afterwards to appear on the scene and win for themselves a dominant position in the capitalist world . . .
>
> "In the sphere of Japanese foreign policy a struggle is taking place between two groups. The fascist military clique continues to strive to seize the whole of China and the South Seas and to squeeze Britain, America, and France out of the East. The liberal bourgeoisie on the other hand insist that concessions be made to the British, Americans, and French in order [that] the Japanese may be able to concentrate their attention on the plundering of China. At present time, the danger of an Anglo-Japanese agreement has increased. The British reactionary bourgeoisie evidently want to partition China, jointly with Japan, to give Japan political and economic assistance on the condition that Japan becomes Britain's watchdog in the East to protect its interests, to suppress the Chinese movement of national emancipation, to launch an attack on the U. S. S. R., and to restrict America's influence. Hence Japan's chief aim as regards the enslavement of China will not change . . . Britain's policy in the East is directed towards organizing a Far Eastern Munich . . .
>
> "As regards the U. S. S. R. we [Chinese] should strengthen our friendship with it, in order to establish a front of unity of both great nations, to secure still greater support . . . Relations with the United States should, generally speaking, be the same. The most reliable friends rendering us support in the Capitalist countries are the broad masses of the people . . ."

The Chungking Government at this time saw little hope that America and Great Britain would come to the aid of China, and therefore hailed the Soviet-German pact as a distinct blow to Japan, and conversely an aid to China. The Kuomintang press agencies agreed with the Chinese Communists that the agreement automatically broke up the anti-Comintern pact and expressed the opinion that the Russo-German pact would allow Soviet Russia to center her attention on Japan and devote her resources more fully to the aid of China.

This proved to be a mistaken idea. Soviet Russia did not devote her resources "more fully to the aid of China." With the break up, in the course of 1939 and 1940, of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, Soviet Russia began greatly to reduce her shipments of supplies to the Chungking Government. On 13 April 1941 Soviet Russia concluded a Neutrality Pact with Japan.

Wang Ch'ung-hui, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, bitterly attacked the Soviet Union. The American M/A in China reported that Government circles in Chungking viewed the signing of the Soviet-Japanese pact with alarm. "The worst feature, as far as the Chinese are concerned, is the possibility that the Japanese will be able to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from Manchuria for use in settling the China incident . . . The possible effect of the pact on continuance of Russian aid to China has also caused some concern." Well informed Chinese quarters in Chungking were also apprehensive that what they called Russia's "appeasement policy" toward Japan might induce Great Britain and the United States to follow Russia's example.

The brighter side of the picture, as far as the Chinese in Chungking were concerned, was the possibility that the pact might tempt Japan, "now that the back door in Manchuria is at least partially freed from fear of attack from Russia," to move into American, British, French, and Dutch areas in Southeast Asia "without attempting a settlement of the China incident." The American M/A reported that "recent developments have led China to believe that a move south will bring on a war between the United States and Japan which, as far as China is concerned, is a consummation devoutly to be wished." By signing the Neutrality Pact with Japan, the Kuomintang leaders believed that Soviet Russia had acted against China, the United States and Great Britain.

The CCP, however, thoroughly subscribed to Soviet Russia's move. In a statement issued in Chungking on 23 April, the Chinese Communists announced:

> "[The Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact] is a great victory of the USSR's foreign policy. The significance of this agreement lies above all in the fact that it strengthens peace on the eastern frontiers of the USSR and guarantees the security of the development of socialist construction. This kind of peace and development of the USSR is in keeping with the interests of the working people and oppressed nations of the whole world . . .
>
> "The Soviet-Japanese pact has not restrained the aid which the USSR renders to independent and just resistance. If only the Chinese government will not use the help of the USSR against compatriots in the country, as for instance was the case in January of this year when the New Fourth Army was destroyed in the southern part of Anhwei Province . . . we are deeply convinced that the USSR . . . will continue to help China . . .
>
> "The hope of the Chinese people for aid from abroad rests above all on the USSR and by this treaty the USSR has not disappointed and never will disappoint China.
>
> "As regards the statement of the USSR and Japan about mutual non-aggression on Manchuria and Mongolia, this measure was necessary since so-called Manchukuo already for some time past had been used by Japan as an instrument for attacks on the USSR and for creating disorders on the frontier of the USSR and Outer Mongolia . . .
>
> "Following the USSR's statement that it will not attack Manchuria, these people [referring to Kuomintang "speculators"] began to maintain that the USSR has acted incorrectly. Such people are to say the least, craven tricksters . . ."

What these "craven tricksters" in the Kuomintang had objected against above everything else was Soviet Russia's pledge in a separate "Frontier Declaration" attached to the Neutrality Pact to "respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo."

After Germany's attack on Soviet Russia in June 1941 Chinese nationalist groups viewed the new war development with some optimism from China's standpoint as it tended to confirm their long-held belief that eventually all major powers would be drawn into the conflict, to the benefit of China. Many

expressed the opinion that Japan would have to "honor" her alliance with the Axis by attacking Siberia and Outer Mongolia.

The Chinese Communists adopted more or less the same attitude toward the new world situation as Communists all over the world. Their concern was for Soviet Russia's welfare, even to the point of making it clear that the Chinese Communists wished that the United States and Great Britain would employ "every means" to help "the countries fighting Germany," even if this meant leaving China to fight on as best she could. Mao Tse-tung's statement on 10 October 1941, the thirtieth anniversary of the Chinese Revolution, is typical of the attitude of the Communists:

> "The war which will decide the fate of the human race is today being fought ferociously on the plains of Russia between the Red Army and the fascist hordes of Hitler. All those people who want freedom, and first and foremost the great Chinese people, are wholeheartedly behind the Soviet Union, behind the Soviet-British-American anti-fascist united front."

In November 1941 Mao Tse-tung stated:

> "In our opinion Britain and the United States must employ every means to help the countries fighting Germany. It is absolutly clear that the aspirations of the majority of Americans and Britains coincide with our own. The British and American people must display more energy in overcoming difficulties and must strengthen the world anti-fascist front."

When those statements are compared with Mao Tse-tung's statement in 1939 after the conclusion of the Russo-German non-aggression pact it becomes clear that in the opinion of the Chinese Communists whoever sides with Soviet Russia sides with the cause of freedom.

After the entry of the United States into the war against Japan the Chinese Communists could naturally not continue to say that the "hope of the Chinese people for aid from abroad rests above all on the USSR." On 23 December 1941 the Central Committee of the CCP published a statement in the *Hsin Hua Jih Pao* in Chungking as follows:

> "The war in the Pacific, started for the purpose of aggression, is an unjust, predatory war on the part of Japan. On the other hand from the point of view of resistance to Japan, the United States of America and Great Britain are waging a just war in defense of independence, freedom and democracy. This new act of Japanese reaction is similar to the Japanese aggression pursued in China for ten years, and fully coincides with the aggression of the German and Italian fascists in Europe and against the Soviet Union.
>
> "The world is now divided into two fronts—the Fascist Front, waging war against aggression, and the Anti-Fascist Front, engaged in a liberation war [sic]. China, Britain, the U. S. A. and other anti-Japanese countries must conclude a military alliance to bring about full military cooperation. At the same time a united front of all anti-Japanese countries and peoples in the Pacific must be formed to continue the war against Japan to final victory.
>
> "The Anti-Japanese National Front [in China] must be strengthened. The people must be afforded an opportunity to participate in the anti-Japanese struggle, as well as in the national reconstruction."

In the years that followed the Chinese Communists, like the Communists in all countries, came to stress more and more the "national" character of their revolutionary movements. When the Communist International was dissolved in May 1943, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the revolutionary organizational form of the Communist International had become unsuited to the necessities of the revolutionary struggle. "What is needed for the present is to strengthen the Communist Parties in the various countries . . . The disbandment of the Comintern does not weaken the Communist Parties of the various countries but, on the other hand, strengthens them, making them more national and more suited to the necessities of the war against Fascism." Mao Tse-tung stated that since the Seventh Congress in 1935 the Communist International "has not once intervened in internal questions of the Chinese Party." The Central Committee of the CCP stated, however, that the Communist International had aided China up until it was dissolved. "What the Chinese people can never forget is that it helped the relization of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation with all its possibilities in 1924 when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was alive. Thence forward it helped the victory of the Northern Expedition. Moreover, when the Chinese Revolution was in most difficult situation between 1927 and 1937, it again aided the Chinese revolutionary people [the Chinese Communists]. Further on, during the six years of anti-Japanese war since 1937, it has called upon all its sections and working people in all countries to help the Chinese to oppose the aggression war of Japanese imperialism."

In the period following the dissolution of the Comintern, the Chinese Communists have tried to convince American observers of their friendly feelings toward America and the importance they attach to America's role both in the war against Japan and in the post-war rehabilitation work in China. This became the case especially after the establishment of an American Military Observer Section in Yenan in July 1944, which was approved by the National Government in Chungking. In December 1944 General Yeh Chien-ying said to an American observer visiting Yenan that "in the past, especially during the period of civil war after 1927, the Communists' attitude toward the United States had not been particularly favorable. However, this attitude had improved to a great extent since the outbreak of the Pacific War. General impressions of the United States were now very good."

In January 1945 Mao Tse-tung said: "We [Chinese Communists] hope for Allied aid but we cannot stake everything on this. We rely on our own efforts and the creative power of the [Communist] Army and the people."

During interviews on 13 March and 1 April 1945 with one of the American observers attached to the American Military Observer Section in Yenan, Mao Tse-tung gave a detailed outline of the policy and attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States and the implications of American support of the Chungking Government. He stressed five things in particular: (1) China needs American aid both during and after the war; (2) the Chinese Communists will extend cooperation to the United States regardless of American action; (3) The Kuomintang cannot develop China into a stabilizing power in the Far East; (4) The Kuomintang is unable to maintain friendly relations with "Soviet Russia and other neighbors;" (5) the CCP represents the interests of the Chinese people wherefore it would be to the best interest of the United States to support the Chinese Communists; only under Communist leadership can democracy be established in China. The following extracts give the main points of Mao Tse-tung's statements:

> "Between the *people* of China and the people of the United States there are strong ties of sympathy, understanding and mutual interests . . . China's greatest post-war need is economic development . . . America is not only the most suitable country to assist this economic development of China: she is also the only country fully able to participate. For all these reasons there must not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding between the Chinese people and America."
>
> "[Chinese] Communist policy toward the United States is, and will remain, to seek friendly American support of democracy in China and cooperation in fighting Japan. But regardless of American action, whether or not they [the Communists] receive a single gun or bullet, the Communists will continue to offer and practice cooperation in any manner possible to them . . . The Communists will continue to seek American friendship and understanding because it will be needed by China in the post-war period of reconstruction."
>
> "Whether or not America extends cooperation to the Communists is, of course, a matter for only America to decide. But the Communists see only advantages for the United States—in winning the war as rapidly as possible. in helping the cause of unity and democracy in China, in promoting healthy economic solution of the agrarian problem, and in winning the undying friendship of the overwhelming majority of China's people, the peasants and liberals."
>
> "The peasants are China . . . The problems of the Chinese farmer are, therefore, basic to China's future . . . There must be land reform. And democracy . . ."
>
> "The Kuomintang has no contact with the agrarian masses of the population . . . Afraid of real democracy, the Kuomintang is forced to be Fascistic . . . Unwilling to solve the agrarian problem it turns toward the principle of rigidly planned, State directed and controlled industrial development."
>
> "Unable, therefore, to create a solid basis for power at home or for cooperative and amicable relations with Russia and other neighbors, it concentrates on 'national defense industry' and engages in the dangerous game of power politics. The expectation of future conflicts, internal and external, is implicit in these policies . . . Under these policies, . . . the Kuomintang cannot solve China's basic internal problems, cannot lead the country to full democracy, and cannot be a stabilizing power in the Far East."

"The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, is *the* party of the Chinese peasant . . . The Communist Party will be the means of bringing democracy and sound industrialization to China . . ."

"It is to be expected that Chiang [Kai-shek] will do everything possible to avoid compromise in which he and the groups supporting him will have to yield power and give up their dictatorship. But the road he is taking now leads straight to civil war and the Kuomintang's eventual suicide . . ." "When attacked we [Communists] will fight back. We are not afraid of the outcome because the people are with us."

"We [Communists] are not worried about Chiang's American arms, because a conscript peasant army will not use them effectively against their brother conscripts fighting for their homes and economic and political democracy. What we are worried about is the cost to China in suffering and loss of life . . . China needs peace. But she needs democracy more, because it is fundamental to peace. And first she must drive out the Japanese. We think America, too, should be concerned, because her own interests are involved."

"America does not realize her influence in China and her ability to shape events there. Chiang Kai-shek is dependent on American help. If he had not had American support, he would have either collapsed before now or been forced to change his policies in order to unify the country and gain popular support."

"There is no such thing as America not intervening in China !"

"You are here, as China's greatest ally. The fact of your presence is tremendous. America's intentions have been good. We recognized that when Ambassador Hurley came to Yenan [in November 1944] and endorsed our basic . . . points [for a settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist problem] . . . [But] we don't understand why America's policy seemed to waver after its good start. Surely Chiang's motives and devious maneuvers are clear. His [recent] suggestions of 'war cabinets' and 'inter-Party conferences' did not solve any basic issues because they had absolutely no power: they were far short of anything like a coalition government [which the Communists demand]. His proposals of 'reorganizing the Communist armies' and 'placing them under American command' were provocative attempts to create misunderstanding between us (the Communists) and Americans. We are glad to accept American command, as the British have in Europe. But it must be of all Chinese armies."

Mao Tse-tung's statement that the Chinese Communists will cooperate with America whether we support them or not may have been more diplomatic than realistic. A former American observer in China with close contacts with Chinese Communist leaders stated in November 1944 that the United States "is the greatest hope and the greatest fear of the Chinese Communists," because they recognize that if they receive American aid, even if only on equal basis with Chiang Kai-shek, they can quickly establish control over most if not all of China. This observer concluded that "if we continue to reject them [the Communists] and support an unreconstructed Chiang [Kai-shek] they see us becoming their enemy. But they would prefer to be friends."

The conclusion from this observation is that the Chinese Communists, if given aid by the United States, will use this aid to oust the Kuomintang from power and unify China under their control.

The result of such a development as far as America is concerned depends much on the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward Soviet Russia. A commonly held opinion on this subject was expressed by an American repatriated in 1943 from Occupied China: "Should the Communists get the upper hand in China as they nearly succeeded in doing in 1927 and are quite liable to do after this war again, seeing how widespread their armies are already in China, there will be a united front that will challenge the world, under orders from Moscow, as soon as the Red Armies have sufficiently recovered from their losses in the present war."

The strong attachment of the Chinese Communists to Soviet Russia is indicated in many ways besides their approval of Soviet Russia's policy no matter which way it swings. An American observer who visited Yenan at the end of 1944 states that there is "no doubt" that a strong sentimental attachment holds for "Mother Russia," the home of the ideology of the Chinese Communists. "At a recent showing of newsreels in Yenan, loud applause greeted Stalin's appearance; there was none for Roosevelt, Churchill, or Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin's speeches receive prominent space in the newspapers." The pictures of Stalin, Lenin, and

Marx are seen on the walls of most public buildings. Occasionally the picture of Sun Yat-sen is placed beside these Communist "saints." At times when American visitors have been received by the Communists, the pictures of Roosevelt and Churchill have been temporarily added to those of Stalin, Lenin, and Marx. The Soviet Russian training and background of the Chinese Communists is shown in such small details as the romanization used on their paper money. They employ the Soviet Russian romanization instead of the British-American romanization commonly used in China for Chinese characters; thus "bank" is written as "*inxang*" instead of "yin-hang."

A former American observer in China, who is convinced of the "nationalist" spirit of the Chinese Communists, stated in November 1944: "With all of their strong nationalist spirit, the Chinese Communists do not seem to fear Moscow's political dominance over them as a result of possible Russian entry into the Pacific war and invasion of Manchuria and North China. They maintain that the USSR has no expansionist intentions toward China. To the contrary, they expect Outer Mongolia to be absorbed with a Chinese federation. They do not see this or any other issue causing conflict between Russia and Chinese Communist foreign policy." This same observer wrote that "Possible future Soviet assistance to the [Chinese] Communists is a subject on which Yenan leaders are uncommunicative. It seems obvious, however, that they would welcome such aid for what it would mean in exterminating the Japanese and giving impetus to Communist expansion in Central and South China."

The Chinese Communists have made great efforts to convince American observers that they have no relations with Soviet Russia. Mao Tse-tung said to the foreign correspondents visiting Yenan in July 1944 that "There has been no connection between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the USSR, either in the past or now. There was a relationship with the Communist International, but this is no longer true. There has been no connection with the Communist Party of any other country." This rather naive statement probably did not convince anyone.

In an analysis of this subject an American observer in Yenan contradicts Mao Tse-tung's statement just cited. "Although it will be denied, channels do exist and there is almost certainly some contact between the Chinese Communists and Moscow. This is probably through Chinese Communists in Moscow and radio at Yenan . . . What contact does exist is between the two Parties, not Governments." This observer states that at present the Chinese Communists in Moscow include the former Chinese representatives to the Comintern, who have been in Russia since the beginning of the war. Among them are Li Li-san, at one time leader of the CCP, and a certain General Chao. "These men certainly are in contact with Russian Communist leaders. Another possible channel of contact is, of course, through the Communist representatives and the Soviet Embassy in Chungking. This contact, however, seems to be limited to avoid arousing Central Government suspicions." There is probably radio communication between Yenan and Moscow, and the Communist newspaper in Yenan receives its TASS news directly by monitoring Russian broadcasts. "Important Soviet editorials are often reprinted . . . These are enough to give at least the Party 'line.' The same can work in the reverse direction—from Yenan to Moscow." He states that there is no evidence, however, that the Chinese Communists receive any supplies from Soviet Russia.

In regard to Soviet Russia Mao Tse-tung recently said to an American observer in Yenan that Soviet participation either in the Far Eastern war or in China's post-war reconstruction depends entirely on the "circumstances of the Soviet Union." He pointed out that Russians have suffered greatly in the war and will have their hands full with their own job of rebuilding. He said that the Chinese Communists do not expect Russian help. "Furthermore, the Kuomintang because of its anti-Communist phobia is anti-Russian. Therefore, Kuomintang-Soviet cooperation is impossible. And for us to seek it would only make the situation in China worse. China is dis-unified enough already! In any case, Soviet help is not likely even if the Kuomintang wanted it." He emphasized, however, that Soviet Russia will not oppose American interests in China if Americans are "constructive and democratic."

Mao Tse-tung did not explain what he meant by this. But it seems apparent from his remark that the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia are in agreement as to what should be a "constructive and democratic" American policy in China. It may be safely assumed that he meant that the United States should support the Chinese Communists.

This assumption is supported by Mao Tse-tung's indirect answer to the following statement by Maj. General Patrick J. Hurley, American Ambassador to

China. During a press conference in Washington on 2 April 1945 Ambassador Hurley said that the Chinese Communists had requested the United States to furnish them with arms. He explained that furnishing arms to an armed political party would be equivalent to recognizing it as a belligerent. And the United States, he noted, recognizes the Chungking national regime as the government of China. He emphasized that the U. S. policy in China was unity and that there would be no unity so long as there were "armed political parties and warlords strong enough to resist the Central Government."

In the subsequent weeks Mao Tse-tung warned the United States and Great Britain not to let their diplomacy go against the "will of the Chinese people." He added that "if any foreign government helps China's reactionary group [a reference to the Kuomintang] to oppose the democratic cause . . . a gross mistake will have been committeed." At the same time he stated that the Chinese Communists believe that the Pacific question cannot be settled without the participation of Soviet Russia.

When Soviet Russia denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5 April 1945, the Chinese Communists used the occasion to praise the Soviet policy in the Far East and to denounce the Kuomintang for having expressed its disapproval of the Neutrality Pact in 1941. The *Emancipation Daily* (*Chieh Fang Jih Pao*), Communist Party organ in Yenan, wrote in an editorial on 8 April: "If the Kuomintang authorities are sincere about correcting their mistakes, they must not continue their four-year hatred of the Soviet Union." The editorial pointed out how the Soviet Union had adroitly used the neutrality pact with Japan to mass her forces to knock out Nazi Germany first, and recalled the "vicious ravings of China's reactionary group against the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact in the past . . . even . . . to the extent of talking about the so-called 'Tokyo-Moscow-Yenan axis.' "

At the end of April Mao Tse-tung, in his report to the Seventh Congress of the CCP in Yenan, gave an important outline of the foreign policy of the Chinese Communists. The Yenan radio reported his speech as follows:

> Mao Tse-tung said, " 'Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, we [Chinese Communists] are of the opinion that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity toward the Soviet Union and swiftly improve Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations.' On behalf of the Chinese people Mao Tse-tung expressed thanks for the help which has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people in China's war of liberation and expressed welcome of Marshal Stalin's speech last November rebuking the Japanese aggressors and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.
>
> " 'We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.
>
> " 'The great efforts made by the Great Powers, America and Great Britain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to China, deserve our thanks. We request the Governments of the United Nations, especially the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, to pay attention seriously to the voice of the widest masses of the Chinese people and not let their diplomatic policy go against the will of the Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people.
>
> " 'If any foreign Government helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed.'
>
> "Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China by many foreign governments and the establishment of new treaties with China on the footing of equality, Mao Tse-tung said that the Chinese people welcome such (measures of treating) the Chinese people on a footing of equality. 'But,' he pointed out, 'China definitely cannot rely simply on equality being given by the good will of foreign governments and peoples. A real and actual footing of equality must in the main rely on the efforts of the Chinese people to build up politically, economically and culturally a new democratic country, which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous and strong. China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the policy of the Kuomintang Government at present in force.'
>
> "Mao Tse-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to the countries in the Far East:

"'After the . . . unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors all democratic [groups] of the Japanese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people, thorough extermination of the Japanese Fascism and militarism would not be possible to guarantee peace in the Pacific. The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese people should help the Korean people to attain liberation.

"'America has already granted independence to the Philippines. We also hope that Great Britain [will] grant independence to India, because an independent, democratic India is not only needed by the Indian people, but is also needed for world peace.' Regarding Burma, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and Annam, Mao Tse-tung said: 'We hope that Great Britain, the United States, and France [will grant], after helping the local peoples to defeat the Japanese aggressor, the right to establish independent, democratic regimes to the local people in accordance with the stand of the Crimea Conference regarding liberated areas in Europe.

"'With regard to Thailand she should be dealt with according to the measures of dealing with a fascist turncoat.'"

In regard to Japan, the Chinese Communists are reported to seek a democracy "like that which they plan in China." In effect this means that they envisage a democracy in Japan more akin to "Soviet democracy" than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. An American observer in Yenan has reported that the Chinese Communists hold it necessary to give Japan reasonable opportunities for economic recovery and stability. This will include freedom of participation in the economic development of China. This observer states that it is apparent that the views of the Chinese Communists are closely similar to the program of the Japanese Communist Party as set forth by Okano Susumu, leader of the Japanese Communist Party. Okano has been staying in Yenan since 1943. Mao Tse-tung has expressed the opinion that military occupation of Japan would be necessary with the aim of forming a democratic government in Japan.

In May 1944 the Chinese Communists established in Yenan the "Japanese People's Emancipation League." It advocates a united front of all Japanese parties with the "fundamental objective" of inducing the Japanese people to cease hostilities and overthrow the militarists.

The League maintains a school in Yenan, the "Japanese Workers' and Farmers' School." The League recruits its members chiefly from Japanese P/Ws. Out of several thousand Japanese P/Ws taken by the Chinese Communists during the past years, the Emancipation League has only between 400–500 members at present.

(*c*) *Soviet Russia's attitude toward China.*—In order to understand Soviet Russia's attitude toward China it is essential to bear in mind that the united front world movement was developed by Moscow. Its purpose, as we have seen, was to safeguard the Soviet Union against fascist aggression and strengthen the Communist parties in the capitalist, "bourgeois" democracies, as an instrument of Soviet policy.

In no country has the united front movement succeeded better than in China. It served its purpose during the first years of the Sino-Japanese war. It then centered the attention of all Chinese political parties and military groups on the problem of fighting Japan, at a time when Soviet Russia felt itself threatened by a war with Japan which it was anxious to avoid. It saved the Chinese Communist Army from extinction and gave the CCP a more powerful position in China than it had ever enjoyed. Had Chiang Kai-shek pursued his intention of starting a new "Extermination Campaign" in 1936 against the Communists in Shensi on the pattern of the Fifth Extermination Campaign in Kiangsi in 1934, it is likely that the Chinese Red Army would have been defeated. What saved it was Chiang's approval (stimulated, of course, by the Sian Kidnapping) of the united front idea.

Soviet Russia's policy in China during the first years of the war was basically the same as during the period in the 1920's of the Soviet-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale*. Soviet support to China in terms of military supplies went exclusively to the Chungking Government as long as the Kuomintang supported the Chinese Communists. When the united front broke up, Soviet support of Chungking was gradually withdrawn. By that time, however, the Chinese Communists had gained a powerful position in China. As a result of the break up of the united front, Chinese resistance against Japan began to diminish. By that time, however, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact eliminated the immediate danger of a

Japanese attack upon the Soviet Union. America's entry into the Pacific War gave Soviet Russia an additional assurance that her Siberian frontiers were safe. On 12 December 1941 *Pravda*, in an editorial entitled "War in the Pacific," wrote that Japan's initial successes had decided nothing. The war undoubtedly will be "long and protracted," it believed, but "the Japanese aggressor has plunged into a very hazardous adventure which bodes him nothing but defeat. . . . In comparison with the United States, Japan is poor as regards resources of raw materials." *Pravda* pointed out that Japan faced the "united front" of the United States, Great Britain, and China.

While Soviet Russia ceased sending military supplies to China she continued her diplomatic relations with the Chungking Government. And her military advisers remained in China, although they were treated with increasing suspicion by the Chungking officials. During the first six years of the Sino-Japanese war Soviet Russia abstained from any action that would have substantiated Chinese suspicion that she was supporting or intended to support the Chinese Communists. Such action would not only have intensified the hatred of the Kuomintang for the Chinese Communists, which could have led to a large-scale civil war and the collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. It might conceivably have involved Soviet Russia in a war against Japan. Soviet officials maintained, outwardly, the attitude that they were not interested in the Chinese Communists and that they hoped for unity between all Chinese resistance parties. Until 1943 the Soviet press hardly mentioned the Chinese Communists.

Soviet Russia's experience in China has been that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP has always favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. On the other hand, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists. In view of this it is only natural that Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists have always supported unity in China, "democratic" unity.

That Soviet Russia was interested in the fate of the Chinese Communists was, however, explained by American observers in Chungking in a comment on the serious situation during 1943 between the Kuomintang and the CCP. "In the background of the situation is inevitably present a deep-seated Chinese [Kuomintang] fear and suspicion of Soviet Russia and its intentions with regard both to the Chinese Communists and the Northeastern Provinces [Manchuria] . . . That the Russians are not altogether disinterested in the Chinese Communist Party is evident from the call made in July [1943] at [several American observers by] representatives of the Soviet Embassy at Chungking who expressed Soviet concern over the possibility of civil war . . . This fear gives added reason for the Kuomintang to wish to dispose of the Communist question before the conclusion of the war in order that a post-war Kuomintang-Chinese Communist struggle for control in North China may not occur. Even should Soviet Russia remain outside the war against Japan, there would exist the possibility of Russian assistance, outright or under cover, to the Chinese Communists." The Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Chungking stated to foreign observers in the Chinese Capital on 14 July 1943 that Chungking Government troops had fired on positions or outposts of the Chinese Communists in as many as ten different places "within the last few days." American observers commented that the Soviet Counselor's approach is "interesting" because so far as could be recalled, the Soviet Embassy had never before shown concern so unequivocally over what happened to the Chinese Communists. (367)

In August 1943 it was reported from Moscow that the Soviet press, for the first time since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, was emphasizing the role of the Chinese Communists in the Chinese war against Japan and was openly supporting their cause. At the same time the Soviet press was becoming more critical of Japan and was criticizing the Kuomintang for harboring pro-Japanese groups. The Soviet press alleged that these groups sought the destruction of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. While Chiang Kai-shek was not attacked, some of his supporters were called "traitors." This press campaign was started by the publication on 6 August 1943 in the semi-official Soviet Journal *War And The Working Class* of an article by Vladimir Rogoff, for many years a Soviet correspondent in China. He charged that the "Capitulators and defeatists holding high posts in the Kuomintang . . . weaken China . . . [and] had sent large forces to the area in which the [Chinese Communist] armies were operating . . . to disarm them and wipe out the Communist Party. If these adventures are crowned with any success, anti-democratic and anti-popular elements will gain the upper hand in Chungking." He warned against civil

war in China. It was not the content of the criticism in the Soviet press that was noteworthy. Similar criticism and charges against the Kuomintang had been made for years by American and British writers. It was the fact that Soviet Russia had departed from its previous press policy, which was to avoid mention of the Chinese Communists and not to make unfavorable remarks about the Kuomintang, that was significant.

It was also not without significance that in 1943 Soviet Russia withdrew her support of the Chinese regime in Sinkiang. The evacuation of Soviet military forces and advisers from Sinkiang began in May. During the rest of the year all Soviet citizens, except the consular staff, were withdrawn from Sinkiang. All Soviet technical equipment, the oil pumps and refinery equipment at the Tushan oil fields, tungsten mine equipment at Bole, and the aircraft assembly plant at T'ou-tung-ho were also withdrawn. Trade between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia came to a standstill.

Russia was fully within her rights, of course, in taking this action. It might even be argued that it was favorable to China, since the Chungking Government was anxious to gain control over Sinkiang. But the stoppage of trade and the total withdrawal of Soviet forces as well as technical advisers and material interests was significant, because its inevitable result was a rapid deterioration of the economic situation in Sinkiang which would reflect unfavorably upon the Chinese rulers. A Chungking Government official stated that while the action of Soviet Russia "means considerable political success for the Central Government, it will result in almost insolvable economic problems." And the Chungking Government's Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Sinkiang who resides at Tihwa, Capital of Sinkiang, stated that the Chinese had attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to maintain their advisers in Sinkiang. In November 1943 he said that the Chinese wished to resume trade between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia but that the Soviet Consul General in Tihwa had stated that there is no possibility of such trade.

A statement by the Soviet Embassy representative in Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province, indicates that the Soviet Russians were aware that their withdrawal from Sinkiang would weaken the position of the Chungking Government in China's Northwest. He said in August 1943 that "Chinese policies [in Sinkiang], unless radically changed, will alienate rather than win the people. In any event, Sinkiang cannot avoid having closer economic ties with Russia than with China." He emphasized that the Tibetans, Mongols, and Moslems in the Northwest could not be won to China unless the Chinese would abandon their attitude toward "subject peoples," give up their present policy of "Sinification," and give up their efforts to govern minority groups by direct control or through support of the "feudalistic leaders" of these minority groups. He expressed the opinion that the Mohammedan question was more important than the Chinese realized and that the Chinese would be opposed by the Mohammedans until Mohammedan interests were recognized and given a more important share in local government matters.

This was, of course, a very correct evaluation of the Chinese. The intolerant attitude of the Chungking Government toward the non-Chinese groups in Sinkiang (which compose about 95 percent of the population) soon led to uprisings against the Chinese. At the end of 1943 the Kazak nomads, the second largest population group in the province, revolted in Northern Sinkiang. They received military support from Outer Mongolia. When the Chinese authorities in Tibwa protested in October 1943 to the Soviet Consul General, he denied that any disturbances had occurred. In March 1944 serious clashes developed in the Altai Mountains on the border between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. The Chinese stated that Soviet planes bombed their provincial troops in the Altai region. Although the Chinese Military Attaché in Washington said that the Soviet Government had denied this, Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan of the National Government in Chungking (who advocates rapproachement with Russia), stated that the Soviet Ambassador to China had admitted that Soviet planes were involved in these bombings.

On 2 April 1944 the Soviet *Tass* news agency announced that Chinese troops had violated the border of Outer Mongolia and that Chinese planes had bombed towns and villages in Outer Mongolia and strafed Kazaks fleeing from Sinkiang. This announcement referred to events during the latter part of 1943. According to Dr. Sun Fo, the Soviet Ambassador to China had informed the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Soviet Russia, because of its mutual assistance pact with Outer Mongolia, would have to aid Outer Mongolia if called upon, "owing to the fact that the Sinkiang-Mongolian frontier had been crossed by

Chinese planes and Kazaks had been machine gunned." An American observer in NW China reported in July 1944 that he had seen a Soviet map of 1940 on which the Mongolian-Sinkiang border was shown well west of the border line on maps printed in Moscow in 1927, slicing off some 83,000 sq. miles of territory from Sinkiang to the benefit of the "Mongolian People's Republic." It seems possible, therefore, that the Outer Mongolians considered the Chinese to have violated their border while the Chinese considered themselves in legitimate Chinese territory.

In November 1944 Kazaks, "White Russians," and Tartars revolted in Ining in Western Sinkiang. They organized a government at Ining by setting up a Local Maintenance Committee with An Te Hai, a Turki (the Turki, Moslems, are the largest population group in Sinkiang) as Chairman, with the reported aim of establishing an East Asia Turki Republic. The new government was reported to possess its own flag, a red banner with white star and crescent and, according to one report, a hammer and sickle as well. Latest reports (10 May 1945) from official sources at Tihwa stated that the Chinese have uncovered a widespread conspiracy in Tihwa itself for seizing the city and establishing a Turki Government. Americans have been informed that the conspirators are well supplied with machine guns, rifles, and hand grenades. Tihwa was reported to have been placed under martial law by the Chinese authorities. At the same time reports said that disturbances are spreading throughout the province. A portion of the Mongol garrison at Karashar, 120 miles southwest of Tihwa, who number about 1,500, are threatening the city from a northwestern direction. Men in plain clothes from Ining have marched south and are threatening Kashgar. "Serious trouble might develop at Kashgar. In the Ining Valley the rebels are forcing conscription."

In the light of these events it seems that Soviet Russia will in the long run benefit from her withdrawal from Sinkiang in 1943. Previous to that time she was committed to the support of Chinese rule in Sinkiang and in 1933, 1934, 1936, and 1937 she rendered military aid to the Chinese in suppressing rebellions by various Moslem groups in the province. During this time the Chinese Governor of Sinkiang, General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, had maintained a friendly policy toward Soviet Russia and had kept himself aloof from the Chungking Government. In 1942 he accepted a rapprochement with the Chungking Government and he and the Chungking authorities began an anti-Soviet policy in the province. The rebellions which followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Sinkiang has undermined Chinese rule in the province. There is at present a strong possibility that the Moslems in Sinkiang may renounce Chinese rule and establish one or several autonomous regimes of their own. All observers agree that if this were to happen these regimes would reestablish friendly relations between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia. By withdrawing her support of the Chinese in Sinkiang, Soviet Russia has not only indicated indirectly to the Moslems in the province her disapproval of the Chinese regime, but has also indicated that she is placing herself in a position to adopt a new policy in regard to Sinkiang.

In April 1944 the Soviet Vice Consul in Tihwa emphasized to an American that it was the policy of the Soviet Union to prevent the formation around Soviet Russia of a "cordon sanitaire" of border states. Soviet Russia was determined, he said, "that the foreign policies of border states should be friendly to the Soviet Union and free from unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers." He said that where border peoples in the past had been oppressed against their will by the large powers, as Outer Mongolia had been by the Chinese, the Soviet Union was prepared to enter into mutual assistance pacts, such as that existing with Outer Mongolia since 1936, to prevent a recurrence of oppressive acts. The remark is significant since it may be considered as giving a commonly held Soviet interpretation of Foreign Commissar Molotov's statement to Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, in August 1944. Molotov said that the Russians had many grievances against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and that they were interested primarily in having a good neighbor to the south.

If we accept the statements of Molotov and the Soviet Vice Consul in Tihwa as indicative of Soviet policy, it would mean that Sinkiang, and probably Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also Communist-controlled North China would go the way of Outer Mongolia which has been protected by the Soviet Union for twenty years from "unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers." This trend of events is, of course, conditional upon whether or not the Chungking Government will readjust its relations with Soviet Russia on a basis of friendship and will accept a new united front arrangement with the Chinese Communists.

The appearance in 1943 of Soviet official and public concern for the Chinese Communists, the beginning of a press campaign highly critical of Chungking, and the Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang were all indications of the beginning of a more active Soviet interest in the Far East. A member of the French Special Mission to Moscow stated in May 1944 that in his opinion Soviet Russia is not going to tolerate for a very long time the continuance of a "reactionary regime" in China. He felt convinced, "definitely," that when the proper time arrives the Soviet Union will take active measures against Chiang Kai-shek and his group of supporters. He said that the Soviet Union will tend to intervene in Asia rather than in Europe in the post-war period.

His comment is similar to that of Mr. XX, a former member of the Communist International and a friend of Stalin, now ostracised as a "Trotskyite." He affirmed that the development of communism in China has always been uppermost in the mind of Stalin, because a Communist China, aligned with Soviet Russia, would create an indomitable Communist world power. Stalin has always been more interested in the Chinese Communist Party than in the German Communist Party. This created considerable jealousy among the German Communists who, before Hitler smashed their Party, always considered themselves as the most important Communist Party outside of Soviet Russia. This informer stated that Stalin had been criticized by members in the Comintern for his policy in China after the failure of the policy of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in 1927. In developing the new united front policy during the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935, Stalin paid especial attention to the application of this policy in China and repeatedly emphasized the coming role of China in the Communist world movement.

The Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang was followed in 1944 by a general withdrawal of all Soviet military advisers from the Chungking Government. The Soviet Military Attaché in Chungking stated to American observers in June 1944 that the Soviet disapproved of Chungking's policy of making relations with the U. S. S. R. worse, "and yet not cooperating with the British or Americans either." American observers, commenting on the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers, said that "the activities of Soviet military advisers in China have been so limited for such a long time that no particular significance is attached to the statement of the Russian Military attaché that these advisers are being removed from China as 'needed for the European fighting;' it might be an indication of Russian displeasure with the growing propaganda by Chinese officials along anti-Soviet lines, which has been particularly in evidence in various ways since the 12 April Sinkiang incident." (This "incident" was the fighting on the border between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia.)

Another indication of growing Soviet displeasure with the Chungking Government was the Soviet press criticism, which during the past year has become progressively more outspoken in its condemnation of Chungking and its approval of Yenan. In July 1944 *War and the Working Class* sharply rapped the helplessness of the Chungking Army in its war against Japan and pointed out that the Chungking Army, numbering ten times the army of Tito in Yugoslavia, was waging a losing battle whereas the latter army had shown successes against Germany. The magazine charged that Chungking should score better results and stated that the Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were feeling the brunt of the Japanese attacks. This was, of course, a misrepresentation of the facts, because the Japanese army did not launch any large-scale attacks against the Communist armies in 1944. Instead, it concentrated its attacks against the Chungking forces.

On 18 February 1945 the Soviet government newspaper *Izvestia* was reported to have given "unqualified endorsement" to the stand of the Chinese Communists for "liquidation of the Kuomintang dictatorship and formation of a coalition government and a united supreme command of the armed forces." *Izvestia* said approvingly that "other democratic parties as well as the Communist Party also suggested the liquidation of concentration camps and fascist organizations, strengthening of friendship with the USSR and increasing ties with Britain, the United States and the other Allies." The newspaper said, "The present situation imposes especially responsible tasks upon China which the National Government and the supreme army command, regardless of their reorganization, have been unable to fulfill . . . China's allies, especially the United States, warmly support the effort of Chinese democracy to achieve national unity."

At the beginning of March 1945 the Soviet trade union organ *Trud* published an article in which it urged the organizing committee of the World Trade Union Conference in London to issue invitations to trade union representatives from

Poland, Iran, and the "Special border areas of China" [Chinese Communist areas], to join the embryonic world trade union federation." American sources in Moscow commented that "The larger political phases of the keen interest of Moscow in international trade union movement are illuminated by the wish of the Russians to advance world standing of Communist China."

On 14 March 1945, the Soviet writer Viktor Avarin gave a lecture in Moscow entitled "The Struggle of the Chinese People for Their National Independence," in which he condemned the "reactionary elements" among the ruling circles in Chungking, discussed the weakness of the Chungking army and lauded the Chinese Communist armies. The speaker gave sympathetic treatment of the role of the United States in China. He stated that the recall of General Stilwell was instigated by "reactionary" Chinese elements. But he pointed out that it would be an error to assume that the Stilwell recall signified a departure from the American policy of attempting to promote Chinese national unity. Ambassador Hurley's visit to Yenan and his "mediation" in the Chungking-Communist negotiations were referred to as evidence of continuing American interest in Chinese unity. In response to a question regarding the Soviet attitude toward China, Avarin remarked that the Soviet Government's policy was based on the Leninist-Stalinist principles of the equality of all peoples. He added that the Soviet people were warmly sympathetic to the Chinese people and their struggle for national liberation and desired to help them in their aspirations.

An American source in Moscow commented that it was significant that Avarin's criticism was directed at the "reactionary" elements in the Chinese Government and the Kuomintang and not against the Government or the Kuomintang as a whole. "This may indicate that if the Soviet Union has decided on an anti-Chungking and anti-Kuomintang policy, it is not prepared at this juncture to reveal it; or that the Kremlin reckons that the situation in China is still sufficiently fluid to warrant hope for the emergence in China of a 'reformed' regime (presumably including the Communists) congenial to the Soviet Union . . . If this interpretation is correct, the Kremlin certainly will have no desire, so long as it believes the situation in China remains fluid, to condemn wholesale either the Kuomintang or the present Chinese Government."

Only a month after this lecture, however, in the middle of April, *War and the Working Class* published an article by Viktor Avarin entitled "Whither Goes China," which was one of the most severe Soviet press attacks on the Kuomintang in many years. He emphasized that "Representatives of the broad masses of the [Chinese] people and the democratic press still suffer persecution. In districts where power is in the hands of the Kuomintang, anti-Japanese democratic fighters are jailed. Only one party is legal—the Kuomintang. Only the Kuomintang press can write what it wants and at present, when all humanity curses the German fascist butchers we come across such lines in the Chungking paper as 'we admire the German people and German soldiers for their valor on the battlefield.' "[33] Mr. Avarin contended that the Chungking Government was cooperating with the Japanese and that it had constructed and "presented" to the Japanese the Kwangsi-Kweichow railway by not defending it. He also mentioned that inflationary prices in Chungking-controlled China had risen from an index number of 485 to 873 since last December. He then asked: "Is this not the beginning of a counter-offensive of large bankers and reactionaries against the people and their demands for the democratization of China? The democratic public received with great anxiety the news that the negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party and Chungking had produced no results."

(*d*) *The American stake in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle.*—The problems of U. S. diplomacy in China are serious. Success or failure in solving these problems will affect the future situation not only in China but in the entire Far East; it is no exaggeration to state that it will decide the type of peace we shall gain by our victory over Japan. For China is the center of the Far East; political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always revolved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers by acquiring the vast region beyond the Ussuri River (the present Russian Far Eastern Provinces), including the port of Vladivostok, from China. Russia's growth as a Far Eastern power has depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests in China proper in the 1930's.

[33] There is no confirmation available that the Chungking press has published a statement to this effect.

The Far Eastern policy of the United States has always revolved around the ideas of equality of competitive commercial opportunity in China, and of respect for the independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. The need of this policy was stated as early as 1853 by the then American Minister to China, Humphrey Marshall. He affirmed that the weakness, or dissolution, of China was a matter of national concern to the United States and that the "true policy" of the American Government must be to strengthen and sustain the Chinese Government against "either internal disorder or foreign aggression. The highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China."

Marshall arrived at this conclusion by observing a situation in China, in the 1850's which was in many respects similar to the present one. At the outbreak of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion (comparable in its destructiveness to the Kuomintang Communist civil war of our time) he saw clearly that the success of the T'ai-p'ing rebels would have meant the separation of China into parts. The break-up of the empire could have resulted in the dismemberment of China by foreign powers. He therefore advocated American support of the Chinese Government as a means of promoting national unity in China and preventing, or at least limiting, encroachments on Chinese territory by the powers. At the turn of the century this policy was given fuller expression in the "open door" agreements which were sponsored by America. At present the prospect of a renewal of the Kuomintang-Communist civil war, on the scale of the years before 1937, threatens China again with separation into parts and possible dismemberment by foreign powers.

The importance to the United States of supporting China's independence has been demonstrated on several occasions. During the past eighty-five years Russia, and during the past fifty years Russia and Japan, the two leading military land powers of Asia, have been the chief threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part of the international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance between these two powers. The sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America's concern in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China was shown at the beginning of the present century when the United States assailed St. Petersburg with unavailing protests on the score of Russian violation of the "open door" in Manchuria. To strengthen her hand, the United States negotiated a commercial treaty with China in 1903, guaranteeing observance of the "open door" principle in all Chinese-American trade, and opening to such trade the Manchurian cities of Mukden and Antung. America's concern about Russian domination over Manchuria was shown again by the watchful attitude of this country during the Russo-Japanese war, 1904–1905. In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt told one of his friends that "As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France[34] . . . that in the event of a combination against Japan . . . I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf." After the Sino-Japanese war, in 1908, America proposed the internationalization of the Manchurian railroads as a means of preventing Russia and Japan from establishing a monopoly over their respective zones of influence in Manchuria.

The Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922 aimed at restraining the foreign powers concerned, and Japan especially, in their policies of territorial aggrandizement in China and preventing any power from gaining control over China. The United States and Great Britain took the initiative in 1922 in inducing Japan to restore full sovereignty over the province of Shantung to China.

During the time of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale* in the 1920's and the "anti-imperialist" movement at that time, Russia was successfully carrying through a policy of "freeing" China from "unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers" than Russia. After Chiang Kai-shek turned against Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists, America strongly supported his nationalist movement for building up a strong, united and independent China. In 1928 the United States took the initiative in strengthening the prestige of the new National Government under Chiang by concluding a treaty with China recognizing the latter's complete autonomy in regard to the levying and collection of tariffs. This was the first important step in abolishing the system of unequal treaties by which the foreign powers had infringed China's sovereign rights.

Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to re-establish Chinese control over Manchuria, where Soviet Russia entertained ambitions similar to those of Czarist Russia

[34] There was at this time a Franco-Russian alliance, with Germany a silent partner.

brought him into conflict with Soviet Russia. In the summer of 1929 China and Soviet Russia fought pitched battles and came close to a formal declaration of war over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The American Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, tried in vain to settle the dispute through the instrumentality of the Kellogg Pact. After Soviet troops had invaded Manchuria, the Chinese Government was forced to accept peace terms from Russia which reimposed upon China essentially the same terms as those contained in the unequal treaties setting up Russia's privileges in Manchuria which China had attacked.

Soon after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 Secretary Stimson eloquently reaffirmed America's Far Eastern policy as follows:

> "For several centuries Eastern Asia has owed its character mainly to the peaceful traditions of this great agricultural nation [China]. If the character of China should be revolutionized and through exploitation [by Japan] become militaristic and aggressive, not only Asia but the rest of the world must tremble. The United States has made a good start in the development of China's friendship. It would have been the most short-sighted folly to turn our backs upon her at the time of her most dire need."

As necessary as the defeat of Japan is to the re-establishment of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in the Far East which was developed in the years before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she started at the dawn of her modern era; a group of relatively worthless islands, populated by fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock will be turned back some eighty years, to the time when Russia and the Western democracies stood facing each other in the Far East and when the period of power politics over China began between these powers. With the total defeat of Japan, Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time during the past eighty years.

To meet this situation the United States has affirmed its policy, aid to China. A recent statement prepared by the State Department reads as follows:

> "The principal and immediate objectives of the U. S. Government are to keep China in the war against Japan and to mobilize China's full military and economic strength in the vigorous prosecution of the war. To accomplish these objectives the U. S. Government has undertaken the following measures: (a) direct military assistance to China and the Chinese armed forces; (b) promotion of effective Sino-American military cooperation; and (c) encouragement to the Chinese to contribute their maximum effort in the war.
>
> "The American Government's long range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that area. Our policy is accordingly directed toward the following objectives: 1. Political: A strong, stable and united China with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people; 2. Economic: The development of an integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between China and other countries; and 3. Cultural: Cultural and scientific cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and progress."

Our present policy was indicated already in 1844, after China had suffered her first major defeat by a Western power, Great Britain. After the first American Commissioner to China, Caleb Cushing, had signed our first treaty with China he offered to the Chinese delegate, Kiying, some models of guns and some books on military and naval tactics, and fortifications, delicately expressing the opinion that such information might be of value to China in the future. Kiying's behaviour was almost prophetic. He politely declined the gifts, stating: "If at a future day there be occasion to use them, then we ought to request your Honorable Nation to assist us with the strength of its arm."

Solutions for the present problems of U. S. diplomacy in China have been offered by many observers. In April 1944 after confirmation had been received of the Kazak rebellion in Sinkiang, an American observer into Chungking commented on American policy in regard to China as it may affect Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists as follows:

> "This incident [in Sinkiang] and the possibility of its repetition in other forms if the Chinese leaders continue in their present [anti-Soviet] course bring into prominence the question of Sino-Soviet relations and the position of the United States in relation to that problem. The United States in its dealings with China should; (1) avoid becoming involved in Sino-Soviet

relations; (2) limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of the war against Japan; (3) show a sympathetic interest in liberal groups in China and try to fit the Chinese Communists into the war against Japan; and (4) use our tremendous influence with the Kuomintang to promote internal unity on a foundation of progressive reform.

"To give, either in fact or in appearance, support to the present reactionary government in China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid solely for the prosecution of the war against Japan would encourage the Kuomintang in its present anti-Soviet policy. The result would be that the Chinese Communists, who probably hold the key to control of North China and possibly Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, would feel that their only hope for survival lay with Russia, and the Soviet Union would be convinced that American aims are opposed to hers and that she must protect herself by any means available, i. e. the extension of her direct power and influence."

Another American observer has stated the problem of U. S. policy in China in its relation to Soviet Russia as follows: He emphasizes that many people think that the situation in China is potentially one of revolution. The "opposition against the Chungking Government," that is, the Chinese Communists, want Russian-type reorganization of the country.

"If the Central Government starts organizing the peasants, there is always the possibility that the Communists might gain control of such an organization. Americans and Russians have tremendous influence in this situation. The Russians could quite easily sway the situation by sending in supplies—troops would not be necessary. The Russians could also lend diplomatic support for a Communist Manchuria. If, when a revolution starts, the Russians assist the Chinese Communists and the United States assists the Central Government, the Russians and Americans will be meeting head on. This possibility worries many people.

"Care must be exercised in sending help to the Chinese Government because . . . if we send in material with 'no strings attached,' we may just be building them up so a civil war can be more easily started."

That problems of China and of Soviet influence in China, either direct or through the Chinese Communists, affect not only China but also Southeast Asia, is indicated by the following observations by an American official observer:

"American cooperation with patriotic, subversive revolutionary groups of Southeastern Asia would . . . frustrate Chinese and Russian efforts through these groups to dominate their countries after the war . . . [These] groups prefer American help to help from other countries, such as China, Russia, or Great Britain whose motives they suspect . . . On the whole, China and Russia successfully influence the groups they touch. This influence is due less to genuine sympathy of these people for China and Russia than to their desperation that causes them to grasp at any aid extended to them. As long as the Chinese and Russian monopoly in these areas is not broken up, China and Russia will determine domestic and international political issues in these areas after the war, and Chinese and Russian domination of eastern and southeastern Asia will complicate economic adjustments in these areas and threaten legitimate American interests."[35]

Among Western Allied observers in the Far East not only Americans, of course, are aware of the danger of Soviet domination in China. The British are keenly aware of it. In October 1943 a high British diplomat in London stated to a Chinese official in the presence of an American diplomat that Soviet Russia, "the most powerful or at least the most potentially powerful country in the world, is the great enigma, a part of which is whether Russia will collaborate with the rest of the world." "The latter aspect," he emphasized, "is one which Chinese should study and watch."

The problems evolving out of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle and its implications for Soviet Russian and American policies merge into the general

[35] Among the most active subversive groups in Southeast Asia are the Communists. They caused the French considerable trouble in the years before the Japanese sent military forces to Indo China in 1940. The Chinese Communists are comparatively strong in Malaya. After the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941 they pledged their allegiance to Great Britain. (So also did the Communist Party of India.) The British released the Chinese Communist prisoners in Malaya and allowed them 10 seats out of 60 in the Chinese Mobilization Committee in Singapore. This gives an indication of their strength.

question of how the Chinese shall be able to establish a government acceptable to both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, a government which can deal on a basis of friendship with both America and Soviet Russia. The other question is how America shall apply its influence in China in the interest of Chinese unity.

It is obvious that the Chungking Government, as now constituted, endangers Soviet-Chinese friendship. Its strong suspicion that the Soviet Union intends to dominate China through the Chinese Communists may or may not be justified. Personal opinions on this subject are divided, although the past records of Soviet Russian-Chinese relations give little support to the contention of those who maintain that Soviet Russia has no intention to dominate China. There is, however, no question that if the Chungking Government fails to effect a compromise with the Chinese Communists whereby the National Government of China becomes representative of the Chinese Communist Party as well as other parties, Soviet Russia may in time denounce the Chungking Government and support a Communist-sponsored government in China. This would be in line with present Soviet policy in Poland and other eastern European countries. There is also a fairly general agreement among observers that failure to effect a Kuomintang-Communist compromise might lead to a large-scale civil war in China after Japan's defeat, possibly before. America's interest in such a compromise is obvious.

In view of this, unity between the Chinese political parties is the key to a solution of China's problems. At the instance of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang and Communist delegates met in May 1944 in an effort to find a solution of their inter-party problems. On 11 May they agreed tentatively to a set of 20 proposals which included a stipulation that the Communist armies should obey the orders of the National Military Council and that the Government should agree to a reorganization of the Communist forces into three armies consisting of 12 divisions, as proposed originally by the Communist general Lin Piao during his negotiations in Chungking in November 1943. It was also tentatively agreed that the Kuomintang should recognize the legal status of the Communist Party and should lift the military blockade of Communist areas.

On 5 June 1944 the Government issued a reply in which it approved of the organization of the Communist armies into "four armies consisting of ten divisions." In other respects the Government expressed its willingness to accept the proposals mentioned above provided the Communists also agreed to them. On the preceding day, however (4 June), Lin Tsu-han, the Communist delegate in Chungking submitted a new set of 12 proposals by the Chinese Communists which went far beyond the proposals agreed upon in May. Among other things, the Communists now requested the Government "to organize the Chinese Communist Party troops into 16 armies consisting of 47 divisions with 10,000 troops per division. As a compromise, the Government is requested to grant designations to at least five armies of 16 divisions." The Communists also requested that "during the period of war . . . the status quo be maintained in areas garrisoned by the Communist troops," and they asked the Government to recognize the legal status not only of the CCP but of all Communist Border Regions and base areas in China. The Government was, furthermore, requested to "give full material aid to the [Communist armies]," and to give the Communist armies "a share due them" of the weapons, munitions, and medicines furnished China by the Allied countries. The Government was advised to "realize democracy." At the Plenary Session of the People's Political Council, which was held in Chungking in September 1944, Lin Tsu-han added a new request of the Communists, the establishment of a Kuomintang-Communist "coalition government."

These demands were refused by the Government. In regard to the Communist demands for democracy and "guarantee of freedom" the Government pointed out that these were "empty phrases . . . because the 'Democracy' in which the Kuomintang believes and the 'Democracy' in which the Communists believed in the past or believe at the present are not necessarily the same."

The negotiations became deadlocked. To the Chungking Government leaders it became obvious that if the Government agreed to the new demands of the Communists to accord legal status to all Communist areas it would in effect give its consent to a permanent division of China into two independent parts.

In a speech before the People's Political Council session in September 1944 Chiang Kai-shek said: "If only the Chinese Communists obeyed military and political orders, the Government would make the greatest concessions to their demands . . . No nation can hope to attain an appropriate position in the family of nations if its internal administration is not unified . . . The Central

Government has repeatedly made it clear that what it insists upon is a unified military command and political unity. While it means to accord equal treatment to the Eighteenth Group Army, it demands equal observance of law and discipline."

A new attempt to break the deadlock which followed the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations in June 1944 was made in November of the same year. The American Government had by this time shown its concern for bringing about unity in China. The Soviet Russian press criticism of the Kuomintang was growing increasingly antagonistic. The situation in Sinkiang was going from bad to worse as a result of the Kazak rebellion. In the summer of 1944 Vice President Henry A. Wallace visited Siberia, Sinkiang, and China proper. The *National Herald* in Chungking, which is believed to express the opinions of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in commenting on Wallace's visit said that the Chinese hoped he would be able to help in bridging the gap separating China and Soviet Russia.

On 3 July an American observer in Chungking, in a conversation with Dr. Sun Fo (one of the leaders of the liberal faction within the Kuomintang), advanced a suggestion that it might be helpful if the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek would call together 11 independent parties and groups, including the Communists and the Kuomintang, into a High Command or Military Council and make an appeal to them to accept, along with the Generalissimo, joint responsibility for effective military operations, "to save what remains of China." This became the basis for the ensuing negotiations for an inter-party settlement. With the Japanese advance in Hunan and Kwangtung toward Kwangsi, the military situation was becoming almost desperate. Kweilin was threatened, and many felt that both Kunming and Chungking were threatened.

In August President Roosevelt appointed Donald M. Nelson, chief of the War Production Board, and Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, to undertake a mission to China to discuss military and economic problems with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On 21 October 1944 General Joseph Stilwell was removed from his China-Burma-India command and was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. On 31 October Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned his post in China and was succeeded at the end of November by General Hurley.

On 7 November General Hurley, accompanied by the Communist delegate Lin Tsu-han, flew to Yenan for a two day conference with Chinese Communist leaders. He had been granted permission by the Generalissimo to present an offer to legalize all parties and allow the Communists to participate in the Supreme National Defense Council and in the Government. Mao Tse-tung accepted the offer "in principle" as comprising a portion of the desires of the Communists. He and Hurley drew up and signed a document which not only included Chiang's offer but also embodied the Communists' desires, among which were a coalition government and a bill of rights. On 10 November General Hurley flew back to Chungking accompanied by Chou En-lai. Ambassador Hurley took part in the ensuing negotiations between Chou En-lai and representatives of the Chungking Government.

Tentative agreements were reached providing for legalization of the CCP, giving the Communists representation in the Government and on the Supreme National Defense Council, and a fair method of distribution of military supplies to the Communist armies. But negotiations broke down on the question of command of the Chinese Communist armies. The Communists were willing to accept an American commander to coordinate their army with the Central Government army. But they refused serving under an American commander who would act under Chiang Kai-shek, the C-in-C of the China war theater. General Chu Te stated to an American observer in Yenan that the only really practical solution is "an American C-in-C of all forces in China, strongly supported by the American government. This commander would have to be able and willing to use the whiphand over the Kuomintang through control of American supplies . . . Even under these circumstances it would be necessary not to mix the Kuomintang and Communist forces. Each should have its own task and sphere of operations." This remark indicates that, as long as the Kuomintang maintains its power, the Communists do not seek any unification of China, but a division of China into two independent parts. They aspire to American support of this plan.

The Communists' proposal for a coalition government was rejected by the Generalissimo. On 7 December 1944 Chou En-lai flew back to Yenan.

On 16 December Mao Tse-tung, in a speech before the People's Congress of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, reaffirmed the Communists' demand for a coali-

tion government. He said that there was little prospect of accomplishing the desired unity in China by negotiation.

On 1 January 1945 Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year's speech announced his intention of calling a People's National Congress (or Assembly) in 1945. The Congress would "adopt a Constitution, which would enable the Kuomintang to transfer the power of the government to the people." On the same day, Mao Tse-tung reaffirmed the Communists' demand for a coalition government. On 24 January Chou En-lai returned to Chungking. "My present trip to Chungking," he stated, "is to propose to the National Government, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Democratic League[36] that . . . a conference of all parties and groups should be held. This will be a preparatory conference to the National Affairs Conference so as formally to discuss the organization and steps leading to the realization of a National Affairs Conference and a coalition government. We [Communists] consider that apart from this there is no other way to . . . overcome the present crisis . . . It is hoped that the Government will quickly accept these proposals."

The American Government again reaffirmed its desire for an inter-party settlement. During a press conference on 23 January Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew reminded both the Chungking Government and the Chinese Communists that the United States stands ready to use its "friendly good offices" in bringing them together. During a press interview in Chungking on 14 February Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, the Minister of Information, and one of the delegates in the negotiations with Chou En-lai, announced that the Government had made the following concessions to the Communists: (1) A "readiness" to recognize the CCP as a lawful political party; (2) Inclusion of a high Communist official in the National Military Council; (3) Inclusion of Communist representatives and representatives of other political parties in the Executive Yuan with a view to forming a "sort of wartime cabinet"; (4) Establishment of a committee of three to consider reorganization of the Communist Army and the question of that Army's supplies, "with possibly an American Army officer presiding."

Dr. Wang said, however, that the Communists had considered these proposals unacceptable, and had brought forth a proposal to convene a conference of all political parties. "It is," he said, "in compliance with the general idea of this request [by the Communists] that the Government has . . . consented to convening a conference of the Kuomintang, the CCP, and other parties as well as some nonpartisan independent leadeds to consider interim measures of military and political unfication pending a convocation of a National Congress." He expressed thanks to Ambassador Hurley for his "disinterested but friendly efforts" during the past negotiations with Chou En-lai in "keeping the two sides together and in helping create a better atmosphere for the negotiations."

Chou En-lai left for Yenan on 15 February with new Government proposals. But he told newsmen that he doubted that the Communist Party would accept the new proposals "any more readily than those rejected." These proposals included one for the establishment of a "Committee of Political Affairs" comprising members from all parties. It would consider problems of reform transition from Kuomintang rule to constitutional all-party rule, and a unified political program for the unification of all armed forces. Chou En-lai stated during a press conference in Chungking that the Government's "concessions" to the Communists, as announced by Wang Shih-chieh, were unacceptable because "there were conditions attached." These conditions, he said, were (1) The Communist troops should be placed under the National Military Council, which the Communists regarded as tantamount to handing them over to the Kuomintang; (2) The Kuomintang "obstinately insisted" that one-party dictatorship would not be terminated. "Concretely speaking," he said, "the Government's conditions mean that there would be no legal status for the Chinese Communist Party unless Communist troops were given over to the Kuomintang Government. The proposed so-called War Cabinet under the Party-ruled Executive Yuan would have no power for final decisions of policy. One-party rule would not be abolished. The proposed Committee of three [including one American] to reorganize Communist troops could only mean giving them to the Kuomintang. On the basis of achievements, the Kuomintang troops, and not the Communist force, require reorganization." Chou En-lai, like Wang Shih-chieh, expressed thanks to Ambassador Hurley for his help in the negotiations.

Here the matter rests. No further negotiations have been held since Chou En-lai's departure from Chungking in February. The issue now is between the

[36] The league comprises several smaller political parties and non-Kuomintang military groups.

Communist-sponsored plan for a coalition government and the Kuomintang-sponsored plan for a National Assembly. Ambassador Hurley recently stated that "the objectives of both plans appear to be generally the same; the chief differences between public statements of both parties concern procedure." The Communists insist that the coalition government should not derive its authority from the Kuomintang. Therefore they maintain that the National Government in Chungking should "discard, immediately, the one-party dictatorship," recognize the legal status of all anti-Japanese parties and groups, and recognize the legal status of the Communist Border Regions and base areas. The coalition government would then derive its authority from the "preparatory conference," of all parties as suggested by Chou En-lai in January this year.

The Kuomintang rejects this plan. On 1 March Chiang Kai-shek announced in an address before the Preparatory Commission for Inauguration of Constitutional Government that he would propose to the Kuomintang Congress, due in May, the convocation of a National Assembly on 12 November this year. "The position of the Government," he said, "is that it is ready to admit other parties, including the Communists as well as non-partisan leaders, to participate in the government, without, however, relinquishment by the Kuomintang of its power of ultimate decision and final responsibility until the convocation of the National Assembly . . . If the Government . . . surrenders its power of ultimate decision to a combination of political parties the result would be unending friction and tears, leading to a collapse of the central authorities. Bear in mind that in such a contingency, unlike in other countries [where parliaments or congresses exist] there exists in our country at present no responsible body representing the people for a government to appeal to. I repeat, whether by accident or design the Kuomintang has had the responsibility of leading the country during the turbulent last decade and more. It will return the supreme power to the people through the instrumentality of the National Assembly, and in the meanwhile it will be ready to admit other parties to a share in the government, but it definitely cannot abdicate to a loose combination of parties [a reference to the Communist-sponsored plan for a "preparatory conference]. Such a surrender would not mean returning power to the people. We must emerge from the war with a United Army. The Communists should not keep a separate army . . ."

The last sentence gives a clue to the main and important difference between the Communist plan for a coalition government and the Kuomintang plan for a National Assembly, for the Communists insist on maintaining their army independent of the Central Army. It now becomes apparent that what the Communists mean by a coalition government is not the establishment of a national government with sovereign rights over all of China, but rather some sort of loose federation between independent parts of China divided between the Kuomintang, the Communists, and other parties and groups, including Mongolians, Tibetans, and the Moslems of Northwest China. The parties would decide on policies of common interest in the councils of the coalition government, these policies to be executed separately by the CCP, the Kuomintang and other independent parties within their respective areas of control.

This type of a federation might be feasible if China were to be divided between the Kuomintang and the CCP with a clearly defined border demarcation between the two parts. This study has, however, shown that whereas the Chungking Government has throughout the war tried to persuade the Communists to accept a demarcation of defense areas between Kuomintang and Communist troops, the Communists have persistently rejected these suggestions. An American Embassy observer in Yenan stated in October 1944 that a statement by Chou-En-lai indicates that the Communists "are now not merely seeking recognition of their present forces and Communist-controlled governments, but of all future ones which may be set up."

A federative coalition government established under such conditions would obviously not lead to unity. There is no indication that the Communists would not continue to insist, as they have throughout the war, that the Kuomintang forces evacuate any area into which Communist forces penetrate. If they refuse, they are accused by the Communists of being "uncooperative," "traitors," "experts in dissension." Under such conditions the plan for a coalition government could never lead to the establishment of a strong central government in China. It would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas of control would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties. But there is nothing indicating that this would mean that the Communists would accord a legal status to present Kuomintang areas.

Little if anything could be gained under these circumstances by extending American aid to the Chinese Communists. The Kuomintang would no doubt resent American aid to the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless the "reactionary" Kuomintang has never stipulated to the United States that if we were to extend aid to both the Kuomintang and the CCP our military commander in China "must," to reverse the statement of General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Communist army, be "willing to use the whiphand over the Chinese Communists." But it is clear that were we to aid the "democratic" Chinese Communists they would expect us to use our "whiphand" against the Kuomintang. This being the case, it is obvious that if the United States started arming both the Kuomintang and Communist armies, we would run the risk of encouraging civil war in China rather than restraining it. This would be a repetition of the tactics employed by several foregn nations, who desired to keep China weak, during the first two decades of the Chinese Revolution. They sold and gave arms to all Chinese warlords, knowing that this would lead to civil war.

It is in this light that General Wedemeyer's recent press statement of the American Army's policy in China must be understood. It was given on the day of Chou En-lai's departure from Chungking, 15 February. "My policy," he said, "is this, that we will not give any assistance to any individual, to any activity, to any organization within the Chinese theater [except to the Central Government] . . . Obvously we get requests from time to time for assistance from various sources but I am ordered to support the Central Government and I am going to do that to the best of my ability." This policy was confirmed by Ambassador Hurley during a press interview in Washington on 2 April.

There is, obviously, no other recourse for the moment. But an all-out support of the Chungking Government with "no strings attached" will not solve the problem. We are facing a situation, it must be candidly admitted, where we are backing a government in China which, though it may be militarily stronger than any other independent Chinese regime, has lost much of its popular following. It is still the same widely hated political "machine" which the aforementioned American observer described in 1935, and the same men who were in power then are in power today. The difference is that the Chinese Communists of today constitute a greater challenge to the Kuomintang's rule than it has ever faced since the days in 1928 when it established itself as the National Government of China.

Mao Tse-tung recently said to an American observer in Yenan, when commenting on the probability of the Kuomintang leaders planning a civil war against the Communists: "Chiang [Kai-shek] could not whip us during the civil war when we were a hundred times weaker. What chance has he now?" He was undoubtedly right. In recent references to armed clashes between Kuomintang and Communist troops, it has been repeatedly stated that the Kuomintang troops are losing because "the populace join the Communists."

It is not only the populace which shows a tendency to join the Communists. Within the past year, several of the military and political leaders in Chungking China who, though not members of the Government except in a purely nominal way, are affiliated with it in the war against Japan, have shown a tendency to cooperate with the Communists rather than the Kuomintang. The corruption of the Government administration and its almost total disregard for any constructive reforms, together with the unwillingness of Kuomintang leaders in the Government to share power with any but well-trusted party members, have alienated practically all the political parties and groups who offered their support to the Government in 1937 at the outbreak of the war. There are also many progressive and liberal leaders within the Kuomintang who strongly object to the policy of the present ruling clique.

In April 1944 Dr. Sun Fo, who is the chief spokesman for the discontented groups within the Kuomintang, said during a speech at the Central Training Institute of the Kuomintang: "There must be a fundamental readjustment of methods within the Kuomintang itself . . . If we had realized the principle of democracy during the past twenty years, the democratic spirit of the party would now be an inspiration to the rest of the country. Unfortunately we have failed to do so . . . The Kuomintang has no right to monopoly of political activity. We have now developed from a system of party dictatorship to one of personal dictatorship [a reference to Chiang Kai-shek] and while claiming to be a democratic country we have no democracy even inside the Party . . . Suggestions have been made that I make complaints against the Government and the Party directly and privately. I have done this many times without effect. People accuse me of being a talkative idealist, but if I do not say these things

no one else will and I say them for China's sake. Unless I say these things now and unless China goes democratic now it will be too late."

All observers agree that the greatest cause of the exceedingly poor showing made by the Chungking forces last year during their defense against the Japanese was the hostility of the people toward their own army and the hopeless disunity between the regular Kuomintang or Central Army and the Provincial armies. Marshal Li Chi-shen of the Kwangsi Military Group, one of the outstanding liberal leaders in China, and a strong advocate of a democratic government said in July 1944: "[The] drift toward dictatorship and departure from democratic principles has brought about the inevitable result; the seizure of power by a small clique, and taxation, which is levied on the people as a whole, is used arbitrarily to maintain the clique in power to the detriment of the people, thus weakening the power of national resistance . . . Because of misappropriation of government funds, the treatment of the soldiers is disgraceful to the extent that they have now neither the strength nor the will to fight . . . The masses of the people are now ready and willing to assist the enemy. There is a slogan quite popular among the people of Honan: 'We should prefer to be slaughtered by the Japanese than to endure the tyranny of [the Kuomintang] General T'ang En-po.' A similar situation exists in the Ninth War Zone [including Honan and parts of neighboring provinces] . . ."

Among various discontented groups in West China in the provinces controlled by the Chungking Government, there is today a strong tendency to form a new united front. But unlike the movement of 1937, this new united front is developing against the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government. It includes several leading scholars, the powerful Szechwan warlords and several other military groups, seven small political parties united in the Democratic League, and a number of non-partisan leaders. The movement has considerable popular support from small shopkeepers, small manufacturers and "petite bourgeoisie," who are angry about inflation, corruption and increasing monopoly of business by the Kuomintang. It is also supported by some enlightened landlords.

None of these groups are pro-Communist. They would be far more willing to unite with the Kuomintang than with the Communists, were the Kuomintang to liberalize its rule and share power with other groups. They have made persistent bids for American friendship and support, but in deference to the Chinese Communists, they have received neither publicity in the American press nor official American recognition in any form. They are not powerful enough to change the political situation through their own efforts. But they can, as they have shown on several occasions, combine with the Communists by supporting their demands for "democracy" and thereby strengthen their position against the Government. The Democratic League is as doubtful as the Communists about the sincerity of Chiang Kai-shek's announcement that the Kuomintang will relinquish one-party dictatorship. Just as the Communists, it has boycotted the National Assembly to be convened in November this year and has subscribed to the Communist plan for a coalition government.

The Chinese Communists on their part are offering strong support to the Democratic League. One leader of the League asserted in August 1944 that the new united front movement against the Chungking Government had been "assured" of the support of the Soviet Russian Government.

It must be emphasized that if the Chinese Communists gain control of this movement, it is not because the followers of this movement desire to combine with the Communists but rather because they find it impossible to obtain any cooperation from the Kuomintang. Under Communist direction the movement can be turned into a powerful weapon against the Government. This movement includes one of the most genuinely pro-American elements in China as well as many of the best educated, most intelligent men and women in China. The literary editor of the *Ta Kung Pao*, the "*Manchester Guardian* of China," wrote in July 1944 to an American observer in Chungking: "Sino-American friendship is based upon the genuine love of Americans on the part of our people, not on the thanksgiving attitude of the present Government. The people with no exception hate their government, and recognize it as no stabilizing force but a serious trouble maker here. If you (Americans) go on to strengthen it with your support you will find gradually our people taking you as hypocrites, visionless traders. . . Even if the war is won in spite of all the above you (America) will be regarded the world wide as Lords Simon and Hoare during the Spanish war. And the world's hope for a leadership towards a new peace will easily turn away somewhere else."

There are still good prospects that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek can reverse the trend, bringing these dissident groups back into the Government's fold. One of the chief complaints of military leaders who belong to these groups is that they have been denied a share of American military supplies, even though their troops are fighting in the Government's army. In March of this year it was reported that General Ho Ying-ch'in, C-of-C of the Chinese Army, was sincerely endeavoring to weld the troops of General Lung Yün, the Governor of Yunnan, and one of the leaders of the opposition movement in Free China, with Central Government forces stationed in Yunnan. It was also reported that he has been advocating measures which would make available to General Lung a substantial portion of the U. S. arms and equipment.

This is, of course, a correct procedure. If American supplies are distributed to various non-Kuomintang groups by the Chungking Government rather than directly by the American Government representatives in China, the dissident groups will undoubtedly rally behind the Government. There has of late been no report of Lung Yün sponsoring the movement against the Government. If the Government effects an equitable distribution of these supplies to other dissident military groups, it is likely that unity will be established between these groups and the Chungking Government, and that these will give up their support of the Communist-sponsored plan for a coalition government and will decide to join the National Assembly. Similarly, if the Chungking Government, rather than the United States on its own initiative, were to distribute to the Chinese Communists a part of the American supplies sent to China, it is conceivable that they would be more favorably disposed to accept Chiang Kai-shek's plan for a National Assembly and constitutional government as the basis for establishing unity in China.

The Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang, which was held from 5 to 21 May 1945, resolved that a law should be enacted giving legal status to political parties and groups other than the Kuomintang. This is apparently a concession to one of the chief conditions stated by the Chinese Communists and the Democratic League as prerequisite to their participation in the National Assembly. Another important resolution was the abolition within three months of all existing Kuomintang headquarters in the Army. This is a move toward the development of the Chinese Army into a true national army rather than a party army of the Kuomintang.

The Kuomintang Congress confirmed Chiang Kai-shek's promise to convene a National Assembly on 12 November to enforce constitutional government. The coming five months will, therefore, be decisive, for unity in China depends greatly on the final decision of the Communists as to whether they shall join in the National Assembly. And this decision will be largely determined by their willingness to join their armed forces with those of the Central Government. At the beginning of May Ambassador Hurley conferred with the Generalissimo on this question of unifying the Chinese armed forces opposed to the Japanese. The Generalissimo said that "some progress" was being made with the Communists although things were "not moving as fast as he would like." He promised, however, that the situation would be solved satisfactorily.

Nevertheless, the prospects for a settlement of this all-important question are not promising. The tendency during the past months has not been toward unity, but away from it. The Communists have freely admitted to an official American observer in Yenan the truth of Kuomintang charges that they keep increasing the scope of the concessions which they demand for a two-party settlement. This supports a conclusion by Congressman Walter H. Judd, who has spent many years in China, and who re-visited China during the latter part of 1945:

> "They [the Chinese Communists] do not want unity. What they want is all the advantages of appearing to want unity so they can get arms and sympathy and support from abroad, while at the same time having all the advantages of complete independence."

Congressman Judd continues:

> "If they [the Chinese Communists] can stall along thus until the war in Europe ends, then they can hope for powerful support from Russia. They can try an 'October Revolution' in the hope of getting control of all of China. If that fails, they can at least rebel and try to split off North China, including Manchuria—of course, in the name of freedom—and then the new 'independent democracy' can invite Russia in to protect it as she is protecting Eastern Europe. The new 'North China' can even voluntarily in-

sist, if it desires, on being taken in as one of the United Socialist Soviet Republics."

This observation should be viewed in the light of a statement by Mao Tse-tung during the recently concluded Seventh Congress of the CCP in Yenan. While in 1941 he approved of Soviet Russia's Neutrality Pact with Japan as in the interests of China and "the oppressed nations of the whole world," he now expressed thanks to Stalin for Soviet Russia's denunciation of the same pact. As long as Soviet Russia was fighting Germany, he never urged Soviet help of China, although he stressed that China's hope was with Soviet Russia. However, with a Soviet victory in Europe assured, Mao Tse-tung declared: "We [Chinese Communists] believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question." In the next sentence he expressed thanks to the United States and Great Britain, especially the former for their efforts "in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors." But he warned them not to let "their diplomacy go against the will of the Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people." "If any foreign Government," he added, "helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed."

The "democratic cause" here referred to is, of course, the Chinese Communists' version of "Soviet democracy" which they have introduced in their areas of control. This "democracy" is, as we have seen in this study, as rigidly controlled by the CCP as is the so-called "dictatorial" system of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang. The American Military Attache to China, in a study of the Kuomintang-Communist problem, stated in October 1943: "Political intolerance is nothing new in Chinese history. If the [Chinese] Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it will be sternly truer of the Communists if they ever attain power."

Soviet Russia's attitude toward China will undoubtedly play an important part in the decision of the Chinese Communists as to whether or not to join the National Assembly, proposed by Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. T. V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, is expected to visit Moscow on his way home from the San Francisco conference. The diplomatic correspondent of the Kuomintang party organ, the Chungking *Central Daily News*, who is now in San Francisco, has stated that T. V. Soong was invited by Molotov to go to Moscow, "presumably" to discuss a mutual aid agreement between China and Soviet Russia. This has not been confirmed. However, any agreement or understanding between the Chungking Government and Soviet Russia would undoubtedly strengthen the cause of unity in China, and lessen the danger of Soviet Russia and the United States becoming involved in the inter-party struggle in China between the Kuomintang and the CCP.

3. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party and Governments in Communist-Controlled Areas

A. CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

In May 1945 the Yenan radio announced that the CCP comprised 1,200,000 members. In comparison, the Kuomintang has 2,000,000 members. In August 1943 Chou En-lai stated that the CCP had about 800,000 members. A member of the Communist Party Headquarters in Chungking stated in July 1944 that no new members had been admitted into the Party in China since 1939. If these various statements are true, then the great increase of Party members has taken place in the past ten months, concurrent with the Communist expansion of areas of control in Central and South China.

The procedure for admission into the CCP is reported by a Communist Party member to be as follows. In a school or factory or particular locality in which there is a "cell" (*hsiao tsu*, literally "a small organization"), a person who is sympathetic to the ideas and ideals of Communism will begin to associate with and become known to others of the same general trend of thought. When such a person has come to have a firm acquaintance with several members of a cell, and they are sure of his sincerity, he will be informed of the cell's existence and, if he wishes to join, he will be supplied with an application blank on which he will enter his name, his status in society, the condition of himself and his family, etc. His application is then presented to a meeting of the cell, and a resolution is

proposed and passed (or rejected) to the effect that he is to be admitted to membership in the Party.

A worker elected in this way will thenceforward be a full member, but a student or peasant will be required to go through a probationary period of several months or more before being admitted. In the case of a member of the "capitalist class" or of the Kuomintang, the cell itself will not be authorized to grant membership; after the applicant's name has been voted on favorably, it will have to be submitted to the next highest organ of the Party for approval.

The Communist informant stated that the Party is organized on an "industrial basis," vertically rather than horizontally, that is, "steel workers in one plant who are members of the Party have no necessary connection with steel workers in another plant who are also Communists;" every Communist worker in that one plant, whatever his task, is a member of the cell or cells in that plant. A cell usually consists of about 20 people. If it becomes too large it is split to form two or more cells, so that in a large factory with a considerable Communist membership there may be several cells. Each cell represents a cross-section of the work of the factory; there is not one cell for one kind of work and another for another kind of work. Each cell has a "Secretary," a "Director of Propaganda," and a "Director of Organization." These officers, who form the Cell Committee, are not elected, but appointed by the next highest Committee in the Party, usually the *Hsien* (County) Committee. All cells are self-supporting, being financed by contributions from the members. Every member must pay into the Party treasury a percentage of his earnings. If the earnings are low the percentage is low, being somewhere between four and seven percent; if the earnings are high, the percentage is sometimes as high as 40 percent.

Liaison between the cells is accomplished through officers appointed by the *Hsien* (county) or City Committee of the Party, according to the district or city in which the cell is located. The Hsien Committee is in turn appointed by the Provincial Committees, which are appointed by the Central Committee in Yenan.

The Communist informant emphasized that this control from above was essential under present conditions in China because of the danger that the Party would be inter-penetrated by Kuomintang and other counter-espionage agents. The greatest secrecy is maintained; the whole organization in Chungking-controlled China is "underground," although its objectives there are no different from those of the Chinese Communists as a whole. According to the informant these objectives are the establishment of "democracy, with free elections and freedom of speech, etc., throughout China, coupled with agrarian and other reforms." "To this end," he said, "they [the Communists] cooperate at the higher levels with members of the Democratic League and other liberal and leftist groups in China, but members of the latter are never directly or indirectly associated with one of the cells, and on the lower or 'operation' levels there is practically no contact."

Election of a new Central Committee was one of the items on the agenda of the Seventh National Congress held in Yenan during the latter part of April 1945. The preceding Central Committee was elected by the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, which was held in Moscow in 1938. The total membership of the Central Committee is about twenty. The Communist informant stated, however, that their names and the number of them are both secret. He said, however, that among the members were Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu, Lin Tsu-han, and Chu Te. The list of members of the Central Committee which appears in Section 4 of this study has been compiled from non-Communist sources.

Because of this secrecy the average member of the Party knows little or nothing about the organization as a whole. The greater part of the membership of the Party is in the Communist-controlled areas. When the Chinese Communist Army reaches a new *hsien*, it contacts the local cell, which it expands, or if there is no cell in existence it organizes one. The cell may be permitted to hold its own election, but usually the Cell Committee is appointed, as is the case in Chungking-controlled China.

The Communist informant stated that no knowledge of the theories of Karl Marx is required of an applicant for membership in the Party. It is only necessary that he sympathize with what he understands to be the general aims of the party, and that he be willing to obey the Party leadership. He is not even required to be literate, the informant said, describing the Party's attitude

as being that the neophyte can be schooled after he enters.[37] The heads of the Propaganda "Department" of the Cell, *Hsien* and Provincial Committees are responsible for the education of the members. In some places classes are held, and higher education is available in Yenan. The local cells only conduct classes in two subjects, "political work" and "common sense." The American Embassy officer who obtained this information stated that he understood that the first of these subjects was largely an elementary education in how to keep out of the hands of the police, while the second course evidently covers the teaching of a basic number of Chinese characters, together with the rudiments of geography, history, etc.

For the Party Statutes (1928) of the CCP, see Appendix I, page 267, Vol. I.

B. BASE AREAS

Communist-controlled areas behind Japanese lines are generally referred to by the Communists as anti-Japanese bases. They have been set up by the 8th Route and New 4th Armies. These anti-Japanese bases are officially called "Military Regions" (*Chün Ch'u*) in Communist military communiques. Administratviely, they are called either "Border Region (*Pien Ch'u*) Governments" where full-fledged Governments are established, with elected village, *hsien* (county) and Border Region Congresses, or "Administrative Committees" (*Hsing-chang Wei yuan hui*), where representative governments have not yet been established. In nearly all instances the military and administrative regions are identical in extent, although there are three military regions which have no border region governments or administrative committees. The Communist, for brevitys sake, use the literary one-character names of the provinces; for example, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsi Border Region is called the Shen-Kan-Ning Pien Ch'u, and the Shausi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region is called the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien Ch'u. All the main base areas are divided into sub-regions, and are called either military sub-regions (or sub-districts), or just districts (when used administratively).

At the end of 1944 there were sixteen anti-Japanese bases, of which only five had full-fledged Border Region Governments, eight had Administrative Committees, and three were Military Regions where no anti-Japanese government organizations had yet been set up. They are as follows (see map):

(*1*) *Border Region Governments*

Under 18th Group Army:

Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia: Shen-Kan-Ning Pien Ch'ü.
Shansi-Suiyuan: Chin-Sui Pien Ch'ü.
Shansi-Hopeh-Honan: Chin-Chi-Yü Pien Ch'ü.
Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar: Chin-Ch'a--Chi Pien Ch'ü.
Hopeh-Shantung-Honan: Chi-Lu Yü Pien Ch'ü.

(*2*) *Administrative Committees*

Under 18th Group Army:

Shantung: Shantung Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

Under New 4th Army:

North Kiangsu: Su-pei Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.
Central Kiangsu: Su-chung Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.
South Kiangsu: Su-nan Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.
North Huai: Huai-pei Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.
South Huai: Huai-nan Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.
Central Anhwei: Wan-chung Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei: Yü-Wan Hsing-cheng Wei-yüan-hui.

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[37] There is some evidence that the Chinese Communists do not encourage educated people to join the Party. Even Chinese liberals and non-party intellectuals who offer their services to the Communists have found it difficult to cooperate with them. For example, the daughter-in-law of Tai Chi-t'ao, President of the Examination Yuan of the National Government in Chungking, a well educated woman, fled from Japanese-occupied Peiping to Yenan *en route* to Chungking. She was treated with the greatest suspicion by the Communists. It took her a year and a half to obtain a release from the Communists to proceed to Chungking, which led her to remark that it is easier to get out of Japanese-occupied areas than out of Communist areas. Meanwhile, she offered her services to the Communists while staying in Yenan, but found them extremely uncooperative. Mr. Michael Lindsey, a British subject who has been working for the Chinese Communists during the past three years, recently told an American Army officer visiting Yenan that "for some unknown reason" the Communists find it extremely difficult to obtain cooperation from Chinese "technical people". Because of this one of their greatest shortcomings is lack of capable technicians, teachers, and administrators. "They [the 'technical' Chinese] all run away at the first opportune moment," he said. But he added as possible explanation for this that it is difficult for any educated person who does not follow the "Party line" to work for the Communists.

(3) *Base Areas with no anti-Japanese governments*

Under 18th Group Army:

Hainan Island: Hainan or Ch'iung-yai Base.

East River: Tung Chiang Base.

Under New 4th Army:

East Chekiang: Che-tung Base.

As originally planned, the Border Region governments were to be under the National Government in Chungking. Of the thirteen Border Region Governments and Administrative Committees which existed at the end of 1944, only two were officially recognized by the National Government—the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia and Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Governments.[38] The eleven other anti-Japanese governments have, therefore, no legal status. Whether legalized or not, however, the real leadership of these anti-Japanese bases is centered in the Communist Party Headquarters at Yenan.

Within, or alongside, a Communist-controlled area there may be found "island" areas where a Kuomintang Government is still in existence. Such areas, however, are much smaller than Communist base areas, and are found only in Central China and the coastal Provinces.

Along the outer edges of the Communist-controlled base areas, near the Japanese lines, the Communists mention the existence of so-called "revolutionary double side" and "reactionary double side" (local) governments. The "revolutionary double side" governments are made up of landlords, merchants and wealthy people in the Japanese-occupied area, who are appointed by the Japanese, but are not enemies of the Communist forces. The "reactionary double side" governments, on the other hand, are made up of wealthy individuals who have played both the Japanese and Communist sides alternately for individual gain, but are at present with the Japanese because their fortunes are dependent on Japanese control.

C. GOVERNMENT IN THE BORDER REGIONS

The administration in the base areas is carried on by Borden Region, *Hsien*, (county) *Chu* (township) and village government organs. Chart No. 1 (see last page, Vol. 1.) shows the general structure of the Border Region Government. Paralleling this structure is the organization of the "People's Committee for anti-Japanese Armed Resistance", which aids the 18th Group Army in the defense of the Border Region and is the link between the Border Region Government and the 18th Group Army.

(1) *Border Region, Hsien and Village Governments*

The highest organ of government in the base area is the Border Region Council (see Chart No. 1, last page, Vol. I.) When the Border Region Council is not in session, government is carried on by the Border Region Government Committee whose members are chosen by the Council. A standing committee is also chosen by the Council to supervise the Government in its carrying out of resolutions passed by the Council. There are also the *Hsien* Council and the Village Citizens' General Assembly whose functions within the *hsien* and village respectively are the counterpart of those of the Border Region Council.

(2) *Supervisor's and Chü Offices*

The Supervisor's Office represents the Border Region Government in supervising the affairs of several *hsien*. The *Chü* (township) Office is the counterpart of the Supervisor's Office in supervising the affairs of several villages. These two offices are purely supervisory and not administrative organs, and are generally called the "nominal offices," while the organs of the Border Region, *hsien* and village governments are the "real offices." Personnel for the Supervisor's and *Chü* Offices are chosen by the Border Region and *hsien* governments respectively, except in areas behind enemy lines where communications are poor and where the personnel of the *Chü* Office are selected by the *Chü* People's Delegates Assembly rather than by the *hsien* government.

(3) *Village Government organs*

The Village Citizens' General Assembly (which includes all village inhabitants of voting age) chooses delegates to form the Village Delegates Assembly, as well

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[38] The Chungking Government recognized the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government in 1938. This recognition may have been rescinded later when an attempt was made by the Kuomintang to set up a conflicting government under Lu Chung-Lin in Hopeh. At any rate, its present status of legality vis-à-vis the Central Government is obscure.

as the Mayor and the Assistant Mayor who are respectively Chairman and Vice-Chairman of both the General Assembly and the Delegates Assembly. Each delegate chosen by the Citizens General Assembly represents several persons; and if the people whom he represents are not satisfied with the way he performs his duties, they may change him at any time without waiting for the next election date. The heads of the various village committees are chosen by the Delegates Assembly from among their ranks. The Mayor and his Assistant and the heads of the village committees together form the Village Government Committee which directs the Village Office's work.

A Village Government as described above may actually govern a combination of several small villages or settlements, or a single large village. If several small villages comprise an administrative village, each small village elects a "chief delegate" to act as intermediary with the Village Officer, taking care of the interests of the particular village. If the Village Government represents only a single village, no "chief delegate" is selected.

(4) Congresses

The Congresses of the various levels of government (Border Region People's Congress of the Border Region Government; Administrative Congress of the Supervisor's Office; and the Hsien People's Congress) are convened by the heads of the various government organs to stimulate democracy and realize collective leadership, according to Communist statements.

(5) Elections

Elections are held every year for village delegates, every two years for the Hsien Affairs Conference, and every three years for the Border Region Council. It appears that in the more sparsely populated regions, in the village (or group of villages) one representative is elected for every 60 persons, in the hsien one for every 600 to 800 persons, and in the Border Region Congress one representative for every 8,000 persons. In the more densely populated region of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, however, one representative for 30,000 people was elected to the Border Region Congress of Jan. 1, 1943.

As early as 1940 the Communist Party decided to limit the number of Communist members in any elective Government body to one-third, leaving one-third for upper class members (landlords and merchants) and one-third for Kuomintang members and non-party people.

This self-imposed restriction has not, however, prevented the Communist Party from taking the leading role. As has been shown in the historical section of this study, in the Communist areas the Kuomintang members have no party machine to back them, and the upper-class non-party group is made up of representatives of the unorganized landlord-merchant class. The liberal intellectual members of the Government are strong supporters of the Communists, and so are the peasants and representatives of mass organizations.

The Communist Party makes a point of sponsoring most progressive plans. An individual landlord, for instance, may suggest a regulation to bring about a certain improvement in administration or in production or distribution. If it is considered worthwhile, the Communist Party endorses such a regulation, publicizing it as a Communist-sponsored measure. It is soon forgotten that the landlord originally introduced the measure, and the Communist Party receives the credit for having sponsored the regulation. For all of these reasons, there is no strong opposition party to the Communist Party, which remains undisputably the dominant political factor.

D. PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES FOR ANTI-JAPANESE ARMED RESISTANCE

The organization of the Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance is strictly a militia ("People's Militia") organization and works closely with the 18th Group Army. The Committees have no civil administrative functions, although they originally formed the core of the Mobilization or Administrative Committees which were the rudimentary governments later replaced by elected governments. The organization of these People's Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance parallels the administrative set-up of the Border Region Government. Members of the Village Committee are elected by the citizens of the village. The Village Committees elect the Chü Committee. The several *Chü* Committees within a *hsien* elect the *Hsien* Committee and so on. Although the Committees have a large measure of independence, they are subject to both government and military control.

The Committees are headed by the Village, *Chü* or *Hsien* Command Headquarters. In the village the Mayor is the head of the Command Headquarters, while the head of the village guerrilla detachment is the executive officer, and the Chairman of the Committee is next in authority. If a Communist army unit is stationed in the area, an army representative is also included in the Village Command Headquarters. The head of the *Chü* government is also head of the *Chü* Command Headquarters, and the *Hsien* Magistrate is head of the Hsien Command Headquarters; the organization of these headquarters is similar to that of the Village Command Headquarters.

The functions of the various groups within these committees are more fully discussed in the military section of this report under "The People's Militia."

4. Directory of the Chinese Communist Party and Border Region Governments

A. CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Since the names and number of members of various Communist Party organs are secret, no personnel list has been obtainable from Communist sources. The list below is supplied by various non-Communist sources and should be evaluated as C–3.

(1) The Central Committee

Chairman: MAO Tse-tung

CHANG Hao
CHANG Wen-t'ien
CH'EN Ch'ang-hao
CH'EN Keng
CH'EN Shao-yü
CHI Ming-hui
CH'IN Pang-hsien
CHOU En-lai
CHOU Hsing
CHU Te
FENG Wen-pin
FU Chung
HO K'o-ch'üan
HO Lung
HSÜ Hai-tung
KAN Ssu-ch'i
KAO Tzu-li
LIN Piao
LIN Tsu-han
LIU Shao-ch'i
LIU Shao-wen
LO Mai
LU Ting-i
MAO Tse-tung
P'ENG Te-huai
TENG Fa
TENG Ying-ch'ao (Miss)
TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss)
TS'AI Shu-fan
TUNG Pi-wu
WU Li-p'ing
WU Yü-chang
YANG Ching-yü
YANG Shang-k'un

(2) The Political Bureau.

Chairman: MAO Tse-tung

CHANG Wen-t'ien
CH'EN Shao-yü
CH'IN Pang-hsien
CHOU En-lai
HSIEN K'ang-chih
K'ANG Sheng
KAO Kang
LIN Tsu-han
LIU Shao-ch'i
LO Mai
MAO Tse-tung
TENG Fa
TSENG Shan
TUNG Pi-wu
WANG Chia-se
WU Yü-chang
YANG Ching-yü
YANG Shang-k'un

(3) *The Secretariat*

Chairman: MAO Tse-tung

Committee Members:	CHANG Wen-t'ien CH'EN Shao-yü CH'IN Pang-hsien CHOU En-lai LIU Shao-ch'i MAO Tse-tung WANG Chia-se
Chief of Organization:	CH'EN Yün
Chief of United Front:	SSU Ko-ching (Acting)
Chief of Publicity:	HO K'o-ch'üan (Acting)
Chief of Intelligence:	HSIEH K'ang-chih
Chief of Social Affairs:	HSIEH K'ang-chih
Chief of Military Affairs:	CHOU En-lai
Chief of Industrial Workers:	CH'IN Pang-hsien
Chief of Agricultural Workers:	K'ANG Sheng
Chief of Women:	TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss)
Chief of Young People:	FENG Wen-pin
Chief of Minorities:	TSENG Shan
Chief of Overseas Members:	LIAO Ch'eng-chih (in 1940)
Director, National Labor Union Headquarters:	LIU Shao-ch'i
Director, Southeast Political Branch Bureau:	LIU Shao-ch'i
Director, North China Political Branch Bureau:	NIEH Jung-chen
Director, Southern Political Branch Bureau:	CHOU En-lai
Director, Northwest Political Branch Bureau:	KAO Kang
Director, Statistics Research Bur:	MAO Tse-tung
Director, Central Research Inst:	FAN Wen-lan (Acting)
Director, Medical Service for the Masses:	FU Lien-chiang
Director, *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* ("Emancipation Daily"):	CH'IN Pang-hsien
Director, *Chieh-fang* Press ("Emancipation Press"):	CH'IN Pang-hsien
Director, *Hsin-hua* News Service:	CH'IN Pang-hsien
Principal, Party School in Yenan:	MAO Tse-tung

(4) *Central Revolutionary Military Council*

Chairman:	MAO Tse-tung
Vice-Chairmen:	CHOU En-lai CHU Te

(5) *18th Group Army*

Commander:	CHU Te
Deputy Commander:	P'ENG Te-huai
Chief of Staff:	YEH Chien-ying
Chairman General, Political Dept:	WANG Chia-hsiang
Secretary General:	YANG Shang-k'un
Director, Yenan Office:	WANG Shih-ying
Secretary, Yenan Office:	HUANG Hua

(6) *New 4th Army*

Commander (Acting):	CH'EN I
Vice Commander:	CHANG Yün-i
Chief of Staff:	LAI Ch'uan-ch'iu
Political Commissar:	YAO Shu-shih (Acting)

(7) *United Defense Headquarters at Yenan of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Regions*

Commander:	HO Lung
Vice Commander:	HSIAO Ching-Kuang
Chief of Staff:	CHANG Ching-wu
Political Commissars:	HSIAO Ching-kuang HSU Hsiang-ch'ien KUAN Hsiang-ying

(8) *Party Office in Chungking*

Resident Representative:	TUNG Pi-wu
Secretary:	LI Pong
Publisher, *Hsin-hua Jih-paos:*	P'AN Tzu-nien

B. BORDER REGION GOVERNMENTS

(1) Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region government

Membership lists have been included here for only the three most important Border Region governments. Personnel information on other governments of Border Regions and Base Areas is too incomplete to be of value in this directory.

Chairman:	LIN Tsu-han
Vice Chairman:	LI Ting-ming
Chairman's Committee:	
AI Ssu-ch'i	KAO Su-hsien
CHANG Ch'in-ch'iu	LEI Ching-t'ien
CH'EN K'ang-pai	LIU Ching-jen
CHOU Yang	MA Ming-fang
HSIAO Ching-kuang	PAI Chen-pang
JAO Chang-hu	T'AN Cheng
K'ANG Sheng	T'ENG Tai-yüan
KAO Ch'ung-shan	TS'AO I-ou
KAO Kang	TS'AO Lan-ju
KAO Lang-t'ing	YEH Chi-chuang
Secretary General:	LO Mai
Commissioner of Civil Affairs:	LIU Ching-fan
Commissioner of Construction:	HO Tzu-lo
Commissioner of Education:	LIU Shih
Commissioner of Finance:	NAN Han-chen
President, Supreme Court:	KAO Tzu-li
President, High Court:	LEI Ching-t'ien
Director of Trade:	YEH Chi-chuang
Chairman, Cultural Association:	MAO Tse-tung
Director, Cultural Association:	WU Yü-chang
President, Yenan University:	CHOU Yang
President, Bethune Medical College:	CHANG I-chen
Director, Bethune Hospital:	LU Chih-chün
Commander, Peace Preservation Corps:	KAO Kang
Mayor of Yenan:	KAO Lang-t'ing
Chairman, 2nd People's Political Council:	KAO Kang
Vice Chairman, 2nd PPC:	HSIEH Chüeh-tsai

(2) Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region government

Chairman:	SUNG Shao-wen
Vice Chairman:	HU Jen-k'uei
Political Committee:	
CHANG Su	NIEH Jung-chen
HU Jen-k'uei	SUN Chih-yüan
LIU Tien-chi	SUNG Shao-wen
President, Associated University:	CH'ENG Fang-wu
Chairman, People's Political Council:	CH'ENG Fang-wu

(3) Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region government

Chairman:	YANG Hsiu-feng
Vice Chairman:	JUNG Wu-sheng

5. EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED BASE AREAS

Education in the Communist base areas is designed to further the war of resistance and train the people to improve agricultural and industrial production. There are two kinds of schools, those directly under the Communist Party for the training of Party officials and Communist Army personnel, and those under the educational departments of the various Border Region Governments. Despite this distinction, however, there is Communist influence in the schools not directly under the Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung's "new Democracy," for instance, and Communist newspapers are used extensively in the University of Yenan (which is under the Educational Department of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government), and primary school textbooks in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, examined by the group of visiting correspondents in the summer of 1944, were found to contain Communist propaganda.

(1) Communist Party Schools

The Communist Party School at Yenan is under Mao Tse-tung's direction. All Party leaders and functionaries from all over China are required to attend the school periodically for purposes of indoctrination. There is also the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University in southeast Shensi, with a branch at Suiteh, Shensi, to train officers for the Communist Armies.

(2) University of Yenan

This University is under the Educational Bureau of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government. It was established in 1941 by the amalgamation of the North Shensi Public School, the Chinese Women's College, and the Tze-tung Youth Cadre School. The Institute of Public Administration was incorporated early in 1944. The University of Yenan now comprises the followng:

(a) College of Administration, with departments of public administration, public finance, economics and jurisprudence;
(b) Lu Hsün Art College, with departments of fine arts, drama, music, and literature;
(c) College of Natural Science, with departments of medicine, chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, and agriculture.

In July 1944 there were 1,302 students enrolled in the University of Yenan, according to Liu Shih, the Commissioner of Education of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government. They are said to spend 80% of their time in classes and study, and 20% in agricultural and industrial production. Great stress is laid upon "practical" education. According to Liu Shih, "National education cannot be isolated from life, and college and secondary education cannot be isolated from society. It will not do to depend upon textbooks alone." The Yenen newspaper CHIEH FANG JIH PAO (Emancipation Daily), organ of the OCP, and other documentary materials are used in addition to textbooks.

(3) Primary and secondary schools

Owing to the deficiency of equipment and materials, the schools in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region are not considered adequate by normal standards. Mimeographed textbooks and hand-drawn maps are used, as well as the Communist-controlled newspaper MASS JOURNAL (which is published by the so-called Cultural Association of the Border Area). Primary schools are under the village and hsien governments, and secondary schools are under the Border Region Governments. There are also classes for adults who wish to learn to read and write, and in the Army, factories, and arsenals, illiterates are urged to learn a few characters each week.

Primary school courses in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region are five years long, according to Commissioner of Education Liu Shih, and classes are held mainly in the winter so as not to interfere with production. Students are required to learn 500 characters the first year and an additional 500 the second year; these enable the student to read the Mass Journal.

During the winter, schools are in session all day with alternate periods of study, song, recreation, and spinning and weaving. Enrollment in the winter classes in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region is said to be over 40,000, and government officials expect to wipe out illiteracy within five years. Mass education is also carried on by means of blackboard newspapers, dramas and so-called "Transplantation Songs," which are songs and dramatizations telling the population how to improve production and keep up the anti-Japanese resistance.

APPENDIX

Party Statutes of the Chinese Communist Party [1928]

CHAPTER 1. TERMS

[Article] 1. *Definitions.*—The Chinese Communist Party is a part of the Communist International. It shall be called: Chinese Communist Party, Branch Headquarters[2] of the Communist International.

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[2] Before a prospective Party member has been approved as a Party member, [one character possibly missing] the appropriate Party Headquarters may entrust said prospective Party member with a certain type of Party work in order to observe his ability and his attitude toward the Party.

CHAPTER 2. PARTY MEMBERS

[Article] 2. *Qualifications for entering the Party.*—[1] Whoever accepts the Party regulations and Party Statutes of the Communist International and of the Party, joins one of the Party's organizations and does active work, therein obeys the decisions of the Communist International and the Party, and regularly pays his Party dues, may be a member of the Party.

[Article] 3. *Procedure for entering the Party.* When a new Party member enters the Party he shall be passed by a Branch Headquarters of the Party. His entry must also be approved by a District Committee of a Municipal or *Hsien* (county) Committee or of an organization equivalent to a *Hsien* Committee.

Conditions for entering the Party are as follows:

A. Factory workers must be introduced by one Party member and passed by a Production Branch Headquarters.

B. Peasants, workers in handicraft industries, intellectuals, and low-ranking employees of various agencies must be introduced by one Party member.

C. High-ranking employees of various agencies must be introduced by two Party members.

D. Those who leave other political parties (such as the Kuomintang) to join the Party must be introduced by three Party members with a membership of one year or more in the Party. If [such person] was formerly an ordinary member of the other political party, he shall be approved by a Provincial Committee; if he was formerly an officer of the other political party, he must be approved by Central [Headquarters].

[Article] 3. When members of the Young Communist League enter the Party, they shall be introduced by the Young Communist Committee. They must also undergo whichever of the above procedures may be appropriate, be passed by a Plenary Meeting of the Party members of a Branch Headquarters or be approved by a higher-ranking Party Headquarters.

Under certain special circumstances Party committees of all ranks have the power directly to recruit and pass on new Party members.

[Article] 4. *Changes in Organization.*—When portions of other political organizations or whole political groups, including entire party organizations, enter or come over to the Communist Party, [their entry into the Party] must be decided on by Central [Headquarters].

[Article] 5. *Transfers of Party members.*—When a Party member transfers from one [Party] organization into the sphere of activity of (that is into the district of) another [Party] organization, he must enter the organization in the place to which he moves and become a member of that organization. All procedures by which Party members transfer from one organization to another or from China to another country must be in accordance with the regulations promulgated by Central [Headquarters].

[Article] 6. *The question of expulsion.*—Expulsion of a Party member must be passed by a Plenary meeting of the Party members of his Branch Headquarters and must be approved by a higher-ranking Party committee before becoming effective. Also, [during the period] before an expulsion decision has been approved by the higher agency, all activities in the Party of the expelled member must cease immediately. Anyone not submitting to an expulsion decision may appeal to the supreme organ of the Party. In cases where a Party member engages in anti-Party activities, Party committees of all ranks have the power to expel [the offender] directly. But the lower-ranking Party Headquarters organization which the expelled person had joined must be notified of such an expulsion decision.

CHAPTER 3. PARTY ORGANIZATION

[Article] 7. *Principles of organization.*—Like other Branch Headquarters of the Communist International, the principle of organization of the Chinese Communist Party is the concentrated democracy system. The fundamental principles of the concentrated democracy system are as follows:

(1) Low-ranking and high-ranking Party Headquarters are elected by Plenary meetings of Party members, by congresses, and by national congresses.

(2) Party Headquarters of each rank must make periodic reports to the body of Party members which elects it.

(3) Lower-ranking party Headquarters must unfailingly recognize the decisions of higher-ranking Party Headquarters, must strictly observe Party discipline, and must execute speedily and exactly the decisions of the Communist International Executive Committee and the directing agencies of the Party. [One character possibly missing] Organizations having control over a certain district are superior in rank to the organizations in the various parts of that district. Party members can carry on debate concerning any question within the Party only before the passing of a decision on that question by the appropriate agency. Any decision passed by the Congress of the Communist International, by the Congress of the Party, or by a directing agency within the Party must be executed unconditionally. Even if a certain group of Party members or certain local organizations do not agree with such a decision, it must still be executed unconditionally.

[Article] 8. *The appointment of directing agencies.*—When made necessary for reasons of secrecy, lower-ranking agencies of the Party may be appointed by higher-ranking agencies and may, with the approval of the higher-ranking agency, appoint new members to its Party Headquarters Committee.

[Article] 9. *Regional districts of the Party.*—The Party is divided into units on the regional principle. An organization controlling a region is a higher-ranking agency than the organizations of the various parts of that region. All Party members, without regard for race or nationality, must enter the organization of a local Party Headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party and become members of the Chinese Communist Party.

[Article] 10. *Executive authority of agencies of various ranks.*—Party organizations have the right of free decision with respect to local problems, within the limits of the decisions of the Communist International and of the Party.

(*Notes*). [1] The introducer must be responsible for the person introduced. If his letter of introduction should be found incorrect, he must be subjected to disciplinary action, which may include expulsion from the Party.

[Article] 11. *The supreme organ of Party Headquarters of each rank.*—The supreme organ of Party Headquarters of each rank shall be the Plenary Meetings of Party members, the Congresses, or the National Congress.

[Article] 12. *The various ranks of committee.*—The Plenary Meetings of Party members, the Congresses, or the National Congress shall elect Executive Committees of the Party Headquarters of corresponding rank. This Executive Committee is the directing agency in the interval between Plenary Meetings and directs all ordinary activities of the organizations appropriate to it.

[Article] 13. *Question of approval.*—All newly established Party organizations (Branch Headquarters, *Hsien* Committees, and so forth) must be approved by the higher-ranking agency to which they are attached.

[Article] 14. The system of organization of the Party is as follows:

(1) In each factory, workshop, commercial shop, street, village, small town, military unit and so forth: firstly, Plenary Meeting of Party members of Branch Headquarters; and secondly, Branch Headquarters Administrative Committee.

(2) In urban or rural districts: firstly, Plenary Meeting of Municipal District Party members or Municipal District Congress; and secondly, District Committee.

(3) Within a *Hsien* or municipality: firstly, *Hsien* or Municipal Congress; and secondly, *Hsien* or Municipal Committee.

(4) Special districts (include several *Hsien,* part of a *province*): firstly, Special District Congress; and secondly, Special District Committee. Special district organizations may be set up when necessary by a decision of a Provincial Committee.

(5) Province: firstly, Provincial Congress; and secondly, Provincial Committee.

(6) The nation: firstly, National Congress; and secondly, Central Committee.

(7) For the sake of convenience in directing the activities of each Party Headquarters, the Central Committee may, in accordance with the needs of the situation, establish Central Administrative Bureaus or Central Special Commissioners with jurisdiction over several provinces. The Central Administrative Bureaus and Central Special Commissioners shall be appointed by the Central Committee and shall be responsible to the Central Committee only.

[Article] 15. *Agencies of Party Headquarters.*—In order to carry out various special Party functions, various departments or committees, such as an Organization Department, a Propaganda and Agitation Department, Labor Movement and Women's Movement Committees, and so on, may be set up under the Party Committees of each rank. Each such department or committee shall be attached to the Party Headquarters Committee, shall carry on its activities under its direction, and shall put into effect its own decisions upon their being passed by the Party Committee. The organization of the various departments under the Party Committee shall be determined by Central [Headquarters].

(Supplementary note): For the purpose of using national languages among the labor and peasant elements of other nationalities and thus facilitating work, a Minority Nationalities Activities Department shall be set up under local Party Committees. This Minority Nationalities Activities Department must carry on its activities under the leadership and supervision of local party Headquarters.

CHAPTER 4. BRANCH HEADQUARTERS

[Article] 16. *Basic organization.*—The basic organization of the Party is the Branch Headquarters (the factory, the mine, the workshop, the commercial shop, the street, the village, the military unit, and so forth). All Party members [carrying on] activities in a place must without exception join a Branch Headquarters. Any place where there are three or more Party members may set up a new party Branch Headquarters organization, but it must be approved by a District Committee of a *Hsien* Committee or of an organization equivalent to a *Hsien* Committee.

[Article] 17. *Special organizations of Branch Headquarters.*—In any business enterprise where there are one or two Party members [carrying on] activities, these Party members may be amalgamated with the Production Branch Headquarters nearest to said business enterprise, or they may organize a Branch Headquarters jointly with Party members in a neighboring business enterprise.

Party members not in any business enterprise, such as persons engaged in a handicraft industry, independent workmen, domestic servants, intellectuals, and so forth, [may] organize a Street Branch Headquarters in accordance with their place of residence.

If in a Village Branch Headquarters there should be workmen in village economic enterprises, such as small mines or a certain kind of agricultural pursuit, they may organize a Production Branch Headquarters on the basis of what they produce.

[Article] 18. *Functions of Branch Headquarters.*—Branch Headquarters is an organization created for the purposes of linking the Party with labor and agriculture. The functions of a Branch Headquarters are: (1) To carry out the Party's slogans and decisions among the non-Party laboring and agricultural masses and cause labor and agriculture to stand on the side of the Party by means of planned Communist agitation and propaganda; (2) To participate actively with the strength of the Party organization in all the political and economic struggles of labor and agriculture; to argue their demands from the standpoint of the revolutionary class struggle; to organize revolutionary movements among the masses; to struggle for the leadership of all revolutionary movements among workers and peasants; to strive to draw workers and peasants into participation in the general revolutionary struggle of the Chinese and international proletariat; (3) To recruit and train new Party members; to disseminate Party literature; and to carry on cultural and political education activities among Party members and among non-Party workers and peasants.

[Article] 19. *Branch Headquarters Administrative Committee.*—Branch Headquarters shall elect three or five persons, according to the number of Party members, to constitute an Administrative Committee to conduct ordinary Party affairs. This Administrative Committee shall conduct the activities of Branch Headquarters and shall assign the work of Party members in Branch Headquarters, such as propaganda, dissemination of printed material, carrying on Party group activities in labor unions and peasant organizations, women's activities, establishing liaison with Young Communist Branch Headquarters, and so forth. The Branch Headquarters Administrative Committee shall elect one person to be Branch Headquarters Secretary to execute the decisions of the Plenary Meeting of Party members or of Branch Headquarters meeting and the directives of higher Party Headquarters.

CHAPTER 5. ORGANIZATION OF URBAN AND RURAL DISTRICTS

[Article] 20. *The District Congress.*—Within the urban or rural sub-district the highest ranking Party organ is the Plenary Meeting of Party members or the Congress of Delegates from every Branch Headquarters of the urban or rural district in question. The Urban or rural district Plenary Meeting of Party members or Congress of Delegates receives and passes on the reports of the District Committee, and it elects the District Committee and the delegates to the *Hsien* or Municipal Committee or to the Special District and Provincial Congresses.

[Article] 21. *The District Committee.*—The urban or rural District Committee directs all Party affairs within the jurisdiction of the district during the interval between Plenary Meetings of Party members or between Congresses. Ordinary meetings of the urban or rural District Committee must be convened regularly, within the limits imposed by conditions of secrecy, at least once every half-month. During the interval between meetings of the Municipal District Committee activities shall be directed by the Standing Committee of the Municipal District Committee. The Standing Committee shall be chosen from among the members of the District Committee itself.

CHAPTER 6. HSIEN OR MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION

[Article] 22. *The Hsien Congress.*—The highest Party organ within the *Hsien* is the *Hsien* Congress. The *Hsien* Congress shall convene once every three days. A temporary *Hsien* Congress shall be called by the *Hsien* Committee on the demand of over half the organizations in the *Hsien* or on the decision of the Provincial Committee (or Special District Committee). The *Hsien* Congress shall receive the reports of the *Hsien* Committee and the Hsien Investigation Committee. It also shall elect delegates to the Special District Congress or Provincial Congress.

[Article] 23. *The Hsien Committee.*—The *Hsien* Committee is elected by the *Hsien* Congress, and is the highest Party organ in the *Hsien* in the interval between *Hsien* Congresses. In addition to representatives of the *Hsien* capital, representatives from the Party Headquarters of the rural districts or from each important village in the *Hsien* must also participate in the *Hsien* Committee.

The time [for holding] Plenary Sessions of the *Hsien* Committee may be determined by the *Hsien* Committee itself, but it must hold meetings at least once each month. The *Hsien* Committee shall elect one person as Secretary of the *Hsien* Committee to administer daily business. The Secretary of the *Hsien* Committee must be approved by higher Party Headquarters.

[Article] 24. *Agencies of the Hsien Committee.*—The *Hsien* Committee must execute the decisions of the *Hsien* Congress, the Provincial Committee, and the Central Committee; and it must, so far as possible, set up various departments or committees (such as, Organization, Propaganda, Agitation, Women's Movements, Peasants' Movements, and so forth) to conduct each type of activity. The heads of the various departments and committees must as a rule be members of the *Hsien* Committee and must conduct their activities under the direction of the *Hsien* Committee. If a *Hsien* Party paper is published, the *Hsien* Committee shall name its editors. The *Hsien* Committee administers Party affairs within the jurisdiction of the *Hsien* and in the interval between *Hsien* Congresses is responsible to higher Party Headquarters. It must also make regular reports concerning its own activities to said higher Headquarters.

[Article] 25. In cities where a *Hsien* Committee is located a Municipal Committee shall not be set up. Activities [in such cities] shall be under the direct guidance of the *Hsien* Committee. City organizations may be divided into city districts. The city District Committee shall be the organization in charge of the activities of a city district.

[Article] 26. The organization of the Municipal Committee shall be [the same as] the *Hsien* Committee, and, in addition to the rural and Municipal Districts under it, it may control the suburban rural districts or the Branch Headquarters directly attached to its suburbs. A Municipal Committee will not be set up in cities where there is a Provincial Committee or a Special District Committee. Activities [in such cities] shall be under the direct charge of the Provincial or Special District Committee.

[Article] 27. In places where a Special District organization has already been established, the Special District shall conduct its activities in accordance with the regulations for all *Hsien*. Where there is no Provincial Committee, the Special District shall establish direct relations with Central [Headquarters] and shall carry on its activities in accordance with the regulations for all provincial organizations.

CHAPTER 7. PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION

[Article] 28. The Provincial Congress is the supreme organ within the jurisdiction of a province. Ordinary sessions of the Provincial Congress shall be convened once each half-year. Temporary Provincial Congresses shall be called by the Provincial Committee on the demand of over half of the organizations of the province or in accordance with a motion of Central [Headquarters]. The Provincial Congress shall listen to the reports of the Provincial Committee and the Provincial Investigation Committee, shall debate questions of Party affairs and social activities in the province, and shall elect the Provincial Committee, the Provincial Investigation Committee, and delegates to the National Congress.

[Article] 29. The Provincial Committee shall be elected by the Provincial Congress. In the interval between Provincial Congresses it shall be the supreme Party organ within the jurisdiction of the province. Representatives of the Central (provincial capital) organization of the province and representatives from Party Headquarters in other important places in the province must all participate in the Provincial Committee.

The Provincial Committee shall determine the time for its own meetings; but it shall hold at least one meeting every month and a half. In the interval between meetings of the Provincial Committee, the Provincial Committee may, for the sake of convenience in its work, elect a Standing Committee from among the members of the Provincial Committee and it may elect a Secretary for the purpose of administering daily business.

[Article] 30. The Provincial Committee shall execute the decisions of the Provincial Congress and the Central Committee. The Provincial Committee shall organize the various Party agencies within the jurisdiction of the province; shall name the editors

of the party papers in the province; shall manage party resources and expenditures within the jurisdiction of the province; and shall control the Accounting Office of Party Headquarters. The Provincial Committee shall have charge of Party group activities in non-Party organizations within the province. The Provincial Committee shall make regular reports on its activities to Central [Headquarters] and shall regularly apprise lower-ranking Party Headquarters of its activities. For doing research into each important problem, the Provincial Committee shall set up various departments or committees, such as, an Organization Department, a Propaganda and Agitation Department, a Labor Movement Committee, and so forth. As a general rule, the head of each department shall be appointed from among the regular or reserve members of the Provincial Committee and shall carry on its activities under the direct guidance of the Standing Committee of the Provincial Committee.

[Article] 31. The Provincial Committee shall conduct activities in the city where it is located by means of Municipal District Committees. For this reason, if a *Hsien* Committee be established where a Provincial Committee is located, such *Hsien* Committee may carry on activities only in the rural districts of the *Hsien*.

CHAPTER 8. THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PARTY

[Article] 32. As a rule, the National Convention of the Party shall meet twice a year. The composition of the National Convention and its rate of representation (i. e., how many persons shall elect one delegate) shall be determined by the Central Committee.

[Article] 33. Resolutions of the Party National Convention shall take effect only after authorization by the Central Committee.

[Article] 34. If the time for holding a Party National Convention should fall just prior to a World Congress of the Communist International, [the National Convention] may, with the consent of the Communist International Executive Committee, elect delegates to such Communist International World Congress.

CHAPTER 9. THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE PARTY

[Article] 35. The National Congress of the Party is the Supreme organ of the Party. As a general rule, it shall meet once a year, being convened by the Central Committee upon obtaining the consent of the Communist International.[3] Temporary meetings of the National Congress of the Party shall be called by the Central Committee on the independent decision of the Central Committee or on the motion of the Executive Committee of the Communist International or on the demand of delegates to the last previous Congress representing organizations [comprising] a majority of the membership of the Party. But the calling of temporary meetings of the National Congress of the Party must be approved by the Executive Committee of the Communist International. [Information] concerning the convening of the Party National Congress, matters to come up for discussion in the Congress, its daily agenda, and so forth must be made known to the membership of the Party one month before it meets at the latest. The Party National Congress may pass resolutions only when the delegates present are able to represent a majority of the membership of the Party.

The rate of representation in the National Congress of the Party shall be determined by the Executive Committee of the Communist International or by the Central Committee or by the Party Convention held prior to the Party National Congress.

[Article] 36. The National Congress of the Party shall

(1) receive and examine the reports of the Central Committee and the Central Investigation Committee,

(2) decide questions concerning Party regulations,

(3) make decisions on all such matters as political questions and questions of policy or organization,

(4) elect the Central Committee, the Central Investigation Committee, and so forth.

[Article] 37. Delegates to the National Congress of the Party should be elected by the Party Provincial Congresses, but when made necessary by secret activities, delegates may be appointed by a Provincial Committee on obtaining the consent of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. A temporary National Convention of the Party may be substituted for a Party National Congress on obtaining the consent of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

CHAPTER 10. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

[Article] 38. The number of members of the Central Committee shall be determined by the National Congress.

[Article] 39. The Central Committee is the supreme organ of the Party in the interval between National Congresses of the Party. *It represents [the Party] when relations are opened with other political parties,*[4] establishes the various kinds of Party agencies, directs all political and organizational activities of the Party, names the editors of the central official organs of the Party, which are under its guidance supervision, sends Central Commissioners to Party organizations in any province and establishes Central Administrative Bureaus as conditions may require, administers publishing offices and other enterprises of importance to the Party as a whole, administers Party finances and resources, manages the Central Accounting Office, and so forth.

The Central Committee shall periodically convene Plenary Sessions of its members—at least once every three months.

[Article] 40. The Central Committee shall elect a Political Bureau from among its own membership to direct the political activities of the Party in the interval between Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee, and it shall elect a Standing Committee to conduct ordinary business.

[Article] 41. In accordance with the various types of activity, the Central Committee shall set up various departments and committees, such as: an Organization Department, a Propaganda and Agitation Department, a Labor Committee, a Woman's Movements Committee, and so forth. The duty of the various departments or committees is to conduct

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[3] The 6th National Congress was held in Moscow in 1928. The 7th National Congress was held in Yenan in April 1945.

[4] Origin of italics uncertain.

various activities within their particular sphere of work in accordance with the directives of Central [Headquarters]. The Central Committee shall appoint the heads of the various departments and committees. These heads should so far as possible be chosen from among the members of the Central Committee.

[Article] 42. On the basis of political and economic conditions, the Central Committee shall determine the scope of the activities of each Party Headquarters organization in each place, and it shall delineate the various territorial units in accordance with the administrative districts throughout the country.

CHAPTER 11. THE CENTRAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE

[Article] 43. The Party National, Provincial, *Hsien*, and Municipal Congresses shall elect Central, Provincial, *Hsien*, and Municipal Investigating Committees for the purpose of inspecting the finances and accounting of Party Headquarters of various ranks and the activities of the various agencies.

CHAPTER 12. PARTY DISCIPLINE

[Article] 44. Strictly to observe party discipline is the highest obligation of all Party members and of Party Headquarters of all ranks.

The decisions of the Communist International, of the Chinese Communist Party National Congress, of the Central Committee and of the other high-ranking agencies must all be speedily and exactly executed. However, all controversial questions within the Party may be debated freely before a decision is made.

[Article] 45. [Those who] do not execute a decision of higher Party Headquarters and [those who] are guilty of other faults recognized within the Party as errors must be given disciplinary punishment by the appropriate Party Headquarters. The methods by which a Party Headquarters administers punishment against an organization are: rebuke, naming a temporary committee, and dissolution of the organization and re-enrollment of its Party members. Against individual party members they are: various kinds of formal rebuke, warning, public rebuke, cessation of important Party activities, and dismissal from the Party or subjection to observation for an appropriate period.

Questions relating to breaches of discipline shall be investigated by Plenary Meetings of Party members or Party Headquarters of the various ranks. Committees of the various ranks may set up special committees to conduct a preliminary investigation of questions relating to a breach of Party discipline. The decisions of such committees shall take effect after being approved by Party Headquarters of that rank. Questions of dismissal from the Party shall be settled in accordance with the procedure established in Article 6 of these Statutes.

CHAPTER 13. PARTY FINANCE

[Article] 46. Expenditures of a Party Headquarters shall be paid from Party dues, special contributions, subventions from Party printing establishments and from higher Party Headquarters, and other such sources.

[Article] 47. The amount of Party entry fees and Party dues shall be determined by the Central Committee. Unemployed and extremely indigent Party members may be exempted from payment of dues.

One who for three months successively fails without adequate cause to pay his dues shall [make] a statement of his voluntary separation from the Party and shall announce it to the meeting of Party members.

CHAPTER 14. PARTY GROUPS

[Article] 48. Whenever there are three or more Party members at the congresses or conventions of, or in the agencies of, a non-Party organization (such as a labor union, peasant association, social group cultural organization, and so forth) they shall form a Party Group the duty of which shall be to strengthen the influence of the Party within such non-Party organization, to carry out the Party's policies, and to supervise the activities of Party members in such non-Party organization. A Party Group may elect an Administrative Committee and a Secretary to conduct ordinary business.

A Party Group shall have the right of independence in settling internal questions and in its ordinary business. When disagreements arise between the committee of a Party Headquarters and a Party Group, the Party Committee should re-examine the question with the help of a representative of the Party Group and make a decision. The Party Group must execute such a decision at once. If the Party Group should dissent from it and make an appeal, the question shall be settled by the nearest higher-ranking Party Headquarters, but it must still carry out the decision of the Party Committee during the period of the appeal.

[Article] 49. When a Party Committee debates a question which concerns a Party Group, it must have a representative of that Party Group in attendance at the appropriate meetings of the Party Headquarters Committee, and [such representaive] shall have the right to speak.

[Article] 50. When a Party Group elects an Administrative Committee, such Administrative Committee must be approved by the Party Headquarters to which [the Party Group] is attached. The Administrative Committee of a Party Group must be responsible to a Party Headquarters of that rank for the work of the Party Group. A Party Headquarters may send one of its own committee members as a representative to join the organization of the Party Group Administrative Committee; it shall also have the power to recall any committee member, but it shall at the same time inform the Party Group of the reasons for the recall.

[Article] 51. In any organization in which a Party Group is active, name lists of personnel for each position shall be proposed by the Party Group on obtaining the consent of local Party Headquarters. Questions relating to the transfer of Party members from one Party Group to another shall be settled in the same way.

[Article] 52. Every question requiring decision in an organization where there is a Party Group ought first to be debated in a meeting of the Party Group or in the Party Group Administrative Committee.

At meetings of an organization [where there is a Party Group], Party members who have joined that Party Group must uniformly support and vote for the decisions of the Party Group on all questions. All Party members who break this rule must be given disciplinary punishment by Party Headquarters in accordance with the Statutes of the Party.

CHAPTER 15. RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST YOUTH CORPS [YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE]

[Article] 53. Representatives having the right to speak and vote must be exchanged between directing agencies of all ranks (from Branch Headquarters to Central [Headquarters]) of the Party and of the Youth Corps. Likewise, the Youth Corps may elect and send [a number of] representatives proportionate to the number of members in the Corps to all Congresses of the Party.

VOLUME II

6. Economic Situation in Chinese Communist Areas

A. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, AREA AND POPULATION

(1) General

The Communist-controlled areas of North China embrace the northeastern parts of Shensi and Kansu in Free China and parts of the provinces of Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, Honan, Suiyuan and Chahar behind the Japanese lines. In Central China the Communist areas are all behind the Japanese lines and include substantial portions of the provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh and small areas in Chekiang and Hunan. In South China the Communists control small areas in and around the Canton delta and on Hainan island. In the occupied region the Japanese control the railways and main highways, the important navigable rivers, the large cities, the chief district cities, and the adjoining countryside. The Japanese-controlled territories separate the Communist areas one from the other and make free and easy communication between them impossible. A unified economic life within the Communist region is therefore impossible.

(2) Economic characteristics

In North China the central core of each Communist base is located in a rough, mountainous or out-of-the-way region. The periphery generally extends out into the plains and more fertile agricultural areas. Between the consolidated Communist area and the Japanese-controlled area there is a region not effectively controlled by either. Millet and wheat are staple food crops. In Central and South China the Communist bases are located in more fertile territory, but are generally outside the main lines of communications and in regions cut by many waterways and divided by swamps and lakes. Rice and wheat are the staple food crops. In general the areas occupied by the Communists were the most backward and least fertile and productive regions prior to the war. Although important mineral-producing areas are within the Communist Border Regions, the important mines are controlled and operated by the Japanese. Agriculture and decaying handicraft industries were characteristic of these areas before the war. Although the Communists have made extensive efforts to reclaim land, revitalize agriculture and revive handicraft industries, the productive capacity of the areas is still low, and there are no modern large-scale industries. Small scale farming and handicraft industries provide the economic foundation of the areas.

(3) Area and population

No even approximately accurate figures on the area and population controlled by the Communistis are possible, because a census has not been taken and because the dividing line between Japanese and Communist controlled areas is constantly changing. Communist broadcasts have claimed as much as 520,000 square miles of "liberated" territory behind the Japanese lines, but other Communist sources lay claim to little more than 150,000 square miles. Similarly some recent Communist sources claim that they control as many as 100,000,000 people, but reports of 1943 claimed only about 52,000,000.

As careful an estimate as possible of the area and population controlled by the Communists was made in MIS in the spring of 1944. This estimate was as follows:

	Area, square miles	Population
North China	155,000	35,718,000
Central China	48,500	23,700,000
South China	8,300	3,000,000
Total	212,000	62,418,000

After making due allowance for recent Communist advances it seems probable that the area largely under their control is somewhere between 200,000 and 225,000 square miles and that the population largely under their control is between 70,000,000 and 85,000,000. Further details as compiled from various sources are given in the accompanying table.

Area and population of the Communist regions

Region	Claims of 1943–44		Claims of 1944–45	
	Area, square miles	Population	Area, square miles	Population
North China (Eighth Route Army Area):				
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia	(?)	2,000,000	35,000	1,580,000
Shansi-Suiyuan	9,000	1,750,000		3,000,000
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh	30,000	8,600,000		[1] 18,000,000
Shansi-Hopeh-Honan	33,000	13,470,000	14,000	4,200,000
Hopeh-Shantung-Honan				10,800,000
Shantung	26,000	10,700,000		[1] 14,000,000
Total for North China	98,000+	36,520,000		51,580,000
Central China (New 4th Army Area):				
Northern Kiangsu				3,700,000
Central Kiangsu				7,608,075
South Kiangsu				1,908,843
North Huai River				3,021,318
Southern Huai River				2,083,600
Central Anhwei				1,660,000
Eastern Chekiang				(?)
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei				9,200,000
Total in Central China	(?)	15,480,000		[2] 30,481,836
South China:				
East River Base	(?)	(?)	7,000	1,000,000
Hainan Island Base	(?)	(?)		(?)
Grand Total		52,000,000+		83,061,836+

[1] The figures for the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shantung areas seem too large.
[2] Sic.

B. ECONOMIC POLICY, PROGRAM AND ACHIEVEMENTS

(1) Economic theory

Although the Communist leaders are admittedly Marxists and look forward to the time when a Communist society will prevail in China, they have for the present abandoned their earlier policies of land confiscation and immediate collectivism in favor of a more moderate policy designed to gain the support of the mass of the people and more suited to the situation in China. In general the theory being followed for the present is that it is impossible for China to move immediately from an agrarian society to a Communist collectivistic society. The Communists argue that China must go through a stage of democratic industrialism based fundamentally upon private property before the time is ripe for true Communism. During this transitory period they expect to avoid the major evils that have appeared in Western capitalistic society.

The ideas of the Communist leaders are set forth in the following reported statements of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Mao states that:

> "Our old program of land confiscation—modified, inasmuch as the landlord got a share—was not bad at the time. The basic demand of the masses was concentrated on their desire for land. Sun Yat-sen advocated it. But it is not suitable to war time because the landlords wish to be anti-Japanese, but a policy of confiscation may drive them into the other camp. The peasants see the simple truth that rent reduction makes it possible for the landlords to remain, and helps to isolate the Japanese. After a few experiences of land confiscation in some areas early in the war, the peasants saw that this policy ultimately harmed them. A policy of rent concessions by the landlord and guarantee of payment of rent by the tenant results in successful and genuine cooperation. This policy is not merely opportunistic: it is the only possible one. Three forms of industrialization will coexist.

These are mentioned in the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress. (State, large scale private, and handicraft) Use of cooperatives depends on locality. Here in the Northwest there will be need for handicrafts. In the large cities conditions will be different. We can work according to Sun Yat-sen. Nation-wide enterprises capable of influence on the national economy, such as railways, should be State-owned. The rest will be private. In rural and distant areas, we will need cooperatives."

Chou En-lai looks forward to an ultimate socialist collectivism but believes that will not come for a considerable length of time.

"China's development will not proceed along the same lines as Soviet Russia's. There will be stages. For example, on the basis of individual production we have adopted the mutual help or labor-exchange method, rather than an immediate and drastic establishing of collectivism.[39] Second, from the principle of private ownership we hope to move to the nationalization of big enterprises—communication systems, banks, war industries. Third, we shall progress from the reduction of rents and interest to the stage of land owned by the tillers, and eventually to state ownership or nationalization of the land. Fourth, on the basis of equal suffrage for all social classes, we shall enable the majority—the laboring classes—to obtain the privilege of suffrage. The intention is to make rule by a minority less likely. . . . Fifth, under conditions of equality we shall strive for international peace and cooperation. These five points summarize what we call our New Democracy. They are also incorporated in the program of the revolutionary *San Min Chu I* as interpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924."

(2) *Present economic policies*

Present policies include among others the following main points:

(a) The abandonment of land confiscation. As a result of the formation of the united front, the program of confiscation of the land of the landlords was abandoned in September 1937. Confiscations prior to that time have remained in force, but according to the Communist none have been made since then.

(b) The reduction and guarantee of rents. Although land confiscation has been abandoned, landlords have had to accept smaller rents, but in return a policy of guaranteeing the payment of these rents has been adopted. This policy has had the three-fold purpose of gaining the support of the landlords, protecting the peasants, and, by reducing the rents on land, forcing the landlords to invest their surplus capital in industry.

(c) The encouragement of cooperatives as a means of developing industry, increasing capital, promoting self-sufficiency and raising the living standard.

(d) The encouragement of private capital in order to obtain sufficient funds to make possible the economic development of the Communist areas. The investment of private capital in industry and business has been encouraged. Profits are limited, and hoarding and profiteering are regulated, but loans are made to all types of private enterprise, especially cooperative. Recent observers indicate that small business enterprises are encouraged and that private trade flourishes in the market towns. In 1944 there were 2,579 private shops in the Yenan area, and the number is said to be increasing every year.

(e) A program of increased production aimed at self-sufficiency, the raising of the standard of living and the equalization of wealth. This program is popularized in the One-One Program of Mao Tse-tung, so named because of its eleven points. The pertinent economic elements of the program are as follows:

Each family is to keep one year's food supply in storage.
Each village is to have a spinning and weaving machine and a blacksmith shop.
Each village (hsiang) is to have a large storehouse.
Each town is to have a general merchandise store.
Each family is to have a pig and a cow.
Each family is to plant 100 trees.
Each village is to have a well and a water supply station.

[39] It should be noted that collectivism was not introduced immediately in the Soviet Union. It was not before 1928 when Stalin felt that Soviet power had been sufficiently consolidated to permit such a drastic economic reform that collectivism was introduced in Soviet Russia. There are many similarities between the economic program of the Chinese Communists and the "New Economic Policy" of Soviet Russia as introduced in 1921.

(f) After the war they look forward to free trade and hope to have foreign help in the development of industry.

The following economic principles, outlined in the People's Political Council in Yenan in 1941, set forth certain of the basic essentials of the present policy:

> The Communists will urge the strict enforcement of the principle of clean and honest government and severe punishment of any functionary guilty of graft or embezzlement. They will oppose jobbery. If a Communist violates the laws, the Party is of the opinion that he should be subjected to a severe penalty. At the same time, we believe that the salary system should be based on the principle of economy and frugality. The necessary material needs of all functionaries and their dependents should be satisfied, and an adequate cultural and recreative life must be guaranteed them.
>
> Communist representatives will urge measures intended to develop agricultural production and to mobilize the masses for their spring sowing and autumn harvesting, and help poor peasants to overcome difficulties in securing plowing animals, farm implements, fertilizers and seeds. They will propose that a further 600,000 *mou* [six *mou* equal one English acre] of untilled land be cultivated in the present year in order to increase the supply of food crops by 400,000 piculs [one picul equals 133 pounds]. Migration of people to the Border Region wil lbe encouraged.
>
> The Communists declare their belief that in the districts where land has been distributed, the right of private ownership of land should be guaranteed to all peasants who have acquired land. In other districts where land has not been distributed (such as Suiteh, Fuhsien and Chinyang), the right of ownership of land should be guaranteed to creditors. The Party declares that the rates of rent and interest must be reduced. Tenants should pay a certain amount of rent to the landlords, and debtors should pay a certain amount of interest to creditors. The Government should regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants and between creditors and debtors.
>
> The Communist representatives will propose measures designed to develop industrial production and trade, encourage private enterprise, and protect private property. They believe the Border Region should welcome investments from outside and abroad, foster free trade, and oppose monopoly and manipulations. At the same time it should develop the cooperatives and promote the development of handlicraft industry.
>
> The People's Political Council should regulate the relationship between employers and employees, put into practice a ten-hour working day, raise labor productivity, foster labor discipline, and adequately improve the livelihood of the workers.
>
> The People's Political Council should devise a rational system of taxation, with the exception of the poorest section of the people, who should be exempted from taxation, a progressive tax system—in which the rate of taxation varies in accordance with the amount of property or income of the taxpayer—should be enforced, so that the costs of the anti-Japanese War are equitably borne, and by the great majority of the population. At the same time the organization of financial institutions should be improved, financial relations regulated, national currency protected. Notes issued by the Border Region Bank should be consolidated so as to facilitate the development of a healthy economy and finance.
>
> The People's Political Council should provide vagrants with opportunity to work on the farm, secure jobs, and receive education. It should seek to correct the bad habits of functionaries and others in discriminating against vagrants. It should pursue a policy of winning over, uniting and educating Hweimin [organizations with superstitions and semifeudal practices and purposes].

(3) The program for increased production and self-sufficiency

Because of the relative poverty of the Communist areas and the difficulty of getting supplies from the outside, a drive to increase production and make the areas self-sufficient was begun in the late thirties. After the imposition of the blockade against the Communist areas by the Chungking Government in 1940 this program was intensified. The main methods used to increase production were as follows:

(a) Every person was to be a producer. Women were encouraged to work and to form spinning and weaving cooperatives. Townspeople, officials, students

and soldiers were ordered to cultivate gardens, to work part time in industry and in general to become self-sufficient. In pursuit of this policy, most of the army units began the reclamation of land, the cultivation of gardens, and the production of clothing and other items needed by themselves. As a result many of the army units are now practically self-sufficient. Army, government and party members are said to be producing about 64 percent of their food and clothing in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region.

(b) "Labor Heroes" were introduced as a means of encouraging people to increase their productive efforts. Persons who had made signal contributions were singled out for honors, and their achievements were propagandized. Idlers were encouraged to go to work and every possible device used to get them to work. In 1935 there were supposed to have been 70,000 idlers in the Yenan area, which number was reportedly reduced to 3,967 by the beginning of 1944.

(c) Labor unions and agricultural labor brigades were also organized to increase the efficiency of labor. The organization of labor unions was begun in 1937, in the Yenan area. The Border Regional General Labor Union was formed in 1940. It includes industrial workers, office workers and agricultural laborers. It is considered a mass organization and aims to mobilize the population in the war. Its functions are to adjust relations between employers and workers, to carry out the government production program and to improve the general cultural condition of the workers. In general it aims to support the labor policy of the government which includes the following points:

The improvement of livelihood, increased production and strengthening the cause of workers.

A 10-hour day for the present period with an 8-hour day as the ideal.

Respect on the part of labor for contracts and the maintenance of labor discipline.

Strengthen the organization and improve workers' education.

Increase the number of laborers.

Peasant societies have been organized to improve the condition of agricultural workers and to bargain with employers. Wages in general are paid in kind, and in many industrial establishments, meals, clothing and other items are provided.

(d) Immigrants were encouraged from other areas, particularly from the famine-stricken regions of Honan. Some 70,000 have reportedly been absorbed recently in the Yenan areas alone.

(e) An extensive program of land reclamation and agricultural improvement was put into effect. (This will be discussed in more detail below).

(f) The organization of cooperatives was actively promoted. They are of four types: industrial or producer cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, transportation cooperatives, and credit cooperatives, of which the first two are the most important. They have been organized extensively throughout all the Border Regions and have added materially to the productive power of the area. Industrial cooperatives were started in 1939 with the aid of organizers of the movement from the Chungking area. However, support from Chungking was soon cut off, and the movement had to go on with little support or aid from the outside. No over-all statistics on the number of cooperatives in the Communist areas are available, but in the Yenan area they are said to have increased from 142 in 1937 to 624 in February 1944.

(4) Achievements of the production program: living standards

In general the program of increased production seems to have been successful. Recent travelers in the various Communist regions almost universally agree that economic conditions have greatly improved over what they were in 1941. At present all of the areas are relatively self-sufficient. Food production has been increased and is fairly equitably distributed. Beggars have practically disappeared, and there are few signs of desperate poverty. Handicrafts have been revised to such a state that the most pressing needs of the civilian population and fighting forces are being met. Clothing is simple but generally adequate. The Yenan area, one of the poorest of the Communist areas and the one which has been most severely affected by the Chungking blockade, is now said to be producing at least two-thirds of its cotton cloth requirement and to be self-sufficient in most consumer goods such as matches, soap, paper, etc. Wheat is of increasing importance in the diet, although millet is still the staple food.

Most observers seem to agree that the general living standard is equal to and in many cases superior to that in Kuomintang China. Troops in general are better fed and certainly in better physical condition than in Kuomintang China.

One observer indicates the change in the standard of living of troops in the Yenan area as shown in the following table. December 1939 equals 100.

1939	100
1940	88
1941	84.2
1942	96.3
1943	125.5

Although living conditions may have improved, judged by Western standards they are still pitifully low, as can be seen from the accompanying table which gives the monthly ration allowance per person established by the government in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Area.

[Pounds]

	Basic minimum ration	Factory workers	Soldiers
Millet	48	[1] 60	60
Meat	2.7–5.3	4	4.6
Vegetables	40	36+	48
Vegetable oils	1.3–2.2		
Salt	1.3		
Coal	60		

[1] Includes 20 pounds of wheat.

In addition clothing, shoes, bedclothes, soap, paper, lodgings, medical care and some other items are provided.

C. AGRICULTURE AND TRADE

(1) *Agriculture*

As has been pointed out, agriculture forms the basis of economic life in the Communist area. In North China the important food crops are millet, wheat, sweet potatoes, *kaoliang*, soybeans, broad beans, corn, Irish potatoes and oats, while the most important commercial crops are cotton, soybeans and vegetable oil seeds. Considerable wool is also produced, and pigs, sheep and poultry are the important food-producing animals. Oxen, donkeys, mules and horses are the chief draft animals. In Central China rice becomes an important food crop, replacing millet and *kaoliang* to a considerable extent, and in South China rice is the all-important food crop. The water buffalo is the most important draft animal in Central and South China.

Since much of the area controlled by the Communists is relatively unproductive, since agricultural methods are very backward, and since the area depended upon the importation of many agricultural tools and implements, the Communists have often had serious difficulties in meeting their food requirements. Consequently they have endeavored to increase agricultural production by the following means:

(a) Land reclamation which includes the clearing and cultivation of land which have been allowed to go to waste, the reclamation of other areas through irrigation and the construction of irrigation canals or drainage ditches. The army has taken a prominent part in this reclamation program. Although no over-all figures on land reclamation are available it seems certain that considerable areas have been restored to cultivation and that areas damaged by Japanese raiding expeditions have been restored.

(b) Agricultural education and the introduction of new methods and new crops. Each of the Border Regions maintains an agricultural experiment station which studies improved varieties of seeds and carries on education among the peasantry directed toward the improvement of agricultural methods.

(c) The increase and improvement of agricultural implements.

(d) The encouragement of livestock breeding.

(e) The improvement of the condition of the tenant farmer through reduction of rents, loans and exemptions from taxation.

(f) The formation of labor exchange groups among the farmers so as to increase village productivity and to use more economically the limited supply of agricultural implements.

(g) Keeping agricultural production out of the hands of the enemy by encouraging handicraft industries and discouraging the production of crops which have no food value or could not be marketed within the Communist area.

As a result of these measures agricultural production has increased, and at the present the Communist areas are generally self-sufficient so far as food production is concerned.

Agriculture is discussed more extensively under the various Communist areas.

(2) Trade

The Communists carry on a limited amount of trade with Chungking China and with Occupied China. The trade with Chungking is mainly from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area, while the trade with the Japanese occupied regions is carried on from the areas behind the Japanese lines. Since the Communist areas were deficient in cloth and most types of manufactured articles, they have attempted to acquire these through trade either with the rest of Free China or with the occupied areas. They adopted a policy in the regions behind the Japanese lines of restricting the export of food, cotton and other raw materials which would be useful to the Japanese, but did permit sufficient trade so that they could obtain cloth and finished products such as munitions, radio parts, medicines, kerosene, etc. During the early years of Japanese occupation it was relatively easy to acquire goods from the Japanese controlled areas, but as time has gone on the availability of manufactured products has decreased and the Japanese have imposed a more rigid blockade, with the result that the flow of essential commodities has decreased. Between 1937 and 1940 relatively free exchange of goods between the Yenan area and the rest of Free China took place, but since that time the Central Government has imposed a partial blockade against the Communist areas. As a result, exports from the Yenan area have been confined largely to salt and petroleum products which were needed by the rest of Free China in return for cloth, dyestuffs, etc. There was very little movement of goods from one Communist area to another because of the difficulties of transportation.

D. INDUSTRY AND ARMS PRODUCTION

(1) Industry

Before the war there was no modern industry in any of the Communist-controlled areas, and because most of the people depended upon imported cloth and manufactured items the home handicraft industries had deteriorated or gone out of existence entirely. Under Communist leadership a great effort has been made to develop handicraft industries in order to make the areas self-sufficient both as to military supplies and essential civilian needs. Numerous obstacles have been encountered, including: (1) lack of equipment, (2) difficulties in obtaining raw materials, (3) lack of skilled artisans, and (4) shortage of power, practically no electrical power being available. Nevertheless considerable progress has been made through the development of cooperatives and the establishment of government factories or government subsidized industries. At present numerous handicraft industries exist throughout the Communist region. They produce cotton, woolen and linen cloth, blankets, stockings, towels, cigarettes, matches, soap, paper, dyes, chinaware, chemicals, machine tools, etc. Although the Communist areas are still not entirely self-sufficient in the production of light consumer goods, their position has greatly improved. They are, however, still woefully weak so far as the production of machinery, chemicals, electrical equipment and all heavy industry goods are concerned. Most steel is obtained from rails torn up from the Japanese-controlled railways.

(2) Arsenals

Although there are a number of small arsenals scattered throughout the Communist areas, they are incapable of effectively meeting the needs of the Communist troops, who still must depend to a considerable extent for arms and munitions upon materials captured from the enemy. No rifles, bullets or other military supplies have been received from the Central Government since 1940–41, when the sending of such supplies was stopped. The largest and best equipped arsenals are in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia area and the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh area. Generally speaking the arsenals behind the Japanese lines are of a mobile type so that they can be dismantled and moved about readily in case of raids. No complete list of arsenals is available, although there appear to be three in the Shenai-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region one or two small ones in the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region, two in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region, two in the Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Border Region and a number in each of the other base areas. American fliers forced down in the New 4th Route Army region in

Kiangsu province reported that each division had three small arsenals attached to it.

The arsenals specialize in the repair of small arms and the loading of cartridges, the manufacture of mortars and mortar ammunitions, hand grenades and land mines, and the production of powder. A few of the arsenals are able to make rifles and light machine guns and repair light field guns. Among the difficulties which interfere with arms and munitions production are: (1) lack of steel, copper, brass and other necessary raw materials; (2) poor explosives (generally speaking the powder available is a locally made black powder of poor quality, although in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region a good quality powder is manufactured); (3) lack of proper equipment and machinery; and (4) lack of adequately trained technical personnel. Numerous observers agree that the armament production facilities of the area are so limited that no large scale offensive would be possible.

Industry and arms production are discussed in more detail under the various Communist areas.

E. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

(1) *General*

Transportation and communication facilities throughout the Communist areas are very poor. There are no railroads and, except in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region which is outside the Japanese occupied area, there are no motor roads. In fact, behind the Japanese lines the Communists have deliberately destroyed roads and trails leading into their base areas as a means of defense against the Japanese. Within the base areas trails provide the chief connecting arteries.

(2) *Roads and trails*

In the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region there are said to be about 800 miles of road which could be used by trucks or motor cars. These include the main highway from Fu-hsien north through Yenan to Mi-chih. From Fu-hsien this road runs southward through Kuomintang-controlled territory to Sian and affords the only motor connection between the Communist area and Free China. Other motor roads include one running northwestward from Yenan via Ching-pien to the salt-producing area in the vicinity of Ting-pien. Another runs from Ting-pien southeast to Ch'ing-yang. A fourth road reportely runs from Ch'ing-chien on the Yenan-Mi-chih road to Ching-pien on the Yenan to Ting-pien road. These roads supplemented by trails constitute the main transportation routes in this area. During 1942 about 45,000 laborers are said to have been mobilized to work on road construction.

The main route leading from Yenan to the base areas behind the Japanese lines runs northward from Yenan to Mi-chih. From there a trail runs northeastward to Chia-hsien on the Yellow River and thence for some distance north along the west bank of the river to a ferry crossing which connects with trails leading to the headquarters of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. From there various routes lead to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region and the Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Border Region. Communication between the base areas behind the Japanese lines is difficult because the Japanese-controlled railroads can be crossed only by armed forces or by means of tunnels.

(3) *Equipment and methods*

The few hundred miles of motorable highway are of little use to motor transport because of the almost complete absence of trucks or automobiles. One source states that there are only about 20-odd dilapidated trucks in the Yenan area. In general, mules, donkeys and human carriers are the main means of transportation, while horses are used to transport persons. Travel is slow and difficult, throughout the Communist areas, and one member of the U. S. Army Observer Section at Yenan indicates that during an extended field trip which he took by horseback they were rarely able to cover more than 25 miles a day. In the area behind the Japanese lines travel is even slower because of the long delays caused in crossing the Japanese controlled railways and highways, and in many cases it takes week or even months to travel a distance which would normally take only a few hours or days. In Hopeh extensive tunnel systems lead under the railways.

The government has encouraged the formation of transportation cooperatives and salt transport groups to facilitate the movement of goods in the Yenan area. These organized groups are said to be much more efficient in transporta-

tion than private transport efforts. Salt is perhaps the most important item transported. In 1942 over 1,550 animals were reportedly employed in the transportation of salt, of which 246 belonged to cooperatives and the balance was privately owned. By 1943, 3,706 animals were employed by cooperatives and 21,337 by private owners.

(4) Interference with Japanese transportation

North of the Lung-Hai railway the Communists have attacked the Japanese-controlled railroads and roads so often that the Japanese have been forced to defend them with blockhouses and ditches and defense works running along the communication lines. Despite these elaborate precautions the Communists are still able to wreck trains, attack convoys and cause considerable damage to Japanese transportation. South of the Lung-Hai railway in the new 4th Army area, the Communists have been less active in attacking communication lines. Consequently they are not protected by dykes and walls, and it is much easier for the Communists to move back and forth across them. They claim to be in a position to destroy large sections of the transportation routes in this area whenever it seems especially profitable to do so. Apart from this type of interference with communications, the Communists hold certain areas which deny to the Japanese the ready use of several potentially important highways. Among these are the through highway in eastern Shantung from Chiao-hsien via Lin-i to T'ung-shan (Suchow), the through highway from Tung-hai (Haichow) to Nan-t'ung in Eastern Kiangsu, the highway from Huhi-yin to Pukow via T'ien-ch'ang in Western Kiangsu, the main highway from Ch'ing-yüan (Paoting) to Tientsin and various other routes of lesser importance.

(5) Radio

Radio communications, although they exist between most of the Communist base areas, are very slow and inadequate. Several days are usually required to transmit or receive messages from the coastal areas to Yenan. Except in Yenan all of the sets are powered by hand generators and the messages have to be relayed from one area to another in order to cover any extensive distance. In exceptional circumstances Yenan can communicate with the Shantung peninsula in seven or eight hours, but this is the exception rather than the rule. The chief difficulty is lack of adequate equipment. Most of the existing equipment is old or has been patched up from materials captured from the Japanese. Efforts are being made through the U. S. Army Observer Section at Yenan to provide short-wave radio sets so that weather data and information about American fliers forced down behind the Japanese lines can be more rapidly communicated to Yenan.

The Yenan radio broadcasting station XNCR exists only for the purpose of broadcasting to outside areas. There are no private receiving sets in Yenan, and the broadcasts are devised primarily for foreign consumption or consumption of people outside the Communist areas.

(6) Telegraph

There are some telegraph lines in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and there are limited telegraphic connections between the area and the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. So far as is known telegraphic communications are not used in other areas. A study of the whole communications situation in the Communist area is being carried on by officials attached to U. S. Army Observer Section at Yenan.

(7) Air transport

Air transport between Yenan and Free China is possible and the U. S. Army Observer Section there has bi-weekly connection with the outside by transport plane.

(8) Post Office

The Communists have their own postal system which is managed by the General Communications Administration. They have their own post offices, stamps and system of postal deliveries. The Nationalist Government insists that the Communist postal authorities interfere with the functioning of the regular postal system of China.

F. CURRENCY AND FINANCE

(1) Currency

Each of the Communist areas issues its own currency which circulates freely throughout the issuing region. This currency is backed in some cases by reserves

of gold, silver and Chinese national currency but in general it seems to have no great backing other than popular confidence in it. It is issued by the various Border Region banks, and in general the circulation of Chinese National Currency or of Japanese puppet currency is prohibited. However, in the areas behind the Japanese lines puppet currency is stolen or otherwise acquired to use in commercial transactions with the areas controlled by the Japanese. An original function of the Border Region currency was to serve as a shield between Chinese National Currency and the puppet currency and so prevent the former from falling into Japanese hands.

The Border Region currency has a fair degree of stability within the issuing region. Since there is little trade between the various Border Regions, it is impossible to determine any accurate standard of value as between the various currencies. In general, however, it seems that currency of the Yenan area is less valuable than that of some of the other areas. As a matter of fact, in all of the Border Regions money is of relatively minor importance, because wages and salaries are paid in millet or other commodities and taxes are collected in kind. Millet is in reality the standard of value in the northern areas and rice is probably the standard in the New 4th Army areas. According to National Government sources approximately $350,000,000 worth of this Communist currency had been issued by the end of 1943. All such currency is illegal in the eyes of the Chungking Government.

Such exchange rates between the Border Region currencies as are available are given in the accompanying table.

Some exchange rates of Communnist currencies

Date	Silver $	CN $	SKN $	SS $	SCH $	Shan $	New 4th $	FRB $	CRB $
1937		1	1.21						
February 1941		1	1.50						
1941		4			1¼–2	5		1	
1943		1	2.20						
July 1943		1	10						
Late 1943	1		1,500	150	30				
May 1944	1		1,000						
Spring 1944					2			1	
Spring 1944				4	1				
Spring 1944			8	1					
July 1944		1	10						
Fall 1944		1	8.50						
1944		1	[1]8						
1944		1	[2]4–6						
Fall 1944			6	1					
February 1945						1		4	

NOTE.—
Silver $ = Chinese silver dollars.
CN $ = Chinese National Currency.
SKN $ = Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia.
SS $ = Shansi-Suiyuan.
SCH $ = Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh.
Shan $ = In 1941 Shansi-Hopeh-Honan, but in 1945 Shantung.
New 4th $ = New Fourth Army Area currency in Kiangsu.
FRB $ = Japanese Puppet Federal Reserve Bank currency (North China).
CRB $ = Japanese Puppet Central Reserve Bank currency (Nanking Gov't).
[1] Official.
[2] Unofficial.

(2) *Prices and inflation*

Prices have gone up considerably in all of the Communist areas and there is unquestionably currency inflation everywhere. Inflation seems to be the worst in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region but most observers agree that inflation is not as serious as in the Chungking area because salaries and wages are paid in kind to a very large extent and hence currency inflation matters very little.

(3) *Banking and finance*

A number of banks function in the various Communist areas. According to a Kuomintang source the following banks have been set up in the various Border Regions:

Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Frontier Bank
Kwang Hwa Shang Tien (shop) in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region

Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Frontier Bank
Northwest Agricultural Bank in Shansi
Shang Tang Bank in Southeast Shansi
South Hopeh Bank
Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu Frontier Bank
Pei Hai Bank in Northeast Shantung
T'ai Shan Bank in Shantung
North Kiangsu Bank
Huai Nan Bank
National Salvation Cooperative Society in Shansi
Agricultural Cooperative Society in South Shantung

Besides issuing currency these banks make loans to the Border Region governments, to cooperatives, and to private enterprises. They also have floated the following loans or bond issues, according to Chungking sources:

(a) The $12,000,000 Ten Year "Reconstruction Loan" issued by the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.
(b) The $500,000 Fifteen Year "Relief Loan" by the office of the Administrative Commissioner for South Hopeh.
(c) The $4,000,000 Fifteen Year "National Salvation Loan" by the Hopeh-Shansi-Chahar Border Region Government.
(d) The $6,000,000 Ten Year "National Reconstruction Loan" by the Hopeh-Shansi-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government.
(e) The $3,000,000 "Trade Loan" by the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.
(f) The lottery savings bonds issued by the Frontier Bank, each issue of which is $1,000,000. (1) (24) (25) (46)

(4) Interest and loans

Generally speaking, the Communists have abolished usury and greatly reduced the interest rates throughout their territory. The various governments make loans in the form of grain, agricultural implements and machinery, equipment, etc., to farmers or industrial enterprises at very low rates of interest as a means of encouraging production. The Communists claim to have reduced interest rates in 899 hsien under their influence.

(5) Taxation

Taxation seems to have been reduced, particularly upon the poorer classes, throughout the Communist areas. Most observers agree that there are only a few types of taxes and that the maximum rate is generally not over 37½ percent upon the total income. Taxes at this rate are levied only upon the richer peasants who hire others to do their work. The rate progressively lowers until the poorest people pay no taxes at all. Since 1937 a general effort has been made to introduce a progressive tax system based upon ability to pay and to be levied upon income or property. However, no uniform system seems to have been adopted throughout the whole region. Taxes are generally paid in kind. There are also rather light taxes upon business, a courvee or work tax, levies for the support of troops and various other devices aimed at collecting revenue and equalizing income.

The Communists claim that in the New 4th Army area in Kiangsu and Anhwei taxes have been reduced by about $200,000,000. In the Tai-hang mountain area of Southern Shansi taxes in 1944 are said to be only about half of those levied in 1941, and in most other liberated areas they also claim that taxes have been reduced. In contradiction to the above claims and to the general opinion of observers in the Communists areas, the Chungking Government contends that the Communists have introduced a multitude of new taxes and lists some 27 different types of levies to back up its contention. These include among others: anti-Japanese contributions, levies on rich families, inheritance taxes, stamp, tobacco, opium and wine taxes, enemy goods entrance tax and marriage registration tax.

(6) Government income

The income of the Border Region governments in general seems to be derived from the following sources: (1) taxation, (2) income from government enterprises and the production of the armed forces, and (3) note issue.

G. THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGSIA BORDER REGION

(1) Agriculture—General

This is one of the poorest of all the Communist areas, although it served as the original base for the whole movement. The region consists of loess-clad hills and barren mountains with valley regions where agriculture can be pursued. Rainfall is very scanty and most of it comes in July and August with some in June. Crop failure caused by lack of rainfall occurs every few years. The hillsides are rather barren or covered with short grass because of lack of rainfall. The most important food crop is millet followed by wheat and *kaoliang*. Irish and sweet potatoes are also important food crops and corn, soybeans, barley, flax and rye are produced. Vegetables include carrots, onions, tomatoes, cabbage and string beans, while melons, apricots and peaches are also produced. Among the commercial crops opium, cotton and tobacco should be noted.

(*a*) *Agricultural education.*—In an effort to improve agriculture the government has sent instructors among the peasants to introduce crop rotation, diversified planting and better methods of fertilization. Seeds have been supplied to the peasants by the government and loans have been made to enable them to acquire necessary equipment. Classes on agriculture and animal husbandry have been set up in rural villages and spinning and weaving have been taught to women in the villages. As a result of these efforts the cultivation of rice has been introduced into this area and the production of wheat considerably increased. More beans, corn soybeans and cotton have also been produced. (1)

(*b*) *Land reclamation.*—According to Communist figures, some 3,300,000 *mou* (one *mou* probably equals ⅙ of an acre) of land were reclaimed between 1939 and 1943. The area reclaimed amounted to about 699,000 *mou* in 1940, 381,000 in 1942, 976,000 in 1943, and the objective in 1944 was 1,000,000 *mou*. In 1943, of the 976,000 *mou* reclaimed, 207,000 were reclaimed by the 8th Route Army. (9 p. 1)

(*c*) *Food production.*—According to Communist figures, total cultivated land and food production (principally millet) in recent years was as follows:

Date	Food production	Cultivated land
	Piculs [1]	*Mou*
1940		11,742,000
1942	1,680,000	
1943	1,840,000	13,387,000

[1] The picul probably equals 133 pounds but it may be the *shih* picul of 110 pounds.

In 1943 food production was roughly divided as follows:

	Percent		*Percent*
millet	24.5	flax	5.1
wheat	21.5	corn	3.7
yellow millet	1.4	potatoes	3.2
beans	11.2	cotton	1.4
buckwheat	7.1	vegetables, misc	2.2
kaoliang	6.4		

The food requirements of the area are given by one Communist source as 1,620,000 piculs and by another as between 1,500,000 and 1,600,000 piculs of millet plus 230,000 piculs of other food. Production in 1943, therefore, exceeded requirements.

(*d*) *Cotton.*—The production of cotton has been particularly encouraged, apparently with good results, as can be judged from the accompanying table.

	Area cultivated	Production of cotton	Production of cotton seed
	(*Mou*)	(*Piculs*)	(*Piculs*)
1940	15,117		
1942	94,000	14,000	28,000
1943	150,288	17,300	
1944	[1] 300,000		

[1] Planned.

The planned production for 1944 would have reached requirements, but frost damaged the crop and consequently complete self-sufficiency was not attained. The main cotton producing districts are around Yen-ch'ang, Yen-ch'uan and Ku-lin. The first two of three districts had about 80 per cent of the total cotton acreage in 1942. In order to encourage the production of cotton, the fields have been exempted from taxation and also loans at low rates of interests have been given to cotton producers.

(*e*) *Salt.*—Important salt fields are located in the northwestern part of the area in the vicinity of Ting-pien. These fields are worked especially during the season when people are not engaged in agriculture. Salt provides the largest percentage of exports from the area, and, according to one source, about $40,000,000 worth of revenue was obtained from salt in 1942. Salt transport cooperatives have been organized to work the fields and transport the salt. Communist figures indicate that 310,000 piculs were produced in 1942 and that in 1943 between 800,000 and 900,000 piculs were produced. During this latter year some 3,706 animals belonging to transport cooperatives were involved in transporting the salt and over 21,000 belonging to private individuals.

(*f*) *Livestock.*—The Border Region Government has also encouraged the production of cattle, donkeys, mules and sheep. According to Commmunist figures, the following increases in livestock took place between 1940 and 1943:

Year	Cattle	Donkeys	Sheep
1940	193,283	125,054	1,725,037
1943	220,781	167,671	20,332,371

Sheep products in 1943 are given as follows: white wool 6,710 poculs; black wool 3,337 piculs; large sheepskins 71,512, and small sheepskins 45,756.

(*g*) *Opium.*—During the last few years it appears that opium has been produced in the area, primarily for export to the Chungking area as a means of obtaining necessary currency for the purchase of cloth and other items. The Chungking Government claims that throughout the Communist areas, 158,000 *mou* were planted to opium in 1942. The controversy over opium has been one factor of discord between Chungking and the Communists.

(*2*) *Industry—General*

The government at Yenan has established a number of industrial plants; it has also encouraged the development of industrial cooperatives and has promoted private handicraft production. Military units, government officials, students and other people are also encouraged to produce items needed for their own use. Early in 1944, according to a Communist pamphlet, there were 108 government establishments in the Yenan area as follows:

weaving	23	implements	13
coal enterprises	18	blankets and cloth	15
grain grinding mills	12	printing presses	5
chemical plants	13	miscellaneous	9

In 1939 there were 800 workers in industrial establishments, and by early 1944 there were some 12,000 workers in 70 of the government and private factories.

(*a*) *Cooperatives.*—Cooperatives have developed rapidly, reportedly increasing, according to one Communist source, from 142 in 1937 with a membership of 57,807 and a capital of $55,225 (Border currency) to 634 in February 1944 with a membership of 182,878 and a capital of $733,998,403. These cooperatives in 1944 were classified as follows: consumer 281, producer 114, transportation 223, credit 6. Another Communist source gives more detailed but very different figures on the cooperatives as follows (values are presumably in Border currency):

Year	Number	Members	Shares of Capital	Business Income	Production	Transportation (head of cattle)
1937	142	57,847	$55,229	$261,689		
1938	107	66,707	75,629	391,282		
1939	115	82,885	125,848	552,249	$600,000	
1940	132	123,279	332,843	1,156,435	4,131,500	
1941	155	140,218	1,362,384	6,493,399	14,189,000	206
1942	207	143,721	9,346,876	34,932,109	23,252,600	265
1943	260	150,000	170,000,000	600,000,000	494,000,000	3,706

(*b*) *Textiles.*—No satisfactory over-all figures on the textile industry are available. In 1941 1,085 persons were reportedly employed by government and army units and operated 388 looms and 32 carpet machines, and 30 spinning and weaving cooperatives employed 385 persons, operating 176 looms and 12 carpet machines. In addition 34,500 weaving workers and 75,000 spinning workers operated 12,000 locally-made looms while 68,000 hand looms were operated in various households. Total production in this year was reported as 100,000 *pi* of cloth (1 *pi* equals 32.33 meters or about 100 feet). This production was said to equal 40 per cent of the requirement. At about the same time Mao Toe-tung indicated that the total demand for cloth in the Yenan area was 360,000 *pi* and that cloth production amounted to one-third of demand. Since that time considerable efforts have been made to increase the production of raw cotton, and some reports state that the area is now approximately self-sufficient in cloth. Woolen and linen cloth production has also been encouraged. Production in government weaving factories, which amounted to only 3,000 *pi* in 1940, increased to 15,840 by 1943.

(*c*) *Iron and steel.*—Shensi iron, generally speaking, is of a poor quality and all mining and refining is done by very primitive methods. The first iron foundry was established in May 1943, and it is operated by people who know very little about iron production. It has two small and three somewhat larger furnaces and employs about 200 workers. Several thousand workers are employed in digging iron ore from mines about 10 miles distant. Some steel is produced by a very primitive puddling process. Iron and steel production is inadequate, and the area has to depend very largely upon captured rails for the steel used in its arsenals. Iron is reportedly produced near Yenan, Kan-ch'uan and other places in Shensi. Mao says that the iron requirements of the area are 47,000 piculs a year.

(*d*) *Coal.*—In 1942 the 15 coal mines in operation are said to have produced 3,400,000 lbs. during the month of September. This, however, barely met the requirements of Yenan. Good anthracite is produced in some areas, but lack of mechanical facilities and adequate transportation seriously limit production and distribution of coal. It has to be carried by mule and donkey to points where it is used.

(*e*) *Printing and paper.*—A local type of grass is used in the production of a rough but rather good quality paper. Several primitive paper factories are operated in the Yenan area, and although production has increased it still does not meet adequately the needs of the area. One of the larger factories which was visited in the spring of 1944 by representatives of the press made ten reams a day. Its motive power was provided by a waterfall and horses.

(*f*) *Petroleum.*—Several oil wells are operated in the vicinity of Yen-ch'ang. The equipment is old and very unsatisfactory and the operating personnel are unacquainted with the technical aspects of oil production. Wells Nos. 1 and 2 are practically dry. Only Well No. 3 is at present functioning, and drilling on Nos. 4 and 5 has just been started. Daily output is said to be from 70 to 80 bbls. The plant produces gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil, lubricating oils and candles. Most of the gasoline produced is kept to operate the few trucks in the Yenan area. Kerosene and other byproducts are largely exported to the Chungking area.

(*g*) *Miscellaneous industries.*—Other important industries include matches, soap, chemicals and pharmaceutical supplies. There is a fairly efficient establishment for the production of the latter materials in connection with the hospital at Yenan. It produces sodium chloride, sodium sulphate, magnesium carbonate, sulphur, medical carmon and bandages, etc.

(*h*) *Arsenals.*—Two arsenals are reported in the vicinity of Yenan. One is located about 12 miles northwest of Yenan at a place variously called Wen-chia-kou or Wu-ch'i-chen. The location of the other is unknown. This was visited by Colonel Barrett and various others who have described it in detail. Its power is provided by two truck motors, and it contains a heterogeneous assortment of lathes, presses, punches and machines. The steel and smokeless powder used in it is produced in other nearby plants. Forgings are hammered out by hand on anvils and a great degree of skill is shown by the blacksmiths. Most of the steel is obtained from rails torn up from the Japanese railways. Its principal product is grenade dischargers (knee mortars). It formerly produced about 100 of these per month, but because of shortage of steel it now only produces about 50. It also reloads rifle ammunition and produces bullets and primers but is largely dependent upon captured cartridge castings. It is now preparing to manufacture cartridges and hopes ultimately to be able to produce about 1,000 rounds

22848—52—pt. 7A——9

per month. It also repairs rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, knee mortars and mountain artillery.

Another arsenal is located in Northern Shensi at the village of Pan-pu-kou, which is somewhat south of Chia-hsien and about 13 miles west of the Yellow River. It serves the Shansi-Suiyuan area primarily. This is said to be the largest and best equipped arsenal in the Communist area. It is located in a very out of the way place and is equipped with machinery which formerly belonged to the arsenal at Taiyuan. It has a large steam generator. It is said to produce from 250 to 300 knee mortar projectiles and 10 knee mortars a week. It also reloads rifle cartridges and manufactures a few light machine guns. The reloading of cartridges is irregular because this depended largely upon the number of casings retrieved from battle. It also makes land mines and repairs weapons. Four hundred men are employed, and it operates two 10-hour shifts daily. One hundred of the men had been former employees in the Taiyuan arsenal.

(3) *Trade*

Because of the deficiencies of this area in manufactured products, particularly cloth and munitions, it desires to obtain these products from the Chungking area. From the formation of the united front agreement in 1937 until 1940 some products did reach the Yenan area and helped to meet its difficulties. However, in 1940 Chungking limited trade to such items as would benefit Chungking and prohibited entirely the movement of arms or munitions into the Communist region. About the only products which Chungking wanted from the Yenan area were salt and petroleum products. Consequently, the balance of trade turned strongly against Yenan, with the result that in 1943 it had an unfavorable balance of trade amounting to CN 150,000,000. In an effort to redress this unfavorable balance and obtain sufficient currency to acquire the imports desired, the cultivation of opium was carried on and some if it is smuggled into Chungking territory. The Yenan government has also imposed restrictions upon all imports except cloth, iron and similar items of vital necessity, and has prohibited the importation of luxuries and nonessentials and the export of foodstuffs. The export of salt and other items is under strict government control.

(4) *Finance*

(a) *Currency.*—The currency of this area is issued by the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Frontier Bank at Yenan. The existing currency dates from 18 February 1941, according to Communist sources. It is illegal in the eyes of Chungking, but it is the only currency allowed to circulate in the area. According to Chungking these Border Region notes were issued much earlier than 1941, and Edgar Snow indicates that when he visited the Yenan area in 1936 Communist notes were in circulation. The exchange rate was then CN$1 equaled Yenan $1.21. It may be that after the formation of the united front the issuance of the Border Region currency was temporarily suspended and that the Yenan government resumed issue in 1941 after the imposition of the blockade by Chungking. The Border Region currency is backed by gold, silver and Chinese national currency, and it seems probable that the silver was brought by the Communists to Shensi at the time of their long march from Kiangsi. One source indicates that much of the currency is in small denominations, which, because of the inflation, makes its use as an ordinary medium of exchange troublesome. Another source indicates that currency is now printed in $200 denominations.

(b) *Inflation and prices.*—Observers disagree as to the degree of inflation in the Yenan area, but all agree that it is considerable. Prices of cloth, metals and such objects which are relatively scarce are possibly higher than in Kuomintang China, but in general prices are probably less inflated than in the rest of Free China. Regardless of the degree of inflation, most people do not suffer from it seriously because of the relative unimportance of money in the whole economy. The situation is summarized by one observer as follows:

> "Prices in Yenan are as high as elsewhere in Free China but the inflation has little effect on the economic well-being of the population. Those groups which suffer most severely in Nationalist China—government employees, soldiers, teachers, students—are paid in kind in Yenan and are under no hardship. Housing, clothing, food and a variety of other necessities are provided. Cash salary or wages have little significance except for the purchase of luxuries, and of these there are practically none. Farmers, shopkeepers, artisans and small industrialists sell their product or labor at inflated prices and accordingly are able to purchase their requirements."

(*c*) *Interest and loans.*—As soon as the Communists came into Shensi they undertook the abolition of usury and the reduction of the interest rate. As of 1936 Edgar Snow noted that the maximum rate permitted was 10 per cent and that most government loans were made at a rate of about 5 per cent. More recently the government has followed a policy of making extensive loans in the form of money, seed, agricultural implements, machinery, etc., to poor farmers, small merchants and private individuals who will enter productive enterprise. The government has also guaranteed payment of the lower rates of interest allowed, which has tended to satisfy money-lenders.

(*d*) *Taxation.*—Soon after the Communists came into Shensi they abolished the existing tax structure, canceled most taxes on the small land owners and tenant farmers and levied rather heavy taxes upon the wealthy landlords and usurers. In 1937 Mao Tse-tung proposed the introduction of a progressive tax system which would be based upon ability to pay, and some such scheme has gradually been introduced. The present tax system seems to embrace the following main features:

A tax levied on land and agricultural gains. This in general is a certain percentage of the produce of the land levied in kind plus taxes on income from rents, animal hire, etc. The maximum is 37½ per cent on the largest incomes and progressively decreases until the poorer people pay little or no taxes at all. The families of soldiers, immigrants of less than three years' standing, and people with too low an income to maintain a decent standard of living are exempted from taxation. Those exempted are said to amount to less than 20 per cent of the population.

A commercial tax. This is said to have started in 1940 and is collected twice a year by the tax office of the local government and the local chamber of commerce. In 1943 it is said to have amounted to 13 per cent of the net profits of commercial activities.

A public service or labor tax. This consists of labor service to the government and includes the transportation of foodstuffs and salt or aid to troops such as carrying wounded soldiers, building roads, underground houses, etc.

Various forms of assistance to the army such as loans of seed, tools, food, clothing, animals, etc.

Most observers agree that taxation for the mass of the people is considerably less than in pre-Communist days.

(*e*) *Government revenue.*—In 1936 government expenditure was said to amount to about $320,000 per month (presumably Border Region currency). At that time 40 to 50 per cent of government revenue was obtained through confiscations, another 15 to 20 per cent through voluntary contributions and the remainder through taxation, trade, government industries and bond issue.

In 1943 according to Communist sources total government expenditure was $6,000,000 Border Region currency plus taxes collected in kind, which perhaps amounted to 170,000 piculs of millet. Of this income 64 per cent came from government enterprises and army production. The remainder came from taxation and note issue. The deficit was said to be 18 per cent, which was met by borrowing from the Border Region bank, i. e., by the issue of notes. The main factor in the unbalanced budget was the drain of currency to pay for imports from the rest of Free China. In 1944 70 per cent of the government revenue was said to be derived from government and army production, and the deficit was said to be considerably less than in 1943. Income from the land tax is given as follows:

1938— 10,000 piculs of millet
1939— 50,000 piculs of millet
1940—180,000 piculs of millet
1944—160,000 piculs of millet plus 180,000 piculs of fodder.

H. THE SHANSI-SUIYUAN BORDER REGION

(*1*) *General*

In general the physical characteristics of this area are similar to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. It is probably the poorest of all the Communist areas and has made the least progress. Achievements here cannot be compared with those in any of the other Border Regions. It is a rather desolate region with a very impoverished peasantry who have not responded as rapidly to Communist leadership as has been the case elsewhere. Most of the people speak a dialect which is not very widely known and this has complicated matters. However, some developments have taken place, and even as early as 1943 some 125,000 people had been organized into the Farmers' Mass Organization and 55,000 workers into the Workers' Mass Organization. It is very important as a

connecting link between the Yenan region and the more prosperous Border Regions to the east.

(2) *Arsenals*

A small arsenal is reported to be located near Hsing-hsien and another in the mountains south of Taiyuan and north of Fen-yang. Both of those are apparently small plants which specialize in the repair of small arms and the manufacture of land mines and grenades. One of them is said to manufacture black powder and the one north of Fen-yang reportedly makes a thousand land mines and two thousand grenades a month.

I. SHANSI-CHAHAR-HOPEH BORDER REGION

(1) *General economic features*

The central core of this area is made up of the mountainous regions forming the border between Shansi, Chahar and Hopeh, but the base area also extends into the fertile North China plain. It is one of the most progressive and richest of the Communist areas. The economy of the mountainous regions is similar to that of the Yenan area, but the plains include very fertile agricultural lands. The rainfall is greater than in the loess highlands and crop failures are less frequent. Wheat and millet are the most important food crops. Wheat is generally planted in October and harvested in the late spring and early summer. Important spring and summer crops are millet, *kaoliang*, corn, soybeans, sweet potatoes, peanuts and sesame. Cotton, hemp and tobacco are important commercial crops, and some wool is also produced. Vegetables include cabbage, beans, carrots and Irish potatoes, while the important fruits are pears, persimmons and melons. The alluvial plains support a large population, and it is in these regions that the intense struggle between the Communists and Japanese for control goes on. The people have suffered severely from Japanese raiding expeditions which destroy property, deplete the food supply, reduce the domestic animals and commandeer workers. As a consequence the area has suffered from a shortage of cattle, seeds and manpower.

(2) *Government economic program*

The government, which includes a large number of non-Communists, has followed a very progressive policy along the following lines:

(a) Land reclamation has been pushed forward. In this regard there has been a close cooperation between the civilian population and the army, which aids in carrying out repair of damage done by the Japanese to drainage canals and irrigation ditches. A considerable amount of land has been reclaimed.

(b) To compensate for the shortage of manpower and to facilitate the general agricultural program, cultivation teams have been formed, consisting of several workers who jointly use the same implements and draft animals and who move from place to place plowing and doing agricultural work.

(c) Mass organizations have been promoted, and by 1943 about 858,000 persons were organized into farmers' groups and some 235,000 in workers' groups.

(d) Loans of seed and animals have been made to farmers, and food has been supplied to famine and devastated areas. The government maintains some food storehouses, but in general government tax grain is left stored in the local villages and is issued to troops or other persons when needed against vouchers which the taxpayer can present to the government as tax receipts.

(e) Household industries have been encouraged to supplement normal farm production and improve the self-sufficiency of the area.

(f) A policy of preventing cotton and other important industrial production from reaching the Japanese has also been enforced. Some opium is produced in the area, but its use is restricted to trade with the Japanese in exchange for necessary commodities.

(g) Finally, a very active program of agricultural research and education aimed toward the improvement of grain seeds and agricultural production has been carried on. This program is well summarized by an observer who was in the area in 1943.

> "A lot of agricultural research work is being done in developing new kinds of seed, methods of pest control, the introduction of new kinds of animals and so on. There are a number of experimental farms which have done some valuable work. Twenty-three irrigation schemes have been carried on with 58 miles of canal increasing the irrigated area by over 15,000 acres. Agricultural credit is given by branches of the government bank and there are

also credit cooperatives. Some work has been done on afforestation but the people have not yet been educated to the dangers of soil erosion, which is actually one of the most serious problems in North China, and progress has been very slight. A lot of trees have been planted by the rivers where people can see that the timber will be useful in the future but they do not see the point of planting on the hills.

"At the end of 1941 an organization for controlling grain prices was started. The farmers usually sell their grain soon after the harvest so that there has been a very big fluctuation in grain prices which rise very high before the harvest and fall very low after. The grain control board has a capital of $5,000,000, half from the government and half from private capital. The private capital was largely subscribed in the form of grain. The board, therefore, started with a considerable influence on prices. It has been of considerable assistance to the farmers and small merchants by being ready to buy in local markets when the price fell too low. Communications in the areas are so bad that slight excess of supply might cause a very big fall in the local market price and the farmer or small merchant might spend a long time transporting his grain by mule between markets several days' journey apart before he could obtain a reasonable price."

(3) Industry and arsenals

The industries in this region are in general similar to those found in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, and the same methods of production are used. One of the most notable industrial establishments of this region is an excellent chemical plant near Fou-p'ing (Fuping) which enables the area to produce the best explosives in the Communist region. It is operated by competent chemists from Peiping. Observers from the area say that the plant is to be divided into four sections which are to be located at different places throughout the base area. The area also has a small blast furnace which makes iron for military use. Two arsenals are also reported, one of which is located near Fou-p'ing. This arsenal is described as being rather similar in character to the one at Wen-chia-kou near Yenan. Vegetable oils are also cracked to produce fuel for lamps. There is a research bureau which encourages new industrial developments.

(4) Currency and taxation

The currency in this area seems to have been especially well managed and apparently its value is holding up better than that in most other areas of North China. It is issued by the Northwest Farmers' Bank and originally had a backing of 60 percent national currency notes. As national currency depreciated most of this reserve was spent in buying gold and silver, which now backs the existing currency. Some reports claim that the currency has a higher value than that of Chinese currency at present.

A progressive tax system has been introduced into certain parts of this area, very similar in nature to that described under the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. The main features are taxes on land and income. Reportedly the rates range from about 7 per cent of the income of the lowest taxpaying group to 65 per cent for the highest income group. There is also a tax on imports and exports. This is levied primarily to regulate trade rather than as a means of revenue. Taxes in general are payable in kind and are collected and stored locally. The policy of reducing rents and interest rates and of public loans at low interest rates is also maintained in this area.

J. THE SHANSI-HOPEH-HONAN BORDER REGION

(1) General

Much of this area is mountainous and unproductive and its population is relatively small. In general the economy resembles in most respects that of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. Tobacco is one of the most important commercial crops produced. There are important minerals in the mountains, but these have never been greatly developed, and the few that have been are under Japanese control. Despite its comparative poverty, the region is relatively self-sufficient.

(2) Agriculture

During 1942 and 1943 the fertile agricultural regions of this area suffered from a severe famine brought on by drought and later by a plague of locusts. The government aided in meeting the famine and rehabilitating the area through a policy of rent and tax reductions and the granting of loans and the supplying

of seed grains to the devastated area. Good crops in the fall of 1943 and 1944 improved the condition of the area considerably. A very active program of improving types of grains and reclamation is carried on. The agricultural experiment station has introduced a new type of corn which has greatly increased the yield. It also maintains an agricultural school which attracts students from throughout the area. During 1944 the government of the area claims that 50,000 acres of wasteland were reclaimed and that agricultural production was greatly increased. In 1943 in this area and the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region some 2,670,000 peasants were organized in mass farmers' organizations and 23,625 workers into workers' organizations.

(3) Industry and arsenals

This region is particularly notable for its production of cigarettes from locally produced tobacco. The cigarettes are traded to the Japanese-controlled areas in return for sugar and cotton cloth. It also makes paper, farm tools, cotton cloth, etc. Fliers forced down in this region report that there are two small arsenals which can make mortars and mortar shells, reload cartridges, repair rifles and produce land mines and grenades. Powder in the area is said to be poor.

K. THE HOPEH-SHANTUNG-HONAN BORDER REGION

This area lies entirely in the alluvial plains of North China and it resembles in every respect the plains area of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. It is a comparatively rich agricultural region, but suffered very severely during 1942 and 1943 from a prolonged drought followed by a plague of locusts. During the drought nearly a million and a half acres reportedly lay uncultivated, and crops of millet, *kaoliang*, wheat, corn and cotton were not over 50 per cent of normal. Many people died or left the area. However, during the fall and winter of 1943–44 there was adequate rain; the government supplied grain seeds, and the resulting winter crop was fairly good. The area was plundered again during the spring and summer of 1944 by the Japanese. Despite these difficulties over 2,500,000 acres were reportedly sown to wheat during the winter of 1944.

L. THE SHANTUNG BASE AREA

The Communist-controlled region in Shantung is broken up into a number of separate areas, although there has been a tendency for consolidation during the past year. The most important base is in the mountainous areas of central Shantung south of the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway, with other centers in the mountainous parts of the Shantung Peninsula and in the relatively swampy areas around the estuary of the old Yellow River. In general, however, the economy resembles that of the plains and mountainous areas of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. Some silk is produced in the mountainous areas of Shantung.

A picture of conditions in the area is given by the Austrian, Dr. Rosenthal, who is serving with the medical department of the Shantung Liberated Area.

> "In Shantung, private property is untouched and landlords have reduced rents by 25%. Formerly landlords got 60–70% of the produce, but now they are getting 37½%. Through seven years of armed resistance, peasants in the 8th Route and the New 4th Army bases are living in greater prosperity compared with the past. It is very obvious that the peasants are willing and actively prepared to fight for their own democratic government and against Japanese mopping-up drives. Landlords are also happy. Income from 37½% of the harvest is handsome, while there are troops fighting against Japanese pillage. Thus the majority of landlords are also backing up and supporting the democracy government.
>
> "There is dire lack of armament, but the food ration of the army is good and the fighting morale is high. There is excellent unity between the army and the democratic government. . . .
>
> "Peasants plow their land with buffaloes, cows, oxen, donkeys and mules. Staple food is millet, *kaoliang* and sweet potatoes which have low nutritious value. The output of wheat and rice is comparatvely [small], but in many places there are extremely sweet pears, peaches, apples, grapes, watermelons, chestnuts and walnuts. . . . Tobacco is planted and excellent cigarettes are manufactured."

Little information is available on currency or tax policy in this area. Reduction of rents and interest rates are put into effect in newly liberated regions. Relief grains and loans at low interest are also distributed by the government. Prices are reported to be less inflated than in occupied China or in Chungking

controlled areas, and one broadcast claims that the Communist currency in the area is at a premium over the puppet Federal Reserve Bank notes.

M. THE NEW FOURTH ARMY AREA IN KIANGSU, ANHWEI, AND CHEKIANG

This includes seven base areas in east central China. In Northern Kiangsu and Anhwei a good deal of wheat is grown, and in some respects the economy is similar to that of the North China plain, but as one proceeds south precipitation increases and rice increases in importance as a basic food crop. Because of the extensive rainfall the area is cut by numerous canals and streams, and the existence of these waterways has facilitated the development of the guerrilla bases. In general, two crops a year are produced in these areas. The winter crop consists of wheat, beans, barley, rape seed and similar commodities. Rice is the most important summer crop and is probably the main element in the diet of the people. It is planted in the spring and harvested in October and November. Silk and cotton are also produced. It is perhaps the richest of all the Communist areas, and observers who have been in the region generally agree that it is well administered and that there is close cooperation between the troops and the local population. If crops are short the ration allowance of troops is reduced. The property of landlords seems not to have been disturbed, and troops are careful to pay for supplies. The general economic well-being of the area is testified to by the fact that no rationing is imposed upon the civilian population. Along the coast peasants are encouraged to produce salt and fishermen are also encouraged.

Local Communist currency, Chinese National Currency and puppet currency are said to be used in these areas. The latter is used primarily in trade with the Japanese, of which there seems to be considerable. A policy of rent and interest reductions has been carried out, although the Communists have moved rather carefully in this regard because of a desire to avoid alienation of the powerful landed interests. Taxation is levied on a progressive basis with the poorer 20 per cent of the farmers exempted from taxation. The highest rates, which generally do not exceed 35 per cent of income, are levied on rich landlords. Revenue is said to be derived from taxes on agricultural production and on industrial and commercial activities. The tax money is reportedly divided so that seven-tenths is used for military affairs and three-tenths for civil affairs.

N. THE HUPEH-HONAN-ANHWEI BASE OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY

This is in general the area around Hankow, and in recent times seems to have been extended to include parts of Hunan and Kiangsi. Its general economic characteristics are similar to the New Fourth Army areas in Kiangsu and Anhwei. A recent broadcast from Yenan summarizes the achievements in the area during 1944.

> "The total area of the Honan-Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi-Anhwei border region is now approximately 33,000 square miles, of which 5,500 square miles were added in 1944. The total population is 9,200,000, of which 1,500,000 were liberated last year.
>
> "There are five prefectures controlling 44 counties. The first provisional Border Region People's Congress attended by 177 delegates was held in June of last year. There are now 16 counties with a County People's Council.
>
> "Vast irrigation projects and productive measures passed by these County People's Councils have led to bumper crops never seen in the past 15 years. Fifteen million dollars in local currency were spent by the government last year for famine relief work, while 293,120 *tan*, 67,844 dollars, 78,785 labor days and 168,664 cattle days were used to aid the dependents of the army men.
>
> "The government has launched a large scale production movement which is also joined by government organs, public bodies and the army. At present the army and institutions are already self-sufficient in vegetables, firewood and coal for three months. They have altogether reclaimed 3,928 acres of wasteland and planted 1,158 acres of vegetables. There are now six cooperatives with a capital of 5,000,000 one with a capital above 5,000,000 and one with a capital of 50,000,000 in local currency.
>
> "Economic reconstruction has been mainly devoted to building and repairing of irrigation works: 1,392,963 work days spent on building of dykes, dams and irrigation canals have reclaimed 88,392 acres of land in 12 counties. In another 13 counties, 1,731,273 work days were spent on irrigation works which can irrigate 141,250 acres of land."

O. BASES IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE

There are two Communist base areas in Kwangtung province one being located in the Canton delta region and the other on Hainan Island. Little is known about economic developments under the Communists in either of these base areas. The East River base in the Canton delta is located in a rich rice-producing area. Rice farming and vegetable production supplemented by local handicrafts undoubtedly provide the basis of economic life in the area. The area of consolidated Communist control in Hainan Island seems to be in the rice-producing lowlands of northeastern Hainan, and rice production undoubtedly forms the basis of economic life.

P. CONCLUSION

The Communists control a large area and considerable population behind the Japanese lines in North and Central China. Economically their activities have been important because they have interfered with Japanese lines of communication and because they have kept cotton, food, other commercial crops and manpower out of Japanese hands. By so doing the Communists have prevented the Japanese from gaining the maximum advantage out of North and Central China. The areas effectively controlled by the Communists, however, constitute the poorest agricultural and industrial areas behind the Japanese lines. The Communists have endeavored, rather successfully, to revitalize the spirit of the peasantry, to increase agricultural production, and to develop handicraft industries to meet civilian and military needs. As a result of their efforts most of the resistance bases may be said to be practically self-sufficient in terms of their relatively simple requirements.

Despite these developments, the Communist areas are economically very weak and undeveloped. Railroads are nonexistent, roads and motor transport are practically nonexistent, communication facilities—radio, telegraph, telephone—are hopelessly inadequate, and modern industry simply does not exist. Facilities for the production of weapons and munitions are small and primitive and unable adequately to meet the needs of extensive guerrilla warfare. Economically and geographically speaking, the Communist area is excellently suited to guerrilla warfare, and the relations between the peasantry and the Communist forces are good. However, the area lacks the economic strength and facilities to equip or maintain modern fighting forces capable of meeting the Japanese in open combat, and its present economic strength is not sufficient to enable existing Communist forces to maintain the pressure upon the Japanese which they could maintain if they were better equipped and supplied.

7. Chinese Communist Army

A. STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(1) General

The forces of the Chinese Communists may be classified into three general categories: the Field Forces, the Local Forces (Guerrilla Army) and the People's Militia. The Field Forces are often moved about from one area to another as the military situation demands, and they generally wear uniform. The Local Forces, or Guerrilla Army, usually confine their operations to particular areas, and wear plain clothes. Other than this, there is little difference under the present organization of the Communist forces between the Field Forces and the Local Forces. These two forces make up the so-called regular troops of the Communist Army. Equipment and training of the former is usually slightly better than that of the latter, but both receive their orders through regular channels of command and both are supplied by regular supply organs. It is believed that both of these forces comprise the two large units of the Chinese Communists, the 18th Group Army, and the New 4th Army. The People's Militia is composed of men and women throughout Communist-controlled areas, selected on the basis of courage, physical condition, endurance, and initiative. Unlike the two groups of regular forces above, they engage regularly in production, and perform their military duties as the occasion demands.

Fuller discussion of these three groups is contained in section 6 of this report.

The average age of general officers is approximately 40 years; of field officers, approximately 37 years; and of company officers, approximately 30 years. In general education the average of both field and company officers is about that of a middle school graduate. (The Chinese middle school corresponds to the Western

High School.) Almost all officers come from the ranks, but of these about 70 percent have received training in the Communist "Anti-Japanese Military Academy" in Suiteh, Shensi.

The average age of enlisted men is approximately 28 years. Taking into consideration their general education before entering the Army and the education they received in the Army, their average level of education is approximately that of a student in lower middle school. (The Chinese lower middle school corresponds to the Western Junior High School.) Their average length of service is about eight years.

(2) Overall Strengths

In October 1944 it was reliably reported that the total strength of the regular Communist forces was 475,000. Of these, 318,000 are reported as under the 18th Group Army Command, 149,000 under the New 4th Army, and 8,000 in South China. Recent reports indicate that these forces may have been increased to as many as 910,000 troops. There is a marked difference between the actual strength of Communist forces and that authorized by the Central Government. Officially, only three Communist divisions and a so-called "Garrison Force" are recognized with a total authorized strength of about 50,000 officers and men. Expansion has been effected by increasing the number of regiments in each division, and by creating new regiments in the various military regions. The New 4th Army was officially disbanded in 1941 and is now unrecognized by the Central Government; nevertheless, its strength is steadily increasing.

(3) 18th Group Army Strength and Distribution

General Chu Te has official status under the National Military Council of the Central Government as Commanding General of the 18th Group Army. The Deputy Commanding General is P'eng Te-huai. General Yeh Chien-ying is Chief of Staff. The 18th Group Army operates in general north of the Lung Hai railroad and East of Sian, Shenai. The six military Regions under the 18th Group Army follow:

(*a*) *Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Military Region.*—This region contains a relatively large concentration of troops, reported as 50,000 in the Field Forces. These are all first-line troops held in this home base area to guard against possible Kuomintang or Japanese attack.

(*b*) *Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region.*—In this region there are 26,000 in the Field Forces, 5,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 31,000 regulars. There are 50,000 Militiamen in the area. The area is relatively small, and has a sparse population. The 120th Division of the 18th Group Army is in this Region, commanded by General Ho Lung.

(*c*) *Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region.*—This region contains 35,000 in the Field Forces, 29,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 64,000 regular troops. There are 630,000 in the Militia. The forces of this area are large, but are probably relatively weak in the extensive plain regions (Central and East Hopeh) and in the mountainous and sparsely populated North (along the North of the Great Wall). This is a well-known area because it was the first established behind Japanese lines and has been more often visited by foreigners.

(*d*) *Shantung Military Region.*—This region contains 42,000 in the Field Forces, 28,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 70,000 regulars. 500,000 Militiamen are reported in the Region. The 115th Division is stationed in the Region, with General Ch'en Kuang as its commander. The Communist Forces have expanded rapidly in Shantung in the past few years, and are well organized in the whole area.

(*e*) *Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military Region.*—In this region there are 50,000 in the Field Forces, 25,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 75,000 regulars. 320,000 Militiamen are reported. This area includes South Shensi and the T'ai-hang Mountains, where the Communists have apparently become well entrenched. The 129th Division is stationed in this Region, Commanded by Liu Po Ch'eng.

(*f*) *Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military Region.*—This area contains 17,000 in the Field Forces, 11,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 28,000 regulars. There are 80,000 Militiamen in the Region.

(4) New 4th Army Strength and Distribution

The New 4th Army is also under General Chu Te's command. General Yeh T'ing is still carried on the roll by the Communists as Commanding General of the New 4th Army, but since his arrest by the Chungking Government dur-

ing the New Fourth Army Incident in 1941, command is exercised by General Ch'en I, whose title is "Acting Army Commander." The Army operates South of the Lung-Hai Railroad, with headquarters in the Hung-tze Lake area. No break-down for Local Forces in the New 4th Army is available but the total has been reported at 31,000. In regions where no figure is given for the Militia, information is not available. The eight Military Regions under New 4th Army Command follow:

(*a*) *Central Kiangsu Military Region.*—This region contains 19,000 in the Field Forces and 130,000 in the Militia. It is the area of the 1st Division, and is bounded on the South by the Yangtze River from Ch'ung-Ming Island (North of Shanghai) West to the Grand Canal, on the West by the Grand Canal to Huai-an, and on the North by the She-yang River.

(*b*) *South Huai Military Region.*—This region contains the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army, with 21,000 in the Field Forces. (See North Huai Military Region below for boundaries.)

(*c*) *North Kiangsu Military Region.*—The 3rd Division is stationed in this Region, with 23,000 in the Field Forces. 85,000 Militiamen are reported. The Region is bounded on the North by a line running generally west from Lienyünkang (Lao-yao) to the Grand Canal, on the West by the Grand Canal as far south as Huai-an, and on the South by the She-yang River east to the coast.

(*d*) *North Huai Military Region.*—The two Huai Military Regions (North and South) cover an area bounded generally by a line running from Süchow, N. Kiangsu, east to the Grand Canal, then south along the Grand Canal to the Yangtze, along it to Nanking, from Nanking southwest to Ho-fei, northwest generally along the Huai-Nan Railroad to near T'ien-chia-an, thence northeast to Pengpu (Pang-fou) and north along the Tsinpu Railroad back to Süchow. The Huai River is the dividing line between the two regions, with Hung-tze Lake generally in the center. The 4th Division is stationed in the area, with 18,000 troops in the Field Forces reported.

(*e*) *Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Military Region.*—This Region contains the 5th Division with 22,000 in the Field Forces. Although this division is almost completely surrounded by the Japanese forces, the Ta-pieh Mountains (on the junction of Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei borders) on the East and the Ta-hung (Tung-pei) Mountains (about 120 miles NW of Hankow) on the west provide terrain favorable for the Communist troops. Parts of these mountain areas are old (pre 1934) Red districts and the people therein are experienced in guerrilla warfare. The Region extends north of Hankow on both sides of the Ping-Han Railway to the vicinity of Hsin-yang, Honan, and south of Hankow along the Canton-Hankow Railway to Yochow, (Yüeh-yang) in Huan. On the east the Region extends to the vicinity of Huang-mei in eastern Hupeh, and on the west to Shasi and Ichang.

(*f*) *South Kiangsu Military Region.*—The 6th Division is stationed in this Region with 6,000 in the Field Forces. 25,000 Militiamen are reported. The Region is bounded on the north and west by the Yangtze River and on the south by a line running generally from Wu-hu east to the coast. In the center of the Region is T'ai Lake (between Nanking and Shanghai). The Region contains some of the largest cities in China.

(*g*) *Central Anhwei Military Region.*—The 7th Division, with 5,000 in the Field Forces, occupies this area, which is along both banks of the Yangtze from Nanking westward to Su-sung. In the northern and widest part of the Region, part of the 2nd Division is operating in the area between the Tsin-Pu and Hwai-Nan Railroads. 25,000 Militiamen are reported in the area.

(*h*) *East Chekiang Military Region.*—The forces operating in this area, about 4,000 in the Field Forces, are known as the "East Chekiang Column." They were originally the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division, 18th Group Army, which were sent to Chekiang in the fall of 1942. 10,000 Militiamen are reported. The Region extends generally on both sides of the Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad to Ningpo, and south as far as Feng-hua.

(*5*) *East River Military Region*

In this area there are 3,000 in the Field Forces. Very little is known of the troops in this area and on Hainan Island. Communist Headquarters in Yenan appears to maintain very slight contact with them.

(*6*) *Hainan Island Military Region*

This Region contains 5,000 in the Field Forces.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(1) General

The organization of the Chinese Communist Army is closely linked with the political organization of the Communist Party and the political organization of the territory controlled by the Chinese Communists. (See p. 2335.) The organization and administration of the People's Militia is based on the civil organization of the Military Regions, Military Districts, and Military Sub-districts. Every unit headquarters of company size and larger has a political section which is headed by a commissar. The commissar usually has received military training and in the higher units often serves as deputy commander.

(2) The High Command

Supreme command of the Chinese Communist Army is vested in the Communist Military Council (Military Affairs Commission). This body consists of a Chairman, who in this case is the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (Mao Tse-tung); a vice-Chairman, who is the Commander in Chief of the Communist Army (Gen. Chu Teh); a second vice-Chairman; a Chief of Staff; the Chiefs of departments of the General Staff; the Inspector General; and two deputies of the Inspector General.

(3) Territorial Organization

(a) General.—The territory controlled by the Chinese Communist Army consists of a large area in North China under the jurisdiction of the 18th Group Army, a somewhat smaller area in Central China under the New Fourth Army, and two very small areas in South China and Hainan.

(b) Area controlled by the 18th Group Army.—The area controlled by the 18th Group Army is divided into six regions, as follows:

1. The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Military Region

This region west of the Yellow River is the Main Communist Base, in which Yenan is located.

2. The Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region

This region is divided into the Ta-ch'ing Mountain Military District (in Suiyuan) and the Chin-hsi-pei (northwest Shansi) Military District.

3. The Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region

This region is sub-divided into four Military Districts, and 13 Military Sub-districts. The Four Military Districts are the following: Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning, (area east of Peiping and Tientsin) Ping-Pei (area north of Peiping), Central Hopei (area SW of Tientsin), and North Yüeh, (area W and SW of Peiping.

4. The Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military Region

This region is sub-divided into two Military Districts and 13 Military Sub-Districts. The two Military Districts are the following: South Hopie, and Hopei-Shantung-Honan.

5. The Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military Region

This region is sub-divided into two Military Districts and 13 Military Sub-Districts. The two Military Districts are the following: in the east, T'ai-heng and in the west, T'ai-yueh (Sw Shansi, excluding Gen. Yen Hsi-shan's area in SE Shansi).

6. The Shantung Military Region

This Region is sub-divided into four Military Districts and 17 Military Sub-districts. The four Military Districts are the following: Po Hai (gulf) in the northwest, Chiao-tung in the Northeast, (Shantung Promontory), Central Shantung, and Pin Hai in the southeast (coastal region S of Tsingtao).

(c) Area Controlled by the New Fourth Army.—The area which is controlled by the New Fourth Army is divided into eight Military Regions. Further subdivision of this area into Military Districts and Military Sub-districts is not known. The eight Military Regions are the following:

1. North Kiangsu Military Region.
2. Central Kiangsu Military Region.
3. South Kiangsu Military Region.
4. North Huai River Military Region.
5. South Huai River Military Region.
6. Central Anhwei Military Region.

7. East Chekiang Military Region.
8. Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Military Region.

(*d*) *South China.*—In South China there are two small Military Regions under command of the 18th Group Army. They are: East River Military Region (Canton Area), Ch'iung-yai Military Region (interior of Hainan Island).

(4) *Organization of the Army*

(*a*) *Field Forces.*—

1. General

The Field Forces and Local Forces of the regular Army are organized into the two main units of the Communist Forces, the 18th Group Army, and the New 4th Army. The former has 3 oversized divisions in its formal organization, plus jurisdiction over the other minor units. The latter has 7 divisions and the "East Chekiang Column" under its command.

2. Divisions

The three divisions of the 18th Group Army as originally authorized by the Central Government consisted of three brigades of two regiments each. The strength was about 14,000 officers and men per division. The exact extent to which these divisions have expanded in numbers of regiments and troops is not known. A recent report states that the divisions of both the 18th Group Army and New Fourth Army are now each organized into three brigades of three regiments. The strength of the New Fourth Army divisions appear to vary greatly and is believed to approximate the strength listed for the field forces in each of the military regions in which the divisions operate.

3. Brigades

A recent report states that there are three regiments to a brigade. The highly decentralized nature of operations would appear to make the brigade an important link in the chain of Command. It probably exercises a relatively high degree of independence in both command and administrative functions.

4. Regiments

The tactical units of the Chinese Communist Army are organized into three types of regiments: type A, type B, and type C.

a. Type A regiments

The 59 type A regiments are organized as follows: a headquarters company, three rifle battalions, and a political section. The headquarters company comprises an administrative section, a signal platoon, an artillery or mortar platoon, a supply platoon, a medical platoon, and a service company. The regiment has a strength of 1763 officers and men and the following equipment: 693 rifles, 124 carbines, 82 pistols, 81 light machine guns, 6 heavy machine guns, 482 mm mortars, 27 light mortars and 33 horses.

b. Type B regiments

There are 105 type B regiments. Type B regiments are similar to type A regiments, but they have only two rifle battalions, and they have no artillery or mortar platoon in the headquarters company. The strength of the type B. regiment is 1,163 officers and enlisted men. Its equipment consists of 468 rifles, 24 carbines, 76 pistols, 36 light machineguns, 6 heavy machine-guns, 18 light mortars, and 13 horses.

c. Type C regiments

There are 133 type C rifle regiments. These regiments are designed to operate in flat terrain where unobserved movement of large bodies of men is difficult. Type C regiments comprise the following: a headquarters company, a political section, and from four to five rifle companies. The headquarters company consist of an administrative section, and supply, signal, medical, and service platoons. The strength of a type C regiment is 866 officers and enlisted men. Its equipment consists of 425 rifles, 20 carbines, 62 pistols, 15 light machine-guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 5 light mortars, and 9 horses.

2. Battalions

The rifle battalion consists of a headquarters, a political section, a headquarters and service company, a machine-gun platoon, and three rifle companies.

6. Companies

The rifle company consists of a headquarters, a political section, a service platoon, and three rifle platoons. Each rifle platoon has three 13- to 16-man squads. The strength of a rifle company varies from 118 to 136 officers and enlisted men. The equipment allotted to a company consists of 83 rifles, 3 light machine-guns, 3 light mortars, 380 hand grenades, 81 picks, and 81 shovels.

(*b*) *The Local Forces, or Guerrilla Army.*—The personnel of the guerrillas is drawn from the local inhabitants. These men receive the same military and political training as do the members of the field force. They do not regularly engage in productive work. The guerrilla forces are controlled by the commander of a Region. The commanders of separate guerrilla detachments besides being responsible to the Region commander are also accountable to the local People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance. It is believed that the organization of the Local Forces is patterned after that of the Field Force, but that they are not as well equipped.

(*c*) *The People's Militia.*—Every able bodied Chinese Communist of either sex between the ages of 16 and 45, who is not a member of the regular army field forces or local forces (guerrilla) is a member of the People's Militia. (Most of the members of the People's Militia are, however, non-Communist volunteers). At each level of administration (region, district, sub-district, county, township, and village) there is a People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance. This body, including an Anti-Japanese Service Section, Demolitions Section, Training Section, and Operations Section, is subordinate to the Communist military commander and the Political Commissar of the Communist Army in the region, district, etc. The People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance trains and directs the operations of the following four groups which comprise the People's Militia:

1. The Youth Vanguards

The Youth Vanguards is a group comprising inhabitants between 16 and 23 years old. Their training consists of military drill, use of weapons and first aid, as well as political indoctrination and intelligence work.

2. The Model Detachments

Male graduates of the Youth Vanguards are organized into Model Detachments. This group supplies replacements to both the regular army field forces and local forces. The "local guerrilla groups," formed within the Model Detachments from those who desire particularly active service, should not be confused with the local forces above, which are composed of full-time guerrillas. Members of the People's Militia engage in production in addition to their military duties.

3. Self Defense Detachments

This group consists of able bodied men who are not members of any of the other groups. They are organized into small groups whose function is to protect the homes and fields in event of raids by small Japanese parties, and sabotage in the event of Japanese occupation.

4. Women's Detachments

Able bodied women who do not belong to the Youth Vanguards are members of this group. Their organization and functions are similar to those of the Self Defense Detachments.

(*5*) *Air Force*

The Communists do not have any aircraft.

(*6*) *Navy*

There is no navy as such. The Communists operate a number of armed junks off some sections of the coasts of Kiangsu and Shantung Provinces which they sometimes refer to as their "Navy."

(*7*) *Organization of the Services*

(*a*) *Signal Communications.*—Signal communications in Communist China are limited by shortage of equipment and trained personnel. However, both radio and wire communications are used by the Army. The radio communications network within the army is as follows:

The 18th Group Army Headquarters in Yenan communicates with the various Military Region headquarters at least once a day.

The Region Headquarters communicate with each other and with the Military Districts under them.

The Military District headquaters communicate with local regimental headquarters, intelligence stations, and other units equipped with radio.

(*b*) *Medical Service.*—See Section 7, h, page 2445.

NOTE.—For chart of territorial organization, see chart No. 1, opposite page 2448.

C. TRAINING OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(*1*) *General*

The training policies of the Chinese Communist army have been influenced by many factors. Training has been carried out under unusual conditions, since the Communists must be on the constant alert against possible attack by the Japanese as well as by the Kuomintang. The time devoted to training is limited, due to the fact that the troops in many areas must produce part or all of their own food and clothing in order to exist. Training equipment is of the most primitive type. Training in the combined arms is practically non-existent. Many of the units have been forced to combine the problem of subsistence with the problem of training. One brigade was sent to an area for the purpose of making it self sufficient. The troops would plant crops in the springtime and tend the fields until harvest. During the period there was practically no training. After harvest time an intensive program would be carried out until the following spring when the cycle would be repeated.

The training objectives of the Chinese Communists have been set forth by General Lin Piao, President of the Anti-Japanese Military Academy in Sui-te, Shensi. He points out that it is necessary for the troops to conduct training and operations simultaneously, and since the troops are scattered it becomes quite difficult to engage in the unit training of regiments or brigades. Due to the high rate of attrition in officer personnel and to the rapid expansion of the military forces, enlisted personnel have been advanced to the officer grade after a comparatively short period of service in the ranks.

The training policy is to give infantry instruction to all personnel regardless of branch of service. Little instructional effort is devoted to subjects like close order drill or company administration. The emphasis is on field training, with the tactics of close combat and guerrilla warfare being stressed. The shortage of ammunition necessitates reliance on the hand grenade and bayonet. Stealth, night fighting and ambush are accepted doctrine.

Training periods vary from two and one-half months in the forward areas to about four and one-half months in the rear areas. Troop training is the responsibility of all officers. Higher commanders indicate the general policy and the details are left to the commanders of the smaller units. Officers are instructed first, and then are expected to pass on their knowledge to the men, who use the coach and pupil method of instruction. Routine tasks of the day are utilized for training whenever practicable. For instance, troops on a routine march would be trained in the tactics of the advance guard, approach march and meeting engagement.

The competitive spirit is fostered by the publication of standings in the progress made during any training period. Formal or informal contests are held and prizes are awarded.

The Communist Forces have emphasized decentralization in training. This does not make for efficiency in methods, but it seems to have been unavoidable by reason of the conditions under which the Communist forces have been forced to operate.

(*2*) *Training in Weapons*

(*a*) *The Rifle.*—The extreme shortages of ammunition have curtailed formal target practice as we know it. In many instances the trainee is allowed but three rounds of rifle ammunition for training purposes. Field manuals on rifle marksmanship are in use by Chinese Communist forces and the conventional subject matter is included in them. The only report available of an observed target practice indicates that no attempt was made to coach the pupil, and that training methods were most primitive.

(*b*) *Machine Guns.*—In an observed target practice, the machine gun was emplaced and aimed, and the pupil had but to step up and pull the trigger. He then would make whatever adjustment he considered necessary.

In their official training manual on the use of machine guns the Communists emphasize vigorous training under field conditions. They teach the doctrine of fire and movement, emphasizing the value of the machine gun as a close support weapon. The weapon is utilized in night training exercises. A knowledge

and use of the terrain in the proper selection of positions is considered essential. Stress is placed on the proper methods of cover and concealment.

(*c*) *Hand Grenades.*—The hand grenade has been considered the most important weapon at the disposal of the Communist forces, and appears to have been effectively employed. Termed "Artillery for the Soldier" the hand grenade has proved a decisive factor in many instances. As a result, training in the use of this weapon has received much emphasis. In an observed training exercise, the troops performed in a most creditable manner.

(*d*) *Bayonet Training.*—Training methods in the use of the bayonet follow the conventional pattern. The use of the weapon in hand to hand fighting is stressed, since the absence of artillery makes victory difficult for the Communists except that which is gained by close combat.

(*3*) *Unit Training*

(*a*) *Squads, Sections, and Companies.*—Extended order drill, for units up to the size of the company, receive careful attention in the theoretical and practical training of the Communist Military Forces. Methods of movement under fire, of deployment, close support and reliance on stealth and ambush are taught. The preponderance of unit training is given under this category by reason of the fact that it is difficult to assemble larger units exclusively for training purposes.

(*b*) *Regiments and Brigades.*—It is in the training of the larger units that the Chinese Communist forces have been most deficient. A U. S. military observer reported on an exercise consisting of an approach march and a meeting engagement conducted by a brigade of two regiments. Among the deficiencies noticed were these: There was not sufficient time given for a reconnaissance, for the designation of assembly points, for the issuance and receipt of orders or of making estimates of the situation. No use was made of concealment or of cover. Machine guns were employed without any definite fire plan in mind. Trench mortars were fired from the crest of hills without taking advantage of the cover afforded by the reverse slope of the hill. Communications were almost non-existent. Communist Military leaders admit their deficiencies and acknowledge the need for further training for officers of the grade of regimental commander and above. Training in the combined arms and in Staff procedure are among the more important items which must be studied before the military potential of these forces is realized to the fullest extent.

D. TACTICS OF THE CHINESE FORCES

(*1*) *General*

The tactics of the Chinese Communist Army have been influenced by their low economic potential, and their operations have been aimed chiefly against Japanese military and economic consolidation and exploitation of the occupied areas.

(*2*) *The Offensive*

(*a*) *Large Scale Operations.*—Despite existing deficiencies in weapons and materiel the Communist forces have occasionally engaged in operation of a fairly large scale. Well organized attacks have been made against puppet troops in Shantung province recently. These attacks against the Chinese puppets appear to have been intensified in the past few months, with the probable objectives of capturing their arms and causing defection in their ranks.

(*b*) *Attacks against Fortified Areas.*—The Chinese Communists have engaged in offensive operations such as raids, attacks on forts, strong points, and forays into large cities.

(*c*) *Attacks against Enemy Troop Concentrations.*—The Communists attempt to strive at the critical time when the Japanese are preparing for mopping up operations. This causes the enemy to detach portions of his striving force and thus weaken the proposed offensive. The favorite tactics are to strike the Japanese on the flanks and rear and then disappear before the enemy can effect a concentration of forces. The Communists have managed to capture an increasing number of prisoners in this manner.

(*d*) *Small Scale Operations.*—It is in the small scale operations that the Chinese Communist Army has dealt the most damage to the Japanese. These operations constitute the larger portion of engaged military activity. The struggle for supplies has been a motivating factor in many cases. Captured enemy materiel and supplies are needed to remedy the deficiencies confronting the Communists. In these engagements the fighting unit is seldom larger than a company, and the operations are generally of short duration. The attacks are leveled at small Japanese detachments on independent missions, isolated Garri-

sons and villages. The tactics used are those of conventional guerrilla warfare. Strategems, night attacks and ambush are employed in order to overcome the inferiority of numbers and weapons.

(*e*) *Demolitions.*—Demolitions on a small scale are included in the program of employed strategy. Bridges, roads, military installations and railroads are destroyed with regularity. However, the homemade black powder used in these operations often prevents the accomplishment of results commensurate with the effort and danger involved.

(*f*) *Use of Propaganda.*—The Communists claim that the increasing number of prisoners captured in the past year is due as much to the effectiveness of their propaganda measures as to their increased military strength. While the peasants in the People's Militia frequently mistreat or kill Japanese prisoners, the regular army forces use the prisoners for propaganda purposes to cause defection in enemy ranks. They are given money, new clothes and good food. They are usually allowed to return if they so desire. Those who do return dispel the belief of their associates that they would be maltreated if captured; hence, according to the Communists, they surrender more easily when hard-pressed. Those who remain receive political indoctrination and usually espionage training, after which they are either returned to Japanese troops for espionage work or used to shout propaganda to the Japanese troops in blockhouses or other enemy concentrations.

(*3*) *The Defensive*

In defending against Japanese attacks, the Communists avoid frontal clashes wherever possible. Avenues of approach are mined and booby-trapped, and the Japanese flanks, rear, and line of communications are harassed and attacked in an attempt to prevent the Japanese advance from penetrating too deeply into the base areas. Where they fail to halt a deep Japanese incursion, the food supplies and the small quantities of manufacturing machinery are either removed from the area or hidden to prevent their capture or destruction by the Japanese. Attacks are then made against the extended enemy line of communications to force a Japanese withdrawal, after which the bases are reestablished.

(*4*) *Summary of Communist Tactics*

Shortage of ammunition has had noticeable effect on the tactics of the Chinese Communists. By necessity they are forced to fight small engagements of short duration. They are precluded the use of long-range fire. In fact, some units have adopted the following rule of thumb for purposes of conservation: Rifle fire is not to be used beyond 200 yards, although more expert riflemen are allowed to fire up to 400 yards. Light machine guns may be fired 300 to 400 yards and heavy machine guns 400 to 500 yards.

Extensive use of land mines has been made recently, and hand grenades are used as much as possible.

The necessary emphasis on small scale operations has had its effect on Staff Procedure as employed in larger Chinese Communist units. Communist forces have had little experience in logistics. Nevertheless, certain characteristics have been developed in their operations. They have attained a high degree of efficiency in independent actions. Their leaders have courage, initiative and self-reliance. Their troops are highly mobile. They know the terrain intimately and use it to the best advantage. They have also learned to improvise with their limited resources.

(*5*) *The People's Militia*

(*a*) *General.*—While not actually a part of the Chinese Communist Regular Forces, the People's Militia has an important part in the continuing operations against the Japanese. The function of the Militia is to maintain peace and order in the rear areas. They are primarily concerned with the task of production, but they are capable of spontaneous guerrilla warfare. The People's Militia is a natural outgrowth of the desire of the more aggressive elements of the population to participate in active defensive operations.

(*b*) *Tactical Doctrine.*—An excellent knowledge of the surrounding terrain coupled with an efficient intelligence system combine to make the Militia a formidable bulwark of defense. Their tactical doctrine can be be summarized by the following Militia Dictum:

"Appear where the enemy does not expect you; attack where he is not prepared. When the enemy attacks, avoid him; when he encamps, harass him; when he retreats, pursue him."

(*c*) *Training Methods.*—Training is considered secondary to production and as a result it is given during the free time of the Militiamen, generally two hours during the evening. Training methods are extremely simple, but the course is varied. The following subjects are covered; fundamentals of drill, rifle marksmanship, grenade throwing, ambushing, tunnel warfare, surprise attack, harassing lines of communication and methods of reconnaissance.

(*d*) *Tactical Employment.*—The People's Militia is used for the most part in active support of the regular forces. It renders valuable service in the protection of supply lines in the evacuation of the wounded.

(*e*) *Tunnel Warfare.*—With customary ingenuity, village inhabitants of areas under the control of the Chinese Communist Military Forces have built underground defense works. Many villages have elaborate caves and tunnels. They are built as a means of escape from Japanese raiding parties. They have an additional function in the safeguarding of supplies and matériel. The tunnels have numerous narrow twists and turns both in the horizontal and vertical planes, making defense a fairly easy matter. Gas proof chambers, secret passages, and air vents are a part of the detailed construction plan.

(*f*) *Mine Warfare.*—The People's Militia has used mine warfare effectively. In many areas the Japanese are reluctant to leave their blockhouses and garrisons, since roads and paths are mined nightly. Mine casings are received from local, primitive ordnance factories. The village inhabitants fill them with homemade black powder, attaching a simple detonating apparatus.

(*g*) *Harassing Warfare.*—The Militia is deployed to tear down and destroy blockade walls, and to fill ditches and moats surrounding Japanese garrisoned villages. They have been instructed to waylay individuals and small groups of Japanese. They have planted spies and intelligence agents in Japanese occupied villages, and in many Japanese units.

(*6*) *Communist Army Intelligence Measures*

The Chinese Communist Armies have developed a unique intelligence system which has apparently been highly successful for their immediate purposes.

The People's Militia, in addition to other duties, maintains a constant vigilance in order to detect spies and traitors. It performs a valuable counterintelligence function by constantly checking the passes of individuals found within their particular locality. In general, the Communist armies could not carry on operations in their present area without the help of the People's Militia.

The Communists have planted spies in towns and villages under Japanese control. Information of impending Japanese attacks has usually been received in sufficient time to allow the proper employment of defensive measures. Many Communist agents are working in Japanese organizations. The lack of portable radio equipment, however, often prevents agents operating in the cities from getting timely information back to Chinese Communist Army Headquarters.

E. MILITARY WEAPONS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

(1) *General*

The Chinese Communist forces are poorly armed. Their manufacturing facilities are extremely limited, and they are forced to depend almost entirely on captured weapons and equipment. The Communists have a few old and badly worn artillery pieces but no artillery ammunition. Trucks and other mechanized equipment are destroyed when captured because the lack of fuel and the lack of trained personnel precludes their use. No protective equipment is available against chemical attack, and signal and medical supplies are insufficient. The troops, all of whom are trained primarily in guerrilla tactics, depend completely on small arms and individual close-combat weapons.

(*a*) *Rifles and bayonets.*—Approximately 80% of their rifles have been captured from the Japanese and Chinese puppet forces. Most of these are probably the Model 38 (1905) 6.5 mm. The remainder have been obtained from the National Government forces and are for the most part 7.92 mm Mausers M 88 and M 98. Bayonets are mostly Japanese Model 30 (1897). A few that are manufactured by the Communists are of inferior quality.

(*b*) *Light machine guns.*—Most of the light machine guns are probably Japanese Model 11 (1922) 6.5 mm, although a few are Chinese 7.92 mm. Z.B. 26 "Praga" type and Belgian 6.5 mm Brownings. Heavy machine guns are Japanese Model 3 (1914) 6.5 mm and Model 92 (1932) 7.7 mm.

(*c*) *Grenade discharges and hand grenades.*—Great faith is placed in grenade discharges and hand grenades for close combat. About 50 percent of the grenade discharges are Japanese M 10 (1921) 50 mm and Model 89 (1929) 50 mm. The

rest are made, mostly by hand, by the Communists in their own small arsenals.

Hand grenades are used in relatively large quantities. These are made by the Communist arsenals and appear to be effective. They are the "potato masher" type consisting of a cast iron head filled with black powder and wooden handle and pull-type friction igniter with a time delay of 4 to 6 seconds.

(*d*) *Land mines.*—In recent operations extensive use has been made of crude land mines. These mines consist of spherical cast iron bodies 5.9 inches in diameter containing a high explosive filling. They are detonated by means of pull-type igniter.

(*e*) *Mortars and antitank guns.*—The Communists have a few old Japanese mortars, possibly the Model 11 (1922) 70 mm, as well as some Chinese 82 mm mortars of the Stokes-Brandt type. In 1938 they received 6 anti-tank guns and 120 light machine guns from the Chinese National Government, but since then have had to capture equipment from the Chinese Nationals or use weapons that have been discarded by the Nationals for salvage.

(*f*) *Ammunition.*—Ammunition supply is the most serious disadvantage to the Communists. All types of ammunition are exceedingly scarce, and the many different small arms calibers complicate the problem. Much rifle and machine gun ammunition has been reloaded in Communist arsenals but is of inferior quality. Ammunition is so scarce that practically none can be allotted for either rifle or MG training.

(*g*) *Individual Equipment.*—Theoretically, the equipment of an infantry soldier consists of a rifle and bayonet, 50 rounds of ammunition, 4 hand grenades, and an entrenching tool. Actually, there is an average of one rifle per two infantrymen and a proportionate amount of other individual equipment.

F. UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(*1*) *Uniform*

In winter the Communist soldier wears the horizon blue quilted uniform, made of cotton. This uniform is light in weight but affords great protection from the cold, and is not too bulky for efficiency. The items making up the uniform are a vest, a long coat (double breasted, high collar model), knee-length breaches and a short jacket. Some or all of these items may be worn by one soldier. Blue denim wrap puttees and the usual Chinese cloth shoe with closely stitched sole of cloth complete the outfit.

A lighter weight uniform is worn in warm weather. A typical blouse has the following characteristics: high neckline, buttons up to the neckline, turned down collar on which insignia could be attached, and a buttoned-flap patch pocket.

(*2*) *Insignia*

Equality is the basis of the relationship in the Chinese Communist Army. There is no difference in the uniforms of "Leaders" and "Fighters" and Leaders wear no rank insignia. Their contact with the Fighters is supposed to be so intimate that their position of authority is known to all. The cap device is usually a red cloth star, although the Chinese national emblem has been officially designated for use.

G. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(*1*) *General*

Before 1940 the Chinese Central Government furnished the Chinese Communist Forces with some explosives, rifles, ammunition, and grain. This flow of supplies was curtailed in 1940, and halted in 1941. The Communists, therefore, in recent years have had to provide supplies and maintenance exclusively through their own efforts. They have fared best with food and clothing, while the quantity of arms, ammunition, medical supplies and other important manufactured and imported supplies has been meager.

(*2*) *Procurement of supplies*

(*a*) *General.*—The territorial organization forms the basis of the productive, maintenance, and repair activities of Communist China. Farmers retain sufficient produce for their needs, moving the balance to numerous widely distributed collection points.

(*b*) *Food.*—Wheat, millet, rice, other grains, vegetables, and small quantities of meat are raised wherever possible. Some of the troops aid in planting and collecting the harvests while others provide protection for these activities.

(*c*) *Clothing.*—Some clothing and uniforms are manufactured in a number of small factories.

(*d*) *Arms and ammunition.*—The Communists obtain most of their weapons and ammunition by capturing them from the Japanese, Chinese Puppet, and to a lesser degree from the Central Government forces. A few arsenals are known to exist but these manufacture only small quantities of rifles, small arms ammunition, hand grenades, and land mines. Because most operations are manual, precision is low, and models antiquated. These arsenals as well as other installations provide limited repair facilities.

(*e*) *Other Supplies.*—Some material such as medical supplies and storage batteries are purchased in either open or "black" markets of Japanese held cities, notably Shanghai.

(*3*) *Distribution and transportation of supplies*

The dispersed supply collecting points (see 2a) become distributing agencies from which troops in the area may draw when necessary. In the event of Japanese incursions, these stockpiles may be moved or hidden and thus saved from destruction or capture. Troops in movement may requisition supplies directly from farmers, offering "ration cards" which are redeemable by the Communist-sponsored government.

Communist forces are particularly deficient in transport. In some rear areas there is a small amount of transport by pack animals and two-wheeled carts (usually drawn by three mules) but in active areas all that troops take with them on the march is carried on their backs or slung on poles over their shoulders. Field officers are often provided with horses or mules. Motor transport is practically non-existent.

(*4*) *Maintenance requirements*

A Yenan press dispatch states that the standard allowance of the army is now four pounds of meat, one and three quarters pounds of oil and lard, forty-seven pounds of vegetables and sixty pounds of grain per man per month. This averages about three and one half pounds per man per day. Observers report that the average soldier appears healthy and well fed.

H. MEDICAL ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

(*1*) *General*

In evaluating the medical accomplishments and problems of the Chinese Communist forces the following four points and their effect upon medical care in the area have been considered:

(a) The Chinese Communist Army is primarily a guerrilla army, and its tactics and organization are based on extreme mobility. The effectiveness of the Communist forces has been due in great part to their ability to strike and run, to infiltrate through enemy lines and harass their rear, to sabotage enemy personnel, supplies and lines of communications. Such extreme mobility directly effects medical organization.

(b) Areas under Communist control correspond rather closely with a topography of rugged hill and mountain sections, while enemy-held territory consists of plains lands and lines of communication running in the valleys between guerrilla areas. This factor is at the same time advantageous and disadvantageous medically speaking. The terrain precludes evacuation of the wounded by any method save hand-borne stretchers or, in the case of the less severely wounded, by horse. At the same time the numerous more or less inaccessible hide-aways in the hills afford excellent sites for dispersal of hospital units.

(c) The Communist Army has on the whole succeeded exceedingly well in their determined effort to win over the peasant class. This cordial relationship between the soldiers and the local peasantry plays an important part in the army's evacuation and care of its sick and wounded.

(d) Since 1939, except for a few more or less luxury items, the Central Government has thrown a rigid blockade around the Border Regions of the Communist area. This blockade has excluded medical supplies and literature from the Communists and has resulted in improvisations, the manufacture of a few modern drugs from locally procureable products, and the utilization of Chinese drugs of questionable efficacy. Only rarely are some urgently needed items smuggled through the blockade.

(2) *Line of Evacuation of the Sick and Wounded*

(*a*) *Company First Aid Man.*—The smallest unit having attached medical personnel is the company, and save for exceptional circumstances this is an enlisted man who has had no more than a basic first aid course or some nursing instruction. The exception occurs in the case where a company is going on a long and arduous journey as a single unit at which time a medical officer (surgeon) may be attached. The medical corps first aid man is equipped with a small cloth bag containing bandages, gauze, iodine and a pair of dressing forceps. Due to the shortage in medical supplies he carries no drugs such as morphine or sulfonamides. After an engagement the medical corps man gives first aid and supervises the evacuation of the wounded to the Battalion Medical Station or a nearby sheltered spot, utilizing the soldiers of his company as stretcher bearers. At this point the responsibility of the company ceases. In the event that a company is out on an isolated mission cut off from rear lines of communications the disposal of the wounded is accomplished by one of two methods: firstly, if the wounded are few in number and the company anticipates further engagements, their uniforms are changed to civilian clothes and they are placed in the homes of the local populace who nurse them back to health and then aid them in filtering back to their units; secondly, if the percentage of wounded is rather high and further engagements are not anticipated, the medical corps man remains behind with the wounded who are dispersed through the local homes, supervises their nursing and after convalescence leads them back to Communist army units. These men though wounded retain their arms, and in their return trip may fight guerrilla warfare for months before rejoining their army. The medical attention given the wounded under such conditions is of necessity limited and those whose lives are dependent on major surgery are lost. Food, bed rest and bandaging constitute the sum total of medical care. At times even bandages are not available.

(*b*) *Battalion Medical Station.*—This medical station lying about a mile behind the lines, staffed by one doctor and two nurses, constitutes the first point in the chain of evacuation where the wounded soldier comes under the supervision of a surgeon. No major surgery is attempted here and the main duties of the surgeon are those of redressing, giving priority of evacuation and supervising the stretcher bearers. Those lightly wounded and able to ride horses or walk are moved on to the rear in this fashion. The mode of medical care in case the battalion is cut off from further evacuation corresponds to that of the company.

(*c*) *Regimental Medical Station.*—The next in line of evacuation is the Regimental Medical Station staffed by two surgeons and four nurses whose duties are to: 1) prepare dressings and bandages for forward stations; 2) debride minor wound and ligature hemorrhaging vessels; 3) temporarily splint fractures; 4) register the wounded. (This is the first point along the line where the wounded are registered). There are no beds in this medical unit, but those lightly wounded may remain here for a few days before returning to join their combat forces. Those requiring further medical attention are evacuated down the line by stretcher or horse to the next unit which is usually set up in some of the buildings of a village about five miles behind the lines.

(*d*) *Brigade Field Hospital.*—This hospital, staffed by five surgeons and a dozen or so nurses, is the first point along the line of evacuation where major surgery, such as amputations, debridement of major wounds and removal of foreign bodies, is performed. No abdominal surgery is undertaken. Here, too, are found the first hospital beds which are put up in buildings temporarily appropriated for this purpose. The time lapse from injury to hospitalization in the Brigade Field Hospital runs from three to eight hours.

(*e*) *Divisional Fixed Hospital.*—Up to this point all medical units have been mobile, but in this hospital the first stationary organization is found. Each submilitary district normally contains two such hospitals, which are set up in villages and have an average bed capacity of one hundred and fifty. Actually the emergency expansion of such a unit is limited only by the size of the village. Usually the operating and the dressing rooms are the only permanent fixtures of the installation, the patients being distributed through the village homes as the occasion demands. The basic staff consists of five officers distributed as follows: three surgeons, one assistant to the surgeons and one pharmacist. The size of the nursing staff depends on the number of patients and the number of nurses available. In such fixed hospitals all types of surgery are performed, the extent limited only by the amount of medical supplies on hand. In the event of a Japanese push even the "fixed" hospital is sometimes forced to move, and the pa-

tients are dispersed into isolated mountain regions where they are cared for in caves. The surgeons and nurses accompany the patients and the local peasants volunteer their services as stretcher bearers to aid in the mass evacuation.

(3) *Base Medical Service*

Each military Region of which there are fourteen reported in Communist China, has as the head of its medical organization a Base Medical Service under whose jurisdiction come larger fixed hospitals (three to four), medical schools (only one of which gives training at all comparable to accepted medical institutions of the west), medical factories and nursing schools. The several Base Medical Services are theoretically under the control of the 8th Route Army Medical Department; however, the various medical organizations are very decentralized and to a great extent on their own initiative. This decentralization is readily explained on the basis of two factors: firstly, the Base Medical Services are to a great extent isolated from one another with poor lines of communication: secondly, the 8th Route Army Medical Department, because of the stringent Kuomintang blockade, has practically nothing in the way of medical supplies to distribute to the various Base Medical Services. As a result, the two organizations are not interdependent. The larger fixed hospitals care for both the local civilian population and the more chronic military patients who, because of the necessity for prolonged hospitalization, have been evacuated to the rear from Divisional Fixed Hospitals. In certain cases where these larger hospitals are in fairly close areas, one will cater to the civilians and the other to the military.

(a) *Hospitals.*—On November 23, 1939, Dr. Norman Bethune, who had been sent to China under the auspices of The American Canadian League for Peace and Democracy some two years before, died of a septicemia resulting from a wound sustained while operating on the wounded in Wutai. Yenan held a vast memorial meeting attended by all representatives of the Communist Party, Army, Government and people, and passed a resolution to enlarge the 8th Route Army Military Hospital and to change its name to the "Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital." This hospital has been moved several times and has split off into further subdivisions. At present there is the head hospital and three sections, all in the vicinity of Yenan. The different sections are located in different areas to facilitate management, supply (growing of food, etc.) and the reception of different kinds of patients. They are all able to solve their own technical problems, but whenever medical difficulties are encountered the head hospital usually convenes consultations of all section chiefs. General consultations are held on all rare and difficult diseases with members of each section attending. Medical reports on the activities of each section are received monthly, and an interchange of professional experiences is a regular item in this relationship. All problems of medicines, medical equipment and other hospital supplies are decided on in meetings organized by the head hospital. Education work, for example, is handled by the head hospital and all three sections, some providing actual teachers for lectures in the medical school and others taking in the graduates for their internships.

(b) *Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital.*—In the Spring of 1943 the hospital moved to its present location at Liu Wan Chia Kou, about four miles northeast of the old walled city of Yenan. The hospital, nestled in a small valley off the Yen River, is a community in itself with all the staff living on the premises. Every family has a small vegetable garden (including the patients who are able to work). The Communist Party has put on a great agricultural drive during the past few years in an effort to make the country self-sufficient. The professors and their families take great pride in showing off their gardens to visitors. The wards and homes of the faculty of the hospital are caves dug out of the soft loose soil of the hill sides.

The hospital has six services with separate wards for each; surgical, medical, infectious diseases, obstetrical-gynecological, pediatrics and the out-patient services. Each individual ward room contains around six beds, except for the pediatrics ward where, due to the shortage of nursing personnel, the preponderance of breast feeding and the local customs, beds are furnished the mothers of the patients so they may sleep beside the cribs. The pharmacy and the laboratory are also housed in caves, but the operating rooms are in a stone building built on a level area below the wards. Each service has one chief doctor and two assistants (out-patient department is staffed by members of the other services

rotating daily); there are two pharmacists, one laboratory technician and one assistant, one superintendent of nurses, and 38 nurses.

Though civilians are accepted, the head hospital is primarily a military institution and caters to soldiers and their families. There are approximately two hundred beds of which fifty are for surgical cases.

Each hospital has a political commissar whose duties seem to be those of a sort of morale builder, catechizer and political instructor. In many ways he would compare with a chaplain attached to our military hospitals. The staff members are from varying walks of life and educated in various parts of the world, some in China, others in America, Germany, France, or Switzerland.

The common surgical diseases encountered are: wounds, burns, fractures, acute appendicitis, inguinal herniae, and minor rectal conditions such as hemorrhoids, rectal fissures and fistulae in ano.

The operating rooms are two in number. In the same building are preparation rooms, dressing rooms where gauze is prepared for sterilization and a small room with the instrument cabinets.

Local and spinal anaesthesia are used almost exclusively, primarily because other types are not available. It is possible to smuggle novocaine and local anaesthetics from Japanese controlled sections of China.

In the medical service the following diseases are prevalent: tuberculosis, influenza, gastro-intestinal diseases, maleria, relapsing fever, and some cases of kalaazar. In pediatrics one encounters whooping cough, pneumonia, and gastro-intestinal diseases. Typhoid, typhus and bacillary dysentery are the more common diseases encountered in the infectious disease wards. One can readily appreciate the difficulty of treating the above diseases when such items as the sulfonamides, neostibosan, arsenicals for intra-venous use and typhoid and typhus vaccines are not available.

Daily ward rounds are held throughout the hospital with weekly staff conferences. Charts are kept in orthodox fashion with history sheets, nursing charts, temperature charts, drug order sheets and laboratory sheets, all of which are printed locally on paper made in this region.

The running fund and expenses of the hospital, except for a small part coming from the China Defense League and the China Aid Council, comes from the Border Region Government. Another small part is supplied from the self-production work accomplished by the hospital.

(4) Conclusion

The medical personnel seem very much alive to the needs of the Army and civilians in Communist China. Considering the difficulties encountered, U. S. observers have been favorably impressed by the accomplishments of the medical profession. The medical staffs of the local hospitals, medical school and military establishments of forward echelons are all very cognizant of their limitations in personnel and matériel. Major improvement in the medical service can only be effected by the importation of medical supplies, at present prevented by the Central Government embargo. The peasants as well as the army would likely benefit from any medical improvement in this section. This would in turn be a factor in improving the fighting qualities of the soldier, for the civilian besides being his family is also his rear echelon, growing the food and making the supplies essential to the army.

I. CONCLUSIONS

The consensus of opinion of U. S. observers is that the Chinese Communist Regular Army is a young, well fed, well clothed, battle-hardened volunteer force in excellent physical condition, with a high level of general intelligence, and very high morale. Training of these troops may be rated as fair for their present capabilities even though it is woefully inadequate judged by American standards. Military intelligence, for their purposes, is good. The most serious lack of the Communist forces is in equipment.

The outstanding weaknesses of the Communist forces include lack of sufficient small arms ammunition, lack of artillery, lack of engineers and other technical personnel, lack of signal equipment in general and especially of radio communication below regiment level, complicated and irregular organization, and heavy casualties among officers with consequent weakness in junior leadership.

The most pressing needs of the Chinese Communist forces are for rifle and machine gun ammunition and for an easily portable weapon capable of knocking out Japanese forts, which sometimes have brick walls. The bazooka might prove useful for this latter purpose, and could also be used against the numerous

Japanese blockhouses of less formidable construction than the forts. The same weapon might be employed against Japanese rail traffic, since the Communists are often able to operate very close to important Japanese-held railroads. Rifle and machine gun ammunition required is caliber 7.92, about half Chinese and half Japanese. An urgent need is for more modern signal equipment, so designed as to be light and easily portable. Photographic equipment of the Communists is very meager. Medical supplies and hospital equipment of all kinds are urgently needed. A few supplies, such as chemical balance scales and various machine tools, would materially increase the productive capacity of Communist manufacturing plants. Many factories waste time making inferior tools which soon wear out because they are made from railway rails. The bayonets manufactured by the Communists are of soft steel and the quality is poor. This is a serious handicap because the shortage of ammunition compels Communist troops to rely heavily on bayonet charges and fighting in close quarters. The Communists have no anti-gas equipment. General Yeh Chien-ying C-of-S of the 18th Group Army, states that the Japanese have taken advantage of this fact to inflict over 14,000 casualties, including a number of brigade and division commanders. There is need for a definite program of tactical training and for training in combined arms. Training in weapons is deficient, partly due to lack of sufficient ammunition and partly due to faulty methods employed.

These shortcomings of the Communists are, however, offset in part by certain organizational advantages. The small units of the Communist forces, carrying the lightest possible equipment, have high mobility and are well adapted to guerrilla warfare. These units are equipped and trained to operate independently. They exist off the country, apparently having full support of the populace in the areas. This facilitates quick dispersal and mobility. The organization of the forces enables coordination of the operations of these individual units, within the limits of existing communication facilities, through a centralized command. This command takes in not only the regular forces of the area, but also the local detachments and other units within the People's Militia, and the whole population enlisted in the People's Self-Defense Corps. The Communists claim that the political work throughout the Army guarantees high morale, excellent discipline, and the whole-hearted support and cooperation of the people.

The capabilities of the Chinese Communist Army may be viewed in the light of the following two factors. Firstly, the Communists are capable of continuing indefinitely the present program of harassment against the Japanese while slowly increasing their strength and supplies. Secondly, they are not capable of independent, decisive operations to dislodge the Japanese from north or east China unless the Japanese situation has deteriorated seriously or is on the verge of collapse.

This deterioration of the Japanese situation depends largely upon the success of the Chungking Government army in an advance against the Japanese and on a landing of Allied forces on the China coast. At present the Japanese forces are so disposed in China that a major operation against them would entail the movement of substantial troops and supplies to the threatened areas. Allied domination of the seas would confine the movement to the lines of communication available to them within China. The reinforcements which the Japanese could obtain to bolster their defense against the Allies would be drawn largely from units engaged in garrison duties along the railways. The Communists are so disposed over all of North China and a large part of Central China that they are capable of (a) widespread attacks against Japanese garrisons and concentrations to hamper their mobilization for movement and (b) attacks upon and destruction of sections of the railroads to interfere with the movements of Japanese troops and supplies. This interference will slow down Japanese movements considerably, though they will probably not stop all movements.

In tactical situations the Communists are capable of providing a local Allied force with the following forms of resistance:

To serve as advance, rear, and flank guards;
To pursue a defeated or withdrawing enemy;
To strike at or turn an enemy flank;
To plant mine fields and engage in demolitions;
To engage in ambush, surprise attacks, and night operations;
To infiltrate enemy lines, attack rear installations, and harass lines of communications;
To provide intelligence to Allied forces on local Japanese strengths, concentrations and movements.

CHART No. 2.—*Strength distribution of Chinese Communist Army*

	Field forces	Local forces	Total regulars	Rifles, field forces	Rifles, local forces	Total rifles	Militia	Regiments			
								A	B	C	Total
Shen-Kan-Ning	50,000		50,000	30,000				14	28	10	52
Shansi-Suiyuan	26,000	5,000	31,000	15,000			50,000				
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei	35,000	29,000	64,000	21,000			630,000		16	40	56
Shantung	42,000	28,000	70,000	25,000			500,000	13	11	13	37
Shansi-Hopei-Honan	50,000	25,000	75,000	29,000			320,000	4	6	17	27
Hopei-Shantung-Honan	17,000	11,000	28,000	11,000			80,000	3	13	11	27
Total, 8th Route Army	220,000	98,000	318,000	131,000	50,000	184,000	1,580,000	34	74	91	199
Central Kiangsu	19,000			11,000			130,000				
South Huai	21,000			13,000			(?)				
North Kiangsu	23,000			14,000			85,000				
North Huai	18,000			11,000			(?)				
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei	22,000			14,000			(?)				
South Kiangsu	6,000			3,000			25,000				
Central Anhwei	5,000			3,000			25,000				
East Chekiang	4,000			2,000			10,000				
Total, New 4th Army	118,000	31,000	149,000	71,000	16,000	93,000	550,000	25	31	42	98
East River	3,000		3,000	2,000		2,000					
Hainan Island	5,000		5,000	3,000		3,000					
Grand total	346,000	129,000	475,000	207,000	66,000	282,000	2,130,000	50	105	133	297

CHART I



CHART I

Note: This chart has been constructed from information supplied by Communist officials.

Communist sponsored government organizations are indicated in GREY.

Communist Party organizations are indicated in solid BLACK.

Chart No. 3

ORGANIZATION OF CLASS A REGIMENT



STRENGTH & EQUIPMENT
CLASS A REGIMENT

1,763 - officers and enlisted men
693 - rifles
124 - carbines
82 - pistols
81 - light MGs
6 - heavy MGs
4 - 82 mm Mortars
27 - light mortars
33 - horses

Note: Class B regiments lack the artillery platoon of the Hq. Co., and one rifle Battalion. (12)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Chart No. 4

ORGANIZATION OF CHAS C REGIMENT

STRENGTH & EQUIPMENT
CHAS C REGIMENT
666 - officers & enlisted me
429 - rifles
20 - carbines
62 - pistols
15 - light MGs
2 - heavy MGs
5 - light mortars
9 - horses



WHO'S WHO IN COMMUNIST CHINA

Note: Asterisks indicates names for which no Chinese characters are available.

AI Ssu-ch'i—Leading Chinese Marxian-Leninist philosopher. Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when reported in 1943. One time member of the Party Central Research Institute.

*AN Wen-hsiang—Identified in 1944 as President of the Sui-te (in Shensi) People's Political Council.

ANDREOFF—One of the Russian Communist advisers with Borodin in China until 1927. Reported in 1944 in Chungking on the staff of the Russian Military Attache. Speaks Chinese fluently, said to be "very clever."

ASANUMA—Head of the Japanese Emancipation League formed in West Suiyüan Province by a group of Japanese captives.

BERG, Michael—See BORODIN, Michael

BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovitch (Ga-lin, Galen)—Marshal. Chief Russian Military Adviser to CHIANG Kai-shek and Instructor in Whampoa Military Academy 1924–27. Born 1889. Metal worker. Served in Czarist Army in World War I until seriously wounded, 1915. Formally joined the Bolshevik Party, 1916. Rose to fame as a military leader in the Russian Civil War. Drove the White Russians out of Crimea, 1920, out of Outer Mongolia, 1921. Appeared in China in 1924 under the name of Ga-lin or Galen. Reorganized and trained Chinese troops. Devised plan of attack for the Northern Punitive Expedition, 1926. Departed from China early 1927. C-in-C of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, 1929–38. Served on the military court which tried TUKACHEVSKI and other Soviet officers in 1937. Reported in October 1944 to be in an NKVD political concentration camp in good health but blind from work in the mines.

BO Gu—see CH'IN Pang-hsien

BORODIN, Jacob—see BORODIN, Michael

BORODIN, Michael (BORODIN, Jacob; GRUSENBERG, Michael; BERG, Michael)—Chief Russian Communist Adviser to Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), 1923–27. Exile from Czarist Russia, studied in the U. S. where he was known as Michael Grusenberg or Berg, 1910–17. Returned to Russia to take part in the 1917 Revolution. Communist propagandist in Spain, Mexico, the U. S., and Great Britain. Illegally in England, he was arrested and deported to Russia in 1922. He arrived in Canton, China, September 1923 as an agent of the Communist International. Became adviser to SUN Yat-sen. Played an important part in the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 1924 and of the Nationalist Government in CANTON, 1925, which was moved to Hankow in 1926. He became, by invitation, High Adviser to the Foreign Ministry of the Nationalist Government and was instrumental in revolutionizing Chinese diplomatic methods. In 1927 the Chinese opposed his idea of a Chinese alliance with Japan and a belligerent attitude toward the British. With the rise of strife between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang and Kuomintang aversion to the Communist International, his position became impossible. He offered his resignation which was accepted in July 1927. However he departed for Soviet Russia in 1927 with full honors and expressions of appreciation from the Nationalist Government in Hankow. Later he became Editor of the Moscow Daily News.

*CHANG Ai-ping—Apparently succeeded P'ENG Hsueh-feng as Commander, 4th Division, New 4th Army in September 1944.

CHANG Ch'in-ch'iu—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

CHANG Ching-wu—Chief of Staff of United Defense Headquarters at Yenan under HO Lung.

CHANG Go-tao—see CHANG Kuo-tao.

*CHANG Han-fu—Editor of the Communist newspaper, Hain-hua Jihpao in Chungking. Attended the San Francisco Conference, 1945, as secretary to the Chinese Communist delegate TUNG Pi-wu. He speaks English.

CHANG Hao (LIN Yü-ying)—Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Around 1917 member of the Social Welfare Society of Hupeh, a great many of whose members became Communists.

CHANG I-chen—Identified in 1943 as President of the Bethune Medical College founded in 1940 in honor of the late Dr. Norman Bethune. Former associate of Dr. Bethune.

CHANG Kuo-tao (CHANG T'e-li; CHANG Go-tao)—Expelled from the CCP March 1938.

Once much respected in Chinese Communist circles as a hero of the "Long March", and as a real field general. Well read and able to converse on many subjects besides the strictly military. Jovial, approachable, stocky, muscular. Member of the upper classes. Was a radical student in Peking. A returned student from Moscow. Participated in the "Literary Revolution" 1917. Helped found the CCP in Shanghai, 1921. In February 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi he was appointed Vice Chairman of the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee with HSIANG Ying as the other Vice Chairman and MAO Tse-tung as Chairman. Member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International elected by the 7th World Congress July–August 1935 in Moscow. As Chairman of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet he helped 4th Front Army Commander HSU Hsiang-ch'ien lead the army into north Szechwan where they joined the Red forces from Kiangsi in the "Long March". Later he became Chairman of the Soviet at Yenan with precedence over MAO Tse-tung himself. He was expelled from the CCP in 1938 apparently because he urged a genuine United Front on the basis of a sincere acceptance of the *San-min Chu-i*. Became a member of the Third People's Political Council in Chungking.

CHANG Lo-fu—see CHANG Wen-t'ien

CHANG Su—Identified in 1943 as member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government.

CH'ANG Te-i—Identified in 1942 as the Communist magistrate of Yen-ch'ush Hsien, Shensi.

CHANG T'e-li—see CHANG Kuo-tao

CHANG Ting-ch'eng—Commanding General of the 7th Division, New 4th Army, Central Anhwei Military Region in 1943, but his acitivities have not been reported since then. TAN Hsi-ling was Acting Commander of the 7th Division in 1944. CHANG established one of the early Soviets in western Fukien Province, 1928. Appointed Commander of the 7th Division February 1941.

'CHANG Wen-ping—Apparently still under arrest as of May 1944. The release of CHANG and other Chinese Communists allegedly arrested in connection with the "New 4th Incident" was requested by LIN Tsu-han in a signed proposal, 1944.

CHANG Wen-t'ien (CHANG Lo-fu)—Member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party in 1943. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he held the following posts: Member of the Political Bureau, member of the Secretariat, and Minister of Propaganda of the CCP; Member, Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee and Chairman of the People's Council. In 1940 at Yenan he was Member of the Central Committee of the CCP, Member of the Political Bureau, and Secretary-General of the Secretariat of the CCP, also President of the Marx-Lenin Institute.

CHANG Yün-i—Deputy Commander of the New 4th Army since at least 1943. Graduate of Paoting Military Academy. Once a leader in the 7th Red Army. Chief of Staff of New 4th Army in 1940. Appointed Commander of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army, February 1941.

CHAO Jung—see HSIEH K'ang-chih

CHAO Yung—see HSIEH K'ang-chih

CH'EN Ch'ang-hao—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

CH'EN Chen-hsia—Identified in 1944 as Director of the Yen-ch'ang Petroleum Refinery, Shensi Province, operated by the Chinese Communists.

CH'EN Chia-k'ang—Acted as representative for CHU Te at some of the functions for the press party to Yenan summer 1944.

CH'EN Chung-fu—see CH'EN Tu-hsiu

CH'EN I (CH'EN Yi)—Acting Commander of the New 4th Army and Political Commissar of Shantung Military District.

Graduate of Whampoa Military Academy 1926. Joined the Communists in Nan-ch'ang after the split with the Kuomintang. In 1931 when Communist control of Kiangsi was almost absolute, he was appointed Military Governor and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Provincial Government of Kiangsi. When the "Long March" started in 1934, CH'EN remained behind in command of guerrilla forces on the Kwangtung-Fukien Kiangsi border. Commanded the 1st Guerrilla Division of the New 4th Army in operations between Shanghai and Nanking, 1938. Escaped with his division after the

"New Fourth Army Incident" 1941, and assumed acting command of the New 4th Army upon capture of Commander YEH T'ing.

CH'EN K'ang-pai—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shansi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

CH'EN Keng—General in southeast Shansi in 1944. Listed as member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1943.

He allegedly once saved CHIANG Kai-shek's life by carrying him from a field of defeat in one of his early wars, 1925. He was promoted to a brigadier general in the nationalist army, but was subsequently jailed under suspicion of being a Communist. He escaped and as Commander of the 1st Division of the 1st Red Army Corps he participated in the "Long March." He was described as one of the important officers of the First Front Army which held a reunion in Kansu with leaders of the 2nd and 4th Front Armies in October 1936. He commanded a brigade of the 129th Division, 18th Group Army in the "100 Regiment Offensive" against the Japanese operating in southeast Shansi, 1941.

CH'EN Kuang—Vice Commander, Shantung Base, 18th Group Army. Reported Deputy for LIN Piao in both 1938 and 1943.

CHEN Pai-ta—see CH'EN Po-ta.

CH'EN Po-ta (CHEN Pai-ta)—Identified in 1943 as secretary to MAO Tse-tung. He is reportedly a well-known Communist theoretician. Author of several books on socialism and of numerous Communist pamphlets in English as well as Chinese. Member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1940. He is reported to have sent CHIANG Kai-shek a criticism of the latter's book "China's Destiny". While in Chungking in 1942 he served as editor of the *Shang-huo Shu-chu* (Life Book Company) and as editor of the Communist newspaper *Hsin-hua Jih-pao*. He was closely associated with CHOU En-lai during this Chungking period. He is reported to be a native of Hunan province and long-time member of the CCP.

CH'EN Shao-yü (WANG Ming)—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee, Member of the Political Bureau, and of the Secretariat of the CCP. Is reported very ill in Yenan, probably with ulcers. He is now in his late thirties. Has a pleasing, disarming manner. He is exceptionally articulate, but is essentially a theoretician. His very short stature is the butt of many Kuomintang jokes. Born the son of a prosperous Anhwei family, he went in 1925 to Moscow at his own expense to attend the Chungshan University. There he specialized in subjects pertaining to revolutionary methods and problems of the unpropertied class. Wrote many pamphlets. He allegedly became the sworn confederate of CH'IN Pang-hsien whom he met at the University. During the 1930's he became the leading Chinese in the Moscow apparatus of the Communist International. In 1934 he was appointed to the following posts at Jui-chin, Kiangsi. Member, Secretarial Bureau; member, Political Bureau; Chairman of the Chinese Communist delegation to Moscow. At the 7th World Congress held July-August 1935 he was elected to the following positions in the Communist International: Member of the Executive Committee; Member of the Presidium; Alternate Member of the Secretariat. In 1940 he was a member of the Central Committee, member, Political Bureau, and member, the Secretariat of the CCP, also President of the China Women's College, and member of the People's Political Council at Chungking. Although Kuomintang sources have long reported him as being at odds with MAO Tse-tung, there is no evidence of any serious rift. According to a reliable American source, his alleged ouster by MAO from the post of Director of the United Front Department in March 1940 was probably a resignation due to real ill health.

CH'EN Tai—Identified in 1944 as Deputy Commander of the 115th Division of the 18th Group Army at the Shantung Base in absence of Gen. LIN Piao.

CH'EN Tu-hsiu (CH'ENG Chung-fu)—Deceased. One of the founders and the first leader of the CCP. Noted scholar and literary figure. He was born in Anhwei 1879. He received advanced education in France and Japan. Returning to China he became professor and later Dean of Literature of the Peking National University. He was in the forefront of the "Literary Revolution" in China which signified an attempt to bring the written language into closer correspondence with the colloquial language. In 1919 he established contact with the Communist International. Together with Li Ta-chao and Lenin's secretary Marin he organized the foundation meeting of the CCP in Shanghai, May 1921. As a result of the Soviet Russian Kuo-

mintang *Entente Cordiale* he was admitted into the Kuomintang in 1924 and was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in 1925. Concurrently a member of the CCP he was elected by the Chinese Communists as one of their delegates to the Communist International at Moscow in 1925.

CH'EN Tu-hsiu led the CCP until the Nan-ch'ang Uprising, 1 August 1927. Shortly thereafter he incurred the disfavor of the Comintern because of his opposition to the Moscow-inspired policy of class war. He was deposed as Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CCP and was dismissed from the Communist Party. Later he affiliated himself with the Chinese Trotskyite sympathizers. In 1932 he was arrested in Shanghai by the Kuomintang, tried and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He was released, however, a few years later. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he went with the Nationalist armies to west China and lived in Szechwan. He died in May 1942.

CH'EN Yi—see CH'EN I

CH'EN Yün—Identified in March 1944 as director of the Department of Organization of the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi he was chosen member of the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee.

CH'ENG Fang-wu—Identified in 1944 as Chairman of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region People's Political Council, and President of the Associated University of the Shansi-Chabar-Hopeh Border Region. He is a noted Communist writer.

Born in 1894 in Hunan Province. He was a friend of the writer KUO Mo-jo during the latter's student days in Japan, and together with KUO he joined the Creative Society (*Ch'uang-tsao She*) and collaborated with him in certain literary efforts. He was formerly professor at Canton University. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP and also President of the North Shensi Public School. In 1943 he was listed in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government as a member of the Chairman's Committee and as Education Commissioner.

CHI Ming-hui—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

CHIANG Ping-chih—see TING Ling.

CHIHO Sheng-ping—Identified in 1944 as magistrate of Yen-ch'ang, Shensi, where the petroleum wells are located. Born a peasant.

CH'IN Pang-hsien (CH'IN Po-ku, Po-ku, Bogu)—He is editor of the Yenan *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* (Emancipation Daily); Director, *Chieh-fang* Press; Director, Hsin-hua News Service. He is tall, broad-shouldered, pale and handsome to the point of incurring such Kuomintang epithets as "pretty-faced Bolshevik." He speaks Russian and some English. He was educated in Russia where he met CH'EN Shao-yü, who allegedly became his sworn confederate. He returned to China in 1930 and was appointed member of the Central Committee of the CCP and concurrently Chief of the Kiangsu Bureau of Organization. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was appointed member of the Secretarial Bureau and member, Political Bureau of the CCP. He was elected an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress July-August 1935. He was reported to have played a big part with CHOU En-lai and YEH Chien-ying in the negotiations with CHIANG Kai-shek during the Sian Incident, December 1936. In 1938 he was Chief of the Hankow Office of the 18th Group Army. In 1939 he was Director of the Northwest Office of the CCP and Resident Member of the Central Government's 1st People's Political Council. In 1940 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CCP and member of both the Chairman's Committee and the Secretariat of the Political Bureau of the CCP. These posts he still held in 1943, when he was also Chief of the Industrial Workers' Department of the Secretariat.

Although he may still hold all or some of these posts, his chief activity is now in propaganda. He has built the circulation of the *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* to a total of 7,855 and is constantly increasing the output of the *Chieh-fang* Press. As Director of the *Hsin-hua* News Service, he is entrusted not only with the job of keeping Chinese Communist leaders informed of world happenings, but must disseminate such news to the public.

CH'IN Pang-hsien, Mrs.—see LIU Ch'ün-hsien.

CH'IN Po-ku—see CH'IN Pang-hsien.

CHOU En-lai—Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Central Revolutionary Military Council, and concurrently Chief of Military Affairs, and Director of the Southern (China) Political Branch Bureau of the CCP. He is also

member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP.

He has lately visited Chungking twice to negotiate with the Central Government, 13 November to 7 December 1944, and 25 January to 15 February 1945. He is at present considered second only to MAO Tse-tung. Since he has great influence in shaping the policy of the CCP toward the foreign powers as well as the Kuomintang and other Chinese parties, he is often referred to as the "foreign minister" of the Chinese Communists. He has been a leading political figure in the political section of the CCP and has also been considered one of the most able and forceful military men in China. Intelligent, he has a modest but composed manner, a friendly smile and a good sense of humor. CHOU is a practical rather than theoretical Communist. He is the one leading Chinese Communist said to enjoy the respect and confidence of CHIANG Kai-shek. He has been reported largely responsible for saving CHIANG's life during the Sian Incident, December 1936.

He was born in 1898 in Kiangsu Province of an old mandarin family. At the age of 13 he moved to Manchuria. He graduated from the Nankai Middle School in Tientsin 1917 and became a student leader, much interested in revolutionary movements. He attended universities in Japan for a year and a half after which he returned to Nankai University where he edited a student newspaper. He was arrested and imprisoned in 1919 for leading a student demonstration, and met his future wife, TENG Ying-ch'ao, in jail. When released he joined a radical society called "Awaken", to which she also belonged. In October 1920 he went to France for two years. There he helped found the French Branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Subsequently he went to Germany for a year and is also reported to have traveled in England. He joined the Kuomintang at Canton in 1924 as Secretary of the Provincial Committee. During 1925–26 he was Chief of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy under CHIANG Kai-shek. He participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition 1926. In command of three divisions under General Ho Ying-ch'in at the time of CHIANG Kai-shek's first anti-Communist coup in Canton, March 1926 CHOU was arrested in Swatow, but CHIANG released him and retained him as "advisor" because of his great influence with the Whampoa cadets. He was appointed head of party work in the Kuomintang armies. Meanwhile he also studied military tactics and strategy under General Galen and other Soviet teachers at Whampoa.

In 1927 he went to Shanghai and led three workers' uprisings, the object being to help CHIANG Kai-shek seize Shanghai. A few months later when the Kuomintang turned against the Communists, PAI Ch'ung-hsi ordered CHOU'S arrest and execution, but a division commander freed him. He fled to Hankow and worked on the Military Committee of the leftist Kuomintang Government in Hankow. He joined the Nan-ch'ang Uprising, August 1927, and became Secretary of the CCP Front Committee. He went with the 1st Red Army to Swatow, led a division in the Kwangtung East River fighting and was defeated. Thereafter he became an undercover worker in Shanghai. He was a delegate to Moscow to the 6th Congress of the Comintern, 1928, and was appointed a member of the Communist International. In 1930 he was Chinese Red Army delegate to Moscow. In the Kiangsi Soviet, 1931, he became Secretary of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP. Six months later he became Political Commissar under CHU Te. In January 1934 he was appointed a member of the Secretariat of the CCP and concurrently Chairman of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and Minister of Military Affairs of the Chinese Soviet Government at Jui-chin, Kiangsi. Then in February 1934 he received the following posts from the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee: member of the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee; Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission, with CHU Te as Chairman.

He participated in the "Long March" starting in October 1934. He was elected member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress, July–August 1935.

With the advent of the United China Front in 1937 he became the representative of the Chinese Communists to the Central Government and was readmitted into the Kuomintang in 1938. In 1940 he was reported member of the Supreme National Defense Council in Chungking. He held the post of Vice Minister of Political Training of the National Military Council

1938–40. In 1940 he was relieved of this post and appointed Vice Director of the War Areas (Kuomintang) Affairs Board, a position which actually meant little. His chief task remained that of liaison officer between the Kuomintang and the CCP. In 1941 he was also head of eight Communist representatives to the Peoples Political Council in Chungking. In 1942 he was asked whether he were ambassador or hostage in Chungking and his answer implied the latter. In the same year he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Communist Central Revolutionary Military Council, but did not return to Yenan until the summer of 1943. After the reshuffle in the CCP in March 1944 he received his present posts.

CHOU is known to speak adequate English and to have studied it in recent years. He said that he had forgotten French and German.

CHOU En-lai, Mrs.—see TENG Ying-ch'ao

CHOU Ho-sheng (CHOU Ho-sin)—Author. Elected member of the Control Commission of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress July–August 1935.

CHOU Ho-sin—see CHOU Ho-sheng.

CHOU Hsing—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

CHOU Shih-ti—see CHOU Tzu-t'i.

CHOU Tzu-t'i (CHOU Shih-ti ??)—Identified in 1940 as Chief of Staff of the 120th Division, 18th Group Army. Reported in 1944 as Chief of Staff and Vice Political Commissar of the Shansi-Suiyuan Base of the 18th Group Army.

CHOU Yang—As of 1944 President of Yenan University. Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1943 he was Secretary General of the Border Government.

CH'U Ch'iu-pai—see CH'Ü Ch'iu-po.

CH'Ü Ch'iu-po (CH'U Ch'iu-pai. TSUI Chiu-pai) DECEASED. One of the founders of the Moscow Branch of the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he held the following posts: Member, Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee; People's Commissar for Education. Apparently killed sometime prior to 1937.

CHU Min-liang—Acted as representative for CHU Te at some of the functions for the press party to Yenan, summer 1944.

CHU Te (CHU Teh)—C-in-C of the Chinese Communist Army, Commander of the 18th Group Army and Deputy Commander of the 2nd War Zone since August 1937. Vice Chairman of the Central Revolution Military Council and member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

He is the best trained military leader among the Chinese Communists. Tenacious when convinced, scrupulously honest, exceedingly selfless in thought and action. He possesses the personal magnetism of inspiring leadership, he is considerate to subordinates, devoted to his men. He lives and dresses like the rank and file, is a wide reader, and sports lover. He is characterized as taciturn, kindly, mild, slow temperament, courteous but not polished. He is stockily built, and has rough features, of peasant type. In January 1944 he was reported as serving more in a General Staff capacity, with P'ENG Te-huai directing operations in the field.

Born 1886 in Szechwan Province. One story says he comes of a poor tenant farmer family, went to local schools, then to the Yunnan Military School 1909–1911. Other sources describe him as a son of the landed gentry, who entered the Yunnan Military Academy through his family's prestige. He joined the *T'ung Meng* Hui in 1909 and later the Kuomintang. In the 1911 Revolution he was a company commander in TS'AI Ao's Yunnan army. He was Brigade Commander in the Yunnan Army during 1913–16, and later aide to the Governor of Yunnan. It is said that at this time he became sunk in vice, opium; he had a harem, and other amenities of a warlord's existence. In 1921 when his patron was ousted as Governor, CHU went with him. He began to read books on Communism and the Russian Revolution and came into contact with Chinese Communists in Shanghai and Canton. He became affiliated with the Communist party, gave up his vices, and divided his property among his wives. He was allegedly sent to Germany in 1922 to study military science at the expense of the Communist International. He was one of the founders of the CCP in Germany. He was twice arrested by the German Police for revolutionary activity and finally driven out of the country. He traveled through Europe and the USSR.

On his return to China in 1926 he became Chairman of the Political Department of the Kuomintang 20th Army in Szechwan province. Later he was appointed Principal of the Military Training School in Nan-ch'ang and concurrently chief of the Nan-ch'ang police. He helped organize the Nan-ch'ang Uprising of 1 August 1927. Driven out of Nan-ch'ang, he retreated to Kwangtung, reequipped his men, and organized the South Hunan Uprising. In May 1928 he combined forces with MAO Tse-tung, thereby becoming Commander of the 4th Red Army. They began a campaign through southern Kiangsi in January 1929 and reorganized the 3rd, 4th and 12th Red Armies into the First Red Army Corps with CHU as Commander. In 1930 he became Commander in Chief of the First Front Army which included the First and Third Army Corps. MAO Tse-tung was always Political Commissar.

At the 1st All-Soviet Congress at Jui-chin, Kiangsi in 1931, CHU was elected C-in-C of the Chinese "Red Army" which repeatedly defeated the Central Government troops sent against the Red Army in Kiangsi. In January 1934 he was appointed member of the Political Bureau of the CCP. In February 1934 he was appointed member of the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee; People's Commissar for Military Affairs; and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee.

In October 1934 he was forced to start the "Long March" and arrived in the Northwest at the end of 1936.

In August 1937 CHIANG Kai-shek appointed him Commander of the Eighth Route Army (the new name given to the Red Army after the conclusion of the Kuomintang-Communist united front) and Vice Commander of the 2nd War Zone. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP, also member of the Supreme National Defense Council in Chungking.

CHU Te, Mrs.—see K'ANG K'o-ch'ing.

CHU Teh—see CHU Te.

CHUNG Ch'i-hsien—Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the 1st Division of the New 4th Army, Central Kiangsu Base.

FAN Chin—Known to be the author of at least one Chinese Communist pamphlet, no date.

FAN Tzu-chia—Last known information dated October 1940. He was a brigade commander, 129th Division, 18th Group Army. Wounded in south Shansi.

FAN Wen-lan—Acting Director of the Central Research Institute of the CCP as of 15 March 1944.

FANG Chih-min—Last known information dated 1939 when he was reported under arrest by the Chungking Government. He was chosen Member of the Presidium of the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee at Jui-chin, Kiangsi 1934. Later he became member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

FANG Pu-chou—Last known information dated 1939 when he was identified as Commander of the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Border Region Guerrilla 5th Column, New 4th Army.

FENG Wen-pin—Reported in 1940 and 1943 as Chief of "Young People" and member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

FU Ch iu-tou—Identified June 1944 as a garrison commander of the New 4th Army.

FU Chung—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

FU Lien-chiang—Ph. D. Reported to be a Christian. He is a graduate of Fukien Christian University. Joined the Chinese Communist forces from the start. In 1944 he was in charge of the medical service for the masses.

FUNG Pak-yu—Reported in March 1943 as leader of about 1,000 armed Communists on Hainan Island.

GALEN—see BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovitch.

GA-LIN—see BLUECHER, Vassily Constantinovitch.

GOGOV—Russian Communist Doctor connected with Bethune Memorial Hospital. He has contributed his medical services to the Chinese Communist forces for several years.

GRUSENBERG, Michael—see BORODIN, Michael.

HAN Ying—see HSIANG Ying.

HO Ch'ang-chiang (HO Ch'ang -kung?)—Identified in 1942 as a commander in the 3rd Column, 18th Group Army. He is possibly the HO Ch'ang-kung reported in 1940 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

HO Ch'ang-kung—see HO Ch'ang-chiang.

HO Ch'ang-li—Identified in 1942 as an "important Communist."

HO K'o-ch'uan (KAI Feng)—Acting Director of Publicity of the CCP. In 1940 was member of the Central Committee of the CCP, and listed again as such in 1943.

HO Lien-ch'eng—Identified in January 1944 as Vice Commissioner of Education of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

HO Lung—General. Commander, United Defense Headquarters (*Lien-fang Ssu-ling-pu*) at Yenan of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Regions. Concurrently commander of the two large units which compose the UDH: the 120th Division of the 18th Group Army and the Yenan Garrison Army (*Liu-shou Ping-t'uan*). Listed as member in 1943 of the Central Committee of the CCP.

He is known as "China's Chappiev". About 50 years old. Allegedly still illiterate at time of the "Long March", he has since been improving his education. An able leader with a sharp wit, shrewd judgment, and a swashbuckling manner which appeals to his men. He is said to possess a fiery temper. Handsome. Allegedly the most admired of all 18th Group Army generals, and most feared by Kuomintang commanders. He is reported to be closely connected with Chinese secret societies.

HO Lung is a native of Hunan. He was a cowherd. At 20 he became leader of a kind of Robin Hood gang. He commanded the 2nd Division of the *Chien-kuo* Army in Szechwan in 1925, and subsequently joined the Nationalist Revolutionary Forces. There he commanded the 3rd Division under T'ANG Cheng-chih. When the Party split in 1927 HO remained with the leftist Kuomintang group. In August 1927 he and YEH T'ing organized the Nan-ch'ang Uprising. Defeated, they fled to Kwangtung where they joined CHU Te and tried to occupy Swatow. After the failure of their venture HO escaped to Hong Kong and thence via Shanghai back to Hunan. There he joined the CCP and, beginning in 1928, built up the 2nd Front Red Army and established a Soviet in the Hupeh-Hunan border area. He participated in the "Long March". In 1940 he was identified as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

HO Tzu-lo—Construction Commissioner of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

HO Wei—Reported in 1940 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP. Identified in 1939 as any army commander in the Chinese Communist forces.

HO Wei-te—Vice Commissioner of Construction of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in January 1944.

HONG Ying—see HSIANG Ying.

HSIA Hsi—Identified in 1939 as Commander of the Chinese Communist 3rd Army.

HSIANG Ying (HAN Ying, HONG Ying, HSIANG Te-lung, SHANG Ying)—*DECEASED.* One report states he was killed in the "New 4th Incident" January 1941. He was an experienced military leader who reportedly provided most of the military leadership of the New 4th Army under YEH T'ing. He was very active in Kiangsu in 1927. In January 1934 at Juichin, Kiangsi, he was appointed to the following posts by the 5th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CCP: member Secretarial Bureau of the CCP; member, Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP; Head of the Labor Department of the Chinese Soviet government. In February 1934 he was appointed to the following posts by the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee; Vice Chairman of the Presidium, with CHANG Kuo-tao as the other Vice Chairman and MAO Tse-tung as Chairman; and People's Commissar for Inspection of Labor and Agriculture. This last post he still held in 1939, but meanwhile had been appointed Vice Commander of the New 4th Army under YEH T'ing. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

HSIANG Te-lung—see HSIANG Ying

HSIAO Ching-hsien—see HSIAO Ching-kuang

HSIAO Ching-kuang (HSIAO Ching-hsien)—Member of the Government Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region since at least 1943, concurrently Vice Commander and Political Commissar of the United Defense Headquarters (*Lien-fang Ssu-ling pu*) at Yenan under HO Lung. He studied at CHIANG Kai-shek's Whampoo Military Academy at Canton, 1924–27. He was one of the first Chinese cadets to be trained at the Moscow Military Academy where he spent the next four years He participated as a leader in the "Long March." In 1936 his task was to break through the hostile Moslems to the Russian controlled areas in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang.

He was defeated by Kansu warlords in October 1936. In January 1937 he held the posts of Chairman of the Military Department of the Kansu Soviet and Commander of the 29th Red Army. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1943 he was reported as Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Garrison Commander.

He is possibly the HSIAO Ching-hsien (*kuang* and *hsien* are two characters frequently mistaken for each other) referred to as a member of the CH'EN Shao-yü clique among Chinese Communists.

HSIAO Chün—Identified in 1944 as a literary figure in Yenan.

HSIAO Hua—Identified in 1942 as a commander of Chinese Communist forces in south Hopeh.

HSIAO Keh—see HSIAO K'o.

HSIAO K'o (HSIAO Keh, HSIAO K'o-ch'eng)—Vice Commander under NIEH Jung-chen of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Military Region, 18th Group Army. He is about 43 years old, of small stature. He was formerly an independent warlord, famed as a guerrilla leader. He received military training in CHIANG Kai-shek's army. In 1928 he helped lead a peasant revolt, then raised his own independent Partisan Army in central China to fight against the Central Government. He joined forces with HO Lung in 1934. Both joined the main Communist forces in the "Long March." He was Vice Commander of HO Lung's 120th Division in 1939, and patrolled districts west of Peking in 1941.

HSIAO K'o-ch'eng—see HSIAO K'o.

HSIAO Wang-tung—Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department, 4th Division, New 4th Army. He was Political Commissar of the same division in 1943 but was apparently succeeded by *TENG Chih-hui in 1944.

HSIEH Chüeh-tsai—Vice Chairman of the 2nd Peoples Political Council of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in Yenan; Chief of the 1st Department of the Chinese Communist Military Council. Sexagenarian. He was interviewed by Chinese members of the Chungking Press Party to Yenan in the summer of 1944.

HSIEH Fu-chih (HSIEH Kung-chih)—Identified in 1940 as a member of the Political Department of a brigade of Chinese Communist forces in North China.

HSIEH Hao-ju—Identified in 1939 as a divisional commander of Chinese Communist forces.

HSIEH K'ang-chih (CHAO Jung, KANG Sang, CHAO Yung)—Chief of the Social Affairs Department and of the Intelligence Department of the CCP. He is a native of Shantung Province, about 41 years old. He attended the University of Shanghai. He is reported to be a follower of CH'EN Shao-yü and to have become a member of the CCP upon the latter's recommendation. He once held the post of Secretary of Organization of the CCP in Kiangsu. In 1940 he was identified as member of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Party Paper Editorial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He was reported in 1943 as Chief of the Central Protection Bureau, in charge of all Communist secret service work. He was also listed in 1943 in the concurrent posts of Chief of Organization in the Central Secretariat and member of the Political Bureau of the CCP.

HSIEH Kung-chih—see HSIEH Fu-chih

HSING Jen-fu—Identified in 1942 as a commander of Chinese Communist forces in south Hopeh.

HSIUNG P'o-ch'en—Identified in 1940 as a Chinese Communist army officers.

HSÜ Cho-jan—Identified in 1939 as a Chinese Communist military leader.

*HSÜ Fan-t'ing—C-in-C of the Shansi "new Army," and Vice Commander of the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region. The Shansi "New Army" is composed of troops formerly under YEN Hsi-shan. Under the influence of HSÜ, who served under YEN Hsi-shan, these troops mutinied and went over to the Communists in 1940 after YEN allegedly attempted to disband them. The "New Army" now shares garrison areas with the 18th Group Army and operates under the General Staff of the 18th Group Army. It is referred to as the "Dare to Die Detachments" under its original commander HSÜ.

HSÜ was formerly member of the *T'ung Meng Hui*. In 1935 he attempted harakiri before SUN Yat-sen's mausoleum to show his loyalty to the *San Min Chu I* and protest against the non-resistance policy against Japan. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he became a high staff officer to YEN Hsi-shan, then Commander of YEN's "New Army" in the 2nd War Zone,

West Shansi. This army consisted largely of liberal volunteers with susceptibility to the influence of Communists with whom they were in close proximity in Shansi. HSU wrote an article, "Words Unspoken for Three Years," in the *Chich-fang Jih-pao*, Communist Party organ in Yenan, on 16 August 1944, protesting against YEN Hsi-shan's alleged slander of the Communists.

HSÜ Hai-tung—Member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported in 1943. Born 1900 in Hupeh province, youngest son of a potter. He went to school while learning his father's trade. In 1922 he joined the 4th Kuomintang Army under CHANG Fa-k'uei. When the Chinese Communists were driven under ground in 1927, HSU returned to Hupeh and organized a "workers' and peasants' army". This group later grew into the 4th Front Army of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, with HSU Hsiang-ch'ien as army commander and CHANG Kuo-tao as chairman of the Soviet. HSU later became commander of the 15th Red Army Corps. In 1937 he was assigned to help NIEN Jung-chen in anti-Japanese action in Shantung. In 1939 he was reported to be in command of a unit of the 18th Group Army in Shensi. In 1940 he was reported as Vice Commander of the Chiang-pei Headquarters of the New 4th Army.

HSÜ Hsiang-ch'ien—Vice Commander and a Political Commissar of 120th Division of 18th Group Army under Ho Lung, also Political Commissar of the United Defense Headquarters. He has been a leading Communist figure for a long time. He was a member of the first class graduated from CHIANG Kai-shek's Whampoa Military Academy and served as an officer in the Kuomintang forces. He participated in the Nan-Ch'ang Uprising in 1927 and subsequently in the Swatow and Canton uprisings. In 1932 he commanded the 4th Red Army Corps on the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei borders. This unit, later known as the 4th Front Army of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, advanced into north Szechwan under HSÜ and the Chinese Chairman of the Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet, CHANG Kuo-tao, and merged in Szechwan with Kiangsi Communists in the "Long March". In 1940 HSÜ was reported in command of a unit in Shantung and Kiangsu. He was also member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1943 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the United Defense Headquarters (*Lien-fang Ssu-ling-pu*) at Yenan of the Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu Ningsia Border Regions under HO Lung.

*HSÜ Hung—Member of the Political Committee of the Independent Communist Division of Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi.

*HSÜ Te-lieh—Known as "Elder HSÜ," or Lao HSÜ, the educator. Born 1876 in Hunan of a poor peasant family. He received six years of classical schooling and became a school teacher. When 29 years of age he entered the Changsha College and upon graduation became an instructor of mathematics. MAO Tse-tung was one of his poorer mathematics pupils. He is said to have been one of SUN Yat-sen's collaborators. During the Revolution in 1911 he was active in the Honan provincial Kuomintang and afterwards became a member of the provincial council. After World War I he accompanied the Hunanese delegation of "workers-Students" to France and studied for three years in the Paris University. He returned to Hunan in 1923, established two modern normal schools in Changsha, and prospered for four years.

He did not join the CCP until 1927, but had sympathized with the Communists before that and had preached Marxism to his pupils. "I wanted to be a Communist" he allegedly stated "but nobody asked me to join. I was already fifty and I concluded that the Communists considered me too old." He joined when a Communist sought him out, and the Party subsequently sent him to Moscow to study for two years. On his return he ran the blockade to Kiangsi, where he became Assistant Commissioner, then Commissioner of Education upon the death of CHÜ Ch'iu-pai. He survived the "Long March" and became Commissioner of Education in the northwest.

HSÜ Yen-kang—Identified in 1930 as commander of a group army of the Chinese Communist forces.

HU Fu—see LIU Shao-ch'i.

HU Jen-k-uei—Identified in 1944 as Deputy Director of the Administrative Committee of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government. In 1943 he was listed as Vice Chairman and member of the Political Committee of the Provisional Executive Committee of the same Border Region Government. He was formerly a Magistrate of Yu-hsien, Shansi.

HUANG Chen-t'ang—Identified in 1939 as Commander of the Chinese Communist 5th Regiment under CHU Te.

HUANG Hsin-lüeh—Identified in 1935 as an important Chinese Communist leader.

HUANG Hua—Identified in 1944 as Secretary in the 18th Group Army Office, Yenan.

HUANG K'o-ch-eng—Identified in 1944 as Commanding General and Political Commissar of 3rd Division of New 4th Army, North Kiangsu Base.

HUANG Ya-kuang—Identified in 1944 as Manager of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Bank.

HUANG Yung-sheng—In 1943 he was reported Commander of the Chinese Communist 3rd Divisional War Zone. He was under command of NIEN Jung-chen in 1940.

JAO Cheng-hu—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

JEN Chih-pin—Identified in 1943 as Political Commissar of the 5th Division, New 4th Army.

JEN Pi-shih (ZENG Pi-shu—When last reported in May 1943 he was to attend a meeting of the Chinese Communists to discuss the disbandment of the Communist International. He was Political Commissar of the 8th Route Army in 1938. In 1940 he was member of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP. He speaks perfect Russian.

JOFFE, Adolph Abramowicz—Deceased. Special Soviet Envoy to China and Japan 1922–24. Outstanding diplomat. Friend of Trotsky and other oppositionists. He was born in Crimea 1883 of wealthy parents. He joined the Socialists in 1900. An exile from Russia, he studied medicine and law in Berlin, Zurich and Vienna, 1903–08. Together with Trotsky he founded *Pravda* in Vienna. On one of frequent secret trips back to Russia he was arrested and exiled to Siberia, 1912. After release, 1917, he became a leader in the Soviet councils. He negotiated with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, and was Ambassador to Germany, 1918. He was ousted from Germany in the same year when it was discovered that he was helping to prepare a revolution in Germany. Thereafter he became Commissar of Foreign Affairs and of Social Insurance of the Soviet Government, then Commissar of Soviet Inspection in the Ukraine. He formulated the Russo-Polish-Ukrainian treaty, and attended the Genoa conference in April 1922. Arriving in Shanghai, December 1922, his talks with SUN Yat-sen led to the SUN-JOFFE Manifesto issued in January 1923 inaugurating the Kuomintang-Soviet *Entente Cordiale*. He left the Far East in 1923 and went to England where he negotiated with the MacDONALD Government in February 1924. He won Britain's recognition of the Soviet Union. He committed suicide, November 1927, out of agony caused by a disease he had contracted in the Far East.

JUNG Wu-sheng—Identified in November 1944 as Vice Chairman of the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government.

*KAI Feng—see HO K'o-ch'uan.

KAN Ssu-ch'i—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

K'ANG K'o-ch'ing (Mrs. CHU Te)—In her twenties. Buxom. Apparently fond of the Yenan Saturday night dances. Not reported as holding any official post.

KANG Sang—see HSIEH K'ang-chih.

K'ANG Sheng (KANG Sin?)—Chief of Agricultural Workers and members of the Political Bureau of the CCP when last reported in 1943. Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. He is probably the KANG Sin who was elected an alternate member of the Executive Committee and an alternate member of the Presidium of the Communist International in 1935 by the 7th World Congress.

KANG Sin—see K'ANG Sheng

KAO Ch'ung-shan (KAO Tsung-shan)—Member of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in September 1944.

KAO Kang—General. Director, Northwest Bureau, and member of the Political Bureau of the CCP. Chairman, 2nd People's Political Council, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region; concurrently Commander of the Peace Preservation Corps. He is about 40 years old, of a peasant family in Shensi. The

alleged inspiration of his revolutionary activity was the death of his father at the hands of authorities for tax defaults. He is locally influential, which is why he is kept in nominal authority, but he has probably run his course in the revolution due to lack of education. He was illiterate in 1935, but has since learned to write. He has had no training abroad. He is inclined to exaggeration. He has an assistant with better education. KAO began his career by stirring up mutinies among soldiery while a young recruit during famines of 1928–29. Subsequently he organized peasant uprisings. He finally established soviet self-government in considerable areas of north Shensi. He organized the Workers' and Farmers' Anti-Japanese Army (Kung-nung K'ang-jih Chun) and had the region already operating as an anti-Japanese base when MAO Tse-tung and CHU Te arrived in Shensi from the south. He is reported to have been Chief of the Supreme Court of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in 1940. In 1943 he was identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

KAO Lang-t'ing—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

KAO Su-hsien—Member of the Chairmen's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

KAO Tsung-shan—see KAO Ch'ung-shan.

KAO Tzu-li—Identified in 1943 as Vice Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government and Concurrently President of the Supreme Court of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1940 and 1943 he was also identified as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

KARAKHAN, Leo Mikhailovich—Soviet emissary, then Ambassador, to the Peking Government 1923–26. Armenian, born 1889. He joined the Bolsheviks in 1904. In 1918 he was Secretary to the Russian Brest-Litovsk Peace Delegation. In 1921 he was Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and became Ambassador to Poland in November 1921. Between 1922 and 1924 he was Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat. He went to China in September 1923 to negotiate with the Peking Government, and concluded agreements in May 1924 for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between China and USSR and for the provisional management by the Soviet Union of the Chinese Eastern Railway. He was appointed Ambassador to China in 1925, and as such became the first Ambassador to China appointed by any foreign power. He was Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs 1928–34. In 1933 he was reported to have been replaced in the conduct of Far Eastern matters and to have fallen into complete disfavor. Nevertheless, he was Ambassador to Turkey 1934–37. No information on him after 1937.

*KUAN Hsiang-ying—Political Commissar of United Defense Headquarters at Yenan under HO Lung.

KUAN Wen-wei—Identified in 1940 and 1942 as a commander in the New 4th Army.

KUO Shu-chung—Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army.

LAI Ch'uan-ch'iu—Chief of Staff of the New 4th Army. In 1940 he was Chief of Staff of the Chiang-pei Headquarters of the New 4th Army.

LAN P'ing (Mrs. MAO Tse-tung)—She married MAO Tse-tung in the spring of 1939. Comely, fairly young, and said to be very intelligent. She was formerly a well-known movie actress in Shanghai. Member of the Chinese Communist Party since 1933. She left her movie career in 1937 to attend the LU Hsun Fine Arts College in Yenan where MAO's interest in drama apparently drew them together.

LEI Ching-t'ien—Identified in 1944 as President of the High Court and Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

LI Chieh-yung—Identified in 1943 as a member of the Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government.

LI Fu-ch'un—Vice Director of the Department of Organization of the CCP at least since March 1944. In 1940 was member of the Central Committee and Director of Organization of the Party.

LI Hsien-nien—Commanding General. Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Base, and momber of the Political Committee of the 5th Diviison of the New 4th Army. He was appointed to the latter post by the Communist Military Council in February 1941. In 1939 he was reported as Commander of the Honan-Hupeh Flying

Column of the New 4th Army. His troops were said to have fought Central Government troops in central Hupeh in 1941, and in Anhwei and Hupeh in 1943.

LI Kuang—Identified as a Communist writer in 1935.

*LI Pong—Identified in July 1944 as Secretary in the Office of the Chinese Communist Resident Representative in Chungking.

LI Ting-ming—Vice Chairman, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. He is allegedly not a member of the CCP or of any other party. In 1941 be originated the principle of the "Picked Army, Simplified Government" (*Ching-ping Chien-cheng*) which has since become one of the ten most important policies of the Chinese Communists. He is about 64 years, a native of Mi-chih, Shensi, and comes from the prosperous gentry class. A typical scholar of the old school, he has been noted as a *chu-jen* (2nd Degree Graduate) in north Shensi. He was onetime private secretary in the former Imperial Office of the Governor of the Yü-lin District, Shensi. Upon formation ofthe Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government in 1937 he was elected member of the People's Political Council.

LIAO Ch'eng-chih (S. C. LIAO)—As of May 1944 he was still under arrest by Chungking Government authorities and he probably is still under arrest. He is the son of the late Kuomintang leader LIAO Chung-k'si. After studying in Germany he returned to China in 1932 and was arrested the following year on charges of Communistic activities. He was subsequently released by CHIANG Kai-shek. At the time of Pearl Harbor he was in Hong Kong as representative of the New Fourth Army. He escaped, but allegedly was arrested by Kuomintang authorities in 1943. LIAO was reported to have left his chief assistant LOO Sun as head of an underground Chinese Communist organization in Hongkong. In 1940 he was identified as a member of the Central Committee and Director of Overseas Members of the CCP.

LIAO, S. C.—see LIAO Ch'eng-chih.

LIN Chu-han—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Chün—Identified in 1940 as Commander of the Chiang-nan Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army of the New 4th Army.

LIN Mai-k'o—see LINDSAY, Michael.

LIN Pai-hsu—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Pei-chuh—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Pei-yü—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Piao—General. Commander, 115th Division, 18th Group Army, with CH'EN Tai as Deputy Commander. President, Anti-Japanese Military Academy (*K'ang-jih Chün-cheng Ta-hsüch*) since at least 1940. Listed in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He is at present in charge of recruitment and training of 18th Group Army troops. LIN Piao is rather diminutive, but wiry and in excellent health. He has proved an able military leader, and is famous for his tactics, strategy and remarkable memory. His articles on military subjects have won recognition not only in Chinese Communist circles but also in Kuomintang China, Japan, and the U. S. S. R. He knows no language but Chinese. He has, perhaps, visited Moscow briefly, but most reports state he has never been abroad. LIN Piao, the son of a factory owner who was ruined by taxation, was born in 1908 near Hankow, Hupeh. He joined Socialist Youth and Kuomintang in 1924, and the CCP in 1925. He graduated from CHIANG Kai-shek's Whampoa Military Academy in 1925 with a brilliant record. Subsequently he commanded a unit in the Kuomintang Fourth Army or "Ironsides" of CHANG Fa-k'uei. In 1927 he joined HO Lung and YEH T'ing in the Nan-ch'ang Uprising. He was made Field Commander of the Chinese Red Army in 1929, and Commander of the First Red Army Corps in 1932. This unit immediately began to defeat or outmaneuver every government force sent against it. After participating in the "Long March", LIN was placed in charge of training cadets at the "Communist Anti-Japanese Military Academy". In 1937 he was given command of the 115th Division with which he defeated the Japanese ITAGAKI Division at P'ing-hsing-kuan (Pinghsing Pass), Shansi, in September of that year. He was indentified in 1940 as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1942 he was invited to Chungking for discussions, but returned to Yenan in 1943 after six months of fruitless negotiations.

LIN Po-ch'ü—see LIN Tsu-han.

LIN Tsu-han—(LIN Chu-han, LIN Po-ch'ü, LIN Pai-hsu, LIN Pei-chuh, LIN Pei-yü)—Chairman, Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

Member, Third People's Political Council, Chungking. Member, Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP. About sixty years old. Handsome, white haired, scholarly looking. Alert, energetic, enthusiastic. He is characterized as an inspiring organizer and leader with ability to draw the best out of junior officers, a man who knows how to pull teams together. He is widely venerated for his learning even in non-Communist China. For a long time LIN was a co-worker of the late SUN Yat-sen, allegedly having done underground work with him prior to the 1911 Revolution. He is reported to have been driven to the study of Marxism by the failure of the 1911 Revolution. In 1925 when SUN Yat-sen died, LIN was appointed Chief of the Department of Peasantry (Nung-min Pu) of the Kwangtung Government. In 1926 he participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition as Kuomintang representative in CH'ENG, Ch'ien's 6th Army. In the same year he was appointed Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, and in 1926 he was appointed Secretary General of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee at Hankow. He went to Russia after the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927 and founded a Chinese Workers' School at Khabarovsk. Returning to China in 1931, he became in the following year Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Chinese Soviet Government in Kiangsi. He participated in the "Long March" to Yenan. Since its formation in 1937, LIN Tsu-han has been chairman of the Shensi-Kangu-Ningsia Border Region Government. In 1940 he was reported as being a member of Chungking's Supreme National Defense Council and member of the People's Political Council. In 1943 he was identified as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP, also member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. He represented his party in the Kuomintang-Communist discussions of May-October 1944, and also acted as a party spokesman before the session of the People's Political Council at Chungking in September 1944.

LIN Yü-ying—see CHANG Hao.

LINDSAY, Michael (LIN Mai-k'o)—Radio advisor and technical assistant to the Chinese Communists in Yenan. An Englishman, son of the Master of Balliol, about 40 years old. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War he was professor of economics at Yenching University, Peking, where he also carried on extensive experimentations in radio. After Pearl Harbor he escaped from Peking with his Chinese wife to the headquarters of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base of the Chinese Communists. He trained radio technicians for the Communists, rebuilt their wireless sets, and worked on improvement of telephone communication for the Border Government. In March 1944, he spent three weeks in Northwest Shansi rebuilding their apparatus and teaching their technicians and eventually arrived in Yenan on 17 May 1944. He now translates material for broadcasts in English and advises on choice of material, taken largely from Chinese Communist newspapers. He is described as fair and honest in opinion but politically naive and naturally influenced by long association with the Chinese Communists. He wears a rough military uniform and is full of enthusiasms for the Border Governments and guerilla warfare.

LIU Ching-fan—Identified in 1944 as Civil Affairs Commissioner of Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

LIU Ching-jen—Member of the Chairmans Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

LIU Ch'ün-hsien (Mrs. CH'IN Pang-hsien)—In her late thirties. Formerly a mill worker in Shanghai. Returned student from Moscow Chung-shan University. She was reported in 1937 as Director of the Women's Department of the Chinese Communist Trade Unions.

LIU I—Identified in 1939 as a Chinese Communist army commander.

LIU Pai-cheng—see LIU Po-ch'eng.

LIU Po-ch'eng (LIU Pai-cheng)—Commander of 129th Division of the 18th Group Army since August 1937. Acting Commander of the Shansi-Hopei-Honan Military Region. Serious-minded, rated as one of the best tacticians and students of military history in the Chinese army. He formerly belonged to the old Szechwan military clique and has been through hundreds of bloody encounters. His right eye was shot out during the civil war. According to a Kuomintang source he belongs to the "CHU Te clique". He is about 46 years old. In 1927 he directed and led an uprising against CHIANG Kai-shek which failed. Subsequently he studied at the Moscow Military College. Upon his return to China he was appointed a staff officer

of the Headquarters of the (Communist) Central Revolutionary Army. In the vanguard of the First Red Army Corps during the "Long March," he obtained a safe passage for the Communists through the territory of the Lolo tribes in Sikang and Szechwan. He won the friendship of these tribes because he understood their tribal feuds and knew a few words of their language. He even succeeded in enlisting hundreds of Lolos in the Red Army. LIU Po-ch'eng was identified in 1940 as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP. As Commander of the 129th Division he occupied towards the end of 1943 the T'si-bang Shan area following evacuation by Central Government forces. In April of 1944 he was reported operating in northern Honan.

LIU Shao-ch'i (HU Fu)—In 1943 he was identified as member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the CCP, also Director of National Labor Union Headquarters and Director of the Southeast Political Branch Bureau. He probably still holds these, or at least some of these posts. He is reported to belong to the "MAO Tse-tung clique" within the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was member of the Secretarial Bureau and of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, and also member of the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee.

LIU Shao-wen—Member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported in 1943.

LIU Shih—Identified in 1944 as Commissioner of Education of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Government.

LIU Tien-chi—Identified in 1943 as a Kuomintang member who was also a member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government.

LIU Tse-ju—Identified in July 1944 as head of the CCP in Honan, a student in the Party School and a writer.

LIU Tzu-tan—Identified in 1939 as Commander of the 26th Chinese Communist Army.

LIU Yen—Last known information dated 1943 when he was reported Political Commissar for the 1st Division of the New 4th Army, a post now held by SU Yü. He was appointed a member of the Political Committee of the 1st Division of the New 4th Army in the Central Kiangsu Military Region.

LO Jui-ch'ing—Director of the Political Department, Field Headquarters of the 18th Group Army. Vice Chairman of the Anti-Japanese University in Yenan in 1938. Identified in 1940 as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

LO Jung-heng—Political Commissar and Acting Commander of the 115th Division of the 18th Group Army in the Shantung Military Region. He has held the position of Political Commissar of the 115th Division under LIN Piao at least since 1939.

LO Mai—Secretary General of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government as of March 1944. In February 1934 he was chosen member of the Presidium of the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee at the meeting in Jui-chin, Kiangsi. In 1943 he was reported as member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP.

LO Ping-hui—Commanding General of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army in the South Huai Military Region. Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1940. Appointed Vice Commander of the 2nd Division of the New 4th Army February 1941.

LOMINADZE—DECEASED. Replaced BORODIN as chief Comintern adviser to the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Chief instigator of the Communist coup in Canton, December 1927. It failed and he returned to Russia where he became a youth leader. Referred to among friends as the "darling of Stalin." After 1933 he began to disagree with Stalin's policy and fell into disfavor. Committed suicide, 1935.

*LOO Sun—Reported in 1942 as head of a Chinese Communist organization in Hong Kong with the underground address of 181 Sai Yeung Choy Street, 3rd Floor, Samshuipo. He was chief assistant to LIAO Ch'eng-chih former New 4th Army Representative in Hong Kong.

LOU Ning-hsien—Identified in 1943 as a member of the Executive Committee of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.

LÜ Cheng-ts'ao—General in the United Garrison Army commanding in the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region. He serves under HO Lung, C-in-C of the United Garrison Army of the 18th Group Army. He is said to have been a

leader of a Red cell in WAN Fu-lin's 53rd Army and a former guerrilla fighter in Jehol. He was the commander of the Central Hopeh Military Region from 1938 probably until it was reported abolished in September 1943 and incorporated in the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region under the direct command of NIEH Jung-chen. As of 1938 he was a member of the Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government. Early in 1943 he was reported in command of Communist forces in western Hopeh.

LU Chih-chun—Director of the Bethune International Peace Hospital in Yenan.

LU Ting-i—Member of the Central Committee of the CCP in 1943.

LUNG Ling—Identified in 1939 as a divisional commander in the Chinese Communist forces.

MA Hai-te—American doctor on the Staff of the Bethune International Peace Hospital and medical advisor to the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Base Medical Service. He is responsible for student health and epidemic prevention. He is a Catholic from North Carolina. Received his medical education in Switzerland. He has been with the Chinese Communist Medical Service since 1936, but apparently is not a Communist himself. He is a man in his thirties or early forties, not tall, muscular, and bent slightly forward. He has an energetic, handsome tanned face, deep set kindly blue eyes under fierce black shaggy brows. He speaks English like an American, French like a Frenchman, Chinese like a native, and some Near Eastern languages. He said he was a Syrian American.

Ma Hsi-wu—Special Administrative Commissioner in East Shensi, concurrently Chief of Branch Court. Originator of the "MA Hsi-wu court method." The procedure is to go among the populace in search of evidence and then combine trial and settlement in court.

Ma Ming-fang—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

*Ma Pun-chi—Identified in 1943 as Commander of a Mohammedan column of the 18th Group Army.

MAHLIN (MARTIN, MARLIN)—Comintern representative, LENIN's secretary, sent to China in 1921. He met Chinese Communists in Shanghai and organized the CCP together with CH'EN Ti-hsiu and others. He also visited Marshal WU P'ei-fu and SUN Yat-sen and recommended, on his return to Moscow, that the Comintern enter relations with both.

MAO Tse-tung (MAO Tze-tung. MAO Tzu-tung). Chairman of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party; Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Council; Principal of the Chinese Communist Party School in Yenan, Director of the Statistics Research Bureau. MAO is an able political, military, and intellectual leader. He has the confidence of the Chinese Communists. He is well read on current affairs at home and abroad. An expert dialectician, he is skilled in rationalizing the policies of the Communist International and is keenly critical within limits of his Marxian orthodoxy. He is a prolific contributor to the Yenan press, and is the Author of "New Democracy" ("Principles of New Democracy" published in 1940), an outline of the basic aims and policies of the CCP. He has impressed interviewers with his sincerity. Born in Hunan Province in 1893, he is a son of poor peasants. His father, however, became fairly prosperous, and was able to pay his son's tuition at various schools. MAO read and studied considerably on his own, becoming acquainted with Western literature as well as Chinese. He enlisted in the Revolutionary Army of 1911, but resigned when SUN Yat-sen came to terms with YUAN Shih-k'ai. He became a student leader. He graduated from the Hunan Provincial First Normal School, and obtained a job as assistant librarian at the Peking National University, where he also attended classes.

Always a rebel and a liberal, his political ideas did not become consolidated until 1920 when he read Marx and books on the Russian Revolution. He began organizing workers politically for the first time in the winter of 1920. In May 1921 he went to Shanghai to attend the foundation meeting of the Chinese Communist Party. In October he became a member of the first provincial branch of the Party in Hunan and Secretary of this group in May 1922. By this time he had organized more than twenty trade unions. In 1923 he went to Shanghai to work in the Central Committee of the Party. He attended the third CCP Congress in Canton when it was decided to cooperate with the Kuomintang. He was then elected Member of the Central

Committee of the CCP and concurrently Member of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Shanghai.

In 1925 he began organizing the peasants, thereby arousing the wrath of the landlords who demanded his arrest. He fled to Canton. For a while he was editor of the Kuomintang paper "Political Weekly" and headed the Kuomintang propaganda department. In 1926 he went to Hankow and directed the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang. From there he was sent to Hunan as inspector of the peasant movement. The following year he was elected the first President of the All-China Peasants' Union. After the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927 he took part in the decision to depose CH'EN Tu-hsiu as Secretary of the Chinese Communist Central Committee, 7 August 1927. He was then sent by the Communist Party to Changsha, Hunan, where he organized the First Division of the First Peasants' and Workers' Army and the Autumn Crop Uprising. The Uprising was not approved by the Central Committee so MAO was dismissed from the Political Bureau and the Party Front Committee. However, he held his army together, based at Ching-kan Shan (Mt.)

In May 1928 he combined forces with CHU Te and created the 4th Red Army with CHU as Commander and himself as Political Commissar. They began a campaign through southern Kiangsi in January 1929. MAO and CHU assumed the same positions in the First Red Army Corps when it was organized in 1929 to include the 3rd, 4th, and 12th Red Armies. In 1930 when CHU became C-in-C of the First Front Army combining the First and Third Army Corps, MAO was again Political Commissar. He also became Chairman of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee.

In 1930 MAO's wife, YANG T'ai-hui, and his younger sister were executed by the Kuomintang authorities. He later married HO Tzu-chien, school teacher and Marxist. His present wife is LAN P'ing, former Shanghai movie actress.

In 1931 he was elected Chairman of the Central Soviet Government in Kiangsi. He was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International by the 7th World Congress, July–August 1935. In 1938 after the Kuomintang-Communist United Front against the Japanese had been formed he was readmitted into the Kuomintang. In 1940 he was reported member of the Supreme National Defense Council and of the 1st People's Political Council in Chungking.

MAO was described in the summer of 1944 as slightly stouter, a chain-smoker inhaling every time, a man with a hearty laugh when amused. Other observers describe him as rather effeminate, somewhat slow-witted, with a tired kindly smile, and fine sense of humor. He seldom appears in public in Yenan and is said to be always well-guarded for fear of assault by Kuomintang secret service agents from Sian.

MAO Tze-tung—MAO Tse-tung

MAO Tzu-tung—MAO Tse-tung

MARLIN—see MAHLIN

"MENG Fu-tang—Identified in October 1944 as Chairman of the South Hopeh Administrative Office of the CCP. He is noted educator in Hopeh Province.

MIYAMOTO, Tetsuji—Formerly a labor foreman who was taken prisoner. Chief of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh branch of Japanese Anti-War League in China. After the formation of the Anti-War League's North China Association he became secretary of its Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh branch.

Note: Japanese Anti-War League was organized by Wataru KAJI, residing in Chunking, who is not a Communist; but location of its branch referred to above makes it possible that Japanese People's Emancipation League, organized by Susuri OKANO in Yenan, is meant.

MUELLER, Hans—Anti-Nazi German doctor with the Chinese Communist Medical Service in Yenan in 1944.

NAN Han-chen—Finance Commissioner of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government.

NEUMANN, Heinz—DECEASED. German. Comintern representative with LOMINADZE to the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. One of the chief instigators of the Communist coup in Canton, December 1927. Following its failure, he returned to Europe where he became a leader of the German Communist Party. After the rise of Hitler, NEUMANN opposed the policy of the Comintern to infiltrate into the NAZI Party. He fled to Switzerland, 1935, and thence to Russia. He was murdered during the purge in 1936.

NIEH Jung-chen (NIEH Yung-chen)—Commanding General and concurrently a Political Commissar of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region under the 18th Group Army; Member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government. Psychologically he is westernized to a certain degree, and is described as more like a college president than a military man. Energetic looking. Approximately 37 years old. Speaks good French. He worked in the Schneider-Creusot Arms factory, Renault Motor Works and the Thomson Electric Company in France. He was educated in the Belgion Labour College and received political training in Moscow. About November 1937, as Political Commissar of the Communist First Army Corps he was sent to Wu-t'ai in Shansi to develop partisan organizations and prevent Japanese occupation of the area. In January 1938 he was Vice-Commander and Political Commissar of the 115th Division of the 18th Group Army in command of Fou-p'ing are in Hopeh. He was the founder and builder of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar War Base and has been a member of the Executive Committee of its Border Government, Military Commander, and Political Commissar in this region since 1938. In 1940 he commanded the 18th Group Army forces in the northeast of Shansi Province, and was also member of the Central Committee of the CCP. In September 1943 the Central Hopeh Military region was reported abolished and incorporated under NIEH's direct command in the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Military Region.

NIEH Yung-chen—see NIEH Jung-chen.

NOULENS—Comintern agent arrested in Shanghai 1932, and convicted in Nanking. He was reported to be at that time the chief Far East agent of the Comintern.

OKAMOTO—Instituted North Kiangsu branch of Japanese People's Emancipation League after dissolution of Anhwei, South Kiangsu, and North Kiangsu branches of Japanese Anti-War Association [League?] for amalgamation into new organization.

OKANO, Susumu.—The best known member of the Japanese Communist Party is OKANO Susumu who makes his headquarters at Yenan, China, in association with the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army. His real name is said to be SAKAMO Tetsu.

OKANO was born in 1892 and was left an orphan when quite young. An older brother put him through a commercial school and then Keia University. His interest in the labor movement dates from 1913 when he was active in the Yu Ai Kai, one of the earliest of Japanese trade unions. His interest in the Russian revolution took him to Russia. Later he went to England where, reportedly, he aided in founding the British Communist Party. His inflammatory speeches then caused Scotland Yard to suggest his departure from the country. After spending some time in France, Germany and Swtizerland he returned to Japan and assisted in the inauguration of the Japanese Communist Party under KATAYAMA Sen in 1922. Shortly afterward he was arrested and spent most of his time in jail until 1931. In 1932 he went to Soviet Russia as a delegate of the Japanese Communist Party to the Third Internationale. After KATAYAMA'S death in 1933 OKANO became spokesman for the party in Moscow and in 1935 was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist International. One source stated in 1944 that OKANO had not been in Japan for 12 years but had occasional underground contact with Communist groups there. Another source stated in 1944 that he smuggled himself quietly into North China in 1937 and worked underground against the Japanese Army until he transferred his activities to Yenan sometime during 1943.

Since his arrival in Yenan OKANO has organized the Japanese People's Emancipation League which has absorbed the less effectual Japanese Anti-War League in numerous places. He also has provided the dynamic leadership which the zealous but inexperienced membership required. He insists that the League is not Communistic. In addition, he has established the Japanese Communist League and the Japanese Workers' and Peasants' School which trains Japanese ex-prisoners of war as well as a few Chinese for propaganda work at the front.

Members of the United States Army Observer Section who interviewed OKANO at Yenan last September reported his program for Japan's emancipation as one of moderation and gradual development toward socialism through "democratic" processes. A Yenan broadcast in December 1944 stated that OKANO attended the second session of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region People's Congress, a privilege which the 8th Route

Army allows to one or two Japanese honorary members of this and other border region assemblies. The National Herald, Chungking, reported his return last June from a visit to Soviet Russia. OKANO is reported to be soft-spoken, physically healthy and energetic, and intellectually alert and keen.

ORLOV, Andrew—Very competent Soviet Russian surgeon in the Bethune International Peace Hospital in Yenan. Arriving in Yenan via Lanchow with permission of the Kuomintang he has been in the Chinese Communist area for almost three years.

PAI Ch'en-pang—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

P'AN Tzu-nien—Publisher of the *Hsin-hua Jih-pao*, Chinese Communist newspaper in Chungking since at least 1943. Identified as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

P'ENG Te-huai—Deputy Commander of the 18th Group Army since August 1937. Dynamic, loathes procrastination, gruff, forthright in manner and speech, a great wit. Of excellent health and endurance. Walked most of the 6,000 miles of the "Long March" frequently giving his horse to a tired or wounded comrade. Non-smoker and teetotaler, late to retire and early to rise. Author of many treaties on military strategy and tactics. Directs field operations, while Commander CHU Te serves more in a general staff capacity. He was born of prosperous peasants in Hunan Province in 1900. Hated by his stepmother. Attended an old fashioned Chinese school where he was often beaten.. At the age of nine he was denounced by his family as unfilial and sent out into the world. He worked as a cowherd, coal-miner, shoe-maker's apprentice, and dyke-builder until 16 when he returned home and was taken in by a rich uncle. During a rice famine in Hunan, he stirred up 200 peasants to attack the house of a merchant known to have large stores of rice. He joined the Army at 18, eventually received a commission and was sent to the Hunan Military School, graduating a battalion commander. There he discovered Marx and other Communist literature. Among his troops he began Marxist course in political training and organized soldiers' committees. In 1926 he married a girl who belonged to the Socialist Youth but they became separated during the Revolution and he has not seen her since 1928.

P'ENG joined the CCP in 1927, revolted from the Kuomingtang Army in July 1928 and joined the "Red Army" with his troops. The 5th Red Army was organized under his command. In April 1930 he was put in command of the 3rd Army Corps which joined forces with CHU Te's 1st Army Corps to become the First Front Army under CHU. Arriving in the Northwest in 1935 after the "Long March" he was put in direct command of the 1st Front Red Army and made C-in-C of all Northwest Red Armies until the arrival of CHU Te in late 1936.

When the United China Front was formed, CHIANG Kai-shek appointed P'ENG Deputy Commander of the 18th Group Army in Shansi. In 1940 he was member of the Central Committee of the CCP and member of the Supreme National Defense Council in Chungking. In 1942 he was reported Chief of the General Staff of the Communist Military Council, also Vice Chairman of the same Council. In 1943 he was reported in the field commanding forces in southeast Shansi, also member of the Central Committee.

Po-ku—see CH'IN Pang-hsien.

ROSENTHAL, Dr.—Austrian or German Jewish surgeon who has been working for the Chinese Communist 18th Group Army in Shantung Province since 1943. Before that he was with the New 4th Army for two years having escaped to the region from Shanghai.

ROY, M. N.—Indian. Communist agent attached to the Kuomintang Government in Hankow in 1927. His alleged indiscretion in revealing to WANG Ching-wei the Comintern's instructions to the Chinese Communists is reported to have been a factor causing the Kuomintang-Communist break. BORODIN was said to have asked for Roy's withdrawal.

SHANG Ying—see HSIANG Ying.

SHU Fan-t'ing—Identified in 1943 as head of the Chinese Communist administration in Northwest Shansi. Said to be a former member of the T'ung-meng Hui.

SU Yü—Commanding General and Political Commissar of the 1st Division of the New 4th Army in the Central Kiangsu Military Region. In February 1941 he was appointed Commander of the 1st Division and has been Political Commissar of this division since 1943.

*SSU Ko-ching—Appointed Acting Director of the United Front Department of the Chinese Communist Party to replace CH'EN Shao-yü, March 1944.

SUN Chih-yüan—Identified in 1943 as a member of the Political Committee of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.

SUNG Jen-ch'iung—Commanding General of the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military Region. In 1940 he was reported Commander of the Communist Southern Hopeh Military Area.

SUNG Shao-wen—Chairman of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government when last reported in 1943. He is not a member of the CCP.

T'AN Chen-lin—Commander of the 6th Division of the New 4th Army when last reported in 1943. In 1941 he was also temporary Political Commissar of his division.

T'AN Cheng—Vice Director of Political Headquarters of the 18th Group Army, and Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. Author of "Report on Political Work in the Army".

T'ANG T'ien—Identified in 1942 as a commander in the 18th Group Army".

*TENG Chih-hui—Reported in 1944 as Political Commissar of the 4th Division of the New 4th Army.

TENG Fa—Member of the Central Committee and member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party when last reported in 1943. He is an outdoors man of action, full of enthusiasm and mischief. Native of Canton, of a working-class family. He was once a foreign-style cook on a Canton-Hong Kong steamer. A leader in the great Hong Kong shipping strike in 1924. He became a Communist, entered Whampoa Military Academy, and participated in the Nationalist Revolution. He joined the Chinese Communist Army in Kiangsi after 1927. In February 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was appointed member of the Presidium of the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee. He was chief of the Chinese Communist Secret Police in 1937 when his head was worth $50,000 to the Kuomintang.

T'ENG Tai-yüan—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

TENG Ying-ch'ao (Mrs. CHOU En-lai)—Member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. She is said to have met CHOU En-lai about 1919 in a Tientsin jail where they and other radical students had been imprisoned for participation in student demonstrations. She was then attending a normal school in Tientsin, and was member of the radical society "Awaken" which CHOU also joined upon release from prison. She was a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1940 and at the same time a member of the 1st People's Political Council, Chungking 1940. In 1943 she was a member of the 3rd People's Political Council in Chungking.

TING Ling (CHIANG Ping-chih)—Well-known woman writer engaged in organizing cultural activities in the Northwest. She was born in Hunan Province in 1905. She studied at the Ping Ming Girls' School founded by CH'EN Tu-hsiu. She entered Shanghai University's Department of Literature in 1924. Her first novel "*Hsiao Shuo*", published in 1927, immediately attracted attention in the literary world. Since then she has written a great many novels and short stories. In 1931 she edited a magazine "*Pei Tou*" ("The Great Dipper") organ of the Left Writers' Union in China. At first she tended to be an anarchist, then after 1927 swung more to the left, especially after the death of her husband, the well-known novelist HU Yeh-p'ing in February 1931. She was arrested as a Leftist writer in May 1933, and imprisoned for two years, then released under surveillance in Nanking. In November 1936, she left Nanking for Sian, where she arranged to join the Chinese Communists in Shensi.

TS'AI Ch'ang (Miss)—"Chief of Women" and member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported in 1943. She has held the former post since at least 1940.

TS'AI Shu-fan—Member of the Central Committee of the CCP when last reported in 1943.

TS'AO I-ou—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

TS'AO Lan-ju—Member of the Chairman's Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government when last reported in 1943.

TSENG Hsi-sheng—Political Commissar, Central Anhwei Base of the New 4th Army. In 1941 he was a member of the Political Committee of the 7th Division of the New 4th Army.

TSENG Shan—Member of the political Bureau of the CCP and Chief of Minorities Department of the Secretariat of the CCP when last reported in 1943. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was chosen People's Commissar for Internal Affairs by the 2nd Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee. In 1940 he was a member of the Central Committee and Chief of Minorities of the Chinese Communist Party.

TSENG Sheng—Commander of Kwangtung People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps operating in the Canton-Hong Kong area. About 34 years old. He was active in the 1935 Student Anti-Japanese Movement. Attended Canton Chung-shan University. Commander of the former 3rd Detachment, which became a part of the Kwangtung People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps in 1940.. He was sent by the New 4th Army in 1939–40 to the Canton-Hong Kong area to organize guerrilla resistance. His present Vice Commander, WANG Tso-yao, joined him with the former 5th Detachment late in 1940. In spite of Kuomintang extermination campaigns against them, TSENG's corps helped many Kuomintang officials escape to Free China after the fall of Hong Kong.

TSO Ch'i—Member of the Political Committee of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. Former Political Commissar of a regiment of the 18th Group Army. He lost his right arm in anti-Japanese action.

TSUI Chiu-pai—see CH'Ü Ch'iu-po.

TUAN Chi-nien—Identified in 1943 by a Kuomintang source as a Chinese Communist and member of the CH'EN Shao-yü clique.

TUNG Pi-wu—Chinese Communist Resident Representative in Chungking. Member of the Chinese Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP. He was one of the founding members of the Hupeh Branch of the CCP in 1921. In February 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he was chosen Chairman of the Provisional Supreme Court by the Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee. He was Chairman of the CCP School at Pao-an, Shensi, in 1937. In 1940 he was reported as a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; member of the 2nd People's Political Council in Chungking; also member of the Council's Resident Committee. Member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party 1943. Standing member, Committee for the Establishment of Constitutional Government, Chungking, October 1943. Member, 3rd People's Political Council, Chungking, and member of the Council's Resident Committee 1944. In October 1944 there was much talk of TUNG's accompanying the People's Political Council's five-man investigation party to Yenan, but so far as is known, the trip never did take place. He was one of the Chinese delegates to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

* WA Bok-san—Reported in 1944 to be a Chinese Communist leader on Hainan Island.

WANG Chen, Maj. Gen. Commander of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the 18th Group Army, Presiding Member of the Brigade Cooperative Management Committee, Commanding officer of the Yenan Garrison, Commanding officer of the Yenan Branch Military Area. He is a hot-tempered warrior from Hunan Province. In the beginning of 1938 he entered northern Shensi from northern Shansi, but a part of his brigade was called back from the front to Nan-ni-wan to do reclamation work in 1939. From 1940 to 1942 the whole brigade was called back by batches to engage in farming. WANG's brigade spends 70% of its time in military training and 30% in political and cultural training. He has said that his troops are educated with "Marxian materialistic dialectics" and "historical materialism." His men seem healthy and well-fed and have received the first prize for production in the army. WANG was chosen to escort the Chungking Press Party from Sian to Yenan in the summer of 1944.

WANG Chia-hsiang—Chairman of the Political Department of the 18th Group Army. In 1940 he was Director of the Political Department of the 18th Group Army, also member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1942 he was member of the Central Committee of the Party and Executive Staff Officer on the Central Revolutionary Military Council.

WANG Chia-se—Member of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the CCP when last reported in 1943. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi, he held the following posts: member, Secretarial Bureau and member, Political Bureau of the CCP; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vice Chairman, Chinese Soviet

Military Affairs Commission. In 1943 he was Chief of Publicity of the Chinese Communist Party.

WANG Chien-an—Identified in 1943 as Commander of the Chinese Communist Central Shantung Area.

WANG Chu—Reported as Political Commissar of the New 4th Army in 1938. No information has been received about him since.

WANG Chu-ch'ing (WANG Tso-yao?)—Guerrilla leader in Tung-kuan area in Kwangtung. Possibly same as WANG Tso-yao as he seems to be doing the same thing in the same area. Reported in 1943 by Kuomintang sources as having had secret dealings with Communist leader TSENG Sheng.

WANG Ming—see CH'EN Shao-yü.

WANG Po—Reported made Political Commissar of the New 4th Army at time of reorganization. No information since.

*WANG Shan—Identified in October 1944 as a member of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area Administrative Committee. Allegedly a Kuomintang member who escaped to the Chinese Communist areas from Japanese occupied Shansi.

WANG Shih-ying—In 1944 he was reported as director of the 18th Group Army Office in Yenan.

WANG Tsai-hsing—In 1944 he was reported as section chief of the 18th Group Army Office in Yenan.

WANG Tso-yao—Guerrilla leader who joined forces with TSENG Sheng late in 1940. Vice Commander under TSENG. Commands the former 5th Detachment which since 1940 has been part of the Kwangtung People's Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps operating in the Canton-Hong Kong area. He is about 30 years old, former student at Central Officers' School, Canton Branch. He participated in the 1935 Student Anti-Japanese Movement. Ex-teacher. After the fall of Canton, in 1938 he organized the 4th Guerrilla Area in the Pso-an–Tung-kuan district. He was recognized as an official guerrilla leader by Kuomintang General HSIANG Han-p'ing, but in the spring of 1940 and later HSIANG sent troops to suppress WANG.

WU Han-chieh—Identified in 1940 as Director of the Political Department of the 129th Division, 18th Group Army.

*WU Hsin-yu—Identified in December 1944 as Vice Chairman of the Shansi-Suiyuan Administrative District.

WU Li-p'ing—Identified in 1943 as member of the Central Committee of the CCP.

WU Liang-p'ing—According to last known information, dated 1940, he was member of the Central Committee and Chief of Information of the CCP. In 1934 at Jui-chin, Kiangsi he held the following posts: member, Secretarial Bureau and member, Political Bureau of the CCP; Director of Work in "White Areas" (non-Communist areas); People's Commissar for Economics.

WU Man-yu—Representative "labor hero" of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. A peasant aged 51. He has been honored as a production leader.

WU Po-hsiao—Identified in 1944 as a Communist writer.

WU Yü-chang—Director of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Cultural Association. Identified in 1943 as member of both the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP. He was reported in 1942 as Chief of the Inspector-General's Department of the Chinese Communist Military Affairs Commission. Member of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd People's Political Councils at Chungking, 1938-1944.

At present his chief activities in Yenan are: publication of "*Ch'ün-chung Pao*" ("People's Newspaper"), a vernacular translation of the "*Chieh-fang Jih-pao*" ("Emancipation Daily"); composition of work songs which are excellent vehicles of propaganda; preparation of old and new, Chinese and foreign plays for local consumption.

WU Wen-yü—Identified in 1941 as Chief of the Political Department of the 3rd Division, New 4th Army.

YANG Ch'eng-wu—No information later than 1943 when he was reported as a Chinese Communist general with headquarters 50 km. NW Pao-ting, Hopeh. He had been operating as a guerrilla leader in North China at least since 1938.

YANG Ching-yü—Identified in 1943 as a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP. He was also Director of the Northwest Political Branch Bureau in 1943.

*YANG Hsiu-feng—Chairman of the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government. He was formerly professor in the National Normal University at Peking and member of the National Salvationist Group organized by Mme SUN Yat-sen and other liberals. He joined the CCP in 1939.

YANG Shang-k'un—Secretary General of the 18th Group Army. In 1943 he was identified as a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP. In January 1934 he was appointed member of the Secretarial Bureau and concurrently member of the Political Bureau of the CCP and Minister (Commissar) of Organization of the Soviet Government at Jui-chin, Kiangsi.

YAO K'ai—Chinese Communist writer. Author of *"Chung-kuo Ko-ming"* (The Chinese Revolution), Moscow, 1932.

*YAO Shu-shih—Acting Political Commissar of the New 4th Army in 1944.

YEH Chi-chuang—In summer 1944 he was Trade Director of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government, manager of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Trading Company, and member of the Chairman's Committee of the Border Region Government.

YEH Chien-ying—General Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army under CHU Te Specialist in guerrilla tactics. He had been characterized as a habitually calm, reasonable man who upon occasion is capable of bursting into violent profanity. He was Director of Studies at the Whampoa Military Academy when CHAING Kai-shek was Principal. With CHOU En-lai and CH'IN Pang-hsien he played a large part in negotiations for CHIANG's release during the Sian Incident, December 1936. He was Chief of Staff of the 8th Route Army. When the name of the 8th Route Army was changed to the 18th Group Army YEH was appointed Chief of Staff and a member of the army's delegation to the National Government. In September 1939 he was Dean of the Chinese Army a Guerrilla Training School in south Hunan where he is reported to have failed as the Government would not grant him sufficient freedom. In 1940 he was listed as a member of the Ceneral Committee of the CCP, but remained at his station in Chungking. He returned to Yenan in 1941 allegedly because there was "nothing for him to do" in Chungking, and resumed active duty as Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army.

YEH Hsi-i—see YEH T'ing.

YEH T'ing (YEH Hsi-i)—No information is available about him dated later than December 1943, but he apparently remains a prisoner of the National Government. He was captured and imprisoned by the Nationalist forces during the new 4th Army Incident in January 1941. YEH T'ing is an able soldier with a distinguished military career. Well-built, stocky, unpretentious, like a merchant in appearance. He was born in Kwangtung province 1898, studied at Weichow Agricultural School 1911. In 1914 he graduated from the Kwangtung Military School, and attended the Hupeh Military School 1914–16. In 1919 he graduated from the Paoting Military Academy. In 1921 he served as a Company Commander in the Kwangtung Provincial Army. In 1922 he was Commander 2nd Battalion, Guards' Regiment of the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Canton. Next year he became Chief of Staff, Kwangtung Gendarmerie. In 1925 he was Chief of the Staff Office, 4th Nationalist Army, and participated in the Northern Punitive Expedition as Commander of the 24th Division of the 4th Army under CHANG Fa-k'uei. In 1927 YEH and his division rebelled in Kiangsi while enroute to the rescue of T'ANG Sheng-chih. YEH joined HO Lung in the Nan-ch'ang and Swatow uprisings that same year, and was reported to have been a leading figure in the "Canton Commune" of December 1927.

There are contradictory reports about his activities between December 1927 when the Commune failed and the spring of 1938 when the New 4th Army was organized with him as Commander. One report states he visited Russia and Germany, traveled through Europe, then retired to Macao. According to another report he worked with CHU Te. Still a third report states he did not participate in Kuomintang-Communist hostilities of those years.

In the spring of 1938 the New 4th Army was organized by CHIANG Kai-shek who appointed YEH T'ing as Commander. He was also to act as the Central Government's Political Commissar. The military leadership, however, is said to have been provided mostly by HSIANG Ying, the Vice Commander. Based on the Kiangsu-Anhwei border near Nanking, the New 4th Army became famous for its guerrilla tactics against the Japanese in the

lower Yangtze valley. YEH is reported to have visited Chungking late in 1939 to negotiate for more supplies and funds.

Following the "New 4th Incident" of January 1941, YEH and some 200 officers of the New 4th Army were arrested by the Central Government. They were reported to have been held first at Shang-jao, Kiangsi, then elsewhere until early 1943 when they were transferred to a prison in Chungking. Later CH'EN Ch'eng obtained permission for YEH to reside with him in En-shih, Hupeh on the personal responsibility of CH'EN; but soon after YEH and his family arrived, CH'EN Ch'eng's new command in western Yunnan made it impossible for CH'EN himself to reside at En-shih. Thereupon CH'EN suggested to CHANG Fa-k'uei, a friend of YEH's, that the latter move with his family to Kwangsi. CHANG and LI Chi-shen are reported to have accepted joint responsibility for YEH and the latter moved to Kweilin. On 19 January 1944 YEH was reported rearrested. A request for his release was among the resolutions passed by the 2nd People's Political Council of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government, December 1944.

YÜAN Kuo-p'ing—Identified in 1940 as Chief of the Political Department of the New 4th Army.

ZENG Pi-shu—see JEN Pi-shih.

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


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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 8

JANUARY 29, FEBRUARY 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1952

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

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Annex
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1
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CONTENTS

Page

Testimony of—
Auerbach, Sol (James S. Allen) 2876–2896
Barnes, Kathleen 2599–2617
Coy, Mildred Price 2643–2650
Deane, Hugh Gordon, Jr 2780–2791
DeCaux, Leonard 2619–2642
Fluegel, Dr. Edna R 2825–2870
Gelfan, Harriet Moore 2559–2598
Keeney (Mrs.), Mary Jane 2773–2380
Keeney, Philip Olin 2791–2794
Mandel, William Marx 2733–2749
Munson, Lyle A 2751–2771
Poppe, Prof. Nicholas N 2691–2731
Rosinger, Lawrence K 2475–2557
Stewart, Maxwell S 2650–2690
Weyl, Nathaniel 2795–2823, 2871–2876

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2:55 p. m., pursuant to notice, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senators Ferguson and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Rosinger, do you solemnly swear that, in the matter now pending before this subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the United States, you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ROSINGER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, NEW YORK CITY, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, LEONARD B. BOUDIN, NEW YORK CITY

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, three witnesses before this committee—namely, Prof. William Canning, Prof. Karl Wittfogel, and Professor Budenz—have testified that you are a member of the Communist Party. We have asked you here today to ask you the question: Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that on the ground that your answering the question would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must stand on the answer I have just given.

Senator FERGUSON. Does your word "decline" mean that you refuse to answer?

Mr. ROSINGER. It means refuse on the grounds given.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You refuse on the grounds given?

Mr. ROSINGER. As I understand it, the witness does not have to employ any particular terminology in explaining.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted the record to make sure that you were refusing to answer, and then you assign the reason, as under the Constitution?

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Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Another witness before this committee, Governor Stassen, has specified that you and Mr. Owen Lattimore were the leaders of a group of experts in the State Department conference in October 1949, which group dominated the atmosphere of the conference at that time.

Mr. Rosinger, are you prepared today to discuss what took place at that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes. I wouldn't like to give in advance a commitment on any conceivable question, but I am certainly prepared to discuss the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. With respect to your answer that you refuse to answer the question as to whether or not you were a Communist, and the fact that you were called by the Secretary of State as an adviser, in 1949, what position does that put the Secretary of State in?

Mr. ROSINGER. I am afraid that I can't answer that question. I would like to say though, on the use of the word "adviser", while the word is open to many interpretations, it should be clear that I was one of 25 people invited for a 2½-day period in the process of a long discussion of American Far East policy, including China policy.

I therefore wouldn't want the word "adviser" to suggest that I had any great importance.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were an adviser; and is it not true that, as such, you submitted a written document to the Secretary of State on questions of the Far East?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes. The document was submitted to Mr. Jessup.

Senator FERGUSON. As one of the officers of the Secretary of State?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that they were not seeking advice?

The way I would put it is this—and this is the way they put it to us, both in connection with the memoranda and in connection with the conference: By "us," I mean the people who submitted memoranda, assuming they received the same communication as I did; and, by "us" at the conference, I mean the participants.

They said they were interested in hearing a range of opinion. There is no way of telling what importance they would attach to any segment of the range.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not they were seeking the range of an opinion of a Communist? Do you think it included that?

Mr. ROSINGER. I do not know what range of opinion they were seeking.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a copy of the document that you submitted?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a copy?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must have had it at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a copy. It was submitted to us today.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I asked him if he did have a copy. Did you give the copy to the committee?

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Mr. ROSINGER. What I did was this: The committee asked me whether I had a copy. I said I was not certain; I would look for it when I got back to New York. I did that and could not find a copy. I then wrote to Mr. James E. Webb of the State Department saying that the committee had requested a copy; I could not find one in my files; I was therefore telling him that I would have no objection to the release of the memorandum to the committee. As I understand from what Mr. Morris has said, the memorandum has been released to the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Rosinger, do you think that as an American citizen, which you are, you should act as an adviser to the State Department on a foreign-policy problem and then refuse to answer as to whether you are or are not a Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can only stand on the position that I have taken.

Senator FERGUSON. And you refuse to answer that question on the ground that it may tend to incriminate you?

Mr. ROSINGER. As you know, I have not used that terminology. I simply stand on the answer I have already given.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, that it would be in violation of the fifth amendment of the Constitution?

Mr. ROSINGER. Essentially, that I have no further comment to make on these particular questions of the considerations on the part of the Secretary of State, or anyone else, in inviting me to a conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Who invited you to the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I read into the record at the executive session, the telegram received in the name of Dean Acheson. If you would like me to, I will read it into the record again.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I wish you would.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that we ought to put into the record the whole transcript of the executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Some of these things I think we can cover individually, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you read the telegram?

Mr. ROSINGER. It is addressed to me at the American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York City, and reads as follows:

> I am inviting a few persons interested in American foreign policy toward China to attend a confidential consultative meeting in the Department on October 6, 7, and 8. Purpose is to provide exchange of views valuable to the Department in developing American foreign policy in this area. Your participation would make a real contribution. The Department will pay travel and per diem. Please write or telegraph, attention Francis Russell, possibility of your attending.
>
> DEAN ACHESON, *Secretary of State.*

Senator FERGUSON. So it would indicate that the Secretary of State was personally requesting your appearance?

Mr. ROSINGER. Actually, I have no means of knowing what discussions went on. Many telegrams are signed in his name. It does not necessarily indicate he had given deep personal thought to the membership of the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who did invite you?

Mr. ROSINGER. No. This is my first knowledge of the existence of the plans for such a conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the only knowledge?

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Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only knowledge? You attended on that?

Mr. ROSINGER. After this, there was some further communication relating to routine details, about methods of transportation, and that kind of thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you paid for attending?

Mr. ROSINGER. I was paid transportation between New York and Washington, and a per diem.

Senator FERGUSON. How much per diem?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know, except that I think the present rate is $9, and very likely it was $9 a day at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. So you then were, in effect, an employe, because you were receiving compensation as well as transportation?

Mr. ROSINGER. In actual fact, when a person goes to a conference in another city he has taxi expenses to the railway station, food expenses and so on, which are rarely covered by the per diem. That is, if his transportation between cities were the only thing covered, he would be taking money out of his own pocket in order to attend.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were paid per diem as well as transportation?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. To and from Washington?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. To Washington, and from Washington back to New York?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

May I say one thing more? I wouldn't accept the statement that I was an employee of the Government because this seems to me to be a very tenuous connection on my part with the Government, and I would say in my own thinking that an employee is presumably somebody who receives some kind of honorarium or salary.

Senator FERGUSON. I see the press here. Have you any objection to your picture being taken if the committee recesses?

Mr. ROSINGER. No. Let us go ahead. I have no objection.

Senator FERGUSON. I will recess the committee so you gentlemen can perform your functions as to photographs, and then you can leave.

(A short recess was taken.)

Senator FERGUSON. I noticed when I asked you the question, including the word "incriminate" as to whether or not you refused to answer on the ground it would tend to incriminate, you left that out of your answer previously. I am asking you now: What provision of the fifth amendment is it that you refuse to answer under?

Mr. ROSINGER. As I understand it, there is a clause in the fifth amendment giving a person the right not to testify against himself in certain situations.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that it?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Are you a naturalized citizen of the United States?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; a native-born citizen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, were you a teacher in the New York City school system?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

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Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time?

Mr. ROSINGER. During the school year 1937–38 and during the school year 1940–41.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you left the school system, Mr. Rosinger; is that right?

Mr. ROSINGER. Actually, I should modify the last part. It was the school year 1937–38 but from September 1940 to September 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Rosinger, what employment did you take after you left the New York City school system?

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment. In the fifth amendment, will you point out the particular part that you are claiming privilege under?

Mr. ROSINGER. May I consult counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; consult your counsel. Will you tell us what part of it you are claiming privilege on?

Mr. ROSINGER. It is the part which begins:

No one shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

Senator FERGUSON. This is not a criminal case.

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, Senator, if you want me to use the word "incrimination"——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you to use any word. I want to know whether it is on the ground it will tend or may tend to incriminate you.

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you are not claiming this provision of being a witness against yourself?

Mr. BOUDIN. May I make a comment? That part that has just been read, the privilege not to be a witness against himself, is the privilege of self-incrimination. The words "self-incrimination" are not used in the Constitution, and the witness need not use those words, but, in order that there be no ambiguity he is using it so there will be no question in the committee's mind that he is pleading the constitutional privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I want to make sure, that it is not on the ground he is testifying in a criminal case, but it is on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him.

Mr. BOUDIN. That term "in the criminal case" is the language which the courts will apply to congressional investigations, as to any proceeding in which they may be a tendency to self-incrimination.

Senator FERGUSON. But the record clearly shows he has avoided and intentionally avoided the question of self-incrimination, because when the chairman asked that question, he avoided it in his answer.

Mr. BOUDIN. Perhaps I ought to say that I had advised the witness what I understand to be the law, that one need not use a particular phraseology and terminology, and that so long as it is made clear to the committee that it is a constitutional privilege set forth in the fifth amendment, the privilege not to be a witness against one's self, the witness is sufficiently protected.

However, since you did then raise the issue, the witness decided to answer you in the terms used by you.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. What appointment did you take after you left the New York City school system, Mr. Rosinger?

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Mr. ROSINGER. I took employment prior to leaving the New York City school system, that is, the school year 1940–41 ended in June 1941, the summer vacation then began. During the summer vacation—I believe on August 1, 1941—I joined the staff of the India Government Trade Commissioner in New York. The Trade Commissioner was then Mr. H. S. Mallik, who is now the Indian Ambassador to France.

When September, 1941, came, I resigned from the school system and continued in the employment that I had begun during the summer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you do both at the same time?

Mr. ROSINGER. There is no contradiction. The school term had come around; I couldn't be holding two jobs at once.

Mr. MORRIS. I wanted to be sure you had not.

Now, when did you first work for the Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think I began there on July 1, 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay with the Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. ROSINGER. Until sometime in June 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what were your duties with the Foreign Policy Association at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. Essentially to do research and writing, with some lecturing.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you receive any grants during the period 1937 to 1948 from various foundations?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you enumerate those grants to the committee, please, if you will, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I am wondering in what sense you are using the word "foundations"?

Mr. MORRIS. Used in the broadest possible sense.

Senator FERGUSON. From any source.

Mr. ROSINGER. In the summer of 1937 I had a tuition scholarship at a Chinese-language summer school at the University of Michigan from the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

From the American Council of Learned Societies, I had a study grant for the study of the Chinese language and Chinese history for 1938 and 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us with whom you negotiated in accomplishing each of those two grants, that is, the one with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the one with the American Council of Learned Societies?

Mr. ROSINGER. With the Institute of Pacific Relations, I believe, because I am not absolutely certain, that it was a Miss Ruth Earnshaw.

With the American Council of Learned Societies——

Mr. MORRIS. Was it with Mortimer Graves?

Mr. ROSINGER. Was he the top officer in the council at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know. The question is with whom you negotiated.

Mr. ROSINGER. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Mr. Graves?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have met him on one or two occasions, but I had not met him at that point. I wrote to whoever was the top person in the American Council of Learned Societies.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not have any recollection of any negotiation with any particular individual at that time?

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Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the next grant that you received, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was a training fellowship in the Rockefeller Foundation for work on the staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. In what amount?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would say roughly $2,000 for the year 1939–40, that is, from September 1939 through August 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. With whom did you negotiate that grant, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I made an application. I don't recall the exact procedure.

Then I was called to the Rockefeller Foundation offices for an interview which I had with Mr. Stacey May.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next grant, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. The next grant was not a grant to me personally; it was a grant to the American Institute of Pacific Relations for work on a book which was published as The State of Asia.

My work on this grant began in September 1948 and ended about October 1950, with one qualification; that the grant did not cover my entire salary. It was simply a contribution toward my working on the staff.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the amount, in that case?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean the amount of the grant?

Mr. MORRIS. The amount of the grant.

Mr. ROSINGER. It was a grant for $7,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that $7,000 expended on you alone, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. No, not entirely, because part of it was used for honoraria for chapters in the book, that is, honoraria for authors other than myself.

Mr. MORRIS. In addition to that amount of money, that fraction of $7,000 did you receive any other compensation from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSSINGER. Yes, I had a salary, and the institute made up the difference between the allocation of the grant and the total salary.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that salary?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was $6,000 annually.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your principal function during the time you were so engaged in the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. To write and do research work.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your principal project at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. This was the principal project.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this" was the principal project, what do you mean?

Mr. ROSINGER. I mean The State of Asia. The original idea was that I would do the entire book. Then it became apparent that it was impossible for one person to do it. We therefore decided on a book which would be essentially a symposium.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rosinger is now giving testimony in connection with the publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, published by Alfred A. Knopf in 1951, called The State of Asia, a contemporary survey by Lawrence K. Rosinger and Asso-

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ciates, issued under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Are all the associates mentioned in the book?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Now, reading from the table of contents, there is:

Foreword by William L. Holland.
The State of Asia by Lawrence K. Rosinger.
China by Lawrence K. Rosinger.
Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore.
Korea by Shannon McCune.
The Korean Crisis and the United Nations by Miriam S. Farley.
Japan by John M. Maki.
Indochina by Ellen Hammer.
Thailand (Siam) by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff.
Burma by S. B. Thomas.
Malaya by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff.
The Philippines by Shirley Jenkins.
Indonesia by Paul M. Kattenburg.
India by Lawrence K. Rosinger.
Pakistan by Holder Furber—

that is all, and then the bibliography, the contributors, and the index.

Mr. Rosinger, when was this project, The State of Asia, first contemplated by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. Roughly, in May or June of 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it decided at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know, because if there was any meeting, I was not present.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first hear about it, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. The Institute of Pacific Relations asked me whether I would be interested in such a project.

Mr. MORRIS. Who at the institute?

Mr. ROSINGER. Mr. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in 1948?

Mr. ROSINGER. 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Had they told you at that time that a grant had been obtained for the project?

Mr. ROSINGER. No. The grant was obtained from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Mr. MORRIS. When was the grant actually obtained?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think in June 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of the negotiations that took place between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Rockefeller Foundation which brought about that grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not in any detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about it?

Mr. ROSINGER. I simply knew that negotiations were going on.

Mr. MORRIS. Between what individuals?

Mr. ROSINGER. I suppose between Mr. Holland and whatever people at the foundation he was approaching.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you do not know who the people in the foundation were whom he was approaching?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to put it this way: I don't know exactly what procedure he followed. Of course, I know the names of some of the people at the foundation who may have been connected——

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Mr. MORRIS. We do not want you to say "who may have been," just those you do know.

Mr. ROSINGER. I cannot tell you on the basis of present recollection, that Mr. Holland went to a certain person and presented the project to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know William Mandel? William M. Mandel?

Mr. ROSINGER. I most respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Harold R. Isaacs?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Daniel Thorner?

Mr. ROSINGER. I most respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privileges in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. I read from the book, The State of Asia, about which we have been speaking, for which you received a grant, under "Editor's acknowledgment."

The other contributors and I also owe much to the sixty-odd specialists, to each of whom one or more of the chapters was submitted for critical comment, in an effort to achieve accuracy and balance. These readers included (in addition to a number of persons in official United States or United Nations agencies) the following persons—

among the persons named are Harold R. Isaacs, William M. Mandel, and Daniel Thorner.

On the next page, which is marked with "x" at the top, it is signed by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

I will ask you whether or not you knew what was in the book?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew that was in the book?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not any of the three names were in any way connected with the Communist Party, either of the United States or of Soviet Russia?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the most information, then, you can give to this committee and to the people, who are, in effect, asked to read this book; is that true?

Mr. ROSINGER. I stand on the answer I have given. I must say though that I think if anybody should judge the book, he ought to read the book.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, are you willing to tell the committee the steps that you have taken in compiling this volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. Again I can't commit myself on every question, but I would certainly have no objection to giving you the general procedure that was followed.

Mr. MORRIS. I want to know, Mr. Rosinger, whether or not you are willing to tell this subcommittee of the United States Senate, what steps you took in compiling this volume which was put out at the expense of a great foundation and which was put out under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which we are investigat-

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ing here, and ask you if you will be willing to make full disclosure before this committee of what steps you took in compiling that volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't commit myself on such a blanket question.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Rosinger, so that the record may be clear and it may help you in answering these questions, one of the reasons for this committee making this investigation and having you before it, as other witnesses, is that they are trying to ascertain whether or not it is a fact that this organization, the American Institute of Pacific Relations, or the Institute of Pacific Relations, was penetrated by Communists, or those who believed or sponsored Communist philosophy. That is one of the reasons that we are conducting this examination.

Now, if the writer of one of their books, who gets a grant from them, comes in and refuses to answer as to whether or not he is a Communist and as to whether or not those that are connected with the writing of the book or the reading of and contributing to the book, reading, and therefore in the way it is used here, contributing, to the book, as to whether or not certain people are or are not Communists, how are we going to ascertain whether or not there was a penetration of Communists into this organization?

I state that, and ask you whether or not, keeping that in mind, and you being a citizen of the United States, your answers are the same, that you refuse to answer the questions?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think the problem might be solved if Mr. Morris would simply question me. We might find at the end that we had gone through all the questions.

Mr. MORRIS. The question is: Will you make full disclosure? Or, will you make limited disclosures?

Mr. BOUDIN. May I ask if there is a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you still refuse to answer the questions that were asked you, that you did refuse to answer?

Mr. BOUDIN. Those are the ones on which privilege was previously pleaded.

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; I stand on those answers. May I say, that would permit a great deal of discussion of the book?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say, Mr. Rosinger, that you are willing to discuss this book, except with regard to actions on your part which involve Communists, or pro-Communists?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't specify.

Mr. BOUDIN. Essentially the answer is that given to the chairman. The witness will stand on the privilege, as previously asserted.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question that counsel has asked appears to go to whether the witness is claiming privilege with regard to a series of questions about the publication of this volume.

Mr. BOUDIN. Yes; and the witness said he could not answer a general inquiry like that. "Will you answer questions on a certain general subject?" If questions were put, he would attempt to answer them, except where he felt the privilege should be asserted.

Mr. MORRIS. One reason I have in asking this question is that one of the facts, I suppose, that this committee will have to decide, is whether the employees of the Institution of Pacific Relations, when they came before this committee, volunteered to make full disclosure about their experience in the past.

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So I think the fact is an absolute fact, and it calls for an absolute answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Can you answer the question?

Mr. ROSINGER. You are asking me to agree to a whole series of questions you do not now know?

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there areas of your experience or activity in connection with the publication of this book with regard to which you would have to claim privilege?

Mr. ROSINGER. I won't know until I hear the questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, will you tell us to what extent you consulted with Mr. Daniel Thorner in the preparation of this volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the extent to which you conferred with William Mandel in the preparation of this volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell the committee to what extent you conferred with Harold Isaacs in the preparation of this volume?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were the people or officials of the United States that you conferred with, that are not mentioned here?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall who they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were the officials of the United Nations agencies that you conferred with, or the readers included that are not named here?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall any of them?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, how frequently have you been in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. Quite infrequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate the number of times you have been there for the committee, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. BOUDIN. You mean during his whole life?

Mr. MORRIS. During his whole life, yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. We might first delimit the period. Excluding the conference, which I do not suppose could be regarded as occurring in their office, I don't think I have been there since 1946, possibly 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom were you visiting when you were last there, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall. My first visit probably occurred in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate the number of visits you made to that particular office between 1943 and 1947, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Probably on the average of about once a year.

Mr. MORRIS. So you would estimate that at about five or six visits that you made to the Far Eastern Section?

Mr. ROSINGER. That would be a fair assumption.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you visit while you were there, Mr. Rosinger?

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Mr. ROSINGER. I do not recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could be sure that Mr. Rosinger is not being unresponsive to this particular question.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recall anyone that you ever visited in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I don't recall at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. During that period, do you know who was in charge of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department? You are a far-eastern expert, are you not, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right. For a time, Mr. John Carter Vincent was in charge.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit with him while you were in Washington, in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I am not sure. I may have visited him once.

Senator FERGUSON. Could there be a reason other than you just do not remember, that you do not want to name people that you visited in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit Alger Hiss in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit with Julian Wadleigh in the State Department?

Mr. BOUDIN. May I confer?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may confer with your client.

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit John S. Service in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit John P. Davies in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit Robert W. Barnett in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like again your answer to the question: Did you ever visit John Carter Vincent in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. Will you have my answer read back?

Mr. MORRIS. Couldn't you answer the question without its being read back? Give us your true recollection at this time.

Mr. ROSINGER. I think I may have visited him once, but I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony that you cannot be sure whether or not you ever visited John Carter Vincent in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent have you ever conferred with or consulted with or visited with John Carter Vincent?

Mr. ROSINGER. The only contact with him that I am certain of is that, as I recall, he was a delegate to the Hot Springs Conference of the American Institute of Pacific Relations early in 1945.

I was there as a recorder and I met him at that time.

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Mr. MORRIS. But your further testimony is that you cannot recall whether or not you did meet him in the State Department; is that right?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore you are not sure that you have met him only once in your life?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; it may have been twice.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit Lt. Andrew Roth in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. You know whom I am talking about, a former lieutenant in the United States Navy? You understand about whom I was speaking?

Mr. ROSINGER. I stand on my answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know an assistant of John Carter Vincent in the State Department named Julian Friedman?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read into the record, particularly apropos of this particular point, an excerpt of a personal statement of John S. Service as appeared before the Loyalty Board? Will you identify the source, Mr. Mandel, as you read it into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from a transcript of proceedings before the Loyalty Security Board in the case of John Stewart Service in the State Department:

Mr. MORRIS. Could you give the document number on that?

Mr. BOUDIN. Could we have the page number?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from page 2234 of the hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, part II, appendix:

STATEMENT OF JOHN STEWART SERVICE

During my period of consultation after my return to the Department on April 12, 1945, I saw a number of newspapermen and writers on China. This was in the normal course of events, and a part of the usual function of officers on consultations, who have newly returned from the field and are in a position to give background information.

One of the people I remember seeing was Lawrence Rosinger of the Foreign Policy Association. I recall that he was having an interview with one of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs, and as their discussion apparently concerned recent events in China, I was called in to answer some questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you stop there?

Does that refresh your recollection, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I wonder whether Mr. Mandel could read the whole excerpt?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Another contact, I remember, was Raymond Swing, who was referred to me by my superior, Mr. Vincent, for background information in regard to some news reports of the day.

Mr. ROSINGER. Have you read everything that applies to me?

Mr. MANDEL. There is more coming.

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Mr. MORRIS. Anything about that particular episode.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

After discussing the particular point, Mr. Swing asked me for comment on General Hurley and an opinion as to whether his negotiations were proceeding successfully. This I declined to discuss, and referred him back to Mr. Vincent.

Another press contact was with two members of the editorial staff of Fortune magazine, which was preparing an exhaustive article on China. These researchers had approached General Olmstead, who was G–5 on General Wedemeyer's staff and was then in Washington. General Olmstead had referred them to me for political background.

I mention these instances, and I know there were many others, as indication that it was current policy to permit responsible officers to give background information to the press. At this time, of course, I had just returned from Yenan, and was in possession of a great deal of recent information of great interest.

Shortly after my arrival I received an invitation to meet on an off-the-record basis, with the research staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York. This invitation was in a brief letter addressed to me by Edward C. Carter.

I discussed it with Mr. E. F. Stanton, Deputy, and then Acting Director of FE, who approved my accepting.

This meeting with IPR took place on April 25. I believe there were 10 or 12 people present. Practically all of them were writers, including T. A. Bissen, Lawrence Rosinger, and a New Zealander named Belshaw.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all that relates to you, Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. ROSINGER. May I see that a minute, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the reading of that document brings out a conflict between Mr. Rosinger's testimony, where he said he had never met Mr. Service.

Mr. BOUDIN. Mr. Rosinger did not say he had never met Mr. Service.

Mr. MORRIS. In the offices of the State Department.

Mr. BOUDIN. In the offices of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Will the reporter read the question?

(The following question was read by the reporter:

Did you ever visit John S. Service in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. That represents a change of question. Actually, what Mr. Mandel read indicated Service had testified that I was in the State Department, that he happened in, which would be a different situation.

I must still say I don't recall the incident in the State Department, but it could have happened.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the visitor mentioned in the testimony of Mr. Service that you were visiting at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't have the faintest recollection at the moment. What is the date of that? Does he give the date of that?

Mr. MANDEL. On or about April 12, 1945.

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Service says:

One of the people I remember seeing is Lawrence Rosinger, of the Foreign Policy Association. I recall he was having an interview with one of the officers in the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Do you remember that incident?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't, but it is possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know any officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs? You were then an expert on China, Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. ROSINGER. There wouldn't be any point in speculating.

Mr. MORRIS. The question is, Did you know any officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs, Mr. Rosinger?

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Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall.

Mr. BOUDIN. Is this word "officers"?

Mr. MORRIS. I am using the language of the testimony here, "e-r-s."

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I submit that the witness may not be responding to the questions in this case, inasmuch as at this time he was a far-eastern expert, and we have testimony here—at least Mr. Service's statement, to the effect that Mr. Rosinger visited with one of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs.

I have asked Mr. Rosinger if he knew at that time any officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs. He says he cannot remember.

Mr. ROSINGER. Do you have a list of the officers? I would be glad to look at such a list. The State Department went through a number of reorganizations. It is hard to recollect exactly what a position a person may have been in at a particular time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Julian Friedman?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have already invoked the privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not trying to enumerate officers, while they are getting a complete list of those who were in the Office or Division of Chinese Affairs.

Do you know Mr. Ringwalt?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't have any recollection of ever meeting him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. John P. Davies?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have already said, I believe, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know John K. Emerson?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't believe I have ever met him.

May I make one point? You mentioned that my own work has been that of a specialist in the far eastern field. I thing it should be apparent from the small number of visits as I testified before, that this work wasn't primarily a question of personal contact, and that it really was a question of research and study in printed material, some conversations, and that kind of thing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write or telegraph or telephone to officers in the State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't say that I never did, but it would not have been a common occurrence. It would not have been the kind of thing I did every week or even every month.

Senator FERGUSON. Did State Department officials come to you outside of the State Department to confer with you?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't believe anybody ever did. They wouldn't have been coming to me and saying "What shall we do about this?" or "What shall we do about that?" There was no such relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. I give you the organization of the Department of State, April 1, 1945, and I call your attention to page 11, under the heading: "Division of Chinese Affairs."

You will see there the names of eight officers. Will you tell us which of those officers you knew personally?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have already testified that I had met John Carter Vincent at the IPR conference earlier in that year. I have invoked the privilege on one other person.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Mr. Friedman?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

I have no recollection of ever having met any of the other people listed here.

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Mr. MORRIS. According to your testimony, then, if you were visiting an officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs at that time it would only be Mr. Friedman or John Carter Vincent; is that not right, Mr. Rosinger?

He is testifying he has not met any of the officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs, and there is testimony to the effect that he was visiting an officer in the Division of Chinese Affairs. It must have been one of those two officers.

Mr. BOUDIN. He did not testify he was visiting officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs. You are incorporating Service's testimony.

The witness stated that he had no recollection. He is not disputing it, because Mr. Service was evidently not making it up.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the witness to be answering the questions, no counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You answer the question.

Mr. ROSINGER. With respect to one of these people, I have invoked the privilege.

My feeling is that you would have to know the exact organization of that Division at that time. This is in a book. Nobody can tell what shifts were made. Nobody can tell whether somebody who is not technically in this Division, but was concerned with China work, might have been the person I was visiting, so that if one could be sure that this was the precise set-up and that there was no confusion in Mr. Service's mind, then I suppose the conclusion would follow.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you have no other recollection about visiting officers in the Division of Chinese Affairs?

Mr. ROSINGER. I didn't testify to that effect. I don't believe you asked me that question. You asked me only in relation to this particular time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. That is what I am asking about, in connection with this particular incident mentioned by Mr. Service.

Mr. ROSINGER. In relation to this particular incident, I have no recollection of the person I visited.

Mr. MORRIS. How often have you met John S. Service?

Mr. ROSINGER. If we assume that Mr. Service's statement is correct—as I have said, I don't have any recollection, but I don't want to challenge it—if we assume that is correct, my conclusion would be twice, because he mentioned another occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. So, you recall no other episodes in meeting Mr. Service, other than the two he has testified to?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. How well do you know Mr. Jessup, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Very slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify on that, please?

Mr. ROSINGER. I met him in connection with my IPR work. That is, when I was on the IPR staff he was at certain times also connected with the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you meet him on those occasions?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think we can put it this way: I was at the IPR in 1939–40. I believe he was probably at the Hot Springs conference of the IPR that November and December, at which I was a recorder. So, I must have seen him on that occasion.

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Outside of that, the chances are I have seen him twice, three times, during the year, and then, casually. He would have dropped into the office.

You must remember, I was a very junior person at that time, both in age and in position, in the IPR, and the fact of his dropping in and passing me, saying a word or two, wouldn't in itself mean anything.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you did not know him very well, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What I am trying to do is reconcile your testimony about your acquaintance with Mr. Jessup with the fact that when you wrote him a memorandum you addressed him "Dear Phil". That would seem to be in contradiction to what you are giving us now.

Mr. ROSINGER. That is standard IPR practice. After you are in the organization 1 week you are calling everybody by their first name.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Frederick Vanderbilt Field in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever address any communications to Field as "Dear Fred"?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that I addressed a question to Mr. Rosinger in connection with a designation that he used in correspondence. I don't think he answered the question. He suggested that there was a general practice within the Institute of Pacific Relations that after a week everybody called everybody else by his first name.

Mr. ROSINGER. That was not an inflexible rule, but it might have been 2 weeks.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they also address letters the same way, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes. It was not just personal conversation, letters, memoranda, anything of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is at variance with the understanding that I am sure Mr. Mendel and I have with respect to the letters in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many times you wrote Jessup?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it more than once?

Mr. ROSINGER. I assume so.

Senator FERGUSON. He was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations when you were there?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't say that he was, at all times. He was, in 1939–40.

Senator FERGUSON. You were there at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right. He was there at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. How often would he be in the offices?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't really answer, because the IPR at that time was located in the building that was like a maze. It was so intricate in

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its construction. As I say, I was a very junior person. He could have made many visits without my knowing it.

Senator FERGUSON. How many times would you say you were in his office?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think he had an office at that time. My recollection is that he was on the faculty at Columbia; so, he would simply have been dropping in.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you writing at that time for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you consulting Jessup?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean as to the contents?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. This was 12 years ago. I can't remember, but I think it can be put this way: His opinion might have been asked about a broad subject I was to write on, or that was under discussion.

I doubt very much whether I would have asked him "Is this particular point accurate?" or "How shall I handle this problem?" I certainly wouldn't have known him well enough for that.

Senator FERGUSON. As a minor official, whom did you consult as to the accuracy of statements?

Mr. ROSINGER. My recollection is that during that actual year I didn't finish many pieces of work. I think I did a few articles. My main work was on "China's Wartime Politics" which wasn't completed until several years later, and completed in a form that was different from the one conceived at that time. So, there woudn't have been much of a finished character to discuss with anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever write for the Institute of Pacific Relations and any writing under any other name than your own?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write for any other person and turn it over to someone?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean for an IPR publication?

Senator FERGUSON. Or any other publication.

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever write under a pseudonym in writing an article?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. You do answer that you never wrote under any other name for the Institute of Pacific Relations or do you decline to answer on that?

Mr. ROSINGER. As far as I know, I have never written anything that the IPR published under a name other than my own.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you have never used a pseudonym in writing an IPR publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you answer the question: Have you ever used a pseudonym for any other publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, will you tell us your association with Mr. T. A. Bisson?

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Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully refuse to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Bisson a fellow employee of yours in the Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a fellow employee of yours at the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. How do you define an employee? As a person on the staff at the time?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. As a staff member, in September 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. You were not, then, an ordinary member?

Mr. ROSINGER. I may have been. An ordinary member simply receives the publications. It is quite possible that I subscribed to their publications before that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall whether or not you were an ordinary member of the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. No, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Who asked you to become a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROSINGER. You will recall that I became a staff member through the Rockefeller Foundation fellowship; so, it was not a question of asking. I had heard that the fellowship existed; that it was to be granted, and I applied for it.

Mr. MORRIS. You applied to whom, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. As I mentioned before, I don't recall the exact procedure, but I was given an interview at one point by Stacey May, of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Mr. MORRIS. From there you were assigned to the Institute of Pacific Relations, to carry out the function of the grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right. The grant was to train a person on their staff.

Senator FERGUSON. How many grants did you work under that received any moneys from the Rockefeller Foundation?

Mr. ROSINGER. Three.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you named them all on the record?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I think one has been omitted.

When I visited India at the end of 1949 and the early part of 1950, that was under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

Senator FERGUSON. When you made application for these grants, or to work under these grants, were you ever asked the question as to how you felt about communism?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not as far as I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone ever ask you whether or not you were a Communist, in connection with these grants, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not as far as I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, will you tell us the circumstances leading up to your grant in connection with your trip to India?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

The American IPR had a conference scheduled in New Delhi on Indian-American Relations, in conjunction with an Indian organization, the Indian Council of World Affairs.

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The executive secretary of the American IPR, Mr. Clayton Lane at that time, felt that it would be a good idea if I were able to attend the conference and, of course, have the opportunity for some travel before and after that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it his idea that you should go to that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was an idea that was common to both of us. I wanted to go, and it was also his idea that it would be a good thing to do.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that act on his part subject to ratification by the executive board or the board of trustees?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you proceed and explain the circumstances of the grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. Mr. Clayton Lane applied to the Rockefeller Foundation; I believe sent them a letter, describing the conference. I don't recall the letter. I don't have a copy of it. He stated that he would like me to be able to go, and putting the question to them.

I believe that in previous testimony Mr. Holland made some reference to some other situation involved, in which there was a discussion among people, but that wasn't anything that I would have personal knowledge of.

Mr. MORRIS. How much time did you spend in India on that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. The conference lasted 10 days or 2 weeks, I have forgotten exactly. I was in India for a longer period.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you told us what the conference was?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was on the subject of Indian-American relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the State Department interested in it?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have no knowledge of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any of their representatives there?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that they were there?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think so. I was not involved in the running of the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was running it?

Mr. ROSINGER. The host organization was the Indian Council of World Affairs. The American Institute was represented only to the extent that there was a delegation there. But the Indian Council of World Affairs was responsible for the arrangements.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know who was in the Indian Council of World Affairs?

Mr. ROSINGER. Some of the people.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that was a Communist-front organization?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what a Communist-front organization is?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would allow to go into the record at this time an excerpt from articles by Mr. Rosinger, taken from his book The State of Asia? These are being offered into evidence simply as samples of the writings of the witness, who has

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been named by three people before this committee as a Communist, and who himself refuses and invokes the constitutional privilege when asked about that particular testimony.

Mr. BOUDIN. May I suggest that perhaps the better way to do it, and I do this with the utmost deference, is simply to incorporate the entire chapter in the appendix of the hearings here, rather than a small paragraph?

I would have no objection to your doing it after the hearing is over, to save time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the problem, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to run up the printing bill.

Senator FERGUSON. If the witness wants any other paragraph to explain the paragraph that is put in, I will ask him to submit to the committee, and the committee will pass on whether or not it will be printed in the appendix.

Mr. BOUDIN. The witness will just have to consider whether that is practical, under that proposal.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I also suggest that since this seems to be a narrative and history of a certain period, I am just taking a certain segment of that history and that lends itself to reduction much more readily than would an expression of views.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. Anybody who is engaged in writing knows that it is the totality of the article, not individual sentences or paragraphs that contain the essence of the article.

Mr. MORRIS. We are mindful of that.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you whether or not you believe this article as a whole is pro-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. What article are you referring to?

Senator FERGUSON. In the book.

Mr. MORRIS. This is your article on China.

Mr. ROSINGER. The way I would answer that question is that I believe that the chapter is true, that is, it seems to me at least as of the time I wrote it, it was, because there are new developments since, but it seems to be a correct statement of events, given the fact that you can never tell the whole history of China in 60 pages or whatever it was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you consider it pro-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it anti-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to stand on my previous answers that I do not consider it pro-Communist, and that I consider it true.

Senator FERGUSON. But you cannot answer my question as to whether or not it is anti-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. I must say that the words themselves are not words about which there is any universal agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever heard it described as being anti-Communist?

Mr. ROSINGER. Perhaps not in those words, but I have seen it praised very highly by an anti-Communist publication.

Mr. MORRIS. What publication is that?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was the Catholic Weekly, the Commonweal, in its issue of July 13, 1951.

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May I read something from it?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't have the whole review here. This is just a part, but the whole thing can be checked [reading]:

In spite of the tremendous importance of the Far East in the world of today, the average American knows far too little about it. The arguments which he hears as to what American policy in the East should be are generally based on opinion rather than facts, emotion rather than reason, and in the absence of adequate and readily available books on the area, he has been left to flounder in darkness.

Mr. Rosinger's book should do much to dispel that darkness. It is the best general work on the postwar Far East yet published. Unlike some of his less competent colleagues—

I want to say I don't take any responsibility for that remark—

Mr. Rosinger apparently realizes that neither he, nor anyone else is qualified to survey recent events in the whole of the vast region stretching from India to Japan. He himself has contributed three chapters to the book, a good introduction survey, an excellent chapter on China, and a somewhat less satisfying one India—

there is some material that isn't particularly relevant. Then he says:

The chapters are factual rather than interpretative, and their general quality is good.

Senator FERGUSON. Has it been praised by any pro-Communist publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not to my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any pro-Communist publications?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. May I call attention to the fact that the passages I was introducing into the record are not introduced to show whether or not Mr. Rosinger is or is not a Communist. I have suggested that they be introduced purely on the basis that these are sample writings of a man who, as I describe it, three times was identified before the committee as a Communist, and who himself invoked the constitutional privilege when asked.

Senator FERGUSON. And they will speak for themselves at the present time.

I will receive them on that ground.

Mr. ROSINGER. Are these passages from all my writings?

Mr. MORRIS. I will tell you what they are. I am taking the segment from history here, page 34 of your volume on China, beginning: "Events in the fall of 1945 * * *"

Mr. ROSINGER. To where?

Mr. MORRIS. Now, go to the first marker there.

Mr. BOUDIN. What you are really going to do now is direct the reporter to incorporate it?

Mr. MORRIS. I am telling it to him. He is going to be making notes at the same time.

Page 34, starting with "Events in the fall of 1945," up to the word "positions," which is in the middle of page 44. There is a notation "end" there.

And then on page 86, the first paragraph, which is marked "Begin": "In the fall of 1949" up to the end of that article.

(The excerpts referred to were incorporated in the record and appear at the conclusion of Mr. Rosinger's testimony on p. 2541.)

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, do you know Mr. Solomon Trone?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that Mr. Solomon Trone at this particular conference, the Indian conference we have discussed here on which testimony has been taken, appears as one of the members of the American delegation to this Indian-American relation conference.

Senator FERGUSON. As shown by what book?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will identify this volume.

Mr. MANDEL. As shown by the volume India-American Relations Proceedings of the Indian-American Conference held in New Delhi in December 1949, listing Lawrence K. Rosinger as rapporteur.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 352" and filed for reference in the committee file.)

Mr. ROSINGER. Rapporteur of one of the three round tables.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you consult with Mr. Owen Lattimore at this conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall any particular consultation. All of the delegates talked with each other. I would say there was striking little discussion about the content of the conference outside of the conference room itself.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the subjects covered by the conference? Did you discuss them with other delegates?

Mr. ROSINGER. There were remarks but no concerted discussion that I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. With whom did you travel to India?

Mr. ROSINGER. I traveled alone.

Mr. MORRIS. You went by yourself?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you precede or follow Mr. Lattimore in going to this conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first meet Mr. Lattimore in India?

Mr. ROSINGER. I imagine on the opening day of the conference. My own recollection is that I arrived in New Delhi the evening before the conference about 1 o'clock in the morning and then the following day the conference began.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you confer with Lattimore at any time other than during the conference hours, during that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have no recollection of conferring with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether there was a Communist caucus preceding the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first meet Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean at any time?

Mr. MORRIS. At any time, the first time you ever knew him?

Mr. ROSINGER. I suppose about 1938, 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Who introduced you?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't really know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you attend any caucus prior to the conference?

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Mr. ROSINGER. No; I couldn't have. I got there at 1 a. m.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether any caucus was called prior to the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. What kind of caucus?

Senator FERGUSON. Any caucus of the members or the delegates.

Mr. ROSINGER. I think the delegates may have met to discuss details of conference procedure or something of that sort. The word "caucus" is a word that has many interpretations.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any Communists met?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to proceed to another one of the volumes of Mr. Rosinger's, if you have covered all the questions on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write China's Crisis?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record again as a sample of the writings of Mr. Rosinger as he appears before this committee today two entire chapters of Mr. Rosinger's book entitled "China's Crisis."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want them in the appendix or do you want to leave them here in the text?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like them to appear in the appendix.

Senator FERGUSON. They may so appear.

(The excerpts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 353" and appear at the conclusion of Mr. Rosinger's testimony, p. 2541.)

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any part on which you want to ask questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I think on one of these you might care to ask a few questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You may read that part.

Mr. MORRIS. The chapter is called Are They Communists? It begins [reading]:

> Ever since the early days of the Chinese Soviets foreign observers have tended to regard the Communists as agrarian socialists or peasant radicals rather than as Communists. According to this view, the present guerrilla movement is essentially the latest in a series of radical peasant movements that have burst forth throughout Chinese history at moments of crisis. For example, in the middle of the last century the Taiping Rebellion, which almost unseated the Manchus 50 years before they actually lost the throne, was basically a peasant revolt.

Then you go on and give views of many observers as to whether or not the Chinese Communists were actually Communists.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, you may have some questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What is your view as to whether or not they were Communists?

Mr. ROSINGER. My view is that they were.

Senator FERGUSON. That they were Communists?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They were tied directly to the Kremlin, the Communists of the Kremlin?

Mr. ROSINGER. I will have to stand on what I have just given.

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Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean then by saying that you agreed they were Communists and not agrarian reformers? Is that what you want to answer?

Mr. ROSINGER. Is that what?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you want to answer, that they were Communists and not agrarian reformers?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that Mr. Rosinger has stated in his article here he just presented the views of certain people rather than used his own views.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I want to find out what his own views were.

Mr. ROSINGER. The thing that troubles me is that these are extremely complex problems which can't be discussed simply and in an off-hand way. Whenever I had written any article or book, it has always been the product, not only of research, but of very careful drafting and redrafting and when I am asked today to say for a permanent record, to express for the permanent record, some opinions on very complex subjects, it does not seem to me that it is feasible.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified that you believe the Communists are actually members of the Communist International?

Mr. ROSINGER. When was that?

Mr. MORRIS. You said they were actually Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked the question.

Mr. ROSINGER. The question was, do I believe, as I recall, that they are or were Communists, and my answer was "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe they are members of the Communist International?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would have to look up the record as of that time to see what the situation was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe it now that they are part of the Communist International?

Mr. ROSINGER. What do you mean by the Communist International?

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the question. What is the Communist International?

Mr. ROSINGER. If by Communist International you mean a specific organization, I don't know whether there is such an organization at the present time.

Mr. MORRIS. By the use of Communist International I mean an alliance of Communist parties throughout the world.

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilage in the fifth amendement to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the reason that you cannot answer as to whether or not the Communists of China are part of the Communist International?

Mr. MORRIS. This International Alliance we have just discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BOUDIN. He is relying on the privilege in connection with that last question.

Senator FERGUSON. You are relying on the privilege?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you indicate in the statement to the State Department that China as of that time, October 1949, was part of the Communist International?

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Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall because I haven't had a copy of the memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. May we go into that State Department conference now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may.

I will read to you:

The Chinese Communists will find economic recovery and reconstruction an enormously difficult job. They will therefore be interested in trade with the west. But there is no reason to believe that for the sake of such trade they would abandon their alinement with the U. S. S. R. or sacrifice basic principles of their internal policy.

Did you state that in your memorandum that you gave to the State Department on September 22, 1949?

Mr. ROSINGER. May I see the memorandum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I will mark that item.

The letter attached is dated September 22, 1949, to Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, United States Mission to the United Nations, 2 Park Avenue, New York City, "Dear Phil," signed, "Larry Rosinger."

Mr. MORRIS. May this go in the record at this time now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive the whole document in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 354" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 354

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, January 29, 1952.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Enclosed herewith is a memorandum submitted to the Department by Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger on September 22, 1949. I believe that this is the memorandum you requested in your letter of January 28 to the Secretary.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Enclosure: As stated.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
New York, N. Y., September 22, 1949.

Ambassador PHILIP C. JESSUP,
United States Mission to the United Nations,
New York City.

DEAR PHIL: Here at last is a statement of my personal views on various aspects of China policy. It should not, of course, be regarded as reflecting in any way an official IPR viewpoint.

With best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER.

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger)

The United States should seek to encourage an American-Chinese relationship consistent with America's stake in world peace and prosperity, as well as with the international development of democratic institutions. More specifically, policy should attempt to promote among the Chinese people an attitude of friendliness toward the United States; to preserve and develop the trade, investment, cultural and other contacts built up over the past century; and to achieve a state of mutual accommodation which will tend to reduce the explosive problems confronting this country in other parts of Asia, notably southeast Asia. If these objectives are attained to a sufficient degree, the effect will be to lessen international tensions in the Far East, enhance the

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security and well-being of the United States, promote the revival of east Asian economy, and work toward a situation in which China will not be aligned exclusively with a single power, the U. S. S. R.

The emphasis in the above paragraph is on long-term development. The reason is simple: As a result of recent events, the United States has lost many of its traditional links with China. The main immediate problem is to avoid adhering to lines of policy that have already failed, and to set in motion long-term processes which will tend to convince the Chinese people that American policy is in their interest, as well as in the interest of the United States. Under the difficult circumstances in which far eastern policy is now being reconsidered, there may be a tendency to think that China can be "written off." But the fact is that in population, location, economic, and military potential, traditional cultural influence, political significance, links with southeast Asia, and other ways China is a crucial portion of the east. The United States should unquestionably work for a further satisfactory development of its relations with India, Japan, and other eastern countries. But this cannot be a substitute for satisfactory relations with China and the integration of these relations in an over-all far eastern policy. Indeed, it must be recognized that an unsound American-Chinese relationship could have very serious effects on our relations with many other areas of eastern and southern Asia.

To develop a successful policy, it is necessary, in Secretary Acheson's words, to avoid basing policy on "illusions or wishful thinking," and to "face the situation as it exists in fact." What, then, are some of the principal realities confronting the United States in China today?

1. The Chinese Communists have won the civil war. Although fighting will go on for a time, a military decision has been reached. There is no reason to suppose that this decision could be reversed by outside efforts to revive the forces of the Kuomintang or to support provincial warlords. The white paper is conclusive on this point.

2. In the Communist-controlled areas the bulk of the people (including the modern middle class, with which the United States has had its closest contacts) appear either to welcome or to accept the new state of affairs. Many intellectuals who have had American training or associations are cooperating actively with the new regime. There is no sign of any significant feeling that the new government is under outside domination.

3. Nationalism has never been as strong in China as it is today, and the Chinese Communists have succeeded in making themselves the leaders of Chinese nationalism.

4. The prestige of the United States in China is currently at low ebb. This is reflected not only in the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States, but also in the widespread antagonism which many non-Communist Chinese have developed toward American policy during the past years of civil war. The fact to be faced is that many Chinese feel strongly that America followed a policy which was not in China's interest. In general, it seems clear that any political tendency or movement which is suspected of receiving American support, or even sympathy, is likely to be discredited in Chinese eyes as a result of that fact.

5. The Chinese Communists will find economic recovery and reconstruction an enormously difficult job. They will therefore be interested in trade with the west. But there is no reason to believe that for the sake of such trade they would abandon their alinement with the U. S. S. R. or sacrifice basic principles of their internal policy. They are, however, likely to show considerable flexibility in discussing the economic details of trade relations. (Opinions vary as to the importance of large-scale trade with the United States for China's economic development. Some Americans believe that Chinese reconstruction is impossible without such aid. The author considers this view incorrect and feels that the absence of large-scale trade with the United States would render more difficult, but not prevent, reconstruction. Consequently, if the United States were to follow a policy of blockade or limited trade, this country nevertheless would possibly be confronted in the end by a reconstructed China, modernized and powerful. In view of the obstacles the United States would have placed in the way of Chinese economic development, such a China would inevitably be far more hostile toward the United States than is the case today.)

6. The friendship of the Chinese people has not been permanently lost to the United States. It is essential to note, first of all, that the anti-American sentiment prevailing in China today is not, by and large, a reflection of pro-Russian sentiment. In addition, anti-American sentiment appears in the main

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not to be based on theory, but on pragmatic reactions to specific American policies of the past few years. Finally, preponderant evidence indicates that anti-American sentiment is primarily sentiment against policy—not against individual Americans, not against the American people, not against the United States as a country. All these considerations suggest that if we act wisely and with a full consciousness of Chinese realities, it should not be too late to develop a successful policy beneficial to America's interests in China. It seems unlikely that in a country basically as pragmatic as China a recovery of American prestige could fail to be reflected in Chinese policy. One note of caution is necessary here. China is now living through a highly fluid, transitional period. It is therefore important to approach developments with calmness and perspective, and not to react to random occurrences as if they were definitive, or to feel that moral judgment must be passed on each day's events.

If these are some of the realities of the Chinese situation, the most sensible course would seem to be to recognize them in policy as soon as possible. What shape can such recognition assume?

(1) No further aid to Chiang Kai-shek or other segments of the Kuomintang. No aid to war lords or local regimes.

A. This includes avoidance of economic or military intervention in Formosa. Such intervention would almost certainly arouse Chinese nationalism and anti-American sentiment to white heat; saddle the United States with a continuing financial and military obligation in a relatively minor area; and involve this country in actions damaging to our international prestige, no matter how they might be explained. Formosa is properly part of China; we have so indicated by our pledged word at Cairo and by the swift turn-over of the island to the Chinese Government after VJ-day.

(2) We should offer no impediments to normal trade with China beyond the exclusion of outright materials of war—military equipment and ammunition. We should, on the contrary, seek to encourage normal trade. This would involve, among other things:

(*a*) Avoidance of any action which would tend to prolong the Nationalist blockade.

(*b*) Development of trade between Japan and China. Japan needs the trade and in the long run is almost certain to engage in it. To the extent that the United States might prevent trade, this country would have to pay the bill economically (in subsidies for Japan) and politically (in Japanese nationalist resentment).

(*c*) Recognition of the need of Britain, especially in view of its present economic difficulties, for normal trade with China.

(*d*) Normal trade between the United States and China.

(3) United States de jure recognition of the new Chinese Government after it is formed. The new Government will be the Government of China; there will be no other, even though fragments of military opposition will exist for a time in certain areas. There is also no prospect that at any time in the foreseeable future this new Government will be displaced by another regime. It is therefore essential to face the facts and maintain the fullest direct contact with the Chinese scene.

(4) Active encouragement to American citizens to maintain, as far as possible, their educational, religious, and other cultural connections with China. This is one of the most important and delicate aspects of American-Chinese relations. American citizens working in this field can be effective in winning Chinese friendship only if they abstain from all intervention in Chinese internal affairs. In this respect the activities of the American Friends Service Committee in China may be worthy of study. Successful execution of the above, and other, policies in China depends, of course, on China as well as on the United States. The author realizes, too, that within the United States many factors shape policy—for example, the views of Congress as well as those of the executive departments. It is, however, essential that the United States decide fairly quickly what it wishes to do. A policy of inaction and drift could only result in the further deterioration of American influence in China. It should also be noted that timing is quite important: early recognition can win us good will in China, but if our recognition merely follows that of many other countries, Chinese opinion will conclude that we grudgingly yielded to realities which we could no longer deny.

It is proper to ask what advantages might accrue to the United States from the course of action suggested above, since no policy can be justified unless it is clearly in the interest of the United States. Some of the advantages have already been brought out or suggested in previous pages. But it may be useful to state explicitly the benefits the United States might expect to obtain:

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(1) Saving of the money, and avoidance of the policy difficulties, involved in prosecuting an unsuccessful course of action.

(2) Preservation and possible extension of the China trade of the United States and associated countries. Given the economic problems of Britain and Japan, and the shrinking foreign markets of the United States, this trade cannot be considered negligible—all the more so since a China in the process of reconstruction could become a far greater market than in the past.

(3) The rewinning, in significant measure, of the good will long enjoyed by the United States in China, with possible beneficial consequences to the United States in the international sphere and in China's internal evolution. Any policy —such as that outlined in this statement—which tends to produce a less, rather than a more rigid, development of Chinese life should have effects beneficial to peace and to the international survival and spread of the best values of our own tradition.

(4) Promotion of some of the conditions essential to orderly change in other parts of Asia. The Chinese revolution will inevitably have effects beyond the borders of China, especially since the surrounding countries are themselves pregnant with change. One way to help regularize the outside effects of Chinese developments would seem to be to work for normal relations with the new Chinese Government. This is not to say that in the event of normal trade, etc., with China, the latter will lose interest in, for example, southeast Asia. Far from it. Nor can the most satisfactory relationship with China in itself provide an answer to the explosive policy issues in the area of Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, etc. The question is simply this: Is it likely to be easier for the west to deal with the need for change in southeast Asia, if American-Chinese relations are marked by sharp hostility, or if China already has been given a stake—an economic stake—in good relations with the United States and Britain?

The assumption in the preceding remarks is that it is deeply in the interest of the United States to normalize its relations with China; that the United States does not have the power to control the Chinese situation; that the exertion of various forms of economic and other pressure on China would constitute no more than delaying actions; and that the power of China, in alliance with other factors in Asia, to harass the Western Powers is not less, and perhaps greater, than the power of the west to harass the new Chinese Government. Apart from these considerations, the writer assumes that the years immediately ahead will be years of general peace—no matter how disturbed particular areas may be—and that some of the most crucial issues in Asia—like the Chinese civil war itself—will be settled within a peaceful international framework.

There is no intention in the above statement to suggest that even the most satisfactory American relationship with China could in itself provide answers to the problems confronting the United States elsewhere in Asia. Trade between Japan and China, for example, will help Japan to face its economic problems, but cannot take the place of a satisfactory Japanese economic policy. Again, nothing that happens in China can be expected to save France from a debacle in Indochina—a debacle which is the product, first of all of French policy. A few general observations are therefore in order: (1) The United States should make known by its actions that it is not afraid of political, social, and economic change in Asia. Asia is overripe for change, and no policy committing this country to support of the status quo can be successful. (2) The United States should particularly concentrate on economic improvement in Asia. The more we help the peoples of Asia to establish governments contributing to the well-being of the average man—who, in four cases out of five, is a peasant—the more secure will our own democracy be. (3) It is futile to think that we could control the future of Asia. We have the power to influence, but the power of decision lies increasingly with the people of the region.

Mr. MORRIS. This is introduced in the record to show again the recommendations of a particular witness who has testified as he has today before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. He has refused to answer certain questions and it is clear that he has because they have been repeated at times.

We will receive now in evidence this document as to the recommendations he made to the United States Department of State after a request that he furnish information and advice to them.

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What is your answer to the question?

Mr. ROSINGER. Will you repeat the question?

(The reporter read back the following question:)

I will read to you: "The Chinese Communists will find economic recovery and reconstruction an enormously difficult job. They will therefore be interested in trade with the west. But there is no reason to believe that for the sake of such trade they would abandon their alinement with the U. S. S. R. or sacrifice basic principles of their internal policy." Did you state that in your memorandum that you gave to the State Department on September 22, 1949?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that today?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think that is another question on which I would have to study the situation and draft an answer very carefully.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you do that and furnish it for the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I submit that inasmuch as opinions are being introduced as samples of Mr. Rosinger's views, that unless he wishes to amplify on this in any way that we let them stand.

Senator FERGUSON. This is to stand. This is not an explanation. I am talking about today.

You cited on page 1 of the American policy toward China, by you, and you have it before you, the white paper as authority for the first item. What is your authority for No. 2?

Mr. ROSINGER. If authority means specific references, obviously I couldn't recall them at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. Specific reference would have to be something that was written at the time and there would be no means of recalling now what those references were.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that true as to No. 3?

Mr. MORRIS. What is No. 3, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER (reading):

Nationalism has never been as strong in China as it is today, and the Chinese Communists have succeeded in making themselves the leaders of Chinese nationalism.

This was September 1949.

A person can obtain reference for a fact, when was a certain cabinet established? In the process of research it isn't so easy to obtain source proofs for a broad conclusion that represents a kind of summation of a lot of reading and work.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you were giving the State Department advice. I want to know the source of your advice.

Mr. ROSINGER. If you want it in general terms, the source was a great deal of reading and thinking about the China situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been in China?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long?

Mr. ROSINGER. In 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. How long?

Mr. ROSINGER. I left this country, if I recall, in April and was back, I think in September.

Senator FERGUSON. Under whose auspices did you go to China?

Mr. ROSINGER. The Foreign Policy Association.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it under a grant?

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Mr. ROSINGER. The association itself, as I recall, provided the money.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they get it from a grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean from a foundation or organization?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your mission there?

Mr. ROSINGER. It was to travel about, study the situation, learn as much as I could about conditions in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you reconcile No. 3 about the nationalism with the language you used under 5 on page 3 of the original, of their alinement with the U. S. S. R., that they would not abandon their alinement with the U. S. S. R.? Do you consider that that was still nationalism?

Mr. ROSINGER. Again this is a very complex question which would have to be explored at length.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the authority for No. 4, "The prestige of the United States in China is currently at low ebb"?

Mr. ROSINGER. Again I don't recall the exact references but I think that a simple check of leading magazines, Time, Life, and so on, at that time would indicate agreement with this estimate of the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know anything about the directive that General Marshall had when he went to China in 1946?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean public directives?

Senator FERGUSON. No, a directive from the State Department as to what his mission was.

Mr. ROSINGER. I recall a statement by the President at that time. There was some documentation in the white paper.

Senator FERGUSON. About his mission?

Mr. ROSINGER. About his mission.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about his directive other than what appeared in the document you testified about?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. So everything you learned about this particular directive you learned from the source about which you testified?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, certain portions of this have been underlined. Is that underlining yours?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think so. It was just designed to make initial sentences stand out.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Rosinger, have you put in the record when you were born?

Mr. ROSINGER. 1915.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you write your first article, what age?

Mr. ROSINGER. Probably about 22.

Senator FERGUSON. You had not written anything before that?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; not for publication.

Senator FERGUSON. At what age did you graduate from college?

Mr. ROSINGER. Twenty.

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Senator FERGUSON. Had you written anything that was published before you graduated from college?

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, some theses in school publications.

Senator FERGUSON. But nothing under a grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your age when you received the first grant?

Mr. ROSINGER. It depends upon which one you mean. At the time of the Chinese Language Summer School in the summer of 1937, I was 22, or a little less than that. At the time of the grant of 1939–40 I was 24 or a little bit less, when that grant began.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record—it already has been introduced as exhibit 129, but I would like to have it read in the record in connection with the appearance of Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter in the record, identifying it first?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y., from J. K. Fairbank, care of Mr. Lauchin Currie, the White House, Washington, D. C., February 28, 1944:

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I have read over the latter part—

and in pencil is inserted "Of Rosinger's ms on China"—

and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China some time? The Government will not be happy about this but it is so well done that they can hardly call it—

and then the word "near" is crossed out—

propaganda.

How can we expedite bringing our friend to California?

Sincerely—

signed "John" and then below that "J. K. Fairbank."

Mr. MORRIS. We put the penciled note on that, Mr. Chairman, even though when it was originally introduced in the record we did not put it in the record, but let the record show that now.

Mr. MANDEL. Penciled note marked:

ECC.

John thinks you should wire Sproul to find out what is happening about the invitation to Han-seng. He is quite worried about the delay—

signed "WLH."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever discuss with John K. Fairbank the possibility of your being sent to China?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall completely, but there could have been such a discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know John K. Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. Slightly, over a period of time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. ROSINGER. I met Lauchlin Currie I think at the IPR conference at Hot Springs in 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Government had anything to do with your going to China in 1946?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not to my knowledge, unless you include the passport in that question.

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Senator FERGUSON. Other than the passport.

Mr. ROSINGER. No; not as far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1946, did you not have to have clearance by the Army?

Mr. ROSINGER. I believe I went just after that rule was dropped. That is my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a letter dated December 30, 1943, from Mr. Rosinger to Mr. William L. Holland.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that, please?

Mr. MANDEL. May I mention that the previous letter has already been introduced as exhibit No. 129? This letter has been introduced previously as exhibit No. 131. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is on the letterhead of the Foreign Policy Association, dated December 30, 1943, addressed to Mr. William L. Holland from Larry Rosinger.

DEAR BILL: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss. I have taken care of your order for the two foreign policy reports, which I understand will be sent to you at a 20-percent discount. I think you will be interested to know that we will publish on February 1 another report of mine, tentatively titled "The Western Stake in Colonial Asia." I doubt that this will be available in print much before publication, but if your conference is taking place before the end of the month, it may be possible to secure some copies. In any event, if you want me to, I will send you the proofs, in about 2 weeks.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall writing that letter, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privileges in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you answer that way as to that whole letter?

Mr. ROSINGER. There is no way of breaking the letter in parts.

Senator FERGUSON. You said you did not know or that you did know Fairbanks? Which is it?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think you asked me at this session.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you known him?

Mr. ROSINGER. I am sorry. Of course, I have already answered. I said I had known him slightly, over a period of time.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position?

Mr. ROSINGER. At what time?

Senator FERGUSON. On December 30, 1943.

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't be sure. He had some Washington position.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Government?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; that is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. What suggestions were you looking forward to from a man by the name of Fairbank in the Government?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get any suggestions from Fairbank, who was in the Government, back in 1943?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get suggestions from a man named Hiss?

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Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get comments from a man named Stewart?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Stewart who appears on this letter Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. BOUDIN. Which letter?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Fairbank mentioned here the John K. Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Hiss mentioned here Alger Hiss?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Donald Hiss?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently, Mr. Chairman, we are not going to get any additional evidence from this witness on this particular letter, so I think we had better let it stand.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce in the record a letter from Mr. W. L. Holland, addressed to Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Department of State, Washington, D. C., October 27, 1944.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and reads as follows:

DEAR WILMA: Here is a letter to Chien Tuan-sheng and a covering note to Dr. White which you may want to read and then give to him. In case you have to get the money to him quickly I am enclosing my check for $300. As soon as I hear that you have cashed it I will ask the IPR to reimburse me.

Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of Larry Rosinger's book, China's Wartime Politics, 1937–44 in the hope that you can send it by pouch to someone in Kunming who can deliver it to Chien. Possibly Dr. White himself might take it if he wants to read the book on the way.

Senator FERGUSON. The copy that you gave out here, dated October 27, does not have a part of that in it. You have inserted something after 1937–44, in the one you handed me to put in evidence, "in the hope that you can send it to Chien."

Mr. MANDEL. There is an error in copying by the clerical staff. The copy I have here reads "send it by pouch."

Mr. MORRIS. Give Mr. Rosinger an opportunity by using this particular sheet to insert what has been left out in the transcription.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of Larry Rosinger's book China's Wartime Politics, 1937–1944, in the hope that you can send it by pouch to someone in Kunming who can deliver it to Chien. Possibly Dr. White

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himself might take it, if he wants to read the book on the way. I shall also try to have a copy sent to the OWI office in Kunming. I am most grateful for your help. Best wishes,

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Senator FERGUSON. Read what it says in the lower left-hand corner.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

(The document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 355.")

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, did you make any arrangements to have your volume, China's Wartime Politics, 1937–1944, delivered by pouch to Government officials abroad?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not as far as I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any such arrangement that was made?

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, specifically, it would apply to this letter. I have no recollection of ever having seen this letter or heard of its contents.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Dr. White?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know W. L. Holland?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Holland?

Mr. ROSINGER. At the present time he is the—I have forgotten the exact title of it—I think International Secretariat of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a letter from W. L. Holland to John K. Fairbank, care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Division of Cultural Relations, State Department, Washington, D. C., dated February 21, 1944.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and read its contents?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 21, 1944, to Dr. John Fairbank, from W. L. Holland:

DEAR JOHN: I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime politics, in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part, from page 47 onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice as much but had to change his plans because of his illness and lack of time.

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then for a few minutes.

P. S.—I have sent the books from Lowdermilk to Wilma.

(For the document referred to and read in full by Mr. Mandel see exhibit No. 128, open hearings before this committee, pt. 2, p. 479.)

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Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a copy of that?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who Wilma is there?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a person by the name of Lowdermilk?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, to what extent was the manuscript of your volume China's Wartime Politics submitted to officials of the State Department for criticism before publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you do not know?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right. I don't know to whom it was submitted.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you give us any testimony in connection with this procedure that Mr. Holland is writing about to Mr. John Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. What procedure do you mean?

Mr. MORRIS. Respecting the comments on your manuscript by the State Department.

Mr. ROSINGER. With the proviso that the explanation of a letter by somebody else should really come from the writer, but not from me——

Mr. MORRIS. We are asking you if you have any additional testimony.

Mr. ROSINGER. I just mean that in the last analysis its meaning must be given by the person who wrote it. The general procedure at the Institute of Pacific Relations, as far as I am familiar with it, was to submit manuscripts for criticism to a variety of people in a fixed field. That included unofficial people and it at times included official people.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say that all your writings under these grants were submitted to people in the Secretary of State's office for criticism.

Mr. ROSINGER. That I cannot say, because it wasn't an invariable rule that it had to go to an official. The invariable rule that it had to be read by a group of people outside the office.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasions do you have knowledge that your works were submitted to the Department of State officials?

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, I am willing to accept the statement in this letter concerning China's Wartime Politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any corrections that the State Department ever made on any of your manuscripts or any additions?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I can't recall any precisely, but, as a general proposition, I would like to say that the kind of corrections they made were usually things that could be called sheer facts, dates, something of that sort, rather than any effort to discuss interpretation.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ever change any conclusions that you had drawn?

Mr. ROSINGER. Not to my knowledge. Of course, they didn't have the power to change any conclusions. All they could do was to suggest, but I don't recall their making any suggestions.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you asking for?

Mr. ROSINGER. I wasn't asking.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the institute asking for when they wrote a letter like the one of February 21, 1944?

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Mr. ROSINGER. Essentially they wanted any suggestions for improvement that they could get.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not include conclusions, policy?

Mr. ROSINGER. Just as an assumption, I assume the institute would have no objection, but my recollection, or my impression is that that kind of suggestion was not forthcoming. Usually the comments were confined to pretty factual points.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any changes that the State Department suggested in any of your writings?

Mr. ROSINGER. I cannot recall any.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they made, if they were suggested by them?

Mr. ROSINGER. Well, if anybody ever pointed out to me a factual error in something I had written in a manuscript I would take it without the slightest hesitation.

Senator FERGUSON. Are we then to take for granted that the works you have written here, outside of factual data, like dates, and so forth, have been approved by our State Department?

Mr. ROSINGER. Absolutely not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have they been submitted?

Mr. ROSINGER. In this case, but if I recall, the kind of statement they always made was that "This does not constitute approval."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever ask John Fairbank for a criticism of any of your works, prior to publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall personally asking him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever ask Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall personally asking her.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a letter from Frederick V. Field, dated January 23, 1940, to the members of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter and read the last paragraph?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 23, 1940, from Frederick V. Field. The last paragraph reads as follows:

You may be interested to note that two other newly published American council pamphlets are now off the press. Deadlock in China, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, provides a vivid and up-to-date picture of the Sino-Japanese War in its international setting, and America Holds the Balance in the Far East, by Robert W. Barnett, analyzes the present issues in American policy against the background of far eastern history and of America's relations to Europe.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 357" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 357

Officers: Philip C. Jessup, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman; Philo W. Parker, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Fields, Secretary; Francis S. Harmon, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
New York, N. Y., January 23, 1940.

To the MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL:

The expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty on January 26, 1940, 6 months after its denunciation by the United States Government, serves to focus the spotlight on the next move in American Far Eastern policy.

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To aid in clarifying this important political issue and placing it in its proper perspective, the American council has just published Our Far Eastern Record: A Reference Digest on American Policy, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. It contains a brief selection of important diplomatic documents, trade statistics, data on public opinion and a digest of proposed legislation. It is hoped that this will be of use to council members who wish certain documentary information in compact form, but who are too busy to go to official sources.

You may be interested to note that two other newly published American council pamphlets are now off the press. Deadlock in China, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, provides a vivid and up-to-date picture of the Sino-Japanese war in its international setting, and America Holds the Balance in the Far East, by Robert W. Barnett, analyzes the present issues in American policy against the background of Far East history and of America's relations to Europe.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have asked questions of the witness before, concerning Frederick V. Field and Robert W. Barnett. In each case the witness has invoked his privilege. I assume that the questions I have prepared for the witness in connection with Mr. Barnett and Mr. Field will meet with the same response.

Is that right, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So, I have no other questions, in view of that fact.

Senator FERGUSON. So, this may remain in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I had intended to ask the witness about his relations with Mr. Field and Mr. Barnett, but, in view of his previous invoking of the privilege, I am dispensing with it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record a letter dated May 31, 1940, from Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. E. C. Carter.

I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will identify this and read paragraph 1.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Mr. Lattimore; did you not, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you known Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. ROSINGER. Slightly over a period of perhaps 13 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been to his home?

Mr. ROSINGER. Once.

Senator FERGUSON. Has he ever been to your home?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasion were you at his home?

Mr. ROSINGER. Simply invited down there.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. I can't recall. Perhaps 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever submit any of your works to Owen Lattimore for criticism before their publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I may have submitted to him the manuscript of China's Wartime Politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know any alterations or changes he made in it, or additions?

Mr. ROSINGER. My recollection is that he did not make any suggestions for change.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you known Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. ROSINGER. I probably didn't meet her until some years after meeting him. I know her extremely slightly.

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Mr. MORRIS. When did you visit the Lattimores, and at their house, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROSINGER. Perhaps 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it approximately that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. It could have been 1948; I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you work with Mr. Lattimore on the institute?

Mr. ROSINGER. My recollection is that he was an editor of Pacific Affairs when I was there, in 1939–40; but my work did not involve working with him, as part of my regular employment.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see him often at that time?

Mr. ROSINGER. No; because I think he was mostly not in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever visit the State Department with him?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You answered, I believe——

Mr. ROSINGER. Except, of course, with respect to that China conference. We were all there at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you agree generally with Lattimore at that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I would have to examine his remarks at the conference, and study the degree of disagreement or agreement, with my own.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you disagree with Harold Stassen at the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I think that has two aspects. I don't recall that I expressed disagreement with the specific point that he made, in relation to his having made it.

Senator FERGUSON. You advocated recognition of Red China there.

Mr. ROSINGER. There were a couple of points on which our statements did not coincide.

Senator FERGUSON. You did advocate the recognition of Red China?

Mr. ROSINGER. Instead of saying "Yes" or "No," could I read the one paragraph statement I made at the conference, which I think gives more of the shadings of my position than a "Yes" or "No" answer would?

Senator FERGUSON. I will put it this way: Do you now advocate the recognition of Red China by the United States?

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean at this particular moment?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. We have the other statement in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Not yet, Mr. Chairman. We have not introduced that in the record. We have introduced in the record here recommendations in connection with what should be done, but we have not introduced in the record as yet his actual statements at the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he was talking about his recommendations in writing.

Mr. ROSINGER. I was talking about my oral remarks.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advocate at that time that we give no aid in keeping Chiang Kai-shek and his government in Formosa?

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Mr. ROSINGER. My recollection is that I said nothing on the subject of Formosa at the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. But in your statement of——.

Mr. ROSINGER. You mean this statement? Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I have not read it through. The statement itself will show that.

You have this on page 4:

No further aid to Chiang Kai-shek or other segments of the Kuomintang. No aid to war lords or local regimes.

A. This includes avoidance of economic or military intervention in Formosa.

Mr. BOUDIN. We are looking at a different copy. We cannot find the material.

Senator FERGUSON. It is (1) on page 4.

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; I said that in the memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether Harold Stassen advocated the same thing?

Mr. ROSINGER. He never submitted a memorandum. My recollection is that he did not advocate that at the conference, but neither did I say anything on the subject of Formosa at the conference. In fact, I would like to add that Mr. Stassen mentioned 10 points I was supposed to have advocated.

A careful search of the transcript of the conference indicates he might have been right on 2½ or 3, but on 7 or 6 of the other 10 points you won't find confirmation in the conference transcripts.

Mr. MORRIS. It was his testimony, Mr. Rosinger, that the group of which you and Mr. Lattimore were leaders, had advocated that.

Mr. ROSINGER. I am not granting the description of the conference. I must say, from what I have read of the testimony, he shifted ground in so many cases, it is hard to tell whether he was charging me with 10 points or not, but the newspaper coverage, which was naturally a brief clip coverage, definitely gave the impression that he said I supported 10 points.

I think, if a person has supported 3 or 4 out of 10 points, he can't conceivably be called an advocate of those 10 points at the conference.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, in view of the fact that Mr. Rosinger impliedly indicates he has not read these 10 points——

Mr. ROSINGER. No; I have read the 10 points.

Senator FERGUSON. Who furnished you a copy of the transcripts?

Mr. ROSINGER. Of that conference?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROSINGER. The State Department sent it to all the participants when it made a public release.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that, did you have a conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you agree with Owen Lattimore at the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. I have already said I would have to see exactly what he said.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do remember the part about Stassen?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; because, when a man attacks you, you naturally pay a certain amount of attention to what he says about you.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate, then, that Lattimore agreed with you.

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Mr. ROSINGER. No; not everybody who disagrees with me, fortunately, has engaged in attacking me.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you known Governor Stassen before?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever met him before that conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet him at the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

I would like to say also that you had another witness who attacked me, Professor Colgrove, and his testimony is not in agreement with that of Governor Stassen on some points.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Professor Colegrove?

Mr. ROSINGER. I met him only at the conference.

I would like to point out in connection with his reliability or unreliability as a witness that he testified that George Kennan spoke at the conference and he, Colgrove, thought that Kennan's remarks were old stuff and of no particular interest or help.

But, if you will look at the record of the conference, you will see that he praised Kennan's remarks effusively at the time.

In other words, you have a witness who says on one occasion before this subcommittee that Kennan's remarks were of no value whatever, and then at the conference asserts that they are of the greatest value.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your comment with respect——

Mr. ROSINGER. It is in the record. A comparison by your research staff will show that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You used the words "attack you", Mr. Rosinger; is that correct?

Mr. ROSINGER. Of whom?

Mr. MORRIS. Both of Mr. Stassen and Mr. Colegrove.

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; I would say it was an attack.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger, was Lattimore's article or manuscript ever submitted to you for comment prior to its publication?

Mr. ROSINGER. I was the editor of The State of Asia, and a chapter of the book is by him and his wife. So, I would say, as far as I recall, that is the only manuscript of his that I have commented on.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Field ever submit a Lattimore manuscript to you for criticism?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have just asked the witness a question in connection with Lattimore's article being submitted to him for criticism before publication. "He can recall one incident."

I then asked him if he recalls Frederick Field submitting an article by Lattimore to him for criticism. He declines to answer.

I think the witness is in a very contradictory position there.

Mr. BOUDIN. I do not think there is anything contradictory when you yourself agree for the record that any reference to Field can bring an assertion of the privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. Does he claim his privilege on this last question?

Mr. BOUDIN. Yes, the witness claims the privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that right?

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record a memorandum to FVF, which are the initials used by Mr. Field, from LKR, which are the initials of Mr. Rosinger, dated February 5, 1940.

This commences:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent; clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received, with that understanding as to the source.

(The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 359 and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 359

FEBRUARY 5, 1940.

F. V. F. from L. K. R.:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent; clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further:

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 3. Shouldn't "therefore" be "however," since the implication of the two previous sentences is that we are taking a strong position toward Japan?

Page 3, line 10. Since the implication here is that we should develop a correct policy before the events, instead of sadly understanding events after they have occurred, how about saying "the problem today is one of correctly understanding and shaping history in the making."

Page 4, line 11. Wouldn't it be better to say: "it will be partly because of American stupidity"? After all, if it is foolish to say that Russian influence by itself can bring bolshevism to China, then it is at least equally false to attribute that power to the United States.

Pages 4–5. The argument here is that social explosions result when internal forces meet outside pressures. I don't know what can be done about it, but this argument—despite a certain cogency—struck me as a little bit foolish, since it is almost equivalent to say that (e. g.) if tsarism had been tsarism, then there would never have been a Bolshevik revolution. And yet the point has its validity. Perhaps it would be helpful to indicate here (as well as later) that the pressures upon China do not now constitute a fixed mathematical quantity, but that their weight can be changed radically by the counterpressure of the United States.

Page 5, last line. Considering the highly dubious origin of the new life movement (i. e., it was essentially a political move in the civil war period), I wonder whether it should be cited as an example of the drive toward "modern," "efficient" political ideas. I don't know much about what has happened to the movement since the outbreak of the far eastern war, but my feeling is that new life is pretty much in the background—perhaps almost the discard.

Page 6, line 10. Perhaps it would be desirable to qualify "every" by "almost," since I suppose that there are certain elements, particularly compradore elements in the captured cities, that—whatever their abstract desires—would be willing to deal with the Japanese, permanently. Or is Lattimore's statement "wants to grow stronger" sufficient to make "almost" unnecessary?

Page 12, paragraph 3, line 5. "led by the Communists." Since Lattimore has not stated precisely what the nature of the split in the united front might be, one would be entitled to assume that important Kuomintang elements might go along with the Communists. In this case, one could only say that the Communists would have more weight than they do now, but whether they would actually be the leaders is at least open to discussion. (This, I think, is particularly valid, since Lattimore has already said that "most" of the Chinese, in the circumstances mentioned, would go along with Russia and that only "some" of them would be of the Wang Ching-wei type.)

At this point perhaps it would buttress the argument to mention the well-known fact that Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia back in 1923–24 only after he was convinced that he could expect nothing—except possibly opposition—from other powers.

I think it might be wise in the paragraph next to the last line in the article to indicate that there might be ways, other than the embargo, of helping China—just so that the suggestions made will have as catholic a character as possible.

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Mr. MORRIS. There is a contradiction, Mr. Chairman. This is obviously evidence of the fact that a Lattimore article was submitted to Mr. Rosinger for criticism and he has said he can recall of only one instance in 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. But he refuses to answer the other question as to whether or not any were submitted by Field.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter dated May 31, 1940, from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter. May that be introduced?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want that in the appendix?

Mr. MORRIS. In the volume.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

Mr. MORRIS. Any objection, Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. BOUDIN. We are not going to object to any documents you put in. I do not think it is our privilege to object to documents that you want to put in. I would suggest you just mark each one and put it in the record.

(The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 360, and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 360

[Pacific Affairs, published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations, Amsterdam, London, Manila, Moscow, New York, Paris, Shanghai, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto]

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., May 31, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Your letter of May 30 about the seriousness with which we must regard our responsibility during a period in which so many international journals have disappeared from view, is very welcome. I have been holding everything, wondering if perhaps the best thing we could do would be to call on resources within the staff to get out a special issue of Pacific Affairs for next September.

However, what has come in thus far, or is already promised, seems to be fairly well aimed at the bulls-eye of the target you specify.

(1) We have the promise of an article by Rosinger on Soviet policy in the Far East since the outbreak of the European war. Considering the standard of his previous articles, this ought to be very good.

(2) We have the promise from Taylor on the theory and mechanics of puppet government. This will be rather speculative in nature. While based on study of Japanese methods in North China, it will have wider applications which, considering the recent submergence of a number of countries, ought to be sufficiently obvious.

(3) We have a long article, on the condensation of which I am now working, by a man named Shore, on the relation of Lenin's writing to Sun Yat-sen. This will be valuable as a background study for both Russian and Chinese policies and trends.

(4) I am also working on the condensation of an article that promises to be really magnificent on the relation of prospects for capital investment, the "450 million" market of China, the nature of the opposition between Japan's "new order" policy and America's open door policy, and so forth. This is by a man named Brandt (if I remember correctly, which I am not sure). This article was passed on to me by Field, but the manuscript does not have the author's name on it.

(5) I am thinking of writing an article myself to be called "Empire lies in the East," to deal with the fact that while the acute focus of struggle between England, France, Germany, and Italy lies in Western Europe, the spoils of victory lie in Africa and above all in Asia.

(6) If the review of the Canadian Royal Commission Report which you have requested from W. Y. Elliott arrives in time, it may also rank with our main articles in importance.

(7) Also financial article by Kurt Bloch.

Any suggestions for improvement or better balance that may occur to you will be very welcome.

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I am very glad that both you and Holland will be keeping an eye on Herbert Norman. Like everybody else, I have been impressed by the quality of his work. We certainly ought to have something from him in Pacific Affairs.

Is The Geology of China, which you mentioned in your note of May 28, and which an accompanying bookseller's letter describes as "imported from Holland," the same as Li Ssu-kuang, The Geology of China. This author's name is given on our catalog card also as "J. S. Lee." We have the book in our geology collection, and it is given as published in 1939, in London, by T. Murby. Based on lectures given at various British universities.

If this is in fact the same book, I shall be glad to look at it and make a recommendation as to purchase.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a memorandum from FVF to LKR dated February 5, 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. These are all papers, Mr. Mandel, coming out of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, are they?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. It will be received in evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a memorandum to FVF from ECC, dated April 2, 1940, previously introduced in the record as exhibit No. 217 at the open hearings of August 23, 1951.

Senator FERGUSON. You want it received again? It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 361, and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 361

APRIL 2, 1940.

FVF from ECC:

I have just had word from Cripps that he will accept my invitation for dinner on the evening of Thursday the 11th. This takes the place of the dinner to which I had invited you for this week. I hope you can come.

Before I send out all of the invitations that I would like to, I wish you would glance through the list below and let me know what four of five people had better be eliminated and what four or five people are important to add from the American Council point of view.

The private room at the Gladstone only holds 20 at the outside and I had rather thought that a meeting of more than 20 might inhibit complete candor on Cripps' part.

Yes. Frederick V. Field (in pencil)
Yes. P. E. Corbett
Yes. W. W. Lockwood
W. B. Osgood Field, Jr.
No. ~~Philip C Jessup~~
No. ~~Joe Barnes~~
Yes. Harriet Moore
No. ~~Mrs Eliot Pratt~~
Yes. Vilhjalmur Stefansson
Rose Rubin
Rose Somerville
Robert S. Lynd
Wm. W. Lancaster
Yes. Ruth Carter
Yes. Jack Shepherd
Yes. Kathleen Barnes
Yes. Robert W. Barnett
Yes. Ch'ao-ting Chi
Andrew Grajdanzev
Yes. Edward C. Carter
Yes. Sir Stafford Crips
Yes. Rossinger
No. ~~T. A. Bisson~~
Yes. Harry Price
No. ~~Luther Tucker~~
No. ~~Sam Harper~~
John Hazard
W. D. C.
Yes. Faymonville
(?) Geoffrey Wilson
No. ~~McCann~~
Yes. Muhle

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Arthur H. Dean, dated April 18, 1949, to Clayton Lane, executive secretary of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

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Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 362" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 362

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL,
New York, April 18, 1949.

MR. CLAYTON LANE,
Executive Secretary,
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LANE: Thank you for your letter of April 15, 1949, together with its enclosures. I think you are greatly to be congratulated on your success with General Marshall. I think we must be very careful, however, that we do not indicate to him either (*a*) that he is coming into an institution of financial difficulties and that we are going to use him to bolster up our appeal to the foundations, who I am inclined to think might misunderstand it, or (*b*) that we are going to use his name to obtain additional funds.

I realize that you have come into an exceptionally difficult situation, but I thing we might go back to the publications of the institute and with the help of Larry Rosinger point out the difficulties our State Department is now facing in attempting to get up a constructive policy for China. I think we might make a very real contribution to the subject if we could state very objectively, but explicitly, problems which we now face in China. I am sure Owen Lattimore would be a great help in this.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR H. DEAN.

I hope you won't get discouraged. It is tough but I think worth while. You have my complete support but (1) I would not mention the Communist attack in relation to IPR publications, (2) for income tax as well as policy reasons I would not indicate we are engaged in pro- or anti-Communist attacks, (3) I would not indicate you have been brought in, to relieve a bad situation. This has antagonized some of Ned's friends.) Some way me must solve the Russian problem. It's up to us to find out what makes them tick; why they are what they are; it's not up to us to fight communism. If we try that we have no function; we must expose how it works, what it is, what it does, when it fails.

A. H. D.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Lawrence K. Rosinger to Mr. Frederick V. Field, dated May 8, 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 363" and is as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 363

MAY 8, 1940.

To FVF from LKR:

I would like to add some ideas supplementary to those you have presented.

I agree that the time for an embargo has probably passed, in view of the long period Japan has had to prepare economically against such action, and in the light of the rapidly changing international situation.

It was originally hoped that the embargo would help bring about the national liberation of China and also aid in preserving the peace of the United States. These objectives must still be sought, but it is a question whether a program developed before the outbreak of war in Europe can still serve such ends. It may at least be inadequate and, at worst, dangerous.

If we consider the possibilities before American far eastern policy today, there are three courses that might appear feasible to the administration: (1) Compromise with Japan on the basis of America's yielding; (2) pressure on Japan to produce a compromise on American terms; (3) pressure on Japan with an eye toward war. The first of these policies is not impossible (the current Japanese-American conversations may be interpreted as supporting this), but does not appear likely to me, in view of America's sharpened consciousness of world power since the European war began, the possibility that Japan may

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try to take advantage of British and French difficulties in Europe to press on farther in the Far East (i. e. against western interests—concessions in China, or against the East Indies), and the possibility that American appeasement of Japan might simply bring the Soviet Union into the far eastern situation more actively than before. Such a policy would be likely only if Washington decided to subordinate American far eastern interests to the needs of Britain and France in Europe. It is far more likely that the State Department intends to try to work out a synthesis in which opposition to Japan becomes a means of supporting Britain and France. * * * The second policy is, I think, still being tried, but I feel that in view of Japanese preparations to meet the embargo and the Allied difficulties in Europe, America action short of war would not deter Japan and might simply lead her to move precipitately. * * * This would leave the possibility of war with Japan, and there is no doubt that if the State Department had this in mind, it could use an embargo as a step toward military action.

It should be remembered that the embargo idea was initiated at a time when it was hoped that strong American action against Japan would simply form one part of international action, involving Britain, France and the U. S. S. R. It was hoped that this front (whether of all four nations, or three, or two) would impede Japan without offering her any hope of finding a way out through war. Of course, it was always considered possible that war might result, but this was thought to be quite unlikely. Today, however, an embargo policy must be thought of as an isolated American action. Britain and France are desperately anxious for agreement with Japan and are quite likely to carry this through despite American wishes. On the other hand, a Soviet-American front (though almost certainly a guarantee against war with Japan) is not in the realm of practical politics. The United States would then have a choice: (1) It could take unilateral action against Japan, at a time (such as the present) when the European and Far Eastern wars are still separate; or (2) it could, if the European and Far Eastern wars were already joined, take action against Japan and thereby make this country an ally of Britain and France. I am inclined to think that the former course, no less than the latter, would involve us in the European war.

Along these lines, an important point should be made. It is commonly assumed, in discussing the embargo question, that the only danger lies in the possibility that Japan might take such action as the occasion for war with the United States. It is worth while to consider whether the United States might not use the embargo as a first step toward war with Japan. It is conceivable that the State Department may reach the conclusion that a peaceful agreement with Japan on American terms is impossible, that Japan is bent on continuing a war which only has the effect of ruining China more and more completely and making it profitless for all nations, and that there is real danger of Japan's joining up at an appropriate moment with Germany—and Italy. In such a situation, the United States might decide that Japan should be stopped by war. I am inclined to think that such a policy appears more credible than it would have some months ago, in view of the definite steps taken for the extension of American economic and political influence abroad—e. g.: Western "hemispheric cooperation," stronger attitude toward Mexico (on oil) interest in Greenland and Iceland. The official statements on the Dutch East Indies, though now probably simply part of a diplomatic maneuver, could also point in this direction. Leaving aside the possible ways of American involvement in war suggested on the last page, it is also worth while to think about the situation that would arise if further Anglo-French defeats in Europe should bring a weakening of the imperial control of the two countries. It is possible, in such a situation, to think of a race among Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States to "fill the vacuum" created by a gradual or rapid French and British decline. This may not occur, of course, but support of the embargo might simply mean support of a general American expansionist movement in connection with which China would be a relatively minor issue.

The question then arises: What concrete far-eastern policy can be suggested for the United States. It is important to remember that it is not always necessary to suggest a policy that may be feasible from a governmental point of view at a particular moment. There are times when all "practical" policies may be undesirable, and when all desirable policies may be officially "impractical." I think that, in connection with the Far East, the tendency should be to watch American policy closely, to ask constantly whether American far-eastern policy envisages a truly independent China or whether the objective is to establish an American economic (indirectly political) control which will keep China in a semicolonial status, even though the heel of Japan has been removed. It is also important to consider all the time the possibility of American involvement in war by way of the Pacific. I think the emphasis should be on: (1) No involvement in war; (2) No agreement with Japan; (3) Continued sympathy with China, as indicated by already existing measures (silver purchases, loans).

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As far as the embargo is concerned, despite what I have said, I would not be in favor of publicly abandoning the idea. This would, I think, be very bad from the point of view of the pro-China movement in this country, since some people might get the idea that what Japan does and what happens to China is of no interest to us at all. Furthermore, I think continued discussion of America's complicity in Japanese aggression can be worth while in indicating the dangers inherent in American far-eastern policy. In short, I think the embargo question should be given a subordinate function of an educational character in the movement for sympathy with China and that one should no longer stress the hope that the State Department can be induced to change its present far-eastern policy without replacing it by something equally bad in other respects.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter dated October 5, 1946, to Mr. E. C. Carter, ECC from RJG, dated October 5, 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 364," and is as follows:)

OCTOBER 5, 1946.

ECC from RJG:

Am in New York for the weekend and just couldn't stay away from the office! No, actually I came in in the hopes of finding you for a few minutes conversation, or, lacking that, to leave you this memo so that you will have it the first thing Monday morning.

Point number one is that the first Washington advisory committee meeting is now scheduled for Thursday evening, October 17. Could you possibly come down for it? In talking with Mortimer Graves I said that probably you or Peggy or both would be down for this first meeting. He asked to be remembered to you and expressed the hope that you could make this first meeting for he felt it would serve as a tremendous shot in the arm for the whole committee if you were there. I know Peggy hoped to come down for it and both of you would be even better. Please do let me know if we may expect one or both of you as soon as you can make plans, won't you? I'd like to tell the other committee members so as to be doubly sure they'll be present.

Incidentally, the people who served on the committee before and who are still in Washington are:

Catherine Porter (probably will have left by then)
Isabel Ward
Eleanor Lattimore
Abbot Low Moffat (and Mrs. Moffat)
Mortimer Graves (and Mrs. Graves)
Pat and Bob Barnett
Margaret and William Carter
Shirley Jenkins
Karl Pelzer (and Mrs. Pelzer)
Lillian Coville

The additions who have been approved to date by the above people and whom I hope to have at the first meeting are:

John Barrow (replaces Dr. Arndt at the U. S. Office of Education)
Ethel Summy of Wilson Teachers College
Mr. and Mrs. Seldon Menefee
Mary Jane Keeney (now in charge of programs at the Metropolitan Broadcasting Company)
Eric Beecroft (now in Hawaii and won't be back by then)

If you think of someone else you think we should have at that meeting please do tell me won't you? Dr. Johnstone's assistant I haven't met yet, but I plan to this week and everyone thinks he should be asked if he is interested.

* * * * * * *

Point number two—in carrying out the two office meetings and one larger meeting each month plan, we have about concluded that the large November meeting should really be a large one. We would like it to be enough of a drawing card so that a large number of people who are potential members can be sent invitations as well as the total Washington membership. This mean a name and fairly popular. We all think John Hersey would be the perfect person. I know you were thinking of him in terms of a New York lunch, but do you think he

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might do both? Or, if not, don't you think perhaps a large dinner or just an evening meeting in Washington in November using him might take precedence over a New York meeting just this once? We do so need something large and impressive at this juncture. If you agree, I wonder if you would ask Hersey since he did write such a nice letter with his contribution telling you how much he was indebted to the IPR. He probably comes up to Washington anyway from time to time from North Carolina. He could set his own date and we'd work around it. Please let me know your reactions on this won't you?

Incidentally, will you please let me know right away whether I should ask Sumner Welles to the Advisory Committee meeting in Washington or whether you'd like to write to him or whether we shouldn't ask him at all.

Our office meeting for the 10th is Roy James talking about Guam. We will probably have Hendershot on Burma for the second office meeting later in the month. We are still trying to get Larry Rosinger for a luncheon the end of this month—working it through an invitation the Lattimores are extending to the Rosingers to spend a weekend with them and incidentally talk to the IPR on a Friday or a Monday (he's teaching in New York Tuesdays and Thursdays).

The enclosed are the announcements we have sent to all members and various organizations in and around Washington. Do you think of anyone or any place we should have particularly sent it to? We also included all the regional offices, incidentally.

That is about all the vital questions and information. I will be anxious for your reply before going ahead any further on any of this.

RENEE.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter to Gen. Frank McCoy, Foreign Policy Association, from Raymond Dennett, dated November 28, 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 365" and is as follows:)

NOVEMBER 28, 1944.

General FRANK R. MCCOY,
Foreign Policy Association,
22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

DEAR GENERAL MCCOY. Do you think it would be possible for the Foreign Policy Association to dispense with Lawrence Rosinger's services for the period of the Ninth International Conference of the IPR from January 5 to 17, 1945? As you know, the Institute has published a number of Rosinger's special studies and the American Council is quite anxious to have him attend the Conference as a recorder. In this position we may secure the benefit of his expert knowledge and the Foreign Policy Association may profit from the opportunity he will get to talk over Far Eastern matters with some of the delegates from the other countries.

Mr. Rosinger would be taking notes at some of the sessions which would be available for his own use in the FPA as well as furnishing material for published proceedings which will be issued later by the Institute. The total cost of the trip, including transportation, will probably be in the vicinity of $180. The American Council will be glad, if it is necessary, to take care of some portion of this expense, but we would be very glad indeed if the Foreign Policy Association would be able to consider the time Mr. Rosinger spends in Hot Springs as part of official business and might, therefore, be able to take care of a major share of this expense.

I sincerely hope that you will consider this request favorably and will be kind enough to make Mr. Rosinger's services available.

With cordial best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. This is a memorandum dated December 4, 1944, listing members present at the 1945 conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 366" and is as follows:)

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DECEMBER 4, 1944.

AMERICAN COUNCIL SECRETARIAT FOR 1945 CONFERENCE

Executive Secretaries:
Raymond Dennett
William C. Johnstone
Charles F. Loomis
Ernest B. Price

Recorders:
Dorothy Borg
Miriam S. Farley
Shirley Jenkins
Carolyn Kizer
Bruno Lasker
Eleanor Lattimore
Harriet Mills
Lawrence Rosinger
Marguerite A. Stewart
Virginia Thompson (?)

General Workers:
Frances Sharpe
Nancy Wilder

Stenographer: Margaret Fischl

Secretary to American Delegation:
Harriet H. Parker

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Roger F. Evans to W. L. Holland, dated January 18, 1951.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The documents referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 367" and is as follows:)

The Social Sciences:
Joseph H. Willits, Director
Norman S. Buchanan, Associate Director
Leland D. De Vinney, Associate Director
Roger F. Evans, Assistant Director
Philip E. Mosely, Assistant Director

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

49 West 49th Street, New York 20

JANUARY 18, 1951.

Cable Address: Rockfound, New York

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street,
New York, 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Acknowledgment of the relevance, timeliness, and quality of Rosinger's volume is good news and I am glad for the lift it has given you. I certainly shall look forward to reading it.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Roger Evans
ROGER F. EVANS.

RFE: jms

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter to Mr. Edward C. Carter from Mr. Chen Han-Seng, dated March 12, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 368," and is as follows:)

CHINA INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

KOWLOON, HONGKONG

P. O. Box 1688

(Pencilled) Received March 12, 1941.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: With this mail will arrive also Mr. Currie on his way back to America. He was twenty days in Chungking but as a trained observer and not like a trained bureaucrat he has certainly learned and understood many things. I am sure he has already appreciated the fact that Chungking is not China because of the exclusive depressive deteriorating atmosphere over there. He certainly made a splendid speech of half an hour before the highest and selective audience in Chungking sponsored by the Sino-American cultural Society on February 23rd. All the way through his speech he emphasised the importance

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of democracy for the sake of both national resistance and the upbuilding of a modern state.

. I saw him both on his way to Chungking and upon his return despite the attempts to encircle him. While in Chungking he asked Hollington Tong to arrange an interview with Professor Ma Yin-tsu. Holly replied after a day of so that Ma was not to be found. Currie enquired if Ma is now confined somewhere, but Holly said that cannot be true. Factually, of course, Ma is now confined somewhere near Chungking because of his criticism of the government finance. He advocated a tax levy on those who became rich during the war.

By ordinary mail I sent you a few days ago a copy of February 15th Newsletter of the China Defence League. The article on the United Front in that issue is worth reading and if I may say so it may be regarded as a brief supplement to my unprinted MS on that same topic. Kindly pass this on to Rosinger if you see fit.

The American Council is to be congratulated for the improved style and new policy of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I for one have always been opposed to the narrow and dry statistical articles that the Survey used to carry. I am enclosing a clipping herewith for the Survey's reference. I wish somebody would find it feasible to use Dr. Lim's speech and write a short piece for the Survey.

Dr. Lim pointed out three problems in his work: nutrition, training and transport. His work is really connected with everybody's work because these problems are both national and urgent. I wish I could find time to write a short article to explain how the economic policy has now affected the Central troops very seriously, because these troops are in the rear where prices are high and no fighting is being carried out. The guerrillas and other troops are mostly on the fronts, where prices are much cheaper, being unaffected by the government policy. Their morale is much higher. If there is really a wide-scale civil war, I estimate that only one-tenth of the Central troops are fit to fight. Have you received the 28th issue of the FAR EAST BULLETIN, dated February 15th?

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

[s] Chen Han-seng
CHEN HAN-SENG

Mr. MORRIS. Finally this is a letter from MP on the letterhead of China Aid Council, of which Mildred Price was then executive secretary, to Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mr. William Holland, and Mr. L. K. Rosinger, and Mr. E. Snow.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 369," and is as follows:)

CHINA AID COUNCIL
COMBINED WITH THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS
1790 Broadway, Room 713, New York 10, N. Y.

MARCH 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

From Mildred Price, Executive Secretary.
To: Mr. T. A. Bisson
Mr. Wm. Holland
Mr. L. K. Rosinger
Mr. E. Snow

I found this clipping and thought you might be interested in a copy of it.

[s] M. P.
M. P.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you testify, Mr. Mandel, that all those documents handed to you are taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Those are the ones that the committee has now received in evidence?

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Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. May the oral remarks of Mr. Rosinger made at the conference, and included in the transcript, be introduced in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 370" and is as follows:)

ORAL REMARKS OF LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER DURING STATE DEPARTMENT CONFERENCE HELD OCTOBER 6, 7, AND 8, 1949

[Oct. 6, 1949, morning session]

Mr. ROSINGER. I have been wondering about the order of the questions. That is, it seems to me that perhaps logically the first thing to do is to turn to something like 22 and 23, which are rather basic questions on the nature of the Far Eastern situation as it confronts us before getting into some of the more specific aspects of China policy and policy in Southeast Asia, and so on.

CHAIRMAN. It is entirely up to the members, it is entirely agreeable to the Department. Twenty-two and 23 are rather general questions, as you will see.

Mr. ROSINGER. I suppose I asked for it. I didn't have anything very extensive to say. It just seemed to me that by a certain logic that they apply to the general situation, and that they might be considered first. On question 22, "To what extent is the upheaval in China and elsewhere in the Far East a predominantly political movement, and to what extent is it the expression of deep-rooted forces arising out of social and economic conditions?" I think it is rather clear that while the political aspect is important as the international situation in the Sovet Union and United States, while the functioning of particular parties—in the case of China the Communists and Kuomintang—are extremely important, the situation would not be the same if those parties did not exist in their present form, that nevertheless we are facing pretty deep-rooted social and economic conditions in the region, that even given a change in the existing political set-up, the existing political movements which are available for expressions of opinion and action in those countries, you would have the gravest kind of discontent, the gravest kind of political upset, because of the general poverty of the area, because of the unresolved social and economic conditions which have the character of a long-term revolutionary process which started a long time back and will not be completed in our time.

[Oct. 6, 1949, 2:00 p. m. to 5:15 p. m.]

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to express my approval of a great deal of what has been just said and to add a few remarks of my own. There have been a number of suggestions this afternoon concerning the possibility of blocking China off or, to put it differently, writing China off. The assumption seems to have been that, for one thing, the Chinese Communists and the Communist-dominated regime could be allowed to stew in its own juices, get into increasing dilemmas, and finally after the passage of years finally be overthrown or come to the United States and ask for the assistance it must have under those conditions in order to continue. The second assumption seems to have been that in the meantime we could, undisturbed, except perhaps by certain local phenomena, build up our position and the position of friendly groups in the countries of southeast Asia and interest India and Pakistan; therefore, that we would have great freedom of action, that the Chinese Communists would have an increasing lack of freedom of action. A number of the questions involved in these two assumptions, I think, will be discussed in the course of these three days. I don't want to go into them in any thorough way, but I would like to throw out the possibility that the Chinese Communists, while facing extremely serious problems—and I think they are rather obvious to us—may solve those problems in fair degree; that is, that the view that they will be unable to solve these problems is of the present moment an assumption.

There are several evidences which would tend to support that assumption; there are others which would tend to oppose that assumption, and the assumption itself needs to be analyzed very seriously. With regard to the second point about our own ability to act relatively unimpeded in southeast Asia, I think there is an assmption there that the new regime in China will simply accept this situation of blockade and do nothing to counter it. My reading of the present

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situation in southeast Asia is that the Western powers with interests there are extremely vulnerable; that the British and Dutch are having problems and the French are having problems in various areas; that the ability of the United States to influence the situation in those places decisively cannot be taken for granted at this moment. I think if we look at the existence of Chinese populations in a number of the countries of southeast Asia, if we look at a certain community of economic condition, a certain community of political outlook—I don't mean on the Communist ideological level but on the ideological level of nationalism and unsolved economic problems which give rise to certain political attitudes—that there is a significant community between China as today constituted and various countries of western Asia. I would go further and say that if the relations between the United States and this new China are utterly hostile that we would have to expect that every possible instrument would be used against us in these areas of southeast Asia and against nations closely associated and allied with us. Therefore, I think it is dangerous to look at this as a one-sided proposition in which the other side stands still, is confounded, faces dilemma, while we act.

It is an interacting situation and we ought to weigh very carefully the question of whether our power to harass, simply to put it on that plain and blunt level, is equivalent to the power of others to harass us. I am not at all sure that the answer is that our power is greater in this respect. This brings me to a further point. I don't think we can write China off, and we need to have a constructive policy towards southeast Asia and India. By all means, we must promote the economic recovery of those areas, we must promote their alignment with us, no question about it. I don't think that can be pursued most constructively if China is imagined as utterly outside this plain as an area with which we are completely hostile. I would like to suggest, then that the normalization of our relations with China—it isn't going to happen next month or perhaps six months from now, but that the normalization of China, the establishment of some kind of situation in which feelings run cordial, at least relations are correct—is an important prerequisite to effective action on our part in other sections of Asia. To put it in a slightly different way: That our ability to be constructive, let's say, in India is not something which can be considered independent of our relationship with China. My own view is that the normalization of relations with China is essential in fair degree to the development of constructive relations with India. Or, to put it still another way: That the development of relations satisfactory to ourselves with a non-Communist India, which we wish to see continue non-Communist, depends upon some kind of correct relations with the China which is presently Communist and which presumably will continue to have such a political make-up for a long time to come or at least as long as we can now foresee.

* * * * * * * *

Mr. ROSINGER. The statement that I thought we should ask the Chinese Communists about their Indian policy before proceeding on it represents a misunderstanding of what I said. My point was that I felt that the normalization of relations with China was an important element in our carrying on an effective policy with other parts of Asia, not that we need ask permission.

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[Oct. 7, 1949, 9:15 a. m. to 12:15 p. m.]

Mr. ROSINGER. I was thinking particularly about the present military situation. The question was raised as to what effect arms from across the border would have, which you answered in part by saying that arms have been smuggled through for some time, but let's say, to what extent increased arms from across the border would have when the Chinese Communists reach that frontier—how would it effect the Indo-Chinese military situation?

* * * * * * *

Mr. ROSINGER. It does, but the particular question I had in mind was this: My impression, which I offer very tentatively, is that the military situation in Indo-China, granting a number of differences, might be compared roughly with the position of the Generalissimo's forces in China itself, let us say in 1947 or possibly early '48. In other words, I am wondering whether the French prospect there is of the same general character as Jung's (spl. ?) prospect was a year or a year and a half ago.

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CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. ROSINGER. I would like to speak briefly on a question of ideology. We have had some discussion this morning of the importance of having more Americans familiar or become familiar with Asia and there is certainly no question of that. We have had some discussion of the importance of how the United States speaks to Asia, and I think that subject is also significant, but I would like to suggest that our ideology in Asia is basically the sum total of our actions in Asia, and the generalization is that the people of the various Asian countries form about us, our way of operating, our way of thinking and doing things, on the basis of these actions; that is, that any emphasis on words alone is misleading and deceiving to ourselves unless, let us say, in Indonesia, Indodesian nationalists feel that American policy is really promoting Indonesian independence, if that happens to be the kind of appeal we wish to make. In other words, that we have to think primarily on the action level, primarily on the level of what policy actually does. I don't believe for a moment, for example, that it would be possible to sell to the bulk of the Chinese people, or the bulk of Chinese intellectuals, or the Chinese middle class hostility towards the United States just on the basis of words. There must have been something in their own experiences they saw which made them receptive to that kind of approach, and, therefore, it is to the actions and not to the question of words, even though words can be persuasive for a time, that we must primarily address ourselves.

I would like to mention one concrete question which I had hoped to bring up before in connection with Miss DuBois' presentation. There has been an item in the press in the past few days to the effect that gold from Japan is going to be transferred to France in the name of Indochina in connection, I believe, with reparations arrangements. I don't know whether that gold is to be used in Indochina by the French or whether it is to be used in France. That would be a significant question. From the news reports, which were brief, it is to be assigned to the Bank of Indochina in some form. I would suggest that nothing we can say to the gretnemas (?) is one-hundredth as important as the concrete question of whether a certain number of millions of dollars of gold is going to be used in Indochina for French purposes, and then without considering the further question of the particular use that is made of that gold.

In other words, I don't think, to sum up, that we can consider this simply on a verbal level. I defer to Mr. Reischauer on the question of Japan, and I would certainly agree that Japan is certainly more ideologically conscious than China or the areas of South Asia. But taking China, taking the areas of South Asia, and taking even Japan in the sense, I believe, that the Japanese people are considered highly practical as well as theoretical I think actions come first. If the actions appeal then you have a marvelous talking point. They can be played up in extremely persuasive ways. But they are basic.

[Oct. 7, 1949, 2: 07 p. m. to 4 : 45 p. m.]

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't think we can find out whether Chinese Communist terms are acceptable until trade is actually launched as a real possibility because my impression is that in all trade with the United States, between the U. S. and other countries, and so on, you first have to have an actual proposition come forward and then you reach your decision. I think it would be very unfortunate if on the basis of a possibility that Chinese Communist's terms might be unacceptable we didn't find out what those terms actually were. I think another consideration is that my impression is that in most trade that goes on you will find some terms acceptable and some not so that would seem a day-to-day process of bargaining on the part of the people, private and official, who are actually negotiating the trade.

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[Oct. 8, 1949, 9 : 00 a. m.]

CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Rosinger.

Mr. ROSINGER. I'd like to associate myself with the view frequently expressed around this table that we should extend recognition. My own personal feeling is that the recognition should come as early as possible. At the same time, I recognize that within this country there are certain practical problems to be faced politically in this connection. The question of timing has been referred to frequently; I think that is extremely important. I think there is a period, it is hard to define in advance, but a period of perhaps three, six, maybe nine months, in which recognition by the United States will have a certain value in

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terms of Chinese opinion and will not simply be a reluctant, grudging following after the facts and after the actions of other countries which will have recognized before us. I would not agree with the statement that with recognition of the new Chinese Government by Russia all the advantages of recognition are lost to other countries. I think that is not so, and the reason why I state this opinion is that I think we have to look at the state of Chinese public opinion. As I see it, the bulk of politically conscious Chinese opinion is not to the extent that it is hostile to the United States, hostile because it is pro-Russian; its anti-Americanism is not pro-Sovietism, by and large, regardless of what the situation may be in connection with particular individuals or leaders.

As I see it, Chinese public opinion, politically conscious public opinion, is not by and large hostile to individual Americans, regardless of particular incidents, it is not by and large hostile to the United States as a country, but rather hostile on rather pragmatic grounds to particular phases of American policy as experienced and perceived in China over the past few years. If that is so, then there is a stake to be won in considering this state of Chinese public opinion. If it is not now, by and large, pro-Russian in its anti-Americanism, then there is a much more favorable basis for returning it to some kind of friendly attitude toward the United States than if, let's say, its anti-Americanism were identical with a pro-Soviet approach.

I might add as a footnote that I think that in a country of 450 million people such as China, in which only a small percentage of the population, even the politically conscious, have a clear-cut, fixed ideology, that this question of how people feel on grounds of personal reaction to the policy of a foreign power, in this case the United States, is very important. I, personally, as I have suggested, would be in favor of recognizing at the earliest feasible moment. I think, though, that in terms of preparing American public opinion for recognition, there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists which can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent that we disentangle ourselves from the Chinese Nationalists, we lay the basis for recognition. As a matter of fact, if we were to recognize today, assuming that were possible, we would be in a highly contradictory situation of recognizing at the time that we were delivering through ECA supplies to Formosa, and so on.

We have not yet cleared ourselves from the entanglement with the Nationalists. I'd like to suggest, although I am not informed on the technical questions, problems of carrying out some of these action, that we end our ECA assistance as soon as possible to the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists. I'd like to suggest that one important question would be the position we take at the United Nations in connection with the resolutions or the proposals of the Chinese Nationalists. I think to the extent that we associate ourselves at the United Nations with their position, we make it very difficult to move toward recognition. I would be in favor of keeping ourselves as clear as possible from association with the Chinese Nationalist position at the United Nations. I think the question of the blockade is extremely important. I was particularly interested in the phrase from the letter of Mr. Hopkins, just read by Mr. Robertson, to the effect that we should actively break the blockade. Regardless of the phrase that is used, I think it is rather obvious that the blockade could not continue if the United States and Britain took an active position against it. The blockade, let's say, arose independently of our will, but its continuance is dependent on the assumption of a certain position of acquiescence on our part.

In this connection, I have been struck by the whole issue of the Isbrandtsen ships, in the stopping and seizure of two of them by the Chinese Nationalists. It seems to me that one of the questions that are most easily understood by the American public and not just recently but all the way back, is the question of the right of American ships to trade freely in various parts of the world. Had action been taken—again I won't try to define it, I don't know the technical details—but had action been taken to defend the right of these American ships to trade through a blockade, which is not a blockade but technically a port closure, a port closure which we have already asserted we don't recognize as a blockade, had action been taken to defend the right of these ships to go through, I think it would have been very difficult for any opponents of the process of moving toward recognition to say "this shall not be done," because this kind of action is highly intelligible to the broadest kind of American public opinion.

Therefore, I'd like to suggest, as a generalization, that the process of disentanglement be carried forward as rapidly as we can carry it forward, as a basis for preparing public opinion as a basis for early recognition.

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Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mildred Price?

Mr. ROSINGER. I decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you accept in the record a book review on Mr. Rosinger's "India and the United States," by Peter Meyer, which appeared in the New Leader of December 18, 1950, on page 21?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Peter Meyer?

Mr. ROSINGER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in evidence.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 371" and is as follows:)

SHALL INDIA SHARE CHINA'S FATE?

"INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger. Macmillan. 149 pp. $2.75)

"Reviewed by Peter Meyer, author, The Soviet Union: A New Class Society, and Tito's Threat to Stalin's Empire

"Since it achieved independence, India has refused to align itself either with the Western or the Eastern power bloc. In the United Nations, it has often abstained from voting on controversial issues. After the fall of China, it refused to organize an independent Asiatic alliance against Communism. It opposed French and Dutch imperialism in the Indies and induced the Western powers to press Holland to give Indonesia independence. It recognized Communist China and did everything it could to maintain friendly relations with the Peking regime. Only when all possibilities of conciliation or evasion were exhausted did India reluctantly join the Western powers on such issues as defense against the aggression in Korea. And confronted with Chinese aggression in Korea, Indochina and Tibet, it follows a policy of outright appeasement.

"Under these circumstances, a study of the motivations, achievements, and failures of the Indian foreign policy and of American relations with India, could be of great value, and the reader opens Mr. Rosinger's book with great expectations. Mr. Rosinger is a staff member of the American Institute of Pacific Relations; he traveled extensively in China and India and is introduced to the readers as a great expert on Asiatic affairs.

"As far as factual material is concerned, there is not much more than could be gathered from diligent reading of the daily press. Still, the book is intriguing in one respect. For while it purports to present the facts objectively, it still contains a very definite interpretation and conveys a message. What is this message? Let us look at a few examples.

"America and Indian independence. It is generally acknowledged that America traditionally supported Indian striving for independence. American pressure on Britain during the war is well known from various documents and wartime memoirs. What is Mr. Rosinger's interpretation of these policies? Let us quote:

" 'A study of the quoted passages suggests the concern of the United States government that the transition from British to Indian rule be as smooth and unexplosive as possible. The references to the effects Indian actions might have on "world peace and prosperity for generations to come" and to the possibility that "civil strife" in India might "become the source of new international tensions" seem more than perfunctory. Conflict in India clearly would have further reduced the strength of war-weakened Britain. * * * Besides, in 1946–47, China and parts of Southeast Asia were already in flames, and it was at this very time tht the alliance of the Big Three disintegrated into the "cold war."

"'With regard to India itself, independence was certain to come before many years. One fundamental question was whether this changeover would be by peaceful negotiation or by force. It was, of course, plain that the more peaceful the transition, the more moderate the future leadership of India is likely to be. London finally decided that it had no realistic course but to seek a negotiated withdrawal, hoping that the new Dominions of India and Pakistan would elect to remain within the Commonwealth when they came to make a choice. In this broad effort the British government apparently had the support of the United States.'

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"This description disregards several things. For instance, American diplomacy was supporting Indian striving for independence when it was by no means sure that Churchill's government would agree to it. And, of course, this was long before the alliance with Russia disintegrated—in fact, in the heyday of this alliance. Considerations about the 'cold war' could not play any decisive role.

"This quotation seems to argue that the imperialist, American as well as British, agreed to give India independence because they could not avoid it. There is some truth in this, but not the whole truth. Some imperialist powers do maintain their rule against the will of the great majority of the colonial population and against the will of world public opinion. And one wonders how far Gandhi would have gotten if India had belonged to the Soviet instead of the British Empire. Britain decided, with American advice, for the independence of India, Burma, and Ceylon without doubt under pressure; but other decisions were possible, even if they had been extremely unwise. Why the wise decisions were made certainly needs more explanation. One reason probably is that in democratic states labor, liberals, and humanitarians can and do fight against imperialism and put pressure on their own governments. This is not true of totalitarian states like the U. S. S. R., but an analysis of Soviet imperialism is conspicuously absent from Mr. Rosinger's book.

"Kashmir. Mr. Rosinger introduces this subject with several questions, about which, he says, 'only speculation is possible on the basis of present information.' For example: What is the precise strategic view of India held by the Pentagon? * * * What is the extent of current Anglo-American consultation on India? * * * What is the degree to which Indian policy on Korea and American policy on Kashmir have influenced each other?

"The author then proceeds to say that on certain issues important to India, among them Kashmir, 'the U. S. S. R. has shown more of a tendency to vote with India, or not to vote against it, than has the United States. On the Kashmir question the U. S. S. R. has abstained, while the United States has sometimes leaned toward the pro-Indian view, sometimes away from it.' One wonders why complete abstention is more favorable to India than an honest endeavor to settle the issue, partly but not totally in Indian favor.

"But, Mr. Rosinger explains, America was primarily interested in averting war between India and Pakistan because such a war would endanger united resistance to Communism in Asia, or, in Mr. Rosinger's words, 'Kashmir could be the graveyard of the remaining Anglo-American position on the continent of Asia.'

"This approach, he says, embittered the Indians and the Pakistanis, for whom Kashmir is a deeply felt matter of national rights, prestige and interest. Few things irritate the Indians more than to see the question of Kashmir approached as a factor in the American-Soviet balance of power. * * * And the appearance of the names of General Walter Bedell Smith and Admiral Chester Nimitz as prospective mediators of the Kashmir conflict 'strongly suggests' that American interest in Kashmir has a strategic aspect, says Mr. Rosinger.

"Well, it cannot be denied that the Western powers have a vested interest in peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. Strangely enough, Mr. Rosinger does not mention that, correspondingly, Stalin has a strong vested interest in fomenting the conflict and abstaining from any endeavors for its solution.

"Still, it would seem, the vested American interest in peaceful solution does coincide with the true interest of the Indian and Pakistani people. And the vested Soviet interest in fomenting strife happens to threaten their vital interests.

"Is Nehru's policy pure hypocrisy? Describing Indian foreign policy, Mr. Rosinger notes that 'the stated purpose of Indian policy has been to follow an independent course in foreign affairs, somewhere in between the positions of the two great powers.' But, 'as tension has mounted between the great powers and between opposing elements inside India, the Indian government has gradually moved in the direction of Britain and the United States, although not abandoning its verbal formula of an independent foreign policy.'

"Why? Because Soviet imperialism constituted a greater threat to Asiatic nations than the traditionally known Western imperialism? By no means. Mr. Rosinger's formulations about the stated purpose and verbal formulas and numerous innuendoes on almost every page of the book show that he did not trust Indian assurances about independent policies from the very beginning. His explanation is: Indian leaders could not 'leap into the Anglo-American ranks at the very moment of severing the long-hated British tie.' They feared a war because it

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'would make the survival of their government completely uncertain.' They hoped that their 'more or less' independent position 'clearly might increase their bargaining power' in seeking economic aid from the United States. A 'small but influential minority,' identified with commercial interests, favors a more or less clear-cut Western alignment, but the majority is afraid of war, fears the influence of foreign capital, is against Western imperialism. Another small, this time 'significant,' minority supports the Soviet view, and even non-Communists and some anti-Communists are attracted by Soviet industrialization, by 'Soviet policy and practice in connection with nationalities and national minorities.' If the Indian government should 'overcommit' the country on international issues, it 'might run into difficulties.' The politically conscious Indians are a very small minority who will not be able to speak indefinitely for the entire country. When the currently inarticulate mass of Indians is aroused to political activity, it will introduce new factors into Indian foreign policy. The most decisive element is likely to be the changing outlook of the Indian people.

"Here, Mr. Rosinger wisely stops. He does not tell us what this changing outlook is supposed to be and who will, in his opinion, arouse the masses and for what. But sapienti sat. A Communist, reading this story, would have no difficulty translating it into his own language: Nehru is a lackey of Western imperialism. He must be careful because Indian masses are opposed to war and imperialism. But his independent foreign policy is a sham; it is conceived to deceive the masses. Behind the screen of stated purposes and verbal declarations, he moves into the imperialist camp, here and there bargaining for a better position, for more economic help. The 'influential' minority of Indian bourgeois pushes him to do it faster. The 'significant' minority of Communists is fighting against this betrayal; Soviet industrialization achievements and nationality policies are winning new followers (who fortunately don't know anything about slave labor and the deportation of whole nationalities). And when the broad masses awake, Nehru's play will be finished; the government, whose survival is already uncertain in any serious crisis, will go the way of Chiang Kai-shek

"This has all been said before in the resolution of the Indian Communist party. But did Mr. Rosinger say it? No, he did not—not in these words. He only, to use his favorite expression, 'strongly suggested' it.

"Nehru and the Commonwealth. If more examples are necessary, read the chapter about India's relations with the British Commonwealth. When Britain gave India independence, the chapter starts, the hope existed that a conservative Indian government, facing internal problems and opponents, might look to some kind of British connection to strengthen its position. (Another Communist thesis: the colonial bourgeoisie, fearing the masses, must betray the struggle for independence and look for protection in the arms of the imperialists * * *)

"And, really, India remained dependent on Britain in significant ways: Britain leads in Indian foreign trade, it owes money to India, it still has investments in the country; India relies on Britain for naval defense. The official Indian approach to the Commonwealth 'has gone through an extended evolution designed to avoid arousing Indian majority opinion.' "

Again, Nehru is deceiving the masses by his clever policies. But is he? The question is whether the facts adduced prove a one-sided dependence on England, or an interdependence of the member nations of the British Commonwealth. One has only to think of the way in which Nehru's appeasement of Red China influenced British policies.

"But in Mr. Rosinger's interpretation, the repeated declarations that India will conduct independent policies even within the Commonwealth again seem only verbal assurances which rather conceal than reveal the true state of things. In addition, Indian affiliation with the Commonwealth provides further links with America. 'The imperial framework so long maintained by the British retains some of its effectiveness, and London possesses methods and contacts which are not available to the United States.' Yes, after all, the British labor government is, as is well known, only a servant of American imperialist warmongers.

"This is enough to illustrate Mr. Rosinger's methods; more examples can easily be provided. Everyone has the right to criticize the policies of the Indian, American and all other governments. But this method of underhand suggestion, vaguely formulated suspicion, cleverly dispersed innuendo—all under the mask of irreproachable objectivity—is trial by slander if there ever was one.

"And why is all this done? We find out in the last chapter, where the author presents some 'more personal observations.' He reports that India is industrially weak, that economic conditions are difficult, that there is unrest among

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the masses, and that the government is shaky. If it cannot 'deliver the fruits of independence' in five years or a little more, another political leadership—right or left—will replace it.

"Is the situation the same as with Chiang Kai-shek? Mr. Rosinger has to admit differences, although mainly in degree, 'in the details of day-to-day development.' Prices are high, but there is no inflation comparable to that of post-war China. Indian bureaucracy has weaknesses but is not so corrupt as Chiang Kai-shek's administration. Communist movements are 'significant' though not as strong as the Chinese Communists were in the years preceding their victory. But, Mr. Rosinger reminds us, the Indian situation is comparable to that of China in the twenties. At that time, the Kuomintang government was still rather stable; its leaders still talked about reforms and even enacted some. And see what happened. The same can—and probably will—happen in India. Mr. Rosinger does not say whether we should hope for it or fear it.

"In any case, we should do nothing to avoid it. 'The concept of an Asian bloc under Indian leadership appears to have no basis in realities.' 'India is not a bastion against China or Russia.' American relations with India cannot be a substitute for satisfactory relations with Red China. It is not within the power of the United States to assure India's future progress and stability. Hands off, let's go home. * * *

"This recommendation constitutes the political core of the book. That's why it was written. That is the advice of our Asiatic expert.

"He is not the first one. From many experts of the Institute of Pacific Relations, we have heard for years the same refrain: China must be left alone. Korea is not worth defending. Japan is more of a liability than an asset. Indochina must be written off. India cannot be saved.

"And another chorus answers about Europe: The Balkans were lost anyway. Czechoslovakia has got what it asked for. Turkey and Greece are hopelessly corrupt. The Germans are all Nazis and no worthy allies. France and Italy are degenerate and will soon collapse. Scandinavia is indefensible.

"Today, these recommendations are not formulated as openly and directly as they used to be in the times when everybody accepted the advice of Mr. Lattimore without criticism. Now, they are proffered by lesser experts, in more cautious language, in a more camouflaged way. But they are the same voices and, confronted by so much camouflage and insincerity, we cannot refrain from asking ourselves the old questions: Cui prodest?"

(The NEW LEADER, Dec. 18, 1950, pp. 21–23.)

Mr. MORRIS. Now, we have compiled a list of works of Mr. Rosinger in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. In executive session, that list was submitted to him. We gave Mr. Rosinger the opportunity to correct any mistakes that may have been made in that listing, and he today has submitted a memorandum in which he points out certain minor discrepancies.

I wish that they be introduced in the record, so that Mr. Rosinger's full comments will be available.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received and the works listed and referred to but not included in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 372" and is as follows:)

2775 MORRIS AVENUE,
New York 68, N. Y., January 24, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Internal Security Subcommittee, Judiciary Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In accordance with your requests at yesterday's subcommittee session, I am writing to give you the following information:

(1) The hotel at which I stayed during the State Department conference of October 6–8, 1949, was the Hamilton Hotel.

(2) On October 6, 1951, I issued a press release of which I am enclosing a copy. There were one or two others of which I do not have copies.

(3) I have no record of the name of the person at the University of California who offered me the teaching position I had there in the summer of 1948.

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(4) I have no copy of the written memorandum which I submitted to the Jessup committee in September 1949. In this connection I have carefully checked my files, as I promised I would. I have therefore written to Mr. James E. Webb at the Department of State, declaring that I have no objection to the release of my memeorandum to the subcommittee.

(5) I have checked on "Exhibit No. 118, Lawrence K. Rosinger" (pp. 468–469 of the subcommittee's printed record) and find that the following corrections should be made for purposes of accuracy:

(a) Line 1: The date is "1937–1944" in the title of China's Wartime Politics.

(b) Line 3: Should be "Far Eastern."

(c) Line 4: "staff" not "staffs."

(d) Line 5: "1937–1944."

(e) Line 5: China's Crisis (not "China Crisis") and Restless India should be omitted, since these were not IPR books. (You will note at the top of p. 468 the statement that the material is being introduced in the record as evidence of my "activities within the Institute of Pacific Relations." Neither of these books had any connection with the IPR's work, and they were written and published at a time when I was not employed by the IPR.

(f) Line 7: Should be "American Institute of Pacific Relations."

(g) Line 11: Should be November 18–December 2, 1939.

(h) Line 18: "India-America."

(i) Line 19: "Research Associate."

(j) Line 25: "Relations" not "Relation."

(k) Line 25: Omit semicolon.

(l) Line 27: "Relations."

(m) Line 36: "Book Review, 1938, pages 421–432" should read: "Germany's Far Eastern Policy Under Hitler, 1938, pp. 421–432."

(n) Line 37: "Book Review, 1939, pages 186–188" should read: "Letter, 1939, pages 186–188."

(o) Line 44: "Book Review, 1942, pages 117–118" should be "Book Review, 1942, pages 116–118."

(p) Line 46: This item should be omitted, since a review of one of my books by another person cannot properly be regarded as part of my record at the IPR.

(q) Line 47: This item should be omitted for the same reason as that given in (p).

As I indicated in appearing before the subcommittee, it has not been feasible for me to check every point. But, with the above corrections, the material in the list may be regarded as substantially correct in form and fact.

I assume that this letter will be introduced into the record as part of my testimony.

Sincerely yours,

[S] Lawrence K. Rosinger.
LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER.

Mr. MORRIS. One of these items will be a compliance on the part of Mr. Rosinger with the request that a certain telegram sent by the State Department to him be made a part of the record, and Mr. Rosinger's message appears on that and is made part of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be received. That is the telegram asking you to come down in 1949 to the conference?

Mr. ROSINGER. May I see that?

(Telegram handed to the witness.)

Mr. ROSINGER. Yes; that is right. It is embodied in a press release.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean you included it in a press release?

Mr. ROSINGER. That is right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 373" and is as follows:)

OCTOBER 6, 1951.

For immediate release.

In reply to a telegram of October 5 from Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb, requesting an expression of views on the possible public release of the

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transcript of the confidential State Department conference of October 6, 7, 8, 1949 on Far Eastern problems, Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger has sent Mr. Webb the message given below. Mr. Rosinger, a private writer and lecturer and the author of a number of books on the Far East, attended the conference together with twenty-four other persons prominent in business, university teaching, missionary activity, and other fields. The purpose of the conference was to obtain a statement of various points of view on Far Eastern problems by persons competent in that field. Mr. Rosinger's message follows: "I would welcome release of the full transcript of the round table discussions on the Far East. In fairness to all participants, I most strongly urge that the record include not only the remarks of outside persons like myself, but also all briefings and other statements by government officials present at the conference. In my judgment, the conference embodied a calm, reasoned discussion of differences of opinion of a type that we desperately need today instead of emotion and hysteria."

Mr. ROSINGER. Since you have included this review by Peter Meyer of India and the United States, a review which I happen not to have seen, but which, I suppose, is not favorable, it seems to me I should be allowed to submit for the record some favorable reviews.

Mr. BOUDIN. We will send them in after the hearing.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means. We certainly will include some of them. The only difficulty might be the bulk and the printing cost.

Mr. BOUDIN. We will bear that in mind.

Mr. ROSINGER. The only point I want to make is: to judge a man's works by reviews is less than a satisfactory procedure. Everything I have written has been praised by somebody and damned by somebody else. I don't see that any conclusion can be reached.

I may say on the basis of my own recollection that, broadly speaking, the vast majority of the reviews have been favorable, and not unfavorable, but even in strict logic, that does not prove anything.

I think the method of judgment by review is not a satisfactory method, but if it is to be followed, then I would like to have it noted that the reviews have been largely favorable.

Mr. MORRIS. You will note, Mr. Rosinger, that all these things introduced, all your writings introduced in the record, are not to show whether or not you had a disposition one way or the other, but a sampling of your writings, of you, as a particular witness before this committee.

Mr. Chairman, there are two other pieces of business here.

General Wedemeyer, who testified before this committee, has written two letters to the chairman of this committee, asking that they be made a part of the record in connection with the testimony he has previously given.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibit 374–A" and "Exhibit 374–B" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 374–A

ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER,
Vice President and Director

AVCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

420 LEXINGTON AVENUE

New York 17, N. Y.

NOVEMBER 11, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: The recent correspondence between Representative Daniel J. Flood (Democrat, Pennsylvania) and Carlisle H. Humelsine, of the Department of State and the pertinent exhibits provided by Mr. Humelsine, have been

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widely noted and commented upon in the press and radio. There has been a tendency to raise the issue of possible inconsistencies in my testimony of September 19, 1951, before your Subcommittee on Internal Security. A few editorial comments that have come to my attention, possibly, could be interpreted as a reflection upon my good faith and sincerity of purpose. I therefore venture to address you in the premises not for that reason alone, but also because I deem it very important that every American interested in the security of our country be provided with available factual information. Maliciously or unwittingly current issues are sometimes confused and misinterpreted in certain quarters. I wish therefore to clarify to the best of my ability testimony pertaining to the four political advisers, John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, John K. Emmerson, and Raymond P. Ludden, assigned to the China theater staff in 1944–45.

Mr. John K. Emmerson did not submit reports pertaining to developments in the China theater. His responsibilities were confined to political reporting, intelligence, and psychological warfare with respect to Japan. Therefore, remarks that I have made or testimony submitted pertaining to report on China from political advisers on my staff do not apply to him.

The crux of the implications raised by the State Department's release of pertinent official correspondence is that, although I voluntarily commended the four political advisers in the spring of 1945 for outstanding performance of duties, I recently indicated to your committee that their advice and suggestions in the military field were not sound and, if implemented, would have accelerated Communist control of China. I must assume that the purpose of establishing what seems to be a paradox is to involve me in an inconsistency. The fact is that there is neither a paradox nor an inconsistency. The facts are these:

When I assumed command of the China Theater in the Fall of 1944 the military situation was deteriorating rapidly and experienced observers predicted that the Japanese would force China out of the war within a few weeks. Therefore, initially I concentrated my attention and efforts upon salvaging the military situation. My directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington explicitly required me to support the Chinese Nationalist Government and to maintain the Chinese armies in effective opposition to the approximate one million two hundred thousand Japanese soldiers in the area. If this were accomplished, obviously the enemy armies would be pinned down in China and the Japanese High Command would therefore be prevented from disengaging large numbers for employment against the advancing American forces of General MacArthur in the Philippines and Ruyukus.

With the earnest cooperation of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese forces supported valiantly by American Air Forces under the command of Major General Claire Chennault, the China Theater Forces did experience a measure of success, and in fact the Allied military posture vis-à-vis the Japanese gradually improved, so that, by early Summer, 1945, Allied forces were beginning to wrest the initiative from the Japanese.

During the crucial period of military operations (Fall and Winter 1944–45) as Theater Commander I necessarily subordinated the attention I normally would have given political developments in the area. The four political advisors on my staff—John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, John K. Emmerson and Raymond P. Ludden—submitted oral and written reports. Frequently these reports provided information pertaining to the character and ability of certain Chinese civil and military leaders. Some reports contained suggestions pertaining to the economic and psycho-social situations. Occasionally the reports included recommendations concerning the potentialities of and developments within the Chinese Communist Army.

Much of the information thus provided was helpful and constructive particularly that pertaining to the character and ability of Chinese individuals with whom I as Theater Commander was almost constantly in official contact.

On the other hand, the information embodied in the reports pertaining to the military situation uniformly was critical of the Chinese Nationalist Forces and invariably was complimentary to the Chinese Communist Forces. Some of the reports included definite recommendations to the effect that I should provide U. S. equipment to and support the Chinese Communist Forces on the grounds that they were fighting the Japanese realistically and would contribute more than the Chinese Nationalists to the over-all war effort. These latter recommendations I did not accept for three reasons:

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(*a*) My directive required me to support the Chinese Nationalist Forces.

(*b*) From the logistical viewpoint it would have been most difficult to transport arms and equipment to the Chinese Communist Army which was located in the remote Province of Sensi.

(*c*) Reports from competent American military observers indicated that the Chinese Communist sporadic operations against the Japanese were inconsequential; were designed primarily to capture arms and equipment from isolated Japanese strong points, and finally were not contributing materially to the overall Allied effort in China.

When the above-named political advisors were relieved from my staff in the Spring of 1945 and were assigned to the American Embassy, I voluntarily issued them letters of appreciation because at that time I felt definitely that their services fully merited commendation even though I did not accept or implement their specific recommendations pertaining to support of the Chinese Communist military forces.

Later as I came to grips with political, economic and social problems in the China Theater, it was obvious that if I had implemented the recommendations of my political advisors to support the Chinese Communist Forces, I not only would have violated my directive, but also such action would definitely have contributed to the success of the Soviet-inspired Chinese Communists against the Chinese Nationalists in their internecine struggle after the war and would thereby have accelerated the communization of the entire area.

Some press and radio reports associated their names with Communist activities and although I was interested, I was in no position to follow up such reports to ascertain their authenticity.

I had never questioned nor do I now question their loyalty to me or to our country. I have testified exactly to this effect before Congressional Committees. Also I have consistently so informed governmental officials investigating the loyalty of those four men.

May I respectfully request that the foregoing be included in the record of your Committee's inquiry not only for the purpose of clarifying the issues involved, but also to reaffirm the premises established therein. I do not object to anyone disagreeing with my views, opinions or judgments. I do object strongly to any reflection upon my sincerity of purpose or upon my integrity.

I wish to thank you and the members of the Committee for your kind consideration in the premises.

Faithfully,

[s] A. C. Wedemeyer
A. C. WEDEMEYER,
Lieutenant General, USA, Retired.

EXHIBIT No. 374–B

ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
Vice President and Director

AVCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

420 LEXINGTON AVENUE

New York 17, N. Y.

9 OCTOBER 1951.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: I respectfully invite your attention, and that of the members of your Subcommittee on Internal Security to the attached telegraphic correspondence between myself and the Honorable James E. Webb, Acting Secretary of State, relating to a statement of mine to the Department of State on 26 September 1949.

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May I suggest that this matter, which bears upon a subject now under inquiry by your subcommittee, be made a part of the record pertaining to my recent testimony.

With every good wish, I am,

Faithfully,

[s] A. C. Wedemeyer
A. C. WEDEMEYER.

Incls—

1951 OCT.—6 P. M. 4:52.

Na. 310 Long Govt. DL PD—TDN Staten Island, N. Y., 6: 434P—General ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER,

AVC Manufacturing Corp., 420 Lexington Avenue:

The Round Table discussions on problems of U. S. policy toward China, held in the Department of State on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, to which you submitted statement, were stated at the time to be on an informal and confidential basis, with the transcript of the discussion to be made available only to officers in the Department concerned with that policy. The Department has made every effort up to the present time to maintain the integrity of that understanding. As you have undoubtedly noticed, there has been extensive reference in the press and before Committees of Congress to these meetings and numerous assertions concerning the nature of the statements by the various participants, from Members of Congress and from the press to make public the transcript of the discussions. Will you please wire immediately collect your views on a possible public release of the transcript of the discussion at the meetings which included your wired statement.

JAMES E. WEBB,
Acting Secretary of State, Dept. of State, Wash., D. C. 061944Z.

[Western Union]

AVCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
420 Lexington Avenue, New York 17, N. Y., 9 October 1951.

JAMES E. WEBB,
Acting Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.:

In reply to your telegram of 6 November requesting permission to make a public release of my statement of 26 September 1949, to the State Department Round Table on Far Eastern affairs of 6, 7, and 8 October 1949, May I state:

I cordially assent to your request with on unequivocal stipulation, namely, that my statement be released only in its entirety and without accompanying remarks or interpretations by the Department of State which might emphasize one recommendation more than another.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that the controversy evoking your request center about testimony given to the McCarran Committee, I am sending that committee this exchange of telegrams, including the text of my statement of 26 Semptember 1949, so that the committee may, if it wishes, include it in its record.

A. C. WEDEMEYER.

[Confidential—Priority]

26 SEPTEMBER 1949.

(Dispatched from Headquarters Fifth Army, Chicago, Illinois)

From: Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer enroute to Sixth Army, Presidio San Francisco, California

Action to: Under Secretary James Webb, State Department: Attention: Francis Russell, Washington, D. C.

Information to: General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

Reference your kind invitation to attend meetings of 20 leading Americans for exchange of views on problems United States policy in China October 6, 7, and 8, respectfully request that I be excused. Mrs. Wedemeyer and I are

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motoring across the country in my private car in accordance with a prearranged schedule which enables me to obtain a long deferred vacation and then to arrive at my destination in time to participate in Joint Army-Navy Exercises. Acceptance of invitation to attend meetings in Washington would leave Mrs. Wedemeyer stranded in Colorado for several days and might interfere with my timely arrival in Sixth Army. Further, I have stated my views pertaining to China to State Department and National Military Establishment officials and representatives both orally and in writing. Only recently I conferred with special group of analysts, Ambassador Jessup, Doctor Fosdick and Doctor Case. It would seem reasonable to assume that my personal views are sufficiently well-known by responsible individuals within the Government as to render my attendance at the meeting unnecessary.

Herewith résumé of views substantially as expressed in the manner and to the individuals referred to above.

The United States should not surrender the initiative in any field of international endeavor, in any area of the world. The timing, the scope, and the character of our efforts in one area (for example the Far East) should be carefully coordinated and integrated with our efforts in other areas of the world (for example, Western Europe, Central Europe, Middle East, et cetera). To insure economy of means and to make our efforts more purposeful to all nations our efforts should be integrated and coordinated with those nations and peoples having objectives compatible with our own.

Specifically with reference to policies and objectives in China the following ideas appear pertinent:

1. The pronounced and progressive deterioration of China's political and economic structures, also the impotence of Government military forces, render it impractical at this time to provide large-scale material aid repeat material aid. The remaining Chinese non-Communist forces or elements, with or without National Government's cognizance, are not organized or equipped to assimilate or to use effectively large-scale material aid.

2. The Chinese people, individually and collectively, would receive a tremendous uplift in morale and would derive strength and hope for the future if the United States (also Great Britain, France, and other friendly countries) publicly affirmed the determination to support anti-Communists or non-Communist elements in China and throughout the Far East. Such a public pronouncement by the President or the Secretary of State would provide the moral support so urgently needed by bewildered millions not only in the Far East but in other important areas of the world.

3. Material aid repeat material aid to Chinese leaders, communities, provinces, or specific areas, actively resisting or tangibly striving to generate realistic opposition to Communism, should be given by the United States on an evaluated scale—carefully supervised by United States representatives—progressively increased in scope if developments warrant. In this connection military equipment, propaganda media, medical equipment, food and clothing might be distributed at times in areas, and in quantities determined by careful evaluation of the existing and developing situation. Our initial objectives should be to restrict and harass the military and economic activities of the Communists and concomitantly to confute and refute the ideas, the ideals, and the ideologies of the Communist political and cultural forces.

4. Continued observation and evaluation of the results attained by the above unequivocal moral support accompanied by evaluated material aid repeat material aid might justify later greatly increased material aid repeat material aid in certain localities or, for example, in support of indigent movements that give tangible evidence of momentum and substance in their struggle against Communist domination.

If clarification or expansion of above ideas is desired I would be glad to comply. My exact location is known at all times to the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

(Signed) H. E. HASTWOOD,
Brigadier General, GSC, Chief of Staff.

Symbol ALFCS 261730Z Sep. 49.

Mr. MORRIS. Also, we have an exchange of correspondence in connection with Julian Friedman, with the State Department, in connection with his records, that have a direct bearing on the hearings which are now in process.

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I would like those to be incorporated in the record at the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 375" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 375

SEPTEMBER 19, 1951.

Honorable DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During the course of the testimony of Alice Widener before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on September 18, 1951, testimony concerning a report filed by Julian Friedman entered the record.

Julian Friedman was an employee of the State Department (App. Div. Asst. in the Dept. of State Sept. 2, 1943; Asst. to Chief Div. of Labor Relations Sept. 1, 1944; Divisional Asst. Nov. 20, 1944; Asst. Sec. of Comm., United Nations Conf. on Int. Org., San Francisco, 1945; Research & Analysis Asst. May 17, 1945.—Biographic Register, Dept. of State, Oct. 1, 1945, page 106) and was dismissed without prejudice.

Would you make available to this Committee whatever reports Julian Friedman submitted on the Chinese Communist Labor Movement?

It would also be appreciated if you would inform this committee the significance of Mr. Friedman's "dismissal without prejudice." With such a dismissal could Mr. Friedman be returned to employment by the State Department if an opening should occur?

Were any facts available in this case to the State Department that could be made available to this Committee in following up this matter?

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

SEPTEMBER 24, 1951.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have your letter of September 19, 1951, addressed to the Secretary, requesting certain information in regard to Julian Friedman, a former employee of the Department of State, referred to during the course of the testimony of Alice Widener before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on September 18, 1951.

This matter will receive prompt attention, and I will communicate with you further in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Rec'd Oct. 19, 1951.

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, October 9, 1951.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of September 19, 1951 requesting certain information concerning Julian Friedman, a former employee of the Department of State.

With respect to your request for "whatever reports Julian Friedman submitted on the Chinese Communist Labor Movement" a search of the Department's files has disclosed only one such report. This report is in the form of a despatch from Shanghai, dated 1945, which contains SECRET information gained from a controlled American source.

It is the view of the Department that preserving the integrity of the reporting by Departmental officers is a matter of principle of the highest importance. In the present context, the release of Mr. Friedman's report, even though he is no longer an employee of the Department, would undoubtedly have the effect of inhibiting the free and frank expression of views by other officers in their reports to the Department. This is true not only because an officer must have absolute confidence that his sources will be protected to the fullest while he is still gathering information but also because the sources must have assurance that they will not be exposed or embarrassed sometime in the future. For these reasons the request for Mr. Friedman's report must be respectfully declined.

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With regard to Mr. Friedman's termination from the Foreign Service on November 12, 1946, there is little that can be added to Mr. Elbridge Durbrow's letter to you of April 23, 1951, on this matter. Mr. Friedman was one of approximately 80 Auxiliary officers whose services were terminated on November 12, 1946 as a result of the liquidation of the Foreign Service Auxiliary. There is nothing in the Department's records on Mr. Friedman which indicates that there was any significance behind his termination. Should Mr. Friedman apply for reemployment in the Department today, he would be considered as any other applicant and as such would be subject to a full investigation, and a complete review of his case would be made under the Department's present employment and security standards.

In reply to the question contained in paragraph five of your letter, a thorough examination of the Department's files has disclosed that there were no facts available to the Department either prior to or at the time of Mr. Friedman's separation.

Sincerely yours,

[s] W. K. Scott
WALTER K. SCOTT,
Acting Deputy Under Secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all we have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to say on the record that I think the testimony today demonstrates the bill that is on the calendar, which would permit committees to grant immunity and require the answers to questions, should receive the very careful attention of the Senate of the United States and the House at the present. It is apparent that if this committee is going to really serve the people of the United States, on occasions, it will be necessary that we be entitled to compel witnesses to testify.

If the people are going to be enabled to act as advisers to our State Department, and then refuse to answer certain questions on the ground that it would tend to incriminate them, as to whether or not they are Communists or non-Communists, and whether or not they know certain people, I think that the people, in order that they may obtain the facts, are going to have to do something about the granting of immunity, and the compelling of witnesses to answer questions.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one other point I notice I did not cover in the press of events.

Were you ever a lecturer at the Jefferson School of Social Science?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you actively assist in the circulation of the Stockholm peace petition?

Mr. ROSINGER. To the best of my knowledge I had nothing to do with it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see it or a copy of it or a facsimile of it?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't recall, except that it was reported widely in the press. I certainly saw it there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have anything to do with its circulation, directly or indirectly?

Mr. ROSINGER. I don't know the full meaning of the word "indirectly" but I didn't have reservations when I said I had no recollection of having anything to do with circulating it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know it was a Communist-inspired document?

Mr. ROSINGER. I decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

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Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that there was a Jefferson School of Social Science?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that a witness testified here that you were a student at that school, or went to its meetings?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that that was a pro-Communist school?

Mr. ROSINGER. I respectfully decline to answer, relying on the constitutional privilege in the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

(Whereupon, at 5:20 p. m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 30, 1952.)

EXHIBIT No. 353

CHINA CRISIS

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger)

(Pages 90–96]

CHAPTER XI—PART I—"ARE THEY COMMUNISTS"

Ever since the early days of the Chinese Soviets foreign observers have tended to regard the Chinese Communists as agrarian socialists or peasant radicals, rather than as Communists. According to this view, the present guerrilla movements is essentially the latest in a series of radical peasant movements that have burst forth throughout Chinese history at moments of crisis. For example, in the middle of the last century the Taiping Rebellion, which almost unseated the Manchus fifty years before they actually lost the throne, was basically a peasant revolt. The Manchus previously had suppressed other revolts, and each dynasty before them had also been faced by its quota of rural uprisings. By anology, then, the activities of the guerrilla armies and governments today could be considered a current variation on an old Chinese theme.

A far more important consideration in judging the Communists has been the moderate nature of their program. Even in the days of civil war, when they expropriated large land-owners, the guerrillas never tried to introduce anything resembling collectivization of agriculture. Their immediate goal was always the launching of long-needed rural reforms and the establishment of a landowning peasantry. Later, when existing policies were remoulded for the sake of unity with the Kuomintang, the Communists became more moderate in method as well as in program. Most striking was their pledge in September 1937 to support Sun Yet-Sen's Three Principles of the People: to abandon the policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang by force, establishing Soviets, and forcibly confiscating land; to abolish the Soviet Government and enforce democracy based on the people's rights; and to place their armies under the control of the National Government.[1]

Most foreign observers would agree that, while the last point has been realized only nominally because of friction with Chunking, the other pledges have been observed, even though Chungking on its side has done little to promote unity. The Eighteenth Group (originally the Eighth Route) and New Fourth Armies' policy of improving the lot of the people, encouraging them to participate in government, and mobilizing them for war against Japan are in agreement with Sun's principles of national independence, democracy, and popular welfare. Moreover, the Communists actually have abandoned the policy of land confiscation, have ended the Soviet political system, and, while defending themselves, have not sought to overthrow the Kuomintang by force.

It is an interesting fact that the twenty-fifth item in the Kuomintang's Program of Resistance and Reconstruction, adopted in 1938, urges the kind of mass organization activity the Communists have been carrying on. This clause reads as follows:[2]

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[1] See p. 23.

[2] The Chinese Year Book, 1938–39 (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1939), p. 338.

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"The people throughout the country shall be organized into occupational groups such as farmers, laborers, merchants, and students. The principle shall be: From each according to his ability. The rich shall contribute in money, and the able-bodied shall sweat. All classes of people shall be mobilized for war."

It is also worth noting that the whole emphasis of the Communists has been on change without violence, and in the areas under their control they have constantly sought to minimize the differences among classes. For example, while effecting reductions in rents and interest rates, they have invariably sought to dissuade the peasants from pressing for more radical reforms that would cause sharp class friction.

This is why, in a broadcast of August 11, 1943, Raymond Gram Swing declared quite correctly that "the Communists have become versed in the democratic art of compromise."[3] This is also why a liberal editorial writer remarks with good reason that they "could more appropriately call themselves the Chinese democrats."[4] At the same time it is necessary to point out that they regard themselves as Communists both in their political theory and outlook. It is true that the mass of people in the Communist areas are simply peasants looking for decent government and a better way of life. But many of the leaders, as well as ordinary citizens, are actually Communists.

The Communists hold that at the present time China is only ready for what they call "New Democracy," i. e. a progressive economic, political, and social program within the framework of a modified capitalism. The realization of their ultimate desire for a socialist China will be possible, they believe, only in the remote future. This attitude is expressed clearly in the following report of an interview by a foreign correspondent:[5]

"'Why do you call yourselves "Communists" if you are practicing democracy?' a foreign visitor here asked a prominent party man.

"'We are Communists,' he was told, 'and shall always remain Communists. But you must realize what a correct application of the Communist theory means in a backward semifeudal country like China.

"'It must mean promotion of the smooth development of productive methods, with the help of capitalistic enterprise, as well as the enterprise of co-operatives.

"'For only from that distant stage of fully developed modern economy can the next step toward socialism be made and only much later can the final step to Communism be taken * * * Communism in China for decades to come can only mean "new democracy." There is no opposition to this policy in our party and the nonparty people everywhere in our areas know we mean what we say and support us because of this policy.'"

This spokesman also declared that "party members are predominantly peasants, keen on reforms and progress but definitely averse to any premature experiments like collective farming and socialist revolution on (the) basis of present low production and low culture."

While the Communists have reiterated on many occasions their desire for the strongest kind of unity with the Kuomintang and other political groups, they may be expected to show considerable toughness in adhering to the reform program they have laid down and in maintaining the independent existence of their party. On both points they are influenced not only by current considerations, but by their interpretation of the break-up of the first united front in 1927. At that time, they say, the Communists and left-wing movement in general placed too much confidence in the intentions of conservative nationalists and therefore were unprepared for the period of suppression. One may be sure that throughout the present war of resistance, whenever friction has increased, the minds of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and other leaders have turned back to the events of 1927.

This, in part, explains the Communists' constant emphasis on preserving their unity and independent existence on the same basis as the Kuomintang. In 1938 the latter proposed that the Communists dissolve and join the Kuomintang as individuals. The Communists refused, arguing that they had a distinct program and that Chinese conditions required more than one party. They proposed instead, that, as in 1924–27, they maintain their own party, but also be permitted to join the Kuomintang (with their names known to the Kuomintang). A second suggestion was for the creation of a national alliance of all parties, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The various groups would be equally represented on a Central Executive Committee and local Executive Committees, which

[3] Amerasia (New York), September 1943, p. 282.
[4] The New Republic (New York), March 13, 1944, p. 335.
[5] Guenther Stein, Christian Science Monitor, August 30, 1944.

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would be responsible for carrying out the united front. Neither of these arrangements was acceptable to the Kuomintang.

One of the questions most frequently asked about the guerrilla leaders is how closely they are tied to the Soviet Union. Intellectually, there is no doubt that they are highly sympathetic toward the Russians in outlook and purposes. In the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, considerable advice and aid were received from the U. S. S. R.—although it should be noted that this was also true of the Kuomintang, which, during 1924–7, relied heavily on Soviet support. Later on the Communists were located largely in the southern province of Kiangsi, ringed about by territory under Central control. When they reached the Northwest in 1935, they were closer to the U. S. S. R., but still were separated by some hundreds of miles of territory in which transport was ordinarily carried on by nothing better than a few caravan routes. Under the circumstances it appears unlikely that they received any significant aid from the Soviet Union after the late twenties.

For more than a decade and a half they have been essentially on their own, and have managed to survive and strengthen themselves despite civil conflict and Japanese aggression. In the course of the present war of resistance they have received virtually no outside aid Except for some materials delivered by the Central Government during 1937–9, small quantities of medicines from abroad, and a trickle of goods imported from Free China despite the blockade, everything they have they appear either to have made for themselves or to have seized from the enemy. In effect, they have been considerably less dependent on foreign assistance than has Chungking itself, for all outside supplies delivered to China, whether from the Soviet Union, the United States, or other countries, have gone to the Central Government. It is significant in this connection that at no time during the present war has the Central Government, or any Central spokesman, stated or even suggested that the guerrilla armies were receiving any foreign military aid.[6]

These facts point to a conclusion of supreme importance: that the Communists are deeply rooted in Chinese political life and that their political stability and power arise from inside China. They must be considered a native political force stemming from Chinese conditions—a force which will have to be dealt with by the Central Government regardless of the position taken by the Soviet Union on questions relating to China. Moreover, however great the sympathy Moscow may feel for the Chinese Communists, the Soviet Union is not alone in its current attitude toward them. The United States in the past year or two has exerted considerable pressure on Chungking to settle its differences with the Communists and achieve a united war effort. At the same time it must be recognized that, if the U. S. S. R. joins in the war against Japan and as a result establishes direct contacts with China's guerrilla armies, the latter will be greatly strengthened beyond their present considerable power.

The moderate, democratic domestic program that the Chinese Communists adopted in 1935–7 is a program to which they have adhered without important changes through all the succeeding vicissitudes of internal and international affairs, and despite all changes in the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the situation in China today presents this crucial issue: Will a coalition government be formed, with the Communists operating simply as a parliamentary left wing?

On such a basis China could look toward internal peace after the war, and the two or more political jurisdictions that exist in the country could be moulded into one, especially if unity at the center is combined with recognition of variety in the provinces. The fundamental problem, however, is one of democracy for the more democratic the National Government becomes, the less occasion will there be for Kuomintang-Communist conflict. That is why Michael Lindsay has suggested:[7]

"The risk of future civil strife depends very largely on the form of the post-war Chinese government. It might almost be said that the Central Government need only fear the existing (guerrilla) organization in North China if it intends to govern badly. A Central Government which tried to abolish democratic institutions and restore the former exploitation of the peasants by powerful landlords and money lenders working with corrupt officials would certainly meet with the universal opposition of the North China population and might well cause a civil war. On the other hand, a democratic government which confirmed and extended

[6] See, for example, T. V. Soong's statement about guerrillas, quoted on p. 139.
[7] Michael Lindsay, "The North China Front, Part II," Amerasia (New York), April 14, 1944, p. 125.

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the present reforms would find no reason for conflict. It would find no reason for conflict. It would find, in fact, that North China had changed from one of the most backward to one of the most progressive areas of China."

What is said here about North China applies with equal force to the entire question of unifying the nation, and what is said about the need for post-war democratic government also holds for government in war time. The unity of the future—or lack of it—is being shaped today and will not wait for decisions to be reached after the defeat of Japan.

CHINA CRISIS

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger)

[Pages 139–147]

CHAPTER IV—PART II—IN THE REAR OF THE ENEMY

The Communist-Led Eighteenth Group (formerly Eighth Route) and New Fourth Armies have played an essential part in preventing a Japanese victory during these past seven and a half years of war. Utilizing guerrilla tactics, they have kept Chinese authority alive in thousands of villages in the rear of the enemy. For, even though Japan long ago seized the key cities and main communications lines, large sections of the countryside remain in Chinese hands. Millions of citizens of the Chinese Republic have learned how to resist effectively, although completely surrounded by enemy forces.

It should not be thought that the Central Government has utterly failed to organize guerrilla warfare, but the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies have accounted for the bulk of effective guerrilla fighting. The area of these armies stretches from unoccupied territory in the Northwest (the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region) to Shantung province in the East, and from the mountains north of Peiping to the Yangtze River in Central China. The dividing line between the two forces is the Lunghai railway, cutting across North China from the coast south of Shantung. Above the railway lies the field of operations of the Eighteenth Group Army; below it, that of the New Fourth. Neither army holds any of the large cities, but their troops are found only a few miles from places like Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Tsinan, and Kalgan, all of which were lost years back in the first phase of the war.

Opinions have varied concerning the exact size of the Communist armies, but the number of troops undoubtedly has risen sharply during the war. Early in 1941 Sun Fo, a high Central Government official, spoke of 500,000 Communist troops but T. V. Soong, then Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of China, thought the total not over 250,000. In the spring of 1944 Theodore H. White of Life magazine declared that, according to the best information, there were between 200,000 and 300,000 in the Communist armies. In 1944 the Communists themselves estimated their regular forces at 470,000.

A force of from 200,000 to 470,000 Communist troops—taking White's minimum estimate and the Communist figure—would equal roughly from 7 to 16 percent of the Central armies, if these are set at 3,000,000 men. Superficially, this might suggest that the Communists are unimportant, were it not for several other factors. First of all, the number of persons below the level of the regular army, but assisting its operations in one way or another, probably runs into the millions. The Communists in 1944 claimed to have 2,200,000 guerrillas. Secondly, the Communist regulars are highly trained in the type of warfare they conduct and therefore are to be compared only with the best troops of the Chungking Government. Finally, the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies appear to be holding down a disproportionately high percentage of the Japanese troops in China.

There are no Central figures on the last point, but in September 1943 Mme. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the famous Chinese nationalist leader, wrote that "the guerrilla areas * * * are engaging and have engaged almost half of the Japanese forces in china." [1]

According to Theodore H. White, the Communists account for "perhaps 200,000 or more Japanese troops." [2]

[1] In Guerrilla China (Report of China Defense League, Chungking, published by China Aid Council of United China Relief, New York, 1944), p. 6.

[2] Theodore H. White, "Life Looks at China," Life (New York), May 1, 1944, p. 109.

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Since there are said to be approximately 600,000 Japanese soldiers in China, this would be at least one-third of the total. Moreover, both Chinese and foreign estimates of the regional distribution of the Japanese forces have generally assigned the largest number of divisions to the North China areas where the Eighteenth Group Army operates. Undoubtedly, the guerrilla achievement is an impressive one.

To these forces, it is important to recognize, war has been a natural condition not for seven and a half years, but more than twice as long. The first units of the Chinese Red Army, which ultimately evolved into the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies, were organized as far back as 1927. The regular and guerrilla forces have been fighting ever since—first against the troops of the old Nanking Government in Civil War, and since 1937 against the Japanese. Their only period of rest was in the year preceding war with Japan, when a state of undeclared peace generally existed with the Central forces.

In August 1937, after a period of negotiation, the Communist forces were reorganized into the Eighth Route Army under the authority of the National Military Council in Nanking. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as Chairman of the Council, confirmed the appointment of the existing commander, General Chu Teh, and vice commander, General Peng Teh-huai, to the same posts in the new army. Subsequently, the two Communist leaders announced that, with the support of the National Government, the Eighth Route Army had marched eastward to engage the enemy. In October, Nanking authorized the formation of a second force, to be known as the New Fourth Army, from Communist guerrillas who had operated in various parts of Central China during the civil war, and were still located there. On April 15, 1938, the New Forth Army was ordered to begin moving to the rear of the enemy for battle. Its first small victory was won with the destruction of four Japanese trucks south of Chinkiang, on June 16, 1938.

In the early years of the war the Eighth Route Army received from the Central Government enough money to pay three Central divisions of 15,000 men each. The New Fourth Army received much less. Both sums, although quite inadequate for the troops involved (since the size of the armies was underestimated and they expanded rapidly), were stretched unusually far. This was possible because the pay of the ordinary soldier in the guerrilla forces was one Chinese dollar a month, and the highest commander, Chu Teh, received five dollars a month—less than the pay of a Central private. Even in the initial period of resistance, aid from the Central Government was on a small scale, but in 1939–40 all pay and supplies of ammunition were cut off. At the same time, Chungking instituted a strict economic blockade described in a later chapter.[3]

The guerrillas have secured most of their war materials by seizing supplies from the Japanese. According to an official Eighteenth Group Army statement, from September 1937 to July 1942 the following arms, munitions, and equipment were captured from the enemy: 73 pieces of field artillery, 29 infantry guns, 2 pieces of antiaircraft artillery, 225 trench mortars, 257 heavy machine guns, 1,735 light machine guns, 95,782 rifles, 4,027 pistols, 352 signal guns, 861 bomb throwers, 9,923,347 rounds of small arms ammunition, 31,865 rounds of artillery ammunition, 108,222 hand grenades, 669 gas bombs, 3 airplanes, 73 automobiles and motorcycles, 8,379 trucks, 142 wireless transmitters, 939 telephone sets, 8,682 bicycles, 130 receiving sets, 12,925 steel helmets, 7,201 gas masks, 27,362 overcoats, and 55,121 army blankets. Not all of these supplies could be used by the guerillas—for example, airplanes—but the bulk consisted of items they could handle.

Captured materials are supplemented by the output of primitive arsenals, often located in the mountains and turning out, in the main, hand grenades and land mines. In a few of the best-equipped factories cartridges are made by refilling old cases. One observer saw a small field arsenal at the front that was producing a rifle a day from steel rails removed by the guerrillas from Japanese-controlled railways. But despite the seizure or production of equipment, the arms situation is serious—far more so than in the Chungking areas. A publication circulated by Eighteenth Group Army sources laments that "worn-out rifles cannot shoot accurately * * * bullets fall midway * * * soldiers have only a few rounds to shoot."[4]

The heart of guerrilla warfare in any country is mobilization of the people behind a political and economic program that advances their interests. This has

[3] See Part Three, Chapter 7, "Guerillas Under Blockade," pp. 202–5 below.
[4] North China Unconquered (no place, no publisher, June 1943), p. 11.

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been true in the underground military movements against the Nazis, and it is also true in China. The political features of the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Army program have already been noted, and the economic aspects will be discussed later on.[5] Here it will be in order, however, to describe some of the military characteristics of popular mobilization by the guerrillas.

First of all, enlistment is entirely voluntary, since guerrilla warfare cannot be based on compulsion, especially in a country like China, where the army has often had a bad reputation among the people. For lack of equipment, there is a waiting list of recruits in the Eighteenth Group Army area, and until they are called they receive part-time training. Through organizations of peasants, workers, merchants, women, and others, every effort is made to heighten the conviction among the people that they should participate personally in resistance and not view the war as spectators. School instruction, newspapers, mass meetings, songs, and plays are all employed to this end.

The following quotation from a guerrilla play, involving three peasants, suggests clearly the nature of the appeal:[6]

"Third farmer: Look at the People's Army! They don't take the harvest from us, and they even want to reduce the land tax and give us a better chance to live, so that we farmers will see better days.

"First farmer: That's a fact. That's true. They're the kind of people who really help us.

"Second farmer: When people do something to help us, it's up to us to do something too."

The play soon follows up the last point and explains how the peasants can help:[7]

"First farmer: How are we going to fight? We've only our bare fists. What are we going to fight with?

"Sergeant of the People's Army: You've all got something, right in your hand! Your hoes and rakes are not worse than our guns. (He lifts up his old gun to show it.) We'll surround the Japanese devils and fight them; you get behind and dig ditches and trenches so their lorries cannot retreat.

"All: Yes! Yes! Let's go home and get our shovels.

"Sergeant: Take what you've got right now! Use your saws to cut down their telephone posts. Use your axes to dig up railway tracks. Use your hoes to pull down telephone wires. And you? (Points to an empty-handed farmer.) You know the roads, so you can be our guide . . . .

"All: (All raise their weapons high in the air.) Good! Army and People! Forward together and fight it out with Japan! Take what you've got in your hand, and fight! Forward and fight the Japanese! They march off, with big strides.)"

No policy of winning popular cooperation could work, if the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies did not respect the rights and property of the people. This is one reason for the enforcement of three major and eight minor rules, most of which deal with the treatment of the civilian population:[8]

MAJOR RULES

"(1) Executive the anti-Japaneese patriotic principles.
"(2) Execute the instructions of higher leaders.
"(3) Do not take the smallest thing from the people."

MINOR RULES

"(1) Ask permission before entering a house. Before leaving thank the occupants for their courtesy, and ask them if they are satisfied with the condition of the house.
"(2) Keep the house clean.
"(3) Speak kindly to the people.
"(4) Pay for everything that you use, at the market price.
"(5) Return all borrowed articles.
"(6) Pay for all articles which the army has broken or destroyed.
"(7) Do not commit a nuisance (dig latrines).
"(8) Do not kill or rob the captives."

[5] For the economic program, see pp. 206–215.
[6] J. Clayton Miller, "The Drama in China's Anti-Japanese Propaganda," Pacific Affairs (New York), December 1938, p. 467.
[7] Ibid., p. 469.
[8] Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 36–7).

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The existence of these rules reflects the impression left by China's former war-lord armies, which often looted the villages they passed through and proved a plague to the people. Today any Chinese army that hopes for strong popular support must be careful to avoid actions reminiscent of the militarists.

The pattern of military organization contains four elements: the regular army, guerrillas, local militia, and village self-defense units. The large forces that constitute the core of the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies are known correctly as "regular" rather than "guerrilla" troops (although it has been found convenient to use the latter as an over-all term in this book). The regulars have a well-developed formal organization and are equipped with light and heavy machine guns and trench mortars. Below the regular army there are guerrilla detachments in the various districts. These are full time soldiers, less well equipped than the regulars. Below the guerrilla detachments, in turn, are the local militia—farmers with a few hand grenades, who harass the Japanese when they raid. And on the lowest level of all are the village self-defense units which aid the army as porters and guides and engage in intelligence work, furnishing the Chinese forces with the latest information on Japanese troop movements.

Relations between officers and men are reported to be close and friendly, and it is the opinion of many observers that the leaders of the Eighteenth Group Army are outstanding for their personal qualities, which show in their leadership. According to Colonel Carlson, who spent considerable time with the guerrilla forces in the early years of the war, "the high ranking leaders of the Eighth Route Army are distinguished by their honesty, frankness, humility, and intelligence." (9 Ibid., p. 39.) Later, Colonel Carlson sought to develop the same type of leadership among his own Marine Raiders, who engaged in guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines on Guadalcanal when American forces were fighting for that island.

The attitude of the guerrilla commanders is reflected in the active political training given their troops. Each company has a political leader, who is in charge of the education of the forces and seeks to develop their morale and understanding of the war. Before every action a meeting of the troops is held, at which the commander explains the purpose of the engagement and other related matters. Afterwards mistakes are discussed at another meeting. Emphasis is constantly placed on the soldiers' thoroughly grasping the meaning of what is being done as well as their own function in the war. It could hardly be otherwise, for guerrilla activity places a premium on the intelligence and initiative of the individual fighting man.

The guerrillas, generally outnumbering the enemy, have sought to hit at his flanks and rear, to cut his communications, and to engage in night rather than day attacks. The practice in retreat has been to destroy everything that might be of value to advancing Japanese troops. However, it would be an error to think of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies as restricting themselves to "hit-and-run" operations by small guerrilla bands. The regular army units frequently carry out coordinated actions, involving thousands of men for several weeks at a time, and even engage in positional warfare of short duration.

All these methods, applied with striking ingenuity, have enabled the guerrillas to meet the enemy successfully. The effect is to harass the invaders, prevent consolidation of their positions, and keep China actively in the struggle. Guerrilla leaders have never had the illusion that their tactics could be decisive in bringing about Japan's defeat, but have always regarded such operations simply as one important phase of a strategy of protracted war. In urging such a strategy—and they were among the first to do so—they made it clear from the outset that, if victory was to be won, the guerrilla stage would have to lead to a final stage in which China would be strong enough and have enough foreign aid to launch a continuing counter-offensive, and engage in considerable positional fighting.

For their resistance to the Japanese the guerrillas, like the Central troops, have paid a heavy price, and the enemy has struck at them time after time in bitter offensives. In spite of this, the Eighteenth Group and New Fourth Armies have carried on effectively. Undoubtedly the guerrillas would be still more active if the Chungking blockade were removed and they did not have to bear in mind the possibility of a Central attack. In any event, it is impossible to study the record of these armies and not conclude that, without their resistance, China's struggle probably would have ended in defeat many years ago. For, despite strained internal relations, the guerrillas have provided an indispensable complement to the Central forces in China's fight for survival, and have served to stiffen their country's spirit of resistance.

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[See page 2496 for discussion regarding the following]

Excerpts From The State of Asia

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates)

[Pages 34 through 44]

Events in the fall of 1945 suggested that Chiang Kai-shek was not in a position to defeat the Communists in civil war. It is true that during the opening phase of the renewed conflict the Central Government added to its wartime territory the area of southeast China, the lower Yangtze-Valley, most of the large cities, and footholds in north China. But the Communists sent forces into Manchuria, considerably expanded their control of rural north China, including most of Shantung Province, and took over some important cities. In this process the Central armies suffered several defeats, although they retained a marked over-all superiority to the Communist troops in number and equipment.

While aiding the Kuomintang, the United States remained interested in the possibility of achieving a Kuomintang-Communist peace agreement. Late in August 1945 Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley was instrumental in bringing about a trip by Mao Tse-tung from Yenan to Chungking for talks with Chiang Kai-shek, but a subsequent agreement on principles in October did not stop the civil war. This was a period of growing concern over China within the United States Government. While some officials wished to give Chiang much stronger support, the dominant reaction was one of caution. There was a feeling that, in view of the many serious economic and other problems he faced, the Generalissimo was overanxious for a military solution and careless about the danger of overextending his forces.

Toward the end of November 1945 Ambassador Hurley, a proponent of large-scale aid to Chungking, resigned, and the President named General George C. Marshall as a special envoy to China. On December 15, in a statement that was part of the new envoy's instructions, the President called for a cessation of hostilities in China, an early unification conference of China's "major political elements," the broadening of the National Government through "fair and effective representation" of other groups, and the integration of autonomous armies into the Chinese National Army. "United States support," he said, "will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife," and he suggested that American military and economic aid would be conditioned on China's moving "toward peace and unity." [1]

In late December 1945 the United States, the U. S. S. R., and Britain agreed at Moscow on "the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife." [2]

The available evidence indicates that both this statement and the earlier declaration by President Truman were in keeping with majority sentiment among politically conscious Chinese who, like the rest of their countrymen, earnestly desired a peaceful solution of internal differences.

On January 10, 1946, with General Marshall as a mediator, the Nationalists and Communists reached a cease-fire agreement, to take effect on January 13. A Political Consultative Conference of the Kuomintang, Chinese Communist party, Democratic League, and other elements, meeting in Chungking during January 10–31, adopted a unity accord providing for a coalition regime as a transition to constitutional government. China's armies were to be reorganized and nationalized, civil liberties protected, and reforms introduced in agriculture, industry, and education. The Kuomintang was assigned a preponderant position in the government and army, but the Communists seemed to have an assurance that their local administrations would not be destroyed. On February 25 the Kuomintang and the Communist party agreed that a sixty-division national army (composed of fifty Kuomintang and ten Communist divisions) would be created over a period of eighteen months.

The hopes raised in China by the Marshall mission were not realized, although many Chinese and Americans worked strenuously to achieve peace. The bitterness and suspicion between the two main Chinese parties were great, and neither

[1] Text in United States Relations with China (Washington, D. C., Department of State, 1949), pp. 607–9.

[2] Text in Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner (eds.): Documents on American Foreign Relations (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1948), Vol. VIII, pp. 829–30.

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trusted the other. Military violations of the truce later occurred on both sides, but the weeks immediately following the conclusion of the agreements were the decisive period for their success or failure. It was at this time that the rightists took the initiative against the peace accords by carrying out what General Marshall subsequently called "quite evidently inspired mob actions" [3] and by seeking important changes in the agreed terms.

The Chinese Communists, according to the American envoy, did not at that time appear irreconcilable.[4] On the whole, they were extremely careful to avoid being held responsible by Chinese opinion if the agreements broke down. They seemed acutely conscious of the long-term value of this approach in influencing the middle group, which in general regarded peace as its only hope of real survival. Some Kuomintang leaders—for example, Shao Li-tze and Chang Chih-chung, two of the government's peace negotiators—favored maximum efforts to make the agreements work. But the dominant Kuomintang elements apparently misjudged both the difficulties of winning a civil war and the extent of the commitment the United States would undertake in China. Although Washington's threat to deny aid had served to insure conclusion of the unity agreements, the rightists, including powerful military and political figures, did not believe that the United States would set sharp limits to its aid if the Central government was hard pressed during a military conflict. They also tended to believe that American-Soviet tension would grow and perhaps lead to an early third world war in which Kuomintang China would be an ally of the United States. Such considerations far outweighed all private words of caution from American representatives, especially since American aid continued, and in some ways expanded, during the crucial first half of 1946, in which the Political Consultative Conference pacts broke down irreparably.

Manchuria was a key area of conflict, and an especially complicated one because of the presence of Soviet forces, which had engaged Japan's Manchurian army for a brief period after the Soviet declaration of war on Japan in August 1945. In the winter of 1945–6 several Chinese-Soviet disputes developed, as differences emerged over the status of the Dairen-Port Arthur area and it became known that the U. S. S. R. had removed an important segment of Japanese machinery from Manchuria as "war booty." In addition, Soviet forces occupied various nontreaty areas in Manchuria for some weeks beyond the final withdrawal date of February 1, 1946. (The Russians were originally to leave by December 1, 1945, but at the request of Chungking, which was not in a position to take over, the date was twice extended—first to January 1 and then to February 1.)

The Chinese Communists undoubtedly benefitted from the presence of the Russians in Manchuia, for the Kuomintang was hampered by the timing of Soviet withdrawals and by Moscow's refusal, under its interpretation of the 1945 treaty, to allow Nationalist troops to enter the region by way of Dairen. The Russians apparently also played a part, directly or indirectly, in the acquisition of surrendered Japanese military equipment by the Communists.

It should be noted, however, that in many places outside the larger cities the Chinese Communist forces themselves effected the surrender of Japanese troops. Despite the Soviet actions, the Chinese Communists were considered by most expert observers to be fundamentally dependent on themselves for their material resources.

General Marshall, for example, privately warned high Central officials in September 1946 that, if the civil war deepened, the Communists might "be driven to seek and be dependent upon outside support, such as Russian aid"—a statement that would have been pointless if Yenan had been thought to be relying on Soviet help.[5]

In January 1947 he stated publicly that he knew of no evidence that the Chinese Communists were being supported by Russia.[6]

Again, in October 1947, Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart reported that there was "little if any evidence of material assistance from Moscow." [7]

These impressions were reinforced, as the civil war mounted in intensity, by the increasing Communist use of American equipment taken from Nationalist troops.

Meanwhile, a basic feature of the postwar period was making itself felt: the reaction of the Chinese people in the Kuomintang and Communist areas to the

[3] Statement of January 7, 1947, in United States Relations with China, p. 687.
[4] Ibid., p. 688.
[5] Quoted from the official United States paraphrase of Marshall's remarks, ibid., p. 187.
[6] New York Times, January 12, 1947.
[7] United States Relations with China, p. 832.

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kind of government they were living under. The Kuomintang was at first welcomed in the cities it took over from the Japanese. The problems of postwar reconstruction were considerable, but despite shipping shortages, railway damage, inflation, the need to restore domestic trade, and other problems, the situation had favorable aspects. The government's gold and foreign exchange reserves totaled more than nine hundred million U. S. dollars at the end of 1945; much of the wartime damage to economic facilities could be repaired in a fairly short period; and extensive industrial properties were inherited from Japan. What the economy needed to make these assets effective was peace, accompanied by increased revenues and a cut in military expenses.

Popular disillusionment set in as officials proved corrupt and prices soared. Private industry suffered from the unstable economy, as well as from the privileged position of government enterprises. The Central budget, devoted mostly to military items, was increasingly unbalanced. There was no land reform, the peasant bore a continuing burden of conscription, and the armies consumed food needed by the cities. The cutting of railways by the Communists and the separation of the northern Nationalist-held cities from the food and raw materials of the Communist-held countryside were also extremely important in adding to the problems of the Kuomintang.

Because the Kuomintang was generally believed to have taken the initiative in resuming civil conflict, and because conditions in its territory were so unsatisfactory, the politically conscious section of the urban middle class, especially the intellectuals of Shanghai and Peiping, became ever sharper in their criticism. The Kuomintang's principal answer was repression and use of the secret police. A new constitution was adopted late in 1946 and other reforms were announced at intervals, but the grim realities of Chinese life remained unchanged.

At the same time the Chinese Communists were carrying forward under postwar conditions the policies they had developed during the war. As before, life was not easy in their areas: much fighting took place in Communist-controlled territory in 1946–7; the armies had to be fed; the countryside was isolated from the cities; and excesses were sometimes committed. But the local and regional governments tried to minimize these problems by keeping expenses low (the entire officialdom, including Mao, lived on an austere economic level), by distributing the tax burden approximately according to wealth, and by engaging in extensive political indoctrination to maintain morale.

The theme of the Communists' land program changed from rent reduction to large redistribution: the landlords were reduced to a peasant status, and their expropriated land was parcelled out among millions of landless and land-poor peasants. The surplus land of many "rich peasants" (a category of peasant just below the landlord level) was also taken. In this explosive process much violence was used against landlords, and policy was sometimes applied so indiscriminately as to affect ordinary peasants. Alarmed at reports of the alienation of many "middle peasants" (who were neither to receive expropriated land nor to lose any of their existing land), the Communist leadership in late 1947 and early 1948 warned the party's rural personnel to curb the tendency toward excesses. The main long-term effect of the program was to create a landed peasantry under Communist auspices in large areas of Manchuria and north China, as well as in parts of central China. The existence of this new peasantry, with an economic stake in its government, strengthened the position of the Communists in the civil war.

The Communist formula for attaining and expanding power had long included three elements: the party, the army, and a "united front" with various "revolutionary classes" (especially the workers and peasants). The party machine, operating from village and town cells up to the level of the National Congress and Central Committee (with the Political Bureau as its nucleus), was an efficient, disciplined, highly indoctrinated organization. Its leaders and many of its ordinary members displayed an iron sense of dedication to a cause.

The army—originally named the Chinese Red Army, then the Eighth Route (or Eighteenth Group) and New Fourth armies during the war with Japan, and later the People's Liberation Army—was also efficient, disciplined, and indoctrinated. One American observer wrote of it early in 1949:[8]

The Communist Liberation Army is a unique fighting organization which owes its successes more to its leadership, its morale, and its contact with the people that to its material strength. The Nationalists have often shown in their better days that they could fight as bravely as the Communists, but they

[8] A. T. Steele, New York Herald Tribune, May 18, 1949.

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have never been able to match the adaptability of the Reds to the peculiar conditions of warfare in China.

The "united front" policy involved an appeal not only to the peasants, but also to labor, the intelligentsia, and even sections of the Chinese business community. The Communists devoted careful efforts to winning the support of, or at least neutralizing as many members of, these groups as possible. Over the years, thousands of intellectuals were trained as organizers of the peasantry—a combination of tiller and scholar which was new in Chinese politics. The Taiping Rebellion, while arousing the peasants, had been opposed by the scholars; Sun Yat-sen had aroused the intellectuals, while making little impression on the countryside. The combination of both elements constituted a powerful force.

It would be hard to overemphasize the political importance of the Kuomintang's loss of the intelligentsia, which had traditionally wielded great influence in China. Frustrated in their hopes for national reconstruction, and harassed politically and economically, many liberal scholars, writers, and artists came to feel that they had nothing to look forward to under the Nationalists, but would, or might, have a future under the Communists. They realized that the Communist areas followed a monolithic doctrine and restricted civil liberties. But the liberals also observed that the Communists, unlike the Kuomintang, actively encouraged certain forms of criticism of the workings of government, and knew how to combine their own predominant leadership with an ability to work in coalition with others. To many members of the middle group the alternatives seemed increasingly to be a sterile Chinese anti-Communism and a Chinese Communism that perhaps offered a way out. Ideally they would have preferred a constructive non-Communism, but this hardly existed in practical Chinese politics.

American opinion tended increasingly to see China largely as a factor in the "cold war." But most politically conscious Chinese shrank from this approach, fearing that their country would become a battleground in a new world conflict. American and Soviet preferences carried little weight with them; and even to the intellectuals, ideology was usually not the crucial factor in choosing between Chiang and Mao. It is also worth remembering that—particularly as a result of the Kuomintang-Soviet-Chinese Communist alliance of 1924–7—the Sun Yat-sen type of philosophy characteristic of the middle group contained Marxist features as well as liberal Western and other elements.

In its traditional stronghold—its leadership of Chinese nationalism—the Kuomintang also lost prestige. Its heavy reliance on aid, or the hope of aid, from an outside power, the United States, was an aspect of this development. Moreover, nationalism meant to the Chinese not only the existence of a national government, but its effective operation for purposes of national construction. No government that failed in this domestic work could long satisfy the nationalistic spirit.

During the civil war of 1946–9, Chinese leftists and Communists unceasingly denounced the Central government as subservient to the United States. These attacks fell on fertile soil in intellectual and other middle class circles. On March 18, 1948, the American Embassy in Nanking (which had again become the national capital after the war) reported that "the slow increase of anti-American sentiment in the country is noteworthy" and referred to "a common conviction * * * that the Generalissimo is, in fact, leading the country to ruin and chaos, and that he could not do so if it were not for the support which the American Government has given him."[9]

The trends just described were a crystallization of many day-to-day developments in the civil war and China's international relations. During the months after it launched its military campaign in the summer of 1946 the Kuomintang won victories, adding to its territory most of the Communist-held cities, as well as sections of the Communists' rural areas. In March 1947 Yenan fell. But the Communists did not, as in 1927 and 1934–5, suffer a basic defeat and the Central government failed to reach what must have been its minimum goal: effective control of the north China railway network.

The strategy of the Communists was not to concentrate on holding territory, but to try to inflict to the Kuomintang much greater losses in men and equipment than they themselves suffered. For its territorial success of 1946–7 the Central government paid a high price. In the spring of 1947 the Communists took the offensive, and in the summer their troops struck across the Yellow River into central China. The Kuomintang never regained the initiative, but resorted to

[9] Message to the Department of State in United States Relations with China, p. 906.

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the defense of fortified strong points, which the Communists bottled up and later took one by one.

American policy toward China also passed through various phases. In January 1947 General Marshall left China to become secretary of state, after issuing a public statement on the failure of his mediation efforts.[10]

He described as the chief obstacle to peace "the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other." In the Kuomintang he found "a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government." They had, he said, "evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions."

General Marshall criticized sharply the Communists' attacks on American policy, their refusal to join the constitutional assembly held late in 1946, and the "radicals" among them, whom he viewed as seeking the Central government's collapse, "without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people." But in addition to the "radicals," he felt there was "a definite liberal group * * * especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments." His conclusion was that "the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties" should assume leadership under Chiange in an effort to attain "unity through good government."

During 1947 war weariness became widespread in Kuomintang China. In February one of a series of economic crises occurred. Late that month and in March a non-Communist revolt erupted on Formosa, mainly as a result of local resentment at maladministration by officials sent from the mainland. The uprising was broken by the indiscriminate shooting down of thousands of Formosan Chinese. In April, largely in response to American pressure, cabinet changes took place in the Central government. Ambassador Stuart, who wished to help rejuvenate the government by encouraging the relatively liberal elements in the Kuomintang, noted that the extreme right wing was still dominant in the party. In May a new economic crisis was accompanied by rice riots, strikes, and student demonstrations. In October 1947 the government banned the Democratic League.

Since the war American military and economic aid to the Central government had taken such forms as postwar lend-lease, the transfer of surplus property and naval vessels, Export-Import Bank credits, and a preponderant American share in the funds of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Out of a total UNRRA expenditure of $658,400,000 in China during 1945–47, the American share constituted $474,000,000. In July 1947, when the Central government was clearly in serious difficulties, President Truman sent to China (and Korea) an investigating mission headed by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had once served in China as General Stilwell's successor. Wedemeyer issued a scathing public statement about the need for reform and, in a secret, official report[11] that was later published, proposed far-reaching military and economic aid to the Nationalists, extensive reforms, and the appointment of American advisers to supervise use of the aid.

The Wedemeyer mission stimulated the continuing American debate on China policy. Two principal and closely connected issues were these: Whether or how to give the Nationalists further aid, and how much importance to attach to reform in judging the China situation. These questions were examined within an international framework of growing American-Soviet tension, and increasingly the main theme of China policy was Russia rather than China.

The Wedemeyer report asked, in essence, that the United States assume direction of the Kuomintang's civil-war effort.[12] In view of Chinese Communist strength, this meant undertaking a commitment of indefinable duration, scope, and cost. China would at once become a major area of American cold-war strategy, and the preponderant American emphasis on Europe would inevitably be affected. The prevailing view in Washington was that the United States would be overcommitting its strength if it tried to act on the same scale in Asia as in Europe; that Asia's temper and stage of development made it desirable to avoid any deep American involvement in unstable situations there; and that

[10] For text, see ibid., pp. 686–9.
[11] For text, see ibid., pp. 764–814.
[12] See Walter Lippmann: "The White Paper: Wedemeyer and Marshall," New York Herald Tribune, September 8, 1949.

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Europe came first because its industry was the decisive element of modern economic power outside the United States and the Soviet Union. In Asia, moreover, Washington regarded Japan as its major military position and thought largely in terms of island bases for air and naval power rather than of continental positions.

Excerpts From the State of Asia

(By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates)

[Pages 86–95]

In the fall of 1949 the various states in the Soviet bloc recognized Peking. In December 1949, Burma become the first non-Communist government to extend recognition, followed shortly by India and, early in January 1950, by Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Ceylon. By the end of September 1950, formal relations existed with seventeen governments, including Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Vietnam (the government of Ho Chi Minh), and the U. S. S. R. Nine other countries—Afghanistan, Ceylon, Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia—had expressed the desire to exchange representatives. Of these, four—Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom—were then conducting negotiations with Peking on the subject.

During the Chinese civil war Britain had avoided committing itself to the Kuomintang and had tried to keep the door open to dealing with a successor regime. Consequently, despite certain incidents, British contacts with the Chinese People's Republic lacked the background of intense suspicion and conflict existing between Washington and Peking. According to Chou En-lai, however, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Britain had been delayed because of Britain's refusal to vote against the Kuomintang's holding China's seat in the United Nations. Britain's position was that it would vote to admit Peking, if the resolution were assured of a majority. At the same time it took a stand favorable to Peking on certain United Nations issues other than recognition. These actions presumably reflected an effort to reconcile a policy of recognition with a desire to avoid voting against the United States on the question of seating Peking in the United Nations.

Britain was desperately anxious to expand its trade all over the world, including China, in which it had a great investment stake, especially at Shanghai. It also possessed the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, consisting of an island off the south China coast near Canton and a small portion of the adjacent mainland. One of the leading ports of the world, Hong Kong contained huge amounts of British capital. Its population of 1,800,000 was overwhelmingly Chinese, and it was regarded by Chinese nationalists of all shades as rightfully part of China, from which the land had been wrested in the nineteenth century. Strained relations with the Peking government might endanger Britain's investments in China, the British position at Hong Kong, or—at a greater distance—Britain's "dollar arsenal" in Malaya, which contained a large overseas Chinese population and a dissident, predominately Chinese guerrilla movement.

British opinion about China was much more unified than American opinion. The British tended to believe that they could do business with Chinese Communism, which they considered an almost inevitable result of Kuomintang misrule and an internal improvement on Chiang's regime. They felt strongly that the West had nothing to gain from voluntary enmity toward the Chinese People's Republic, since this would merely serve to cement the Chinese-Soviet alliance. They also placed China in a different category from Eastern Europe on the ground that China had a distinctive social structure, economic development, and national tradition, and that the Chinese Communists had come to power essentially through their own efforts. China, in their view, was a country that could—unlike Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia—aspire to the status of a great power. The effect, according to many English observers, was to promote an equal rather than a subservient Chinese Communist approach to Russia. The British did not know what the future might bring, but they considered it wise to encourage such a Chinese attitude.

After the application of blockade measures by the Kuomintang, Britain rather early used warships to escort its commercial vessels in Chinese waters. While

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not formally recognizing the blockade, the United States, by contrast, accepted it in practice. In December 1949, for example, Washington warned American ship captains that they might lose their masters' licenses if they took American vessels into Shanghai waters. Again, the British wished a largely unrestricted trade with China, but the United States increasingly imposed a wide range of restrictions on strategic commodities. In this respect Britain's China trade policy gradually followed that of the United States, especially after the outbreak of the Korean war.

Early in 1949 American businessmen in China, like the British, were reported interested in trying to operate under the Communists. This attitude continued for many months, although it was somewhat affected by the beginnings of the blockade, labor disputes in Shanghai in the summer of 1949, and other questions. With the tightening of the blockade, the worsening of American-Chinese relations, and the introduction of heavy business taxes by Peking, a decidedly pessimistic attitude developed among American businessmen. Peking desired and needed trade, but its approach to foreign firms was one of marked independence. With no great investment stake in China and various economic alternatives at home, many American companies were in a position to withdraw.

In August 1949, following the fall of the Kuomintang Washington published an official defense of its China policy, especially, in the 1944–9 period. Entitled United States Relations with China, and known informally as the China "White Paper," this volume, based on State Department files, aroused extensive comment and controversy. Its main thesis was that the United States gave the Nationalists extensive advice that was ignored and aid that was wasted, and that nothing the United States "did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed" the outcome in China. Total American aid to the Kuomintang since VJ-day was estimated at slightly more than two billion dollars in military and economic grants, plus civilian and military surplus property costing more than one billion and sold at $232,000,000.

The main State Department tendency during 1949 was to "wait for the dust to settle" in China. According to this view, recognition might ultimately come, but the timing would depend on American politics and Chinese policies. Meanwhile, as the magnitude of China's internal problems became clear, Peking would perhaps soften its attitude toward the United States, in the hope of obtaining aid. If at the same time the United States avoided major new commitments to the Kuomintang, Chinese anti-American sentiment might lessen, Chinese attention might shift to elements of friction in relations with the U. S. S. R. (e. g., over Manchuria, Mongolia, or Sinkiang), and the result might be a form of Chinese Titoism.

According to a powerful contrary view, held by sections of the Administration, of Congress (especially in Republican ranks), and the press, the Chinese People's Republic was simply a moscow satellite, the hope of Titoism was illusion, Peking should be denied recognition or admission to the United Nations, trade with it should be kept to a minimum, and the United States should undertake to keep Formosa in non-Communist hands. Supporters of this general approach, including General MacArthur, also tended to desire a much greater or even a primary emphasis on the Far East in American Foreign policy, as contrasted with the existing preponderant emphasis on Europe.

While the two approaches can be isolated for purposes of analysis, actual policy combined them in a complex fashion reflecting domestic and international pressures. The State Department was more willing than its opposition to think of finally recognizing Peking, but at the same time American official influence worked against early recognition by other countries. Again, the President and secretary of state early in 1950 declared firmly that the United States would not intervene in Formosa, but American aid continued to go to the Kuomintang on Formosa.

In the spring and summer of 1949 the Communists showed signs of desiring relations with the United States, and on October 1, 1949, the Chinese People's Republic asked the United States, along with other governments, to extend recognition. But relations hardened, perhaps particularly after the Kuomintang blockade and bombings, which Peking charged were American-inspired. Several incidents in China also had a marked effect in the United States. In October, for example, the American Consul in Mukden was arrested and imprisoned on the charge of beating a Chinese employee. After trial and conviction he was deported. Early in 1950 Peking's seizure of a section of American consular prop-

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erty in the capital was followed by the withdrawal of all American consular personnel from the Chinese mainland.[1]

Formosa became a major issue between the United States and Peking. At the Cairo conference in 1943 and at Potsdam in 1945 it had been agreed that this island, which had been Chinese territory under the Manchu dynasty, but had been lost to Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, should be returned to China after the war. This was done following the Japanese surrender.

The Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang were as one in declaring Formosa Chinese territory. The Kuomintang hoped to maintain itself on the island and from it eventually to invade the mainland with American support. The Communists saw Formosa as the last Nationalist refuge, whose incorporation (together with Tibet) would end the civil war, the blockade, and the threat of Nationalist bombings, as well as the Kuomintang itself. They also declared that victory on Formosa would permit the launching of a full peacetime economy in China.

Chiang withdrew to Formosa in December 1949 and on March 1, 1950, formally resumed the presidency of Nationalist China. On Formosa he had an army of about half a million men, as well as a considerable refugee population of former mainland officials and Kuomintang supporters. The normal population of Formosa consisted of approximately seven million persons, mostly Chinese long settled there. Japan had carried out a degree of modern development for its own imperial purposes, but industry and mining had deteriorated markedly since 1945. The population was reported hostile to the Kuomintang because of misrule and the bloody suppression of the 1947 Formosa uprising. But in 1950 the Kuomintang was trying to rehabilitate itself with the local population; for example, through land reforms.[2]

Located on important communications routes, Formosa also possessed two good harbors and space for good airfields. Its political instability and severe potential economic problems, however, affected its military value in Kuomintang hands. Observers doubted that Chiang could hold it if Peking acquired the air power to protect troop ships sent from the mainland. It was evident that, with Soviet aid, Peking was developing an air force, and by the summer of 1950 rumors of an early campaign for Formosa were widespread.

On January 5, 1950, in an effort to settle sharp official differences on the subject, President Truman declared that the United States had accepted Chinese authority over Formosa, had no designs on the island, and would not follow a course leading to involvement in the Chinese civil war, or give military aid or advice to the Nationalists on Formosa.[3]

On the same day Secretary Acheson commented on the view that Formosa was legally Japanese territory until the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty.[4]

The Chinese have administered Formosa for 4 years. Neither the United States nor any other ally ever questioned that authority. * * * We did not wait for a treaty on the islands over which we have trusteeship.

The policy enunciated by the President went counter to the views of General MacArthur and to statements made a few days before by ex-President Hoover and Senator Taft, advocating use of the American Navy, if necessary, to keep the Chinese Communists from taking Formosa.

The utterances by Truman and Acheson did not end the official debate and Formosa. Early in June 1950, with the visit of several high American officials to General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, a strong trend toward a shift in policy was indicated, although the decision apparently remained to be made. The Korean war crystallized the situation, and on June 27 the President announced that Chinese Communist occupation of Formosa "would be a direct

[1] The property taken over had been assigned to the United States following the Boxer Rebellion and had once been used as a military barracks, but later converted to office use. Peking also took over similar French, Dutch, and British property, but the respective governments did not follow the United States in its action. The former Russian military cantonment was returned to China in 1950 under a clause of the Chinese-Soviet treaty of February 14, 1950 (see p. 85, above).

[2] The Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, set up under the 1948 congressional appropriation for China, was important in this connection.

[3] He stated that economic aid would continue. During 1950 Economic Cooperation Administration aid to Formosa exceeded the total taxes collected by the Chinese Nationalist government on the island.

[4] Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1950, p. 80.

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threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces" in that region.[5] He added:

"Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."

This represented a significant, although not complete, incorporation into policy of the views of General MacArthur about Formosa. Soon afterward, as north Korean forces advanced rapidly in south Korea, Washington became concerned at the possibility of involvement in hostilities with China either in Korea or Formosa. Moreover, much Indian and other Asian opinion was opposed to the Formosan policy of the United States, and London indicated that it intended to stay out of any conflict if Peking launched operations to take the island.

The President declared to Congress on July 19 that "military neutralization" of Formosa was "without prejudice to political questions affecting that island."[6]

At the end of the month MacArthur arrived in Formosa for conferences with Chiang and other Kuomintang leaders. Late in August, in a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he declared Formosa strategically essential to the United States. Referring to various islands under American or friendly control, he said: "From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific."[7]

On an order from the President, MacArthur asked the Veterans of Foreign Wars to withdraw the statement, but it had already been distributed. A White House spokesman said that the purpose of the order had been to avoid confusion about policy in Formosa, and that in foreign policy there could be only one voice, that of the President.

The United States viewed Peking's policies with increasing suspicion. At the same time Peking's reaction to American policy, both in Formosa and Korea, was vehement. On June 29 Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai denounced the Formosan action as "armed aggression against the territory of China" and declared his government's determination to "liberate Taiwan (Formosa)."[8]

Again, on July 6, he sent a sharp protest to United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie. Later in the month an "Anti-American Aggression Week" was held in China, and Peking subsequently asked the Security Council to order the withdrawal of American forces from Formosa.

The issue of China's representation in the United Nations has been under international discussion for many months. Late in 1949 Peking had asked for the expulsion of the Kuomintang delegates and its own admission to the organization. In January 1950, following the defeat of a Soviet proposal for the ouster of the Nationalist representative in the Security Council, the Soviet delegate had launched a boycott of the Council, which continued until the August session. The declared American position was one of opposition to seating Peking, but willingness to accept a majority vote of the Council as not subject to a veto. American opposition, however, clearly deterred a number of United Nations members from voting for admission, although they regarded continued Kuomintang representation as at least unrealistic. Five of the eleven members of the Security Council—half the membership apart from Nationalist China—had already recognized Peking.[9]

In March 1950 Secretary-General Lie began to press for a settlement of the question as essential to the functioning and progress of the United Nations organization. Later, in July 1950, the Indian government, through Prime Minister Nehru, sought unsuccessfully to bring about Peking's admission as a prelude to discussion of a Korean settlement.

Some divisions of the north Korean armies were reported to consist of Korean troops that had once been part of the Chinese Communist armies in the civil

[5] Ibid., July 3, 1950, p. 5.
[6] Ibid., July 31, 1950, p. 166.
[7] U. S. News and World Report (Washington, D. C.), September 1, 1950, p. 32.
[8] People's China, July 16, 1950, p. 4.
[9] The recognizing Security Council members were: India, Norway, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R. The other Council members were: Australia, (Nationalist) China, Canada, Ecuador, Egypt, and the United States.
For details of United Nations aspects of the situation, see the chapter: The Korean Crisis and the United Nations.

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war and had later returned to Korea. But during the summer of 1950 there seemed to be no evidence of Chinese involvement in Korea with men or materials. There was much speculation in the United States as to whether Moscow might persuade Peking to act in Korea. The issue, however, was not simply one of ideology or general Communist strategy, since Manchuria bordered on Korea and depended for some of its electric power on facilities located on the Korean side of the frontier. Korea had also been used by Japan as an invasion route to China. In this connection a thoughtful American commentator, Walter Lippmann, noted "the critical importance of Korea in the foreign policy of any Chinese government, no matter what its ideology," and added that "in its geography Korea is to China what Florida is to the United States." [10]

When the Korean war began, the new Chinese government was less than nine months old, and its problems were enormous. It was only on the assumption of peace that the various plans for the country's economic development over a period of years could have made sense when they were drafted. Liu Shao-chi, for example, had declared on May 1, 1950, with reference to the projected incorporation of Tibet, Formosa, and some coastal islands then held by the Kuomintang: [11]

After the end of the war and the unification of the whole country, we shall urgently need a peaceful environment to carry out our economic construction.

The Chinese did not enter the Korean war in July and August 1950, when their presence might have resulted in a north Korean victory, or make an effort to save the north Korean forces south of the 38th parallel after the landings at Inchon in the north Korean rear in September. Official Indian sources voiced the view, based on reports from the Indian ambassador in Peking, that a crossing of the parallel by United Nations forces might be followed by Chinese action in Korea. The decision, however, was to launch operations in north Korea, apparently on the assumption that China would not intervene. In a speech on September 30, 1950, shortly before south Korean troops marched north of the parallel, Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese would not "supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded." [12] In mid-October, as soldiers under General MacArthur's command moved close to the Manchurian-Korean frontier, Chinese forces appeared in the Korean war. Within a few weeks it was evident that they were present in significant numbers.

With the sharpening of the international crisis, China's foreign relations moved into a new phase. Peking wielded a power not previously known to the Kuomintang. Action in Korea was one aspect of the situation; the entrance of Chinese troops into Tibet was another; rumors of Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese forces of Ho Chi Minh in Indochina possibly indicated a third. Peking was undoubtedly operating in close association with Moscow under the Chinese-Soviet alliance. But in its own right China plainly had become a greater force in Far Eastern affairs than at any time in the previous century.

[10] Walter Lippmann: China's Interest in Korea, New York Herald Tribune, August 29. 1950.
[11] People's China, May 16, 1950, Supplement, p. 7.
[12] Ibid., October 16, 1950, p. 7.

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you swear the witness?

Senator FERGUSON. You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. GELFAN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HARRIET MOORE GELFAN, NEW HAVEN, CONN., ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID REIN, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, witnesses before this committee, notably Hede Massing, Elizabeth Bentley, and Louis Budenz, have testified you were a member of the Communist Party. Were you as a matter of fact a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. GELFAN. I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a citizen of the United States?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And as such you realize the importance of this committee's work in trying to ascertain facts on the question of subversion in government and subversion in the United States?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. While I do not want to try and unduly persuade you to answer these questions, but as an American citizen appreciating the importance of this, is there any way that you can help us, that you feel that you can help us and not have to claim this privilege?

Mrs. GELFAN. I shall answer all those questions I feel I can answer, sir.

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Senator FERGUSON. You feel that under the circumstances, notwithstanding the importance to the country, that you cannot answer that question because of the constitution?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And your answer may tend to incriminate you.

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, was your maiden name Harriet Moore?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. As Harriet Moore, were you ever secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I was acting secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. At what time?

Mrs. GELFAN. It was in the second half of 1943, until the spring of 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you succeed in the position of secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I succeeded Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in turn succeeded by whom?

Mrs. GELFAN. Mr. Dennett.

Mr. MORRIS. So you in the interim were acting between Mr. Lockwood and Mr. Dennett?

Mr. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you chairman of the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations under the name of Harriet Moore?

Mrs. GELFAN. I believe I was, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. For the years 1941 and 1942?

Mrs. GELFAN. As I recall it, those are the years, but I believe you have the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time the national officers in 1941 of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I find that has already been introduced as exhibit 60.

Senator FERGUSON. Can we not refer to it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. This shows that Harriet Moore was a member of the board of trustees, was a member of the executive committee, and was chairman of the nominating committee in the year 1941. As I say, that has been introduced as exhibit 60. (See pt. 1, p. 264.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. GELFAN. I cannot answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the same claim of privilege?

Mr. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Again, you appreciate that there were many people who believed this organization to be a patriotic organization interested in getting the real honest facts in the Far East and that if it was penetrated by Communist influences that it would be important that the people know it so they might guard themselves in the future from belonging to organizations and in taking for granted that all organizations, even though they appear on the surface to be proper organizations, may be the spokesmen of communism. You appreciate how important this is, that we ascertain whether or not people who had a direct, official, let us say a directing effect upon the organization, whether or not they are Communists. I want to assure you these questions are asked for that purpose. If we can discover what did

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take place in this organization, having that in mind, can you answer the last question? I mean as to whether at the time you were or were not a Communist when you were secretary?

Mrs. GELFAN. I feel I cannot answer that question on the same grounds.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you chairman of the nominating committee in 1942?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, my memory is not exact as to which year; one year, whether it was 1941 or 1942. I believe you have the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your recollection you did not serve as chairman both years?

Mrs. GELFAN. No. I may have been nominated to that position, but I recall serving only 1 year.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, are you currently a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last serve as a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I am afraid I don't recall. I do recall that the last time I was elected I resigned immediately because I was not in position to attend the meetings; but I don't remember which year that was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in 1946?

Mrs. GELFAN. It might have been. I don't recall which year it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, did you work for the Institute of Pacific Relations in Moscow?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us how long you worked in Moscow for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I went to Moscow in the winter of 1934–35 as a research associate—I don't remember the exact title—for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I returned again in the spring of 1936 as a member of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. In 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you graduate from college?

Mrs. GELFAN. 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. Immediately upon graduation you joined the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that right?

Mrs. GELFAN. After the summer vacation.

Senator FERGUSON. What college did you graduate from? We had better keep our voices up so that everybody can hear.

Mrs. GELFAN. Bryn Mawr.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you specialize in any particular field?

Mrs. GELFAN. When I was in college we had two majors. Mine was economics and politics.

Senator FERGUSON. They taught politics in those days, too.

Was there any Communist activity on the campus?

Mrs. GELFAN. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a Communist at the time you graduated from college, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. I cannot answer that question.

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Mr. SOURWINE. On the same claim of privilege?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, we have some letters that have been extracted from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We would like to ask you certain questions about these letters. We will try to make it just as quick as we can.

Are you acquainted with a letter introduced into the record from Mr. Carter to Mr. Lockwood wherein he discusses various assignments of the Institute of Pacific Relations? This is dated May 8, 1940, and it was introduced into the record as exhibit 41 (see pt. 1, p 237) in the hearing of August 2, 1951. One paragraph here says:

> Send Harriet Moore to the U. S. S. R. to go through all Government and party writings on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and Politburo chiefs.

Are you acquainted with that exhibit?

Mrs. GELFAN. I read it in the printed booklet.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Carter as a matter of fact send you to the U. S. S. R. to go through all government and party writings on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and Politburo chiefs?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir; he did not.

Mr. MORRIS. As I said, Mr. Chairman, that has already been introduced into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have instructions as to what to do in Moscow?

Mrs. GELFAN. When, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. When you went over as an agent for the Institute of Pacific Relations. This in effect says that you were sent over there to go through all Government and party writings.

Mrs. GELFAN. But I didn't go, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never went over there?

Mrs. GELFAN. Not on this assignment; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you did go, did you have an assignment? You said that you had been in Moscow for the organization.

Mrs. GELFAN. I wasn't clear as to your question.

The first time I went I went to do research on the subject of Boriat, Mongolia. The second time I went, I went as a member of Mr. Carter's staff.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Mr. Carter's mission on that occasion when you went as a member of his staff?

Mrs. GELFAN. Mr. Carter at that time was touring various countries which had organizations related to the Institute of Pacific Relations and seeing the local organization of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was in that connection that he was going to Moscow in 1938.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you really want to find out on your first mission? They must have assigned a mission to you.

Mrs. GELFAN. I was to study materials on certain minority people in the Soviet Union, the Boriat Mongols and do research on them.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you want to find out about the minority people?

Mrs. GELFAN. I simply wanted to study their background and their development.

Senator FERGUSON. How was that to be used by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

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Mrs. GELFAN. The Institute of Pacific Relations was interested in the peoples of the east.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, they were interested in Russia. Russia was considered by the institute as part of the east?

Mrs. GELFAN. Part of Russia borders on the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you were interested in that?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you develop something in relation to the minorities?

Mrs. GELFAN. I did not complete my study, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Mrs. GELFAN. Because I could not get permission to travel to Boriat, Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. You tried to get permission in Moscow?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were turned down?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they assign a reason?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you did not really do anything on your mission?

Mrs. GELFAN. I studied the published material that could be found in libraries.

Senator FERGUSON. In Moscow?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that same material be here in our Library of Congress? Do you know?

Mrs. GELFAN. Some of it might.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you read Russian?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you say you were born?

Mrs. GELFAN. In Evanston, Ill.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you study Russian?

Mrs. GELFAN. I studied it in London and again in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mrs. GELFAN. Just before going there. It was in 1934.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did it take you to be able to read Russian?

Mrs. GELFAN. It took me quite a while, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. About how long?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is a difficult question to answer because I wasn't taking a single course that I could date.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you bring back any report?

Mrs. GELFAN. Just notes, sir. I did not publish a book or a study on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was paying your way on that trip?

Mrs. GELFAN. The Institute of Pacific Relations had given me, I believe, a research grant.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did they get the money for the research grant?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that it was a research grant?

Mrs. GELFAN. I believe that was the status in their books, but I wouldn't be sure. You would have to check their records.

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Senator FERGUSON. When they granted these grants to people to do research, do you know what investigation they made of the people that were to do that?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir; I don't know what investigation was made.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they make an investigation of you?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recollect any inquiry of you as to whether or not you could do the job?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall any particular——

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall any investigation.

You may take the witness, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, do you know that from time to time charges were leveled in and about the Institute of Pacific Relations that you were a Communist or pro-Communist in your writings?

Mrs. GELFAN. I have read the testimony that has been given here.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to the fact that we held hearings here, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I don't know what you are referring to.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall anything that was printed or said around the institute or anywhere else saying that you were a Communist or had leanings or sympathies for the Communist movement?

Mrs. GELFAN. There may have been some statements in the press before. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall any of them? Had it ever been called to your attention that it was claimed that you had pro-Soviet leanings?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall, sir. There may have been. I just don't recall.

Mrs. MORRIS. We had a letter from Mr. Dubinsky appearing in our record in regard to the controversy that he had with Russian War Relief. The principal issue in that controversy was whether or not you were pro-Communist.

Mrs. GELFAN. I misunderstood the question. I thought it was in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. In my question I did have it in regard to the institute, but was there anything in connection with any work?

Mrs. GELFAN. Naturally, I recall the episode of Russian War Relief.

Mr. MORRIS. You were then a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. I was a member, I believe, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mrs. GELFAN. In 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. You were at that time a member of the executive committee, a member of the board of trustees, and chairman of the nominating committee, were you not?

Mrs. GELFAN. In 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. So you were at that time an active member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The fact that these charges had been leveled, had been raised at the Institute of Pacific Relations—they had, had they not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't quite understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the fact that you had pro-Communist leanings ever raised at the Institute of Pacific Relations?

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Mrs. GELFAN. I still don't understand the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Gelfan. You have said you knew Mr. Dubinsky had made certain charges?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those charges ever discussed at the Institute of Pacific Relations by you with your superiors or by your superiors with you, by your associates there with you?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall that being discussed at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you now a photostat of a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter to Mr. Goodwin Watson dated August 24, 1942.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you identify that document as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and then read that letter for us, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, might I interrupt for just a moment? We have another period, to wit, the period during which the witness was connected with Russian War Relief.

At that time you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. GELFAN. I feel I cannot answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the same claim of privilege?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated August 24, 1942, addressed to Dr. Goodwin Watson, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, from Edward C. Carter. It reads:

This is in answer to your inquiry regarding Miss Harriet Moore.

I have no hesitation in testifying to her unimpeachable loyalty and high character. She is an American of the Americans. As to her objectivity, I can quite understand how some people, especially in former years, would criticize her as pro-Soviet. I think that this derives from the fact that for several years she has been assigned the task of studying the Soviet Union and writing about the Soviet Union. Prior to June 22 last year almost anyone who wrote descriptively and objectively regarding Soviet developments, whether in the field of science, education, industry, or communications, was accused of being pro-Soviet.

I have personally known Miss Moore frequently to criticize manuscripts because of their being pro-Soviet and thus not objective.

It is not true to say that Miss Moore has invariably followed the party line. She was, for example, interventionist long before June 22, 1941. I know that she was extremely critical of movements like the American Peace Mobilization.

As you doubtless know, criticism of Miss Moore in certain quarters derived from a case of mistaken identity. She was confused with another Miss Harriet Moore, who is said to have been one of the founders of the Communist Party in the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know another Harriet Moore?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you heard of one?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

There is no family connection between these two women, and the other Harriet Moore was several inches shorter and several years older than the Harriet Moore of whom you write.

In discussions of Soviet policy I have heard Miss Moore criticize the approach and behavior of Soviet officials and the Soviet system again and again.

If I can give you any further information, please do not hestitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced in full into the record in connection with the question put to the witness.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 403" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any further comment on that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I have no comment on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask one question?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you while you were in the Institute of Pacific Relations criticize manuscripts because they were pro-Soviet and, therefore, nonobjective?

Mrs. GELFAN. I might well have; I don't recall. It is a long time since I did that work. I couldn't name any specific——

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, I have here a letter dated June 24, 1943. It is addressed to you from Mr. Carter. It discusses a program to be undertaken by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I ask you if you can recall that letter? Do you recall having received that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I probably received that letter. I don't recall it exactly, but I recall the subject matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, could you ask Mr. Mandel to identify that letter as a photostat?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that as a photostat of a letter taken from the files of the institute?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 24, 1943, headed H. M. from E. C. C. and marked W. W. L. in the corner.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the document just shown to the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could that be put in the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 404" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 404

JUNE 24, 1943.

HM from ECC:

In connection with the bright outlook for the development of the Washington office because of Katrine Parsons' acceptance of the job, I wish to follow up my suggestion yesterday with reference to working out a plan for the progressive increase of Amco membership in Washington. Such a move can have many substantial results:

1. Washington shares with New York the premier position as a news center. A high percentage of newspapermen now in Washington have had journalistic experience in the Far East. They should all gradually be rounded up for membership.

2. There are substantial and heretofore completely untapped financial possibilities in developing the Washington Amco membership. Some of our best friends from different cities are now in Washington, including, Lt. John D. Rockefeller, 3rd, Harold K. Hochschild, Charles Dollard, Mrs. Frances Bolton, Maj. H. S. Little, Raymond Gram Swing, Ambassador Grew, etc. Of these almost the only one that we have systematically cultivated since starting our Washington office is Mrs. Bolton.

3. The current information and research possibilities are almost unlimited. Experts and research workers in Government bureaus, in spite of their intellectual objectivity are peculiarly susceptible to the influence of social and political prestige. As Holland said yesterday, we can get a great deal more cooperation from cautious but able Government experts if the IPR from time to time makes a modest splash in high social and political circles. These oc-

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casional affairs will also have the desired psychological effect on the men in the press bureaus whom we will want to handle regular releases on the Far Eastern Survey, Amco pamphlets, Pacific Affairs, and IPR books.

4. When, after the war, people now in Washington return to their homes right across the country they can advance the IPR in Seattle, San Francisco, Chicago, and way stations if they have become enthusiastic participants in the Washington program of the American Council.

In order to start a number of the best present Amco members in Washington thinking on our common problems so that the autumn program will be theirs rather than ours, I am wondering what you would think of having Parsons and Jayson arrange for a planning party at some fancy Washington home about the third week of July. Cocktails at 5:30 and discussion from 6 to 7 might start a lot of people thinking of our common problems and aid us in (*a*) launching the autumn program; (*b*) finding suitable quarters; (*c*) immediately expanding the the membership; (*d*) enlisting a few volunteers; (*e*) increasing press contacts.

Possible places for such a party would be at the home of Mrs. Robert L. Bacon, Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, Robert Bliss, Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, Joseph E. Davies. Do you know what sort of establishment John Rockefeller maintains?

A preliminary step to all of the foregoing would be the immediate preparation of a complete list for circulation to several of us of the present Washington Amco members.

I do not think that the development of such a membership program would interfere with the research and information objectives which have prompted your desire to develop the Washington office. As indicated above, I think they would multiply those contacts and make it far easier for Miss Parsons to establish immediate prestige. It would automatically in an impressive social setting put her into pleasant personal contact with a lot of people whose offices she will want to visit in connection with our information program.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there not some way that we can put these in the record and not have them read and printed twice?

I notice in the record you find it read once and then the instrument inserted. I think if the witness will follow it, and if there is any change, then she can say so and we will not have to print it twice.

Mr. MORRIS. It is merely a stenographic device. If the thing appears in its entirety, there should be no need of its again appearing.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice that. It will be reprinted then. If it is something which has been read in part, then you have to show the whole thing so that it can be seen whether or not it is out of context.

Where you read the whole document, that should only be printed once.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had asked that it be placed in the record at this point and identified. Then it can be discussed. It is now in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to the next letter. I have here a letter signed by Mortimer Graves, administrative secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies, addressed to Mr. Carter.

In this letter, Mrs. Gelfan, there is a paragraph which begins:

Miss Moore says "the ARI is not an academic institution."

Will you identify that?

Mrs. GELFAN. The American-Russian Institute.

Mr. MORRIS. This reads:

As I understand it, this is exactly the reason why it was not represented at the conference. In an effort to have a small conference, Dr. Stevens decided to confine it to an academic group. It would be possible to argue that some other kind of conference is needed, but the fact is that this is the kind of conference

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that this particular conference was. It concerned itself with what is to be done about Slavic studies at the academic level, and possibly peripherally and inadequately with what the academicians might do to help Slavic studies at other levels. This seems to me a quite sound limitation, and my experience has been that conferences ought to adopt limitations and ought to limit themselves to matters they are competent to discuss.

Do you recall that particular conference mentioned in that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. What is the date?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy before you?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. That is July 10, 1943.

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir; I believe I do recall this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, can we have this letter identified by Mr. Mandel and placed in the record at this point?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an original of a letter dated July 10, 1943, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the American Council of Learned Societies addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and it is signed by Mortimer Graves, administrative secretary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the letter which was just shown to the witness and which she and Mr. Morris were discussing?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May it be offered for the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 405" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 405

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

Member of the International Union of Academies

Executive Offices

1219 Sixteenth Street NW.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

JULY 10, 1943.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR NED: Thank you very much for sending me Harriet Moore's comments on the Rockefeller Foundation Conference on Slavic Studies. I am sorry to say that it seems to me as though pique plays a more prominent part in it than criticism. Whether the pique is justifiable or not is another question. I realize very well that Miss Moore has worked exceedingly hard to build up ARI to the point it has reached, and that she has every reason to be proud of it. However, this was frankly a gathering of academicians at the university level. The matter "Slavic studies at school level, and even popular public education on the Slav countries" was not really discussed; it came up quite by accident on the basis of remarks made by Bernadotte Schmitt, and received only such consideration as politeness to Schmitt required. Heaven knows, nobody realizes better than we do that there is no "problem" about getting Russia and the Far East into school curricula; the problem is in seeing that they get into curricula under the best conditions.

I find it difficult to share Miss Moore's amazement that "no attention was given to ARI" in the discussion of library problems. So far as I remember, no library—except possibly the Library of Congress—was seriously mentioned, though there may have been incidental remarks about some of the libraries with which the people there were connected. At any rate, no attempt was made to list libraries or to evaluate them, and it seems to me, therefore, idle to worry

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about whether any particular library was mentioned or not. There was suggested a serious study of American library facilities in this field, and if such a study should be made without taking the ARI into cognizance there would be ample reason to complain, but the study, so far as I know, has not yet even been started.

I confess that I do not know how the "Russian Economic Institute" memorandum got into the picture. It was one of the documents that was kicked around but nothing was done about it; I do not even remember that it was mentioned in the discussion, and I doubt very much if there is the slightest chance that any money will be given to this organization.

Mr. Stevens has certainly heard of ARI. My understanding is that he now has an application for its support in front of him.

Miss Moore says "The ARI is not an academic institution." As I understand it, this is exactly the reason why it was not represented at the conference. In an effort to have a small conference Dr. Stevens decided to confine it to an academic group. It would be possible to argue that some other kind of conference is needed, but the fact is that this is the kind of conference that this particular conference was. It concerned itself with what is to be done about Slavic studies at the academic level, and possibly peripherally and inadequately with what the academicians might do to help Slavic studies at other levels. This seems to me a quite sound limitation, and my experience has been that conferences ought to adopt limitations and ought to limit themselves to matters they are competent to discuss.

There, of course, is some general justice in Miss Moore's feeling that people and organizations who were "prematurely and excessively" anti-Fascist or realistic about the Soviet Union are in some quarters considered to be under a cloud. I really do not know, but I doubt very much whether this consideration would weigh very heavily with Dr. Stevens, though the Foundation would have to take account of any public feeling in the matter. I do not think that it would be wise to show Miss Moore's comment in its present form to Dr. Stevens, because I think that its intemperance would militate against the ARI. So far as I know there is no danger that the ARI will not be thought of in any suggestion which involves a center of information on the Soviet Union.

Most sincerely,

[s] Mortimer Graves,
MORTIMER GRAVES,
Administrative Secretary.

MG: B.
Enclosure.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the next paragraph, please?

Mrs. GELFAN. Which one?

Mr. MORRIS. The one after the one I read.

Mrs. GELFAN (reading):

There is, of course, some general justice in Miss Moore's feeling that people and organizations who were "prematurely and excessively" anti-Fascist or realistic about the Soviet Union are in some quarters considered to be under a cloud. I really do not know, but I doubt very much whether this consideration would weigh very heavily with Dr. Stevens, though the Foundation would have to take account of any public feeling in the matter. I do not think that it would be wise to show Miss Moore's comment in its present form to Dr. Stevens, because I think that its intemperance would militate against the ARI. So far as I know there is no danger that the ARI will not be thought of in any suggestion which involves a center of information on the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall that particular episode?

Mrs. GELFAN. My protest?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAN. I do, in general, recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where your document may be that you wrote? This reads:

I do not think that it would be wise to show Miss Moore's comment in its present form.

Do you know where that document is?

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Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know its contents?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you just think about it a while? If you do not know where it is, you might recall what was in it.

Mrs. GELFAN. I am afraid I do not recall what happened that long ago in any precise detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, will you read the last long sentence in the first paragraph?

Mrs. GELFAN (reading):

Heaven knows, nobody realizes better than we do that there is no "problem" about getting Russia and the Far East into school curricula; the problem is in seeing that they get into curricula under the best conditions.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you engage in any activity in connection with getting Russia and the Far East into school curricula?

Mrs. GELFAN. Personally, I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say personally, you mean what?

Mrs. GELFAN. I mean in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations in the program of preparing booklets for schools.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what that program was, and who was head of it, and something about it; in fact, all you know about it?

Mrs. GELFAN. I believe the institute had always had that as part of its program to provide factual materials on all levels, the high-school level, the college level, and other levels, on the Far East.

In this connection they published some pamphlets, booklets, that were aimed specifically for the school-reading public.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the American-Russian Institute have any program with regard to placing material in school curricula?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall any such program, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you——

Senator FERGUSON. It would indicate here that Russia went into these programs willingly and wanting to get in.

"There is no problem about getting Russia and the Far East into school curricula."

He said the problem was to get them in under the best condition.

What would you say that meant?

Mrs. GELFAN. I am afraid you will have to ask him. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. As a student of what the Institute of Pacific Relations was doing and what their program was.

Mrs. GELFAN. I really can't guess at that, sir. I don't know what he meant.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be logical to say it meant to get them in so as to not let it appear on the surface that they were in?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, I don't know what he meant.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say in reading that? What does it mean to you?

Mrs. GELFAN. If I saw the rest of the correspondence, sir, perhaps I would know what he meant there, but I don't know from this what he meant.

Senator FERGUSON. You do know what the last paragraph means about your memorandum. Is that clear?

Mrs. GELFAN. What is clear, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. That what was in your memorandum would not be well to be shown to Dr. Stevens because it was intemperate.

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Mrs. GELFAN. That is what he says.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would militate against the ARI. Do you know how it was intemperate?

Mrs. GELFAN. I imagine I was rather angry at the time, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At what?

Mrs. GELFAN. That the ARI was not invited to that conference, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were trying to get the ARI into the conference?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I did not know about the conference until after it happened.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were angry that it had not been taken in?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mrs. GELFAN. Because I felt that the ARI had one of the best libraries on Russia that it was logical to invite it to a conference discussing libraries and other forms of study and Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had worked very hard to build up the ARI and you did not like to see it passed over?

Mrs. GELFAN. All right; put it that way. I felt logically it belonged at the conference since it had been one of the best libraries.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say that Russian literature of today is generally propaganda for the Communist Party?

Mrs. GELFAN. You mean literature published in the Soviet Union?

Senator FERGUSON. By the Soviet Union.

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, I have not been following their publications in the last few years.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were studying them and looking into them, were they or were they not generally Communist propaganda?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is a difficult question to answer, sir. You have to define the terms in the first place, and you have to recognize the limitations to reading all of the literature that is published by a country.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever found any Russian literature that was Communist propaganda.

Mrs. GELFAN. Oh, certainly, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever found any that was not Communist propaganda?

Mrs. GELFAN. I would question whether some literature was specifically Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. You think there is a free thought in Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know precisely what you mean by that.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know what I mean by that? Is there the right to free thought in Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't really know.

Senator FERGUSON. You were one of the people who were interested in framing the policies of the Institute of Pacific Relations and trying to get the Russian literature into our schools, and so forth?

Mrs. GELFAN. I didn't say that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the Institute of Pacific Relations was interested in it.

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know about that.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a secretary.

Mrs. GELFAN. As far as I know, the Institute of Pacific Relations was never interested in getting literature into the schools.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Gelfan, didn't you at one time have charge or supervision of a program of preparation of material for use in schools under the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, I was not in charge of such a program.

Mr. SOURWINE. As secretary you had no supervision over that program?

Mrs. GELFAN. As secretary I had general supervision over whatever programs were going on there at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew about a program for preparing material for use in the public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything about the nature of that material?

Mrs. GELFAN. It was small illustrated books.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it trying to put into the schools? What was its aim?

Mrs. GELFAN. Trying to put information about the countries around the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it trying to put the information in about Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. There was a pamphlet on Russia; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What pamphlet was that, Land of the Soviets? Do you remember that pamphlet?

Mrs. GELFAN. I could identify the pamphlet if I saw it, but I don't remember the title.

Mr. MORRIS. By Maxwell and Marguerite Stewart, Land of the Soviets?

Mrs. GELFAN. Have you got a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. Not here.

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't remember the exact title.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever read it?

Mrs. GELFAN. I suppose I did read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did that information come from?

Mrs. GELFAN. You will have to ask the people that wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was biased, pro-Communist?

Mrs. GELFAN. It is a long time since I read that pamphlet.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any pro-Communist literature going out under the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Not that I knew about, sir; not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say you were well versed in what communism stood for?

Mrs. GELFAN. Would you repeat the question, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that you were well versed in what communism stood for?

Mrs. GELFAN. I wouldn't say I was terribly well versed in that; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say you were moderately versed?

Mrs. GELFAN. These are awfully vague terms.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you know about communism?

Mrs. GELFAN. The theory of communism? Not very much, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you studied communism, or the theory of communism, or Marxism, or Marxist-Leninist-Stalinism in any Communist meetings or group meetings?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, I feel I must decline to answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the same grounds?

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Mrs. GELFAN. That it might tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Madam, if you were asking to put these books into the schools, that is, your organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations, do you not think that it was one of the requirements that a person be versed in this question of communism to see whether or not they were actually true in fact, before we exposed our children of America to them?

Mrs. GELFAN. Could you make the question more concise, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know how I can make it any clearer. I say do you not think that as one of the people that were directing the Institute of Pacific Relations, that it was a requirement that you be well versed in the principles of communism in order that you may ascertain whether or not this literature that was to go out and go into our public schools was screened by experts to see whether or not it was presenting the picture as it really was and what communism stood for before we exposed our children in the public schools to this literature?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, that question never came up there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think an institution that is having people write books for the public schools about the Soviet Union ought to know something and really be an expert as to what communism was before we would put them in the schools and expose our children to them?

Mrs. GELFAN. Sir, the procedure with regard to publications at the Institute of Pacific Relations, as I understood it, was to submit the manuscript to a number of people who were recognized as experts in that field to get their criticism.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there not danger if you do not have a person who is skilled in communism, knows what it is to recognize it and still steeped in the principles of Americanism, that you are apt to give it to an expert who might be a Communist? Is that not dangerous?

Mrs. GELFAN. That could happen.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any searching in the Institute of Pacific Relations to ascertain whether any of its writers were really Communist or pro-Communist?

Mrs. GELFAN. I had no knowledge of any investigation of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. You understand the position that the Institute of Pacific Relations is being placed in by your testimony this morning where you refuse to state as to whether or not you were or were not a Communist? You appreciate that?

Mrs. GELFAN. I did refuse to answer the question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think, then, it would be a fair inference by the public there may have been Communists on this board, or on the direct force of the Institute of Pacific Relations where witnesses come in here who had something to do with it and do not testify?

Mrs. GELFAN. Maybe.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot help us any more than you have this morning because of the Constitution? You claim you have that privilege?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter here from Frederick V. Field, a photostat, dated August 22, 1939, addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, New York City.

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Mr. Mandel, I ask you if you will identify that as a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 22, 1939, to Miss Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, from Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a clear copy?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Use this one.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that Frederick V. Field asked you to write for him in the magazine Amerasia?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall the particular incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article along the line suggested by Mr. Field in the letter of August 22, 1939?

Mrs. GELFAN. I can't remember. If I did, it is in Amerasia.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you have no recollection about this particular letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 406" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 406

AUGUST 22, 1939.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,
American Russian Institute,
56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.

DEAR HARRIET: I wonder if you would be interested in writing a little piece for Amerasia based on the enclosed propaganda blurb from Kinney of the S.M.R. Incidentally, would you return the blurb for our propaganda files?

What I have in mind is something roughly comparable, although I hope better done and a little more elaborate than the piece I wrote on Japanese propaganda in the Topics in Brief for our October 1938 issue.

This present item on the Manchukuo-Mongolian border fighting of the summer seems to me particularly vicious because they use the names of at least two pretty decent American correspondents to support their allegations. I doubt very much, for instance, whether Steele of the Chicago Daily News ever filed a dispatch to the effect that "the Japanese aerial force was far superior to that of the Soviet and that the bravery and morale of the Japanese-Manchukuo troops far exceeded those of the Soviet-Mongolian forces." This, of course, may be true but I am sure that neither Morris nor Steele said so, not to speak of the eight other correspondents mentioned. It would be interesting to compare what Kinney says these men said with what they actually sent their newspapers. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare his account of the border fighting with what appears to have taken place. Incidentally, what did take place? That too would be pretty good news.

I really wish you would try your hand at this either in a Topics in Brief of three to five hundred words or in an article of a thousand or more. In answering this note as to whether or not you will agree to write the article you might also attempt a brief paragraph telling me the inner and outer significance of the Soviet-German trade treaty and accompanying Russian editorials.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Mr. Field?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was one of the moving spirits in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. At one period; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he, when you were in it?

Mrs. GELFAN. For part of the time; yes, sir. He was on the staff.

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Senator FERGUSON. Would you say as a member of the board of directors, or the moving spirit of the Institute of Pacific Relations that he would be a proper person, or would have been a proper person, to have submitted Soviet literature that was to go into our public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't get the precise question.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Mr. Field?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was one of the directors I believe, or trustees, as they call them, of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As a director of the Institute of Pacific Relations, would you say that he would have been a proper person to submit literature that was being written about the Soviets which went into our public schools? Would he have been a proper person to submit it to ascertain whether it was proper to go to our students in our public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. He had no special knowledge of Russia. His field was China.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom did you have in the Institute of Pacific Relations as a proper person to submit these to?

Mrs. GELFAN. It was submitted to outside experts.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were those experts?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know, sir. I wasn't in charge of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Andrew Grajdanzev?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he considered one of the experts of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the question of Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. He did some research for them on the question of Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I go back?

Were there any booklets or papers submitted about China to the public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. You have the list of the school pamphlets.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he have been a proper person to have submitted it to concerning China? You say he was an expert on China.

Mrs. GELFAN. That was his field.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he have been a proper person?

Mrs. GELFAN. When?

Senator FERGUSON. When they were submitting them to the schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. I have never thought about that. I never had anything to do with that. I don't know whether I would have thought so, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Field have pro-Communist leanings, or not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't know?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that he had?

Mrs. GELFAN. I read the newspapers, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what Amerasia was?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it pro-Soviet?

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Mrs. GELFAN. I wouldn't know about that, sir, unless I looked through it again. It is a long time. It didn't deal very much with Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Frederick V. Field any relation to Olga Field of the Institute of Pacific Relations staff?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not recall whether or not Amerasia was not pro-Soviet?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir, I don't. It is many years since I have looked at those articles. As I say, it didn't deal very much with Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your field was specifically Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had been there on extended visits, had you?

Mrs. GELFAN. I had been there on not too extended, but visits.

Mr. SOURWINE. On two occasions?

Mrs. GELFAN. On three occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you outlined those three for us? I only remember two.

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir; I have not mentioned the third one, which was the first time I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mrs. GELFAN. That was in 1934, the spring, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long were you there on that occasion?

Mrs. GELFAN. Six or eight weeks at the most.

Mr. SOURWINE. The second time you have mentioned, how long were you there then?

Mrs. GELFAN. Four or five months.

Mr. SOURWINE. The third time?

Mrs. GELFAN. Again, 6 or 8 weeks.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the extent of your visits to Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see why you say they are not extended.

Did you during that time make any studies of Russian state documents, political documents of any nature?

Mrs. GELFAN. I studied only books available in libraries.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you during that period and thereafter maintain a regular correspondence with persons in Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness if she recognizes that book.

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is that book?

Mrs. GELFAN. That book is a book I wrote, summarizing——

Mr. SOURWINE. The name of that book is Soviet Far Eastern Policy 1931–45; is that right?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which you wrote?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The jacket says, "Sponsored by the International Secretariat Institute of Pacific Relations." Is that right?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Will you look on the inside of the jacket and will you read the underlined language there? Would you read aloud just so we will know what and that we are talking about the same thing?

Mrs. GELFAN (reading):

Knowledge of Russian, extended trips to the Soviet Union and continuous correspondence with Russians have enabled her to observe and evaluate Russian attitudes. She is at present research director of the American-Russian Institute. The book is sponsored by the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. That paragraph refers to you as the "she"?

Mrs. GELFAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that blurb?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir; that is a publisher's blurb. It is exaggerated, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not think it was propaganda?

Mrs. GELFAN. The blurb?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAN. Publisher's propaganda; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you study at any special schools in Russia?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I attended no school in Russia, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the publisher?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall who the publisher was?

Mrs. GELFAN. The Princeton University Press.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not you ever denied that statement? Do you remember seeing it before?

Mrs. GELFAN. I must have seen it, I suppose. I don't know that I saw it in advance of its being put on the book. That I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. After it was on the book?

Mrs. GELFAN. No doubt I saw it.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not deny that it was an accurate statement of facts? An accurate fact?

Mrs. GELFAN. No. It is an exaggeration, but it is usual, I believe, for publishers to exaggerate.

Senator FERGUSON. It is what is known as puffing?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. This book covers the period 1931–45?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that include the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us where in the book you referred to that?

Mrs. GELFAN. I am not sure I can.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not find it in the index.

Mrs. GELFAN. Maybe I didn't refer to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that or was that not an important incident?

Mrs. GELFAN. In the Far East?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAN. It had a bearing. If I may be permitted to read from my introduction, I can perhaps explain this.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean why it was not included?

Mrs. GELFAN. May I?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

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Mrs. GELFAND (reading):

The reader of this short study will not find the full story of the Soviet Union as a far-eastern power. That story will not be written until archives are opened, not only in Moscow, but in China, Japan, and the western capitals. What is attempted in this book is to bring to the American reader an account of what the Soviet Union said and did in the Far East from 1931 until 1945. It gives approximately the picture which the Soviet people themselves have of this part of the world scene, for the study is compiled almost exclusively from Soviet sources.

In addition, the appendices include translations of Soviet editorial comments on the most important developments. As far as possible, the account of actual events has been checked against known Soviet sources, but the author has not been able to make use of materials in Chinese or Japanese.

Although it has not been possible to give adequate space to European events whose impact on Soviet far-eastern policy has been so great it will be obvious to the reader that Soviet relations at one end of its vast domain cannot but be of vital importance to its relations at the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Who furnished you the material, or helped you with this book?

Mrs. GELFAN. I did the research myself, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You said it was all from Russian source.

Mrs. GELFAN. I read Russian.

Senator FERGUSON. A Soviet source; is that correct?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss the Yalta problem, the agreements at Yalta?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do all the translating yourself from the Russian into English?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know about Yalta at the time the book was written?

Mrs. GELFAN. I didn't know about Yalta until I read about it in the papers, and I don't know when it was in the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't discuss that in the book?

Mrs. GELFAN. I shouldn't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not be a very vital and important part?

Mrs. GELFAN. If I didn't know about it, I couldn't write it.

Senator FERGUSON. If it were published before your book was out?

Mrs. GELFAN. I would have referred to it had it happened.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel now that it was not published at the time your book came out?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't think it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when the book was actually published?

Mrs. GELFAN. It was published at the end of 1945, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. About February of 1945 Yalta was announced.

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't believe what happened at Yalta was made known until sometime later.

Senator FERGUSON. Any of it?

Mrs. GELFAN. Except maybe there was a conference. When was Yalta——

Senator FERGUSON. We will find out.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have read into the record at this time an extract of a report apparently submitted by Mrs. Gelfan in connection with the points we have covered in our examination.

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Mrs. Gelfan, I would like to offer you a document which Mr. Mandel will testify has been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Apparently it was signed by you, was it not, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your report to the Institute as acting secretary?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That bears the date January 1944, does it not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I guess so. You have it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read from page 3 on that? It is in connection with schools in the Far East and the pamphlet is put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations. This is your report.

Mrs. GELFAN (reading):

The American Council's school program is meeting an evermore enthusiastic response both from school teachers and from educational organizations concerned with the lack of attention given to the Far East in American schools. As reported in IPR in wartime the American Council has felt its central job to be the preparation of teaching materials and has concentrated on that.

Two more pamphlets, the sixth and seventh of the Webster series of unit tests for high school classroom use, are now appearing. Twentieth Century India by Kate Mitchell, and Kumar Gashal is just off the press and Behind the Open Door by Foster Rhea Dulles, a history of America's relations with the East, will be published in February. The gross income from sales of the first five titles amounted to $45,000 in 1943.

A second series designed for the elementary school is now in preparation. This will consist of three readers—one dealing with the peoples of Asia; one with geography, and one with history—to appear during 1944. A short illustrated reference manual on the countries of the Pacific is to be added to the Webster publications as an aid to teachers.

Incidentally, to this basic program, the American Council has also prepared, at the request of United China Relief, a geography worksheet on China and a primer on Chinese calligraphy.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you acknowledge that is evidence that the Institute of Pacific Relations did engage in getting pamphlets——

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interrupt, would it not be better to ask the witness if she had included that in her report? She does not pretend to be a lawyer and cannot answer a question as to what is evidence.

Mrs. GELFAN. I wrote that report.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was true and factual? It referred to things that had happened and were happening?

Mrs. GELFAN. The report?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not misrepresent in your report?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you accept this?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred was marked "Exhibit No. 407" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 407

ADDENDA TO THE REPORT, IPR IN WARTIME

The following informal report is intended to round out the story of the American Council's work in 1943 and project its program in 1944. The 1941–43 report issued in August under the title "IPR in Wartime" covered in greater detail the various aspects of the current program.

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STAFF CHANGES

In recent months, additions to the American Council's staff have been made which enable it to carry forward a more effective program in three of its principal offices. Bruno Lasker has returned to the staff of the New York office with the assignment of supervising a large part of the research publication and of improving the library and information services. In San Francisco, Dr. Ernest B. Price has been appointed Director of the Bay Region group. The plans he has outlined to expand the IPR programs there are summarized below. The Washington office has been established as a strong branch office under Rose Yardumian as Washington representative and Dean William C. Johnstone, of Washington University, as Director of the Washington study program. As will be described below, these appointments have, for the first time since Robert Barnett left for the Army, made possible a continuing IPR program in Washington.

FAR EASTERN SURVEY

In the second half of 1943, the Far Eastern Survey has had an enviable record of publishing articles of great public interest. Following its wartime policy of presenting important views on current war and postwar problems, it has received favorable comment and quotation from leading American writers and commentators. As material becomes available, it will carry an increasing amount of discussion on postwar plans—both in those put forward by various American organizations and those originating in Pacific countries. Arrangements have also been made for a correspondent in India in addition to Gunther Stein whose reports from China have been appearing in the Far Eastern Survey.

The circulation of the Far Eastern Survey has been growing slowly and now stands at 2,000. While it will undoubtedly remain primarily a publication for students and experts, systematic promotion is expected to increase its circulation substantially.

IPR PAMPHLETS ON THE FAR EAST

Henceforth the American Council intends to issue six pamphlets a year, under the series title "IPR Pamphlets." These are designed to present, in popular form, basic information about far-eastern countries, and to furnish the average citizen with a background for discussion of important current issues with particular emphasis on postwar problems. IPR Pamphlets are approximately 64 pages in length, illustrated, retailing at 25 cents (subscription for series of six, $1).

First of the 1943–44 series is Speaking of India, by Miriam S. Farley, giving in question-and-answer form the kind of elementary information that Americans seek about India. Other pamphlets now in preparation are as follows (titles tentative):

China, by Maxwell S. Stewart.
The United States and the British Commonwealth, by F. R. Scott.
The Philippines, by Catherine Porter.
America's Economic Interests in the Far East, by John H. Oakie.
Civil Aviation in the Pacific, by Leonard Engel.
Korea, by Andrew Grajdanzev.
Japan, by Marguerite A. Stewart.
America's Role in the Pacific (author to be announced).

To meet continued demand, two of our earlier pamphlets Know Your Enemy: Japan and Asia's Captive Colonies have recently been reissued in revised editions. Our Far Eastern Record (two volumes in one) is also being reprinted.

Returns from recent promotion indicate that these pamphlets are satisfying a wide public demand in the United States to learn more about the countries and peoples of the Pacific.

In addition to the regular pamphlet series, the American Council from time to time plans to publish annotated bibliographies with brief introductory articles. The first of these deals with Korea.

THE FAR EAST IN THE SCHOOLS

The American Council's school program is meeting an ever more enthusiastic response both from school teachers and from educational organizations concerned with the lack of attention given to the Far East in American schools. As reported in IPR in Wartime, the American Council has felt its central job to be the preparation of teaching materials and has concentrated on that.

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Two more pamphlets, the sixth and seventh of the Webster Series of unit texts for high-school classroom use, are now appearing. Twentieth Century India by Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal is just off the press and Behind the Open Door by Foster Rhea Dulles, a history of America's relations with the East, will be published in February. The gross income from sales of the first five titles amounted to $45,000 in 1943.

A second series designed for the elementary school is now in preparation. This will consist of three readers—one dealing with the peoples of Asia, one with geography, and one with history—to appear during 1944. A short illustrated reference manual on the countries of the Pacific is to be added to the Webster publications as an aid to teachers.

Incidentally to this basic program, the American Council has also prepared, at the request of United China Relief, a geography work sheet on China and a primer on Chinese Calligraphy.

In an attempt to focus the attention of the individual school teacher on this area of study, the American Council in cooperation with the American Observer, a school magazine reaching 450,000 children, conducted a test on the Far East. Through this medium, teachers were enabled to find out impartially just how much their pupils had learned about the Far East.

Some 44,000 children in 729 schools in 43 States took the test, which was given with no special advance preparation. The median achieved was 28 correct answers out of a possible 51. The teachers welcomed this test as a tool for evaluating their pupils' background information, as well as a device for interesting them in the Far East. We received a large number of letters from these teachers, expressing their gratitude, but indicating surprise that their pupils seemed to know so little about the Pacific area. Many stated that they planned to take immediate steps to give additional emphasis to the Far East. In response to their requests, a second test will be prepared by the IPR this spring to provide these teachers with a means of measuring their pupils' progress, after classroom attention has been given to the subject.

It is interesting to note that the results of this test while not to be taken as more than indicative of a general situation, showed improvement as compared to results obtained in a high-school test conducted in 1939 by Dr. Alfred Church under the auspices of Harvard University. In that test the median was 25 correct answers out of a possible 100.

RESEARCH

The two major research undertakings of the American Council have been fully described in The IPR in Wartime. Suffice it to add that the first volume resulting from the Study of the History of Chinese Society under the direction of Karl August Wittfogel is now ready for publication. It is hoped that it will be possible to start it through the press in the immediate future.

Jan Broek's Economic Geography of Southeast Asia is well under way. Maps have already been prepared on land forms, population density and rate of increase, religions, languages distribution of Chinese and land utilization. Other maps on physical background and on economic development are in preparation. Dr. Broek hopes to finish the draft of the text and the balance of the maps during the first half of 1944 before he returns to the University of California, Berkeley.

In recent months, the American council has published only one research volume, Benjamin H. Kizer's The United States-Canadian Northwest, and has one other in press, Walter Radius' United States Shipping in the Pacific, 1914–40. However, many American authors have contributed to the International Research Series.

Other American council projects now in process are:

- Labor in the Philippines by Kenneth K. Kurihara with an introduction by Catherine Porter
- Japanese in the United States by Carey McWilliams
- Japanese in Hawaii by Andrew Lind
- Labor in China by Israel Epstein

During 1944, the American council plans to initiate the following new projects:

- Consequences of the economic development of China for American economy
- Steps toward the development of self-government in dependent areas
- Postwar treatment of Japan
- Postwar organization and security in the Pacific
- American relations with India

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AMERICAN COOPERATION IN POSTWAR EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN THE FAR EAST

Regional programs

The New York office, as the center of American council research and publication, has also been carrying forward a program of local activities in New York City. In addition to the informational services rendered by its library and staff, it has been holding a series of off-the-record luncheon meetings for the business community. The speakers recently have included Ambassador William Phillips, James Yen, H. J. Timperley, Col. Evans Carlson, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, K. C. Mahindra, E. C. Carter, W. L. Holland.

During the winter it will extend this type of meeting to the general membership and to uptown groups as was done in the case of the reception for Mrs. Roosevelt on her return from the Pacific and for Mr. Carter.

In the school field the New York office has sponsored one teachers' conference this fall and is cooperating with the Foreign Policy Association and the League of Nations Association in holding two student conferences. In addition, the staff has taken the lead in teachers' meetings in New York City and nearby cities, helping to introduce teaching methods and materials on the Far East to the social-studies courses.

Mention should also be made of the fact that the New York staff has been working more closely with outside agencies, such as the press, the radio, and the publishing firms. Through these associations, it has been able to make a further contribution to American knowledge of the Pacific.

The New York office of the IPR moved to new headquarters in November. The more adequate library space will make it possible for the IPR to improve its facilities as a reference center on the Far East. With this end in view, a trained librarian is joining the staff and special funds will be sought to round out the present collection of books and periodicals. While the new offices do not afford space for large meetings, they do provide a more convenient place for small conferences.

The Washington office, a branch of the New York office, has undertaken the largest program of study groups. With the concentration of Far Eastern specialists in the capital, the study groups have offered a welcome opportunity to many to discuss the current and impending problems in the Pacific.

The first series has been conducted to parallel a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs working on a similar agenda. It has dealt with the colonial problem as an issue in Anglo-American Far Eastern relations and with economic problems in Southeast Asia. As an offshoot of the former discussions, a special 2-day conference was held on the future of American-Philippine relations.

At present a group is working on the future of Japan, and in the next few months there will be similar programs dealing with India, American-Chinese relations, and American Far Eastern policy. It is hoped that the last topic will also be examined by study groups under the other regional offices.

In addition to the study-group program under the direction of Dean William C. Johnstone, the Washington office is holding a series of lectures for the American council membership. The schedule has included lectures by Edward C. Carter and William L. Holland, Foster Bain, the Lord Hailey, and Sir Frederick Whyte. Those projected for the spring will include James Yen and a panel discussion on Korea.

Through these activities, the Washington office is serving a real need of both the American council and the Pacific council in providing an informal and unofficial meeting ground for the many people now working in the far-eastern field in Washington. The enthusiasm with which it has been greeted speaks well for its program.

It should further be added that as Washington is a national center for news services dealing with foreign affairs, the American council has been able as never before to get the results of its work to a wider public through the standard channels of public information.

The San Francisco Bay region division has throughout the year found itself under constant pressure to supply information from its library, to furnish speakers for outside organizations and for the radio. It has risen to the occasion exceedingly well and is widely utilized by all types of organizations.

Its program of luncheon meetings have had a good attendance—averaging 77 and the speakers have included Sir John Pratt, Owen Lattimore, Dr. John Condliffe, Dr. John Badeau, Sir George Sansom, Gerald Winfield, Hon. W.

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Cameron Forbes and Nila Magidoff. The San Francisco group also held a series of four businessmen's round-table discussions under the leadership of far-eastern specialists.

In November Dr. Ernest B. Price was appointed director of the bay region division, and with the backing of the bay region committee is launching a very much enlarged program. New headquarters were immediately obtained to permit staff and library expansion. The core of the program remains the locating, assembling, making usable, and encouraging the use of facts concerning the Pacific area. This implies an enlarged program of conferences and meetings as well as greater participation in the American council research program.

The strengthening of the bay region group in 1944 will be an immensely valuable asset in the total American council program and should provide stimulus to IPR on the entire Pacific coast.

In Chicago, the American council has its offices in the International Relations Center where it can cooperate with other organizations in the field of foreign relations. Its independent program has, as was the case last year, concentrated on a series of lectures or seminars for teachers and two student conferences. As before, the attendance has been regular and large.

The Chicago regional office has also had a series of round-table meetings, in cooperation with the Library of International Relations. At these meetings, various specialists on the Far East have been presented.

Hawaii, after a period in which war activities made it difficult for the IPR to have a full program, is again undertaking work in the school field, lecture meetings, and discussion groups. Nineteen hundred and forty-four should see a real increase in the activity, bringing it back to the prewar level.

The Pacific Northwest and southern California have also been virtually inactive in the past year, because the far-eastern personnel has been drained off to the war. Now, however, both groups are planning a revival of regular programs for 1944.

CONCLUSION

In the last half of 1943 the American council has been laying a firm foundation throughout its regional offices for programs geared directly to American wartime and postwar needs. In the months following Pearl Harbor, the pressure for information and personnel in the war agencies overwhelmed the IPR and, in a degree, thrust aside its long-term program of research and public education. Now, despite its loss of personnel, it has restored the balance and is responding more adequately to the large popular demand and need for public information and discussion of the Pacific area. Its popular pamphlets, its school program, its discussions and study groups, and its projected research plans all reflect the type of service which is sought of the American council. In the course of 1944, the American council hopes to bring this program into full effect. The financial resources of all its regional offices are improving and its membership is growing. To the extent that it can meet and hold the interest of various American groups—teachers, businessmen, news commentators, and far eastern specialists both in and outside of Government service—the American council will carry out its function of improving America's capacity to win the war and build the peace in the Pacific area. In this work, it profits enormously from its association with the other IPR councils in the Allied countries around the Pacific. It is the hope of the American council that this association can be strengthened during the coming year.

HARRIET L. MOORE, *Acting Secretary.*

JANUARY 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you have it identified by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 1944, headed "Addenda to the Report, IPR in Wartime."

It has a mimeographed signature of Harriet L. Moore, Acting Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to refresh your memory, if I might.

In 1941, do you know whether or not Mr. Joseph Barnes, in August of 1941, wrote a pamphlet, "America and the Soviet Union by Joseph

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Barnes and Harriet Moore," six pages, Institute of Pacific Relations, 5 cents?

The reprint from the Far Eastern Survey in tracing the recent history of the American-Russian relations gives material not readily available elsewhere. The author's main thesis is that the basic paradox of the Soviet-American relations has been that a deep and important parallelism of national interest between the two countries has produced only infrequently any effective cooperation between their Governments.

I ask you whether or not you did write such a pamphlet for the public schools.

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall that pamphlet. If I wrote it, it is around somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that was censored by any one before it was sent in to the public schools?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't know what procedure was used on that.

Senator FERGUSON. This leaves the people who had students in the public schools in the position that they now find themselves; that this article being written, cosponsored by you, or written partly by you, under your name, with the fact that you now refuse to answer as to whether or not you were or were not a Communist as to that time.

Is that true? You do refuse to answer as to whether or not you were or were not a Communist at the time, in August 1941, when that pamphlet was written by you and Mr. Barnes? Is that true?

Mrs. GELFAN. I decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that whole document go into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive the whole thing.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 408" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 408

ANNOUNCING RESOURCE PACKETS FOR SECONDARY-SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STUDENTS ON THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EAST SELECTED BY COMMITTEE ON MATERIALS FOR TEACHERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, 744 JACKSON PLACE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Good neighbors * * * open door * * * reciprocal trade * * * Panay incident * * * embargo * * * appeasement * * * Chiang Kai-shek * * * Caribbean * * * Burma Road * * * hemisphere solidarity * * * Nine-Power Treaty * * * Havana Conference * * * League of Nations * * * Japan's new order * * * tariff * * * totalitarian penetration * * * the Philippines * * *

RELATED PUBLICATIONS FOR TEACHERS

(Prepared by the Committee on Materials for Teachers in International Relations and Published by the American Council on Education)

1. The Teacher and International Relations. 19 pages, June 1941. Council * * * $0.10. Discussion of responsibilities of teachers in the present international emergency.

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2. American Isolation Reconsidered. 208 pages, July 1941. Council * * * $0.50. Traces history of American neutrality from 1793 to 1941 and points out issues involved in decisions about peace and war. Includes more than 60 pages of original documents related to these issues. Specific classroom activities are suggested.

THE COMMITTEE ON MATERIALS FOR TEACHERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION

Philip Bradley, Queens College, Chairman

Howard W. Anderson, Cornell University
J. Thomas Askew, Armstrong Junior College
Dorothy Borg, Institute of Pacific Relations
Francis J. Brown, New York University
Marie J. Carroll, World Peace Foundation
Edward M. Earle, Institute for Advance Study, Princeton
Charles Gosnell, Queens College
Ross Hoffman, Fordham University
Erling M. Hunt, Teachers College, Columbia University
Philip C. Jessup, Columbia University
Tyler Kepner, Brookline (Mass.) High School
Walter C. Laves, University of Chicago
William W. Lockwood, American Committee for International Studies, Princeton University
William T. Stone, Foreign Policy Association
Harrison C. Thomas, New York City Public Schools
Ruth Wanger, South Philadelphia High School for Girls

THE WHY? WHAT? AND HOW? OF "RESOURCE PACKETS"

Why?

Teachers today have a responsibility to guide students in an honest consideration of the international scene in which the foreign policy of the United States is being forged. This is not any easy task, but it cannot be avoided. On the street, in the home, in the theater, everywhere students hear and participate in discussions of events in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America. These questions cannot help but be brought into the classroom.

To obtain authentic interesting materials on international developments which teachers and students can use is difficult. Research organizations and distinguished scholars have prepared penetrating analyses of the problems which face us, but most of this material is not written for secondary-school students.

What?

To investigate this situation, the American Council on Education 2 years ago appointed a Committee on Materials for Teachers in International Relations. The committee asked the Foreign Policy Association and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations to assist it by selecting materials to provide teachers with helpful background data and immediately useful classroom pamphlets on the United States and Latin America and the United States and the Far East.

The Latin-American packet contains 10 items—9 new authentic pamphlets plus a specially written syllabus for the teacher which coordinates the pamphlets by outlining the problems in this area, provides a bibliography of supplementary resources—and suggests specific classroom activities. The complete unit sells at $1.50, postage paid. The cost of the separate items, if ordered from the publishers, would be $2.20.

The Far East packet contains 10 items—9 pamphlets plus a similar syllabus. This complete unit sells at $1.50, postage paid. The cost of separate items would be $2.95.

How?

Each teacher and each school will determine how the packets can be best fitted into the class program. Many teachers have indicated that they will use them as units in civics classes or history classes. Others are using them as supplementary readings in these or other classes. Some libraries will make special exhibits of the packets. Their use is almost unlimited in a school which seriously tries to face the problems of the place and stake of the United States in the world scheme.

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Resource packet on the United States and Latin America (*$1.50 postage paid*)

	Price on each item if ordered separately
1. Syllabus for Teachers on the United States and Latin America. 20 pages, October 1941. The Council Contains: (1) an outline of the most important factors in the field; (2) an annotated bibliography; (3) suggested classroom activities. The pamphlets in the resource packet are integrated by page or section under relevant headings—for reading reference, class assignments, or individual reading. It represents expert judgment of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association.	$0.10
2. Challenge to the Americas, by John I. B. McCulloch. 64 pages, October 1940. FPA Up-to-date study of contemporary relations between Central and South America—strategic, political, and economic. Special attention is given to the bearing of European colonies in the Americas on United States foreign policy.	.25
3. Look at Latin America, by Joan Raushenbush. 64 pages, November 1940. FPA Convenient handbook of essential facts about our neighbors to the south—their geography, resources, trade, economic and social progress, transportation, and military defenses. Twenty-five maps and charts accompany a brief text.	.25
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1. Syllabus for Teachers on the United States and the Far East. 18 pages. October 1941. The Council---------- $0.10
2. America and the Soviet Union, by Joseph Barnes and Harriet Moore. 6 pages. August 1941. IPR---------- .05
   This reprint from the Far Eastern Survey in tracing the recent history of American-Russian relations gives material not readily available elsewhere. The authors' main thesis is that "the basic paradox of Soviet-American relations has been * * * that a deep and important parallelism of national interest between the two countries has produced only infrequently any effective cooperation between their Governments."
3. American Policy in the Far East, 1931–41, by T. A. Bisson. 153 pages. (Revised edition) October 1941. IPR---------- 1.75
   A well known expert on the Orient traces the pattern of United States Far East policy, analyzes the Sino-Japanese struggle since 1931, and discusses Japanese-American trade friction, the collapse of naval limitation and problems of Philippine independence. Contains 34 documents.
4. Showdown at Singapore? by W. W. Lockwood and Michael Greenberg. 31 pages. May 1941. IPR---------- .15
   Study of interests and policies of various powers in the Pacific area. Dealing with the United States, the authors state: "The outcome in the Far East turns increasingly on the decision of the United States. The question is not only whether Japan is to be stopped but in what way and for what purposes."
5. Shadow Over Asia, by T. A. Bisson. 96 pages. April 1941. Headline Book Series, FPA---------- .25
   Traces history of Japan's resistance to democratic influences and recent course of her road to Empire. Gives an invaluable account of the rise of militant Japan.
6. America's Stake in the Far East, by Miriam S. Farley. 23 pages. 1938. Reprinted October 1941. IPR---------- .10
   Provides the only simple, comprehensive summary of the United States economic stake in the Far East. Answers such questions as: Size of our Far East trade. With whom we trade. Are our trade and investments a source of conflict?
7. Our Far Eastern Record, by William W. Lockwood. 48 pages. Vol. I, January 1940. IPR---------- .15
   The highlights of our relations with the Far East in recent years years are given in this reference digest of American policy through selections from official statements and documents, trade tables, records of the Gallup polls, etc.
8. Our Far Eastern Record, by William W. Lockwood. About 48 pages. Vol. II, November 1941. IPR---------- .15
   The story taken to January 1940 by volume I is brought up to date in volume II. United States Far East policy is seen in its wider setting as America faces a two-ocean challenge.
9. Philippine Emergency, by Catherine Porter. 78 pages. October 1941. IPR---------- .15
   Written in the author's usual vivid style, Philippine Emergency discusses the problems of Philippine defense and gives background material on the internal politics of the islands, the Independence Act, and the crucial problem of American-Filipino trade.

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10. America Faces Japan, by William C. Johnstone. 32 pages. October 1941. Oxford University Press Up to date analysis of our foreign policy in the Far East. Our political, economic, and strategic relations with Japan are emphasized especially in view of the Axis treaties.	$0.10
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American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.
Foreign Policy Association, 22 East Thirty-eighth Street, New York City.
Oxford University Press, 114 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Owen Lattimore as a document taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations files, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated April 8, 1940, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked "Urgent" addressed to Owen Lattimore, signed by Edward C. Carter. It is a a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. The last document we introduced into the record has not been properly identified by Mr. Mandel, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mandel, would you relate what that document was?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a folder taken from the files of Raymond Lyman Wilbur, once the head of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is marked "Announcing resource packets for secondary school teachers and students of the United States and Latin America and the United States and the Far East, selected by Committee on Materials for Teachers in International Relations of the American Council on Education with the assistance of the Foreign Policy Association and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, as a matter of fact, take that document from the files of Mr. Wilbur?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was such literature out?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, I knew there was promotional literature.

Senator FERGUSON. That was promotional literature?

Mrs. GELFAN. So it says.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you ever saw that before?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall this particular thing.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the promotional literature.

Mrs. GELFAN. I saw some promotional literature.

I don't recall this whole particular batch of things.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is addressed "Dear Owen," and is signed by Edward C. Carter, dated April 8, 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy of that last letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

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Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember reviewing a book by Mr. Grajdanzev?

Mrs. GELFAN. Reviewing a book?

Mr. MORRIS. Referred to in that letter.

Mrs. GELFAN. In what letter?

Mr. MORRIS. The letter just mentioned.

Mrs. GELFAN. This does not say I reviewed a book of Grajdanzev. It said I read a book review written by Grajdanzev.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the review submitted to you, Mrs. Gelfan?

Mrs. GELFAN. Apparently; I don't recall this incident.

Mr. MORRIS. So you can add no testimony to this?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that letter be received?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 409" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 409

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 8th April 1940.

Urgent.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: On reading Grajdanzev's excellent reviews of the three Russian statistical books, I had the feeling that others might think that Grajdanzev had not quite done himself justice. I therefore submitted the reviews to Miss Harriet Moore and she has very kindly sent me comments under date of April 5. I enclose an extract of her letter.

I am sending this in duplicate in case you want to pass it on to Grajdanzev. You may, however, decide that it is better for you yourself to do a little editing. I don't think it is in Grajdanzev's best interests to have the review put precisely as it is.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a letter which bears the initials of H. M. which was written from 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. C., and it is addressed to Hilda Austern.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this as a letter having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated December 7, addressed to "Dear Hilda." It has no signature. The initials "H. M." are in the corner.

Mr. MORRIS. Will this be admitted, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 410" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 410

(Penciled initial:) HM

744 JACKSON PLACE NW.,
Washington, D. C., December 7, 1943.

DEAR HILDA: Settling down to the routine of any job is pretty hard after last week, but I'm trying.

I was wondering what you would think of the Secretariat or the American Council (I don't know in what sphere this would come) running a small meeting for the non-Pacific Council people in Washington from the various national groups—Chinese, Filipino, British, etc.—to hear Mr. Carter and Bill Holland speak. I have had several requests for such a meeting. For example, people like Howard Daniel, Daniel Lew, Rajchman, and others like them would be very much interested. Let me know what you think of this, please.

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What was the name of your contact in the headquarters, Army Service Forces? Was it Beukema? The reason I ask is that we have sent a letter to the Washington office saying that they are mailing us a copy of the ASTP's Atlas of World Maps. We have not received it yet; is this the business you were working on, or is this something else?

I had a note from Katrine Parsons saying she is much better. It seems that she had developed quite a sinus infection which ran her down considerably. She sends all of you her love.

When does Laura arrive?

My best to you all,

Sincerely,

_____.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us whether or not as a matter of fact you did write that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I don't believe I did write that letter.

Mr. MORRIS. It does not appear conclusively, Mr. Chairman, that Mrs. Gelfan did write that letter. The only indication is the initial, H. M., in the corner.

Is it your testimony you did not?

Mrs. GELFAN. No; I didn't write it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your belief that means you simply got a copy of it?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. It has been received without explanation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who did write that?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything on that to help you make up your mind who might have written it?

Mrs. GELFAN. No. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here a series of letters and I think, in the interest of time, I would like to have them introduced into the record if they will be identified by the witness. We can save time.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would do that.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Carter to Owen Lattimore, dated August 31, 1945. There is one paragraph here wherein Mr. Carter is speaking of Mr. Zukhov. He says:

Zukhov made three trips of many score of kilometers to come in to Moscow for long conversations with me. Both Motilev and Voitinsky were too far away to be able to come in. Communications are still frightfully strained. I had a long talk with Vice Commissar Lossovsky and among other things discussed with him the new opportunity for the Pacific Institute. He undertook to see that proper aid and facilities were given by the Academy of Science to Zukhov now that the situation in the Far East and the Pacific is "clarified".

The word clarified is in quotes, Mr. Chairman.

He had read with warm interest Solution in Asia, which I had sent him on publication. He begged that I give him Harriet Moore's galley proof Soviet Far Eastern Policy.

Do you have a copy of that?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that letter in the record? Could it not be identified?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here some photostats of letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated the 31st of August 1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, signed Edward C. Carter, and also to be addressed to Mr. Horace Belshaw, Mr. Ifor B. Powell, Andrew Grajdanzef, Miss Harriet Moore, RDC, WDC, and HA.

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Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "also to be sent to"?

Mr. MANDEL. There is an attached photostat which says, "Letter to Owen Lattimore also sent to."

Mr. SOURWINE. And then it lists those names?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, and gives the same date.

Mr. SOURWINE. May that go in, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 411" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 411

31.8.45

Letter to Owen Lattimore also sent to—

Mr. Horace Belshaw, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y.
Mr. Ifor B. Powell, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York.
Andrew Grajdanzef, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York.
Miss Harriet Moore, 58 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y.

(Pencilled initials:)

RDC
WDC
HA

c/o AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Grosvenor Square, London W. 1, 31st August 1945.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Your letter in response to my cable has luckily awaited me here. What you have written is most helpful.

The trip from the Bering Straits through Velkol, Seinchan, Yakutsk, Ninji-Illinsk, Krashnoyarsk, and on to Omsk, Kazan to Moscow cannot be reported until I see you face to face. The anthropological and historical people in Yakutia were most cooperative. In almost every guest house my host remarked on pointing out my bedroom: "Willkie, Wallace, Lattimore, and Molotov slept here"! The trip to the Donbas with its mines, industries, and devastated locomotive works needs many pages.

Zukhov was most interesting and cooperative. He has moved the Pacific Institute office from Razin Street to Volhonka 14. The Pacific Institute suite is number 330. Voitinsky is in the same building on the second floor. Motilev has a large office suite in the central building of the Moscow University—the second Moscow university has now been merged into the single great institution.

Unfortunately I arrived in Moscow for the first fortnight in four years when the academic people were free to take a holiday. Zukhov made three trips of many score of kilometres to come in to Moscow for long conversations with me. Both Motilev and Voitinsky were too far away to be able to come in. Communications are still frightfully strained. I had a long talk with Vice Commissar Lossovsky, and among other things discussed with him the new opportunity for the Pacific Institute. He undertook to see that proper aid and facilities were given by the Academy of Science to Zukhov now that the situation in the Far East and the Pacific is "clarified." He had read with warm interest "Solution in Asia," which I had sent him on publication. He begged that I give him Harriet Moore's galley proof "Soviet Far Eastern Policy." He wanted to read Tamagna's article on China's postwar finances. He seemed to be familiar with Japanese attacks on the I. P. R. and on the Secretary General and asked whether the American and British people took the I. P. R. as seriously as the Japanese. He has a high regard for Zukhov.

The Pacific Institute has received almost every I. P. R. publication, though those of the past six months have not all arrived. I presented Zukhov with the collection that Ruth Carter entrusted to me and Lossovsky gave me his word of honour that he would pass on to Zukhov the manuscript of Harriet Moore's book; he hinted that he supposed Miss Moore would add a final chapter in the light of the vast changes that synchronized with my visit to the U. S. S. R.

I found that some highly placed official in every Commissariat that I had to work with was broadly informed as to the work of the I. P. R., and fairly beamed that I had so timed my visit as to arrive in Moscow on the very day

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that the U. S. S. R. went to war with Japan. Litvinov remembered that I reached Manchuria on September 17, 1931, and Peking on July 3, 1937. Lossovsky was from Missouri as to the Emperor's capacity to lead Japan toward democracy. I talked at length with an American marine engineer who helped install the machinery for the Amur ferry boat which was a prerequisite to the strategy of encircling Korea and Manchuria. He and his Soviet colleagues had to complete the ferry before August 30. They made the date; and he crossed the river on the ferry with its first load of thirty freight cars destined to cross to Soviet Skiya Gavan, and of course the first trip was followed by innumerable subsequent trips with munitions and other essentials that had come in vast quantities along the Trans-Siberian to Kharbarovsk then to Konsomolsk for ferry transshipment across the Amur. According to my best sources of information the Baikal-Amur railway does not yet run into Konsomolsk, all munitions and other war material for Soviet Harbour were coming into Konsomolsk by way of Kharbarovsk.

The Soviet Ambassadors to China, Vinogradov and Vostov, were in Moscow while I was there and made an appointment to meet me, but through no fault of theirs I had to forego the privilege of seeing them because of a conflict of dates.

Anna Louise Strong was of course completely mystified by the Sino-Soviet agreements. Edgar Snow was not so pessimistic, and of course Eddie Gilmore thought it represented superstatemanship on the part of Moscow, Chungking, and Washington. Borodin took the same line as Byrnes and Gilmore.

The Lenin Library people whom Ruth Carter wanted me to see were also away on holiday. I did, however, see the assistant to the chief librarian of the Foreign Language Library, who is eager to get by gift or exchange every one of the I. P. R. publications.

I received Harriet Moore's cable proposing an exchange of visits between Urnov and Rubin. This I conveyed orally and in a formal letter to Kemenov of Boks. Confidentially I may say that he was the only person I met in the Soviet Union who showed complete incompetence to understand either the I. P. R. or R. R. He lives in a rarified atmosphere of what he calls "international cultural contacts," but his definition of culture excludes almost everything except the fine arts in a restricted meaning, and internationalism to him means principally for the Western World to hypnotise itself into the belief that Soviet art and music surpasses anything else on the planet. He is fabulously hospitable when it come to the opera, lavish dinners, and ballet and radio stars; but when it comes to achieving what I would call serious objectives his capacity for inaction is unlimited. In the past two years by a commendable act of will he was made tremendous progress in learning English. It may be that when he uses the English language as a tool for studying English and American thought he will become more competent. This linguistic achievement is all to his credit for his work drives him terribly.

I read between the lines that he can't spare Urnov for a long time and that Miss Moore should rely on Mikhailov and Gromov to get a visa for Rubin.

All Americans who are hoping to visit the Soviet Union should remember that the housing and care of foreign visitors is still a terrific problem and will continue to be for at least another year. There are so many new embassies, so many many new international commissions with visiting foreigners that you discover that ministers from the Middle Powers have to be housed in a single bedroom in one of the hotels. The housing shortage in every city I visited was unbelievably great, and the Russians are so hospitable they simply won't let foreigners rough it, even though the foreigners bravely assert that if they can only get a visa they will take pot luck with the masses. Americans who are loudest in such protestations howl the worst when the first bed bugs march in on them.

I am afraid the foregoing will not answer one percent of your questions. The answers to the rest must wait till I return, but don't for heaven's sake think that I have all the answers to the rest must wait till I return, but don't for heaven's sake think that I have all the answers.

Gratefully yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you receive a copy of this?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't remember this particular letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Zukhov?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir. I don't believe I did.

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Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Lossovsky?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. If the witness has no comment to make on that, I suggest we go to the next one.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this document as a letter from the IPR files, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a document dated November 6, 1943, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Miss Rose Yardumian, from Harriet L. Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. I show you that letter and ask you if you can recall having written that letter?

Mr. SOURWINE. While the witness is studying the letter, may it be offered for the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 412" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 412

NOVEMBER 6, 1943.

Miss ROSE YARDUMIAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
744 Jackson Place, Washington 5, D. C.

DEAR ROSE: I am writing this just to recapitulate what we decided the other day when you were here. If I have got something twisted, please let me know. The enclosed memos deal with the financial and administrative arrangements.

1. In order to take fullest advantage of the return of ECC and WLH, the following activities should be planned:

(*a*) Press interview to be arranged by RWR and AJ.

(*b*) A dinner for about forty Congressmen and other leading people in Washington for ECC and WLH at the first opportunity.

(*c*) An Amco membership meeting for all Washington members for ECC and WLH. Also to be arranged as soon as possible. For these two events (*b* and *c*) AJ will go to Washington to help with the arrangements.

(*d*) A small meeting with Army and Navy education people to discuss the further need for educational work among the troops now stationed in India and China.

(*e*) Radio engagements for ECC and WLH.

(*f*) A meeting for the Pacco representatives in Washington. According to Hilda, this doesn't have to be done in the immediate future..

2. In re study groups:

(*a*) WCJ is to draft four or five questions to serve as the basis for regional study groups or conferences on American policy to be organized by Amco in the course of 1944.

(*b*) WCJ will talk again to Zafra regarding the joint American-Philippine conference.

(*c*) The question of a joint American-Dutch conference has been dropped.

(*d*) WCJ will send us the agenda for the American Council study group on Japan and Rose will send us as soon as possible the preliminary list of those to be invited to them.

3. It was agreed that it would be advisable to get a hotel room for the meetings so as to be sure to have a place for the study groups even if it costs somewhat more than the former meeting room.

4. It was agreed that it would be advisable to send out a letter announcing the opening of the Washington office and the projected plans for that office. One such letter should go from the American Council to the Americans in Washington who have used the IPR. The other should go from ECC to the various non-Americans in Washington (I will draft such a letter for the American Council for your approval and will then try to get it signed by either Sproul or Calkins).

5. It was agreed that we should try to work out with Joy Hume some arrangement whereby she can assist Rose Yardumian in contact work in Washington.

I trust this covers the general picture but if there are corrections, please send them to me.

Sincerely,

HARRIET L. MOORE, *Acting Secretary.*

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Mrs. GELFAN. I think I recall that letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall making the recommendations that appear in that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall—these things were worked out jointly.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you wrote the letter, you did make the recommendations?

Mrs. GELFAN. This does not say they were recommendations made by me. This says we were recapitulating what we decided the other day.

I don't know who "we" was.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

In order to take the fullest advantage of the return of ECC and WLH, the following activities should be planned.

Is not that making a recommendation?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, because it says "this just to recapitulate what we decided the other day when you were here."

These were the decisions taken. I don't remember who "we" were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Rose Yardumian one of the "we"?

Mrs. GELFAN. She apparently was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember anyone else present?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you identify these various initials: ECC?

Mrs. GELFAN. Some of them I can. This is Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. W. L. H.?

Mrs. GELFAN. Mr. Holland.

Mr. SOURWINE. R. W. R.?

Mrs. GELFAN. It may be Russian War Relief.

Mr. SOURWINE. A. J.? You don't know?

Mrs. GELFAN. I can't think who it might be. I undoubtedly did know.

Mr. SOURWINE. W. C. J.?

Mrs. GELFAN. I prefer not to guess at these things, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what that meant at the time you wrote it?

Mrs. GELFAN. I obviously knew at the time I wrote it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know, or do you know now, what it meant when you wrote it?

Mrs. GELFAN. I think it is William Johnstone. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. How did Johnstone spell his name? Is it s-t-o-n?

Mrs. GELFAN. This man spells his name s-t-o-n-e, I think, sir.

Mr. MORRIS I would like to proceed to the next one

Will you identify this letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 20, 1943, addressed to Miss Rose Yardumian and signed "Harriet L. Moore, Acting Secretary."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will this be introduced?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

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(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 413" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 413

OCTOBER 20, 1943.

Miss ROSE YARDUMIAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

DEAR ROSE: You are probably so busy that you don't need any letters from us with suggestions. I trust that the moving went smoothly and that you have finally been able to find someone to help you with stenographic problems. What is the story on the telephone? Have you got a number?

We are here trying to decide what additional study groups should be undertaken. I imagine that we will be writing to Bill very shortly and will send you a copy.

The IPR has been invited to send someone to the Informational Conference on the Relief and Rehabilitation Program of the United Nations. I am sending them your name and you should definitely go. You might drop in and get a copy of the program at the office of the chairman of the Organizing Committee, Dr. Esther Caukin Brunauer, 714 Evans Building, 1420 New York Avenue NW. Dr. Brunauer is in charge of the arrangements and, as you know, knows all about the IPR and you should meet her anyhow. I am writing to find out if it will be possible for an additional person to go. If so, probably I will ask Bruno as he is working on the OFRRO reports at present.

All's well here though we are very busy and seem a bit distracted. As soon as you have worked out the library list, please send it along and we will try to get the things to you very quickly.

I hope you are not having too much trouble over the living arrangements. I am sorry that the original scheme didn't work out as we had hoped.

Sincerely yours,

HARRIET L. MOORE, *Acting Secretary.*

hm/di.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall of having written that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall this letter. I undoubtedly wrote it.

Mr. MORRIS. You will not deny you wrote it?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comment to make on that letter?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, in connection with this hearing today, whom did you consult before you came down here?

Mrs. GELFAN. No one, sir, except my lawyer. I didn't speak on the phone to anybody.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't speak to anybody?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel is with you?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, have you been identified on the record?

Mr. REIN. I don't think I have. My name is Davie Rein.

Senator FERGUSON. Where is your place of business?

Mr. REIN. 711 Fourteenth Street, Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. You are practicing with a firm there?

Mr. REIN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the name?

Mr. REIN. Forer & Rein.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Gelfan, did you consult with Henry Collins in connection with your appearance here?

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Mrs. GEFLAN. Today?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you consult with Henry Collins in connection with your being subpenaed by this committee to appear here in Washington?

Mrs. GEFLAN. I spoke to him. I told him——

Mr. MORRIS. You asked him for advice; did you not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I suppose so.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, or did you not?

Mrs. GELFAN. I saw him shortly after I received your letter asking me whether I would be available for testimony. I told him I had received such a letter and we chatted about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give you advice as to how to conduct yourself before this hearing?

Mrs. GEFLAN. No, sir. He suggested I should have a lawyer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he suggest what lawyer you should have?

Mrs. GELFAN. He named several lawyers as possibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he name your present lawyer?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Henry Collins has been identified by Whittaker Chambers as an associate of Alger Hiss?

Mrs. GELFAN. I saw it in the papers.

Senator FERGUSON. You talked to Mr. Collins about your constitutional rights?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall discussing that with him.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't recall that?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it mentioned at all with Mr. Collins?

Mrs. GELFAN. It might have been. I don't recall precisely. We chatted very briefly.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he a lawyer?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his business now?

Mrs. GEFLAN. He is a writer.

Senator FERGUSON. Where does he live?

Mrs. GELFAN. Bronxville.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the occasion that you got in touch with Mr. Collins on this matter?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us why you went to Mr. Collins?

Mrs. GELFAN. I certainly can. I was trying to buy a house in Bronxville. I asked Mr. Collins who his real-estate agent was. That was the connection in which I got in touch with Mr. Collins.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have the letter about coming here to testify at that time?

Mrs. GELFAN. I had Mr. Morris' original letter asking me as to my availability for testimony. I did not have a subpena at that point.

Senator FERGUSON. Had Mr. Collins ever had any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. GELFAN. Not as far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you contributed money to the following organizations: The American League Against War and Fascism?

Mrs. GELFAN. That one I don't remember whether I ever did.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall contributing $400 to the American League Against War and Fascism?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall it.

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Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute to the American rescue ship?

Mrs. GELFAN. Which was the American rescue ship?

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall that? It is a Spanish relief organization.

Mrs. GELFAN. I contributed to the Spanish Relief Organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you remember contributing to the American-Russian Institute?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately how much money?

Mrs. GELFAN. I have no idea over the years. A fair amount.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately? Was it $10,000?

Mrs. GELFAN. I would be surprised if it was that much.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you be surprised if it was more than $5,000?

Mrs. GELFAN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would you get funds in that amount to contribute?

Mrs. GELFAN. From my family, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You obtained them from your family if they were contributed?

Mrs. GELFAN. No. I don't want to—my family has given money. I am free to spend it as I wish.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you state your question again so that she will have it clearly in mind?

Mr. MORRIS. My last question was: Would you be surprised to realize you contributed more than $5,000?

Mrs. GELFAN. I said "no."

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was all the money which you contributed to the organizations named your own money at the time you contributed?

Mrs. GELFAN. Of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not make contributions on behalf of someone else or act as an intermediary?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So if any money was given by you to any of these organizations, you had not solicited or obtained it from anyone else to be given under your name?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were giving it as your own?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then your statement it may have come from your family was to indicate the family had given it to you not for this cause?

Mrs. GELFAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember contributing to the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean you contributed?

Mrs. GELFAN. I don't deny it. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember contributing to the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?

Mrs. GELFAN. I probably did, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.

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Senator FERGUSON. I find in this book some documents dated as late as August 14, 1945. That would indicate that it was published after that date.

Mrs. GELFAN. Those were put in after it was in proof.

Mr. SOURWINE. By this book you are referring to what, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. The Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931 to 1945, by Harriet L. Moore.

Do you have anything that you want to give to the committee now—any information?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that you have had a fair hearing?

Mrs. GELFAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It has been complete, as far as you are concerned?

You do not want to add anything to it?

Mrs. GELFAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the committee will recess subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4:20 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we were to have three witnesses here today, but due to a misunderstanding we have only one, and which witness has been heard in executive session, as you know, earlier today.

Senator WATKINS. I understand.

Mr. MORRIS. The other two, Mr. Len DeCaux and the former Mildred Price, both will be heard on Monday in executive session.

Senator WATKINS. This witness has been sworn in executive session. Does counsel think it is necessary to have her sworn again in public session?

Mr. MORRIS. I would suggest it, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. It may be surplusage, but we can do it anyway.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate of the United States will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. BARNES. I do.

TESTIMONY OF KATHLEEN BARNES, MIDDYLANDS, NEW HARTFORD, CONN., ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER, ESQ., WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, will you give your full name and address to the stenographer, please?

Mrs. BARNES. Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, Middylands, New Hartford, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, where were you born?

Mrs. BARNES. In England.

Mr. MORRIS. What town in England?

Mrs. BARNES. Bladon-Dobshire.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become an American citizen?

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Mrs. BARNES. In 1930, I think.
Mr. MORRIS. What is your marital status now?
Mrs. BARNES. I am divorced—well, single.
Mr. MORRIS. How many times have you been married?
Mrs. BARNES. Once.
Mr. MORRIS. To whom where you married?
Mrs. BARNES. Joseph Fels Barnes.
Mr. MORRIS. When were you married to Mr. Barnes?
Mrs. BARNES. I married Mr. Barnes in 1928, and we were divorced, I think, in 1935.
Mr. MORRIS. In 1935. And you have since not remarried?
Mrs. BARNES. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, were you ever a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mrs. BARNES. I was.
Mr. MORRIS. When did you commence that relationship?
Mrs. BARNES. In, I think it was, the fall of 1934.
Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, at that time, was Mr. Barnes an employee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mrs. BARNES. I don't think so. I think he had left just before.
Mr. MORRIS. He had been secretary; is that right?
Mrs. BARNES. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. He had been secretary up until what year?
Mrs. BARNES. Up until 1934.
Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony that your employment with the institute commenced at a time subsequent to his departure?
Mrs. BARNES. That is as I recollect it. I don't know, there might have been some slight overlapping in technicalities, but I don't think so.
Mr. MORRIS. Have you made any visit to Moscow?
Mrs. BARNES. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell the committee the number and the duration of each visit?
Mrs. BARNES. I was there twice, once in—I don't remember how many months I was all the time in Moscow. I think about three and a bit, the first time.
Mr. MORRIS. Three and a bit months?
Mrs. BARNES. Yes, three and a part of a month. And the second time I was there—my impression is that it was something like 2 months. I can't remember exactly.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you there on behalf of the institute?
Mrs. BARNES. Was I there on behalf of the institute?
Mr. MORRIS. Yes.
Mrs. BARNES. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you do any work in Moscow for the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mrs. BARNES. I don't think so; no.
Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, have you read the testimony within which your name has appeared before this committee?
Mrs. BARNES. I have.
Mr. MORRIS. And you understand that you were named by one of the witnesses here as a member of the Communist Party?
Mrs. BARNES. I do so understand.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, were you in fact ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. BARNES. I refuse to answer because of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to testify against myself.

Senator WATKINS. Are you afraid if you answer that truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mrs. BARNES. I suppose that is—that is a different phraseology of the same thing, is it not?

Senator WATKINS. In answer to my question, I think you know what I asked.

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, I think so, yes.

Mrs. MORRIS. When did you terminate your relationship with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. BARNES. In 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you still a member of the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you do not subscribe to the publications any more?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, did Mr. Carter ever recruit you or ask you to do any work for the Government in the early part of the war?

Mrs. BARNES. Asked me to do any work for the Government? I suppose you refer to a letter there in which he sent some sort of a questionnaire as to—something about the National Resources Planning Board.

I do not recollect particularly receiving that letter from Mr. Carter. I may have. I do recollect filling in a questionnaire from the National Resources Board.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter addressed to Mrs. Kathleeen Barnes, dated September 24, 1940?

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that that is a document of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 24, 1940, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that in the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. That will be received in the record and marked in the next sequence with an identifying number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 414" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 414

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., September 24, 1940.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES:

DEAR KATHLEEN: On behalf of the National Resources Planning Board, the American Council of Learned Societies is preparing a roster of scientific and professional personnel who can use what are described as "unusual" languages.

You, of course, come in this category, and I am wondering whether you have any objection to my listing your gifts. Would you let me know how many of the following nine functions you would feel competent to fulfill in case Uncle Sam needed you:

1. Radio listening.
2. Radio speaking.
3. Intensive teaching of languages.

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4. Reading foreign-language newspapers and other printed materials.
5. Censoring handwritten and typewritten correspondence.
6. Translating technical materials into English.
7. Translating into foreign languages.
8. Work with natives, either in the United States or abroad.
9. Organizational and administrative work connected with the above.

Have you by any chance received a copy of the ACLS communiqué on this matter direct?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter? I would like to ask Mrs. Barnes a few questions on it.

Mr. MANDEL. The letter reads:

DEAR KATHLEEN: On behalf of the National Resources Planning Board, the American Council of Learned Societies is preparing a roster of scientific and professional personnel who can use what are described as "unusual" languages.

You, of course, come in this category, and I am wondering whether you have any objection to my listing your gifts. Would you let me know how many of the following nine functions you would feel competent to fulfill in case Uncle Sam needed you?

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough, Mr. Mandel. Thank you.

Mrs. Barnes, can you recall Mr. Carter writing this letter to you?

Mrs. BARNES. No; I don't recall receiving the letter. It is quite possible he did, but I just don't happen to remember it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anyone associated with the American Council of Learned Societies?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes; I mean, I did know somebody on the National Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Mortimer Graves?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know the project Mr. Mortimer Graves undertook to supply personnel for the National Resources Planning Board?

Mrs. BARNES. I may have known at the time, but I have no recollection now.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not deny receiving this letter, though, do you?

Mrs. BARNES. I do not deny receiving that; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this letter refresh your recollection to anything about this episode?

Mrs. BARNES. I do remember filling out—what do you call it—a questionnaire from the National Resources Planning Board asking my abilities.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any follow-up from the National Resources Planning Board?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do, in fact, during the war, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I was a mother of a young child, and worked for the Red Cross; ran a victory garden.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you work for the Government at all?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I am a writer, a free-lance writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a document from the Institute of Pacific Relations from W. W. L., which are the initials of Mr. Lockwood, to various staff members of the Institute of Pacific Relations including one K. B., whom, I presume, is Mrs. Barnes.

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Mr. Mandel, would you authenticate that that is an official document from the files of the Institute?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 27, 1942, to a number of individuals whose initials are listed, among them being K. B., and it is from W. W. L.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read the pertinent sections from that?

Mr. MANDEL. (reading):

The newest Government project calling for study of the Far East is a School of Military Government being organized under the auspices of the War Department. This is to be located at the University of Virginia under the direction of Maj. H. C. Dillard and J. I. Miller. These two gentlemen called on me Tuesday to ask the cooperation of the IPR in advice on materials, personnel, and curriculum. The purpose of this school is to train officers in the techniques and problems of military government in areas taken over from the enemy.

Another paragraph reads as follows:

Dillard and Miller would like our assistance at several points. Immediately they would like suggestions on far eastern personnel available and competent to give instruction, at least for this first summer period. I would be glad to have suggestions as to historians, political scientists, geographers, etc., who might be considered in this connection.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, do you remember receiving that memorandum?

Mrs. BARNES. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you deny that you received that memorandum?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't deny it, I have no recollection of the whole matter.

Mr. MORRIS. You will notice the date of that, Mrs. Barnes, is 1942.

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you were not an employee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. BARNES, No; I wasn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of anybody else, any other staff member of the IPR, who had the initials K. B.?

Mrs. BARNES. I am not at all familiar with the staff of the IPR after I left it at all.

Mr. MORRIS. But it is your testimony that you were not at that time an employee of the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. That is right. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, where were you on March 27, 1942?

Mrs. BARNES. I imagine in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the institute send on copies of memorandum up to you after you terminated your employment?

Mrs. BARNES. Not that I recollect at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone, in fact, ask you for recommendations for personnel for the military government?

Mrs. BARNES. I have no recollection of such a happening.

Mr. MORRIS. And yet you do not deny that you have seen such a memorandum?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't deny a thing, if I don't recollect it at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, this was a document from the file of the institute, was it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into the record?

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Senator WATKINS. I will accept it in the record, but I might say that it is not of very much weight unless it is connected up in some other way. In a court, it probably would not be received in evidence without some connecting link to tie it in.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, it is not admissible in connection with Mrs. Barnes, Mr. Chairman, but I think it is admissible of the fact that Mr. Lockwood did circularize the employees of the institute with a view toward their getting recommendations for military government.

Senator WATKINS. For that purpose, I think, for whatever value it has, it will be put in the record, and it will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 415," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 415

MARCH 27, 1942.

To: KB GET WLH
KRCG DB ECC
MSF PEL MG
CP

From WWL:

The newest government project calling for study of the Far East is a School of Military Government being organized under the auspices of the War Department. This is to be located at the University of Virginia under the direction of Maj. H. C. Dillard and J. I. Miller. These two gentlemen called on me Tuesday to ask the cooperation of the IPR in advice on materials, personnel, and curriculum. The purpose of this school is to train officers in the techniques and problems of military government in areas taken over from the enemy.

As the war progresses, and as the military forces and successful large areas will be freed from Axis domination and will require provisional military administrations. In many respects the policies followed in this interim period may set the mold for long-term postwar economic and political readjustment.

It is proposed to provide a selected group of officers with general background training for this job. The first course will begin in June and run for approximately three months. The curriculum will include elementary training in the organization of the Army and the War Department and legal procedural problems, and historical experience where it seems applicable. As men are ticketed for various areas they will be given intensive background courses in the history, geography, resources, economic and political organization of the areas in question.

Dillard and Miller would like our assistance at several points. Immediately they would like suggestions on far eastern personnel available and competent to give instruction, at least for this first summer period. I would be glad to have suggestions as to historians, political scientists, geographers, etc., who might be considered in this connection.

In the second place they want help in building up a library of teaching materials. On looking over my shelf of recent IPR books, they decided that they should have virtually all of our books, periodicals, and reports. I am sending them a complete list, eliminating only those things that clearly are not useful, and in addition including suggestions regarding non-IPR materials.

The headquarters of the School of Military Government at present are in the new Armory Building, 10th and B Streets SE, Washington, D. C. (War Department Extension 71951).

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, were you ever a director of the American-Russian Institute?

Mrs. BARNES. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't remember exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the American-Russian Institute in 1941?

Mrs. BARNES. I think I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a contributor to Soviet Russia Today?

Mrs. BARNES. I have written for it; yes.

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Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a member of the editorial board of the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes. I think I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mrs. Barnes, we introduced into the record in open session before this committee a compilation of your works in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations which appears as exhibit No. 185, part 2, page 645. You have that compilation in front of you?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you acknowledge that that appears to be an accurate compilation of your contributions to the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. You mean the fact that I did write these things?

Mr. MORRIS. That you did write those things.

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, it is my impression so.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you know, that is an accurate compilation?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes. You may have left something off.

Mr. MORRIS. But, in the short time that you have had to study it, it seems to be an accurate compilation of your contributions?

Mrs. BARNES. It seems to me that I did write these things; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, do you recall making a contribution to Pacific Affairs in December 1935 in connection with an article written by Hansu Chan for the publication China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any experience with the publication China Today at that time?

Mrs. BARNES. What do you mean by experience with it?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, had you any dealings with the magazine China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. I have been trying to think of this since the executive session, trying to remember that. I don't remember writing them letters.

Mr. MORRIS. And yet you did digest an article that appeared in China Today for that publication, did you not, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. Digest it for——

Mr. NORRIS. An article that appeared in China Today for the Pacific Affairs of December 1935?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So, therefore, you must have read at least that issue of China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now can you tell us to what extent you had been a reader of China Today at that time?

Mrs. BARNES. Frankly, I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with the editors of China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. That is what I think I have been thinking of, and I think I probably did.

Mr. MORRIS. What editors?

Mrs. BARNES. Pardon?

Mr. MORRIS. What editors?

Mrs. BARNES. Well, I cannot absolutely recollect who were the editors at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did you know Mr. Field at that time, Mr. Frederick V. Field?

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Mrs. BARNES. I knew Mr. Field at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was an editor of China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. Did I know it at that time? I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Chi?

Mrs. BARNES. I did not know any Mr. Chi at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was an editor of China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. That Mr. Chi was an editor of China Today? At that time, I did not know Mr. Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Mr. Chi was the author of the article signed Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. At that time; no.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you learn that Mr. Chi was the bearer of the name Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. I do not remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you estimate when you first learned it, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. No; frankly, I can't estimate it, but I should say it must have been quite a time ago.

Mr. MORRIS. How long after 1935, the date of this article?

Mrs. BARNES. I should think several years.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the circumstances of your learning that Mr. Chi used the name Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would try, for us, Mrs. Barnes, please.

Did you ever personally meet Mr. Chi?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you that he was Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. Not that I recollect; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did you know that China Today was a Communist publication?

Mrs. BARNES. When did I know it?

Mr. MORRIS. At any time?

Mrs. BARNES. An official Communist publication?

Mr. MORRIS. No, a publication that was Communist in orientation.

Mrs. BARNES. I don't know what you mean by how it was oriented.

Mr. MORRIS. A magazine that supported the purposes and the ideals of the Chinese Communists.

Mrs. BARNES. What was the original question?

Mr. FORER. That is the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, that is the question. Did you know at any time that the magazine China Today was a supporter of the ideals and the purposes of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BARNES. It is very hard to recollect what one thought about a thing. I think I must have thought at some time that it tended in that direction; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Chi ever tell you that he was associated with China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. Not that I recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall, as a matter of fact, who did tell you that Mr. Chi was in fact Mr. Hansu Chan?

Mrs. BARNES. I can't recall anybody.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Field tell you?

Mrs. BARNES. Not that I recollect.

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Mr. MORRIS. Apparently we can't proceed any further on that score, Mr. Chairman. Apparently we have asked Mrs. Barnes to extend herself as much as possible to recall how she did know that Mr. Chi was in fact Hansu Chan.

Mrs. BARNES. And frankly, I cannot remember.

Senator WATKINS. That will have to be her answer, if it is the best answer she can give.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have read into the record the little paragraph which bore the signature "Kathleen Barnes" in the December 1935 issue of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Mandel, would you read that into the record, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from page 477:

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

In the last issue of Pacific Affairs, there appeared an article by Harold Isaacs entitled "Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution: A Marxist View." The September number of China Today carried a direct answer to this article, written by Hansu Chan. This answer is intended to refute both Mr. Isaacs' conclusions and the premises upon which they are based. It is so challenging and so vital to any student of Far Eastern affairs that it should be presented to those who read the first article and who might otherwise not know of this rebuttal. An abstract of Mr. Chan's answer follows.

Kathleen Barnes is signed under that statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, was that intended to be an official Stalinist refutation of a Trotskyist version of China society?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't know that it is an official Stalinist rebuttal. I would say that it tended to be a Stalinist thing, and the other one a Trotskyist thing; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, how well known was it that Mr. Chi wrote under the name of Hansu Chan for China Today?

Mrs. BARNES. I am sure I can't answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of anyone else in the Institute of Pacific Relations who knew that Hansu Chan was in fact Dr. Chi?

Mrs. BARNES. Well, if I knew I suppose quite a lot of other people did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say it was a matter of common knowledge?

Mrs. BARNES. I frankly don't know. I mean, I cannot remember. I cannot remember this distance back. I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, I am going to have introduced into the record, principally for your recognizing the authenticity of the letters, a series of letters, and if you have no comment to make on them we can simply put them into the record and let it go at that.

Mrs. BARNES. I can't guarantee the authenticity of things.

Mr. MORRIS. No, but you can make whatever comment that is accurate on each one of these.

This, Mr. Chairman, is a letter to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes from Mr. E. V. Harondar, dated June 20, 1935.

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that that is a copy of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 20, 1935, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes and signed by E. V. Harondar, Secretary, Council of the U. S. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations, 20 Razin Street, Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, do you recall having received that letter?

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Mrs. BARNES. Is that the one I saw a little while ago?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I showed you all of these letters.

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recall receiving it, but I doubtless did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Harondar?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think I ever met him; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who he was?

Mrs. BARNES. Mr. Harondar was the Secretary, I think, of the Soviet Council. No, I never met him. I am sure I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. This is on the letterhead of the council of the U. S. S. R. Institute of Pacific Relations, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, dated June 20, 1935. But you can give no testimony to this letter?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recollect any. I don't recollect receiving it, but I doubtless did.

Senator WATKINS. The letter will be received as a part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 416" and is as follows:)

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, June 20, 1935.

MRS. KATHLEEN BARNES,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: In Mr. Kantorovich's absence I am acknowledging receipt of your letter of May 24. Mr. Lattimore's book mentioned therein has been just received, but the History of the Russian Revolution is still on its way to Moscow. As soon as it is received we will make arrangements to have them reviewed in compliance with your request.

We were not writing to you about the books you sent us pending receipt of all publications listed in your letter. Only a part of these arrived so far and I am trying to trace the rest of them through the Moscow post office. However, the list of these books as well as those of them we have already received clearly indicate that this consignment constitutes a most interesting and valuable contribution to our library, for which please accept our sincerest thanks. We are endeavoring to collect a set of books which would represent an adequate compensation for the collection you sent us—and I have to confess that this is not an easy task. A few days ago we sent you a complimentary copy of the last issue of U. S. S. R. in Construction devoted to the Soviet Far East and a brief handbook of economic information entitled "The U. S. S. R. in Figures." Both will probably be of interest to you and the fact that they are published in English will render their use possible to non-Russian speaking members of your staff.

Further referring to our previous correspondence concerning data for Mr. Cressey I take pleasure in informing you that the other day a consignment of maps containing, (1) soil map of the European part of the U. S. S. R., (2) soil map of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R., (3) map of the forests of the European part of the U. S. S. R., (4) geological map of the European part of the U. S. S. R., (5) geological map of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R., (p. 25), (6) hypsometrical map of the European part of the U. S. S. R., (7) map of quaternary deposits, left Moscow for U. S. A. These maps have been addressed to the American Council in New York.

Sometime ago we received a letter from the library of the Academy of Science of the U. S. S. R. asking for information as to the possibility of further continuation of their exchange relations with you. We could only refer them to you direct, stating that our considerations concerning this matter have been made known to you by our letter of March 10.

As soon as all the books listed in your communication are received here I will write you again. I hope that by this time I will be able to advise that the next consignment of our books left Moscow for New York.

Sincerely yours,

[s] E. HARONDAR
E. V. HARONDAR, *Secretary.*

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Mrs. BARNES. Do you want me to——

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, if you have anything, Mrs. Barnes, to add to this in any way, we would appreciate very much your comment.

Mrs. BARNES. That does talk about this exchange of books between the Soviet Council and the American Council, which we were sending books, one to the other, and I was building up the Russian-language library which we had in the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. In other words, you were engaging in the exchange of literature with the Soviet Council?

Mrs. BARNES. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And I think that first paragraph, Mr. Chairman, which does, in fact, cover an exchange.

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, it seemed to. He was talking about a shipment of books that he had sent, and they were hoping to send us one back that would be equally useful.

Mr. MORRIS. It says here:

In Mr. Kantorovich's absence I am acknowledging receipt of your letter of May 24.

So apparently you had written to Mr. Harondar, then Mr. Harondar could not have been the secretary at that time, could he?

Mrs. BARNES. What is he signed as?

Mr. MORRIS. Secretary.

Mr. Lattimore's book mentioned therein has been just received, but the History of the Russian Revolution is still on its way to Moscow.

Who is the author of the History of the Russian Revolution?

Mrs. BARNES. I haven't the slightest idea.

Senator WATKINS. As a writer, do you not keep pretty well acquainted with the books that are coming out in this particular field, and the names, at least, of the authors?

Mrs. BARNES. Well, I mean, I did at that time, yes; but no longer.

Senator WATKINS. You do not remember now?

Mrs. BARNES. I certainly don't remember, no.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, I have here a copy of a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter to you, dated April 16, 1938.

Mr. Chairman, will you accept this into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received as a part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 417" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 417

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, April 16, 1938.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES,
Office.

DEAR KATHLEEN: Your friend Sturgeon, who is still giving 80 to 90 percent of his time to the fisheries question, desired the following:

1. To have me tell you yet again how admirable he thought your article in the Far Eastern Survey.

2. To have me understand how tactfully and efficiently you handled everyone in Seattle.

3. To have me assure you that he was disappointed that you had not yet carried out your announced intention of visiting Washington and seeing him.

4. To have me request you to let him know when your big study would be (*a*) finished, (*b*) published.

5. To have me tell you that he assumes you know of the study being made by Bingham of Harvard on the jurisdictional aspect of fisheries which, pre-

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sumably, is to be published in August. If you have not happened to hear it, he thought you would want to get in touch with Bingham in the near future.

With my very best congratulations, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the authenticity of that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of the letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the carbon copy being from the files, dated April 16, 1938, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, and signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall receiving this letter?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recall, but I doubtless did. It is 14 years years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand. May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. It has gone into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a letter from Kathleen Barnes to Frederick Field, from Seattle, Wash., dated August 21, 1937, on the letterhead of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is the original of the letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 21, 1937, addressed to "Dear Fred" and signed "Kate," and the typewritten signature "Kathleen Barnes."

It is on the letterhead of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, can you recall having written that letter?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recall writing it, but I undoubtedly did.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that appear to be your signature?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes, it looks like my handwriting and my type.

Mr. MORRIS. May this be received?

Senator WATKINS. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 418" and is as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 418

Telephone, PLaza 3-4700 Cable, InPAREL, NEW YORK

AMERICAN COUNCIL
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
129 EAST 52D STREET, NEW YORK CITY

Officers:
Carl L. Alsberg, Chairman
Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman
Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman
Frederick V. Field, Secretary
Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer
Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

Research Staff:
Kathleen Barnes
Miriam S. Farley
Russell Hall
William W. Lockwood, Jr.
Catherine Porter
Russell G. Shiman

BARONESS APARTMENTS,
1005 Spring St., Seattle, Washington, August 21, 1937.

DEAR FRED: Commenting on your letter to Bill Lockwood re change or no change in our activities now that things have broken into action in our realm of interest, I agree with your point of view. I heartily endorse a pamphlet. It should sell like hotcakes. In fact I think we had better do it quickly before someone else does a bad one.

The present unpleasantness certainly comes as no surprise to any of us. The work we have undertaken was all begun while this thing was brewing. If it was important enough then, it should be important now. If there is any value to our

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endeavors at the acquisition and dissemination of the drier forms of knowledge, it is, I hope, a permanent one. However we will have to meet more demands of a current nature than we have in the past. Inevitably we will be looked to as fountainheads of wisdom on all topics, from military strategy to the prevention of typhus and camp-followers. Also, somebody might as well get something out of situations such as these and it is a change for us to capitalize on the fact that the Far East is on the forefront of the news and hence of people's minds. Anything that can be turned out in written form or spoken will be of value both to dissemination of fairly correct information and to enhancing people's respect for the I. P. R., also it may be hoped to cause them to loosen the strings of their money bags. The question of how much of such extra work we can do is another thing. It takes so infernally long just to do one thing let alone several.

The tone of my letters seems unfortunately serious. Also my verbiage gets worse. Sorry.

A war would start when the office was in the middle of summer vacations. I hope it is not getting you down too much, you and Bruno and whoever else are there. How's New Hartford?

Too bad about Reischauer. Also too bad about Levanevsky & Co.

Fish are getting me down. Are you coming to the conference?

Sincerely,

[s] Kate
KATHLEEN BARNES.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, did you ever work at the Institute of Oceanography for the U. S. S. R.?

Mrs. BARNES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with it?

Mrs. BARNES. It may have been one of the organizations that I sent material to, and they sent books on fish.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you engage in a fishing research project for the institute?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us something about that, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. That was a study of the fisheries of the North Pacific, North Pacific Fisheries was the name of the book, and I am surprised that you don't have it down on this list, by the way. Shouldn't the book be on this list?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, it should be, Mrs. Barnes.

Mrs. BARNES. And it was inspired by the—I don't know if you recollect at that time there was quite a certain feeling in the papers about Japanese fishing off the coasts of Alaska in such a way that they were outside, I think, the 3-mile limit, so that they were in—if you consider the 3-mile as the legal position—they were outside the position.

But there was a feeling among the people interested in fish that they were so fishing that they were destroying or cutting down on the salmon runs, which, as you probably know, come into the various rivers up in Alaska.

It seemed it was a potential source of friction between this country and Japan, and I wrote an article about it, and from that grew the desire that a book should likewise be written on the subject, which I proceeded to work on.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow interested in the statistics acquired in the study?

Mrs. BARNES. I haven't the slightest idea.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, there was an exchange of information with the Soviet Council of the IPR on this project, was there not, Mrs. Barnes?

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Mrs. BARNES. I don't recollect so. I don't remember it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not remember exchanging statistics and facts found as a result of this project with the Soviet Council of the IPR?

Mrs. BARNES. They undoubtedly got a copy of the book when it was printed.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the statistics gleaned from the project itself?

Mrs. BARNES. No. They were in the book, I mean, the book was full of statistics.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. But there was a whole study undertaken by the Institute, was there not, Mrs. Barnes?

Your book was not the only compilation of the results of the project?

Mrs. BARNES. That particular project which I did was—I mean, that was the only thing as the result of the work I did, and there was another man working on it, too—I mean Gregory. That was the only one on that.

Then I believe there was a legal study undertaken on whether the 3-mile was the limit or whether the 12-mile was the limit, and probably the international rights.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Mr. Gregory? Can you identify him for the record, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. Mr. Gregory was a professor in Seattle.

Mr. MORRIS. And who was the one who undertook the legal study?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't remember the person's name.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your testimony that you cannot recall the extent to which the results and the statistics and the compilations on this project were interchanged with the Soviet Council?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think anything was interchanged, that I recollect, at all. Everything that was pertinent and valuable for the study went into the book which they ultimately got. That is all I know of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mrs. Barnes. But it was the practice of the Russian Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations to engage with the American Council of the IPR and exchange bits of information, studies, projects, and the like?

Mr. BARNES. I suppose they got notification of the projects, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. But you have seen in the testimony here of open sessions extensive incidents of that, have you not?

Mrs. BARNES. I am sorry, I have not read all of it.

Mr. MORRIS. But that which you have read, you certainly noticed that some of it involved you, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I think that is quite different. The stuff that my name was involved on was the question of exchanging books in order, as I said before, to build up this library which I was building in the institute, for the purposes of study.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Now you got the books out of the Soviet Council, did you not?

Mrs. BARNES. I got books from the Soviet Council.

Mr. MORRIS. And you in turn sent books over to the Soviet Council?

Mrs. BARNES. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all I am asking you.

Mrs. BARNES. But you said whether I sent over figures and statistics and things like that.

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Mr. MORRIS. But in these books, the fishing project thing, was a mess of statistics, was there not?

Mrs. BARNES. I said they undoubtedly got the book, did I not? They undoubtedly had the Government reports on the fishing which I had gotten those reports from. They may have, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. What of those other books and documents that were mentioned in the testimony, those involving, for instance, the Manual on the Panama Canal?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't recollect the incident, but undoubtedly they asked for it, and I would send it to them if it was a thing that was publicly printed and I was able to get it.

Mr. MORRIS. So, as a matter of fact, there was a practice engaged in of exchange of information and exchange of books between the Soviet Council of the IPR and the American Council of the IPR?

Mrs. BARNES. Exchange of books; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And memoranda?

Mrs. BARNES. Undoubtedly there were letters written by one council to the other; yes. But I don't remember any sections taken out of books before they were published being sent around.

Mr. MORRIS. No; but there was no implication whatever of that, Mrs. Barnes.

Mrs. BARNES. I am sorry. I must have completely misunderstood.

Mr. MORRIS. I will show you a letter from Mr. Jerome D. Greene, on the letterhead of Harvard University, dated March 29, 1935, addressed to Mrs. Joseph Barnes, Institute of Pacific Relation, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y., which letter discusses the Rockefeller Foundation interests and the sponsorship by the Institute of Pacific Relations of a Russian language school to be held in the summer of 1936.

Can you recall receiving that letter, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I undoubtedly did. I mean, I have no clear recollection of receiving it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you authenticate that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the stationery of Harvard University, dated March 29, 1935, addressed to Mrs. Joseph Barnes and from Jerome D. Greene.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It will be received and made a part of the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 419" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 419

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Cambridge, Mass., March 29, 1935.

Jerome D. Greene, Secretary to the Corporation, to University Hall.

Mrs. JOSEPH BARNES,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Thank you for your letter of March 21 in answer to my inquiry about intensive language courses in Russian, Chinese, and Japanese during the sumer of 1936.

I shall confer with Professor Cross about the possibility of a Russian Language School in the summer of 1936. As the sponsorship of the Institute of

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Pacific Relations has proved a valuable factor I should hope it might be continued, even if we should organize the Russian Language School here ourselves and without drawing on any funds of the IPR except such as its sponsorship might help us to get from a foundation. While I am not in a position to say what the Rockefeller Foundation will do in this respect and am rather careful to dissociate myself from all applications for the benefit of Harvard University as I am a trustee and a member of the executive committee of the Foundation, I see no impropriety whatever in having the application made with the IPR's endorsement and at least nominal cooperation. After all, if the money should be available there is no harm but positive good to come from having a Russian language course given both in the East and in the West the same year, provided enough teachers can be found to go round.

I am even more interested in the prospect of a summer course in Japanese and Chinese, though I have not discussed the matter very fully here as yet.

I think these intensive foreign language courses constitute one of the best services which the IPR has rendered, first by its initiative and second by its help in getting financial support.

Sincerely yours,

JEROME D. GREENE.

P. S.—I enclose an extra copy of this letter so that you can forward it to Mr. Field if you think best.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us to what extent you were acquainted with that particular language project?

Mrs. BARNES. I was acquainted very well with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it briefly?

Mrs. BARNES. We organized a school of intensive teaching of the Russian language, and I believe later—yes, I know later on—it was followed by a school of the intensive teaching of the Chinese language and a school of the Japanese language.

This Russian school sort of pioneered what was regarded as the intensive method of having people sit down and study for 5 or 6 hours a day on the language study.

We felt that they did get a great deal more in a short time that way, and it was a good way to learn the language. I think we had that Russian language school for about 2 or 3 years.

We felt it was valuable for promoting understanding of the problems of the Pacific.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with that last point, where there was a seeming misunderstanding between the witness and myself, I would like to have read into the record a letter from Mr. E. C. Carter, apparently written from the steamship *Chitral*, dated January 24, 1935, addressed to "Dear Fred." It is addressed to Mr. F. Field, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow gave me, indicating precisely what American fisheries publications they already have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect of the fish business.

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by way of confirmation.

Sincerely yours,

E. C. CARTER.

Does not that, Mrs. Barnes, indicate that there was an extensive exchange on the subject?

Mrs. BARNES. That, I believe, was long before the fisheries book which we were discussing was begun, and the Institute of Oceanog-

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raphy—I don't recollect. It may very well have been a contributing member to the Council of the Institute over there.

I mean, I just hazard a guess on the thing, and I wanted material on fisheries. If they hadn't gotten a complete one, I undoubtedly got them for them. But it had nothing to do with my work, which I think we got mixed up on before.

Mr. MORRIS. This is already introduced into the record as exhibit 187 (pt. 2, p. 648). There is no need for going into it.

But Mr. Carter points out, as I have already stated:

As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions.

Is that not a clear indication that you were engaged, on January 24, 1935, in a practice of seeing that the Soviet Council of the IPR or the Institute of Oceanography were getting extensive statistics on the fishing industry?

Mrs. BARNES. I got confused on this thing now. Does not that indicate that I was sending them stuff?

Mr. MORRIS. That you were in the practice of seeing to it that the Soviet Council or the Institute of Oceanography were being supplied with statistical information on the fishing industry?

Mrs. BARNES. It sounds so; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this letter not recall anything along those lines to you, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. I do have some recollection, I do have some recollection of getting very colorful folders, you know.

Mr. MORRIS. So, as a matter of fact, you did, in addition to sending your volume over, you did send some other information on the fishing industry?

Mrs. BARNES. So it would seem. But my point is that was before the volume was even begun, and had no connection therewith. I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the extent to which Mr. Field also sent statistics on the fishing industry?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think Mr. Field sent anything. I think he would hand it over to me.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were the practical assistant to Mr. Field on this project?

Mrs. BARNES. It was my department; yes. And whatever statistics I sent them, I am sure, were, you know, printed statistics, the fisheries department——

Mr. MORRIS. Then you were in contact with commercial firms in order to obtain considerable information along that line, were you not?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't think I got considerable information from commercial firms at all. I think I may have gotten some folders.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here, Mrs. Barnes, a letter from Mr. Frederick V. Field to Mr. Carter. That is dated San Francisco, April 19, 1935.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have a copy of your letter of April 16 to Kathleen Barnes which conveys to her the praise which Sturgeon of the State Department had for her Far Eastern Survey article on fisheries. I notice in point No. 5 that you refer to a fisheries study by Bingham of Harvard of which you assume Kate is informed. This is without doubt our own American Council study of the jurisdictional aspects of the fisheries question which is being conducted by Bingham, who may have once attended Harvard, but who is now at Stanford.

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If I am mistaken in this, please let me know, for it would be somewhat alarming at this late date to discover that another Bingham and this one at Harvard was producing the same thing which our Bingham was producing at Stanford.

Does that letter indicate that as late as 1938 you were still engaged in this fisheries project?

Mrs. BARNES. I don't know when I began it. But I don't think I began it until 1937. You mean the fisheries project of writing that book on fisheries?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mrs. BARNES. It wasn't begun until 1937. I was working on it in 1938. And I believe you asked me before, did you not, of the name of the person who was doing the legal work.

I conclude from that that it was Bingham.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received in the record after authentication by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original on the letterhead of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 19, 1938, San Francisco, to Mr. Edward C. Carter from Frederick V. Field, signed "Fred."

Senator WATKINS. It will be received as part of the record.

(The letter referred was marked "Exhibit No. 420" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Barnes, our exhibit No. 58 (see pt. 1, p. 262), which was introduced in the public record on August 2, 1951, discussed at length here a division of people interested in Russian studies. It says:

The fourth group consists of the few people who are already familiar with the institute record in the Soviet Union or could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism.

Do you remember reading this memorandum?

Mrs. BARNES. Yes; I read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment to make on that?

Mrs. BARNES. Except I don't remember knowing an awful lot about the institute, its work, and all, at that particular time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Barnes, do you remember attending a meeting that was held in honor of Sir Stafford Cripps?

Mrs. BARNES. I remember seeing that reference. It is quite possible I was there. I can't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you not recall that you attended a rather intimate party on behalf of Mr. Cripps?

Mrs. BARNES. I am sorry, I don't know. It is quite possible.

Senator WATKINS. May I inquire, you seem on so many of these points that you do not remember, you do not recall. You say it may have happened.

Surely, a party of this kind you would remember, would you not?

Mrs. BARNES. What was the date?

Senator WATKINS. Even if it was quite a while ago.

Mrs. BARNES. Frankly, really—I mean, I really don't know. I mean, I would have gone, I would have no hesitation in saying I did go, but I just don't happen to recollect it, that is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been to any intimate parties given on behalf of Sir Stafford Cripps?

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Mrs. BARNES. I can't recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. When I say "intimate party," I have here the list, Mrs. Barnes. It is composed of 32 people who attended, apparently.

Mrs. BARNES. I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. I will show you exhibit No. 217, which appears at page 687 of part 2 of the public hearings.

What is the date of it, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. 1940, April 2. That is 12 years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. That memorandum indicates that you were there, does it not, Mrs. Barnes?

Mrs. BARNES. It indicates that I was invited or suggested as a person to go. And I say quite frankly I may very well have gone, but I just frankly don't recollect it. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. The chairman does not have any. Do you want to recess?

Mr. MORRIS. Recess.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess subject to the call of the chairman.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 p. m., Friday, February 8, 1952, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4:15 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume the session. Cali your witnesses.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux.

Senator WATKINS. You have already been sworn in executive session before this committee?

Mr. DECAUX. That is correct.

TESTIMONY OF LEONARD DeCAUX, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, DAVID REIN, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your full name, for the record?

Mr. DECAUX. My name is Leonard DeCaux.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your address, Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DECAUX. 5 Beekman, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position?

Mr. DECAUX. Managing editor for the magazine March of Labor.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is the editor?

Mr. DECAUX. John Steuben.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is the stockholder of the corporation that edits that publication?

Mr. DECAUX. I do not know the names of the stockholders. The president is Mr. Vincent Halinan.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, have you been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you join the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. I think it was in 1942. My memory is vague on dates, because I have not been able to refresh it from papers out in California, so I ask to be excused if I guess at some of the dates.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that it would approximate the time of your joining the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. I believe it was.

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Mr. MORRIS. Are you presently a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. No.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you resign?

Mr. DECAUX. I never resigned; I just stopped paying dues.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you stop paying dues?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't remember exactly. That must have been around 1947 or 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, have you been a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall what years you were a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. DECAUX. Not exactly. I think it was just after the war, but I am a little vague on those dates. I do not recall exactly. I believed I served two terms.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born, Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DECAUX. In New Zealand.

Mr. MORRIS. What year?

Mr. DECAUX. 1899.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you educated at Harrow School?

Mr. DECAUX. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Oxford University?

Mr. DECAUX. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Brookwood Labor College?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you married to Carolina Abrams?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you marry her on July 14, 1928?

Mr. DECAUX. I believe that was the date.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you come to the United States in 1921?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you naturalized?

Mr. DECAUX. In 1928.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever work for the Committee of Industrial Organizations?

Mr. DECAUX. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold for that organization?

Mr. DECAUX. I held the position of publicity director and editor of the CIO News for the Committee for Industrial Organization and its successor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. Until what year?

Mr. DECAUX. Until 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you sever connection with that organization at that time?

Mr. DECAUX. I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the reason behind your resignation?

Mr. DECAUX. I resigned to do some writing.

Mr. MORRIS. While you held the aforesaid positions, Mr. DeCaux, were you closely associated with Mr. Lee Pressman in that organization?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, may that question be suspended for a moment, with the chairman's permission?

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Senator WATKINS. It may be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want us to understand, Mr. DeCaux, that you have told us the whole truth with regard to your resignation from your position with the CIO?

Mr. DECAUX. I told you the reason that I resigned and that it was announced. I didn't go into what might have happened between Mr. Murray and myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us have the whole truth.

Mr. DECAUX. I was asked to resign by Mr. Murray.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us why?

Mr. DECAUX. We had some differences.

Mr. SOURWINE. About what?

Mr. DECAUX. In regard to the public relations of the CIO and on account of the CIO News.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what way?

Mr. DECAUX. Mr. Murray was not specific. He said he was not satisfied.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, testimony has been given before this committee by two witnesses, Mr. Whitaker Chambers and Mr. Louis Budenz, to the effect that you have been in the past a member of the Communist Party.

Would you tell this committee whether or not in fact you have been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DECAUX. I claim the privilege of declining to answer the question under the fifth amendment of the Constitution on the ground of possible self-incrimination.

Senator WATKINS. By refusing to answer that question, are you afraid if you answer it truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes, sir; on the grounds it is possibly self-incriminating.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, I have here from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations a letter dated November 16, 1945, from Mr. Dennett to Mr. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. Chairman, will you have this received in the record after it is identified by Mr. Mandel?

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Mandel, do you identify this?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 16, 1945, to E. C. C. from R. D.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, so the record may be clear, this carbon copy as it exists, being the carbon copy of an original, the whereabouts of which we are not aware, this particular carbon copy itself was found in the Institute of Pacific Relations files; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is not a copy of something that was found in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. Correct.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 421," and is as follows:)

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EXHIBIT No. 421

NOVEMBER 16, 1945.

To: ECC.
From: RD.

Answering your memorandum of November 15, the following is a list of the trustees whom I have met, with the number of times I have met them indicated in parentheses:

B. C. Allen (5)
Eugene E. Barnett (a score)
Pearl S. Buck (4)
Robert D. Calkins (a score)
J. P. Chamberlain (2)
Allan E. Charles (4)
Len DeCaux (7 or 8)
Edwin R. Embree (5)
Brooks Emeny (a dozen)
John Fairbank (7 or 8)
Frederick F. Field (a score)
Galen Fisher (a dozen)
Huntington Gilchrist (a score)
Henry F. Grady (2)
Mortimer Graves (6)
Jerome D. Greene (2)
J. W. Greenslade (8 or 9)
G. Ellsworth Huggins (a score)
Benjamin H. Kizer (a dozen)
Owen Lattimore (a dozen)
Charles F. Loomis (at Hot Springs)
Henry R. Luce (2)
Charles E. Martin (a score)
James L. McConaughy (a score)
Frank R. McCoy (7 or 8)
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin (7 or 8)
Lawrence Morris (a score)
Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein (a score)
Philo Parker (4)
W. S. Rosecrans (2)
Chester Rowell (1)
Lawrence D. Seymour (a dozen)
Robert G. Sproul (4)
Elbert D. Thomas (2)
John Carter Vincent (7 or 8, plus Hot Springs)
Brayton Wilbur (a dozen)
Ray Lyman Wilbur (4)
Payson Wild (none since he became a trustee)
Mrs. Louise Wright (7 or 8)
Admiral H. E. Yarnell (5 or 6)

Of these, Charles, Emeny, Fairbank, Fisher, Kizer, Lattimore, Sproul, Brayton Wilbur, and Mrs. Wright have visited the office, in addition to the members of the executive committee, all of whom, I believe, have been here at one time or another.

In some cases the meetings mentioned above have been casual as, for example, with Henry Grady but, in most instances, I talked specific IPR business with these trustees. My most intensive talks have been with the Bay region members, most of whom I saw a number of times during my visits and, particularly, at the time of the San Francisco Conference.

I have only seen the trustees listed above.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, this is an estimate or what purports to be an estimate of the number of times Mr. Dennett, who was then secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, estimated that he dealt with the various members of the board of trustees at that time.

I think you have a copy before you. You will notice that indicates:

Answering your memorandum of November 15, the following is a list of the trustees whom I have met, with the number of times I have met them indicated in parentheses: * * *

Len DeCaux (seven or eight).

Mr. Chairman, that was introduced in the record as evidence of the extent to which Mr. DeCaux was active in the Institute of Pacific Relations as manifest by this particular document.

Senator WATKINS. Who is R. D.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Raymond Dennett, then secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony that you did meet with Mr. Dennett seven or eight times?

Mr. DECAUX. I do not recall how many times I met him. It is possible, if he said so, I met him that many times. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, I would like to call your attention to our public exhibit No. 132 (see pt. 2, p. 494), which was introduced at the open hearings of August 16, 1951.

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That was a copy of an IPR document, of a letter sent by Mr. Philip C. Jessup on August 1, 1944, to Mr. Raymond Dennett, Secretary of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, wherein Mr. Jessup made a recommendation for people who should be selected as delegates to the then forthcoming conference of the IPR at Hot Springs.

Mr. DeCaux, I think you will notice in the second paragraph your name appears. Is that right, Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DECAUX. This is a copy of it, is it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; that is right.

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, do you, as a matter of fact, know that Mr. Jessup recommended you as a delegate to the Hot Springs conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DECAUX. I was not aware of who recommended me at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that you did not know who recommended you?

Mr. DECAUX. I do not recall any knowledge at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you remember being invited to act as a delegate?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who invited you to act in that capacity?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall the name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, as a matter of fact, act as a delegate to the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. DECAUX. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with the caucus that the American delegation held prior to that conference?

Mr. DECAUX. I believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in the conference?

Mr. DECAUX. I probably did.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately how many people caucused at that time?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recollect the occasion, but I assume I did attend.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the whole delegation caucus?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, I have here a letter which Mr. Mandel will authenticate.

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original of a letter dated November 24, 1943, addressed to "Dear Harriet" and signed "Rose," on the letterhead of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that taken from the files of the Institution of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that in the record?

Senator WATKINS. The exhibit may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 422" and is as follows:)

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EXHIBIT No. 422

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.
New York Washington, D. C. Chicago San Francisco Honolulu
129 East Fifty-second Street
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.
PLaza 3-4700

744 JACKSON PLACE, NW.

Washington, D. C., November 24, 1943.

DEAR HARRIET: Thanks for last letter which I had hoped to answer long ago; you straightened out everything very nicely. I am so sorry that I was hasty in thinking the three of you had planned the Amco program at lunch that day. Alice may have told you that we sent out a letter which she drafted, a copy of which I enclose which refers to Bill as director of the Washington study program and to me as Washington representative. Bill has not been using me as a stenographer: it's just that the job requires one. But anyhow, we have a new girl now and she may work out all right.

The excitement about your coming marriage is pretty sharp. And, of course, everyone sends you best wishes, etc. When are you and spouse heading in direction of Washington? Soon, I hope.

Mary is leaving Washington on Thursday presumably by air for India. We won't believe it until it all happens? KP left Washington for Salt Lake on Monday evening; the moving etc. in New York left her very tired and she was in no condition to face the Red Cross which I think is a horrid organization anyhow.

The past week has been very exciting. The response to the press luncheon is very good; at least a dozen people have already called me about the general Amco meeting and the invitations just went out on Monday. Len DeCaux took me to lunch and we had an interesting chat for 2 hours in which he told me confidentially that the right wing of the CIO through the Committee for Democratic Action is planning to concentrate on IPR as a liaison organization. Sounds like fun. I await the attack. Nothing has happened yet so I am taking the initiative and inviting Ray Walsh and Kenneth Crawford who lean in that direction (and who are influential in right-wing CIO thinking) to the Japan Amco meeting and to the general Amco membership meeting.

A very curious thing happened yesterday. Kenneth Landon of the State Department and a girl from FEA (intelligence) and someone from OSS all called me in the course of the morning and asked about the "structure of the American Council of the IPR." I read the three of them the statement in the front of new books and am sending them the statement and the Amco report. At first I thought it might be the stirrings of an investigation. Last night Alvin told me about the call from FEA, that someone had asked him about the IPR and he referred her to me. I then told Alvin about the Landon call and he called Landon whom he knows very well and it seems as though it is all due to the Hill dinner, that the top people in OSS, FEA and State invited just didn't know what kind of an organization the IPR was and put people to work on finding out what we were. So I gather that there is nothing to worry about, that it was just a routine question, but funny that all three should come in the same morning.

I think it would be swell if CP could come down for the press luncheon and meet some of these boys. Any chance?

DeCaux gave me some information on CIO people and AFL and I will try to get to work on them as soon as possible.

It was very nice to see Hilda and Art and Andrew yesterday and I hope very much that I'll be seeing you soon.

Yours,

ROSE.

Mr. MORRIS. From the copy that you have, Mr. DeCaux, will you read for the committee the third sentence in the fourth paragraph?

Mr. DECAUX. You want me to read through the whole record?

Mr. MORRIS. Begin with "Len DeCaux took me to lunch."

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The fourth paragraph begins: "The past week has been very exciting." Do you have that paragraph Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DeCaux. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you read the particular sentence beginning with your name?

Mr. DeCaux (reading):

Len DeCaux took me to lunch and we had an interesting chat for 2 hours in which he told me confidentially that the right wing of the CIO through the Committee for Democratic Action is planning to concentrate on the IPR as a liaison organization. Sounds like fun. I await the attack. Nothing has happened yet, so I am taking the initiative and inviting Ray Walsh and Kenneth Crawford who lean in that direction (and who are influential in rightwing CIO thinking) to the Japan Amco meeting and to the general Amco membership meeting.

Mr. Morris. Do you recall taking Rose Yardumian to lunch on or about November 24, 1943?

Mr. DeCaux. I don't recall the conversation.

Mr. Morris. Do you remember having a conversation with Rose Yardumian to the effect she has written in this letter?

Mr. DeCaux. I do not recall the details.

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, Mr. DeCaux, that you did not take Miss Yardumian to lunch?

Mr. DeCaux. I did not say that.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Miss Rose Yardumian?

Mr. DeCaux. I believe I did. The name is familiar to me now. It suggests somebody I knew but I don't recall her personally. The thing is a long time ago and I met so many people I do not recall the circumstances exactly or her exactly.

Mr. Morris. What position did Rose Yardumian hold at that time?

Mr. DeCaux. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. Was she secretary of the Washington office of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DeCaux. I don't know. I don't recall.

Mr. Morris. Do you remember any strategy that would involve an opposition between the Committee for Democratic Action and the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DeCaux. I don't know. My memory is very vague on that. I don't recall what is meant by the Committee for Democratic Action.

Senator Watkins. Who is Rose?

Mr. Morris. Rose Yardumian, we presume.

Mr. Chairman, we have here a letter which Mr. Mandel will identify.

Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon of a letter found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 21, 1942, written to Mr. Robert W. Barnett, Institute of Pacific Relations, from William W. Lockwood, secretary.

Mr. Sourwine. This paper was found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that right?

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. This is exhibit No. 115 (see pt. 2, p. 445) of the open hearings of August 14, 1951. On the copy of the letter that you have before you, Mr. DeCaux, I refer you to the fourth paragraph which reads as follows:

I also invited Len DeCaux, CIO publicity director and editor of the CIO News. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a very favorable impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him.

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Do you remember attending the Mount Tremblant conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DeCaux. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Do you know who the Michael is that is referred to in that paragraph?

Mr. DeCaux. No; I am not sure who is meant by that.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Michael Greenberg?

Mr. DeCaux. I don't recall anyone by that name.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Michael Lee?

Mr. DeCaux. I don't recall the name. It is possible.

I have met a great many people in the course of my conferences and CIO duties, and so forth and so on, on other occasions. When I say don't recall anyone or may say I don't know them or place them, it is possible I may have met some of these people at some conference or convention or some place. That applies to many people.

Mr. Morris. Do you know who recommended you as a delegate to the Mount Tremblant conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DeCaux. My memory is that it was the secretary and I do not exactly recall his name.

Mr. Morris. Who was the secretary?

Mr. DeCaux. This letter stated it was Lockwood. It may have been Lockwood.

Mr. Morris. Two paragraphs down from there it reads:

In the opinion of Hiss, Coe, and Despres, we ought to get Berle or Acheson or both. More about this later, too.

Do you know from your experience in the Institute of Pacific Relation that those three gentlemen, Hiss, Coe, and Despres, were advisers on Institute of Pacific Relations matters?

Mr. DeCaux. I don't recall anything about those gentlemen except I believe I met Mr. Coe at some conferences.

Mr. Morris. Who is Mr. Coe?

Mr. DeCaux. Mr. Frank Coe I met at some conferences. I don't know if that is the one referred to.

Mr. Morris. What position did you hold at the Mount Tremblant conference?

Mr. DeCaux. I simply attended there as a delegate and took part in the discussion.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, our exhibit No. 104 (see pt. 2, p. 425) of the open hearings of August 14, 1951, dated November 30, 1942, begins in paragraph 1—this is a memorandum to Mr. Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup, and it is from William W. Lockwood:

In response to your request for the designations of the American Council members of the Mount Tremblant committees. I am putting down the following suggestions. These should be reconsidered at Mount Tremblant after checking with Jessup, so they are merely tentative for the present.

The last one listed is publications committee—tentatively, Len DeCaux.

Did you serve as head of the publications committee at the Mount Tremblant conference, Mr. DeCaux?

Mr. DeCaux. I think I did. I don't recall serving in any official capacity. It is possible that I was placed on some committee and was not active on it, but I don't recall.

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Mr. MORRIS. Were you associated with the Federated Press at any time?

Mr. DECAUX. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold in the Federated Press?

Mr. DECAUX. I was in charge of the Washington Bureau of the Federated Press in the years 1934 and 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you make any effort to coordinate a program between the Federated Press and the Institute of Pacific Relations during the period you held that particular designation?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall having done so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record at this time a series of releases issued by the Federated Press, which Mr. Mandel will identify for our record.

Mr. MANDEL. These are releases of the Federated Press of various dates beginning with February 1941, found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. What is claimed for these?

Mr. MORRIS. This, Mr. Chairman, purports to be a series of articles which bear the following caption: "Written for"—and the name of the paper is blank—"and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's."

We have one opinion by Andrew Roth. The second is written by Janet K. Howie, who is described as research associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Andrew Roth is identified as the author of numerous articles on India and Indochina. The third is by Jack Shepherd. Mr. Shepherd is identified as an Australian and has lectured at the University of Sydney.

The fourth is by Dorothy Borg of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The fifth is by Dorothy Borg, member of the research staff, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The sixth is by Miriam S. Farley, research associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The next is by Harriet L. Moore, not further identified on this pamphlet.

The next is by Harriet Moore, executive secretary, American-Russian Institute.

The next is by Virginia Thompson, research associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The next is by Chen-han Seng, editor of Far East Bulletin, special correspondent to Federated Press.

The next is by Catherine Porter, member of the research staff, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

The next is by Andrew Roth, author of numerous articles on India and Indochina.

May they be incorporated in the record?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 423" and are as follows:)

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[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 1. Jan. 3, 1941]

LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By MIRIAM S. FARLEY, Research Associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

One of the most impressive buildings in Tokyo is the Diet building, a magnificent white marble structure completed in 1936. On Jan. 20 the Japanese diet will meet in this building for what may be the last session it will ever hold.

As the chief citadel of the democratic movement in Japan, the diet has been under attack for many years. Now there is talk of eliminating it altogether. It may survive as a cog in the new Japanese-style fascist state but it will not be a real democratic parliament.

The Japanese diet has never enjoyed nearly so much power as the American congress or the British parliament. Nevertheless, after the adoption of a constitution in 1889 there was steady, if slow, progress toward genuine democracy.

Universal manhood suffrage was achieved in 1925. In the 1920's the political parties for the first time obtained a real voice in the government. During these years Japan's international policies were more liberal and peaceful than they have been since.

But Japanese democracy was unable to withstand the blasts of the post-1929 depression. In recent years the diet has been so weakened that it has become little more than a rubber stamp for the government in power.

Nevertheless it at least provided a forum for the expression of opinion. Last spring one intrepid member, Takao Saito, created a sensation when he ventured to cast doubt on the righteousness of Japan's war in China. The authorities do not want any more such incidents.

During 1940 a long step toward emasculation of the diet was taken by elimination of the political parties, all of which voluntarily voted to disband. Try to imagine congress functioning in Washington without Republicans or Democrats. But in the coming session of the diet there will be no political parties.

The political parties fell an easy prey to the wave of militaristic reaction because they had never put down deep roots among the people. The two big parties, the Seiyukai and Minseito, were commonly considered the creatures of the big business combines like Mitsui and Mitsubishi.

They defended the interests of private business against the encroachments of a militarized state. But they did not represent the interests of the long-suffering peasants and the ill-paid workers of Japan. Hence the people had little confidence in them and were not too sorry to see them disappear.

There were several small workers' and peasants' parties, which made remarkable gains in the 1936 and 1937 elections. But they were still weak and were swept away in the wave of reaction which followed the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war.

It is usually unsafe to judge Japanese politics by western standards. But even in Japan, recent political history has shown that in times of stress democratic institutions are in danger of being wiped out unless they have a wide base of popular participation and unless they serve the interests of the many rather than the few.

-mfs-alc

CLEVELAND—(FP)—Pres. Roosevelt was requested Dec. 30 to force Harris-Seybold-Potter Co., beneficiary of a $200,000 defense contract, to comply with the national labor relations act. The request came from the United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers (CIO), with whom the firm has refused to deal.

-wd-jp-alc

NEW YORK—(FP)—A new union shop agreement covering 6,000 workers in 217 electrical fixture and lamp plants was signed by Local 3, Intl. Bro. of Electrical Workers (AFL).

cha-jp-alc

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[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 4. Jan. 8, 1941]

LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By HARRIET MOORE, Executive Secretary, American-Russian Institute

The Soviet interest in keeping the war as far as possible from its borders is at present centered in southeastern Europe, where today only Turkey and Bulgaria remain between the war and the Black Sea, the southern frontier of the U. S. S. R.

Soviet relations with these two countries have been in marked contrast to those of czarist Russia. Though both fought against Russia in the first World War, Bulgaria had long been one of the Slavic states under a kind of patronage from Russia, while the Turkish empire was the traditional enemy of the czars in their southward expansion around the Black Sea.

After the revolution the positions were reversed. The Bulgarian government, fearing that its people might follow the example of their Slav cousins in Russia, did not even establish diplomatic relations with the U. S. S. R. until 1934 when first faced with Hitler's Germany. The New Turkey, however, in its battle for national independence and reconstruction following the collapse of the old Ottoman empire in the last war, found in the Soviets a lasting friend.

In the present war, Bulgaria is again heavily subjected to German pressure, and Turkey is bound by a mutual assistance pact to England. The Soviets were disturbed and displeased when Turkey made this arrangement, despite the loophole which Turkey had left to free it from any obligation that might bring it into conflict with the U. S. S. R. The Russians felt that by entering the pact, Turkey would be sucked into the fighting, thus bringing war close to the Soviet south.

Aside from the fact that Turkey actually borders on the oil-rich Caucasus, it also controls the Dardanelles, key to the Black Sea approach to the Ukraine and Caucasus. Were Turkey to enter the war, it could open the straits to the British navy.

The Black Sea is not only a frontier for the U. S. S. R., but a most important route for internal and foreign trade. Oil, manganese, and the fruits and wines of the Caucasus are exchanged across its waters for the coal and iron, the grain and cement of the Ukraine.

Foreign trade also continues on the Black Sea. To have it invaded by belligerent fleets would greatly complicate the position of the Soviets, who well remember that in 1918 the Germans landed in the Caucasus, only to be displaced from the oil fields a year later by the British and French, converging from the east across the Caspian Sea from Persia and from the west through the Dardanelles and across the Black Sea.

For these reasons, the Soviets have exerted their influence to keep the war out of this region; to keep the Dardanelles closed to warring navies. Through increased trade, the U. S. S. R. may be able to help Bulgaria and Turkey protect their economic independence which has been seriously threatened by the wartime disruption of trade. In the case of Bulgaria, the Soviets have also given it diplomatic support, as in approving the return of Dobrudja from Rumania, so long as this could be achieved without fighting.

hm-alc

REPUDIATES ACCUSATION AGAINST UNION MEN

SACRAMENTO, CAL.—(FP)—James Thorne, whose "confession" of helping to creosote houses built by nonunion labor caused the arrest of four Oakland carpenters (now out on a habeas corpus writ), has repudiated his statement.

Thorne says he was forced to sign by the police after being held three days in jail with no food or bed-clothing.

madf-alc

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[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. Feb. 5, 1941]

LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's

By VIRGINIA THOMPSON, Research Associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

In ancient Siam there were seven classes of slaves, and even the freemen were required to perform services for the state and for their patrons. Hence there was no labor problem.

But with the growth of the rice export trade in the late 19th century, slavery gradually lost its economic basis. By 1905, when the change was complete, about a fourth of the nation was economically and socially dislocated.

For years Siam was known as the country in which labor costs were higher than anywhere else in the East. Thousands of Chinese streamed into Thailand to do the work that the native population was unable or unwilling to perform. But a rise of nationalism, coupled with higher immigration fees, has cut down the influx of Chinese to the point where a labor shortage may ultimately be expected.

Out of 8,000,000 occupied persons listed in the census, well above 80% are engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry, and only a little more than 2% in industry. Wages of farm workers range from 23¢ a day in the north to 46¢ in the south. When paid on a seasonal basis, a worker earns in prosperous times from $36 to $55, plus board and lodging, for six months' services.

The Chinese prefer the piecework system, under which an energetic coolie can make as much as $77 a month by dumping paddy into baskets, compared with earnings of $10 to $21 for a day laborer.

An odd aspect of the Siamese economic system is that, reversing conditions in the West, the Siamese bourgeois is the one who works steadily, while it is the peasant who has many unoccupied months—too often spent in drinking, gaming and brigandage. The government has made a small beginning toward technical training for workers and establishing employment offices. But the goal of the average Siamese remains a post in the civil service. Although the government has recognized the danger of developing an exclusively Siamese white-collar class, it has so far done little to avert it.

Chinese workers in the rice mills of Bangkok organized a series of strikes in the 1930's, directed against a cut in pay. The government intervened at the workers' request, but no real headway was made in the struggle for fair wages. A permanent committee to deal with labor problems was established, however, to be followed by a general labor survey.

In 1938 the national assembly overwhelmingly defeated a bill to bring hours, wages and social insurance up to the standards prevailing in other countries. The defeat is explained by the indifference of the nationalistic Siamese to improving the welfare of the Chinese who compose most of the working population. On the other hand the assembly adopted a measure to reserve for Siamese workers about half of the job openings in certain fields.

Thailand still has nothing worthy of being described as a labor movement, although there is a degree of organization among the industrial workers of Bangkok. These form about 1% of the total working population.

Conditions among agricultural workers are far worse. Nothing has been done to improve their status or to assure a more abundant supply of manpower to develop the vast uncultivated lands of the nation.

The alternative to cheaper and more abundant labor is the use of mechanical power, but this is difficult for rice farming and in any case the cost of fuel is prohibitive. The government will soon face a reckoning on its policy of cutting down Chinese immigration without providing for replacement. -vt-alc

BIRMINGHAM—(FP)—The Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO) has signed contracts covering 1,000 workers at the local plants of the U. S. Pipe & Foundry Co. and Southern Cement Co. sl-jp-alc

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LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

(By CHEN HAN-SENG, Editor of Far East Bulletin)

(Special Correspondence to Federated Press)

HONGKONG—(FP).—The fate of China may depend upon the outcome of a civil war that has begun in the southern part of Anhwei province, about 300 miles southwest of Shanghai. In this area, around the village of Mowling, Chinese troops have turned their guns upon other Chinese troops, renewing the fratricidal conflict that has broken out from time to time during the past two years.

Those attacked were part of the New Fourth Army, which includes both Communist and non-Communist elements. About 100,000 troops of this army had moved northward across the Yangste river, as ordered by the national government at Chungking.

Left behind were 4,000 troops attached to the headquarters of the New Fourth, and about 6,000 members of the non-fighting establishments—the political training school, hospitals and so on, including many women and children. The commanders of this body of 10,000 negotiated with Gen. Ku Cho-tung, head of the Third War Zone, for safe conduct across the river.

While negotiations were under way, three divisions of the Ninth Army and five other divisions—80,000 troops in all—began to close in on the 4,000 soldiers. By Jan. 3 the remnant of the New Fourth Army was completely surrounded within an area of 10 square miles.

On Jan. 6 the eight encircling divisions suddenly swooped down on the trapped soldiers and their followers. Immediately—and on two succeeding occasions—the commanders of the New Fourth and the Eighth Route Armies sent joint telegrams to the Natl. Military Commission in Chungking, appealing for cessation of hostilities. Chungking replied that the war zone commander, Gen. Ku Cho-tung, had been instructed to let the New Fourth proceed northward. But at the same time fighting was continued around Mowling with the greatest ferocity.

In their joint telegram of Jan. 13, the commanders of the Eighth Route and New Fourth asked the Chinese public who was disobeying orders and who was breaking the national solidarity. They pointed out that while their troops were holding the Japanese on important battlefronts, they were attacked from the rear by Chinese troops under Chungking's command.

Madame Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese leaders sent a similar message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. They told him that the real enemy of the Chinese is the Japanese invader. But in spite of these appeals, the fighting continued until Jan. 13, when the 4,000 besieged troops ran out of ammunition.

Out of 10,000 people, more than 4,000 were killed and wounded and 2,000 captured. Commander Yeh Ting was seriously wounded; Deputy Commander Han Ying was slain. Also killed were many cadets, political workers, technicians, nurses, and children.

The main body of the New Fourth Army, north of the Yangste, is now facing annihilation, together with the fighters of the Eighth Route Army. Nearly 800,000 Kuomintang troops are ready to launch a bitter internecine war against these two armies.

Since this huge force represents almost half of the Kuomintang armies, it is plain that if the civil war spreads there will be no troops adequate to resist the Japanese. The Japanese would then be able to pull out more troops from China for their expansion policy in the south Pacific.

While the Communist party of China demands the restoration of the New Fourth Army to its official status and a subsidy to the families of those killed and wounded, public opinion throughout the nation requires a measure of justice and harmony. Significant is the comment of the British-owned South China Morning Post (Hongkong) of Jan. 21: "The Communists have contributed appreciably to the discomfiture of Japan, and from all accounts they have a better conception of China's fundamental needs than have those leaders in whose minds feudal ideals still persist . . . Thousands who follow the red banner seek only a decent livelihood . . . ' Perhaps the most persuasive gesture would be the parallel enforcement of stricter discipline within the ranks of the Kuomintang." —chs-alc

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LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By ANDREW ROTH, Author of Numerous Articles on India and Indochina

Indochina has emerged from the obscurity of small items buried in the back pages of the American press into the full glare of front-page headlines.

Friction between the unofficial Anglo-American alliance and Japan has reached a new intensity. The fate of Indochina is a key to future developments in the area.

Indochina's importance is largely strategic. From northern Indochina, where Japan obtained bases last September, Japanese planes have taken off to bombard the Burma road and southwest China. In addition, Japan has taken steps to obtain Camranh bay, Indochina's partly developed naval base on the southeast coast, and Saigon, a smaller but completed base further south.

Possession of these bases would not only help Japan to outflank the defenses of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, but also bring Japan within 750 miles of Singapore—the British Gibraltar of the East.

It was largely because Indochinese officials refused to give up these bases that Japan encouraged Thailand to attack Indochina, paving the way for Japan to step in as "mediator." The peace conference between Thailand and Indochina is now going on in Tokyo and Japan is expected to emerge as the winner, with the possibility of obtaining bases in Thailand—as well as Indochina—as payment for its mediation.

Most discussions of Indochina have ignored the fact that the nation's 23,000,000 inhabitants have aspirations of their own. As in China and India, the great mass of the Indochinese people are peasants, impoverished by a tremendous burden of high taxes and low returns. In Indochina the economy was largely owned by the Bank of Indochina, whose political representative in France was Paul Baudoin, foreign minister in the Reynaud cabinet and also in the early days of the Petain regime.

The development of the nationalist movement in China in the twenties and the effect of the depression of 1929 promoted agrarian discontent in Indochina. This culminated in an uprising of Indochinese troops at Yenbay in 1930, with sporadic fighting continuing in 1931. The rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed, but the basic cause—peasant poverty—was not removed.

That unrest still exists in Indochina was demonstrated by a series of riots and demonstrations which occurred throughout the state in November and December of 1940. In the Saigon area alone more than 1,000 "rebels" were arrested, 200 of them being lined up and shot at the Saigon airport. The desire on the part of the Indochinese to be free from the bondage of either the Japanese or the French may yet play an important part in southeast Asia, the Balkans of the Far East.

ar-alc

FINGERPRINTING AFTER CONVICTION ONLY, JUDGE RULES

KANSAS CITY, MO.—(FP)—Labor leaders who have sought to enjoin the police from fingerprinting them unless they are convicted of a felony lost their injunction suit, but won their point.

Judge Ben Terte refused to grant the injunction because he said the labor leaders had not shown that they were in danger of wholesale fingerprinting.

On the other hand, he ruled that police had no right to fingerprint anyone unless convicted. His ruling effectively blocks and indiscriminate fingerprinting by the police. Police officials will seek to change the law at the current session of the legislature.

ssw-bls

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LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

BY CATHERINE PORTER, Member of the Research Staff, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

The unskilled Filipino worker can hardly be worse off than he is now even after the islands achieve independence. This is true, despite the fact that the entire standard of living in the Philippines will be greatly lowered.

Sugar, which has paid high dividends and has contributed a large share of government revenue, has paid low wages to its common laborers. Many studies, both governmental and private, have been made of this side of the industry; some have never been released.

An important report was made a few years ago by I. T. Runes, who obtained information from 173 families in leading sugar-growing provinces. The annual income of the average family of five persons was found to be $90—or $1.73 a week.

More than half of the families were in debt; savings accounts and insurance were unknown. These same conditions apply to at least 760,000 persons, even if we assume that they are not characteristic of other industries and other areas.

An equally important study of rice farmers revealed that the 93 families investigated had an annual income of $140, about two-thirds of which was in money. The average expenditure for the year was $128.50, leaving a small margin for savings. The standard of living was extremely low, however, and the food was described as a "starvation diet."

In the last year or two the Department of Labor has conducted investigations of wages in various industries. In the abacá (hemp) industry, strippers earned from 7½¢ to 20¢ daily: classifiers, as much as 50¢ or $1. Cocoanut planters earned from 12½¢ to 20¢, usually with two meals included; driers, about 40¢, huskers, 75¢. The minimum for unskilled agricultural workers in general was 6¢ for women and 10¢ for men, with board; the maximum was 50¢.

The government effort to set a minimum wage of 50¢ a day for laborers on public works was gradually defeated by the large numbers of men attracted from the fields and mines. So that more men could be employed, wages were frequently reduced to 30¢ and in some cases even this was cut in half. It should not be overlooked that this form of employment is frequently temporary or at best part time.

There is evidence that the mining industry is striving to set better wage standards. A study of 28,000 laborers revealed that more than two-thirds received between 50¢ and 75¢. Since mining is the one industry that shows promise of progress under present conditions, the wage trend here is one hopeful sign in a generally depressing picture.

cp–alc

DIAMOND CUTTERS WIN $150 SCALE IN NEW PACT

BROOKLYN—(FP)—Diamond cutters, polishers, and setters won 30% wage increases in a new 6-month industrywide pact signed by the Diamond Workers Protective Union (AFL).

The agreement covers 450 regular and piece workers in 48 New York, Philadelphia and Cincinnati shops. Top rate is $150 a week.

In addition to the raises, weekly bonuses of from $10 to $50 are paid, the exact amount depending on the shop. Weekly scales under the new pact range from $60 to $150, said DWPU Pres. Jules Verbeeck.

Although there is at present a shortage of polishers in the industry, there is still a considerable number of cutters unemployed, he said.

jv–jp–alc

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[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 4. March 28, 1941]

LOOKING AHEAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By DOROTHY BORG, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

An appeasement group in China is willing to make peace with Japan. This group, led by reactionary government officials in high positions, gained the upper hand last summer when Great Britain closed the Burma Road.

At that time the country went into the doldrums and the appeasers seized the opportunity to weaken the progressive elements in China. They were motivated also by the rapidly growing economic crisis which threatened to sweep them out of power. By attacking Communist elements in the New Fourth Army, they stirred up a conflict which has led the country to the brink of civil war.

Japan has been trying to bolster the appeasement group in China. She knows that civil war means victory for Japan. Above all, she wants to end the China Incident so she can take advantage of the European conflict to fulfill her dreams of expansion in southeast Asia. These plans naturally fit in with Germany's and there have been recent reports that the Nazis intend to present peace terms at Chungking.

The groups which stand out against the appeasers are the mass of the people, the Communists, and the bulk of the army. Chou En Lai, Communist leader, has stated that it was "ridiculous" to suppose that the Chinese Communists would stop fighting the Japanese if Russia signed a nonaggression pact or even an alliance with Japan. In regard to the population throughout free China, the suffering seems to be far greater than is generally realized.

All observers say the destruction of villages by bombing is appalling, poor transportation has led to scarcity of food, inflation is making itself felt, and the burden of refugees—often estimated at 40,000,000—is increasingly severe.

It is in terms of the people at large that America is said to hold the balance in China. If the people are downhearted, the appeasement group is strengthened and may achieve its aims. If the people see hope ahead, they pick up courage and are ready to fight the war to the end.

The strong stand taken by the U. S. and Great Britain in the last weeks must have acted as a tonic to the Chinese people. American assistance may well tip the scale against civil war and a consequent deal with Japan.

db–alc

WESTINGHOUSE READY TO NEGOTIATE WAGE BOOST

NEW YORK—(FP)—Negotiations for a national contract and a general 10¢ hourly increase for 40,000 employes of the Westinghouse Mfg. Co. will start during the first week in April, announced Sec.-Treas. Julius Emspak of the United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers (CIO).

He said the firm, which has led the fight against putting a union agreement in writing, had agreed to negotiate. Emspak's announcement was made after a conference of UERMW delegates from 22 Westinghouse plants.

ue–jp–alc

EMPLOYER TROUBLE A NATIONAL PROBLEM, CIO NEWS SAYS

PHILADELPHIA—(FP)—The CIO News of March 31 carries a front-page "summary of employer trouble throughout the U. S." The paper says:

"The obstinate refusal of big business employers to bargain collectively or to observe the federal law today has precipitated a number of serious situations throughout the U. S."

hcf–alc

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LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By JANET K. HOWIE, Research Associate, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

Australia, whose entrance into the industrial field has been very recent, is now engaged in a program of large-scale production that will permanently change the whole basis of her economic structure.

Although it is too soon to judge the exact effects of the war on Australian labor, the trend is toward longer hours and greater employment. A strenuous effort is being made to maintain a balance between wages and cost of living but the situation is growing constantly more difficult.

Before the war the normal working hours were 44 hours for 5 days and wages were about $20 to $23 a week for the metal trades. Since the war, engineers have been working 12-hour shifts for a 72-hour week; overtime has jumped their wages to around $40 a week. Toolmakers and coppersmiths often work the entire week-end, and boilermakers now average 56 to 60 hours a week.

The basic or minimum wage established by the courts is $14.50 for Sydney and Melbourne (slightly less for other districts). Overtime and margins for skill have greatly increased the actual amounts received.

In spite of the rise in nominal wages, however, there has been a slight fall in real wages during the first year of the war. The cost of living has risen 4.7% and the indices for food and clothing have risen 3.8% and 10.2%, respectively. This has occurred in spite of the efforts of the Price Fixing Commission to maintain normal price levels.

The price rises hit those not engaged in war industries most seriously as they are maintaining the official 44-hour week and are not receiving the high overtime pay.

Longer hours, price rises, and constant war strains have caused the outbreak of many strikes. Total strikes during the March quarter of 1940 numbered 110 and affected 94,000 workers, showing a loss of 489,000 working days. The average strike lasts about 5 days, although many are merely 1-day stoppages for a show of strength.

Such strikes as the long and bitter coal strike of May 1940, however, cause much disturbance and unemployment. Most of the walk-outs have been in the heavy steel industries and among the shipyard workers. Grievances generally concern wages, hours, and dilution of skilled crafts.

Strikes do not receive public sympathy, for the arbitration system has been accepted by both labor and management, but they are not denounced with such vehemence as defense strikes in this country. Most of the strikes are settled by a compromise, but workers' requests that the basic wage be raised were recently refused.

The power of the federal Arbitration Court has been extended to intrastate disputes and its awards have been made binding on the entire industry instead of merely the company in which the dispute arose. Whether these powers will be continued after the war is impossible to say.

Since arbitration is compulsory, there is no need for a cooling-off period as advocated by employers in this country. Private agreements are sometimes made between company and union officials but generally the agreements are handed down by the industrial courts and are binding on both parties. Should Premier Molotov visits Hitler in Berlin and Foreign Minister Halifax reports to state of Queensland, where striking is illegal.

These strikes do not indicate any attempt on the part of organized labor to hinder the war effort. The official Labor party, whose main support is the trade-unions, is wholeheartedly supporting the administration's war effort under Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies. Labor holds half the seats in the all-important Advisory War Council.

jkh–db–alc

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LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By JACK SHEPHERD

EDITOR'S NOTE.—Mr. Shepherd, an Australian, has lectured at the University of Sydney.

The new Australian cabinet, formed after a month of negotiations, has no Labor members. This is of particular importance because Labor was offered four or five posts in the cabinet and, since the September elections, is the largest single bloc in parliament.

The new cabinet, like its predecessor, is made up of members of the United Australia party and the United Country party; these groups, which represent the more conservative urban and rural elements respectively, have a majority of two over the combined Labor forces in the house of representatives.

Delay in the appointment of the new cabinet has been due largely to the efforts of Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies to induce Labor leaders to take part in a National government. These efforts began in the dark days immediately after the fall of France when there was a widespread popular demand for a government representing all the major parties.

But the Labor party, led by John Curtin, while prepared to give full cooperation in the war effort, has steadfastly refused to forego its independence or to risk the aggravation of rifts in its own ranks by accepting the cabinet seats offered.

The basis of the Labor party's attitude was indicated on June 21 when Curtin declared his belief that the interests of the country "could always best be served by the Opposition doing its work as an opposition so long as it remained in opposition, and as a government when it became a government."

Though the September elections considerably increased Labor's strength in parliament, its gains were not big enough to give it a majority capable of forming a cabinet of its own. Even before the elections, however, the Labor party had indicated its willingness to serve on a War Advisory Committee and this offer has now been accepted by the prime minister.

The aim of the committee is to insure effective labor collaboration in Australia's war effort. The council will have on it four members of the inner cabinet and four members of the Labor Opposition.

In view of Labor's increased strength in parliament and the narrowness of the government's majority, the Australian Labor party should be able to exert its influence on national policy a good deal more effectively in the future than it has in the past.

-js-alc

RED SMEAR AGAINST WRIGHT EVAPORATES AS ACCUSERS RETRACT

By Federated Press

UTICA, N. Y.—(FP)—Two officials of the Dairy Farmers Union (unaffiliated) retracted charges of communism made against DFU Pres. Archie Wright and admitted that the attempt to smear Wright originated with groups trying to smash the union.

The two officials are Frank M. Brill and Sam Schou. An investigation by a union committee, including the two men, resulted from the charges. Wright filed a $200,000 slander suit against Brill and Schou, which he withdrew when the committee issued a statement acquitting him.

The investigation proved that "all of the propaganda spread throughout the milkshed has been wholly inspired by antiunion, antifarmer interests whose sole purpose seems to be the disintegration of the union," the committee's statement said.

"Our investigation shows that all rumors that Wright is a Communist, or has communistic tendencies, are absolutely false, and without foundation."

fu-jp-alc

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LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By HARRIET L. MOORE

The position of the Soviet Union in the European war is a key question today. Premier Molotov visits Hitler in Berlin and Foreign Minister Halifax reports to Parliament that there is at last some chance of the conclusion of a British-Soviet trade agreement. How is this possible?

The Soviets have declared from the outset that they are neutral and are ready to trade with any nation. But the mystery surrounding the Soviet attitude toward the Anglo-German war arises out of the contrast with its clear-cut anti-aggression stand in regard to China, Ethiopia, Spain and Czechoslovakia. It gave substantial aid to the Spanish government; offered single-handed military assistance to the Czechs on the eve of Munich; and it continues to give China more help in trade and credits than any other country. Now in Europe it maintains neutrality and offers trade to both sides.

The Soviet explanation is that it regards the Anglo-German war as a conflict of rival imperialisms, one seeking to gain world dominance and the other to retain it. In the outcome of such a war it claims no interest and hence its desire for normal commercial relations with both belligerents.

To date only Hitler has been willing to deal with the Soviets on their terms: he sent his top-ranking diplomat to Moscow; gave in to the Soviet protest on its exclusion from the Danubian conference; gave priority as far as possible to Soviet trade.

On the other hand Britain has sent only second-rank diplomats to Moscow and until recently has ignored Soviet protests on minor matters. It has also hesitated to establish trade relations and in its government remain men who, deeply suspicious of the U. S. S. R., brought about the Munich settlement, nonintervention in Spain, and temporary closing of the Burma road—all of which ran counter to Soviet interests. In short, although the U. S. S. R. has been ready to negotiate with both sides, Germany has been more ready to meet this offer and consequently German-Soviet relations have been more fully developed.

On the other side of the picture is the fact that up to the present all the Soviet moves in Finland, Poland, Rumania, and the Baltic states have immediate military significance only in terms of Soviet-German conflict. The Soviet press continues to urge the utmost in defense preparations against the "capitalist encirclement" and a glance at the map shows that Germany and Japan are the two nations "encircling" the U. S. S. R.

Defense measures taken by the Soviets range all the way from increasing the standing army to lengthening the working day from seven to eight hours, except in dangerous occupations where it remains six or seven hours. While the manufacture of consumers' goods has been sacrificed to the interest of defense industries, the grain harvest this year is estimated at 112,000,000 tons, little below 1939. It is the third largest crop in Russian history and grain continues one of the basic factors of Soviet economic strength.

All these signs of defense preparedness only underscore the fact that strategically the Soviets are well aware of the dangers to them in an overwhelming German or Japanese victory.

Whether or not the Soviets will abandon their neutrality both in Europe and Asia will depend on the direct danger of attack on their borders. Whether, while remaining neutral, they will decide to favor one warring power in Europe against the other, just as they favor China against Japan, may depend on such developments as revised British policy toward India, or the practical results of Labor Minister Ernest Bevin's speech urging that Britain, to win the war, must aim to obtain "social security" for the whole community. The British Government's willingness to deal with the U. S. S. R. is of course basic to any change in present Soviet practice in European affairs.

-hlm-alc

SAN FRANCISCO—(FP)—Factory employment in California was 22% higher in October 1940 than in October 1939.

-sir-jp-ms

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[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 2. Dec. 4, 1940]

LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

(By Andrew Roth, Author of numerous articles on India and Indo-China)

Unrest is on the march in India today, with the organized labor and peasant movements leading a fight for peace, independence, and improved living conditions which threatens to assume the proportions of the American revolt in 1776.

Tension reached a new high at the beginning of November when Jawaharlal Nehru, former president of the Indian Trade Union Congress and second only to M. K. Gandhi in the All-India National Congress, was given four years of "rigorous imprisonment" for advocating peace and independence for India.

Nehru will not be alone in prison. He has joined thousands of labor and peasant union leaders, and many active members of the All-India National Congress and of such progressive units within the congress as the Forward Bloc and the Congress Socialist party.

Whether Nehru will survive his term is doubtful. Already Swami Sahajanand, general secretary of the All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Union), has died in prison after being sentenced to three years of "rigorous imprisonment."

The ferment in India is based on two factors: stark poverty and the desire for independence. Even before the outbreak of the current war, the Indian standard of living was on a par with the most impoverished southern sharecropper. The average family in India, excluding the top 1% of landlords, industrialists, and native princes, had an income of $20 a person a year.

During the course of the present war, the British have converted India into a vast arms plant. Armaments production has increased twelvefold. Conscription of labor has been instituted.

Despite increased war orders the purchasing power of the Indian masses has declined. Thus the American consul at Bombay has reported that the cotton piece-goods industry, one of the most important consumption industries in India, "has been declining for several months as a result of the increased cost of living for industrial workers and a steady decline in prices paid to farmers."

The Indian workers and farmers are not bearing the brunt of the war willingly or even passively. In October 1939, 90,000 Bombay workers, under the leadership of the Girni Kamgar Textile Union, carried out a 1-day political strike against the war and the repressive measures of the British government.

This set off a wave of strikes which affected virtually every industrial town in India and resulted in the arrest of the leadership in virtually every militant union. The fight against the war and the attacks on the labor-union movement have resulted in the welding of the Indian labor movement after an 11-year split. The unified Trade Union Congress declared in its main resolution:

"Participation in war which will not result in the establishment of freedom and democracy in India will not benefit India—much less will it benefit the working class of India."

The news dispatches from India do not feature news of the organized laborers and peasants. Yet it is only on the basis of their resistance to further attacks on their living standards that Indian news can be interpreted. ar-alc

MACON, GA.—(FP)—When a wage-hour-law violator is caught, he cannot merely promise to cease violating the law in the future and escape an injunction against future violations. So ruled U. S. Judge Bascom Deaver in enjoining the Carpenter Lumber Co., of Eatonville, Ga., from future wage-hour-law violations. -wh-jp-lac

SAN FRANCISCO—(FP)—The instalment system has been okayed by the NLRB. The Carlisle Lumber Co., in Washington, said it couldn't pay $150,000 in back wages to 148 employees discharged in 1938. Instalments over five years were allowed. madf-alc

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[FEDERATED PRESS, EASTERN BUREAU, 30 Irving Pl., N. Y. C. Sheet 5. Dec. 26, 1940]

LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

By DOROTHY BORG, Member of the Research Staff, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations

Will China's united front hold? This is the question which dominates everything in China today. If the united front breaks, the war of resistance to Japan is lost. It is this fact which has kept Communists and Kuomintang together for the last four years.

From 1926 to 1937, China was split wide open by civil war. Chiang Kai-shek, as head of the Chinese government and leader of the Kuomintang, waged one annihilation campaign after the other for the extermination of the Communists.

There seemed to be an insuperable gap between the two parties. The Kuomintang consisted of wealthy landowners, bankers, and industrialists; the Communists received their main support from the peasants. Throughout the civil war, however, the Communists insisted that "Chinese must stop fighting Chinese" and join forces in opposition to Japan.

Finally, at the end of 1936, during the famous kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek, the Communists persuaded the generalissimo to accept their view. The annihilation campaigns ceased, the united front was formed, and China prepared for the conflict with Japan.

Seven months later the Sino-Japanese war broke out and Japan, to her overwhelming surprise, was faced with a strong, united China. Instead of conquering China in a quick triumphal march, Japan now finds herself bogged down in a major struggle that seems to have no end.

Throughout the war the record of the united front has had its ups and downs. Reports have leaked out of fighting between government troops and "red" soldiers. Moreover the fundamental differences between Communists and Kuomintang still exist.

The Communists have instituted many reforms in the areas under their control. They have tried to ease the almost intolerable burden of the peasant, who constitutes 85% of China's population.

They have reduced rents by 25%, passed laws against the eviction of tenants, reapportioned taxes on a fairer basis, and placed a 10% maximum on all interest rates. Formerly the Communists confiscated and redivided the estates of wealthy landowners but this practice has been abandoned since the formation of the united front.

In the past the central government violently opposed the methods of the Communists. What its position is today no one can tell. The government's main aim is to win the war and in line with this policy it seeks to maintain a balance between all political groups.

The most important point is that despite a long history of bitter enmity and opposing views which may or may not be reconciled some day, both Communists and Kuomintang realize that they cannot win the war without each other's assistance. For this reason, the united front is likely to hold at least until the end of the fight against Japan. -db-alc

KEWANEE, ILL.—(FP)—The Kewanee Mfg. Co. signed its first agreement with the Intl. Bro. of Boiler Makers, Iron Shipbuilders & Helpers (AFL) following a 2-month strike. l-jp

TRONA, CAL.—(FP)—The Intl. Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers (CIO) won an NLRB election among employes of the American Potash & Chemical Corp. The IUMMSW received 476 votes as against 102 for an AFL union and 103 for a company union. cn-jp

NORFOLK, VA.—(FP)—The Bro. of Railway Clerks (AFL) defeated an 18-year-old company union in a Natl. Mediation Board poll among 2,450 employes of the Norfolk & Western Railroad. -l-jp

Mr. MORRIS. As I say, these purport to be publications put out under the joint auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Federated Press.

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Mr. DeCaux, did you participate in what purports to be an operation between the Federated Press and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations which brought about the release of the aforesaid releases?

Mr. DECAUX. In what year?

Mr. MORRIS. The first is February 19, 1941; the next is April 9, 1941; the next is November 13, 1940; March 28, 1941; December 26, 1940; January 3, 1941; November 27, 1940; January 8, 1941; February 5, 1941; February 14, 1941; March 5, 1951; and December 4, 1940.

Mr. DECAUX. I am pretty sure I did not. I was not connected with the Federated Press at that time, nor the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know of this project?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall any project jointly undertaken by the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Federated Press?

Mr. DECAUX. I do not recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive those in the record?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire on a different subject, or would it break Mr. Morris' trend of thought?

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned Mr. Vincent Halinan earlier. Do you remember?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you regard him as in any sense your employer?

Mr. DECAUX. I am not sure what exactly constitutes an employer relationship. I understand he is president of the board and I have only just become associated with the magazine. I suppose in that sense that makes him my employer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if he actively participates in the management of March of Labor?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know to what extent he participates.

Mr. SOURWINE. He has other interests?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a practicing attorney?

Mr. DECAUX. I understand so.

Mr. SOURWINE. In California?

Mr. DECAUX. That is my understanding.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is the editor of March of Labor?

Mr. DECAUX. John Steuben.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he the editor at the time you came with the magazine?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first become connected with the magazine?

Mr. DECAUX. In January of this year, last month.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not form a connection with the magazine in August of 1951?

Mr. DECAUX. In August of 1951?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DECAUX. I may have contributed some articles previously to that.

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Mr. SOURWINE. You may have contributed some articles previous to August 1951?

Mr. DECAUX. No; previous to the time of coming on the staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not become a regular contributor, a steady contributor, beginning with August 1951?

Mr. DECAUX. Steady is a little bit of an exaggeration. I contributed a book review and an article, if that can be called steady.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no arrangement with the magazine to be a steady contributor?

Mr. DECAUX. I agreed that I would contribute articles when I could.

Mr. SOURWINE. I show you the August issue of the March of Labor. On the masthead, do you see the paragraph referring to yourself about halfway down the page, the left-hand column? Will you read that?

Mr. DECAUX (reading):

Starting with this issue, Len DeCaux will become a steady contributor to our magazine. Len and his writings are known from one end of the country to the other. As editor of CIO News and CIO publicity director for many years, he made many contributions in the CIO. Welcome, Len, to our family.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having read that, do you want to expand in any way in answer to the question whether beginning in August 1951 you had a regular connection with the magazine?

Mr. DECAUX. I had a connection as a contributor of occasional articles.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there compensation attached to that?

Mr. DECAUX. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your understanding? What was the consideration for which you agreed to be a regular contributor?

Mr. DECAUX. I agreed to help the magazine because I liked it and to contribute articles from my area when I found anything of interest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they agree to pay for what you contributed?

Mr. DECAUX. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you not in fact contributed articles to this magazine before August of 1951?

Mr. DECAUX. Not that I recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. So you were, in a sense, merely a person who submitted articles to the magazine beginning August 1951 and your actual connection came in January of this year?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge, is anyone connected with the management or administration of this magazine connected in any way with the Communist Party or with communism?

Mr. DECAUX. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Steuben has any connection with communism?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Halnernan has any connection with communism?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record a letter from Val, a letter which Mr. Mandel will identify.

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Mr. MANDEL. This is an original letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 28, 1935, addressed to "Dear Bill" and signed "Val."

Mr. MORRIS. Is there another letter attached to that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Attached to this is a letter addressed to Dr. Lewis L. Lorwin, dated February 9, 1938, and the typewritten signature is William W. Lockwood, Jr.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. DeCaux, I read from this letter of October 28, 1935:

The local FP man, Len DeCaux, is a good friend of mine, and a damned good person. (Please reverse order of above.) We discussed that People's Press only last Saturday—but chiefly we talked about that amazing A. F. of L. convention.

Were you a friend of Val Lorwin?

Mr. DECAUX. Val Lorwin I knew; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Lewis Lorwin?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recollect having met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Anthony Jenkinson?

Mr. DECAUX. Yes; I think.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Anthony Jenkinson doing at that time?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he connected with the Allied Labor News?

Mr. DECAUX. He may have been connected with the Allied Labor News Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Allied Labor News Service connected with the Federated Press in any way?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't believe it was at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequently did it become allied?

Mr. DECAUX. That I don't know for certain. I have heard reports to that effect.

Mr. MORRIS. What reports did you hear?

Mr. DECAUX. Simply there was some connection between the two but I don't know of my own knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. What connection did you hear existed between the two organizations?

Mr. DECAUX. That they have the same office or something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may these be received in the record?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received in evidence.

(The two letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 424 and 424A" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 424

FEBRUARY 9, 1938.

Dr. LEWIS L. LORWIN,
1230 New Hampshire Avenue, Washington, D. C.

DEAR VAL: Thanks very much for the crime file, which I hasten to send on to Fred Field. Before consulting any of your character witnesses we will be sure to let you know.

I haven't seen Tony Jenkinson since you left and I am wondering if he turned up looking for a bed.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

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EXHIBIT No. 424A

(Penciled note: FVF return to WWL).

1230 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, *Washington, October 28, 1935.*

DEAR BILL: I write in some haste, lest I fail entirely to write. You are a splendid fellow. Thanks for your check; it is thrilling to get these contributions from people of moderate income; I boil when I think of Taft's luncheons at which millions were raised. What do you say—since you offered complete choice south of the Mason-Dixon line—to dividing your check between the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and Commonwealth College at Mena, Ark.? I shall assume this is your intent unless I hear otherwise.

Thanks likewise for your job assist. I am now a pensionary of Uncle Sam, in Hammy's Consumers' Division, where once held forth your friend Jim Abrahamson. I have not yet become accustomed to the notion of working for the Government; maybe I shan't last long enough ever to get used to it. Hammy hopes to salvage the Division from the collapse of the NRA, of which it is part, in April. At present I am working on the magazine, The Consumer, which is in its second issue, and doing press releases, etc. Hammy was much interested in my idea of doing a price study on cotton; I may get around to it, though I do not see how I could very well do it in the 3 or 4 months ordinarily available for a price study. Nevertheless the idea holds me: what do you think of it? You have no doubt seen others of the price studies (confidential though they have been)? * * * I shall put you down as a subscriber for The Cons.

Your typewriter shall be delivered. It may even get to the metropolis.

I have seen a sample issue of Palmer's People's Press. I wish it much luck, though I think the efforts of its editors might be better spent, and I think it will probably fail. If it is to be merely muckraking and pictorial, and not openly partisan, why will the average bozo read it rather than the more attractive and fuller Mirror or News? Anyway how are you going to plaster it over the newsstands where the average worker will get a chance to prefer it to the Mirror? That requires a million dollars. The local FP man, Len De'aux, is a good friend of mine, and a damned good person. (Please reverse order of above.) We discussed that People's Press only last Saturday—but chiefly we talked about that amazing A. F. of L. convention. The latter was omitted from the People's Press somehow, though it was the week of the Atlantic City jamboree.*

Again, many thanks for your various efforts, Bill. I hope I may see you in New York. The arrival of what the papers call "a million dollars worth" of Van Gogh (penciled note—at the Met. beginning 5 Nov.) gives me another reason for trying harder to get transport some week end, though these be busy days. Best to Jinny,

(Signed). VAL.

(Penciled note: N. B. I am still maintaining the Taft office, and doing a few days a week on that.

*The Socialist (all is much improved).

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember attending a luncheon for Michael Lindsay in April 1946?

Mr. DECAUX. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington Office?

Mr. DECAUX. It is possible; I attended some luncheons. I don't recollect who were present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Sourwine, do you have any more questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. None, sir.

Senator WATKINS. The witness may be excused.

Call your next witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Harold Coy.

Mr. Chairman this witness has already been sworn.

Senator WATKINS. The record may show that she was sworn in executive session.

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TESTIMONY OF MRS. HAROLD COY (MILDRED PRICE COY), ACCOMPANIED BY HER COUNSEL, JOSEPH FORER, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and address?

Mrs. COY. Mildred Price Coy.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present residence?

Mrs. COY. 57 Split Rock Road, South Norwalk, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your husband's occupation?

Mrs. COY. He is a writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you the executive secretary of the China Aid Council?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been named as executor under the last will and testament of the late Agnes Smedley?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard, Mrs. Coy, the testimony before this committee from the witnesses, Elizabeth Bentley and Louis Budenz to the effect that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FORER. Is the question whether she had heard it?

Mr. MORRIS. Whether she heard or read testimony before this committee to the effect that she was in the past a member of the Communist Party.

Mrs. COY. I read the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Coy, were you in fact ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question because of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to testify against myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you at the present time a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I am not a member of the Communist Party.

Senator WATKINS. With reference to that declination, are you afraid if you answer the question that Mr. Morris asked of you, if you answered that truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mrs. COY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party at any time during the year 1951?

Mrs. COY. I must decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party during the year 1950?

Mrs. COY. I must decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party prior to 1950?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer for the same reasons.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize, do you not, that when you have chosen to testify with respect to the question as to whether you are now a member of the Communist Party and you have stated that you are not, and subsequently you are asked if you were a member during the most recent year and you claim your privilege, that you are liable to leave the inference that you were a member during the year 1951?

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Mrs. COY. If that is the inference you wish to draw, there is nothing I can do about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party last week?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party this morning?

Mrs. COY. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party at midnight last night?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want this committee to understand that you may have left the Communist Party as recently as midnight last night?

Mrs. COY. I don't want you to understand anything, Mr. Sourwine. You will have to draw your own inference.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are disavowing present membership in the Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have disavowed membership in the Communist Party this morning, that is, on the morning of February 11, 1952?

Mrs. COY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you are refusing to answer the question as to whether you were a member of the Communist Party on midnight, February 10, 1952; is that correct?

Mrs. COY. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you making that refusal with advice of counsel?

Mrs. COY. I have consulted counsel, but it is my own decision.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that this record may be complete, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that the witness be directed to answer the most recent question; that is, with regard to the membership in the Communist Party at midnight on February 10, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. The Chair directs you to answer that question.

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question because of my privilege under the fifth amendment not to testify against myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the following three letters as letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a handwritten card directly from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 18, 1942, marked "ECC from Y. Y. Hsu," and also an original letter dated May 23, 1942, adressed "Dear Mr. Carter" from Yung-ying Hsu, and is exhibit No. 101 from our open hearing held on August 14, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those are two separate documents?

Mr. MANDEL. They are two separate documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they both documents which you took from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations now in possession of this committee?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer these two letters for the record.

Senator WATKINS. Those exhibits may be received in the record.

(The card referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 425" and is as follows. For the letter referred to as exhibit No. 101, see pt. 2, p. 415.)

EXHIBIT No. 425

(The following is taken from a penciled card:)

SATURDAY, APRIL 18, '42.

ECC. From: Y. Y. HSU:

WLH saw me and we discussed Chinese Labor situation in general. But he forgot to check with me to whom the Labor Law excerpts were given. It was given to: Mr. Sweetland of CIO, Miss Anderson and Gurlack (one copy) of Y. W. C. A., Miss Price and Mrs. Snow. They have all asked me about the problem.

Right now I am analyzing unions reported in "Ministry of Economic Affairs Bulletin," and may finish a report on this early next week. I'll also study the problem further and report to you from time to time.

Mr. MORRIS. The first letter reads—this is signed by Yung-ying Hsu:

Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request.

Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same problem. She also suggests my participation.

Mrs. Coy, do you know Mr. Saul Mills?

Mrs. COY. I knew him several years ago, I guess. I haven't seen him in about 10 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall his asking you to perform the following task on May 23, on or about May 23, 1942?

Mrs. COY. Frankly I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. William Holland?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Holland an officer of the China Aid Council?

Mrs. COY. He was in 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Sol Mills active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. COY. Is he active?

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active?

Mrs. COY. To my knowledge I don't know a thing about that.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Mills asked you to do this particular thing, as indicated in the letter, was he then acting within the orbit of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. COY. I just don't know. I don't know a thing about it, I really don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Another one of these letters, Mrs. Coy, reads:

WLH—

this is presumably William L. Holland—

saw me and we discussed Chinese labor situation in general. But he forgot to check with me to whom the labor law excerpts were given. It was given to: Mr. Sweetland of CIO, Miss Anderson and Gurlack (one copy) of YWCA, Miss Price and Mrs. Snow. They have all asked me about the problem.

Do you remember consulting Mr. Y. Y. Hsu on such a problem as indicated by this letter?

Mrs. COY. I don't remember it.

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Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Y. Y. Hsu?

Mrs. COY. I did know him at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Y. Y. Hsu a member of the Chinese Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the same reason I stated before, that it might incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. You feel that if you answered the question whether or not Y. Y. Hsu was a member of the Chinese Communist Party that would incriminate you?

Mrs. COY. Yes; I feel that way.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of the American Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I refuse to answer for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Dr. Chi?

Mrs. COY. Yes. You mean the man you asked me about?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mrs. COY. He was a member of the China Council board of directors.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was a member of the Chinese Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. Not to my knowledge, I don't. Just to be frank with you, I didn't know Dr. Chi very well when I first came there, but I just had very little knowledge of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Coy, do you want the committee to understand that it is your position with respect to certain parties that you will answer questions as to whether you knew them to be members of the Communist Party but with regard to certain other parties you will not answer the question, refusing to answer on the grounds of possible self-incrimination?

Mrs. COY. Sorry, I don't understand your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have refused to answer certain questions put to you with regard to whether certain named persons were members of the Communist Party, claiming the privilege of self-incrimination; is that right?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have attempted, to the best of your ability to answer questions put to you with regard to whether certain other named persons were members of the Communist Party. Is that right?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you are attempting to make a distinction on the basis of what you knew about a person; is that correct?

Mrs. COY. I will have to examine each question that you ask me separately.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is your counsel telling you what to say?

Mr. FORER. Senator, I do not think that is a proper question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not a Senator.

Mr. FORER. I was addressing my remarks to the Senator.

Senator WATKINS. It is perfectly all right for you to advise on the legal question but you must not suggest the answer. The witness is sworn to testify and tell the truth and you are not a witness but we are permitting counsel to advise on legal questions only and not to put words in the mouth of the witness.

Were you suggesting any answer?

Mr. FORER. You are assuming that.

Senator WATKINS. I am not assuming anything.

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Mr. FORER. I am advising my client as to her legal rights. I do not think it is proper for Mr. Sourwine to make such insinuations. That is the only point I want to make.

Also, it seems to me, Mr. Sourwine, some of your questions are quite unclear.

Senator WATKINS. They may be unclear or not, depending on the point of view, but the witness may say whether she understands them or not without asking counsel whether she understands them or not.

Mrs. COY. I didn't get the implications. I thought my counsel understood it and could tell me what the question meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you do not understand the question, please tell me and I will try to make it understandable.

I am not endeavoring to confuse you.

Senator WATKINS. May I instruct the witness that you are entitled to consult your counsel on legal questions only but not what you shall say in the answer.

Mrs. COY. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I continue for just a moment, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. You may continue.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to make this perfectly clear so that you will understand what I am asking you about.

On some of the names that you have been asked about, you have refused to answer the questions as to whether they were Communists or you knew them to be Communists. Is that right?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On other names you were asked about people you did not know to be Communists you stated you did not know whether they were Communists.

Mrs. COY. I said not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. When a name was mentioned and you were asked, "Is that person a Communist," and you had no information on the subject, you have fully and frankly told the committee you did not know.

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking: Does that indicate that you are making a distinction, that you are answering the committee's questions with regard to named individuals if they are people whom you did not know to be Communists but that you are refusing to answer the question with regard to certain other named individuals? Is that not true?

Mrs. COY. I don't really know whether to say "yes" or "no." I don't want to say "yes" if it isn't so. I did claim the privilege on some people and some people I didn't. So if that is it, that is what I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you claiming that privilege with regard to persons named when you have some knowledge as to whether they are or not Communists?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the fifth amendment, not to testify against myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have no knowledge as to whether one of the named persons is or is not a Communist, is there any reason you should refuse to answer that question?

Mrs. COY. It seems to me that the questions are directed in such a manner to try to get me to surrender my privilege. I just don't want to do that, Senator.

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Mr. SOURWINE. You have answered such questions about certain people when in fact you had no knowledge as to whether they were or were not Communists; is that correct?

Mrs. COY. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your persistence in refusing to answer questions with regard to certain other persons is because you feel you need to do that in order to protect your privilege; is that right?

Mrs. COY. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have had advice of counsel in connection with that?

Mrs. COY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, on that point also I respectfully request that the Chair direct the witness to answer the questions with regard to the named persons with respect to whom she has previously refused to answer.

Senator WATKINS. It is not clear to me, Mr. Sourwine, just what information you wish to elicit from the witness.

If you will make it specific now—it is somewhat argumentative and a matter of conclusion from what the witness has said about this thing and what she has refused to say about others.

Do you have some specific case you want to ask about?

Mr. SOURWINE. We can raise the issue with one name.

Senator WATKINS. Will you ask the question as to one name which was refused previously?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Y. Y. Hsu is or was a Communist?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reasons previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of the fact that this witness has here answered such questions with regard to certain other named persons, I ask that the Chair direct the witness to answer this question.

Senator WATKINS. Are you afraid that if you answer that question truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mrs. COY. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. It seems to me, Mr. Sourwine, it would be useless for the Chair to order under the circumstances. On the ones she answered and gave an answer probably she was sure they would not incriminate her but if she says if she answered it truthfully it might, she is entitled to claim privilege.

Mr. SOURWINE. The request that the Chair direct the witness to answer was not with the thought that the witness would then answer, but merely to meet the technical requirement that the Chair has directed an answer to the question. Otherwise, you have acceptance of the witness' privilege by the committee and you have no provision of law to cover the refusal.

Senator WATKINS. On that ground, I direct you to answer the question.

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer for the reason previously stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Coy, do you know Elizabeth Bentley?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question on the reasons previously stated.

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Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Elizabeth Bentley testified before this committee that you were the organizer of the far-eastern unit of the Communist Party?

Mrs. COY. I read that in the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the testimony that Miss Bentley gave on that score true and accurate so far as you know?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reason previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Louis F. Budenz?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reason previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you act as speaker for the Communist Party, Branch 1, Fifth Assembly District, in New York, on November 16, 1936?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reason previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions of this witness.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. No more questions, sir.

Senator WATKINS. The witness may be excused.

Mr. MORRIS. I have one other question.

Were you active in the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mrs. COY. I decline to answer that question for the reason previously stated.

Senator WATKINS. Call your next witness, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the next witness is Mr. Maxwell S. Stewart.

Senator WATKINS. I think the record will show that he was sworn in executive session.

You may proceed with your questions.

TESTIMONY OF MAXWELL S. STEWART, JACKSON HEIGHTS, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, JOSEPH A. FANELLI, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, will you give your residence to the reporter?

Mr. STEWART. My residence is 9309 Twenty-fifth Avenue, Jackson Heights, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. STEWART. Editor and economist.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is your employer?

Mr. STEWART. Public Affairs Committee.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Public Affairs Committee?

Mr. STEWART. The Public Affairs Committee publishes pamphlets, summarizing research on social and economic problems.

Senator WATKINS. Are you an officer of that organization?

Mr. STEWART. I am; yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. What is your position?

Mr. STEWART. I am secretary.

If the chairman wishes, I can introduce a statement about the organization.

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Mr. MORRIS. It will not be necessary.

Are you now an editor of the Nation magazine?

Mr. STEWART. I am not.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you sever your connections with the Nation magazine?

Mr. STEWART. About 2 years ago, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you worked with the United States Government at any time?

Mr. STEWART. I have not been formally employed. I believe I was listed as an adviser in the War Manpower Commission but it was an unsalaried position and I had no responsibility, no duties.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you consultant with the War Manpower Commission?

Mr. STEWART. Consultant.

Mr. MORRIS. During the years 1943 and 1944?

Mr. STEWART. I believe it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, did you ever act as editor of the pamphlet series for the Institute of Pacific Relations pamphlets?

Mr. STEWART. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. There were two periods of time actually, one a series of pamphlets put out by the Webster Co., which I edited in 1942, I believe, for a period of 6 weeks or so, and then again in 1947 for about a year.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. As I recall it, my first affiliation was about 1932 when I was elected at that time to honorary membership and I was elected to membership.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you presently a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. STEWART. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you the husband of Marguerite Ann Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Marguerite Ann Stewart ever the secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. STEWART. She was.

Mr. MORRIS. When did she act as secretary?

Mr. STEWART. I am not absolutely sure of the date but my impression is that it was 1947 and 1948 for a period of about 1 year.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you heard that your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations has been disavowed by a man who was formerly the executive secretary, Mr. Clayton Lane of that organization?

Mr. STEWART. I heard it just about an hour ago in executive session for the first time.

Mr. MORRIS. The question was asked you?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would identify this letter for us, for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter taken from the collection of Ray Lyman Wilbur, dated May 10, 1949, addressed to Senator Jack B. Tenney, signed Clayton Lane, Executive Secretary.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that in the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 426" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 426

[Copy for Dr. Wilbur]

MAY 10, 1949.

Senator JACK B. TENNEY,
Chairman, Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities,
State Legislature, Sacramento, Calif.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Since writing you last on April 27, acknowledging receipt of a copy each of the Third Report and Fourth Report of your Committee on Un-American Activities in California, I have read carefully all references I could find in these reports to this institute and to persons connected with it or formerly connected with it.

The statements in these reports which particularly led your committee to the conclusion that this institute was a Communist-front organization were presumably those referring to the American People's Fund and to the pamphlet, Land of the Soviets.

My letter to your committee of March 10 informed you that this institute no longer receives contributions from the American People's Fund. Mr. F. V. Field has no connection of any kind with this institute.

Neither Maxwell Stewart nor Marguerite A. Stewart has any connection with the IPR. The pamphlet, Land of the Soviets, is regarded by this office as out of date in many respects. It is no longer available to the public although we have many copies of it. No publication by this institute today on such a subject would contain material of the kind to which your report objects in its comment on this pamphlet.

I trust your committee will shortly conclude, and state publicly, that it no longer finds occasion to regard the activities and associations of the American Institute of Pacific Relations with apprehension or concern. Such a statement would greatly assist my efforts here to restore confidence in and support of activities in the American national interest as well as in the interest of objective research, on very complex and important matters.

I enclose for your information and for your committee's files copies of some letters received since my last letter, expressing informed opinion on the value of the functions and current activities of the American IPR. Your attention is also once more invited to my letter to members of this institute, dated December 17, 1948, transmitting a full statement of what the American IPR is and is not. A copy was sent you with my letter of March 10, but another is now enclosed for your convenience.

While in Washington last week I had a long discussion with our newest trustee, General Marshall, on our activities and research projects. It will perhaps interest you to learn that the general particularly emphasized the need for this institute to reach a much wider public with its publications. He is very well informed about our current and projected programs and has a high opinion of them.

Sincerely yours,

CLAYTON LANE, *Executive Secretary.*

Enclosures: Letter to Counterattack, December 17, 1948.
Letters from: Lockwood.
Taylor.
Chamberlain.
Welles.
Sinclair.
Wright.
Murphy.
Hansen.
Durdin.
Thorp.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, do you have a copy of this letter before you?

Mr. STEWART. I do not.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, was this on original letter which is in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of an original carbon from the files of Ray Lyman Wilbur.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a signed carbon?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir; it was a typed signature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that this be introduced in the record as evidence of the fact that what purports to be a carbon of such original letter is actually in the Wilbur files but not as evidence that such a letter was signed by Clayton Lane until it has been identified by Clayton Lane.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received with that qualification.

Mr. STEWART. May I comment on that letter now?

Mr. SOURWINE. By all means, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. STEWART. At the time this letter was written I was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations but only a member, not a staff member. Marguerite Ann Stewart was not a member. I think she had resigned by that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. She had resigned as secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations or as a member?

Mr. STEWART. I think as a member. We have only one membership in the family now. However, Mr. Lane, I think the same year, invited me to a discussion group at the Institute of Pacific Relations. I participated to some extent in that discussion group. So apparently Mr. Lane simply made a mistake. I know of no other way of putting it. I did not know Mr. Lane well but I have met him. He certainly must have known possibly subsequent to this that I was a member. He may not have known at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you testifying that Mr. Lane's statement here, "Neither Maxwell Stewart nor Marguerite Ann Stewart has any connection with the IPR" is an inaccurate statement?

Mr. STEWART. I am testifying as far as myself it is an inaccurate statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Also, Mr. Lane neglects to mention the fact that both you and Mrs. Stewart had been active prior to May 10, 1949, in the Institute of Pacific Relations, does he not?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, will you read the fourth paragraph of that letter, please? Will you read it aloud to the committee?

Mr. STEWART (reading):

> Neither Maxwell Stewart nor Marguerite A. Stewart has any connection with the IPR. The pamphlet, Land of the Soviets, is regarded by this office as out of date in many respects. It is no longer available to the public although we have many copies of it. No publication by this institute today on such a subject would contain material of the kind to which your report objects in its comment on this pamphlet.

I might state that the rest of that paragraph is correct, so far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that the Institute of Pacific Relations considered the Land of the Soviets as out of date in many respects?

Mr. STEWART. Not only that but, as a matter of fact, my wife who wrote the pamphlet asked that it be withdrawn 2 or 3 years before this letter was written.

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Mr. MORRIS. Your wife wrote the pamphlet and you edited it; is that right, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a sponsor for the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born?

Mr. STEWART. I have made an effort to find the answer to that question, a very considerable effort. The effort included a visit to a man who was executive secretary of the organization, a study of my own files, and consultation with other people, and as far as I can discover I was never connected with the organization. That was also the testimony of this man.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have any memory with respect to it?

Mr. STEWART. I have only a dim memory that such an organization existed but no memory that I ever——

Senator WATKINS. You were not active in any way?

Mr. STEWART. I am certain I was never active in it.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any evidence available to this committee that might possibly contradict the testimony of the witness on that point, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a copy of an article appearing in the Daily Worker on Monday, October 28, 1940, in which Maxwell Stewart is listed among 350 noted Americans supporting the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born.

Mr. STEWART. I am aware of that particular letter because I saw it in the record. I might state that it is possible that that is correct but I think very unlikely. The name American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born is a name which would have appealed to me. If I had been asked to join it at that time, I might have possibly done so. But, as I say, I have no recollection of ever participating in it. I am certain that I never attended any meetings. I am certain I never had any direct connection with it. I am morally certain that I never had any connection with it whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a member of the National Board of the American Council on Soviet Relations?

Mr. STEWART. In 1943, I accepted such membership. I later resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you ever been a member of the executive committee of the American League Against War and Fascism?

Mr. STEWART. I was so listed from 1935 for some years but I never participated in the organization. I never participated in the meetings. I never participated in the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been sponsor of the American League for Peace and Democracy?

Mr. STEWART. My understanding is that that is the same organization.

Mr. MORRIS. It is the same organization but it has had a different name during different periods of time.

Mr. STEWART. My understanding is that they carried over the names that the American League for War and Fascism had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any connection with it after the names were carried over?

Mr. STEWART. I had no connection but I knew they carried my name over. The organization then turned into the American Peace Mobili-

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zation. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact I had no conection with it whatsoever. My name was not carried, I am sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a member of the board of directors of the American-Russian Institute from 1939 to 1950?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a member of the national advisory board of the American Youth Congress?

Mr. STEWART. I was, along with a lot of distinguished Americans.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a member of the board of directors of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. STEWART. I was active in the formation of that organization in 1945, was elected a member of the board of directors, but I resigned as a member of the board of directors in late 1945 or early 1946, before taking a position as editor of the IPR pamphlet. I resigned because I had a feeling that a person who was connected with that position should not have any connection with an action organization. I might say, after I resigned, the organization changed character drastically and was subsequently put on the Attorney General's list, but that change took place years after I had any direct connection with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you listed as a consultant by that organization in 1950?

Mr. STEWART. No; not in 1950. I have, in case you are interested, a letter of resignation which I believe is dated 1948 which I will be glad to submit at the proper time.

Mr. MORRIS. I think it would be appropriate to show that he resigned in 1950.

Mr. STEWART. I resigned in 1948. I protested against the use of my name in this connection. I have several copies of that.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be received?

Senator WATKINS. That may be received.

(The letter referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2690.)

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been sponsor for the Council of Pan-American Democracy?

Mr. STEWART. My name is listed. I never was active in that organization.

Mr. MORRIS. You deny that you were sponsor for the Council of Pan-American Democracy?

Mr. STEWART. My answer is that I believe I was so listed but I was never active in the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you acquiesce on the use of your name?

Mr. STEWART. I did on one occasion only.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the National Committee of the Friends of Soviet Union?

Mr. STEWART. I was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, were you a member of the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners?

Mr. STEWART. I believe that for 1 year I belonged to that organization. I don't recall that I had any official position in it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, were you a sponsor for the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship?

Mr. STEWART. Didn't I answer that question before?

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Mr. MORRIS. No; the other is the American Council on Soviet Relations. This is the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship.

Mr. STEWART. Then my answer is wrong on the other one. I got these mixed up. This is the organization that I sponsored in 1943 in company with several Senators, several members of the Cabinet, and many other distinguished Americans.

Subsequently, I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a speaker for the North American Committee To Aid Spanish Democracy?

Mr. STEWART. My impression is that I gave one speech to them, but I have never been able to confirm that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, do you know now that the 10 organizations, that you have acknowledged at least some association with in the past, have been listed by the Attorney General as being subversive organizations?

Mr. STEWART. I know they have. The citation came in most cases many years after I left the organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at the time you were associated with each organization that each was so listed by the Attorney General as a subversive organization?

Mr. STEWART. At the time I was a member of these organizations they were not so listed, and consequently I could not have known.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a question at this point?

Is there any of these organizations, having them all in mind that you have been asked about here today, which at the time you were a member of or associated with, that to your knowledge was connected in any way with communism or with the furtherance of Communist aims?

Mr. STEWART. Certainly not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, were you associated with the China Aid Council?

Mr. STEWART. I have no recollection of any association with that organization as a member of China Aid Relief.

However, I did see in your record a photostat showing me as a sponsor back in 1938. I was at that time active in four or five organizations which were interested in supporting China, resisting Japanese aggression. This was not one of the organizations I was active in, but I can well concede that I might have allowed my name to be used in an organization devoted to relief for China at that time, but I had—no; I did not participate in that organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in the Mother Ella Reeve Bloor forty-fifth anniversary banquet?

Mr. STEWART. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who Mother Bloor was?

Mr. STEWART. I made an investigation and discovered it. I did not know when I was first confronted with that name, but I know now.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any evidence available to the committee that would tend to contradict the evidence given by the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a printed copy of an announcement of the Mother Ella Reed Blore forty-fifth anniversary banquet held on Friday, January 4, 1936, at the Hotel Lismore in New York, Mother Ella Reed Blore being a well-known Communist leader at the time and among the list of sponsors is Maxwell S. Stewart.

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Mr. STEWART. I am quite aware of that. I have seen that same statement. I am not able to throw any light on it, but I can state categorically I did not attend such a meeting.

Senator WATKINS Did you allow the use of your name as sponsor?

Mr. STEWART. I have no recollection of doing so.

I would be very doubtful I would.

Senator WATKINS. You would not deny you had?

Mr. STEWART. No; I wouldn't deny it, because I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember signing a New Masses letter to the President? That is not a very adequate description of the letter, but Mr. Mandel will further identify it.

Mr. MANDEL. In the New Masses of April 2, 1940, there appeared a petition to the President, at that time President Roosevelt, in behalf of the New Masses, a magazine with your name attached.

Mr. STEWART. I have some recollection of that. As I recall it, it was what seemed to be a freedom-of-the-press issue, and as an editor of a liberal weekly it seemed to me a suitable thing for me to associate myself with.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that New Masses was a Communist magazine at that time?

Mr. STEWART. Yes; I certainly did, but it seemed to me the freedom-of-the-press issue was paramount.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it may be of small importance; but, since that letter has been discussed and since it appears to be worthy of asking questions of the witness, is it desired that the text of that letter be inserted in the record at this point?

Senator WATKINS. Do you have the text here, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Is it a long letter?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator WATKINS. It may be inserted.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 427" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 427

[New Masses, April 2, 1940]

The petition to the President, printed below, was initiated by the following committee: Elliot Paul, chairman; Franz Boas, Theodore Dreiser, Rockwell Kent, Corliss Lamont, George Seldes, Maxwell S. Stewart, and Dashiell Hammett. As we go to press, more signatures are arriving in the mail and will be published later.

To President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:

In periods of crisis, those civil liberties which are the foundation stone of a free society are endangered. Today, in the face of international crisis, it behooves us, as loyal Americans, to examine critically and expose to the light all threats against democracy at home.

External vigilance is the price of democracy, and we must critically analyze any governmental attack on the rights of Americans to maintain dissident opinions which inevitably results in the destruction of civil rights for all.

The recent raid, without warrant, on the veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the abortive indictments in Detroit for recruiting for Loyalist Spain, the badgering of Communist leaders, the attacks by the Dies committee on consumer and labor groups, are all part of the rapidly accumulating evidence of a tendency to pervert the spirit while pretending to adhere to the letter of the Bill of Rights.

This same tendency exists in the perversion of the function of the special grand jury now convened in Washington, D. C., to investigate alleged military espionage. This investigation was initiated by the former Attorney General, by the wide-

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spread publication of an extraordinary letter accusing a number of organizations and individuals of serious crimes. This unprecedented procedure was sharply condemned by the Washington Post as a breach of the constitutional rights of citizens. The subsequent public announcement by the special prosecutors that such investigation "would be used as a clearinghouse" inevitably created a suspicion that even an inquiry might be perverted into a witch hunt directed against those whose views express differences with the Government.

The New Masses is not mentioned in the letter of the Attorney General, but this has not prevented the grand jury from devoting much of its time to questioning editors and of New Masses. Day after day, testimony is taken having no possible relation to the crimes under investigation, but intended to uncover the witnesses' views on current social and political problems. In this respect, it is really a Dies committee in another form. The continuances of this procedure might drive New Masses out of existence by frightening its readers and supporters, by harassing its editors, and by exhausting the meager funds of the magazine. It is, in fact, a war of nerves which will lead to the destruction of the freedom of expression of dissident opinion.

In the World War the suppression of the Masses, the barring from the mails of other publications, came after the entry of this country into the war. Today the move to silence free opinion is terrifyingly faster. It is a portent of war and a portent of wider suppression. Many of those who petition you, Mr. President, do not agree with the social and political views of New Masses but we recognize that the rights guaranteed in the Constitution cannot be denied to any group without undermining these rights themselves, and thereby making them insecure for all.

In your recent message to the Nation on its seventy-fifth anniversary, Mr. President, you said: "It does not matter whether one agrees with the Nation or not. The important thing is that everywhere and always—particularly in a democracy—minorities shall have a means of expressing themselves." That, Mr. President, is a genuine affirmation of the elementary human and civil rights of all Americans and we urgently call upon you to apply it—"everywhere and always."

We respectfully request you, Mr. President, to exert your influence to end this attack on freedom of the press and prevent its repetition in the future.

(Signed) Gordon W. Allport, Professor of Psychology, Harvard University; Frank E. Baker, President, State Teachers College, Milwaukee, Wis.; Joseph Warren Beach, Chairman, English Department, University of Minnesota: Dr. George H. Bishop, Professor, Washington University, St. Louis; Marc Blitzstein, Composer-Playwright, New York; Franz Boas, Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University; Louis B. Boudin, Attorney, New York; Lyman R. Bradley, Assistant Professor of German, New York University; Millen Brand, Writer, Barto, Pa.; Harold Chapman Brown, Professor, Stanford University; Edwin Berry Burgum, Professor, New York University; Lester Cohen, Writer, Doylestown, Pa.; Bruce Crawford, Editor and Writer, Charleston, W. Va.; Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana, Lecturer and Writer, Cambridge, Mass.; Edward C. Delafield, Jr., Vice President, Modern Age Books, New York; Theodore Dreiser, Author, Hollywood; W. E. B. DuBois, head, Department of Sociology, Atlanta University, Ga.; Henry Epstein, Solicitor General, New York State; Abraham Flexner, Director Emeritus, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University; Franklin Folsom, Executive Secretary, League of American Writers, New York; J. J. Fulton, Stirling Professor, Yale University; Lewis Gannett, Literary Editor, New York Herald Tribune; Dr. A. L. Goldwater, Physician, New York; Mordecai Gorelik, Scene Designer, New York; William Gropper, New York; Dashiell Hammett, writer, New York; Frank H. Hankins, Professor, Smith College of the City of New York; Benjamin Harrow, Professor of Chemistry, College of the City of New York; Melville J. Herskovitz, Professor of Anthropology, Northwestern University; Philip M. Hicks, Professor, Swarthmore College; William W. Hinckley, former chairman, American Youth Congress, Bethesda, Md.; Kenneth E. Hoover, Minister, Shrub Oak, New York; Ellsworth Huntington, Professor, Yale University.

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William Lloyd Imes, Clergyman, New York; Robert Josephy, Book Designer, Bethel, Conn.: Van Dusen Kennedy, Instructor in Economics, Swarthmore College; Rockwell Kent, Artist, New York; Dr. John A. Kingsbury, Social Worker, Shady, N. Y.; Arthur Kober, Writer, New York; Corliss Lamont, Author, New York; Ring W. Lardner, Jr., Writer, Hollywood; Paul H. Lavietes, Assistant Professor of Medicine, Yale University; M. Levi, Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan; Philip Loeb, Actor, New York; J. B. Love, NYA Administrator, Butte, Mont.; Robert Morss Lovett, Governor, Virgin Islands; William M. Malisoff, Professor of Biochemistry, Polytechnic Institute, New York; Albert Maltz, Author and Teacher, New York University; Kirtley F. Mather, Professor of Geology, Harvard University; Edward G. Maxted, Priest of the Episcopal Church, Pascagoula, Miss.; H. L. Mencken, Writer, Baltimore, Md.; Catharine Meyer, Teacher, Vassar College; Paul Mueschke, Associate Professor of English, University of Michigan; William S. Noble, Minister, North Baltimore, Ohio; Katherine Macy Noyes, Urbana, Ill.; William Albert Noyes, Noyes Laboratory of Chemistry, University of Illinois.

Harvey O'Connor, Writer, Chicago; Shaemas O'Sheel, Writer, Red Hook, Dutchess County, N. Y.; Sam Ornitz, Writer, Los Angeles; Elliot Paul, Writer, New York; William Pickens, Director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Alan Porter, Teacher, Vassar College; Israel Putnam, President of I. Putnam, Inc., Elmira, N. Y.; Walter Rautenstrauch, Professor of Industrial Engineering, Columbia University; Gardner Rea, Artist, Brookhaven, N. Y.; Anton Refregier, Mural Painter, New York; Paul Robeson, Singer, New York; Earl Robinson, Composer and Choral Director, New York; Wellington Roe, Writer, Staten Island, N. Y.; Harry Sacher, Lawyer, New York; Margaret Schlauch, Teacher, New York University; Edwin Seaver, Author, New York; George Seldes, Writer, Wilton, Conn.; Helen Seldes, Wilton, Conn.; Howard Selsam, Professor, Brooklyn College; Harlow Shapley, Professor of Astronomy, Harvard University; George H. Shull, Professor, Princeton University; Herman Shumlin, Stage Director and Producer, New York; Rev. F. Hastings Smyth, Superior, Society of the Catholic Commonwealth, Oratory of St. Mary and St. Michael, Cambridge, Mass.; Alice D. Snyder, Professor of English, Vassar College; Moses Soyer, Artist, New York; Raphael Sayer, Artist, New York; George Soule, Editor, New Republic; Philip Stevenson, Writer, New York; Donald Ogden Stewart, Writer, Carmel, Calif.; Maxwell S. Stewart, Associate Editor, the Nation; I. F. Stone, Associate Editor, the Nation; Hans Otto Storm, Engineer, Palo Alto, Calif.; Paul Strand, Photographer, New York; Dirk J. Struik, Associate Professor of Mathematics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Helen Tamiris, Dancer, New York; C. Fayette Taylor, Professor of Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Frederick Thompson, Manufacturer, San Francisco; Edward C. Tolman, Professor of Psychology, University of California; Jean Starr Untermeyer, Writer, New York; Harold C. Urey, Professor of Chemistry, Columbia University; Stuyvesant Van Veen, Mural Artist and Anthropologist, New York; Charles H. Wesley, Professor of History, Howard University; James Wechsler, Assistant Editor, the Nation; Howard W. Willard, Illustrator-Designer, New York; Susan H. Woodruff, Lecturer, Member DAR, New York; Richard Wright, Writer, Crompond, N. Y.; Art Young, Artist, Bethel, Conn.; Leane Zugsmith, Writer, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you ever been the editor of a publication, China Today?

Mr. STEWART. Not an editor; a contributing editor something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long were you contributing editor of China Today?

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Mr. STEWART. My impression was 1938–41. I have here a letter of resignation that I wrote in 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at that time know that China Today was a Communist publication, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. I did not think it was a Communist publication. In the days I was connected with it, it was engaged in support of China against the Japanese aggression.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know the principal editor of the publication, Max Granich?

Mr. STEWART. I have here a letter resigning from the publication after Max Granich became editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you were not a contributing editor at the same time that Max Granich was managing editor?

Mr. STEWART. There was some overlapping. I resigned very shortly after he became editor.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did he become editor?

Mr. STEWART. My impression is that it was just a few months before my letter of resignation.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you send that letter of resignation?

Mr. STEWART. May I introduce the letter of resignation at this time?

Senator WATKINS. You may.

Mr. STEWART. I can give you the date of it, March 18, 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the date of the letter?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You sent it on the same day?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. The copy may be received.

(The letter referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2670.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Knowing now that the letter is March 18, 1941, when is it your testimony that Mr. Granich became associated for the first time with China Today?

Mr. STEWART. I said I don't recall that, but my impression is that he became associated perhaps one or two issues before this.

Mr. SOURWINE. As long as 3 months?

Mr. STEWART. I don't remember at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as long as 6 months?

Mr. STEWART. It could have been a deal longer as far as my memory is concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as long as 2 years?

Mr. STEWART. No, certainly it could not. I can't precisely fix the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been as long as 1 year?

Mr. STEWART. I feel very confident it wasn't as long as 1 year. You might prove otherwise, but I doubt it.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the editors of the publication while you were a contributing editor?

Mr. STEWART. It was a man named Eugene Shackner.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his official title?

Mr. STEWART. He was the editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether a man named J. W. Phillips was editor during the time?

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Mr. STEWART. He was not, nobody by that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether a man named Hansu Chan was editor of China Today while you were editor?

Mr. STEWART. I don't recall he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Hansu Chan was a pseudonym used by a man named Dr. Chi?

Mr. STEWART. Yes. I am not sure when I became aware of that, but I had become aware of it.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become aware of that?

Mr. STEWART. I have been reading the record of these hearings and it may have been there I became aware of it or it may have been a long time. I did meet sometime in 1930 Chao Ting Chi, but I don't recall the date.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you read the testimony of Mr. Budenz before this committee that he met you in the office of the Nation some time in the early 1940's?

Mr. STEWART. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall as a matter of fact whether you ever met Mr. Budenz in the office of the Nation in the early 1940's?

Mr. STEWART. I am quite certain that I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you deny meeting Mr. Budenz in the office of the Nation?

Mr. STEWART. I never met Mr. Budenz as far as I know at any time, any place, under any circumstances.

At that time I was not working at the Nation full time. I went down half a day a week, I did not receive any callers at the Nation office, so it is entirely unlikely I could have met him. I think it entirely unlikely I could have met him and forgotten about it. Incidentally, as I would like to introduce in the record a little later, my position at that time was strongly in opposition to communism, so it is highly unlikely that the editor of the Daily Worker would be looking me up.

Mr. MORRIS. Was your opposition to communism so strong that you feel now that your participation in the activities of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy after the Second World War can be reconciled with that?

Mr. STEWART. You will note my letter of resignation. I think that answers it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, do you have any evidence on whether or not Mr. Earl Browder had directed Louis Budenz to consider you to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. In view of the statement I just made, that my position was very strongly opposed to communism at that time, and it is in the public record that I was writing not one article but many articles directly opposed to the Communist position, I think it is very unlikely that Earl Browder would send Budenz to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you retain your position of antagonism to the Communist Party and its aims from that day until the present time?

Mr. STEWART. I certainly did.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the Communist Political Association?

Mr. STEWART. I was not.

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Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. STEWART. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write or approve for publication any pro-Communist propaganda?

Mr. STEWART. I certainly did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, I have here before me the masthead of the magazine, China Today, which lists as contributing editor Mr. Theodore Draper. Do you know Mr. Theodore Draper?

Mr. STEWART. I don't recall ever hearing the name before.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lawrence Hearn?

Mr. STEWART. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Frederick Spencer?

Mr. STEWART. I don't know anybody by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. By what name did you know him?

Mr. STEWART. I don't know anybody by that name.

Mr. MORRIS. T. A. Bissen?

Mr. STEWART. One of my best friends.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. T. A. Bissen ever used the name Frederick Spencer?

Mr. STEWART. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Frederick Field ever used the name Frederick Spencer?

Mr. STEWART. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Field?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Field well?

Mr. STEWART. Not well, but I know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at any time that Mr. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. I have no knowledge on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any knowledge now that Mr. Field is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. I know he was contributor to the Daily Worker and editor of New Masses, but I have no knowledge whether he was a member of the Communist Party, but I might assume he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet Mr. Field that would indicate to you at the time he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Victor Yakhontoff?

Mr. STEWART. I have met him.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the circumstances of your meeting Mr. Yakhontoff?

Mr. STEWART. It was a social affair of some sort. I only met him once, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever write to the New Masses?

Mr. STEWART. I wrote an article in 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever written book reviews for New Masses since that time?

Mr. STEWART. I believe a book review on Collective Security appeared somewhere in 1938.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write a book review for New Masses in 1935?

Mr. STEWART. That I do not know. That was asked me for the first time in executive session and I had no information on it at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you sign a letter under New Masses auspices on November 26, 1940, demanding the release of Mr. Prestes?

Mr. STEWART. I have no information on that. I obviously wouldn't do anything if New Masses asked me to.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write a book review for the New Masses, July 2, 1935, reviewing Louis Fischer's book Meet the Soviet Citizen?

Mr. STEWART. That is what I thought I was asked a moment ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked if you did in 1935 write a book review for the New Masses.

Mr. STEWART. That I have no information on.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did write a book review for New Masses in 1939?

Mr. STEWART. I thought it was 1938.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did write in 1938?

Mr. STEWART. On collective security; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they ask you to write a review?

Mr. STEWART. Yes; it was a book on collective security. I was taking a strong collective security position at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you did write something for New Masses?

Mr. STEWART. Yes. I answered that before.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there any other evidence you feel should be put in the record at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Stewart, did you ever sign a letter in protest against the barring of Communists from the Civil Liberties Union?

Mr. STEWART. I happen to have a copy of that letter here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you offer it for the record?

Mr. STEWART. Surely. I cannot put my hand on it right now.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, if I may, one or two questions for foundation.

Is that the only copy of letters that you have written and statements that you have made that you brought here with you?

Mr. STEWART. No. I have several other things I would like to introduce later on.

Mr. MORRIS. I should like to ask that all of those things be made available to the committee here.

Mr. STEWART. That is fine. Thank you very much.

Senator WATKINS. They will be received.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the chairman please, I did not mean to offer them for the record at this moment. It is sort of in the nature of a spontaneous duces tecum. I wanted to ask that the material that was brought by the witness be made available to the committee staff for examination.

Senator WATKINS. Since certain statements have been made by the witness about his relationship to these organizations, I think it is only fair that he be permitted to put them in.

Mr. STEWART. I have a statement showing the contrast between my writings and those of the Communists in the period between 1931 and 1941, which contrasts my position with that of the Communists at a very crucial period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did we get that letter that was asked for?

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Mr. STEWART. I haven't found it yet, but you will.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean to interrupt the presentation but the reporter has a lot of exhibits to keep track of.

Mr. STEWART. I have several other things I would like to introduce. I have that document some place. I cannot lay my hand on it right now.

Mr. SOURWINE. While the witness and counsel are looking for that letter, might I make a brief comment with regard to another matter?

An earlier witness here today had some testimony with regard to the Federated Press. I am informed by Mr. Mandel that the American Federation of Labor a number of years ago had a committee which investigated the Federated Press and filed a report thereon which was released to the public, and I respectfully suggest that the Chair instruct Mr. Mandel to secure an authenticated copy of that report and that it be placed in the record at the point where the Federated Press was a part of the witness' testimony.

Senator WATKINS. You want the entire report printed in the record or do you want it made an exhibit in the case or just merely filed?

Mr. SOURWINE. As the Chair wishes.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know at the moment. I do not know how long it is going to be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the Chair instruct Mr. Mandel to procure an authenticated copy and later on pass on the question of where it goes in the record?

Senator WATKINS. Yes, I will ask Mr. Mandel to do that. Whether it is actually printed in the record or not will depend on its length and whether it is material.

The same may be done with respect to Mr. Maxwell S. Stewart's statement, Maxwell S. Stewart versus the Communist Line—A comparison. It is a rather lengthy document. It may be filed as an exhibit in this investigation and if considered to be material we can have it printed, but it is rather lengthy.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 428" and is as follows (see p. 2670 for Maxwell Stewart versus the Communist Line):)

EXHIBIT No. 428

FEBRUARY 12, 1952.

Mr. WILLIAM GREEN,
President, American Federation of Labor, Ninth Street and Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. GREEN: On June 2, 1923, a subcommittee of the American Federation of Labor, consisting of Messrs. Matthew Woll, G. W. Perkins, and Chester M. Wright made a report on the Federated Press. Would you kindly send us a certified copy of this report for insertion into our records?

Your cooperation will be appreciated.

Kindest regards and all best wishes.

Sincerely,

EVA B. ADAMS,
Administrative Assistant to Senator Pat McCarran.

[Letterhead of American Federation of Labor]

WASHINGTON 1, D. C., *February 15, 1952.*

Miss EVA B. ADAMS,
Administrative Assistant to Senator Pat McCarran, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MISS ADAMS: Replying to your letter dated February 11, I enclose a copy of a report on the Federated Press as of June 2, 1923.

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The copy which I am sending you was taken from the official proceedings of the 1923 convention of the American Federation of Labor and was signed by Messrs. Matthew Woll, G. W. Perkins, and Chester M. Wright.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) WM. GREEN,
President, American Federation of Labor.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR CONVENTION, 1923

REPORT ON FEDERATED PRESS

The Cincinnati convention authorized your executive council to have an investigation made of the reportorial and news policy of the Federated Press. We directed President Gompers to have that investigation made. He appointed a committee for that purpose. The committee conducted this investigation and reported as follows:

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 2, 1923.*

Mr. SAMUEL GOMPERS,
President, American Federation of Labor,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR AND BROTHER: In accordance with your request we undertook an inquiry into the policies, methods, and general affairs of the Federated Press, in accordance with Resolution No. 82 adopted by the last annual convention of the American Federation of Labor at Cincinnati, Ohio.

We made careful examination of the files of the Federated Press which were put at our disposal by Mr. Carl Haessler, managing editor. We should like to say that in every respect Mr. Haessler was courteous and obliging during the course of our inquiry in Chicago.

The Federated Press is an incorporated organization of labor publications, serving at the present time 75 publications, which are as follows:

B. of L. E. Journal, Eteenpain, Federated Press Bulletin, Galesburg Labor News, Illinois Industrial Review, Labor Advocate (Racine), Labor Herald.

Labor Unity, Laisve, Midwest Labor News, Milwauke Leader, Minneapolis Labor Review, New Majority, Ny Tid, Oklahoma Leader.

One Big Union Bulletin, Peoples Voice, Radnik, Tom Mooney's Monthly, Toveri, Truth.

Tyomies, Voice of Labor, Volkszeitung, Uj. Elore.

Advance, Alba Nuova, American Railroad Worker, B. C. Federationist, Canokia Valley News, Dawn, Detroit Labor News, Free Voice.

Fur Worker, Headgear Worker, Illinois Miner, Industrialisti, Industrial Solidarity, Industrial Worker, Iowa Farm and Labor News, Labor Advocate (Tacoma), Labor Age, Labor Journal.

Labor Leader, Llano Colonist, Miami Valley Socialist, Minnesota Union Advocate, Newark Leader, New York Call, Panvor, Pennsylvania Worker, Plebe, Prosveta.

Railroad Amalgamation Advocate, Seattle Union Record, Searchlight, Spravedlnost, Tri-City Labor News, Vilnis, West Virginia Federationist, Williamson County Miner, World Tomorrow.

California Oil Worker, Train Dispatcher, Upholsterers' Journal, Railway Clerk, Electrical Worker, Producers' News, Maritime Labor Herald.

In addition to these newspaper clients, the Federated Press service is furnished to about 200 local unions and central bodies and to somewhere between 40 and 50 individuals. These take the service mainly as a means of assisting the Federated Press, the local unions and central bodies paying $1 per week each for the service, the individuals paying $20 a year, and having no right to republication of any of the material in the service.

The Federated Press maintains staff correspondents in Washington, New York City, Berlin, Moscow, Sydney, Mexico City, and Chicago, and it has correspondents in other cities in the United States who are paid space rates.

It would be possible to enter into a lengthy and detailed analysis of the material furnished by the Federated Press to its various member publications, but this would not be nearly as illuminating as Mr. Haessler's own statement of the Federated Press policy.

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As he stated it to us, the policy of the Federated Press is to attempt to report the news of all pretending-to-be factions or wings of the labor movement and to admit to membership in the Federated Press publications representing all factions and wings of the movement. It is regarded by the Federated Press as desirable that there should be on the board of directors representatives of all trends of thought in the labor movement.

Having this statement, we endeavored to get from Mr. Haessler a definition of the term "labor movement" as used by the Federated Press. We were given to understand that within the meaning of that term the Federated Press includes all protesting minorities and that the question of whether these minorities are revolutionary in character or not has nothing to do with the case.

On this point Mr. Haessler furnished us with a copy of a letter which he had written in answer to an inquiry dealing with his policy as managing editor. The following paragraph from that letter is illustrative of his attitude as he states it:

I shall work as managing editor of the Federated Press as long as I am permitted to carry out my conception of its proper function, which is, I believe, to be a cooperative labor news service catering impartially and cordially to every group in the labor movement. I have tried to cut out the factional news and reports of internal union strife that is of no concern to labor as a whole, though wads of such news come to the desk. I have tried also to proportion the news so that all labor elements may have an opening in our columns if they wish it.

This we believe to be an accurate presentation of Federated Press policy, but we cannot refrain from pointing out that the phrase "all labor elements" includes all of the various revolutionary elements outside of the American Federation of Labor, hostile to the American Federation of Labor, hostile to democratic principles in general, and in open warfare in an effort to undermine and destroy the American Federation of Labor.

It appears furthermore to be the Federated Press policy to give as much weight and importance to any protesting minority as to the bona fide trade-union movement in the matter of news. Thus we observed that day after day the Federated Press carries much more news in relation to the doings of various protesting minorities than it does in relation to the activities of the bona fide trade-union movement. We observed furthermore that news stories relating to the trade-union movement are not infrequently handled in such a manner as to reflect discreditably upon the trade-union movement.

It is true that when one or two of these instances were called to Mr. Haessler's attention he manifested a desire to make correction. However that may be, the fact remains that under the policy of the Federated Press every agency or organization which may lay claim to a labor designation is entitled to representation in the news service of the Federated Press on a basis of importance equal to that of the trade-union movement. Every destructive, revolutionary agency finds a ready entree to the Federated Press service as long as it makes claim to a labor designation.

The board of directors of the Federated Press is so composed as to make any policy other than the one now in force impossible. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the personnel of the directorate, it is apparent that a majority of the present directors would in any test be either hostile to the American Federation of Labor or lukewarm toward it. Among the directors are W. A. Foster and Arne Swabeck whose philosophy is well known and with whom a majority of the directors probably will generally be found in sympathy.

In connection with the general policies of the Federated Press it is worth noting that the European manager is Mr. Louis Lochner, who, during the World War, was at the head of the notorious People's Council, the head and front of the pacifist propaganda. It is perhaps also worthy of note that general European news, and particularly British news, is supplied to the Federated Press by the London Daily Herald, concerning whose connections with the Soviet authorities there were some months ago most astonishing revelations.

It was pointed out to us that A. F. of L. publications might change the policy of the Federated Press by the simple expedient of becoming members in numbers sufficient to outvote the present majority.

There are two things to be said about this. First, not less than four-fifths of the present members must vote for the admission of an applicant; and second, even though a sufficient number of editors loyal to the principles of the American Federation of Labor should become members of the Federated Press, they would, by so doing, vote themselves into an indebtedness of approximately $48,400, and it is our frank opinion that this would indeed be an unfortunate acquisition.

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The Federated Press service is sent daily to clients in the form of printed sheets. In addition to the daily printed sheet a monthly bulletin is issued which serves as a house organ. The daily service carries a series of articles under the caption, "Economic news service," and these are gathered together and printed on a single sheet once a week.

In addition, the Federated Press issues what it calls chain papers, there being at present four of these. In these chain papers one page is reserved for local news of the community for which the paper is issued while the remaining pages are made up entirely of material carried in the Federated Press service during the week.

Samples of all of this material are attached to this report, together with a copy of the bylaws and copies of the monthly bulletin containing the names of clients and the current annual budget which provides for expenditures amounting to $100,000, providing that amount of money can be secured.

We found throughout the Federated Press service a continued domination of the news by articles relating to the IWW, the so-called amalgamation movement, "political" prisoners, the Communist Party, the Workers' Party, the Socialist Party, and Russian affairs. That is to say that there is a continuous tide flowing through the Federated Press service of a pro-Soviet, pro-Communist, prorevolutionary, anti-American Federation of Labor character.

We found in a long series of issues, under the standing heading, "Labor trials," a constant repetition of stories about IWW cases, Communist cases and the Michigan syndicalist cases. Typical of this column is the issue of May 18, containing under this heading stories about the trial of Ruthenberg in Michigan, a story about political prisoners, and a story about the troubles of the spectacular Upton Sinclair in California. In another issue the column covered IWW cases in Los Angeles and San Francisco; criminal syndicalism cases in Gary, Ill.; and a story from New York about political prisoners.

The issue of May 5, 1923, fairly well typifies the general policy of the Federated Press. The columns of the daily service are 14 inches long and there are six columns. Few stories run more than 8 inches and any story running from 6 to 8 inches is therefore an important story from the Federated Press point of view. In this issue 40 inches were devoted to various "isms" while the contents of but 10 inches related to real trade-union activity. In the same issue there were small items, totaling from 6 to 8 inches, of what might be termed real or bona fide labor news, in addition to the article on economics which in this case dealt with the Pennsylvania Railroad.

Among other things in this day's issue was a news story discussing the strike of the Marine Transport Workers, using the name of the International Seamen's Union and the Marine Transport Workers in such a way as to make no proper distinction between the IWW organization and the bona fide trade-union.

It is true that our instructions confined us to the editorial and news policies of the Federated Press, but the Garland Fund had been so much in discussion and had been the basis of a news story in which in our judgment the president of the American Federation of Labor received unfair treatment that we deemed it advisable, in view of these and other facts, to make some inquiry in this direction and to include the results in this report.

We cannot refrain from including here a letter which has some bearing on the situation inasmuch as it was addressed by a member of the board of trustees of the Garland Fund to a member of the executive board of the Federated Press who is also a member of the board of trustees of the Garland Fund, though neither held these respective positions at the time the letter was written. The letter is as follows:

JUNE 30, 1922.

Mr. WM. Z. FOSTER,
118 North La Salle Street, Chicago, Ill.

DEAR BILL FOSTER: Thanks for yours of the 26th. I can't add to what I have said about Costello's relation to the Federated Press. I do wish you could make the effort to straighten things out before you go west—or work on it at long distance, if that can be done. Costello ought to be generous enough to not stand in the way of a really able man taking his place. Can't you persuade him?

I am delighted with the prospects and progress of your league. Of course, the future belongs to your bunch.

Yours always,

(Signed) ROGER BALDWIN.

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It should be explained in relation to the above letter that Mr. Costello was the then managing editor of the Federated Press, later succeeded by Mr. Haessler.

The last two sentences of the letter of course constitute the most important portion of the letter in connection with this report. They make the type of influence wielded by at least two members of the Garland Fund which has agreed to give $15,000 to the Federated Press and which has already given a substantial portion of that amount.

Taking up again the analysis of Federated Press policy, we find in the issue of May 9, in a story printed under a Washington date line, the following: "European labor is warned by Samuel Gompers not to expect cooperation from organized labor of the United States in general strikes as a means to economic or political advancement." Of course, the statement actually issued by the president of the American Federation of Labor had to do entirely with general strikes as a means of preventing war and did not deal with strikes in any sense in connection with economic developments.

It would be possible to proceed with analysis of a great many of the issues of the Federated Press but there would be, it seems to us, no point to an endless repetition of the same story. An analysis of issue after issue can only lead back to the conclusion that the Federated Press lends itself continuously to the spreading of doctrines subversive of the best interests of the American working people as expressed in the bona fide trade-union movement, and that this condition is going to continue. The personnel throughout the organization makes this clear, and the record of its conduct proves the case beyond any shadow of doubt.

We are aware of the fact that a small number of publications purporting to be bona fide trade-union publications are members of the Federated Press, subscribe to its service and print it in part or in whole. We make the assertation, however, as emphatically as we may and without qualification, that no publication can follow the policy of the Federated Press as expressed in its daily service and remain loyal to the fundamental principles set up as the standard of constructive trade-unionism by the American Federation of Labor. There should be harmony and united action along constructive lines before we can be entirely successful in the fulfillment of our mission and the attainment of our aim in the labor movement.

Respectfully submitted.

(Signed) MATTHEW WOLL.
G. W. PERKINS,
CHESTER M. WRIGHT.

Mr. STEWART. Did I introduce the letter to Mr. Max Granich? I want to introduce that. I am not sure whether it is the one I passed out or not.

Senator WATKINS. This particular one I referred to a moment ago will be made a part of the file, but it will not be printed for the moment.

Mr. STEWART. Here is the letter to the Civil Liberties Union which I would like to introduce. I think I have introduced most of the material.

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness was asked about this letter and he stated he had a copy.

It was requested that he supply that copy for the record.

Senator WATKINS. This is "Complete Text of Open Letter to the American Civil Liberties Union." It may be received in the record.

(The material referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2683.)

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a letter which you wrote?

Mr. STEWART. It is a letter of which I was one of a number of signatories.

Mr. SOURWINE. At whose request did you sign?

Mr. STEWART. I have no idea.

Senator WATKINS. But it stated your views?

Mr. STEWART. It stated my views.

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Mr. SOURWINE. This material which the chairman has accepted as part of the file of the committee headed "Maxwell S. Stewart Versus the Communist Line—a Comparison" is an analysis prepared by you?

Mr. STEWART. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. That, of course, has already been made part of the file in this case. We will determine later whether we will have it printed or not.

The witness has offered a letter, copy of a letter dated March 18, 1941, to Mr. Max Granich, editor of China Today. That may be received as part of the record.

(The letter referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2670.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a letter written by you, Mr. Stewart, to Mr. Granich?

Mr. STEWART. It was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stewart, have you been a contributor to the publication, Soviet Russia Today?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been active in the American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, otherwise known as Indusco?

Mr. STEWART. I was chairman of it for a number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider that organization to have been influenced in any way by the Communist Party?

Mr. STEWART. Definitely it is anti-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you active in the American Society for Russian Relief?

Mr. STEWART. No; I never participated in that organization. I am not sure whether that is Russian War Relief or not, but I didn't participate in any pro-Russian organization of that type.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few more IPR letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations which I would like to have introduced in the record at this time.

Mr. STEWART. May I introduce one or more documents in the record?

Senator WATKINS. Yes.

Mr. STEWART. I have introduced this comparative document showing excerpts from my writings. I would like to introduce a lengthy excerpt of an article titled "Luxury or Liberty" in the Nation of 1941 which expresses a position which could not be more strongly opposed to the Communists at that time.

Senator WATKINS. It may be filed.

(The article referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2684.)

Mr. STEWART. I have also an editorial which I wrote, titled "Half Aid to Britain," which was somewhat earlier at that time and again it shows me very strongly opposed to the Communists.

Senator WATKINS. It may be included in the files without at this time being incorporated in the record.

(The document referred to appears at the conclusion of Mr. Stewart's testimony. See p. 2688.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if the witness is willing, if that is his desire, I suggest that everything he submits here today be incorporated not necessarily into the record but in the appendix of these hearings.

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I think we should do that in fairness to Mr. Stewart, who has asked that these things be made available to us.

Senator WATKINS. That will be the order.

Mr. STEWART. I certainly appreciate that.

Mr. MORRIS. I do not think the other letters are very important. We can introduce them in the record at any time.

Senator WATKINS. If there is nothing further, the committee will stand in recess.

Mr. STEWART. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 p. m. Monday, February 11, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(The following material through p. 2690 was offered by Mr. Stewart:)

MARCH 18, 1941.

Mr. MAX GRANICH,
Editor, China Today, 168 West Twenty-third Street,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MAX: As I look over the March issue of China Today, I am somewhat perturbed by the general tone of several of the articles.

I should not care if it were not for the fact that my name appears as a member of the editorial board and, as you know, the editorial board has not been called into session for some time. I think this is most unfortunate in view of the change in the tone of the magazine; and, under the circumstances, I think it best that I resign as a member of the editorial board and request that my name be removed from it.

This does not mean that I shall be unwilling to cooperate with you in the future. It merely means that I am unwilling to appear to take responsibility for something over which I actually have no control.

Sincerely yours,

MAXWELL S. STEWART.

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MAXWELL S. STEWART VERSUS THE COMMUNIST LINE—A COMPARISON

Here indicated are statements reflecting the Communist line (principally from the New Masses) as compared with the statements of Maxwell S. Stewart for the same period (principally from the Nation of which magazine he was then an editor for the period 1935–41). Most of the editorial material to which reference is made was unsigned. However, these pieces are so marked in the Nation's files. Since the following report is pertinent to the charges against Mr. Stewart, special emphasis is given to the relative position on collective security, isolationism, economic aid, military preparedness, and the Far East.

(NOTE.—In order to shorten the report, it has been necessary to use excerpts. However, every effort has been made to avoid distortion and to retain the flavor of the entire article.)

THE COMMUNIST LINE	WRITINGS OF MAXWELL S. STEWART
COLLECTIVE SECURITY	
1931–35	
JAPANESE ATTACK MANCHURIA	
Communist position on collective security during this period not clear-cut.	During the Japanese attack on Manchuria, 1931–32, Maxwell Stewart took a strong stand in favor of collective security in the pages of World Tomorrow, of which he was a contributing editor.

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THE ETHIOPIAN WAR

Communist position not clear-cut.

[Editorial in the Nation, September 4, 1935, entitled "Sanctions or war?"]

Mussolini may shake his fist threateningly at Great Britain when the latter talks of sanctions, but if the United States and the League powers take a common stand he will have little choice except to seek a face-saving compromise. Such a stand is the one guaranty against a war that may destroy all that is left of Western civilization.

[Editorial in the Nation, November 20, 1935, entitled "Helping Mussolini Win His War"]

The recent action of the League of Nations Sanctions Committee, adding oil, coal, iron, pig iron, and steel to the list of war materials which should be barred from Italy, makes it little short of criminal for the United States to delay further in taking steps to restrict the export of these commodities to Italy. * * * We are in the unenviable position of being responsible for supplying Mussolini's airplanes and tanks with fuel for their bombardment of Ethiopian villages.

[Editorial in the Nation, December 18, 1935]

It can scarcely be denied that the subject of oil has become the pivot around which all hope of building a system of collective security turns. The effort to create a world organization capable of enforcing the peace may fail, but it must not be because the United States neglected to carry its share of the burden.

ATTITUDES AFTER RUSSIA ENTERS LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1936–1939

The Communist began to strongly advocate collective security.

The New Masses, July 25, 1939—It is intolerable that adherents of collective security should still be charged with making war * * *. The assumption that the United States can isolate itself from world events is untenable.

Stewart's writings in the Nation continue to support collective security.

THE EUROPEAN WAR BEFORE THE GERMAN INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION

September 1939 to June 1941

THE HITLER-STALIN PACT

[August 22, 1939, editorial in the first issue of the Nation published after Hitler-Stalin Pact]

August 1939: Immediate reaction to Hitler-Stalin Pact in the New Masses confused and indeterminate.

The impact of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact has blown to pieces all international calculation. Its echoes resound as wildly in Chungking and

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THE EUROPEAN WAR BEFORE THE GERMAN INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION—continued

Tokyo as in Danzig and London. We discuss on a later page the fateful European implications of the agreement. In Asia it may, ironically, have some useful byproducts.

[August 22, 1939, Signed Book Review in same issued of the Nation]

No matter what their personal preferences, the citizens of the democratic states must accept a high degree of totalitarianism if they are to defend themselves against nations that are organized solely for war purposes * * *. We are left with a feeling that what is most needed is a complete change in the mentality and morale of the democratic states * * *. They must realize that essentially the war has already begun.

GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR

[The New Masses, July 16, 1940]

* * * The New Masses has maintained from the beginning that victory for either side in the imperialist conflict would be a catastrophe for the people of all countries and for the cause of genuine democracy.

[An editorial in the New Massed, October 1, 1940, entitled "Why Vote for War?"]

* * * In our opinion the danger to the American people lies in the fact that a war has developed in several parts of the world. A war whose purpose is the revision of relations among the big imperialist powers, a war for the hegemony over weaker peoples, for the exploitation of colonial markets—an imperialist war * * *.

The real danger arises because the American capitalist class is lusting to participate in this revision of world relations on a basis most favorable to itself * * *.

If the American people are to reject the policy of their own worst enemies who have visted the disaster of crisis and unemployment on American life for the past 10 years * * * it seems to us that we must evolve a foreign policy among these general lines:

(1) *Withdrawal of all economic and political support for one side or another in the present war; the renewal of full neutrality of word and deed.*

(2) The abandonment of economic and military penetratation in the hemisphere; the encouragement of industry for the Latin-American peoples, the division of landed estates, develop-

[Editorial in the Nation, September 16, 1939, entitled "American Neutrality"]

In issuing two separate neutrality proclamations, the President sought to dramatize the inconsistency of America's position with respect to the war. The first reflected our determination to remain out of the war, a possibility which is not irreconcilable with our desire for an ultimate allied victory. The invoking of the Neutrality Act, on the other hand, threw the weight of American policy on the side of Hitler. Already its effects are apparent. Approximately half of the 1,400 planes ordered in this country last spring by England and France have been held up by decree. Another 1,500 have been ordered subject to cancellation if the embargo is not lifted.

The President has been outspoken in declaring that application of the arms embargo amounts to strengthening Hitler's hand. By allowing ordinary commercial credits and short-term obligations to be extended to belligerents, he has gone as far as his discretionary power under the act permits to make the burden on the Allies and American business as light as possible. In taking this action the President appears to recognize what should now be clear to everyone—that *we shall have to aid England and France by all means short of war. Defeat for the Allies would seriously undermine American security. It would bring Hitlerism to our very door. Realistically analyzed, our choice is not between aiding or not aiding Britain; it is whether we are to send ample material now or by re-*

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GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR—continued

ment of education, and collaboration with the popular and democratic forces among them.

*Such a program * * * represents a program of independence from the ambitions of British or German imperialism, independence from the ambitions of American imperialism.*

[The New Masses, December 3, 1940]

Our opposition to a British victory or American participation does not rest * * * on partiality for the other side. The fact is that we do not favor either side. It insults the intelligence, the strength, the power of the American people to say that the choice is support for either side * * *. We are profoundly convinced that none of the problems of Europe will be served by the victory of British imperialism. * * *

What is at stake in this war is not the Nation, but capitalism * * *. It is not democracy but imperialism * * * which stands or falls in this war.

stricting this aid increase the likelihood of sending men later.

[Editorial in the Nation, October 7, 1939, entitled "Embargo Battle Begins"]

The struggle for the revision of the Neutrality Act has begun on the floor of the Senate. * * *

All these changes will make it more difficult for England and France to obtain needed supplies in this country. The sole change of benefit to the Allies is the section placing arms, ammunition, and implements of war on a cash-and-carry basis similar to that proposed for all other exports to belligerents. Some authorities go so far as to insist that the introduction of cash-and-carry restrictions on trade in materials other than arms will more than offset the gains the Allies may expect from the repeal of the arms embargo. Already British and French shipping is being taxed to the utmost. Continued losses from submarine warfare may create such a shortage of ships that the Allies will be unable to purchase needed raw materials, to say nothing of airplanes and other primary war equipment. Limiting credits to a 90-day period, without renewal, may also seriously hamper trade * * *. It now appears that the chief struggle will occur over the section permitting 90-day commercial credit. Although this provision is highly restrictive as it stands, isolationists are determined to bar all credits on the ground that they are inconsistent with the Johnson Act * * *. The prohibition of short-term credits would drastically limit our ability to supply France and Britain with the materials they require. *Any weakening of the Allies, as has been previously suggested in these columns, is bound to intensify the conflict. We trust that regardless of senatorial oratory, Congress will be realistic enough to face the issue in those terms.*

[Editorial paragraph in the Nation, May 4, 1940]

Von Ribbentrop's attempts to defend the Nazi invasion of Norway by accusing the British of harboring similar designs has hardly improved Germany's moral position before the world. There is considerable internal evidence that the documents presented in the White Book are forgeries. George Fielding Eliot, for example, has pointed out 12 ways in which the alleged "operation orders," said to have been found on a British officer captured near Lille Ham-

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GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR—continued

mer, depart from the style stipulated in the Field Service Regulations of the British Army. But establishment of the authenticity of the documents would not greatly aid the Nazi case. For while Von Ribbentrop accuses the British of having planned by April 6 and 7 to send troops to Norway, it is evident that the German soldiers who were landed at Norvik were actually under way several days before this. The German charge, moreover, appears to fall down completely before the fact that a week actually elapsed after the German invasion before the first British troops were landed, and that these landings bore all the earmarks of hasty and inadequate preparation. Nothing is said in the White Book, it may be added, about a British threat to Denmark; yet the Nazi occupation of Denmark was obviously part of the same prearranged plan as the seizure of Norway.

[Editorial paragraph in the Nation, July 12, 1940]

Mr. Stimson understands the risks of active assistance to Great Britain and is well acquainted with the legal difficulties involved in the type of aid which he suggests. *But more clearly than anyone else in public life, he has recognized the danger to our security that will arise if Britain falls and aggression remains unchecked.*

[Signed article in the Nation, August 3, 1940. (See photostat of this entire article in appendices; it was one of three examples taken from my writings to prove my isolationism.) "Conscripting America"]

Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany the New Masses opposed all aspects of defense, including conscription. When the first conscription bill was introduced, the New Masses of July 9, 1940, carried a two-page article on "Every person favoring peace and civil liberties should understand the terms of the Burke-Wadsworth conscription bill."

It began and continued with a long, involved story about John Jones, his father and his 18-year-old brother, all of whom would have to register. It elaborated on every possible eventuality that might happen to them if conscriptions were adopted, stressing the fact that if one of them should "grumble" he might be arrested * * * might be imprisoned for five years and fined $10,000 * * *.

Passage of the bill puts one phase of M-day into operation.

The brutal logic of events during the past few weeks has swept away many illusions long cherished by those who call themselves liberals or progressives. Pacifism has become a luxury which we dare no longer enjoy. Few of us who fought armament bills in the past have come out against the President's recent unprecedented defense program. The fate of France with its Popular Front reforms has even raised the question of how far we dare go in ameliorating working conditions when faced by a potential enemy whose strength is based on a slave economy.

* * * Let us arm to the limit against Nazi aggression.

[Editorial in the Nation, August 24, 1940, entitled "New Defense Frontier"]

The President's action in arranging with Prime Minister King for the establishment of a permanent joint defense

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GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR—continued

board has gained popular approval on both sides of the border. A few of our isolationists have expressed misgivings at a step which binds the United States in a military pact with a country which is an active belligerent in the European war, but it is generally recognized even in isolationist circles that the United States dare not stand by and allow Canada to fall into the hands of a hostile power * * *. *Our real frontier for the purposes of defense lies in the British Isles.*

[Editorial in the Nation, August 31, 1940, entitled "A Year of War"]

Although isolationists are still vociferous, the widespread approval given to the proposed sale of over-age American destroyers to Britain reflects a striking change in American public opinion. Since the collapse of France, many Americans have come to recognize that our fate as a Nation is closely tied to Britain.

[Editorial in the Nation, September 22, 1939]

During the entire Hitler-Stalin Pact period 1939–41, the New Masses, as usual, contained no objective reporting of Russia, but instead consistently editorialized its reports of world developments so as to make it appear that Russia was always right, the other nations always wrong.

The logic of events might stimulate the western democracies to redouble their aid to China to offset Soviet influence. *In the event of a general European war, the responsibility for preserving China from either Soviet or Japanese domination would fall primarily on the United States.*

[Editorial in the Nation, February 17, 1940]

The Allies seem to be finding it increasingly difficult to regard the U. S. S. R. as strictly neutral but have yet to decide whether they would gain by treating it as an open enemy. Should they take this step and carry Turkey with them, the Caucasus would be the obvious point to strike. The seizure of this region would deprive Russia of its chief oil resources and would be an end to the German hopes of obtaining supplies. At the same time it would check any Soviet attempt to move against the Iranian and Iraquian oil fields or in the direction of India.

[Editorial paragraph in the Nation, September 21, 1940]

The only country in a position to challenge Germany in Rumania is the Soviet Union. But there is little in recent Soviet-German relations to suggest that Moscow is willing to risk war by opposing this step in Hitler's *drang nach Osten.*

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ATTITUDE TOWARD FRANCE AND THE SPANISH REFUGEES

Background: After the Spanish War tens of thousands of refugees streamed across the French border and took up asylum in France. They were still there during the Hitler-Stalin pact period.

In 1940 the Communist press launched a vicious attack on France for its treatment of these refugees. (See photostat of New Masses, editorial of April 2, 1940.) This was part of overall Communist policy to discredit and attack the western Allies.

In Nation editorials throughout this period Stewart took issue with the Communist point of view, pointing out that France had done and was doing more for the refugees than any other country, and deserved credit and aid—not criticism—for its efforts.

NEUTRALITY ACT AND LEND-LEASE

The New Masses was consistently against repeal of the Neutrality Act and lend-lease. The following excerpt is but one example of many of the editorial approaches taken.

[The New Masses, January 21, 1941, "the Lease-Lend Dictatorship"]

* * * What began as a lease-lend plan—by itself an evasion of the Neutrality and Johnson Acts—has emerged as a gargantuan scheme for adjourning representative government and placing in the hands of one man unlimited power to commit acts of war in defiance of the Constitution. * * * It is breath-taking, this soaring blueprint of fascism.

[Editorial paragraph in the Nation, December 21, 1940]

Hope for repeal of the Neutrality Act to give increased aid to Britain is heightened by the forthright plea of Representative Sol Bloom.

[November 30, 1940, editorial paragraph in the Nation]

This is no time for the United States to play Shylock. If Britain needs credits, we should give them on the most modest terms possible. The least we can do is to make it possible for Britain to fight our battles for us.

[December 21, 1940, editorial paragraph in the Nation]

Congress alone has the authority to see that Britain receives the full assistance, short of war, that this country is capable of providing. In view of the emergency, it should face this issue before considering any other legislation.

[January 4, 1941, editorial in the Nation, entitled "Tasks Before Congress"]

Foremost among the issues before Congress is, of course, our policy with respect to the war and aid for Britain. * * * The President's radio address has set the keynote, but it remains for Congress to make the basic decisions. It is evident that the Neutrality Act will have to be either revised drastically or repealed. Of the two alternatives, repeal seems the most honest and the safest, since it would restore the traditional basis of inter-

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NEUTRALITY ACT AND LEND-LEASE—continued

national law as a guide for American foreign policy. Repeal of the Johnson Act may not be necessary to carry out the President's plan of sending arms to the British, but it is a bad law, and its existence only serves as an inducement to subterfuge or lack of realism in facing the immediate problems of foreign policy. It should be repealed.

AID TO BRITAIN

[January 28, 1941, an editorial in the New Masses entitled "A Travesty on 1776"]

1776 is a symbol of the American Revolution, of the great democratic war against British tyranny. Today it has been converted into a symbol of the Roosevelt counterrevolution, of the reactionary war alliance with Britain against * * * Germany and Italy. The new dictatorial lend-lease bill, H. R. 1776, is tagged "liberty, democracy, and antifascism." Its real meaning is booty, power, war, and fascism. * * *

The fundamental lie lies in the concealment of the fact that not German imperialism alone threatens the American people * * * but the struggle for * * * world domination among rival imperialists * * * it is capitalism, the profit lust of a small group of supermonopolists that is the aggressor everywhere. The fascism of Wall Street speaks with brutal arrogance in H. R. 1776. That is why Thomas W. Lamont's Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies is for it.

[April 8, 1941, the New Masses]

On April 5 and 6 several thousand men and women are gathering in New York. They come from all parts of the country to plan peace for the American people. They speak for nameless millions and they stand against America's rulers who have driven our country into virtual undeclared war * * *

[April 8, 1941, the New Masses]

It is admitted, even by many interventionists, that fully 85 percent or 90 percent of our people are opposed to participation in the imperialist conflict. * * * While the majority * * * are against participating, they favor aid to Britain. They do not yet understand * * * that there is a fundamental contradiction of this attitude—that aid to one side in the imperialist struggle must inevitably frustrate those who wish to remain at peace.

[March 8, 1941, editorial in the Nation entitled "Half Aid to Britain"]

The Senate's delay in passing the aid-to-Britain bill provides a dramatic but tragic illustration of the inability of our legislators to sense either the magnitude or the imminence of the threat to England and the United States from the coming Nazi offensive. It is almost as if there were some fatalistic force which had decreed that in our action in this crisis, as in others, shall be too little and too late. The full force of the Nazi fury is destined to fall in not more than 60 days; *every hour counts.* There would not be time under the best of circumstances to send Britain anything like all the aid it needs, but every plane, gun, destroyer that can be rushed to the other side will be vital to Britain's defense. And if Britain succeeds in beating off the initial attack, the struggle will have just begun. For it may be assumed that Germany will stake everything on obtaining a decision before the year's end.

Few Americans seem as yet to be aware of the amount of aid that must be given if Britain is to survive the year. Germany not only has an immense head start in military and economic preparations, but its armament production is still far and away above that of the British. * * *

The plain fact is that the United States must deliver, as Fritz Sternberg has pointed out in his "Fivefold Aid to Britain," some $1,000,000,000 worth of supplies to the Empire each month. This is from four to five times what we are now sending. *But we cannot possibly attain the $1,000,000,000 a month figure unless we are prepared to make drastic sacrifices in domestic consumption. Our preparations for defense so far have proceeded on the assumption that a country like America can have both guns and butter. Any contrary opinion is treated in some circles as a betrayal of liberalism.* It is

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AID TO BRITAIN—Continued

[May 6, 1941, the New Masses]

* * * The majority of the American people are waking up from day to day to the realization of what's in store for them . . . (they) now realize that they have been brought to the very brink of war. * * * *And they don't want war.* * * *

The President * * * has gone too far * * * his commitments to the British are already so profound that he cannot retain control over British policy without going the whole hog. Yet it would be fatal to participate in the war bearing in mind this domestic opposition.

true that if our national income were raised to $100 billion a year, we could well afford to devote a quarter of it to national defense and aid to Britain and still have sufficient to meet all our normal consumer demands. Such a goal is within our reach, but it cannot be attained in 1941. *And we cannot afford to wait.* * * * The priorities established last week in the aluminum industry are expected to reduce materially the use of the metal in cooking utensils. This is the first and only sacrifice American consumers have been asked to make for defense. It is, of course, wholly incommensurate with what is required. It is time we realized that unless we are willing to deprive ourselves of luxuries now we may be forced to make infinitely greater sacrifices following a British defeat.

[May 10, 1941, editorial in the Nation]

The President's order to the Maritime Commission to assemble 2,000,000 tons of shipping to aid Britain in the Battle of the Atlantic raises hopes that the shipping problem is at least being tackled with the energy it demands. Of course the Maritime Commission cannot create ships, but it can divert vessels used in coastwise or Great Lakes service to overseas service and, if necessary, transfer them to foreign registry. The Lake shipping available is unfortunately limited to ships that can travel through the present St. Lawrence canals. In the case of coastwise vessels the only problem is that of organizing rail traffic to care for the extra burden. The 69 Danish, Italian, and German ships recently seized in our ports will be available as soon as Congress responds to the President's request for enabling legislation. * * * The general practicability of the President's plan for a shipping pool to aid Britain is shown by the speed with which the Maritime Commission obtained the release of 25 tankers for British use, with promise of 25 more within a brief period. Although there has been no confirmation so far of the reported arrival of American ships at Suez, American supplies are known to be getting through to Egypt. This is, at least, a good start in the most crucial phase of defense and aid to Britain.

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[June 21, 1941, editorial in the Nation (issued 4 days before the Soviet Union was invaded by Hitler), entitled "Letting Britain Down"]

After the President's words a few weeks ago about the necessity for getting aid to Britain * * * the figures on the first 3 months of the Lend Lease Act were a profound shock. The total value of shipments * * * was $75 million—very far from the $1,300 million * * * we were supposed to provide * * * and still farther from the $1 billion a month which, according to conservative estimates we must furnish Britain if American assistance is to offset German superiority in arms production * * *

AID TO BRITAIN RELATED TO AID TO CHINA

[November 19, 1940, an article in the New Masses entitled "New Conspiracy Against China"]

To regard aid to Britain and aid to China as interchangeable or synonymous is a dangerous illusion. The war in Europe is between Great Britain, the greatest imperialist power in the world, and a country * * * ambitious to replace Great Britain in that role * * * while China is fighting for her national independence.

[November 23, 1940, an editorial in the Nation entitled "Aid to China Is Aid to Britain"]

A few months ago many American observers were urging that the United States move its battle fleet into the Atlantic, either as potential aid to Britain or as a protection to the United States in case of a British defeat. With the passing of the danger of an immediate invasion of Britain that argument no longer has even partial validity. On the contrary, it has not become clear that the maintenance of our fleet in the Pacific as a bulwark of a strong far eastern policy is not only highly important to our own defense but essential to the successful defense of Great Britain. In order to maintain its supremacy in the Mediterranean and safeguard Suez, Britain has weakened its far eastern defenses by transferring naval units from the Far East and troops from Australia, New Zealand, and India. Needed troops have also been withdrawn from the defense of the British Isles. Much larger forces are required. Most of these must come from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada by way of the Indian Ocean. But Japan's recent evacuation of important territory in south China and concentration of its forces on the islands of Hainan and Formosa can only be interpreted as preparation for further adventures in the South Seas. There are reports of a Japanese ultimatum to French Indochina which, if accepted, would give Japan an important and needed naval base at Saigon, almost halfway to the East Indies. Faced by this immediate threat, the British dominions will be compelled to keep back forces for home defense, and there is danger that the immense resources of India may be cut off by a Japanese naval blockade.

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AID TO BRITAIN RELATED TO AID TO CHINA—continued

[December 3, 1940, the New Masses, a 2-page spread entitled "Aid to Britain Today, War Tomorrow"]

The title to this article is an accurate indication of the contents. It upheld an isolationist policy on the part of the United States, ending the war as an imperialistic venture.

Prompt action by the United States in sending naval reinforcements to the Philippines and at least a small contingent to the vicinity of the Singapore base would forestall this threat. For it is clear that there can be no attack on the East Indies if a strong American naval unit is in a position to cut off the Japanese expeditionary force from its base. Increased aid for China by the United States can also play a large part in checkmating Japan's aggressive intentions in the South Seas. But without at least potential naval support we could not be certain that our shipments to China would reach their destination.

If Japan can be checked, the dominions, together with India, can in all probability take care of the Axis threat to Suez. And *a strengthening of the British defenses in that vital zone offers the best hope of persuading Turkey to throw its resources into the Mediterranean struggle. The cost of all of this to the United States, it will be noted, is negligible as compared with what might be involved if Britain's life-line were severed.* Quite apart from the fate of Britain, it is clearly to our interest to preserve China and prevent Japan from making further incursions in the South Seas which would threaten our vital supplies of tin, rubber, antimony, and tungsten. That such a policy is almost of utmost importance to Britain is our good fortune in this day when choices are usually between evils.

REARMAMENT AND LIVING STANDARDS

[October 8, 1940, editorial in the New Masses]

Try as they will to blur class differences and sing "national unity" this armament program is being speeded up in the interest of those who will reap the profits, and not for the masses who will sacrifice their health and well-being, and possibly their lives.

[March 25, 1941, the New Masses]

* * * Hundreds of war contracts have been signed, but between July 1940 and February 1941 just 21 corporations have received amounts of more than $100 million each. * * * How those war industrialists must laugh now—they who squirmed under Ney's questions a few years ago. * * * Nobody asked * * * "friend or foe?" Certainly not "Democrat or Fascist?" There was just one password: profits.

[August 3, 1940, article in Nation entitled "Conscripting America"]

* * * The fate of France with its Popular Front reforms has even raised the question of how far we dare go in ameliorating working conditions when faced by a potential enemy whose strength is based on a slave economy. * * * Let us arm to the limit against Nazi aggression.

[February 1, 1941, editorial in the Nation]

The conscription of labor in Britain, recently announced by Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labor, seems on the face of it a retreat from the relatively enlightened social policy followed by the British Government in recent months. Yet there are compelling reasons why some such step should be taken. * * * *Some compulsion seems, therefore, defensible as an emergency measure.*

(See photostat of signed Nation article, "Luxury or Liberty?", May 24, 1941.)

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ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA AND JAPAN

Background: There was a united front between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists until the incident of the new Fourth Army in the winter of 1940–41. Following this the Communists became increasingly critical of Chiang Kai-shek and were never again reconciled to his leadership. (See excerpt, the New Masses, February 11, 1941). Throughout these years Stewart in the Nation consistently supported a united China with Chiang as leader. He held that the important thing was unity but urged domestic reforms. At this time everyone—Stewart, Chiang and the Communists were agreed that the United States should not send help to Japan.

[February 11, 1941, the New Masses]

The crisis in China is coming to a head. After last week's report of the massacre of the new Fourth Army leadership on the south bank of the Yangtze River comes a confirmation and "justification" of this action from Chiang Kai-shek himself. * * * We have been pointing out in editorials since the currency loan to China that Washington has the decisive hand in the current crisis.

[January 18, 1941, an editorial in the Nation entitled "China In Danger"]

The issues which divide the groups are basic and cannot be resolved in the midst of a life-and-death struggle with Japan. But it is clear that whatever happens unity must be maintained. By taking definite steps to extend political democracy within China, Chiang would provide a safety valve for all forms of domestic discontent. * * *

Of equal importance, if China is to be saved from defeat, are measures to relieve the acute economic situation. Here responsibility falls primarily upon the United States. Immediate assistance on a large scale—or even news that such aid was on the way—would lessen the discontent and prevent a collapse at Chinese resistance.

[October 26, 1940, an article in the Nation entitled "We Need Not Fight In Asia"]

The real danger of our position at the moment lies not in the fact that we have dared oppose Japan's dream of empire, but in the fact that we have not adopted strong enough measures to make our opposition effective. * * * Continuation of a piecemeal policy may well lead to war since the State Department seems incapable of vigorous action which will prevent war. Should we draw back before it is too late? The answer to that can be found in the experience of Great Britain, which has learned that each retreat before Japan's threats is followed by new demands more severe than those previously considered a menace. Appeasement can provide no safeguard against war.

(NOTE.—The title of the above article was cited by the Friends of Democracy as proof of my isolationism—M. S. S.)

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AFTER THE SOVIET-JAPANESE PACT

April 13, 1941

Between January 21, 1941, and March 18, 1941, the New Masses had eight long articles and editorials in praise of China. *In mid-April the Soviet-Japanese Pact was signed.* On April 22, there was a two-page article on the Soviet-Japanese Pact representing it as a great Soviet victory for peace. After this date *The New Masses* almost completely ignored China and Japan except for one mention until June 2, 1941—the date the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union.

[April 29, 1941, the New Masses (a few weeks after the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Pact)]

The pact raises the question of the future of American policy in the Far East. Do the American people realize where a pernicious man like Sumner Wells, an overconfident gambler like Franklin Roosevelt are getting us? Having appeased Japan they now prepare to fight her. They have snubbed the U. S. S. R., tried to buy off Japan at her expense, and now they ask the people to carry on two wars in different parts of the world at the price of their living standard and their lives.

[April 26, 1941, an editorial in the Nation entitled "Will Japan Move South?"]

The week that has passed since the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact has brought only conflicting guesses as to its significance in terms of immediate Japanese policy. Some observers are certain that Japan will take advantage of the pact to launch its long-expected drive into the South Seas. Others seem equally confident that Japan has drawn a blank, and that it is in no better position than before to risk war with the United States.

In view of these conflicting interpretations, the interview with Toshio Shiratori, special adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, published elsewhere in this issue is worth careful reading. Mr. Shiratori speaks for the extremists who have largely controlled Japanese foreign policy in recent years. He is obviously attempting to make the American people see the logic of Japanese expansionist dreams.

Except for their unusual candor, Mr. Shiratori's remarks follow the pattern of other recent Japanese statements. They represent an effort to appeal to isolationist sentiment by alternating threats with visions of a Greater America which is to coexist with a Greater East Asia and New Order in Europe. * * * *The United States still has it within its power to throttle Japan, militarily and economically, by imposing an iron-clad embargo on the export of oil, steel, and other essential war materials.* * * *

RUSSIA ENTERS THE WAR

June 22, 1941

[July 1, 1941, the New Masses (1 week after Soviet Union has been invaded)]

The mortal issued is joined. A conflict has begun of titanic military and political proportions, a conflict which climaxes and overshadows the successive crises since the First World War. * * * While the armed forces of the First Workers Republic test the strength and endurance of the Fascist host, the people on this side of the Atlantic will have the opportunity to test who are the real anti-Fascists.

[September 30, 1941, the New Masses]

* * * It is good to hear from Averell Harriman * * * that hundreds of American planes are arriving on Soviet soil. *But the plain fact is that American aid, both for Britain and the Soviet Union, is still a shadow of what it ought to be.*

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COMPLETE TEXT OF OPEN LETTER TO THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

MARCH 19, 1940.

We appeal publicly to the American Civil Liberties Union to rescind its recent purge resolution as unworthy of its traditions and incompatible with its principles.

In the past, loyalty to the Bill of Rights in America has been the sole requirement imposed by the Civil Liberties Union on its members and its officers, and this should continue as always to be its only criterion. In the two decades of its existence the union has concentrated its energies on one job and one job alone—the defense of civil liberties at home. It has steadfastly refused to go beyond that task. It has resisted, as inconsistent with its fundamental aims, any attempt to involve it in questions concerning civil liberties abroad or forms of government. As a result, it has the broadest kind of support from persons holding all sorts of divergent political views and has kept its ranks undivided by questions with no direct bearing on its purposes. During those 20 years its enemies would have been happy to divert the energies of the union from defense of civil rights at home to endless debate on events abroad. They seem to have succeeded at last.

We believe that by the purge resolution the American Civil Liberties Union encourages the very tendencies it was intended to fight. It sets an example less liberal organizations will not be slow to imitate. It places the prestige of our foremost defender of civil liberties behind the idea that Communists or Communist sympathizers or that infinitely extensible category of "fellow traveler" are properly to be barred from certain types of offices and treated as less than first-class citizens.

The resolution "regards it as inappropriate" for any persons to serve on the governing committees or the staff of the Civil Liberties Union "who is a member of any political organization which supports totalitarian dictatorship in any country, or who by his public declarations and connections, indicates his support of such a principle." This category, according to the resolution, includes not only Communist, Nazi, or Fascist parties but "inactive organizations with obvious antidemocratic objectives or practices, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Silver Shirts, Christian Front, and others."

These standards are extremely loose and broad. When the Civil Liberties Union opposed the original resolution for the Dies committee investigation, it objected properly that the terms of that resolution were "dangerously vague." But the categories now established by the Civil Liberties Union itself are vague enough to satisfy Dies himself and far more dangerous because they come from an organization whose function is to defend civil liberties.

The real effect of this resolution is to give the union an opportunity to purge itself of Communists and those suspected of any sympathy with Communists. The reference to Nazis and Ku Kluxers and Silver Shirts can hardly be taken seriously since, unlike the Communists, they have never fought for civil liberties in this country. They do not believe in civil liberty here or anywhere else now or at any other time.

They would no more join the Civil Liberties Union than they would the B'nai B'rith or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The union, by "barring" them from office, has taken a less-than-momentous step.

Furthermore, this resolution, like the type of "loyalty" legislation the union has fought so often, does not confine itself to members of the Communist Party. It applies to all those who support "totalitarian dictatorship" in any country. What is a totalitarian dictatorship? Is wartime France, with its concentration camps, and its rigid controls of fundamental rights, democratic or totalitarian? And is not the American Civil Liberties Union necessarily ruling at those faithful Catholics, who, following the policy laid down by their church, approve the Fascist regimes in Spain and Italy?

The word "support" is never too clear, but what is one to say of the reference to any person who "by his public declarations and connections indicates his support of such principle"? What is meant by "connections" and what are sufficient indications? What are "native organizations with obvious antidemocratic objectives or practices"? What is "obvious" to one man may well be obscure to another. Many of our greatest newspapers have in the past few years denounced the Democratic Party under Franklin D. Roosevelt for "obvious antidemocratic objectives" and the President has often been accused, as have many Presidents before him, of antidemocratic "practices." On the other hand, would

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a stockholder in a corporation given to obviously undemocratic practices be barred by this resolution, a stockholder in Girdler's Republic Steel, for instance?

The phrasing of the resolution is dangerous; its context is worse. The Civil Liberties Union was founded in 1920. The Soviet Union was established in 1917 and with it the "dictatorship of the proletariat." We are told that Communists are to be barred from office or employment in the Civil Liberties Union because, while fighting for civil liberties in America, they accept their suppression in Soviet Russia. Why, then, did the Civil Liberties Union wait until 1940 before seeking to bar them?

"The answer," the Civil Liberties Union said in a letter to its friends, "is to be found in the entirely new direction of the Communist movement since the Nazi-Soviet pact." But civil liberties within the Soviet Union were no different before the pact than after. One could not print an opposition paper in Moscow in August 1939, before the pact, or after it, in September 1939. In any case, what does the pact have to do with American civil liberties?

Could it be that the majority of the national committee and board of directors of the Civil Liberties Union is taking sides in the developing European conflict? Is their real objection an objection to the position of the Soviet Union in that conflict? Has that question anything to do with the need for defending civil liberties in America?

The phrasing of the purge resolution is so wide as to make the Civil Liberties Union seem a fellow traveler of the Dies committee. Its context is such as to make it seem that the Civil Liberties Union has been unable to keep its head in the kind of crisis that is the greatest danger to civil liberties.

The Civil Liberties Union is too valuable an organization and too precious a symbol. We ask it to turn back from this far-reaching step away from its traditions. We call upon it to rescind the purge resolution. We urge it to continue itself, as in the past, to civil liberties at home and leave international politics to other organizations.

The Civil Liberties Union has often found it necessary to mobilize public sentiment in order to defend civil liberties. Never before has it been necessary to mobilize public sentiment in order to defend civil liberties within the Civil Liberties Union.

The Civil Liberties Union was formed in 1920 to fight postwar hysteria. It would be a great pity if it were now to become the victim of prewar hysteria.

(Signed by) Robert Morss Lovett, John T. Bernard, Franz Boas, Howard Costigan, Theodore Dreiser, Prof. Henry Pratt Fairchild, Robert S. Lynd, Carey McWilliams, Rev. Dr. A. T. Mollegan, Prof. C. Fayette Taylor, Charles S. Ascher, William T. Cochran, Henry T. Hunt, Gardner Jackson, Maxwell S. Stewart, I. F. Stone, James Wechsler.

[From the Nation, May 24, 1941]

Luxury or Liberty?

(By Maxwell S. Stewart)

We are about to shift our defense program into high gear. During the first six or eight months after the collapse of France we operated in low. In the past few months we have been in intermediate—gradually gaining speed but still not ready for the all-out effort the President promised. The delays have been inevitable. A year ago the United States did not have, in any sense of the word, an armament industry. Factories had to be built or reconditioned, tools made, raw materials obtained, and the errors and breakdowns that go with any new enterprise overcome. Now that the construction has been completed in large part and production has started, we are faced with the real test of what we can achieve. *For it is plain that if Britain is to be saved, and our own defense assured, we must reach productive heights during these next few months undreamed of a year ago.*

During the first year of the defense program it has been widely assumed that the United States, unlike Germany, could have both guns and butter; that no essential sacrifice would be required. All we had to do, some argued, was to put our 9 or 10 million unemployed to work in the armament industries. We would then have the greatest armament industry in the world without any interference with the production of goods for everyday living. They completely disregarded the fact that the unemployed were mostly unskilled, and that we lacked tools and

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equipment for the defense industries. As a matter of fact, we did expand our production of consumers' goods during the period in which our armament program was in low gear. Our clothing and shoe industries operated at well above their 1939 levels. Meat consumption rose sharply, despite higher prices. The production of automobiles in the last quarter of 1940 was more than 30 percent higher than in the last quarter of 1939. This situation continued into the early months of 1941. Consumer purchases of luxury articles increased even more rapidly than production. Instead of making a sacrifice for national defense, the American people as a whole were profiting from it. In that sense they deserved the Nazi gibe of being war profiteers.

Even in money terms America's contribution to national defense and aid to Britain has so far been insignificant in comparison with the contributions made by the British or with those wrung from the German people for war purposes. In the fiscal year just ending we spent approximately $6 billion for defense. In the coming year the amount may reach $20 billion. Even this last figure is less than one-fourth of our national income. In contrast, England is spending £4 billion a year, or 60 percent of its total income. Canada also is devoting considerably more than half its national income to defense. Germany is spending at the rate of 72 billion marks a year, or nearly two-thirds of its national income. And this is not half the story. In any discussion of relative sacrifices it must be remembered that the German economy has been on a war basis since 1933. This has given the Reich a tremendous head start. *If the democracies are to win, they must not only match present German armament production—including that of the occupied countries—but they must make up the lead that Germany gained while they slept.* In the long run, American plus British capacity will greatly surpass anything that Germany can hope to achieve, even through the exploitation of the New Europe. However, it is not capacity but present production which counts. The war will, in all probability, be won or lost by production in the next six or eight months.

URGENCY AND LIVING STANDARDS

If we had eight years to build up our armaments, as Germany has had, there would be no reason why we should not have both guns and butter. A national income of $100 billion is well within our reach. With a quarter of this devoted to defense, we could have the greatest war industry in the world. And the $75 billion which remained would give us, at present prices, a standard of living appreciably higher than has yet been attained in this country. But we do not have eight years; it is more a matter of eight month. Barring inflation, the national income this year will be in the neighborhood of $85 billion. If we are to get $13 billion worth of defense materials, plus $7 billion worth for Britain—and these are minimum figures—it is evident that we shall have to cut deeply into that section of our income which now goes to provide consumer wants. In other words, we shall have to curtail our standard of living. The cut, on the basis of the foregoing estimates, would be some $5½ billion, or about 8 percent. It may turn out to be much greater. It ought to be greater during these next six or eight crucial months. If our aid to Britain and the empire is to offset German arms superiority, it should average approximately $1 billion a month. It has yet to reach a third of that amount.

Any suggestion that the American people must cut their standard of living provokes a violent reaction in certain circles. By many it is regarded as a betrayal of liberalism. Some even see it as a threat to democracy, arguing that since democracy depends upon voluntary cooperation rather than compulsion, we must demonstrate its superiority by providing both guns and butter. Those who argue in this manner ignore the time element. They either deny or disregard the plain mathematical facts outlined in the preceding paragraph. Yet, to a certain extent, we must admit the truth of what they say. It is clearly against the interest of national defense, to say nothing of the more general objectives of democracy, to impose sacrifices which will undermine the health and efficiency of the American people. The third of the nation which the President has described as ill fed, ill clothed, and ill housed cannot be further deprived of essentials without the basic strength of the country being undermined. Already steps have been taken to improve the diet and housing conditions of these groups in the interest of defense. Further steps will doubtless have to be taken; and this may require some increase in the production of essential articles for consumption.

But there are many ways in which the "American standard of living" can be cut without sacrifice of essentials. It is not only the poor who have benefited from

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the wartime expansion of business. The well-to-do have gained as much or more. Net corporation profits, after deduction of taxes, were 27 percent higher in 1940 than in 1939. They have continued to rise in 1941. Although complete statistics are not available, it would seem fair to say, on the basis of such figures as automobile sales, that there has been a relatively larger gain in expenditures for luxury goods than for necessities. It is somewhat startling to find that well over 15 percent of our total manufacturing production last year consisted of what is known technically as consumers' durable goods. These include automobiles, electric refrigerators, furniture, heating equipment, musical instruments, radios, and jewelry. To cut down the production of such goods for a year or two could hardly cause hardship. For we have enormous stocks on hand. There are some 27,000,000 passenger automobiles on the roads today. Half of these are less than five years old, and nearly three-fourths are new enough to possess a substantial amount of unused mileage. The stock of durable goods in the hands of consumers exceeds $30 billion in value. With this reserve to go on we should be able to divert as much as $4 billion worth of durable-goods production to national defense annually. To strengthen further the case for such action, it happens that the consumers' durable goods industries are among our most efficient. They possess a disproportionate amount of the country's skilled labor and effectively harnessed horsepower.

FOUR WAYS TO CUT DOWN BUYING

Mere realization that consumer sacrifices are necessary is not, however, enough. Much depends on the way in which they are effected. The four methods most commonly used for limiting consumer purchases in time of emergency are (1) high prices, (2) direct control of production, (3) priorities, and (4) rationing. The first, which is also the one most frequently employed—allowing prices to rise and thus curtail consumption—is the least satisfactory. Although there can be no doubt of its effectiveness, the goal is achieved almost entirely at the expense of the low-income groups. The well-to-do pay the increased prices, grudgingly perhaps, and pare their savings accordingly. This runs counter to the government's plan for financing defense by tapping the savings of individuals. A more serious objection is found in the fact that increased prices under present conditions are bound to lead to inflation. A rise in the cost of living is certain to be followed by demands for higher wages, and any substantial rise in wages would make further price advances inevitable. Thus the cycle of inflation is started.

A much more reasonable method of attacking the problem is for the government to restrict or prohibit the output of the things that compete with defense production. It should take such action regardless of whether the competition is in machine tools, necessary raw materials, or skilled labor. The most obvious example of such competition is that offered by automobiles. Here our record is disgraceful. Whereas Germany stopped the production of private cars in the first week of the war, American automobile production for the week ending May 11, it has just been announced, was 132,000 cars, the highest for any week since 1937. We have been told that production of 1942 models will be cut 10 percent and possibly 20 percent. But why should it not be cut 100 percent?

So far we have been able to conserve crucial commodities for defense uses merely by applying a system of priorities. But although priorities should be rigorously applied to cut down, say, the use of aluminum in consumer goods, they are ill adapted to bring about a general reduction of consumption. They may lead to sudden and marked price increases in the restricted articles; and they cannot bring a general reduction in consumption. They merely divert purchasing power from the restricted articles to others which are perhaps less crucial to the defense effort. If people cannot buy aluminum pans, they will buy some other kind. Enamel ware is, as a rule, cheaper than aluminum, but most people will spend the difference on something else—thus maintaining the total drain on the country's productive resources.

In an effort to avoid undue hardship while effecting a general reduction in consumption, the European belligerents have employed an elaborate system of rationing and price fixing. Although it is perhaps the most satisfactory of the methods commonly used to restrict consumption, rationing also has its limitations. It has the advantage of being fair, but it is by far the most cumbersome and costly means of limiting consumption; and, like priorities, it fails to strike at the root of the evil. For if the amount of money that people can spend for many essential articles is restricted, they will tend to spend the amount they have thus saved for other things, chiefly luxuries and nonessentials—which is precisely what we should seek to prevent.

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THE DIRECT ATTACK

The best way to avoid this is to attack purchasing power directly. This may be done by a combination of three methods: namely, taxation, compulsory savings, and restrictions on consumer credit. It must be noted, however, that curtailment of purchasing power would supplement, not replace, direct cuts in production.

Of the three methods, taxation is undoubtedly the most important. Taxation not only curtails consumer buying power but diverts to the government money that would normally be spent for everyday living, permitting the government to use it directly for defense. This is exactly what we should seek to do. The effectiveness of this method depends, however, on the *kind* of taxes which are imposed. Taxes which fall primarily on the low-income groups are undesirable because they tend to curtail expenditures for food, health, and other essentials while leaving the demand for luxury articles, which are bought chiefly by the well-to-do, virtually untouched. Progressive taxes, on the other hand, such as income, inheritance, and excess-profits taxes, which fall chiefly on the higher-income groups, tend to cut into savings and to restrict expenditures for luxuries. In theory the necessary curtailment in the consumption of durable goods and nonessentials could be accomplished solely through an increase in progressive taxes. But if we are at all realistic, we must recognize that there are definite limits to the tax increase that any Congress will vote. And that limit at the moment is far short of the English tax rate.

Compulsory saving provides a supplementary method of tapping excess purchasing power. This rather unique device was strongly urged upon England at the start of the war by John Maynard Keynes, Britain's most celebrated economist. Keynes early saw that the volume of consumer goods would have to be cut, and urged that the government reduce the amount of money in people's pockets to correspond by deferring a part of the wages and salaries of all persons with incomes above a specified level. By this means he sought to avoid the undesirable social consequences of financing the war by conventional loans. The Keynes plan, in modified form, has been adopted in England. It might well be tried here.

The third approach to the problem is peculiarly adapted to America. It happens that a very large proportion of our consumer purchases, particularly of durable goods, are made on credit. The total volume of consumer credit in the United States is probably well over $9 billion and may have risen as high as $10 billion. Automobile financing alone accounts for more than two billion, excluding the cars bought on loans obtained from commercial or personal finance companies and credit unions. Loans to encourage the purchase of household equipment account for another billion or billion and a half. Advances by regulated small loan companies and industrial banks, and the personal loans of commercial banks total considerably more than $1 billion—of which a large part is used to finance retail purchases. Since the total production of consumers' durable goods is less than $6 billion a year, it is safe to say that more than half of these goods are sold on time. It seems therefore that restrictions on consumer credit would go a long way toward achieving the cut in consumer expenditures that is necessary to match cuts in production. And the reduction would take place precisely in the area where it is most desirable.

NO MORE INSTALLMENT SELLING

Complete elimination of installment selling would seem justified under the circumstances. We might start, however, by outlawing it in certain fields, such as in the sale of new automobiles. In addition, a very considerable reduction in the amount of consumer credit could be effected if banks were compelled to curtail their advances to the various consumer-credit agencies. Most of these agencies are dependent on the commercial banks for a considerable proportion of their funds. Possibly as much as one-third of all our consumer credit rests on short-term bank loans. Since the banks are already subject to strict control by the Federal Reserve System, restrictions on this type of loan would be relatively easy to apply and enforce.

To be fully effective the restrictions on the banks should be supplemented by direct limitations on installment credit. It would be desirable, for example, to stiffen the requirements for down payments. Or the length of time allowed for payment might be cut. If a down payment of 50 percent were required for all installment purchases and the length of the repayment period were cut in

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half, it is probable that a 50-percent reduction in installment sales could be effected. In automobiles alone this would mean a reduction of $1 billion a year in sales. The total curtailment in the demand for durable goods would probably be nearly twice this amount.

A similar tightening-up process might be applied to charge accounts and cash loans. Department stores could be instructed to insist on all charge accounts being paid within thirty days. Since most accounts run considerably longer at present, such a provision would bring about a substantial contraction in the volume of time sales. Restrictions on cash loans present somewhat greater difficulties. In some instances they might cause real hardship. But inasmuch as personal loans are often used as a substitute for installment financing, some kind of parallel limitation is clearly necessary. Shortening the period of repayment would perhaps be the least objectionable means of achieving this purpose. An increase in interest rates would hardly lead to any appreciable reduction in the number of loans, and would place an undesirable burden on many needy families.

The only objection to restrictions on consumer credit is that their effectiveness may be temporary. Given time, many families could save up enough money to pay cash for a new car or a new refrigerator. And since they would save interest and installment charges, they would have more money than ever to spend. But it would not always work out this way. Experience has shown that most families simply do not save for large expenditures unless they are compelled by some such device as instalment selling. Barred from instalment purchases by rigorous down-payment requirements, such families would probably spend more for food, clothing, health, and other day-to-day necessities. This, of course, would work in the interest of national defense. In general, the families which are able to pay cash for large purchases are to be found in the high and upper-middle income groups. Left to their own devices, they would undoubtedly spend a substantial part of their income for automobiles and other types of durable goods. Spending of this type could be discouraged by imposition of a heavy tax—possibly as much as 100 percent—on such articles, compelled to by some such device as installment selling. Barred from installment

Adequate defense cannot be secured if our desire for comfort must be pandered to. Even less can we furnish the aid which Britain and China so desperately need and which we must give them for the sake of our own future. Unless we deprive ourselves voluntarily of needless luxuries at this time we may find ourselves compelled to make vastly greater sacrifices later on—sacrifices comparable to those imposed on the populations of the Axis countries.

Half Aid to Britain

(By Maxwell S. Stewart)

[From the Nation]

The Senate's delay in passing the aid-to-Britain bill provides a dramatic but tragic illustration of the inability of our legislators to sense either the magnitude or the imminence of the threat to England and the United States from the coming Nazi offensive. It is almost as if there were some fatalistic force which has decreed that our action in this crisis, as in others, shall be too little and too late. The full force of the Nazi fury is destined to fall in not more than sixty days; every hour counts. There would not be time under the best of circumstances to send Britain anything like all the aid it needs, but every plane, gun, or destroyer that can be rushed to the other side will be vital to Britain's defense. And if Britain succeeds in beating off the initial attack, the struggle will have just begun. For it may be assumed that Germany will stake everything on obtaining a decision before the year's end.

Few Americans seem as yet to be aware of the amount of aid that must be given if Britain is to survive the year. Germany not only has an immense head start in military and economic preparations, but its armament production is still far and away above that of the British. With the addition of the resources of the conquered territories, Germany has achieved a capacity for steel production that is approximately double that of Britain. America's resources are infinitely greater than those of Germany and the rest of Europe combined, but our shipments to Great Britain, though well above the peacetime level, are infinitesimal when compared with Germany's advantage. *And they have been declining in recent months.* The peak in American exports to Britain was in August when they reached approximately $125,000,000. September recorded

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a decline to $103,000,000; in October they were $107,000,000; in November $102,000,000; and December was the worst month of all, with but $101,250,000. Even at the August rate, the volume of American deliveries to the British Empire was less than the economic gain which Germany is deriving, month by month, from the conquest of France. If the advantages gained from the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland, and Belgium are taken into account, it is clear that Hitler is drawing twice as much from the conquered territories as England and the Empire are obtaining from the United States.

The plain fact is that the United States must deliver, as Fritz Sternberg has pointed out in his Fivefold Aid to Britain, some $1,000,000,000 worth of supplies to the Empire each month. This is from four to five times what we are now sending. And this is not a need to be fulfilled in 1942 or 1943 when the arms program gets fully under way. The need will be greatest during the next few months; after that we can perhaps afford to slacken up a bit. But we cannot possibly attain the $1,000,000,000 a month figure unless we are prepared to make drastic sacrifices in domestic consumption. Our praparations for defense so far have proceeded on the assumption that a country like America can have both guns and butter. Any contrary opinion is treated in some circles as a betrayal of liberalism. It is true that if our national income were raised to $100,000,000,000 a year, we could well afford to devote a quarter of it to national defense and aid to Britain and still have sufficient to meet all our normal consumer demands. Such a goal is within our reach, but it cannot be attained in 1941. And we cannot afford to wait. Barring inflation, the maximum national income likely for this year is $85,000,000,000. If we are to get $12,000,000,000 out of this for Britain and another $10,000,000,000 or $12,000,000,000 for our own defense, it is obvious that we shall have to sacrifice some of the luxury goods we otherwise would consume. Germany stopped the production of private motor cars the day that war started. England took similar action last fall. But the United States, supposedly in the midst of a gigantic effort to build up its defenses, turned out more cars in January and February than in the corresponding months of any of the past few years. The priorities established last week in the aluminum industry are expected to reduce materially the use of the metal in cooking utensils. This is the first and only sacrifice American consumers have been asked to make for defense. It is, of course, wholly incommensurate with what is required. It is time we realized that unless we are willing to deprive ourselves of luxuries now we may be forced to make infinitely greater sacrifices following a British defeat.

HAGUE, N. Y., *April 6, 1944.*

DEAR RAYMOND: I shall be willing to read the Borg manuscript, and also the Chu one if, in fact, it is ready to be read, which I doubt from the way you write about it.

I could see Miss Borg at the Roosevelt Friday morning about nine-thirty if that is convenient for her. Then we could talk about it at lunch if there is anything to say.

Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. It ought to do some good even in Chungking. There may be enough new developments between now and the end of the year to require some additions or supplements to the text but I should suppose it would do for the documentation for the next conference. It's about the best booklet I have seen out of the IPR.

Affectionately,

(Signed) TYLER.

(Longhand note to MSF and MAS:) Tyler is not prone to make comments of this sort—I know, having been around him these many years. I think you are due a bow!—R. D.

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DECEMBER 15, 1948.

Miss MAUDE RUSSELL,
Executive Director, Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy,
111 West Forty-second Street, New York 18, N. Y.

DEAR MISS RUSSELL: I have just noticed that my name is listed on the "Spotlight" as a "consultant." Will you please see that it is removed. At no time have I ever been "consulted" about any aspect of the magazine's content or policy, and I feel that it is both misleading and unfair that my name should be listed. I have come to feel that one's name should be associated only with work in which one can actively participate and I am not in a position to participate in the committee's activities.

Yours sincerely,

MAXWELL S. STEWART.

9309 TWENTY-FIFTH AVENUE,
Jackson Heights, L. I., N. Y., December 6, 1948.

Mr. LOUIS F. BUDENZ,
Dean's Office, Fordham College,
New York 58, N. Y.

DEAR MR. BUDENZ: You and I have never happened to meet nor have we had any contact with one another. And in a sense that is the reason for my writing to you.

In a letter written by Alfred Kohlberg to William Bullitt, Mr. Kohlberg quotes you as informing him that I am a member of the Communist Party. Since you were at one time a leading member of that party and were, I assume, in a position to be acquainted, by name at least, with the prominent people who were members of the party, you must know that there is no basis for such a statement so far as I am concerned—for I have never in any way been connected with the Communist Party.

I should appreciate any light you can throw on the origin of this misstatement.

Sincerely yours,

MAXWELL S. STEWART.

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 3:15 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in session. The record will show that we have already held the executive session and that we are now holding an open session or public session.

Mr. Morris, have you any witnesses to be sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. Just Professor Poppe, and as he has already been sworn in executive session, Senator, there would be no need of his taking the oath in open session today.

Senator WATKINS. The record will so show.

TESTIMONY OF PROF. NICHOLAS N. POPPE, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, WASH.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. POPPE. I am Nicholas N. Poppe, spelled P-o-p-p-e; born 1897 in Che Foo, China. I got my education, primary, secondary, and university education in Russia. I was professor of oriental languages in Leningrad, and a visiting professor.

I came sometimes to Moscow where I had an opportunity to see people in various Communist universities.

Mr. MORRIS. What are you doing now?

Mr. POPPE. At the present time, now, I am professor of Far Eastern languages of the University of Washington in Seattle, Wash.

Mr. MORRIS. Where you a professor in the Soviet Union?

Mr. POPPE. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give us some of your more notable positions that you held in the Soviet Union; just the outstanding ones, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. I was a full professor of the University of Leningrad from 1925 to 1941. I was simultaneously full professor of the Institute of Oriental Languages at Leningrad which first, at the beginning, was an open university or school for everybody and, after 1930,

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became a Communist high school for training Soviet agents of the foreign office, trade, and so on, for oriental countries. I was simultaneously corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, and the head of the Mongolian Department of the Academy of Sciences.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your specialty, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. My specialty is Far Eastern languages. Those comprise Mongolian, Tibetan, Turkish; and I have also a certain knowledge of the languages of the natives of Manchuria; and of the history and literature of the names of peoples.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, Professor, as such, you were a full-fledged Soviet professor who was empowered to teach and train Communist students?

Mr. POPPE. I was after a clearance, as everybody had to undergo such clearance. I was admitted, or to say it better, I remained in that school which from a usual one was transformed into a Communist one. Some people were purged and removed from there.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, when did you come to the United States?

Mr. POPPE. I came in 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1949?

Mr. POPPE. 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Who helped you come to the United States?

Mr. POPPE. It was the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party, Professor Poppe?

Mr. POPPE. No, I have not been.

Mr. MORRIS. You have never been a member of the party?

Mr. POPPE. Never have been.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, we are engaged in an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the possibilities of whether there were forces at work influencing our far eastern policy. We have had testimony before this committee that the Institute of Pacific Relations was putting out pamphlets which stated that the Chinese Communists were not, in fact, real Communists.

Mr. Mandel, will you point out portions of these pamphlets that have come up in recent days along those lines?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from a pamphlet entitled "China Yesterday and Today," by Eleanor Lattimore, edited by Margaret Ann Stewart and published as a cooperative project by the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and the Webster Publishing Co., on page 108:

> When we speak of the Chinese Communists we should remember that they stand for something rather different than what is ordinarily meant by the word "Communist." They are not advocating the Russian system for China and, unlike the Russians, they maintain the system of private property and enterprise in the areas under their control.

Mr. MORRIS. And one other one, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from a pamphlet entitled "Wartime China," by Maxwell S. Stewart, published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, page 45:

> As China is not like any other country so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries and you can also find resemblances to the "grass-roots" populist move-

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ments that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices."

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, have you been in a position to testify today on the question of whether or not the Chinese Communists have in fact been real Communists?

Mr. POPPE. I have not testified to this fact, but I can do it here.

Mr. MORRIS. I say are you prepared to testify here today?

Mr. POPPE. I am, yes. It is incorrect to say that the Chinese Communists are not real Communists. They are Communists, but the communism in China is at the present time in another stage. It is in its initial stage when any Communist revolution is in the first place an agrarian revolution in undeveloped countries where there is no industry.

In industrial countries it takes immediately the shape of a proletarian revolution with 5-year plans, slave labor, and so on. In agrarian countries the Communists have to solve problems which usually are solved in other countries by democratic revolutions.

A democratic revolution gives freedom to the peasant, abolishes slavery or serfdom, and gives the peasant the farmer's land. This was achieved in Russia in 1870. This was achieved at the beginning of the past century in Germany, and so on, but it was never achieved in China because China lived in feudal conditions and only through revolution at our time could solve this problem.

It happens that the Communists were the first to handle this problem.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, the question addressed to you though was were the Chinese Communists in fact real Communists?

Mr. POPPE. They are.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. First of all, I could observe the coming into existence of the Communist Party of China. It is known that at the beginning of 1920—say 1919 and 1920—there was no Communist Party in China. Very soon afer the Russian revolution the Soviets under Lenin discovered that Communist revolution in the west would not be possible.

The Bavarian and Hungarian Republics collapsed, and thus the only hope was to try elsewhere. In China the situation was favorable because China lived at that time in a peculiar condition created by the inequalities with other powers. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who tried to create a new order for China, did not get much help from the outer world.

It was Lenin who offered him the recognition of the new order in China, the abolition of the inequalities concluded by the Czarists Government with the Chinese Government, and so on, and, when Sun Yat-sen asked him to help him to organize his party, it was Borodin who was sent to China to help Sun Yat-sen officially, but in reality to divert the development of the Kuomintang Party from its line to a Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, in your teaching were you able to observe Chinese Communists being trained in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that, Professor?

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Mr. POPPE. Yes, I shall testify on this subject. In 1921, two special schools were established in Moscow. One was the Stalin University of the Toilers of the East. The other was the Chinese University of Sun Yat-sen, the Sun Yat-sen Chinese University.

There is a brief statement about the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in the small Soviet encyclopedia in volume 4, page 455:

The Communist Stalin University of the Toilers of the East established in Moscow on April 21, 1921. Its task is the training of qualified party workers from the ranks of toilers of the eastern nationalities who are able to apply the methods of Marxism, Leninism to the practice of the revolution in the struggle of the Socialist system. The Communist University consists of the sectors of the Soviet and non-Soviet East. In the first sector representatives of 72 nationalities receive training. Since 1926, a scientific research association has been connected with the university which published the journal Revolutionary East.

I may add that this university, the University of the Toilers of the East, had in its ranks Communists from all the eastern countries except China. The Chinese Communists were trained in the Sun Yat-sen University. That was established at the same time.

The subjects studied at that university were Marxism, Leninism, the History of the Russian Communist Party, the History of Imperialism, the History of the Colonial World Under Imperialism, elements of Marxist philosophy such as dialectic materialism, and also economics.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, approximately how many Chinese Communists per year would be trained?

Mr. POPPE. 1,000 Chinese Communists were accepted every year. The course was 2 years and, after a study during 2 years, they graduated and were sent to China where they established local study groups and local schools so that the training of the Communists both in Moscow and in China by the graduates from that school was something which can be compared to a geometric progression.

During 20 years it was about 20,000 graduates from the Moscow University alone.

Mr. MORRIS. From the Sun Yat-sen University?

Mr. POPPE. From the Sun Yat-sen University.

Senator WATKINS. When did that start?

Mr. POPPE. In 1921, it started. I have fortunately got here in the Library of Congress a list of the publications of the Sun Yat-sen University. This pamphlet should be translated, I think, fully, but I shall give only a few titles of books and articles published by them.

Senator WATKINS. What language is it in now?

Mr. POPPE. This is in Russian.

Senator WATKINS. What you are attempting to do now is to give some translations and quotations?

Mr. POPPE. I will give you a translation of a few titles of books published by them, if necessary.

Senator WATKINS. Were you in a position to know what was going on in this university?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose we do that later. We would like to get the personalities first. Could you tell us who some of the Chinese Communists were who were trained there in Moscow?

Mr. POPPE. Li Li-sian.

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Mr. MORRIS. How do you know Li Li-sian was trained in Moscow?
Mr. POPPE. Because I saw him.
Mr. MORRIS. You saw him. Who else?
Mr. POPPE. The writer, Emi Siao.
Mr. MORRIS. Is that E-m-i S-i-a-o?
Mr. POPPE. Yes. E-m-i is his first name. S-i-a-o is his last name.
Mr. MORRIS. Who else, Professor?
Mr. POPPE. The first one was Li Li-sian. Shall I spell the next?
Mr. MORRIS. Yes, please.
Mr. POPPE. L-i L-i-s-i-a-n.
Mr. MORRIS. Was Chou En-lai trained in Moscow?
Mr. POPPE. No; I don't think so. He came for short times, but he never got a training as a regular student.
Mr. MORRIS. But you saw him in Moscow, however?
Mr. POPPE. Yes, on several occasions. Oh, yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Was he there on official Communist business?
Mr. POPPE. He came to the Comintern. He came to the University of Sun Yat-sen to see his people being trained there, and offered to attend some important party meetings.
Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he was there on official Communist Party business?
Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course.
Mr. MORRIS. How about Mao Tse-tung?
Mr. POPPE. Mao Tse-tung came occasionally for very short times, several times, but he never studied there.
Mr. MORRIS. He used to visit Moscow on official Communist business?
Mr. POPPE. Before the Long March, which was in 1934.
Mr. MORRIS. Can you therefore testify, Professor Poppe, that the Chinese Communists were, in fact, trained in Moscow?
Mr. POPPE. Yes, I can.
Mr. MORRIS. And is it fair to say that your testimony that Chou En-lai or Mao Tse-tung, were not trained there, but participated in the training and had regular party meetings and conferences in Moscow?
Mr. POPPE. They delivered, of course, some speeches to the Chinese students there, so that, if this is part of training, they did train.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, when these Communists finished their training in Moscow, did they go back and engage in various Communist Party assignments in Asia?
Mr. POPPE. Yes. There they created cells, trade-unions. Some of them became political commissars in the Chinese Red Army. Some of them were workers, carrying on the so-called land reform in the Soviet-occupied parts of China, and so on.
Mr. MORRIS. Did the NKVD, which is the Soviet security organization, oversee the training of the Chinese Communists?
Mr. POPPE. No. It was the Comintern. They were only checked by the NKVD, of course, but NKVD did not train them.
Mr. MORRIS. That was a Comintern operation?
Mr. POPPE. Yes, a Comintern operation.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you in a position to observe the NKVD school in Moscow?

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Mr. POPPE. No; I did not. This was a very complicated matter. People, mainly Russian subjects, went for training, say in far eastern matters, and then, after they got knowledge of the languages and the conditions in the countries concerned, they were sent to special NKVD schools, where they were trained only on matters as to how to carry out subversive activities, and so on.

But I have not finished my testimony about the Chinese Communists.

Some of them, a large group, was also trained in the Leningrad Tolmachoff Academy.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you mind spelling that, please?

Mr. POPPE. T-o-l-m-a-c-h-o-f-f. That later on was moved to Moscow and became known as Lenin Academy. That was the political academy of the Red Army. They trained only political commissars, the Russian and Foreign Red Armies. Among other subjects they had to study also the organization of guerrilla warfare and the barricade warfare in various countries.

This became known to me because one of the people who was teaching Russian to Chinese students there happened to see a map of Berlin, and on another occasion, of Tokyo, with red and blue circles, and crosses, and so on, and, when he asked one of his students about the meaning of those maps, he was answered "These are the strategical points in Berlin" and so on; where it would pay to build barricades, in the event of a revolution. So this was part of the curriculum that was carried on there, but not in those universities, the University of the Toilers of the Far East, or Sun Yat-sen, because those trained only civilians.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Could you tell us approximately how many students were trained each year on the Tolmachoff University?

Mr. POPPE. Well, the Chinese group was not very large, about 50 students every year.

Mr. MORRIS. About 50 every year?

Mr. POPPE. Fifty; yes. The others were Russians and various nationalities. There were at least 3,000 students.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any of the other Asiatic nations represented in the Tolmachoff University?

Mr. POPPE. Yes—Turks.

Mr. MORRIS. Japanese?

Mr. POPPE. Japanese—well, very few, but they were also mainly Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever an adviser to the Red Army, Professor Poppe?

Senator WATKINS. Before he leaves that, may I ask at what time was this Tolmachoff Academy operating, about which you are testifying?

Mr. POPPE. Well, that is around 1935 to, say, 1940; 1934, '35 or '36.

Senator WATKINS. I notice that you referred to Berlin and Tokyo.

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. What was the Tokyo situation? What were they teaching there?

Mr. POPPE. They were teaching also in the event of revolution in Japan, that there would be street fighting, as to where the Communist organizers should place the machine guns and build their barricades, so everything was done for the event of a possible revolution. Those barricades in Tokyo, as it is known, were never used, were never built.

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Senator WATKINS. What about the people who were to carry it out? Were there some Japanese there?

Mr. POPPE. Japanese, yes; and Russians also.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever an adviser to the Red army?

Mr. POPPE. Well, only at one occasion, when, after the fights on the Mongolian and Manchuko frontier, the Soviets, the Mongols, and the Japanese created a Mixed Frontier Commission in the city of Chita, in eastern Siberia, where they met and discussed the frontiers, but there was evidence that the frontiers were where they were supposed to be, and the Japanese claimed they were further to the west, the Soviets claimed they were further to the east, and so on; and after all those controversies, General Bogdanoff came to Leningrad and to the Oriental Institute, discussed this matter with the party secretary and the latter introduced me to him, and told him that I was an expert on those areas. So I was told to take all the old ancient maps of the eighteenth century, drawn by French Jesuits in the eighteenth century, Chinese and Mongolian maps made in the early nineteenth century, and so on, and compare where the frontier was; and I was a bit surprised that the Soviet claims were justified.

Mr. MORRIS. You think they were justified?

Mr. POPPE. They were; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the creation of that map, Professor, did the NKVD take any interest in your work at all during that time?

Mr. POPPE. Not in these maps, of course, because they were not drawn by me and they were not for publication, but, in general, mapping and publication of maps is controlled by the NKVD. The only agency publishing maps and permitted to do so is the chief geographic and geodetic department of the NKVD. They check all the maps and publish them, even an archaeological map. For instance, I added an archaeological map to one of my books, and that map had to get first an approval of the NKVD because the cities, the frontiers, and also some other points there were indicated there.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Professor, do you remember the rather large-scale project that was undertaken by the Soviet authorities, to produce a Soviet world atlas?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I do remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that, please?

Mr. POPPE. Well, the atlas is an enterprise on a very large scale, and a special publishing house was created to compile and publish that atlas. It was Professor Motylev who headed that atlas.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us who Professor Motylev is?

Mr. POPPE. Professor Motylev is a party member.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that he is a Communist Party member?

Mr. POPPE. A Communist Party member, and an economist; not a physical geographer, a scientist of very little significance, but an outstanding party organizer, and a man who knows how to run an organization under Soviet conditions. He was trusted greatly and he was ordered not to compile, because he himself alone was not able to do this, but to establish a group which would compile that atlas, and to supervise the publication of that atlas. The result of that work was published in 1937. It is a big Soviet world atlas, technically done

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very well, but, as anything in the Soviet Union, it had also to comply with the Marxist-Leninist line of thinking.

Senator WATKINS. At this point, may I ask you this question, Professor: Did you obtain what you are testifying to now by some personal contact with this man that you have mentioned, this very able party organizer, or is that just a general reputation?

Mr. POPPE. It was his general reputation. I did not know him personally. It was his general reputation, that he was an outstanding organizer.

Senator WATKINS. Did you know about this work that he was doing through some personal contacts with it?

Mr. POPPE. Of course, I knew how they were doing this work because lots of people were working there, and I know also the publication itself. I have seen it. I have used it, and so on. I know what that atlas is.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have a copy with you?

Mr. POPPE. It is here. It is a wonderful piece of work, technically, very beautiful; and the work was started very early in the early 1920's, and at Lenin's request. Lenin ordered that a large atlas be published, which would go along the Marxist-Leninist line, which would show the world as divided by the imperialists and as exploited by the imperialists, and so on. This volume contains in its first part the physical geography of the world in general, the hemispheres, and suns and stars and so on; and then the Soviet Union. There we find maps of everything, the plants and animals and population, and industry and so on.

Senator WATKINS. Did you produce that atlas here? That is apparently volume I.

Mr. POPPE. Only one appeared. The second has not appeared as yet.

Senator WATKINS. Did vou produce it or did you get it from the Library of Congress?

Mr. POPPE. That is the property of the Library of Congress, I guess. This is not my copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you get this particular copy?

Mr. POPPE. Mr. Mandel gave it to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify where this volume came from?

Mr. MANDEL. This volume of the Soviet great atlas comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. Motylev was in fact associated with the Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that his reputation in Moscow was that he was predominantly a Communist Party man rather than a scientist?

Senator WATKINS. How could you ascertain that? Was it generally known?

Mr. POPPE. It was generally known. Of course, I have not seen his identity cards showing whether he was a party member or not, but it was known; it was generally known that Professor So-and-so is an

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outstanding party member. Professor So-and-so is a nonparty member.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he referred to in the Soviet press at the time as a party member?

Mr. POPPE. The press never identified anybody. It was never said, for instance, by the Russian newspapers, that someone was a party member or was not; but it was known. For instance, every week they had party meetings and, of course, some people were permitted to attend them and the others were not. So, of course, obviously, those who were permitted, it was only the party members. Sometimes they had open meetings; then everybody attended them.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever attend any of these meetings?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course, I attended also some open meetings, when I was told to do so, because a very important matter had to be discussed.

Senator WATKINS. Did you take part in the discussions?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Did you attend any of these meetings that were not open?

Mr. POPPE. No; never.

Mr. MORRIS. That was open for party members?

Mr. POPPE. Only for the party members, and sometimes even for the bureau members alone, so even the party members did not know everything.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, do you know a man named Voitinsky?

Mr. POPPE. I know him very well. Voitinsky is an outstanding Communist, a member of the Comintern, a man who played a very important role in Chinese affairs. He in his youth was an organizer of parties of guerrillas against the White Russian armies in Siberia. Later on he became a member of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Office, and played a very important role in the far eastern development. Then he became one of the directors of the Communist Academy which later on was merged with the Russian Academy of Scientists, and became the nucleus of the future Academy of Scientists. He was also the director of various institutes in the Academy of Sciences, chief editor of the magazine World Policies and World Economics. He is the right-hand of Stalin's number one economist, Varga.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, would you tell us whether he was himself a Communist party man?

Mr. POPPE. He was a party man, a member of the Comintern, and in 1936 and 1937 he conducted a purge of the Academy of Sciences, and many people who worked together with me in my institute, my assistants, were purged, simply in consequence of his accusations.

Senator WATKINS. What do you mean by purged? What was the purge?

Mr. POPPE. It was in 1936 and 1937, in connection with Stalin's destruction of Zinoviev, Borodin, and all the other well-known Communists. A great purge was started in all the agencies, and all the universities, and so on. I can only say, to give you an idea of what it was in my Institute of Oriental Study, that we had 94 scientists and 37 of them were arrested and disappeared forever; 37 out of 94.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. 1937; Voitinsky delivered a speech in our institute where he severely criticized this man and that man, and so on, and a few

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days later there was the elimination of all those people. So he was the one who gave the green light for those arrests.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, do you know that this same Mr. Voitinsky was an official of the council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. He was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. It was known because he was listed among the members in printed editions of that institute, and also in the magazine published by the Institute of Pacific Relations here in the United States, the Pacific Affairs. There, among the members of the foreign directors, the managers of the foreign branches, Voitinsky was mentioned as a member of the Soviet Union, the representative of the Soviet Union in the Pacific Relations Institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Kantrovich?

Mr. POPPE. I never met him, but I read many papers written by him, and articles. Later on he fell into disgrace and disappeared, was eliminated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in order to bring this down to the subject under which the investigation has been carried on, I think it would be appropriate at this time if we would introduce into the record several reports from the files that we have of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which show the relations between the American representatives of the Institute of Pacific Relations and these persons about whom we have been discussing today.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed in that manner.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Memorandum of informal conversation at the Communist Academy, Volkhonka 14, Moscow, May 26, 1934."

I read sections of this:

> The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes—

which might be Kathleen Barnes—

> Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in the revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the University at Vladivostock. * * *

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing to indicate that that is Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. MANDEL. Except that that is the period when she was in Moscow. It corresponds with this period.

Then it states:

> Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September Pacific Affairs. * * * They invited Voitinsky to write for the December issue on the land problems on Soviet China. * * *
>
> Mr. Voitinsky said that he believed the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports. * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen this document before today, Professor Poppe?

Mr. POPPE. I think I have seen the photostat which Mr. Mandel is reading.

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Mr. MORRIS. Yes; that is the one he has in his hand. Could you supplement the information on this report in any way for the committee? I mean, do you know Mr. Abramson, who is mentioned there?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; I knew Abramson.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Abramson an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. POPPE. I think of the Russian branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what we mean.

Mr. POPPE. Yes, he was.

Mr. MORRIS. You know nothing, however, about this particular meeting, do you, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. I don't know anything about this meeting, and the matters discussed here are not of primary importance from my viewpoint.

Mr. MORRIS. And therefore you would have no occasion to know of these things.

Mr. POPPE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. But you do know who Mr. Voitinsky and Mr. Abramson who are mentioned in this report are?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same Mr. Voitinsky that you are talking about?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, it is the same. I know his first name is Gregory and his second name is Nahum.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 430" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 430

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL CONVERSATION AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY, VOLKHONKA 14, MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1934

The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes, Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in the revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese.

1. Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September Pacific Affairs on the romanization of Chinese. They invited Voitinsky to write for the December issue on the land problems of Soviet China or the land problems of China generally.

2. Discussion took place regarding the invitation which Carter and Barnes had extended to the librarian of the Communist Academy Library to prepare each quarter an eight-page bibliography of the more important books and articles written in the Soviet Union on the problems of Soviet Asia, the Far East and the Pacific. Pending conversation on May 28 between Carter and Barnes on the one hand, and the present Communist Library librarian and billiographer on the other, it was proposed that the librarian of the Communist Academy prepare the bibliographical notes for Pacific Affairs, but where critical appraisal of the more important books or articles was desirable, that these should be undertaken by those in the Communist Academy who, like Voitinsky and Abramson, have expert knowledge of the Far East.

3. Mr. Voitinsky said that he believed the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports on the following subjects:

(*a*) The inner situation in Netherlands India—the economic interdependence of the peasant and the city worker, and also the interdependence of these on capital and trade in Holland. The whole situation as portrayed in official documents in Netherlands India and in Holland would be of the greatest interest to the Communist Academy. The academy would also welcome information on the nationalist movement in Netherlands India. At the moment the academy has no Dutch-speaking member, but could easily get all Dutch documents translated.

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(*b*) He would appreciate all the information the IPR can send him regarding the agrarian movement in Japan and the financial dependence of Japan on other countries. He would like to compare Lenin's thesis on Japan, which he feels is stated in algebraic terms transformed into arithmetical terms, through a study of finance and trade. He would like very much more information than is at present available on the evolution of the labor movement and the close relation between the village and the city. He believes that it is desirable to study the middle class of Japan, which he understands contains a large number of people who simultaneously fulfill the roles of landlord, petty manufacturer, and small money lender, constituting for Japan a distinct class of "petite bourgeoisie." Freda Utley has done some work in this field, but Voitinsky is eager to have very much more. The Communist Academy is placing very much more emphasis in the historical background in Japan and in other countries than formerly. Voitinsky wants more studies of the Character of the Meiji Restoration (1868). Some in the academy believe that the prevailing Japanese historical interpretation of this period is inaccurate and misleading, just as they believe that Korean history as interpreted in Japanese-inspired textbooks is inadequate. They believe that this may be true of Japanese-inspired textbooks in Manchoukuo.

(*c*) Voitinsky wants both economic and historical material on the Japanese colonies.

(*d*) Both Voitinsky and Abramson would like copies of Rajchmann's China report to the League of Nations and in fact copies of all the material which the League has on China. They want to get a copy of an economic report made for the Nanking government by League experts of economic and social conditions in the province of Kiangsi.

(*e*) Abramson spoke of the difficulty of getting certain Chinese publications which are not properly listed or which for a variety of reasons have a limited circulation.

4. Voitinsky reiterated his willingness to cooperate in securing articles for Pacific Affairs. He could see no possible objection in principle to members of the academy furnishing articles. Carter and Barnes explained that normally articles should be of 4,000 words and that the standard fee for such articles was $50. They emphasized that they wished to have the academy apply three criteria to such articles: First, that they be orthodox from the Communist point of view; second, that they are to be written by the very best authorities; third, that they be important and of general interest.

5. Carter referred to the new atlas of China which he was taking to London with a view to discovering whether an English edition was possible. Voitinsky said that an English edition would be of greater value than the Chinese edition. Carter undertook to send Voitinsky a copy of the large Chinese edition as soon as it was formally published, and also a copy of the English edition if and when published. Mr. Abramson accepted the invitation of Carter and Barnes to visit Mr. Carter's room in order to inspect the new Chinese atlas. This Mr. Abramson did.

6. Mr. Barnes, in passing, mentioned one aspect of the language problem of the IPR and took occasion to refer to basic English and its important role in facilitating the work of those who desire quickly to get a knowledge of normal English.

7. Mr. Voitinsky expressed interest in Lattimore's forthcoming book on the Mongols.

8. Mr. Carter expressed the hope that it might be possible for the IPR to have in Moscow for a part of each year an IPR representative with a knowledge of Russian who might continue to develop the interchange of books and articles which had been started by Mr. Barnes. Both Mr. Voitinsky and Mr. Abramson spoke with sincere appreciation of Mr. Barnes' helpfulness, his good command of Russian and his genuine acceptability. They promised to give the same cooperation that they had given to any qualified IPR representative whom Mr. Carter might send to continue the work which Mr. Barnes had begun. Mr. Abramson agreed to accord the facilities of the library in the academy to any fully qualified research workers from any of the IPR countries who had a working knowledge of Russian and who came with Mr. Carter's credentials.

9. Mr. Voitinsky expressed the hope that it might be possible for the IPR, apart from its formal publishing program, to appoint correspondents in different countries who might supplement more formal studies by individual reports. Mr. Barnes was not certain that a satisfactory system for such reports could be easily arranged.

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10. Mr. Abramson indicated that on the occasion of Mr. Carter's next visit to Moscow he would like to see him and would do all in his power to facilitate the objects of his visit.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this as a paper taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations' files?

Mr. MANDEL. This is the original of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Report of visit of Secretary General to Moscow," which would be presumably E. Carter, dated December 20–31, 1934."

In this document is mentioned:

Dr. V. E. Motylev, the chairman, as director of the Great Soviet World. * * * Voitinsky, the vice chairman, as head of the Pacific Ocean cabinet of the Communist Academy—

and others.

Mr. MORRIS. You will notice here that the chairman of this meeting was Dr. V. E. Motylev. He is listed here as the chairman and director of the Great Soviet World Atlas. Is that the same Mr. Motylev about whom you have been testifying?

Mr. POPE. It is the same.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. S. S. Joffe?

Mr. POPPE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. A. S. Swanidze?

Mr. POPPE. I only heard about him. I read something. He was not a scientist at all. He was director of a bank and, if I am not mistaken, was involved in those financial business, so that I don't know much about him, but he was an outstanding party member as he was one of the Soviet heads of the finances in the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read sections of that report, bearing on the Soviet atlas?

Mr. MANDEL. This paragraph is from page 14 of that report. It says:

The aim of the atlas is to give a Marxist-Leninist cartographic picture of the world, i. e., a comprehensive picture of the epoch of imperialism and particularly the period of the general crisis of capitalism.

Mr. Morris, to show the importance of this atlas in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, I have a review here of the atlas by Owen Lattimore and I would like to read a paragraph, if I may.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, do you think that appropriate at this time?

Seantor WATKINS. You may do so.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from the September 1938 issue of Pacific Affairs, review of the Great Soviet World Atlas.

Senator WATKINS. Published by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir; and this a review signed by "O. L.", and I read one paragraph:

The historical message, in short, of which special mention is made in the introduction, is extended to demonstrate the superiority of socialism as practiced in the Soviet Union with the deliberate purpose of arrival at a future communism over the capitalism of the rest of the world. The method, it must be conceded, is formidable. It is not vulgar propaganda, but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you finished reading from that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

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Mr. MORRIS. Professor, could you tell us whether or not any elements of propaganda crept into the preparation of the atlas?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course; much propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that, please?

Mr. POPPE. Well, first of all the atlas gives not always a true picture of the world, and the maps themselves are propaganda. For instance, there is one map which shows Outer Mongolia. It is my field. I know Outer Mongolia very well, and, therefore, I am entitled to mention this country in the first place.

One of the maps shows the world as economically dominated by various imperialist countries.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "dominated" exactly what do you mean by that?

Mr. POPPE. Just exactly what they mean; that a country is economically being exploited by imperialist countries. The imperialist countries get raw material from their invested capital.

Mr. MORRIS. How does a chart or map show that?

Mr. POPPE. Various colors, red, green, blue, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Give us a concrete example.

Mr. POPPE. For instance, the United States is amber, and countries being exploited by the United States are also amber or they are striped with amber, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you indicate that on that particular page there?

Mr. POPPE. On this particular page, Outer Mongolia, is a country completely absorbed and integrated in the Soviet economic and political system. It is a Soviet satellite, but instead of presenting it in the same color as the Soviet Union, they give it the yellow color, as China, with those amber stripes, which means that the United States import and export from Outer Mongolia.

This is not true. Outer Mongolia had a trade with the United States. By 1926 or very soon after—I even knew a man by the name of Carter. He was a representative of one of the American firms there in Outer Mongolia. He was expelled by 1929 or 1930 from Outer Mongolia, just as all other foreigners were, and the atlas was published in 1937, after the last American had been expelled from Outer Mongolia. And Mongolia is shown as a country trading with the United States, for instance.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that published?

Mr. POPPE. 1937. So it was 10 years after the expulsion of the foreigners from Outer Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there other instances such as that?

Mr. POPPE. There are other distortions, of course. For instance, let us take one of the railroads which existed in reality here in the Soviet Union by 1935 or 1936, but which is not shown here, and that railroad was vital for the Soviets during the Hitler invasion. I will find this map here——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, while Professor Poppe is looking for that, I would like to have introduced into the record this letter which Mr. Mandel will identify as a document taken from the files of the institute.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed with its introduction.

Mr. POPPE. Here is a railroad which is not shown here. From here [indicating] to here [indicating]. This railroad is not shown. It is very important, strategically and economically.

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Mr. MORRIS. Pointing from 35° to 40° longitude, on what page?

Mr. POPPE. 163. This line was cut by the Germans here [indicating] and nevertheless the supplies rolled from here along this line to this line, to Moscow. You see, the lend-lease Liberty vessels came here.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony then that this map, as it is presented in this atlas, is not an accurate map?

Mr. POPPE. It is not accurate.

Mr. MORRIS. You know from your own experience that there is a railroad there, not depicted.

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I know.

Mr. MORRIS. What reason do you give for that not being on this map.

Mr. POPPE. That is strategically important, and it could not be shown for everybody; and a scientific atlas should be more accurate, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Your testimony is that this is not an accurate atlas in that certain important and strategic railroads are not listed therein?

Mr. POPPE. I would formulate it so that things which should not be known to everybody are not shown here in this atlas.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this last letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter, to CH-s, presumably Chen Han-seng, dated April 18, 1938.

This is a big day in the life of the IPR for the first volume of Dr. Motylev's great Soviet World Atlas has today arrived. Two precious copies have come, one addressed to Holland and one addressed to me. Here, for your close perusal for a few hours is Holland's copy. Keep it safely and see that it is locked up at night.

Senator WATKINS. Who is CH-s?

Mr. MORRIS. Chen Han-seng.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 431" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any other evidence of Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the world geography or history in that atlas that you would care to call to our attention, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. For instance, there is a map, the Imperialist Division of the World, the penetration by the Imperialists, from the year so-and-so to the year so-and-so, and there are various such maps.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. POPPE. Several.

Mr. MORRIS. That you have noticed in this particular volume?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. The red slips here show the pages.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the organization Voks?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what that was?

Mr. POPPE. V-o-k-s, spelled in Russian. This was the old union organization for the cultural relations with other foreign countries. Its aim is the purchase of foreign literature and publication of that literature in the Soviet Union; second, exportation of Soviet literature; third, invitation of important scholars, artists, painters, musicians, dancers, and so on, from other countries; let them travel and make their performances, and so on; and the same also for the Soviet dancers and singers going abroad.

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This agency would not invite the first, the best, person, no matter how important or artistic he was. Of course, they checked him thoroughly and only after they got an approval from the NKVD, they could invite him and send him tickets and so on. The importation of foreign literature was, of course, important, because we did not get foreign currency and we, the scientists and other intellectuals, could not get literature from abroad, and besides it was a bit dangerous to get books directly from our foreign colleagues. Therefore, this was a very fortunate solution of the problem. Foreign professors, of course, sent their books to that organization, and the organization forwarded it to people whom those books might concern.

Once I got a letter from the French Professor Haganower, who wrote me that he was sending his books and articles through Voks. Then there came a phone call from the Voks and they said:

We have got some books for you and we shall forward them to you tomorrow, but two items could not be forwarded for censorship reasons. They will remain here, but we would appreciate it very much if you fully acknowledge the receipt of all of the books.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, did you know a man named Arosev?

Mr. POPPE. He was the head of Voks.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that Voks was the organization that had general supervision over the exchange of literature between various countries?

Mr. POPPE. Literature and people.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to call your attention to the fact that our exhibit No. 37 in part 1, at page 187, which represents the minutes of the founding meetings of the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R., taking place on July 28, 1934, in Moscow, that there were present at that meeting, we have (1) the president of the institute, Prof. V. E. Motylev, about whom we have testimony today; vice president, Mr. Voitinsky, about whom we have had testimony here; and No. 3, Mr. I. S. Arosev, chairman of the Society for the Cultural Relations with Other Countries.

He is the gentleman about whom you have just given testimony?

Mr. POPPE. He is.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us whether or not, Professor Poppe, you know anything further about the exchange of books with the United States, for instance?

Mr. POPPE. Well, I don't know exactly what their activities were in this field.

Mr. MORRIS. You just know the general nature of Voks; is that right?

Mr. POPPE. I know the general nature, because I myself got my books from France and Germany through them.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, was that operation supervised by the Com munist Party?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; of course it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it highly political or cultural?

Mr. POPPE. In the Soviet Union everything is political because the scientists and the students were always told that there is no science outside of policies. All science is political and so also they considered the culture as part of their policies.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the last few days we have been having testimony in connection with the exchange of books and the exchange

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of information engaged in between the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder if you would receive into the record today several of these letters? Mr. Mandel, will you identify them as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed with the introduction of these letters.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy, the actual carbon copy, which comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

This document is dated January 23, 1939. It comes from the San Francisco address, addressed to "Dear Harriet" that being addressed to Miss Harriet Moore from Bruno Lasker.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the pertinent paragraph, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

DEAR HARRIET: After receiving your letter of the 16th, I went to see Mrs. Isaacs to find out to what extent we could perhaps rely on the San Francisco office of your institute to supply us with literature about the Soviet Union for our exhibition. * * *—

and further comment—

* * * of next importance from the educational standpoint are, of course, the periodicals, and I am very grateful to you for your offer of the American Quarterly of the Soviet Union, and of the Bulletin of the Soviet Union—

and then he asks for further Soviet literature.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 432" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 432

1795 CALIFORNIA STREET, SAN FRANCISCO

JANUARY 23, 1939.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,
The American Russian Institute,
56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HARRIET: After receiving your letter of the 16th, I went to see Mrs. Isaacs to find out to what extent we could perhaps rely on the San Francisco office of your institute to supply us with literature about the Soviet Union for our exhibition. Although Mrs. Isaacs has been most helpful, it appears that the help we can expect from her is exceedingly limited for two reasons: First, that she herself does not have very much of the Russian literature in her institute library; and second, that she must keep the little she has on hand, particularly in a year when, like every other institution in San Francisco, the ARI must expect a larger number of visitors than usual, some of them intent on serious study.

Mrs. Isaacs will, however, from time to time supplement what I can get from publishers for special temporary displays with loans from her excellent library on Russia and the Soviet Union in English, and whatever else she may have, including the atlas which apparently no one else in San Francisco can afford to buy.

Speaking about the atlas, do you happen to know whether the edition planned with Cressey's captions and notes in English is likely to come out this year, or have you any other suggestion as to how I might obtain a copy of the atlas for the duration of the exhibition?

Of next importance from the educational standpoint are, of course, the periodicals, and I am very grateful for your offer to send us copies of the American Quarterly of the Soviet Union and of the Bulletin of the Soviet Union. You are quite right that not only current numbers but also back files would be of use, if the back numbers could be kept together in some sort of folder or loose-leaf cover.

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The real difficulty begins, however, when I am inquiring for copies of Soviet Russia today, Soviet Land, the U. S. S. R. in Construction, and Creative Art; perhaps also the monthly Arctic Periodical. Apparently, since at Mr. Carter's suggestion I am not attempting to get these periodicals through official sources, one would have to get them from the New York offices of the SRT publications, Bookniga and Voks, but I am a little afraid that any letter from me would receive no attention at all in these quarters. Some of these periodicals actually have had special numbers relating to the Far East and to Siberia. There is also an illustrated ethnographic journal, and, above all, there is International Literature in English. Some years ago that journal had a magnificent article on the modern development of Japanese literature (the finest thing of the sort I have ever read, full of sly humor and yet informative and reliable).

Apparently, the Soviet Union is getting out a good deal of material in English without attempting to propagate it except through commercial channels. This may be a virtue, especially when compared with the hideous generosity of the Japanese and Manchukuoan Governments, but it means that the great majority of the American people never see anything at all printed in the Soviet Union.

Although this may not perhaps appeal very much to your scholarly mind, I believe one of our first functions is to acquaint the American public with the fact that good books are published in Russia, books that can be enjoyed by people irrespective of their social or political creed. If it were at all possible, therefore, I should like to feature some of those beautifully printed and illustrated books that have come off the Soviet presses in recent years, even though possibly the subjects of some of them may not bear directly upon the Pacific. For example, I would go a little beyond the boundary to include the wonderful Prince Igor book in a display of books on the legends of Pacific peoples. I might even stretch a point and sneak in a really beautiful book about European Russia in a special display on folk arts or the like.

Considering how strong the anti-Communist feeling still is here on the coast, I would, if I were a propagandist for better relations, use such books as I have named as a first step to associate the minds of even ordinary people with something other than purges, armaments, and steel works when they think of the Soviet Union.

The point of all this is to inquire whether, in some way or other, you could not secure for our book exhibition a representative sample of literature, both books and periodicals, printed in Russia and as far as possible relating directly to Siberia and the Pacific, but also including more general works perhaps, if outstanding examples of good book-making.

Enclosed is a copy of the form letter which I wrote for you in December, but which I did not send at that time because I wanted, first, to find out whether it might not be possible to secure works from the Soviet Union without giving you so much trouble. Not knowing how easy or how difficult it may be to comply with our wishes as expressed above, but being quite convinced that you will do your best, may I not leave this whole problem in your lap? If you cannot secure anything of use for our purpose, I shall feel that, even through direct correspondence with the various commercial Soviet agencies, I could not have done better. But perhaps you can secure at least some significant contributions, or persuade someone to lend us the back numbers of some of the periodicals I have named.

Yours very sincerely,

BRUNO LASKER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have another?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated November 21, 1934, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to "Dear Harriet," presumably Harriet Moore, signed by Edward C. Carter.

Excerpts from this letter read as follows:

Yesterday I received your cable reading as follows: Send complete list institute publications. Have asked me for specific answers to questionnaire sent to you. Especially interested in exchange of publications and afraid you uninterested. General answer desirable now. Details when you arrive. Moore.

Last evening I cabled you in a cable as follows: Mailing you list gathering publications rapidly as possible. Profoundly interested. Tell Kantorovich his publications should be sent Pacific Council, New York, not Honolulu * * *—

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and further on:

This morning I have included in a cable to Field the following message: "Moore Moscow cables Kantorovitch eager have you send books promptly, your memorandum November 8." Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you receive that in the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 433" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 433

CHATHAM HOUSE,
10 St. James' Square, London SW. I., November 21, 1934.

DEAR HARRIET: Yesterday I received your cable reading as follows:

"Send complete list institute publications. Have asked me for specific answers to questionnaire sent to you. Especially interested in exchange of publications and afraid you uninterested. General answer desirable now details when you arrive. Moore."

Last evening I cabled you in a cable as follows:

"Mailing you list gathering publications rapidly as possible; profoundly interested. Tell Kantorovitch his publications should be sent Pacific Council New York not Honolulu. Writing. Carter."

Last evening also I sent you by air mail two copies of the latest printed list of IPR publications. With this letter I am sending two more. Enclosed also is a copy of Fred Field's memorandum to me of November 8, which is simply for your information, and need only be made known except in general terms until the system is working. This morning I have included in a cable to Field the following message:

"Moore Moscow cables Kantorovich eager have you send books promptly your memorandum November 8. Carter."

At the meeting of the IPR committee at Chatham House yesterday I presented the first two parts of the following statement:

COOPERATION WITH THE NEWLY FORMED SOVIET GROUP

The new Soviet group has offered to collect and send to the Pacific Council's library a complete set of all publications in the U. S. S. R., books, booklets, and magazines, on the Pacific and the Far East. Most of these, of course, are in Russian. In return, the Soviet group expects that the IPR will supply them with a complete set of all publications issued by the institute and by the different national groups affiliated with it. My request to you, therefore, is that—

(1) You may consider making available a full set of Chatham House publications bearing on the Far East and the Pacific, to begin to serve as the nucleus of the British section of the Moscow library of the IPR.

(2) I would like to meet a few members of Chatham House and others in the United Kingdom who are specializing in the problems of Soviet Russia today, more particularly including those who are studying Soviet, far-eastern, and Pacific questions.

(3) I venture to hope that ultimately it may be possible for Chatham House to secure as a staff member someone with an intimate knowledge of present-day Soviet Russia and a mastery of the Russian language. Such a staff member, preferably rather highly trained in the field of economics, would be of value in making available to Chatham House the results of far-eastern Soviet research and in communicating to the IPR headquarters in Moscow, in the Russian language, such contribution as the Royal Institute has to make to scientific work in the Soviet Union.

The third I will discuss at a later meeting. With reference to part 1, the committee expressed general approval but said that the Chatham House shelf was now so long that the request must first be considered by the finance committee and they by the publications committee. It is perfectly clear that a good many of the Chatham House publications will be available, but it is not certain whether there will be a sample of everything, for example, the big History of the Peace Conference. They assured me that every one of the Chatham House publications are in the library of the Communist Academy in Moscow. Professor Webster, who supported my proposal, emphasized the importance of having at least two sets of Chatham House publications in Moscow and urged affirmative action. If

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Chatham House should run into some snag, I suppose some of the Chatham House publications would be provided by Field if coming within the scope of his memorandum to me of November 8. I could, of course, get a substantial discount on all Chatham House publications, but I feel pretty optimistic with reference to getting a favorable decision from Chatham House within the next fortnight.

Having changed the depository for the Pacific Council's Russian library from Honolulu to New York makes it psychologically slightly more difficult for Chatham House to donate a long shelf of expensive books to Moscow when all Russian volumes that are to be sent in exchange are to be housed in the office of the American Council. I have explained that the library, though housed there, will be maintained as the Pacific Council Russian library and that the American Council is providing for the library full service and cataloging and that the American Council is paying one-half of the salary of the special deputy librarian of the Russian section.

Of course, I am hoping that the Soviet group will send some important books to Chatham House. There are three members of the Chatham House staff who can read Russian titles, two of whom can read Russian well.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, did Voks also supervise the travel of individuals?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; they did. And I remember very well I had great difficulties when the Finnish scholar, Professor Kechtunan, came together with another professor, Professor Posti, to Leningrad.

They wanted to travel in an area populated by various Finnish people and tribes, and they were permitted only to travel in one area, but not to go to another area, and by Voks I was told, "Please try to dissuade them from going to that area. We would not like them to go to that place."

Mr. MORRIS. Who would make a determination as to whether an individual should go to, say, Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. It would be NKVD and the Russian foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. Would that be planned by Voks?

Mr. POPPE. Voks could not decide what foreigner could go to another foreign country. Mongolia is, officially, a foreign country.

Mr. MORRIS. Were explorers allowed into Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. After 1926 they were not allowed. I remember there was in 1926 Roy Chapman Andrews from the Field Museum, the noted paleontologist, and geologist, from the United States. And the other was also in 1926, the painter, Roerich, who established a museum in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. They were allowed to go into Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. They were, in 1926. Then, prior to that time, Dr. Lindgren, a Swede, was there, but after 1926 nobody was permitted.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. I know because a colleague of mine, the Hungarian Ligati, was not permitted to go to Mongolia; so, he had to go around the whole world to China, and then from there into Chinese Mongolia, but not into Soviet Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would receive into the record at this point a letter which Mr. Mandel will identify as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, would you read the first few paragraphs of that.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed with that matter.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 12, 1937, addressed to Owen Lattimore, from Edward C. Carter.

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This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip. He wants to arrange things so that you and he can go together. Because of exceptionally heavy pressure on him in connection with completing the next page of the atlas, this year is quite out of the question for him to go to Mongolia. Had he been free, he would have come to the Soviet Far East to meet me, but atlas pressure tied him to Moscow. He sent Bremman, the Secretary-General of the U. S. S. R. Council, who speaks Japanese, and Krasavtsev, who speaks Chinese. As one is a party member and one a nonparty member and each has had the richest kind of personal experience, both in the Soviet Union and in the Far East, they made an exceptionally useful, delightful, and informing combination.

As I think you know, Motylev arranged for me to go to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious, and wanted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves. It seems that the justification for my going was as the chief executive of an international organization, in which a representative Soviet scientific organization is an active member.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, have you any comment to make on the two facts in those paragraphs; namely, that Mr. Motylev had invited Mr. Lattimore to make a trip to Mongolia, and the other one that Mr. Carter was taken to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited?

Mr. POPPE. I don't know whether Mr. Motylev invited Mr. Lattimore to make that trip. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, the second sentence here is: "Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip."

Mr. POPPE. I don't see here an indication that he had invited him. He was perhaps simply anxious to get permission for him after having received an application from Owen Lattimore; so I don't know. Who applied first? Was it Motylev who offered that trip or Owen Lattimore, who had asked about permission to go to those countries? But, anyhow, I know that trips to Mongolia were connected with extreme difficulties, and in 1937, although I was not only a Soviet citizen, but I was also head of the Mongolian studies in Russia, I was not permitted to travel to Outer Mongolia. I did not get the traveling pass.

Senator WATKINS. Did you try to get one?

Mr. POPPE. Well, the president of the Academy of Sciences asked me to go to Mongolia. I was not quite well. I was very reluctant, but he said "Go, go, go." I made an application and there was a refusal from the NKVD—"No pass for you."

Senator WATKINS. Did they give a reason?

Mr. POPPE. They never give reasons.

Senator WATKINS. They just denied it?

Mr. POPPE. Simply denied it.

Senator WATKINS. Does this have any significance to you: that Owen Lattimore was able to go on this trip?

Mr. POPPE. I don't know whether he went on it. I only see in this paper that there was a conversation about a trip to Mongolia, but whether he had succeeded in getting permission to go to those places or not, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not when Lattimore did, in fact, subsequent to that time, go to Mongolia, after 1937?

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Mr. POPPE. After 1937. I read in one of his articles that he had gone to Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, from China to Moscow, but it seems to me that it was during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any other direct knowledge, other than Mr. Lattimore's writings, of whether or not he went to Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. He does not mention in those books which I have read, his trip to Outer Mongolia. He has lots about Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Professor, his books are accessible to this committee, and we can learn from those books whether or not he said that he went to Mongolia. But do you, as a matter of fact, know whether or not Mr. Lattimore ever went to Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. In those books, the situation in Asia or the inner Asian frontiers of China, and so on, in all those books, it is the travel in Mongolia. And there is also a book, Across the Desert, or something like that, and he mentioned Mongolia, but it is always Inner Mongolia, belonging to China, and not controlled by the Soviets.

Mr. MORRIS. Apart from his books, Professor, do you know from your own experience whether or not Mr. Lattimore ever went to Mongolia?

Mr. POPPE. In one of his articles——

Mr. MORRIS. Not from his articles; do you know from your own experience?

Mr. POPPE. No; I don't know anything. I only read this one article, that he had passed through Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, has this last letter been introduced into the record?

Senator WATKINS. I do not know, but it may be, if it has not been.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 434" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 434

HOTEL RICHMOND,
Geneva, September 12, 1937.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
33A Ta Yuan Fu Hutung, Peiping, China.

DEAR OWEN: This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip. He wants to arrange things so that you and he can go together. Because of exceptionally heavy pressure on him in connection with completing the next stage of the atlas, this year is quite out of the question for him to go to Mongolia. Had he been free he would have come to the Soviet Far East to meet me, but atlas pressure tied him to Moscow. He sent Bremman, the Secretary-General of the U. S. S. R. Council, who speaks Japanese, and Krasavtsev, who speaks Chinese. As one is a party member and one a non-party member, and each has had the richest kind of personal experience both in the Soviet Union and in the Far East, they made an exceptionally useful, delightful, and informing combination.

As I think you know, Motylev arranged for me to go to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious and wanted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves. It seems that the justification for my going was as the chief executive of an international organization in which a representative Soviet scientific organization is an active member.

Motylev had been planning to go to the Nanking meeting of the Pacific council and was hoping that if this were possible he might be free soon after to go to Mongolia with you.

Now, of course, the war situation makes the future for him and the institute most uncertain, so that for the time being it will be a good scheme for you to

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make your plans for next year in such a way that, if Motylev can go to Mongolia and if the war situation makes it possible for him to get your permit and for you to go, a Mongolian trip would be a possibility. But, until we know more than we do now as to the duration and consequences of Chinese resistance and Japanese endurance and Soviet involvement, there is nothing to do but keep plans flexible as you and I have formed the habit of doing during recent years.

With reference to Pacific Affairs the atmosphere was totally different from that which characterized our discussions when you and I were in Moscow. At that time, you will remember, Motylev was on the offensive, particularly because of the Isaacs article and relationship. This year Motylev and Bremman were not even on the defensive. They humbly admitted that they had not carried out their promises to you and me and their obligations to the institute and that there was no use of their offering the excuse that it was difficult to get Soviet citizens to write for Pacific Affairs when neither of them had themselves found time to write articles. They wanted me to explain to you that they were thoroughly ashamed of their failure to send articles and they made the most solemn kind of resolves to themselves write and send you something in the near future.

I told them that both you and I wished that the Voitinsky article had been sent to Pacific Affairs instead of being published in Tikhii Okean. I said that we both felt that it was precisely the kind of article that we wanted in Pacific Affairs, whereupon Motylev meekly admitted that Voitinsky had written the article especially for Pacific Affairs, that Bremman and Voitinsky were keen to have it sent to you, but that Motylev felt that the other councils would regard it as too provocative and tendencious and so had it shifted to Tikhii Okean. Bremman, of course, was delighted that you and I sided with him. I think that the incident has this value that Motylev now has a concrete example of what we all would like from the Soviet Council in Pacific Affairs.

Bremman, who at that time had only seen the first issue of Amerasia, felt that the policy of the magazine promised to be defeatist and that, instead of educating American public opinion in the realities of the Far East situation, it was likely to intensify the ostrichlike attitude of the American people and the American Government. I told him that I felt sure that both you and Fred would welcome incisive criticism of Amerasia, in case they wished to contribute an article on the subject to Pacific Affairs. I cabled Fred to send Motylev the whole file of Amerasia from the beginning.

I read between the lines that they welcomed my suggestion that if they didn't think the time had come for them to be the first council to come out with an article analysing Japanese policy, they might render a very great service by an article analysizing either American or British policy.

You will have gathered by now that the Soviet IPR extended to me every possible facility and courtesy throughout my stay in the Soviet Union. The members of no council have made more comprehensive plans for a visit of an officer of the international secretariat or incurred as great expense.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—Perhaps I ought to add that Motylev may not find it easy to get permission for you to go to Mongolia. It took him weeks finally to get permission for me to go to certain parts of the Soviet Far East, and I gathered from what he said that he anticipated even more effort would be required in the case of Mongolia. But he is so definitely committed to getting the permission so that he and you can go together that nothing further needs to be done except to leave everything in his hands.

Copies: W. L. HOLLAND.
HARRIET MOORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon of a letter, the carbon being taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 15, 1937, to Albert Sarraut, signed by Mr. Carter.

Mrs. Carter, Miss Ruth Carter, my secretary, and I have recently arrived in Moscow from North China.

We saw in Peiping the beginning of this deplorable war between China and Japan. In the Soviet Far East the U. S. S. R. IPR gave me the very great privilege of visiting not only Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Birobidjan but also the new city of Komsomolsk, hitherto unvisited by any European or American foreigner.

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Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, will you comment on the accessibility that Mr. Carter seems to have had in these various remote sections of the Soviet Union, as evidenced by this and the preceding letter?

Mr. POPPE. Those areas in the Far East were completely closed to everybody, and even the citizens of the Soviet Union were not permitted to go to those restricted areas, and this is because of their strategic importance and also because they were the main concentration camps and it was highly undesirable for the Soviet to let anybody see them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that last letter into the record?

Senator WATKINS. We will receive this into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 435" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 435

HOTEL METROPOLE,
Moscow, 15th August 1937.

M. ALBERT SARRAUT,
President, Comité d'Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique,
13 Rue de Four, Paris VI, France.

DEAR M. SARRAUT: Mrs. Carter, Miss Ruth Carter, my secretary, and I have recently arrived in Moscow from North China. We saw in Peiping the beginning of this deplorable war between China and Japan. In the Soviet Far East the U. S. S. R. IPR gave me the very great privilege of visiting not only Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Birobidjan but also the new city of Komsomolsk, hitherto unvisited by any European or American foreigner.

Before going to the Soviet Union we visited Japan, China, the Philippines, and Hongkong. In China I visited Canton in the south, Chungking and Chengtu in the far west (Szechwan), Nanking and Shanghai in the Yangtze Valley, and Peiping in the north. En route to Vladivostok I visited Mukden and Hsingking in Manchuria, and Seishin and Rashin in Korea.

After completing our visit here we plan to visit Geneva, Paris, the Netherlands, and London.

If you desire it, I would greatly appreciate the privilege of meeting the English-speaking members of the Comité d'Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique someday to tell them of some of my observations on this visit to the Far East.

Which of the following dates would be best for you for such a meeting—September 1st, or September 7th, or September 9th, or September 17th, or September 28th, or September 30th?

Perhaps you would send me a telegram, "Carter, Metropole, Moscow," indicating what date would be most convenient for you for such a meeting.

In addition to meeting your English-speaking members, I will, of course, on some date convenient with them, desire to discuss with M. Levy and M. Dennery, among others, the questions mentioned in the enclosed memorandum.

Looking forward with great eagerness to the privilege of seeing you again and also Levy, Dennery, Laurent, and Touzet, I am with deep appreciation of your friendship,

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not Mr. Kantorovich, about whom you have given testimony today, was ever purged?

Mr. POPPE. He was purged and disappeared.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about it?

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you this question: When you say "purged," for the purposes of the record, does that mean he was killed?

Mr. POPPE. "Purged" is, so to say, he evaporated and disappeared.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, he was just taken out and lost?

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Mr. POPPE. He simply disappeared. Yesterday he was and today he is no longer. That is a purge.

Senator WATKINS. It does not necessarily mean he was killed?

Mr. POPPE. No; perhaps put in a concentration camp. It is, I would say, "eliminated."

Senator WATKINS. I think we know what you mean.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a carbon taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relation. It is undated, and it says, "Copies for W. L. H. for 'IPR Notes.' "

In case Kantorovich did not write you direct, this is sent for your information. I do not think it means any change in U. S. S. R. I. P. R. policy, as I gathered last December that Kantorovich's appointment was only temporary—

then follows a letter signed by A. Kantorovich, to E. C. Carter headed "Council of the U. S. S. R. Institute of Pacific Relations."

DEAR CARTER: This is to announce to you that both for personal reasons, and because of pressure of literary work which lately has been more and more insistent, I have decided to resign my position as Secretary-General of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations—

and the rest follows:

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record?

Senator WATKINS. That may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 436" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 436

Copy for W. L. H. for "I. P. R. Notes."

In case Kantorovich did not write you direct, this is sent for your information. I do not think it means any change in U. S. S. R. I. P. R. policy as I gathered last December that Kantorovich's appointment was only temporary.

E. C. C.

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
20, Razin Street, Moscow,

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
Care of Grand Hotel, Auckland, New Zealand.

DEAR CARTER: This is to announce to you that both for personal reasons and because of pressure of literary work which lately has been more and more insistent, I have decided to resign my position as Secretary-General of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Since Mr. Motylev is leaving for the Far East for a couple of months, the affairs of the institute will be for the present in the hands of Mr. G. W. Voitinsky whom the mail and cables will reach at the address: 20, Razin Street, Moscow.

It goes without saying that I shall remain in close touch with the activities of the Soviet council of the institute and that, in my from now on unofficial capacity, I still look forward to meeting you in Moscow whenever your many duties will envolve another visit to our country.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) A. KANTOROVITCH.

Mr. MORRIS. On that last point, Professor, we have one more letter here which I think should go into the record, because it is on the accessibility granted to Mr. Carter to travel extensively in remote areas.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a mimeographed memorandum and taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; headed "Mr. Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations."

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I will read sections of the document:

Mr. Carter, who is one of the leading experts on the political and economic developments in the countries of the Far East, has recently returned from an extended trip through China, Japan, Manchuria, and the Soviet Far East. He revisited China in the spring of 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record?

Senator WATKINS. That will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 437" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 437

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER, SECRETARY-GENERAL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

129 East Fifty-Second Street

NEW YORK CITY

Plaza 3-4700

* * * * * * *

Mr. Carter, who is one of the leading experts on the political and economic developments in the countries of the Far East, has recently returned from an extended trip through China, Japan, Manchuria, and the Soviet Far East. He revisited China in the spring of 1937. After meeting Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at headquarters in Kuling, he made a study of prewar Chinese opinion on a Nation-wide basis. Mr. Carter was in Peiping, ancient capital of imperial China, when the war broke out.

In Japan, Mr. Carter was given a reception by the Foreign Minister. He was entertained by prominent leaders of business and finance, by officers of the Army and Navy and by Prince Konoye himself. He had unusual opportunities to cast a glance "backstage" in one of the most hectic hours of Japan's recent history.

In Manchuria, members of the Manchukuo government gave a number of very illuminating interviews to Mr. Carter, who visited the new capital, Hsinking, as well as the newly established, highly strategical Japanese naval base at Rashin in the northern tip of Korea.

In the far-eastern region of the Soviet Union, Mr. Carter's experiences were most unique and enlightening. He was the first foreign guest to be invited to certain sections of that heavily guarded portion of the U. S. S. R., notably Komsomolsk, the city of Russia's youth. He made an interesting and unusual trip through the Amur region and met officers of the Red army forces stationed in that area. In Birobidjan, Mr. Carter had a revealing discussion with some of the outstanding Soviet citizens about the degree of religious freedom in the U. S. S. R.

Before returning to the United States of America, Mr. Carter spent some time in Europe where he met a number of European statesmen including members of the French Cabinet, the Colonial Minister of Holland, and Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. While in Geneva recently, Mr. Carter talked with Mr. Wellington Koo, chief Chinese delegate to the League of Nations, and many other experts on the Far East.

Mr. Carter will spend a few weeks in the United States before he has to return to the Far East next year, in connection with an international research conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next document?

Senator WATKINS. Are we going to have comment on this by the witness?

Mr. MORRIS. That, Mr. Chairman, I intend to group with the previous two that have been introduced into the record, and upon which the witness has made comment. That is, on the accessibility granted to Mr. Carter to go to these remote places.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a hand-written document on the stationery of the Kokusai Hotel in Seishin, Chosen; that would be Japan, would it not?

Mr. POPPE. Seishin, Chosen, is Korea.

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Mr. MANDEL. The letter is dated July 17, 1937. It is addressed to "Dear Bill" and signed "Edward." I read a section of the letter:

If you go to Manchuria, see Ludden, the American vice counsul in Mukden.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you begin with the preceding sentence?

Mr. MANDEL. The preceding paragraph reads:

Owen had a wonderful time with Mao, etc.

Owen is in fine form. I had long talks with Peffer in Peiping and Mukden and with Bisson in Peiping. I missed my rendezvous with Wittvogel at Peitako because I left Peiping on an emergency train that went out on a few minutes notice and I had no chance to wire him. He gets more monumental all the time.

If you go to Manchuria, see Ludden, the American vice consul in Mukden (he is eager for contacts) tell him I sent you. Get him to introduce you to Chief Lengdon.

If you go to Hsinking call on all the people in the Foreign Affairs, Ohashi, Tsutsui Matsamura, and Pakh. Ask questions of as many of them as you can separately.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, do you know Mr. Ohashi?

Mr. POPPE. No, I don't know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Tsuitsui?

Mr. POPPE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Matsamura?

Mr. POPPE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Pakh?

Mr. POPPE. Pakh was an outstanding Communist in the University of the Toilers of the East. If it is the same Pakh or not, I do not know, but I met such a person.

Mr. MORRIS. What nationality was he?

Mr. POPPE. Korean.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a Korean Communist?

Mr. POPPE. A Korean Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the letter be accepted into evidence?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

EXHIBIT No. 438

(Copy of handwritten letter:)

THE KOKUSAI HOTEL,
Seishin Chosen, July 17, 1937.

DEAR BILL: I hope you explained to Shigi that my message was sent in sincere friendship—not to find fault but to inform—Shigi has been such a marvelous friend to me I thought he would feel I was letting him down if I did not signal to him. His representative or representatives may have no alternative in the situation in which they find themselves—but I was able with my limited facilities to check up on some raw inaccuracies and I found people in Manchukuo of all places who knew that the Peiping dispatches were inaccurate.

Tell Elizabeth that here I am in Seishin and they swear that the Siberia *Maru* will come in and go out tomorrow even as she told me the night before I flew to Chengtu.

Owen had a wonderful time with Mao, etc. Owen is in fine form. I had long talks with Peffer in Peiping and Mukden and with Bisson in Peiping. I missed my rendezvous with Wittvogel at Peitako because I left Peiping on an emergency train that went out on a few minutes notice and I had no chance to wire him. He gets more monumental all the time.

If you go to Manchuria see Ludden, the American vice consul in Mukden. (He is eager for contacts.) Tell him I sent you. Get him to introduce you to his Chief Langden. If you go to Hsinking call on all the people in Foreign Affairs Ohashi, Tsutsui, Matsamura and Pakh. Ask questions of as many of them as you can separately.

My time in Mukden and Hsinking was brief but terribly interesting and valuable, but I can't tell you about it here.

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I hope you will get my today's telegram about Nan and Shigi in time to reply before I sail tomorrow at 11 a. m.

Give my love to Doreen—Alice and Ruth are going to Mrs. Cecil Lyon's at Chinwangtao—so you may miss them unless you are already in the north.

Ever affectionately,

EDWARD.

JULY 18.

P. S.—Your wire saying Nan was fine and asking for North China impression came late last evening—I am so glad about Nan—she will enjoy being with you and Doreen—she is a swell girl. I am glad she is being saved the journey through Manchuria. It is certainly gruelling heat just now—give her my love.

As to North China—in a word it is contained in this rough copy of a purely personal letter to Tomo. There was no doubt in the various Embassy circles in Peiping (when I was there) as to the provocative character of the North China garrison's actions.

Now as to the present situation you are in a better position to judge than I. I left on July 14 and events have been moving with rapidity since. Alas, I don't read Japanese so I am cut off here for the news—(I haven't met anyone here who speaks 10 words of English). Peffer was sure (July 16) that China and Japan were in for 3 or 5 years of war. I am hoping a major struggle may still be avoided but it is probably settled now one way or the other. Darien, Mukden and Hsinking were taking their air-raid drill at night with ridiculous seriousness—using it no doubt to whip up the martial spirit.

The Japanese garrison in North China has felt for a long time that it was up to them to take North China—their ideas have been in antithesis to those of ex Foreign Minister Soto. I was shown communiqués for Japanese headquarters in Peiping which were flagrantly inaccurate and must have been intentionally misleading. So many Japanese were unexpectedly killed last week that I am afraid it may be difficult to restrain Japan from an attempt at mass slaughter.

While I was in Peiping the mayor who was active while General Sung was off on his sit-down strike against Japan (on his holiday)—the mayor, who is a good soldier, was active with great wisdom, restraint, and firmness—people thought he was acting with Sung's approval—if so, Sung was acting at that time as a patriot—whether he can continue to so act now that the Japanese have him back in Tientsin I don't know.

You see I am just guessing because I have had no news for 3 days.

Please make a copy of my letter to Tomo and send it to me at Moscow and send a copy by air mail to Kate Mitchell, Hotel Crillon, Paris, but ask her not to circulate it. It is only for you and Kate.

My steamer is in and I must go on board. I'd give a great deal to stay on in China as you are doing, but you and Elizabeth and Owen and Bisson and Peffer and Doreen are all there and only I have this Soviet F. E. chance so it seems up to me to push off.

Love to Doreen.

Ever,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Notes written on side of stationery opposite para. 5, p. 2:)

Sung has wanted to remain in power in the North but he has wanted to be a success—He has done a lot of swell things and some others. He long ago realized that he had more of a future as a Chinese patriot than as Japanese hireling. He is a pretty good soldier, but rather old style and not too intelligent.

(Notes following signature on p. 2:)

Loomis is coming to Tokyo but apparently not to China as he is raising money in and organizing Los Angeles in September and October.

I want him to go to Manila for January and February.

Madrigal—perhaps the richest Filipino, has at last accepted the chairmanship of the Philippine Council—I hope this means that Aforteil?? will accept the Secretaryship and that you can go there for at least a week en route to New Zealand.

Please send the North China Daily News to me for the next 3 weeks to Hotel Metropole, Moscow—then for 2 weeks care Arthur Sweatser?? Geneva. Subscribe for 5 weeks and ask Elizabeth if she can to reimburse you.

Are you going to have it typed into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. It is just 2 pages.

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Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 438" and appears on pp. 2717–2718.)

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a Mr. Borodin?

Mr. POPPE. I never knew him, but he is well known to everybody engaged in far eastern affairs in the Soviet Union. I know about him. He was born in Riga in Russia. He lived in the capital of Latvia and he was wanted by the Far East police because of his revolutionary activities and he escaped to the United States, and in the United States he started and organized an illegal Communist Party school in Chicago, where he trained Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Chicago, you say?

Mr. POPPE. In Chicago, yes. And in 1919 Lenin recalled him and wanted him to do some Comintern work in Moscow. He came and was very soon appointed Sun Yat-sen's adviser and organizer of the Kuomintang Party, and he was also the one who succeeded in merging the Communist Party with the Kuomintang Party, and he succeeded also in creating a left wing in the Kuomintang Party.

After he failed to make the Kuomintang Party completely Communist and Sun Yat-sen died, and Chiang Kai-shek found out about his activities, he was expelled, sent back to Russia, and very soon he fell into disgrace and was never mentioned again.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the last letter I gave you, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a carbon which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated December 11, 1933, and addressed to Miss Lucy Knox, Moscow Daily News, Moscow, U. S. S. R., and is signed W. L. Holland, and at the top it is marked "Copy to O. L."

I will read one paragraph:

We are immensely interested at the office in your pleasant remarks about Borodin, so much so that I am asked by Owen Lattimore, who, as you perhaps know, has been made editor of the new Pacific Affairs, on a quarterly basis, to inquire whether you could discuss with Borodin the possibility of his writing an article for us of five or six thousand words on some aspect of his work in the Chinese Revolution, or on present-day opinion in the Soviet Union on the development of communism in China. If Borodin himself does not wish to write, would it be possible for you to interview him and let us have the article in that form? I do not need to tell you that we really do not mind what the subject is about so long as it has to do with the Pacific in some way. We really are crazy to get something from Borodin.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Poppe, did you know the Moscow Daily News?

Mr. POPPE. I read it sometimes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a Communist publication?

Mr. POPPE. It was a paper in English, published by the Soviets.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a Communist publication?

Mr. POPPE. It was just like Pravda or Izvestia, because all the papers are published by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know whether or not Mr. Borodin in December 1933 was then working for the Communists?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, he was still in the Comintern at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. When did he fall out of the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. It was in about 1937, 1936 or 1937, that he also disappeared.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you receive that letter into the record?

Senator WATKINS. This letter will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 439," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 439

[Copy to OL]

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, December 11, 1933.

Miss LUCY KNOX,
Moscow Daily News, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

MY DEAR LUCY: Doreen and I were greatly cheered to get your charming exposition of latter-day Marxism. I took the liberty of showing it to a number of people in the New York office, to their great enjoyment. I am awfully glad that you are learning, however late in life, a little something about the economic foundations of history. Unfortunately, of course, you are in the wrong country for studying social revolutions, and I should advise you to hurry back to New York as soon as you can in order to witness the last vestiges of capitalism in this country before it is quietly buried under a pile of codes written at Washington by a bevy of young professors from Columbia. I say it in all seriousness because you simply have no realization of the way in which rugged individualism is being maltreated over here. Liquidation of the Kullak was a mere trifle compared to the liquidation of Wall Street by the new boys at Washington.

We are immensely interested at the office in your pleasant remarks about Borodine, so much so that I am asked by Owen Lattimore, who, as you perhaps know, has been made editor of the new Pacific Affairs, on a quarterly basis, to inquire whether you could discuss with Borodine the possibility of his writing an article for us of five or six thousand words on some aspect of his work in the Chinese Revolution, or on present-day opinion in the Soviet Union on the development of communism in China. If Borodine himself does not wish to write, would it be possible for you to interview him and let us have the article in that form? I do not need to tell you that we really do not mind what the subject is about so long as it has to do with the Pacific in some way. We really are crazy to get something from Borodine. The fee for an article in the new regime is $50 but we should probably be prepared to pay $100 for a suitable article directly from Borodine.

The plaintive note in your letter about the shortage of valuta touched us all very deeply, and you may be interested to know that Joe Barnes expects to leave for Moscow in January to spend 4 months or so over there. If you could arrange it, I know he would be more than delighted to use you in some secretarial capacity. Meanwhile Doreen and I will save ourselves the trouble of sending you some useless Christmas present and send a little valuta instead.

I had expected to leave New York by the middle of December and complete the 3 months of my fellowship which are still available by going to Stanford to work under Alsberg before going out to Japan for the rest of 1934. Now that Barnes is going to Russia and Field to London early next year and Mr. Carter, as new General Secretary, is setting off on the first of his world tours in February, I have been ordered to remain in New York during the winter, so that I shall probably go directly out to Japan in the spring. I want, if possible, to remain there for 12 months and produce a colossal book on Japan's tottering economic framework. In the meantime I am struggling desperately to produce a colossal volume on the tottering discussions of the Banff Conference. Lasker and I are again partners in the job, but neither of us is at all happy about it, and, as usual, I am lagging far behind in getting my chapters written. Doreen and I lead a very comfortable and interesting life. We are living about an hour out of town in Westchester County, quite near Lasker's house. We boast of an imposing looking but somewhat defective car and commute in and out quite frequently.

I simply cannot begin to tell you all the news of ourselves and institute folk. You probably know that Loomis is now Conference Secretary and doing something in a vague way about the educational activities of the Hawaii Council; and that Miss Green has announced her resignation at the end of the year. The Keesings, after writing a book on the beastly customs of the mountain tribes in the Philippines, soon to be published in London along with their book on Samoa,

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have gone off to the London School of Economics to do some anthropology under Malinowski. They have also produced a son quite recently, which solved quite a number of problems. Thus far, I have produced nothing except a few misshapen chapters for Problems of the Pacific. It is all very discouraging.

We wish you all kinds of good things, and in particular, we wish you whatever is the proletarian equivalent of a bourgeois Happy Christmas.

Affectionately yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Dihmanshtein?

Mr. POPPE. He was head of the Institute of the National Minorities. It was a Communist school in Russian subjects, but of oriental origin, the Tartars and Mongols and Kalmuks and so on. They got their sort of a high-school education and also party education, and then they were sent to their native places as party secretaries as party organizers, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he an important Communist?

Mr. POPPE. He was a member of the Comintern and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the early 1930's.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Harondar?

Mr. POPPE. No; I don't know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this next document, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of Institute of Pacific Relations, headed, Meeting, April 11, Institute of Nationalities; Dimanshtein, ECC, OL—ECC might be E. C. Carter and OL might be Owen Lattimore—and HM might be Harriet Moore—and Harondar.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Mandel, if the chairman will just receive that into the record, we will not give it any more attention right now.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a list of the people present at that particular meeting.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 440," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 440

MEETING: APRIL 11, INSTITUTE OF NATIONALITIES; DIMANSHTEIN, ECC, OL, HM, HARONDAR

The present institute is an amalgamation of two former institutes—the ethnological institute for the study of minor nationalities, and the Bostoko-begenie Institute for study of economic and social development. The work consists of a study of the history of the minor nationalities, and of their languages. They have postgraduate students who are studying to become specialists. There are 50 of them at present and 60 scientific specialists on the various nationalities. The students come from 20 different nationalities. The institute also publishes books. It has written one of the history of the nationality policy up to the end of the first 5-year plan and is now about to publish one on the first 3 years of the second 5-year plan. Likewise it has published books on various nationalities. Its magazine is Revolution and Nationality, of which Dimanshtein is the editor. The institute is now working on the new alphabets for various nationalities. It likewise has to supervise the work of its affiliated institutions in many of the minorities.

The criterion for judging whether a group is a minor or a major nationality is entirely relative, since every minor nationality is a major nationality in some district. Each one has its own institutions and its own government organs where its language is used.

The minorities in the far eastern district are mostly the small peoples of the north and the Jewish autonomous Oblast. There are schools in all of these districts, but the higher schools and techikums are centralized in Kharbarovsk.

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There are also Koreans in the far eastern district, who use their own language in schools, etc. Many Koreans from Korea come there to study, since the Japanese forbid the use of their language in Korea. There are also many Ukranians and Russians in the Far East, who have their own schools, etc.

In the past few years the results of the use of Latinized Chinese have been very successful. It is much more quickly learned and since most of the Chinese in the far eastern district are workers, they were illiterate, and the new alphabet has been a great aid in abolishing illiteracy. The use of this alphabet has been influential in China itself. They have received publications from Shanghai and other places written in their alphabet, not in the English Latin alphabet. Although there is little difference between the Latinized alphabet used here and the English one, they have found that the use of a few new signs helps with the pronunciation. The newspapers for Chinese in the far eastern district are printed in both Latinized and Chinese alphabet.

The very small tribes which are widely scattered, are beginning to consolidate and to intermix.

In Buriat-Mongolia they use the Latin alphabet for the same reasons that they use it elsewhere—it is quicker to learn. Before 90 percent of the people were illiterate and now only 30 percent are illiterate. They started work on the use of this new alphabet in 1929. In the Mongolian People's Republic, they use both the Latin and the Mongolian alphabet, although the latter predominates.

The students in the institute who come from the minor nationalities almost all go back and work among their own people after finishing their training. This institute is not coordinated with the Institute of Arctic Peoples in Leningrad. That is a higher school, while this one takes students who have already finished a higher school—aspirants. It is true that most of the Arctic tribes live in the far eastern sections.

It is difficult to tell whether some tribes learn more quickly than others. There are great differences between individuals of the same tribe, but to date there have not been enough students from the various tribes to make it possible to generalize. Earlier they used to specialize in art and the social sciences, but now they are beginning to enter the exact sciences. This is probably due to the fact that factories have been built among these peoples.

Dimanshtein is president of Ozet, the organization in charge of the colonization of Jews in Birobidjan. For the past 7 years there has been migration there, but at first there were very few and many returned from there. In the last few years the conditions of living have greatly improved. At first they had to build everything for themselves. The city of Birobidjan had only 600 people and now it has 13,000. According to the present plans this will be made an industrial center of the whole far eastern district. At present the tempo of migration is great. The total population is 62,000 and expect it to be 150,000 very soon. The natural resources of the area are rich. There is coal, minerals, lumber, fish, water power. This year many foreign Jews will be admitted. These will come largely from the United States, Latvia, Poland, and not many from Germany. This is because they will only accept qualified workers. There are not so many in Germany, because there most are intelligensia and would find it difficult to live in Birobidjan. Four years ago about 600 foreign Jews settled there, and about one-half of them have remained. The others went to other parts of the Soviet Union. Those who migrate from within the U. S. S. R. come mostly from the Ukraine, White Russia, and the western districts. At first they accepted anyone who wanted to go, but now that there is no unemployment, they select those who are most qualified to go. The plan at present is to increase agricultural land from 48,000 hectares to 100,000, and to increase the industrial workers to 30,000 or 40,000. The Yiddish language is used, not Hebrew. Few of the Jews know Hebrew. They are now considering having it taught in the higher schools, in connection with study of Jewish history. Birobidjan formerly was uninhabited, because there were no roads into it. Now the population is 33–34 percent Jewish. By the end of the year it will be 40 percent and next year it should be 60 percent. There are some small tribes such as the Tungussi living there, and many Russians. There are very few Jews who came from Palestine. They find that they do not settle permanently. They have a metallurgical and a medical technikum and a pedagogical school. This year they are planning to open a university. They may convert the pedagogical schools into a university.

OL said that it would be interesting to have an article for PA comparing Birobidjan and Palestine in regard to aim, administration, and relation to the other peoples in the locality. Dimanshtein said that he thought this could be done. In Palestine the relations between the Jews and the Arabs is very bad,

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because one represents the ruling peoples. This, of course, can't exist in Birobidjan. There the various nationalities work in the same collectives, etc. in perfect harmony.

In Buriat-Mongolia they are building a large locomotive factory and several meat combinats. The Buriats are becoming industrial workers and transport workers. There are not many minerals in Buriat-Mongolia, but it is near Kuznetsk. Also there are several autonomous districts of other minorities, which have minerals in them. These other peoples are Altai-Turkish peoples, related to people of Tanna-Tuva, rather than to the Mongols.

The course at the institute is a 3-year course. They have a library with a collection of literature, newspapers, and periodicals in many of the languages of the minor nationalities. In the institute itself there are workers in 20 languages of these peoples.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Varga?

Mr. POPPE. He is a very well-known Soviet economist. He was the one who predicted, among other things, a collapse of the capitalist system after World War II. He wrote books and articles on the economic depression imminent in the United States after 1945, but then it did not come true, and he fell in disgrace.

But Stalin, nevertheless, did not let him perish, and he is still the head of the Institute of Economics in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he the director of the Communist Academy?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, he was. And he is also the director of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences, a very important person, a Communist, Hungarian by origin.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he connected with the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. He was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Communist Academy an organization run by the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. No, by the central committee of the Russian Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know of the Institute of Oceanography?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. I knew that was a scientific organization whose head was first Chakalsky, a very famous scholar, who wrote a large book on the ice in the polar seas. And this was a scientific organization and did not have anything in common with communism.

Mr. MORRIS. It did not?

Mr. POPPE. They studied only ocean seas, water, the plants in the waters, and so on and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I believe this document has already been introduced into the record. This is a report of the visit of the secretary-general to Moscow, December 20–31, 1934.

Reference there is made to a visit with Mr. Varga, who was a director of the Communist Academy.

Senator WATKINS. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Losovsky?

Mr. POPPE. Losovsky?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. POPPE. I don't know what Losovsky—but Losovsky was the head of the Russian Information Bureau. He was responsible for the news released for the press.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he have anything to do with the Comintern?

Mr. POPPE. I don't know, but probably. He was the man responsible for the news released for the Soviet press. It was a very responsible job.

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Mr. MORRIS. Have you, Professor Poppe, as a specialist in Mongolian affairs, had an opportunity to read the writings of Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. POPPE. Oh, yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give us the benefit of your observations, based upon your experience in Moscow and your experience in Mongolian affairs, and the writings of Mr. Lattimore with respect to Mongolian affairs?

Mr. POPPE. Two books Mr. Owen Lattimore did, the Mongols of Manchuria, and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China, are interesting books and contain sometimes valuable information. The other books, I was very sorry to state it when I read them, made a very superficial impression upon me—for instance, Solution in Asia, and Situation in Asia, and so on. And what was distressing to me was that Mr. Lattimore discusses so many countries, not having, in my opinion, a foreign knowledge of those countries, for instance, Mongolia. He often writes of Mongolia as a democratic country, a country which has made magnificient progress, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. If I may stop you at that point, Professor, was it, in fact, a country of that description?

Mr. POPPE. No; it was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you comment along those lines for us, please?

Mr. POPPE. This needs explanation. Mongolia was completely wild, a nomadic country in 1919. The new revolutionary people's Government established by the Soviets and supported by the Soviets and getting orders from Moscow has achieved, of course, some positive achievement, such as they established schools, hospitals, and so on. And no matter who establishes schools or hospitals, in my opinion, does a good job, if there were no schools and hospitals before. But this is not the end of this story.

The deportation of the population of the Mongolian Buddhists, Lamaseries, the destruction and the annihilation of the Mongolian Government, the execution of the Mongolian ministers, forced collectivization, the deportation of many people to the Soviet Union, and so on, are rather negative phenomena, I would say.

Therefore, I cannot call such a system a democratic one.

And also here I hope I am right, that Mr. Owen Lattimore is only superficial here, that he did not say this in order to give us a distorted picture.

For instance, in this article, Where Outer and Inner Mongolia Meet on page 34, he says that:

> There have been internal troubles in Outer Mongolia and even attempted rebellion—

probably he was mistaken on this or misinformed. It was not an attempted rebellion. In 1932 the entire population revolted against the Soviets. The Red Mongolian Army and many members of the Mongolian People's Army took the side of the revolters, and this rebellion was suppressed by the Russian Red Army, tanks and aircraft were rushed from Russia to Mongolia, so I cannot call it an "attempted rebellion," it was more than that.

Therefore, it is either superficial, or a distortion of the truth.

And there are also other articles and items where Mr. Owen Lattimore——

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Mr. MORRIS. Before you leave that book, from what did you just read?

Mr. POPPE. Where Outer and Inner Mongolia Meet.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Lattimore wrote that?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that?

Mr. POPPE. It is from Amerasia, volume XI, March-August, 1938, 6 years after that revolt, and 2 years after the execution of the Mongolian Governor by the Soviets.

The members of the Government were people personally known to me.

Senator WATKINS. And you think that is a distorted account?

Mr. POPPE. It is a distorted account. I would not say it was an attempted rebellion.

Senator WATKINS. How would you describe it?

Mr. POPPE. I would say it was a revolt, or it was an overt revolt of the entire population.

Senator WATKINS. But it did not succeed?

Mr. POPPE. It did not succeed. It was more than an attempt.

In many articles we learn that, for instance:

> Soviet Policy in Outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It certainly established a standard with which other nations must compete if they wish to practice a policy of attraction in Asia. The Russian-Mongolian relations in Asia, like Russian-Czechoslovak relations in Europe, deserve careful and respectful study.

I think that the comparison of Mongolians to Czechoslovakia is rather an unfortunate one, because we know what happened in Czechoslovakia, and the same benefits of what has happened in Czechoslovakia are at the present time enjoyed by the Mongols.

Mr. MORRIS. From what did you read there, Professor Poppe?

Mr. POPPE. This comes from Solution in Asia, page 144.

Senator WATKINS. Written by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. POPPE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any further comments?

Mr. POPPE. They are of the same sort, in various other articles.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you make a conclusion based on all of them?

Mr. POPPE. I would say that these are the conclusions—well, it is a little bit difficult to me, because I would not like to say so, but this gives us a greatly distorted picture of Mongolia and the real happenings there. He talks about democracy. Well, the Soviets call their system the most democratic in the world. And in this sense, also, the Mongolian system, the system prevailing in Mongolia, is also democratic.

Senator WATKINS. Because it is on the Soviet pattern?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course; it is Soviet democracy.

So I would add in all of these writings that in Mongolia there is democracy but the Soviet democracy, how the Soviets understand it.

Mr. MORRIS. And you think Mr. Lattimore should apprise his readers of that word if he means it in that connection?

Mr. POPPE. He says simply "democracy." And sometimes he says that the Mongols and other Asians do have the same sense for understanding what democracy is as we have.

In the first place, I know that the Asians love very much property, and a man who lives in democratic conditions, such as in old China,

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but who owned his own herd and sheep and his own field, he felt himself happier than being dependent, and being deprived of them and enjoying democracy alone—with no property.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, the kind of democracy he is describing is actually a democracy in which they did not have private property?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; no property. It was forced collectivism in Mongolia, which resulted in that revolt, sir.

Senator WATKINS. The picture he has shown on this country is not accurate at all?

Mr. POPPE. Not accurate; no. It is not scholarly work. Those two books, they are interesting and valuable books; and those other books are very superficial writings, and give a distorted picture of the realities.

Senator WATKINS. Are they, in effect, pro-Soviet, or favorable to the Soviet Union and its activities?

Mr. POPPE. I think that as Mr. Lattimore had not been in Outer Mongolia at that time when he wrote those books, that he had read all of this in various Soviet papers, and had taken these statements from them.

Senator WATKINS. Rather than from his own observations?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course. This is my feeling.

Senator WATKINS. Then he would be putting into his books the Soviet line?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, of course, and even involuntarily.

Senator WATKINS. Do you mean that he did not do it purposely?

Mr. POPPE. No; I don't know how, but I say only that one who takes his information always only from those papers, he depends greatly upon the ideas expressed in them, so I don't know whether purposely or not.

Senator WATKINS. It would give the American people, then, who read the books, a distorted, completely distorted picture of what was going on?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, a distorted picture.

Senator WATKINS. So it would be more or less favorable to the Soviet line, or the Communist line?

Mr. POPPE. Well, of course, a student who does not know anything—for instance, I remember a young fellow in the University of Washington last year, who wrote a paper on Soviet policies toward the national ties, the national minorities, and he used only Soviet literature. He wrote a paper which was an appraisal of the Soviet System from the very beginning to the end.

That paper was shown to me by one of his professors, and I demonstrated all of the mistakes. I told him, "Well, here, democracy—where did you take this democracy from?"

"Well, it is in such and such a book. It is a Russian book."

"But do you know that this democracy with concentration camps?"

"Well, how could I know? There is nothing about that in the books," he said.

Well, I cannot blame that young fellow of 20 or 21, who got his second-hand information from Russian books.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel has one other document I would like to put into the record here.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

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Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 29, 1939, addressed to Philip C. Jessup, from Edward C. Carter. I will read portions of the letter.

I did not let Molotoff know that I was in Moscow until the day before I left. He sent word that it just happened that every minute was taken that day—

and then further:

After that—a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars of the U. S. S. R., of which he is chairman. He was very anxious to have me see the Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Losovsky.

Lovsovsky is responsible for Asia and the Pacific, and Potemkin is responsible for Europe. As you know, Losovsky has long lived in Paris and has been secretary-general of the International Trade Union Movement. He is mature and informed. He said that whatever decision the Council of the U. S. S. R. of the IPR made with reference to participation in Victoria, would be followed with the closest interest by the Narkomindel——

Mr. MORRIS. What is that?

Mr. POPPE. It is a People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. It is a foreign office.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

which I would realize was precluded by the IPR constitution from taking any formal part in the work of the institute. He felt that Victoria was timely, and asked specifically whether the agenda was to deal with purely academic questions, or whether it was to discuss the contemporary problems arising from the war, in the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same Mr. Losovsky about whom you have testified?

Mr. POPPE. Yes. He became, later on during the war, he was appointed chief of the press information, and he formulated always the records from France and foreign news. Formerly he was head of that section of the foreign office.

Mr. MANDEL. May I read one other sentence here:

Losovsky is familiar with many of the institute studies, and is following the work of the institute closely. He indicated that in his capacity as a private citizen of the Soviet Union he hoped that the work and the program of the institute would continue to grow. Half of our long conversation was with reference to the work of the institute and the other half with reference to the world situation.

Mr. MORRIS. May that also be received in evidence?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received as a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 441" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 441

(Penciled notation:) Please return to RDC.

CARLSON COURT,
Pall Mall Place, London S. W. 1, June 29, 1939.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR JESSUP: My report on Moscow will have to reach you piecemeal owing to pressure of engagements in Amsterdam, London, and Paris. This report will deal with Miss Moore's monograph on Soviet policy in the Far East. I must confess that I arrived in Moscow with a large measure of uncertainty as to what the attitude of the Soviet Council would be to a member of the secretariat writing on Soviet far eastern policy. Without mentioning the author or the character of the contents I opened this section of our agenda by saying that we wished him* to criticize a (*Motilev) manuscript which a member of the secretariat had

* Penciled notation.

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written. He immediately said that was unnecessary and was exceedingly reluctant to do so because of his cablegram to the Princeton conference he had wanted to make it clear that the very essence of the institute as an international organization was that members of the International Secretariat should have complete academic freedom.

I then mentioned that Miss Moore was the author of the manuscript. He was very reluctant to make criticisms because he was afraid that this might be regarded in other countries as a retraction of the U. S. S. R.'s sincere commitment to academic freedom on the part of the Secretariat. I finally persuaded him, however, to read the manuscript. He said that he still favored its publication as Miss Moore's work as a member of the International Secretariat but still hesitated to make the criticism that Miss Moore so eagerly wanted from him. Finally, I got him to promise to make a careful critique, but this he only consented to do if he could send his criticism informally to her rather than as an institute communication.

I am convinced that Motylev's attitude in this matter was evidence of the deepening confidence in the value of the institute and a desire deeper than ever before to find ways and means of strengthening the work of the institute throughout the world.

At the present time he gets the most cooperation between councils from the American Council first and the Australian Council second. A very voluminous interchange of correspondence and services is now going on with the Australian Institute.

The Soviet Council has budget provisions for sending three members to Victoria. They are also endeavoring to secure additional money from the cooperating societies so as to increase their national contribution to the Pacific Council from $2,500 to the $3,000 which the budget committee and the finance committee suggested at Princeton.

They are perfectly willing to send their manuscripts for the Inquiry for editing and publication in New York. In fact, Motylev said that he hoped in editing their manuscripts the Secretariat would bear in mind that the Soviet method of expression was sometimes more vigorous than the best English usage and that the Secretariat in its editorial work would exercise full freedom in presenting the facts in such a way as to carry the greatest weight with English-speaking groups.

Not simply because of the purge but because of a nation-wide effort to increase efficiency in academic as well as in industrial and governmental work, a number of changes have been made in the personnel in the constituent scientific and other institutions that together make up the Soviet Council. In view of these changes it is necessary for Motylev and Voitinsky to reeducate some of the new officials of the various constituent societies so that they may be brought up-to-date fully with reference to the importance of Soviet participation in Victoria. Once this has been achieved the November date does not offer any insuperable obstacle in itself to Soviet participation.

Motylev's large monograph on Soviet events and policies in the Far East and concurrent relations of the Soviet Union to the other countries will be, he hopes, finished by the end of July. He is giving an enormous amount of time to it. It will be an elaboration and extension of his little book of contradictions which was written for a small popular audience. The 10,000 copies of the first edition have already been sold out. Voitinsky is working hard on his paper but is under such exceptional pressure that he is not absolutely certain that he can complete it in time for Victoria. It would be offered as a post-Victoria Inquiry document.

In connection with the international research committeee's program on the standards of living, Markus, the very able head of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science, is working on the Soviet standard of living. I had the privilege of an afternoon conference with him and half a dozen of the departmental heads in the institute of economics. They strike me as an exceptionally gifted group. The institute as a whole has a personnel of 130. Seventy are highly qualified research workers, the remaining 60 are engaged in clerical and routine statistical work. Markus was for sometime the Soviet member of the staff of the International Labour Office where in Geneva he was regarded as first rate.

I also had an afternoon discussion with the academician E. S. Varga, the supreme head of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Science. He has

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been charged with making a thorough analysis of various regions of the Soviet Union from the standpoint of their all-round development to serve as the basis for the fuller utilization of all natural and labor resources and bringing industry nearer to the source of raw materials and the distribution of consumption. He has just completed a draft of a program of research for the third 5-year plan in which not only members of the Academy of Science but also local societies all over the Union will cooperate. This program involves a large number of scientific expeditions which are leaving this month for all parts of the Soviet Union. Varga is also responsibly related to the Institute of World Politics and World Economics in which Voitinsky, the Soviet member of the international research committee of the IPR is so actively engaged. Voitinsky, as you know, has a long background in China. He first attended Sun Yat-sen's lectures in Canton in 1920. If I remember rightly Voitinsky was in the Tsarist prison in Kamchatka at the time of the revolution where he led a prison uprising which was successful and within a few weeks at the age of 21 he was Lenin's Governor General of Kamchatka. In him we find a happy combination of the man of affairs and the very qualified scholar.

On my arrival Motylev and Voitinsky asked whether I thought we could get through our joint program of IPR and general discussion if 2 hours each day for 5 days were assigned for the purpose. I replied in the affirmative but the discussions became of such mutual advantage that we averaged 5 or 6 hours together each day during my visit.

These long conversations, visits to two of the latest movies and to the opera and ballet, together with correspondence with China and Japan pretty well filled up my time. I did, however, have the opportunity of useful conversations with Grummon, the chargé of the American Embassy, with Sir William Seeds, the British Ambassador, who with Sir William Strang was in the midst of carrying on long, protracted London-Moscow conversations with Molotoff, the new Foreign Minister of the U. S. S. R., with Yui Ming, until lately chargé of the Chinese Embassy, and who with Sun Fo were the principal Chinese negotiators in the Sino-Soviet trade pact which was signed on June 18, with Hrdlicka, of the Smithsonian, who is hoping to go shortly to Soviet shores opposite the Aleutian Islands to continue his investigation of the means by which the ancestors of the North American Indian passed from Asia to America. On his last expedition he satisfied himself that the journeys were not by land. They must have been by kayaks. He believes that if the Polynesians could travel hundreds of miles in uncharted seas, the people of northeastern Asia who are still excellent boatmen could do the same. Contrary to my practice on former visits, I spent no time with the foreign correspondents. I did, however, see Denny, of the New York Times. Among foreigners whom I saw, Bohlen of the American Embassy staff seemed to be the best and most objectively informed on the Soviet Union. He, as well as Grummon, who was for years in Dairen, should, I think, be considered for membership in the American council. Knowing how correct the U. S. S. R. IPR Council is with reference to the strictest separation of their activities and those of the Narkomindel, I did not let Molotoff know that I was in Moscow until the day before I left. He sent word that it just happened that every minute was taken that day (Sir William Seeds and Sir William Strang). After that, a meeting of the Council of Peoples Commissar of the U. S. S. R., of which he is chairman. He was very anxious to have me see the Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Losovsky.

[(Penciled notation:] MRT—Note.)

Losovsky is responsible for Asia and the Pacific and Potemkin is responsible for Europe. As you know Losovsky has long lived in Paris and has been secretary general of the international trade-union movement. He is mature and informed. He said that whatever decision the Council of the U. S. S. R. of the IPR made with reference to participation in Victoria would be followed with the closest interest by the Narkomindel which I would realize was precluded by the IPR constitution from taking any formal part in the work of the institute. He felt that Victoria was timely and asked specifically whether the agenda was to deal with purely academic questions or whether it was to discuss the contemporary problems arising from the war in the Far East. I told him that I believed that 90 percent of the discussion would be on these contemporary problems but that I hoped the temper of the discussions would be 100-percent academic. Losovsky is familiar with many of the institute studies and is following the work of the institute closely. He indicated that in his capacity as a private citizen of the Soviet Union he hoped that the work and program of the institute would continue to grow. Half of our long conversation was with reference to the work of the institute and the other half with reference to the world situation.

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On the evening of June 25, Motylev gave a Soviet IPR dinner attended in addition to himself and Voitinsky by Krushinitsky, head of the U. S. S. R. Chamber of Commerce (this chamber which is more interested in science and education than the chambers in other countries has been represented in the Soviet IPR from the start), Constantine Soushchak of the Institute of Economics and Politics of the Academy of Science, this institute has also been represented in the Soviet IPR from the start, and Miss Schapova who acted as my interpreter throughout my 5 days. It so happened that though she was an exceptional interpreter her services were rarely necessary. She accompanied Lindbergh as his interpreter throughout all of his flights and visits and the occasion of his last trip to the Soviet Union. She happened to interpret for him on the occasion when he affirmed to a large audience that the United States and the U. S. S. R. led the world in aviation. (I may pass on this remark to Lord Halifax who has asked me to lunch tomorrow.)

I regret to say that there were not enough hours in the day to permit my calling on either Litvinoff or Troyanovsky, both of whom are still in polite society. For Bill Holland's benefit I might say that Markus' standard-of-living study, according to Markus, will not be ready until the end of the year. On relating this Motylev said that he would bring great pressure on Markus to complete it in time to be submitted to the International Research Committee at Victoria. Motylev is eager to have it included in the regular international research series of the secretariat.

At the outset I said this letter could only be a very partial report of my Soviet visit. My notebook is full of intrinsically more important material than is contained in this letter. Furthermore, on the institutional side I have much to report to Lattimore, Holland, Field, and to some of the other national councils. On the personal side Motylev could not have made more satisfactory arrangements for my comfort and the efficiency of my visit. The Soviet members vied with the Dutch in interrogation with reference to my observations in Tokyo, Chungking, Bangkok, Allahabad, and Itarsi.

Every detail of my visit was arranged with efficiency and clocklike promptness. Having been flown by ace Dutch pilots from Bangkok all the way to Stockholm in Douglas DC–3's I wondered how the Soviet pilots would compare. To my private satisfaction and inward calm I could discover absolutely no difference in their handling of Douglas DC–3's on the outward journey Stockholm, Riga, Velikilukei, Moscow, and the return journey with the same stops. Just as the Dutch pilots on the long swing from Batavia to Amsterdam reached Amsterdam a little ahead of time so the Soviet pilots on each of the two fairly long but nevertheless shorter journeys reached their destination ahead of time. I have now added to my flying experience my having been flown by German, British, Dutch, Soviet, and Danish pilots.

I fear that the rest of my report on the Soviet Union will have to wait until my return.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—I saw innumerable new workmen's apartment houses in Moscow and also spent 2 hours wandering alone in the worst slums. I did manage an hour also at the Museum of Western Art.

Mary Pickford and her new husband arrived at my hotel 2 days before I left, but I succeeded in leaving Moscow unscathed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had Professor Poppe here today because with his experience in Moscow, and his specialty in Mongolian languages, he is one of the few people in the country who can comment and testify on some of the documents that have come before us in our extensive studies.

Senator WATKINS. How long have you been in the United States?

Mr. POPPE. Three years, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Were you a Russian citizen?

Mr. POPPE. I was a Russian citizen before; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were captured by the Germans, were you not?

Mr. POPPE. Yes, I was; in 1942. I came to Germany and from Germany to the United States.

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Senator WATKINS. You did not leave directly from Russia to come here?

Mr. POPPE. Yes; I came from Germany—in 1942 from Russia to Germany, and in 1949 from Germany to the United States.

Senator WATKINS. What was your last period of service as an educator in Russia?

Mr. POPPE. In 1942, a few days before the capture of that area by the Germans.

Mr. MORRIS. What area was that?

Mr. POPPE. Mikoyan Shakhar in northern Caucasia. They revolted, and there was no escape from those areas, because the entire population revolted against the Soviets.

Senator WATKINS. I was wondering if you had left Russia with the consent of the Russians, or were permitted to leave, and I understand now that you got out the other way. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much, Professor.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess, subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p. m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 5:20 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Homer Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order. Do you have a witness, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. We have Mr. William Mandel.

Senator FERGUSON. This is an open hearing. Will you see that the door is marked as such?

Mr. Mandel, will you raise your right hand?

You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM MARX MANDEL, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FORER, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. William Mandel, will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. William Marx, M-a-r-x, Mandel, with one "l," M-a-n-d-e-l. My address is 545 West One Hundred and Sixty-fourth Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Sir, due to the black list resulting from the activities of this committee and others, I am not able to pursue my occupation as a writer and researcher and translator, so I am trying to make a living as a furniture merchant.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. William Mandel, have you heard the testimony before this committee that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That has been brought to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you, in fact, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must refuse to answer that question under my privilege of the fifth amendment against testifying against myself.

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Mr. MORRIS. Can you reconcile that answer that you have given to that question, Mr. Mandel, with your statement which you have just made, that due to the fact that you have been blacklisted by this committee—precisely what do you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you make a further explanation as to what you mean by being blacklisted? Certainly this committee has issued no blacklist.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The committee has not, sir, but the climate of opinion that has developed in the past several years around persons who have written for an organization which this committee is presently investigating, this subcommittee, and the climate of opinion that has arisen in connection with persons who, as I do, deem it possible to live in the same world with the Soviet Union, at peace, that climate of opinion, to which I believe the conduct of this subcommittee and others has contributed, has made it impossible for persons such as myself to earn a livelihood in our accepted professions.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment, Mr. Mandel. You say that this committee, by questioning subversive activities in the United States in open hearings, when people are under oath, make it impossible for a man who comes before it and says that he refuses to answer questions on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate him, as to whether or not he was or is or ever was a Communist—first, can you say that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir. I will expand, if you would like it.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would. That is what these hearings are open for. We want an explanation as to why you think that this committee as a congressional committee should not go into the facts, to ascertain whether or not there are Communists in the Government or in organizations that are trying to influence our Government when we are in this cold war with communism, and in a hot war with communism.

Mr. MORRIS. You understand, Mr. Mandel, that you were asked to come here today to be given an opportunity to deny the fact that you were a member of the Communist Party, in accordance with open testimony?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I did not know why I was asked to come here, but, along the lines of the questioning or discussion that has proceeded thus far, it is of interest that long before anyone referred to me as ever having allegedly been a member of the Communist Party, the general climate of opinion—and I can give a specific instance if you care to have it—was such, that persons, not only myself, but others, who have not been called before this committee, but persons who have not made any secret of their belief that we and the Russians can live at peace in the same world together, with a certain amount of give and take on both sides, such persons have found it impossible to go on getting remunerative employment in the fields in which they were previously recognized.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Mandel, there is a lot of difference in being a Communist and one who says that we ought to be able to live in one world with the Russians.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I know of nobody on this committee who has questioned the right of any person to believe or to advocate that we

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can live in this world with Russia. That does not say that they are Communists. That is an entirely different thing.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. But, I think it is difficult——

Senator FERGUSON. Is that where you claim you stand? Do you claim that you have been harmed by virtue of the fact that you have advocated the proposition that America and Russia should be able to live in one world?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Precisely, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me say, as far as I know, nothing has ever been said in this committee in derogation of that right.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, sir, to the degree that I am informed of the testimony thus far, and I have read a good deal of it quite carefully, of the witnesses called, the line of questioning pursued—I am not referring to any particular questioner, I am referring to this testimony—has been such, and particularly in the over-all events of the past year, as to indicate that anybody who does not believe that we ought to go to war with China is a Communist. That is my interpretation of the testimony and the questions with regard, for example, to gentlemen like Mr. Lattimore, with regard to a number of other people before the group, and with regard to the charges made by a number of the other witnesses.

Mr. MORRIS. You must concede, Mr. Mandel, that the only question that has been put to you today, or at least the only one I put to you, was: Were you, in fact, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And anything further than that was further questioning on the part of the chairman, supplemented by myself, and you were asked to explain your present attitude, and the charges you made voluntarily, before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. You started in by charging the committee with blacklisting you, and that is what I wanted an explanation of.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, let me be specific.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask you this question, and then I will let you be specific: Do you believe that the Soviet Government has done its utmost to live in a world with America in an amicable way?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. One could also expand on that at length.

Senator FERGUSON. Expand on that at length.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. All right. I think there have been mistakes on both parts, but I believe that in proposing to reduce armaments by one-third across-the-board, and which we have not accepted, and proposing to outlaw the atom bomb cold, which we have not accepted, and they have proposed inspections, and they said we could go in there any time and they can come in here at any time to inspect——

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that communism, even after they would say that you could inspect, would allow you to go within its borders and make an actual inspection?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is an interesting question, sir, and I can answer with this comment: That Mr. Walter Lippmann, who no one has ever accused of being a Communist or anything close to it, offered the opinion in one of his columns a year or two ago, which I would be glad to provide to this committee, that the reason for our representatives in the UN proposing inspections was that they were absolutely certain that the United States Senate would never agree to permit Russians to come poking around our installations here.

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Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute, you have not answered my question.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would answer that I think they would. That is simply my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that Communists would allow that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think that they would; that is a matter of opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that the history of communism would allow America and the free nations to rely upon the words "Well, we will allow inspections"?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. May I illustrate that?

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe it was in Time magazine, about a month or two ago, that a British banker was reported at length on his wanderings around certain parts of Russia. They did not permit him to go everywhere—there was no such agreement of the kind that we are here hypothetically discussing—and he reported primarily in an unfavorable way on the standard of living and various other things. That is one instance of recent free poking around.

There was a delegation recently of British Quakers, headed by a very wealthy, prominent businessman, Mr. Cadbury, of the Cadbury Chocolate interests, who also went to Russia, visited many places, and had conversations at length. I do not mean to imply at all that anybody can go over there at any time that he wants to, and see what he wants to.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been in Russia?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I have.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any restrictions placed on you?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. None whatsoever?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that the United States has done its utmost in trying to live with the Soviet powers amicable in this world?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir. Specifically, we pledged to demilitarize Germany and Japan. We are now remilitarizing them. We have just indicated—and when I say "We," I am speaking of the United States Government—an intention to go back on our word—that's the only language I can use—given at the Yalta Conference, which was a conferenoe at which our country was represented by its Chief of State, relative, in this particular case, to the island of Sakhalin, to the Korea islands, and to certain other holdings, and we have made peace with many of the men who were the chief enemies of our country during the last war, and I don't think that can win the confidence of a country that lost by its own estimate, 7,000,000 dead, and by the estimate of most other people, a great many more dead than that.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you this question: In case of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whom would you support?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. If our country were attacked, I would fight for my country.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, you personally would determine whether or not Russia had attacked America?

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Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say, sir, that that is, as Mr. Roosevelt used to say, a very "iffy" question. I simply cannot envisage that kind of situation.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot envisage that? You cannot envisage the Soviet powers attacking America?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That's correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you believe that communism does not believe in aggression against capitalism?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say that it is because I believe in terms of their record, that that has not been their record.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say, then, about the attack on Poland, at the time of the pact with Hitler?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Mr. Churchill, whose love for communism is well known, commented at that time that it was in the interests of Russia's defense against a German attack that she stand upon that line. That is the first thing.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the attack on Finland?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. If you will review the United States Army training film, Battle of Russia, you will find that the United States Army explained to its troops that the Russian attack on Finland was part of the procedure of protecting its frontiers against the attack from Germany that was expected.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote that; do you know?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the attack of the North Koreans on the South Koreans?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Sir, I have yet to have it satisfactorily explained to me why John Foster Dulles, the American diplomatic representative to South Korea, and our chief military man, were photographed in what was described in the New York Times the next day, the front-line trenches, 2 days before the war began.

Senator FERGUSON. I was in Korea in 1949 in December. Suppose I would have visited the front-line trenches of the South Koreans. I was at Suwon, which is thirty-some miles south of the dividing line.

On Saturday afternoon, the military authorities put on a parade, a review of their military. Do you think that if the war had started then, it would have indicated that America had something to do with the starting of the war?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would not like to impugn your intentions, no, sir; I can only say that at the time you were there, in 1949, and I would be glad to provide the committee with this document, the Minister of the Interior, I believe, Interior or Armed Forces, of South Korea stated to the New York Herald Tribune—it was published in the New York Herald Tribune—that he had been wanting to attack North Korea to settle the matter in that way and that the Americans had constantly told him, "No, not yet." The question in my mind—I was not in Korea in 1950 and I don't know—is as to whether that "Not yet" ever became "Now."

Senator FERGUSON. And you think that the fact that Mr. Dulles and someone else was up with the South Korean soldiers a few days before, indicated that the time had come, the "not yet" had arrived, at the time when they were instructed to attack or permitted to attack?

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Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, sir, General MacArthur in his testimony before a committee of the Senate last year, stated that at the time of the beginning of that conflict, the North Korean troops were disposed for defense in depth, with the bulk of their troops 100 miles north of that frontier. That was his testimony, based on his Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the South Koreans?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The North Koreans. They were 100 miles north of this frontier.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand, then, that you believe that the South Koreans attacked the North Koreans?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think there is that distinct possibility, in this situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think, then, that there is the possibility that Russia has nothing to do with this attack, if the North Koreans did attack?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Since I am not willing to grant as at all proven that the North Koreans did attack, I am in no position to comment on Russia. The North Koreans are certainly fighting with Russian arms. That goes without saying.

Senator FERGUSON. Your opinion is the South Koreans did the attacking?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say there is a good chance of that, but I was not there.

Senator FERGUSON. But that is your judgment?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would offer that as my judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the Yalta agreement was a good agreement?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I certainly do. I think it was entirely to the interests of the United States in every respect.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you shoulder arms against Red China?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. If Red China attacked us, which is an utter impossibility, I certainly would.

The very question indicates to me what I said earlier about the purpose of some of the persons doing the questioning before this committee, in seeking to create an atmosphere in which anybody who opposes war with China is shut up. Obviously China cannot attack.

Senator FERGUSON. We are letting you talk.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am sorry.

Senator FERGUSON. And I want you to talk. And now I want to ask you this question: Do you think that with the American troops fighting against the North Korean troops, with the Red Chinese soldiers moving in to North Korea, they did not attack America?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. You are speaking now of the Red Chinese?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. To which I reply that if the Red Chinese had moved to within the same distance within Canada or Mexico as we did in Korea, we would be entirely justified in moving into Canada and Mexico.

Senator FERGUSON. It is still aggression.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't think so, no, sir. We have established bases thousands of miles from our frontiers, all over the world.

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Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, you believe that in this fighting in Korea, the North Koreans and the Red Chinese and the Russians, who are furnishing at least the matérial, are justified?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. In the first place, I do. In the second place, I think that the important thing today is to end the thing before it gets us all into it, rather than to argue out questions, to which, at best, I can offer an opinion only, not having been there, as I stated earlier, and anyone else can also offer an opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you settle that? You say they were justified? How would you settle it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Stop the fighting tomorrow where we are and settle all other questions afterward.

Senator FERGUSON. And move out?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Stop the fighting where we are, and then let our side and their side argue the thing out. Let the negotiators get stomach ulcers, so we don't kill any more men.

Senator FERGUSON. But then, would you move out?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say that that depends upon the good will and the proposals of both sides from that point on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you have not answered the quesion I put to you before. Would you shoulder arms against Red China?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. If Red China attacked us, which is an utter impossibility, I would shoulder arms against Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you shoulder arms if you were asked tomorrow by the United States in the present set of circumstances which now exists?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. What is the question?

Senator FERGUSON. What is your age?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. My age is 34.

Senator FERGUSON. The question was: If you were asked to go to war tomorrow in the Korean theater, with the United States troops, would you go?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I will obey the laws of my country.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would go?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would go.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you have written some books that have been sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations, have you not?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the extent to which your books have been sponsored by the Institute?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I wrote a book called The Soviet Far East and Central Asia. I believe the date of the publication in printed form was 1944. I believe that it appeared in mimeographed form either the previous year or 1942. Your information might be even more exact than mine on that; and that is the book that I wrote for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. You also made a speech, did you not, at the Eighth IPR Conference?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir; I was never at any IPR conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an expert in foreign relation matters?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Those who have employed me to do this work apparently thought that I was.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Far East?

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Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Primarily on Russia, but since this particular work regarding Russia and the Far East came along, that is how the connection arose.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your educational background?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Public schools in New York City, high school in New York City, one semester of biochemistry at the age of 14 in Moscow University, 1 year of engineering at City College thereafter, 1 year of a fellowship at postdoctoral level. They based this on the work I had done—I had no degree—at the Hoover Institute, of Stanford University, in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a knowledge of what communism is?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I could hardly pretend to be something of an expert on Russia without having some knowledge of what communism is.

Senator FERGUSON. I wonder whether you read the first article by Whitaker Chambers in the Saturday Evening Post?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I scanned through it; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say about that article, on the description as to what communism is, and is not?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am afraid that I would have to study it thoroughly before——

Senator FERGUSON. You would want to comment?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Before I would want to comment; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was a fair explanation as to what communism is?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I said I would have to study it more fully.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what communism is? You have said that we ought to be able to get along with it.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That we have not done our share in trying to get along with it. You think Russia has?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is communism?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think it is essentially a system under which what they call the means of production, factories, mills, mines, raw materials, railroads, banks, become public property——

Senator FERGUSON. That is the economic side of it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That's the economic side of it. And that the Government is run in the interests of those who are called proletarians, industrial wage workers, to prevent any return of what they term exploitation.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you believe that they believe in the wiping out of those who are opposed to that system?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. You speak of physical wiping out?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not they have prison camps in Russia?

Mr. MANDEL. The Soviet Union has a penal system, undoubtedly.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that they did?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Wipe people out?

Senator FERGUSON. Wipe people out.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Sir, I happened to be in Russia in the year 1931, and 1932, which has been described—and I think that it is an

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accurate description—no one seems to disagree with it, as perhaps the toughest years but one, economically speaking, under the present regime, since their civil war of 1918–20, and the year in which this process of collectivization of farming was very intense.

I learned the Russian language when I got there. I did not know it previously.

Senator FERGUSON. You now speak and write and read it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I write poorly; I read it fluently, and speak it very well. I learned the language when I got over there, but the physical appearance apparently does not correspond to any particular nationality, and so, when I had dressed as a Russian, nobody took me for anything else. Here was the capital city of the nation, a city which is more comparable to Chicago, in its reflection of the country at large, than is Washington or New York City in our own country. People came in and out all the time. I went out to buy milk from the peasants who came into town.

The peasants asked me questions. There were some beggars on the streets. They were usually peasant people, judging by their clothing, but never in the year that I was there—and this is the year that is described by others, as this time of terrible imprisonment, persecution, deaths, and what have you—was there any indication in any of these contacts which one has wandering around a city, and principally out of curiosity, of this kind of procedure.

I will not question that some—how many, I don't know, and I frankly don't think anybody knows—that some of the recalcitrants employing peasants—the kulaks, as they were called—were deported to certain areas and jailed; but, as to this matter of mass murder, there was not that atmosphere of any kind in the country.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not there are slave-labor camps in Russia?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. There are penal camps.

Senator FERGUSON. Not slave labor?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Not slave-labor camps.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many people who started out with the present Russian Soviet Government were killed?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. It's 35 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Or committed suicide?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. A number have. It's 35 years.

Senator FERGUSON. How many would you say were killed, who were known as leaders in that movement under the movement itself, by those who were coleaders?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think we would have to say at which level we are discussing this.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at the top level.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, I can think of two at the very top level, a man named Zinoviev and a man named Kamenev.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were they killed?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. According to testimony given at a trial attended by Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, and which with the experience of 20 years as a lawyer he felt was legitimate testimony, these men were guilty of treason, and their country's laws provided for execution for treason.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you familiar with what was known as the trials in Russia, about 1937?

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Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. From reading.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think about those?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is the group of trials to which I have reference.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that they were merely carrying out the criminal laws of Russia, that they were fair, and that they were fair trials?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is the testimony of our Ambassador to our Secretary of State as published in his book Mission to Moscow, issued with the approval of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You are basing your judgment on that statement?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am basing my judgment in part on that statement and in the full text of the testimony at those trials.

Senator FERGUSON. From the text, you came to the same conclusion?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I come to that conclusion, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I show you what purports to be a conference report, Secretariat Paper No. 1, which Mr. Mandel will identify as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BENJAMIN MANDEL. This is a mimeographed copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "The Soviet Far East," by William Mandel, research associate, American-Russian Institute, eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, Canada, December 1942, Secretariat Paper No. 1, international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, October 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. William Mandel, I will ask you to tell us what you know about that report.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I will identify it, judging by its appearance. I cannot go through the 56 pages offhand; but, judging from its appearance, it is the report that I wrote at that time.

I just want to make it clear that the identification of my connection does not connect this organization here [indicating].

Senator FERGUSON. What is the organization?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I was identified here as research associate of the American-Russian Institute. The conclusion might be drawn from the reading that this is in some way connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. And the other is the international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations.

How does it come that both of those names are on that cover?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Well, one was my position.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was your position, research associate, American-Russian Institute?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir; that was my position.

Senator FERGUSON. And how did the other name—international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York—get on it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That organization asked me to write this report, and they published the other to identify me.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is no misquotation on this paper?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir. My point simply was that, in a way, the way it was read, one might get the idea that the one organization was a part of the other. That was the only reason for my explanation.

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Senaor FERGUSON. I think that is clear; that they are not the same organization.

Mr. MORRIS. For whom did you prepare that report?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. For the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Who requested you to do it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't recall exactly; probably Mr. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed the project?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. How much was spent on that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't know. Your file will probably give the information.

Mr. MORRIS. How much money did you receive from the institute?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Same thing; it was 10 years ago. The sum was not large, and you probably have the figure there, and I would be happy to verify it.

Senator FERGUSON. About how much was it? Was it an expensive job?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No; I would say it was not an expensive job.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it $500?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would guess that it was in that vicinity. I am speaking of payment to me, not any other expenses.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Did you attend the conference itself?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You prepared the paper for submission to the conference?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. But you yourself did not attend?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Did not attend.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you prepare a pamphlet entitled "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia"?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That was a book.

Mr. MORRIS. A book, then?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is this book [indicating]?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Correct.

Mr. MORRIS. This bears the name "The Soviet Far East" by William Mandel. That is the same as "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia"?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe the inside title page will show the full title. I believe it is the same.

Mr. MORRIS. Who published that book?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The Institute of Pacific Relations and a private publisher, Dial Press.

Mr. MORRIS. Who requested you to undertake that project?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Essentially that project is this one expanded [indicating].

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the first document?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes; this second one is the first document, expanded.

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Mr. MORRIS. This is a publication dated 1944, and the Mont Tremblant Conference was 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is correct, but I think the contents of the 56 pages here are virtually identical with several chapters of the other book.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the IPR finance this second project?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't think so. Again, if your records show differently, I would be glad to verify it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they go over this, criticize it, and approve it, reject it, or what?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I assume they did.

Senator FERGUSON. It must have been satisfactory to them, to put it out under this label, because they say "Copyright, 1944, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations."

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say it was satisfactory, within their framework of seeking a variety of opinions. They have had books by people who would undoubtedly differ with me 100 percent in probably everything I say in there.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that this pamphlet and this book were pro-Soviet?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say that they represented my honest opinion of the truth about the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But were they pro-Soviet?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't think that the truth is pro or anti.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think it was pro; it was merely as you saw it?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That's correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not trying to be pro-Soviet were you?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you read the testimony of Mr. Budenz, given this committee concerning you?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe I have. You may want to refresh my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. This is page 662 of the public hearings, part II:

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. William Mandel, Mr. Budenz?
Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him to be a Communist?
Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I have met him both at the headquarters of the Communist Party and also up at the offices of the Soviet Russia Today, or, yes, Soviet Russia Today.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him to be a Communist of long standing, Mr. Budenz?
Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he is a well-versed Communist.

Is that accurate testimony?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am afraid that I have got to refuse to answer under the privilege granted be by the fifth amendment, not to testify against myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Mandel, you said that you were blacklisted by this committee and others. You have now been given the opportunity to deny what at least one man said, Mr. Budenz. Is that not correct?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I will now give you the privilege to deny what anyone has said on this record or to this committee as to your being a Communist or a pro-Communist or a card-carrying Communist, or a left winger, or anything else.

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Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The only person before this committee who made any such charge was Mr. Budenz.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. So you decline.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am sorry to say—and I can assure you that I would much prefer to discuss the matter differently, but I am sorry to say that, on advice of counsel, I have given my answer to this question.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Do you believe that the Smith law, under which the 11 Communists were indicted and tried, is a good law?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. May I consult with my counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(The witness conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. My answer is that it is not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not a good law?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is an improper law?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. It goes counter to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, and, what is more important than that, I think it is very bad for this country to have any legislation that tends to restrict people's expressions of opinions in any way, on the books.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that the 11 men that were tried in New York in the Federal court under that law had a fair trial under the law?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. My reply, sir, is that I do not, and I have one very specific reason for thinking so, among others, and that is that the grand-jury system, the jury system, as such there—I live there and I am not unfamiliar with these things—the juries are so selected as to weight the juries disproportionately against working people, Negroes, and members of other minorities, and since these men put themselves forward as defending the rights of working people, Negroes, and other minorities, it is obvious that they might have expected, or might have had some reason to expect, a different kind of verdict if such people had been on this jury.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you in any way contribute to that trial, any funds, or anything?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must again refuse to answer, under the privilege granted me in the fifth amendment of the Constitution, not to testify against myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked to contribute in any way to the Hiss trial—Alger Hiss?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contribute?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you contributed to any other trials? I am excluding the Communists' trial. You refused to answer in relation to the 11 Communists.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I would say I probably have.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you give us the names of them?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes. There was a trial recently of Dr. W. E. B. DuBois and his associates. If my memory serves me correctly, I made some contribution to that.

Senator FERGUSON. What were they charged with?

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Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. My memory is that they were charged with failure to register under the foreign agents' registration law. They were acquitted, or the charge was dropped.

Senator FERGUSON. You said that you believed that the Russian trials of 1937, the purge trials, so-called, were fair, and the trial of the 11 Communists was unfair. Do you believe that the Soviet judicial system is superior to the United States of America judicial system?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is a very bland question.

I would say that I am quite keenly aware, and I say in writings of mine, of miscarriages of justice under the Soviet judicial system, and I am quite confident more of them have occurred than I have personally read about.

Senator FERGUSON. So, you do not care to pass upon which is superior?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir; I don't. I think that each country works out its own judicial system in accordance with its own history.

Senator FERGUSON. But, as to the particular trials you mentioned, you thought one was fair and the other was unfair?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I gave my answer on those; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to add anything more to your statement here?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had a fair day in court here?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I certainly have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Mandel just about this article.

You wrote a letter to the New York Times that appeared on the editorial page on October 29, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I did, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write that at the request of anybody?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read one paragraph from that letter, please?

Mr. BENJAMIN MANDEL (reading):

> If the IPR is guilty of something or other because it sponsored or publicized my work, then so are all the others listed above, which makes everybody out of step but McCarran and McCarthy. If the dicta of that group are permitted to stand, and if the Federal and State Governments are not influenced to drop the prosecutions of Dr. W. E. B. DuBois and Prof. Dirk Struik, the principle of guilt by association will be used to hound and whip into line all who, like Dr. Jessup, ever permitted free discussion and scholarship in the field of foreign policy or anything else.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a fair statement of what you said?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That is exactly what I said.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think the Government has been unfair in the prosecution of those men mentioned in that letter?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir, certainly; and, as far as Dr. DuBois is concerned, the fact that the judge threw the case out of court after I wrote this letter—I do not show any connection; I am speaking in terms of time—would tend to indicate that there is some substance to my belief.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe in the law that requires aliens to register?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, when were you most recently at the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Within the last few days, since receiving the subpena from this committee, and for the purpose of reading the record of the previous testimony, which I cannot afford to buy at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not work for them now?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the last you worked for them?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. To distinguish, I have never been a salaried employee.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not mean that.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. The last time I did any paid work for them was over a lengthy period, dating from probably October 1948—the dates are subject to correction—to, I would say, July of 1950—that date also is subject to correction—compiling a collection of Soviet far-eastern policy documents and Soviet commentary. It was no commentary of my own; it was a collection of documents and commentary which they published, with a very strong anti-Soviet introductory statement by a Prof. Max Beloff, of England, who was invited to write that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Budenz?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I have given my answer to that.

Mr. MORRIS. No; you have never answered that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Mr. Louis F. Budenz?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I am afraid that I must answer that I refuse to answer on the grounds of the privilege granted me by the fifth amendment of the Constitution, not to testify against myself.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the question as to whether or not you knew Louis F. Budenz to be a Communist at one time?

(Witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds just given.

Senator FERGUSON. I recognize your right to refuse to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you been a guest lecturer at the California Labor School?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Again, with regrets, I must refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, were you suspended from City College in New York City in 1933, because of your opposition to the Reserve officers training program there?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I was expelled from City College in 1933 for opposition to militarism.

It may have been the particular detail that you have mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a lecturer at the Jefferson School of Social Science?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must refuse to answer that question under the privilege previously cited.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that you have been listed as a lecturer in the Jefferson School of Social Science in the Daily Worker of June 28, 1945, page 5?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe I must give the same answer as to the previous question.

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Mr. MORRIS. But do you know you have been listed as such in the Daily Worker?

(The witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds previously stated.

Senator FERGUSON. I recognize his right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandell, were you a senior fellow in Slavic studies at the Hoover Institute in Stanford University.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position.

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. For the academic year 1947; specifically from February through September, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you obtain that position?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I wrote a letter of application, if my memory serves me correctly, either to the director, without name, or to Dr. H. H. Fisher, the director.

Mr. MORRIS. How well do you know Dr. H. H. Fisher?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. In a way that a fellow very junior in years, and in standing, knows the director of a serious and important academic institution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, prior to the time you went to Stanford University, know Dr. Fisher personally?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I had met him once.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you meet him?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I met him at Stanford University.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think it must have been the end of 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mary Wright, at Stanford University?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you meet Mary Wright?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Probably during this period of 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute to the Soviet Arctic Encyclopedia in 1949 or 1950?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. There was no Soviet Arctic Encyclopedia. I contributed to the Encyclopedia Arctica, a product of the Stefanson Library, financed by the United States Office of Naval Research.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you obtain that association?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Vilhjalmur Stefanson, V-i-l-h-j-a-l-m-u-r, same last name, was the head of that library, and was apparently acquainted with my work on the Soviet Union.

Apparently he drew the conclusion that I had competent knowledge to do research in the field.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you known Dr. Stefanson at the time?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. At what time?

Mr. MORRIS. At the time that you prepared that contribution?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Obviously.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him personally?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you ever met him?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what circumstances did you meet him?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I had lunch with him in a hotel in San Francisco. I remember that because he was there lecturing.

Mr. MORRIS. Who introduced you to Mr. Stefanson?

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Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I believe it was his wife.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that is a United States Navy project?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. It is one of the projects that—somebody else will have to give you the exact details on these things—but it is one of a number of projects which are neither civilian nor defense, exactly, and each one of the branches of the armed services—in this case, the Office of Naval Research—saw fit to finance what it called a contribution to science.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I met him once.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you meet him?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. At the home of Mr. Stefanson. I might say that I was introduced in passing.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a contributor to Pacific Affairs, the publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. Pacific Affairs published one article of mine, which is also to be found in the two other publications of mine of IPR, which you have asked me about before.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think it was in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the editor of Pacific Affairs at that time?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Michael Greenberg?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. That name sounds familiar.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a discussion with Mr. Michael Greenberg at that time?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I simply don't recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever met Michael Greenberg?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I think I have.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you meet Michael Greenberg?

Mr. WILLIAM MANDEL. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all I have.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 6:10 p. m., Thursday, February 14, 1952, the committee was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 3:15 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. We will come to order.

This is a continuation of the testimony of the executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has already been sworn in executive session.

TESTIMONY OF LYLE H. MUNSON, SILVER SPRING, MD.

Senator FERGUSON. You understand that you have been sworn, Mr. Munson, do you not?

Mr. MUNSON. I do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And now, under oath, this is an open hearing.

I will ask you your full name.

Mr. MUNSON. My name is Lyle H. Munson.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are here under subpena, Mr. Munson, are you?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes; I am here under subpena.

I would also like to inquire, Mr. Chairman, if the record will show to the public that the decision that public discussion of this matter is, in fact, in the public interest was made by the committee and not by me.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

The present chairman of the subcommittee heard all of this testimony in executive session this morning and the subject was gone into very carefully, I think, thoroughly. I am satisfied, after conferring with counsel of the committee, that there is nothing in this record that will be brought out but what is in the interest of the public, and for that reason alone, this is a matter of great public concern and therefore it is in the public interest that we have this testimony.

I personally am very sensitive to anything that would affect our public security. I have tried to consider all that and I have come to the conclusion that the public interest is overbearing as far as this testimony is concerned.

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I realize the position in which the witness is, but there are times when personal concern cannot interfere with the public interest, and I believe that this is one of the times.

Mr. MUNSON. I appreciate the chairman's understanding in this matter and I am grateful for that statement that has just been made.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your address to the reporter, Mr. Munson?

Mr. MUNSON. I reside at 1798 East-West Highway, in Silver Spring, Md.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. MUNSON. I am a publisher, engaged in the publication of books in English, Japanese, Chinese, Siamese.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is your business office, Mr. Munson?

Mr. MUNSON. My firm is incorporated in the State of New York under the laws of the State of New York. The business was first established in the Orient, in Hong Kong, British Colony. We maintain branches in Manila and in Tokyo at the present time.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been in the past an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MUNSON. I was at one time an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency for a period of approximately 1 year, ending on or about mid-April of 1950. I had submitted a formal resignation some 60 days in advance of that date, but my actual departure from the agency did not take place until sometime in or about mid-April of 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a fact that you stayed on after you submitted your resignation, for a short period, in order to complete an assignment that it was desired you should stay for?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, do you recall making a voluntary statement to two special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the 11th of April of 1950?

Mr. MUNSON. On or about that date I did make a statement to two special agents of the FBI.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, did you this morning, in executive session, identify a copy of that instrument?

Mr. MUNSON. I did identify a document which appeared to be a copy of that instrument.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that such a copy, sir [presenting document to witness]?

Mr. MUNSON. This would appear to be a copy of that instrument.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may we allow the witness time to read this through, because I am going to question him about it somewhat?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

I think that is the copy that he saw, but I want him to read it so that he will be familiar with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you now read the statement, Mr. Munson?

Mr. MUNSON. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything in that statement which is untrue, to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Mr. MUNSON. To the best of my knowledge, there is nothing appearing in this paper that is untrue.

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Senator FERGUSON. This appears, then, does it, to be a copy of a statement that you made to two persons who identified themselves as special agents of the FBI?

Mr. MUNSON. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. May this be offered for the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it as part of the public record. It is now in the record.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 442" and was read in full:)

APRIL 11, 1950.

I, Lyle H. Munson, make the following voluntary statement to Albert C. Hayden, Jr., and William S. Hyde, who have identified themselves to me as special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

On Wednesday, November 16, 1949, I participated in a conference with John P. Davies, Jr., of the Department of State. My memorandum for record, written subsequent to that meeting, reports the following as the substance of Mr. Davies' comments:

1. That as regards Chinese personnel, the persons most helpful to OPC would be Chinese with American wives or husbands, who consequently had close ties with this country.

2. That he [Davies] had discussed with other OPC staff members the matter of employing certain persons through appropriate cut-outs, to consult and guide OPC in certain activities affecting the Far East.

3. That the persons he had indicated to them should be used were Benjamin K. Schwartz, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Professor [John] Fairbank and wife.

Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that the above-mentioned persons should be used by OPC, and that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach. Mr. Davies said that he would be perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit charged with producing such materials. He said that he was aware that they were considered Communists by some uninformed persons, but that they were not Communists, but "only very (politically) sophisticated."

It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington (probably New York or Boston) and that through a cut-out of OPC choosing, these persons provide not only guidance, but actually produce materials, for OPC utilization.

Davies was particularly insistent that Dr. Schwartz, of the Russian Research Institute at Harvard, be retained by OPC for policy guidance in certain fields of its activities, and noted that Dr. Schwartz had been most helpful to him as a consultant.

The suggestions and recommendations made by Mr. Davies did not constitute an order or directive, nor were they so interpreted by me or my superiors.

LYLE H. MUNSON.

Senator FERGUSON. We will ask you some questions about your statement, Mr. Munson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, was this a carefully prepared statement?

Mr. MUNSON. I would say that appropriate time and attention was paid in its preparation.

Mr. SOURWINE. This statement refers to an occasion on which you participated in a conference with Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Department of State; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it refers to a memorandum for record, written subsequent to that meeting. Was that a memorandum which you wrote for the CIA?

Mr. MUNSON. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the files of the agency by which you were then employed?

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Mr. MUNSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have available to you, for consultation and for refreshment of your memory, at the time you wrote this memorandum of April 11, the memorandum for record which you had previously written for the CIA?

Mr. MUNSON. I did have available to me at the time that I prepared this statement for the FBI such memoranda for record as I had prepared for Central Intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it true that it was not only available, but you did see it and you did know what was in it at that time?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that I had occasion to refer to it and to refresh my memory at the time I prepared this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. So that, while it is some time after the meeting that you had with Mr. Davies on Wednesday, the 16th of November 1949 to April, you had documents before you that were made following your November meeting; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And while that meeting was then fresh in your memory?

Mr. MUNSON. And while that meeting was fresh in my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those documents, as the chairman has pointed out, were available to you and were, in fact, consulted by you at the time this statement was prepared; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that I did consult them, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this conference with Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., a conference requested by him?

Mr. MUNSON. It was a conference requested and initiated by Mr. Davies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who participated in that conference besides yourself and Mr. Davies?

Mr. MUNSON. There was one other employee of the Central Intelligence Agency present.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have, because of security reasons, declined to make public the name of that person; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. At that time that I joined the Central Intelligence Agency, as at the time that I resigned from it, I took an oath to maintain in confidence all activities, classified information, including the names of employees that might come to my attention during the period of my employment. The name of the gentleman who accompanied me in this conference would, it seems to me, fall in that classification.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have, as a matter of fact, been informed, since you were subpenaed to appear before this committee, that that name did fall in that category and should not be publicly revealed; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. I have discussed this matter with responsible persons at CIA in an effort to insure that I would, in this appearance here, not have occasion to reveal any classified information, and it was requested that this name not be revealed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask permission not to proceed further with that line of inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. The Chair, under the particular circumstances, at the particular time, is familiar with the facts, and I do not think at the present time that it detracts from the testimony. Therefore I will not compel the witness to name the particular person that was involved.

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Mr. MUNSON. I am grateful for that consideration, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. At this conference, at which only three people were present—is that right, only three?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. At this conference, which took place on or about the 16th of November 1949, were certain recommendations made by Mr. Davies?

Mr. MUNSON. Certain recommendations were made by Mr. Davies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those unsolicited recommendations, that is, unsolicited by you?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes. They were not solicited either by myself or by my confederate, who accompanied me to the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. So far as you know, were they unsolicited by the CIA?

Mr. MUNSON. So far as I am knowledgeable, they were unsolicited by any official of CIA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did those recommendations concern the use of certain persons, and were those certain persons named by Mr. Davies during that conference?

Mr. MUNSON. They were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those persons Benjamin K. Schwartz, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Prof. John Fairbank, and the professor's wife, Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that those were the names of the persons that Mr. Davies recommended.

Mr. SOURWINE. This memorandum mentions those names. Does it not?

Mr. MUNSON. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time Mr. Davies made his recommendation to you, do you know whether he was cleared to receive classified information?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it, then, that you did not at that time discuss with him any classified information; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. On the occasion of this conference I had no occasion to reveal to him any classified information that was in my possession, concerning which I was knowledgeable.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, then, this information was coming to you from an outside source, the State Department, and you were not imparting information from your agency to him or the State Department; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. I attended the conference, Mr. Chairman, as a receptacle of information which I, in turn, carried back to the agency by which I was at that time employed; where it was reviewed and acted upon, in this case the action being the form of a rejection of the recommendations that had been transmitted to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was really that you were acting as a receptacle, as you say, receiving the information and not giving information out of your agency; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So the conversations that we will get from you today are what Mr. Davies gave you; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

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Senator FERGUSON. Rather than what you gave him?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, you merely were a receiver of this information, and this memorandum is a memorandum as to what took place, as far as Davies was concerned on that day; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON: This is a record of my recollection of that conference, in which I was really a recipient of recommendations, nothing more.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, did you testify this morning that nothing that Mr. Davies said could be taken as a definite information that he possessed any classified information concerning the CIA?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that there was nothing in the conversation on his part or on our part which in any way would indicate a knowledge, on the part of Mr. Davies, of the operations or activities or personnel responsibilities of our agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this conference cleared by the top level at CIA before it took place? Was any special issue made of it, or any special clearance sought with regard to it?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that the then head of the branch or the section to which I was assigned was conversant with Mr. Davies' request that my coworker and I go to and appear at his office for the conference. Whether or not it was discussed by him with persons higher in the bureaucracy than that, I cannot testify.

Mr. SOURWINE. As it came to you, was there anything in your instructions which, in your opinion, would have authorized you to discuss with Mr. Davies classified matter?

Mr. MUNSON. I certainly had no such instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did not discuss classified matter with him?

Mr. MUNSON. I did not discuss classified matters with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether this conference was cleared at any level in the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you regard Mr. Davies, when he sought to set up the conference and when you had the conference with him, as speaking as an official of the Department of State?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes. The conference was held in an office in the Department of State Building during office hours, customary Government working hours. I did consider that he was an official of the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he purport to speak as an official of the State Department in making his recommendations to you and, through you, to your agency?

Mr. MUNSON. I can only say that at no time did he indicate that he was not speaking as an official of the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us in your own language, please, with reference to this memorandum—and, if necessary, refresh your memory—just what it was that Mr. Davies recommended with regard to the six named persons?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that these six persons should be used by the Central Intelligence Agency as a source of consultation and guidance and in the preparation of materials which might be useful to us in executing our chartered responsibilities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Technically speaking, did that involve employment of these persons?

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Mr. MUNSON. Not employment in the sense that you here have employed the court reporter, for example, or, as I would understand your relationship, that you are an employee of this committee, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it would have constituted employment in the sense that you employ a tool or that you employ an instrument to dig in your garden, would it not?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies was recommending that we avail ourselves of the knowledge, counsel, and guidance of these six persons, that we use them as consultants in assisting us in directing activities for which we were responsible.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Davies' recommendations had been followed out, would these persons have become, in the broad sense, a part of the CIA operation?

Mr. MUNSON. Had Mr. Davies' recommendations been carried out—which I repeat, they were not during my period of employment there—these persons would have become consultants, indirectly, and would have been furnishing counsel and suggestions for the consideration of CIA officials.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will ask several questions now, which may seem to you repetitive. I will phrase them as I do because I want to traverse, in a certain way, certain phases of this.

Mr. MUNSON. All right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies, on the occasion of this conference of November 16, 1949, suggest or urge that Edgar Snow be used for guidance by an agency of the Government other than the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies suggested the use of six persons, and Mr. Snow was one of those six persons.

Mr. SOURWINE. I appreciate that fact.

On this series of questions now, I would be grateful if you would, if you can, answer yes or no. Then if the answer needs to be qualified, qualify it. Do you understand?

Mr. MUNSON. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies ever suggest or urge that Edgar Snow be used for guidance by another agency of the Government, that is, other than the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies ever suggest or urge that Snow be used for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government, that is, other than the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes; subject to the qualification which I have indicated and which I would like to reiterate here. Mr. Davies was recommending the utilization of these people for the purpose of consultation and guidance in preparation of materials calculated to be useful to us, indirectly, through an intermediary, and in such way that Mr. Snow and the others would not be cognizant at any time that they were furnishing those suggestions or ideas, recommendations or materials directly to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that his whole proposal clearly involved keeping these persons in the dark as to how their recommendations, suggestions, advice, and guidance were being used?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies had recommended that these persons, as a unit or as a working group, be set up or established physically out-

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side the confines of the Central Intelligence Agency establishment and geographically outside the Washington area, and that contact with them be maintained or negotiated in all cases through an intermediary of CIA choosing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever suggest himself as that intermediary?

Mr. MUNSON. He did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever suggest anyone as that intermediary?

Mr. MUNSON. He made no suggestion as to who that intermediary should be. As a matter of fact, it is my recollection that he indicated that this intermediary should be a person of CIA's own selection or choice.

I should add, I think, sir, that this recommendation or proposal never was refined in thinking or in planning in the degree that we are trying to discuss it here, for the simple reason that the recommendation was rejected by responsible and proper CIA officials before any such planning or implementation could be considered.

Senator FERGUSON. On the point of having, let us say, a cut-out used, was that for the purpose of not allowing these persons to know who was getting the information; or was it for the purpose of not having them directly contact and be known to be contacting your organization?

Mr. MUNSON. I cannot speak as to what was in Mr. Davies' mind.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say on that point?

Mr. MUNSON. The matter was never discussed in those terms, Mr. Chairman. It was my understanding that these persons were to be used through an intermediary, that there would be no direct contact between any responsible official of the Central Intelligence Agency and the aforementioned six, but that that contact would be made through the intermediary for the purpose not only of denying these six access to or information about Central Intelligence Agency personnel and responsibilities and activities, but also to preclude their knowledge that they were furnishing information directly to or indirectly to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you possibly do that, under your paragraph?

I will read it to you:

> It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington (probably New York or Boston) and that through a cut-out of OPC choosing, these persons provide not only guidance, but actually produce materials for OPC utilization.

How would you set up six people, of diverse interests, in one office or one suite of offices and contact them to get guidance and materials for your work and they not know at least what was being done? How do you explain that?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not explain it, sir. As I said, the recommendations never were implemented.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am talking about your statement there as to what took place. Did he, or did he not, indicate that he had talked it over with the people and they were agreeable?

Mr. MUNSON. He did not at any time indicate that he had discussed this matter with any of these six persons.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, was this understood by you at the time to be a proposal that these six people be duped into furnishing a service for CIA?

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Mr. MUNSON. I would say rather that it was my impression that it was being recommended that CIA should avail itself of consultation and guidance indirectly and without the direct knowledge of these six persons.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already said that, have you not?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you understand at the time that what Mr. Davies was proposing was that these six persons be duped into providing information that the CIA could use? That either was your understanding or it was not.

Mr. MUNSON. I suppose in a general sense—I am simply trying to find an alternate of this word "dupe." It is not a very satisfactory word in this instance. I suppose basically this is the substance of the recommendation, however.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, is what you are saying that Mr. Davies referred to these people in his recommendation, treated then in his recommendation as persons who would not voluntarily help the CIA but whose help or assistance would have to be secured through a means whereby they would be uninformed as to the fact that they were actually assisting CIA operations? Is that a correct statment?

Mr. MUNSON. No.

Again, I cannot speak for what was in Mr. Davies' mind. It did not occur to me at the time he was suggesting that these persons were individuals who would not, if directly requested by the Central Intelligence Agency, supply information and guidance. There was never any implication of this and the question did not arise in our conversation, according to my recollection. He suggested no alternatives to this. This was simply, as I have stated in this memorandum, his recommendations as to how CIA might avail itself of this guidance and recommendation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me ask this question: was there anything in his recommendation which could have been construed or which, in your opinion, was intended as a recommendation that these people, or any of them, be used as double agents?

Mr. MUNSON. At no time did I understand that Mr. Davies was suggesting the use of any one or all of these persons as double agents.

Senator FERGUSON. They were to be used, were they not, according to this memorandum, as a unit?

Mr. MUNSON. They were to be used as a work shop team, or unit; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the people to be placed at the head of it appeared to be, in this memorandum, Professor and Mrs. Fairbank, where you say that Mr. Davies said that he would be perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of the unit, charged with producing such materials.

Mr. MUNSON. I did not accept this, Mr. Chairman, as a recommendation to us that Professor and Mrs. Fairbank should be placed at the head of the unit. I simply accepted it as his opinion that he would be satisfied if they were confident of their ability to perform such function.

Mr. SOURWINE. You both discussed the recommendation in the light of the assumption that the unit would have to have a head, is not that true?

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Mr. MUNSON. We did not pursue it to that degree. It was never discussed to the degree of how it should be set up or in what nature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies, at least, must have contemplated the unit would have to have a head, because he mentioned the possibility of Dr. Fairbank heading the unit; did he not?

Mr. MUNSON. He did not mention the possibility of Dr. Fairbank heading this unit. He spoke of his confidence in Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit charged with such responsibilities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean it might be in contemplation that these six people would cooperate as a cooperative unit without any directing head?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not mean to imply that at all. I am simply saying Mr. Davies did not recommend to us: "I recommend you should place Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of this unit." He simply expressed his own opinion that Professor and/or Mrs. Fairbank would be competent to head a unit of this kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it not implicit in the recommendation that somebody head such a unit?

Mr. MUNSON. It seems logical to assume so; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it not inferred by you that there would have to be someone to head the unit?

Mr. MUNSON. In organizing such an activity, it would be customary to have a head certainly of such a work unit, and it would seem there would have to be a head.

Mr. SOURWINE. Under the conditions specified in Mr. Davies' recommendation, as you have explained it to us, that head would have to have been one of these six people; would it not?

Mr. MUNSON. Either one of these six people, or the intermediary.

Mr. SOURWINE. The intermediary could not have been both the unit and the cut-out, could he?

Mr. MUNSON. I don't know, because we did not discuss it or try to work it out in that detail. We did not go into any problem of organizing this; we simply accepted this as a suggestion. The suggestion was actually refused in a matter of hours or days. There was never any discussion or attempt to build what the Army calls a table of organization or to set up the structure of this committee in any way.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spoke earlier of setting up these people somewhere away from Washington, and this memorandum speaks of situating them physically in an office or suite of offices. Would you say that Mr. Davies had recommended that these persons be set up in an office or offices somewhere outside of Washington?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That they be so set up by an agency of the Government, directly or indirectly?

Mr. MUNSON. Indirectly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Indirectly, yes; is that your answer?

Mr. MUNSON. Indirectly, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask a question, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, it was clear to you, was it not, that this unit was to give guidance to the program and was not to be guided?

Mr. MUNSON. It was clear to me that Mr. Davies was recommending that these persons provide and furnish consultation and guidance and that the reverse would not be the case.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Was he making a recommendation of this nature: "Get A, B, C, D, E, and F together, find out what they say, and then do the opposite"?

Was that the kind of guidance that he was recommending be secured from these people?

Mr. MUNSON. No; Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that consultation and guidance and materials coming from a unit composed of these persons and prepared by them would represent a proper approach to certain activities and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he mean proper from the standpoint of the interests of CIA and the interests of the United States?

Mr. MUNSON. I don't know how Mr. Davies uses the word "proper." That is the way I interpreted it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the way you interpreted it?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think, did you, that someone would be offering you help other than to help the United States?

Mr. MUNSON. I did not think so, and I hoped not.

Senator FERGUSON. And there was not anything being said by the man but what it was for the benefit of the United States and that you could rely upon it; is not that true?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, Edgar Snow was one of these six people; was he not?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have stated that Mr. Davies recommended that these six people be set up in an office by an agency of the Government; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. Indirectly; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Davies recommend that Snow be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. Insofar as Mr. Snow was to be one of this unit or working group of six; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies so recommend in that connection with regard to each one of these six named persons, that is, Snow, Benjamin Schwartz, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Prof. and Mrs. John Fairbanks?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why the FBI came to you?

Mr. MUNSON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They merely came to you, identified themselves, and asked you concerning this interview; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that the FBI first talked with a superior of mine in the Central Intelligence Agency; having talked with him, requested an audience or an opportunity to interrogate me, and through that official of CIA, my conference with the FBI was arranged.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean your superiors knew that you were having a conference with the FBI?

Mr. MUNSON. They did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they know you had furnished a voluntary statement to the FBI?

Mr. MUNSON. They did.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have furnished such a statement without giving a copy of it to the superior, for the CIA files, in case they wanted to place it there?

Mr. MUNSON. I am sure that neither then nor now is there anything in the statement which I gave the FBI which I would not then or now be willing to have any or all of my superiors see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you did give a copy to any of your superiors or transmit it to the CIA files?

Mr. MUNSON. I cannot remember precisely, sir. There were several memoranda on this subject. I can only state that it would have been normal process for copies of this statement to be made for the files.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a mattter of fact, you are being cautious in your answers there because you know there is no copy of it presently in the CIA files, or you have been told there is no copy presently in the CIA files; is not that right?

Mr. MUNSON. I have asked for a copy. I have asked if one was available. I was simply told that one has not been found or that one was not readily available to show. I was not told point-blank that no such copy existed.

Mr. SOURWINE. The fact that you asked for it indicates that you then thought you had furnished one for the CIA files, does it not?

Mr. MUNSON. I certainly thought that there would be one in the CIA files.

Senator FERGUSON. This indicates that it is in quotes, is not that right?

Mr. MUNSON. The statement here is in quotes, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you prepare this document, of which this is a copy, and give it to these two FBI agents?

Mr. MUNSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. So that, in that sense, it is official; is it not?

Mr. MUNSON. It is in that sense my sworn statement to the FBI, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave it to them and you wanted them to rely upon it and it is true; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. It is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you desire that if it came within their operations, that they rely upon it?

Mr. MUNSON. I gave it to them for such purpose as they chose to make use of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in their official capacity.

Mr. MUNSON. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, do you know what Mr. Davies knew, if anything, about Mr. John Fairbank with regard to whether he was or was not Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. MUNSON. I have no idea about what Mr. Davies knew about Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Davies knew about Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. MUNSON. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Davies knew about Benjamin Schwartz?

Mr. MUNSON. I have no idea other than what Mr. Davies said during the course of our conference, that Dr. Schwartz was particularly

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knowledgeable in the field of Chinese communism and that Dr. Schwartz had been very helpful to him as a consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Dr. Schwartz was, in fact, ever a consultant to Mr. Davies?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not know, other than Mr. Davies' statement at this meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. You have stated that in the next-to-the-last paragraph of your statement; have you not?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Davies should testify under oath that Dr. Schwartz had never been a consultant to him in any capacity, would that change your answer at all?

Mr. MUNSON. I could only reaffirm, sir, that it is my recollection—and I am willing to state—that Mr. Davies stated, in the course of our conversation in the conference on the 11th of April, that Dr. Schwartz had been most helpful to him as a consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those his words, that is not a summarization of what he said?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that those were his words. I made notes during the course of the conference. Those notes have subsequently been destroyed. My memoranda for the files of the Central Intelligence Agency were made from those notes. This present memorandum supplied the FBI was made from my memoranda for the CIA files.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you misspoke the date there. You said the 11th of April.

Mr. MUNSON. Thank you for the correction, sir. The conference was the 16th of November and the statement to the FBI was on the 11th of April. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Davies knew about Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. MUNSON. No, I do not know what he knew about Anna Louise Strong.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what he knew about Agnes Smedley?

Mr. MUNSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies, after objections were raised that any one or some of these people were Communists, assert that they certainly were not, that they were just people who were extremely politically sophisticated?

Mr. MUNSON. No objections, sir, were made that any or all of these persons were or were not Communists. Mr. Davies did volunteer, in the course of his discussion of setting up this mechanism or this workshop team and in discussion of the various persons that he recommended, that he was aware that Mr. and Mrs. Fairbank—I think he was speaking only of them—were considered Communists by some persons. He expressed himself as believing that they were not Communists but were only very politically sophisticated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you say he volunteered that statement?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, without anyone else at the conference having mentioned the question of communism in respect to Professor and Mrs. Fairbank or in respect to any of these persons, he volunteered the statement that there had been some mention, at least,

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of communism with regard to Dr. and Mrs. Fairbank but that, in his opinion, they were not Communists but only very politically sophisticated; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct. It was a volunteered statement on his part, provoked by no suggestion or objection on the part of the other two participants at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he set up the charge and then knock it down?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he set it up with regard to any of those other people?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that he spoke in this regard only of Professor and Mrs. Fairbank. He did not discuss the political affiliations of any other persons or of these persons other than this one single statement.

Senator FERGUSON. That left the impression that if two were mentioned as having been considered by some to be Communists and they were not; did it, or did it not read the impression to you, that he was not giving you the information that any of the others were considered Communists or were Communists?

Mr. MUNSON. Could I have that question restated, sir, please? I am not sure I understand it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will restate it.

Where he states that two of these people were considered by some uninformed to be Communists and that he was assuring you they were not but they were only very politically sophisticated, did that leave with you the impression, not mentioning anything about communism as to the others, that they would not be Communists?

I am not asking you what you knew about these people; I am asking you about what his statements left with you.

Mr. MUNSON. In his statements, in my opinion—and it was my impression at the time, as now—he certainly was not indicating a belief that any one of these persons was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. I take it, from what you wrote there, that that would be true; that if a man mentioned out of six the fact that two of them were considered Communists and he was assuring you that they were not, that it would leave you or anyone reasonably prudent with the idea of none of them being Communists.

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. The reason implication in your inference was, was it not, that none of this group of six was Communist?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Further, Mr. Munson, did you have the impression that all six were to be cast in the same political perspective?

Mr. MUNSON. All six were to be used in the same way as part of one and the same team, performing one and the same function.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to be perfectly sure about this phrase of "only very sophisticated" or "only very politically sophisticated." I note that in this statement of April 11, 1950, the word "politically" is in parentheses. Does that indicate that possibly you added that word by way of explanation?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that the word "politically" was not used immediately prior to the word "sophisticated."

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Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, is it your recollection that what Mr. Davies said was that these persons, Mr. and Mrs. Fairbank were only very sophisticated?

Mr. MUNSON. Only very sophisticated; implying in a political sense.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes: but did he use the whole sentence at once, stating in a single sentence that they were not Communists, they were "only very sophisticated"?

Mr. MUNSON. As near as my notes at that time revealed and my memoranda written for the agency, I tried to follow the pattern and substance of his precise remarks. It is my recollection that he said that he was aware that they—meaning Professor and Mrs. Fairbank—were considered Communists by some uninformed persons, but that they were not Communists but "only very sophisticated."

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, was he stating that a very sophisticated person—in the political sense—could be mistaken for a Communist? Was that the thesis that he was advancing?

Mr. MUNSON. As I understood it, that was the thesis that he was advancing. That was my interpretation of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is almost parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, and perhaps I should not ask this question.

In your own opinion, is that a tenable thesis, Mr. Munson?

Mr. MUNSON. In my own opinion, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider Communists as politically sophisticated people?

Mr. MUNSON. Communist like to think so and so represent. I have never seen, heard, read, or come into contact with Communists or any manifestation or writing of communism which indicates any particular sophistication, politically or otherwise.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as you were concerned, did this consultation or conference with Davies come out of—as we usually express it—the blue sky? Was there any warning in advance?

Mr. MUNSON. None, sir.

You are speaking of the specific conference on the 16th of November?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. MUNSON. There was none.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you first heard that he wanted to talk with you was it that you saw him, would you say?

Mr. MUNSON. It was a matter of hours, at most. It is my recollection that the request for the appearance of the other gentleman and myself came sometime in the late forenoon or at or about noon on the date of the conference, the same day.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever sought advice from Davies before the 16th of November?

Mr. MUNSON. Had I ?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MUNSON. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, was Mr. Davies at that time a member of the Policy Planning Board of the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. The dates would have to be checked and the records of the Department of State would show. It is my recollection that he was.

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Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, what do the records of the Department of State show in that respect? What does the State Department Register indicate?

Mr. MANDEL. The Biographic Register of the Department of State, dated April 1, 1951, on page 109 says that John Paton Davies, Jr., was a class 2—appointed class 2 April 14, 1948, and was a member of the Policy Planning Staff July 1, 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does it show his status as of the middle of November 1949?

Mr. MANDEL. That would imply that he had his class 2 classification in the period prior.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I see that?

Mr. Chairman, reading from this, it says:

* * * Foreign Service officer of class 3 November 13, 1946; first secretary and consul at Mexico City April 15, 1947 (canceled); to the Department August 11, 1947; class 2 April 14, 1948. * * *

From that, it appears that Mr. Davies was assigned to the Department of State at the time of this conference, but it does not clearly appear that he was a member of the Policy Planning Staff prior to July 1, 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, could you tell us what position Mr. Davies holds today in the State Department?

Mr. MANDEL. The following information is the result of a telephone call to the State Department this afternoon: The Personnel Division of the State Department states that John Paton Davies, Jr., is at Frankfort, Germany, as a class 1 deputy director of political affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel calls my attention to the fact that the information we have just read appeared in the State Department Register for April 1, 1950, but does not appear in the State Department Biographical Register for April 1, 1951. The information that Mr. Mandel is referring to is that of being political officer at Frankfort on the Main.

Mr. Chairman, for the sake of comparison and to clarify what we are talking about, may I ask that these two biograpical sketches be both inserted in the record at this point. Where there is any conclusion to be drawn from the facts, they will be there for study.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 442A" and is as follows:)

[From the Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1950]

DAVIES, JOHN PATON, JR.—b. Kiating, China, of Am. parents, Apr. 6, 1908; Shanghai-Am. Sch. grad.; Yenching U., Peiping, 1929–30; Columbia U., B. S. 1931; app. For. Ser. officer unclass., v. c. of career, and sec. in the Diplo. Ser. Dec. 17, 1931; v. c. at Windsor Jan. 12, 1932; For. Ser. Sch. Nov. 29, 1932; v. c. at Yünnanfu Mar. 30, 1933; language officer at Peiping Aug. 30, 1933; v. c. at Mukden Sept. 5, 1935; at Hankow Apr. 7, 1938; class eight Mar. 16, 1939; to the Dept. June 28, 1940; class seven May 1, 1941; cons. and cons. at Kunming (for duty as 2d sec. temp., at Chungking) Apr. 28, 1942; 2d sec. at Chungking July 1, 1942; class six July 16, 1943; 2d sec. and cons. at Moscow Jan. 26, 1945; class five May 16, 1945; 1st sec. at Moscow in addition to duties as cons. Nov. 14, 1945; class four May 19, 1946; For. Ser. officer of class three Nov. 13, 1946; 1st sec. and cons. at Mexico City Apr. 15, 1947 (canceled); to the Dept. Aug. 11, 1947; class two Apr. 14, 1948; pol. officer at Frankfort on the Main Feb. 17, 1950; married.—HICOG.

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[From the Biographic Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1951]

DAVIES, JOHN PATON, JR.—b. Kiating, China, of Am. parents, Apr. 6, 1908; Shanghai-Am. Sch. grad.; Yenching U., Peiping, 1929–30; Columbia U., B. S. 1931; app. For. Ser. officer unclass., v. c. of career, and sec. in the Diplo. Ser. Dec. 17, 1931; v. c. at Windsor Jan. 12, 1932; For. Ser. Sch. Nov. 29, 1932; v. c. at Yünnanfu Mar. 30, 1933; language officer at Peiping Aug. 30, 1933; v. c. at Mukden Sept. 5, 1935; at Hankow Apr. 7, 1938; class eight Mar. 16, 1939; to the Dept. June 28, 1940; class seven May 1, 1941; cons. and cons. at Kunming (for duty as 2d sec. temp., at Chungking) Apr. 28, 1942; 2d sec. at Chungking July 1, 1942; class six July 16, 1943; 2d sec. and cons. at Moscow Jan. 26, 1945; class five May 16, 1945; 1st sec. at Moscow in addition to duties as cons. Nov. 14, 1945; class four May 19, 1946; For. Ser. officer of class three Nov. 13, 1946; 1st sec. and cons. at Mexico City Apr. 15, 1947 (canceled); to the Dept. Aug. 11, 1947; class two Apr. 14, 1948; mem., Policy Planning Staff, July 1, 1950; married.—HICOG.

Mr. SOURWINE. Bearing in mind what you testified to regarding the recommendation Mr. Davies made concerning this group of six persons, I would like to have you answer specifically, Mr. Munson: Did Mr. Davies recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by another Government agency for policy guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes; in the same manner.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you stated that Mr. Davies did state that Dr. Schwartz had been helpful to him as consultant, did you?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are quite clear on that point?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say, Mr. Munson, that Mr. Davies had vouched for the responsibility of these people jointly and severally to act in the capacity that he was recommending to you?

Mr. MUNSON. May I answer, Mr. Chairman, by saying that he recommended that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared by these persons would represent a proper approach to our responsible activities, insofar as that constitutes vouching for them singly and collectively.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they to work together?

Mr. MUNSON. They were to work together; that he was so doing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, did Mr. Davies on the occasion of this conference of Wednesday, November 16, 1949, suggest that Agnes Smedley be used to produce materials for utilization for another department of the Government—that is, other than the State Department?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes; in the manner that I have indicated.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did he state that materials prepared by Agnes Smedley would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that he represented that Agnes could be used by CIA or a branch of CIA for consultation and guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. Would you restate that one, sir, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that Mr. Davies represented that Agnes Smedley could be used by the CIA or a branch of CIA for consultation and guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. He recommended that they be used.

I am not sure what the use of the word "could" in your question implies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he recommend that Agnes Smedley be used for consultation and guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

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Senator FERGUSON. With reference to Agnes Smedley, could I ask whether or not he was recommending to you Agnes Smedley as a Communist, to be used as a Communist?

Mr. MUNSON. It was not my understanding that he was recommending her use in that way, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that he was recommending her as a member of the Communist apparatus?

Mr. MUNSON. I can only say that if he was recommending that she be used as a part of the Communist apparatus, he did not convey that to me by anything that was said at the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. The recommendation itself had no connotation that any of these people were Communists or were to be used as Communists or were pro-Communist or were to be used as pro-Communists; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, did not what Mr. Davies said to you about Fairbank being politically sophisticated indicate to you that the contrary was the case?

Mr. MUNSON. It was such an indication to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies recommend that Anna Louise Strong be set up in an office along with these others, by some agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that she be used for consultation and guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state anything with regard to his impressions of either Agnes Smedley or Anna Louise Strong, as to communism or procommunism or political beliefs?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state that materials prepared by Anna Louise Strong would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. He did not refer singly to Anna Louise Strong. He stated that materials prepared by these as a working group, as a unit, would represent, in his opinion, the proper approach.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he specifically recommend Professor Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by an agency of the United States?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he recommend that Professor Fairbank be used to prepare materials for another agency of Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he recommend the use of Mrs. Fairbank for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he recommend the use of Mr. and Mrs. Fairbank together as a part of this group for consulation and guidance by any agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state that Fairbank could be trusted to prepare materials which would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. Again, I must answer by saying that he recommended—indicated his belief that materials prepared by this group, of which Professor Fairbank would be a part, would represent the proper approach. He did not singly identify Professor Fairbank; he

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simply identified materials coming from this group of which Professor Fairbank would have been one and a part.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies recommend that Fairbank be set up in an office by some agency of Government?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he state that Fairbank was a person ideally suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. I don't recall his use of the phrase "ideally suited," sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he say, "well suited"?

Mr. MUNSON. It is my recollection that he did not say "well suited."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he convey to you or seek to convey to you, as you understood it, the idea that Mr. Fairbank was particularly well qualified?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. To provide consultation and guidance to another agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did he recommend his use—that is, Mr. Fairbank's use—for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Referring again to the matter of sophistication, are you quite sure that Mr. Davies stated that Fairbank and Mrs. Fairbank were not Communists but only sophisticated?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions except this: When were you last outside the United States?

Mr. MUNSON. I made a trip abroad on business for my publishing firm in the spring of 1951. I left the United States on or about the 2d or 3d of February, according to my recollection, by way of New York and Boston, to Europe, across to the Far East, to take care of business matters in Hong Kong and Manila, transferred people in my employ from Manila to Hong Kong, returning to the United States on or about the middle of March of 1951. I have not been outside the continental United States since that date, according to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since the middle of March 1951?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no further questions.

Senator FERGUSON. There is one other question.

Is it correct to say that, by virtue of the third paragraph from the last in your statement to the FBI agents, that you had conveyed to these FBI agents that these six people were to act collectively in giving the guidance and the material help to the CIA, or the agency with which he desired them to be placed?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct. I certainly reaffirm what I have said in this third paragraph from the last.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, did the question of whether or not these people consciously knew that they were going to be working for the CIA come up in your conversation with Mr. Davies?

Mr. MUNSON. It was never discussed, sir. This was left, the mechanics of implementing this, the structure of this relationship with these people, was left to the discretion of CIA personnel. Mr. Davies' rec-

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ommendations in no way constituted an order or a directive. They were not so interpreted either by myself or by my superiors. The Central Intelligence Agency, including myself, retained to itself the right to accept or reject the recommendation and implement it according to its own choice of manner. Mr. Davies made no suggestion as to the mechanics of how we should set up the relationship with these people, other than to recommend that contact with them might possibly be effected by the Central Intelligence Agency through an intermediary.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Munson, as far as you know, did he have authority to issue either a directive or an order to you?

Mr. MUNSON. I at no time assumed or believed that Mr. Davies could order me to do anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Or had authority to order?

Mr. MUNSON. Or had authority to order.

Senator FERGUSON. Or to issue a directive to you?

Mr. MUNSON. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were his recommendations so strongly advanced that they appeared to be in any sense an expression of authority or an intent to exert pressure on your agency?

Mr. MUNSON. Well, if they were, that pressure certainly was readily and easily resisted and rejected, sir. The recommendations were never implemented.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us answer the other question.

Did you get the impression, at the time that he was trying to put this over, that he was attempting to throw his weight around, that he was attempting to exert authority, whether or not he had it, that he thought he had authority? Generally, did you get the impression that he was trying to get this done?

Mr. MUNSON. I had no doubt in my mind, sir, that Mr. Davies thought this was a proper undertaking and one that should be effected and one that he would like to see effected.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, he was trying to get it done, was he?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was not simply laying it out as a possible course of action for more mature consideration at a later date, was he?

Mr. MUNSON. Well, he was offering it as a recommendation to the Central Intelligence Agency, coming from him in his capacity.

Mr. SOURWINE. As an official of the Department of State?

Mr. MUNSON. And the Central Intelligence Agency was then in a position to accept or reject it as a recommendation. It was at no time given as an order or a directive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it ever reported back to him whether it was accepted or rejected?

Mr. MUNSON. I cannot answer that, sir. I did not report it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Munson, do you know whether or not the Willoughby charges against Agnes Smedley were known at that time?

Mr. MUNSON. I do not know, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, our record contains testimony and evidence to the effect that in February 1949 General Willoughby had put forth his conclusions of the Sorge espionage case, and a few days after that, the Army, in the person of Col. S. Eyester, Deputy Chief

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of the Army Public Information Service, published a retraction of the Willoughby charges.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. MORRIS. That was in February 1949. That was a time prior to both this interview and to the report of the interview.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Munson, there is one loose end here that we perhaps had better clean up for the record.

This memorandum mentions OPC. Where those initials used by you and understood by Mr. Davis to refer to a part of the CIA, a subordinate portion of the CIA operation?

Mr. MUNSON. They were so used.

Senator FERGUSON. So that when you use them here, it is the CIA or a part of it?

Mr. MUNSON. It is a part of CIA.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the record will show that five of the six mentioned here have been people who have been mentioned in varying degrees in the public hearings of the subcommittee investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations, and for that reason, Mr. Munson is giving testimony about these people today.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MUNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. You are excused.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the witness excused from the subpena?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

We will rise without a date.

(Thereupon at 4:30 p. m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4:45 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. The first witness will be Mary Jane Keeney, who has already been sworn in executive session.

Senator FERGUSON. Mrs. Keeney, you have been sworn?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are now under oath. You may proceed with the examination.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, will you give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interpose, Mr. Chairman, if the Chair would have no objection, could the witnesses be sworn anew for this public session?

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. KEENEY. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. And if you will raise your hand, Mr. Keeney.

You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this subcommittee, being a subcommittee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KEENEY. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. And you, Mr. Deane.

You do solemnly swear, in the matter now pending, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in this hearing of a subcommittee of the United States Senate, so help you God?

Mr. DEANE. I swear.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask that there be inserted in the record at this point a copy of the committee resolution authorizing a single

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Senator to sit and act as a quorum for the purposes of administering oaths and taking testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be inserted at this point in the record.

(Resolution referred to is as follows:)

Resolved by the special subcommittee appointed to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal security laws under Senate Resolution 366 (81st Cong.) of the Committee on the Judiciary, that pursuant to subsection (3) of Rule XXV, as amended, of the Standing Rules of the Senate (S. Res. 180, 81st Cong., 2d sess., agreed to February 1, 1950), a quorum of the subcommittee for the purpose of taking sworn testimony shall consist of one Senator of said subcommittee. (Adopted January 18, 1951.)

TESTIMONY OF MARY JANE KEENEY, NEW YORK CITY, ACCOMPANIED BY SARAM AMERLING, ESQ., NEW YORK CITY

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, will you give your full name and address to the reporter.

Mrs. KEENEY. Surely. Mary Jane Keeney, 41 King Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on constitutional grounds.

It is my understanding that the fifth amendment, which does not require me to bear witness against myself, gives me that privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. Ask the next question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, have you been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on precisely the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, on the grounds of self-incrimination?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that correct? You just shook your head.

Mrs. KEENEY. I am sorry. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been active in the Washington Committee on the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on the same ground.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, have you been an employee of the United States State Department?

Mrs. KEENEY. For a very brief period.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what period that was?

Mrs. KEENEY. In the spring of 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Until?

Mrs. KEENEY. Until my resignation on July 15, 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Was your resignation voluntary or were you asked to leave the State Department?

Mrs. KEENEY. Entirely voluntary.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any other United States Government employment?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what it was?

Mrs. KEENEY. I was appointed to the Board of Economic Warfare in October 1942, as an editor.

I remained in that position until approximately November 1, 1944, when I moved to another section of the same agency, which at that time

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was called the Foreign Economic Administration. I was employed there as an economic analyst.

I remained in that position until approximately November 1, 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I interrupt before the witness gets beyond that date in 1945?

At the time you were first appointed to the BEW, had Mr. Henry Wallace come in to head that organization yet?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, he was Director.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was Director?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then you remained on through into the time when Mr. Lauchlin Currie was an Assistant Director?

Mrs. KEENEY. I don't remember whether Mr. Currie was a Director or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not remember Mr. Currie's direction?

Mrs. KEENEY. No, I don't remember Mr. Currie's connection. He may have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead from that date in 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were working for the Government, at any time, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds that I have mentioned before.

Senator FERGUSON. The constitutional grounds?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is on the ground of possible self-incrimination?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And were you, during that same period of time, a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer that question on the same ground.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with our public exhibit 364, which was introduced on January 29, 1952, which indicates the activity on your part with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. KEENEY. May I confer with my counsel?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the record show who is the counsel accompanying the witness?

Senator FERGUSON. Will the counsel state his name?

Mr. AMERLING. Saram Amerling, 521 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say your address was in New York City?

Mr. AMERLING. 521 Fifth Avenue.

Senator FERGUSON. A member of the New York Bar, I assume?

Mr. AMERLING. The New York Bar, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue with your delineation of duties with the United States Government?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did we get an answer to that last question, Mr. Morris?

Mrs. KEENEY. The last question was—I am not acquainted with the exhibit.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not acquainted with it?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read from paragraph 3 of our exhibit 364.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that in the printed hearings, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has a copy of those hearings been tendered to the witness and counsel?

Mr. MORRIS. It has not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can that be done?

Mr. MORRIS. It has not been printed yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it and then they can hear it.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Incidentally, the people who served on the committee before and who are still in Washington are: Catherine Porter (probably will have left by then), Isabel Ward, Eleanore Lattimore, Abbot Low Moffat (and Mrs. Moffat), Mortimer Graves (and Mrs. Graves), Pat and Bob Barnett, Margaret and William Carter, Shirley Jenkins, Karl Pelzer (and Mrs. Pelzer), Lillian Coville.

The additions who have been approved to date by the above people and whom I hope to have at the first meeting are: John Barrow (replaces Dr. Arndt at the U. S. Office of Education), Ethel Summy of Wilson Teachers College, Mr. and Mrs. Selden Menefee, Mary Jane Keeney (now in charge of programs at the Metropolitan Broadcasting Co.). * * *

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your name?

Mrs. KEENEY. I must decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait, what is your name?

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman——

Senator FERGUSON. I merely want to know whether it is the same name as has been read.

Mr. AMERLING. I do not know if it is the same person.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about persons, I am talking about names.

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, my name is Mary Jane Keeney.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you engage in the activity reported in that letter, Mrs. Keeney?

Mrs. KEENEY. I must decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a program director at the Metropolitan Broadcasting Co.?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever in charge of programs at the Metropolitan?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever work for that company?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Keeney, will you proceed to enumerate the positions that you held in the United States Government?

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I may have, for the record, that document identified as to its source and context of that paragraph that was just read.

Mr. MORRIS. It has already been identified in our public record, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. It is in the public record as exhibit 364, open hearing on January 29, 1952.

Mr. MORRIS. A copy of that will be made available to you today, if you like.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, we will get you a copy.

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Mr. AMERLING. And incorporate it in its entirety by reference in this hearing?

Mrs. KEENEY. Will the reporter tell me at what point I ceased to testify on my record of United States employment? I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you go forward from November of 1945?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes. In November of 1945 I was appointed a member of the German Economics Group, attached to the staff of the United States representative to the Allied Commission on Reparations.

I was in Europe with the Reparations Commission from November until early in March 1946.

When I returned, I found that the Office of Foreign Economic Administration, where I had been employed, had been blanketed into the State Department, sometime during that absence, at what time I do not know.

I remained in the Office until its liquidation on June 30, 1946, and resigned from the State Department, entirely voluntary, Mr. Morris, and with honors, on July 15, 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. What was you next employment after that?

Mrs. KEENEY. My next employment after that was with the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone in the State Department aid you in obtaining employment with the United Nations?

Mrs. KEENEY. That again represents a very great difficulty.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us why, Mrs. Keeney?

Mrs. KEENEY. It represents this difficulty, that when I appeared as a witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in June 1949, I was under instructions from the Bureau of Personnel of the United Nations that on matters of appointment and all matters of internal administration I was not authorized to testify.

This comes under the staff rules and regulations with respect to unpublished information, and with respect to unpublished information a member of the Secretariat is bound under staff rule 7, even after separation from the service of the United Nations, to observe the sanctity of unpublished information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now employed by the United Nations?

Mrs. KEENEY. No, I am not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you desire to offer for the record the staff rule to which you referred?

Mrs. KEENEY. I read it to—I showed it to Mr. Morris. I will be glad to read it to you.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you desired to offer it for the record.

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Am I correct in understanding that it is on the basis of this rule and the instructions previously made to you——

Mrs. KEENEY. No, the instructions previously made to me were on the basis of many more rules and regulations as well as articles 100, 103, and I believe article 105 of the Charter.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not want to put any words into your mouth, but I do want to give you an opportunity to make the record complete as to why you are now declining to answer this question.

Mrs. KEENEY. I decline to answer the question because of my previous instructions under rules and regulations, articles 100, 103, and I believe also 105 of the Charter, and also specifically staff rule 7, the

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pertinent line of which reads: "This obligation does not cease with separation from service."

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you are making the point, are you, that your instructions and these rules and regulations of the United Nations excuse you from answering the question which this committee has put to you?

Mrs. KEENEY. I am pleading that the rules and regulations bind me.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the extent that you are justified in refusing to answer the committee's question, is that your contention?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not claiming immunity under the fifth amendment with regard to this question, are you?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not claim that to answer this question would tend to incriminate you?

Mrs. KEENEY. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are refusing to answer this question, are you, solely on the grounds that you are bound by the directive, the rules, and the regulations of the United Nations, and that being so bound you contend you are justified in refusing to answer the committee's question, is that right?

Mrs. KEENEY. I contend that I am barred from answering it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Barred?

Mrs. KEENEY. Barred.

Senator FERGUSON. Not permitted to answer?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, not permitted to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. By statute, you mean?

Mrs. KEENEY. By previous——

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman, may I interject here? I take it the position of the witness is that the status of the U. N. Charter having been adopted by the United States Senate has equivalent status to a treaty status, and that this rule 7 takes its authority from article 105 of that Charter.

Therefore, to that extent she is precluded from giving any information which the rule proscribes as to any unpublished information which she gained as a result of her employment at the United Nations.

Senator FERGUSON. Counsel, you also know that the witness acts at her peril on interpreting as to whether or not the question does come within the rule, and also the question as to whether or not the rule is a valid statute, now part of the Constitution, allowing witnesses to claim privilege under this.

Mr. AMERLING. Well, Mr. Chairman, she does not claim that it is part of the Constitution. She does not assert that it is part of the Constitution as a result of the adoption of the United Nations Charter by the United States Senate.

But she maintains that this is a binding rule so far as her conduct is concerned, that this is unpublished information, and that the prohibition applies to her disclosing this information to anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you adopt the statement just made by your counsel?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you contend that this rule is more binding upon you than your obligation under the oath you have just taken to tell

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the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to this commitee?

Mrs. KEENEY. That is a very good question. I would like to consult my counsel.

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman, as a reply to that question, I think it is the witness' position that this body does not have the power and should not compel her to violate that rule; and that it is not a question of superior obligation or duty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you adopt that?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the question be read back which the witness has refused to answer, and concerning which we have had colloquy since.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel that you have had a fair analysis, had the right to give a fair analysis of your reasons?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have anything else to say about why you refuse to answer this question?

Mrs. KEENEY. You must remember, Mr. Ferguson, that I am a layman; I am not an international lawyer.

My conduct in this matter is regulated, originally, by specific instructions from the Bureau of Personnel, which I assume had the benefit of the advice of international lawyers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true that you are not taking the position you are taking here solely on the basis of your own assumption as to what the law is, but that you are here with counsel and that you have had advice of counsel in this matter?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, I have had advice of counsel in this matter, but it rests, of course, my answer rests, upon instructions from which I do not feel that I can be absolved.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your refusal, you recognize, as the Chair has pointed out, is your own and the consequences of that refusal will rest upon you and not upon your counsel? Do you recognize that?

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I said you do it at your peril. That is a statement that we lawyers use because we want it well understood.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your refusal is your own, is it?

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel cannot claim privilege.

Mrs. KEENEY. I realize that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not claiming privilege, are you?

Mrs. KEENEY. No, I am not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not claiming that this will incriminate?

Senator FERGUSON. The right to refuse to answer, she is claiming that, is it not?

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness is simply refusing to answer on the ground that the committee has no power to compel her to answer and should not compel her to answer because she is bound by rules, regulations, and orders previously received by the United Nations, is that correct?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. AMERLING. Can I supplement that statement, then. Her present understanding of her obligations in this respect are based upon the official instructions which were originally given to her which covered precisely this area of information. So that it is on the basis

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of having previously gotten official rulings and instructions from the UN personnel, and the presumption that they understand the coverage and the intent, or intended coverage, of that section that she takes the position she presently takes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you adopt that as your answer?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you considered the question of whether or not the United Nation treaty is self-executing?

Mrs. KEENEY. I would be incapable of answering that question because I do not understand it.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the question which the witness refused to answer be read back?

Senator FERGUSON. Read the question to the witness.

(The question was read by the reporter as follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone in the State Department aid you in obtaining employment with the United Nations?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still decline to answer that question for the reasons you have given and in light of the discussion which has taken place?

Mrs. KEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I request that the witness be directed to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. The Chair now, Madam, orders you to answer the question.

Mrs. KEENEY. May I confer with my counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. KEENEY (after consultation). With all due respect to you, Senator Ferguson, and to the powers of the United States Senate, I feel that for the reasons I have already stated I must decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. You may call the next witness. I will excuse this witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane will be the next witness.

TESTIMONY OF HUGH GORDON DEANE, JR., BRONXVILLE, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY LEONARD BOUDIN, ESQ., NEW YORK, N. Y.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, Mr. Deane.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. DEANE. Hugh Gordon Deane, Jr., 790 Bronx River Road, Bronxville, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. I am on the staff of the New York Daily Compass.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, you have been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DEANE. No; I have not been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I have been a member for some time, and I have had several other minor connections with it, but I haven't been active in it. I haven't been employed by the institute, nor with one exception have I contributed to its publications.

Senator FERGUSON. One publication, you did contribute to it?

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Mr. DEANE. Yes. I wrote one article on request for the Far Eastern Review, concerning the Chinese industrial cooperatives in 1941.

After I saw how the manuscript had been edited and revised, I asked that my name be removed from the published version.

My name was printed in a footnote saying that I had contributed material. I took this step because I had written an article friendly to the Chinese industrial cooperatives, and the manuscript as it was prepared for publication was hostile to the Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Senator FERGUSON. Yours was pro?

Mr. DEANE. Mine was pro; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, have you been an employee of the Coordinator of Information?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you an employee of the Coordinator of Information?

Mr. DEANE. I was an employee from December 1941 until December 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you obtain that position?

Mr. DEANE. I first applied for a general job with the Government, through the Civil Service Commission. Later I was interviewed by the Personnel Office of the Coordinator of Information, and by Mr. Irving Pflamm in whose section I later worked.

Mr. MORRIS. While you worked for the Coordinator of Information, Mr. Deane, did you ask the Institute of Pacific Relations to aid you in your programing?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I did. At the direction of my superiors, whose names I don't recall——

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would try to recall the names of your superiors, Mr. Deane. Who directed you to get aid from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DEANE. I don't remember which person it was above me who directed me to do this.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the persons above you?

Mr. DEANE. Mr. Pflamm——

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know his first name?

Mr. DEANE. Irving Pflamm, and Carl Crow.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you spell that last name?

Mr. DEANE. C-r-o-w. There were quite a number of other persons who were above me in the hierarchy, since I was at the very bottom of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you at that time a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DEANE. I believe I was then a member of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Miss Miriam Farley at that time?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know Miss Miriam Farley?

Mr. DEANE. I, at that time, had been back from China for some months, and I had met her during those months.

She was, I believe, one of the persons to whom I asked help at the direction of my superiors when we were trying to get the institute to cooperate in the preparation of propaganda broadcasts to Asia, some of which I was writing.

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Senator FERGUSON. You were then an employee of the State Department?

Mr. DEANE. Was the Coordinator of Information under the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you. At least it was under the United States Government?

Mr. DEANE. It was under the United States Government; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you not think it was State Department?

Mr. DEANE. I am sorry, I do not know what the precise status of it was.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, you have before you a copy of a letter.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a photostat of a copy of a letter, dated January 10, 1942, addressed to Miss Miriam Farley, signed Hugh Deane.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive it into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 443" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 443

[Copy]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
RADIO NEWS ROOM,
Washington, D. C., January 10, 1942.

Miss MIRIAM FARLEY,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MIRIAM: As you may have heard, via the grapevine, I am now working for the Coordinator of Information.

We are putting out a daily broadcast to Japan, "Japan vs. Japan," sent in Japanese, as well as in English. As you can guess, this is some task.

Therefore, I'm writing to ask your help, and the help of the IPR. You can guess what sort of stuff we are interested in—material about economic and political problems and travails inside Japan, about Japanese political activities in conquered areas, about such things as evidence of graft in high place in China, etc.

Could you send me a file of the Far Eastern Survey for the last 3 months, and send me the Survey from now on. Send me the bill.

Any suggestions that you have will be much appreciated, and any material which you can supply will be most gratefully received.

I wish that we could get together and have a talk sometime. When you or Catherine, or any of your colleagues, are down this way, give me a ring. If you need a place to stay, you can always stay with my wife and me.

Best regards,

(Signed) HUGH (Deane).

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record might be clear, Mr. Mandel, is it correct that what was found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, now in the possession of this committee, was a document marked "copy" and purporting to be a copy of this particular letter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, do you remember sending that letter?

Mr. DEANE. I don't recall particular letters that I wrote. It is such a long time ago. But the letter does look familiar.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the third paragraph, please?

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Mr. MANDEL. It reads as follows:

Therefore, I'm writing to ask your help, and the help of the IPR. You can guess what sort of stuff we are interested in—material about economic and political problems and travails inside Japan, about Japanese political activities in conquered areas, about such things as evidence of graft in high place in China, etc.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, do you remember writing that paragraph?

Mr. DEANE. As I say, I can't be precise about correspondence that has taken place so long ago. Again, the letter looks familiar to me.

Mr. MORRIS. You will not deny that you wrote the letter?

Mr. DEANE. I am in no position to deny that I wrote the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would identify this letter of January 12 which purports to be an answer of Miss Farley to Mr. Deane.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 12, 1942, to Mr. Hugh Deane, Radio Newsroom, Coordinator of Information, and signed Miriam Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. That will be received as part of the record.

(The document refered to was marked "Exhibit No. 444" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 444

JANUARY 12, 1942.

Mr. HUGH DEANE,
Radio Newsroom, Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR HUGH: It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us; we are standing on our heads.

One rather obvious suggestion that occurs to me offhand is to plug Hull's note of November 26 and other American statements such as our note of December 1938 indicating that the United States was always willing to consider the peaceful alteration of the status quo including economic concessions to Japan. "We made you a fair offer but your military leaders rejected it and chose war," etc. Another rather obvious line which has doubtless already occurred to you is, "the Nazis are not your friends, they look down on the Japanese race and are just using you for their own purposes." This can be backed up by quotations from Nazi writings, the kind of thing that is found in the special section of Asia magazine for November 1941.

For our part we shall of course be much interested to know the kind of stuff that our Government is broadcasting to Japan. Would it be possible for us to obtain a file of transcripts of these broadcasts? It seems to me that it would be a very good thing if at a little later date the Far Eastern Survey could carry a short article describing American propaganda to Japan providing that this is consistent to the policy of your department.

You will be interested to know, in case you have not already heard, that we are about to open an office in Washington for the purpose of keeping in touch with all of the various departments of the Government which are working on the Far East. Bob Barnett is to be in charge and some of the rest of us will doubtless get down occasionally. I know that Bob will want to look you up as soon as he gets established.

I am passing your order for the Far Eastern Survey on to the subscripton department.

Sincerely yours,

MIRIAM FARLEY.

Mr. DEANE. Mr. Chairman, if it is appropriate now, I would like to put into the record a comment on this third paragraph.

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Senator FERGUSON. All right, you may comment on it.

Mr. DEANE. I will confine my comment to the last phrase "by such things as evidence of graft in high place in China, etc."

To a person unfamiliar with the situation it might seem that I was referring to evidence of graft in the Chinese Nationalist Government. Certainly, plenty of that evidence exists.

But in fact, I was referring here to evidence of graft in the Japanese puppet government set up in China. We had received information that there was a great deal of graft. We thought at the time that if we could get more evidence it would be a useful item for our propaganda in Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. You were putting out a daily broadcast to Japan, Japan versus Japan. What did you mean by that?

Mr. DEANE. Japan against Japan was the name of a daily broadcast beamed from San Francisco to Japan containing propaganda designed to alienate the Japanese people from the Japanese Government.

Along with that there was a program called Victory for Japan, some scripts of which I also wrote, and also the COI broadcast programs called Victory for the Philippines, Victory for Thailand, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, do you remember receiving that letter of January 12, 1942? This is a copy of it. It has been identified and introduced into the record.

Mr. DEANE. Again I cannot make an absolute statement about a letter received in January 1942. But again I will say that the letter looks familiar to me.

Mr. MORRIS. And that letter purports to be a cataloging of recommendations that Miriam Farley was asking you to be on the lookout for in the Coordinator of Information office?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as they are now fully in the record, and for the sake of expediency, I would like to move on.

Senator FERGUSON. You may move on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here a copy of a letter of February 2, 1942, from Mr. Hugh Deane.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, of a letter dated February 2, 1942, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, signed Hugh Deane.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 445" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 445

WWL: From ECC, Feb. 4, 1942.
Precisely what does Hugh Deane want of the IPR? (Pencilled:) ECC.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., February 2, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER.

DEAR MR. CARTER: My apologies for not writing you sooner. I guess I'm getting to be a typical bureaucrat, I keep putting things off.

I have discussed your suggestions about utilizing Shortwave Research through the IPR with some people down here, and I am writing a memorandum about it to Joseph Barnes in the New York office.

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Frankly, I am rather vague about what Shortwave Research could do for us. I don't know precisely what sort of material they could compile for our use. We would be interested, of course, in material about Chinese activities in this country and about right-thinking Japanese.

Could you give me a better idea about your proposition? Sorry to have to trouble you.

I was glad to have a chat with you in New York, short as it was, and hope that I will get a chance to see you again.

Very truly yours,

[s] HUGH DEANE.

(Pencilled note:) ECC. Except for the fact that I'm one of three or four people here who have had genial but meaningless letters from Deane, I know nothing about what he's doing. WWL.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read several paragraphs from that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR MR. CARTER: My apologies for not writing you sooner. I guess I'm getting to be a typical bureaucrat, I keep putting things off.

I have discussed your suggestions about utilizing Shortwave Research through the IPR with some people down here, and I am writing a memorandum about it to Joseph Barnes in the New York office.

Frankly, I am rather vague about what Shortwave Research could do for us. I don't know precisely what sort of material they could compile for our use. We would be interested, of course, in material about Chinese activities in this country and about right-thinking Japanese.

Could you give me a better idea about your proposition? Sorry to have to trouble you.

I was glad to have a chat with you in New York, short as it was, and hope that I will get a chance to see you again.

Very truly yours,

HUGH DEANE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, do you remember writing that?

Mr. DEANE. It is pretty new to me, but I suppose I wrote it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, what relation did Mr. Barnes have to you at that time?

Mr. DEANE. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Barnes—Mr. Barnes, in fact, was in a separate section of the COI in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he your superior?

Mr. DEANE. No; I don't believe the two sections, the section I was in, was under his, though I can't swear to it. But I have no recollection about writing any memorandum, and I have no recollection about being told to write a memorandum or contemplate it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not, however, deny the contents of this letter?

Mr. DEANE. I can only say that this letter looks familiar in the sense that this is the way I write letters.

Mr. MORRIS. And you do not deny that that letter is your letter, a copy of your letter?

Mr. DEANE. I cannot affirm it positively, but I cannot deny it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, while you were an employee of the Coordinator of Information, to what extent did you carry on an exchange of information such as indicated by these last three letters with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DEANE. Not to a very great extent. The Institute of Pacific Relations, apparently, as I recall, never did help us to any great extent on these particular broadcasts that we were preparing, and I believe that our effort to get more cooperation from them didn't work out very well.

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Mr. MORRIS. When you left the Coordinator of Information, what was your next employment?

Mr. DEANE. I joined the Navy in December 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you take a Japanese language course, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. I took a Japanese language course at Boulder, Colo.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you remain a Japanese language officer?

Mr. DEANE. I remained a Japanese language officer until approximately March 1946, when my discharge from the Navy was completed.

Mr. MORRIS. During that time were you classified as an intelligence officer?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I was.

Senator FERGUSON. And were you an intelligence officer?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. And as such, did you have access to classified documents, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. I had some access to classified documents.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DEANE. I must decline to answer that question for the following two reasons: First, this question involves freedom of speech; in particular, since I am a working newspaperman it involves freedom of the press, and, therefore, I avail myself of the protection offered by the first amendment of the Constitution.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Before you get to the second one, could I ask you some questions?

In other words, you claim that a man can refuse to answer a question before a committee because he has the freedom of speech, the freedom not to answer. Is that right?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And the second question, that you are a newspaperman, and as a newspaperman you have the freedom to refuse to answer a question?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; the freedom of press is an aspect of the freedom of speech.

Senator FERGUSON. And you claim that you have the right rather than to speak, not to speak, as a newspaperman?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that it?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will not be able to recognize your two rights as you define them under the first, because I don't think that the Constitution allows anyone to use those two reasons for failing to answer a question material to the issue.

You may proceed to your next reason that you were going to give.

Mr. DEANE. And secondly, I avail myself of the privilege of the fifth amendment, which, I am advised by counsel, has been interpreted by the courts as designed to cover the innocent as well as the guilty.

Senator FERGUSON. And you realize that the provision in that constitutional amendment is that one need not testify against himself?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or testify to anything that would tend to incriminate him?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, sir.

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Senator FERGUSON. I will recognize your second reason, the fifth amendment. I will not require you to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, before I get too far away from it, I would like also to introduce into the record a letter dated January 16——

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask another question.

While you were an intelligence officer of the United States, and entitled to classified information, I will ask you whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DEANE. I must decline to answer for the reasons cited above.

Senator FERGUSON. I will not require you to repeat those reasons. They were just given.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you identify this letter of January 16?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original letter on the letterhead of the Coordinator of Information, Washington, D. C., Radio News Division, dated January 16, 1942 to Mr. Edward C. Carter, signed Hugh Deane.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read that letter, please, into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR MR. CARTER. Thanks for your prompt reply. I plan to come to New York next Friday, January 23, and hope to have a chat with you.

Here's the dope generally about our broadcasts. We have a staff of four, in Washington, a couple of more people in New York, and an office in San Francisco. In San Francisco our scripts are translated. We broadcast from KGEI in San Francisco. To Japan, the stuff goes in Japanese and English. To China, in Mandarin and Cantonese, not Shanghai as yet. Also English of course.

Mr. BOUDIN. Are you suggesting that was not in every appropriation hearing?

Mr. MORRIS. We are asking the witness if he was authorized to dispense that information.

What is your answer, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. To the best of my recollection, my dealings with the IPR were at the direction of my superiors.

I was a rather minor official, and I didn't take it upon myself to inaugurate any such program. I wasn't authorized to send myself up to New York.

The fact was that we had the task of broadcasting to Asia, and we wanted to get the cooperation of people who were experts in the field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be admitted into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, it will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 446" and was read in full:)

Mr. MANDEL (continuing):

We are broadcasting only in short wave. But in a couple of weeks, we hope to start pumping the stuff in long wave.

We get fairly complete reports from the FCC's monitoring service, and, of course, find them very useful.

When in New York, I hope to get some good material from you. We are planning a series of broadcasts under the theme Unfinished Business—i. e., about Japan's unconcluded war in China. I want to get, therefore, some material on Wang Ching-wei, etc.

Our office in Washington is at Twenty-fifth and E Streets NW. My telephone number is Executive 3300, extension 480.

Will you please inform your colleagues of my impending visit?

Hoping to see you next Friday.

Sincerely yours,

——— ———.

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Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Deane, did you not consider that the fact that we get fairly complete reports from the FCC monitoring service was a classified type of information at that time?

Mr. DEANE. I have no recollection about the FCC monitoring service.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, is that your signature? That is an original letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think information like that would be classified during a war, that they were monitoring certain broadcasts and you were getting the information?

Mr. DEANE. The only relevant information I can give you, Mr. Chairman, is this: As I understand it, the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service is now undertaking this job of monitoring foreign newscasts, and that the FBIS releases or makes available to private organizations and private persons, daily, the results of its monitoring a foreign broadcast.

Senator FERGUSON. But when we were at war, did you not consider that that kind of information was classified information?

Mr. DEANE. I have no recollection of my consideration of the question at all or of even the fact that we were getting FCC broadcasts.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your signature, Mr. Deane?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; that is my signature.

Senator FERGUSON. Was IPR giving you help on these broadcasts?

Mr. DEANE. Yes. We were trying to get more help from the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who in the IPR was giving you help, so as to help you broadcast to the Pacific and China and Japan?

Mr. DEANE. When I approached the institute I talked to quite a number of people in it, and I gathered from these letters that I approached Mr. Carter and Miss Farley, and some others. I don't recall the details now.

Senator FERGUSON. Did your superiors know that you were getting information from the IPR?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And for the IPR? The Senator's question was from the IPR, and I add for the IPR. You see, you were supplying IPR with information here.

Mr. BOUDIN. What information was being furnished?

Mr. MORRIS. The letter itself is information, the second paragraph:

> Here's the dope generally about our broadcasts. We have a staff of four in Washington, a couple more people in New York, and an office in San Francisco. In San Francisco our scripts are translated. We broadcast from KGEI in San Francisco. To Japan, the stuff going in Japanese and English. To China, in Mandarin and Cantonese; not Shanghai as yet. Also English, of course.
>
> We are broadcasting only in short wave. But in a couple of weeks we hope to start pumping the stuff in long wave.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, have you been a consultant with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. DEANE. I will decline to answer for the reasons which I have stated earlier in the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is?

Senator FERGUSON. The fifth amendment, if that is what you mean; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. The fifth, not the first?

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Mr. DEANE. I will simply refer to my previous answer.

Senator FERGUSON. You may ask the next question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into the record the Far East Spotlight, March 1949, or at least the index of that volume. It shows that Mr. Deane was in fact a contributor to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

May the whole page in its entirety go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received; yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 447," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 447

FAR EAST SPOTLIGHT

A monthly report on U. S. Policy and internal events in China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Southeast Asia and India.

MARCH 1949

The Tokyo Martyrs *by Agnes Smedley* 3
New China's Economic Policy 5
Elections Mark Japan Change *by Hugh Deane* 6
Never Let the Right Hand Know 7
The New Delhi Conference *by Gerhard Hagelberg* 8
Action Program for New China Policy 10
Call to Students 12
Turning Point for Chinese Students *by John Foster* 13
Toward U. S. Trade With New China 14
Washington Pipeline 14
Far East Reading—Japan Diary by Mark Gayn, *reviewed by Philip Keeney* 15
In North Korea by Anna Louise Strong, *reviewed by H. W. Sunoo* 16
Far East Briefs 18

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OFFICERS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC FAR EASTERN POLICY:

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The Editor will consider manuscripts submitted, but assumes no responsibility regarding them.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been a correspondent for the Allied Labor News?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. And for what other syndicates?

Mr. DEANE. Tele-Press.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become a correspondent for Allied Labor News and Tele-Press?

Mr. DEANE. The summer of 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. And where did you carry out your assignments?

Mr. DEANE. Tokyo, Japan.

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Mr. MORRIS. Were you a fully accredited correspondent at SCAP headquarters?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any difficulty at SCAP headquarters?

Mr. DEANE. Yes; I had some difficulty at SCAP headquarters, like most of my colleagues.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were at SCAP headquarters, I will ask you whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DEANE. I must decline to answer for the same reasons which I have given before, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Deane, did you ever have a by-line article in the Daily Worker?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, I believe I did. My articles to Allied Labor News were distributed to some 150 or more clients, of whom the Daily Worker was 1.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Allied Labor News in the habit of dispensing articles to the Daily Worker?

Mr. DEANE. Since the Daily Worker subscribed to Allied Labor News, it received everything that Allied Labor News distributed.

Mr. MORRIS. And by arrangement with the Daily Worker, was it enabled to take an article of yours, written under the auspices of the Allied Labor News, and put it into the Daily Worker with your by-line?

Mr. DEANE. Yes, it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you find that an objectionable fact?

Mr. DEANE. I had no objection.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the staff of the China Monthly Review?

Mr. DEANE. I am listed as a contributing editor to the China Monthly Review.

Mr. MORRIS. As of today?

Mr. DEANE. As of today.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is that now published?

Mr. DEANE. That magazine is published in Shanghai, China.

Mr. MORRIS. In Communist China?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Under Communist auspices?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you consider that a Communist magazine?

Mr. DEANE. I will decline to characterize it for the reasons I have stated above.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, the fifth amendment and the first amendment. I will recognize it for the fifth amendment.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a correspondent for the China Weekly Review?

Mr. DEANE. The China Weekly Review is the predecessor of the China Monthly Review, and I have written for the China Weekly Review for approximately 10 or 12 years.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an expert on the Far East?

Mr. DEANE. I write on the Far East on the basis of considerable background and with considerable care to the facts.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever written under an alias?

Mr. DEANE. No, I haven't.

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Senator FERGUSON. Always your own name?

Mr. DEANE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been a contributor to the Far Eastern Survey? That is the publication of the IPR.

Mr. DEANE. Yes. As I explained earlier, I wrote one piece for the Far East Survey, from which I requested that my name be deleted.

My name was printed as a footnote, saying that I had contributed material to the article. This was the article about the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever contributed to Pacific Affairs?

Mr. DEANE. No, I haven't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions at this moment.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney.

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP O. KEENEY, NEW YORK CITY, ACCOMPANIED BY SARAM AMERLING, ESQ., NEW YORK CITY

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Keeney, you have been sworn. State your full name and address.

Mr. KEENEY. Philip O. Keeney, 41 King Street, New York City.

Senator FERGUSON. And your last occupation?

Mr. KEENEY. My last occupation was with the War Department in Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you quit that occupation?

Mr. KEENEY. May 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. You are the husband of the lady who testified here previously, Mary Jane?

Mr. KEENEY. Yes, I am.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, Mary Jane Keeney?

Mr. KEENEY. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, were you the principal speaker at a luncheon held under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the fourth floor at Seventeenth and K Streets NW, in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. KEENEY. I decline to to answer that question on the reasons given in the fifth amendment, of self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. You understand the question is were you the speaker at a luncheon held under the auspices of the IPR?

Mr. KEENEY. Yes; I understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel to identify this document and read that one paragraph, and have it read into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of American Institute of Pacific Relations. There is no date. It reads as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 448

You are cordially invited to attend the IPR luncheon Wednesday, December 11, 12:30 p. m., fourth floor dining room, YWCA, Seventeenth and K. Streets NW. Speakers will be Martin Bennett, industrial engineer, who was special assistant to Mr. Pauley, member of the first reparations mission to Japan and chief of staff of the second mission to Manchuria. Mr. Bennett will talk on the Pauley reparations report on Japan, which was recently presented to the President.

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Philip O. Keeney, who recently returned from Japan. As libraries officer for the Civil Information and Education Division of SCAP, Mr. Keeney covered all the islands. He will speak on conditions in Japan generally.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be included in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that you were listed to speak?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason, Senator Ferguson.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were the librarian in Japan, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. KEENEY. Senator Ferguson, I refuse to answer that question for the same reason, self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, have you been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question, Mr. Morris, for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you contributed to the Far Eastern Survey, which is the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, were you ever treasurer of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think the index of the Far Eastern Spotlight which we introduced into the record during the testimony of the last witness makes mention of the fact that Philip O. Keeney was there listed as treasurer.

Senator FERGUSON. Your name is Philip O. Keeney?

Mr. KEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you write an article called Reorganization of the Japanese Public Library System, which appeared in two parts in the January 28, 1948, and the February 11, 1948, issues of the Far East Spotlight, which was the official publication of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know as to whether or not it was a fact that Communists were put into the schools and colleges after the surrender of Japan?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question, Senator Ferguson, for the reason given above.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not you knew that Communists were put into the labor unions in Japan after their surrender in August of 1945.

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Keeney, when did you first take employment with the United States Government?

Mr. KEENEY. In January 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold at that time?

Mr. KEENEY. I had a position in the Reference Department in the Library of Congress.

How long did you hold that position?

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Mr. KEENEY. I held that position for approximately 5 months when I was made acting chief of the Accessions Division in the Library of Congress.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position as Acting Chief of the Accessions Division?

Mr. KEENEY. I held that position until September 19—I think it was 1941 when I went to the—I became the library officer to the Coordinator of Information, which became later on OSS.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Keeney, would you say it would be advantageous for Communists to put a Communist into the Library of Congress of the United States?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason I stated above.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, the fifth amendment?

Mr. KEENEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were an employee of the Coordinator of Information, were you acquainted with the previous witness before this committee, Mr. Hugh Deane?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question, and state the reason I mentioned above.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Hugh Deane?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason I mentioned above.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, did you receive this into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive it.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 448" and was read into the record in full. See p. 2791.)

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next employment in the Government, Mr. Keeney?

Mr. KEENEY. I think it was approximately September 1943. I became Chief of the Documents Security Section for the Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you work under that employment?

Mr. KEENEY. At Q Street.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next employment, Mr. Keeney?

Mr. KEENEY. I went to Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. What assignment did you have in Japan?

Mr. KEENEY. In Japan I became the libraries officer for SCAP.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Keeney, when you were in the Library, working in the Library of Congress, did you have anything to do with a special room known as the Russian Room where there was Russian literature?

Mr. KEENEY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have anything to do with that?

Mr. KEENEY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that shortly after you went into the Library, papers disappeared out of that room, and they have not been able to locate them?

Mr. KEENEY. It is the first I have ever heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell the committee the nature of your duties as a chief librarian at SCAP headquarters? What was the title you gave?

Mr. KEENEY. Well, I was called libraries officer. I traveled quite widely through Japan, seeing the demolition that had occurred to

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Japanese libraries, and tried to discuss with Japanese librarians the best way to rehabilitate those buildings, and tried to work out legislation that would be advantageous for the rehabilitation of those libraries, and also I tried to improve the standard of librarians in Japan, get them larger salaries because they were grossly underpaid.

That was my main function.

Mr. MORRIS. While holding that position, did you encounter various members of the Institute of Pacific Relations who visited Japan?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason stated above.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at that time encounter Mr. Owen Lattimore, who was in Japan with the Pauley Reparations Commission?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason stated above.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you engage in extensive conversation with Lattimore?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that question for the reason stated.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know Owen Lattimore?

Mr. KEENEY. Senator Ferguson, I refuse to answer that question for the reason stated above.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Edward C. Carter?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. W. L. Holland?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that for the reason stated above.

Mr. MORRIS. Philip H. Jessup?

Mr. KEENEY. I refuse to answer that for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest in view of the witness' attitude that we desist from pursuing this line of inquiry any further. It is obvious that he is not going to give us any answers about the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. You refuse to answer any question, I understand it, in relation to the Institute of Pacific Relations, is that right, on the ground that it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. KEENEY. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is no use to proceed any further.

Mr. MORRIS. I suggest that we adjourn until 2:30 tomorrow, Senator.

Senator, our witness at 2:30 tomorrow has been summoned to appear, but until we hear that he is going to be here I suggest that we do not announce his identity.

Mr. AMERLING. Mr. Chairman, I take it the present witnesses are excused?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, they are.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 2:30 tomorrow afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 p. m., Monday, February 18, 1952, the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., Tuesday, February 19, 1951.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland, presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness today will be Mr. Weyl.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you raise your right hand, please?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate of the United States will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WEYL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF NATHANIEL WEYL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, will you give your name and address, full name and address, to the reporter, please?

Mr. WEYL. Nathaniel Weyl, 1718 P Street NW, Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. Writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, I have, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you join the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. I joined the Communist Party either in very late 1932 or very early 1933, I believe the latter.

Mr. MORRIS. How old were you at the time?

Mr. WEYL. Twenty-two years old.

Mr. MORRIS. When you joined the Communist Party, Mr. Weyl, were you assigned to a particular unit or a particular cell?

Mr. WEYL. You mean when I first joined the Communist Party?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, when you first joined.

Mr. WEYL. I was assigned to what is known as a fraction as distinguished from a cell.

Mr. MORRIS. What city was this in?

Mr. WEYL. This was in New York City, and the fraction was in the National Student League.

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Senator EASTLAND. What is the difference between a fraction and a cell?

Mr. WEYL. A fraction consists of a group of Communists who are working inside an organization.

Senator EASTLAND. Is that for the purpose of controlling the organization?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; that is right.

Senator EASTLAND. What organization did you want to control?

Mr. WEYL. The organization was called the National Student League. It was a Communist organization among the students, and has subsequently been cited as subversive, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not clear. A fraction would work in that particular organization?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; and would consist of members of the organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEYL. Whereas, a cell would consist of the Communists living in a certain neighborhood or perhaps working in a certain industry. No, I believe working in a certain industry would mean fraction.

Senator FERGUSON. That would mean, technically, a fraction?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is the Communist fraction of an industry, is that right, or of an organization?

Mr. WEYL. Or of an organization, trade-union.

Mr. MORRIS. It is that portion of the whole organization that is made up of Communists?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And I assume that that is for the purpose so that they can exert their efforts in that particular industry or organization like your student movement, and so forth?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir; either an organization which they do not control and which they wish to control, or one which they already control, which was the case with the National Student League. They merely desired to maintain control.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you assigned to that?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I think I can say I was assigned to it, but may I answer that more fully?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I wish you would.

Mr. WEYL. I joined the National Student League before I joined the Communist Party, and I was placed, to the best of my recollection—I was placed on the executive committee almost immediately because I had been fairly prominent in Socialist student affairs. So when I joined the Communist Party I became a member of the fraction of that organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, Mr. Weyl, how long did you remain in that particular activity in New York City for the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Morris, until my study terminated, which was the end of the academic year, I presume, May or June.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the year 1934?

Mr. WEYL. No, 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you leave New York at that time, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I was a graduate student.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you go?

Mr. WEYL. I was a graduate student at Columbia University.

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Mr. MORRIS. And did you return back to your home?

Mr. WEYL. You mean immediately thereafter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. WEYL. Immediately thereafter I went to my mother's home for the summer, in Woodstock, N. Y., and then was requested to come down to Washington for a job in the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Who requested you?

Mr. WEYL. Thomas C. Blaisdell. May I add to that answer that I am convinced that Mr. Blaisdell was never a Communist or a sympathizer of the Communist Party. He had known me principally in the relation of teacher to student.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony, Mr. Weyl, that Mr. Blaisdell's asking you to Washington bore no relation whatever to your work within the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Precisely. I want to emphasize that.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you know Mr. Blaisdell?

Mr. WEYL. At Columbia, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. What did he teach at Columbia?

Mr. WEYL. He taught economics.

Senator EASTLAND. What department employed you in Washington?

Mr. WEYL. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to know about this: Did Blaisdell know that there was such an organization as the youth movement there, the student movement?

Mr. WEYL. I believe he must have, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it a secret that the Communists had obtained control of that organization?

Mr. WEYL. Well, that is very hard for me to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering how you young folks kept this such a great secret that the professors did not catch on to what you were doing.

Mr. WEYL. Well, Senator, as far as I was concerned, I was always, at Columbia, perfectly open about my views.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was known that you were a Communist?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I said so.

Senator FERGUSON. You said so?

Mr. WEYL. I wrote articles under my own name. Now, all I am saying——

Senator FERGUSON. Then Mr. Blaisdell must have know you were.

Senator EASTLAND. Let him answer. Go ahead and finish your answer, sir.

Mr. WEYL. The rest that I would like to is this, and, of course, here we are speculating about what goes on in another man's mind——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you what goes on in his mind.

Mr. WEYL. But it is very possible, and I would judge probable, that Mr. Blaisdell, having no interest in student and campus politics, paid very little attention to this sort of thing, which was ascertainable, and if he did have an opinion that I was radical he may well have thought that this was simply a disease of youth.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were going to take that disease with you down into Government and it was a rather contagious disease, was it not?

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Mr. WEYL. It certainly turned out to be, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean, there was not any doubt that communism was contagious among youth.

Mr. WEYL. That is correct; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. As you described it, a disease.

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Blaisdell's job down here in the Government?

Mr. WEYL. He was the Assistant Chief of the Consumer's Council of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Would you like an explanation of what they did?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEYL. The organization, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, had two main functions: One was the crop restriction program and the other was marketing agreements, which involved regulation with the consent, generally, of industry of the processing industries in the agricultural field with respect to prices and fair-trade practices.

In the regulatory hearings, there would be three representatives: The commodity specialist in the Department of Agriculture, who would preside, the representative of the general counsel's office, and the representative of the Consumers' Council.

The Consumer's Council was appointed or rather was set up under the Agricultural Adjustment Act for the purpose of protecting consumer interests within the program. Therefore, we tended to oppose price regulation and restrictive devices.

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you been before that in Blaisdell's classes?

Mr. WEYL. I don't recall, Senator, that I was ever in his classes because he taught in Columbia College. I may have been. I was at the graduate school.

Senator EASTLAND. Who recommended you to him?

Mr. WEYL. It wasn't a question of anybody recommending me to him. I was a graduate student in economics and he and I have had many discussions of economic theory.

Senator EASTLAND. What I want to know is: To your knowledge, did someone recommend you to him for employment?

Mr. WEYL. That I have no knowledge of, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. When you got to Washington, did you find any other Communists in the Government here?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you come to join a Communist cell in Washington?

Mr. WEYL. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Who induced you to join a Communist cell, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. A man named Harold Ware.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist at that time?

Mr. WEYL. He was.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he work?

Mr. WEYL. He had set up a small Communist-controlled outfit called Farm Research. The name may be slightly inaccurate. I am sure Mr. Mandel could correct it himself.

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However, I did not know him in that context. He came to me stating that as a member of the party it was, of course, one of my obligations to——

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. To function in an organization of the party.

Senator EASTLAND. He knew you were a member of the party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir, Senator; from New York, from the headquarters files, I presume.

Senator EASTLAND. He got that information from the Communist headquarters in New York?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were a full-fledged Communist member at that time?

Mr. WEYL. That is right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And came down here, or then you were transferred down here, is that it, to a cell?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I was such a new member of the Communist Party, Senator, that I think I did not realize that I was supposed to transfer.

Senator FERGUSON. You joined the new one down here?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. I was told that "this is the unit," and "you are in it."

Senator EASTLAND. He was assigned to a unit, is his testimony, from headquarters in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, would you tell us who were the members of that Harold Ware unit of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Mr. Morris. I hope I will not omit any names because sometimes you remember the names very well but you can't remember them to recite in a series after 19 years or so. Alger Hiss, of course, Lee Pressman, Charles Kramer, Henry Collins, John Abt.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Nathan Witt a member of that?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Victor Perlo?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say Alger Hiss, Mr. Weyl, did you see——

Mr. WEYL. Excuse me. Still with this question, should we deal with that matter we discussed in executive session, or skip it?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will come to that, Mr. Weyl.

Mr. WEYL. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Weyl has indicated he left out one name which he has given in executive session.

Senator EASTLAND. I think he should supply it.

Mr. MORRIS. He has supplied it.

Senator FERGUSON. I might say that I presided at that meeting, and the committee has that name.

Senator EASTLAND. Is there any reason why he should not testify now as to the name?

Senator FERGUSON. I think so. I will explain it to the Chair.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, when you say that Alger Hiss was a member of that unit, how do you know that Alger Hiss was a member of the Harold Ware cell of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I only know that, Mr. Morris, because I saw him there on, let us say, more than two occasions, because nobody was in

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that unit who was not a Communist Party member, and I saw him pay dues.

Senator FERGUSON. In the cell?

Mr. WEYL. In the cell.

Senator FERGUSON. You sat with him, in other words, in the cell meeting?

Mr. WEYL. Precisely.

Senator FERGUSON. On at least two occasions?

Mr. WEYL. More than two occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you estimate the number of times, Mr. Weyl, that you saw Alger Hiss in closed Communist meetings of the Harold Ware cell of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. I am afraid I couldn't do that, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it run as high as 20?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I think I have to repeat my answer for this reason: The lapse of time is 18 years. I attached no particular importance to Mr. Hiss and would have no reason to remember the number of times he was present and the number of times he was absent.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said that in the past tense, you "attached"?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, attached.

Mr. SOURWINE. No particular importance at that time?

Mr. WEYL. Of course, subsequently it has assumed very great importance.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say it was more than five times, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. If I can answer this as a guess, I would say yes.

Senator FERGUSON. A guess would not do us any good. You do testify absolutely that it was more than two?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He could not have attended a meeting of that cell once without being a Communist, could he, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. No, he could not, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator EASTLAND. You said you saw him pay dues. I think he has covered that. What about Mr. Kramer?

Mr. WEYL. I beg pardon?

Senator EASTLAND. What about Kramer? You mentioned a Mr. Kramer.

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Charles Kramer.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know whether he was employed since that time by a committee of the United States Senate?

Mr. WEYL. I so understand, Senator, from published testimony concerning a man who was, obviously the same person on the basis of the photographs then published.

Senator EASTLAND. You identify him as the same party who was a party member with you?

Mr. WEYL. That is correct, yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Could you remember the committee that employed him?

Mr. WEYL. My impression was that it was a committee under the chairmanship of Senator Pepper.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you a question. I show you the Saturday Evening Post of February 9, 1952, and I show you a picture that you were shown in executive session.

It is now torn out of here.

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Senator EASTLAND. In addition to the people which you have named, who were members of the cell to which you belonged, did you know any other Communists who were employed by the Federal Government?

Mr. WEYL. I can't recollect knowing any, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you receive information that there were other Communists in the Government?

Mr. WEYL. No; I did not. The only information bearing on that, which I received, was from Harold Ware to the effect that this unit would be confined to people of, let us say, professional grade, whose rank in the Government was either reasonably high in terms of their age, or whose prospects were fairly good.

Senator FERGUSON. But they were all in Government?

Mr. WEYL. They were all in Government, Senator, yes, except Harold Ware.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you call him?

Mr. WEYL. You would call him the organizer.

Senator FERGUSON. The organizer?

Mr. WEYL. Or the secretary of the party unit.

Senator EASTLAND. Where is he now? Do you know?

Mr. WEYL. He is dead Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Lee Pressman a member of that unit?

Mr. WEYL. He was, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you tell us more about the unit? Was it a secret unit or was it an open unit?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I would like to do that. It was very definitely a secret unit. At the time I was a member of it, it was engaged, to the best of my recollection, purely in study, that is Marxist study.

The reason given to me for the secrecy which, by the way, I rather objected to, particularly since I had not been secretive about my beliefs previously, was that all these people anticipated a permanent career in Government, and if it is known that they are Communists, although there is no legal barrier—that is, speaking at that time——

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, you could be hired even though you were an open and notorious Communist.

Mr. WEYL. You could, Senator, and, furthermore, the civil service specifically was debarred from inquiring into political affiliations.

Senator EASTLAND. By who?

Mr. WEYL. I think it is the act of 1884, the Civil Service Act. But I wouldn't be sure of the date. But, despite the legality of the matter, the way the thing was presented to me by Ware was that this would involve a very serious prejudice and destruction of these men's careers and therefore secrecy was essential.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you comply with that question of secrecy?

Mr. WEYL. I complied with it, Senator. At least I thought I complied with it. I was never quite as conspiratorial and discreet as the others would have liked.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that you sat with every one of these people that you named here, or were asked about, as being members of the cell, that you sat in this Communist cell with them on at least one occasion?

Mr. WEYL. I would say that definitely, but provided I understand the question. In saying that I sat with all of them——

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Senator FERGUSON. I do not mean at one time. At one time or another.

Mr. WEYL. At one time or another I sat with all of them, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you are giving personal knowledge that each one of them was a Communist member and sat in a cell meeting, this cell meeting, with you at least on one occasion.

I am talking about all the others besides Hiss.

Mr. WEYL. That is my testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Weyl, these people whom you have named, do you know, as a matter of fact, these are the same people who have been subsequently identified by Mr. Chambers before the House Un-American Affairs Committee, and before the Alger Hiss trials in New York?

Mr. WEYL. I do, Mr. Morris.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, at that point, I wonder if we could not make that identification more current.

Senator FERGUSON. I was going to say there is an identification in the record. I mean, we have sent for the identification and we will put it into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very well, but before we are through so that this record hooks them up with existing people whose present identity can be established.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain a member of that unit?

Mr. WEYL. I ceased to be a member of that unit in June of 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you leave the unit?

Mr. WEYL. I felt the role of being a Government official and a secret member of the party uncomfortable. I, of course, was not at liberty as a disciplined Communist to change units or change jobs at my whim or pleasure. I first approached Ware on the basis of my personal dislike for the situation and got nowhere.

I then pointed out to Mr. Ware that my presence in this cell was violative of all the rules of secrecy that he himself had set up on the grounds that I had published articles clearly identifying myself as a Communist in the Student Review and the Daily Worker, and had spoken as a Communist at gatherings up to and over 1,000 people; that this had happened in the winter of 1932–34, and so it was a matter of very easy check; that, therefore, my presence in the unit was a threat to its security, and, on that basis, I requested and obtained the right to resign from the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Hiss' position in Government at that time?

Mr. WEYL. He was an assistant counsel to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, that is, one of the two men directly under Jerome Frank, who was general counsel.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the other man?

Mr. WEYL. The other was Lee Pressman.

Mr. MORRIS. Also a member of the unit?

Mr. WEYL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you came to Washington did you become a member of this unit in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration?

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Mr. WEYL. That is a question, Senator, that the FBI asked me, and I honestly can't answer because I don't recollect.

Senator FERGUSON. About how long?

Mr. WEYL. The best recollection, and it may be a bad one, is that this unit was set up around the beginning of 1934.

Senator FERGUSON. It was set up, then, and you were in it about how long?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I am here assuming, Senator, and I think that assumption is right, that it was set up with all of the people who were then in Government brought in as members. In other words, the only persons who were members during my time, and who came in after the initial meeting, were people who joined the Government after I did.

Senator FERGUSON. What year would you say that you sat with these people in this Communist cell?

Mr. WEYL. On the basis of this recollection, which I emphasize is imperfect, I would guess that I sat in these unit meetings for approximately the first 6 months of 1934. It may have been longer.

Senator FERGUSON. But you place it as 1934?

Mr. WEYL. If this point is important, we could get closer to the time period in this sense: Charles Kramer, I recall, came in to the Government at a time when the unit was already set up. His name was then Charles Krivitsky. I am sure that there is a personnel record of the date on which he joined the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

Mr. MORRIS. And you offer that by way of giving us the precise date of which you attended these meetings?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If I might, Mr. Chairman, clear this matter up, in the Saturday Evening Post, February 9, 1952, I show you page 17 of that magazine, and I ask you as to whether or not you can identify on that page a picture of Alger Hiss, the Alger Hiss that you sat with in a Communist cell here in Washington, and who, you say, paid dues.

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator; this man [indicating].

Senator FERGUSON. You are pointing to a man in the right-hand column, the tallest one in the group; is that right?

Mr. WEYL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Standing next to a man with a hat over his face; is that correct?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; that is the identification. And that man is Alger Hiss whom I knew as a Communist Party member in 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, was Whittaker Chambers at that time a member of the Ware cell?

Mr. WEYL. No; he was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Donald Hiss?

Mr. WEYL. Mr. Donald Hiss was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, when did you tell this information that you are presenting to the committee today to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. WEYL. Approximately a month after the outbreak of war in Korea.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean that the outbreak of war in Korea caused you to give evidence to the FBI that you had withheld up to that time?

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Mr. WEYL. Yes, Mr. Morris. My break with the Communist Party was very much earlier.

Mr. MORRIS. When was your break with the Communist Party completed, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. The complete rupture with the Communist Party occurred precisely on the day that the Nazi-Soviet pact was announced, culminating a period of doubt and indecision.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first break with the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. That was when I first broke. However, I lapsed as a member of the Communist Party in 1938, I believe, but continued to do some work in Communist-controlled organizations which were specifically directed against nazism.

Mr. MORRIS. But that ceased, as you say, at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mr. WEYL. At the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact I proceeded to write articles and deliver speeches opposing communism and opposing the Soviet state. But I did not reveal my personal part in the Communist movement, nor did I identify persons who had been Communists with me and toward whom I felt I had certain obligations of trust and confidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record on a previous hearing our exhibits numbered 17, 19, 20, 23, 26, 107, 115, 131, and 132, which represented extensive evidence of Alger Hiss' activities in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I think we can just make mention of that fact today.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you want them to go into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir. They are in the record, Mr. Chairman.

And in connection with these other names, we have no evidence that they were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, at least we present no evidence at this time that they were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

If the chairman thinks we have covered this particular subject sufficiently, we would like to ask Mr. Weyl some questions about other people connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to go over in evidence, Mr. Chairman, this part of this magazine with this picture on it. It is already in the record of the executive session but I would like to make it part of this record.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be received.

(The document referred to by reference was marked "Exhibit No. 449" and filed for the record.)

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, did you know Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. WEYL. I did, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was a Communist?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Frederick Vanderbilt Field at one time a Socicalist?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Mr. Morris, he was. When I first knew him, in 19— I will just leave out that date, tbout 1930, he was a Socialist.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that Frederick Vanderbilt Field left the Socialist Party and entered the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. That is correct, Mr. Morris.

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Mr. MORRIS. When did this transition take place, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. WEYL. To the best of my knowledge, the transition took place in 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Chao-ting Chi?

Mr. WEYL. I did, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. I am going to be very careful about this testimony, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would be, Mr. Weyl.

Mr. WEYL. With respect to Chao-ting Chi I can say that I always dealt with him as a Communist and that he made statements to me that indicated that he was a Communist, and that they were indicative of his having been an official in the Communist Internationale.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the reason for your giving the latter, coming to the latter conclusion?

Mr. WEYL. Of course, Chi was, I would say, quite open about his Communist beliefs and affiiliations. My hesitation was on the specific question of Communist Party membership.

But the instance that comes to my mind is that Chi was talking about Heinz Neumann, who was a very well-known leader of the German Communist Party, and he said that he had no respect for Neumann or no use for Neumann, and Neumann was a coward, and then told the story of Neumann being in Hong Kong and driving around Hong Kong with Chinese comrades. Chi would be using the word "comrades" in this connection.

Well, getting into an area where there was Chinese authority, the police took out these Chinese Communists and shot them. Neumann, in Chi's opinion, could have prevented it if he had shown courage.

This was purely Chi's story, and the way it was told and the circumstances under which it was told indicated to me that Chi had been working with Neumann or under Neumann.

And a subsequent check indicated that Neumann was one of the men responsible for Communist Internationale policies in China about the year 1929 or 1930.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Weyl, that Chi's association with the Communist movement was open and notorious?

Mr. WEYL. I don't think I can go that far, Mr. Morris. I would merely like to say that I would not have considered him a very secret member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean he was very open in his pro-Communist expressions?

Mr. WEYL. I thought so.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to ask you a question right there, if you will permit me. Did you attend any Communist social functions in Washington at any time?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, very many; Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. What were they? Were they parties, drinking parties, dances, or what were they?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I suppose, going over a period of several years, they might have included all of those things—talks, motion-picture showings, dances, drinking parties.

Senator EASTLAND. Who attended those parties?

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Mr. WEYL. Well, Senator, that is such a broad question. I mean, there are so many of them.

Senator EASTLAND. The people that you know and can recall.

The question that I just asked you is a question that should have some thought. I am going to ask you to make that list and deliver it to the attorney for the committee.

Mr. WEYL. You mean, Senator, have it of all the persons whom I recollect as having been at a Communist party?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. We probably will not publish the list, but we want the information.

Mr. MORRIS. That is at executive session, you understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Could we ask what you define as a Communist social party?

Mr. WEYL. That is why I was so bewildered at the question, frankly, and I think I may have misunderstood it. I can't recall any social functions that were confined to Communist Party members.

Senator EASTLAND. That is the reason that I will take the list in executive session.

Mr. WEYL. Yes. Well, I mean that there are hundreds of people who would go to parties under Communist sponsorship, possibly knowing about them, possibly ignorant of them, possibly simply wanting to look up a friend who was there which would, by itself, be something that would have no significance at all I would think.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ever use it as a kind of a means to recruit members, to get them to associate with Communists, and so forth?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I suppose that was unquestionably the main purpose.

Senator EASTLAND. Those social functions, were they organized by this unit of the party?

Mr. WEYL. In Washington?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; the one to which you belonged?

Mr. WEYL. No; the unit was secret. It was supposed to have no connections whatsoever with the Communist Party of Washington, D. C.

Senator EASTLAND. How would they be organized? How were they organized?

Mr. WEYL. The unit you mean?

Senator EASTLAND. No; the social functions. Who sponsored them?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I am now thinking of New York, not of Washington. I don't think I ever attended a Communist social function in Washington, D. C.

Senator EASTLAND. I asked you about Washington.

Mr. WEYL. About Washington?

Senator EASTLAND. Social functions that the Communists sponsored in Washington.

Mr. WEYL. Then my answer is "No," and if you wish I will explain why.

Senator EASTLAND. No; that is all that is necessary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, would you tell the committee what you can about Chi's open and notorious pro-Communist activities, to the best of your ability?

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Mr. WEYL. Well, you want direct testimony here, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. I want whatever you know about him, Mr. Weyl.

Mr. WEYL. I was simply wondering whether I should tell the story I told in executive session, which I pointed out to you at the time was simply a story I had heard from that period.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give it to us, Mr. Weyl, for just whatever it is worth. If something has to be followed up, the committee can undertake that.

Mr. WEYL. I give it to you with a distinct and explicit preliminary statement that I don't vouch for its accuracy one bit.

Mr. MORRIS. This is something you heard, rather than something you experienced?

Mr. WEYL. I can't tell you whether I heard it from Chi himself or somebody else.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that if this is, one, a story which the witness calls hearsay, and, two, one not from experience, and, three, a story which was given to the committee in executive session, it may serve very little useful purpose.

Senator EASTLAND. I want to get the story and see whether it can be connected up. I was not present in the executive session and I do not know what the story was. I want to know it. You may proceed, sir.

Mr. WEYL. The story, Mr. Chairman, is that the Theater Guild was putting on a Communist play, a play written by a Soviet writer. I believe it was called Roar, China, Roar. The hero was a Chinese revolutionary.

So they were hard put to find a suitable Chinese revolutionary, and they went down to Union Square and saw an obviously intelligent and eloquent and rather commanding figure giving a Communist speech. That was Chao-ting Chi.

On this basis, they proceeded to give him a try-out, and he played the leading role. So, again, that is the story. That is not something that I personally vouch for as true.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you get that story?

Mr. WEYL. Well, I can't recollect where I got it, except that the time when I heard it was around 1937, when I knew Chi. It may have been from Chi. It may have been from some mutual friend.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you believe that story?

Mr. WEYL. Well, Senator, I simply accepted it as true, having no particular curiosity and no reason to verify.

Senator EASTLAND. At the time you were told the story and based on your knowledge at that time, you believed its accuracy; is that what I understand?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that one of the things that led you to say that he was an open Communist?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; that was one of the things.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have dinner at Dr. Chi's home?

Mr. WEYL. I believe I did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the presence of his wife?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

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Mr. MORRIS. Can you testify that Dr. Chi's wife, Harriet Levine, was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. No, Mr. Morris. I can testify that I took it for granted that she was a Communist.

When I say a Communist, I don't necessarily mean that she carried a party card. I would have no knowledge of that.

Mr. MORRIS. But she engaged in conversations with you and with him in your presence which indicated to you that she was a Communist?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. May I make a little explanation here?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Weyl.

Mr. WEYL. I hope that my answers do not sound evasive. One knows, when one is in the Communist Party, and one discusses interparty matters with people on a certain basis, that they are Communists and it is very difficult coming before this committee or any other body more than 10 years later to give any specific and convincing reason for that knowledge.

Where the question is directed to actual membership in the Communist Party, it is generally impossible to answer with respect to people who normally would not carry party cards and would not pay dues, but would be under the discipline of the organization so that, technically, it might be said that they were not members of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. But they would still be Communists?

Mr. WEYL. They would be Communists in the fundamental sense of being believers in communism, subject to the discipline of the Communist Party organization.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you can be subject to the discipline and not carry a card?

Mr. WEYL. Precisely, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. And you could be also subject to the discipline and not pay dues?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that all these people in this unit, Alger Hiss unit or Ware unit, as you called it, were under the discipline of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir, Senator; and I would say there very categorically that they were Communists, according to the official definition in the statutes of the Communist Internationale, that is, they were subordinate to the discipline, they were active in an organization, they paid dues, and they had party cards.

Senator FERGUSON. They did at that time?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say, then, that all these people in this one cell that you mentioned here in Washington, in the agricultural section, of which Mr. Hiss sat at the meetings, had party cards?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know whether the wives of those people were Communists or not?

Mr. WEYL. I don't Senator, and if they were Communists they were not in the unit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the testimony concerning Mr. Lee Pressman, I would like to offer into the record a

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paper which Mr. Mandel will identify as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which purports to be a photostatic copy, and which shows that among the American delegation to the 1945 conference of IPR was a Mr. Pressman.

Mr. Mandel, would you identify that?

Senator EASTLAND. Could you identify it? You said it purports to be.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 2, 1944, headed "Suggestions for categories of American delegation, 1945 conference."

It is divided into categories including: Business, press, military, government, and, under the category of Labor we find, under CIO, DeCaux, Nixon, Pressman, Walsh.

At that time, Lee Pressman was general counsel for the CIO.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this a photostat of a document which was found in the IPR files and which is now in the possession of this committee?

Senator EASTLAND. That is what he testified.

Mr. MANDEL. The document was in the IPR files.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you cause this photostat to be made?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted into the record.

(The document refered to was marked "Exhibit No. 450" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 450

MARCH 2, 1944.

SUGGESTIONS FOR CATEGORIES OF AMERICAN DELEGATION—1945 CONFERENCE

Business:	
Investment and Finance: e. g. Eric Johnston, C. V. Starr	2
Transportation: e. g. Grady, Kaiser, Trippe	1
Sales, branch factory: Production and imports: e. g. Batt, Minor, Odlum, Schultz, Watson	2
Total	5
Press; e. g. Mrs. Bolton, Byas, Dabney, Daniele, Field, Davis, James, Lippmann, Luce, Menefee, Sharwood, Sulzberger	2
Military: e. g. Bales, Clay, Hilldring, Pence, Reischauer, Schuirmann, Shoemaker, Yarnell	2
Government:	
Political; e. g. Austin, Fulbright, Grew, Judd, Thomas, Wallace	2
Administration and Policy: e. g. Berle, Currie, Emerson, Hornbeck, Howard, Remer, Thompson, Vincent	3
Total	5
Labor:	
AFL: e. g. Shiehkin, Watt	
CIO: e. g. DeCaux, Nixon, Pressman, Walsh	
Total	2
Professional and Academic: e. g. Colgrove T. Dennett Dunn, Fairbank, Jessup, Johnstone, Keesing, Kirk, MacNair, Moore, Stanley, B. Wilbur, B. Kizer	4
	20

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TOTAL DELEGATION

[1] *Nuclear group*

Business: Kizer and/or Wilbur
Military: Yarnell, Bales, or Shoemaker
Government: Emerson, Vincent, or Remer
Professional: Jessup and Johnstone, Fairbank, Stanley, or Dennett
(Penciled note:) Sent to members of conf cttee July 28, 1944.
Business:
Benjamin H. Kizer } We are already committed to these two delegates.
Brayton Wilbur }
Suggestions:
Eric Johnston: Kizer is going to explore the possibilities late in August and will report thereafter. He thinks the chances are good. I assume that the committee will approve issuance of a formal invitation upon indication that Johnston will accept.
Will Clayton or T. J. Caldwell (Houston, Tex.): Both suggested by the executive committee of the Houston Foreign Policy Association. As an alternative, it was suggested that Clayton might be asked to name a member of his firm who had charge of business in the Far East. No commitments. Some desirability of getting representation from Southeast. George A. Morison; Vice president, Bucyrus-Erie Co., Milwaukee, or someone picked by him from that area. Morison is chairman of the Milwaukee chapter. No commitment. Good to get Middle West represented and draw Milwaukee group into planning.
Croyle Hunter: President, Northwest Airlines. A friend of Ben Kizer's, active in fight against the "chosen instrument" interest of Pan American Airways. Very concerned about postwar aviation to Orient. No commitment.

The following are suggestions drawn from the names of those who have attended New York meetings of the American Council:

J. C. Cooper: Pan American Airways
Mansfield Freeman: Starr Park & Freeman
J. A. MacKay: National City Bank
Philo W. Parker: Standard Vacuum Oil Co.

Government:

Lauchlin Currie: Department of State
Dean Acheson: Department of State
John Carter Vincent: Department of State
Eugene Doorman, or Joseph C. Grew: Department of State
Harry White: Treasury Department
J. W. Fulbright: House of Representatives
Senator Austin: U. S. Senate
Senator Thomas: U. S. Senate
W. H. Judd: House of Representatives
Rupert Emerson, or Willauer: Foreign Economic Administration
C. A. Remer: Department of State
Owen Lattimore: Office of War Information
W. A. M. Burden: Civil Aeronautics Board
Abbot Low Moffat: Department of State
Stanley K. Hornbeck: Department of State

(Mr. Currie, who clearly indicated he would like to be invited, thought the Government representative should be: Acheson, as head of all economic planning in the State Department; Emerson, as operating head of Liberated Areas in F. E. A.; Vincent and Doorman, or Grew, as those on technical level in State; and Harry White. The presence of Acheson would obviate any problem of omitting SKH. Currie himself would, if asked, probably help persuade the others on his list to accept. I would suggest naming five people to be asked as delegates and another five to be asked as members of the American delegation secretariat.)

Labor:

Robert J. Watt: A. F. of L. (no commitment. Has indicated he might be willing to accept).

[1] To do some initial planning.

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Len DeCaux: CIO (no commitment. DeCaux would like to come again; is perfectly willing to step aside if we feel someone else would help in getting more CIO cooperation).

(In both cases the invitation should be addressed to the head of the organization with the name of the preferred person specified in the text of the letter.)

Military:

Admiral Harry E. Yarnell
General Frank R. McCoy
Admiral Greenslade
General Bissell
Commodore Allen
Colonel Carl Faymonville
Captain Pence
Colonel Shoemaker

(General McCoy strongly recommended General Bissell, hoped that this conference would see some new and younger faces. Admiral Yarnell, as a vice chairman of Pacific Council will attend in any event, therefore technically need not be counted as a member of the American delegation. If California is allowed to name a delegate in addition to Wilbur—as I think they ought to be—Greenslade or Allen are definite possibilities or even probabilities.)

Press:

Virginius Dabney, Richmond
R. E. Freeman, Richmond
Walter Lippmann
Sumner Welles
Joseph Barnes
Raymond Gram Swing

(No commitments. I personally would favor making every effort to get Sumner Welles there in view of his recent book. Kemper Freeman, son of Miller Freeman, may want to attend as an observer and for reasons of good will in Seattle it may be desirable to allow him to come.)

Academic and professional—

Philip C. Jessup	Frederick V. Field	Grayson Kirk
H. Foster Bain	Knight Biggerstaff	Frank W. Notestein
Tyler Dennett	Harold Sprout	Ada Comstock Notestein

Secretariat of American Delegation (other than the staff members who will be picked late). It would be desirable, in assessing the list above, to suggest those who should come in this bracket if not up to the level of the brackets above—

William C. Johnstone
Wilma Fairbank, Science, Education, and Arts Division, Department of State
Haldore Hansen, Science, Education, and Arts Division, Department of State
Robert Feary, Department of State. Former private secretary to Grew.
Ernest B. Price
Charles E. Loomis
Solomon Adler, Stabilization Board. Recently in Chungking.

(In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding or criticism, I suggest that all those who are on the American Council payroll, such as Loomis or Price as well as our own staff, be placed in this category rather than on the official delegate list.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, did you know Philip Jaffe?

Mr. WEYL. I did, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not Philip Jaffe was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Mr. Morris, Philip Jaffe identified himself to me as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that mean that he was technically a member of the Communist Party?

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Mr. WEYL. Not necessarily, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain what you mean, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. There is a rather sharp line of demarcation—I should probably more accurately say there was because I have no direct knowledge of these things of recent date—between the fellow traveler who either went part way with the Communist program or was utilized by the Communists, and the man who was inside, who was subject to the discipline of the organization, who was a complete believer, at least as far as the party knew, in its doctrines, and who could, therefore, be trusted.

This did not, however, necessarily mean carrying a card or paying dues. At all times the Communist Party of the United States has had secret organizations which include espionage organizations but are not in any sense limited to them. That is, a person of fairly high professional standing or somebody who is much in the public eye would normally not carry a party card or pay dues because these would be tangible facts of evidence which might sometime be found and lead to his exposure and thus ruin his usefulness.

So by Communist I mean somebody who was considered to be a person who could be relied upon, who was subordinate to the organization, who carried out orders and who worked for the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Philip Jaffe and Harriet Levine, their names have occurred in this investigation as being connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, is there anything that we have today that we can introduce into the record in connection with Harriet Levine?

Mr. MANDEL. According to sworn testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, part one, 1950, dealing with State Department loyalty investigations, Harriet Levine is identified as the wife of Chao-ting Chi, and also as a secretary of Owen Lattimore. She worked for the Institute of Pacific Relations in the summer of 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Who identified her as such, Mr. Mandel? From whose testimony are you reading?

Mr. MANDEL. From Owen Lattimore's sworn testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Weyl, have you ever been in the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEYL. I have, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us the circumstances of your being in the offices of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. I am afraid I can't even approximate the date, except the late 1930's. I was doing some research of my own, that happened to be on world resources and population, and, at the moment, I was working on far-eastern material.

So I telephoned Field and asked whether I could use the library, and he very kindly consented for me to do so. I would imagine that I was in and out of there for a period of a month; not every day but fairly frequently.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you understand, as a Communist Party member, was it your understanding, that the Institute of Pacific Relations was controlled by the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Well Senator, no, it was not. I had nothing to do with far-eastern work. I simply realized that certain people who had a powerful position in the—what you might call the secretariat of the

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organization were Communists, and that the Institute of Pacific Relations seemed to be following more or less of a Communist Party line.

But I had no knowledge beyond that.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no knowledge, really, Mr. Weyl, to come to the conclusion whether or not the Communists were able to control the policies of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEYL. No.

Senator EASTLAND. He said so, he said to follow the Communist policy.

Mr. WEYL. I said a pro-Communist policy. By that I do not mean——

Senator EASTLAND. That is a distinction without a difference.

Mr. WEYL. Well, I think, Senator, I would like to take exception to that if I may.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, sir.

Mr. WEYL. I simply felt that the trend in their publications was in the general direction of the Communist Party——

Senator EASTLAND. Pro-Communist.

Mr. WEYL. Yes—was not sufficient to indicate to my mind definitely whether it was or was not controlled.

Mr. MORRIS. As a matter of fact, you did not know one way or the other whether it was controlled by the Communists or not.

Mr. WEYL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You never made a search of their writings to ascertain, did you?

Mr. WEYL. No, I didn't, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were you visiting at the time of your visit to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEYL. Mr. Morris, I wasn't visiting anybody. I simply got a place where I could put down my typewriter.

Mr. MORRIS. Who gave you permission?

Mr. WEYL. Fred Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Institute of Pacific Relations' office near the Amerasia office?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. My recollection is that they were adjoining, and that there was a door between them, and that people seemed to flow from one office to the other. I was never clear on which was which.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about Amerasia, the magazine?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that it was pro-Soviet?

Mr. WEYL. I would have assumed at the time that it was Communist controlled.

Senator FERGUSON. You had reasons to believe from reading it, and so forth, and the way it was gotten up, and all, that it was Communist controlled?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know a Lieutenant Roth?

Mr. WEYL. No, I never knew Lieutenant Roth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify for the record these two documents?

Mr. Chairman, there is one item in connection with Mr. Alger Hiss' activities in the Institute of Pacific Relations which has not been brought out in public session yet, and I would like to introduce some

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preliminary documents on that, preparatory to having other witnesses discuss the particular subject.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you want the documents read?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel can identify two of them first.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated May 14, 1947, addressed to O. C. Hansen, Esq., from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. And the second, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. The second is a mimeographed copy of a letter marked "personal" and "confidential," dated March 28, 1947, addressed to Brooks Emeny, from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the fourth paragraph.

Mr. MANDEL. May I say that the mimeographed copy came from the files of the Institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read the fourth paragraph in the letter to Brooks Emeny?

Mr. MANDEL. It reads as follows:

As a concession to the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the IPR, I am inclined to think that if you want to get the maximum number of organizations in under your umbrella, you will be wise to consider calling the new organization the American Institute of International Relations or the American Institute of World Affairs rather than attempting to woo these organizations into becoming subordinate to the FPA.

That is the Foreign Policy Association.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Mandel, would you read an extract from the letter to Mr. Hansen, which begins at the bottom of page 5.

Mr. MANDEL. At the bottom of page 5 is the following paragraph:

The man on whom we are all pinning our greatest hopes for advancing the whole cause of interorganizational coordination and cooperation is Alger Hiss, who had succeeded President Butler as the new head of the Carnegie Endowment. Recently I received from Hiss, under date of May 2, his comment on my letter of March 28 to Emeny. I think I am violating no confidence in quoting the following from Hiss' letter:

"I am returning herewith copies of your memorandum of January 15 and your letter of March 28 to Brooks Emeny. I appreciate very much having had the opportunity to read them and having the benefit of such a full exposition of your views. You asked for 'comment.' I find myself in agreement that amalgamation at this stage is undesirable and impracticable."

Mr. Hiss goes on in the letter to affirm his commitment to continuing and accelerating the process of interorganizational cooperation which took on a new lease of life in the spring of 1946. At the executive committee meeting on May 5, it was voted unanimously to take a definitely affirmative attitude to a proposal from Roland Redmond, of the American Geographical Society, and Alger Hiss with reference to securing a common office building for several research organizations on a property immediately adjacent to the United Nations here in New York. This will, of course, take time, for condemnation proceedings and new construction are involved. The executive committee enthusiastically supported my recommendation for full-scale exploration with Redmond, Hiss, and others of this important proposal. There are several other concrete cases of interorganizational cooperation on which we are all working for a common end. For example, a dozen organizations, a number somewhat in excess of those named in resolution 1, are working out an extensive plan for greatly increasing the distribution of United Nations documents in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, have both of those documents now been introduced into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. I will order them into the record.

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(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 450–A" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 450–A

MAY 14, 1947.

O. C. HANSEN, Esq.,
301 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR MR. HANSEN: Thank you for your frank letter of May 2 expressing disappointment at my letter of April 25, with its memorandum to the board regarding the Coronado resolutions.

I can quite understand the reasons for your disappointment and sympathize with them. At the same time, I hope I can aid you in taking an equally sympathetic point of view to the obligation which I felt I had in writing that memorandum.

Certainly a majority of the members from the bay region and Seattle were practically unanimous in favoring Resolutions 1, 2 and 3. But this enthusiasm was not expressed as vividly by other members of the conference.

As you will remember, the membership of the Coronado conference was somewhat in excess of 100. The attendance at the meeting on the morning of April 12 was approximately 90. In spite of the interesting discussion and the arguments of those who favored Dr. White's resolution, the maximum number who voted on any of the resolutions was 45. (In favor of Resolution 1, 43; in favor of Resolution 2, 36.)

There were several reasons for this 50-percent abstention from voting:

1. Many had never heard of a proposal for organic union between the FPA and the IPR until they reached Coronado and did not want to commit themselves until there had been much further study.

2. Several were very definitely against it, but did not vote against it because they had confidence that the national board of trustees, after studying the matter, would make decisions which all would recognize as sound. If the national board finally recommended organic union, these members were prepared to accept it.

3. A few of the Government people from Washington who were opposed to the merging of the FPA and the IPR did not vote because Government people are not encouraged to take part in the policy-making activities of organizations like ours.

By the time we left Coronado nearly as many people had spoken to us opposing Dr. White's resolution as had publicly voted for the resolution as finally presented at the plenary session. When I asked some of these why they were not more vocal at the session, they retorted in various ways:

One member said that organic union with the FPA was so contrary to the historic mission of the IPR that he couldn't see how it could possibly ever be approved by the national board of trustees.

Another said that the process already started between the IPR, Council on Foreign Relations, the FPA, and other bodies that had been gathering momentum for the past year was so encouraging that he thought that publicity about organic union would hinder rather than help.

Another member said that there was very little use in opposing what he felt was an organized minority at Coronado. All admitted, he said, that the national board of trustees was the institute's policy-forming body. When the board of trustees considered the Coronado resolutions he was sure that although the board would give serious study to them he did not think that the board would be overly impressed by the fact that they had been voted for by only about half of the members of the IPR at Coronado, especially in view of the fact that the total membership at Coronado was only about 5 percent of the total membership of the American IPR.

A number of members from both sides of the Rockies expressed some considerable perplexity over the phenomenon in which all the advocates of organic union between the FPA and the IPR came from cities in which there are no branches of the FPA. Some of these same members also pointed out that a few of the members of the IPR in Seattle and San Francisco who on the one hand had been most eager for organic union with the FPA and on the other had been most critical of the IPR for what they described as Manhattan-domination, seemed completely to ignore the fact that the policies, activities, and directives of the FPA, excellent as they are, are far more Manhattan-dominated than is the case with the IPR. For example, one only has to compare the composition of the

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national board of trustees of the IPR during the last 5 years with the board of directors of the FPA during the same period to substantiate this.

In other words, I had to write the memorandum knowing that it would be studied by those members of the IPR who had been at Coronado and were strongly in favor of organic union, those who were opposed to it, and also to members of the board of trustees, a majority of whom had not been at Coronado, and ultimately to the members throughout the country, only a fraction of whom had had the benefit of the Coronado discussions.

I think part of the difficulty at the moment arises from the fact that, as is so often the case, a set of resolutions that are passed at a single conference or a single meeting that have not been submitted to careful study in advance are likely to mean different things to different people.

I gather that to several in San Francisco the resolutions meant "union now" between the FPA and the IPR at the national level as a nucleus for an all-inclusive American Institute of International or World Affairs with local Institutes of World Affairs in as many communities as possible throughout the country.

To others, the resolution meant a mandate to the national board of trustees of the American IPR to seriously and immediately consider inviting the trustees of other organizations to appoint a joint committee to explore the possibility of organic union or some form of greater coordination between their organizations.

To some it may have meant a green light for the IPR at the local level to merge with other similar organizations in a community effort, leaving national coordination as something to be explored more deliberately.

I remember vividly your statement at the plenary session at Coronado that there never might be so propitious a time as the present for bringing about amalgamation, due to the fact that Brooks Emeny, the newly elected president of the FPA was present, and that Emeny and I had full confidence in each other. I imagine that Emeny was as pleased as I was by your genuine bouquets. Perhaps following your remarks I should have said that there might be quite a difference between what he and I would like to do in our personal capacities and what we would have to do in our role as servants respectively of the FPA and the IPR.

Now at Coronado you were one of the few to bring in the all-important question of financial support. I only wish that this had been discussed more thoroughly. At the community level, united fund-raising is pretty general American practice for charitable organizations both in peace and war and for war-relief organizations during periods of international crisis.

For many years both San Francisco and Honolulu raised their funds independently of other agencies and, on balance, pretty successfully. Now I gather that you feel the community study of the Pacific and the Far East can be financed more easily and more adequately by a united appeal. I certainly would not want to challenge your intimate knowledge of San Francisco's giving habits on this point.

At the national level, however, the stuation is quite different. Practically 100 percent of the hundreds of thousands of dollars which have been contributed to the national and international programs of the IPR in recent years, and indeed throughout its history, has been given precisely because the IPR was a specialist organization with a big but concentrated program. Many of the largest givers have continued their donations because they felt the IPR was homogeneous, was without entangling alliances, and was free to dedicate itself exclusively to its central purpose of research, discussion, and publication on the problems of the Pacific.

At the local level I have assured Dr. Staley and other friends in San Francisco that the bay region committee's autonomy and competence was such that it must decide what was best for the community and best for promoting intelligent study of international affairs on the part of great masses of San Francisco's population.

I do hope that nothing in my April memorandum on Coronado caused anyone in San Francisco to feel that I was opposed to the formation of a San Francisco Council on World Affairs, even though that meant the end of the use of the name "IPR" in San Francisco.

The board of trustees, however, have assumed over the years and currently some very heavy responsibilities. Among these, not necessarily in the order of their importance, are the following:

A. An extensive program of participation, research, publication, and financial support of the international IPR.

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B. To the great foundations we have made moral commitments for carrying out certain programs in the educational and research field beyond the life of present financial grants from these foundations.

C. We are committed to a number of business corporations who contribute from $500 to $2,500 a year to the national budget for continuing service.

D. We are committed to projects in several of the universities and to cooperation with some of the learned societies which we cannot lightly terminate.

E. There are quite a number of generous individual donors to the national budget who expect us to carry on as a highly competent specialist organization on the Pacific at least until the American people generally are giving proportionately as much study to the problems of the Pacific as they are to the problems of the rest of the world.

I can assure you quite definitely that unless some heretofore unidentified millionaires emerge to throw vast financial resources behind organic union of the FPA and the IPR, much of the present national income of the American IPR would wither away if the IPR became merely one unit in a national organization on world affairs.

Partially because it has no endowment and partially because it is a research organization, the American IPR has always had some difficulty in securing its annual budget. On balance, this has been a healthy stimulus to turn out work of the highest quality and dealing in the main with urgent current problems. I have learned that in a few quarters there is some pessimism as to the IPR's ability to continue to secure its national budget. Personally, I am optimistic on this score because of the institute's marked growth in national prestige recently. Some of the pessimists have said that the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation will not continue to support the IPR unless it amalgamates with the FPA. I have been unable to find the slightest basis for this rumor. Of course it is true that for years these two humanitarian organizations have periodically warned us that we must not count on their support in perpetuity. In accordance with their policy toward other organizations, both the Rockefellers and the Carnegies are supporting us at present on a declining scale. I have recently been informed by one who I believe has the confidence of both the Rockefellers and the Carnegies that the kind of cooperative plan on which we have been working with the other organizations for over a year is more than likely to result more in an increase of foundation financial support of the IPR than in a decrease.

As was pointed out at Coronado, there is considerable criticism in England, both on the part of big busines and among scholars, of the inadequate handling of Far Eastern problems by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. I have experience of similar situations in Australia, New Zealand, and India.

However much one may mark one's memoranda "confidential," ideas do get around. My memorandum had to be written in the knowledge that some of the IPR members who would receive it were also members and in some cases officers of the organizations mentioned in Resolution 1. As I explained at Coronado, and here I think the members of the conference were most considerate in deferring to my point of view, for over a year representatives of the IPR have been engaging in extended consultations with representatives of the FPA, Carnegie Endowment, Council on Foreign Relations, World Peace Foundation, etc., working toward a far greater coordination of effort with a view to a much wider national service.

For some months, as you so well know, under Henry Grady's chairmanship, there have been a similar series of consultations on the part of leaders of various organizations in San Francisco.

Now the San Francisco resolution as originally proposed at Coronado seemed to some of us as completely ignoring this painstaking and already productive process of consultation at the national level. Perhaps I can best illustrate my point by transplanting the problem from the national to San Francisco level.

Supposing in the midst of the negotiations between Henry Grady, Staley, Lynn White, Thomas Harris, Deutsch, and others, some of the members of, say, the Carnegie Endowment's Center and the IPR had got together and recommended immediate organic union between those two organizations; and this to be effected without the knowledge of the Mills Institute nor the ARI nor any of the other organizations. I think you will agree that Grady and Deutsch would have found themselves in an exceedingly embarrassing position, irrespective of the merits of a bilateral amalgamation of the International Center and the IPR.

If the San Francisco resolution had gone through in its original form, the national officers of the American IPR would have been put into a highly embarrass-

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ing position in their relationships to the Carnegie Endowment, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the other organizations mentioned in Resolution 1 as adopted.

In salesmanship as well as in wooing, one does have to consider the attitudes of the other party. Before I left Coronado I had received word from high authority in the Foreign Policy Association in New York that the directors of that organization had never considered, either as a corporate body or as individuals, any proposals for organic union between the FPA and the IPR. This, of course, was right in line with Brooks Emeny's remarks at Coronado when he said he was participating in the discussions not as the newly-elected president of the FPA but as a member of the IPR.

In March of this year, I wrote Emeny, on learning that he had accepted the presidency of the FPA. For your information I enclose a copy of the letter to Emeny, dated March 28. On his arrival in Coronado, Emeny told me that the letter had reached him too late to answer from Cleveland, but that he was glad to say that he agreed fully with everything I said in that letter.

The man on whom we are all pinning our greatest hopes for advancing the whole cause of interorganizational coordination and cooperation is Alger Hiss, who had succeeded President Butler as the new head of the Carnegie Endowment.

Recently I received from Hiss, under date of May 2, his comment on my letter of March 28 to Emeny. I think I am violating no confidence in quoting the following from Hiss' letter:

"I am returning herewith copies of your memorandum of January 15 and your letter of March 28 to Brooks Emeny. I appreciate very much having had the opportunity to read them and having the benefit of such a full exposition of your views. You asked for 'comment.' I find myself in agreement that amalgamation at this stage is undesirable and impracticable."

Mr. Hiss goes on in the letter to affirm his commitment to continuing and accelerating the process of interorganizational cooperation which took on a new lease of life in the spring of 1946. At the executive committee meeting on May 5, it was voted unanimously to take a definitely affirmative attitude to a proposal from Roland Redmond of the American Geographical Society and Alger Hiss with reference to securing a common office building for several research organizations on a property immediately adjacent to the United Nations here in New York. This will, of course, take time, for condemnation proceedings and new construction are involved. The executive committee enthusiastically supported my recommendation for full-scale exploration with Redmond, Hiss, and others of this important proposal. There are several other concrete cases of interorganizational cooperation on which we are all working for a common end. For example, a dozen organizations, a number somewhat in excess of those named in Resolution 1, are working out an extensive plan for greatly increasing the distribution of United Nations documents in this country.

On May 5 we had the great privilege of having Mr. Rene May of San Francisco in attendance at the executive committee meeting. Unfortunately, it was a poorly attended meeting due to Huntington Gilchrist's absence in Europe, Arthur Dean's place being grounded in Washington, and several other similar occurrences. Other than Mr. May, there were only five members of the executive committee present.

Luckily, Mr. May had attended a recent and very fully attended meeting of the bay region committee when the Coronado resolutions were fully discussed. He kindly called on me before the meeting and made an admirable statement of the bay region's point of view. He was warmly welcomed by the other members of the executive committee. He urged that we should not go ahead too rapidly in pressing for the implementation of the Coronado resolutions. He felt strongly that the matter should be fully discussed by a full meeting of the national board of trustees before approaches were made to the other organizations. He stated emphatically that he had said at the San Francisco meeting that premature action in changing the status of the IPR would be seized upon by Mr. Kohlberg as evidence that his campaign, although meeting overwhelming defeat, was now later handsomely vindicated.

In line with Mr. May's remarks, the executive committee recommended that the officers call a meeting of the board of trustees in June when a maximum attendance could be sought and as many points of view as possible solicited in writing in advance.

Already a number of letters have come in commenting on my memorandum regarding Coronado. For your information I enclose copies of letters from the

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following: Ed Allen, E. C. Auchter, Arthur Coons, George B. Cressey, Carrington Goodrich, Elizabeth Grenn Handy, B. H. Kizer, Herbert Little, Charles E. Martin, David N. Rowe, and David L. Shillinglaw, and Louise L. Wright. You have already received direct from President White a copy of his letter to me of May 1.

Now what I would like from you is a detailed statement of why you regard my memorandum as biased.

The protagonists of "union now" were very brief in giving their reasons in favor of their position. I do not remember their making any points which were not mentioned in my memorandum. Doutbless they can make a much stronger case than they made at Coronado. It was precisely because I wanted my memorandum to be as useful to all as possible that I stated in it that I hoped it could be kept within the family because if it "is inaccurate at any point I am eager to have it corrected prior to any wider circulation."

Thanking you again for your letter, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

[Confidential]

MARCH 28, 1947.

Personal.

BROOKS EMENY, Esq.,
Council on World Affairs,
922 Society for Savings Building,
Cleveland, Ohio.

DEAR BROOKS: You were good enough several weks ago to tell me that I was the first person outside the FPA board whom you had consulted with reference to the invitation to you to become president of that association. I deeply valued this confidence and have observed it. You have discussed the pros and cons with me several times since, and the last day you were here you asked me flatly whether I would advise you to accept. This I did with real conviction. Now I have been informed that you have definitely accepted and will give a great deal of time to the FPA from now on but will not assume full-time work until September.

One of the several reasons for my position that you accept was that you assured me that the FPA board had told you that it was dissatisfied with the FPA of the past and would make any changes in program in the future that you and they felt wise, including a change of name.

On the matter of the name, my tentative judgment is that it would be questionable during the first year of your administration to change it. Because of the genuine institutional pride which so many FPA members possess, you may find it unwise to make this change too abruptly.

As a concession to the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the IPR, I am inclined to think that if you want to get the maximum number of organizations in under your umbrella, you will be wise to consider calling the new organization the American Institute of International Relations or the American Institute of World Affairs rather than attempting to woo these organizations into becoming subordinate to the FPA.

As you know, the IPR through Mrs. Stewart, Dr. Ewing, and me has been working for cooperation with the other organizations on a functional basis. So far as I know, informed IPR members have gone along with these cooperative moves.

But I am somewhat doubtful whether within 12 months we could have any hope of getting the most intelligent and dynamic far eastern experts in the IPR to recommend merging the IPR in the FPA. It is true that a few of our members would welcome this. But they are not people, for the most part, who are seized with the importance of keeping the study of far eastern problems constantly before the American public.

It seems to many of us that before a Nation-wide attempt is made to almalgamate the various foreign affairs organizations there is a prior desideratum, namely, an effort to stimulate indigenous and largely self-sustaining movements to found an American Institute of African Relations, an American Institute of Latin American Relations, an Institute of Middle East Relations, and, perhaps, last of all, an American Institute of European Relations. We question whether these can be organized from the top down nationally. It would be easy to do on a chart, but not in fact. Initiative must come from those who have an imme-

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diate concern—just as was the case with the Institute of Pacific Relations. We have never forgotten your letter of October 18, 1946, when you wrote to a mutual friend as follows:

"The principal reason why I have decided to continue my support in the American Council is because it has accomplished in the past what I consider to be an unique contribution to the furtherance of understanding of Far East relations and should be able to continue to do so in the future. Its contributions include not only the richest research material available on any region of the world, but of equal importance it has been the means of inspiring the interest of more American men and women in Far East problems than any other single institution or group of institutions that have come to my knowledge. If you study the war record of this country you will be amazed to find that the overwhelming proportion of American brain work which went into the successful prosecution of the war and is now engaged in the solution of the problems of peace was actually recruited from people whose first interest in Far East matters were inspired by the Institute of Pacific Relations. Another major contribution has been the techniques which the institute has developed, not only in the matter of regional research but also in study and conference methods with respect to the problems of a specific region of the world. If this same procedure could have been adopted as it applies to Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa we would not be facing the shortage of manpower and brainpower which we now face with respect to these other regions."

Happily, there already exist nuclei for such organizations. Although the Princeton University effort on the Near East is still rather slight, the Washington effort which Hoskins and others are developing is more promising and may get somewhat substantial backing. Regarding the North American-European area you will remember the IPR initiated a number of years ago a conference at Prout's Neck on North Atlantic relations which was of considerable value and influentially attended, but the war prevented any follow-up. When I was in France in 1945 some of our French colleagues expressed the hope that a conference of that sort leading to a North Atlantic Institute might soon be organized. Perhaps Africa is less well covered in our universities than most other areas. There are, however, a few competent people who are anxious to proceed with something substantial and not propagandist.

There is another problem on which the IPR is working that I know you will also want to study. Happily, several of our great universities are developing what are called area faculties or institutes, which are staffed by representatives of many disciplines in the social sciences. This is happily bringing into the universities the IPR pattern, according to which for years its research work has been an integration of the viewpoints of anthropologists, economists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, etc., in the study of a limited though large area of the world. The universities, at the moment, are circumscribing their field to areas somewhat smaller than that of the IPR, but some will shortly include all, or nearly all, of Asia.

The IPR is integrating its program with many of these area faculties and has been offered to this end the active cooperation of some of the learned societies.

Our feeling is that institutes like ours which have, for the most part, had their research roots in the universities must accentuate this relationship, and it may be that area institutes such as I have envisaged at the top of page 2 of this letter may best develop from bases in appropriate universities rather than from a possibly somewhat artificial organization of new ad hoc societies, not fully integrated with the university faculties.

You know that you can always be assured of my cooperation with you in your new job. But I did not want you to conclude from my urging you to accept it that I see any early likelihood of the IPR dissolving itself and trusting the FPA, even under your leadership, to cover the Far East and the Pacific adequately in the immediate future.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. They are being offered as evidence of Alger Hiss' activity in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Now, Mr. Weyl, did you ever engage in espionage in connection with your activity in the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Never, Mr. Morris.

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Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever violate the laws of the United States Government while you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. I never did, Mr. Morris. May I add something?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, by all means.

Mr. WEYL. Odd as this may seem, I never suspected that these secret organizations of Communists were to be diverted for espionage purposes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony of Whittaker Chambers on these matters?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Does he give any testimony to the effect that there was espionage being engaged in by that unit at the time you were in it?

Mr. WEYL. No, Mr. Morris. My recollection of the testimony is that the espionage started at a time after my departure from it.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of the witness, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Nobody ever approached you for papers out of the Agriculture Department?

Mr. WEYL. No, certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact, at that time they were rather public property anyway, were they not?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. There was no security classification that I can recall at this time, except possibly in State and War.

Senator FERGUSON. So there would not have been any reason to have you use a ring to get them out of the Agricultural Adjustment?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

Senator EASTLAND. I would like to thank you for candidly and directly answering the questions that have been put to you today. You have been a refreshing contrast to some of the witnesses appearing in public session here during the past few weeks.

I have noted in particular that you have given this evidence to the FBI after the Hiss trials. I can, of course, regret that you had not done so before. However, the task of our committee is to give every encouragement to people to come forward with whatever evidence they possess to expose the Communist conspiracy that apparently has reached high places in our country.

I note that you broke with the Communist Party in 1939, and that it took the Korean war to break down your reluctance to testify openly on these matters. But the phenomena surrounding an ex-Communist's unwillingness to expose former associates has been extensively demonstrated previously before our committee.

We can deplore that it took so long, but, at the same time, we are glad that it did take place.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I just inquire once again?

Prior to Alger Hiss' trials, were you approached to try and get this testimony?

Mr. WEYL. No, Senator, I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you were not called before the grand jury?

Mr. WEYL. No, I was not interrogated.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were not questioned by anyone as to what you knew about Alger Hiss or his connection with communism?

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Mr. WEYL. No, Senator, not in any respect.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you have given now this testimony, these statements, to the FBI?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator. I went voluntarily to the FBI about a year and a half ago and told them the story.

Mr. MORRIS. However, Mr. Weyl, you were called before the House committee in 1942, were you not?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And you did not give this testimony at that time?

Mr. WEYL. No. Would you like me to explain my attitude?

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would. I think it is of significance.

Mr. WEYL. First I will go back a bit. I think that should be changed to 1943, Mr. Morris, although I told you 1942, in executive session.

I rejoined the Government service after my public break with communism—by which I mean public attacks of communism, not public statements about my own role. I was then faced with the problem on what I should do in reference to these people who I know had been members of the Communist Party. Still, I repeat, the idea of espionage did not cross my mind.

Thinking it over, I saw no possible way of finding out the truth. If I went to any of them on a private basis, they would, of course, tell me that they had broken, whether they had or not. I was rather inclined to assume—and, incidentally, Hede Massing tells me she made the same assumption—that a man like Alger Hiss whom I had considered to be level-headed and highly intelligent would not have remained in the Communist organization after or during the alliance with Hitler. So I remained silent about them——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the Soviet alliance with Hitler?

Mr. WEYL. Yes. I remained silent about the entire matter. I avoided these people. I felt that I did not see sufficiently strong reasons for my breaching confidence and destroying the careers of people who might very well have changed.

I, of course, now recognize that this was wrong, and I make no apology for it. I was, in 1943, I believe, subpenaed to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee and answer charges that I had published Communist articles under my own name in 1932 or 1933, and that I had been active in various Communist-front organizations.

I told the committee that I had been, until 1939, a Communist, and I offered to the committee, into evidence, writings subsequent to 1939 showing them that I was now an anti-Communist, so that there was a certain degree, though certainly not an entire degree, of candor about my own role, and I simply put before the committee the question which was for them to decide of whether my past activities or my present activities should be the compelling consideration.

Senator FERGUSON. You left out, in other words, between 1933 and 1939, that space?

Mr. WEYL. I left out the whole organizational matter. I could not have brought it in without naming names.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you questioned in detail on it?

Mr. WEYL. No, I don't believe, Senator, that any questions were asked that had any bearing on the existence of such. I am sure there was not.

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Senator EASTLAND. Is there anything further?

Mr. MORRIS. I have nothing further.

Mr. WEYL. I would like to thank you, Senators, and members of the committee, for the courtesy and fairness of this hearing.

Senator EASTLAND. You have been a very frank witness and we appreciate your assistance.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, tomorrow we have Dr. Edna Fluegul of the staff of Trinity College, who was a member of the Postwar Planning Division of the State Department, and who will give some testimoney concerning Mr. Hiss' role in the Postwar Planning Division of the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. We will recess until 2:30 tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 3:36 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., Wednesday, February 20, 1952.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senators Watkins and Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness today will be Dr. Edna R. Fluegel.

Senator WATKINS. Will you raise your right hand, please?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony given in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss FLUEGEL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF EDNA R. FLUEGEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, did you receive a telephone call last night in connection with your announced testimony before this committee today?

Miss FLUEGEL. I did, about 20 minutes of 11. I answered the telephone, and someone said something about "You remember that security documents are subject to penalties," and hung up.

I frankly don't know if someone was trying to kid me or if it was serious.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have any idea who telephoned you?

Miss FLUEGEL. No, I have no idea. It happened so fast that I was not thinking of anything like it. It did, however, suggest a question: As far as I know, most of the documents I will be referring to, while they were secret and top secret at the time I used them, have certainly been declassified in the course of years.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know that as a fact?

Miss FLUEGEL. If they haven't been declassified, it has been inertia rather than anything else. Certainly, nothing I say will jeopardize the security of the country.

Senator WATKINS. I say, Mr. Morris, I think that the staff of this committee should start an investigation immediately so as to discover,

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if possible, the source of that telephone call. The witnesses here must not be intimidated in any way.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be very difficult, Senator, to follow up a call like that.

Senator WATKINS. It may be, but I think we ought to do whatever we can that can be done about it.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present address now?

Miss FLUEGEL. 2531 Q Street NW., apartment 207.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position?

Miss FLUEGEL. Professor of political science, Trinity College.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever an employee of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, I entered the State Department in June of 1942, and worked in the Postwar Trends Unit until the following spring, about May.

In May of 1943 I became a member of the special group working on public opinion studies, and late in the summer, about September, I became unit head of a unit that was preparing biographical intelligence studies for possible use in selecting postwar leaders.

In the following summer, about September of 1944, I became a foreign affairs specialist on the staff of the Secretary of State, servicing the postwar programs committee.

That postwar programs committee became the Secretary-staff committee in the State Department reorganization at the end of the year.

Technically, I stayed with that for the rest of the time I was in the Department, which was until September of 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, would you raise your voice just a bit, please?

Miss FLUEGEL. Technically I stayed in that outfit until I left the Department in September of 1948, although actually I was detailed to the San Francisco Conference, and then over to the first meetings of the United Nations in London, and then to work on a book describing the whole story of postwar planning.

I was working on that book from about June of 1946 until I left the Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, do you have that book that you mentioned with you now?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, I have. It is right here.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that fully for the committee, please?

Miss FLUEGEL. The title is Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–45, published by the Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that published by the Department of State, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Let me check. Released February 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. February of 1950.

Mr. Mandel, will you verify for the record—I think it is in the introduction—that Dr. Fluegel is mentioned in this volume as one of the contributors to the compilation of that volume?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here the index of persons, which lists Edna R. Fluegel on pages 4, 158, 211, and 415. These are the persons involved in the formulation of this document.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Mandel, too, there is an accreditation given on page 4, is there not?

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Mr. MANDEL. On page 4 we find the paragraph which reads as follows:

The book was written by Harvey A. Notter, adviser to the Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs. Research and editorial assistance was given by a small staff comprised of—

and that list has Miss Edna R. Fluegel.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us with particularity, Dr. Fluegel, what your assignment was in connection with this volume?

Miss FLUEGEL. When I was detailed to the volume, they were trying to pull together a group who had actually been through the postwar planning experience. Since the documents were scattered and only people who knew what had happened, it was felt, could understand the work on that book, difficulties arose which made it impossible to get much of a staff.

So that from June of 1946 until sometime toward the end of 1947 Mr. Notter worked on it occasionally and part time. I worked on it full time and did a great deal of the research.

At that time, the rest of the group came on.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you leave the Stae Department, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. In September of 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position at the time of your departure?

Miss FLUEGEL. Foreign affairs specialist, technically attached to the Office of the Secretary of State.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, while you were associated with the Postwar Planning Division of the Department, to what documents and reports did you have access?

Miss FLUEGEL. Perhaps I can particularize that because it will explain different understandings at different times. When I was on the Postwar Trends Unit we received everything that came into the Department that in any way contained proposals of what we might do at the end of the war.

That would range from dispatches through published material. When I had the intelligence unit, we received every bit of information that contained any name of a foreign personality, including OSS material, and, when we needed it, of course, material from other intelligence units.

When I went to the Postwar Programs Committee, our job, of course, was to service the top planning committee in State, made up of the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretaries. So that then I saw all of the minutes and all of the documents going for top policy decision.

The same thing was true in the Secretary's staff committee. And then, when I went to work on this book, we had access to all the material that we could find that bore on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. On the subject of postwar planning?

Miss FLUGEL. That is right. And it was at that time that I had access to all of the minutes and documents from back in 1942, which I had not seen in 1942, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, were these minutes that were made available to you, Dr. Fluegel, would they be minutes of meetings involving, say, the President of the United States and Premier Stalin?

Miss FLUEGEL. Pertinent memoranda of conversations between the President and Mr. Stalin would be available, plus the verbatim minutes

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of all of the meetings held in all of the committees and subcommittees working on postwar planning.

Senator WATKINS. You mean to say that there would be a memorandum there in the files of these meetings purporting to be the minutes or to give the substance of what had transpired?

Miss FLUEGEL. As far as the meetings of the committees in the postwar planning organization, it would be the authenticated verbatim minutes.

Senator WATKINS. I am calling your attention specifically to the conferences between the President and Premier Stalin.

Miss FLUEGEL. That varied. I had them in some cases and in some cases I had all of the communication between the two of them.

Senator WATKINS. You mean the letters and cables or whatever had passed between them?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. In the case of the Moscow Conference, for example, I had the whole records. In the case of Tehran, the Department did not have the whole record on Tehran. In the case of Yalta, I had the records of one man who attended it, and bits from other people, but no verified records from Yalta.

Senator WATKINS. None of the correspondence as you had in the other case?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, here and there, on one or two particular questions, for example, on which I worked. You see, it was a question of what we needed. On questions on which I worked I had all of the correspondence that could be found.

Mr. MORRIS. And that would be minutes of very high classification, is that so?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. Sometimes Cabinet meetings; sometimes meetings of the Secretary of State; sometimes an interdepartmental meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. In your opinion, Dr. Fluegel, is there a question of present security involved in any of the testimony that we have taken here in executive session in connection with your own experience in the State Department, concerning your experience with these documents?

Miss FLUEGEL. I certainly can think of none.

Mr. MORIS. You can think of none?

Miss FLUEGEL. No.

Senator WATKINS. Speak up a little louder.

Miss FLUEGEL. I said I can think of none.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, what was the genesis of the postwar planning section of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. It is a rather long story. I will try to telescope it.

In the fall of 1939, Secretary Hull, that was at the time we were neutral, Secretary Hull was very much worried about what the state of the world would be like at the end of the war, and that was on the assumption that we would not partake in the war.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was expressly stated. I had the records of all of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that stated?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Leo Pasvolsky was appointed in charge of the small group and at the first meeting, which was held about the middle of December 1939—it was with the Secretary of State, and the As-

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sistant Secretaries—the feeling was expressed that the United States should be thinking of what the condition would be at the end of the hostilities and, from there until much later the assumption was that we would remain neutral.

The primary work of that group was the preparation of a memorandum of proposals which Mr. Welles took to Europe when he saw all of the heads of the beligerent States about February of——

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that?

Miss FLUEGEL. I had the documents.

Mr. MORRIS. You had the documents.

Miss FLUEGEL. Including Mr. Welles' report on his mission.

Mr. MORRIS. And the basis of your testimony here today is on the basis of the documents which you have handled?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Miss FLUEGEL. That will be true throughout. That particular effort was abandoned at the time—right after the blitz. I wasn't in the Department at the time. They had proposed a conference of neutrals.

Mr. MORRIS. By the blitz, you refer to the——

Miss FLUEGEL. The German sweep into Western Europe. Many of the neutrals who were going to participate in a conference, of course, were occupied by the German armies.

In the summer of 1940, and again I had these minutes, I was not in the Department then—in the summer of 1940 a study was made as to what——

Senator WATKINS. Let us see if I understand you. You say you had those minutes and you were not in the Department then. How did you have the minutes?

Miss FLUEGEL. I got the minutes when I was working on this book.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Senator Watkins, I think the witness has indicated that she received minutes when she was working on this book of events that had taken place prior to the time she was working in the Department.

Senator WATKINS. I understood so. But I was wondering how she had possession of them after she had severed her connection with the Department.

Miss FLUEGEL. No; I was just explaining that I was not then a member of this postwar planning group.

Senator WATKINS. All right.

Miss FLUEGEL. That group in the summer of 1940 reconsidered matters in terms of events in Europe and made economic studies as to what the effect, for example, would be on the United States if Germany conquered the rest of the world. A whole series of studies of that sort were made.

As far as we could gather from the records, that particular effort tapered off in the fall of 1940. Running through the year 1941, there was a very small group continuing to work on problems, but, of course, it was a year of transition.

A recommendation—I saw the recommendation—went to Mr. Roosevelt in the spring of 1941 to establish a more definite postwar planning set-up. That recommendation was acted upon by Mr. Roosevelt a few days after Pearl Harbor, and the first full meeting of what became the real post-war planning outfit was held in February of 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. 1942, did you say, Dr. Fluegel?

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Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. And that first meeting was what was known as the President's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that held?

Miss FLUEGEL. February 1942. Mr. Hull was ill at the time and Mr. Welles presided at the first meeting. There were about four of those meetings, and out of those meetings——

Mr. MORRIS. Continuing through what period of time?

Miss FLUEGEL. The top committee, that particular committee, met only four times terminating, I think, in April or May of the same year.

It had by that time, though, laid down the basic lines and launched this whole series of subcommittees.

There was a subcommittee on territorial problems, which branched off into a whole series of committees, including country committees; there was one on political problems; later one on dependent areas; one on security problems, in which the Army and Navy participated.

They all proceeded to meet and plan and work. The research staff serviced those, and I was a member of the research staff.

Mr. MORRIS. So really this all went into effect in 1942, is that right?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to have introduced into the record three documents which relate to IPR activities along the lines being described by the witness here today.

Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would identify and read into the record this exchange of correspondence.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here some documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I will begin this series chronologically.

The first is a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The letter is dated March 30, 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may these go into the record before the reading?

Senator WATKINS. They may be made a part of the record.

(Letters referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 451" and are read in full below.)

Mr. MANDEL. The carbon comes from the files of the institute. It is addressed to Mr. William M. Lockwood, on the letterhead of the Board of Economic Welfare, and is signed by Roy Veach, March 30, 1942.

DEAR BILL: I have had an opportunity to talk with a good many people both inside and outside the Government since I came down here, particularly regarding the present state of thought and action on plans and advance preparations for the postwar world. It seems perfectly clear to me, and to others who are trying to observe the situation closely, that some new impetus is needed to bring scattered thinking into focus. We do not yet have in Government or outside of Government any agreement, or any general understanding, as to the essential points in a postwar set-up that will make possible another war within a generation or two, and there is no adequate plan for such public discussion of this problem as will lead to general support of the action that governments must take.

I, and a few others here, have been casting about for the proper agency or medium to bring together the people who should think through this problem and advise upon lines of action. This might be done by Edward Meade Earle's committee, as a follow-up of the Prout's Neck Conference last summer. On the other hand, I believe it would be desirable for the auspices to be a little broader and I wondered therefore whether the IPR and the FPA—

referring to the Foreign Policy Association—

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and perhaps also Shotwell's Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, might join with Earle's committee in sponsoring such a conference, entirely without publicity.

It would be my idea that a group ought to meet near Washington during the spring, at least before the end of May, and that it should spend 2 to 4 days together. If the meeting is limited to 2 days, say Saturday and Sunday, I believe you would have a better chance to hold the entire group together since each member might be able to commit himself to that much time.

As a starter I would suggest the following people outside the Government: Shotwell, Buell, Pittman Potter, Eugene Staley, Jacob Viner, Clarence Pickett, Quincy Wright, J. B. Condliffe, Isaiah Bowman, Dr. Boudreau, A. Loveday, A. Hansen, Edward Meade Earle, Walter Van Kirk, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Vera Micheles Dean, and of course you and Ned Carter. You might want to include also George Warren, Secretary of the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees; Patrick M. Malin, American Director, International Migration Service; Michael Straight, Maxwell S. Stewart, Carter Goodrich, Esther Brunauer, Bill and Anne Johnstone and John Coyl of the National Planning Association.

From within the Government you might include Mrs. Roosevelt, Vice President Wallace, Milo Perkins, Berle, Acheson, Pasvolsky (and Julian Wadleigh, Charles Yost, and Harley Notter, from Pasvolsky's Division in the State Department); Harry White of the Treasury; Wayne Taylor, Amos Taylor and A. R. Upgren of the Department of Commerce; Lubin and Hinrichs from the labor field; Stacy May from WPB; Stephen Raushenbush from the Power Commission; Rigland and Fox, on the staff of the President's Committee on War Relief Appeals (and perhaps Joseph E. Davies and Keppel of the committee); and from the staff of our board, Lewis Lorwin, Winfield Riefler, William T. Stone, and Louis Bean.

Let me know what you think about this plan. If you are not in a position to take the initiative we should like to take it up with someone else.

Sincerely yours,

ROY VEATCH.

P. S.—Of course other names will occur to me as soon as this has gone—for instance, I certainly wouldn't leave out Phil Jessup. Presumably a group of four or five would want to do a careful job of drawing up the list.

This is followed by a letter dated April 6, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to ECC, presumably E. C. Carter, and WLH, presumably William L. Holland, from WWL, presumably William W. Lockwood:

I'd like your advice on a reply to the attached letter from Roy Veatch. It proposes a conference this spring on the essentials of a postwar settlement, attended by persons in and out of the Government.

There isn't any doubt but that this would be a very useful undertaking if properly set up. It might in fact be the Prout's Neck follow-up which we have been unable to arrange thus far.

The chief problem I should think would not be organizational sponsorship but finding someone with the standing, time, and resources to pull it off. Given this it would be easy to get the necessary informal cooperation.

As for our taking the lead, shouldn't positive IPR efforts in this field be devoted primarily to our own area of concern? I should think any conferencing that we do ought to be directed first of all at several preparatory meetings for the September show. This would not preclude our chipping in but would mean that someone else would really have to carry the ball.

Ed Earle is out West for a month investigating different aspects of the Japanese evacuation.

I am sending a copy of Roy's letter to Phil Jessup. He might like to consider the proposal in relation to his Carnegie endowment program.

Veatch's personnel proposals are entirely American, but surely this meeting should be international in character.

That letter is dated April 6, 1942. And then from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is a brief note, a carbon of a note, dated April 7, 1942, headed "WWL from ECC":

I wish somehow or other someone other than Roy Veatch could undertake the task of postwar planning. While he knows a great many people in Washington I can't believe that he is the soundest person for us to tie to.

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Mr. MORRIS. And then, Mr. Chairman, we have a letter dated September 25, 1942, which apparently indicates that the Institute of Pacific Relations did carry on a postwar policy discussion plan.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that and read that one into the record, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 25, 1943. At the top it says: Similar letters to—and lists the following individuals: J. H. Shoemaker, K. Y. Yin, W. H. Schubert, Archie Lochhead, Li Ming, H. D. Fong, Lauchlin Currie, W. L. Pierson, W. Taylor, E. C. Carter, Harry White, Frank Coe, E. J. Coil, Emile Despres, Herbert Feis, Irving Friedman, Mawell Hamilton, Alvin Hansen, Alger Hiss, P. H. Ho, Stanley K. Hornbeck, Charles Kindelberger, Leo Pasvolsky, Harry B. Price, Ludwik Rajchman, Carl F. Remer.

The letter reads as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 451A

Dr. KAN LEE,
China Defense Supplies, Inc.,
1601 V Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. LEE: The Institute of Pacific Relations will hold the second session of its round table discussion on Chinese postwar reconstruction on Friday evening, October 2, in the Colonial Room of the Cosmos Club. Dr. Harry White will be in the chair. Dinner will be at seven; drinks being served from 6:30.

There are enclosed an agenda for this meeting and a summary of the last. Please indicate on the enclosed card whether or not you can attend.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT W. BARNETT.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the person described as being in the chair, Dr. Harry White, has been identified before this committee by several witnesses as being a member of the Communist Party, as in addition some of the members to whom similar letters were sent, according to the notations Mr. Mandel has read.

As evidence of IPR activity along the lines that the witness is now testifying, will you receive this letter into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 451A" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, what position did Alger Hiss have at this particular time? This is now the fall of 1942.

Miss FLUEGEL. At that time, he was assistant to Mr. Stanley Hornbeck, who was political adviser in the State Department, and was a member of the President's Advisory Commission.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the President's Advisory Commission, Dr. Fluegel, that you refer to?

Miss FLUEGEL. The President's Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy is this top, over-all postwar committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Made up of whom? What was the make of it?

Miss FLUEGEL. The composition, roughly, as it started, was to include members of the Department, senior members of the Department, senior members on a very top level for other interested departments, and also some of the new postwar outfits, like BEW.

It was also to include distinguished outsiders like Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Myron Taylor, Ann O'Hare McCormick, and several

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others, with representation from War and Navy, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I think also the idea was that this represented the military departments as well.

A little bit later, I think sometime in the spring of 1942, some Congressmen started coming in, but most of the Congressmen were not in until 1943.

The full list of membership—there were so many new ones added to it because sometimes the member never did attend but sent a representative. There was also—I forgot to mention—representation from the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Who represented the White House on this?

Miss FLUEGEL. Lauchlin Currie was one, David Niles was another, and there was a third member.

It was not always clear, even then, whether they represented the White House or one of the parts of the White House Establishment.

The full list which we had worked out and had verified by most of the members is contained in that book, and it gives the new ones so far as any of us were able to establish it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, at this point in the record, will you insert the references made by Dr. Fluegel in this volume? I do not think we have to go into it now, Mr. Chairman. It does not have to be read, Mr. Chairman. But at this point in the record, will you accept from Mr. Mandel the list that appears in this volume?

Senator WATKINS. We will accept it that way.

Mr. MORRIS. We do not have to take the time to go into it, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. It can be inserted in the record, if you will present it.

(Information referred to is as follows:)

MEMBERSHIP

[Source: "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–45," Department of State, Publication 3580, General Foreign Policy, Series 15, Released February 1950, pp. 71–78 of chapter entitled "Organization and Meetings of Full Committee"]

When the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy began its meetings, its composition and its structure of subcommittees were established in principle but not fully elaborated. Its organization was not an action completed on a given day but was rather a process of development. This process continued throughout the committee's active life, which lasted in most of the political fields of its work until the summer of 1943 and in the economic fields and that of special regional prnblems until the spring of 1944. This process of growth at all times affected not only the Advisory Committee's membership and structure but the scope and the conduct of its discussions as well. Flexibility of conception, not the rigidity of preconception, characterized every aspect of the committee and its work. By the spring of 1943 various departmental, interdepartmental, and other mechanisms had begun to grow out of the committee's activity. In a number of important respects the committee's powers and functions became the foundation for various later structures through which its work was carried forward, with little interruption but much adaptation, as the periods of advanced preparation and of action arrived in the several fields of work.

Although there was great need to keep the Advisory Committee small, there was greater need to provide the range of competent judgment essential for sound results. Ultimately, specific representation of major points of view among the public and in the Government became a factor that further enlarged the committee. "Membership" tended for these reasons to be defined strictly but to be widely diversified.

The Advisory Committee proper came to include 10 nonofficial members, 5 Senators and 3 Representatives 11 members from the Department of State of whom 4 were ex-officio, a member each from the War and Navy Departments and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a unit, and 1 member each from 4 other departments, 3 members from the White House staff, 1 from the Library of

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Congress, 4 from the wartime agencies, and 1 from among the continuing agencies of the Government. In addition there were other Senators and Representatives, as well as certain individuals from private and public life, who served on the subsidiary bodies of the main committee.

The members drawn from private life were chosen primarily because of their high personal qualifications for policy consideration and because of their capacity broadly to represent informed public opinion and interests. The selection of official members was based both on personal qualifications and on representation of the interested parts of the Government. Emphasis upon "representation" increasingly became a practical objective in building the Committee on effective and influential lines and was reflected in all appointments made after the initial four months of the Committee's activity.

Usually the members from private life and from the Congress were invited by letter from the Secretary of State with the approval of the President. Formal procedure was likewise followed in the case of invitations to members having Cabinet status, who either attended themselves or, while holding direct consultations with Secretary Hull and other officials of the Committee, were represented at meetings by appointees of their own choice. Other members were invited informally, through oral invitations extended by Secretary Hull or with his approval.

The distinction between formal and informal membership was without significance in the actual character of participation. In contrast, however, there were differences in extent of participation between general members, who took part in various aspects of the work, and special members invited to serve in particular problem fields. General members tended to be active in the consideration of political, territorial, and security problems, whereas the special members were active chiefly, through not exclusively, with respect to economic problems.

Five of the persons named in the initial recommendation approved by the President in December 1941 were general members. Of these, three were wholly engaged in nonofficial activities at the time: Isaiah Bowman, President of the Johns Hopkins University, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick, foreign-affairs analyst of the New York Times. Two were so largely engaged in nonofficial pursuits, though having special official responsibilities, that they also were regarded as representing the public. These were Myron C. Taylor and Norman H. Davis. Mr. Taylor, industrialist and philanthropist, was Personal Representative of the President, with the rank of Ambassador, on the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees and also to Pope Pius XII. Mr. Davis had been in official service for many years, especially in connection with economic and disarmament conferences, and was at the time Chairman of the American Red Cross and President of the Council of Foreign Relations. James Thomson Shotwell, historian and Director of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was added in June 1942, becoming the sixth member having general and nonofficial status on the Advisory Committee.

Of the special nonofficial members, two were invited in May 1942 to participate in the field of economic problems: Robert J. Watt, international representative of the American Federation of Labor, and Walter P. Reuther of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. A month later Brooks Emeny, director of the Council of Foreign Affairs of Cleveland, Ohio, was invited to take part in the same field and in that of legal problems. Early in April 1943 William Green, president of the A. F. of L., and Philip Murray, president of the C. I. O., received invitations formally to represent directly their organizations in the economic field, taking the places held previously on a more personal basis by Mr. Watt and Mr. Reuther. (See pp. 136, 139.) Eric A. Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, was likewise invited at the same time directly to represent his organization in the economic field. Two economists, Percy W. Bidwell of the Council on Foreign Relations and Jacob Viner of the University of Chicago, participated in the specialized consideration accorded European regional problems for some months beginning in June 1943.

The membership from the Congress reflected the desire of both Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt to have direct congressional participation in the preparation on a basis of as nearly equal representation of the two major political parties as practicable. Nonpartisan agreement upon foreign policy and harmony of views between the Executive and the Congress were the objectives. This desire to assure a unified national view on basic foreign policy and so avoid the costly mistakes made at the close of World War I was manifest

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in the earliest of the invitations, May 27, 1942, and throughout all subsequent developments. Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Democrat, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Warren R. Austin of Vermont, Republican, the minority member of that committee designated after consultation with Republican leaders, were the first congressional participants.

On January 9, 1943, two Democratic Senators, Walter F. George of Georgia and Elbert D. Thomas of Utah; two Democratic Representatives, Sol Bloom of New York and Luther A. Johnson of Texas; and one Republican Representative, Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, joined the Committee. Six weeks later, another Republican Senator, Wallace H. White of Maine, also became a member. The Senators named were currently serving on the Committee on Foreign Relations except for Senator George, who after long service as its chairman had recently left that committee for another important assignment. The Representatives were members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Representative Bloom being its chairman and Representative Eaton its ranking minority member. Participation was undertaken in various capacities by other Republican leaders as political changes occurred and later as international negotiations were undertaken. (See pp. III and IV.)

In addition to congressional participation in the Advisory Committee and its initial subcommittees, a number of Members of the Congress later sat on the "special committees" that during 1943, as the main work of the Advisory Committee was drawing to a close, became active in the economic and social fields. Participation in these bodies did not necessarily involve membership on the Advisory Committee. Invitations were given in such instances by the various "special committee" chairmen directly. The "special committees" included the following Members from the Congress: Senators Scott W. Lucas of Illinois and Claude Pepper of Florida and Representatives Schuyler Otis Bland of Virginia with J. Hardin Peterson of Florida as alternate, and Alfred L. Bulwinkle of North Carolina, Democrats; and Representatives Richard J. Welch of California and Charles A. Wolverton of New Jersey, Republicans.

The number of Department of State officials named as members of the Advisory Committee continued throughout to be severely restricted in order that the Committee might be in fact widely representative of the country. This policy was adhered to strictly in the case of the Committee itself, the President having said, when approving the Committee, that the proposed State Department membership was a little too heavy. The policy was relaxed slightly, however, in the case of the main subcommittees. Membership accordingly was confined largely to officials of the rank of Assistant Secretary or above, with participation of other high officers limited, as a general rule, to attendance on request without membership.

A large proportion of these departmental officials had taken part in the earlier planning effort. Those having general membership were principally those mentioned in the original letter of recommendation to the President: Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Assistant Secretaries Berle and Acheson, together with four members of ex officio standing. Mr. Pasvolsky was a member ex officio on the basis of both his responsibility as Executive Director of the Advisory Committee and his general duties as Special Assistant to the Secretary. The legal adviser, Mr. Hackworth, and the Adviser of International Economic Affairs, Mr. Feis, had ex officio status based on their regular duties. Assistant Secretary Acheson and Mr. Hawkins, the fourth ex officio member as Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, were specialized in their assignment at this time, working wholly in the economic field.

On February 6, 1942, just before the Advisory Committee convened, Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long and John Van A. MacMurray, who was serving temporarily as Special Assistant to the Secretary, were appointed to take part in a special capacity. Soon thereafter the Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Ray Atherton, was similarly appointed because of his particular personal qualifications for work in connection with political, territorial, and security problems, though he was usually represented in the two latter fields by Cavendish Cannon of the same Division, acting in a personal capacity.

In addition, the four political advisers of the Department—James Clement Dunn for Europe, Stanley K. Hornbeck for the Far East, Laurence Duggan for the other American Republics, and Wallace S. Murray for the Near East—attended meeting as superior operating officials when political, territorial, and security problems pertaining to the countries and areas of concern to each, respectively, were scheduled for discussion and on such occasions served as special ex officio members. Mr. Hornbeck in August 1942 and Mr. Dunn in March

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1943 began regularly to undertake subcommittee duties in connection with international security problems, as did Joseph C. Green, Special Assistant to the Secretary, in the same special ex officio capacity beginning June 10, 1943. The participation undertaken at times in various economic fields by Paul Culbertson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, beginning October 9, 1943, and H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, former Minister to Finland on special duty in the Department, beginning June 23, 1943, did not raise questions of membership.

Three members from the White House staff took part. Benjamin V. Cohen, who had been named in the original list submitted in December 1941 and who had general duties at the White House in his capacity as legal counsel of the Office of War Mobilization and on the basis of his earlier work in the Government, was active in all fields. David K. Niles, administrative Assistant to the President in matters concerning the War Production Board, became a member prior to the convening of the first meeting of the Advisory Committee and concentrated on economic problems. While serving personally, he spoke in a sense for Harry Hopkins in accord with the wishes of the President. Subsequently, on April 9, 1943, Lauchlin Currie, also administrative assistant to the President, became a member for work on economic problems.

Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, joined the Committee on January 2, 1943, taking part especially in the consideration of political problems.

The Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War were requested early in the work of the Advisory Committee to designate representatives in connection with problems of international security, and consequently Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn and Maj. Gen. George V. Strong became members at the end of April 1942. Rear Admiral Harold C. Train began regular attendance as alternate member for the Navy Department in August 1942. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as an entity was invited in March and April 1943 to be represented. Its several officers who thereafter attended comprised in fact the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and they spoke together for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as if they were a single member of the Advisory Committee. They were Vice Admiral Russell Willson of the Navy, Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick of the Army, and Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild of the Air Corps. Shortly thereafter a naval air representative, Capt. George H. DeBaun, was designated to serve with these officers. Senior representatives of the armed services were assisted throughout by specialists on given problems or by other aides. Among these assisting officers were Brig. Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, Col. Thomas J. Betts, Col. James F. Olive, Jr., Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lanphier, Capt. H. L. Pence and Capt. V. E. Korns, who attended without being members.

Representation of several wartime agencies was rendered highly desirable by the postwar bearings of their emergency functions. Outstanding among these was the Board of Economic Warfare, of which Vice President Henry A. Wallace was Chairman. Since Mr. Wallace himself could not attend, he was represented from the beginning by an appointee of his own choice, Milo Perkins, Executive Director of the Board. Mr. Perkins also was unable personally to attend meetings, and accordingly the further exception was allowed to the general rule against alternates by permitting William T. Stone, Assistant Director of the Board, and also Louis H. Bean, to attend for him, effective with the first meeting on February 12, 1942. Subsequently, on June 6, 1943, Mr. Stone himself was designated as the member for participation in the fields of economic problems of concern to the Board, while Mr. Bean continued thereafter to attend as observer.

Various other emergency agencies were eventually represented. Chester C. Davis, Administrator of the Food Production and Distribution Administration, became a member early in April 1943, though his regular duties shortly proved too heavy to permit his attendance. On April 9, 1943, Marvin Jones, Judge of the United States Court of Claims, was invited to membership, at first personally but subsequently in his capacity as War Food Administrator. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, was invited to membership on April 9, 1943.

It was recognized at the outset that the economic and social problems to be considered by the Advisory Committee would involve at various stages the work of a number of the permanent Departments and agencies of the Government. Preliminary studies in connection with such problems in their respective fields had been begun or projected by a number of the Departments, but, in several instances, time was required to arrange for the representation of these Departments and agencies on the Committee because of the many readjustments of function and responsibility then being undertaken to place the Government

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on a war footing. Furthermore, there was need of prior exploration by the Committee to clairfy the policy problems presented before all the Departments most concerned could be determined.

Harry D. White, Director of Monetary Research and Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, was designated April 15, 1942, to represent Henry Morgenthau, Jr., in the case of economic and financial problems. Paul H. Appleby, Under Secretary of Agriculture, was invited to membership on February 9, 1942, representing Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary of Commerce, Jesse Jones, was represented by Wayne C. Taylor, Under Secretary of Commerce, beginning the following July. William L. Clayton, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, served for a time commencing June 21, 1943, as chairman of a special economic comittee, though he did not become a member of the Advisory Committee. Invitations to membership were extended on April 9, 1943, to Miss Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, and to Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Subsequently, officials of other agencies were asked to undertake special responsibilities in the work, though not formally as members of the Advisory Committee. As Oscar B. Ryder, Chairman of the Tariff Commission, could not attend, Lynn R. Edminster of the same Commission participated in his stead beginning June 15, 1943. Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, and Hugh Cox, Assistant Attorney General, took part in the consideration of economic problems commencing June 4 and July 2, 1943, respectively.

Many other officials in various Departments and agencies of the Government took part in discussions or assisted otherwise in the conduct of the committee's work. In view of the scope and character of the problems at issue, the number of these officials progressively increased. However, because such participation was pursuant to official duty and accordingly was subject to the frequent changes of personnel or assignment in the Government, the separate identification of all these individuals is not undertaken here. The participation of those active on one or another related committee in the Advisory Committee structure and of those specially placed at the service of the committee in a professional research capacity is indicated below.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the first Director of the Postwar Planning Division of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Leo Pasvolsky was special assistant to the Secretary in charge of postwar matters.

I should explain, I suppose, that up until about the fall of 1943 we were not allowed to use the term "postwar." We were working on problems arising from the strained relations, or something to that effect.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, who succeeded Pasvolsky?

Miss FUEGEL. Pasvolsky remained in charge as special assistant, but shortly before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Ambassador Wilson returned—it was directly before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference—and Alger Hiss, who had been special assistant to Mr. Hornbeck who had just been designated Ambassador to the Netherlands, became special assistant to Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson was ill off and on through that period although he did attend the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Shortly after the conference, Mr. Wilson left and Mr. Hiss was in charge. I think technically he became director of what was known as the Special Political Affairs Office about February of 1945, although he had been acting sometime before that.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you testify that, although he had been acting director prior to February 1945, he formally became the director of what was in effect the postwar planning division of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you tell us about the nature of his duties in that role, Dr. Fluegel?

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Miss FLUEGEL. Well, right before Dumbarton Oaks, when he first came, he immediately took a very active part. He was in charge of all of the arrangements. He was secretary to several of the top planning committees and attended Dumbarton Oaks in that capacity.

I suppose you would describe his job as pretty much the job of a secretary general plus personal adviser to the delegates.

Mr. MORRIS. What documents or what material would be available to him in that role?

Miss FLUEGEL. Everything that existed.

Mr. MORRIS. Everything in the entire Department of the highest classification?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. At that particular time, you see, postwar involved everything, economics, social, political.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know that of your own personal knowledge?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. You see, everything, every single decision—at that time, they had this top secretary's committee which was the final place where policy decisions were made, and it really operated then. So that every paper on every subject requiring top policy decision came to it, and Mr. Hiss was ex officio a member of that committee.

Senator WATKINS. And all that material was then available to him as it was to the members of the committee?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. Do you want me to carry on?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss FLUEGEL. Following the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, he did, of course, participate in all of the meetings, discussing plannings for Yalta, since a major part of the Yalta Conference—as a matter of fact the reason for the Yalta Conference—was the failure to settle certain questions during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

Among other things, I think you probably remember that there was a stage during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference when it was touch and go as to whether the conference would continue. There was a great deal of correspondence between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Stalin.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us when Dumbarton Oaks Conference was held?

Miss FLUEGEL. I would have to check the exact date. Roughly in August and running through September.

Mr. MORRIS. August of 1944?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. It was held in two stages. The first stage in which Great Britain and the United States and the Soviet Union participated, and the second between the United States, Great Britain and China, with the final session that brought all four together.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, I wonder if we might go back to the period of 1941 and 1942, at the start of the war.

What was our policy then, to the best of the ability that you are able to testify, on the basis of your experience, toward the Soviet Union?

Miss FLUEGEL. I would start, then, with the policy statement given to the President's Advisory Committee in the first meeting in February of 1942.

It was made by Mr. Welles. I should point out I was not in the Department then. I have this from the minutes.

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Mr. MORRIS. When you say you have this from them, the minutes, the minutes were made available to you in connection with your duties in compiling this volume——

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And on the basis of your experience with those minutes, you are now testifying here today?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct. Mr. Welles informed the members of the committee, when it convened for the first time, that they were to consider as policy guidance the Atlantic Charter, the decision to concentrate the war in Europe, which would guide them in giving priority to European problems, and that the third factor to be borne in mind was that the method by which the United Nations Declaration had been signed with the great powers—the four great powers, since France was not considered—signing at the White House and the other powers signing at the State Department. From the beginning that constituted the differentiation between the great powers and the small powers.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did that policy remain in force?

Miss FLUEGEL. You had some minor shifting in policy all through the period, but the first question, great question, of change in policy came up in the spring of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened then, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Immediately after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, difficulties arose between the two countries and you may remember——

Senator WATKINS. Between which two countries?

Miss FLUEGEL. Between the United States and the Soviet Union. It reached such a point, you may remember, that publicly Admiral Standley, who was our Ambassador in Moscow at the time——

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of this difficulty?

Miss FLUEGEL. Growing demands for a second front on the part of the Soviet Union, the fact that, immediately after Stalingrad, the League of Polish Patriots was announced at Moscow, and also the Committee for Free Germany, and this association of German officers who had surrendered at Stalingrad. It was recognized almost immediately that, potentially, at least, they could become governments in exile sponsored by the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. From documents.

Mr. MORRIS. You know each of those things which you have testified to from documents?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, documents and dispatches sent in alerting us to that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, the existence of the Polish——

Miss FLUEGEL. The League of Polish Patriots.

Mr. MORRIS. The German Officers Corps, and the Free German Committee?

Miss FLUEGEL. And, as a matter of fact, the accuracy of that prediction was confirmed by the fact that the leading members of the Polish Government and of the Eastern German Government have now been taken from those groups.

This agitation was reflected by Admiral Standley when he criticized the Soviet Union for not publicizing lend-lease, and Pravda, I think

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it was Pravda—it may have been Izvestia—did publish a small paragraph. That was sometime in March.

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I think Admiral Standley will be one of the later witnesses before this committee, and we can have verification of this part of it from him.

Miss FLUEGEL. I should add, following that, a decision was made to try to prevent any further deterioration in relations and that is when a mission was sent to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any concern expressed by the officials of the United States Government at that time?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, a very great deal.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Again from documents and dispatches at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain in detail what some of these documents are?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. As a matter of fact, I never clarified in my own mind whether Admiral Standley spoke on his own or under instruction. I did not see that.

But I do know that the immediate reaction was very bad, and there was discussion in the Department, there were dispatches coming in and inquiring inquiries going out.

Mr. MORRIS. Did these inquires and dispatches indicate concern on the part of the United States officials about the deterioration of the United States-Soviet Union relation?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. The purpose of the mission sent to Moscow that spring was to try and reconcile differences, and one of the things we got out of that was the abolition of the Comintern. What we gave, I never saw.

Senator WATKINS. Who were the members of the mission?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was Ambassador Davies. I don't recall who went with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, at this time, was the term "United Nations" being used at all, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, it had been used off and on, and some people have tried to trace it, and I think the tracing has resulted in attributing it to Mr. Roosevelt even before the United Nations declaration in January. That was pretty much——

Mr. MORRIS. January of what year?

Miss FLUEGEL. 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the term "United Nations" used at that time?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. Yes, United Nations was used. Perhaps, to carry through in answering your question, it was in August of 1943 that this uneasiness crystallized in a decision on the part of the President to go ahead full speed with the establishment of a postwar international organization.

Up to that time, there had been some consideration given to a transitional period after the war, what we called the posthostilities period, and to not establishing the permanent organization until after the world had settled down a little.

But at a meeting, at the White House, and I saw the records of the meeting, Mr. Roosevelt decided that the only hope of insuring Russian participation and thus Russian cooperation in the postwar would be if we got her in the organization before the end of the war. It was in

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the light of that August 1943, decision that we proceeded with the Moscow Conference and the Four Power Declaration.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know all of this, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. From documents and memoranda of conversations at the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Which you had and dealt with and handled in connection with your work?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Dr. Fluegel, did you go with Alger Hiss to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about the development of postwar planning at that juncture in history?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. But perhaps there I should back track again because having taken this up to 1943 there was another development in 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Miss FLUEGEL. That bears directly both on Yalta and on San Francisco.

Midway in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, several questions popped up, but two that were very serious.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, I wonder if you would inform the committee of the developments leading up to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. What was the nature of it, and why was it called?

Miss FLUEGEL. After the Moscow declaration, the Four Nation Declaration, since we had decided to go ahead full steam, the United States spent every effort to get the meeting held.

Running through the spring of 1944, we initiated rather elaborate drafts. In the month of May, Mr. Hull met with Congressmen and consulted them on it. At the conclusion of those consultations, a copy of our proposals was given to the other governments concerned.

The British also had proposals. Then when they came to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the idea was that the four powers would work over these, and if they reached agreement then they would call the larger meeting, including all of the other nations.

The United States insisted on the participation of China. Britain was agreeable; Russia objected. The conversations were held in the two stages.

It was in the first stage, the Russian stage, that the conference almost broke down when the question of the so-called veto, and the question of plural membership for the Soviet Union came up.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the first time that that problem arose, is that right, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. We should have known about the plural membership. We had one alert, and that was in connection with the war crimes matter.

I think it was very late in 1943. The Russians had raised the question. They had been denied, I think, primarily at that time by the British. The Russians then proceeded to change their constitution.

The amendment to the Russian constitution of February 1944, apparently, was to meet that objection to establish that the Republics of the Soviet Union actually did have independent control of their foreign affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. When you mentioned the problem——

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Miss FLUEGEL. Somebody noted it. I saw a record noting that somebody suggested that maybe this was laying the groundwork for future claims.

Mr. MORRIS. You remember seeing that that had been noted within the Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. But so much was happening at the time that it was just lost tract of. So that when the question came up, it was a bombshell.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say the question came up, Dr. Fluegel, I wish you would describe in full to the committee the nature of the problem that arose at that time.

Without going into what happened, Dr. Fluegel, I would like you to explain the nature of the question itself. You refer to the plural proposal.

Miss FLUEGEL. The Russian proposal, at first presented to us, was about three points. First it was a request that every one of the Soviet republics be given membership.

Mr. MORRIS. How many separate Soviet republics were there?

Miss FLUEGEL. Sixteen. The second proposal was the Ukraine and Byelorussia and Lithuania. Lithuania, you see, would have involved forcing American recognition which we had refused and continue to refuse.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the second. That would have given the Soviet Union four votes.

Miss FLUEGEL. Plus the recognition of Lithuania which would have automatically extended to Estonia and Latvia as well.

Mr. MORRIS. And at that time, the United States had not recognized the absorption of Lithuania?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And acquiescence in that plan would have given recognition to Lithuania?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. The third proposal, the one which eventually they got, was the admission of the Ukraine and Byelorussia. It did, of course, involve complete distortion since we had decided that membership was to be to sovereign states only. At the time the question came up, it was considered dynamite, so much so that it was referred to from the time of Dumbarton Oaks until Yalta as the X matter, and they kept a record of even the stenographers who had typed papers concerning it. It is an example of one of the questions that was considered dynamite at the time and didn't turn out to be such dynamite.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor, is it your testimony that there was a great deal of secrecy surrounding the Soviet's demand that they have the plural number of votes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. We even asked them not to bring it up again, and there was a limit on the papers and all in which any reference to it appeared. When the reference did appear, it was veiled as the X matter.

I am citing that now because, certainly, it can no longer have any security importance, althought at the time it did.

The question of the voting almost resulted in a breakdown of the Conference and at one time, according to records I saw, Mr. Hull asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and here I don't know whether he did it by letter or through the military liaison——

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Mr. MORRIS. But you do know he did it?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, sir—what their opinion was, how important it was to continue with Dumbarton Oaks. The answer we received was at all costs to accommodate because we could never again fight a major war.

It was in the light of that, that accommodations were made and the questions were postponed and the plans for Yalta were set, which brings us down to Yalta.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might go into the San Francisco part before we go into the Yalta thing. That is not taking it in continuity, but I think it will bring out the witness' role in this affair better than if we did it the other way.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed in any order you think will develop the subject matter better.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, will you tell us what your role was at the San Francisco Conference?

Miss FLUEGEL. I was special assistant to the executive secretary in the international secretariat of which Mr. Hiss was Secretary-General.

Mr. MORRIS. Hiss was Secretary-General?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were special assistant?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the executive secretary?

Miss FLUEGEL. Easton Rothwell, who was head of the staff servicing the Secretary's office.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you in San Francisco with that staff?

Miss FLUEGEL. Roughly 3 months. I arrived about a week before San Francisco, and stayed a few days after.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Hiss' role at that time in the formation of the United Nations?

Miss FLUEGEL. As Secretary-General he was, of course, an international officer running the Conference and trying to compromise frictions between the delegates. In addition to that, he operated up at the Fairmount Hotel with the Big Five, who held almost a separate conference, of course, all during the San Francisco meeting, and also with the American delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you see Mr. Hiss during those days?

Miss FLUEGEL. I probably ran into him a couple of times a day, or would see him at meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say he had complete control of the delegation, United States delegation, at that time?

Miss FLUEGEL. No, he had complete control of the international secretariat. As far as I could gather from the records of the delegation I saw, he operated in a sense as Mr. Stettinius' assistant with respect to the delegation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Stettinius was at that time Secretary of State?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what role had Alger Hiss played at Yalta?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, of course, he went to Yalta as the top international organization specialist, and a large part of the Yalta Conference was to be devoted to that. That, at the time, of course, is all I knew.

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Mr. MORRIS. You were not at Yalta, were you, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. No, I was not at Yalta. When I was working on the book, we were fortunate enough to get from a man in the State Department Mr. Hiss' handwritten notes on the Yalta Conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you get the handwritten notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Bechover. He is in some post, or was, in United Nations Affairs. And he gave Mr. Notter, who gave me, the notes Mr. Hiss had left with him on the Yalta Conference.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you handled the original notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, they were all handwritten.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Senator WATKINS. Did you know the handwriting of Mr. Hiss? Are you sure of that?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. I was told they were, and I did know the handwriting.

Senator WATKINS. You had seen it many times before?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. And you had seen him write?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. I probably should describe the notes to explain that I really know only about one section of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain them in full?

Miss FLUEGEL. I was interested because I was trying to follow the story on the Ukraine and Byelorussia.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, at the time you were handling these notes, you were preparing a paper on this plural voting difficulty?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right, and had no interest at all in any other feature. So I leafed through the notes, looking for this material.

The notes, as I said, were mostly penciled, containing the kind of doodling you would have, you know, if you were keeping notes during a meeting. On some occasions there was an indication that he had passed them back and forth. Occasionally there was an "OK., FDR." I remember that particularly. "San Francisco, O. K., FDR," added to it.

The notes were very difficult to read, so that all I recall of the pages I leafed through were scattered references to really the whole range of the Conference. On the Ukraine and Byelorussia, I did read everything in there.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is your testimony, Doctor, that in connection with the subjects covered by the Hiss notes that did not concern you directly, you had only a casual perusal?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right, the kind of a perusal you would have when you were looking for your own subject.

Mr. MORRIS. But with your own interests, you studied those notes in detail and are prepared to testify here today?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we ask the State Department to make a copy of all of Hiss' notes to the committee.

Senator WATKINS. And not only to make a copy, but you want it produced for the committee?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. I think that is a fair request.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there copies made of those notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. I should explain that, too. At that particular time the Department had no record of Yalta whatever, except a few short summaries.

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Mr. MORRIS. Summaries by whom?

Miss FLUEGEL. There was one summary by Mr. Mathews, but a very, very short one, I think, about two paragraphs.

Senator WATKINS. You made a pretty broad statement there. You said no record whatever. At least they knew a conference had been held there.

Miss FLUEGEL. I mean no verbatim record. They had requested it and, I believe, subsequently secured it. But at the time we were working on this book we were told that no such copies existed.

Senator WATKINS. How long was that after the Yalta Conference?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was 1948.

Senator WATKINS. 1948?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. When you say that, you are making a rather strong statement there. Did you have an opportunity to examine all of the files to see whether or not there was any record there?

Miss FLUEGEL. No; but Mr. Notter did call every top officer in the Department asking if they had it.

Senator WATKINS. And the answer was in the negative?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

And as I indicated, subsequently I have reason to believe they got it. But that is completely hearsay.

Mr. MORRIS. You think that memorandum was subsequently obtained?

Miss FLUEGEL. That the records of Yalta were subsequently obtained; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. But at that time they were not available to your project?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. The records of Tehran were not available either.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, in connection with these Hiss minutes, they, however, were available?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was not a Department document. That was in Mr. Bechover's personal possession.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he obtain them?

Miss FLUEGEL. From Mr. Hiss, so he said.

Mr. MORRIS. Were copies made of Hiss' notes at Yalta?

Miss FLUEGEL. Because we had nothing else, I had the feeling that copies should be made and that it should be more than just a personal copy. At the time, however, we were extremely hard pressed for typing. I did give Mr. Hiss' notes to a stenographer who had to farm them out.

The handwriting was very bad and, actually, they were so confused in places that the ideal thing would have been to have had them photostated. But photostating facilities were not available. Copies were made, I would say roughly four or five, and I directed that a couple of them be sent over to one of the files. What happened to the others I don't know, or how authentic the copy is, because I never had a chance to proofread it.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, to compare with the original?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. I could decipher the handwriting, knowing a great deal about the subject matter of the section I read. How accurately it would have been deciphered by a stenographer I don't know. It was difficult handwriting.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the original if possible of those notes be obtained from the State Department for the committee, or, if that is not available, certainly one of the copies that the witness has testified to today.

Senator WATKINS. I think it should be obtained and it would probably take a letter from the chairman of the committee to the State Department to obtain it.

I think such a letter should be sent, and they should be obtained if at all possible.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness is prepared to talk about those features of the notes concerned with her particular project but the rest of it we know nothing about, as far as this witness is concerned, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. As far as this investigation is concerned, I do not think it would be complete, now that these matters have been brought up, without getting those notes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. And we are interested in Mr. Hiss' role because Mr. Hiss was active in the Institute of Pacific Relations which we are examining.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, it all ties into this general investigation we are making of the activities of this organization now, and how our postwar planning was influenced.

Mr. MORRIS. That, in conjunction with the IPR letters we have introduced into the record today, together then with the IPR people who were mentioned in this book as being influential in postwar policy.

To get back to 1943 and 1944, what were some of the factors which caused us to change our policy, Soviet postwar policy, with respect to the Soviet Union?

Miss FLUEGEL. I have, of course, thought and thought and thought back over the matter. I think the first major decision that, as it worked out, almost forced us in the direction of subsequent decisions, was the one to concentrate the war on Europe because what happened is that, as we began to realize that the European war would finish up, and as we then thought that the Japanese war would continue a long time after, it was always a question of what we actually could do.

I know specifically, I can tell you in the case of the declaration on liberated areas, in the course of the discussion, when the idea came up that maybe we should insist on guaranties, of course, the answer immediately was that we were in no position to insist on anything. We would be pulling our armies out of Europe to transfer them to Japan, and it would leave Russia able to do what it wanted to anyway.

Therefore, a paper agreement was better than no agreement. That sort of reasoning ran through any number of questions.

Senator WATKINS. Was there anything in the files to indicate what the real situation was in the Far East, the military situation?

I am not asking you to state what it was, but was there information to indicate what the real situation was?

Miss FLUEGEL. I saw relatively little information, although I know that in the debate on the Japanese Emperor, for example, the idea that ran in and out was that, if we did not have to insist on unconditional surrender, if we didn't have to insist on the elimination of the Emperor, then a quicker conclusion was possible. Otherwise, the calculation was a year to a year and a half after the end of the European war.

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Senator WATKINS. If I understand you correctly, then, it would be that if we did not insist on unconditional surrender, the war would have ended 2 years earlier?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right, or a few months after the end of the German war. You see, many historians argued that, since this was Japan's first major effort at world conquest, contrary to the opinion of some of the Japanese experts it was unlikely that a country in that position would really knock herself out. She would be more likely to make peace and try again. That was the general historian's line of reasoning.

Senator WATKINS. Was there anything in the file to indicate that any overtures had been received through Russia from Japan seeking to bring about an early peace?

Miss FLUEGEL. I don't recall specifically. I read about the overtures to Russia. I have a very vague recollection in the spring of 1945 of recurrent rumors from different parts.

However, none of those were any stronger than many we had received about other countries, too. I did not see the kind of very definite reports I have since read about.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have the full correspondence between the Department and Russia?

Miss FLUEGEL. No. In working on this, you see, it begins to taper off with San Francisco and, on the book, we dropped our interests in territorial matters a little bit earlier. The division of territorial studies was abolished in February 1945, so that that sort of thing would not have come to us.

Senator WATKINS. I would think it would come into the general subject of postwar planning, to know just what Russia was indicating she was going to do with respect to the Far East.

Miss FLUEGEL. Senator, you might also think that the atomic bomb would. But frankly, it never came into consideration at the meetings. These people, the technical people, who were doing the postwar planning up through San Francisco did not know of the possibilities of the atomic bomb, and, consequently, some of their plans were pretty unrealistic.

Senator WATKINS. Did they not know about the general position of the Army and our forces over there, and of the Japanese forces, and the condition of the Japanese Navy and their shipping and the general state of the Japanese which indicated—at least we know now—that collapse was imminent?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is true. But I should explain again that the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee was established in the fall of 1944. Thereafter, much of the so-called postwar planning began to narrow into organizational planning. What was really happening all through this later period was that parts of the postwar planning activity began to separate out into the permanent structure of the Department.

Now, that began to happen, in a way, as early as 1943. What is now the whole public affairs outfit is really the descendant of this little postwar trends unit I was in. And by the beginning of 1945 * the postwar planning was primarily directed toward San Francisco and the broad consideration of all questions bearing on the postwar began to disappear at the most critical time.

* Hull went out at end of 1944.

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Senator WATKINS. When did your work in this Department cease? When did you end your connection with the Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. In September of 1948. You mean when I left the Department?

Senator WATKINS. Yes.

Miss FLUEGEL. September of 1948.

Senator WATKINS. Then in 1945, after the German Foreign Office files were discovered, was there any information brought before the groups with respect to what Russia had been doing in connection with Germany?

Miss FLUEGEL. There again I have since seen, when I was working on that book, a few scattered records of the top level sub-Cabinet group that was working on plans for Germany. But those plans were not then being brought into the Secretary's staff committee.

Senator WATKINS. Was there any reference to those files which had later been published by the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Not that I recall. What I recall, actually, is the fight between State and Treasury as to what to do about Germany.

Senator WATKINS. You recall that those files were captured along about April 1, I think, 1945?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. And you say there was no reference to the contents of those files?

Miss FLUEGEL. I saw no reference. In fact, the first reference I saw to the contents of those files was when the publication came out on Nazi-Soviet relations.

Senator WATKINS. You know what was in those files now by reason of that publication?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. And that, of course, would have been of great consequence in knowing what to do about Russia.

Miss FLUEGEL. It still would be worth taking into consideration.

Senator WATKINS. I think you are right.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, do you know from your own personal experience of any changes made in planning at Yalta?

Miss FLUEGEL. This one subject in which I was primarily interested——

Mr. MORRIS. What subject is that, Doctor?

Miss FLUEGEL. Ukraine and Byelorussia.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the question of plural voting?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That was referred to as the X matter because it was of such secrecy that they did not want to mention it by name?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct. Everybody who typed a paper connected with it, their names were kept from Dumbarton through Yalta.

I don't have all of the answers to that, but I do have a rough idea from Mr. Hiss' notes of what happened, and his version is somewhat different from Mr. Byrne's book, in his published book, Speaking Frankly.

I do know that all of the records of the Department, including the last paper that went with the American group to Yalta, stated the reasons for opposing, with the concluding recommendation "do not accept on the X matter."

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At Yalta itself, a meeting of the three foreign ministers was held to discuss the matter. The matter was then referred to their direct assistants, Mr. Jebb, Gromyko, and Hiss. I have it here.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, are you testifying now from your memory?

Miss FLUEGEL. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that you have there?

Miss FLUEGEL. This is the record of Mr. Hiss' notes.

Mr. MORRIS. And would you identify what it is?

Senator WATKINS. You mean to say you have there this copy of the notes that the stenographer did?

Miss FLUEGEL. No; I have the summary of the information on Ukraine and Byelorussia which I extracted from the notes in connection with this larger paper on the subject I had been doing.

Mr. MORRIS. You remember we said Dr. Fluegel was ready to testify on that portion of the Hiss notes concerning the particular problem on which she was working. But as to the remainder of the items, she has nothing but a vague recollection.

Senator WATKINS. I had reference to the basis for her testimony. We are inquiring about that. You asked her if it was from her memory, and she said it was from the notes she had taken from the summary.

Miss FLUEGEL. I was talking from my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make those notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. When I was in the Department.

Mr. MORRIS. When the Hiss notes were available to you?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. I made them from the Hiss notes.

Mr. MORRIS. May I suggest that the witness be directed to read from that inasmuch as the source may be more accurate than her recollection?

Senator WATKINS. I think she can use it for a basis of her recollection. That is, if you think it would give a more accurate picture than your memory, I would suggest you read from them.

Miss FLUEGEL. This is a boiled-down version of what I extracted, and I will break into the story directly.

The last notation I have here, right before the Yalta Conference in January of 1945, is that there may have been talks with members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and with other individuals. I haven't found the records.

Mr. MORRIS. In a louder voice, please.

Miss FLUEGEL. Information that such talks occurred is from handwritten notations by Mr. Hiss to the effect that the President had made a special point in these congressional talks of the ridiculousness of the Soviet proposal re the 16 republics.

Then the following information is from Mr. Hiss' papers at Yalta:

At a plenary meeting of the Conference on February 7, 1945, Molotov said that the Soviet proposal was based on the changes in the Soviet Constitution of February 1944. He said, however, that the Soviet Government, now informed of the United States and United Kingdom position, was not urging the proposal advanced at Dumbarton Oaks for admission of 16 Soviet Republics. He said that the Soviet Union appreciated the patience and the gradual character of the British dominions' approach to separate international status, and that the Soviet Union, in withdrawing its original proposal, would consider it fair if at least three or perhaps two republics were admitted to original membership. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania were specified. The

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population and importance of the former were stressed and the sacrifices in the war of all three. President Roosevelt observed that the whole question of plural voting was most interesting and required detailed study. He proposed that the Soviet request be referred to the three foreign ministers for study. This was done.

Then, a paper, a background paper, was prepared for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 8, and it is that paper that advanced the arguments against the proposals.

Senator WATKINS. Who prepared that paper, do you know?

Miss FLUEGEL. The people over there, on the basis of the papers they had taken with them.

Senator WATKINS. When you say the people over there, who do you mean?

Miss FLUEGEL. I would assume Mr. Hiss and the people working on international-organizational matters.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Mr. Hiss and his group?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. It would have been prepared on the basis of papers they had taken from the Department. We had prepared two black books, one for the President and one for the Secretary, giving all possible positions which they should take.

Senator WATKINS. All possible positions? Do you mean all alternatives?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. We usually prepare them in terms of the maximum desirable and the minimum acceptable with intermediate positions [reading]:

At that meeting—

this is the meeting of the Foreign Ministers—

which was at the British delegation's headquarters and was presided over by Eden, Molotov and Eden jointly agreed that in the course of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be named as initial members of the organization and the British would support this proposal. Mr. Stettinius said he felt that, from the standpoint of geographic area and population, question deserved sympathetic consideration, but that he found it difficult to reconcile the proposal with the Dumbarton Oaks decision that each state have one vote. He thought that the United Nations might meet to complete the charter and then elect additional members before the first meeting of the new organization. Mr. Stettinius explained, however, that he hadn't had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the President and couldn't commit the United States until he did. A drafting committee composed of Jebb, Gromyko, and Hiss was appointed—

Senator WATKINS. And Gromyko was the Foreign Ambassador to the United States?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. And Alger Hiss——

Mr. MORRIS. This is the drafting committee of three to resolve the problems?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right, and to prepare the recommendation for the heads of states—

to draft the report of the meeting for the next plenary. The draft agreed upon by the drafting committee was to the effect the United Kingdom supported, United States reserved its position.

This is Mr. Hiss' version, of course.

Subsequently, without clearing with or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko—

and I hesitate over this, but I stress this is what was in Mr. Hiss' notes—

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the British changed the report so that it stated the United States as well as the United Kingdom concurred. The British said that they had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case as he did not understand that any such issue was presented to him.

Mr. MORRIS. That last statement, Dr. Fluegel, what is the origin of the last statement?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Hiss' notes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Hiss' notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. Right on through, this is all from his notes.

Senator WATKINS. You say that Stettinius did not agree to this?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. Mr. Hiss says that it was not the case.

Senator WATKINS. That is, that the United States had not joined that same position?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right [reading]:

At the afternoon plenary (February 8), the report of the Foreign Ministers was presented. The pertinent passage was "The United Nations, as they existed on February —, 1945, that is, those who had—

this is just the thing that subsequently came out.

According to a memorandum [March 19, 1945] by Mr. Hiss, the above report was made and—

and this is a direct quote from Mr. Hiss' minutes from the memorandum of March 19—

before the matter could be clarified the President expressed his agreement as a matter of policy.

Another record in the Hiss papers states:

The report by the Foreign Secretaries was accepted, subject to paragraph 2 (b) being amended to read as follows: "The United Nations as they exist on February 8, 1945, and such of the associated nations—"

and then it runs on through.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there more on that point?

Miss FLUEGEL. I have a comment now.

Senator WATKINS. Did you finish reading that paragraph?

Miss FLUEGEL. There is more in the quote, but it is what has subsequently been published.

Senator WATKINS. I think probably that ought to be included in the record. Let us have it all.

Miss FLUEGEL (reading):

as have declared war on the common enemy by March 1, 1945, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

Mr. Hiss' notes on the plenary meeting show clearly that the President, while he agreed, did not consider the Ukraine and Byelorussia separate states.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he did not understand the problem.

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And is that a question of briefing, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. It does raise the question. I got interested in the question, really, as an example of how diplomacy should not be practiced. Here was this question that everybody had been standing on their heads about all these months, and suddenly, in a casual minute, either because the President didn't understand or because he wasn't briefed, for some reason, he agreed.

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Mr. MORRIS. The very problems you were discussing were not taken into consideration at all?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. And then after they tried to patch the thing up, because Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Flynn, according to Hiss notes, and my recollection is that it is also in Mr. Byrne's book, were very much concerned about it, and what they succeeded in doing is getting Mr. Roosevelt to request that the United States reserve the right to request additional votes. We later decided not to do so.

Senator WATKINS. That was after the decision had been made?

Miss FLUEGEL. That was after the decision had been made .

Mr. MORRIS. And again, Dr. Fluegel, the basis of that testimony is the Hiss notes and the memorandum of your reading the Hiss notes which you have before you now?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is why it is important on other subjects that we obtain a copy of these Hiss notes to find out what exactly his role was in some of the other subjects that were discussed at Yalta.

Senator WATKINS. Would it be likewise important to ask the Secretary of State to furnish such other documents they have there, or notes, that would explain the matters that we have gone into here?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. There may be others in addition to the Hiss notes that this witness might be able to tell us.

If you have gone through these records, and had access to them, is there anything there that would help this committee? Can you put your finger on any others, or name any others, that you know?

Miss FLUEGEL. You see, the Far East was not my field, but the entire story of all of the evolution of the territorial planning is in the minutes of these postwar committees.

Senator WATKINS. Can you name the committee so that we will know what to request?

Miss FLUEGEL. Starting with the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, running through the Subcommittee on Political Problems, Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, the country committee in China, Burma, and India, and so forth. There was another country committee on the Far East, one on dependent areas; the Postwar Planning Committee, the Secretary's Staff Committee.

The papers, you see, kept coming through all the time. Some were repeats, some were new ideas. It just wasn't my field so I didn't follow the developments.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Morris, I think we ought to request from the Secretary of State that these papers be made available to our staff members for at least investigation and inspection to see whether or not they have any bearing on the matter we are investigating.

Senator FERGUSON. I am familiar with some of these facts, and I would just like to ask a few questions about the telephone call. Did you recognize the voice in any way?

Miss FLUEGEL. No; not at all. Frankly, I, when I first told Mr. Morris this morning, had really thought it was someone kidding me, and had the reaction that maybe I had better raise the question as to whether I would be violating security.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a memorandum of some of Mr. Hiss' notes?

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Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. And you see the position I take on that is that it is not a Department of State document. That was a personal memorandum of Mr. Hiss. Consequently, it does not raise the question of security.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But Mr. Hiss made personal notes.

Miss FLUEGEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make a transcript of those notes for Mr. Hiss?

Miss FLUEGEL. No. Mr. Hiss was out of the Department at the time. He had left this copy of his handwritten notes with Mr. Bechover. What I did, I thought that a copy should go in the Department's files.

Senator FERGUSON. And you made a copy for the Department's files?

Miss FLUEGEL. I asked the secretary to make it. She was very hard pressed and had to farm it out. There were copies made, and I directed that two be sent to the postwar files. I did not, however, read them. They had not been proofread. The general nature of the notes, except here and there, was such that they almost required photostating. Not being able to arrange for photostating, I thought we had better get as much as we could.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, let us say, transcribe those notes, or did you merely take the bundle of those notes and give them to some officer in the State Department and tell him what they were? I am not clear on the record as to what these notes that you are talking about are.

Miss FLUEGEL. The notes, judging from the nature of the notes themselves, were taken by Mr. Hiss in pencil, handwritten at the meetings, with apparently some insertions in between, containing all sorts of "doodling." For example, if I passed the paper over to you, and you would say, "Let's go ahead," or something, and pass it back, plus long sections summarizing the proceedings of the meetings. They were his personal notes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. When you took those notes, did you have them transcribed and put in the files?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. First I ran through them myself, looking for the one subject in which I was interested, which I had a legitimate reason for extracting. I did that and then gave it to the secretary and asked her to have come copies made.

I did raise the question of photostating, but at that time, at least, photostating just was not feasible. You couldn't get it done, and you had to send the things all over the place.

So I do know a couple of copies were made, but they were made in sections. We broke up the papers, for example, and one girl was given five or six pages and no one had time to proof it.

Senator FERGUSON. Not knowing whether they had been proofread or not, the last you knew the notes themselves, the official documents, were in the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Hiss' personal notes were returned to Mr. Bechover. The copies that we had had typed but not checked were sent to the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Bechover?

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Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. Bechover was a member of the staff of the United Nations Affairs office at the time, and I believe is still in the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. He was at that time an official of the United States State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you have every reason to believe that at the present time these notes and papers are in the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; in his possession.

Senator FERGUSON. But he is an official.

Miss FLUEGEL. That is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, perhaps I should add that the witness has testified that copies were made up of those notes and that those copies were put in the files. Senator Watkins has directed that the State Department be requested to give either the original copy of his notes or, failing to be able to supply that, the copies of Hiss' notes that were made, and that Dr. Fluegel has testified were made at her direction.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that should be done.

Senator WATKINS. I am glad you are in agreement, because it seems to me, in matters as important as this, especially inasmuch as Mr. Hiss was tied in with the Institute of Pacific Relations and this whole pattern runs through the proceedings, we ought to have those notes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to state on the record now that I ran into a quotation from an officer of the State Department that I would like to put in the record here because I would like to have this brought over at the same time.

Senator WATKINS. I think probably at this time we can have it put into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It is Conrad E. Snow of the Loyalty Board, and he is quoted as saying:

The Hiss case, and the case of Judith Coplon in the Justice Department, have done more harm in terms of public confidence than any harm Hiss or Coplon ever did in the delivery of classified papers.

That would indicate, if I interpret it, that the State Department has taken upon itself to judge whether or not disloyalty is less harm than to disclose to the public that there has been disloyalty. The reason I bring it to the attention of this committee is because of Mr. Hiss' name coming in, these notes, and also the fact that yesterday Mr. Vincent was cleared by this Loyalty Board.

Previously Mr. Service had been cleared by this Loyalty Board, although the Review Board held on the question of loyalty that he should not be further employed.

Senator WATKINS. Has Mr. Vincent's case been reviewed by the Review Board yet?

Senator FERGUSON. No; it has not been reviewed. As I understand it, where you are cleared, a review board is not supposed to take jurisdiction of it unless they do on their own motion.

Then there is Mr. Davies, whose name was brought into the record just last week on the testimony of Mr. Munson in relation to some people that were recommended to the CIA by Mr. Davies. Now, I think we ought to ask Mr. Conrad E. Snow to come up and make an explanation as to whether or not this quotation is a correct quotation from him.

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I will put it in this record again. I will read the whole quotation:

The Hiss case and the case of Judith Coplon, in the Justice Department, have done more harm in terms of public confidence than any harm Hiss or Coplon ever did in the delivery of classified papers. Both worked in absolute secrecy. Their best friends were ignorant of their acts. Neither would have been employed by Government for a day after their acts were discovered. But a swallow does not make a summer; neither do these two cases make out an infiltration of Government by Communists.

I think it is something that this committee should go into. If that is the attitude now, if Mr. Hiss' notes are in the Department, we ought to have them. But we ought to at least have Mr. Snow's attitude on the question of loyalty in the State Department, which we are investigating in connection with the IPR and these particular men connected with the IPR.

Senator WATKINS. I agree with the Senator from Michigan. Since, under the rules of this committee, we now have a quorum, I direct that a subpena be issued for Mr. Snow.

Mr. MORRIS. It shall be done, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And I will furnish you with a copy of this so that you can ask him to bring his speech along.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, will it be necessary for us to put into the minutes in connection with that evidence that Mr. Hiss' affiliation with the Communist Party was known long before his departure from the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that is another item in here, when he says he would not have been allowed to remain there a day. The evidence is well established that Mr. Berle took it up with the President and that it was known in the State Department.

Senator WATKINS. But it was not believed.

Senator FERGUSON. I may say when the Hiss case was first mentioned, being the chairman of the investigating committee of this Senate in looking into the facts of the Hiss-Chambers case, trying to decide whether or not Mr. Chambers should be brought before that committee, I took it up with the State Department, one of the officials, and that official admitted that the question of the loyalty of Hiss had been taken up in the Department and there was a memorandum on it.

Senator WATKINS. Did he give you the date of the memorandum?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I was making a search as to whether or not to use Mr. Chambers as a witness. So that last part shows, at least, not a knowledge of what had gone on in the State Department in relation to Mr. Hiss, but that is minor compared to the actual quotation that I presented.

Senator WATKINS. We will have Mr. Snow here and have him make a full explanation.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, was the policy in connection with this plural voting determined prior to the time the delegation left for Yalta?

Miss FLUEGEL. It was determined contrary to the final solution; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Dr. Fluegel?

Miss FLUEGEL. From a whole series of meetings and a whole series of memoranda, including a final memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. What did the final memorandum say?

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Mr. Chairman, in connection with this memorandum the witness is about to read from, she has evidenced a reluctance to put this into the record on the general question of security. Will you direct the witness, Mr. Chairman, to put that into the record?

Senator WATKINS. I would like to hear from the witness what her reasons are before I make that direction.

Miss FLUEGEL. The primary reason is not security involving the Government, but a possible reflection on the British who, of course, had a special interest in this because they didn't want the question of the Dominions, as they were then, raised.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think that if there is a question of security, the committee ought to have the opportunity to examine it as a whole before it is put into the record.

Senator WATKINS. Of course, the witness has said it does not involve the question of security, but it might be a reflection upon the British. Now, whether or not that involves our security may be open to argument.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know as though Mr. Hiss could cast much reflection upon the British.

Miss FLUEGEL. I might be able to resolve the difficulty by reading the headings of the three propositions.

The first is the Soviet Republics are not signatories of the United Nations Declaration. That is the first argument against admitting the two republics, and the rule had been that only States which signed the declaration could be admitted to membership.

The second proposition is: The question should be postponed until the organization is formed.

The third question, the third proposition, is: The Soviet Republics are not sovereign states under international practice. That is from a memorandum dated February 8, 1945, and headed "Arguments against inclusion of any of the Soviet Republics among the United Nations members."

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Dr. Fluegel, I would like to ask you if there is anything more in that memorandum that should be added in connection with the testimony that you are giving here today?

Miss FLUEGEL. I think not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have the question of whether that whole document which is from Dr. Fluegel's memorandum made on the basis of reading the Hiss notes should be inserted into our record.

Senator WATKINS. I think probably the committee ought to take a look at it in view of the question raised by Senator Ferguson before it is received. Do you have another copy of it?

Miss FLUEGEL. No. I will be glad to leave this with you. I would like to read it over—there may be one or two things that I would delete for security reasons.

Senator WATKINS. They are your own notes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you mark those, then?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

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(The document referred to is as follows:)

ROUGH NOTES ON THE "PLURAL VOTING" QUESTION PREPARED BY DR. EDNA FLUEGEL

UKRAINE AND BYELORUSSIA

The admission to UNCIO of the Ukrainian and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics to initial membership in the UN and participation in the conference was the endproduct of a Soviet offensive initiated in August 1943. For the United States it represented and continues to represent a deviation from the decision to base membership in the Organiaztion on states and to accord to each state one vote. American support for the deviation was reluctantly accorded at the Crimean conference whether by design or by error, only after the initial Soviet request had been considerably, although not fundamentally, curtailed, and when it became apparent that neither Soviet participation nor a prompt convening of UNCIO, both judged to be of paramount importance, could be obtained without acceding to the Soviet demands.

Pre-Dumbarton Oaks

[NOTE.—The question of votes for separate Soviet Republics was first raised in connection with membership on the UN Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes.]

After a year of informal discussion, the UK issued invitations on August 31, 1943, for the diplomatic representatives at London of the governments invited to meet to discuss the establishment of a UN Commission. In reply, the Soviet Union asserted that the separate Soviet Republics were as sovereign as the Dominions and should each be invited. They specified, as particularly worthy in view of suffering, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Karelian-Finnish Republics. The Soviet Government claimed that, since the meeting was to be judicial, no legal obstacles existed and that such important matters should not be decided by ordinary standards of international practice. The UK rejected these claims because (1) it would involve recognition of Soviet absorption of the Baltic Republics and Eastern Poland, (2) it would constitute a precedent and other federations could just as logically claim representation. The UK suggested the Soviet Union could designate an adviser from any Soviet Republic affected by a discussion. A meeting was set for October 21, but the Soviet Union failed to attend and failed to reply to a resolution urging Soviet participation. In an aide memoire to the United States the UK reviewed the whole problem, stressing again the Baltic and Eastern Poland aspects, as well as the fact that the Soviet Constitution of 1936 under article 14 reserved the representation of Union citizens in international affairs to the Soviet Government. Throughout, the United States was in accord, but stressed the importance of not arousing debate and not alienating the Soviet Union. In February 1944 the Soviet Constitution was changed. Studies made in the State Department's Division of International Security Organization of the constitutional changes, however, concluded that they did not alter the situation. While it was then feared at the research level, that the Soviet might press for more votes in the international security organization, no such Soviet proposal was made before Dumbarton Oaks.

Dumbarton Oaks

The question was first introduced at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations on August 28, 1944, toward the conclusion of a discussion in the steering committee of initial membership in the projected Organization. The unexpurgated minutes of that meeting record that Ambassador Gromyko "stated that all of the 16 Soviet Republics should be included among the initial members of the Organization." The Soviet representative subsequently amended the record to read "it is the Soviet understanding that all of the 16 Soviet Republics will be included, etc." The British representative, Sir Alexander Cadogan, immediately said that he would make no comment but that the United Kingdom would have to discuss with the Soviet Union the question of the international status of the

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Soviet Republics. Under Secretary Stettinius said the United States would have to consider the proposal.[1]

While the steering committee immediately proceeded to other business, the seriousness of the Soviet move was fully appreciated, both in terms of substance and in term of its potentially disastrous effect on public opinion both in the United States and in other nations.

Under Secretary Stettinius reported the matter to the President at 5 p. m. the same day and to Secretary Hull early the next morning. Both were amazed and deeply concerned, and Mr. Stettinius was instructed to state that the United States could under no conditions accept the Soviet position and explain that it would present untold difficulties. The President observed that it would be just as logical for the United States to seek 48 votes.

Mr. Stettinius met with the Soviet Ambassador at 11:15 on August 29 as instructed, informed him that both the President and the Secretary considered the Soviet proposal out of order and apt to jeopardize the success of the meeting, and asked that the proposal be withdrawn, suggesting that, in any event, it might more properly be presented to the projected Organization subsequent to establishment. The memorandum of conversation, dictated by Mr. Stettinius, quotes Mr. Gromyko as responding: "The reason I raised this point at the meeting yesterday was merely to advise the United Kingdom and the American Government that we had this matter in mind but I will agree, in our present meetings at Dumbarton Oaks, that there should be no further reference whatsoever to this subject, and I agree that we will define the initial membership as consisting of the United Nations and Associated Nations." At the joint steering committee meeting that afternoon, the Ambassador, while rejecting a suggestion that the reference in the minutes of the previous meeting be deleted, agreed not to refer to the matter again during the conversations. He said his purpose had been to notify the United States and United Kingdom and that the subject would probably be raised by his Government on some other occasion.

This eased the immediate situation, but did not resolve the matter. Measures, instituted when the question was first introduced, to guard againts a "leak" were continued in the hope that negotiations at the top level would succeed. Records mentioning the matter were drastically curtailed and all reference to it utilized a code designation, "the X matter." In the period between August 28, 1944, and the Yalta Conference, fewer than a dozen Americans were acquainted with the problem.

During this period, a solution was sought. Mr. Stettinius reported to the President immediately after the steering committee meeting on August 29 and the problem was further considered by the President and Secretary Hull. It was feared that, if no explicit formal objection were recorded the Soviet Union might bring up the matter at UNCIO, stating that it had been notified of the United States and United Kingdom at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations and that no objection had been made. It was decided, therefore, that the President should send a personal message to Marshal Stalin immediately. The message, drafted in the State Department and sent on August 31, 1944, expressed the President's deep concern and pointed out that raising the question at any time before the establishment and entry into operation of the projected organization would imperil the entire project. The President added to the State Department draft a sentence pointing out that, when the organization was established, the General Assembly would be in a position to deal with the question if the Soviet Union then wished to introduce it.

Marshal Stalin's reply of September 7, 1944, was not reassuring, although it did disclose a base for compromise and an intention to discuss the matter further with the President. Marshal Stalin first made it clear that he attached "exceptional importance" to the matter. He then referred to the constitutional changes effected in the Soviet Union earlier in the year.[2] He cited the Byelorussian and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic specifically as surpassing in population and political importance many of the states on which agreement had been reached. The message concluded with the hope that an opportunity would develop to explain to the President the political importance of the question raised by the Soviet delegation.

The X matter was touched on indirectly in a joint steering committee meeting on September 19 and specifically on September 27. At the latter meeting Am-

[1] The word "new" was inserted before "proposal" in the revised minutes.

[2] U. S. S. R. Const., art. XVIIIA revised by decree on February 1, 1944. The new relationship was carefully studied in the State Department by several groups but the conclusion reached by all throughout was that the "republics" were not, in fact, autonomous states.

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bassador Gromyko stated that Soviet agreement on a date for the general conference would depend on the acceptance by the United States and the United Kingdom of two Soviet proposals, the Soviet position on unanimity in the Security Council and the Soviet proposal that the 16 Soviet Republics be among the initial members of the Organization.

During the Chinese phase of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, the X problem was discussed briefly at a joint steering committee meeting on October 4, 1944. The President had alluded to it on the previous day in a conversation with Ambassador Wellington Koo. The President had asked how many Chinese provinces there were and had gone on to refer to a Soviet proposal which he characterized as absurd. At the steering committee meeting the previous developments were sketched, and the need to maintain secrecy while efforts were made to resolve the problem was stressed.

Follow-through consideration

The problem was considered again and again in follow-through meetings in the Department in the fall of 1944. It was felt that the matter would have to be settled by the Big Three heads of state, that the United States could not accede to the Soviet proposal, and that the Soviet Union might be attempting to make a trade on the two major outstanding questions, unanimity in the Security Council and initial membership in the U. N. for the 16 Soviet Republics. The conclusion reached in these meetings was phrased in a recommendation of November 15, 1944, "In any event, oppose X."

In conversations with officers of the Department in January 1945 Ambassador Gromyko continued to stress the importance his country attached to the proposal, however, and to advance arguments in support of it. He asserted that the 16 Soviet Republics, although intimately associated as members of a federation, had their own constitutions and dealt independently with their own foreign affairs. He also asserted that most of them were more important than Liberia or Guatemala. The Department officials replied that it was obviously a question for discussion at a Big Three meeting.

The matter was, in fact, being handled by the President directly. At a meeting at the White House on January 8, 1945, the President had informed Secretary Stettinius, and Messrs. Dunn, Pasvolsky, and Bohlen that he was clear as to how he would proceed.

[NOTE.—About this time, there may have been talks with members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and with other individuals. Information that such talks occurred is from a handwritten notation by Mr. Hiss to the effect that the President had made a special point in these talks of the ridiculousness of the Soviet proposal re the 16 Republics.]

Yalta

The question was resolved at the Yalta Conference in the following manner:

[NOTE.—This information from papers of Mr. Hiss.]

At a plenary meeting of the Conference on February 7, 1945, Molotov said that the Soviet proposal was based on the changes in the Soviet Constitution of February 1944. He said, however, that the Soviet Government, now informed of the United States and United Kingdom position, was not urging the proposal advanced at Dumbarton Oaks for admission of 16 Soviet Republics. He said that the Soviet Union appreciated the patience and the gradual character of the British Dominions' approach to separate international status, and that the Soviet Union, in withdrawing its original proposal, would consider it fair if at least three or perhaps two Republics were admitted to original membership. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania were specified. The population and importance of the former were stressed and the sacrifices in the war of all three. President Roosevelt observed that the whole question of plural voting was most interesting and required detailed study. He proposed that the Soviet request be referred to the three Foreign Ministers for study. This was done.

The following paper was supplied to Secretary Stettinius as "background" for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 8:

FEBRUARY 8, 1945.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUSION OF ANY OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS AMONG THE INITIAL MEMBERS

1. *Soviet Republics not signatories of the United Nations Declaration.*—On further thought we have become impressed with the Soviet view that the initial member of the United Nations Organization should be the signatories of the

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United Nations Declaration. As none of the Soviet Republics are signatories of that Declaration, Mr. Molotov's proposal that two or three of these Republics be admitted to initial membership would be contrary to that principle.

2. *The question should be postponed until the Organization is formed.*—The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the Organization is formed.

Mr. Molotov said yesterday at the plenary session that the Soviet Government had observed the gradual development of international relations of the British Dominions. In accordance with the practice followed by the Dominions, it would seem to be premature to take the action proposed by Mr. Molotov at this time. We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet Republics before we consider this question.

The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the Organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.

3. *The Soviet Republics are not sovereign states under international practice.*—The Soviet Constitution does not permit the Soviet Republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the Republic are also inconsistent with the Republics being sovereign.

[NOTE.—India is one of the United Nations. It, too, is not dependent. The Soviet representatives will probably argue that if India can be a member so should their three Republics.]

The answer.—India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations, and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of separate nationhood than the Soviet Republics.)

At that meeting, which was at the British delegation's headquarters and was presided over by Eden, Molotov and Eden jointly agreed that in the course of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be named as initial members of the Organization and the British would support this proposal. Mr. Stettinius said he felt that, from the standpoint of geographic area and population, the question deserved sympathetic consideration, but that he found it difficult to reconcile the proposal with the Dumbarton Oaks decision that each state have one vote. He thought that United Nations might meet to complete the Charter and then elect additional members before the first meeting of the new Organization. Mr. Stettinius explained, however, that he hadn't had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the President and couldn't commit the United States until he did. A drafting committee composed of Jebb, Gromyko, and Hiss was appointed to draft the report of the meeting for the next plenary. The draft agreed upon by the drafting committee was to the effect that the United Kingdom supported, United States reserved its position. Subsequently, without clearing with or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko, the British changed the report so that it stated the United States as well as the United Kingdom concurred. The British said that they had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case as he did not understand that any such issue was presented to him.

At the afternoon plenary (February 8), the report of the foreign ministers was presented. The pertinent passage was: "The United Nations, as they existed on February —, 1945, i. e., those who had at that date signed the United Nations Declaration, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. It will be for the Conference to determine the list of original members of the Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics."

According to a memorandum (March 19, 1945) by Mr. Hiss, the above report was made and "before the matter could be clarified the President expressed his agreement as a matter of policy." Another record in the Hiss papers states:

"The report by the Foreign Secretary was accepted, subject to paragraph 2 (b) being amended to read as follows: 'The United Nations as they exist on the 8th February 1945, and such of the Associated Nations[3] as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March 1945, would be the only States invited to the Conference on World Organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support the pro-

[3] The term "Associated Nations" in this connection means the eight Associated Nations and Turkey which shall be regarded as an Associated Nation for the purpose.

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posal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e., the Ukraine and White Russia.' "

Mr. Hiss' notes on the plenary meeting show clearly that the President, while he agreed, did not consider the Ukraine and Byelorussia separate states. Both Molotov and Stalin suggested that the position of the Soviet Republics would be facilitated if they signed the U. N. Declaration before March 1, 1945. President Roosevelt objected that signatories must be states, that while the Ukraine and Byelorussia were at war they were at war as parts of the Soviet Union. It was decided that they should not adhere to the Declaration and should not receive invitations to the conference.

According to rough notes by Mr. Hiss, Mr. Byrnes was very worried about the commitment made on February 8, 1945, and, on February 9 discussed it with Mr. Flynn who was also worried. Mr. Byrnes proposed that votes be accorded Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska and discussed this with the President and with Prime Minister Churchill. Mr. Hiss said that he told Byrnes it would be better for the President to get released from his commitment than to propose this.

At the plenary meeting on February 11, when the communiqué was under consideration, Stalin proposed to include: "It has been also resolved to recommend to the Conference to invite the Ukraine and White Russia as original members." Both the President and the Prime Minister indicated that publication of such a statement would cause them embarrassment and Stalin withdrew the proposal. The secret protocol of the Conference contained the following commitment: "When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e., the Ukraine and White Russia." [Something happened here that is not covered by the Hiss papers—the tentative United States claim to additional votes.]

[NOTE.—The following version of what happened is taken from Speaking Frankly, by James F. Byrnes:]

"Immediately after announcing the Soviet Union's acceptance of the President's proposal on voting procedure in the Security Council, Mr. Molotov expressed the hope that Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania would be admitted to the United Nations. In any event, he said, he hoped the first two would be admitted. Marshal Stalin made a forceful plea in support of the suggestion.

"Prime Minister Churchill supported the Soviet request, stating: 'My heart goes out to White Russia, bleeding from her wounds while beating down the tyrants.'

"Not wishing to agree, and yet not wanting to oppose Churchill and Stalin directly while the issue of the international organization was in the balance, the President made this statement: 'The British Empire has great populations in its dominions, like Australia, Canada, and South Africa. The Soviet Government has great masses of population like the three dominions mentioned. The United States has no colonies but has a large population. Brazil is smaller than the Soviet Union but larger in area than the United States. There are many countries with small population, like Honduras and Liberia. We must study the question of whether any country should be given more than one vote. I do not want to break down the principle of one vote to each nation. Therefore, we can decide on the general plan of a meeting to organize the association and then before the meeting, through the Foreign Secretaries, or at that meeting we can decide these questions and I will be glad to take them up.'

"There was no dissent. Because I was strongly opposed to granting the Soviet request, I thought the President had done a good job and that we might hear no more of the proposal. But at the Conference table the next afternoon the President began reading a report of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers which had just been handed him and said:

" 'Paragraph 2 is that it will be for the Conference to determine the list of the original members of the Organization.

" 'At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and the United States will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist republics.'

"The report was agreed to.

"I learned later that at the Foreign Ministers meeting, Mr. Eden, who wanted to be certain of the admission of all members of the British Commonwealth including India, which was not an independent state, agreed with Mr. Molotov on the votes for Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Mr. Stettinius then also agreed to the arrangement. As the meeting opened, the Secretary advised the President of the action which the President later announced, and the heads of the Government approved.

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"I was surprised at the agreement which, in my opinion, was very unwise. After the meeting I urged my view upon the President. I reminded him that before we left Washington he had told a group of Senators that if Stalin proposed granting membership to Byelorussia and the Ukraine, he would insist upon membership for each of our 48 States. The truth is, the Soviet Republics are no more independent than the States of our Union.

"I recalled to him how effectively the opponents of the League of Nations had argued that the British, because of their dominions, would have five votes in the Assembly while we would have but one. Our people had come to realize that the dominions were independent states and frequently held views different from the United Kingdom, but that was not true of the Soviet Republics. I feared the opponents of the United Nations might use the allotment of three votes to the Soviet Union as effectively as the foes of the League had used the argument against the British votes 26 years earlier. I urged the President at least to ask that the United States be granted a number of votes equal to those of the Soviet Union. The President feared it was too late but said he would consider it.

"I convinced Hopkins that, at the very least, we should secure such an agreement from Stalin and Churchill whether or not we afterward exercised the right. He then joined me in urging the President to withdraw his agreement regarding the two Soviet Republics unless Russia agreed the United States also should have three votes. The President finally told us he would present it to Marshal Stalin. On the last day I spent at Yalta, February 10, the President wrote him a letter which stated:

" 'I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

" 'I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference.'

"The following day Marshal Stalin advised the President that he entirely agreed with him that 'since the number of votes for the Soviet Union is increased to three in connection with the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia among the members of the Assembly, the number of votes for the U. S. A. should also be increased.

" 'The number of votes for the U.S.A. might be increased to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two basic Republics,' he said. 'If it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this proposal.'

"President Roosevelt also asked Churchill for his views, and Churchill stated he would support the President in any proposal he made to achieve American equality with other nations.

"When I arrived in Washington there was waiting for me in the White House Map Room the following cable:

" '*For Justice Byrnes from Mr. Hopkins*

" 'The President has received completely satisfactory replies from the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin on additional votes to achieve parity for the United States, if necessary. In view of the fact that nothing on this whole subject appears in the communique, the President is extremely anxious no aspect of this question be discussed even privately.'

"I assumed he had some very good reason for not wishing this matter to be discussed, and I complied with the request.

"The President and his advisers concluded not to ask at San Francisco for compliance with the agreement that we have as many votes as were given to Russia. He did not again discuss the subject with me, and I did not know he had changed his mind. I admit that the public opposition to Russia's three votes as against our one was not so great as I had expected. But nevertheless I think we should have insisted at San Francisco on the agreement made at Yalta. I felt then and feel now that the smaller states would have opposed the request of the Soviets and the United States. This course would have been just and it would have resulted in both Governments having only one vote. That would have been the best solution."

Follow-up

Following the conference there were further developments. On March 17 Ambassador Gromyko called on Mr. Dunn to inform him of Soviet plans for representation at the San Francisco Conference. After giving the figures for

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Soviet personnel, the Ambassador went on to say that the representation for the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics would total 30. In the subsequent discussion it became clear that the Soviet Union was intent on expanding the Yalta commitment to include immediate participation of the two republics at the conference. This had been rejected by both the United Kingdom and the United States at Yalta. The precise and limited nature of the Yalta commitment was pointed out in this and subsequent discussions.

Shortly thereafter partial information in regard to the matter "leaked" to the press and on March 30 correspondents submitted a series of direct questions to the Secretary of State. At a press conference on April 3, the following statement was released:

"The Soviet representatives at Yalta proposed that the White Russian and the Ukrainian Republics be initial members of the proposed international organization. This was a question for the United Nations assembled at San Francisco to consider and decide.

"In view of the importance which the Soviet Government attached to this proposal, the American representatives at Yalta, having the utmost respect for the heroic part played by the people of these republics in their unyielding resistance to the common enemy and the fortitude with which they have borne great suffering in the prosecution of the war, agreed that the Government of the United States would support such a Soviet proposal at San Francisco if made. No agreement was, however, made at Yalta on the question of the participation of these republics in the San Francisco Conference.

"In the circumstances the American representatives at Yalta believed that it was their duty to reserve the possibility of the United States having three votes in the General Assembly. The Soviet and British representatives stated their willingness to support a proposal, if the United States should make it, to accord three votes in the assembly to the United States. The President has decided that at the San Francisco Conference the United States will not request additional votes for the Government of the United States in the General Assembly.

"Announcement of these proposals was make first to the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference. In order to correct the impression conveyed by partial publication of the facts, public announcement was made prior to a final determination of the course to be followed by the delegation with regard to possible additional representation for the United States."

A further Soviet attempt to expand the nature of this commitment was made in a preconference meeting of the heads of the Big Four delegations on April 23, 1945.[4] Foreign Minister Molotov, raising the question of procedure in regard to the consideration of the question, sought information on how other states, particularly the Latin-American states and the other British Dominions, were likely to vote. He said that he considered the United States and the United Kingdom morally bound to exert every effort to secure a favorable vote. Secretary Stettinius said that, while the United States was committed to vote in favor of admitting the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics as initial members of the projected organization, the decision on whether they should be admitted rested with the Conference. He also pointed out that, at Yalta, the question of participation by those republics in the Conference itself had not been raised (this conflicts with Conference notes) and that the United States was not committed to support that. Foreign Minister Molotov agreed with this interpretation of the Yalta commitment but said that the Soviet Union expected the United States and United Kingdom to see to it that admission was voted and that his government would judge by the results of the election. Both Secretary Stettinius and Foreign Minister Eden repeated that their governments controlled no vote but their own and that their commitment was limited to a pledge to support by their vote admission to initial membership in the organization, and that the decision in any case rested with the Conference itself.

The proposal to admit to original membership in the organization the two Soviet Republics was formally submitted to the San Francisco Conference by Mr. Molotov on April 27, at a meeting of the heads of delegations. It was promptly supported, in accordance with the Yalta agreement, by the United States and United Kingdom and was unanimously endorsed. It was reported to the plenary session and approved the same day. The proposal to admit the two republics to the Conference, which had not been agreed to at Yalta, was

[4] The discussion took place at the beginning of the meeting before Foreign Minister Soong joined the meeting.

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also pressed by the Soviet Union at the meeting of heads of delegations on April 27. It was referred to the Executive Committee and approved on April 30 by the Committee, the heads of delegations, and the fifth plenary session.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, had you any reason to suspect Alger Hiss during the course of your dealings with him? In other words, were you surprised when the disclosure about Alger Hiss came forth?

Miss FLUEGEL. I had no reason to consider him a Communist or to expect the allegation that he might be one. I had one experience that made me question his judgment, and that was this: It is a very small matter, but when I was in London, roughly in February of 1946, at the United Nations meeting, I was told by the—you see, I was with the international secretariat at the time, on loan from the State Department—Mr. Hiss was with the United States delegation in London—I was told by the French editor of the new United Nations Journal that he was not going to take responsibility for the way the Soviets were changing the records of the Security Council meetings.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the minutes of the meetings?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes. I had done my doctorate work in the field of constitutional law and knew that those first meetings were apt to become precedents, and consequently it was essential that the minutes in all languages coincide.

So I reported it to the American delegation headquarters and was rather brushed aside with the comment that Mr. Hiss and a person who was working for him at the time as an assistant, Miss Fosdick——

Mr. MORRIS. What Fosdick?

Miss FLUEGEL. Dorothy Fosdick, now with the policy planning staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she presently a member of the five-member policy committee?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is true—that they were keeping track of it and that nothing could be going wrong. Of course, I dropped the matter. I was just reporting what the Journal editor had said.

I do know that later when I was working on this book I came across a letter from Mr. John Foster Dulles sent to the Department the following summer in which he raised the question, because apparently either he or some member of his staff who reads Russian had been comparing the records and had found discrepancies. Well, that was one episode.

Mr. MORRIS. You feel that Mr. Hiss was in charge of keeping that record straight; is that right?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is what I was told.

Mr. MORRIS. That he had what position in respect to those minutes?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, I was told that Mr. Hiss and Miss Fosdick were following the matter and that nothing could be wrong with the minutes.

Now, that was a very small thing. Following that, I would say roughly about a year before the whole thing came out and, as a matter of fact, when Mr. Hiss was still in the Department, when security people or FBI people would ask you about somebody else, the question was often "What is that person's relationship with Mr. Hiss?"

Well, of course, it builds up in your mind the idea that Mr. Hiss was being investigated, too. So that I was not surprised, but I had no reason to know.

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Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, were you aware of the Institute of Pacific Relations during the term of your work in the Postwar Planning Division in the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Rather vaguely because my field is not the Far East. However, in the first job on postwar trends, in addition to all of the dispatches, we did get this volume of literature. Almost the only literature on the Far East, magazine literature, was from the Institute of Pacific Relations. So we used all of that, and everybody else did, too.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say literature of the Institute of Pacific Relations, do you mean the publications of the institute?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; Amerasia, Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Far Eastern Survey?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Senator WATKINS. And the handbooks were put out for the inspection of our troops and so forth?

Miss FLUEGEL. I saw relatively few of the handbooks. I saw maybe one or two. It was mostly these magazines at that early period.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anything extended to the possibility that the publications of the Institute and Amerasia possibly could be partisan.

Miss FLUEGEL. No. Frankly, not being, myself, an expert in the Far East, I would depend on them a good bit. They were produced by an educational organization of good repute. They came to our desk from the library, and you used them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you feel that the IPR and its publications had an influence on the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; I would be quite sure they did.

Senator FERGUSON. On policy?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, you know, that is an awfully hard question to answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that. That is one of the problems of this committee.

Miss FLUEGEL. But the thing is, the question of who makes policy, theoretically—I doubt, for example, that it influenced Mr. Hull or, later, any of the others. But what makes them make policy is this whole flow of information that goes up to them.

Senator FERGUSON. From them all?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right. Now, unquestionably that flow of information is influenced by what you read.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you think it was influenced by the IPR?

Miss FLUEGEL. It was bound to be, since it was all that you were reading.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that that was virtually the only material available on the Far East?

Miss FLUEGEL. The only material that I recall except dispatches coming in from Chungking. As I say, my work then was postwar trends and, later, personalities. I used those magazines if they had any information on Chinese leaders.

Senator WATKINS. What about the others working in those fields? Were they using it likewise?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, I know, of course, that the people working in the Far East——

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Senator WATKINS. That was the only information available to them as well as to you?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, you see, they may have had some information from their own competence against which to check this, but the rest of us didn't have.

Senator FERGUSON. When you had questions concerning the Far East, would you say that the IPR or its publications had any influence on your judgment?

Miss FLUEGEL. Here is the sort of thing that I did at that time: From all this material that came to us in postwar trends, we prepared, I think it was about a six-page mimeographed sheet which we distributed to the Department and to our missions abroad, summarizing for them ideas that were being tossed around on postwar planning.

For example, if we had come across an article on postwar planning in one of these magazines, we would have been likely to abstract it and circulate it further.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, were you acquainted with the John S. Service dispatches from the field?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes, because they created, of course, a tremendous sensation in the Department. Most of the material for a person like myself, whose field is political theory and foreign policy rather than a specialized country area, the over-all picture I would be getting would be in the form of digested summaries of telegrams and dispatches coming in, without the name of the person sending them in.

At that time you rarely questioned an incoming dispatch because there was no question of the competence of department in most of our minds. But in the case of the John Service dispatches, well, I remember that they were routed especially to me by a friend in another office, and I think a similar practice followed throughout the Department, because they were extremely well written and they were exciting, and they came in at a time when everybody was depressed and frustrated about the future.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you say they represented, what view? You said they were refreshing and lively.

Mr. FLUEGEL. Well, after I read a couple of them, I was quite sure what view they represented.

Senator FERGUSON. What did they represent?

Miss FLUEGEL. I thought they were definitely pro-Communist. Certainly, I distinguished sharply, for example, between the interpretation he put on agrarians, let us say, and some of the things we got in at an earlier date from the so-called peasant movement in Middle and Eastern Europe, which was certainly agrarian.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Service contend that the movement in China was agrarian?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; as I remember the dispatches, and, remember, it was years ago and I read them only because they were well written and everybody was talking about them, as I recall them, yes, much of it was on the freshness, the honesty, the realism, the enthusiasm of these people, and, as I said, there was so little of that anywhere else at the time that it was refreshing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he indicate that it was communism?

Miss FLUEGEL. My recollection is, and I can't be sure whether that was in Service's dispatches or others coming in at the time, that there

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was some questions as to whether it was communism, whether it wasn't just like the term "socialism," covering a great many differences, and the emphasis was that this was certainly a different kind of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Not Soviet?

Miss FLUEGEL. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that Service's reports indicated that it was not Soviet Kremlin communism, international communism?

Miss FLUEGEL. Well, I think that there is a little shift, and again I am talking now on very sketchy background, but my recollection is that there was a little shift in the line, if you want to call it that, from the initial enthusiasm and the initial stress that this was an agrarian movement. Then, quite suddenly—no, it is not that, it is communism but you had better make your peace with it and win it over.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that take place?

Miss FLUEGEL. Sometime in the period, I would say, generally 1944–1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Fluegel, who was Alger Hiss' deputy when he was the head of Postwar Planning Division in the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Mr. John Ross, who had been in charge of personnel throughout most of the postwar period, I think from 1942 until right before the San Francisco Conference.

He then became Mr. Hiss' deputy and left the Department at the time Mr. Hiss left and went up to New York and has been aiding Senator Austin in all sorts of capacities since; sometimes one of our delegates, sometimes deputy delegate.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a relationship between Mr. Ross and Mr. Hiss which was a close one?

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes; I would think so. For about a year my office was across the hall from them, and they were around all the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Fluegel, you say that you were active in the preparation of this volume, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation.

Miss FLUEGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you made a compilation of this Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation volume of the State Department and determined from that preparation the role played by members of the Institute of Pacific Relations, particularly those whose names appeared before our open hearings in connection with this volume?

Mr. MANDEL. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive Mr. Mandel's report on how members of the Institute of Pacific Relations, who have been mentioned in these hearings, figured, according to this volume again, in the postwar planning work of our State Department?

Senator WATKINS. Receive it in what form? Is it to be presented in a memo, or is he going to quote from the book itself?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, what is that?

Mr. MANDEL. I have prepared a memorandum based on this volume, entitled "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation," showing the membership in committees and subcommittees of persons associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The list is a brief one. I would like to read it. It includes: Hugh Borton, Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer, V. Frank Coe, Lauchlin Currie, Lawrence Finkelstein, O. Benjamin Gerig, Harold Glasser, Alger Hiss,

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Philip C. Jessup, William T. Stone, and Harry Dexter White. The positions are enumerated and the pages referenced.

I have also prepared a list of the associations of the listed individuals with the Institute of Pacific Relations which, if the Chairman permits, I will read.

Senator WATKINS. We will receive this first memorandum, and then we will permit you to go ahead with the other.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

POSTWAR FOREIGN-POLICY PREPARATION, 1939–45, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Released February 1950]

Hugh Borton attended meetings of subcommittee on territorial problems, of the advisory committee (p. 119).

Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer attended meetings of international organization group as an expert (p. 249).

Became an assistant secretary (p. 303).

V. Frank Coe listed as a representative at meetings of the interdepartmental group to consider postwar international economic problems and policies, representing the Treasury Department (p. 29).

Attended meetings of the American Technical Committee representing the Foreign Economic Administration (p. 143 n.).

Alternate member of the informal policy committee on Germany (p. 370).

Lauchlin Currie listed as a representative at meetings of the interdepartmental group to consider postwar international economic problems and policies representing the Executive Office of the President (p. 29 n.).

Member for work on economic problems of the advisory committee (p. 76).

Member, committee on postwar foreign economic policy (p. 139).

Member, executive committee on economic foreign policy (p. 219).

Laurence Duggan, member, advisory committee (p. 76).

Member, subcommittee on political problems (p. 97).

Member, departmental committee on political planning (p. 156).

Chairman, area committee for Latin America of committee on special studies (p. 178).

Member, policy committee (p. 209).

Lawrence Finkelstein, member, preparation staff, United States delegation to the United Nations Conference (p. 420).

O. Benjamin Gerig assisted in directing the work on international organization and arrangements of the advisory committee (p. 155).

Member, drafting group, the Charter of the United Nations (p. 176).

Interdivisional committee on over-all economic organization (p. 222).

Member, research staff, international organization group (p. 249).

Member of drafting group preparatory to the Crimea Conference (p. 373).

Attended meetings of subcommittees of advisory committee on postwar foreign policy (97, 108, 119 n., 147 n.); Food Conference and Organization (p. 144, 184); chairman, committee on colonial problems (p. 177); Assistant Chief, International Security and Organization Division (p. 216).

Attended Dumbarton Oaks conversations (pp. 291, 295, 307, 314, 315, 316, 332); Chief, Dependent Area Affairs Division (p. 351); work on trusteeship problems (pp. 387, 388, 429, 432, 434, 446); attended San Francisco Conference (pp. 419, 420, 436, 437, 443 n., 446).

Harold Glasser, one of the advisers to Dean Acheson at the Atlantic City UNRRA Conference, representing the Treasury Department as the Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research (205 n.).

Member, subcommittee to formulate recommendations within the framework of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (p. 354).

Alger Hiss attended meetings of subcommittee on territorial problems, of the advisory committee (p. 119).

Alternate member, policy committee (p. 209 n.).

Appointed Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (p. 216).

Attended meetings preparatory to Dumbarton Oaks Conference (p. 249).

Member, agenda group (p. 275).

Alternate member, armaments committee (p. 275).

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Member of committee to allocate officers to work on the basic instrument of the general international organization preparatory to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference (p. 291).

Responsible for developing administrative arrangements for Dumbarton Oaks (p. 292).

Executive secretary, American group, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 293).

Present at preconference briefing, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 295).

Executive secretary of executive secretariat of American group at Dumbarton Oaks (p. 297).

Secretary in international capacity, Dumbarton Oaks meeting of heads of Great Britain, Russia, and United States (p. 305).

Secretary, steering committee, Dumbarton Oaks (p. 312).

Attended meetings for drawing up plans for a general international organization (p. 381).

Member of committee preparing for Crimea Conference (p. 386).

Attended meeting of the interdepartmental committee on dependent area aspects of international organization as State Department representative (p. 388).

Accompanied President to Yalta (p. 392).

In charge of arrangements for United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 415).

Secretary, informal organizing group on arrangements for the San Francisco Conference (p. 439).

Philip C. Jessup, technical expert on proposals for the statute of the court, United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 419).

United States adviser on committee to draft statute for United Nations Conference at San Francisco (p. 426).

William T. Stone attended advisory committee on postwar foreign policy meetings representing the Board of Economic Warfare (p. 77).

Member, economic subcommittee, committee on postwar economic policy (p. 139).

Harry Dexter White, member, interdepartmental group to consider postwar economic problems and policies (p. 29).

Attended international conferences (33 n., 241, 242 n., 418, 438).

Member, advisory committee on postwar foreign policy (pp. 77, 81, 92, 135, 136).

Member, Taylor committee (p. 139).

Attended meetings of Cabinet committee (p. 141).

Chairman, Stabilization Fund and Reconstruction and Development Bank Committee (pp. 142, 224).

Attended Anglo-American economic conversations (pp. 191, 192).

Member, executive committee on economic foreign policy (p. 219).

Representative, informal policy committee on Germany (p. 370).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is the list of those people who are mentioned in this volume as having active roles in the formulation of postwar planning for the State Department under the project about which we are hearing testimony today.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Mandel may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will now read the connections that these people did have with the Institute of Pacific Relations and the general nature of the testimony which is before this committee concerning each. This is the testimony that has come out to date, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. Hugh Borton is listed as a writer for Pacific Affairs, member of the board of trustees of the American council, and a writer of several IPR publications. An IPR luncheon was given in his honor on January 11, 1947.

Esther C. Brunauer, according to our files, was suspended from the State Department for security reasons. She was an incorporator of the IPR.

V. Frank Coe has been cited in testimony of Elizabeth Bentley as a member of the Silvermaster group of the Communist Party. He attended IPR conferences in 1942 and 1945.

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Lauchlin Currie has been cited in testimony of Elizabeth Bentley as cooperating with an underground group of the Communist Party. He was a member of the board of trustees of the IPR in 1946.

Lawrence Duggan was cited as a member of the underground group of the Communist Party by Whittaker Chambers and Hede Massing in testimony before this committee. He is listed as a member of the IPR.

Lawrence Finkelstein has been a contributor to the Far Eastern Survey and a coauthor of several IPR publications.

O. Benjamin Gerig was a representative of the IPR at one of its study meetings in 1939.

Harold Glasser was cited in testimony before this committee as a member of an underground group of the Communist Party. He is mentioned in one of the IPR letters as a favorable Washington prospect for the IPR.

Alger Hiss is listed as a member of the board of trustees of the IPR and has been cited in testimony as a member of the underground group of the Communist Party.

Philip C. Jessup, was chairman of the Pacific council of the IPR in 1946, and vice chairman of the American council from 1936 to 1943.

William T. Stone has been an incorporator of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, when the Institute of Pacific Relations became incorporated, he was one of the three people named in the certificate of incorporation as incorporators. Is that right, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. Harry Dexter White was also mentioned in testimony before this committee as a member of an underground group of the Communist Party and a member of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Fluegel, who succeeded Alger Hiss as head of the postwar planning Division of the State Department?

Miss FLUEGEL. Dr. Dean Rusk.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, was Dr. Dean Rusk active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Dr. Dean Rusk was a member of the American council of the IPR and actively supported an IPR request for a donation from the Rockefeller Foundation as late as 1950. He also suggested the use of IPR publications by the Chief of Military Intelligence, according to a letter in our files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that letter is introduced into the record, bearing on the general question on whether or not the Institute of Pacific Relations and its members who were active in it had an influence on our far eastern policy as set forth by this project, about which we have heard testimony today.

Senator WATKINS. That will be so received.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of the witness.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will recess, subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p. m., Wednesday, February 20, 1952, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.,

The subcommittee met at 3 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senators Ferguson and Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, Mr. Weyl has asked to make a couple of changes in his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been sworn, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator, I have.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are continuing under oath?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF NATHANIEL WEYL, WASHINGTON, D. C.—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. What is it you desire to say on the record?

Mr. WEYL. Well, Senator, when I testified here the day before yesterday, it was without having had the opportunity to check my recollection on a few points, and I find that my recollection was in error.

Now, in my testimony of 2 days ago, before this committee, I was queried about testimony I gave under subpena before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1943, and my answer is, or my answer then was:

I told the committee that I had been until 1933 a Communist, and I offered to the committee into evidence writings subsequent to 1939 showing them that I was now an anti-Communist.

Then it continued, and then you, Senator, asked the question:

You left out, in other words, between 1933 and 1939, that space?

My reply:

I left out the whole organizational matter. I could not have brought it in without naming names.

Now, subsequent to that testimony, I had opportunity to see what I actually did tell the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you got that testimony?

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Mr. WEYL. I have that, sir. I was asked at that time whether I was or had ever been a member of the Communist Party, and my reply that I then made was not true.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the question of the record of the Un-American Activities Committee and your answer.

Mr. WEYL. Senator, I do not find the question. It is very far up here that Mr. Matthews, who was the interrogator of the House Committee—here it is:

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Weyl, have you any dissent that you would like to enter at this time to the remarks made by the Honorable Martin Dies?

I will now skip down to the essential point.

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I would like to make a dissent on some of the details.

Then I go on down—

Mr. WEYL. This is a dissent of detail. Now, your statement is that there is no doubt about my being a loyal Communist Party member. I would like to make two points about that. The first is that while those articles—

this refers to articles written by me of a Communist character in 1932 and 1933—

The first is that while those articles show very clearly, I think, although I then espoused the Communist position, I was not a member of the Communist Party. That is perhaps not too significant, because whether a man carries a card or holds certain views is perhaps legalistic. The thing that is significant is the implication "his being a loyal Communist Party member" that I am now a member of the Comunist Party.

And when the occasion arises here, I would like to try to submit to you pretty conclusive evidence that I am not only not a member of the Communist Party, but that I have written in opposition to the Communist Party over a period of a year or so prior to my present employment by the Government.

And elsewhere here I said that I had been, to all intents, a Communist. So that the point of correction is obviously there is no correction of my statement that I became anti-Communist in 1939. The point of correction is that I stated falsely before the House Committee in 194? that I had never formally been a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is that that you want to correct here, and you are offering this as the record as to what you did say over there? You are not disputing this record?

Mr. WEYL. Not at all, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But you want to correct this record in the present proceedings to say now that notwithstanding what that record showed in the Un-American Activities Committee that you were, at that time, an actual member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. No, Senator, not at the time I testified; certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I mean at the time that you testified before the Un-American Activities Committee.

Mr. WEYL. I was not a Communist then, no.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had been at the time you related, in 1932 and 1933.

Mr. WEYL. That is right. And that the statement I made there that I was to all intents a Communist was certainly insufficient.

Senator FERGUSON. You feel now that a frank, fair statement would have been as of 1932 and 1933, the time mentioned in that testimony that you were an active and real member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Precisely, Senator.

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Senator FERGUSON. All right. I will permit this record to be, to show now what you say, and I think we ought to include that whole page that you have been reading.

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 452" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 452

Let me add for the record that the Mahogany program is not, of course, for furniture but for military purposes.

That, I think, brings the record up to date.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Weyl, have you any dissent that you would like to enter at this time to the remarks made by the Honorable Martin Dies?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; I would like to make a dissent on some of the details.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Take them point by point.

Mr. WEYL. Yes. Before doing so, you spoke of my making a statement about this. Is it your intention that I shall make a statement?

Mr. STARNES. Yes; that is what you are being asked for now. Any statement that you care to make of a dissenting nature about the allegations made by Mr. Dies, in connection with his speech.

Mr. WEYL. I will first make a few corrections on details which are of no importance.

My title is principal business economic analyst.

My salary is $5,600.

Then, another dissenting detail is this: This statement says: "For several years Weyl was very prominent in Communist activities among the students."

I had the opportunity to check up these files in the Public Library of New York, and the dates, as near as I can recall it, are from approximately December 1932 until May of 1933. Of course, that does not affect the substance of it, but it is a correction of detail.

Mr. MASON. I want to get this clear. Instead of saying for several years, it should have been for several months; is that it?

Mr. WEYL. That is correct; yes.

Mr. STARNES. A part of 2 years?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. STARNES. Several months, but a part of 2 years?

Mr. WEYL. Yes; that is correct.

Then there is another dissent of detail. This states:

"His writings in the Communist Party newspaper, the Daily Worker, also leave no doubt about his being a loyal Communist Party member."

I had forgotten that I ever wrote for the Daily Worker. As far as my research of the files in New York indicates, I wrote one article there. Isn't that correct, Mr. Matthews?

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is the only one we have.

Mr. WEYL. Well, I think describing one article as "writings" is a bit misleading.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall the date of the article to which you refer?

Mr. WEYL. I think it was May 1, wasn't it?

Mr. MATTHEWS. 1933?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. It was for a May Day supplement, but it appeared under the date of April 29, 1933.

Mr. WEYL. I see. This is a dissent of detail.

Now, your statement is that there is no doubt about my being a loyal Communist Party member. I would like to make two points about that.

The first is that while those articles show very clearly, I think, although I then espoused the Communist position, I was not a member of the Communist Party. That is perhaps not too significant, because whether a man carries a card or holds certain views is perhaps legalistic. The thing that is significant is the implication "his being a loyal Communist Party member" that I am now a member of the Communist Party.

And when the occasion arises here, I would like to try to submit to you pretty conclusive evidence that I am not only not a member of the Communist Party, but that I have written in opposition to the Communist Party over a period of a year or so prior to my present employment by the Government.

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Mr. MASON. Well, would you say that it is correct that at that particular time, and in that particular writing, we will say, that you agreed with or espoused the Communist position at that time?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir. I will have to admit to that mistake.

Mr. MASON. I just want to get in my own mind how much truth there is in this.

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MASON. But you, of course, would deny that you ever were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEYL. Yes, sir.

Mr. STARNES. Go ahead.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you through with the dissents?

Mr. WEYL. I would like to ask your pleasure in this.

When I got my subpena yesterday, I dug through a lot of newspaper writings of mine to show my points, at which I said things no Communist or Communist sympathizer could say. I would like to put those in the record. I don't care when I do so. That is entirely at your pleasure.

Mr. STARNES. That is all right. You can append those just like these publications. They are too lengthy, of course, to put in the record, but we will append them as exhibits, and go along with the testimony, and then the other members of the committee can examine them at length.

Mr. WEYL. Unless Dr. Matthews would like the opportunity of hearing them and cross-examining on them, in case he feels they do not indicate what I say they do.

Mr. STARNES. All right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Before we leave the substance of the matter contained in the speech of the Honorable Martin Dies, I would like to ask a few questions about the organizations involved there, for the record.

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you publicly associated with an organization known as the National Student League?

Mr. WEYL. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you hold any official position in connection with that organization?

Mr. WEYL. Well, as I recall, I was associate editor of this magazine, Student Review, and that was, I think, the official organ of the National Student League.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have another change you want to make, Mr. Weyl?

Mr. WEYL. I do. But before doing so, Mr. Morris, I would like not to expand on this but just to mention my reason for saying what I did before the House committee in 1943.

I have mentioned it before. It was a feeling that I had an obligation to protect people who had been associated with me in the Communist Party, and whom I thought might very well have broken quietly.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any such feeling now?

Mr. WEYL. No, Senator, I do not. Senator, I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. And at the time you testified the other day, Mr. Weyl—was that the 14th?

Mr. MORRIS. It was Tuesday of this week. That is the 19th.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any such reservations?

Mr. WEYL. No, I had no such reservations, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, your testimony now, your oath, is without mental reservations?

Mr. WEYL. It is, sir.

The other correction is this: I stated in my testimony 2 days ago when I was asked to estimate the time at which the Ware cell started functioning——

Senator FERGUSON. I think that was my question.

Mr. WEYL. I think it was, Senator. Perhaps we can find it here.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you help the witness find that testimony, Mr. Morris?

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Mr. WEYL. The question was as to the date at which the unit started, and the testimony reads as follows:

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you came to Washington did you become a member of this unit in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration?
Mr. WEYL. That is a question, Senator, that the FBI asked me, and I honestly can't answer because I don't recollect.
Senator FERGUSON. About how long?
Mr. WEYL. The best recollection, and it may be a bad one, is that this unit was set up around the beginning of 1934.

And then further testimony by me:

Mr. WEYL. If this point is important, we could get closer to the time period in this sense: Charles Kramer, I recall, came into the Government at a time when the unit was already set up. His name was then Charles Krivitsky. I am sure that there is a personnel record of the date on which he joined the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

I am not taking the trouble to check the personnel records. But I am taking the time to check Mr. Kramer's testimony in regard to charges made against him by Whittaker Chambers. In that he states that he joined the Agricultural Administration late in 1933. If that is true, and I see no reason why such testimony should not be true, then it would follow that the Ware unit was initiated in 1933 and not in 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. You estimated the point early in 1934, did you not?
Mr. WEYL. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. And it is, instead, late 1933?
Mr. WEYL. That is all I have.
Mr. MORRIS. The second item, Senator Ferguson, was that he placed the date in his mind as early in 1934, whereas he has since had a chance to test the records and he finds it was late in 1933.
Senator FERGUSON. Instead of early 1934?
Mr. MORRIS. That is right.
Mr. WEYL. This is an inferential process from the Kramer entry into the Government which I was able to check after I left.
Senator FERGUSON. All right. Is there anything else that you want to say?
Mr. WEYL. I have nothing further, Senator.
Senator FERGUSON. And you have seen your testimony?
Mr. WEYL. I have, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. And it is correct and accurate?
Mr. WEYL. Well, there is possibly one detail. I think it is so minor that I am not sure it should be brought up here.
Senator FERGUSON. What is it?
Mr. WEYL. I notice that I stated that I had been a member of the executive committee of the National Student League. To the extent that there was a controlling body, I was a member of it. But I am not sure that it was formally an executive committee. My reason for having doubts at this time is that I note my 1943 testimony simply stated my function in the organization as associate editor of the Student Review, which was their national organ.
Senator FERGUSON. But on the controlling body, you were an active member?
Mr. WEYL. Yes, Senator. I just am not entirely sure that this was very formally established as a controlling body. My recollection does not suffice in that point.
Senator FERGUSON. That is the only explanation that you want to make on this record?

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Mr. WEYL. That is all I have, Senator.
Senator FERGUSON. All right.

TESTIMONY OF SOL AUERBACH (JAMES S. ALLEN), LONG BEACH, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID REIN, ESQ., WASHINGTON, D. C.

Senator FERGUSON. You were sworn in an executive session today?
Mr. AUERBACH. That is correct.
Senator FERGUSON. And this is a continuation. The Chair recessed the executive session to an open hearing today at this hour. So you may proceed under oath.
Mr. MORRIS. What is your name?
Mr. AUERBACH. My pen name is James S. Allen. My real name is Sol Auerbach. My address is 134 West Hudson Street, Long Beach, N. Y.
Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?
Mr. AUERBACH. I am a writer.
Mr. MORRIS. For whom do you write?
Mr. AUERBACH. I will claim privilege under the fifth amendment on the grounds that an answer might tend to incriminate me.
Mr. MORRIS. What is your education, Mr. Auerbach?
Mr. AUERBACH. Through college.
Mr. MORRIS. What college did you attend?
Mr. AUERBACH. The University of Pennsylvania.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, are you acquainted with the testimony before this committee to the effect that you were a representative of the Communist International and a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. AUERBACH. I must refrain from making any comment on that on the grounds of the privilege accorded me under the fifth amendment.
Mr. MORRIS. You understand, Mr. Auerbach, the question put to you was: Are you aware of the testimony before this committee to that effect?
Mr. AUERBACH. I am aware of the testimony.
Mr. MORRIS. Is that testimony true and accurate?
Mr. AUERBACH. There I claim my privilege.
Senator FERGUSON. On that, you claim that could tend to incriminate you?
Mr. AUERBACH. Correct.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, have you been a contributor to Pacific Affairs?
Mr. AUERBACH. I have.
Mr. MORRIS. What articles have you contributed to Pacific Affairs?
Mr. AUERBACH. I contributed one article on the agrarian situation in the Philippines and another on the danger of Japanese aggression against the Philippines.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article called "The Negro in the United States"?
Mr. AUERBACH. Not an article, Mr. Morris. It was a book.
Mr. MORRIS. I see. Was that book reviewed in Pacific Affairs?
Mr. AUERBACH. Not that I can remember.
Mr. MORRIS. You do not know whether Guy B. Johnson reviewed your book for Pacific Affairs?
Mr. AUERBACH. That I wouldn't know.

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Mr. MORRIS. That was in March 1937, Mr. Auerbach?
Mr. AUERBACH. What was? The book?
Mr. MORRIS. The review.
Mr. AUERBACH. I wouldn't remember.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, did you ever write a book for the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. AUERBACH. I never did.
Mr. MORRIS. Was there any negotiation toward that end?
Mr. AUERBACH. I did negotiate.
Mr. MORRIS. And will you tell us what happened?
Mr. AUERBACH. I had asked the Institute of Pacific Relations to help finance a book on the Philippines, which would discuss the situation of the Philippines with regard to Japanese aggression in the Pacific, and that award was never granted by the institute.
Mr. MORRIS. With whom did you carry on negotiations?
Mr. AUERBACH. As I recollect, it was with Mr. Carter, principally. There may have been some correspondence with Mr. Field on that.
Mr. MORRIS. And did you negotiate with Mr. Lattimore in that connection?
Mr. AUERBACH. I don't believe so.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever negotiate with Mr. Owen Lattimore about writing any article?
Mr. AUERBACH. I did, in connection with Pacific Affairs.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these volumes? Will you authenticate these letters?
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask permission, after proper authentication, to introduce these into the record.
Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed from 381 Fourth Avenue, room 1301.
Mr. MORRIS. What is that address?
Mr. AUERBACH. On that question, I claim my privilege under the fifth amendment.
Mr. MANDEL. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, from James S. Allen.
Senator FERGUSON. Was that address of 381 Fourth Avenue, room 1301, the address of the International Publishers?
Mr. AUERBACH. I am afraid I would have to claim my privilege on that, Senator.
Senator FERGUSON. And refuse to answer on the grounds it would tend to incriminate you?
Mr. AUERBACH. Of possible self-incrimination.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whose address it was?
Mr. AUERBACH. At what time?
Senator FERGUSON. On June 2, 1938.
Mr. AUERBACH. Obviously I know whose address it was.
Senator FERGUSON. And were you at that address at that time?
Mr. AUERBACH. There again I must claim my privilege.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do we have in our public record to date any evidence that the International Publishers is an open and notorious Communist publication? Mr. Mandel, have you that in the public record?
Mr. MANDEL. Yes, we have.
Mr. MORRIS. It is in the public record?
Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

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Mr. MORRIS. I thought if we did not, Mr. Mandel would be directed to have something in there.

Mr. MANDEL. International Publishers has been cited by the Attorney General or the House committee, or both.

Senator FERGUSON. You state it now for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. I would like to check on it rather than trust my memory.

Sentaor FERGUSON. Would you state as to whether or not on June 2, 1938, the date of that letter, that it was the address of the International Publishers?

Put that in and then check up.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. It reads as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 47

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Field with regard to my proposed book on the Philippines. Please pardon the delay in replying to your note of May 28, since I have just returned to the city.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

Another letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is dated April 13, 1938, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, from James S. Allen:

EXHIBIT No. 46

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am contemplating a small book on the Philippines, with chief emphasis upon the internal situation in the light of the problems of the Pacific area.

I have already done much preparatory work, and expect to round out my materials by additional observation and new data during another trip to the Islands. I will probably leave in July and spend 4 or 5 months there.

It has occurred to me that the Institute may be interested in the project, and may be willing to extend financial aid. Upon my return at the end of this year, I will have at hand the materials necessary for the writing of the book. But my problem will then be to assure myself 3 or 4 months of uninterrupted time for writing the book. I do not know the usual procedure of the Institute in such matters, but may I take the liberty of requesting an advance grant to enable me to complete the book for publication?,

Should the institute be unwilling to make any commitments with regard to the sponsoring or publication of the book, another alternative seems possible. In the kind of general book which I am planning, it will be impossible to use the mass of data which I already have and which I will gather during my next trip. The institute may be interested in taking the materials for utilization in a Philippine handbook or other form. In this case, I could arrange for the publication of my book on its completion with a commercial publisher.

If it is possible to work out some basis of aid in advance, I could plan my trip and future plans accordingly. Should it be felt that some arrangement could be worked out, I would, of course, be glad to supply further details on the plan of the book.

I am ready to consider any other suggestion you may have in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. ALLEN.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record at this point?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in the record.

(Letters referred to were exhibits Nos. 46 and 47, pp. 247 and 248, pt. 1, from the open hearing before this committee on August 2, 1951.)

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Auerbach, that you did not complete negotiations with the institute at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you admit you wrote this letter?

Mr. AUERBACH. Very likely, yes. I am certain I wrote that.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated April 16, 1938. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, from Frederick V. Field, and reads as follows:

EXHIBIT No. 453

DEAR MR. CARTER: Here are copies of an exchange of correspondence which I have had with James S. Allen which speaks for itself. You doubtless know of his work for he has contributed to both Pacific Affairs and Amerasia. The book he will turn out on the Philippines will, I know, give the best analysis of internal forces, economic, social and political within the islands which has yet been made available. I had a long talk with him when he returned from his first trip to the Philippines and know that he thinks along lines which you and I would both respect.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

The next is a letter addressed from care of Auerbach, 45–40 Forty-eighth Street, Woodside, Long Island, N. Y.; April 13, 1938; from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a photostat of a letter from those files, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, from James S. Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write that letter?

Mr. AUERBACH. I suppose I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You have no reason to deny it?

Mr. AUERBACH. I have no reason to deny it. It is in line.

Senator FERGUSON. It was in line with your idea at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it.

(The first letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 453" and was read in full. The content of the second letter is the same as that of exhibit 46, p. 247, pt. 1.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, who financed your trip to the Philippines at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. I must invoke my privilege under the fifth amendment on the grounds that to make a reply to that question might tend to be self-incriminating.

Mr. MORRIS. You did make a trip to the Philippines, did you not? Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in the Philippines?

Mr. AUERBACH. All told probably about 7 or 8 months, or in that.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the nature of your work in the Philippines?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to invoke the privilege of the fifth amendment on that, too, Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you a member or were you at that time representing the international Communist movement?

Mr. AUERBACH. Again I will have to invoke my privilege on that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Frederick V. Field?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether or not he in any way represented the international Communist movement?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to invoke my privilege on that question, sir.

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Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not Mr. Field was ever a Communist?

Mr. AUERBACH. My reply would be the same.

Senator FERGUSON. That you claim the privilege under the Constitution. All right. The next question, please.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel wants to read something into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. I refer to exhibit No. 52, page 252, part I, placed into the record previously, it being a letter from the New York Telephone Co., dated May 15, 1951, addressed to Senator Pat McCarran, which reads as follows:

DEAR SIR: Your letter of May 9, 1951, in reference to a listing in the Manhattan Telephone Book for 1938 of the names International Publishers, Communist Party USA, or Communist Party of New York State has been referred to me for reply.

The 1938 edition of the Manhattan alphabetical directory, corrected to November 10, 1937, contained the following listings, among others: International Publishers Co., 381 Fourth Avenue, Murray Hill, 5–2864; Communist Party of the U. S. A., New York County Committee, 381 Fourth Avenue, Murray Hill 5–2462.

No listing appeared in the directory for a New York State Communist Party or a Communist Party of New York State.

The two listings published in the 1938 Manhattan alphabetical directory also appeared in the 1938–39 edition, corrected to May 12, 1938, and again in the 1939 issue, corrected to November 9, 1938.

If we can be of any further assistance to you or to your committee in this matter, please do not hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely yours,

L. J. JORDAN,
General Directory Manager.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please, for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This has been previously used as exhibit No. 53, page 254, part I. It is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated May 29, 1940, addressed to W. L. Holland from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the last paragraph of that letter, pelase?

Mr. MANDEL. The last paragraph reads as follows:

Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet Policy in the Pacific made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were: Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Muhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, can you recall attending the meeting described in that letter?

Mr. AUERBACH. Rather dimly, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us what happened at that meeting, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. I don't recollect it enough to be able to describe it in detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you cannot recall what transpired at that meeting, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. My testimony is that my recollection is rather dim about the meeting and I can't remember just what happened.

Mr. MORRIS. You do remember the meeting, though?

Mr. AUERBACH. I do dimly remember such meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember that all of those people mentioned in this letter were actually present at the meeting?

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Mr. AUERBACH. I do not. I couldn't testify to that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. AUERBACH. I had met Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. And on how many occasions had you met Mr. Carter?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps only at that meeting. I don't recollect any other occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet Mr. Field?

Mr. AUERBACH. That I wouldn't know.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you wouldn't know, Mr. Auerbach, what do you mean?

Mr. AUERBACH. I mean I wouldn't recollect just how many times I had met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you estimate for the committee how many times you met Mr. Field?

Mr. AUERBACH. It would be a rather difficult thing to do.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would try, Mr. Auerbach.

Mr. Chairman, the witness is trying to recall how many times he met Mr. Field.

Mr. AUERBACH. I am afraid I couldn't say just how many times.

Senator FERGUSON. More than a dozen times?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps not; no.

Senator FERGUSON. More than a half dozen times?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps. Maybe that would be more or less about it.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be about the number.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, do you recall attending a meeting in honor of Sir Stafford Cripps?

Mr. AUERBACH. I do recall that; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attend such a meeting?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what auspices was that meeting held?

Mr. AUERBACH. As I remember, it was held under the auspices of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original memorandum dated April 3, 1940, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Memorandum to ECC," presumably E. C. Carter, from FVF, presumably F. V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the significant parts, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. It reads as follows:

It is very difficult to suggest changes in your dinner list for Sir Stafford Cripps on April 11. I should like to suggest for your consideration the following, not on your present list: Jaffe, Bisson, Rosinger (particularly if you invite Barnett), Luther Tucker, Harry Price, Corliss Lamont, and James Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. The next paragraph too, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

I don't know who could be eliminated from your present list because I do not know exactly what purposes you have in mind in including some of the people you have proposed. I am wondering if you would insure a more frank discussion if you eliminated all non-Americans, including, of course, representatives of the British Dominions. I suggest this with a good deal of hesitance because it eliminates some of the best people on your list. As far as the American Council is concerned, I question including Robert S. Lynd, but you may have some special reason for this. I also question Stefansson, Rose Rubin, and Rose Somerville whom I do not know.

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Mr. MORRIS. Did you as a matter of fact attend the meeting referred to in this letter, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. I recall that I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us what happened at that meeting, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. As I remember, it was in the nature of an interview with Sir Stafford Cripps, where everyone present just fired questions at him and tried to get his opinion on various problems at that time confronting the world.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you throw questions at Sir Stafford Cripps at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. I imagine I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall, however, as a matter of fact, whether you did or not?

Mr. AUERBACH. I would say I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know on what basis Mr. Field was making up this list that was just read to you?

Mr. AUERBACH. I wouldn't have the slightest idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there anything in that letter that indicates the basis for sending out that list?

Mr. MANDEL. A postscript reads:

Because of the size of the room I can't invite all that you have proposed, but I have eliminated some from my list. My list was made up in part by suggestions from the American Russian Institute. I shall try to get Cripps for a small private all-American meeting if you wish it, but I cannot be certain of success.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the American Russian Institute?

Mr. AUERBACH. Only through the news and through some of the publications.

Mr. MORRIS. You have never attended meetings of the American Russian Institute?

Mr. AUERBACH. No; I never have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that last letter be received in evidence?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 454" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 454

APRIL 3, 1940.

Memorandum to ECC.
From FVF.

It is very difficult to suggest changes in your dinner list for Sir Stafford Cripps on April 11. I should like to suggest for your consideration the following, not on your present list: Jaffe, Bisson, Rosinger (particularly if you invite Barnett), Luther Tucker, Harry Price, Corliss Lamont, and James Allen.

I don't know who could be eliminated from your present list because I do not know exactly what purposes you have in mind in including some of the people you have proposed. I am wondering if you would insure a more frank discussion if you eliminated all non-Americans, including, of course, representatives of the British Dominions. I suggest this with a good deal of hesitance because it eliminates some of the best people on your list. As far as the American Council is concerned, I question including Robert S. Lynd, but you may have some special reason for this. I also question Stefansson, Rose Rubin, and Rose Somerville whom I do not know.

If Mrs. Eliot Pratt comes, I hope you will let me sit next to her because I like to look at her and I think she is a very intelligent girl. Aside from that there isn't any particular reason why she should be included.

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I am afraid that these comments are not very helpful, for any list of 20 people has to be pretty arbitrary, and you are the obvious person to exercise the authority.

FVF from ECC:

Because of the size of the room I can't invite all that you have proposed, but I have eliminated some from my list. My list was made up in part by suggestions from the American Russian Institute. I shall try to get Cripps for a small private all-American meeting if you wish it, but I cannot be certain of success.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, I am going to give you a compilation prepared by Mr. Mandel of what seems to be a list of your writings. Would you look at this and see if there are any inaccuracies on the list?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege on that, Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the whole list?

Mr. AUERBACH. On the whole list.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean if there were typographical inaccuracies there you would decline to make the correction for us?

Mr. AUERBACH. I had not looked at it from that viewpoint.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you deny writing any of these matters?

Mr. AUERBACH. I would claim privilege on that, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in a case like this, we try to be as accurate in compiling a man's writings as possible. Mr. Mandel has carefully prepared that list. Before putting it into the record, we wanted to present it to Mr. Auerbach and see if that is an accurate list.

Senator FERGUSON. I see that. But he claims his privilege.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever work for International Publishers?

Mr. AUERBACH. I claim my privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Have we anything to show that the International Publishers has been listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MANDEL. The International Publishers has been listed as the Communist Party publishing house, headed by Alexander Trachtenberg, and this citation was made by Attorney General Francis Biddle in 1942. Also, Mr. Biddle cited the International Publishing House as the "publishing agency of the Communist Party" in his brief of the case of William Schneiderman, a brief for the case of the United States against William Schneiderman, page 145.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have three or four letters here I think should be properly introduced into the record at this time, further showing the association of Mr. Auerbach, who is known as James A. Allen, and the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of which indicate that the officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations knew of Mr. Allen's Communist disposition at that time.

Will you receive them in the record, or should we go through them individually?

Senator FERGUSON. Are they identified, all of them? Mr. Mandel, are all these letters now identified as coming from the records of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 16, 1938, headed "WWL to ECC."

Senator FERGUSON. If you will just identify them, please.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there one passage in there that you have noted, Mr. Mandel?

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Mr. MANDEL. The second is a photostat of a memorandum dated April 14, 1938, headed "WWL to ECC," marked "Philippine research." In this letter is a paragraph on page 2 reading as follows:

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the black belt which most people thought rather fantastic. Since the agrarian problem in the Philippines is obviously a key issue and since Allen has been short of funds, at least until recently, there may be some way in which the IPR can give him a useful boost. Chen Han-seng says that Allen's former hostility to Quezon has now been somewhat modified.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Auerbach, did you ever write a book on the Negro problem in the United States?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it propose national self-determination for the Negro?

Mr. AUERBACH. That was one of the points raised in the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that a communistic ideology?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege on that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You claim privilege on that and refuse to answer on the grounds it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive these into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 455 and 455A" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 455

APRIL 16, 1938.

WWL to ECC:

In the accompanying memorandum I have attempted to advance the discussion of the American council's role in Philippine research beyond the point where the subject was left at our luncheon the other day. For the immediate future the conclusions are rather negative—you may think them unnecessarily so.

I wonder if this project is not one on which we might make a special appeal in certain quarters for new funds and thus put ourselves in a position to do a really effective piece of promotion.

WWL to ECC APRIL 14, 1938.

PHILIPPINE RESEARCH

Our luncheon meeting still leaves rather vague what the American council should do both as regards the Secretariat inquiry and a long-term research program. Even if we follow up the suggestion and call a committee under Hayden, we should attempt meanwhile to clarify what we want done and might be in a position to do. It is unlikely that merely setting up a committee will carry us far unless we have a pretty good idea what we want and unless we are prepared to put a good deal of staff effort into pushing the thing along. I hope that Hayden will be here within a few weeks for a research committee meeting so that we can confer with him in person. Meanwhile, the situation looks to me about as follows:

SECRETARIAT INQUIRY

The bulk of the contribution to the Secretariat inquiry, as I understand it, is to come from the Philippine council, with what assistance the Secretariat and the American council may be able to give. The American council is to be primarily responsible, however, only for the specific American angle—the Philippines as a factor in our far eastern relations. Not only does this accord with IPR policy, but it recognizes the fact that with two possible exceptions, which I shall mention below, Americans in this country are hardly in a position to make any very useful contribution to the study of internal Philippine affairs

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or of Philippines relations in the Far East. Just what the general program of the Philippine study should be is for someone else to say. Perhaps the possibilities can be divided into two categories: (1) Memoranda on the general aspects of the external problems of the Commonwealth, and (2) more thoroughgoing research into various domestic phases of Philippine economic and political life.

Under the first category come the general subjects of international trade and international political relationships during and after the change in the political status of the islands. From the Philippine angle this involves the problem of economic readjustment and of political security in the present and future. From the American, it involves primarily the Philippines as a factor in our policy in the Pacific. In this category the American council shares with the Philippine council the responsibility for documenting the Secretariat inquiry.

It hardly seems necessary, however, for the American council to plan any extensive effort along this line. Philippine-American trade relations have been abundantly documented by the United States Government and private investigators. The facts are known and the problem is largely the political one of negotiation. So, too, the political and strategic phases of American interests are not in need of extensive research, particularly in view of Hayden's forthcoming volume (about which I have written for more specific information). The naval angle will come in for consideration in our naval study. In addition, we contemplate a data paper on American far eastern policy for the next conference, and meanwhile the conferences now being held may turn up a good deal of analysis and opinion on the subject.

Accordingly, I see no reason to alter our original proposal—that the American council should now plan only for a memorandum (possibly a data paper for the next conference) analyzing the place of the Philippines in American policy and the American angle of the Philippine question itself. Even this should be somewhat conditional on Hayden's present work, and on the needs of the situation as it develops next fall. It may be that the most useful thing we could do would be to assemble a small group of people next winter to prepare a brief series of recommendations on Philippine policy, comparable to that issued under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association 2 or 3 years ago. Possibly this report might be correlated with a parallel report undertaken and issued in the Philippines by a responsible group of Filipinos.

In the second category—that of Philippine research projects bearing on the secretariate inquiry—it is not clear to me that the American council should undertake anything at the present time. Little progress can be made in any important Philippine studies except by persons on the spot. I do not know whether the secretariat is sending someone to the islands or what relationship, if any, this person might have to the American council. Presumably this matter of research on internal political, economic and social affairs will be worked out between the Secretariat and the Philippine Council, although the American council would naturally do everything it could to assist.

Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the black belt which most people thought rather fantastic. Since the agrarian problem in the Philippines is obviously a key issue and since Allen has been short of funds, at least until recently, there may be some way in which the IPR can give him a useful boost. Chen Han-seng says that Allen's former hostility to Quezon has now been somewhat modified. Without knowing any more of the situation than this, I wonder if it would be desirable to investigate the possibility of hooking up Allen, Fred Howe, and others in such a way as to secure a thoroughgoing and rounded report on all phases of the agrarian problem. Perhaps this is altogether fanciful in view of personalities, etc., but in any case the sample of Allen's work is most promising.

With reference to your exchange of letters with Field on the subject of Miss Eleanor Dennison, which you passed along for comment—the subject of Philippine economic interest in the Far East deserves thoroughgoing study. The existing trade is relatively small, of course, and is a subject easily documented. The important question is rather the potentialities for the future. If the American trade tie is cut, the islands will be forced to reorient themselves in terms of far-eastern trade relations, and this means primarily but not exclusively trade with Japan. (A study of Hongkong trade, for example, shows that intra-

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regional trade has developed rapidly in this area, even excluding the Japanese share.) Someone ought to make a close study of both the competitive and complementary relationships of Philippines products and potential products with those of adjacent countries on all sides. But this is a highly technical matter and hardly to be undertaken as a doctoral thesis by some American girl in California. Unless it is already being done in the Philippines under official auspices. I should think it would constitute one important phase of the secretariat inquiry in the islands.

LONG-RANGE RESEARCH PLANS

Before setting up any committees and inviting suggestions for a program, I wonder if we should not consider rather carefully what we are actually prepared to do. In general, the need seems to be for basic studies in the social sciences in the Philippines rather than for anything that can be done from secondary materials over here. Moreover, our program, as you have pointed out, should be the stimulation of interest among American scholars, largely lacking in the past, rather than carrying through some particular research project under American council auspices. Such a research-promotion campaign would presumably include a survey of these research needs, after the fashion of an SSRC committee, to be followed by a varied program including publicity for these needs, the coordination of research efforts, the provision of funds for travel and study in the islands, the encouragement of graduate study by Filipinos in the United States, the building up of library resources here and in the islands, etc.

There is only one objection to our launching such a program right away, but that is a practical one: Who is going to do it? We can get useful advice, suggestions, and contacts from a committee set up for the purpose, as proposed, but the actual execution of the program—the administrative responsibility—would fall upon us to a large extent and would be quite time consuming. There is little value in making the gesture unless we are prepared to follow it through. At present we are already rather far extended in our general program. It is questionable whether we should embark on any special effort along this line until some of our present responsibilities are liquidated.

It was this limitation of staff which was largely responsible for dropping the proposal discussed last summer for a Philippine-American council or committee. The plan which Lasker then proposed was a program to stimulate cultural relations in general with research as one of its important subdivisions. For a time it looked as though Veatch might be the man to carry out this research project, to serve as correspondent for the committee in the islands, and to carry a good deal of responsibility for organizing the thing at this end. When this scheme collapsed, owing to Veatch's decision to stay with the State Department, and when the war broke out, we went no further.

What we need is a staff person who would be our research person on the Philippines, thoroughly conversant with the subject, and who, in the remainder of his or her time, would be a Mortimer Graves in this field. It would be advantageous, although not essential, for this person to spend a period in the Philippines and return with a first-hand understanding of the situation. Until we see our way clear to some such arrangement, I am somewhat skeptical of the wisdom of making the initial splash and arousing expectations which we may not be in a position to fulfill. Is this taking a too negative view as far as the immediate possibilities are concerned?

EXHIBIT No. 455A

WRITINGS OF JAMES S. ALLEN

The Communist, "A Magazine of the Theory and Practise of Marxism-Leninism published monthly by the Communist Party of the United States of America" (became Political Affairs in 1945):

"The Soviet Nations and Teheran," March 1944, pp. 206–216.
"The New Role of China," April 1942.
"Prologue to the Liberation of the Negro People," February 1933, p. 147.
"The Scottsboro Struggle," May 1933, p. 437.
"American Imperialism and the War," November 1939, pp. 1046–1053.
"The Crisis in Mexico," October 1940, pp. 907–915.

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"The Farmers and the Struggle Against the War Program," July 1940, pp. 628–648.
"Farm Production for Defense," October 1941, pp. 910–916.
"The Far Eastern Front in the War Against the Axis," March 1942, pp. 143–162.
"The New Role of China," April 1942, pp. 238–249.
"Introduction to 'For the Fulfillment of the Rio Pledges: Resolution of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Argentina,'" May 1942, pp. 360–363.
"The Pacific Front in the Global War," December 1942, pp. 1012–1020.
"Some Lessons of the 'Fateful Decade,'" March 1943, pp. 258–265.
"We Can Win in '43," November 1943, pp. 680–687.
"Bretton Woods and World Security," December 1944, pp. 1078–1086.
"Prologue to the Liberation of the Negro People," February 1933, pp. 147–170.
"Sharecropping as a Remnant of Chattel Slavery," December 1934, pp. 1241–1253.

Political Affairs:
"The World Assembly at San Francisco," April 1945, pp. 291–301.
"The New Stage in the Far East," May 1945, pp. 441–447.
"'Enlightened' American Imperialism in the Philippines," June 1946, pp. 526–540.
"The Policy of Anti-Soviet Encirclement," October 1946, pp. 879–892.
"The Negro Question, A Discussion Article," November 1946, pp. 1046–1056.
"The Negro Question," December 1946, pp. 1132–1150.
"A Comment on State Capitalism and Socialism," May 1948, pp. 426–439.
"The New War Economy," December 1948, pp. 1055–1074.
"The Marshall Plan," July 1947, pp. 536–570.
"The Marshall Offensive for Imperializing the Ruhr," August 1947, pp. 739–750.
"German Policy of the Marshall Plan," September 1947, pp. 855–864.

Amerasia:
"Japan in the Philippines," April 1937, pp. 73–78.
"Democracy and Independence in the Philippines," March 1939, pp. 25–29.

New Masses, cited by Attorney General Francis Biddle as a "Communist Periodical," Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7688:
"Quezon and the Philippines," April 27, 1937.
Reviews "Civil War in USA," by Marx and Engels, International Publishers, December 14, 1937.
"Where We Stand with Russia," November 13, 1945.

Pacific Affairs:
"Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines," March 1938, pp. 52–65.
"The Philippine Problem Enters a New Phase," June 1938, pp. 159–170.

Books:
"The Negro Question in the United States," International Publishers, New York, 1946.
"World Monopoly and Peace," International Publishers, 1946.
"The Negroes in a Soviet America," coauthor with James W. Ford, Workers Library Publishers, New York, June 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, integrated into the record at this time should be exhibits Nos. 50, 51, and 52, which also relate to the same subject. They are in the record now, but they should be integrated into this hearing.

(See exhibits Nos. 50, 51, 52, pp. 251 and 252, pt. I, from the open hearings before this committee on August 2, 1951.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, who is this memorandum by which states this? It is William Lockwood to E. C. Carter, and Carter at that time was the Secretary?

Mr. MORRIS. Secretary General.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and in this he acknowledges the Communist ideology of the writer of the book, and the writer was James S. Allen, the present witness.

Mr. MORRIS. The letter so indicates, Mr. Chairman.

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Senator FERGUSON. Is there any other evidence in there that they knew that Mr. Allen was a Communist? That letter clearly states or indicates that they knew he was a Communist.

Mr. MANDEL. That is all on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have another letter to go into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter addressed to Mr. James S. Allen, care of Auerbach, dated April 16, 1938, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, signed by Frederick V. Field, which I offer for the record. Attached thereto is another letter dated April 13, 1938, to Mr. Frederick V. Field from James S. Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything notable that should be called to the attention of the chairman, in that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 456" and are as follows. For the letter of April 13, 1938, see exhibit No. 47, p. 248, pt. I, of the open hearing before this committee on August 2, 1951.)

EXHIBIT No. 456

SAN FRANCISCO, *April 16, 1938.*

Mr. JAMES S. ALLEN,
% Auerbach, 45–40 Forty-eighth Street,
Woodside, Long Island, N. Y.

DEAR MR. ALLEN: I wish I were in a position to send an encouraging reply to your letter of April 13 regarding the possibility that the American Council might be interested in financially sponsoring the completion of your book on the Philippines. I am obliged, however, to reply by informing you that we have no funds whatsoever to devote to this project and that I see little possibility of our being able to secure special funds during the course of the year.

I am, however, sending your letter to Mr. Edward Carter, Secretary General of the international body of the Institute, who may have something more constructive to suggest to you. It is also possible that when Mr. Holland, secretary of the International Research Committee, returns to this country early in June, I may find that he knows of some way of putting a few hundred dollars at your disposal. He is now in New Zealand and the difficulties of the mails for that distant region are such that there is no use in trying to get in touch with him until he reaches San Francisco six weeks hence.

Be assured that I shall keep this request in the back of my mind and shall inform you of any encouraging signs which I may use on the horizon. You need not argue the importance of your project for I know enough of your work to anticipate the important contribution your book will make. It is merely a question of figuring out how help can possibly be extended.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g
copy to Mr. Carter

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, have you ever been the foreign editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. AUERBACH. I must claim privilege on that, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, how many trips have you made abroad in your life?

Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment. I show you a little pamphlet here, World Cooperation and Post-War Prosperity, by James S. Allen. Did you write that?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes; I wrote that.

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Senator FERGUSON. Well, I call to your attention now on the second page about the author:

James S. Allen, the author of this pamphlet, is the foreign editor of the Worker, and a regular contributor to the magazine Political Affairs.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege there, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that that was circulated as part of that book?

Mr. AUERBACH. I knew the pamphlet was circulated, and everything in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Everything in it. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with New Century Publishers?

Mr. AUERBACH. How do you mean that, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of its existence?

Mr. AUERBACH. I know of its existence.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you worked for it?

Mr. AUERBACH. I must refuse to answer that on the grounds of privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the New Century Publishers, Inc., of 832 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y., a Communist publisher?

Mr. AUERBACH. Again I must claim my privilege on that, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do we have a citation by the Attorney General of New Century Publishers?

Mr. MANDEL. We have none from the Attorney General, but I know from my research that it is the official Communist Party publisher.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have more letters here, but I think they should properly be reserved until some of the future witnesses come before this committee inasmuch as they bear on the other witnesses as well as Mr. Allen.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 9, 1938, headed "ECC from CH-S," presumably that standing for Chen han-seng. This letter refers to "excellent material" to be found in the work of James Allen.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 457" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 457

9TH MARCH, 1938.

ECC from CH—S:

To the two enquiries you made yesterday, I reply as follows:

I do not know specifically what Bill had in mind with regard to the Russian materials. However I am inclined to believe that it would not be Russian studies of Chinese and Japanese agrarian problems because such materials although appearing in Russian have been taken originally from Chinese and Japanese publications. As data materials, therefore, there is hardly any point in getting them through the Russian language. Even articles originally done by the Russians themselves, in such studies, are already available in Japanese and Chinese translations. The Japanese have been very quick, not only in translating Russian articles, but also in making full translations of materials such as those that I have used.

I think it most probable that Bill had in mind materials on Soviet agriculture, in order to show how collectivisation can and has been accomplished, particularly on the rice farms in Birobidjan and Primoskaya.

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If you want to read some of the "devastating recent books on the American share croppers," such books as:

Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South, Human Factors in Cotton Culture

Walter Wilson, Forced Labor in the United States

Charles S. Johnson, Shadow of the Plantation—

are of course indispensable general descriptions. There is other excellent material, such as the Department of Agriculture publications since 1916 and especially since 1933: statistical investigations by the University of North Carolina on two counties (Arthur Raper, a Preface to Peasantry, published 1936); theoretical studies as Marx and Engels The Civil War in the United States, and Lenin's Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States (included in the volume Lenin on America); and more or less polemic literature like Allen's The Negro Question in the United States and Norman Thomas' Human Exploitation in the United States.

At this point I would like to say, however, that I think after going through the literature above mentioned it will be clear that the differences beween the situation in the United States and China are so fundamental that in spite of the grievous conditions of the southern sharecroppers, they still represent two categories of agrarian economy. The United States Cotton Belt is in the main framework of a highly developed capitalistic society, whereas China is almost entirely embedded in a pre-capitalistic society. Let us ask, for instance, why is it not possible in China at present to have such agricultural export as financed by Wall Street for the South; and again why is it not possible to initiate such a large-scale relief administration as under the Roosevelt regime? Then it is also to be observed that there are different tendencies in the two countries: in the South there is a noticeable tendency among the sharecroppers to become wage earners on the farm. whereas in China the tendency is just the reverse, i. e., money wages are decreasing the reverting to wages in kind.

As for an international comparison of the grievous peasant conditions as an isolated phenomenon, would it not be better to choose such places as exist in Rumania, Hungary, or Brazil? I am not suggesting such a comparison, however, because the value and validity of such a comparison is still doubtful.

In reading through my file of letters from Bill, I notice that in one of them, dated February 12, he said, "I was talking about your manuscript with Dr. Alsberg the other day and raised the quesion of whether it would be politically wise to publish the book just at this time. He said he thought there was no objection to our going ahead."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a mimeographed sheet taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and it is a table of contents of Pacific Affairs for March 1938 showing James S. Allen as author of an article entitled "Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 458" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 458

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

March 1938

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Changing Status of the Cabinet in Japan—Yashushi Sekiguchi.
China's Advance From Defeat to Strength—"Asiaticus."
The Strategy of the Sino-Japanese Conflict—Herbert Rosinski.
The Soviet Press and Japan's War on China—Harriet Moore.
Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines—James S. Allen.
The Revolution in Chinese Legal Thought—M. H. van der Valk.
Reports on research:
No. III: A Large-Scale Investigation of China's Socio-Economic Structure—Karl August Wittfogel.

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Comment and correspondence:
Footnote on "American Foreign Policy"—Sir Frederick Whyte.
Japan's War Hunger—Eliot Janeway.
Letter from W. E. Wheeler, with editor's reply.
Letter from Rammanohar Lohia.
Book reviews:
Red Star Over China, by Edgar Snow-Edward C. Carter.
First Act in China: The Story of the Sian Mutiny, by James M. Bertram-Chen Han-seng.
Problems of the Pacific, 1936: Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, edited by W. L. Holland and Kate Mitchell, assisted by Harriet Moore and R. Pyke-D. Mitrany.
China at Work: An Illustrated Record of the Primitive Industries of China's Masses, by Rudolph P. Hommel-T. T. Read.
Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542–1936, by Roy H. Akagi; and The Abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement, by Rodman W. Paul-Harold S. Quigley.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; Symposium on Problems of Japanese Economics, July 1937 (in German)—Emil Lederer.
The Problem of Japan, by Capt. Malcolm D. Kennedy-Herbert Rosinski.
Prince Ito, by Kenju Hamada-Grace James.
Oasis Interdites: De Pekin au Cachemire, by Ella Maillart-O. L.
American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations, by James Morton Callahan Edgar McInnis.
Why We Went to War by Newton D. Baker-R. C. K. Ensor.
A History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East, by Paul H. Clyde-K. S. Latourette.
Raw Materials in Peace and War, by Eugene Staley-Wilfred Smith.
Limits of Land Settlement, prepared under the direction of Isaiah Bowman-P. M. Roxby.
The Private Manufacture of Armaments, vol. I, by Philip Noel-Baker; and Armaments Year-Book, 1936, League of Nations—Russel E. Hall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write such a pamphlet?

Mr. AUERBACH. An article. Yes; I wrote that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, are you acquainted with a man named Chao-ting Chi?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did know him.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know Mr. Chi?

Mr. AUERBACH. It is a difficult question to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you see Mr. Chi?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is difficult to say; several times.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see him as many as 10 times?

Mr. AUERBACH. I would say not.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say not?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Chen Han-seng?

Mr. AUERBACH. Yes; I had met him.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet Chen Han-seng?

Mr. AUERBACH. On a few occasions; not many.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Y. Y. Hsu?

Mr. AUERBACH. I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have never met Mr. Hsu?

Mr. AUERBACH. I don't recall meeting Mr. Hsu.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man who used the pen name of Asiaticus?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Hans Mueller?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Shippe?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

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Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Dr. Chi or Mr. Chen Han-seng were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. AUERBACH. I claim the privilege on that.

Senator FERGUSON. On the grounds that it might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. AUERBACH. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Auerbach, I do not think you had completed answering the question that I had asked you before of your developing your trips abroad. When did you first go abroad?

Mr. AUERBACH. I first went abroad in 1927.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what auspices did you go abroad on that occasion?

Mr. AUERBACH. Under the auspices of a student organization, composed of a number of social problems clubs at the various university campuses.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you next go abroad?

Mr. AUERBACH. In 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you go on that occasion?

Mr. AUERBACH. To the Philippines.

Mr. MORRIS. What other countries?

Mr. AUERBACH. In passing, Japan, China, and coming back stopping at a number of European countries, but only in passing, in transit.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a United States passport at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what name was the passport issued?

Mr. AUERBACH. Under my own name—Sol Auerbach.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed that particular trip, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will claim the privilege on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you try to get aid from the IPR for that trip?

Mr. AUERBACH. I tried to get aid from the IPR for a book.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you write that book?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they give you any aid?

Mr. AUERBACH. They did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask them for any aid to make the trip to write the book?

Mr. AUERBACH. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, in order that you would write the book later?

Mr. AUERBACH. No. I suppose that it might have worked that way, if they had given me a grant on writing the book. It would have contributed to the expenses of the trip.

Mr. MORRIS. Actually, did you receive money while you were in the Philippines from the IPR for your articles?

Mr. AUERBACH. Not while—no, I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Money was not sent to you there?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

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Senator FERGUSON. Did the articles that you wrote about then or before help to finance your trip to the Philippines?

Mr. AUERBACH. It did.

Senator FERGUSON. So then really, the IPR did help to finance your trip to the Philippines.

Mr. AUERBACH. That is a pretty broad interpretation, isn't it, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you. Did it not do so?

Mr. AUERBACH. It was after—I wrote the articles after I returned from my trip to the Philippines, and whatever I received from them I received on my return.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has testified that he did not receive the money while he was in the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand. He got it after he came back. Did you borrow money and repay it out of the money you got from these articles?

Mr. AUERBACH. I will have to claim privilege there, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not the International Communist organization finance your trip to the Philippines?

Mr. AUERBACH. The privilege again.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make a trip abroad, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. In 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed that trip?

Mr. AUERBACH. I claim privilege there.

Mr. MORRIS. What countries did you visit at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. The Philippines.

Mr. MORRIS. And what other countries?

Mr. AUERBACH. In transit, I suppose just Japan and China.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did that trip last, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. About 6 months.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, it ended in early 1939?

Mr. AUERBACH. I think it did. I think I returned at the beginning of 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you stayed in the United States how long?

Mr. AUERBACH. Constantly, with the exception of a trip now and then to Mexico or Cuba.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make your first trip to Mexico?

Mr. AUERBACH. I believe it was in 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed that trip, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. The privilege again.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, how long did you stay in Mexico at that time?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps as long as 2 months. I am not quite certain. I don't recollect the exact duration of my stay.

Mr. MORRIS. In all, how many trips have you made to Mexico?

Mr. AUERBACH. Perhaps three, two or three, maybe.

Mr. MORRIS. And who financed the second and third trips to Mexico, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. Again I must claim privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. What other trips have you made abroad, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. I made a trip to Cuba.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make that trip to Cuba?

Mr. AUDRBACH. Also about the same time, 1940 or 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Who financed that trip?

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Mr. AUERBACH. The privilege on that.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last trip abroad?

Mr. AUERBACH. I believe that was it.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you applied since that time to make a trip abroad?

Mr. AUERBACH. I have not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you still have a United States passport?

Mr. AUERBACH. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened to your passport?

Mr. AUERBACH. I think it was taken up by one of the inspectors at the Mexican border on one of my trips back. I had taken it along for identification purposes, and I think it was collected by the Department of State there.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was that, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. That you will have to ask them.

Senator FERGUSON. I think at this time the record should show that the "ECCI"—will you tell who that is?

Mr. MANDEL. That is the executive committee of the Communist Internationale.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

And its presidium has the right to send their representatives to the various sections of the Communist Internationale.

I will offer to put in the record, out of the bylaws and regulations, sections 21 and 22 (and is as follows):

[Source: A pamphlet published by Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1936]

PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL TOGETHER WITH ITS CONSTITUTION

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

* * * III. The executive committee of the Communist International and its subsidiary bodies.

* * * 21. The sections must carry out the instructions of the permanent bureaus of the ECCI. Sections may appeal against the instructions of the permanent bureaus to the ECCI or to its Presidium, but must continue to carry out such instructions pending the decision of the ECCI or of its Presidium.

22. The ECCI and its Presidium have the right to send their representatives to the various Sections of the Communist International. Such representatives receive their instructions from the ECCI or from its Presidium, and are responsible to them for their activities. * * *

It seems clear from the evidence, at least the conclusion can be drawn, that the witness' refusing to answer who paid his way, and the other evidence in this case, would indicate that it was paid by the Internationale, and, therefore, it also indicates that there was some evidence of that known to the IPR, and that they had him write articles after he came back after being supported and sent there by the Communist Internationale.

I think that is a fair deduction from the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. The testimony from two witnesses to date, Miss Hede Massing and Mr. Louis Budenz, has been to the effect that Mr. Auerbach, or Mr. Allen, was working for the Communist Internationale. In addition, Mr. Chairman, we have, if necessary, other witnesses to that same effect.

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Senator FERGUSON. That is what I say, up to the present date. That does not mean that the IPR cannot come in here and show what they know about it, I mean, the record as it now stands.

Mr. MORRIS. And we have asked Mr. Auerbach to come here and and we have given him an opportunity to deny these things. He has chosen to stand on his privilege.

Do you know, Mr. Auerbach, that you have been quoted as an authority by Mr. Andre Vishinsky who is the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, on September 18, 1947?

Mr. AUERBACH. I know I was quoted in one of his speeches. I don't know as an authority or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it an accurate quotation?

Mr. AUERBACH. I suppose the sense of it was. I will not vouch for every word.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did he make the quotation?

Mr. AUERBACH. As I recall, at the General Assembly meeting of the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union?

Mr. AUERBACH. No, I don't know him.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever met him?

Mr. AUERBACH. I have met him at a reception.

Mr. MORRIS. What reception was that, Mr. Auerbach?

Mr. AUERBACH. At a reception at the Soviet Embassy on their anniversary.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington?

Mr. AUERBACH. Here in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you frequently attend those celebrations?

Mr. AUERBACH. No, not frequently.

Mr. MORRIS. How many times have you been to them?

Mr. AUERBACH. Twice, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever discussed this quotation that he made with him?

Mr. AUERBACH. No, I never had that opportunity.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give us a list of the Soviet officials that you have met? Let the record show that the witness is conferring with counsel. What is the answer?

Mr. AUERBACH. Well, I was conferring with the counsel in order to make my own mind clear on some points. I believe that I have met, at the reception, I have met innumerable representatives. I can't recall all the names.

Senator FERGUSON. Any outside of the formal reception?

Mr. AUERBACH. Not that I can recollect outside of the receptions themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that include members of the International, the Communist International?

Mr. AUERBACH. That I wouldn't have any way of knowing, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know that?

Mr. AUERBACH. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we were to have another witness here today. The other witness will be Ella Winter. We have received an official

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report from the United States marshal in New York. According to the notation on the subpena which was returned by the marshal, "is said to be vacationing in Europe."

But it says here:

After due and diligent search, I am unable to find the within-named Ella Winter within the eastern district of New York. Signed William A. Carroll, United States marshal, by James Griffin, deputy.

May that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. That will be a part of the record.

(Subpena referred to is filed with the committee's files, and is for committee reference.)

Mr. MORRIS. And may the staff be instructed they no longer continue their efforts to subpena Ella Winter to appear before this body?

Senator FERGUSON. Unless they get evidence that she is back in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing else, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will recess subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Thursday, February 21, 1952, subject to the call of the Chair.)

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INDEX TO PART VIII

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

Page

AAA. (*See* Agricultural Adjustment Administration.)
Abraham Lincoln Brigade ---- 2597, 2657
Abrahamson, Jim ---- 2643
Abramson ---- 2770, 2701, 2703
Abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement ---- 2891
Abt, John ---- 2799
Academy of Science (Moscow) ---- 2590, 2692, 2699, 2723, 2728, 2729, 2730
Acheson, Dean ---- 2477, 2501, 2539, 2555, 2626, 2711, 2810, 2831, 2835, 2868
Across the Desert ---- 2712
Action Program for New China Policy ---- 2789
Adams, Eva B ---- 2664
Adler, Solomon ---- 2811
Adloff, Richard ---- 2482
Advance ---- 2665
AFL (*See* American Federation of Labor.)
Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines ---- 2887, 2890
Agriculture Department. (*See* United States Department of Agriculture.)
Agricultural Adjustment Act ---- 2798
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) ---- 2797, 2798, 2802, 2803, 2821, 2875
Aid to Britain bill ---- 2677, 2688, 2689
Aid to Britain Today, War Tomorrow ---- 2680
Air Force (United States) ---- 2535, 2836
Akagi, Roy H ---- 2891
Alba Nuova ---- 2665
Alexander, Wallace M ---- 2511, 2610
Allen, B. C ---- 2622
Allen, Commodore ---- 2811
Allen, Ed ---- 2819
Allen, James S. (*See* Sol Auerbach.)
Allied Commission on Reparations (German Economics Group) ---- 2777
Allied Labor News Service ---- 2642, 2789, 2790
Allied Powers ---- 2672, 2673, 2675
All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Union) ---- 2638
All-India National Congress ---- 2638
Allport, Gordon W ---- 2358
Alsberg, Carl L ---- 2610, 2720
Alvin ---- 2624
AMCO. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council).)
Amerasia ---- 2542, 2543, 2574, 2575, 2713, 2725, 2835, 2887
American and the Soviet Union ---- 2583, 2587
America Faces Japan ---- 2588
America Holds the Balance in the Far East ---- 2511, 2512
American Civil Liberties Union ---- 2668, 2683, 2684
American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives ---- 2669
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans ---- 2524
American Committee for International Studies, Princeton University ---- 2585
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born ---- 2654
American Council on Education ---- 2584, 2585, 2587, 2588
American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) ---- 2480, 2567, 2602

Digitized by Google

Page
American Council on Soviet Relations (National Board) 2654, 2656
American Embassy (Bombay) 2638
American Embassy (Moscow) 2711, 2712, 2729
American Embassy (Mukden) 2554
American Embassy (Nanking) 2536, 2551
American Far East Policy 2476
American Federation of Labor (AFL) 2624, 2628, 2633, 2639, 2642, 2643, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2810, 2834
American Federation of Labor (Convention, 1923) 2665, 2666
American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations 2891
American Friends of the Chinese People 2597, 2662
American Friends Service Committee (China) 3502
American Geographical Society 2814, 2818
American Institute of African Relations 2819
American Institute of European Relations 2819
American Institute of International Relations 2814, 2819
American Institute of Latin American Relations 2819
American Institute of Middle East Relations 2819
American Institute of Pacific Relations (*see also* Institute of Pacific Relations American Council) 2477, 2480–2486, 2494, 2500, 2518, 2519, 2529, 2533
American Institute of World Affairs 2814, 2816, 1819
American League Against War and Fiscism 2596, 2654
American League for Peace and Democracy 2654
American Neutrality 2672
American Observer 2581
American Peace Mobilization 2654
American People's Fund 2652
American-Philippine Conference 2593
American Policy in the Far East 2587
American Policy Toward China 2504
American Quarterly on the Soviet Union 2605, 2707
American Red Cross 2624, 2834
American-Russian Institute (ARI) 2567–2571, 2574, 2577, 2604, 2629, 2655, 2707, 2742, 2817, 2882, 2883
American Society for Russian Relief 2669
American Technical Committee 2868
American Youth Congress 2655, 2658
Americas 2586
America's Economic Interests in the Far East 2580
America's Role in the Pacific 2580
America's Stake in the Far East 2587
Amerling, Saram 2774, 2791
Anderson, Miss 2646
Anderson, Howard W 2585, 2590
Andrews, Roy Chapman 2710
Anglo-American Alliance 2632, 2634
Anglo-American War 2637
Anti-American Agression Week 2556
Appleby, Paul H 2837
ARI. (*See* American-Russian Institute.)
Ariyoshi, Koji 2789
Armaments Year Book, 1936 (League of Nations) 2891
Armed Forces. (*See* United States Armed Forces.)
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish 2831, 2832, 2834
Armstrong Junior College 2585
Army. (*See* United States Army.)
Army Public Information Service 2771
Arndt, Christian 2521, 2776
Arosev, I. S 2706
Artic Periodical 2707
Ascher, Charles S 2684
Asiaticus. (*See* Hans Meuller.)
Askew, J. Thomas 2585
Atherton, Ray 2835

Digitized by Google

Page
ASTP (Army Services Training Program) 2590
Atlanta University 2658
Atlantic Charter 2839
Atlantic City Jamboree (The Socialist) 2643
Atlantic City UNRRA Conference 2868
Atlas of World Maps (ASTP) 2590
Auchter, E. C 2819
Auerbach, Sol (James S. Allen) 2876–2896
Austern, Miss Hilda 2511, 2589, 2593, 2610, 2624
Austin, Senator Warren R 2809, 2810, 2835, 2867
Australian Cabinet 2636
Australian Government 2556, 2636, 2679
Australian Institute of Pacific Relations 2728
Australian Labor Party 2636
Avco Manufacturing Co 2534, 2536, 2537
Axis 2604

B

Bacon, Mrs. Robert L 2567
Badeau, Dr. John 2582
Bagwell, May 2789
Baikal-Amur Railway 2592
Bain, Foster 2582, 2811
Baker, Frank E 2658
Baker, Newton D 2891
Baldwin, Roger 2667
Bales 2809, 2810
Banff Conference (I. P. R.) 2720
Bank of China 2544
Bank of Indochina 2527, 2632
Barnes, Joseph Fels 2518, 2583, 2584, 2587, 2600, 2613, 2701, 2702, 2720, 2784, 2785, 2811
Barnes, Kathleen 2518, 2599–2617, 2700, 2880
Barnett, Eugene E 2622, 2881
Barnett, Mrs. Robert (Pat) 2521, 2776
Barnett, Robert W 2486, 2511, 2512, 2518, 2625, 2776, 2832
Barrow, John 2521, 2676
Batt 2809
Battle of the Atlantic 2678
Battle of Russia 2737
Baudoin, Paul 2632
Bavarian Republic 2693
B. C. Federationist 2665
Beach, Joseph Warren 2658
Bean, Louis 2831, 2836
Bechover, M. R 2844, 2853, 2854
Beecroft, Eric 2521
Behind the Open Door 2579, 2581
Beloff, Max 2747
Belshaw, Horace 2488, 2590
Bennett, Martin 2791
Bentley, Elizabeth 2559, 2644, 2649, 2650, 2717, 2718, 2869, 2870
Berle, Adolf A., Jr 2626, 2809, 2831, 2835
Bernard, John T 2684
Bertram, James M 2891
Betts, Col. Thomas J 2836
Beukema, Herman 2590
Bevin, Ernest 2637, 2680
BEW. (*See* Board of Economic Warfare.)
Biddle, Francis 2883, 2887
Bidien, Charles 2789
Bidwell, Peroy W 2586, 2834
Big Five 2843
Big Four 2863
Big Three 2529, 2859

Digitized by Google

Page
Biggerstaff, Knight 2811
Bill of Rights 2657, 2683
Bingham 2609, 2615, 2616
Bishop, George H 2658
Bissell, General 2811
Bisson, T. A 2488, 2492, 2493, 2518, 2524, 2587, 2662, 2717, 2718, 2789, 2880, 2881, 2882
B. of L. E. Journal 2665
Blaisdell, Thomas C 2797, 2798
Bliss, Robert 2567
Blitzstein, Marc 2658
Bloch, Kurt 2517
Bloom, Sol 2676, 2835
Bloor, Mother Ella Reeve 2656
B'nai B'rith 2683
Board of Economic Warfare 2774, 2775, 2836, 2869
Board of Economic Welfare 2830
Boas, Franz 2657, 2658, 2684
Bogdanoff, General 2697
Bohlen 2729, 2859
Bolshevik Revolution 2516
Bolton, Mrs. Frances 2566, 2567, 2809
Book Review 2533
Bookings 2708
Borg, Dorothy 2523, 2585, 2627, 2634, 2639, 2689
Borodin, Michael 2592, 2699, 2719, 2720
Borton, Hugh 2867, 2868, 2869
Bostoko-begenie Institute 2721
Boudin, Leonard B 2475, 2479, 2484, 2495, 2658, 2780
Boudreau, Dr 2831
Bowman, Isaiah 2831, 2834, 2891
Boxer Rebellion 2555
Bradley, Lyman R 2658
Bradley, Philip 2585
Brand, Millen 2658
Brandt, William 2517
Bremman 2711, 2713
Bretton Woods and World Security 2887
Brill, Frank M 2636
British Army Field Service Regulations 2674
British Embassy (Moscow) 2711, 2712, 2729
British Gibraltar of the East 2632
British Government 2502, 2503, 2520, 2526, 2528–2531, 2538, 2548, 2553–2556, 2580, 2589, 2628, 2629, 2634, 2637, 2638, 2671–2681, 2684–2689, 2709, 2838, 2841, 2849–2851, 2856–2863, 2869.
British Parliament 2628
British Quakers 2736
Broek, Jan 2581
Brookline (Mass.) High School 2585
Brooklyn College 2659
Brookwood Labor College 2620
Browder, Earl 2661
Brown, Francis J 2585
Brown, Harold Chapman 2658
Brunauer, Esther Caukin 2595, 2831, 2867, 2868, 2869
Bryn Mawr College 2561
Bryson, Hugh 2789
Buchanan, Norman S 2523
Buck, Pearl S 2622
Bucyrus-Erie Co 2810

Digitized by Google

Page
Budenz, Louis Francis ---- 2475, 2559, 2621, 2644, 2650, 2661, 2690, 2744, 2745, 2747, 2894
Buell ---- 2831
Bulgarian Government ---- 2629
Bulletin of the Soviet Union ---- 2707
Bullitt, Ambassador William C ---- 2690
Bulwinkle, Alfred L ---- 2835
Burden, W. A. M ---- 2810
Burgum, Edwin Berry ---- 2658
Buriat Mongols ---- 2562
Burke-Wadsworth Conscription Bill ---- 2674
Burleigh ---- 2855
Burma ---- 2482
Burma Road ---- 2584, 2634
Butler, Nicholas Murray ---- 2814, 2818
Byas ---- 2809
Byrnes, James F ---- 2592, 2848, 2852, 2861, 2862

C

Cadbury, Mr ---- 2736
Cadbury Chocolate Interests ---- 2736
Cadogan, Sir Alexander ---- 2857
Cairo Conference ---- 2502, 2555
California Oil Worker ---- 2065
California Un-American Activities Fact Finding Committee ---- 2652
Calkins, Robert D ---- 2593, 2622
Callahan, James Morton ---- 2891
Call to Students ---- 2789
Canadian Government ---- 2556, 2679, 2685
Canadian Royal Commission Report ---- 2517
Canning, William ---- 2475
Cannon, Cavendish ---- 2835
Canokia Valley News ---- 2665
Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States ---- 2890
Carlisle Lumber Co ---- 2638
Carlson Court (London) ---- 2727
Carlson, Evans F ---- 2546, 2547, 2582
Carlson Marine Raiders ---- 2547
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ---- 2586, 2587, 2814, 2817, 2818, 2819, 2831, 2834
Carpenter Lumber Co ---- 2638
Carroll, Marie J ---- 2585
Carroll, William A ---- 2896
Carter, Bill ---- 2880
Carter, Edward C ---- 2512, 2517–2519, 2521, 2523, 2562, 2565–2568, 2582, 2588–2590, 2592–2594, 2601–2604, 2609, 2610, 2614–2616, 2621, 2622, 2626, 2645, 2646, 2700–2703, 2705, 2708–2711, 2713–2718, 2720, 2721, 2727, 2730, 2784, 2785, 2794, 2814, 2819, 2820, 2831, 2832, 2877–2884, 2887–2889, 2891
Carter, Margaret ---- 2521, 2714, 2776
Carter, Ruth ---- 2518, 2590, 2713, 2714, 2718
Carter, William D ---- 2518, 2521, 2590, 2776
Catholic Weekly ---- 2495
Central Chinese Government ---- 2543, 2544, 2545, 2551, 2552
Central Chinese Troops ---- 2524, 2547
Central Committee (China) ---- 2550
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ---- 2752, 2753, 2754, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2758, 2759, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2767, 2769, 2770, 2771, 2854
Chakalsky ---- 2723
Challenge to the Americas ---- 2586
Chamberlain, J. P ---- 2622, 2652
Chambers, Whittaker ---- 2621, 2803, 2821, 2855, 2870, 2875

Digitized by Google

Page
Chang, Chih-chung ---- 2549
Changing Status of the Cabinet in Japan ---- 2890
Chapman, Abraham ---- 2789
Charles, Allan E ---- 2622
Chatham House (London) ---- 2709, 2710
Chen, Han-seng ---- 2523, 2524, 2627, 2661, 2705, 2884, 2885, 2889, 2891, 2892
Chennault, Gen. Claire Lee ---- 2535
Chi, Chao-ting (Hansu Chan) ---- 2518, 2605–2607, 2661, 2805, 2806, 2807, 2808, 2812, 2891, 2892
Chi, Mrs. Chao-ting (Harriet Levine) ---- 2808, 2812
Chiang, Kai-shek ---- 2502, 2513, 2514, 2526, 2531, 2532, 2535, 2542, 2545, 2548, 2551, 2552, 2555, 2556, 2584, 2631, 2681, 2716, 2719
Chicago Daily News ---- 2574
Chicago University ---- 2585, 2834
Chien, Tuan-sheng ---- 2508
China ---- 2482, 2580
China Aid Council ---- 2524, 2544, 2646, 2656
China Aid Relief ---- 2656
China Crisis ---- 2541, 2544
China Defence League ---- 2524, 2544
China Defense Supplies ---- 2832
China at Work ---- 2891
China in Danger ---- 2681
China Institute of Pacific Relations ---- 2523
China Monthly Review ---- 2790
China Today ---- 2605, 2606, 2607, 2660, 2661, 2669, 2670
China Weekly Review ---- 2790
China Yesterday and Today ---- 2692
China's Advance from Defeat to Strength ---- 2890
China's Interest in Korea ---- 2557
China's Wartime Politics ---- 2492, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2512, 2533
Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction ---- 2555
Chinese Central Government ---- 2543, 2544, 2545, 2551, 2552
Chinese Central Troops ---- 2524, 2547
Chinese Communist Army ---- 2535, 2536, 2541, 2544, 2545, 2546–2548, 2550, 2556, 2557, 2631, 2634, 2681, 2695, 2788, 2789
Chinese Communist Labor Movement ---- 2539
Chinese Communist Party Democratic League ---- 2548
Chinese Democratic League ---- 2552
Chinese Embassy (Moscow) ---- 2729
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (American Committee) ---- 2669, 2791
Chinese Guerilla Troops ---- 2524, 2541, 2544, 2545, 2547, 2553
Chinese Language Summer School ---- 2506
Chinese National Military Council ---- 2545, 2631
Chinese Nationalist Army ---- 2524, 2535, 2536, 2538, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549
Chinese Nationalist Government ---- 2502, 2503, 2525, 2528, 2532, 2535, 2538, 2541, 2543, 2548, 2551, 2552, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2693, 2784, 2838, 2841
Chinese People's Republic ---- 2553, 2554
Chinese Revolution ---- 2719, 2720
Chinese-Soviet Treaty (1950) ---- 2555, 2557
Chinese Year Book ---- 2541
Chitral (SS) ---- 2614
Cholmeley, Elsie ---- 2789
Christian Front ---- 2683
Christian Science Monitor ---- 2542
Chu, Teh ---- 2542, 2689
Chu, Tong ---- 2789
Chungking Blockade ---- 2547
Church, Dr. Alfred ---- 2581
Churchill, Winston ---- 2737, 2861, 2862
CIA. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency.)
CIO. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
CIO News ---- 2620, 2625, 2634, 2641
City College (New York) ---- 2658, 2740, 2747
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) ---- 2810
Civil Liberties Union ---- 2663, 2668, 2683, 2684

Digitized by Google

Page
Civil Service Act ---- 2801
Civil Service Commission ---- 2781
Civil War in U. S. A ---- 2887, 2890
Clay ---- 2809
Clayton, William L ---- 2837
Clyde, Paul H ---- 2891
Cochran, William T ---- 2684
Coe, Frank V ---- 2626, 2832, 2867, 2868, 2869
Cohen, Lester ---- 2658
COI. (*See* Coordinator of Information.)
Coil, E. J ---- 2832
Colegrove, Kenneth W ---- 2515
Collective Security Book Review ---- 2662
College of the City of New York ---- 2658, 2740, 2747
Collins, Henry ---- 2595, 2596, 2799
Collins, Gen. J. Lawton ---- 2537
Columbia University ---- 2492, 2585, 2658, 2659, 2720, 2727, 2766, 2767, 2796, 2798
Comintern ---- 2695, 2699, 2719, 2721, 2723
Comment on State Capitalism and Socialism ---- 2887
Commerce Department. (*See* United States Department of Commerce.)
Commission for Investigation of War Crimes (UN) ---- 2857
Committee for Democratic Action ---- 2625
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (Lamont) ---- 2677
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy ---- 2650, 2655, 2661, 2690, 2788, 2789, 2792
Committee of Industrial Organizations. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
Committee on Materials for Teachers in International Relations ---- 2585, 2588
Commonweal ---- 2495
Commonwealth College (Mena, Ark.) ---- 2643
Communist ---- 2886
Communist Academy ---- 2699, 2700, 2701, 2702, 2703, 2709, 2723
Communist Chinese Army ---- 2535, 2536, 2541, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2550, 2556, 2557, 2631, 2634, 2681, 2695, 2738, 2739
Communist International ---- 2499, 2805, 2808, 2876, 2893, 2894, 2895
Communist Line ---- 2669
Communist Party ---- 2475–2478, 2482, 2483, 2494–2500, 2504, 2516, 2519, 2525–2544, 2548–2565, 2571–2573, 2584, 2600, 2601, 2606, 2621, 2631–2650, 2656, 2657, 2660–2698, 2702, 2706, 2708, 2717–2723, 2733–2736, 2744–2747, 2763–2769, 2774, 2775, 2786–2813, 2820–2822, 2832, 2855, 2869–2883, 2885, 2888, 2889, 2892–2895.
Communist Party (Argentina) ---- 2887
Communist Party (Branch 1, 5th Assembly District, New York) ---- 2650
Communist Party (China) ---- 2498, 2499, 2500, 2504, 2516, 2525, 2527, 2532, 2535, 2536, 2539, 2541, 2543, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2606, 2631, 2634, 2639, 2647, 2649, 2681, 2692, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2805.
Communist Party (German) ---- 2805
Communist Party (Korea) ---- 2717
Communist Party (New York State) ---- 2880
Communist Party (New York County Committee) ---- 2880
Communist Party (Russia) ---- 2483, 2694, 2719, 2723
Communist Party (United States) ---- 2475–2478, 2483, 2494–2500, 2540, 2559, 2564, 2565, 2572, 2573, 2584, 2600, 2601, 2621, 2637–2650, 2657, 2660–2669, 2690, 2733, 2734–2736, 2744, 2745, 2763–2769, 2774, 2775, 2786, 2787, 2792–2813, 2820–2822, 2832, 2855, 2869–2872, 2874, 2880, 2883, 2886, 2888.
Communist Party (Washington, D. C.) ---- 2806
Communist Political Association ---- 2661
Comstock, Miss Ada. (*See* Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein.)
Comte d'Etudes des Problems du Pacifique ---- 2714
Condliffe, John ---- 2582, 2831
Conference on World Organization ---- 2851, 2860, 2861
Congress. (*See* United States Congress.)

Digitized by Google

Page
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) ---- 2620, 2621, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2628, 2630, 2634, 2639, 2641, 2646, 2809, 2811, 2834
Congress Socialist Party (All-India National Congress) ---- 2638
Congressional Record ---- 2887
Connally, Senator Tom ---- 2835
Conscripting America ---- 2674, 2680
Consumers Council ---- 2798
Coons, Arthur ---- 2819
Cooper, J. C ---- 2810
Coordinator of Information ---- 2781, 2782, 2783, 2784, 2785, 2786, 2787, 2793
Coplon, Judith ---- 2854, 2855
Corbett, P. E ---- 2518
Corbett's Group ---- 2880
Cornell University ---- 2585
Coronado Conference ---- 2815, 2816, 2817, 2818, 2819
Cosmos Club ---- 2832
Costello ---- 2667, 2668
Costigan, Howard ---- 2684
Council of Foreign Affairs (Cleveland) ---- 2834
Council on Foreign Relations ---- 2814, 2815, 2817, 2818, 2819, 2831, 2834
Council for Pan-American Democracy ---- 2655
Council of People's Commissars of U. S. S. R. ---- 2727
Council on World Affairs ---- 2819
Court of Claims. (*See* United States Court of Claims.)
Coville, Lillian ---- 2521, 2776
Cox, Hugh ---- 2837
Coy, Mrs. Harold (Mildred Price) ---- 2524, 2529, 2643, 2644–2650
Coyl, John ---- 2831
Crawford, Bruce ---- 2658
Crawford, Kenneth ---- 2624, 2625
Cressey, George B ---- 2707, 2819
Crillon Hotel (Paris) ---- 2718
Crimean Conference ---- 2857, 2869
Cripps, Sir Stafford ---- 2518, 2616, 2882, 2883
Crisis in Mexico ---- 2886
Cromwell (*see* Sullivan & Cromwell) ---- 2519
Cross, Professor ---- 2613
Crow, Carl ---- 2781
Crown Colony of Hong Kong ---- 2553
Culbertson, Paul ---- 2835
Currie, Lauchlin ---- 2506, 2523, 2534, 2775, 2809, 2810, 2832, 2833, 2867, 2868, 2870
Curtin, John ---- 2636
Czarists Government ---- 2693

D

Dabney, Virginius ---- 2809, 2811
Daily News (Chicago) ---- 2574
Daily Worker ---- 2654, 2661, 2662, 2747, 2790, 2802, 2873
Dairy Farmers Union ---- 2636
Dana, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow ---- 2658
Daniel, Howard ---- 2589
Daniele ---- 2809
Danubian Conference ---- 2637
DAR. (*See* Daughters of the American Revolution.)
Darr, John, Jr ---- 2789
Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) ---- 2659
Davies, John P ---- 2486, 2489, 2535, 2753, 2754, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2758, 2759, 2760, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2765, 2766, 2767, 2768, 2769, 2770, 2771, 2840, 2854
Davies, Joseph E ---- 2567, 2741, 2755, 2831
Davis, Chester C ---- 2836
Davis, Morris ---- 2789
Davis, Norman H ---- 2834
Dawn ---- 2665
Deadlock in China ---- 2551, 2512
Dean, Arthur H ---- 2518, 2519, 2818
Dean, Vera Micheles ---- 2831

Digitized by Google

Page
Deane, Hugh Gordon ---- 2773, 2780–2791, 2793
Deaver, Judge Bascom ---- 2638
DeBaum, Capt. George H ---- 2836
DeCaux, Leonard ---- 2619–2643, 2809, 2811
DeLacy, Hugh ---- 2789
Delafield, Edward C., Jr ---- 2658
Democracy and Independence in the Philippines ---- 2887
Democratic League (China) ---- 2552
Democratic Party ---- 2628, 2683, 2835
Dennery ---- 2714
Dennett, Colgrove T ---- 2809
Dennett, Raymond ---- 2522, 2523, 2548, 2560, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2689, 2810
Dennett, Tyler ---- 2811
Dennison, Eleanor ---- 2885
Denny ---- 2729
Department of Labor. (*See* U. S. Department of Labor.)
Despres, Emile ---- 2626, 2832
Detroit Labor News ---- 2665
Deutsch ---- 2817
De Vinney, Leland D ---- 2523
DFU. (*See* Dairy Farmers Union.)
Diamond Workers Protective Union (AFL) ---- 2633
Dies Committee ---- 2657, 2658, 2683, 2684
Dies, Martin ---- 2872, 2873, 2874
Diet (Japanese) ---- 2628
Dillard, Maj. H. C ---- 2603, 2604
Dimanshtein, Mr ---- 2721, 2722
Documents on American Foreign Trade Relations ---- 2548
Dollard, Charles ---- 2566
Doorman, Eugene ---- 2810
Douglas DC–3's ---- 2730
Drama in China's Anti-Japanese Propaganda ---- 2546
Draper, Theodore ---- 2662
Dreiser, Theodore ---- 2657, 2658, 2684
Dubinsky, David ---- 2564, 2565
Du Bois, Cora ---- 2527
Du Bois, W. E. B ---- 2658, 2745, 2746
Duggan, Laurence ---- 2835, 2868, 2870
Dulles, Foster Rhea ---- 2579, 2581
Dulles, John Foster ---- 2737, 2864
Dumbarton Oaks Conference ---- 2837, 2838, 2841, 2842, 2843, 2849, 2857, 2858, 2860, 2868, 2869
Dunn, James Clement ---- 2809, 2835, 2859, 2862
Durdin ---- 2652
Durkin, James ---- 2789
Dutch Government ---- 2526, 2529, 2555

E

Earle, Edward M ---- 2585, 2831
Earnshaw, Miss Ruth ---- 2480
Eastern Bureau (Federated Press) ---- 2627–2639
East German Government ---- 2839
Eaton, Charles A ---- 2835
ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) ---- 2528
Eccles, Marriner ---- 2837
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) ---- 2528, 2555
Economic Defense of Latin America ---- 2586
Economic Geography of Southeast Asia ---- 2581
Ecuador Government ---- 2556
Eden ---- 2850, 2860, 2861, 2863
Edminster, Lynn R ---- 2837
Egyptian Government ---- 2556
Eighteenth Group Army ---- 2541, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2550
Eighth International Conference of American States ---- 2586
Eighth Route Army ---- 2541, 2544, 2545, 2550, 2631
Elections Mark Japan Change ---- 2789

Digitized by Google

Page
Electrical Worker 2665
Eliot, George Fielding 2673
Elliott, A. Randle 2586
Elliott, W. Y 2517
Embargo Battle Begins 2673
Embick, Lt. Gen. Stanley D 2836
Embree, Edwin R 2622
Emeny, Brooks 2622, 2814, 2816, 2819, 2834
Emerson, Rupert 2809, 2810
Emmerson, John K 2489, 2535
Emperor of Japan 2592, 2846
Emspak, Julius 2634
Engels 2887, 2890
En-lai, Chou 2553, 2556, 2557, 2695
Enlightened American Imperialism in the Philippines 2887
Ensor, R. C. K 2891
Epstein, Henry 2658
Epstein, Israel 2581, 2789
Eteenpain 2665
Ethiopian War 2671
European War 2517, 2520, 2637, 2671, 2672, 2846
Evans Building (Washington) 2595
Evans, Roger F 2523
Ewing, Dr 2819
Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) 2894
Export-Import Bank 2552
Eyester, Col. S 2770

F

Fairbank, John K 2506, 2507–2511, 2622, 2753, 2755, 2759, 2760, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2764, 2765, 2768, 2769, 2809, 2810.
Fairbank, Mrs. John K. (Wilma) 2508–2511, 2753, 2755, 2759, 2760, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2764, 2765, 2769, 2811
Fairchild, Henry Pratt 2684
Fairchild, Muir S 2836
Fairmount Hotel (San Francisco) 2843
Fanelli, Joseph A 2650
Far East 2488
Far East Briefs 2789
Far East Bulletin 2524, 2627
Far East Police (Russian) 2719
Far East Reading—Japan Diary 2789
Far Eastern Front in the War Against the Axis 2887
Far Eastern Review 2781
Far Eastern Spotlight 2690, 2789, 2792
Far Eastern Survey 2524, 2567, 2580, 2615, 2782, 2783, 2791, 2792, 2865, 2870
Far Eastern War 2520
Farley, Miriam S 2482, 2523, 2580, 2587, 2604, 2610, 2627, 2628, 2689, 2781, 2782, 2783, 2784
Farm Production for Defense 2887
Farm Research 2798
Farmers and the Struggle Against the War Program 2887
Fascists 2596, 2654, 2676, 2680, 2683
Faymonville, Col. Philip R 2518, 2811
FBI. (*See* Federal Bureau of Investigation.)
FCC. (*See* Federal Communications Commission.)
FEA. (*See* Foreign Economic Administration.)
Feary, Robert 2811
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 2752, 2753, 2754, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2769, 2803, 2821, 2822, 2864, 2875
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 2787, 2788
Federal Power Commission 2831, 2837
Federal Reserve System 2687, 2837
Federated Press 2627–2639, 2640, 2642, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667
Feis, Herbert 2832, 2835

Digitized by Google

Page
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt ---- 2491, 2511, 2512, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2605, 2606, 2610, 2615, 2616, 2622, 2643, 2652, 2662, 2709, 2713, 2720, 2730, 2789, 2804, 2809, 2811, 2813, 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880, 2881, 2882, 2883, 2888
Field, Olga ---- 2576
Field, W. B. Osgood, Jr ---- 2518
Finkelstein, Lawrence ---- 2867, 2868, 2870
First Act in China ---- 2891
First Workers Republic ---- 2682
First World War ---- 2629, 2658, 2666, 2682, 2834
Fischer, Louis ---- 2663
Fischl, Margaret ---- 2523
Fisher, Galen ---- 2622
Fisher, H. H. ---- 2748
Fisher, Welthy Honsinger ---- 2789
Fivefold Aid to Britain ---- 2689
Flexner, Abraham ---- 2658
Flood, Daniel J ---- 2534
Fluegel, Edna R. ---- 2823, 2825–2870
Flynn, Mr ---- 2852
Folsom, Franklin ---- 2658
Fong, H. D ---- 2832
Food Production and Distribution Administration ---- 2836
Forbes, W. Cameron ---- 2583
Forced Labor in the United States ---- 2890
Ford, James W ---- 2887
Fordham University ---- 2585, 2690
Foreign Affairs ---- 2834
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) ---- 2565, 2788
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) ---- 2624, 2775, 2777, 2793, 2810, 2868
Foreign Economic Administration (Intelligence) ---- 2624
Foreign Language Library ---- 2592
Foreign Policy Association ---- 2480, 2487, 2488, 2504, 2507, 2522, 2582, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2814, 2815, 2816, 2817, 2818, 2819, 2830, 2885
Foreign Service. (*See* U. S. Foreign Service.)
Forer, Joseph ---- 2599, 2644, 2733
Forer & Rein ---- 2595
Forman, Harrison ---- 2789
Fortune Magazine ---- 2488
Forward Bloc (All-India National Congress) ---- 2638
Fosdick, Dorothy ---- 2864
Foster, John ---- 2789
Foster, W. A ---- 2666
Foster, William Z ---- 2667
Four Power Declaration ---- 2841
Fox ---- 2831
Frank, Jerome ---- 2802
Free German Committee ---- 2839
Free Voice ---- 2665
Freeman, Kemper ---- 2811
Freeman, Mansfield ---- 2810
Freeman, Miller ---- 2811
Freeman, R. E ---- 2811
French Cabinet ---- 2716
French Government ---- 2503, 2520, 2526, 2527, 2529, 2538, 2555, 2629, 2672, 2673, 2676, 2683, 2684, 2689, 2716
Friedman, Irving ---- 2832
Friedman, Julian R ---- 2487, 2489, 2538, 2539, 2540
Friends of Democracy ---- 2681
Friends of the Soviet Union (National Committee) ---- 2655
Fry, Varian ---- 2586
Fujii, Shuji ---- 2789
Fulbright, J. W ---- 2809, 2810
Fulfillment of the Rio Pledges ---- 2887
Fulton, J. J ---- 2658
Furber, Holder ---- 2482
Fur Worker ---- 2665

Digitized by Google

G

Page
Galesburg Labor News 2665
Gandhi, Mahatma 2530, 2638
Gannett, Lewis 2658
Garland Fund 2667
Gayn, Mark 2789
Gelfan, Harriet Moore (Harriet Moore) 2518, 2559–2598, 2616, 2627, 2629, 2637, 2707–09, 2713, 2721, 2727, 2728, 2809, 2880, 2890, 2891
Geology of China 2518
George, Walter F 2835
Gerig, O. Benjamin 2867, 2868, 2870
Gerlach Talitha 2646, 2789
German Armies 2829
German Economics Group (Allied Commission on Reparations) 2777
German Foreign Office 2848
German Officers Corps 2839
German Policy of the Marshall Plan 2887
German-Soviet Trade Treaty 2574
Germany's Far Eastern Policy Under Hitler 2533
Gilchrist, Huntington 2622
Gilmore, Eddie 2592
Girdler 2684
Girdler's Republic Steel 2684
Girni Kamgar Textile Union 2638
Gladstone Hotel 2518
Glasser, Harold 2867, 2868, 2870
Goetz, Delia 2568
Goldwater, A. L 2658
Gollobin, Ira 2789
Gompers, Samuel 2665, 2668
Good Neighbors 2586
Goodrich, Carrington 2819, 2831
Gorelik, Mordecai 2658
Goshal, Kumar 2579, 2581, 2789
Gosnell, Charles 2585
Grady, Henry F. 2622, 2809, 2817
Grajdanzed, Andrew 2518, 2575, 2580, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2880
Grand Hotel (Auckland) 2715
Granich, Max 2660, 2609, 2670
Graves, Mortimer 2480, 2521, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2602, 2604, 2622, 2776, 2886
Graves, Mrs. Mortimer 2521, 2776
Great Soviet World Atlas 2703, 2705
Greater New York Industrial Council (CIO) 2646
Green, Miss 2720
Green, Joseph C. 2836
Green, William 2664, 2665
Greenberg, Michael 2587, 2625, 2626, 2749
Greene, Jerome D. 2613, 2614, 2622
Greenslade, J. W. 2622, 2811
Gregory 2612
Grew, Hon. Joseph C. 2566, 2809, 2810, 2811
Griffin, James 2896
Gromov 2592
Gromyko, Mr 2849, 2850, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2862
Gropper, William 2658
Grummon 2729
Guerrilla Chinese Troops 2524, 2541, 2544, 2545, 2547, 2553

H

Hackworth 2835
Haessler, Carl 2665, 2668
Haganower, Professor 2706
Hagelberg, Gerhard 2789
Hailey, Lord 2582

Digitized by Google

Page
Halifax, Lord ---- 2635, 2637, 2730
Halinan, Vincent ---- 2619, 2640, 2641
Hall, Russell ---- 2610, 2891
Hamada, Kenju ---- 2891
Hamilton Hotel ---- 2532
Hamilton, Maxwell ---- 2832
Hammer, Ellen ---- 2482
Hammett, Dashiell ---- 2657, 2658
Hammy's Consumers Division ---- 2643
Han, Ying (*see also* Hsiang Ying) ---- 2631
Handy, Elizabeth Grenn ---- 2819
Hankins, Frank H ---- 2658
Hansen, A ---- 2831, 2832
Hansen, Haldore ---- 2652, 2811
Hansen, O. C. ---- 2814, 2815
Hansu, Chan. (*See* Chao-ting Chi.)
Harmon, Francis S ---- 2511
Harondar, E. V ---- 2607–2609, 2721
Harper, Sam ---- 2518
Harriman, Averell ---- 2682
Harriman, Mrs. J. Borden ---- 2567
Harris-Seybold-Potter Co. ---- 2628
Harris, Thomas ---- 2817
Harrow, Benjamin ---- 2658
Harrow School ---- 2620
Harvard University ---- 2581, 2609, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2658, 2659, 2753
Hastwood, H. E ---- 2538
Havana Conference ---- 2584
Hawkins ---- 2835
Hayden, Albert C. Jr. ---- 2753, 2884, 2885
Hazard, John ---- 2518
Headgear Worker ---- 2665
Headline Book Series ---- 2587
Hearn, Lawrence ---- 2662
Helping Mussolini Win His War ---- 2671
Hendershot ---- 2522
Hepburn, Admiral Arthur J ---- 2836
Hersey, John ---- 2521, 2522
Herskovitz, Melville J ---- 2658
Hicks, Philip M ---- 2658
Hilldring ---- 2809
Hinckley, William W ---- 2658
Hinricks ---- 2831
Hiss, Alger ---- 2486, 2507, 2508, 2596, 2626, 2799, 2800, 2802, 2803, 2804, 2808, 2813, 2814, 2818, 2820, 2821, 2822, 2823, 2832, 2837, 2838, 2841, 2843, 2844, 2845, 2846, 2848, 2849, 2850, 2851, 2852, 2853, 2854, 2855, 2856, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2864, 2867, 2868, 2870.
Herald Tribune (New York) ---- 2550, 2552, 2557, 2658, 2737
Hiss-Chambers case ---- 2855
Hiss, Donald ---- 2508, 2803
Hiss Trials ---- 2802, 2821
History of the Colonial World Under Imperialism ---- 2694
History of Imperialism ---- 2694
History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East ---- 2891
History of the Peace Conference ---- 2709
History of the Russian Revolution ---- 2608, 2609
Hitler, Adolph ---- 2533, 2577, 2629, 2635, 2637, 2671, 2672, 2675, 2676, 2704, 2737, 2804, 2822
Hitler-Stalin Pact ---- 2577, 2671, 2675, 2676, 2804
Ho, P. H ---- 2832
Hochschild, Harold K ---- 2566
Hoffman, Ross ---- 2585
Holland, William L ---- 2482, 2494, 2506–2510, 2518, 2523, 2524, 2566, 2582, 2589, 2593,–2595, 2604, 2646, 2705, 2713, 2715, 2717, 2719, 2721, 2730, 2743, 2794, 2831, 2880, 2888, 2891

Digitized by Google

Page
Hommel, Rudolph P 2891
Honig, Charlotte 2789
Hoover, Herbert 2555
Hoover Institute (Stanford University) 2740, 2748
Hoover, Kenneth E 2658
Hopkins, Mr 2528, 2862
Hornbeck, Stanley K 2809, 2810, 2832, 2835
Hoskins 2820
Hot Springs Conference (Institute of Pacific Relations) 2486, 2490, 2622
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2835
House Committee on Un-American Activities 2777, 2802, 2822, 2871, 2872, 2874, 2878
House of Representatives (United States) 2540, 2810
Houston Foreign Policy Association 2810
Howard 2809
Howard University 2659
Howe, Fred 2885
Howie, Janet K 2627, 2635
Hrdlicka, Mr 2729
Hsu, Yung-ying 2645, 2646, 2647, 2649, 2891
Huggins, G. Ellsworth 2622
Hull, Cordell 2783, 2828, 2830, 2834, 2835, 2841, 2842, 2858, 2865
Human Exploitation in the United States 2890
Human Factors in Cotton Culture 2890
Human Geography of the South 2890
Hume, Joy 2593
Humelsine, Carlisle H 2534, 2539
Hungarian Republic 2693
Hunt, Erling M 2585
Hunt, Henry T 2684
Hunter, Croyle 2810
Huntington, Ellsworth 2658
Hurley, Patrick J 2488, 2548

I

Illinois Industrial Review 2665
Illinois Miner 2665
Illinois University 2659
Imes, William Lloyd 2659
Imperialist Division of the World 2705
India 2482
India-American Relations Conference 2497
India and the United States 2529, 2534
India Government Trade Commissioner (New York) 2480
Indian Council of World Affairs 2493, 2494
Indian Government 2531, 2556, 2679
Indian Trade Union Congress 2638
Indochina 2482
Indochina Bank 2527, 2632
Indonesia 2482
Indonesian Nationalists 2527
Industrial solidarity 2665
Industrial worker 2665
(IWW) Industrial Workers of the World 2667
Industrialisti 2665
Informational conference, relief and rehabilitation program (United Nations) 2595
Inner Asian frontiers of China 2724
In North Korea 2789
Institute of Economics (Moscow) 2723, 2728, 2730
Institttue of Nationalities 2721
Institute of National Minorities 2721
Institute of Oceanography (U. S. S. R.) 2611, 2614, 2615, 2723
Institute of Oriental Languages (Leningrad) 2691
Institute of Oriental Study 2699

Digitized by Google

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations ..... 2477–2494, 2500, 2506–2511, 2516–2532, 2546, 2560–2596, 2600–2616, 2619–2646, 2651–2655, 2669, 2689, 2692, 2698–2703, 2707–2721, 2727–2730, 2739–2744, 2749, 2771, 2774–2794, 2804–2820, 2832, 2846, 2854, 2855, 2865–2870, 2877–2895.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 2511, 2522, 2523, 2566, 2567, 2571, 2580, 2581–2583, 2588, 2589, 2593, 2608–2613, 2615, 2616, 2623–2640, 2652, 2692, 2707, 2710, 2828, 2809–2811, 2820, 2870, 2884
Institute of Pacific Relations (Australian Council) 2728
Institute of Pacific Relations (Bay Region Group) 2580, 2582, 2583, 2622
Institute of Pacific Relations (China) 2523, 2647
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hawaii Council) 2720
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference) 2486, 2490, 2622, 2623
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat) 2509
Institute of Pacific Relations (Mount Tremblant, 8th Conference) 2626, 2739, 2742, 2744
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York Research Staff) 2488, 2580, 2582
Institute of Pacific Relations (Ninth International Conference) 2522
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 2593, 2810, 2870
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine-American Council) 2886
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine Council) 2718
Institute of Pacific Relations (Prouts Neck Conference) 2820, 2830, 2831
Institute of Pacific Relations (Sixth Conference) 2891
Institute of Pacific Relations (U. S. S. R.) 2607–2609, 2611, 2612, 2615, 2701, 2707, 2710, 2711–2714, 2728–2730
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington Office) 2582, 2593, 2625, 2643, 2774
Institute of World Politics and World Economics 2729
International (Communist Party) 2499
International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers (AFL) 2639
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL) 2628
International Labour Office 2728
International Migration Service 2831
International Publishers 2877, 2878, 2883, 2887
International Relations Office 2583
International Research Committee 2730, 2888
International Research Series 2581
International Seamen's Union 2667
International Secretariat (IPR) 2509, 2576, 2577, 2728, 2742, 2744
International Union of Academies 2568
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (CIO) 2639
Iowa Farm and Labor News 2665
IPR in Wartime 2579, 2583
Isaacs, Harold R 2483, 2607
Isbrandtsen Steamship Line 2528
Ito, Prince 2891
IUMMSW. (*See* International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.)
Izvestia 2719, 2840

J

Jackson, Gardner 2684
Jaffe, Philip 2789, 2811, 2812, 2881, 2882
James, Grace 2891
James, Roy 2522, 2809
Janeway, Eliot 2891
Japan 2482
Japan and Asia's Captive Colonies 2580
Japan in the Philippines 2887
Japan's Foreign Relations (1542–1936) 2891
Japan's War Hunger 2891
Japanese Army 2544, 2545, 2547, 2549, 2680, 2716, 2847
Japanese Diet 2628
Japanese Emperor 2592, 2846
Japanese Foreign Office 2682
Japanese Government 2503, 2516, 2519, 2520, 2544, 2546, 2550, 2555, 2557, 2634, 2679, 2708, 2784, 2847

Digitized by Google

Page
Japanese in Hawaii 2581
Japanese in the United States 2581
Japanese-Manchukuo Troops 2574, 2718
Japanese Navy 2716, 2847
Japanese Naval Base (Rashin) 2716
Japanese Naval Blockade 2679
Japanese Public Library System 2792
Jebb, Sir Gladwyn 2849, 2850, 2860
Jefferson School of Social Science 2540, 2747
Jenkins, Shirley 2482, 2521, 2523, 2776
Jenkinson, Anthony 2642
Jessup, Philip C 2476, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2500, 2511, 2518, 2533, 2585, 2623, 2626, 2727, 2746, 2794, 2809, 2810, 2811, 2831, 2868, 2869, 2870
Jeffe, S. S 2703
Johansen, C. E 2789
Johns Hopkins University 2517, 2589, 2834
Johnson Act 2673, 2676, 2677
Johnson, Charles S 2890
Johnson, Guy B 2876
Johnson, Luther A 2835
Johnston, Eric 2809, 2834
Johnstone, Anne 2831
Johnstone, William C 2523, 2580, 2582, 2588, 2594, 2809, 2810, 2811, 2831
Joint Army-Navy Exercises 2538
Joint Chiefs of Staff 2833, 2836, 2842
Joint Strategic Survey Committee 2836
Jones, Jesse 2837
Jones, Marvin 2836
Jordan, L. J 2880
Josephy, Robert 2659
Judd, Rita 2789
Judd, Hon. Walter H 2809, 2810
Justice Department. (*See* U. S. Department of Justice.)

K

Kaiser 2809
Kamanev 2741
Kamagar, Girni (Textile Union) 2638
Kantorovich, Mr. A 2608, 2609, 2700, 2708, 2709, 2715
Kattenburg, Paul M 2482
Kechtunan, Professor 2710
Keeney, Mrs. Mary Jane 2521, 2773–2780, 2791
Keeney, Philip Olin 2789, 2791–2794
Keesing 2809
Kemenov 2592
Kennan, George 2515
Kennard, J. Spencer 2789
Kennedy, Capt. Malcolm D 2891
Kennedy, Van Dusen 2659
Kent, Rockwell 2657, 2659
Kepner, Tyler 2585
Keppel 2831
Kewanee Manufacturing Co 2639
Keynes, John Maynard 2687
KGEI (San Francisco) 2787
Kindelberger, Charles 2832
King, Prime Minister 2674, 2832
Kingsbury, John A 2659
Kirk, Grayson 2809, 2811
Kizer, Benjamin H 2511, 2581, 2622, 2809, 2810, 2819
Kizer, Carolyn 2523
Knopf, Alfred A 2481
Know Your Enemy 2580
Knox, Miss Lucy 2719, 2720
Kober, Arthur 2659
Kohlberg, Alfred 2690

Digitized by Google

Page
Kokusai Hotel (Seishin) 2716, 2717
Konoye, Prince 2716
Koo, Wellington 2716, 2859
Koo, Wellington 2716, 2859
Korea 2482, 2580
Korean Crisis and the United Nations 2482, 2556
Korean war 2557, 2821
Korn, Capt. V. E 2836
Kramer, Charles 2799, 2800, 2803, 2875
Krasavtsev 2712
Kremlin 2498, 2867
Krivitsky, Charles 2803, 2875
Kroner, Hayes A 2836
Krushinitsky 2730
Ku, General Cho-tung 2631
Ku Klux Klan 2683
Kullak 2720
Kuomintang Government 2501, 2502, 2514, 2516, 2525, 2532, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2548–2557, 2631, 2639, 2693, 2719
Kuomintang-Soviet-Chinese Communist Alliance 2551
Kurihara, Kenneth 2581

L

Labor Advocate (Racine) 2665
Labor Advocate (Tacoma) 2665
Labor Age 2665
Labor in China 2581
Labor Herald 2665
Labor Journal 2665
Labor in the Philippines 2581
Labor Leader 2665
Labor Unity 2665
Laisve 2665
Lamont, Corliss 2657, 2659, 2881, 2882
Lamont, Thomas W 2677
Lancaster, William W 2518, 2566
Land of the Soviets 2652, 2653
Landon, Kenneth 2624, 2653
Lane, Clayton 2494, 2518, 2519, 2651, 2652
Langdon, William R 2717
Lanphier, Col. Thomas G 2836
Lardner, Ring W 2659
Lasker, Bruno 2523, 2580, 2595, 2611, 2707, 2708, 2720, 2886
Latourette, K. S 2891
Lattimore, Owen 2476, 2482, 2497, 2512, 2513, 2514–2518, 2522, 2532, 2582, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2608, 2622, 2702, 2703, 2711, 2712, 2717, 2718, 2719, 2720, 2721, 2722, 2724, 2725, 2726, 2730, 2735, 2749, 2794, 2810, 2812, 2877, 2880, 2892
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) 2482, 2513, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2692, 2776
Laurent 2714
Laves, Walter C 2585
Lavietes, Paul H 2659
Leaftad, Catherine 2789
League of American Writers 2658
League of Nations 2584, 2671, 2702, 2716, 2862, 2891
League of Nations Association 2582
League of Polish Patriots 2839
Leaning 2880
Lease-Lend Dictatorship 2676
Lederer, Emil 2891
Lee, J. S 2518
Lee, Kan 2832
Lee, Michael 2626
Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick 2716
Lend Lease Act 2679, 2676

Digitized by Google

Page
Lenin Library 2592
Lenin, Vladimir I 2517, 2572, 2592, 2693, 2694, 2698, 2702, 2703, 2705, 2729, 2890
Leningrad University 2691
Letting Britain Down 2679
Levanevsky & Co 2611
Levi, M 2659
Levine, Harriet (Mrs. Chao-Ting Chi) 2808, 2812
Levy 2714
Lew, Daniel 2589
Li, Ssu-kuang 2518
Library of Congress 2568, 2698, 2792, 2793, 2833, 2834, 2836
Library of International Relations 2583
Lie, Trygve 2556
Life Looks at China 2544
Life Magazine 2505, 2544
Lim, Dr 2524
Limits of Land Settlement 2891
Lindbergh 2730
Lind, Andrew 2581
Lindgren, Dr 2710
Lindsay, Michael 2543, 2643, 2789
Lippmann, Walter 2552, 2557, 2735, 2809, 2811
Li-sian, Li 2694, 2695
Lismore Hotel (New York) 2656
Little, Herbert 2819
Little, Maj. H. S 2566
Litvinoff 2730
Liu, Shao-chi 2557
Llano Colonist 2665
Lochner, Louis 2666
Lockwood, W. W 2518, 2560, 2562, 2585, 2587, 2602–2604, 2610, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2642, 2643, 2652, 2783, 2784, 2785, 2830, 2880, 2883, 2884, 2887
Loeb, Philip 2659
Lohia, Rammanohar 2891
London Daily Herald 2666
London School of Economics 2721
Long, Breckinridge 2835
Long March 2695
Look at Latin America 2586
Loomis, Charles F 2523, 2622, 2718, 2720, 2811
Lorwin, Lewis L 2642, 2831
Lorwin, Val 2642
Losovsky, Mr 2590, 2592, 2593, 2723, 2727, 2729
Love, J. B 2659
Loveday, A 2831
Lovett, Robert Morss 2659, 2684
Lowdermilk 2509
Loyalty Board (State Department) 2487, 2854
Lubin 2831
Lucas, Scott W 2835
Luce, Henry R 2622, 2809
Ludden, Raymond P 2535, 2717
Lunghai Railway 2544
Luxury or Liberty 2669, 2680, 2684
Lynd, Robert S 2518, 2684, 2881, 2882

M

Ma, Yin-tsu 2524
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 2535, 2544–2557, 2738
MacKay, J. A 2810
MacLeish, Archibald 2836
Macmillian, Publishers 2529
MacMurray, John Van A 2835
MacNair 2809
Magidoff, Nila 2583

Digitized by Google

Page
Mahindra, K. C---- 2582
Maillart, Ella---- 2891
Maki, John M---- 2482
Malin, Patrick M---- 2831
Malinowski---- 2721
Malisoff, William M---- 2659
Mallik, H. S---- 2480
Maltz, Albert---- 2659
Manchu Dynasty---- 2555
Manchukuoan Government---- 2708, 2716
Mandel, William Marx---- 2483, 2733–2749
Manhattan Telephone Book---- 2880
Manual on the Panama Canal---- 2613
Mao, Tse-tung---- 2505, 2542, 2548, 2551, 2717
March of Labor---- 2619, 2640–2641
Marine Raiders (Carlson)---- 2547
Marine Transport Workers---- 2667
Maritime Commission---- 2678
Maritime Labor Herald---- 2665
Markus---- 2728, 2730
Marshall, Gen. George C---- 2519, 2548, 2549, 2652
Marshall Mission---- 2548
Marshall Offensive for Imperializing the Ruhr---- 2887
Marshall Plan---- 2887
Martin, Charles E---- 2622, 2819
Marx, Karl---- 2551, 2572, 2607, 2693, 2694, 2698, 2703, 2705, 2801, 2887, 2890
Mason, Mr---- 2874
Massachusetts Institute of Technology---- 2659
Massing, Hede (Mrs. Paul Massing)---- 2559, 2822, 2870, 2894
Mather, Kirtley F---- 2659
Mathews, Mr---- 2845
Matsamura---- 2717
Matthews, Mr---- 2872, 2873, 2874
Maxted, Edward G---- 2659
May, Stacey---- 2481, 2818, 2831
Mayala---- 2482
McCann, Colonel---- 2518
McCarthy, Joseph R---- 2746
McConaughy, James L---- 2622
McCormick, Ann O'Hare---- 2832, 2834
McCoy, Gen. Frank---- 2522, 2622, 2811
McCulloch, John I. B---- 2586
McCune, Shannon---- 2482
McInnis, Edgar---- 2891
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred---- 2622
McWilliams, Carey---- 2581, 2684
M-Day---- 2674
Meet the Soviet Citizen---- 2663
Meiji Restoration---- 2702
Mencken, H. L---- 2659
Menefee, Selden---- 2521, 2776, 2809
Menefee, Mrs. Selden (Audrey)---- 2521, 2776
Menzies, Robert G---- 2635, 2636
Metropole Hotel (Moscow)---- 2714, 2718
Metropolitan Broadcasting Co---- 2521, 2776
Meyer, Catharine---- 2659
Meyer, Peter---- 2529, 2534
Miami Valley Socialist---- 2665
Michigan University---- 2480, 2659
Middle Powers---- 2592
Midwest Labor News---- 2665
Mikhailov---- 2592
Miller, J. Clayton---- 2546
Miller, J. I---- 2603, 2604
Mills, Harriet---- 2523
Mills Institute---- 2817

Digitized by Google

Page
Mills, Sol 2646
Milwaukee Leader 2665
Ming, Li 2832
Ming, Yui 2729
Minh, Ho Chi 2553, 2557
Ministry of Economic Affairs Bulletin 2646
Minneapolis Labor Review 2665
Minnesota Union Adovcate 2665
Minnesota University 2658
Minor 2809
Minseito 2628
Mitchell, Kate 2579, 2581, 2718, 2891
Mitrany 2891
Mitsubishi 2628
Mitsui 2628
Mixed Frontier Commission (Japanese) 2697
Modern Age Books 2658
Moffat, Abbot Low 2521, 2776, 2810
Moffat, Mrs. Abbot Low 2521, 2776
Mollegan, A. T 2684
Molotov 2635, 2637, 2729, 2849, 2850, 2860, 2863
Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet 2482
Mongolian Government 2724
Mongolian People's Army 2724
Mongolian People's Republic 2722
Mooney, Tom 2665
Moore, Harriet. (*See* Harriet Moore Gelfan.)
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr 2837
Morris, Lawrence 2622
Moscow Conference 2828, 2841
Moscow Daily News 2719, 2720
Mosely, Philip E 2523
Motylev, V. E 2590, 2697, 2698, 2703, 2705, 2706, 2711, 2712, 2713, 2715, 2727, 2728, 2729, 2730
Mont Tremblant Conference (IPR) 2626, 2739, 2742, 2744
Mueller, Hans (Asiaticus) 2890, 2891
Mueschke, Paul 2659
Muhle 2518, 2880
Munson, Lyle A 2751, 2771, 2854
Murby, T 2518
Murphy 2652
Murray, Philip 2321, 2834
Murray, Wallace A 2835
Museum of Western Art (Moscow) 2730
Mussolini, Benito 2671

N

NAACP. (*See* National Association for Advancement of Colored People.)
Nanking Government 2545, 2702
Narkomindel 2729
Nation 2651, 2659, 2661, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 2681, 2684, 2688
National Association for Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 2769, 2683
National Board (Politburo) 2562
National City Bank 2810
National Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners 2655
National Committee of Friends of the Soviet Union 2655
National Congress (China) 2550
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship 2655, 2656
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 2638
National Mediation Board 2639
National Military Council (China) 2545, 2631
National Military Establishment Officials 2538
National Planning Association 2831

Digitized by Google

Page
National Recovery Administration (NRA) 2643
National Resources Planning Board 2601, 2602
National Students League 2795, 2796, 2874, 2875
Nationalist Chinese Army 2524, 2535, 2536, 2538, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549
Nationalist Chinese Government 2502, 2503, 2525, 2528, 2532, 2535, 2538, 2541, 2543, 2548, 2551, 2552, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2693, 2784, 2838, 2841
Navy (United States) 2487, 2538, 2555, 2556, 2593, 2749, 2787, 2830, 2833, 2836
Nazi Party 2532, 2546, 2655, 2673, 2674, 2677, 2680, 2683, 2685, 2688, 2783, 2804
Nazi-Soviet Pact 2655, 2684, 2804
Negro Question in the United States 2887, 2890
Negroes in a Soviet America 2887
Nehru, Jawaharlal 2530, 2531, 2556, 2638
Neumann, Heinz 2805
Neutrality Act 2672, 2673, 2676
Never Let the Right Hand Know 2789
Newark Leader 2665
New Armory Building (Washington) 2604
New Century Publishers 2889
New China's Economic Policy 2789
New Conspiracy Against China 2679
New Defense Frontier 2674
New Delhi Conference 2789
New Fourth Army 2541, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548–2550, 2631, 2634, 2681
New Leader 2529
New Majority 2665
New Masses 2657, 2658, 2662, 2663, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 2682, 2887
Newsletter (China Defense League) 2524
New Republic Magazine 2542, 2659
New Role of China 2886
New Stage in the Far East 2887
New War Economy 2887
New York Bar 2775
New York Call 2665
New York City School System 2478, 2479, 2480, 2585, 2740
New York Daily Compass 2780
New York Herald Tribune 2550, 2552, 2557, 2658, 2737
New York Polytechnic Institute 2659
New York Public Library 2873
New York Telephone Company 2880
New York Times 2549, 2729, 2737, 2746, 2834
New York University 2585, 2658, 2659
New Zealand Government 2679
Niles, David 2833, 2836
Nimitz, Admiral Chester 2530
Nine-Power Treaty 2584
Ninth Army 2631
Ninth International Conference (IPR) 2522
Nixon 2809
NKVD 2695, 2696, 2697, 2706, 2710, 2711
NLRB. (*See* National Labor Relations Board.)
Noble, William S 2659
Noel-Baker, Philip 2891
Norfolk & Western Railroad 2639
Norman, Herbert 2518
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy 2656
North Atlantic Institute 2820
North Carolina University 2890
North China Daily News 2718
North China Front 2543
North China Railway Network 2551
North China Unconquered 2545
North Korean Forces 2556, 2738, 2739
North Pacific Fisheries 2611
Northwest Airlines 2810
Northwestern University 2658
Norway Invasion 2673

Digitized by Google

Page
Norwegian Government 2556
Notestein, Mrs. Ada Comstock (Miss Ada Comstock) 2511, 2610, 2622, 2811
Notestein, Frank W 2811
Notter, Harvey A 2827, 2831
Noyes, Katherine Macy 2659
Noyes, Laboratory of Chemistry 2659
Noyes, William Albert 2659
NRA (*see* National Recovery Administration) 2643
Ny Tid 2665

O

Oakie, John H 2580
Oasis Interdites 2891
O'Connor, Harvey 2659
Odlum 2809
Office of Education (United States) 2521
Office of Naval Research 2749
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 2624, 2793
Office of War Information (OWI) 2509, 2810
Office of War Mobilization 2836
OFRRO 2595
Ohashi 2717
Oklahoma Leader 2665
Olive, Col. James F 2836
Olmstead, General 2488
One Big Union Bulletin 2665
OPC 2753, 2758, 2771
Oriental Institute (Leningrad) 2697
Ornitz, Sam 2659
O'Sheel, Shaemas 2659
OSS. (*See* Office of Strategic Services.)
Our Far Eastern Record 2512, 2580, 2587
OWI (Office of War Information) 2509, 2810
Oxford University 2620
Oxford University Press 2588
Ozet 2722

P

Pacco (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations Pacific Council) 2593
Pacific Affairs 2513, 2517, 2518, 2546, 2567, 2605, 2607, 2700, 2701, 2702, 2703, 2713, 2719, 2720, 2791, 2865, 2869, 2876, 2877, 2884, 2885, 2890.
Pacific Front in the Global War 2887
Pacific Institute (U. S. S. R.) 2590, 2709, 2710, 2711, 2712, 2713, 2715, 2728
Pakh 2717
Pakistan 2482
Palmer's Peoples Press 2643
Panama Canal Manual 2613
Panay Incident 2584
Panvor 2665
Parker, Harriet H 2523
Parker, Philo W 2511, 2622, 2810
Parsons, Katrine 2566, 2567, 2590
Pasvolsky, Leo 2828, 2831, 2832, 2835, 2837, 2859
Paul, Elliot 2658, 2659
Paul, Rodman W 2891
Pauley, Mr 2791, 2794
Pauley Reparations Commission 2794
Pauley Report 2791
Pearl Harbor 2583, 2829
Peffer 2717, 2718
Peking Government 2553
Pelzer, Karl 2521, 2776
Pelzer, Mrs. Karl 2521, 2776
Pence, Capt. H. L 2809, 2811, 2836

Digitized by Google

Page
Pennsylvania Railroad 2667
Pennsylvania University 2876
Pennsylvania Worker 2665
Peoples Army (China) 2546
People's China 2557
People's Council 2666
Peoples Liberation Army 2550
Peoples Voice 2665
Pepper, Claude 2800, 2835
Perkins, Miss Frances 2837
Perkins, G. W 2664, 2665, 2668
Perkins, Milo 2831, 2836
Perlo, Victor 2799
Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution 2607
Peterson, J. Hardin 2835
Pflamm, Irving 2781
Philippine Emergency 2587
Philippine Problem Enters a New Phase 2887
Philippines 2482, 2580
Phillips, J. W 2660
Phillips, William 2582
Pickens, William 2659
Pickett, Clarence 2831
Pickford, Mary 2730
Pierson, W. L 2832
Pinchot, Mrs. Gifford 2567
Plebe 2665
Policy of Anti-Soviet Encirclement 2887
Polish Government 2839
Polithuro. (*See* National Board.)
Political Affairs 2886, 2887, 2889
Political Bureau (China) 2550
Political Consultative Conference (Kuomintang) 2548, 2549
Political Problems Subcommittee 2852
Pope Pius XII 2834
Poppe, Nicholas N 2691–2731
Porter, Alan 2659
Porter, Catherine 2521, 2580, 2581, 2587, 2604, 2610, 2624, 2627, 2633, 2776
Posti, Professor 2710
Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 2826, 2833, 2867, 2868
Postwar Planning Committee 2852
Potsdam Conference 2555
Potter, Pittman 2831
Powell, Ifor B 2590, 2591
Pratt, Mrs. Eliot 2518, 2882
Pratt, Sir John 2582
Pravda 2719, 2839, 2840
Preface to Peasantry 2890
President's Advisory Commission 2832
President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees 2831
President's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 2830, 2832, 2833, 2836, 2837, 2838, 2852
President's Committee on War Relief Appeals 2831
Pressman, Lee 2620, 2799, 2801, 2802, 2808, 2809
Prestiz, Mr 2663
Price, Ernest B 2523, 2580, 2583, 2811
Price, Harry 2518, 2832, 2881, 2882
Price, Mildred (Mrs. Harold Coy) 2524, 2529, 2643, 2644–2650
Prince Igor Book 2708
Princeton Conference 2728
Princeton University 2585, 2658, 2659, 2728, 2820
Princeton University Press 2577
Private Manufacture of Armaments 2891
Problem of Japan 2891
Problems of the Pacific 2721, 2891

Digitized by Google

Page
Producers' News ---- 2665
Progress of Pan American Cooperation ---- 2586
Prologue to the Liberation of the Negro People ---- 2886
Prosveta ---- 2665
Public Affairs Committee ---- 2650
Public Library of New York ---- 2873
Putnam, Israel ---- 2659
Pyke, R ---- 2891

Q

Queens College ---- 2585
Quezon ---- 2884, 2885, 2887
Quezon and the Philippines ---- 2887
Quigley, Harold S ---- 2891

R

Radius, Walter ---- 2581
Radnik ---- 2665
Railroad Amlgamation Advocate ---- 2665
Railway Clerk ---- 2665
Rajchman's China Report ---- 2702
Rajchman, Ludwig ---- 2589, 2702, 2832
Raper, Arthur ---- 2890
Raushenbush, Joan ---- 2586
Raushenbush, Stephen ---- 2831
Rautenstrauch, Walter ---- 2659
Raw Materials in Peace and War ---- 2891
Rea, Gardner ---- 2659
Read, T. T ---- 2891
Red Cross ---- 2624, 2834
Red Mongolian Army ---- 2724, 2818
Red Star Over China ---- 2891
Redmond, Roland ---- 2814
Refregier, Anton ---- 2659
Reich ---- 2685
Rein, David ---- 2559, 2595, 2619
Reischauer, Edwin O ---- 2527, 2611, 2809
Remer, C. A ---- 2809, 2810, 2832
Rene, Mr ---- 2818
Republic Steel ---- 2684
Republican Party ---- 2554, 2628, 2835
Resources and Trade of Central America ---- 2586
Reuther, Walter P ---- 2834
Revolution and Nationality ---- 2721
Revolution in Chinese Legal Thought ---- 2890
Revolutionary East ---- 2694
Rhoads, Charles J ---- 2610
Richmond Hotel (Geneva) ---- 2712
Riefler, Winfield ---- 2831
Rigland ---- 2831
Ringwalter, Mr ---- 2489
Roar, China, Roar ---- 2807
Robertson, Mr ---- 2528
Robeson, Paul ---- 2659, 2789
Robinson, Earl ---- 2659
Rock, Nathan ---- 2789
Rockefeller Foundation ---- 2481, 2482, 2493, 2494, 2523, 2613, 2614, 2817, 2870
Rockefeller Foundation Confernce on Slavic Studies ---- 2568
Rockefeller, John D. III ---- 2566, 2567, 2568
Rockefeller, Nelson A ---- 2836
Roe, Wellington ---- 2659
Roerich ---- 2710
Rohrbough, Edward ---- 2789
Roosevelt, Mrs ---- 2582, 2831

Digitized by Google

Page
Roosevelt, President 2628, 2657, 2658, 2672, 2674, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2682, 2683, 2684, 2685, 2737, 2791, 2827, 2828, 2829, 2830, 2831, 2834, 2835, 2836, 2838, 2840, 2844, 2849, 2850, 2851, 2852, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2862, 2863, 2868, 2869, 2890.
Roosevelt Hotel (New York) 2689
Rosecrans, W. S 2622
Rosinger, Lawrence K 2475–2557, 2881, 2882
Rosinski, Herbert 2890, 2891
Ross, John 2867
Roth, Andrew 2487, 2624, 2627, 2632, 2638, 2813
Rothwell, Easton 2843
Rowe, David N 2819
Rowell, Chester 2622
Roxby, P. M 2891
Royal Institute of International Affairs 2817
Rubin, Rose 2518, 2592, 2881, 2882
Runes, I. T 2633
Rusk, Dean 2870
Russell, Francis 2477, 2537
Russell, Miss Maude 2690, 2789
Russia 2483, 2501, 2504, 2505, 2516–2520, 2525, 2532, 2536, 2541, 2543, 2548–2557, 2562–2578, 2583, 2584, 2589, 2592, 2607, 2608, 2616, 2629, 2634, 2637, 2654–2656, 2667, 2671–2679, 2682, 2684, 2691–2713, 2716–2731, 2734–2744, 2804, 2838–2851, 2856–2864, 2867, 2889, 2895.
Russian Academy of Scientists 2699
Russian Economic Institute 2569
Russian Far East Police 2719
Russian Foreign Office 2710
Russian Information Bureau 2723
Russian Language School (IPR, 1936) 2613, 2614
Russian Red Army 2724
Russian Research Institute (Harvard) 2753
Russian Revolution 2608, 2693
Russian Trials (1937) 2746
Russian War Relief 2564, 2565, 2594, 2669
Ruthenberg 2667
Ryukyu Islands 2535
Ryder, Oscar B 2837
Sacher, Harry 2659
Sahajanand, Swami 2638
Saigon Airport 2632
Saito, Takio 2628
Sanctions or War 2671
Sansom, Sir George 2582
Sarraut, Albert 2713, 2714
Saturday Evening Post 2740, 2800, 2803
Sayer, Raphael 2659
SCAP (Supreme Command Allied Powers) 2790, 2792, 2793
Schapova, Miss 2730
Schlauch, Margaret 2659
Schmitt, Bernadotte 2568
Schneiderman, William 2883
Schoenfield, H. F. Arthur 2836
School of Military Government (University of Virginia) 2603, 2604
Schou, Sam 2636
Schubert, W. H 2832
Schuirmann 2809
Schultz 2809
Schutzer, Arthur 2789
Schwartz, Benjamin K 2753, 2755, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2767
Scott, F. R 2580
Scott, Walter K 2540
Scottsboro Struggle 2886
Searchlight 2665

Digitized by Google

Page
Seattle Union Record 2665
Seaver, Edwin 2659
Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics 2586
Second World War 2661, 2723
Secretariat (IPR) 2509, 2523, 2576, 2577, 2589, 2728, 2742, 2744, 2812, 2884, 2885
Secretariat Paper No. 1 2742
Secretary's Staff Committee 2852
Seeds, Sir William 2729
Seeman, Bernard 2789
Seiyukai 2628
Sekiguchi, Yashushi 2890
Seldes, George 2657, 2659
Seldes, Helen 2659
Selsam, Howard 2659
Selsbee, Elizabeth 2789
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2487, 2812, 2849, 2859
John Stewart Service 2486, 2490, 2535, 2866
Seventh Fleet 2556
Seymour, Lawrence D 2622
Shackner, Eugene 2660
Shadow over Asia 2587
Shadow of the Plantation 2890
Shanghai Commercial Press 2541
Shao, Li-tze 2549
Shapley, Harlow 2659
Sharecropping as a Remnant of Chattel Slavery 2887
Sharpe, Frances 2523
Sharwood 2809
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region 2544
Shepherd, Jack 2518, 2636
Shiehkin 2809
Shigi 2717
Shillinglaw, David L 2819
Shiman, Russell G 2610
Shippe 2891
Shiratori, Toshio 2682
Shoemaker, Colonel 2809, 2810, 2811, 2832
Shortwave Research 2784, 2785
Shotwell Commission 2831
Shotwell, James Thomson 2831, 2834
Showdown at Singapore 2587
Shull, George H 2659
Shumlin, Herman 2659
Siao, Emi 2695
Silver Shirts 2683
Silvermaster Group 2869
Sinclair, Upton 2652, 2667
Sino-American Cultural Society 2523
Sino-Japanese War 2511, 2512, 2628, 2638
Sino-Soviet Agreements 2592
Smedley, Agnes 2753, 2755, 2761, 2767, 2768, 2789
Smith College (New York) 2658
Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell 2530
Smith, Wilfred 2891
Smithsonian Institution 2729
Smyth, F. Hastings 2659
Snow, Conrad E 2854, 2855
Snow, Edgar 2524, 2592, 2753, 2755, 2757, 2761, 2789, 2891
Snow, Mrs. Edgar 2646
Snyder, Alice D 2659
Socialist Party 2667
Society of the Catholic Commonwealth 2659
Society for Cultural Relations With Other Countries 2706
Solution in Asia 2724, 2725
Some Lesson of the Fateful Decade 2887

Digitized by Google

Page
Somerville, Rose 2518, 2881, 2882
Soong, T. V 2543, 2544, 2863
Sorge, Richard 2770
Soto, Foreign Minister 2718
Soule, George 2659
Soushchak, Constantine 2730
South Korean Troops 2557, 2737, 2738
South Philadelphia High School for Girls 2585
Southern Cement Co 2630
Southern Tenant Farmers Union 2643
Soviet Arctic Encyclopedia 2748
Soviet Army 2549
Soviet Embassy (Washington) 2895
Soviet Far Eastern Policy 2576, 2590, 2598
Soviet Far East and Central Asia 2739, 2742, 2743
Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact 2671
Soviet-German Trade Treaty 2574
Soviet-Japanese Pact 2682
Soviet-Mongolian Forces 2574
Soviet Nations and Tehran 2886
Soviet Press and Japan's War on China 2890
Soviet Press 2699, 2723
Soviet Russia Today 2604, 2669, 2708, 2744
Soviet Union. (*See* Russia.)
Soyer, Moses 2659
Spanish Government 2637, 2657
Spanish Relief Organization 2597
Spanish War 2676
Speaking of India 2580
Spencer, Frederick 2662
Spravedlnost 2665
Sproul, Robert Gordon 2506, 2511, 2593, 2622
Sprout, Harold 2811
SRT (*see* Soviet Russia Today) 2708
SSRC Committee (Social Science Research Committee) 2886
Stabilization Board 2811
Stabilization Fund and Reconstruction and Development Bank Committee 2869
Staley, Dr 2816, 2817, 2831, 2891
Stalin, Joseph 2529, 2530, 2572, 2577, 2683, 2694, 2699, 2723, 2804, 2816, 2827, 2828, 2838, 2858, 2861, 2862
Stalin University of the Toilers 2694
Standard Vacuum Oil Co 2810
Standley, Admiral 2839, 2840
Stanford University 2615, 2616, 2658, 2740, 2748
Stanley 2809, 2810
Stanton, E. F 2488
Starnes 2873, 2874
Starr, C V 2809
Starr Park & Freeman 2810
Stassen, Harold E 2476, 2513, 2515
State Department ..... 2476, 2477, 2485–2490, 2494, 2500–2505, 2509–2514, 2520, 2521, 2525, 2532–2540, 2548, 2551, 2554, 2555, 2615, 2624, 2692, 2753, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2765–2767, 2770, 2774, 2777, 2780, 2782, 2810–2812, 2823, 2826, 2840, 2844–2850, 2853–2859, 2864–2870, 2886, 2893, 2894.
State Department (Biographic Register) 2766, 2767
State Department (Conference, October 1949) 2476, 2525, 2534
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs) 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490
State Department (Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements) 2835
State Department (Division of Cultural Relations) 2509
State Department (Division of European Affairs) 2836
State Department (Far Eastern Division) 2485, 2486
State Department (Division of Labor Relations) 2539
State Department (International Security Organization) 2857, 2868
State Department (Loyalty Board) 2487, 2854

Digitized by Google

Page
State Department (Personnel Division) 2766
State Department (Policy Planning Board) 2765, 2766, 2767
State Department (Postwar Planning Division) 2823, 2826, 2837, 2865, 2867, 2870
State Department (Postwar Trends Unit) 2826, 2827
State Department (Register) 2766, 2767
State Department (Round Table) 2537
State Department (Science, Education, and Arts Division) 2811
State Department (Special Political Affairs Division) 2837
State Department (White Paper) 2501, 2504, 2505
State of Asia 2481–2483, 2494, 2515, 2548, 2553
State Teachers College (Milwaukee) 2658
State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 2847
Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO) 2630
Steele, A. T 2550, 2574
Stefansson Library 2748
Stefansson, Vilhjalmur 2518, 2748, 2881, 2882
Stefansson, Mrs. Vilhjalmur 2749
Stein Guenther 2542, 2789
Sternberg, Fritz 2677, 2689
Stettinius, Mr 2843, 2850, 2851, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2863
Steuben, John 2619, 2640, 2641
Stevens, Dr 2567, 2569, 2570
Stevenson, Philip 2659
Stewart, Donald Ogden 2659
Stewart, Marguerite A 2523, 2572, 2580, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2692, 2819
Stewart, Maxwell S 2507, 2508, 2572, 2580 2650–2690, 2831
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph 2552
Stimson, Mr 2674
Stone, I. F 2659, 2684
Stone, William T 2585, 2831, 2836, 2868, 2869
Storm, Hans Otto 2659
Straight, Michael 2831
Strand, Paul 2659
Strang, Sir William 2729
Strategy of Sino-Japanese Conflict 2890
Strong, Anna Louise 2592, 2753, 2755, 2761, 2763, 2768
Strong, Maj. Gen. George V 2836
Struik, Dirk J 2659, 2746
Stuart Ambassador Leighton 2549, 2552
Student Review 2802, 2874, 2875
Study of the History of Chinese Society 2581
Sturgeon 2609, 2615
Sues, Ilona Ralf 2789
Suez Canal 2678, 2679, 2680
Sullivan and Cromwell 2519
Sulzberger, Arthur Hays 2582, 2809
Summy, Ethel 2521, 2776
Sun, Fo 2544, 2729
Sun, Yat-sen 2516, 2517, 2541, 2551, 2631, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2696, 2719, 2729
Sun Yat-sen Chinese University 2694, 2695, 2696
Sung, General 2718
Sunoo, H. W 2789
Survey Associates, Inc 2587
Survey Graphic 2586
Swabeck, Arne 2366
Swanidze, A. S 2703
Swarthmore College 2658, 2659
Sweetser, Arthur 2718
Sweetland 2646
Swing, Raymond Gram 2487, 2488, 2542, 2566, 2693, 2811
SWNCC. (*See* State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Sydney University 2627, 2637
Syllabus for Teachers on the United States and the Far East 2587
Syllabus for Teachers on the United States and Latin America 2586
Taft, Senator Robert A 2555, 2643
Taiping Rebellion 2541, 2551

Digitized by Google

Page
Tamaris, Helen 2659
Tariff Commission. (*See* United States Tariff Commission.)
Tasks Before Congress 2676
Taylor 2652
Taylor, Amos 2831
Taylor, C. Fayette 2659, 2684
Taylor Committee 2869
Taylor, Myron 2832, 2834
Taylor, Wayne C 2831, 2832, 2837
Teacher and International Relations 2582
Teachers College (Columbia University) 2582
Tehran Conference 2828
Tele-Press 2789
Teney, Jack B 2651, 2652
Territorial Problems Subcommittee 2852
Terte, Judge Ben 2632
Thailand (Siam) 2482
Theater Guild 2807
Thomas, Elbert D. 2622, 2809, 2810, 2835
Thomas, Harrison C 2585
Thomas, Norman 2890
Thomas, S. B 2482
Thompson, Frederick 2659, 2809
Thompson, Virginia 2482, 2523, 2627, 2630
Thorne, James 2629
Thorner, Daniel 2483, 2485
Thorp 2652
Three Principles of the People (Sun Yat-sen) 2541
Tikhii Okena 2713
Time Magazine 2505, 2736
Times (New York) 2549, 2729, 2737, 2746, 2834
Timperley, H. J 2582
Tito 2554
Tokyo Martyrs 2789
Tolmachoff University 2696
Tolman, Edward C 2659
Tom Mooney's Monthly 2665
Tomo 2718
Tong, Hollington 2524
Topics in Brief 2574
Touzet 2714
Toveri 2665
Toward U. S. Trade with China 2789
Trachtenberg, Alexander 2883
Trade Union Congress (India) 2638
Train Despatcher 2665
Train, Admiral Harold C 2836
Trans-Siberian Railroad 2592
Travesty on 1776 2677
Treasury Department. (*See* United States Treasury Department.)
Tri-City Labor News 2665
Trinity College 2823, 2826
Trippe 2809
Trone, Solomon 2497
Trotsky 2607
Troyanovsky 2730
Trueblood, Howard J 2586
Truman, President Harry H 2505, 2538, 2548, 2552, 2554, 2555, 2556
Truth 2665
Tsuitsui 2717
Tucker, Luther 2518, 2881, 2882
Turkish Government 2629
Turner, Jeanette 2789
Turner, Robert K 2548
Turning Point for Chinese Students 2789
Twentieth Century India 2579, 2581

Digitized by Google

Page
Tyler ---- 2689
Tyomies ---- 2665

U

UERMW. (*See* United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, CIO.)
Uj. Elore ---- 2665
Un-American Activities Committee (Dies) ---- 2657, 2658, 2683, 2684
Un-American Activities Committee (House) ---- 2777, 2802, 2871, 2872, 2874, 2878
Un-American Activities Committee (California) ---- 2652
United Australia Party ---- 2636
United China Relief ---- 2544, 2579, 2581
United Country Party (Australia) ---- 2636
United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers (CIO) ---- 2628, 2634
United Nations ---- 2482, 2483, 2485, 2500, 2528, 2529, 2539, 2553, 2556, 2557, 2595, 2735, 2774, 2778, 2779, 2780, 2814, 2818, 2826, 2840, 2841, 2843, 2844, 2847, 2850, 2851, 2854, 2856, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2862, 2863, 2864, 2867, 2868, 2869, 2895.
United Nations (Charter) ---- 2778, 2839, 2840, 2860, 2861, 2868
United Nations Conference on International Organizations (UNCIO) ---- 2857, 2858
United Nations (Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes) ---- 2857
United Nations (Informational Conference, Relief and Rehabilitation Program) ---- 2595
United Nations (London Conference) ---- 2826, 2839, 2864
United Nations (San Francisco Conference) ---- 2539, 2622, 2826, 2841, 2843, 2844, 2847, 2850, 2860, 2862, 2863, 2867, 2868, 2869
United Nations (Security Council) ---- 2556, 2859, 2864
United Nations (United States Mission) ---- 2500
United Nations Journal ---- 2864
United States Air Force ---- 2535, 2836
United States Armed Forces ---- 2487, 2535, 2537, 2538, 2555, 2556, 2590, 2593, 2603, 2604, 2737, 2738, 2739, 2749, 2760, 2770, 2771, 2787, 2830, 2833, 2836
United States Army ---- 2537, 2538, 2590, 2593, 2604, 2603, 2737, 2738, 2739, 2760, 2770, 2771, 2830, 2833, 2836
United States Cabinet ---- 2656
United States-Canadian Northwest ---- 2581
United States Chamber of Commerce ---- 2834
United States Civil Service Commission ---- 2781
United States Congress ---- 2502, 2537, 2554, 2556, 2673, 2676, 2678, 2687, 2834, 2835, 2862
United States Court of Claims ---- 2836
United States Department of Agriculture ---- 2798, 2837, 2890
United States Department of Commerce ---- 2831, 2837
United States Department of Justice ---- 2854, 2855
United States Department of Labor ---- 2633, 2837
United States Embassy (Bombay) ---- 2638
United States Embassy (Moscow) ---- 2711, 2712, 2729
United States Embassy (Mukden) ---- 2554
United States Embassy (Nanking) ---- 2536, 2551
United States Fifth Army (Headquarters) ---- 2537
United States Foreign Service ---- 2540, 2766, 2767
United States Government ---- 2475, 2478, 2483, 2500–2506, 2508–2513, 2516, 2520, 2526–2530, 2532, 2538, 2548, 2549, 2551–2556, 2566, 2580, 2585, 2600–2603, 2613, 2651, 2658, 2671, 2677, 2680, 2682, 2684, 2713, 2734, 2736, 2738, 2746, 2757, 2761, 2767–2769, 2774, 2775, 2782, 2792, 2793, 2797–2803, 2821, 2822, 2830–2834, 2837–2841, 2849–2851, 2858–2863, 2869, 2873, 2875, 2885.
United States House of Representatives ---- 2540, 2810
United States Library of Congress ---- 2568, 2698, 2792, 2793, 2833, 2834, 2836
United States Mission to United Nations ---- 2500
United States Navy ---- 2487, 2538, 2555, 2556, 2593, 2749, 2787, 2830, 2833, 2836
United States Office of Educations ---- 2521, 2776

Digitized by Google

Page
United States Office of Naval Research 2749
United States Pipe & Foundry Co 2630
United States Relations with China 2549, 2551, 2554
United States Senate 2483, 2500, 2532, 2534, 2536, 2539, 2540, 2559, 2599, 2673, 2677, 2688, 2735, 2738, 2773, 2778, 2780, 2800, 2810.
United States Shipping in the Pacific, 1914–40 2581
United States Sixth Army 2537, 2538
United States Tariff Commission 2837
United States Treasury Department 2810, 2831, 2837, 2868
United States War Department 2603, 2604, 2833, 2836
University of Atlanta 2658
University of California 2532, 2581, 2659
University of Chicago 2585, 2834
University of Harvard 2581, 2609, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2658, 2659, 2753
University of Illinois 2659
University of Leningrad 2691
University of Michigan 2480, 2659
University of Minnesota 2658
University of New York 2585, 2658, 2659
University of North Carolina 2890
University of Pennsylvania 2876
University of Princeton 2585, 2658, 2659, 2728, 2820
University of Sydney 2627, 2637
University of Toilers of the East 2717
University of Virginia (School of Military Government) 2603, 2604
University of Vladivostock 2700, 2701
University of Washington 2580, 2691, 2726
University of Yale 2658, 2659
(UNRRA) United States Rehabilitation Relief Agency 2552, 2868
UNRRA (Atlantic City Conference) 2868
Untermeyer, Jean Starr 2659
Upgren, A. R 2831
Upholsterers' Journal 2665
Urey, Harold C 2659
Urnov 2592
U. S. S. R. (*See* Russia.)
U. S. S. R. Chamber of Commerce 2730
U. S. S. R. In Construction 2608, 2708
U. S. S. R. in Figures 2608
Utley, Freda 2702

V

Van Der Valk, M. H 2890
Van Clief, Jeffry 2789
Van Gogh 2643
Van Kirk, Walter 2831
Van Veen, Stuyvesant 2659
Vance, Ruppert B 2890
Varga, E. S 2723, 2728, 2729
Vassar College 2659
Veatch, Roy 2830, 2831, 2886
Verbeeck, Jules 2633
Veterans of Foreign Wars 2556
Vietnamese Forces 2557
Vilnis 2665
Vincent, John Carter 2486, 2487, 2488–2490, 2622, 2809, 2810, 2854
Viner, Jacob 2831
Vishinsky, Andre 2895
VJ-Day 2502, 2554
Vladivostock University 2700, 2701
Voice of Labor 2665
Voitinski, Grigorii N 2590, 2699, 2700, 2701, 2702, 2706, 2713, 2715, 2728, 2729, 2730
Voks 2705, 2706, 2708, 2710
Volkszeitung 2665
Von Ribbentrop 2673, 2674

Digitized by Google

W

Page
Wadleigh, Julian ---- 2486, 2831
Wallace, Henry A ---- 2775, 2809, 2831, 2836
Wall Street ---- 2677, 2720, 2890
Walsh, Ray ---- 2624, 2625, 2809
Wang, Ching-wei ---- 2516, 2787
Wanger, Ruth ---- 2585
War Manpower Commission ---- 2651
War Production Board ---- 2836
Ward, Isabel ---- 2521, 2776
Ware Cell ---- 2874
Ware, Harold ---- 2798, 2799, 2800, 2801, 2802, 2808, 2874
Warren, George ---- 2831
Warren, Susan ---- 2789
Wartime China ---- 2692
Washington Pipeline ---- 2789
Washington Post ---- 2658
Washington University ---- 2580, 2691, 2726
Washington University (St. Louis) ---- 2658
Watson, Goodwin ---- 2565, 2809
Watt, Robert J ---- 2809, 2810, 2834
Webb, James E ---- 2477, 2533, 2534, 2536, 2537
Webster Co ---- 2651, 2692
Webster, Professor ---- 2709
Webster Series ---- 2579, 2581, 2651, 2692
We Can Win in '43 ---- 2887
Wechsler, James ---- 2659, 2684
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C ---- 2488, 2534, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2552
Wedemeyer, Mrs. Albert C ---- 2537, 2538
Wedemeyer Mission ---- 2552
Welch, Richard J ---- 2835
Welles, Sumner ---- 2522, 2652, 2682, 2811, 2829, 2835, 2839
We Need Not Fight in Asia ---- 2681
Wesley, Charles H ---- 2659
Western Powers ---- 2503, 2526, 2529, 2530
West Virginia Federationist ---- 2665
Western Stake in Colonial Asia ---- 2507
Westinghouse Manufacturing Co ---- 2634
Weyl, Nathaniel ---- 2795–2823, 2871–2376
Wheeler, W. E ---- 2891
Where Outer and Inner Mongolia Meet ---- 2724, 2725
Where We Stand With Russia ---- 2887
White Book ---- 2673, 2674
White, Dr. Harry ---- 2508, 2509, 2810, 2815, 2831, 2832, 2837, 2868, 2869
White House ---- 2506, 2833, 2836, 2839, 2840, 2859
White, Lynn ---- 2817
White Paper (State Department) ---- 2501, 2504, 2505, 2552
White, President ---- 2819
White Russian Armies ---- 2699
White Russian Republics ---- 2722, 2850, 2851, 2860, 2861, 2863
White, Theodore ---- 2544
White, Wallace H ---- 2835
Why Vote for War ---- 2672
Why We Went to War ---- 2891
Whyte, Sir Frederick ---- 2582, 2891
Wickard, Claude R ---- 2837
Widener, Alice ---- 2539
Wilbur, Brayton ---- 2622, 2809, 2810, 2811
Wilbur Files ---- 2653
Wilbur, Ray Lyman ---- 2511, 2622, 2651, 2653
Wilder, Nancy ---- 2523
Wild, Payson ---- 2622
Williamson County Miner ---- 2665
Willard, Howard W ---- 2659, 2789
Willauer ---- 2810
Willits, Joseph H ---- 2523

Digitized by Google

Page
Will Japan Move South ---- 2682
Willoughby, Gen. C. A ---- 2770, 2771
Wilson, Geoffrey ---- 2518, 2837
Wilson Teachers College ---- 2521, 2776
Wilson, Walter ---- 2890
Winfield, Gerald ---- 2582
Winter, Ella ---- 2895, 2896
Witt, Nathan ---- 2799
Wittfogel, Karl August ---- 2475, 2581, 2717, 2890
Woll, Matthew ---- 2664, 2665, 2668
Wolverton, Charles A ---- 2835
Woodruff, Susan H ---- 2659
Workers Library ---- 2887
Workers' Party ---- 2667
World Assembly at San Francisco ---- 2887
World Cooperation and Post-War Prosperity ---- 2888
World Monopoly and Peace ---- 2887
World Peace Foundation ---- 2548, 2585, 2587, 2814, 2817, 2819
World Policies and World Economics ---- 2699
World Tomorrow ---- 2665, 2670
World War I ---- 2629, 2658, 2666, 2682, 2834
World War II ---- 2661, 2723
WPB ---- 2831
Wright, Archie ---- 2852
Wright, Chester M ---- 2664, 2665, 2668
Wright, Mrs. Louise ---- 2622, 2819
Wright, Mary ---- 2748
Wright, Quincy ---- 2831
Wright, Richard ---- 2659

Y

Yaffe, Richard ---- 2789
Yakhontoff, Victor ---- 2632
Yale University ---- 2658, 2659
Yalta Conference ---- 2578, 2736, 2738, 2828, 2838, 2841, 2842, 2843, 2844, 2845, 2848, 2858, 2859, 2862, 2869
Yardumian, Rose ---- 2580, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2624, 2625
Yarnell, Admiral H. E ---- 2622, 2809, 2810, 2811
Yeh, Ting ---- 2631
Yen, James ---- 2582
Yenbay Uprising ---- 2632
Yin, K. Y ---- 2832
Yost, Charles ---- 2831
Young, Art ---- 2659
Young Womens Christian Association (Y. W. C. A.) ---- 2646, 2791
Yugoslavian Government ---- 2556
Y. W. C. A. (*See* Young Women's Christian Association.)

Z

Zafra ---- 2593
Zeserson, Fred ---- 2789
Zinoviev ---- 2699, 2711
Zugsmith, Leane ---- 2659
Zukhov, Mr ---- 2590, 2592

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A175-B
11

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

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 9

FEBRUARY 26, 27, 28, 29, MARCH 1, AND 3, 1952

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CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Pages
Owen Lattimore	2897–3275

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p. m., pursuant to notice, in room 424 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran (presiding), O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, Jenner, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

The witness will please rise and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are to give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say at the outset as I have said before, that pictures might be taken before the hearings but not during the hearings. We do not think it is best to annoy or interrupt the witnesses in their testimony.

When the Members of the Senate became members of this committee, both the chairman of the committee and the members of the committee individually and collectively fully realized that we were to be and would be the targets of invective and disparaging remarks and statements. Our anticipation in that regard has been fully carried out. The Daily Worker has devoted many columns to its condemnation of this committee, its members, and the manner in which it has operated. Every Communist in America has taken opportunity to cast invective and discouraging and disparaging remarks with reference to this committee and its membership. We were fully advised before we undertook this task that such would be the course and procedure. It is not at all out of line with the general procedure of the Communist Party and Communists generally in the world.

For many months one of the great jurists of America, Judge Medina, sat in trial during all kinds of condemnatory remarks and insulting expressions. He dealt with the matter at the close of that great trial.

A statement has been filed today by the witness. The ticker shortly after noon announced that that statement was available to those who

saw fit to read it and it was at the office of the attorney for the witness. The press has that statement now. Of course, that statement and its remarks are no longer privileged, as that term is known in the law. The witness must be responsible for the full gravity of his remarks produced in that statement. In that statement there is carried out the same policy as has been carried out against this committee. Intemperate and provocative expressions are there set out and elaborated upon.

This committee could exercise its rights. We could deny that statement the right to become a part of the record. We realize that this is a country of free speech, that that is one of our great heritages, and we propose to see to it that it is carried out here today. Notwithstanding the insulting and offensive remarks that appear in the record, the statement made by the witness now under oath, he may proceed with his statement with the understanding that from time to time as he goes along counsel for the committee will interrogate him.

You may proceed, sir.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, before the witness proceeds, may I identify myself on the record. I am Abe Fortas, of Arnold, Fortas & Porter, here as counsel for Owen Lattimore. Our address is 1200 Eighteenth Street NW., of this city.

Senator, I should like to ask you to advise me of the rights and privileges of attorneys. I have examined your record of these hearings and I find that you yourself made the following statement on July 25, 1951——

The CHAIRMAN. What I said is not necessary. I can tell you in a minute, Mr. Fortas.

I did tell you privately and I will tell you now on the record that you will be permitted to remain here. You will not be permitted to testify and you will not be permitted to suggest answers to questions. When the witness seeks your counsel he will have opportunity to obtain your counsel.

Mr. FORTAS. Thank you, Senator. May I ask whether I am permitted to object to questions?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask counsel if this press release was issued from your office?

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, I was out of town yesterday, and my knowledge of it is that Mrs. Lattimore delivered copies to counsel to the committee at 1 o'clock on yesterday, that thereafter copies were made available to the press and copies were available in my office for members of the press.

Senator FERGUSON. So that your office in effect circulated this statement?

Mr. FORTAS. Well, you are using a term with legal connotations.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a lawyer.

Mr. FORTAS. Yes, but I have not considered that question, and I would not be prepared to answer it at this moment.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you read the statement?

Mr. FORTAS. I have.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you prepare it or help to prepare it?

Mr. FORTAS. I consulted with Mr. Lattimore while it was being prepared; yes, sir; and I consulted extensively.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew it was to be used and circulated prior to the reading of it in this hearing?

Mr. FORTAS. I certainly did, and I see nothing improper about it and nothing unconventional about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any knowledge about the facts?

Mr. FORTAS. I have no personal knowledge aside from the usual sources that a lawyer knows, of course, Senator. As you know, Senator, a lawyer never vouches for statements when he has no personal knowledge of the facts.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the next question, as to whether or not you approved the statement.

Mr. FORTAS. You know what a lawyer does, and you are a distinguished lawyer yourself.

The CHAIRMAN. You could answer that question, Mr. Fortas.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you or did you not approve the statement?

Mr. FORTAS. From a legal point of view, absolutely; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I might intervene for just a moment before Mr. Lattimore starts reading his statement, I have, I think, just three or four preliminary questions. Have you identified yourself for this record, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did in executive session.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you for the purpose of this public session just give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My name is Owen Lattimore, and my address is Ruxton 4, Md.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think we can dispense with the other formalities, Mr. Chairman, and let the witness begin with his statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Mr. Lattimore; you may proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senators, I have asked for this public hearing because your proceedings have resulted in serious damage to my reputation as an objective scholar and patriotic citizen, to the Institute of Pacific Relations with which I have been connected, and to our Government's Foreign Service personnel and the conduct of its foreign policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chair will excuse me, please, we have here the letter by which Mr. Lattimore asked for a hearing, the chairman's reply, Mr. Lattimore's subsequent request for a postponement, and the chairman's reply; and if the witness will identify these two letters I suggest that those should go into the record at this point, as supplementary to the statement of the witness that he asked to be heard.

(Whereupon the documents were shown to the witness.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That letter of November 6 is your original request to be heard; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think so; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May those go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Those may be in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 459A, B, C, D," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 459A

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
THE WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
Baltimore, Md., November 6, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: It has repeatedly been reported in the press that your subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee has promised that I will me given an opportunity to refute publicly the false and slanderous allegations that have been made about me before your subcommittee. Months have now gone by without my being given this opportunity, and I am now informed that your subcommittee will hold no more public hearings until January. This long delay greatly increases the injury done to me.

I trust that you will notify me at an early date when I can expect to have a public hearing. It will, of course, take me at least a week to make arrangements and preparation for the hearing, and I should therefore appreciate as much advance notice as possible.

Yours sincerely,

[S] Owen Lattimore.
OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: c.

EXHIBIT No. 459B

NOVEMBER 10, 1951.

MR. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: Your letter of November 6 has been forwarded to me here.

The committee had been planning to call you as a witness at the convenience of the committee. Now that you have, in the letter above referred to, requested an opportunity to be heard, an effort will be made to hear you at your convenience. You are, however, quite correct in your understanding that there will be no more public hearings until January.

You will be given, as you request, at least a week's advance notice of the date at which you will be called to appear before the committee.

Sincerely,

[S] PAT MCCARRAN.

EXHIBIT No. 459 C

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
THE WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
Baltimore, Md., December 20, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: On November 6, I wrote you to inquire as to the date when your subcommittee might afford me a public hearing, and on November 10, you replied stating that an effort would be made to hear me at my convenience, but that there would be no more public hearings until January. You also stated that I would be given at least a week's advance notice of the date on which I would be called to appear.

You may remember that I appeared before your subcommitteee on July 13 in response to your subpena.

I have been invited to lecture in London before the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Central Asian Society. The lecture before the Royal Geographical

Society has been scheduled for January 14. The lecture before the Royal Central Asian Society was scheduled to commence on December 19, but this date has been postponed because of a delay in my date of departure from the United States.

Mrs. Lattimore and I plan to proceed to London by air, leaving here on December 27, and to return about January 20. I shall be available to your committee at any time thereafter, but I should like, as I indicated in my letter of November 6, to have a week's notice of the exact time when I am to be called so that I may complete preparations for my appearance. This would mean that I could appear before your committee at any time beginning January 28.

I continue to be eager to testify at a public session of your committee, and I hope that my trip to England will not inconvenience you.

Yours sincerely,

[s] Owen Lattimore.
OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 459 D

DECEMBER 28, 1951.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: This will acknowledge your letter of December 20 in which you informed me of your invitation to lecture in London before the Royal Geoegraphical Society and the Royal Central Asian Society.

Your trip to England will not inconvenience the subcommittee in any way, and you may complete your plans as scheduled.

I appreciate your desire to testify at public sessions of our committee as your testimony will be very interesting. We will schedule your appearance sometime after your return to this country.

Sincerely,

[S] PAT MCCARRAN.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the opening paragraph of your statement, have you expressed the four points which give you concern with regard to the conduct of these hearings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. These are four introductory points, and I don't know whether you would consider some of the supplementary material that comes later to be separate points or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you expressed those points in the order of their primary interest to you—that is first yourself, second the IPR, and third the Foreign Service, and fourth the United States foreign policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I don't think I thought of it that way when I drafted it. On the whole I can say "No," it is rather the reverse order.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The impression has been assiduously conveyed in your proceedings——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean by "assiduously conveyed" to make the charge that the committee has intended to convey a certain impression?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I mean that witness after witness before this committee has attempted to convey this impression and that no witnesses have been asked any question that might test their veracity.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to charge, sir, that the committee has intended to convey a particular impression?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot answer for what is in the minds of the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are asking you what is in your mind, sir, what you intended to convey by the use of that phrase.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I intended to convey by the use of that phrase exactly what is stated here.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire? Do you include yourself as one of the witnesses among those that you have mentioned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean attempted to convey that I am a Communist or Communist sympathizer?

Senator FERGUSON. I did not mention Communist or Communist sympathizer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been heard once in executive session.

Senator FERGUSON. You say no witness has been questioned.

Mr. LATTIMORE. None of these witnesses referred to here.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you questioned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was questioned in executive session some 7 or 8 months ago, and I have no transcript of that session.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever ask to see the transcript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I asked to see the transcript afterward, to go over it and see if there were any mistakes in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go over it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. So you had the transcript, and you knew what its contents were?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read the transcript about 7 months ago, and naturally my memory of it is not very fresh now.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any notes about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I made no notes when I read the transcript.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have an extra copy of your statement, so that we may follow it when you make it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know if I have any more.

Mr. FORTAS. There were copies delivered for each member of the committee, and the copies that were brought here have all been distributed to the press.

Senator FERGUSON. How many were distributed to the press, Mr. Fortas?

Mr. FORTAS. I haven't any idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many you had made, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't.

Senator WATKINS. It is easier to follow you if we have a statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. If we might get back to this question of your phrase, "assiduously conveyed," what did you mean by that word "assiduously"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I believe the Latin etymology of the word probably means to sit down and stick at.

Mr. SOURWINE. It comes from "assiduus," doesn't it? Did you use it in that sense?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the sense in which I used it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The impression has been assiduously conveyed in your proceedings that I am a Communist or a Communist sympathizer or dupe——

Mr. SOURWINE. How has that been conveyed, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, the record is full of it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are making the charge, sir, and has anyone on the committee conveyed that impression, or has it been conveyed only by witnesses testifying here under oath?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think some of the leading questions of members of the committee could be so interpreted, perhaps.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you interpreting the questions asked by the committee as intended to convey that you were a Communist or Communist sympathizer or dupe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In writing this opening part of my statement, I was trying to convey an over-all impression of hearings that had been going on for 8 months or so in which hostile evidence, evidence hostile to me and others, has been piled up, and at this present time I am attempting to deal with that accumulation of many months.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire there as to whether or not the witness believes that it is an important subject to inquire as to whether or not an institution that is giving information to the public has been penetrated by Communists or Communist sympathizers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The subject is obviously important, but as you will find later in this statement, I raise the point that previous clarification as concerns myself was rather copiously provided 2 years ago before the Tydings committee, and has been completely disregarded in the hearings before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that this committee should take the record of the Tydings committee and close its proceedings and not conduct any examination; is that what you are asking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is not what I am asking.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you mention it, then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I mention it because I think that it is relevant to any such inquiry, and yet—especially as far as I myself am concerned—and yet no reference has been made to it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you claim that that was a full and complete examination of the question of the penetration of Communists or Communist sympathizers into the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am claiming that it was relevant to me personally, and my connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations were included in that inquiry.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, this committee should not have gone into the question of your relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that the question of my relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations might have been brought up with reference to what had gone before.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do I understand, then, that you think that this committee should not have gone into that question here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I am merely suggesting that a more fair way of going into the question, as far as I myself am concerned, would have been to maintain at least the continuity of the record between the extensive replies that I gave before the Tydings committee and the allegations that have been made here.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you figure that you were cross-examined by the Tydings committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Completely cross-examined; you think all of the facts were brought out?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I think that Senator Hickenlooper went into a great deal of detail over many hours.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Tydings committee have the records that were obtained by this committee from up in Concord in Massachusetts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do you think that they could have examined this problem of the Institute of Pacific Relations, without those records?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only point I am making, Senator, is that no continuity or connection has been established in the hearings before this committee with the inquiry that was conducted by the Tydings committee, and I am not suggesting that one should have been a substitute for the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you not think, from one of your answers here, that you have indicated that this committee had gone out of its way in an unfair manner to conduct these hearings about the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am merely saying that as far as I, myself, am concerned, I think the committee would have been fairer if it had taken into account the record of the Tydings hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. On the question of the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the question of myself and any connection between me and the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you have stated that the impression has been assiduously conveyed, and you have explained what you meant by that in the proceedings of this committee, that you are a Communist or a Communist sympathizer or dupe. Have witnesses before this committee testified that you were a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have witnesses before this committee testified that you were a Communist sympathizer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have witnesses before this committee testified that you were a dupe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think one or two witnesses have suggested that I was either a sympathizer or a dupe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who any of those witnesses were?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have read through such a mass of this stuff recently that I am afraid my memory is not very clear on many of these details.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether, in fact, a witness did so testify, or whether you simply added that yourself as a third or possible alternative?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, no, it was based on a definite impression from my reading it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You see, I have been working on this for a long time, I have been making notes as I went along, and the notes were eventually incorporated into this statement. But in view of the kind of work, that goes over and over a subject, you sometimes have the

note that establishes a particular point, but your mind loses the connection with which the point was originally made. I am satisfied with the point, however.

The impression has been assiduously conveyed in your proceedings that I am a Communist or a Communist sympathizer or dupe; that I master minded the Institute of Pacific Relations——

Mr. SOURWINE. At that point, sir, to what extent did you have to do with the conduct of the affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. During my period of employment by the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1934 to 1941, I was responsible solely for the editing of the quarterly magazine, Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Dennett, a former secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, had testified that you and Mr. Jessup were the two principal leaders of the affairs of that institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am aware that he so testified, and I would dispute the accuracy of his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The impression has been assiduously conveyed in your proceedings that I am a Communist or a Communist sympathizer or dupe; that I master-minded the Institute of Pacific Relations; that the Institute of Pacific Relations and I master-minded the far-eastern experts of the State Department——

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, Mr. Lattimore, can you say that the Institute of Pacific Relations and you had no influence upon the far-eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. By the way, what is your name, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Sourwine, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I hate replying in the blank.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was present at the executive sessions, and I met you, sir, at that time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations were available to all and sundry, including——

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you are not answering the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am leading up to my answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it is a necessary introduction.

Including members of the Government. In the years when I was active in the institute, the number of far-eastern experts and people primarily interested in the Far East was relatively small. So far as I know, practically all of them either belonged to the institute or read its publications.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you including in that statement the far-eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am including them; and therefore, it would be my assumption that practically all far-eastern personnel, or personnel dealing with the Far East, in the Department of State, would read the publications of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. And most of them, you say, were members of the institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe some of them were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you say most of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said most people interested in, and how far that includes the Government personnel, I have no way of knowing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it include some?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The records of the institute would doubtless show.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that it did include some of the far-eastern experts of the State Department, that is, the membership of the IPR did include some of those experts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know in general that it included some, and I couldn't name you anyone definitely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, let us get back to the original question: Can you say that the Institute of Pacific Relations and you had no influence on the far-eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, the way in which I was trying to answer the question was that I assume that those who read the publications of the institute formed their own opinions about it, but it is obviously impossible for me to answer on behalf of an anonymous Mr. X in the State Department whether he personally was influenced by the work of the institute, and if so, how much.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask a question there? Did you intend to influence the people in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The program of the Institute of Pacific Relations was perfectly clear, Senator. It was to make available on the market, the market of ideas, the most accurate information that it could assemble on the subject of the Far East, so that those who were interested could use that information as they themselves saw best.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I would like to have you answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Answer my question: Did you intend to influence the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We intended to contribute to the general fund of knowledge about the Far East. Any question of a particular intent to interest the State Department as a policy-making organ of the Government was, to the extent of my knowledge, never dreamed of.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you furnish pamphlets and booklets and books to the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't personally.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the institute.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You would have to ask someone in the institute who was in charge of distribution.

May I say that the Foreign Policy Association and other organizations interested in foreign policy, I believe that the general practice is to sell the publications; and then, in order to promote the sale of publications, to send free copies to people who might become likely subscribers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you furnish free copies of the Pacific Affairs, of which you were the editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I occasionally sent out free copies; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To the State Department or any officials in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether they were included or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then when you say you did not want to influence the State Department officials——

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as I was concerned, the intention was to provide information for those who were interested in the belief, which I think is a good old American belief, that out of a free market of information and ideas, the best will eventually win out in competition.

Senator FERGUSON. You figured yours was the best?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We furnished many kinds of opinion, as well as information.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would not say it was good, bad, and indifferent opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would say that to the best of our ability we always produced well-informed opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be the best?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was impossible to say what would be the best, because the Far East then, as now, was an area of controversy, and equally well-informed people might come to different conclusions from the same data.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, if such was the purpose, including the making available to the State Department, with possibly having some effect on their policy, was any effort made to prevent Communists from having any voice in the conduct of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. First, I would like to be a little more precise about your wording, "to make available to the State Department," which implies an exceptional interest in getting the State Department——

Senator O'CONOR. If it were not exceptional, it was not kept from the State Department; the information that you were making available to others, you certainly had a right to assume would be available to the State Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is why I say that I prefer a wording "to make available," rather than "to make available to the State Department."

Senator O'CONOR. Does that satisfy you, that it was available to the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If the wording is that it was as available to the State Department as it was to anybody else.

Senator O'CONOR. And that was, of course, your reason for being, was it not: to make it generally available?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To make it generally available.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, my question was: What, if any, steps were taken during the time that you were there to prevent Communists from having voice in the conduct of the affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From 1934 to 1941, as I have stated before, I was responsible only for Pacific Affairs, and most of that time that was a one-man and a secretary office, and most of the time it was not in the United States. I was not responsible for the employment of any personnel in New York or elsewhere, and hence not responsible for policies of employment.

Senator O'CONOR. I am waiting for you to answer the question. Does that complete your answer?

The CHAIRMAN. I am waiting for an answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. But I was not in a position to have any concern with whether Communists were employed or not.

Senator O'CONOR. Are we to understand that you were not interested in whether or not Communists participated in the formation of opinion and the dissemination of factual information, and are we to understand that you were disinterested and indifferent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I think that you can understand, Senator, simply that the matter never came within my purview.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read Pacific Affairs before it was sent out to the public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As editor, I read everything that went in before it went in.

Senator FERGUSON. Then were you not concerned as to whether or not pro-Communists were writing for that magazine while you were editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a different question, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, answer that one.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asked about the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question.

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think that that can be answered promptly. You can answer it categorically.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer is that I was concerned primarily with the quality of matter that went in. The Soviet Council was one of the members of the institute, and naturally I assumed that anything contributed by the Soviet Council was contributed by a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you felt that that would be a colored view, if it was contributed by the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I assumed that any contribution coming from the Soviet Union would be in conformity with official Communist doctrine.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would be colored?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would be colored according to official Communist doctrine.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever ascertain or try to ascertain whether or not any writers other than those in the Soviet Union, as members of their Government, were putting any articles in the magazine of which you were the editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In regard to any contributions other than Soviet contributions, if the contribution had struck me as Communist or Communist propaganda, I would certainly have gone into the matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever go into the matter as to who was writing, whether they were Communists or pro-Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I always went into the matter from the point of view of whether the man was well-informed and knew his stuff; and if anything had struck me as Communist propaganda, as such, I would certainly have taken up the matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think at that time you could have recognized pro-Communist propaganda?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very likely there would be forms of Communist propaganda that would get by me.

Senator FERGUSON. You were able to detect Communist propaganda at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not consider myself an expert on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it may be that because of your inexperience in Communist propaganda that you did not recognize it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is possible; and it is also pertinent, I think, Senator, to remember that in the 1930's there was neither the same general understanding of Communist methods of conspiracy and infiltration that there is now, nor the same general apprehension on the subject. The occasional publication of left-wing articles was com-

mon in many journals of repute, and people were not concerned then as they are today with precise shades of difference among leftists.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the reason that you allowed them to appear in Pacific Affairs, because they were appearing in other magazines?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My standard in Pacific Affairs was to secure, to the best of my ability, well-informed articles.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the question is: Could you detect, if you were not an expert in Communist propaganda, that they were not giving you well-informed articles, but they were giving you pure, unadulterated Communist propaganda under the label of facts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think, Senator, that even without being an expert, if I had been presented with pure, unadulterated Communist propaganda I would probably have recognized it.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you say the Pacific Affairs never presented any pro-Communist propaganda at the time you were editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I want to be fair to the people that contributed to Pacific Affairs, and I think that I would like to ask you, therefore, to define a little more sharply what you mean by "pro-Communist."

The CHAIRMAN. Could you answer the question?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what pro-Communist is? I will not question you if you do not know what it is.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I should say pro-Communist, particularly in the 1930's, might include a very wide range, including some things that some people would call pro-Communist and other people would not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you recognize any pro-Communist propaganda in the magazine while you were editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Pro-Communist in the sense of, say, promoting communism in the United States, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Promoting it in the world. You know that it is not a local matter, communism, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We are on the question of promoting, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I know we are.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I might interrupt, the question which has not yet been answered is way back when, if the Senator will excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the only question which has not been answered, but if we could get to a question that would be answered once in a while, it would be very helpful.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you answer the question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What are we driving at right now?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know what you are driving at. I am trying to get an answer to a question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator, looking at it from 1952, I would find it extremely difficult to lay down a definition of what was pro-Communist in 1935 or 1936.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. I will go back and ask you another question. Was there or was there not any pro-Communist article in your magazine, Pacific Affairs, while you were editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it would depend on who was making the definition of what is pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the only answer you can give?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that that is the necessary answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, suppose we make it the definition advocating international communism.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think we published anything of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say there was not anything like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, just to bring the record up to date, could we go back to my question?

The CHAIRMAN. How far back are you going?

Mr. SOURWINE. This is quite a ways back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lattimore, can you say that the Institute of Pacific Relations and you had no influence on the far-eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot state whether we did or not, or how much.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you intend by the statement in this issued statement here of yours, to convey the impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations and you had not had any influence on the far-eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To my best understanding, the Institute of Pacific Relations never had a policy of influencing the formation of policy in the United States Government through influencing personnel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, will you attempt to answer the question: Did you intend by the language in this statement, to convey to the committee the impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations and you never had any influence on the far-eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I intended to convey that we never had any influence that was the outcome of a campaign or policy of influencing the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you intend to convey the impression that you never had any influence—period?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether we had any influence on individuals in the State Department or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you intend to convey the impression by the language which you used here, that the Institute of Pacific Relations and you had no influence on the far-eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I intended to convey the impression that we had no influence that was the result of a calculated campaign on our part.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, please leave out any question of calculation, and I am asking you whether you intended to convey to this committee the impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations and you had no influence on the far eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, my answers have to be within my competence to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is not within your competence to answer that question as to your intent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have answered as to my intent already.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you disavow the intent to convey, by the language which you used, the impression that the IPR and you had no influence on the far eastern experts of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I intended to convey that I have no way of measuring whether the institute had any influence or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead with the reading of your statement, sir.

Senator SMITH. Could I ask him a question there?

Mr. Lattimore, during and after you were editor of the Pacific Affairs, did you have any conversations with any of the far eastern experts in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. During and after, yes.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, did you get any impression from them as to whether or not the articles that you had either edited or had printed, or written yourself, had any influence on them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You are asking me to throw my memory a long way back, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Well, of course, I am asking you to do just that, if you have a memory about that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can remember discussing this and that about the Far East many times with members of the Department of State.

Senator SMITH. With a good many members?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I could not give you a precise answer as to whether any article or publication was ever referred to, either one put out by the institute or one put out by somebody else.

Senator SMITH. Well, you discussed those articles with various men in the Far Eastern Division?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I think you misunderstood me, Senator. I say that I discussed far eastern matters, and I don't remember ever discussing with a member of the State Department any particular article, either one with which I had connection or one for which I had no responsibility.

Senator SMITH. With how many people in that Department did you discuss far eastern affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would find it impossible to tell you, Senator, how many people I ever knew in the Department, much less——

Senator SMITH. I did not ask you how many you knew in the Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Much less with how many I——

The CHAIRMAN. Won't you answer the question of Senator Smith? Do you understand the question? If you do not understand it, let us know and we will have it repeated.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question is, With how many people did I discuss? And the answer is, I have no way of telling.

Senator SMITH. Well, did you discuss it with many, or few?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Many or few is a subjective variation, and how many is "many," and how few is "few"?

Senator SMITH. I would have thought that you had some idea about the difference between "few" and "many," but if you do not have any conception of that, I can appreciate that you probably cannot answer the question and probably do not want to answer it. Now, what I am asking you now is: How many people did you discuss it with there? How many?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Do you know the names of some of them that you did discuss it with?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I could probably recollect some names of people with whom I have discussed it.

Senator SMITH. Suppose you give it to us.

Mr. LATTIMORE. But I wonder if it would be fair to mention the names of some people, and leave the names of other people out?

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question, if you will. A question has been propounded.

Senator SMITH. I am asking for all of them. We do not want you to leave out anybody; we do not want you to slight anybody.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I would like to point out that I have lived in many countries——

The CHAIRMAN. Now, just a minute, Mr. Lattimore. Just a minute. A question has been propounded to you, and do you care to answer it?

Read the question to the witness.

(The pending question was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Mr. Fortas.

Mr. FORTAS. I said to the witness, "Go ahead and state the names."

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to admonish you again, when the witness wants advice from you, he will indicate it.

Mr. FORTAS. The witness is supposed to turn to me?

The CHAIRMAN. Please conform to that rule.

Mr. FORTAS. I will, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I was just trying to make it plain to the Senator who asked me the question, that I am not trying to be evasive. I have lived in and met members of the State Department in many countries. When I changed my residence, very often the acquaintanceship would be dropped, and it might be renewed again later on. Consequently, I am not like a man who has been sitting in the same city all of his life and finds it easy to remember whom he knew in what year, and what he talked about, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. If you cannot remember, you can answer the Senator by saying you cannot remember; but there is a distinct question, very clearly pronounced to you, as to who you discussed it with, and name them all, he said, that you can remember. That, is no matter where you discussed it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I have discussed questions of the Far East—let us try and begin at the top with—I can't remember his name now. Just a moment. With Mr. John V. A. McMurray, when he was Minister in Peking in the late 1920's and early 1930's. And I have discussed questions of the Far East with Mr. Nelson T. Johnson, who was subsequently Minister and later Ambassador. And I have discussed them with Ambassador Clarence E. Dawes, in Chungking. And I have discussed them with Mr. Grew when he was Ambassador in Tokyo. And I believe I also met and probably talked about far eastern questions with Mr. Dunmon, who was in the Tokyo Embassy at the same time.

And then in Peking, below the top rank there would be—do you want me to include military attachés and people like that?

Senator SMITH. My question was as to persons in the State Department, connected with the State Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, all of these so far are State Department.

Let me see. There would also be Mr. John Carter Vincent. There would be the men—I don't remember their names now—who were our consuls in Mukden and Harbin in 1929 and 1930; members of our consulate in Tsinsing, especially in the 1920's, and I can't recall their names offhand at the moment.

And among people who were junior personnel in the early 1930's in Peking, there would be Mr. Edmund Clubb, Mr. Donald Service. There was a man named—what was it, Rice or Millet, or some kind of

grain—it was Mr. Ringwald; Mr. John Davies—there was Mr. James Penfield; and there is a man named Landon, I think, who was consul or consul general in Chungming in 1944, and afterward I believe he went to Korea. And there was Mr. George Atcheson, and probably a lot more, but they don't come to mind.

Senator SMITH. You do not recall any of the persons working here in Washington in the State Department that you talked to about this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, some of these people I met in China only, and some in Washington, and some both in China and in Washington.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, did you discuss with all of those, and others, the articles that were appearing in Pacific Affairs while you were the editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea, sir.

Senator SMITH. You have no recollection whatever?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think it is very likely that when I was out in Peking, for instance, a very small foreign community, and the new issue of Pacific Affairs had just arrived from the printer and been distributed, that somebody would say, "There is a good number this time. I like that article by So-and-So," or something of that sort. But I have no precise recollection.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any recollection whether you received any word either oral or written, by anyone in the State Department after the publication of particular articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is quite possible, but I don't recall any.

Senator SMITH. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not have thought that the magazine Pacific Affairs was a failure, if it had not had some influence on the State Department officials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I should point out at this moment, Senator, that Pacific Affairs was not an American magazine.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, whatever it was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was an international publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I tried to get as much circulation for it as I could in a number of countries.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what languages was that magazine published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In English.

Mr. SOURWINE. In English only?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was it printed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was printed in——

Mr. SOURWINE. In what country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Entirely in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Printed in the United States and mailed out from either New York or from wherever the printer was.

Mr. SOURWINE. What proportion of its circulation was within the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. You could get those figures.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it as high as 80 percent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would doubt it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it as high as 75 percent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I don't remember those ratios.

Senator FERGUSON. He has not answered my question, whether or not he would have considered it a failure if it had not had some effect upon the officials of the State Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have considered it a failure if it had not interested or if it had not been of interest to intelligent people working on far eastern problems.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you trying to influence—you indicate that it was a foreign paper as well as United States, and were you trying to influence the foreign policy of any other nation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, were you trying to influence the opinion of the public of America along far eastern affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not trying to influence anybody's opinion, Senator. I was trying to supply information to those interested.

Senator FERGUSON. But not trying to influence them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it was not a propaganda organ, in any sense.

Senator FERGUSON. No articles were printed, to your knowledge, to influence the opinion of people?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We published articles of opinion as well as articles of information. You are getting into an area there of the difference between an author's intent and an editor's intent.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you write any articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, as a writer, try to influence the opinion of the American public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't try to influence the opinion of the American public more than the opinion of anybody else who might read the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you try to influence anyone's opinion, and let us make it broad now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly, I had views of my own, and I marshalled my facts in connection with my own views. And incidentally, my views proceeded from the facts and not from the facts from the views.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you only publish those facts that you had personal knowledge of?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I published facts—in what sense do you mean "personal knowledge," Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing them from personal knowledge, personal experience.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, you mean not including something that I might have got from a written source?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, no. Certainly, I have often gone on written sources.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever allow anyone to write in the magazine under an alias?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Why was that done?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a very common practice.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, did you permit any Communists to write under an alias?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever try to find out whether any person who wrote under an alias was or was not a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that question ever arose.

Senator FERGUSON. Not even in your mind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not even in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not much concerned, then, with the question of communism while you were with the Institute of Pacific Relations, is that a fair statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the 1930's?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, any time while you were with the institute.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that you should draw a line there, Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. You draw the line.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Between when I was an editor and when——

Senator FERGUSON. When you were an editor, you were not concerned with the question of communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the 1930's, when I was editing that magazine, Senator, subjects like the Chinese Communists, and so on, were topics of general interest, and I tried to get information on those, but I never published an article that I believed to be by a Chinese Communist or promoting the Chinese Communists' cause.

However, in the 1930's, if it had been possible to get an article by a Chinese Communist giving the Chinese Communist point of view, that would have been such a news scoop that I might well have published it, with an identification of just what it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You would, then, have identified it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you at that time, in the 1930's, that you are talking about, believe that the Communists of China were agrarian reformers, or under the international communism from Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never believed that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers. I have always believed that they were right straight down-the-line Communists. I would like to qualify that, however, by pointing out that for many years the program of the Chinese Communists was based on winning a following amongst an agrarian population. I would like to point out, in connection with the ideological identity between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin Communists, that for many years the Chinese Communists were working in an isolated part of China where the belief among many experts is that it was impossible for them to have constant liaison with Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. You did understand this Communist problem, and you knew the difference between the Moscow Communists and those that might be just agrarian reformers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that I thought any Communists were just agrarian reformers.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the purpose of the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, the Chinese Communists, as far as I have known, have always claimed that they were straight Kremlin Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. They have never contended that they were just agrarian reformers, have they?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Senator WATKINS. Might I ask this question: Did you ever challenge the Communists, or write an editorial attacking communism and exposing it to the people of the United States and to the world, through this magazine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I was not an expert on communism, even Chinese communism, although I lived in China, and I published a number of articles very hostile to the Soviet Union and communism, by others, in Pacific Affairs.

Senator WATKINS. You do not remember about when those articles were published?

(Brief recess.)

Senator O'CONOR. The witness may proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let's see; I can remember William Henry Chamberlin.

Senator WATKINS. I said, your opinions were your own opinions, your own editorials that you wrote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I said, I was not writing on the subject of communism.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I want to find out, if you ever wrote an editorial on communism and exposed it and pointed out any of the dangers of communism to the free world.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was editing a magazine with all kinds of people contributing, and I published anti-Communist opinions. However, I was not an expert on the subject myself, and I did not write on the subject myself.

Senator WATKINS. You did write many editorials and wrote your own opinions, as you stated a moment ago?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not many editorials. I wrote articles. I think most of the articles that I wrote in Pacific Affairs were on my own specialty, which was Inner Mongolia.

Senator WATKINS. You say you did publish some articles that were anti-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. You could name those?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I can name some: William Henry Chamberlin; Harold Isaacs, a man who was the former Dutch Ambassador, Dutch Minister in China, Oudendyk, O-u-d-e-n-d-y-k.

Mr. SOURWINE. You list a number of such writers further on in your statement, do you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I do; yes.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever write on the subject of communism in your editorials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I ever wrote on the subject of communism as such in my editorials.

Senator WATKINS. Did you recognize at that time that there was a danger in communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recognized that communism was one of the important subjects in the Far East.

Senator WATKINS. You did not answer my question. I asked you if you recognized that there was a danger in communism to the free world.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in the sense that we recognize it now; no.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you did not recognize it at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I thought in the 1930's that communism was an extremely important subject in the Far East, but I did not have the same understanding of Communist conspiracy in long-range methods that I have today.

Senator WATKINS. Yet you have traveled extensively in Russia and in Asiatic countries where communism was rampant at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I had not traveled extensively in Russia. I had traveled in China, but had never been in Communist territory or Communist-infiltrated territory in China throughout my stay in China until almost the very end.

Senator WATKINS. You do not mean to say to this committee that you did not study communism or the writings that were put out in connection with it or the articles and books written by Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made no special study of communism.

Senator WATKINS. I have a further question here with reference to whether or not the State Department relied upon this information or was influenced by it. We had a witness before us, Mr. Lattimore, I think it was Dr. Fleugel, who said that they went to the Institute of Pacific Relations publications to get information because there were very few other sources from which they could get information on the Far East.

Do you care to comment on that, since you are a student of the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There were very few in that period. There were very few publications devoted exclusively to the Far East. There were, of course, articles on far-eastern subjects that came out in magazines like Foreign Affairs and in publications devoted to international relations in general, such as the publications of the Foreign Policy Association, but I believe that in those years, to the best of my recollection, the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations were the only ones that not only specialized on the Far East but were confined to the Far East.

Senator WATKINS. And you would know as a matter of fact from your general knowledge of what was being published, written and published on the Far East, that the Institute of Pacific Relations articles were probably about the—well, they comprised the major part of literature at that time on that subject?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't know whether they comprised the major part of the literature, I think they comprise the important part.

Senator WATKINS. You are an expert on far-eastern affairs; you would naturally keep in touch with these publications, all articles written? It would be part of your job to read them and analyze them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Even in those days, Senator, the volume coming out was too much for one man. You see, the Institute of Pacific Relations dealt with everything from Asiatic Siberia down to Indonesia, and even in those days no one man could possibly be an expert on all the countries comprised within that enormous geographical range.

Senator WATKINS. Well, I understand you probably could not be acquainted with all of them, but it would seem to me that having taken on the position of editor of this magazine that dealt in foreign affairs and studied those problems, that presented facts in connection with them, that you or your staff would survey all of the current articles and the literature on the subject for review and for presentation to keep your readers informed of what was going on in the Far East.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me tell you there, Senator, the method of editing was rather different from that. I was only one person and

usually had no help except a secretary. So the method of editing and editorial evaluation, whether an article was worth publication or not, was by circulating typescript copies of articles to all countries.

You see, this magazine came out only once in 3 months, so the rate of publication was rather leisurely. If, for instance, we had an article by an Englishman affecting Dutch Indonesia, we would send that article to somebody in Holland as well as to people in America interested in the subject and similarly with all of the questions. They were, practically all the material in Pacific Affairs, had extensive prepublication circulation and was seen by a number of people.

If any questions were raised, they were always referred back to the author.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, you may continue your statement. I think you were just at the latter part of the second paragraph on the first page.

Mr. Lattimore. I am still in the first part of the second paragraph, so if I may resume so that readers will not lose track of the sense——

Senator O'Conor. You have been over the first part three or four times, the "assiduously conveyed."

Mr. Lattimore. But the sentence hasn't been finished yet.

Senator O'Conor. You would prefer to go back and continue that?

I wonder whether we could withhold our questioning until the whole paragraph is read?

Mr. Lattimore. That would accord with my interest in the subject, Senator.

The impression has been assiduously conveyed in your proceedings that I am a Communist or a Communist sympathizer or dupe; that I master-minded the Institute of Pacific Relations; that the Institute of Pacific Relations and I master-minded the far eastern experts of the State Department; and that the State Department "sold" China to the Russians. Every one of these is false—utterly and completely false.

Senator Ferguson. He has finished that sentence, and before he gets to the next one, could I ask a question?

Senator O'Conor. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Do you claim that you know and say that the State Department sold China to the Russians—that is, you have personal knowledge that that is utterly and completely false, or are you talking about your own——

Mr. Lattimore. I am talking about a dependent clause of this sentence beginning, "The impression has been assiduously conveyed that," and so forth.

Senator Ferguson. That the State Department sold China to the Russians?

Mr. Lattimore. But not conveyed by me. But not conveyed by me, and not believed by me.

Mr. Sourwine. Might I ask a clarifying question?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any doubt about the Russian domination of China today?

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, that is a very controversial question.

Mr. Sourwine. Then you do have doubt?

Mr. Lattimore. Some people believe. I would like to state my opinion in a moment, but I would like to state it in a balanced way.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was attempting to clarify, not to bring forth a lengthy statement. If it does not clarify, I would withdraw it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Some people maintain that China is controlled in each and every detail by the Russians. Others believe that China is controlled by the Chinese Communists, but that the Chinese Communists are allies rather than subordinates of the Russians. I would incline to the second opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am afraid the question did not help clarify, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I could ask a number of questions right there, but I think I will pass them.

Senator O'CONOR. Just proceed, Mr. Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Because I think it is contradictory to what he said, that they were Communists dominated by Russia, and I will go back and take the other statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That point, Senator, I think I should——

Senator FERGUSON. Clarify?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Clarify myself.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I spoke of my belief that the Chinese Communists consider themselves completely—ideologically completely—in conformity with Russian ideas of communism. That is a question of ideological conformity, and not a question of operational control.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any Communists that are actually Communists, as you claim they are, that are not under the control of the Communist Party of Russia, the Kremlin?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I believe that in the case of the Chinese Communists, owing to questions of time and distance and lack of personnel, and so forth, it would be extremely difficult for the Russians to have operational control of every detail of the Chinese Communist action in China even if they wanted it and even if the Chinese Communists were willing to concede it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you do not believe that Russia is dominating the war in Korea as far as the Chinese are concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If I knew the answer to that question, Senator, I would be in Wall Street making a lot of money.

Senator FERGUSON. In what way would you be making money out of that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it would be extremely valuable information to know exactly who is controlling how much.

Senator FERGUSON. Who do you think would pay you for that opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I could probably go to the market.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not say that that was the prevalent opinion in the United States—that they are dominating the action of the Communists of China in Korea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether it is the prevalent opinion or not. I know that many well-informed people in England and India believe that the initiative there is held by the Chinese rather than by the Russians.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know enough about it to decide either one way or the other. That is why I say if I did know I think it would be useful knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would think that Russia would classify as a neutral as far as Korea is concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question itself is somewhat of a non sequitur; isn't it, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you. Would you classify it as a neutral?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you do have some opinion on it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have an opinion, but not a precise opinion that I would go to bat for. I recognize the limits of my own knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask two questions?

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department, the American State Department, make the policy which the American Government followed with respect to China over the last 7 or 8 years?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know enough about it to tell you, Mr. Sourwine, how far it was made by the State Department, how far by the White House, how far by the advice of the armed services, how far perhaps by the Treasury, how far by the Congress.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that hindsight indicates that there were any mistakes in the policy which was followed by this country with regard to China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would make a distinction there, Mr. Sourwine. In fact, I try to make it later in my statement, between mistakes and lack of success.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good. Could we go ahead with the statement, Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Except for this one question. Mr. Lattimore, you have indicated that you were not entirely informed as to the relative importance of the different agencies or departments or individuals. May I ask if you, during that time, had any connection with the State Department or the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In a policy making?

Senator O'CONOR. In any capacity.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No connection other than that of an ordinary citizen, probably as a matter of fact less connection than any far-eastern representative in this country.

Senator O'CONOR. Were you prior to that time or at that time having any connection with the State Department or the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never been stationed in the employ of either the State Department or the White House with the distinction, which is a technical distinction, but perhaps I had better mention it, that when I was on a mission in Japan, which was a White House mission, the pay checks for some reason—some bureaucratic reason that is beyond my ken—were sent out by the State Department rather than by the White House.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you occupy any space in either the State Department or the White House or any adjunct of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not by right. This question has come up before.

Senator O'CONOR. At all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I dealt with it later in my statement, but I don't mind going into it now if you like. At one time when I was

working for Chiang Kai-shek and when my functions were largely liaison functions between Chang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt, I was back in this country. and Mr. Lauchlin Currie, who was the executive assistant to President Roosevelt, who was in charge of most of Mr. Roosevelt's interest in the China problem, offered me the courtesy, not the right, of the use of a room adjoining his own office.

That room was—there has been a great deal of confusion about it because that room was in the Old State, War, and Navy Building. The question was raised whether I had an office in the State Department. I confess I wasn't bright enough to tumble to it right away because that building housed, besides the State Department, a large part of the Executive Offices of the President and also the Bureau of the Budget. It was a multioffice building. But I did have the use of an office that was physically located in that building but was not regarded by anybody concerned as a part of the State Department.

Senator O'CONOR. Will you then proceed to your statement, Mr. Lattimore, please?

Senator FERGUSON. I might just ask one question here. Is it a fair assumption, then, that while you were editor of the Pacific Affairs the State Department was avoiding your judgment or your opinion as an expert in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That during the period I was editing Pacific Affairs the State Department was avoiding?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; is that a fair assumption?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Avoiding what?

Senator FERGUSON. Your——

Mr. LATTIMORE. My opinion or avoiding Pacific Affairs?

Senator FERGUSON. Your opinion.

Mr. LATTIMORE. One has to draw a delicate line between disregard and avoidance.

Senator FERGUSON. Avoidance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the State Department was disregarding your opinion?

Senator O'CONOR. Let him answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they avoiding getting in touch with you as an expert?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so. Of course, the manner and attitude of the State Department in those days was rather top-lofty and full of hauteur, so I suppose the mere civilian crawling on the ground might feel that he was being avoided, but I don't know whether it would be a just accusation.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you feel that you were being avoided?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't feel that I was being regarded.

Senator O'CONOR. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, are you familiar with exhibit 229 introduced in the public record of this hearing on August 23, 1951, being a letter from Mr. Sumner Welles to Mr. Edward C. Carter, in which Mr. Welles stated that—

> While for obvious reasons the Department of State has necessarily adopted the practice of refraining from enforcing or sponsoring any particular private organization, I am glad to say that in the opinion of officers of the Department who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations the publications of the institute have been of interest and value, and the institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion.

Did you have that in mind at all in the answers you have just given?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't have that in mind. Now that you read it out it seems to me a sort of standard formula that any Government office sents out to any private organization that sends its publications and hopes for a pat on the head. They didn't want to give in their public relations any idea of scorning anybody.

Mr. SOURWINE. I apologize for that diversion, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. All right. Now the next paragraph, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Concerning my reputation and character, you have now for many months been publishing to the world an incredible mass of unsubstantiated accusations, allegations, and insinuations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who does the witness mean by "you"?

Senator O'CONOR. May I ask, Mr. Sourwine, it will expedite if we read the entire paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right.

Senator O'CONOR. Will you continue on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. For months a long line of witnesses has set me in the midst of a murky atmosphere of pretended plots and conspiracies so that it is now practically impossible for my fellow citizens to follow in detail the specific refutation of each lie and smear.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, who do you mean by "you" as used in the first line of that paragraph? You mean this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. By "you" I mean the committee was responsible for conducting and publishing these proceedings. Later on in my statement I raise the point that I do not know whether some of the initial responsibility is that of the committee or that of its staff.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that apparently there is no doubt about whom he means. He starts out in the first sentence, "Senators." He is talking to us.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I wanted to ask the witness, Mr. Chairman, is whether to his knowledge the committee has published anything except the hearings which have been held.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have these hearings consisted of anything except the testimony of witnesses under oath?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have something to say later about the manner in which that testimony has been elicited and presented.

I should, in fact, be less than frank if I did not confess that I see no hope that your committee will fairly appraise the facts; and I believe I owe it to you to state the reasons.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean by that, sir, to charge that the committee is hopelessly biased?

Mr. LALLIMORE. I give, I say here, that I owe it to you to state the reasons.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is, What do you mean? Do you mean to charge that the committee is hopelessly biased?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I mean that I am going to state the reasons for which I believe that; that I have no hope that this committee will fairly appraise the facts.

Mr. SOURWINE. By saying that you have no hope that this committee will fairly appraise the facts, do you mean to charge that the committee is hopelessly biased against you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I try to make clear later in the statement, I don't know, I am in no position to know how much of this responsibility is divided between the committee and its staff.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, what you do in that sentence is to charge this committee with bad faith. Is that what you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am stating here my own lack of hope that this committee would fairly appraise.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, Senator Smith asked you a simple question, whether you do or do not make such charge.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether it's lack of faith or prejudice, Senator.

Senator SMITH. You say "* * * I see no hope that your committee will fairly appraise the facts."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Now, if we would fairly appraise the facts, you would say we would be acting in good faith, if we did fairly appraise the facts? You say we would act in good faith; would you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly.

Senator SMITH. Now then, you say, therefore, if according to your reasoning as stated here that we were not fairly appraising the facts that is tantamount to saying that we are acting in bad faith; is that what you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I base—I give my reasons, later on.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking for reasons; I am asking about that sentence.

Senator O'CONOR. Is it not possible to give a categorical answer?

Senator SMITH. Not the reason, the meaning of those words.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, there is a difference between bad faith and prejudgment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you attempting to make a technical distinction between bias and prejudice?

Senator O'CONOR. Just a minute; he ought to be permitted to complete his answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I base this statement here largely on the fact that the chairman of this committee at a time that the hearings are still in progress and before all the evidence is in has stated in print in a published interview as his "curbstone opinion" that the IPR originally was an organization with laudable motives. It was taken over by Communist design and made a vehicle for attempted control and conditioning of American thinking and American policy with regard to the Far East.

It was also used for espionage purposes to collect and channel information of interest or value to the Russian Communists. That was, in my opinion——

Senator O'CONOR. Will you just identify that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is the United States News and World—it's quoted later in my statement. United States News and World Report of this city, and the date is November 16, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire at this point? Would it interrupt Senator Smith?

I would simply like to inquire, Mr. Lattimore, do you know that at the time the chairman made that statement this committee had taken five volumes of testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea, Mr. Sourwine, of how much the committee had scooped up or what it scooped it up in, but I am aware that the hearings are not complete, that this is a prejudgment in a hearing that is still under process where most of the accused have not yet been heard.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean, Mr. Lattimore, to imply your feeling that the chairman of the committee had no right to form for himself a personal opinion as to what the testimony up to that point indicated?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I am merely pointing out that when the chairman of this committee makes a public statement of this kind in a publication that goes to many thousands of people and may, therefore, influence public opinion while the hearing is still in process, it deprives me of hope that the committee will fairly appraise the facts.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, were you taking this statement of what you read of the chairman as a personal one to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am taking it as a statement on this whole inquiry of which I am a part.

Senator FERGUSON. Could it be possible that evidence in this committee does show exactly what the chairman said? Leave yourself out of it. I am talking about the other evidence not concerning you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean accusatory evidence, some of it rather obviously biased and prejudiced with no clarification from the many defendants yet in the picture? No, I don't think it's possible to make a fair appraisal under those circumstances.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that if seven or eight witnesses who wrote for IPR had appeared in this room and when asked the question at the time that they wrote as to whether or not they were or were not Communists and they refused to answer on the ground that it might tend to incriminate them after there was evidence in the record that they were Communists; that this IPR then had been penetrated by Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am saying here——

Senator FERGUSON. Answer my question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I see no hope——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you what you see.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That the committee will fairly appraise the facts as they regard me.

Senator FERGUSON. Answer my question. With seven or eight witnesses testifying as I have said, would you say it would be a fair statement by the chairman that it had been penetrated by Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I come to the question of these witnesses later in my statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you answer my questions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the moment I would say that it is a biased and prejudiced action to make a public statement of this kind from such a position of responsibility as the chairman of this committee at any time before all the evidence is in, including the rebuttal evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, you have made the statement that there was not any Communist influence in this. Do you not think it would have been well for you to hold your opinion until all the evidence was in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Excuse me, Senator, the discussion up to this point has not been about whether there was any Communist influence in such a vague thing as "in all this" or "in this," I forget your exact terms. The discussion has been about Pacific Affairs, which I edited, and about my responsibility for that.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not named in the United States Reports, are you? Your name was not used in relation to this sentence that you read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As one of those who for the first time in something like 8 months is being given an opportunity to say something in public for himself, I think I am entitled to make that statement, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were named in this statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I was not named.

Senator FERGUSON. In relation to the sentence——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not named, but the statement which I am quoting is one of a kind to implicate anybody concerned with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you adopt that sentence as meaning you when there was other testimony in the record showing that Communists had penetrated the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am simply referring to a statement made while an investigation is still in process which I consider a prejudicial statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you are criticizing the Chair for making a statement when there was evidence in this record showing that Communists had penetrated. I am leaving you out of the question entirely, that Communists had penetrated the IPR. You are criticizing the chairman's statement of that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not see the justification, Senator, for such a statement in characterization of the whole when the evidence applies to only a part. This statement does not say in part or as far as the hearings have gone, or without prejudice to those who may be innocent, or anything of that kind. There is no reservation in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that that statement indicates that everyone connected with the IPR was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that statement means exactly what it says.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it say that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That Senator McCarran came to the conclusion that it was taken over by Communist design and made a vehicle and so forth and that it was also used for espionage purposes. The fact that some individuals may have refused to testify whether they were ever Communists is thus creating a belief in any reasonable mind that they probably were at one time Communists or may still be Communists is still not evidence that they took over the institute or that they controlled it or that they used it for conveying information to Soviet Russia.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Lattimore, you understand that this is a seven-man committee, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. And that the chairman obviously was not trying to speak for anybody but himself. As far as I am concerned I am trying to keep my mind open on this question, and it does not help any for you to come along and make charges like that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I appreciate that.

Senator SMITH. Was there any question that Field was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he has refused to testify, hasn't he?

Senator SMITH. I thought he admitted.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know; is it in the record?

Senator SMITH. He had a Communist demonstration before the White House, did he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know what the record has in that respect, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Have you read all this record now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I read most of it once. Some of the more recent testimony that hasn't been printed I haven't read yet.

Senator SMITH. Could you reach any conclusion if you did not have any interest in this matter, the same as Senator McCarran, as far as it has gone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My primary conclusion on reading the record, as I state precisely later on, is that the record shows that no witness has been subjected to examination, much less cross-examination, to test his veracity or the validity of his evidence.

Senator SMITH. Do you understand that this is a trial or it is in the nature of a grand jury procedure? You know the difference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry I don't.

Senator SMITH. You know that a grand jury proceeding is one in which you are trying to get facts on which to base a charge. This is a grand jury. In a trial you say, "This man is accused of being guilty. Is he innocent or guilty?" You see a distinction, I know, between those. You understand that this was an inquiry in the nature of a grand jury proceeding to see what are the facts on which charges might be based. I guess your counsel will agree with that distinction.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, wouldn't even an all-powerful and careful grand jury be somewhat interested in the quality of its witnesses?

Senator SMITH. Absolutely, but you cannot do everything in one hearing or 1 day or for that matter 1 year.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, could we have a recess?

Mr. SOURWINE. Could I have just one question to tie up that paragraph and then go to the recess?

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think the question has been asked before, but not directly answered. When you said that you saw no hope that this committee would fairly appraise the facts, did you mean to charge that the committee is biased?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that question has been asked in at least two or three forms already, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think it has. Will you answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My feeling I expressed as clearly as possible in the words I have here, simply that I see no hope that this committee will fairly appraise the facts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you make a technical distinction between inability to appraise the facts fairly and being biased?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Those aren't the only two alternatives, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you make a technical distinction between those two alternatives?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not make a technical distinction between those two alternatives only when they are not the only alternatives that apply to this instance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you make a technical distinction between those and other alternatives?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will say that my statement is primarily based on the impression that I have from a reading of the proceedings as they have thus far been published of a general attitude of minds being made up in advance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not think that being biased and being unable fairly to appraise the facts are substantially the same thing? Do you want to make a distinction between them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I am no scholar of philosophy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want to make a distinction between them? Do you want to make a distinction here between being biased and being unable fairly to appraise the facts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Being biased or being unable to——

Mr. SOURWINE. Fairly appraise the facts.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I will rejoin the split infinitive, unable to appraise the facts fairly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw that question. I am anxious to get over to the next page where Mr. Lattimore makes it clear that he is opposed to making a technical distinction.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment; I might ask a question.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. There is not any doubt, Mr. Lattimore, that you have made up your mind about the committee as to what you read from the United States Reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made up my mind primarily on one thing, Senator, and that is that I am an innocent man.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you say that your opinion is biased about this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, if you want to go on with this game of semantics, I would say that from my point of view if you draw a diagram I stand at the center of this picture and it's very hard to be biased in the center. You can be biased at any point departing from the center, but it's extremely difficult to be biased at the center, to stand at the center as I am and you are what you are.

Senator O'CONOR. We will take a recess now until 20 minutes after 4.

(A short recess was taken.)

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please come to order.

All right, Mr. Lattimore, will you proceed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To give a false appearance of reality to this nightmare of outrageous lies, shaky hearsay, and undisguised personal spite, the subcommittee has put into the record letters, memoranda, book reviews, and other items from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, that is a long paragraph. Might I ask a question at the end of that sentence?

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Dr. Lattimore, who do you charge with "undisguised personal spite"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That comes later in my statement, Mr. Sourwine.

Senator SMITH. Let us hear it now; I know I have no personal spite.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am glad you don't.

Senator SMITH. Why should I?

Senator WATKINS. I am in the same position I indicated. nobody makes up my mind. I say you are not helping by discussing the committee to start with.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am trying to say that the subcommittee started to put into the record letters, memoranda, book reviews, and other items.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who do you charge with "undisguised personal spite," sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I look through the——

Mr. SOURWINE. You know who you refer to. Do you have to read that statement to learn who you refer to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One rather obvious example of personal spite is one of your former employees, Miss Freda Utley. I should say——

Mr. SOURWINE. Has Miss Utley testified before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Miss Utley was in the employ of this committee and presumably helped to recruit and prepare some of the other witnesses.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know any witness that Miss Utley has helped to recruit, Mr. Lattimore?

Senator O'CONOR. Just a moment; Mr. Morris has a question.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any one witness who Miss Utley helped to recruit for this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea. I know that Miss Utley showed her personal spite when she testified.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. When she testified before the Tydings committee a couple of years ago, and then she was hired by this committee for a couple of months.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you referred to "this nightmare," were you referring to the proceedings of the Tydings committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was referring "to this nightmare of outrageous lies, shaky hearsay, and undisguised personal spite," presented before this subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Now the "undisguised personal spite" that you refer to as presented——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Which includes Karl Wittfogel, would be a good example. I should think Professor McGovern and Professor Colegrove, both of Northwestern University.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now we are getting at it. Who else would you include in your charges of "undisguised personal spite"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I have read through and endeavored to clarify as much as one brain can hold it, an enormous mass of testimony already issued by this committee, and if you will give me time I would be very glad to come in tomorrow with some more specific identifications.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Here is a fairly simple statement, "and undisguised personal spite." That means personal spite that anybody can see; that is undisguised. Now if the author cannot tell us who it is that has this spite, I do not know whether we should even consider this statement any more if it is so flimsy that he cannot tell you who it is that has personal spite.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have given certain examples.

Senator SMITH. You have not named anybody on this committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presented before.

Senator O'CONOR. Are we to understand, then, Mr. Lattimore, that you do not intend that to be applicable to any member of this committee?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, your whole sentence says the subcommittee has done something and tells why you think the committee has done it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The subcommittee has put into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. Why do you say that the committee has put into the record certain things? Do you not say that the subcommittee has done that "to give a false appearance of reality to this nightmare * * *," meaning the proceedings of this subcommittee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say "this nightmare of outrageous lies, shaky hearsay, and undisguised personal spite * * *." Are you not then charging that this subcommittee has done certain things, namely, put matters into the record in order "to give a false appearance of reality" to the proceedings of this committee? Is that not what you are saying there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "To give a false appearance of reality to this nightmare of outrageous lies, shaky headsay, and undisguised personal spite," and so forth. I specified below that a large part of this comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have indentified——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said on the previous page—no, at the top of this page—that I do not believe, that I have no hope, that this committee will fairly appraise the facts, and this is part of my supporting statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not challenging you on what you are saying, sir, at the moment; I am trying to make the record clear as to what precisely you are charging. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This material has been presented in such confusion, and years and dates have been so jumbled, as to make it impossible for ordinary citizens who are not experts on the Far East to judge whether a problem is being discussed as it was at the time, as it might have been, or as it is now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have two questions about that sentence. You say the material has been presented in confusion, sir. Did you find it confusing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that years and dates have been jumbled. Is there any document that you know of that has been introduced in the hearing record to date which has been misidentified as to date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I mean a confusion in the order in which dates and subjects have been presented.

Mr. SOURWINE. You take issue with the order in which they have been presented. Will you answer as to your knowledge whether any document has been put in the record and improperly identified as to date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know of no such example, and I wasn't talking about any such thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. You are criticizing the committee for taking a witness and going through that particular witness on documents and dates even though it may skip certain periods. You would want the committee to bring a witness back, have all the witnesses here, and put it in, all the testimony of 1 year, in at that period so that you could judge the evidence of all the witnesses for a particular year; is that what you are after?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, my impression from trying to go through all this material and reduce it to some order for the purpose of answering these charges against me is that it is extremely difficult to do so because the allegations jump all over the place from year to year, the documents of different years are introduced at various points.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not because witnesses have knowledge of certain documents and not knowledge of other documents?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, Senator. To some extent the presentation of documents seems to have been, according to the record, at the instance of counsel of the committee rather than of the witnesses themselves in some cases at least.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask a question.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, you realize that every witness that has testified has testified under oath here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Quite so.

Senator SMITH. Do you recognize that that system of having witnesses in courts or what-not under oath is the only system that you can have when you start to take the testimony of a person? You would say, would you not, that when a court swears a witness to testify to the truth that is all the court can do at the moment; is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. The court cannot know in advance what the witness is going to say precisely; can it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, in the case of this committee the practice apparently has been to hear every witness, or practically every witness, in executive session before and then to hear them in public. By the time the public record is published it includes a number of references showing that witnesses have been questioned on the basis of something that they have previously said in executive testimony which would presumably give the maximum opportunity for presenting problems in chronological order and with the documents for those problems introduced at that point in the record.

Senator SMITH. You approve of having executive sessions to first give the witness a chance to testify without publication; do you not, or do you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never been a Senator, Senator, and I can't solve that kind of problem.

Senator SMITH. I am asking you whether or not you prefer to have and think it would be fair to have an executive session first to try to get at the facts before they were brought out in public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never had the responsibility of handling that kind of problem.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking you that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I just don't want to give an off-the-cuff answer on a problem I have never handled.

Senator SMITH. How would you conduct an investigation of this sort if you were trying to get at the facts? Would you first have the witness sworn or would you take him unsworn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator, I certainly would not let months and months go by before people who have been accused of very vile charges——

Senator SMITH. I did not ask you that question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not given a rebuttal.

Senator SMITH. I am asking you how, step by step, you would conduct an investigation. Would you first swear the witness, or would you prefer to have him unsworn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Have any witnesses been unsworn?

Senator SMITH. No; I said would you prefer to have a witness sworn or unsworn.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, Senator; you are asking technical questions.

Senator SMITH. Not at all. I am going to the question of whether or not this committee has gone on in good faith in swearing witnesses to try to get the truth.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I said nothing about swearing witnesses.

Senator SMITH. But you attacked the committee here. You said that it is "To give a false appearance." That is what you said we are trying to do, give a "false appearance of reality to this nightmare of outrageous lies, shaky hearsay, and undisguised personal spite." Up to now you have not pointed out who on this committee has personal spite against you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have.

Senator O'CONOR. What did you say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have.

Senator WATKINS. On the committee?

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Smith said "on the committee," said you disavowed that previously?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, no, thank you.

Senator SMITH. So you do not want to tell us how you would proceed in conducting an investigation when you are trying to get the facts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't think my amateur opinion of how——

Senator SMITH. Do you not know that what we are doing here is trying to get the facts? Nobody has been charged with a crime so far as I know here. Do you not understand that we are just merely trying to get the facts to start with?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am saying that I should have liked to see witnesses given an earlier opportunity to answer charges. I should

like to see some examination and cross-examination. Those are questions on which I can answer. The question on whether you ask a witness to swear standing on his head or sitting down, that kind of thing, is just beyond my competence.

Senator SMITH. We have asked you to testify under oath; have we not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And you are testifying under oath?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am.

Senator SMITH. And we are cross-examining you; are we not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. What is the question about that? You have a chance to say anything you want to say.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I haven't accused anybody of being a Communist on inadequate evidence, but I am being cross-examined.

Senator SMITH. Who has?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A whole string of your witnesses.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who are you accusing of what?

Senator SMITH. They swear under oath.

Mr. LATTIMORE. But they haven't been cross-examined.

Senator SMITH. Well, whenever they get ready to charge anybody with being a Communist, they will be cross-examined at the trial of the case. We are not trying the case now. You seem to misconceive the purpose of an investigation, that is just to get the facts to start with. I would not want you accused here without giving you a full chance to reply, not at all. That is the reason I understood we were going to hear everything you have to say, and I am in favor of that, giving you a chance to explain everything.

Senator WATKINS. This is not a trial, Mr. Lattimore. If you were in court and said the things you said to this committee to a court, you would be promptly held in contempt of court and would be in jail. So this is not a trial. You are getting a lot better treatment than you would get in a trial if you made those statements to the judge.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have made a statement here which I have been working on for months, in which I have tried to give as orderly as possible a presentation of what I want to say in as orderly a way as I know how to do it. I have made my statement and then bring in what else I have to——

Senator WATKINS. Do you want us to consider it fairly, impartially, and without bias? Answer me that. Do you want us to consider it that way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly.

Senator WATKINS. Why do you start out abusing us if you want us to do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have to characterize the kind of evidence that has been piled into this record.

Senator WATKINS. You are not characterizing the evidence; you are characterizing the committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I am characterizing the way in which this kind of evidence has been piled up with no opportunity for rebuttal, and very important, I think.

Senator WATKINS. You are here for rebuttal now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And no testing of the credibility or veracity of the witnesses.

Senator SMITH. How do you think we ought to test your credibility and your veracity? We are taking you on what you say. How do you say we test your credibility and veracity right now in your own case?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I think all of you are doing the best you can.

Senator SMITH. We are doing just what you said we were not doing then; are we not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator, I think that the kind of examination to which I have been subjected for several hours now, has been rather markedly absent in the case of some of the witnesses who have been making the accusations to which I am trying to reply.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, you are accusing, are you not, certain witnesses coming before this committee with outrageous lies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you are saying about other witnesses?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now why do you then censure other witnesses who came in to say that you had not told the truth? Why should you censure them and not want them to censure you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I think that thus far I have probably not read a complete sentence without interruption, whereas the witnesses to whom I refer have been given a very free hand.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone accuse you——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Without the same kind of——

Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone accuse you as being an outrageous liar?

Mr. LATTIMORE. By implication, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. You are using not implications but the exact words.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They are accusing me of being a Communist, and I am denying it. Wouldn't that be an obvious lie?

Senator SMITH. We do not know whether it is or not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All I am trying to do, Senator, is to get out a straight statement.

Senator O'CONOR. Just a minute, Mr. Lattimore is speaking. Go ahead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am not legally trained myself. I am trying to read a statement that I have made in as simple English as I can, and I have been interrupted repeatedly. I don't want to give an impression of evasiveness or hair-splitting or anything of that kind, but I cannot help but be conscious of what I believe is one difference between the grand jury procedure which you yourself mentioned not long ago and this kind of procedure, namely, that I believe that a grand jury is not usually composed exclusively of trained lawyers.

Senator SMITH. I do not know of any grand jury——

Mr. LATTIMORE. When on the other hand I am perhaps unwarrantedly aware of the fact that I am sitting here under conditions in which my own lawyer is not allowed to tender advice to me while I am asked rather complicated questions involving legal points which might be pitfalls for me, to which I have to try to reply to the best of my ability.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, is that not begging the question? You were advised, and if you were not advised, you are now, that on any of these so-called complicated questions if you are unable to comprehend them you have the right to consult with your counsel. Why do you give the impression in the record that you are being deprived of the right of consultation with counsel?

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, my counsel is not allowed to intervene at any time.

Senator O'Conor. You are allowed to consult him.

Mr. Lattimore. At any time he thinks I may need advice and I in my ignorance may be at the most need of advice at any moment——

Senator O'Conor. It is evident that you know when you need advice, and you know better than anybody else when you need it.

Senator Watkins. Most of the witness' statements up to date have been charges against the committee, and now he is including some of the witnesses, and I think the committee had the right immediately to find out what he meant by what he was saying, who and all that.

Now we had not had any witness before that has shown the contempt for the committee that this witness has and made the charges that he has. I think we have had a perfect right to question him on that. I think he comes in and says he cannot get a fair trial, and immediately afterward he will say he did not have a fair trial.

I came here with an open mind to try to get your statement. When you keep on attacking and attacking it seems to me you cannot be fair.

Mr. Fortas. I am counsel for Mr. Lattimore. Do I have the privilege of saying something here?

Senator Smith. If you can give us any facts, I say you should.

Senator O'Conor. What did you wish to say?

Mr. Fortas. I wish to address myself to this program that the distinguished Senator Smith raised—that is, about procedure. It is, after all, a legal question. It is very difficult for a lawyer to sit here and hear statements that affect the interest of his client and to be in a position where he can't say anything. I am sure that all of you gentlemen who are distinguished lawyers appreciate that.

Now as to Mr. Lattimore's consulting with me, he is sitting here under an intense barrage questions from one, two, three, four, five distinguished gentlemen, and his concentration is intense upon those questions, and obviously he can't be expected to know when to consult counsel.

Now of course I have a very fundamental difference of opinion with Senator Smith as to the purpose of a Senate investigation. I believe that the purpose of a Senate investigation is to develop the facts, both sides of the facts, impartially and fairly. It is not my position or my prerogative to say whether that has been achieved here or not. I haven't read your hearings, and it is none of my business here. But it does seem to me that when Mr. Lattimore is confronted with a choice as to whether this is a grand jury or petty jury proceeding that he is obviously at a serious disadvantage.

If Senator Smith says that it is like a grand jury proceeding, it's like a grand jury proceeding so far as Mr. Lattimore is concerned. To me there are a great many differences.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may suggest it, this witness has read a page and a half of this statement. The statement says that "I believe I owe it to you to state the reasons for what is a serious accusation of this

committee." As I read the statement it is a serious accusation of the committee, and I have read the statement, and he proceeds to set forth the reasons why he makes that accusation. He may be right; he may be wrong. He may be justified; he may be completely unjustified, but, Senator, may I respectfully beg of you that the witness be allowed to lay before the members of this committee, most of whom, I take it, have not read the statement, what the reasons are and then may I respectfully suggest that you go ahead and cross-examine him on it, but I suggest that no human being can present a statement in that fashion.

I know many of you gentlemen; I have the greatest respect for all of you, and I am sure that it is merely because you do not realize, as I keenly do, the strain under which this man is and has been for many days and many weeks that causes this. I beg your pardon, Senator, for getting emotional about this, but I do believe that it should be said.

Senator O'Conor. The committee has considered the matters. The sessions are not to be prolonged; certainly they have not been thus far. We did not begin until some time approaching 3 o'clock. At the request of the witness a recess was taken, and we are going to continue only to 5 o'clock. So that in full time he will not have been on the stand much over 2 hours, so it is not too long. He has enjoyed advice of counsel during the preparation of the statement, and he has shown himself to be capable.

The point I was making is that he was giving an erroneous impression that he is not enjoying advice of counsel. The point is that he has the right to advise with you at any time. If that has not been sufficiently indicated before, it has now.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Fortas, if this were a grand jury procedure you would not be entitled to be in the grand jury.

Mr. Fortas. No, and he would not be confronted with a group of skilled lawyers.

Senator Ferguson. Would he not have the Attorney General and would he not have any number of assistants to the Attorney General and would he not be before the grand jury?

Mr. Fortas. The point I am making, and I beg of you to consider, is a human matter. The point that I am making to you is that the strain upon a witness of having questions shot at him, which is perfectly appropriate procedure, I am not criticizing you, I am asking you to bear in mind that strain, of having questions shot at him by a number of very skillful lawyers, is very great indeed, and it is so great as to preclude his use with ordinary intelligence of the availability of counsel for consultation.

Senator Ferguson. What length of sessions would you desire?

Mr. Fortas. It's not a matter of the length of session. You have been very kind, and when I saw the witness was under great fatigue and asked the chairman for a recess I got it, and I am sure that you will continue to extend that courtesy. But, gentlemen, these proceedings are a tremendous strain. I have seen that with people that I have handled, and I beg you to keep that in mind and let this man lay out these reasons which will retraverse many of the things which you have already asked him.

Senator Ferguson. You are again asking this committee to conduct the examination by allowing the witness to read this statement without cross-examination?

Mr. FORTAS. No; I am not.

Senator FERGUSON. I, for one, do not believe that that is the way to conduct this examination. You and I differ on that problem. I am sure, Mr. Fortas, that if you were over here you would want to ask some questions.

Mr. FORTAS. I don't know what my attitude would be, Senator. I am sure that I would want to have the witness say what he had to say in an orderly fashion. I don't believe this witness has done it.

Senator SMITH. I think the difficulty there, Mr. Chairman, is that these statments which we have cross-examined him on are manifestly unfair statements which he has made about the committee and about witnesses. Now I can understand how Mr. Lattimore might sit down and write this or dictate it in a free-hand fashion and make statements that he does not have proof of, and that is a thing that he can do until he is challenged.

We are challenging Mr. Lattimore's statement that we are trying to give a false appearance; we are challenging the statement that the committee will not fairly appraise the facts, not that it is not able to do so but will fairly appraise the facts. That is to say that we will improperly and unfairly appraise the facts.

I resent that because I do not think this committee has any prejudice against Mr. Lattimore; certainly I do not have, and I do not believe the rest of you have. We may have had witnesses that were prejudiced against him, but that is not our fault as long as we swear them to tell the truth.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, may I take up one thing?

Senator O'CONNOR. The witness.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Namely, that if you believe that this committee in its published proceedings has created the impression that this is a committee before which a witness could appear with only a statement that he had light-heartedly, and I think you said free-handedly, dictated——

Senator SMITH. I did not say "light-heartedly."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think you underrate the committee.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Watkins.

Senator WATKINS. I want to make a comment with respect to the suggestions of Mr. Fortas that we wait until he is through.

Mr. FORTAS. I beg your pardon; with the subject matter.

Senator WATKINS. If you are going to go through 50 pages, by that time the Senators have to go to other matters, and we have to ask questions as we go along because it has been my experience that we never ask them. We have to ask them as the witness goes along.

He has raised the charges against the committee. He has not gotten down to facts.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been trying.

Senator WATKINS. But you did not get by the charge statement against the committee, and we have a right to know.

Mr. FORTAS. You haven't a copy of the statement, but you will notice that on page 8 there is a roman II, and all that I had in mind was that the witness be allowed to get through with this one subject matter so that you can see and cross-examine him on what he says about that particular subject matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I move that it is 5 o'clock and we recess. The press has had this; the public have had it, and the only people that are going to miss anything are those people who are now in the room and who have not had the opportunity to read it.

Senator O'CONOR. It has already been determined to recess at 5, and it is almost that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I make one remark?

Senator O'CONOR. The witness.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Please do not think that I was trying to accuse the Chair or the committee of denying me advice of counsel. I am perfectly aware it was made expressly clear by Senator McCarran at the very beginning that I am entitled to advice of counsel when I ask for it.

All I was trying to point out is that this is a one-way procedure and that my counsel is not entitled to intervene when he as a lawyer might see that I am trying to answer these complicated legal questions from trained lawyers, might, as a layman, be getting into trouble that I did not appreciate and therefore couldn't ask him about in advance.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, in retrospect as you look back on this afternoon's hearing has there been any point where you would have preferred Mr. Fortas to advise you when you realize that you did not ask for advice?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't know if you realize the kind of strain that this hearing is, but it requires such an intense concentration on each question as it is asked that I at this moment could not give you an intelligent recapitulation of this afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. He may be by morning.

Senator O'CONOR. But you cannot refer to a single instance where you were at a disadvantage by reason of that fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not offhand, no, because my mind is now a maze.

Senator O'CONOR. At this point then we will as previously agreed stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, February 27, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:55 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, Jenner, and Watkins.

Also present: Senators Langer and McCarthy; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

The chairman on yesterday intended to but omitted to make this statement to the audience, that the committee prefers that there should be no demonstration of any kind to any statement made by any witness, either approving or disapproving of the statement. We hope that the audience may see fit to conform to that rule.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Lattimore, you were interrogated yesterday, and you covered about three pages of your statement. You have a statement there of 50 pages. Would you desire to insert that full statement in the record, or do you desire to read the statement and be interrogated on it, paragraph by paragraph? And if you insert it in the record, as you may do if you see fit, it will become a part of the record, but you will be cross examined on your statement and on other matters pertaining to your statement and your position. Which do you wish to do?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, may I at this moment avail myself of your previous permission to use my one-way communication with my counsel?

The CHAIRMAN. You can have a two-way communication if you want to.

(Mr. Lattimore conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like to read my statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You will be interrogated as you go along.

Senator O'Conor, I will have to ask you to take over. I have to go to another assignment. Thank you very much.

(Senator O'Conor assumed the chair.)

Senator O'Conor. You may proceed.

Mr. Lattimore. I am not quite sure where I got to yesterday. I believe it was near the bottom of page 2, is that right? Does the record show?

Senator O'Conor. I do not think that you got through the second paragraph, but the sentence beginning, "This material has been presented," and so forth. I think you were being interrogated on that. In any event, I think time might be saved, if you so desired, to take it up at that point and just read on.

Mr. Lattimore. This material has been presented in such confusion, and years and dates have been so jumbled, as to make it impossible for ordinary citizens who are not experts on the Far East to judge whether a problem is being discussed as it was at the time, as it might have been, or as it is now. I do not know whether this is chargeable to the committee or its staff——

Mr. Sourwine. At that point——

Senator O'Conor. I think you should be permitted to finish the sentence and the paragraph.

Mr. Lattimore. But no one can read the record without realizing that this is what has happened.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lattimore, do you mean by that statement that you do not know whether this is chargeable to the committee or its staff, to say that in your opinion there has been a deliberate jumbling by either the committee or its staff, or both?

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, I believe the record as it has been accumulated shows just what I have said, a jumbling that makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to judge whether a problem is being discussed as it was at the time, as it might have been, or as it is now. The responsibility for that is clearly the responsibility of the committee. I am obviously not in a position to know how far the committee has exercised its own individual and collective responsibility, how far it has delegated it to counsel, or exactly how this has been done.

Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire? Is your complaint, Mr. Lattimore, against the committee, the way it has handled the investigation as far as you are concerned, or does it go to the investigation of IPR and other people connected with IPR? Is this a charge on all matters of investigation, or is it only as it relates to you, that you may be concerned with the investigation?

Mr. Lattimore. This is a statement, Senator, of my opinion on the record as it stands to date, in which I am involved.

Senator Ferguson. There are many other people involved, also, is that not correct?

Mr. Lattimore. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And there is the question of the relationship of the IPR with the State Department, is that not correct?

Mr. Lattimore. If any, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you say "if any." Do you think that there is no connection whatever between IPR and the State Department, or any of the State Department officials?

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, you have used the word "connection," which may mean different things to different people.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true.

Mr. LATTIMORE. At this point I should like, if I may, to say a few words as carefully considered as I know how to make them.

Senator SMITH. Did you not ask him a question? I do not see why we cannot have plain, simple answers to the questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we will get along quickly.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, I do think that if the question is susceptible of a direct answer, that might be made; and then any explanatory statement that you might desire to make in connection with it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am trying to make a statement on the thoughts that are guiding me in making my answers, and I think perhaps if I were allowed to express those thoughts at the present time, it might clarify other questions coming up, as well as the question immediately before the committee.

Senator O'CONOR. You may proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been for many years a professional writer. I am also a university professor. I am accustomed to a careful use of words. I have tried to boil down into 50 pages what I have to say about an accumulation of material presented before this committee in something like 8 months. I have tried to use firm and precise language.

Yesterday under questioning I felt at times as if perhaps I might be giving a defensive or what some people might even think evasive or hair-splitting series of answers to many questions. I want to make it perfectly clear that I have no intention of evasiveness; that I have said as clearly as I can what I have to say; that if there is any hair-splitting, or if there is any playing with alternative choices of words, that is not my responsibility. It is a consequence of the form in which questions are asked me.

As I said, I have used firm language. Many of the questions that have been addressed to me appear—I may be oversensitive on the subject—but appear as if they were intended to make me either soften my statements or perhaps in frustration say something more strong than what I intended to say.

Gentlemen, I am not a lawyer. I am an innocent man trying to defend himself as best he knows how. I may at times be forced by this manner of questioning to overstate my reactions. If so, I want it to be perfectly clear on the record that these are not my words—they are words put into my mouth by the manner of questioning.

Senator SMITH. Could we have one understanding before we proceed further, Mr. Chairman, that we are not, or I for one am not asking Professor Lattimore on language. As I understand, all we are asking him is to state the facts in such plain and concise language that all of us can understand what the answers to a question are, instead of having these long, spun-out discussions, including the comment about splitting infinitives, which indicates there was some little intention to quibble about language.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I want to assure you that I was not trying to put words into your mouth, and I do not intend to so try. I just want to ask questions, and I want to leave you out of it as much as possible. I am not talking about this statement, as far as you personally are concerned now; I am talking about the investigation by this committee into what I think is a very, very important matter, and that is the question of penetration of communism into institutions of Amer-

ica, and for that matter, into other governments and other countries. We are fighting a war involving that very principle. And if we have to limit our investigation here and be cowed down and fearful that we are going to offend someone, then we are not going to get very far in advising the people of America on this great problem of penetration. And that is why I want to talk about the State Department. I want to give every man the right to make statements, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and I will advocate it with him; but I think that when that freedom of speech and that freedom of thought goes to the department of Government that can influence the action of that Government, then the people ought to be able to thoroughly go into the matter, not in personalities but in questions of the broad principles. That is why I asked you the question here now about the State Department and the IPR.

Forget that you were a trustee for a moment. Let us look into it, as you said in the statement. I was a member, yes, I was a member of the IPR. I paid nominal dues. I was a judge in Michigan at the time that I went into it, and I wanted to learn something about the facts. Now, let us forget whether we were members. Let us now look at the IPR and try to ascertain whether or not people did penetrate it, and what difference does it make to you and to me, except that we ought to both want to expose it if people did penetrate it. And to think that I sat here, and if you would have been here you would have heard people come in and say, "When I wrote those articles for the IPR, when I wrote a book that was to be used in the public schools, I refused to answer whether or not I was a Communist."

Mr. Lattimore, I think that you and I ought to be greatly interested in the problem as to whether or not the IPR was penetrated by communism to the extent that Communists wrote books under the label of the IPR, that we were members of, and put them in the public schools of America. I think that the time has come when you and I ought to forget the personal things and try to ascertain for the benefit of the United States citizen what is happening by communism, and if we are going to deal in personalities and if we are going to have arguments about personalities in this investigation, we are never going to advise the people.

Let us look at the IPR, and let us take for granted that the people that were running it were innocent; but, whether they were innocent or guilty, if they were penetrated should we not then show that to the public so that in the future there will be no further penetrations?

Now, if we can think of it in that way, maybe we can get somewhere.

Now I will ask you the question, Professor: Did, in your opinion, the State Department get information from IPR?

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I am in agreement with what you say, especially about not being cowed.

Senator Ferguson. And I do not want you to be cowed.

Mr. Lattimore. I am dealing with, I think, all of the questions that you have brought up, and I have tried to put them in my statement in an orderly manner, and to support what I have to say. I have adverted to this matter of the questioning because it contributes, in my respectful opinion, to the character of jumbled evidence that I referred to before, and it leads very frequently to a request to me to give an offhand statement of something that I have later put in my prepared statement, in my own words and in my own way, in such

a manner that I may later be confronted with possibly quibbles about, "You said it this way on interrogation, and you said it that way in your statement."

I think, Senator, it would be much more orderly if I were allowed to proceed with my statement, and then to answer any questions you like in any order you bring them up.

Senator O'CONOR. Just a second. You are not to determine for the committee how it is to proceed. The chairman gave you the right this morning to place the entire statement in the record if you so desired, or to proceed and have the committee to undertake its interrogations as you went along. You consulted with counsel as you desired to do, and then you determined that you did not wish to put your statement in the record in toto.

Now, you are not to tell the committee how it is to proceed. The question Senator Ferguson asked is a very direct one and a simple one, and it admits of a clear answer, and we would like very much to have you address yourself to it and answer it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I only meant, Senator, to say how I would like to proceed.

Senator O'CONOR. Fortunately, you are not a member of the committee, sir, for this purpose.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Your question again?

Senator FERGUSON. I will put it this way——

Senator O'CONOR. Let the stenographer read it so the committee might have it before them.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I never worked in the State Department.

(The question asked by Senator Ferguson was read by the reporter as follows:)

Now I will ask you the question, Professor: Did, in your opinion, the State Department get information from IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have only an outsider's presumption that members of the State Department got information from IPR publications, as they did from any other publications that might interest them, on the subject of the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I asked you that question was—and I think that your answer brings this up now—you defend two or three people in this statement, as far as the State Department is concerned, and you tell the public in this statement that, for instance, Mr. Clubb was freed by the Loyalty Board. And where did you learn that, if you know nothing about the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From the press.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will ask you whether or not you know that it is a fact that the State Loyalty Board itself did not clear Mr. Clubb, and that Mr. Acheson personally, when it went to him for review, was the one who set aside the ruling of the Board and freed Mr. Clubb?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not seen that in the press, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you whether or not you know it is a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, are you just quoting here in this statement about these people what you learn in the press rather than trying to get the facts? You are giving to the public the idea that

Mr. Clubb was freed by the Loyalty Board, and I am asking you whether or not you know it was a fact that that was not a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know that it was not a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why do you give it to this committee and expect this committee not to ask you any questions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You are perfectly free to ask me that question, Senator. I have given you my answer.

Senator FERGUSON. And your answer is that you do not know. Have you talked to Mr. Clubb about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen Mr. Clubb since he was cleared: yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask him whether or not the Loyalty Board found against him, and then when it went up to Mr. Humelsine he approved the Loyalty Board, and when it went to Mr. Acheson he reversed the Loyalty Board?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am not either an amateur or a professional snooper.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you that; and I asked you whether or not you asked Mr. Clubb.

Senator SMITH. That is a simple question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I accepted Mr. Clubb's word that he had been cleared.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you that he was cleared by the Loyalty Board?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not interested in going into post mortems on the fact, and I congratulated him and then we went on to talk about other subjects.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you why he had resigned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the subject of his resignation, I did not ask him why he had resigned. I congratulated him on resigning, and he later made a statement to the press that he was resigning at this time because he felt that his career had been permanently damaged, and that under the system of multiple jeopardy now prevailing, he might be haled up again at any other time. I accordingly wrote in my statement that he has taken to heart the now obvious lesson that the State Department is not a safe place for a man who has been cleared. That is my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss that with Mr. Clubb—as to why he resigned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not discuss it with him, Senator Ferguson. He is a friend of mine, and an honorable man, and when he said he had been cleared, I said, "Thank God." Why should I badger him?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that the State Department on a number of occasions, Mr. Lattimore, has brought the charges, and then allowed people to resign; and that up to date, as far as from the State Department's view, no one has been discharged for loyalty reasons, and we will exclude the Clubb situation. I am asking you whether or not you know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not know it, and it is no concern of mine and no duty of mine as a citizen.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, when you raised these questions here about certain people in the State Department, I wanted to know whether or not you had actual knowledge.

Senator SMITH. Might we inquire as to why—I believe it is on page 21—Professor Lattimore even went into the matter of Mr. Clubb at all? What was the purpose in doing that?

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I wanted to know.

Senator SMITH. If you were not concerned with it, what was the purpose of bringing his name into this statement of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator, I protest once more at being forced to take up my statement disjointedly instead of in the orderly manner that I wanted to do, but I would point out to you that on page 20 I give my reasons:

> The three outstanding examples of men sacrificed to the hysteria that has been whipped up in this country by the China lobby—a hysteria to which this committee, I am sorry to say, is contributing—are—

And then I go into the names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire?

Senator FERGSON. You had no personal knowledge, did you, Mr. Lattimore, on the Service and the Clubb and the Vincent, the three names that you mentioned here in your statement—you have no personal knowledge as to what was in the loyalty reports, and the evidence, and the FBI reports; have you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, all three men are men that I have known for years, and all three men are such trustworthy members of the Department of State that they would not, and I have never asked them to, talk to me about the internal mechanisms of the Department of State. My concern is—and again I return to my statement, and again in a fragment:

> I believe that it is as important to the welfare and safety of this country to have a strong State Department and an able Foreign Service in our diplomacy as it is to have effective military forces. I believe that——

Senator FERGUSON. I agree with you on that.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading:)

> That the usefulness of our Foreign Service personnel has already been jeopardized by the work of this committee—both directly by attacks on irreplaceable personnel, and indirectly by impairing the confidence of the Nation and our foreign allies in our State Department and by instituting a reign of terror among our Foreign Service personnel.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question, Mr. Lattimore, but I am glad that you read that into the record, and I agree with the first part, as I indicated.

My question is: Do you know what the charges were, and do you know what the evidence was, as far as the State Department, the FBI, and the Loyalty Board are concerned, on these three people named here in your statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, am I a citizen of America, or a subject of Czechoslovakia or Franco Spain? Am I expected to run around snooping on my fellow citizens?

Senator O'CONOR. Just a moment, Senator Ferguson.

That statement is entirely unnecessary. The question of Senator Ferguson did not call for any such outburst as that. Now, will you kindly confine yourself to the question that is asked, and I think if it is answered in the same manner in which the question is asked, there will be no difficulty.

Senator SMITH. May we have the question read?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator O'CONOR. You either do or you do not know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know the charges as far as they were in the press, and I do not know the procedures or the documents; unlike Senator McCarthy, I have not been procuring classified documents.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just asking you whether or not you knew; and you say you do not know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, counsel desires to inquire.

Senator WATKINS. Yet you passed judgment on all of those situations; did you not?

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Watkins asked a question.

Senator WATKINS. Now, you say you did not know, and yet you pass judgment on each one of these cases and you proceed to characterize their treatment.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am standing on the public record as it is in the press, as it is in the record of this committee; and I am somewhat resentful, I think naturally, of the implications that I should have constituted myself a private eye of some kind and gone probing into matters that are not the ordinary province——

Senator WATKINS. That is not an answer to what I asked you. Did you or did you not pass judgment on it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Pass judgment? I expressed an opinion.

Senator WATKINS. That is in the nature of a judgment that they were given unfair treatment.

Senator SMITH. The question, it seems to me, is whether or not we expect him to do any snooping, because that is up to his own conscience to determine, and the question is whether or not he was willing to make statements in this statement of facts, supposed to be, about someone that he had not investigated, and I thought that was what Senator Ferguson asked.

Mr. LATTIMORE. When it has been stated in the press, Senator, that a man has received official clearance, that is sufficient for me.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, now.

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness hasn't answered Senator Ferguson's question as to whether Mr. Clubb told him why he, Mr. Clubb, was resigning.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he answered that by saying he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the witness say Mr. Clubb did not tell him why he was resigning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told the Senator that I took up the subject by congratulating him, and that I then saw Mr. Clubb's statement to the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. Precisely. You told the Senator that you had not asked Mr. Clubb about his resignation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not ask Mr. Clubb.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you told the Senator that you had read it in the press, but you did not answer the question as to whether Mr. Clubb told you why he was resigning; and, now, did he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said I did not ask Mr. Clubb, and I didn't go into any post mortem, and there was no conversation on the subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you why he was resigning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. He told you that he was resigning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I assumed that I knew why he was resigning, and that was all there was to the conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. He told you that he was resigning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I think I saw him after his resignation had been announced.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not tell you that he was resigning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He didn't tell me beforehand that he was going to resign.

Mr. SOURWINE. You simply met him and congratulated him on it, and there was no discussion as to why he had resigned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had already been in the papers with his statement?

Senator O'CONOR. Now, if you will, the bottom of page 2, then. We will proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All kinds of attempts have been made to depict me as a Communist or a Soviet agent. I have in fact been falsely identified as a fellow traveler, sympathizer, or follower of the Communist line or promoter of Communist interests. Now I want to make my position clear. I am not interested in fine or technical distinctions. I am not interested in graduations or degrees of disloyalty. I have no use for fancy, legalistic distinctions. I am none of these things and have never been. I am not and have never been a Communist, a Soviet agent, a sympathizer, or any other kind of promoter of communism or Communist interests, and all of these are nonsense. I so testified long ago, under oath, before the Tydings subcommittee, and I do so again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might break in, there are four or five questions which have been asked a number of witnesses here, and in order to give Mr. Lattimore an opportunity to make his denial completely categorically, I would like to ask those questions:

Mr. Lattimore, are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of the United States or a member of the Communist Party of any other country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever been asked or invited or urged to join the Communist Party of any country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a part of any Communist organization, apparatus, or network?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever under Communist discipline?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever agree to accept Communist discipline?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. One of the most shocking things that has happened in the proceedings is that not one of the witnesses against me has ever been asked in examination or cross-examination a question that would test his motives or his reliability. Most shocking in this respect has been the suppression or at least the bland ignoring of evidence

already of record. The counsel of this subcommittee, Mr. Morris, was the counsel of the Republican minority of the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations—the Tydings committee—and therefore had intimate knowledge of this record evidence. It has also been widely reported in the press.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt the witness at that point, I would like to ask this:

Are you intending to charge Mr. Morris with willful suppression of evidence?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't profess to know the inside of Mr. Morris' mind.

Senator O'Conor. That was not the question. You were asked what was in your mind.

Mr. Lattimore. What is in my mind is that Mr. Morris had intimate knowledge of this record evidence, and that I think it is a shocking thing that in the proceedings before this committee no mention has been made of that fact.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you carefully phrased your language for the purpose of conveying implications which you do not desire flatly to make, of implying charges that you don't care to state?

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, that is one of those hair-splitting legalistic questions to which I referred, and I do not want to give a hair-splitting answer. I have tried to make my language clear and firm. I have tried not to imply that I know things which I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. I want to refer the witness to page 2519 of the State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation—I think that it might better be known as the Tydings investigation—under Senate Resolution 231, in going into the question of whether or not they went thoroughly into IPR, and yesterday it was brought out that they did not have the files of the IPR. Senator Tydings says this:

> There isn't anything, Mr. Morris, that isn't pertinent, and we can keep on asking for things, and there is no doubt in the world, that would be a good thing to get, and you could ask for 5,000 different things; but we are pretty far away from loyalty in the State Department when we get out in the Institute of Pacific Relations with our little force. We just haven't got it.

Does that not indicate that Senator Tydings was not going into the question of the Institute of Pacific Relations and its relation to the State Department?

Mr. Lattimore. Senator Ferguson, I was very clearly, in my statement, referring not to things that the Tydings committee might have gone into. I had no more control over the proceedings of the Tydings committee than I have over the proceedings of this committee, and I was referring specifically to matters that are of record in the Tydings hearings.

Senator Ferguson. You see, I am much more interested in the whole procedure of the investigation of penetration in the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I am not directly interested in the individuals that may come up from time to time in that investigation, only as it relates to the broad question of penetration into the Institute of Pacific Relations, plus the other question of the Institute of Pacific Relations' relations to the State Department and making of foreign policy. So I feel that the committee has a much broader field, and a more im-

portant question than even the Tydings committee had, of individuals and their loyalty.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson, the next passage in my statement refers to a witness who appeared before the Tydings subcommittee, and has also appeared before this subcommittee. It illustrates exactly what I meant to say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before the witness goes to that, if the Chair will permit, I would like to get back to this question of the charge against Mr. Morris. The witness did not answer the question as to whether the language here was intentionally put together for the purpose of implying a charge that he does not want to make. If that is not the case, it should be very easy to say, "No, I did not."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that I answered that question, Mr. Sourwine, and I said that my language was carefully chosen not to imply things that I do not know; and I do not know——

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not an answer to the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether Mr. Morris acted in bad faith or not. That is a matter for his conscience.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an animus against Mr. Morris, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I have no animus against Mr. Morris. I am merely defending myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any feeling against him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. How do you mean "any feeling"?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you dislike him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you dislike him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any feeling of enmity or irritation against him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have a feeling of outrage at the way in which the evidence before this subcommittee has been stacked, in which he took a material part.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what you are expressing here, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am expressing the fact here that—

most shocking in this respect has been the suppression, or at least the bland ignoring, of evidence already of record. The counsel of this subcommittee, Mr. Morris, was the counsel of the Republican minority of the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations—the Tydings committee—and therefore had intimate knowledge of this record evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have gone back to read the statement again, haven't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you going to insist throughout this hearing on saying nothing outside of the language that you have said has been carefully phrased over months, in this statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am endeavoring, Mr. Sourwine, as I said before, not to confuse issues by having words put into my mouth in the answering of questions, thus obscuring what I have clearly and categorically said of my own volition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you realize this paragraph you have just concluded reading will, to any ordinary person who reads it once for the first time, convey the impression that you are charging Mr. Morris with deliberate suppression of evidence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I am referring here to the proceedings of this subcommittee——

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you were aware——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of which Mr. Morris is only a part.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that the original reading of this by almost anyone will convey the impression that you are charging Mr. Morris with the deliberate suppression of evidence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not aware, Mr. Sourwine, of your authority to state how the ordinary citizen would react. You are an interested party.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you were aware of that fact. You are, as you have stated, a man of education, a man who is a university professor; and now, are you aware that the average reader will get—or do you have an opinion as to what impression the average reader will get from this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have an opinion of the impression I intended to convey.

Mr. SOURWINE. Good. Now, what did you intend to convey?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I intended to convey that "most shocking in this respect has been the suppression or at least the bland ignoring of evidence already of record."

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you intended to convey—and then you state exactly the language which is in here.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, and I hope the impression was conveyed.

Senator SMITH. Professor Lattimore, you say first that there has been the suppression. Well, now, are you certain that you meant to convey the impression that you spoke with certainty that there had been suppression of evidence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If I had meant that, Senator Smith, I should have said so. That is why I wrote, "suppression or at least the bland ignoring."

Senator SMITH. So that when you said "suppression," you did not really mean "suppression," that you had any evidence of suppression; but you are making the statement of either suppression or bland ignoring?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Smith, the evidence that I have is that the great majority of the allegations that have been made against me before this subcommittee were previously made before the Tydings committee and thoroughly dealt with there, and that this connection has never been referred to in the proceedings before this subcommittee; that Mr. Morris was one of the counsel of that committee, and one of the counsel of this committee; that the absence of connection in the two proceedings indicates either suppression or bland ignoring.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, then that is your answer to what you meant when you charge this committee, or at least Mr. Morris, with suppression of evidence; that is all the answer you want to give to that, is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is all of the answer I want to give.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that that is any answer at all when you charge a man with suppressing evidence, or do you think that you have answered that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am referring to the fact, Senator, that evidence has been omitted before this subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. Was anybody attempting to keep you from offering any evidence you wanted, if it has been omitted?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After 8 months, I have finally been allowed to appear here and read a few paragraphs of what I want to say.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the paragraphs you have already read, have you offered any evidence?

Senator O'CONOR. Just hold that.

Have you concluded?

Senator JENNER. The witness has stated this matter has been gone into thoroughly before the Tydings committee. I think that the reading of Senator Ferguson from the Tydings committee shows that they did not have the staff and they did not go into this fully. I believe my recollection is probably correct that this investigation primarily is with IPR, and to show its relationship with the State Department and the influence it might have had upon the State Department. He says this matter was gone into thoroughly before the Tydings committee. The files and the records of the IPR were not even available. As a result, we found them some place up here in a barn, stored away, and that is the base of this investigation. So on that basis, how could Mr. Morris be fully acquainted with all of this, and how could it have been thoroughly gone into in the Tydings hearings when it was not even available? How could it have been suppressed? I want to ask the witness, on the basis of that fact, how it could have been suppressed? How could it have been thoroughly gone into?

Senator O'CONOR. Do you understand the question? The question is addressed as to how you could contend that that evidence, which was not then available to the Tydings committee, was in fact suppressed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, the Tydings committee, I think, investigated me very thoroughly, and they stated in their conclusions:

> Having found on the evidence before us that Mr. Lattimore is not an employee of our State Department, that he is not the architect of our far eastern policy, and that he is not a spy, our consideration of him should be concluded, since to do otherwise would place us in the anomalous position of passing judgment on the ideological disposition of a private citizen. We are constrained, however, to make some observations relative to the case in its entirety, not only as a matter of elementary fairness to Mr. Lattimore, who traveled half way around the world to answer the charges against him, but the scholars and writers throughout the country and the American public generally. Owen Lattimore is a writer and a scholar who has been charged with a record of procommunism going back many years. There is no legal evidence before us whatever to support this charge, and the weight of all other information indicates that it is not true. We find absolutely no evidence to indicate that his writings and other expressions have been anything but honest opinions and convictions of Owen Lattimore. Similar opinions and convictions vis-à-vis the Far East are entertained by many Americans about whom no conceivable suggestion of Communist proclivities could be entertained. We do not find that Mr. Lattimore's writings follow the Communist or any other line, save as his very consistent position on the Far East may be called the Lattimore line.

Senator JENNER. That is an opinion of a committee without the evidence that this committee has had before it. The Tydings committee did not have this evidence before it, and that is an opinion they reached on the evidence before their committee. But since that committee has concluded its hearings, the files and the records of the IPR have been disclosed, and we have obtained them in a barn up here in Connecticut or some place. Now, this hearing is based upon

a different set of facts, and so how could you say that the counsel has suppressed evidence that was never before the Tydings committee in the first place, and how could you say that the Tydings committee thoroughly went into this when they did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, the evidence that has been used against me before this subcommittee comes only in very small part from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, illegally taken by this subcommittee——

Senator SMITH. Wait a minute. Did you say "illegally"?

Senator O'CONOR. Just a second. I do think Mr. Lattimore ought to be allowed to complete his sentence.

Senator SMITH. I did not understand whether he said "legally" or "illegally."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Illegally.

Senator O'CONOR. Proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The main evidence that has been used against me is a regurgitation, with an additional birth now and then, of the stuff that was put up before the Tydings subcommittee and dealt with there.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you answer, now, why you used the phrase that the evidence was "obtained illegally"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am basing that on the statement of, as I recall, Mr. Holland, in his appearance before this subcommittee.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you accustomed just to repeat a statement on the legality or illegality of a matter because one particular witness says——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe Mr. Holland, when he was questioned about that, replied that he was making a statement on advice of counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. Why, Mr. Lattimore, are you defending the Institute of Pacific Relations? I can see a reason that you might be greatly upset on your own problems, but why do you bring up this question now of defense on the legality or illegality of this committee getting records of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am dealing with the Institute of Pacific Relations only as it is being used in this attempt to make me out to be what I am not and never have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you think if the evidence does prove that the Institute of Pacific Relations was penetrated by Communists, that that casts a reflection upon you, and therefore you are making these statements today, in your own defense?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Would you repeat that question?

Senator O'CONOR. We will have it read.

You may consult counsel.

(Mr. Lattimore conferred with his counsel.)

Senator FERGUSON. You have raised the question of legality of this committee obtaining evidence, and you say that this committee obtained "illegally," and you are accusing this committee of illegally obtaining evidence and using that evidence that it illegally obtained. Now, that evidence is only evidence from the IPR and not from you. I am asking you whether or not it is your contention that if the IPR is found to have been penetrated by Communists, that that will cast a reflection on you, and that is the reason that you are raising this question of legality or illegality?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Aren't you raising two questions, Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You can answer them, and I made an explanation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. One question is about the legality of obtaining the files, and the other question is about the validity of any evidence contained in the files.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about your defense. You brought up the question, indicating in this record that this committee illegally obtained evidence, Mr. Lattimore; and I asked you the question where you got that opinion, and you said from Mr. Holland's statement to this committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And then I went on to ask the question about whether or not you took other people's opinion on these questions of legality or not, and repeated them; and then I came back to your defense of the IPR.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it is my belief, Senator, throughout my connection with the IPR, that it was never controlled by Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever penetrated?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A number of people who have refused to answer whether they were Communists or not, and therefore presumptively may be or may have been Communists, worked in the IPR. That is a far cry from saying that they controlled or influenced either the IPR or me.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you the question: Was the IPR penetrated? And is there any evidence, in your opinion, in this record that the IPR was penetrated by Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, "penetration" is your word, and may I ask you what you mean by it?

Senator FERGUSON. Influenced; let us use that word now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because the IPR may have been penetrated in the sense that Communists had jobs in the IPR. I have yet to see evidence that Communists controlled the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that you have made the statement that, in your opinion, Field, who was connected with the IPR, is a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is certainly my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. And you say that he became a Communist, I think, in the 1940's, did you use that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that I used that. Somebody else used it and I am quite willing to accept it. I did say the forties.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1940. Do you think that the position that Mr. Field held in the IPR, as a Communist, on your own statement that he was a Communist, had any influence on the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, the record is that everything published by the IPR was always circulated to many readers of diverse qualifications of knowledge and diverse opinions before being published. I think that that is by far the strongest safeguard that any private institution can have on its output not being biased by the propaganda of the Communists or anybody else.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you about that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And, therefore, I believe that it is not true that Field, or any other Communist, controlled the IPR or its output.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you have used the word "controlled," and I have asked for the word "influence." You have taken the defense again that they had a mechanism to avoid being controlled, and I am not talking about whether they tried to avoid or not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your word, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Influence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; influence. I do not believe that the work of the IPR was influenced in a Communist direction or in the service of Communist propaganda by Field or anyone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, the difficulty, I think, between you and me on this problem is that you take for granted that Communists do not have the capacity and the ability to penetrate and influence, in a devious way even, against the great effort of honest people.

My experience on this committee, and I must tell you, Mr. Lattimore, is such that the devious activities of Communists, and the way they work and manipulate and the way they have worked and manipulated all over the world, leads me to believe that you cannot set up in any organization that has them in responsible positions any mechanism to keep out their activities and their influence, and I think the only way that you can do it is not to have them in.

Now, you may disagree. Do you disagree on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On that all I can say is that I am not an expert on Communists or communism. I do have some experience in research work and editing and some experience of putting out a good product that is free of propaganda. I will go no further than to say that the IPR was run in such a manner that it had the maximum safeguards that a private institution can have in protecting itself against these dangers. Whether it was absolutely successful in every sentence, half-sentence, and comma is a matter on which opinions might well differ.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think, Mr. Lattimore, that we could trust a Communist in a responsible position in IPR; that he would not try and actually influence for communism? What is your opinion on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My opinion is that I would not knowingly employ any Communist in the IPR, or a similar organization. To that I can only add, as I have said in my statement, that in the 1930's, no private organization was running a private FBI to sift and check its personnel, and that our sole standard was not to promote any propaganda, but to promote free presentation of information and discussion of that information.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think, Mr. Lattimore, today—let us look at it as of today—that any Communist can fairly present the facts and not actually use facts as propaganda to further communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have just stated that I would not myself knowingly employ a Communist, and it is for those reasons that I wouldn't.

Senator FERGUSON. That answers my question; you and I agree on that.

Senator O'CONOR. Would you resume, then, Mr. Lattimore? One suggestion occurs to me, which I would like to see if counsel and all agree on: That it appears that from this point up until page 9, there is one segment of the matter that possibly could be given, to the best in-

terests of all, uninterruptedly; and so, if that is given as a whole, it might admit, then, of better discussion and consideration.

Mr. FORTAS. That is splendid, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. For the purpose of expedition, I offer that as a suggestion, that you should proceed, and that would be a very proper way in which to proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will cite just one example, a rather striking one—that of Louis F. Budenz.

The proceedings of the Tydings committee show that Budenz's accusations of me before that subcommittee were a complete fabrication concocted for the specific purpose of his appearance there. They show (1) that until he was recruited to tell his fantastic yarn, Budenz never mentioned me to the FBI despite hundreds of hours of testimony (transcript, p. 1116); (2) that in 1949 when he wrote an article for Collier's, denouncing many persons for their participation in the Chinese situation, Budenz made no mention of me (transcript, p. 1096); (3) that when he published a book in 1950 dealing with the same subject, he made no reference to me in his manuscript, inserting a passing mention only after I was publicly attacked by Senator McCarthy (transcript, p. 1115). All of this material was available to your committee, and your counsel, Mr. Robert Morris, was thoroughly familiar with it, but not one syllable of it was entered in your record nor was Mr. Budenz asked a single question concerning it.

In connection with this man Budenz, Senators, I call your attention to the fact that the personal history and character of Louis Budenz was thoroughly gone into in the hearings before the Tydings committee in 1950.

This man, when he became a functionary of the Communist Party, was neither a dupe nor a visionary. He was a hard-bitten man of 44, and his own sworn testimony, contained in the official transcript of the deportation proceedings entitled "In the Matter of Desideriu Hammer, Alias John Santos, Respondent in Deportation Proceedings File No. A-6002664" shows that he was already, before becoming a Communist, a man of immoral life.

I exposed him as a liar before the Tydings committee. Since then a distinguished newspaperman, Mr. Joseph Alsop, has publicly challenged him as a perjurer, and has demanded of this committee that the record of Budenz' testimony be sent over to the Department of Justice for examination to see whether he should be prosecuted for perjury.

Before the Tydings committee, Budenz was an uneasy and evasive liar who weaseled and retreated when his credibility was questioned, but before this committee every question that was addressed to him was an invitation to make the most imaginative and inventive use of what Mr. Joseph Alsop has aptly called "the built-in pick-up" in his memory. Thus admonished, drilled, and exhorted to take heart and fear not, he proceeded to bring up his old, disproved charges with a new assurance and with new embroideries and embellishments.

In the Tydings hearings, Budenz finally said, "I have never seen any vestige of his [Lattimore's] Communist Party membership." Senator Lodge attempted to get Budenz to state "a specific instance when an order or an instruction was given [to Lattimore] and carried out" (p. 1134). After hesitating and weaseling, Budenz said: "Well, the order to represent the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers

was certainly carried out." Then, when Senator Lodge asked, "Is that the most concrete and specific illustration there is?" Budenz then said, "That is the most concrete, yes, sir" (p. 1134).

Now, it was clearly established in the Tydings committee hearings that in fact I had never called the Chinese Communists "agrarian reformers," nor had Pacific Affairs carried articles calling them agrarian reformers, with the single exception of an article by a Chinese Communist, which was clearly labeled as such, and was presented as an example of what the Chinese Communists were saying. It was thus clearly brought out that Budenz was not only lying when he said that I "carried out an order" but lying in the dark and by guesswork.

Before the Tydings committee, Budenz backed away when asked to show whether he really knew anything about my writings or opinions. Senator Green summed it up:

> Then, you say you have never seen him, never talked with him, never had any communication with him, you have read none of his books to speak of, none of his articles to speak of.

Now, it is characteristic of this man and of this dark world of intrigue, that your counsel, Mr. Morris, carefully refrained in the hearings before you from asking Budenz whether he had read my writings. If he had, Budenz would have had the choice of plain, not fancy, perjury or confessing that he had no basis for his charges. Instead, Mr. Morris and Budenz sought to achieve just as good a general effect. Mr. Morris obligingly asked "Subsequent to that time, did you follow the publication Pacific Affairs?" and Budenz obligingly replied, "Yes, although, of course, today that is not all fresh in my memory."

Before the Tydings committee it was brought out that when Budenz was in conference with an editor of Collier's magazine and not protected by congressional immunity, he stated (p. 1096) that he was not saying I "acted as a Communist agent in any way." Before this subcommittee, however, knowing he would be protected, he lied glibly and obligingly (p. 1016).

Senator FERGUSON. I think I will ask a question there. Do you think that Mr. Budenz is protected from perjury as far as the Department of Justice is concerned for his statement before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a legal question. I do not know what the answer is.

Senator SMITH. You made the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. You have made the statement.

Mr. FORTAS. May he confer with counsel?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He has made that statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is protected from libel action by me, I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but not from perjury. Mr. Lattimore, as I understand it, you feel that this whole question of perjury, as far as you are concerned and as far as Mr. Budenz is concerned, ought to be referred to the Justice Department. Your counsel has just said that they can take it up on reference.

There is not any doubt that you accuse Budenz of perjury, is there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have been reminded several times that this committee makes its own procedure. If this committee, in its

discretion, wants to refer my case to the Justice Department they are, of course, free to do so. My opinion is the case of Budenz should be referred to the Justice Department.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand. Now, of course, if they are going to convict Mr. Budenz of perjury as to what he said to you, then——

Mr. LATTIMORE. He didn't say anything.

Senator FERGUSON. No; about you in this committee. The only way that it could be referred would be to refer to your statements and his statements, so that the Justice Department——

Mr. LATTIMORE. And Mr. Alsop's, and Mr. Vincent's statements, and Mr. Wallace's statements.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; refer them all to the Department of Justice. Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is in your discretion, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. From what you are saying here, accusing Budenz of absolute perjury, do I understand that you do accuse him of perjury?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am not a lawyer.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to get some information. If you do, then I would recommend to this committee that they do refer this matter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am not aware of the precise legal distinctions here between a liar, a liar under oath, and a perjurer. You are a lawyer. I will just ask you which of those terms is the strongest? Tell me the strongest one and that is the one that I want to use.

Senator FERGUSON. Perjury implies that he willfully testified falsely, knowingly.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that the strongest term?

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is the strongest.

Mr. LATTIMORE. O. K., that is my term. He is a perjurer.

Senator FERGUSON. Then if you say that now, then I say that I will recommend to this committee that the matter be referred to the Department of Justice.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask one thing.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Watkins, if you would not mind, we would like for him to complete this segment.

Senator WATKINS. It is on the very same thing. I noticed that he said, before the Tydings committee, it was brought out that when Budenz was in conference with an editor of Collier's magazine and not protected by congressional immunity—as a matter of fact, he was protected by congressional immunity when he was before the Tydings committee, was he not, the same as he would be here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to ask a legal question on that.

Senator WATKINS. You are giving a legal opinion.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The conference that he had with Collier's is outside of the Congress.

Senator WATKINS. The testimony of Budenz was when Budenz was before the committee, at the same time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The point I am making is simply that when Budenz was out of the shelter of the Congress and was asked a straight question by somebody, he refused to lie.

Senator O'CONOR. I interpreted your statement to mean that you are referring only to the Collier's conference.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am referring only to the Collier's conference.

Senator O'CONOR. That is in indicating that that was not protected by the immunity?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. As I get it from the sentence there, it seems rather vague and indefinite.

Before the Tydings committee it was brought out—

Was it brought out from Budenz or was it brought out from somebody else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will continue with the statement.

MORRIS. Was Lattimore discussed as a Communist?

BUDENZ. Instructions were given to him as a member of the Communist cell; yes, sir.

I recall to your minds that Mr. Morris was present throughout the Tdyings committee hearings and knew that Budenz had backed away from saying that I had acted as "a Communist agent in any way." Yet this same Mr. Morris is the one who invited Budenz, from the borrowed immunity of his presence before this subcommittee, to testify that I received instructions as a member of a Communist cell. If the precise phrases used mean anything different, it is too subtle for me. To my non-Communist mind, Budenz said one thing to Collier's, and the opposite here.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Sourwine, you indicated you had some questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have several questions over that matter that has just been traversed.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to say, Mr. Lattimore, you realize, in referring this matter of Budenz to the Justice Department, they would then have to determine who committed the perjury. Is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean whether Budenz——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, in bringing a charge.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I imagine Budenz will be referred to the Justice Department. It would be a question of whether Budenz committed perjury.

Senator FERGUSON. But then you would not want your testimony referred?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean that the price of accusing anybody of perjury is to be accused of perjury yourself?

Senator FERGUSON. One of the statements has to be false. That is correct. Either you are correct or Budenz is correct. That is, to determine whether Budenz is guilty of perjury.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My belief that Budenz is a perjurer could be proved or disproved.

Senator SMITH. What he means, Mr. Lattimore, as I understand that which Senator Ferguson is driving at, is that you and Mr. Budenz have made diametrically opposed statements. That is true, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Statements of fact, and both of you have made them under oath. That is true, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Now then, if one is right the other is wrong. The one that is wrong is the one that has committed perjury. That is

what Senator Ferguson is getting at. There would have to be an inquiry by the Department as to whether you or Mr. Budenz had been the one to commit perjury.

Senator WATKINS. And if they determined that you are the one who told the untruth, then you would be prosecuted for perjury. That is what they should do.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I know that I am not a liar of any kind. I believe that the evidence shows that Budenz is a perjurer. I should like to see the indications of Mr. Budenz's perjury followed up, and lead where they may.

Senator WATKINS. I think that it proper. It should be referred, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. These two gentlemen cannot both be right. He says that they are opposite.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask the indulgence of the committee to ask a few questions over the several pages which the witness has just finished reading?

Senator O'CONOR. Will you proceed please, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 4, Mr. Lattimore, under the subpoint that you have numbered 3, you refer to a manuscript presumably the manuscript of a book published by Mr. Budenz in 1950. Have you ever seen that manuscript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never seen the manuscript myself. The question was brought up in the hearings before the Tydings subcommittee. I would recommend that they be reviewed by this subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. The page references which you give here, are they to the printed hearings or to the typed and mimeographed transcript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They are to the typed and mimeographed transcript.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the paragraph at the bottom of page——

Senator SMITH. One moment, please. Right there, Professor Lattimore, you said "he made no reference to me in his manuscript."

If you did not see and had not seen the manuscript, how could you make that statement under oath yourself?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I believe that if the committee will investigate that transcript, which has not apparently been done yet, it will be found that I made that statement on the admission of Budenz.

Senator SMITH. I never asked you that. You said "in his manuscript."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You said "he made no reference to me in his manuscript." You just said a moment ago, as I understood it, that you had not seen the manuscript.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is the result of questioning of Mr. Budenz.

Senator SMITH. Do you still understand you are testifying under oath?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Then how can you testify under oath that he made no reference to you in the manuscript if you had not seen the manuscript? I just want to test the ability of you to make statements of that sort.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Mr. MORGAN. Now going back, Mr. Budenz——

Senator SMITH. What are you reading from?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The transcript of the Tydings subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. That is something that was beyond your knowledge was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was there, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I asked you the simple question how could you swear that he made no references in the manuscript after you said you had not seen the manuscript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have here a statement that "The proceedings of the Tydings committee show—". And it repeats "they show—." Now everything that follows below there is a reference to what the proceedings of the Tydings committee shows. It is not a statement of my own knowledge.

Senator SMITH. You said he made no reference "to me in his manuscript."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said that comes, Senator, without a full stop under the sentence beginning "They show——."

Senator SMITH. That is so far as you are concerned, and that is not sworn testimony so far as you are concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is sworn testimony and that is in the Tydings committee.

Senator SMITH. Is that a statement of sworn testimony of fact by you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you are getting me confused.

Senator SMITH. I do not mean to confuse you. I asked you a simple question. When you put something in the statement here, and after you had already testified you had not seen it, the manuscript, that is a simple question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am testifying that I did not see the manuscript, and that I am basing my statement on sworn testimony before the Tydings committee.

Senator SMITH. But not your sworn testimony, not your sworn statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Senator SMITH. All right. That is what I was getting at.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, gentlemen.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I continue, Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, Mr. Sourwine, will you continue, please.

Mr. SOURWINE. The full paragraph at the bottom of the page——

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I complete that reference first?

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. By introducing what the testimony was before the Tydings committee, may I complete it?

Mr. SOURWINE. You have given your page reference, Mr. Lattimore, to the testimony you were referring to. We are going to recess here at half past 12. That has been stated. May counsel have permission to traverse what you have already read as to your statement?

Mr. FORTAS. I believe the chairman ruled on that.

Senator O'CONOR. It is permissible to make reference to the transcript of the other proceedings upon which the witness said he relied, and you can do that. You have done it by way of page reference now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, my feeling is that reference by page number was adequate in the first instance, but is not adequate since the questioning by Senator Smith; that Senator Smith's elaboration by questioning entitles me to read the more detailed record myself.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, there is another problem involved there, there is a problem of cross-examination by us of the men who made the statements in that testimony, and therefore that ought not to go into this record except by reference. We do not want to adopt that as truthful testimony because we do not know.

Senator O'CONOR. I think it is a very simple issue. What portion of that, Mr. Lattimore, do you refer to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My reference in my statement is to page 1110. The fuller reference would be page 1114, beginning with Mr. Morgan's questioning of Budenz about his book, and the course of publication, and ending with the answer to a question, by Budenz, near the top of 1115.

Mr. SOURWINE. May that be inserted?

Senator O'CONOR. That will be inserted in full.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 460" and is as follows:)

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

[Pt. 1, pp. 518–519]

Mr. MORGAN. Now, going back, Mr. Budenz, to a further matter, I believe you have presently with publishers a book; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORGAN. What is the title of the book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Men Without Faces.

Mr. MORGAN. And who publishes it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Harper & Bros.

Mr. MORGAN. What theme have you developed in this book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, the name suggests the theme. The name is not arbitrary. It is because of the fact that we were forbidden to photograph most of the leaders of the Communist Party—that is, Biddleman, Tractenberg, or the secret heads of the Communist Party—we had a rule we were forbidden to photograph them. That is why the name of the book, because it indicates the Soviet fifth column in this country. The book exposes the Soviet fifth column in this country. I know, because I am in it.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you develop in this book this picture which you are giving us today, this picture about the 1937 and the 1943 and the 1944 incidents?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. MORGAN. Do you refer to Mr. Lattimore in this book?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; I did not, and there is a specific reason, because if I were to refer to Mr. Lattimore I would be in the same peculiar situation I was in in the Wallace situation. In fact, the Wallace situation was the cause of my not putting Mr. Lattimore in this book. The only time that I put Mr. Lattimore in the book was to identify Mr. John S. Service.

Mr. MORGAN. What was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. John S. Service. Service. And because I made a slight error of fact about Mr. Service, saying that he had advised Mr. Wallace, I corrected that to say "advised Mr. Wallace in the Government with Owen J. Lattimore." That is being made because of the error. Now, the thing——

Senator SMITH. That will not be admitted in.

Senator FERGUSON. No, that will just be inserted into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. This paragraph at the bottom of page 4, sir, where you say that the personal history and character of Louis Budenz was thoroughly gone into in the hearings before the Tydings committee in

1950, by whom was that gone into? Who testified with regard to the personal history and character of Louis Budenz? Not in addition to anything, but who testified in regard to it?

Mr. Lattimore. There was some testimony by Budenz in examination, I believe, and then there was also the official transcript of the deportation proceedings.

Mr. Sourwine. You are talking about the Santos transcript that you mentioned at the top of the next page, that is what you are referring to when you say it was thoroughly gone into?

Mr. Lattimore. Partly that and partly, I believe, the interrogation.

Mr. Sourwine. Of Mr. Budenz himself?

Mr. Lattimore. Himself, yes. I haven't got that reference exactly at the moment.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with offering that Santos transcript?

Mr. Lattimore. That Santos transcript, Mr. Sourwine, was submitted to my counsel, Mr. Fortas, and I would prefer to have him answer on that.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where he got it?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know where he got it.

Mr. Sourwine. Did he ever tell you where he got it?

Mr. Lattimore. Did you ever tell me where you got it?

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, we are asking you.

Mr. Fortas. May he consult with counsel?

Senator O'Conor. Yes.

Mr. Lattimore. No, he didn't.

Mr. Sourwine. Was there any cross-examination?

Mr. Fortas. I can make a statement as counsel, on this, if you want me to.

Senator Ferguson. I think we ought to let the questioning go on and find out what the witness knows first, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether there was any questioning about that Santos transcript as such?

Mr. Lattimore. As I remember, it was handed up in a sealed envelope with the suggestion that the Tydings committeee should consider it, and advising them to consult their discretion on putting it into the record.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it printed as a part of the record of the Tydings hearings?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe it was.

Senator Ferguson. Who handed it up, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. As I remember, sir—I can check with my counsel, but my memory is that my counsel handed it to counsel of the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Fortas handed it?

Mr. Lattimore. To Mr. Morgan, I believe, or to the chairman of the committee. You can ask him.

Senator Ferguson. Had you seen it before?

Mr. Lattimore. I had not seen it.

Senator Ferguson. You had not seen it before it was handed up in a sealed envelope?

Mr. Lattimore. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever seen it?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Then how do you make this statement in this record if you have never seen this matter?

Mr. FORTAS. Do you want a statement of counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I want to know how he makes this statement.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Fortas, I think at this juncture it is proper for the Senator to ask that.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the page number that you are reading from?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From page No. 5.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it summarized, Mr. Lattimore, before the Tydings committee?

Senator FERGUSON. You accused him of being an immoral person, a man of immoral life, and you give a proceeding in a record that you have never seen. Do you not indicate to this committee, when you make that statement, that you did see it and you were testifying to that as a fact, that that record did show it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I can check with my counsel to see what his memory of this is, but my recollection is that he handed this up to the counsel or to the committee, and that I asked him what that was, and he said something about it is too filthy for you to need to read, or something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. But here you make a specific charge from a document, and it now turns out that you had some information from your counsel which would be hearsay, that this was too filthy for you to read or to bother with, as your words go.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, this is hearsay. It can be checked very easily. Get the documents and look at them.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I am asking as to what you say to this committee. You are asking this committee to believe this document. You are reading it as testimony and you are past that point, and you ask this committee to believe you when you said that that document contained this information. Now it turns out that you never saw that document.

Senator O'CONOR. Let the record show that the witness consulted with his counsel in the meantime. Proceed with your answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have just consulted with my counsel and he reminded me of something that I had forgotten, that Senator Chavez had made reference to this on the Senate floor.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you then quoting Senator Chavez?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will be glad to add that reference to the testimony in my statement.

Senator FERGUSON. It still makes it hearsay, as far as you are concerned.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I don't know exactly what fine distinction you are driving at, Senator. But I think the matter is easily settled. Get a hold of the transcript.

Senator SMITH. I think the point, Mr. Chairman, is that this witness here has put in a statement, sworn to as sworn testimony, and now he admits that he had never seen the document about which or from which he was quoting or making statements.

If that is the way most of this statement of yours has been made up, then I can see we are justified in thinking that this is jumbled as well as the testimony in the rest of the proceedings has been jumbled, as

you suggest. Why did you make that statement, Mr. Lattimore, if you did not know, of your own knowledge, it was the truth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, if you would like me to read it and make it direct testimony—I understand it is a rather distasteful thing to read—I will go through with it.

Senator SMITH. I am not asking you that. I am not asking you that, Mr. Lattimore. I am asking you why did you put in here a statement that you are to introduce as sworn evidence when you had not even read the statement to which you are referring?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because the record of the Tydings committee shows that it was submitted.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not know is in it yet, do you, of your own knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not of my own knowledge.

Senator SMITH. All right. Then you are swearing to something you did not know. You made that statement here.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that Senator Chavez said that he was a man of immoral life.

Senator SMITH. Senator Chavez can speak for himself.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will be glad to add him.

Senator SMITH. You made a statement of fact there that you did not have in your possession at the time you made it; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made the statement that this document exists, and that its contents are of a certain character, and I am perfectly prepared to have my statement tested by a checking of the contents.

Senator SMITH. And you say that it showed he was already, before becoming a Communist, a man of immoral life?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my understanding.

Senator SMITH. You made that statement without even reading the document to which you refer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have made that statement, Senator, with reference to a supporting document, which is a great deal more than has been done in the case of some of the evidence offered against me before this subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. But you had not read the supporting documents?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew of the existence of the supporting documents.

Senator SMITH. But you had not read it. Will you answer a simple question? You had not read it, had you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. Senator, do not badger me like that.

Senator SMITH. I am not badgering you.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, it was a question you could answer "yes" or "no." Nobody is badgering you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have already answered, I have done it several times, and he is badgering me to say it again.

Senator O'CONOR. The answer is "No," that you did not read it prior to making this statement.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, you say that Senator Chavez used statements upon the Senate floor in relation to that document; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In relation to Budenz and this document was among the references that he made.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; now I will ask you the question as to whether or not you know where Senator Chavez received this information that he repeated on the floor, or that he stated on the floor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read his speech?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I read his speech.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have not any idea where he received the information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not recall now, after 2 years, whether he stated where he received it or not. I can just make reference to these proceedings.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not he received it from your counsel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked to the Senator before he made the statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to him after?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you do not know where he received the information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are quoting this here, that Budenz was of immoral life, without ever seeing the document or to know actually of your own knowledge what was in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; with very specific references to the document making it easily identifiable and verifiable.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that it is worse to accuse a man, without personal knowledge, of immoral life than it is to accuse him of being a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I am referring to a specific document which can easily be verified. That is not in the same class as the kind of hearsay evidence that has been offered against me.

Senator FERGUSON. You think it is different?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it is very different.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that document available to you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not know if I could get it by going to the archives of the Tydings committee or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may we inquire of counsel with regard to that document?

Senator O'CONOR. As a matter of fact, I think counsel volunteered or desired to state how it was procured.

Mr. FORTAS. I should like to make a statement. The rules of this committee say, whatever that means, that counsel may not testify; but this is a statement of counsel, that I ask to be allowed to make on this subject.

The procedure before the Tydings committee in which I represented Mr. Lattimore included a provision to the effect that counsel for any witness might hand to the committee counsel written questions and supporting material. In the course of the hearings which were highly publicized, as you will recall, concerning Mr. Lattimore before the Tydings committee, a lawyer here in Washington telephoned me and said that he had a transcript which would be of interest to me. I told him that I should be very interested to receive it.

The transcript came over. The transcript was the one referred to on page 5 of Mr. Lattimore's statement here. I read the transcript. The transcript was of such a nature and made reference in intimate detail to a man's personal life, that man being Budenz. The character of the transcript was such that I concluded that it had a bearing upon Mr. Budenz's credibility as a witness. But it was also such that I concluded that I did not want to have anything to do with making it public.

I consulted with Mr. Lattimore about that. I do not recall whether he read the transcript or not. I do remember, I am certain that I described to him the contents of the transcript.

I then put the transcript in a sealed envelope and handed that transcript to Mr. Morgan, who was then counsel of the Tydings committee, and I believe that I—I haven't checked this, but either informally or on the record the Tydings committee was advised that the transcript that was in this sealed envelope, that its nature was such that I felt that it should be examined by the committee—perhaps this was in Mr. Lattimore's statement, perhaps he said it—that it should be examined by the committee privately and should not be automatically made a part of the record. The reason for that, again, being that the transcript contained matters relating to Mr. Budenz's private life which I found to be quite distasteful, but also quite relevant to the issue of Mr. Budenz's credibility, that being a legal judgment.

That is what happened, and I handed the transcript up and I don't recall whether there was any further reference to it in the Tydings committee proceeding.

Senator Ferguson. Did it become a part of the record?

Senator O'Conor. Would you wait just a moment?

Mr. Fortas. If I am making a statement as counsel, I wish to finish.

Senator O'Conor. You will be permitted to. Go ahead. I think, Senator Ferguson, he ought to be permitted to finish the statement.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to know, first, before we get the statement, whether it became part of the record of the Tydings committee?

Mr. Fortas. I assume so, Senator. I don't know. I haven't checked the records.

Senator Ferguson. Did it ever appear in the press?

Mr. Fortas. No. I was going on to the next part of the story.

Senator Smith. May I ask you, Did Mr. Budenz ever hear of it, or was he ever faced with it? That is to say, did he ever have a chance to deny it, or what?

Mr. Fortas. Senator, I don't recall. I haven't checked the Tydings committee records.

The next part of the story is that Senator Chavez made a speech on the Senate floor attacking Mr. Budenz. Perhaps I should not characterize the Senator's speech. But the Senator made a speech on the Senate floor in which he made reference to Mr. Budenz, and made reference to this transcript. I believe—I haven't checked it—that he used the words that Mr. Lattimore has used in this statement.

I did not see Senator Chavez before that. Senator Chavez did not obtain the transcript from my office. We did not have the transcript. As a matter of fact, the transcript was never returned to us.

Now, Mr. Morris wrote an article for the Freeman Magazine—is that the name of it?—in which he said that Mr. Lattimore must have

obtained this transcript from a—I don't have the article, and this is not a precise quote—the effect of it was that Mr. Lattimore must have obtained the transcript from a Communist lawyer.

Mr. Lattimore did not obtain the transcript at all. The transcript came into my possession in the manner that I have described. It came to me from a Washington lawyer; and if the committee is insistent upon it, I will give the committee this lawyer's name, with his permission.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Sourwine, had you asked that?

Mr. Sourwine. I had not asked who the lawyer was who offered you and subsequently gave you this transcript.

Mr. Fortas. With the permission of the lawyer concerned, I state that the lawyer who gave me this transcript is Joseph F. Fanelli, of this city.

I hasten to say that I have known him for many years; that in my opinion he is a highly reputable, very fine, non-Communist member of the bar of this city.

Mr. Sourwine. Has counsel completed his statement?

Mr. Fortas. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand first a telegram addressed by the chairman of this committee to Mr. Edward Shaughnessy, district director, immigration, 70 Columbus Avenue, New York, N. Y. I ask permission to read it into the record.

Senator O'Conor. Proceed.

Mr. Sourwine. It is dated February 25, 1952, and reads as follows:

Re your DD files letter to Victor Lasky, New York World-Telegram, May 18, 1950, reading: "Dear Mr. Lasky: Reference is made to your letter of May 16, 1950, relative to a story appearing in the New York World-Telegram and Sun of May 16, 1950, which stated, among other things, that only one copy of the hearings involving John Santo was ever released by immigration authorities and that went to Harry Sacher. Our records here disclose that only one copy of the deportation hearings in the John Santo case was furnished to any one not an official of the Department of Justice and that was to Harry Sacher, attorney for John Santo. I do not have any definite knowledge as to how, if Mr. Lattimore's attorneys procured a transcript of the Santo hearing, it was accomplished. Sincerely yours. Edward J. Shaughnessy." Confirm contents of letter by reply wire.

Senator Pat McCarran,
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

I now have, Mr. Chairman, the teletype which has been delivered to the committee this morning, bearing the receipt date February 26, 11:26 a. m., 1952, marked with the stamp of the General Services Administration, confidential copy, reading as follows:

Hon. Pat McCarran,
United States Senate:

Answering your telegram of yesterday, content of my letter referred to is hereby confirmed.

Edw. J. Shaughnessy,
District Director, Immigration Service, New York City.

Senator O'Conor. They will be admitted into evidence.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 461 and 462," and were read in full.)

Senator O'Conor. As previously announced, we will take a recess at this time for 1 hour. The committee is in recess.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1:35 p. m., the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). The committee will come to order. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at the recess I had begun asking Mr. Lattimore several questions covering pages 5 through 8 of his statement which he had just completed reading. We were discussing the matter of the Santos transcript. It might be well if we conclude the discussion of that.

I should like, in order to clear up one point with regard to the Santos transcript, to ask a question of counsel, since counsel for the witness has made a statement about that matter. Will the Chair permit that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to inquire whether you know whether Mr. Fanelli, from whom you got this transcript, was associated with Mr. Sacher in the Santos case?

Mr. FORTAS. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Lattimore, is it your testimony that the Santos transcript was handed up to Mr. Morgan at the Tydings committee hearings by Mr. Fortas?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my recollection. I am not sure whether it was handed to Mr. Morgan or directly to the chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, did you not hand that transcript up to the Tydings committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe I did. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you not tell the Tydings committee what they would find on certain pages of that transcript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did, were you telling them about those pages from hearsay or had you examined those pages?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had not examined those pages. I was told by my counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell the Tydings committee that you had been told by your counsel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did. It could be checked by reference to the transcript.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; we have the reference to the transcript.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to ask to read it at this time, but I request that it be marked, the paragraph beginning a little below the middle of the page 812 of the Tydings hearings and continuing through the paragraph that ends at the top of the next page, and be inserted in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be inserted.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 463," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 463

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

[Pt. 1, pp. 812–813]

The history of this man's participation in questionable ventures did not begin—as it certainly did not end—with his party membership. Before he joined the party in 1935 he was a radical, left-wing agitator. He has been arrested

21 times, tried and acquitted 21 times. I assume that he was not guilty, but he was most certainly remarkably active.

If you are not yet convinced of this man's unsavory character, I suggest that you read his sworn testimony on cross-examination contained in the official transcript of the deportation proceedings entitled "*In the Matter of Desideriu Hammer, alias John Santo,* Respondent in Deportation Proceedings, file No. A–6002664."

I do not wish to discuss the matters contained in this transcript, but I hand a copy to the subcommittee.

Senator TYDINGS. It will be put in the record as exhibit 83.

Dr. LATTIMORE. I suggest that the committee should not, in advance of examining this transcript, make it part of the public record.

Senator TYDINGS. It will be kept sealed and noted in the record as an exhibit but not spread in the testimony until the committee can look into it.

Dr. LATTIMORE. Beginning at page 143 of the transcript, which is page 36 of the typewritten copy, Budenz admits that even before he joined the Communist Party he engaged in certain personal activities which, to say the least, are offensive to accepted standards of decent and conventional behavior. Beginning on page 170 of the transcript, which is page 50 of the typewritten copy, Budenz refuses to respond to a series of questions relating to his personal behavior on the grounds that his answers might incriminate him. These questions, gentlemen, relate to two different alleged relationships; and they all concern Budenz' activities before he became a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. FORTAS. May we see that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 5 of your statement, Mr. Lattimore, you make the statement that Mr. Budenz weaseled and retreated. Did you intend by that to express your contempt of the witness who weasels and retreats?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I intended by that to characterize Budenz' manner as it appeared to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not intending to express any contempt for Mr. Budenz?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not intending to convey the impression that he was an Eagle Scout, if that is what you mean.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the bottom of page 5, you quote Mr. Budenz as saying, in the Tydings hearing, "I have never seen any vestige of his" referring to you, "Communist Party membership."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you not quote the next sentence after that, in Mr. Budenz' testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see the transcript on that?

Mr. SOURWINE. The next sentence after that reads:

What I have received is these official reports which are quite binding and were binding on me as a member of the Communist Party.

Is that not correct? If you cannot find it in your transcript, you will find it at page 527, the fourth paragraph from the end, of the transcript I just handed you, the printed transcript. I am sorry, the chairman has that now.

Do you have it now? It is on page 527, the fourth paragraph from the end.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 527, which paragraph did you say?

Mr. SOURWINE. Maybe I have the wrong page reference. It is possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Fortas, did you know Harry Sacher?

Mr. FORTAS. I may have met him some time. I know that I have not seen him within my present recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not he has been disbarred as far as the Federal court of New York is concerned?

Mr. FORTAS. I have seen that in the press, Senator; yes. The case may be on appeal. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But there had been an action concerning him in at least the lower court?

Mr. FORTAS. Yes; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that he was sentenced for contempt of court in the so-called 11 Communist trial that was presided over by Judge Medina?

Mr. FORTAS. I read that in the press; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And sentenced to 6 months?

Mr. FORTAS. I don't remember that.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not it has been confirmed by the appellate court?

Mr. FORTAS. I think that is right. I think it is before the Supreme Court now.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is on page 527, the fourth paragraph from the end.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I find that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read that whole paragraph there? That is Budenz's testimony; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> The point is this: I would say of course the question of personal knowledge is a legal question in a certain way, but I would say, so far as meeting Mr. Lattimore, as seeing him in meetings, that I have never done so, that I have never seen any vestige of his Communist Party membership. What I have received is these official reports which are quite binding and were binding on me as a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all. The question I am asking, sir, is why, when you quoted the sentence "I have never seen any vestige of his Communist Party membership" and quoted it in the context of showing that Mr. Budenz was admitting, as you contend, that he had no basis for any assertion with regard to your Communist Party membership, why did you not go on and quote the next sentence in the same paragraph of Mr. Budenz's testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I have no objection whatever to the next sentence being included in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question. The question was why you did not put it in, not whether you have an objection to it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I thought that the point that Budenz admitted that he had never seen any vestige of Communist Party membership on my part was the pertinent point I was trying to make. I had been trying to write a statement not longer than absolutely necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it was modified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This other statement—there are other statements that appear at other points in the Tydings transcript, and it is part of the hearsay part of Mr. Budenz's evidence.

For instance, on page 1137 of the Tydings-typed transcript, Budenz says:

> Outside of what I was officially told by the Communist leaders, I do not know of Mr. Lattimore as a Communist.

I did not quote that either.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that the statement you gave was modified by the next sentence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Modified by the next sentence?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the one that was read.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They are two separate sentences.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever inveigh against anyone for quoting things out of context, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that this committee has introduced a great many quotations out of context; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever inveigh against anyone?

Senator FERGUSON. You did not answer the question at all, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know that I would use the word "inveigh." I have pointed out that people have used statements out of context.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever expressed your disapproval of using statements out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have expressed my disapproval of using statements out of context. I do not think that this particular point, if that is what you are referring to, is the point out of context.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I was going to ask you, whether you think you have quoted this thing out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I think I have given a fair connotation of Mr. Budenz's testimony over all.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 6 you referred to an article by a Chinese Communist published in Pacific Affairs, which you say was the single exception to a rule.

Are you there referring to the article Agrarian Democracy in Northwest China, by Ma Ning, do you recall?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is probably the reference. Incidentally, I don't mean—you use the word "rule" there. I don't mean rule in the sense that the magazine had any rule against presenting the views of Chinese Communists. I mean, as it so happens, that is the only one we had that I have been able to find.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the top of page 7, sir, you say:

> Now, it is characteristic of this man and of this dark world of intrigue, that your counsel, Mr. Morris, carefully refrained in the hearings before you from asking Budenz whether he had read my writings.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you realize, sir, that the plain meaning of that language is a charge that something which Mr. Morris did is characteristic of Mr. Budenz?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that your interpretation of it?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you if you realize that that is the plain meaning of the language.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My interpretation of the meaning of the language is that Mr. Morris, with every opportunity to straighten out the Budenz record, did not do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you deny that the plain meaning of that language is the statement that something Mr. Morris did is characteristic of Mr. Budenz?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am stating that it is characteristic of this man, in this dark world of intrigue. I mean, the whole way in which Budenz has been allowed to make his accusations, broadcast, with no checking or verifying of his credibility, no testing questions whatever.

Mr. Sourwine. You are talking about something Mr. Morris did; are you not?

Mr. Lattimore. I go on to——

Mr. Sourwine. No, not going on, sir. In this particular sentence you are talking about something Mr. Morris did.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, it is characteristic of this procedure.

Mr. Sourwine. You are talking about something Mr. Morris did; are you not?

Mr. Lattimore. That Mr. Morris carefully refrained in the hearings——

Mr. Sourwine. And you are stating that what Mr. Morris did in that regard is characteristic of Mr. Budenz; are you not?

Mr. Lattimore. If you would like to interpret it that way.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you deny that you intended it that way?

Mr. Lattimore. All right, if you want to put that word in my mouth, I will intend it that way.

Mr. Sourwine. Please do not intend it that way for me, sir. I am asking you what you did intend. I think it is germane to this committee to know whether the plain import of what you said is something which you intended to say.

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, the use of the words "this dark world of intrigue" is in itself a statement on my part that there are things here that I cannot fathom, that I think that the proceedings would have been much fairer and clearer if there had not been this mystery and this atmosphere of intrigue. Precisely what characteristics Mr. Morris and Mr. Budenz shared in this dark world of intrigue is something that I don't know. If I had known, I would have said it.

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by "intrigue" here, as used?

Mr. Lattimore. I mean this manner of presenting evidence when it had been clearly shown in the Tydings hearings that Budenz was unreliable and evasive, to present him all over again before this subcommittee without a single question to check his credibility.

Now, I am not saying, Senator, that my view of Budenz is necessarily correct. I am not saying that the evidence in the Tydings transcript is all the evidence there would be. I am merely saying that I think that, in view of the nature of the accusations made by Budenz, some check should have been made before this committee. And did your committee ask your counsel if they had checked Budenz' credibility?

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any knowledge, sir, of any checks that may have been made?

Mr. Lattimore. All I can see is an absence of any check.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Budenz had been used by the Justice Department on many occasions in court and had been vouched for as to credibility by the Justice Department of the United States?

Mr. Lattimore. That was not brought up, Senator, in the Tydings hearings.

Senator Ferguson. My question was did you know?

Mr. Lattimore. There is something pertinent to this that I have on the record before, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Would you like to return to that later?

Mr. Fortas. Mrs. Lattimore is looking for it now.

Mr. Sourwine. You say Mrs. Lattimore is looking it up now?

Mr. FORTAS. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed. We will return to it later.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask this question, Mr. Lattimore? With regard to this sentence we are discussing, the first sentence at the top of page 7 of your statement, now that we have had some discussion of it here and now that you have reread it, is there anything that that sentence appears to you to convey that you want to disavow here or in any way circumscribe or amend?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I considered that sentence carefully before I wrote it, and I will stay with it as it stands.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure you did. Now at the end of that first paragraph at the top of page 7 you say:

Mr. Morris and Budenz sought to achieve just as good a general effect.

By that statement do you mean that Mr. Morris and Mr. Budenz had a common purpose?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I mean that the record as it stands certainly looks like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, Mr. Morris and Mr. Budenz had a common purpose; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my opinion, Mr. Morris brought on Mr. Budenz and asked him questions which, as I stated just above, enabled Budenz to avoid the choice of plain, not fancy, perjuring on confessing that he had no basis for his charges. At this moment, Senator, I have found the point which I was looking for.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is in a statement made by me before the Tydings committee. I don't have the page reference to the printed hearings:

Third, I am informed that the Department—

that is, the Department of Justice—

does not vouch for the general character or credibility of its witnesses. At most, it impliedly represents that the use that they are qualified to testify on matters upon which they are questioned; for example, in appropriate cases it calls as Government witnesses narcotic peddlers, gangsters, racketeers, confessed murderers, and thugs.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not vouch for the fact that when they call a witness such as they used Budenz for in these cases, they at least believe what he is going to say to be true and not perjury?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably on the point for which they are calling him. But Budenz was not called by the Department of Justice to testify against me.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I am not talking about you now. I tried to eliminate you as much as possible out of the case.

But if they call him in one of these other cases, they vouch for the credibility of what he is going to say in that case; do they not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, sir. If we can get back to the question of your statement that Mr. Morris and Budenz sought to achieve just as good a general effect, did you intend by that to imply any prearrangement between Mr. Morris and Mr. Budenz?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no knowledge how much they may have prearranged things between them. I wrote that sentence simply

because it looked to me as if both Morris and Budenz had skirted around difficulties known to both of them from the previous hearings before the Tydings committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. But to put it bluntly, were you not then, and are you not now, charging conspiracy between Mr. Budenz and Mr. Morris to achieve what you call just as good a general effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My counsel tells me that he believes that that is a question of legal opinion on which I don't have to express myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything in that statement, that sentence that I read, which you now want to disavow or amend or circumscribe in any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say the innuendo is there, that you are charging Morris and Budenz in a conspiracy to bring about perjury?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I said above that this whole thing appears to me to be a dark world of intrigue. The point has just been brought up that the definition of conspiracy is a legal question. I don't know about conspiracy, collusion, anything of that kind. I have simply made the point that the record shows that both men skirted around points of difficulty well known to both of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us leave the word "conspiracy" out and use the word that they just combined to have perjury committed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. To have what?

Senator FERGUSON. To have perjury committed in the proceedings. Is that not what you say?

If he had, Budenz would have had the choice of plain, not fancy, perjury or confessing that he had no basis for his charge. Instead, Mr. Morris and Budenz sought to achieve just as good a general effect.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What I was pointing out was that the line of questioning followed was one which permitted Budenz to evade the whole question of perjury.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you say Mr. Morris obligingly asked. Who was he obliging, in your opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Mr. Sourwine, in view of the fact that no questions were asked that would cause Budenz the slightest difficulty, in view of the fact that Budenz was enabled to go further and be even more outrageous in his accusations than he was before the Tydings committee, obliging—that is, obliging Mr. Budenz—is the only term I can think of.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to find out, how you intended it. And when you say a little further on, "Budenz obligingly replied," who did you intent to say Mr. Budenz was obliging?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether Mr. Budenz was obliging Mr. Morris personally or obliging the committee. But he was apparently giving an answer that he thought would be well received.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the next paragraph you refer to a conference with the editor of Collier's magazine.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether that conference was face to face or over the telephone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection of the discussion before the Tydings committee is that it must have been face to face, and with a stenographer present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the Tydings committee record shows that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my recollection. I would be glad to have it verified.

Mr. SOURWINE. We would be glad to have you verify it, sir, if you can find anything in the Tydings record that indicates that.

Mr. FORTAS. May the witness take a look at it?

Mr. SOURWINE. No.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I have found it here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have before me, sir, the page of the printed record which confirms that. I wanted to question you about it. I will be glad to wait, if you finish.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think perhaps we could save time. We have had a 4- or 5-minute pause here. If you would look at this page which I hand you, which is, I believe, the printed record of that transcript, it might save time. I simply want to ask you a question about it.

Mr. FORTAS. Do you want to skip this point?

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a relatively immaterial point, sir. It is our worth holding up the proceedings over. I simply wanted to ask about the nature of this conversation.

Was not this the case of the editor of Collier's, or one of the editors, or editorial board members of Collier's, talking with Mr. Budenz about an article he had written for Collier's and a draft of which was then in the possession of Collier's and in the possession of this editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. So I gather from the transcript, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And was not the editor of Collier's asking Mr. Budenz about what he said in that article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he not saying "You say this here, now how about that? You do not say this here." Is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the sort of conference it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was not asking Mr. Budenz "What do you, Mr. Budenz, say to me now about the question of whether anyone is or is not a Communist?" He was asking Mr. Budenz "Do you, in this article, say anything about Mr. Lattimore?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, he was apparently—my name was brought in there, and the editor suggested this—that the way Budenz had put it made it look as though I had been a Communist agent, and Budenz backed off and said he was not stating that I acted as a Communist agent in any way.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your interpretation of what took place; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my answer to your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

That is quite correct, Mr. Fortas, that is what I asked him for.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that this material in small type, which appears on page 512 of the State Department employee loyalty hearings, the Tydings hearings, may be inserted in the record of this committee at this point. That is what I asked Mr. Lattimore to read and what we were discussing.

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). It will be so inserted.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 464" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 464

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

[Pt. 1, p. 512]

Question. You tell about Browder saying that the followers of Mao Tse Tung had to be presented in a new light. It's easy to see that this was an idea the Communists had to push. Don't show that they invented this idea, show that they fostered it.

Answer. I'll do that.

Question. You have done one thing here that I think is not good. By inference you implied that Joe Barnes and Lattimore are not Communists exactly but are fellow travelers. You say the Communists supposedly endorsed Roosevelt.

Answer. I think probably what we ought to do is to leave out those names entirely. Perhaps we can rephrase it some way. I said it merely to show that they would add meat to what I was saying.

Question. From our standpoint it seems that you were damning these people. This might put us in an embarrassing legalistic position. We have no particular reason to smear Lattimore. The same thing applies to that thing about Roosevelt on page 5. Why did you use the word "supposedly"?

Answer. It was only because from time to time they were supporting Browder inferentially. They didn't come out and say they were for Roosevelt. Their arguments were for Roosevelt but their candidate was Browder. The Communist support of Roosevelt was not an actual support but only a way of winning the people over that were undecided.

Question. On page 7 you say "This idea of the 'upstanding Chinese Communists, the great agrarian reformers,' was peddled everywhere from that time on." You haven't given a single instance that it was peddled or that the idea was planted by the Communists. Give at least one instance, or more than one if possible.

Answer. Lattimore and Barnes became champions of some of these ideas as time went on.

Question. You're not saying that they acted as Communist agents in any way?

Answer. No.

Question. That ought to be quite clear.

Answer. Oh, yes.

Mr. FORTAS. May I make the point that the hearings before the Tydings committee included the entire transcript of this conference between the editor of Collier's and Mr. Budenz. I point that out to you. I do not know what this segment is to be introduced, but the committee may want to consider whether you want the entire transcript.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is counsel suggesting that an effort is being made here to take something out of context?

Mr. FORTAS. Of course not, Mr. Sourwine. I haven't seen what you are offering. Customarily, when evidence is offered in any proceeding that I know of, it is shown to opposing counsel in advance. I am not asking you to do that.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is material with which it was assumed counsel was thoroughly familiar, having participated in the Tydings hearings.

Mr. FORTAS. I have never seen the printed transcript, and neither has Mr. Lattimore. I don't know what the pages are.

Senator O'CONOR. You may proceed to the next question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at the risk of cluttering this record, there are only a little over two pages of the entire transcript that is referred to, and they appear beginning on page 513. May those pages now be inserted at this point in the record?

Senator O'CONOR. All right; they will be inserted.

Mr. SOURWINE. And leaving the previous excerpt which was inserted in the record at that point so that anyone may compare to see if they were taken out of context.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be so included.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 465" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 465

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

[Pt. 1, pp. 512–516]

BUDENZ ARTICLE RED MYTHS, STARRING CHINA

(By Mr. Leonard Paris)

Question. The main problem, Mr. Budenz, was that we felt that your thesis of this piece wasn't entirely proved. Let me tell you what I think of it: We need more documentation on some of the things. On the second page you say the whole idea of coalition government was concocted by Soviet Russia in order to defeat America in the Far East. I don't doubt that their support of coalition government was a contributing factor, but who first suggested coalition government?

Answer. The Communists.

Question. Before it had been publicly mentioned anywhere else?

Answer. Yes.

Question. I think you ought to mention when and where and by whom coalition government came to public attention.

Answer. It was the Communists who pushed it and made use of it. I will get the authority for this.

Question. On page 3, the sentence reading: "These Moscow agents, pledged by their own declaration," etc., you quote "a sort of nonpartisan leaguer." Where does this come from?

Answer. This comes from Browder. That is to say I don't know of anyone who used that phrase. It was used for an argument that the Communists in China are different. However, I will get authority for that statement. I used it because it was pushed by the Communist Party.

Question. Here is an example of the sort of thing that needs more incidents and instances. On page 4 the sentence which reads "At every turn of history, the Chinese Communists, etc." I think it would be well for all readers if you gave some examples of that, other than just the pact between Russia and China. You're talking about the Soviet nonaggression pact. We need more examples to support that.

Answer. I'll get you that.

Question. You tell about Browder saying that the followers of Mao Tse-tung had to be presented in a new light. It's easy to see that this was an idea the Communists had to push. Don't show that they invented this idea, show that they fostered it.

Answer. I'll do that.

Question. You have done one thing here that I think is not good. By inference you implied that Joe Barnes and Lattimore are not Communists exactly, but are fellow travelers. You say that Communists supposedly endorsed Roosevelt?

Answer. I think probably what we ought to do is to leave out those names entirely. Perhaps we can rephrase it some way. I said it merely to show that they would add meat to what I was saying.

Question. From our standpoint it seems that you were damning these people. This might put us in an embarrassing legalistic position. We have no particular reason to smear Lattimore. The same thing applies to that thing about Roosevelt on page 5. Why did you use the word "supposedly"?

Answer. It was only because from time to time they were supporting Browder inferentially. They didn't come out and say they were for Roosevelt. Their arguments were for Roosevelt but their candidate was Browder. The Communist support of Roosevelt was not an actual support but only a way of winning the people over that were undecided.

Question. On page 7 you say "This idea of the 'upstanding Chinese Communists, the great agrarian reformers,' was peddled everywhere from that time on." You haven't given a single instance that it was peddled or that the idea was planted by the Communists. Give at least one instance, or more than one if possible.

Answer. Lattimore and Barnes became champions of some of these ideas as time went on.

Question. You're not saying that they acted as Communist agents in any way?

Answer. No.

Question. That ought to be quite clear.

Answer. Oh, yes.

Question. You say that the entire history of coalition governments was that Russia took over eventually. We need concrete instances, and examples very much more effective. They must also be complete enough so that they can be quickly identified and so that the reader can see that they are true.

Answer. It will be very brief.

Question. On page 10, "On December 7 last, it was discovered in Washington that there had been a tragic lag in the delivery of promised war material and other goods to Nationalist China, etc." Isn't the reason for that simply because Congress didn't appropriate more than that? Isn't it true that more aid went to Greece and Turkey than China simply because more had been appropriated?

Answer. I have to check on that. This was pointed to by the New York Times in an editorial.

Question. On page 11 there is a dubious slam on the unions. "A special secret order was sent out to the Communists, to be pushed in unions and in every occupation where sympathizers were engaged, etc." It sounds as though you can expect to find Communist sympathizers in every union.

Answer. We can change that. It's a document that I'm referring to there. I will look it up. It may be the way it is phrased. The unions are the chief opponents of the Communists. Communists are always trying to work within the unions. In a number of unions they do have Communists as they do in all fields.

Question. "Arrangements were made whereby the legs of book reviewers were to be pulled so that those works which gave a break to the Chinese Communists would receive favorable notices." etc. We need an instance of this. Make the article much more effective by getting an actual case.

Answer. In previous articles my statements were specific; then they were made very general.

Question. Any documentation?

Answer. No. I can't prove it legally. That's why I use a general phraseology.

Question. Best thing to do is leave it out.

Answer. The trouble is I did have a host of specific examples and then had to take them out.

Question. On the Amerasia case, refresh most of our readers as to what actually happened. Did the defendants get off without any difficulties? How did it work out?

Answer. Jaffe was fined and one other defendant, Larson (I have to check up on this) got a small suspended sentence. Nobody went to jail. Mitchell was not given punishment of any kind.

Question. Can you indicate how Communist pressure was exerted?

Answer. I'll make an effort to check this. This is pretty well known. That's why I didn't go into it.

Question. But people forget details. The actual outcome of the case should be stated and the definite part that the Communists played.

Answer. Definitely. I should tell more of what these documents contain. The plans of Chiang Kai-shek's army and the economic plans of the Chinese Government were in those papers.

Question. On bottom of page 16, "In his address Mr. John Carter Vincent indicated Nationalist China as a place unsound to invest private or public capital." You're not trying to imply that this was a Communist idea, are you? Hasn't it been pretty well demonstrated that Nationalist China was unsound?

Answer. The State Department was supporting Nationalist China.

Question. The point is, Mr. Vincent's quotes on Nationalist China may or may not have been the result of the Communist lie.

Answer. I'll have to link it more closely. It was accepted in the Far East division. I'll bring you more information on this.

Question. If Mr. Carter's advice were taken, you claim there would be an awful fiasco. Isn't there any possibility that part of the trouble in China is the Chinese Government itself?

Answer. Surely.

Question. Never in any part of the article was it admitted that Chiang Kai-shek's government was weak and corrupt. You're trying to show the Communist influence.

Answer. Let me take hold of that. I'll present more examples of Communist activity and show how the activity played its part.

Question. We shouldn't try to convince our readers that Chiang Kai-shek was all white and that Communist propaganda led to what happened over there.

Answer. As a matter of self-defense, America was completely unaware of what was taking place in China.

Question. You have to prove that General Carlson was a party liner—back it up.

Answer. He was such a striking example. He was a Communist many years. I can be stronger. I can give you instances. I can show you who was associated with him on this committee.

Question. On page 21: "It was out of all these pressures, Moscow-directed, that President Roosevelt was persuaded to amend our solemn pledge of China's integrity made at Cairo to the Yalta promise that Soviet Russia would get Outer Mongolia and even a chance at Manchuria, et cetera." Moscow-directed pressures were not solely responsible; that is putting it a little too broadly.

Answer. It shouldn't be solely.

Question. "It is from such creation of confusion in the American mind that we have promised aid to China and not given it in the measure it was pledged." You were referring to the New York Times editorial, I presume. Show actual figures.

Answer. I'm glad you raised this about Roosevelt. I can tell more in this piece. The reason I don't go more into the Communist activities is because I don't want to sound repetitious of some of the other articles. The methods used by the Communists have a somewhat similar tone. The tactics described sound like it happened before.

Question. On these things, the more instances you can show to bear out what you say or what your thesis is, the better it will be. It has to be more than just implied or inferred. Make it as definite as you can possibly make it without getting into libel.

Answer. There is a terrific job in writing this. I know certain connecting links which I dare not say. I try to bring them out, but they become somewhat broken, because I cannot give the link. I will make some of these definite changes that you suggest. I will enlarge the information on the Chiang phraseology.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the top of page 8, sir, and this is the last point I wish to inquire about before you go ahead with the reading of your statement, you say:

> This same Mr. Morris is the one who invited Budenz to testify that I received instructions as a member of a Communist cell.

I would like to ask you how did the question that Mr. Morris asked at that point invite any particular testimony from Mr. Budenz?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, that second sentence was written after careful consideration, and after reading the part of the transcript in which Mr. Morris was questioning Budenz.

Incidentally, the smooth way in which Budenz was allowed to present his accusations forms rather a startling contrast with the questioning of accused witnesses before this committee.

The only conclusion I could come to from that reading was that the entire method of Mr. Morris' questioning constituted an open invitation.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. You were not referring to the particular question that you have here cited in your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am referring to the whole of the questioning.

Mr. Sourwine. All right. I have no more questions up to this point where the witness concluded reading his statement.

Senator O'Conor. Will you proceed? Again, just by way of expediting the proceeding, it appears to me that there is a natural break at the end of page 14, before taking up the several points that the witness indicates were used in a certain matter. It occurs to me that, from this point on, until the conclusion of page 14, which may be a natural segment or just a segment, that you might want to proceed and read it entirely.

Mr. Lattimore. I am entirely with you, Senator.

Senator O'Conor. All right, go ahead. You may proceed from the middle of page 8.

Mr. Lattimore. As for the Institute of Pacific Relations, your chairman has already publicly proclaimed that he has prejudged it, and I do not suppose that anything I say will change his mind. In a printed interview, while the investigation is still in process, he has already stated, as his "curbstone opinion," that the institute "was taken over by Communist design and made a vehicle for attempted control and conditioning of American thinking and American policy with regard to the Far East." It was also used—he said—"for espionage purposes to collect and channel information of interest or value to the Russian Communists" (United States News and World Report, November 16, 1951). It sounds almost as if the curbstone from which the distinguished Senator delivered this opinion had been imported from one of the countries in which accusation is accepted as conclusive of guilt. My own relations with the IPR were gone into quite thoroughly before the Tydings subcommittee, the record of which your counsel, Mr. Morris, has so sedulously kept out of sight. I therefore ask permission to submit as an exhibit a copy of my statement of May 2, 1950, to the Tydings committee, and I particularly call your attention to the analysis, beginning page D1, showing that my writings have not followed the Communist line, have conflicted with the Communist line, and have been bitterly attacked by Communists.

May I offer that, Senator?

Senator O'Conor. Yes; that will be received and marked for reference.

Mr. Lattimore. Thank you.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 466," and is filed in the committee file for reference.)

Mr. Lattimore. The proceedings before this subcommittee have created so much confusion and mystification about the IPR that I want to repeat, in plain English, that I never had any administrative responsibility in the American IPR, or any supervision of its staff. I have been for some years a trustee, and for a short time after the war I was a member of the executive committee of the American IPR; but as I do not live in New York, my attendance at meetings was infrequent. I also want to say clearly that in my own work as editor of Pacific Affairs from 1934 to 1941 I was not dominated or directed or influenced in any way by Communist or pro-Communist people or attitudes. Pacific Affairs was not an American publication. It was an international publication. I was not responsible to the American IPR, but to the international council.

Articles appearing in Pacific Affairs were circulated in advance to readers in a number of countries. Articles dealing with current con-

troversies were always shown in advance to someone representing the other side of the controversy, in order to maintain a high standard of debate and discussion, while eliminating mere propaganda as far as was humanly possible.

I call your attention to my analysis of Pacific Affairs during the years I edited it which appears on pages C–1 to C–5 of my statement of May 2, to the Tydings committee, which I have just handed to you, and from which I wish to quote a few paragraphs:

> May I remind you that throughout this period there was nothing reprehensible or even unusual about the occasional publication of significant left-wing views or the analysis of left-wing movements in far eastern countries° Such views and analyses appeared in all the leading journals of the United States and the whole Western World. In those days, before Kohlberg, McCarthy, and Budenz undertook to revise the American tradition of free inquiry and free speech, nobody dreamed of accusing an editor or publisher of being a Russian spy because such views were printed.
>
> I have made a new tabulation for you of all material published in Pacific Affairs under my editorship. Of a total of 250 contributions, only 17—written by 11 persons—could possibly be called, by anyone, left of center because of facts or opinions favorable to Russia, Chinese Communists, guerrillas, or leftist movements in Asia. Remember this was an international magazine; 94 articles were definitely right of center, and 143 either dealt with nonpolitical and noneconomic subjects or presented purely neutral points of view. There was nothing even remotely like a "mobilization" of Communist or leftist writers.
>
> I would also like to point out that the same 11 people who contributed the 17 articles I have mentioned as representing left-wing positions contributed, during the same years, a total of at least 204 articles to reputable non-Communist periodicals including the Saturday Evening Post, Reader's Digest, Literary Digest, American Mercury, Fortune, and the Atlantic Monthly.
>
> And in the same period we published at least 94 contributions that were definitely to the right of center, which means about seven times as much right-wing material as there was material presenting left-wing views or information. Among our right-wing or anti-Russian contributors were Sir Charles Bell, British authority on Tibet and Mongolia; L. H. Hubbard, a Bank of England economist specializing on Russia; Prof. Robert J. Kerner of the University of California; Nicholas Roosevelt; Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, who was against a tough policy toward Japan; Arnold J. Toynbee; F. W. Eggleston, later Australian Minister to China; G. E. Hubbard, right-wing British authority on China; William Henry Chamberlin, and a strong representation of Kuomintang writers.
>
> I expect that during the same period, hardly any serious and objective magazine devoted to analysis of political problems, could show a fairer or more representative sample of current thinking.

By promoting the publication and discussion of important facts and opinions the IPR, in my opinion, was making and is still making a valuable contribution to our shockingly meager information about the Far East. To use political intimidation to curtail or eliminate the free market of facts and ideas to which the IPR has contributed would be a catastrophe to the best interests of this country.

In a free country, the discussion of foreign policy cannot be monopolized or patroled by the government. The people of a democracy, and the officials who handle foreign policy in the government need to be able to draw upon a wide field of academic and private research, done by people who are not subject to bureaucratic controls. It is right that the Congress should interest itself closely in both the issues and the conduct of foreign policy, but it is not right that the Congress should make itself the censor of academic research and personal opinion.

Beginning in 1938, and continuing for several years, the Institute of Pacific Relations carried out a special project, called The Inquiry, financed by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Nothing about

The Inquiry was secret. The whole background of war and political and economic conflict in the Far East was covered, and so were questions of future peace settlements. More than 30 books were published as an "inquiry series." These books went straight into public circulation. They could be bought and read by anybody, including Government officials.

Another research enterprise was carried on in the same years by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. This research was also financed by a special grant from a private foundation, and its results were submitted to the State Department.

I did not contribute to the Institute of Pacific Relations inquiry. I did contribute to the Council on Foreign Relations research. I took part in more than one of the "study groups" and for a time was chairman of one of them. I wrote memoranda and expressed opinions.

If this subcommittee is interested in my views, its investigative staff is open to the charge of extraordinary incompetence for trying to investigate me through the Institute of Pacific Relations. They should have looked into my connections with the Council on Foreign Relations.

In fact, I think that several memoranda which the Council on Foreign Relations asked me to write in October and November, 1940, were forwarded by the Council to the State Department. The memoranda had no effect whatever, I'm sorry to say. In them I predicted that the Japanese would find it easy to come to terms with the Russians and that Russia would not act jointly with America. Accordingly, I urged that we strengthen our position by increasing aid to China, and I warned that "there is grave danger that we shall get into a war with Japan, with Russia joyfully neutral and uncooperative."

My warnings of a Russian-Japanese get-together were justified when they signed a neutrality pact in April 1941. It turned out that I was right in foreseeing that war between Russia and Germany was more likely than war between Russia and Japan, in expecting Japan to turn south, toward Singapore, and not north toward Russia, and, finally, in warning that this could only be prevented by simultaneously boosting military supplies to China and cracking down on economic supplies to Japan. But the record shows that between the time of these memoranda and Pearl Harbor, a year later, these views of mine had not the faintest effect on the conduct of American foreign policy. We continued to aid the Japanese war machine and to hope that Japan would be kept busy with Russia.

In the good days of freedom when I edited Pacific Affairs for the IPR, no one was being bullied for having an inquiring mind or independent opinions. Every magazine and scholar was eager to get facts and to publish or read diverse opinions on the issues of the time. In those days it is regrettably true that nobody—and I mean nobody—had a crystal ball so that he could see into the future with unerring success. The nature of Communist infiltration was not known. It never entered our heads to set up a private FBI or security screening to determine the exact political affiliation of IPR staff members or contributors to IPR publications. It didn't enter anybody else's head, either. The Saturday Evening Post, the Luce publications, and the Wall Street Journal didn't work that way, either.

As a matter of fact, we had the best protection against being manipulated or duped that a private organization could possibly have—complete openness of discussion of facts and ideas.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask a question there? Did I understand you to say back further that you had really nothing to do with the policy or the setting up of what you say now is protection? And where did you get this information about the best protection?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not say anything about setting up anything. I merely said that we did not set up, and that nobody knows——

Senator FERGUSON. But you say back here further that you did not have anything to do with the policy of the IPR.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said I never had any administrative responsibilities in the American IPR, that is quite true.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get the information, then, about "We have the best protection."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I participated in it, Senator; because I knew that as editor of Pacific Affairs my articles, the articles I published, were circulated all over the place before they were published, and the manuscripts of other articles and also books were circulated all over the place, including some of them coming to me sometimes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you did know what was going on, you were being consulted about what was going on in the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I was not being consulted about what was going on. I was receiving some of the material that was thus circulated.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that any of these people that have refused to testify before this committee as to Communists, when they were writing the articles and books for the IPR, did you know those persons at the time these contributions were being made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew some of them. I knew of others. I did not know of any of them as Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make any inquiry or did you know of any inquiry about their communist leanings, or being Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I just said, Senator, that it never entered our heads to set up a private FBI or security screenings as of those years of the 1930's.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you mean by that statement, as a matter of fact, "we had the best protection," do you mean in the light of not being of the opinion that there was penetration by Communists? Not having that knowledge, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What we were concerned with at that time was the general question of propaganda or biased presentation of views, any propaganda, any bias. As a matter of fact, what most people were concerned about in those days was Japanese propaganda more than anything else.

Senator FERGUSON. Can we agree that the Communists are very clever in giving out their propaganda?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly we can agree on that. I have already stated that in those days, I think, most people were not yet aware of the danger of Communist conspiracy or long-range operation.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Then do you not think that with the lack of knowledge, that it may have been possible for the Communists to penetrate IPR, and carry on their propaganda?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All I am saying is that the output at that time did not impress me or other people to whom the material was circulated as Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back now to this problem as to whether or not it is innocence rather than knowledge that they did penetrate IPR, do you think that we ought to disclose to the public, if it was a fact, that, innocently, as far as anybody that was honest about the thing in the IPR, allowed penetration to be had, not knowing that it was being had? Do you not think that if it was penetrated we should disclose that to the public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There was a part of the beginning of your question that I did not get, Senator. I will ask to have it read back.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I will give it again. Suppose we assume for the next question that there was no permission or knowledge upon any of the managers of the IPR—I want to exclude Mr. Field—but that as far as you were concerned, as far as Carter was concerned, as far as Holland and the other people were concerned, that it was because it never entered your head that anybody would try to penetrate, but that they did pentrate, should not that fact now be brought out to the public so that in the future it would be very difficult for peneration to be had without knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no objection whatever to that information being brought out, Senator. In fact, I highly approve of it. What I disapprove of, in the way in which the evidence has been stacked before this committee, is the impression that, because certain people may have been Communists at one time, and I don't know whether they were Communists at that time or later, that certain people who may have been Communists at that time were in the IPR, that they also controlled the policy of the IPR and the output of the IPR.

Now, there are two points there: First, there was no IPR policy to control; second, any honest review of the output of the IPR will show that it did not, in fact, serve Communist interests.

Senator FERGUSON. But of course, now, that is your judgment and you are giving that as your judgment to this committee of seven members, hoping that they will adopt your judgment. But if they come to a different conclusion, are you going to accuse them of bad faith, and is not that what you are doing in this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I am saying that this committee has thus far admitted an overwhelming amount of accusations and allegations to state, imply, or insinuate that the IPR was an instrument of the Communists, that that evidence is not adequate, that the other side has not been shown, that the enormous output of the IPR of a perfectly normal and even conservative character has been disregarded, and that the result is a distorted picture.

Senator FERGUSON. They have also permitted this record to show today that you, purely on hearsay, have branded Louis Budenz as an immoral person, and other than a Communist, is that not true?

Should we immediately censure you and strike from this record that statement? Or should we let it stand?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only thing you could do there, Senator, would be to refuse to permit me to quote an official document.

Senator FERGUSON. You have never seen the official document.

Senator O'CONOR. How do you know what was in the official document if you admit yourself you have never seen it or consulted it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know what my counsel would say to this, but my feeling is that the relationship between counsel and client is of such a kind that I was entirely entitled to take his word for it.

Senator SMITH. Do you know Harry Sacher?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Have you ever had any conversation or correspondence with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Have you ever had anybody go from you to him or from him to you and ask for any of this information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you know who he is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From the hearings, from the mention that has been made here.

Senator SMITH. You know from the press who he is, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall seeing his name in the press.

Senator SMITH. You do not recall reading about the trial of the Communists in New York City, with Judge Medina?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read some of the stories of the trial about the Communists. I confess I didn't make any minute study.

Senator O'CONOR. You are at the top of page 14, at the end of the second paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As a matter of fact we had the best protection against being manipulated or duped that a private organization could possibly have—complete openness of discussion of facts and ideas. All research data, and opinions about the data, were constantly being circulated to, and commented on and criticized by, people who were authorities on the subject and who had, among themselves, many differences of opinion. Under that system, a research organization simply cannot be slanted or controlled to promote communism or any other single and exclusive policy.

If it was party strategy to infiltrate the IPR, I did not suspect it. Nor as a matter of fact, did Senator Ferguson, who was a member of and contributor to the IPR from 1936 to 1944—years when I was active in it, or Ray Lyman Wilbur or Newton D. Baker or Joseph B. Chamberlain or Jerome B. Greene or Robert Gordon Sproul.

Maybe a few Communists or pro-Communists did work for the IPR. I suppose that a few worked for the United States Government, too, and for some of our leading papers and great corporations. It does not follow that this made them communistic, that is, the employer, or that their other employees or executives were infected with the virus. In the case of F. V. Field, I had no reason to consider him a Communist during the period when he was secretary of the American IPR in the 1930's, although I have no doubt he became one during the 1940's. I have been shocked and surprised to learn recently that five other people connected in one way or another with the IPR have refused to say whether they were ever Communists. If they were Communists when I know, or knew of them, then I saw no evidence of it. And certainly an honest and complete review of the IPR will show that it was never controlled or dominated by Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. You speak of five other people, sir. Do you know that in fact, up to this date, there have been 11?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Field, Moore, Rosinger, Kathleen Barnes, William Mandel, Mildred Price, Len DeCaux, the two Keeneys, Deane, and Allen.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Are those all connected with the IPR?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Your knowledge is greater than mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, because of your reference to your shock and surprise to learn that certain people had refused to answer, I would like to ask this: Do you think that refusal to answer that question indicates that the person refusing is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that that is the general presupposition at the present time. I am informed that people sometimes do refuse to answer that question out of principle.

So far as I know, the five that I have mentioned here, nobody even mentioned that principle. Therefore, I must make the inference that they probably are or were once Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you not know that the Constitution would not allow them to claim exemption from testifying only on principle, that they must invoke the fifth amendment which is the one that provides that he shall not testify against himself?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your authoritative statement on that.

Mr. SMITH. Who are the five that you referred to here? That is, in this particular spot.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Field, Harriet Moore, Kathleen Barnes, Len DeCaux, Rosinger, and Allen, besides Field.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not know that by the time those persons you named had testified there were many more than five who had refused to answer that $64 question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What relation did they have to the IPR or to me? I can only speak of people that I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not know all of these 11 people I named?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Read them over. I think there are several I never knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Harriet Moore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Lawrence Rosinger?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Joseph Barnes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know William Mandel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Harriet Price?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Len DeCaux?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Len DeCaux, I think I have met him; but I wouldn't recognize him if he walked into the room.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know the Keeneys?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have met them casually; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Deane?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Deane?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know James S. Allen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, that establishes who you know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that any of these witnesses refused to testify that they knew you on the grounds it might tend to incriminate them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here goes some hearsay evidence, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you if you ever heard of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Somebody told me that James S. Allen so testified. But I didn't see the press report myself, and I heard about that after this statement was prepared.

Senator FERGUSON. How long ago was this statement prepared?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It has been in preparation for several months.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but when was it finished?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was finished, maybe, 6 or 8 hours before it was delivered to this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why was not Allen's name used here to make it six? You had known that Allen refused to testify.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was confining my remarks to people that I know. I can only be shocked and surprised about people I know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Allen?

Mr. LATTIMFRE. I corresponded with him, I never met him. At least, I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you mean by "know" that you knew them personally?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or had some contact with them; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Writing and corresponding is contact, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE."Yes; that is right. Well, I have included him, haven't I?

Senator FERGUSON. Have you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness did name Mr. Allen.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right. I was confused here because I first mentioned five people besides Field.

Mr. SOURWINE. You then testified that you did not know Mr. Allen.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in the sense that I don't believe I ever met him. If you want to say that corresponding means knowing, that is all right, I will accept that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so the record shows how you mean when you say.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In this case I am trying to oblige you by meaning what you say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you say here on page 14, "I suppose that a few," meaning a few Communists, "worked for the United States Government, too, and for some of our leading papers and great corporations."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of any Communists who have worked for the United States Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I could probably provide you with some names, if I searched newspaper files. I can't recall offhand. I am not an expert on the subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am speaking of your own knowledge. Do you have, yourself, any personal knowledge of any Communists who have worked for the United States Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge of any Communists who have worked for any of our leading papers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Leading papers? No; I don't think I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge of any Communists who have worked for any of our great corporations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. If we may go back to page 12, sir, where you say, "The investigative staff of this subcommittee is open to the charge of extraordinary incompetence for trying to investigate me through the Institute of Pacific Relations." I ask you, do you know that this subcommittee began this particular investigation because of its interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that is in the record; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the subcommittee started out with a very substantial mass of documents obtained from the files of the IPR in a manner which you have here characterized as illegal?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It has been given a fair amount of publicity, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you blame the staff of the committee for the fact that after we got into those files we found your name on document after document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, the point that I was making here, and this is my principal concern with your inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations, is that this committee or its staff have tried to use the Institute of Pacific Relations as a stick to beat me with. And I was merely pointing out that if they wanted to beat me up they could do it better with the Council on Foreign Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does your ego, sir, compel you to the conclusion that this subcommittee is after you rather than investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not my ego; my epidermis.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have come to the conclusion that the committee is after you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you think that any other conclusion would be possible to a reasonable person?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you what your conclusion is. If no other conclusion is possible to a reasonable person, I assume you will say "Yes," that is your conclusion.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is my conclusion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, that is all of the questions I have at that point.

Senator O'CONOR. Are there any other questions?

If not, then will you continue, Mr. Lattimore? It occurs to me that another natural break would be at the top of page 19, that that would be a statement that might be taken up at one time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Fine. The committee staff has used against me letters and interoffice memoranda from the files of the IPR. I have two points that I want to make about the evidence selected from these files.

(1) Each and every item is, in the context of its time and subject, completely innocent and explicable, and certainly not evidence of subversive activity.

(2) The method in which these letters and memoranda have been used is, to say the least, a startling departure from any possible standard of fairness or objectivity. They have been presented to witnesses who did not have access to the full text, and to witnesses who, though they were neither the writers nor the recipients of this "evidence", have been asked to interpret what the original writer meant.

As the outstanding example of the way in which my connections with the IPR have been exploited by this committee, I want to take up a letter that I wrote to Mr. E. C. Carter on July 10, 1938, because of the unnecessary and rather silly mystery which has been built up concerning it. Mr. Carter, as well as a number of people who had nothing to do with the letter, have been asked to comment on it before this subcommittee, whereas I, the author of this letter, was questioned by this subcommittee for between 5 and 6 hours, in executive session, 2 weeks before the public questioning of Mr. Carter, and was not asked a single question about it. If the subcommittee's intention had been to get an explanation of this letter, I could easily have given it to them. Instead, Mr. Carter was asked to explain from memory, after 13 years and without being allowed to see the full text, much less the full correspondence of which it was a part, what he thought I might have meant by a number of expressions that I used.

I therefore wish to make a rather extended comment.

An obvious effort has been made to try to convey the impression that I was giving Carter instructions, but the fact is that I did not take the initiative in writing this letter. Mr. Carter wrote to me, and to a number of other people, asking for comments on the Inquiry, a special research job to be undertaken by the IPR, to which I have referred. In his letter, Mr. Carter had said:

> Asiaticus has been employed to prepare a major monograph on certain determining factors in the Chinese situation. Dr. Chen Han-seng will undertake two important sections of the Chinese study. An invitation has just been extended to Mr. Ch'ao-ting Chi to undertake two other sections.

The Inquiry was really none of my business. As I have said I did not contribute to it, and had no administrative or supervisory responsibility for it. Mr. Carter, however, frequently invited comments or advice on particular IPR enterprises from people who had no connection with them.

A great deal has been made of the fact that Asiaticus, Chen Han-seng, and Ch'ao-ting Chi, the three men mentioned by Mr. Carter, have, many years later, been identified before this subcommittee as Communists. Asiaticus was reported killed during the war. The two Chinese are reported to be now working for the Chinese Communist Government, but that is true of a great many Chinese who were loyal to Chiang in earlier years. As it turned out, eventually none of these three men completed a contribution to the Inquiry series.

My reply to Mr. Carter was that he was cagey to invite these three men to contribute. I thought that Mr. Carter was cagey in exactly the same sense that a newspaper columnist once described Senator Homer Ferguson as "benign and cagey." I think that Mr. Carter can be very aptly described as a benign and cagey man. In his work for the IPR he has always tried to increase international knowledge

and understanding, which is benign, and he has always tried to do so by mixing together in the free-market place of discussion as many different points of view as possible, which is equally commendable in my opinion.

I also stated to Carter that the three men suggested would bring out "absolutely essential radical issues." Gentleman, you must remember the year 1938, and the context. I used the word "radical," of course, in its dictionary sense of "fundamental." What I had in mind—as Carter and anybody else would have known, were the radical problems of reform in China and China's relations with foreign powers. In the course of Japanese aggression, there had been conspicuous examples of the Chinese of invaded territory refusing to support the war-lords who oppressed them. They passively accepted the Japanese, because they had nothing to fight for. This had led to widespread demands for reforms in order to give the Chinese people something to fight for, including drastic economic reforms, especially in rural taxes and in the relations between landlords and sharecropper tenants.

If China won the war these radical issues would continue to exist and perhaps might be even more pressing. As we found in every country that was a victim of aggression in the Second World War, soldiers who have just defeated a foreign aggressor and people who have suffered from invasion are likely to demand a better standard of life.

Radical international issues were also looming on the horizon. Chiang Kai-shek had already been pressing for revision of China's international treaties. With China victorious, the Chinese people were certainly going to refuse to go back to the old status under which China was in effect a tributary country to the United States and Britain as well as to Japan and other countries. China was certainly going to demand a place among the great powers of the world. Once we got into the war, the United States recognized this, and over Churchill's objections we voted for China as one of the Big Five of the United Nations.

In my letter to Mr. Carter I went on to say that—

> for the general purposes of the inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position, for the IPR, differs with different countries.

By "different countries" I meant, of course, the different National Councils of the IPR.

> For China—

I wrote—

> my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position, far enough not to be covered by the same label but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

The situation as of 1938 was as follows: The Communists were taking, for them, a very moderate position. They were urging rent reduction and other economic reforms. The Chinese liberals were urging a wider political representation and an end of the Kuomintang one-party system, but were hesitating at economic reforms. I thought economic reforms were essential (and I remind you that it is now a generally accepted thing that such reforms, especially rural reforms, are an imperative necessity all over Asia if disastrous Com-

munist revolutions are to be forestalled); and in this respect my position was in advance of the Chinese liberals. However, as I was not a Communist, Carter was not a Communist, and the IPR was not Communist, I did not want the IPR to play into the hands of the Communists by advocating the same economic reforms and allowing them to claim the credit. The Communists were already claiming that they and they alone were bold enough to demand economic reforms. I thought that approval, among foreign friends of China, of the idea of fundamental reforms, especially rural reforms, might encourage the Chinese liberals to speak up and to break the Communist monopoly of claiming to be progressive.

I also wrote: "For the U. S. S. R., back their international policy in general"——

Senator SMITH. The U. S. S. R., is that the Soviet Russia that you are talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Soviet Russia, yes [reading]:

> But without using their slogans and, above all, without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

This period, 1938, was the period of maximum Soviet cooperation with the United States, Britain, France, and the League of Nations. It was the stated policy of the U. S. S. R.—almost universally credited at the time as in good faith—to support international unity and to resist Japanese and also German and Italian aggression. Even by 1938, however, I had learned through my experience in dealing with Russians as editor of Pacific Affairs, that it is a standard Soviet maneuver to try to make every act of agreement between equals look as if it were acceptance of Soviet leadership. I did not believe in any such subservience to the Russians, and I did not want the Institute to make the mistake of allowing the Russians to claim, or anybody else to believe, that agreement as to international unity and against aggression was an act of subservience to Russian policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You have one statement here in relation to the letter that indicated to me, and I do not know whether it is right, that Mr. Carter was prohibited from reading this letter, the total of the letter, the whole letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Where are we now?

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 15, near the bottom, the sixth line from the bottom.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the impression I got from the transcript, Senator. If I am wrong, I should be glad to be corrected.

Senator FERGUSON. Without being allowed to read the full text, I show you the transcript on page 36, where the letter was identified and Senator Eastland asked, "Who is the letter from or to?"

> Mr. MORRIS. It is from Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. Carter, dated July 10, 1938.
> The CHAIRMAN. I think the witness should do it.
> Senator WATKINS. He probably can identify it better than anyone.
> Mr. CARTER. I would like to read it later, but identify it as having been written by Lattimore to me, that I received it.
> The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
> Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I would like to read two paragraphs from this and ask your comment on them. This is Mr. Lattimore writing to you.

Would that indicate that he was not allowed to read it? That is, when he had it, identified it, and said that he would like to read it later, and then it goes in in its entirety 3 pages later as exhibit 4?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Later means after the questioning, does it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; it becomes a part of the official record; it is put into the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. But he had not read it in full before he was questioned.

Senator FERGUSON. But that is not what you said. You indicate that this committee kept him from reading it and would only allow him to see two paragraphs. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your correction on that, Senator. All I can say is that only part of my time is available, and with very limited means I have tried to make this statement as accurate as possible, and I think it compares favorably on the subject of accuracy with the investigation that has been carried out by this committee with many, many thousands of dollars of the people's tax-paying money.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, you can keep repeating that, and the committee is going to allow you to keep repeating that, as to what you think about the committee.

I know of nobody on the committee that is going to interfere with you if you put that into the record with every answer.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask, Mr. Chairman, this question.

Mr. Lattimore, did you know that this very letter that you are talking about, the cagey letter, that that was in Mr. Carter's barn up in Massachusetts on his farm in Massachusetts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume that is where it came from.

Senator SMITH. I say, Did you know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't say that from offhand. I presume so, from the point that it was in the record.

Senator SMITH. Did you know that those records of the IPR were taken out of New York City and taken up to Mr. Carter's farm and put in his barn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. So I understand; yes.

Senator SMITH. Did you know at that time they were taken up there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. You never heard about that until the public press announced it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire briefly as to another point? On page 15 of your statement, Mr. Lattimore, in the——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Before you go on, Mr. Sourwine, may I point out that my reference about being allowed covers more than the question of the full text referred to by Senator Ferguson. I refer also to "much less the full correspondence of which it was a part."

I believe it is true, is it not, Senator Ferguson, that officers and members of the institute have not been allowed to have access to the files while they were in your custody?

Senator FERGUSON. I know of no such rule.

Mr. MORRIS. No, that is wrong, Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Carter has been invited down to look at that particular correspondence you are talking about, by written letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Has he been allowed full access to all of the files that you hold?

Mr. MORRIS. I answered that particular question, Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Carter asked about that one, and he was invited to come down

and look at it. He has never availed himself of the invitation. That is in writing.

Senator SMITH. I think Mr. Lattimore's question pointed to the fact as to whether or not we would be willing to turn over the files to Mr. Carter and his cohorts, and we have not been willing to turn them back to them because we had enough trouble getting them in the first instance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

On page 15 of your statement, Mr. Lattimore, in the third paragraph from the top, near the end of that paragraph, you use the word "evidence." You say:

> They have been presented to witnesses who did not have access to the full text, and to witnesses who, though they were neither the writers nor the recipients of this "evidence"—

you put the word "evidence" in quotes. When you were reading the statement you read the quotation marks.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your purpose in putting that word "evidence" in quotes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To emphasize the highly selective nature of the material on which witnesses have been questioned before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you use the word "evidence" in the legal sense?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether that is the legal sense or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the word "evidence" have a connotation other than the legal sense in your mind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, Mr. Sourwine. I am not a lawyer.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no purpose in using those quotation marks to indicate your feeling that the documents in question were not evidence, or did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My intention was to indicate that they were a mere fragment of the evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Over on page 16, you refer to a newspaper columnist who described Senator Ferguson as benign and cagey. Will you tell the committee who that was and when the column appeared?

Mr. LATTIMORE. John O'Donnell, in his column "Capital Stuff," in the—what is the name of this?

Senator FERGUSON. By "this" you mean a newspaper?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. It is the Daily something or other. It is dated Washington, D. C., August 9, and was published in this particular paper, the name of which is not on the top, on August 10, 1948.

Mr. SOURWINE. And how did you come across this particular column? How did you find it or who gave it to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. I have an enormous stack of clippings at home. I clip as much as I can referring to the Far East, and it is impossible for me to identify where individual clips came from.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a clipping from your files?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is a clipping from my files; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been in your files since approximately the date on which it appeared?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not specifically called to your attention in connection with this hearing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it was not called to my attention. It was found by me by accident when pouring through a stack of stuff.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 17, sir, of your statement, at the end of the first paragraph on that page, you refer to reforms in the relations between landlords and sharecropper tenants.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you were referring to agrarian reforms?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say I was referring to agrarian reforms; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on page 18 you use the term "rural reforms" twice. Were you there referring to agrarian reforms?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is a little bit of a quibble, isn't it, Mr. Sourwine? "Rural reform" and "agrarian reform" are virtually interchangeable terms.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I thought. And the answer is "Yes," is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all of the questions I have.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, in your reference here to Mr. Carter not being allowed to see the full text of the letter, you have known all of the time, have you not, that until those records were seized in Mr. Carter's barn, that the possession of all of those records, including that letter, were in him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably, yes.

Senator SMITH. Now, did you know anything about the difficulty and the delay that the committee experienced in getting some other records that turned out to be in Mr. Field's basement and unbeknown to the committee, and some that were not in the barn? Did you know about those records?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I saw some reference to it in the press.

Senator SMITH. Did you know anything about those records being put in Mr. Field's basement at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not a thing.

Senator SMITH. You had severed your connection with IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no connection—no, I was connected with the IPR, but I was not consulted on the disposal of back files, dead files.

Senator SMITH. So you disclaim any knowledge or responsibility for the records that were taken out of the IPR office and put in Mr. Field's basement in New York City?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no responsibility for it whatever.

Senator SMITH. Did you have anything whatever to do with the suggestion that these records of the IPR be taken from New York and transported to Mr. Carter's barn in Massachusetts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had nothing to do with it.

Senator SMITH. Were you connected with the IPR at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was probably at that time—I would have to know the exact year, but I was very likely a trustee at that time.

Senator SMITH. As a trustee, you had full access to the records of the IPR, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably, if I wanted them.

Senator SMITH. And you availed yourself of that right at any time that you wished to examine IPR records?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I ever availed myself of it.

Senator SMITH. You do not think you did?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever go to Mr. Carter's farm?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been to Mr. Carter's farm, yes.

Senator SMITH. When did you go to Mr. Carter's farm?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't remember. It must have been years ago, the last time.

Senator SMITH. You know the barn in which these papers were placed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know the big barn on his place. It is probably the same one.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever go in that barn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have been there.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever go to the barn while any of these papers were in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea whether they were there or not.

Senator SMITH. Did you examine any of the files of the IPR in Mr. Carter's barn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't.

Senator SMITH. Did you ask for any of those papers to be brought from his barn for you to examine, either in his house or elsewhere?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. So you never saw any of these records after they were taken to Mr. Carter's barn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge, I never saw any of them.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, Mr. Lattimore, would you proceed. It would appear that a natural break would occur at page 24, so will you continue until that point? It would move things along.

Senator SMITH. Before we leave that, on page 18, where you describe what your hunch was, that you wanted to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position far enough not to be covered by the same label, you meant by that that you did not want this group to be known as associates of the Soviet Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I meant that I didn't think that independent investigation should be conducted in the way that would enable anybody to say that any outside influence was directed.

Senator SMITH. And then you cautioned "far enough not to be covered by the same label."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Did you think it would be detrimental to the organization to have the Soviet label placed on its activities at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, it is very difficult for me to say in 1952 exactly what I had in mind in 1938, in writing an obviously hasty and informal letter.

Senator SMITH. I can quite appreciate that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can say that the best of my recollection at that attitude on questions in China—this was after the all-out Japanese attack on China had begun—my feeling at that time was that the more liberal representatives of the Chinese Kuomintang and other Chinese

who were not members of any party had a great opportunity at that time to carry on reforms along with the war, that would put the whole question of the modernization and postwar, wartime, and postwar development, of China on a footing of progress in a democratic direction, and not allow these very simple and necessary reforms in China to be captured by the Communists or have the Communists claim that they dominated the whole business.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, I asked you what I thought was a very simple question in its form, and I think the answer would be simple.

I asked you whether or not at that time, when you were referring to this same label, you regarded that it would be detrimental to this group to have the Communist label placed on them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again, with all of the reservations that are necessary in trying to think up exactly what I meant in 1938, 14 years ago, I would say that my feeling was probably quite as much about the nature of the problem in China as it was about the nature of the problem lying before the IPR.

Senator SMITH. I was not asking about the problem. I was asking you the one simple question: Did you at that time regard the Soviet label as detrimental?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should have regarded any approach to a monopoly to the labels of progress, reform, democracy, and so forth, by the Communists in China was highly detrimental.

Senator SMITH. I was asking about the Soviet label which you apparently are referring to here. You cautioned them to keep far enough not to be covered by the same label. But enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

Now did you not mean by that that you did not want the Soviet label to be put on in the first instance, and yet you wanted them far enough ahead of the Chinese liberals so that it would be noticeable that you were not going along with the Chinese liberals?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I made it fairly clear that what I wanted to do was to spur on and encourage, if possible, the leadership of necessary reforms in China by the non-Communist Chinese. And again, speaking after 14 years, my supposition would be that what I was referring to was not to let the Communists put their label on reforms, and not a question of just the general public thinking that this is Communist.

Senator SMITH. Further down on page 18, you also wrote:

for the U. S. S. R.—

and you mean by that Soviet Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH (continuing):

Back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and, above all, without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

In other words, you were suggesting that they follow the international policy of the Soviets, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I was speaking then in the context of the fact that this was the most cooperative and internationalist period of Soviet foreign policy, when I think most people accepted the idea that the Soviet line at that time, which was the indivisibility of peace and

so on, was in good faith. And I thought, and so did many people in this country and in Europe, that this was a good kind of policy to follow.

But I certainly did not want—I would not do it myself, and I would not want any organization with which I was connected—to encourage the Russians to think that we had no minds of our own and were letting them make up our minds.

Senator SMITH. Why were you counseling Mr. Carter to back their international policy in general?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The policy at that time was a policy of resistance to aggression, both in Europe and in Asia. And if that had been at the time the over-all policy of Britain or of France, I would have said back their policy.

Senator SMITH. I said back their international policy, Russia's policy, in general.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That policy at that time, as of the late 1930's, was, in my opinion, a very good policy of united international resistance to aggression. I approved it when the Russians followed that policy just as I disapprove of it, of the Russians, now when they are guilty of aggression.

Senator SMITH. That was not their international policy in general, was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1938; yes.

Senator SMITH. Were they not still pursuing the Communist policy then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1938 they were pursuing a policy of maximum cooperation with the then League of Nations, with Britain and France, and so on.

Senator SMITH. Yet their general international policy was Communist, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you are going into questions of what people knew or thought about Soviet Russia in the 1930's from the point of view of what we know and think about Russia in the 1950's. I do not claim that in the 1930's I knew as much about the character of Russian or Communist policy as I think I know now.

I have this feeling of the possibility of cooperation with Russia is not one that is peculiar to me. It lasted well after the 1930's. As late as 1942, General MacArthur said "The hopes of civilization rest on the worthy shoulders of the courageous Russian Army."

In 1943, the New York Times——

Senator SMITH. He did not say anything about the political policy of Russia, did he? He is talking about the army. He is talking about the fighting qualities of the army, is he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should have said that in 1942 a major part of the Russian policy was expressed in the actions of its army. But I may be mistaken.

In 1943, the New York Times, in an editorial, wrote: "We can do business with Stalin, and that business will help our political relations with the Russians. A tenth of the human beings of the world are on the way to higher living standards in Russia."

In 1946, in the Catholic Quarterly, the Reverend George H. Dunne wrote: "If Europe moves all the way to communism, it will not be because of Russian intervention but because of the obstructionist tactics of die-hard reactionaries."

In 1942, the Chicago Tribune wrote——

Senator SMITH. None of those people wrote such letters as you did here to Mr. Carter; did they? I am asking what you said, what you meant, not what the New York Times said or what anyone else said.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am merely trying to make a little bit plainer the fact that I think is fairly plan: That I showed at that time an optimistic view of the possibility of cooperating with Russia and with a number of other nations against the kind of aggression that the Germans, Italians, and Japanese were putting on.

It seems to me a little bit—I don't know quite what the word is, but perhaps a little bit inconsistent—to demand that I prove that everybody who felt the same way that I did also wrote to the same people that I wrote to.

Senator SMITH. I was asking you about your language. But if that is your answer, that is all right. I was asking you about your specific language which was quoted in that statement.

Senator FERGUSON. You indicated that back in the late 1930's and the early 1940's you did not have knowledge of the Communist infiltration; is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not this letter that Senator Smith has just been asking you about, that part, indicate that you did have some knowledge of the operations of Communist infiltration and Communist tactics?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator; that is a little bit far-fetched.

Senator FERGUSON. You say it would not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had had experience with the Russian representatives in the IPR, that they were a highly combative bunch, and that any time there was agreement or even approach to agreement with the Russians they claimed it was because other people had agreed with them and not because they had agreed with other people.

The difference between that and political infiltration seems to me to be fairly obvious.

Senator FERGUSON. You were considered as a student of international law, of international affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. In those years I was not considered a student of either. I have never, in fact, been a student of international law, and so far as I was a student of international affairs, my primary qualifications, in 1938, were based on my specialized work in the Mongol border regions of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you did not look into the question of strategy and the tactics of communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; at that time I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. I show you a report here headed "Under Trojan horse tactics," what was printed as of 1935 about their tactics. If you did not know about that, how do you account for no one in the IPR, which was interested in international law and international politics, and problems in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't answer for other people in the IPR, Senator Ferguson. All I can say is that as of 1938 I did not regard myself, and was not regarded by anybody else, as an expert on any kind of communism.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask the research director of the committee to read that into the record at this place.

Senator O'Conor. All right.

Mr. Fortas. Senator, you will identify it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is part of the transcript, as I understand it, the identification.

Senator O'Conor. Suppose when reading it, you give the identification first.

Mr. Mandel. This is a quotation from the House Committee on Un-American Activities report dated 1939. On page 27 the annual report reads as follows:

In 1935, the Communists changed their tactics, their strategy and tactics, to what is now known as the Trojan horse tactics. Georgi Dimitrov in an address to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International held in Moscow, in August 1935, said: "Comrades, you remember the ancient tale of the capture of Troy? Troy was inaccessible to the armies attacking her, thanks to her impregnable walls, and the attacking army, after suffering many sacrifices, was unable to achieve victory until, with the aid of the famous Trojan horse, it managed to penetrate to the very heart of the enemy's camp. We revolutionary workers, it appears to me, should not be shy about using the same tactics."

Printed from the Workers Library Publishers, New York City, a Communist publishing house, in reporting the full text of the Dimitrov address to the Communist International, July 25 to August 21, 1935.

Mr. Lattimore. I don't see what earthly relevance that has to what we are talking about. But I do think it is a pity that Georgi Dimitrov didn't go into the question of whether wooden horses didn't have wooden horse feathers.

Senator Ferguson. That is your answer to no question.

Mr. Lattimore. That is a comment.

Senator O'Conor. As I have stated before, it would appear to be a connected statement from pages 19 to 24. If we proceed to read that uninterruptedly it would be more expeditious. All right, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore. The personal damage that has been done to me by the way in which this subcommittee has allowed malicious testimony to be stacked against me is probably beyond repair. But much more important is the damage that has been done to my country, the country of which I am only one private citizen, and the damage that has been done to the conduct of the foreign policy of our country.

When China fell to the Chinese Communists, it was a grave set-back to the interests of this country, an unmitigated tragedy. This particular outcome of the Second World War, the establishment of a Communist government in China, was the result of complex causes. Some of these causes go far back in history. Some were the results of the changing balance of power produced by the Second World War. Some were due to the decay and internal corruption of the previous government of China.

I have been, to the best of my ability, a careful student of the causes, course, and outcome of this great contemporary catastrophe. I believe that in part it could be foreseen and was in fact foreseen by various individuals. I believe that, with the advantage of hindsight, a number of mistakes can be pointed out in the handling of the American policy that attempted, at various stages, to forestall, to avoid, and finally to mitigate this catastrophe.

It would be useful to analyze these mistakes of the past, as a guide to the future, but it certainly serves no patriotic purpose to distort mistakes, or, more accurately, lack of success, as if they were signs of

guilt. The attribution of personal guilt for the mere purpose of providing political scapegoats is not civilized or democratic behavior, however widespread it may be among primitive groups of men.

But what I emphatically do not believe is that the catastrophe was brought about by the treachery or incompetence of those entrusted with our foreign policy. By and large, I believe that our China policy was handled not only loyally but as competently as could have been reasonably expected, considering the many forces and circumstances in the situation that were beyond our control.

I believe that it is as important to the welfare and safety of this country to have a strong State Department and an able Foreign Service in our diplomacy as it is to have effective military forces. I believe that the usefulness of our Foreign Service personnel has already been jeopardized by the work of this committee—both directly by attacks on irreplaceable personnel, and indirectly by impairing the confidence of the Nation and our foreign allies in our State Department and by instituting a reign of terror among our Foreign Service personnel.

First, as to the direct injury: It is a fact that almost all the few men with outstanding experience and knowledge of China have already either been eliminated from the Department of State or are working in other parts of the world, in the hope of keeping them out of the line of fire of a bitterly partisan political fight and out of range of the venom of men who are determined to find evil where none exists.

Senator O'Conor. The parties will kindly desist from any display of approval or disapproval while the hearing is in progress, please.

Mr. Lattimore. The three outstanding——

Senator O'Conor. Would it be desirable to take a recess at this point?

Mr. Lattimore. If I may.

Senator O'Conor. We will take a recess for 5 minutes.

(A brief recess was here taken.)

Senator O'Conor. The hearing will please be in order.

All right, Mr. Witness, will you proceed?

Mr. Lattimore. The three outstanding examples of men sacrificed to the hysteria that has been whipped up in this country by the China lobby—a hysteria to which this committee, I am sorry to say, is contributing—are John Stewart Service, O. Edmund Clubb, and John Carter Vincent. Any one of these men would have been capable of holding, in our far-eastern policy, the kind of respected position that is held with regard to Russian policy by George Kennan; but where are they now?

John Stewart Service, an exceptionally able career diplomat, after being cleared six times by the State Department Loyalty Security Board—and I believe I am in error there; I believe it is more than six times—and after a careful statement that he was not guilty of disloyalty, has been summarily dismissed for "reasonable doubt" of disloyalty, under a new ruling.

Senator Ferguson. Is that not a Presidential order, and is that not the wording of it?

Mr. Lattimore. As to "reasonable doubt"?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I have not made it specific in my statement here, but the thought in my mind in referring to this is that whoever

is responsible for this ruling, it constitutes a new ruling on past cases which has been given retroactive force and conveys to some members of the public, of whom I am one, a flavor of cruel and unusual punishment, the pursuit of a man until you have completely failed to get him under existing rules, and then saying, "All right, we will get him; we will make a new rule."

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the President made the rule; did he not? It is his Presidential order.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not informed in detail on that, Senator. I should consider it a part of the general disastrous and pusillanimous retreat of the State Department under the bludgeoning to which it has been subjected. I regret it, but I consider it a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. You charge the State Department with cruel and unusual punishment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is that not just exactly what you said?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is the Loyalty Review Board a part of the State Department?

Senator FERGUSON. No; it is part of the executive branch. And you said it was because the State Department had been cowed or bludgeoned.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not an expert, Senator, on the structure of the Federal Government. Perhaps I should have informed myself more carefully on this, particularly as I am vitally concerned about it.

Senator FERGUSON. You are trying to give this committee some advice and opinion, and I would have thought you would have sought accurate information before you would swear to it, that we would rely upon it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have certainly tried to give this committee my opinion. If I had thought that this committee was susceptible to advice, perhaps I might have thought out my terminology more carefully in that context.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, of course, you know what we want is not just opinion advice. We want facts. Now, I will ask you—and I think perhaps I can clear this up and I can understand how you may not be familiar—you say here "cleared six times by the State Department Loyalty Security Board."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. That is a board, as I understand, composed of State Department employee officers or employees. Now, I did not understand you referred to the President's Loyalty Board, which is the over-all Board, which is a review board. Which are you referring to in this language?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I am correct in saying that his summary dismissal by the State Department was mandatory immediately upon the rendering of the verdict of the Loyalty Review Board.

Senator SMITH. That is the over-all Board. So that what you say here was with reference to the State Department Board itself?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I am referring to the general——

Senator SMITH. The over-all Loyalty Board, the President's Loyalty Review Board?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it was responsible.

Senator SMITH. You understand that each department has a loyalty board, and then there is the President's Loyalty Review Board which

hears appeals from these different departments, which among others is the State Department? I am just trying to get it clear which you had reference to.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read the opinion by the Review Board, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I read it at the time.

Senator SMITH. And did you find any evidence in that opinion that they were of the opinion that Mr. Service had or had not given some secret papers or documents to Amerasia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember that their conclusion, which I have quoted here, was that he was not guilty of disloyalty.

Senator SMITH. Well, do you remember the other, that they had found as a matter of fact that he had delivered secret documents to any member of the Amerasia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection of that differs from yours, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I am asking you, and I am not making a statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that he had in his possession only declassified papers.

Senator SMITH. Did they not mention that he had given papers to Amerasia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If your information is better than mine, I will accept it. What I remember is the conclusion of the Loyalty Review Board that he was not disloyal.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they find that under the rule that the President had laid down, that there was reasonable doubt of his disloyalty, and therefore he should be discharged?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They found, they very carefully stated, that he was not disloyal, and then they said that they felt entitled to consider him as—what is it——

Senator SMITH. A bad security risk?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. Something about reasonable doubt of loyalty.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you are placing——

Mr. LATTIMORE. It seems to me a shotgun sort of rule, under which to try to run a government.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, your criticism is of the Presidential order, on that statement; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In this connection, my criticism is of the entire policy of the executive branch, which I think has been brought about by a disastrous attempt to appease the China lobby and others attacking the foreign policy of this country.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. O. Edmund Clubb, a political observer and reporter of outstanding conscientiousness and ability, with a unique experience combining China, central Asia, and Russia, was publicly suspended for 7 months, without pay and on the flimsiest of charges, while his loyalty was being investigated. After finally being vindicated and reinstated, he has resigned. He has taken to heart the now obvious lesson that the State Department is not a safe place for a man who has been cleared.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you know what the charges against Mr. Clubb were?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as they appeared in the press, I had a general knowledge of them, and I considered them extremely flimsy and I have so stated here.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you repeat any of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One was about going to the New Masses, visiting the New Masses; and another one was about knowing the late Agnes Smedley.

Senator FERGUSON. Any others?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall offhand.

Senator FERGUSON. And you describe them as "the flimsiest of charges?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I consider those to be extremely flimsy charges for questioning the loyalty of a State Department man who, as a servant of the State Department endeavoring to qualify himself by knowledge of factors important in foreign policy, should be able to consider it a duty to know, converse with, and have discussions with people of the most varied kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have any discussion or talk with Mr. Service after his discharge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Since his discharge, I haven't seen him, I don't think.

Senator FERGUSON. While matters were pending?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen him occasionally; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk over what the charges were?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In a general way; yes. I did not ask for his confidence, and my purpose in seeing him was to show that as a friend of his, I was not going to be scared off.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I assume that you were not a witness for Mr. Service?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was not a witness.

Senator FERGUSON. Or Mr. Clubb or Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or Mr. Clubb or Mr. Vincent.

John Carter Vincent, a man of ambassadorial seniority, has for several years been removed from work in the area of his unique specialty—the Far East—and has been assigned to North Africa, because, in the prevailing temper of the times, the administration dares not return him to work where he belongs and is needed.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Lattimore, you have named three men here whom you think have been unfairly treated; that is, John Stewart Service, O. Edmund Clubb, and John Carter Vincent.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I modify one word there, Senator? I think "scandalously" would be better than "unfairly."

Senator JENNER. I will accept your word.

Now, going back to another period in history in the Far East, would you be kind enough to tell this committee what you thought of the way Joseph Grew was treated?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know very little, indeed, about the resignation of Mr. Grew, and I couldn't tell you offhand by whom he was replaced.

Senator JENNER. Do you know anything about Stanley Hornbeck, what happened to him, and why?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have known Stanley Hornbeck for many years.

Senator JENNER. Would you tell the committee about his career in the Far East, and what happened to it, and why?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understood that he served the last assignment as Ambassador to the Netherlands, and then retired in the ordinary course.

Senator JENNER. And Mr. Dooman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know very slightly.

Senator JENNER. Could you tell us anything about his career?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know anything about his career.

Senator JENNER. Or Patrick Hurley, or his experience in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know what I have read in the press.

Senator JENNER. Lieutenant General Wedemeyer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know what I have heard in the press.

Senator JENNER. Adolph Berle?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Practically nothing.

Senator JENNER. Is it not a fact that these men, too, were either removed from office or assigned to diplomatic posts or military posts of no importance because they did not go along with the policy of the State Department in the Far East? Is that not true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know about the details of reassignment or retirement of any of these men, Senator.

Senator JENNER. Well, you have made a reference here about "attacks on irreplaceable personnel." Now, these men that I have named were all replaced, and do you know who replaced them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, can you inform me whether any of the men that you have just mentioned were ever pilloried for months on end in the press as Communists, or Communist stooges, or agents of the policy of a foreign——

Senator JENNER. No. As a matter of fact, they were just the opposite. They were anti-Communist, and then walked the plank because they were, and that is what I am trying to get at. You are supposed to be an expert on this situation, and I assumed that you knew about all of these facts.

Now, would you tell me what you mean by "irreplaceable personnel," "both directly by attacks on irreplaceable personnel"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that personnel like Vincent, Service, and Clubb are very difficult to replace.

Senator JENNER. Would you say that Joseph Grew and Stanley Hornbeck and Adolph Berle and Patrick Hurley and Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer would be hard to replace?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know enough about the details of their qualifications to have an opinion, Senator.

Senator JENNER. Well, I think another thing should be brought out here, Mr. Chairman, this question of reasonable doubt, this new rule that the witness says he does not care for.

Reasonable doubt; "has been summarily dismissed for 'reasonable doubt' of disloyalty, under a new ruling."

Are you trying to tell this committee that if there is a reasonable doubt about a man being loyal to this country, that he should remain in the office of public trust and handling secret papers, and so forth? If there is a reasonable doubt about it, do you believe he should be retained in that kind of a position?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I believe that the question of loyalty in our Government service is of paramount importance.

Senator JENNER. I noticed you stated that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is of such importance that I think it should be handled strictly on grounds of proof or disproof; that vague words like "reasonable doubt," which may mean one thing to one man and

something else to somebody else, are not the words of a ruling under which a high morale can be maintained in the Department.

May I read, Senator, something of what I mean here, and it is an editorial from the American Foreign Service Journal of August 1951. This generally represents the point of view of the Foreign Service men in the Department of State. I quote:

> Another direct cost of this baiting is the toll it takes among members of the coming generation, who have talents and capabilities to contribute in the future formulation of a wise foreign policy for our country, but who are frightened away by the sort of hatchet work which seems on the way to becoming accepted as commonplace. In 1949, there were 1,128 candidates who took the foreign service examination; and in 1950, candidates numbered 807. This year—

that is, 1951—

> despite extra solicitation, only 760. The draft, competitive job opportunities in a booming economy, and administrative problems of enlarging the service were partly responsible. Nevertheless, this change, which was made the subject of methodical inquiry, clearly demonstrated that regardless of interest in or qualification for the field of foreign affairs, young people simply do not see any valid reason why they they should put their persons, careers, and reputations in potential jeopardy by joining the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who wrote that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know John K. Emerson is one of the editors of the publication from which you have just read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that he might have written that article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire whether it is a State Department magazine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know what its connection with the State Department is.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe it is generally considered the fraternity journal of the Foreign Service of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know at what expense it is being published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Or at whose expense?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator JENNER. I come back to this same question, and I do not know whether the witness answered it or not: You deplore these men being attacked and you call them irreplaceable men, and I am going to ask you if a man was anti-Communist, such as Joseph Grew, Stanley Hornbeck, Mr. Dooman, Patrick Hurley, Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, you would also abhor replacing those irreplaceable men, too, would you not, because they were anti-Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have no idea of the grounds upon which any of those men resigned or were replaced.

Senator JENNER. You are not acquainted with these men and their careers and their position on the Far East and you are a far-eastern expert?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Some of them I have met very slightly, and you have mentioned several who are concerned primarily with Japan, which is not my field of specialization, and the assertion that they

were fired because they were anti-Communists is your assertion, Senator, and I never knew that before.

Senator JENNER. All right.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, it is a fact that at the time Mr. Grew and at least some of these other men were fired, we did not have the same situation in the Far East with respect to the Communists being in dominant control that we have today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume you are right. This was some years ago, wasn't it?

Senator SMITH. Yes. So that since these men who were known as anti-Communists were relieved of their duties and their positions communism has made great advances in the Far East?

Senator JENNER. That is why they were removed.

Senator SMITH. I am just asking for the facts.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is your argument, Senator, a post hoc, ergo propter hoc?

Senator SMITH. I believe you said you did not want to indulge in legal or technical language, so I am asking you in plain language if, after these men were removed, it is not a fact that there have been great advances by communism in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. Of course, the advances of communism since the death of Julius Caesar have been even greater.

Senator SMITH. And that is the relation that you think, or the attitude that you think you ought to have in discussing a current matter?

Senator FERGUSON. Could we have an answer, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I confess, Senator, I see no connection between the points you are making.

Senator SMITH. But the fact remains the same, that we did have a great many millions of friends who were anti-Communist in the Far East, but sometime after these men, as Senator Jenner referred to, were released, then some kind of influence got in there by which today we do not have the same number of friends and that section of the world has gone Communist; and you say that there is no connection, in your opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A large part of the Far East has gone Communist. I don't know exactly how to take your expression that we had many millions of friends there. A question would arise there of how far they were actually friends, and how far they might have become friends or stronger friends under a different policy, and the question of whether they were merely sitting on the sidelines and waiting for things to happen, and so forth.

Senator SMITH. There was a change in our policy in the Far East, was there not, after Mr. Grew and these others who have been mentioned were relieved of their duties?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure that I could point to any change in our policy, Senator, that could be accurately coordinated with the service of these particular men.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Davies when he was in the Far East, John K. Davies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. John P. Davies, and I knew him, not very well, but I knew him.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not used his name here. Is there any reason? You have named three, but you did not name Mr. Davies.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I named these three particularly because I know them better, but I would include Mr. Davies among those who have been sent to hide out in non-far eastern countries by the State Department, presumably hoping they will be there safe from snipers.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear the testimony of Mr. Munson, a former CIA agent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. And you do not know what the testimony might be in the hearing here about Mr. Davies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I saw some reference to it in the newspapers, but that part of the transcript of this committee's proceedings had not become available when this was written.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read it in the newspapers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read it in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. And after reading that, would you say that you would still include him as one of these persons?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I also read a statement——

Senator FERGUSON. Answer my question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Excuse me; I am answering it, Senator. I also read a statement in the newspapers from Mr. Davies, something to the effect that the whole matter had been taken up previously and cleared in the hearings, or something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you placed your reliance on his statement, and not on what the CIA man had testified to under oath?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am in no position to place my reliance on either statement, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. But you are including him now as one of those that you think have been unjustly discharged?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The accusations had not been made when Mr. Davies was sent to Germany, or when I wrote this statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you as of today.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As of today, I have no opinion.

Senator JENNER. Referring to your statement here:

> But much more important is the damage that has been done to my country, the country of which I am only one private citizen, and the damage that has been done to the conduct of the foreign policy of our country.

Now, I will ask you, could you possibly conjure a set of facts where our foreign policy could have been more mishandled, from Yalta down to the present time, in the Far East? You are a student of this, sir, and it is a fact that at Yalta we gave Manchuria to Russia and the northern half of Korea, and the Sakhalin and Kurile Islands; and it is the fact that we sent General Marshall to China with the specific mission to force Chiang Kai-shek to take the Communists into his government and into his army and to have a united-front government; and it is the fact that when World War II ended, there was only about 175 million Communists. And as a result of Yalta, and confirmed at Potsdam, and the Marshall mission, and the replacing of these loyal Americans who were anti-Communists in the Far East with men who were following, I will say, at least the pro-Communist line, could you think of any more damage that your country has suffered than that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am afraid that I can agree with hardly a word that you have said.

Senator JENNER. You think our policy in the Far East has been successful?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that our policy, or I think that our interests in the Far East have suffered extremely serious setbacks, and I do not believe that those setbacks were a consequence of our policy.

Senator JENNER. That was our policy, was it not: Yalta, the Marshall mission, replacing these men who were fighting the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you have made a chracterization of Yalta and of General Marshall's mission with which, I am sorry, but I don't agree.

Senator JENNER. I think that that is the whole crux of it. That has been our policy; and if it has been successful, you think it has been successful. Certainly I do not think it has been successful.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to read you the words, Senator, of somebody who has expressed this problem better than I——

Senator JENNER. I do not care to hear someone else's words. I want your words on it, and you stated that the policy has been successful.

Senator O'CONOR. I think we can settle this very well.

Senator JENNER. He has answered my question, and I do not care for a dissertation on the speech——

Senator O'CONOR. If Mr. Lattimore wishes to adopt the language used by someone else, it is perfectly permissible for him to read it.

Senator JENNER. He said he thought it had been a successful policy.

Senator O'CONOR. I thought he wanted to elaborate on it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I want the reporter to read back and see if I said anywhere that we had a successful policy.

Senator SMITH. Did you say that, or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly not.

Senator O'CONOR. I did understand that you wished to elaborate somewhat.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is from Mr. George F. Keenan, our newly appointed and confirmed Ambassador to Russia, in his recent book, American Democracy—1900–50:

> It is similarly incorrect to portray the Yalta Agreement as a terrible betrayal of Nationalist China. The agreement was that we should recommend certain things to the Chinese Government. The leaders of that Government were not averse to these things at the time. They had asked us long before Yalta to help them to arrange their affairs with the Soviet Government. They later expressed themselves as well satisfied with what we had done. And in the subsequent negotiations, which they themselves conducted independently with the Russians, and which actually constituted the controlling arrangement for the future of Manchuria, they went in some respects further in the way of concessions to the Soviet Union than anything that had been agreed upon at Yalta and recommended to them by us. They did this despite the fact that they were warned by us that in doing so they were acting on their own responsibility and not at our recommendation.

I should like to add a point, and this I quote from the Reporter magazine, the issue of February 19, 1952:

> "In the treaty"—

and this is the treaty between the Chinese and Russia direct—

> "the Chinese Nationalists, who seemed eager to court Soviet freindship"—

and this is the Chinese Nationalists who were eager to court Soviet friendship—

"made concession which went beyond the provisions of the Yalta Agreement, and were prevented from going even further only by the persuasion of Averell Harriman, who was then United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Ambassador Pat Hurley reported that Chiang Kai-shek was generally satisfied with the treaty, and thanked me"—

that is, thanked General Hurley—

"for the basis that I had helped him to lay for reapproachment with the Soviets."

Madam Chiang, then in the United States, called on President Truman to compliment him on the result of the conversations between the Nationalists and the Soviet representatives, and thank him for the United States help in bringing them about.

Life magazine as of that time, which seems to have changed its mind, hailed the treaty as "as great a victory for common sense as the defeat of Japan was for armed might" and indicated that it was "a vindication of American policy in Asia for almost 50 years."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who wrote that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

It forecast a warm brotherly collaboration between Chiang and Mao Tze-tung.

Frome Life magazine: "Peace, lively but genuine peace," they cried, "is therefore the outlook."

Senator JENNER. Do you know who wrote that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you adopting it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am adopting it as far as it is an accurate quotation of the people who are quoted, the——

Senator FERGUSON. Are you adopting it as being the correct view?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am adopting it insofar as it may quote correctly from the people from whom it quotes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not answering my question at all.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is as far as I can answer it.

Senator FERGUSON. You can answer my question.

Mr. FORTAS. I think if you will clarify what you mean by "adoption"——

Senator FERGUSON. Are you adopting it as your testimony, or are you only quoting somebody else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am quoting from original sources which have been cited in a secondary source, which I have not yet had time to verify or check. If the quotations are accurate, I am willing to present it as my testimony that they are accurate.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I am not asking you that. That was not my question at all. Do you agree with what is said in the articles or the matter that you have just read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I agree that that was said.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the time it was said.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you that, whether you agreed it was said. I asked you whether you agreed with it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't agree, or automatically agree, on the correctness in 1952 of things that were said in 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you put it in the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because the Senator here had made a statement implying that everything that had been done in American foreign policy in those years was the work of American traitors.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not indicate and ask you to bring out evidence of what somebody else said, did he? He was asking for your opinion.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My impression is, Senator, that he was making a rhetorical statement, at the end of which he asked for my agreement, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; your agreement, and not someone else's agreement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told him I couldn't agree, and then I produced this evidence from the period as an indication of why I couldn't agree.

Senator JENNER. Could we get the record straight? It started like this: I was reading from the statement of Professor Lattimore—

> But much more important is the damage that has been done to my country, the country of which I am only one private citizen, and the damage that has been done to the conduct of the foreign policy of our country.

And I asked the witness if he could think of any greater damage that could be brought about as a result of our policy, and that is how the question started.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is where we disagree, you see. I don't think it was brought about by our policy.

Senator JENNER. That is all I want. That was an answer to my question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You are entitled to your opinion.

Senator JENNER. You are quoting people, and you do not know who they are, and you referred to a treaty in this quotation that you just read, and that was the treaty between China and Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator JENNER. When was that treaty entered into?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see, the Yalta agreement was in February of 1945, and was followed within a few months, I think, by a direct Chinese Nationalist Treaty with Russia.

Senator JENNER. In other words, the treaty you are reading from followed the Yalta agreement. Now I will ask you: Was Chiang Kai-shek or the Chinese Government represented at the Yalta agreement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator JENNER. And if you were the leader of a country and you had been "sold down the river," would you not begin fighting for your life, and do you suppose that had anything to do with this treaty that you have been reading about, as to which you do not know who wrote it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have just quoted from George Keenan, who was in the State Department——

Senator JENNER. I remember that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Handling these affairs, which I was not, and therefore better informed on the subjects than I am, stating presumably as authoritatively as it can be stated that before Yalta, Chiang Kai-shek had asked us to undertake these conversations.

Senator JENNER. Was Chiang consulted about Yalta and the agreements reached at Yalta?

Mr. LARRIMORE. My understanding is that Chiang asked us to undertake discussions with the Russians, which led up to what was decided at Yalta.

Senator JENNER. And he was not at Yalta, and he was not consulted about the future interests of his country, and he was one of our allies, was he not, Professor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, the evidence that I have just read is a clear indication that he was not only consulted, but that he was consulted at his own initiative, and consulted before Yalta.

Senator SMITH. Was there not a refusal to him to have him present at Yalta?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My memory of that, Senator, is somewhat hazy, and I think it could be looked up in the white book that there was an agreement between the Americans and the British before going to Yalta, not involving the Russians at all but an American-British agreement, that in view of the proved leaking security of Chungking, where top secrets were steadily being reported to the Japanese, it was unadvisable to have a Chinese Nationalist representative at a conference where we hoped, as the outcome, to get the consent of Russia to enter the far eastern war against Japan, because if that had leaked to Japan through Chungking, it would have been a disaster.

Senator JENNER. And at that time, that particular time, is it not correct that the military leaders were telling us that Japan was a defeated nation; and that we entered into an agreement with Russia, unbeknownst to Chiang Kai-shek, to equip an army, a Siberian Russian Army of 1,250,000 Russian soldiers, to fight with us 6 days in a war against Japan? Is that correct, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe it is, Senator.

Senator JENNER. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe the record shows that the pressure at Yalta to accept anything that the Russians might demand as a condition for entering the war against Japan, came primarily from the armed services.

Senator SMITH. Well, there were efforts made by at least someone in the American forces to keep the Yalta agreement from being entered into, with respect to Russia coming to war for that short period of time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I have read something about an effort on the part of some group within the Armed Forces to change that decision.

Senator SMITH. Was Mr. Keenan there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At Yalta? I believe he was, but I am not sure.

Senator SMITH. Who was the main man representing the State Department at Yalta? Was it not Mr. Alger Hiss?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I believe Mr. Hiss had a rather subordinate position at Yalta, and if Mr. Keenan was there he certainly far outranked Hiss.

Senator SMITH. But you do not know whether Keenan was there, and you do not know if he was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. Let me see, I think Stettinius was there.

Senator SMITH. But Hiss was the confidential man dealing with Stettinius and the President at Yalta?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know how confidential the position held by Hiss was, Senator Smith. My understanding is that at that time his position in the Department of State was rather low.

Senator SMITH. Well, there is no doubt but what Yalta sealed the doom of Nationalist China, did it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should question that very much, Senator.

Senator SMITH. You think it had nothing to do with it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that on the contrary, as far as the direct effects of Yalta reached, they favored the early entry of Chiang Kai-shek's troops into Manchuria.

Senator SMITH. In any event, after the Yalta Agreement, the Nationalist cause got continuously worse, did it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, it didn't get continuously worse, Senator. In the first period after the surrender of Japan, there was a steadily increasing expansion of the territory occupied, military power, and military authority of the Nationalist Government, and the decline came after that expansion.

Senator SMITH. How long after that expansion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, let me see. I think it began, the decline began—I am not sure of my memory here, and I would have to look up the record—but I believe toward the end of 1948, and I do recall that General Wedemeyer, who has been cited here, attributed the weakening of the position of Chiang Kai-shek partly to unwise military overexpansion, against which Wedemeyer himself advised, but in vain.

Senator JENNER. You would not agree, Professor, that the decline of Nationalist China started after General Marshall went over and we talked with the Communist troops and tried to get them into a united-front government; and failing that, for the next 15 months after Marshall returned from his mission we did not give Chiang any aid, although the money was appropriated for it. And you would not mark that as the beginning of the decline of Nationalist China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I would not agree that the decline of Nationalist China came because of General Marshall's mission.

Senator JENNER. As a result of the mission.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or as a result of the mission.

Senator JENNER. All right.

Senator SMITH. Did you hear the testimony of Admiral Cooke before this committee, about how he sat there in command of the United States naval forces in Chinese waters and saw this disintegration of the Nationalist forces brought about by the policy that we had then adopted? I am just asking you if you know about that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read that testimony, and I was struck by the fact that nobody asked Admiral Cooke whether, in his present activities, he draws any financial advantage from operations associated with Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator SMITH. What do you mean by that? Do you want to ask him that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that Admiral Cooke is associated with a corporation of some kind doing business on Formosa, partly in military supplies.

Senator SMITH. You think that influences his activities back there, or his judgment back there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that it is a question, at least in view of the kind of questions that have been asked of me before this committee, that it would have been a proper question to have asked of Admiral Cooke.

Senator SMITH. Is anybody questioning what you are doing now, and how you are earning your living?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It seems to me that the entire assault upon me by this committee or its counsel—and I don't know where the responsibility is distributed—is predicated on a prejudgment that I am a man of bad faith.

Senator SMITH. I was asking you about Admiral Cooke's testimony, and you read it and you know what he said, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that it is a usual procedure, when people are questioned about problems of this kind, to determine whether they are or are not interested parties.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any doubt as to the patriotism and loyalty of Admiral Cooke?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never met Admiral Cooke, and I am merely saying that a question of that kind would have been proper, in my opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that you are helping your position, sir, by attacking the honor of Admiral Cooke?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I am not attacking the honor of Admiral Cooke. I am making some comments on the procedure of this committee.

Senator O'CONOR. It is very evident that we will not be able to conclude, and I thought that we would get to a natural breaking point.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just ask one question? Did you know that Mr. Hiss, Alger Hiss, testified before the Un-American Activities Committee that he was proud to be closely connected with the Yalta agreement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know that, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before the record closes, Mr. Chairman, I think this comment should be made at this point: that at the beginning of Admiral Cooke's testimony, he was asked about his present connections, and his present business, and he testified with regard to it.

Senator SMITH. I wonder if the witness would like to reiterate his statement that Admiral Cooke was not asked about it or did not tell us about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was not asked if he drew any financial advantage from it.

Senator SMITH. What do you mean by that? You mean you are charging Admiral Cooke with converting or embezzling Government property?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Just what do you mean by "financial advantage"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am simply raising the question of the value of showing in discussions of this kind whether a man may or may not be an interested party in the opinions which he expresses.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I read the testimony, just a half a page here, at the outset of Admiral Cooke's testimony? He was asked:

Will you give your full name and residence to the reporter?

And he said:

Charles Maynard Cooke. My permanent residence is in Sonoma, Calif. The last 2 years I have been living in Formosa.
Question. What is your present military status, Admiral Cooke?
Answer. I am a retired admiral, United States Navy.
Question. When did you retire from the United States Navy?
Answer. The 1st of May 1498.
Question. Admiral Cooke, will you tell us what your present occupation is?

Answer. My present occupation is that I have just terminated a tour of service as an employee of the Commerce International-China, which has been furnishing technical services to the Chinese in Formosa.

Question. Is that an American corporation, Admiral Cooke?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What was your position with that corporation?

Answer. I occupied a position of coordinator of this group of technicians that served in Formosa.

Question. Who were those technicians, Admiral Cooke?

Answer. They were some retired officers, some Reserve officers, some ex-officers of the services of the United States, and some enlisted men, too.

Question. They are all United States citizens?

Answer. Yes.

Question. They were all employees of Commerce International-China?

Answer. Yes; CIC, as it is referred to.

Question. Admiral Cooke, have you ever been in the employ of the Chinese Government?

Answer. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now, Dr. Lattimore, you are willing, after your criticism of the committee, you are willing to sit here and impugn the motives and blacken the character of a retired naval officer, against whom you know nothing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not impugning Admiral Cooke's character.

Senator SMITH. What did you mean when you interjected what you did?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am merely pointing out that when this committee has before it myself or Mr. Holland, or Mr. Carter, or Mr. Vincent, the record shows that we are asked the most searching and probing questions of every kind; and that no witness who has been brought before this committee making charges of the disloyalty of individuals or the incompetence of American foreign policy, has been asked any questions of an even remotely comparable kind.

I wish to add specifically that I am not impugning the motives or the character of Admiral Cooke.

Senator SMITH. Will you answer this question? Why did you say what you did about Admiral Cooke?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I thought that it was pertinent to the question of the procedure of this committee.

Senator SMITH. What did that have to do, whether or not Admiral Cooke had been employed by these other people, what did that have to do with the procedure before this committee, unless you meant to impeach him and his character?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not mean to impeach him or his character, Senator. It is a well-known fact that, I believe, a man's judgment may be unconsciously affected by the point where his personal interest or advantage lies.

Mr. FORTAS. May I respectfully suggest this witness has been on the stand about 2 hours and 25 minutes, with just a 5-minute break?

Senator O'CONOR. I was undertaking to make a comment on that very point. We have been advised that the Senate is about to vote on a very important issue. As a matter of fact, there may be a series of votes, and it appears impossible for us to continue at this point. I was going to ask my colleagues, and of course counsel, as to their convenience in returning.

May I ask, in view of all of the developments, do you consider that it would be proper to put in the record the entire statement at this

time, and consider it as having been submitted and incorporated in the record in toto?

Mr. FORTAS. It is Mr. Lattimore's judgment; but since you have asked me, it seems to me that your ruling allowing him to read segments of it is a very wise one.

Senator O'CONOR. It has not progressed as far as I thought it might.

Mr. FORTAS. I think we have made pretty good progress, and if Mr. Lattimore asked me my opinion, I would suggest that we continue on that basis; and it is his decision.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have already tried to make the suggestion to you that we should continue on the same basis.

Senator O'CONOR. All right. I thought that I would make possible the introduction of the entire statement, which of course is already a matter of public knowledge, anyhow, because it has been distributed, and I thought it might just expedite the questioning. But if you feel that it is necessary to do it this way, we will do so.

We will recess until tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Thursday, February 28, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Herbert R. O'Conor, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor (presiding), Smith, Ferguson, Jenner, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator McCarthy; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please be in order.

We will now resume the hearing of the witness, Owen Lattimore.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS

Senator O'CONOR. It occurs to me, Mr. Lattimore, that you were on page 21 of your statement, just at the beginning of the fourth paragraph, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might ask one question, and I won't interrupt Mr. Lattimore for a while then.

Yesterday, Mr. Lattimore, you quoted at some length from the Reporter, a magazine. Do you know whether that magazine has actively advocated the recognition of Communist China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I do not.

Senator O'CONOR. The paragraph, I think, starts: "Each of these men * * *."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Each of these men is a loss to the State Department—and there are few men of the same caliber left. The indirect damage to the conduct of our diplomacy is even greater. The more politically controversial our problems of diplomacy are, the more vital it is that the experts in the State Department should be able to discuss them fully, frankly, and without fear, and should be free to consult with academic experts. But we have reached a point of general intimidation at which our diplomatic representatives must feel under great pressure to report back to Washington only what it is safe to report, and make only those policy recommendations that they feel sure will not result in political attacks on their careers.

I am reminded, Senators, of something that once happened to the Russians. In 1939 they invaded Finland, sure that they were going to have a walk-over, but suffered serious military defeats and tremendous damage to their prestige. Does anybody doubt that this was because political intimidation had made yes-men of the Soviet diplomats reporting to Moscow? Communist doctrine and the party line required them to report that the Finns were groaning under bougeois-capitalist oppression, and would welcome the Russian invaders. They dared not report the truth, that the Finns were a democratic people, willing to fight against even the Russian colossus in defense of their liberties. The consequence was that Russia walked into a booby trap.

The anger of the American people will be great, Senators, if the political reporting of the State Department degenerates to this point because of political persecution, intimidation, and the demand that the China lobby be empowered to lay down a line to the State Department. What booby traps is the China lobby laying on the road ahead of us?

There are three interpretations that have been made of the records of the State Department victims of the China lobby:

Senator FERGUSON. Would you name the China lobby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The China lobby, Senator, is, I think, something that has been characterized, in a political rather than legal use of terminology, as an open conspiracy.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood yesterday you did not know what a "conspiracy" was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is why I said this morning "in political rather than legal terminology." I don't know what a conspiracy is in legal terminology.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what it is politically?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The expression "open conspiracy" is one that is fairly frequent in the writing of political scientists.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it? What is an "open conspiracy," politically?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was just trying to get to that, Senator. An open conspiracy may be said to exist when people who are leagued together, not as members of an organization but because they have a common purpose, do not claim to be a membership organization but openly state what their objectives are and openly advertise their sympathies with each other, and quote each other's opinions and works, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you give us the common purpose of the China lobby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The common purpose of the China lobby is to make support of the driftwood government on the beaches of Formosa a primary objective of American foreign policy, subordinating other questions of policy to the consideration of all-out aid to Chiang Kai-shek; the activation of a campaign, based on Formosa, for the recovery of the mainland, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, then, you speak of the Nationalist Government as the "driftwood" government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that that is a fair circumstantial characterization, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You once worked for Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was not a driftwood government at that time. I worked for Chiang Kai-shek and I did the best I could for him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Communist line changed in July of 1943, and that your magazine carried the change of the party line, as far as Chiang Kai-shek's government was concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, in the Tydings hearings, it was repeatedly asserted——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you know it? That can be answered "yes" or "no."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know it only by the assertions that were made before the Tydings committee in 1950. As for the second part of your question——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Mr. Bissell, in July of 1943, in your magazine—I do not think you were editor at that time, were you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not editor.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the party line changed, and that the magazine carried the change of the party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask for the name of the magazine, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Pacific Affairs, the one that you had been editor of.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Aren't you wrong, Senator, and aren't you referring——

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question. That is not the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Bissell wrote an article in July of 1943, on the change of the party line, as far as Chiang Kai-shek's government was concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If I may make a slight correction, I believe the gentleman's name is Bisson and not Bissell.

The CHAIRMAN. I ask that he answer these questions "Yes" or "No."

Senator O'CONOR. Just a second. Where the question admits of a direct answer, as such a question does, it would expedite matters, we think, if you would answer it directly, and then any explanatory statement that might be made can be admitted.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew of it as of 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when did you change against the Nationalist Government, against what you called the "drift-wood government"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I, Senator, did not change against any government. I would find it hard to document my answer here exactly, but I think about 19—oh, by the end of the war, I had grave doubts whether the Nationalist Government could survive a civil war; and by 1947 I was sure that they couldn't win a civil war; and I think by about 1948 I was convinced they were going to lose the civil war.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know now that your own Government, the United States Government, is supporting what you class as the "driftwood" government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do, and I think it is a mistaken policy.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are challenging the opinion and the honesty of people who you claim are assembled together as the China lobby, who are supporting the very thing that their Government is supporting, that is, the Nationalist Government of China; is that not a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, not exactly. I am maintaining my own opinion as an expert, so far as I am an expert, that the Government on Formosa is not viably for a long period. I think any policy based on that assumption is a mistaken policy that will lead us eventually into great difficulties. You have said that I have challenged the good faith——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of the China lobby. I have just said that the China lobby is a rather amorphous thing, and I would certainly not challenge the good faith of every person associated with the China lobby.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do you mean to say that what you say in here is praise of the principles of the China lobby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. WhatI say here is that the consequences of submitting to intimidation which characterizes as a traitor or an agent of Russia or the Chinese Communists, or a fellow traveler of the American Communists, anybody who voices his opinion that the China lobby is wrong, is one that is disastrous to the conduct of foreign policy in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you say in your statement that the State Department is the victim of the China lobby——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you not impugning the motives of the China lobby in advocating the support of what you call the "driftwood" government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am impugning the tactics of the China lobby in its resort to intimidation instead of fair argument based on analysis and discussion of facts.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think if the State Department followed your philosophy that you have stated here this morning, that they would be victims and would you call them victims of you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a hypothetical question, "of you"——

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that they will follow it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because the Department has never followed my advice or opinions.

Senator FERGUSON. This morning you indicated that the State Department should call in academic people, such as you, for consultations, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite right; and if I may qualify that a moment, I believe that the State Department should call in people who hold my point of view, and who hold all other points of view.

Senator FERGUSON. Even including the Communist point of view?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that the State Department should certainly familiarize itself with the Communist point of view. The Communist point of view may be a dangerous factor in our present political life, but nobody can deny it is important.

Senator FERGUSON. But do you not think if a man is called in as a consultant on the Communist point of view, he should be openly known to every member of the State Department and the public that he is a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure, Senator, how I would handle a difficult problem of this kind. I have never been faced with it. In government, it is obviously necessary to have a very careful and au-

thoritative study of Communist aims, methods, and so on, and my inclination is to believe that that kind of study can be made best, not by consulting Communists, but by the study of people who never have been Communists, and are neither Communists nor ex-Communists, but are trained experts in political science, economics, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would say that the State Department was not proper in calling in, for instance, Mr. Rosinger, as an expert, and then find that he comes before this committee and when asked the question as to whether or not he was or was not a Communist at the time that he was called in as an expert by the State Department, that he refuses to answer on the ground it would tend to incriminate him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean the State Department should have known before what other people only knew afterward?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that that is an answer to my question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I do not.

I asked whether you thought it was correct——

Senator O'CONOR. The question was whether you approved of that procedure.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I approve of the State Department calling in anybody who at the time he is called in holds a reputable position in the field of writing and publishing about foreign policy in this country, and I do not think that they should automatically adopt the opinions of any one person. I think that they should, and I believe that they do to the best of their ability, subject to the present atmosphere of intimidation, try to assemble opinion, sort it, and come to considered conclusions themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it your considered judgment that the Secretary of State now is intimidated? You charge it many times here in this statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say the indications run that way, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you give us what the intimidation is? You see, Mr. Lattimore, as I understand it, you are one of these men that insists that there should not be any reflections cast upon anyone or his character without real proof, and now, what is your proof that the Secretary of State is being intimidated? That is a very serious charge against a Cabinet officer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that the drift of our policy for the last couple of years shows that while the State Department still, to a certain extent, protests that it is following its own policy, it is largely following, in fact, the policy of its most intemperate critics.

Senator FERGUSON. And you call the State Department, then, the victim of its critics because you personally do not agree with the opinions of the critics, is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say that, no, it is not a question of whether I agree with the opinions of the critics; it is a question of an observed phenomenon which has been frequently referred to in the press of this country, as well as in the press of Great Britain, as saying that the State Department has become the prisoner or the captive of its critics.

Senator FERGUSON. You objected very strenuously to some remarks about you, as to the State Department being the victim of your philosophy, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have objected to having it represented that my opinions influenced the State Department when in fact they did not; and if my opinions had influenced the State Department, that would be part of the record, and I would have no objection whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not advocate that we allow it to appear that we had lost Korea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you state?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wrote a syndicated newspaper article in which I attempted to analyze what I thought was the then state of discussion of foreign policy in Washington, as of the end of 1949, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your remark on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And my remark, which has been used out of context by many people and I think is one of the most unscrupulous cases of using my writings out of context that I know of, contained not a word of advice to Washington policy makers. I said as clearly as I could that in the previous case of China, Chiang Kai-shek had fallen, and Chiang Kai-shek had been supported by this country, and as a result the State Department had been accused not merely of letting Chiang Kai-shek fall but of pushing him over.

In the case of Korea, as of the summer of 1949, it had been widely advertised that Korea was not considered an essential part of the defense periphery of the United States; as it appeared in the press it was stated that a line had been drawn which included Japan and Okinawa but did not include Korea or Formosa, as I recall. I said that as soon as the American military forces had been completely withdrawn from South Korea, it was likely that South Korea would fall; and, with the China lobby accusations in mind, I warned that Washington policy planners did not want the eventual fall of South Korea to be turned against them in an accusation that South Korea had not merely fallen but had been pushed by the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, have you ever worked for or been in the employ of any other government than the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I qualify that answer, Senator? I worked for Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator O'CONOR. The question is as to any other government. It admits of a direct answer: You were or you were not. And if you were, and then desire to make any explanation, that is perfectly in order. But you ought to answer the question directly first.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I can, Senator. I want to ask for the opinion of you gentlemen on this subject. I was in the employ of Chiang Kai-shek, who was at the head——

Senator FERGUSON. Please answer: Were you or were you not in the employ of any other government?

Mr. FORTAS. Point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no right to ask for a point of order.

Just a minute, Mr. Chairman. Just a minute. I object to that way of proceeding. This gentleman has no right to ask for a point of order, and he is no part of this body.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me rephrase the beginning of my reply. I do not believe——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. Just a second, Mr. Lattimore.

The question is one which, in the opinion of the Chair, does admit of a direct answer. He either was or was not. Now, he can make any explanation he desires after he has answered the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, just a second, before that goes any further.

I advised this gentleman when he first come in here of what his province would be. Now, that was no part of it, your breaking in with any point of order. Now, if you do that again, you are going to be excluded from this committee.

Mr. FORTAS. That is up to you.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right, and don't do it again.

Mr. FORTAS. That is up to you.

The CHAIRMAN. I will certainly do it.

Mr. FORTAS. You have the power.

Senator O'CONOR. Proceed, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you have stated that in the opinion of the Chair, the question is susceptible to a "yes" or "no" answer. May I state that, in my opinion, it is not susceptible to a "yes" or "no" answer, and I want to explain why. However, as I have said before, if the committee or any member of the committee insists on putting words in my mouth, I will use those words.

Senator O'CONOR. Are we to understand, then, Mr. Lattimore, that you do not know whether you were or were not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I will ask the next question. Your answer is that you do not know.

Senator O'CONOR. If that is correct, you can proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

My next question—that answers that question, and you do not know. I will ask you whether or not any of your trips have ever been financed by any foreign government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer to that question depends on the previous one and, therefore, I will have to answer again I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. I will now exclude from my question the Nationalist Government of China, and as to any other government, have any of your trips been financed in any amount or in any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think I should yes to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you give us the nations or the governments that have financed your trips?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, in 1929, when I was traveling in Manchuria, I was allowed to buy tickets at rebate rates on the South Manchuria Railway, which was Japanese-owned and I believe partly a private corporation and partly a Government corporation. This was a usual practice of the South Manchuria Railway at that time, a privilege that they offered to all writers and journalists.

In 1936, when I traveled home from China to this country via Siberia, and spent some days in Moscow, I made a side trip to Leningrad; and as I recall, the expenses of that trip were paid by the Soviet branch of what was then the Soviet Council of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be the Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In Russia, that would be either a branch of the Government or an organization subsidized by the Government, and we needn't quibble about that.

Then perhaps to be absolutely scrupulous, I should say that when I accompanied Vice President Wallace, as he then was, on his mission in Siberia and China in 1944, I do not know, but possibly a part of the local expenses in Siberia and China of the party as a whole, not of me individually unless I was included in the whole, may have been borne by the Russian or Chinese Governments.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever in the employ of the British Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever employed by any British subjects to make trips or financed by them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was employed in a British firm which was registered as a British firm, although it had other nationals in its employ; and in the course of ordinary business work I traveled fairly extensively in China on firm expense accounts.

Sentaor FERGUSON. What was the firm?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The firm was the firm of Arnhold & Co., registered as a British firm, operating at a number of places in China, and it was an import and export and engineering firm.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever do any writing that was directly or indirectly financed by the British Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Neither directly nor indirectly, as far as I know. I worked for a newspaper once which was British owned.

Senator FERGUSON. What paper?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Peking and Tientsin Times, of Tientsin, China.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever work for any British subjects on writings that were financed by the British subjects, directly or indirectly?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have contributed to British publications.

Senator FERGUSON. In no other way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever make a trip into Mongolia for the British?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so. Oh, at one time when I was traveling in Mongolia, I had a supplementary grant—which was considered an honor award, but took the form of a financial grant, which I used for expenses of my traveling—from the Royal Geographical Society.

Senator FERGUSON. Of Britain?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write anything for that compensation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Frequently for the publication of the Royal Geographical Society.

Senator FERGUSON. For the particular grant that you had from the Royal Geographical Society?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so. I don't believe that there was any publication.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to my asking you about what you said in relation to Korea, I take from the Sunday Compass—you know what that is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a paper in New York, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. This is an editorial. I think they quote you here as saying:

The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. If the Compass quoted me to that effect, they misunderstood what I wrote in the original article, and I should like to have the original article put in the record, if I may.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask that it be made a part of the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. When I wrote that article, my intention—and I believe it was clear from the text—was to say, not that this was my advice, but that this was the problem that confronted policy makers in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you approve that policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not entirely. I don't know whether this is in writing at any time, but I certainly remember my attitude at the time, and that was that if we were going to withdraw from Korea and leave a situation in which I was sure that the South Korean Government was going to fall, then if you are getting out, the thing to do is to get out and not stay there with one foot to be caught in a trap.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, do you have the original article from which you said that quotation was incorrectly drawn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have it at home.

Senator SMITH. I would like to know if that is a signed article by you. It says "By Owen Lattimore."

Senator FERGUSON. I want to correct it. I took that as being part of this editorial, and I do see now, as Senator Smith points out, that there is a division there and it is not part of the editorial.

It looks like your language.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is my language, and this paragraph at the end has been taken without reference to the article as a whole. And I submit the article as a whole means exactly what I have just said.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you paid for this article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This, incidentally, I should like to make clear, Senator, is not an article, in minor detail, it is not an article written for the Sunday Compass. It is an article written for a syndicate which sold the article to whatever papers——

Senator SMITH. Did you write the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly I wrote it.

Senator SMITH. All right, then, that speaks for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. This is your language?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is my language; the whole article is my language.

Senator FERGUSON. What were you asking, and I consented, to put in the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The whole article.

Senator FERGUSON. And you say that that is not in the whole article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I say that this concluding paragraph is only a part of the whole article, which sums up what I considered at the time to be the discussion of policy toward Korea in Washington at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by the last line: "Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of $150,000,000."?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I look over the article as a whole?

Senator O'CONOR. You may; yes, indeed.

It might help us all in evaluating it if you were to give the date.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The date is July 1949. It is a little earlier than I thought.

Senator, since several people are participating in this discussion, and since not everybody has a text, may I read the full text so that we all have it in our minds?

Senator O'CONOR. We had intended, or I had at least, to put the entire article in the record, but I think that you are entitled to quote any part of it that you think gives a different impression than that which is contained in the paragraph there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think, Senator, in order to make it clear that I am here quoting opinion rather than stating opinion, it would be advisable to let me read the whole article, because the article is linked, paragraph by paragraph, and I don't think that any isolated paragraph gives the full——

Senator O'CONOR. You have been given the article. You may read it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Washington," and this is July 17, 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you paid for that article by the Compass?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not by the Compass.

Senator FERGUSON. By a syndicate. And so you were really, in effect, paid, then, for the writing of this article; and what syndicate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Overseas News Agency, and it is marked here, "ONA." [Reading:]

WASHINGTON (ONA).—It is a foregone conclusion that the Truman administration and the Department of State are going to have a rough time with their Korean policy. By the same token, Republicans in Congress, together with Democrats who are critical of United States policy in Asia, are going to have a field day sniping at the official presentation of the policy of granting President Syngman Rhee's South Korea $150,000,000 for a "recovery program."

As the record stands, it is now revealed that Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a strong appeal for the $150,000,000 grant before a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Unless South Korea gets the money, he warned, it will fall within 3 months.

Simultaneously with this urgent appeal, however, it is also revealed that the evacuation of American occupation troops from South Korea, where they have been sitting on the lid ever since the end of the war with Japan, has now been completed. All that remain are about 200 officers and men who have the dismal and unpromising mission of attempting to train an anti-Communist and anti-Russian defense force.

There is an ominous comparison between this mission and the MAGIC force—

That is capital "M," capital "A," capital "G," capital "I," capital "C"—

or military advisory group in China, which found itself completely baffled by corruption and personal warlordism in Chiang Kai-shek's China.

Yet there is logic to the course of action advocated by Secretary Acheson. It is, moreover, a perfectly convincing logic. What makes the utterances of the Secretary of State sound absurd is not the logic of United States policy, but the fact that the policy is now conducted under rules of protocol which have become as rigid as tribal taboos.

For the logic we must go back to the sad precedent of China. The sad truth is that Gen. George C. Marshall——

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. "Sad" is not in there on the "truth."

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was "sad precedent" —and I reread the word "sad" [reading]:

The truth is that Gen. George C. Marshall, on his mission to China in 1946, before he became Secretary of State, became convinced of several unpleasant

things which, because of the state of political opinion in America, could not be stated out loud.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you are going to name all of those things.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

First, he was convinced that the Kuomintang would not be able to triumph over the Chinese Communists unless it took American advice.

Second, he was convinced that politically and militarily America could not handle the situation in China by taking the Kuomintang by the scruff of the neck and the seat of the pants and making it behave. Yet he could not, as a statesman, advise what seemed sensible to him as a general—that the United States simply pull out and abandon an untenable position.

As a compromise, American policy took a course of relative inaction, but not complete inaction. As it became more and more obvious that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were doomed the conduct of American policy became increasingly delicate. The problem was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them. Such a policy never succeeds completely, and critics have done their best to make the public believe that the United States did push Chiang and the Kuomintang over the cliff.

Korea is another chapter in the same unhappy story. I have yet to meet an American who knows all the facts and believes that Syngman Rhee is either a popular or a competent President of South Korea. In spite of high-pressure elections, his legislature is more badly split against him than China's was against Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator SMITH. Than China's was?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Against Chiang Kai-shek.

The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall, but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of $150,000,000.

I submit that that is exactly what I said it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not put in quotes that this was somebody else's statement about letting it fall.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't put it in quotes.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My opinion was——

Senator FERGUSON. Answer my question. That was your opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was trying to convey at that time——

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know what you did convey, and not what you were trying to convey. What about what you did convey?

Senator O'CONOR. You are at liberty to state whether that correctly expresses your viewpoint, and whether you did use those words, and, if it admits of any other interpretation, you are free to express it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think it admits of another interpretation than the one Senator Ferguson is trying to put on it.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you whether anyone else used that phrase: "The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall, but not to let it look as though we pushed it"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether anybody else used the phrase or not, Senator, but I think that that paragraph clearly implies that this is the problem with which the State Department is grappling in Washington as of July 1949, and is not my advice to the State Department.

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you this question: Did you favor the granting of $150,000,000 to South Korea, so when——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said there, I say there quite clearly in the article, Senator, that I consider that there is logic to it; yes.

Senator WATKINS. To give them $150,000,000 so when they did go over to the Communists, they would have $150,000,000 to start off in supporting Communist causes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I thought, as I think it is clear from that article, I agreed with people in Washington who thought that the South Korean Government would probably not be able to stand; but I thought that the only honest policy for the United States was to do what was humanly possible in the situation, to give the South Korean Government what it needed to stand, so that if it fell, or when, as I believed, it fell, it should not appear that there could be no honest accusation that the United States had simply abandoned Korea.

Senator WATKINS. You understand that if they were given $150,000,000, knowing that they are going to fall, that they would be that much enriched and would have that much money to help out in the Communist cause and it would go into Communist hands, that $150,000,000; is that not the logical conclusion from that recommendation of the Secretary as well as your own recommendation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I answer "yes" or "no," and then qualify?

Senator WATKINS. That is the way we want you to answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer is "No," and my answer is that the logic, on the basis of precedent in the case of China, is that out of that $150,000,000, probably $149,999,999.99 would end up in New York banks in the possession of rich Koreans.

Senator WATKINS. Then you favored giving over $149 million to go into the hands of some private people who would graft that much from the Korean Government, and you still recommended it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recommended that we do our best to give the Koreans a chance, and if they misused that chance, that was their responsibility.

Senator WATKINS. You did not want it to come in to the Communist group; you wanted them to come in pretty well fixed up?

Senator O'CONOR. I think that he ought to be permitted to answer Senator Watkins' question at this point.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believed that we had done the best we could in Korea, or we had tried to do the best we could in Korea, with a certain amount of bungling; that Syngman Rhee and his crowd were pretty hopeless, but that the only honorable thing in the circumstances, when we had announced that we thought the situation was untenable by us, was to stake them to a chance in life; yes.

Senator JENNER. Did the Government follow that policy, Professor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Government—may I answer "Yes," with qualifications?

Senator JENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My impression, just from recollection, is that the Government was in the course of following that policy, which had been determined before I had anything to say about it, and therefore was not influenced by me; and that before it had been completed, the North Korean Communist aggression occurred, and our whole policy, in my opinion quite rightly, was immediately switched to resistance against armed Communist aggression.

Senator JENNER. You stated that you feared that the corrupt Koreans would get—I forget; $149,999,999.99, or something—and that the balance would probably go to Korea. Now, is it not a fact that out

of the moneys that Congress appropriated to help the Syngman Rhee government in South Korea, actually your figures are almost correct, except about all we gave the South Koreans in the way of aid was about $200 worth of bailing wire?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, the concluding paragraph which we have read, and I quote from your concluding paragraph, says:

> The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of $150,000,000.

Well, now, who did you expect South Korea to fall to, and what force or power were you thinking of when you said, "The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I presume at that time—and remember, I am not stating my own opinion, I am quoting opinion in Washington—I assume that the conclusion must have been that it would fall to the Communist-dominated North Korean Government.

Senator SMITH. And you understood at that time that the North Korean Government at that time was Communist-dominated?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly understood it, and my feeling on that subject, Senator Smith, was not a hasty conclusion; it was based on a considerable previous course of events—statements of opinions by authoritative persons.

For instance, on June 24, Congressional Record, 1949, page 8297, Senator Knowland read into the Record the following quotation from Way of a Fighter, by General Chennault:

> Gen. George C. Marshall told Congress in the spring of 1948 that if Manchuria were lost to the Chinese Communists, the United States position in Southern Korea would be untenable. Manchuria has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

On July 5, Congressional Record, 1949, page 8821, Senator Knowland stated his belief that—

> It will not be possible for the southern half of Korea, which is the Korean Government recognized by the United States and the other Western Powers, set up under the general auspices of the United Nations, to retain its freedom.

Therefore, it was apparently the well-considered opinion of people in a position to know the inside of government workings much better than I, that this was an untenable situation. If a situation is considered by both the top military and the top political authorities to be untenable, then my reaction would be, "All right, it is untenable, and the thing to do with an untenable situation is to get out and get back to a situation that is tenable."

Senator SMITH. And with that in mind, you said to let South Korea fall, and you meant fall to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. With that in mind, I summed that up as my reading of Washington opinion at the time.

Senator SMITH. Well, could you answer my question? You meant "to fall to the Communists," and let Korea fall to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I meant that my interpretation of Washington opinion was that they were prepared to let Korea fall to the Communists.

Senator SMITH. You did write this language yourself: "The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall," and there is no mistake about that being your language; is there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the language in which I expressed my summing up of Washington opinion.

Senator SMITH. And then you go ahead and say:

Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of $150,000,000.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Now then, you meant by that, did you not, for the Government of America to throw away $150,000,000 on the South Koreans, after you had recommended that it be allowed to fall to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not recommend that it be allowed to fall to the Communists.

Senator SMITH. Well, you said:

Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of $150,000,000.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I stated my summing up of Washington opinion.

Senator SMITH. So that you do not say you recommended the $150,000,000?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. You did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Now, the quotation that you read from the Record, the Congressional Record, was more than a year prior to this date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Now, when did you conclude that Korea, South Korea, had to fall to the Communists—before this article? How long before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When I wrote this article, the discussion of this $150,000,000 grant was being discussed in Washington. I therefore looked up the newspaper records to see what had led up to the situation, and I attempted to write an article summing that up.

Senator SMITH. Now, you were familiar, were you not, with the speech that Mr. Acheson made on January 5—I believe it was—1950, in which he referred to the fact that Korea and Formosa, I believe he put it, were beyond the defense periphery of America?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Did you approve of that policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understood—may I answer the question and then qualify it?

Senator O'CONOR. You may do that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I approved of that policy because I understood that it was not solely a State Department policy but one that had been arrived at after authoritative military surveys of the problems by the military forces—the representatives of the military forces of the Government.

Senator SMITH. Whom did you understand that from—the State Department officials or the Defense Department officials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understood it from the press, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Only from the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Only from the press.

Senator SMITH. You had no discussion with anyone in the State Department about that policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not believe I did.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, are you sure whether you did or did not discuss it with anyone in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure, I say. Yes, in 1949, I would have seen various military and civilian friends of mine, but whether I discussed this particular problem with them, I don't recall.

Senator SMITH. You would not say that you did not discuss it with some of the people in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I might have, and I would have considered it a perfectly legitimate subject to discuss——

Senator SMITH. Well, then, was——

Mr. LATTIMORE. For any newspaperman to discuss.

Senator SMITH. Was that partly your conclusion, too—that Korea and Formosa were beyong the defense periphery of America?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My conclusion, Senator, was that in view of what I knew from the press, and the public discussion, they were right, or right enough so that I wouldn't attack it.

Senator SMITH. Did you not regard that statement or enunciation of policy on January 5, 1950, as really an invitation for the North Koreans to immediately move into South Korea, when we announced we were not going to defend Korea and Formosa, and was that not tantamount to an invitation to go into Korea, for the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a question of subjective judgment, Senator, and it wouldn't be my conclusion, and it would be a perfectly fair conclusion for anybody who wanted to draw that conclusion.

Senator SMITH. In other words, the Communists of North Korea, when they saw that announcement of Mr. Acheson, that was tantamount to saying, "We aren't going to defend South Korea"; was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Communists, or anybody else, could read that the United States had said this was outside the defense perimeter.

Senator SMITH. That meant they were not going to defend it; did it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That presumably implied——

Senator SMITH. Was it not what you and everybody else would understand from that language?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, is that the conclusion that you drew?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The conclusion I drew is that if a position is considered untenable, then it is wise not to try to defend it.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you whether you drew the conclusion that the United States Government had announced a policy, and therefore would not defend Korea?

Senator O'CONOR. Your knowledge, in other words, of the attitude of the Government in that respect.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I must confess that one thing that did not enter my mind at that time was the North Korean armed aggression—marching into a country to conquer it by force of arms and forcibly change the system of government. If it is put on the question not of supporting the South Korean Government, but of resisting external armed aggression, I should have said. "Certainly; we should resist external armed aggression in Korea or anywhere else in the world."

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that we should let them penetrate it and take it over, and not do anything about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is always difficult, Senator, even so recently as 3 or 4 years ago, to maintain that you can recall verbally exactly what you thought at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. You wrote an article advocating something, and we have read it to you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that my anticipation at the time, based on the political news that was coming out of Korea, was that the South Korean Government was going to be changed from inside by the discontent against Syngman Rhee that was already evident, and that a different kind of government was going to come on the top.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be a Communist government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not necessarily, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it have had Communists in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were writing as a foreign expert; and, Mr. Lattimore, you knew that this article was going to be distributed throughout the world, and it was for that purpose, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, may I speak to your use of the word "expert"? I notice that it was worked very successfully on Mr. John Carter Vincent when he was here. I would like to point out that "expert" is only a relative term. Experts are not infallible. If experts were infallible, we would not have any; we would have a series of numbers on a telephone, and you would just dial and find out what is going to happen. Experts differ from each other, and among each other.

My feeling at the time was that we had considered that Korea was untenable; that the Government, as it stood at that time, was going to fall; and that this would probably lead to some form of amalgamated government between North and South Korea, which we had always stated was our policy. And I must say that I still hoped at that time that a modified government would be possible that would not be entirely dominated by the Korean Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. When you say here, "Let South Korea fall," you meant more, did you not, Mr. Lattimore, than just the Government changing by a vote? South Korea was to fall and not the Government; and therefore, the only way it would fall would be to arms, is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not necessarily correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I ask you whether this article was not circulated throughout the world?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wish I could say that anything I ever wrote, Senator, was circulated throughout the world. I am not such a fantastically popular author as all of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that Russia, Communist——

Senator SMITH. What does that mean, Overseas News Agency?

Senator FERGUSON. It was to be distributed outside the United States, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe they sold, or tried to sell, their service abroad, just as AP and UP and other services do.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now do you not think it is a fair interpretation of your remarks here that you, Owen Lattimore, were telling the world that the thing to do for America, therefore, was to let South Korea fall, but not to let it look as though we pushed it, and it was an

invitation that America would not intervene in case they attempted to make it fall?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer to that, Senator, is "No," with qualifications, if I may.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, qualify it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was telling the world what it already knew: That the United States was considering that Korea lay outside our defense perimeter, and was untenable. In that situation, I thought that the South Korean Government was bound to fall, and that there would take place an amalgamation beween North Korea and South Korea, under circumstances obviously disadvantageous to us, but we had faced that fact by saying that the position was untenable.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you not also indicate to the public and say to the public that we had done the identical thing in relation to China: That we had let it fall? "The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall," and you had stated before: "Korea is another chapter in the same unhappy story." And right about that you say that we in effect allowed Chiang to fall, but we also made it look as if we did not push him.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I answer that question "No," with qualifications?

Senator FERGUSON. All right, give your qualifications.

Mr. LATTIMORE. China had fallen primarily because China was also a situation that we could not control. When we could not control it, we began to withdraw our support, but in fairness to the still existing Chinese Government we were, I think, honorably careful to make it clear that the fall of China was not due to our pushing it over, as was being said by either ill-informed or ill-intentioned critics.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you did use the same language, did you not, and I will read it to you:

As a compromise, American policy took a course of relative inaction, but not complete inaction.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

As it became more and more obvious that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were doomed, the conduct of American policy became increasingly delicate.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

The problem was—

and now you are saying our Government—

The problem was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them. Such a policy never succeeds completely, and critics have done their best to make the public believe that the United States did push Chiang and the Kuomintang over the cliff.

In other words, you say that the State Department was not able to put it over, as far as the public was concerned, that we did not push them; and then you seem to criticize some people for bringing it out to the public that we really did push them, is that not a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer to your exposition of what you think I said, Senator, is "No," with qualifications.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, qualify it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it is fairly obvious that the language used in that syndicated article was sardonic language.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume you made it that way so that the public would understand it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought it was understandable, Senator, and I was not writing for purposes of being obscure.

Senator O'CONOR. Just continue with your explanation, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was sardonically describing a situation in which a course of withdrawal had become, in the opinion of those who were directing our policy, inevitable because the situation had become untenable. A policy of withdrawal is always full of pitfalls, as far as public opinion is concerned. Misunderstanding is very easy, and very natural, and manipulation of that misunderstanding for political purposes is always tempting.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that there were some of the nations in the United Nations that advocated that after we started the war in Korea, it would be a good thing if we could be pushed out gracefully?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, Senator; I don't think I know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be along the same line of allowing it to fall but not let the public know——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. Would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The war in Korea began in 1950, after a date at which I have been forced to neglect a great part of what should be my professional activity in keeping abreast of the details of news in the Far East because of the continuing malicious attacks to which I have been subjected, and so I cannot claim to be as well informed as perhaps I should be.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I have just a couple of questions.

Mr. Lattimore, this Overseas News Agency is the one that distributed this article, and did they ever distribute other articles by you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir; they distributed other articles.

Senator SMITH. How was that Overseas News Agency set up, and who were the personnel there that managed it, and who did you deal with? Those questions I would like to have answered.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Overseas News Agency is a small syndicate in New York, and I was approached by somebody working for that agency at the time that I was leaving the Government service, and I am sorry I don't recall his name, asking me if I would be willing to write an occasional column of comment on the Far East; and I think that I began writing for them occasionally in 1945, and continued until 1948 or 1949, I think it was 1949, when their finances were somewhat in difficulty, and they could no longer afford to pay me and, in fact, they still owe me a certain amount of money; and I ceased writing for them.

Senator SMITH. Was Mr. Thackrey, the editor and publisher, the man who talked to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge, Senator, I must say I have never met Mr. Thackrey, and I don't know him, and to the best of my knowledge he has nothing to do with the agency.

Senator SMITH. And how about Mr. Gold?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Are you reading from the letterhead of the company?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never heard of Mr. Gold in connection with the Overseas News Agency. The head of Overseas Agency when I was writing for it was Mr. Jacob Landau, who has since retired; and who is the head of the agency now, I don't know.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, where did you understand that news agency circulated its articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It circulated its articles wherever it could sell them, as far as I know, and let me see if I can recall some of the papers in which articles of mine written for Overseas News Agency have been published. One would be the New York Herald Tribune; one is the New Republic; one is the Watertown Times of New York; and one is a small paper in Connecticut, something like Watertown; and the New Haven Register, I think; and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch; and the Baltimore Sun.

Senator SMITH. How about foreign papers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Louisville Courier. Papers abroad, I don't remember ever receiving any clips on that it was published.

Senator SMITH. You do not know about any of the other foreign papers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sure you could get the record from Overseas News Agency.

Senator SMITH. When you were approached for an article to be sent out, were you given or was it suggested to you the subject that they wished you to write on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. You chose the subject? Did you write it and sell it to them, that is what I am getting at?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To use the celebrated phrase, Senator, I wrote as I pleased.

Senator SMITH. Then how did you write; with a view to selling, or did you first make arrangements for them to buy the article before you wrote it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is that?

Senator SMITH. Did you write the article and then attempt to sell it to whoever would buy, this agency, or did you write as a result of their arrangement with you to write an article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Their arrangement with me was at one time that I should write an article—the arrangement was at first that I should write once a week, and later that I should write twice a week, and later I believe once again that I should write once a week.

Senator SMITH. But you chose your own subjects?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And in this particular case, you chose as a subject of your article, "South Korea—Another China," and is that not true? Is that not the name of the article, the subject of the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the name that is printed there, but I may point out that I did not write the titles. Different papers published my articles under their own headlines.

Senator SMITH. You do not think that you chose the name, then, "South Korea—Another China"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so; no. I think that I usually sent by article in to the agency with a heading of some kind on it, but it very rarely appeared with the same headline in the different papers in which it was published.

Senator O'CONOR. All right.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask one question.

The last paragraph in that article, about South Korea and China, I am not clear as to whether you have said that that was not an expression of your opinion, or merely a quote of other opinion.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my attempt at a summation of Washington opinion.

Senator WATKINS. You did not mean that to be your own opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I meant that to be a summation of Washington opinion.

Senator WATKINS. Well, you could answer whether you meant it to be your own opinion or not.

Senator O'CONOR. Was it similar to yours, or at variance with yours?

Senator WATKINS. Was that your opinion? Let us get it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the whole, I supported the policy.

Senator WATKINS. On the whole; and that included, of course, this paragraph?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If I had been critical of the policy, I should have so stated it.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, Mr. Lattimore, will you resume, and it occurs to me that this is one connected link, up to the top of page 24, if you might go on from where you left off reading, if we could just withhold any questions until you have reached that point.

Mr. LATTIMORE. There are three interpretations that have been made of the records of the State Department victims of the China Lobby:

1. That they sincerely and objectively reported the facts as they saw them at the time. In a reasonable climate, this would, of course, be the presumption; and although my knowledge is necessarily limited, I am sure that it is the fact.

2. That they are Communists and subservient to a foreign power. On the evidence that I have seen in your hearings and the newspapers, this is a contemptible and baseless charge.

3. That there existed in this country, and particularly in the Foreign Service of the State Department, a web of men who were attempting to serve a Communist cause, that I was a part of this web, and that the Government officials were either conscious parts of it or dupes.

Senator SMITH. Just a moment, there.

Senator O'CONOR. Will you withhold questions until he finishes the top of the next page, if that does not interfere with your questioning?

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The central problem of this subcommittee, Senators, is to decide between these three alternatives. I am concerned directly in this problem as it touches State Department officials only because of the third possibility; only because Joseph McCarthy and some of McCarthy's fellow travelers have attempted to use me as a tool with which to discredit the men who have had much to do with determining our far-eastern policy.

Let us take a look—an honest look—at this preposterous theory of a secret spider web with me at the center of it.

First and foremost, my acquaintance with State Department officials can best be described as sporadic. I met some of them in China. Foreigners living in the small foreign communities of China saw each other frequently, and my wife and I were on friendly terms with them there. But it is also important that you recognize the limitations of our acquaintanceship with them and other Foreign Service personnel. When they were transferred to other posts we lost touch with each other, and when we again found ourselves in the same city, we were glad to see each other, but we seldom corresponded with them, or they with us.

As for my acquaintance with these men and other State Department people in Washington, I must again remind you that the people in this country engaged in far-eastern research are very few. For professional reasons, they need to see a good deal of each other. I have always circulated among far-eastern people in the State Department less than most academic specialists on the Far East, because my principal research interest is the frontier regions between China and Russia, especially Mongolia, and Mongolia has never been considered important in American foreign policy.

Parenthetically, I consider that the neglect of the Chinese-Russian frontier in American studies is a serious mistake. The lack of such studies makes it difficult to coordinate the study of American interests and policies in the Far East, Central Asia, and the Middle East. I have done my best to promote such studies and the Johns Hopkins University is now the leading university in the country in the teaching of contemporary spoken Mongol and research on the Mongol area.

Senator JENNER. May I ask a question?

Senator O'CONOR. I did promise Senator Smith, who had attempted to ask a question before, that he could interrogate the witness.

Senator SMITH. You are using an expression that I have been hearing off and on ever since I have been here, for the last year and a half, and you say "victims of the China lobby." And I have never yet been able to get anybody to identify the China lobby. Who are the personnel of the lobby, now, would you mind telling me, not only for past understanding but also for future guidance? Who are the China lobby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, your question follows on from a question asked me by Senator Ferguson a moment ago. However, I will do my best to amplify it.

As I say, I believe it is a rather amorphous body, an open conspiracy rather than a tight membership organization. I believe that one might say that it consists partly of professional or amateur lobbyists in the usual sense; that it has mercenaries, and that it also has occasional allies, sort of guerrilla troops skirmishing around the fringe; and, therefore, if one names any one person, that person might not be a member of the China lobby in exactly the same sense as another person. But I should say that one of the conspicuous members of the China lobby is a Mr. William Goodwin, who is or has been actually employed and registered as a lobbyist for the Chinese Embassy here. There is the well known Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, who is a man of private means and able to finance his interests in the discussion of China policy, and he also has or had financial interests in China. And I believe that some Senators may be considered to be part of the China lobby, or occasional allies of the China lobby.

Senator Knowland, for instance, whom I consider to be an absolutely sincere man, is frequently referred to as the "Senator from Formosa."

Senator FERGUSON. That is a Communist line, is it not, "the Senator from Formosa," Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge, Senator. They may have picked it up.

Senator FERGUSON. You have never heard that the Communist line is to call the Senator from California, "the Senator from Formosa"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I have never heard that, and it may be true, and of course, I don't follow the Communist press.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead and give us some more names, because I am interested in identifying this China lobby.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And then the China lobby——

Senator SMITH. Right there, before we leave Senator Knowland, because I have a very high regard for Senator Knowland, you do not mean that he has been a member of the China lobby working in a sinister way against the interests of America in behalf of China, do you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator, I just expressed or stated my opinion that I have a high regard for Senator Knowland and consider him an absolutely sincere man, and that is why I prefaced my remarks by saying that when one man may be named as part of the China lobby, he is not necessarily the same as another man.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when you referred to the Senator from California as "the Senator from Formosa," you were not treating him with respect, were you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. If you were repeating hearsay. You come in here and you charge people with blackening your character, and then you use an expression on this stand against a Senator as the "Senator from Formosa."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I should——

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I said yesterday that you could say anything you wanted to on the end of an answer, which you have been continuously doing, about all of the Senators on this committee; but when you bring in another Senator and charge him with being in the China lobby, and refer to him as "the Senator from Formosa," I think that you should be called to order.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, Senator. You may call me to order if you like. I was merely——

Senator FERGUSON. And you cannot gloss it over with a glib tongue as to what you feel about him.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I considered that I was merely citing an extremely well-known and partly humorous description of him that appears in the press and on the radio.

Senator O'CONOR. It would seem in order, Mr. Lattimore, I agree, that the reference was uncalled for, and it was not becoming, and it should not have been made. He is a highly respected and honored official, and any sort of reference to that is belittling, and certainly it does not have any part in a serious discussion or consideration such as that in which we are engaged. And if, as you are now indicating, it was made a semihumorous way, that, too, has no part in this proceeding.

Senator JENNER. Might I add there that any man who stands up for America is to be belittled by such men.

Senator O'CONOR. There will be no demonstration of either approval or disapproval.

Senator SMITH. Maybe this will help a little bit to clear it up, Mr. Lattimore. On page 22 of your statement you state or you say that "there are three interpretations that have been made of the records of the State Department victim of the China lobby."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. And so you regard those State Department people that you referred to as "victims," for instance, of Senator Knowland as one of the China lobby? Do you or do you not refer to Senator Knowland as one of the people who has made a victim of some of the State Department people?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I answer "No," with qualifications?

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge, as I recall, from the press, I do not believe that Senator Knowland has joined in this kind of clamor, and that is one of the reasons that I respect him.

May I advert to a remark made by your chairman? I was called upon to describe the China lobby, as I understand it, and I very carefully specified that there were many different kinds of people in it, and that the characterization of one was not necessarily applied to another. Then I thought that it would be the proper thing for me, since I believe that in the public mind a number of Senators and Representatives are associated with the China lobby, not to show any attitude of fear or cringing by avoiding the mention of the names of eminent men. I therefore deliberately chose the name of Senator Knowland because I thought that he was a man whom I could mention in a very respectful manner as showing that I have a difference of opinion with him, but that I respect him, but that I consider that his position represents one part of what this China lobby is.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, you are in a sense departing from the point made by the temporary presiding officer. I made no objection to your naming Senator Knowland, but I did think that you did go too far in describing him as representing other than the United States of America, which I am sure he represents alone, and will not be influenced by any foreign allegiance.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, Senator. Perhaps I should have left that to the press.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean?

Senator SMITH. You mean you have an arrangement with someone on the press to characterize these men, and you should have left that to the press? What did you mean by that statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I simply meant that this is a term under which Senator Knowland is frequently referred to, and I might have assumed that if I had only mentioned Senator Knowland, that the press, as they often do when they are identifying people, would have put in brackets that Senator Knowland has been referred to as the "Senator from Formosa."

Senator JENNER. In what press have you read that Senator Knowland was the "Senator from Formosa"?

Senator SMITH. The Communist press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I never follow the Communist press.

Senator JENNER. I want an answer to my question, and I want to know in what press the witness has read that Senator Knowland is referred to as the "Senator from Formosa"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, Senator, I can't name offhand a specific paper in which I read it.

Senator JENNER. Not one, not even one newspaper?

Senator SMITH. And yet you make that statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a term that I have been reading for months, and also hearing on the radio.

Senator JENNER. What papers do you read, then? Maybe we can get at it that way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read regularly the New York Times and the Baltimore——

Senator JENNER. Has the New York Times, to refresh your memory, ever referred to Senator Knowland as the "Senator from Formosa"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, Senator. It would have to be looked up.

Senator JENNER. You make this charge and yet you cannot name one paper that referred to Senator Knowland as the "Senator from Formosa"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't name—I can tell you the papers I read.

Senator JENNER. But you do not recall any single newspaper?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot recall.

Senator JENNER. You thought it was a humorous reference, and yet you did not get any humor and you cannot remember the humor that you got from reading some newspapers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, it is a very frequent reference—so frequent that I would not associate it with any newspaper.

Senator JENNER. Do you read the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you read the Compass?

Senator JENNER. What paper do you read besides the New York Times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was trying to tell you when you interrupted me.

Senator JENNER. Please do, with qualifications.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read the New York Times regularly and I read the Baltimore Morning Sun regularly and I read the Washington Post regularly and those are the only ones I read regularly.

Senator JENNER. Thank you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Since I have characterized this also as a term that appears on the radio, the radio programs to which I listen regularly——

Senator JENNER. Now, maybe some commentator. What commentator have you heard who referred to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The 6 o'clock news broadcast of the CBS in the evening.

Senator JENNER. Can you name one commentator, then, among all of your news broadcasts that you have listened to, who referred to the Senator from California as the "Senator from Formosa"?

Senator O'CONOR. The witness should be allowed to answer.

Senator JENNER. He answered on the newspapers and now this is a new question and I am asking what commentators.

Senator O'Conor. I think that is in order, but the witness ought to be permitted to complete his answer.

Senator Jenner. He had completed the newspapers and switched over to radio news broadcasts.

Senator O'Conor. Now, the question is as to what radio broadcasts you customarily listen to, and the commentators.

Mr. Lattimore. The programs and commentators to which I customarily listen are the 6 o'clock CBS news program in the evening which includes a number of commentators or news broadcasters; and I listen to the 8 o'clock CBS news in the morning; and then going back to the evening, I occasionally listen at 7 o'clock to Fulton Lewis, Jr.

Senator Jenner. Did you ever hear Fulton Lewis, Jr., refer to the Senator from California as the "Senator from Formosa"?

Mr. Lattimore. I can't recall.

Senator Jenner. Can you recall any commentator on any of the news broadcasts——

Senator O'Conor. I do think, now—had you finished your answer?

Mr. Lattimore. I had not.

Senator O'Conor. I think that you should finish it.

Mr. Lattimore. At 7:15 I usually listen to Elmer Davis.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear Elmer Davis say that?

Senator O'Conor. I think——

Mr. Lattimore. I think, I wouldn't say for certain, I think it is quite likely.

Senator Ferguson. I would think so.

Senator O'Conor. Let us be in order.

Mr. Lattimore. At 7:45, I usually listen to Mr. Ed Murrow's program, again on CBS. And that is all of the programs I listen to regularly and the papers that I read regularly.

Mr. Fortas. Can you give this witness a rest, please?

Senator O'Conor. We will take a recess for 10 minutes.

Senator Ferguson. I think he needs a rest. The record clearly shows he needs a rest.

Senator O'Conor. We will take a recess for 10 minutes.

(Short recess.)

(At this point Senator McCarran assumed the chair.)

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Is there any question pending?

Senator Smith. I asked Mr. Lattimore to name the persons who constituted the China lobby and he named three or four, and I would like to get the additional names of those he regards first as to the China lobby.

The Chairman. You may answer, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I tried to begin my answer with great care——

The Chairman. Let us name the Senators who belong to the China lobby, is that the question?

Senator Smith. The persons who constituted the China lobby, and among them he named one Senator, and I would like to have him name the others, because he said or he referred to the State Department victims of the China lobby, and I want to know who constitutes the China lobby, the personnel, and the names.

The Chairman. That calls for names, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore. All right, Senator.

Before naming any further names——

The CHAIRMAN. That calls for names, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I'll mention any further names only with great reluctance——

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement in that regard will be stricken from the record. Name the names. That is what the answer is.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am naming these names with the greatest reluctance.

The CHAIRMAN. That is stricken from the record. Call the names.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have characterized people as being——

The CHAIRMAN. Call the names, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the lobby as being different——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to answer the question or don't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, before——

The CHAIRMAN. I ask you to answer the question now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, yes, I will answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Your other statements will be stricken from the record, and you are called upon to name names, and now do so.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very respectfully, Senator, you are——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's name the names and answer the question of the Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have mentioned Mr. Alfred Kohlberg. I understand that an employee of the China lobby has been a Miss Freda Utley. I understand that there is a great deal of private Chinese money in this country——

Senator SMITH. Now, that does not answer my question.

The CHAIRMAN. The last part of the answer will be stricken from the record.

Senator SMITH. He says, "State Department victims of the China lobby." Now, "victim" is not a very nice designation of someone who has been the victim, and I want to know who are the China lobby?

The CHAIRMAN. You are calling for names.

Now, names is what your answer is.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understand that, Mr.——

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer calls for names, please, Mr. Lattimore, and certainly you——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Members of the Chinese Embassy. And that is all of the names that I will name.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions, Senator?

Senator SMITH. So that those names are the names of the persons who constitute the China lobby—and I see you are getting reinforcement from your wife behind you. Now, I am asking you to name the names of the persons that constitute the China lobby, and you have given us three or four. Now, are they all that constitute the China lobby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I speak to my counsel.

Senator SMITH. I am asking you for the names.

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that question "yes" or "no."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been told, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please answer the question? Never mind what you have been told. Answer the question "yes" or "no," and then explain, if you wish.

Mr. FORTAS. The witness has asked permission to consult with counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. If he wants to consult with counsel, he may consult.

Mr. FORTAS. Now may he?

The CHAIRMAN. He certainly may. I have told you that.

Mr. FORTAS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not going to get fortification from the rear.

Senator SMITH. That has been going on all morning, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is going to stop.

I will have to ask for quiet in the rear of the room, please.

What is your question, Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. I asked him to name the names of the persons constituting the China lobby to which he refers here in his statement on page 22.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should name Mr. George Sokolsky, a newspaper columnist, and I believe radio commentator. I should name the Chicago Tribune——

Senator SMITH. What names, individually?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Editorially.

Senator SMITH. Who? The persons, I called for, the names of the persons constituting the China lobby as referred to by you on page 22 of your statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I, Senator, again refer to the fact that I started out by saying that I consider that any individual may be classified with the China lobby in entirely different degrees and under entirely different connotations.

Senator SMITH. Any kind of degree. Mr. Lattimore, you have made a serious charge here, that the State Department employees have been made victims of the China lobby. Now, that is a statement you have made, manifestly for the purpose of prejudicing somebody. Now, I want to know who constitutes this China lobby that you apparently mean to say has been guilty of all sorts of insidious influence on the State Department. Now, who are the persons? Now, if you did not know any persons who constituted the lobby, manifestly this is an improper statement to put before the committee. If you do know who constitutes the China lobby, you are entitled to tell us; and that is all I am asking for, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That calls for names, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should name a Mr. Victor Laskey——

Senator WATKINS. Tell us where he lives, if you have that information.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know where he lives, sir. I have seen articles of his. I think that that is all I can recall at the moment, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator SMITH. The persons you have named are the persons to whom you attribute the influence that produced the State Department victims?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Those are all of the names that I can recall under this kind of hammering, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, I think that that is uncalled for, to Senator Smith's question, and I think it ought to be stricken from the record, the remark that he has been hammered. He has had a recess to remember names. Certainly to request a man

over and over, when he refuses to answer and fails to answer, to get names of an organization, I do not think that that ought to be classed by any witness before this committee as "hammering."

The CHAIRMAN. I entirely agree with you, Senator. The remark will be stricken from the record. I hope that that will not occur again.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think—and, of course, I have no objection how he refers to the questions I ask him, because I certainly started in this hearing with not any feeling against Mr. Lattimore whatsoever, and I am going to maintain my composure, and my effort in fairness, regardless of his truculence and his petulance or his arrogance, and I expect to continue listening to what the evidence is. But when such flimsy statements as this are made, and then he cannot back it up, I think it is something that we should consider as to whether or not we should throw this whole statement of his out, and then proceed by way of direct question and direct answer from Mr. Lattimore, because we have seen this whole statement is full of such jumbled statements as that, that are not backed up; and when you specifically inquire as to the foundation for his statement——

Senator FERGUSON. May I just say in relation to that, that is the reason this hearing is taking so long. If we were to admit these generalizations, such as the one about the China lobby and the fact that the State Department is a victim of the China lobby, and many other statements that have been shown to be hearsay, and not founded upon fact, then we would be admitting the truth of all of these statements and these conclusions. That is the difficulty that we are facing here, with a long cross-examination to try to ascertain what the facts are, and what this man actually knows. It is unfair to a record.

Senator SMITH. I think what he says is a reflection upon the State Department and upon the people who are honestly trying to operate the State Department in the best manner, and for him to characterize these four or five people as the people who have made victims of State Department employees. But that is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. I had one other question that I wanted to ask the witness. He refers to Senator Knowland as the "Senator from Formosa," and have you ever seen an editorial entitled, "Senator from Formosa"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I remember, no.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that you might have?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think that I have.

Senator FERGUSON. You realize that when you say that a Senator is from a foreign land, that it is a serious charge against the Senator?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think that that would vary with the circumstances, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. If you felt that he was, then it would not be a serious charge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should feel that it varies according to whether the name or the term is applied humorously or hostilely, et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think to accuse a man of being a Senator from a foreign country is humorous or could be humorous?

The CHAIRMAN. When it is made under oath?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in a serious investigation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I did not call him that under oath. I referred to the fact——

The CHAIRMAN. You did call him that under oath, because you are under oath all of the time here, Mr. Lattimore, and so anything you have said is under oath, and your counsel will so advise you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I referred to him in quotations, not as my characterization.

Senator FERGUSON. And I said on this record, I gave you a question, that that was the Communist line. Now, I will ask you again: Did you ever see it in an editorial, "Senator from Formosa"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can remember.

Senator FERGUSON. To back up what I said about it being the Communist line, I want to show you that editorial and ask you whether you ever saw it? Don't read the slip on it; I turned it down.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I haven't read the slip, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I know you didn't, because I asked you not to, but read the editorial, and I will ask you if you ever saw it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to ask that when I am shown written material——

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I be allowed to see the whole thing.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to read the editorial.

The CHAIRMAN. That calls for a categorical answer, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This I never saw.

Senator FERGUSON. Now look at the slip.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "San Francisco, Calif.—Peoples World."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that that is a Communist sheet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that was stated at the Tydings hearings a couple of years ago, and I don't know the paper myself.

Senator FERGUSON. You learned, then, in the Tydings committee that that was a Communist sheet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I heard that it was stated that it was a Communist sheet.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, they end the editorial by saying, referring to the Senator from California, "the Senator from Formosa"; and in another place they use it as "Senator from Formosa"; and the title is "Senator from Formosa." And they say: "Knowland has been the Senator from Formosa rather than from California anyway."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have already said that I do not read the Communist press.

Senator FERGUSON. I will introduce that into the record to prove that it is the Communist line of referring to a distinguished Senator from this body as the Senator from a foreign land, Formosa.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The editorial referred to was marked "Exhibit 467," and is read in full below by Senator Ferguson:)

SENATOR FROM FORMOSA

Democratic leaders at their recent State executive committee meeting vied for the dubious honor of controlling a pro-Truman delegation to their party's national convention.

But they did not pay the slightest attention to selecting a candidate to run for United States Senate and to preparing a major campaign to defeat Senator William F. Knowland, the GOP incumbent.

It is an open secret that the Democratic leadership has given no real opposition Governor Warren for years. It is also a fact that most of the party's bosses did not try too hard to beat Senator Richard Nixon in 1950.

Now they seem to be preparing only a token campaign against Knowland. And there could be no clearer measure of the bankruptcy of the Democratic Party leadership in California than its complacency in permitting a State with a great progressive tradition to be represented by two of the worst and most reactionary men in the Senate.

Knowland has been the Senator from Formosa rather than from California anyway. His primary concern seems to have been representing Chiang Kai-shek in the Senate. He has been a major advocate of an all-out United States war against China, and has been prepared to expend millions of American lives to restore the corrupt Chiang regime to power.

Knowland has flagrantly misrepresented the people of California. He has been for every reactionary and repressive measure such as the Taft-Hartley and McCarran Acts. And he has been against price control and rent control and even the most modest social-security measures.

And he can be defeated. He can be swept out of office in a wave of revulsion against his war policies and his flagrant advocacy of vested interests in the Senate.

But one thing is sure. That job can't be left to the Democratic Party and to the committee it has picked to survey candidates. It is a job for labor, for the Negro people, for the masses of people who want Knowland defeated. We believe that CIO, AFL, and independent unions should take the lead in joining forces behind a strong progressive candidate who will not be a dummy for Knowland, who will really go out to win, who will really represent the people, and will really realize the potential of mass opposition to the Senator from Formosa.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, may I answer?

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask a question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask that the record show at this point that I repeat that I do not read the Communist press?

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Lattimore, earlier, over a space of some 30 or 35 minutes, there was discussion of what was referred to at some times as a recommendation with regard to the United States getting out of Formosa.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to be sure the record is clear on that point. Is the point you were attempting to make that you merely, during that period in 1949, referred to what you found or felt to be the opinion in Washington, and that you were not yourself recommending to the State Department that the United States get out of Formosa?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not completely, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you clarify that, please? Did you recommend to the State Department that the United States get out of Formosa?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the time that this article was written, in July of 1949, I was reflecting State Department opinion. By the end of 1949 I had accepted that opinion as the established policy.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That calls for a categorical answer, and I want the answer "yes" or "no," and then you may explain afterward.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I say "yes," with amplification?

The CHAIRMAN. You may explain your "yes" after you say it, or "no" after you say it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the end of 1949, in a memorandum that I wrote preparatory to a conference that was called by the Department of State in, I believe, November of 1949, as I recall, there was a paragraph saying that we should liquidate our position in Formosa as rapidly as possible, or words to that effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only occasion on which you recommended to the State Department that we get out of Formosa?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only one I recall, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you regard Formosa as an undesirable form of government, a monarchist form of government, which was not worthy of our support?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever say so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was not a monarchist form of government, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever say so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That it was a monarchist——

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever say so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am just asking for clarification of the question. Did I ever say that South Korea was a monarchist form of government?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about Korea, Senators.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I could have ever said that Korea was a monarchist form of government.

Mr. SOURWINE. And just to make the record clear, it is Korea we are talking about when I asked you if you recommended that the State Department get out of it; was that your understanding?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you say that you did so recommend in something that you wrote in November of 1949?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I wrote it in November of 1949, that was the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have here today on several occasions used language which sounded as though you intended to convey the impression that you had not made such a recommendation to the State Department. Did you at the time intend to convey that recommendation to the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time I intended to convey that impression only with regard to that particular newspaper article.

Mr. SOURWINE. You weren't expanding the answer beyond the specific question that was asked you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not intending to; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. And if you conveyed a broader impression, that was not your intention?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you sir, attend a conference at the State Department on far eastern policy in October of 1949?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your date, Mr. Sourwine. I thought it was November, but it may have been October.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take part in that conference orally?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in the course of that conference, say:

* * * I think we ought to give a little more attention to the problem of Korea. Korea appears to be of such minor importance that it tends to get overlooked by Korea may turn out to be a country that has more effect upon the situation than its apparent weight would indicate.

I don't know how it can be done but I should feel very much easier about the prospects of success of American policy in the Far East as a whole if we can proceed or arrange our new relationship with Japan, whatever it turns out to be, by disengaging ourselves as far as possible from southern Korea.

It has been widely stated, and I don't know if it is true, but it may be open to criticism—that Korea is not a decisive strategic position. Certainly on the political side Korea is likely to be an increasing embarrassment. Southern Korea unfortunately is an extremely unsavory police state. The chief power is concentrated in the hands of the people who were the collaborators of Japan and therefore Korea represents something which does not exist in Manchuria and North China; namely, if the Chinese are willing to trade with Japan it is because they no longer fear that trade with Japan means Japanese strategic control.

Southern Korea, under the present regime, could not resume closer economic relations with Japan without a complete reinfiltration of the old Japanese control and associations.

Korea is a danger to us in other respects. I think that throughout Asia the potential democracies—people who would like to be democratic if they could are more numerous and important than the actual democrats. The kind of regime that exists in southern Korea is a terrible discouragement to would-be democrats throughout Asia who would like to become democrats by association with the United States. Korea stands as a terrible warning of what can happen.

Did you say that, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I said that; and may I ask if that is the full text of what I said on the subject of Korea?

(A printed document was handed to the witness.)

Mr. SOURWINE. If there is any additional portion that you would like to have inserted in the record, preceding that or following that, I will ask that the chairman insert it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am merely asking, because I can't recall offhand whether I reverted to the subject of Korea later in the discussion.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is in our record in full, sir, and if you will notice, I was reading from page 1677 of volume 5 of our hearings, which is the official State Department transcript of these conferences. The whole thing is in the record, and the record will show, as you will find if you examine it, that you adverted to the subject of Korea.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, and I just wanted to make sure whether that was the only occasion on which I adverted to it. My wife has here, I think, a separate transcript of everything that I said at the conference, and it would be easier to check in that; and may I ask permission to check that?

Mr. SOURWINE. If there is anything that the witness cares to offer later on in connection with that, the Chair can rule on it at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. We will go on now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as this particular reference goes, Mr. Sourwine, that is certainly what I said, and I stand by it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, I just would like to clarify one minor point in the record. At the bottom of page 20, you made a reference to Mr. John Stewart Service, Mr. O. Edmund Clubb, and Mr. John Carter Vincent, and you compared them with Mr. George Kennan; and I want to ask you if you really mean that any of those three men could adequately fill the same relative position with respect to the Far East that Mr. Kennan fills with respect to Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I recall the original wording, "would have been capable of holding"? I will amplify that to say "capable of developing into that kind of man." With that amplification; yes, I believe that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You refuse to accept it the way I stated it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Would you repeat the way you stated it?

Mr. SOURWINE. I will try.

The CHAIRMAN. The reporter will read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wonder if there was something in the way that I stated it that you rejected.

(The question referred to was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept that. I would prefer to state things in my own words.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire there, Mr. Chairman?

After the Loyalty Review Board of the President has found reasonable doubt as to Mr. Service, and you read the opinion, do you still say that that is a correct statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I still say that that is a correct statement, Senator, and I return to my characterization yesterday of the wording of that "reasonable doubt" ruling as an undesirable one for the handling of Government personnel.

Senator FERGUSON. For that reason, you place no credence in the Board's finding, is that correct, because you do not believe in the principle upon which it is based?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I say "No," and then qualify it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't. I think that it is extremely detrimental to the morale of Government personnel when a man is subjected to repeated jeopardy, and after many specific clearances is finally got rid of under a new and vague wording.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever accepted the conviction of Alger Hiss as being a proper conviction?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have. I also accept his attempt to get a fresh trial as a proper procedure under American law.

Senator FERGUSON. And have you ever expressed any objection to the Smith Act, the one under which the 11 Communists were convicted?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry—first, no, I have not expressed any objection to it. I should add that I have never read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Lattimore, going to page 23 of your statement, you will recall that you had discussed three interpretations of what you said were the "records of the State Department victims of the China lobby," and then you talked of the central problem of the subcommittee; and then you said:

> Let us take a look, an honest look, at this preposterous theory of a secret spider web with me at the center of it.

Now, before I ask this question, I want to lay a foundation by asking you, do you know what I mean when I refer to the "referent" for a pronoun?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry; no.

Mr. Sourwine. If you use the pronoun "he," and then I say, "What is the referent for that pronoun," I mean who were you referring to when you said "he."

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, may we use it in that sense in connection with the question I am about to ask?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Right in the next sentence you wrote, and had mimeographed:

> First and foremost, my acquaintance with those State Department officials can best be described as sporadic.

Who did you mean by "those"? What is the referrent for "those"?

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, I corrected this text.

Mr. Sourwine. I understand that, but you had "those" originally, and that is what you had mimeographed; and I want to know what you mean by "those"?

Mr. Lattimore. I meant originally my acquaintance with State Department officials.

Mr. Sourwine. What State Department officials?

Mr. Lattimore. With State Department officials.

Mr. Sourwine. You said "those," and now I want the referent for "those."

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I meant, when I wrote it, to refer to my acquaintances with State Department officials.

Mr. Sourwine. What State Department officials?

Mr. Lattimore. Then I read "those"——

The Chairman. Now, that calls for the names of the officials, that is the question: What State Department officials?

Mr. Latimore. I meant State Department officials in general with whom I was acquainted.

Mr. Sourwine. That is obviously untrue, Mr. Lattimore, because the context of your own statement shows that you differentiate between these men and other State Department people. Now, I want to find the referent in your own statement with regard to "those." Do you go back or were you referring to men who were in the so-called secret spider web, or do you go further back to the paragraph above it and find "men who have had much to do with determining our far eastern policy," or do you go still further back to find the referent for "those"? Obviously it must appear before the use of the pronoun.

Mr. Lattimore. My intention was to refer to State Department in general, as people in general; on page 22, for example, "the State Department victims of the China lobby."

Then after I had written it, I saw that the word "those" would easily be interpreted as meaning a reference only to three men, and I therefore, in order to carry out my intention, struck the word "those."

Mr. Sourwine. How did you mean it, sir, when you originally wrote it? Did you intend it as a reference to a particular group of men?

Mr. Lattimore. I intended it as a reference to the whole far eastern group.

Mr. Sourwine. What do you mean by the "far-eastern group"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I mean those in the Department of State primarily trained as far-eastern experts, especially China experts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you telling this committee that you did not have a particular group of men in mind when you said "those"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the particular group that I had in mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean all of the State Department people who were trained in the far-eastern affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the general group I meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. But in the next sentence, sir, you wrote: "I met all of them first in China", didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is why I changed it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have changed it, but isn't that what you originally wrote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I realized that some of the China group that I had met, China group of the State Department that I had met, I had not met first in China, and therefore I changed the wording to make it inclusive.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, didn't you, when you first wrote this, have in mind a particular group of State Department officials, and wasn't that a group of State Department officials all of whom you had first met in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, let us go down a little farther——

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I amplify that?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that you have gone into that before the question was propounded to you, and I think that that is far enough. I hope, Mr. Lattimore, that you might obey the decorum of this committee, and when you are cut off by the chairman of the committee, that is the end of your statement, and your statement is on file in this committee, and you are under oath.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, pursuing Mr. Sourwine's question just a bit, I would like to call attention to the fact that in the same paragraph there is further evidence by language which seems to me to substantiate the contention made by Mr. Sourwine, and I call your attention to the statement:

> Foreigners living in the small foreign communities of China saw each other frequently—

Now, that is not the whole State Department. It is those in China.

> * * * and my wife and I were on friendly terms with them there. But it is also important that you recognize the limitations of our acquaintanceship with them and other Foreign Service personnel.

Evidently he is referring to some particular group in China, and then he adds, "and other Foreign Service personnel." Then—

"When they were transferred"—that is "they," and not the whole Foreign Service—"were transferred to other posts we lost touch with each other * * *."

Now, who does he mean?

"* * * when we again found ourselves in the same city"—which apparently he did—"we were glad to see each other, but we seldom corresponded with them, or they with us."

I submit the comment that it certainly bears out the contention of Mr. Sourwine. Those were not changed in the paragraph, and I read them just as they are in there now.

Mr. SOURWINE. When we get down to that question, may I inquire whether you made those changes on the advice of counsel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in the next paragraph, sir, you say:

"As for my acquaintance with these men * * *"

Were you referring to certain men?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was referring to the general group of those working on China particularly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't mean the same men that you referred to in the paragraph above when you wrote "those"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I meant in the paragraph above, when I wrote "those," the same that I meant in the paragraph below: The general group of people working in China, some of whom I met first in China, and some of whom I met first elsewhere, although they were China service people.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that the referent for those various pronouns is not the phrase in the second paragraph above, that is, the first paragraph from the top of page 23, "the men who have had much to do with determining our far-eastern policy"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would certainly include them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, let us go back to the paragraph at the bottom of page 22: "* * * a web of men who were attempting to serve a Communist cause * * *" Is that a referent for the "those" and "these" and the "them"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would include them, and others.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Let the witness continue the reading.

The CHAIRMAN. He may continue the reading.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Aside from these social contacts, my Government experience has been limited and my contacts with anything that could be called policy making (or attempts to influence policy) extremely rare. The record was fully brought out in the hearings before the Tydings subcommittee, and is as follows:

1. In 1941 and 1942 I was personal political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. This was on the nomination of President Roosevelt; but I was in the personal service of Chiang Kai-shek; not of the Chinese Government; not of Mr. Roosevelt; not of the American Government.

I was, in effect, charged with liaison functions between Chiang Kai-shek and the White House. My first appointment, in July 1941, was for 6 months. I was then reappointed, to serve indefinitely. When I resigned at the end of 1942 to enter a war job in this country, Chiang graciously asked me to consider myself on "reverse lend-lease," and to return to his service at any time.

In February 1942, I returned to this country for several months during which Chiang asked me to familiarize myself with the handling in Washington of American aid to China. During this time my liaison with the White House, on Roosevelt's instructions, was through Mr. Lauchlin Currie, an assistant to the President. I lived in Baltimore but came over to Washington several days a week and Mr. Currie offered me the use of an office adjacent to his.

The big problem at this time was to get supplies to China for use in the war against Japan, and on Chiang's instructions I was in communication both with Mr. Currie, who was handling this matter for

the President, and with officials of the various Chinese missions in Washington.

It was apparently these circumstances that formed the basis for the charge—as if there was some sinister significance in it—that I had "a desk in the State Department," from which the inference has been made that I influenced the State Department. Currie's office, and other White House executive offices, were in the building which also housed the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget. I confess I did not think of this when the charge was originally made. The fact of the matter is that the State Department were quite resentful of Roosevelt's use of his executive assistants, like Currie, to provide personal channels through which Chiang communicated with Roosevelt, and this resentment extended to me. Consequently, I doubt if I would have been very welcome in the State Department during this period.

2. In 1943 I was Deputy Director of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information in charge of Pacific operations. As the title implies, I was responsible for operations, not policy. In 1944 I came to Washington, still with the same title, and during that year I went out to Australia, to set up OWI operations under General MacArthur. You will recall that General Thorpe, MacArthur's chief of Counterintelligence, testified before the Tydings committee (transcript, p. 1215) that he thoroughly investigated me in connection with this mission, and found nothing subversive in my record. In fact, he was kind enough to say, "Were I called on to commit my personal safety and that of my command on information supplied by Dr. Lattimore, I would do so with confidence that he would always act as a loyal American citizen." I submit as an exhibit the statement made to the Tydings committee by General Thorpe in 1950.

May I submit that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. This offer will be withheld until the Chair can go over it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the same year, 1944, as a representative of OWI, I accompanied Vice President Wallace on his mission in Siberia and China. In the fall of that year, I returned to my university work, coming to Washington only 1 or 2 days a week, as a consultant to OWI.

I have been accused by Budenz of exerting a Communist influence on the Vice President of the United States when I accompanied him on his mission to Siberia and China. This barefaced accusation has been so effectively disproved by the testimony of Mr. Wallace and of Mr. Alsop that it is unnecessary for me to repeat their evidence here. Mr. Wallace in his recent letter to the President also confirmed the fact that I did not act—or, indeed, attempt to act—as his political adviser on the mission in question.

3. In the winter of 1945–46 I spent between 3 and 4 months in Japan with the Pauley mission, which was making a survey of American reparations policy in Japan. Using my connection with this mission as a springboard, a whole new series of accusations have been parroted here concerning ideas I am supposed to have advocated concerning Japan.

Mr. Dooman, Mr. McGovern, and the always obliging Budenz have stated, and your questions to other witnesses have inferred, that I recommended a policy of deindustrializing Japan—a policy which they in chorus labeled as Communist. Mr. Dooman, Mr. McGovern, Mr.

Colegrove, and your counsel, Mr. Morris, have also, in chorus, distorted some ideas which I expressed before the end of the war concerning the Japanese Emperor.

It is a most interesting coincidence, if one could call it that, that whereas McCarthy's charges of my subversive influence on Government policy, based on Alfred Kohlberg and dutifully echoed by Louis Budenz, were concerned almost solely with our China policy, this new note was suddenly sounded by no less than four of your witnesses—that my policy recommendations on Japan were also sinister. Even the phrases used by the four men were similar. Mr. Dooman claimed that the Pauley report, which I had written, "provided for turning Japan into a pasture." Mr. McGovern testified that it was my policy to have "a bloody peace in Japan"; "to completely reduce Japan to vagary and impotence"; "to reduce Japan back to an agricultural country and destroy all Japanese industry." To have Budenz join this chorus is most surprising of all because in 1950 he testified about me for a whole day and never even mentioned my ideas about Japan. But before this committee he obligingly came through and stated that I had aided the "Communist conspiracy" for a "hard peace in Japan."

All of these statements are false. Now I do not want to appear to subscribe to the charge that anybody who advocated such a policy is a Communist. But the fact is that neither the Pauley mission nor I personally ever advocated the deindustrialization of Japan. When I was in Japan with the Pauley mission at the end of 1945 I did play a major part in drafting a reparations report, in close conference with Mr. Pauley and based on the assessments of the technical members of the mission, working with data supplied by General MacArthur's headquarters. This report was anything but a punitive document and could not possibly be described as aiming at a "bloody peace." It supports none of these ridiculous yarns. Its principal recommendations were to use the surplus war industry of Japan as reparations to aid the industrialization of countries in Asia that had been plundered by Japan; to prevent Japan from controlling the economic life of Asia; and to leave Japan enough industry to provide for trade and the purchase of necessary imports.

Even before the end of the war, when hatred of Japan was at its height, I wrote in Solution in Asia, 1945, page 184:

> We must avoid confusing industrial demilitarization with disindustrialization. In a Japan deprived of all industry, people would starve by the million * * * we do not hate them to the point of starving several millions of them. Japan must be left with some industry.

Neither Solution in Asia nor the Pauley report is a classified document. They clearly show that whoever steered Mr. Dooman, Mr. Colegrove, Mr. McGovern, and Mr. Budenz to brand these recommendations as Communist was far, far off the beam and completely lacking in scruple.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore has referred to this Solution in Asia, and I recall testimony in this record—and I do not know whether the witness has seen it—of an FBI agent here before this committee, and I wonder whether we could have that so that it would appear here? Do you have that?

Mr. Morris. Yes; I have it.

The Chairman. Very well, you may proceed, Mr. Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. I would like to refer to this testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. We have it, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it go in the record at this point. Have the clerk read it, and identify the witness.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the testimony of Harvey M. Matusow, in executive session, before this committee on February 13, 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was he or what was he?

Mr. MANDEL. He gives his career as follows in the testimony:

I joined the Communist Party in October of 1947. A year preceding that I joined the AYD, American Youth for Democracy, Communist Party youth.

Mr. MORRIS. He joined the Communist Party on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; isn't that right, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I am reading in sequence, and I haven't come to that yet:

In 1948 I worked in full-time employment of the Jefferson School, in the Jefferson School book shop.

Further:

In March of 1949, I became a full-time employee of the Communist Party of New York City, worked at the county headquarters——

Mr. FORTAS. Is he reading the transcript?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FORTAS. He seems to be skipping about.

Mr. MORRIS. Was not Mr. Matusow at that time an employee of the FBI?

Mr. MANDEL. On page 6 of this testimony it says:

In the summer of 1950, I went to New Mexico, to Taos, N. Mex., and at that time I had contacted the FBI, and was furnishing information to them and still in the party, and furnishing information to them in relation to party activities near Los Alamos, at Taos, N. Mex.

Senator FERGUSON. At one time he was in the employ of the FBI, as an agent?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What does he say about the Solution in Asia, as far as the Communists are concerned?

Mr. MANDEL. It says:

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Matusow, we are primarily interested in the Institute of Pacific Relations and matters pertaining to the Far East in connection with the Communist Party.

In the course of your activities, did you ever handle any literature of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes. In 1948, when I worked at the Jefferson School book shop, and during the periods of 1949 when I worked at the book shop on Sunday nights to supply literature to the various lecturers they had on their lecture program I handled certain material put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. Was this pamphlet one of those pieces of literature that you handled?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. Our Job in the Pacific, by Henry A. Wallace.

Mr. MANDEL. Who published that pamphlet?

Mr. MATUSOW. The Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council.

Mr. MANDEL. How did you handle that pamphlet?

Then there is further discussion dealing with the pamphlet.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you get down to the other one?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Did the book shop ever promote any of the publications of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it did.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. MATUSOW. The books Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, published by Little Brown & Co.——

Mr. MANDEL. What year?

Mr. MATUSOW. 1945—it was one of the books used in the book shop and suggested reading for a background on the party line, the Communist Party line, in Asia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the Chair may wish to order this entire record placed in the record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. I move it be placed in the record, but I wanted to have Mr. Lattimore know what was being said in this record about his book.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your motion that this entire record be included?

Senator FERGUSON. This witness' testimony be included in this record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be the order.

(The testimony referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 469," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 469

INTERNAL SECURITY

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, February 13, 1952.

EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL

This subcommittee met at 11:15 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research.

Senator WATKINS. The subcommittee will come to order. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF HARVEY M. MATUSOW, 1308 GRAND AVENUE, DAYTON 6, OHIO (RESUMED)

Mr. MANDEL. Will you give your name and address?

Mr. MATUSOW. Harvey M. Matusow, 1308 Grand Avenue, Dayton 6, Ohio.

Mr. MANDEL. You have been previously sworn?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you give very briefly your career in the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. I joined the Communist Party in October of 1947. A year preceding that I joined the AYD, American Youth for Democracy, Communist Party youth organization.

In 1948, I worked in full time employment of the Jefferson School in the Jefferson Book Shop.

Mr. MANDEL. That is the Jefferson School of Social Science?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, at 575 6th Avenue, in New York City.

In September of 1948 I became a full time employee of People's Sings, Inc., a cultural organization of the Communist Party at the time.

Mr. MANDEL. Where were they located?

Mr. MATUSOW. 126 West 21st Street.

Mr. MANDEL. Why do you say it was a cultural organization of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Every organizer and full time employee of that organization were members of the Communist Party——

Mr. MANDEL. To your knowledge?

Mr. MATUSOW. To my knowledge. I attended meetings with them as Communists.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you proceed with your other experiences in the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. While at People's Songs, I worked on a national scale with the Progressive Party in their 1948 election campaign.

During this time I was also an organizer in the Communist youth movement in New York County.

In March of 1949 I became a full time employee of the Communist Party of New York City, worked at the county headquarters.

Mr. MANDEL. Where were the county headquarters?

Mr. MATUSOW. 35 East 12th Street.

Mr. MANDEL. Who was your superior?

Mr. MATUSOW. George Blake Charney.

Mr. MANDEL. Does that complete your experience in the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, it does not. In May of 1949, under Communist instructions, I went to Puerto Rico, spent three weeks in Puerto Rico.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you go to Puerto Rico under the auspices of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Mr. MANDEL. You were paid by the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Mr. MANDEL. And you did not go under some other committee or other auspices?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, the Communist Party of New York County and New York State, both.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you describe briefly your trip to Porto Rico, what you did there, and who accompanied you?

Mr. MATUSOW. Ted Bassett, who was then New York County Educational Director for the Communist Party, accompanied me to Porto Rico.

When we got to Puerto Rico, we met in closed party meetings with Caesar Andreau, who was then General Secretary of the Porto Rican Communist Party; Juan Santo Rivers, who was Chairman of the Porto Rican Communisty Party. We also met with Juan Sias Corales, Trade Union Secretary for the Communist Party of Porto Rico and General Secretary of the Communist union there, either the CGT or UGT. A check will bear out which one it is.

His wife, Consuelo Sias Corales was Educational Director of the Communist Party at Puerto Rico; also Jane Speed Andreau, the wife of Caesar Andreau. She had been a Communist Party organizer in Alabama and had attended Communist leadership schools in New York.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you go on with your activities?

Mr. MATUSOW. We were instructed to set up a Communist Party newspaper in Porto Rico or furnish the funds for the setting up of this newspaper.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you take funds with you?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; but we brought information down as to where the funds could be gotten or how they could be gotten.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you know the details of that?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes. Well, basically the funds would be gotten when the paper was ready for publication and the funds were needed, a Communist organizer would go from New York to Porto Rico with a bank draft or the cash necessary.

Mr. MANDEL. That was the arrangement you told the Porto Rican Communist leaders?

Mr. MATUSOW. Correct. Now, we also had the question of getting a Porto Rican delegate to the World Youth Festival to be held in Budapest, Hungary, in 1949.

Eugene Cubues, the Communist youth leader of Porto Rico, was selected.

I was instructed to tell him that he was to apply for a passport to go to France, Italy, and England. I was instructed to tell him to apply for the passport to go to eastern European countries as a tourist. But before I left, I received all of the necessary information, photographs and life history, to obtain a visa for him to go to Hungary.

I turned that information over to the Communist Party office in New York.

Mr. MANDEL. Whom did you turn it over to?

Mr. MATUSOW. To actually the American Youth for a Free World, at 144 Bleecker Street.

Mr. MANDEL. To what individual did you turn it over?

Mr. MATUSOW. To Lou Diskin, who at that time was Communist Party organizer for New York State, the youth movement in New York State, and with instructions for Cubues to pick up his visa for Hungary in Paris, when he got there.

In the summer of 1949 I was a full time employee of Camp Unity. I managed the Communist Party book shop at that camp, Camp Unity, Wingdale, New York.

In the fall of 1949, that is, from September to December, I was a full time employee of the Workers Book Shop at 48 East 13th Street in New York. I then carried out party assignments and was working in the Communist Labor Youth League as, at that time, State Literature Director of the Labor Youth League.

In the summer of 1950 I went to New Mexico, to Taos, New Mexico, and at that time I had contacted the F. B. I. and was furnishing information to them, and still in the party, furnishing information to them in relation to party activities near Los Alamos, at Taos, New Mexico.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Matusow, we are primarily interested in the Institute of Pacific Relations and matters pertaining to the Far East in connection with the Communist Party.

In the course of your activities, did you ever handle any literature of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes. In 1948, when I worked at the Jefferson School book shop, and during the periods of 1949 when I worked at the book shop on Sunday nights to supply literature to the various lecturers they had on their lecture programs, I handled certain material put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. Was this pamphlet one of those pieces of literature that you handled?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, Our Job in the Pacific by Henry A. Wallace.

Mr. MANDEL. Who published that pamphlet?

Mr. MATUSOW. The Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council.

Mr. MANDEL. How did you handle that pamphlet?

Mr. MATUSOW. That was displayed at the book shop, and when people who were attending the Jefferson School, or party members whom I knew to be such, inquired about material, background material, on Asia, and mainly relating to the Communist revolution in Asia taking place in China, the Communists versus the Nationalists, I was instructed to suggest certain readings. This Our Job in the Pacific was one of those suggested readings.

Mr. MANDEL. Who suggested it to you?

Mr. MATUSOW. The manager of the book shop, Sid Ballinger. Before that, it was Ruth Nesi, the wife of Jim Nesi, who works for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you state as far as you remember what your instructions were in connection with this pamphlet?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, this pamphlet was one of the many books used—I will say that, that this was, as I say, part of the background material that you would give a Communist or somebody interested in the subject of the Communist Party viewpoint on the Pacific or the China question, the Asiatic question.

Mr. MANDEL. Did the book shop ever promote any of the publications of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, it did.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. MATUSOW. The book Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, published by Little Brown & Co.——

Mr. MANDEL. What year?

Mr. MATUSOW. 1945—it was one of the books used in the book shop and suggested reading for a background on the party line, the Communist Party line, in Asia.

Mr. MANDEL. What do you mean by suggested reading?

Mr. MATUSOW. You see, that was the Jefferson School book shop, and there were many courses conducted.

During this period, as I said, the war in China, the Communist revolution in China, was taking place, and many people professed a great interest in that and the party, the Communist Party line, as disseminated, had not caught up with the tide of events, we might say. The party had been caught for a while flat-footed in the terms of the actual literature put out by the Communist Party, international publishers.

Things were moving too fast for them. The State Education Committee got together and decided which books would be good background material, and which supported the Communist Party line.

They came out with a decision that Solution in Asia was one of those books which could give a Communist Party member a correct line, a Communist line, on the Asiatic situation in China and China specifically.

Mr. MANDEL. Did the book shop also promote the works of Israel Epstein?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes. One book in specific was The Unfinished Revolution in China. Besides promoting the books of Israel Epstein, he was a lecturer at the Jefferson School on the question of China.

Mr. MANDEL. Did it promote the works of Lawrence K. Rossinger?

Mr. MATUSOW. I don't recall the name. May I go back on one point of Israel Epstein? When I worked at the Jefferson School, I was informed by David Goldway, who was then the Executive Secretary or Director of the Jefferson School, or held a leading position at the school, that nobody works at the Jefferson School and there are no lecturers on our programs who are not Communist Party members.

Mr. Goldway is also a member of the New York State Educational Committee of the Communist Party.

Mr. MANDEL. How do you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. I attended the meetings, staff meetings, of the Jefferson School.

As I say, I was a full-time employee, and when I was on the New York State Educational Committee of the Labor Youth League, I was on the Educational Committee of the Labor Youth League, and we worked closely with the Communist Party Education Committee in New York State, and I was told that Mr. Dave Goldway was a member of that Committee and had seen him at Communist Party headquarters when he was there to attend meetings of this New York Educational Committee.

Mr. MANDEL. What if anything do you know about the work of Frederick V. Field?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was told there again, before my trip to Porto Rico, I should say, that I should prepare myself or I should get a good background of the Porto Rican question.

Mr. MANDEL. Who told you?

Mr. MATUSOW. The Communist Party organizer in New York City, George Blake Charney.

Before I went to Porto Rico they wanted to make sure I was well founded in the party line of Porto Rico. I asked where I might get the material needed for the study of the background on the part of the Porto Rico question, and I was informed that the Frederick Vanderbilt Field library on West 26th Street, the Frederick Vanderbilt Field library was the place to go to get the party line and the background material needed for Porto Rico.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you actually go to that library?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, I did.

Mr. MANDEL. How long were you there?

Mr. MATUSOW. I spent three or four afternoons and a few mornings there doing research on Porto Rico.

Mr. MANDEL. Did Frederick V. Field teach at the Jefferson School?

Mr. MATUSOW. To my knowledge he lectured there, he did lecture there. I mean, I know that, but I can't say what specific lecture it was.

Mr. MANDEL. In what way did the name of Evans F. Carlson come to your knowledge?

Mr. MATUSOW. When I was a member of the AYD, American Youth for Democracy, I picked up the official publication of the American Youth for Democracy, which at that time was the Communist Party Youth Organization in the United States, and on the back cover of this publication called Youth, a letter from Evans F. Carlson, a retired Brigadier General of the Marine Corps, was published, and it stated that he was proud and honored that his name had been chosen to name one of the AYD Clubs.

It seemed that one of the AYD Clubs had written him asking him for permission to use his name.

Mr. MANDEL. Is there any way you can get us a copy of that?

Mr. MATUSOW. I don't know what issue that would be.

Mr. MANDEL. What year would that be?

Mr. MATUSOW. It would be one of the 1946 or 1947 issues.

I was also informed by people in the party literature set-up when the book The Big Yankee came out, which was the biography of Evans F. Carlson, before I sold that book, I mean in my capacity as a literature agent for the Communist Party, that it was highly recommended reading on the question of the Communists in Asia, and that General Carlson was a very close friend of Mao Tse-

tung, the party chairman and the head of the Communist Chinese Government. I was also told that General Carlson had been to China and he had trained the remnants of the Eighth Rout Army, which was the Communist Army. That was before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MANDEL. In what way did the name of Corliss Lamont come to your attention?

Mr. MATUSOW. Corliss Lamont had a number of articles published in a magazine called Science and Society.

Mr. MANDEL. What is the magazine?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was a Marxist quarterly, I believe. It was put out by members of the Communist Party. It delved mostly into philosophical questions.

Mr. MANDEL. Was it considered a Communist publication by the Jefferson book shop?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. We also handle a book, and the title slips my mind right now, by Mr. Lamont, published by the Philosophical Library in 1949 or 1950, dealing with Marxist philosophy.

Mr. MANDEL. In other words, the work of Corliss Lamont was promoted, the books of Corliss Lamont were promoted, by the Jefferson book shop?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, and also the Workers book shop.

Mr. MANDEL. In what way has the name of Chu Tong come to your attention?

Mr. MATUSOW. He was editor of the China Daily News.

Mr. MANDEL. What was the official estimate of the China Daily News?

Mr. MATUSOW. When Mr. Chu Tong lectured at the Jefferson School of Social Science on the question of China, I was informed before his lecture that he was a membor of the Communist Party.

Mr. MANDEL. Who informed you?

Mr. MATUSOW. Dave Goldway, of the Jefferson School. I might add that the reason for this answer and the reason for my question was that I was to handle literature that was to be sold during his lecture.

Before anybody lectured, I inquired about how far with the party line "can I go in selling the literature?" I mean, "would there be any objections on the part of the lecturer?" I was informed that he was a party member and that I could go all out in distributing party literature at his lecture.

I was also told by the same person, and other people connected with the Daily Worker and the Communist Party State Office when I was employed there, that the China Daily News was the Chinese language version of the Daily Worker in that it disseminated the line so closely and did not deviate.

Mr. MANDEL. Did you remember who told you this?

Mr. MATUSOW. There again I go back to Mr. Dave Goldway. I go to Ben Bordofsky.

Mr. MANDEL. Who is he?

Mr. MATUSOW. He is head of Wholesale Book Corporation, the Communist Party literature distributing house in New York and nationally, and on occasions when I had occasion to visit the offices of the Daily Worker and speak to certain people there, such as Allen Max, and offhand I can't think of some of the other names, and also Mr. James Nesi, a teacher at the Jefferson School and a lecturer for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, he also told me that he took the China Daily News as a Communist party organ.

Mr. MANDEL. Would you remember what year Chu Tong lectured at the Jefferson School, approximately?

Mr. MATUSOW. 1949.

Mr. MANDEL. Have you anything more to say about Chu Tong or the China Daily News?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; I believe that completes that.

Well, yes; also one other person, if I might, a member of my club, the Tompkins Square Youth Club of the Communist Party, was a man named Lee York, or it could have been pronounced York Lee. I am not sure which was his first or last name.

He was born in China. At the time he was about 24 years old. He had joined the Chinese Communist Party at the age of eleven in China. During the second World War he joined the American Army and claims to have become an American citizen on the basis of that.

He also referred to the China Daily News as a Communist Party organ, distributed among the Chinese people in New York City.

Mr. MANDEL. In conversation with you?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. What, if anything, do you know about Agnes Smedley?

Mr. MATUSOW. We distributed and sold books written by Agnes Smedley at the Jefferson School book shop and the Workers shop.

Mr. MANDEL. What, if anything, do you know about Edgar Snow?

Mr. MATUSOW. His book, Red Star Over China, the party considered one of the most important books on the China question.

Mr. MANDEL. What, if anything, did you know about an organization known as A Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was informed by the Jefferson School, during the summer of 1948, through Dave Goldway, that a lecturer, namely, James Nesi, would appear at the summer camp for a period of one week to discuss China, and he would represent the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

I know Mr. Nesi personally and knew him to be a member of the Communist Party.

During that week when Mr. Nesi lectured, I was informed that the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy was a Pro-Communist group run by Communist party members. Their office was at 799 Broadway, in New York City.

At a later date in 1949 I had visited their office on more than one occasion—and don't remember the names right now, but knew the people that staffed the office to be members of the Communist Party.

Two of them in particular, who were secretaries or employees of that organization, had attended Communist Party youth meetings which I attended.

Mr. MANDEL. Was 799 Broadway the headquarters of other Communist organizations?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes. One in particular where I worked, the Labor Youth League and the Labor Research Association was also at the offices of 799 Broadway.

Mr. MANDEL. What if anything do you know about the Magazine Guild and its parent organization, the United Office and Professional Workers?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was a member of that organization and while——

Mr. MANDEL. Just let me interrupt you, if you please. Of which organization?

Mr. MATUSOW. The United Office and Professional Workers Union.

Mr. MANDEL. You were not a member of the Book and Magazine Guild? That which was affiliated with the United Office and Professional Workers?

Mr. MATUSOW. I worked very closely with the organizers of that Book and Magazine Guild.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you tell us what you know of either the Book and Magazine Guild or the United Office and Professional Workers?

Mr. MATUSOW. My contacts with the United Office and Professional Workers Union, of which the Book and Magazine Guild was part of, as a Communist Party member and a member in good standing of the United Office and Professional Workers Union, was informed by the organizers of the United Office and Professional Workers Union, such as Winifred Norman, Norma Aaronson, Jack Greenspan, Aaron Kramer, Ethel Beach, and also by Communist Party organizers such as Norman Ross, that the United Office and Professional Workers Union was staffed, and full-time employees had to be, by members of the Communist Party. That included the Book and Magazine Guild.

Mr. MANDEL. Does the name of James S. Allen mean anything to you?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes. James S. Allen was considered one of the party theoreticians on the questions of minority groups.

I believe in 1937 he wrote a book called The Negro Question in the United States, which is being reprinted now by the Communist Party.

He has written a number of pamphlets—I don't recall the titles of those pamphlets—and articles in magazines such as Political Affairs, and which was distributed by the Communist Party.

Mr. MANDEL. Were his pamphlets promoted by the Jefferson book shop?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, and they were published by the Communist Party, International Publishers or New Century Publishers.

Mr. MANDEL. Was New Century Publishers an official Communist publishing organization?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Mr. MANDEL. What does the name of Abraham Chapman mean to you?

Mr. MATUSOW. The name is just familiar. I don't know him.

Mr. MANDEL. William Mandel?

Mr. MATUSOW. Mr. Mandel had lectured at Camp Unity in the summer of 1949 under the auspices of the Council for American-Soviet Friendship. And there again, at Camp Unity, I was informed by the State Literature Director of the Community Party, Ben Bordofsky, that all lecturers at camp this summer "will

be Communist Party members, and your literature distribution in relation to those lecturers will be accordingly."

Mr. MANDEL. Mildred Price?

Mr. MATUSOW. I don't know the name.

Mr. MANDEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Matusow, for your testimony today.

(Whereupon, at 11:53 a. m., Wednesday, February 13, 1952, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

Mr. FORTAS. May we see it?

Mr. MORRIS. It is the testimony of Mr. Matusow.

Mr. FORTAS. Could I read it at luncheon; this record?

Senator FERGUSON. That is all right.

Did you ever know that your book was being used by the Communists as a Communist line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't. I believe that record says that they used it for background reading.

Senator FERGUSON. Covering the Communist line, does it not say that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It says they used it as background reading.

Senator FERGUSON. You heard what was read.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I heard it, they said they were using it for background reading.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the Communists were using your Solution in Asia as background reading?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not it was in line with the Communist line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say not.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard anyone, outside of this witness, saying that it was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that parts of a Communist review of Solution in Asia were introduced into the record, but not the whole review.

Senator FERGUSON. This record makes this statement, and your counsel can check it at noon:

Things are moving too fast for them. The State Education Committee got together and decided which books would be good background material, and which supported the Communist Party line.

Now, did you ever know that your book was used by the Communist State Education Committee as supporting the party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. And then at another place they say:

They came out with a decision—

meaning the Communist Party—

that Solution in Asia was one of those books which could give a Communist Party member a correct line, a Communist line, on the Asiatic situation in China and China specifically.

The CHAIRMAN. Your question is: Did he know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not know that. Might I amplify that?

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have you amplify that you did not know it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would understand that anybody who was studying the Far East at that time might read various books for background information, and anybody could use a book like that to twist to their own purposes, whatever those purposes were.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, Mr. Lattimore, do you not think then that people may be justified in criticizing your book as following the Communist line when testimony before this committee from an employee, an FBI agent, has characterized it as having been adopted as carrying out the party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator. And may I say a few words in addition to that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I do think that such an interpretation would be entirely unbalanced unless it were also entered into the record that many people of other points of view also used and commented favorably on Solution in Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. But you would not criticize people now for following what this witness has said under oath; would you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would criticize anybody who took a single opinion on a book that was in the open market and was used, quoted, commented on by all kinds of people of the most diverse opinions.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account for the reason that the Communists may have taken this book as background for the problems in Asia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't.

The CHAIRMAN. I think at this time, Mr. Chairman, we have reached a point where we can recess for lunch.

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

On page 2 of this summary it is said, where he quoted:

> Things were moving too fast for them. The State education committee got together and decided which books would be good background material, and which supported the Communist Party line.

Now, I inquire as to whether or not there is anything in that record to indicate that this term, "the State education committee," refers to an official organization of the State, wherever it was, in New York, or is that the committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. MORRIS. The antecedent paragraph shows that, I think, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I just wanted to be sure what it is referring to.

Mr. MORRIS. It says: "* * * in the terms of the actual literature of the Communist Party," and "Things were moving too fast for them."

Senator SMITH. Is that referring to the State education committee of the Communist Party, or the State of New York, or what?

Mr. MORRIS. Of the Communist party.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have reached a point where we can recess now for the noon recess, and we will reconvene at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p. m. the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, so that there can be no confusion in the record as to the witness Harvey M. Matusow, I want to read in relation to his identification with the FBI from the record:

> In the summer of 1950, I went to New Mexico, to Taos, N. Mex., and at that time I had contacted the FBI and was furnishing information to them, and still in the party, furnishing information to them in relation to the party activities near Los Alamos, Taos, N. Mex.

Mr. FORTAS. May the record show that that is the only passage in the transcript that refers to this connection with the FBI?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FORTAS. And may the record also show that I agree that certain parts of the transcript will be deleted?

Senator FERGUSON. That has no reference to this case.

Mr. FORTAS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed to read, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I make a request, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. You may make a request.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife is sitting here with me with certain supporting material that I prepared for this statement. May she from time to time hand that material to me as I need it?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think that that should be done for the purpose of implementing your answers. You should make your answers, as far as you can, and then if you ask for information from anyone that is connected with it, it will be granted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a short series of questions at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, has Mrs. Lattimore, to your knowledge, been giving advice and assistance to any of the witnesses before this subcommittee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether to call it advice and assistance. She came over here to help Mr. Holland somewhat, before he appeared before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she been helping any other witnesses in any way, as far as you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she attended a number of our hearings, to your knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She has attended a number of hearings; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew that she had been taking notes of those hearings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what she did with those notes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She brought them home and showed them to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge, has Mrs. Lattimore had any contact with witnesses before this subcommittee, other than Mr. Holland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We have both of us seen Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. He is just asking about Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would rather have you ask her yourself, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking what you know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, my mind is extremely confused because of the very complicated work that I have been through preparing this statement and consulting with other people myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer the question yes or no?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't answer it yes or no.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the record shows that this witness feels that he is not competent to go along, as I understand this

answer here. He said he is so confused with the work he has been through preparing this that he might not be responsible for his answers.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not care to take that.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I rephrase the question?

Do you know, Mr. Lattimore, whether Mrs. Lattimore has consulted with any witnesses before this committee before they have testified here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I state, Mr. Sourwine, why my memory is confused?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. That is not the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot answer that clearly, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is do you know. You can answer it whether you know or not, and then explain.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she consulted with any of the witnesses who have appeared here, after they testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I amplify my previous answer, Mr. Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. You may explain it, not amplify it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will explain it by saying that these hearings have now been going on for some 8 months. During the course of that 8 months, both my wife and I have been very busy making notes, looking up references, all kinds of things, and for that reason it is not at all clear in my mind what persons my wife may have seen or consulted with before their hearings or after their hearings in the course of this long period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any instances in which Mrs. Lattimore has consulted with witnesses who appeared?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I recall at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you advised or assisted any witnesses before this committee, you yourself?

The CHAIRMAN. That is, before they testified, do you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Either before or after, in connection with their testimony here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have talked with Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter. That is all I can recall at the moment, because there may be others, if you would name some others. I would be glad to answer whether I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you consulted and advised with any witnesses before this committee after they had begun their testimony and before they had concluded it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever come over to Washington to have conferences with witnesses before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Mrs. Lattimore ever have conferences with witnesses before this committee on the day they testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the day they testified? My wife was over here and saw Mr. Holland, I think, on the morning that he testified here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your complete and full answer to this question I just asked you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is as full as I can make it at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that you and Mrs. Lattimore did not on any occasion come over to Washington and have a conference with any of the witnesses before this committee on the day they testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I couldn't say we didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you did?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure. If I were allowed to consult with my wife, I could probably get a clearer recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that on that point the witness be allowed to consult with his wife and then asked to answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. She doesn't remember any such occasions. She thinks it could only have been Mr. Carter and she doesn't remember consulting with him here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk with Mr. Clubb before or after he testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I talked with Mr. Clubb before he testified here, but I didn't know that he was to testify here.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you confer with him after he testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I talked with him subsequent to his testifying here, but I don't recall whether we discussed his testimony here or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you think about it, whether or not you did discuss with him his testimony before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I again consult my wife?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was she with you when you were talking to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think she would have been there; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if it does not interrupt the Senator—Mr. Lattimore, you seem to have the impression that if you had consulted and advised with any witness before this committee, it was Mr. Holland. Apparently after talking with Mrs. Lattimore, as you stated she thought if it was anyone it was Mr. Carter. Could it have been Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter together?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It might have been, but I don't think both of them together.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything about the occasion on which you might have consulted with Mr. Carter about his testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall precise dates. I can't recall the precise stage which the hearings had reached. I do remember talking with both of them, though.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, if you had, with Mrs. Lattimore, made a specific appointment and met with Mr. Carter to discuss his testimony before this committee, would you not remember it, or if you had done so with Mr. Holland would you not remember it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen and talked with so many people in the last 8 months, on the general subject of——

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that. Would you not have remembered it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not necessarily, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever have dinner with Mr. Carter and Mrs. Lattimore at the conclusion of a session of this com-

mittee at which Mr. Carter had testified, for the purpose of discussing with him the testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife says she saw him at the time of his hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you have dinner with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking about you, now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you had dinner on the night of September 20, 1951, which was the date on which Mr. Carter testified before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I couldn't tell you, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not have dinner at the Aldo Cafe, in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Aldo Cafe? I may have, I don't remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where that cafe is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I couldn't tell you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever eaten there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is possible that you could have eaten in the Aldo Cafe and not remember it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if there is anything unusual about the cafe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that it is a cafe that has a tremendous grape arbor so that wherever you sit at the tables the grapes are hanging about a foot and a half above your head?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember such an arbor; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember eating in that cafe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember eating there; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the occasion on which you were eating there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; Mr. Carter was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us who else was there?

The CHAIRMAN. You have grapes and Carter mixed up now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't remember anyone else there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say there was no one else there besides you and Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't say so; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mrs. Lattimore was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, do you not know she was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; she was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. From your own recollection, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not from my own recollection; I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is possible that Mr. Lawrence Rosinger was there with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Might be. No; neither of us remember his being there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your recollection? You said it might be, and you turned to Mrs. Lattimore, and she said "No" and you said "No." What is your recollection, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, my memory is not built of the structure of grape vines.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. You can answer. What is your recollection, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None; blank.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you would say that we would be unable from you to obtain the name of the fourth person, if there was a fourth person who was with you that night?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to Mr. Clubb, do you remember your conversation with Mr. Clubb?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Before he appeared here?

Senator FERGUSON. Either before or after.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I remember we dropped in without any previous planning or anything to call at the Clubbs' one day when we were over here, and we dropped in because I had called him at the Department and was told he was on leave, or something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. You saw in the paper, did you not, that he had been suspended?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you will let me go on with my story, Senator; after receiving this reply from the Department of State, I called his house and he said, "Yes, we are at home. Come on over."

So we went over there, and he told us that he had been suspended. We then saw it in the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, after he testified, did you have a conversation with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think almost certainly; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Before or after he testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Neither before nor after.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Service?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen Mr. Service occasionally in the past few months in connection with his appearance here before or after, I couldn't specify.

Senator FERGUSON. And Mr. Davies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not Mr. Davies.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, if I understood you correctly, you stated earlier that you had not come over to Washington for any conference with any witnesses before this committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have recalled one to your mind, have we not, that is, the occasion on which you had dinner with Mr. Carter and Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to ask you if you can recall any other occasions on which you had conferences with witnesses before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say there were no other occasions on which you had conferences with witnesses before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say there were not many such conferences?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. No more questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed, Mr. Lattimore, to read your statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The distortions by your witnesses of what I wrote in 1945 about the Japanese Emperor are even more amazing. Mr. Dooman charged that I had been opposed to using the Japanese Emperor as an instrument of American policy after the war, as if Americans who opposed keeping pet emperors were somehow un-American, and Senator Eastland argued that Communists wanted to overthrow the emperor because "communism and monarchy are incompatible" and "Lattimore understood this."

Mr. Colegrove, rising to the occasion, expressed the idea much more vividly, saying that I had urged that the Japanese Emperor "and his whole family should be exterminated."

But Mr. McGovern excelled even Mr. Colegrove in the enormity of his accusations. Under prodding and leading questions from Senator Eastland, McGovern elaborated his distortions of my opinions about the Japanese Emperor to the point of saying that I "wanted him murdered," and wanted his family, including "his wife and children," treated as "among the worst of the war criminals," and "turned over to the Chinese who would know how to deal with him."

This ludicrous "mishmash" is a deliberate garbling of the opinion that I clearly expressed in Solution in Asia, in 1945, that after the war (not as "the best way to overthrow Japan"), the Emperor and his family should be interned in China, under the supervision of the United Nations. This suggestion was obviously predicated on the assumption that there would be a strong, stable government in China, under Chiang Kai-shek, and that China would be one of the Big Five of the United Nations. It was also predicated on the assumption that if the Emperor was not made a martyr, but simply removed from circulation, the way would be cleared for a future republic in Japan which I thought would favor the growth of a democratic system (Solution in Asia, pp. 187–188).

It was a humane suggestion, made at a time when many people, inflamed by Japanese atrocities and high American casualties, were demanding mass exterminations, just as a few fanatics are demanding now that we get rid of our Russian worries, or our Chinese worries, by dropping atom bombs indiscriminately and wiping out women and children as well as troops. I have never believed in or advocated this kind of bloodthirstiness.

Others (and I accuse none of them of being Communists) wanted to be more drastic. For instance, Senator Brien McMahon was quoted in the New York Times of August 11, 1945, as saying, "If the Japs are allowed to keep their fantastic god-emperor system, we may get an armistice and not an end to the war." Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault was quoted in the New York Times of August 30, 1945, as declaring that our greatest potential danger was in leaving the Japanese Emperor in control, and saying "There will either be a popular revolution headed by the commercial class or the Mikado will rebuild the old structure and begin new conquests at a future date."

On September 18, 1945,, Senator Russell, of Georgia, supported by Senators Fulbright, McClellan, and Taylor, introduced a joint reso-

lution to have Emperor Hirohito tried as a war criminal (S. J. Res. 94, Congressional Record, vol. 91, p. 8680).

I have here, also, quotations from others who wanted to get rid of the Emperor—including Hanson Baldwin, Mayor LaGuardia, Otto Tolischus, Brig. Gen. Carlos Romulo, Admiral William F. Halsey, Senators Wallace H. White, Tom Stewart, William Langer, and Sun Fo of the Chinese Nationalist Government—which I would like to introduce into the record.

Senator SMITH. What purpose is that, Mr. Chairman? Here are some unsworn statements by somebody who is not even at the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received at the moment, subject to a decision by the committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I speak to your remark, Senator?

Senator SMITH. I am just making an observation. Neither one of those men are here to be subject to cross-examination. You have put in ex parte statements from them.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I make an observation pertinent to your observation?

Senator SMITH. That is up to the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot see anything to raise an issue about. The Chair will pass upon the insertion into the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Against this background it sounds rather fantastic to hear Mr. Colegrove make what was, for a political scientist, an extremely rash statement. He said that "exterminating" the Japanese Emperor "has always been the Soviet line." I must confess my own ignorance. I should like to see Professor Colegrove produce the evidence on this interesting point.

On the subject of Japan, I don't want to be misunderstood. If the price of gaining your approval is that I forget the stab in the back at Pearl Harbor, that I forget the barbarous depredations of Japan in China and other countries, and that I subscribe to emperor worship, then the price is one that you will not get from me. I cannot forget recent history, and I cannot forgive treachery, whether it is made in America or in Japan. I do hope, however, that Japan will turn her back on her recent history, that she will become a decent member of the family of nations, and that the Emperor will become a ruler on the model of the English constitutional monarchy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, in the light of your present knowledge, do you think the United States was wrong in not eliminating the Japanese Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. May I explain that by adding that what I recommended on the subject of the Japanese Emperor was written before the end of the war when it was expected that there would be a bloody last stand made on the Island of Japan itself before we secured a surrender, and that therefore the political aspects, following the conquest of Japan, would turn out to be quite different from what it actually was.

Actually, the Japanese surrendered before we had landed at all. The Emperor took part in the surrender, and on the whole, I should say, that General MacArthur's handling of the Emperor was conducted with great diplomatic skill and statesmanship.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. You say "I recommended." To whom did you make a recommendation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To anybody who might buy my book.

Senator WATKINS. Did that include the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It included anybody who might buy my book.

Senator WATKINS. Is that the only recommendation made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the subject of the Japanese Emperor, I believe that is absolutely the only recommendation I made.

Senator WATKINS. I noticed you said in the form that "I recommended" and that was the reason I was curious to know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I was merely referring to what I had written in Solution in Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask one question on that. You mentioned again the Solution in Asia. I will ask you whether or not you knew that your book, Solution in Asia, was advertised for sale by the International Book Store, 1400 Market Street, San Francisco 2, Calif.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know it.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you know that the International Book Store, San Francisco, was listed by the Un-American Activities Committee report 1947, page 100, "The Communist Party book center in the Bay area for the distribution of its literature"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't, Senator, and in fact I believe I had never heard of the International Book Store until this moment.

Senator FERGUSON. We talked about the Daily Peoples World this morning, did we not, and you had heard that that was a Communist newspaper?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I first heard of that at the time of the Tydings hearings, a few years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. On January 8, 1945, in the Peoples Daily World, this ad appeared under "San Francisco." I am putting that in in relation to the witness' testimony, the witness who testified about your book being used.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is the first time I have seen it.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that at an executive session I took some time ago there was some testimony on that same point. It seemed to me there was an FBI agent who made a statement on that.

The CHAIRMAN. That was covered this morning.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, is the Senator offering this for the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I am. But I want to call attention to the fact that it is listing William Z. Foster's book in the same ad.

Do you know William Z. Foster.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who wrote Sabotage?

Mr. LATTIMORE.. No, I don't know that book.

Senator FERGUSON. The Plot Against Peace. Do you know whether that was by Albert Kahn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I have heard of that book, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So your book was advertised with Mr. Foster, Mr. Albert Kahn, and the Solution in Asia. Do you think that might

confirm the man who testified this morning that it was being used as background of the Communist Party for their party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Senator, I have already stated that I don't see why the Communists——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that might confirm? That is the question. Do you care to answer that "Yes" or "No," and then elaborate, if you wish?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't answer that question yes or no, Senator. I don't know how the Communist Party operates in these matters.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever talked to any Communists in relation to that book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever arrange for any price reduction for that book, to Communists or Communist book stores?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not your publisher did?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether he did or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever consult you about reduction in price?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I was ever consulted on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, will you think about it. You say you didn't think so. Will you think a moment and see whether or not you do recall that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if this is offered for the record, it appears to be a photostat. I believe Mr. Mandel prepared this photostat or caused it to be prepared. May we ask Mr. Mandel, who has been sworn for the duration of these hearings, about this?

Mr. Mandel, is that a photostat which you caused to be prepared?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is it a photostat of?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat of the paper called the Daily People's World.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a photostat of a portion of a page of that paper, is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. June 8, 1945, page 5.

Mr. SOURWINE. Being the display ad of the International Book Store?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one more question about Mr. Foster.

Do you know who William Z. Foster was, that is, what his position was in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he was at one time one of the leading Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. At one time. Do you not think he is now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is he?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought he was replaced by Browder or somebody.

Senator FERGUSON. When did that happen? When did you hear that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know he was indicted as one of the leading Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't answer you on that. I know that people considered the leading Communists were indicted, but I couldn't tell you anything about it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know whether William Z. Foster was indicted?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Albert Kahn's position?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have heard of him in connection with that book that you have just referred to.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not he wrote pro-Communist literature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Other than that, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this to be admitted, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. That will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 471" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 471

[Daily People's World, June 8, 1945, p. 5]

SAN FRANCISCO

NEW BOOKS AT INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZED LABOR FACES THE NEW WORLD (by Wm. Z. Foster), 5 cents: Discusses the growing strength of organized labor, and the possibilities for advancement created by the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions.

THE PLOT AGAINST THE PEACE (by the authors of "Sabotage"): Deals with Nazi Germany's secret plans for a Third World War by splitting the United Nations.

SOLUTION IN ASIA (by Owen Lattimore): Mr. Lattimore deals with the political, economic, and military factors affecting developments in the Far East.

INTERNATIONAL BOOK STORE

1400 Market Street, San Francisco 2, Calif.

Free mailing to all parts of the United States

DAILY PEOPLE'S WORLD was cited as the "West Coast mouthpiece of the Communist Party * * * published by the Pacific Publishing Foundation, Inc., in San Francisco. * * * The San Francisco office is located at 590 Folsom Street and the Los Angeles office is at 206 South Spring Street." (California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1948, p. 342.) GUIDE TO SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS, May 14, 1951, House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 131.

INTERNATIONAL BOOKSTORE, SAN FRANCISCO

1. "The Communist Party book center in the bay area for the distribution of its literature." (California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report 1947, p. 100.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Chair desire the witness to go ahead with the reading of his statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead with the reading of your statement, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that the record would be more balanced——

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind about the balance of it. You may proceed with the reading of your statement. We can take care of the balance. Please go ahead with your reading. We will take care of the balance of the record. That is our obligation. Please go ahead with the reading of your manuscript or else desist from it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 4. In 1949, I was invited by the State Department with about 30 other people to take part in a discussion of far-eastern policy; and as part of the preparations for that discussion I contributed—also on invitation—a memorandum of my views. To the best of my recollection this is the only time, in more than 25 years, that the State Department has ever asked me for my views.

For the purpose of discrediting the far-eastern policy of the present administration, and presumably to keep himself in the newspapers as a perpetual presidential candidate, Mr. Harold Stassen has attempted to make me the scapegoat of this conference.

Mr. Stassen accused me of leading, at this conference, a "prevailing Lattimore group" which advocated a Communist line. He then described a "10-point program" which he claimed I had advocated. Mr. Stassen obviously did not expect the record of the conference would be made public.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask leave to interrupt the witness at that point, to clarify his statement in that regard?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you, Mr. Lattimore, intend by that sentence——

The CHAIRMAN. What sentence is that?

Mr. SOURWINE. "He then described a '10-point program' which he claimed I had advocated."

The CHAIRMAN. You will have to get more of the sentence in there.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the full sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. It refers back to who?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Stassen.

Do you intend by that sentence, Mr. Lattimore, to make the statement that Mr. Stassen claimed that you alone, as an individual, advocated a 10-point program?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That sentence, Mr. Chairman, should be taken in conjunction with the previous sentence in which there is the expression quoted from Mr. Stassen "prevailing Lattimore group."

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you answer the question directly, please? Did you intend by that sentence to make the charge that Mr. Stassen had stated that you, as an individual, had advocated a 10-point program?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He described me as one of the individuals who had advocated a 10-point program.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking about your intent, sir. Did you intend by the sentence that I read to charge that Mr. Stassen had stated that you, as an individual, personally, had advocated this 10-point program?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My intention was to quote from Mr. Stassen himself, that he said I was one of a group which advocated a 10-point program.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not quote from him that way, did you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did. He accused me of leading at this conference a prevailing Lattimore group. Later in my statement I come to the question of Mr. Stassen and me personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact you know, do you not, that Mr. Stassen said the group advocated these 10 points; that he explained what he meant by the group, and that he did not at any time say that you personally had avocated all the 10 points. Is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Stassen repeatedly made statements which would convey to the ordinary member of the public reading the newspapers that, as a member of the group, I must have made such statements personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you then charging, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Stassen did state that you had advocated this 10-point program?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am stating that Mr. Stassen conveyed that impression.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now may I get back to the original question, sir.

I wish we could have a yes or no on it. Did you, by the use of this sentence "He then described a '10-point program' which he claimed I had advocated" mean to say that Mr. Stassen was charging you as a person with advocating this particular 10-point program?

Mr. LATTIMORE. With advocating; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your intention?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And will you now——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Which he claimed I had advocated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you now tell the committee from what part in the record you are quoting when you say that Mr. Stassen declared that you were advocating that program, as an individual?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He stated "that the members of this group had not differed from each other."

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed with your reading.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, please, may I continue?

Do you not know, Mr. Lattimore, that after having identified the group that he was speaking of, after having said there were two leaders in this, one perhaps senior, Mr. Owen Lattimore, and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger, they were the leaders in the discussion of the prevailing group, Mr. Stassen was then asked if he would in a concrete way set forth some of recommendations that this group had made during the conference and he stated "The group that was led in the discussion by these two gentlemen recommended 10 points for American policy in China and in Asia."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I submit, Mr. Sourwine, that to the ordinary reader that would convey the impression that I had made some of the statements.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are discussing this, then, only in the light of what you consider to be a statement by Mr. Stassen that you as a member of this group have advocated the 10-point program that you speak of?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed with the reading, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Accordingly, he let his imagination run riot and attributed to me all the opinions expressed at this conference with which he disagreed, and some that he just imagined.

As soon as I learned of Mr. Stassen's statements I appealed to the State Department to release the full record of the conference. I publicly asked Mr. Stassen to join me in this request, which he did not do.

As soon as I could obtain a transcript of my remarks I released it to the press, and later the full transcript of the entire conference was released.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt?

Do you, Mr. Lattimore, take credit for the release of that conference record by the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, you referred yesterday somewhat disparagingly to my ego, but I think in this case I can claim a major part of the credit for getting that transcript released.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do no think there is any question about it.

As a matter of fact, do you know that this committee had asked that that transcript be made available to this committee long before you asked that it might be made public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that it was denied to this committee until after you asked that it be made public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know that; no. I may have heard it at one time, but I didn't know it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take no issue with the statement that you were largely responsible for the release of that transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed with your reading, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You have that in your files, and I ask you to check it against what I say here. This transcript clearly showed that I had not advocated any of the 10 points which Mr. Stassen had so irresponsibly labeled as a Lattimore program. His 10 points were as follows:

1. Deferment of the problem in Asia; priority for Europe. What I said was that the problems of Asia and Europe should be handled jointly.

2. No United States aid-to-Asia program until "after long study." I did not suggest "long study." I said that we could attract Asian countries away from Russia by showing that friendly association with the United States was a better and faster way of obtaining economic prosperity.

3. That the Russian Communists were not as aggressive as Hitler. On that point Mr. Stassen attributed to me a garbled version of something that was said by Mr. George Kennan, of the State Department.

4. Early recognition of Red China. I did not advocate this. I said that to recognize Red China in haste might create in Asia the impression that we had been panicked; but that to defer recognition too long, if the Chinese Communists proved that they were there to stay, might give the impression that we had been baffled. Incidentally, I do not believe that we should recognize Red China at this time.

5. The United States should encourage such countries as Britain and India to recognize Red China, and should then follow with its own recognition.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when you say that you do not recommend that we should recognize China at this time, do you know of anybody that would recommend that we recognize Red China when we are fighting a war with her?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. While we are fighting that war?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Has that anything to do with your recommendation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I put that in as a safeguard against being quoted out of context.

Senator FERGUSON. Quoted by who?

Mr. LATTIMORE. By this committee or the press or anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that this committee would quote you out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This committee has quoted me out of context.

Senator FERGUSON. On what occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can give you one occasion when Mr. John Carter Vincent had read to him, I believe, or had shown to him, a passage from Solution in Asia dealing with what I represented as the attitude of the Asian peoples on the frontier of China, and left out the words "in their eyes" in such a way as to misrepresent me as believing what I said other people thought.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find that in the transcript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is in the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you let us see it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, the question was, Did you find that in the transcript? It is perfectly obvious from the way you turned around to Mrs. Lattimore that you did not. Is that not true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was turning around to see if we had a copy of that part of the transcript with us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you find it in the transcript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I checked the transcript.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you call the attention of the committee to the fact that there was something in the way of an omission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think it could have been an omission, or do you want to now cite it as bad faith upon the part of the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That particular quotation has been used against me so often, and I have protested against it so often, that when I encounter it now I can hardly avoid the assumption that it is deliberate misquotation.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean that it has been quoted before with this omission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it has.

Senator FERGUSON. Who quoted it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask if we have a record of it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; we would like to have it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator McCarthy quoted it, and I can produce that quotation.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would, for the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And Miss Freda Utley quoted it, and I can produce that quotation.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about producing the quotation that you charged the committee made out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As soon as I can get hold of the copy of the transcript, Mr. Sourwine, I will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed with your reading for the time being.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 5. The United States should encourage such countries as Britain and India to recognize Red China, and should then follow with its own recognition. There is nothing like this in the transcript.

6. That it should be United States policy to turn Formosa over to the Chinese Communists. I did not mention Formosa.

7. That it should be our policy to permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong Kong. Although Mr. Stassen said this was one of the "hot arguments" of the conference, the only mention of Hong Kong in the entire conference was by Mr. Butterworth of the State Department, who had merely said, "The British have not sought any particular assistance through us for the defense of Hong Kong." Mr. Stassen himself also referred to Hong Kong, but there was no "argument."

8. That Premier Nehru had shown reactionary and arbitrary tendencies. I did not speak on the subject of India, nor mention Nehru, for whom I have always had the highest regard and whom I consider the outstanding representative of freedom in Asia.

9. That the United States should not approve the Nationalist blockade of the Chinese Communist coast, and should send economic aid to Communist areas. I did not say this.

10. That no aid should be sent to the non-Communist guerillas, nor to the Chiang Kai-shek forces. I said nothing of this sort.

In his second hearing, after the full record had been released, Mr. Stassen backtracked. He did not, of course, admit error. That would have been out of character for a Presidential candidate. He attempted to cover up by quoting some member of what he had labeled the "Lattimore group" (who, he said, had "not differed" from each other) in support of each of his 10 points. He quoted me in connection with only 1 of the 10, and that in a way to distort my meaning.

Confronted with the absurd discrepancies between the kind of conference that he had pretended to describe and the kind of conference that was revealed when the full transcript was finally published, Stassen tried to escape by doing acts on the flying trapeze, as if he were a road-show McCarthy swinging through the air with the greatest of ease from "205 names" to "57" names and all the rest of it. Instead of continuing to claim that I was the leader of the group because I advanced all or any of their 10 points, the only reason he could now give for calling me and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger its "leaders" was that we had done most of the talking; although even this was not the case.

Whatever agreement there was between Mr. Rosinger and me was purely accidental. I know Mr. Rosinger only very slightly and had had no discussion with him on any of these matters either before or during the conference. Our contributions to the discussion happened to be on different subjects, except on the matter of the recognition of Red China and, since we differed markedly on this, there was not even anything which could be termed agreement between us.

On the subject of the recognition of China, Mr. Rosinger advocated recognition as "early as possible," within "perhaps 3, 6, maybe 9 months," whereas I pointed out that there could be serious disadvantages either in a hasty recognition of the Red regime, or in delaying recognition too long.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness whether he thinks that the quoted statements there, his own and Mr. Rosinger's, are actually different or whether his own statement is only more palatable?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think my statement is entirely different.

Mr. SOURWINE.—Mr. Rosinger, within "perhaps 3, 6, maybe 9 months." You were urging that recognition be not delayed too long. What is the difference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One of the differences is that I have here simply boiled down what I actually had to say on the subject, and one of the things that I had to say on the subject was that any question of recognition of China should be considered only in conjunction with a number of other moves on policy in Asia. I don't believe that point was taken up by Mr. Rosinger at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. The discussion of the whole question of what you said can well be saved for a later date. But I was endeavoring to find out whether, on the basis of what you had seen fit to quote here, you felt that there was a contradiction between what Mr. Rosinger had urged, and what you were urging.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think there is a distinctive difference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think they are contradictory?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think contradictory, in that context, Mr. Sourwine, is a rather trick word.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand the witness is accusing the counsel of trying to trick him?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and it has been going on right along. Answer that question. You can answer it yes or no. Do you think it is contradictory?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That my position was contradictory of Rosinger's?

The CHAIRMAN. The statement of the witness will be stricken from the record as regards the question being tricky.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Senator. I still think it was a tricky question.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be stricken from the record also. Now if you will answer the question we will get along.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that the question is not susceptible to answer in terms of the word "contradictory."

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Go on. Go on with your reading.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a fact that in October 1949, many responsible, well-informed and patriotic men believed that it would be sound policy to recognize the new government in China. To hold that belief was not in the slightest unpatriotic or subversive. When the British Government recognized the Red government of China, there was no appreciable Tory opposition, and the present conservative government confirms that policy today. I hold it against no man that he took that position at that time. I freely admit that I was not crystal-clear in my own mind then as to the best course of action. If I myself, at that confernece, had advocated the recognition of China, I should not be in the least ashamed of it. But on the point of relevant fact, the record shows that I did not. It would be more accurate to accuse Mr. Rosinger of conniving with Mr. William R. Herod, president of the General Electric Co., Mr. William S. Robertson of the American & Foreign Power Co., and J. Morden Murphy, vice president of the

Bankers Trust Co. All of these men advocated recognition at that time, as the transcript shows. I present for your record quotations from these and other men who advocated recognition of Red China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at that point, the entire transcript of the proceedings of that State Department conference is in the record of this committee, as printed in volume 5.

I should like at this time to tender to Mr. Lattimore and his counsel, and Mrs. Lattimore, the committee copy of the record of Vincent's testimony.

I am still interested in having Mr. Lattimore identify the particular quotation which he says was printed improperly.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be presented to the witness. Mrs. Lattimore is not a witness before this committee, and neither is his counsel. It will be presented to the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. I beg the Chair's pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. If the witness wants to refer to his counsel or anyone else, that is his business.

Mr. FORTAS. Do you want us to have Mr. Lattimore look at this now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, at this time, while we are on that particular record, I want to offer into the record, back at the time we put in this ad from the International Book Store, the remarks of the report of 1948, page 342, Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, on May 14, 1951, House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 131.

The CHAIRMAN. That will go in in connection with the other offer?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; with the ad.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

I think you are going to take up considerable time here, in having the witness look up through the labyrinth of testimony.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I have some assistance, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I think probably it would be well to defer the matter until a later date.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is all right with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say that I understand a request was made for a continuation of the hearing by Mr Fortas.

Mr. FORTAS. I said, Mr. Chairman, that I had engagements Saturday and Sunday out of town, that it would be possible for me to fly back and get here Monday morning, but it would be very difficult, indeed. But I could get back Wednesday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. We are deferring other committees. I have put over the Appropriations Committee today in order to be here. I am going to put over the Judiciary Committee on Monday in order to go on. We just must go through with it to a conclusion. I am sorry to say that we just cannot accommodate you in that respect.

Mr. FORTAS. I should say, Mr. Chairman, that I made the other arrangements on the basis of Mr. Morris' kind statement to me that the committee would have to finish by Friday night. Is that not true?

Mr. MORRIS. No, I did not. Mr. Fortas. I said that we had a hearing scheduled for Monday, and I gave as the reason why we could not begin on Wednesday as you suggested the fact that we would have to

finish this week this hearing because of the other engagement on Monday.

Mr. FORTAS. That is what I tried to say, briefly though.

Mr. MORRIS. That made no mention of Friday.

Mr. FORTAS. You said this week.

Mr. MORRIS. I did.

Mr. FORTAS. As I understand it, the chairman is now suggesting that we go on Monday.

The CHAIRMAN. We will go on with this hearing because the Senator from Michigan here, who is a member of the Appropriations Committee, and also other Senators, are detained. We just have to conclude this so as to go on to other work.

Today I had to adjourn the Appropriations Committee so as to come back here. I am sorry to say that our condition is such that we just cannot always accommodate the way we would like to accommodate.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that we hold the hearing on Saturday also?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, we will be here on Saturday also.

Mr. FORTAS. It is absolutely impossible for me to go and be here on Saturday.

The CHAIRMAN. You can have some other member of your firm here.

Mr. FORTAS. There is no one else who is considering this case, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry not to be able to accommodate you, but the work is so, here, that we just have to put in every hour, as you may see since you have been up here, as you know without being told of it.

Mr. FORTAS. I know, Senator, but I did make this engagement on the basis of what I understood Mr. Morris to say, and I cannot cancel it.

Mr. MORRIS. There was no mention that we would not have anything on Saturday.

Mr. FORTAS. I understood you to say Friday night. If I misunderstood you, I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish I could accommodate you, Mr. Fortas. I am sincere in that; but it just cannot be done; that is all there is to it. You have other members of your firm.

Mr. FORTAS. I do have other members of my firm, but there is nobody who is familiar with this matter. However, you will have to give me a little time.

The CHAIRMAN. I will have to deny your request, that is all. I am sorry to do it.

I do not think we should delay the committee to look up something through that record at this time. I would like to go on.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, in addition to the statements on the subject of the recognition of Red China, at this conference that we were discussing, I have some supplementary statements in favor of that at the same time which I desire——

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what question you are addressing this to.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am addressing this to the point in my statement where I say "I present for your record quotations from these and other men who advocated recognition of Red China."

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed and present that, and the Chair will pass on it. We will go over it.

I may say to you that I am going to pass on these things as to whether or not they are material or in line with the hearing. I am going to pass on them just as soon as I can.

(For the material referred to see exhibit 477 which appears on p. 3703 of appendix I, pt. 10.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. A member of this committee did his best to help Mr. Stassen. As "evidence," Mr. Stassen cited the fact that I made the not very brilliant or original remark that there was a "new situation" in Asia. "That meant the recognition of Communist China, doesn't it?" asked Senator Smith, eagerly coming to his aid. "That is right," said Stassen.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know why Professor Lattimore has put in the words "eagerly coming to his aid."

What is the basis for any such statement as that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the impresson I got from reading the transcript.

Senator SMITH. Is there anything in the transcript that reads that? That is another part of your imagination. I guess you got that from your epidermis that you referred to yesterday, the feeling.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Why are you justified in saying that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that Mr. Stassen had made a not at all convincing statement and that he received immediate support.

Senator SMITH. I asked the question. According to what you said, that meant the recognition of Communist China, does it not? That is a question, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a question and it is a leading question.

Senator SMITH. Maybe it is leading, but why do you say I was eagerly coming to his aid?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because my impression was that it was a leading question, and for the purpose of leading him to——

Senator SMITH. Do you have any reason on earth why I should want to come to Mr. Stassen's aid?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None; except the impression I have here.

Senator SMITH. That is just your imagination at work; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My interpretation of a written text, Senator.

Senator SMITH. There is nothing in that text that says anything.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, Mr. Lattimore, it is also trying to infer that the Senator did it in bad faith. Is not that what you wanted to convey to the public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you use it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is no implication of bad faith.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you use it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The indication is that this was a statement that might be strengthened to imply the recognition of Communist China and Senator Smith had helped Mr. Stassen to make that, to carry that inference further.

Senator FERGUSON. You accuse Stassen of bad faith, do you not, in that record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't accuse Stassen of anything more than just trying to get on in the world.

Senator FERGUSON. And not of bad faith?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not of bad faith, no, just trying to get on in the world.

Senator SMITH. You think then that any time a committee member asks a question to clear up the statement of a witness, that that is eagerly helping, for the witness that you referred to, eagerly coming to his aid. That is what you said, did you not? And you said it without any foundation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is simply my impression on reading the transcript. If I misinterpreted you, I would be glad to change it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are making that a part of your oath here, before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What, this statement here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Senator SMITH. We might ask him to prove that now. I think that would make a good point.

The CHAIRMAN. We might have to go into your mental processes in order to find out if you were eager.

Senator SMITH. That just goes to show, Mr. Chairman, the total irresponsibility of this witness' statements, without foundation.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, you say you did not accuse Mr. Stassen of bad faith.

The CHAIRMAN. He said so. He testified to it here today.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to go back on page 32, where you accuse him, that—

Stassen tried to escape by doing acts on the flying trapeze, as if he were a road-show McCarthy swinging through the air with the greatest of ease from "205 names" to "57" names—

and all the rest of it. You mean that that sentence does not infer bad faith.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that sentence infers great agility.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you pretend as a scholar and as a teacher in a college that your answer is an answer to the question that I asked?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You will proceed with your reading. Everybody is in bad faith, excepting Mr. Lattimore.

Senator SMITH. That seems to be the case.

Mr. LATTIMORE. How much more silly can the part-time president of a great university get?

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who are you talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Stassen.

Senator FERGUSON. I have been talking about a Johns Hopkins professor, and I wondered whether or not you had come into that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. How much more silly can the part-time president of a great university get?

Senators, if you are really interested in the future of our country—and I am sure that you are—you will look into your minds and hearts and try to find the answer to the real and shocking question, "Why does a man of Stassen's stature engage in irresponsible and false accusations of pro-Communist views? Is this committee lending itself to the encouragement of such destructive activities by the politically ambitions, the fellow-travelers of witch-burning, the insecure, and the vain and ambitious?"

Mr. SOURWINE. You say that is not charging Mr. Stassen with bad faith?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He is charging him with perjury. Whether that is bad faith or not, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you claim that is charging him with good faith?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I claim that is charging him as is clearly stated here, with irresponsibility.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is not bad faith when he does it under oath?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you are a lawyer. You would have to define that. I can't.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you use it—it is your word?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I used the term "irresponsible."

Senator FERGUSON. And you say that is accusing him of bad faith?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it is not accusing him of bad faith.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that a witness, or any other person, can use words of invective and then escape their legal effect by claiming that they have no knowledge of their legal effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine——

The CHAIRMAN. Just answer that "Yes" or "No," and we will see where we will get.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer is that I am incapable of answering that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, are you a teacher in Johns Hopkins?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Of what institution are you a graduate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not a graduate of any institution.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a graduate of any high school even?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I finished my studies at a school in England——

The CHAIRMAN. Did you graduate from high school? Can you not answer that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I just want to make a point here that I went to school in England where they do not graduate.

The CHAIRMAN. Please answer the question. Did you ever graduate from high school? You can answer that "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't graduate from a high school. I went to school in England; I left school at the age of 19 and there was no such thing as graduation ceremonies or diploma or anything of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever graduate from a grammar school?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Chairman, along that line, while we are on that subject——

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I asked that question is the apparent desire of this witness to avoid the consequences of his own statements by saying that he does not understand the statement, after it has been brought to his attention.

Senator JENNER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the witness a question along that line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, on your statement there I have no desire whatever to escape any responsibility for what I have said.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not care what your desire is.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will stand by every word that I have written in this statement. What I am declining to do is to accept legalistic paraphrasers and rephrasings of what I have said in terms which I do not understand.

Senator SMITH. Maybe I can understand it. Let me ask you about this: On the bottom of that paragraph, you refer to "the fellow travelers of witch burning." Who are you talking about there? Can you tell us who you are referring to there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that Mr. Stassen at that moment was fellow traveling along with Senator McCarthy, and I should say that Senator McCarthy is a graduate witch burner.

Senator JENNER. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. Those are the only ones that you refer to there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Those are the only ones that I have at the moment.

Senator FERGUSON. I suppose you are not imputing bad faith in that answer that you made about Senator McCarthy and Mr. Stassen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think there is a difference there.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that is bad faith?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think there is a difference between Senator McCarthy and Stassen. I think Mr. McCarthy is capable of bad faith. I think Mr. Stassen is just too slippery. That is, the question of bad faith and good faith probably doesn't alarm him.

Senator JENNER. You say you are an academic specialist on the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator JENNER. We should like to know when you are speaking as an academic expert and when you are expressing the opinions of a private citizen.

I will ask you this question: Are you an expert on politics, economics, geography, or military science?

The CHAIRMAN. On either of those, is that what you mean, Senator?

Senator JENNER. That is right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not primarily on any of those.

Senator JENNER. Then what academic degrees do you have?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. He has none.

Senator JENNER. He says he is an academic expert, but he has no degrees.

Senator SMITH. I believe he does have some honorary degrees.

Senator JENNER. You said you were an academic expert on the Far East. I asked you what academic degrees you hold and you said "None."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator JENNER. That is all I want, Mr. Chairman. He has answered my question.

The CHAIRMAN. Go on with the reading.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 5. In addition to the foregoing Government connections, I once lectured, on invitation and without pay, to a group of State Department personnel, on Japan. I was one of a number of outside persons who gave similar lectures.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I think the committee needs a little more information on that subject.

Did you lecture on more than one occasion, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Only that one occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just one occasion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only occasion I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember when that was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I look and see if I have the documentation on that?

Mr. SOURWINE. While we are waiting for that answer, is it your statement that you did not give a series of talks or lectures for personnel of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, I never did anything of that kind; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. This particular lecture that you speak of, the date of which you are trying to get us, can you tell us how that was arranged?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will bring in the exact date reference tomorrow, Mr. Sourwine. It was arranged by a letter to me from someone in the State Department. I remember being asked about that at the time of the Tydings committee hearings, and didn't remember, and I believe I looked it up later and found that it was Mr.—I think his name is Francis J. Russell.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. John Carter Vincent had anything to do with that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what position he held at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't recall—no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him the subject of your lecture either before or after you made it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. If that date could be furnished for the record, I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman, on that point.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead with your reading, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Just to keep the record full at this moment, I believe the date was probably early in 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 6. In 1945, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman, expressing my views on China policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask the witness if he kept a copy of that letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I kept a copy of that letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have it with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you furnish it for the committee record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that that letter, as furnished and identified by Mr. Lattimore, be placed in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us look at it first.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a copy, Mr. Lattimore, of the letter that you speak of?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a copy.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it a carbon copy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it is a typed copy.

Senator SMITH. Do you have the carbon copy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have a carbon copy.

Senator SMITH. An original carbon copy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The original carbon copy; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is only one copy of this. For the information of this committee, it is only a single page, does the Chair believe it should be read?

The CHAIRMAN. One moment, please; we have not looked at it.

Senator Smith, will you take over the chair, please? I have another assignment.

Senator FERGUSON. I move, Mr. Chairman, that the letter to the President be made a part of the record, and if there is any question about it it may be compared with the carbon copy.

Senator SMITH (presiding). Without objection, that will be done.

(Letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 473" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 473

JUNE 10, 1945.

HON. HARRY S. TRUMAN,
President of the United States.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, on the recommendation of President Roosevelt, appointed me his political adviser in 1941, the policy of the United States was to support a united China. There appears now to be a major change in our policy, which may invite the danger of a political and even a territorial division of China and the further danger of conflict and rivalry between America and Russia.

Until quite recently, great care was taken to avoid any inference that America, in aiding China as a nation, was committing itself to all-out support of one party in China's domestic affairs. There now appears to be a fundamental change. Public statements by men regarded as spokesmen for American policy encourage many Chinese to believe that America now identifies the Chinese Government with one party and only one party, commits itself to the maintenance of that party, and may in the future support that party in suppressing its rivals.

Such a belief among Chinese may make Russians feel that America has led the way in committing itself to one party in China, and that Russia would be justified in following that lead and committing itself to the other major party. As a consequence, we may be heading straight into a situation in which political partisanship and rivalry for control of strategic geographical zones will be the actual starting point for any discussion of far-eastern issues between America and Russia.

In the eyes of many people such a development would mean that America itself, long the supporter of China's political and territorial integrity, had initiated a new policy identified with the political and territorial partition of China.

These considerations point to the possibility of grave crisis and make me feel it my duty as a citizen to lay before you, Mr. President, the opinion that the crisis cannot be averted by approaching the problem through the politics of either China or Russia. The first step toward a solution must be to correct the alarmingly rapid drift of current American policy.

With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.

Respectfully yours,

[s] OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL.

Senator SMITH. Are we ready to proceed? Do you have some further questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. Not immediately, sir.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore one question.

On the strength of that letter which you wrote to the President, you had a conference with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. And he gave you 3 minutes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Just about.

Senator SMITH. All right; go ahead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't have a stop watch with me.

Senator SMITH. But you said in your document here it was 3 minutes, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is my recollection. But it was a relative order of magnitude that I made.

The President, in response, asked me to come to see him, and I did. Our conference lasted about 3 minutes. Neither my letter nor my visit had the slightest effect on American policy. This is the only time, in more than 25 years, that I ever took the initiative in writing to a President of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. When he replied, did he only ask you to come and see him? He did not give you any opinion, did he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have a copy of his reply here, which I will be glad to submit, if you want it.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to see it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the reply says: "Glad to see you some time."

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know whether it was an answer to your letter or what. You say now there has been nothing done by our Government after the date of the letter of June 1945, indicating that the President followed anything you had to say in that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Indicating that my visit had the slightest effect on American policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You say there is nothing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in my opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have some questions later on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only occasion when you visited a President of the United States, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only occasion on which I have ever visited Mr. Truman.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked if that was the only occasion on which you visited a President of the United States.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, I thought you said the President. A President; no. I also saw President Roosevelt several times, in connection with my work with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will reserve questions for a later time, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you leave with the President any of your writings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My book, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any writing, outside of the letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I left with him two memoranda.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you copies of the memoranda?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have copies of those memoranda. Incidentally, there is some supplementary correspondence about arranging a conference. Would you like to see that, too?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I would like to see it all.

Mr. Lattimore, when you gave us the first letter, why did you not give us the memoranda that you left?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You asked for the letter. I have the whole lot here, ready to hand over. I don't think it is an indication of reluctance.

Mr. FORTAS. May we take a recess while these letters are read? We have been going for about an hour and 20 minutes.

Senator SMITH. Wait until he asks about these memoranda.

Senator FERGUSON. I move, Mr. Chairman, that we make all of these records a part of the record.

Senator SMITH. Does that include the memoranda you were talking about?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Is the document attached here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is attached.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Senator SMITH. That will be done subject to the decision of the chairman, if there is any reason why the communication the President makes to a third party should not go into the record. I am not too familiar with that rule or policy.

(For the correspondence referred to see exhibit No. 530A, B, C, D, E, pp. 3386 to 3388.)

Senator SMITH. We will recess for 5 minutes.

(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing was resumed.)

Senator SMITH. We will proceed with the hearing. Are there any further questions before we proceed with reading the statement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have been asked by our custodian of records to be sure that the witness and counsel understand that the transcripts of the Vincent testimony which we handed over to them are the committee file copies, and should not be taken with them.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

All right, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, at this point I have found the relevant passages in the transcript about the quotation from Solution in Asia that was shown to Mr. Vincent—No, it was apparently not shown to him, but read to him. May I indicate it?

Mr. SOURWINE. What page is that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 3246.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the transcript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of the transcript.

Mr. SOURWINE. And from page of Solution in Asia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It refers to as quoted on page 139.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a copy of that Solution in Asia?

Mr. SOURWINE. There is one here.

What is the quotation which you say was read out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

The fact that the Soviet Union always stands for democracy is not to be overlooked. It stands for democracy because it stands for all the other things. Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to

the status of democracy. If China or Russia or some other alien people do not measure up to the standards of some particular American modification of Anglo-Saxon democracy, we say that it is not democratic. We are going to find ourselves boxing with shadows instead of maneuvering in politics, if we stick to this habit. The fact is that for most of the people in the world today, what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant. What moves people to act, to try to line up with one party or country and not with another, is the difference between what is more democratic and less democratic in practice.

Mr. SOURWINE. What context was that taken out of?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was taken out of the context, the previous paragraph, which begins "To all of these peoples—" that is, peoples of the frontier of Russia—

the Russians and the Soviet Union have a great power of attraction. In their eyes, rather doubtfully in the eyes of the older generation, the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy, a powerful combination—

then that goes on—

The fact that the Soviet Union also stands for democracy—

which is clearly linked to the previous statement—

In their eyes—

is not to be overlooked.

Senator FERGUSON. But does it not indicate clearly that there was something about it; it was not taken out of context to mislead, was it?

Let me see your book.

In the transcript, do the words "also stands" indicate that there was something else in your book before about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it indicates the previous paragraph, you see, the two.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but there was not any attempt to leave the impression there were not any paragraphs before this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. The whole statement is introduced, the whole passage is introduced, by the statement that "in their eyes" it looks like this, not in my eyes, but in their eyes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore; that paragraph you have just read has several sentences. The second sentence says:

Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy.

Did you mean that as you wrote it, to cover only what we here in America are in the habit of from the standpoint of the eyes of the peoples of Russia and the Soviet Union, or from the standpoint of the peoples of Asia that you were referring to in the paragraph above?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a little bit complicated, your question, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will reduce it to a simpler form.

Is all of this paragraph which you read, which you say was taken out of context, is all of that paragraph to be read as an expression of what these "peoples" referred to in the paragraph above?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All of it is to be taken in context with the introductory statement that, politically, the Soviet Union, as of 1945 had a great power of attraction to people on its frontiers.

I then describe the reasons for that power of attraction, as I thought it appeared to the eyes of the people affected.

The statement as presented in the transcript looks as if I had merely given a eulogistic description of Soviet Russia, as my own description, without reference to the opinions of the people whom I had previously mentioned. I think that is a serious distortion of context.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, there are a number of separate sentences in that paragraph, are there not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. How about this sentence:

> We are going to find ourselves boxing with shadows instead of maneuvering in politics if we stick to this habit.

Who is the "we" that you were referring to there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "We" is primarily the United States, but I think it might be stretched to include also the democracies of Western Europe with interests in Asia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you say:

> The fact is that for most of the people in the world today, what constitutes democracy in theory is more or less irrelevant.

When you said "fact" there, were you referring only to a fact in the eyes of all of these people that you mentioned in the paragraph above?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was referring to a fact in my own opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. But in three sentences above that, where you said, "The fact that the Soviet Union"—you were not referring to a fact in your own opinion; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was referring to a fact in the eyes of the people to whom I referred.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think counsel for the committee understood that, and deliberately quoted this out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I presumed that they had graduated from more grammar schools, high schools, colleges, and so forth, than I had. If I was able to write it, they ought to be able to read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. How could the previous paragraph that you claim was left out after this sentence:

> Here in America we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the two paragraphs are very closely tied together, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, who is the "we" here? Here in America?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not saying there that the people of Russia——

Mr. LATTIMORE. No—here in America, we Americans are in the habit of taking a very narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy.

In other words, we do not regard the Russians as democratic, but, for the reasons given above, there is the possibility that other people, who don't know the United States, might take the Russians as democratic.

That is a political fact which we have to take in consideration, if we want to set up a counter program that makes those people more attracted to us and our policy than to the Russians and their policy.

In fact, somewhere else I state that the United States has more power of attraction over Asia than any other country, if we will use it rightly.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Mr. Vincent said about your paragraph, whom you have quoted here as being able to be an Ambassador, and placed him on a par with some of the other members of the State Department in the higher brackets?

He said: "I would say that that was a misconception of communism." Would you say he was correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and it was not on a leading question, either.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Vincent, after having this truncated quotation read to him, is asked: "Now that you have heard it"—that is, without the part which I, the author, regard as essential—"does it have any connotation in your mind as being pro-Communist or anti-Communist?"

Mr. Vincent replied: " I would say that that was a misconception of communism." Mr. Vincent is replying in 1952 to a passage written in 1945, published in 1945. In other words, at a time when the entire situation had greatly altered.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you now say that it is a misconception of communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would not say that. I would say that at the present time this kind of power of attraction of the Russians over neighboring people in Asia, has probably diminished in a great many cases. I do not know of any cases in which it may have increased.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, can you see anything in that paragraph that may have led the Communist Party to adopt your book as a background on the Communist line in having told in the same ad with Foster and Kahn's book. Taking your paragraph, can you see any reason that they may do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Ferguson, I have no knowledge of the processes of the Communist mind, or why they choose my book, or anybody else's book as general reading.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, you have complained, as I understand, about something being read out of context. Now, the paragraph that you referred to as being read out of context, is a paragraph consisting of seven sentences, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. At least I will accept your count. I have not made the count myself.

Senator SMITH. You start off one of them in saying: "Here in America, we are in the habit of taking a narrow view of foreign claimants to the status of democracy."

There is nothing in that sentence connected with any preceding paragraph or sentence, is there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That particular sentence, I think, is merely a statement of fact.

Senator SMITH. Well, yes. Now the next sentence is also in the same category, is it not? It does not refer back to anybody's eyes, or the eyes of any particular people?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; here the inference is very clear that I am referring to the fact that Americans, rightly, in my opinion, do not recognize Russia as a democracy.

Then I go on to say—

but we are boxing shadows if we don't realize that what the Russians have to offer in the most illiterate and backward parts of Asia may appear to people there to be democratic. If we are going to meet that attraction, we have to set up something that will beat the Russians' attraction.

Senator SMITH. That is not what you said in the book, is it? You are adding that now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is part of the entire thread running through the book, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Then the complaint that you have to make against the committee is for not putting the whole book in, printing the whole book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The complaint I have is that this particular paragraph is so clearly related to my statement of "other peoples' opinions" that it is a quotation out of context to put it in in a manner that would lead the hearer, when he merely has it read to him, to believe that it was a statement of my opinion.

Senator SMITH. It appears to me that it would be a statement of your opinion. But that is a matter for construction. I suppose we need not waste our time on that.

All right, you may proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very little has been said about me before this subcommittee that wasn't already in the record of the hearings before the Tydings subcommittee. Most of it is just a regurgitation of the same vague nonsense. To refresh your memories, let me read to you the conclusions of the majority of that subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, would you indicate, please, where, in the hearings before this subcommittee, has been regurgitated 1,400 pages, or any portion of it, of the Tydings' hearings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say the Budenz testimony, and a lot of the rest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that Mr. Budenz testified before this committee the same way that he testified before the Tydings' committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am saying that he regurgitated the same nonsense, with some additional embellishments.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since we would prefer to use more precise and descriptive words than your adjectives, will you answer my question, please?

Is it your statement that Mr. Budenz testified before this committee substantially the same as he testified before the Tydings' committee?

Senator SMITH. Can you not answer that question, whether he did or whether he did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He did and he did not, Senator. He repeated his Tydings' testimony, or most of it, and he added some more. I come to that later in my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your statement, sir, that Mr. Budenz in the testimony before this committee, contradicted anything that he had said before the Tydings' committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Contradicted?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir. Did he, before this committee contradict himself in what he had said before the Tydings' committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall offhand that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he before the Tydings committee say anything which contradicted anything he later said before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Before the Tydings' committee he was cross-examined and he contradicted things he had previously said.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wish you would answer the question, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Before the Tydings' committee he could hardly contradict something he hadn't said yet before this committee. When he came to this committee, he obviously had to watch his step in dealing with his previous Tydings' testimony.

Senator SMITH. I thought your complaint the other day, Mr. Lattimore, was that he said more than he said before the Tydings' committee, and things differently.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I deal with that later in my statement.

Senator SMITH. You did make that statement, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Senator SMITH. All right, proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure that it comes later in my statement; I think it comes previously, where I deal with his testimony about Japan. I am not sure whether it is earlier or previously.

This is quoting from the Tydings' committee report, pages 72 and 73:

> Owen Lattimore is a writer and a scholar who has been charged with a record of procommunism going back many years. There is no legal evidence before us whatever to support this charge, and the weight of all other information indicates that it is not true * * * We find absolutely no evidence to indicate that his writings and other expressions have been anything but the honest opinions and convictions of Owen Lattimore. Similar opinions and convictions vis-à-vis the Far East are entertained by many Americans, about whom no conceivable suggestion of Communist proclivities could be entertained. We do not find that Mr. Lattimore's writings follow the Communist or any other line, save as his very consistent position on the Far East may be called the Lattimore line.

In the hearings before this subcommittee there has, however, been some addition to, and some subtraction from, the cast of character. The most important subtraction is Freda Utley, who has not—at least not yet—been accorded the publicity facilities of these hearings. Miss Utley is an ex-Communist, with a record of pro-Nazi utterances.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the data on the pro-Nazi utterances?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have that data in the transcript of the Tydings' committee hearings. Just let me see if I have it here.

Senator FERGUSON. What are you quoting from?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am quoting from a review in Catholic World by Leonard J. Schweitzer, of Freda Utley's the High Cost of Vengeance.

Senator SMITH. We will not accept any review, also, that you have a quotation from.

Senator FERGUSON. We want to know what you are quoting from.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already testified under oath that Miss Utley is an ex-Communist with a record of pro-Nazi utterances.

We want to know what the utterances are.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see if I have any direct quotes here.

Senator FERGUSON. Surely you did not take that from an editorial of some opinion of hers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here is a direct quote.

Mr. SOURWINE. By whom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A direct quote of Freda Utley, from her book, The High Cost of Vengeance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have the book with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether that quotation is taken out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you are basing your charge on, that she has a record of pro-Nazi utterances?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am basing it on this and a number of other quotations.

Senator SMITH. Have you ever read the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have.

Senator SMITH. Do you have the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Have we a copy with us?

I have a copy at home in Baltimore. I don't have it with me.

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest we wait until we get the book.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Before the Tydings' committee she demonstrated her personal animus against me. This committee hired her as a member of its staff, and she undoubtedly aided in recruiting witnesses and in rehearsing their stories.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chairman would pardon me, I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore to name one witness who was recruited by Miss Utley.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot name any witness. I have not been inside the proceedings of this committee. That is why I wrote "undoubtedly."

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "undoubtedly"? "Undoubtedly" means "without doubt."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Without doubt, in my mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not say that.

Senator SMITH. You are making a statement of fact.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is clear, from the context, I think.

Senator SMITH. You still understand, Mr. Lattimore, that you are under oath, and you are making a statement of fact here, and now you have no information to back it up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Excuse me, Senator Smith, I think I am making an expression of strong opinion.

Senator SMITH. That is not what we want here. We want facts, as we have mentioned many times.

Do you know whether or not this committee had had any witness recruited by Miss Utley?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is my opinion——

Senator SMITH. I am not asking your opinion. I am asking for a fact.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not know, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I did not think you did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Miss Utley rehearsed the story of any witness before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I assume from the way in which some of those stories were presented——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know for a fact.

Senator SMITH. Then you are making statements here under oath, that are not the truth, so far as you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am making statements of strong opinions.

Senator SMITH. We do not want any more opinions. We want statements of fact. You are sworn. If you do not know a thing to be a fact, we do not want you to be sitting here quoting somebody else's opinion. You are just wasting the time of everybody.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, a great many statements of opinion against me have been freely entered into the record. Am I not to be allowed to state my own opinions?

Senator SMITH. No; you state facts. That is what we want. If you do not have a foundation of fact, then do not state it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not know why she has so discreetly disappeared, or whether her removal is permanent. My guess is that the committee, or its staff, must have concluded after this intimate dealing with her that she was too obviously erratic and unreliable, and too clearly an agent of the China lobby.

Senator SMITH. You are "guessing" now, are you not? You admit you are guessing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am stating it.

Senator SMITH. And you have not a particle of information in the way of facts, to back that up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am making my guess. I stated it as a guess.

I hope that some day the story will be told, which will give the details of this extraordinary show of circumspection. It reminds me of the farcical incident of the missing witness, Huber, recruited by Joe McCarthy, to appear before the Tydings committee.

He was subpenaed at the request of the Wisconsin Senator—"the Wisconsin whimperer," who has recently shown Mr. Luce that he can dish it out, but he can't take it—but Huber lost his nerve at the last moment. I've often wondered what happened to Huber and why he has not been compelled to explain how he was recruited and by whom, and what eventually happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness if he thinks Mr. Huber has, or has had, anything to do with this committee or its proceedings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no reason to believe so, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then why do you drag him into your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am stating the case of the witness who disappeared, after McCarthy recruited him, and I am comparing it with the fact that Miss Utley has not appeared after the committee recruited her.

Senator SMITH. You think that has some place in this hearing, that paragraph you just read, do you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir; I have had——

Senator SMITH. As a statement of fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As a statement of opinion.

Senator SMITH. I say "as a statement of fact" do you contend that is a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is a fact?

Senator SMITH. What you have stated in that paragraph. You know what I am talking about, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Excuse me, sir. The discussion has gone on over several subjects, and I am not quite sure what fact you are referring to.

Senator SMITH. I am asking you about that paragraph you just read. Did you introduce that as a statement of fact? Do you understand that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The statement of fact that Huber was recruited by McCarthy, that he later lost his nerve and disappeared, and so on? Yes, I state that as a matter of fact.

Senator SMITH. I am talking about what is in the paragraph, that whole paragraph, is that a statement of fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my belief, it is, Senator.

Senator SMITH. All right; go ahead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Among the additions to the Tydings list I have already dealt in some detail with Mr. Dooman and Mr. Stassen, and have referred to the novel ideas of Mr. Colegrove and Mr. McGovern, concerning my alleged recommendations about Japan.

I should now like to turn to the testimony of Barmine and Fittfogel. General Barmine, of course, is an ex-Communist. So is Wittfogel. Your chairman, Senator McCarran, has indicated that this makes them especially credible witnesses.

Senator SMITH. On what do you base that, your charge against Chairman McCarran? Is that some more opinion of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is not a charge against Senator McCarran, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Is that backed up with facts, or is that mere opinion of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a reference to Senator McCarran's introductory remarks, at the beginning of the hearings of this subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is your interpretation of those remarks, is it not, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I read the remarks?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your interpretation of those remarks or a direct quote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is not printed here as a direct quote. I would have to look through it to see whether the words "specially credible witnesses" do appear there directly.

Senator SMITH. Or whether Senator McCarran indicated. You say there "Your chairman, Senator McCarran, has indicated that this makes them"—that is, the fact that they are ex-Communists—"especially credible witnesses."

Mr. LATTIMORE. The chairman stated:

> In such an investigation as this, where a possible conspiracy is being examined, very often the only evidence obtainable derives from persons who once participated in the conspiracy.

I think my words here are a warrantable characterization of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the Senator went on:

> Only eyes that witnessed the deeds, and ears that heard the words of intrigue, can attest thereto. Thus, ex-Communists, and agents of the Government who posed as Communists, often are the only sources of evidence of what transpired behind doors, closed to the non-Communist world.

Do you think there is anything in that that has anything to do with the credibility of an ex-Communist as a witness?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that it is a fair inference of mine to state that Senator McCarran has indicated that these make them especially credible witnesses.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not see any difference between availability and credibility?

Your shrug does not get into the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is more lawyer language, Mr. Sourwine. I wrote what I thought.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think "availability" and "credibility" are legal terms, which require a legal definition? You used that word "credibility"—it is your word, as you said the other day. What do you mean by it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was referring to credibility and not availability, and I think that my opinion there is supported by what has just been read from Senator McCarran's introductory statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean by the word "credibility"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I meant that the committee would believe them.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you think that Senator McCarran is saying here that ex-Communists are especially entitled to be believed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was the impression that I got.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you still get that impression, now that we have been over the language again?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I still do.

Senator SMITH. So you still say that Senator McCarran has indicated that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my opinion, he has indicated.

Senator SMITH. I am asking you for a statement of fact, Mr. Lattimore. You seem to dodge behind your opinions. You seem to forget that you are under oath to testify to the truth here.

Now, do you still say that Senator McCarran has indicated that this makes them specially credible witnesses?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What I am clearly stating there is my opinion, that Senator McCarran has so stated.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should have assumed the contrary: that a man who has spent his life in the Communist school of lies, deceit, and intrigue, should always be suspect. But Senator McCarran would apparently regard that view as proof of Communist tendencies.

Barmine was a Red army general.

Senator SMITH. He admitted, did he not, that he was Red?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, he did. That is my authority for making this statement.

His testimony was that another Red general told him that I was a Soviet agent in China. This was not entirely new, since Senator McCarthy had quoted Barmine in his attack on me in March 1950, and then dropped him.

After reading the transcript of Barmine's flimsy testimony before your committee, I wonder if this use of fantasy and hallucination to establish guilt is not more worthy of the Kremlin than of the United States Senate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, have you at any point in the preparation of this statement deliberately sought to be contemptuous of this committee, and/or the Senate of the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I have deliberately sought to express a feeling of indignation and outrage against the treatment I have received.

Senator SMITH. What treatment do you refer to from this committee, so far as this committee is concerned, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I refer to the admission of the kind of evidence that has been heaped against me without a word of cross-examination, to test the reliability or credibility of the witnesses.

Senator SMITH. Is that all you have to say on that? All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Barmine was a conspicuously reluctant witness before you, and in spite of leading questions by Mr. Morris and members of this committee, and their repeated efforts to aid him in remembering conversations and events between him and other Reds, supposed to have taken place 15 or 18 years ago, his answers remained vague, apologetic, and full of qualifications.

Barmine said that the other Red general, named Berzin, in a discussion of the possibility of opening Soviet intelligence branches along the China coast, mentioned me and Joseph Barnes as "our men," whatever that means, in connection with the possible use of IPR personnel in China.

Here Barmine made two slips. He referred to this discussion as taking place at the end of 1933——

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt there, because of that date, would the witness indicate at what point in the transcript of the testimony Mr. Barmine said that this discussion took place at the end of 1933? It is the understanding of the committee staff that Mr. Barmine said it took place in 1935.

Senator SMITH. Will you point that out?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is taken up in the rest of the paragraph.

Senator SMITH. Can you point that out?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is referring to the fact that a correction was made later and therefore doubtless it doesn't appear in the final transcript of the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean a correction in the testimony of Mr. Barmine, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you intending to state or imply that this committee has doctored the transcript of Mr. Barmine's testimony in publication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether the committee or its staff doctored the testimony, or whether Barmine made a request to alter his testimony, or what happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you making the charge that it was altered?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am making the charge that, if I may go on with the rest of the paragraph—I think it explains it clearly.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you should answer that right now, sir. Are you making the charge that the testimony was altered after having been given, that the transcript was changed for whatever reason after the testimony had been taken down?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am making the charge that newspapermen who called me after the story—that newspapermen called me after the story appeared and Barmine's story was mysteriously up-dated in later editions of the evening papers.

Senator SMITH. What newspapermen called you? Let us get that fact now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The man who called me was, as I remember, the United Press man, United Press desk man, in Baltimore.

Senator SMITH. What was his name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember his name.

Senator SMITH. Who else called you, a newspaperman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was the only one—no, there may have been a Baltimore Sun man who called me, too.

Senator SMITH. You do not know who that was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you here when Mr. Barmine was testifying, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I wasn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You make the definite statement here, and a statement you are offering this committee under oath, that he, meaning Barmine, referred to this discussion as taking place at the end of 1933. Do you know that to be so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am making reference to the fact that two different newspaper stories appeared.

Senator SMITH. You do not know it of your own knowledge? Just answer my question, do you know it of your knowledge or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't know it of my own knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the record of Mr. Barmine's testimony at that point?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what that record shows?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As the record now stands, it doesn't show 1933.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does it show?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not—I would have to read it again to refresh my memory, but my impression is that it doesn't show very clearly what year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean, sir, that you are stating here, on the basis of what one or two newspapermen, according to you, told you, that the testimony of this witness was different from what the record which you have read shows it to have been?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not what newspapermen told me, I am basing it on newspaper clips.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you testifying here on the basis of newspaper clips—if you please, Mr. Lattimore—are you testifying here on the basis of newspaper clips that the testimony of Mr. Barmine was actually different from what the record before this committee shows it to have been?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am testifying that after the story appeared, I was called for comment because 1933 was mentioned and I said "Why, my goodness, in 1933 I had nothing to do with the Institute of Pacific Relations." And the later stories carried the date 1935 or 1936.

Mr. SOURWINE. And are you presuming to conclude from that that the record of this committee was changed, rather than accepting the possibility that a newspaperman might have been mistaken?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't say that, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you say, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I say that when I pointed out to newspapermen who called me after the story appeared——

Mr. SOURWINE. Pointed out what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That in 1933 I had no connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that I was in the United States and not in China from 1933 to the autumn of 1934, after this, after I had been called on this point, Barmine's story was mysteriously up-dated in later editions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the evening papers, is that not what you said?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Either the evening papers or the morning papers, I can't recollect now.

Senator SMITH. How about the rest of the sentence, to refer to 1935 or 1936? You do not know now whether it was 1935 or 1936, do you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The record reads, page 194 of the printed record, that Mr. Barmine said that he was appointed to the presidency of some trust that he was working for at the end of 1933.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that the witness' interpretation of what the record says is of any particular value here.

If he has a portion of that record which he believes establishes his contention that Mr. Barmine said 1933, I think he should offer that portion of the record and let it go in now.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, will you give a witness a minute to look at the record, since there is a question about the record?

Senator SMITH. I thought we had it there.

Mr. FORTAS. He hasn't had a chance to look at it since he has been asked the question.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore do you have in your possession, I mean for your own use, a copy of that transcript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I do.

Senator SMITH. Then I am going to suggest that if you can find any justification or statement about the 1933 and will send it out any time within the next 10 days, we will look it over and see it. That is to save time.

All right, Mr. Sourwine, have you some other questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I have one more question.

Mr. Lattimore, you stated and stressed the fact that you had no connection with the IPR until 1934. As a matter of fact, did you not attend the IPR conference in 1933?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I attended it as a delegate. I was not an employee, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think the attendance at that conference was not a connection with IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your amendment, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever an employee of IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was an employee of IPR from the beginning of 1934.

Mr. SOURWINE. Until when?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are speaking now of your connection with the magazine Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. As editor of that magazine, you were an employee of IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was an employee of the Pacific Council of the IPR, not the American IPR.

Senator SMITH. You may proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Barmine also said our names had been suggested because they needed men who had "military training" (p. 1933). I have had no military experience whatever, and I doubt if Barnes had, either. When Senator Eastland asked him, "Just exactly what did he say about Mr. Lattimore?" Mr. Barmine answered evasively, "You see, I want to emphasize that this project which was finally never realized by me was only a very small part of the preparation. This was 15 or 16 years ago—to tell you exactly what words, I would not like to say anything I don't remember very firmly." Again, how vague can testimony be and still be permitted to be used to blacken a man's name?

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read that sentence again, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last one?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again, how vague can testimony be and still be permitted to be used to blacken a man's name?

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Since everything about Barmine's General Berzin sounds rather fishy I tried to look him up on Barmine's book One Who Survived. Sprinkled all through this book, in both the original French version and the American version, which seems to have been stepped up considerably for local consumption, are a great many names of important Russians with whom Barmine claimed to have rubbed shoulders. One name that is entirely missing in both versions is that of General Berzin. Yet in his testimony Barmine makes a great deal of Berzin as a real big shot under whom he worked for 15 years. Why does he mention him here for the first time? Incidentally, neither version of Barmine's book, of course, mentions Joseph Barnes or Owen Lattimore or the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask one brief question?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, do you know if there was a General Berzin?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Barmine also stated that a General Krivitsky in Paris in 1938 corroborated Berzin's statement about Barnes and me. General Krivitsky also wrote a book and testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1938. In neither place did he mention my name. Nor did he mention Joseph Barnes or the IPR. What is more significant, he did not mention either the Red generals, Berzin or Barmine.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire once more, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, did you use research methods to endeavor to ascertain whether there was a General Berzin?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, there are no research methods at my disposal to determine that fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make your best efforts to determine whether there was a General Berzin?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Having no means, I made no efforts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In short, Barmine's testimony can best be described in the words of Barmine. When Senator Ferguson asked him whether the FBI had the "evidence" that he had just given about Barnes and Lattimore, he said, "Well, if you call it evidence—" (p. 211).

It reminds me of a little story in Barmine's book, which I submit herewith as an exhibit, describing how a Soviet military intelligence agent, when he takes a powder and runs out of the Soviet police state, hires out as an expert on Soviet skulduggery and, when he runs out of real information, has to invent a lot of new stuff in order to stay in the racket. It reads to me like a very good description of Barmine himself as well as of his native American counterpart, Budenz.

Mr. SOURWINE. What book are you referring to, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here, Barmine's book, One Who Survived.

I would like to hand up at this moment a copy of the relevant part of the text of Barmine's book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read that book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have.

Senator SMITH. That will be submitted subject to the Chairman passing on it when he goes over it.

(The material referred to was marked exhibit 475 and appears in the appendix on p. 3704.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I turn now to the other ex-Communist, Karl August Wittfogel. In his testimony Wittfogel tried to creat two impressions—that in the early years of our acquaintance we were friendly with each other on the basis of mutual Communist sympathies, and that after he finally stopped being a Communist, in 1939, he broke off relations with me. Both of these pictures, drawn by Wittfogel's inventive hindsight, are maliciously false.

I first knew Dr. Wittfogel in Peking in 1935 and 1936. He has attempted to show that at this time I knew he was a Communist and must therefore have been one myself. He does not claim that he ever told me he had been or was still a Communist. I did not consider him one. He had been rescued from Hitler's Germany by a committee of British scholars, an active member of which was the distinguished authority on economic history, R. H. Tawney, a stanch anti-Communist.

The flimsy statements by which Wittfogel attempted to show that I knew he was a Communist are complete nonsense. The chief one is a story that in my presence Dr. Woodbridge Bingham had asked him if he had ever been a Communist and he said "No." He then tried to suggest that I flashed him a smile implying that I knew that what he really meant was that he was a Communist. The truth is that I have not the faintest recollection of this whole conversation, but if I smiled at all, it was certainly a non-Communist smile. Now I would be willing to believe that Communists have an arsenal of secret signals, but I would never suppose that it included anything as good-natured as a smile. In fact, I though that these grim conspirators regarded a smile as a bourgeois gesture—practically as an enemy of the state. If I am wrong, and if a smile is a secret Red signal, I confess that I used to smile a good deal. In the pre-McCarthy days I used to think that life was lots of fun.

Senator SMITH. May I ask you a question there? Were you present when Wittfogel testified in this room?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any representative present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me ask my wife whether she was there.

She was there.

Senator SMITH. You knew when he was going to testify, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was announced in the paper.

Wittfogel also made the ridiculous assertion that the fact that I used the terms "feudal' 'and "feudal survival" in describing Asiatic societies showed that I was a Communist. His claim that these terms are nothing but litmus papers for telling Communists from non-Communists is ridiculous. It sounds like an echo from the religious disputes and persecutions of the Middle Ages, when professing Christians put each other to death in quarrels over the difference between "transsubstantiation" and "consubstantiation."

On this rather absurd subject Wittfogel specifically charges that in a book published last year, Pivot of Asia, I dropped my academic disguise and let the heretical truth leak out: I referred to "semi-feudal" relations in the Chinese Central Asian province of Sinkiang. It is quite true that I used the phrase, and it was an accuate description. I am sorry that I did not know that the Communists had a patent on the term, and that to use it was as dangerous as it is to smile.

If the use of terms like "feudal survival' 'is a test of communism the following quotation may be of interest. It is from the American Anthropologist, July-September 1951, page 403, and is from a review of a book about Japan:

> But here (in Japan) as in Germany, industrialization was so late and so rapid that many feudal elements survived.

The author who thus uses the hideous and forbidden expression "feudal elements" is Esther S. Goldfrank (Mrs. Karl-August Wittfogel). I hasten to say I know nothing of her political views, and in any event I wouldn't accuse Wittfogel of anything on account of his association with his wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, Mr. Lattimore, would you tell the committee, please, why you dragged Mrs. Wittfogel in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I think it is a pertinent illustration of the absurd nonsense of Wittfogel's talk about semi-feudalism and feudal survival, and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the review by Mrs. Wittfogel which you quote here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not read the full review, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. You quote one sentence out of context, is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I quote one sentence which here I think is a complete statement of the problem, and therefore can be considered in context.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, and if so will you assert, whether Mrs. Wittfogel is making that statement as her own or as a summarization of what was said in the book that she reviewed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know, do you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Have you any data on that?

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is, Do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, not knowing, you have yet presented the letter for this committee as though it were her own opinion, is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have presented it as a quotation from a review by Mrs. Wittfogel.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that is an adequate answer to the question, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have so presented it without having seen the whole review?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is one clear, unequivocal aspect of Wittfogel's testimony that demonstrates that he was lying either about me or about his own severance of Communist affiliation. Wittfogel stated definitely twice that he finally broke all Communist connections in the summer of 1939. I have in my possession many long letters which show clearly that he remained on friendly terms with me for 8 years thereafter—that is, until 1947. If he told the truth about his separation from communism in 1939 he must have continued to think of me as non-Communist, at least until 1947, when we had our last exchange of correspondence.

Many very friendly letters which he wrote to me in 1940 and 1941 contain such phrases as "the warmest greetings to all of you," "I am so happy to see you soon here," "yours in friendship," "your new book—looks fine and it reads fine," "Love to all of you, when do we meet?"—none of which sound as if I were a Communist he had finally broken with in 1939.

In an undated letter in 1941, Wittfogel wrote to me as follows:

> During this week end I have reread your Inner Asian Frontiers and McGovern. The reading of the two books made it clear again to me how absolutely superior your analysis and presentation is not only to his—he is a dwarf—but to practically everybody who has ventured into an analysis of Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft of the oasis. Your analysis really seem definite and classic. I shall follow it for whatever I may be able to write about the Asiatic Oases. I hope to be not too stupid a disciple.

During the war, from 1941 through 1944, I had very little time for correspondence with anyone, but, in a letter to me dated March 4, 1945, praising my book Solution in Asia, he wrote—and this is the same book I will call to your attention that Senator Ferguson has suggested has some sort of Communist coloration—he wrote:

> I have delayed writing my weekly Sunday letters for hours because I could not tear myself away from your Asiatic Solution. By watching my action, not my words, you can judge how great the power of attraction of your new book is. You are really an expert to end all experts. I have not read anything for a long time, that made me think so much about the various aspects of the postwar world. This is a fascinating story, one, which, I hope, will be read much and intensely, because you certainly show that the political leaders have to act quickly, wisely, and boldly, or else—But I am sure, you are right, as solid a peace has to be made as possible in this most artfully balanced of all worlds. The breath-taking picture of a world dancing ballet on a swinging tight rope emerged clearly from your masterly pen.

This is the letter that Wittfogel tried to bypass in his testimony, saying that he had barely looked at the book and wrote me a nice note just to be polite. I submit all of these letters in full for your record.

Senator SMITH. We will receive those, subject to the Chairman's permission.

(For the letters referred to see exhibits 597 A, B, C, D, pp. 3611 through 3614.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. From this time until 1947 Wittfogel remained friendly, and even when we had some differences of opinion he did not suggest that he thought me pro-Communist in any way.

During 1947 we had a disagreement over his invitation to me, at the end of 1946, to write an introduction to his History of Chinese Society: LIAO. I asked him to be allowed to read the book before writing the introduction, and I am afraid that I indicated that I would not write an introduction without being given a chance to form my own opinion about the work I was supposed to sponsor in this way. This entirely reasonable request didn't seem to suit Wittfogel and after several letters I heard no more from him.

My guess about the matter is that Wittfogel staged this little maneuver because, with the mounting China Lobby attacks on the IPR for harboing Communists, with constant reiteration of the familiar Kohlberg attacks on me, he was becoming alarmed about his own concealed Communist connections, and decided that he had better join the pack rather than run the risk of being destroyed by it. Senator McCarran's indication, at the opening of these hearings, that if ex-Communists informed on other people all would be forgiven, provided this tortured man Wittfogel with a perfect avenue to the new social security.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a few questions?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. One question I would like to ask is this: Do you believe that Communists or former Communists are performing a service for the United States when they come forward and testify?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I believe that the kind of information about the inside workings of the Communist Party that can be obtained by ex-Communists, by FBI agents passing as Communists in the Communist Party, and so on, is absolutely essential to our security. I believe that there are probably ex-Communists who are of great value.

But I believe that it is a great temptation to the ex-Communist to market his wares at more than their true value, and to go on purporting to give testimony when he has exhausted his real testimony.

Therefore, I believe that it is extremely necessary, especially in pubic hearings, where people, not only people's reputation but their livelihood is affected, that there should be the severest testing of the credibility of any ex-Communist used, and the validity of his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, I think in justice to you one matter should be shown. You are bilingual; are you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, bilingual usually means equally versed in two languages.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then let me say are you multilingual, do you have several languages at your command?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have several of them that I speak, none of them as well as I speak English, of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. What are they, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I speak Chinese very well. I speak Mongol pretty well. I speak French enough to get along. I speak German enough to stammer along, and to understand other people's conversation, and I have a reading knowledge of Russian, a considerable remnant of a reading knowledge of Latin, and a few tattered remnants of a reading knowledge of Greek. I could also at one time read Swedish, but I am out of practice now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have access to a Soviet encyclopedia or a "Who's Who"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is a copy of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia in the library at Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you check it or have it checked to find out whether General Berzin was mentioned therein?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a paper. I would like to ask Mr. Mandel what it is.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a translation submitted by the Library of Congress in reference to Ian Antonovich Berzin, and it is a translation from volume 5, pages 626–627 of the Soviet Encyclopedia, 1927.

Mr. SOURWINE. I offer this for the record.

Senator SMITH. You may read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very well.

Senator SMITH. This is in English?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Read it, then.

Mr. SOURWINE. The names I may mispronounce as they are Russian names. It reads as follows:

EXHIBIT 474

TRANSLATION

[Translation from vol. V, col. 626–627 of the Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Moscow, 1927]

Berzin, Ian Antonovich ("Pavel Vasil'evitch," "Zemelis," "Vinter") born in 1881, Communist party-worker. He hails from a peasant family in the Livonian Province. As a village teacher he conducted revolutionary activities among the peasants. He joined the Social Democratic Party of Latvia in 1902. In 1904 he was arrested and banished to the Olonets Province from which he escaped in 1905. During the 1905 revolution Berzin was active as a propagandist and agitator in the Baltic region. He was arrested by a punitive detachment of General Orlov in December 1905. Upon his release from prison in 1907 Berzin worked in Petersburg as secretary of the Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. At the same time he was elected as a delegate to the London Congress. He emigrated in 1908, lived in Switzerland, France, Belgium, England, and in the United States, working in various party organizations, became editor and collaborator of the Latvian organs of Bolshevik orientation (such as the central organ of the Social Democrats of Latvia "Tsinia" and others). In 1915 he took part in the Zimmerwald Conference and in the founding of the "Zimmerwald Left." In 1916 and 1917 he was editor of the Latvian Social Democratic newspaper "Stradneks" in Boston and of the Russian left wing—internationalist newspaper "Novyi Mir" (The New World) in New York. In 1917 he was elected at the Sixth Congress as a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks) and of the Central Committee of the Social Democrats of Latvia. At the Second Congress of the Soviets he was elected member of the All-Union Central Executive Committee. In 1918 he was appointed Plenipotentiary Representative to Switzerland, and in 1919 People's Commissar of Instruction for Latvia. From 1919 to 1920 he was secretary of the Comintern. In 1920 he headed the delegation for peace negotiations

with Finland and afterwards he became Plenipotentiary Representative to Finland. From 1921 to 1925 he was attached to the Embassy in England. Since August 1925 he has been the Plenipotentiary Representative of the U. S. S. R. in Austria. Berzin's literary works, chiefly in the Latvian language, encompass a great variety of fields ranging from politics to problems of cultural and art criticism.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Does it mention he is a pal of Barmine's?

Mr. SOURWINE. This is from the Soviet dictionary of 1927, sir, as previously stated. It is offered in the record, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of showing that there was such a person as Berzin.

Senator SMITH. All right; go ahead.

(The material referred to was marked exhibit 474 and was read in full by counsel.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have now disposed of the charges against me personally. But I am also concerned with something of far greater importance—the fate of the far-eastern policy of our country.

The threat of sabotage to our far-eastern policy transcends the interest of the individual citizen. For more than a quarter of a century I have been openly printing, publishing, and stating in public lectures exactly what I think about a wide range of problems. My field has been the Far East in general, more specifically China, and still more specifically the border lands between China and Russia. The record shows that I have never consistently agreed with any ideology, school of thought, group, trend, or individual. I have at times changed my own opinions, but only on the basis of changed conditions, more mature consideration, or additional data; never because of being hypnotized, intimidated, or bought.

I do not find it surprising, or anything to be ashamed of, that I have at times made mistakes. But, whatever the mistakes I have made, I have never tried to deliver the policy of my country into the hands of a foreign power, as the Communists have tried to deliver it to the Soviet Union, and the China lobby is trying to deliver it into the hands of Chiang Kai-shek.

On the record of the situation in China and changes in American policy toward China, the issue, Senators, is not one of domestic politics, or McCarthy's reelection, or of who will benefit, politically or otherwise, from denunciation of me, Mr. Vincent, or others. The great issue is what about China? Are we on the right track? Or has United States policy been affected by disloyal or subversive persons?

When discussing China, it is of crucial importance to put events into their proper perspective in history. I ask you, Senators, if you are interested in facts, kindly to allow them to be presented in the context of their time. If you do not, the result will not be clarification but a continuation of the distortion and confusion that have characterized your inquiry to date.

There have been malicious and pointless attempts to prove that I and other misrepresented the Chinese Communists as "different" from the Russians, or as mere "agrarian radicals." It was proved before the Tydings committee that I never did. Neither, I believe, did the career far-eastern experts of the State Department. But I offer you, for the record, an exhibit showing that Gen. Pat Hurley; Freda Utley, of the China Lobby; and Hallett Abend, of the New York Times, did say that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists. Now, here again, it would be utter nonsense to suggest that this is a sign of

communism or procommunism. The judgment that Patrick Hurley, for example, expressed about the Chinese Communists was a perfectly possible conclusion for a man to arrive at honestly at that time. He may have been wrong—but he was not attempting to distort the facts or subvert his country.

May I hand in here these quotations that I have just referred to, Senator?

Senator SMITH. They will be received, subject to the decision of the chairman for insertion in the record.

(For the material referred to, see exhibit 476 in appendix I of pt. 10, p. 3705.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. One of the principal targets of the China Lobby's criticism in the controversy about the history of our Chinese policy has been the proposal for a coalition between the Nationalists and the Communists—or more properly for a working arrangement between the two, in order to avoid a civil war in which, as informed observers knew and as events proved, the Chiang government would be bound to lose. Even General Marshall's motives have been assailed by the China Lobby because he advocated this, in spite of the fact that it is a matter of record that this policy was first sponsored by Secretary of State Byrnes, who has never been attacked for it and should not be.

It is nonsense to say, as had been dogmatically asserted before this committee, that coalition or cooperation with Communists always ends with the Communists taking over.

The Free French cooperated with the Communists, and the Communists did not take over France. Today about a third of the French Deputies are Communists.

The postwar Government of Burma began as a coalition with Communists, but the Communists were later expelled and armed action taken against them.

The Indonesian Nationalist movement began as a united front with Communists, but the Indonesian Government has since taken armed action to suppress them.

The British cooperated during the war with Indian Communists, but the Communists did not take over India.

In saying this I do not want to be misunderstood as advocating collaboration with Communists. This is always dangerous—as dangerous as a partnership with a bear. It should be tolerated only where there is no alternative. My point is only that coalition is not necessarily surrender, and that coalition may reasonably be advocated in particular circumstances by persons whose sole objective is the ultimate defeat of communism.

In China too the idea of coalition and compromise was not a foolish idea dreamed up in Washington. There was a solid basis for the view that a coalition was the only alternative to the certain triumph of communism. And there was a solid basis for the hope that it might give the non-Communist groups time to reorganize, and eventually to oust the Communists.

If I may make an interpolation here, Mr. Chairman, I would like to change "eventually to oust the Communists" so as to read "and eventually to dominate the situation."

The reason I suggest the change is that at that time, that is, right at the end of the war, the precedence of the ousting of the Commu-

nists for the French and Italian Governments had not yet been established, and it might seem as if I were claiming a little too much precedence by talking in the thing in the context of 1945.

Senator JENNER. May I ask a question?

You say that the Chiang government was bound to lose if the civil war was started. Did the Nationalists have more troops than the Communists, or fewer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not quite sure of what you said.

Senator JENNER. Did the Nationalists have more troops?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; but before that you said——

Senator JENNER. You said the Chiang government was bound to lose if the civil war was started.

Mr. LATTIMORE. If the civil war was started. No.

Senator JENNER. Well, at this particular time in history, did the Nationalists have more troops than the Communists, or fewer troops?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe they had a good many more.

Senator JENNER. Were the Communist troops trained for other than guerrilla war?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I am not sure of to answer that question.

Senator JENNER. Was Under Secretary Acheson correct on June 19, 1946, when he testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Chiang had four times as many troops as the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably he was right. I don't have the figures to check it.

Senator JENNER. Was he correct when he said that the Communists needed American minimum training, and I quote from him, and minimum quantities of equipment, needed American military training and minimum quantities of equpment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know about that, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Are you sure you mean the Communists and not the Nationalists?

Senator JENNER. He said that. That is the record of June 1946. What I want to bring out is how could the Communists have won without Russia's help if the Nationalists had four times the number of troops that the Communists did? How could they have possibly won without the Communist help?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A recent British authority on the subject said that they had two invaluable allies, the Chinese Communists, that one was Chiang Kai-shek and the other was the Republican Party of the United States.

Senator JENNER. Thank you very much.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can give you the exact reference. The book is called Asia and the West.

Senator SMITH. Who wrote that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is by a man named Maurice Zinkin, a former member of the Indian Civil Service, who now represents a large corporation in India.

Senator JENNER. Then it was the Republican Party that withheld the aid to Chiang's Nationalist Government; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the author I have quoted was making a satirical reference to the fact that, as the civil war drew to a close with the Nationalists being steadily defeated, the fact that the Nationalists were receiving American arms resulted in transferring to the Communists in China the idea of nationalism so that the nation-

alist idea was captured away from the Nationalists by the Communists.

Senator JENNER. And then it was the Republican Party that sent General Marshall to China with his mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, we have to talk here in terms of context.

Senator JENNER. You gave me an answer; you said two things, the invaluable aid of Chiang and the Republican Party. I want to find out if the Republican Party sent General Marshall over to force Chiang Kai-shek to form a united government to take the Communists into his Republic and into his army.

Senator SMITH. If it is available, he should be able to give it.

Senator JENNER. It is available. He made the answer of the two invaluable things.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Republican Party did not send General Marshall to China. He was sent by the administration.

But if I may amend the way you put the question, Senator, I would suggest that General Marshall was not sent to force Chiang Kai-shek to accept the Communists.

Senator JENNER. What was the result of General Marshall's mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The result of General Marshall's mission was that he failed to negotiate a compromise in China.

Senator JENNER. After being there how long?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see, about 1 year, I think.

Senator JENNER. He talked a little bit longer than they are talking in Korea. They are talking 8 months in Korea, and he talked a little longer than that, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I accept your statement.

Senator JENNER. What was the report that he brought back to this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The report that he brought back was that his attempts at negotiation had been defeated primarily by the intransigents on both sides.

Senator JENNER. During this period of time, the Republican Party, had they failed to vote appropriations to help Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't answer you on the record.

Senator JENNER. Was the money that was appropriated by us used, was the intent of Congress used to help Chiang Kai-shek in his fight against the Communists? Was it used?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that General Chiang was not short of munitions.

Senator JENNER. And at the time General Marshall arrived in China, the Nationalists had four times the number of troops as the Communists had?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And were already being warned by General Wedemeyer not to overextend themselves.

Senator JENNER. And yet your answer to these facts is that the Republican Party and General Chiang Kai-shek caused the downfall of the Nationalist Government in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I quoted a satirical comment by the British author.

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question there, Mr. Lattimore?

Were you in China while General Marshall was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I wasn't. Wait a minute, now. I want to be absolutely accurate on this.

In the week of Christmas, 1945, to New Year's 1946 I was briefly in Shanghai and Peiping on a visit connected with the work of the reparations mission in Japan.

I am not sure whether General Marshall was in China at the moment or out of China for a visit. But I didn't see him.

Senator SMITH. What I was pointing to was, was the trip that you made with Mr. Henry Wallace and some other persons, through Russia, I believe, and Mongolia, did you go down to China on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. What year was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1944.

Senator SMITH. And how long were you gone on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Approximately 2 months, I think.

Senator SMITH. Up to that time had the Chinese Nationalists, about that time, been holding their own, so to speak, if we may know, in their fight with the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Up to that moment there was officially no fighting between the Nationalists and the Communists.

Senator SMITH. What I meant was had the Nationalists up to that time held their ground? They hadn't been run over like they were later?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They lost a lot of ground to the Japanese. I don't think they lost any ground to the Communists.

Senator SMITH. That is what I mean. Some time after that trip they did begin losing a lot of ground to the Communists, did they not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that they lost it to the Japanese, not to the Communists as long as the war lasted.

Senator SMITH. When did they begin losing ground to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think after the civil war began.

Senator SMITH. Do you remember what time, what year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is rather hard to date because there was a certain amount of scrappy fighting between the Nationalist troops and the Communist troops which General Marshall tried to halt with his famous truce teams, and so on; but the real fighting began in 1946.

Senator SMITH. That is all, unless you want to say something else about the Republican Party.

Senator JENNER. I am glad to find out who sold them out.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, is this a good time to break today?

Senator SMITH. No; we will go on until we finish this. We only have seven more pages. We want to finish.

Have you any questions now?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir; not now.

Senator SMITH. All right, you may go ahead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will proceed.

There had in fact, been a coalition in China from 1937 to about 1944. It had worked. It had not been dominated or captured by the Communists, and it had saved China from Japan. The Byrnes-Marshall policy was not a new experiment. It was an attempt to restore and prolonged the previous combination that had been dominated by Chiang Kai-shek.

Look at the historical record.

Before Pearl Harbor, the overwhelming issue in China was the issue of Japanese aggression. In 1937, the Chinese formed what they called a united front, including the Communists and Chiang's Nationalists, against further Japanese encroachment. It is of cardinal significance—and it conditions every subsequent event—that this united front enabled China to continue the fight against Japan—with which we were also at war after December 1941; and that it was so clearly controlled by Chiang Kai-shek and his party that foreign aid, both ours and Russia's, was received directly only by Chiang Kai-shek, not by the Communists.

By 1944, or perhaps as early as 1943, while we were still in bitter war with Japan, this coalition had fallen apart so much that American representatives, diplomatic, military, and economic were seriously worried. We were making every effort to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek, militarily and economically, but our help was being wasted through inefficiency and corruption. Some experienced observers were already beginning to believe that Chiang Kai-shek's part of free China was in danger of being completely conquered by the Japanese. Some of these observers, including American military officers, even felt that the American Government ought to assert its right to send supplies to the Communist areas of resistance. Their argument was that we must be prepared to keep up resistance to the Japanese somewhere in China, even if it was Communist resistance, just as we were doing everything we could to keep Communist Russia in the war against Germany.

If I had seen at that time some of the reports that were published later in the white paper, I might have taken a position in this controversy; but I did not see them and so simply maintained my previous position in general support of Chinese resistance, and later supported the policy that General Marshall was trying to carry out.

But I believe that this period has been well summed up by Mr. Joseph Alsop. In a column on July 25, 1951, he pointed out that the argument for direct American dealings with the Communist-led forces had been ably presented by Mr. John Davies, of the State Department, who was prophesying in 1943–44 that at the end of the war the Communists were going to come out on top; but that if America gave them moderate aid it would promote their confidence in America, and thus achieve a division between them and the Kremlin. Mr. Alsop had opposed Mr. Davies' position at the time, but in his column he concludes:

> Davies made what must now be accounted an extremely brilliant deduction—that Titoism was possible, before Titoism had been heard of—and if Davies' recommendations had been followed, I now believe he would have been proven right.

Also, there is an important fact that has not been brought out before this committee. General Marshall's proposals were not an attempt to force Chiang, alone and without allies, into cooperation with the Communists. Much hope was placed in the minority parties composing the Democratic League, when General Marshall called—

> a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government (White Paper, p. 688).

If Chiang had known how to strengthen those allies and undertake with them a program of reforms it would have been possible to take the steam out of the Communist drive to political power. Chiang's failure to restrain the hostility and brutality of his rightwing supporters toward this group did much to destroy the support that moderate and liberal Chinese had been given him.

In that situation some of our best qualified observers had already predicted that if the Communist problem were put to the test of force in a civil war, the attempt would end in disaster. We all know that the attempt was made, that it did end in disaster, and that General Marshall, put the blame for the failure of his negotiations on the intransigeants of both Chiang Kai-shek's side and the Communist side. We also know that it is the opinion of the American military experts who had most to do with Chiang's armies that Chiang overreached himself by invading Manchuria too deeply, against the advice of General Wedemeyer, and that, in the words of our own General Barr:

> No battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment. Their military debacles, in my opinion can all be attributed to the world's worse leadership and many other morale-destroying factors that led to a complete loss of the will to fight (hearings before Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, June 1951, p. 1856).

That, Senators, is the outline of what happened. Every possible effort has been made, by Chiang's representatives and by the China lobby to confuse the story, but the record speaks for itself. Let me repeat: there had been a united front, or loosely speaking, a coalition of Chiang's party and the Communists from 1937 to 1944. It had worked in the sense that Chiang had been able to dominate it, and that China had been able to defend itself against Japan, and thereby to help itself and us. Coalition proposals by General Marshall and others were made in the light of this history and of the clear, inescapable facts known to all of us who are not blinded by interest or idolatory, that Chiang's party was falling apart—and if put to the test would fall and the Communists would prevail.

And now what? How are we to handle the continuing consequences of the vast shift in the world balance of power represented by China under the control of a Communist government friendly to Moscow?

Some, including Chiang's refugee government and the China lobby, want to involve us in a war with Russia on the mainland of China, the sooner the better. I agree with General Bradley that this would be "wrong war, wrong time, wrong place."

Some want us to follow a policy of blockade, raids, and landings, aid to anti-Communist guerrillas, and the activities of what Congressman Walter Judd calls a United States "department of dirty tricks." I agree with the general consensus of the China experts in Great Britain that this would result merely in welding tighter the alliance between Peking Reds and Kremlin Reds, and an increase in the rate of Russian aid and in completing the conversion of China into a police state on the model of the Russian police state.

Some believe that we should write off China as a total loss. Again, I do not agree.

As the basis for a policy that might work, I suggest the following principles——

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record might be clear, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness another question.

From here on to the end of the statement, you are giving your recommendations with regard to foreign policy that the United States should follow; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite right.

Senator SMITH. I do not think that has any place in this investigation.

Senator JENNER. It could be submitted for the record.

Senator SMITH. Yes. We will stop right there. The statement will be in the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, may I correct myself? I have been reading along and lost track of things.

Mr. Sourwine asked me if, from there to the end, it was my recommendation of foreign policy. There are seven points of foreign policy here, but the remainder, from the bottom of page 48 to 50 contains matter which I think is not direct recommendations of a foreign policy of this country.

Senator SMITH. That is dealing with the future anyway. I say that it can be put into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask one question.

In relation to the letters and the memoranda to the President, and your talk, did you distinguish between being an adviser to the State Department and the President? Do you draw any distinction there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was simply a citizen who wanted to put some ideas before the President.

Senator FERGUSON. But when you were asked at times, as I understand it—and I want you to correct me if I am not correct—you claimed you were never an adviser to the State Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you distinguish then between that and being an adviser to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would certainly distinguish, Senator, but I don't think I was being an adviser to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. When a man writes the letter and the two memoranda, or the one with the two parts of it, and the different letters, and saying how important it was that you see the President before he made commitments, in effect, do you say that is not in there? You are shaking your head.

Mr. FORTAS. I do not think that was what the letter said.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me have the letter.

Reading from the letter of June 20:

> Since I am most anxious that the views which I represent should be laid before the President for his consideration before his forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, I hope very much that you will find it possible to arrange an appointment for me as soon as possible after the President returns from San Francisco.

And then you give him the places that you can be reached. Do you still say that he did not want to act as an adviser to the President, counsel?

Mr. FORTAS. No; I say that is not the point.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the point? Why were you shaking your head when I was giving the question?

I do not mind being criticized from the witness, I expect it from the witness. But I do not expect that from the counsel.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, in the first place I was not criticizing you. And in the second place, I believe, and the record will show—or at least I understood and the record will show whether it was or not—your reference was to the letter which Mr. Lattimore sent to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. The record will show that I was asking about his desire to give advice.

Mr. FORTAS. You can ask the question and I am sure he will answer it. But I thought you were referring to the witness' letter to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. You saw I had a paper in my hand, and you thought I was looking at it. It had nothing to do with the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is a question of the choice of words and the meaning of words to different people.

In my opinion, an adviser is a person who is retained or requested to act as an adviser. I don't think that the hundreds, in fact thousands, of people who ask to see the President of the United States in the course of a year in order to make suggestions of various kinds can accurately be classified as advisers.

Senator FERGUSON. So you are now saying that the reason you did not mention the President and these letters, and this memorandum, was that you figured that you were offering your advice, and he was not requesting it. Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Are you through?

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever approved the plan that General Marshall was sent to China to put into effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I approved the sending of General Marshall, and I approved the statements——

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you that. I asked you if you approved the plan.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I approved the statement that was issued at the time that he went to China, which was all that the public knew of the purposes of the mission. I approved of that.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you learn that he was sent on a mission to try and take the Communists into the government, as you advocated in your memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I learned that General Marshall was going to China when I saw it in the press. I did not advocate that General Marshall be sent to China to take the Communists into the government.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not advocate that General Marshall be sent, but you advocated that that be our policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I warned the President, as I recall. May I see the text of what I wrote?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I warned the President.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any other copies of this? I imagine there might be some curious people that would like to see them.

Senator FERGUSON. I would say there would be.

Mr. LATTIMORE. We have only the copies that we are turning in.

Mr. SOURWINE. The letters are in the record, including the memorandum, I think.

Senator SMITH. There was some question that they be admitted subject to the propriety that the chairman would pass on them, having in mind there might be some correspondence with the President with which I might not be familiar.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought they were in or else I would not have examined on them.

Senator SMITH. I do not think there is any secrecy about them. But I did have some hesitancy myself in ruling on correspondence that might have passed between Professor Lattimore and the President of the United States, and I prefer to leave that for the chairman of the committee to pass on.

Mr. FORTAS. My I suggest, it is 5:15, and this witness has been on the stand all day. Perhaps you can clear that up tomorrow morning.

Senator SMITH. That can be done. But there is one thing, and I want to make it clear. Mr. Lattimore stopped reading or finished reading, I believe, at the top of page 47. Then there are a few pages, 47, 48, 49, and half of page 50, and I asked whether or not anybody wishes to have them read.

I want to ask whether Dr. Lattimore wants to go ahead and read it now, so that his whole story will be before us.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to object to him reading it.

Senator SMITH. I am asking Dr. Lattimore whether or not it is his wish that he proceed to read the pages. You see, they are dealing with some advice as to policy, not as to the past. What is your preference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I prefer to read it, if I might.

As a basis for a policy that might work, I suggest the following——

Senator FERGUSON. Is this a suggestion to the committee or are these your views?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is my statement of opinion about foreign policy.

Senator FERGUSON. But not advice to the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is not advice to the committee. It is words to be considered by anyone who is interested.

As the basis for a policy that might work, I suggest the following principles:

1. Since the North Korean Communist aggression, we have made clear some of the broad outlines of our policy in Asia as a whole. We have shown that we will nowhere tolerate the territorial expansion of communism by armed aggression, that we have the power to protect free peoples against this kind of aggression, and that if it is tried again, elsewhere, we shall resist again. We must hold fast to this policy, and we must build and maintain the strength to carry it out. If we do I believe we can count on countinuing United Nations backing.

2. On the basis of these principles, we must consider the problem of China as a part of the whole complex of the problems of Asia. We cannot handle it successfully in isolation. We must be ready and quick to resist aggression anywhere in Asia; and at the same time, we must be even ahead of the Asians in insisting that freedom for them means freedom from all foreign domination—our own, Britain's and France's as well as that of the Soviet Union.

3. Our stand in Korea made it possible to begin negotiating from a position of strength. But in negotiating from positions of strength, it is necessary to show also that while we are determined to stop Communist aggression, we are eager to promote alternatives that are acceptable to the maximum number of people in Asia—and Europe. We must show that we are not blindly committed to preventing changes in the status quo—that we accept the principles of national self-determination, national independence, and the right of any people to determine its own form of government and its own economic system.

4. Those aspects of our policy that are symbolized by the words "point 4" and "Marshall plan" must be made as positive, as active, and as important as the aspects that are symbolized by the words "containment" and "positions of strength." We must show our willingness to help in the progress of economic development, as well as political freedom, in all the countries that are willing to accept our policies of equality, mutual help, and mutual defense.

5. I do not prophesy—I do not think any man could honestly prophesy—what the eventual answer will be. But I do believe that China is different from Russia, has national interests different from those of Russia, and will follow those interests rather than Russian doctrine and dogma.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask one question at that point, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Lattimore, do you presently believe that the Chinese Communists are following the line of Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see any signs that they are about to give it up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I haven't had the time to follow the situation very closely, but I don't see any signs.

I do not pretend to know how far the China of the future may differ from the Russia of the present, or in what way. But I do believe that there is no Russian combination of strategic, political, and economic forces that can permanently mold the people of China against their will.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not understand that communism will not be directly, as far as the Chinese are concerned, indicated that it is coming from Moscow, but it is the trained man from Moscow, and under the domination of Moscow, that will make it appear to the Chinese that the thing is Chinese rather than Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the contrary, Senator. My understanding is that the present Chinese Communist propaganda emphasizes the Russian connection. I may be wrong on that. It may have switched again, but that was the last I heard of it.

Senator FERGUSON. But the actual Russian does not come down except as an overseer, does he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, I am not informed on the details of that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You are giving an opinion. I would think before you would give an opinion that you would know something about the details.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am trying to give long-range opinions.

Senator FERGUSON. This is long-range advice?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is long range.

Senator FERGUSON. Fifty or one hundred years?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long? What do you call a long-range opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is not intended to be a report on the details of last week's situation in China.

Senator FERGUSON. How long a range?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, Senator. I should think it would depend partly on the outcome of the Korean negotiations.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that this advice will help this committee in deciding whether or not there was penetration in the IPR by Communists, and whether or not the IPR had an influence on the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it might help the committee to decide whether they think that I am a Communist or not.

Senator SMITH. You mean what you say as to the future?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What I say as to the future. If you think I am talking like a Communist, that is your judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. No, I think we ought to take it for the last reason.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 6. It is of critical importance that, as the independent forces and separate characteristics of China begin to make themselves felt, both China and the rest of Asia should be made to realize that their true future lies in independence—independence of America, as of Russia, but a real independence supported by America, and not a phony independence subordinate to Russia.

7. Independence of this kind is possible. It is possible without a world war. And it can lead eventually to a stabilization of relations with Russia as well as with Asia. It is the declared policy of our Government that our purpose in attaining positions of strength is to be able to negotiate such a stabilization. I support that concept of policy.

But to carry out such a policy successfully, we must convince Asia, and the world, and above all ourselves, that we are not abandoning democracy. In defending ourselves against totalitarian aggression abroad and infiltration within, we must not, despairing of our heritage of freedom, try to take refuge in the brutal kind of police state that we fought against when we destroyed Hitler and defeated Japan.

The responsibility, gentlemen, for deciding how the problems of China and Asia shall be handled rests squarely on this country, because of our preponderating influence on the policies of such countries as Britain, France, and Japan. I know that there are people who believe that we should forthwith go to war with the Soviet Union and thereby resolve the conflict over China and the world. Your chairman has said that such a war is inevitable. A logical case of sorts can be made for this view, based on the record of the intransigeance and faithlessness of the Soviet Union in the international community. But this case disregards the basic values of the lives and the spiritual and moral well-being of ordinary people. These values are at stake, and they would be threatened even more by a great world war than they are by the present limited conflict.

War may come upon us. We may have no choice other than to endure and inflict its horrors. But the moral values that we are defend-

ing cannot be defended if we take upon ourselves the inhuman and brutal responsibility of preventive war. The demands of civilization and humanity are that we make every effort, unless and until we are forced into war, to protect ourselves and the values of civilization by means short of war.

The policy which I have described, as well as the policy to which our Government and the United Nations are committed at the moment, is the policy of containment of aggression and of building up the conditions and forces of freedom. It demands, over and above strength and firmness, a deep understanding of the hearts and aspirations of men. This policy is the hard way, the difficult course. It requires patience, firmness ,and great skill. If we follow it, we shall be walking, fully armed, through minefields and among pitfalls. A violent move can bring disaster. Misinformation as to where we are treading, and the sensitiveness of the ground on which we tread, can cause a fatal miscalculation.

Senator SMITH. Just a minute, Dr. Lattimore. It has come to the attention of the Chair, from at least two sources, that at the end of this session a demonstration has been planned in this room.

The Chair wants to state that there will be no demonstration. The Chair has asked officers to come into this room, and the hall, and under no circumstances will we tolerate any demonstration for or against Dr. Lattimore. I hope that it will not be necessary for the officers to arrest anyone, as I have instructed them to do if there is any demonstration whatsoever.

Go ahead, Dr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Gentlemen, of this I am certain: So long as this program of maneuver is our policy, so long as we choose the difficult and great course of peace, we are completely dependent for success on the validity of our information, the skill with which we analyze the information, and the ability not only of our diplomats but of our non-Government, academic, and private research students and analysts. We cannot hope to play this dangerous game, and certainly not to win it, unless we have the facts as to what is going on. Our observers must be allowed to report the facts as they see them, without the fear that their motives will be misconstrued if they tell the truth. We must know the facts favorable to our enemy as well as those that we like. Of equal importance, we must have the views and opinions of all who have any special competence. Their views must be freely stated and stoutly maintained, so that those who have the ultimate decisions to make may have the fullest choice of various alternatives and so that the people may understand the issues at stake.

We cannot, of course, entrust our destiny in any way to those whose first allegiance is to a foreign loyalty, whether that be the Soviet Union, Communist China, Chiang's Formosa, or Franco's Spain. But we must be ever alert to encourage, and not to destroy, freedom for the vigorous expression of views, even of wrong views; and freedom for our private institutions, as well as our official personnel, to make their contributions to the formation of policy and the determination of our destiny. This is the essence of democracy, and it is democracy's strength. It must not be destroyed.

Senator SMITH. Dr. Lattimore, you have finished your prepared statement, I believe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you have been allowed to finish it with the opportunity for such vigor as you wish to express, have you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And with occasional interrogations, Mr. Chairman, as the chairman stated at the beginning.

Senator SMITH. I must say, at the end of this reading by you of a prepared statement, you have been allowed to finish this reading unmolested and with the emphasis you have just demonstrated.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. I just want to make that clear and have it in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask if there is anything that he wanted to say now about this document, or to add to it or subtract from it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not at the moment, Senator, thank you.

Senator SMITH. Then we will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, when the examination of Dr. Lattimore will continue.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, February 29, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Senators Young, McCarthy, and Mundt.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We regret the congested condition of the room, but it is impossible to do otherwise. We hope that we may have quiet.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I was asked yesterday at the close of my statement if I had anything to add. I do have some supplementary material that I should like to be allowed time to assemble over the week end and present later.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, have you ever worked in concert with a person whom you knew to be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever knowingly assisted the Communist Party of any country, or any person or persons known to you to be a Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Institute of Pacific Relations; of course, the Russian members of the Russian Council could be assumed to be Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. But apart from them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Apart from them, no; I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever taken instructions or abided by recommendations made by members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge; no.

Mr. MORRIS. The Communist Party or any other country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever received any orders or instructions or suggestions, directly or indirectly, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I considered to be Communist or pro-Communist at the time?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer?

Mr. MORRIS. I will read it again. [Reading:]

Have you ever received any orders or instructions or suggestions, directly or indirectly, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Orders and instructions, no. Of course, when I went up to Yenan, the Chinese Communist headquarters, in 1937, and later in Chungking under the instructions of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, I did talk with Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. But otherwise your answer is "No"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Otherwise my answer is "No."

The CHAIRMAN. Read that question again, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever received any orders or instructions or suggestions, directly or indirectly, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you fully understand the question, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I considered to be Communist or pro-Communist at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Except for Yenan and Chungking.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Except for Yenan and Chungking.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I don't consider that he has answered the question. When he puts the answer "considered" I do not think he has answered the question at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question again, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Have you ever received any orders, instructions or suggestion, directly or indirectly, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

(Mr. Lattimore consulting counsel.)

Senator FERGUSON. The question is did he know them to be Communists or have information.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I considered to be Communist at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think that that is the answer, and I do not think it calls for time, Mr. Lattimore. I think you should consider the question, if you please. I asked you if you understood it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I understood it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I will have it read again for you if you think you do not understand it or if you have any doubt about the understanding of it, because it is a vital question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I understood it, and I think my answer was clear, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you have made an answer to the question, Mr. Lattimore. In order that you may clarify your situation, I ask the counsel to read the question again.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Have you ever received any orders or instructions or suggestions, directly or indirectly, from any Communist or pro-Communist source?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I considered to be Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Except in the case of Chungking and Yenan.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, and there it is only a question of having conversations with them, and I don't remember anything there that could be considered a suggestion, much less an instruction.

The CHAIRMAN. Or an order.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or an order.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever consciously conformed your actions or your expressions of opinion with any Communist policy or Communist directive?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. When you were editor of the publication Pacific Affairs did you ever publish an article by a person whom you knew to be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Apart from Russian contributions, no.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were editor of Pacific Affairs did you publish articles by persons whom you subsequently learned were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; learned or believed to be now.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Mr. Field, and I suppose I should include any of those who have refused to testify before this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that James S. Allen was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't. To the best of my recollection, I knew nothing about him prior to his article coming in.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to——

Mr. LATTIMORE. His article being submitted.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, during the time you were editor of Pacific Affairs——

Mr. LATTIMORE. During the time.

Mr. MORRIS (continued). Right up to the middle of 1941, did you ever know that James S. Allen was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know that Joseph Barnes was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Again during the term of your editorship of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then or ever.

Mr. MORRIS. That term is applied to all of these questions. The term "while you were an editor of Pacific Affairs" is applied to all of the questions I am now asking.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I see; yes.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Morris, I think probably he ought to be asked if he has ever been told by anyone that they were Communists during that time, in addition to the question you have asked.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever told that James S. Allen was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever told that Joseph Barnes was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Kathleen Barnes was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Mr. T. A. Bisson was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Chi-Chao-ting was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Chen Han-seng was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Frederick V. Field was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Michael Greenberg was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know or were you ever told that Y. Y. Hsu was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know or were you ever told that Olga Lang was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Harriet Moore was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Lawrence K. Rosinger was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Guenther Stein was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Edgar Snow was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever told that he was pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't consider him pro-Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, "Did you know?" I think you can answer that "Yes" or "No," Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge, he was not pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Andrew J. Steiger or were you ever told that Andrew J. Steiger was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Anna Louise Strong was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know or were you ever told that Mary Van Kleeck was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or have you ever been told that Nym Wales was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know or were you ever told that Ella Winter was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. SOURWINE. If I might interrupt, by the witness' answer to each of those questions "No; I don't believe I ever was," do you intend the "I don't believe I ever was" to refer to the portion of the question about having been told?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I include that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the "No" go both to the question of knowing and of having been told whether the person was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In each instance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Senator FERGUSON. So, even though there are two questions, you are answering both of them "No"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am answering both of them, to both parts of the question, that I don't believe I ever was.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you qualifying that answer?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute, now. Put the question again.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you answer both parts of the questions, all of the questions, "No"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I answered both parts of all the questions "No; I don't believe I ever was."

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Are you qualifying the "No" there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am qualifying that I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. SOURWINE. The statement "I don't believe I ever was" is not a completely responsive answer to the question, did you know So-an-So was a Communist. That is all I was getting at.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it certainly is intended to be responsive, Mr. Sourwine.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean to answer "No"; do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I mean to answer "No"; that I don't believe I ever was. After all, my memory is not perfect. I am being asked about people with some of whom I had extremely slight contact many years ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, if I ask you "Did you ever know that Y. Y. Hsu was a Communist?" and you say, "No", I don't believe I ever was," it is not completely responsive. Do you see what I mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I was asked if I know or was I ever told——

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That he was a Communist, and I don't believe I ever was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ever was told.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Ever was told.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically on the question of did you know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I don't believe I ever knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. That is your answer to each of these series of questions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I wanted to know.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you qualifying the word "no?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am saying that I don't believe I ever knew or was told.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think that is responsive to the question.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not responsive because he can say "No," and that would answer the question. It is a complete answer to the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, it would be a complete answer to the question if I had a total memory, but I just don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever told that Victor A. Yakontoff was frankly pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. At any time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man who used the pen name of Asiaticus?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never knew him. I received articles from him which I published.

Mr. MORRIS. Did not all of the above 21 persons contribute leading articles to Pacific Affairs while you were editor of Pacific Affairs? Allen, Barnes, Kathleen Barnes, Bisson, Chi, Chen Han-seng, Field, Greenberg, Hsu, Lang, Moore, Rosinger, Stein, Snow, Steiger, Anna Louise Strong, Mary Van Kleeck, Nym Wales, Ella Winter, Victor Yakontoff, and Asiaticus?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not be able to reply offhand that they all contributed at all or that they contributed leading articles.

The CHAIRMAN. You weren't asked about leading articles. You were asked did they contribute articles.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think I asked about leading articles.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(Mr. Lattimore conferring with counsel.)

The CHAIRMAN. Did they contribute leading articles while you were editor of the magazine?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to refresh your recollection?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right if he wants to refresh his recollection.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have a list here of contributors to Pacific Affairs, Mr. Chairman. I would like to consult it.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did you say that Michael Greenberg was on that list?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; Michael Greenberg.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My list here, which may not be correct, shows a contribution from him in September 1941, which would be after the period of my editorship.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. You didn't prepare for that edition.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much is the lag, Mr. Lattimore, in your magazine? That is, what is your schedule? What is the time period between preparation and going to press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This was a quarterly magazine, and therefore the timing of a quarterly magazine is rather leisurely. Some of the articles came from abroad. So some articles would be, so to speak, in the works for more than the period between two issues. The closing date before going to press when I was editing for China was rather long, naturally, because I had to send the final material from China. Then when I was editing it from Baltimore it was naturally very much shorter, but I don't remember just what the time limit was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was a month, 6 weeks, 2 months?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It may have been of the order of 6 weeks or so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did you say that Y. Y. Hsu was on your list, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have him on my list at all. That may be a mistake on my part.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the answer, did he or did he not? After you consult your list, I would like to have you answer the question completely.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In that case my list may not be absolutely correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Would your list show a translation done by him, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Possibly there may have been a translation by him that wouldn't show in my list.

Mr. MORRIS. You would have the original listed there, not the translation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough on that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you have an answer to the question. Do you have your question there?

Mr. MORRIS. With the exception of those two, Mr. Lattimore——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am going on through the list——

The CHAIRMAN. Consult your list and then answer the question. [Mr. Lattimore examining document.]

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think those are the only exceptions I would make, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Otherwise your answer is "Yes," Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That they contributed to Pacific Affairs during the period when I was editor of it.

Mr. MORRIS. There was a further qualification, that it was leading articles, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Leading articles would be a question of subjective judgment, and I am not sure whether I would qualify all those contributions as leading articles.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the distinction of an article rather than a review in Pacific Affairs?

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that, how about a distinction? I don't think your question is clear.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Pacific Affairs is made up of a series of articles and a series of book reviews. There is a distinction between the two. In fact, you have them listed separate, do you not, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Make your question complete.

Mr. Morris. Would you testify that they contributed articles as opposed to reviews?

Mr. Lattimore. I see. I think there is a further distinction to be made, that Pacific Aflairs——

The Chairman. First of all, answer that question and then see if there is a further distinction to be made.

Mr. Lattimore. I believe that they all contributed articles; yes, not reviews.

The Chairman. If you wish to make a further distribution, you may do so.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. I was simply going to state that Pacific Affairs included at the beginning of the magazine, articles. Then there was a section called "comment and opinion" or "comment and criticism," or something of that sort, which would be in a quarterly magazine more or less the equivalant of a letters to the editor section, and then came the book reviews.

Mr. Morris. If you use the term "leading articles," what would you describe as a leading article, in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. Lattimore. I would put it in the article section, but would not include the comment and criticism section.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, have you testified in executive session before this committee that you did not know Asiaticus to be a Communist and in your opinion he was a Socialist?

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I did; yes.

Mr. Morris. Is the chairman satisfied with that answer? We will have Mr. Lattimore's answer read into the record. He said he believed he did.

The Chairman. Let us have it.

Mr. Lattimore. I am speaking from my recollection.

Mr. Morris. I understand you can't be expected to remember it word for word.

Senator Ferguson. No. Show it to him and ask him if that is true.

Mr. Sourwine. I have it here.

The Chairman. Show him the record and he may answer.

Mr. Sourwine. You will find it on that page, Mr. Lattimore [Mr. Lattimore examining transcript].

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, my statement is that testimony was, "I don't know he was a Communist. I would have said, speaking as of the late 1930's, that I would have thought he was possibly a Socialist, but not a Communist."

Mr. Morriss. All right. Mr. Lattimore, did you not testify in executive session before this committee that you did not know that Asiaticus was a Marxist?

Mr. Lattimore. May I see the transcript?

Mr. Morris. Yes. That is on page 87.

Mr. Lattimore. I testified, "I didn't know whether he was a Marxist or not. I thought he was a left-winger."

May I add there that this was many years ago, and my memory may not have been perfectly accurate. Also I would like to add that I certainly did not consider myself then and don't consider myself even now an authority on who is a Marxist and who isn't.

Mr. Morris. To your qnowledge was Asiaticus——

The CHAIRMAN. The reference to many years ago doesn't refer to the record you have in your hands, does it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was not in the record. I am adding that now, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but you said your memory many years ago. You did not refer to the record that you made that was handed to you today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't refer to it at the time. I said I wanted to add that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chairman means this record was not made many years ago.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was just adding a clarification.

Mr. SOURWINE. This record was on July 13, 1951.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might the record be clear as to what was in the record of the executive session and what he added? I am not clear what he added.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the record should be clear on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel may read the record.

Senator FERGUSON. So it will be clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Asiaticus was under discussion. Mr. Morris said:

And yet, Mr. Lattimore, you were able to recommend him as a qualified performer for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Lattimore said:

I didn't recommend him. He wrote in some material for me which I thought was a good article on the subject and I published it. One of his articles was on railway loans in China at the turn of the century, the late 1890's and the early 1900's. It concerned some of the British Railway loans of that period. I sent the article, as I always did in such cases, to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, and they disagreed with some of his interpretations but not with his statements of facts.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew at the time he was at least a Marxist, didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know whether he was a Marxist or not. I thought he was a left-winger.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that term, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a vague term which it is extremely difficult to make precise.

In connection with the other matter——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's not get that confused with the other matter.

Mr .SOURWINE. I mean the other mention of Asiaticus.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Asiaticus had any part in the inquiry conducted by the Institute of Pacific Relations, the long inquiry that you people conducted in the late thirties?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't answer that. I was not in charge of the inquiry and I don't know who did participate and who didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall that you commended Mr. Carter on the selection of Asiaticus on that inquiry?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't have been at all surprised. I thought he was a good economist who knew economic conditions in China pretty well.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is your testimony that you did not know he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know he was a Communist. I would have said, speaking as of the late 1930's, that I would have thought he was possibly a Socialist, but not a Communist.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you testify in executive session that you did not know that Asiaticus had written for Imprecorr, the official publication of the Communist International?

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I did.

Mr. Morris. Page 86 and page 88.

The Chairman. Show that to him. [Mr. Lattimore examining document.]

Mr. Lattimore. The question here from Mr. Morris was, "Did you know that he had written for Imprecorr." And, "Mr. Lattimore: No; I didn't."

May I add at this time that I doubt very much whether I knew in the 1930's that there was such a thing as Imprecorr.

Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, Mr. Lattimore, was Asiaticus considered a Marxist in IPR circles?

Mr. Lattimore. I couldn't answer that, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Do you have knowledge that he was considered a Marxist?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't think I do. I don't know and I don't think I ever did.

Mr. Morris. I see. Did you know that Asiaticus had written a book published in Berlin under Communist auspices entitled "From Shanghai to Canton"?

Mr. Lattimore. Here I am speaking from recollection which is not at all precise, but I believe I may have been told that by Wittfogel.

Mr. Morris. Did you know that he had written the book From Shanghai to Canton from your own knowledge?

Mr. Lattimore. Not from my own knowledge, no.

Mr. Morris. Did you read the book?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Morris. What names did you know Asiaticus by? Did you know him by the name of Shippe?

Mr. Lattimore. Shippe, or Shipper; yes.

Mr. Morris. Hans Mueller?

Mr. Lattimore. Hans Mueller? I don't think I did.

Mr. Morris. Any other name?

Mr. Lattimore. No, Not that I recall.

Mr. Morris. When you corresponded with him you corresponded with him in the name of Shippe; is that your testimony?

Mr. Lattimore. That is my recollection, yes.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, how many articles did Asiaticus write for you while you were editor of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. Lattimore. My list here shows four.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, so we will be sure we are talking about the same man, I show you a volume of Pacific Affairs. Which one is that?

Mr. Lattimore. This is volume 9 for June 1936.

Mr. Morris. Does that contain an article by Asiaticus?

Mr. Lattimore. It contains an article by Asiaticus.

Mr. Sourwine. May I see that, Mr. Lattimore? Mr. Lattimore, are any of these people who wrote for this particular issue of Pacific Affairs, Communists so far as you know?

Mr. Lattimore. Not of my personal knowledge.

Mr. Sourwine. Harriet Moore?

Mr. Lattimore. Not of my personal knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Asiaticus?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Not of my personal knowledge.
Mr. SOURWINE. Guenther Stein?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Not of my personal knowledge.
Mr. SOURWINE. Lin Yu?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Not of my personal knowledge.
Mr. SOURWINE. Wang Yu-Ch'uan?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Wait a minute. Lin Yu I don't even remember.
Mr. SOURWINE. He wrote "Twin Loyalties in Siam."
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.
Mr. SOURWINE. Wang Yu-Chuan?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. H. J. Timperley?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. W. Wynne Williams?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't even recall him.
Mr. SOURWINE. C. J. Robertson?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't even recall him.
Mr. SOURWINE. A. Arthur Schiller?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall him.
Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say, then, that there are no Communist writers represented in that issue of the magazine; that is, the June 1936 issue?
Mr. LATTIMORE. In that issue certainly to the extent of my knowledge at the time as editor, no.
Senator WATKINS. May I inquire just what do you mean by your personal knowledge? Are you seeking to make a distinction between that and their reputation?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No. What name was read here? Harriet Moore? I have no personal knowledge that she is a Communist.
Senator WATKINS. Was she reputed at that time to be a Communist?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. I don't remember hearing that.
Senator WATKINS. Was she generally considered so in your IPR circle?
Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1936?
Senator WATKINS. Yes.
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of those persons reputed to be Communists as far as you know?
Mr. LATTIMORE. On this list?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read into the record at this time the testimony of Mr. Wittfogel that appears at 309 in the open session?
Mr. MANDEL. I read from the testimony of August Wittfogel, dated August 7, 1951, on page 309, part I of the hearings, reading as follows——
Senator FERGUSON. Just one moment.
Senator WATKINS. What hearings, Mr. Mandel?
Mr. MANDEL. Hearings before this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Quoting:

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The Chi story I have told. No doubt I have said I discussed it with Lattimore. The Asiaticus story I told you and I talked to Lattimore after he came back here. We talked about Asiaticus, too, several times. I told him the story the way I knew it; I told Lattimore that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read what the reference is to, Mr. Mandel, on page 308?

Mr. MANDEL. On page 308 Dr. Wittfogel says in answer to Mr. Morris' question:

Will you relate to us the circumstance of your meeting a man known as Asiaticus in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. The name Asiaticus was known to me in Germany as the name of a German Communist who had held a leading position in the German party, who was known as Heinz Moeller, and who I think in the middle of the twenties left Germany. His faction was defeated, and one of the ways of leaders of such groups would be to make themselves useful in Moscow and be reassigned, as Gerhardt Eisler was later on.

This man went to China and participated in the early developments of the expansion of the Kuomintang regime, when there was cooperation with the Communist Party at that time, from Canton into Yangtze Valley up to 1927. And Moeller, who, like I think a number of other Communists held a position in the Kuomintang government, and Mr. Stalin would say "apparatus."

He worked there in some kind of press or publicity——

Mr. FORTAS. That is "as." I think you misread a word.

Mr. MANDEL (reading).

as Mr. Stalin would say "apparatus."

He worked in some kind of press or publicity center and put his articles or some others together in a book which was published I think in 1928 in Germany under the title, translated, "From Canton to Shanghai."

Mr. MORRIS. Did a Communist publishing house publish that Dr. Wittfogel?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes, that is right, in Germany, and I was interested. He was a protege of Gerhardt Eisler's, and I think this was not a very good book.

Mr. MORRIS. Keep going.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. [Reading:]

It was poorly written, and I think it was dull stuff. So I inquired about the circumstances and I heard more about this Heinz Moeller. It was published at that time. It was just before the fall of Eisler; and Eisler wanted it, and he was then powerful. The book was printed.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you met Asiaticus in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I met him in the house of, I think, some doctor, some people from Europe who I don't think were political. I don't remember any details about them. They said there was a man who would like to see me, and he introduced himself as Asiaticus-Moeller. He told me he had been expelled—maybe I knew it, I don't remember exactly how this came about—from the party but that he had made his peace with the great father in the Kremlin and that he had been back in Moscow and that he was in good standing again, and at that time he was writing for Izvestia, which would indicate indeed he was in good standing.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you did meet him in Shanghai in 1937?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, I would like to present to you a copy of a letter which we introduced into our official files here as exhibit No. 4 on the first day of the hearings.

Mr. MORRIS. That is enough, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. Mandel, will you get the next document? Will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Meeting on Pacific affairs,

April 8; Motiliev, Voitinsky, ECC, OL, Harondar, HM." And there is a penciled notation which is photostated, marked "1936."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this document, and ask you if you ever have seen this before.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it that you want him to see the original?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have ever seen it before.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember a meeting in April 8, 1936, in Moscow in which those people enumerated there were present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall one or more meetings with members of the Soviet group of IPR. I couldn't tell you how many and I couldn't tell you the exact dates. I am perfectly willing to accept that this is the record of one of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I wonder if you would read on page 3 the full paragraph beginning with "O. L." The reference "O. L." is to you, is it not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read aloud that paragraph, please, Mr. Lattimore? Will you read this aloud, please, this paragraph?

Mr. FORTAS. Did you say the third paragraph?

Mr. MORRIS. No, the only paragraph beginning with "O. L." The larger paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. [Reading:]

O. L. asked if Motiliev had received both his long letters on the question of P. A. and Motiliev said that he had only received the second. O. L. said that his main difficulties had been two: (1) When he took over the editorship of P. A.—

That is Pacific Affairs—

it was after the last conference, and he and E. C. C.—

That is Mr. Carter.

did not want to determine a definite policy alone, since that would be a one-sided, American decision. Therefore, no very clear policy was determined and this is to be done at Yosemite, he hopes. (2) He has had trouble getting material from the different councils. The lack of articles on——

The CHAIRMAN. Will you raise your voice a little. I cannot hear you.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Japan is not the lack of asking. The Japanese council has promised articles on rice, silk, and the cooperative movement. In the first five issues, it was never known whether there would be enough material until a week before the magazine went to press. At the beginning P. A. had no prestige and it was difficult to get people to write for it. Some of the articles in the first issues are padding, due to lack of material. Likewise, the Soviet council did not send in its articles. The one article received from them was made the leading article. It has only been in the last 2 or 3 months that O. L. has felt that he could freely turn down articles. In the case of the Isaacs article, there was not enough material for that issue. The Chinese council did not object to the article and would give no answer to it and no other article on the same subject. It is impossible to get in touch with the Chinese Communists to get an answer from them. O. L. did not know about the writer in China Today or he would have tried to get the answer published in P. A. rather than in China Today. However, when it was published in China Today, the question came up whether the precedent should be set of republishing materials from other magazines. It had never been done, and P. A. was supposed to publish new material. Therefore O. L. decided to print an extract of the answer and give it a prominent place. O. L. had previously tried to get other articles on the Chinese Revolution, but this was the only one he could get. It was made a leading article in New York. In the next issue of P. A. there is to be an

article by a Communist writer which is antagonistic to the Chinese council and the British council. He likewise does not represent the Soviet council. This will be a leading article and will represent a personal opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the end of the paragraph?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue reading, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought you just wanted that one paragraph.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a new paragraph?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is enough, then.

The CHAIRMAN. No. It goes over on the next page.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. [Reading:]

Motiliev said that it would be better to put as leading articles one that represented the point of view of one of the councils. O. L. said that he was prepared to consider this idea——

Mr. SOURWINE. Actually the difference is that counsel and the Senators are looking at a mimeographed copy. Mr. Lattimore is looking at the photostat of the original. I believe as the photostat shows it, he has ended the reading of the paragraph. On the mimeographed copy it goes over to the top of the next page, and it can't be determined whether it is a new paragraph or the same paragraph because they are not indented.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you testified before the Tydings Committee that you did not know Dr. Chi to be a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I probably did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we had better read into the record, Mr. Mandel, page 887 of the Tydings committee hearings.

Mr. Chairman, will that last document be received into the record?

Mr. SOURWINE. As identified by Mr. Mandel as coming from the files of IPR and as being the document commented upon by the witness. Here is the page of the Tydings transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one question which I think the witness has already answered. The letters "O. L." stand for Owen Lattimore; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You so understand that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, this is the Tydings hearings——

Senator SMITH. I think Dr. Lattimore made it clear, but lest it may not be, the photostatic copy from which he read was a photostat of the original. Have you seen that before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I ever saw it before

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask a question of Mr. Mandel. Mr. Mandel, is this a true and correct photostatic copy of an original instrument found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 478" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 478

MEETING ON PACIFIC AFFAIRS; APRIL 8; MOTILIEV, VOITINSKY, ECC; OL; HARONDAR; HM

Voitinsky said that the magazine had been reviewed twice in Tikhii Okean and there the general opinion about it had been stated. Such a magazine which is important should have a definite aim. Although different opinions are expressed

in it, there should be a general line in it and this should be the struggle for peace. The general tenor of the articles should be to show that collective security is the only possible way to peace. This aim is so wide that it can be supported by writers of all shades of opinion. At present the magazine has no line and this is the main weakness.

Voitinsky said that the article by Whyte is interesting but incorrect in its approach. It is a program article, about IPR policy. It treats China and Japan on the same footing and shows no aggressor. How can there be an objective study of the Pacific if no aggressor is shown. Whyte says that the causes of the Pacific problems are internal—in China, currency; in Japan, lack of raw materials—and England and America should help to solve these problems. But when no aggressor is recognized, the proposals are idealistic and weak, for it is impossible to introduce a new economic policy before the aggressor is stopped.

Voitinsky said that in PA China is not treated as a subject, only as an object. Therefore the writers neglect the possibility of China itself affecting the solution of China's problems. This is historically incorrect, and it makes it impossible for students of the question to understand the current movements within China. The Isaaks article, which is written at a very low level and is incorrect, is an attempt to show something about the internal situation in China.

Voitinsky said that there was little in PA on the internal situation in Japan. This is due to the fact that Japan is not regarded as an aggressor. But it is important to know how strong Japan is socially and economically internally. Likewise there is little on the question of nationalities—about Mongolia, and the colonies in the Far East. No effort is made to show that Japan is trying to exploit national culture and national feelings. In fact O. L. in his earlier articles gave Japan the benefit of the doubt and said that Japan might help these peoples.

O. L. asked if the article on the Japanese Monroe Doctrine was not about these questions. Voitinsky said that it was good about the juridicial aspects. But since the magazine represents an organization which is struggling for peace, there were much greater possibilities for writing on these subjects.

E. C. C. said that the constitution of the IPR states as its object the study of the conditions of the peoples on the Pacific. There is a controversy within the institute as to whether the object is entirely scientific study, or active effort to maintain peace.

O. L. said that the review of the magazine in Tikhii Okean was entirely correct when it said that PA reflects the chaotic conditions in the opinions in capitalistic countries.

Motiliev said that if the object is to reflect the conditions and life of the peoples, still PA does not study the real social and economic life inside the countries—not in Japan, Korea, and other colonies. An objective study would inevitably show exploitation by the Japanese. Likewise the internal conditions of China are not shown—what are the causes of the rise of red China; what are the causes of the contradictions in China; what are the tendencies within China. The same is true about Australia and the U. S. S. R.

O. L. asked if Kathleen Barnes' article did not give something on the United States. Motiliev said that it only gave one side of the picture of the Soviet Far East.

Motiliev said that even if the aim of PA was to characterize the general conditions, it was impossible to do this without a definite idea about them. When no definite idea is given for a magazine, the wrong idea is conveyed by it. If there is no position taken on the problem of Japan's aggression in China, which is now the fundamental problem in the Pacific, then it seems as if the wrong position had been taken. In practice PA gives a definite political analysis, which is one-sided and therefore incorrect. For instance the Eggleston article fully justifies Japan, and tries to prove that England and the United States are to blame for the far-eastern situation. O. L. pointed out that this article reflects a definite body of opinion. Motiliev said that he was not against publishing this article, but also PA must give an analysis of the contradictions that are found in Eggleston's analysis. This is very difficult to do, because the IPR has members in all countries involved. But in order to satisfy most of the members of the institute, Motiliev thinks, it is necessary that PA have a definite political position. As a result of the present absence of such a position, the magazine is in fact directed against the ideal of peace. Even if the IPR doesn't aim to work for peace, it certainly does not aim for war.

E. C. C. said that the magazine is not the whole of the institute. In some of the other IPR work these analyses of internal conditions are being given,

e. g., a book will appear this month by a Japanese on Japanese penetration of mandated islands; a study is completed by a Korean on land utilization in Korea; a study is being done on agricultural organization in New Zealand which shows the waste that there has been in the land policy there; the book Key Economic Areas in Chinese History is written by a Marxist and gives an analysis of Chinese internal development. O. L. said that in the next issue there was to be an article on the rise of land taxes and the fall of dynasties in Chinese history, which was written by a Chinese, treating China as a subject, not an object. E. C. C. said that PA will be without focus until the Soviet members contribute to it regularly. PA has never received the article from Voitinsky on agrarian problems in China. When Soviet articles appear regularly, they will make the issues clearer and will show up the negative quality of many of the other articles.

Motiliev said that another way to accomplish this was through greater objectivity in the editorial work. For instance the Isaacs article on Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution is written on a very low level and is incorrect. An article on this question by a bourgeois journalist of good standing would be interesting. But this is a Trotskyist article which doesn't reflect the opinion of any of the councils of the IPR. A very serious answer to this article was published in China Today, but only extracts from this answer were printed in PA. Motiliev said that the Soviet Council could not answer this article, but he had suggested that some of the Chinese leaders give an answer. Motiliev said he did not know who the editor of China Today is, but his answer expressed the opinion of 50 million Chinese. Motiliev asked why this article was made the leading article. The leading article should express the opinion of some one of the member Councils. Motiliev said that in general he did not think the magazine was objective, although some of its objects, such as trying to show different shades of opinions, were carried out. The Isaacs article is only one example. For instance the article on Fisheries, while on the whole objective, contains some incorrect information. Possibly this was due to the fact that the author did not know the facts. Motiliev wrote to O. L. about these inaccuracies and nothing appeared in PA about them. In general Motiliev thought that O. L. made it more difficult for himself by publishing leading articles like the Isaacs article and not publishing the answers to them.

O. L. asked if Motiliev had received both his long letters on the question of PA and Motiliev said that he had only received the second. O. L. said that his main difficulties had been two: 1. When he took over the editorship of PA, it was after the last conference, and he and E. C. C. did not want to determine a definite policy alone, since that would be a one-sided, American decision. Therefore no very clear policy was determined and this is to be done at Yosemite, he hopes. 2. He has had trouble getting material from the different councils. The lack of articles on Japan is not for lack of asking. The Japanese Council has promised articles on rice, silk, and the cooperative movement. In the first five issues, it was never known whether there would be enough material until a week before the magazine went to press. At the beginning PA had no prestige and it was diflicult to get people to write for it. Some of the articles in the first issues are padding, due to lack of material. Likewise, the Soviet Council did not send in its articles. The one article received from them was made the leading article. It has only been in the last 2 or 3 months that O. L. has felt that he could freely turn down articles. In the case of the Isaacs article, there was not enough material for that issue. The Chinese Council did not object to the article and would give no answer to it and no other article on the same subject. It is impossible to get in touch with the Chinese Communists to get an answer from them. O. L. did not know about the writer in China Today or he would have tried to get the answer published in PA rather than in China Today. However, when it was published in China Today, the question came up whether the precedent should be set of republishing materials from other magazines. It had never been done, and PA was supposed to publish new material. Therefore O. L. decided to print an extract of the answer and give it a prominent place. O. L. had previously tried to get other articles on the Chinese Revolution, but this was the only one he could get. It was made a leading article in New York. In the next issue of PA there is to be an article by a Communist writer which is antagonistic to the Chinese Council and the British Council. He likewise does not represent the Soviet Council. This will be a leading article and will represent a personal opinion.

Motiliev said that it would be better to put as leading articles one that represented the point of view of one of the councils. O. L. said that he was prepared

to consider this idea, but often before he has not had an important article which represented a council. O. L. said that if the Soviet group would show in their articles a general line—a struggle for peace—the other articles would naturally gravitate to that line. O. L. said that he had no organizational authority to tell the councils what kind of articles they should send in. He hopes that this will be settled at Yosemite.

Motiliev said that it was a dangerous editorial mistake to publish the Chamberlin review. It is not because the review was about a book by Stalin, but because in the same review there was a review of a book by Chernavin. This is a very important political question for them here.

They have no objection to having Stalin's book reviewed and they are willing to answer a review, but the review must be done with due respect, to a person in Stalin's position. Motiliev asked why the book was given to Chamberlin who was known to be so anti-Soviet. (Incidentally Chamberlin's book has not been received here for reviewing.)

O. L. said that he had not realized Chamberlin's position, but as soon as he learned of the Soviet opinion about Chamberlain, he canceled an article on the Soviet press which he had asked from Chamberlin.

Voitinsky said that he had not entirely understood E. C. C.'s answer to the question of the aim of the institute. Voitinsky said that recently many organizations which had previously had no political opinions were taking definite positions. The IPR is a big organization and is a kind of unofficial league in the Pacific. Whyte in his article says that part of the aim of the IPR is to find a solution for the situation in the Pacific. Therefore the IPR must take some line on this question. Voitinsky said that he thought the IPR and PA must have as its aim the struggle for peace—through scientific study and research aimed in that direction. Voitinsky said that last year this point was not urged here, because the Soviet group was still new in the IPR, but more because the objective situation was not what it is today.

ECC said that this change in attitude toward political questions in the IPR was already reflected in the change in the agenda for the fifth round table. Originally this was to be about the changing balance of power in the Pacific—just an objective appraisal of the shifting balance. Now it is to discuss methods of peaceful change and solution of the problem.

O. L. said that he was willing to have P. A. reflect such a line, but these positive ideas can only be started positively. He cannot dictate to the other councils what they must write. He must first have an original article taking a stand, and this will make the others write to that point.

Voitinsky said that it would be possible to answer the Whyte article.

O. L. pointed out that his articles in PA had been criticized in Tikhii Okean, but never in PA. He said that when Motiliev wrote to him about the fisheries article, he had sent the corrections to New York, but they were too late to be included in the original article. He did not know that Motiliev wanted to have sections of his letter published. O. L. has considered starting a letter section in PA, but to date there hasn't been enough material to make it possible.

ECC said that the Isaacs and Chamberlin articles were great mistakes, and would not be repeated in the future. H. M. said that O. L. had nothing to do with the Chamberlin reviews. That was done on the responsibility of the New York Office.

Motiliev suggested that there be articles on some of the following: (1) Internal relations in China, Japan, and the Japanese colonies. (2) Economic development of the U. S. S. R. as a whole and the Soviet Far East. (3) General conditions in the Pacific, the contradictions between countries, the question of war and peace. Articles like Eggleston's should be printed, but they should be criticized and answered.

O. L. said that he tried to get an answer to this article from many people, but they all said that it was the opinion of the Australian Council and that there was no need to answer it. Voitinsky said that the American council should have answered it.

Motiliev made the following proposals as to organization of the magazine. A. The leading article should always express the opinion of a definite council. It is customary to have the leading article more or less official. B. Articles by unknown and irresponsible writers should not be published on important questions. But there should be articles by leading personalities who are of interest, no matter what they represent; e. g., Bywater and Asiaticus. C. There should not be criticisms of books and opinions of the leading personalities of the various member countries. It is unnecessary to have such criticism, it is not part of the work of the IPR, and it embarrasses the members of the councils.

Voitinsky said that now the Soviet group would try to write articles for PA. O. L. said that if they would start it would give him a stronger hand with the other councils. The British have been good about providing articles so far, but the other councils have not been so good.

O. L. said that he wanted a Soviet review of the Webb book. Voitinsky said that it could be reviewed.

X I e KING EDWARD
STALIN
HIROHITO

The CHAIRMAN. What is the next question? I think you were asked to read, were you not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked that it be given to the witness so that the question may be asked of him if he did so testify before the Tydings hearings.

(Mr. Lattimore examining document.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question is from Senator Hickenlooper:

During your acquaintance with Mr. Chi prior to the war or during the war did you believe him to be or did you learn him to be a Communist at any time?

Dr. LATTIMORE—

It should have been Mr. Lattimore, of course.

Dr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; no, sir.

Is that all you want me to read?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. You had two answers, meaning you answered both; yes sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I just repeated my answer, I suppose. I am reading the transcript.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that answers counsel's question.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify before this committee in executive session that you never at any time knew that Dr. Chi was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I probably did. May I see the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Executive session, 155, top of the page.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Question by Mr. Morris:

Dr. Lattimore, did you ever at any time know that Dr. Chi was a Communist?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Young Dr. Chi?
Mr. MORRIS. Young Dr. Chi.
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you testify in executive session that only on one occasion did you meet Dr. Chi's father in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I testified that I met Dr. Chi's father in China only on one occasion. Later my memory was refreshed and I wrote in to the committee explaining that I met him twice.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked what you testified to.

Mr. MORRIS. You did testify to that effect and you did also send a letter to the committee stating that you had learned otherwise.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the letter you sent to the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is the letter, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter be received into the record as a change that Mr. Lattimore wanted to make in his testimony in the executive session before this committee?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. If that is the case, the witness should adopt this letter as his testimony now. I assume that is his desire.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Except, of course, that he does go on record to show that he learned this some time ago and not today.

Mr. SOURWINE. He adopts this letter as written as his testimony now.

The CHAIRMAN. There is your letter; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 479" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 479

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Baltimore 18, Md., September 2, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: It is my recollection that in executive session of your subcommittee on July 13 I was asked about meeting Prof. K. C. Chi, then Commissioner of Education in Shansi Province, in China, in 1937, and that I confirmed that I had. It is further my recollection that I was asked whether I had met him in China on any other occasion, and that I replied that I could not remember that I had.

It has now been drawn to my attention that in a public session of your subcommittee Dr. K. A. Wittfogel testified that he and I had met Professor Chi, also in Shansi Province, in 1935. This testimony has refreshed my memory, and I wish to confirm that I did meet Professor Chi in 1935, in company with Dr. Wittfogel and, if I remember rightly, Dr. Woodbridge Bingham. I believe also that I remember that Professor Chi was advised beforehand of our coming to call on him by Dr. Walter Judd, now Representative Judd, who was then a missionary in that province, and whose mission was on cordial terms with the Chi family.

I wish to add to my previous testimony accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

[s] Owen Lattimore.
[t] OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: c.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify in executive session before this committee that you had no reason to believe that Dr. Chi could be a Communist? That is 155.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again young Dr. Chi?

Mr. MORRIS. Young Dr. Chi.

(Mr. Lattimore examining transcript.)

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Senator FERGUSON. And you had no reasons to believe that he could be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Had anyone ever told you he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough.

Mr. Lattimore, did you in executive session before this committee testify that no one ever told you that Dr. Chi was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably.

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't you just read it there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You are referring to this? Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Your answer is "Yes"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer was "Yes"; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify in executive session before this committee that no one had related to you the circumstances, the inevitable conclusion of which would have been that Chi was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I just read that in the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. That is page 156, another place, Mr. Lattimore. You may want to see it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did see it just now.

Mr. MORRIS. Very good. Your answer is "Yes"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever receive an official report to the effect that Dr. Chi was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify before this committee that you did not have any reasonable grounds to believe that Dr. Chi was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. 155.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is my testimony:

In the case of Dr. Chi, my principal contact with him was during the war years, when he was holding extremely high and confidential positions under the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had no reasons to believe that he could be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read further? I think there is another reference there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Had anyone ever told you he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. So your answer to that last question is——

Mr. LATTIMORE. That that was my testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify before this committee in executive session that you had no evidence that he might be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so.

Mr. SOURWINE. The same page, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What was that page?

Mr. SOURWINE. 155.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What was the question?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question again.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify before this committee in executive session that you had no evidence that he might be a Communist?

The CHAIRMAN. Page 155 of the executive hearing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any evidence that they might be Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the case of Miss Chomeley I knew her much too little to have an authoritative opinion one way or another.

In the case of Dr. Chi, my principal contact with him was during the war years, when he was holding extremely high and confidential positions under the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did you testify before this committee in executive session that you had no evidence that he might be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson then goes on:

And you had no reasons to believe that he could be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. So what is the answer to that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Had anyone ever told you that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Had anyone ever related to you the circumstances, the inevitable conclusion of which would have been that he was a Communist?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, the answer was "No"?
Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer was "No."
The CHAIRMAN. Then the answer to this question is "Yes," that he so testified?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that is the same question, Mr. Morris; is it?
Mr. MORRIS. May I see page 155, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. FORTAS. The record speaks for itself.
Mr. SOURWINE. The record does speak for itself. It has been read here now by the witness and it is a part of the record. There is no point in quibbling over what it said.
Mr. FORTAS. That is how I characterize it. I agree with you.
Mr. SOURWINE. I think counsel's original question was intended to simplify it, but it hasn't turned out that way.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify that Dr. Chi, as far as your contacts with him were concerned, held an extremely high and confidential position in the Chinese Nationalist Government?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Dr. Chi wrote for China Today under the name of Hansu Chan?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I ever knew that.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know it at all?
Mr. LATTIMORE. My memory is not clear. It may have been in one of the transcripts of this committee that I have read.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the testimony on page 81 of the executive session, the executive session with Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. SOURWINE. If it is Mr. Lattimore's testimony, why not give it to him and ask him if he testified that way? This is a part of the record.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read page 81—your testimony on that page relative to this question?
The CHAIRMAN. Read the question again, Mr. Morris.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he wrote for China Today as Hansu Chan?
Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he contributed to China Today?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I learned that some time ago. I didn't know it at the time that I knew him.
Mr. MORRIS. Did he not make a contribution under a pseudonym?
Mr. LATTIMORE. So I have been told.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what the pseudonym was?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Mr. MORRIS. When were you told that, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that was in some publication by Kohlberg or some other member of the China Lobby.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you told that Dr. Chi wrote for China Today?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I think my answer in executive session covers my recollection of it, Mr. Morris.
Mr. MORRIS. And what is that, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. LATTIMORE. That I read about it in some publication.
Mr. MORRIS. Can you give us the date?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that China Today was a Communist or pro-Communist publication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify before the Tydings committee that you did not know the New China Daily News to be Communist in 1942 or 1943?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I amplify my answer on the subject of China Today?

Mr. MORRIS. The question, Mr. Lattimore, is, Did you testify before the Tydings committee that you did not know the New China Daily News to be Communist in 1942–43.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I mean the previous question on China Today.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the previous question?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know China Today to be Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I ever knew that until much later, and among my reasons for not thinking it Communist was the fact that its contributors included Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, Geraldine Fitch, now active in the China lobby; her husband, George Fitch, of the YMCA——

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you testifying from memory, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I am testifying from looking up some copies of China Today recently.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Schwellenbach; Freda Utley, a former member of the staff of this committee; Emory Luccock, L-u-c-c-o-c-k, pastor of the American Church in Shanghai; Edward Hume, director of the Christian Medical Council; Harry B. Price; and Father Charles Meeus, M-e-e-u-s. In November 1938 it published an interview with Bishop Paul Yu Pin and in the same month Walter Judd spoke at a meeting sponsored by the American Friends of the Chinese People of which China Today was the organ. On the cover of the July 1939 issue was a picture of the Chiang Kai-sheks.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point may I have referred to the record our exhibit No. 54 which was introduced in open session on August 42, 1951. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter into the record at this time? I would like that to apply to this part of the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter dated December 13, 1939, addressed to Mr. Max Granich, China Today, 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York, N. Y. It is evidently a photostat of a carbon. There is a typed signature of Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the document taken from the files?

Mr. MANDEL. The document was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

DEAR MR. GRANICH: Thank you for your letter of December 11. I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible for me to join the editorial board of China Today. I am a member of the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that one of my employers is the Japanese council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the board of China Today, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can that be shown to the witness?

(Document shown to Mr. Lattimore.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, is that a copy of a letter which you wrote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it is.

There is another paragraph here that has not been read into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like to read it in, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. SOURWINE. The whole thing is in the record; is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, it is, Mr. Sourwine. Would you like to read it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

I have been desperately busy the last few months completing a book, and consequently have published very little in magazines. I am expecting to write some articles in the next few months, but I think you will agree that these articles would have their maximum impact if not published in magazines which are devoted to "the cause of China."

Mr. MORRIS. "The cause of China" is in quotes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "The cause of China" is in quotes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Did you testify before the Tydings committee that you did not know the New China Daily News to be Communist in 1942–43?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1942–43? Yes, I believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced or a reply to the record at this time exhibit No. 35, which was introduced into the record on July 26, 1951, page 189. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document and read it into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document, of a carbon copy, in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated October 17, 1940. At the top are initials ECC and WLH. It is addressed to Mr. F. V. Field, American Peace Mobilization, 1116 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, D. C. The typed signature is Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. [Reading:]

DEAR FRED: Enclosed I am sending you an article submitted to me by Asiaticus. For readers of Pacific Affairs, it would read like propaganda, and rhapsodical propaganda at that. As the article is also too long, however, we might be able to shorten it, pruning out a great many adjectives but still retaining the realistic points. However, it is too late for our December issue.

I am therefore sending you the article as is, to see whether you may have any suggestions for placing it.

The sooner you can look in on us, the better we'll be pleased.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you identify that letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is quite evidently a letter that I wrote; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask for a short recess in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Just 1 minute.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The date is 1940, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask for a short recess in executive session?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could the committee retire, this room being as full as it is.

(Whereupon, at 11:15 a. m. the subcommittee went into executive session.)

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a. m., the hearing was reconvened.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, may I add to an answer that I made to Mr. Morris sometime ago, when he was asking me about Communist contributors to Pacific Affairs?

The CHAIRMAN. Was that this morning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This morning's session, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the question? We want the question first.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Could you remember the question, Mr. Morris? It was about Communist contributors to Pacific Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the reporter read the question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was a question something about "Did you ever publish Communist contributors?" or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. When you were editor of the publication Pacific Affairs, did you ever publish an article by a person whom you knew to be a Communist?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the question to which I refer. I merely wanted to point out——

The CHAIRMAN. What was your answer to it, please? Mr. Morris, will you give the question so the reporter can go through his notes?

Mr. MORRIS. The question was: When you were editor of the publication Pacific Affairs, did you ever publish an article by a person whom you knew to be a Communist? That was the seventh question on my list here.

(The record was read by the reporter as follows:)

Mr. MORRIS. When you were the editor of the publication Pacific Affairs, did you ever publish an article by a person whom you knew to be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Apart from Russian contributions, no.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I simply wanted to point out, Mr. Chairman, that my memory had slipped a rather obvious cog, since, on page 6 of the statement that I read before this committee there is the following:

The CHAIRMAN. Page 6 of what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of my statement prepared for this committee.

* * * an article by a Chinese Communist which was clearly labeled as such and was presented as an example of what the Chinese Communists were saying.

Mr. SOURWINE. You identified that, I believe, under questioning, as an article written by Mau Ning, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I may have said that it might have been by him. My recollection is not clear. As I recall, it was an article about the Chinese Communists in northwest China which had been originally printed in China, and was translated and sent to us, and we published it, labeling it as a translation of a Chinese Communist article, giving it as an example of what the Communists were saying in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you take this issue of June 1936, Pacific Affairs, and tell us which article there is referred to as the

article by a Communist writer which is antagonistic to the Chinese council and the British council, referred to in the minutes which have been presented to you of the April 8, 1936, meeting in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't point to such an article, Mr. Morris. I believe the note that was read was something about a Chinese Communist, wasn't it?

Mr. MORRIS. What note are you referring to, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The minutes of that meeting in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no reference to a Chinese Communist writer here, the statement is——

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see what the original text was?

Mr. MORRIS. That is a stencil, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

In the next issue of PA, there is to be an article by a Communist writer which is antagonistic to the Chinese council and the British council.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, please?

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Communist article that you referred to? According to these minutes, you say it is coming out in the next issue of Pacific Affairs, which you now have before you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall. I don't believe it refers to this article by Asiaticus, if that is what you mean.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not the article by Asiaticus—is it not antagonistic to both the Chinese council and the British council?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think it is antagonistic to the Chinese council.

Mr. MORRIS. It talks about usury on the part of the Chinese Government, doesn't it?

Would you look at it a minute, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Where is the article now? Can you give me the page reference? Where is the statement about usury?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say, Mr. Lattimore, while we are waiting to find that, that you were not referring to the Asiaticus article during this conference with Motiliev, Voitinsky, and the others?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; my recollection is that at that time, or just before that time, while I was in China, I had been trying to get hold of a Chinese Communist article of some kind, and that I thought I had, but eventually failed. My recollection is that happened several times. There may be some correspondence about it in the files.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are saying that, to the best of your memory, Asiaticus was not a subject for discussion at this conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my memory, this reference in the conference is not to Asiaticus.

Mr. MORRIS. When did that particular article go to press, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back to this other question about the usury?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph on the top of page 167.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The whole paragraph?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the top of page 167.

Nor was this all. Besides the lucrative business for the banks and bondholders, there were other advantages, some of which may be quoted from clauses of the loan agreement. First of all, the loan was to be secured on "the entire revenues of the Chinese Maritime Customs." In addition to this, the Chinese Government undertook that "the administration of the Chinese Maritime Custom Service shall remain as at present during the currency of this loan." This makes it possible to understand another of the clauses reading as follows: "During the said term of 45 years, the amortization shall not be increased nor the loan redeemed nor converted by the Chinese Government."

The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., which alone took half of the loan, became at the same time the depositary bank of the Maritime Customs, the biggest source of Chinese public income. The gigantic usury and national humiliation contained in this one loan agreement are guaranteed to this day by the British supervisory control of the Maritime Customs and executed by the Honkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., the trustees of almost all of the British loans to the Chinese Government.

Mr. Morris, I should like to point out that that paragraph would have been entirely welcome to the Chinese council of the IPR as of 1936.

Mr. Morris. What is the national humiliation referred to?

Mr. Lattimore. That refers to the kind of loans—the kind of loan agreements that China had to sign before the time of the Nationalist Government, and protests against such loans and demands for revisions of such treaties were part of the policy of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Mr. Morris. And what was the usury referred to, on whose part?

Mr. Lattimore. I would say that referred to the British. I may add that this particular article by Asiaticus was submitted to the British in advance, met with protests from them on the interpretation of the facts, but none of the facts were disputed and the criticism or suggestion was not made that it was an article by a Communist.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, if the chairman will permit——

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. So that we may get correctly what you referred to as your reference earlier in your statement to an article by a Chinese Communist, is that from page 6 of your statement?

Mr. Lattimore. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. You said it was clearly established in the Tydings committee hearings that in fact—

I had never called the Chinese Communists agrarian reformers, nor had Pacific Affairs carried articles calling them agrarian reformers, with the single exception of an article by a Chinese Communist which was clearly labeled as such, and was presented as an example of what the Chinese Communists were saying.

Mr. Lattimore. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. I had asked you at the time if that article that you referred to was not the article Agrarian Democracy in Northwest China by Mau Ming.

Mr. Lattimore. I had forgotten the name Mau Ming, but by its title of the article, I recognize it. That is the article.

Mr. Sourwine. That is the article that you did refer to?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. And does that appear in this issue of Pacific Affairs; does it?

Mr. Lattimore. It does not appear in this issue of Pacific Affairs, and in the issue in which it does appear the article is identified, the original Chinese publication is identified, the name of the translator is given.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, in this conference that you were having, sir, on April 8, the memorandum recites that you stated that the next issue of Pacific Affairs—that is, the next issue after the conference—was to have an article by a Communist writer which would be antagonistic to the Chinese council and the British council.

Are you now stating that there was in fact no such article published in the next issue of Pacific Affairs, that is, this June issue that we have before us?

Mr. Lattimore. That is my recollection. My general recollection of that period, as I say, is that as editor of Pacific Affairs I was trying to get something that would represent the Communist problem in China; this problem was of growing importance, other publications were trying to get material on it, and I was trying to find a Chinese Communist who would write an article for us; maybe it would have to be translated or something of that kind.

I never succeeded in getting one.

Mr. Sourwine. Where was that conference held, this meeting between yourself, Motiliev, Voitinsky, Harondar, and HM. I suppose that is Harriet Moore?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; that must have been Harriet Moore.

Mr. Sourwine. Where was it held?

Mr. Lattimore. Where was it held?

Mr. Sourwine. What country and city?

Mr. Lattimore. It was held at the office of the Russian council of the IPR, as far as I remember.

Mr. Sourwine. In Russia?

Mr. Lattimore. In Russia, yes.

Mr. Sourwine. In Moscow?

Mr. Lattimore. In Moscow.

Mr. Sourwine. Actually, that was April 8, and we are talking about the June issue. Had not the June issue already closed at that time?

Mr. Lattimor. I couldn't tell you whether it had or not.

Mr. Sourwine. You had a 6-weeks lag when you were editing it from Baltimore, and a much longer lag when you were out of the country, isn't that right?

Mr. Lattimore. I am not sure what the lag was. There may have been an article submitted which was considered, you know, just a Communist tirade and not what we want, and therefore thrown out, or something of that sort.

Mr. Sourwine. Certainly you had to close this book at least a month before it was printed, did you not?

Mr. Lattimore. You may remember, Mr. Sourwine, that when I asked you about the lag in publication, I was extremely uncertain on the subject.

Mr. Sourwine. Well, you edited this magazine for some years, didn't you?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I did.

Mr. Sourwine. What is the shortest lag you ever had between closing and printing? That is something you would remember.

Mr. Lattimore. No; it is simply that I have a general memory that there was a lag. I don't remember exactly what it was.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you telling us here, Mr. Lattimore, that you could have edited a magazine for years and not known what the deadline was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If I had edited a magazine that always had the same deadline, I would probably remember. But this was an extremely shifting business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say shifting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; because I was editing from different places, and my general recollection is that the first few years, you see—I began in 1934—if we had an April issue, that it should appear in April, that in the early years, owing to delay in getting material, sometimes the April issue would appear after April, or the June issue after June.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not asking you when it appeared. I am simply asking you what was your minimum time lag, what was your deadline schedule, how long before the actual publication did you have to close the forms, did you have to have your copy in?

You dealt with that. You met that every quarter. Now, certainly you can give us some idea about what it was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met it in a different way in many quarters, Mr. Sourwine.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not answering the question at all, Mr. Lattimore. Get at the question, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am answering it to the best of my ability.

The CHAIRMAN. Give your best judgment, if you cannot do any better, as to what the lag was. That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe there ever was any definite lag, unless maybe after 1938, when I was editing from Baltimore and we were close at hand.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had to have your copy in at least a week before the magazine was out in print, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you. I never handled that. I sent my stuff to the New York office, and the New York office handled the whole question of printing, printing contracts, distribution, mailing out, and so on. I never had anything to do with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are testifying under oath here, sir. Are you telling this committee as editor of this magazine you don't know whether you had to have your copy in at least a week before the publication date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am saying, Mr. Sourwine, that I don't remember what the deadline was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you had to have it in at least a week before the publication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think probably at least a week; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you know whether it had to be at least a week?

Mr. LATTIMORE. But the publication date itself would vary, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. By publication date, you are probably talking about the date appearing on the magazine, and I am talking about the date that it actually came off the press. Don't you know that you had to have your copy in at least a week before the actual publication came off the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your estimate of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not estimating. I am asking you to state categorically, do you know or do you not know that you had to have your copy in at least a week before that magazine came off the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All that I can testify, Mr. Sourwine, is that we used to correspond back and forth with New York, and wherever I was, and they would say "Will the copy be in by" such and such a date, and when the copy was in, it was up to them to get it to the printer and get it out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that you do not, then, know that you had to have your copy in at least a week before the magazine came off the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not know anything more than that I would, by correspondence, fix a date with the New York office when I would regard my copy sent in for the magazine as complete.

Mr. SOURWINE. And would that date bear any relationship to the date at which you hoped to get the magazine off the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would bear a varying relationship.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you, when you were fixing that date, think about the time when the magazine would probably come off the press, if you met that deadline?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not thinking in terms of when it would come off the press. I was thinking in terms of getting it out and distributed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, would you think, when you were fixing the deadline for getting copy in of that, in terms of when you would get the magazine out and get it distributed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, you have all of the documents of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Strike that from the record, if you please. Mr. Lattimore, when the chairman calls your attention to this, please desist from further expression.

The question, Mr. Lattimore, has been propounded to you, and you answered it this morning or yesterday when you said that probably 6 weeks, at times, was the lag. Now, if you do not know what the lag was, state to the counsel that you do not know. If you know what it was, state to the counsel that you know. If you cannot, then give your best estimate as to what the lag was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't state what the lag was. When Mr. Sourwine first asked me that question, I thought it was rather a trivial question. If he wanted to have 6 weeks, I was perfectly willing to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. There are no trivial questions here. We try to get away from the trivial stuff. We got away from that yesterday. We closed that yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I proceed, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, when you, as editor of this magazine, would fix a date by which you were going to try to get your copy in—in other words, a deadline—did you think of that deadline in relation to the time when you would be able to get the magazine out and distributed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what was the relationship in your mind there between the deadline which you fixed and the time when you would be able to get the magazine out and distributed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At this date, I don't know. As I have already said, I think it varied from quarter to quarter.

Mr. Sourwine. How much did it vary?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.

Mr. Sourwine. Did it vary by as much as a month from quarter to quarter?

Mr. Lattimore. It might easily have.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean that when you fixed your deadline, Mr. Lattimore, you didn't know within a month when you were going to be able to get the magazine off the press, if you met that deadline?

Mr. Lattimore. In the first part of my editing of Pacific Affairs, when I first started editing it from China, later when issues had to be edited while I was traveling as in this case from China all the way to America, it would vary considerably.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think, Mr. Lattimore, that you could possibly have gone on off to Russia, be there in April, and have left the question of your June issue up in the air?

Mr. Lattimore. No; there was an assistant editor in New York, and to cover contingencies for a thing like that I would, like my traveling, for instance, I would try to have extra articles on tap for that issue so that the assistant editor could make a last-minute choice and get out a full issue.

I may point out that this Communist article which I was expecting could easily have been an article mailed from Peking to New York without my seeing it, in the manner in which that periodical was edited, and it may never have come through, or may have come through and been rejected.

Mr. Sourwine. Are you through?

Mr. Lattimore. Surely.

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore, at the time you were having this conference on the 8th of April——

The Chairman. Where?

Mr. Sourwine. The conference in Moscow with Voitinsky and Motilev and others, don't you know now, and didn't you know then whether the copy was all in for the forthcoming June issue of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember at all, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. Sourwine. When you said here "In the next issue there is to be an article by a Communist writer," were you not referring to an article which had already been edited, the copy on which had already been sent to the printer?

Mr. Lattimore. Not necessarily. I could easily have been referring to an article that was promised.

Senator Smith. Mr. Sourwine, may I suggest there that the language is antagonistic. I would think that that would presuppose that at that time the article was in existence, and Dr. Lattimore had known it and had seen it, because he was pronouncing it antagonistic.

Mr. Sourwine. That is the point I was attempting to make, Senator. Isn't that true, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Sourwine, an article by a Chinese Communist would automatically be displeasing to the Chinese council.

The Chairman. What is our question? Just a moment.

Mr. Sourwine. I asked him if it was not true that he was referring to an article which was in existence which was antagonistic.

Mr. Lattimore. No; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, do you think it is possible that this magazine, Pacific Affairs, could ever have come off the press in less than a month after the time that the copy was all in?

Mr. FORTAS. Just a moment. Mr. Lattimore wants to consult me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question, please.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I am incompetent to answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the June issue. Do you know when it came off the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. He says he is incompetent to answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked him another one.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will show you the table of contents page and ask you the question again. Do you know when that magazine came off the press; that is, the June issue for 1936?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know when it came off the press.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a time stamp and a copyright number on that page, are there not? What is the date stamp there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This stamp on here?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that a copyright stamp?

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you recognize it as such?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't. I don't think I have ever seen one before. The stamp here, if it is a copyright stamp, is May 8, 1936.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there a copyright number there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is a circle with a C in it, and C–1–B–299322. It is the first time in my life I have ever seen such a mark. Perhaps it is a copyright mark.

Mr. SOURWINE. You edited the magazine for how many years?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I edited the magazine for nearly 7 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. And this is the first time that you have ever seen the symbol, a circle with a C in it, or knew what it meant?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The first time I have ever seen it.

Senator SMITH. May I inquire, is that on other copies also?

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a similar copyright stamp on all other copies that we have been able to find in this volume, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Does it show a considerable variation?

Mr. SOURWINE. There is some variation, Mr. Lattimore. That question had best be answered by giving the facts.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you not know that a copy was sent to the Patent Office?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My knowledge of copyright procedure, Senator Ferguson, is extremely vague. All I know about copyright procedure is that I believe anything that is to be copyrighted has to be deposited in the Library of Congress. Isn't that right?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I may be permitted to state this for the record, the issue here, and I show it to the Chair as I speak, of Pacific Affairs for March bears the copyright symbol and number B–289470, and the date February 5, 1936. That is a variation of 3 days from the other one. That is, this is the March issue which was copyrighted February 5.

The June issue, the date which was given, was copyrighted May 8. The September issue bears copyright number B–309436, was copyrighted August 20. And the December issue copyright B–320637, bears the date September 10, 1936.

I might also inform the committee, and if the committee desires testimony or an affidavit on this point it can be secured, a telephone check was made by the staff of the committee with Mr. Clyde S. Edwards, Chief of the Serials Division of the Library of Congress, who furnished this information:

That Pacific Affairs dated June 1936 was stamped May 11, 1936, the date when that piece was received in the Periodicals Division for shelving; that the contents page, May 8, 1936, bears the copyright stamp OCIB–29932, and that is the date when the issue was received in the copyright office for registration, and that number is the copyright registration number.

We are informed by Mr. Edwards over the telephone that the official records of the Library of Congress so show.

If I might point out just one more thing. That means that this magazine was off the press on May 8. It was off the press sufficiently in advance of May 8 to have, by that date, reached the Library of Congress as the official depository for copyright. It was then less than 1 month after the date on which the witness has testified that in Moscow he was stating that this issue was to have in it an article by a Communist writer which is antagonistic to the Chinese council and the British council.

I would now like to ask you once more, Mr. Lattimore, whether you still want to say that that article which you were referring to there was not then in existence and the copy had not then been sent to the printer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe it could have been, Mr. Sourwine, I have a general but clear recollection that there are a number of cases in my editorial corespondence with various people in which I referred to a future article as a certainty, and then it never came out in the magazine.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not in this conference discussing Asiaticus at all; is that your statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge and recollection, the question of Asiaticus never came up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is Bywater?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Hector Bywater—I am not certain whether he was British or American. He, in the 1930's, was more or less the Hanson Baldwin of his time. He was a writer, especially on naval strategy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he pro-Communist, anti-Communist, conservative, liberal?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say conservative.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you looked at the last page of this memorandum which has been shown you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I haven't.

The CHAIRMAN. Have we a photostatic copy?

Mr. SOURWINE. What we have here is typed. We can give him the photostatic copy if he prefers.

You have the photostatic copy there if you wish?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last page?

Mr. SOURWINE. The last page. And look at the third paragraph from the end of the page. Will you read that paragraph aloud, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Mr. Motiliev, Mr. Lattimore, too?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Motiliev was the head of the Soviet council.

Motiliev made the following proposals as to organization of the magazine: (*a*) The leading article should always express the opinion of a definite council. It is customary to have the leading article more or less official. (*b*) Articles by unknown and irresponsible writers should not be published on important questions. But there should be articles by leading personalities who are of interest, no matter what they represent; e. g. Bywater and Asiaticus. (*c*) There should not be criticism of books and opinions of the leading personalities of the various member countries. It is unnecessary to have such criticism; it is not part of the work of the IPR, and it embarrasses the members of the councils.

Mr. SOURWINE. What magazine was referred to there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was referring to Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was referring to Asiaticus, too; wasn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He also refers to Asiaticus.

Mr. SOURWINE. Having refreshed your memory by reading that paragraph what do you say now about whether Asiaticus was discussed at that conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Motiliev may have brought up the subject of Asiaticus.

The CHAIRMAN. Then he was discussed at the conference; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was discussed by Mr. Motiliev.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say, Mr. Lattimore, whether you identified to these gentlemen who were at the conference the Communist writer to whom you referred, who was to have an article in the Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No ; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not identify him as Asiaticus?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could there be any other author in that particular magazine which was the one published after you were in Moscow that could have been the Communist you were talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson, this is referring back to the conversation in 1936——

The CHAIRMAN. Answer that question.

Mr. LATTIMORE (continuing). And my memory is necessarily——

The CHAIRMAN. Look at the magazine and answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. And if there are any others that would be in a class of being a Communist outside of the one we have been talking about.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not think Senator Ferguson, that this article to which you have referred, the Asiaticus article, or any other article in that issue, could be referred to as Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question. That is not the question at all. Strike that answer, Mr. Reporter, and read the question to the witness.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. We were talking about Asiaticus. You say it is not him. Is there any other that it could be?

Mr. Lattimore. May I amend my answer, then, to say that it is not he or any other.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Ferguson. Today, do you believe that Asiaticus was a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. Today, according to the best of my knowledge, I believe he very likely was. I don't know of my own knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. You qualify it by "very likely." You would not say he was?

Mr. Lattimore. Not of my personal knowledge; no.

Senator Ferguson. From anything that you have read?

Mr. Lattimore. I have read other people's opinions, and my opinion would be second-hand.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, do you remember the context of the page that I showed you of that article? You have it there before you. Will you look at it again and tell me whether there is anyone else on that page whom you now know or believe to have been a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. The top name on the list is Harriet Moore, who has refused to answer the question whether she was ever a Communist; and, therefore, it would now be my supposition that she probably was.

Mr. Sourwine. And were you referring to Harriet Moore in this conference in Moscow when you spoke of a Communist writer who was to have an article in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Is there any other person on that table of contents listed as an author of an article who is now known to you or believed by you to have been a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. There is nobody there known to me or believed by me to be a Communist, with the exception of Harriet Moore, and I am perfectly willing to accept Asiaticus as a Communist. But I don't know it of my own knowledge.

Mr. Sourwine. Then is it true, Mr. Lattimore, that, on the basis of what you know or believe now, that article by Asiaticus meets the description which you gave in the Moscow conference of an article which you said was to be in the next issue of Pacific Affiairs?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe this Asiaticus article meets the description.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, you now believe Asiaticus to be or to have been a Communist, is that right?

Mr. Lattimore. Very likely; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. He did not represent the Soviet council; did he?

Mr. Lattimore. No; he didn't.

Mr. Sourwine. This was a leading article; was it not?

Mr. Lattimore. It was one of the main articles. Technically, the leading article is the first article in any issue, and I don't think we refer to subsequent articles.

The Chairman. Get the answer.

Mr. Lattimore. In that sense, it was not a leading article. The leading article is always the first one.

The Chairman. He did not ask you for the sense. Was it or was it not a leading article? It is very easy to answer that question.

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I am correct, Senator, in saying it was not a leading article.

Mr. Sourwine. Where did it appear in the magazine?

Mr. Lattimore. Second space.

Mr. Sourwine. How much space was devoted to the first-place article?

Mr. Lattimore. Page 157 to page 165, about eight pages.

Mr. Sourwine. How much space was devoted to the Asiaticus article?

Mr. Lattimore. 165 to 177. That would be about 12 pages.

Mr. Sourwine. Was there any article in the magazine in greater length than the Asiaticus article?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. What was that?

Mr. Lattimore. An article by Guenther Stein, the title of which is "Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader"; and, without looking it up, I believe it is a review of the Japanese press.

Mr. Morris. Is that the same Guenther Stein who was associated with the Sorge espionage ring?

Mr. Lattimore. I do not know that he was associated with the Sorge ring.

Mr. Sourwine. Did this article represent a personal opinion, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. Which article?

Mr. Sourwine. The article by Asiaticus.

Mr. Lattimore. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Was this article antagonistic to the British council?

Mr. Lattimore. The British council criticized it; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. And you state, however, that it was not antagonistic to the Chinese council; is that correct?

Mr. Lattimore. That is correct; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. And it is on that basis that you say that the article, even on the basis that you now know, does not, in your opinion, meet your description here of the article that you thought would be printed in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. Lattimore. Partly that, and partly my recollection that in 1936 we were trying to get hold of a Communist Chinese contribution.

Mr. Sourwine. I would like to ask this: When Motiliev——

Mr. Morris. You say you were trying to get in touch with them?

Mr. Lattimore. We were trying to get hold of a Chinese Communist article.

The Chairman. You stated that now on three or four occasions.

Mr. Lattimore. In 1936, that was good editing, in my opinion.

Mr. Sourwine. When Motiliev spoke of Bywater and Asiaticus, did you understand him as using the two names as antithetical, as in any sense being opposite poles of opinion or approach?

Mr. Lattimore. Not necessarily opposite poles.

Mr. Sourwine. He said there should be articles by leading personalities who are of interest, no matter what they represent; e. g., Bywater and Asiaticus.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. What did you understand "e. g." to mean?

Mr. Lattimore. Examples of different kinds of opinion.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. But you did not take it that he was using the two names as in any sense antithetical?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Contrasting but not necessarily representing extreme poles.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not, so far as you understood it, use the name "Asiaticus" in the sense of a Communist writer or a pro-Communist writer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the public record at this time pages 16 and 17, from the executive session testimony of E. Newton Steely, 4213 Woodberry Street, University Park, Md., a member of the Board of Appeals and Review, Civil Service Commission, on February 25, 1952.

Mr. SOURWINE. Together with the document there identified?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine, together with the document identified.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. It is in our executive session record, Mr. Chairman. We would like it in the open session.

Senator FERGUSON. I move, Mr. Chairman, that it be made part of this open session.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of this open session.

Mr. MORRIS. And the exhibit attached?

The CHAIRMAN. And the exhibits attached.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that?

Mr. MANDEL. Excerpt from the testimony of E. Newton Steely, 4213 Woodberry Street, University Park, Md., a member of the Board of Appeals and Review, Civil Service Commission, on February 25, 1952, before the Senate Internal Security Committee, pages 16 and 17:

Mr. SOURWINE. As now refreshed, can you testify whether you did tell Mr. Owen Lattimore about the Communist record of Dr. Chao-ting Chi?

Mr. STEELY. I think so, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you?

Mr. STEELY. Relying on the statement I made a day or two after the incident allegedly happened, at that time I said I did. I would say that statement is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You brought in the question you made in a day or two after the incident happened. What brought that into the picture?

Mr. STEELY. Looking at the document just handed me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean the document just handed you is a copy of a statement you made a day and a half or two days after the incident?

Mr. STEELY. Will you repeat that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that the document just handed you which you just glanced at is a copy of a statement you made a day or two after the incident of the conference with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. STEELY. Apparently so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I offer this for the record as identified by the witness.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would look at this document again before I receive it and look at the statement here in the third paragraph from the bottom on page 1. You may want to look at the other two pages.

I will receive it as Steely Exhibit No. 2.

(Document referred to was received as "Exhibit No. 2" and filed for the record.)

Senator FERGUSON. That indicates that after he looked at it, it was received in evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 1, in the report itself?

Mr. Mandel is reading a paragraph commencing on the bottom of page 1.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, may we see the entire transcript of this, because it has referred to what has gone before—the entire transcript of the record of your executive session? Mr. Sourwine starts "As now refreshed."

Senator FERGUSON. Let the record show that it is being handed to you.

Mr. FORTAS. Thank you.

Mr. MANDEL. This reads as follows:

Dr. Kung Chuan Chi has been investigated by the Commission for his position as assistant language editor (Chinese), OWI, and his case is now pending before the Commission. In view of the fact that Mr. Lattimore is relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation regarding Mr. Hong, the OWI representatives were also informed of the unfavorable information secured regarding Dr. Chi and his son, which included testimony to the effect that the young Dr. Chi is or was, until recently, a Communist and that he at one time was a delegate to the Third International in Moscow, and to the effect that the older Dr. Chi was removed from his position as commissioner of education in the Shansi Province because of Communist activities.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

(Exhibit referred to as "Steeley Exhibit No. 2" was marked "Exhibit No. 480," and "Exhibit No. 480–A," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 480

SEPTEMBER 2, 1943.

WM. H. MCMILLEN:

As requested by you, Mr. Frank Marsh and Admiral McCullough of the Office of War Information were interviewed on August 31, 1943, relative to the case of Chew Sih Hong, Assistant Field Representative in the New York Office of OWI. Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Operations, OWI, who is sponsoring Mr. Hong and upon whose recommendation OWI requested that this case be reopened, was also present during this interview.

Mr. Hong was originally investigated in New York for this position and was rated ineligible by the Commission (see Minute 4 of December 4, 1942). The file also shows that on November 30, 1942, the Commission was informed that Mr. Hong's services were terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942, as a result of information furnished the OWI by the Commission in a letter dated October 26, 1942.

The Commission was subsequently informed under date of July 27, 1943, by Admiral McCullough that the information furnished it by Mr. Elmer Davis, under date of November 30, 1942, regarding the termination of Mr. Hong's services, was somewhat in error as Mr. Hong was separated from the New York Office of OWI for duty with the Army and that upon his return in the Spring of 1943 he was again employed in the New York Office as the New York Office was not advised of the fact that Mr. Hong had been declared ineligible by the Civil Service Commission.

On the basis of Rear Admiral McCullough's letter of July 27, 1943, this case was reopened for the purpose of interviewing Mr. Owen Lattimore of San Francisco and some additional investigation was also made.

During my interview with Mr. Marsh, Mr. Lattimore, and Admiral McCullough, the evidence secured during investigation of Mr. Hong was discussed and they were advised fully regarding the substance of the derogatory information.

As reported by Investigator H. R. Memering, who interviewed Mr. Lattimore in San Francisco, Mr. Lattimore does not know Mr. Hong personally and in recommending him for retention in the Service, he is relying upon Dr. Kung Chuan Chi, Assistant Language Editor (Chinese) in the New York office of OWI. Mr. Lattimore has known Dr. Chi since about 1935 when he met him in Shansi Province in China. Mr. Lattimore is also personally acquainted with Dr. Chi's son, Dr. Chi Chao-Ting. Mr. Lattimore added little to the testimony given Mr. Memering in San Francisco.

Dr. Kung Chuan Chi has been investigated by the Commission for his position as Assistant Language Editor (Chinese), OWI, and his case is now pending before the Commission. In view of the fact that Mr. Lattimore is relying upon

Dr. Chi's recommendation regarding Mr. Hong, the OWI representatives were also informed of the unfavorable information secured regarding Dr. Chi and his son, which included testimony to the effect that the young Dr. Chi is or was, until recently, a Communist and that he at one time was a delegate to the Third Internationale in Moscow and to the effect that the older Dr. Chi was removed from his position as Commissioner of Education in the Shansi Province because of Communist activities.

Mr. Lattimore devoted considerable time to a discussion of factional strife among the Chinese and possible interests on the part of witnesses giving derogatory testimony regarding Mr. Hong. He appeared inclined to explain away all accusations of communism made against Mr. Hong on this basis. He also advanced as a reason for believing the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance not to be a Communist organization the fact that this organization was composed of small-business men whose interests would be affected adversely under communism. Mr. Lattimore said he could not understand why the story that the elder Dr. Chi was removed from his position as Minister of Education in the Shansi Province because of Communist activities would be circulated. Mr. Lattimore also stated that Dr. Chi was known to Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota and that Congressman Judd, a former missionary, spent some time in Shansi Province during the time Dr. Chi was an official there. It was pointed out to Mr. Lattimore that testimony regarding Dr. Chi's removal was secured by the Commission both in New York and San Francisco. The information received in San Francisco came from a source found to be reliable in the past by the Commission. The informant did not know Dr. Chi personally but had to inquire about him to secure this information. That this latter source should be biased against Dr. Chi in making this statement appears to be unlikely.

After a lengthy discussion of the various angles in the case, such as the intricacies of Chinese politics, possible motives witnesses testifying might have, and so forth, as well as the derogatory testimony itself, Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Marsh, and Admiral McCullough were asked whether, in view of the information in the case, they felt that Mr. Hong should be retained. Their statements were substantially as follows:

Mr. Lattimore stated that wished to keep Mr. Hong on the job, that he had an efficient set-up in the Chinese Section in New York and wanted to keep it that way, that he has explicit confidence in Dr. Chi, that Mr. Hong is under careful supervision and even if he were a Communist that he is not in a position where he could do any damage, that the selection of suitable Chinese was a delicate matter and it is extremely difficult to obtain a competent employee who does not have connections which might constitute leaks in the organization, that under the present set-up with Dr. Chi and Mr. Hong there had been no instances of confidential information getting into unauthorized channels and that there had been no attempts on Mr. Hong's part to use his present position for the spreading of Communist propaganda, and so forth. Mr. Lattimore also pointed out that Mr. Hong was recently used by the Army to teach Chinese to 224 officers in India. Mr. Hong was highly praised for this work in a letter from Col. Gilchrist of the United States Army.

The substance of Mr. Lattimore's statements was to the effect that he wants to retain Mr. Hong and is still relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation and knowledge of Mr. Hong, all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

Mr. Marsh stated that he recognizes the intricacies of Chinese politics and he feels that if Mr. Lattimore still wants to employ Mr. Hong, knowing the nature of the testimony against him, the risk involved, etc., he would recommend that Mr. Lattimore be permitted to retain Mr. Hong as an employee of OWI in his present position.

Admiral McCullough said that if Mr. Hong was to be removed on the basis of the evidence that he had heard in the case that he felt that others higher up in the organization should also go, that others had been retained against whom the evidence was more damaging than it was against Mr. Hong, that he would go along with Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Marsh in favor of Mr. Hong's retention in the Service.

In view of the fact that Mr. Lattimore is placing so much reliance upon Dr. Chi, whose case is also pending before the Commission at the present time, it is suggested that Dr. Chi's investigation be considered in connection with the Hong case.

Mr. Lattimore was asked whether there was anything about Mr. Hong's services which could not be performed by other Chinese Translators and he said "No" but that he wished to keep his present organization in view of the fact that it was functioning efficiently.

In view of the testimony obtained during the subsequent investigation of Mr. Hong in San Francisco and the evidence secured in the investigation of Dr. Chi regarding Communist activities on the part of him and his son, I can see no reason why the Commission should disturb its previous rating of ineligibility in Mr. Hong's case.

E. NEWTON STEELY.

(Exhibit 480–A is testimony from the E. Newton Steely executive session before this committee and was requested to be inserted by Mr. Fortas, counsel to Mr. Lattimore, and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 480–A

EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY OF E. NEWTON STEELY ON FEBRUARY 25, 1953, VOLUME 185

* * * * * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember having a discussion with Owen Lattimore in 1943?

Mr. STEELY. Yes; I recall the discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. During that discussion with Mr. Lattimore did you inform Mr. Lattimore about the Communist record of a man named Dr. Chao-ting Chi?

Mr. STEELY. I am sorry, that comes directly under that area.

Mr. MORRIS. Chi was not a Government employee, was he?

Mr. STEELY. Chi at that time was at the head of some section of OWI.

Mr. MORRIS. You are not thinking of Mr. K. P. Chi, are you?

Mr. STEELY. No. I was thinking of the Dr. Chi who was sponsoring Hong.

Mr. MORRIS. We are not asking about that Mr. K. P. Chi. Dr. K. P. Chi, as you say was a man who was sponsoring a man who was then under investigation for loyalty. We are not going to ask you about that man.

Mr. STEELY. I wonder if you would mind giving me his full name?

Mr. MORRIS. Kung Chuan Chi is the man you referred to.

Mr. STEELY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. We are not asking you any questions about that particular man. That is K-u-n-g C-h-u-a-n C-h-i. We are not going to ask you any questions about that Mr. Chi.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is the man who is the Government employee; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are talking about another Chi, Dr. Chao-ting Chi, C-h-a-o hyphen t-i-n-g C-h-i.

Mr. STEELY. As far as I can recall I never heard of that Chi. This Dr. Kung Chuan Chi I understand from the report had a son. What his name was——

Mr. MORRIS. Chao-ting Chi.

Mr. STEELY. I do not know whether he was an employee or not.

Mr. MORRIS. I am telling you he was not. We want to ask you about the conversation that you had with Mr. Lattimore with respect to the younger Dr. Chi who was not a Government employee at the time.

* * * * * * *

Mr. SOURWINE. You volunteered the information here that you had an interview with Mr. Lattimore, did you not?

Mr. STEELY. Yes. I mentioned that in connection with my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us where it was?

Mr. STEELY. Yes. That was in the office of Admiral McCullough who at that time was the Security Officer for OWI. I believe it was in the Social Security Building.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are not asking for records or files. We are asking you this time only whether on the occasion of the conference with Mr. Owen Lattimore which you testified about, you did have with him, you told him about the Communist record of Dr. Chao-ting Chi.

Mr. STEELY. That is the one?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. STEELY. Gentlemen, I cannot recall the details of that conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell the committee the answer to that question if you are able to refresh your memory with regard to it?

Mr. STEELY. I might say to you my only connection with this case was about a one-hour interview. I had nothing to do with the rating of the case or the previous investigation of the case. That is one hour that was spent approximately eight and one-half years ago.

Mr. STEELY. My statement was to the best of my recollection I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your recollection is good on that?

Mr. STEELY. No, not particularly good. I have handled hundreds of cases since then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any doubt in your mind you did so inform him?

Mr. STEELY. I have no doubt as far as Kung Chuan Chi is concerned, but I am not sure about the other Chi he is asking about. To the best of my recollection I did, but I can't be sure.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew there was a father and son?

Mr. STEELY. Yes, from reading the file?

Mr. SOURWINE. If your recollection could be refreshed so that you were sure in your own mind what you had done, would you then testify to this committee as to what you had done in that regard?

Mr. STEELY. As to whether I informed him?

Mr. SOURWINE. As to whether you informed Lattimore of the Communist record of Chao-ting Chi, the younger Chi. You have said to the best of your recollection you did. If your recollection should be refreshed so that you were sure you did, would you so testify?

Mr. STEELY. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, do you have a document there? I do not want to have you identify this document. I want to hand it to the witness and ask him if this refreshes his recollection in that regard.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say in justice to this witness, Mr. Chairman, this document was not obtained from this witness and I am quite sure this witness did not know it was in the possession of the committee up until the time it was handed to him.

Mr. STEELY. I have no knowledge of it being in your possession.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt about the fact this was your statement?

Mr. STEELY. It apparently is a photostatic print of a memorandum. I couldn't tell you whether it is an exact copy unless I checked with my word. I can't identify this as being an exact copy. It is addressed to Mr. McMillen and it is not signed. This has written "E. Newton Steely" which is my name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recognize any of the pencil writings on there?

Mr. STEELY. No, sir. You mean these?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, the various marks.

Mr. STEELY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not refresh your memory?

Mr. STEELY. It refreshes my memory in this way; it is quite similar, if not an exact copy, of a statement that I made shortly after my interview with Mr. Lattimore. I can't say that is definitely it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it truly recite what is does say with regard to that interview?

Mr. STEELY. I can't answer the question without checking with the original.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, the question of a true recital would have nothing to do with the original of this memorandum.

Mr. STEELY. My independent recollection of that interview is not sufficient to enable me to say that is a true recital.

Mr. SOURWINE. Except with regard to the original question as to whether you did inform Mr. Lattimore of the Communist record of Chao-ting Chi; is that correct?

Mr. STEELY. That statement is correct, I think, and it is based upon the part of which you call my attention which apparently is my statement. I don't say it isn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your independent recollection as now refreshed is that you did tell Mr. Lattimore about the Communist record of Chao-ting Chi; is that correct?

Mr. STEELY. No. I have a recollection that is independent of that statement in there as to whether I went in there with the son or not. I think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You certainly would not the next day make a statement you did, would you?

Mr. STEELY. I would not. If that is a correct copy of the report that I made, I did. Anything that I said in that report which was made at a time that it was fresh in my mind and following an interview on which I had taken notes would be correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any doubt as to the correctness of that?

Mr. STEELY. No; I do not have any—my position is this: Looking at it, I think it is a copy of the statement I made. But as to whether it is a true recital or an exact copy, I can't say.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a photostat?

Mr. STEELY. Apparently.

Senator FERGUSON. Would this refresh your memory? The third paragraph from the last:

"During my interview with Mr. Marsh, Mr. Lattimore, and Admiral McCullough, the evidence secured during investigation of Mr. Hong was discussed and they were advised fully regarding the substance of the derogatory information."

Mr. STEELY. That no more than the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that not lead you to believe this is a copy?

Mr. STEELY. As far as my belief is concerned, yes. As to my testimony that it is, that is something else.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you about the young Chi who was not a Government employee. I am asking you whether you had information about him, testimony to the effect that in 1943 he was or has been until recently a Communist and that he at one time was a delegate to the Third Internationale in Moscow?

Mr. STEELY. All information that I had at that time was gotten out of the report of investigation. If I informed Mr. Lattimore to that effect, I had that information and he was told about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Conversely, if you had it, did you inform him about it?

Mr. STEELY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This statement says that you did inform him about it, doesn't it?

Mr. STEELY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you think you did?

Mr. STEELY. I think so, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that refresh your memory? We are not talking about anybody that had a job with the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that this younger man, the son, had attended the Third Internationale in Moscow?

Mr. STEELY. Did I know it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, from any documents or anything else?

Mr. STEELY. Basing my reply upon this document, I must have read that somewhere in the file; otherwise, I never heard of him before.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have every reason to believe that did come to your knowledge?

Mr. STEELY. I must have if that is a correct copy of the report of the interviews.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't mean to put you on the spot. All we can ask is your understanding.

Mr. STEELY. I must say you do a good job unintentionally, if I may say so.

I would interpret this to mean information that was obtained as a result of investigation by the FBI or the other investigative agencies of the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Steely, do you recall whether or not you told Mr. Lattimore that the New China Daily News was a Communist publication?

Mr. STEELY. No, sir; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know whether it was a Communist publication?

Mr. STEELY. I never heard of the paper except when I read the file before I went down to see Mr. Lattimore. Whatever the file said about it is all I knew about the China Daily News.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it say that?

Mr. STEELY. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you look at the file before you came up here?

Mr. STEELY. Hurriedly.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find that in it?

Mr. STEELY. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say it wasn't in it?

Mr. STEELY. No, sir. I probably had just a few minutes to look at that file. It took me all morning to try to get it, as a matter of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I may be forgiven, my attention was momentarily diverted, and I missed the connection with the file the witness was talking about. What file are you talking about?

Senator FERGUSON. About the file in the record of the Civil Service Commission. It is about a newspaper.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is why I am uncertain. Are you talking about a file regarding this newspaper you were just asked about, or some other file?

Mr. STEELY. As I understood the Senator's question as to whether I knew the new China Daily was a Communist paper, my answer was I had never heard of the paper except what information I may have gotten from reading the Commission's file.

Mr. SOURWINE. What file are you talking about, a file on this paper?

Mr. STEELY. The file pertaining to the investigation of Kung Chuan Chi and this other man, Hong.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are testifying here you could have acquired information about the North China Daily News in no other way than in connection with that particular investigation?

Mr. STEELY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How could you be sure of that?

Mr. STEELY. I never heard of the paper otherwise.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hear of it in that connection?

Mr. STEELY. If I ever heard of the paper, if that is the name, it must have been where I got the information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why must it have been there? Did you ever investigate another matter involving another Chinese?

Mr. STEELY. I didn't investigate this case. I went down to make an interview.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a very interesting statement. As I understand it, you have now testified you do not remember ever having any knowledge about the North China Daily News.

Mr. STEELY. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you ever did have such knowledge, you got in in connection with a specified case. That is the testimony which is unusual.

Mr. STEELY. I do not see your point there. As I said a moment ago, I never heard of the North China Daily News or the China Daily News, whichever is the correct name.

Senator FERGUSON. New China Daily News.

Mr. STEELY. If it is referred to in that memorandum, all the information I got pertaining to those two cases or anything mentioned in there before going down to Lattimore was gotten from the Commission's file.

Mr. SOURWINE. All the testimony about these two cases was gotten from the Commission's files, but we are asking now about a particular newspaper. You have testified you have forgotten when you ever knew anything about it.

Mr. STEELY. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you did know something about it, shouldn't it be obvious you could have learned that in connection with anything you have now forgotten?

Mr. STEELY. You wouldn't learn it looking at the television or you wouldn't learn it from reading books. You have to get it out of some——

Mr. SOURWINE. Your testimony would be credible if you said, and perhaps you did, that if you ever knew anything about that paper, it was information you got from the Commission's file.

Mr. STEELY. I thought that is what I said.

Mr. SOURWINE. I understood it was information you got from these particular files and that is different.

Mr. STEELY. This is the only Chinese case I ever had anything to do with.

Mr. SOURWINE. Even admitting the probability, if you did get it, it was in connection with this case, actually if you do not remember now anything about the paper, you can't say whether you ever did, or if you ever did, where you learned it, can you?

Mr. STEELY. I still think if I ever did hear of it, it must have been from this.

Mr. MORRIS. You said just before you came down here you had a quick look at a particular file. Did you see that particular paper we have shown you in that file?

Mr. STEELY. I saw one comparable to that. I don't know whether it is an exact copy or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were looking for that?

Mr. STEELY. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. To refresh your memory?

Mr. STEELY. That was the one thing I had to do with the case.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read a statement in that one by Dr. Chi, young Dr. Chi?

Mr. STEELY. I think so. I think the statement shown me here—there were about three pages of that. I had just a few minutes to glance at it. I couldn't tell you all that is in there now.

Mr. MORRIS. It was substantially the same statement you read earlier today?
Mr. STEELY. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. You read over this paper down in your files?
Mr. STEELY. I glanced at it. I didn't have time to read it carefully.
Senator FERGUSON. Having read over this down in the office, this one paragraph you have been shown, do you not remember so that you can say without doubt that this is a copy of that document?
Mr. STEELY. I have stated, Senator, that I think it is. When you say without doubt, you have to compare each statement contained therein. I think it is.
Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it either is a copy of the same document or it is a clever simulation of it?
Mr. STEELY. I have said I think it is.
Mr. SOURWINE. I have no further questions.
Senator FERGUSON, I do not want any doubt about whether this is a genuine document. You did not give it to us.
Mr. STEELY. I think that is an exact copy but I can't swear it is. I can swear I think it is.
Senator FERGUSON. You haven't any reason to doubt that it is?
Mr. STEELY. No.
Senator FERGUSON. That is all.
There is another document there that should be in evidence.
Mr. STEELY. This is a copy of the subpena.
Senator FERGUSON. We want that other paper that you read.
Mr. STEELY. Yes; this is here.
Senator FERGUSON. That will be exhibit No. 3.
(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3" and filed for the record.)
(Thereupon, the committee was recessed at 4:30 p. m. subject to the call of the Chair.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to introduce or refer to the record at this time, refer in the record at this time, the open session testimony of Mr. Karl August Wittfogel, pages 288, reading as follows:

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Wittfogel, did you tell Mr. Lattimore about your experience with Dr. Chi in Germany in 1929?
Dr. WITTFOGEL. We talked a great deal about Dr. Chi—Mr. Chi, I mean.
Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify that conversation you had with Owen Lattimore about your previous experience with the then Mr. Chi?
Dr. WITTFOGEL. You see, there wasn't only one conversation. There were many. We had a lot of time. We traveled for days and sometimes we stayed for a half day or a day in a Chinese inn. Mr. Lattimore was very much interested in Chi as quite a brilliant man. He was just writing the thesis I have referred to, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History.
Since I had met Chi, too, we discussed the things which, from my point of view, were Chi's interest in my ideas which he later on dropped without much major difficulty, so I don't know. I had practically a vested interest in Chi as a man who took up some of my ideas and Lattimore was interested in him. So naturally I told him about the circumstances I met him under, and that Chi had worked in the Comintern and came back at that time via Germany to America and that he was going on doing this political work.
Mr. MORRIS. You did tell him both of your encounter with the then Mr. Chi in Germany as well as your encounter with Jaffe and Bisson in 1934?
Dr. WITTFOGEL. I sure did.
Mr. MORRIS. Was there any episode that took place that would corroborate your recollection of the fact that you had these conversations with Mr. Lattimore? Did you visit anybody connected with Chi?
Dr. WITTFOGEL. That is right. Professor Chi, who I think has come up in one of those epic features of the Lattimore story, namely, this letter he wrote to Mr. Barnes about Mr. Chi, where he mentions the father and the son Chi. There he refers to exactly this old Professor Chi who had a high position at the university. I think he was commissioner of education at that time of the Province of Shansi, and he had been head of the law school.
We were kind of interested in how this Papa Chi would take his son's Communist adventures, and naturally we approached the matter subtly. You know that a Chinese is a very dignified man and well restrained. Like other fathers, you could see the papa was not too happy with the way his son developed, but he accepted it as the fact. He loved him nevertheless.

And then on page 301, we have, still in Dr. Wittfogel's testimony:

Point 2: When you asked me about whether Lattimore knew that in these early days I was a Communist—he has later written me a letter in which he told me that he hasn't been aware of this—we do not have to refer to the nonexisting television set. As I said, all our talks about Chi the son and Chi the father made sense only in connection with the background of the Chis' story when it was perfectly clear that we were dealing with a man who had this Communist background, and my relations were in the same set.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you go into point 2, Doctor, at one point in line with your previous testimony that you and Mr. Lattimore had gone to see the elder Chi, partially at least for the purpose of finding out how he reacted to his son's Communist escapades——

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Not quite. We were in the town where he lived and we thought of looking him up.

There is other testimony in that that is already in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that the transcript of this executive session, which I have just been looking through hastily, contains a good deal of additional material which, in my opinion, affects the probative value of the excerpts that have been put in the record, and also contained some material that is irrelevant, really, to the issues here. It seems to me that counsel might want to consider putting in some more of this executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter for counsel. We will see about that.

Mr. MORRIS. We will come to a decision on that, Mr. Fortas.

Mr. FORTAS. May I at sometime take this up with you, and tell you what I noted?

Senator FERGUSON. The other questions and answers that you want in, will you mark those?

Mr. FORTAS. Yes, if I may keep this until we get a few moments.

Mr. MORRIS. At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into the record, from the article Pacific Affairs, June 1936, to which reference has been made——

The CHAIRMAN. What year?

Mr. MORRIS. June 1936. I would like to introduce the whole page of contents, together with page 155, which is a short sketch of the contributors in the current issue.

It mentions here, under the second article:

"Asiaticus" is the well-established pen name of a German writer who was formerly, under this name, the correspondent in China of Die Weltbuhne, and other German left-wing papers. He published, under the same name, a book called Von Kanton Bis Shanghai, 1926–27, which in 1929 was published in a Japanese translation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, will it interrupt Mr. Morris' statement, to place something else in the record at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. We are placing that in the record? You asked that that be inserted into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(Material referred to was marked Exhibit No. 481 and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 481

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

[Vol. IX, No. 2—June 1936]

	Page
Years of Fulfillment—Harriet Moore	157
The Financial Cutting Edge in the Partition of China—"Asiaticus"	165
Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader—Guenther Stein	177
Twin Loyalties in Siam—Lin Yu	191
The Rise of Land Tax and the Fall of Dynasties in Chinese History—Wang Yu-Ch'uan	201
Makers of Public Opinion About the Far East—H. J. Timperley	221
The Settlement of the Australian Tropics—W. Wynne Williams	231
The Rice Export From Burma, Siam, and French Indo-China—C. J. Robertson	243
Pacific Affairs bibliographies: No. II: Native Customary law in the Netherlands East Indies—A. Arthur Schiller	254
Book reviews. See also next page	264

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BOOKS REVIEWED IN THIS ISSUE

	Page
Australia and the Far East, edited by I. Clunies Ross—H. J. Himjerley	264
Australia in the World Depression, by E. Ronald Walker—Linden A. Mander	267
Canada: An American Nation, by John W. Dafoe—A. Gordon Dewey	269
My Country and My People, by Lin Yatang; and T'ien Hsia Monthly—Charlottee Tyler	271
Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning, by Lyon Sharman—Paschal M. D'Elia	276
Japan's Place in the Modern World, by E. H. Pickering—M. Matsuo	278
Japan's Policies and Purposes, by H. Saito—Jerome D. Greene	281
The Social and Economic History of Japan, by Eijiro Honjo—Hugh Borton	284
The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, by John Gilbert Reid—R. T. Pollard	287
Special Correspondent With Bandit and General in Manchuria, by A. R. Lindt—O. M. Green	289
Organized Labor in Mexico, by Marjorie R. Clark—Harry Conover	290
New Zealand, by W. P. Merrell—J. B. Condliffe	292
Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb—Kathleen Barnes	294
The Soviet State, by B. W. Maxwell—Ryuichi Kaji	296
Soviet Russia Fights Crime, by Lenka von Koerber—Margaret Miller	299
The United States in World Affairs in 1934–35, by Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs; and Survey of International Affairs, 1934, by Arnold J. Toynbee and V. M. Boulter—A. Whitney Griswold	301
American Foreign Relations, by Louis M. Sears—Edgar McInnis	303
Commodity Control in the Pacific Area, edited by W. L. Holland—H. Belshaw	304
Migration and Planes of Living, 1920–34, by Carter Goodrich, B. W. Allin and Marion Hayes—Bruno Lasker	309
Road to War, by Walter Millis; A Better Economic Order, by Rt. Rev. Msgr. John A. Ryan; and The Need for Constitutional Reform, by William Y. Elliott—D. W. Brogan	311
Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect On the West, by G. E. Hubbard, assisted by Danzil Baring—E. F. Penrose	314
Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific, by Philip G. Wright—C. F. Remer	317
Neutrality: Its History, Economics, and Law. Vol. I, by Jessup and Deak; Vol. II, by Phillips and Reede; Vol. III, by Turlington; Vol. IV, by Jessup; and Can We Be Neutral?, by Dulles and Armstrong—Lawrence Preuss	321

Books reviewed may be purchased through this office, and will be mailed, post free, at the publisher's list price. Orders should be sent to Pacific Affairs, 129 East 52d Street, New York City.

HARRIET MOORE—is a Research Associate of the Institute of Pacific Relations, who has spent several periods of study in the U. S. S. R. during recent years.

"ASIATICUS"—is the well-established pen name of a German writer who was formerly, under this name, the correspondent in China of Die Weltbuhne and other German left-wing papers. He published, under the same name, a book called Von Kanton Big Shanghai, 1926–27, which in 1929 was published in a Japanese translation.

GUENTHER STEIN—formerly correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt, is now correspondent for several English newspapers in Tokyo. He is the author of Made in Japan (London, 1935).

LIN YU—an Associate Editor of the China Critic, of Shanghai, has lived in Siam. He edits the Oversea Chinese column of the China Critic and is an occasional contributor to the Chinese press.

WANG YU-CHUAN—is an undergraduate of the National Peking University at Pe-ping. He has contributed to the leading Chinese economic journals, and the material on the present article is appearing also, in the Chinese, in Shih Huo (Food and Commodities).

H. J. TIMPERLEY—is an Australian journalist of many years' experience in the Far East, who is now correspondent in China for the Manchester Guardian, and advisory editor of Asia.

W. WYNNE WILLIAMS—is a member of the Australian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.

C. J. ROBERTSON—is attached to the Institut Internation d'Agriculture of Rome. He is the author of World Production and Consumption of Sugar (London, 1934).

A. ARTHUR SCHILLER—is Assistant Professor of Law at Columbia University.

AMONG THE REVIEWERS ARE—

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The Editors cannot undertake to return unsolicited manuscripts unless accompanied by stamped addressed envelopes or International Reply Coupons.

*Has frequently visited the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Discussion was had earlier today about the publication China Today. I hold in my hand the 1939 issue of that magazine. I would like to ask that the masthead and table of contents be inserted in the record at this point.

The masthead indicates the editorial board consists of T. A. Bisson, Philip J. Jaffe, Maxwell S. Stewart, and Robert Norton; that the managing editor was Max Granich; the business manager Dorothea Tooker; contributing editors Theodore Draper, Miss Haru Matsui, Michael Rothman, Harold Ward, Gen. Victor A. Yakhontoff.

The table of contents shows articles by Ting Ling, T. A. Bisson, Ma Hai-teh, James Bertram, Julius Loeb, E. Guy Talbott, Dr. M. S. Bates and Esther Carroll, in addition to the features which are also shown in that table of contents. May that be admitted?

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the editor?

Mr. SOURWINE. The editor was Max Granich.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the tie-in?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore was questioned this morning with regard to his knowledge of this publication, and a letter was inserted, his declination to serve on the editorial board.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 482," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 482

CHINA TODAY

Editorial board: T. A. Bisson, Philip J. Jaffe, Maxwell S. Stewart, Robert Norton
Managing editor: Max Granich
Business manager: Dorothea Tooker
Contributing editors:
Theodore Draper
Miss Haru Matsui
Michael Rothman
Harold Ward
Gen. Victor A. Yakhontoff
Julius Loeb, cartographer

Vol. 5, No. 5—February 1939

With the Editors	2
Our Children, by Ting Ling	4
China Greets the New Year, by T. A. Bisson	5
Where Nippon Sits On a Volcano, by Ma Hai-teh	7
May Day In Tokyo, by James Bertram	8
Two Fathers of Their Countries, by Julius Loeb	10
What Will Congress Do? by E. Guy Talbott	12
Poison F r Profit, by Dr. M. S. Bates	13
Flashes From China, edited by Grace Granich	16
Slipping Past Japan's Censor, edited by Manville Rodgers	17
Books, Films	18
America in Action, by Esther Carroll	19

Published monthly at 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York, N. Y., by American Friends of the Chinese People. Single copy 10 cents. Yearly subscription $1. For foreign countries except Canada add 50 cents. Entered as second class matter, October 24, 1934, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask one question which would be irrelevant elsewhere, and may even be irrelevant here.

Do you know the author Ting Ling, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met him in Yenan, in 1937.

Mr. SOURWINE. Ting Ling is a pseudonym?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a pseudonym, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the name of the author that writes under that pseudonym?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know it at the time you met her?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I did. I don't think I ever knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. I have two more things on this same issue, Senator.

This is in connection with the book we referred to From Canton to Shanghai, published by Agis Verlag. On page 53 of this book appears a statement in German, and reference is made to "the Communist Party, the sole leader of the national and social revolution."

Mr. Fortas, you may want to amplify, you may want to select other excerpts from the book to go into the record. But we would like to have this, together with what you want to add, inserted into the record by way of characterizing that particular book.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the connection?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with Asiaticus, the Asiaticus article we referred to, there is an item here giving a short sketch of the author Asiaticus. This is at a time when Mr. Lattimore was the editor of the publication.

It mentions in here that he is the author of this particular book, which we have questioned Mr. Lattimore about, and this is an excerpt from that book which indicates that the writer believed that the Communist Party is the leader of the national and social revolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to insert this into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the book that Mr. Lattimore never heard about.

Mr. MORRIS. According to his testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And it is in here as a note.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The note referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 483" and was read in full by counsel.)

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the question I intended to ask, whether Mr. Lattimore ever read this book either in the German original or in the Japanese translation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I never.

Mr. MORRIS. The articles by Asiaticus in Imprecorr have already been introduced in the record. May they be referred to in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be referred.

(See pp. 47–50, pt. 1, for reference to Imprecorr.)

We shall recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. FORTAS. I have read this transcript and I have marked in the portions that I should like to have be inserted in the record and which I think are necessary in order to set the other excerpt in its correct context.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be done, Mr. Fortas.

(See exhibit No. 480A, p. 3161.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I wonder if I might make a short statement at this time. Might the record show that the document which was offered this morning was offered particularly as a document which had been accepted in the executive record, and the reason for the shortness of the excerpt was that we were attempting only to establish that fact, and then consideration be given to the consideration of counsel with regard to the addition of the other matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine, or whoever is going to proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to a point that was made this morning. We were discussing the minutes of April 8, 1936. I think I would like——

The CHAIRMAN. Taken where?

Mr. MORRIS. Minutes of a meeting in Moscow, at which were present several Soviet officials and representatives of the American IPR and the Pacific Council of the IPR. We had a lengthy discussion on it. I think inasmuch as the subject treated in the April 12 minutes is very much the same, I would like that introduced into the record at this time instead of later on as we had planned, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, you may bring it forward.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed, "Meeting, April 12, Motiliev, Voitinsky, ECC, O. L., H. M., Harondar."

Mr. MORRIS. And what is that, Mr. Mandel? What is that document?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a photostat of a document.

Mr. MANDEL. Photostat of a document.

The CHAIRMAN. Of a document found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall attending a meeting in Moscow on April 12, 1936, at which the people named in that document were present?

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE—Resumed

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall it, but I assume that there was such a meeting and that I was there.

The CHAIRMAN. In the initials in there that were read, the "O. L." was you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would be myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give Mr. Lattimore one of these stenciled copies so we can make reference to the same document and it will be a lot clearer.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a stencil——

Mr. MORRIS. That is a stencil of that document and I think we can make the same references.

I would like to call your attention to page 2, and would you go down to the eleventh line, the sentence beginning "O. L." in the eleventh line.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I read through the document as a whole first?

Mr. MORRIS. It will take quite some time. It is a long article, Mr.

Chairman. I would like to direct the witness' attention to that one particular paragraph first, and then we can discuss the whole thing.

The Chairman. I don't see any reason why he can't testify as to that and then read it through.

Mr. Morris. Just read that one paragraph, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore. Beginning "O. L."?

Mr. Morris. Beginning with "O. L." in the eleventh line.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. [Reading:]

O. L. said that that would make it possible to have two Soviet articles in one issue.

Mr. Morris. May that go into the record now, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Ferguson. The document?

Mr. Morris. The document.

The Chairman. Yes. It is authenticated. You mean the photostatic copy.

Senator Ferguson. I think this record ought to show that the director of research, when he put these articles in, has been sworn, and they are really going in under that auspices.

The Chairman. Mr. Mandel has been sworn.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean, but I think the record ought to show that.

The Chairman. It may show it again, of course, by all means. Did you want him sworn again?

Senator Ferguson. No. I think when an exhibit goes in like this the record ought to show.

The Chairman. That it goes in under the auspices of the research director.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 485" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 485

Meeting: April 12, Motiliev, Voitinsky, E. C. C., O. L., H. M., Harondar

I. E. C. C. explained that the discussions at the Round Tables at the conference were not simply questions and answers by the representatives from the countries whose economy was being studied. The questions in the preliminary agenda attempt to anticipate all the subjects which may be brought up for discussion. Moreover the round tables do not follow the agenda completely. The agenda is just used as a general guide.

Motiliev asked how the members of the conference were divided between the round tables. E. C. C. said that each round table had members from each country and from each profession, if possible.

Voitinsky said that in Whyte's article there was a proposal that the conference should reach some conclusions and make some proposals, i. e. in respect to China's currency problem and Japan's problem of raw materials. These are economic questions, but they have great political importance. How will these proposals be worked out at the conference? E. C. C. said that the opinion expressed in that article was Whyte's personal opinion, and, while he was an influential member of Chatham House, the article had not been seen by the Chatham House staff and did not represent an official opinion of Chatham House. However, Whyte's proposal reflected the general Chatham House interest in whether or not the British Government was serious about Hoare's suggestion in re raw materials. E. C. C. said that he thought the government would end up perhaps by granting a loan to Japan to help finance purchases of raw materials. E. C. C. said that all such proposals would be considered by the Pacific Council and the Research Committee before the conference and some tentative conclusions would be reached. These in turn would be modified by the results of the conference itself.

II. E. C. C. explained that the Soviet Council should have a representative at each of the committee meetings scheduled to be held before the conference opens.

III. E. C. C. asked if the Soviet members of the Council would be willing to speak to small groups in various American cities. Motiliev said that this could probably be arranged and it would be better to plan for this after the conference, rather than before.

IV. O. L. said that he would like to meet the Soviet suggestions as far as possible, in re having a more definite line expressed in PA. He has not been able to do this before, because he has not had close cooperation from the various Councils. He said that if the Soviet group would start on such a line, he would be able to make the others cooperate more fully. Voitinsky said that the main trouble was that the articles in PA did not come out against the aggressor, and the aggressor was not analyzed from within, therefore there were no indications of the internal weakness of the aggressor.

O. L. asked for an article on the structure of the Japanese Empire. This might bring out the point that continental aggression was not antithetical to maritime aggression, but the two supplemented each other. Voitinsky said that this would probably be possible. He also suggested that there should be an article on aggression against Outer Mongolia, as this was so important now.

O. L. said that he had asked Dimanshtein for an article on Birobidjan. Voitinsky suggested an article on Japanese policy in Korea. This has already been done in Tikhii Okean. The same material could be used for another article for Pacific Affairs. O. L. said that this had been done in regard to the article on the Chinese Land Tax. A Chinese version of the article had appeared, but this was revised to meet the needs of a non-Chinese audience. The material was the same, but differently organized. O. L. said that he would like about six articles a year from the Soviet Council. Voitinsky said that they would do one on Outer Mongolia to be ready for the next issue (to be mailed May 20) and then one on Korea and one of the Japanese Empire. He said that he personally would like to write an article in reply to Whyte's article. O. L. said that that would make it possible to have two Soviet articles in one issue. Voitinsky said that these articles would be done on the same basis of the materials which had already appeared in Tikhii Okean, but "would be polished for export." He said that the articles would have to be translated here. O. L. brought up the question of editing the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles. In regard to the Asiaticus article he had to revise the vocabulary considerably, or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda. In the Kantorovitch article O. L. had edited out a number of things, but the New York office had put them back in. Voitinsky said that that would be impossible with their articles, because they cannot give in on their point of view. No such editorial changes could be made without their approval. He said that they understood the problem of PA and knew what sort of thing they would have to write for it.

O. L. said that they wanted book reviews from the Soviet Council in every issue. There could be as many as three per issue. Voitinsky said that they could get the Webb book reviewed. Voitinsky said that it would also be interesting to have Tikhii Okean reviewed in each issue. This would get across their point of view.

V. E. C. C. explained about the Ten Year History of the IPR; Condliffe writing the section on economic research; Boeke on cultural and anthropological; Whyte on political. He wants the Soviet Council to read these sections and then write a further section on what the Soviet Council considered important in the IPR work and what future policy and work should be followed. Although the book concentrates mainly on the research work of the IPR, it will also treat the whole activity.

VI. E. C. C. said that Holland was very pleased with the Soviet plan to make the studies of the cotton industry and of Standards of Living. He explained that the IPR did not try to make every council join every research project. The Soviet Council should just do those things which were important from their own point of view.

O. L. mentioned that in the June issue there would be a bibliographical article by Schiller. He would like to have such an article from the Soviet Council. Voitinsky thought that this could be done.

VII. E. C. C. said that Liu Yu-Wan would like to know as soon as possible when Motiliev would be in China, so he could make plans for him.

VIII. Motiliev said that he thought Romm would be named to represent them in New York on the staff before the conference. This could not be confirmed until Bucharin came back, but he thought this would be worked out. E. C. C.

explained that it would also be desirable to have a Soviet person on the international staff in the period between conferences. He suggested someone like Rogov.

IX. E. C. C. said that he would like to have Harondar send him a list as soon as possible of the Soviet representatives on the international committees. He also wondered if after the discussions which have been held here, it would be possible to have a Soviet correspondent on PA again.

X. E. C. C. explained about the International Studies Conference, its organization and its development. He said that the IPR is a member of the conference and in the past has had an observer at the conferences, usually someone from England. This year the conference is to be held in Madrid and will be the first of two conferences on the subject of collective security, etc. E. C. C. has the right to appoint anyone he wants to represent the IPR there. He will send the complete agenda, and the papers that are already prepared when he gets to Paris. He will also find out if any other Soviet organization is represented in the conference. If the Soviet IPR would like to send someone, he will arrange it. They might prefer to wait until next year, when the final conference on collective security will be held. Last year the Soviet ambassador in London attended the conference as an observer, but the general policy of the conference is not to have government officials attend as members. Motiliev said that this question would be considered by the committee, and he would notify E. C. C. of the decision.

XI. E. C. C. explained the controversy between himself and the Honolulu group.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you continue reading, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Voitinsky said that these articles would be done on the same basis of the materials which had already appeared in Tikhii Okean, but "would be polished for export. He said that the articles would have to be translated here. O. L. brought up the question of editing the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles. In regard to the Asiaticus articles he had to revise the vocabulary considerably, or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda. In the Kantorovitch article O. L. had edited out a number of things, but the New York office had put them back in. Voitinsky said that that would be impossible with their articles, because they cannot give in on their point of view. No such editorial changes could be made without their approval. He said that they understood the problem of PA and knew what sort of thing they would have to write for it.

The CHAIRMAN. What is meant by the term "their" as used in the context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I assume that it means the Soviet Council of the IPR.

In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that this is clearly not a stenographic transcript, it is a memorandum written by somebody, not myself. This is the first time I have ever seen it, and I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any particular phrase.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting took place, is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The meeting took place; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And minutes were made of the meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Minutes were made of the meeting. I don't know who made the minutes. It doesn't seem to show here and they were not shown to me before.

The CHAIRMAN. The parties named in the minutes which you have before you now, in the manuscript before you, were there to your knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sure they were there. In my present recollection I can't recall who was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't it apparent from reading those minutes, Mr. Lattimore, that at that particular time it was apparent to you that Asiaticus articles had already been taken up by Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably I had had an article from Asiaticus, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is not the article we were discussing this morning in the June 1936 edition of Pacific Affairs, the first article that Asiaticus ever wrote for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think it is. He may have sent something before that was not accepted and not printed. This is the first one that was printed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't edit Asiaticus' article between April 8 and April 12 while you were in Moscow, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember doing any editing in Moscow, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. So if you had had it and edited it by April 12, you had had it and edited it by April 8, isn't that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall in connection with the Asiaticus article that you had to revise the vocabulary considerably or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris, I remember——

The CHAIRMAN. I think you had better answer that yes or no and then explain, Mr. Lattimore. That is susceptible of an answer yes or no, and you may explain afterward.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember that I considered——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Mr. Lattimore. I tried to guide you in the proper course, and you don't seem to want to follow it.

Mr. FORTAS. May I have the question?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question to the witness.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That is susceptible of an answer yes or no, and then you may explain, if you have an explanation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember clearly I considered that his writing was very strongly anti-British and I was willing to retain anything where his facts would support it but I edited out anything that I considered merely anti-British verbiage.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go back just a minute. To whose article were you referring in your last answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The article by Asiaticus.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, as a matter of fact, did you not force through that Asiaticus article over the objections of certain British interests?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Mr. Sourwine; I did not force it through. I followed the usual practice of sending an advance copy and asking for objections, if any. I don't have the correspondence, but my strong recollection is that they objected to certain interpretations of the facts, but not to the facts themselves, and our procedure in such cases was not exclusively in the case of the British, but always to go ahead and publish the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document that I have just handed you.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of an original letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of Pacific Affairs, dated December 13, 1937, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, signed Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this letter introduced into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 486" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 486

Cable: Inparel, New York Telephone PLaza 3-4700

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Published Quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations

HONOLULU, HAWAII

316 Dillingham Bldg.

Office of the Editor, 129 East 52nd Street, New York City

13TH DECEMBER 1937.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
Mechanics Institute Building, Post Street,
San Francisco, California.

DEAR CARTER: A boat left for San Francisco the day after we got in here, but I did not get off my intended letter to you on account of the rush of dealing with PACIFIC AFFAIRS material, end of the year accounts, and so forth. Consequently I am getting this ready for the Clipper.

Bill and I are much encouraged to find that in submitting our joint memorandum to you we were actually converging on a line of development which you had already begun to mark out. I am looking forward to our early meeting in California, so as to get new arrangements under way as rapidly as possible.

Evidently the December number of PACIFIC AFFAIRS has had to be somewhat deferred owing to the slowness of the mails. I guess we were wise not to try to hold on longer in Peiping. If we had stayed, we might have been badly in arrears by the time the March number was due. It appears now that I can go on from here to San Francisco and still be in time for final consideration of the March number.

As you may know, there have been heartfelt promises from Saionji for a major Japanese contribution for March. While in Tokyo I was impressed by Saionji's brains and forthrightness. Nevertheless, I dare not put more than the usual faith in an article promised from Tokyo. It is therefore comforting to have actually in hand a very good article which Bill secured from Uyeda on "pigmy" industries. Our Japanese Council is probably having a pretty grim time. They said very politely that they would have liked to have me longer in Japan; but it was quite clear that while they were glad to see me for a moment and to get fresh and independent information about China, a longer stay might have been embarrassing to them. The morning after our arrival at Tokyo the breakfast newspaper contained an account of the dismissal of Yanaihara for "pacifist" opinions expressed long ago, these being held by the Home Office to be "dangerous to peace and good order. * * *"

Of the material awaiting me here the most interesting was the Hubbard article on the Soviet Five Year Plans, which Holland and I have read with, probably, curious expressions on our faces. While waiting for whatever reaction it may detonate in Motylev, I may as well review several considerations that are likely to turn out to be pertinent.

In the first place, it is a calamity that in spite of our combined and persistent urging, the Soviet Council has never contributed adequately to PACIFIC AFFAIRS. As a result, this very skillful attack threatens to make an impression on readers who have not had the prior advantage of reading constructive presentations of problems of major Soviet interest, by Soviet authors.

In the second place, Motylev and his colleagues told you and me in Moscow that they did not object to adverse criticism, if expressed by people of leading reputation, or people representing important bodies of opinion. Hubbard cannot

lightly be refused a hearing. He has an important influence and standing among "people who count" in England; otherwise he would not be retained as an expert by the Bank of England.

In the third place, this article comes to us, though we did not ourselves request it, through Chatham House, one of the major organs of the IPR. As editor, I necessarily recall that I forced through an article by Asiaticus on British capitalist financial policy in China, against the protests of Chatham House. This would make it difficult for me to refuse the Hubbard article on the ground that it is impolitic. It is true that Asiaticus has no connection with our Soviet Council, but it is equally true that he is regarded by Chatham House as a representative Marxist spokesman. Chatham House, therefore, will undoubtedly consider that it has by precedent a claim to make stringent criticisms of Marxist policies and Soviet achievements.

There are several points in Newton D. Baker's letter of proposals concerning the General Purposes Budget for 1938 on which I should like to consult you as early as possible.

I am glad to see that an effort will be made to reduce the budget of PACIFIC AFFAIRS. I wonder, however, whether the changes thus far proposed will prove practical.

I notice that the estimated income of PACIFIC AFFAIRS has been raised from $4,800 to $5,100. This presumably would mean an increased circulation and therefore increased printing costs. Yet the estimate for "printing and cuts" has been cut from $4,400 to $3,800.

It may prove possible to reduce the appropriation for travel, which has been put at $800 for 1938. Owing to our forced return from China, there has been a considerable excess in travel over the 1937 estimate of $700. It occurs to me, however, that you may have overlooked an item for $500 set aside for travel in the 1937 appropriation from the Research budget for my Inner Asian project. On consultation with Bill, it seems to us both that this $500 has not yet been touched; if it were applied to the 1937 excess, it might prove possible to save on the 1938 appropriation.

I notice that there was an item of $1,000 for promotion in 1937, which has been reduced to $400 for 1938. I should like very much to know what expenditures were charged against this fund in 1937, and what were the results.

You must have had a terrific time of it riding the double crisis of adjustments within the IPR and application of the IPR's resources to the present crisis. We are looking forward eagerly to hearing from you something of the interesting consultations you must have had already, and plans for the present and future. Our problems always seem to come down to the fact that however difficult the present, the future is not cut off.

Yours,

Owen Lattimore /s/
OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, can the letter be shown to Mr. Lattimore and ask him if it is a letter which he wrote?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you look at these letters and determine whether or not it is a letter written over your signature, photostat of a letter over your signature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is clearly a letter over my signature; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this introduced into the record with the question addressed to Mr. Lattimore this morning, "To your knowledge was Asiaticus considered a Marxist in IPR circles?"

The CHAIRMAN. You may read it and insert it in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the paragraph at the bottom of the stencil page beginning "In the third place"?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

In the third place, this article comes to us, though we did not ourselves request it, through Chatham House, one of the major organs of the IPR. As editor, I necessarily recall that I forced through an article by Asiaticus on British capitalist financial policy in China, against the protests of Chatham House. This would make it difficult for me to refuse the Hubbard article on the ground that it is impolitic. It is true that Asiaticus has no connection with our Soviet Council, but it is equally true that he is regarded by Chatham House as a

representative Marxist spokesman. Chatham House, therefore, will undoubtedly consider that it has by precedent a claim to make stringent criticisms of Marxist policies and Soviet achievements.

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask the question whether or not he was a Marxist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was apparently a Marxist in the opinion of the Chatham House.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you disagree with that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't as of 1937 have been qualified to agree or disagree.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you say now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think he probably was.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you change your mind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the identification of various things that he has written as having been published by Communist publishing houses, and so forth, which I didn't know at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Does not this document that you have here of the minutes of the meeting in Moscow indicate the same thing? That was in what year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is written at the end of 1937, and that document is in the middle of 1936.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So prior to this, the minutes of a meeting indicated that he was a Communist or a Marxist, isn't that correct, and you were in the meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think the minutes of the meeting indicates that he was a Marxist or a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Let's see the minutes.

Senator O'CONOR. While Senator Ferguson is looking at that, may I ask one question which may clarify this?

The CHAIRMAN. He is in consultation with his counsel right now.

Senator O'CONOR. I am sorry. I did not mean to interrupt you.

I wonder, Mr. Lattimore, in light of the text of this in which it is said "I necessarily recall that I forced through an article by Asiaticus on British capitalist," whether there is any further comment you desire to make in view of your previous answer that you had not so forced the article through.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, simply that by my recollection I didn't force through articles against the opinion of the British any more than I forced them through against anybody else, but I wouldn't dispute the phraseology, that in a casual letter to somebody I said I forced it through. It is a phrase you can use when you have overridden an objection, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you didn't mean that you had forced it through?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON. You did not mean this at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is a question of the choice of words, Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe he didn't mean his answer to Mr. Sourwine.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wondering.

Senator O'CONOR. I was wondering which of the two.

The CHAIRMAN. Which of the two do you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is simply the question of a use of words. My recollection is that I wouldn't have said that I forced it through. My

recollection was that I said I had overridden the objection or something of that kind, but since I see that I did say that I forced it through, I accept it that I said I forced it through. But I think the difference between forcing it through and overriding an objection is not very significant.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, there wasn't any doubt about the article being very critical of the British.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No doubt about its being very critical of the British.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would say the British strenuously objected to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again a question of choice of words.

Senator FERGUSON. What word do you want to use?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say, without having seen the original correspondence from the British, that my recollection is that they strongly objected.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and that it would take something more than just a few words to have it put in over their objection, would it not? Don't you think the word "forced" is the proper word in here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Forced or overrode. I don't see any great difference between the two.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this now refresh your memory on this as to what you did do in relation to this article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This refreshes my memory that I overrode the British in spite of their objections, and if you like, forced it through.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it not also indicate to you that that is the article that you were mentioning when you were in Moscow, because of what you said here?

Mr. FORTAS. What is this?

Senator FERGUSON. In this 13th of December 1937 letter, the one he just read.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it must have been the same article, but that doesn't mean that I thought it was a Communist article.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, now we find that in Moscow you were talking about someone writing as a Communist an article, and you now come to the point where you call this same writer a Marxist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't call him that.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. But he is called a Marxist by those who want the article kept out.

Mr. MORRIS. Or representative Marxist.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Does that not indicate to you that it is the same man you were talking about in Moscow as a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It does not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it because of your previous answers on this record that it does not refresh your memory?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, because I have such a clear memory that I had been trying to get a Chinese Communist article.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that is just exactly what you did get, a Chinese Communist article, but you got it from a German? Is that not exactly what you got?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I got an article from an anti-British German whom I regarded at that time as a social-democrat. He is identified as I recall in the contributors paragraph there in Pacific Affairs as a contributor to left-wing journals. May I complete that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As of 1936 my knowledge of any differences between left-wing social-democrats, how far social democrats are Marxist, the difference between social-democrats and Communists, and all the rest of it, was so vague that I would be quite capable of loose phraseology.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, Mr. Lattimore, do you think it was fair, as an editor of a paper, to foist upon the public, particularly Americans, an article by this person and under an editor that doesn't know the difference between a social-democrat, a Marxist, and a Communist? Do you think you were fair then, doing that without understanding these terms and who they were?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I was not only fair, but that I was fairly representative of American editors at that time, 1936.

Senator FERGUSON. As you see it now, what do you think about your work?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I see it now, I think I did a job of editing a magazine participated in by a number of nations necessarily dealing often with controversial topics in a manner of which I am not ashamed.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't you go into the proposition as to whether or not this man was a representative Marxist spokesman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because as of 1936 I didn't think it important.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't think it made any difference whether he was a Marxist spokesman, a Communist, or a left-winger; is that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think even in 1936 I would have made a distinction between Communist Party members or Russian Communists and various kinds of European social democrats and so forth, but that is merely my recollection. It is awfully hard for me to remember exactly what my attitude was on those subjects 18 years ago, or 16 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, you allowed him to write other articles and put them in this magazine after the 13th of December 1937, when your letter speaks of him as a Marxist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You allowed him to write more articles after that and put them in your magazine, is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then did you understand that he was writing as a left-winger, a Marxist, or a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understood, as I remember describing him in the contributors' identification paragraph there, as a left-winger.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever describe him later as a left-winger?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. That could easily be checked from copies of Pacific Affairs. You see, after all, this is a British description of a man as a representative Marxist.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think they ought to know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't see why I should have accepted them as authoritative on that subject, no.

Senator FERGUSON. But you said you had trouble recognizing. Don't you think you might have taken the advice of some experts, the British, on Marxists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't think that the particular British that were writing to me on the subject were any more experts on the subject than I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consider you were an expert?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't. The whole point in my mind at the time was that the man had an anti-British attitude, and the question was one of the propriety with which he stated his anti-British point of view.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you agree, Mr. Lattimore, that the effect upon the public whether this was permitted by stupidity or intention would be the same as far as this magazine was concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What impression?

Senator FERGUSON. Of these Communist writings.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think it is Communist writings, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think that article was the writing of a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Even today you do not think so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Today I would say that my opinion is that the man was probably a Communist. I do not think the articles were Communist and I do not think the articles further Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't, not even to this day.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that because you do not recognize Communist propaganda?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, because as of the general standard of publishing and discussion in 1936–37, I wouldn't consider it Communist propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about today. You have read the article. You know what you think of it today. You read part of it here this morning.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My opinion of it today is that in 1936–37 it was not Communist propaganda.

Senator O'CONOR. Could you let me ask one question there. Mr. Lattimore, when did you come to the realization that Asiaticus was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know that "realization" is the exact word.

Senator O'CONOR. When were you convinced?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The proceedings of this committee have shown that he published books with Communist publishing houses, and there is a phrase there, something about the great Communist Party this, and that, and so forth. On that I would accept that he was a Communist.

Senator O'CONOR. Are we to understand that until the formation of this committee you were not sure or were not convinced that Asiaticus was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, that would be the correct way to put it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record the Asiaticus article that appears in Pacific Affairs, June 1938. It runs from page 237 through 252. May that be made part of the

record? Mr. Lattimore has a copy of that article, I am sure. It is an exchange between Edgar Snow and Asiaticus.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The nature of the article having come into the discussion, I think it is proper to put it in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 487" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 487

[Soure: PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Vol. XI, No. II, June 1938]

"ASIATICUS" CRITICIZES "RED STAR OVER CHINA"

In view of the extraordinary interest aroused in all countries by Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China, we print herewith some correspondence which gives "Asiaticus" criticism of Snow's study of the Chinese Communists, together with a letter from Mr. Snow himself. We have considerably condensed all three letters, owing to necessities of space, but trust that in doing so we have not done injustice either to "Asiaticus" or to Mr. Snow.—EDITOR.

To the EDITOR OF PACIFIC AFFAIRS:

SIR: Edgar Snow, the first foreign writer to enter Chinese Red territory, has done in Red Star Over China an excellent and well-documented piece of reporting. His book is a unique historical contribution. However, even nonpartisanship and honest investigation do not necessarily prevent errors of outlook and interpretation in presenting facts personally seen and truthfully related. When Snow leaves actual reporting and turns to theory, he makes many esssential mistakes about the Chinese Communist movement, the historical position of Soviet China and the Red Army, the Soviet Union and Communism in general.

His fundamental conception is plain: a revolution led by Communists, like that of Soviet China, must necessarily be a proletarian revolution with immediate Socialist aims. He found little that could properly be called Socialism in the Chinese Soviet region, in spite of his emphasis on the enormous revolutionary changes in the Chinese Soviet region. He tends to explain this by saying that the agrarian revolution, without actual Socialist changes, gave the Reds an "immediate basis of support"; they could not, while confined in the remote interior, "'try out Communism in China,' which is what some people think the Reds have been attempting in their little blockaded areas" (p. 212). Obviously, the inference is that the Reds would "try out communism" if they could gain control of the great cities.

This is certainly wrong. The policy of the Chinese Communists makes it quite unmistakable that their only immediate aim was to carry through that Chinese revolution which was actually going on; which was not a Socialist but a nationalist revolution, against imperialist domination, combined with a bourgeois-democratic revolution aimed at eradicating the powerful feudal remnants in rural China and getting rid of the patriarchal, absolutist reactionaries. The political organization of the Chinese Communists (Red Army and Soviets, under Communist leadership) was never intended for any other purpose. The only difference between cooperation with the Kuomintang now and in the former period (1926–27) is that there are now Soviet areas in which this movement has been under the majority control of workers and peasants ever since the Kuomintang, going against Sun Yat-sen's teachings, compromised with imperialism and feudal reaction in 1927. The institution of Soviets (meaning Councils) does not imply that China is attempting what Russia accomplished in 1917; it is more like the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905, led by proletarians, which saw the first historical appearance of Soviets.

Nevertheless, Chinese Communism is a model child of Marx. Engels once said that Marxism is essentially the doctrine of the conditions necessary for the victory of the workers. The appearance in history of centralized, independent national states, with democratic constitutions, is one of those conditions, and so is the liberation of the peasants from feudal chains. Long before the epoch of Socialist revolution, beginning in 1917, the struggle against feudal absolutism and for democratic liberties and national defense against aggressors was part of the "minimum program" of the Socialist or Communist movement, an essential step

toward the "maximum program" of proletarian revolution and a Socialist economy. Therefore the Chinese Communists, in throwing everything into a struggle for national, bourgeois-democratic revolution, are not betraying the Socialist revolution but preparing the way for it in the future—although it may be a long way from Chinese victory against Japan and over the reactionaries in China to a Socialist revolution.

Snow interprets Chinese Communism as an attempt at Socialist revolution when he argues (p. 441) that "the assistance expected from the world proletariat failed to materialize," and that "in the Communist International Program it is clearly recognized that successful proletarian movements in semicolonial countries such as China 'will be possible only if direct support is obtained from the countries in which the proletarian dictatorship is established' (i. e., in the U. S. S. R.)." As a matter of fact China is justified in expecting help not only from the world proletariat but from all progressive forces which support democracy, peace, and resistance to aggression; and not only from the U. S. S. R. but from all democratic and peace-loving peoples—not necessarily through intervention, but through international collaboration to prevent imperialist intervention.

It is a mistake to suggest, as Snow does (p. 212), that the Chinese Communists used land redistribution merely as a maneuver to gain the power that would enable them to press forward to thoroughgoing Socialist changes, including collectivization. The liberation of the Chinese peasantry was an aim in itself, because the peasantry will follow any political party that is ready to fight for the relief of peasant misery. Imperialist conquerors and their reactionary Chinese agents are the worst enemies of peasant liberation. It is quite different with great numbers of the smaller Chinese bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia; and so long as they are willing to abolish feudal exaction and tax extortion as part of their program for national salvation and democratic reform, the peasants will not hesitate to follow them. Snow believes that the Kuomintang would not "sign its own death-warrant" (p. 445) by genuinely realizing bourgeois democracy; but the Chinese nation can only survive through unification and immense sacrifices on the part of all classes, espeically the peasantry, and therefore if the Kuomintang, as the party of the bourgeoisie, were to prevent the sweeping reforms that are necessary if China is to survive, it really would be signing its own death-warrant. In a time of general sacrifice, the ruling party can only retain leadership if it considers the interests of those whom it calls on to follow it. Snow himself makes it clear (p. 445) that "some recognition of the demands of the majority will have to be made by the tiny minority which now monopolizes the State economy and policing power."

But no "tiny minority" can enforce its will over the majority in China, in present circumstances. The Japanese want nothing better than to cooperate with all internal enemies of progress and rejuvenation in China, and therefore those who lead the Chinese cannot afford to isolate themselves from the great majority of the nation. The Chinese Communists, as the party of the workers and poor peasants, have come to the fore not because they are under the delusion that the peasants can thus easily be made into fighters for Socialism, but because of their vital interest in a complete victory of national bourgeois-democratic revolution, which must be established before the goal of Socialism can become an actual political issue. Even if the bourgeoisie were to surrender to imperialism, leaving the Communists in complete power in all of China that remained unconquered, an immediate "thoroughgoing" Socialist revolution would not be a practical question, because such a Communist government would still consist only of the executives representing the majority of the Chinese people, in a struggle still focused on national independence and peasant liberation, even though the proletariat might have the hegemony in a union of workers, peasants, and the small bourgeoisie.

What Snow evidently has in view is the Socialist revolution in the Soviet Union. In Russia, however, the proletariat was already in the vanguard. Not only had there already been successive stages of revolution, but there was a more mature base, nationally, socially and economically. The collectivization of rural economy in the Soviet Union came after a proletarian revolution, when the key economic positions had been in Socialist hands for more than a decade. The struggle for bourgeois-democratic revolution and national independence, which may yet take decades in China, was already over in the Soviet Union. Snow evidently realizes this but he seems to think the Chinese Communists may have a short-cut scheme and that "the victory of the revolution in China may hinge on the ability of the U. S. S. R. to make the transition from a program of Socialism in one country to Socialism in all countries, to world revolution" (p. 449).

Disregarding Snow's evidently confused idea of the program of "Socialism in one country" and his implication that somehow this hinders "Socialism in all countries," or world revolution, it may be pointed out that even if the Soviet Union should change its mind and begin to promote "Socialism in all countries," beginning with China, the fact would still remain that Socialism cannot be constructed in China until imperialist aggression has been defeated and the bourgeois-democratic revolution completed. Marx, in the preface to Capital, states that:

One nation can learn from others, and should do so. When a society has discovered the natural laws which regulate its own movement, it can neither overleap the natural phases of evolution, nor shuffle them out of the world by decrees. But this much, at least, it can do: It can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs (International Publishers, N. Y., 1929, p. 864).

The Soviet Union has always offered to China the opportunity, whenever China might be willing to take it, to make use of Soviet revolutionary experience for the national liberation of China. According to Snow, however:

* * * the Soviet Union in fact did not extend to the Chinese comrades the promised "assistance and support of the proletarian dictatorship" in any degree commensurate with the need. On the contrary, the great help, amounting to intervention, which the Soviet Union gave to Chiang Kai-shek until 1927 had the objective influence of bringing into power the most reactionary elements of the Kuomintang. Of course, the rendering of direct aid to the Chinese Communists after 1927 became quite incompatible with the position adopted by the U. S. S. R.—and here is the well-known contradiction between the immediate needs of the national policy of the Soviet Union and the immediate demands of the world revolution—for to do so would have been to jeopardize by the danger of international war the whole program of Socialist construction in one country. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the influence of this factor on the Chinese revolution was very great (p. 441).

He goes on to describe the Chinese Communists, "deprived of an ally," continuing "to struggle alone for the 'hegemony of the bourgeois revolution.'"

Presumably Snow uses "bourgeois revolution" in inverted commas because he cannot see that the Chinese revolution is bourgeois, and doubts whether the Chinese Communists see it that way. Probably his inference is that this is all "tactics," aimed at eventual Communist leadership of a Socialist revolution. This prevents him both from seeing the historical function of the Kuomintang when it was struggling against the old Peking Government, the warlord scourge and imperialist intervention, and from seeing that the Communists joined the Kuomintang solely in order to advance this struggle—just as Marx and Engels supported the German bourgeois revolution of 1848. The Kuomintang's accession to power meant a historical advance for China, even though the Communists could not prevent the reactionary elements within the Kuomintang from taking advantage of this. The Soviet Union was not responsible for this turn of events. Its advisors were not attached to Chiang Kai-shek merely personally, but to the National Government and the elected leadership of the Kuomintang and the Army. They supported the Kuomintang majority in advocating a centralized civilian government controlled by the Kuomintang, not by the Army. Chiang Kai-shek opposed the transfer of the National Government, to which Borodin was attached, from Canton to Wuhan; his moves against this Government and the eventual surrender of the Kuomintang opposition, leading to abandonment of Sun Yat-sen's policy of cooperation with workers and peasants and the Communist Party, brought Soviet advisorship to the Kuomintang to an end. This advisorship, from 1923 to 1927, had represented aid not merely to the Chinese Communists but to the Chinese national revolution.

The Chinese Red Army began its existence with the military uprising at Nanchang in 1927, with which communism, according to Snow, "first became an independent force (p. 51). It had really been an independent force, however, from the moment the Communist Party of China was founded. It was prominent in cooperation with the Kuomintang until 1927; in the Shanghai general strike of 1925; in the 1925–26 strike and boycott against Hongkong; in the armed uprising, together with the Nationalist Army, against Chang Tsung-chang's hordes before Shanghai in 1927. In the subsequent 10 years, just as much as in the present cooperation in the national war of resistance, the Chinese Communists have directed their activities mainly toward the national and bourgeois-democratic revolution; and this does not in the least contradict their function as an independent class force aiming historically toward Socialist revolution. Marx and Engels began to make the working class conscious of its historical position and

mission by cooperating with all democratic forces, and taught it to rely on its own strength and not to follow the other classes blindly even in the course of this cooperation. Their teaching was: cooperation with the bourgeoisie when it works against feudalism and for democracy, and resistance to it when it compromises with reaction and betrays democracy.

In compliance with these principles, the Chinese Communists regarded the Kuomintang's abandonment of the revolutionary policies of Sun Yat-sen, in 1927, as a menace to the national and bourgeois-democratic revolution. They have struggled, ever since, to reinstate these policies throughout the nation. They believe (p. 77) that the decade since 1927 "has richly validated their thesis that national independence and democracy (which the Kuomintang also set as its objective) cannot be achieved in China without an anti-imperialist policy externally and an agrarian revolution internally." Surely this means that, while changing their tactics to suit different situations, they have continuously fought for the national and bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Has the Communist International (of which the Chinese Communist Party is a member) failed to help Chinese Communists, and has assistance from the Soviet Union and the world proletariat "failed to materialize," as Snow suggests? He sees the reason for this "failure" in the "well-known contradiction between the immediate needs of the national policy of the Soviet Union and the immediate demands of the world revolution," thus making the Comintern "a kind of bureau of the Soviet Union" (pp. 478 and 441). Would Snow also say that the world proletariat is an institution of the Soviet Union? To him the Soviet Union under Stalin has been responsible for changing the Communist International by "transition from an organization of international incendiaries into an instrument of national policy of the Soviet Union" (p. 376). He speaks of the Comintern as having to "limp along as a kind of poor stepchild which might be officially disinherited whenever it did anything malaprop" (p. 479). This is a characterization of the Comintern which will be acclaimed by outright Fascists as well as by the Trotskyites. Snow's failure to see the working out of the historical process, however, has already been corrected by Mao Tse-tung, who in an interview with Snow (p. 167) declares that "the Communist Party of China was, is and will ever be, faithful to Marxist-Leninism." The truth is that the Chinese Communist Party, as an integral part of the Comintern, has learned the revolutionary theory and practice for which the Comintern stands. By fighting in the vanguard of the actual Chinese Revolution it has carried forward China's struggle for liberation from imperialism and aggression; a cause in which national independence and the people's livelihood are combined; a cause which is not only China's but that of all workers, all over the world, and which has consistently been upheld by the Comintern. Therefore, the Chinese Communists today represent not only the workers and peasants of China, but the entire nation, in their fight for national liberation, and therefore they stand for democratic freedom as a whole.

Though representing a partisan view, these remarks may perhaps be useful toward the establishment of a real understanding of the position and character of the present program of the Chinese Communist Party.

"ASIATICUS."

SHANGHAI, *January 1938.*

EDGAR SNOW REPLIES

To the EDITOR OF PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

SIR: I appreciate the privilege of having seen an advance copy of the long remarks on my book, Red Star Over China, by "Asiaticus." My first reaction was sheer amazement that anyone could read my book and emerge from the task with impressions so directly antipodal to those which I hoped to convey. Unfortunately, "Asiaticus" approaches my book chiefly as theorist; but it seems to me a not entirely scientific use of theory to develop his criticism, not on the basis of what I actually wrote but on his own theory of what I really meant to write.

"Asiaticus" desired to prove that the Chinese Communists did not in the past, and do not now, propose to establish Socialism in China, but only bourgeois democracy. This is all right, for no doubt some people still believe that the Communists want to create Communism in China in the next five minutes (not that they wouldn't like to, at that, if it were possible). The thesis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not original with "Asiaticus"; he assumes

that I have never heard of it, and do not accept it. The main burden of his criticism is that what I really meant to say was that the Chinese Communists strive to seize power and immediately construct Socialism. Yet nowhere in my book do I take such a position. What does the book actually say? In the last chapter, which is the only section dealing avowedly with theory, and that of necessity but briefly, I wrote:

"A popular and never-dying notion of the Communist movement in China is that it is anticapitalist in the sense that it does not see the necessity for a period of bourgeois or capitalist economy, but wants right away to proclaim Socialism. This is rubbish. Every pronouncement of the Communists has shown clearly that they recognize the 'bourgeois character' of the present revolution. The struggle has been not over the nature of the revolution so much as over the nature of its leadership. The Communists recognize that the duties of that leadership are to realize, as quickly as possible, two primary historic tasks: first, to overthrow foreign imperialism and establish national independence (that is, liberate China from its semicolonial status); second, to overthrow the power of the landlords and gentry and establish democracy" (that is, liberate the masses from "semifeudalism").

Only after those tasks have been accomplished, the Communists foresee, will it be possible to move toward socialism.

But how can these victories be won? For a while the Communists hoped to win them with the bourgeoisie. But when the counter-revolution occurred in 1927, when the Kuomintang (the party of the landlords and bourgeoisie) abandoned the revolutionary method against both imperialism and "feudalism," they became convinced that "only a worker-peasant democratic dictatorship, under the hegemony of the proletariat" could lead the bourgeois revolution—which in China did not assume a definitive form immediately after the overthrow of the imperial monarchy, but only at the time of the Great Revolution—1925–27.

The Communist saw that the Chinese capitalist class was not a true bourgeoisie, but a "colonial bourgeoisie." It was a "compradore class" with the character of an excrescence of the foreign and finance monopoly capitalism which it primarily served. It was too weak to lead the revolution. It could, in fact, achieve the conditions of its own freedom only through the fulfillment of the anti-imperialist movement, the elimination of foreign domination. But only the workers and peasants could lead such a revolution to its final victory. And the Communists intended that the workers and peasants should not turn over the fruits of that victory to the neo-capitalists whom they were thus to release, as had happened in France, Germany, Italy—everywhere in fact, except in Russia. Indeed, they should retain power throughout a kind of "N. E. P." period, a brief epoch of "controlled capitalism" and then a period of State capitalism, followed at last by a speedy transition into Socialist construction, with the help of the U. S. S. R. All this is indicated quite clearly in Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

"The aim of the driving out of imperialism, and destroying the Kuomintang," repeated Mao Tse-tung in 1934, "is to unify China, to bring the bourgeois democratic revolution to fruition, and to make it possible to turn this revolution into a higher stage of Socialist revolution. This is the task of the Soviet" (pp. 437–438).

This is no doubt inadequate, but it seems to state very clearly that even had the Reds seized power they would have had no hope of instantly creating a Socialist utopia. Yet evidently "Asiaticus" thinks that the book does not mean what it says here and elsewhere (the thesis is also explained on pp. 76–80), but that what I actually meant to say was that the Communists want "right away to proclaim Socialism" despite my description of such notions as "rubbish."

In the above-quoted chapter I endeavored to explain how and why the Communists broke with the Kuomintang in 1927, the nature of the armed struggle for power in the next 10 years, and finally the basis on which the Communists engaged in a common struggle with the Kuomintang against Japan. The unprecedented intensification of the imperialist invasion was the main reason for the present reconciliation between the opposing class forces represented by the Communists and the Kuomintang, but the question of the hegemony of the revolution remains in abeyance, depending on the outcome of the war.

"Asiaticus" does not seem to understand this question of hegemony of the revolution very clearly. He thinks that the Communists were fighting only for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and that the Kuomintang fought for it too. If that were so it would be impossible to explain the past decade of civil war. Actually they were both fighting for that, but also for something more.

They fought also over the real issue of the hegemony of power, over whether the Chinese revolution was to be a "worker-peasant democratic dictatorship under the hegemony of the proletariat," or whether it was to resolve into a dictatorship under the hegemony of the Kuomintang. During their armed struggle for power (1927–1936) the Chinese Communists never conceded the role of leadership of the revolution to the Kuomintang—any more than the latter conceded it to the Communists. It was only after the submission of the Red Army last August to the high command of the Central Government—in which the hegemony was clearly not proletarian—that the Communists recognized the leadership of the bourgeoisie in the present stage (the struggle for national independence) of the still uncompleted revolution.

It is therefore not quite correct to say, as "Asiaticus" does, that in the past the "only immediate aim" of the Chinese Communists was the realization of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Throughout the period of the Soviets and civil war the Communists' "immediate aims" were to complete the anti-imperialist, antifeudal, bourgeoise-democratic revolution, and also to complete it in the form of the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship under the hegemony of the proletariat. Or, as this was expressed in the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic itself:

"It shall be our task to finally establish this dictatorship throughout China. It shall be the aim of this dictatorship to destroy all feudal survivals, to annihilate the might of the warlords in China [among whom the Communists then classified Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang armies—E. S.] to unite China, systematically, to limit the development of capitalism, to build up the economy of the state, to develop the class-consciousness and organization of the proletariat, to rally to its banner the broad masses of the village poor, in order to effect the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat." [Italics mine—E.S.]

"Asiaticus" trouble is that he ignores the significance of the new stage in the Chinese Revolution, and in the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, which began with the actual achievement of the United Front. But even though the present anti-imperialist struggle against Japan, which is manifestly revolutionary war, has been initiated by, and is still under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, with the loyal cooperation of the Communists it is a grave error in dialectical thinking to imply from this that the Communists would not be prepared, if conditions imposed the task upon them, to accept the full hegomony of the revolutionary war themselves.

It is a mistake to assume that during the civil war the Communists were fighting for the bourgeois-democratic revolution for the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they were from the beginning of the Soviet movement to its end fighting for proletarian hegemony of the revolution of the bourgeoisie, and for the ultimate ("maximum program") realization of Communist society, and this remains today a goal which gives to the Marxist-Leninist proletarian leadership its invincible morale and revolutionary determination. "The Communist Party will never abandon its aims of Socialism and Communism," as Mao Tse-tung recently said:

It will still pass through the stage of democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie to attain the stages of Socialism and Communism. The Communist Party retains its own program and its own policies. The party program is Socialism and Communism and this different from the San Min Chu I. Its policy program is more thorough compared with those of any other party and clique within this country, but it does not fundamentally contradict the program of the San Min Chu I.

"Asiaticus' " error is that he does not distinguish between this role of hegemony and the nature of the next stage of the Chinese revolution itself. Chen Tu-hsiu suffered from some such view in 1927, when he advocated that the Communists submit to the Kuomintang and bourgeois hegemony of the revolution, and later on the Trotskyist emphasized the same view. They ignored the validity of the Chinese Soviets (which they regarded as peasant rebellion merely) because they denied the possibility of the proletarian role of hegemony in such a worker-peasant movement, and its ability to realize the tasks of bourgeois-democratic revolution. "Asiaticus" evidently does not take that position, because he approves of the Soviets as progressive, but his inadequate conception of the Communists' aim for hegemony of power leaves unexplained one deep side of the nature and intensity of revolutionary struggle in China during the pre-United Front epoch.

As concerns the remainder of "Asiaticus' " review, which attempts to interpret the historic relationship between the Comintern, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Communist Party, it must be apparent that this poses very great questions, which are changing in their nature each day. It is introduced by "Asiati-

cus" in such a manner as to require lengthy discussion, or none at all, and I feel I have already more than exhausted the courtesy of your space. It does not seem to me, however, that "Asiaticus" correctly represents my attitude toward the Comintern and the Soviet Union, which is objective, I hope, and somewhat critical, but not antagonistic nor unfriendly, as one might conclude from his review.

Red Star would in any event have been a book far short of perfection, because it was completed before the Sino-Japanese war broke out it is all the more subject to alteration. There are errors of fact in it, and doubtless errors of judgment and analysis, and some of these concern the Soviet Union; but none of them represent a hardened prejudice. The views I have expressed are subject to revision. I do not claim to be a trained Marxist; I am only an amateur at theory, and I am anxious to be corrected in this respect, as in others. But the charge that I believe the Chinese Communist movement "can only be one" with "immediate Socialist aims" would, if it were true, destroy any value my book might otherwise possess, and I am unable to let it go unchallenged.

EDGAR SNOW.

SHANGHAI, *January 1938.*

"ASIATICUS" HOLDS HIS GROUND

To the EDITOR OF PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

SIR: I must congratulate Edgar Snow on admitting that his views do not represent a hardened prejudice. However, my criticism of his erroneous conceptions of the character of the Chinese Revolution are only confirmed by his reply. He quotes his own statement that the Chinese capitalist class was "not a true bourgeoisie," but a "colonial bourgeoisie," and therefore was "too weak to lead the revolution." I cannot grasp how a bourgeoisie subjected to foreign or colonial domination ceases to be a true bourgeoisie. We know from history that even in independent countries like Germany, Tsarist Russia and Japan the bourgeoisie did not lead the bourgeois-democratic revolutions, but surrendered politically to feudal, absolutist forces, being satisfied with economic domination for itself. It might happen, however, that a "colonial bourgeoisie," if denied economic expansion and national independence, might be forced to lead the national bourgeois revolution in spite of its peculiar weakness in such a situation. This weakness could only be overcome by arousing the masses of people to democratic action. This was the idea of Sun Yat-sen, who was both an anti-imperialist and a democratic leader. In justice to Sun Yat-sen it must be pointed out that, contrary to Snow's opinion, the theory of the Chinese bourgeois revolution being at the same time a revolution against imperialist domination was not only clarified and developed by the Communist Party but also profoundly realized and taught by Sun Yat-sen himself. It had a foremost place in his revolutionary policies and the San Min Chu I.

Snow states that I make the mistake of assuming that the "Communists were fighting for the bourgeois-democratic revolution for the bourgeoisie." It is he who is utterly mistaken, not I. The bourgeois-democratic revolution is historically both for the bourgeoisie and for the expansion of the capitalist order; just as the proletarian revolution is both for the proletariat and for Socialist transformation. He states in his book that the idea that the Communists were fighting for the bourgeois-democratic revolution for the bourgeoisie imputes "futility to the heroic sacrifices of thousands of lives in the struggle to assure the Socialist future of China." Here I can only refer him to the heroic sacrifices during the bourgeois-revolutionary periods of the American War of Independence and the Civil War; to the sacrifices made for the French Revolution and the sacrifices made by workers and peasants during the long-drawn-out period of bourgeois revolution in Russia, in 1905 and again in 1917.

The split in the Chinese revolutionary United Front in 1927 occurred because the Kuomintang compromised with feudal forces and with imperialism, and turned against the democratic forces of the workers and peasants and the small bourgeoisie of the cities. In so doing it surrendered its former position of leadership in the national bourgeois revolution. It was the Communists who continued the fight. In so doing they took over the leadership of the revolution, but the historical character of the revolution remained the same, and the Communists were not "fighting for that but also for something more." The workers and peasants were not fighting "for the bourgeoisie," but for their own

national and democratic freedom, and the relief of their own misery. This is what gives the proletariat the interest to struggle to assure a Socialist future. However, their economic and political interests combine wih the bourgeois aim for economic and political domination, because this aim means the overthrowing of the combined forces of feudalism and of imperialist domination. It is characteristic of the period of bourgeois-democratic revolution that all democratic forces follow the leadership which actually exists and really leads the revolution. The necessity for proletarian leadership, and the possibility of realizing it, arise only when the bourgeoisie does not lead the revolution, or actually oppose it, by submitting to feudal forces, or to feudal forces combined with or led by imperialist aggressors. Even so, proletarian leadership, or the hegemony of the proletariat among the democratic forces, does not mean opposing the existence of the bourgeoisie as a class, or preventing it from rejoining the revolutionary front. It is only a continuation of the revolution, which the bourgeoisie has betrayed, in contradiction to its own class interests. It is only in a proletarian revolution aimed at overthrowing the bourgeoisie and realizing Socialism, that it is impossible to consider the interests of the bourgeois class.

In speaking of "immediate Socialist aims," I did not of course mean "springing into Socialism right away." I simply defined the historical character and mission of a proletarian revolution. Snow states that the Chinese Communists, after attaining power, would have to go through an "N. E. P." period of controlled capitalism, leading first to state capitalism and then to a speedy transition to Socialist construction, with the help of the U. S. S. R. This however does not mean retaining power, which is characteristic of proletarian hegemony in a bourgeois-democratic revolution. It applies to the position of the proletariat under a proletarian dictatorship, acquired by the victory of Socialist revolution. The N. E. P. period in the Soviet Union, and that of controlled capitalism and state capitalism, were only possible after the victory of Socialist revolution. The Russian Communists, in aiming for this revolution, never concealed its character or confused it with bourgeois-democratic revolution. On the contrary, they pointed out the fundamental difference in character and historical sequence of these two kinds of revolution. During the earlier bourgeois-revolutionary period they made heroic sacrifices for decades, following a clear and distinct revolutionary theory about the aims and possibilities open to the democratic forces within the frame of bourgeois revolution. The theory of the Chinese Communists is in no way different. They have always aimed at the realization of the national bourgeois-democratic revolution, which is the only one within the scope of historical realism in China today. It is true that their party program represents not only "something more," but very much more. The propaganda for their final aims will always express this aim, which is confined to the direct interests of the workers and poor peasantry and does not apply to the interests of the broad democratic front of a national bourgeois revolution. Any attempt, open or covert, to introduce the struggle for this "something more" during the fight for bourgeois national revolution would mean the isolation of the proletariat and the Communists from the national and democratic revolutionary front. This has been further emphasized by the new developments of which Snow speaks. The Chinese bourgeois revolution, aiming at unification, centralization and the national independence of China, as well as at peasant liberation and democratic victory, means the revolutionary creation of a modern state. As such it is distinctly different from the later period of struggle to realize Socialist revolution for China.

In 1905 Lenin foresaw that, in the event of the overthrow of Tsarism by the bourgeois-democratic revolution, there would be a long period of democratic rule in Russia with a bourgeois-democratic republic, but under a government of workers and peasants. By 1917, however, the situation had become quite different. The Russian bourgeoisie had by then attained full economic domination, and to a great extent political power also, under the Tsarist regime, which took part in an imperialist aggressive war in the interests of the Russian bourgeoisie. The collapse of Tsarism was thus the beginning of a revolutionary crisis directed against both imperialist war and the rule of the bourgeoisie, and accordingly the belated achievement of peasant liberation offered direct support for the victory of Socialist revolution.

The enormous difference between this and the present revolutionary issue in China is obvious. The main interests of the Chinese nation are still unification, centralization and national independence, which had been attained in Russia long before 1905, by which time the Russian bourgeois landlord regime was suppressing and exploiting other nationalities. Finally, there is in China the

revolutionary bourgeois party and a government created by revolution as well as a very broad mass of small bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, whose aim is complete unification and centralization, and the national identity which is menaced by the imperialist aggressor. In Russia, the revolutionary organization of the workers had already become the only leadership in the bourgeois-democratic revolution against Tsarism. The main problem for Chinese Communists and their main tactical question ever since their existence as a party is, therefore, not competition for leadership but the duty of assuring, as the most conscious of the democratic forces, that the national bourgeois-democratic revolution shall actually proceed under conditions of the broadest possible cooperation and unity of all democratic forces. They must make full use of every possibility of achieving a free China, nationally organized as a democracy of the whole people. Then and only then can the issue of attaining "something more"—social freedom for the proletariat and the poor, led by a powerful working class in an industrialized China—become actual and urgent. There is no doubt that this will finally be attained, for the historical progress of the Chinese nation will not stop with the victory of national bourgeois revolution, but will only proceed more rapidly.

Snow has called me a theorist and he speaks of himself as an amateur. Theory is nothing but knowledge of the essential facts and knowledge of how to apply them. To be an amateur is not an advantage but a handicap, especially for a writer who has done and is doing such valuable work as Edgar Snow in the cause of China's struggle for freedom. I hope he will overcome the handicap—the sooner the better.

"ASIATICUS."

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first meet Frederick V. Field, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think—I am sure it was in 1933 at the Banff conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify before the Tydings committee in 1950 that while you were dealing with Frederick V. Field you did not know him to be a Communist or that you had seen no evidence that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume I did. May I see the record on that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; Tydings committee, page 816. Mr. Lattimore, will you read from page 816. I will give you a copy of the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee a year ago. Page 816, the last paragraph that is completed on the page, the last sentence reading—Do you have it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Moreover, at that time I had seen no evidence attributing either Communist beliefs or support to Field. I am now told that he was then an active supporter and financial backer of Norman Thomas.

Mr. MORRIS. Now will you read on page 817 the first full paragraph, beginning "Budenz"?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Budenz has publicly mentioned the names of only two alleged Communists who wrote for Pacific Affairs under my editorship, James S. Allen and Frederick V. Field. These men wrote articles which were published 12 and 13 years ago. At the time that I accepted their articles, however, I had no reason whatever to believe either of them to be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The question, therefore, Mr. Lattimore, is, Did you testify before the Tydings committee in 1950 that while you were dealing with Frederick V. Field you did not know him to be a Communist or that you had seen no evidence that he was a Communist?

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, there is a little confusion here. I believe that this says "during this period." May we examine the transcript to see what this period refers to?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; you have a copy there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the proceedings before the Tydings committee?

Mr. FORTAS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I believe it is during your editorship of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think it is.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify before the Tydings committee in 1950 that while you were editor of Pacific Affairs you did not know Frederick V. Field to be a Communist or that you had seen no evidence that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify before the Tydings committee that you never believed Field to have been a Communist or to have had vigorous Communist sympathies? Page 888 of the Tydings committee.

Mr. FORTAS. That is during the same period, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. That is a question addressed to you by Senator Hickenlooper, the middle of the page [reading]:

During that association did you believe at any time, or were you reliably informed by Mr. Field—I will put it specifically—by Mr. Field, on information, that Mr. Field was a Communist or had vigorous Communist sympathies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. Quite the contrary. As far as I knew, Mr. Field was a man who had an interest in the economies of the Pacific region, and who was rather a liberal young man. My acquaintance with him, my discussion of political topics with him, was so casual that it was not even—not until the other day did I even learn that he had at one time been a supporter of Mr. Norman Thomas. At that time I didn't know it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, that is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will identify this document?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a handwritten letter on the letterhead of the United States Lines, dated October 22, 1936, addressed to "Dear Fred," signed with a signature, an initial signature.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you a photostatic copy of that letter and ask you if you will identify that signature and that letter as yours.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, did that come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, that is, the document of which this is a photostat?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, this is mine.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first four paragraphs, Mr. Lattimore. We have here a stencil copy which may be easier to read.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it would be.

The CHAIRMAN. May I have the original, please. I just want to see it a minute.

Mr. FORTAS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the first four paragraphs of that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. [Reading:]

DEAR FRED: One of the first things I did after the tumult and the shouting was to read over the edited version of my Pacific Affairs editorial as a result of which I am now wagging this old gray head.

Your editing of the sentence about the nonexpansive characteristics of the Soviet Union demonstrates that you are a perspicuous political economist but allows also the inference that I am the better editor.

Considering the character of Pacific Affairs the character of most of its readers and also my limited attainments as a writer, I still think there is a good deal to be said for my original version, though not to the point of overriding your decision, if you think there are other arguments more valid than the following:

You defined my sentence, if I remember the phrase, as "describing a characteristic rather than the causes of the characteristic." This was all I had attempted to do. As a reasonably intelligent observer, I can be expected to note a characteristic; but whereas you can define the causes of the characteristic with authority, I could not. Therefore phrases like "imperialistic expansion," and "forces which cause capitalistic nations to seek foreign outlets" read a little out of character over my signature.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read another paragraph, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. [Reading:]

Granted the signature, I think the admittedly incomplete phrasing first used is more persuasive, I wrote the piece as a whole with the limited object in view of creating an impression (not a scientific definition), of Japan as a "menace," and I thought this could most effectively done—

I suppose the word "be" is left out—

by carefully avoiding the political-economic vocabulary, which is (again, over my signature) unnecessary for political economists and too accertive——

I suppose that means "assertive"—

for the peural public.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that "puerile public"?

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like to look at the original, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. For the general public; "too assertive for the general public."

Mr. MORRIS. For the general public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. For the general public; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what did you mean when you said to Mr. Field, "Whereas you can define the causes of the characteristic with authority, I could not."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to see the article that was being discussed before I could recall what I was writing about.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all the answer you can give to that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently, Mr. Lattimore, that was a letter in longhand; was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So it wasn't dictated and not read. It was written by you in longhand.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Written by me in longhand.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this document, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Can you identify the article I was writing about, Mr. Morris?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait just a minute.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you insert it in the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You asked for it. I will insert it in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 488" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 488

[Handwritten letter]

UNITED STATES LINES

ON BOARD S. S. WASHINGTON

22 OCT. '36.

DEAR FRED: One of the first things I did after the tumult and the shouting was to read over the edited version of my Pacific Affairs editorial, as a result of which I am now wagging this old grey head.

Your editing of the sentence about the non-expansive characteristics of the Soviet Union demonstrates that you are a perspicuous political economist but allows also the inference that I am the better editor.

Considering the character of Pacific Affairs, the character of most of its readers, and also my limited attainments as a writer, I still think there is a good deal to be said for my original version, though not to the point of overriding your decision, if you think there are other arguments more valid than the following:

You defined my sentence, if I remember the phrase, as "describing a characteristic rather than the causes of the characteristic." This was all I had attempted to do. As a reasonably intelligent observer, I can be expected to note a characteristic; but whereas you can define the causes of the characteristic with authority, I could not. Therefore phrases like "imperialistic expansion", and "forces which cause capitalistic nations to seek foreign outlets" read a little out of character over my signature.

Granted the signature, I think the admittedly incomplete phrasing first used is more persuasive, I wrote the piece as a whole with the limited object in view of creating an impression (not a scientific definition) of Japan as a "menace" and the Soviet Union as not a menace, and I thought this could most effectively be done by carefully avoiding the political-economic vocabulary, which is (again, over my signature) unnecessary for political economists and too assertive for the general public.

However, you decide. In any case, there's is need to be urgent to what Catherine will tell you is a Little Brown Girl degree. She needn't get out the cold chisel and mutilate the plates or anything like that.

One of the things I'm going to make an effort at is the stirring up of discussion and controversy that will carry over from number to number and so keep up a livelier interest in *Pacific Affairs*. I'm going to work on this in England, partly to make English subscribers realise that *Pacific Affairs* is not all American and partly to make American readers feel that it isn't just a case of foreigners contributing sedate articles which Americans contribute all the aggressive opinions. My article was intended to open things up, not to close the issue by a too definite and accurate defining of the mainsprings of action. For instance, I might with luck get Peter Fleming to write in saying that perhaps the Soviet Union isn't a menace in Outer Mongolia, but how about Sinkiang? Then we'd be off for a long gallop, because Fleming can draw an accusation that looks pretty good for readers of the *Times:* but he can't sustain it. Maybe he knows that, of course, and won't stick his neck out.

I'm sorry our going away party wasn't a party at all. It was nice of you to turn up in Sholls; but my God, I'd thought I was sending out invitations, and had been looking forward with vulgar enthusiasm to too many drinks too early in the day. A hell of a come-down it turned out to be.

And now what do you think has happened? This damn-fool ship has all kinds of internal immigration restrictions, and I can't get near enough that high-flying but low-living secretary of mine to give her any work to do, and so have to communicate with you by manual labour in this beetle-spoon. At the same, apparently all her family use this captain, so she gets asked up to the bridge for cocktails while we limply plod the deck keeping track of our progeny. Maybe Carter can handle a situation like that, but Jesus, you know me.

This is a swell trip, though. Unbelievably flat seat. Practically no passengers. David is learning to swim in the pool, and demonstrates his Arizona technique on the rockinghorse in the playroom. I can find breezy places where my pipe doesn't start a rush for the lifeboats and read some of the books I've been toting around for months, and work on a review of Chi's book for Karl August's magazine. Have we been in America these last few months? They say so, but you know how these rumours get around.

So long Fred, and don't forget about that magazine. I'm with you in my dim way, and if you'll really send along the dummy, I'd like to try to be of use even in the practical details.

Yours,

(Signed) OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. I was going to ask Mr. Lattimore what he knows about the article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is October 22, 1936, and there is something lower down indicating that the article is already at the printers. Let's see, how did our articles run, October or December 1936. Which one I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. You have Pacific Affairs for 1936 in front of you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is 1938.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the 1936 volume, Mr. Lattimore. There is an article in September by you, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter is written in October, apparently about an article that is still to be published.

Mr. MORRIS. Let's have the 1937 Pacific Affairs.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see if it sounds as if it were the article entitled "Land and Sea and the Destiny of Japan" in the December issue of Pacific Affairs, 1936. Page 586. I think it must be a reference to this article.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this article," Mr. Lattimore, you mean——

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Land and Sea and the Destiny of Japan," Pacific Affairs, December 1936, which is an article about what I called the defensive position of Russia at that time in the Pacific and what I defined as the aggressive position of Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that article contain a reference to the nonexpansive characteristics of the Soviet Union? Do you find that? That would be the identifiable feature, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. May I read the paragraph.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; please do.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think really to make sense I need to read two paragraphs, page 588:

While, therefore, the rise to continental power of the Soviet Union, not foreseen at the time of the Washington treaties, has now changed the balance of power in Asia, it cannot be said that a "nationalistic rivalry" between the Soviet Union and Japan over colonial regions to be exploited is necessarily implied. The position of the Soviet Union—

Remember, this is 1936—

is defensive while that of Japan is aggressive, and if the Asiatic expansion of Japan cannot be attributed either to "laws" of geographical proximity or to the "realistic" necessities of competing in expansion with the Soviet Union, then the motivating impulse must be looked for in Japan itself. In this connection a Canadian writer has recently pointed out that czarist Russia was expansionist in terms of both trade and political empire while the Soviet Union, because it changed the nature of its internal economy, is not. He then draws attention to the fact that for centuries Japan was not driven toward the mainland of

Asia by any inevitable urge. The energy of expansion appeared when private capital in its western form invested in industry was introduced into Japan, creating a demand for external markets—

This is quoting from the Canadian author—

for the principal reason that the decision as to how the national income shall be spent or invested are made by men who see higher profits in foreign expansion than they do in internal reconstruction.

There is a footnote to an article called Pacific Problems and the IPR, by F. R. Scott, Canadian Forum, Toronto, October 1936.

Mr. SOURWINE. That article as printed does not appear to contain the phrases which in your letter of October 22 to Mr. Frederick Field you indicated were objectionable to you, does it, to wit, the phrases "imperialist expansion" and "forces which cause capitalistic nations to seek foreign outlets"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to read through the whole article just to see if they are there.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was going to ask you if you didn't know, as a matter of fact, that your objections prevailed and that they were again eliminated from the article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe they were, but I didn't know it.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it in your letter, do you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I think I say in the letter——

Mr. MORRIS. You say:

Therefore, phrases like "imperialist expansion" and "forces which cause capitalistic nations to seek foreign outlets" read a little out of character over my signature.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. Because I was not a political economist.

Mr. MORRIS. Then can you answer, what did you mean when you said to Mr. Field in this letter, "whereas you can define the causes of the characteristic with authority, I could not"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I regarded Mr. Field at that time as primarily an economic expert on the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this second letter I gave you?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated October 3, 1939, addressed to Owen Lattimore, typewritten signature Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you look at that document, photostatic copy of the document, and tell us whether or not you recall having received such a letter. Will you read that letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I don't recall the letter at all, but it is obviously one that was written to me and that I received. At least I presume I received it. I will read from the mimeographed copy.

EXHIBIT 489

NEW YORK, *October 3, 1939.*

DEAR OWEN: I have read your piece called Third Alternative on the current policies of the Soviet Union and for once in my life I must admit to having a negative reaction to one of your manuscripts. I have the notion that you are straining arguments, that you are not perfectly sure of your ground, and that you are attempting to project your ideas into the future when no prophecies can now be put to paper, particularly in a journal like Pacific Affairs.

To criticize your manuscript in any detail will practically involve me in writing an article myself, and this I am by no means prepared to do. I don't know enough of the answers to write the kind of careful and complete interpretation without which nothing at the moment should, I believe, be put on paper. Partial explanations are likely to be more misleading than enlightening.

If I were to try and work out my own thoughts on Soviet policy I think I should start by attempting to compare the conditions of the present war, the second imperialist war, with those of the first imperialist war.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Lattimore. That is October 3, 1939, just 1 month after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I accept that.

I should first say that both wars were similar in that they were imperialist wars, in the Marxist sense of the word. I should immediately add, however, that they contained an essential difference, the difference being the concrete existence of the Soviet Union with 21 or 22 years of revolutionary experience now as contrasted with its nonexistence during the first war.

The next step would be, I believe, to recall the slogans of revolutionary groups during the first war; namely, to transfer the imperialist war into a civil war or into a series of civil wars. This object came off only in czarist Russia during the last war, though pretty substantial attempts were made in a number of other countries. I judge that the slogan of the present war is exactly the same, but that again the concreted existence of the Soviet Union makes its application in the present war something quite different than in 1914–18. The problem today from a revolutionary point of view is the same as it was in 1914: The British must get rid of their Chamberlains, the Germans of their Hitlers, the French of their Daladiers. But this time the Soviet Union operates as a powerful and concrete force to aid in these civil war efforts.

In attempting to carry out the civil-war slogan today the Soviet Union is, I believe, working along two hypotheses. The first, which in their minds is by all odds the most desirable but at the same time the most improbable, is an immediate cessation of hostilities, an immediate stopping of the imperialist war. It is, I think the revolutionary belief that the stopping of the war immediately would almost automatically mean the overthrow of the Chamberlain, Daladier, and even Hitler groups, for no one of those rulers could go back to their people who have already been aroused. Even if the people of these countries did not immediately overthrow their rulers as a result of a peace today, the class struggle in all the countries concerned would have been so accentuated as to promise internal democratization as—

Apparently that is a misprint—

at a very early date. The second alternative hypotheses and a more likely one is that there can be no immediate peace and that this imperialist war will be fought out for some time. This will be unfortunate from the revolutionary point of view because workers will be fighting workers; workers are the people who make the armies and who are slaughtered. The historical result, however, will be the inevitable overthrow of ruling groups in all the belligerent countries. There is every probability that the civil-war slogan will succeed over a widespread area.

It is an interesting commentary on Soviet policy during the first month of the war that Hitler apparently went into the war in order to secure Poland and in order to secure domination over the Balkans and the Baltic countries. During the first 4 weeks he had apparently been preceded in every one of these purposes by the Soviet Union. It would also seem to me that the British and French went to war not in order to smash Hitlerism as an end in itself but to smash Hitlerism in order to form a strong European block which would eventually attack communism. What a licking this idea has taken in the first 4 weeks.

I fear that I have written you a very long letter and that what I have said compares unfavorably with your own manuscript which I started out by denouncing. However, I feel that if we can keep our thoughts to the level of discussion and letter writing for a few weeks there will emerge something sufficiently well thought out to warrant publication in Pacific Affairs. Please let me hear from you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, when you received that letter did you consider that that was evidence that Mr. Fields had vigorous Communist sympathies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember receiving the letter, and my recollection has been that I began to think that Mr. Field was a close fellow traveler of the Russians at the time of the American Peace Mobilization, which I think was 1941, wasn't it? But judging from this letter, my memory was in error by about 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. This letter has not been admitted in evidence. Do you wish it to be?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that into evidence, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received in evidence.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 489" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. You were editor of Pacific Affairs on October 3, 1939, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you testify before the Tydings committee that you did not have a desk in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a close associate of Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I would not say close. My work brought me into considerable contact with him for a very short period.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you in fact have an office in the State Department Building with Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had the use of one room of Mr. Currie's offices in that building.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent did you establish yourself in that office?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, I was living in Baltimore, came over to Washington occasionally, had the use of that room and I suppose it would be one of the extensions of Mr. Currie's phone or a phone in his office. I don't believe I kept files there.

Mr. MORRIS. How often did you use that office?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is impossible for me to recall clearly now, but I should say probably several days a week.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time?

Senator O'CONOR. Several days a week, over what period of time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I got back from China about, I think, the beginning of March 1942 and went back to China in the late summer. Part of that time I was not much in Washington because when I first came back I had rather bad dysentery from living in Chungking, and later in the summer in the hot weather I had a recurrence of it. But I don't remember the exact period.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the period during which you occupied the office in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the period in which I used that office when I was in Washington, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question propounded to you.

Senator O'CONOR. It would be accurate to say you used it several times a week over a period of 4 or 5 or 6 months?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you there regularly every day or nearly every day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I was. I think it was usually 2 or 3 times a week.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make a practice of being there as regularly as your health would permit?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I was supposed to be home partly on leave, but also the Generalissimo requested me to familiarize myself with the work of the various agencies in Washington that were concerned with aid to China. So when some question of aid to China was up, I was likely to be in Washington more consecutively, and there would be lulls when I spent most of my time at home.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't, then, count this office in the State Department Building as one that you went to regularly, that you intended to go to as regularly as your health would permit?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't consider that I went to that building on any regular schedule, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Nor stayed there any regular hours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Nor stayed there any regular hours.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, on whose recommendation were you proposed to the Generalissimo as an assistant?

Mr. LATTIMORE. President Roosevelt.

Senator O'CONOR. And from whom did he receive the recommendation, if you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only one I know was—let me think. I think I was asked to submit two names, and I submitted the names of Admiral Yarnell and President Isaiah Bowman, of Johns Hopkins. I believe President Bowman was the only one he consulted.

Senator O'CONOR. You don't know who suggested your name to President Roosevelt?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I never knew that. As I said at the time of the Tydings hearing, I perhaps a little vainly simply took it for granted that if people were looking for somebody in the far-eastern field, my name would naturally be one of those considered.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you never told anybody that Lauchlin Currie had arranged for that appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Arranged that appointment?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It depends on how you mean arranged the appointment. He arranged the appointment for me to see the President, but I don't believe he arranged to have me appointed as adviser.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever tell anybody that he had arranged to have you appointed as adviser?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall testifying in executive session before this committee that your use of Currie's office was so irregular and so infrequent that it would be impossible to characterize it any other way, other than the way you have just described it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As irregular and infrequent? That is approximately as I have described it just now, isn't it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat——

The CHAIRMAN. You haven't had an answer to that last question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is the way I testified.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a copy of a letter, the copy being from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 12, 1942, addressed to "Dear Mr. Kizer," and the typewritten signature "Owen Lattimore."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you look at that letter and see if you can recall having written it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I wrote this.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the last paragraph, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last paragraph:

My home address is as typed above, and my home telephone is Towson 846–W. I am in Washington about 4 days a week, and when there can always be reached at Lauchlin Currie's office, room 228, State Department Building; telephone National 1414, extension 90.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you testify in executive session that you never at any time at the request of Lauchlin Currie took care of his correspondence at the White House while he was away?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have. May I see it? That would certainly be my recollection now.

Mr. MORRIS. Page 26.

Mr. Chairman, may this be received in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received in the record, having been identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 490" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 490

RUXTON, MD., *June 12, 1942.*

DEAR MR. KIZER: Your letter of May 23, for a small but weight-carrying committee to head up American interest in China, during the war and during the negotiation of peace, is one that interests me very much. I think your suggestion of Judge Schwellenbach to head the committee is positively brilliant.

I hope that you will soon in fact be in Washington, as your letter half prophesies. It would be easy to talk out such a project more quickly and thoroughly than it could be done by letter.

My home address is as typed above, and my home telephone is Towson 846–W. I am in Washington about 4 days a week, and when there can always be reached at Lauchlin Currie's office, room 228, State Department Building; telephone National 1414, extension 90.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what I stated, and that is my recollection now.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated July 15, 1942, marked "W. W. L., and W. L. H., Strictly Confidential, The White House, Washington," addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and the typewritten signature is Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at that letter, Mr. Lattimore, and tell us whether you can recall having sent that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I evidently sent it, but I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be admitted into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph of that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

DEAR CARTER: Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he is away and in view of your telegram of today, I think I had better tell you that he has gone to China on a special trip. This news is absolutely confidential until released in the press.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 491," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 491

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, July 15, 1942.

Confidential.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR CARTER: Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he is away and in view of your telegram of today, I think I had better tell you that he has gone to China on a special trip. This news is absolutely confidential until released in the press.

In view of the fact that all kinds of delay in travel are likely to occur, August 22 and 23 would be a more likely date for him than August 15 and 16. The later date would also suit me better.

As to a place for the meeting, I imagine that Princeton is the best, in spite of certain inconveniences. Considering the people you are going to have, if you held the meeting in either New York or Washington, too many of them will be interrupted all the time or hauled right out of the meeting.

In your list of suggested attendants at the meeting, James Shoemaker would probably be a better representative of the Board of Economic Warfare than W. T. Stone. I knew that it is a bad thing to suggest too many people for a conference of this kind, but a name that might interest you is that of Gordon Bowles, who is now also with the Board of Economic Warfare. He has been with them so short a time that as far as representing the Board is concerned, he could not compare with Shoemaker. He would be valuable, however, for his knowledge of Japan, Korea, and parts of India. You have probably known him longer than I have, but just in case you should not know him, I might say briefly that he is the son of a very famous Quaker missionary in Tokyo and was partly educated in Japanese schools and in the Tokyo Imperial University

Your tentative agenda seems to me quite adequate in general coverage and as specific as it can be made when we shall be discussing a very fluid situation which makes it difficult to define in advance the most important subjects of discussion. One minor comment that occurs to me is that under Paragraph 8 you mention individually the Philippines, Thailand, Korea, and India, but not Malaya, Netherlands India, or Indochina.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the top officials of the State Department——

Mr. FORTAS. Excuse me just a moment, Mr. Morris.

(Mr. Lattimore conferred with counsel.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris, I should like to add to what I have just said that this refreshes my recollection and that I believe that Currie told his secretary to open his mail and to pass on to me anything that might be of concern to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I am asking you if you can reconcile the statement you have just made with your testimony in executive session which reads as follows——

The CHAIRMAN. The page?

Mr. MORRIS. Page 26:

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, isn't it a fact that when Currie went away for a period of time he would ask you to take care of his mail at the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. When I was back on leave from China in the summer of 1942 Mr. Currie allowed me to use an outer office attached to his office.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean allowed you to use it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He said there was an empty office there with a desk and a chair in it, and I was living in Ruxton and when I came over to Washington and had appointments to see people, and so forth, I used that as the place where I hung my hat.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell me this, Mr. Lattimore. Is it your testimony that you did not at the request of Lauchlin Currie take care of his mail at the White House when he was away?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That certainly is my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, will you please read that paragraph that you read in that letter? Read it out loud.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he is away and in view of your telegram of today, I think I had better tell you that he has gone to China on a special trip. This news is absolutely confidential until released in the press.

Obviously my memory was inaccurate.

Mr. MORRIS. That is written on White House stationery, is it Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, dictated to Lauchlin Currie's secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the testimony before this committee that Lauchlin Currie aided an espionage ring in Washington during the war?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't remember seeing that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read Miss Bentley's testimony to that effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have not read all of the published hearings of this committee, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I haven't read all of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the testimony before this committee that Lauchlin Currie had informed agents of an espionage ring that the United States was about to break the Soviet code?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't remember reading that. Oh, I think I have read that in the press, but I don't remember reading it in the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 27, 1942, addressed to Joseph Barnes, typewritten signature Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is previous exhibit No. 103, and I would like to read it into the record in connection with the testimony of Mr. Lattimore at this time in connection with his association with Currie.

The CHAIRMAN. In this hearing?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir. Mr. Carter in this letter writes as follows:

DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington, Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope that some day soon when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he

would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon.

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the White House exchange.

I read that in connection with Mr. Lattimore's answer on the extent to which he knew Mr. Lauchlin Currie.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was read in full and has previously been marked Exhibit No. 103.)

Mr. MORRIS. I believe Mr. Sourwine has a question.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lattimore, this letter is written to Mr. Joseph Barnes. You knew Mr. Barnes, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have known Mr. Barnes since 1934.

Senator SMITH. You and he were friends, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We were and are very good friends.

Senator SMITH. This may be entirely erroneous, but some suggestion was made that he was a kinsman of yours. Is he, or not?

The CHAIRMAN. Was a what?

Senator SMITH. Kinsman, a cousin. I want to clear that up, either way.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes?

Senator SMITH. Someone said, I believe, that your mother was a Barnes and this man was kin to you. Is there anything to that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether there is anything to it or not.

Senator SMITH. At least we got that part cleared up.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, during the period when you had the office of desk space in the White House Annex that you described, did you have access to confidential information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did.

The CHAIRMAN. State Department, as I understand it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. State Department. No; I don't think I did. I might have if Currie showed me State Department material bearing on something that he was doing for the President in connection with aid to China, but my memory is absolutely unclear on that subject.

Senator O'CONOR. Did he show you such material?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have just said I may have, but I have no clear recollection at all on the subject.

Senator O'CONOR. You do refer to the information that you were sending to Mr. Carter as confidential. You knew that the nature of his trip was one which couldn't be made public.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I said in the letter there, I didn't want to take the responsibility of broadcasting it that he had gone on a trip until it was in the press. May I add the reason for that?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The reason for that was, of course, a military security reason because when people were going to China, flying in over the hump it was extremely dangerous. The flying itself was dangerous enough. Japanese fighters were within range. It was considered advisable to avoid any tip-offs that might set the Japanese watching for chances to shoot down planes at a particular interval of time.

Senator O'CONOR. Did it come as any surprise to you in the more recent past that he was accused of having been in league with a Soviet espionage ring?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It came to me as a complete surprise, a shocking surprise. I don't believe it. I can't believe it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine has a question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, if we might revert to the letter under date of October 3, written to you by Mr. Frederick V. Field, which referred to your piece called Third Alternative.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes?

Mr. SOURWINE. On the current policies of the Soviet Union. That would be the then current policies, wouldn't it, as of 1939?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall anything about that piece, "Third Alternative"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether it was ever published in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know. I might be able to look it up. Just a minute. I have a list here of my own contributions.

I don't see it here; no. I must say I don't remember writing such a piece.

Mr. SOURWINE. Undoubtedly you had written something or Mr. Field wouldn't have been criticizing it, is that not true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Undoubtedly I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not suggesting you didn't write the piece? You are stating now that you simply don't remember writing it or what was in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were editor of Pacific Affairs at this time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why was it that Mr. Field was telling you that if you and he kept your thoughts to the level of discussion and letter writing for a few weeks there will emerge something sufficiently well thought out to warrant publication in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can only infer from that wording—I don't remember the circumstances at all—that the question was putting in some kind of article in Pacific Affairs at the beginning of the war in Europe.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean, sir, did Mr. Field have a veto power over what went into Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; he didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you submit material to him before deciding whether it would go in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Field was at that time secretary of the American IPR. Since it was our general practice to circulate things that appeared in Pacific Affairs to various people for criticism and comment before publication, I, as editor, thought that I should receive the same treatment. So when I wrote an article I sent it in to the assistant editor in New York, and she was free to circulate it to all and sundry.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that this article was not sent by you to Mr. Field——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it very much.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Would you say that Mr. Field had no responsibility for the editorial content of Pacific Affairs and had no authority with regard to what went into the magazine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say the answer to that would be different in different years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's talk about this year, 1939.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to look it up, because at different times various people were listed as consultant-editors of Pacific Affairs representing the various national councils. Sometimes that would be for the American, and sometimes that would be the Secretary of the American council, and sometimes I believe it would be somebody else.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the year in which you have testified Mr. Field was secretary of the American council?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; but I think we could settle that very quickly by looking at the masthead for 1939 and seeing who is listed, if anybody. In fact, I am not sure that all the time we edited Pacific Affairs we had that system. We may have started out with that system and then discarded it, and my memory is not clear on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you think this letter indicates that Mr. Field both has and is exercising a certain measure of editorial authority?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't. I think Mr. Field is expressing his personal opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have asked that a copy of Pacific Affairs for some month in 1939 be sent for, and when we get it I would like permission to revert and get an answer to that one question. Otherwise, that concludes my line of questioning on that point.

Mr. MORRIS. May we have another letter introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please.

Mr. MANDEL. There is a photostatic copy of a handwritten letter on the letterhead of Pacific Affairs, addressed to Frederick V. Field and signed with the same initials with which the previous letter has been signed and identified by Mr. Lattimore. It is dated September 27, 1935 sent from 33 Ta Yuan Fu Hu Tung, Peiping, and is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can it be handed to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. MORRIS. That is a photostat of the original?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; this is obviously mine.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may it be received in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. When the witness said it is obviously mine, do you mean it is a letter which you wrote and in your handwriting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is dated at Peiping, September 27, 1935.

DEAR FRED: After getting back here——

The CHAIRMAN. Who is referred to by "Dear Fred"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter is to F. V. Field, New York office.

EXHIBIT 492

DEAR FRED: After getting back here I read your summary of the movements of the Communist armies in China, which I read with very great interest. I am sorry that I cannot offer very much in the way of comment you request. Particular comment is ruled out because I have not read more than a fraction of the newspaper reports you have gone through. All I can say is that if I had gone through all the reports, I am sure I could not have reduced them to so clear a summary statement..

As for general comment, probably all that I could offer is already contained in the editorial article I had already sent forward for Pacific Affairs, which you have probably read by now.

Half an hour ago I received your letter of 4th September (which made pretty good time) and I have already gone over the enclosures. I found Hansu Chan's retort to Isaacs very interesting——

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Hansu Chan, Dr. Chi?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It has been so stated before this committee, I believe. I don't know [reading]:

but here again I should not like to venture a detailed comment, or even a summary for print. For this also, anything that I could commit myself to signing is in the editorial already sent.

I am certainly not the man to risk summarizing so closely worded an argument, because my knowledge of Communist controversy is so limited that I should be quite capable of giving a Trotskyist summary of a Stalinist plemic. I could probably do it the other way round just as easily. Moreover I have just been traveling with Wittfogel who, as you probably know and I dimly suspect, is a bit of a heretic from either the Stalinist or the Trotskyist point of view when it comes to the bourgeois feudal controversy over the nature of Chinese society, so I am in a complete fog.

In the editorial referred to I did try to take into consideration some of the points raised by Isaacs, but I did not refer directly to his article because, once more, of lack of confidence in my own understanding of the controversial issues. Anyhow that article is as far as I should care to go for the present.

What I should like to suggest is that you yourself summarize the Hansu Chan article, in the manner you suggested for me. You are far more competent than I, and since the reply appeared in America and you are the American corresponding editor, your position entitles you to sign the notice. You could do it in such a manner as not to draw any accusation of official American IPR approval of the Stalinist view. (Your Survey article was a masterpiece of detached statement.)

There is an appalling accumulation of work here, but I'll be writing again when I have thrown some of it over my shoulder.

Yours,

O. L.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I put that in the record in connection with the series of questions on whether or not Mr. Lattimore knew that Mr. Field was a Communist while he was editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it been received?

The CHAIRMAN. It is received and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 492" and was read in full.)

Mr. SOURWINE. To clear this up, here is the June 1939 copy of Pacific Affairs. Can you say now the extent of the editorial authority or responsibility that Mr. Field had at that time in that year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We got the wrong issue. It is torn here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry. Try this one.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This seems to confirm my memory that in the latter years of my editorship of Pacific Affairs there were no national editorial—what would you call them—correspondents or something of that kind as such. All that is listed here is the national secretary, and I am simply listed as editor. I believe that in the earlier years we did have national corresponding editors.

Mr. SOURWINE. What issue is that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is September 1939.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking about the year 1939, aren't we?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. In that year 1939 you are saying now in that year 1939 there were no corresponding editors.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Apparently not.

Mr. Sourwine. And therefore Mr. Field had what degree of editorial responsibility and authority?

Mr. Lattimore. None.

Mr. Sourwine. In this letter which you have just read, of 1935, you did refer to Mr. Field as the American corresponding editor or words to that effect, did you not?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I did. I believe in earlier years we had such a system.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Field in 1935 secretary of the American IPR?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember.

Mr. Sourwine. He was in 1939?

Mr. Lattimore. I think so. We can confirm that in a moment. I am not sure of the year when he resigned.

Mr. Sourwine. I hope I haven't handed you the one with the torn page.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; you have.

Mr. Sourwine. Sorry.

Mr. Lattimore. Of the United States, yes, Field was.

Mr. Sourwine. Was secretary of the American IPR?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

The Chairman. What year?

Mr. Lattimore. 1939.

Mr. Sourwine. You are saying, however, that notwithstanding that fact, Mr. Field did not in 1939 have any editorial responsibility or authority with regard to Pacific Affairs?

Mr. Lattimore. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. And you are stating in this letter of October 3 to you which has been read and discussed, which starts out with a reference to your piece called Third Alternative, that in your opinion Mr. Field was not attempting to exert or express any editorial authority or responsibility?

Mr. Lattimore. In my opinion, he was probably one of several people to whom an article had been sent for prepublication criticism.

Mr. Fortas. Is this a good time for a recess?

The Chairman. I wonder. Senator Smith, do you have to go away tonight?

Senator Smith. Not right away.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson is not here. I would like to have more in attendance, if it was possible.

Mr. Sourwine. Could you recess for 10 minutes?

The Chairman. I was thinking of recessing for the day. Would that be satisfactory?

Senator Smith. Yes. It suits me.

The Chairman. Senator O'Conor.

Senator O'Conor. Whatever you say, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to stay.

Mr. Fortas. Before you recess for today, may I note the appearance here of my partner, Thurman Arnold, as counsel for Mr. Lattimore, since I may have to be absent from time to time.

The Chairman. We will reconvene at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning and continue.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m. Saturday, March 1, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, MARCH 1, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to request the introduction into evidence of Mr. Lattimore's testimony at executive session, about which he was questioned yesterday, the entire testimony, that is.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be dealt with at a later time.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, was John K. Fairbank a subordinate of yours in the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Was he what?

Mr. MORRIS. A subordinate of yours while you were director of Pacific Affairs in the Office of War Information.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe he was. The records would show.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position in the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am rather vague what his position was. He was never as I recall a direct subordinate of mine.

Mr. MORRIS. He was not head of the China Division?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If he was, I think it must have been after I ceased to be Deputy Director of Pacific Operations.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the date of that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that was in 1944. I don't recall exactly when I ceased to be Deputy Director, but remained in contact with the OWI as a consultant.

Senator FERGUSON. How long were you a consultant, up to what time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Into 1945, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the time in 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall exactly. I am sure the records will show.

Senator FERGUSON. Speaking of subordinates, could I inquire into another matter, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the subordinate, you or Mr. Field, in the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Neither.

Senator FERGUSON. On a equal basis?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On a totally different basis. I was an employee of the Pacific Council, and he was an employee of the American Council.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice in some of these letters that you were exchanging opinions, that is, as to criticism of articles, whether they went in a certain way.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; those were purely on an individual basis.

Senator FERGUSON. Rather than as employees or supervisors?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that John K. Fairbank used the White House as his mailing address?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that, unless I read it in the press since these hearings began, but I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. So you would not know then that he used as his return address, care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, care of the White House, Washington, D. C.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I ever knew that.

Mr. MORRIS. At this time, Mr. Chairman, may I make reference at this part of the record to exhibit 129 introduced in our open hearings of August 16, 1951, which shows a letter by John K. Fairbank, return address care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, the White House, Washington, D. C. That is in the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Michael Greenberg your successor at Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe he was. When I resigned as editor—and my recollection is I didn't have anything to do with it—but my recollection since looking up old issues of Pacific Affairs is that he became managing editor or something of that kind I think Mr. Holland became the actual editor.

Mr. MORRIS. I have the first volume after your retirement, Mr. Lattimore, which is the September 1941 volume and that lists "editor, Edward C. Carter, managing editor, Michael Greenberg."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, that would be correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the testimony before this committee by several witnesses that Michael Greenberg was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have seen that in the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Michael Greenberg working for Mr. Currie at the White House at the time you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not at the time I was there, I don't think.

Mr. MORRIS. He came along later, is that it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have in the record at this time the executive session testimony of Mr. Stanley Hornbeck on the question of Mr. Currie and Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; produce it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is two pages, and I would like to read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, taken February 15, 1952. It reads:

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Hornbeck, have you ever been sworn in this hearing?

Mr. HORNBECK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HORNBECK. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Hornbeck, will you state your full name?

Mr. HORNBECK. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Hornbeck, what is your present address?

Mr. HORNBECK. 2139 Wyoming Avenue, Washington, D. C.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Hornbeck, have you been subpenaed to come here this morning?

Mr. HORNBECK. I have.

Senator FERGUSON. By the committee?

Mr. HORNBECK. Yes; by the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are here in response to that subpena?

Mr. HORNBECK. I am.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore you have been sworn as a witness in this hearing?

Mr. HORNBECK. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Hornbeck, how long were you associated with the United States Department of State?

Mr. HORNBECK. My service in the United States Department of State was in two periods: First, in the Office of Economic Adviser from 1921 to 1924; second, from 1928 continuously to 1944. In the second period I was from 1928 to 1937 Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs; from 1937 to January 15, 1944, adviser on political relations; from then until May 1, 1944, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs; and from then until September 21, 1944, special assistant to the Secretary of State.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall a conversation in 1941 that you had with Mr. Lauchlin Currie in connection with the appointment which was about to be made of Owen Lattimore as special adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. HORNBECK. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. HORNBECK. In 1941, shortly before Mr. Owen Lattimore went to China as adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Lauchlin Currie came, on his initiative, to me in my office in the old State, War, and Navy Building. Mr. Currie was at that time one of the several anoymous assistants to the President, Mr. Roosevelt, and in that capacity he had concern, interalia, with questions of United States relations with and regarding China.

On the occasion of this call, Mr. Currie said that he wished to inform me that Chiang Kai-shek had asked President Roosevelt to nominate an American national to be an adviser to him, Chiang, and that President Roosevelt was nominating Mr. Owen Lattimore.

I inquired whether President Roosevelt had consulted the Secretary of State. Mr. Currie replied in the negative.

I expressed doubt whether an assumption by the President of responsibility for such a nomination was a wise procedure and whether the nomination of Mr. Lattimore was a suitable nomination.

I made reference to a procedure which has been followed over a period of many years in the nominating of a series of very able American advisers to the Government of Siam (Thailand), and I asked who had suggested to President Roosevelt the nomination of Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Currie replied that he, Currie, had. I said that in that case it should be an easy matter to effect a reconsideration. Mr. Currie said that he was sure that President Roosevelt's action had been appropriate, that he was confident that the nomination was a suitable nomination, and that, in any event, there could be no reconsideration inasmuch as the nomination had already been sent to Chiang Kai-shek * * *.

To that extent I would like to have the executive session minutes of Mr. Hornbeck introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone want anything further in this record introduced?

Mr. ARNOLD. May I look at it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. There is something on another page if you like you may put in the record.

Mr. ARNOLD. I will read it over first.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, on yesterday, I inquired as to whether or not you knew who had proposed your name to President Roosevelt for appointment as adviser to the Generalissimo, and a question or two was asked with respect to Mr. Lauchlin Currie.

Did you know of any consultation had by the President with the Department of State prior to your designation as adviser?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever heard of anything of the kind.

Senator O'CONOR. Did it occur to you it was important to know whether or not the recommendation was or was not approved by the Secretary of State?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. At that time I was so unfamiliar with the workings of the Government that I would not have known anythink of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, do you say that on yesterday you asked him who had recommended him, and that he said he did not know?

Senator O'CONOR. No, I did not give the answer. I said I asked him certain questions with respect to who had recommended him to the President for appointment as adviser to the Generalissimo. I did not state what his answer was.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he say then Lauchlin Currie? You said so this morning; that is the reason I am asking you.

Senator O'CONOR. No; I did not so intend to say.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to clear up.

Senator O'CONOR. I am obliged to you for clearing the record, Mr. Chairman. I do not think you said that. Your response did not indicate that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Senator O'CONOR. I said there had been a series of questions asked after with respect to Lauchlin Currie, but I did not mean to say you had made any response, and your answer indicated you had not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Was there any discussion whatsoever as to the participation of the Secretary of State in the designation or in the recommendation for your appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Between me and somebody else?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, who first notified you or contacted you in relation to this appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection on that is very clear, Senator. I came to my office at the Johns Hopkins one morning and was told that there was a White House call for me. So, I answered that call, put it back through the operator, and the man at the other end said, "This is Lauchlin Currie, Assistant to the President. Could you come over and see me?" And he made an appointment, and I went over to see him.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the first that you knew of Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not believe I had ever heard of him before.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, being a White House call, you remembered who called you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was also the first time I ever had a message to call the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. I can see the reason for your remembering. Did Mr. Currie ask you what your experience was or anything?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think he did in a general way; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he indicate that it was all accomplished; that you were really being asked, or was he just asking you, if they asked you, would you consider it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was the nature of the interview; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That if they asked you——

Mr. LATTIMORE. If I were asked, would I be available.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to the President at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that I did not talk to the President until after one or two more interviews with Mr. Currie. I didn't talk to the President until my name had gone in and the President was prepared to accept it.

Senator FERGUSON. So, your conversations with Mr. Currie, I assume, were along the line of what your experience had been, and so forth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume that was what it was. I haven't any notice of those conversations.

Senator FERGUSON. So, you have every reason to believe that Mr. Currie did recommend your appointment, because you had not talked to the President before it was actually sent in, as you say, accomplished.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether that would constitute a recommendation. I don't even know whether Mr. Currie sent in more than one name.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask that.

Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, this committee has been unable to subpena Mr. Currie. Is that correct, counsel?

Mr. MORRIS. Pardon?

Senator FERGUSON. It has been impossible for the committee to subpena Mr. Currie?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Currie is in South America, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is the reason I would like to ask the Chair this morning to write or wire Mr. Currie; and I know he is not subject to the subpena, being out of the country, but to request his appearance before this committee. He is named so many times

in relation to this IPR that I just feel to complete the testimony we ought to do everything we can to have Mr. Currie come back.

The CHAIRMAN. We will see that that is done right away. That will be the order.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall the date of the call from the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall the exact date.

Senator SMITH. Do you have a record, or do you recall the date that you came over to see Mr. Currie? Was it that day or the following day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no record of it, and no exact recollection. I do not know whether it was the next day or the day after. It was very soon.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall the month? What is the nearest date that you can pin it down to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was probably June 1941.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, may I read into the record the next sentence which follows [referring to executive session testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck].

The CHAIRMAN. That which was read by counsel?

Mr. ARNOLD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. ARNOLD (reading):

It may be noted in the sketch of Mr. Lattimore which appears in Who's Who in America that Mr. Lattimore is stated to have been political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, 1941–42.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, would this be a good place to clear up a point that is a little bit uncertain in earlier questioning this morning?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the position held by Mr. John K. Fairbank with the United States Information Service in China. I hold in my hand a bulletin of America's Town Meeting of the Air, the December 6, 1949, broadcast, being the five hundred and eighty-ninth broadcast. This appears to be a transcript of the broadcast and is published as such by Town Hall, Inc., and it indicates on page 8 at the bottom of the page and running to the top of the next page that Mr. George V. Denny, Jr., who was moderator, introduced Dr. John K. Fairbank as—

Professor of history at Harvard University, who served as special assistant to the American Ambassador in China in 1942 and 1943, who as Director of the United States Information Service in China in 1945 and 1946, and is the author of many books, among them The United States and China. We take pleasure in welcoming back to Town Hall Dr. John K. Fairbank.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that that paragraph of introduction may be placed in the record at this point, and then I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore does that refresh your memory at all with regard to the post that Dr. Fairbank held?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It doesn't exactly refresh my memory. It takes the place of my memory. I might say that the United States Information Service in Chungking was, to the best of my recollection, under the Embassy, although it used and distributed materials from the

Office of War Information. It was a complicated bureaucratic set-up there in which Office of War Information operated in the United States, but by this time, I think, American personnel, all American nonmilitary personnel of various kinds, were coordinated under the Embassy, and under the authority of the Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you with OWI in 1945 and 1946?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1945–46, a part of 1945 I may have still been with them as a consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that this does not indicate in any way that Mr. Fairbank was ever your subordinate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Say "Yes." Let us clear that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say it does not indicate that he was my subordinate.

The CHAIRMAN. The matter will be inserted in the record. I think, if I were to be technical about it, it does not have a place in the record. It goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of it. But it will go into the record. The question is whether the party who made the statement knew what he was talking about at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, so the record may show, this was offered to refresh the witness' memory, not as evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you and John K. Fairbank and Alger Hiss frequent associates?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you, Mr. Fairbank, and Mr. Hiss together at any time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever invite Alger Hiss to your home?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that last question read again to the witness.

(The question was read by the reporter as follows:)

Were you, Mr. Fairbank, and Mr. Hiss together at any time?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want the answer to stand to that as "No"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That Mr. Hiss, Mr. Fairbank, and I were ever together?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question again to the witness.

(The question was reread by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever invite Alger Hiss to your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did. At the time that is was reported in the press that Mr. Hiss was coming to Baltimore to initiate a libel action, I wrote to him and asked him to stay with us if he so desired.

I might add that, just a few months before that, Mr. Hiss had been given an honorary degree at my university, and I thought it was an ordinary courtesy to offer.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the day or the year that this happened, that you invited him to come to your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the year. It could be verified from the press, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. The libel action was against Chambers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. At that particular time, there had been quite a bit of newspaper publicity of Chambers' testimony against Hiss: that he was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall in detail. I supose that is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. You just suppose that is true. Let us get a little more definite. Did you not know it was true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall exactly how much I had read in the press at that time. I can't recall the date exactly. I could look it up or anybody could look it up. It would be in the press at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about looking it up. What I want to know is what you knew. You say that you saw in the press that he was starting an action in the Federal court, and who was the action against?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The action was against Whittaker Chambers.

Senator FERGUSON. And it would be assumed by you—would it not—that the action was by Hiss against Chambers in relation to Chambers' testimony, and his statement on the radio backing up his testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember that much in detail. My present recollection, Senator, is that the Chambers charges against Hiss came out, so to speak, in progressive steps, and I can't remember how much had come out at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any doubt in your mind, when you invited Mr. Hiss to your home to stay, that he had been accused as a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had been accused of something serious——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, "Was there any doubt in your mind?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't remember what was in my mind at the time, Senator. My present recollection is that he had by then been accused of something serious enough to make him initiate a libel action. But exactly what the accusation was at that stage, I don't remember now.

Senator FERGUSON. Had he not been also accused by sworn testimony that he had removed papers from the files of the State Department and given them to unauthorized Communist sources.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My present recollection, Senator, doesn't carry that much detail.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I am not getting answers to questions on matters that I think a man ought to remember.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not getting the answers.

Senator FERGUSON. Personally, I think a man ought to remember some of the things I am asking. When a man comes to a city, having started an action against another man for libel, and a man invites him to his home to stay with him in his home, he ought to know something about these things.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, Senator; my memory simply does not measure up to your specifications.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it a blank on this matter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it is not a blank. I remember that I asked him. I remember that he had been accused of something serious enough to make him initiate a libel action; but, as I say, my present general recollection is that the charges against Hiss came out in successive stages; and, without looking up the newspaper record of the time, I wouldn't be able to say even what I ought to remember as of a particular date.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did he remain at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He didn't come. He didn't accept the invitation.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you called him on the phone or how did you contact him to come to your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wrote him a letter, I think. I don't believe I called him on the phone.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you have your files searched and ascertain if you do have?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely. I have gone through my files, of course, during the past couple of years or so, and I have never seen a letter to that effect, or a carbon of a letter to that effect. I may say that my files are not kept very meticulously.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you write him a letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I wrote him a letter.

Senator FERGUSON. To what address, do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. My presumption would be that I wrote to the Department of State. It might be in their files.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the newspaper article say what day he would be at Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't even recall that. I don't recall whether the newspaper said that he would be coming or would be coming on a particular date, or would be coming in the near future.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to him after the day you wrote him the letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You have never seen him since then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never seen him since then.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have not talked to him on the telephone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever did. In fact, I don't believe I ever talked to him on the telephone.

Senator FERGUSON. Even before that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Before or after.

Senator FERGUSON. But you had seen him before that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had seen him occasionally when he was in Mr. Hornbeck's office. He sat in Mr. Hornbeck's outer office, and I would stop and chat with him while waiting for an appointment with Mr. Hornbeck, and then I saw him on the occasion when he received an honorary degree at the Johns Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he stay at your home when he received the degree?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; he never stayed at my home.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you class him as a close personal friend prior to that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give a reason why you requested him to come and stay at your home? Was there anything you wanted to talk over with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; there was nothing particularly I wanted to talk over with him. It was just a general gesture of courtesy.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you wrote the letter would you say the pumpkin papers appeared in the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. You do remember that.

Mr. LITTIMORE. I remember they appeared, but the date sequence is beyond me.

Senator WATKINS. I understood the witness to say that he addressed the letter to Mr. Hiss at the Department of State.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I probably would have.

Senator WATKINS. Was he in the Department of State at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a copy of the letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator WATKINS. Just a moment. May I get an answer to that? Do you still say you sent it to him to the Department of State?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I probably sent it to the Department of State. I have just turned to my wife and asked her if she had any supplementary memory, and she says that she thinks at that time Mr. Hiss was no longer with the Department of State, but with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.

Senator WATKINS. You knew that as a matter of fact he was with the Carnegie Endowment at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It had slipped my memory in answering this question. As I say, my memory of the sequence of dates is very vague. But I should have remembered it, because now that the point has been brought up, I remember that his being given an honorary degree at the Hopkins was more or less on the occasion of his leaving the State Department and taking up the directorship, or whatever it is, of the Carnegie Endowment.

Senator WATKINS. When did that happen? When was this honor conferred on him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think probably about 1946.

Senator WATKINS. That was a long time before the Chambers exposures.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was before the Chambers charges, before any question of libel action, as I recall

Senator WATKINS. Is this the only occasion that you have ever written to Mr. Hiss?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe it is.

Senator WATKINS. Do you not know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only one I can recall. I doubt very much if I ever wrote to him on any other occasion. I would not have any reason to write to him.

Senator WATKINS. Are you confused in your mind on that question whether you did or did not write to him other times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. But I am trying to carry my memory back a rather long way. My general recollection is that I would never have had anything to write to Mr. Hiss about, and therefore I don't suppose I did, but there may have been some bureaucratic matter in the Government during previous years which had involved my writing to him so I don't want to say flatly that I didn't. I just can't remember anything that I did write to him about or would have written to him about.

Senator WATKINS. This may have been covered by other questions; I came in late—if it has, you can so indicate—how long did you know Mr. Hiss at the time you wrote him this letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had known him casually—I doubt if it could have been before 1938.

Senator WATKINS. At least from 1938 on.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I put 1938 as the earliest possible date because that was when I came to live in Baltimore after returning from China. But I may not actually have met him until 1939 or 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "casually" in that respect, as you put it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like to have my words read back. I forget how I used it.

(The answer was read by the reporter as follows:)

I had known him casually—I doubt if it could have been before 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by the word "casually," as you use it there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I used it there, it might be something like dropping him a note saying "I am coming over to Washington and would like to see Mr. Hornbeck. Can you make an appointment?" Or something of that sort.

Senator WATKINS. Did you occasionally drop over to see Mr. Hornbeck in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did; yes.

Senator WATKINS. Were you in the habit of asking Mr. Hiss to make the appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Hiss was——

The CHAIRMAN. The question was, "Were you in the habit"—and that can be answered "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I was in the habit.

Senator WATKINS. What recalled to your mind that you might have sent a note to him asking him to make an appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think this came up before you came in.

The CHAIRMAN. No; it did not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That Mr. Hiss sat in the outer office of Mr. Hornbeck. He was sort of an assistant to Mr. Hornbeck and was therefore the man I saw when I was waiting for an appointment with Mr. Hornbeck.

Senator WATKINS. Over what period of time had your visits to see Mr. Hornbeck occurred?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I saw Mr. Hornbeck occasionally—I can't recall how frequently—from 1938; that is, from the time I came home to settle down permanently here, until, well, until his retirement from the State Department. But I wouldn't see him very frequently, and I certainly wouldn't see him on any regular schedule.

Senator WATKINS. What were the purposes of your conferences with Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Hornbeck was one of the top men for the Far East in the Department of State, and at that time from 1938 on up to Pearl Harbor, there were many questions of American policy relating to Japan, on the one hand, and China on the other. Those were the years of very lively discussion of the desirability or possibility of an embargo of war materials to Japan, and my present recollection is that I principally went in to see Mr. Hornbeck from time to time to get from him a statement on where policy stood at the moment, just as newspapermen and academic men would do at that time.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever go at his instance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At Mr. Hornbeck's instance?

Senator WATKINS. Yes, or his invitation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Senator WATKINS. Did you visit anyone else at the State Department on any of these occasions that you visited Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember visiting Mr. Hull once.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Let us proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. One more question, if I might.

Mr. Lattimore, when was the first that anyone testified before a congressional hearing that came to your knowledge or to the public that you were pro-Communist, if they did so testify?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you not any recollection at all of when it became public from some committee that someone had testified that you might even be pro-Communist or connected with the Communists?

Mr. ARNOLD. May I consult with him?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Lattimore consulted with Mr. Arnold.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that the first case of that was when I was in Afghanistan, and received wires from press representatives saying that Senator McCarthy had made charges against me.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that before or after you invited Mr. Hiss to your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Long after, I suppose.

Senator FERGUSON. It was long after?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So no one had mentioned you in relation to communism so far as committees were concerned at the time you invited Mr. Hiss?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you get a letter from Mr. Hiss declining your invitation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did: yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what he said, or do you have a copy of that letter? Will you try to produce that letter for us?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't have a copy, but I remember fairly clearly that I received just a brief courteous note from him, saying that he had relatives in Baltimore and would stay with them, or something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time you invited him to your home, you were professor at Johns Hopkins?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not know the merits of the case for the libel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know, then, whether or not it was an actual fact that Mr. Hiss had delivered papers to the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, You did not know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not know for a fact and I thought that when charges are made against a man, when he has denied those charges, and has said he is going to take legal action, it is a courteous thing for

his friends to make some little gesture that shows that they do not believe that mere accusation is equivalent to conviction.

Senator FERGUSON. You were one of his friends, then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. Well, I was an acquaintance, rather than a friend.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought that was the duty of an acquaintance; that if a man was being accused of delivering secret papers from the State Department to the Communists, and accused of being a Communist, that it would be the duty of an acquaintance who was a professor at a school to invite the man to his home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was an acquaintance who had been present when he received an honorary degree at my university. I knew that the president of my university, the late Isaiah Bowman, had an extremely high opinion of Mr. Hiss, and the general atmosphere in which I had some acquaintance with Mr. Hiss was that this whole business was an incredible charge.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after the degree did you hear that he was accused of the accusations that were being made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At present I can't recall the time interval, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. He got his degree before the accusations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, precisely.

Senator FERGUSON. And the accusations, sworn testimony, did not make any difference to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My attitude was that——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. You can answer that "Yes" or "No." Sworn testimony did not make any difference to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Sworn testimony did not make enough difference to me to make me believe that a man's friends and acquaintances should begin to treat him as guilty merely on a charge and before both sides of the case had been heard.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, where did you say you were when you first heard the news that Senator McCarthy had charged——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was in Afghanistan.

Senator SMITH. How long did you stay there after that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It may have been 5 or 6 days; it may have been a week.

Senator SMITH. Then where did you go?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then I returned to this country.

Senator SMITH. Did you stop en route between Afghanistan and America any day or 2 or 3 days, any length of time at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I stayed between planes, while making connections. I think I stayed, oh, for one night at Karachi, Pakistan.

Senator SMITH. That is the only place you spent as much as a day or night?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, and may I say, as an example of the way that people react to unproven charges, that during my stay overnight and into the next day before catching my plane in Karachi, the American Ambassador in Karachi, a very fine gentleman from my own State of Maryland, invited me to lunch.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator SMITH. That is all.

Senator O'CONOR. At whose instance did you go to Afghanistan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. United Nations.

Senator O'CONOR. And specifically upon whose invitation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Specifically on the invitation—I think I would have to say specifically on the invitation of the Government of Afghanistan. Would you like for me to elaborate on how that appointment came about?

Senator O'CONOR. It might be of interest, yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was called on the telephone from United Nations and told that the United Nations had a program of technical assistance to unindustrialized countries, that is the United Nations equivalent of point 4. That in that connection they had compiled lists of people who might be regarded as useful for technical assistance missions in different parts of the world, that a number of Americans who knew anything about Afghanistan and were not already engaged in Afghanistan was infinitesimal, but that they had my name as a general expert on the inter-Asian or central Asian area, and would I be interested in considering taking part in a mission of that kind which was then being discussed with the Afghan Government.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you speak the language?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Had you ever been there before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had never been there before.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed, Senator.

Senator SMITH. One other question following that. Dr. Lattimore, did you have any conference or conferences with any newspapermen after you left Afghanistan before you got to America?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was interviewed, I think, by a United Press man at Karachi, and afterward when the plane landed at Rome, and again at London, pressmen came up and asked me question. I wouldn't be able now to identify which services they represented. At Karachi it may have been United Press or Associated Press, or it might have been both.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall any particular newspaperman that interviewed you at any of those places?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall any one by name. There was nobody that I had previously known.

Senator SMITH. No one you had previously known at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you receive a telegram from Edward Carter on the day that the Hitler-Stalin nonaggression pact was announced to the world?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris, I believe that was the date.

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that, if you know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that was the date. That is not of my own knowledge. That is as of Mr. Morris' statement in executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you receive on that day, Mr. Lattimore, from Mr. Carter an invitation to fly to Moscow at IPR expense for 3 to 5 days' visit.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not believe it was an invitation, Mr. Morris. I believe it was a statement of possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you receive any request?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was certainly not a request, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I remember, it was a suggestion that if I wanted to do that, the IPR would be willing to bear my expenses or part of my expenses.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you go to Moscow, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Why not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because my summer vacation was coming to an end. I wanted to spend a little time in Norway on the way home, and that is what I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall whether or not you actually received that telegram from Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not have recalled it if I had not been shown it in executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. But you have recalled it now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have recalled it now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you turn it down?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was not a telegram I took seriously at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you indicate your refusal? Did you send anything in the way of a communication to Mr. Carter to tell him you were not going to Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel to identify this, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a telegram from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked "Stockholm, August 24, 1939." addressed to "Lattimore, Cooks, STKM", and signed "Carter."

The CHAIRMAN. That is a photostat of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, would you look at that document and see if you can recall having received that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I received it. May I read it?

Mr. MORRIS. You may, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Cable if Motylev free see you. Would you care make 3- or 5-day visit Moscow? Can pay air passage and Intourist Hotel second category.

CARTER.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you did receive that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I obviously must have received it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when and where you received it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. He said he received it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't. Until I was shown this telegram in executive session I had forgotten the whole incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been received in the record.

(The telegram referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 494" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 494

Telegram Kungl. Telegrafverket

STOCKHOLM, *24 August 1939.*

alp–wqb —ppsbron 2

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sw64 1 lee mass 30w 24/8 0935 VIA GOTEBORG-RADIO
nlt—lattimore cooks stkm

Cable if Motylev free see you. Would you care make 3- or 5-day visit Moscow? Can pay air passages and Intourist Hotel second category.

CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you go from Sweden to Norway at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Just about that time; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, in view of the fact that you have just now read that telegram, could you now answer the question that you received an invitation from Mr. Carter to go to Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would not call it an invitation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have introduced into the record at this time the front page of the New York Times of Thursday, August 24, 1939, which carries the announcement that that morning the Hitler-Stalin nonaggression pact had been announced to the world.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. August 24, 1939.

And this telegram, sir, was sent by Mr. Carter from Lee, Mass., apparently, at 9:35 in the morning, according to the date at the top of the telegram.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask if there is a time difference between Europe and the United States taken into account there?

Mr. MORRIS. It is 7 hours earlier, Moscow, or 8 hours.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Seven or eight.

Mr. MORRIS. About 7 or 8 hours. So you see that would have been announced 7 or 8 hours earlier in Moscow than Lee, Mass.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is there anything to show that anyone living in Lee, Mass., would have known that earlier than the New York Times?

Mr. MORRIS. We will have to ask Mr. Carter about that.

Mr. Chairman, I would like Mr. Mandel to introduce the next document.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to act on this other offer as soon as Senator Ferguson is through.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, would you care to look at the New York Times of that date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 495" and is as follows:)

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Copyright, 1939, by The New York Times Company

Late City Edition: Partly cloudy and warm with scattered showers today and tomorrow. Temperatures Yesterday—Max., 88; Min., 70

[Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 29,797. Entered as Second-Class Matter, Postoffice, New York, N. Y. New York, Thursday, August 24, 1939]

GERMANY AND RUSSIA SIGN 10-YEAR NONAGGRESSION PACT; BIND EACH OTHER NOT TO AID OPPONENTS IN WAR ACTS; HITLER REBUFFS LONDON; BRITAIN AND FRANCE MOBILIZE

[Column 5]

QUICK ACTION SEEN—BERLIN TALKS OF 6 P. M DEADLINE FOR MOVE AGAINST POLAND—DICTATOR WARNS BRITISH—HENDERSON SO WROUGHT UP ON LEAVING PARLEY WITH HITLER THAT HE IS SPEECHLESS

(By Otto D. Tolischus)

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES

BERLIN, Thursday, Aug. 24.—While Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was in Moscow discussing, in the view of some German quarters, not so much a new nonaggression pact as "Poland's fourth and final partition," Chancellor Hitler yesterday received Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador, for a fifteen-minute conference.

According to reliable information, the conference ended on a rather blunt note that is interpreted in diplomatic quarters as possibly Herr Hitler's last word. The communiqué, issued last night, reads:

"Complying with the wish of the British Government, the Fuehrer received Sir Nevile Henderson at the Berghof today. The Ambassador delivered a letter from the British Prime Minister addressed to the Fuehrer, which was drawn up in the same sense as yesterday's British communication regarding the Cabinet session.

"The Fuehrer left no doubt in the mind of the British Ambassador that the obligations assumed by the British Government could not induce Germany to renounce the defense of her vital national interest."

HITLER'S TONE REPORTED BLUNT

Actually Herr Hitler's tone to Sir Nevile was reported to have been even more blunt than the communiqué indicates. In effect, Herr Hitler told the Ambassador that Britian had no business in Eastern Europe and that her guarantee of Poland merely encouraged Polish resistance to German demands, therefore it was up to Britain to persuade the Poles to yield or face the consequences.

Sir Nevile left the conference so wrought up he was speechless. Not trusting his memory to repeat the exact shadings of Herr Hitler's answer, he asked that it be put in writing and he returned for it a half hour later. He got it couched in the same strong terms that Herr Hitler used to him before.

At the same time there are also well-authenticated reports that, in addition to Prime Minister Chamberlain's letter, Sir Nevile also delivered to Herr Hitler an oral message that if Herr Hitler would give the Poles time Britain would try to induce Poland to come forth with new proposals. In that connection some circles launched—perhaps not unintentionally—the suggestion that Foreign Minister Josef Beck of Poland might after all ask to see Herr von Ribbentrop and even Herr Hitler. A preliminary meeting with the former might be arranged at Riga, Latvia, on Herr von Ribbentrop's return from Moscow. But Polish circles declare the suggestion was "extremely unlikely" because it spelled surrender.

As during the last few days the word in Berlin is that the zero hour, which will set the German Army on the march, will come today, and these rumors are supplemented with the additional detail that the exact hour is 6 P. M. [noon, New York time], which might mean "contact with the enemy" some time tomorrow. Furthermore, orders to postpone action, issued after Herr von Ribbentrop's departure for Moscow, have been canceled again.

GERMANS ELATED BY NEWS

How much all that is merely a part of the "war of nerves" and how much is bitter reality remains to be seen. In fact the tension developing in Germany, at least in an atmosphere of fantastic unreality, is made no more real by the delayed Summer heat that lures the populace to the woods and beaches, and, together with the elation over the Russian pact and renewed confidence in Herr Hitler's diplomatic superiority over the democratic statesmen, helps to hide the war clouds.

However, the rebuff to Britain yesterday, which in some quarters is compared with the rebuff administered to the French Ambassador by King William of Prussia just preceding the Franco-Prussian War

[Continued on Page Two]

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[Column 8]

BARS HOSTILE UNION—TREATY FORBIDS EITHER TO JOIN ANY GROUP AIMED AT OTHER—ESCAPE CLAUSE OMITTED—VON RIBBENTROP'S CAR, FLYING SWASTIKA, PASSES BENEATH RED FLAG AT KREMLIN

(By The Associated Press)

Moscow, Thursday, Aug. 24.—Germany and Soviet Russia early today signed a nonaggression pact binding each other for ten years not to "associate itself with any other grouping of powers which directly or indirectly is aimed at the other party."

By the pact they also agreed to "constantly remain in consultation with one another" on their common interests and to adjust differences by arbitration.

The nonaggression clauses bound each power to refrain from any act of force against the other and if either party is "the object of warlike acts by a third power" to refrain from supporting that third power.

The pact did not include the usual escape clause providing for its denunciation in case one of the contracting parties attacked a third power. This provision has been written into most nonaggression agreements signed in the past by Moscow.

ARRIVES BY PLANE

(By G. E. R. Gedye)

Special Cable to The New York Times

Moscow, Thursday, Aug. 24.—With the meticulous punctuality of a perfectly staged arrival, two huge Focke-Wulf Condor planes conveying Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, and his thirty-two assistants, landed at the Moscow airdrome on the stroke of 1 P. M. yesterday.

Adequate but not excessive police precautions were taken at the airdrome. For the first time the Soviet authorities displayed the swastika banner, five of which flew from the front of the airdrome building, but were placed so as not to be visible from the outside.

Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff was not present to welcome Herr von Ribbentrop, probably because he is not only Commissar of Foreign Affairs but also Premier, and therefore higher in rank than Herr von Ribbentrop. Instead the visitor was received by Vladimir P. Potemkin, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Barkoff, protocol chief; Mr. Merkuloff, Vice Commissar of Internal Affairs, under whom falls the NKVD, formerly the GPU; Mr. Alexandroff, chief of the Central European Department of the Foreign Office, and General Suvoroff, commander of the Moscow garrison.

Almost the entire staff of the huge German Embassy, headed by the Ambassador, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, with the military, naval and air attachés in uniform, was present. The German civilians mostly wore top hats and cutaway coats.

The Italian Ambassador, Augusto Russo, with his military attaché in uniform, also was present. The feature of the reception most commented upon was the absence of any Japanese representative.

The German Embassy staff stood lined up like troops on parade. As each was presented to Herr von Ribbentrop he sprang to attention, clicked his heels, gave the Hitler salute and shook hands, again saluting and heel-clicking.

IN OLD AUSTRIAN EMBASSY

From the airdrome the party drove to the city through streets where police in their white Summer jackets stood every ten paces. For Herr von Ribbentrop the Soviet Government provided a large American car from the Kremlin car park, flying the swastika flag.

The party drove directly to the former Austrian Embassy, where they are being housed. Subsequently Herr von Ribbentrop and leading members of his mission had luncheon at the embassy with Count von der Schulenburg.

At about 3:30 P. M. Herr von Ribbentrop, accompanied by Count von der Schulenburg and an expert translator whom the Germans brought from Berlin, drove through the gates of the Kremlin with its

[Continued on Page Six]

* * * * * * *

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 5, 1940, addressed to Harrison Forman, Port Washington, N. Y., with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is the carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that carbon and ask you if you can recall having sent that letter to Mr. Forman.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The date is February 5, 1940. May I read it?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

EXHIBIT 496

DEAR FORMAN: Last summer while in Sweden I got a post card you had sent from Moscow. After that I saw a report in a paper about your being heckled at a Canadian meeting. Then came your startling Christmas card, and that had an address on it, so I can write to make acknowledgment.

It was interesting enough being in Sweden on the eve of war; it must have been even more interesting to be in Moscow when the dam was beginning to crack. As a matter of fact, I'd have been in Moscow myself when the Germans marched into Poland, if it hadn't been that a cable from my New York office was not delivered until we reached our boat in Norway.

You must have had an extraordinarily interesting time, and I'd like to hear more about it. Do you ever pass this way on your lecturing peregrinations? If you do, I wish you'd put up with us over night. Or is there a chance of our crossing anywhere else? I shall be away from here during most of the month of March, going out through western Canada and coming back via the Pacific coast.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The letter which was read in full was marked "Exhibit No. 496.")

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I add some comments, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a letter you wrote, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite obviously a letter I wrote. One I totally forgot until I saw it just now.

Mr. MORRIS. In there, Mr. Lattimore, do you not state that you would have been in Moscow if you had received the telegram we have been discussing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I state that.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it not a fact that at that time, August 24, 1939, and for a period of approximately 18 months, Moscow joined Berlin as the headquarters of the enemy of the democratic world?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your statement on that.

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What had Mr. Forman been heckled for?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. It must have struck you as important. You wrote him about it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It evidently was something that struck me as interesting at the time, but I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it that he was pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you the other way. Was it that he was anti-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not any idea of what you wrote him about being heckled?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You apparently were on his side.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The press might show.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought it was——

Mr. LATTIMORE. As of 1940, I would have been extremely interested to talk to anybody who had been in Moscow at the time the dam was beginning to crack, as I said. That whole business of the Nazi-Stalin pact had everybody speculating, everybody was interested in talking about it. At that time, and since, I had an extremely slight acquaintance with Mr. Forman, but I certainly did not consider him a Communist or a pro-Communist. Now, I should like to say——

The CHAIRMAN. You started to say "extremely." Did you mean "extremely"? Then you said "slight." Straighten the sentence out.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would be extremely slight.

Senator FERGUSON. And you thought, then, as you say here, that it must have been even more interesting to be in Moscow when the dam was beginning to crack.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Quite so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though the Russians were against the free world at that time with Germany.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I tell you why I thought it was interesting?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I wish you would.

Mr. LATTIMORE. When I was in Sweden, the person whom my wife and I knew best was Dr. Sven Hedin, the celebrated explorer. Dr. Hedin for many years had been extremely pro-German and was, in fact, I believe, an honorary member of the Nazi Party. Just a short time—I forget whether it was 2 or 3 days—before the Nazi-Stalin pact was announced, we had dinner with him, and he told us that he thought that the British-French negotiations with the Russians were going to break down, and the Russians were going to come to

terms with the Germans. My knowledge as an expert on European politics was so slight that I pooh-poohed the idea. My idea was that the Germans and the Russians were such enemies that they could not possibly get together. I was astounded when the pact came out and with that background I would naturally have been even more interested in talking to anybody who had been in Moscow at the time that I had heard a conversation of this kind in Sweden.

Senator FERGUSON. But this indicated that it would have been interesting for you to be in Moscow.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would be interesting for anybody to be in Moscow. I don't think it says me, personally. I said I was in Sweden. That was very interesting. You were in Moscow. That would have been even more interesting.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I have put into the record the executive session interrogation on this particular subject? This is page 57 from the executive session testimony of Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have copies of that to follow? Counsel, do you have copies of that to follow?

Mr. ARNOLD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We did have it yesterday.

Mr. MORRIS. Here is a copy.

Beginning at page 57, the question is:

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that that cable from Mr. Carter to yourself had no relation to the pact that had been announced the previous day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly would say not. It is a telegram that I received on the 24th or 25th, whenever it came into Sweden. But as far as my mind is concerned, it has no connection with the date.

Senator EASTAND. Did you go to Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you reply to that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What?

Mr. MORRIS. How did you reply to that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt if I replied at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Wasn't that unusual?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; my assumption would be—I may have replied—but my assumption would be that receiving it at that time with the excitement caused by the Hitler-Stalin pact, my assumption would be, this is an idea that Mr. Carter was thinking of before the pact, but with that pact it is quite obvious that any such arrangements would be impractical.

Senator SMITH. May I ask him a question?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Senator.

Senator SMITH. At that time you say you were on a vacation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Then on page 59:

Senator SMITH. And do you recall what sort of an answer you gave to that, if you gave any answer?—

That is the second line, page 59—

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall what answer I gave. If I had given any answer it would have been negative.

Mr. ARNOLD. May I again request that the entire testimony be introduced in evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. That request will not be granted. It deals with different subjects.

Mr. ARNOLD. I haven't had time to read it; in order to protect my record, Senator, may I request that all the testimony on that subject be put in evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter we will take up later.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that we have here a letter written—when, in 1950?

Senator FERGUSON. February 5.

Mr. LATTIMORE. February 5, 1940. When I quite obviously from the letter had no exact recollection of the date of the relationship between the telegram and the Nazi-German pact that I mentioned that I received the telegram when I got on the boat in Norway, and it was obviously not in my mind that I would have received it in Sweden on the Nazi-German pact if I had been in Sweden at the time. I should like to add a word or two of amplification there, of why there should have been such a telegram at all.

Mr. Carter knew at that time that I had long been trying to get into Outer Mongolia.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you trying to testify to this committee as to what Mr. Carter thought or knew at that time? If you are, I do not think we would care to go into it. I do not think the committee would care to hear it. We would rather hear it from Mr. Carter.

As regards you, or yours, all right, but what Mr. Carter was thinking at the time or what he did at the time or how he considered at the time, I do not think you are capable of testifying.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept that, Mr. Chairman. I had previously told Mr. Carter that I wanted to get into Outer Mongolia, because as a specialist on Inner Mongolian habited regions of western Manchuria, by then occupied by Japanese, and in southern Inner Mongolia, under Chinese rule, I wanted to get into Outer Mongolia, which even then was a Russian satellite, and it would be impossible to arrange such a visit unless I were able to get to Moscow and see the Outer Mongolian representatives inMoscow, because there were not any Outer Mongolian representatives anywhere else.

Senator O'CONOR. May I ask a question there? Can you reconcile any better than you have the two apparently conflicting statements regarding the receipt of the telegram and your attitude? In the executive session, the impression was left, at least upon me, that you had received Mr. Carter's cablegram, and declined it. It now appears from the correspondence that you did not receive it until a subsequent time. Had you received it, you would have received it——

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the impression the Chair gets from the testimony this morning. The testimony this morning, as I get it, is that he did receive the telegram. He doesn't deny receiving the telegram.

Senator O'CONOR. He received it according to this letter at a later date. I read from the letter——

The CHAIRMAN. He says in that letter that he received it.

Senator O'CONOR. That is right [reading]:

> if it hadn't been that a cable from my New York office was not delivered until we reached our boat in Norway.

That seems to conflict with your statement in the executive session that you had received it and had declined it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of course——

Mr. ARNOLD. Just a second. I am a little——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Mr. Counsel. When you are called upon for advice from the witness, you may give it, but otherwise not.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to show you that he said in this letter he would have been there if he had not received the wire.

Senator O'CONOR. Do I make myself clear, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. May I first look at my testimony in executive session, or do you want me to answer cold?

Senator O'CONOR. You are perfectly free to refer to it. I was referring to the statement that Mr. Morris had read.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I notice that I stated—I think this is pertinent to your question of dates, Senator O'Conor, and I would like to bring it out first and then refer to the question of dates—this is my statement in executive session. No, first, a question from Mr. Sourwine:

Was Mr. Motylev the person who because of his official position in the Soviet Union might have been able to assist in getting you access to Mongolia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Motylev was head of the Russian Institute which was at that time a member of the international group of the Institute of Pacific Relations. At the Yosemite conference of the institute—

That was, I might interpolate, in the summer of 1936—

I had put up to Mr. Motylev the suggestion that I might be able to make a visit to Outer Mongolia via Russia. Mr. Motylev, like all Russians, was extremely cagey on the subject, because it was my experience, a very baffling experience on that in trying to get into Outer Mongolia, that is, that the Russians would never have anything on the record to prove that they controlled who permitted people into or out of Outer Mongolia. Everybody knows that it depended on them, but——

Mr. CHAIRMAN. You are reading from the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What page, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 59 and 60 [reading]:

but they would never let anything get on the record to prove it.

On this question of the date in executive session I was shown by Mr. Morris this copy of the telegram. I was not shown by him this letter to Harrison Forman about the fact that I had received the telegram only in Norway. I was shown a telegram to me, addressed to Stockholm, with no indication that it had been received in Norway, and I think I quite naturally allowed my memory to be refreshed to the extent of saying that I received it there. I simply assumed it. It was an unwarrantable assumption.

Then at a later hearing a letter was brought out which proves that I did not receive it in Sweden, as I had been led to assume by the manner of questioning in the executive session, but that I had received it some time later, 2 weeks or so later, in Norway, which I had totally forgotten.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, would that explain why at the time of the executive session you indicated that, having been shown it, you assumed that you received it and you volunteered the information that you declined it and that you did not wish to go to Russia, whereas——

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't volunteer that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the question be asked.

Senator O'CONOR. That was my understanding. Of course the record will speak for itself on it. But now, upon being shown the letter from you to Mr. Forman, it is clearly indicated that you had not received it, and had you received it you would have accepted it and gone to Moscow.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here again, Senator O'Conor, I wrote this letter without looking up the date of the telegram or the date——

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question, Mr. Lattimore. Just a moment. That is not the question. Read the question of the Senator from Maryland.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I first look up the executive record to see if I did in fact say that I declined?

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the executive session?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The executive session here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you say this morning that you wanted to complete your vacation, that you mentally declined because you wanted to finish your vacation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, no; I think that is an unjustifiable inference.

Senator FERGUSON. Then go back and read the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. He is trying to read one phase of the testimony now. One at a time. He wants to read the executive session testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have it on that point, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Mr. Morris"——

Mr. MORRIS. What page is that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The top of page 57.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that that cable from Mr. Carter to yourself had no relation to the pact that had been announced the previous day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly would say not. It is a telegram that I received on the 24th or 25th—

I had been led to say that by the manner in which the telegram had been presented.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean, you had been led to say that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had been led to say that by the presentation of a telegram, the dates of which indicated that it must have been delivered in Sweden on those dates, and without my memory being refreshed by the knowledge which you had that I actually received it in Norway several weeks later.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you mean you had been led by reading the telegram into that statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had been led by having the telegram presented to me, and not the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. But you had been led by reading the telegram, and not the presentation of it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had been led by the fact that the telegram had been presented to me. If the telegram had not been presented to me I wouldn't have read it—

on the 24th or 25th, whenever it came into Sweden. But as far as my mind is concerned, it has no connection with the date.

If I may go on, Senator O'Conor, I think it is obvious from my letter to Mr. Forman that I had quite forgotten the dates on the telegram and that I was assuming many months later that if the telegram had not been delivered to me in Norway, I would have received it before the Nazi-German Pact and would in that case have tried to complete the arrangements and go to Moscow. In that case I might have been in Moscow when, as I put it, the dam began to crack, which would have been extremely interesting.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Morris? Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. I would like to go back and ask a question. Dr. Lattimore, just now I asked you about whether when you left Afghanistan you had any interviews with any one, newsmen, that you recalled, and you told us that you had a lunch at Karachi, I believe it was, and then you changed planes, but that was all, except that newspapermen met you at some of these places and interviewed you and none of them you knew.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, I don't believe I saw anyone I knew.

Senator SMITH. I believe you wrote a book, did you not, "Ordeal by Slander."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Will you tell us now that you did not meet any newspaperman en route home from Afghanistan? Do you still say that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I remember now. Yes, you are quite right. My recollection completely slipped. Mr. Hamilton Owens, of the Baltimore Sun, came to London and traveled back on the same plane with me.

Senator SMITH. Let me see if you recall that you wrote this in your book. On page 18:

Then I went to face the flashbulbs, and talked to the reporters.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH (reading):

One thing I noticed right away. Not only the English reporters, but also Americans were quite obviously assuming that I was innocent until proved guilty. Among the newspapermen in the group at London Airport was Hamilton Owens, editor of the Baltimore Sun. The fact that he had come all the way to London to meet me was like getting a signal in code to which I had the key. I knew that the Baltimore Sun, as my home-town paper, would be exposed to the full pressure of unreasoning emotion as soon as the McCarthy charges came out. I also knew that the editorial page of the paper had a tendency to be flabby. I had therefore guessed that as soon as the sensational McCarthy charges come into the open, the Sun had played the news on its front page with the biggest headlines that the printing room could provide while hesitating, on its editorial page, to point out that in my university and my own community my loyalty has never been doubted. (They later sent a man up to Wisconsin who wrote some good stories on McCarthy).

I could therefore see right away that at least one of the reasons why Hamilton Owens had come all the way to London was that he was looking for a safe way to write a friendly story about me. This he did, and I was very grateful to him for it.

Here is the book. That is what you wrote in your book, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite right.

Senator SMITH. So Mr. Owens was a friend of yours, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And still is, is he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He still is.

Senator SMITH. And he flew all the way to London to meet you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you acquiesce in any suggestion by Soviet officials in Moscow in 1936 that you would endeavor to express a definite line in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you you to look at this document. This was introduced in open session yesterday. I ask you to read a paragraph with the number IV.

The Chairman. For the purpose of clarifying the record, what is the number of that exhibit?

Mr. Arnold. May I have one?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

The Chairman. Is there a number of identification on the exhibit?

Mr. Morris. Yes. Exhibit No. 485.

The Chairman. He was asked to read something.

Mr. Morris. Will you read the paragraph marked IV on the first page.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

OL said that he would like to meet the Soviet suggestion as far as possible, in re having a more definite line expressed in PA. He has not been able to do this before, because he has not had close cooperation from the the various councils. He said that if the Soviet group would start on such a line, he would be able to make the others cooperate more fully. Voitinsky said that the main trouble was that the articles in PA did not come out against the aggressor, and the aggressor was not analyzed from within, therefore there were no indications of the internal weakness of the aggressor—

May I——

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that, April? What year?

Mr. Morris. 1936.

Mr. Arnold. You want the whole thing read, do you not?

Mr. Morris. No.

Mr. Lattimore. May I add something at this point, Mr. Morris?

Senator Ferguson. Before that, could I ask you one question? What was the definite line? Was that the Communist Party line? You say there—

the Soviet suggestion as far as possible, in re having a more definite line expressed in PA. He has not been able to do this before, because he has not had close cooperation from the various councils.

Then, "He said if the Soviet group would start on such a line." That was the Communist Party line, was it not? Why do you have to confer with your counsel to answer that question?

Mr. Lattimore. Senator Ferguson——

Senator Ferguson. It is not a legal point. You can answer that. You wrote it.

Mr. Lattimore. Senator Ferguson, I see nothing here to suggest that this was the party line.

Senator Ferguson. What line was it?

Mr. Lattimore. I was just going to ask permission to say something about this point which was a subject of discussion and differing points of view throughout my period as editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Arnold. Would it be out of order to make——

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

The Chairman. Let him answer.

Mr. Arnold. I had a question about that question, that is all.

Senator Ferguson. I am asking now, when you were talking about the Soviet definite line, as to whether or not that was not the Communist Party line.

Wait, Judge, that is not a legal matter.

Mr. ARNOLD. There is something about the question——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Senator FERGUSON. The witness will say there is something wrong with the question if there is.

Mr. ARNOLD. May we have the entire question read back?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That can be answered "Yes" or "No" and then explain.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my opinion, no.

Senator FERGUSON. What line was it? What was the definite Soviet line, if it wasn't the Communist Party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This was the line of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in connection with a particular subject of differing points of view between various national councils in IPR at that time. If it was the Communist line, when the Japanese Council must have been Communist because the line that the Russians were taking at that moment was exactly the line that the Japanese were taking in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Let me read you this line and see whether or not you are entirely right in your answer. "He said"—is it you they are talking about? Is that you or is that the Russians? "He said that the Soviet group"—that would be you—"would start on such a line." What line were the Russians to start on, a non-Communist line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. They were to start on the line that articles in Pacific Affairs should be presented by the various councils as groups and not by individuals as individuals. This was a line that had nothing Communist about it. It was the line that was shared by the Japanese Council at the same time. The British, Chinese and American councils did not agree. They all thought that people should write as individuals and not as representatives of councils.

Senator FERGUSON. Were the Soviets going to follow a party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have no way of knowing whether that was a party line or not. All I know is that it was the same line that was being followed by the Japanese Council at the same time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know the Soviets to follow any other line than the Communist line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am not enough of an expert——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Did you know? Answer it "Yes" or "No," no matter whether you are an expert or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you don't know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as my knowledge goes, Senator, I believe that the Russians have at various times followed lines, if you want to use that word, temporarily for particular purposes that had nothing Communist about them as such. In the larger sense, if you want to say that it is Communist policy to do that kind of thing, of course I would agree.

Senator FERGUSON. You would agree that they do it in that way?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer?

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever known the Soviets not to follow a party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as my knowledge goes, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, as far as they are concerned in writing in this magazine it was perfectly proper for them to follow the party line, and you were going to see that that was done.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not what you say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the first place, I would remind you that this is not a stenographic record. This is a condensed memorandum written by somebody afterward, not shown to me for my approval——

The CHAIRMAN. That will be stricken from the record. Answer the question, Mr. Lattimore. Read the question back to the witness and have him answer the question.

(The question was read by the reporter as follows:)

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, as far as they are concerned in writing in this magazine it was perfectly proper for them to follow the party line, and you were going to see that that was done.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not what you say?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not what was said? I will put it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Read what he said.

Senator FERGUSON. He said this: "He said that if the Soviet group would start on such a line, he would be able to make the others cooperate fully." That was a definite line the Soviets suggested.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I don't know—maybe I missed it—whether or not this was identified and how it was identified. In view of the suggestion which Mr. Lattimore has just raised that this doesn't purport to quote him verbatim but rather is a summary, who made this? Do we have any evidence on that?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Smith, this was identified by Mr. Mandel yesterday as a copy of a document found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and it purports only to be the minutes of a meeting at which those people attended and Mr. Lattimore has testified he did attend.

Senator SMITH. I just wanted to get it identified.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like the record to show also that this is not a verbatim record of what I said.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, who, outside of you, was present at this meeting from America?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The notation at the top shows Mr. Carter, myself, and Harriet Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think at this time it would be appropriate if we incorporate into this part of the record the testimony about the Communist affiliations of Voitinsky and Motylev, who were two of the gentlemen at this meeting and the next meeting which will be discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have it, let's have it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine, testifying before this committee in open session——

The CHAIRMAN. Give the page.

Mr. MORRIS. At page 188 in the published reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's see that counsel has a copy of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Part I, page 188.

Mr. ARNOLD. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barmine testifying, the last sentence of that first paragraph. This is in the fall of 1921 he is talking about:

Among them was Voitinski who at this time was in charge of the far-eastern section of the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you know Voitinski as the man who was head of the far eastern section of the Foreign Office at that time?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right. He came back to the Foreign Office from the Comintern and when he was also in charge of far eastern affairs. He returned back from the Foreign Office a couple of years later again to the same work.

Mr. MORRIS. You, therefore, testify he had come from the Comintern to occupy that position as head of the far eastern section of the Foreign Office and after he finished that assignment he went back to the Comintern?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify also. General, in the Comintern he was in charge of far eastern affairs?

Mr. BARMINE. That is right.

We had the open testimony of Professor Poppe on February 12, 1952, on this same subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps in view of the fact that counsel here was not present and does not know who General Barmine was, if he wishes it stated we can state it.

Mr. ARNOLD. I know who he is.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Have we a copy of this open session, Mr. Poppe's testimoney? I will read it with you, Mr. Arnold. We seem to have only one copy available. I will read it with you.

Mr. ARNOLD. You don't have to do that. Just give it to me when you are through. I can remember it. I have no doubt you will read it correctly.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a question addressed to Professor Poppe, of the University of Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, do you know a man named Voitinsky?

Mr. POPPE. I know him very well. Voitinsky is an outstanding Communist, a member of the Comintern, a man who played an important role in Chinese affairs. He in his youth was an organizer of parties of guerrilas against the White Russian Armies in Siberia. Later on he became a member of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Office and played a very important role in the far eastern development. Then he became one of the directors of the Communist Academy which later on was merged with the Russian Academy of Scientists, and became the nucleus of the future Academy of Scientists. He was also the director of various institutes in the Academy of Sciences, chief editor of the magazine, World Policies and World Economics. He is the right-hand of Stalin's No. 1 economist, Varga.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, would you tell us whether he was himself a Communist Party man?

Mr. POPPE. He was a party man, a member of the Comintern, and in 1936 and 1937 he conducted a purge of the Academy of Sciences, and many people worked together with me in my institute, my assistants, were purged, simply in consequence of his accusations.

Senator WATKINS. What do you mean by "purge"?

Mr. POPPE. It was in 1936 and 1937, in connection with Stalin's destruction of the Zinoviev, Borodin, and all the other well-known Communists. A great purge was started in all the agencies, and all the universities, and so on. I can only say, to give you an idea of what it was in my Institute of Oriental Study, that we had 94 scientists and 37 of them were arrested and disappeared forever; 37 out of 94.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that, Professor?

Mr. POPPE. 1937. Votinsky delivered a speech in our institute where he severely criticized this man and that man, and so on, and a few days later there was the elimination of all those people. So he was the one who gave the green light for those arrests.

Then in connection with Mr. Motylev, again Professor Poppe testifying on the same subject, the question was asked:

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us who Professor Motylev is?
Mr. POPPE. Professor Motylev is a party member.
Mr. MORRIS. You know that he is a Communist Party member?
Mr. POPPE. A Communist Party member, and an economist, not a physical geographer, a scientist of very little significance, but an outstanding party organizer, and a man who knows how to run an organization under Soviet conditions. He was trusted greatly and he was ordered not to compile, because he himself alone was not able to do this, but to establish a group which would compile that atlas, and to supervise the publication of that atlas.' The result of that work was published in 1937. It is a big Soviet world atlas, technically done very well, but, as anything in the Soviet Union, it had also to comply with the Marxist-Leninist line of thinking.

Mr. ARNOLD. Is that part of the public record?
Mr. MORRIS. Yes. You may look at that.
Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman——
The CHAIRMAN. There is no question pending.
Mr. LATTIMORE. May the record show at this point——
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, I think, was questioning.
Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, in this one dated April 12, do you have that before you?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I do.
Senator FERGUSON. Yesterday, you read that you had considerable trouble with the minutes of the April 8 document:

In the next issue of PA there is to be an article by a Communist writer which is antagonistic to the Chinese Council and the British Council.

We had to spend, I would say, an hour on the question of whether or not that was Asiaticus. You had great trouble in answering the question. Now I show you the one of April 12, over on page 2, and ask you whether or not when you used this language, "in regard to the Asiaticus article"—That is the first article he wrote that was published?
Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.
Senator FERGUSON (reading):

he had to revise the vocabulary considerably or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.
Senator FERGUSON. Doesn't that prove to you that the man you were talking about, the Communist, when you were in Russia, writing his first article, was Asiaticus?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; it doesn't. I will remind you again this is not a verbatim record. The way in which this is condensed, written after the meeting, not at the meeting, not presented to me beforehand for—verification——
The CHAIRMAN. The answer is that it does not, and that is the answer. Just a moment.
Mr. LATTIMORE. Forthcoming article.
The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You have answered the question.
Senator FERGUSON. I will ask him this question: Would not this indicate that the person who wrote the minutes—who had to be one of three—you, E. C. Carter, or Harriet Moore—because these are found in the office in New York? At least one of those three people? That is clear from the record, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is not clear to me from the record, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say a fair interpretation of the record by the person who wrote it is that that is true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; because there may have been somebody else present who was merely there for the purpose of taking notes and therefore was not recorded as a participant in the meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. At least to the writer of the note it is a fair conclusion.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I cannot answer what would be the conclusion in the minds of the person who wrote the note. The only conclusion that I can speak to is my own conclusion as a reader of these notes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris. All right, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I would like to inquire if Mr. Lattimore knew that someone was taking notes, a résumé of what took place at the meeting, not only of this meeting on the 12th, but the 8th and other meetings. You knew that memoranda were being made, that summaries were being made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't.

Senator SMITH. Was that not the custom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What?

Senator SMITH. Was that not the custom when all of you had a meeting to have notes made as to what was said and done?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not an invariable custom; no.

Senator SMITH. Did you know it was ever done?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely, yes.

Senator SMITH. You and Mr. Carter went over the minutes after they were written, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe I did.

Senator SMITH. Never?

Senator LATTIMORE. When I saw these, was the first time that I could recollect ever hearing it.

Senator SMITH. So whoever took the minutes of the meeting, you had such confidence in them that you didn't think it necessary to go over the minutes yourself afterward?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't even know whether they were going to be written up as minutes.

Senator SMITH. I mean, whoever did make the minutes of the meeting was of such character that you relied upon him without checking the minutes yourself?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I either didn't consider it important enough to ask about or whoever made the minutes didn't consider it important enough to submit them to me for checking. This is an extremely amateur, private organization, Senator. This is not like records of diplomatic meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not in the question at all, whether it is amateur or not.

All right.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, did you not direct that these minutes be kept at these conferences?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Whose activity would it be? You did have this done.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can speak only as a very vague generalization, Senator, not from personal knowledge, but my assumption would be—and it is no more than an assumption—that if notes were made, they were made at the instance of Mr. Carter——

Senator WATKINS. He was the secretary.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Since he was the secretary-general dealing with various national councils, and since the discussion of the editing of Pacific Affairs was at that time being taken up with various national councils, I went in and talked with the Dutch after this visit in Moscow. Mr. Carter was not present. Then Mr. Carter and I talked about it with the British in London, and then this led up to a fairly thorough but inconclusive discussion of the editing of Pacific Affairs at the Yosemite conference in the summer of the same year.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you ask the Soviet officials in Moscow in 1936 to show a general line in their articles, which general line would be established in Pacific Affairs and around which all other articles would naturally gravitate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recollect it, but presumably it is in these minutes somewhere, if that is the way you have read it.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Did you or did you not? Do you care to answer that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recollect it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, that is the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I refer you to the exhibit that was introduced yesterday represented as the minutes of the meeting of April 8. I ask you to turn to the paragraph beginning on the top of page 4. Will you read that paragraph beginning with "Motiliev."

Senator SMITH. Is that April 8, 1936?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Senator Smith. The first paragraph on page 4, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. [Reading:]

> Motiliev said that it would be better to put as leading articles one that represented the point of view of one of the councils. O. L. said that he was prepared to consider this idea, but often before he has not had an important article which represented a council. O. L. said that if the Soviet group would show in their articles a general line, a struggle for peace, the other articles would naturally gravitate to that line. O. L. said that he had no organizational authority to tell the councils what kind of articles they should send in. He hopes that this will be settled at Yosemite.

May I add——

The CHAIRMAN. "O. L." is who?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is myself. May I add to that? I think that is an example of very ordinary diplomatic procedure. When people are pressing for something, you say, "All right, if you want it that way, start something yourself."

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is enough.

Proceed. Let us go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you appeal to Soviet officials for their assistance in converting Pacific Affairs from a loose and unorganized collection of articles into a journal which had a recognizable position and a general point of view?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume from the fact that you have just read it that I did so. I have no recollection of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer is that you have no recollection; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter dated June 2, 1937, addressed to Dr. V. E. Motylev, Soviet Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, No. 20, Rozin Street, Moscow, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore, addressed from 33, Ta Yuan Fu Hutung, Peiping, China, and the carbon copy was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew Mr. Motylev, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I met him first in Moscow that year.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall having written that letter to Mr. Motylev, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. ARNOLD. Do you have an extra copy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not recall it until this was shown to me, but it is quite obviously a letter that I wrote.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a copy of a letter that you wrote; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A carbon copy; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. There is a little delay in getting the copies.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The document on which the witness was last examined is in the record in full, is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. The last one has already been introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write that letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I wrote it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be admitted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be admitted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 497" and is read in full, beginning on p. 3240.)

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the paragraph, Mr. Lattimore, beginning "You will realize, however."

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

You will realize, however, that my abilities in this respect are not superhuman. I can write all over the world requesting articles and suggesting topics; but I can only print what I receive. If I am to convert Pacific Affairs from a loose and unorganized collection of articles into a journal which has a recognizable position and general point of view, I must rely very considerably on you. The Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations is more interested in this question of coherence than any of the others, all of which, by their composition and form of organization are more or less incoherent. If I could have from you an article in each number, and if these articles were planned to succeed each other in such a manner as to create a recognizable line of thought, it would be much easier to get other contributors to converge on this line.

May I add a comment?

Mr. ARNOLD. Just a moment. Mr. Chairman, may he read the entire letter?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The letter is being offered for the record, I believe, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The letter is in the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV: The new number of Pacific Affairs will be reaching you at about the same time——

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Mr. Motylev?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is a letter to Dr. Motylev in Moscow from me in Peiping.

The CHAIRMAN. He was a Communist known to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Motylev was the head of the Soviet Council, and I did not know that he was a Communist, but of course I would have presumed that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV——

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Did he hold any position in the Soviet Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only position that he held that I knew of, besides his position as head of the Soviet Council, was his position as the head of this—What was it called now—Institute of Soviet World Atlas, or something like that.

Senator FERGUSON. That was part of the Soviet Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You say back at that time you did not know that the officials that held positions in the Soviet Government were Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't and I will recall to you that Professor Poppe, who testified before this committee, said that he was never a Communist but that he held a high professorial position in the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that at the time back in 1936?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether I knew it or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you adopt his language here as testimony to prove that you didn't know it in 1936?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am simply adopting this language, Senator Ferguson, to show that an outside academic person—I wasn't an academic person then—that an outside person visiting the Soviet Union need not necessarily have assumed as of 1936 that people who held academic positions in Russia were always chosen Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the testimony of Professor Poppe that I read here this morning stated that Mr. Motylev was a Communist Party member.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, but Mr. Poppe's testimony, as I recall reading it in the transcript, was that he himself held an important and favored position in the Soviet academic structure and also stated that he had never been a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. That he, Poppe, had never been.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That he, Poppe, had never been a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead with your reading.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right.

(Exhibit No. 497 is as follows:)

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV: The new number of Pacific Affairs will be reaching you at about the same time as this letter. In it you will find an article of mine on The Lines of Cleavage in Inner Mongolia. As the printed text has been altered from what I originally wrote, I thought that you and your colleagues might be interested in seeing the original version, and accordingly I enclose a copy.

I wrote this article while traveling from England to China, at a time when I was out of touch with currnt news and recent developments. Partly for this reason, and partly because it seemed to me that the editor of Pacific Affairs ought himself to be subjected to editorial authority when writing articles, and should not have unlimited power to print his own opinions without revision, I asked Miss Porter in New York to have my article edited. Accordingly, Miss Moore, Miss Barnes, and Chen Han-seng very kindly undertook to make criticisms. Miss Moore has now written me that they made a number of changes. She has not sent me a copy of these changes, but I understand that it was considered that I had not been altogether fair to Voitinsky and Arens in quoting from them.

Since I have the greatest respect for the opinions of both Voitinsky and Arens, although differing from them myself in a number of details, I should be grateful, if they considered the subject important enough, to have their comments on both versions of what I have written. Perhaps they might lead eventually to a further article, either in Pacific Affairs or in the Tikhii Okean.

That is a Soviet publication, a publication of the Soviet Institute.

I also enclose an article on Tibet by Sir Charles Bell. I should be delighted if you or one of your colleagues would write something for Pacific Affairs on this subject. The present article is, I consider, not only weak in several points, but very conspicuously weak. Sir Charles Bell, however, has been an important participant in the modern history of Tibet; moreover, he makes several quotations from conversations with important personages and for these reasons, I think it is desirable to publish his article—though I think it would be still more desirable if we could have comments from another point of view, to be printed either in the same number or in a subsequent number. The article is at present planned for our December number.

I shall be interested to receive your comments on the June number of Pacific Affairs. I am afraid you may think it inferior to the December and March numbers. This is partly because while I was on my way from England to China, it was difficult to keep up a full correspondence and to secure a better grouping of articles. This was not my only difficulty however. I think we are in general agreement that the contents of Pacific Affairs ought to be planned fairly well in advance, so that the numbers will follow each other in regular sequence, developing a recognizable line of thought.

You will realize however that my abilities in this respect are not superhuman. I can write all over the world requesting articles and suggesting topics; but I can only print what I receive. If I am to convert Pacific Affairs from a loose and unorganized collection of articles into a journal which has a recognizable position and general point of view, I must rely very considerably on you. The Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations is more interested in this question of coherence than any of the others, all of which, by their composition and form of organization are more or less incoherent. If I could have from you an article in each number, and if these articles were planned to succeed each other in such a manner as to create a recognizable line of thought, it would be much easier to get other contributors to converge on this line.

I think I have said all this before, either in letters or in conversations. I repeat it now because we are now in a period, after the last conference, when there is a kind of natural lag, and people have to be reminded frequently of the plans made for Pacific Affairs, otherwise they tend to lose interest, or to become absorbed in other interests. I hope you will not mind threfore if I conclude by begging you once more to start sending me the articles which you mentioned while I was still in London.

This is the third letter I have written since getting back here; I hope the others have duly reached you.

With cordial personal regards,

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

May I add something to that?

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question pending here. There is nothing to be added. You have read the whole letter. Proceed with your questions, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you recommend during the Hitler-Stalin pact that every issue of Pacific Affairs contain some reminder

of the fact that the Soviet Union was part of the Far East and the Pacific region?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very probably. I presume so from what you have just read. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. At the top is "ECC" and "WLH." The document is dated March 26, 1941, 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. It is addressed to Miss Harriet L. Moore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City, with typed signature of Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you can have recall having sent that letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall having sent this letter, but quite obviously I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read that letter, Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Chairman, may it go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. The letter which the witness identified. Very well.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 498" and is read in full below.)

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR HARRIET: Thanks very much for your note of March 25. There is no terrible hurry about the review of the Taracouzio's book; but if you can get it to us within the first week of April, we can include it in our June issue. Even though it may have little direct bearing on the Far East, it might make a useful book on which to hang a mention of the place of the Far East in Soviet foreign policy as a whole. I should like to have in every issue of Pacific Affairs at least some reminder of the fact that Soviet Russia is part of the Far East and the Pacific region.

Thanks very much for the address of the book shop. I am writing to them for a catalog, if they have one.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. What is your question?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you know that Harriet L. Moore before this committee refused to state whether or not she was a member of the Communist Party on the ground that her answer might incriminate her?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I remember that, and I remember stating my shock and surprise and dismay.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an answer to the question, about your shock and surprise and dismay. The question is, do you remember.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I stated that I remembered. I began by stating that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that the American Russian Institute was a subsidiary of Voks?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read that in any memorandum of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I recall; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever take up with the Presidium of the U. S. S. R. the question of what mistakes you and Mr. Carter had made between 1934 and 1936 in the management of IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably I did. I have no recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to this letter, what was the book shop that Miss Moore was talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea. It could have been any sort of bookshop.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 10, 1936, addressed to Mr. V. E. Motylev, Moscow, and it has the typed signature, Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this letter is not addressed to or sent by Mr. Lattimore, and yet Mr. Lattimore is discussed in it. Would you care to see the letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. ARNOLD. Do you have copies?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we have copies.

Mr. Lattimore, will you read the next to the last paragraph on the first page beginning with the word "second"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Second, if it meets with your approval, I suggest that during the first 2 or 3 days of our visit, Miss Moore, Lattimore, and I review jointly with you and the Praesidium the relation between the U. S. S. R. National Council on the one hand and the International Secretariat and the other National Councils on the other, with a view to discovering wherein we have made mistakes or failed to carry out the plans which we formulated in December 1934.

This refers to plans of which I have no knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask for further identification. Mr. Mandel——

Mr. MORRIS. Has identified it as a copy of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel is here, sir. He can speak for what he identified it as.

Mr. MORRIS. What is this document.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter, a carbon of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. It may be received in evidence.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 499" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 499

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK, *February 10, 1936.*

Mr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: This is to confirm our interchange of cables, as follows:

"LATTIMORE AND I PROPOSE VISIT MOSCOW MARCH TWENTY-NINE TO APRIL SEVENTEEN. PEASE CABLE WHETHER CONVENIENT FOR YOU.

"CARTER."

"WILL BE GLAD SEE YOU LATTIMORE SUGGESTED TIME.

"MOTYLEV."

It was delightful to discover that the dates which I proposed would be convenient for you. As you know, Lattimore for a long time has been anxious to meet you, to visit Moscow and to advance his knowledge of the affairs and ideas of the Soviet Union. After the Yosemite Conference he hopes to learn the Russian language with a view to a more extended visit to the U. S. S. R. in 1937. But as a preliminary to all that, the visit which I have proposed in my cable, will, I am sure, greatly facilitate all his future studies of Soviet affairs. As you know, Mongolia is one of his areas of concentration but his interests are wide.

In addition to Lattimore's visit, I myself want to carry out my promise to you on the night of December 30, 1934, that I would return to Moscow within two years. I have arranged for Miss Harriet Moore to accompany me because of her knowledge of Russian, because of her wide knowledge of the work of the IPR, and because of my desire that she renew her contacts with those in Moscow who are sources of authentic information regarding Buriat Mongolia. I hope that at the time of our visit you can get the necessary permission for her to visit Buriat Mongolia some time after the Yosemite Conference, preferably at the beginning of 1937. The objects of my visit to Moscow, among others, are as follows:

First, to renew my personal acquaintance with you and the Prassidium and the other members of the U. S. S. R. National Council of the IPR. Lattimore and Miss Moore will similarly want to make the acquaintance of as many of the Council as possible.

Second, if it meets with your approval, I suggest that during the first two or three days of our visit, Miss Moore, Lattimore, and I review jointly with you and the Prassidium the relation between the U. S. S. R. National Council on the one hand and the International Secretariat and the other National Councils on the other, with a view to discovering wherein we have made mistakes or failed to carry out the plans which we formulated in December 1934.

Third, I wish to explore with you the steps that should be taken to ensure that a Soviet group of at least eight should attend the Yosemite Conference. We hope, of course, that both you and Voitinsky will attend, and want to discuss with you ways and means of ensuring that at least six more representatives of the U. S. S. R. Council will be present, as this will permit of there being two Soviet members at each of the four simultaneous round tables. The American Council desires that I raise with you the question of arranging for the Soviet IPR representatives to meet influential groups of American citizens in New York, Washington, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco.

Fourth, we will hope to find your data paper preparation well advanced and we will want to have your criticisms of the preliminary round-table discussion outlines which I sent you in printed forms on November 15th and which were subsequently reprinted in December IPR NOTES.

Fifth, with reference to publications, there are several points, (a) what is the status of the symposium of articles on important questions pertaining to the Pacific Ocean and the Far East, which the U. S. S. R. Council was planning to publish, in English, and which you discussed with us at the time of our visit to Moscow in December 1934? (b) Has the Survey of Soviet Institutions studying the Far East been completed? (c) Is there any better method for purchasing Soviet books and subscribing to Soviet periodicals in the United States than through Bookaiga and other regular bookstores in this country? (d) what policy can we mutually adopt that will result in fuller Soviet participation in *Pacific Affairs?*

Sixth, would it be possible for the U. S. S. R. National Council to appoint a Soviet citizen to be a member of the Secretary General's staff, if not for a year, at least for a month before and a month after the Yosemite Conference?

Seventh, in addition to discussing general questions, Mr. Lattimore will, of course, wish to meet some of the leading scientific workers who are studying Mongolia.

Eighth, the American Council has asked me to discuss with you whether the present book exchange arrangement between New York and Moscow is satisfactory to the U. S. S. R. Council. The American Council would like to have, if possible, more material on the internal development of the U. S. S. R.

Ninth, both from the point of view of the American and all the other Councils, we wish to discuss in detail the bibliographical exchange, several aspects of which were discussed so helpfully by Mr. Harondar and Mr. Fisher last summer.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I do not know how long you want to run. What is your pleasure, Mr. Morris? Mr. Sourwine wants 5 minutes before we conclude. I thought we would not run this afternoon, if that is satisfactory to the members of the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. That is satisfactory to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine, you may have your 5 minutes now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just two loose ends I want to clean up.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the Communist Party of China backed by Russia in 1940, do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your opinion that it was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is my opinion that it was; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has the Communist Party of China been consistently backed by Russia ever since 1940?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your opinion that it was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is not my personal knowledge. It is my opinion; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever held a contrary opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Whether I ever held a contrary opinion?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever express a contrary opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have expressed a contrary opinion, not holding one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is impossible to answer that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that it is possible that you would have expressed an opinion you didn't hold?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Your question was, "Would you have expressed a contrary opinion, not holding one?"

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have expressed an opinion that you didn't hold?

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you understand what I meant, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. How can you express an opinion you don't hold?

Mr. SOURWINE. You are quibbling. You understood what I meant, didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me restate it, then. Is it true that you have stated here that so far as you can recall it has been your opinion since 1940 that the Communist Party of China has since 1940 been backed by Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is my opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since that has been your opinion, do you think you would have ever expressed a contrary opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I would have expressed a contrary opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then I am asking you, Did you ever express a contrary opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. That is clear. Let's proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. The other loose end I want to clean up, Mr. Chairman, is the matter of the lawsuit which Mr. Hiss brought and the invi-

tation by the witness to Mr. Hiss to visit his, the witness', home. Do you know, Mr. Lattimore, in general what the charges were that were brought against Mr. Hiss by Whittaker Chambers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; I don't want you to repeat them. I want to know if you know in general what they were.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can tell you what I think in general they were. I am not sure whether my knowledge is——

The CHAIRMAN. The question——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have an accurate knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you aware at the time of the Hiss-Chambers confrontation that anything of that nature had been going on or had gone on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Anything of which nature?

Mr. SOURWINE. The nature of the confrontation of Hiss and Chambers. Do you know what I am referring to when I speak of that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that in a very dramatic scene Mr. Hiss and Mr. Chambers were brought together by the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives to try to settle the question of identities?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I remember reading something about that; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did read the newspapers about that time, didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were aware of that at or about the time it happened?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I must have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time that you invited Mr. Hiss to stay at your home with you, were you aware that that confrontation had taken place and that he had been identified by Mr. Chambers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no present recollection of what stage this thing had reached at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it would have made any difference in your invitation to Hiss to visit your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think it would have made any difference. My invitation to Mr. Hiss was based simply, as I said, on the general attitude that it is the decent thing, when a man is subjected to very serious charges, to show that you do not necessarily believe that accusation is equivalent to guilt.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you had intended to express some question as to whether your invitation took place after the conclusion of the Chambers accusation of Hiss. Is there any doubt in your mind about that now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Would you repeat that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Is there any doubt in your mind about whether your invitation to Mr. Hiss followed his accusation by Mr. Chambers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have already said, Mr. Sourwine, that I don't remember the stage reached by these charges at the time I issued that invitation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You issued your invitation after Mr. Hiss had filed his libel action against Mr. Chambers, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That libel action was filed in September, September 27, to be precise, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in Baltimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your statement.

Senator O'CONOR. What year?

Mr. SOURWINE. 1948.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your date. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have no evidence on this, but I am reliably informed that the motion for new trial filed by Mr. Hiss recites that date as the date of filing. It can be easily established from the court records.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is any question about it. I do not want any incorrect date to go in here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was explaining the basis for my question to the witness.

Senator FERGUSON. With that explanation, Mr. Chairman, may it remain in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may remain in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. And if the witness wishes to dispute it, he may do so later.

Mr. SOURWINE. The confrontation of Mr. Hiss by Mr. Chambers was on August 17, 1948, which was 5 or 6 weeks prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Did you know that to be true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have here the official record of the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings, if it is desired to establish that date.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about it. If any question is raised we can establish it by the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. The hearings before the House Un-American Activities Committee ran from July 31 through September 9, in this volume, and the testimony does show that the confrontation was on August 17, 1948.

Those were the two loose ends I wanted to cover in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. I have just one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, on page 4 of the minutes of the April 8, 1936, meeting, the second paragraph reads:

> Motylev said it was a dangerous editorial mistake to publish the Chamberlin review.

Who was Chamberlin? Was he not an anti-Communist writer, or have you so identified him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right; yes.

Senator SMITH. And Motylev was the Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. He was protesting against publication of the Chamberlin review?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. In the next paragraph it is stated, not reading the whole paragraph—

> but the review must be done with due respect to a person in Stalin's position. Motylev asked why the book was given to Chamberlin who was known to be so anti-Soviet.

Then the next paragraph reads:

O. L. said that he had not realized Chamberlin's position, but as soon as he learned of the Soviet opinion about Chamberlin, he canceled an article on the Soviet press which he had asked from Chamberlin.

This is the same Chamberlin, the anti-Communist writer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right; yes.

Senator SMITH. And upon the protest of Motylev you canceled this article by Chamberlin?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I comment on that?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. These meetings with Motylev began in an extremely unfriendly atmosphere. The Russians had published in their own journals some reviews of my work on Mongolia in which they used extremely unpleasant personal epithets about me. This whole situation was the very reverse of the Russians trying to infiltrate the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Institute of Pacific Relations as an international body was trying to get the Russians in. We were leaning over backward to show that we would entertain any reasonable presentation of their point of view, any reasonable criticism of other people's point of view, and we never succeeded. We got, I think, maybe one or two articles from them, and then all these other articles referred to that I was trying to get from them, and so on. I was being as diplomatic, as polite as I could, but it just didn't work. They just wouldn't participate; they wouldn't cooperate, and they finally just dropped out of the Institute.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is sufficient explanation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In regard to Mr. Chamberlin's article I was forced to concede that Mr. Chamberlin had made personal remarks about the ruler and I was forced to concede that the Soviet representatives had a right to protest about that, just as the British would have had a right to protest if an article about British policy had contained personal remarks about the King.

The CHAIRMAN. And the force was the objection on the part of the Soviets; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The force was the objection on the part of the Soviets, which would have been no different in that respect from the objection of any national council on a similar point.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, in view of the fact that we are not going to have a session this afternoon, I have three questions on this general subject. May I ask them now?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever make a Communist article the core around which to build a whole issue of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I recall. I would be interested to see what you are referring to there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever make a straight Marxist article the core around which to build a whole issue of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever consciously take a Communist or straight Marxist article and edit it in such a way as to conceal its nature and make it palatable to Pacific Affairs readers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 16, 1940, addressed to Mr. Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer that, Mr. Lattimore, and ask you if you recall having received that letter.

(Mr. Lattimore examining document.)

Mr. MORRIS. What is your answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember this now.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is a blank here that isn't in the photostat. I had better read from the photostat.

DEAR OWEN: You may recall that in the winter I asked whether you would be interested in an article on the Chinese market by a young German whom I had met, William Brandt. He failed to meet your deadline of the end of March but has now turned over to me a manuscript which is going to you under separate cover. It may be delayed a day or two because I have not yet finished going through it carefully. The first impression of the manuscript is a most alarming one for it is 61 pages long. The second impression, however, at least as far as the first 30 pages which I have carefully read are concerned, is that it wanders off into a good many theoretical considerations supplementary to but not essential to the main thesis. In my opinion it can, therefore, be very considerably reduced but this is going to be a very tough job of editing. I also have the impression that, while the analysis is a straight Marxist one and from that point of view should not be altered, there are a great many of those overused Communist words and phrases which will make most of your readers vomit and which can very easily be paraphrased to the great benefit of the article.

I am under the impression that this is a really very brilliant piece of work but at the same time it is somewhat uneven in quality. The main thing that Brandt is trying to say is a very important point which should be given serious consideration and should therefore not be confused by an overdifficult article or by too many excursions into peripheral questions.

At this point I don't think it is necessary for me to give any more of my own opinion. I hope that you will be able to let me know what you think of it and whether or not you see any possibility of its being made into a Pacific Affairs article. You would, I think, be the best possible editor of it but if you don't want to undertake the job it might be interesting to ask Rosinger to take a crack at it. On the other hand, you may feel (*a*) that the article cannot be sufficiently condensed and/or (*b*) that on the whole it is somewhat too theoretical for your purposes. I am assuming, of course, that you are not going to be disturbed by the ridicule with which some of the pillars, not only of our society but of the IPR, like Sir Arthur Salter, are treated. (Footnote: why in Heaven's name has Sir Arthur been made Parliamentary Under Secretary of the Ministry of Health in the new British Cabinet?)

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that letter be received?

The CHAIRMAN. It is received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 500" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 6, 1940, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you recall having sent that letter to Mr. Field.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, please, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR FRED: Your letter of June 5 came in just when I was going to write you a note about the Brandt article. By the way, the name is on the article; but at the end of the paper, which was such a long way off that I had not yet got within sight of it.

I wanted to let you know that I am working on the paper. The first problem has been to get an original manuscript of 60 pages down to manageable proportion for Pacific Affairs. I hope you have warned the author of my Terrible Turk methods of editing, so that the shock won't be so great when he sees my draft edited version. This, of course, he will in turn be perfectly free to criticize.

The ideas he works in are absorbingly interesting, to me at least. I may have misinterpreted some of them in my attempt to abbreviate, but I am quite sure that I have learned a lot. It has been slow work. In fact, if the editing I have done were reduced to terms of 8-hour working days, it would already amount to several days, and I am not through yet.

Enclosed are a couple of enlargements that may interest you. I like the one at the water side of a little lake-island port in Sweden for its lighting effects, though the composition is disappointingly postcardy.

Yours,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been identified.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I make a reference to the article in question.

Mr. MORRIS. We have one more letter on it, Mr. Lattimore. We will introduce that first.

The CHAIRMAN. Insert it in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 501" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostate of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 11, 1940, addressed to Mr. F. V. Field, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. Addressed from 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you can recall having sent that letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall now that I see the letter; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 502" and is read in full below.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that into the record, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is June 11, 1940:

DEAR FRED: Herewith I am sending back to you the original manuscript of the Brandt article, together with the original copy of my edited version, and an extra carbon copy for you and Carter to consult at your leisure while Mr. Brandt compares his original with my original.

I do hope that Mr. Brandt will go easy on me for not going easy on him. I hated to shorten the article at all, but the present length is all that we could manage. I particularly hated to cut out things like his amusing citation from Mark Twain.

This article is a good stout core around which to build the whole of the September issue of Pacific Affairs. It does not merely juxtapose, but really integrates, questions affecting Europe, America, and Asia. I don't know when I have so much enjoyed studying and editing an article for Pacific Affairs.

Yours.

This article was one that I always considered one of the most interesting I received for Pacific Affairs. It was written in 1940 while the war with Asia was going on, and I must say that I didn't take seriously

Field's characterization of it as Marxist, because to my untutored mind of those days it was a most un-Marxist article. It was an article which described the possibilities of a peaceful evolutionary change in the status of colonial countries from Asia after the war, with development to be done by capitalistic investment and a combination of political independence and economic support. It was a sort of forerunner of what we now call point 4 thinking.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, what question were you answering by the last remark? What question were you answering?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was making a comment on the correspondence about an article which interested me at the time and which I still think is an interesting article to read.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you read it last?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When did I read what last?

Senator FERGUSON. The article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The article? It is an article——

The CHAIRMAN. When did you read it last?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see. Within the last year or two, I am sure.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure. Oh, yes, I know. I read it at the time of the Tydings hearings when I was reviewing the editorial record of Pacific Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked about it at the Tydings hearings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked about these letters and these minutes of meetings at the Tydings hearings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that when you took this Marxist article as described by Field——

Mr. LATTIMORE. As described by Field, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I said, "As described by Field." He made quite a description of it, didn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I——

Senator FERGUSON. And even said that your readers would vomit?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't agree.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't care whether you agreed. He said that, didn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He said it, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time, you said in an answer this morning, Russia was out of the Pacific Affairs.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1940, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. When did they get out?

The CHAIRMAN. If at all.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think they just sort of tapered off. My recollection is not clear on that. I don't think there was any formal resignation. I think they just stopped subscribing or taking part.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, isn't it true that at the meeting in Moscow in 1936 the party line was established by the Pacific Affairs and the Institute and that after that day they remained in and finally did taper off because the party line was being carried on and it could be carried on much better if they didn't appear in the organization? Isn't that a fair conclusion from these documents here today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, that is a totally unwarrantable conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. I don't see, Mr. Lattimore, how you can draw any other conclusion than that conclusion from these documents and these letters and these articles.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I draw a totally different conclusion and so did readers of the Pacific Affairs through the years.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not make any difference what somebody else did.

Senator O'CONOR. May I ask a question there, Mr. Lattimore. At the time you received this from Mr. Field did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. I thought you told us yesterday that you knew that in 1939.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I said that reading now a letter that Field had written in 1939 I would consider that my memory of him as a close fellow traveler had been wrong by 2 years. Reflecting on that overnight, I came to the conclusion that perhaps I had committed the same error that so many other people commit, namely, thinking back to the 1930's with the knowledge and the point of view that we have in the 1950's. I do not believe that, speaking as of 1952, with all the intervening years, I would today be entitled to say that in 1939 I was sophisticated enough to classify people in that manner.

Senator O'CONOR. But the fact is, is it not, Mr. Lattimore, that yesterday you did give us to understand that you believed that Field in 1939 was known to you to be a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I don't think the record will show that.

Senator O'CONOR. You now say that you have always believed that he was a Communist only as of 1941 or thereabouts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection has always been that I began to think of him as a close fellow traveler of the Russians in the—I think it was the winter of 1940–41 when the American peace mobilization was on, and even then I thought of him as a fellow traveler of Russia and a justifier of Russian policy rather than a Communist.

Senator O'CONOR. Even though he described the analysis as a straight Marxist one and including Communist words? Did that not leave an impression on you that the article was definitely following the party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not as of that time, Senator. America at that time was——

The CHAIRMAN. "Not as of that time" is your answer. The rest will go out. Any further question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I have a question.

Mr. Lattimore, would you say that any reasonable and prudent editor could come to any other conclusion after reading this May 16, 1940, letter to you, than that Mr. Field was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I think that many reasonable and prudent editors as of that date would have acted the same way I did, because there was the article——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and here were his words:

> I also have the impression that, while the analysis is a straight Marxist one and from that point of view should not be altered, there are a great many of those overused Communist words and phrases which will make most of your readers vomit and which can easily be paraphrased to the great benefit of the article.

In other words, "Let's go back," he says, "to the Communist propaganda line and conceal this thing, but let's make it palatable for the people who are reading it and carry out the Marxist Communist line." Wouldn't any reasonable editor draw that conclusion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I do not agree with you.

Senator FERGUSON. I can't agree with your answer, either.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like to give you my reasons for not agreeing.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to give the reasons. You do not agree with him, and that settles it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like the record to show that I have tried to give my reason.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, one word. In that letter of May 16, Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Field suggested that you also pass it on to Mr. Rosinger. Was that Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger that he was referring to or did you know who he was referring to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, yes; I must have known. 1940. I think Rosinger was working for—I don't know whether he was working for the IPR then or was working for the Foreign Policy Association.

Senator SMITH. You know he has been identified, has he not, by some witnesses as a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that now; yes.

Senator SMITH. You did not know that in 1940?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no reason whatever to suppose that.

Mr. MORRIS. You know, Mr. Lattimore, when we had Mr. Rosinger in here to testify, he declined to answer whether or not he was a Communist on the grounds that the answer would incriminate him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that, and I was profoundly shocked to hear it.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, in editing the article did you omit the obvious Communist words and phrases to which Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field referred?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Thank you for asking that question, Senator. I eliminated what I considered to be a lot of European economic jargon used by a man who did not write English well. I did not consider myself an expert on Marxism, and perhaps for that very reason when I saw an article that did not have all the simple stereotyped, violent revolution, class warfare, and all the rest of it that I as a nonexpert on Marxism would have expected at that time, I went on my own judgment of the manuscript and not on Mr. Field's characterization of it.

Senator O'CONOR. The reason for asking that was that you previously stated you were not conversant with the Communist line or Communist readings and writings, and I wondered why, if you were not so well versed, you didn't ask Mr. Field to what he referred when he said that obviously there were Communist phrases and words.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All I can answer, Senator, is that in the atmosphere of that type, in discussions of international relations, economic and political problems, and so on, that just wasn't customary in the circles in which I moved.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator SMITH. Did you publish the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I published the article; yes.

Senator SMITH. In Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I thought it was a very good article.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have forgotten the name of it.

Mr. MORRIS. When did it appear?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably September. I think it is mentioned in this letter. We could look it up.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there two articles by Mr. Brandt in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; there was another one by him, too.

Senator O'CONOR. Is the original manuscript in existence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator O'CONOR. There would be no way to show just what was submitted. If it is in existence, this committee must have it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I follow a short line of inquiry here, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Lattimore——

The CHAIRMAN. Any levity in the rear of the room or any demonstration will have to be dealt with, because we are crowded in here. I hope people will observe the decorum and not engage in that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have here two references to articles by William Brandt, in Pacific Affairs, 1940, entitled, the first one, "The United States, China, and the World Market," and the other one is another reference.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it appeared in 1941, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought there were two articles by him. Let me look at this and see if it is the same.

Mr. MORRIS. There is an article in 1941 by Mr. Brandt.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh. Maybe that is the one. The first one is United States, China, and the World Market, and that is September 1940, and the second one is Economic and Living Standards, American and Asiatic, June 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Which is the article that we have been discussing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It must be the 1940 one.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the name of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The name of it is the United States, China, and the World Market. Some of the characterizations of Mr. Brandt's writing that I have made here just from recollection probably spread over both articles rather than being confined to one of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. There is no question. Propound a question, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, in 1940 was Frederick V. Field a man whom you respected?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1940, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a man whose intellect and intellectual attainments you respected?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a man whose intellectual attainments I respected primarily as an economic expert on the Pacific area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a friend and coworker of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was—I think "coworker" would not be quite accurate, since he was primarily in the American Council and I was under the Pacific Council.

Mr. SOURWINE. He occasionally suggested things to you and sent you articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He occasionally suggested things to me or commented on things, or I sent him things for comment, as I did to many others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at that time have any reason to fear that he would deliberately attempt to mislead you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. When Mr. Field sent you an article and characterized it as a straight Marxist article, did you so little regard him that you failed to consider that as a flag on the article and that you failed to have any check made as to whether it was a Marxist article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I simply read the article, Mr. Sourwine, and my opinion of the article differed from Field's.

Mr. SOURWINE. You felt, did you, that you were a sufficient judge of what was a Marxist article that, in spite of Mr. Field's warning, you could go ahead and safely print the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't regard myself as an authority on Marxism, and as of 1940 I regarded Field as something of an authority on both Russia in the Pacific and China, but I am sure I didn't regard him as a Marxist authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider that he was giving you a warning when he sent you the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not a warning. I considered that he was stating his opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he was stating it as his opinion, did you feel that he did actually have the opinion that this was a straight Marxist article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, of course that was his opinion. I still felt that I was quite competent to stack up my opinion against his when I read the article.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Field was giving you his honest opinion that this was a straight Marxist article, did you feel he was warning you against using it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I felt he was submitting it to me for my consideration.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, he was urging that you do use it, wasn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether—no, I think he was stating that it was a very interesting article.

Mr. SOURWINE. He wanted you to edit it, didn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I think on the whole he was suggesting that it not be used. I am not sure. Let's have a look.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what purpose did he send you this article?

The CHAIRMAN. He wanted you to edit it, didn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He thought it was an article that would interest me.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what purpose did he send it to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. His first letter says that he had previously asked me if I would be interested in an article on the Chinese market. The Chinese market is something that has always been of interest in America. He says he always has "the impression that, while the analysis is a straight Marxist one and from that point of view should not be altered, he is not suggesting disguise.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you forgotten why you are reading that letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Why I am reading it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Why am I reading it?

Mr. SOURWINE. You are reading it, I think, to help answer my question as to why Mr. Field sent you this article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, he is saying it is really a very brilliant piece of work but at the same time somewhat uneven in quality.

The main thing that Brandt is trying to say is a very important point which should be given serious consideration and should therefore not be confussed by an overdifficult or by too many excursions into peripheral questions.

The CHAIRMAN. He was talking to you about publishing the article; was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, he was.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he wrote you that letter to try to get you not to use the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He sent it to me for my interest and consideration. Certainly I don't consider it a strong recommendation. I don't think he is writing me a letter saying this is a "must" article, and you have to get it into Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know when he sent you that letter that he wanted you to use the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think he sent it to me, as many articles were sent to me, for consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that he wanted you to use that article in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I can construct this letter as pressure on his part to get me to publish it.

The CHAIRMAN. You did publish the article; didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I published the article and I think the correspondence shows that I was rather more enthusiastic about it than Field was.

The CHAIRMAN. You had the letters and correspondence from Mr. Field.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Drawing your attention to it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I recall to you, Mr. Chairman, that I also published this article by Asiaticus.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you about that. That will be stricken. We are dealing with the article sent to you by Mr. Field in which he draws your attention——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully say that I think my comment is pertinent.

The CHAIRMAN. Your comment is not pertinent and will not be recorded.

Mr. SOURWINE. I can conclude in a few more questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you have stated, have you not, that you did not understand this letter from Mr. Field as a warning against publishing the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't regard it as a warning against publishing it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you regard it as an indication that Mr. Field hoped, at least, that you would publish this article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I regarded it as an indication that Mr. Field had submitted what he thought was a good article, or an article that would interest me.

The CHAIRMAN. For publication.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would interest me for consideration for publication.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he wanted you to edit it, didn't he? If you weren't interested he wanted you to send it to somebody else to be edited.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He thought it would have to be edited for two reasons——

Mr. SOURWINE. He wanted you to edit it, didn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. For excessive length and for vocabulary.

Mr. SOURWINE. The matter of excessive length had to do with the requirements of Pacific Affairs, didn't it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It had to do with the requirements of editing, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was looking forward to having that article published in Pacific Affairs, wasn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was stating some of the problems that would have to be considered in taking it up for decision whether to publish it in Pacific Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, when Mr. Field sent you an article in this way, stating it was his opinion that it was a straight Marxist article, and when you felt it was honestly his opinion that it was a straight Marxist article and he was suggesting or urging or hoping that you would print it in Pacific Affairs, didn't that indicate anything to you about Mr. Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not as of 1940, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to testify, then, that Mr. Field's language in this letter was not a warning flag to you, either with regard to the article or with regard to Mr. Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As of 1940 it was an indication to me that Mr. Field thought it was straight Marxist thinking. As my practice has always been for editing or for any other purpose, I read the material to form my own judgment on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will recess.

Senator SMITH. Dr. Lattimore, in the first paragraph of the letter of May 16, 1940, Mr. Field did state the analysis is a straight Marxist one.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was his opinion, yes.

Senator SMITH. That is what he said to you in the letter, anyway.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. You read this letter at the time you got it, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Then in the second sentence, the last paragraph, he says, "I hope that you will be able to let me know what you think of it and whether or not you see any possibility of its being made into a Pacific Affairs article."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. After you got that letter you did see the possibility of its being made into an article and proceeded to do so and publish it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. That was your decision, upon your judgment and discretion that it should be published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Even after Mr. Field had suggested that it was a straight Marxist line, I believe he said.

All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question.

Mr. Lattimore, in the second sentence in the May 16 letter Field says to you, "He failed to meet your deadline of the end of March—" Was that the deadline for the June issue?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions but I do not think we should continue today.

The CHAIRMAN. Monday afternoon at 2 o'clock. We have a Judiciary Committee meeting regularly on Monday at 10:30, and there are some matters that can not very well be passed over. We will reconvene Monday afternoon at 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m., Monday, March 3, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, MARCH 3, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2:15 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Eastland, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Senators McCarthy and Kem.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, I request the introduction into evidence of the article about which there was so much testimony yesterday, United States, China and the World Market, by William Brandt, in the September 1940 issue of Pacific Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. You are making that as a request. As soon as I have the opportunity to run through it, I will make a ruling on it.

Mr. ARNOLD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write the book Ordeal by Slander?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Several portions of that purport to be writing of your wife, Mrs. Owen Lattimore, or Eleanor Lattimore, is that so? Several parts of this purport to be written by Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One chapter, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read what she wrote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Before it was published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And everything, to your knowledge, as far as you know, stated by Mrs. Lattimore you know to be true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as I can say so, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, on page 35 of the book, Mr. Lattimore, Mrs. Lattimore says, speaking of you, "He didn't know any Russians in this country or any Communists."

That is the statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the statement, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. May I see that book that you are referring to?

Mr. ARNOLD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you testify before this committee in executive session that you met Mr. Constantine Oumansky in early July 1941, at lunch with Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you subsequently change that testimony to read June or early July 1941?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that your meeting with Mr. Oumansky was after the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe I did. I don't remember. May I ask, by the way, that I be furnished with a full copy of the transcript of my hearing in executive session?

It is very difficult for me, after 8 months, especially since I have, in reading the transcript of the other hearing, naturally got my memory all mixed up with recollections of things years ago, things recently stated about things years ago, and so forth. So that my memory is——

The CHAIRMAN. You are asking for a copy of the transcript of the executive session?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, have the executive sessions been made a part of this record?

Mr. ARNOLD. There was a request, but it has not been acted on yet.

Mr. MORRIS. The committee has not acted on that.

The CHAIRMAN. There are certain matters that have been asked to go into the record. One has just been asked for by the counsel here, entitled "The United States, China, and the World Market." Is that the one?

Mr. ARNOLD. That is the one.

The CHAIRMAN. That and two other exhibits that have been submitted to the Chairman for ruling will be admitted, but they will be admitted only for the appendix of the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I might ask, is that what counsel asked for?

Mr. ARNOLD. No, I asked for the executive sessions to be made part——

Senator FERGUSON. No, the ruling on this particular article is sufficient if it is put in the appendix?

Mr. ARNOLD. That is all right.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be the order.

(For The United States, China, and the World Market, see exhibit 470 in appendix I of pt. 9, p. 3680. For the two other exhibits referred to see exhibits 595 and 596, pp. 3608 and 3610.)

Senator FERGUSON. But the next question is that you asked to see the whole executive session testimony.

Mr. ARNOLD. I asked that it be put in the record, and the committee has not yet moved.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter that I will take up with the committee just as soon as the hearing is over, that is, as soon as today's session is over.

Mr. ARNOLD. But the present request is that it be shown here.

The CHAIRMAN. He has always been shown.

Senator FERGUSON. I move that he be given the record for this particular page that he is talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. That is always done. That will be done.

Senator FERGUSON. It has been done in the past, yes.

Senator SMITH. Has that not been the practice?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, all along.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to have for my own reference a full transcript of this testimony taken 8 months ago, which, as I say, I have now a necessarily unclear memory.

The CHAIRMAN. That makes the matter public record in place of an executive record, and that is a matter for the committee to determine.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, this would not make it a public record, to allow him personally to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Every time he is questioned about it, he will see it.

Mr. ARNOLD. That is right. But he would like to read the whole thing.

Mr. MORRIS. May I say this, Mr. Arnold, that Mr. Lattimore has had access to that all along. That was the clear understanding that existed, and he did come in at one time and make corrections and studied it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is not my recollection, Mr. Morris. My recollection was that I was told I could come in immediately after the executive session and check the transcript to see if I thought there was anything inaccurate in it. But I asked at that time if I could have a copy, and I was told no.

My understanding was that I was permitted to see it that once and that once only.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, we said that you could not have a copy but that you had free access to it at all times.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall your saying that, Mr. Morris. My distinct impression was that I was allowed to see it only once.

The CHAIRMAN. You did see it and correct it? Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. But that was 8 months ago, and especially, as I say, with all of the subsequent hearings and transcripts that I have read, my memory of what I was then asked about things that happened years ago, and what other people have since said about things that happened years ago, necessarily creates many confusions in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will rule on it later on.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I want to say, about that executive session, I wish to testify as freely and unequivocally as possible. But I can only testify to the best of my recollection.

I asked at that time if I might be shown documents about which I was being questioned, but the present method of questioning gives me somewhat the feeling of a blind man running a gauntlet.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. The Chair will rule as to whether or not you may have the record at a later hour.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. The question, Mr. Lattimore, was: Did you testify that your meeting with Mr. Oumansky was after the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union? That is at the top of that page. That is page 37.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I stated that it was just before I went out to China, so it must have been June or early July of 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Will you read the rest of that testimony on that page?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris then asked:

That was, therefore, after the Hitler invasion of the Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you try to recall your conversation with Mr. Oumansky on that third occasion, with a view toward determining the political atmosphere that prevailed at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall that Mr. Oumansky behaved more or less like the other Ambassadors that I met at that time, just before I went to Chungking, of countries allied or associated in some manner with China, that is, behaved like a diplomat.

Mr. MORRIS. He behaved like a diplomat?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I am asking again, Mr. Lattimore, if you will recall as much as you possibly can about that particular meeting, and describe the meeting in the fullest detail to the committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was a dinner which began with the fact that I was going out to China. Mr. Oumansky said that he was very glad that a man well acquainted with China was going out in the capacity as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Then he said various things about the continuation of Chinese resistance, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe his attitude as combative at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I have just described it as diplomatic.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say that the atmosphere prevailing at the dinner was one which would induce you to be at your ease?

Mr. FORTAS. If you can answer that question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see. I should say that the atmosphere was one in which I was extremely on my guard. I was going out to a new assignment with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There had been a good deal of publicity about it. Everybody that I met in Washington was trying to find out what my assignment was. My position was that I wouldn't know my assignment until the generalissimo told me what it was, and it was that kind of a situation.

Mr. MORRIS. Again, what was the date of your assignment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Late June or early July 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your distinct recollection that you did discuss your assignment with Mr. Oumansky at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I discussed the fact that I was going out to China, but not my assignment because my attitude at the time with everybody whom I spoke was that my appointment had just been made, and the details of my assignment I would know when the generalissimo told me.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Lattimore, I will ask you some questions on the basis of that transcript.

Did you testify that your meeting with Mr. Oumansky was after the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I believe I did. I couldn't guarantee that, just to the best of my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that during this conversation Mr. Oumansky behaved like a diplomat?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that you discussed on that occasion with Mr. Oumansky your assignment with Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I discussed the fact that I had been assigned; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that there had been a great deal of

publicity about your assignment to the generalissimo, and that everyone in Washington was trying to find out what your assignment was, and that you were therefore extremely on guard?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify in executive session before this committee that you discussed your assignment with Mr. Oumansky?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I discussed with Mr. Oumansky the fact that I had been assigned, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 20, 1941, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is exhibit No. 32, already introduced into our public record.

Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that and ask if you had received that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is did you receive the letter? Is that the question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume that I did. It was addressed to me in San Francisco. No; it was addressed to me in Baltimore. That is right. June 20.

Mr. MORRIS. Just a minute, and we will have copies of that.

Senator FERGUSON. What year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1941. That would be before the Hitler——

Mr. MORRIS. We will have copies ready in just a minute.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Wouldn't that be before the Hitler invasion?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that letter, Mr. Lattimore, for the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is dated in New York, June 20, 1941. [Reading:]

DEAR OWEN: If you have time while in San Francisco you and Bill Holland may want to arrange a private talk with Col. Philip R. Faymonville whose present address is Headquarters of the Fourth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the generalissimo at some future time in Chungking. If you wish me to, I will wire him for an appointment.

Sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 23, 1941, addressed to Dr. Philip C. Jessup, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this letter and ask you if you have ever seen that letter before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this letter has been identified by Mr. Mandel as a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and it is supplementary to the events related to the last letter. I would like to have it introduced into the public record at this time. It supplements the conversation in the letter identified previously by the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness said he never saw it. I am wondering just how you tie it in, how you connect it.

Mr. MORRIS. We have examined Mr. Carter on that letter, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Carter has testified in a public record.

Mr. MORRIS. About that letter, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this letter in the record now?

Mr. MORRIS. No; at that time it was not put into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What you mean is that Mr. Carter, as the secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, identified this letter as having been written by him and addressed to Mr. Jessup. Is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. But by a mistake, obviously, Mr. Chairman, it was not introduced into the public record at that time even though it was identified by Mr. Carter as having been written by him.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it may be inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder, Mr. Lattimore, if you would mind reading that letter for the committee, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. June 23, 1941, addressed to Dr. Philip C. Jessup, care of American Express, Santiago, Chile. [Reading:]

DEAR JESSUP: Immediately following your excellent suggestion regarding General Barrows, I wrote Wilbur and asked whether he would be willing to make a presentation of a series of IPR publications to the general for the ultimate purpose which you and I discussed.

Wilbur responded in the affirmative, and I sent him a handsome assortment. These reached Barrows on the morning of June 10. Just by a pure fluke, this was the day on which Wilbur and the Bay Region IPR gave a luncheon at the Palace Hotel at which Wilbur asked me to speak of some of the latest developments in the IPR. I sat between Wilbur and General Barrows.

This morning Wilbur sent me a letter from General Barrows, copy of which I enclose. So far, so good.

I ought to add that at the luncheon I was able to emphasize to General Barrows the role that W. I. Holland and Galen Fisher are playing in the total program of the IPR. The bay region group has a scheme for an emergency study of the Japanese in California and have made some progress in getting Barrows interested in seeking to secure part of the funds from the Carnegie Endowment.

The Canadian Institute—Northwest-American IPR 2-day meeting at Victoria was realistic and worth while. The discussions were at a very high level. After Victoria I met members of the institute in San Francisco, Stanford, Berkeley, and Los Angeles. Holland is a great asset on the Pacific coast, though we miss him sorely here. Sproul's executive assistant, James F. Lash, is gradually wiping out the difficult situation that existed under Farren Scott.

I wonder whether you happened to hear Churchill's speech yesterday. Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill managed quite a spectacular week end. It so happened that last week I had lunch with Oumansky in Washington on Wednesday. We talked for a couple of hours. I was fortunate in getting Lattimore over from Baltimore, as I thought it was pretty important for him to have a long talk with Oumansky, in view of his job and the evolving world situation. It was a most illuminating 2 hours.

Sincerely yours.

The CHAIRMAN. I will say right there that admission of this instrument is a matter of weight rather than admissibility. I do not think that this business can be held down excepting as it may be material to your other connecting facts. He is not bound by this letter. The letter was not addressed to him, nor was it written by him. But it is admitted. It is a question of the weight of it rather than the admissibility of it.

(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 503," and was read in full.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that this letter establishes the fact that my recollection was wrong in believing that I had that lunch with Mr. Carter and Oumansky in Washington after the Hitler invasion of Russia. It seems to have taken place before.

The CHAIRMAN. That helps to make it material, then. That is all right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you a calendar of June 1941. You will notice that the date of that last letter is June 23, 1941.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And in the last paragraph, the sentence reads, "It so happened that last week I had lunch with Oumansky in Washington on Wednesday."

That would place that lunch as June 18, would it not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, June 18.

Mr. MORRIS. Now in this letter of June 20, which is the previous exhibit, Mr. Carter writing to you says, in speaking of Colonel Faymonville:

> He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had lunched with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday. I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and to the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking. If you wish me to, I will wire him for an appointment.

So therefore, you say, Mr. Lattimore, that your testimony that this conversation took place after the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union was inaccurate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you also said, Mr. Lattimore, that there had been a great deal of publicity about your assignment to the generalissimo.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And that everybody in Washington was trying to find out what your assignment was and that you were, therefore, extremely on guard. I would like to introduce into the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, the New York Times of June 29, 1941.

On page 9 there is a news item, "Lattimore named adviser to Chiang." This appears on page 9 of the New York Times, Sunday, June 29, 1941. May that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may go into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 504" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 504

[Source: New York Times, Sunday, June 29, 1941]

LATTIMORE NAMED ADVISER TO CHIANG—APPOINTMENT OF WIDELY KNOWN WRITER ON CHINA EVOKES PRAISE IN CHUNGKING—HELD TOKEN OF ESTEEM—AUTHOR'S IMMEDIATE TASK WILL BE TO FACILITATE AID FROM UNITED STATES

[Special to the New York Times]

WASHINGTON, June 28.—Owen Lattimore, widely known American author of several books dealing with affairs of the Far East, has been appointed as a special political adviser to the Chinese Government, and will go to Chungking immediately. President Roosevelt recommended the appointment, and General Chiang Kai-shek, according to a cable from Chungking, today officially accepted the President's recommendation.

T. V. Soong, former Chinese Minister of Finance, who is now in Washington as head of the China Defense Commission, yesterday cabled to General Chiang that Mr. Lattimore's appointment "may be considered as a major token of increasing understanding between China and the United States." The appointment is for a period of 6 months, but will probably be extended. Cables received here today from Chungking said the selection was well received in China, particularly so as Mr. Lattimore speaks Chinese fluently.

Mr. Lattimore, who has lately been engaged in special research work at Johns Hopkins at Baltimore, was born in Washington, D. C., in 1900 and was educated in England and at Harvard. At the age of 20 he first went to China and engaged in business at Shanghai, going later to Tientsin, where he became a newspaperman. Since 1926 he has been engaged in travel and research, particularly in Manchuria and China's far northwest, having had connections successively with the Social Science Research Council, the Harvard-Yenching Institute, the J. S. Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

His better-known books include The Desert Road to Turkestan, High Tartary, The Mongols of Manchuria, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, and Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict.

Mr. Lattimore's immediate tasks in China have been described as facilitating United States aid to the Chungking Government and, indirectly, to help discourage Japan from her expansionist program in East Asia.

Mrs. Lattimore and their son, David, will remain in the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here a letter from W. C. Gilbert, Acting Director of the Library of Congress, addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, Senate Internal Security Committee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Referring to your request of October 2, 1951, a search of the New York Times index indicates that the first reference therein to the appointment of Owen Lattimore as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek appeared in the New York Times issue of June 29, 1941.

A search of our files revealed no earlier reference.

Sincerely yours,

W. C. GILBERT, *Acting Director.*

Mr. Lattimore, does not that indicate that your testimony that there had been a great deal of publicity about your assignment to the Generalissimo, and that everyone in Washington was trying to find out what your assignment was, was inaccurate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That shows that my recollection was inaccurate. I was referring to my recollection of the general period at which I was appointed, and to the fact that there was a great deal of interest. Actually, before the announcement was made public, a number of people knew about it, and I saw a number of people.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that not indicate, Mr. Lattimore, that 11 days before your appointment was announced, that you had discussed this appointment with Mr. Oumansky in Washington?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This indicates, Mr. Morris, that owing to the fact that up to then I had been editor of Pacific Affairs, one of the earliest people informed about the fact that I was getting this appointment was Mr. Carter, and that Mr. Carter took the initiative in arranging for me to meet Mr. Oumansky at lunch.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you realize, now, Mr. Lattimore, that that conversation took place at a time when Mr. Oumansky represented a Government which was at political war with the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is not the point that would stand out in my recollection, Mr. Morris. That Government at that time was strongly supporting Chiang Kai-shek's government in China with munitions and airplanes, and in that aspect was cooperating with the policy of the United States.

However, its actions may have been in conflict with the policy of the United States in other respects and in other parts of the world.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, was it the practice of the IPR to send advance copies of your articles in Pacific Affairs to Mr. Oumansky?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether it was or not. As has frequently been mentioned here, advance copies of Pacific Affairs articles were circulated to all kinds of people. That was usually done by the New York office, to whom I sent the material after editing, and I would not necessarily know what article went to which people.

I was always willing to have my own material circulated in advance and criticized.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 28, 1940, addressed to "Dear Oumansky, His Excellency, The Soviet Ambassador," with a typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that taken from the files of the institute?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive into the record this document, which is a copy of a letter sent by Mr. Carter to Mr. Oumansky?

We have been discussing Mr. Oumansky and Mr. Lattimore's relations with Mr. Oumansky, and this letter bears on that point. I will show it to Mr. Lattimore and ask him if he has seen it before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this the one that Mr. Mandel identified just before?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recollect ever seeing this before.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mandel, this was part of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. An instrument that you found or a paper that you found in those files?

Mr. MANDEL. A carbon copy of a letter, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be admitted into the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 505" and is read in full below.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter for us, please?

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that the witness may have to do a lot of talking if he reads letters with which he is not immediately concerned, and that it be read by counsel?

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt at this time, I would like to say one thing. It is a very small point, but I have noticed sometimes the letter appears twice in our records, because it is read and then inserted. I wonder if it might be read, and that the reporter be instructed to compare the actual letter as subsequently submitted with the text as read, to be sure it is accurate, and let that be done.

The CHAIRMAN. That should be done.

Mr. MORRIS. This letter reads (exhibit No. 505 is as follows):

DEAR OUMANSKY: Enclosed for your private information is a first draft of an article by Owen Lattimore which is intended for publication in the September issue of Pacific Affairs. Even though the situation may change rapidly between

now and September, I thought that you might wish to see this advance copy of his article for it seems to me to represent an important point of view.

Sincerely yours.

Mr. Lattimore, was not that letter written during the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This was dated what?

Mr. MORRIS. June 28, 1940.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What was the date of the Hitler-Stalin pact? 1939? Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That material article of yours, did that bear on China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recollect. I would have to look at the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, how often have you seen Mr. Oumansky in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think three times.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I saw him once, I think, for the first time I met him was when he came out to visit the Yosemite conference of the IPR, in the summer of 1936, and I saw him at a lunch at a club in Baltimore to which he was brought by Mr. Hamilton Owens, editor of the Baltimore Sun.

Mr. MORRIS. When was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would be 1939 or 1940, I don't remember which, and this occasion when I had lunch with him, with Mr. Carter, those are the only occasions I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 26, 1938, addressed to Constantine Oumansky, Embassy of the U. S. S. R., with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. Attached thereto is a photostat of a letter on the letterhead of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated December 8, 1938, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and signed C. Oumansky.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive these into the record? They bear on the experiences of Mr. Lattimore, the witness here today, in connection with Mr. Oumansky, a person to whom this letter is addressed and who replied to the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mandel, the photostatic copy that you have referred to is a photostat of an instrument found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All of these photostats are photostats of instruments found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your request?

Mr. MORRIS. May that be inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean both documents?

Mr. MORRIS. Both documents.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record.

Senator SMITH. Are you going to read those?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry. The first is a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter, dated November 26, 1938, to Mr. Constantine Oumansky, Esq., Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT 506

DEAR OUMANSKY: Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the December Pacific Affairs. I think you will be interested in the brief note by O. L. (Owen Lattimore, the editor), entitled "Can the Soviet Union Be Isolated?" You can find this on page 492.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The second letter reads, on the letterhead of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Washington, D. C., December 8, 1938:

EXHIBIT 507

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for drawing my attention to the O. L. note in the Pacific Affairs. I read it with interest and appreciation.

In the meantime I attended a luncheon in Baltimore at which Mr. Lattimore also was present and we had a most pleasant exchange of opinions.

I hope to see you soon in New York.

Sincerely yours,

C. OUMANSKY.

(Documents previously read by counsel were marked Exhibits Nos. 506 and 507, and are read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Attached to the letter, Mr. Chairman, is the article itself, signed O. L., under the heading of "Comment and Correspondence. Can the Soviet Union Be Isolated?" which appears on page 492 of the Pacific Affairs. May that be part of the record?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the witness should be asked whether or not he is familiar with that article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I look at it, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Does O. L. stand for you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. It may be admited in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 508" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 508

[Pacific Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 4, December 1938, pp. 492–493]

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE—CAN THE SOVIET UNION BE ISOLATED?

More than any one nation, the Soviet Union today holds the balance of power in both Asia and Europe. Was the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, in which Great Britain, as Mr. Roosevelt points out in his article in this issue, did not merely acquiesce but actively participated, intended as a necessary preliminary to the isolation and encirclement of the Soviet Union? If so, will it succeed? Any attempt to forecast correctly the results of Germany's expansion in Europe and Japan's attempt to conquer China must depend on the answer to this puzzle.

Since the betrayal of Czechoslovakia there has been a great deal of confusion, especially in England, over the theoretical question of whether the Soviet Union would have honored its conditional obligation to support France, if France had supported Czechoslovakia. This, it seems to me, is the wrong way to approach the problem. The right way is to ponder, first, the Soviet Union's very evident willingness to defend its own Siberian frontier against Japan, earlier this year, and its equally evident ability to do so successfully. This demonstration, it should be remembered, was made when the Soviet Union might well have become involved in fighting both in Europe and Asia, and is evidence that the Red army was prepared to carry on two wars at once.

Given the willingness of the Red army to fight, in the only case in which an experimentally minded aggressor has actually tried conclusions, it must be conceded that the Soviet Union holds a stronger strategic position than ever.

Against Germany, the Red army no longer has to plan for the defense of the awkward salient of Czechoslovakia, but can dig in on its own territory. To attack the Ukraine, Hitler's "pure" Germans will have to cross a belt of Slavic populations, who may for the moment be subservient, but have already been taught that the Germans will always despise and abuse them. Against Japan, the Soviet position is even better. The Japanese have been thrown back from Siberia with great loss of prestige, and forced to involve themselves more inextricably than ever in a war in China which is more hopless than ever.

These conclusions are difficult to dispute, and seem to me to outweigh the many allegations, all of them speculative, to the effect that the Red army has been "demoralized by purges." The only positive evidence on the record is clear: France and Great Britain have not been willing to fight. The Soviet Union has been willing to fight, and has actually fought, in self-defense, but has refused to take the aggressive, even when it looked profitable, as in Siberia.

There is an implication in M. Levy's article, also published in this issue, that the Soviet Union has "revealed its permanent ambition to establish its sovereignty over Outer Mongolia." Does this mean that the Soviet Union is achieving successfully, at China's expense, the kind of aggression in which Japan appears to be failing? This appears to me to be not only an inaccurate interpretation, but one that is crudely inaccurate. The truth is that the Mongols have been driven by fear of Japan to ask for all the Soviet protection they can get. Japan may also yet succeed in driving the Chinese into the arms of the Soviet Union—where they certainly would not go of their own accord. More than that, France and Great Britain may yet be driven to beg from the Soviet Union the assistance which they refused in the case of Czechoslovakia.

For, arguing from the record, there is every probability that Germany, Italy, and Japan will go on grabbing what they can from Great Britain and France, rather than rush headlong against the enigmatic menace of the Red army. This is common sense, for Great Britain and France have surrendered every threat, while the Soviet Union has surrendered nothing, has made no bluffs that could be called, and has called one bluff very effectively.

Consequently, the recent policy of Great Britain and France has not only been disastrous to democracy and the way of evolution, making more grim the opposing extremes of revolution and counterrevolution. It has also competely failed to encircle or isolate the Soviet Union, and given it instead a greatly increased though still not clearly defined power in the affairs of both Europe and Asia.

O. L.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever know a Soviet official in the United States named Gokhman, G-o-k-h-m-a-n?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever did. I don't believe I ever heard that name before.

The CHAIRMAN. Spell that again, please.

Mr. MORRIS. G-o-k-h-m-a-n, and there is the initial G. He was the consul general of the U. S. S. R., San Francisco.

The CHAIRMAN. He said he never heard of him before.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Don't remember him.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether you can inquire whether he knew him by title rather than by name, as the consul general of the U. S. S. R. in San Francisco?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In San Francisco in what year?

Senator FERGUSON. Give him the year.

Mr. MANDEL. 1938.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1938? I believe I remember having lunch at the Soviet consulate in San Francisco some time early in 1938; yes. I completely have forgotten the name.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

The CHAIRMAN. Let us clear that a little bit, Mr. Lattimore. You had lunch at the Soviet consulate in San Francisco, and would the committee be justified in believing that at that time you met this man whose name had been mentioned, or had luncheon with him, or what was the connection of the luncheon? That is what I want.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the connection of the luncheon with the party mentioned, Gokhman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have only a very vague recollection of the luncheon. I believe that several IPR people had lunch at the Soviet consulate at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the consul general there at the luncheon?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you precisely, Senator Ferguson, whether the consul general was there or whether he was out of town and we had lunch with a consul or vice consul, or what it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot recall now whether the officer was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How many people would you say were present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Three or four, four or five.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you then stationed in San Francisco?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was then living in Berkeley, and had a room in the offices in the IPR in San Francisco, from which I edited Pacific Affairs. I used to go over to San Francisco 2 or 3 days a week.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your principal employment at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My principal employment at that time, in Berkeley, was writing the first draft of what eventually became my book, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, which was published in 1940.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were directly connected with the institute as editor of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was my only connection with the institute?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 18, 1938, addressed to the Honorable Gregory I. Gokhman, consul general of the U. S. S. R., with a typed signature of Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here three letters which represent an exchange of correspondence between Mr. Gokhman of the Soviet Union and Mr. Frederick V. Field. They relate to the testimony that has just been offered by this witness, and I would like the three of them introduced into the record after they have been identified by Mr. Mandel. Mr. Mandel will read them for the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. How did they relate to the testimony of the witness? Did they mention his name?

Mr. MORRIS. They mention his name and they mention the occasion that the witness has just testified to, namely visiting the consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like to see them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like to see them, if I may. Do we have copies?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the first one, Mr. Lattimore [handing document].

There is the second one. Mr. Lattimore [handing document].

Have you three there, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Two.

Mr. MORRIS. Here is the third one, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Two of those have not yet been identified by Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify the second one, please?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of the one you did identify?

Mr. MANDEL. April 18, 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of the next one?

Mr. MANDEL. The second is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter, at the top of which it says "Copy to Mr. Lattimore," dated April 26, 1938, addressed to the Honorable Gregory I. Gokhman, and the typed signature of Frederick V. Field is on the top.

The third document is on the letterhead of the consulate general of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The CHAIRMAN. And the date of that is what?

Mr. MANDEL. It is dated April 29, 1938. It is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, and is signed by G. Gokhman.

Mr. MORRIS. The first one reads under date of April 18, 1938:

EXHIBIT 509

DEAR MR. GOKHMAN: I am greatly obliged for the report of the court proceedings of the trials held in Moscow March 7 to 16 of this year. I learned a very great deal from reading the verbatim reports of the important trials preceding these and look forward with great interest to scrutinizing the present volume. I wish it were possible to have more Americans read those first hand reports for I know that they explain a great deal which is rather difficult to understand in the brief and often badly interpreted articles which appear in our newspapers.

I have for a long time wanted to invite you to have luncheon with my colleague, Owen Lattimore, and myself and I wonder if it would be possible for you to do so on Monday, April 25. I should like to have you see our new headquarters at 1795 California Street and I wonder, therefore, if you could not meet us here any time after 12 noon that day so that we could show you our quarters before proceeding to lunch.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

In reply, from San Francisco, April 26, 1938—that is not the reply. I am sorry. This is another letter from Frederick V. Field, April 26, 1938, to Mr. Gokhman.

EXHIBIT 510

DEAR MR. GOKHMAN: It appears that some of the energetic although not too well-informed persons connected with the Golden Gate International Exposition have suddenly realized that the Soviet Union borders on the Pacific Ocean. These persons have approached us to know if we could cooperate in securing Soviet exhibits. While this approach to us is not official, if it is even semiofficial, I do not want to involve the American Council in the question until I learn from you what, if any, plans your country has with regard to this fair.

In a number of instances where foreign governments have not leased space the fair authorities have arranged, through special committees, to secure exhibits through private, nonofficial institutions or through individuals as a substitute for official participation. This I know is being done in the case of China which, because of war, cannot officially take part. If some move in this direction is to be made for Soviet exhibits, it is obviously in our mutual interests to see that it is done as intelligently and with the cooperation of as well-informed people as possible. Provided your country will take no official part in the exhibitions and provided the exposition authorities wish to have Soviet

exhibits, my own inclination would be to suggest to them that the question be put in the hands of the American Russian Institute. While the local branch of the American Russian Institute is, as far as I know, rather weak, the New York organization has become a fairly substantial one and might, I think, be persuaded to take an interest in this subject.

I do not, however, want to make any move on this matter until I have your advice.

It was a great pleasure seeing you yesterday for luncheon and I hope that Dr. Lattimore and I will soon be able to take advantage of your kind invitation to visit you at the consulate.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before the next letter is read, might I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you have testified to your memory, not as to details, but as to the fact of a luncheon at the consulate. This letter appears to refer to a luncheon at a place of the choosing of Mr. Field or yourself, or the two of you. Can you remember such a luncheon?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't. That must have been a lunch that Mr. Field had with the consul. I believe the only time I ever met him was at the consulate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I did not have a copy of that letter at the time it was read. The reading of it seemed to indicate that Mr. Lattimore was at the luncheon. May we have the wording again?

Mr. MORRIS. The last paragraph reads:

It was a great pleasure seeing you yesterday for luncheon and I hope that Dr. Lattimore and I will soon be able to take advantage of your kind invitation to visit you at the consulate.

Does that not indicate, Mr. Lattimore, that the invitation had been extended to Mr. Field and to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It indicates that an invitation to lunch at the consulate had been extended to Mr. Field and myself, but I don't think it indicates that I was at the lunch that had already taken place, that had been mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire, Mr. Lattimore, how many times you did have a luncheon at the consulate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Just that once, as far as I can remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Just once?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, and I don't remember that man. I don't remember. It was an inconsequential social lunch, as far as I remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, the first of these three, the one dated April 18 from Mr. Field to Mr. Gokhman, was an invitation to Mr. Gokhman to have lunch with Mr. Field and yourself?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the 25th. The letter of the 26th indicates that there was a luncheon on the 25th. Are you saying now that you were not present at that luncheon on the 25th?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall; no. You see, I was living, as I say, in Berkeley, and it may have been a date that I couldn't come over, or something of that sort.

Mr. Morris. The third letter, Mr. Chairman, dated April 29, 1938, on the letterhead of the consular general of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2563 Divisadero Street, San Francisco:

Exhibit 511

Dear Mr. Field: I have your letter of April 26. I regret to advise that so far I have had no offi ial information as to whether the U. S. S. R. will or will not participate in the Golden Gate International Exposition in 1939.

The question referred to in your letter should be taken up, I believe, with the American Russian Institute in San Francisco, which is a quite independent institution and not a branch of that in New York.

I would be glad if you and Mr. Lattimore could have lunch with me at the Consulate on Friday, May 6, at 1 o'clock. If that date meets with your convenience, please let me know.

Yours sincerely,

G. Gokhman.

Senator Ferguson. Did you show where that had been addressed to?

Mr. Morris. That is addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

The Chairman. Those are the three letters?

Mr. Morris. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. They will be received.

(Documents previously read by counsel were marked "Exhibit Nos. 509, 510, and 511, consecutively, and were read in full.)

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, is it this luncheon of May 6 at the Consulate which you did attend?

Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection as to the date.

The Chairman. These exhibits have already been identified and have been inserted into the record.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, do you know a Soviet official named Vladimer Rogov?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I remember meeting him.

Mr. Morris. Did you meet him in the United States?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I met him here in Washington.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the circumstances, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. As clearly as I can recall them, Rogov had been the correspondent of Tass, the official Soviet news agency in Shanghai all during the war, that being possible because Russia was neutral as regards Japan, so that the Russian news agency operated in Japanese-occupied Shanghai. He was being transferred from Shanghai to London. I forgot the exact year, whether it was 1943 or 1944, somewhere along there.

Somebody, I believe Mr. Carter, arranged for several people to meet Rogov at the Cosmos Club here in Washington in the afternoon for the purpose of asking him questions.

The Chairman. That was what date?

Mr. Lattimore. I am not sure of the date, Senator.

The Chairman. And the year?

Mr. Lattimore. I have a note here that it was in 1944.

Mr. Sourwine. Was that a luncheon?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe it was; no. I believe that tea was served or a choice of tea or drinks.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was pretty late in the afternoon to have a luncheon?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The middle of the afternoon.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did it last, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was present at the meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only person that I clearly recall being present, because I walked out with him afterwards——

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, it will be necessary to recess for a few minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether we can have the question read when we return, and have an answer put in then rather than cutting the witness off?

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess subject to the call of the Chair. We will be back here today. We will return as soon as possible.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. Due to a series of votes that have been taken in the Senate, and will probably be taken during the rest of the afternoon, it is necessary to adjourn this meeting until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. The committee stands adjourned until that hour.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Tuesday, March 4, 1952.)

INDEX TO PART 9

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.)

A

Page

Aaronson, Norma ---- 3061
Abend, Hallett ---- 3108
Academy of Sciences (Russia) ---- 3235
Acheson, Dean ---- 2943, 3026, 3031, 3110
Afghan Government ---- 3220
AFL. (*See* American Federation of Labor.)
Agrarian Democracy in Northwest China ---- 2971, 3148
Agricultural Organization of New Zealand ---- 3168
Aldo Cafe (Washington, D. C.) ---- 3067
Alexandroff, Mr ---- 3224
All-Union Central Committee (Soviet Second Congress) ---- 3107
Allen, Mr ---- 2986
Allen, James S. (*See* Sol Auerbach.)
Allin, B. W ---- 3167
Alsop, Joseph ---- 2955, 2957, 3053, 3113
Amerasia ---- 2978, 3002, 3144
America in Action ---- 3169
American Aid to China ---- 3052
American Anthropologist ---- 3104
American Church (Shanghai) ---- 3144
American Civil War ---- 3188
American Express (Santiago, Chile) ---- 3264
American Federation of Labor (AFL) ---- 3046
American & Foreign Power Co ---- 3079
American Foreign Relations ---- 3167
American Foreign Service Journal ---- 3005
American Friends of the Chinese People ---- 3144, 3169
American Mercury ---- 2981
American Peace Mobilization ---- 3145, 3197
American-Russian Institute ---- 3242, 3273, 3274
American War of Independence ---- 3188
American Youth for a Free World ---- 3057
American Youth for Democracy, Communist Party Youth Organization (AYD) ---- 3055, 3056, 3059
America's Town Meeting of the Air ---- 3212
Andreau, Caesar ---- 3057
Andreau, Jane Speed ---- 3057
AP. (*See* Associated Press.)
Arens ---- 3241
ARI. (*See* American Russian Institute.)
Armed Forces (United States) ---- 3011, 3012, 3013, 3022, 3060, 3160, 3263
Armed Services Committee ---- 3114
Armstrong ---- 3167
Army (United States) ---- 3060, 3160, 3263
Arnold, Fortas & Porter ---- 2898
Arnold, Thurmand ---- 3206, 3207, 3259
Arthur, Sir ---- 3249
Asahi Institute of the Far East ---- 3168
Asiaticus. (*See* Hans Mueller.)

Page
Associated Press (AP) 3032, 3220
Atcheson, George 2913
Atlantic Monthly 2981
Auckland University College 3168
Auerbach, Sol (James S. Allen) 2987, 3061, 3125, 3128, 3190
Austern, Hilda (Hilda Ray; Hilda Beetholtz) 3167
Australia and the Far East 3167
Australia in the Word Depression 3167
Australian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 3168
Austrian Embassy (Moscow) 3225
AYD. (*See* American Youth for Democracy.)

B

Baker, Newton D 2985, 3177
Baldwin, Hanson 3070, 3154
Ballinger, Sid 3058
Baltimore Sun 3035, 3040, 3231, 3268
Banff Conference (IPR) 3190
Bank of England 2981
Bankers Trust Co 3080
Baring, Danzil 3167
Barkoff, Mr 3224
Barmine, Alexander 3097, 3098, 3099, 3100, 3101, 3102, 3103, 3108, 3234, 3253
Barnes, Joseph 2976, 2977, 2986, 3099, 3102, 3103, 3125, 3138, 3165, 3201, 3202
Barnes, Kathleen 2986, 3126, 3128, 3137, 3167, 3168, 3241
Barr, General 3114
Barrows, General 3264
Bassett, Ted 3057
Bates, M. S 3169
Beach, Ethel 3061
Bell, Sir Charles 2981, 3241
Belshaw, Horace 3167, 3168
Benitez, Conrado 3167
Bentley, Elizabeth T 3201
Berle, Adolph 3004
Berliner Tageblatt 3168
Bertram, James 3169
Berzin, Gen. Ian Antonovich 3099, 3102, 3107
Better Economic Order 3167
Biddleman 2961
Big Five 2990
Big Yankee 3059
Bingham, Woodbridge 3103, 3141
Birobidian 3173
Bissell, Mr 3019
Bisson, T. A 3019, 3125, 3128, 3165, 3169
Board of Economic Warfare 3200
Boeke, J. H 3167, 3173
Bolsheviks 3107
Book and Magazine Guild 3061
Bordofsky, Ben 3060, 3061
Borodin 3235
Borton, Hugh 3167, 3168
Boulter, V. M 3167
Bowman, Isaiah 3198, 3219
Bradley, General 3114
Brandt, William 3249, 3250, 3254, 3259
British-French Negotiations 3226
British Government 2990, 2991, 2997, 3011, 3021, 3024, 3076, 3078, 3079, 3109, 3119, 3137, 3140, 3172, 3175, 3178, 3179, 3180, 3196, 3223, 3224, 3226, 3248, 3249, 3269, 3270.
British Loans (Chinese Nationalist Government) 3148
British Railway Loans 3131
Brogan, D. W 3167, 3168

Page
Brooklyn College ... 3168
Browder, Earl ... 2976, 2977, 3072
Bucharin ... 3173
Budenz, Louis F ... 2958–2962, 2964, 2966, 2969–2977, 2979, 2981, 2984, 3053, 3054, 3093, 3103
Bureau of the Budget ... 2921
Burmese Government ... 3109
Butterworth, Mr ... 3078
Byrnes, James F ... 3109, 3112
Bywater, Hector ... 3139, 3154, 3155, 3157

C

California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report 1948 ... 3073
California University ... 2981, 3168
Camden Post Office (N. J.) ... 3167
Camp Unity ... 3058, 3061
Can the Soviet Union be Isolated ... 3269
Can We be Neutral ... 3167
Canada: An American Nation ... 3167
Canadian Forum ... 3195
Capital ... 3184
"Capital Stuff" ... 2993
Carlson, Gen. Evans F ... 2979, 3059, 3060
Carnegie Endownment ... 3216, 3264
Carroll, Esther ... 3169
Carter's Barn ... 2992, 2994, 2995
Carter, Edward C ... 2921, 2979, 2989, 2990, 2992, 2994, 2995, 2997, 3014, 3064–3068, 3131, 3135–3138, 3145, 3167, 3171–3173, 3176, 3193, 3199–3201, 3220–3222, 3227, 3228, 3230, 3234, 3236–3238, 3242–3244, 3250, 3260, 3263–3267, 3269, 3274.
Catholic Quarterly ... 2997
Catholic World ... 3094
CBS. (*See* Columbia Broadcasting System.)
Central Government (China) ... 3187
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ... 3007
CGT ... 3057
Chamberlain ... 3247, 3248
Chamberlain, Joseph B ... 2985
Chamberlain Review ... 3139, 3247
Chamberlain, Neville ... 3196, 3223
Chamberlain, William Henry ... 2916, 2981
Chambers, Whittaker ... 3213, 3214, 3216, 3246, 3247
Chan, Hansu. (*See* Chao-ting Chi.)
Chao-ting Chi ... 2989, 3126, 3128, 3136, 3140, 3141, 3142, 3143, 3158, 3159, 3160, 3161, 3162, 3163, 3164, 3165, 3166, 3194, 3205.
Chapman, Abraham (John Arnold) ... 3061
Charney, George Blake ... 3059
Chatham House ... 3172, 3178
Chavez, Senator ... 2963, 2964, 2965
Chen Han-seng (Raymond D. Brooke) ... 2989, 3126, 3128, 3241
Chennault, Gen. C. L ... 3029, 3069
Chernavin ... 3139
Chew Sih Hong ... 3159, 3160, 3161, 3163
Chi (father of Chao-Ting Chi) ... 3140, 3161, 3165, 3166
Chi, Chao-ting ... 2989, 3126, 3128, 3136, 3140, 3141, 3142, 3143, 3158, 3158, 3159, 3160, 3161, 3162, 3163, 3164, 3165, 3166, 3194.
Chi, K. P ... 3161
Chi, Kung Chuan ... 3159, 3161, 3162, 3164
Chiang Kai-shek ... 2921, 2978, 2979, 2989, 2990, 3007, 3008, 3011, 3012, 3018, 3019, 3022, 3026, 3027, 3033, 3046, 3052, 3053, 3078, 3087, 3088, 3108, 3110–3114, 3124, 3144, 3184, 3187, 3198, 3209, 3210, 3212, 3262, 3265, 3266.

Page
Chiang Kai-shek, Madam---------- 3009, 3069, 3144
Chicago Tribune---------- 2998, 3043
China Critic---------- 3168
China Daily News---------- 3060, 3163, 3164, 3168
China Defense Commission---------- 3266
China Greets the New Year---------- 3169
China International Treaties---------- 2990
China Lobby---------- 2945, 3002, 3018, 3020, 3036, 3037-3039, 3041-3044, 3049, 3050, 3096, 3106, 3108, 3109, 3114, 3143, 3144
China Today---------- 3135, 3138, 3143, 3144, 3169
Chinese Central Government---------- 3187
Chinese Communist Government---------- 2989, 2999, 3017, 3019, 3020, 3060, 3076, 3078, 3079, 3081, 3082, 3120
Chinese Embassy (Washington, D. C.)---------- 3037, 3042
Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance---------- 3160
Chinese Land Tax---------- 3173
Chinese Maritime Custom Service---------- 3148
Chinese Nationalist Army---------- 3012, 3112, 3114
Chinese Nationalist Blockade of Communist China---------- 3078
Chinese Nationalist Government---------- 2978, 2979, 3008, 3010, 3011, 3023, 3024, 3033, 3046, 3058, 3070, 3078, 3087, 3108, 3109, 3110, 3111, 3112, 3113, 3120, 3142, 3143, 3148, 3184, 3198, 3265, 3266
Chinese Nationalist Treaty with Russia---------- 3010
Chinese Revolution---------- 3135, 3138, 3184, 3185, 3187, 3188
Chomeley, Miss (Elsie Fairfax)---------- 3142
Christian Medical Council---------- 3144
Chu Tong---------- 3060
Chungking Embassy---------- 3212, 3213
Churchill, Winston---------- 2990, 3115, 3264
CIA. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency.)
CIC. (*See* Commerce-International China.)
CIO. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
Civil Service Commission (Board of Appeals and Review)---------- 3158, 3159, 3160, 3163, 3164
Clark, Marjorie R---------- 3167
Clipper---------- 3176
Clubb, O. Edmund---------- 2912, 2943, 2944, 2945, 2946, 3000, 3002, 3003, 3004, 3048, 3066, 3068
Colegrove, Kenneth W---------- 2928, 3054, 3069, 3070, 3097
Collier's Magazine---------- 2956, 2957, 2958, 2974, 2975, 2976
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)---------- 3040, 3041
Columbia University---------- 3168
Comintern---------- 3107, 3165, 3185, 3188
Commerce-International China (CIC)---------- 3014
Committee on Appropriations (Senate)---------- 3081
Committee on Armed Services---------- 3114
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy---------- 3058, 3060, 3061
Committee on Foreign Affairs (House)---------- 3026, 3110
Committee on Foreign Relations (Senate)---------- 2948, 2949, 2961, 2968, 2976, 2977, 3114
Committee on Un-American Activities---------- 2999, 3015, 3071, 3073, 3080, 3102, 3246
Commodity Control in the Pacific Area---------- 3167
Communist Chinese Army---------- 3060, 3112, 3184, 3204
Communist International---------- 2899, 3132, 3183
Communist Labor Youth League---------- 3058, 3061
Communist Party---------- 2897, 2902–2909, 2914–2919, 2923–2926, 2932, 2933, 2942, 2947, 2951–2956, 2958, 2961, 2965, 2967, 2969–2971, 2976–2991, 2995–3007, 3017–3021, 3027–3032, 3036–3039, 3045–3047, 3052–3063, 3069–3078, 3092–3120, 3123–3149, 3152–3167, 3170, 3179–3191, 3197, 3205, 3208, 3214, 3218, 3219, 3226, 3232–3236, 3245, 3247, 3252, 3253, 3259.
Communist Party (China)---------- 2915–2919, 2955, 2956, 2971, 2976–2981 2989, 2990, 2996, 2999, 3007, 3017, 3020, 3027–3030, 3060, 3076, 3078, 3103, 3108–3110, 3118, 3124, 3127–3136, 3140–3149, 3152, 3154, 3157–3166, 3179–3190, 3245
Communist Party (Germany)---------- 3134
Communist Party (India)---------- 3109

Page
Communist Party (Japan) 3069
Communist Party (Korea) 3028, 3029, 3030, 3031, 3032, 3117
Communist Party (Kremlin) 2915, 2919
Communist Party (Moscow) 2915
Communist Party (New York City) 3055, 3057
Communist Party (New York County) 3057
Communist Party (New York State) 3057, 3058, 3060
Communist Party (Puerto Rico) 3057
Communist Party (Russia) 2915
2919, 2923, 2981, 2995, 2997, 3073, 3113, 3180, 3189, 3197, 3235, 3236
Communist Party (United States) 2897, 2909, 2947,
2980, 2984–2988, 2991, 3004, 3020, 3046, 3049, 3052–3062, 3071–3074,
3092, 3094, 3106, 3123–3133, 3146, 3191, 3197, 3208, 3214, 3218, 3247
Compass. (*See* Sunday Compass.)
Condliffe, J. B 3167, 3168
Congress. (*See* United States Congress.)
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 3046
Congressional Record 3029, 3030
Conover, Harry 3167, 3168
Cooke, Admiral Charles Maynard 3012, 3013, 3014
Cooks 3221, 3222
Corales, Juan Sias 3057
Corpus Christi College (Oxford) 3168
Cosmos Club (Washington, D. C.) 3274
Council for American-Soviet Friendship 3061
Council on Foreign Relations 2982, 2988
Cubues, Eugene 3057, 3058
Currie, Lauchlin 2921, 3052,
3053, 3197, 3198, 3199, 3200, 3201, 3202, 3208, 3209, 3210, 3211, 3212

D

Dafoe, John W 3167
Daily (Washington, D. C.) 2993
Daily Peoples World 3045, 3071, 3072, 3073
Daily Worker 2897, 3040, 3060
Daladier 3196
Davies, John P 2913, 3006, 3007, 3068, 3113
Davis, Elmer 3041, 3159
Dawes, Clarence E 2912
Deak 3167
Deane, Mr. (Hugh) 2986
DeCaux, Len 2986
D'Elia, Paschal M 3167, 3168
Democratic League (China) 3113
Democratic Party 3046
Denny, George V., Jr 3212
Department of Justice. (*See* United States Department of Justice.)
Deportation Proceedings against Desideriu Hammer 2955, 2962, 2967–2969
Desert Road to Turkestan 3266
Dewey, A. Gordon 3167, 3168
Die Weltbuhne 3166
Dillingham Building (Honolulu) 3173
Dimanshtein 3173
Diskin, Lou 3058
Dooman, Eugene 3003, 3005, 3053, 3054, 3069, 3097
Draper, Theodore 3169
Dulles 3167
Dummon, Mr 2912
Dunne, George H 2997

E

Eastern Industralization and Its Effect on the West 3167
Economic and Living Standards, American and Asiatic 3254
Edward (King of England) 3140, 3248
Edwards, Clyde S 3154

Page
Eggleston, F. W---- 2981
Eighth Route Army---- 3060, 3204
Eisler, Gerhardt---- 3134
Elliott, William Y---- 3167
Emmerson, John K---- 3005
Emperor of Japan---- 3054, 3069, 3070, 3071, 3140
Employee Loyalty Investigation (State Department)---- 2948, 2961, 2968, 2975, 2976, 2977, 3000, 3001, 3002, 3049
Engels---- 3182, 3184
Epstein, Israel---- 3059
Executive Offices of the President---- 2921

F

Fairbank, John K---- 3207, 3208, 3212, 3213
Fanelli, Joseph F---- 2967
Faymonville, Col. Philip R---- 3265
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)---- 2945, 2954, 2955, 2982, 2983, 3054, 3055, 3063, 3064, 3071, 3103, 3106, 3163
Federal Court of New York---- 2970
Ferguson, Senator Homer---- 2989
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt---- 2926, 2953, 2954, 2984–2986, 2994, 3059, 3125–3128, 3145, 3167, 3190, 3191, 3195, 3197, 3203–3206, 3208, 3249, 3250–3258, 3271–3274.
Financial Cutting Edge in Partition of China---- 3167
Fisher, Mr---- 3244, 3264
Fitch, George---- 3144
Fitch, Geraldine---- 3144
Flashes from China---- 3169
Fleming, Peter---- 3193
Fleugel, Dr. Edna R---- 2917
Focke-Wulf Condor Planes---- 3224
Food Research Institute---- 3168
Foreign Affairs---- 2917
Foreign Investments in China---- 3168
Foreign Policy Association---- 2906, 2917, 3253
Foreign Service. (*See* United States Foreign Service.)
Forman, Harrison---- 3225, 3226, 3229, 3230
Fortas, Abe---- 2898, 2939, 3017, 3123
Fortune Magazine---- 2981
Foster, William Z---- 3071, 3072, 3073, 3092
Franco-Prussian War---- 3224
Franco Spanish Government---- 2945, 3120
Free French---- 3109
Freeman Magazine---- 2966
French Government---- 2991, 2997, 3109, 3110, 3119, 3186, 3196, 3226, 3270
French Revolution---- 3188
From Canton to Shanghai---- 3132, 3134, 3170
Fuehrer. (*See* Adolph Hitler.)
Fulbright, Senator J. William---- 3069

G

Gedye, G. E. R---- 3224
General Electric Co---- 3079
General Purposes Budget for 1938---- 3177
General Services Administration (GSA)---- 2967
German Army---- 3223
German Bourgeois Revolution of 1848---- 3184
German Embassy (Moscow)---- 3224, 3225
German Government---- 2982, 3186, 3196, 3223, 3224, 3226, 3227, 3269
German-Russian Nonaggression Pact---- 3220, 3222–3224, 3226, 3227, 3241, 3268
Gilbert, W. C---- 3266
Gilchrist, Colonel---- 3160
Glazebrook, G. deT---- 3167
Gokhman, Gregory I---- 3270–3273

Page
Gold, Mr---- 3034, 3035
Golden Gate International Exposition---- 3272, 3274
Goldfrank, Esther S. (Mrs. Karl Wittfogel)---- 3104
Goldway, David---- 3059–3061
Goodrich, Carter---- 3167
Goodwin, William---- 3037
GOP. (*See* Republican Party.)
Granich, Grace---- 3169
Granich, Max---- 3144, 3169
Great Soviet Encyclopedia---- 3107
Green, O. M---- 3167, 3168
Green, Senator Theodore Francis---- 2956
Greenberg, Michael---- 3126, 3128, 3208
Greene, Merome D---- 2985, 3167, 3168
Greenspan, Jack---- 3061
Grew, Ambassador Joseph C---- 2912, 3003, 3004, 3005, 3006
Griswold, A. Whitney---- 3167, 3168
GSA. (*See* General Services Administration.)
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation---- 3266
Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications (House Committee on Un-American Activities)---- 3073, 3080

H

Halsey, Admiral William F---- 3070
Hammer, Desiderio (Alias John Santos)---- 2955, 2962, 2967, 2968, 2969
Hansu Chan. (*See* Chao-ting Chi.)
Harondar, E. V---- 3135, 3136, 3149, 3171, 3172, 3174, 3244
Harper & Bros---- 2961
Harriman, W. Averell---- 3009
Harvard Corp---- 3168
Harvard University---- 3212, 3266
Harvard-Yenching Institute---- 3266
Hayes, Marion---- 3167
Henderson, Sir Nevile---- 3223
Herod, William R---- 3079
Hickenlooper, Senator Bourke B---- 2904
High Cost of Vengeance---- 3094, 3095
High Tartary---- 3266
Hirohito---- 3054, 3069, 3070, 3071, 3140
Hiss, Alger---- 3011, 3013, 3049, 3213, 3219, 3245, 3246, 3247
History of Chinese Society: LIAO---- 3106
Hitler, Adolph---- 3076, 3013, 2119, 3196
3220, 3222–3228, 3230, 3241, 3260, 3262, 3263, 3264, 3265, 3268, 3270
Hitler-Stalin Nonaggression Pact---- 3220, 3222, 3224, 3226, 3227, 3241, 3268
Hoare---- 3172
Holland, W. L---- 2952, 2953, 2984,
3014, 3064–3066, 3145, 3167, 3173, 3176, 3199, 3208, 3242, 3263, 3264
Hong, Chew Sih---- 3159, 3161, 3163
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp---- 3148
Honjo, Hijiro---- 3167
Hornbeck, Stanley---- 3003–3005, 3209, 3210, 3215, 3217, 3218
Hsu, Y. T---- 3126, 3129
Hubbard---- 3176–3177
Hubbard, G. E---- 2981, 3167
Hubbard, L. H---- 2981
Huber---- 3096, 3097
Hull, Cordell---- 3218
Hudine, Sven---- 3226
Hume, Edward---- 3144
Humelsine, Carlisle, H---- 2944
Hurley, Gen. Patrick---- 3004, 3005, 3009, 3108, 3109

I

Immigration Service. (*See* United States Immigration Service.)
Imprecoor---- 3132, 3170
Indian Civil Service---- 3110

Page
Indian Government 3076, 3078
Indonesian Government 3109
Indonesian Nationalists 3109
Inner Asian Frontiers 3105, 3266, 3271
Inquiry 2981, 2982
Institut International d'Agriculture of Rome 3168
Institute of International Studies (Yale University) 3168
Institute of Pacific Relations 2899,
2901, 2903–2907, 2910, 2915, 2917, 2918, 2921, 2923–2925, 2927, 2929,
2940, 2942, 2943, 2948, 2951–2954, 2980–2986, 2989–2998, 3023, 2055,
3058, 3099–3102, 3106, 3123, 3131–3139, 3144–3149, 3152–3159, 3167,
3168, 3171–3174, 3176, 3177, 3191, 3195, 3199–3208, 3212, 3220, 3221,
3225, 3229, 3233–3244, 3248–3254, 3263–3272.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 2980, 2985, 3055,
3058, 3102, 3137, 3171, 3204, 3205, 3206, 3208, 3233, 3244, 3254, 3272
Institute of Pacific Relations (American-Northwest Council) 3264
Institute of Pacific Relations (Australian Council) 3139
Institute of Pacific Relations (Banff Conference) 3190
Institute of Pacific Relations (Bay Region) 3264
Institute of Pacific Relations (British Council) 3136,
3138, 3147, 3149, 3154, 3157, 3233, 3236, 3238
Institute of Pacific Relations (Canadian Council) 3264
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese Council) 3136,
3138, 3147, 3148, 3149, 3152, 3154, 3233, 3236.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japanese Council) 3135, 3176, 3233
Institute of Pacific Relations (National Councils) 2990, 3168, 3238, 3243, 3244
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 3102, 3168, 3171, 3208, 3254
Institute of Pacific Relations (Russian Institute) 3229
Institute of Pacific Relations (Soviet Council) 2908,
3023, 3123, 3135, 3138, 3139, 3149, 3155, 3156, 3173, 3174, 3176, 3177,
3229, 3233, 3234, 3239, 3240, 3241, 3244.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite Conference) 3278, 3243, 3268
International (Communist) 2999, 3132, 3183
International Book Store (San Francisco) 3071, 3072, 3073
International Publishers 3184
International Reply Coupons 3168
International Studies Conference 3174
Intourist Hotel (Moscow) 3221, 3222
IPR Notes 3244
Isaacs, Harold 2916, 3138
Italian Government 3110, 3186
Izvestia 3134

J

Jaffe, Philip J 2978, 3165, 3169
Japan's Place in the Modern World 3167
Japan's Policies and Purposes 3167
Japanese Emperor 3054, 3069, 3070, 3071, 3140
Japanese Government 2982,
3011, 3048, 3054, 3112, 3113, 3114, 3119, 3135, 3137, 3138, 3139,
3173, 3187, 3188, 3194, 3202, 3217, 3266, 3269, 3274.
Japanese Monroe Doctrine 3137
Jefferson School Book Shop 3055, 3056, 3058, 3060, 3061
Jefferson School of Social Science 3055, 3056, 3058, 3060, 3061
Jessup, Philip C 2905, 3167, 3263, 3264
John Hopkins University 2900, 2901, 3037,
3083, 3084, 3107, 3191, 3198, 3211, 3215, 3218, 3242, 3250, 3266
Johnson, Nelson T 2912
Judd, Walter 3114, 3141, 3160

K

Kahn, Albert 3071, 3073, 3092
Kaji, Ryuichi 3167, 3168
Kantorovitch 3173, 3174

Page
Karachi Embassy (Afghanistan) 3219
Keeney 2968
Kennan, George F 3000, 3008, 3010, 3011, 3048, 3076
Kerner, Robert J 2981
Key Economic Areas in Chinese History 3138, 3165
King Edward (England) 3140, 3248
King William (Prussia) 3224
Kizer, Benjamin H 3199
Knowland, Senator William F 3029, 3038, 3039, 3040, 3044, 3045, 3046
Koerber, Lenka Von 3167
Kohlberg, Alfred 2981, 3037, 3042, 3054, 3106, 3143
Kramer, Aaron 3061
Kremlin 2915, 2919, 3098, 3113, 3114, 3134, 3224
Krivitsky, General Walter 3102
Kuomintang Government 2990, 2995, 3027, 3033, 3134, 3182, 3183, 3184, 3185, 3186, 3187
Kurile Islands 3007

L

Labor Research Association 3061
Labor Youth League 3059, 3058, 3061
LaGuardia, Mayor 3070
Lamont, Corliss 3060
Land and Sea and the Destiny of Japan 3194
Landau, Jacob 3035
Landon 2913
Lang, Olga 3126, 3128
Langer, Senator William 3070
Larson 2978
Lash, James F 3264
Lasker, Bruno 3167, 3168
Lasky, Victor 2897, 3043
Lattimore, David 3194, 3266
Lattimore, Owen 2897–3275
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) 2898, 2901, 3065, 3066, 3067, 3068, 3259
League of Nations 2291, 2997, 3168
Lee, York 3060
Lenin 3185, 3187, 3189, 3236
Levy, Roger 3167, 3270
Lewis, Fulton, Jr 3041
Library of Congress 3107, 3153, 3154, 3256
Lieu, D. K 3167
Life Magazine 3009
Lindt, A. R 3167
Lines of Cleavage in Inner Mongolia 3240
Lin Yatang 3167
Lin Yu 3133, 3167, 3168
Lin Yu-Wan 3173
Literary Digest 2981
Little Brown & Co 3056, 3058
Little Brown Girl Degree 3193
Liverpool University 3168
Lockwood, William W 3199
Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot 2955, 2956
Loeb, Julius 3169
London Airport 3231
Louisville Courier 3035
Loyalty Board (State Department) 2943, 2944, 2945, 2948, 2961, 2968, 2975, 2976, 2977, 3000, 3001, 3002, 3049
Luccock, Emory 3144
Luce, Henry 3096
Luce Publications 2982

M

Page
Ma Hai-teh ---- 3169
Ma, Ning ---- 2971
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas ---- 2997, 3053, 3054, 3070
Made in Japan ---- 3168
Makers of Public Opinion about the Far East ---- 3167
Manchester Guardian ---- 3168
Manchu Abdication and the Powers ---- 3167
Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict ---- 3266
Mandel, William M ---- 2986, 3061
Mander, Linden A ---- 3167, 3168
Mao Tse-tung ---- 2976, 3009, 3059, 3186, 3187
Marsh, Frank ---- 3159, 3160, 3163
Marshall, Gen. George C ---- 3007, 3008, 3012, 3026, 3039, 3109, 3111, 3112, 3113, 3114, 3116, 3118
Marshall Mission ---- 3007, 3008, 3012, 3026
Marshall Plan ---- 3118
Marx, Karl ---- 3060, 3130, 3131, 3132, 3138, 3177, 3178, 3179, 3180, 3181, 3182, 3184, 3185, 3187, 3188, 3196, 3236, 3248, 3249, 3251, 3252, 3253, 3255, 3257.
Matsui, Miss Haru ---- 3169
Matsuo, M ---- 3167, 3168
Matusow, Harvey M ---- 3055–3063
Mau Ming ---- 3146, 3148
Max, Allen ---- 3060
Maxwell, B. W ---- 3167
May Day in Tokyo ---- 3169
Mayflower Hotel ---- 3263, 3265
McCarran Act ---- 3046
McCarthy, Senator Joseph R ---- 2946, 2955, 2981, 3036, 3054, 3077, 3078, 3083, 3085, 3096, 3097, 3098, 3103, 3108, 3218, 3219, 3231
McClellan, Senator John L ---- 3069
McCullough, Admiral ---- 3159, 3160, 3161, 3163
McGovern, Professor ---- 2928, 3053, 3054, 3069, 3097, 3105
McInnis, Edgar ---- 3167, 3168
McMahon, Senator Brien ---- 3039
McMillen, William H ---- 3159, 3162
McMurray, John V. A ---- 2912
Mechanics Institute Building (San Francisco) ---- 3176
Medina, Judge ---- 2897, 2970, 2985
Meeting on Pacific Affairs ---- 3135
Meens, Father Charles ---- 3144
Memering, H. R ---- 3159
Merkuloff, Mr ---- 3224
Merrell, W. P ---- 3167
Michigan University ---- 3168
Migration and Planes of Living, 1920–34 ---- 3167
Miller, Margaret ---- 3167, 3168
Millet ---- 2912
Millis, Walter ---- 3167
Mitchell ---- 2978
Molotov, Vyacheslaff M. (Molotov) ---- 3224
Mongols of Manchuria ---- 3266
Moore, Harriet ---- 2986, 3126, 3128, 3132, 3133, 3135, 3136, 3149, 3156, 3167, 3168, 3171, 3172, 3236, 3241, 3242, 3243, 3244, 3265
Morgan ---- 2960, 2961, 2962, 2966, 2968
Moscow Airdrome ---- 3224
Moscow Conference ---- 3156
Moscow Garrison ---- 3224
Motylev, V. E ---- 3135–3139, 3147, 3149, 3152, 3155, 3171–3174, 3176, 3221, 3222, 3229, 3234, 3236, 3238–3240, 3243, 3247, 3248
Mueller, Hans (Asiaticus) ---- 2989, 3128, 3130, 3131, 3132, 3133, 3134, 3139, 3148, 3154, 3155, 3156, 3157, 3158, 3167, 3170, 3174, 3175, 3177, 3181, 3182, 3185, 3186, 3187, 3188, 3190, 3236
Munson, Lyle ---- 3007
Murphy, J. Morden ---- 3079

Page
Murrow, Edward R---- 3041
My Country and My People---- 3167

N

National Peking University---- 3168
Nationalist Chinese Government---- 2978, 2979, 3008, 3010, 3011, 3023, 3024, 3033, 3046, 3058, 3070, 3078, 3087, 3108–3113, 3120, 3142, 3143, 3148, 3184, 3198, 3265, 3266.
Native Customary Law in the Netherlands East Indies---- 3167
Navy (United States)---- 3012, 3013
Nazi-German Pact---- 3228, 3230
Nazi Party---- 3073, 3094, 3226, 3228, 3230, 3241
Need for Constitutional Reform---- 3167
Nehru, Pandi Jawaharial---- 3078
Nesi, Jim---- 3058, 3060, 3061
Nesi, Ruth---- 3058
Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law---- 3167
New Century Publishers---- 3061
New China Daily News---- 3144, 3163, 3164, 3168, 3195
New Haven Register---- 3035
New Masses---- 3003
New Republic---- 3035
New World (Novyi Mir)---- 3107
New York Federal Court---- 2970
New York Herald Tribune---- 3035
New York State Educational Committee---- 3058, 3059, 3062, 3063
New York Times---- 2979, 2997, 2998, 3040, 3069, 3108, 3222, 3223, 3224, 3265, 3266
New York World-Telegram---- 2967
New Zealand---- 3167
Nixon, Senator Richard M---- 3046
NKVD. (*See* Ogpu.)
Norman, Winifred---- 3061
North China Daily News---- 3163, 3164, 3168
North Korean Government---- 3029, 3031
Northwestern University---- 2928
Norton, Robert---- 3169
Novyi Mir (New World)---- 3107

O

O'Donnell, John---- 2993
Office of War Information (OWI)---- 3053, 3159, 3160, 3161, 3207, 3213
Ogpu (NKVD)---- 3224
Old State, War, and Navy Building---- 2921, 3209
One Who Survived---- 3102, 3103
Ordeal by Slander---- 3231, 3259
Organized Labor Faces the New World---- 3073
Organized Labor in Mexico---- 3167
Oudendyk---- 2916
Oumansky, Constantine---- 3260, 3262, 3263, 3264, 3265, 3266, 3267, 3268, 3269
Our Children---- 3169
Our Job in the Pacific---- 3055, 3058
Overseas News Agency---- 3026, 3032, 3034, 3035
Owens, Hamilton---- 3231, 3268
OWI. (*See* Office of War Information.)

P

Pacific Affairs---- 2905–2913, 2916, 2918, 2921, 2925, 2956, 2980–2983, 2991, 3019, 3101, 3125, 3128–3139, 3144–3149, 3152–3157, 3166–3168, 3173–3197, 3203–3208, 3231–3238, 3242, 3244, 3248–3257, 3266, 3267, 3271.
Pacific Affairs Bibliographies---- 3167
Pacific Problems---- 3195

Page
Pacific Publishing Foundation, Inc 3073
Pacific Weekly 3168
Palace Hotel (San Francisco) 3264
Paris, Leonard 2977
Pauley, Edwin M 3053, 3054
Pauley Mission 3053, 3054
Pauley Report 3054
Pearl Harbor 2982, 3060, 3070, 3113, 3217
Peking Government 3184
Peking National University 3168
Peking & Tientsin Times 3024
Penfield, James 2913
Penrose, E. F 3167, 3168
Peoples Daily World 3045, 3071, 3072, 3073
People's Songs, Inc. 3056, 3057
Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution 3138
Phillips, P. D 3167
Philosophical Library 3060
Pickering, E. H 3167
Pivot of Asia 3104
Plot Against Peace 3071, 3073
Poison for Profit 3169
Polish Government 3223
Political Affairs 3061
Pollard, R. T 3167, 3168
Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome 3168
Poppe, Prof. Nicholas 3235, 3236, 3240
Population Theories and Their Application 3168
Porter. (*See* Arnold, Fortas & Porter.)
Porter, Catherine 3167, 3193, 3241
Potemkin, Vladimir P 3224
Praesidium (U. S. S. R.) 3242, 3243
President's Loyalty Review Board 3001, 3049
Preuss, Lawrence 3167, 3168
Price, Harriet 2986
Price, Harry B 3144
Price, Mildred 2986, 3062
Princeton University 3200
Progressive Party 3057

R

Reader's Digest 2981
Red Star Over China 3062, 3182, 3185, 3188
Reede 3167
Reid, John Gilbert 3167
Remer, C. F 3167, 3168
Reporter 3017
Republican Party (GOP) 2948, 2949, 3026, 3045, 3110, 3111, 3112
Rhee, Syngman 3026, 3027, 3028, 3029, 3032
Ribbentrop, Joachim Von 3223, 3224, 3225
Rice 2912
Rice Export from Burma, Siam, and French Indo-China 3167
Ringwald 2913
Rise of Land Tax and Fall of Dynasties in Chinese History 3167
Rivers, Juan Santo 3057
Road to War 3167
Robertson, C. J 3133, 3167, 3168
Robertson, William S 3079
Rockefeller Foundation 2981
Rodgers, Manville 3169
Rogov, Vladimir N 3174, 3274
Romm, Vladimir 3173
Romulo, Brig. Gen. Carlos 3070
Roosevelt, Nicholas 2981

Page
Roosevelt, President ---- 2921
2976, 2977, 2979, 3052, 3053, 3087, 3088, 3198, 3202, 3209, 3210, 3211, 3265, 3269.
Rosinger, Lawrence ---- 2986
3021, 3059, 3067, 3075, 3078, 3079, 3126, 3128, 3249, 3253
Ross, I. Clunies ---- 3167
Ross, Norman ---- 3061
Rothman, Michael ---- 3169
Royal Central Asian Society ---- 2900, 2901
Royal Geographical Society ---- 2900, 2901, 3024
Royal Institute of International Affairs ---- 3131
Russell, Francis J ---- 3086
Russell, Senator Richard ---- 3069
Russia ---- 2908
2916–2920, 2925, 2947, 2977–2982, 2991, 2997–3002, 3007–3011, 3018, 3023–3026, 3032, 3048, 3076, 3087–3093, 3103, 3107–3114, 3117–3125, 3128, 3135–3140, 3146, 3149, 3152, 3167, 3168, 3174, 3176, 3182–3197, 3201, 3203, 3223–3232, 3236, 3240–3243, 3248, 3252, 3255, 3260, 3262, 3265, 3268–3274.
Russian Academy of Sciences ---- 3235
Russian Army ---- 2997, 3098, 3224, 3270
Russian Embassy (Washington, D. C.) ---- 3268
Russian Foreign Office ---- 3224, 3235
Russian-German Nonaggression Pact ---- 3220, 3222, 3223, 3224, 3227, 3226, 3241, 3208
Russian Institute (IPR) ---- 3229
Russian-Japanese Neutrality Pact ---- 2982
Russian Revolution of 1905 ---- 3107
Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party ---- 3107
Russo, Augusto ---- 3224
Ryan, Rt. Rev. Msgr. John A ---- 3167

S

Sabotage ---- 3071
Sacher, Harry ---- 2967, 2969, 2985
St. Louis Post-Despatch ---- 3035
Saito, H ---- 3167
San Francisco, Calif.-Peoples World ---- 3045, 3071, 3072, 3073
Santos Hearing ---- 2967, 2968
Santos, John (Alias Desideriu Hammer) ---- 2955, 2962, 2967, 2968, 2969
Saturday Evening Post ---- 2981, 2982
Schiller, A. Arthur ---- 3133, 3167, 3168
Scholefield, Guy H ---- 3167
Schulenberg, Count Frederich Werner ---- 3224, 3225
Schumpeter, Elizabeth Boody ---- 2981
Schweitzer, Leonard J ---- 3094
Schwellenbach, Judge ---- 3199
Schwellenbach, Senator ---- 3144
Science and Society ---- 3060
Scott, F. R ---- 3195, 3264
Scroggs, William O ---- 3167
Sears, Louis M ---- 3167
Second Congress of the Soviets ---- 3107
Second World War ---- 2990, 2999, 3007, 3060
Secretariat (IPR) ---- 3168, 3244
Senate Committee on Appropriations ---- 3081
Senate of the United States (See United States Senate)
Service, Donald ---- 2912
Service, John S ---- 2961, 3000, 3002, 3004, 3048, 3049, 3068
Settlement of the Australian Tropics ---- 3167
Sharman, Lyon ---- 3167
Shaughnessy, Edward ---- 2967
Shepardson, Whitney H ---- 3167
Shippe, M. G. (*See* Hans Mueller.)
Shoemaker, James ---- 3200
Siberian Russian Army ---- 3011

Page
Sino-Japanese War---- 3188
Slipping Past Japan's Censor---- 3169
Smedley, Agnes---- 3060, 3061
Snow, Edgar---- 3061, 3126, 3128, 3182, 3183, 3184, 3185, 3188
Social-Democrats---- 3180
Social Democratic Party of Latvia---- 3107
Social and Economic History of Japan---- 3167
Social Science Research Council---- 3266
Socialist Party---- 3130, 3131, 3183, 3186, 3189
Sokolsky, George---- 3043
Solution in Asia---- 3054, 3055, 3056, 3058, 3059, 3062, 3063, 3069, 3071, 3073, 3089, 3105
Soong, T. V---- 3266
South Korean Government---- 3025, 3028, 3029, 3030, 3031, 3032, 3033, 3035, 3047, 3048
South Manchuria Railway---- 3023
South Manchuria Railway Co---- 3168
Soviet Communism: A New Civilization---- 3167
Soviet Five-Year Plans---- 3176
Soviet Military Intelligence---- 3103
Soviet Russia Fights Crime---- 3167
Soviet State---- 3167
Soviet Union---- 2903, 2916–2920, 2925, 2947, 2977–2982, 2991, 2997–3002, 3007–3011, 3018, 3023–3026, 3032, 3048, 3076, 3087–3093, 3103, 3107–3114, 3117–3125, 3128, 3135–3140, 3146, 3149, 3152, 3167, 3168, 3174, 3176, 3182–3197, 3201, 3203, 3223–3232, 3236, 3240–3243, 3248, 3252, 3255, 3260, 3262, 3265, 3268–3274.
Spanish Government---- 2945, 3120
Special Correspondent with Bandit and General in Manchuria---- 3167
Sproul, Robert Gordon---- 2985
St. Louis Post Dispatch---- 3035
Stalin, Joseph---- 2997, 3115, 3139, 3140, 3185, 3205, 3220, 3222, 3226, 3227, 3235, 3241, 3247, 3264
Stassen, Harold---- 3074, 3075, 3076, 3078, 3082, 3083, 3084, 3085, 3097
State Department---- 2899, 2901, 2905–2907, 2910–2913, 2917–2921, 2940–2945, 2948, 2951, 2961, 2968, 2975–2977, 2982, 3000–3007, 3010, 3011, 3017–3022, 3026, 3027, 3030–3051, 3053, 3068, 3071, 3074–3076, 3078–3080, 3092, 3108, 3113, 3115, 3197–3203, 3209, 3214–3219
State Department (Employee Loyalty Investigation)---- 2948, 2961, 2968, 2975, 2976, 2977, 3000, 3001, 3002, 3049
State Department (Far Eastern Division)---- 2911, 3209
State Department (Foreign Service)---- 2899, 2901, 2945, 3000, 3005, 3036, 3037, 3051
State Department (Loyalty Board)---- 2943, 2944, 2945, 2948, 2961, 2968, 2975, 2976, 2977, 3000, 3001, 3002, 3049
State Department (Office of Economic Adviser)---- 3209
Steamship *Washington*---- 3193
Steely, E. Newton---- 3158, 3159, 3161, 3162, 3163, 3164, 3165
Steiger, Andrew J---- 3126, 3128
Stein, Guenther---- 3126, 3128, 3133, 3157, 3167, 3168
Stettinius---- 3011
Stewart, Maxwell S---- 3169
Stewart, Senator Tom---- 3070
STKM---- 3221
Stone, William T---- 3200
Stradneks---- 3107
Strong, Anna Louise---- 3126, 3128
Sub, Organizations and Publications Guide (House Committee on Un-American Activities)---- 3073, 3080
Sunday Compass---- 3024, 3025, 3026, 3040
Sun Fo---- 3070
Sun Yat-sen---- 3167, 3168, 3182, 3188
Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning---- 3167, 3168
Supreme Court. (*See* United States Supreme Court.)
Survey---- 3205
Survey of International Affairs, 1934---- 3167

Page

Suveroff, General ---- 3224

T

Taft-Hartley Act ---- 3046
Talbott, E. Guy ---- 3169
Taracouzio ---- 3242
Tass ---- 3274
Tawney, R. H ---- 3103
Taylor, Senator ---- 3069
Ten-Year History of the IPR ---- 3173
Thackrey, Mr ---- 3034
Third Alternative ---- 3203, 3206
Third Internationale ---- 3160, 3163
Third World War ---- 3073
Thomas, Norman ---- 3190
Thorpe, General ---- 3053
San Min Chu I : Three Principles of the People ---- 3187, 3188
Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader ---- 3157, 3167
Tien Hsia Monthly ---- 3167
Tikhii Okean ---- 3137, 3173, 3174, 3241
Times (New York) ---- 2979, 2997, 2998, 3040, 3069, 3108, 3222, 3223, 3224, 3265, 3266
Timperley, H. J ---- 3133, 3167, 3168
Ting Ling ---- 3169
Tokyo Embassy ---- 2912
Tokyo Imperial University ---- 3168, 3200
Tolischus, Otto D ---- 3070, 3223
Tomkins Square Youth Club ---- 3060
Tooker, Dorothea ---- 3169
Toronto University ---- 3168
Town Hall, Inc ---- 3212
Toynbee, Arnold J ---- 2981, 3167
Trachtenberg ---- 2961
Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific ---- 3167
Treasury Department. (*See* United States Treasury Department.)
Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen ---- 3168
Trotsky, Leon ---- 3138, 3185, 3187, 3205
Truman, President ---- 3001, 3009, 3026, 3045, 3049, 3086, 3087, 3088, 3089, 3115, 3116, 3117
Tsarist Russia ---- 3188, 3189
Turlington ---- 3167
Twain, Mark ---- 3250
Twin Loyalties in Siam ---- 3133, 3167
Two Fathers of Their Countries ---- 3169
Tydings Committee ---- 2903, 2904, 2928, 2947–2952, 2955–2962, 2964–2966, 2968, 2969, 2972–2976, 2980, 2981, 3019, 3045, 3052, 3053, 3071, 3093–3097, 3108, 3136, 3144, 3145, 3148, 3190, 3191, 3251
Tydings, Senator Millard ---- 2903, 2904, 2928, 2947–2952, 2955–2962, 2964–1966, 2968, 2969, 2972–2976, 2980, 2981, 3019, 3045, 3052, 3053, 3071, 3093–3097, 3108, 3136, 3144, 3145, 3148, 3190, 3191, 3251
Tyler, Charlotte ---- 3167

U

UGT ---- 3057
Un-American Activities Committee ---- 2999, 3013, 3071, 3073, 3080, 3102, 3246, 3247
Un-American Activities Committee Report, 1947 ---- 3071, 3073
Un-American Activities Committee (California) Report 1948 ---- 3073
Under Trojan Horse Tactics (report) ---- 2998
Unfinished Revolution in China ---- 3059
United Nations ---- 2990, 3034, 3069, 3073, 3117, 3120, 3220
United Office and Professional Workers ---- 3061
United Press (UP) ---- 3032, 3100, 3220
United States Armed Forces ---- 3011, 3012, 3013, 3022, 3060, 3160, 3263
United States Army ---- 3060, 3160, 3263
United States and China ---- 3212
United States, China, and the World Market ---- 3254, 3259, 3260
United States Congress ---- 2920, 2957, 2978, 3026, 3029, 3111, 3169

3 9999 05018 315 9

Page

United States Department of Justice_ 2955, 2956, 2957, 2958, 2959, 2967, 2972, 2973
United States District Court (Baltimore) 3247
United States Embassy (Chungking) 3212, 3213
United States Embassy (Karachi, Afghanistan) 3219
United States Embassy (Tokyo) 2912
United States Foreign Service 2899, 2901, 2945, 3000, 3005, 3036, 3037, 3051
United States Fourth Army (Presidio, San Francisco) 3263
United States Government 2899, 2905, 2906, 2910, 2920, 2922, 2942, 2961, 2973, 2982, 2985, 2987–2991, 3011, 3019, 3027–3034, 3039, 3046, 3049, 3052, 3054, 3070, 3073, 3078, 3087, 3091, 3092, 3106, 3110, 3113, 3115, 3119, 3120, 3137, 3161, 3163, 3201, 3210, 3213, 3216, 3265–3267
United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs 3026, 3110
United States Immigration Service 2967
United States Information Service in China 3212
United States Library of Congress 3107, 3153, 3154, 3266
United States Lines 3191, 3193
United States Navy 3012, 3013
United States News and World 2923, 2980
United States Reports 2925, 2927
United States Senate 2897, 2934, 2963, 2966, 2968, 2976, 3014, 3045, 3098, 3114, 3209, 3275
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2948, 2949, 2961, 2968, 2976, 2977, 3114
United States Supreme Court 2970
United States Treasury Department 2920
United States in World Affairs in 1934–35 3167
University of California 2981, 3168
University of Liverpool 3168
University of Michigan 3168
University of Toronto 3168
University of Washington 3168, 3235
UP. (*See* United Press.)
Ushiba, Tomohiko 3167
U. S. S. R 2903, 2916–2920, 2925, 2947, 2977–2982, 2991, 2997–3002, 3007–3011, 3018, 3023–3026, 3032, 3048, 3076, 3087–3093, 3103, 3107–3114, 3117–3125, 3128, 3135–3140, 3146, 3149, 3152, 3167, 3168, 3174, 3176, 3182–3197, 3201, 3203, 3223–3232, 3236, 3240–3243, 3248, 3252, 3255, 3260, 3262, 3265, 3268–3274.
Utley, Miss Freda 2928, 3042, 3077, 3094, 3095, 3108, 3144

V

Van Kleeck, Mary 3126, 3128
Varga 3235
Vasilevitch, Pavel. (*See* Ian Antonovich Berzin.)
Verlag, Agis 3170
Vincent, John Carter 2912, 2945, 2957, 2978, 3000, 3003, 3004, 3014, 3032, 3048, 3068, 3077, 3086, 3089, 3092, 3108
Vinter. (*See* Ian Antonovich Berzin.)
Voitinsky, Grigorii N 3135, 3140, 3147, 3149, 3152, 3171, 3174, 3232, 3234, 3235, 3241
Volks 3242
Von Kanton Big Shanghai 3166, 3168
Von Koerber, Lenka 3167
Von Ribbentrop, Joachim 3223, 3225

W

Wales, Nym 3127–3128
Walker, E. Ronald 3167
Wall Street Journal 2982
Wallace, Henry A 2957, 2961, 3024, 3053, 3055, 3058, 3112
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations 2900, 3141
Wang Yu-Chuan 3133, 3167, 3168
Ward, Harold 3169
Warren, Governor 3046

Page
Washington Post ... 3040
Washington Treaties ... 3194
Watertown Times (New York) ... 3035
Way of a Fighter ... 3029
Webb ... 3140, 3173
Webb, Beatrice ... 3167
Webb, Sidney ... 3167
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C ... 3004, 3005, 3012, 3114
Welles, Sumner ... 2921
Western Powers ... 3029
What Will Congress Do ... 3169
Where Nippon Sits on a Volcano ... 3169
White Book ... 3011
White House ... 2920, 3052, 3053, 3199, 3202, 3208, 3211, 3212
White Paper ... 3113
White Russian Armies ... 3235
White, Senator Wallace H ... 3070
Wholesale Book Corp ... 3060
Who's Who ... 3107, 3212
Whyte ... 3137, 3139, 3172
Wilbur ... 3264
Wilbur, Ray Lyman ... 2985
William (King of Prussia) ... 3224
Williams, W. Wynne ... 3133, 3167, 3168
Winter, Ella ... 3127, 3128
Wittfogel, Karl ... 2928, 3097, 3103, 3106, 3132–3134, 3141, 3165, 3166, 3194
Wittfogel, Mrs. Karl. (*See* Esther S. Goldfrank.)
Workers Book Shop ... 3058, 3060, 3061
Workers Library Publishers ... 2999
World Policies and World Economics ... 3235
World Production and Consumption of Sugar ... 3168
World-Telegram (New York) ... 2967
World War II ... 2990, 2999, 3007, 3060
World War III ... 3073
World Youth Festival (Budapest) ... 3057
Wright, Philip G ... 3167

Y

Yakontoff, Victor A ... 3128, 3169
Yale University ... 3168
Yalta Agreement ... 2979, 3007–3013
Yanaihara ... 3176
Yarnell, Admiral Harry E ... 3198
Years of Fulfillment ... 3167
YMCA. (*See* Young Men's Christian Association.)
York, Lee ... 3060
Young Men's Christian Association ... 3144
Youth ... 3059
Yu, Bishop Paul Pin ... 3144

Z

Zemelis. (*See* Ian Antonovich Berzin.)
Zimmerwald Conference ... 3107
Zinkin, Maurice ... 3110
Zinoviev ... 3235

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 10

MARCH 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, AND 21, 1952

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

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CONTENTS

	Page
Testimony of Lattimore, Owen	3277–3674
Appendix I	3680–3714

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY
LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Watkins, and Jenner.

Also present: Senator McCarthy, J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD, ESQ., COUNSEL—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, the other day, at the close of the hearing, I said I had some questions to ask in relation to the reports that came out of the Moscow meeting.

It was indicated that Mr. Lattimore did not know anything about these reports that appeared now in the evidence.

Is that still your contention, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. To the best of my recollection, I don't remember them.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I say to the best of my recollection, I don't remember ever seeing those minutes before.

Senator FERGUSON. You wrote Ordeal by Slander?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And you feel that you are responsible for all that is in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I ask you to look at page 51. It is a chapter by your wife:

> We had breakfast with Edward C. Carter. Mr. Carter had been secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations when Owen had edited Pacific Affairs, and I wanted to see him because McCarthy's speech had dealt at length with the IPR and Owen's connection with it, all still based on Kohlberg and China Lobby, and had laid great stress on Owen's one visit to Moscow where he had spent 10 days with Carter on IPR business in 1936.

Now, that is the meeting that we were talking about the other day; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I read further:

The present secretary-general, William Holland, and his family, also old friends of ours, were staying at the Carters', and it made me happy to know that I had won support and help of all of them. Mr. Carter gave me copies of old reports he and Owen had made to the IPR about the Moscow visit, and also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night before.

Now, where are those reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We have them in our file now.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they the same as this report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not tell us before about these reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Why should I?

Senator FERGUSON. Why should you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you not sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the time of these hearings, this whole business that some reports that I had written at that time had been shown to my wife had completely slipped my mind. It is in a printed book.

Senator FERGUSON. When we produced the reports out of the files that we obtained up in the barn, did you not indicate to us that you were in no way responsible for any of those reports, and inferred any other reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't infer anything of the kind, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce the reports now that are mixed in here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They are in a printed book somewhere. I will try and find them for you and bring them to you.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they made from these typewritten reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I remember that the general procedure was that when I came back from a trip of that kind, I think I would write in a sort of letter report.

Senator FERGUSON. But here were official reports as if they were taken at the meetings; is that not true?

The CHAIRMAN. Answer audibly, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what they appear to be; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you not infer in your answers that you felt that we should not use that kind of report, because you had no knowledge of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. All that I inferred was that the statements there made about what was being discussed were reports of my words and were not a stenographic record of what I had actually said, and I also stated that I did not recall ever having seen those reports.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not suppose that those reports were used by Carter, at least, in making up the reports?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea how Carter made up his reports.

Senator FERGUSON. It says here that you and Carter made them up.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made a report, and Carter made a report, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what this says?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see that?

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us the report that you made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will try and find the book in which it is; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us have the report. The report was not in a book; you did not write the book and give it to them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I wrote a report to the IPR, I believe, which was included in one of the IPR publications.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you keep a copy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When I wrote it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look and see?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I haven't seen it.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that show that you wrote a report or you and Carter wrote a report?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Mr. Carter gave me copies of old reports. * * *

That is indicating more than one report—

* * * He and Owen had made to the IPR about the Moscow visit.

That would indicate to me that he had made a report and I had made a report—

And also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see that press release?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall ever seeing it, no.

Senator FERGUSON. You passed off rather lightly this meeting with Moscow in your Ordeal by Slander; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't think it was a very important meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think it was important. That is all at the present time. I will have further questions when we see your report.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Sourwine, I think you drew my attention to the fact that a question was pending when we concluded.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, according to my memory. The witness had begun an answer and had not concluded at the time the recess was called.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the record of yesterday's proceedings available?

Mr. MORRIS. It will be here in a moment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris; you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive into the record at this time the date of the Russian-Japanese Nonaggression Pact that was signed in 1941?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the World Almanac of 1944, page 36, under the heading of Japan: "Signed 5 year neutrality pact with Russia April 13, 1941."

The CHAIRMAN. What is the object of that? Will you please connect that up?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness yesterday gave testimony concerning a meeting that was held in Washington on June 18, 1931, and we were trying to determine the political atmosphere that prevailed at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, sir.

Before you proceed, I have here page 5337 of the record of these proceedings. Mr. Lattimore was under examination by Mr. Morris. I read from that page to connect it up:

> Mr. MORRIS. Who was present at the meeting?

Does that give you a connection, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. SOURWINE. Reference was being had to the luncheon with Rogov, I believe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think it was a luncheon.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct. You stated that it was not a luncheon. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN (reading):

> Mr. SOURWINE. It was pretty late in the afternoon to have a luncheon?
> Mr. LATTIMORE. The middle of the afternoon.
> Mr. MORRIS. How long did it last, Mr. Lattimore?
> Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.
> Mr. MORRIS. Who was present at the meeting?
> Mr. LATTIMORE. The only person that I clearly recall being present, because I walked out with him afterward * * *

Do you wish to finish that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only person I recall was Mr. C. F. Remer, who was at that time, I believe, connected with OSS, one of the United States intelligence agencies, and I believe I recall commenting to him as we went out about some of the questions that had been asked Rogov.

I may say that I remember asking Rogov only one question myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, how long did that meeting last?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Was John Carter Vincent present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether he was present or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, on our exhibit No. 26, introduced into the open hearings, is the document from Rose Yardumian, of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to Mr. Edward C. Carter.

The postcript on that reads:

> Rogov and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last two and a half hours, talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

That is the notation on this letter which describes the meeting that the witness is now testifying to. That is already in our record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that refresh your memory?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not very much.

According to my memory, there would have been more people present than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it refresh your memory that you were there for several hours, two and a half hours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not very clearly, no.

Mr. MORRIS. It could have been longer, too, could it not have been, Mr. Lattimore?

At that point it lasted two and a half hours.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It could have been longer, or it could have been shorter.

Senator FERGUSON. The only Vincent that was indicated there would have been Vincent of the State Department, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Up here in the letter itself it is: "talked with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Carter Vincent."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may point out, Mr. Senator, that here was a Russian who had been in Japanese occupied Shanghai, and it was a highly proper thing at that time for American Government personnel to interview such a person and see if they could get any information out of him.

Senator FERGUSON. But there was not any doubt about him being a Communist, was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Nor was there any doubt even of the fact that American Government personnel should try to get any information they could out of Japanese occupied Shanghai, in 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. But did not your book say that you did not know any Russians or Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think if you will read the context of that, Senator Ferguson, you will see that it clearly shows that my wife was writing in 1950, that as of 1950 I didn't know any Russians in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say you didn't know——

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute.

Do I understand you want to convey to us now that your wife was writing and you approved it in your book that, as of the date that you wrote the book, you did not know any Russians or Communists? In 1950? Why do you limit it to 1950?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not limiting it in that manner at all, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you mean by 1950?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This was written in 1950. Where is the reference?

The CHAIRMAN. Just one moment. I would like to have the record read back there, if you please.

(The record, as heretofore transcribed, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I limit it to 1950 because it was written in 1950, and the context clearly shows that she was writing about the general period of 1950, and the McCarthy charges.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you charged as of 1950 of associating with the Communists on the day that she wrote it? It does not say anything about 1950 there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I still haven't been able to find the exact reference.

Mr. MORRIS. It is page 35, Mr. Lattimore. You will probably find it underlined.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; here is the context.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

McCarthy had replied that this is completely untrue. This man has a desk at the State Department and has access to the files, at least he had until 4 or 5 weeks ago. He is one of the top advisers on Far Eastern affairs, has been for a long time, and they know it.

Nothing in McCarthy's description fitted Owen, but the thought crossed my mind that Tydings' description did. He had been on the Reparations Mission to Japan 5 years ago. It was a White House mission, but I just discovered in looking through old records that he had been paid by the State Department. But the thought was too fantastic. He didn't know any Russians in this country or any Communists. He didn't have access to any secret material. How could anybody, even McCarthy, accuse him of being a spy?

Senator FERGUSON. You claim that that refers only to the time that she was writing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That refers to the general period in which she was writing, and in which McCarthy was saying that I was—apparently McCarthy meant at that time—the top Soviet agent in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. And also does it not say that: "He had been on the Reparations Commission to Japan 5 years ago"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that refer to the time she was writing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would mean that at the time she was writing, she was actually stating that 5 years before I had been in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, would not Mrs. Lattimore have written "he doesn't know any Russians" if she were talking about that present time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris, I think this is a rather quibbling question about grammar.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. MORRIS. It is not quibbling. She would have said "He doesn't know any Russians," to bear out your interpretation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. She is writing a chapter there about her experiences before I got home from Afghanistan, and she was saying that as of this time of her experiences, before I got back from Afghanistan, she was saying that I didn't know any Russians in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. And also she was writing at a time, Mr. Lattimore, was she not, when you were coming back, and you approved this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was not writing at that time. She was writing about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait until the Senator finishes his question.

Senator FERGUSON. But she was also writing, and putting it in your book, and had it distributed after the Tydings hearings; is that not right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you not feel that that was the end of all hearings on that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly hoped it was. However, I was already somewhat aware of the new practice of multiple jeopardy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you call this multiple jeopardy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think this was all brought out in the Tydings hearings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was quite sufficiently brought out in the Tydings hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. I would think that you would think it was sufficiently brought out there, but we did not.

Now, the Tydings hearings have access to the documents in reply to this, showing that you did know Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None of the documents that had been brought out show that I knew Communists in 1950, or Russians, in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. So you want to limit this now to your activities in 1950?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I would just like a distinction kept clear between the period that my wife was quite obviously writing about and the period ranging up to 10 and more years previously, covered by these various items from the IPR files that Mr. Morris has been bringing out.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when did you leave the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When did I leave it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean its employ?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I left its employ in 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you cease being a member of the trustees?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I am still a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. You still are a trustee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you think that your activities as far as this book was concerned, you were limiting them to 1950?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I am saying that my wife's statement was limited to the general period of 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. That did not become your statement by the publishing of the book?

That is not a legal problem?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Would you repeat that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not become your statement when you published the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It became the statement in a book published, of which I was listed as the author, certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you want to answer the question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the way I want to answer it; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with this mention of the man Rogoff in this line of questioning, I would like to have a little background from the previous testimony about this.

Mr. Mandel, will you read from the bottom of page 528 in the Budenz testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. The Budenz testimony is before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Before this committee, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Mr. Budenz was then under oath?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. (Reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, can you tell us of another meeting you attended which Mr. Field reported for the IPR?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a meeting of 1943 when I began to anticipate and then thought of the 1940 series of meetings. At this meeting of the political bureau at which Earl Browder I know definitely was present, and I believe Robert William Weiner. His name strikes me because he was not always present at these meetings, and other members of the Politburo who were not generally there, including Trachtenberg. At this meeting Mr. Field stated that he had received word from Mr. Lattimore. It is my impression that he had seen Mr. Lattimore personally just a day or two before, but I may be mistaken. It was a

communication either personally or in some other way. Mr. Field just returned from a trip and I get the impression that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore personally, and Mr. Lattimore stated that information coming to him from the international Communist apparatus where he was located indicated that there was to be a change of line very sharply on Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say that the negative opposition to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a positive opposition and that more stress was to be put upon attacking Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Communist Party line change at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists took action to discover the accuracy of this. They were advised that there was in the course of preparation an article by Vladimir Rogoff, the Tass correspondent, written at Moscow's request on this question which would attack the appeasers in China and Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. The Tass correspondent, you say?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain what Tass was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Tass was the official Soviet news agency in this country and so far as I know still is, but I knew it then quite definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this article subsequently communicated to the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article was communicated to the Daily Worker. The first message was received through Grace Granich who had been in charge of the Intercontinent News, a Soviet agency, which had been put out of business by the Department of Justice, but who continued to maintain her relations with the Soviet Embassy, consulate, and other sources of information, including communications to Moscow and we were advised of the coming of this article and then we received it.

Mr. MORRIS. And was the Communist line actually changed as a result of these steps that were taken?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Politburo suggested that someone, and the name of T. A. Bisson was mentioned in that connection, be enlisted to write an article in connection with the Institute of Pacific Affairs publication on this matter explaining the democratic character of the Chinese Communists and indicating that Chiang Kai-shek and his group represented antidemocracy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz, but you mentioned the Institute of Pacific Affairs. You were referring to the Institute of Pacific Relations and its publication Pacific Affairs?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. I sort of got the two together.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did T. A. Bisson write an article for the IPR at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of the article, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the name of the article. I recall that it was not published in Pacific Affairs as implied in the testimony just read.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is the article by Mr. Bisson which was written for the Institute of Pacific Relations in our record now?

Mr. MANDEL. It is in our record on page 534 of our hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that article?

Mr. MANDEL. The date of the article is July 14, 1943, published in the Far Eastern Survey.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Far Eastern Survey an official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It is an official organ of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get this straight, now.

This article that you are about to read, the witness says was not published in the publication Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not published in Pacific Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. You are now reading from another magazine?

Mr. MORRIS. There were only two publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one Pacific Affairs and the other Far Eastern Survey.

The CHAIRMAN. And this is from the Far Eastern Survey.

Senator SMITH. What connection did he have with that?

Mr. MORRIS. It is going to be brought out, Senator, the connection there.

Will you read the two passages?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called Feudal China; the other Democratic China. These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

Then further:

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, does not Mr. T. A. Bisson there label Nationalist China feudal China, and Communist China a democratic China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Apparently he does.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that particular article provoke the Chinese Council of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I have subsequently read somewhere, maybe in the transcript of these proceedings, that it did. I had nothing to do with the article at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did. At that time I was exceedingly busy as Deputy Director of OWI in San Francisco, and I don't believe I was keeping up with the Institute of Pacific Relations' publications at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you agree with that particular article by Mr. Bisson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to read the whole article to determine whether I agreed with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew about this article, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the time?

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time and here, as of today, yesterday, the day before yesterday?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Subsequently I have seen it mentioned in the transcripts that I have read. I haven't reread the article.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, did you not have this article so clearly in mind that when Senator Ferguson the other day referred to the matter you corrected him both as to the name of the author and as to the place where the article had appeared?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember it clearly enough for that.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew that that was the change in policy, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I knew from reading the transcript of these proceedings, and also, I believe, the Tydings proceedings, that this had been referred to as having something to do with a change in line.

With the article I had no connection whatever. I don't know enough about the history of the Communist line to know whether that was in fact a switch in the Communist line; but whether it was a switch or a continuation of an old line, or whatever it may be, it certainly did not coincide with what I was saying and writing at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a party line, that the Communists had a party line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know in general that the Communists have a party line; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When would you say that you acquired that knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would be impossible to say.

Senator FERGUSON. About when?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would be impossible to say. The party line is something that is generally associated with Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. And has been for years, has it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And has been for years. I don't know how long. I have never been a specialist in Communist politics, and I have never made it my business to analyze the Communist Party line or the switches, or anything of that kind.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, then, Mr. Lattimore, that you did not at that time read the Bisson article and that the Bisson article was contrary to things you were writing at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is my testimony that, to the best of my recollection, I did not read the article at that time, didn't even know of it until some vague time later, and most of my knowledge of it at this moment is based on reading the transcripts of these proceedings.

Mr. MORRIS. And could it not coincide with what you were saying at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If it is a line that says—what is it supposed to have said?

Mr. MORRIS. That Nationalist China was feudal China, and that Communist China was democratic China.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All I remember is that as of 1943 I gave a couple of lectures down at Pomona College in San Francisco.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an answer.

Will you read the question, please, Mr. Reporter? Read Mr. Morris's question.

(The record, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter).

The CHAIRMAN. The question was, Was it contrary to the line you were writing at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I believe it is completely contrary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of the Office of War Information at 111 Center Street, San Francisco, Calif., dated July 26, 1943, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland, signed "Owen," and typed signature "Owen Lattimore, Director, Pacific Operations."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you look at that letter and testify as to whether or not you wrote that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I must have written this letter, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

DEAR BILL: Your letter of July 20 arrived just as I was reading T. A. Bisson's article on China. I was trying to formulate for myself some way of expressing an opinion. I think you do this very well. Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different terminology. Nevertheless, I think his main points are as sound as you think they are.

It is just possible that I may get to Washington at the end of this month and if so I hope to see you and Carter before you leave.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no use reading the rest of it unless you care to, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't need to. This apparently indicates that I agreed with some opinion that Mr. Holland expressed at that time which I had not seen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received in the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 512" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 512

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION,
111 SUTTER STREET,
San Francisco, Calif., July 26, 1943.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Your letter of July 20 arrived just as I was reading T. A. Bisson's article on China. I was trying to formulate for myself some way of expressing an opinion. I think you do this very well. Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom he might have persuaded with use of a different terminology. Nevertheless I think his main points are as sound as you think they are.

It is just possible that I may get to Washington at the end of this month and if so I hope to see you and Carter before you leave.

I am very much ashamed of having fallen down on my review assignment. I think I can assure you of the review article by September 15. However, the difference in publication date is not serious as the dating of the book itself now makes it a matter of the historical record of stages in Russian opinion about China, rather than an urgent current presentation.

If the University of California Press write to me for an opinion on Norin's manuscript, I shall be very glad to give a recommendation.

Yours,

Owen /s/
OWEN LATTIMORE,
Director, Pacific Operations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did T. A. Bisson go with you when you went to Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he did.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you make that trip to Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was in the spring of 1937 sometime.

Mr. MORRIS. What arrangement did you make for that trip, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We traveled from Peking by rail up to Shansi Province, then down south through Shansi Province, then west into Shensi Province, and got to what I think was the railhead at the city of Sian, and then we chartered a motor car and drove up to Yenan.

The CHAIRMAN. You say we. We was in the party?

Mr. MORRIS. Who accompanied you on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr Bisson and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you confer with Mao Tse-tung when you were in Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We had an interview with——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you confer with Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I did not call it conferring.

Mr. MORRIS. How much time did you spend with Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. I think there were a couple of interviews at which he was asked questions, principally by Mr. Bisson and Mr. Jaffe. Each of those interviews would probably last an hour or two. I am not sure how long.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you stay? Did you stay at the Foreign Office in Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We stayed at, I believe, a sort of hostel that they had for visitors.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, Mr. Lattimore, confer with Chu Teh?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not say that we conferred with him, no.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you speak with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I spoke with him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you speak with Chou En-lai?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you address a mass meeting in Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made some general remarks, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you write an account of that for the London Times, that trip to Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that. Maybe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked in the corner "F. V. F. etc." The title is "The Strongholds of Chinese Communism, a Journey to North Shensi," by Owen Lattimore. In the upper left-hand corner it says: "Sent by O. L. to Times, London (may not be published, of course)."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that article, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recall it, and I don't recall whether it was published, or not. I did occasionally publish articles in the London Times.

Mr. MORRIS. Then does that recall anything to you, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the exhibit identified by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Does not that purport to be an article that you prepared for the London Times, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It certainly appears to be. I had completely forgotten it, forgotten about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a true account of your experiences in Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably it is. I haven't read it yet. May I read it?

Mr. MORRIS. You may.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is headed "One," indicating that there may have been a later one. [Reading:]

(Exhibit No. 513)

Many people at Nanking will tell you that Chinese communism is finished. The appeal to class war has been dropped. The landlords are no longer being appropriated. The territory held by the Communists is poor in agriculture and almost barren of other resources. The Communists are already accepting subsidy from Nanking, and are offering to accept incorporation into Nanking's armies. This must mean, in the end, the "fading army" of the Communists as a separate political and military force, unless perhaps theiy faintly survive as a left-wing group within the orthodox Chinese nationalism.

Yet, if this be collapse, the Communists are not in the least anxious to cover it up. On the contrary, they claim that the present situation is chiefly of their own asking. It was they who relaxed the lockjaw silence of the Sian crisis last winter with the magic of their united-front slogans. They did not intervene until after Marshal Chiang Kai-shek had been made prisoner by the mutinous remnants of the old Manchurian armies. When they did intervene, it was to save the life of the Generalissimo, their mortal enemy of 10 years of civil war. This they did to show that they were more eager to rally the nation against Japan than to triumph over Nanking. The implication of what they say is that they do not intend to wither away in the ravines and loess plateau of north Shensi. There is more than a hint, in the assured maneuvering of the youthful veterans who led the Red armies, that they believe already that they have a negative control strong enough to prevent Nanking from doing what they do not like, which may yet be converted into positive control and full command of the situation.

All of this makes north Shensi not only a mystery, but a region in which perhaps can be discovered important clues to the unfolding history of eastern Asia; the struggle for unity in China; the forces welding illiterate millions into increasingly solid and formidable resistance against Japan; the convergence on China, from different directions, of Japan and the Soviet Union.

Not knowing of any underground tunnels that would lead me to north Shensi, I set about planning the journey in trustful innocence. I sent a letter to the Red capital, by ordinary mail, with my address candidly printed on the back of the envelope—and got in answer a cordial invitation. Accordingly, I went by train to Sian, the capital of Shensi, and then by car to Yenan, the Red capital, about 250 miles to the north.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, may I interrupt at that point?

Is that a true account of your preliminary arrangements to Yenan?

Mr. Lattimore. It sounds like it. I had completely forgotten about it.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I read from the testimony of Mr. Lattimore, taken in executive session before this committee?

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Morris. I am reading from page 71:

Mr. Morris. And before you went beyond that line—

That is the line separating Communist China from Nationalist China—

demarkation, it would be necessary to have the Communist authorities' permission; isn't that right?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Morris. You mean anyone could go up there?

Mr. Lattimore. At that time, the Communists were welcoming anybody who would go in. The government authorities were trying to stop people from going in.

Mr. Morris. The Nationalist Government?

Mr. Lattimore. The Nationalist Government.

Mr. Morris. So the only objection to going up there would come from the Nationalist Government?

Mr. Lattimore. The only objection came from the Nationalist Government.

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you or anybody in your party did not make any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in?

Mr. Lattimore. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Which is correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I see no conflict, Senator Ferguson.

Apparently, according to this account, I wrote up to the Reds and said, "Would it be all right if I came up?" and they said, "Sure, fine," and I went on up. They didn't make the arrangements.

And, as I state in this article, which I had completely forgotten, I didn't know about any underground tunnels leading up there. I just got on a train and went.

Senator FERGUSON. Read the last answer.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you or anybody in your party did not make any prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not tell us about writing the letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had completely forgotten about it. I wrote from Peking and I didn't consider that this indicates a prearrangement for travel arrangements at all.

Senator FERGUSON. You felt that you could not got in without the consent of the Communists or you would have never written them.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I wanted to have the whole thing completely in the open, so I wrote a letter up there saying, "Would it be all right if I wanted to come?"

I knew in general that all of the newspapermen were trying to get up there. I don't know whether other newspapermen used the same method that I did, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know other newspapermen, whether they did get up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, other newspapermen did get up.

Senator FERGUSON. Who did you take with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I went with Mr. Bisson and Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe.

Senator FERGUSON. And did your letter state you wanted them to come along?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection whatever. It may well have. I don't know about Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, but the suggestion of going up there was, to the best of my recollection, originally made to me by Mr. Bisson.

Senator FERGUSON. Bisson suggested it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think so; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, when you wrote, would you not include Bisson and Jaffe if they were to go along with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. It depends on what time the letter was written.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom did you address your letter, Mr. Lattimore, do you remember that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know anyone in Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know anyone in Yenan.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would write to the government, would you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I might write to—I don't know that I would have called it the government at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom did you write, then? What would you write a letter for?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would write a letter to indicate that I was not somebody trying to sneak in; that I was just somebody who wanted to come up.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would be inclined to keep you out? You would have to write to those persons. Who would they be?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would depend, Senator, on what was the terminology being used at that time. After the Sian incident in December 1936, the Nationalist Government had given the Communists up there some kind of status—I don't remember exactly what it was—and I would presumably write to whatever administrative organ was indicated by the terminology of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You wrote a letter up there, but you say now you cannot recall to whom you wrote it; is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom you addressed the letter is something you cannot remember?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. It was presumably addressed to some sort of office rather than a person.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you help me? I have trouble at times with your testimony along this line, that you know nothing about communism, and at other times it appears to me the testimony indicates that you know all about communism.

On this, will you know about this communism in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew that there were Communists in northwest China, and I was very eager to go up and see something about it.

Just not long before that, a 10-year news famine on the Chinese Communists had been broken by Mr. Snow, who had succeeded in coming up there and coming out with a story that had set every other newspaperman in China trying to get up there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not this article in the London Times, whether it appeared or not, that you are reading, did not the first part of it indicate that you were well familiar with Communists in China and Communist activities?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; it indicates that I was familiar, as the first paragraph shows, with what people at Nanking were saying and thinking, and it indicates, as the second paragraph shows, that I was familiar with whatever I was able to observe while I was up there, for about 4 days.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, does not this letter that was read to you just a few moments ago, July 26, about the Bisson article, indicate that you knew something about Communists when you said:

> Bisson's terminology will turn away a number of people whom he might have persuaded with the use of a different terminology.

In other words, he was calling, in that article, the Communists of China the democrats. Did this not indicate that you knew all about communism and that the line was not to use words here in the articles to turn people away?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; it indicates that——

Senator FERGUSON. What was the terminology that you were talking about here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to reread the article to know that, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. May I see that, Mr. Lattimore?

I am going to suggest that since it is two and a half pages long, rather than to go into the whole thing, I would just like one more paragraph placed.

But if you care to read the whole thing——

Mr. ARNOLD. I haven't seen it. He would like to read the whole thing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has expressed a wish to read the whole letter.

The CHAIRMAN. He may read the whole letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the sake of continuity of the record, Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the witness be permitted to read it all the way through?

The CHAIRMAN. Beginning at the first?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, beginning where he left off.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

It took 4 days to get there from Sian and 6 to get back, because the rains were on and we were driving through the heart of the loess country. The yellow, wind-dropped soil lies hundreds of feet thick over what used to be the face of the earth. The hills are smothered, but a network of streams has cut down to the ancient valley beds, so that the formation is now one of innumerable plateaux, some of them higher and some lower, but all flat-topped and all divided from each other by straight-sided ravines. When it rains, the whole landscape becomes a nightmare of rather inferior, pale-colored chocolate. The streams boil up in flood and the cubes of tableland sag and slump. As a matter of fact, it is not a country made for wheels at all. The local inhabitant prefers pack mules, when it is dry, and when it is wet, he gives up altogether, because even a mule skids on wet loess. Only the foreigner, winching and flinching from the memory of fleas indoors, and the revolutionary, who has been trained to follow a line even when skidding, stay out in the wet and strive to make progress. It is not easy, because the newly and crudely made motor road traverses the pale chocolate nightmare in appalling ascents and descents. From each ravine it attacks the next cube of tableland at a corner, climbing at angles that are difficult even for trucks with five gears; it then rushes across the top of the cube and falls over the far edge in a series of even more terrifying swoops.

In spite of this, it has become a pilgrim's highway. Chinese educators and students are going up by the hundred, and many of them stay to take courses in the Red academy. Foreign visitors are welcomed, and missionaries are being urged to come up and see for themselves that their premises are undamaged and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in private, as they like. The only foreign visitors thus far have been Americans, but the Communists profess impatience to see representatives of other nations, and judging from the way they talk, the first Englishman to arrive will be a good deal of a hero.

There is in this a slightly wry contract with the history of the last 10 years, when missionaries fled at the whisper of a Red raid, and when Great Britain, rather than Japan, was the bull's eye in the target of Communist propaganda. What does this reversal mean? Is this the true end of the long march? When the ghost army of the Reds was flitting from Kiangsi round by the fringes of Tibet to the uneasy lands of the partly Muslim, partly Chinese, partly Mongol northwest, a curious thing became noticeable. Whenever it was officially reported that a detachment of the Red army had been surrounded and annihilated, that particular column invariably turned up, a little later, 50 or a hundred miles farther ahead on its appointed line of march. Bearing this in mind I was particularly eager, when the Sung pagoda overlooking Yenan came in view to find out whether the famed, almost fabulous, leaders of the Red army showed any signs of that fading-out so knowingly predicted of them in the best semi-official quarters. As a matter of fact, one of the first things I heard was that in a blockhouse on another hill, opposite the pagoda, built before the Reds came, to defend the town from them, there still stand the proclamations offering large rewards for Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te, dead or alive. The Reds had never assaulted the town. It was the defense that faded out, leaving only the notices behind it. Another omen?

Mao Tse-tung, the first of the leaders that I met, did not look faded. In fact, they say he has put on a little weight during the recent months of relative inactivity. It is absurd, looking at him, to think of the rumors current for years that he was about to die of tuberculosis. It would be equally absurd to think of him as a ravening bandit or as a cold doctrinaire.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that you are speaking of there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mao Tse-tung.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire?

That was your own opinion? That was not what somebody was telling you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was my opinion at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Indicating that I didn't know much about communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the revolutionary people that you were talking about following the line that you referred to before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he would be generally included, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew about the party line, then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew there was such a thing, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew how Communists followed it, as indicated in your remarks in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Generally speaking, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That was specific; was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What?

No; it is just a general reference to the fact that there is such a thing as a Communist line, and that Communists follow the line even when they skid, or try to.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

In the course of a few days I saw him in many moods; at interviews that lasted for hours; at meals, at the theater (in the church of the English Baptist Mission), where sketches and short plays were being put on that substituted United Front propaganda for Communist indoctrination. One of my most vivid impressions was on the evening of my departure. The room was full; Chu Te and Chou En-lai had their heads together over a statement to the press; others were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken "out"—for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet entirely free. I happened to glance at Mao Tse-tung, who was sitting in the middle of it all. His head had sunk forward a little, his arms hung limp, his face was expressionless, and his eyes without luster. He had completely withdrawn himself from his surroundings. Then someone spoke to him, and he joined in at once, as though he had subconsciously kept up with all the conversation going on around him.

This is a trivial example of a flexibility that is really amazing. Mao Tse-tung can range from the widest philosophical concepts on which the Communist policy is based to the narrowest detail of practical application, without haste, without delay, and without the slightest blurring of focus. He has fire and passion, but so matured and tempered that there seems to be no personal warping of his thought; and yet, in a long extemporaneous discussion of a complicated subject there will not be a single cliche (and Chinese is more full of cliches than even English); every phrase has a personal stamp.

It would be misleading, however, to give too many personal details about Mao, Chu Te, and other leaders. So little is known of the inside workings of the Communist movement in China that it is almost always spoken of in terms of its leading personalities. At Yenan a contrast is immediately noticeable: The Communists themselves never speak of Nanking in terms of Chiang Kai-shek, or any other leader. They stick to estimates of groups and movements and economic, social, and political forces.

From this alone it is obvious that they are not either bandits preying on society or condottieri aiming at power for the sake of power. This is as true

now that they have compromised on a united front as it was when they were at open war with Nanking. Some of their more positive characteristics I shall try to describe in a second article.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. If I did, it must be in this file. I don't have it.

Senator FERGUSON. How would this get into the IPR files?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Evidently I sent it, marked in the top corner FVF, who was at that time, I believe, secretary of the American Council.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Field, F. V. Field.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have to have clearance by Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would you send this article to Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was following the usual IPR practice of sending articles for information to the IPR office, and since Mr. Field was the secretary, he was the obvious person to send it to.

The CHAIRMAN. This instrument that is being discussed is not in the record. Do you wish it in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 513" and was read in full by Mr. Lattimore beginning on page 3289.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, was all of your time taken by the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot understand why you would be sending this to Field, an article that you were trying to sell to the London Times.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was an article I was sending to the New York office, Mr. Field being secretary.

I had just been up to a then still mysterious and exciting part of China that everybody was trying to get to, and I thought that my best chance of writing an article would be for the London Times.

But rather than write a long description of a journey that I knew would be of interest to the New York office, since, after all, the IPR was studying China, among other countries, I simply sent a carbon copy of the article. That would be my present reconstruction of what happened.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you paid personally or was the IPR paid on an article like this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On an article like this, I would be paid personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. This goes back just a little way, Mr. Lattimore: Did you find Yenan in any way crowded with non-Communist tourists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I should say fairly crowded.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have said several times that everyone was trying to get up there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was everyone able to get up there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not everybody. A number of people were stopped by the Chinese Government authorities.

I remember in the papers at the time there was a good deal of talk about the fact that the correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune was forced to leave the plane on which he was trying to fly up there.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you send up your original letter asking if you could come?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Judging from the account that has just been read out, I stuck it in the mail with my return address on the back, and it went on up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the mails operating into Communist-held China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They were; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not say in this article that as you were ready to leave, they were crowding around to give you messages, because communications were difficult, or words to that effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether those communications were given to us, or not. There were, I think, several cars leaving at the same time.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Do you not say in this article that they were crowding around to give you messages? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am trying now to throw my memory back. Let's see——

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to throw your memory back. It is right there in the article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is 15 years or more.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the article, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you want me to read that passage again?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Read the article, Mr. Lattimore.

The question is: Do you not say in that article that they were crowding around to give you messages?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> Others were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken out, for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet entirely free.

I suppose that indicates that the mails were censored.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question. The question was whether or not they were giving to you and your party the messages.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe they were.

As far as my recollection goes, Mrs. Edgar Snow was up there at the time and asked us to take a letter back to her husband for her, and I believe—here my memory is extremely uncertain—that she may have also asked us to take down to her husband some of the material that she had been collecting up there so as to have it in Peking when she got back.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, as I understand it, there was one lady.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You wrote this whole paragraph around the fact that Mrs. Snow wanted you to take a letter to her husband.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is all that I remember that our party took out.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I did not ask you what you took out at all. I want to know what you were describing in that article, and now

you leave us with the opinion that all you were doing was describing the fact that Mrs. Snow was sending a letter down to her husband with you or one of your party.

Mr. ARNOLD. May he read the article again?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

But it is what he is telling us what he meant by that, now.

Mr. ARNOLD. I thought it was what was in the article.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him read the article again.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> Others were arguing, laughing, giving verbal and written messages to be taken out, for communication between the Red world and the outside world is not yet entirely free.

Mr. SOURWINE. The important thing, Mr. Lattimore, is that question of what the communications between the Red world, as you have spoken of it, and the outside world, were.

I do not mean to labor the point, sir, but I would like to know: Are you testifying here that you sent your letter to Yenan and received an answer through the ordinary course of the mails; that you made no special arrangements to have that letter delivered in Red China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my testimony.

And if I had received no reply to that letter, I would have considered it an indication of the extent to which the Red region was still being blockaded or sequestered, or whatever you like to call it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Does the word "others" describe Mrs. Snow alone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At this moment, I have no recollection, sir. There were a number of people preparing to leave Yenan at that time, and I was just giving a journalist's general impression of what was going on.

I think the fact that I was writing it for a London newspaper, with a hope of publication, is a fairly obvious indication that it was nothing that anybody regarded as surreptitious.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not mean to convey the idea, do you, that when you were selling these articles you were not writing the truth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was certainly writing the truth as I understood it at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we would take the idea that it was more than Mrs. Snow that wanted to send articles out.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably, it was. That is the way it reads.

Then I will distinguish from that as significant that the only things that I remember our party taking out were some messages and manuscripts of Mrs. Snow's.

I think the way to settle this would be to ask some of the other people who were up there at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was this particular meeting that you describe Mao sitting in the meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Somewhere in one of the offices in Yenan, I suppose, or guest rooms, or hostel, or somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was not a public place?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, yes; everything there was pretty public.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not he one of the leaders of this movement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, he was one of the leaders in the movement.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the head of that government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring to whom? Mao Tse-tung?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mao Tse-tung; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not this in one of his residences, or offices?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall clearly at the time, but I would say it was much more probably at the guest hostel where a lot of them came to say good-by to people who were leaving.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have a bypath I would like to follow briefly, if I may, for 2 or 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were with Mr. Bisson in Yenan; is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were in Japan in the fall of 1945, did you see Mr. Bisson there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I met Mr. Bisson very briefly.

As I remember, the United States strategic bomb survey mission was arriving in Tokyo just about the time the reparations mission was leaving, and Mr. Bisson was attached to the strategic bomb survey, and I saw him just before he left Tokyo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you travel anywhere with him in Japan in the fall of 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, do you know Shiro Takeda?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Nobuyoshi Nakamura?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Teiji Koide?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who any of those three men are?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I cannot place them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they accompany you to or within Japan in 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not than I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any trips with them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so. Let me see. I don't think I made any trips out of Tokyo.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go around Tokyo with them? Did they accompany you, or did you accompany them in Tokyo on any occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have. I can't recall it at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I add into the record at this time an article which appeared in the New Masses on October 12, 1937, by Mr. Philip Jaffe?

The CHAIRMAN. We have a peculiar situation here now. You have the witness saying that he did not know these parties named by counsel.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't recall them. I don't believe I met them.

The CHAIRMAN. And that they may have conducted him around Tokyo.

Do you want to straighten that out, or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like to explain, Mr. Chairman, a number of times in these hearings the names of people have been mentioned whom I totally failed to recall, and later on some memorandum or other document is brought out which indicates that I did meet them. This is part of the whole procedure, which I should very respectfully like to criticize.

The CHAIRMAN. That part will be stricken from the record. You are not here for the purpose of criticizing; you are here for the purpose of testifying under oath, and you are under oath.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record the article by Philip J. Jaffe who, as the witness has testified, was one of the four people in his party at Yenan?

This appeared in the New Masses of October 12, 1937.

The CHAIRMAN. You had better listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, would you let me ask one question before Mr. Morris proceeds?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, you referred in your testimony to interviews with Mao Tse-tung.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. How many interviews did you have with him? You mentioned several hours. How many times did you interview Mao Tse-tung, or were you present with him in the interview?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I myself personally, not more than two.

Senator SMITH. Were you present when others were interviewing him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as I remember, the only interviewing was done by others.

Senator SMITH. Who were present with you at those interviews? What other individuals?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Bisson and Mr. Jaffe.

Senator SMITH. Were Mrs. Snow and Mrs. Jaffe present at those interviews?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Senator SMITH. Were any other individuals present besides you and Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Snow and Mr. Bisson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only other person that I recall was a young Chinese who was acting as Mr. Mao's interpreter.

Senator SMITH. So that each time you had an interview with Mao Tse-tung, it was just the three or four of you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. So it was more or less, then, you might say, a private interview or private hearing with Mao Tse-tung, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was.

I don't know whether "private" is the right word to characterize it. He was giving some foreigners some information for publication if they felt it. So I wouldn't call it very private.

Senator SMITH. Did he give you permission to publish everything he said to you there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, that was the basis on which the interviews were held, just like a journalistic interview which is for the purpose of publication.

Senator SMITH. At that time he was the commander in chief, was he not, and the head man, so to speak, of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that would be my assumption. I don't know exactly how the committee structure of the Communists went at that time; whether he was regarded as a member of a committee or as the individual head.

Senator SMITH. Did he not have a residence, an official residence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had a small mud house off in a corner of the town.

Senator SMITH. You do not mean to convey the impression just now, then, do you, that he just met you around in any particular public places?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He also met us around in public places.

Senator SMITH. How many times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We were there 4 days. I don't remember whether we saw him each of those 4 days, or not.

Senator SMITH. Did you inquire about the people in attendance at the Red academy which you mentioned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in detail; no.

Senator SMITH. Did you write an article about the work being done in the Red academy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did, unless there is a second article for the London Times here, in which I said something about it.

Senator SMITH. I believe that is all at the moment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive in the record the article I described, namely, the newspaper article of October 12, 1937, written by Philip J. Jaffe, who was one of the party of four accompanying Mr. Lattimore on this trip to Yenan, about which we have had testimony today?

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you get that?

Mr. MORRIS. This is from the New Masses of October 12, 1937.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, it can be tied in to Mr. Lattimore's visit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read two passages here which relate to the witness today.

Mr. ARNOLD. Do you have a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. No; we do not.

Senator SMITH. Is the New Masses a Communist publication? Is it true, or is it not?

What is the proof you have up to now?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you give us the document on the New Masses?

Mr. MANDEL. The New Masses was cited as a Communist periodical by the Attorney General Francis Biddle in September 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. I am now reading from page 5, column 1. This is by Mr. Jaffe, who accompanied Mr. Lattimore, according to Mr. Lattimore's testimony, on that trip to Yenan:

While in Yenan our party which included beside myself, T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs,

stayed at the foreign office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished our first dinner in Yenan, when guests arrived: Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow, and many Communist leaders. Before long, we were talking and singing in a variety of languages. In the midst of our animated discussion, somebody entered quietly and sat down. "Comrade Mao" someone said—Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the then Chinese Soviet Government.

I would now like to turn to page 10, reading from column 2.

The CHAIRMAN. The same article?

Mr. MORRIS. The same article, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Mr. MORRIS. By Philip J. Jaffe, who was one of the people on that trip.

Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh—

Who is now the head of the Chinese Communists; is he not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't answer that.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the 1,500 cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about 500 from other schools. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have you go back to the first excerpt you read there, where it speaks of those who were there.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read it again, please?

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

While in Yenan our party, which included besides myself T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, stayed at the Foreign Office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished our first dinner in Yenan when guests arrived: Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; the only two non-Chinese then in the region, Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow; and many Communist leaders. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. I want to refer to that one remark about the only two non-Chinese in the region.

Mr. MORRIS. "The only two non-Chinese then in the region." That is in contradiction of the testimony we have had here today; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness stated here today that there were many people there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I didn't state they were there at the time I was there. A number of them got there before I was there and a number got there after I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, I asked you if you found the place crowded with tourists.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Chinese. Chinese are also tourists sometimes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, were you restricted in any way while you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I would say I was.

Senator FERGUSON. How?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One of my principal interests in being there was to try to find out how the Communists were dealing with minority groups such as the Chinese Moslems and the Mongols.

This was near to Mongol territory. And I heard while I was there that there was a school for such people situated just outside of Yenan, very close, and I repeatedly asked to be taken there and allowed to interview people. But this was not permitted.

Finally, they said that they would bring in a delegation from there, and they brought in a number of what they called students in a school for minorities that they had there. These included Moslems, Tibetans, Mongols, and various tribal people like Lolos and so forth. And they had a Chinese there in charge of them, and he was an English-speaking Chinese, and he started to ask them various routine questions in Chinese.

Presumably, part of their education in this school was that they were all learning Chinese, which he would then interpret into English.

Having spotted a couple of Mongols, I started talking to them in Mongol. They were delighted to find someone who spoke Mongol and began to respond very eagerly. But the Chinese in charge of them became so obviously agitated at my having direct access to them without his control that I broke it off for fear of getting the poor boys into trouble.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a camera?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you restricted in taking pictures?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think we were restricted at all in taking pictures.

Senator FERGUSON. You seem to have a very fine memory on this conversation when you had the Chinese interpreter who brought in these people.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Naturally. These Chinese minorities were my special subject of interest and research study.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not mention them, though, in your article, did you, in the London Times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether I mentioned them in a subsequent article, if there was one, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try and find if you have a copy of that article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely I will.

The CHAIRMAN. Does Mao Tse-tung speak English?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he speak Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question right there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, was any conversation had, prior to your addressing the students, as to under what circumstances you would address them, or in what manner?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. There was an address of some sort by, I think, Chu Teh, who was presiding. And he said: "We have many visitors here, including some foreign visitors, and we welcome them all," and, you know, that kind of thing. And then somebody who was standing beside them said, "One of these foreigners talks Chinese; how about having him come up?" and there was a sort of clamor from the crowd, and they said, "Make the foreigner talk Chinese."

So I, unwilling, scrambled on the platform. At that time I had never made a public speech in Chinese; I had nothing prepared, and

so I got up and made some remarks. And there were a lot of guffaws because I used rather colloquial language instead of formal lecture language, and then I scrambled down.

There was a mixture of laughter and applause.

Senator O'Conor. About what were your remarks?

Mr. Lattimore. A general kind, that we were very glad to be up there and we thanked them for their hospitality, and we wanted to see what was going on—that sort of thing, you know.

Senator O'Conor. How about Mr. Jaffe's and Mr. Bisson's remarks?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether they made remarks or not. If they did, it would have to be through interpreters, of course.

Senator O'Conor. Of course, you noted Mr. Jaffe's reference to the article in the New Masses.

Mr. Lattimore. I skipped that. Did he say they addressed the——

Senator Ferguson. Yes. He said three of them.

Senator O'Conor. All three of them addressed.

Will you read that please, Mr. Morris?

Mr. Morris (reading):

> Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself. * * *

Senator O'Conor. That is to what I was referring.

What have you to say with reference to their addressing the group?

Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection of what they were talking about, Senator. My recollection is one of sort of mingled pleasure at having been able to scramble through a speech in Chinese and embarrassment in having made slips in the use of colloquial language that made people laugh. So I was not psychologically in the right mood for paying close attention to what other people were saying.

Senator O'Conor. In view of the other observations that were made, as to the difficulties confronting others in getting up there, the impression is left, at least on me, that you were not only welcome, but that you were given more or less free rein to do as you pleased while you were there. Would that be correct?

Mr. Lattimore. Roughly correct, Senator.

If I may explain, we were certainly given remarkable opportunities to interview people and to ask questions.

As I say, I personally found restriction on my movements and opportunities when I tried to get into the one thing that interested me most.

I can't answer for the journalists who got there before me and got there after me, except in the general sense that the newspaper accounts published by such people at the time all laid stress on at least the relative frankness and willingness to talk of Communist leaders when interviewed up there.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, the only other question I would like to ask is this: You have previously indicated or stated that you are unfamiliar with the Communist line and with Communist teachings and precepts.

In the article in the London Times, in your reference to Mao, you not only speak quite approvingly of him, but you indicate that he was

quite adept at speaking on the philosophies and other things. How do you know that he was adhering to those things of the Communist line if you did not know the Communist line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the impression that I got by sitting by while Bisson and Jaffe were interviewing him. And this was the general period when, by agreement between both the Communists and the Nationalist Government, the united front was being worked out, and they were asking him a lot of technical questions about "What do you mean by 'united front'?" et cetera, et cetera.

And my impression, from listening to those answers, was that he was in full command of exactly what he meant and exactly what he didn't mean.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, did you have any form or type of letter of introduction or credentials; anything of that sort, to present there to Mao's government, or Mao's officials when you arrived?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't think we had anything whatever of the kind.

Senator SMITH. Were you just accepted at face value by Mao and his attendants?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. That was the practice at the time, Senator. They were accepting any kind of journalists, particularly any foreign visitor who would come up.

Senator SMITH. I thought you told us earlier, though, that you feared you would have some trouble getting up there, and that was the reason you wrote that first letter. That there was a line beyond which the Communists did not allow journalists to come, except by prearrangement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I don't think my writing them a letter implies that at all. All I was doing was trying to let the Communists know that I had the intention to come up there and see things, if I was allowed to see things, and that I was not trying, so to speak, to sneak in on them.

Senator SMITH. Do you recall where you posted that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think just in an ordinary letter box in Peking City.

Senator SMITH. I missed that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would——

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to leave that as soon as I have Mr. Lattimore identify one picture in this article.

Mr. Lattimore, I offer you page 7 and call your attention to the top picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Page 7 of what?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the New Masses article which has been introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it admitted, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you admit it into evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. The article may be admitted. It will have to be copied out of there.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 514" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 514

[New Masses, October 12, 1937]

CHINA'S COMMUNISTS TOLD ME—A SPECIALIST IN FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS INTERVIEWS THE LEADING MEN OF RED CHINA IN THEIR HOME TERRITORIES

(By Philip J. Jaffe)

Fifteen days before Japanese troops opened fire on a Chinese garrison near Peiping, I was seated in the one bare room which is the home of Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of the interview Mao Tse-tung said to me: "Japan cannot stop now. Japan wants to swallow China. Its next step will not be long delayed. You ask about the future of the united front? The united front is inevitable because Japan's invasion farther into the heart of China is inevitable."

Twenty-four hours later, in the military headquarters of the former Chinese Red Army, only two big rooms, walls covered with huge military maps, I asked the most famous of the Communist commanders, General Chu Teh: "Why do you think that General Chiang Kai-shek will have to accept the aid of the Red Army?"

Chu Teh replied: "A form of the united front has now existed for several months and has resulted in a large measure of internal peace. The Chinese bourgeoisie, however, is not easily able to forget its ten-year fight against the Red Army. But when the war with Japan eventually begins, it will not be a question of what the bourgeoisie wants; they will have to have the Red Army. In a war with Japan, it will not only be a question of regular troops. China must also depend on its peasants and workers whom the Communists alone can lead. It is not merely the numbers of the army which count; it is the mass population as well. If Chiang Kai-shek thinks that he can raise a large army to fight Japan, without at the same enrolling the masses as the backbone of the struggle, then he will be rudely disappointed. No war against Japan can be successful without a correct organization of the peasants and workers, and this only the Red Army can successfully carry out."

Two weeks later I know that the prophecy made by the two famous leaders of the former Chinese Red Army had been fulfilled. On July 7, Japan invaded North China. On August 22, the first stage of the united front—that of military cooperation—was concluded between the Nanking and Red Armies. In the words of the official communiqué from Nanking, "the Chinese government and the Communist army have been fighting for the last ten years; this is the official conclusion of the war." Mao Tse-tung has since been appointed governor of the former Soviet region, now renamed the Special Administrative District. Chu Teh has been appointed commander in chief of the former Red Army, now called the Eighth Route Army. Chou En-lai, another outstanding Communist with whom I spoke, is the official Communist representative on the general staff in Nanking.

Mao Tse-tung, political leader.—Yenan is the capital of the former Soviet region. On June 21, after four days' travel from Sian, the capital of Shensi province, scene of the Chiang Kai-shek incident of last December, through semi-starved villages, on bridgeless rivers, and roads deep with gullies, we finally passed through the beautiful, ancient main gate of Yenan. We were greeted at the gate by Agnes Smedley, the distinguished American writer and an old friend of the Chinese people. While in Yenan our party which included beside myself, T. A. Bisson of the Foreign Policy Association, and Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, stayed at the Foreign Office. The building was soon buzzing with excitement. We had barely finished our first dinner in Yenan, when guests arrived: Ting Ling, China's foremost woman writer; Li Li-san, an old associate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; the only two non-Chinese then in the region; Agnes Smedley and Peggy Snow, wife of the American writer, Edgar Snow; and many Communist leaders. Before long we were talking and singing in a variety of languages. In the midst of our animated discussion somebody entered quietly and sat down. "Comrade Mao," someone said—Mao Tse-tung, the political leader of the then Chinese Soviet Government.

We spent many hours with him after that evening—at interviews, during meals, at the theater—and we were increasingly impressed by the complete sincerity and lack of ostentation that is so typical of him and of the other leaders we saw. It was during these visits that we grew to feel his tremendous force, a force likely to be overlooked at first because of the low, even voice, the quiet

restraint of his movements, and the beautiful hands, almost too delicate for a soldier, but so dextrous with the writing brush. But the quiet voice speaks with brilliance and authority, the movements of the tall, slim body with slightly stooped shoulders are sure and well coordinated. Like all other Red Army commanders, Mao wears exactly the same uniform as the rank-and-file soldiers, eats the same food, sleeps on the same sort of k'ang (a low, long bed of stone), avoids all social ceremonies, and altogether lives an extremely simple life. It becomes easy to understand the tremendous personal appeal which Mao has as a leader. This leadership dates from the first organizational meeting of the committee which organized the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1920. Mao was an important figure at that meeting.

Our interviews with Mao Tse-tung were many and on a host of topics: the evolution of Nanking's policy; the inner political struggle within Nanking; the Sian incident; the united front; the student movement; the role of other powers in Far Eastern affairs; and the perspective of China's future development, etc. But since Mao Tse-tung asked me to transmit a message to the American people, it is perhaps best to confine his remarks to those concerning America and its isolationist policy.

"Though there are many Americans who are isolationist in principle," he began, "America is not and cannot be isolationist. America is in this respect like other capitalist countries; part proletariat, part capitalist. Neither one nor the other can be isolationist. Capitalism in the imperialist countries is world-wide, and so is the problem of liberation which needs the effort of the world proletariat. Not only does China need the help of the American proletariat, but the American proletariat also needs the help of the Chinese peasants and workers. The relation of American capitalism to China is similar to that of other capitalist countries. These countries have common interests as well as conflicting ones—common in that they all exploit China, conflicting in that each wants what the other has, as exemplified by the conflict between Great Britain and the United States, as well as between Japan, Britain, and the United States. If China is subjugated by Japan, it will not only be a catastrophe for the Chinese people, but a serious loss to other imperialist powers."

At this point Mao was handed a wireless message announcing both the fall of Bilbao and the resignation of France's premier, Léon Blum. We discussed the probable causes of both these events. Mao clearly showed his grasp of the world situation, despite the isolating distance. We took time off to answer a host of questions, this time by him. What is comparative strength of the Socialist and Communist Parties in America? Did we know the life stories of John L. Lewis and Earl Browder? The strength of the American labor unions? The Trotskyites? American official opinion on the Far East?

Then Mao Tse-tung continued: "The Chinese revolution is not an exception; it is one part of the world revolution. It has special characteristics, but fundamentally it is similar to the Spanish, French, American, and British struggles. These struggles are all progressive. Therein lies their similarity. It is this similarity that evokes the broad sympathy of the American masses and their concern with the fate of the Chinese people. We, on our part, are also concerned with the fate of the American people. Please convey this message to your people. The difference between our peoples lies in this: the Chinese people, unlike the Americans are oppressed by outside invaders. The American people are, of course, oppressed from the inside, but not by feudal forces. It is the hope common to all of us that our two countries shall work together."

Chu Teh, military leader.—Though Chu Teh is known to the outside world for his military exploits, his other activities are many and varied. We first met Chu Teh in a class he was teaching on the "Fundamental Problems of the Chinese Revolution." Wearing spectacles, he could very well have been mistaken for a professional teacher. At the People's Anti-Japanese Military Political University at Yenan, he teaches both military tactics and Marxist-Leninist principles. From 1922 to 1925, Chu Teh studied political and economic science, philosophy, and military strategy in Germany. As a result he speaks German freely. His favorite recreations are reading, conversation, horseback riding, and basketball. The latter sport is a subject for much fun among the troops. His love for the game is greater than his ability and he can often be found hanging about a group which is choosing sides. If he is not picked, he quietly moves on to the next court in the hope that there his luck will turn. My greatest disappointment at Yenan was that rain ruined an appointment we had to play basketball with him.

Chu Teh, commander in chief of the Eighth Route Army, is the personification of the spirit of these armies which for 10 years have been continuously victorious in the face of overwhelming odds. His career has been devoted mainly to the military side of revolutionary activities. Fifty-one years old, he has taken part in the entire development of modern China, from the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 to the present struggle against Japan. Beginning with August 1, 1927, when together with another famous Red commander, Ho Lung, he organized the Nanchang uprising, he participated in exploits which have now become legend. In November 1931, the first All-Soviet Congress in Juikin, Kiangsi, bestowed upon him the title of commander in chief of the army. Even in Nanking I heard many call Chu Teh the greatest military genius in all China.

There is strength and assurance in that square, stocky figure, in that strong peasant face, weather-beaten by a life of campaigning, and in those small bright eyes which are quite hidden when he laughs, and he laughs frequently. We took a picture of him standing with legs apart and hands on hips. That is Chu Teh.

"The Red Army in this region under our direct command numbers about ninety thousand," he began. "This force occupies a contiguous territory extending from North Shensi to East Kansu and South Ninghsia. From Yenan to Sanyan there are some partisan troops in Kuomintang uniforms. In this region professional full-time partisans number from ten to twenty thousand. The number of part-time partisans is much larger; their duties are to maintain order in their districts.

"Of the ninety thousand regular troops here, only twenty to thirty thousand come from the original Kiangsi district. About thirty thousand were recruited on the way, chiefly in Szechwan, and the rest are from local areas.

"In other partisan areas there are various groups numbering from one to three thousand soldiers, but it is hard to estimate the total figure; we ourselves are not certain about this. These partisan areas are located in southern Shensi (southwest of Sian), the Fukien-Kiangsi border, the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border, northeastern Kiangsi, the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, the Kwangtung-Hunan border, the Kiangsi-Hunan border, and the Shensi-Szechwan border. Connections with several of these are still maintained, but not with all; and these connections are irregular and uncertain." Asked if we might publish this, Chu Teh replied "It doesn't matter. The fact is well known throughout China."

Having seen many Red troops carrying on their maneuvers with excellent new rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, and the ubiquitous Mausers, we were curious to know how well armed they were as a whole. Chu Teh replied, "Our regular ninety thousand troops in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region are in general well armed. Other equipment, such as clothes, food, and supplies, is not satisfactory. Although it greatly improved after the Sian incident, it is still far from sufficient. Though we had established contact with Chang Hsueh-liang before the Sian affair, it was only during the two weeks following the actual incident that any large quantity of munitions, clothing, and food reached us."

As Chu Teh continued the conversation, punctuated frequently by his broad, genial smile, he came to the discussion of his well-known theory of the military tactics necessary to defeat Japan, namely, to avoid decisive engagements in the early stages in favor of guerrilla tactics to encircle the enemy and harass it until its morale was shattered. We wanted to know something about the Manchurian volunteers. Were they really well organized or were they mere hungry "bandits"?

"At first," Chu Teh said, "the Manchurian volunteers were largely impoverished peasants and the scattered remnants of the defeated Manchurian troops. They operated without a plan, could not accomplish much, and finally were almost destroyed. The Communist Party then began to organize new peasant detachments, who were later joined by what remained of the original volunteers. As a result, most of these formerly leaderless forces have been converted into important detachments with wide popular support. This year there has been some increase in the number of volunteers along the Korean border, in eastern Fengtien, and in eastern Kirin. The increase has been more systematic than hitherto. New groups have recently been formed in Jehol and Chahar. About three months ago a report to me stated that the total number of Manchurian volunteers ranged from fifty to sixty thousand." In reply to a statement made by the Japanese to the effect that 70 percent of the Manchurian volunteers are Communists, Chu Teh said that this was not an exaggeration.

On the United Front.—Of all the questions facing China and the former Soviet area the most important is that of the united front. No one in Soviet China knows the details of the negotiations more intimately than Chou En-lai, vice chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, and second in importance only

to Mao Tse-tung. It was he who carried on all the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Born thirty-nine years ago of a mandarin family, Chou En-lai joined the revolutionary movement in 1911. Upon his return to China in 1924 from a stay abroad, he became chief of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. It is said that even today the generalissimo has a great fondness for Chou. When asked why the united-front conversations were then not moving very fast, Chou En-lai said: "The form of the Chinese united front is quite different from that in Europe or the United States. In China two parties fought each other for ten years. The Communist Party representing the proletariat and peasantry was a revolutionary party with its own areas and military forces as well as its own social, political, and economic system. The Kuomintang represented the ruling social groups throughout the rest of China. But the position of the Chinese bourgeoisie was such that the obstacles arising from their class position could not forever bar a united struggle against Japan. The bourgeoisie of China have at last come to realize that the Japanese invasion harms all classes and that, standing alone, they are too weak to safeguard China's freedom and independence."

Up to the time of Japan's most recent invasion, the united-front negotiations had progressed quite slowly though not without positive results. Internal peace had been achieved, and the two armies no longer fought each other. Confiscation of land in the Soviet regions was abolished. The name of the Red Army was changed. Dramatic troupes began to tour the countryside to teach the peasants the meaning of democratic elections. Nanking began to contribute a considerable, though as yet insufficient, sum of money monthly to the Soviet area. Technical difficulties made a complete united front often seem impossible. But Japan's military aggression scattered all the major obstacles.

The land problem.—Ever since October 1935, when the main body of the Communist armies from Central and South China began to arrive in north Shensi, their immediate objectives have been twofold. First, to build a permanent base for internal development, and second and more important, to use this base as a spearhead for unifying all elements in China for a successful war of defense against the invading Japanese militarists. Despite the fact that the former Soviet area, the largest single contiguous territory ever held under Communist rule, stated as one of the most economically backward areas in China, the welfare of the peasants and workers has been improved considerably. There is not sufficient room here to tell all that we saw and heard, but a few high spots, in the words of Po K'u, one of the important leaders of the region, will perhaps shed some light.

Po K'u's home and office is in the abandoned compound of an English Baptist mission. When we expressed surprise at finding religious pictures hanging on his walls, Po K'u said that he left the compound just as he found it in the hope that the missionaries would return.

In reply to several questions on the land confiscation problem, Po K'u said in quite good English: "When the first Soviets were established in 1933 in Shensi, all the good land along the river banks was in the hands of rich landlords who used the great famine of 1930 as a lever for confiscating this land. From then until the Sian incident in December 1936, all this land was divided among the peasants; all taxation and levies were abolished; democratic liberty was extended to all; peasants built up their own armed forces for their protection instead of relying on landlords' forces; and peasants enjoyed the aid and direction of the Soviet government to increase production, improve the land, and develop consumer cooperatives.

"After the Sian incident when the united-front organizations had already begun, the redivision of land among the peasants was stopped in districts occupied after the beginning of the negotiations. In general, the ownership of land is not the main problem in this territory. Land is plentiful, for Shensi is thinly populated, with an average of one family to every thirteen miles. The form of exploitation and, therefore, the main problems are usury and excessive interest rates on money and cattle. Land rents and money lending rates, therefore, have been reduced drastically. The maximum rent now permitted in the Soviet areas is 30 percent of the land produce, and peasants can bargain with landlords to further reduce this percentage, while the money-lending rate has been reduced from a general 10 percent monthly rate to a maximum of 2 percent. Even last year, when warfare was still going on, the Soviet government spent one hundred thousand dollars for ploughs, seeds, etc., while this year there will be an additional cash distribution of sixty thousand dollars."

Apparently there has been a great deal of confusion about this abandonment of land confiscation. Mao Tse-tung's pithy words perhaps explain it most

simply. He said: "It is not so much a question now of whether our lands belongs to the peasants or the landlords, but whether it is Chinese or Japanese." The same reasoning is applied by the Communist leaders to the larger question of China as a whole. To all of them "it is not a question now of which general controls which province, but whether the land will remain Chinese or come under Japanese control. If the latter should happen, the original problem disappears."

Life in the Special Administrative District.—Our visit, however, did not consist only of a series of interviews. We visited stores and shops, noting with interest how much cleaner and more orderly they were than any we had seen on our trip, and how relatively well-stocked they were. And the cheesecloth covering the food for sale stood in marked contrast to the cities in non-Soviet areas where the only coverings we had seen were armies of flies. Even the dogs, the most miserable of all living things in China, were active and barking. Anyone who has seen the worm-eaten, starved, gaunt dogs of China, too weak to move out of the way of a passing vehicle, will understand the meaning of that.

Culturally, too, the Soviet region is making great strides. Besides Yenan, the present capital, three other cities are being developed as cultural centers: Tingpien, Yenchang, and Chingyang. Anti-Japanese academies and dramatic groups are the axes around which the cultural life is being developed. Study classes, reading room, theatricals, dances, lectures, and mass meetings are regular features of life in the Soviet territories. We were amused to hear the universal complaint of all librarians. "They keep the books out too long."

But most interesting and important of all was our visit to the theater. A troupe of players was scheduled to go on the road the following day, and they graciously went through their repertoire for us as well as for their own delighted audience. In a packed auditorium, seated on low, narrow, backless wooden benches, before a crude stage whose footlights were flickering candles, we sat through four hours of amazingly excellent plays, superbly acted. With perfect realism (so different from the classical Chinese theater) and delightful humor, they presented plays designed to teach the peasants how to vote and how to unite. They explained the value of cleanliness, of vaccination, of education, and the stupidity and danger of superstitions. At one point, for instance, one character complained of being tired. "We weren't tired on our seven thousand-mile march," was the reply. And the audience roared as did Mao- Chu Teh, and the rest of the leaders who sat next to us, having as good a time as anyone. The high spot of the evening was a really professional performance of a scene from Gorki's Mother, which had been given at the Gorki memorial evening celebrated in Yenan, and a Living Newspaper by the young people on such subjects as bribery, bureaucracy, and hygiene. All these plays were being sent out to the villages.

Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the one thousand five hundred cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about five hundred from other schools. Here are some questions asked of me. "What is the position of woman in the U.S.A.? How do American workers live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's N.R.A. campaign? What is the present situation in the Left literary movement in America? What do the American people think of our long march west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.

This stress on the role of the United States is altogether typical of the reaction throughout China. These people have traditionally considered Americans as their friends and they do not want us to fail them now. A few days after our arrival in Shanghai, I received a letter from Agnes Smedley which tells better than I am able how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in the former Soviet regions.

"In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I want to tell ou that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the effect of that meeting until two or three days had passed. Then it began to roll in. I have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people. One was so moved by it that he could not sleep that night but spent the night writing a poem in praise

of you all. I enclose the poem. It is not good from the literary viewpoint. But from the viewpoint of the emotion behind it, it is of value. It is a deeply passionate poem. It is not good enough to publish, but it is good enough to carry next to your heart in the years to come. To that meeting, it may interest you to know, came delegations sent by every institution. Many institutions could not cross the rivers. But they sent activists, groups of six to a dozen. They later gave extensive reports. I am getting those reports from instructors day by day. All are deeply impressed and moved and grateful to you and all of you. There has never been anything like this here before."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you want me to read the caption of this photograph?

Mr. MORRIS. Please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The photograph is captioned:

Troops marching through the main gate of Yenan to their drill grounds. The crouching figure with the camera is Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a picture of you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As well as a man can identify a rather distant profile picture of himself, I would say so, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any evidence there of your being supervised?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is no evidence in that picture, except, of course, that this was an arranged parade. I suppose you might call that being supervised.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they parade for you by arrangement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I recall, we asked if we could take some photographs of——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. I asked if they paraded for you by arrangement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe it was by arrangement.

My recollection is rather hazy, but I believe we asked if we could take some pictures of troops.

The CHAIRMAN. You reviewed them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

And they said, "We will have some troops out on the parade ground tomorrow and you can come and take pictures, if you like."

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Was this before, or after you were adviser to the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was long before.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that question?

Senator WATKINS. I asked him if it was before or after he was adviser to the Generalissimo.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may say, Senator, that the Generalissimo was very much interested in my having been up there at that time, and we had quite a talk about it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like now to get back to Rogoff and War and the Working Class, which started out this questioning about the change in line.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. We have introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, as our exhibit No. 26, the letter from Rose Yardumian to Mr. Edward Carter. I would like to read it at this time.

This is January 20, 1944:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I received your letter of January 17 with copies of the telegrams you sent Mr. Hiss and Mr. Currie. I called Alger Hiss yesterday morning and he told me that he had received your wire, but was sure that I would understand that he could not make the first advance in arranging a private talk with Rogoff. He mentioned the Rogoff articles *In War and the Working Class* and that Rogoff's material had caused considerable controversy in circles here. * * *

Mr. Lattimore, is it your testimony that you know nothing of those articles in War and the Working Class at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe at that time I knew nothing about it.

Mr. MORRIS. So Rose Yardumian knew about it, but you did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know about that now; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean is it your testimony that at that time, Rose Yardumian, who wrote this letter, knew about the articles of Rogoff War and the Working Class, but that you did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would be my presumption from the wording of the letter that she knew about it. I don't recall knowing about the article at all. I did get hold of the article later on, I think several years later, and looked it up.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Rose Yardumian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew her.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the secretary of the Washington office of the IPR, was she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe she was.

I can't recall now whether she was the secretary or one of the girls in the office, or what.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the testimony before this committee that she was on the board of a Communist publication last year in Communist China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't remember seeing that.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not read that part of your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so. No. I read so much testimony, I am not sure of the details.

Mr. MORRIS. I am continuing reading now:

* * * He said that if Larry Todd wanted to bring Rogoff to Hornbeck's office, they would not refuse to see him. I am not sure that I understand the mechanizations of our State Department. Bill Johnstone saw no point in my trying to get in touch with Mr. Hornbeck directly, since presumably Hiss had consulted with Hornbeck.

Mr. Currie has arranged to see Rogoff at 12 o'clock today. Colonel Faymonville is returning to Washington from New York this morning and is supposed to get in touch with our office then.

Rogoff visited our offices yesterday afternoon and Bill and I had a little talk with him about the small meeting which we had hoped to hold Thursday at 5:30. Rogoff said that he thought that it was unwise for us to hold the meeting; that certain Chinese groups in Washington were very distressed at the fact that he was talking so much. He thinks that it would be bad for the Institute of Pacific Relations to have him speak under its auspices. * * *

Do you understand the reasoning of Mr. Rogoff there, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am afraid I don't.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

* * * Bill and Anne Johnstone had hoped to get a small group of people together at their home this evening—the Hornbecks, Remers, Blakeslees, and a few others—but time is very short and many of these people have already made plans for this evening, so the Johnstone idea will probably not come off. How-

ever, Rogoff is coming into our office at 2 o'clock today. Bill is planning to take him to the Cosmos Club to talk with Owen Lattimore, Carl Remer, and John Carter Vincent. After he talks with these people, we are making arrangements to take him to the Library of Congress and a few other places.

I am sorry that our meeting did not work out for him, as I know that there are many people here would have enjoyed hearing him.

Sincerely yours,

Rose

ROSE YARDUMIAN.

P. S.—I am enclosing a list of the Army-Navy people who have accepted to date.

P. P. S.—Rogoff and Bill have been at the Cosmos Club for the last 2½ hours talking with Lattimore, Remer, and Vincent.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom was that letter addressed?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Edward C. Carter, of the International Secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. January 20, 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the record, is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

This bears on the knowledge that the Institute of Pacific Relations had with respect to Rogoff's article, which, according to testimony before this committee, signalized the change in Communist Party thinking in 1943.

Mr. Lattimore, did you know Mr. Vladimir Romm in this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I met him at the Yosemite Conference of the IPR in the summer of 1936, at which he was one of the two, I think, Soviet delegates.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Mr. Motiliev in this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; at the same time.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever met Mr. Litvinoff in this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I called on Mr. Litvinoff when I was Chiang Kai-shek's adviser when I was back here on leave in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you see Mr. Litvinoff?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever seen Mr. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador in this country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I have seen him in this country. I saw him in Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give him or his office something for the Soviet pouch?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe that it would be accurate to describe it as giving it to him for the Soviet pouch. I wrote to him stating that I would like to try to make a trip to Outer Mongolia and as there was no Outer Mongolian representation in this country, I would appreciate it if he would convey my request to the Outer Mongolian Embassy, or whatever it may be, in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever meet Mr. Gromyko in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I ever did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you make an arrangement with Mr. Gromyko to have your book Solution in Asia published in the Soviet Union?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I did. I seem to remember reading something about that in the testimony. Carter may have suggested it, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. But it is your testimony that you did not, is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My memory is very vague on the subject, but I don't think that I did myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these two letters, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 26, 1945, addressed to Mrs. Owen Lattimore, Ruxton, Md., with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. And the second?

Mr. MANDEL. The second is a photostat of a carbon, a document, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 3, 1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these letters read into the record at this time since they bear on the series of questions being addressed to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 515 and 516," and were read by Mr. Mandel.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read those two letters, please?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter of February 26, 1945 (exhibit No. 515):

DEAR ELEANOR: This is just to thank you for your lovely hospitality on Sunday. Your place is so lovely, the food so good, and the conversation so stimulating that I do want you to know what great pleasure and profit you gave me.

I had a good talk with Owen on the train and I hope I can be of a little assistance in carrying out his project.

A part of my purpose in getting a number of low-cost copies of Solution in Asia fits right into the build-up which is desirable as preparation for getting an invitation from across the water for Owen to go abroad.

I have discovered that Owen's 40-percent discount is better for the IPR than anything we can get from the publisher. I would be grateful therefore if you could have 12 copies sent me as speedily as possible together with your bill.

Ever gratefully yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The second letter is dated March 3, 1945 (exhibit No. 516):

DEAR OWEN: Would you be willing to do a review of Rowe's book China Among the Powers for Pacific Affairs?

Our reviewers still have to do their reviews as a labor of love even though they may have no burning affection for the book to be reviewed. If you are willing to undertake this task we would like to have your review by March 27, but if this is impossible and you could do it for us later we would prefer to have a review from your pen in a subsequent issue rather than to get a substitute writer for the next issue. If you will accept I will, of course, send you immediately a reviewer's copy of the book.

As soon as possible after receipt of extra copies of Solution in Asia I am going to descend upon Gromyko and begin to lay the plans for exploring the feasibility of your recent proposal.

I felt that of all the speakers you did by far the best job at the town hall.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what did Mr. Carter mean when he said he was going to "descend upon Gromyko and begin to lay the plans for exploring the feasibility of your recent proposal"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Subject to the limitations of being able to say what was in another man's mind——

Mr. MORRIS. He is talking about "your recent proposal," Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say that my "recent proposal" must have been my same old proposal that went on for years and years, of trying to get into Outer Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. And that bore no relation to having a publishing of Solution in Asia done for Soviet internal consumption?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea what that would be.

Mr. MORRIS. You have read Mr. Carter's testimony on that point, have you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Which is contradictory to what your understanding was at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. In what way?

Mr. MORRIS. Did he not testify that there was such a project?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A project for——

Mr. MORRIS. Having the Soviets publish a version of your book, a copy of your book, an edition of your book.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I didn't remember that. As far as I can see from this present correspondence, he was trying to get some copies of my book to send—what is it now—to send presumably to Russia, but whether the project included a translation or a Russian edition, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You did send copies of Solution in Asia to the Soviet Union, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I sent them to Mr. Carter. I don't think I remember sending any to the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a memorandum. In the corner is "OL." This is a photostat from the documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It reads as follows:

(EXHIBIT No. 517)

Distribution of 12 copies of Solution in Asia—

and these names are listed:

W. K. Hancock—for review 3–12–45—Mrs. V. L. Pandit
K. P. Chen
Gromyko (2)—1 for Zhukov
Kisselev—for Kemenov and Voi
Litvinoff—for Varga and Voitinsky
3–14–45—Stepanov—for Mikoyan (for Lozovsky and Voitinsky??)

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want done with that?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, from your knowledge of IPR documents, the fact that "OL" appears in the upper right-hand corner indicates, does it not, that you were to get a copy of that distribution made of your book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably. Well, it would mean—I question that I had received a copy.

Is that my initial? I mean did I initial that to show I had received it, or did somebody else?

Mr. SOURWINE. Look at the photostat and see if those are your initials.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, the "OL" there isn't my writing.

Mr. MORRIS. But from your knowledge of markings of institute papers, does that not indicate to you that that meant a copy of that should go to you for distribution?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very probably; yes. It might mean simply that it was to be put in the "OL" file in the IPR office. I wouldn't be able to tell you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, could you find out from the witness if he knows who these people are that are mentioned here?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

May we have that introduced in the record first?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 517" and was read in full.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Lozovsky, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Voitinsky?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Voitinsky I met in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Stepanov?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't place him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Mikoyan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he is the same Mikoyan whose name I have seen in the press as a Soviet official.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is do you know him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Zhukov?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Kemenov?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't place him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Varga?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Varga? I know that he is a Soviet economist, but I don't think I have met him.

Mr. MORRIS. But you know who these people are?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Gromyko's name in there?

Mr. MORRIS. Gromyko's name does appear there; yes, sir.

Do you know Mr. Gromyko?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, identification of these men can be made at a later time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The other names at the top of this list, Mr. W. K. Hancock, I don't think I have ever heard of him.

Mrs. V. L. Pandit is, of course, the recent Indian Ambassador in this country.

K. P. Chen is one of the leading bankers of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he in China now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he is in Hongkong. I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you know that Soviet officials collected information on economic geography and statistics from United States Government departments for the IPR in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know that. At least, I don't believe I ever knew it. It would seem to me to be quite an ordinary procedure, if they did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here the minutes of a meeting of April 2, 1936, and I am asking Mr. Mandel if he will identify this document.

The CHAIRMAN. Meeting of what?

Mr. MORRIS. Meeting in Moscow.

Mr. Mandel will identify it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting, April 2, 1936, Moscow: Mr. Carter, Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore, H. M. Harondar."

Mr. MORRIS. "H. M." is different from Harondar; is it?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will a copy of that be made available to Mr. Lattimore, please?

This is April 2, 1936.

Mr. Lattimore, will you read the sixth paragraph on the front page, which begins with "Motiliev."

Mr. LATTIMORE. The sixth?

Mr. MORRIS. The one that says:

Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving * * *.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving from the United States more material on the economic geography of the country; the official publications of Government departments, particularly the statistical reports.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did the IPR serve as a conduit for the Soviet officials to receive such information from the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask you to turn, Mr. Lattimore, to page 2 and take up the second item there on the top of the page, "II. In re: Pacific Affairs."

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

The discussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present.

Mr. MORRIS. Why should that discussion be postponed until Voitinsky was present, Mr. Lattimore? Did you know at that time Mr. Voitinsky was the head of the far eastern section of the Comintern?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I did not.

As far as my recollection serves, Voitinsky was the editor, or one of the editors, of the publication which was regarded as the official publication of the Soviet council of the IPR and, therefore, would be a natural person to include in an editorial conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, may I call your attention to VII on page 3, just about the middle.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "In re International Secretariat Policy"?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want?

Mr. MORRIS. I want Mr. Lattimore to read it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Motiliev said that Voitinsky had not yet read ECC's report on the policy. He thought that there would be no objections in principle, although there might be some on details. He said that he had received a letter from Honolulu criticizing the policy and would like to discuss the whole question when Voitinsky was here.

Mr. MORRIS. And then, finally, Mr. Lattimore, I would like you to turn to the last page.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is "ECC"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Beginning in the first paragraph on the last page, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this—

I don't know what "this" is—

when Voitinsky was here. He said that he did not think there would be any critique of the general policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions about Pacific Affairs, not as to its policy and contents but as to its juridical position as to the instrument of the IPR. He said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you know at that time Mr. Voitinsky's position with the Communist International?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, does your research of Pacific Affairs at this period of time indicate that anything appeared therein along the description I just gave?

Mr. MANDEL. In the issue of September 1936 of Pacific Affairs——

Mr. MORRIS. That is just shortly after the meeting you were discussing, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MANDEL. Cited under the title "Literature on the Chinese Communist Movement" is the following notation of an article on British imperialism in China, from the Communist International, No. 6, November 1924, and another article by Mr. Voitinsky, entitled "The Situation in China," from the Communist International, No. 21, April 1925.

This is taken from Pacific Affairs of September 1936, listing the writings of G. Voitinsky.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were editor at that time, were you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of Pacific Affairs; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, might that whole document be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 518" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 518

MEETING APRIL 2, 1936, MOSCOW: MR. CARTER, MR. AND MRS. LATTIMORE, H. M. HARONDAR

1. In re exchange of books and periodicals.

ECC said that of the member countries those most interested in Soviet materials are the English, Chinese, and American Councils. The American Council is best equipped to use them. The two Chinese who know Russian are at present not in China. In England the Russian materials are used by some of the members of the Chatham House, but the staff is not able to make full use of them. Since the American Council could best use the books, the decision was to have the main IPR collection in New York temporarily.

HM explained that the exchange was very successful to date, but that there was difficulty in choosing what books were wanted because it was impossible to tell about their contents without some kind of bibliographical exchange.

Motiliev said that it would be possible to provide almost all the materials printed in the Soviet Union. Since the American Council is interested in books on the Soviet Union in general, it will be necessary to work out a system for selection.

Harondar said that he had already sent to New York the list of all the periodicals which the U. S. S. R. IPR is receiving for Mrs. Barnes to choose which ones were wanted in the U. S. He said that he now received library cards of all the books on pertinent subjects, with a short résumé of the contents. He will have these sent to the U. S. to serve as a basis for selection.

Motiliev said that the annual plan figures and the publications of the statistical institute would be sent regularly without a preliminary exchange of the bibliographical cards.

Motiliev said that he was interested in receiving from the U. S. more material on the economic geography of the country; the official publications of Government departments, particularly the statistical reports.

Harondar said that their library on Japan, in English, was meagre and they would like more books on this. If it is possible to have sent from America the Japanese Government reports in English, they would like to have them.

ECC said that Ushibe should be able to furnish those.

Lattimore asked if there were important materials in Mongolian and Chinese available here.

Motiliev said that there is very little. There is a magazine published in Mongolia in Russian. There is also a Russian newspaper in Buriat-Mongolia. There are Mongolian and Chinese newspapers for those peoples in the Soviet Far East. All of these can be sent.

Motiliev said that there was very little use made of latinized Chinese due to the difficulties of retaining contacts and connections with older Chinese literature and with contemporary publications in China. The Chinese newspaper occasionally publishes a supplement in latinized Chinese.

Motiliev said that it was easy to get materials on Buriat-Mongolia, but more difficult on Mongolia. Harondar will check on the publications available here in Mongolian.

Motiliev presented everyone with a copy of *U. S. S. R. Handbook* published by Gollanz. He also gave HM the latest number of *Sovietskie Kraebedenie* which is devoted entirely to Buriat-Mongolia. He shows Lattimore the new Mongolian Atlas and said that he would try to get a copy for him.

B. In re Exhibit of periodicals at Yosemite.

ECC explained that at Yosemite he wanted to have an exhibit of the most important periodicals appearing in the U. S. S. R. on the Far East, the Soviet Far East, and on the U. S. S. R. in general. He would like two copies of the monthly and quarterly magazines and four of the weekly magazines.

Motiliev said that there were few magazines on the Far East as such, but many general magazines that had important information on the Far East.

II. In re Pacific Affairs.

The discussion of this point was postponed until Voitinsky could be present.

III. In re the appointment of a Soviet member of the staff of the Sec'y Gen'l.

Motiliev said that this question could not be settled immediately, but he would like to know what type of person was wanted.

ECC said that the Soviet member should be able to do the following:

1. Visit the IPR library in N. Y. to find out in what particular fields it was weak.

2. To visit the other important libraries in the country at universities to find out how far they are equipped to supply people who are studying the Soviet Union.

3. To prepare summaries in English and descriptions of the Soviet periodicals for the exhibit in Yosemite.

4. To meet the people working in the universities on the Soviet Union.

5. To help on Pacific Affairs.

Motiliev said that this meant the Soviet member should be one of the leading people in the IPR group here and well-informed on the Far East, etc. This would be very difficult, because the institutions where such people are working are very hesitant to let them go for a long period. In principle he felt that such an arrangement would be a good thing.

IV. In re Motiliev's visits en route to Yosemite.

ECC reported that Liu Yu-Wan was very anxious to meet Motiliev in Shanghai. Liu Yu-Wan has now been made secretary of the Society for Sino-Soviet Cultural Relations, of which the Soviet ambassador is one of the officers.

Motiliev said that he was not sure that he would get to Shanghai before Liu Yu-Wan had left.

ECC said that Liu Yu-Wan was ready to wait for him. He also wants to come to Moscow after the conference.

ECC reported the invitation to Motiliev from Chatham House. Chatham House suggested that the middle of May might be a good time for such a visit.

Motliliev said that it would be very difficult for him to do it. This year is a very busy one for him since the first volume of the Atlas is to appear during the year. Likewise Voitinsky is very busy, as editor of the new quarterly. However, it might be possible to arrange for someone else to visit London. Motiliev is planning to finish his reports during the end of April and May. He considers that it is less important for him to visit England than China, since the opinions of leading English are more easily found in their articles and books than is the case with the Chinese.

V. In re Soviet participation at Yosemite.

(*a*) Personnel: ECC said that he was anxious to have as large a delegation as possible. He suggested that Romm would be very acceptable to the other countries. He also mentioned Neymann.

Motiliev said that this could not be settled immediately. Romm would undoubtedly represent Izvestia, and might be a member of the delegation.

(*b*) Documentation: Motiliev reported:

1. The Symposium on the Soviet Far East is almost ready. The last articles are going to be received soon. By the end of May it should be printed in English.

2. The Symposium on international relations in the Pacific Area will be ready at the same time. Most of the articles in it will be entirely new, but they may translate some of the articles from Tikhi Okean. He asked that HM give an opinion as to which articles would be more interesting.

3. Nationality Policy in the Soviet Far East. This paper was to be prepared by Dimanshtein. He is very busy and not very prompt. His secretary says that he probably cannot do it before the conference, but maybe it will be done afterwards.

4. Paper on Pacific relations in general, in connection with the fifth round-table. This paper is being prepared by Motiliev. It should be ready in May. He does not know how long and full he will be able to make it.

Motiliev asked if May would be too late for the papers.

ECC said that it would be too late for Australia and New Zealand, but in any case the most important use of the documentation comes after the conference.

Motiliev said that it might be possible to send mimeographed copies earlier. He said that the two symposiums would be of value for several years and that the Symposium on the Soviet Far East would be printed in 50,000 copies, since there was no such study in existence here.

Motiliev said that part of the Standard of Living study should be done by the conference. This is being written by Kravel who is vice president of Gosplan and director of all the statistical work.

VI. In re finance and budget.

ECC said that he would discuss this later alone with Motiliev.

VII. In re international secretariat policy.

Motiliev said that Voitinsky had not yet read ECC's report on the policy. He thought that there would be no objections in principle, although there might be some on details. He said that he had received a letter from Honolulu criticizing the policy and would like to discuss the whole question when Voitinsky was here.

VIII. In re HM's visit to Buriat Mongolia.

Motiliev said that he would be only too glad to arrange it, but due to the unstable conditions there, it was impossible to arrange it at present. Last year when he inquired as to the possibilities, the military institutions objected. At present Americans are allowed in Birobidjan. With Buriat-Mongolia it is just a question of time until the conditions become normal. If HM wants to visit other minor nationalities, as for instance in the Caucasus, it can be arranged.

IX. In re Lattimore's visit to Mongolia.

Motiliev said that the same thing applies to Mongolia as to Buriat-Mongolia, but there the question is more complicated since Mongolia is an independent country. Mongolia now is constantly ready for war and conditions are very unstable.

There is a Mongolian representative in Moscow, with whom Motiliev spoke when Lattimore first applied for permission. This representative did not refuse, but said he would have to write to Ulan Bator for permission and seemed reluctant to try to get permission. Moreover, there would not have been sufficient time to arrange this.

Motiliev did not try to get permission through Narkomindel. Since the U. S. S. R. IPR is in no way connected with the Narkomindel, he couldn't try to get permission from them without the approval of Lattimore and the Institute.

Lattimore said that he would rather not go by getting permission via Narkomindel.

Motiliev said that it would then be necessary to wait until conditions improved.

X. In re Soviet critique of international policy of IPR.

Motiliev said that he would like to wait to discuss this when Voitinsky was here. He said that he did not think there would be any critique of the general policy of the IPR. There would be definite questions about Pacific Affairs, not as to its policy and contents, but as to its juridical position as the instrument of the IPR. He said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.

Motiliev said that although there were few subscriptions to Pacific Affairs here, it was read by many specialists and they found it very interesting.

Lattimore said that he would also like to discuss the institutional position of Pacific Affairs.

Motiliev said that the circulation of Tikhi Okean was between 3,000 and 5,000. The circulation is limited by a lack of paper rather than a lack of readers. When he was in the Far East he had great difficulty in finding any copies and it is impossible to get back numbers.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I point out that at that time, I don't think that my knowledge of the Russian set-up included any assumption that the fact that a man had printed something for the Communist International meant that he held a position on the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you offer to supply military information to the Soviet officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding with that, I am not clear on one position, back on page 4.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the last exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

* * * he said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position.

In these previous minutes of the meeting we found that there was to be a line or policy, and we find articles carrying that out.

What do you say is meant by "the U. S. S. R. IPR position"?

Your wife just handed you a paper. Is that in relation to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is in relation to the previous questioning here several days ago about the question of line in Pacific Affairs, on which I should like to make some amplifying remarks.

Senator FERGUSON. You can make those later.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have, though, what you mean here, or what was meant here by the "U. S. S. R. IPR position."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of what that meant. That is something I didn't write. I don't remember ever seeing these minutes before, and it seems to me the wording is rather obscure, but may have something to do with institutional arrangements at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, does it not sound reasonable that if you and Mr. Carter were to make up reports on this meeting later—which you claim that you did and which was in your possession at the time you wrote the book—that you would get the minutes that were taken, which are now before you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it doesn't, Senator. I don't think that, as of 1950, I knew there were such minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not talking about 1950. I am talking about the time that you claim the reports were written.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would write a report on my own recollections of what there was to report about.

I remember that at the Yosemite Conference in 1936 I was called upon to make a report to some kind of special committee for the purpose, on the editorial problems and policy of Pacific Affairs, and presumably there was some reference there to the visit that I had just then recently made to Moscow, the details of which were presumably then much more fresh in my head.

Senator FERGUSON. But is it not clear, from the minutes of the meetings that were taken by the IPR and placed in their files, that there was to be a U. S. S. R. policy line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you explain the expression that I read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The expression that concerns the "preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position."

And I say that is an obscure wording, which at this time I can't identify, especially as I didn't write it and don't believe I have ever seen it before.

Senator FERGUSON. But taking all the other documents that we have had on the IPR, your meeting in Moscow, is it not a fair inference that there was a policy line and that that is the policy line that they were talking about there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I see no reason for such an inference.

May I, Senator Ferguson, at this moment advert to the question of line, as it was discussed the other day, because I think we may have been talking——

Senator FERGUSON. I don't have any question now, but I just want to say that I cannot agree with the witness' explanation that he has given at all.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one question about this line?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, where this memorandum, prepared, by Mr. Carter, says:

> He said there would be discussions and negotiations in connection with the question of preventing the publishing of articles which are in some way harmful to the U. S. S. R. IPR position—

does not that sentence indicate that the U. S. S. R. position and the IPR position were one and the same, because it is in the singular and refers to the positions of the two?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That wouldn't be my conclusion, Senator.

Senator SMITH. It would not be?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. What would be your conclusion about that, then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, as I said, I think this wording is very obscure, but it seems to me that it refers to a U. S. S. R. and IPR position and possibly the relationship between the two.

Senator SMITH. It does not say "positions." Does not that sentence indicate that they are one and the same, U. S. S. R. IPR position?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. If there had been two, would not that have said two, plural?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To put what I said before in a different way, it might refer to the position of the U. S. S. R. in the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Of course, it did not say that, though, did it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. That is what I say, that my interpretation is unauthoritative and I think the whole wording is obscure.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, was not there a new policy laid down at the Moscow meetings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; not in my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were there not articles published in Pacific Affairs that the Soviet officials not like and brought up with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There had.

Mr. MORRIS. And did not you and Mr. Carter say that there had been mistakes in publishing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to review the transcript at that point.

Senator FERGUSON. And, Mr. Lattimore, did they object, after the meeting in Moscow, to any articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't recall offhand.

Senator FERGUSON. But they had before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you will look over again those Moscow memoranda, one of the things that stands out is that we were trying to get the Russians to promise to contribute articles, which never came through.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question at all.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, you and Harriet Moore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was with you at the time?

Harriet Moore was present, was she not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think she was one of those present; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Kathleen Barnes present at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. She was present at these meetings, was she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist at that time, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. You know they both have refused to testify before this committee, on the ground that their answers would incriminate them, when asked whether or not they were members of the Communist Party.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They have done so, to my great astonishment and distress.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, there is one other question I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever have a copy of the U. S. S. R. handbook, the Soviet Handbook?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In English, or Russian?

Senator SMITH. I do not know. Either one.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that an IPR publication?

Senator SMITH. No.

I refer to the third paragraph from the bottom on page 1 of the exhibit—and it mentions your name up in there—where it says:

> Motiliev presented everyone with a copy of U. S. S. R. Handbook published by Gollanz. * * *

Then it also refers to this:

> He shows Lattimore the new Mongolian Atlas and said that he would try to get a copy for him.

Do you remember that handbook?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember that handbook.

Senator SMITH. You do not have it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have it; I don't know.

Senator SMITH. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I think we will recess now until 1:30, if that will be satisfactory to the Senators.

(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I had reached the question, did you offer to supply military information to Soviet officials through the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the witness, I believe, had answered no.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had answered that I had no recollection. Since my memory, however, is incomplete, if you have a document to refresh my recollection I shall be glad to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you identified that document, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting April 6; Motiliev; ECC; OL; FD; Harondar; HM," and then the penciled note 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is FD, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know who FD was. It may have been one of Mr. Carter's secretaries.

Senator FERGUSON. How many people had gone over to this meeting in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife and I came from Peking, accompanied by Miss Tyler, who had been doing some research on teaching of English in China, and we were met in Moscow by Mr. Carter, Miss Moore, and a secretary of Mr. Carter's whose name I forget.

Senator FERGUSON. Could that be the name that has been given to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is why I suggested that might be, FD, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who is Harondar?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was secretary of the Soviet Council of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not you discussed military activities at all at that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no present recollection of it whatever.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will this be introduced into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Have you identified it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a photostat of a document?

Mr. MORRIS. It is of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. And so testified by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 519" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 519

MEETING APRIL 6; MOTILIEV; ECC; OL; FD; HARONDAR; HM

ECC explained about Cressey's proposed study of Soviet geography. Motiliev said that in principle he welcomed the idea, as there was so little work done in English on this phase of the Soviet Union. He asked whether the plan included economic geography. ECC answered that while it would be largely physical geography, some attention would be paid to economic geography. ECC gave Motiliev a copy of Cressey's outline and Motiliev said that he would discuss it later.

In re the preliminary agenda for the Conference: Motiliev said that the questions on the Soviet Union included in the section headed "International Implications" reflect a negative valuation of the Soviet Far Eastern policy. E. G. the question "Does the industrialization of the Far East work for or against the Peace Policy" is all right taken by itself, but when grouped with many other questions of this nature, the general impression is unfavorable to the policy.

Motiliev said that some of the questions would be very difficult to answer, since the delegation did not represent Narkomindel e. g. the questions of the strategic significance of industrialization and the questions on Sinkiang.

Motiliev said that it was not correct to lump Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia in one question. Outer Mongolia is an independent state while Sinkiang is part of China. The policy in regard to Sinkiang is just a detail of the general policy in regard to China. It is true that Sinkiang is very closely linked to the U. S. S. R. economically due to its geographical position, but it is part of China politically. Likewise Outer Mongolia should be called the Mongolian People's Republic to keep clear the difference in status between these places.

Motiliev said that the questions reflect the fears of their Far Eastern policy rather than the real essence of it.

Some of the questions which are included in the Soviet section would be impossible for them to answer. e. g. the question of whether or not other powers would let the U. S. S. R. give China aid in its reconstruction; question in re German-Japanese alliance which belongs in the section on the balance of power; the question in re U. S. recognition (No. 47).

In the questions on other countries many of the real problems of the Pacific are not treated adequately. e. g. the question of naval rivalry; of English-Japanese-Chinese relations; of American-Japanese relations and American interests in China; of American public opinion in re the Far East (does the opinion of the authors of Empire in the East, not including Pfeffer, reflect the opinion of the general people, of the intelligensia, or of the controlling groups of bankers, etc.?). Many of these questions need additions and changes.

Motiliev said that some of the more fundamental problems and analyses would be included e. g. in his data paper he was going try to show that Orchard's analysis of Japan was illogical. (Lorwin agreed with Motiliev's criticisms of Orchard.) He feel that the analysis is superficial. Orchard finds that the density of population and the lack of land are the fundamental problems for Japan. If this is true then expansion is the only way out, and this justifies expansion as in the increases of the whole nation. Orchard's contentions are not supported statistically. Penrose, for instance does not come to the same conclusions about the population. Motiliev will try to prove that the fundamental problems are in the internal structure of the society and can be solved by changing that structure. One of the main problems is the fact that there are remnants of feudalism mixed up with capitalism. For instance 70 percent of the agricultural population are tenants.

Another interesting question is about the real causes for the American withdrawal from the Philippines. Motiliev found Quincy Wright's analysis very convincing.

Motiliev said that there were many articles in Pacific Affairs with which they did not agree. After the organizational question of P. A. has been discussed, they would like to discuss some of these articles.

In re question 48, on the effect of U. S. recognition of the U. S. S. R., ECC said that Roosevelt probably thought that recognition had prevented Japanese invasion of Siberia. Motiliev said that the main thing that had prevented that was the military preparation of the U. S. S. R. U. S.-U. S. S. R. relations have not been close. They have been passive both economically and politically.

Motiliev said that questions that have no direct political significance should be included e. g. the questions of the economic development of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, and the Kurile Islands. Although the strategic importance of these places may have greater significance, it would be interesting to know of their economic importance. The Japanese have a fuelling station very near Kamachatka, which is in reality a military base.

Motiliev suggested that in order to prepare the final agenda, each Council be asked to submit proposals and changes. These suggestions should then be sent to the Councils concerned with the question for approval or disapproval. He does not want to have questions included which are embarrassing to any of the Councils. ECC said that previously those questions were included which were approved by three or four Councils. The publication of the preliminary agenda in IPR Notes was done in an effort to get such criticisms and suggestions from all the Councils.

Motiliev said that another interesting question was whether the position reflected in Empire in the East was due to the fact that questions of internal recovery had been so important in the last few years. If this were so, the position might be just temporary.

Motiliev said that the British Policy in the Pacific was the key to the situation. The policy is very indefinite and vaccilating, just as in the European policy of England. While it was possible to see the general line, it was impossible to know what the policy would be tomorrow. He asked about the possibility of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and expressed the opinion that in the next few years it would be impossible, and on the contrary there would be growing contradictions between England and Japan. OL said that in an article by Asiaticus for PA on Financial Imperialism in the Far East, the opinion was expressed that England was drifting toward recognition of Japanese predominance in North China; consolidation of British influence and interests in South China; and the establishment of a "common hunting ground" in the Yangtze valley. At the same time Japan will not recognize a British sphere in China, even if it is of much smaller size. OL said that there was great opposition to the Anglo-Japanese alliance in England from the navy, the interests on the China Coast, the home financial interests, and from the Dominions. This is reflected in the British attitude toward the Philippines. Motiliev said that the British want the U. S. to keep the Philippines to act as a wall between Japan and the Empire.

Motiliev said that in the U. S. S. R. the general opinion as to the cause of the U. S. liberation of the Philippines was that they were very complex. The interests of the sugar industry were very important but not decisive. Here it is considered that it was a conscious step taken by the U. S. government to bring greater British activity in the Pacific. This is the idea expressed by Quincy Wright. Another idea is that from the military point of view the U. S. is glad not to have to protect the Philippines which are practically impossible to defend. On the other hand the independence is not real and for the next ten years the U. S. has the right to defend and use the Islands for military bases.

OI asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific. Motiliev said that formerly the Soviet attitude was that war in the Pacific between Japan and the U. S. was impossible because of the distance between them. Now the development of aviation has changed this. The question of Guam is considered important here. Motiliev said that the Trans-Pacific air service was considered primarily of military importance in the Soviet Press, but it of course had some commercial value. ECC said that he thought the Trans-Pacific line was started partly to keep the British Imperial line out of that service; and partly because of the American idea that China was the great potential market for the U. S. Motiliev said that at present the competition between different countries on technical aspects of aviation is very great. The development of stratosphere airplanes was of greatest significance. In April there is to be a conference of specialists on this question here.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the last paragraph of that document?

The CHAIRMAN. The last paragraph, did you say?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific. Motiliev said that formerly the Soviet attitude was that war in the Pacific between Japan and the United States was impossible because of the distance between them. Now the development of aviation has changed this. The question of Guam is considered important here. Motiliev said that the Trans-Pacific Air Service was considered primarily of military importance in the Soviet press, but it of course had some commercial value. ECC said that he thought the Trans-Pacific line was started partly to keep the British Imperial line out of that service; and partly because of the American idea that China was the great potential market for the United States. Motiliev said that at present the competition between different countries on technical aspects of aviation is very great. The development of stratosphere airplanes was of greatest significance. In April there is to be a conference of specialists on this question here.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the next question?

Mr. MORRIS. When you dealt with the Soviet officials in Moscow, Mr. Lattimore, did you deal with them as if they could possibly be Communist intelligence agents?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. We, at least I, assumed that they were all connected with the Soviet Government in one form or another, but we had no knowledge of the individual status of the people beyond the way they described themselves when—you know, when we were introduced, and so on.

Of course, at the present time, I would generally assume that any Soviet citizen or subject is an intelligence agent or a potential one.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, back when you were discussing these problems with these people, you knew that they were Government officials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And, therefore, anything that you told them could be used by their Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of course it could.

Senator FERGUSON. Well then, how do you distinguish between an intelligence agent now and one then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose I mean in terms of belonging to organized intelligence services of any country. But, of course, we had no great concern on the subject since nobody connected with the IPR had access to secret information of any kind. We were entirely an organization dealing with published materials in the open market, and international discussion.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you then discussing this question of war bases in the Pacific?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asking if they would be interested in an article in Pacific Affairs on the subject. During my editorship of Pacific Affairs in those years, we published an article on submarine warfare as related to possibilities of submarine warfare, as related to Japan. That was by an American author.

We had an article on the significance of the Dutch Navy in the Pacific generally, that was by a Dutch naval officer or former naval officer. We had articles on guerrilla warfare in China, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Mr. Lattimore, if a person had written the article that you had an interest in mind, in the first sentence, he would have had to obtain some information from the United States along that line.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't say so, Senator. That is, any more than we had to obtain information from Government sources for the other articles we wrote on general questions of strategy in the Pacific.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would you get the information if you did not get it from our Government?

OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator, as of 1936 I should say that the obvious question in that connection was Singapore, about which a great deal had been published. There had been a good deal of discussion about whether Singapore, as an air base, was a substitute for a naval base or in addition to its use as a naval base, and so on.

There was wide area of discussion of that kind of problem.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever write any articles or have them written on this question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; we never did, and I don't believe—no, I think I can be quite sure in saying that we didn't even approach anyone to write such an article.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read another paragraph here.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is this from the same minutes?

Mr. MORRIS. From the same minutes. I am reading now a paragraph beginning with "Motiliev said that questions"—it is in the middle of page 2:

Motiliev said that questions that have no direct political significance should be included, e. g., the questions of the economic development of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, and the Kurile Islands. Although the strategic importance of these places may have greater significance, it would be interesting to know of their economic importance. The Japanese have a fueling station very near Kamchatka, which is in reality a military base.

Then there are other paragraphs here along the same nature. Mr. Chairman, the whole thing is in the record.

I would like to ask Dr. Lattimore: In view of the desires being expressed by the Soviet officials here, whether or not General Barmine's testimony to the effect that the Soviet military intelligence was using IPR as a cover shop to secure military information from the United States and from Japan and China, whether or not that becomes plausible.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I think it is absolutely implausible. It seems to me that these are perfectly legitimate questions for general discussion as possibilities for articles in an international publication in 1936.

We did, in fact, have articles on the Soviet fisheries in the North Pacific, and on the disputes between the Russians and the Japanese over those fisheries, involving Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands, and so on. So if you want to be very far-fetched and say that this kind of thing was intelligence information, it was intelligence information about the Russians rather than to them.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not a fact, that Mr. Carter has already testified that when he returned from some of these trips he reported to our G–2?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that testimony, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that you had never heard that he had?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is the first time I remember hearing it.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever requested to report to G–2?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been asked to meet with various groups of people——

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of our Armed Forces after returning from trips; not specifically G–2, as far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. If it was not specifically, when you returned is it not true that you reported to some of our Armed Forces?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asked to give general talks about my observations abroad to groups that included military personnel, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did it not include G–2 officers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't be precise about that without having a list of the people who attended.

Senator FERGUSON. And were you not asked questions about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My memory is very unclear at the present time. I think that I was asked my opinion about this and that, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That being true, did you not feel that the Russian authorities would be questioned by at least their intelligence officers, if they were not intelligence officers themselves?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. As of 1936 I had no feelings of the kind because I didn't have experience of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. You have had no feeling about it at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no feeling about it at all. If questions of real military importance had come up, I would certainly have mentioned them to, for instance, Colonel Faymonville, who was our military attaché in Moscow under Ambassador Bullitt.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that not the Colonel Faymonville who was sent back because he was too pro-Soviet, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know for what reason he was sent back. I know that there is a tribute to him in a book by former Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles as being the best-informed military officer we had on Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that would not conflict with the fact that he was pro-Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as I knew Colonel Faymonville, I had no reason to consider him pro-Russian.

Senator FERGUSON. How many times would you say that you had been interviewed by our authorities on the question, for instance, of this trip to Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On this trip to Moscow, I don't remember any questioning. I do remember having dinner at the American Embassy with various Embassy personnel, at which Colonel Faymonville and others were present, and which the general subject of our talks with the Russians was a part of the topic of conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Ambassador at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. William Bullitt.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you visit any high Russian officials at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At Ambassador Bullitt's suggestion, he took me to see a Russian official. I think he was a Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, or something of that sort.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did you talk about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I gave some opinions on Inner Mongolia. May I explain?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Just about at this time, there had been some clashes on the Outer Mongolia frontier, between the Russian and Mongol forces and the Japanese. Roy Howard had just had an interview with Stalin, at which Stalin had made what was then considered a sensational statement that the Russians would defend Outer Mongolia in case of any invasion.

In connection with this, Ambassador Bullitt asked me about supplementary information from Inner Mongolia. I didn't know Outer Mongolia. But he was asking about general conditions in Inner Mongolia. And I told him what I knew, and my opinions about it as of that time, and I believe I mentioned the fact that the Russians had attacked my publications on the subject and had very strongly insinuated that I was pro-Japanese, and so on.

Mr. Bullitt said, "Well, I think what you are saying is extremely interesting, and I think the Russians ought to hear about it. Suppose I fix up an appointment. Would you mind talking to them?"

I said, "No; I will say to them just what I have said to you, if you think that is all right."

So he made the appointment and took me down there and, in his presence, I talked with the Soviet Vice Commissar.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet anyone else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe we met anyone else.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the one occasion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know it was just that one occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this Colonel Faymonville that you are speaking of here, is he the same Colonel Faymonville about whom Mr. Carter wrote you in June of 1941, that letter which went into the record yesterday?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying now that you knew Colonel Faymonville as early as 1936?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I first met him in Moscow in 1936.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Carter knew that you knew him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he did, since we were both in Moscow at the same time. He may have forgotten, of course.

Mr. SOURWINE. In his letter of June 20, 1941, Mr. Carter suggested that if you had time in San Francisco you and Mr. Holland might want to arrange a private talk with Colonel Faymonville, and he gave the headquarters, and then he described him to you.

He said, "He would, I think, have been thoroughly at home and at ease if he had luncheon with us at the Mayflower on Wednesday."

That was that luncheon with Ambassador Oumansky, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he said, "I think you get the idea. It may be that if you get the same favorable impression of him which Harriet Moore and I have, he might be someone who could be exceptionally useful to you and the Generalissimo at some future time in Chungking."

Would you take it from that that Mr. Carter knew that you knew Mr. Faymonville?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is not clear to me from that whether he knew it or not. I would assume he knew it since we were both in Moscow at the same time and dined at the Embassy together, and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know definitely whether Mr. Carter knew that you were acquainted with Colonel Faymonville?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know definitely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I explain a little bit more? One reason why I personally was very much interested in Colonel Faymonville was the fact that he had started life as an expert on Japan rather than Russia. He spoke Japanese in addition to Russian, and there were very few American military or civil personnel who had that kind of accomplishment. Hence, I would think that Faymonville's opinions on questions in northeast Asia, involving both Japan and Russia, would be valuable opinions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Before this next document, Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that the last paragraph makes no mention of Mr. Lattimore supplying an article.

The first sentence is: "OL asked if there was any special interest in the U. S. S. R. about the question of air bases in the Pacific."

Mr. Lattimore, did Soviet officials collect economic and financial information on China and Japan for the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether they did or not, but if you have a document on the subject to refresh my memory I shall be glad to see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, are you about to leave this document?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we leave, may I ask a question?

You will recall, Mr. Lattimore, that on a previous occasion we have discussed here the meeting of the 8th of April.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the meeting at which the minutes indicated that you had spoken of an article by a Communist writer to be published in Pacific Affairs.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And we had some colloquy about whether you were referring to Asiaticus. The memorandum subsequently, that is, in one of its latter paragraphs, did mention Asiaticus.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe some point was made of the fact that that mention of Asiaticus in the same memorandum was quite some time subsequent to the mention of an article by the Communist writer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to call your attention to the fact that in this document, being the minutes of the meeting of April 6, there is also mention of Asiaticus, and I ask you if you recall that there had been such mention at the conference which this document purports to recount?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall it.

This, again, is a copy of some minutes that I don't remember seeing at the time or since. But, looking over those previous minutes, something has occurred to me which might clarify the questions you were asking me at that time about deadline for Pacific Affairs, and so on.

There are two points here: One is that I was not in control of the daedline of Pacific Affairs; that thatw as all handled in Washington, and sometimes—in New York, I mean—and sometimes I didn't know until an issue came out exactly what was in it.

The other thing is that very possibly, as subject matter for these discussions with the Russians, I had with me carbon copies of what I was expecting to be in the June issue of Pacific Affairs, and that therefore the next issue would refer to the September issue. That is a possibility. But it might straighten things out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, as bearing on the question of whether the article by Asiaticus did appear in the June issue, was in fact in existence at the time of these conferences, you will note that at the bottom of page 2, beginning in the middle of the paragraph, these minutes read:

> OL said that in an article by Asiaticus for PA on financial imperialism in the Far East, the opinion was expressed that England was drifting toward recognition of Japanese predominance in north China; consolidation of British influence and interests in south China, and the establishment of a "common hunting ground" in the Yangtze Valley.

That would indicate that the article was in being at that time, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would indicate that it was in being in manuscript.

Mr. SOURWINE. At least in manuscript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At least in manuscript; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to offer at this time for the appendix of the record an article about Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, military aide to President Roosevelt, who "has spent 15 years in the U. S. S. R. His views on Soviet aims are somewhat at variance with 'Red menace' tales."

This is an article in the Daily People's World, Friday, February 18, 1949.

I think this paper has been described, has it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir; described in connection with the Senator Knowland comment.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the editorial. And also of the ad concerning the witness' book.

Mr. MORRIS. That is described as a Communist paper?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You want that to go into the appendix of the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to appears in the appendix of the record as exhibit No. 472 on 3700.)

Mr. MORRIS. The next question is, Did Soviet officials like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs could not quite take the same line?

The CHAIRMAN. Let us hear the question again.

Mr. MORRIS. The question to Mr. Lattimore is, Did Soviet officials like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs could not quite take the same line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They may have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 11, 1939, addressed to Mr. Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be shown to the witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having received that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I must have received it. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been identified.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the witness to read that letter, commencing at the outset.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dated July 11, 1939, on board steamship *Aquitania.*

(EXHIBIT No. 520)

DEAR OWEN: The Chinese are more unanimously enthusiastic about Pacific Affairs than the members of any other group.

I might mention, of course, that this means the Chinese of the official Chinese Council:

Franklin Ho was immensely impressed by Guenther Stein's The Yen and the Sword. Ushiba assured me that the office of the Japanese Council was taking seriously your request for additional Japanese articles. Motylev was eager for much more intimate factual details giving both very recent economic information and also personal observations as to what is going on in China and Japan.

As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Jaffe, he likes the militancy of Amerasia. He recognizes that Pacific Affairs cannot quite take this line but he still insists that no one can legitimately criticize you if you do decide to adopt his request to you of 3 years ago that Pacific Affairs come out strong consistently and repeatedly for the collective system.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, may I interrupt your letter there? Is that not going back to your meeting with them in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is going back to that meeting and indicating that apparently Motylev considered that for 3 years I have not fulfilled his suggestion that Pacific Affairs take a stronger line denouncing Japanese aggression.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not also show the opposite, that also you had agreed at that time with the Russians to take a line for the Russians?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, it doesn't. It indicates that at that time the Russians repeatedly brought up the idea that Pacific Affairs should take an editorial line of characterizing Japanese policy in China as aggression, and we repeatedly pointed out that Pacific Affairs was controlled by a number of National Councils, and that we had to try

to please everybody, and usually wound up by displeasing somebody in practically every issue.

Senator FERGUSON. Had the Russians asked you to use your magazine, the Pacific Affairs, to advocate the collective system?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is clearly meant here by collective system is collective security system.

The CHAIRMAN. Now go back to the question, please.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he request you, when you were in Moscow——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that request in Moscow. As I remember just now, the minutes don't show it, but Carter after 3 years apparently feels that that was the general tenor of the conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. But is not that all they are talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because characterizing the Japanese policy in Asia as aggression would be one way of saying, "Well, there ought to be some collective security measures taken through the League of Nations to stop it."

Senator FERGUSON. Did not Russia enter into a pact with Japan on this question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The next year.

Senator FERGUSON. The next year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Some 8 months later.

Senator FERGUSON. And does not this indicate that at least one thing was discussed, that collective system by you and the Russian people at the Russian meeting in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That indicates that from Mr. Carter's recollection 3 years later, it was that we talked about collective security.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it say collective security there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It seems to me that the context clearly indicates collective security.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Does it say collective security. Can you not answer that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What it says is "come out strong consistently and repeatedly for the collective system." And I can read the context in no other way than meaning collective-security system.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator, are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, did you want Mr. Lattimore to continue reading?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. But my question was—there were two points that I made there—one of the questions was did Soviet officials collect economic and financial information on Japan through the IPR, and did Soviet officials like the militancy of Amerasia and understand why Pacific Affairs could not quite take the same line.

Question two was partly answered by the first paragraph, but it will not be answered until we get to the paragraph starting:

> One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese internal economic and financial position.

However, if the witness would like to read the whole letter, I have no objection.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I answered Senator Ferguson that the difference referred to here between Amerasia and Pacific Affairs can easily and clearly be established; namely, that Amerasia did repeatedly charac-

terize Japanese policy in China as imperialism, Amerasia being an American magazine published in America, and therefore quite able to be strong on such a subject; whereas, Pacific Affairs, being under the control of a number of National Councils, some of whom objected to characterizing one member of the Institute as an aggressor, was always much milder in that respect.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have any doubt that the Amerasia was a Communist magazine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It never occurred to me to think that Amerasia was a Communist magazine. If you will go back over the issues of Amerasia at the time that was connected with it, up to 1941, you will see that it could not be characterized as even a left-wing magazine in those years [reading]:

Both he and Voitinsky regret that there is no evidence of our having taken seriously their request for this 3 years ago. They feel the necessity for this was never greater than today. Their insistence was of great interest to me for two reasons. First, because it is evidence that they treat the IPR seriously and have orderly memories of their suggestion. Second, because it contraverts the assertions of the reactionaries in Paris, London, and Washington that the retirement of Litvinoff meant that the Kremlin was throwing over its commitment to the collective system.

Could you use the present appearance of Sir Arthur Salter's "Security—Can It Be Retrieved?" as the occasion for an early full length treatment that will be so fundamental as to appeal to the more thoughtful members of the institute in every member country and so militant as to convince Motylev and Voitinsky that we are responding to their suggestion.

One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese internal economic and financial position. Happily this will be supplied by Chi's study for the inquiry. (You have doubtless seen his Virginia Quarterly article.) I am going to reopen with Jessup and Angus the question of publication of some Inquiry material in Pacific Affairs when it is of such a nature as to fit in with your own policy as editor and when it is of a kind which will make important and authentic information of which scholars and statesmen are in need available to a wide Pacific Affairs audience.

Your many friends all along the line inquired for you and sent you their warmest greetings. All are asking when your book will be published.

I learned in one or two quarters that Miss Virginia Thompson's book on Indochina is not being taken seriously because there is a criticism of Pelliot or an implied criticism of Pelliot's position. Do you happen to know what would be the basis of this and whether scholars in other countries regard Pelliot with the same degree of infallibility as he regards himself?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. That letter is in the record, Mr. Chairman; is it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it is.

(The document, as previously read in full by the witness beginning on p. 3331 was marked "Exhibit No. 520.")

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you employ Y. Y. Hsu with the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did. My recollection is imperfect on the subject. If you have a document to refresh it, I would be glad to see it. But in the meantime I can tell you to the best of my recollection what the situation was.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you employ Y. Y. Hsu with the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I didn't. I have some recollections on the subject, but I don't believe that they included my employing him.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say you did or you did not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you offer to employ Y. Y. Hsu in the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I did not. If you would allow me to state my recollection on the subject——

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then we will see if it corresponds with whatever documents you have.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that the Office of War Information, the New York office, needed materials to put out in Chinese language material to be sent to China, that the library resources for that kind of thing in New York were very restricted, and that a request was made to the New York office of IPR to know whether OWI could draw on the IPR's file of Chinese materials; that this was consented to and that Y. Y. Hsu was the man who was in charge of that material in the IPR office at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know Mr. Hsu?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Rather slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever visit you at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. He and his wife visited us in Baltimore.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Once, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit him at his home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We went and had dinner with him and his wife on Long Island somewhere once, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time of his Communist record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Mr. Hsu now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he is in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he an official of the Red Chinese Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no knowledge on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. But you do believe he is in Red China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he is in Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you put into the record at this time Mr. Y. Y. Hsu's Communist record as it existed in 1942?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a clipping from the Daily Worker of December 14, 1929, page 5.

Senator FERGUSON. What date?

Mr. MANDEL. 1929.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. What was the date of these dinner parties?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what is the date of the dinner party at your home and Mr. Hsu's home that you just testified to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After the war, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. That is sometime subsequent to 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. This article describes, and I quote:

> Tonight in six great demonstrations the New York workers will protest against the butchery of thousands of thousands of workers in Haiti and China and will denounce the American Government, which is mobilizing all its forces for war against the Soviet Union, fatherland of the workers of the world.

Listed as speakers at these meetings are the following, who have recently been indicted as Communist leaders. I read the name of

I. Amter, Alexander Trachtenberg, and, listed also as a speaker, Y. Y. Hsu.

I have here another clipping from the Daily Worker of November 6, 1933, which says, in part, that 38 workers' organizations have endorsed the Communist Party ticket and program in the New York municipal elections. Listed as endorsing that program and ticket is Y. Y. Hsu.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what date, the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. That, Mr. Chairman, was 1933.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here another clipping from the Daily Worker of August 13, 1928, page 1, which describes that 15 workers participated in a Chinese tag day under the auspices of the Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Unions, and it lists also the names of individuals who were arrested in connection with that tag day.

Among those arrested was Y. Y. Hsu, spelled here S-h-u, secretary of the New York Worker Peasant Alliance. A photograph is given with the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may these go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 521" and are as follows:)

[Source: Daily Worker, December 14, 1929, p. 5]

SMASH ATTACK ON HAITI, U. S. S. R.—MASS MEETS MOBILIZE AGAINST IMPERIALISM

Tonight in six great demonstrations the New York workers will potest against the butchery of thousands of workers in Haiti and China and will denounce the American Government, which is mobilizing all its forces for war against the Soviet Union, Fatherland of the workers of the world.

Meetings will be held at St. Luke's Hall, 125 West 130th St.; Manhattan Lyceum, 66 East Fourth St. Speakers, H. Benjamin, Anna Daman, George Siskind, James Mo. Bryant Hall, Sixth Ave. near 42d St. Speakers, I. Amter, Max Bedacht, Harriet Silverman, Joseph Boruchowitz, Alexander Trachtenberg, T. H. Li, Sam Darey. Rose gardens, 1347 Boston Rd., Bronx. Speakers, Bill Dunne, T. Y. Hu, Leon Plott, G. Green, H. Sazer. 318 Grand St., Brooklyn. Speakers, J. L. Engdahl, Rose Wortis, J. Williamson, Y. Y. Hsu. Hopkinson Mansions, 428 Hopkinson Ave., Brooklyn. Speakers, M. J. Olgin, Otto Hall, T. P. Hu, Gertrude Welsh. Bohemian Hall, Second and Woolsey Aves., Astoria, L. I. Speakers, A. Markoff, Richard Moore, Tong Ping.

Tomorrow afternoon at 1:15 New York workers are urged to gather at Park Row and Broadway in front of the Federal Building to demonstrate against Wall Street's oppression, aided by the Washington Executive Council, of the Colonial and American workers and its attacks on the Soviet Union.

Dozen of organizations will participate in these demonstrations. At the Bryant Hall meeting, which takes place at 6 o'clock instead of 8, as at other demonstrations, leading members of the Needle Trades Workers' Industrial Union will speak also on the organization movement among the dressmakers and the false strike of the I. L. G. W. U.

[Source: Daily Worker, November 6, 1933, p. 2]

THIRTY-EIGHT WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS ENDORSE COMMUNIST PARTY PROGRAM—PARTY'S FIGHT FOR MASSES' NEEDS CITED IN STATEMENT—INDUSTRIAL UNIONS, UNEMPLOYED, COUNCILS, WOMEN'S COUNCILS AMONG BACKERS OF RED CANDIDATES

NEW YORK.—Thirty-eight workers' organizations have endorsed the Communist Party ticket and program in the New York municipal elections. No other has shown daily its stubborn and ceaseless fight in the shops and streets for the

needs of the masses, says the statement signed by these unions, unemployed councils, and fraternal organizations.

Headed by such fighting unions as the Marine Workers Industrial Union, the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union, the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union, the organizations supporting the Communist Party state:

"Only the Communist Party as the party of the working class represents the interests of the entire working population, stands squarely on the principle that the provision of adequate food, clothing and shelter, and the defense of the rights and living standards of the workers are the primary issues in this campaign."

Among the organizations signing endorsement for the Communist candidates are the Unemployed Councils, Friends of the Soviet Union, Councils of Working Class Women, Anti-Imperialist League, Workers Ex-Servicemen's League, and the Labor Sports Union.

Needle Trade Industrial Union:
Ben Gold, General Secretary
Louis Hyman, President
Irving Potash, Secretary
Isadore Weisberg, Manager, Dress Dept.
Joseph Boruchowitz, Manager of Cloak Dept.
Samuel Burt, Fur Dressing Dept.
Ben Stallman, Org. of Bathrobe Dept.
Dominick Montello, Org. of Custom Tailors
Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union
James Lustig, Organizer
James Matlis, Secretary
Marine Workers Industrial Union:
Roy Hudson, National Secretary
Thomas Ray, Secretary
Food Workers Industrial Union:
Jay Rubin, General Secretary
William Albertson, Org. of Hotel and Restaurant Dept.
Sam Kramberg, Org. of Cafeteria Dept.
Alteration Painters Union: Morris Kushinsky, Secretary
Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union:
Fred Biedenkapp, Organizer
Isadore Rosenberg, Secretary
Building Maintenance Workers Industrial Union: Mort Sher, Secretary
Drygoods Workers Union:
Louis Kfare, Vice Chairman
Chester Fierstein, Chairman
Furniture Workers Industrial Union: Morris Pizer, Secretary
Independent Carpenters Union:
Isaac Berman, Organizer
Herman Bogartz, Secretary
Nathan Ellin, Treasurer
Taxi Workers Union:
Harold Eddy, Organizer
Abner Feigin, Financial Secretary
Cleaners and Dyers Union: Max Rosenberg, Secretary
Laundry Workers Industrial Union: Sam Berland, Secretary
Building and Construction Workers League:
Jack Taylor, Secretary
Sam Nessin, General Secretary
Trade Union Unity Council:
Andy Overgaard, Secretary
Rose Wortis, Assistant Secretary
Sheppard, Organizer
Office Workers Union: Laura Carmon, Organizer
Unemployed Council:
Israel Amter, National Secretary
Carl Winter, Secretary of Greater New York
Richard Sullivan, Org. of Greater New York
International Labor Defense:
William Lawrence, Secretary, New York District
William Patterson, National Secretary
William Fitzgerald, Org., Harlem Section

Workers International Relief:
Pauline Rogers, New York City Secretary
Alfred Wagenknecht, National Secretary
Friends of the Soviet Union: B. Friedman, Secretary
Anti-Imperialist League:
William Simons, National Secretary
John Bruno, Secretary, New York
Anti-Imperialist Alliance: Y. Y. Hsu, National Secretary
Workers Ex-Servicemen's League:
Harold Hickerson, National Secretary
Joseph Singer, Secretary, City Committee
Emanuel Levin, National Chairman
P. Cashione
Council of Working Class Women:
Clara Bodian, Secretary
Clara Shavelson, Educational Director
Sarah Licht, Org. Secretary
Labor Sports Union: Mack Gordon, Secretary, New York District
International Workers Order:
Max Bedacht, National Secretary, Jewish Section
Harry Schiller, New York City Secretary
Sadie Doroshkin, Secretary City Central
Russian Mutual Aid: Joseph Soltan, President, New York District Committee
English Workers Clubs:
J. Landy
Edith Zucker
Finnish Workers Federation
Jewish City Club Committee

[Source: Daily Worker, New York, Monday, August 13, 1928]

FIFTEEN JAILED BY NEW YORK POLICE IN RELIEF COLLECTIONS FOR CHINESE TRADE-UNIONISTS—ARRESTS AIDED BY FOLLOWERS OF KUOMINTANG—SOLICITING WITHOUT PERMIT CHARGED

Fifteen workers, who participated in the Chinese Tag Day under the auspices of the Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Unions, were arrested yesterday in Chinatown. They were charged with "soliciting without a permit" and were released on $500 bail each, furnished by the local International Labor Defense. The collectors are to appear at the First District Court, White and Center Sts., at 9 a. m. today (Monday), where they will be defended by Jacques Buitenkant, retained by the New York Section of the International Labor Defense.

Those arrested were Y. Y. Shu, secretary of the New York Worker-Peasant Alliance; David Wee, 27; H. T. Tsiang, 28; David Kanner; Max Postolsky, 21; W. Martin, 18; Du Peld, 22; Yekelchik; M. Levin, 12; I. Kleinman, 19; R. Kleidmann, 20; B. Winnick, 17; B. Rosenberg, 22; and L. Chansik.

* * * * * * *

[Picture head: ARRESTED LEADER]

Above is Y. Y. Shu, secretary of the New York Worker-Peasant Alliance, who was among the 15 workers arrested yesterday. Shu was active in the Chinese Relief Tag Days held yesterday and Saturday. Thousands of dollars were contributed by the workers of New York to aid the Chinese workers in their fight against imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. Photo was taken during the recent antiwar demonstration at Union Square.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these next two documents?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 24, 1942, addressed to Mr. Joseph Barnes, Coordinator of Information. It has a typewritten signature of Yung-ying Hsu. It is dated April 24, 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been identified as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter for us, please?

The CHAIRMAN. To whom is it addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. To Mr. Joseph Barnes, Coordinator of Information. [Reading:]

(EXHIBIT No. 522)

DEAR SIR: It is a great pleasure to receive your letter of the 21st instant. I have just requested my alma mater, Leland Stanford University, for a transcript of my academic records to enable me to fill out the application blank with greater accuracy. The application will be sent to you at the earliest possible time.

Under Mr. Edward C. Carter's capable, enlightening and benevolent leadership I find my work in the Institute of Pacific Relations extremely interesting and enjoyable. However, if you think I can be of any help to your work, I will ask Mr. Carter to release me from my present position.

As you have been associated with the institute, you might agree with me that its equipment and environment are a great asset to writers either on or for the Far East. For the past 14 months I have been in charge of the Chinese collection here. It might be beneficial for both the institute and the Coordinator of Information that part of the work of the latter be done in the former. It is my opinion that Mr. Carter would be glad to offer the facilities of his organization to the war effort and welcome such an arrangement.

Permit me, sir, to express my deep appreciation of both your and Mr. Owen Lattimore's kindly attention.

Sincerely yours.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is it signed by?

Mr. MANDEL. Yung-ying Hsu.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Y. Y. Hsu?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The previous document as read by counsel was marked "Exhibit No. 522.")

The CHAIRMAN. Let us get this straight. Y. Y. Hsu and Yung-ying Hsu are one and the same individual?

Mr. MORRIS. Is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably, yes. I don't know anything about the Y. Y. Hsu of the 1920's or 1930's. This is all new to me.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you did not know the Communist record of Y. Y. Hsu?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is my testimony. I have no recollection of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you receive copies of the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, as they were issued?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At no time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At no time.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not a contributor to the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor a subscriber?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when you were with the OWI, did you make any investigation prior to employment of personnel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. Investigation of personnel was the function of a separate personnel branch of OWI.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know whether they made any examination or investigation of personnel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that all people employed by OWI, including myself, were subject to investigation by the Civil Service Commission which, my recollection is, was able to check with other investigating agencies, such as the FBI.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any investigations for security purposes, to your knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, there was an investigation of individuals before they could be hired.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I had in mind.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is along the security line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think every single person had to be investigated along loyalty and security lines.

The CHAIRMAN. When was OWI set up first? Do you remember?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know the precise date, Senator. It grew out of COI, Coordinator of Information, which was at some time split into OSS and OWI.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not come in then until it was OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And you came into it after what year, or about what time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I came into it, I think, in late December 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of these articles in the Daily Worker?

Mr. MORRIS. The last one is 1933, Senator, the latest one is 1933.

Mr. Lattimore, I had asked you the question in connection with that letter Mr. Mandel read, what your recollection is of the kindly attention referred to in the last paragraph that you showed to Mr. Hsu.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no present recollection whatever. May I say that the set-up of OWI at that time, as far as Chinese work was concerned, was that all radio transmissions——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, I do not think you are answering the counsel's question now. If you want to go back, if you want to go back to a former question, that would be something else.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am explaining why it is difficult for me to answer this question, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question, Mr. Reporter, of the counsel, Mr. Morris.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That was his answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Chinese personnel of the New York Office were under Mr. Barnes' jurisdiction, not under mine.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not belong to this question. That belongs to another question asked by Senator Ferguson. If you want to let it stand that way, it is all right, but it involves the thing more.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you have any dealings with Mr. Hsu when he was, as he says there, in charge of the Chinese collection of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, no direct dealings, as far as I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, showing a letterhead of the Office of War Information, 111 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif., dated March 12, 1943, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland and signed "Owen."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall sending that letter to Mr. Holland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't recall sending it to him, but obviously I sent it.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that look like your signature at the bottom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is to Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.:

(EXHIBIT No. 523)

DEAR BILL: Several weeks ago I was in New York, but only on Saturday and Sunday, and saw no one but people in our own office, except for the fact that I had lunch in the Hsu's apartment with old Prof. Chi and his wife and Harriet Chi.

Anytime that it would be useful to you to have Hsu working out here for the IPR, we should be very glad to take him on as a part-time consultant or research man for our Chinese Section.

Would you let me know if you have any ideas on the subject that I could help to follow up?

We are enjoying being in San Francisco again. Feels just like home (only a hell of a lot more crowded). David is taking Chinese lessons, writing and all.

Love from us too to Doreen, Mrs. McGarry, and Patricia.

Yours,

OWEN.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be inserted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 523" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, is that meeting that you had in Mr. Hsu's apartment still another meeting in addition to the one you testified to took place out on Long Island somewhere?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably the same, but I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. You also testified the other was after the war, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought it was after the war; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And on Long Island?

The CHAIRMAN. This is a different meeting. This was not on Long Island, as I understand it. This was in New York.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know from this letter whether the apartment was in New York or on Long Island.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was Mr. Hsu's apartment, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recollect. The only place that I recollect is an apartment on Long Island, and I thought I was there after the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recollect an apartment on Long Island which was Mr. Hsu's apartment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that if Mr. Y. Y. Hsu was not living on Long Island in 1943, this was a different apartment and a separate and second visit; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. And you knew Mr. Hsu well enough for him to be the only person you visited for that whole weekend?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I say here "saw no one but people in our office."

The CHAIRMAN. Now go back to the question again. What is your question? Do you know Mr. Hsu well enough so that he is the only one you visited during that weekend?

Mr. MORRIS. In addition to the people in your own office?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether I had lunch outside the office with anybody else, or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Harriet Chi mentioned in the first paragraph, was she ever your secretary?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was my secretary for about 2 weeks in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. She is the wife of the Chao-ting Chi that we have talked about at great length in this testimony, is she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was at one time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. The one that has been read?

It is in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you employ Jack Dinichi Kimoto as a translator for the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of it.

But if you have a document there to refresh my memory, I may be able to recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Lattimore, have you ever met the Chinese—and here I am afraid I must spell them for you—C-h-a I-a-o M-u?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall, unless he was one of the numerous staff we had at OWI, or unless you have some document there that I can refresh my memory with.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Kung P-eng?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The same answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet those two gentlemen in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In China?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so; no.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would recall, Mr. Lattimore, whether you ever met those two gentlemen in China.

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you could bring forward something——

Mr. MORRIS. That is, at the time you were adviser to the Generalissimo.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the names at all, but they may be people that I met in connection with my official duties, working for the Generalissimo.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever pass on to them reports and information of any kind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again, not that I recall, unless you can refresh my necessarily imperfect memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever send coded messages to Yenan while you were in Chungking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Coded messages to Yenan?

The CHAIRMAN. While you were in Chungking.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I wouldn't believe so, unless it was in connection with some of my official duties.

Mr. MORRIS. It is possible that you may have done it in connection with your official duties?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, after you sent your dispatch to Lauchlin Currie on November 25, 1941, urging a rejection of the modus vivendi, will you tell us what your itinerary was through December 7, 1941?

On the 25th you sent to Lauchlin Currie, on the 25th of November 1941, a dispatch suggesting that the proposed modus vivendi, whereby a truce would be effected, a temporary truce would be effected, between Japan and the United States in order to avert a war—you remember that dispatch, do you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, of course; I was not urging the modus vivendi.

Mr. MORRIS. You sent the dispatch, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I was reporting at the Generalissimo's request. I was reporting his action to that proposal.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you tell us what your itinerary was after you sent that dispatch on November 25, from Chungking, sir?

Where did you go up until December 7, 1941?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Beginning at the end of that, I remember that on December 7—that is, Pearl Harbor day—I was in Chungking, and I don't believe that I was out of Chungking between those two dates.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in Hong Kong at that time, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Possibly; no I wasn't.

Mr. MORRIS. When were you in Hong Kong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was in Hong Kong—let's see—I was in Hong Kong once between July, when I went out to Chungking, and Pearl Harbor. But I don't memember the exact time. I believe it was earlier than November—more likely September or October.

But my memory is not at all clear.

Mr. MORRIS. And how about December 8?

Mr. LATTIMORE. December 8?

December 8 I was booked to fly from Hong Kong on a clipper ship which was sunk at its moorings in Hong Kong. I never went down.

Mr. MORRIS. You were to go to Hong Kong by ship?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was to fly to Hong Kong by plane from Chungking, and catch the Pan-American Clipper to fly for home. At something like 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, before my plane was due to take off, one of the Generalissimo's aides rang me up and said the Japanese have attacked Pearl Harbor, "so your trip is obviously off."

Mr. MORRIS. And then what did you do after that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then I stayed in Chungking until I left for America via Burma and the "hump" sometime early in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Chi over there at that time? He flew over with you when he went to the Generalissimo's assignment, did he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He and General Chennault and I all went out on the same plane; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you frequently saw him while you were serving that term with the Generalissimo, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I saw him fairly frequently, because he was one of the confidential secretaries of H. H. Kung, who was very, very close to the Generalissimo.

Mr. MORRIS. And all during that time, it is your testimony, is it not, that you did not know that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you have testified, have you not, that you did not know that James S. Allen was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. To the best of my knowledge, I never knew that he was a Communist until quite recently.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that you never met James S. Allen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge I never met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have an exhibit No. 53 which has already been introduced in open session. This is a carbon copy of a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Holland. I would like to show it to Mr. Lattimore and ask him if reading the last paragraph of that will refresh his recollection on the negative answer he gave to the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that bear any identification as having been admitted?

Mr. MORRIS. That has been admitted and is exhibit No. 53.

Mr. ARNOLD. May we have a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. I ask Mr. Lattimore to read the last paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last paragraph of this letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Holland says:

> Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet policy in the Pacific, made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Nuhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that letter indicate that you and Mr. Allen met together?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe it does, Mr. Morris. I have seen this before, when it was issued as an exhibit, and I believe that it is a mistake on Mr. Carter's part. Maybe he had a list of people who had been invited to such a conference, but I don't remember taking part in it, and there is at least one person there besides Mr. Allen whom I never remember meeting.

I note that in this letter he says: "last week," and he may have been writing from a faulty recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that James S. Allen has testified before this committee that he did attend that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know, Mr. Lattimore, what the group is that is referred to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have only a very imperfect recollection of the fact that at that time, 1940, Professor Corbett of Yale, who is an expert on Roman law and international law, and later made a special study of Soviet law, was conducting some kind of a study, I believe, under the auspices of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. And his students were referred to as "Corbett's group;" is that what you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know whether they were students or other people who took part in a discussion group under the auspices of the IPR, or exactly what the arrangement was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of that group, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend any meetings of that group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember attending this or any other meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that you did not attend that meeting that is referred to there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, I never attended that meeting; no.

The CHAIRMAN. The names there are all familiar to you, are they not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not all of them; no. There is somebody here named Muhle, whom I can't place at all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only one that is not familiar to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The others are familiar to me, that is, they are people I know or know of, know of slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I am now going to call your attention to our exhibit 455, which was introduced into the record on February 21, 1952. It takes the form of a memorandum on Philippine research, dated April 14, 1938, WWL to ECC. WWL is Mr. Lockwood, is it not, and ECC is Mr. Carter?

I ask you if, in the course of your duties as editor of Pacific Affairs, which you were at that time, that memorandum would have been in the purview of the documents available for your research?

Mr. SOURWINE. Before that question is answered, I think the question before the question last asked was not responded to.

I think the record should show that in response to the previous question, Mr. Lattimore nodded, but made no sound.

Mr. MORRIS. The nodding was yes, was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The nodding was that I was prepared to look at this exhibit.

This exhibit I have also seen, because it was previously issued.

Until I saw it, I had no previous recollection of it, and I believe that I never saw it before. You will see that it is headed "Research." I was not connected with American Council Research at that time, and I was not in New York at that time. I was living in California, and had not been in New York for a couple of years.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first see that document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Some months ago, after it had been released by this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Some months ago, that is February 21, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. February. I thought you read February 21, 19——

Mr. MORRIS. No, 1952.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1952?

Mr. MORRIS. This, Mr. Chairman, is obviously what Mr. Lattimore is referring to, judging by the period of time, and is a copy of the letter, and the Institute of Pacific Relations also retained a copy of this letter. So a copy is also available in their office.

The paragraph I would like to read, since you have seen it, Mr. Lattimore, is the third paragraph on the second page.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go back and get the letter from whom to whom?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood is writing to Mr. Carter. This is in 1938, at a time when Mr. Lattimore is the editor of Pacific Affairs. He has testified that in 1938 he was on the west coast.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The paragraph reads:

> Are you in touch with James Allen? I understand he is going to the islands in July to continue his investigation. His recent Pacific Affairs article on the agrarian question was most interesting and gave evidence of being a careful and scholarly piece of work. His earlier book on the Negro problem in the

United States was praised by scholars as an excellent piece of research, even though his Communist ideology led him off into a proposal for "national self-determination" in the Black Belt which most people thought rather fantastic.

Does not that indicate to you, Mr. Lattimore, that the people in the New York office knew that James S. Allen was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It certainly indicates that Mr. Lockwood thought he had a Communist ideology.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that would not make him a Communist, would it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not necessarily a Community Party member.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ask you anything about membership?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought that question was usually asked with regard to membership, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you had better watch the questions and do not read into this "membership" if it is not in it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right.

There are, after all, Senator, many are, and have been, many general Marxist writers who are sometimes loosely called Communists who have never engaged in Communist organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all right. If you want to answer the particular question that way, and if you want to give that answer as far as Allen is concerned, is that your opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I don't have enough to go on to make any opinion one way or the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you give us that answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I didn't want to make my opinion positive in one sense or another when I don't know enough about it to be positive.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you know that Mr. Allen at that time was associated with the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read the testimony before this committee that he was an agent for the Communist International?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I have seen some reference to that in the transcript; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you not know that he had a byline in the Daily Worker for a long period during the war, and was known as the foreign editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know all of that in detail. According to my recollection at the time of the Tydings hearings 2 years ago, the fact was brought up that he had some sort of Daily Worker connection.

I don't remember the details. But I believe that that was the first I know of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it not show at least a lack of coordination, let us say, Mr. Lattimore, that the New York office should know that James Allen was a Communist, and that you, as editor of Pacific Affairs, for which he was writing, should not know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think no more lack of coordination that was fairly general around the IPR office. After all, we were not a Government office with chains of command and regular protocol on what went to who, when, and how, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. When you wanted to be in touch with Mr. Allen, how did you get his address?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably I got it either from the IPR or perhaps he wrote to me. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get his address from Mr. Field?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if I might interpose at that point: Your question was when you wanted to get in touch with Mr. Allen, "How did you get his address?"

I do not believe the witness means to say that when he wanted to get in touch with Mr. Allen, Mr. Allen wrote to him.

Is that what you meant to say, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Allen may have written to me in connection with the fact that I published a couple of articles, and I may have had his address that way.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was, when you wanted to get in touch with Mr. Allen, how did you get his address?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get his address from Mr. Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection on the subject, but if you have a document there I shall be glad to have my memory refreshed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 27, 1939, addressed to Mr. Owen Lattimore from Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having received that document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall receiving it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, Mr. Lattimore? It is short.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR OWEN: Carter's office reports that James Allen may be reached at—

Then I can't read this clearly—

* * * 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street—

I think it is—

New York City.

Sincerely yours,

(The document as previously read by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 524," as above.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume that Mr. Field was at that time—when was this, 1939?

I think he was still secretary of the American IPR. So, presumably, I wrote to him for the address.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify several days ago that at that time you realized that Frederick Field was at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't. I testified that in 1952, seeing a letter written by Field in 1939, I would now say that my memory may have been in error by 2 years as to the time when I thought he was beginning to be a close fellow traveler of the record.

However, that projection of my memory back from 1952 to 1939 is not worth a great deal.

After all, the way people were writing about Russia and Russian policy in 1939 was pretty loose.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you not, in your voluntary statement that you brought in here, say that you knew Field was a Communist in the 1940's?

I even corrected you to show what you had said.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I said that I believe that by the 1940's he had become a Communist, or something of that sort. I forget the exact wording.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

You are now talking about 1950. Well, then, did you know that in the 1940's, back in the 1940's, he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; as of the 1950's, I remember that in the 1940's I considered him a Russian fellow traveler, or possibly a Communist fellow traveler. But I don't remember when I began to feel that way.

The CHAIRMAN. You came in here with your statement voluntarily. Do you recall your statement? It was to the effect that he was a Communist in the forties.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said in my statement——

Senator FERGUSON. What page is that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Page 14—

I had no reason to consider him a Communist during the period when he was secretary of the American IPR in the 1930's, although I have no doubt he became one during the 1940's.

That is, I have, in 1952, no doubt that he became one during the 1940's. I may say that that is based not so much on my own recollection as on some testimony that I read in the transcript of the hearings of Mr. Carter here, much of which was entirely new to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there are some truths in this hearing that you take for granted?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My opinion of Mr. Carter has always been that he is an extremely honest man.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that where you got the idea "although I have no doubt that he became one during the 1940"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I say, it is partly from recollection, which is very vague, and difficult for me to specify as to year, but I also read some things in Mr. Carter's testimony which would now, in 1952, indicate to me that Field definitely became a Communist in the 1940's.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it would indicate that Carter's testimony shows the fact to be that Field became a Communist in the 1940's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not Carter's opinion, but some of the facts given by Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. The facts given by Carter. It would, therefore, appear that while Field was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, he was a Communist, and Carter's facts show it; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As of 1952 they create a strong presumption.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, have you read the testimony of Mr. Nathaniel Weyl before this committee, which was to the effect that Mr. Field became a Communist in 1935?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I haven't. Is that part of the——

Mr. MORRIS. That is public testimony.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Has that part of the transcript been printed yet?

Mr. MORRIS. It has not been printed yet. But you do read transcripts that the Institute of Pacific Relations obtains in New York, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read some of them; by no means all of them.

Mr. Morris. But they are available to you.

Will you identify that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 3, 1938, addressed to Mr. James S. Allen, care of American Express Co., Manila, Philippine Islands. It has the typed signature of Owen Lattimore.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you recall having written that letter to Mr. Allen.

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall having written it, but I obviously wrote it.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the letter, please?

Mr. Lattimore (reading):

(Exhibit No. 525)

Dear Allen: Immediately on receipt of your letter of which I herewith enclose a copy, I wrote to your American address. As I received no reply, and the deadline for the December number of Pacific Affairs was fast approaching, I had perforce to schedule the letter for publication without reply for you.

That must be a misprint for "from you":

I added an editorial note to the effect that we expected a reply from you for our March number.

Now I have just heard from your wife, giving your Manila address. Although it is too late for you to send a reply for December publication, I am forwarding this by clipper mail in the hope that it may reach you before you leave the Philippines. I hope that this will not merely give you extra time before our March number, but possibly enable you to make a last-minute check-up on the data on which you founded your original statements.

As your article appeared to me, as a nonexpert, to have every external characteristic of careful observation and reasoned statement, while the vigor of the attached letter of refutation indicates great confidence on the part of the protesting company, I shall be extremely interested in following up, in due course, the discrepancy between the two statements.

Please note, by the way, my new permanent address, as given above.

Yours very sincerely.

Mr. Morris. May that be inserted into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 525" and read in full.)

Mr. Morris. To what extent did you know James Allen's wife?

Mr. Lattimore. I never met her, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Morris. What name did she use when you spoke to her?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't think I spoke to her. My recollection of this correspondence is that—what was the date of that letter from Field giving his address?

Mr. Morris. That is April 27, 1939.

Mr. Lattimore. April 27, 1939. This is previous. I must have written to Allen care of IPR, or whatever address I had for him, and the letter was presumably forwarded to his wife who told me that he was out of the country.

Mr. Morris. When did she tell you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. I presume she told me by letter.

Mr. Morris. How did she sign letters—Mrs. James S. Allen?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember.

Mr. Morris. Do you know that James Allen is not the man's name at all?

Mr. Lattimore. I have seen recently something in the newspapers to that effect. That was the first of it I knew.

Mr. Morris. How did she identify herself when she spoke to you or wrote to you?

Mr. Lattimore. Presumably as Mrs. Allen.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the man we have been discussing, James S. Allen, has testified before this committee and he stated that his name is Sol Auerbach, but that he writes in these various publications under the name of James S. Allen.

Mr. Lattimore. Incidentally, Mr. Morris, I am all confused about this man Allen. I got the impression some time ago—I think it may have been at the time of the trial of the 11 Communists in New York—from reading the press, that Mr. Allen was a Negro. Now I am sure, if I had met a Negro expert on the Philippines, I would remember it.

Now, I see that his name is given as Sol Auerbach which doesn't sound to me like a Negro name, so I don't know what he is.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard the name Sol Auerbach?

Mr. Lattimore. Auerbach, I don't believe I ever have; no.

Mr. Morris. May I take one more letter?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Morris. There has been identified a letter, Mr. Chairman, as exhibit 49, August 2, 1951: This is a letter that Mr. Lattimore wrote to Mr. Allen in 1939. Would you care to read it, Mr. Lattimore? This is to Mr. James S. Allen.

Mr. Lattimore. It is dated February 27, 1939, addressed to Mr. James S. Allen, 508 West One Hundred and Thirty-ninth Street, Apartment 42, New York City [reading]:

Dear Allen: Excuse my writing to you by dictaphone, as I am away from my office and kind of crowded for time.

It was good to hear from you again, and I am only sorry that your Letter to the Editor was not in time for publication in our March number. It will have to come out in June. I am returning to you herewith a copy of the letter as set up to go to the printer. I am also sending copies to the Compania and to the Philippine Branch of the IPR.

What about some more on the Philippines sometimes? We are really rather hard-pressed to get enough material that is not directly about the Japanese war on China. At the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed "radical" stuff on the islands. Have you done any work in French Indochina, the Malay Straits, or Netherlands Indies?

By the way, have you any ideas that I could use in expanding circulation in the Philippines for Pacific Affairs? I think it is a healthy thing not to depend entirely on the organizational efforts of the IPR in each area for subscriptions. The more we can widen out everywhere by getting people who are not just members or joiners to subscribe to Pacific Affairs, the better for us.

I may be in New York toward the end of March. If so, I very much hope that I may be able to make your acquaintance personally.

Yours very sincerely,

Owen Lattimore.

Mr. Sourwine. May I inquire?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, can you explain why you were concerned over the reaction of the Philippine IPR to your publication of fundamental stuff on the Philippine Islands?

Mr. Lattimore. Was that the reaction of the Philippine IPR I was concerned about, or the reaction of the tobacco company?

Mr. Sourwine. The letter said, sir—

at the same time I needn't apologize for pointing out to you that we couldn't guarantee to take another article from you on the Philippines right away, if it

would look to the Philippines IPR as though we only printed "radical" stuff on the islands.

I was asking what was the basis for your feeling that the Philippine IPR would be concerned about your printing fundamental stuff on the Philippine Islands?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose it was because of that protest from the tobacco company that disliked Allen's article. The Philippines council was one of the councils from which we had often tried unsuccessfully to get articles.

Then I got an article from somebody who had been to the Philippines, which raised a controversy in the Philippines. So I suppose the Philippines council might be concerned about it.

Incidentally, the tobacco company's criticism of Allen's figures and statements had raised absolutely no question of his being a Communist, and as far as concerns the conditions that he dealt with the accuracy of his investigation seems to be fully upheld by the report of the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs appointed by the President of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you reading that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you reading that from some document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am reading that from some notes I have prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you not answer the question without reading it?

Who presented that to you? Where did you get that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I asked my wife for it.

Senator SMITH. Is that a memorandum you prepared yourself, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is a memorandum that I prepared myself.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you prepare that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In preparation for these hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you prepare that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not quite sure at what time. I have been preparing for these hearings for months.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get a definite answer to this question: When did you prepare this document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the course of preparing for these hearings, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the closest you can get to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the closest I can get to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Within how many months? Within a period of how many months?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Within a period of approximately 8 months.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you think that you might be asked about this article and about Allen? What made you think that you might be asked about this article and Allen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because of previous testimony, both at the time of the Tydings hearings and before this committee, for example——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you refresh your memory about Allen, try to find any of these letters to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I looked up to see what I might have on the subject of Allen. Then I looked up the question of the situation at that time in the Philippines.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it that your counsel wants to call to your attention?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The entries on the subject of Sol Auerbach in the printed transcript of this hearing, part 1, July.

The CHAIRMAN. What date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Part 1, July 25, 26, 31; August 2, 7, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, it is the import of your testimony to the effect that James S. Allen's article was not a Communist article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the import of my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you mean by the word "radical" in that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I meant the word radical, in quotes, in the sense that as of that time any article which was contested by a plantation company about conditions of plantation labor might have been called radical by the plantation company.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you did not here use it in the sense of fundamental?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here I did not use it in the sense of fundamental, and I had it in quotes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, knowing what you do now about James S. Allen, do you think that he still could write an article that would not be a Communist article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris, I don't know any way of preventing a Communist from occasionally taking an intelligent interest in an important problem. I should think that under certain circumstances a Communist would be quite capable of writing an article that could not be regarded as slanted in a Communist direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if he was writing under an assumed name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Even if he was writing under assumed names. Other people also write under assumed names.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 3:15 p. m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, March 5, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY
LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, and Watkins, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you have a copy of the letter that you mentioned in the article to the London Times yesterday, of permission to go to Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't have it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not have a copy of that.

Mr. Lattimore, did you ever express disagreement with the policy of the United States Government, that all aid to China should go through the accredited Chinese Nationalist Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of that, but my recollection isn't complete. If you have a document I would be glad to discuss it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever recommend or protest that aid should be given to the Chinese Communists lest the United States appear partisan in withholding aid from the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that, either, but again my recollection isn't complete.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever prepare a protest to an article written by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell, in the Reader's Digest, in 1945, which was destined for the New York Times, over the signature of Thomas Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I participated in that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain what happened at that time, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Eastman and Mr. Powell had printed in the Reader's Digest which cast slurs on me and others. I wrote to the Reader's Digest and asked for an opportunity to reply, received what

I considered a very curt and rude reply, and a little bit later, I believe, Mr. Carter wrote to me and suggested that a letter be published, be offered to the New York Times for publication. He believed that Mr. Thomas Lamont might sign such a letter, and suggested that I draft it so that what I considered the relevant material would be in it.

Mr. MORRIS. So the views in that memorandum were your views?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know about the final state of it. I prepared a draft.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, are the views in that draft your views?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the views in my original draft were my views; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read the letter that actually appeared in the New York Times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think a letter did appear in the New York Times.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it appear anywhere?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these documents, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 14, 1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Attached thereto is a photostat of a letter to the editor of the New York Times, consisting of five pages. It is unsigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask if you will look at that and answer whether or not that letter is addressed to you, whether that is a copy of a letter addressed to you, and whether the draft therein is your draft.

(A document was handed to the witness.)

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, all of this matter, a photostatic copy of which was presented to the witness here, was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter from Mr. Carter to me is clearly written by him and received by me. If I may just look at this draft here—

I do not believe the draft is entirely my draft. I think it is probably a combined draft of some sort.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose work besides yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, unless it was Mr. Carter or if he asked somebody else in New York to help him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Lamont know anything about this subject?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I believe there was some correspondence between Mr. Carter and Mr. Lamont on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. But did he know anything personally about it, or was he merely the mouthpiece for you and Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Lamont had long been interested in China.

Senator FERGUSON. He had been?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he had long been interested in China; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you say is in this document that is not yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is impossible for me to recall at this time exactly what phrases were mine and what phrases were somebody else's.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a matter of phrases, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe partly a matter of phrases, partly, perhaps, a matter of paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a matter of substance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I read it out, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MORRIS. Before doing that, you will be given that opportunity, Mr. Lattimore; I would like to ask a few questions beforehand.

Will you read that letter that accompanies the draft?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

(EXHIBIT No. 526)

DEAR OWEN: Although last night's suggestion for ghost writing for a downtown big shot has certain attractive features, my second thought is that my original suggestion should not be lightly discarded.

You are a pretty big shot yourself and a great many people will listen to you.

If on further thought you think that there would be even greater advantages in the proposal advanced last evening, I am willing to explore the possibility of it, but my original suggestion still is my first choice.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Mr. Chairman, will you receive both the draft and the letter into evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. The draft and the letter have been identified as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and will be received in evidence.

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 526," which was read in full above, and "Exhibit No. 527," which is as follows:)

TO the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

The San Francisco Conference has shown us that Soviet Russia is a country with which we can cooperate. The statesmanship of the Russian delegates, and concessions made by the Soviet Government, have contributed to this fortunate outcome. Tensions have eased, especially in Europe.

On the other hand there is cause for uneasiness in a new trend, which is now developing, toward criticism of Soviet motives and Soviet policies in Asia. We shall be well advised to consider this trend now, in advance of President Truman's first Big Three meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. When that meeting is held public interest and public comment and speculation will inevitably be drawn toward Russia's position, and Russia's relationship to us, in Asia and the Pacific. We shall do well to prepare now for the thinking which will absorb our interest then. Should we prepare ourselves for this occasion by hardening, within our minds, the assumption that Soviet and American interests in Asia are inherently in conflict with each other? Ought we not rather to search for a larger framework of policy within which American and Soviet interests can be accommodated to each other?

An example of anticipatory alarm about Russia is to be found in the influential magazine Reader's Digest, under the title "The Fate of the World Is at Stake in China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell. In this article it is suggested that there is a danger that American policy might disastrously "sell out" President Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Communists, and "bring under totalitarian regimentation 450 million people." To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the authoritativeness of several of those Americans who have, in fact, contributed most authoritatively to a clear American understanding of contemporary China and Contemporary Russia—including Owen Lattimore, Harrison Forman, and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both American and Soviet policy in China. In making such a review, we should examine American policy just as closely as Soviet policy, and make our criticisms where they are due.

Under Pearl Harbor, the American policy was to support China while avoiding, as far as possible, a direct challenge to Japan. Since Pearl Harbor, our policy has been to give China the maximum aid permitted by difficulties of transport and the demands of other theaters of war. We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in China, in order to facilitate the most effective resistance in Japan.

Soviet Russia has followed a parallel policy. Even during the period when there was a danger that Russia might be attacked from two sides by Germany and Japan, the Soviet Government accepted whatever risk there might be in giving aid to China. Moreover, Soviet aid, like American aid, encouraged political unity in China. No attempt was made to channel Soviet aid toward the Chinese Communists. All aid was delivered, with no restrictions attached, to the National Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. After the German invasion of Russia the flow of aid understandably decreased; but Madame Chiang has given us an authoritative statement of the extent and significance of Soviet aid up to 1941. Writing in Liberty magazine (January 21, 1941) she said:

"Intellectual honesty constrains me to point out that throughout the first three years of resistance, Soviet Russia extended to China, for the actual purchase of war materials and other necessities, credits several times larger than the credits given by either Great Britain or America. Both these countries, indeed, circumscribed their advances with conditions which prevented even one cent of the money from being used for badly needed munitions, equipment, or war materials of any kind * * *. When Japan protested through the Ambassador at Moscow that the aid extended was a breach of neutrality, Russia did not wilt, or surrender, or compromise, but continued to send supplies of arms to China. It will doubtless be said that Russia has been aiding China for selfish interests. In reply to this I may point out that Russian help has been unconditional."

Russian and American policy in China can be made parallel, and we know from experience, not by guesswork, that the Russians are capable of contributing, at the very least, an equal share in making the policies of the two countries parallel.

At the present moment there is a danger that the parallel policy may not continue. This danger has not yet arisen from Russian policy, but it has arisen from American policy. Whereas Russian policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of the Chinese Communists in the benefits of Russian aid to China, American policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefits of American aid. Recent statements by General Hurley, our Ambassador to Chungking, and General Wedemeyer, the ranking American officer in the theater, have restricted the benefits of Lend-Lease to the forces politically identified with President Chiang Kai-shek, and have restricted American personnel from acting in ways that might benefit forces other than those politically identified with President Chiang.

As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors one political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when the Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this divergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an American precedent.

Many issues are here involved. Not the least of them is the possibility of a complete reversal of the time-honored American policy of supporting the territorial and political integrity of China. American aid to one party in China, leading to Russian aid to another party, could easily result in inflicting on China a terrible civil war, following more than eight years of heavy sacrifice in a war for national survival. American policy, which traditionally has always opposed the partition of China, might thus actually precipitate a partition by making the government of part of China dependent on American control and virtually compelling political opponents of that government to look for foreign support elsewhere.

To those who can think of American policy only in terms of an anti-Russian coalition, like the authors of the article in Reader's Digest from which I have quoted, such a prospect may seem to be only a bold move in power-politics. It is ironical to recall that one of them, Mr. Eastman, was long a supporter of Leon Trotsky, and is the translator of his works. Were Leon Trotsky in the

Kremlin today, and not Marshal Stalin, the prospect of the division of China between Russia and America, setting the stage for a world war between Communism and capitalism, might well be enticing to American Communists of the Trotskyist persuasion.

To other Americans it should be alarming to contemplate the possibility of an irrevocable reversal of historic American policy in China, leading to irremediable antagonism between us and Soviet Russia, threatening the foundations of world security that have been laid at San Francisco with Russian aid, and making America responsible for a new world phase of the politics of hostility.

The safeguard against these dangers lies not in limited support of one nation, or one party within a nation, but in wider and better-balanced cooperation with China, with Russia, and with Great Britain. Mr. Owen Lattimore, in his recent Solution in Asia, has wisely warned against an American policy which would make the Chinese Government "dependent on us to the point where it cannot deal with other governments without our backing," and has urged that "it is essential that America should cease to be so conspicuously the main link between China and the United Nations. Our interests are great, but they are not isolated. China policy must be brought into proper liaison with our Soviet and British policies."

Our interest—and it can be made a common interest with Great Britain and Russia—is that China should be strong, united, and independent. Only a China which is strong because it is united, and therefore capable of true independence, can inspire the permanent confidence of the American people and provide the conditions for expanding investment and trade which are needed by the rest of the world almost as much as they are needed by China herself.

At President Truman's forthcoming meeting with the others of the Big Three the necessary adjustments can and should be made, and they should have the widest support throughout the American Nation. American policy should be brought back to its traditional support for a politically and territorially united China, and this paramount requisite for the future stability of Asia should not be jeopardized by factious attacks on any of our allies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask a question there, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MORRIS. We are still on the same subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, would you look at page 3 of this draft?

This is the draft of the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The paragraph at the bottom of that page.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It says:

As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors one political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when the Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisian activity. If this divergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Rusisans should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an American precedent.

Can you say whether that is one of the portions of the draft which is yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that was probably mine; yes. This is in line with the thinking that was very common at the time, of which I was aware, as I said in my statement, prepared statement for this committee, on page 44:

Some experienced observers were already beginning to believe the Chiang Kai-shek part of free China was in danger of being completely conquered by the Japanese. Some of these observers, including American military officers, even

felt that the American Government ought to assert its right to send supplies to the Communist areas of resistance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you believe what you wrote here in this paragraph that I have just read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Why, certainly, I believed it at the time; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you realize that this paragraph includes the statement that: "* * * the Russians," at this time, which was 1945: "* * * are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity"?

Did you believe that?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Mrs. Lattimore.

The Chair has borne with you now for several days in what appears to be your whispered answers to the witness on the stand. If it occurs again, the Chair will be constrained to have you moved from your position. I do not like to do that. I want to be as courteous to you as I can. The Chair is not going to endure this much longer.

That is an end to it, and that is all.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Your question, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you realize, Mr. Lattimore, that that paragraph infers the statement that at the time, that is, in June of 1945, the Russians were, to use the words of the article: "Still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity."

Did you believe that at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believed that at the time, and I should like to ask permission to read a note on the subject in a printed book by General Chennault.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might pursue this for just a moment before we have any extraneous matter put in?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not testify here, sir, I believe the day before yesterday, that you have believed, and now believe, since 1940, the Russians were supporting and have been supporting the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I clearly remember making that statement. The support of the Russians to the Chinese Communists during the war period, to the best of my knowledge, then and at this time, was progaganda support, moral support, anything except direct support in the way of arms and supplies.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think, sir, that that support, such as you speak of, even it was confined to moral support, propaganda support, and all of the other support short of arms, do you think that meets the description "scrupulously refraining from partisan activity?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I believe it does, Mr. Sourwine. I believe the Russian support of those years emphasized the need for continuing unity in China, and not resorting to civil war at a time when all Chinese ought to be fighting the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you believe, Mr. Lattimore, that the Russians were strictly impartial as between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalist Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no doubt, Mr. Sourwine, that the Russians were not impartial. But whatever their reasons, they were at that time, as far as I know to this day, scrupulously following an international policy of supporting the joint Chinese resistance to the Japanese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you meant when you said the day before yesterday that the Chinese Communists were being supported by Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what I meant, yes. I did not mean military support or support of supplies.

I should like at this moment to read this citation from General Chennault, which I found quite recently when I was looking over the records.

The CHAIRMAN. Refer that to the counsel, please.

Mr. MORRIS. What relevancy does that have, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Before we go into that, just refer it to the counsel, please.

Have you got it with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think I have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us have it, please.

Now you may pursue your questions. You may read it at a later time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that last document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 19, 1945, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask if you recall having received that letter.

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recall receiving it, but obviously I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been established as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This one?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, the one I just handed you.

This is already introduced, I understand, as exhibit 29, in the printed hearings, before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could we have an extra copy for Mr. Arnold?

Mr. ARNOLD. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read that, Mr. Lattimore, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR OWEN: Here is a typed copy of the draft you handed me yesterday. Late last evening I went up to One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Street and saw the son. I discovered that, alas, his father left yesterday for Maine and probably will be gone all summer.

I explained the general situation to the son and said that I would like his advice as to who would be the best single person or group of three or four to sign such a letter. He made some academic suggestions and then finally suggested the possibility of his father.

He thought it would be better for me to approach him than for him to do so, though he said the chances weren't very good because his father is fatigued and doesn't usually like to take on extra burdens during his holiday.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Lattimore. Who is the person he referred to there as the son?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know of my own knowledge, Mr. Morris. I presume, from reading the transcript of these hearings, that it is Mr. Corliss Lamont, the son of Mr. Thomas Lamont.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time you received this letter from Mr. Carter, he presumed that you knew who the son would be when he wrote this letter, did he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony that you may have known that the son at that time was Corliss Lamont, but at least the testimony to date has refreshed your recollection on that score?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The testimony to date has refreshed my recollection on that score, and I presume that I knew at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt about that, that you knew who the son was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I presume there was no doubt about it, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was Mr. Carter using the cryptic language employed there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You would have to ask Mr. Carter that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue reading, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

He also confirmed what I suspected, that the father likes to do his own writing. I am, however, prepared in 2 or 3 days to send the draft to him, with as strong and tactful a letter as I can write on the off chance that he might be willing to do something.

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly, and this is at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4.

Is that the same 3 and 4 that is on this mimeographed copy?

This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria, et cetera, while you put it in reverse.

I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of avoiding this?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—May I make one more suggestion, that is, that you add a final paragraph in which the author puts in a plea for a strong, united, independent China, a China which would inspire confidence of the American people in general, and a China which would give confidence to those American businessmen who seek mutually advantageous trade between the United States and China?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I show you that original of the draft again, and the paragraph questioned about, the paragraph Mr. Sourwine questioned you about.

It does appear at the bottom of page 3 and the top of page 4.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of the original?

Mr. MORRIS. Of the one that we have been discussing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that appear to be the same paragraph?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, yes. That is page 3 of the mimeographed copy.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Chairman, to complete this episode, I would like to put into the record the answer of Mr. Thomas Lamont, which he wrote on July 5, 1945, wherein he declined the invitation of Mr. Carter to publish the draft over his signature in the New York Times.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a letter dated July 5, 1945, addressed to Edward C. Carter from Thomas W. Lamont, on his letterhead.

Mr. Morris. Will you receive that into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. It is a part of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator Ferguson. Could the whole letter be read into the record?

Mr. Morris. It reads as follows:

(Exhibit No. 528)

Many thanks for yours of June 29. You are too flattering about my casual letters to the New York Times. I, too, have been concerned over the steady drip against Russia by various commentators. Max Eastman has always been a weather cock, veering from pro-Trotsky to bitter anti-Soviet. Powell I had thought better of.

I have read the Reader's Digest article and have gone over with care your memorandum. In effect I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter urging our Government to alter its apparent present policy, and to make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in northwest China. Quite aside from any question of transport to such a remote region, the principle involved seems to be that I should assume knowledge of the situation, and of the proper policy to be drawn from same, more adequate than our Government has.

Of course, I have no such knowledge and could not justify myself in attempting to correct the policy adopted. My way would always be first to seek information from the department at Washington. As a matter of fact, even in my letters to the Times when any possible question of current policy was involved, I have first shown the letters to the Department of State, not for approval, but for clearance as to any question of crossing wires.

You know your China better than I do, for my stay there was hardly more than a month or two. But we both realize how exceedingly complicated the situation is and is bound to be. Chiang's government now loosely rules all eastern and southern China (subject to Japanese occupation). The area includes all the great cities. Now, if Chiang has his doubts as to the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist armies against the Japanese, and such question has been many times raised, and if Chiang is fearful that once Japan is ousted, then those northern armies will turn on him, perhaps he is justified in feeling that the meager supplies available for China should be furnished for his armies, and not for the other boys. In your memorandum you point out that Russia has been scrupulous to send supplies to Chiang alone. Well, if that be true, why is that not additional argument for us to do the same?

I am really discussing things about which I have no first-hand information. And in reading your memorandum I may well have just been stupid. Am I all wrong?

With personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

T. W. Lamont.

The Chairman. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 528," and was read in full.)

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, after hearing that read do you now say that the Institute of Pacific Relations was not trying to influence public opinion?

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I do not say that.

I say that I had been, I and others had been, attacked in a grossly distorted article in the Reader's Digest, that I had tried to get space for a reply and had been refused.

Senator Ferguson. Who refused you?

Mr. Lattimore. The editors of the Reader's Digest, to whom I wrote directly.

Senator Ferguson. Have you copies of those letters?

Mr. Lattimore. I haven't found them, but I remember the incident very clearly.

Mr. Carter then, as an individual, suggested to me that there might be a way of finding publications somewhere else. He suggested that I write a letter myself as is clear here from his letter to me of June 14.

My feeling was that I was disgusted with the whole business, and that if the Reader's Digest wouldn't allow me space for reply, I didn't want to go to the New York Times individually, but if Mr. Carter thought that there was an individual or possibly a group of individuals who would put forward the view, or part of the view that I shared, I would not mind making a draft of material.

That is a question of individual action and not a question of the action of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the Institute of Pacific Relations attacked in any way in the article in the Reader's Digest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not your book, Solution in Asia, which the testimony in this record now shows from one witness, used as Communist propaganda, for the line here in America by the Communist Party?

Is that not a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, Senator. I believe you are in error. I believe there has been testimony here that Communist bookshops sold my book along with other non-Communist books as background reading.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not my question. You heard the testimony read here of the witness who said that it was used as the background for Communist line in America, and that book was being attacked in this article in the Reader's Digest. Is that not a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't believe that the record shows that anybody testified that it was being used as a background for the Communist-line propaganda.

I believe the testimony shows that it was sold as background reading. The book was also criticized in Communist publications.

The CHAIRMAN. You distinguish between background reading and background what?

Senator FERGUSON. For the Communist line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the difference? What is the difference between background reading for a Communist and Communist-line reading?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The difference in this case is that my book was sold in a great many bookshops besides Communist bookshops, and that Communist publications criticized by views.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read testimony at this point into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would read what the witness said about the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the testimony of Mr. Matusow taken in executive session on February 13, 1952. Mr. Mandel is interrogating Mr. Matusow [reading]:

Mr. MANDEL. Did the bookshop—

that is, the Communist bookshop—

ever promote any of the publications of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, it did.

Mr. MANDEL. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. MATUSOW. The book, Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, published by Little Brown & Co.—

Mr. MANDEL. What year?

Mr. MATUSOW. 1945—it was one of the books used in the bookshop and suggested reading for a background of the party line, the Communist Party line, in Asia.

Mr. MANDEL. What do you mean by suggested reading?

Mr. MATUSOW. You see, this was the Jefferson School Book Shop, and there were many courses conducted.

During this period, as I said, the war in China, the Communist revolution in China, was taking place, and many people professed a great interest in that, and the party, the Communist Party, line, as disseminated had not caught up with the tide of events, we might say. The party had been caught for a while flat-footed in the terms of the actual literature put out by the Communist Party interntaional publishers.

Things were moving too fast for them. The State education committee got together and decided which books would be good background material, and which supported the Communist Party line.

They came out with a decision that Solution in Asia was one of those books which could give a Communist Party member a correct line, a Communist line, on the Asiatic situation in China and China specifically.

That is the end of the pertinent testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the IPR concerned with this dispute in the Reader's Digest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Then what did Mr. Carter have to do with it? Why did you not defend yourself instead of using the ruse of having Lamont, as if it was something for the IPR to be concerned with?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I attempted to put my point of view before the editors of the Reader's Digest and was refused an opportunity.

Mr. Carter then took the initiative in suggesting that some other way be found of publishing the view which I and many others held at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you an employee of the Government of the United States at the time this was going on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave as your address on June 20, 1945, the OWI here in Washington, If you were not a member what were you doing in the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. June 20, 1945?

Senator FERGUSON. I will get the exact date here. On June 20, 1945, you wrote a letter to Matthew Connelly, the secretary of the President, and you gave telephone OWI, Washington, REpublic 7500, Extension 72228.

If you were not an employee, what were you doing in the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time I was an occasional consultant to the OWI, and if I had been in Washington on any day which Mr. Connelly telephoned me at my home in Ruxton and couldn't find me, he could have very likely have found me at OWI.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you were an employee of the United States Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was an occasional consultant, which meant that I was an employee on any day that I actually worked there to act as consultant.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you receive a day as being a consultant.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall. The records will show, doubtlessly.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you or were you not on the payroll of the United States Government while this was going on with Mr. Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was an independent citizen who was occasionally consulted and on the days when I was consulted I received a consultant's fee, or whatever you like to call it, from the United States Government.

It had absolutely no limiting effect on my expressing my own views as a citizen.

Senator FERGUSON. How much did you draw from the United States Treasury in 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, sir. I am sure that the records would show.

Senator FERGUSON. We will get that and put it in the record, if it is not one of those matters that is a secret and we cannot obtain it.

It may be the question that your employment was that way, as you indicate now.

Mr. ARNOLD. If there is any question of secrecy, we will waive it, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you this: I was asking you the other day about the article of Bisson, where the party line was changed in relation to China in 1943. That has been discussed quite a bit in this record.

The question came up as to changing the line and calling the Communists of China democrats, and that their government was the democracy, and that the Nationalist Government was the feudal system.

Now, I ask you whether that was not the same kind of a question that was raised in the article in the Reader's Digest, and I ask you to read, on page 15, "Deception No. 1." See whether the IPR was involved. Read it out loud.

The CHAIRMAN. What page is that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. 15.

Mr. MORRIS. May that whole article, and it is only nine pages, go into the record at this point?

(See exhibit No. 549, p. 3498, for article.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson, may I say first that I never discussed the Bisson article with anybody as a change in the Communist line; did not consider it to be anything of the kind.

Senator FERGUSON. Your memory is becoming much better on the Bisson article as we go along.

Now, will you read this "Deception No. 1"?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> Deception 1: That Russia is a "democracy" and that China can therefore safely be left to Russian "influence."
>
> Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous conception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936–39, as a "triumph for democracy." He now urges our Government in a book called Solution in Asia to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in central Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read it so as to give the quotes out of your book, so that we can tell what is a quote and what is not a quote?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in Central Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book on its jacket.

He [Mr. Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the sign series of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.

This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was filled with jazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be advertised as more academic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government, however, it legitimized the dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party (article 126). Stalin himself, addressing the Congress which ratified the draft of the constitution, frankly stated this fact:

"I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Union only one party can exist, the party of Communists" (Pravda, November 26, 1936).

In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 1938, only one candidate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the party and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the party's choice. The ceremony has not been repeated and would make no difference if it had. The constitution is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is shot or sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia full regions are given up to these concentration camps, where from 15 to 20 millions—

Footnote:

Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red army, estimates that the number is about 12 million. Boris Souvarine, French historian of Bolshevism, estimates 15 million. Victor Kravchenko, recently resigned from the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, who has visited many camps and had official relations with their managements, says these estimates are low and puts the figure at 20 million.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you let me have it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cite this as an example of an extremely unfair attack on me, which makes one brief quotation from what I wrote entirely out of context. It says that I recommended that the United States cheerfully accept something which I did not recommend that the United States cheerfully accept, then ties it in with a whole lot of extraneous matter which has no concern whatever with me.

It was against that kind of treatment that I protested to the editors of the Reader's Digest.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was this that you were trying to answer by getting Mr. Lamont, over his own signature, to write your letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not trying to get Mr. Lamont over his own signature to answer my own letter. I was acceding——

Senator FERGUSON. You say that this record does not show that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do, Senator. The record shows that I was acceding to a request from Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Mr. Carter have to do with it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Carter wrote to me and made some suggestions, to which I acceded.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a copy of his letter, Carter's letter to you? Is that the one that was read?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is the one that was read.

Senator FERGUSON. Who approached Carter first? Did he approach you, or did you approach him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My distinct recollection is that he approached me. I am sure you can check that by asking him.

Senator FERGUSON. Who else did you contact on one of the disputes, as to whether or not America should furnish aid to the Communists, direct aid to the Communist army and not through the National Government or the Government of China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember consulting anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you consult anybody?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember consulting anybody.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not you did consult anyone. Think about it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember consulting anybody, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. This was just about the time that you were talking—what is the date on that? The 19th of June?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 14th of June and 19th of June, from Mr. Carter; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. The 10th of June was when you wrote the first letter, as I recall that letter. Did the fact that you wanted to go and see the President have anything to do with this dispute you were having?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; it had nothing whatever to do with this dispute. At that time I held certain views on China. The whole subject of China was a subject of very keen public discussion at the time.

I, like others, was reading and talking about it. I, like others, was writing or trying to write on the subject. My views were my own.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you give us some of the others that were talking along the same line that you advocted, of giving aid to the Communists in China and building them up?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you understand the question, Mr. Lattimore?

If not, we will have it read back to you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I understand the question, Mr. Chairman.

Are you ready, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I am ready.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot possibly recall offhand as of 1952 exactly who was writing and discussing these subjects in 1945. I would be glad to look up the record for you, if you are interested.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I ask that question, in one of your letters—I think it was the one to Mr. Matt Connelly—you said: "The views I represent."

Whose views did you represent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My own.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you mean, when you said the "views I represent," your views alone?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall exactly what I meant 7 or 8 years ago in writing that letter. I presume I meant my own views and possibly— don't want to quibble about it—I may have represented what I considered to be a body of views then current.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose views were they outside of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know at this time. I have pointed out in the statement I prepared for this committee that these views were held by many of the American observers in China, including military.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you advocate that the Soviet Union take over and annex Manchuria?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Can we have an answer to that? That seems to be a clear-cut question.

Mr. ARNOLD. I wish you would read the record back. I think we answered it.

The CHAIRMAN. I want an answer. Did you or did you not? He did not answer. He answered "I don't believe I did."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will change that answer, Senator.

I am sure I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Mr. Carter was then talking about?

There is just one section of your draft that I question slightly and this is at the bottom of page 3 and top of page 4. This possibility is precisely what your critics are always advancing. They say that the Soviet Union is definitely going to annex Manchuria and so forth, while you put it in reverse. I would hate to have your critics pounce on this and announce that even Lattimore admits that Manchuria is to become a part of the Soviet Union. Do you see any way of avoiding it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Apparently, Mr. Carter thought my wording was unclear and ought to be made clear.

Senator FERGUSON. The question is, did you discuss with Carter the question of Manchuria becoming a part of Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I am certain I didn't, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you—do you know anyone else besides yourself that was advocating the sending of material, Army equipment and so forth, to the Communists in China and not have the Nationalist Government take care of the government in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was a view that was quite prevalent——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anyone else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, the American military, or a large part of the American military in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in touch with the State Department policy at this time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; not particularly.

The CHAIRMAN. In any way?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what our policy was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as it could be seen from the newspapers and so on, I knew it.

Senator FERGUSON. What was our State Department's policy as of June 10 on this question?

The CHAIRMAN. What year?

Senator FERGUSON. 1945.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Subject to an imperfect recollection, Senator, I believe that this was a period of controversy in which statements were being made by, I think, General Hurley and others, which resulted in a great deal of public discussion and a general belief that State Department policy as of that moment was unclear.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to going to the White House, did you give any information to any Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I was going to do so, you mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to any radio commentators?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall. I frequently—no, not frequently—I occasionally saw radio commentators and newspapermen at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I think the date of that White House matter should be in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. The date of July 3 was the date that you went to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have the documents before me, Senator. I will accept your date.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the draft of the memorandum that you left with the President the day you were there dated July 3?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Was it?

Senator FERGUSON. The draft that you left with the President, it is dated the 3d.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is dated the 3d, yes, the 3d of July.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the day you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what day of the week you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall what day of the week it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of anybody having knowledge, outside of the White House and you, that you were going to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall at this moment. I wouldn't have regarded—yes, I do. I know that I talked with President Bowman, of Johns Hopkins, about the whole idea of writing to the President, and asking for an opportunity to speak with him.

I quite likely talked to other people about it. There was no secrecy about the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to any radio commentators as to anything that you would take up with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have. My recollection doesn't include it. The manner of your questioning, Senator, suggests that maybe you know I did.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be stricken. He says he does not recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am at least fair on the question suggesting that you might.

I will be a little more explicit.

Did you have any conversation or any direct or indirect communication with Drew Pearson before you went to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that the night before you went to the White House, or at least before you went to the White House, it was announced by Drew Pearson as to one thing that you would take up at the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, Senator.

Mr. Reporter, will you read back the last two or three questions and answers? My attention was taken away.

(Thereupon, the portion of the record referred to, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have heard later, of course.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Drew Pearson at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I had ever met him. I may have, but I doubt it, at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945; right before June 3?

Mr. LATTIMORE. July 3.

Senator FERGUSON. July 3. Thank you for correcting me.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think at that time I knew Drew Pearson.

Senator FERGUSON. When you went to the White House, was there any member of the State Department present at the meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I believe it was only the President and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know David Karr, a leg man for Drew Pearson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe I ever met him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know any representative prior to that time of Drew Pearson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't, to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how Drew Pearson would know that you were going to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I think a lot of people would like to know how Drew Pearson knows a lot of things.

The CHAIRMAN. That answer will be stricken. The question is did you know how he knew that you were going to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe he could possibly have known from me.

Senator FERGUSON. You quote him quite elaborately in your Ordeal by Slander, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. You mean that I quoted him 5 or 6 years later about something quite different, yes, I did, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you say there was no member of the State Department present at your conversation when the President was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection it was only the President and myself.

Senator FERGUSON. The President knew in advance what you wanted to discuss with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In general, yes, in the letter I had written to him sometime before. The memorandums that I left with him had not been submitted to him before.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you whether or not, while you were in the White House, you saw any member of the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, but I had a very brief conversation with Mr. Joseph Grew, at that time, I think, Under Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary, or something of that kind, who was waiting in the anteroom to see the President, and who came over to speak to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you talk to him before you saw the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I forget whether it was before I saw the President, or after. I didn't really talk to him. He came over and asked me one question which I answered.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question was whether I had ever lived in Japan for any consecutive period, and the answer was "no."

Senator FERGUSON. And what did he say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He said, to the best of my recollection, he said, "I thought so."

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the only conversation you had with the Under Secretary?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. And was that before you went in to the President, or after?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I say, I forgot whether it was before or right after.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss Ambassador Joseph Grew with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was his name mentioned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that Drew Pearson announced on the radio, I think it was the night before or a few days before, if you went in Monday morning which, I think, was the 3rd of July—I may be incorrect on that date—that Drew Pearson announced that you were going to the White House to ask the President not to appoint Ambassador Joseph Grew as an adviser in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that. If Mr. Pearson said that, he was completely in error, which sometimes happens with even omniscient columnists.

Senator FERGUSON. And you think he is one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I think it is a mark of the trade of columnists to appear to be as omniscient as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you who you had in mind. Do you have a copy of your memorandum to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I have a copy of it here.

Senator FERGUSON. No; it is the copy of the letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The copy of the letter?

Senator FERGUSON. The last paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the letter to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, the letter to the President dated the 10th of June 1945:

> With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.

Who were you talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was talking about advisers who are not associated with the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced. I had nobody particularly in mind.

I remember quite clearly that part of the occasion of my asking for this interview was that American policy in the Far East, and particularly with regard to China, was becoming controversial in the papers, and I thought it was a good moment for an impartial review.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Joseph Grew one of the people you were talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As an impartial adviser?

Senator FERGUSON. In that paragraph, is he one of the people that you were talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Mr. Grew at that time was, as I say, an associate—no; an assistant or——

The CHAIRMAN. That is susceptible of an answer of "Yes" or "No," and then you may explain, Mr. Lattimore. The question calls for an answer of "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer was "Yes"; Mr. Grew was one of those who were concerned with American policy in the Far East.

I don't know whether he was concerned with policy toward China.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the formulators?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't answer as to the internal structure of the formulation of policy at that time, Mr. Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the implementers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Neither can I answer that question, except that he was a high executive officer of the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. He had been in China in the Far East; had he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had been in Japan. I don't know about China.

Senator FERGUSON. He had been in Japan and had been the Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Vincent one of the formulators?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you that, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the implementers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you that, except that he had a position in the State Department at that time. As I say, I don't know what the chain of command in the State Department was at that time as between policy formulation and policy implementation.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Ballantine; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew Mr. Ballantine.

Senator FERGUSON. Is his name Joseph or Thomas?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Joseph.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the formulators?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember, Senator, whether Ballantine had at that time already retired from the State Department, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. He had not at this time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had not at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he one of the implementers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Again I don't know enough about the internal structure of the State Department to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were you talking about here, that you were telling the President in a letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I was not talking about who, I was talking about what. I was saying that I thought it would be a good idea to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed.

And, as an extension of impartially reviewed, I didn't think that a policy could be impartially reviewed by those who had been recently making or practicing it.

Therefore, I suggested that outside people who had not recently been concerned be called in for such an impartial review.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the excerpt should be read again to the witness, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is quite a clear suggestion, Senator.

I should say, to anybody in Government, that would be a suggestion that a question of policy be reviewed by some kind of a board, the individual members of which had not recently been connected with the question to be reviewed.

I believe that is not unknown practice in the conduct of government.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, will you state, Mr. Lattimore, what the policy was that you describe as "recently practiced"?

What was the policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I was somewhat unclear on the subject, Senator, or I wouldn't have suggested a review. I thought that I, myself, and a good many other people, could do with some clarification.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted people that had nothing to do with the policy, and you now tell us that you did not know what the policy was?

The CHAIRMAN. He said he was unclear on it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said I was unclear on it.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what you knew about the policy that you were objecting to, that you wanted reviewed, and you were telling the President that he ought to get people who had nothing to do with the policy.

That would indicate it was a very erroneous policy, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not necessarily, Senator. I think that is quite clearly stated in the second paragraph of my letter to the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what the policy was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I read that?

Senator FERGUSON. I want an answer to the question as to what the policy was.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the policy to which he was objecting; is that right?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

You said that policy "as recently practiced."

The CHAIRMAN. Confine yourself to the question, will you, please, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I cannot at this moment give you an accurate statement of what I thought in 1945 the policy was.

But my letter to the President, and the second paragraph of my letter to the President, clearly shows what I thought made review and discussion desirable.

May I read that article?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

You said in the article that you wanted Lamont to write, that one of the policies was that they were not furnishing arms to the Communists, and you wanted a change in that policy, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I consult my own statement on that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Senator has just restated what he thinks was my opinion, Senator McCarran, and I should like to see what my opinion was.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood he has quoted from the Lamont letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He has paraphrased it.

Senator FERGUSON. I paraphrased it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. What do you want to read from, the Lamont letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From the proposed draft for a letter by Mr. Lamont; yes. Following page 3 of the mimeographed copy [reading]:

> As a result, American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels that, while we continue to aid China the nation, our aid now favors one political group against all others and is withheld from one major group, the Chinese Communists, which has armed forces in combat with the Japanese. American aid to China has thus become politically partisan at a time when the Russians are still scrupulously refraining from partisan activity. If this divergence of policy should create a strain in Russian-American relations, the blame cannot be thrown upon the Russians. On the contrary, if the Russians should in the future begin to extend direct aid to the Chinese Communists, they could justify themselves on the ground that they were merely following an American precedent.

I think this shows concern, Senator, that American policy should not furnish the Russians with a pretext for direct intervention in the internal policies of China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say, Mr. Lattimore, that that paragraph did not convey the idea that you were favoring aid to the Communists as well as to the Nationalists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This paragraph, Senator, clearly shows that I believed that the Communist armies, as armies in combat with the Japanese, could be of greater use if some of the American supplies to China were used by them.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, going to your letter of June 10 to the President, do you not, in other words, say the same thing in this paragraph [reading]:

> Until quite recently, great care was taken to avoid any inference that America, in aiding China as a nation, was committing itself to all-out support of one party in China's domestic affairs. There now appears to be a fundamental change. Public statements by men regarded as spokesmen for American policy encourage many Chinese to believe that America now identifies the Chinese Government with one party and only one party, commits itself to the maintenance of that party, and may in the future support that party in suppressing its rivals.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question?

Senator FERGUSON. What is the difference between the two statements, the paragraph that you read, begining with, "As a result American aid to China is now confined to such politically limited channels," and so forth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The two paragraphs, Senator, state or restate, in somewhat different ways, my concern about the same primary question; namely, that our aid to China, as a nation and an ally, should not be allowed to involve us in partisan support.

It has always been my belief that one of the mistakes of American policy was to treat China in that way, differently from the way in which we treated, say Great Britain. We never in Great Britain specified aid in terms of the Conservative Party or the Labor Party.

At the end of the war, when the British had an election and the Labor government came in instead of Churchill, we did not attempt to affect that election by saying that, "Unless Churchill is reelected, we won't play."

I believe that a great deal of damage was done by creating, in fact, an impression that China was committed not to a nation, but to a party.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your explanation as to the difference between these two paragraphs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my explanation as to the similarity between these two paragraphs.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, did you regard the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists as just two competing political parties in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I regarded them as, among other things, two competing parties in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would have had them treated on the basis of two competing political parties, as we treated the competing political parties in England, which you used as an example; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In terms of the war against Japan, I was in favor of using any forces that would fight the Japanese and thereby diminish American casualties.

As regards domestic politics, I was afraid that support for one party against another party in Chinese domestic politics would lead to failure rather than success.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, going now to your letter of June 10, 1945, in the first paragraph, about the policy which you were talking about in the last paragraph, you say there:

> There appears now a major change in our policy. * * *

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the policy, and what was the change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The policy is stated in the first sentence of the letter:

> When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, on the recommendation of President Roosevelt, appointed me his political adviser in 1941, the policy of the United States was to support a United China. There appears now to be a major change in our policy, which may invite the danger of a political and even a territorial division of China and the further danger of conflict and rivalry between America and Russia.

I have not looked up the context of the Times in the newspapers of the day, but I believe I am correct in stating that this refers to statements that were beginning to be made in the press at the time by—I hope I am not quoting him incorrectly—General Hurley and others, indicating that there was a conflict of opinion among top American personnel on this subject.

And I though that if there were such a conflict, it would be sound practice to have an impartial review of American policy by people not recently involved in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, you indicated in one of your answers that you thought I drew the wrong conclusion about that you were advocating aid to the Communists.

I want to read from the Lamont letter, in the second paragraph:

> * * * in effect, I think you are suggesting that I write to the Times a letter urging our Government to alter its apparent present policy and to make available lend-lease supplies to the so-called Communist armies in Northwest China.

Did not Mr. Lamont understand your article to mean that you were advocating that they send lend-lease supplies directly to the Communists, as a government?

The CHAIRMAN. Listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not Mr. Lamont draw the conclusion that you were asking him to write a letter to the Times under his name, for your benefit, in a dispute that you were having with some men that wrote an article in the Reader's Digest, that you were advocating a change in America's policy of only giving lend-lease to the Nationalists of China, being the Government of China, and that you were advocating that the lend-lease goods go directly to the Communists as well as to the Nationalists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson, I believe that if you will read that letter as a whole, you will see that Mr. Lamont was stating a tentative opinion, which he carefully modified by saying that he had been out of touch for some time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, had you ever used any other man or woman as you were trying to use Lamont in this letter to the New York Times?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I was not trying to use Mr. Lamont, and I don't believe that I have made it a usual practice to ask other people to write for the papers for me.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you whether you made it the usual practice; I asked you whether you ever did it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall anything of the kind, Senator.

I would like to emphasize at this moment that——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that if you did you would recall it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think it would be quite likely. It would depend on how serious the matter was.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, how many memorandums did you leave with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I left him 2 one-page memoranda, which are in the mimeographed exhibit here run together like one memorandum; one on Japan policy as related to China, and one on China policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell us in your statement, on page 33, where you mentioned going to the President, that you had left any memorandum with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Why not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't see why I should have. I said that I tried to see the President, and I think it is quite the usual practice when one goes to see the President, to leave a memorandum of what the interviewer would like to talk about.

Senator FERGUSON. You say, then, that you did not feel that in this statement you should give us anything other than the fact that you had written a letter, "I wrote to the President expressing my views on China policy"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. "And the President, in response, asked me to come to see him, and I did."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. "Our conference lasted about 3 minutes."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. "Neither my letter nor my visit had the slightest effect on American policy."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the policy that you tried to affect, so that we can ascertain whether or not it had any effect on the American policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The policy, as I have thought I saw it at the time, was to drift into a position of appearing to take sides in Chinese domestic politics, which I thought was an alarming drift.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not to furnish material to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my interview with the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated it in your letter when you asked him to aid both sides.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not thinking of that as aid to the Communists; I was thinking of that as prosecution of the American policy of not promoting a divided China and of prosecuting the war against Japan as actively as possible.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, were you not trying, at the exact time, to influence American public opinion by getting Mr. Lamont to write a letter to the New York Times so that it would be published to the world under his name, to get aid to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Ferguson, I was not trying to get Mr. Lamont to do anything.

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

I was acceding to Mr. Carter's request, suggestion to furnish some material for a letter to be signed by Mr. Lamont, which he could accept or reject, and which he finally rejected.

It was my opinion at that time that part of avoidance of a disastrous split in China, as the end of the war was approaching, was to spread American aid over all forces fighting the Japanese and avoid creating a pretext for the Russians to take a hand in Chinese internal politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Carter know that you were going to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I am sure he didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. So the Institute of Pacific Relations had nothing to do with this visit?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the policy after you had been to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To know whether or not you had influenced it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I am speaking simply from my general recollection, which I think has been tested over a good many years, that I have never had any influence on American policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that a man who had written a book entitled "Solution in Asia" might have an influence on the President if he went to see him personally and left a memorandum with him, particularly where he advocates getting a new set-up in the State Department to review the policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

When I asked for that interview I was not thinking of myself as the author of any particular book. I was thinking of myself as a

person who had been familiar with President Roosevelt's policy in China at the time that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appointed me as his adviser.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever have a conversation with anyone connected with the State Department along this line, of the change in policy, or the policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall, unless I casually talked with State Department people as I did with newspaper people, people back from China, everybody who was interested in the subject at the time.

As I say, this was a subject of very general discussion at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. With whom would you say you had talked about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At this time, Senator, I couldn't possibly tell you.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have a very long conversation with Mr. Grew about it, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Ballantine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Dooman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dooman?

Senator FERGUSON. Dooman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that after you went to see the President, that within a short time Mr. Grew left the Department; was replaced?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you today, Senator Ferguson, when Mr. Grew resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that shortly after you went to the White House, that Mr. Ballantine was replaced?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the calendar of events in that connection, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not know, as a matter of fact, that after you went to the White House, that in a short time Mr. Dooman was replaced, Eugene Dooman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall that there was a change at that time. I believe that these were senior personnel who were reaching normal retirement age in any case.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you not know that after you went there, that your friend that you placed so highly in your statement here to this committee, Mr. John Carter Vincent, was promoted and took over the work of the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember that Mr. Vincent, after his return from China, was promoted in the State Department, which at that time I would certainly have regarded as an excellent promotion; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you not know that it took place after you had been at the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until I looked up these memoranda, Senator, I wouldn't have recalled which came first.

Senator FERGUSON. But is it not a fact that it did take place, that the three replacements happened after you were there, that the promotion of Mr. Vincent and the others took place after you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you seem to be trying to impute to me power that——

The CHAIRMAN. Cannot you answer "Yes" or "No"?

Please answer it. Do not argue with the Senator.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, you are now saying that these promotions took place subsequently.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the record shows it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. So you say. I haven't looked up the record.

Senator FERGUSON. That being a fact, how can you tell the world that you did not have any influence on the policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I had the slightest influence on the policy, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what the Marshall mission was to China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that General Marshall went out to China; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what was in his instructions?

The CHAIRMAN. The question is Did you know what was in his instructions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know at the time, no. I know very roughly now.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you want to tell this committee, this Senate, that you, as a private citizen, after having this dispute with the Reader's Digest in the writing of the memorandum for Lamont and the writing of the letter to the President and the urging to the President, that you had to see him, in fact, before he went to Potsdam; that after you had been there, you failed or neglected to look into the State Department or its policies after that date and you cannot tell us what happened? Is that what you want to leave with this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator. What I want to leave with this committee is that this extremely brief interview with the President had no consequences whatever, as far as I ever knew.

Nobody in the White House or in the State Department called me back to consult me on any steps that were about to be taken.

Senator FERGUSON. That doesn't answer my question, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I don't believe that this very brief interview of mine with the President had any consequence at all.

Senator FERGUSON. We are having great difficulty in getting from you this morning what policy you wanted changed. What I want to know is why you tell this committee in your statement that what you wanted done and what you presented to the President, had not the slightest—and you use the word "slightest"—effect on American policy, and you never followed it up to know what the Marshall mission to China was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't believe that my interview with the President or my letter to him or the memoranda that I left with him had the slightest effect.

Senator FERGUSON. How can you tell us whether it had the slightest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not telling you whether it had the slightest.

Senator FERGUSON. You did in your statement. You told the whole world that it had the slightest effect, on the top of page 34.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe it had the slightest effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Read your statement of what you told us.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Neither my letter nor my visit had the slightest effect on American policy."

I believe that is a true statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not there in issue today before this committee the question as to whether or not you had any influence on our American foreign policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you choose to put it that way, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not in issue as to whether or not the Institute of Pacific Relations, of which you were a trustee at this time, had any influence on the foreign policy of America?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I think that my brief contact with the President on this occasion had no effect whatever on American policy, and it certainly had no connection with the Institute of Pacfic Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, that is not an answer to the question.

Read the question, Mr. Reporter.

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter, as follows:)

Senator FERGUSON. Is not there in issue today before this committee the question as to whether or not you had any influence on our American foreign policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is your statement of the issue, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, I am not willing to allow you to draw the conclusion, and have it become final, as to whether or not you had the slightest influence on American policy.

That is why I am asking these questions.

And I am sorry it is taking so long.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am sorry. I can say that, to the best of my knowlege and belief——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reason why it is taking so long here. You gave us many conclusions. We discovered many of them were based purely upon hearsay and that you asked this committee to draw those conclusions with you.

I, for one, as a Senator, am not willing to take your conclusions when I think there are outstanding facts, and I want to question you about those facts.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Go ahead and question, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us take the memorandum that you left with the President. You say that you did not go there for the purpose of influencing him.

I would like now for you to answer why you went.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did I say that I did not go there for the purpose of influencing him?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the inference you leave.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you go there for the purpose of influencing the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go there for that purpose?

The CHAIRMAN. Answer that "Yes" or "No," now, and then make an explanation.

Did you go there for the purpose of influencing the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; of course, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write the Lamont letter with the intent that you were going to try to influence the State Department, the President, and the public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was its purpose?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I acceded to Mr. Carter's request to draft some material for a letter by Mr. Lamont for the specific and limited purpose of correcting gross distortions of my views which had appeared in the Reader's Digest.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you say that the Reader's Digest raised the question about your advocating the sending of lend-lease, or any other matériel, to the Chinese Communists as a government? Was that raised in the Reader's Digest issue?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not recently read the Reader's Digest, and I can't answer for their editorial intentions. I can only speak to the point that I considered that what they published was grossly unfair to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they publish anything that was grossly unfair to you about your advocating the sending of lend-lease or any other matériel to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe that they said that I advocated that. Did they?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I do not think so. I wondered why put it in the Lamont letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because the Reader's Digest had misrepresented my views, and I wanted to make a statement of what my views actually were.

Senator FERGUSON. How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views? You do not say in the Lamont letter than "Owen Lattimore advocates this." You wanted Thomas Lamont to advocate it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I take a moment to look at this Lamont draft?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I wish you would.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it that you want to look at now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would——

Senator FERGUSON. He wants to look whether he advocated Thomas Lamont to advocate that he had advocated.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Carter had asked me to provide him with some material. My reference to——

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From this draft that I sent to Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. To Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To Mr. Carter; yes. I didn't send it to Mr. Lamont.

Senator FERGUSON. He had a man take it to Lamont.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the authoritativeness of several of those Americans * * * including Owen Lattimore, Harrison Forman, and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both American and Soviet policy in China.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, Senator? Do you want the question read?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Digest article raise the question of your advocating the furnishing of this material to Communist China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Digest article, as you will see from that extract that I recently read into the record, describes me as advocating that the American Government—I think the words were—cheerfully accept things which I did not advocate the American Government cheerfully accepting.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not answer the question of the Senator. I want that question read to the witness again.

And I ask you, Mr. Lattimore, to answer it, if you please, if you care to answer it. If you do not, you may say so..

Read the question of the Senator from Michigan.

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter, as follows:)

Senator FERGUSON. How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views? You do not say in the Lamont letter that "Owen Lattimore advocates this." You wanted Thomas Lamont to advocate it.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, I submit that is responsive.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair does not think so.

Mr. ARNOLD. Well, then, try and answer it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Will you read it again?

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was again read by the reporter, as follows:)

How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the gist of the question.

Mr. ARNOLD. I would like to have read the balance of the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the whole thing.

Mr. ARNOLD. I do not want to say much here.

Would you read the answer back? Because, with all due respect, I believe——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Would you read my previous answer back.

The CHAIRMAN. Read that entire portion of the record.

(The portions of the record referred to, as heretofore transcribed, were read by the reporter as follows:)

Senator FERGUSON. How would your views in the letter that you gave to Lamont, to be under his signature, how would they get to the public as your views? You do not say in the Lamont letter that "Owen Lattimore advocates this." You wanted Thomas Lamont to advocate it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I take a moment to look at this Lamont draft?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I wish you would.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it that you want to look at now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would——

Senator FERGUSON. He wants to look whether he advocated Thomas Lamont to advocate that he had advocated.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Carter had asked me to provide him with some material. My reference to——

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From this draft that I sent to Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. To Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To Mr. Carter, yes. I didn't send it to Mr. Lamont.

Senator FERGUSON. He had a man take it to Lamont.

Mr. LATTIMORE. "To bolster the case, the article casts doubts on the authoritativeness of several of these Americans * * * including Owen Lattimore,

Harrison Forman, and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both American and Soviet Policy in China."

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, Senator? Do you want the question read?

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the answer.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put another question to you along the same line.

You were asking Mr. Lamont to raise an issue in the letter to the New York Times that was not raised, you say, in the Digest article, and that issue was America's policy being changed to send ammunition, lend-lease, and military aid of any description to the Communist government in China.

Now I ask you, in your raising that new issue, as to whether or not you were asking Mr. Lamont to raise it, not in your name, but in his name; that that was his opinion, that it should be done so as to influence the President of the United States, the State Department officials, and the American public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I think that is a complete misconstruction.

Senator FERGUSON. Why were you advocating it, then, in the Lamont letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the first place, I was not advocating a change in American policy; I was advocating a continuity of American policy of supporting united Chinese resistance as a whole to the Japanese.

Mr. Carter had suggested that I write a letter myself to the New York Times. I didn't want to do it because I was disgusted with the whole subject.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been gone over now. I do not see why we should go over it again.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Carter twisted your arm and finally compelled you to write the memorandum to Lamont.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But let us get back about this policy.

You say that you did not advocate the change. Then I ask you why you say there in your letter that there now appears to be a fundamental change, and in the last paragraph you say:

> With the utmost earnestness, I venture to urge you to have America's policy toward China impartially reviewed by advisers who are not associated with either the formulation or the implementation of that policy as recently practiced.

That indicates clearly that there was a change in the policy.

Senator SMITH. Is that the letter to the President, Senator? You did not say what letter it is.

Senator FERGUSON. The letter to the President dated June 10, 1945.

Now, do you say there never was a change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I did not say there never was a change. I said I did not advocate a change, that I advocated the maintenance of the continuity of American policy.

Senator FERGUSON. But you indicated in the letter that America had changed its policy, and you wanted them to go back to the old policy; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I think that is not quite correctly stated.

I indicated in my letter to the President that a change was coming about in America policy.

I thought that such a change, if it finally took place, would raise very serious questions, and I advocated an impartial review of the whole subject. I was not myself advocating a change.

Senator FERGUSON. What you claim now you were trying to do was to prevent a change.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I was saying that before any change was made there should be an impartial review of policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we not have a policy not to furnish aid to the Communists as such?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I don't believe our policy was formulated in those terms.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Our policy was formulated in terms of aid to the nation of China and in terms of not encouraging any form of split or civil war in China while the really very desperate war for survival against Japan was going on.

Senator FERGUSON. Now let us get to the letter or memorandum that you left with the President. Is this the only memorandum that you left with the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only one.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not this memorandum was ever sent to the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I have no knowledge whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know as to whether or not Mr. Vincent, who was promoted to take over the far-eastern work of the State Department, ever saw your memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it very much, indeed, but I have no personal knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to him about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us examine it.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know: Is the witness undecided on that? He said. "I don't believe I did."

You would know, would you not, whether you did or did not talk on a matter as important as this?

The CHAIRMAN. We will get that answer.

Senator WATKINS. I am a little disturbed on the witness having a keen memory on so many things and how his answer is "I don't believe I did."

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get him to answer "Yes" or "No" for 4 days, and I still get that answer.

Mr. WATKINS. I would like to know if he answers "Yes" or "No" on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I can't answer "Yes" on that.

Senator WATKINS. Can you answer "No"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't answer "No" on that, either.

This was a period of acute and active discussion all over America at that time on questions of foreign policy. I would certainly talk to anybody whom I met in those days about my duties.

Senator WATKINS. Were you meeting Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met him occasionally.

Senator WATKINS. Did you talk with him about our foreign policy during that period of time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator WATKINS. How can you remember that, if you cannot remember the other?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I remember that Mr. Vincent, like all the State Department people I know, was an extremely correct member of the Foreign Service, who would talk with people outside the Government only in extremely restricted terms of getting information from them, but not giving information to them.

Senator WATKINS. You do admit, however, during that period of time, or about that time, that you did have conversations with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I had conversations with him in that general period, and in those conversations I would certainly express my views, as I have always expressed my views—completely openly, whether popular or not.

But what I can't guarantee, and what I think extremely unlikely, is that I ever talked to anybody in terms of a complete repetition of the memorandum that I left with the President.

The natural course of events would be that I would talk about whatever topic seemed to me to be of interest, which would naturally overlap with the subject matter of memoranda like this.

But I can't say that I ever discussed with anybody these matters in precisely the terms or the words that I presented them to the President.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have conversation with him prior to presenting the memorandum to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly had conversations prior, in time, to this memorandum.

Senator WATKINS. Is it not, as a matter of fact, very likely that if you met him at all, this subject was on your mind? You felt it was so important that you wanted to take it to the President, that you would discuss it with your friends in the State Department, a man that you knew?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In terms of going to see the President, no.

Senator WATKINS. Before you went to the President, would you not discuss it with them first, before you finally went to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In terms of my interest in the subject——

The CHAIRMAN. He did not ask you about terms of anything.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought he did.

Senator WATKINS. I did not ask about terms. Did you discuss it with them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I talked of this whole topic of policy in China and controversy beginning to rise over policy in China with all and sundry.

Senator WATKINS. You were very much alarmed about it, as a matter of fact; were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't say, perhaps, very much alarmed. I don't want to quibble. I would say very much concerned.

Senator WATKINS. You thought it of enough importance to take it to the President; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly I was very much concerned.

Senator WATKINS. You would not take it to the President unless you were somewhat alarmed at the drift that American policy was taking at that time; would you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I will accept your word, Senator. My own word would have been "concerned."

Senator WATKINS. What I want to find out is the basis for your statement that you do not believe you discussed it with him when you said you were discussing it with all and sundry.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, no. That I discussed the actual memorandum with him.

Senator WATKINS. You could not discuss that because it had not been prepared beforehand. I am talking about your conversations immediately prior to your going to the President.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Undoubtedly, my conversations with all and sundry touched on this general field.

Senator WATKINS. And if you talked to Mr. Vincent you probably talked to him about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I probably mentioned what I thought about it, yes.

Senator WATKINS. But you say you do not believe you did not. You said awhile ago you did not believe you did not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

I want to make it quite clear, and not to get confused by the questioning, that I am trying to distinguish between talking with State Department people and other people about the general topic of interest—which, of course, I would do at that time—but that I do not believe that I discussed with anybody a project for leaving a memorandum with the President, or the words in which I should draw up that memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. State Department people do not come into the term "all and sundry."

Senator WATKINS. I thought they were Americans and they would come in with the rest of them.

Mr. ARNOLD. Do you think they come in with "sundry"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not all, but perhaps sundry.

Senator WATKINS. As I recall, Mr. Lattimore, you have at great length pointed out how close a friend Mr. Vincent was and other people in the State Department, particularly three of them that you felt so keenly about here a few days ago, and it seems to me that if you knew them that well, it would only be a natural thing that you would discuss with them, if they were available at all, this thing you had in mind, this thing you felt was really dangerous to the country and it would be to the best intrests of the country if you had a change in that policy.

That is what I wanted to know: If you did not discuss with them, prior to going to the President, the very project you had in going there and leaving that memo with him.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not discuss that very project.

And I want again, Senator Watkins, if I may, to make very clear my admiration of the training and discipline which enables State Department men, when talking with members of the general public, always to restrict their contribution to the conversation to such matters as are generally known in the press, so that they don't reveal the inside workings of the State Department while, at the same time, as good State Department men should, they acquire a knowledge of

both the factual knowledge and the opinions of others. That is exactly the way the certain State Department——

Senator WATKINS. If you did talk with them, you did not get any sympathy from them, any support or encouragement: did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never got from them any inside dope.

Senator WATKINS. But shortly after you had been there, at least one of those men was appointed to a very important position: Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Which I think, Senator, was clearly in the cards at the time, in terms of his special knowledge, seniority, regular process of people going up.

Senator WATKINS. You say it was in the cards. Did you not have in mind when you went to the President——

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator WATKINS. To get such a change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my memorandum to the President, I pointed out——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Did you not have that in mind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wanted to show what I did have in mind, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt just a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. These letters and memorandum were made part of the record and not actually received in evidence.

I do not know whether or not they have been distributed. I now move that they become officially part of the record.

We have been reading from them, and I move they be distributed because I know it is difficult for the press to follow this. It is the only medium we have for the public to know what is going on.

The CHAIRMAN. I will have to have them designated.

Senator FERGUSON. I will designate them as follows:

They refer to his testimony, pages 33 and 34.

The first is the letter dated June 10, 1945, from Owen Lattimore to the President, and was marked "Exhibit No. 473."

The second is a copy of a letter from the White House, the President, on June 14, 1945, to Mr. Lattimore.

The third is a Western Union wire from Matthew A. Connelly, Secretary to the President, to Mr. Owen Lattimore.

Next is a copy of a letter from Owen Lattimore to the President, dated June 20, 1945.

Next is the memorandum for the President, which was left with the President in two parts, but is now as one in this memorandum; interview of the 3d day of July 1945.

Last is a letter dated June 20, 1945, from Owen Lattimore to Matthew Connelly.

That is where I cited the OWI address.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you ask that they be inserted in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, made part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; they will be inserted in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that these were offered for the record several days ago, subject to the Chair's determination.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. At that time they had not been referred to in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 530–A, 530–B, 530–C, 530–D, 530–E," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 530–A

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 14, 1945.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md.

MY DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I appreciate very much yours of June tenth.

The Chinese situation is developing alright. The policy has been definitely outlined to the Chinese. The Russians and the British and ourselves have reached an agreement which I think is in the best interest of China.

I would be glad to discuss it with you sometime, if you feel inclined.

Sincerely yours,

[s] HARRY TRUMAN.

EXHIBIT No. 530–B

[Telegram]

WA21617—GOVT—WASHINGTON, D. C., 29 52 9P.

DR. OWEN LATTIMORE,
The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.:

The President will be glad to see you 11:30 a. m., Tuesday, July 3. Please confirm. Regards.

MATTHEW A. CONNELLY,
Secretary to the President.

EXHIBIT No. 530–C

JUNE 20, 1945.

HON. HARRY S. TRUMAN,
President of the United States,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I most sincerely appreciate your letter of June 14, and the opportunity you offer me for a discussion of policy in China.

If the views which I earnestly wish to place before you for your consideration should be of any value to you, they would be of more value before your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

In the hope of causing the minimum inconvenience in taking up some of your heavily burdened time, I am writing to your secretary, Mr. Connelly, asking if it will be possible to arrange an appointment soon after your return from San Francisco.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL:ec.

EXHIBIT No. 530–D

Interview of July 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

JAPAN POLICY AS RELATED TO CHINA POLICY

Japan, politically, now banks everyting on the hope of peace terms that will make possible a come-back and another war. The only possible come-back is as leader of an Asiatic coalition under the racial battle cry of "down with the white man." Therefore, unlike Germany, where the principal Nazi underground will be in Germany, the Japanese underground must be largely in other parts of Asia. China is the key to this problem.

Like Germany, Japan must also do its best to pit the Western Allies against Russia. China is also the key to this problem.

Therefore, in China the Japanese problem is not WHETHER they are going to be defeated, but How to manage the process of being defeated to their own future advantage. The Japanese have already begun to handle this problem by seeing to it that their defeat contributes to both the political and the territorial disunity of China. Where they can manage to retreat in favor of Chiang Kai-shek and not in favor of Communist guerrillas, they do so. Where there are no Communists, they try to retreat in favor of provincial, regional, or war-lord troops, instead of Chiang Kai-shek troops, so as to contribute to territorial disunity. They hope that, if China can be led into both ideological civil wars of landlords against peasants and regional civil wars of provinces against the Central Government, Japan will not be eclipsed during its years of postwar weakness.

To counteract this Japanese policy, the American policy in China must work steadily for peace, unity, and modern political forms.

At the same time Japan hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and America to be "soft" with "antirevolutionary" Japanese big business and to wink at the fact that big business in Japan is as militarist as the militarists.

To handle American policy in the new phase, it is necessary to make adjustments to the fact that China, rather than Japan, is now the key to Far Eastern policy as a whole. In most government agencies at the present time the tendency is to find Japan-trained men in higher policy-making posts than China-trained men, simply because Japan used to be a more important Great Power than China.

CHINA POLICY

There are two alternatives in China:

1. Division of the country between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists: This would mean, for Chiang, a permanent policy of getting American support, for which he would give anything America wants; and, for the Communists, a similar policy of getting Russian support, with similar results. The eventual consequences would almost inevitably be war between America and Russia.

2. A unified China: To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, and Britain to build up China as a whole. The Communists would have to accept minority standing as a long-term status; but Chiang would have to give them real power within a coalition government, proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation.

In other words, we can have either a divided China, with Chiang having dictatorial power in his territory, subject to acting as an instrument of American policy; or we can have a whole China, at the price of pretty drastic political change, including limitation of the personal power of Chiang.

Unless he is certain of American policy, Chiang would rather have unlimited power in a small China than limited power in a larger China. He still thinks that America is on the fence, but will be stampeded into jumping down on his side, against Russia, if he hits the right timing in a civil war against 'the Boishevik menace." Influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long-term conservative trend, with Republican ascendance, and that Henry Luce, Walter Judd, etc., have guessed the trend correctly.

The basic American interest is represented by policy No. 2. It can be successfully worked. Chiang is tenacious but has shown in the past that he knows when to give in and try a new policy. But he will only play ball if America and Russia, with British approval, make it plain that they are going to be joint umpires. America alone cannot either coax or bluff Chiang into a settlement with the Communists involving real concessions; but, if Washington and Moscow agree, both Chungking and Yenan will carry out the agreement.

EXHIBIT No. 530–E

JUNE 20, 1945.

MR. MATTHEW CONNELLY,
Secretary to the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CONNELLY: On June 14 the President wrote to me that he would be glad to discuss with me some questions of policy in China which I had ventured to raise in a letter to him on June 10.

Since I am most anxious that the views which I represent should be laid before the President for his consideration before his forthcoming meeting with Prime

Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, I hope very much that you will find it possible to arrange an appointment for me as soon as possible after the President's return from San Francisco. I can be reached through the following points:

Home address (postal) Ruxton, Md.
Telephone (home) Towson 846.
Telephone (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore) University 0100, Ext. 72.
Telephone (OWI, Washington) Republic 7500, Ext. 72228.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: ec.

Senator FERGUSON. I had many more questions, Mr. Chairman, but I think perhaps Senator Watkins would want to continue.

Senator WATKINS. I will let it go now.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to recess. I have no questions on the document itself.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the pleasure of the committee about reconvening?

Senator FERGUSON. Any time the Chair desires, I will come back.

I would also like to put in the record, for your information, Mr. Lattimore, the fact on the Clubb case that, as I understand, Mr. Acheson, at a press conference, now said that he did reverse the board in the Clubb case and reinstated Mr. Clubb; that his finding was opposite to the board.

That is for your information. I asked you about it, and you seemed to know nothing about it the other day.

I will put that press release in.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess now until 1:30.

(Thereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p. m., same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, the witness had a quotation from General Chennault's book which you said we would read later.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether it is a quotation or not. There is an excerpt here which was handed to me; and, without the opportunity to present it to the committee, I withheld action on it. It presents certain phases that I should think would be for the consideration of the committee.

Mr. ARNOLD. It is very short, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is short.

Mr. ARNOLD. And you can strike it if you think so. Could it be read subject to being stricken?

The CHAIRMAN. No. I will submit it to the committee just as soon as I get the opportunity.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. This presents a phase of quoting an excerpt, presumably quoting an excerpt, from a publication by a party who is not present, not subject to cross-examination or to inquiry. But those phases will be presented to the committee.

Mr. ARNOLD. I would appreciate it because many such quotations are in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. May I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, if you will place before yourself the letter to Times by Mr. Lamont.

Mr. MORRIS. Designed for Mr. Lamont.

Senator FERGUSON. Designed; yes; written by you to be placed in the Times, if possible, by Mr. Lamont. The second paragraph is what I am interested in. I want to go back to this change.

You seem to know in these letters much about the policy, but I do not find it in the answer that you are making here. Let us take one of these quotes:

> On the other hand, there is cause for uneasiness in a new trend, which is now developing toward criticism of Soviet motives and Soviet policies in Asia. We shall be well advised to consider this trend now, in advance of President Truman's first Big Three meeting with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

What was that trend, and who was responsible for the new trend that you are talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I say that I have not looked up the newspaper record of the period. I assume that it was part of the trend toward feeling that Russia was not a country we could cooperate with, while there was also at the same time, the general period of the San Francisco conference, a very strong feeling among many people that postwar cooperation would be possible.

I thought that as much public discussion of that as possible would contribute to a well-informed public opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was public opinion you were trying to sway? What you call a well-informed public, but it was public opinion that you wanted to sway?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wanted to contribute to public opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not want to sway it any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wanted to advocate my own opinions and to have them honestly discussed like anybody else's opinions, and I resented the manner in which my opinions had been misrepresented in the article in the Reader's Digest.

Senator FERGUSON. You claim to be an authority on China and the Far East, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I claim to be a person who has studied China and the Far East for many years. I do not and have never claimed to be an exclusive authority.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you whether it was an exclusive authority. That would be another question. But were you an authority?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that would be a question for somebody else's judgment, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel suggests that you are too modest. I could only suggest, maybe, that you are not truthful enough on it, and I want to read something for that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, may I say that I resent it?

Senator FERGUSON. You may resent it, but let me ask you to read now, where you have not been modest, when you printed it under another man's name. Read the last paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On this page?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> An example of anticipatory alarm about Russia is to be found in the influential magazine Reader's Digest, under the title "The Fate of the World Is at Stake

in China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell. In this article it is suggested that there is a danger that American policy might disastrously "sell out" President Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Communists, and "bring under totalitarian regimentation 450,000,000 people." To bolster this case, the article casts doubts on the authoritativeness of several of those Americans who have, in fact, contributed most authoritatively to a clear American understanding of contemporary China and contemporary Russia—including Owen Lattimore, Harrison Forman, and Edgar Snow. The publication of such an article invites a review of both American and Soviet policy in China. In making such a review, we should examine American policy just as closely as Soviet policy, and make our criticisms where they are due.

Senator FERGUSON. You were perfectly willing to have Mr. Thomas Lamont call you an authority.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This was something that I had submitted to Mr. Carter at his request to be submitted to Mr. Lamont.

Senator FERGUSON. I have heard that a dozen times.

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. We will move along quickly here if you will keep to the answer.

You were perfectly willing to have Mr. Thomas Lamont tell the public that you were an authority.

Mr. LATTIMORE. If he approved of the wording, he could do so.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not request him to approve through your agent, Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir: I made no such request. I submitted a rough draft of a memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you put your name in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because my reference was to Reader's Digest and the article in the Reader's Digest, and my name was a part of it.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not hesitate to say that you were an authority as well as Mr. Forman and Mr. Edgar Snow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't hesitate.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to this sentence:

We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in China in order to facilitate the most effective resistance to Japan.

What was the change there that you were talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask where that quotation is from?

Senator FERGUSON. The next paragraph after the one you completed reading, on page 2.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I suppose the word "Under" is "Before," "Before Pearl Harbor," or is that "after"?

Yes; because the next sentence says "Since," so that word apparently, instead of "Under Pearl Harbor"——

Mr. LATTIMORE. It probably is "Until Pearl Harbor."

Senator FERGUSON. It is in that paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. [Reading:]

Since Pearl Harbor, our policy has been to give China the maximum aid permitted by difficulties of transport and the demands of other theaters of war. We have also, until quite recently, encouraged political unity in China in order to facilitate the most effective resistance to Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The change, as I recall it, in the discussion of the period—I repeat, I have not looked up the newspaper record of the time—was that it was being advocated that we should restrict

aid entirely to Chiang Kai-shek's own armies while other people believed that as we approached the coast of China, as we were nearing Japan, made direct contact with the Chinese armies on the mainland, we should also be entitled to cooperate with the Communists and Communist-led guerrillas.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, these letters and this memorandum were written prior to the end of the war between the United States and Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They were written as the end of the war was rapidly approaching, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that it was rapidly approaching?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it was the general opinion at the time because, through General MacArthur's island-hopping campaign, in combination with the United States Navy, we were getting within reach of both the home islands of Japan and the mainland of China.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew, then, that the war was about over?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know. My feeling was that the war was approaching an end.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that during the war there were battles between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There were some clashes, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How many divisions or armies did Chiang Kai-shek have to put on his border up at the Communist border to preserve the integrity of his rule?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall the figure, Senator, but I do recall that in the opinion of some of the American diplomatic and military representatives in China, some of those troops were being unnecessarily immobilized.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. My question was how many did he use on the border?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he use any?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There were troops at the corner of northwest China where Chiang Kai-shek's free China and the Communist-held part of China joined.

Senator FERGUSON. But it is your contention now that they were not there to keep the Communists from moving into the Nationalist territory?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it is my contention that many of the Americans in the field at the time considered that the blockade of the Communists was unnecessarily large and severe, immobilized an unnecessarily large number of Chiang's troops.

Senator FERGUSON. But they did immobilize some of his troops?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And at the very time that at least Chiang Kai-shek felt that it was necessary to preserve his own army to keep the Communists back, you were advocating arms and supplies and munitions to the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; you are talking about two different situations.

Senator FERGUSON. Please do not tell me what I am talking about. I am just asking you the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, in my opinion, then, Senator, there were two different situations. One was during the period when the United States had no access and no hope of immediate access to the coast of China.

The second was the period when we were rapidly approaching the coast of China and when many people thought, as was discussed in the press at the time, I remember, that the Japanese would withdraw from the home islands of Japan and make a last stand in Manchuria, in which case the question of combined American-Chinese operations on the mainland against Manchuria would have been very important.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now let us go back to the question I was asking.

In June of 1945 was it not true that Chiang Kai-shek had immobilized some of his troops against Japan and in order that he may protect his army from the Chinese Communist Army?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is true, Senator, that he had immobilized part of his army. It is also true that in the opinion of many American observers there at the time it was unnecessary.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, we are not going to get through today unless we can get the answers to these questions. I can stay over here as long as you can stay over there.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, he is answering.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, counsel. I told the counsel when he first commenced this hearing as to what their limitations were. When he wants advice, he can ask you for advice. You will not participate in the proceedings.

Mr. ARNOLD. I am sorry, Senator. He permitted me to read the answer to the question before, and I thought I could be helpful in the proceedings by merely striking out the last part of that answer.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I think ought to be stricken out, and if he will just stick to the answers he and I will get along.

The CHAIRMAN. You just tell the witness to answer the question, and you will give him some pretty good advice.

Mr. ARNOLD. I think he is trying, Senator.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the trouble here, Senator Ferguson, is merely that——

Senator FERGUSON. Are you answering my question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot accept your statement of the question as if it were my opinion on the question.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a fact, therefore you would have to know. Did you or did you not know whether or not Chiang Kai-shek was demobilizing or, as you called it that, part of his troops between his part of China and the Communist part of China, to protect his part of China from the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew that he was immobilizing part of his troops in that area, and I also knew that many Americans in China considered that he was immobilizing in excessive number.

The CHAIRMAN. That is no part of the answer. That is another part.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was in June 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Generally speaking in that period; yes,

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And that was the very time that you were advocating Mr. Lamont, over his signature, to advocate that we furnish to the Communists in China munitions and arms. You can answer that question "Yes" or "No."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that question is susceptible to a "Yes" or "No" answer, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to answer it "Yes" or "No," or not answer it? Just say whether you do or do not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't want to answer it "Yes" or "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Then I will take it for granted that the two documents speak for themselves, the answer before and the documents.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to explain, Senator, that I am referring to a new situation, not an old one.

The CHAIRMAN. If you say you cannot answer the question, there is no explanation, if you cannot answer it "Yes" or "No." If you cannot answer it, you cannot answer it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I not explain why I can't answer it, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I did not ask you that question, to explain why.

Mr. Lattimore, we will go to the document that you wrote for the President. I will just take the China part. The Japanese part, I think, speaks for itself, at the present time [reading]:

> Division of the country between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists. This would mean, for Chiang, a permanent policy of getting American support, for which he would give anything America wants; and for the Communists, a similar policy of getting Russian support, with similar results. The eventual consequence would almost inevitably be war between American and Russia.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is prefaced, Senator, by the statement, "There are two alternatives in China."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That was one of them. Is that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was one of them; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What made you think that if America gave Chiang Kai-shek support, Russia would give the Communists support?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not certain of it. I thought that this was a probability or one of the alternatives, and I so stated it. Obviously, I had no positive knowledge. I was stating a theory or opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the memorandum to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the memorandum.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. This was advice to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that this is what would happen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that point, Mr. Lattimore, as a matter of fact, did you not then know that the Russians were supporting the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, I did not know that they were supporting them in any sense of giving them arms, and I don't believe that at that time they were giving them arms.

We have been over that previously. I certainly considered that the Communists had the moral and political support of the Russians.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that Russia was supporting them? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that Russia was supporting them in that sense, but not in the sense of arming them.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to your Lamont letter, I read you this:

> At the present moment, there is a danger that the parallel policy may not continue.

You are talking about the previous paragraph, where it says:

> Russian and American policy in China can be made parallel, and we know from experience, not by guesswork, that the Russians are capable of contributing at the very least an equal share in making the policies of the two countries parallel.

Where did you get that information? That was from experience and not from guesswork.

Mr. LATTIMORE. From experience and from my work with Chiang Kai-shek I knew that Russia and America had followed a parallel policy in China of encouraging united resistance to the Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you cease being adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1942; at the end of 1942.

Senator FERGUSON. Going to the next paragraph:

> At the present moment there is danger that the parallel policy may not continue. This danger has not yet arisen from Russian policy, but it has arisen from American policy.

What change did we make?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was referring again there, Senator, to the changes that I thought I saw coming about from statements in the press at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. The next sentence:

> Whereas Russia's policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of China Communists in the benefit of Russian aid to China, American policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefit of American aid.

Where did you get that information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From the press, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it a fact?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so. Reference to the press of the time would show.

Senator FERGUSON. So up to that time Communist Russia was not asking that Communist China be included in its aid?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that is true. That is supported by that quotation from General Chennault written after the end of the war, which I wished to read into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I know you want to get that in, but we will get that in later.

In your statement to the President you said, "For the Communists a similar policy of getting Russia's support with similar results * * *."

Why did you say that their policy would not continue to give aid to Chiang Kai-shek? Was it for the reason that they were, at that time, able to have the Yalta agreement where we were to give them certain benefits out of China, and was it that they were about to make a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing Chiang Kai-shek as the real government of China?

Was that their reason for not stipulating or not saying that they wanted to aid the Communists in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no means of knowing what their policy was at that time, Senator.

My paragraph clearly refers to anticipation of a future situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Your paragraph does not, if I might go back to it. "Whereas Russia's policy has never"—you are telling Mr. Lamont that the Russian policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of Communists, Chinese Communists, in the benefit of Russian aid to China.

America's policy has recently explicitly excluded them from the benefit of American aid.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On which page is that?

Senator FERGUSON. On page 3.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I undoubtedly believed that was true at the time, and I believe it is true, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you knew it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I say that Russian policy has never yet demanded the inclusion of the Chinese Communists, et cetera. That is obviously stated to the best of my knowledge at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. You were going to ask Mr. Lamont to put it in a statement over his signature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was not going to ask Mr. Lamont to put it in a statement over his signature.

Senator FERGUSON. You were just going to ask Mr. Carter, who went to Mr. Lamont's son in order that they may get it put over his signature, is that the way you want to leave it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I was supplying some material which could be considered, used, or rejected by Mr. Lamont, according to his judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what Mr. Lamont's son's thinking was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever heard about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had heard about him vaguely.

Senator FERGUSON. Just vaguely?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Just vaguely.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to Mr. Carter after you received his letter mentioning the son?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did. There was just this correspondence, and then I believe Mr. Carter sent me a copy of Mr. Lamont's letter to him, and there the matter dropped.

In other words, Mr. Lamont had exercised, according to his own judgment, exactly the option that was implied in my submitting any material at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not go to see Mr. Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know Mr. Lamont. The idea was not mine. The whole idea came from Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you state to Mr. Carter to tell Mr. Lamont that you, as an authority, were writing this article for the New York Times, and to tell Mr. Lamont who was writing it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, Mr. Carter asked me for a draft, and I gave him a draft.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he represented it as your thinking or as Carter's thinking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not Lamont knew that you prepared the draft?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us take the next statement in your China policy.

A unified China: To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, and Britain to build up China as a whole.

At that very time that you were writing to the President, you said that up to that time Russia showed no desire or requirement, let me put it that way, that there was to be a unification between the Communists and the non-Communists in China. Is that not true? That, is, to at least require her aid to be given only to the one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You said Russia's policy has never yet demanded——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Has never yet demanded, that was true to the best of my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Lamont article?

Senator FERGUSON. That is the Lamont article.

At the same time, you were telling the President this:

To unify China, there must be a settlement between Chiang and the Communists and simultaneously an agreement between America, Russia, and Britain to build up China as a whole. The Communists will have to accept minority standing as a long-term status; but Chiang would have to give them real power within a coalition government, proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation.

You wrote that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wrote both of those, one referring to the past, and one referring to a problem that I anticipated in the future.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were then advocating to the President a coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I was stating to the President, as I believe, an alternative. Let me see, I supported the second alternative.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were telling the President that the Communists would have to accept a minority standing as a long-term status, but Chiang would have to give them real power within a coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. That was my assessment of the situation that I thought was coming up.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not exactly what General Marshall went to China to do?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that is roughly what was indicated in the directive to General Marshall, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not what Mr. Carter gave as one of the ways of solving the problem when he got the first memorandum out on the Marshall mission? It is Vincent that I mean.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember that memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. You have seen the Vincent testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have read through it, yes. There was a great deal of it, and I don't remember every bit of it in detail.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember the memorandum of December 9, 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't. I would like to see it to refresh my memory.

The CHAIRMAN. That is by Vincent?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, Vincent.

The CHAIRMAN. And Vincent was then in what position?

Senator FERGUSON. He had been promoted to what position, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you exactly, at that time, whether he was head of the China desk or of the whole Far Eastern Division. I believe it was one or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. He was head of the Far East, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure, sir, when he was promoted from head of the China desk to head of the Far Eastern Division.

Mr. MORRIS. He was head of the Far Eastern Division on December 7, 1945.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was?

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This seems to be signed "J. F. B."

Senator FERGUSON. On the other side it is "Fe: Vincent." Who is J. F. B.?

Mr. MORRIS. That is James F. Byrnes.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was written by Vincent.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that what the notation indicates?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that is what it indicates. Will you read it?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading from exhibit No. 389 of hearings before this committee):

The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on December 7, the Secretary of State said:

"During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united, and democratic China.

"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well-organized groups who are now without any voice in the Government of China.

"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience, and restraint. It will not be solved by slogans. Its solution depends primarily upon the good will of the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions."

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not just what you were saying in your second letter, that the Communists would have to accept a minority standing as a long-term status, but Chiang would have to give them

real power within a coalition government proportionate to their real strength, not just token representation?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the memorandum to the President?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That indicates close, similar thinking.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the next paragraph?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his special representative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set forth above.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the end of the coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably. [Reading:]

Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not indicate that your second alternative, a unified China, was exactly what the State Department and the President were doing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It indicates that my thinking was similar to that which led the State Department or the State Department and the Armed Forces in combination to that decision. I see no cause and effect relationship.

The CHAIRMAN. This memorandum had been placed before the President before General Marshall was sent abroad?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, by almost 6 months.

How can you then say, with this in mind, Mr. Vincent writing it, that you had not the slightest effect, or your memorandum did not have the slightest effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am convinced, Senator, that it did not have the slightest effect. I saw the President for about 3 minutes. I got a Presidential brush-off in a nice, polite way, and I went out.

I should say it is much more likely that the State Department formed its opinions from the material gathered in the field in China, where I had not been recently, from its own representatives, and from military representatives.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this the first time that you told us you had a brush-off from the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had said that I had seen the President for about 3 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. You left a memorandum with your arguments in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is included in the classification of a polite brush-off.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you get for the witness a copy of the white paper?

(Document handed to witness.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I at this moment, Senator, read into the record the President's letter to me?

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the first letter where he stated the policy was already formed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you can read that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the record already.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, may I refer to the fact that the President had already told me that affairs in China were well in hand?

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime, Mr. Vincent had been promoted?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Grew was put out, Mr. Ballantine was put out, and Mr. Dooman was put out.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the meantime of what, may I ask?

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime between the time you left the memorandum with the President and the time Marshall was sent to Asia. Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Also in the meantime the President was telling me that affairs concerning China were well in hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you in all earnestness, utmost earnestness, told him to have the American policy in China impartially reviewed by advisers "who are not associated with either formulation or implementation of the policy as recently practiced."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, Senator, that indicates that I thought that an impartial review would be more authoritative and have results than any personal opinions of mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us look at page 10 of the letter of transmittal by Mr. Acheson.

By the way, what was Mr. Acheson's position with the State Department when you went to see the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He was in the State Department, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my general recollection. I can't tell you exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. He held a high position?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose so.

Senator FERGUSON. Well now, there was a letter of transmittal of the white paper, and if you will turn to page 10 of that, which is signed by Dean Acheson, you may start and read what he says on the letter of transmittal of the white paper to the public.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> When peace came, the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China:
>
> 1. It could have pulled out lock, stock, and barrel.
>
> 2. It could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists.
>
> 3. It could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides.

Senator FERGUSON. Right there, is that not exactly what you told the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That indicates similar thinking but no cause and effect.

Senator FERGUSON. No cause and effect. Would you think, then, that the only way we could get a cause and effect would be for the President to say, or have Dean Acheson say in here, "This was the policy proposed by Owen Lattimore, the authority on the far eastern affairs"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you get it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think one of the gaps in our knowledge here is whether the President ever transmitted my memoranda to the Department of State, or whether they were ever considered or accepted. I have never heard they were.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that the President would submit your memorandum if he had any intentions of following it to the men who were responsibile for that policy in the State Department, with the expression in the letter that you wanted them all taken out of the authority?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I don't know how matters were handled, matters of policy were handled, at that time between the White House and the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read on, Mr. Lattimore, from Dean Acheson's letter, the Secretary of State. It is on page 10, continuing.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> The first alternative would, and I believe American public opinion at the time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our international responsibilities and of our traditional policy of friendship for China before we had made a determined effort to be of assistance.

Senator FERGUSON. That is after the war and, naturally, that would not be included in your suggestion to the President because you were talking as to when the war was on. Is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Continue reading.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was talking while the war was on, but looking forward to postwar situations.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> The second alternative policy, while it may look attractive theoretically and in retrospect, was wholly impracticable. The Nationalists had been unable to destroy the Communists during the 10 years before the war. Now, after the war, the Nationalists were, as indicated above, weakened, demoralized, and unpopular. They had quickly dissipated their popular support and prestige in the areas liberated from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil and military officials. The Communists, on the other hand, were much stronger than they had ever been, and were in control of most of North China.

Senator FERGUSON. There, if they had followed in June of 1945 your suggestion of giving arms to the Communists, they would have been even stronger than they were as Acheson found them, is that not true?

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the Communists would have been?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not necessarily true, Senator. I was looking forward to a final phase of the war when, like many other people, I expected that there might be considerable fighting on the mainland of China for the recovery of Manchuria in case the Japanese made a last stand there, and I think it is highly hypothetical what might have come out of that one way or another. It is something that never happened and therefore one could not tell what the results would have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say now that they would not have been stronger if they had received the arms that you suggested?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I say I have no way of knowing.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the committee can draw that conclusion. Go on and read the next part.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Because of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces, which was later to be tragically demonstrated, the Communists probably could have been dislodged only by American arms. It is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 1945 or later. We therefore came to the third alternative policy, whereunder we faced the facts of the situation and attempted to assist in working out a modus vivendi which would avert civil war but, nevertheless, preserve and even increase the influence of the Nationalist Government.

Senator FERGUSON. That is really what you were advocating in the unified China.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That indicates a similar line of thought, but not cause and effect.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain what you mean by cause and effect?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It does not indicate that the policies adopted were based on any recommendation of mine, and I submit that it was an obvious probability that the State Department based its policy on its own information and military information from the field in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, why are you disclaiming so vehemently that you had any influence on the State Department when their policy did follow the line that you suggested? Is there a reason?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is a reason, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The reason is that there was a general category of thinking along this line at the time, that I participated in it, and that I think it would be an absurd exaggeration for me to claim that I molded policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is only because you would feel it would be an exaggeration?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Exaggeration is a relative word. I put before it absurd, an absurd—if you prefer, I will say an absurd invention.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But you had in the Lamont memorandum said that you were one of the authorities on the Far East. You sought the President's audience. You took the memorandum and left it there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not intend to influence him as an authority?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I hoped to influence the President primarily toward an impartial review of problems of policy as they then stood.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know any way that you could have put this proposition up to the President in any stronger language or way than you did?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I stated my opinions to the President as clearly as I could, based on the best knowledge available to me at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read now the rest of your letter. I want to ask you some questions about it, about your argument in your memorandum to the President.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

In other words, we can have either a divided China, with Chiang having dictatorial power in his territory, subject to acting as an instrument of American policy; or we can have a whole China, at the price of pretty drastic political change, including limitation of the personal power of Chiang.

Shall I go on?

Senator FERGUSON. That was part of your argument telling him that the unified China was what you were asking him for?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And that we would have to insist upon pretty drastic political changes, including the limitation of the personal power of Chiang. That meant a coalition government, did it not, taking the Communists in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That meant a coalition government, yes. That meant recognition of the fact that, in my opinion, the Communist-controlled part of China could not be conquered by the force available to Chiang.

Senator FERGUSON. Up until that time, had you ever known a government that had survived when it took in the Communists and made a coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that there was a previous example, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that communism was such at that time that it was impossible to have such a coalition government and have it successful, without it becoming a Communist government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not think so. If I thought so, I would have made different proposals.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the next paragraph?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> Unless he is certain of American policy, Chiang would rather have unlimited power in a small China than limited power in a larger China. He still thinks that America is on the fence, but will be stampeded into jumping down on his side, against Russia, if he hits the right timing in a civil war against the "Bolshevik menace." Influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long-term conservative trend, with Republican ascendance, and that Henry Luce Walter Judd, et cetera, have guessed the trend correctly.

Senator FERGUSON. There you were warning the President that Chiang, if he got aid from America alone, and there was not aid going to the Communists, and there was not a coalition government, that he, in a civil war, would be against the Communists, the Bolshevik menace, and you put that in quotations, is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct. I mean, that is correct as far as it being in quotations. It is not correct so far as your interpretation of what I was saying.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you put it in quotations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know why I put it in quotations at that time, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You must have believed that it was not quite accurate, the Bolshevik menace, or you would not have put it in quotes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; my general opinion at the time was that communism in China could be contained, so to speak, and that the Generalissimo could maintain the ascendancy.

Senator FERGUSON. Even in a coalition government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Even in a coalition government, or, in fact, the only way he could would be through a coalition government.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you think to be the difference between the Republican policy on that and the President's policy, when you say "influential advisers tell him that America is headed for a long-term conservative trend"? What do you mean there by "conservative trend"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know exactly what I meant by conservative trend in 1945, but it is clearly here in connection with Republican ascendance and the mention of what I identified at that time as the opinions on China policy of Mr. Luce and Congressman Judd.

The CHAIRMAN. He was predicting the election of Stassen, perhaps.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was saying that that was the way that Chiang's advisers were talking to him.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you learn that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I knew some of Chiang's advisers quite well.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get this information, in this country or in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My latest information on the subject was in this country.

Senator FERGUSON. Who gave it to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A Chinese connected with the Chinese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. One man whom I recall particularly was one of Chiang's oldest and closest associates, a Mr. Tseng Yang-fu.

Senator FERGUSON. Where is he now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know where he is now.

Senator FERGUSON. When was the last you saw of him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last I saw of him was when he was in this country in 1945, received medical treatment at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, and then stayed with me for several days before going back to China.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he in China or Formosa?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he is in Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you heard from him in Formosa?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask my wife?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may inquire from your wife.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last I heard of him—no, this is previous. This is just before he came here, so I don't remember when I heard from him last.

Senator FERGUSON. May we see the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely. [Document handed.]

Senator FERGUSON. Read the next paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. The next paragraph of what?

Senator FERGUSON. Of the memorandum to the President: "The basic American interest is represented by policy No. 2."

That is the one that appears to be at least the same line as was carried out in the white-paper letter of transmittal; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the one that indicates that I belong to that general school of thinking; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. "It can be successfully worked," you say. "Chiang is tenacious, but has shown in the past that he knows when to give in and try a new policy."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> But he will only play ball if America and Russia, with British approval, make it plain that they are going to be joint umpires.

Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What you wanted, then, was a policy where Russia and America, and with at least the consent of Britain, were to be umpires in running China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe not the umpires in running China. I believed that the situation coming up at the end of the war in China was one that the United States would not be able to control single-handed. I thought it had to be part of a general international agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by joint umpires?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Joint umpires in the sense that primarily, if the Communists accepted a minority position in a coalition government, it would have to be seen to that they didn't try to get away with any monkey business.

Senator FERGUSON. And you think that America should have stepped in and Russia would have stepped in, to keep the Communists in line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought, as I said in the final sentence here:

> America, alone, cannot either coax or bluff Chiang into a settlement with the Communists involving real concessions; but if Washington and Moscow agree, both Chungking and Yenan will carry out the agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not true that at Yenan the Communists would have had to have carried it out, if Russia had said so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know that I could have said so authoritatively at that time, Senator, and, at the present time, the degree of independence of the Chinese Communists from the Russians is a matter of considerable debate.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you are not one of those observers that believe that the Communists in Korea today are under the control of the Communists in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no final answer on that, Senator. All I am aware of is that there is one school of thought that believes the situation is primarily controlled by the Chinese Communists, and another school of thought that believes that the whole thing is dictated from the Kremlin.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you think about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have sufficient information to make a strong declaration of opinion in either direction.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you do not think they are controlled by Russia, you do not have any evidence that they are?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My opinion is that they are more allies of Russia than subordinates of Russia, and I believe that the Russians would have considerable difficulty in running China completely.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it may be that Russia could, in your opinion, act as a neutral in any truce?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. The whole wording here does not indicate neutrality. It indicates an agreement between the great powers of America, Russia, and Britain and, therefore, an agreement between interested parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that in 1946 Mr. Acheson, Secretary of State—and which was just about a year after the memorandum was given—took somewhat the same line before the House Foreign Affairs Committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know it, Senator. I shouldn't be surprised. As I say, this was part of a general school of thought, to which I was a minor adherent, and not, I think, a shaper of that school of thought.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to make, as a part of the record here, the memorandum and the press release; that is, the memorandum to General Marshall out of the white paper that is set forth in our record, and the letter of transmittal, so that it would all be in and not be taken out of context.

I would like to have the testimony of Dean Acheson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee as of June 19, 1946, a hearing on H. R. 6795, become a part of the record.

Mr. MORRIS. That portion of the testimony relating to the subject, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, relating to the subject. I would like to have that read into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be read.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have it read at least down to page 5, if Mr. Mandel would read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. Testimony of Dean Acheson before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 19, 1946, hearings on H. R. 6795 [reading]:

Chairman BLOOM. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, your statement, coupled with that of Secretary Patterson and that of General Marshall, I think constitutes not only a reason, but shows the necessity for the enactment of this legislation. So I shall ask no questions.

Chairman BLOOM. Dr. Eaton.

Mr. EATON. In my judgment, I consider the association with China in the future as probably of more importance to the destiny of the Nation and the world than any other single relationship. That is why I am strongly in favor of this legislation.

I notice on page 3 of your statement, Mr. Secretary, that General Marshall arranged for the training by our American people, with the use of American equipment, of certain Communist leaders who are to become incorporated into the National army. Are those fellows now fighting the National army in Manchuria?

Mr. ACHESON. No. I think the situation is this, Mr. Eaton: I do not believe that any such training has gone on in the past, or is now going on. What General Marshall was asked to do and agreed to do, and what is necessary to be done, is that when the plan for the amalgamation of the two armies is accepted and begins to go into effect, those units of the Communist army which are going to be amalgamated with the National army will receive a period of training from 60 to 90 days before they march out to join their opposite numbers in the other army. The plan roughly contemplates that a certain number of months from the day on which it is to go into effect certain divisions of the Communist army and certain divisions of the National army will be amalgamated. When that occurs it is essential that the troops from the Communist side which go into the troops of the new Chinese Army have a minimum of the same sort of training that their compatriots have had. Some of the divisions in the present National army have been trained by United States forces. These American training forces that we are talking about will be forces that will take a Communist outfit which is to be amalgamated with the new army and put it in shape so that it can readily go into the outfit. That is the program.

Mr. EATON. The objective of General Marshall's plan is that when the Communist forces are taken into the National army, he will then have a Nationalist army, not an army composed of two parts, one Nationalist and one Communist. What guaranty have we, since history has taught us a few lessons, I hope, that that will be the actual situation?

Senator FERGUSON. Who asked that question?

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Eaton. [Reading:]

Mr. ACHESON. You know better than anyone in the world, Dr. Eaton, there is no guaranty about anything in human affairs; but the problem they are facing in China is one, at the present time, of having two armies separated in organization, space, and everything of that sort. Now, if those armies can

be amalgamated unit by unit—not trying to take one whole army and put it with the other, but by taking separate units of each army and integrating them in one force—then the chances of division are tremendously reduced.

Mrs. Rogers. Mr. Secretary, how many Communists is it anticipated will be trained under the proposed plan?

Mr. Acheson. I think that they will try to take all the units that are going to be put into the new army immediately preceding their joining the new army and give them a 60- or 90-day schooling.

Mrs. Rogers. But, can you give us any approximate number that will be trained?

Mr. Acheson. I do not know. If the total size of the army is going to be 60 divisions, I do not know what proportion of the personnel would be Communist.

Mrs. Rogers. Could you get that proportion for us?

Mr. Acheson. The information that I have had handed me is that of the 60 divisions which are contemplated the personnel which would be equivalent to 50 divisions will come from the national army and the personnel which would be equivalent to 10 divisions will come from the Communist army.

Mrs. Rogers. That question will be asked on the floor. That is the reason I wanted to have that information.

Mr. Acheson. Five-sixths will be taken from the national army and one-sixth from the Communist army.

Chairman Bloom. Mr. Chiperfield.

Mr. Chiperfield. Mr. Secretary, besides the assistance this country gave to China which you have recited in your statement, did not the United States also furnish credit amounting to $900,000,000?

Mr. Acheson. I presume you are referring to the $500,000,000 loan made in 1942.

Mr. Chiperfield. There was not any particular reason for not mentioning that; it was simply because you were referring to the military assistance?

Mr. Acheson. That is correct.

Mr. Chiperfield. I have no questions now, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Rogers. Do you think that China will turn to Russia if we do not offer the assistance?

Mr. Acheson. I have no views on that subject. I am sure that we will assist China. I do not think I want to speculate on what would happen if we did not.

Mrs. Rogers. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use our arms against us?

Mr. Acheson. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter. There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country except in accordance with the principles and under the procedure of the Charter. Under the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ force against us, I am sure that we would veto that. They will not do it. That is the technical and legal answer to your question.

I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that.

Mrs. Rogers. I suppose a fight could start before that was decided, could it not?

Mr. Acheson. Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us? I do not think so.

Chairman Bloom. The Chair thinks that we should not go into that.

Mr. Acheson. I am sure that we do not need to worry.

Mrs. Rogers. I think if there were any way to have an agreement it would be very helpful. I thought in the passage of lend-lease we should have some agreement with the nations. I find it impossible, and many other members find it impossible, to find out just exactly what is going on in lend-lease. That is all I have.

Chairman Bloom. Mr. Gordon.

Mr. Gordon. I have no questions at this time.

Chairman Bloom. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. Vorys. Mr. Secretary, sooner or later, and probably sooner, the question may arise as to whether our furnishing arms to the Republic of China is in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and I note in your statement you mentioned the obligations of the Charter for the preservation of peace, at various times. I think it would be very helpful if you would spell out for us who are not as familiar with the provisions as you are and our chairman and our ranking Republican member, who were there when it was drafted, just how this operates.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I have some material from the Congressional Record here that I should like to read into this record as pertinent to my own thinking in the year 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to ask you about what Mr. Acheson was thinking in 1946. Do you know what change there was between June of 1945 and June of 1946, other than the peace, other than the stopping of the shooting? I do not mean the peace.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know about the change. General Marshall had been carrying on his mission in China, had succeeded in halting the civil war to a certain extent, and was trying to negotiate a form of settlement that would leave the dominant control of power in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you recognize at the time what Mrs. Rogers apparently recognized in 1946; that is, in 1945 when you were asking for this unity, particularly the aid to the Communists, and the unification by virtue of a joint government? Such as is said here [reading]:

> Mrs. ROGERS. Is there any way we could have an agreement with China whereby she would not use our arms against us?

Then Mr. Acheson said:

> Mr. ACHESON. Well, I suppose we have that in the United Nations Charter. There all the nations agree that they will not employ force against any country in accordance with the principles and under the procedure of the Charter. Under the principles and procedure of the Charter, if anyone wished to employ force against us, I am sure that we would veto that. They will not do it. That is the technical and legal answer to your question.

Did you have the same view back in 1945? You talked about the Charter and the protection under the Charter, and what had happened. Did you think all we had to do to stop a war was to veto it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't think I referred to the Charter at all. My view was that the postwar situation in China was one that could be kept manageable only by international agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Mrs. Rogers then said, to that answer, when he ended up by saying "I think we can rest assured that the Chinese will not do that," meaning they would not use the arms we gave them against us, Mrs. Rogers said: "I suppose a fight could start before that was decided; could it not?"

Then Mr. Acheson seems to be quite surprised at that, because he said: "Do you mean that the Chinese would attack us? I do not think so."

Had you the same idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I did not have the same idea. My ideas went no further in June—July 1945 than a belief that the situation in China could only be controlled by agreement between the major powers.

Senator FERGUSON. And then Chairman Bloom said:

> The Chair thinks that we should not go into that.
> Mr. ACHESON. I am sure that we do not need to worry.

Was that your thinking at the time: that there was no worry about bringing these Communists in and bringing Russia into this Chinese situation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. You are making, I think, an unjustifiable link between Mr. Acheson's worries in 1946 and the problem that I was trying to consider in 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. The only thing I can see now is the difference that we did not give the Communists arms; but, if so, there may have been some worry back in those days.

Is it not true that as soon as they did get arms we found them moving down in North Korea, down across the imaginary line that we used to divide the country; and, in November of the same year, we find the Communists in China using arms against the United States.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not put it quite the same way, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you put it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would put it that, when we supplied arms in large quantities to armies that proved incompetent to use them, they passed very rapidly into the hands of the Chinese Communists and were turned against our policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, was the reason for your going to the President with this letter and this memorandum the point that you felt that Ambassador Grew, Mr. Dooman, and Mr. Ballantine were opposed to your views and your philosophy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. My feeling was, as is shown in my letter and memoranda quite clearly, that controversial problems of American policy were arising, and that the most important thing to do was to get an impartial review.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, directly or indirectly, contact Dean Acheson about your visit to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you surprised when you saw Ambassador Grew coming out of the President's office the morning that you called on him?

By the way, it was Tuesday morning, the 3d, instead of Monday.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it struck me as quite natural to see—I still forget whether he was Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary of State—him in the President's anteroom.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not get the urge to say, "Ambassador Grew, I am going to talk about the Far East. Will you not come into the President's office and we will talk it over together?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't think it was a privilege of a citizen going in to see the President to do the President's inviting for him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that you were just acting as a private citizen when you took this message to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. No more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No more.

Senator FERGUSON. And no less?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And no less.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all at the present time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I have some material here from the Congressional Record pertinent to the general question of discussion of the subject of China in 1945 that I should like to read into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see it first, please.

Senator FERGUSON. I have something before he puts that in, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. One is from Representative Walter Judd, and the other is from Representative Mike Mansfield.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I said that I would produce for the minutes a matter concerning the Secretary of State. I have, from the ticker, this announcement as of 11:33 this morning, 3–5, meaning today [reading]:

> Secretary Acheson said today he personally had cleared Foreign Service Officer O. Edmund Clubb after the State Department's Loyalty and Security Board had decided Clubb was a security risk.

Last evening I asked Mr. Michael McDermott to furnish to me a copy of all press releases by the State Department, or any officer thereof, concerning the Clubb case. At about 1:25 he called me and said that they had not assembled them all, but that he would send them up to me. I will want to put those into this record also, because I think it is very material to the issue that we cannot get information from the officers under oath but when they desire it they can release statements to the press.

I am going to ask that the whole matter be taken up in this committee as to the Clubb case so that we may get it under sworn testimony and not only in press releases.

You will note that this says "The State Department Loyalty and Security Board has decided Clubb was a security risk."

That is under the McCarran rider to the appropriation bill and not the President's Loyalty Board, the question of security.

I believe that, under the law, he has absolute discretion to discharge a person for security risk; but, if they try the person under the loyalty and then he sets aside an order of the Loyalty Board, the Appeal Board of the Loyalty Board would have the right to post-audit.

But, if they do it under the security risk, there is no right for the Appeal Board to come into the picture at all. This would be a method of cutting off the Appeal Board. It seems significant that this is done in this way, after the Service case was reversed by the Loyalty Appeal Board. I think the record ought to show that.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to you, Senator, that this matter was taken up in the Appropriations Committee, incidentally, and the substance of Mr. Humelsine's statement was—and I quote the substance only—that he was precluded from giving the information to the committee.

As far as I am concerned, whether it be in this committee or in the Appropriations Committee, the matter should and must be gone into. If men, after having been considered unfit to continue in service by the Loyalty Board, are relieved of that decision so that they may become inheritors of pensions from the Government, it is time for Congress to take very decisive action.

Do you have something else that you want to say?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I might say that last evening I had asked the State Department also, by letter, to furnish to the Appropriations Committee the number of employees that have been allowed to resign, or have resigned after a loyalty case has been started, the number of employees that have resigned or have been permitted to resign after an investigation of their loyalty was started, the amount of salary of each such employee and the amount of pension that they are now drawing.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say to you that that request was also made by Mr. Humelsine by the chairman of the subcommittee having the appropriation at hand. I understand it is being prepared.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not have the privilege of being here, and I did not have the privilege of being in the Appropriations Subcommittee, of which I am a member, and I asked that it be furnished to you. I did not know that it was going to be furnished to you, or I would not have asked.

The CHAIRMAN. The two excerpts here, assertedly from the Congressional Record, I think counsel will check with the Congressional Record; and, if they are to go in, they will go in in context, and I will reserve the ruling on the matter.

As regards this matter that was submitted to the Chair this morning, asserted to be a quotation from General Chennault, I have submitted this to the committee.

Is there any objection to its going into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I have read it, and I have no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection, it will go in the record.

On the other, the ruling of the Chair will be withheld until we can check the context of the Congressional Record.

Mr. ARNOLD. May the witness read it at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The quotation is from Way of a Fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, published in New York, 1949. That is well after the end of the war. It is chapter 5, page 61 [reading]:

> Soon after Japan attacked at Shanghai, the Chinese sent an official call for help to all the major powers. Only Russia responded. The Russians didn't pause to play partisan politics or trip over ideological folderol when their national interests were at stake in China. All of the Soviets' aid went to the Central Government of the Generalissimo. The Russians had had no love for the Generalissimo since the 1927 split when he drove the Russian-supported Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang and slaughtered them by the thousands. For nearly 20 years he fought a ruthless war of extermination against communism in China. The Russians sent their aid to the Generalissimo solely because he represented the strongest and most effective force opposing Japan, and they supported him exclusively, ignoring the Chinese Communist armies, which badly needed external support.

Mr. MORRIS. As of what time was General Chennault writing there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is describing the early years of the war in China, before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not apparent, however, from that article; is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is apparent that this aid began when Japan was attacked at Shanghai, which would be the summer of 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first get that memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This one?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that information.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think about 2 weeks ago. I had a moment to spare in my university office, and I noticed there was this book by General Chennault which was in the book case. I pulled it out just to look through it, to see if there might be anything pertinent, and then ran on to this passage.

Senator FERGUSON. And it backs up what part of your thinking as of that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It backs up my thinking that, while the Russians supported the Chinese Communists politically and in their world propaganda, they disregarded them during the period of the war in China in favor of assistance to China as a nation, delivered exclusively through Chiang Kai-shek.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that could have been for the purpose of their getting the Yalta agreement, and also getting the agreement or the treaty with the Nationalist Government, not being quite sure that the Communists could not throw out the Nationalists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is not my interpretation, Senator. My interpretation is that the Russians were afraid of Japan and would support anything that was against Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that General Chennault has testified before the watchdog committee of the Appropriations Committee and before the Appropriations Committee itself of the Senate in reference to that subject?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know that. Are there any further questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire, I have a few loose ends we can tie up here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. First, Mr. Lattimore, with regard to the letter and memoranda to the White House, which has been discussed here at some length today, do you feel that the letter itself, the letter of June 10, adequately conveyed to the President, and did you intend by it to convey to him, your belief that the Chinese Communists were then and had been since at least 1940 supported by Russia, along with what I assume was your belief stated here that "If America then identified itself with one party, Russia would be justified in following that lead in committing itself to the other major party"; namely, the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, my letter was intended solely to indicate to the President that I would like very much to see him and lay my opinions before him.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the question read. It is an involved question. I would like to have it read.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. You use the term "letter" there. I wonder if it would be clarified to say "memoranda."

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I meant letter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter was intended to convey only what was in the letter, and the matter that was in the memoranda was matter that I considered only when I sat down to write the memoranda.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you care to assert a belief, Mr. Lattimore, as to whether there is any intellectual dishonesty of this letter of June 10 to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say, Mr. Sourwine, that I should resent any indication of intellectual dishonesty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you intend to mislead the President in that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your letter of June 10, addressed to the President——

The CHAIRMAN. By that last question, do you mean to intend to this committee that you meant to lead him and that you presented an honest view in leading him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I meant to imply solely that I wanted to have a chance to put some opinions before the President.

The CHAIRMAN. It was for the purpose of leading the President, was it not? It was for the purpose of influencing his judgment, was it not? It was not just for the purpose of laying a paper before him.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly hoped that the President would consider my opinions. To that extent, I wanted to influence him. I did not want to influence him exclusively. I took it for granted that the President would consider the opinions of many people.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will look at your letter of June 20 to the President, June 20, 1945, the middle paragraph, the second paragraph, quoting from the letter: "Your forthcoming meeting with the Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin."

I ask you, sir, did you have any private information with regard to that forthcoming meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't. My best recollection is, in looking over these memoranda, that that had not been—that that had just come out in the press and, therefore, made me feel that if anything I had to say was worth consideration at all, it was worth consideration at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You refer, of course, by that, to the Potsdam meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think that must be the Potsdam meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be surprised to learn that the public announcement of the Potsdam meeting had not yet been made on the 20th of June?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should be very much surprised. Had it not been mentioned in the press?

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not know what the fact is, sir. I am just making a record as to your recollection as to whether you had any private recollection.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I had no private recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Looking up to the memorandum itself, sir, I have just three questions about it.

There were some things in this memorandum that were intended as recommendations, were there not, and I speak of that portion of the memorandum which is labeled as related to Japanese policy as related to China policy.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This paragraph, the third paragraph, to counteract this Japanese policy, the American policy in China must work steadily for peace, unity, and modern political forms, was in the nature of a recommendation; was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should agree to that; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It called for an American policy favoring unity in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was the American policy for some time thereafter, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next paragraph says, at the same time, Japan hopes that fear of Russia will induce Britain and America to be soft

with antirevolutionary Japanese big business. That was, was it not, an implicit recommendation against a soft policy with Japanese big business?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Implicitly; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, American policy was a hard policy with Japanese big business thereafter; was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not particularly hard; not hard, not soft. In between.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the end of that memorandum you find this sentence [reading]:

> In most Government agencies at the present time the tendency is to find Japan-trained men in higher policy-making posts than China-trained men, simply because Japan used to be a more important great power than China.

That is an implicit recommendation for more China-trained men in higher policy-making posts, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the State Department thereafter had a substantial number more of China-trained men in high-policy posts; did it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It did.

I would say that there is no question of cause and effect here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you name some of those China-trained men who came into power in higher policy-making posts at a period subsequent to the date of this memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I am correct in saying that it was after this memorandum that Mr. Vincent was promoted.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to put in the record here a quotation from The Present Situation and the Next Tasks. It is a draft resolution of the national board, Communist Political Association, as amended and approved by the national committee on June 20, 1945.

The source is Political Affairs, of July 1945, pages 579 to 591, Earl Browder, Editor.

I will ask that our director, Mr. Mandel, read it into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. These are excerpts from the draft resolution of the National Board of the Communist Political Association:

> Now that the war against Hitler Germany has been won, the American economic royalists, like their British Tory counterparts, are alarmed at the strengthened positions of world labor, at the democratic advances in Europe and at the upsurge of the national liberation movements in the colonial and independent countries * * * They are trying to organize a new cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union * * *

That is from page 580.

Further, from page 581:

> It is this reactionary position of American big business which explains why Washington, along with London, are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united and democratic China; why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East. It accounts, too, for the renewed campaign of anti-Soviet slander and incitement calculated to undermine American-Soviet friendship and cooperation * * *

Then on page 584: "Remove from the State Department all pro-fascist and reactionary officials * * *"

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine has one more question.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment.

Mr. Mandel, I take, from your experience as director of this committee, that is what is known as the commie line as of that time?

Mr. MANDEL. That was a resolution presented to the Plenary meeting. That is a full meeting of the national committee of the Communist Political Association, which was held June 18 to 20, 1945, and sets the line for the coming period.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. MANDEL. In the United States. That was held in New York City. It sets the line for the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was then the head of the Communist Party?

Mr. MANDEL. In this same issue of the Political Affairs, the statement of Jacques Duclos, which laid the basis for the removal of Earl Browder, is included in this issue and the resolutions included here marked the change of line of the Communist Party from one of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain to one of hostility; which was symbolized by the removal of Browder and the selection of Eugene Dennis as the executive secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, do you have any questions?

Senator SMITH. I have two questions. They are very short.

Mr. Lattimore, did you know young Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1945?

Senator SMITH. Yes; at the time this letter was prepared, when you prepared that communication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I had ever met him at that time.

Senator SMITH. Had he been active at that time in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether or not Mr. Carter knew him at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is evident that Mr. Carter knew him to the extent of seeing him at that time; but how well he knew him, I don't know.

Senator SMITH. You do not know of any relations that existed between Mr. Carter and the Institute of Pacific Relations and young Mr. Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. You had never met him then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time, I don't believe I had met him.

Senator SMITH. Did you get acquainted with him shortly thereafter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not shortly thereafter, I don't think.

At sometime thereafter, after the war, he spoke at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in Baltimore, and I met him then.

Senator SMITH. At the time you prepared this proposed letter for Mr. Lamont, Sr., to sign, did you know then Mr. Lamont, Jr.'s political thinking on communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew nothing whatever about him, sir.

Senator SMITH. Did Mr. Carter at that time, when he proposed this plan for you to prepare the text for a letter for young Mr. Lamont to get old Mr. Lamont to sign; did Mr. Carter tell you anything at all about young Mr. Lamont's signature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He told me no more than is in that letter.

Senator SMITH. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one more question on the memorandum.

The memorandum on China policy starts out with: "There are two alternatives in China."

Did you intend in that memorandum to state or imply that there were two, and only two, alternatives in China, in the context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, was there not a third choice very clearly indicated?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is that?

Mr. SOURWINE. To wit, American support of Chiang Kai-shek to drive the Communists out or overcome them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think, if you call that an alternative, it is certainly taken up here by implication; isn't it?

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You intended to have regard for that and to cover in your memorandum for the President, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the way I read this memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. You question whether it was, in fact, an alternative.

It is, as a matter of fact, an alternative which Dean Acheson recognized; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After the end of the war; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. Is it?

I thought the third alternative that Mr. Acheson gave was withdrawal from China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not Mr. Acheson recognize the alternative of all-out American aid to Chiang?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let us go back to you. Did you recognize the alternative of all-out American aid to Chiang at the time you wrote this memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think the term "all-out aid" had come into use then, and I doubt if those were the terms in which I was thinking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in whatever terms you thought of it, think of the alternative of American aid to Chiang against the Chinese Communists for the unification of his nation under him by eliminating the Communist forces as a revolutionary force?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think this is implied in this memorandum, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is your answer, then, that you did think of it at the time you wrote this memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose I must have.

Mr. SOURWINE. You could not have implied it without having thought it, could you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can only read this memorandum now with the interpretation I put on it in 1952.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean you have now no memory of whether you thought of that alternative at the time you wrote this memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only memory I have is that I placed before the President what I thought were the two alternatives: Division of the country, or unification of the country.

And, under division of the country, I envisaged the possibility of American support for one side and Russian support for the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris has a question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, in connection with the memorandum you prepared for Mr. Carter, do you know whether that memorandum was shown to Mr. Bisson before it was sent to Mr. Lamont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no clear recollection on that subject, but if you have a document to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. I just want your recollection at this time, Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. He says he has no recollection.

Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I have.

Maybe I should have.

Was it mentioned in Mr. Carter's testimony, or something of that sort?

Mr. MORRIS. I will give you the executive session minutes of your testimony, Mr. Lattimore.

At the bottom of the page there, does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, yes [reading:]

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I would like to introduce into the record in conjunction with this, and I would like to show, first of all, to Mr. Lattimore, a memorandum from the files of the institute, "TAB from ECC," "TAB" generally standing for Mr. Bisson and "ECC" standing for Mr. Carter, dated June 20, 1945, and ask you if that means anything to you?

And I replied that I had never seen this before, it has my initials on it, but I didn't recall seeing it before.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that refresh your recollection that it was shown to Mr. Bisson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your answer "that is right"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 3:25 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Thursday, March 6, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Watkins, and Jenner.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director, and Senator McCarthy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY ABE FORTAS, COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did Mr. Carter ever ask you for the best possible Soviet defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I remember some correspondence on that subject; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what you remember about that?

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Did Mr. Carter ever ask you? He said he believes he remembers some correspondence on this.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I should be glad to have my memory refreshed, if you have correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, let us go ahead without refreshing memories. Let us find out what the witness now knows.

The CHAIRMAN. But he does not tell you what he knows. He says he believes that he received some communication, in answer to a question, "Did Mr. Carter ever ask you?"

Senator FERGUSON. That does not take a memorandum to refresh your memory.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The best of my recollection at the moment is that I think Mr. Carter wrote to me on the subject of the Russian invasion of Finland and asked my opinion on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably about the time of the invasion of Finland.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was the winter of 1940–41, wasn't it?

Senator FERGUSON. That was from the IPR. I mean he was representing the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe it was an individual inquiry on his part.

Senator FERGUSON. A personal matter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A personal matter.

Senator FERGUSON. And he wrote you about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your opinion? What did he want to know about the invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is—and, as I say, it is not very precise—that at that time there was a great deal of discussion about the significance of the Russian invasion of Finland.

My feeling was that the invasion of Finland was an outrageous thing on the part of the Russians, but I also believed that the politics of Europe at that time had sunk to a pretty low level.

The previous betrayal of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France had created a situation in which there was a general scramble for advantage among the great powers, and the ethics of international relations were not very conspicuous.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say, then, that if France and Britain did something, then you think that the morals were lowered so as to justify Russia in doing something like the invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that I thought—I am sure that I didn't think that the Russian invasion of Finland was justified, because I supported the local branch in Baltimore that was of some sort of organization that was collecting funds for Finland.

On the other hand, I remember that at that time there were some people who were advocating going to war with Russia on the subject of Finland, and that seemed to me to be a rather unrealistic proposition.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Carter ever ask you for a pro or a con opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that he asked me for my opinions on the subject.

I would have to see the correspondence again.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you take that he had an opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether he had an opinion or not, or whether he was trying to form an opinion and was asking me what I thought of it.

Senator FERGUSON. And that time was he pro-Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't be able to say. No; I don't think he was particularly pro-Russian.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait; you "don't think." You put in the word "particularly."

Was he pro-Russian, or do you want the answer to be that he was not particularly pro-Russian?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that he was pro-Russian.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he pro-Soviet at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think he was pro-Soviet.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. What did Britain and France do that you thought justified Russia, or the Soviets, invading Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not think that the British and French had done anything that justified Russia in invading Finland. At least, that is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned them here this morning. What did they do to mitigate Finland's aggression?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought that the British and French had betrayed Czechoslovakia and had thereby contributed to creating a very nasty situation in Europe, in which everybody was engaged in a bare-faced scramble for power, and ethical considerations were being trampled underfoot.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain what the "betrayal" was—so the record will show it—of Britain and France, of Czechoslovakia; what you thought it was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection, without looking up the documents of the time, is that the French had a treaty of mutual defense of some kind with Czechoslovakia and the British had some kind of treaty or understanding for the support of France—and let me see—I believe the Russians also had a treaty for the support of Czechoslovakia; that the Czechoslovaks appealed to the French, but the French and British, at Munich, decided to put pressure on the Czechoslovaks to surrender their western defense system to Hitler, and that that destroyed the security system for the containment of German aggression that had been built up after the First World War.

Senator FERGUSON. And because Britain and France had failed to carry out their treaty obligation to Czechoslovakia, you felt that had something to do with a justification of the Soviets invading Finland, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I did not think it was justification.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you mention it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I called it a justification, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You mentioned here this morning—what is it? Mitigation?

Senator SMITH. Are we not getting off the beam a little bit, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I think this is important.

Senator SMITH. I just wonder if it is because I can understand that if it was a trail—and I am inclined to think a little bit it was—that is something about another question entirely, about the Czechoslovakian situation.

I assume that what Dr. Lattimore meant was that that so lowered the level of public morals in Europe that that was one of the reasons understanding Russian aggression in Finland.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the morals were so lowered by the Czechoslovakian incident that anything might follow.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is right.

Senator SMITH. Yes. The Russians might be encouraged to do anything.

I happen to know a little bit about that, because the Russians had agreed to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia—Dr. Benes wrote me that, incidentally—if England and France had laid down on Czechoslovakia.

I want to go ahead, except I am thinking of the time we are taking.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to go ahead.

Now, you say that was a personal matter between you and Mr. Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the best of my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait just a minute.

Mr. Carter was then the secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, just the same as he has been all the time; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

But Finland was not connected with the Pacific or with Asia, and any correspondence between me and Mr. Carter on the subject would not have been institute correspondence, but personal correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. If it was personal correspondence, would Mr. Field have anything to do with it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether Mr. Field had anything to do with it, or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would he be consulted if it was personal correspondence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Might be. Anybody in Mr. Carter's and my personal acquaintainceship might have been consulted.

As I remember, at that time, everybody was talking to everybody else, and a good many people were writing to a good many people about this.

Here was one of the most perplexing situations that had ever arisen in the history of Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, your long answers.

Will you tell us now whether or not you felt at the time that Mr. Carter asked you about the Soviet invasion of Finland that he was pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would not say he was pro-Soviet.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, do you have a letter?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 26, 1940, addressed to Owen Lattimore, Esq., with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I show you that letter and ask you if you can recall having received that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This must be the letter that I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

I want to know if that is an answer that you recall having received.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I recall having received it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is dated April 26, 1940 [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 531

DEAR OWEN——

Senator FERGUSON. What was your address at that time? Will you give it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My address was Johns Hopkins. [Reading:]

Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convincing (I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers) statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s justification for the Finnish campaign? The Soviets clearly regard the action as a necessary defense measure. Three-fourths of the rest of the world still regards it as unprovoked aggression.

Have you yourself written or are you writing anything along this line?

Sincerely yours,

This is dated April 26, 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive it into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it will be admitted into the record.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 531" and was read in full beginning on p. 3422.)

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, would that indicate as to whether or not Mr. Carter was pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

I would say that this indicates that Mr. Carter was trying to form an opinion on the subject and that, as a necessary part of forming an opinion on the subject, he was trying to find out whether there had been a convincing statement from the Russian point of view or of the Russian point of view?

The CHAIRMAN. He says, "Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convincing"—and then in parentheses: "I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. "Bourgeoisie readers" are non-Soviet readers; are they not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Non-Soviet, and, I should say, non-Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. And he wanted to convince the non-Soviet reader.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I do not agree that he wanted to convince a non-Soviet reader.

The CHAIRMAN. He said, "I mean convincing to bourgeoisie readers"? What does that mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is obviously considering himself as a non-Soviet and non-Communist person, and, as such, he wants to know where the Russian case is stated for people like himself.

He obviously means he wants to compare it with other opinions.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Read the sentence again.

So as to make it complete, leaving out the parentheses, it states:

Where in English or French or Russian has there appeared the most convincing * * * statement as to the U. S. S. R.'s justification for the Finnish campaign?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he is looking for; is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say that is a reasonable step for an impartial man to take when he was trying to assemble evidence and opinions on a very complicated problem.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, was this, or was it not, an IPR matter?

Was he trying to do this personally?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that that letter is clearly a personal letter and not an organizational, institutional letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when we get to a case like this, do you not see anything in this letter at all to indicate that Mr. Carter was pro-Soviet in this letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I see nothing of the kind. I see he states that: "Three-fourths of the rest of the world still regards it as unprovoked aggression."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But is he not asking you to give him the best possible defense for the Russians?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is trying, it is obvious, to find that out——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Let us hear the question.

Please read the question, Mr. Reporter.

I am asking you to address yourself to the question.

(Thereupon, the pending question, as above transcribed, was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That can be answered "Yes" or "No," then you can explain, if you wish.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Obviously, as a part of trying to inform himself on all points of view of a very complicated question, which was the subject of great political discussion at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You have to read that into the letter, do you not, that last statement of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where do you get the idea that he wanted all points of view when he was trying to get the best for the Russians and said nothing about any other point of view at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is saying: "Three-fourths of the rest of the world still regard it as unprovoked aggression."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And does he not also in the letter assume that you would be writing on the Soviet side when he said, "Have you yourself written, or are you writing anything along this line?"—meaning along the line of the Soviet side?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He does not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I consider it impossible to read any such implication into the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you said that this was not an organizational letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Field sent a copy of that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. It doesn't say here that he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, did he venture an answer to Mr. Carter's questions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall anything on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. May I ask you this question:

Was 129 East Fifty-Second Street the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, that was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 30, 1940, headed "Memorandum to: E. C. C. from F. V. F."

The CHAIRMAN. Who is ECC and who is FVF?

Mr. MORRIS. That is presumably Mr. Edward C. Carter and Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Mr. Chairman, this letter bears on the question about which the witness is now testifying, and I would like Mr. Mandel to read this letter into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see it.

Senator FERGUSON. It that original out of the files of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. April 30, 1940: "Memorandum to: E. C. C. from F. V. F."

Mr. MORRIS. This is 4 days after the previous letter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 532

I noticed, in a letter from you to Lattimore, or vice versa, which passed over my desk today, a question about good sources for the Soviet point of view on the Finnish campaign. I wonder if you have seen a booklet of 130 pages just issued by Soviet Russia Today, entitled "War and Peace in Finland—A Documented Survey." It contains most of the pertinent documents and if you are looking for an analysis which is admittedly from the Soviet point of view, this is, I think, as good as anything which has come to hand.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be admitted into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted into the record.

(Document deferred to was marked "Exhibit No. 532" and was read in full.)

Mr. FORTAS. Excuse me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to ask your counsel something?

Mr. FORTAS. He said "no."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you notice there in the first line that Mr. Field is looking upon you and Mr. Carter as interchangeable in connection with that particular query? He could not recall whether the letter was from Carter to Lattimore, or Lattimore to Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would not say, Mr. Morris, that he regards me and Carter as interchangeable.

The CHAIRMAN. He is speaking of the language now, Mr. Lattimore.

The first line of the note reads: "I noticed, in a letter from you to Lattimore or vice versa which passed over my desk today * * *."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Morris' question is: Do I regard that as indicating that Field says that Lattimore and Carter were, or regarded Lattimore and Carter as interchangeable?

Mr. MORRIS. With respect to this query.

Mr. LATTIMORE. With respect to this query.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer is "No," and I would like to explain.

Mr. FORTAS. We want the question read.

The CHAIRMAN. Reframe the question. You can get at it in another way.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, does not that first sentence indicate to you that, with respect to this particular query, namely, where to find the most convincing, to bourgeoisie readers, defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland, did he not consider in his mind that you and Carter were interchangeable with respect to being the originator of that particular query?

Mr. Lattimore. My answer is "No."

May I explain?

The Chairman. I do not think it is necessary for an explanation. The answer is "No." That is all there is to it.

It is a question of the construction of the language.

Mr. Lattimore. I think I have something pertinent to say on the subject.

The Chairman. I do not think there is anything pertinent. When you say "no, it is not interchangeable," then it is not interchangeable. That is your decision.

Mr. Lattimore. May I explain why I think the answer is "No"?

The Chairman. No. The language speaks for itself.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Lattimore, it appears that Mr. Field had on his desk that particular day, which would seem to be the 30th of April, the Soviet literature, War and Peace in Finland; would it not?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And that when it passed over the desk, he was not quite sure whether it was a letter from you to Carter, or Carter to you?

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; that is not my construction of the language.

Senator Ferguson. That is not your construction?

The Chairman. Just a moment, Senator.

If there is any more evidence of expression in the rear of the room, any more disturbance in the rear of the room, the room will be cleared. I have said that once or twice before. I hope it will not occur again.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, did you know that Soviet Russia Today was a Soviet publication?

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No, at that time." I don't believe at that time I knew the publication Soviet Russia Today at all.

Mr. Morris. Did you know at that time that Frederick V. Field was a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir; I didn't. To the best of my recollection, I did not believe then that he was Communist—

The Chairman. Just a moment.

A moment ago, in listening to the question, I think the Chair ruled erroneously, and I want to correct my ruling. I refused to permit the witness to explain his view on the first two lines, or three lines of the letter. I think I ruled hastily and I want to correct that ruling. I want him to have that opportunity.

You may have it now.

Mr. Fortas. We want the question and the answer read back.

The Chairman. You may have the question and the answer read back, if you want to clarify your position.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. May I?

The Reporter (reading):

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, does not that first sentence indicate to you that, with respect to this particular query, namely, where to find the most convincing, to bourgeoisie readers, defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland, did he not consider in his mind that you and Carter were interchangeable with respect to being the originator of that particular query?

The Chairman. The reason why I changed my ruling is that I caught the expression "in your mind" as to what was in Mr. Carter's mind.

Senator Ferguson. And not what was in Field's mind?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. FORTAS. In Mr. Lattimore's mind.

The CHAIRMAN. It is his analysis of what might have been in the writer's mind.

Mr. FORTAS. He said Carter. I thought he said Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. In his analysis.

If he wants to give it after looking at the language and listening to the question again, I think the Chair was erroneous in its ruling.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I simply wanted to explain, Mr. Chairman, that it was the practice in the institute to circulate letters and copies of letters to everybody in the office and people outside the office, and my construction of this language is simply that Mr. Field remembered seeing some correspondence some days before and hadn't bothered to look up who wrote the correspondence when he sent this little note to Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a fair explanation of it, if you can guess what was in the writer's mind.

He is making a guess at it, and that is all there is to it.

Let us proceed.

Senator SMITH. With that language, "vice versa." I do not quite agree with the chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever seen before that time the publication Soviet Russia Today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever furnish a document to Mr. Carter in reply to his letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall writing to Mr. Carter expressing some opinions. I don't recall the exact language.

Senator FERGUSON. But did you furnish a document?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you mean a document other than writing him a letter?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever ask you for any more than an answer to his letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall that he did. I don't believe he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read War and Peace in Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I ever read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you endeavor to answer his question about what is most convincing to bourgeoisie readers in defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did. I believe that what I did was to express my own opinions about some of the factors involved.

Mr. MORRIS. As the most convincing defense?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I don't recall. I don't believe that I responded to any such point, that I simply wrote down some general observations that were in my mind at the time as to what I thought about the situation.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you did not reply to this particular query of Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the question about some source in English, French, or Russian?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I replied to that point.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attempt to give the best possible defense of the Soviet invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I believe that I expressed my own opinion. My own opinion may have included some expression about what sort of case I thought the Russians could make for themselves, or something of that sort.

But I certainly did not do any research on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you think that the memorandum from Field to Carter indicated that Field believed Carter wanted a pro-Soviet opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. The language is: "A question about good sources for the Soviet point of view."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Which, it seems to me, would be a reasonable point—let me repeat once more—for anybody who was trying to find out what the score was on Finland.

The CHAIRMAN. The language of this note is, again, interesting. This was a note from Frederick V. Field to the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Carter.

He says in this note: "I notice, in a letter from you to Lattimore or vice versa, which passed over my desk today * * *." In other words, the note which Carter had written to you passed over Field's desk. You said that you did not know whether or not that note was referred to Mr. Field.

It is evident, from this letter, that it had been referred to Mr. Field.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And he says: "A question about good sources for the Soviet point of view on the Finnish campaign."

Then he refers Carter to what he considers a good source:

> I wonder if you have seen a booklet of 130 pages just issued by Soviet Russia Today, entitled "War and Peace in Finland—A Documented Survey." It contains most of the pertinent documents—

This was Field giving advice to Carter, who had written you.

> * * * It contains most of the pertinent documents and if you are looking for an analysis which is admittedly from the Soviet point of view, this is, I think, as good as anything which has come to hand.

He was rather praising it; was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was rather what?

The CHAIRMAN. Praising it. In other words, he was recommending it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was recommending that anybody who wanted to find out what the Soviet point of view was would find in this publication the documents which the Russians had considered it pertinent to publish.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris, go ahead.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that Field's statement was pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 29,

1940, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. In the upper part of the sheet we have the initials F. V. F. and K. B., presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Kathleen Barnes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does K. B. stand for Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you explain what you believe those initials mean on the top of that photostat?

Mr. LATTIMORE. What I believe they mean?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My assumption would be that Mr. Carter had initialed them for circulation in the office to Kathleen Barnes and Frederick V. Field.

Senator FERGUSON. And your name being on the top would indicate that it was later to be filed, I assume, under your name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably would be put in the file of Carter's correspondence with me; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So, certainly the Institute of Pacific Relations considered it an organizational letter, did it not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wouldn't say so.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it still indicates what is before you now, that this is purely a personal matter between you and Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as I was concerned, it was a purely personal matter between me and Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I would still say it.

Senator FERGUSON. From the evidence before you——

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And what has been produced here in the case?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Knowing, as I do, that it was Mr. Carter's regular practice to circulate a great deal of his personal correspondence to other people.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. 129 East Fifty-second, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the address on the letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 129 East Fifty-second.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the last paragraph in your letter.

Mr. Chairman, first, will it be admitted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It has been identified by Mr. Mandel, has it not, as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 533" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 533

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., April 29, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Thanks very much for putting me wise to the correspondence and editorial comments in the Herald-Tribune. I thought your letter was perfectly justifiable, and the tone taken by the editorial writer in commenting on it rather nasty. I enclose a copy of the letter I have just written them.

With regard to the Gayer book on "American Economic Foreign Policy," am I to understand that Holland has received a review copy, or that he is merely recommending it to you? Let me know if I should write for a review copy. Offhand, I should concur with the selection of Plumptre as reviewer.

We are so far advanced in the process of getting the June issue of Pacific Affairs through the press that it would be difficult now to get in the suggested notice of the nonparticipation committee pamphlet "Shall America Stop Arming Japan," for reasons of both time and space. What should be our future policy about matters of this kind? Would it not be making Pacific Affairs too "American" for subscribers abroad?

Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking myself. It seems to me that everybody takes a too simple approach to this problem, the Russians from their side and everybody else from his own side. It seems to me that even if the Russians had more detailed, plausible and documented evidence of "plots" in or concerning Finland than I have yet seen, and even if they had strong justification in "realistic" terms, from the strategic point of view, they nevertheless made a political blunder in attacking Finland. On the other hand, I think there is apt to be a certain smugness in the people who either unconsciously assume or explicity state that what Russia did, after a great war had already broken out, was much worse than what the French and British did in letting down first Spain and then Czechoslovakia. The Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very thing; but as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others. The moral guilt of Russia is presumably as great as that of any of the others, since if you assume that there is an absolute morality, then by definition there can be no degree of morality; but if justification be pleaded, the Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression, and can claim that there is a difference between being the first to start aggression and committing what might be called an act of "self-protective aggression" after the general scramble had begun.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

P. S.—Who is in charge of the Pacific Council Library now that Lilienthal has left? I should like to know if you have, and if I may borrow, "League of Nations Mission of Educational Experts: The Reorganization of Education in China," Paris, 1932.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The paragraph reads:

Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking myself. It seems to me that everybody takes a too simple approach to this problem, the Russians from their side and everybody else from his own side. It seems to me that even if the Russians had more detailed, plausible and documented evidence of "plots" in or concerning Finland that I have yet seen, and even if they had strong justification in "realistic" terms, from the strategic point of view, they nevertheless made a political blunder in attacking Finland.

On the other hand, I think there is apt to be a certain smugness in the people who either unconsciously assume or explicitly state that what Russia did, after a great war had already broken out, was much worse than what the French and British did in letting down first Spain and then Czechoslovakia. The Russians *may* have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very

thing, but as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing, and betrayed by others. The moral guilt of Russia is presumably as great as that of any of the others, since there can be no degree of morality; but if justification be pleaded, the Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression, and can claim that there is a difference between being the first to start aggression and committing what might be called an act of "self-protective aggression," after the general scramble had begun.

The expression "self-protective aggression" is in quotes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you thereby answering Mr. Carter's query as to what was the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't think I was. I was replying to Mr. Carter's letter as a whole and not to a particular point of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your answer, Mr. Lattimore, or Mr. Fortas' answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer has been introduced by the phrase, "Your question about where to find the most convincing statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking myself."

But the language shows that I had not looked up the matter.

May I add a word of explanation?

The CHAIRMAN. You were asking yourself for a justification of the Russian invasion, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you say here.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asking where to find the most convincing statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You said it was a question that you had been asking yourself.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. In other words, like Mr. Carter, I thought that here was an extremely complex and confusing question, and I would like to know more evidence on all sides.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, was that your answer to my question, or was that Mr. Fortas' answer to my question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was my answer to your question.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, I object. I don't think that is called for.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not caught Mr. Fortas suggesting answers as yet.

Mr. FORTAS. No, sir; and you won't.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I should be given the courtesy of making a statement. I unconsciously and without deliberation commented on Mr. Morris' question, I am afraid, audibly. I said that that is not what Mr. Carter had asked Mr. Lattimore.

And the record speaks for itself.

Mr. Morris' question was whether this was the most convincing statement of the Soviet position that Mr. Carter had asked for. Now, that is not what the record shows Mr. Carter asked Mr. Lattimore for.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you intentionally broke in.

Mr. FORTAS. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. As long as we are all testifying, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. I hope that that will not occur again.

Senator, you were asking.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I was going to ask a question on that, in line with what the Chair asked.

Your question about where to find the most convincting statement as to the Soviet justification for the Finnish campaign is one that I have been asking myself.

Mr. Lattimore, does not that clearly indicate that you stated to Carter that you had been asking yourself just what he asked you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Something to justify the Finnish campaign.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; not something to justify the Finnish campaign; a statement of the Soviet point of view as a necessary ingredient for anybody who was trying to find out what the score was on Finland.

Senator FERGUSON. What, Mr. Lattimore, was a "self-protective aggression"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume, in 1952——

Senator FERGUSON. No, no. In 1940.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1952, trying to reconstruct what I was thinking in 1940, 12 years previously, that I meant here that—what is it now——

Senator FERGUSON. "Self-protective aggression."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that if justification be pleaded I presume that the Russians might put up a case of saying that this was self-protective aggression after other people had started aggression.

I might add that I doubt if anywhere in the record have the Russians ever admitted to such a thing as self-protective aggression.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you had any trouble solving, in your own mind, the problem as to who was the aggressor in Korea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The aggressor in Korea was clearly the North Korean Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. And you would not say that Russia now calls that "self-protective aggression"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would doubt very much if the Russians would admit to such a damaging formula.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris, go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, when you wrote that letter, did you really believe that Russia had only become a treaty breaker because Britain and France had set her a bad example?

The CHAIRMAN. Are you referring now to Mr. Lattimore's letter of April 29, 1940?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I have your question again, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you really believe that Russia had become a treaty breaker only because she had been set a bad example by Britain and France?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember what I meant at the moment, Mr. Sourwine, beyond the language of this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I am using plain English.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The language of this letter does not support the twist that you are trying to put on it, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What are you saying in that letter? Are you not saying in that letter that Russia really stood by her treaties until Britain and France set her a bad example, and then she became wayward?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I am saying:

The Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very thing. But as far as the evidence goes, the Russians stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until these principles had been violated by some of the great powers with which Russia was dealing and betrayed by others.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I meant there that there were two possibilities. One was that the Russians may have been feeling and hoping for years for a chance to do this very thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. You underlined the "may," did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I put that in as a possibility, and I doubt if any pro-Soviet or pro-Communist person would have allowed for that possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the other?

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you said, "as far as the evidence goes."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then I said, "as far as the evidence goes."

Obviously, as far as the evidence known to me went at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I want you to do, Mr. Lattimore, is to put into different language what you meant there. You are a man very facile with language. Express your thought there another way.

Mr. FORTAS. He wants to consult with me.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Consultation between witness and counsel.)

The CHAIRMAN. Just before proceeding, I would like to have the record read back just a little. I think Mr. Lattimore said there were two—I do not think he called them alternatives, but he dwelt on one.

One was that Russia may have for a long time been hoping for this, or that is the substance of it.

The other was something else. He did not dwell on the other.

Mr. MORRIS. The other alternative was that the Russians had stood by collective security and the honoring of treaties until the treaty structure had been violated by others.

The CHAIRMAN. And that they had taken that as a justification; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not that they had taken it as a justification.

But I suggested that if justification be pleaded, the Russians can point out that they did not lead off in the scramble of aggression.

Mr. SOURWINE. I accept that as an answer, Mr. Chairman. I think the witness has rephrased what he said in the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is an answer.

Do you accept that as an answer?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall making an effort, after a Soviet protest, to prevent the appearance of an article by Mr. L. M. Hubbard, in 1938, from appearing in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do I recall what?

Mr. MORRIS. Your making an effort to prevent an article by Mr. L. M. Hubbard from appearing in Pacific Affairs.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember that. If you have a document to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall some controversy about Mr. Hubbard's article, do you not?

Mr. Lattimore. I do recall that Mr. Hubbard wrote an article. I don't recall a controversy.

The Chairman. The question is, Do you recall a controversy about Mr. Hubbard's article? It calls for a simple answer, "Yes" or "No."

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall a controversy beyond the fact that—now, wait a minue.

Mr. Fortas. What year was this, Mr. Morris?

Mr. Morris. In 1938. That is in the question.

The Chairman. Do you recall a controversy about Mr. Hubbard's article?

Just answer that, if your memory serves you.

Mr. Lattimore. I remember not exactly a controversy, but a question of whether another point of view should also be expressed.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 8, 1938, addressed to Dr. V. E. Motylev, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore, and the initials ECC, in the upper lefthand corner.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Mandel, what you mean, is it not, is that you have there a photostat of a document from the files of the IPR? Is that correct?

Mr. Mandel. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. The document itself was a carbon copy of a letter.

Mr. Mandel. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I show you this document and ask you if you recall having sent it?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't recall having sent it. But I obviously did send it.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will it be received into the record.

The Chairman. That document, as I understand it, is a photostatic copy of a document in the nature of a carbon copy, found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Morris. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. The witness says he obviously had sent it.

It will be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 534" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 534

1795 California Street,
San Francisco, Calif., February 8, 1938.

Dr. V. E. Motylev,
20 Razin Street, Moscow.

Dear Dr. Motylev: Immediately on receipt of your letter of 15 January I cabled you requesting an article on possibilities of constructive international action, to be considered as part of a general defense against imperialist and fascist aggression; this article to be used as the leading contribution in our June number.

I hope very much that you will be able to provide such an article. Naturally, I have suggested only general terms; the particular terms are for you to decide. I may add that in the December number I tried to set a tone that would encourage such articles from all sources. The response up to date has not been too encouraging; therefore it will be all the more helpful to me if you can now supply the suggested article.

In regard to L. M. Hubbard's article, I have carefully noted your criticisms. I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the question of anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. The real difficulty is this: the membership of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." These nations continue to set great store by the principle of free speech. Many individual members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the purpose of criticising the USSR. If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so, they will criticise Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely destroy its usefulness.

Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the circumstances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to *favor* publication of positive and constructive articles, while not *preventing* entirely the expression of negative and defeatist views. This means that whenever we find it impossible to prevent publication of such an article as this one by Hubbard we should at least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with them constructively.

Now as to L. M. Hubbard himself. Of course I do not propose to print his article simply because he is a brother of G. E. Hubbard of Chatham House. The reason that I find it difficult to reject his article is that he is an "expert" of the Bank of England, he has written a book on Soviet finance that is considered authoritative in Great Britain and America, and to reject his article would cause the majority group represented in the Royal Institute of International Affairs to accuse Pacific Affairs of being partisan—thus damaging its influence in Great Britain. The accident that this Hubbard is a brother of the Hubbard who is appointed by Chatham House to be in charge of communications with Pacific Affairs merely increases the difficulty of dealing with the situation.

In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action:

(1) I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs. A copy of the article, thus revised, is attached to this letter.

(2) I am writing to G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House, asking him to withdraw the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. If, however, he officially insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it, in our June number.

(3) Finally, I urge you to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House insists on publication of the original article.

In concluding this letter I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the best of my ability, within the limits imposed on me by the different national bodies which have a voice in the conduct of Pacific Affairs, I shall publish only material which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the USSR Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with indispensable assistance.

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

The CHAIRMAN. In going along here, we have not attempted to number or designate these documents. They should be numbered in the record when the record is put up. They should be numbered or designated so that they will have some designation.

The Chair has not attempted to do it, but it must be done.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, under a previous order of the Chair, these documents were ordered numbered consecutively as introduced. They have not been marked, however, which I think is what the Chair is referring to.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter commencing with paragraph 3, which is where the pertinent reference commences?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

In regard to L. M. Hubbard's article, I have carefully noted your criticisms. I am sorry that I seem to have expressed myself clumsily in regard to the question of anti-Soviet articles in Pacific Affairs. The real difficulty is this: The membership of the IPR is predominantly of the "democratic nations." * * *

Mr. MORRIS. That "democratic" is in quotes, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; "democratic nations" is in quotes [reading]:

* * * These nations continue to set great store by the principle of free speech. Many individual members of the IPR appeal to this principle for the purpose of criticizing the U. S. S. R. If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so, they will criticize Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely destroy its usefulness.

Senator FERGUSON. That organ of Soviet propaganda is in quotes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is in quotes, yes [reading]:

Realization of the urgent necessity for promoting all that is really democratic in the public life of the "democratic nations," and resisting the forces that favor imperialist aggression and fascism, is only gradually spreading. In the circumstances the only wise and constructive thing for me to do is to favor publication of positive and constructive articles, while not preventing entirely the expression of negative and defeatest views. This means that whenever we find it impossible to prevent publication of such an article, as this one by Hubbard, we should at least make sure that in the same number there shall appear an article which deals with the true values of the same questions, and deals with them constructively.

Now as to L. M. Hubbard himself. Of course, I do not propose to print his article simply because he is a brother of G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House. The reason that I find it difficult to reject his article is that he is an "expert" of the Bank of England, he has written a book on Soviet finance that is considered authoritative in Great Britain and America, and to reject his article would cause the majority group represented in the Royal Institute of International Affairs to accuse Pacific Affairs of being partisan—thus damaging its influence in Great Britain. The accident that this Hubbard is a brother of the Hubbard who is appointed by Chatham House to be in charge of communications with Pacific Affairs merely increases the difficulty of dealing with the situation.

In the circumstances, I am taking the following course of action:

1. I am deleting from the article one of its most objectionable paragraphs. * * *

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what that paragraph was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't [reading]:

* * * A copy of the article, thus revised, is attached to this letter.

2. I am writing to G. E. Hubbard, of Chatham House, asking him to withdraw the article altogether, on behalf of Chatham House. If, however, he officially insists on publication of the article, I shall have to publish it, in our June number.

3. Finally, I urge you to write, immediately, a reply to the article, to be published in the same number. This must be received in New York not later than the last week of March. It will be used only in case Chatham House insists on publication of the original article.

In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles. To the best of my ability, within the limits imposed on me by the different national bodies which have a voice in the conduct of Pacific Affairs, I shall publish only material which emphasizes the true issues which the world is facing. In this, the U. S. S. R. Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations can come to my aid with indispensable assistance.

Very truly yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

May I comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This letter begins with a paragraph not yet read into the record, showing that I had received a letter from Mr. Motylev, evidently a letter criticizing the article I was about to publish.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you submitted it to Motylev in order that he could censor it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not for censorship.

In the course of the usual practice of Pacific Affairs, I had circulated the article in advance.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom did you circulate those that were pro-Soviet? Who in America censored them or looked them over for the pro-Soviet article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All articles were circulated to those who might be considered most interested, in the first place. Many of them were sent additionally to people who might be considered to have no position one way or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an answer to the question.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not answer my question.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an answer to that question at all.

Read the question, Mr. Reporter.

The question was propounded twice.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall only one article.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

(The pending question, as heretofore recorded, was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think there was more. He doubled back.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you circulated this because it was anti-Soviet. It is clear from the letter that you did that. I want to know——

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the same way——

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Senator ask his question, and answer it.

Senator FERGUSON. To whom did you submit pro-Soviet articles so that they could be censored, or, as least, criticized before they were published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would depend on the content of the article. Any article would be circulated——

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose it was an article criticizing Russia, written by a United States writer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. An article criticizing Russia by a United States writer would be circulated to the Russians, also to the British, Chinese, Japanese, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose it was an article by Soviet Russia, pro-Soviet. Who criticized it for the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The New York office would look after that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Field?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether it would be Mr. Field, or who it would be. It would also be circulated to the Japanese, Chinese, British, et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that Mr. Field was a competent critic to determine whether or not an article should be changed that was a pro-Russion article?

Mr. Lattimore. In 1938 I thought that Mr. Field was one of the critics to whom such an article might be circulated.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. Lattimore. You will remember that in the record there was an article by a Soviet contributor, which I personally disliked very much and which was finally put in because the Chinese Council said, "Oh, go ahead and print it; it is the Soviet point of view and everybody knows it is"; although the Japanese continued to object.

Mr. Sourwine. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

I cannot quite understand why you would take an article by this Britisher and send it to the Russians, which is in effect sending it to the Russian Government, for their comment on that article as to whether or not you should or should not print it.

Mr. Lattimore. It was part of regular practice. It was the same for all other councils.

Senator Ferguson. And you had stricken out one anti-Soviet paragraph, at least?

Mr. Lattimore. Which was undoubtedly also covered in my correspondence with the British.

This is only a part of the record, and the full record would show my correspondence with the British as well.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to see it all.

Mr. Lattimore. So should I, Senator.

The Chairman. The question was asked now about having stricken one out; that is, the Soviet phase of it, at least.

Did you, or did you not in the letter so state?

Mr. Lattimore. The letter so states.

Senator Ferguson. You said it was the most objectionable, indicating there were other objectionable ones that were anti-Soviet. But that was the most?

Mr. Lattimore. That was evidently my opinion at the time.

And may I add that this was undoubtedly covered in correspondence with the British, too.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to see the article.

Mr. Lattimore. This was a period when all of us were leaning over backward trying to drag the Soviets into more contributions to Pacific affairs, and more participation in the Institute, and I remember clearly that the attitude taken was, "Let's get the Russians out of this business of just criticizing and stalling; let's get them to make some contributions and then make them realize that they are getting only the same treatment as other people."

You can see that this whole letter is an attempt to explain to a Russian, who is unfamiliar with the practice of free speech and criticism in democratic countries, how things worked and that Russia was not being particularly singled out as an object of anti-Soviet propaganda; that we frequently published articles unacceptable to other councils.

This was recognized practice at the time.

Senator Ferguson. When you had a pro-Soviet article, to whom did you submit the article so that an anti-Soviet could appear in the same edition?

You were indicating here that you were going to do that on the reverse.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I referred already to the case of an article—I believe it was by Voitinsky—which attacked both the Japanese and the Chinese, and I asked both the Chinese and the Japanese to reply, which they didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you send them copies of the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I sent them copies of the article in advance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it not your understanding, Mr. Lattimore, that the Soviets would not permit the editing or changing of their articles?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That question was brought up in one of the conferences at Moscow, and we were still then in the frame of mind that many people had in those years——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I want to get the question. I want to get the question and see whether you are answering it.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. The question was what was your understanding.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My understanding is that quite recently Mr. Chairman, in those memoranda——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is was it not your understanding, referring to that particular time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My understanding was that the Russians had made that demand. My recollection was that we were still hoping to wean them away from this Soviet rigidity which has since become more familiar to all of us.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had had that made clear to you in the conferences in Moscow in 1936, that the Russians would not permit their articles to be changed or edited?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That had been made clear, that that was the Soviet attitude, and we had not accepted, from our point of view, the idea that that attitude could not be changed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever strike out of a Soviet article a part that you thought was objectionable?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't produce it, but I remember that that very question came up in the case of the article by Voitinsky.

Senator FERGUSON. Then will you produce it so that we will have it here on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the article published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The article was published.

Senator FERGUSON. The IPR would be able to do that for you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, I don't think they can do it. You have all of the IPR documents.

Senator FERGUSON. They can come down here and look through the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. The IPR must have it if it was published. It must be in the files of the IPR.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember writing to Mr. Carter my strong objections to the whole tone of that Soviet article.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question. Did you strike any of it out?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I struck some of it out.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce or have the institute produce for this record what you struck out?

The CHAIRMAN. The question is to produce the article, and I think it calls for the printed article.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, may I inquire whether we may have access to the IPR files in your possession for the purpose of searching for that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you can look through them. I ask the Chair that you be permitted to do that.

Mr. FORTAS. Not for the article. The article would not show what was cut out. It would require access to the files.

The CHAIRMAN. The article, he said, was printed.

Mr. FORTAS. Yes, but it would not show what was deleted.

The CHAIRMAN. But he could designate where the deletion was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might submit, I do not believe the files of the IPR would contain editorial material of Pacific Affairs. Would they, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I couldn't tell you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were not the Pacific Affairs files kept separately?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Pacific Affairs files were kept separately by me, but I think in large part in duplicate in the New York office.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have made a point, sir, that, as Pacific Affairs editor, you were employed by the International Council of IPR.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The files which this committee has are the files of the American Council of the IPR.

Can you tell the committee whether your files of Pacific Affairs were duplicated in the files of the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know, Mr. Sourwine, whether they were kept in the files of the American IPR or in a separate file box in the New York office.

But Pacific Affairs, the handling of the printing and distribution of Pacific Affairs, was done from New York, and I sent copies of all manuscripts and correspondence in the normal course of operation to the subeditor in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the American IPR did you send such manuscripts and correspondence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the person who was acting as the subeditor of Pacific Affairs in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In those years I think it was Miss Catherine Porter.

Mr. SOURWINE. This committee is interested in the relationship between Pacific Affairs and the American Council of IPR and has touched on that subject before and understood you to say that you were making a clear distinction that you were not employed by the American Council of IPR, that you were working for the International IPR.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite right.

Mr. SOURWINE. If, as a matter of fact, your correspondence and records of documents and manuscripts were filed with the American Council of IPR, that is a germane and important point, and we would like to know what your best memory is on it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My best memory is that duplicates of all correspondence and manuscripts were sent to Miss Porter in New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. What happened to the original?

The CHAIRMAN. Miss Porter was with whom or with what organization, rather?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She was with the IPR, and she may have been—I couldn't recall; the records will undoubtedly show it—she was probably working part time with the American Council and part time for the Pacific Council.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Was this Hubbard article actually published in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it was.

Senator WATKINS. Did the Russians send in a reply to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; as usual, they didn't. This was one more case of our trying to get something out of them so that there could be equal treatment. I think that article—I may be wrong in saying it—was by Voitinsky; that article that we published was on railway questions in Manchuria by a Soviet correspondent. I believe that was the only one we ever got out of them.

Senator WATKINS. You asked them to reply and send it in early so you could publish it in the same number?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, and they never sent it.

Senator WATKINS. Suppose they had sent in a reply, what would have been your action with respect to that reply?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would have gone straight to Chatham House, among other councils. The top carbon copy would have gone to Chatham House.

Senator WATKINS. Would you have published that, with the others having a chance to criticize and tell what they thought about the reply article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would have been subject to the same sort of back-and-forth correspondence between a number of councils and individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Would you have published it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The publication would have followed exactly the same course as in the case of the Soviet article.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator wants to know if you would have published the article.

Mr. FORTAS. Could we have the question read back?

Senator WATKINS. I did not think I asked that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be read back.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator WATKINS. Would you have published it, the reply without first submitting it to these others?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Definitely not.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, you were rushing him to get it in so you would have had it there in time. You would not have had time to do that, would you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wanted to get it out of him as early as possible; but, if there had been a cable or a letter from the British saying that they objected to it, then it would have been held over to a later number. That kind of thing frequently happened.

Senator WATKINS. As I got from this situation, you were right up against a deadline, and you would not have time to do all of this, send it around and have it circulated around.

Mr. LATTIMORE. We always, Senator, tried to get articles as early as possible, especially from these non-English-speaking councils, because they were always falling behind deadlines, and we were usually giving them a deadline ahead of the real deadline so as to give ourselves a little margin of time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a real deadline, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not as a newspaper regards it, sir. With a quarterly magazine there is always——

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mention newspaper. Did you have a real deadline, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We had a flexible sort of a deadline.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Sourwine asked a question just now that had been answered, and I think maybe we ought to clear it up now. That is to say where the files of Pacific Affairs were located, if, indeed, they were located anywhere else except at the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was not cleared up, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I can see how the editorial files might have been in Mr. Lattimore's possession or in one of the other's possession. Why not ask Mr. Lattimore specifically whether or not the files that would have contained the original articles which, when compared with the article which was printed, would have shown what was deleted, whether he has that file or whether he knows where it is.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had that file, and I think I can tell you exactly what happened. I kept original files in the same office in which I worked at Johns Hopkins.

At that time I was considered half time with Johns Hopkins and half time with the institute. Then I left, went out to China, did various war jobs, came back to Johns Hopkins, and did not want to resume the editorship of Pacific Affairs.

I remember at that time writing to the New York office and saying: "Here I have a lot of back files of Pacific Affairs. Do you want them shipped to New York or shall I junk them?" The answer was: "We think the duplicate files here are sufficient, so you can just junk that stuff you have in Baltimore."

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by the New York office, Mr. Lattimore? The New York office of what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The New York office of IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. The International Council or the American Council?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The two offices were together. I don't recall clearly, but on this case I would probably have written to Mr. Carter as secretary-general, therefore representing the International IPR.

Senator SMITH. Well, now, were those files actually junked, or do you still have them somewhere in your office?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; they were junked.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your opinion, sir, as the former editor of Pacific Affairs, that the best place to look for old files of Pacific Affairs is in the files of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The best place to look would be in the storage files of Pacific Affairs. Whether they have been amalgamated with the American Council files or not is something I just don't know about.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I ceased to have any concern.
Senator FERGUSON. Who wrote the headings for the articles?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Sometimes the author; sometimes I, myself.
Senator FERGUSON. In the Hubbard article, who wrote it?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what it was?
Mr. LATTIMORE. What the article was?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. The article or the heading?
Senator FERGUSON. The heading.
Mr. FORTAS. The question is the heading.
Mr. LATTIMORE. There are two articles by L. E. Hubbard; that is, the one that is being given here—it is a misprint—by L. M.
Senator FERGUSON. The one of October 1937.
Mr. LATTIMORE. One of June 1938, called A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union, and one of September 1938, The Standard of Living in the Soviet Union.
Senator FERGUSON. When did you get the article from Hubbard, the one A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Published in June 1938? I don't know when I got it. Maybe several weeks ahead, maybe several months ahead.
Senator FERGUSON. The letter to Motylev is February 8, 1938, and he had apparently had the article before that. Did you not get it around October, when the man wrote?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Did he write it in October?
Senator FERGUSON. There is another footnote on it: "This article was written in October 1937."
I notice that the editor edited this even in the article. Apparently you put the heading on, "A capitalist appraisal of the Soviet Union," and your first footnote is: "This article was written in October 1937."
Your second footnote is: "In 1937 production rose to 1,000 pounds—ED."
You were seeing that the people were advised when the article was written. He had written, in his article, 1925, 667 pounds of grain. I will read what it says:

> Since Russia has always been self-sufficient in food, the average consumption per head of population must be determined by the production per head of population. The most important constituent in the total food supply is grain. Official Soviet figures show that the total quantity of wheat and rye produced per head of population since 1925 has varied as follows: 1925, 677 pounds; 1926, 731 pounds; 1927, 666 pounds; 1928, 590 pounds; 1929, 550 pounds; 1930, 696 pounds; 1931, 503 pounds; 1932, 480 pounds; 1933, 684 pounds; 1934, 672 pounds; 1935, 697 pounds. This is an average of about 632 pounds—

Now you put the "2" in and refer down to your own footnote, and you make this memorandum: "In 1937 production rose to over 1,000 pounds."
Why did you do that?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably because that was a recent statistic that had come to hand since the author wrote his article.
Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get it?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably from the New York office. We had several people there doing research on Soviet economics, and so forth.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you may have got that from

Mr. Field to make it appear that these figures were all wrong because it was a capitalist appraisal?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it. I think it would be much more likely that we got it from somebody who was able to read economic materials.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 174 you have a footnote 3 giving different figures than he gave.

Mr. LATTIMORE. More recent figures; is that right?

Senator FERGUSON. No. You give:

Professor Prokopovich, in his Bulletin No. 104, published by the Slavonic Institute in Prague, gives the following comparison of the purchasing power of the price of a quintal of wheat and rye in 1913 and 1932.

The item that you corrected was:

There is no doubt that the purchasing power of the peasants' money income now is less than prewar.

Now, to contradict that, you publish, as an editor's note, something different.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, may the witness see that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I am going to show it to him later.

Then you make a correction on page 177: "Figures for 1936 include all footwear, for previous years only leather footwear."

Then on page 184 there is a criticism, or this sentence is used:

The greater part of the collective farm peasant's income consists of a dividend in kind from the farm produce after all State requirements have been filled, and, as an individual, he has no choice in the policy of the farm nor in the work he must do.

You have carried it in "6" and you call it an editor's footnote. You put this in:

This does not agree with the account in Soviet Communism, a New Civilization, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, second edition, London, 1937—Ed.

How do you account for that correction?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose somebody had found this other statistic and put it in.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was working on this article besides you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea who may have worked on it in the New York office.

Senator FERGUSON. This article annoyed you to have published it, did it not; it was quite a corn to you to have to publish this article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was trying to avoid a break with the Soviet Union. I was trying to get them into the works and get them to participate in the give and take of the other councils.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not do the best by these footnotes to appease the Soviets?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I would not say so.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not say so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that last quote that I gave you, No. 6, was an appeasement to the Soviets?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. I think it was an attempt to balance the article, and may I say that the whole such editorial changes were referred——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Strike that last from the record, Mr. Reporter. When you are asked to pause, please, Mr. Lattimore, pause.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you found anything in this record so far, and I am excluding yours now, on the part of Carter or Field that has been pro-Soviet. I do not think I have found an answer from you that anything was ever pro-Soviet.

I am asking you, can you point out anything that you have heard in the record by Field or Carter that was pro-Soviet?

The CHAIRMAN. In the record of this hearing?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in the record of this hearing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not in any objectionable sense.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you qualifying it? Objectionable to you? That is the difficulty in this hearing. You want to be the sole judge. judge.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I merely wish to be——

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking whether it is objectionable. I am asking whether it was pro-Soviet.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; not in the sense of furthering——

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is "No"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Even the letter this morning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Even the letter this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. From Carter to you, about the invasion of Finland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was an attempt to get all sides of a question by a man who had not yet made up his mind. I don't think that can be called pro-Soviet.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore, you were against publishing any anti-Soviet articles, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was trying to get the Soviet people to participate in the working of the institute.

Senator WATKINS. Let me read you this sentence from your letter.

> In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles.

That is a part of your letter. That expressed your views.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That expressed part of what I thought was a diplomatic approach to these rigid and unbending——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, did that express your views? Answer that question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It expressed my attempt to be diplomatic.

Senator WATKINS. At that time, were you anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet in your own views?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As best I can recall, Senator, at that time I was not pro-Soviet, and in the workings of the institute I was trying to get the Soviet people to participate.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; let us proceed.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was certainly anti-Communist.

Senator WATKINS. I had a question there with respect to that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was not anti-Soviet participation in the institute, certainly.

Senator WATKINS. Did you realize there was any danger from a Communist philosophy and the Communist program at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As for 1938 I did not consider that they were dangerous; no.

Senator WATKINS. And when you said that you agreed with this sentiment, they ought not to publish anti-Soviet articles, you would be against any kind of an anti-Soviet article that might reveal even a dangerous situation that was coming up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was trying to get the Soviet people into participation in the IPR, and for that purpose I was willing to limit the number of articles that were direct attacks on the Soviet until we could get them in and make them realize that they were not being given any treatment different from any other council.

Senator WATKINS. You said that you should not publish these anti-Soviet articles.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Obviously trying to placate Mr. Motylev and trying to get him to be a little more cooperative than he had been in the past, or ever was in the future.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might inquire so the record will be very clear on this. If you changed the article in any way from the author, did you always say "Ed.," indicating it was editor, if there was a footnote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. I not only did that, but I also referred it back to the author himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you try and show us, then, the correspondence showing whether or not these footnotes all have been submitted to the author or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As far as the record of these documents may show them, I will certainly try to.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand, the record of these documents and the record that he kept, let us see if I have this clear, the files that he kept have been destroyed. Am I correct in that assumption from his answers?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The files that I kept I had been told to junk because it was considered that the duplicate files in New York were sufficient.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in fact junk them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. I might say that on page 174 appears "—ED." ', meaning editor. On the other pages there are no "ED." 's on them or "—ED.," except on the last one that I read, where I read the "ED.," on page 184.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The other notes would be the author's own notes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then will you get us the correspondence or try to find the correspondence between you and the author approving the editor's notes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If they can be found in the files you possess, I will be glad to try.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, so the record may be clear, do I understand that it was the first footnote and the last footnote to which you referred that have "ED." and the other ones to which you referred do not have "ED."?

Senator FERGUSON. I did not read "ED." on those, either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I may intrude here, I am interested in the witness' suggestion that the first place to start looking for

these is the files that the committee has. I asked the witness earlier if he felt that the best place to look was in these files, and I understood his answer to imply that he did not think so.

I would like to ask again, sir, do you think that the most likely place to find remaining files of Pacific Affairs is in the files of the American Council of IPR, which this committee now possesses?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I assume that you had all of the files, all of the back files, and that they might include international files as well as American council files.

Mr. SOURWINE. If we do not have international files, do you still feel that the best place to look would be in the files of the American council, which this committee has?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I said, Mr. Sourwine, I don't know anywhere else to look.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any resources for attempting to determine what became of those carbons which you were told were adequate records?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None whatever.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no one you could ask what became of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I could ask the IPR people if they had amalgamated the international files with the American council files. May I explain why I think so?

My understanding is that those back files had been moved up to Mr. Carter's barn, partly because of lack of space in the New York office——

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, pardon the interruption.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an explanation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not testify here, sir, that you had no knowledge about those files being in the barn, or where they were, until you read in the newspaper that this committee had seized the files?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right. But I don't think that alters the explanation I was just giving.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not an explanation of anything, because you do not know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think there is a——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I am not going to argue with the witness, and I do not want the witness arguing with the Chair.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought the record showed that I had a pertinent point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. I thought Mr. Lattimore answered a question I asked him if he had been in the barn, and I thought he said "Yes."

Was that before or after the documents were in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't even tell you that. I don't know which year they were moved up there.

Senator SMITH. Do you know how many times you were in the barn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe four or five times.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever have any conferences or meetings there with Mr. Carter or anybody else in the barn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. Part of the barn was fitted up as a sort of conference room.

Senator SMITH. That was with respect to IPR matters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was with respect to IPR matters, and I believe that the only occasions that I was there were on matters of the

International IPR, the Pacific council, rather than the American council.

Senator SMITH. You never saw any of the IPR records in that barn, the question Mr. Sourwine just referred to?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I remember there were file cases there, but I don't know what was in which ones. I know that Mr. Carter was planning to write a history of the IPR, and, therefore, he would have legitimate reason to have Pacific council files there as well as American council files.

Senator SMITH. He sort of took over that job?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After he retired he was going to spend some time on writing a history of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Who has a question?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You destroyed the files of Pacific Affairs, is that right, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I junked them.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by junked them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told my secretary that we didn't want these files any more, and would she have the janitor take them out.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was this at the time, over at Johns Hopkins?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you do this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think in 1945 or 1946, after I had returned to the Hopkins from my war jobs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony that you had none of the files of Pacific Affairs in your possession or under your control after 1946?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When these files were junked, as you say, were they taken out by the janitor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The next time I came into my office they weren't there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what was done with them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I haven't the faintest idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know we had a case over in an investigation before the other body where a witness initially testified that he put certain papers in the wastebasket and later on he said, "They didn't ask me what I did with the wastebasket."

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, could we have a few minutes' recess?

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess at 12. Is that all right?

Mr. FORTAS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider this article by L. E. Hubbard an anti-Soviet article?

If you have difficulty answering that question, I call your attention to the last paragraph of the letter we have been discussing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think, Mr. Morris, at that time I was competent to judge an economic article on the economics of Soviet Russia. I considered it an article that the Russians considered anti-Soviet.

Mr. MORRIS. I am just using your expression of anti-Soviet there in the last paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the last paragraph. Read the first sentence of the last paragraph.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

In concluding this letter, I wish to concur with you in the sentiment that at this time of extreme crisis in the Far East, Pacific Affairs ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you consider this article an anti-Soviet article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I considered it an article that the Russians considered anti-Soviet.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is did you consider it an anti-Soviet article. It is asking for your own consideration.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I consider that I was incompetent to judge on the subject. Maybe if I looked over the correspondence——

The CHAIRMAN. That is the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what did you mean in paragraph 3 of that letter, that criticism of Pacific Affairs as an organ of Soviet propaganda would largely destroy its usefulness?

Mr. FORTAS. That is not quite the quote.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you mean by that?

Mr. FORTAS. That is not quite the quote.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said:

If I, as editor of Pacific Affairs, prevent them from doing so—

that is, prevent people from criticizing the U. S. S. R.—

they will criticize Pacific Affairs as "an organ of Soviet propaganda" and largely destroy its usefulness.

You wanted to know what I meant by that?

Mr. MORRIS. What did you mean by that, yes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I meant to try to educate the Russians to an understanding of the practice in democratic countries that if you publish pro and con articles you are not necessarily engaged in a campaign against some one particular country, something that we never got them to understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that next letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, evidently a photostat of a carbon from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 10, 1938, addressed to a Miss Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York, N. Y. It is unsigned.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the address of the letter, the mailing address?

Mr. MANDEL. It comes from 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment now. I want Mr. Mandel to testify. Is this a photostatic copy of a paper found in the files of the Pacific Relations, the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I raise that question is that you say "evidently." I want to clear it as to whether it is or is not. It is; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record inasmuch as the first paragraph in this letter relates to the controversy that we have now been taking testimony on?

The Chairman. Let me look at it.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, it is an unsigned letter, but it did emanate from the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The Chairman. It is addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York. Very well, it will be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 535" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 535

129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, February 10, 1938.

Miss Harriet Moore,
American-Russian Institute,
56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York, N. Y.

Dear Harriet: Has Owen Lattimore written you about Motylev's protest over the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a copy. Lattimore feels that our relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we are asking Motylev to write for the same issue a rejoinder. Now, Motylev will probably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considering getting both you and Gradjansev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possibly be produced.

Before starting in on it, however, I should like to talk with you so as to get your reaction to the proposal.

Tuesday afternoon, your father and mother put on a swell cocktail party for me (or rather for the IPR) at the Casino. It was delightful to see them both and to see your brother. You will probably hear from the family as to who attended. The only academic people were Sam Harper and Hazard. Howard Vincent O'Brien of the Daily News was there, and Mrs. T. Kenneth Boyd. As for the rest, I'll have to get the list from your family as I just couldn't remember the names of everyone that I met. After the meeting was over, Harper and Hazard endorsed an aside that I made with reference to your competency.

At luncheon yesterday with Sewell Avery, I took the same line.

I wonder whether you can spare a little time to see me on, say, Monday afternoon, the 14th?

Sincerely yours,

———— ————.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the first paragraph, please?

Mr. Lattimore (reading):

Dear Harriet: Has Owen Lattimore written to you about Motylev's protest over the Hubbard article? In any event, here is a copy. Lattimore feels that our relations with London necessitate our publishing Hubbard's article, but we are asking Motylev to write for the same issue a rejoinder. Now, Motylev will probably refuse to do this, so Lattimore and I are considering getting both you and Gradjansev to collaborate in the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possibly be produced.

Before starting in on it, I should like to talk with you so as to get your reaction to the proposal.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, at that time, did you know that Harriet Moore was a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I did not, and I did not consider her a Communist.

Senator Ferguson. Who would you say wrote this letter, Mr. Lattimore, from its text?

Mr. Lattimore. I have no way of knowing.

The CHAIRMAN. It is associated with your correspondence with Mr. Carter, is it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you strike out enough of it to have it appeasing to the Russians, with your editor's notes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think the editor's notes were appeasing the Russians, but apart from that——

Mr. FORTAS. What is the question?

Senator FERGUSON. The question is, did they ever write this masterly, penetrating, penetrating and masterly, rejoinder and take the sting out of this capitalist article?

The CHAIRMAN. That can be answered yes or no.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever write, yes or no?

Mr. FORTAS. Did you ever write, yes or no, but not with that addendum.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to frame the questions, Mr. Fortas, not you.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not going to pass on these questions, Mr. Fortas.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the answer to my question, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question to the witness.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe any masterly rejoinder was ever written, but we did publish, in June 1938, an article called The Rate of Growth in the Soviet Union, which might be considered as an article balancing the Hubbard article. That article is listed by A. W. Canniff, and recently, when I was looking through copies of Pacific Affairs, I noticed that A. W. Canniff was described as a pseudonym.

That may have been the result of this—this pseudonym may represent the article which is suggested in this letter. But my recollection is not at all clear on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Who wrote the article?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Who wrote the Canniff article?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was trying to recall that, and I haven't been able to recall it. When I saw that it was a pseudonym, I searched my memory to see if I could remember who it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Why would it be written by an alias?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what I couldn't imagine at the time I saw it. Now, from this letter here——

The CHAIRMAN. Which letter do you refer to now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am referring to this unsigned letter to Miss Harriet Moore of February 10, that it may have been a joint research article done by Miss Harriet Moore and Mr. Gradjansev, and that for purposes of simplification they wrote it under a pseudonym instead of a joint name. This is pure speculation on my part.

Senator FERGUSON. But it appears that at least Miss Moore has refused to answer whether or not, when she was working on this job, she was a Communist, and her ground assigned was that it would tend to incriminate her.

I think you have indicated that that was sufficient proof to you to prove that she was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would certainly raise that presumption in my mind. But as I have also said quite recently, in 1938 I had no reason whatever to consider Miss Moore a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the gentleman there, Gradjansev?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The other was Mr. Gradjansev, who was a White Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether that is the same Mr. Gradjansev who was dismissed from General MacArthur's headquarters for left-wing activity?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not know that he was dismissed for left-wing activity. I know he worked for a while under SCAP.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he was dismissed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew he was dismissed.

Mr. MORRIS. What reason did you believe was the cause of his dismissal?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The reason I heard was that he had given some cigarettes to some Japanese. He was a man who didn't smoke, and he used his cigarette ration to give to some Japanese who were doing some economic work for him, and this was considered, I believe, to be black-marketeering.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you know that the American-Russian Institute was affiliated with the Soviet organization Voks?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been asked that question before, and I did not know it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know it was cited by the Attorney General as a subversive organization, the American-Russian Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had heard that, and then I heard that that decision had been revoked .

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 24, 1938, addressed to Owen Lattimore, with a typed signature of G. E. Hubbard. It is a photostat of a carbon from the files of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this document, and ask if you can recall having received that letter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall having received it, but obviously I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. FORTAS. May we have a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry, we do not have copies of that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You want me to read the full letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is dated February 24, 1938 [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 536

DEAR LATTIMORE: I have received your letter of February 8 about the articles by my brother (whose initials by the way are L. E. not L. M.).

It is my first sight of the article as I sent the only copy I had to your New York office as I explained at the time. As it now stands after your pruning, I confess I can't quite understand why the trouble has arisen. Barring the last two paragraphs, which verge on politics, it seems to me a thoroughly unemotional, well-documented and slightly overstatistical, statement of economic conditions in Russia. Whether the picture it gives is one-sided only a very well informed person can tell; knowing my brother I am perfectly certain that there is absolutely no intentional distortion. Any criticism of the Soviet system by a

writer brought up in the capitalist school, and vice versa, is, I should imagine, likely to be regarded as prejudiced by the other side, but I find it hard to understand why the present piece of work should be classed as "anti-Soviet."

I should have thought that this was a clear case for a "correcting" article from the IPR Soviet Council if they disagree with the writer's factual statements, his interpretation of the figures, or his description of the working of the collectivist system. If Mr. Motylev had contended that the article contained definite misrepresentations, and was in a position to show that this is so, the same question of principle would arise which we considered in connection with the Asiaticus article in the June 1936 issue of Pacific Affairs; but it would almost seem from the quotations you give from his letter that his objection is much more general and such as would extend to any critical review of economic conditions in the U. S. S. R. if we were not favorable to the system. If so, the question of excluding such contributions from Pacific Affairs is, as you say, one of policy. But surely one of policy for the IPR as a whole, rather than for Chatham House. As regards Chatham House responsibility our view would be that the contribution was an individual one, the fact that it went through me being merely the result of my attempt to fulfill your request for grist for Pacific Affairs and in such circumstances I am sure that Chatham House would not wish to accept responsibility. Macadam and I feel that the question of risk which publication would imply for relations with the Soviet Council can only be estimated by Carter and yourself and that a decision on this point could not very well be asked of our committee.

I really think that it comes back after all to the question of editorial principle, and of editorial decision. Obviously no one would want to see the relations of the Soviet with the IPR torn by the publication of anything appearing in Pacific Affairs, and if Mr. Motylev is not prepared to accept the article as an honest attempt at analysis by an informed foreign observer, written without political arriere-pensee although from an admittedly capitalist viewpoint, and to counter it by a rejoinder written from the Bolshevik standpoint, it may be wiser, as a matter of principle, to close Pacific Affairs to the discussion of Russian internal affairs and so to exclude the present article. I should hope, however, that Mr. Motylev would consent to see the matter in that light and to meet criticism of things in his own country just as we had to meet what was, I submit, much less objective criticism of ourselves in the Asiaticus article.

I am not referring to my brother as he is really not concerned with IPR internal politics, so will you deal with him direct as and when necessary? I am afraid that he was not warned that his manuscript would have to pass the fire of Moscow criticism. I ought no doubt to have remembered your practice and told him.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) G. E. HUBBARD.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted.

(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 536" and was read in full.)

Senator FERGUSON. May I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the name of the man or the writer that wrote the counter-article for June?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Canniff.

Senator FERGUSON. You put a note on that. You seemed to know who Andrew W. Canniff was, because you said this, and you have the article follow the Hubbard article:

Readers of Pacific Affairs are accustomed to our policy of printing articles that express different and sometimes opposite points of view. We do this for something more than the interest of good debate, a more important aim of our editorial policy is to let our readers know as far as we possibly can what is really happening in all the subjects that are of interest to the Institute of Pacific Relations. We, accordingly, print the following article by an author who uses almost exactly the same figures as Mr. Hubbard, but comes to an entirely different conclusion. Mr. Canniff has recently been studying the agricultural economics of both the Soviet Union and Manchuria—ED.

You said that you knew this man. He had been studying it. You did not say he was writing under an alias.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is in the list of authors at the beginning of the——

Senator FERGUSON. In this note you did not.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in the note, no. It was in the description of authors at the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that you said this morning you did not know who this was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said that I didn't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say from that description of somebody who had been studying agricultural economics in both Russia and Manchuria, that it was probably Mr. Gradjansev.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was the man who was mentioned in the article with Harriet Moore to write the masterly piece?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is somebody else's language.

Senator FERGUSON. To prepare the masterly rejoinder?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is somebody else's language, not my language.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2 p. m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The subcommittee reconvened at 2 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you in 1945 recommend Frederick V. Field as a person to work with the Defense Advisory Commission of the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did, Mr. Morris. I have seen some reference to that possibility in the transcript, but I don't recollect doing so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of Pacific Affairs, Telephone: University 0100, extension 48, appearing in upper right hand corner, and Please Address Reply to: 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., appearing under letterhead of Pacific Affairs, dated September 10, 1940, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, signed Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that letter and ask if you recall having written it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recall having written this.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your signature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my signature. I must have written it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is to Frederick V. Field.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dated September 10, 1940. [Reading:]

EXHIBIT No. 537

DEAR FRED: This morning a Mr. S. Taylor Ostrander, of room 303, 1424 K Street, Washington, D. C., rang me up to ask where to get hold of an economist competent to deal with Japanese wartime fiscal policies. I at once gave him your name and told him that on account of getting the new edition of the Economic Handbook ready for publication, you would be in touch with the right people.

He said that he already had you on his list to ring up, and went on to ask about other people. I think I forgot to say at the beginning of this letter that he is connected with one or another branch or subdivision of the Defense Advisory Commission. I then gave him Grajdanzev's name, as being both a trained economist and currently working in original Japanese material. I pointed out that for his purposes the fact that Grajdanzev does not yet have his citizenship might be a barrier, but he told me that in some cases they proceed by appointing someone to a general job, with salary allowances for taking on assistants for such purposes at this.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may it be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 537" and was read in full.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is that other name there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Grajdanzev.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was the man referred to this morning, a White Russian, who was at that time in New York. And I think he was doing some work, maybe part time or for the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Was what you wrote to Mr. Field there the truth, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Why, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on the letterhead of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "E. C. C. from A. G.—copies to O. L. and M. F." It is undated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may be this be read into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the initials identified.

Is anyone competent to identfy them?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, on the basis of your experience with the Institute of Pacific Relations, could you tell us who used the initials E. C. C.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. E. C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. A. G.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A. G. would be Andrew Grajdanzev, I think.

Mr. MORRIS. O. L.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Myself.

Mr. MORRIS. M. F.?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Miriam Farley, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask on this recommendation of Field, of September 10, 1940?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. We have had some difficulty in getting an answer, Mr. Lattimore, as to just when you came to the conclusion

that Field was a Communist. You said in your statement that it was in the forties.

Did you withdraw any of these recommendations after you came to the conclusion that he was a Communist, or did you let them stand?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Excuse me, Senator, this is not a recommendation of Mr. Field for an intelligence job.

Senator FERGUSON. You are writing to Field:

I at once gave him your name and told him that on account of getting the new edition of the Economic Handbook for publication, you would be in touch with the right people.

You mean for somebody else to——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought that Field would know better than I would who was competent to work with Japanese wartime fiscal policy.

Senator FERGUSON. And then did you think that Field at that time, as a Communist, would be a proper person to get them in touch with the Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe that on September 10, 1940, I thought Mr. Field was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us the date when you did come to that conclusion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I can only come to the conclusion on the basis of my present knowledge and recollections that Mr. Field probably became a Communist in the 1940's sometime.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you came to the conclusion in the forties, I think you stated in your statement—see if I quote you correctly——

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come to the conclusion?

I think this question has been asked and answered two or three times.

When did you come to the conclusion that Mr. Field was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am now of the conclusion that he became a Communist probably sometime in the 1940's, but I don't know when I first came to that conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you no way of telling this committee when you came to that conclusion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me see the Harriet Moore letter of this morning.

Mr. Lattimore, this was the same man that you had recommended, you had recommended Grajdanzev's name, and he was the one who was being recommended to "prepare the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possible be produced to the anti-Communist article by Hubbard." And it was put in your magazine in June of 1938; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The recommendation and the wording are not mine, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question now. Listen to the question.

Senator FERGUSON. But he is the same man who was recommended for that job and did write the pro-Soviet article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I cannot accept your characterization of that article as pro-Soviet, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I realize that you have said that you see nothing, you have not seen anything pro-Soviet.

But is not that what you were telling Molotov, that if that article went in, in effect you would try and get, allow him to write an article?

And then the facts come out here that someone is writing Harriet Moore, who turns out to be a Communist, and to get Harriet Moore to get this gentleman to write "the most penetrating and masterly rejoinder that can possibly be produced."

And you put the headline on this article by Hubbard that was a capitalist article, and you followed it with this article that was supposed to carry out what you had in mind with the Soviets, of having a counterarticle.

Would not that make it pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is no.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I explain?

I asked the Soviet Council to put in an article of their own, which would obviously have been pro-Soviet. Failing that, I wanted to get an article that would present another treatment of the same material used by Mr. Hubbard, and, as far as my intentions were concerned, they were not to produce an article that would be Soviet propaganda, or anything of the kind.

I had at that time no reason whatever to suppose that Harriet Moore was Communist, and I had no reason whatever to suppose that Grajdanzev was Communist, or pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I revert back—I do not like to do this—to previous testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. But on Friday, a letter written by Mr. Field to Mr. Lattimore, dated October 3, 1939, was presented to Mr. Lattimore on the general bearing of whether he knew at that particular time that Field was a member of the Communist Party, or connected with the Communist movement ideologically.

Mr. Lattimore read Mr. Field's letter, which contained the following paragraphs:

> If I were to try and work out my own thoughts on Soviet policy I think I should start by attempting to compare the conditions of the present war, the second imperialist war, with those of the first imperialist war. I should first say that both wars were similar in that they were imperialist wars, in the Marxist sense of the word. I should immediately add, however, that they contained an essential difference, the difference being the concrete existence of the Soviet Union with 21 or 22 years of revoluntionary experience now as contrasted with its nonexistence during the first war.
>
> The next stop would be, I believe, to recall the slogans of revolutionary groups during the first war; namely, to transfer the imperialist war into a civil war or into a series of civil wars. This object came off only in Czarist Russia during the last war, though pretty substantial attempts were made in a number of other countries. I judge that the slogan of the present war is exactly the same, but that again the concrete existence of the Soviet Union makes its application in the present war something quite different than in 1914-18. The problem today from a revoluntionary point of view is the same as it was in 1914; the British must get rid of their Chamberlains, the Germans of their Hitlers, the French of their Daladiers. But this time the Soviet Union operates as a powerful and concrete force to aid in these civil war efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose letter is that?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field to Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Chairman.

At the time, as I recall, we presented this letter to Mr. Lattimore.

He conceded that his memory was wrong by several years in his estimate that Field was a Communist.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, may we see that transcript?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, Mr. Fortas.

Mr. Fortas, the Chair and you got along pretty well for about 7 or 8 days. We hope we will get along for the rest of this time.

Mr. FORTAS. I join you in that hope, Mr. Chairman.

Just a moment, Mr. Lattimore. I think Mr. Morris sent for the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we can get on while we are waiting for that, Mr. Chairman, to save time.

The CHAIRMAN. The transscript should be here and his answer should be read back to him.

Mr. MORRIS. The question is on page 5149 of the transcript.

Mr. Lattimore, perhaps you will read it, commencing with the question put to you by Mr. Morris.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Mr. Lattimore, when you received that letter——

Mr. MORRIS. That is the letter that I had just read, is it not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right [reading]—

did you consider that that was evidence that Mr. Field had vigorous Communist sympathies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember receiving the letter, and my recollection has been that I began to think that Mr. Field was a close fellow traveler of the Russians at the time of the American Peace Mobilization, which I think was 1941. Wasn't it? But judging from this letter, my memory was in error by about 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you knew he had these vigorous pro-Communist sympathies in 1939?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is what I said at that time, Mr. Morris. I thought the matter over subsequently, and it seems to me that I ought not to go too far in characterizing my very vague recollections of that time years ago.

It seems to me that, reading again this letter of Mr. Field's to me, that an equally possible explanation is that I might have thought at the time that this was just another example of an American intellectual interested in Russian problems indulging in the kind of amateur interpretation of ideology that has since become such a prevalent habit.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Lattimore, you want to change your testimony of last Friday; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to amend my testimony to that extent, to say that my recollection of what I thought at the time is not at all clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, we have been in these hearings now some 7 or 8 days. You realize that during all of that time and now you are under oath?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, Senator, I do.

I also realize that many pieces of evidence have been presented to me in many ways with other people's phrasings and wordings, and that under the pressure of cross-examining, I may at times have admitted to using other people's words and saying things that I didn't quite mean myself, or that I would have said if I had had time for mature consideration, or if I had been less fatigued.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, that brings us to the question that you expect this body to pass upon the question and, with this statement, how are we going to tell whether you are telling the truth, or not, either from fatigue or a willful intent not to tell it?

What are we going to do? Are we going to sit here for 8 days and now have you tell us that you are not responsible for what you have told us? Is that what you want to tell us now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator. I am merely saying that after many days of interrogation about matters that happened many years ago, I am not at all surprised that I should have become somewhat confused in my recollections, and I don't wish to make too strong a claim that my recollection of periods so long ago is accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no doubt that Field is a Communist now, have you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe he probably is, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come to that conclusion? Now let us go backward.

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I said, I don't remember exactly when I came to that conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the date that you gave us in your first answer may be just as correct as that which you are giving us now; is not that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I would like to stand on my statement in the record, Senator, in my prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Which statement do you wish to stand on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my prepared statement, page 14, that I have no doubt he became one during the 1940's.

The CHAIRMAN. Which statement do you wish to stand on? The one that you gave last Friday, which you read back, or the one that you gave today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The one that I read back was an admission that my memory might have been in error by a couple of years. It may have been in error by a couple of years, or it may have been in error by more than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, is it that you want to change your testimony because you are confronted with this letter of recommending——

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; this letter is not a letter recommending Mr. Field. This is a letter stating that Mr. Field——

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. Recommending that they get in touch with Mr. Field to get someone to work on the Defense Advisory Commission?

You would not say, would you, that a Communist was a proper person to recommend someone in 1940 to work on the Defense Advisory Commission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I would think—I don't know what I thought at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you say now?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it now?

The CHAIRMAN. What do you say now? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I state rather carefully what I think now?

Senator FERGUSON. I hope everything you say is stated carefully.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What I think now is that the intelligence services of the United States are entitled to make use of any individual, any

source of information that they may think valuable to themselves under such conditions of security as the intelligence services may devise, which an outsider like myself cannot lay down.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you continue to read the document?

Mr. MANDEL. I am reading from the document marked "E. C. C. from A. G., copies to O. L. and M. F."

(EXHIBIT No. 538)

(International Secretariat)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

The following telegram appeared in the Soviet newspaper Trud, but probably appeared also in Pravda and Izvestia (we do not have the numbers of these two from August 29):

[Trud, August 29, p. 4]

LATTIMORE ON THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION

NEW YORK, August 27 (TASS)—In the magazine Far Eastern Survey there appeared an article by Lattimore, the Director of the School of International Relations, who accompanied Wallace during his recent trip to the Soviet Union and China, on the basis of his personal observations Lattimore regards highly the Soviet national policy (policy in respect to the nationalities), observing that from the moment of the establishment of the Soviet regime all nationalities of the Middle Asia and other regions, formerly oppressed, received an opportunity to develop widely their economy, national culture, language, and so on. Lattimore describes the present prosperity of the so-called backward peoples prosecuted pitilessly under Czarism.

Lattimore points out that his knowledge of the Russian and Mongolian languages permitted him to talk with Many Kazakhs, Buriato-Mongols, Turkomans, and representatives of other nationalities, and from these conversations he obtained valuable information that shows welfare and prosperity of these peoples freed by the Soviet Constitution.

Lattimore compares the position of the national minorities in the Middle Asia in the Czarist time and under the present regime. As an example, Lattimore gives the fact that Kazakhstan, a country populated formerly by the nomads, now became an industrialized country which has its own industry, own engineers, and a large percentage of the Stakanovites among the workers.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what role did Mr. Grajdanzev play in this kind of transaction? Did he read the Soviet press and find favorable references to you and passed them on to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would like to see this, but there is no hurry about it.

I have very little knowledge of what Mr. Grajdanvez's work was at that time. My general recollection is that he was working on such Russian language materials as the IPR had available.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it a practice of his to notify you of any such favorable references in the Soviet press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly not a practice. I presume that, as a friend of mine, if he ran across something that would interest me he would send it to me.

I should like very much to ask for the text of my original article in Far Eastern Survey, because, from my hearing—and I have not yet read it—of that Soviet extract there, I should say that it is obviously not a straight quotation from what I wrote, but partial quotations interwoven with phrases put in by the Soviet writer.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Lattimore, you would like your article to go into the record with this Soviet interpretation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly should.

This Soviet interpretation or misinterpretation.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the article?

Mr. MORRIS. We can obtain it and put into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I think it should go in with an exhibit, if you are going to introduce the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of this?

Mr. MORRIS. It is probably 1944, Senator, in connection with the mention of the "recent trip." He accompanied Mr. Wallace on a "recent" trip.

Senator FERGUSON. Maybe you can help us with the date, Mr. Lattimore. You look at that.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have a document here, Senator, which my wife is looking for now, which I should like to enter into the record as pertinent to this question of Soviet nationality.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like the article to which this document refers and to which you have testified. We want that first.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This one here?

The CHAIRMAN. You have referred to a document that you wrote.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; in the Far Eastern Survey.

The CHAIRMAN. We want that first, if you please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have that with me.

Mr. FORTAS. Is your staff sending for that, Senator?

Mr. SOURWINE. They are looking for it, Mr. Fortas.

Mr. FORTAS. Do you want Mr. Lattimore to wait until you find it?

The CHAIRMAN. If you want to go into some questions, as an insertion in the record——

Mr. SOURWINE. Here is a copy of the Far Eastern Survey, 1944, sir, the bound volume. Perhaps you can find that article.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, does this amount about to what would be classed as someone sending you a newspaper clipping?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; roughly.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you save it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you protest it was wrong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you write back and say, "This is wrong"? Did you get in touch with the papers that printed it and say, "I deny this"? Did you do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I might interpret this as being either a digest of a newspaper quotation or a newspaper article or it might be a newspaper article [reading]:

> The following telegram appeared in the Soviet newspaper Trud, but probably it appeared also in Pravda and Izvestia (we do not have the numbers of these two from August 29).

Then in what appeared to be headlines, caps, appears:

> Lattimore on the National Policy of the Soviet Union—

which might be construed as being a ——

Senator FERGUSON. Copy of a clipping.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Otherwise, I do not know what it is.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This appears to be the article: "Minorities in the Soviet Far East," by Owen Lattimore, in the Far Eastern Survey of August 23, 1944.

It is not very long. May I read it into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Put it into the record, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is two printed pages or more, is it not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Almost exactly two printed pages.

The CHAIRMAN. I want something to be done with this photostatic copy that we are passing around here.

Do you offer this for the record? If so, what is its authenticity? Where does it come from?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel identified it, sir, as a letter having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a letter. It shows on its face that it is not a letter.

Mr. MORRIS. It is a memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you swear now that you never saw this document, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of seeing it.

Senator FERGUSON. It appears to have been sent to you with your initials on it. Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I have a look?

It is headed E. C. C. from A. G., copies to O. L. and M. F.

The CHAIRMAN. From that, Mr. Lattimore, would you say it was evidently a communication of some sort from E. C. C. to the other parties?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; from Mr. Grajdanzev, to Mr. Carter, with copies to myself and Miss Farley.

The CHAIRMAN. A communication from.

Mr. LATTIMORE. A communication from, yes.

I have no recollection of ever seeing it before. The point is immaterial, however. It was obviously intended for me to see.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

With it should go the article.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The article will be placed in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 538," which was read in full by Mr. Mandel, and "539," as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 539

[Source: Far Eastern Survey, August 23, 1944, pp. 156, 157, and 158]

MINORITIES IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST[1]

(By Owen Lattimore)

On many occasions during a brief recent journey through the Soviet Far East and Central Asia I was struck by the obvious success of the Soviet policy toward its minority peoples, and by the international importance of this policy. The essentials of the Soviet method are simple. The Russians work by removing legal, social, and economic obstacles to the progress of minority peoples and "backward" peoples. These peoples are then free to work out their own progress according to their own capacities. The method is anything but paternalistic. Because the people work out their own progress, they feel that everything which they accomplish is their own, not something charitably bestowed on them.

[1] Mr. Lattimore, Director of the Page School of International Relations and coauthor of The Making of Modern China, accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on his recent trip to the Far East.

The chief obstacle removed by Soviet action was, of course, the "old order" of Tsarism, with its legal discriminations and its policy of favoring privileged groups among non-Russian minorities, in order to use them as instruments for ruling the unprivileged. For this reason the minority peoples, who feel that their local self-government is their own, also feel that the Soviet State as a whole is their own. This accounts for an outstanding difference in the psychology of minorities in the Soviet Union and in America. With us, minority rights are largely identified with the right to nonconformity. Consequently Americans sometimes ask, "What would happen if one of these Soviet minorities were to try to use its minority rights to attempt to set up laws, institutions, and practices conflicting with Marxist doctrines and Soviet orthodoxy?" The answer appears to be that this would be the last thing that would occur to their minds, not the first. All of them have a long history of oppression. Since, in all their long history, only the Soviet Government ever freed them from discrimination and gave them the opportunity of progress, they identify their own interest with the Soviet interest, and in everything which they do to advance their own particular interest their instinct is also to advance the general Soviet interest, not to encroach upon it, because the general Soviet interest is the primary safeguard of their own particular interest.

Within the framework of the Soviet economic order and state structure, Soviet policy has been to encourage the national pride and sense of cultural or community identity of minority groups. In Soviet Asia, this includes peoples like the Buryat Mongols, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and the Tungusic tribes, whose languages, traditions, and way of life are very different from those of the Russians. They encourage these peoples to go ahead and assert their independence in all cultural forms—costume, theater, art, and so forth—and to work out their own adaptation to the general structure of the Soviet Union.

Although many of the places visited were new to me, some of the peoples were not new, as I had known Mongol, Kazakh, and Kirghiz nomads, Turkish-speaking oasis dwellers, and Tungusic forest tribes on the southern side of the Russo-Chinese border in Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Familiarity with several of the cultures which are spread on both sides of the border, and an ability to speak Mongol and a certain amount of Russian, made it possible for me to get some valuable indications, even in a very short time, as to how contented and prosperous these people are as members of the complicated Soviet system of peoples, republics, and autonomous communities—uniform in some respects and variegated in others.

SOVIET POLICY IS FLEXIBLE

The actual way in which Soviet policy works is naturally not uniform in all places and among all groups. The Yakuts, for instance, seemed to me to have integrated themselves with the Soviet order less than such peoples as the Buryats. This is not surprising because the Yakuts are a tough-fibered people who have long been noted more for their ability to extend their own culture to other sub-Arctic peoples than for their absorption of Russian culture. Moreover, they live in small, widely scattered and isolated communities in which the spread of education in schools, by radio, and so forth, is less uniform than it is in more closely settled regions.

Among people who are few in numbers, also, it is difficult to preserve a separate culture. The Khakass near Minusinsk, for instance, are so minor a minority that they tend to merge with the Russians rather than to preserve their own way of life.

In Buryat Mongolia, on the other hand, there is no doubt whatever that the Buryats are running their own show. This is also true in Uzbekistan and in Kazakhstan.

In the great Kazakh Republic, which extends from the Chinese frontier to the Caspian Sea, the national autonomy policy is most successful. Among the Kazakhs before the revolution there had been a long tradition of hostility to the Russians and the Tsarist Russians had never attempted to recruit Kazakhs as troops. An attempt to conscript them into labor battalions led to rebellions in 1916, even before the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the present war, however, Kazakhs have supplied whole divisions of cavalry to the Soviet army. Since few of them speak Russian they are brigaded in their own units under their own officers. The Russians speak admiringly of the battle record of these Kazakhs.

While Kazakh nomadic herding is flourishing, the Kazakhs—like most no-

mads—also show a marked aptitude for machines and industry. At Karaganda, in the Kazakh Republic, there are some of the largest open-cut coal mines in the world. About a third of the miners are Kazakhs. Kazakh engineers and technicians are being trained there, and there is a high percentage of Stakhanovites whose output is higher than the norms on which wage rates are based. The head of the mines is a third-generation miner from the Don. When I asked him if he planned to stay on after the war, he replied, "No, I shall go back to the Don. The Kazakhs will want to run their own mines."

One detail of policy interested me as being particularly significant. Primary education is in the language of the people and in general Russian is not taught in their primary schools. In high schools Russian is taught as a second language for a few hours each week. In the universities, where they are advanced enough to have their own universities, Russian is compulsory. Conversely, when Russians are living as a minority group in an area that is overwhelming Kazakh or Mongol, the Russians have the same privilege of having their own primary schools; but for Russian children the Kazakh or Mongol language is compulsory. Thus the cultural autonomy of these various minorities within the bounds of Soviet Asia is maintained, and the minority languages are given a prestige value.

All of this is important because it will have repercussions far beyond the Russian frontier. There has been a steady movement of attraction toward Russia set up among a number of Cenetral Asian peoples. The Russians do not need to propagandize among them. These peoples are attracted toward Russia because of the success and prosperity of their cousins on the Russian side of the frontier and there are bound to be some important international consequences of this tendency.

MOBILITY IN BORDER REGIONS

Along most of the Soviet border the political frontiers are artificial, and identical or closely similar peoples live on both sides of the line. This is true not only along the Chinese but along the Iran and Afghanistan frontiers as well. In the 19th century political development in that part of the world was in abeyance. Central Asia was in suspended animation except for the superficial conquests by Tsarist Russia. If there was oppression on one side of the line there was a tendency for some of the people to skip over to the other side; but such movements did not express a choice between the two different systems of government.

The general impression today among their neighbors is that the people on the Soviet side of the border are well off. They are envied for the law, order, and security which they enjoy and for their individual and community prosperity. If there is turmoil in Chinese Turkistan or Iran or Afghanistan, many people will want to move to get away from the trouble and Soviet territory is the nearest area which looks safe and untroubled. This is a comparatively recent development. During the Soviet revolution there was a bad time of turmoil, and elements which were opposed to the revolution moved to the Chinese side and into Iranian and Afghan territory; but that period is now over.

The situation is one which requires adjustment of American thinking. We still tend to assume, whenever Soviet influence is noticeable in an Asiatic community, that ignorant people have been "misled by Communist propaganda." To think in this way is to mislead ourselves. The Soviet prestige in Asia today has little to do with propaganda. It is noteworthy that Soviet prestige is highest among those who are nearest to the Soviet frontier and influenced primarily by what they know, and by the practical comparisons which they are able to make. Among such people the Soviets are rated highly not because of promises of what they might do for others, but because of the impressive evidence of what they have actually done in raising their own standards.

Everywhere in the Soviet Far East there is a noteworthy age uniformity among those who are running local affairs. Whether Russian, Buryat Mongol, or Kazakh, the average age of people in high positions seems to be between 30 and 35. They are a postrevolutionary generation, old enough to have had the new education and young enough to be free of the old social cleavages. To them the present order is right, inevitable, and, above all, their own.

The implications of the Russian policy are evident. China and the Soviet Union have a common frontier in Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan (Sinkiang), and Manchuria, and along this frontiier minority populations occupy large and strategically important areas. Anywhere along the frontier, except in Manchuria, you could move the line 800 miles south, and still affect the personal destinies of no Russians and very few Chinese. This situation gives these minorities a great deal of bargaining power. Therefore, their political importance is

great. They have more option than weak minority populations usually have. They can get what they want by taking sides. This is true to some extent even as far as Iran and Afghanistan.

The war in Far East is being won largely by air and naval power in the Pacific. Yet in spite of these victories at sea and in the air, the political situation which will develop inland on the continent is likely to be largely out of reach of naval power and carrier-based aircraft. The possibility of a political outcome of this kind has not entered into the political thinking of America to the degree that it should have.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I should like in the record also my competent statement, before reading my own article, that this citation from the Soviet press is a typical piece of Soviet propaganda; namely, taking isolated phrases from my article and adding phrases of their own.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you make an effort to get a yearly review of Pacific Affairs into the New Masses?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did. But if you have a document to refresh my memory, I should be glad to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. That answer does not seem to carry cogency, "I don't believe I did, but if you have a document." You certainly know whether you did, or not. That was a publication.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't. I have no recollection of it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to say that you do not know that you tried to get these documents in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to say "No" to the question as propounded to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question is "No; I do not remember doing any such thing."

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is "No," you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 10, 1937, headed "Memo: F. V. F. from C. P."

F. V. F. presumably is Frederick V. Field, and C. P. is presumably Catherine Porter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, now.

Frederick V. Field is an established character here in this hearing. How about the other one? Who is the other one?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you know whose initials C. P. are?

Mr. LATTIMORE. C. P., I think, is Catherine Porter, who was the New York subeditor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the content of this memorandum bears on the questions put to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Owen has raised the question of our getting yearly reviews of Pacific Affairs into the New Masses, the Nation, the New Republic, and so on. He wanted me to ask you about this. His suggestion was that we might have such reviews start in August when the conference is on. Do you think there is any possibility of wangling a thing like this in so short a time?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be inserted in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record for the purpose stated by Mr. Morris.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 540" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did Mary van Kleeck write for Pacific Affairs an article on the Moscow trials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mary van Kleeck was at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. William Henry Chamberlin subsequently write an article in Pacific Affairs on the Moscow trials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, he did.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your reaction to having received that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time, I can't recall, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Chamberlin's article published in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at the same time write an answering article to Mr. Chamberlin's letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I wrote an article which was my own comment on the whole question of the trials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 5, 1938, headed "ECC from CP."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the contents of the memorandum identified by Mr. Mandel bear on the last question addressed to the witness.

Mr. Mandel, will you read it, please?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 541

JULY 5, 1938.

ECC from CP: Here is a copy of a letter from Chamberlin (June 13) intended for publication in Pacific Affairs. I have air mailed a copy to Owen and have sent a copy to Harriet Moore requesting her to write Owen by air.

Have you any comments to be passed on to Owen? Do you think at this point Miss van Kleeck should see Chamberlin's letter, or shall we wait?

Mr. MORRIS. May it be received into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received into the record.

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 541" which was in full above and "Exhibit No. 541A" which appears as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 541–A

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

[Pacific Affairs, vol. IX, No. 3, September 1938, pp. 370–372]

Mr. Chamberlin's successor as Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, Demaree Bess, has published in the Saturday Evening Post, which is hardly a pro-Soviet organ, the story of an American engineer working for the Soviet Government. This foreigner, though not "called as an independent expert witness," describes how his work was hampered by men who were later convicted of sabotage.

Why should Mr. Chamberlin be surprised that no letters, memoranda, or minutes of meetings of the conspirators were adduced in evidence? The testi-

mony makes it clear by inference that the work of all the conspirators interlocked so closely with that of loyal citizens that, if they had risked much in writing, they would have been caught much sooner.[1] As for the suggestion that the new head of the secret service is likely to abuse his power just as Yagoda did, it is obvious that the publicity given in the Soviet Union itself to Yagoda's turpitude is a safeguard against any such thing.

Mr. Chamberlin's remarks about the "striking contrast between the magnitude of the confessions and the meagerness of the results" are too rhetorical. The verbatim records of the trials are entirely credible in the way they describe the descent from grandiose ideas to futile deeds. The ideas were so grandiose that they could not have been carried out except with enthusiastic popular backing. It requires no adroit casuistry to conclude that, apart altogether from disputes over theory, the majority of the people in the Soviet Union are unwilling to risk the improved life which they are beginning to enjoy, after the sufferings first of the revolution and then of the "undeclared civil war" of the Five-Year Plan. The authorities are beginning to make good on the promises of reward held out for the sacrifices necessary to establish Socialism in a country with unorganized resources. Those rewards, though not yet dazzlingly great, are so widely distributed that no general revolt in the face of visibly growing success could possibly be expected except by emotionally biased antagonists like Trotsky.

The "gross discrepancies" in evidence to which Mr. Chamberlin refers appear to be subjective. Where conspirators within a country are in only intermittent and furtive contact with exiles abroad, it is hardly a "gross discrepancy" to count on the future aid of exile accomplices whom you do not yet know to be dead. Nor am I emotionally disturbed by the fact that the Norwegian authorities denied the inconvienient airplane that came to Oslo. This seems to me a not very hair-raising example of diplomatic usage. In much more actutely uncomfortable circumstances, it may be recalled, the British Government was unable even to imagine what submarines could be torpedoing British ships off the ports of Spain.

[Pacific Affairs, September 1938, pp. 370–372]

Then we come to the well-known phenomena of "sinister pressure" and "grovelling repentance." In reading the verbatim reports of the trials, I naturally went over most closely the testimony and confessions of the only two of the accused whom I had ever met personally, because these were men whom I could to some extent visualize. They were Radek and Rakovsky. I think that the distinguished personage of the IPR in whose company I called on Radek, and the British diplomat in whose house I met Rakovsky, would both agree that there was nothing out of character in the testimony of either man. Both of them not only gave perfectly coherent evidence, but psychologically convincing accounts of the way in which they were enmeshed.

The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered *and rectified*. A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the Party" or "someone in the Government." That sounds to me like democracy.

O. L.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record the article referred to in this testimony, signed "O. L." in the Pacific Affairs of September 1938, which commences on page 370, together with the preceding article, which is signed William Henry Chamberlain, Tokyo, June 1938, which ends on page 370.

The Chairman. Have you properly connected the article with the excerpt that has just been inserted in the record?

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[1] See review (p. 401) by J. N. Hazard of proceedings of the Bukharin trial.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you testify that is the same article referred to in the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read the last paragraph in Mr. Lattimore's article?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. This is an article signed "O. L."—presumably, Mr. Lattimore, and I think the witness has identified it as such.

Have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

> The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracies was a triumph for democracy or not. * * *

And the reference is to the Moscow trials, Mr. Chairman.

> * * * I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered and rectified. * * *

The words "and rectified" are italicized.

> * * * A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the government." That sounds to me like democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that article?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that indicate, Mr. Lattimore, that you thought these trials were democracy in action?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. It sounded like democracy.

Senator FERGUSON. It sounded like democracy in action?

Senator SMITH. Would you like to see it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should like to see it.

It sounds to me like exactly what it says, that the consequence of people in Russia——

The CHAIRMAN. I understood it is the last paragraph.

What is the question, Mr. Morris, please?

Mr. MORRIS. The questioning on this subject has been finished, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lattimore has requested that he see the article.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question pending, then?

Mr. MORRIS. No question pending.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. May I continue with the next question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The point here—replying to Senator Ferguson's question—I think it is that I said that conditions which—and here I quote:

> Give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly, whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by "someone in the party" or "someone in the government." That sounds to me like democracy.

That is, that I think it is democratic when citizens can protest against things done by party members or Government members.

Senator FERGUSON. To what are you referring?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may say that this was a disappointed hope. It didn't develop that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that the trials were such an expression?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I was clearly distinguishing there between the trials and the results of the trials.

Senator FERGUSON. The result of the trials was death to many of the people, is not that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you think that that designated democracy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I thought that an atmosphere in which citizens could protest against abuses would be democracy.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that that was a protest of the citizens, or a protest of the Government departments?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was referring to articles in the press which I had seen at that time, saying that after the trials of these people in Russia, a lot of whom were officials, these press articles said that people in Russia were beginning to act a little more independently toward their official bureaucracy, and I thought that was an encouraging sign.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did E. Herbert Norman write for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir; I believe he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what name did he write for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Under the name of E. Herbert Norman, as far as I remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever use a nom de plume?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The original document was a carbon copy. It is dated May 30, 1940. It is from 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y., addressed to Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. And it says in the corner: "Penciled note copy to WLH."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that letter and ask you if you can recall having seen it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think I recall having seen this.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mind reading that letter, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The letter is dated May 30, 1940.

(EXHIBIT No. 542)

DEAR OWEN: Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the eve of his sailing for Tokyo as language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs.

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on contemporary matters, providing he writes under a nom de plume.

I imagine that by now you have read his Inquiry book, "Japan's Emergence as a Modern State." This is probably the most fundamental study that has yet appeared in the Inquiry Series. I am hoping that all of us may find some way of continuing Norman as a contributor to the IPR publication program in one form or another.

Sincerely yours.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated to counsel just a few minutes ago that you did not believe that that writer wrote under a nom de plume.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to change your answer now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I do not wish to change my answer. I don't believe he did.

May I say that this is quite obviously a reference to the fact that it is usual practice for diplomatic personnel of our own country and other countries to sign a non de plume rather than their own names. An outstanding example, of course, is the Mr. X article by George Kennedy in Foreign Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, Mr. Lattimore, that Mr. Norman has been identified before the committee as having been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen that reference in the transcript. I have also seen some of the Canadian press protests on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record at this time an excerpt from the publication China Today, which Mr. Mandel will identify?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the magazine China Today, for March 1936, which is the official organ of the American Friends of the Chinese People.

On page 121 of this magazine we find the following:

CANADIAN FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

It is with great pleasure and much applause that we greet our friends in Canada and congratulate those who played an active part in organizing a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. Taking advantage of the presence in Toronto of Gen. Fang Chen-wu, Mr. A. A. MacLeod, chairman of the Canadian League Against War and Fascism, organized several outstanding meetings which resulted in the formation of the new organization. Beginning with a banquet on Saturday, February 8, with 80 present, Gen. Fang Chen-wu, with whom China Today readers are well acquainted, began a series of important meetings which included a special luncheon at the House of Commons in Ottawa and interviews with the Prime Minister and other political figures. Following a Fang Chen-wu mass meeting in Toronto held in Central Technical School on February 9 and attended by 1,500, a group of 30 met at Wymilwood, Queen's Park, and organized a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. A provisional committee was elected and is composed of E. H. Norman (secretary), a teacher born in Japan * * *.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is enough, Mr. Chairman.

May that article go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the object? What is its significance?

Mr. MORRIS. We are questioning the witness about his association and the publication of articles by Mr. E. H. Norman. According to that article, E. H. Norman was the secretary of a Canadian subdivision of the American Friends of the Chinese People. We would like to have something in the record to show that the American Friends of the Chinese People is a Communist-front organization.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that should come along now if this is inserted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like at this point, then, to introduce the testimony of Mr. Morris L. Appelman, who was member of the Communist Party and a member of the Communist cell that ran the American Friends of the Chinese People. I would like his testimony covering that to be put into the record in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that taken in executive session or open session?

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session, Mr. Chairman, on January 11, 1952.

The CHAIRMAN. You can read sufficient of it now to tie this in, if it can be tied in.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel is examining Mr. Appelman [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 542A

Mr. MANDEL. Then in May 1935, you were contributing editor of China Today?

Mr. APPELMAN. I don't remember that title, but apparently I was if I was listed as such.

Mr. MANDEL. What was China Today?

Mr. APPELMAN. It was a publication of the American Friends of the Chinese People.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. APPELMAN. A front organization of the Communist Party.

And then on page 6, Mr. Morris questioning:

In connection with the American Friends of the Chinese People, did you as a matter of fact belong to it?

Mr. APPELMAN. Yes, sir. I don't remember whether it was a dues-paying organization, but I was identified with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you sent there by the Communist Party?

Mr. APPELMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who in the party sent you?

Mr. APPELMAN. It was either Grace Maul or Esther Carroll or both, because they were my two contacts.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Grace Maul Grace Granich?

Mr. APPELMAN. The same party.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been identified with both these people?

Mr. APPELMAN. They were both definitely party members; and, so to speak, my party liaison was with them. At that time I was. At the time they first contacted me I had been expelled; I was not a party member in good standing; and they were my supervisors so to speak, in that organization.

Mr. Fortas, would you like to see that testimony?

Mr. FORTAS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the relevancy of that testimony with this witness?

Mr. FORTAS. That is my point.

Mr. MORRIS. The American Friends of the Chinese People was an organization with which Mr. Norman was connected, and we are now asking Mr. Lattimore if he published articles by Mr. Norman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment, until the Chair rules on this.

The testimony of Mr. Appleman may be inserted in the record. Do you want it in full?

Mr. MORRIS. Just those portions that I read, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the record now.

The exhibit China Today may be inserted in the record for what it is worth at the present time.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 542 and 542A", which was read in full. No. 543 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 543

[Source: China Today, March 1936, p. 121. Published monthly at 168 West 23d Street, New York, N. Y., by the American Friends of the Chinese People]

CANADIAN FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

It is with great pleasure and much applause that we greet our friends in Canada and congratulate those who played an active part in organizing a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. Taking advantage of the presence in Toronto of General Fang Chen-wu, Mr. A. A. MacLeod, Chairman of the Canadian League Against War and Fascism, organized several outstanding meetings which resulted

in the formation of the new organization. Beginning with a banquet on Saturday February 8th with eighty present, General Fang Chen-wu, with whom *China Today* readers are well acquainted, began a series of important meetings which included a special luncheon at the House of Commons in Ottawa and interviews with the Prime Minister and other political figures. Following a Fang Chen-wu mass meeting in Toronto held in Central Technical School on February 9th and attended by 1,500, a group of thirty met at Wymilwood, Queen's Park, and organized a Canadian Friends of the Chinese People. A provisional committee was elected and is composed of E. H. Norman (secretary), a teacher born in Japan, Professor John F. Davidson of Upper Canada College, and A. R. Menzies, a Victoria College student who was born in China. One of the important members of this group is William Arthur Deacon, Literary Editor of the *Mail and Empire* of Toronto, who wrote a splendid interview with General Fang for his paper.

We in the United States extend our heartiest greetings to our friends in Canada and we urge them to keep in close contact with us and we in turn pledge ourselves to work in close cooperation with them.

The importance of the Far East in the whole problem of war and peace is rapidly becoming a matter of common knowledge. It is therefore very significant and hopeful that groups of "Friends of the Chinese People" have been organized in several countries. America, France, England, Holland, and now Canada have joined the international front of those whose chief aim is to help the Chinese people in their struggle for national liberation, the realization of which will play a most powerful rôle for peace throughout the Far East and the whole world. We urge other countries to follow and join this rapidly forming "International Friends of the Chinese People."

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, before refusing your kind offer to show me that transcript, I assume there is no reference to Mr. Lattimore by name.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no reference to Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. FORTAS. Then I don't care to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. It has to do with the writer. That is the tie-in, I understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, what article did Mr. Norman write in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been looking for it, Mr. Morris, and I don't find an article listed for the period when I was editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there one subsequent to that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe there was one at some time; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you acquainted with Mr. Evans F. Carlson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your association with Mr. Carlson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Carlson first when he was in the American Marine Guard in the Embassy in Peking, and I saw him maybe two or three times here in America.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give him advice?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. I want to go back to this offer of the exhibit that the Chair has admitted in evidence as part of the record.

The question was propounded to the witness as to whether or not this writer had been a contributor to the publication while he was editor. He says "No," in substance. You cannot hold him responsible for something that was done in the publication before he was in charge of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, could it not be admitted as some evidence as far as the institute is concerned?

The CHAIRMAN. It may go in to that extent, but I do not want it to go to the extent of tying in this witness to any collaboration with the writer through the introduction of these exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole matter goes to the weight of the thing rather than to its admissibility.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I think the observation you are making is worth while to make at this time. I think we must bear in mind that our prime investigation is of the IPR and that we are not trying Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. I notice that some of the newsmen and some of the columnists continue to refer to the fact that we are trying Mr. Lattimore. I have not felt I have been trying Mr. Lattimore, and I do not believe any of the rest of the committee have felt that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore came here at his own request as a witness to testify, to clear his record, apparently, of statements that have been made by witnesses who testified with reference to him. He is not on trial.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the letter read into the record previous to the introduction of these exhibits contained an offer from Mr. Carter to have Mr. Norman write for Pacific Affairs under a nom de plume; and, in view of the testimony this morning about the appearance of the nom de plume, we had no way but to ask Mr. Lattimore whether or not, as a matter of fact, Mr. Norman did write it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am admitting the exhibits, but I want to limit their significance—that is all—because they address themselves to the Institute of Pacific Relations rather than to Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you knew Mr. Norman, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Norman at that time very slightly. I think I had met him once or twice when I was at the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York. I knew him later in Japan when I was in Japan with the Pauley reparations mission.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you see Mr. Norman at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I saw him quite frequently at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you give advice to Evans Carlson as to whether or not he should stay in the Navy or leave the Navy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I remember very distinctly that Carlson told me that he was thinking of resigning from the Marine Corps, and I urged him not to.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you urge him not to, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Because I thought that a man of his expert knowledge in China would be useful to the Nation in his service in the Marine Corps.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Mr. Carlson was chairman of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you not testified in executive committee that you thought that organization was a Communist organization?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see my testimony on that? My present recollection of it is rather blank, I am afraid.

Mr. MORRIS. That is page 91, Mr. Lattimore. You may read any part of it into the public record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My testimony in executive session was as follows:

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the organization Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been associated with that in any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I was asked to subscribe to it, and I replied that since I was at that time writing syndicated newspaper articles as an independent commentator I did not want to subscribe to any partisan organizations of that kind. However, right at the end of the war, they were bringing out some fairly interesting information that was not readily available elsewhere, and I sent in a subscription and asked them to send me their material.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe that is a Communist organization?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that it certainly has become a fellow-traveling organization. I don't know whether it is Communist, or not. I am not an expert on the shades of difference between fellow-travelers and Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that last letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated March 27, 1939, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of a document, and it was previously used as exhibit No. 154.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Lattimore, will you identify that letter as having been written by you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that in our record now, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is exhibit 154.

Mr. Lattimore, will you read that letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The date is March 27, 1939. [Reading:]

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak out he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east I have no recent impressions by which to gauge his possible usefulness as a "Friend of China."

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write you again.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated February 8, 1940, addressed to Maj. Evans F. Carlson, American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression. The typed signature is "Owen Lattimore." It is a carbon copy of a letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having written that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall it now.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, please, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is dated February 8, 1940. [Reading:]

DEAR EVANS: What a dope I am! I forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous candid portrait of yourself.

Don't give anybody else too much the idea that it is a Herculean job to make the fur fly in Baltimore. If anybody should come along all ardor and enthusiasm, why break his spirit in advance? Besides, after the swell work you did, it should be easier in the future.

Yours.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me see that letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will it be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received in the record.

(The document previously read by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 544" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify those two documents?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of an article from the Daily Worker, of March 16, 1944, the editorial page, which is an article with the following heading: "Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's tribute to Sun Yat-sen, Chinese Communists."

Then it continues:

Following are excerpts from the address delivered by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, at Sun Yat-sen Day Tribute Meeting, Sunday, March 12, Metropolitan Opera House.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that appear in the Daily Worker?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want to do with this one?

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be received in the record, Mr. Chairman?

This is an article about Lieutenant Colonel Carlson, which appeared in the Daily Worker.

The CHAIRMAN. "Lieutenant Colonel Carlson's tribute to Sun Yat-sen, Chinese Communists."

This is a photostat clipping from the Daily Worker, is that correct, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be received into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be admitted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 545" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 545

LT. COL. CARLSON'S TRIBUTE TO SUN YAT-SEN, CHINESE COMMUNISTS

Following are excerpts from the address delivered by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson, at Sun Yat-sen Day tribute meeting, Sunday, March 21, Metropolitan Opera House.

Fifteen years ago this coming June it was my rare privilege to participate in the ceremonies at Nanking, China, attending the State Burial of the Father of the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen. I was there as a member of the personal staff of Admiral Mark Bristol, then commanding our Asiatic Fleet.

This man of humble birth, by his unshakable confidence in the dignity of the human being, regardless of his race, creed, or color, and by his unselfish devotion to the cause of bringing to the four hundred millions of his native China the hope and freedoms of the democratic way of life, overthrew the Imperial Ching dynasty and set the pattern which gave birth to the Republic and which has enabled his countrymen to resist for nearly seven years every effort of Japan to enslave them.

We of the United States of America cannot escape our debt to Sun Yat-sen. The debt is rendered more poignant by the knowledge that we failed Doctor Sun back in 1923, in his hour of need. Failing to secure our support he turned to another great democratic people, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who provided the financial and moral aid which enable Chiang Kai-shek to accomplish the task of uniting China under one government in 1938. Today we enjoy the benefits of this unity through the magnificent efforts of China, under Generalissimo Chiang's leadership, to contain Japan's armies in Eastern Asia as we advance against the common enemy across the Pacific.

HAILS SUN'S PRINCIPLES

Doctor Sun is best known for the political philosophy which he evolved, called the San Min Chu I, or Three Principles of the People. This philosophy, subscribed to by all political groups in China today regardless of their complexion, combines the best of the political doctrines of ancient China with those principles

of democratic doctrines of Britain, the U. S. S. R., and the United States which Doctor Sun felt were most suitable to the needs and temperament of the Chinese people. Some of his ideas regarding the application of these principles indicates the universal scope of his political thinking.

His principle of Nationalism relates to the fundamental need for people to be organized into a sovereign state. In China the principles had a two-fold application: (1) to induce a feeling of nationalism throughout all the people of this vast country; and (2) to regain for China the sovereign rights which had been impaired through the instrumentality of the Unequal Treaties imposed by foreign powers.

The Principle of Democracy Doctor Sun interpreted as the "People's sovereignty," or control of government by the people. He contemplated that the people's will would be exercised through suffrage, the recall, the initiative, and the referendum. For the administration of government he added to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches we know, the old Chinese institution of examination (comparable to our civil service) and censorship (most nearly akin to our supreme court). The application of these principles indicate the universal scope of his political thinking.

China is administered today under this quintuple form of government, but the people have not yet attained the right of suffrage. Instead the nation is governed by the Kuomintang party.

TELLS OF THREE-FOLD PROGRAM

Doctor Sun contemplated that suffrage would be attained through a three-fold program. First there was to be the Period of Military Conquest, during which China would become united under the Kuomintang Party. Then would follow the Period of Political Tutelage, during which the party would govern while the people were being politically educated. Finally, suffrage would be conferred on the people and the nation would enter the final period of Representative Government. The Period of Political Tutelage has prevailed since 1928.

The most discussed and least understood of the Three Principles is that of the People's Livelihood. In effect, Doctor Sun's conception of this principle boils down to state socialism. He aimed to improve the livelihood of all the people, and he proposed to do this through social and economic reform, nationalization of transportation and communication, direct taxation and socialized distribution through cooperative societies.

While, as I said a few moments ago, all political groups within China subscribe to his Three Principles of the People, all groups do not interpret the principles in the same way, and emphasis in the application of the various principles differs with the groups. The Kuomintang, under the aegis of Chiang Kai-shek, has brought Nationalism to a high peak. The Chinese Communist Party, which, from the nature of its works, I would term the Social-Democratic Party, goes in more for improving the people's livelihood and preparing them for the exercise of representative government.

You hear much about the activities of the Kuomintang Party, which constitutes the national government at Chungking. Let me say a word about the less publicized Social-Democratic group which operates mostly in the northern provinces and largely behind the lines of the Japanese army. In the early years of the Sino-Japanese war I spent a number of months with this group. I found that its military successes were due in large measure to the democratic political action of the people and to the solid integrity of its leaders.

HONORS COMMUNIST FIGHTERS

Recently I had a report from Professor Michael Lindsay, formerly of the faculty of Yenching University, and now present with this group, on the activities of the group up to the end of last year. Professor Lindsay tells me that the military agencies of this group, the 8th Route and New Fourth Armies, are containing about 350,000 Japanese troops. These Chinese armies operate for the most part in small mobile columns which engage the enemy daily. Activities have been extended northeast of Peiping and into southern Manchuria, where they constitute a constant threat to the Japanese lines of communication with China. These armies, with their militia units, now number about one million men.

One feature of the administration in the northern provinces that is significant is the extent of the public school system as well as of the adult education program. There are 7,500 schools operating in the Shansi-Hopei area, west of the

Peiping-Hankow railroad, and in this same area 300,000 adults had learned to read and write by the middle of 1943. People in this area, cut off from Free China by Japanese military units, not only participate in the war effort, but govern themselves through their elected representatives. Thus are the principles of Doctor Sun being brought into full realization.

One exponent of Doctor Sun's principles who merits special mention, is his widow, the former Sing Ling Soong. Madame Sun has consistenly and persistently, since her husband's death in 1925, endeavored to bring about the complete realization of his aspirations. Quiet and self-effacing, she is less well-known abroad than her sister, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, but in China she has a large and loyal following.

Madame Sun places only one interpretation on the teachings of her distinguished husband: the literal application of the principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood. She understands the self-discipline and self-sacrifice which their application requires, and she begins with herself. None who has visited her can have failed to be impressed by the simplicity of her life, her love for humanity and her unremitting effort to improve the livelihood of her fellow citizens. I have known Madame Sun for many years, and her friendship has been an unfailing source of inspiration.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the other one, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here the original of an article from a magazine entitled "Youth," the official organ of the American Youth for Democracy, which had been cited as subversive by the Attorney General.

This issue is evidently undated, and on page 5 of this issue we have the following article headed "We Fought For Peace; by National Committee to Win the Peace, Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson, USMCR (Retired), Paul Robeson, cochairmen."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carlson has been identified before this committee as having been a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you offering just this article for the record, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, we have not seen these two articles offered for the record. Is there any reference in them to Mr. Lattimore by name, in either of them?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I wonder if the significance or the meaning of this letter of February 8, 1940, from Owen Lattimore to Carlson is clear, where Mr. Lattimore starts out with: "What a dope I am! I forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous candid portrait of yourself."

Was there a memorandum in the paper, or in this envelope, or do you mean what followed as being the "glamorous candid portrait?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say, Senator, that it probably is a reference to a snapshot that was enclosed, a snapshot of himself, a camera snapshot.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not mean to convey that the language was the portrait?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you say: "Don't give anybody else too much the idea," and so forth. What did you mean by that?

Read it and tell us what you meant by that.

Mr. LATTIMORE [reading]:

DEAR EVANS: What a dope I am!

The CHAIRMAN. How did you spell the word "dope?"

Mr. LATTIMORE. D-o-p-e.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not use "u," did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I said:

What a dope I am! I forgot to give you the enclosed glamorous candid portrait of yourself.

Don't give anybody else too much the idea that it is a Herculean job to make the fur fly in Baltimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you stop right there now? What did you mean by that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think my recollection is probably correct, Senator, that I was referring to Colonel Carlson coming to Baltimore to speak for the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression. Among other speakers we had for it were Dr. Walter Judd, now Congressman Judd, also Admiral Harry Yarnell.

* * * If anybody should come along all ardor and enthusiasm, why break his spirit in advance? Besides, after the swell work you did, it should be easier in the future.

Senator FERGUSON. What "swell work" were you talking about?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Swell work in raising funds for the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, you have an exhibit here that you have offered for the record. Up to this point, I have not been able to catch your connection to tie it in here with either the Institute of Pacific Relations or the witness on the stand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore gave testimony today, Mr. Chairman, about his having given advice to the author of that article, that he should stay in the Navy and not resign. We had some questioning on that point.

Reference was also made to Colonel Carlson's membership in the Communist Party. That article is an article that Carlson wrote for the American Youth for Democracy publication, and that bears on Colonel Carlson's political persuasions in connection with the advice offered to him by Mr. Lattimore, who told him he should have stayed in the Navy, where he would be more potent.

Mr. FORTAS. Do you mean the article refers to it?

Mr. MORRIS. It bears on his political identity. He is writing for a Communist publication.

Mr. LATTIMORE. On his political identity at the time I gave him that advice?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute.

Did I understand that this organization, of which Carlson was a member, was listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

Again I say it goes to the weight of its worthwhileness.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 546" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 546

WE FOUGHT FOR PEACE

(By National Committee to Win the Peace, Brig. Gen. Evans F. Carlson, USMCR (retired) Paul Robeson, cochairmen)

[Source: Youth, Published by American Youth for Democracy, February 1947, p. 5]

During the war, American youth carried their ideals for a postwar world into battle. Their guns spoke the hope of an era of permanent, democratic peace,

The rhythm of marching feet sounded their aspirations for an economic future quite in contrast to the homeless, black-market ridden land to which they returned.

They fought hard and they fought well in their battle against the enemy. But their enemies were not only Hans or Tayaka. Their enemies were the philosophies that held one man is better than another because of the color of his skin or the religion that he practiced; that democracy is an archaic system that must be replaced by fascism; and that the armed might of imperialism can rule the world. Side by side the democratic peoples of the world, American youth defeated the advocates of these philosophies.

The youth of America had good cause to fight as they did under the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt. They remembered well how his courageous leadership had saved the post-World War I generation from the chaos of the Hoover depression. They knew from experience how his fight for a better America had enabled many of them to finish school, to improve their living standards and to enjoy the full benefits of American democracy.

With Franklin Roosevelt, the youth of America envisaged a world free from the scourge of war. They knew that his policy of friendship and unity of all United Nations held the key to peace as well as victory. Translated into practical terms, it meant an incessant battle for economic democracy, for colonial independence, for minority rights and for the spirit of friendly cooperation among the Big Three powers.

F. D. R. did not live to see the peace he worked so hard to win. He did not live to see that peace threatened by dangerous voices in our midst who are already crying for a new war—a new and terrible conflagration that will wipe out democracy as it lashes the earth with the weapons of an atomic age.

But today, others, particularly the youth of America, are fighting along the battle lines set by F. D. R. Through the AYD, through the National Committee to Win the Peace and through every other democratic channel of people's expression, American youth are working to return our Nation to the program of F. D. R.

The future of the youth of America is inextricably woven into the pattern this country sets for itself in the immediate period to come. The voice of youth will play a major role in determining that pattern.

Together with the youth of America, the National Committee to Win the Peace will work to crystalize public opinion on a course which will enable us to live in peace with all nations of the world—on a course which will enable us to steer clear of a war which might be precipitated by forces which are inimical to the best interests of the youth and people of America.

Only if our country follows such a course will the ideals of F. D. R. and the youth of America for a better postwar world be fulfilled.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever serve as a member of the board of directors of the American-Russian Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I may have, for a year.

If you have a document to refresh my recollection, I should be glad to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 24, 1940, addressed to Miss Harriet L. Moore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. The document is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall having written that letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I recall it. And it shows that my recollection was wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, he recalls it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you read the letter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The date is October 24, 1940, to Miss Harriet L. Moore, the American-Russian Institute, 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.

(Exhibit No. 547)

DEAR HARRIET: I am afraid that I cannot serve on the board of directors of the institute, but I think you will appreciate my reasons.

My primary interest, and the only field in which I speak with any authority, is the Far East. At the present time, of all times, I do not want to run the risk of having anything I may say about the Far East discredited by people who say "You can't trust a word he says about China, because he is interested in cultural relations with the Soviet Union."

Yours very sincerely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will it be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received into the record.

(The document previously read in full by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 547".)

The CHAIRMAN. What is the next one?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "On board *M. V. Georgic*, en route to New York." It is dated October 19, 1937, addressed to W. L. Holland, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is a phototsat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the handwritten notations on the top?

Mr. MANDEL. At the top are the following handwritten notes [reading]:

Copies to OL—to share with RP & ED.
CHS—to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT.

The CHAIRMAN. Can somebody interpret those initials, please, who they were, for the record? Who were the parties?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, will you identify the parties?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

OL—to share with RP & ED.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your signature to the letter, "OL"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; this is a circulation notation, to be sent to "OL" and for "OL" to share with "RP" and "ED."

The CHAIRMAN. Who are they. Who is "RP"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "RP" I think was an Englishman named—I forget his name—Page or something like that, who was working for the IPR in Shanghai.

"ED," I think, is Elizabeth Downing.

Then the other initials are "CHS—to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT." Presumably, that means Chen Han-seng, to share with Harriet Moore, Catherine Porter, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley, Kathleen Barnes, Charlotte Tyler.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the relevancy of this document is that a copy of it had been sent to Mr. Lattimore, and the questioning will bear on his knowledge of the contents of this memorandum.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you offering that for the record, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer this for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 548" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 548

Copies to OL—to share with RP & ED
CHS—to share with HM, CP, EFC, KB, CT

ON BOARD "M. V. GEORGIC," EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK,
19th October, 1937.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
% Kokusai Kyokai, 12 2-chome Marunouchi, Kojimachi-ku,
Tokyo, Japan.

DEAR BILL: The pace in and following Moscow has been such that I can only now begin a piecemeal report to you on visit and discussions. Today I will group my answers around the agenda which I prepared for a meeting of the praesidium on August 13 and August 17. To give you the trend, I will italicize the agenda which formed the basis of these two formal meetings, but there were many other conversations so that the information contained in this letter was not entirely conveyed at those two stated meetings.

I. THANKS TO SOVIET COUNCIL FOR ARRANGING SECRETARY-GENERAL'S FAR EASTERN VISIT

Here I gave a rather full account of what I regarded as the deeper significances of the visit. V. E. M. explained the difficulties in making the arrangements but his great satisfaction that the object of the visit had been achieved, namely, better equipment of the Secretary-General for his work.

This led to a very extended discussion of possible developments in the war in China. The sketch made by V. E. M. and Y. P. B. in August has thus far been proved both fundamental and accurately prophetic. To describe it here would make this letter, which must be long anyhow, too bulky. It would also make the letter interesting.

II. RESEARCH

A. Letter from Holland to Bremman dated June 28, 1937.

(1) English or American editions of Standards of Living Reports.

(2) Report on North Pacific fisheries.

B. Letter from Holland to Carter dated June 28, 1937.

"The other place of research which we should like to have started in the Soviet Union is a report on Soviet foreign policy with special reference to the Far East and the countries having membership in the IPR. Each national council is being asked to prepare a similar report, necessarily presenting its own national point of view.

"In connection with the studies on the economic development of dependent territories in the Pacific it might be interesting for them to prepare a report on the administration and economic development of its Far Eastern territories inhabited by minor nationalities, contrasting this with the customary methods of Western Colonial administration.

"There is one further point. Motileff in discussing the Land Utilization studies at Yosemite spoke with some enthusiasm about securing an extensive and very illuminating report on land utilization and agricultural development in the Soviet Far East. There would be widespread interest in such a report and I hope you will take the matter up again with him and assure him of our desire to have the study done and to do whatever we can to facilitate its publication in English. Besides this Motileff spoke of supplying material for the new edition of the Economic Handbook. On this point however I assume that Miss Mitchell will be well armed with specific requests and suggestions since the preparation of the new edition has already been started under Mr. Field's direction."

With reference to English or American editions of the Standard of Living Reports, the praesidium is hospitable to the idea in principle, but is very reluctant to have these handled on any but a commercial basis. They do not wish to have publications subsidized for this makes their work liable to attack as propaganda. If some English or American publisher will not take the studies on a commercial basis it is probable that it could be published through the English Workers Press or through International Publishers.

With reference to a report on the North-Pacific fisheries, the praesidium wants to know precisely what the objective of the Institute is for this study. There are so many approaches that the praesidium does not wish to set a lot of people to work on every aspect of Soviet Far Eastern fisheries without knowing with very great precision, what you and Alsberg want. In this connection, please see my letter to Alsberg of V. E. M. thought that the fisheries question had been better treated in the Pacific Fisherman than it had in Pacific Affairs. He had sent Miller Freeman the latest data in July. Some time when you are in Tokyo you may wish to look up Juikoff, an expert on fish, who is attached from time to time to the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo.

If the Japanese I. P. R. or the American I. P. R. set the pace in the studies of the fishery question or if you and Alsberg give a precise outline of just what the purpose of the study is, it will be very easy for the Soviet I. P. R. to make the necessary start on the study.

With reference to a report on Soviet foreign policy in the Far East, V. E. M. wonders whether you wish it treated primarily from the historical point of view or with the emphasis on contemporary manifestations of Soviet foreign policy. If the latter is what you want, the situation is a little difficult because of the lack of connection between the Soviet I. P. R. and the Foreign Office, as prescribed by I. P. R. custom. It may be helpful if you would suggest an organizing principal for all of the Councils for their monographs in this field.

With reference to your suggestions that the praesidium prepare a report on the development of the Far Eastern Territories inhabited by Minor Nationalities, for contrast with the customary methods of Western Colonial administration, I have already written you (see my letter of September 29) that it is quite impossible for the Soviet I. P. R. to prepare a report for such a purpose. The Minor Nationalities are in no sense "colonial" areas. If you want a monograph on this subject it is a legitimate request to make of the Soviet I. P. R., but only if it is completely disassociated from preparation for the Round Table on Colonial Problems.

With reference to Land Utilization there is a voluminous report on this subject for '34, '35, '36, on which someone is working. But it probably cannot be brought up to date until the second half of next year. Then someone should go to the Far East for the purpose of correcting and supplementing the statement.

With reference to the new edition of the Economic Handbook. I had nothing to say as Field had not supplied me with an outline of his proposed procedure in this matter. When a specific request is made to Motylev I think he will respond. But I didn't get the idea that he regarded this project as one to which everything else should be subordinated.

III. PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Lattimore's urgent desire for Soviet articles for Pacific Affairs, for example, Voitinsky's article in Tikhii Okean, which was translated and used in Amerasia, would have been ideal as a contribution to Pacific Affairs.

This has been covered in my letter to Lattimore of September 12, a copy of which I have already sent you.

IV. AGENDA FOR 1939 CONFERENCE

A. Comment of Soviet Council.

B. Replies from other Councils.

The Soviet Council prefers the methodology of our April proposal to that followed at Yosemite. At the same time the praesidium does not feel so strongly in this matter as to desire to have their vote weigh too decisively. They feel that as one of the newest Councils they would prefer to throw in their lot with the wishes of the majority of the older Councils. The Council favors the inclusion of the current crisis in the Far East in the agenda of the next Conference. The Soviet Council had not yet received the Kingston proposals when I was in Moscow. They had seen the Chatham House memorandum of August 3rd and Miss Harriet Moore's important contribution on methods and objectives.

V. INTERIM MEETINGS OF PACIFIC COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE, BANKING, APRIL 21–28, 1938

A. Agenda.

B. Soviet participation.

If the meetings are held in Nanking the Soviet Council will aim to be represented. The Soviet Council would have preferred a meeting in October 1937,

in England to a meeting in China in April 1938, partially because of distance, but principally because of the advantage of getting Great Britain to assume greater interest and responsibility in the I. P. R. through acting as host.

VI. PACIFIC COUNCIL FINANCE

I referred to Dafoe's letter of March 30th in which he referred to Lord Astor's letter stating that the Chatham House increase of its gift was defended on the ground that it would enable the Institute to get more money from the other Councils.

The praesidium was glad that Chatham House had increased its contribution to $750, but sorry that it had not raised it to $1,000. The U. S. S. R. will consider increasing its contribution to $3,000.00 next year. If all the other Councils would increase, they would do likewise, but they do not feel that it is sound for them to give more than Great Britain which in reality they are already doing if you take everything into consideration. The Soviet Council is the only Council which has never taken a penny from the International Research Fund. Nearly every Council, except the American and Canadian have got more from the Research Fund than they have contributed to the General Purposes budget. Furthermore, the Soviet Council this year took care of all my expenses from the time I arrived in Vladivostok until I reached Moscow, and thus in fact added several hundred dollars to the Pacific Council's income, though this item will not show in our books. The Soviet I. P. R. is prepared to supplement its contribution to the Pacific Council by helping to meet the Ruble needs of staff members like Miss Moore and Lattimore when they travel on study tours in the U. S. S. R.

VII. INFORMAL REPORT ON I. P. R. DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN, PHILIPPINES, AND CHINA

Here I gave a survey of the difficulties and promise of the three Far Eastern Councils. I described the favorable financial outlook in Japan and China and indicated that I feared that few if any of the hoped for contributions would now actually be paid to either Council. I referred to the promises of increased financial support of the Philippine Council and the bearing this might have in ultimately creating something more substantial than that which has existed in the past. The praesidium asked very penetrating questions regarding the Institute in the three countries.

VIII. CRITICISMS AND COMMENTS OF THE U. S. S. R. I. P. R. REGARDING THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT SINCE YOSEMITE

The praesidium was so conscious of its failure to cooperate in supplying articles for Pacific Affairs that little was said under this heading. Fears with reference to Problems of the Pacific will not it appears be realized. I saw an advance copy of the volume in London and was able to write Motylev a letter which will I think end his anxiety. The only real criticism was with reference to Cressy whom the praesidium recognized was not a representative of the I. P. R. and had only been recommended by the I. P. R. as in Class B. Motylev felt that Cressy was exceedingly conservative and in many important fields uninformed. For example, he criticized the Atlas because Manchuria and the Outer Mongolian People's Republic were not shown in the same colors as indicating an identic political status.

Motylev nevertheless, was very glad that the Atlas had been able to pay Cressy between 3,800 and 4,000 Rubles for eight days work on the Atlas, thus providing for all of his Ruble needs throughout the extensive journeys which Motylev arranged for him to different parts of the Union.

IX. WORK PLANS OF MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT FOR THE COMING YEARS CARTER, MITCHELL, HOLLAND, CHEN HAN-SENG, LATTIMORE, MOORE, PYKE, ETC.

Here I gave the best forecast I could of staff plans. Motylev was sorry that Mitchell had been unable to come to Moscow and that I had not applied earlier for permission for Holland to accompany me to the Far East. The position with reference to Lattimore's going to Outer Mongolia is set forth in my letter to Lattimore of September 12, a copy of which I sent you. The position with reference to Miss Moore's going to Buryat, Mongolia is set forth in my letter to her of September 12, a copy of which I have also sent you.

X. COMMENTS BY OFFICERS OF THE U. S. S. R. I. P. R. ON PRESENT CRISIS IN THE FAR EAST

This, as indicated above, calls for a separate memorandum.

XI. MOTYLEV'S SUGGESTIONS FOR CARTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (AUGUST 10, 1923)

When I reached Vladivostok, Bremman told me that Dr. Motylev hoped that it would be possible for me to take my family for a fortnight to the Crimea at the end of the Moscow visit. Motylev renewed this invitation on our arrival, but because of previous engagements in Western Europe, and the growing seriousness of the crisis in the Far East, we had to decline with thanks this very kind invitation.

Arrangements were made, however, for us to take a fascinating three-day trip in the Moscow-Volga Canal, going as far as Kalinin. We made interesting visits to the parks, to the Red Army Club, to one of the big stadiums for a soccer game between Dynamo and the Red Army, and spent all of August 18 at the great aviation field outside of Moscow watching some hundreds of airplanes celebrating the annual Civil Aviation Day.

We saw a good many of the staff of the American Embassy, although Mr. Davies was away on his yacht in the Baltic. We saw the British Ambassador, and several of his staff, had long talks with both the Chinese and Japanese Ambassadors, with Litvinova, and, of course, with several of the foreign journalists. Mr. and Mrs. Barnes extended many courtesies including a cocktail party for many of the foreign journalists the day we left. On August 21st Motylev gave a dinner, attended, among others, by Smirnov, the new head of Vox, Vinogradoff, Foreign Office referent for England and the United States, Wineberg, of the Anglo-American section of the Foreign Office, Miss _____, one of the editorial staff of Isvestia. Voitinsky we did not see as he had not returned from his holiday. It so happened that our visit to Moscow came at a time when several members of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. Council were away on vacation. Harondar had been borrowed for six months to assist in the Soviet Building at the Paris Exposition. We had two good talks with him in Paris.

One evening Motylev took us to the movie "Na Vostoke." This is a film version of Pavlenko's novel which has gone through edition after edition since its publication a few months ago. I am told though it is a novel, it contains a surprising amount of military information regarding the position of the Red Army in the Far East. You will remember Harriet Moore's review of this book in the September Pacific Affairs.

We had a long session at Vox at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov. Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova, and myself were present. Smirnov wanted to know how cooperation between Vox and the American-Russian Institute could be made more effective. He wished to get a very much fuller understanding of the work and program of the A. R. I. and hoped that more substantial cooperation could be built up in the future. I read between the lines that Vox felt that the A. R. I. gave letters of introduction to Vox to any American tourist who requested one and thus they had no basis for discrimination as to who was entitled to a lot of time and who could best be handled by Intourist. If Vox knew in advance of the specific social opinions and interests of important Americans, they could make very much better use of their limited staff. Smirnov wanted a long explanation as to why the A. R. I. still retained a certain internationally known enemy of the U. S. S. R. on its board of directors.

Just before I left, Smirnov luckily had a long letter from Osgoode Field, the President of the A. R. I., which I gather set his mind at rest at several points. The A. R. I. had recently sent a representative to Moscow who didn't seem to know very much either about the A. R. I. or about the social views of its members.

I used the occasion to explain what I thought was the membership basis of the A. R. I., namely, an interest in the U. S. S. R. I said that I thought the membership was open both to friends and critics of the Soviet Union. I added that perhaps in the long run its greatest strength might lie in its being a cross section of American public opinion.

XII. OTHER BUSINESS

A. Memorandum from Chatham House dated August 3rd, 1937

This memorandum arrived after our first conversation on preparation for the next conference. On one of these occasions Motylev emphasized how eager the Soviet I. P. R. is to have the Institute deal with current controversial issues.

Unless the Institute courageously continues to face the most pressing and fundamental controversies, it cannot render its largest service.

B. What steps will be taken to insure intelligent and significant reviews of Great Soviet World Atlas in principal countries. How secure a few advance copies with memorandum on principal points of significance

Motylev indicated that the first edition of the Atlas would be 10,000 copies. These would be used up almost immediately. He really hoped that the first edition would not be widely reviewed because then the overseas demand for copies might exceed the number available. He would, of course, see that one copy was sent to the International Secretariat and to each National Council.

C. Recommendation as to duration Miss Harriet Moore's visit to Buryat Mongolia

ECC was asked to write a formal letter to Dr. Motylev a few months in advance of Miss Moore's proposed visit to Buryat Mongolia, describing the purpose of the visit and its duration. It was suggested that an application for say two months' residence in Buryat Mongolia be made. A major difficulty was, of course, the matter of military secrets. A minor difficulty might be the question of suitable living quarters as the Buryat Mongols draw no lines between the sexes.

D. Could Bremman spend at least 3 months as a member of the International Secretariat in 1938 or 1939

Motylev indicated that the Soviet Council must provide a Soviet staff member for the International Secretariat for a few months prior to the next Conference; but whether Bremman himself could be spared was another question. Bremman as you know is one of the Japanese experts in the Academy of Science (Institute of World Politics and Economics). He is only able to give part time to the work of the I. P. R. He is exceedingly able and would be quickly annexed by the American Council if we ever station him in New York.

E. Procedure with reference to members of the International Secretariat and the Secretariats of the National Councils visiting the Soviet Union in the future

This question was raised as a result of Shiman's long delay in getting a visa. The full details of this are covered in my letter to Field of August 20th, a copy of which I enclose.

In general the Soviet I. P. R. will always find it easier to get visas for senior staff members, who come for longish visits rather than for junior members who contemplate visits of only a few days. Very great regret was expressed by Motylov that Field had not notified him, in advance, of Shiman's plans.

F. The internal situation in the Soviet Union

The discussion of this topic by Motylov and Bremman was one of the most interesting and enlightening experiences in the whole course of my visit. But this better be covered in a separate memorandum which I hope some day to be able to prepare.

G. Suggestions from Soviet Council to the Secretary-General regarding making the work of the International Secretariat more efficient

The praesidium had no suggestions to make.

H. How secure promptly several copies of the following publications of the Institute of World Politics and Economics. Provisional titles only

(*a*) *Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria*
(*b*) *Guerrilla Warfare in Manchuria*
(*c*) *Symposium on China*
(*d*) *Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in Japan*
(*e*) *Financial situation in Japan*
(*f*) *Position of the Working Class in Japan*
(*g*) *Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourvitch*
(*h*) *Dissertation by Levina (?) developing Lenin's idea that Capitalism is acceptable to the United States peasant because of the absence of feudal factors.*

Motylev and Bremman said that some of the foregoing titles were not phrased accurately, some are completed, and some may never be published.

Notice of publication of any of these studies will presumably appear in Tikhii Okean. Miss Moore should be asked to notify the Secretary-General when any of them are forthcoming, with a view to deciding whether translation is desirable.

I. Other business as proposed by the officers of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R.

There were several general conversations with reference to the attitude of other Councils to the present aggression in the Far East. Surprise was expressed that the American intelligensia is so silent; even the interesting discussions at the annual meeting of the American Council revealed a lack of fundamental information as to the actual forces that are operating in Japan. Both Reichshauer and Warnshuis took the optimistic and inaccurate view of trends in Japan which were not refuted in a clear-cut way in the ensuing discussion. Similarly there is little evidence in the discussions of the Royal Institute in London, of a fundamental understanding of the Far Eastern situation. Is it not possible for the American and British Councils to make such a clear-cut analysis of the forces at work in the Far East as will reveal to their publics the nature and danger of the present aggression? Should not the Institute in all countries be the foremost organization in making highly fundamental analyses? Could not the American and British Councils hold special meetings and express opinions on contemporary questions while they are acute?

A special conference convened by the American Council, if adequately reported and publicized, could give a fundamental analysis of the whole Far Eastern situation which might be of the greatest importance to public opinion throughout the world. The imperialistic fallacy of men like Orchard should be dealt with in a clear-cut way by the American Council of which he is a member.

Reverting to the program for the next Conference, the Soviet I. P. R. is not deeply concerned with shipping and trade competition in the Pacific because of the Soviet's foreign-trade policy.

With reference to the two reports on Standards of Living; the first part should be completed by the end of December and the second half by the end of January. I think, however, that the first report, namely that by Krivetsky, is more certain of completion than that by Professor Kravel. I seem to remember Motylev saying that Kravel's work had been interrupted either by serious illness or by his transfer to another and more urgent job.

With reference to the symposium on the Far East; Krasavtsev stayed on in the Soviet Far East after Bremman and I left in order to see all of the authors personally and make arrangements for checking all of the manuscripts.

Both Motylev and Bremman were eager to know of developments in the I. P. R. in all of the member countries. They discussed many of the ideas put forward at Yosemite by members from the various countries. They had enjoyed the visits after Yosemite of Liu Yu-wan, of Van Walree of the Pacific Institute in Amsterdam. They were much impressed by Lattimore's statement that if the Soviet I. P. R. would only furnish a regular series of articles for Pacific Affairs it would be much easier for him to bring the editorial policy into a real focus than it is at present.

Doubtless this letter will raise many questions on which you will want further clarification. Please, therefore, write me fully after you have read it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask you now to turn to page 5 of the stencil copy, Mr. Lattimore. Will you read the paragraph commencing at the top of the page?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I look at the document of the whole to see the relevance of the particular paragraph to the whole?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, you may, Mr. Lattimore.

(The witness examined the exhibit.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. I found here the name Pyke. That must be "R. P."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, the questioning, you see, is about the American-Russian Institute, and you find the reference to that commences, I believe, on page 5. The whole thing will be in the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What is the paragraph you wanted me to read?

Mr. MORRIS. The top of page 5.

Senator FERGUSON. Before he reads that, might I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you found the reports on your visit to Moscow, that you were going to look up for me, referred to in your Ordeal by Slander?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I haven't found it yet. I haven't had an opportunity to go and look for it. I can tell you in general what its nature is.

Senator FERGUSON. No, we want to see the report.

Mr. Chairman, even though we recess Mr. Lattimore's testimony, might we hold it open until we get those reports, until we see whether they ought to go into the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There was no report solely on the Moscow meetings. It was my report to the committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations on my work as editor of Pacific Affairs, which included a reference to the Moscow visit. There was no separate report on the Moscow visit.

Senator FERGUSON. The report that was referred to in the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the testimony, sure.

Shall I read?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

We had a long session at Vox at the invitation of the new president, Smirnov. Motylev, Mrs. Carter, Miss Kislova and myself were present. Smirnov wanted to know how cooperation between Vox and the American-Russian Institute could be made more effective. He wished to get a very much fuller understanding of the work and program of the ARI and hoped that more substantial cooperation could be built up in the future. I read between the lines——

"I" meaning Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. And "ARI" meaning what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. American-Russian Institute.

"I" and "myself" all the way through here is Carter.

I read between the lines that Vox felt that the ARI gave letters of introduction to Vox to any American tourist who requested one and thus they had no basis for discrimination as to who was entitled to a lot of time and who could best be handled by Intourist. If Vox knew in advance of the specific social opinions and interests of important Americans, they could make very much better use of their limited staff. Smirnov wanted a long explanation as to why the ARI still retained a certain internationally known enemy of the U. S. S. R. on its board of directors.

Do you want me to go on?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is still Carter:

Just before I left Smirnov luckily had a long letter from Osgood Field, the president of the ARI, which I gather set his mind at rest at several points. The ARI had recently sent a representative to Moscow who didn't seem to know very much either about the ARI or about the social views of its members.

I used the occasion to explain what I thought was the membership basis of the ARI, namely, an interest in the U. S. S. R. I said that I thought the membership was open both to friends and critics of the Soviet Union. I added that perhaps in the long run its greatest strength might lie in its being a cross section of American opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. The "ARI" stands, again, please, for what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. American-Russian Institute.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you correct our record in connection with whether or not the American-Russian Institute is now listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MANDEL. A member of the staff called the Justice Department after this morning's session, in that regard, and was told that the present status of the American-Russian Institute of New York, which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General on April 24, 1951,

remains the same. This was told the member of the staff by Mrs. Keene, of Mr. Foley's office.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you serve with the Pauley Reparations Mission in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time did you so serve?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think from about maybe late October or November 1945 to late January or possibly the beginning of February 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. During that time, were you on the State Department payroll?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. My recollection is that the staff were paid through the State Department, although they were regarded——

The CHAIRMAN. How the staff were paid makes no difference. Were you on the State Department payroll; yes or no?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say yes and no, Senator.

May I explain?

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of yourself, not of the staff.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Speaking of myself, my understanding was that the Pauley Mission was a White House mission, not a State Department mission, but for some reason of Government arrangements that I don't know, my pay checks came through the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. The declaring of that whole statement is your answer that you were on the State Department payroll. So what is the use of wasting time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I should say—well, I won't quibble about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you the third ranking member of that mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, about third or fourth, I should say.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you going to read this document?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry, Senator. Did you want to go into that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I wanted to ask a question.

Who was the director who was anti-Soviet on this board, do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know in this that you read, what they mean by "social opinion" and "social views"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not any idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. It would be a matter of speculation.

Senator FERGUSON. How would you speculate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If you want me to speculate, Senator——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The first recollection that would come to my mind is that they wanted to know those views because they gave capitalists and anti-Communists better treatment than they did Communists. At least, so I was told when I was in Moscow, by Mr. Demaree Bess, who was then correspondent to the Christian Science Monitor, and I expressed amazement that after the hostile way they criticized my writing, they had allowed me to make a trip to Moscow to look at their Mongolian research work. And he said, "Oh, that is quite simple." He said, "If they consider a person anti-Soviet they always treat him much better."

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think the question calls for you to quote anybody else.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was, of course, as of 1936.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that the words "social views" meant Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it. But is pure speculation on my part. I don't think my speculation is very authoritative.

Senator FERGUSON. You received this at the time. It indicates that it was passed to you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It indicates it was passed to me, yes. I don't recall reading it, and I presume I put it on one side as something that didn't have any particular concern to me.

The CHAIRMAN. That was by Mr. Carter, was it not?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, were you listed as a special consultant with the Pauley Mission staff?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that was my rank, or title, or whatever you call it, listing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, when you testified in executive session before this committee, we asked you if you helped draft the Pauley reparations report, and you testified "quite largely."

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, Mr. Morris, in his opening prepared statement, it is my memory that Mr. Lattimore referred to the Pauley report as a report which "I wrote." Is that not correct, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not sure whether I wrote or drafted, or something.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is on page 26, the fifth line from the bottom.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have it on 27.

Mr. FORTAS. You must have different pages.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is this the reference you mean, Mr. Sourwine:

When I was in Japan with the Pauley mission at the end of 1945, I did play a major part in drafting a reparations report in close conference with Mr. Pauley.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I am referring to this statement which is at the bottom of page 26, which is the copy I have here, and which is one of the copies you distributed on the opening day:

Mr. Dooman claimed that the Pauley report which I had written provided for turning Japan into a pasture.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think, Mr. Sourwine, that must be a reference to a statement by Mr. Dooman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in fact, write the Pauley report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I played a large part in drafting it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us go on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, by bringing together a lot of loose ends here, I believe we can finish in about an hour and a half tomorrow.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do we not recess until then?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine has a question today.

The CHAIRMAN. There was submitted to the chairman yesterday a matter of the insertion into the record of excerpts from the Con-

gressional Record. I had Mr. Sourwine and other members of the staff look up the question of context.

Mr. Sourwine, what did you find as regards those excerpts?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the excerpts were two in number. They are referred to on page, or beginning on page 5635 of the record of this committee of yesterday. Mr. Lattimore said:

> Mr. Chairman, I have some material here from the Congressional Record pertinent to the general question of discussion of the subject of China in 1945 that I should like to read into the record.
>
> The CHAIRMAN. Let me see it first, please.
>
> Senator FERGUSON. I have something before he puts that in, Mr. Chairman.
>
> Mr. LATTIMORE. One is from Representative Walter Judd and the other is from Representative Mike Mansfield.

Senator Ferguson then went forward with the matter he had, after which the chairman said:

> The two excerpts here, assertedly from the Congressional Record, I think counsel will check with the Congressional Record and, if they are to go in, they will go in in context, and I will reserve the ruling on the matter.

With regard to these two excerpts, I have here the original sheet as furnished by Mr. Lattimore, and also a longer excerpt from the Congressional Record, showing the point at which each of these appeared in context. If the Chair deems it not improper, I would like to ask the witness a question or so about these and then lay the whole thing in the record, or offer it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I do not want to go too far in questioning the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, did you prepare these excerpts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I see the typing? I think that would show whether I did or not.

(Documents handed to the witness.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think I did this actually myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You offered them for the record. Do you know who did prepare them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I couldn't tell you exactly, Mr. Sourwine. Several people at the Hopkins have very kindly volunteered to help me by looking up references, and so on, and I think this must be from one of them. But I don't know which one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take any steps before you offered these for the record to satisfy yourself that they were not out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I made no check. I accepted them as excerpts from the Congressional Record.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Chair will hold its ruling further in the matter at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. Until the witness at least can vouch for these?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We will stand in recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 3:37 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Friday, March 7, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:35 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator McCarran.

Also Present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Of the Senators belonging to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senator Smith has been called hastily to his home in North Carolina on official matters. Senator O'Conor is away on official matters, and Senator Eastland has been called away.

The belief of the committee is that as many as can listen to this testimony should listen to it. For that reason, it is the conclusion of the committee that this matter goes over and is recessed now until 10:30 Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 10:37 a. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Monday, March 10, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, O'Conor, Ferguson, Watkins.

Also present: Senator McCarthy and Senator Mundt.

Present also: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a question I would like to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY ABE FORTAS, COUNSEL—Resumed

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you put into the record in the Tydings committee the memorandum that you left at the White House on July 3, 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you put into the record the letter that you wrote to the President as of that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, June 10, 1945.

Did you at all discuss the visit to the White House, before the Tydings committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I was asked whether I had made such a visit, and I replied that I had.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not give the letter or the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was not asked for them.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not questioned, then, about those letters at all, were you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you did state that you had been to the White House in 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that was stated in the record; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But nothing more than just you had visited there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider the Soviet Government a normal government, or did you consider it an international conspiracy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When?

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the question when if you will tell me whether you ever did.

In your opinion, what was it? A normal government, or was it an international conspiracy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my opinion, the Government of Russia was the revolutionary of Russia and different from any other government.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did recognize, in the early thirties, that the Soviet Government was different than the normal government of nations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it was the only government of its kind.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come to the conclusion, if you ever did, that it is a conspiracy and has in mind installing its form of government world wide?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I believe that involves questions of relations between the Russian Government, the Comintern, and the Communist Parties of various countries on which I am not versed.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, When did you come to the conclusion?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You said it was different than other governments; it was the only government of its kind.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you come to that conclusion? That is the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is that I have not come to that conclusion.

May I explain?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not come to that conclusion because I don't know how the structure of international relations is set up as between the Russian Government and the various Communist Parties.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you ever study the Russian language?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have studied the Russian language.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you speak it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't speak it. I read it quite freely.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you show the exhibits that we have now on the record, of your visit to the White House, that is, the memorandum and the letter, to any member of the Tydings committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. FERGUSON. Or the staff?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you account, Mr. Lattimore, for not making that part of the record? Did you not think that was material on the question as to whether or not you ever had anything to do with the foreign Policy of the Far East, as far as the President or the State Department was concerned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not think it was material. The question of whether the committee wanted to see it was up to them.

Senator FERGUSON. How would they know that it existed? You did not disclose it to any of them.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They knew that I had visited the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your only explanation, is it, for not disclosing at that time your memorandum, your stand on the Far East, and your letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I would add to that, that as a citizen I would not take the initiative in revealing the details of a citizen asking to see the President of his country.

Senator FERGUSON. You disclosed at least the letter to this committee in your voluntary statement; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. I disclosed the fact that——

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a copy of your statement? Will you read it?

The CHAIRMAN. The answer, as I understand it, then, is no.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now I am asking him to look on the bottom of page 24.

Mr. FORTAS. It is No. 6.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Thirty-three I have here, No. 6:

> In 1945, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman expressing my views on China policy. The President, in response, asked me to come to see him, and I did.

Senator FERGUSON. So you disclosed it to the President and to the public prior to coming into this hearing. What was the difference between this hearing and the Tydings committee hearing so that you did not want to disclose the fact that you had written to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not say that I did not want to disclose the fact that I had written to the President. I said here that—I told the Tydings committee that I had seen the President, and in this statement I said that I had written to the President and asked if I could see him. I see no discrepancy.

Mr. FORTAS. No; that is not right.

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel corrects you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wrote to President Truman expressing my views on China policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You did not say that you just wrote a letter. You say in this statement that you had written a letter expressing your views on China policy. You knew that the Tydings committee was investigating a question, and one of the questions was whether or not you had been an influence on our foreign policy, or what you had to do with it.

Why did you not disclose what you did in this memorandum to us? Why did you not disclose it to the Tydings committee so that they could have gone into it?

You cite the case, do you not, that the Tydings committee has found you absolutely innocent of everything? Why did you not disclose that fact to them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told the Tydings committee that I saw the President.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not tell them that you had written a memorandum of your views on the Far East or on China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told the Tydings committee that I had seen the President. If they wanted to know more about it, I was perfectly prepared to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell them that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember the transcript of the Tydings committee at that point. I certainly didn't refuse to answer any questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You are aware of the fact that you were sworn at that time to give them all the facts, were you not? The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Did you not think that, as part of your visit, if you left a memorandum, that that was material to the issue as well as giving your views in a letter which you expressed here? You did not even disclose to this committee that you had left a memorandum with the President, in your voluntary statement.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I understand that when I am sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that is an undertaking to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in response to questions.

Senator FERGUSON. You came in and were sworn, and you read this statement to this committee. Will you let me see it, please?

You read this statement, No. 6, at the bottom of page 33:

> In 1945, on my own initiative, I wrote to President Truman expressing my views on China policy. The President, in response, asked me to come to see him, and I did. Our conference lasted about 3 minutes.

Now, Mr. Lattimore, you produce here a letter giving your views on the matter. You swore, when you read this, that it was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Now I ask you, why did you not then, instead of leaving the idea that you had left nothing with the President, but talked with him for just 3 minutes, why did you not produce, as part of this memorandum——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, may I see the relevant part of the Tydings transcript?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Let the Senator conclude his question.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not then give to the committee the fact that you had written the memorandum and left it with the President? How can you say that that is an accurate statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, may I see the relevant part of the Tydings transcript?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But I am still asking you the question not on the Tydings transcript at all, but what you told this committee. You did not mention in this statement to the committee when you were telling them that was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that you had left the memorandum; you said merely that you had written a letter to him. How do you account for that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I have already said that I, as a citizen, do not believe in taking the initiative in revealing what a citizen talks about to his President when he sees him.

If the committee wants to ask for it—and this committee did—it is not in my power to refuse. But the responsibility lies with the committee. I see no obligation to volunteer anything of that kind.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the difference between your state-

ment on your views of the China policy in your letter than those in the memorandum that you left with the President? What is the difference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry. I don't understand the question.

Senator FERGUSON. You said that you did not want to disclose what you said to the President.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you think that that is the reason for stating it this way, that you only wrote a letter and saw him for 3 minutes and did not tell us that you left the memorandum?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I see nothing wrong in that whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you whether you saw anything wrong. Is that a statement of the whole truth?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I repeat that the question of the truth is a question of what the committee asks me.

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked, Is that a statement of the whole truth? Do you want to answer that?

Senator FERGUSON. What you said to the committee in your memorandum.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, it is impossible, in one memorandum, to state the whole truth of the whole range of things that the committee may be interested in, or of what has already been in the transcript.

I provided here a basis on which the committee could question me, and on which it has questioned me.

Senator FERGUSON. And is that your explanation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my explanation.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have the witness see the record now in the Tydings committee, if he wants to.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Tydings committee record available? The question on which the witness asked for the Tydings committee record was in the Tydings committee record, but if he wants to see the Tydings committee record what-

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He had asked to see it.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, you don't have the reference to this portion of the Tydings record, do you?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. FORTAS. This will take some time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we can get it later.

That is all I have at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I understand a review of the record over the week end disclosed that the article written by J. P. Powell and Max Eastman for the Reader's Digest has not been entered into the record. May it be done at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. How has that been identified? My memory does not serve me.

Mr. MORRIS. The witness was testifying one day late last week that he could recall preparing a memorandum which Mr. Carter wanted Mr. Thomas Lamont to sign. That memorandum addressed itself to the article in Reader's Digest by Powell and Eastman. That had not been inserted in the record; may it be done so at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 549" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 549

[Source: Reader's Digest, June 1945, article entitled "The Fate of the World Is at Stake in China," by Max Eastman and J. B. Powell (pp. 13–22, inclusive)]

THE FATE OF THE WORLD IS AT STAKE IN CHINA

Periodicals in Allied countries do not hesitate to publish blunt opinions when their national interest is at stake. Criticism of American policy and of individual Americans by official Russian journals, for instance, has been extreme. We can hardly expect to keep the respect of the other United Nations if our press—supposed to be the freest in the world—does not speak up just as boldly. Especially in relation to our friendly neighbor China, a plain-spoken report of the facts and a frank discussion of American policy are imperative.—THE AUTHORS.

China is a giant among nations. Larger than all Europe, its population is one-fourth of the human race. And this giant is waking up. Following the example of Japan and Russia, it is entering the industrial age.

Therefore, the question whether China goes democratic or totalitarian is the biggest political question of today. In war or peace the weight of this giant of manpower may well be decisive in settling the fate of the world.

China at present is split into three parts. Manchuria and the eastern half, including most of the seaboard, are occupied by Japan. A northwestern region not far from the Soviet border is held by the Chinese Communist Party. The rest of China is still under the Chiang Kai-shek government, which commands the loyalty of an immense majority of Chinese everywhere.

Chiang Kai-shek is the successor of Sun Yat-sen, father of the Chinese revolution and founder of the Kuomintang (People's Party), which is dedicated to these three aims: National independence, political democracy, and the people's welfare. From 1927 to 1937 Chiang defeated the war lords; crushed the attempt of the Communists, Moscow-led, to seize power; and united under the Kuomintang practically all China except the small northwest region into which his armies drove the Communists. Through popular and powerful enough to make himself permanent dictator, Chiang set a date, November 12, 1937, for a constitutional convention. Japan attacked in July of that year, and the convention had to be postponed. With victory now in sight, he has set it again—November 12, 1945—Sun Yat-sen's birthday.

Just before Japan's attack, the Communists formed a united front with the Kuomintang and promised to fight under Chiang Kai-shek. But they cooled off after the Stalin-Hitler pact and finally renounced their promise. Explaining that theye were "revolutionaries, not reformers," they declared themselves and their Red Army independent. They now have their own government, coin their own money, run their own party-controlled newspapers and suppress all others. They recently declared a boycott against Chiang's effort to produce a democratic republic, denouncing his constitutional convention, 6 months before its delegates are elected, as a slaves' congress.

J. B. Powell, born not far from Hannibal, Mo., graduated from the University of Missouri and taught 4 years in the school of journalism there. He was in China throughout the period between the two world wars as editor of the China Weekly Review, a liberal journal known all over the world. He was at the same time correspondent for the Manchester Guardian and other papers and edited for several months the daily China Press in Shanghai. (He says he worked about 20 hours a day.)

Mr. Powell was taken prisoner by the Japanese in December 1941. The story of the inhuman treatment he received, which resulted in the loss of the greater part of both feet, appeared in the Reader's Digest, November 1942. Mr. Powell has just finished a new book which will be published soon by MacMillan under the title "My 25 Years in China."

Max Eastman is an outstanding American authority on Marxism and the Communist movement. He edited the Communist weeklies the Masses and the Liberator from 1913 to 1922 and thereafter lived for 2 years in Soviet Russia, where he became thoroughly disillusioned with communism in action. Speaking Russian and reading the Russian press, he has continued to follow closely the development of the Soviet regime and the Comintern.

Such is the present state of China's hope for democracy. Japan, we are now sure, will be driven out; but whether Manchuria and north China, which "old

the principal makings of great industry, will fall to the Communists and thus ultimately swing the whole gigantic nation down the totalitarian road is undetermined. We Americans cannot evade our responsibility in this, for the question which social system prevails in China is identical with the question whose leadership prevails—that of democratic America or of totalitarian Russia.

American modes of influence are cultural persuasion; the example of prosperity; skilled technical assistance; capital investment; and, above all, military and economic supplies. Russia's weapons are conspiratorial organization and party-controlled propaganda, leading to seizure of power and a liquidation of all democrats and, if necessity arises, military invasion in the name of liberation. Russia cannot furnish capital, an example of prosperity, technical assistance, or supplies on a scale comparable to ours. This gives us the trump cards if we play our hand with clear understanding of the forces involved.

The Communists know this and are doing their best to cloud our understanding of these forces. A flood of books, articles, reviews, news dispatches, lectures, and radio broadcasts is pouring across our country, dedicated to the sole purpose of confusing American public opinion about the situation in China. There are four main points in this deception now being practiced upon us, all equally false and all aimed at persuading us to abandon another 450 million people to the totalitarian infection spreading from Russia.

DECEPTION 1. THAT RUSSIA IS A "DEMOCRACY" AND THAT CHINA CAN THEREFORE SAFELY BE LEFT TO RUSSIAN "INFLUENCE"

Owen Lattimore is perhaps the most subtle evangelist of this erroneous conception. Mr. Lattimore appraised the net result of the Moscow trials and the blood purge by which Stalin secured his dictatorship in 1936–39 as "a triumph for democracy." He now urges our Government, in a book called Solution in Asia, to accept cheerfully the spread of "the Soviet form of democracy" in central Asia. His publishers thus indicate the drift of his book on its jacket:

> He [Mr. Lattimore] shows that all the Asiatic peoples are more interested in actual democratic practices, such as the ones they can see in action across the Russian border, than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon democracies which come coupled with ruthless imperialism.

This deception was set going in Moscow in 1936, when a new constitution was filled with jazzed-up phrases from our Bill of Rights so that it could be advertised as more democratic than ours. Instead of establishing popular government, however, it legitimized the dictatorship of the Russian Communist Party (art. 126). Stalin himself, addressing the congress which ratified the draft of the constitution, frankly stated this fact:

> "I must admit that the draft of the new constitution actually leaves in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class and preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party. In the Soviet Union only one party can exist, the party of Communists (Pravda, November 26, 1936)."

In the "elections" held under this constitution in 1937 and 1938, only one candidate's name appeared on each ballot. He had been endorsed by the party, and the "voting" consisted of assenting to the party's choice. The ceremony has not been repeated, and would make no difference if it had. The constitution is merely a facade for dictatorship, and anyone who protests the fact is shot or sent to a concentration camp. In Siberia whole regions are given up to these concentration camps where from 15 to 20 millions * of Russian citizens are dying a slow death at hard labor. That is the kind of "democratic practices" the Chinese would see "across the Russian border" if they could look. But looking is not permitted by totalitarian states.

First of all, then if our policy in China is to be wise, we must hold in steady view the fact, frankly admitted by Stalin and once vigorously stated by President Roosevelt as follows: "The Soviet Union is a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world."

If this dictatorship spreads its tentacles across China, the cause of democracy in Asia is lost. As is well known, these tentacles need not include invading

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*Alexander Barmine, former brigadier general in the Red army, estimates that the number is about 12,000,000. Boris Souvarine, French historian of bolshevism, estimates 15,000,000. Victor Kravchenko, recently resigned from the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington, who has visited many camps and had official relations with their managements, says these estimates are low and puts the figure at 20,000,000.

Soviet troops, but only the native Communist parties now giving allegiance to the Soviet Union and taking their directives from Moscow. When these Communist parties get control of a neighboring state, the Moscow dictatorship and its fellow travelers call that a friendly government. It is by means of these Communist-controlled "friendly governments"—not by overt military conquest—that Russian power and totalitarian tyranny is spreading from the Soviet Union, in Asia as in Europe.

Hence, for those who cannot swallow deception No. 1, there is another. We shall quote from a recent book, Report from Red China, by Harrison Forman:

DECEPTION NO. 2. "THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT COMMUNISTS—NOT ACCORDING TO THE RUSSIAN DEFINITION OF THE TERM. I SAW NOT THE SLIGHTEST TANGIBLE CONNECTION WITH RUSSIA."

Forman is backed up by Edgar Snow, the best-known popularizer of the pro-Communist view, with the remark that the Chinese Communists and their leader Mao Tse-tung, "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of establishing communism in China in the near future."

To unmask this deception, you need only go to the Daily Worker's book shop on Thirteenth Street, New York City, pay 25 cents for Mao Tse-tung's book, China's New Democracy (1941), published with an introduction by Earl Browder (1945), and read the book. You will find that the "Lenin of China" is a devout, orthodox, and obedient disciple of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and gives unqualified allegiance both to Soviet Russia and the Communist world revolution.

Here are a few quotations from Mao's book:

"The world now depends of communism for its salvation, and so does China."

"We cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union or from the victory of the anticapitalist struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany."

"No matter whom you follow, so long as you are anti-Communist you are traitors."

Mao explains learnedly that communism in China has two stages: First, the present stage of "New Democracy," which is but a preparation for the second stage: i. e., "proletarian revolution" and the establishment of collectivism on the Soviet model. Mao excoriates those who do not understand this, and insists that "the second stage must follow the first closely, not permitting a capitalist dictatorship to be inserted between them." ("Capitalist dictatorship" is Mao's term for democracy as we understand it.)

How different this is from Edgar Snow's dulcet assurance that the Chinese Communists "happen to have renounced, years ago now, any intention of establishing Communism in China in the near future."

Mr. Snow also says, "Long before it became defunct, the Comintern ceased to have much direct contact with the Chinese Communist Party." The fact is that Mao Tse-Tung was one of three Chinese members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from 1935 to its dissolution in 1943. At the last congress of the Russian Communist Party the growth of the Chinese Party was enthusiastically reported and the Party congratulated on becoming "tempered in the fires of civil war and national war," and on "building a Soviet regime." Mao sent the congress a "flaming Bolshevik greeting" lauding the Russian Soviet system and concluding with "Long live Comrade Stalin!"

The Chinese Communist Party is the darling of Moscow and of Communists all over the world. Its national congress has actually met in Moscow. All its maneuvers, even the most "reformist," have been executed under orders from the Kremlin. A glance in the Moscow Party press is enough to prove that there has been no let-up of this intense concern with the Chinese Communist Party. Obviously, the success of the Chinese Communists in building a Red Army and establishing an independent nation just over their border—a nation whose leader declares, "We cannot be separated from the Soviet Union"—would only intensify the interest of the heads of the Soviet Union.

To complete the record of this deception: In the translation of Mao's book, Earl Browder omitted words and passages which would, if printed in America, expose his own game of playing democratic patriot in order to get his henchmen into positions of power. In the Chinese edition Mao is outspoken in advocating the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and explaining that democracies like England and the United States are "capitalist dictatorships," which "have become, or are about to become, blood-stinking military dictatorships of the capitalist class." "On the point of death," they have become "imperialist" and

will soon be replaced by "the newest Soviet-style socialist republic, a dictatorship of the proletariat."

He explains that in this respect there is no difference between the "Eastern (i. e., Japanese) imperialist" and "the s. o. b. imperialists of the West." (The Chinese epithet is fouler, but s. o. b. will do.) All this, which is of the essence of Mao's orthodox Communist position, is omitted from the American edition.

The Chinese Communist Party is more honest. Late in 1944 it passed a resolution "accepting American demands to establish military bases in the Northwest," but adding: "We are heir to the orthodoxy of Marx and Engels which calls for a class revolution of the workers and peasants. * * * The cooperation of the Chinese Communist Party with the United States is a temporary strategy. * * *"

That disposes of the propaganda myth that the Chinese Communists are not Communists.

DECEPTION NO. 3. THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE FIGHTING THE JAPS, AND THAT THE CHINESE NATIONAL ARMY IS NOT

The truth is that the Chinese Communists are fighting the Japs enough to hold their border, but not enough to make it worth while for the Japs to move in and clean them out. This can be seen by a glance at the map. The front east of Yenan, where the Communists claim they have an army of 450,000 soldiers heroically fighting the Japs is stationary. It hasn't moved since Japan came up to the Yellow River in 1938. Although the Japanese have attacked in some areas, there have been no real battles. American military observers agree that a virtual truce has existed in several front sectors, especially along the railways supplying Japanese forces fighting American and Chungking troops in the south.

Where Chiang Kai-shek's National Army fights, the record of bloody and heroic battles has been spread on the pages of the world press for years. We all know of the great struggles in 1937 and 1938 in which the flower of Chiang Kai-shek's armies was lost together with such modern armaments as China possessed. China has received only a trickle of aid as against the flood of lend-lease sent to Russia, but Chiang's armies have fought on. There were at least 100,000 casualties in the battles they fought last year on Chinese soil, and certainly 85,000 in the furious Burma campaign which has broken the blockade by reopening the Stilwell road.

Casualties among Chiang's troops run to over four times the total number of soldiers the Communists claim to have.

The tragic fact is that while fighting the Japs a little, but never enough to menace Japanese communication lines to the war against Chiang in the south, the Communists are also waging "revolutionary war" against the Chinese National Army. When the war began, the Chinese Communists Central Committee declared: "In Chinese politics the decisive factor is military power. We must in the course of the war of resistance, expand as far as possible the military power of the Party as the basis for capturing the revolutionary leadership in the future." Since Pearl Harbor Mao naturally has been willing to let the "s. o. b. Western imperialists" finish the Japs while he concentrates on "capturing the revolutionary leadership."

This makes less astounding the statement of Lin Yutang: "For every Japanese the Communists claim to have killed they have killed at least five Chinese, for every town they have captured from the Japanese they have captured 50 towns from other Chinese." It explains Congressman Walter Judd's statement that when, last summer, the Japanese armies raided down from the north through four to six hundred miles of country the Communist claim to control, they got free passage. Not a single one of the hundreds of trains carrying Japanese soldiers and supplies was derailed. (Congressman Judd, of Minnesota, served 10 years as a medical missionary in China, and saw communism first hand. He revisited the country last September and October.)

While this process of Communist revolution is going forward according to a published schedule, such fables as the following are related by Harrison Forman and solemnly quoted in a review of his book by Edgar Snow:

"In the 7 years of war the Communists have fought over 92,000 battles. They have killed and wounded 1,100,000 * * * and captured 150,000 of the enemy. * * * For the same period the Communists suffered over 400,000 casualties."

Ninety-two thousand battles in 7 years is 36 battles a day, or one battle every 40 minutes. In these battles the Communists, although a good number of them were armed only with "old blunderbusses, mines, or any weapon at hand," are

alleged to have knocked off enemy troops at the rate of 20 per hour, or one every 3 minutes—this without allowing for mealtime or rest hours, night or day, for 7 years running. Besides these astronomical achievements, the deeds of our Marines at Tarawa or Guadalcanal are, of course, mere child's play.

It is doubtful if a more fantastic tale was ever told with a straight face to the American people. And we repeat: To expose it, you have only to look up the documents and use your brains.

DECEPTION NO. 4. THAT CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS A FASCIST, AND THAT HIS TOTALITARIAN REGIME IS PREVENTING THE COMMUNISTS FROM ESTABLISHING DEMOCRACY

What kind of "democracy" the Communists aim to establish we have heard from their leader: a "Soviet-style dictatorship of the proletariat." Not only Chiang Kai-shek but everyone in the world who intelligently opposed this kind of dictatorship is denounced as a fascist. This has been the Communist smear technique ever since Hitler broke his pact with Stalin.

Chiang's regime is not democratic. When he assumed power in 1926, it was the opinion of the leaders of the Kuomintang that only a military dictatorship could achieve the unity and independence of China. Until that should be achieved China, thanks as much to the Communists as to foreign intruders and war lords, could not create a democratic republic. Whether they were right or wrong, it is certain that, except for the Communists and their subservience to Moscow, Chiang has achieved both the unity and independence of China; and he is moving toward a democratic republic.

He once remarked to Ambassador Hurley: "If I become a dictator I will be forgotten, like all dictators in our history, within 48 hours of my death. But if I sincerely work to return power to the people, I will be remembered as the George Washington of China. Can there be any doubt of my choice?"

Chiang's speech of last March, in which he set the date for constitutional convention, is sensible and convincing. It concluded:

> "Upon the inauguration of constitutional government, all political parties will have legal status and enjoy equality. The Government has offered to give legal recognition to the Communist Party as soon as the latter agrees to incorporate its army and local administration in the National Army and Government. The offer still stands. * * *
>
> "I am optimistic of national unification and the future of democratic government in our country."

No one, comparing Chiang's speech with the schedule of steps toward proletarian dictatorship drawn up by Mao Tse-Tung, could fail to see which of the two is on the road to democracy. Chiang has permitted the publication of a Communist daily in his capital throughout the war, while Mao will not even admit a correspondent of any Kuomintang, or non-Party, newspaper in his capital. There is a maddening press censorship under Chiang, but under Mao there is no free press to censor. That is a rough indication of how things stand.

The Chinese Communist regime is a ruthless party dictatorship, camouflaged like Russia's with ceremonial elections, but ruled with executions, purges, concentration camps. The Chinese National Government has tabulated, with name, place, date, and circumstance, the persons known to have been officially murdered by the Communists as "traitors and Trotskyites" from April 1939 to October 1944. They total 34,758, of whom 26,834 were military personnel, 3,069 government officials, 1,387 Kuomintang Party workers, and the rest civilians. This does not include the unnumbered Chinese soldiers killed by the Communists in combat action against Chiang's troops.

The fact that China under Chiang is not yet democratic is the very thing that makes the Communist danger so great. If the Chinese knew freedom and possessed it, they would be less ready victims of the totalitarian infection. Having known little but the arbitrary rule of rival war lords, and then the equally arbitrary enforcement of national unity by the Kuomintang, they are as open to this infection as the Russian peasants were who had known only the regime of the Czar. They are poised at a cross road, ready to go either way—the way of the Russian totalitarian state toward which Mao and the Chinese Communist Party are pointing, or the way of American democracy toward which Chiang and the Kuomintang are pointing. This is why the Chinese liberals, as even pro-Soviet reporters admit, while fighting for more freedom under Chiang, are not for the Communists.

What Chiang needs is our political understanding, technical assistance, loans, investments, munitions, and supplies in support of his plan to introduce con-

stitutional government and make China democratic. The two most important items on this list at the moment are supplies and understanding. Supplies our State Department has recently, to the relief of all wise men, decided to give to Chiang, and not to the Communists. But we must give understanding too.

It shows no understanding to demand of an anti-Communist government that it "unite" with Communists. An American foreign policy based on this mistake may very soon prove fatal, not only from the standpoint of democracy but of every American interest in Asia. Put yourself in the place of Chiang Kai-shek and you will see why. Chiang has fought the Communists in bloody war and desperate intrigue for 20 years. He gained his power by saving China from a Communist revolution in 1927. He knows the Communists. He knows that one word from Stalin—and no word from anywhere else in the world—could produce the "unity" some critics are so irritatingly urging him to pull out of a hat.

Chinese courtesy will survive a lot of irritation. But Chinese patriotism has a limit beyond which it will not go. And there lies behind our pressure upon Chiang for a "unity" he cannot achieve, an implication that can only infuriate Chinese patriots. The implication is that the Roosevelt-Churchill pledge at Cairo to return Manchuria to China at the end of the war may, if unity fails, be interpreted to mean turn over Manchuria to the Stalin-dominated Communist government of Yenan.

Washington rumor, reported in the New York Times, even says that Stalin was promised a free hand in Manchuria for his help in the war against Japan. But Stalin may never have asked for Manchuria. That is not his method of expansion. All Stalin needs in order to establish his power in Manchuria is a "friendly government": a quick march in there by Mao's Red Army, followed by the usual made-to-order puppet state. Our acquiescence in that operation will be sufficient to sell out Chiang—sell out the hope of democracy in China, and the hope of a strong independent American ally in Asia.

Chiang's loyalty to the Western democracies, and to America in particular, throughout the long war for Manchuria has been inflexible. It survived our unlimited export of war materials to Japan; it survived our "defeat Hitler first" policy and the loss of Burma and Malaya, which enabled the Japanese to blockade China, and prolonged her sufferings interminably; it survived the Stilwell incident; it has survived the recent, Communist-kindled flare of anti-Chinese slander in the American press; it has even survived, so far, our inane demand for "unity" (with armed revolutionists who are waging war against him). But it will not survive the knowledge that we propose to turn over to Stalin, through the agency of these revolutionists, the richest lands of China about which, essentially, the whole war with Japan has been fought.

Chiang, because of his belief in Western institutions, has stood like a rock against those in his party who advocate a rapprochement with Russia as against his close friendship with the United States. But should it become apparent that we intend to bargain away all North China for the sake of Russia's help in the war, will Chiang be able to resist this pressure? With what arguments can he answer those Chinese patriots who will suggest that China do her own bargaining with Russia, and renounce the policy of special trust in the United States? Only the smoke-screen of deception laid down by the Communists and their fellow travelers blinds us to this momentous question, and all it entails—for us and for world democracy.

These pro-Communists are playing the same game in Asia that succeeded so brilliantly in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, for instance, on his principle of "arming anybody who will kill a Hun," Churchill sent munitions and supplies to the rebel Tito, veteran Comintern organizer and agent of Moscow, enabling him besides killing Huns to wage a civil war against our ally, the legitimate government, whose troops were commanded by General Mikhailovitch. Mikhailovitch was also killing Huns, but he had not the backing of Moscow, and he had no propaganda machine with which to counter this same four-sided lie: Russia is a democracy, Tito is not a Communist, Tito is fighting the enemy and Mikhailovitch is not, and Mikhailovitch is a "fascist."

Except for Chiang's loftier position as head of his government for 18 years, the situation in China is ominously similar. And the choice for us is inescapable: Either we face the facts and side with the growth of democracy, or we swallow the lies and endorse the totalitarian strangulation. There was never a plainer or more simple issue before a United States Government.

But there is one big difference—that is the size of China. To sell out Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese "Tito" will not add a paltry 13 million to the totali-

tarian Colossus. It will bring under totalitarian regimentation 450 million people. This vast population, united in their policy with the Soviet totalitarian empire of some 200 million, would certainly threaten the hope for a democratic world. When Iran and India followed China, as they almost certainly would, that would mean a solid block of 1 billion people under a totalitarian regime.

Facing such a prospect, it seems obvious that as intelligent democrats we must abandon the whole policy of meek appeasement toward Communist propaganda and power in China. Even Russia will have greater respect for us if we make unmistakably clear our loyalty to those free institutions which have enabled our American nation to arm, equip, feed, and rescue from destruction a half of the planet. If we really believe in democracy, let us implement that belief with a peaceable but clear-headed, informed and resolute campaign to promote the democratic way of life throughout the earth.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I am presenting you a list of names. I am going to ask you, in connection with that list of names, the following two questions. Perhaps we can save some time on it, if you will advert to this for just a minute.

The question will read in every case: In your dealings with the following people, did you know or did you have any reason to believe that they were Communists? That will be the question.

If you had no dealings with them, of course, you will have the opportunity to say so at the outset. So the question in connection with each one of these individuals will be:

Did you know, or did you have any reason to believe that they were Communists?

Mr. Sourwine. That this person was Communist?

Mr. Morris. That this particular person was a Communist, in your dealings with that particular person.

Senator Ferguson. Do you not include otherwise? Whether it was in his dealings with them that he knew they were Communist, or otherwise knew they were Communist?

Mr. Morris. That is right, or otherwise knew.

Mr. Fortas. Mr. Morris, if you are going to ask that question about all these people, may I ask you to reframe it now?

Mr. Morris. All right, let us take one.

In your dealings with Solomon Adler, did you know, or did you have any reason to know, that Solomon Adler was a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Senator Smith. Wait a minute, Mr. Morris. Is that presupposing that he had dealings with Solomon Adler?

Mr. Morris. Senator Smith, I indicated that if he had no dealings with the man he would, of course, have the opportunity to so state at the time.

Senator Smith. All right.

The Chairman. Do you understand the question, now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. I think so.

Mr. Fortas. Two questions.

Mr. Morris. There were two questions; that is right.

Mr. Sourwine. May I rephrase the question, just in case there is any doubt about it? It might not do any harm to say it once more. Mr. Morris will read a name. The reading of the name presumes that Mr. Lattimore had dealings with the person. If he has had no dealings with the person, he is to say so. Otherwise, Mr. Lattimore is to indicate his answer to the question as to whether, in his dealings with

this person, or otherwise, he ever knew or had any reason to believe that the named person was a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was a Communist, all right.

Mr. MORRIS. The second name is Hilda Austern.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. H. W. Baerensprung.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know H. W. Baerensprung?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I saw him once when he came to this country, and I knew him as a person who had been reorganizing Chiang Kai-shek's police force.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he prepare an article for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Joseph F. Barnes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. FORTAS. Just a moment.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Morris, may we have it understood, if you are going to conduct the examination this way, that by the witness answering these questions, he does not personally name any statement, or no inference is permissible as to whether he thinks or does not think that they were Communists?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. The question is addressed to his knowledge as to whether or not he knew them to be Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Or had reason to believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Or had reason to believe; that is right, Senator.

Kathleen Barnes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; until the question came up to her refusing to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. Joseph M. Bernstein.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know who he is and I don't believe I ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Charles Bidien.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know who he is and I don't believe I ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he prepare an article for Pacific Affairs while you were the editor of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it very much. I don't believe I have ever seen that name before.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. T. A. Bisson.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Albert Blumberg.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever met him, and I am not sure who is meant.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Michael Borodin.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Michael Borodin I never met. I have seen him once and I assume he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Louise Bransten.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of clarification?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FORTAS. Again I understand the question is: Did you have any reason to know that they were Communists, or to believe that they were Communist at the time that you were dealing with them?

Mr. Sourwine. No. The question is: Did you, in your dealings with them, or in any other way, know or have reason to believe that this person was a Communist?

Mr. Fortas. At any time?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir.

Mr. Lattimore. I certainly never had any dealings with Mike Borodin.

Mr. Morris. You did not encounter Borodin, did you?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't encounter him. He was at a meeting in Moscow when I was there in 1936 with Mr. Carter and somebody afterward told me that that was Borodin.

Mr. Morris. Louise Bransten.

The Chairman. My understanding is that—see if my recollection is correct—that you said, in answer to the former question, that you believed he was a Communist. Am I in error on that?

Mr. Latimore. I believe that he is a Communist simply from my reading of Chinese history in the 1920's.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Morris. Louise Bransten.

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recognize that name and I don't believe I ever met any such person.

Mr. Morris. Did you prepare an article for the committee of the American-Russian Institute, the chairman of which was Louise R. Bransten?

Senator Watkins. Is that Louise R. or Louise A. Bransten?

Mr. Morris. Louise R. Branstein is the name.

Mr. Fortas. It is wrong on the list.

Mr. Morris. It is wrong on the list; that is right. Louise R. Bransten. Do you remember preparing an article for the American-Russian Institute, of which she was acting as chairman?

Mr. Lattimore. I am not sure this is the same thing, Mr. Morris, but I remember publishing an article in the American Quarterly on the Soviet Union, or something.

Mr. Morris. Does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. Lattimore. No, it doesn't. The article here appears to be an article that I published in Far Eastern Survey, and it may have been reprinted by this publication. But I don't recall ever seeing it before.

Mr. Morris. Did you give permission to have it republished?

Mr. Lattimore. Not that I recall. It is quite possible.

The Chairman. Did you prepare the article?

Mr. Lattimore. I prepared an article for the Far Eastern Survey. The Far Eastern Survey may have consulted me on permission to have it republished elsewhere, but I don't recall it.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may the article, as it appears in this particular document, be introduced into the record?

Senator Smith. Does Mr. Lattimore identify this article?

The Chairman. He has not identified the article.

Mr. Lattimore. I have identified the article by title. Let me look and see if it is the same article.

Yes; this is the same article. It is marked "By permission of Far Eastern Survey, American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations."

Without comparing the two articles, I would not know whether this is a complete reprint, or not.

Senator SMITH. I think we might have it understood there that Mr. Lattimore will have a chance to review that, sentence by sentence, if he wishes to.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he should be given that chance before it goes in.

Senator SMITH. It can be put in with his right to apply to it any changes he finds necessary in order to make it conform.

The CHAIRMAN. You may return to this article at a later time, after Mr. Lattimore has had a chance to look at it.

All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Earl Browder.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I considered him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you meet Mr. Browder, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall what year it was, but I went down once when I was about to leave for China. I went down to the offices of the American Communist Party and called on him to see if I could get some leads to find out about the Communists in China, and I got a complete brush-off.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone arrange that meeting for you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I just walked down there.

Mr. MORRIS. You walked in cold?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Walked in cold.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask a minute.

That was before you started for China on one occasion, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Up to that time, had you ever met Browder before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Had you ever had any dealings with him since that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. He came down and testified before the Tydings committee, but I didn't see him.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever attend a conference or meeting when he was present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. FORTAS. Will you try to place that, approximately?

Senator SMITH. I recall reading somewhere about Mr. Lattimore's conference with Mr. Browder before he left for a trip to China. I do not know what the date was.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was before the Tydings committee I testified to that.

Senator SMITH. I do not remember where I had seen it. I believe you do refer to that in your book.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That he had a conference with Browder?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I wouldn't call it a conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you testify that took place in 1936, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It may have been in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Herman Budzeslawski.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that I identified that name from an article by a woman columnist, Dorothy Thompson. She wrote an article in

the Saturday Evening Post about him. I met him once at the office of Overseas News Agency at the time when I was writing syndicated articles for them, and so was he, under a different name, which I forget.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you try to recall what that other name is, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I could try, but I am very vague on the subject. I believe it is probably in that article by Dorothy Thompson.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you did not know, or had no reason to believe, that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Norman Bethune.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know his name only by reading. I don't believe I ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe that he was Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I have seen that stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Angus Cameron?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Angus Cameron, I have no reason to believe was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Have your dealings with Angus Cameron been extensive, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not at all. I met him once. I have never had any dealings with him.

Mr. MORRIS. How many books of yours has he published, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a member of a firm that has published several books of mine, but the handling of my books for publication by that firm was never through him.

Mr. MORRIS. Through whom was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was through Mr.—oh, I would have to go a long way back—wait a minute. My first two books were published by that firm at the end of the 1920's and I dealt with—I think he was the then head of the firm, whose name was Max something. He has since died. And my more recent books through that firm have all been handled through Mr. Stanley Salmen.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. S-a-l-m-e-n.

Mr. MORRIS. Evans Carlson. Evans F. Carlson.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Were your dealings with him extensive?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I wouldn't say they were extensive.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently have you met General Carlson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I used to see him socially quite a bit in the 1930's, when he was at the American Marine Guard at the Embassy in Peking, and I have seen him maybe three times in this country, three or four times.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you advise him at the time of his considered resignation from the Marine Corps in 1939 that he would be more effective in serving the cause of China by "staying in the Marine Corps" rather than resigning.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think that wording is exact.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your recollection of it, Mr. Lattimore, of what is in the record. I would like to have your testimony on it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I thought it would be a pity for him to resign from the Marine Corps. I thought that his knowledge and experience would be of better service to this country in the Marine Corps.

Mr. MORRIS. Abraham Chapman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I have ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was a writer for the Institute of Pacific Relations publications?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember some correspondence on the subject at a time when I was on the research committee of the IPR, but I never met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Chen Han-seng.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Chen Han-seng, at the time I knew him, I had no reason to believe was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is he now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have heard that he is in China.

Mr. MORRIS. That is Red China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Your dealings with Chen Han-seng were quite extensive, were they not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I knew him when he was doing research for the IPR, and then he worked two academic years at Johns Hopkins.

Mr. MORRIS. Under your sponsorship?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Under my direction.

Mr. MORRIS. Chew Shi Hong.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not quite sure who is meant there by Chew Shi Hong.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may we come back to that?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Harriet Chi.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Harriet Chi, yes, I knew slightly; had no reason to believe was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. She was your secretary at one time, was she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She worked as my secretary for, oh, 10 days or 2 weeks, in 1936, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. She is the wife of Chao-Ting Chi, who is now an official of the Chinese Communist Government, is she?

Mr. LATTIMORE. She is; or was.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name; will you pronounce that next name, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I pronounce it "Chow Moo" (Ch'Iao Mu).

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a feminine or a masculine name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't tell.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have had no dealings with that person?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. It may be somebody I had met in China. I can't place the name.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you had no dealings with that person while you were acting as an adviser to the Generalissimo?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't testify exactly to that. I met so many people once or twice while I was working for the Generalissimo.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where that particular person is now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Chu Tong.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Chu Tong I met maybe twice while he was working for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe, or did you know at that time that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not consider him a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might interpose:

Mr. Morris occasionally rephrases the question, and I think it should be made clear to the witness that even so, that does not change it for subsequent names. The question remains for each name, first, the assumption that the witness has had dealings with this person. If not, he is to so state.

Then the question is: Did you, in your dealings with this person, or in any other way, know or have any reason to believe that this person was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the case of Chu Tong, there was some question of his loyalty record being reviewed by—I forget whether it was the Security Board of OWI or the Civil Service, or both of them, and the question came up whether he should be considered as a person who should be discharged for loyalty.

And I believe the record shows that the grounds were considered insufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Back there a few names there was one to whom the witness referred as having been under him at Johns Hopkins. What name was that?

Mr. MORRIS. Chen Han-seng.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Chen Han-seng.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand he testified he is now in Red China.

Mr. LATTIMORE. So I believe. I heard that recently.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think the question embraced whether or not he knew or had reason to believe that he was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think it did, Mr. Chairman. I certainly did not believe him to be a Communist at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you this copy of a civil service paper, the first line of which makes reference to Chew Sih Hong. In connection with the difficulty we had in identifying who that was, I ask you if that would refresh your recollection.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would mean that Chew Sih Hong and Chu Tong are probably the same person. Many Chinese have two personal names, and sometimes one is used and sometimes the other. Chu would be the family name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, was that a matter of your recollection, or was that only a statement as to what the paper that Mr. Morris handed you indicates?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The paper that Mr. Morris handed to me indicates that it was the same person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any recollection as to whether that is true, whether they were the same person?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not without reading the document through again. But I am willing to assume they were the same person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think if you read the document through it would refresh your recollection?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Does the document also refer to him as Chu Tong?

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, I call attention to the fact that the letter refers to Chew Sih Hong, the middle name appearing here as S-i-h. On this list it is S-h-i; that is, on the list that Mr. Morris supplied.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter that will have to be straightened out by the witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. The American spelling of Chinese names and syllables is a fearful and wonderful thing, is it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I remember now. I was thinking of this as a Mr. Chew, which would be a common Chinese name, but I see that he is referred to here as Mr. Hong. And I remember now old Dr. Chi telling me something that I didn't know before, that the family name there is Tong, or Hong, which is pronounced one way in Fukien Province and the other way in other provinces of China.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us clear it up now.

Did you know him? Did you have dealings with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew him. I saw him a couple of times at the New York office of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know him to be, or have reason to believe that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. There was this question raised by the Civil Service Commission and, as I say, my recollection is that it was decided that the evidence was insufficient.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now recollect, sir, that the two names on this list, Chew Sih Hong and Chew Tong are the same person?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They must be the same person; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will this document that reflected the witness' recollection on that point be introduced into the record, for that purpose?

Mr. SOURWINE. Simply as the document that was shown to the witness, and which he read?

Mr. MORRIS. Which he read.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted for that purpose. I do not know what else is in here.

You are not holding him responsible for what else is in here, are you?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 550" and is as follows.)

EXHIBIT No. 550

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF LAW OFFICE,
November 14, 1943.

The COMMISSION.

(Through Mr. Smith and the Executive Director and Chief Examiner.)

I am submitting herewith as a unit the cases of Chew Sih Hong and Dr. Kung Chuan Chi, employees of the Office of War Information. These cases are being submitted together because both individuals are serving in the same section, and it appears that Mr. Hong was employed at the recommendation of Dr. Chi who in turn was employed by Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director of Pacific Operations of the Office of War Information.

The case of Mr. Hong was previously before the Commission and analyses of the facts in his case were furnished by the undersigned and by Mr. Cannon. We both took the position that Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance, reputed to be an organization affiliated with the Communist Party, and the China Daily News, said to be a publication by and for Chinese Communists, and his references and associations, were such as to warrant a finding of ineligibility. The Commission transmitted to the Office of War Information a

proposed memorandum opinion in the case of Mr. Hong and under date of November 30, 1942, Mr. Elmer Davis in a letter to Commissioner Flemming stated that in view of the information which we furnished him, Hong was terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942. The Commission thereupon advised the Office of War Information under date of December 8, 1942, that the Commission has concluded that a finding of ineligibility is necessary and that the Commission's records have been noted to show that Mr. Hong's services were terminated at the close of business on November 15, 1942, as reported in the letter from Mr. Elmer Davis of November 30, 1942. Previously the Commission had approved the finding of ineligibility and this action was recorded in Minute 4 of December 4, 1942.

In a letter dated July 27, 1943, Rear Admiral R. P. McCullough referred to previous correspondence regarding Mr. Hong and stated that the letter of November 30, 1942, from the Office of War Information to the effect that Hong had been terminated at the close of business November 15, 1942, was somewhat in error because Mr. Hong had been separated from the New York office of the Office of War information on November 15, 1942, for duty with the Army and that when he returned in the spring of 1943 he was again employed in the New York office of the Office of War Information, that office not knowing that Hong had been declared ineligible by the Civil Service Commission. Admiral McCullough accordingly requested that the Commission reconsider the case of Mr. Hong. Mr. Moyer then sent the file to the Investigations Division so that an interview might be had with Mr. Owen Lattimore, Head of the San Francisco office of the Office of War Information. Mr. Lattimore was accordingly interviewed in San Francisco and on a later date Mr. Steely interviewed Admiral McCullough and Mr. Marsh of the Office of War Information regarding Mr. Hong, Mr. Owen Lattimore being also present during this interview. Mr. Steely reported among other things that Mr. Lattimore stated that he wished to keep Mr. Hong on the job, that Mr. Lattimore had an efficient set-up in the Chinese section in the New York office of the Office of War Information and wanted to keep it that way, that he had explicit confidence in Dr. Chi, that Mr. Hong is under careful supervision and even if he were a Communist he is not in a position where he can do any damage, that the selection of suitable Chinese was a delicate matter, and it is extremely difficult to obtain a competent employee who does not have connections which might constitute leaks in the organization, that under the present set-up with Dr. Chi and Mr. Hong there have been no incidents of confidential information getting into unauthorized channels and that there had been no attempts on Mr. Hong's part to use his present position for the spreading of Communist propaganda. Mr. Lattimore also pointed out that Mr. Hong was recently used by the Army to teach Chinese to 224 officers in India. Mr. Lattimore stated that he did not know Mr. Hong but he did know Dr. Chi and is relying upon Dr. Chi's recommendation and knowledge of Mr. Hong.

During the interview in San Francisco Mr. Lattimore made an extended statement regarding Mr. Hong and Dr. Chi and also furnished the investigator with a copy of a letter which he had written to Mr. Joseph Barnes under date of June 15, 1943. The statement of Mr. Lattimore during the interview and the copy of his letter to Mr. Barnes are appropriately identified in the file. It would be a difficult thing to attempt to summarize Mr. Lattimore's lengthy statement or his letter to Mr. Barnes. However, the gist of his comments is that he does not know Hong personally but based on his knowledge of the situation, neither the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance nor the China Daily News are Communistic. He then proceeded to give rather involved reasons for his conclusions. He said that he had known Dr. Chi, who is about 70 years of age, in China, that he was a respected and cultured man, and that his knowledge of Dr. Chi is such that he has implicit faith and confidence in his integrity and ability. He told Dr. Chi to select the person he wanted to assist him and Dr. Chi selected Mr. Hong. This was the first time that Mr. Lattimore had any knowledge of Mr. Hong at all.

Among other things Mr. Lattimore said:

> "Of course, I have no concrete proof that Hong is not a Communist but in the absence of concrete proof I think there is a prime facie case to show that he is not a Communist. I know there is a law preventing the hiring of Communists. Personally and frankly I would not be too worried if an individual Communist were in Hong's position. This is because he would not be able to form a 'cell' and could not get away with anything. He could not commit verbal sabotage, and all of the work coming out of the New York office has to clear through me."

On a later occasion Mr. Lattimore stated to our investigator in part:

"Now I know that the various factions smear a non-Conformist by charging him with being a Communist. However, the Chinese Government dare not come out in the open and intervene in such domestic problems. I merely say this: If your people have gone to the Chinese Ambassador or any other Chinese Government representative and such Chinese representative has told you that this man Hong is suspected of being a Communist, then I say you should discount such evidence and certainly should not declare the man ineligible merely on that kind of evidence. It is true that I don't know anything about Hong personally except what I have learned from Dr. Chi. It is also true that he could be a Communist without my knowledge. It is also true that he could have hoodwinked Dr. Chi. However, until concrete evidence is presented that he is a Communist then I believe that based on Dr. Chi's standing and reputation and ability, his judgment that Hong is not a Communist is a prime facie case in favor of Hong and should not be reversed on the testimony that you may have received from anyone representing the Chinese Government or for that matter on the testimony of any Chinese."

It will be noted that the sum and substance of Mr. Lattimore's testimony is that he does not know Mr. Hong, that he does know Dr. Chi, that he has full faith in Dr. Chi and was willing to employ Hong on Dr. Chi's recommendation, that he does not know whether Hong is a Communist, but does not think he is and that even if Hong were a Communist, he would still like to retain Hong in the service because Hong could do no harm in his position.

In his letter to Mr. Barnes, Mr. Lattimore outlined the entire situation as he understood it, described the relationship between Hong and Dr. Chi, and then said:

"As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American government agency, there will be no difficulty with either man, no irresponsible playing with Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction. The retention of both men is therefore a guarantee to the secrecy and security of the work of OWI as well as a guarantee of the confident fulfillment of directives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given the time to work on it, I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics, to their source; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after getting rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire people who would actually be the nominee of factions not under our control."

The foregoing letter from Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Barnes was written in strict confidence and is not to be quoted to any outside source.

The evidence before the Commission at the time unfavorable action was originally taken in the case of Mr. Hong tended to indicate rather strongly that Hong is a Communist and engaged in activities having for their purpose support of Communist party interests. The recent investigation and interviews have not changed the evidence and have, on the contrary, elicited some information tending to strengthen the position that Hong is pro-Communist. Thus it was brought out in addition to all of the other information that Hong was active in the American Student Union during his school years.

The evidence indicated that Hong is pro-Communist. The question now for determination is whether his employment should be approved because of the strong representations of Mr. Lattimore that Hong is probably not a Communist, but even if he is a Communist, Mr. Lattimore still wishes to retain him because Hong will work under close supervision and will not be able to do any harm.

On the one hand it can be argued that since we are reasonably convinced that Hong is pro-Communist, it is our responsibility to require his removal notwithstanding Mr. Lattimore's representations. On the other hand the Commission could, if it wished, take the position that since Mr. Lattimore has assumed responsibility, the Commission can afford to permit Hong's retention in the service. If the Commission takes the latter position it will be tantamount to saying that although we believe the individual is a Communist, we will be willing to rate him eligible provided the employing agency is willing to assume the responsibility. I doubt that the Commission can afford to avoid the issue in this manner. If we believe Hong is a Communist then we should rate him ineligible.

Do we believe Hong is a Communist? The Commission's original finding was based on Hong's connections with the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance and with the China Daily News. Much of the information regarding the Communistic

nature of the Alliance and the newspaper came from Chinese, some of whom were connected with competing newspapers. We ourselves have not read the China Daily News. Mr. Lattimore states he has read some of the issues and has found nothing Communistic in them, although he admits there might have been something Communistic in the issues which he has not read. Mr. Lattimore has spent years in China and from his statement and letter to Mr. Barnes it would appear that he is thoroughly familiar with the various political factions. His conclusion is that Hong's connections, in the light of his knowledge of the situation, do not necessarily point to pro-Communism. In matters of the Chinese, Lattimore is somewhat of an expert and his opinion is entitled to considerable weight.

Since we have no direct evidence that Hong is a Communist, and since the original decision was based on the circumstances of Hong's connections and in view of Mr. Lattimore's representations, I am ready to reach the conclusion that possibly we made an error in the case of Mr. Hong; I am, therefore, ready to recommend that Mr. Hong be rated eligible for retention in his position in the Office of War Information.

In the case of Dr. Chi, I recommended in my memorandum of May 7, 1943, that he be rated eligible. Mr. Smith did not agree with me. The Commission has not yet acted on the case of Dr. Chi. For the reasons stated in my memorandum of May 7, 1943, I again recommend that Dr. Chi be rated eligible.

ALFRED KLEIN,
Acting Chief Law Officer.

CX: FS: ODS.
September 17, 1943.

MR. MOYER: I do not believe I clearly understand Mr. Lattimore's point of view regarding the cases of Chi and Hong. It seems that he is, in effect, suggesting that whatever evidence we may have, short of being positive and direct, tending to show the applicants to be communistically inclined is entitled to very little weight and that his judgment, based on his personal knowledge of Chi and on Chi's appraisal of Hong, should prevail. However, as pointed out by Mr. Klein, there is no absolute proof that the applicants are Communists and in view of Lattimore's knowledge of the complicated Chinese political situation, gained through years of residence in China, I am also willing to change my previous recommendation for both applicants from ineligibility to eligibility.

FARRAR SMITH.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Frank V. Coe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I knew Mr. Coe very slightly. I met him several times here in Washington when he was a Government servant.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever attend an Institute of Pacific Relations meeting with Mr. Coe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that Mr. Coe was at one of the international conferences of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you attend that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I was also there.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the question.

I was asking him to complete the answer, because the question embraced whether or not he met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall attending a caucus meeting of the IPR at Hot Springs, in conjunction with Mr. Frank V. Coe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall it. But if you have a document to refresh my memory, it may——

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you now exhibit No. 293, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Already in our record.

Mr. MORRIS. Already in our public records, 293.

Senator SMITH. Which Hot Springs is it?

Mr. MORRIS. That is Virginia.

The CHAIRMAN. This is with reference to Frank V. Coe, is it?

Mr. MORRIS. Frank V. Coe; that is right, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember ever seeing this document before.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that document recall a caucus meeting of the IPR that you attended, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it is headed "Preliminary meeting of the American delegation."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember attending a preliminary meeting of the American delegation of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember, but such preliminary meetings were quite a common procedure before international conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that document purport to be the minutes of that meeting, at which Mr. Jessup presided?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I must have been there, but, as I say, I do not recall the meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that document show that you spoke on several occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The document indicates that I spoke on several occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not that document indicate that Mr. Frank V. Coe was present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It indicates that Mr. Coe was present.

I note also that this is not a stenographic transcript and——

The CHAIRMAN. You have not been asked about that. I have warned you on several occasions; I have tried to get you not to interject statements after the Chair's ruling.

You were asked a question as to whether or not that refreshed your recollection as to whether or not you had met Mr. Frank V. Coe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It does not refresh my recollection that I met him there, but, quite obviously, he and I were there at the same time.

May I add that the record is not a stenographic transcript and that I don't hold myself responsible for the way in which I may be quoted here.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not asked as to that, or as to whether you were responsible.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Henry Collins, is the next name.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name, and I don't believe I have met him.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you want done with this exhibit in the hands of the witness?

Mr. MORRIS. That has already been introduced as exhibit No. 293, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Laughlin B. Currie.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No."

Mr. MORRIS. Hugh Deane.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever met him. I think he is a man who may have been a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, but I don't believe I have ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Len DeCaux.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Len DeCaux I have met once or twice and had no reason to believe to be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Ellen DeJong.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met her occasionally over some years in the IPR and had no reason to believe her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. She was a staff member of the IPR, was she not?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe she was for a short period.
Mr. MORRIS. Is she now known as Ellen Atkinson?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what she is doing now?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't.
Mr. MORRIS. Theodore Draper?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have ever met him.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any associations with him in connection with the IPR?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever did. I don't recall his name as associated with the IPR at all.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Laurence Duggan.
Mr. LATTIMORE. I never met Mr. Duggan.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. James Dolsen.
Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a new name to me. I can't place it.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Israel Epstein.
Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Israel Epstein I knew slightly and did not consider him a Communist, but did believe him to be an ardent supporter of Chinese Communists.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where he is now?
Mr. LATTIMORE. It has been stated in the press that he has gone abroad.
Mr. MORRIS. Is he in Red China now?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he was recently feted in Red China?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.
Mr. MORRIS. Is he the husband of Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, he is.
Mr. MORRIS. Was Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley a staff member of the IPR?
Mr. LATTIMORE. She was for a period, I believe, yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Is she now in Red China?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.
Mr. MORRIS. Dolly Eltenton.
Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I met her several times in California. I believe she worked for a while for the California office of IPR. I had no reason to believe and have no reason to believe she is a Communist.
Mr. MORRIS. John K. Fairbank.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, could I intrude at that point?
Have you, Mr. Lattimore, given us your full recollection with regard to Mrs. Eltenton?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe I have. I knew her very slightly.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know her husband?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I met him maybe once or twice at the time that she was working for the IPR.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever visit in his home?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I think my wife and I may have had dinner there once.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. and Mrs. Eltenton ever visit in your home?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you just ask your wife if she recalled?
Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she say she did not?
Mr. LATTIMORE. She said she did not.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Eltenton alone ever visit in your home?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mrs. Eltenton at one time secretary to Jack Oakie?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember exactly what her position was. She had some secretarial position at the California IPR.
The CHAIRMAN. Let's go back, then. The question was was she ever sceretary to Jack Oakie.
Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't answer that.
The CHAIRMAN. Why cannot you answer it?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Because all I remember is that she worked at the California office, and precisely in what capacity I don't recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did she leave IPR to go with the American-Russian Institute?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was she with the American-Russian Institute as a paid employee after she left IPR?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. SOURWINE. At the time that there was a visit to the home of the Eltentons by you and Mrs. Lattimore, was she then with the American-Russian Institute?
Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that she was with the IPR.
The CHAIRMAN. At that time?
Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time.
Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Sourwine, can we have a date, a year?
Mr. SOURWINE. I would be very interested to have the date and year of the household visit.
Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the only time at which we knew Mrs. Eltenton and her husband was in the first half of 1938, when they were living in Berkeley.
Mr. SOURWINE. Have you told the committee all that you know about Mr. Eltenton?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I have told everything that I can recall. I have a very shadowy recollection of both of them.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right.
Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee in connection with Dolly Eltenton and her husband George Charles Eltenton?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Mr. MORRIS. You have not read it?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Mr. MORRIS. The next name on the list is John K. Fairbank.
Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is no.
Mr. MORRIS. You do know John K. Fairbank well, do you not?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I know him; yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him well, Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Fairly well.
Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever work for you in the Office of War Information?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No. He never worked under me.
Mr. MORRIS. Was he not head of the China Division of the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that. My recollection is that he worked for the Office of War Information—no that he worked in the American Embassy in Chungking collecting documents, I believe, for colleges and universities and research work over here, and then transferred to the OWI.

But the precise dates and precise character of his service in OWI I didn't have anything to do with and I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember her, and I had no reason to consider her a Communist at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Gen. Feng Y'hsiang.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Gen. Feng Y'hsiang, I met first in Chungking when he was one of the deputies to Chiang Kai-shek, and I met him afterward in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he ever a guest at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He stayed overnight at my house once.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever travel in the United States with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see, I think I traveled from Philadelphia to Baltimore with him once. I had gone up to Bryn Mawr, where I was requested to act as his translator in a speech he made at Bryn Mawr College.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony you did not know or had no reason to believe he was a Communist ?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Had no reason to believe he was a Communist. Anything but.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever introduce him to anybody as your Communist friend?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you persuade him to go back to Communist China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever discuss the prospects of his return to Communist China, with anybody?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I believe that I may have talked in general terms about his going back to China, but I don't think it was Communist China at that time. My view of him was that he was one of the strongly democratic Chinese who had never joined the Reds and was not likely to.

The CHAIRMAN. To come back again, to whom are you referring?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Gen. Feng Y'hsian, once known as the Christian general of China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce into the record at this time two newspaper articles in connection with the last man about whom we have been interrogating Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Where do they come from, and what is their background?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the New York Times of January 15, 1948, page 14, and a photastat of another article from the New York Times, of September 6, 1948, pages 1 and 6, in reference to Feng Yu-hsiang.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you cause those photostats to be made from the original papers?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the date at which, or about which the witness knew this party?

Mr. FORTAS. What is the date of those photostats?

Mr. MORRIS. That is September 1948.

When did you last see Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The last time I saw him was when he stayed at our house. He and, I think, a son-in-law of his stayed overnight at our house.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his son-in-law's name, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall the exact year. Perhaps my wife can.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you living? In Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, outside of Baltimore. Ruxton.

Mr. MORRIS. It was in connection with the trip that he made to the United States, was it not, obviously, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In connection with?

Mr. MORRIS. The visit must have been at the same time he visited the United States.

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the same time, yes. He had been appointed by Gen. Chiang Kai-shek to make a study of hydroelectric enterprise in this country, and I remember his telling me that he had taken thousands of feet of motion-picture film in connection with that.

Mr. MORRIS. He met with a violent death, did he not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He died in a fire aboard a Soviet ship, I believe, in the Mediterranean somewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the basis for the introduction of these exhibits?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, one article describes the death that Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang came to, and the other was an article indicating when he arrived, which would tend to be corroborative of the time that Mr. Lattimore did meet Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.

Mr. FORTAS. What is the date?

The CHAIRMAN. It is supposed to be September 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Both are September 1948.

Mr. FORTAS. You say that there is a date as to the time when he arrived, which tends to corroborate the witnesses' testimony, and presumably you are referring to a date given in the story.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. FORTAS. I wondered if you would state that to the witness, because we haven't seen the article.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one here of the New York Times of January 15, 1948, page 14; one of the New York Times, September 6, 1948, page 1, and another from the New York Times dated September 6, 1948, page 6.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a run-over of the former story.

Senator SMITH. Could we not clear it up, Mr. Chairman, by letting the witness and his counsel examine those right now?

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what is the basis for the introduction of them. They do not refer to this witness, as I understand it.

Mr. MORRIS. But they do refer, Mr. Chairman, to Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, about whom we have been interrogating this witness, and they do place the time of his visit to the United States during the time of the visit when Mr. Lattimore testified he did have Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang in his home.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it have any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir; not what we are putting in the record at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is going to withhold the ruling on that for the time being.

You may proceed with some other matter.

Mr. MORRIS. Julien R. Friedman.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one question before we leave that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, with respect to Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, that he made several thousand feet of moving picture film——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Made or had been given.

Senator SMITH. Did you see any of those yourself?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't.

Senator SMITH. You did not know whether any of them were made of just public utilities, or whether some of them might have been made of military installations. Do you have any information either way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no information whatever.

This was in the period when there was a great deal of talk about a possible TVA on the Yangtze, and that sort of thing, and the Chinese Government was very much interested in large-scale hydroelectric enterprises.

Mr. MORRIS. Julian R. Friedman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is he a man who worked for the State Department at one time?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. He was an assistant to John Carter Vincent at the time he was Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, then, I knew him slightly and had no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him in Mr. Vincent's office in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't recall meeting him there, no. I think whenever I met him it was socially. If he was in Mr. Vincent's office, I may well have met him.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the facts show that he had a desk in the same office with Mr. Vincent, if that will help you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may quite well have met him in Mr. Vincent's office, but if so it was so inconsequential that I retain no memory of it.

Mr. MORRIS. You did say whenever you did meet Mr. Friedman it was at social gatherings, Mr. Lattimore. Will you tell us about those?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I just remember meeting him occasionally. He may have been at one or more IPR conferences, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him as the Hot Springs convention in 1944?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If he was there, then I must have met him there?

Mr. MORRIS. But that is the best you can testify to about your association with Julian Friedman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Harry Gannes?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Chen Han-seng write a review of his book for Pacific Affairs while you were the editor of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall. He may well have. Could you give me the year of that?

Mr. MORRIS. December 1937.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite possible, but my recollection of reviews in Pacific Affairs is not very good, partly because while I was editing Pacific Affairs from abroad many reviews went in without my having seen the original manuscripts.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your testimony you did not recall Harry Gannes at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mark Gayn?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Mark Gayn I met at the Press Club in Tokyo, I believe, for the first time. That would be the winter of 1945–46. and I think I saw him once in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that occasion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was just before he was going to Europe on some kind of writing assignment, so I was told.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever confer with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, it certainly wasn't a conference. It was a casual meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a moment, Mr. Morris. If I may interpose, the witness has not yet answered the main question about Mr. Gayn.

The question is: In your dealings with this man, or in any other way, did you know or have any reason to believe that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Louis Gibarti?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you do not recall having a meeting with Mr. Louis Gibarti?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly don't recall it. If you have a document somewhere, it might refresh my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Harold Glasser?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name either.

Mr. MORRIS. G-l-a-s-s-e-r.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you encounter him on the Pauley Reparations Mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He wasn't a member of the mission.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you encounter him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, on the Pauley Reparations Mission.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you did not encounter or run into Harold Glasser in connection with the Pauley Reparations Mission?

Mr. LATIMER. I don't recall it. In Tokyo?

Mr. MORRIS. At any place.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or here? I just don't place the name.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Max Granich?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Max Granich I know from the transcript of these hearings. I have never met him, but there is in the record the

fact that I once wrote him a letter declining to join the board of China Today, which he edited.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Michael Greenberg?

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a moment, please. The witness has not yet answered the question: Did he, in his dealings with this man, know him or had any reason to believe he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my dealings with him, I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is a little broader than that. The question is: In your dealings with him, or in any other way, did you have reason to believe or did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know him to be a Communist, and I didn't believe him to be a Communist. China Today at that time was not a magazine that I recognized as a Communist front.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Michael Greenberg?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Michael Greenberg I knew slightly. I think I met him at the New York office of the IPR and, of course, I know that he later became managing editor, or some such title, of Pacific Affairs after I had left. I knew him very slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. You used his services, did you not, in the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall using his services.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. If I may interrupt, please, before the document comes in. Here again we have a situation where the major question—that is, whether the witness in his dealings or in any other way knew or had reason to believe this person was a Communist—has not been answered.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question is assuming that you did have dealings with the person. There is, of course, no objection to expatiating on that, but I keep coming back to it because the main question is whether you knew or had reason to believe that the person was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I knew him very slightly and had no reason to believe him a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 28, 1941, from 300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore. It is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you that document and ask you if you can recall having written it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall having written it, but I obviously did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the second paragraph, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "The three points raised by Greenberg are, I think, decisive."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what the three points were in connection with that paper by Greenberg?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; but the first sentence of the letter is:

> Herewith I am returning the docket of papers relative to Bloch's proposal for an analysis of the Russo-Japanese Pact.

I see that I go on in the latter to object to the fact that the people in the New York office don't seem to realize that quarterly magazines have to deal in rather long terms of reference, whereas the Far Eastern Survey, which was a fortnightly publication, dealt with things that were closer to the news.

The CHAIRMAN. Now get back to the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 551" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 551

WLH
ED

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., April 28, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Herewith I am returning the docket of papers relative to Bloch's proposal for an analysis of the Russo-Japanese Pact.

The three points raised by Greenberg are, I think, decisive.

There is another thing that I think should be borne in mind whenever proposals of this kind come up. Everybody at 129 East Fifty-second Street who does any writing seems to me to be dominated by the routine and rhythm of Far Eastern Survey—and to be unconscious of the fact. The old Far Eastern Survey, I should hastily add. There are already signs that the new Far Eastern Survey is doing a Moses on them and leading them out of the wilderness.

But the habit of mind to which I refer is still there and still dominant. It is the habit of thinking that the art of writing something that is a combination of profound philosophy and snap judgment on something that happened a week ago or at most two weeks ago.

This just won't do for a quarterly. You have to drop the idea that you are writing about something that happened a week or ten days ago. You have to cast your mind forward at least three months—four is safer. It is not a question of what people are guessing about the Russo-Japanese Pact now, but what they will be thinking about it in September. The essential approach involves the computing of two factors: (1) By September, what impress will remain on people's minds of the actual wording, the diplomatic and political timing, and the immediate effects of the Russo-Japanese Pact? (2) By September, what will be the general character of the consequences flowing from the Pact? I do not mean sensationally accurate prophesies of who will be sipping tea and who will be gulping vodka. I mean a broadly correct anticipation of main trends.

All of this means that you cannot deal with foreground at all. You must combine background in the most scholarly sense of that much abused word with the panorama of the future.

It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time, or any time, did you have any reason to believe that Michael Greenberg was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, while we are on the document, may I go out of order a minute and ask Mr. Lattimore to read the last paragraph of this letter?

The CHAIRMAN. That is on the second page.

Mr. MORRIS. It is on the second page.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army.

This is apparently for reasons of time limit.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain what you meant by that reference, Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Read that again, Mr. Lattimore, please.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I read the preceding sentence also?

The CHAIRMAN. Just read what you did read. I want to get that. What did you read when you were asked to read?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

> It is for reasons like this that I switched Anna Louise Strong off the topic of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army.

Mr. MORRIS. Read the preceding paragraph, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The preceding paragraph is [reading]:

> All of this means that you cannot deal with foreground at all. You must combine background in the most scholarly sense of that much abused word with the panorama of the future.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you mean by the reference that you were switching Anna Louise Strong off of the topic of the Fourth Route Army and onto the topic of the Eighth Route Army?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can only speculate on that, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Anna Louise Strong doing an assignment for you at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether she was doing an assignment or had volunteered an article.

Mr. MORRIS. But is it not apparent from your reading of your own letter, Mr. Lattimore, when you say you switched her off one topic and onto another, that she was obviously working for you in some capacity?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not necessarily. She may have volunteered an article on one topic and I suggested that she take up another topic.

Mr. MORRIS. At least to that extent she was working for you, if you could switch her from one to the other, even though she was volunteering?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I think if a correspondent is trying to place an article with a publication, that correspondent is working for himself or herself until the article is accepted.

Mr. MORRIS. Were the Fourth Route Army and the Eighth Route Army both Communist armies?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Eighth Route Army was a Communist army. The Fourth Route Army was an army organized by Chiang Kai-shek which contained both Communists and non-Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. And it ultimately became a Communist army; did it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Part of it did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the reference of taking Anna Louise Strong from the Fourth to the Eighth Route Army?

The CHAIRMAN. What is meant by that language?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As I say, I can only speculate on it at this distance, but in view of the fact that I was talking about the subject of a quarterly magazine not writing off the top of the news, and in view of the fact that this letter was written in 1941, it may be that the Fourth Route Army was known at that time only from recent newspaper reports, and I thought it was difficult to give a balanced long-term treatment of it, whereas the Eighth Route Army had been known for a long time, and was a subject that could be written about in the terms

of a quarterly magazine, rather than a subject for some publication that was staying close to the daily headline.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that the Eighth Army was a Communist army?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Eighth Army was a Communist army.

The CHAIRMAN. And you switched her from the Fourth Route Army to the Eighth Route Army; is that right? Is that what the language says?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The language says I switched her off one topic and onto another topic, presumably in terms that she would write about one topic rather than another. The Eighth Route Army at that time was under Chiang Kai-shek's command, although it was a Communist army.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Anna Louise Strong was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you any reason to believe that she was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had no reason to believe that she was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that she was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I never learned that she was.

Senator FERGUSON. That is up to this date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is up to this date. I don't consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. H. Hatem?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't place that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you had no connection with Dr. Hatem?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None that I can recall. There may be something in the files about it, but I completely fail to place the name.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to know if the record shows what Mr. Lattimore's definition of a Communist is in these answers. He is answering that he never knew Anna Louise Strong to be a Communist, even up to this date, and had no reasons to believe.

What is your definition in these answers of the words "a Communist"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A Communist, I suppose, is a known Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. A known Communist? They did not ask you that, as I understood the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no reason to believe that Anna Louise Strong is a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Senator FERGUSON. What I have been trying to find out now is that you have answered many questions here, and one of them was as to whether or not you ever knew or had reasons to believe that Anna Louise Strong was a Communist.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No: I had no reason to believe she was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. But I want to know what the word "Communist" means to you when you are answering these questions.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no reason to believe that she was a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question at all, whether or not she was a member of the party. Is that what you understood all of

these other questions from No. 1 down to mean: that you knew or had reasons to believe they were members of the party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you talking about card-carrying Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, I am not an expert on the subject of card-carrying Communists versus noncard-carrying Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, would you include at least, in the question with relation to Anna Louise Strong, as to whether or not she was under the discipline of the Communist Party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge of Anna Louise Strong, which is rather slight, I had no reason to believe that she was under any discipline except her own.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the editor of the Moscow Daily News, was she not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think she was. Was she?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not know she was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. You have reviewed her books, have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have reviewed at least one book of hers.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in what year; 1935?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Possibly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, along this line of questioning we have not been putting documents into the record for fear we would not be able to finish this up very quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to be afraid about finishing up very quickly. We are going to go on with this hearing until it is concluded. Do not be afraid about time.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should define what we mean as a Communist when we ask the witness a question. That is to say, whether we are referring just to a card-carrying Communist, a member of the Communist Party, or whether we are also including in that category those persons who we know are generally classified as Communists because they follow the Communist line.

The latter would be a much broader definition. Perhaps we should say to the witness here just which of those two we mean, whether we mean strictly a card-carrying Communist or whether we mean a person that may or may not be a card-carrying Communist but yet does follow the Communist line. I think that is what Senator Ferguson is driving at.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am driving at.

Senator SMITH. I am sure the witness would rather have it cleared that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Whether or not they were voluntarily following the line.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would this definition be acceptable: In this list of questions, when we refer to the word "Communist," the committee means a person who is, using the Senator's words, who is or has been willingly cooperative or collaborating with Communists for the furtherance of Communist purposes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a good definition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Using that as the definition of Communist, Mr. Lattimore, are there any of the answers you have given with regard to these people that you would want to change?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am afraid, Mr. Sourwine, that those are definitions that I can't accept. I haven't been conducting a private investigation service, and all I can speak to is my personal knowledge of people or knowledge of their writings, or something like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that answer to stand in reply to the question propounded by Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you do not accept the definition given you nor the explanation given you by Mr. Sourwine or the members of this committee, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Lattimore, whether or not you accept it, if you are advised that that is what the committee means by interrogating you as to whether or not you had knowledge of whether they were Communists, do you, or do you not, stand by your previous answers that none of these individuals whom you have negatived were known to you to be Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, because phrases have been used like "generally classified as Communists," and I just don't understand exactly what that means. I don't think it is a precise enough definition.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully request that the question be repeated?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, Mr. Fortas.

Senator O'CONOR. I will repeat it. My question is, and I will rephrase it, whether or not you accepted the definition as given by Mr. Sourwine. I would like to ask you whether or not any of the persons about whom you have been interrogated were known to you to be acting in furtherance of Communist objectives or of being identified with Communist undertakings.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the answer would be "No," Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer? What is your answer, not what you think?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer, without reviewing in detail all of these names, is no. In the case of Anna Louise Strong——

Mr. SOURWINE. In order to answer that question you have to review those names.

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the case of Anna Louise Strong, she was known for many years as a writer who gave sympathetic accounts of conditions in parts of Soviet Russia that she visited. Later on she was a person who wrote accounts very friendly to the Chinese Communists of what she saw in Communist China.

The question of whether doing a thing of that kind was honest reporting by the person concerned of facts as she saw them, or whether it was a question of deliberately furthering the cause or interests of the Chinese Communists or the Russian Communists, is a subjective evaluation for which I don't have the data. Therefore, I say that as far as my knowledge is concerned, she was not a Communist.

Senator O'CONOR. You have not, I think, Mr. Lattimore, answered fully. Our question is not as to whether the person's writings may, in fact, have been of aid and assistance, as well as if the person will-

fully was acting in furtherance of Communist objectives and was lending himself or herself to the furtherance of Communist objectives, to the best of your knowledge.

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge, I never considered that Anna Louise Strong was willfully furthering the interests of the Chinese or Russian Communists in the dishonest sense of disregarding her own judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Let me have that answer, please That is an avoidance of the question. Read me the answer.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

The CHAIRMAN. That is a willful avoidance of the answer. It is going to be stricken.

Answer the question. Will you read the question back to the witness, please, the question of the Senator from Maryland?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Senator O'CONOR. Is that applicable to all of the other individuals?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I think it is. As I say, again, without reviewing each individual name——

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness has repeated. He says that again without reviewing these names. In order to answer that question, he must review these names, and the record should show that he has reviewed these names. Otherwise, the answer means nothing.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you review the names and answer the question, Mr. Lattimore?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not think, in deference to the question answered, that we have a sufficient understanding now that there is an understanding between the committee and the witness as to what is meant by the word "Communist."

For instance, he uses expressions like "willfully" and whether a person is "dishonest." If she was a Communist, no one could say she was dishonest in her judgment. I think we ought to take a minute here and get an agreement on what we mean by the word "Communist" in these questions. I think this is very material.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot prevent the witness from inserting a word of his own which is not used by the interrogator, and that is what he has been doing all along.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, I think the word "willful" was Senator O'Conor's word.

Senator FERGUSON. I had used the expression once knowingly.

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, there have been so many questions, I wonder if the committee could not rephrase the question and put it to the witness. I think this is just a case of confusion because of different terminology used by the interrogators.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator O'Conor's question was very clear and very distinct. It will be read back to the witness again if need be.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I ask this question of the witness: Mr. Lattimore, did you say about the handbook written by Anna Louise Strong, This Soviet World, as reviewed by you on pages 611–612:

> Her book, as a whole, is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individuality and the foreign idea of regimentation.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I asked him if he wrote that about the book that was written by Anna Louise Strong.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall writing that, but I am willing to accept this extract. I would like to see the full context.

Mr. MORRIS. What year is that, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. September 1945, Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, while we are getting that article, may we have the question redirected to Mr. Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson's question?

Mr. MORRIS. No; Senator O'Conor's question. And may we have the witness's last answer?

The CHAIRMAN. You will have to read back to get Senator O'Conor's question.

Senator O'CONOR. I said, Mr. Lattimore, apart from whether you accepted the definition as repeated by Mr. Sourwine, whether, in your responses to the questions concerning this list of individuals, you meant that you had no knowledge that any one of those individuals had acted in furtherance of Communist objectives or were identified with Communist undertakings?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To my knowledge?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is no, to my knowledge, as far as my knowledge extends. May I add a word or two there?

When, especially in the early 1930's, I read an attempt to describe something that was going on in some part of Soviet Russia that was friendly in the sense that it didn't have in every other paragraph, "Remember these, all murderers," or something of that kind, I thought it was an honest attempt to observe and report what was going on in Russia. My assumption would not be that that was done in purpose of furthering the spread of Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, on this point may Mr. Mandel read into the record Anna Louise Strong's contributions to the Communist publications as of that time?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. What are you reading from?

Mr. MANDEL. From a record I have accumulated. The sources are all given.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel has been sworn as the research director, and he will give the sources of each individual item as he comes to it, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. Moscow Daily News of July 2, 1933, published in Moscow for English-speaking people in the Soviet Union and throughout the world, Miss Anna Louise Strong is associate editor. She also was a writer for the following Communist publications: The Liberator of March 1923, page 24; Soviet Russia Today, December 1934, page 5; the New Masses of June 28, 1938, page 15; the Sunday Worker of December 21, 1935, page 3; the Labor Herald—that is the Communist Labor Herald—of March 1924, page 16; the Worker's Monthly of January 1925, page 108; Soviet Russia Today of March 1937, pages 14 and 15.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the article, Mr. Lattimore, that you made reference to that you reviewed. [Document handed.]

The CHAIRMAN. I understand there is some confusion as to the date. Is that right? What is the question now pending?

Mr. Morris. Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, asked Mr. Lattimore whether or not he had made a certain statement in reviewing Anna Louise Strong's book, and he wanted to see the whole text. He has been given the text, and he now may make any change in that that is necessary.

The Chairman. What is the question, the question by Senator Ferguson?

Mr. Lattimore. It refers to a particular sentence which I have here.

The Chairman. I want the question, if I can get it.

Senator Ferguson. Can you identify what I asked you in the book?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I found it.

Senator Ferguson. Is it accurate?

Mr. Fortas. Would you read it back, Senator?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I think it is accurate. The sentence is:

> Her book, as a whole, is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of "regimentation."

Did you want to ask me anything further on that, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. No, but I was troubled with your answer about Miss Strong, whether you knew she was a Communist. I attributed the difficulty to the point that you and I were not thinking about the word "Communist" in the same light. I could not understand how you could answer that you did not think she had connection with the Communist Party. That is the reason I said to the Chair that I hope now we might have an understanding as to what this word means that we have been using here in this last group of questions about these persons from Adler to where you are now.

Mr. Lattimore. Do you want to make a new definition?

Mr. Morris. Mr. Sourwine, you had addressed a definition to the Chair.

Mr. Sourwine. Would the committee wish to use this definition: Communist means a person under Communist discipline, or who has voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives.

The Chairman. Do you know that to apply to any of those names that have been referred to you?

Mr. Lattimore. I would say not, subject to the times at which I knew these various people and various contributions that they sub mitted.

Mr. Sourwine. You have now reviewed the list, have you, Mr Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. I have reviewed the list. I notice that there is, for instance, besides Anna Louise Strong——

Mr. Morris. This is the list down as far as Michael Greenberg. That is as far as we have gotten, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore. No, Dr. Hatem, I think.

Mr. Morris. Yes, we had gone to Hatem. You are right.

Mr. Lattimore. Well, of course, there are various people to whom I have referred, like Earl Browder, knowing that he was a Communist and—what is his name—Borodin, assuming that he was a Communist. There is Israel Epstein, who I once reviewed as writing a book that was partisan on the side of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, but you testified that you had no reason to believe that he was a Communist while you knew him, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did not consider him at that time to be a Communist. I considered him a partisan of the Communists. How that is affected by Mr. Sourwine's definition I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. How is it affected in your mind?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, at that time, I considered him, at the time I reviewed his book, I considered that he gave a partisan statement in favor of the Chinese Communists. But as of the year that book was written, exactly what that meant in terms of Russian Communists and American Communists would be something else again.

Many people were writing extremely favorable accounts of the Chinese Communists at that time. I think perhaps I could say that, at that time, using a very loose term—which again is not really a satisfactory definition in itself—I would consider Epstein a fellow traveler of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if the committee accepts this definition, and I assume that is the case with regard to its question, then the question is, putting this definition in place of the word "Communist," first we assume that you had dealings with the person named, and if not, please state that, then in your dealings with this person, or in any other way, did you know or have reason to believe that this person was a person under Communist discipline or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives.

Taking that as the question, Mr. Lattimore, and looking back over these names, down as far as that of Dr. Hatem, are there any of the answers which you gave in the negative which you would like to change or qualify?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think no, with the exception of Israel Epstein, whom I mentioned here, and possibly Abraham Chapman. I can't remember exactly what the correspondence was. I never met him personally, but I seem to remember that the question was raised in the research committee of the IPR that he had done some kind of work from the Communist point of view, or as a Communist, or something of that kind. I don't recollect the exact terms.

The question was raised whether his work should be published at all, and, if so, how it should be described or presented. But as I say, I don't remember the details.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you had that in mind, did you, when you previously answered the question about him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. When I previously answered the question about him, I had in mind that I did not, of my personal knowledge, know him to be a Communist. I think so—I am not sure. I would like to have the transcript read back. I am getting a little bit confused with all of these going back and forth from one name to the other. If we go back in the transcript to the raising of the name of Abraham Chapman, perhaps I could be clearer.

Mr. SOURWINE. The transcript will speak for itself, sir. But the question is, Now that you have been somewhat more confined by the committee's definition of "Communist," what is your answer with regard to Mr. Chapman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My answer with regard to Mr. Chapman is that I had no personal dealings with him, and therefore did not personally

know him or consider him to be a Communist. But that I believe, and without seeing the correspondence again, I can't remember exactly what it is about, that the question of his being a Communist or supporting a Communist presentation, or something of the kind, may have been raised.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say you had reason to believe, then, that he was a Communist or a fellow traveler?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would be impossible for me to be more precise there, Mr. Chairman, without seeing the original correspondence again and reviewing it. I don't want to be unjust to anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Down to where we are on the names now, what would your answer be, and you have given us a definition of "fellow traveler," as to knowing or having reason to believe that any of these people were fellow travelers?

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, I am not sure that he has defined "fellow traveler."

The CHAIRMAN. He has used it alternately.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I used the term, and I believe I said that it was in itself a loose and unsatisfactory definition.

Senator FERGUSON. As loose and as unsatisfactory as it is to you, what do you say about my question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Let the record show the witness is examining the list.

Mr. LATTIMORE [after examining the document]. No, I don't believe I had any reason, at the time I knew any of these people, to consider that they were fellow travelers, with the exception or partial exceptions already indicated.

Mr. MORRIS. And that includes Mr. Israel Epstein, is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would include Mr. Epstein, whom I certainly considered at the time to have written a partisan book, that was partisan on the side of the Chinese Communists.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you made that last answer, you had occasion to, and did, review the list of names on which you have been interrogated. Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your answer on Earl Browder? I see his name under the B's.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I had already mentioned that I considered him to be a Communist at the time. So I understood that he was not affected by this review.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the committee will recess at this point. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The hearing reconvened at 2:10 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD, COUNSEL—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, over the recess, I was trying to recall as much as I know about Anna Louise Strong, who has been mentioned here, and I do believe that I recall that at one time she was working for a paper in Moscow, I don't remember in exactly what capacity, but in view of the fact, I should say that that would classify her as somebody who was knowingly working with the Russians at that time.

I may say that my memory is unclear partly because what was on the top of my memory was the newspaper stories about her being arrested in Russia and thrown out.

The CHAIRMAN. She was working with the Russians at that time, did you say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time.

How conscious of that I was in the 1930's, at the time that I published material by her, is completely beyond my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. And at the time she was working for the Russians, the Russian Government was a Communist government; is that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that. I think Mr. Morris read into the record something, but I don't recall what year was mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you place about the year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't. My general recollection is that she went to Russia very early after the revolution, but I don't know the details of her career.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, When Anna Louise Strong came back from Moscow after her differences with the Soviet Government there, did she stop to visit you at Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; she stopped over briefly one afternoon.

Mr. MORRIS. How soon after her return from Moscow was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. I think it must have been within a few days after she landed in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did she stay visiting you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe an hour or so.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you discuss with her at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it really wasn't a discussion. She was telling us about being arrested and thrown out.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "us," whom do you mean?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife and myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Was anybody else present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did she go to see you at that time, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we understand that she visited you at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any further business she might have had in Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she express any?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you living in Ruxton at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; let us get along.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you know Joan Chase Hinton?

Senator FERGUSON. Just before you go to that: Did Miss Strong leave you any letters or memorandums or reports or anything?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, are you getting back to this list now?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I am getting back to the list now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just so that the record will be clear on this afternoon's session, and to refresh the witness' recollection of the question, the question with respect to each one of these names, the reading of the name assumes that the witness has had some dealings with the person. If not, the witness is requested to so state when the name is read.

The CHAIRMAN. Some dealing or some acquaintance.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, sir.

Then the question is: In your dealings with his person, or in any other way, did you ever know or have reason to believe that this person is a person under Communist discipline or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of the Communist Party objectives?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, do you understand that as applying to each name as we go down the list.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Joan Chase Hinton.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "No." I knew her very slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know any other members of her family?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I know her mother.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is her mother, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Her mother is the head of a school in Vermont.

Mr. MORRIS. What is her name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Carmelita.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you a member of the board of that school, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been a member of the board of that school?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I have.

Let me ask my wife.

I don't think so, no.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever lectured or taught there at any time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I never taught there. My son went to school there, and once or twice when I was up there I spoke at school gatherings.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe a couple.

Mr. MORRIS. In what connection did you meet Joan Chase Hinton?

Mr. LATTIMORE. As Mrs. Hinton's daughter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know any other members of the family?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met her brother, who was at that time farm manager of the school.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. William.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer for the record an article written by Joan C. Hinton, from Communist China, in September 1951.

The CHAIRMAN. I will deal with that in just a minute.

There was another matter here referred to the Chair this morning that I did not rule on, and that was the matter of the clippings from the New York paper.

Mr. MORRIS. Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have had a better foundation laid for their admission with reference to this witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like me to do that now, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. If you have anything better than what you have offered, I would like to have it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is nothing better, sir. We were interrogating the witness on the time he met Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, who was the subject of those articles. Those articles clearly placed the period that Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang was in the country as September 1948, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not attempting to bind this witness by anything that is in these statements, are you?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You are simply using these for the purpose of trying to fix a date; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir. And the general nature of the identity of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted for that purpose.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 552, 552A" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 552

[New York Times, January 15, 1948, p. 14]

FENG PROCLAIMS HIS EXILE; WILL WORK AGAINST CHIANG

[Picture of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang]

Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian general" of China, who has been a prominent figure there for 30 years, formally assumed the role of a political exile yesterday.

In an interview in his apartment at 839 West End Avenue, General Feng said he pleaded guilty to the charge of disloyalty made against him last week in Nanking.

Asserting that as far as he was concerned his ties with the Chinese Government, headed by President Chiang Kai-shek, were "totally severed," the general said he would devote himself from now on to work on behalf of a new revolutionary movement founded recently in Hong Kong.

This movement, he explained, was set up by delegates of "various democratic groups" within China. It includes segments of the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) that disagree with President Chiang and also representatives of the Chinese Communists, he stated.

The aim of the new association for which General Feng will act as a sort of spokesman in this country, is the overthrow of President Chiang's "reactionary and dictatorial regime," he said.

EXHIBIT No. 552A

[New York Times, September 6, 1948, pp. 1 and 6]

FENG DEAD IN RUSSIAN SHIP FIRE; WAR LORD TO TALK TO REDS

(By the Associated Press)

Moscow, September 5.—The death of Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, China's fabulous "Christian general," aboard a Russian ship in the Black Sea was announced in the Moscow press today. General Feng was 67 years old.

The newspapers Pravda and Izvestia said that the former war lord and a daughter perished in an accidental fire aboard the Russian motorship *Pobeda* near the end of a voyage from New York to Odessa. The news of General Feng's death came when the ship docked at Odessa.

The newspapers said that the blaze resulted from careless handling of motion-picture film. They said that there were other victims of the fire but gave no details other than to note that General Feng's daughter was killed.

(The *Pobeda* was the ship upon which Mrs. Oksana S. Kasenkina and the Samarins, Russian school teachers who defied the Soviet authorities by remaining here, were to have sailed from New York. The ship left here July 31.)

[Special to the New York Times]

London, September 5.—A Tass dispatch from Odessa recorded by the Soviet monitor here tonight, said of the *Pobeda's* trip:

"At Cairo she took on board more than 2,000 Armenian repatriates who were brought to Batum. On August 31 the *Pobeda* sailed from Batum to Odessa. On the way a fire broke out on board the motorship as a result of the careless handling of cinema films, which caught fire. There are victims aboard, among them Chinese Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang and his daughter. The motorship has been brought to Odessa. An investigation is under way."

Nanking, China, September 5 (AP).—Moscow reports of the death of General Feng were received with reserve by Chinese Government officials today.

The official spokesman, Hollington Tong, said there would be no immediate comment on the reported death of the former Government leader who was expelled from the Kuomintang (Government party) after leading an opposition movement in the United States to President Chiang Kai-shek.

FENG'S RELATIVE TELLS OF HOBBY

Berkeley, Calif., September 5 (AP).—General Feng's daughter-in-law today raised the possibility here that he might have been the victim of his own motion-picture hobby.

She said he had taken with him some personal movies and a quantity of films of the American hydroelectric and reclamation projects that he had been studying.

Notified of the report of his death, she said she and her husband had last heard from the general in a letter postmarked in Egypt (apparently when the ship stopped there) saying merely that he would be unable to write again for some time.

The general's son Feng Hung-chi, is a mechanical engineering student at the University of California. He was so overcome by grief that his wife spoke for him.

She said that they had not known what route the general was taking to China but that all the rest of the family was with him.

This included General Feng's wife; a second son, Paul Feng; two young daughters, Mildred and Dora; and an elder daughter, Lita, with her husband, Robert Lo.

Lita was a premedical student at the College of the Pacific, Stockton, Calif., until last January, when she went to New York and was married to Mr. Lo.

The Soviet report did not make clear which of the three daughters was killed.

The general's widow is the former Li Teh-chuan, who once was a YWCA secretary in Peiping. She was known to many Americans there and in Chungking as a brilliant woman, greatly interested in her husband's stormy career.

Feng a Critic of Chiang's Regime

In a speech in this country in December General Feng, a severe critic of the Government of President Chiang Kai-shek, said that he would not return to his native land because he would be killed if he did so.

He made the speech shortly after he had been ordered to return to Nanking. He was sent here, a year before, ostensibly to study water-conservation projects, but in reality it was as a political exile. He spent most of his time rallying support to oppose the present Chinese Government.

A well-known war lord for more than 30 years,, he was described by his friends as "the Christian general" and by his enemies as a turncoat. He was a leading executive of the Chinese Government during World War II but broke completely with it in the last 2 years.

His opposition to the Nanking Government, which he charged with corruption and inefficiency, led him to cooperate with the Communists, although he always denied that he was a Communist or that he favored the Soviet Union. He accused the Chinese Government of using the Communist threat as a bogy to obtain more loans from the United States.

"The so-called Russian threat to China is being used by the Chinese Government for its own purposes," he said once. "I am not a Communist and am not for Russia. But I know of no proved evidence that the Russians are helping the Chinese Communists."

Another time he denied that Chinese Communists actually practiced communism. He said they were carrying out the principles set forth by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic, under whom he fought in the revolution of 1911.

At first, however, the Chinese Communists were wary of him. They denounced him for his political program which, they said, would only eliminate President Chiang without changing the basic social and political character of the Chinese Government.

But, in April of this year, it was reported that coalition had been established between the Communists and exiled Chinese political groups, including General Feng, on the basis of a platform calling for the overthrow of President Chiang, opposition to the United States, and the setting up of a left-wing united front regime in China.

Shortly afterward, it was reported that General Feng was in Europe on his way to north China for conferences with the Communists on the formation of a rebel government. It was then said that he would travel through Russia to China. That was the last word heard about him until the reports of his death.

Soldier, poet, and politician, he had been a leading figure on the Chinese scene since 1913, when he became commander of a brigade that was one of the most formidable units of the Chinese Army.

Behind him was a background of dire poverty, common to the masses of Chinese peasantry. He was born in 1880 of coolie parents. He recalled later that in a period of more than 10 years he ate meat only once.

In some unknown manner, however, he entered military school and then the Army, rising until he became an important officer. He was baptized in the Methodist faith in 1913, converted his troops, and was said to have led them into battle singing Onward, Christian Soldiers. In an interview in New York in 1946, he denied the legend that he had baptized platoons of men by squirting water from a hose on them.

His career as a war lord had its ups and downs. Sometimes he was a power in politics; at other times he was in exile or on a farm writing poetry—he published five volumes of poetry in China.

He was an eloquent speaker, a formidable debater, and a blunt critic of the missteps of his colleagues. He was tall—six feet, three inches—and emphasized his humble origins by wearing the coarse blue gown of the peasant. His critics added that underneath he wore silk-lined furs.

Some Chinese leaders called him a noisy bumpkin, but he always exercised a great influence on the masses of Chinese people. The troops that served under

him achieved a reputation for sobriety and discipline unique in war-torn China. Smoking, gambling, and loose living were forbidden; and, it was reported, daily attendance at prayer meetings was part of his army's routine.

Despite this, some domestic and foreign critics maintained that his methods were too brutal. This, they said, was the reason he never held a prominent place in Chinese affairs for long.

In 1924 he executed a bold coup that for a time put him at the head of the Government. The cost, however, was a reputation for treachery that never was overcome. Two years later he was forced to flee from China and took refuge in Moscow.

Among the posts he later held were State Councillor of the National Government, Minister for Military Affairs, member of the National Military Council, commander in chief of the People's Allied Anti-Japanese Army in the 1930's, and a leading commander of Chinese forces in World War II. He was a member of the Kuomintang from 1918 until his expulsion on January 7 of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me we had another article here that was not admitted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore was going to compare this article with the original that he wrote, Mr. Chairman, and rather than take up the time, he agreed to do that later on.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not had the time to do it yet; have you, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not yet, Senator.

Senator SMITH. I understand that would be subject to any comment he wishes to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We will give him a chance to go through it.

All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this article is entitled "Why China Wants Peace." It appears in the People's China of September 16, 1951. It is written from Communist China and bears this preliminary introduction [reading]:

Joan Chase Hinton, a young American scientist, witnessed the first atomic-bomb explosion in the New Mexican Desert. A graduate of Bennington College, Miss Hinton took up graduate studies in physics at the University of Wisconsin and at the University of Chicago. From 1943 to 1945 she was a research assistant at the atom-bomb project in Los Alamos. An active member of the Association of Atomic Scientists, Miss Hinton was opposed to the secrecy and Government control which became attached to all work on atomic research. She came to China in 1948. In 1949 she married and is now working with her American husband in an animal-breeding farm in Inner Mongolia.

With the publication of this letter, readers are given the opportunity to know the impressions of a young American scientist, living and working with the Chinese people, joining with them in their great work of peaceful construction.

May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 553," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 553

WHY CHINA WANTS PEACE

(By Joan C. Hinton, September 16, 1951)

Joan Chase Hinton, a young American scientist, witnessed the first atomic bomb explosion in the New Mexican desert. A graduate of Bennington College, Miss Hinton took up graduate studies in physics at the University of Wisconsin and at the University of Chicago. From 1943 to 1945 she was a research assistant at the atom bomb project at Los Alamos. An active member of the Association of Atomic Scientists, Miss Hinton was opposed to the secrecy and govern-

ment control which became attached to all work on atomic research. She came to China in 1948. In 1949 she married and is now working with her American husband in an animal breeding farm in Inner Mongolia.

With the publication of this letter, readers are given the opportunity to know the impressions of a young American scientist, living and working with the Chinese people, joining with them in their great work of peaceful construction.

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS,
1749 L Street NW., Washington 6, D. C., U. S. A.

DEAR MR. WOLFE AND THE FAS: Yesterday I received your application for remembership in the Federation of Scientists. As I am just now almost directly under your feet, in Suiyuan Province, Inner Mongolia—where it takes two weeks for mail to arrive by donkey from the nearest railroad—I must say I was rather surprised and pleased to receive your application, and in two months' time at that.

You asked, "What has been happening to you since you were an FAS member?" As it was just the FAS and the questions with which it deals which drove me to China, I thonght I would take the opportunity to write to you, though I should have told you long ago why my dues stopped coming.

As you probably do not remember me, let me begin by telling you a bit of my history. From as early as I can remember, I was determined to become a scientist. Even in grammar school, I can especially remember forcing the teachers to let me study Faraday's The Candle instead of taking Latin. In high school I concentrated on chemistry, oblivious to all my other courses. Finally, in college, I settled on physics, building a Wilson cloud chamber in my sophomore year and spending as much time as I could getting in the way of the cyclotron boys at Cornell. From college I went to Wisconsin where I studied as a graduate student for two years. As people became more and more scarce, disappearing to secret places, I became restless too and finally ended up at Los Alamos where I worked another two years on the "W. B."

Then came the bomb and Hiroshima and the mass migration of atomic scientists to Washington. I first joined the association of Los Alamos scientists, and then spent some six weeks in Washington working for the FAS. Your pamphlet mentions the "enthusiastic if inexperienced emissaries" now flocked to Washington. I am afraid both these statements applied to me above anybody else—especially the inexperience. I will never forget my chagrin when I went to a certain Senator's office to get some information and the secretary condescendingly looked up at me asking, "Is this in connection with school work?"—me, an atomic scientist, coming to Washington to fight for scientific freedom and world peace—the very nerve of her. Well, my heart was in the right place anyway.

From Washington I went to Chicago as an assistant in the Institute for Nuclear Studies, and later as a Fellow. By 1948, I had about one more year to go for my degree. In physics I could not have dreamed of a better opportunity for studying—I loved it. I was just beginning to get the feel of quantum mechanics—as though it were a part of me instead of something strange in textbooks. I was devouring Dirac and what I could get hold of on statistical mechanics. Yet the better things became for me in physics, the more depressed I became. Ever since that morning when we sat on a hillock south of Albuquerque and felt the heat of that bomb 25 miles away, something had started to stir in me. It forced me to Washington. Then I forced it down and left for Chicago, but it refused to stay down. The Truman doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the stagnation of the Atomic Energy Commission in the U. N.—how could one just sit still in a laboratory and ponder in the depths of statistical mechanics. The memory of Hiroshima—150,000 lives. One, two, three, four, five, six * * * one hundred and fifty thousand—each a living, thinking, human being with hopes and desires, failures and successes, a life of his or her own—all gone. And I had held that bomb in my hand. Could I sit and pounder Dirac? What was science for? For the sake of Science? That is what I had thought before. But we all pondered over Dirac and then suddenly 150,000 people were killed. Were we to blame? We were only studying science, finding out how the world was put together. Was the government to blame—really? Do we not have any say as to what our life work is to be used for? Are we puppets or human beings? Can we not vision the world of tomorrow? Will it be a world of destruction and misery, agonising death by radiation or will it be a world where mountains are moved by atomic bombs to change the course of rivers and make rich green land out of deserts? Where is our imagination?

By 1948 I could not stand it any longer. My friends all seemed to be going back into secret work. Were they crazy? Were we who studied physics to

spend all our lives thinking up means of mass extermination? Even my fellowship money came from the Navy. We were doing nonsecret work at the time. We needed some deuterium for our accelerator. In the room where I studied there was only a little space in the corner for a desk, the rest of the room was piled with cases of heavy water right up to the ceiling for the argon. We asked for some. Nowhere in America could we get any. Finally we sent to Norway and two little bottles were sent back to us with a picture of a Viking ship and a little note saying, "I thought you had civilian control."

In Washington, a friend of mine had asked me to go to China. I had refused. I was determined to become a physicist. But the idea kept gnawing at me. It would not let me go, until finally I felt like I was being caught in a horrible trap. No matter where you turned, you were faced by war, secret work, the Navy, the Army, and madmen locked in their laboratories thinking up new and better methods of total destruction. Suddenly, I made up my mind and left. But it was not easy. The love of science and physics was pretty strong. Of all my notebooks and books I only had room for two in my trunk. I sat for a long time looking at those books, then took Joos and the handbook of physics and chemistry and set out for China alone with a terrible emptiness in my heart. I had broken away from everything I ever had desired or known. I broke away because I had to. I had to find out what was going on in the world outside of physics. What was happening to the peoples of the world—so I came to China, to see America from the outside and to understand the tremendous upheaval going on inside Asia.

WHAT I LEARNED IN CHINA

And what have I learned in the three years since I have been in China? Perhaps the main thing is that the people of the East do not want war. That the peoples of the East are not interested in America. They are occupied with building up their own countries, pulling them out of their centuries of feudalism, changing them as fast as possible into modern, industrialised lands with abundance for all—lands where beggars cease to exist, and slums and "Maxwell Streets" are things of the past that the children read about in history books. Everything is for peaceful production, for building, for life, for the people—and I learned something else—that these people can get along perfectly all right without America. I used to think that American aid would mean a lot to China. A country so backward—how could she develop without American help? But where there is a will there is a way and the Chinese people have a will so strong that nothing America can do will ever stop it. They will think of plenty of ways and they will develop fast. The only obstacle to their development would be a war. They are not afraid of America. If she must fight, China will show that she is made of steel—but China will never start a war, war is against her every interest.

I know that you may ask, "How do you know? They are just filling you with propaganda, you fool!" So I will not talk any more in generalities. I will only tell a few things from my experience. The first is the conditions I found in Kuomintang, China. I spent a year in Kuomintang territory, and all that time it never ceased to amaze me why we (America) should be giving millions of dollars of aid to such a stupid, corrupt, conceited, useless government as the government of the Kuomintang. Just one example will suffice (though anybody who lived in Shanghai for just a few months at that time could cite countless examples). That is, the business of the "gold yuan."

For the fun of it, I kept a logarithmic plot of the inflation and it was a fairly straight line. I have forgotten just now what the period was, but the line was pretty steep. It was steep enough so that towards the end, prices would double or even triple in a day. I remember especially how carefully I had to plan to buy a jackknife. I went to a certain place (of which kind Shanghai was teeming) early in the morning with a briefcase to cash one American dollar. The briefcase having been duly loaded full of Chinese notes, I tore as fast as I could to the store and emptied them out on the counter before the price could rise. A briefcase full of notes for a jackknife? The poor storekeepers were in a terrible fix. They had to either not count the money and get stuck short or hire several extra hands just for counting money and lose that much in wages anyway. And the banks were in an impossible state. The cost of shipping and counting money was far beyond the value of the money. In fact, it was not even worth the paper it was printed on. The clerks in the banks were peering out from behind heaps of bills piled up to the ceiling. "Money, money everywhere, but not a crumb to eat." And so, of course, in order to stay alive one had to put

one's wealth into something besides paper money: in silver dollars, American dollars or goods, and the barter system flourished.

Then the government announced its "currency reform." Under penalty of death all gold, silver, American dollars, and hoarded goods were to be turned in to the banks and exchanged for the new stable "gold yuan." Every day the paper had pictures of people being shot for disobeying their order. Houses were searched. Anybody found guilty was dragged off to prison. Thousands upon thousands of ordinary folk turned in the little bit of savings they had in return for paper "gold yuan."

For a week or two, as I remember, prices remained stable. Then whisperings began in the black market—and soon they broke—the "gold yuan" fell off its pedestal. To where? Right smack on the extrapolation of the exponential inflation curve which I had been plotting all year. What did this mean? Only that the government had previously printed this tremendous excess of notes, had held them out of circulation for a week or two until as much gold and silver, etc., as could be collected from the people was taken in, and then let go, leaving the whole population with nothing but worthless scraps of paper. Thousands upon thousands of people left without a cent of savings—the biggest, most cold-blooded mass robbery in history or ever dreamed of. And the gold and silver was pocketed by the "Big Four"—the ruling families of China and shipped to America and other safe places as fast as possible before liberation. At the time I was too stupid to realize what was happening. I naively assumed that this time maybe the government was finally really planning to do something about the inflation. It was only after that point fell so perfectly on my curve that the truth began to dawn. But even then, it took me a long time to really realise the treachery, the calculated cold-blooded intent of these criminals who called themselves a government. And it was these crooks to whom America was sending millions of dollars worth of "aid"—guns, bombs, tanks, trucks, and a trickle of powdered milk.

Enough for the Kuomintang. Perhaps the next thing I might mention is the liberation of Peking. American papers always implied that the Chinese Communists were supplied by Russia. So I rather expected to see Russian weapons as the People's Liberation Army marched past. But in the whole parade which I watched for three or four hours, I never saw a single Russian weapon. A few old Japanese guns, but mostly new American trucks, cannon, tanks, guns, and trucks with "United States Army" written on the side in white letters as plain as day. The soldiers laughed when you asked them about it and said, "Uncle Sam sends them to Chiang and Chiang sends them to us."

Then again, people told me that foreigners would never be allowed to travel alone in the liberated areas. That the Communists would keep a pretty close eye on the travellers and be sure only to let you see what they wanted you to. In the back of my mind, I thought perhaps this might be true, too. I was all prepared to have an escort wherever I might choose to go and in the beginning I was given one. I wanted to go and visit a friend of mine who was staying at a place about 100 miles away, so I was supplied with a guide and went. But on coming back, my friend explained that I was used to travelling and could find the way back by myself and without further ado. I was left to go back alone. So again, the American press was wrong. Nobody was watching me, they were only helping me. I was free to look at whatever I liked. That was the first time and it has been that way ever since. When I go to a new place, someone is always ready to help me out to find the way. Once I have become familiar with the place I am left completely free.

My first job was working in an iron factory packed away in the mountains of Shensi. What were they making there? They were melting up American-made hand grenades, shells, wings from crashed planes sent from America to Chiang, steel and aluminum of weapons sent by America to kill them and making them into cooking pots, ploughs, and hoes. They were transferring these things of destruction into useful tools to build up a new and prosperous China, making wagon wheels and pumps and gates for irrigation canals. Americans would probably not even realise it was a factory and they would laugh at it when told so—not even a lathe, nothing but the hands of the people. Everything was made by hand. But Americans might do a little thinking, too. The Chinese with their bare hands are building up a new nation, while the Americans with their tremendous industrial strength are preparing to destroy mankind. The Chinese are not afraid; they are just sorry. If America were not preparing for war—if she were not threatening China at every point—China could put even more effort into construction, into building better homes for her people, into eliminating floods, into stabilising crops, into bringing in

machinery and transforming their land from one of despair and poverty into one of prosperity, enlightenment, a nation of scientists working for the enrichment of mankind. But America seems bent on war. So China will continue her construction despite America. She will keep on putting all she has into the betterment of the living conditions of her people. But at the same time, she will never stop watching America. She will not tolerate any high-handed action against her sovereignty. She is not afraid and her people know how to fight and know what they are fighting for. Anyone who came to work at that factory could not help but learn this. The irresistible strength of New China seemed to permeate everything, even the silent walls of the caves at night, waving black shadows and crimson reflections from the furnaces outside.

Since then all of China has been liberated and she now has more regular factories day by day. Skilled mechanics and engineers are being trained. Though some places still work by hand, others are forging ahead still faster with machines while others are using machines to make machines. It will not take her long.

At present I am working on an animal-breeding farm in Inner Mongolia. Of what I have learned here I will only say the following: that I was amazed to hear Acheson—a responsible representative of the U. S. government—say that the Soviet Union was "annexing whole territories" of Northeast China and Inner Mongolia to herself. I have lived here two years. So far I have only seen one thing Russian, that is, ten Soviet stallions given to our farm for breeding purposes, along with apparatus for artificial insemination. What are we doing with these stallions? We are breeding the farmers' horses and the Mongolian ponies, improving the horses of Mongolia. The farmers come for miles around to get their horses bred. The stallions were given to China under the Agreement signed last year—an Agreement of friendship and mutual assistance between China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese are free to use them where and as they see fit. The Soviet Union does not interfere. To the peasants here, the Soviet Union is symbolized by these stallions, sleek-haired, refined, bigger than anything they have ever seen before and with no stud fees. The silent eyes of these ten stallions tell more to the Mongolian horsemen than any amount of insinuating speeches that Acheson ever could. If this is what is meant by being annexed by the Soviet Union then they would just as soon! They are not afraid of words, they only believe in what they see. And what do they see as far as America is concerned? Again, it is not empty words of friendship which impress them. It is bombing planes, guns, and tanks given to the Kuomintang. In our farm's cornfield are two old craters from American-made bombs. No amount of speeches from American diplomats can erase these holes and the people do not easily forget.

CHINA WANTS PEACE

The people of China want peace. The people of the world want peace, including the people of America. Though I supposed I have been away too long to still be considered a member of the American scientists, yet I personally still feel as though I am one of you. I have written you to let you know at least the story of one of your members. One person refusing to work on secret projects, refusing to work on war, of course, does no good. But all of you at home united together have a very special strength in your hands. I only want to say to you: Use your strength, use whatever you can to work actively for peace and against war. As long as there is war, science will never be free. Are we scientists going to spend our lives in slavery for madmen who want to destroy the world? At home one gets frightened. Listening to so much war talk one begins to believe that if we do not prepare for war the other side will and then we will be destroyed. But now I have been living on the other side for some time and know for sure that this is a lot of lies, that China wants peace and is working for peace with all she has. She will never attack America, nor will any of her allies. If you people would only believe this, if you could only see for yourselves as I am seeing, then, I am sure you would not hesitate for a minute to work for peace with every ounce of strength you have.

So long for now and remember me to whomever is there that I might know.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JOAN HINTON, *People's China.*

June 4, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it may be that we want to identify by Mr. Mandel the nature of the publication, People's China.

Mr. Lattimore, are you acquainted with that publication, People's China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am not acquainted with it. One of two copies have been sent to my office from China, presumably in the hope of getting a subscription, but I couldn't say I am acquainted with it.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name on the list, Mr. Lattimore, is Alger Hiss.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the terms of the question, I did not consider him to be Communist at the time I knew him.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in connection with Alger Hiss?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Philip Jaffe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The same answer.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not believe him to be a——

Mr. LATTIMORE. To be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Anthony Jenkinson.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Same answer.

Mr. MORRIS. How extensive was your experience with Anthony Jenkinson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My acquaintance with him was very slight. I met him at the Yosemite conference of 1936, of the IPR, and I believe I didn't meet him again until after the war, or toward the end of the war, when he started a publication called Allied Labor News, in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you did not know or had reason to believe that the Allied Labor News was a Communist publication?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I had no reason to believe that.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, at the time you are testifying, as I understand it, your answers relate only to the time you knew them——

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Back when they were writing or had some connection with you in relation to the Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, there have been a couple of names since then. I don't think I have seen Mr. Jaffe since, oh ten years or so, and all the knowledge I have of him since then is from the press.

Senator FERGUSON. We asked you if you knew or had reason to believe, and your answer would infer now that up to this time you did not know, nor did you have reason to believe that Hiss was a Communist, or that Jaffe was a Communist. Do you want that answer to stand?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I don't believe that I know of any evidence that Mr. Hiss is a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Or was a Communist.

Oh, wait a minute. There was a story in the papers the other day; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. It was under oath, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe it was, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you referring to the testimony of Nathaniel Weyl?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to change your testimony as to Mr. Hiss now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I can't speak to that, Senator Ferguson. I don't know the witness or his reliability or its connection with other evidence. I don't consider myself competent to give an answer.

Senator FERGUSON. How much evidence does it take to convince you that a person is a Communist? I wonder how much evidence it takes to have you answer that you do know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Perhaps, Senator, this committee could give me a definition of how much evidence I ought to take.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know what your answers mean. I am trying to judge this case from answers and the record.

Do I understand, then, that from all you read about Mr. Hiss, all that was in the paper or anything else, all that you heard about it, that, under the definition that we gave you, you would say you had no knowledge or reason to believe that Mr. Hiss was a Communist, or ever was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, if I may elaborate on my answer, all I know about Mr. Hiss is that——

The CHAIRMAN. That is not answering the question. You are just avoiding the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am simply saying, Senator, that I haven't followed the news about Hiss very carefully in the press. I don't consider myself an authority on the subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I remind the witness again of precisely what the question is? He has been reminded of it time and again, and the Senator, in his question, embraced the reminder.

Senator FERGUSON. The same thing is true in relation to Mr. Jaffe, is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that I ever seen it testified that Mr. Jaffe was a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard that he was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall any testimony to that effect, no. It may have been in the transcripts of this committee, but I have read such an enormous amount of them that I——

Senator FERGUSON. I am just wondering if, after reading this record, if you did not have some notion at least that Hiss and Jaffe were Communists. What is your answer to that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say that sworn testimony to the effect that Hiss was a Communist would come within the definition, "Reason to believe"; but I don't remember any sworn testimony in the case of Mr. Jaffe.

Senator FERGUSON. So you would say now that you do have reasons to believe that Hiss was a Communist, do you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say to that extent, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You qualified that answer by saying "to that extent," that somebody swore that he was; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not believe so.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no personal knowledge about it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have no reason to believe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I consider that sworn testimony is some reason to believe. But it is not the same thing as conviction, is it?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you. To you it is not, is it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. To my mind, conviction is conviction, and accusation is accusation.

Senator SMITH. It might come in the middle ground of conclusion from testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen, let us proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mary Jane Keeney.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I take the two names together?

Mr. MORRIS. Mary Jane and Philip Keeney?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mary Jane and Philip Keeney.

Mr. MORRIS. You may, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My knowledge of them is extremely slight and I had no reason to believe that they were Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Philip Keeney in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met him, yes, when some group that he was coming out with had just arrived. I met him when I was going into a building and he was coming out. We stopped and shook hands.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you known him before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had met him slightly here in Washington, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet with him in Japan, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that was the only occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Robin Kinkead.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No reason to believe that he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You did know him, and had dealings with him, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was on the staff of OWI in San Francisco when I was there.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Benjamin Kizer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know Mr. Kizer, do you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know Mr. Kizer.

Mr. MORRIS. He is a member of the board of trustees in the Institute of Pacific Relations, is he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Whether he still is, I don't know. He may very well be.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions have you seen Mr. Kizer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen Mr. Kizer off and on over a period of years.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he a member of the board?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a member of the board at one time, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Sergei Kournakoff.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Corliss Lamont.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have met Mr. Lamont, I believe, once, and have had no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Olga Lang.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The same answer, no.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions have you met Olga Lang?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met her in China when she was married to Karl August Wittfogel. I don't recall whether I have ever met her since in America, or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did she write articles for Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think she wrote an article for Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Michael Lindsay.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know Mr. Lindsay very slightly. I think I met him once in this country, and have no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is T. B. Lowe.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of anyone who used the pseudonym T. B. Lowe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you and Mr. Bisson ever team up and write an article under that pseudonym?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you sure of it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall writing an article jointly with Mr. Bisson at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you do not know the name T. B. Lowe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. T. B. Lowe? Is that meant to be T. B. Lowe?

Mr. MORRIS. No. H. Lowe is the name I am asking now.

Mr. LATTIMORE. T. B. Lowe is a new name to me.

Mr. MORRIS. That means nothing to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How about the name H. Lowe?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't place that, either.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is Duncan C. Lee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you have never met Duncan C. Lee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my knowledge and recollection, I have never met him.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mr. William Mandel.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think this is the William Mandel who worked for a time for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I forgot whether he was an employee or whether he did a research job. He did some work on Soviet Russia, of some kind.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have done some work on his books, have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that when I was a member of the research committee, the manuscript, or part of the manuscript of one of his books was sent to me for looking over.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he worked for the Hoover Library?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not introduce Mr. Mandel to Mr. Stefansson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Selden Menefee is the next name.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Menefee very slightly a good many years ago here in Washington. I haven't seen him for some years, and have no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Robert T. Miller.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't place that name, except I believe recalling that it came up in the transcript of hearings of Mr. E. C. Carter. But I still don't place the name. I am sure I have never met him.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is P. T. Moon.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Harriet L. Moore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Harriet L. Moore, I have no reason to consider a Communist at the time I knew her. Her recent refusal to answer the question whether she had ever been a Communist raises a strong presumption that she is or was at some time a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have known her for many years, have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I knew her slightly in the 1930's and saw her again very occasionally afterwards.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, the record of these meetings in Moscow, that we have introduced into the record at great length, shows that she and you attended all those meetings together.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. She has also been a leader of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In fact, she acted as secretary, did she not, Mr. Lattimore, at the time that you were associated with the institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. If it was, it was probably at the time when I was out of the country, because I don't recall her acting in that capacity.

Mr. MORRIS. You did have many long and extensive dealings with Miss Moore, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I would not say. Not long or extensive.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is E. Herbert Norman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is no.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last see Mr. Norman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1947, at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Stratford, England.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Mr. Norman in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met him in Japan in the winter of 1945–1946.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet him in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Fairly frequently. I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Just before you pass that: Did you ever have any negotiations or know of any negotiations between yourself, Norman, General Thorpe, Emerson, and Fairbank, or any of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I recall the suggestion being made that I should take a job as a civilian employee under General Thorpe, but nothing in the way of negotiations, and certainly nothing in the way of negotiations with—what was the name—Emerson.

Senator FERGUSON. Emerson, Fairbank.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Emerson, Fairbank, Norman, and Thorpe.

Senator FERGUSON. And you.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know of the move to try to bring Japanese Communists back into Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew of any?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversations about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't believe I did. I believe that, in fact, I know that at the time I was in Japan, some, at least, of the Japanese Communists who had been in China during the war, they either returned to Japan when I was there or had already returned at the time I got there. I don't know which.

Senator FERGUSON. But those that returned while you were there, did you know of any moves at all among any of those people that I have named to get the Japanese or Japanese Communists back into Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. In the way of moves to get them back, I don't know a thing about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us say other than moves, just to get them back.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. All I know is the bare fact that several of the Japanese came back. What the arrangements were I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know of any negotiations or efforts to get them back?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to General Thorpe about any of that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't talk with General Thorpe on that subject at all, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Nor with Norman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Nor with Norman.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear any conversation between Thorpe and Norman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Oleta O'Connor.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a postal card announcing a meeting. It is dated March 5, 1938. The post card reads as follows:

The Interprofessional Association presents a symposium, "Is Chamberlain yielding to fascism?"

Speakers: Miss Lillian Phillips, lecturer on foreign affairs; Miss Oleta O'Connor, chairman, county committee, Communist Party; Mr. Owen Lattimore, Director, Institute of Pacific Relations, noted author, and editor of Pacific Affairs.

Chairman: John D. Barry.

Questions and discussion from the floor.

The meeting is dated Thursday March 10, at Sorosis Hall, 536 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif. Admission 35 cents.

Mr. SOURWINE. What year is it, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, can you recall speaking at such a meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't recall any such meeting. I don't believe there was one.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you, under the circumstances, receive that into evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received into evidence for what it is worth.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 554" and appears on p. 3549.)

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Hotzumi Ozaki.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember reading that name in connection with press stories about the Sorge case in Japan, I believe, and I believe that I also saw in the transcript of these hearings that Ozaki was at, I think, the Yosemite Conference of the IPR in 1936, but I don't believe I met him.

EXHIBIT No. 554



Mr. MORRIS. Were you at that conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was at that conference, but I don't recall meeting him.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is P'eng Kung.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is that the same P'eng Kung, or Kung P'eng, that was mentioned several days ago?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that that is the name of a secretary of Chou En-lai, whom I met in Chungking when I had one or two conversations with Chou En-lai under the instructions of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that whenever you met Kung P'eng, it was under the direction of the generalissimo?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was within the generalissimo's directive to keep in touch with Chou En-lai on certain points.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mr. Fred W. Poland.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might interpose, I think that the witness' statement gives rise to a fair inference with regard to the Communist connection of Kung P'eng, or P'eng Kung, but there was not a direct answer on that.

Might we have that for the record?

Mr. Lattimore. I see. Yes.

I assume that she was a Communist. I can't answer to that of personal knowledge, because I believe the Communists at that time were using a number of people simply because they could speak English and not necessarily members of the party.

There may be other evidence on the subject.

Mr. Morris. Do you know where Kung P'eng is now?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Fred W. Poland.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I remember meeting Mr. Poland once at the Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR in 1942—would that be 1943—1942, I guess.

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that is the only occasion on which you met Mr. Poland?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I ever met him before or since.

Mr. Morris. He was an active member of the secretariat of the IPR, was he not, of the international IPR?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe he was. My recollection is that he was somebody who was brought along for the Canadian secretariat of that meeting. I may be wrong on that.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe, or do you know that he is a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I had no reason to believe.

Mr. Morris. Do you know that he was one of the defendants in the Canadian espionage case?

Mr. Lattimore. I was just going to add I remember seeing something about that in the press. But I believe he was acquitted; wasn't he?

Mr. Morris. The next name is Lee Pressman.

Mr. Lattimore. Mr. Pressman, I have met maybe a couple of times here in Washington. At that time I had no reason to believe him a Communist, but I believe that since then—has he refused to testify, or did he testify that he was one?

Mr. Morris. I believe he has acknowledged, Mr. Lattimore, that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Lattimore. I see.

Mr. Morris. What was the occasion for your meeting Mr. Pressman in Washington, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. Oh, a couple of times socially. I don't recall the circumstances. I had no particular conversation with him. I just remember him as a person who was there.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Mildred Price.

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I have ever met Mildred Price. Her name has come up in these transcripts, but I don't believe I have ever met her.

Mr. Morris. You know she was the executive secretary of the China Aid Council, do you not?

Mr. Lattimore. From the transcripts of these hearings, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You belonged to the China Aid Council, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I did. Did I? I would be glad to have my memory refreshed, but I doubt if I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You made financial contributions to it, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is quite likely, yes.

I made financial contributions to the pet schemes of Madame Chiang Kai-shek and her sisters, Madame Kung and Madame Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you gave the contributions to the China Aid Council and yet you did not know Mildred Price, who was the executive secretary of that organization.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew and you know the China Aid Council was an affiliate of the American League Against War and Fascism; is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Ludwig Rajchman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I met Mr. Rajchman, or Dr. Rajchman, a number of times here in Washington when he was working with Dr. T. V. Soong, who was at that time the head of China Defense Supplies, I think, and I have met him once since the end of the war, at the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. He is a member of the Soviet Polish delegation, is he not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen something to that effect in the press. I don't know when he became one.

At the time I saw him in the United Nations, it was my understanding that he was a member of the United Nations employee staff and not a delegate of Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. But he was sent there by Soviet Poland, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not clear on that. There are several subdivisions of the bureaucracy of the United Nations, and I don't know which one he belonged to.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Samuel Rodman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever rent an office from Samuel Rodman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did I ever rent an office from him?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. MORRIS. Were you acquainted in Washington?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you acquainted with an organization called the Committee of One Thousand?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have heard that name certainly, but I can't place it today.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you did not know that the Committee for One Thusand used the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations as its headquarters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That certainly is my testimony; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Rosinger slightly over a period of years when he worked for Foreign Policy Association, and afterward Institute of Pacific Relations. I had no reason to believe him a Com-

munist until he refused to testify before this committee, which creates a strong presumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you last see Mr. Rosinger, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In New York, in the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations, oh, probably more than a year ago.

Senator FERGUSON. After these hearings, had started, after the records were obtained?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe it was after the hearings had started. It may have been after the seizure of the files.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean after the seizure of the files?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It may have been. I am not quite sure of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you recall anything about your conference or discussion or talk with him at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I think the sole topic was the question of a piece, a contribution on Mongolia and Tibet, which my wife and I were writing for a book that he partly wrote and partly edited.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Andrew Roth.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Mr. Roth very slightly in Washington about 1945 and had no reason to consider him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You reviewed the manuscript of his book, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I reviewed the manuscript of his book and wrote a recommendation for the publishers.

Senator FERGUSON. A few days before the arrest of Mr. Roth and Mr. Jaffe, was Mr. Roth at your residence in Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He came over to Baltimore; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was: Was he at your residence in Baltimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was present at that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. John Stewart Service.

Senator FERGUSON. Anybody else? Roth, Service——

Mr. MORRIS. Was Rose Yardumian there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think she was, but I have never been sure whether she was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Anybody else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A couple of professors from Johns Hopkins, and their wives.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were they?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Professor Carter, of the School of Geography, and Professor Moose, of the Department of Political Science.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that occasion to have the professors there and have Service and Roth there, and possibly another?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, they were a couple of professors whom we at that time—I think they were both pretty new at the Hopkins and we knew them very slightly and thought they might be interested in meeting some people interested in the Far East, and asked them out.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew, then, that Mr. Roth and Mr. Service were coming to your home, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before they came did you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Two or three days, probably.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the occasion of having Mr. Roth and Mr. Service, and possibly the other person, there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Mr. Service I hadn't seen since he had been in Chungking, and I wanted to see him.

Mr. Roth, I think, had been asking if he could come over and show me his manuscript. So we just thought to put the two things together and asked them to come over, I think it was one Saturday or Sunday afternon. And I think the day before, on the campus, I ran into these two professors and suggested that they might be interested to come out for a picnic lunch.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Roth bring his manuscript with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he brought it with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it in a proof form?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether it was—I am sure it wasn't in typed script. It might have been in either galley or page proof.

Senator FERGUSON. Galley or page proof.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

I am not at all clear on that. It might even have been in typed script.

My wife says she thinks it was in proof.

Senator FERGUSON. In proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In proof; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you examining the proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I think it was in the living room. I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see it on the bed, laid out on the bed in the bedroom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I can recall. It may have been there because when guests came in they were shown into the spare bedroom and put their coats and things there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it would be laid out on the bed under those circumstances.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It might very easily had if he had been carrying it loose.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not there were any papers from the State Department laying out on your bed, or a bed in your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sure there weren't.

Senator FERGUSON. You are sure of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. At least, if there were, I didn't see them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that one of these college professors had stated that there were papers on the bed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe there was something of that kind in the Tydings testimony. I am sure it was wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever talk to the professor about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not think it was important enough to ask the professor if he did happen to see those papers there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I asked the other professor, and he recalled seeing nothing of the sort. I didn't ask the professor who gave that testimony, because I have a sort of dislike for talking with informers.

Senator SMITH. Did you regard him as an informer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I don't believe he gave any testimony at all. I believe he gave information to Senator McCarthy.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, then, if I understand it correctly, if someone went to a person who had knowledge of the facts, either

some member of a committee or a staff member, if that person gave the truth as he saw it, would you class him as an informer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would certainly say that a colleague of mine, on a university faculty, if he thought he recalled anything of the sort, should have come and checked it with me, frankly.

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose he saw it and you did not see it. Suppose he saw it and you did not see it. Suppose that Service and/or Roth did have these papers in your bedroom——

Mr. LATTIMORE. I still think that, as a matter of frank relationships between members of the same faculty, he should have come and told me about it.

Senator FERGUSON. And for that reason, you would not interview him or ascertain whether or not he did know of those facts?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly not; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you feel?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the way I reacted to it.

Senator FERGUSON. And have you never talked to him since?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever spoken to him since?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he still on the faculty?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the other professor involved there, Mr. Lattimore?

Senator FERGUSON. Wait until I get the name of this man.

What was the name of the professor who was the "informer"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Professor Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. What branch of the school was he in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. School of geography.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he interested in the Far East?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not specially, I don't believe.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did you invite him there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, the school of geography was the pet project of President Isaiah Bowman of the school, who regarded geography and international relations as very closely related.

I thought any intelligent member of the faculty would, as of that time, be interested in meeting somebody recently back from the Far East and somebody who was writing on problems of the Far East.

If I had met a couple of other members of the faculty, I might just as well have invited them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you review the book or these manuscripts in the presence of Professor Carter and the other professors?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My recollection of that is not very clear. I think that I sat on a window seat by a large sort of picture window looking out on the lawn where everybody was gathered and rapidly went through the manuscript or proof.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you spend on the proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe half an hour or so.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say that the professor, or both professors, were sufficiently intelligent so that they would recognize what a proof was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It would depend on how closely they had looked.

Senator FERGUSON. What kind of paper was the proof on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. And you reviewed the book in about a half hour, then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I went through the book very rapidly.

Senator FERGUSON. How many pages would you say it had?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I think when it was published it was about a 250-page book.

Senator FERGUSON. How long would these galley proofs be, in length?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether they were galley, or page proof. Galley proof usually runs, I think, about two and a half book pages per galley.

Senator FERGUSON. It would be easily recognized, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you recall, sitting at the window, whether or not it was galley proof or page proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I can't recall. I have read so many proofs in my life, it is hard to remember which one I read on a specific occasion.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you really feel a man would be mistaken about seeing pages on a bed if he attended a meeting, even though they were galley proof, or page proof?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He might be.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the room where the gentlemen put their coats?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have shown them up to the room.

Senator FERGUSON. Who, would you say, came first?

The CHAIRMAN. Of the two, or of the group?

Senator FERGUSON. Of the group.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not any idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No idea.

Senator FERGUSON. How long afterward was Roth arrested and Service arrested?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was a very short time afterward. I forget exactly what. I believe——

Wait a minute. On that question of the stuff being on the bed, I seem to remember that the information, as repeated by Senator McCarthy, was that Professor Carter's wife went into the room to change a baby's diaper and told him that she had seen something on the bed, or something.

This being a room which is used partly as an office, there might have been papers of my own lying around there.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would not say that the professor or his wife did not see papers on the bed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They may have. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though his wife saw it and told her husband, then you thought he was an informer and you never went to ask him about them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly did think he was an informer; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, did you read the testimony before this committee that Roth's book Dilemma in Japan—and, of course, the galley proofs were of that book, were they not—that that was passed by the Communist Party of the United States before it was published?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember reading that testimony. Can you tell me whose testimony that was?

Mr. Morris. Have you read the article that appeared in the Daily Worker of June 26, 1945, which reads:

Roth's forthcoming book, Dilemma in Japan, dissects the State Department's past mistakes and current fallacies, and, in the author's words, it exposes Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co., announced the book would come out in September.

Did you read that testimony, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. I believe I saw a photostat or a mimeograph of part of that excerpt from the Daily Worker. May I point out, however——

The Chairman. The question is: Did you read that testimony?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall whether I read that testimony. I do recall, however, that at the time I was talking with Mr. Roth about his book, he told me that it had all been cleared in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, who was the other professor at that meeting that we have been discussing?

Mr. Lattimore. Professor Moos.

Mr. Morris. Is he related to Elizabeth Moos?

Mr. Lattimore. What Elizabeth Moos?

Mr. Morris. The mother of William Remington. I think she was a recent defendant in the American Peace Crusade.

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't believe he is any relative whatever.

Mr. Morris. He is not?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know Mr. Remington?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Paul Robeson, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore. I have met Mr. Paul Robeson once. Let me see, it was in 1942—when he was out in San Francisco, and he sang, he recorded some songs to be broadcast over the radio. I believe he was also asked to do the same thing for radio to Europe from the New York office.

Mr. Morris. Did you attend a meeting at which Mr. Paul Robeson was present, in the home of Mrs. Edith Field?

Mr. Lattimore. Not a meeting. I went to dinner at Mrs. Field's mother's house, and Mrs. Field and Robeson were there and, I think, also Max Yergan, whose name comes down here later.

Mr. Morris. Were they all present at that dinner party?

Mr. Lattimore. At that dinner party; yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you answer the question with respect to Paul Robeson?

Mr. Lattimore. At that time I had no reason to consider Mr. Robeson a Communist; judging from what I have read about him in the press more recently, he may very likely be one.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Kimi Kazu Saionji.

Mr. Lattimore. I remember a K. K. Saionji—I am not sure about the personal names there—who was a member of the secretariat of the Japanese IPR.

Mr. Morris. Was he the secretary of the Japanese Council of the IPR?

Mr. Lattimore. I believe he was at one time; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you answer the questions with respect to Mr. Saionji?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no reason to believe him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he was a defendant in the Sorge espionage case?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I read in the press that he was arrested at that time, but set free.

Mr. MORRIS. He was given a suspended sentence, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Was he? I didn't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Helen Schneider.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't place that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. As a staff worker on the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. A staff worker in the Amerasia office?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Isidore Schneider?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is M. C. Shleesnyak.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew Dr. Shleesnyak when he was at the Johns Hopkins for about a year as secretary of the Arctic Institute of America.

Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know Mr. Shleesnyak?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not very well. We visited back and forth a certain amount, dined at their house and they dined at ours.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they ever stay with you at your home over night?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe they did. I don't think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they ever visit you in your home in Vermont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. We may have seen them at Stefansson's, the next farm.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they stay at Stefansson's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe they came up there. I believe that was the first time we met them. That was before they had come to Hopkins.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Shleesnyak accompany you on your trip to the Arctic?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I would say that I accompanied him. He organized a trip up to Point Barrow for—let's see—it was on behalf of the Arctic Research Institute, which was doing some work at Point Barrow, and President Bronk of the Hopkins, was one of the trustees of that and was unable to go and asked me to go as his deputy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Mr. Shleesnyak had been a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was a registered Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not. Mr. Sleesnyak told me that he had in one election in New York voted the Communist ticket and that, under New York rules, this required his registering accordingly, but that he had never been a Communist and that the matter had been cleared with Naval Intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you intervene with Naval Intelligence on his behalf at the time the question of his security in his making a trip to the Arctic had come up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't at that time know there was such a question of security.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Mr. Shleesnyak now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is at the Weizmann Institute in Palestine.

Mr. MORRIS. What is he doing there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is doing some kind of research on ecology.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent have you been active in the Arctic Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say that I have not been active at all.

Mr. MORRIS. You did know Mr. Shleesnyak; did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I knew him, and when the Arctic Institute was brought to the Johns Hopkins for a period I welcomed it. It was an extension of interest in interrelations and they used to hold seminars there, and I attended several seminars.

In fact, I believe I gave a seminar once myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Stefansson active in the Arctic Institute?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Stefansson I believe is; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Stefansson a close friend of yours, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Stefansson has been a good friend of mine since, oh, 10 years or so.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Stefansson is closely associated with Mr. Shelesnyak, is he not, or has been in the past?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know how closely.

Mr. MORRIS. At least, you know on one occasion he stayed overnight at Stefansson's home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the physical connections between Stefansson's home in Vermont and your home in Vermont?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Stefansson has a farm where he spends the summer in Vermont, and about half or three-quarters of a mile away, through the woods, there is another farm, which he detached from his holding and sold to my wife and myself.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name on the list is Agnes Smedley.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Agnes Smedley I knew slightly during the 1930's. I did not consider her a Communist. I did consider her a partisan of the Chinese Communists.

That, incidentally, was not in the 1930's, as I recall, but in the 1940's.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by a partisan of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Wait a minute. Yes, I did know her in the thirties, because in 1937 she was up in Yenan; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you not know that the Chinese Communists were controlled by the Russian Communists out of Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I didn't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. It is very much a disputed question among experts on the subject.

I rather inclined to the view that the Chinese Communists have, at least in the past, been more or less autonomous.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that why you say that she was a partisan, she was probably a fellow traveler of the Chinese Communists? Is that what you want to classify her as?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Subject to the extreme vagueness of the term fellow traveler; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You have used it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I used it saying that it was a vague and unsatisfactory term.

Senator FERGUSON. But you do not think that she bordered on the definition now that we have given you as a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. From my slight acquaintance with her, she was what you might call an unruly and rebellious type that would be likely to get thrown out of any party she joined.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, do you know of any American that was, in your opinion, a Chinese Communist, that belonged to the Chinese Communist group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the Russian Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose there have been of the Russian Communists, but I couldn't name any.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is do you know?

Senator FERGUSON. Know anybody.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Under this definition that we are now using on communism?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That were members of the Russian Communist Party?

Senator FERGUSON. I did not say members of the party. I do not want to say members of the party. I mean just affiliated with it, as we gave you the definition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Senator mean using "Communist" in the sense of a person under Communist discipline, or who has voluntarily or knowingly cooperated and collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I suppose Anna Louise Strong, in working for a Communist-owned paper in Moscow, but——

Senator FERGUSON. Smedley?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Smedley I don't believe was ever in Russia. Was she?

Senator FERGUSON. Would that keep her from being a Communist within the definition that we have given you of Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought you meant the other definition; I am sorry.

No. As far as I knew Agnes Smedley, which was very slightly, she had a great deal of interest in China and either not much interest in Russia or I didn't know much about it.

In China she was particularly known for her support in writing up of the new Fourth Army, which was a mixed Communist and Chiang Kai-shek army.

And, as I recall, in her book on that army, she is much more enthusiastic about the non-Communist commander of the army than she was about the Communist second in command of the army.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you knew that she willed her property to Chu-Teh, the Chinese Communist general; did she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read that in the press; yes.

Mr. Morris. And you know that Mildred Price, who was the executive secretary of the China Aid Council, was her executor under her last will and testament?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't remember reading that.

The Chairman. Are you acquainted with Earl Browder?

Mr. Lattimore. Only to the extent of having gone to his office once.

The Chairman. You are acquainted with him.

Mr. Lattimore. I would not call that acquaintance; no.

The Chairman. You would not call that an acquaintance. All right.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Edgar Snow.

Mr. Lattimore. No; I did not and do not consider him a Communist under these definitions.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Richard Sorge.

Mr. Lattimore. Richard Sorge I never met under that or any other name, as far as I know.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever receive a letter from Mr. Sorge?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Ordway Southard.

Mr. Lattimore. Ordway Southard I do not know. He is a man who bought from me and the Stefanssons the farm that we had in joint ownership. I never met him and had nothing to do with the transaction and didn't know that he was or had been a Communist until it was published in the press later.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you do know, it has been published in the press, that he was an active member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Lattimore. It was published in the press that he had been a candidate for Governor of Alabama on the Communist ticket, or something of that sort.

Mr. Morris. Would that satisfy you that he was a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. That would satisfy me that he was a Communist.

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you did, then, deed your property to Mr. Southard, to Mr. and Mrs. Southard?

Mr. Lattimore. I sold that property; yes.

Mr. Morris. Did you testify in that fashion in executive session before this committee?

Mr. Lattimore. Did I?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I get back to this? It will just take a minute.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Morris. I am going on to the next question. Perhaps Mr. Mandel can find that reference there.

It is you testimony you did deed your property, you and Mr. Stefansson and Mrs. Stefansson and Mrs. Lattimore, did deed the property that you held in common, to Mary and Richard Southard?

Mr. Lattimore. We sold it; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Is it Mary and Richard Southard, or Mary and Ordway Southard?

Mr. Morris. Mary and Ordway Southard.

The Chairman. The question is, Did you deed it to those parties named?

Mr. Lattimore. We sold it; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you deed it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't understand the technical term "deed."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you sign the deed?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you sign a deed or conveyance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We signed whatever papers were necessary for the transaction; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know what a deed is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I understand there are deeds of gift and all kinds of deeds, but, to my simple mind, I sold it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this deed a gift?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you a document and ask if you ever have seen it.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify the document I have presented to Mr. Lattimore, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I have seen this. It is not my signature or my wife's signature. It must have been done by proxy, by an attorney in Bethel, Vt.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will you identfy that and these two documents, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat that I ordered made of a warranty deed No. 481, between Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you cause that document to be photostated?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the original?

Mr. MANDEL. The original is at the Bethel town clerk's office.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. MANDEL. In Vermont.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a photostat of the original document on file, recorded there?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you caused it to be photostated?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify the other two documents, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a mortgage deed, No. 241, between Ordway Southard and Mary Southard, on the one hand, and Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson, of Bethel, on the other, and also Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. And the third document?

Mr. MANDEL. The third is a photostat of a warranty deed No. 467, with the names of Viljahmur Stefansson, Evelyn Stefansson, and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that come from the same source, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. It comes from the same source.

Mr. MORRIS. And the fourth one?

Mr. MANDEL. The fourth one is a mortgage deed with the names of Ordway Southard and Mary Southard and Viljahmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore. The number is 241.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that taken from the original record?

Mr. MANDEL. From the same source; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know if these are photostats of original documents on file and recorded in some official place.

Mr. MANDEL. They are photostats of documents in the files of the clerk's office at Bethel, Vt.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they file deeds in the clerk's office? Is it a town clerk, or a register of deeds, or what?

What I do not understand is how these mortgages could have typed signatures on them if they are photostats of the original papers that are on file. And the signatures on the Stefansson-Lattimore deed look to be in the same handwriting, the husband's and the wife's. The L's are identical.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Mr. Stefansson signed on your behalf in this connection, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. We gave power of attorney to somebody, either Mr. or Mrs. Stefansson, or to Mr. Bundy, of Bethel, Vt., who is an attorney.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not signed under a power of attorney.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They aren't?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall testifying in executive session here on July 13, 1951, in this fashion:

> Mr. MORRIS. And then when you sold that property, to whom did you sell it?
> Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't sell the property. My wife and I empowered Mr. Stefansson to sell it on our behalf.
> Mr. MORRIS. You gave him the power of attorney?
> Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, and we were rather pressed for money at that time, owing to extraordinary expenses forced on us by Senator Joseph McCarthy and needed some cash and we sold the farm.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was certainly my recollection at the time, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And yet you testified here today that you did sell the property to Mr. and Mrs. Southard.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, through somebody holding a power of attorney.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make out a power of attorney at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose I must have.

Mr. MORRIS. It does not appear on these documents.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question?

Mr. Lattimore. I notice that there is a certificate by Mr. and Mrs. Stefansson before someone up in Vermont. There appears to be here an acknowledgment by you and Mrs. Lattimore before Elizabeth Carroll. You will note that she certified that you and Mrs. Lattimore personally appeared. Is that right, or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "State of Vermont" is crossed out and "State of Maryland" put in.

Senator FERGUSON. At Baltimore.

Mr. ARNOLD. The signature is not on here. I do not understand that at all.

Senator SMITH. Yes, it is further down there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you see the acknowledgment?

Senator SMITH. Then right below that is a certificate by the notary who says they personally appeared.

Mr. ARNOLD. And it is not a signature that appears on here.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. We ought to be able to get this straightened out. There has to be a ground made for the admission, if you are going to offer it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear now what happened. The clerk up there made a copy in his own handwriting, of what was in the record, and then photostated his own handwriting instead of photostating the original in the record. Then that appears to be in the same handwriting.

Senator SMITH. Do you know Elizabeth H. Carroll, the notary public?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it must be one of the secretaries at Johns Hopkins who has a power of notary.

Senator FERGUSON. But then you did make a deed and acknowledged it before one of the secretaries in Baltimore, you and your wife; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We sold it. We didn't handle the transaction. The entire transaction was handled by the Stefanssons.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it a fact that you and your wife went before a notary, or a notary came before you two and took your acknowledgement and you signed the deed to this property up in Vermont? Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose that is the story; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you only get "suppose" on that? Cannot you tell us whether that is or is not a fact? It happened in 1950. In deeding your property away, you cannot give us a better answer than "suppose."

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator, the correspondence on the subject was conducted primarily between my wife and the Stefanssons, and they handled the entire transaction on our behalf.

And then apparently we were assured that everything was in order and some papers were sent down to be notarized, and we got them notarized.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had to swear that it was your free act and deed. You were transferring real estate. Do you not recall that at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I recall that we were authorizing the Stefanssons to get jointly owned property sold. I had full confidence in the Stefanssons getting——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lattimore, this was done in Baltimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; in Baltimore.

It was not what Stefansson did, but what you did.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry. I am not quite sure what you are driving at, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I know. That is the trouble with your answers. You do not know what I am driving at. Do not try to figure out what I am driving at. I am just asking you a question.

Did you, or did you not, go before a notary and swear that that was your——

The CHAIRMAN. It is an acknowledgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me read it to you:

* * * personally appeared and acknowledged this instrument by them, sealed and subscribed to be their free act and deed.

Did you or did you not do that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Evidently I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to put in the word "evidently"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right; I did.

I am just saying I don't remember the transaction at all, sir. I mean the details of the transaction. All I remember is that we managed to get rid of our farm.

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind the details of the transaction, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Chairman, he said that he did. What more can he say?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; after considerable effort.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask Mr. Lattimore one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator SMITH. How many deeds have you ever signed before, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. For the sale of property?

Senator SMITH. That is what I mean, yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't remember any others for the sale of property. I signed papers for the purchase of property on which I built my house near Baltimore, and I am afraid I will have to tell you that I can't remember a single detail of it.

Senator SMITH. I just have in mind that I have had clients to acknowledge documents that they relied upon me as counsel, and I was just wondering what implication should be drawn from the fact that this acknowledgement was that way.

Mr. LATTIMORE. We had counsel. We had an attorney in Bethel, a Mrs. Bundy, who, together with the Stefanssons, handled the details of the transaction. And so we had full confidence that everything was being legally done and that we would get our money.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you and Mrs. Lattimore negotiating for the sale of this property for some time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Letters had passed between Mrs. Lattimore and the purchasers, or between you and the purchasers; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, none had passed between us and the purchasers.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say a few minutes ago that some letters had passed, that correspondence had passed between Mrs. Lattimore and someone else for the purchase of the disposal of the property.

You knew you were going to dispose of it, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. When these instruments were shown to you, they were shown to you in Baltimore and you acknowledged them in Baltimore, according to the face of the instruments.

Now, do you say you did, or did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did acknowledge them; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at that time, Mr. Lattimore, know to whom the property was being deeded?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We may have known that it was somebody named Southard, but we didn't know anything about them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had the deed in front of you, did you not? You signed it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose I must have known, but not knowing who Mr. Southard was, it made no particular impression on our mind.

You see, this property was not simply being sold on our behalf; it was property that we jointly owned with Mr. and Mrs. Stefansson, and since we had an attorney acting for us in Bethel, and since the Stefanssons were acting in their own interest as well as ours, we didn't consider it necessary to take any special precautions in supervising the details.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you testified in executive session that you did not sell that property to the Southards, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I testified that it was sold on our behalf by the Stefanssons, I think. That was my recollection at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. But, Mr. Lattimore, there is the testimony and the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Read the record again.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

> And then when you sold that property, to whom did you sell it?
> Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't sell the property. My wife and I empowered Mr. Stefansson to sell it on our behalf.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is a true statement, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Then that is not true testimony, is it, Mr. Lattimore, in view of the fact that this deed has been presented to you today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think there may be a confusion here about the word "sell" perhaps. I don't know. It sounds to me like a technicality.

Mr. MORRIS. How much did you pay for that property when you bought it, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We paid for it, according to the notes I have—this was, as I say, outlying property belonging to the Stefanssons. It had a very tumbledown farmhouse on it and——

The CHAIRMAN. How much did you pay for it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We bought a half interest in it from the Stefanssons for $1 and considerations. The considerations were that we were to put the house on the property in order.

Mr. MORRIS. How much did you sell it for?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We sold our share of it for $2,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you hold a mortgage on that property today?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe it has been paid off.

Our cost in putting the property into order was something in excess of $2,000.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name on the list is Mr. Stefansson's name.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they be received into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. I would like to have it cleared up. I am not going to rule on that now. I am going to find out just what the context is, why they should be received. I am going to withhold ruling on that at the present time.

(For the chairman's acceptance of exhibits No. 555A, No. 555B, and No. 555C, see p. 3607. The exhibits follow.)

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mr. Stefansson's name, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What is Mr. Stefansson's first name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Vilhjalmur.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you a close friend of Mr. Stefansson's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have been a good friend of his for 10 years or so; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at any time have reason to believe that he was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Gunther Stein.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The same answer.

I knew Mr. Stein extremely slightly; met him maybe two or three times in Chungking in 1941 and 1942, and saw him, I think, once in this country at the end of the war or after the end of the war.

Mr. MORRIS. On several occasions you have praised his writings, have you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On one occasion, I believe, I wrote a review of a book of his and on another occasion I wrote to Prof. McMahon Ball in Australia, commending Stein as a good economist on Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Therefore, you must have known something about Mr. Stein before you would so commend him; is that not correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had seen some of his writings; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, when did you first have reason to believe that Mr. Stein was a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have ever had reason to believe he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he has been identified as having been involved in the Sorge espionage case by General Willoughby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen that reference.

I also understand that Stein has denied it.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you be willing to accept his denial?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Who am I to judge?

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Sabelle Yardumian Stein.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume that is the name of the present Mrs. Stein, whom I met once very briefly here in Washington with her husband.

Mr. MORRIS. And she is the sister of Rose Yardumian; is she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understand; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And Rose Yardumian was someone who acted as your secretary for many years; was she not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; she didn't. She worked, I think, for the Washington office of the IPR at one time. She never had worked as my secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. At least you would often dictate letters, would you not, which would bear the initials at the bottom "OL: y"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it very much.

Mr. MORRIS. That was a frequent notation, was it not, on your outgoing letters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I doubt it. I don't think I dictated—I can't remember dictating any letters in the Washington office of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Then where would the notation "OL: y" come from? What would that mean, Mr. Lattimore? That notation that frequently appeared in the letters that we have before us?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was probably my secretary in Baltimore, Mrs. Margaret Young.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say "Margaret" Young, or "Marguerite" Young?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Margaret."

EXHIBIT No. 555A



WARRANTY DEED Entered ... Stamps ... 481

Know all Men by these Presents:

That ... Husband ... Maryland ... Husband ... Baltimore ... Maryland ... Baltimore ... Maryland ... Baltimore ... Maryland

Bethel Town Clerk's Office, Bethel, Vermont. March 13, 1952.
I, Robert E. Bundy, Town Clerk of the Town of Bethel, in the County of Windsor, and State of Vermont, having by law the custody of the real estate records of the said Town, hereby certify that the photographic reflex copy on the reverse side hereof is an exact reproduction of a record in Book 38 Page 481 of said Bethel Land Records.

Attest, Robert E. Bundy
Town Clerk

EXHIBIT No. 555B

MORTGAGE DEED. 241

Know all Men by these Presents:

That we, Ordway Southard and Mary Southard, husband and wife,

of Bethel in the County of Windsor and State of Vermont

in the consideration of Forty-five Hundred---- dollars

paid to our full satisfaction by Vilhjalmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson of Bethel in the County of Windsor and State of Vermont, and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore of Baltimore in the County of Baltimore and State of Maryland

by these presents, do freely give, grant, sell, convey and confirm unto the said Vilhjalmur Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson, and Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore

and their heirs and assigns forever, a certain piece of land in Bethel in the County of Windsor and State of Vermont, described as follows, viz:

Being eighty acres of land or more, by estimation, situated in that part of Bethel known as Olympus, together with buildings thereon and furniture therein. Said real estate is all and the same conveyed to us, the said Ordway Southard and Mary Southard, by the warranty deed of said Stefanssons and Lattimores dated the 14th day of June A.D., 1950 to be found of record in Bethel land records in Book 38 page 481 to which reference is had for more detailed description.

To have and to hold said granted premises, with all the appurtenances thereof, to the said Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Evelyn Stefansson, Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore and their heirs and assigns, to their own use and behoof forever; and we, the said Ordway Southard and Mary Southard for ourselves and our heirs, executors and administrators, do covenant with the said Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Evelyn Stefansson, Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore and their heirs and assigns, that until the ensealing of these presents we are the sole owner s of the premises, and have good right and title to convey the same in manner aforesaid; that they are free from every encumbrance; and we hereby engage to warrant and defend the same against all lawful claims whatever.

Provided, however, that if we, the said Ordway Southard and Mary Southard, either or the survivor, shall pay or cause to be paid accordingly to its tenor, our certain promissory note executed of even date herewith for the principal sum of Forty-Five Hundred Dollars, payable to the said above named four mortgagees, or to Vilhjalmur Stefansson, acting under power of attorney given by the other three mortgagees, said note to be paid as follows:- $1000 or more on or before July 1, 1950; $1000 or more on or before September 1, 1950; $600. or more on or before July 1, 1951, and thereafter $500 or more on the 1st of July yearly until $4500 with interest at the rate of 5% annually has been paid in full. Also if we keep valid insurance on said buildings with policy showing interest of said mortgagees, and shall pay premiums on same and real estate taxes assessed on these premises before same are delinquent, then this deed shall be null and void, otherwise of full force and effect.

In Witness Whereof, we hereunto set our hand s and seal s this 19 day of June A D 19 50

In the Presence of

Robert E. Sundy to C.S. Ordway Southard (L.S.)

Gladys Wilson Sundy (L.S.)

Robert E. Sundy to M.S. Mary Southard (L.S.)

Gladys Wilson Sundy (L.S.)

State of Vermont, } At Bethel this 19 day of June A D 19 50

Windsor County, } ss. Then Ordway Southard and on the 1st day of July A.D., 1950 the said Mary Southard their

personally appeared, and they acknowledged the instrument by them sealed and subscribed to be their free act and deed.

Before me, Gladys Wilson Sundy

Notary Public.

Bethel Town Clerk's Office July 1, 1950 at 12 o'clock 30 minutes P. M.

Received for record a deed of which the foregoing is a true copy.

Attest, Robert E. Sundy, Town Clerk.

I hereby acknowledge satisfaction of the Mortgage Deed within and the same is discharged of record.

In the presence of

Bethel Town Clerk's Office

DISCHARGE

Received for record the Discharge of the Mortgage recorded on this page and the same is a true copy of the said discharge

Attest: Town Clerk

Bethel Town Clerk's Office.Bethel,Vermont. March 13,1952.
I,Robert,Town Clerk of the Town of Bethel,in the County of Windsor,and State of Vermont,having by law the custody of the real estate records of the said Town,hereby certify that the Kolagraph reflex copy on the reverse side hereof is an exact reproduction of a record in Book 39, Page 241 of said Bethel Land Records.

Attest,

Town Clerk

EXHIBIT No. 555C



WARRANTY DEED. Internal Revenue Stamps affixed and Cancelled. 467

Know all Men by these Presents:

That We, Valentine V. Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson

husband and wife

of Hanover in the County of Grafton and State of New Hampshire

in the consideration of Seven Thousand Dollars and other good and valuable consideration

paid to us by Edward Tatnall Canby and Edna Canby

of Washington in the County of District of Columbia and State of Maryland, grantees,

by these presents, do freely give, grant, sell, convey and confirm unto said Grantees and their heirs and assigns forever,

a certain piece of land in Bethel in the

County of Windsor and State of Vermont, described as follows, viz: One undivided half part of the following pieces of the premises conveyed to us by Edward Tatnall Canby by warranty deed of even date herewith and recorded in Book 99 page 143 Bethel land records, to which reference is made:

First: All of said premises lying westerly of the Chicago, Boston & Maine Railroad, and bounded and described as follows: Beginning at a point in the center of the highway leading easterly from said village of Bethel to Gaysville at the northeasterly corner of land now or formerly of Mary Brooks; thence southerly by said Brooks land to the center of the White River; thence westerly by the center of said White River to the center of the highway leading northerly from said village of Bethel to Gaysville; thence northerly by the center of said highway to the point of beginning, containing about 10 acres, more or less.

Second: All of said premises lying easterly of the Chicago, Boston & Maine Railroad, and bounded and described as follows: Beginning at a point in the center of the highway leading easterly from said village of Bethel to Gaysville at the northeasterly corner of land now or formerly of Mary Brooks; thence southerly by said Brooks land to the center of the White River; thence easterly by the center of said White River to the center of the highway leading northerly from said village of Bethel to Gaysville; thence northerly by the center of said highway to the point of beginning, containing about 10 acres, more or less.

Excepting and reserving from the above described premises all rights of flowage and all rights of the public in and to the waters of the White River and the highway leading from said village of Bethel to Gaysville.

Also excepting and reserving from the above described premises all rights of flowage and all rights of the public in and to the waters of the White River and the highway leading from said village of Bethel to Gaysville.

To have and to hold said granted premises, with all the privileges and appurtenances thereof, to the said grantees Edward Tatnall Canby and Edna Canby, husband and wife, by the entirety, and to their heirs and assigns, to their own use and behoof forever, and we the said grantors, Valentine V. Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson, husband and wife, for ourselves and our heirs, executors and administrators, do covenant with the said grantees and their heirs and assigns that until the ensealing of these presents we are the sole owners of the premises, and have good right and title to convey the same in manner aforesaid; that they are free from every encumbrance; and we hereby engage to warrant and defend the same against all lawful claims whatever.

In Witness Whereof, we hereunto set our hands and seals this 12th day of September A. D. 1927

In the Presence of

Virginia E. Hendy — Valentine V. Stefansson (L. S.)

Mary C. Hendy — Evelyn Stefansson (L. S.)

(L. S.)

(L. S.)

State of Vermont, } At Bethel this 24th day of September A. D. 1927

Windsor County, ss. } said Valentine V. Stefansson and Evelyn Stefansson personally appeared, and acknowledged this instrument by them sealed and subscribed, to be their free act and deed.

Before us, Virginia E. Hendy, Notary Public. Justice of the Peace.

Bethel Town Clerk's Office, April 10, 1928 at 2 o'clock and 0 minutes A. M. Received for record a deed of which the foregoing is a true copy.

Attest: Hendy & W. B. Hendy, Asst. Town Clerk.

Bethel Town Clerk's Office.Bethel,Vermont. March 13,1952.
I,Robert E.Bundy,Town Clerk of the Town of Bethel,in the County of Windsor,and State of Vermont,having by law the custody of the real estate records of the said Town,hereby certify that the Kodagraph reflex copy on the reverse side hereof is an exact reproduction of a record in Book 38, Page 457 of said Bethel Land Records.

Attest:

Town Clerk

Mr. Morris. Did you know that Rose Yardumian was in Communist China last year?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; I did.

Mr. Morris. In connection with a Chinese Communist publication?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't know that.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Andrew Steiger.

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I have ever met Mr. Steiger personally. I think that the extent of my contact with him is when he did a large part of the drafting of a book for then Vice President Wallace, the manuscript of which was sent down to me before publication.

Mr. Morris. But it is your testimony you never met with Mr. Steiger in that connection?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I never met with him in that connection.

Mr. Morris. Or in any other connection?

Mr. Lattimore. Or in any other connection that I can remember.

Mr. Morris. You did have dealings, though, to that extent, did you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore. To that extent; yes. And I think maybe one exchange of correspondence.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Anna Louise Strong, Mr. Chairman, and I believe we have covered that in previous questioning.

After that we have Madam Sun Yat-sen.

Mr. Lattimore. Madam Sun Yat-sen I knew slightly in Chungking in 1941–42, and had no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. Morris. Did you see Madam Sun Yat-sen in connection with your visit to China with Mr. Wallace?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't believe I did. I think some members of the mission called on her; but I don't believe I was with them.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Daniel Thorner.

Mr. Lattimore. The answer is "No."

Mr. Morris. You do know Daniel Thorner?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes, I know him. He worked under me for a year at Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. Morris. The next name is Kyuichy Tokuda.

Mr. Lattimore. Could you identify him more closely? I don't identify the name Kyuichy. This may be a man named Tokuda who was regarded as one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party in 1945.

Mr. Morris. Did you deal with that gentleman?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I didn't deal with him. I had one interview in which I questioned him.

Mr. Morris. What was the date of the interview?

Mr. Lattimore. I was trying to find out whether there was any difference in point of view between the Japanese Communists who had been in jail in Japan during the war and those who had been in China during the war and had come back, who were a subject of considerable speculation among Americans in Japan at that time. But I didn't succeed in seeing any of those who had come back from China. So the furthest I got was an interview in which I asked questions of Mr. Tokuda.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, there is a possibility of a typographical error in this name Kyuichy. Perhaps it should end with an "i" instead of with a "y". I would like to ask the witness if that makes any difference in his answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it doesn't make any difference. Kyuichy would be his personal name, and in transcribing Japanese names a "y" in that position at the end would be unusual, but spelling it one way or the other doesn't make me remember what his first name actually was.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Solomon Trone.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Trone I met once in India in 1949, when he was acting as a special economic and technical adviser to Prime Minister Nehru. I believe that is the only time I met him, and I had no reason to term him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Shigato Tsuru.

Mr. LATTIMORE. This Mr. Tsuru I met in Japan in the winter of 1945–46. I met him maybe two or three times, and I had no reason to consider him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him in company with Mr. Herbert Norman?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not he was Mr. Herbert Norman's roommate back in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was connected with the publication Science and Society?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at that point, there should be noted the possibility of a typographical error. That name is spelled on this list S-h-i-g-a-t-o. It probably should be S-h-i-g-e-t-o. Does that make any difference, Mr. Lattimore, in your answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I couldn't tell you which one is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where he is now, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume he is in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what he is doing in Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last hear from Mr. Tsuru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never heard from him.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Mary Van Kleeck.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mary Van Kleeck I have never met. She wrote one article in Pacific Affairs in 1936 or '37, and I had no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the article that we had testimony about the other day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. In the Moscow trials?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. The next is John Carter Vincent.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Vincent I have known since about 1930, off and on, when we happened to be in the same town. I had no reason to consider him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Nym Wales.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Nym Wales I knew very slightly when she was the wife of Edgar Snow, and that was in Peking in the 1930's. I don't believe I have ever seen her in this country, and I have no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Harry Dexter White.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. White I met maybe three times here in Washington in 1941–42, in connection with briefings on financial policy in China. I had no reason to consider him a Communist.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Harry Dexter White the individual connected with the Treasury Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was connected with the Treasury Department; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the Under Secretary of the Treasury, was he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I forget what his exact rank was.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he fall out of the window? I believe he died a violent death.

Mr. MORRIS. He died a violent death; yes. Wait a minute, now. Excuse me, Senator. Apparently he died of a heart attack.

The next name is Ella Winter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Ella Winter wrote one article in Pacific Affairs in about 1936 or 1937. I had never met her, and had no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Victor Yakhontoff.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Victor Yakhontoff I don't believe I have ever met. He contributed an article—maybe he contributed an article to Pacific Affairs, I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Carter ever discuss his political feelings with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He may have. If you have a document to refresh my memory I might be able to recall something about it. I haven't even heard of him since the middle 1930's some time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not deny here on last Friday, Mr. Lattimore, that you did not know that Mr. Yakhontoff was a Communist or pro-Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I certainly didn't know that he was a Communist or pro-Soviet.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 25, 1943, addressed to Owen Lattimore from Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I ask you if you can recall having received that letter.

Mr. ARNOLD. Do you have copies?

The CHAIRMAN. Are there copies available?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; here you are. [Document handed.]

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall receiving this. I obviously did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, please, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 556

DEAR OWEN: General Yakhontoff called to see me today to offer his services to the IPR. Someone had told him that the IPR was greatly expanding its program and he would like to be employed for any research work which we might assign to him. I had to tell him that, while we had plans for expansion, we hadn't yet found the funds and that so long as the present situation persisted I could make no proposals to him. He told me that he had recently written you offering his services. Personally, I think his record is good. He is frankly pro-Soviet but has never been and is not now a party member. He is a United States citizen. He is full of energy, lectures with very great success, and has

to his credit some fairly good books which would have probably been much better if he had had the benefit of working under your direction. He feels himself pretty competent not only on Soviet, but also on far eastern affairs. I think that if you are considering additions to your staff you may want to give some thought to the possibility of using him.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Harriet Moore in Chicago with the suggestion that if she knows any reason why you should not consider him she write you direct.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record?

The Chairman. It may be admitted into the record.

(The document previously read in full by the witness was marked "Exhibit No. 556".)

Mr. Morris. The next name is Rose Yardumian.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; she has been mentioned before. I knew her very slightly when she worked in the IPR office here in Washington temporarily some time during the war years. I had no reason to consider her a Communist.

Mr. Morris. The last name is Max Yergan.

Mr. Lattimore. Max Yergan has been mentioned before, and I don't know anything more about him than what I said then.

Mr. Morris. In other words, you remember meeting him at the dinner party at the home of Edith Field?

Mr. Lattimore. Once.

Mr. Morris. And you did not, at that time, have any reason to believe he was a Communist?

Mr. Lattimore. Quite so.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have some documents I would like Mr. Lattimore's identification of, and I will put them into the record without any questions.

I also have a few other questions of a miscellaneous nature to ask of the witness.

The Chairman. I think, however, that we will have to recess at this time. We do not like to put this hearing off, but it looks as though we are rather crowded with overwork. Will it be satisfactory to the members of the committee if the matter went over until the day after tomorrow at 10 o'clock or 10:30?

Senator O'Conor. May I just ask one question?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Lattimore, I was anxious, just before getting away from the list, to ask you if there was any reason for, you might say, the equivocation in regard to your reference to Paul Robeson. At the time you were asked the question as to whether you had reason to believe that he had communistic leanings or affiliations, your answer was that he may very likely be one.

You had previously indicated that you like to speak in plain English, and that you do not indulge in fancy or round-about terms.

Do you want to leave that there? Apparently everybody in America knows him to be what he is. I was wondering whether you desire to leave it in that state.

Mr. Lattimore. Senator, I wasn't trying to equivocate there. It is simply that I have seen in the press references that lead me to believe that he is either a Communist or a very close fellow traveler, or something of that kind. I have not made an analysis of it. I am not a student of Paul Robeson.

Senator O'Conor. Of course, you have known of the various activities in which he has engaged, and of his statements given in various parts of the world which have been strictly anti-American and pro-Soviet?

Mr. Lattimore. I know of some of those in a general way. I would be hard put to cite you the exact ones. I was merely trying to come within the wording of this definition about "what do you know now," et cetera.

Senator O'Conor. All right. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. All right, we will recess until Wednesday morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 3:44 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10:30 a. m., Wednesday, March 12, 1952.)

88348—52—pt. 10——20

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 1:45 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, and Ferguson.

Senator Mundt.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire. I would like to request, Mr. Chairman, that the committee ask the State Department, and also the President, for the statement and the letter that was mailed by Mr. Lattimore to the President on the 10th of June 1945, and also the statement that was left by Mr. Lattimore at the White House on July 3. Also, if they have it on the calendar, the time that Mr. Lattimore called on the President, the length of time he was with the President.

The CHAIRMAN. The request will be made for the authorities mentioned. Let me say that the Chair ruled some days ago with reference to the filing of statements. The reorganization plan, the reorganization law, set up some years ago, provides, among other things:

> The committee shall, so far as practicable, require all witnesses appearing before it to file in advance written statements of their proposed testimony at least 24 hours before hearing, and to limit their oral presentation to brief summaries of their argument. The committee staffs shall prepare digests of such statements for the use of the committee members.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I had also asked Mr. Lattimore to point out in the Tydings committee the testimony given to that committee in relation to his visit to the White House. I wondered whether he has that.

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY THURMAN ARNOLD, ESQ., COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I have not been able to find that, and to the best of my belief it isn't there, and I had simply forgotten about the whole business at the time of the Tydings hearings and didn't run across those papers until later. I mentioned them in my statement to this committee because they had been mentioned in previous testimony here which reminded me of it.

Senator FERGUSON. How many times had you called on the President of the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Only that once, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the one that you say you entirely forgot?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had been questioned about your relations with the foreign policy of the United States, whether or not you had any influence on it; is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the only time that you ever saw a President about the foreign policy, and you forgot it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Senator——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Answer the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe that is what is true, Senator. My memory is getting more and more mixed up because of the way the questions have zigzagged across.

Senator FERGUSON. Those are not zigzag questions, and they are not mixed-up questions.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; what I mean, Senator, is the questioning as a whole has gone back and forth over a great many years, and it is getting increasingly difficult for me to remember what I remembered when.

Senator EASTLAND. Difficult to remember what you talked to the President of the United States about on your visit to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He visited the President once and forgot it. That is the answer.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The questioning, Senator, before the Tydings committee was entirely in the context of what Government positions I had held, and I think it is quite natural that this other occasion didn't enter into my——

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question pending.

Senator FERGUSON. One of the big questions, Mr. Lattimore, was whether or not you had ever had any influence upon the foreign policy of the United States. And you now say to this committee that the time you visited the President and left a memorandum with him, and the fact that you had written the letter with a statement as to what you thought the foreign policy was, that when you were giving the testimony in relation to your influence upon the foreign policy, you forgot the only time that you had ever been there, and you didn't give it to the Tydings committee, and you came before this committee and said that that committee had acquitted you of everything, given you a clean bill of health, and that we were to be criticized for not giving you the same on the Tydings committee hearing.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator, if that interview with the President had had the slightest effect——

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that question, please. That is an involved question.

Senator FERGUSON. That was just a summation of what I take this testimony to be. I am going to ask you some other questions and see how your memory is on those. Do you remember coming back with Mr.

Wallace and Mr. Vincent from the Far East when you made a trip with them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What kind of a plane had you, do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A four-engined plane.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many people came back on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you any idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see, there was Mr. Wallace, Mr. Vincent, Mr. Hazard, and myself, and the military personnel of the plane.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And the military personnel of the plane, I think six or seven people.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is all; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anybody else on the plane? Think about it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you land in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We landed, I think, at Fairbanks, Alaska, and then we landed in Canada, and then I think we flew straight—no; I am not sure whether we flew straight to Seattle or made an intermediate landing somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Were the same people on the plane the whole trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. The same people.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And no more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went from Seattle to where?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From Seattle straight to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not stop anywhere?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I remember stopping once, but I can't remember whether it was on the way from Canada to Seattle or on the way from Seattle to Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you stop at Great Falls?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Great Falls, that is the name of the place.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the name?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And do you remember having your picture taken at Great Falls?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not? Do you remember the people that were on the plane having their pictures taken at Great Falls?

Mr. LATTIMORE. On the way out to China or on the way back?

Senator FERGUSON. On the way back.

Mr. LATTIMORE. A group picture?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember the photographer placing Mr. Wallace in the center of the group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember that there were at least 10 Russians on that plane?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Senator FERGUSON. You do not remember that?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Senator FERGUSON. You would remember that if it had happened?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think so.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the answer?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I should think so.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who wrote Mr. Wallace's speech that he made in Russian to some group? He made a speech in Russian, did he not; he read it?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know who wrote it?
Mr. LATTIMORE. He wrote it himself, I believe.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know a Boris Pregel?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Senator FERGUSON. Of Russia.
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Senator FERGUSON. You say Mr. Wallace wrote the speech himself and delivered it, read it?
Mr. LATTIMORE. He wrote the speech himself, and I believe Mr. Hazard translated it into Russian for him.
Senator FERGUSON. You can't recall now of a group picture of the Russians and you and Mr. Wallace being taken at the airfield in Great Falls?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have at the present time.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that such an incident did not occur?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no recollection of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, just answer my question. Would you say it did not occur?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say it didn't occur; yes; as far as my recollection, Senator. I have been asked to bring in some supplementary material.
Senator EASTLAND. I have a question. Did you know Dr. Colegrove?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Colegrove; yes.
Senator EASTLAND. How long did you know him?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I have known him off and on since the 1930's.
Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever offer him employment?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I did. I remember his testifying to that effect, but I don't recall offering him employment.
Senator EASTLAND. Well, do you deny that you offered him a job when you were with OWI?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't deny it; I just don't remember it.
Senator EASTLAND. You do not remember whether you offered him the Japanese desk or not in OWI?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember that at all.
Senator EASTLAND. You have read his testimony before this committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. He states that, at a meeting with you, you offered him a job, that you stated that the Chinese Communists "were real democrats and that they were really agrarian reformers and had no connection with Soviet Russia."

Now, was that testimony true or false?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In my opinion it is false, Senator. I don't remember meeting him at the airport, as he says, and I don't remember any such conversation, and I don't think such a conversation is likely.

Senator EASTLAND. Would you remember having dinner with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator EASTLAND. Dr. Colegrove states that, under oath, you were advocating the murder of the Japanese Emperor and his family. Was that statement true or false?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That statement is false, Senator; and as I recall, Mr. Colegrove was referring there not to conversation but to a book that I wrote, and there is nothing of the kind in the book.

Senator EASTLAND. It was to a conversation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. He stated that you were following the same line that the Japanese Communists had followed?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a question, Senator?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir. I asked him if that was true.

The CHAIRMAN. His attention is being taken up now with something else. Will you listen to the question, Mr. Lattimore, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think that is true, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not think it is true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I can't tell you what the line of the Japanese Communists was on the subject.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it your opinion that the Emperor of Japan should be killed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman, I have been requested to bring in supplementary material. May I offer it now?

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the request?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think sometimes the Chair and one request was, I remember, from Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. You may lay it before the chairman.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. Here is a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations with my 1936 report on Pacific Affairs, which Senator Ferguson requested. Then I was also requested to bring in the letter from the Department of State, inviting me to lecture, in 1946, to the State Department personnel. I was also asked to identify in the transcript the question of the dating of General Barmine's statements about 1933 or 1935–36, and I have analyzed that with the appropriate references to the text.

May I ask, also, Senator, if the exhibits that I attached to my statement to this committee and that I asked to have entered into the record have been entered?

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Sourwine, you were going to take that matter up today. Are you?

The CHAIRMAN. That is going to be taken up at a later time.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time that we concluded with Mr. Lattimore's testimony on the last previous occasion, when he was on the stand, we were discussing two excerpts which he had offered for the record. Our record is incomplete with regard to those. There is also here certain material under the heading of "Chinese history project" and also with regard to who wanted to recognize Red China, and I think one other item which Mr. Lattimore offered initially and on which the Chair has not yet ruled.

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I renew my request that that be entered into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will take the matter up again.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I wish to offer some material that I prepared with respect to my book, Solution in Asia, in view of the testimony which the committee accepted yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that requested?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, this is an offer of evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I might say at the time, since it has come up, that the staff is prepared and does recommend with regard to this material earlier submitted by Mr. Lattimore, that the Chair admit it for printing in the appendix of the record, and order that it be footnoted back to the point in the record at which Mr. Lattimore first asked that it be introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The Chair will pass on that later on.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, will you point out in this book where your report is?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I marked that, on 76.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris, if you wish to proceed, you may proceed.

Mr. ARNOLD. May we have a ruling on this offer?

The CHAIRMAN. I will rule on it later on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of saving time, Mr. Lattimore and his attorney on the one hand and I on the other, have stipulated on the authenticity of certain letters, 18 letters, that I would like to introduce into the record as a single unit.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a list of those?

Mr. MORRIS. I have a list, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have that list, Mr. Arnold?

Mr. ARNOLD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That has been presented to Mr. Lattimore and his attorney. They have gone through the list, and I would like them now to state that they appear to the witness to be copies of organizational documents that were either sent by him or to him.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, with at least one exception which is minutes of a conference or something.

Mr. MORRIS. Which was that, now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This one here.

Mr. MORRIS. July 9, 1934.

Mr. LATTIMORE. July 9, 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. And what comment have you on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, that also appears to be a copy of an original document, but it isn't a letter to me or from me.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a meeting at which you were present and the initialed paragraph here, "Mr. Lattimore produced the statement

showing the distribution of Pacific Affairs as of July 9, as follows." That is right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may those documents be introduced into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a stipulation, as I understand, between counsel and counsel for the witness that these are correct photostatic copies; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that they appear or are taken from where?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will testify——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they are stipulated.

Mr. MORRIS. They have been taken from the files of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. They may be admitted into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may speak clearly, may I show Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Arnold this list, and ask if this is the list, physically, of the documents with respect to which the stipulation has been made.

Mr. ARNOLD. I assume it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have the list you have.

This is now, what I have in my hands, the list of the documents with respect to which there is a stipulation.

Mr. ARNOLD. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then will the chairman order that these be inserted and printed.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted and printed.

Mr. MORRIS. In every case the copies were sent to the witness and his attorney, except for the third item on the list, that is dated April 18, 1935, San Francisco. May we have that particular one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is this the one?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, that is the one.

The CHAIRMAN. What about that?

Mr. MORRIS. That is covered in the list, Mr. Chairman.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 566 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, P, Q, R, S" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 566–A

PACIFIC CENTER,
1795 CALIFORNIA STREET,
San Francisco, Calif., August 18, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: Your telegram of the sixth arrived a few days before we left camp. As you urged me "to consider resigning from Amerasia at an early date," it seemed wise both to think the matter over very carefully and to await your comment on my withdrawal of an article from the new number of Amerasia. Arriving here yesterday, I found your letters of August 8 and 10; also possible for me to attempt to balance the general nature of the problem and the particular merits of the case.

To begin with, I need hardly assure you how anxious I am to make any concession consistent with elementary ideas of dignity and propriety, that might help you in your difficult diplomatic handling of Japanese demands, and further the major interests of the Institute. This is no time at which to allow individual intrasigeance to threaten the smooth working of the Institute as a whole.

At the same time, I cannot but regret that the Japanese Council should have been allowed to make a debating point of this intrinsically unimportant per-

sonal issue. It would have been easy for me to withdraw from Amerasia a few months ago; it would be easy a few months hence. To withdraw just at this moment, "under fire," would be for me personally a minor disagreeable incident; for the whole Institute, it seems to me, it would establish a dangerous precedent. There would be two regrettable consequences. In the first place, the whole matter would be regarded and reported in Japan as a "victory," however minor. In the second place, a false issue would be substituted for the real issue. For the appearance of my name on Amerasia cannot possibly be the real issue. The character of what I write in Amerasia differs in no definable respect from what I publish in a number of other journals. The "line" of Amerasia, as the organ of a group, differs in no way from the "line" which I have been steadily advocating as an individual, for over a year, in a number of other publications. Accordingly, for me to retire from Amerasia under Japanese pressure would not seriously affect my output of such personal influence as I may have, but would establish, for the whole Institute, the dangerous precedent that a single National Council is entitled to influence, for long range, the writings of staff members of the Institute in other countries.

Reviewing the whole matter afresh, it seems to me essential to reconstruct the whole "case history" in brief:

(1) Amerasia was planned and launched while I was out of America. I supposed at the time that I was being invited to join the board simply in order to make it clear that Amerasia was not intended to displace Pacific Affairs or be a rival to it. There was thus a justifiable reason for asking me to join the board.

(2) I understood that the matter had been discussed between you and Field. I had no reason to believe you disapproved.

(3) As a member of the board, I have remained throughout a figurehead. Owing to distance from America, I could not take part in editorial deliberations.

(4) As an individual contributor, what I have written for Amerasia—regardless of what Amerasia's "line" is supposed to be—does not differ in any respect from what I have written for Pacific Affairs, Atlantic Monthly, Foreign Affairs, International Affairs, Asia, and so forth. It is not as if I reserve a special brand of "anti-Japanese" utterance for Amerasia. I have never written anything that did not come under one of two categories: (*a*) What I know; and (*b*) what I think. Under either category, it is more or less an accident where I publish. In this connection, it would also be legitimate to recall to the Japanese Council that I was generally considered, a few years ago, to be on the whole a "realist" whose views could be, and were, quoted in support of Japanese policies. Any subsequent changes in these views have come about since I have been under the full influence of the IPR, with access to the material furnished by all of its national councils and research undertakings.

(5) Coming to the actual question of resignation, it seems to me that either: (*a*) I should have been requested not to join the board of Amerasia in the first place; or (*b*) I should have been requested to resign some months ago, in order to forestall Japanese criticism; or (*c*) I might be requested to resign a few months hence, in order to avoid the appearance of successful Japanese intervention in the affairs of an American publication catering to American readers.

(6) A graceful compromise, possibly, might be the publication of a paragraph in an early number of Amerasia, to the effect that I have been obliged, owing to pressure of work consequent upon taking up a new position at Johns Hopkins, to withdraw temporarily from the editorial board.

Would you let me know what you think of this? Bear in mind, of course, that any personal sensitiveness on my part is not to be given undue consideration. I want the particular aspects of the case to be put on record, but this does not mean that I want the particular aspects to be allowed to distort the general aspects. However, it would be a legitimate method of bringing the particular and the general into focus, I think, to ask the Japanese Council whether their proposed ban will immediately or ultimately be extended to such Pacific Council officers and International Committee chairmen as Dafoe, in his editorial capacity; Walsh, as editor of Asia, and Hubbard, as a publicist.

Passing on to the question of efforts to secure Japanese collaboration on Pacific Affairs, I am sending you such copies of correspondence as I have available here. This is all of recent date, owing to the fact that I have not had all permanent records with me since leaving Peiping. Helen Wiss, however, could furnish you with more from the New York files of copies of my correspondence. Holland should also be consulted, as he has labored incessantly to get Japanese material for us.

One minor point, in conclusion: Your reference to the article "What Korea Pays for Japanese Rule" in the June number of Pacific Affairs is worded in such a way that it implies that this article expressed my personal opinion. It did not. The article was a condensed translation from Tikhii Okean. My initials identified my responsibility as a translator, but not as a commentator. Inclusion of this material in our "Comment and Correspondence" was an attempt to remedy the lack of Russian material in Pacific Affairs which, like the lack of Japanese material, you and I and others have so often deplored.

In this connection, the comparison of the Hubbard-Canniff brace of articles with the Yanaihara-Tikhii Okean brace is pointless. Our principle has always been to provide opportunity for an answer to an attacking article. This was done in the Hubbard case. It was not necessary in the Tikhii Okean case, as we already had in hand the Yanaihara article, presenting the point of view of the country attacked.

In conclusion, I want to express once more my readiness to submit to your ruling on the whole question, not merely in formal recognition of your authority, but because of your mature and humane judgment.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 566–B

WLH
ED

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., March 20, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Our June issue will approximately mark the fourth anniversary of the war in China. I think it would be appropriate for me to write the leading article of the issue under some such title as "Four Years," reviewing the history and development of the war and estimating its present potentialities.

Since this issue will be the first after the passing of the Lease-Lend Bill, I think the great majority of our readers would also like an article that would cast up the reckoning on America. Where does she stand, how did she get there, where does she go from here: The average writer of such an article would key it almost exclusively to the Atlantic and Great Britain. For Pacific Affairs we need someone who has an expert knowledge of the Far East and a comprehensive understanding of the relations of China and Japan to Europe, to the United States, and to Russia. By far the best man I can think of is T. A. Bisson. Would you agree to this suggestion? If we cannot get Bisson, what would you think of Kate Mitchell: She has not the first-hand knowledge and authority that Bisson has, but she has a direct and competent mind, and she would be a new contributor to Pacific Affairs.

Enclosed I am sending you some sample photographs from the Princeton meeting. These of course are only a beginning, as I have to work slowly in broken patches of spare time. I am sorry that these pictures were taken on a cut-rate roll of cheap film on which the negatives were not separately numbered. Therefore the only way of identifying each picture is by these sample prints. So I suggest that you mark lightly on the back of each print how many copies you would like. Send them back to me, and I'll gradually fill up the complement.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 366–C

ECC

EXTRACT FROM LETTER DATED SAN FRANCISCO, APRIL 18, 1935, OWEN LATTIMORE TO CATHERINE PORTER

I find around here that the knowing Mr. John Thompson of the San Francisco Daily News has an explanation of the Moscow trials which is widely accepted. It is simply that Stalin is getting rid of all the people "who knew him when" so as to monopolize control of the political machine. To me this simply does not make sense because even from the little I know of the personalities of 1917, 1918,

it is clear that a number of the people who have since come to be classified as Old Bolsheviks did not properly belong to the famous closely welded core of the Communist Party. On the contrary, many of them were radicals who belonged to the fringe of the Party and many of them had already been known for years as obstinate partisans of one or another variant theory.

As a reader, I should like to find a good article on the Who's Who of the Old Bolseviks, sorting out who was really a close follower of Lenin and who was a more or less loosely harnessed sidekick whom only Lenin's genius could keep pulling in the traces. As an editor, I don't know whether I should prompt anyone to write such an article at the present time.

EXHIBIT No. 566–D

Initialed: "ECC."

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., January 9, 1939.

Mr. L. V. HARONDAR,
Council of the U. S. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MR. HARONDAR: Thank you very much for the copy of your letter to Mr. Holland of December 13th. The "Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R." arrived in due course and I am arranging to have it noticed in Pacific Affairs.

Please let me know if there is any possibility at all of Soviet contributions to Pacific Affairs. We have now grown in circulation, and I think in influence, to the highest level since Pacific Affairs has been published. This makes all the more conspicuous the lack of Soviet contributions. It would greatly improve our position if we could have, from time to time, articles directly sponsored by the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

With warm good wishes for the New Year.

Yours very sincerely,

(t) OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: Y.

EXHIBIT No. 566–E

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
10 ST. JAMES SQUARE,
London, S. W. I., 2d November 1936.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: There is one by-product of my Canadian trip that I wished I could have talked over with you before leaving. I found both in Montreal among the high up head office executives of Canada's nearest imitation of New York, and among the civil servants and not quite head of department administrators of Ottawa, an extremely lively interest in Chinese communism and in the crisis confronting, the Nanking government. When I started to talk I had a few general ideas such as the theory that the Nanking government would go on compromising up to the last desperate moment rather than risk everything on an outright resistance, and also a very strong feeling that the Communists because of their exhortation to resistance and their repeated offers of a united front have been gaining the support of ordinary democratic and patriotic nationalists as well as of Marxists. These general impressions I had not arranged in any very precise manner. As a result of questions asked, etc., I found myself gradually taking the following position, of the correctness of which I am not quite sure. I should be grateful for any criticisms, either your own or those of Chen and Chi, etc.

The people who are most active in making the position in China, are not any of the Chinese parties but the Japanese. They have worked with great skill on maxims derived from a close study of the older Chinese history and particularly of invasions from the northern frontier. Owing to the strong survival into the twentieth century of many factors that were operating in the history of China

before the nineteenth century, they have succeeded in reproducing with remarkable accuracy the familiar phenomenon of the breakup of China under barbarian invasion. They know how to strike along the lines of regional cleavage and also along the lines of cleavage between the country-landlord-scholar-gentry and the peasantry. In this way they have apparently justified the good old contention that the Chinese are an antiquated people with no cohesion or solidarity of any modern kind.

Actually this kind of thing can only be pushed up to a certain point, because in spite of the survival of old factors, there are also new factors at work which beyond a given point influence developments increasingly rather than decreasingly. What I mean is that the Japanese although using troops and armaments of a modern kind could invade China on the archaic plan of invasion, but when it comes to consolidating the conquest the old precedents fail and they find the foundations of triumph crumbling under them as in Manchuria. The archaic conquest cannot provide dividends of a modern kind.

When we consider the whole process from the side of Nanking we see more clearly the interaction of old and new factors. Nanking facing the Japanese invasion has all the regional and social weaknesses of the old order in China, but it also has other weaknesses of a different kind which are due to the fact that the Nanking government represents primarily those elements in China which correspond to Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and so on in Japan, but which are less highly developed than their Japanese counterparts. They stand for the invasion of the older China by a capitalism modeled on that of Western countries and capable of undercutting western and Japanese capitalism in open competition, but not so strong as foreign capitalism in its control of political and military auxiliaries.

The instinct of the interests represented by Nanking is to play for time in which to develop up to the Japanese level of strength. This is hopeless. The Japanese, because they have advanced further on a line of development parallel to that of the Nanking Chinese, can always prepare for invasion more rapidly than Nanking can prepare for resistance. Nanking, squeezing its eyes tightly shut and cling to the hope of a resistance always deferred to some future date, naturally compromises in various directions. Of these the most nearly practical is the line of working for foreign support on the theory that some such nation as America or England will eventually decide that it is better to support Nanking than to acquiesce in the total Japanese conquest of China.

In the circumstances the tactics of the Japanese are to keep pushing Nanking from one partial surrender to another while their strategy is to refrain from making the pressure so high as to startle any other nation into active alliance with Nanking or to stampede Nanking itself into desperate resistance. Nanking has already yielded so much that in the event of resistance leadership would pass rapidly to the Communists. This is the last thing that the Japanese want. They know that in the first set battle they could shatter the regular battalions of Nanking; but the remnants would then be raised up under Communist leadership and resistance would spread over the whole countryside. Then the Japanese would be at war with a continent and would have to disperse their armed forces over a tremendous territory. What Japan wants is to keep Nanking's armies intact in order not to have to fight the Communists. The showdown will come at a moment, which the Japanese are at present deferring as much as Nanking itself. The Japanese have involved themselves in a tremendous gamble in which their hope of success rests entirely on the possibility of edging Nanking step by step into a position in which it will appear a hopelessly bad bet for either British or American support. Then, at a moment which will have to be very carefully prepared, the Japanese will unmask their final ultimatum and risk everything on the assumption that Nanking will capitulate and not make a pseudo-Samson gesture of pulling down the pillars of the temple. They will then be able to use Nanking's armies with only a stiffening of their own troops to crush Communism, and so be able to hold their own main forces mobile and in reserve. The program may involve the elimination of Chiang K'ai Shek, which the Japanese have so frequently threatened, but obviously it is based on the assumption that they can reach a point of indirect control at which they can tip over Chiang K'ai Shek without spilling the rest of Nanking into the lap of the Communists.

In the circumstances the hope of the Communists must lie in the precipitation of a war in which Nanking will take the lead at first, only to be defeated and to let the leadership lapse for the Communists to take over. If they succeed, the situation will not be parallel to either Manchuria or Abyssinia, as many

people assume. In Manchuria the armies of Chang Hsueh-liang held together long enough to prevent general popular resistance from getting underway, and also the situation was clouded by the sham intervention of the League of Nations. In Abyssinia the quaint emperor, knowing that his position in his own country was more that of a conqueror than that of a genuine national ruler, was unable to rely on the dispersed tribal resistance that alone could have bogged down the Italians' advance, but bent every effort to the creation of a sham modern army which gave the Italians exactly what they needed: a chance to attack a fixed focus of resistance; and this resistance lasted long enough to let the Italians get so far into the country that popular and tribal resistance became hopeless.

In the present situation in China the existence of the Communists alters everything. If the resistance is begun soon enough—that is before the Japanese have got in far enough so that they can use Nanking and its armies as a shield to carry before them in fighting the Communists—Then the kind of war that would result would be more nearly parallel to the civil wars and wars of intervention in Russia. Once the formal armies of Nanking were cracked in the absurd effort to meet the Japanese on ground on which the Japanese are infinitely superior, the private soldiers and many of the noncommissioned and junior officers of the defeated armies could be raised up again and combined with the peasants and workers to build up a genuine national resistance. The Japanese would no longer be fighting bankers and factory owners, whose great wealth made them nervous and ready to compromise, but would be at war with mud huts and impoverished farms, against which the use of tanks and airplanes would involve a maximum expenditure of wealth for a minimum acquisition of wealth. In such a situation the Chinese Communists would actually be better off than the Russians were to start with; for the first Red armies were led by amateurs, while the Chinese would have from the beginning veteran military and political organizers and a nucleus of hardbitten partisan armies already inured to that kind of war.

How much of all this lucubration is approximately sound?

England is appallingly depressing. We are living in one of those incredible English suburban houses that make you feel like a furniture maggot. I start my Russian lessons on Monday and that is the only cheerful prospect in sight. I have already interviewed the man and he seems to promise an intelligent, competent and rapid approach, which will give results. For everything else I subscribe to the pronouncement of Wardsworth: "England is a fen of stagnant waters." The national fog includes the newspapers. George Taylor said in his last article for us that there is a conspiracy of silence in the press about the real issues in China. The same is true of Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The London metropolitan press no longer deserves its immense nineteenth century reputation. It is not that the news is fabricated but that it is distorted and partially suppressed in such a manner that the true significance of events does not come through.

The other night we went to an extremely interesting dinner of the Central Asian Society, the membership of which is, of course, exaggeratedly die-hard but which has more significance at the present moment than it did a few years ago. The speeches were rabid. Sir Francis Lindley, formerly Ambassador to Japan, said that the real issue in the Far East was not between the survival of China or the conquest of China by Japan, but between the conquest of China by Japan or by Communism. In such a choice the British interest must obviously lie with Japan. This noble sentiment was loudly hear-heared. It is true that Lindley is said to be disgruntled because he was not reappointed to Japan, and that the meeting was strictly private and not reported to the press, but it is also true that every one present regarded him as speaking for the ordained leaders of the British people. You will be pleased to hear that Eleanor and I were presented to this choice assemblage from the speakers' table and our names applauded. However, I had the pleasure of exchanging paralysed expressions with Dame Rachel Crowdy during the speeches.

All the best from this bedraggled company.

Yours.

(Signed) Owen Lattimore.

EXHIBIT No. 566–F

(Hand-made letters: IPR)

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
Baltimore, Md., January 10, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Thank you for your letter of December 13, and for sending me an advance copy of the collection of documents on Soviet Far Eastern Policy compiled by William Mandel. I have not had time to go through the documents, but I read with interest the introductory chapter by Max Beloff. I noted particularly his definition of the two methods of studying Soviet relations with other countries: either setting out the Soviet record "as the Russians see it"; or attempting to give a more rounded presentation by giving something of the context in which the Russians behave as they do.

I have passed the copy over to E. H. Carr, who is a visiting lecturer here for a couple of months. I have not yet had his comments, except for the fact that when I gave him the copy, he remarked that he thought that in general Mandel was apt to be lacking in a critical approach.

From what I have seen of Beloff's work, he is a careful scholar, and I am therefore much interested in your proposal to get a later and more extended analytical study from him, together with a collection of documents.

Sincerely as ever,

(s) Owen
(t) OWEN LATTIMORE, *Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 566–G

Pencilled in: "WLH—You will find this good reading, ECC."

300 GILMAN HALL, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., October 11, 1938.

Mr. A. J. GRAJDANZEV,
San Francisco.

DEAR ANDREW: As usual, I have let several letters from you accumulate before replying, but I hope this will not deter you from continuing to write often because I find them extremely useful and by referring to them I have formed a still higher opinion of your judgment of the course of political events all over the world.

First, however, about you and Mary. I think you are doing the right thing about trying to arrange your own application to get on the quota. It seems to me that there is a good chance that this will succeed, and if it does it may simplify the problem for Mary. I am assuming, of course, that you will let me know without any delay if there is anything whatever that I can do.

Next, about the bibliography by Nasu, published by the Japan I. P. R. In view of the fact that it simply lists titles with practically no comment on contents I think it is unnecessary for us to have a review in PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

I have been comparing your last letter with a note from Chen Han-seng, who ascribes the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist to the lack of political firmness—especially the lack of a people's front in Czechoslovakia. I assume that since you also anticipated the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist, either with or without British and French support, you must also have detected this weakness. I confess my own judgment was not so accurate. Up to the last minute it seemed to me that even the defeatist groups in Czechoslovakia itself and in France and in Great Britain had been maneuvered into a position which made "peace at any price" impossible.

Naturally I agree with you that even if one had counted on the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, it would have been impossible to predict the shameless and infamous manner of the betrayal. This being the case, it is at least a good thing that Hitler's recent speech told the British whom they may have in their government and whom they may not have. This pretty well destroys the Chamberlain

claim to "peace with honor" because it so insolently emphasizes the dishonor.

Moreover, the full extent of the British and French defeat is rapidly becoming visible, and it is a good thing that this should be realized at once. For even the Chamberlain assumption that Hitler will not be caught in a channel which leads him away from Western Europe and straight toward the Soviet Union is now being disproved. In fact, the Soviet Union is not being either encircled or isolated but both its political position and its strategic position have been undoubtedly strengthened. Politically the Soviet Union is now free of treacherous and undependable alliances. At the same time Hitler and Mussolini now have to face the choice: whether to attack a country which is unmistakably prepared to defend itself or to go on attacking Great Britain and France, which have just as unmistakably shown that they can be bullied and robbed. In the circumstances, there can hardly be a doubt. It is Britain and France which will lose, not the Soviet Union. Moreover, Great Britain and France will have to start sacrificing their own interests, as the supply of victims like Czechoslovakia and Spain is running out. (Even in Czechoslovakia and Spain, of course, it is not only the Czechs and the Spanish who lose but the British and French also.) However, it is possible that the next major encroachments will not actually be in Western Europe but in the Near East and the Far East. In China it is highly probable that the Japanese will disguise their failure to secure a sweeping victory over the Chinese by bullying the British and French out of Shanghai and Hongkong, forcing them to close the Canton and Indochina routes of military supplies to China. In this case what China loses will be nothing to what the British and French lose, for the Chinese are now in a position in which the supply of foreign munitions (always exaggerated in importance by most commentators) is day by day of less importance than the internal organization of the Chinese people itself. Lack of British and French support will force the Kuomintang wing of the United Front to take precisely those measures which have already been proved efficacious in the North and which the Kuomintang would have avoided as long as it could rely on British and French aid.

In strategic questions the Soviet Union is also strengthened. It does not have to defend the awkward salient of Czechoslovakia but can dig itself in on its own frontier, while any attack from Europe will have to move a long way from the Fascist centers of strength and pass through the doubtful areas of east Europe and the Balkans where all kinds of national and other rivalries, though perhaps driven underground by the temporary gain of Germany in strength and prestige, will continue to smolder. In the Far East, also, it is almost to be hoped that the Japanese will succeed in taking Hankow—after suitably heavy losses, of course; for this would at last demonstrate that even Hankow cannot be made a "decisive" victory by Japan but only expose the Japanese to increased perils on both flanks as popular resistance is organized south of the Yangtze and the already organized popular resistance in the north develops to even more effective forms of warfare. In this latter regard the taking of Hankow would divert all or most of the munitions received from the Soviet Union into the strategic area of the Eighth Route Army which has until now been starved of them. This means two things: A shorter distance to be traversed from the Soviet Union, and probably a more effective employment of the munitions by the Eighth Route Army than by the main armies of Chiang Kai-shek.

In short, dangerous as the situation is all over the world (including North and South America, where the results of the Munich betrayal cannot but strengthen agents of reaction) I cannot see any possibility of the simultaneous attack from east and west which alone could threaten the Soviet Union. There are certain parallels and of course many differences between the "isolation" of the Soviet Union and the "isolation" of the United States which I do not know how to assess properly.

In the meantime, we are settling down very happily here in Baltimore and looking forward to an extremely interesting winter.

Yours ever,

(t) Owen Lattimore.

EXHIBIT No. 556–H

(Initials) CHS. KM.i

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., August 8, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR OWEN: Needless to say Holland and I appreciated greatly your letter of the 28th, Fred will be telling you on your arrival in San Francisco of Takayanagi's visit and the serious situation which has arisen between the Japanese Council on the one hand and the Chairman of the Pacific Council and the Secretary General on the other.

Where we have made mistakes we want to rectify them. Where disagreement is due entirely to misunderstanding we want to get complete understanding. It is a fairly complicated situation because at the moment British and Dutch cooperation in the Secretariat Inquiry is partly conditioned by whether or not the Japanese Council itself cooperates.

Holland and I feel that every possible adjustment should be made that does not impair either the project or the integrity of the International Secretariat's capacity to serve all of the Councils. As Fred will have told you Takayanagi was never more friendly, clear, or sincere. He has made a very deep impression on me. He has come on a very difficult errand.

Speaking of Takayanagi, Dr. Dafoe wrote me on July 25th as follows:

"For him personally I have, of course, the highest respect. Privately I have no doubt he needs our sympathy and understanding; and to the extent that it can be done without capitulation, we must show him respect, attention and consideration."

In view of this situation and in view of the fact that it is a matter of common knowledge that Amerasia was founded to "take a line," Holland and I feel that the position of the International Secretariat will be stronger if you drop off of the board of Amerasia. I have just wired you therefore as follows:

"Many thanks for yours twenty-sixth. Holland self generally support your view on your role as expert and would not urge you seriously restrict your writing. But we both feel your official connection with Amerasia is legitimate Japanese ground for complaint and in view of present strained relations would urge you consider resigning from board at an early date and for experimental period of say three months refrain from contributing signed articles to Amerasia."

We hope that this is not making an unfair request. We do not wish you to restrict your writing except for what we feeel is the expression of rather definitely provocative personal opinions as in your recent review of the Utley pamphlet.

Field will doubtless be showing you the papers he has which set forth the Japanese objections.

Borton has the theory that between the time that the Japanese Council published its acceptance of the Secretariat project in the Annual Report of the International Association, and the sending of Viscount Ishii's cable of protest to Dafoe and me, some very stiff action must have been taken against the Japanese I. P. R. either by the war office or the foreign office.

Yasuo is still optimistic and still believes that, when the Japanese Council realise that the Inquiry is not intended to name aggressors and is not intended to make findings and judgments and that we generally desire Japanese cooperation, they will cooperate.

Hoping to hear from you soon, I am
Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 566–I

(Initials) wlh. km. For advice.

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., March 9, 1939.

MR. F. V. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Thanks very much indeed for your note about the good old *Amerasia* question. You have put very clearly the one essential question: that my withdrawal would be an admission that *Amerasia* is an activity not in keeping with the work of the IPR or its staff. I guess I was groping toward this, but had not quite grasped it. I wish I had put it more clearly in my letter to Carter. This makes it all the more essential, I think, that you and Carter and I should talk this over altogether at the same time, a thing I do not think we have yet done.

In the meantime, however, I think that if Chi is appointed to Carter's staff, you could go ahead and withdraw my name.

(Pencilled in: Agree WLH.)

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL:Y.

EXHIBIT No. 566–J

(Pencilled in) "Copies: Tarr, Holland."

ROYAL YORK HOTEL,
Toronto, November 14, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
300 Gilmore Hall, the Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: I have been discussing with Dafoe and Tarr the whole question of freedom in writing and speaking on the part of members of the Secretariat, in view of the possibility that the whole matter may be aired at the January meeting of the Pacific Council. Tarr commented on your role as editor in the following terms. He does not favor making Pacific Affairs neutral, but rather making it more lively, fundamental, and provocative. He suggests, for example, that instead of putting your most challenging articles into *Amerasia* or elsewhere, you put them into Pacific Affairs, sending an advance manuscript to the Council that might take exception so as to permit of simultaneous publication of the ablest comment or counter statement by the Council concerned. If it is absolutely impossible to get the reply in time, provocative articles by the editor should have a conspicuous foreword indicating that the editor is aware that his views are likely to be seriously challenged by members of —— Council, and that therefore an advance copy of the article has been sent to that Council with an urgent invitation for a full reply in time for publication in the next issue. Tarr thinks it is very important to make it clear to the whole I. P. R. constituency that the editor has made every effort to be inclusive and to get the fullest and ablest contributions from Japanese and from believers in the Japanese cause, so that if the Japanese do not play ball, there will be prima facie evidence that they are suffering simply through default.

Tarr and I would like to have your reaction to this proposal. You and Holland and I are in an extraordinarily difficult position as the servants and employees of eleven Councils with as disparate and antithetical views as characterize these Councils at the present time. It may be that we will have to confess one day that the I. P. R. was conceived in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of free inquiry and that it can no longer be sponsored by Councils in countries where this tradition has been repudiated. In the meantime, the actual position is that we are responsible to all eleven Councils and are obliged to do our best to give the fullest expression to the views they hold.

With reference to your note commenting on McWilliams' letter, I have a terrible feeling that I suggested that you delete the allusion to the fact that Japan and Russia have been the least responsive to your repeated appeals for cooperation. In doing so, I was by indirection proposing something which is contrary

to Tarr's present proposal that we not only continue to invite Japanese contributions, but publicize the fact that we have repeatedly sought them.

Since talking with Tarr and Dafoe, I have received this copy of your immensely interesting "hypothenuse" article with the indication that it has been submitted to Amerasia subject to my approval. I do not approve of its going to Amerasia over your signature in its present form, because I do not think it is cricket for the editor of Pacific Affairs, even in his private capacity, to indulge in ridicule of the youth of Japan who have been driven off to fight in China. The "flying trapeeze" paragraph is so gorgeous that I hate to object to it, but object I think I must.

As a means of making Tarr's suggestion concrete, I am wondering what you would consider to be the pros and cons of sending this article by the first steamer to Saionji, indicating that it is the best analysis of the situation you can make in the light of Asiatic history and present world forces. You could then state that you would like to publish in the same issue the work of whatever writer the Japanese Council feels is best qualified to put forward an able challenge to this thesis, with a view to giving the Pacific Affairs public throughout the world the soundest possible basis for making up their own minds on the question.

If you should decide to send it, there are one or two other points at which it should be edited, as at the moment it is addressed to an American and not to an international audience. My only other comment on the article, which has nothing to do with the foregoing, is whether in the light of the recent statement by R. A. Butler, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons explaining that the British Government is not planning to invest in reconstruction under Japanese rule, there should not be a slight twist to the phrase you use on page 4. Of course, as you have written it, you are very cagey, for you simply say that the British are "talking about" investing. I do not for a moment believe that Butler's statement removes the possibility that they may actually do so.

Have you ever dropped in to see the immaculate Suma, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, who was so long in Nanking and such an intimate friend of Matsumoto? He is reputed to be an exceedingly able person and has been abroad enough to know how to state things in terms intelligible to the western world. Would there be any point in interesting him in writing for Pacific Affairs, adopting the Chatham House device for Foreign Office reviewers, a nom de plume?

Sincerely yours,

(t) EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 566–K

OCTOBER 26, 1936.

MR. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square,
London, S. W. 1. England.

DEAR OWEN: Here is a clipping from yesterday's New York Times on a subject which was of interest to you sometime ago. Can't you find somebody in London who can write a first rate article on British communications with the Far East, both commercial and military.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 566–L

[Telegram]

LEE, MASS., *August 20.*

(Initialled: L F)

OWEN LATTIMORE,
1795 California Street,
San Francisco, Calif.:

Do not understand Amerasia mix-up on Review but congratulate Amerasia for printing it. In view developments here this week desire withdraw at least temporarily suggestion you resign Amerasia Board. We can discuss that on your arrival.

E. C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 566–M

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., March 8, 1939.

Mr. F. V. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Recently Carter wrote to me bringing up once more the question of my resigning from *Amerasia.* I have been cudgeling my brains about this and I wonder if you will agree that the following are the salient points to be considered:

Carter says that this would be a good time for me to withdraw when the Secretariat is not actually under fire from Japan; Carter adds that he is considering giving a Secretariat appointment to Chi; apparently, as Chi is a Chinese, it would not be necessary to ask him to resign from *Amerasia;* at the same time Carter thinks it would be a bit too much to have two members of the International Secretariat on the Board of Amerasia, and this is a further reason for asking me to resign.

Points on the other side:

Your main reason originally for asking me to join *Amerasia* was that it would indicate that there was no rivalry between the two publications. This argument still holds. In fact, if I were to withdraw now, it might be taken to mean that a strain had developed between *Amerasia* and Pacific Affairs.

As regards withdrawing from *Amerasia* while not under fire, that is a perfectly good point, but on the other hand, it seems to me that by doing so a perfectly good bargaining counter would be wasted. If the Japanese dislike my remaining on *Amerasia* as much as all that, it might turn out that there would be a quid pro quo which they would offer to get me off.

Of course, the think taken as a whole is much more psychological than anything else anyhow. I should hate being hustled off *Amerasia* by Japanese importunity when the Japanese are treating free speech and opinion the way they are in their own country. Yet I also hate the idea of neatly ducking out of the line of fire during a lull in controversy.

So much for my point of view. What about yours? I wish we could consult, but failing that I am herewith giving you authority to withdraw my name from the editorial board of *Amerasia* if Chi should be appointed to Carter's staff. If something should go wrong with that arrangement, then the whole question will not be so urgent and I may have an opportunity to discuss this with you and Carter at the same time a little later on. I am sending a copy of this letter to Carter.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: Y.

EXHIBIT No. 566–N

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Published Quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations

In pencil: note and ret. to ECC.

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., March 8, 1939.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

DEAR CARTER: I am sorry to have taken so long replying to your letter suggesting again my resignation from Amerasia. I have written to Eleanor about this, and today I have written to Fred Field, as you will see from the attached carbon copy. The trouble is I am a person of excessively vacillating character, as you have already discovered, and hate having to make a decision while I am off on my own without anyone to consult. The letter to Field gives what seems to me the chief pros and cons of the question. As you see, I have authorized him to take my name off in case you should confirm your decision to appoint Chi to your staff. This ought to take care of any emergency aspects of the

question, and the other aspects I should like to be able to discuss with you and Field simultaneously, as you are both concerned in addition to myself.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) Owen Lattimore
(t) Owen Lattimore.

OL: Y.

Exhibit No. 566–P

129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, February 15, 1939.

Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
c/o President's House, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa.

Dear Owen: In your letter to W. Macmahon Ball of February 6, you write the following:

"I am sending a carbon copy to E. C. Carter, who may overhaul the original with a fast letter to you asking you not to publish. I am making a general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can reprove me when I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentleman."

In your Pacific Affairs report to the Pacific Council at Princeton you very kindly said:

"Mr. Carter was consulted on all material that differed in the slightest from the ordinary routine; and this of course meant that his colleagues were also drawn into consultation."

Under these circumstances and in view of our earlier correspondence, I am wondering whether the time has not now come for you to withdraw from the Amerasia board. I remember that you were willing to do so last year, but that I withdrew my request because I heard that the Japanese were undertaking economic reprisals against the I. P. R. in San Francisco.

Now that relations are, for the time being at least, established once more on a basis of confidence and cooperation between the International Secretariat and the Japanese Council, I am wondering whether it would require any great self-sacrifice on your part to withdraw from the Amerasia Board.

One of the reasons for my raising this matter at this time is that I am now inviting Ch'ao-ting Chi to serve for a number of months as a member of the International Secretariat. For perfectly obvious reasons I do not wish to ask him to withdraw from the Amerasia Board. I do feel, however, that having both you and Chi publicized as on the Amerasia Board is open to question.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter.

Exhibit No. 566–Q

129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, August 10, 1938.

Confidential.

Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

Dear Owen: As you will read between the lines, what I am trying to do is: (1) To make a few minor concessions so as to see whether efforts at face-saving are efficacious; (2) to clear up misunderstandings between the Secretary-General and Tokyo; (3) to apologize for any mistakes, if mistakes have been made; (4) to preserve all that is essential.

As you know, from the very start there has been a misunderstanding between Fred and me about your role on Amerasia. He thought in the very first instance that my saying that there was no objection to his talking to you about Amerasia meant that I approved of his inviting you to serve on the Amerasia board. I was surprised when I first learnt that you had accepted a position on the board. I was not only surprised but disapproved. I was reluctant to raise the issue at the time and still am. Why should I be cracking down on free speech when I am attacking more highly placed persons all over the world for doing the same thing?

I am particularly eager, if you can conscientiously do so, to have you resign from Amerasia before the circulation of the next issue which contains a flaming

article by Peffer which is likely to be the last straw for many Japanese readers of Amerasia. This is not to say that I disapprove of Peffer writing that kind of article, nor do I disapprove of Ameraisa publishing it, but it is the kind of wholesale condemnatory diatribe which cannot, as I conceive it, be sponsored by a member of the International Secretariat so long as the Japanese Council is a full member of the Pacific Council. Needless to say I have not mentioned to Takayanagi the fact that before his arrival I raised with you the question of your relationship to Amerasia.

Since he has come and from letters from other visitors from Japan, I gather that some members of the Japanese Council feel that you are not quite fair in editing Pacific Affairs. I gather that some of them have noted that when Hubbard wrote his article criticizing the Soviet Union, you made it possible for an author, friendly to Russia, to print a reply in the same issue. Also in the June, 1938, issue in which the article by Yanaihara on the Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea was printed, there was your editorial comment expressing another point of view, under the title, "What Korea pays for Japanese Rule." I think the leaders of the Japanese Council imagine that articles and editorials critical of Japan have not been submitted to them since the war broke out in time for them to be able to make comments to be included in the same issue of Pacific Affairs.

If it is not too much trouble, I wish that you or Mrs. Ward would dig out of your files pertinent quotations from your letters to the Japanese Council over the past year and a half or two years, in which I know you have repeatedly asked them for articles and comments on the articles of others.

At this stage I do not wish you to write to Saionji or any other member of the Japanese Council, jumping on them for lack of cooperation, but I would like to have, for private reference, during this next highly difficult fortnight, enough of the actual record of your dealings with Tokyo to enable me to assure people like Dafoe, if Takayanagi speaks of Pacific Affairs, that you have worked harder to get participation from the Japanese Council than from any other member group.

Sincerely yours,

(t) Edward C. Carter.

Exhibit No. 566–R

Publications Meeting

New York, *July 9, 1934.*

Present: Barnes
Lattimore
Shiman
Carter
Austern
Lasker
Mitchel

Mr. Lattimore produced the statement showing the distribution of Pacific Affairs as of July 9th, as follows:

	Paid	Members	Exchange	Complimentary		Paid	Members	Exchange	Complimentary
Foreign:					Foreign—Continued				
Australia	6	44	6	15	Poland	1			
Canada	44	325	5	11	Sweden	2		1	
China	65	85	20	19	Switzerland	4		5	7
England	71		15	14	Straits Settlements	1			
France	6		9	6	Spain	1			
Germany	15		11	1	U. S. S. R.	8		9	
India	9		1	2	Palestine	1			
Japan	12	135	8	18	Domestic:				
Java	13		1	2	Hawaii	60	105	3	14
Netherlands	14		2	2	Philippine Islands	9	56	3	16
New Zealand	7	103	1	10	United States	407		35	10
Austria			1						
Denmark			1		Grand total, 1941 subscriptions	761	855	138	176
Brazil	1								
Fiji				1					
Hungary	1								
Italy	3		1						

When Mr. Carter congratulated Mr. Lattimore on this growing circulation, Miss Austern remarked with much feeling that subscriptions were all very well but what could be done when they weren't paid. The China Council, for example, owes over $125 for subscriptions and won't do anything about it. The members of Chatham House, on the other hand, are extremely prompt in paying up. Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Japan are all in arrears in payments.

Mr. Lattimore next raised the question of Herr Hans Pfotenhauer who has been writing asking to become the exclusive agent for Pacific Affairs in Germany. While it would be very desirable to have a German agent, Mr. Lattimore felt that it would not be wise to give anyone exclusive rights. This opinion was shared by the others present.

Advertising.—In the matter of advertising in Pacific Affairs, Mr. Lattimore considered that it would be justifiable and desirable if it were restricted to publishers and books, on an international basis. A real service could be performed in bringing to the attention of readers in other countries such things as the publications of the Commercial Press, which gets out a great deal of material in English about which little is known. Mr. Carter said that he would approve of the plan subject to two conditions:

(1) That it was not started until it could be done on a really international basis. By this he did not mean that every country in the I. P. R. should have to be represented but that at least five major countries should be included.

(2) That the advertising be confined to really academic subjects.

Bibliographical Section.—Mr. Carter briefly described the present situation with regard to the preparation of bibliographical material in the Chinese, Japanese and Russian fields for use in Pacific Affairs. While in Peiping he and Holland had proposed that Nankai University and the National Library in Peiping should collaborate on the preparation of such material, with the China I. P. R. acting as coordinator. The matter had also been taken up with the Communist Academy Library in Moscow, which had agreed to furnish material in the Russian field. Mr. Holland had an assistant in Tokyo who was working on the preparation of the Japanese material. Mr. Carter had gone ahead with these arrangements on the strength of Lattimore's cable to him approving the idea of a bibliographical section.

Mr. Lattimore said that though he had cabled approval of obtaining critical bibliographical material in the Chinese, Japanese and Russian fields, he was not at all convinced that this material should go into Pacific Affairs. If a bibliographical section was to be introduced he would strongly advocate that it take form of an article analysing, criticizing and commenting on the material rather than a regulation listing of the books. His aim was to get a wider circulation for the magazine among the general reading public and he felt that it would make the magazine unbalanced, as well as scare off the kind of readers he was trying to attract, to include a large bibliographical section and continue to have only a few regular articles. A well-written article describing what had been done in the field of Chinese or Russian studies and estimating the relative importance of the books and articles would be of far greater interest and use to all except advanced scholars in the field.

Mr. Lasker suggested that it might be possible to do a series of subject bibliographies over a wider range of time, covering, say, the material appearing in the last five to ten years.

Mr. Barnes asked whether the Pacific Council could not get out the bibliographical bulletin as a regular service to Institute members and entirely separate from Pacific Affairs. This might be done from the Central Library in Honolulu. The material and the critical analysis and selection would have to be done in each country, but it could be then sent to Honolulu and all that would be necessary would be to have a librarian who was able to compile and edit the material into final form.

Mr. Carter explained that Wellington Liu was preparing a brief bibliography with the idea of its being used in Pacific Affairs and that it might be advisable to wait until it arrived and then see what kind of stuff it was and how it could best be used.

The question was dropped for the moment, to be taken up at later interviews between ECC and OL.

Mr. Lattimore then brought up the question of Mao's article which he felt should most certainly be printed in Pacific Affairs though it might cause trouble in both China and Japan. It would be necessary to condense it somewhat and he

suggested that C. C. Wang might be asked to do this. There was general agreement that the article should be printed and the ways and means were left to Mr. Lattimore to decide.

With regard to the future place of printing Pacific Affairs it was felt that in spite of the lower costs of printing in both China and Japan, the danger of censorship, the pressure of the local group, and similar factors made it more desirable to continue to print in New York and to find a managing editor to be in charge while Lattimore was away.

Before the meeting adjourned Mr. Lattimore produced a Ph. D. thesis of a young Chinese studying at Columbia which he said had aroused very favorable comment and was considered by many to embody an entirely new analysis and interpretation of China's economic development. The study is called *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History*, as revealed in the development of public works for water control. Mr. Lattimore explained that the author, Ch'ao-Ting Chi was trying hard to raise the money to have it published by the Columbia University Press, so far unsuccessfully, and suggested that possibly the I. P. R. might consider getting it published. It would have to be completely rewritten, as it was practically unintelligible in its present form. Mr. Lattimore had already started revising parts of it and was planning to use a section as an article for Pacific Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 566–S

MAY 16, 1944.

Dr. CH'AO-TING CHI,
Care of Central Bank of China, Chungking.

DEAR CHI: I have not forgotten our conversation last September about the possibility of your doing something further on your study of wartime economic developments in China. I hope that the chances of your doing this have now improved as a result of your new job in the Research Department in the Central Bank, which ought to give you more opportunity for writing. I should appreciate hearing from you on this matter. Possibly you could send your reply via Adler or George Taylor or Owen Lattimore.

Our budget situation is such that I doubt if we could put up more than $750 for this particular work, particularly as we invested so much in the original project. At present prices I realize that $750 amounts to very little, but I doubt if we can spare more. It will probably be necessary, therefore, to concentrate on one or two aspects of the subject instead of trying to complete the whole book. You might let me know you ideas on this.

If possible, I should like to have part of your report available as a document for the I. P. R. conference which is to be held early next January at Virginia Hot Springs. We should need to receive it by November 30 at the latest.

How are things going in your new job? I would be interested to learn something about the program of the Central Bank's Research Department and also to receive some of its publications. Hsu is still working for us, doing a good job, but we are very much hampered by the difficulty in getting materials from China. Clippings seem to be terribly delayed in arriving, probably because they are detained by the American censorship for copying. Carter and I would be glad to have your off-the-record comments on developments in the China I. P. R. Please feel free to talk quite frankly to Taylor and Lattimore about this.

Best Wishes.

Sincerely yours,

(t) W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. Lattimore, do you recall during the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2 years ago, identifying a letter that you wrote to Mr. Joseph Barnes on June 15, 1943?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Has a copy of that been given to you this morning?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it has.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record? That is a copy made of the letter that was introduced before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and which was identified as a letter written by Mr. Lattimore at that time, and which he now affirms that he did write to Mr. Barnes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it may be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 567" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 567

111 SUTTER STREET,
San Francisco, Calif., June 15, 1943.

Mr. JOSEPH BARNES,
Office of War Information,
224 West Fifty-seventh Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR JOE: In your capacity as a member of our Personnel Security Committee there are certain things which you ought to know about Chinese personnel. It is a delicate matter for me to tell you about these things because of my recent official connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason I am marking this communication secret.

When we recently reduced the number of our Chinese staff in New York it was quite obvious that there was going to be trouble and that this trouble would take the form of accusations against the remaining personnel. The fact is that certain of the personnel with whose services we dispensed had connections outside the office. This leads directly into the main question. It is extremely important from the point of view of security that intelligence information should not leak out of our office through our Chinese personnel. It is an open secret in Washington that the security of various Chinese agencies there is deplorable. Any pipeline from our office to any of those agencies is not a pipeline but practically an open conduit.

However, it is not only a question of Chinese Government agencies. There is also a well-organized and well-financed organization among the Chinese in this country connected with Wang Ching-wei, the Japanese puppet. This can be traced back to the history of the Chinese revolution as a whole. To present it in the fewest possible words: Sun Yat-sen was largely financed for many years by Chinese living abroad. Not only Sun Yat-sen but Wang Ching-wei had close connections among the overseas Chinese. However much he is a traitor now, the fact must be recognized that Wang Ching-wei is a veteran of Chinese politics with connections which he has nourished for many years among Chinese communities abroad, including those in the United States.

Chinese in the United States come almost exclusively from a few localities on the coast of China, practically every one of which is now occupied by the Japanese. Thus these Chinese in America have both family connections and financial investments which are under the control of the Japanese, and because of his years of political organizing work Wang Ching-wei knows all of these connections and can apply pressure through them.

On the other side there is a special organization within the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party at Chungking which is charged with maintaining political and financial connections with Chinese overseas. This overseas bureau also has a detailed knowledge of the Chinese communities in America and is able to apply pressure. Thus there is a very intense conflict going on every day in every Chinatown in America between the Wang Ching-wei agents and those of the Kuomintang. It must be remembered that while the Kuomintang is able to operate in a private way as a political party among Chinese residents in America, it is also the party which "owns" the Chinese Government and is thus able to make use of Chinese Government agencies.

Thirdly, there are numerous Chinese in America who are politically unaffiliated. There are, of course, Communists but they have neither the money nor the organization of the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The genuinely unaffiliated Chinese are a curious compound product of Chinese politics and American environment. They tend to be intensely loyal to China as a country, without conceiving that the Kuomintang or any other political organization has a monopoly right to control of their thoughts and actions. They are like Americans; they like to give their political allegiance, not to have it demanded of them. They are reluctant to support a regimented series of causes laid down for them under orders; like Americans, they often give moral and financial support to a scattered number of causes, some of which may even conflict with each other to a certain extent.

The conflict between the Wang Ching-wei organizing group and the Kuomintang organizing group in America cannot be fought out in the open. Both sides have very good reasons for not courting publicity. Each is anxious to bring into its fold as many of the unaffiliated Chinese as possible. Each is also anxious

not to be exposed as an "un-American" organization or a foreign political group working on American soil. Both of them accordingly find it very good tactics not only to cover up themselves but to put pressure on those whom they are trying to bring under their control, to accuse unaffiliated Chinese of being Communists. This is an accusation which covers up the accuser at the same time that it puts pressure on the accused.

One of the outstanding rallying points of the unaffiliated Chinese in America is the New China Daily News in New York. This is controlled by an organization of laundrymen. I understand that the shareholders number two or three thousand and that they take an active interest in the newspaper. The essential thing about these laundrymen is that in the nature of their business they are independent small-business men. This means that they are on the one hand fairly well insured against Communist theology, since the small-business man of whatever nationality is likely to be a man who had made his way by his own initiative and enterprise and is therefore extremely suspicious of collectivist economic theories. On the other hand, these Chinese small-business proprietors are reluctant to submit themselves unquestioningly to the control of the vested interests which have grown up in China in association with the dominant Kuomintang. The New China Daily News would probably not come under much pressure if it were not for the fact that it is one of the best edited Chinese papers in America with a growing circulation. It does not need to be subsidized or supported by a patron, like many, perhaps the majority, of Chinese papers. It pays dividends on its own merits. A number of Chinese language papers in America receive subsidies from the Kuomintang. At least two, and perhaps three, receive subsidies from the Wang Ching-wei group. One or two others trace back to the group within the Kuomintang which was at one time headed by the late Hu Han-min, a leader of the right-wing faction within the Kuomintang. The Hu Han-min group, though once regarded as right-wing conservatives, are now regarded in China as "old-fashioned liberals"—liberal, so to speak, short of the New Deal. They are less bitterly involved in Chinatown politics than the Wang Ching-wei and Kuomintang groups. The two latter, which are engaged in handing out carefully colored news and doctored editorial policies, are intensely jealous of and hostile to an unaffiliated paper like the New China Daily News, which, so to speak, flaunts its sins by being so readable that the Chinese public in America buys it for its own sake.

It would be rash to say that there are no Communists connected with the New China Daily News. Here it is necessary to consider another peculiarity of the politics of Chinese living out of China. These Chinese are far from being tied to the chariot wheels of Moscow; but when it comes to resisting the trend toward totalitarian regimentation within China they are often willing to support parts of the program advocated by the Chinese Communists within China. This is so much a part of the pattern of politics of Chinese living out of China that it is not uncommon to find wealthy men, even millionaires, supporting the program of the Chinese Communists in whole or in part. This was, for instance, conspicuous in Malaya before the fall of Singapore. For such prosperous and independent Chinese it was a question either of backing their independent judgment of the steps that needed to be taken toward creating a working democracy within China, or of paying financial tribute to the Kuomintang, which sometimes tends to be autocratic, and not infrequently spurns advice from Chinese abroad at the same time that it demands their financial contributions.

In the specific setting of America, it is the independent small-business man, like the laundryman, rather than the very few wealthy merchants who most conspicuously maintain this tradition of political independence. In America, some of the most wealthy individuals are either committed to Wang Ching-wei and his puppet Japanese party or at least are hedging until they have a better idea of how the war is finally going to turn out.

In the circumstances we have to be extremely careful about our Chinese personnel. While we need to avoid recruiting any Chinese Communists we must be careful not to be frightened out of hiring people who have loosely been accused of being Communists. We have to be at least equally careful of not hiring people who are pipelines to the Wang Ching-wei or to one or other of the main factions within the Kuomintang. After all, as an American Government agency we should deal with the Chinese Government or regular agencies of the Chinese Government, but should not get in the position of committing ourselves to the Kuomintang, the political party which controls the Chinese Government, as if it were itself the Chinese Government. You will recognize the importance of this proposition and the delicacy which it requires on the operational level.

For our purposes, it is wise to recruit as many unaffiliated Chinese as we can, to pick people whose loyalty will be reasonably assured on the one hand by the salaries which we pay them and on the other hand by the fact that they do not receive salaries or subsidies from somewhere else.

Mr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong, both of our New York office, conform excellently to these requirements. Mr. Chi I have known for many years. Until his family estates were occupied by the Japanese, he was a wealthy landlord. He was brought up in the older scholastic tradition in China, before the spread of modern western education, but at the same time he is keenly interested in the national unification of China and the orderly development of a stable political organization there. I know by long experience that he is anything but a Communist; I also know that because of his seniority, his background of independent wealth, and his superior mentality he is not a man to be pushed around by party bureaucrats. Chew Hong is a much younger man, but one whom Dr. Chi trusts and of whose integrity he is convinced. There is something in their relationship of the old Chinese standards of disciple and master. As long as Dr. Chi stands in the relationship of loyal friendship to me and the loyalty of an honest employee of an American Government agency, there will be no difficulty with either men, no irresponsible playing with Chinese politics, and no leakage to any Chinese faction.

The retention of both men is therefore a guaranty to the secrecy and security of the work of the OWI as well as a guaranty of the confident fulfillment of directives. I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting rid of either man. I know that both men may be subjected to attacks. Given time to work on it, I could undoubtedly trace such attacks to their origin and give you the full details. I doubt whether the Personnel Security Committee of OWI would be able to trace such attacks, rooted in the intricacies of Chinese factional politics, to their source; but I should not like to see us placed in a position where, after getting rid of people now attacked, we would be forced to hire people who would actually be the nominee of factions not under our control.

It is for this reason that I have written this long letter to urge you to report to our Personnel Security Committee the necessity for exercising pronounced agnosticism when any of our Chinese personnel are attacked.

In the meantime I am doing my best to check over our Chinese personnel in San Francisco.

Once more I urge you to observe the strictest confidence in acting on this letter, because in certain quarters it might be considered that I am under a moral obligation to see that OWI is staffed with Chinese who take their orders from some source other than the American Government.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE,
Director, Pacific Operations.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Chu Hong, who was mentioned in that letter, an employee of the OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did he hold?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember the classification of his position. He was an assistant translator to Dr. Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know if he was also known as Chu Tong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is the same man.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is admitted into the record is it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a fixed policy determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Office of War Information would not engage in any attacks upon the Emperor or his family?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe there was such a ruling. I don't remember whether it came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever violate this directive or this ruling directly or indirectly?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever try to make use of an attack by Sun Fu on the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe that was quoted in part in a broadcast from San Francisco.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you responsible for that broadcast?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was responsible as head of the San Francisco office; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was not that an attack on the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that it was not an attack on the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My testimony is that it was not. My understanding is that that ruling was that there should be no American attacks on the Japanese Emperor. This, as I remember, was criticism of some sort. I don't remember the wording of the Sun Fu article, nor do I remember what was quoted. But this was quoted as a Chinese opinion on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you felt that the directive which forbade an attack on the Emperor was a prohibition against American attacks on the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my belief; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you felt that you could use this attack by Sun Fu, inasmuch as it was not an attack by an American on the Emperor.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe it was a criticism of some sort. I am not sure I would use the word "attack."

Mr. MORRIS. You would change the word from attack to criticism of the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, or the Emperor system or something. I would have to see the original wording to remember what it was all about.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony, Mr. Lattimore, that you interpreted the Joint Chiefs of Staff ruling that there be no attacks or criticisms of the Emperor or his family, in such a way that you felt you could use an attack originated by Sun Fu over the Office of War Information transmitters?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I believe that that was——

The CHAIRMAN. I want an answer to that, yes, or no, before you explain it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The answer is "Yes," and I believe that that was checked with Washington at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did a Mr. Clay Osborne ever protest your actions in connection with this directive?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Clay Osborne at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was head of the Japanese desk in San Francisco.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of OWI?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of OWI; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he resign as a result of the difficulty that he had with you at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he did.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that answer and that question. Did he resign as a result of the difficulty that he had with you at that time? Your answer was "Yes, he did." Is that right?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, I wonder if you would, just for the sake of completing the record here, answer a few questions in connection with the time you spent out of the country.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were born in Washington, were you not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first leave the country, as a child?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At the age of 10 or 11 months, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you go then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Where or when? My parents took me to Shanghai, China.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until, I think it was 1912.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you left China and you went to what country?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then I left China and went to Switzerland, where I was in school for 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. That would be from 1912 until 1914.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were at that time, 12 and 14 years of age.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You were born in 1900.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you then come back to the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I first came back to the United States in 1928, I would say.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you from 1914 to 1928?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1914 I went to England and I remained at school in England until very near the end of 1919, and then made an attempt to go back to China via America, but owing to the postwar shipping shortage in England, I was able to get a passage via Suez before I could get one via America, so I went back to China via Suez, arriving there at the end of 1919. I remained in China until 1926, when I started on a journey overland, through Mongolia and Chinese Central Asia, into India, which I reached toward the end of 1927. My wife and I then spent the winter of 1927–28 principally in Rome, Italy. Then we returned to America through France and England.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you marry, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1926.

Mr. MORRIS. And you married Eleanore Holgate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That brings us up to what year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1928.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you in 1928, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1928, the beginning of 1928, I was in Italy. Then I returned through France and England to this country.

Mr. MORRIS. And that was now late 1928?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I think it was the spring of 1928. May I check with my wife on that?

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until 1929, when I went out to China and Manchuria.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in China and Manchuria?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Until the summer of 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. And it was then that you first made arrangements to be the editor of Pacific Affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; in the summer of 1933 I came back to this country and then I went up to Banff to the conference of the IPR in Canada, then in the fall we went to New York, and it was in the late fall of 1933 that Mr. Carter took up the question of my becoming editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in the United States from that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the fall of 1934 I went back to China.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you stay in China on that tour?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Through 1935 and until the spring of 1936, when I returned to the United States via Russia, Holland, and England.

Mr. MORRIS. During the period of 1934 to the last time, did you ever encounter a man named Thompson, an attorney who was a partner of Clarence Darrow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't believe so?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall that name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue with that itinerary, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Then——

The CHAIRMAN. You have him up to what, now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1936. In the fall of 1936 I went to London, where I stayed for between 3 and 4 months, and then at the beginning of 1937, my wife and I returned to China via the Suez, and we remained in China from the spring of 1937 until about the beginning of December 1937. We then returned to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. You stayed in the United States until——

Mr. LATTIMORE. We stayed in the United States, let me see, I think it was almost Christmas 1937 when we arrived in San Francisco, and we remained in the United States until 1941, when I went out to China, at least I think that is right. No; 1939, I made a journey to—we spent the summer vacation in Sweden and Norway.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you stayed in the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And then stayed in the United States until 1941 when I went out to China to work for Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say that you had booked a passage on December 7, that is December 8 across the date line, for Hong Kong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From Hong Kong.

Mr. MORRIS. You had booked passage from Hong Kong, but at that time you were in Chungking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was in Chungking; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever go to Hong Kong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't. I was to fly from Chungking to Hong Kong and catch the Pan American Clipper there.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say your passage from Chungking to Hong Kong was canceled?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the reason for the cancellation, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the small hours of the morning, one of the Generalissimo's aides rang me up and told me that Pearl Harbor had been bombed and that I shouldn't go to Hong Kong.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, I offer you here a list of writings compiled by the Library of Congress, writings of yours. I ask you if you will take these. There is no need to do it now, but take these and check to see that that is a fair list and that everything purportedly written there by you actually was written by you, and then so advise the committee. Then we might like to have that, Mr. Chairman, introduced into the records as a list of Mr. Lattimore's writings.

Mr. Lattimore. There seems to be a Mexican edition of one of my books. I didn't know that existed.

Mr. Sourwine. Can you make the offer on that at a later time, after it is checked by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Morris. Yes; I will.

The Chairman. It will have to be.

Mr. Morris. Now, just one other thing, you have a son David Lattimore, have you not?

Mr. Lattimore. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Did he attend the World Youth Festival in Prague in 1947?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes; he did.

Mr. Morris. Did you aid him in making plans to attend that?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. Well, actually, he went with a school group. And the plans were made through the school.

Mr. Morris. Was the World Youth Festival, as far as you know, a Communist project?

Mr. Lattimore. No; we didn't understand it to be so at the time. There were delegations from all kinds of non-Communist countries.

Mr. Morris. Have you subsequently found out that it was a Communist project?

Mr. Lattimore. No. The Communist delegations were very active at the time, but I wouldn't be able to characterize it as a Communist project.

Mr. Morris. Do you know who accompanied David on that trip?

Mr. Lattimore. Several people from his own school.

Mr. Morris. Who were they?

Senator Eastland. What school was it?

Mr. Lattimore. The school was Putney School in Vermont, and the head of the school, Mrs. Hinton, also went to Czechoslovakia that summer.

Mr. Morris. Who was Bertha Hinton?

Mr. Lattimore. Her daughter.

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Bertha Hinton was the one who was the identifying witness who gave the State Department, when he applied for his passport, gave him an affidavit of indentification?

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't know that. Bertha Hinton was a daughter-in-law of Mrs. Hinton, not a daughter.

Mr. Morris. How was she related to Joan Hinton?

Mr. Lattimore. Joan Hinton was her daughter. They were sisters-in-law.

Mr. Morris. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson. What did you learn about this youth meeting that your son went to?

Mr. Lattimore. Not very much.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to learn something about it before your son went?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We wrote to a woman in the YWCA, in New York—wasn't it? And asked about the World Youth Congress, and she wrote back that they did not consider it Communist and they were sending a delegation from the YWCA.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the search that you made before you allowed your son to go?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. How old was your son at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1947—that would be 16.

Senator FERGUSON. Who went with your son?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He went with the school group.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know a boy by the name of Michael Sloan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he was a schoolmate of my son's.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he go?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; he went.

Senator FERGUSON. Had your son traveled alone before on trips like this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had gone on school trips.

Senator FERGUSON. Abroad?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not abroad; no.

Senator FERGUSON. This is the first time abroad?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Who paid his expenses?

Mr. LATTIMORE. We did.

Senator FERGUSON. Not the school?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not the school; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you investigate the meeting afterward?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. So your inquiry was to the YMCA.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And they said it was not a Communist meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And the son went, and came back, and that is all you know about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. ARNOLD. YWCA, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the YWCA?

Mr. LATTIMORE. YWCA, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How many people went from the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any idea?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he does not know.

Senator FERGUSON. I did want you to find in this report that you handed me, on page 76, you state it starts, a report on the Moscow meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, there is no—I wrote no specific report on the Moscow meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not even mention it, did you? I think I went over every line.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to what?

Senator FERGUSON. A report that he brought in today, saying that I had requested the report that he referred to in his statement, no, it is in his book, Ordeal by Slander, that he obtained up at New York, from Mr. Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was before I came back from Afghanistan. My wife was given it by Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but where is the report that your wife was given by Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is it.

Senator FERGUSON. About Moscow; where is the Moscow matter in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This is simply a general report presented at the international meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1936, and it takes up the whole question of editorial policy, and gives the point of view of various countries.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been asked for the report of the Moscow meeting. Is it in there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; there is no report on the Moscow meeting. Mr. Carter's report is also in this volume, and he mentions it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when the report was printed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1936, I presume.

Senator FERGUSON. When were you in Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In the spring of 1936. This was printed after the Yosemite meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. We have what purports to be minutes of the Moscow meeting, and I understood that you had a report that you had made on the Moscow meeting. Where is anything in here about the Moscow meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you call for, Senator, when you asked him to bring in this exhibit that he has in his hands?

Senator FERGUSON. I understood that he had some minutes or he had a report that he made on the Moscow meeting.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; that is a misapprehension.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have none on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I never wrote one.

Senator FERGUSON. You never made one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Never made one, no.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anybody else ever make one?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Carter here, in his report as Secretary General, to which my report as editor is appended, states:

> Since the Banff conference, I have visited the Soviet Union three times, in June and December 1934, and again in April 1936. In addition to long conferences with members of the Soviet Council regarding problems of research, publication, administration, conference preparation, finance, library exchanges and participation in Pacific Affairs, the Soviet Council has arranged for me to visit the headquarters of a number of research institutions working on Far Eastern and Pacific problems—

et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. He does not mention you being there.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; he does not mention anyone except himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all he says about the Moscow meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you remember if there is anything else there?

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask one question while we are waiting?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I am trying to get this exhibit connected up here. The Senator from Michigan called for his writing on the Moscow meetings, as I understand it.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not understand that that is what I wanted?

The CHAIRMAN. He brought this exhibit in saying this is what the Senator called for.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here is part of Mr. Carter's report, page 144, the heading is "Editor of Pacific Affairs." [Reading:]

During the winter following the Banff conference, Mr. Lattimore spoke before the branches of the Canadian Institute in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, and Hamilton and at the Empire Club in Toronto.

During 1935 he spoke before IPR groups in Honolulu; Pan-Pacific Club, Shanghai; the Rotary Club and the College of Chinese Studies, Peking.

In 1936 he spoke at the Academy of Science, Moscow, and under IPR auspices in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. He also lectured at the Royal Anthropological Institute, the Central Asian Society, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London.

Senator FERGUSON. That does not give us a report on the meeting that the IPR had with the Russians in Moscow, does it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is covered, sir—there is simply some reference to long conferences.

Senator FERGUSON. What page was that on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Page 23, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to put the whole book in the record. Will you read that?

The CHAIRMAN. Does that refer to a Moscow meeting? Does your answer say that the book refers to the Moscow meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, it mentions April 1936.

Senator FERGUSON. What does it say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is the section that I read about before.

Senator FERGUSON. You read it. All right, it is in the record.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. And there is——

Senator FERGUSON. The correspondence in the minutes seemed to show a turning point in the activities of the IPR. Where did you ever make a report to the trustees about that turning point?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A turning point?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You remember the testimony, where they talked about the party line.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir, it isn't the party line.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, they talked about a line.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They talked about an anti-Japanese line. They talked about mentioning Japan as an aggressor.

Senator FERGUSON. And afterward, you struck certain paragraphs, because they were critical of communism. You put editor's notes in certain articles afterward. Where did you ever report to the trustee about the change of the course that IPR was going to have?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There was no change of course, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you report to the trustees?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The only report that I recall ever writing is the one that is in this volume here.

Senator FERGUSON. And that begins on page 76.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And there is not a word about the Russian conference in Moscow, is there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, there is a reference, however, to the different points of view about publication of controversial articles, and the question of editorial responsibility, the question of the functions and powers of national correspondence, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, is there any word about Moscow?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever report to the trustees on the Moscow conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, you were in India in 1949, were you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. While in India, did you meet with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. How long was your meeting with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I landed in New Delhi at dawn, I had lunch that day with Mr. Nehru. Then I saw him once or twice at public receptions. I also——

The CHAIRMAN. How long was your meeting with Mr. Nehru, is the question, and I think you can state that in terms of time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I remember having dinner with him twice, and staying for a considerable period after dinner talking. I wouldn't be able to say exactly how much in hours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, who arranged your luncheon appointment with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe the Indian Ambassador here, his sister, Madame Pandit, telegraphed out to him that I was coming and he was therefore notified as soon as I arrived.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see Mr. Solomon Trone in India?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he instrumental in arranging any of the meetings with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; he was not. On one occasion Mr. Nehru, at a reception, at his house, took me and Mr. and Mrs. Trone and his top Indian economics adviser into a small room and we sat there and talked for about maybe a half hour or an hour.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you proffer any advice to Mr. Nehru on the policy that India should take?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I was asked some questions about economic parallels between India and China and responded to those questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you leave any memoranda with Mr. Nehru?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions along those lines.

The CHAIRMAN. I sent a note down to counsel just a minute ago. Maybe he cannot read my writing. I would not blame him if he didn't.

Mr. ARNOLD. Monday would be very, very inconvenient, and I couldn't make it. It would be very inconvenient.

The CHAIRMAN. Very inconvenient?

Mr. ARNOLD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Monday is the regular meeting day of the Judiciary Committee.

Gentlemen, we will have to recess this committee at this time, on account of other matters that must be taken up. Mr. Sourwine will want to interrogate this witness for several hours on questions that he has prepared growing out of the record. We will be unable to meet on Monday, if counsel cannot be here conveniently, and just what day we can meet on account of the other committees, the Chair is not able to state at this time. But counsel will be advised in ample time so that he can be here at his convenience. We will try to meet your convenience.

Mr. ARNOLD. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Chairman, and any other day but Monday of that week——

The CHAIRMAN. We will try and work it out. This committee also has its members on appropriations and other committees and they are meeting from time to time. We have to try and straddle the time so as to get in as much time on this and wind it up as quickly as possible. Is there any suggestion as to time? I do not like to put it to the call of the Chair, because that is an indefinite time, and yet that is about the only way that I can put it at this time, in view of the fact that we can't make a date certain. Would that be satisfactory to you, Counsel?

Mr. ARNOLD. Yes, sir; there are three of us there. Mr. Fortas is in Texas. The other gentleman is before the Commission, and I have some rather important matters to study. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The only way I can express it is that I will call you at the proper time.

Mr. ARNOLD. How about the other matter?

The CHAIRMAN. I will make a ruling on this other matter later on. We will recess subject to call.

(Whereupon, the hearing was recessed subject to call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, and Ferguson.

Also present: Senator McCarthy.

J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in session.

Senator FERGUSON. Before we start the testimony, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore, do you have the quotations you mentioned in the statement you read to Freda Utley's utterances that you say she was pro-Nazi?

TESTIMONY OF OWEN LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS—Resumed

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I have not completed my collection on revision of those statements yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you file them as part of your sworn testimony in the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine, you may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there are several loose ends which should be taken care of, I believe, before we proceed today with direct interrogation. The Chair will recall the question of certain deeds of property by Mr. Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore and the authentication thereof. I now hold the photostats of those deeds and the authentication is on the back of each one by Mr. Robert E. Bundy, town clerk, in accordance with the form and traditional practice of the jurisdiction. I submit the Chair may at this time wish to order they now be inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bundy certifies that the kodagraph reflex copy on the reverse side thereof is an accurate reproduction of a record in book 38, page 481 of said Bethel Land Records. That appears on each of the documents with that authentication. They will be admitted for the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 555A, No. 555B, and No. 555C." See p. 3565 for exhibits.)

The CHAIRMAN. There was another matter that I think the Chair did not pass on that it seems to me might be well to have now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I believe the Chair has reference to certain material which was offered for the record by Mr. Lattimore at an earlier date. In connection with some of that, there was mentioned earlier, but it did not go in the record at that time some material, and one of the items submitted by Mr. Lattimore was an excerpt from a speech by Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana, which, according to Mr. Lattimore's note, appears in the Congressional Record, volume 91, IV, page 4900, May 22, 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair raised the question at that time as to whether or not the excerpts were taken out of context.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. It is submitted and the record will speak for itself on that question.

I request permission of the Chair to read into the record at this time a portion of the material which the staff considers to be the context in which these particular excerpts appear.

The CHAIRMAN. With the idea of admitting the excerpts?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will indicate to the chair when we come to the excerpt submitted by Mr. Lattimore. This is the one from the speech by Congressman Mike Mansfield:

EXHIBIT No. 595

The Chinese Communists or the Kungchantang—share-in-production party—are also an important factor affecting relations between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese Communists number about 90,000,000 in the 15 autonomous areas under their control.

Now begins the excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore:

They are, at the present time, more reformists than revolutionists and they represent the peasant revolt that has often characterized the long years of Chinese history. They have made many reforms in agricultural areas relative to the reduction of rent, taxes, and interest rates. Local democracy is practiced and many cooperatives have been organized. The Chinese Communists collect their own taxes, make their laws, and issue their paper money. They maintain a separate state economically, politically, and militarily, and they have rendered valiant service in the war against the Japanese. Possibly 16 divisions of Nationalist troops of Chiang Kai-shek, under Hu Tsangnan, have been used to blockade the Communist area. The Soviet Union does not send aid to these regions of China. However, the future policy of the Soviet toward the Chinese Communists is problematical. It may be that the divide between Kuomintang, and Communist China may have repercussions in the relations between Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin.

The question of Chinese disunity is very important to us. If China can achieve unity—and the prospects at present are doubtful—she can then be in a strong position at the final peace conference and eventually in fact as well as in theory, become a great power and thus powerful enough to maintain the peace in her part of the world.

If, on the other hand, this unity is not soon achieved, the position of China and ourselves will become extremely difficult. The U. S. S. R. will, in my opinion, enter the war against Japan. When that happens the Soviets will, as a matter of geographical propinquity, depend on and render such aid as is necessary to the Chinese Communists because they will be in a good position to attack Japanese concentrations and because there has been and will be in the future—unless Chinese unity is achieved—ideological sympathies which will draw the two together. Should this happen it is quite possible that there would exist in China two separate and distinct states in the postwar period. One would be allied to and, in a sense, dependent on Russia; the other would be, in a sense,

anti-Russian but would be dependent on itself for survival and not on any outside power. I cannot envisage, if this comes to pass, the United States maintaining more than a passive interest in Chinese affairs because to do otherwise would place us in an extremely embarrassing position.

Mr. Chairman, I recall that I did not note the point at which the excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore ended. It ended with the words "in the war against the Japanese."

Senator O'Conor. That is difficult to follow. Can you read the excerpt itself?

Mr. Sourwine. The excerpt by Mr. Lattimore is this:

They are, at the present time, more reformists than revolutionists and they represent the peasant revolt that has often characterized the long years of Chinese history. They have made many reforms in agricultural areas relative to the reduction of rents, taxes, and interest rates. Local democracy is practiced and many cooperatives have been organized. The Chinese Communists collect their own taxes, make their laws, and issue their paper money. They maintain a separate state economically, politically, and militarily, and they have rendered valiant service in the war against the Japanese.

That was the end of the excerpt offered by Mr. Lattimore.

In connection with that, I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore a couple of questions.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you regard Mike Mansfield as an expert on Asia or any portion of Asia?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't knew whether I could answer that question "Yes" at the present time, Mr. Sourwine.

My recollection is that speech of his was made just after he had returned from a visit to China, where he went for the purpose of informing himself.

Mr. Sourwine. You offered the excerpt as an indication of what he thought at that time rather than an indication of what the fact was?

Mr. Lattimore. I offered it as an indication of rather widely held opinions at that time.

Mr. Sourwine. The question is on the admission of it, Mr. Chairman. It has been read in full.

The Chairman. It may be admitted in its entirety so it will not be taken out of context.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 595" and was read in full by counsel.)

Mr. Sourwine. The next offer that was made by Mr. Lattimore was two excerpts from a reprint of a column by Ernest Lindley in the Washington Post December 7, also a reference to Congressional Record, volume 91, part 13, page A5388.

Mr. Fortas. The year?

Mr. Sourwine. December 10, 1945, remarks of Walter A. Judd. It appears that Mr. Judd did make certain remarks. The two excerpts offered by Mr. Lattimore are as follows:

* * * some honest American observers who cannot be accused of Comintern connections think the Chinese Communists are the best foundation on which to build a united and democratic China. * * *

The real question is: Can China best be unified by unconditional support of the Central Government or by the use of American influence, with the consent of the government powers, to bring together the Central Government and the Chinese Communists and—still more important—democratic groups in China which are presently unarmed? The second choice is the better. It may not succeed. But it should be more thoroughly explored and more deftly pursued.

If the Chair would permit, I should like to read a page and a half which shows that material fully in context.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is from the extension of remarks of the Honorable Walter A. Judd, of Minnesota, in the House of Representatives on Monday, December 10, 1945, taken from an article by Ernest Lindley, which appeared in the Washington Post on December 7, 1945, which was entitled, "How Aid China?"

EXHIBIT No. 596

* * * The cry "Hands off" is coming, within the United States, principally from two groups: The unreconstructed isolationists and active supporters of the Chinese Communists. This is an odd alliance. The only characteristic with its two elements seem to have in common is indifference to the interests of the United States and to organization of a stable peace.

This observation must carry two qualifications.

Now we come into the quote by Mr. Lattimore:

The first is that some honest American observers who cannot be accused of Comintern connections think the Chinese Communists are the best foundation on which to build a united and democratic China. They were overruled, however, by Roosevelt, who consistently regarded Chiang Kai-shek as the better bet.

NEEDS DEFT HANDLING

The second qualification is, of course, that no one wants American lives expended in a civil conflict within China. It might as well be recognized that prevention of another major conflict will involve the risk of lives—only a tiny fraction, however, of those which would be lost in another great war. At the same time, every effort should be, and is being, made to keep American troops out of the lines of fire in China. Our aid should be confined to weapons and supplies followed by help in developing transportation and manufacturing.

"Hands off" is a complete negation. It is an abandonment of a historic policy at the very time it has been accepted by other major powers, and therefore has its best chance of fruition.

The real questions is: Can China best be unified by unconditional support of the Central Government or by the use of American influence, with the consent of the other great powers, to bring together the Central Government and the Chinese Communists and—still more important—democratic groups in China which are presently unarmed? The second choice is the better. It may not succeed. But it should be more thoroughly explored and more deftly pursued.

Might I ask Mr. Lattimore a couple of questions there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this offered for the purpose of showing a situation as it existed or showing what Mr. Lindley thought about it at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was offered, Mr. Sourwine, as a sample of well-informed discussion and opinion in Washington at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. It may be, sir; I have asked you this question before, but in your opinion were either of these excerpts offered by you taken out of context?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I thought they were sufficiently in context.

Mr. SOURWINE. That second one is before the Chair as to ruling of admissibility.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in its entirety.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 596" and was read in full by counsel.)

Mr. SOURWINE. The Chair also has before it for consideration certain material offered by Mr. Lattimore, one, a page and a half, headed, "Who said the Chinese Communists were not real Communists?", being a quotation from Mr. Patrick J. Hurley and Freda Utley; a

letter on the stationery of the Chinese history project, addressed "Dear Owen," another letter also addressed "Dear Owen" and signed "Karl August," apparently from Mr. Wittfogel, who appeared before this committee; a third and fourth letter also so addressed and so signed, an excerpt from a book by Alexander Barmine——

Mr. FORTAS. Was that first letter from Mr. Wittfogel?

Mr. SOURWINE. The four are from Wittfogel, letters of March 4, 1945; April 7, 1940; November 2, 1941. That one is headed, and the other one is headed, "Sunday night midnight" and has written on it in pencil "1941"; and a document consisting of three and a half pages headed "Who wanted to recognize Red China," containing what purports to be quotes from a number of sources.

The complete accuracy of quotations in that regard the staff has not had time to determine, Mr. Chairman, and they are offered by Mr. Lattimore. It is respectfully suggested that the Chair might wish to rule that this material be printed in the appendix of the record. It is not sworn testimony, but that it be printed in the appendix of the record and footnoted back to the point at which it was offered by Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the offer should be divided. Some of it could be admitted. Wittfogel's could be admitted in all probability.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Chair wish to rule?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that can be divided and admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 597 A, B, C, D," and are as follows: The other documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 475, 476, and 477" and appear in appendix I, pt. 10, pp. 3703 through 3706.)

EXHIBIT No. 497–A

Sponsors: America Council of The Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City; International Institute of Social Research, New York City. Director: Karl August Wittfogel. Advisory Committee; Homer H. Dubs, Duke University; L. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University; Ralph Linton, Columbia University; Karl H. Menges, Columbia University; R. H. Tawney, London School of Economics; George E. Taylor, University of Washington; James R. Ware, Harvard University

CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT

Low Memorial Library

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Tel. UNiversity 4–3200, Ext. 593

420 RIVERSIDE DRIVE, *March 4, 1945.*

DEAR OWEN: I have delayed writing my weekly Sunday letters for hours because I could not tear myself away from your Asiatic "solution." By watching my *action*, not my *words*, you can judge how great the power of attraction of your new book is. You are really an expert to end all experts. I have not read anything for a long time, that made me think so much about the various aspects of the postwar world. This is a fascinating story, one, which, I hope, will be read much and intensely, because you certainly show that the political leaders have to act quickly, wisely, and boldly, or else. * * * You do not say much about world war No. III, leaving this wisely to the brass hats and brass minds. You say less about No. IV and V—in my opinion, many questions may not be decided before and during III (as the short-sighted brass brains think, who have no long historical breadth), but only before and during IV—or after, but I am sure, you are right, as *solid* a peace has to be made as *possible* in this most artfully balanced of all worlds. The breath-taking picture of a world dancing ballet on a swinging tight rope emerged clearly from your masterly pen.

This and many more questions have been stirred up by your book. Maybe, I shall have a chance once to interview you about all those things which I do not know, but would like to learn through discussion with you.

But beyond and before all this—what about the slightly more remote affairs of the Liao empire? When I discussed your preface the last time with you, you suggested 1945, when the book would be done and the conferences over. It is 1945 now, what about getting the thing done? You remember that Tawney thought the manuscripts should be studied for several weeks before an introduction could be written. This is thoroughness, but it also reflects the fact that Tawney is far from Inner Asia. You are at home, where he would be a newcomer. I am sure, you can go over the stuff much faster. How would it be, if you came here for a day or two, to see whether you can get through with it. If not, we might see. whether some part of the ms. could be sent to your home for a couple of days (we are somewhat in difficulty, and this is one of the reasons why I suggest your working over the ms. here, at least for one, or two, or three days).

I know you have many friends here with whom you might wish to stay, but I am sure you know also that you are most welcome to stay in our miserable guest room, when and if that suits you.

Again, my very warmest thanks for the book. May it shake the people from their slumber. It has the power to do so. There are, as I said before, a few questions, where I should like to ask for further explanation or where I beg to differ, but as a whole, you certainly did a marvelous job.

Yours ever,

——— ———.

EXHIBIT No. 497B

Officers: Philip C. Jessup, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman; Philip W. Parker, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Francis S. Harmon, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

1795 California Street, San Francisco. Telephone: TUxedo 3114; 129 East 52nd Street, New York City. Telephone: PLaza 3–4700. Cable: INPAREL

NEW YORK, *April 7, 1940.*

DEAR OWEN: I want to congratulate you on the new opus. It is out, I got it, it *looks* fine, it *is* fine. I have been going through it, and I have been reading many parts, some of them twice, and I must say I like it very much indeed. Although I had seen the manuscript and studied it, the book is so rich and so intelligent that it seems a new book to me with many things to learn and many more to think about. You have enriched the literature on your subject, of which I am just consuming a great deal for my Liao prefaces, very much indeed. The book has substance, style, vision. It is much more then just a synthesis of old suff, it contains much little known material and it coordinates it under fresh and stimulating viewpoints. Congratulations again. ((pencilled note) I am sure it will be a standard work in its field.)

I have shown the copy which I got from the Society—as its member, not as your friend—I have shown it to our office, and they all seem excited about it. Dr. Goodrich hopes that you will let him have a copy, since he, as he said, read the proofs for you. If that is so, it might not be a bad idea at all to let him have a copy.

I am very busy, Owen, but I would love to see you. At that oriental meeting we read our three papers, Yu-ch'uan on the *chun* of Ch'in, Feng on the social stratification of Liao, I on the early institutions of China in the light of modern anthropology. The papers seem to have been all right.

Liao is almost finished, as far as Feng is concerned, but not as far as Karl August. I am working hard over the text and the footnotes; there is still much to be done. Han is in the making now, and so is Chin. I begin to understand more about the barbarian world of China's frontier than I did ever before. That is probably the reason why my mind is so open to the message which your new book has to give.

Love to all of you. When do we meet?

Yours cordially,

/S/ Karl August.
/T/ KARL AUGUST.

125 Riverside Drive,
Between 84 and 85th Street,
Friday, April 12, 40.

(Address and arrow pencilled)

Dear Owen: These are most pleasant news. I am very glad to learn that you are coming to New York next week. Do not go to a hotel. My little apartment upstairs 10–D is at your disposal, a bedroom, the study, and the bath. Unfortunately we have taken away the telephone, because I practically do not use it. If you have friends whom you want to ring you up, please give them just *our number* (downstairs): Trafalgar 7–2871.

Have any meals with us which you are free to take at home, particularly the breakfast and, whenever you can, the dinner, although it seems from your letter that the two evenings are taken. If so, that is all right. You must do whatever you have to do. Please consider our house just as a convenient lodging place with full freedom for all your movements.

I am so happy to see you soon here, so is Esther. I hope we shall have at least some chance for a little personal talk. I want you to see our Liao stuff. Chia-sheng and Yu-chuan will both be very proud to get your book.

Love to all of you.

Yours always,

[s] Karl August.

(Penned:) Do you know when you will arrive? Our office telephone is *Columbia:* University 4–3200, extension 593 (or just ask for K. W. the girls know my name).

Exhibit No. 597–C

CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT

Low Memorial Library

Columbia University

new york city

November 2, 1941.

Dear Owen: It was awfully good of you to send me a copy of your new book. Many, many thanks, Owen, and my most cordial congratulations for the prompt and smooth delivery of this baby. The book looks fine, and it reads fine. I feel—and I am sure any intelligent reader feels—that a unique amount of experience and thinking has gone into these pages. There are several points which I want to include into our Liao volume, but I have to settle down for a more thorough study first, which I am going to do next weekend.

The pictures are very striking, almost as good as the text, almost. I like your stories, and the little human features which make your tales so rich.

Lots of good luck for this one too.

Yours ever,

(s) Karl August.
(t) Karl August.

Exhibit No. 597D

CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT

Low Memorial Library

Columbia University

new york city

Sunday Night (Midnight) 1941.

Dear Owen: Having thought your letter over again—and several times so—I come to the conclusion that you were more right than not. What you miss, is a detailed presentation of the first part of the analysis. This I did not give, because it would have taken me months to get into all the historical material without a more detailed analysis of the *Asiatic* oriental societies cannot be given. But since people generally agree that waterworks *are* the foundation of the socio-economic structure of Egypt as well as of Babylonia, the analysis with its "illus-

trations" which I *could* not give *now*, was not so urgently needed. America was not discovered from the standpoint of the theory, and America was easier. There, no huge historical records existed. An abbreviated analysis of the anthropological material was possible. This I have attempted.

I have dreamed of a thorough analysis of the great Asiatic societies in the style of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas. Perhaps *I* may be able to do it later, perhaps somebody else will undertake it in the meantime. Let us hope so. Your critical remarks touched a sore spot, a wish of my own, one which I was not able to fulfil, at least not at the time being.

The oasis section should be added. This I knew, and in this respect I had written to you. During this week end I have re-read your Inner Asian Frontiers and McGovern. The reading of the two books made it clear again to me how absolutely superior *your* analysis and presentation is not only to his—he is a dwarf—but to practically everybody who has ventured into an analysis of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft of the oasis. Your analysis really seems definite and classic. I shall follow it for whatever I may write about the Asiatic oases. I hope to be not too stupid a disciple.

Any wish or suggestion that I might enlarge the book to a considerable extent hurt me somewhat. I was very, very, very tired, Owen. If a marathon runner is at the end of his run and just at the edge of his physical collapse, then the kind of advice of a friend "come on, run faster, run further," cannot be received with enthusiasm. I am going to explain why the *first* part gives a concentrated and condensed picture of the basic mechanism only and why within the frame of this book no *elaborate* analysis can be given (but is not needed either) and why a more detailed analysis is added for the new and relatively simple field of America. This will clarify the situation and prepare the reader to expect what he is going to get, and nothing different. This and a better Maya chapter, and Spain, and the new Bureaucracy, and a chapter on the oasis is really all I may still be able to cheat out of my nerves and brains. Then I must fall back upon the end of Liao and the Ch'in-Han double volume.

Thank you for all the good your letter gave, Owen. I did not want to write a sad letter. I just did.

Love to all who like me.

Yours cordially,

[s] Karl August
[t] Karl August.

Mr. Sourwine. These are photostats of letters which you had in your files?

Mr. Lattimore. That is right.

The Chairman. They were received by you?

Mr. Lattimore. That is right.

The Chairman. The other we can pass on. Let us go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Before we start, Mr. Lattimore, you had brought in a report that you had mentioned in your book Ordeal by Slander.

Mr. Lattimore. My wife mentioned it.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; in her chapter, but you had adopted it by publication of the book; is that right?

Mr. Lattimore. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. It also stated that Mr. Carter had issued a press release that he had shown you; is that correct?

Mr. Lattimore. I believe so. Yes; that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. I assume you read that press release in the morning when you landed. The testimony said:

> Mr. Carter gave me copies of the report he and Owen had made to the Institute of Pacific Relations about the Moscow visit and also a copy of a statement about it he had released to the press the night before.

Mr. Fortas. That is a book?

Senator Ferguson. One was the report, but the press release apparently you saw; is that correct?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't remember whether I saw that press release or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You approved this statement indicating that you were approving the press release?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I simply approved the chapter as my wife wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and you adopted it as yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I adopted it as a contribution to my book.

The CHAIRMAN. You adopted it as yours is the question. Did you or not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether legally that constitutes adopting it as mine or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, as a matter of fact, adopt it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I included it as a contribution by my wife to my book.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see the press release?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall whether I did or not. I read a great deal of stuff in a great hurry at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to offer in evidence the press release that was issued.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 598" and is read in full below.)

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you to read it and then I will ask you questions about it later.

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 598

McCarthy charges "baseless," Carter says, in defense of his 1936 visit to Moscow.

This is from the New York Times, Friday, March 31, 1950, page 3 columns 2 and 3 [reading]:

Edward C. Carter, provost of the New School for Social Research and former secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations, declared last night that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1936, but explained that the visit had been in connection with institute matters.

In a formal statement released from his office, Mr. Carter said that he had "not seen the full text of the remarks" in which Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, of Wisconsin, was "reported to have mentioned my name" in the Senate yesterday in Washington. He termed the Senator's charges in the case, as in other cases, as "baseless." Mr. Carter formerly headed Russian War Relief, Inc.

"I was in the midst of a series of visits to national councils of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the Far East and Europe" in 1936, Mr. Carter recalled. Owen Lattimore, he added, was homeward bound after a tour as editor of Pacific Affairs, the quarterly of the organization.

"Mr. Lattimore and I," Mr. Carter continued, "accepted an invitation to address a meeting of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, where we spoke of our impressions of the far-eastern situation. During our visit we conferred with a considerable number of scholars who were specializing in far-eastern studies.

"We also conveyed to officers of the American Embassy in Moscow our impressions of conditions in countries we had visited. Upon my return to the United States I discussed details of my trip and conferences at length with officials of the State Department in Washington."

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, keeping in mind the file, the reports taken out of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations about which you were questioned, do you think that is a fair analysis of that report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do. I think it is a fair summary of Mr. Carter's visit to the USSR.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it outlined the real things that were down there and the people that were conferred with?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And the policy that was to be adopted and was adopted?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I would not say that a policy was adopted. Questions of policy were discussed.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think this fairly sets out the questions that were discussed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it is a fair summary of the visit. It is not a report on the whole conference.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question. Answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think it fairly sets out the conferences you had?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; for a statement of its length, I think it is perfectly fair.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. "For a statement of its length." My question is, Do you think that fairly represents to the people of the United States what took place with you and Carter and the IPR and the people in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think it does.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice there that he conveys the idea, and you carry it out in your book, because you refer to this press release that you conveyed to the officers of the American Embassy your impressions of the conditions in the countries "we had visited" and "upon my return to the United States I discussed details of my trip and conferences at length with officials of the State Department in Washington."

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I point out that falls into two parts.

Senator FERGUSON. It is all in one quotation.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question, Senator?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Carter states: "We discussed with officials of the American Embassy in Washington," which is quite correct, or rather, in Moscow, which is quite correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Who were the officials you discussed it with?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Ambassador Bullitt; Mr. Angus Ward, who was, I think, the No. 2 man in the Embassy; I believe Mr. Loy Henderson was there at that time, too; and Colonel Faymonville, who was military attaché.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the Ambassador?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Bullitt.

Senator FERGUSON. You discussed it with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss all the details?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What does it say?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

We also conveyed to officers of the American Embassy in Moscow our impressions of conditions in countries we had visited.

Senator FERGUSON. How about the the next sentence?

Mr. LATTIMORE (reading):

Upon my return to the United States I discussed details of my trip and conferences at length with officials of the State Department in Washington.

That refers to Carter and not myself.

Senator FERGUSON. That was conveying to the American people the details; in fact, everything that was discussed in Russia was discussed with our State Department; and that is the basis of saying McCarthy's charges were false because he came back here and discussed them in detail with the State Department. Is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't answer, Senator, for exactly what Mr. Carter meant when he was describing his own discussions with the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You were referring in your book Ordeal by Slander to a press release and thereby adopting it, that you had been slandered, and you cited the press release. That is, you referred to it; that the details of everything that went on in Russia with you and Carter were discussed by the United States State Department.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Senator Ferguson, I am afraid I can't answer "Yes" to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Answer it any way you want to answer it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife referred to the fact that Mr. Carter had shown her his press release. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. You want to tell us here that, in going over this the morning you got back, you did not even check up on the press release, and you used it in the book; is that correct? You referred to it in the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife referred to the book, and I saw no need for checking on the original press release.

Senator FERGUSON. Thereby you adopted it?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. That is a legal question, Senator. I printed it in a book as a contribution by my wife.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted the people to rely upon the book, did you not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. There are still a few loose ends, Mr. Chairman. After that there will be a few unrelated questions, then the concluding questions of the series.

There is in our record as exhibit 539 an article entitled "Minorities in the Soviet Far East" by Owen Lattimore which appeared in the Far Eastern Survey, August 23, 1944, pages 156, 157, and 158. The question arose as to whether an article entitled "Minorities in the Soviet Far East" as it appears in the magazine Soviet Culture in Wartime, No. 3, 1945, being a magazine or pamphlet published by the American-Russian Institute, of 101 Post Street, San Francisco, was the same article.

Inquiry was made of Mr. Lattimore's attorney, and I now have a letter from Mr. Thurman Arnold acknowledging receipt of the enclosures which we sent him to identify the article and stating that Mr. Lattimore confirms that the article by him, Minorities in the Soviet Far East, as it appears in the magazine Soviet Culture in Wartime, No. 3, 1945, is the same as the article published by him in the Far Eastern Survey, issued August 23, 1944, pages 156 to 158.

I would simply like to have Mr. Lattimore confirm that on the record at this time if that is the fact. I have both the Far Eastern Survey and the photostat of the other article, if you want to see them again.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I don't need to see them again. I confirm it is the same article.

You will note the reprint states that it is by permission of Far Eastern Survey.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct. It carries at the bottom the notation: "By permission of the Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall any permission was ever asked there; that I ever knew about the reprint being made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may the cover, the next page about the authors, and the table of contents, as they appear in the magazine Soviet Culture in Wartime, No. 3, 1945, be inserted into the record to establish that the article, Minorities in the Soviet Far East, did appear in such a publication and that it is the same as the article published by him in the Far Eastern Survey, issued August 23, 1944, pages 156 to 158.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 598A" and is as follows:) (For the article Minorities in the Soviet Far East, as published in the Far Eastern Survey, issue August 23, 1944, pp. 156 to 158, see p. 3462.)

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COVER ILLUSTRATION: *Leningrad, the Cradle of Russian Classical Culture—The City of Peter, of Pushkin and of Chaikovsky.*

Table of CONTENTS

This Is the Hour, *by Holland Roberts* 4

Soviet Schools, *by Eugene Medynsky* 5

Note on Nursery Schools 10

Tribute to Alexander Kaun, *by Ernest J. Simmons* 11

Alexander Kaun Exchange Fellowship 11

Minorities in the Soviet Far East, *by Owen Lattimore* 12

The Organization of Soviet Science, *by Peter L. Kapitsa* 16

Note on Science 24

Some Aspects of Psychiatry in the U.S.S.R., *by Gregory Zilboorg, M.D.* . 25

Note on Refresher Courses for Physicians 30

Notes on Music 31

Notes on Films 35

Soviet Theater 36

Scenes from Two Soviet Plays, *by Alexander Korneichuk and Leonid Leonov* 39

Report on the American Russian Institute 48

Drawings by Giacomo Patri

●

Edited by the Publications Committee of the American Russian Institute

LOUISE R. BRANSTEN, *Chairman*

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, an offer was made by Mr. Lattimore for the record of a statement by General Chennault, and I believe Mr. Lattimore was allowed to read the statement into the record; is that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to inquire whether you regard General Chennault as an authority on what was taking place in the Far East at the time he was out there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I consider that he was an authority on that subject that he was writing about in that book.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question. Repeat the question, Mr. Reporter.

(The question referred to was read by the reporter.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you do regard him as an authority on what he was writing about in that book. What do you mean by "that book"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The book from which I quoted. It is just another way of phrasing the question, as you put it, what he was writing about at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "that book," do you mean Way of a Fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think he was an expert with regard to the matters he wrote about in that book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, because of the identification of General Chennault as in the mind of this witness being an expert on these matters, I ask permission to read at this time the first page from the foreword to this book after which I will make an offer for admission into the appendix of the record the entire foreword. I think it is significant.

THE UNITED STATES IS LOSING THE PACIFIC WAR

Three years after VJ-day, this country is facing the loss of everything it won during the four bloody years it took to defeat Japan.

Mr. FORTAS. Could we have the date?

The CHAIRMAN. This was the book from which the excerpts were taken?

Mr. SOURWINE. This book is copyrighted 1949 by Claire Lee Chennault.

Mr. FORTAS. Thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE (reading):

Here are the facts:

Gen. George C. Marshall told Congress in the spring of 1948 that if Manchuria were lost to the Chinese Communists, the United States position in southern Korea would be untenable.

Manchuria has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

General Marshall also told Congress that if the Chinese Communists controlled North China the United States position in Japan would be "extremely serious."

North China has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 1948 that if the Chinese Communists take the lower Yangtze Valley and Shanghai the American military bastion on Okinawa will be outflanked and his position in Japan will be as exposed and untenable as it was in the Philippines during 1941.

As this is written, the Chinese Communists are fighting toward the Yangtze at Nanking. They are aiming to force a Yangtze crossing and sweep to Shanghai.

A complete Communist victory in China will channelize the undercurrents of native unrest already swirling through Burma, India, Malaya, and Indonesia into another rising tide of Communist victories. The ring of Red bases can be stretched from Siberia to Saigon. Then the stage will be set for the unannounced explosion of World War III.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, because of its pertinency, not merely in connection with the portion I read, but throughout, that this foreword be ordered printed in the appendix of the record for the reference to this point in the main body.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the book from which an excerpt was taken by Mr. Lattimore and the author of which Mr. Lattimore says was an expert on Asiatic conditions at that time; is that correct?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the title?

Mr. SOURWINE. Way of a Fighter.

The CHAIRMAN. The offer may be received and it will be inserted in the record.

(The foreword of the book referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 599A and appears in appendix I, pt. 10, p. 3706.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, we come to the specific excerpt which Mr. Lattimore read in the record. I would like to ask permission to read into the record the portion before and behind it, immediately preceding and immediately following it in the book so that we may have it in the record in the context in which that lay. Also the last sentence of the paragraph in which that excerpt appears, since Mr. Lattimore did not read it.

Senator O'CONOR. I wonder if you would make clear the portion Mr. Lattimore quoted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. This is on page 61, and begins chapter 5 of the book.

While American diplomats were busy prodding American airmen out of China, the Red Air Force arrived. The Russians sent four fighter and two bomber squadrons completely staffed and equipped to fight the Japs in China. They arrived in the fall of 1937, before the fall of Nanking, and stayed for a year and a half, leaving just a few months before the European war reached the shooting stage in the fall of 1939.

Now begins the portion read by Mr. Lattimore:

Soon after Japan attacked at Shanghai, the Chinese sent an official call for help to all the major powers. Only Russia responded. The Russians didn't pause to play partisan politics or trip over ideological folderol when their national interests were at stake in China. All of the Soviets' aid went to the Central Government of the Generalissimo. The Russians had had no love for the Generalissimo since the 1927 split when he drove the Russian-supported Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang and slaughtered them by the thousands. For nearly 20 years he fought a ruthless war of extermination against communism in China. The Russians sent their aid to the Generalissimo solely because he represented the strongest and most effective force opposing Japan and they supported him exclusively, ignoring the Chinese Communist Armies, which badly needed external support.

That is the conclusion of Mr. Lattimore's excerpt.

Japan had been preparing an attack on Russia for 20 years, and unnumbered shooting rehearsals had been held along the Siberian border. The Russians were willing to help anybody who was fighting and weakening Japan.

When Japanese bombs at Pearl Harbor blasted American officialdom into more than an academic interest in China, we would have done well to study Russian policy in China. Thus the United States might have avoided many of the tragic errors that turned American policy in China into a powerful ladle stirring anew the witches' broth of Chinese disunity and civil war.

Mr. Chairman, turning to another page in this book, I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore just one question.

Do you know whether the relations between General Stilwell and Chiang were cordial or strained?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe they were cordial at one time and strained later on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, following that up, I should like to request insertion in the record at this point one paragraph marked here on page 316 of this book and five consecutively marked paragraphs beginning on page 317 and concluding on page 318, which deal with that question. I do not want to take the time of the committee to read them here now.

The CHAIRMAN. Dealing with what question?

Mr. SOURWINE. The relationship between Chiang and General Stilwell. That question has come up in connection with this investigation, and we have here the testimony of a man Mr. Lattimore considers to be an expert on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 599" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 599

WAY OF A FIGHTER, CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT, EDITED BY ROBERT HOTZ, G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK

(Pp. 316, 317, 318)

* * * Although Stilwell was not seriously concerned with military problems in China, he did not hesitate to plunge into Chinese politics to further his ends. By the fall of 1943 his relations with top Chinese leadership were so bad that his recall was seriously considered. President Roosevelt wrote a note to Marshall pointing out that Stilwell appeared to have apparently "outlived his usefulness" in China and should be replaced. Marshall replied that he had no suitable substitute, and Stilwell stayed on for another critical year.

* * * * * * *

Stilwell's worst political excursion came during the summer and early fall of 1944 when he began using the Chinese Communist government of Yenan as a lever to move the Generalissimo. Although Stilwell was never particularly interested in Chinese intelligence, he sent an official American military mission to the Communist capital at Yenan in May 1944 for the alleged purpose of gathering intelligence. The Chinese Communists were then on extremely thin military and economic ice. Ever since the fighting between the Communist-controlled New Fourth Army and Central Government troops along the Yangtze in 1940, the main Communist armies had been bottled up in Shensi Province between the Japanese and Central Government. There they were militarily impotent and hard pressed to provide the bare necessities of life. Much has been written by gullible correspondents, some of them with pronounced Communist sympathies, regarding the vast military effort of the Chinese Communists against the Japanese. My experience indicated that the Communist military activities were confined largely to raiding small Japanese outposts for food and arms. When the Japanese were attacking Central Government troops, the Communists were generally content to stand idly by. It was significant that during the Honan campaign in the early spring of 1944 the Communist guerrillas did not sabotage a single Japanese troop train moving south down the Pinghan Railroad to the Yellow River. These trains passed through an area thick with Red guerrillas.

The American mission to Yenan was hardly established before Stilwell's Chungking staff began to proclaim loudly the superiority of the Communist regime over the Chungking government. Contents of secret reports from the Yenan mission were freely discussed over Chungking dinner tables by Stilwell's staff No secret was made of their admiration for the Communists who, they said, were really only "agrarian reformers" and more lige New Dealers than Com-

munists. The hue and cry charging the Generalissimo with "hoarding lend-lease arms" to fight the Communists was raised with renewed vigor along with the claim that China's best troops were being used to blockade the Communists instead of fighting the Japanese. After Stilwell was removed, Wedemeyer conducted an exhaustiv survey of all Chinese army equipment and reported that not a single American gun or bullet had gone to Chinese armies east of Yunnan with the exception of the 500 tons belatedly delivered to Kweilin and Liuchow.

The Generalissimo did keep a sizable army at Sian, the gateway to Communist territory, and they did maintain a patrol on the main communication lines to Yenan. That they were also defending the Tungkwan Pass, one of the three vital gateways to West China, was conveniently ignored by Stilwell's staff. Late in 1944 many of these troops were withdrawn to bolster the sagging Salween offensive, and the Japanese promptly began an offensive aimed at Siam. Only a sudden and cold winter halted the Japanese short of their goal.

I do not think that Stilwell had any political motives in encouraging his Chungking staff to function as a public-relations bureau for the Yenan Communists. It was of a piece with his earlier dalliance with the Kuomintang reactionaries. He was simply unconcerned with anything but his immediate objectives. The Yenan Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him command their armies. Stilwell never gave up his hopes of commanding the Chinese Red Armies. After the end of the Okinawa campaign in the spring of 1945 Stilwell proposed to land his Tenth Army on the Kiangsu coast above Shanghai, which was controlled by the Chinese Communists. His plan was to join forces with the Reds, arm them, and turn the combined forces south for an assault on Shanghai. That this would have encouraged the Chinese Communists to open rebellion against the Central Government should have been obvious even to Stilwell. It would also have bottled the Generalissimo up in Chungking as tightly as he ever was blockaded by the Japanese.

Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking government, it was a common joke that Stilwell's headquarters were developing a private foreign policy with John Davies (Stilwell's political adviser) as secretary of state.

* * * * * * *

Mr. SOURWINE. One more question with regard to this book. Do you know whether General Stilwell's removal or replacement was at the behest or suggestion of Vice President Wallace?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From reading the testimony before this committee, I believe it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that there is testimony in our record that shortly following the transmission by Vice President Wallace of the Kunming cable, word was sent by the White House to China giving Stilwell increased power?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't have a clear recollection of that, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. On this question also, Mr. Chairman, I should like to offer for the record from this book the marked paragraphs beginning at the bottom of page 320 continuing to the middle of page 322, which will speak for themselves, but for the information of the committee and in the opinion of counsel, they express General Chennault's feeling that General Stilwell had made himself persona non grata with Chiang to such an extent that his removal was inevitable.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the point?

Mr. SOURWINE. The question has been raised in these things, Mr. Chairman, as to whether the recommendation made by Mr. Wallace, whatever that recommendation was, with regard to replacement of General Stilwell and/or appointment of General Wedemeyer as the President's personal representative was a recommendation anti-Communist, pro-Communist, or having any connection in that regard.

This question here does bear on the solution of that problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 600" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 600

WAY OF A FIGHTER, CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT, EDITED BY ROBERT HOTZ, G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK

(Pp. 320, 321, 322)

* * * Allowing Sultan to leave Chungking proved to be a tactical error. Without his safety valve present, Stilwell was apparently stimulated by the obvious signs of Chinese weakness for a final joust with his old adversary, the Generalissimo. On September 19 Stilwell received a radio from President Roosevelt for dellvery to the Generalissimo. One of the two or three Americans who have ever seen a copy of that message told me it sounded like a communication from Adolf Hitler to the puppet head of a conquered satellite state. In violent terms Roosevelt blamed the Generalissimo for China's present plight and presented an ultimatum to appoint Stilwell as Chinese commander. The tone of the message was totally foreign to Roosevelt's usual approach to the Generalissimo. There were strong suspicions that Stilwell had actually written the message himself; sent it "eyes alone" to Washington; and there the War Department had persuaded Roosevelt to sign it and send it back to China.

When the Roosevelt message hit Chungking, Hurley and Nelson were working with T. V. Soong drafting the final minor details of the agreement on Stilwell's command. Hurley and Nelson urged Stilwell not to deliver the message. They believed that the violent tone of the radio would upset the applecart and serve no useful purpose, since the Generalissimo had already agreed to the terms demanded.

"We've already won the ball game," Hurley told Stilwell.

Stilwell agreed to hold the message. Hurley and Nelson went back to the Generalissimo's country villa at Huang Shan outside Chungking to continue work on the agreement.

On September 21 Stilwell appeared unexpectedly at Huang Shan and interrupted the conference. Meeting Hurley and Nelson in the Generalissimo's anteroom, Stilwell explained that he had been thinking about the message and had changed his mind. He now felt he had no authority to withhold a message from President Roosevelt to the Generalissimo. Striding past the astonished emissaries Stilwell confronted the Generalissimo with the Roosevelt message. The Generalissimo listened and let Stilwell depart in stony silence. Then he called in T. V. Soong and exploded.

The Generalissimo told Soong the Roosevelt message was a challenge to China's sovereignty. He was prepared to risk anything rather than surrender China's independence. Stilwell must go even if it meant the end of all American aid to China. On this score there could be no compromise.

Stilwell felt that he had scored a tremendous personal triumph. He was happy that his "hour of vengeance" has struck and composed an ode to celebrate the occasion. In this curious poem Stilwell admitted that he had presented the message to "break the Peanut's (Stilwell's designation for the Generalissimo) face."

Stilwell's delivery of the Roosevelt message actually killed forever his chance of getting supreme command in China. In his complete misunderstanding of Chinese psychology, Stilwell stupidly pushed the Generalissimo into a corner where he had no alternative but to lash out and fight back with all his power. Only those who had extensive dealings with Stilwell could understand his peculiar tactics in this climatic encounter.

The Sino-American pact, once nearing signature, lapsed into deadlock over the Stilwell issue. For weeks no maneuvering was able to regain the lost momentum. When Stilwell realized that the Generalissimo would not back down, he frantically sought a compromise that might prevent the ax from falling on his own lean neck. One of Stilwell's Chinese military advisers, who was not aware of the Roosevelt ultimatum, suggested that perhaps Stilwell's dalliance with the Chinese Communists might be the root of the trouble. Stilwell promptly wrote a note to one of his bitterest Chinese opponents, General Ho Yin Chin, Chinese War Minister. In this note Stilwell admitted that he had planned to arm the Chinese Communists but promised to drop the plan in exchange for retaining his post in China. Stilwell had no authority to make such a promise,

and he later violently denied the existence of the note to Ho. However the full text of the note appears on page 337 of Stilwell's published diaries with the notation that it was given to Ho in both Chinese and English versions.

Even his last ditch maneuver proved futile. The Generalissimo was still willing to accept an American over-all commander in China. It could be almost anybody but Stilwell. Agreement was quickly reached on bringing Al Wedemeyer up from Ceylon to take the post. On October 19 the War Department radioed Stilwell orders to leave China and return to the United States.

* * * * * * *

Mr. FORTAS. May I inquire whether there is any reference to this witness by name in those portions?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, there is not.

Mr. Lattimore, I hand you a clipping, or what purports to be a clipping from the New York Herald Tribune of June 22, 1947, apparently a review of a book, No Peace for Asia, written by Harold R. Isaacs, with the byline reviewed by Owen Lattimore, and I ask you if you wrote that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask it be inserted.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 601" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 601

A PESSIMIST IN THE ORIENT

NO PEACE FOR ASIA

(By Harold R. Isaacs * * * 295 pp. * * * New York: The Macmillan Company, $3.50)

(Reviewed by Owen Lattimore)

Some years ago Mr. Isaacs published a book called The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, with a preface by Leon Trotsky. No book dealing with the events of 1925–28 in China rivals it in vituperation of both the Communists—the Stalinist Communists, that is—and Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Isaac's dislike of both Stalin and Chiang, and of the political parties associated with both of them, continues in his new book.

In addition, Mr. Isaacs does not like the colonial policies of Britain, France, and Holland. Nor does he like American policy in the Far East. Like many other writers, Mr. Isaacs believes that at the end of the war we had among the peoples of Asia an incalculable reservoir of good will. If anything good were to come of the war they looked for it to come from us. They looked to us much more than they did to Russia. "The swift dissipation of this asset right after the victory over Japan," says Mr. Issacs, "was by the same token one of the most extravagant and prodigal examples of conspicuous waste ever recorded in the annals of the nations."

Mr. Isaacs, in short, gives an analysis of extreme pessimism, with no reservations in favor of the western democracies and even less in favor of Russia. The one country on which he really lets himself go on a note of something like romantic admiration, combined, however, with hopeless tragedy, is Indo-China. Comparing this account with his accounts of other countries, the explanation would seem to be that at the time he was there the situation was one of "pure" revolution not compromised by expedient deals or aid from anybody. The Indo-Chinese revolutionaries had not even had the advantages, which the Indonesians and others had had, of Japanese attempts to organize them and use them against their imperial rulers. They had begun their fight against the French. They continued it against the Japanese. They resumed it once more against the French and against the British supporters and American equipment of the French.

Mr. Isaacs writes well, but even in the brief time since he witnessed the beginning of the colonial wars it has begun to seem that colonial nationalism is capable of a prolonged resistance which will prevent the restoration of imperial rule in anything like as complete a form as he apparently anticipated.

An important clew to the whole situation in Asia is the kind of movement that has developed since the war in what had been the Chinese guerrilla area behind Japanese lines. These were the only important areas which Mr. Isaacs does not seem to have visited. Mr. Isaacs, referring to China, writes of "the cold embrace of Communist totalitarianism"; but, it appears from other accounts that it is in these areas that there really is a beacon of hope, because of their political condition is neither one of romantically tragic desperation nor of doctrinaire fanaticism.—Tribune, June 22, 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the conclusion of this review appears this language:

Mr. Isaacs, referring to China, writes of "the cold embrace of Communist totalitarianism"; but it appears from other accounts that it is in these areas that there really is a beacon of hope, because their political condition is neither one of romantically tragic desperation nor of doctrinaire fanaticism.

Do you remember writing that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell the committee briefly what you meant by it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. That is consonant with other things that I was writing at the same time that I believed was cause for hope, especially in north China at that time, because a large part of the battle against the Japanese had been carried on by people who were neither Communists nor Kuomintang, and I regarded that as a hope for the emergence of a middle group.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you intending there to say anything favorable to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you furnished to the Tydings committee certain correspondence between yourself and a Mr. W. Heissig and some papers in connection therewith?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. They appear at page 1881 of the Tydings committee hearings and ending apparently on page 1892. I would simply like to ask so that they may be properly referred to in our record if these documents, as they appeared in the Tydings committee hearings, are accurate copies of what you furnished the Tydings committee? Have you had occasion to examine that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not had occasion to examine them since, but I am sure they are accurate copies.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did furnish these documents to the Tydings committee and they were accurate and true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want anything done about that last matter?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, Mr. Chairman. It has been identified as to the page number in a printed Senate hearing. It simply has been reaffirmed by the witness. It is available as background for the committee if they wish it.

You had occasion, in your testimony earlier, to quote from yourself, I think, with regard to your trip to Yenan, and you made some mention there of missionaries. Do you recall that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In a general way, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I show you the transcript of your testimony at the top of page 5379 of our mimeographed record, where you said, quoting from yourself:

> Foreign visitors are welcomed and missionaries are being urged to come up and see for themselves that their premises are undamaged and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in private as they like—

and I ask you, do you remember so testifying?

Mr. LATTIMORE. This, I think, is a quotation from the article that I drafted for the London Times, but apparently was never published?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, I remember that.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in Yenan, did you see any missionaries?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, we didn't. We saw some of the missionaries from Yenan at the first town outside of the territory controlled by the Chinese Communists, and we told them this on our way back.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told them this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Told them that the Communists were saying that missionaries could come back.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did they tell you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They said that they were considering it, but that they didn't want to get into any political trouble as between Communists and the government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why were they outside Yenan? Do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had they left Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably, since they were outside.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do I understand correctly they told you after you told them the Communists had said they could come, the missionaries told you they were considering going back but they were afraid they might get into political trouble if they did?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it on the basis of that experience alone that you wrote—

> Missionaries are being urged to come up and see for themselves that their premises are undamaged and the Chinese Christians left undisturbed to preach in public or pray in private as they like?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not entirely. My recollection is that the Communists told us they had previously sent messages to the missionaries to the same effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, missionaries of all faiths?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The faith of the missionaries that you talked about outside Yenan, what faith was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Those that we talked with outside Yenan were Protestants. I think they were all English missionaries. I had no contact with missionaries in Yenan, but I remember telling you about speaking to some Mongols there and these Mongols said that the Catholic missionaries in their territory just north of Yenan had not left.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Mongols say anything to you about whether the Catholic missionaries that you speak of had been molested in any way or disturbed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. They said they had not been molested.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure how the Chair will rule on this offer. It may be not precisely an ancient document. Let me ask one foundation question. This was what year you were in Yenan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1937.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold in my hand, Mr. Chairman, original copies of press releases issued by the National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service under dates, respectively, October 5, 1936, July 5, 1937, and December 6, 1937. These news releases refer to conditions affecting missionaries in North China at that time. For whatever evidentiary value they may have I ask that they be admitted to the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think your foundation is quite laid.

Mr. SOURWINE. These are offered in line with what Mr. Lattimore has said he had offered something to show what was being said at that time.

I don't offer these as illustrative of the facts, but I do offer them as indicating what a reputable Catholic news-giving organization was putting out at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in connection with the statement just made by Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 602, 603, and 604," and are read in full below.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I ask whether those releases refer specifically to the same area that I was in or to other areas of North China?

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Chair wish to have these read?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer the question of the witness?

Mr. SOURWINE. Being much less familiar with China than Mr. Lattimore, I would prefer to read them. They do refer to North China.

(EXHIBIT No. 602)

ROME, September 28 (NCWC—Fides).—According to latest reports, four Catholic missionaries are still held captive by Communists and bandits in China and Manchukuo.

The Reverend Epiphany Pegoraro, O. F. M., and Brother Paschal Nadal, O. F. M., the first an Italian and the latter a Spaniard, were captured in May 1935 at Mosimien in the Vicariate of Tatsienlu, where they were stationed at the Leper Asylum. The latest news of them is that they are still alive and are acting as nurses to the Communists.

The Reverend Henry Kellner, of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart of Issoudun, was captured at Shihtsien in January 1936. The Communists have demanded a ransom of $50,000.

The Reverend Clarence Burns, of the Maryknoll Mission in Fushun, Manchukuo, was captured by bandits in February 1936. No word has been received concerning him for several months.

(EXHIBIT No. 603)

LANCHOW, KANSU, CHINA, June 28 (NCWC—Fides),—The region about Lanchow was completely cut off from communication with the outside world for several months in 1936 and 1937, all letters passing into the hands of the Reds who controlled the district. The Catholic missionaries of Lanchow received

no news except by radio. The lives of priests, brothers, and sisters were never before in such peril, and since most of them are Germans, besides being Catholic, they feared that their lot under an eventual Soviet domination would be particularly hard.

The Chinese New Year was observed with apprehension, because at that time strife had broken out between the Northeast Division of the army and the troops of the Central Government. Moreover, the rebel officials were making life hard for the people; the specter of famine had appeared on the horizon; and the Reds were scoring victory after victory over the Chinese Mohammedans of the province.

But the tide turned when Government troops arrived and defeated the Reds. The rebellious forces of the Northeast Army were ordered to leave Lanchow, and the Government troops took command.

The cities of Liangchow, Kanchow, and farther to the west, Kaotai, were still in the hands of the Reds, but a band of Tungans (Chinese Mohammedans) made a surprise attack on Kaotai and killed all the Reds and, unfortunately, many of the innocent town's folk too. The Mohammedans unwittingly set fire to the new Catholic church, which was burned to the ground.

The ranks of the Reds have been thinned by a number of terrible battles. Hundreds of them, together with their hangers-on, have been brought to Kanchow where they met their end in a big pit prepared for their bodies outside the east gate. It was revenge of the Tungans who have the reputation of taking no prisoners.

Many of the poor wretches were baptized by Catholic missionaries before they reached the pit. Approximately 2,000 wounded were cared for by missionaries. Brother Philotheus Guggemoss, of the Catholic mission staff, took sick and died while nursing the sick and wounded.

The Red invasion of the Vicariate of Lanchow during the past year has brought a loss of $30,000 (Mexican) to the Catholic mission.

(Exhibit No. 604)

The Hague, November 29.—Word has been received here that the Most Reverend Hubert Francis Schraven, Vicar Apostolic of Chengtingfu, China, has been murdered by bandits in that country. Bishop Schraven, who was a member of the Congregation of the Mission, was born in Lottum, in this country, October 13, 1873.

The report from China also said that seven other Catholic missionaries were killed at the time Bishop Schraven met his death. Two of these other missionaries were from the Netherlands, three were from France, one from Poland, and one from Czechoslovakia. Bishop Schraven had labored in China for 40 years.

Mr. Lattimore. May the record show all of the places mentioned in those reports, with the exception of one which I don't immediately identify, namely, Shihtsien, are many hundred miles from any part of China I visited in that year.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, do you remember a previous occasion during your testimony here when a point arose as to whether you said or had meant to say that Manchuria was going to be taken over or had been taken over by the Reds?

Mr. Lattimore. No, I don't remember that.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever stated or argued that Manchuria would be taken over or had been taken over by the Reds?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall writing about that.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever written or stated to the contrary that Manchuria was an independent nation and not a puppet state?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I have.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you ever attempted to convince anyone Manchuria or Manchukuo was an independent state?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I have.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Morris was questioning you toward the end of a previous session about your itinerary and I believe it covered up to 1941, at which time you went out to China as adviser

to Chaing Kai-shek. Could we go on from there and bring it up to date as rapidly as possible?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant that as a question. Going on from 1941 I mean. You had told us from 1920 to 1933 you were in China in Manchuria; in 1933 you went to the Banff Conference of the IPR; in 1935 you went to China and returned by way of Russia, Holland, and England, arriving in 1936.

In 1936 you went to London for 3 or 4 months. You returned by way of Suez and in 1937 you went out to China, returned about Christmas time, 1937; remained in the United States until 1939, and then a summer vacation in Sweden and Norway of that year. In 1941 again you went out to China as adviser to Chiang.

Is that substantially the substance of your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. Do you want me to go on with times when I was out of this country and which countries I visited?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1942, I returned from China via Burma, India, and South America.

In the fall of 1942 I went back to China via the same route.

At the end of 1942, I returned from China with Mme. Chiang Kai-shek also by the same route—India and South America. In 194— I am not sure; maybe it was toward the end of 1942, I went to the Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR. That could easily be checked. I think that must have been the fall of 1942. That was in Canada.

In 1943, I did not leave this country. In 1944, I flew to Hawaii to set up OWI work under Admiral Nimitz and on to Australia to set up OWI work under General MacArthur; then returned to this country by the same route.

In the summer of 1944, I flew via Alaska to Siberia and China with Vice President Wallace, returned by way of Outer Mongolia, Siberia, Alaska, and a stop in Canada, to this country.

In 1945, I spent the summer vacation in Mexico. In 1946, I spent the summer vacation in Nova Scotia. In 1947, I spent the summer vacation in Europe, principally France, Czechoslovakia, and England, attending an IPR conference in England before returning to this country.

My wife reminds me that I have forgotten going to Japan in the fall of 1945, with the American Reparations Mission under Ambassador Pauley, returning early in 1946.

In 1948, I don't believe I was out of the country. In 1949 I went to a Joint American and Indian Conference at New Delhi in India, and stopped briefly in Pakistan on the way back.

In 1950, in the spring of 1950, I went to Afghanistan via Pakistan on a mission for the United Nations.

In 1951, I was, at the very end of 1951, a day or two after Christmas—my wife and I flew to England, where we remained for about 3 weeks, returning toward the end of January this year.

I think that is the complete catalog.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, when you left China in 1936, what route did you take to Moscow? Will you tell us that in as much detail as you can, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. From Peking to Manchuria, which was then under Japanese control, to Siberia, then via the Trans-Siberian Railroad to

Moscow. I made a side trip to Leningrad and then back to Moscow. Then by train from Moscow to Poland, passing through Poland without a stop-over, and through Germany without a stop-over; then staying in Holland—I am not sure; perhaps a week—and in England for what?—2 weeks? Something like that. And back to the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. In all, how many times have you been in Moscow, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Once.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was the occasion when you had your conference with the Soviet IPR officials, the officials of the Soviet council?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Concerning which there has been substantial testimony here, has there not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Considerable, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, will you tell us on what other occasions did you have conferences of a similar nature with other councils of the IPR, other national councils?

The CHAIRMAN. Of the IPR?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I had considerable talk with the Dutch that same year in—let's see. Where was it now? Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and one other place where the Dutch had centers. I talked with the man who was acting as Dutch editor and correspondent for the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, sir, the way you answered that question indicates you didn't grasp what I was trying to get at. Because you wouldn't have had a similar conference to the one you held in Moscow at several places in Holland. The one you had in Moscow was a conference, was it not, with the top officials of the Soviet Council? And you were discussing particularly their views with regard to what should go into Pacific Affairs. Isn't that correct?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know on what other occasions, if any, you had conferences with the top officials of IPR councils from other countries.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I had similar conferences with the Dutch in Amsterdam, as far as they could be similar, since I was alone there and not with Mr. Carter, who was the secretary general. But I did talk with the top board of the Dutch IPR and also visited their local boards in a couple of other towns.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in Amsterdam in what year?

Mr. LATTIMORE. '36.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir?

Mr. LATTIMORE. And I had similar conferences with the British at Chatham House, again with the modification that Mr. Carter was not present, so it was simply a conference of the editor of Pacific Affairs, not including the secretary general of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any others?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1934, on the way out from America to China, and again in 1937, on the way back from China to America, I had similar conferences with the Japanese IPR in Japan, again with the exception that this was myself having the conferences, and without the presence of the secretary general.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I also had similar conferences with the top people of the Chinese IPR in Shanghai and Peking, but not all at the same time, because their representation was rather split up geographically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I again had conferences with the British at Chatham House in the winter of '36–'37, when I was staying in London for about 3 months on the way back to China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those conferences of the same nature that we are talking about, that is, a top level conference with the national head of an IPR council with regard to the question of what went into the magazine of which you were editor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes, as far as the magazine was concerned. They didn't concern general IPR research, et cetera, such as was taken up by Mr. Carter, or by Mr. Holland, when he was traveling.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there any more?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is all I can recall at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then would you say that the only conference that you recall at which the general secretary was present and at which these general questions of policy as well as the question of what went into the magazine were taken up, was the one in Moscow in 1936?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. At the summer conference of the IPR at Yosemite in 1936, there was a more general conference of a special committee on Pacific Affairs, with top delegates from a group of national councils.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was not quite the same thing; was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not quite the same thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then get back to my original question. Would you say or would you deny that the conference in Moscow about which there has been so much testimony here was the only conference of that nature at which the general secretary of IPR was present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you recall?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having testified here with regard to whether you ever suggested in any of your writings that Soviet Russia might be reaching out for Mongolia or might be planning to take over Mongolia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever did suggest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not offhand.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take the opposite tack, that Mongolia was independent, and that there was no threat of Soviet domination?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I have frequently written that Outer Mongolia is an independent state in the sense of never having been incorporated in Russia; but I have also qualified that by describing it as a satellite state.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think now it is a satellite state?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Very much so.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long have you held that opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That would be hard to say. I think it would be hard to say particularly, because the expression "satellite" is a postwar expression.

Mr. SOURWINE. When would you say you first expressed the opinion that Outer Mongolia was a satellite state, if you did ever express it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably about 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, prior to that time, did you take the view or hold to the view that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian influence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not free of Russian influence. I think in the terminology of that time, before people were using the word "satellite" I would have referred to it more as a Russian protectorate or a state under Russian protection, or something of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me rephrase the question, or perhaps I should ask a different question.

Did you ever take the position or argue that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian domination?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think I did, before the war, describe it as free of domination.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have changed your view since then?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think the situation has changed since then.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Have you changed your view?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have changed my view, in line with what I consider to be a changing situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. When do you think the situation changed? Can you give an approximate date?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I should say some time after the war, if I had been able to get to Outer Mongolia, I might have a more sharp opinion on that, but it is very difficult to determine from outside.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: When do you think the situation changed? If you do not know, you can say so.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know. Some time after the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first reach the conclusion that Outer Mongolia was an independent state and free of Russian domination? Do you know?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Some time in the 1930's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when you first argued that or first expressed that view publicly?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us now when, in fact, Outer Mongolia did become an independent state and free of Russian domination?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I would say that—I forget the exact year; 1920 or '21 or somewhere along in there, the Mongols who had previously declared their independence of China, came into close relations with Communist Russia, and certainly the Russian influence from that time on was very strong. But my impression was that it was primarily at the request of the Mongols themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say the Russian influence was very strong from about 1920 or 1921 on?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, if I understood you correctly, you said a moment ago that the situation changed after the war. What war did you mean? The First World War?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; the Second World War.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it change? Did the Russian domination become stronger after the First World War?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I would roughly characterize the 1920's and 1930's as a period when the close relations between Russia and Outer Mongolia could hardly be described as Russian domination, because it was largely or chiefly at the instance of the Mongol Government itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was, however, during that time, a large measure of Russian influence. Is that your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you recognized that at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never argued to the contrary; is that your testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. Another loose end, quite unconnected with what we have been discussing: You remember testifying here earlier, I believe on the last day before this one, when you were on the stand, concerning a YWCA worker who told you in 1947 that the World Youth Festival was non-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In her opinion; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, will you give us the name of that YWCA worker?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My wife says she believes we have the letter at home, and we can furnish you with the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Talitha Gerlach, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not a personal letter, is it? It is in relation to the conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is no reason why we shouldn't turn in the letter. You can have the whole letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, have you ever used a nom de plume in your writing?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I ever have.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you answer that more definitely, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection, I never have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, does the phrase "Pivot of Asia" mean anything to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It is the title of a book that I wrote in collaboration with others at the Page School at the Johns Hopkins, which was published in 1950?

Mr. SOURWINE. With whom did you collaborate?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let's see. There were about six or eight people. Let's see if I can remember them all. Dr. John De Francis.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you spell that for the reporter, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. D-e F-r-a-n-c-i-s.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is professor at the Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the next?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dr. Daniel Thorner, T-h-o-r-n-e-r.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Who is now at the University of Pennsylvania.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the next?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Dr. Chen Han-seng, C-h-e-n H-a-n-S-e-n-g, who is now in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you identify him, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, he had previously worked for the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is the same Chen Han-seng that has been discussed in previous testimony here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Cheng Chih-yi, C-h-e-n-g C-h-i-h-y-i.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a former member of the Academia Sinica, which was the Chinese Government Research Institute. And he worked with me at Johns Hopkins for 2 years. I believe he is back in China now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In Red China, I think. The last I heard of him he went back to Hong Kong, but he may be in Red China now. Let me see.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, when you said he was connected with China, did you mean the Nationalist Government?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was under the Nationalist Government, yes.

Prof. Karl H. Menges, K-a-r-l H. M-e-n-g-e-s.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you identify him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of Columbia University. Oh, there was also a chapter contributed by Mrs. Thorner, the wife of Prof. Daniel Thorner.

Is that the lot?

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom are you addressing that question?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was asking my wife. My wife assisted in the editing of the book.

Prof. Tom Weiner, W-e-i-n-e-r, or Thomas Weiner, of Duke University.

I think that is all. Do you remember any others?

Mr. SOURWINE. At the time you collaborated with those persons, did you know or have any reason to believe that any of them was or had been a person under Communist discipline, or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I didn't believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a minute. I don't know whether he answered the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I did not know or believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Rockefeller Institution have anything to do with the financing of the writing of this book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. The Carnegie Foundation made a grant-in-aid.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how much that was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do I remember how much it was? I don't remember offhand. I could get the figure for you.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when that grant was made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think probably in 1947. I think probably for the academic year 1947–48.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was head of the Carnegie Foundation at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know who was head of it. The member of the foundation with whom I dealt was Mr. John Gardner.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Alger Hiss ever connected with that foundation?

Mr. Lattimore. No, sir. He was connected, as I recall, with the Carnegie Endowment, which is a different set-up.

Mr. Sourwine. All right. And it is your testimony that the Rockefeller Foundation had nothing to do with any donation or endowment or gift in connection with the preparation of this book?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe they had anything to do with it.

Mr. Sourwine. All right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever approached or talked to Mr. Hiss about money to write any books or pamphlets or papers?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Fortas. Mr. Sourwine, do you want that figure? I am not clear.

The Chairman. The what?

Mr. Fortas. The figure, about the amount of money.

Mr. Sourwine. We would like to have it for the record, yes, sir.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, how many times have you been in Mongolia?

Mr. Lattimore. I am afraid I have lost count.

The Chairman. If you can, give us an approximation.

Mr. Lattimore. I first traveled in Mongolia in 1926. This was in Inner Mongolia. And I visited Inner Mongolia very frequently from then until 1937, when I left China.

I was in Outer Mongolia once, in 1944, for a brief stop-over on the way back from China.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, when you left China in 1935 to go to Moscow, did you go through Inner Mongolia?

Mr. Lattimore. No; neither Inner nor Outer.

Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire, while you were on that same point: When you left China, did you know you were going to stop in Moscow?

Mr. Lattimore. In 1936?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Lattimore. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. That was a planned trip?

Mr. Lattimore. That was at the request of Mr. Carter, C-a-r-t-e-r, as secretary general.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and paid for by the institute?

Mr. Lattimore. And paid for by the institute.

The Chairman. That was a planned trip, was one question.

Senator Ferguson. I thought he answered that "Yes"; that it was a planned trip.

Mr. Lattimore. I answered that; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore, have you seen an article entitled "Lattimore Whose Ordeal—," appearing in the New Leader of March 17, 1952?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Which contains a statement that Ambassador Hu Shih was not given information about your appointment to Chiang Kai-shek until some time after your conference with Ambassador Oumansky.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have not seen that article; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to when the Chinese Ambassador received information or intelligence with regard to your appointment as aide to Chiang Kai-shek, adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. None whatever. The handling on the Chinese side was through Dr. T. V. Soong rather than through the Chinese Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the question came up, and a member of the committee asked the staff about it. The staff has wired Dr. Hu Shih and has a telegram, which I will not offer for the record, because it is not evidence, which states that he received word only 2 days before Mr. Lattimore left. I bring it up now for the committee's consideration of a future time as to whether Dr. Hu Shih should be called as a witness on that point, if it is considered important to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. That was 2 days before the official announcement was made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Two days before the official announcement was made. I stand corrected.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you know they were not going through the Embassy in relation to your appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know whether Dr. T. V. Soong was clearing with the Embassy or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked to Dr. Soong?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to your appointment?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was that conversation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Wait. I want to be sure of that. It was prior to the appointment. I am not sure whether it was prior to the recommendation or not.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his official position?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was head of China Defense Supplies, which was an organization set up in this country for the handling of supplies from the United States to China.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he connected with the Embassy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know what the formal connection was between the Embassy and China Defense Supplies.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you see him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At his residence here in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington? Then you do not dispute this telegram, as I understand it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't dispute it. I just don't know about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I resume?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you have testified here with regard to your opinion as to whether your conference with President Truman and the memoranda you left with him and the letter you sent him had any influence on him. Do you know whether, as a matter of fact, he gave any consideration to that matter in the days subsequent to your leaving of the memoranda with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no knowledge of that whatever.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was on July 3, was it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, I ask you if that paper which I now hand you carries a paragraph which you had copied from the book, Mr. President.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is the book. It may be read from the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this paragraph, which appears on page 122 of the book, may be read into the record at this point. May I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. This is from the book presumably coming under the authorship of the President of the United States, entitled, "Mr. President"? Very well. Read it from the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. This purports to be an entry, a diary entry, by the President [reading]:

July 4, 1945—

Now, that was the date following your visit to see the President.

Down Potomac on the Potomac with Vinson, Snyder, Rosenman, George Allen, Steve Early, Charlie Ross, and Matt Connelly. Discussed Russia and Japanese war, government for Germany, food, fuel, and transportation for Europe, sterling bloc. Do not feel happy over situation.

Mr. Lattimore, did you ever see a letter from Betty Ussashevsky to Marguerite Stewart of the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Professor who?

Mr. SOURWINE. Betty Ussashevsky. Do you know who she was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a letter from Betty Ussashevsky to Marguerite Stewart of the American Council of the IPR, expressing the fear that IPR was going to be investigated?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I have seen a reference to that in the testimony before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was: Did you ever see the letter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss such a letter with your wife?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are aware of that letter as it appears in our record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that that letter was transmitted to your wife by Mrs. Stewart with the expressed hope that she would discuss it with Bill and John Carter Vincent and any other trusted friends who might be in the know on these things?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen that reference in the testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you didn't discuss it with your wife?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I remember discussing it at all. My wife says she believes I was abroad at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were abroad at the time you read it in the testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; at the time that this letter was sent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you have stated that you didn't see it at that time. You also said you saw it in the testimony.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see it in the testimony after you got back to the United States?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; this is referring to 1945, isn't it?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am referring now to our testimony. You said you saw this letter in our testimony.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; within the last few weeks.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, after you saw that letter in our testimony and knew what it said about transmittal of the letter to Mrs. Lattimore, are you testifying here that you didn't discuss it with Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I haven't discussed it with her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mrs. Lattimore did, in fact, discuss that letter with Mr. John Carter Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would have to ask her.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you whether you know.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether, in fact, she did discuss it with anyone else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, you remember there has been testimony here about a meeting at the Aldo Cafe in Washington, D. C., following the testimony before this committee of Mr. Carter, which was attended by Mr. Carter, you, Mrs. Lattimore, and a fourth party?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been able to remember yet who that fourth party was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; it was a graduate student at Johns Hopkins, named Mr. Catesby, C-a-t-e-s-b-y, Jones.

Mr. SOURWINE. Catesby Jones?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Catesby Jones; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you describe Mr. Jones, for the benefit of this committee, please?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Jones is a student in the School of Geography at Johns Hopkins.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I meant physically. Is he tall, or short? Does he have a beard?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He doesn't have a beard. He has a mustache. He is fair in color, and taller than I am.

Mr. SOURWINE. Slender?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, not slender, I should say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you talked with Mrs. Lattimore about that occasion since you testified about it here previously?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this your own recollection you are testifying from now, as refreshed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it is not my recollection at all. It is that she reminded me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know that it is true that it was Mr. Catesby who was there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I assume my wife's recollection is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know that that is true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know that it is true. I am assuming that it is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't actually recollect who the fourth man was?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't actually remember it at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Catesby?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or Mr. Catesby Jones.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Catesby Jones. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, having your recollection, as you say, refreshed by your wife, and still not being able to remember it yourself, did you have any thought of checking with Mr. Catesby Jones to see whether he was in fact with you there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I haven't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any other person with you there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Catesby Jones have any connection with the IPR, or has he had any?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he have any connection with Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure he doesn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. What connection does he have with you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is a graduate student at the Johns Hopkins University, and I am one of the supervisors of his thesis work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he come over to Washington from Johns Hopkins with you on that day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe he did. I believe we must have run into him here.

[To Mrs. Lattimore] Do you remember that?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how he happened to be invited to that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I presume we just ran into each other and went to dinner together.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not just run into Mr. Carter, did you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I came over to see Mr. Carter, as I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was by prearrangement that you had dinner with Mr. Carter?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think it was by prearrangement. I think my wife and I came over to see him, and it got along toward dinner time, and we said, "Let's go and get something to eat."

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew he was testifying before this committee on that day; didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you came over to see him after he finished his testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was after he finished his testimony; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what time he finished his testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't. It was some time in the late afternoon, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how long it was between the time he finished his testimony and the time you went over there to dinner?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was long enough for a casual meeting and then just a suggestion to go eat?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I should think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where you casually met?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, we went to the hotel that Mr. Carter was staying at. Where we met Mr. Jones, I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You met him by appointment; didn't you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. Mr. Carter?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; Mr. Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Carter, by appointment, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was prearranged, then, wasn't it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To meet him, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We had better get that straightened out. That same question was propounded to the witness a moment or two ago and he said "No." Now, was it by prearrangement? That has been asked twice, here, and has been answered two ways.

Mr. FORTAS. I think the previous question was the dinner by prearrangement, Senator.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think it was.

Mr. FORTAS. The record will show.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Could we check that on the record?

Mr. SOURWINE. The record will speak for itself as to the question. If the witness is now testifying that he did meet Mr. Carter by prearrangement, that is what I was trying to find out.

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer that question "Yes" or "No." Was it by prearrangement that you met Mr. Carter that day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was by prearrangement of some sort. May I elaborate a little bit?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it needs any elaboration.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The question is whether it was called in from Baltimore, or here.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You have answered the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the witness' mention of calling from Baltimore or calling from here raises an interesting question I would like to ask.

Does that indicate, sir, that you initiated this meeting with him?

The CHAIRMAN. With whom?

Mr. SOURWINE. With Mr. Carter. That you sought to meet Mr. Carter on that day?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you said you don't remember whether you called him from Baltimore or called him from here. That would indicate you remember you called him, wouldn't it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I called him, but the reason why I say I don't remember is that he may have let me know from New York previously that he was coming down here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you may have had a previous understanding that you would meet with him after he finished testifying that day.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether I knew that or not, or whether he simply told me from New York that he was coming down here, and then I had the idea of seeing him here.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

Turning to another subject, Mr. Lattimore, when did you first meet Mr. Dean Acheson.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have never met Mr. Acheson.
Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know him at all.
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know him at all.
Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever corresponded with him?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I have.
Senator FERGUSON. On that, could you be a little more definite?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sure that I have never corresponded with Mr. Acheson. The reason why I say I believe I haven't is that I may have had occasion in the past to write some letter to the State Department, where you are supposed to address the letter to the Secretary.
Senator FERGUSON. I wondered about the October 1949 meetings, whether you were invited. Your wife is now handing you a folder, and I wondered whether or not you had a wire, as some of the other people had, or a letter, from the Secretary of State.
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe that correspondence was in the hands of Mr. Jessup and the other members of that special committee, Mr. Case and Mr.—I forget his name. My wife has just reminded me that I did write a letter or send a telegram to Mr. Acheson requesting him to release the transcript of my remarks at that 1949 meeting.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only letter or telegram or other communication?
Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only one, I believe.
Mr. SOURWINE. That you ever sent Mr. Acheson?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever speak at the Army War College?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I have spoken there maybe once, maybe twice.
Mr. SOURWINE. Not more than twice?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.
Mr. SOURWINE. And at least once?
Mr. LATTIMORE. And at least once.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember when?
Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, it must have been about 1945 or 1946, possibly 1947. I am not sure.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what you talked about?
Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember in detail. Probably some general talk on the Far East.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember how your talk was arranged?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who made the contact or who invited you to speak?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the assignment or transfer of any person in the State Department to any post in the Far East?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever did.
Mr. SOURWINE. You never made such a recommendation to anyone?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; not that I recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make such a recommendation with regard to John S. Service?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am pretty sure I never did.
Mr. SOURWINE. Miriam Farley?
Mr. LATTIMORE. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. T. A. Bisson?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communist or pro-Communist who was employed by the Office of War Information?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Either Chinese or American Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I considered Communist or pro-Communist at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, leaving aside the question of what you considered, I want to ask you this question: Do you know of any person, either Chinese or American, racially, who was employed by the Office of War Information, who was a person under Communist discipline or who had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with the employment of anyone to a position of importance with UNRRA—UNRRA—for China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know anyone who held a position of importance with UNRRA for China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I knew Mr. Benjamin Kizer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he the only person who fills that specification?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He is the only one I can recall at the moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, he is the only person who ever held a position of importance with UNRRA for China that you knew?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I recall; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you had nothing to do with his appointment and made no recommendation with regard to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you acquainted with any member of the United States Supreme Court?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have met Mr. Justice Douglas, and I have met Mr. Justice Black. I think those are the only two I have met.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend a discussion conference of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Washington on or about December 9 and 10, 1938?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall it. It would be quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, attempting to refresh——

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let's see. What date in '38?

Mr. SOURWINE. December 9 and 10, 1938.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I was in Baltimore at that time, so it is very likely I would have been invited.

Mr. SOURWINE. Attempting to refresh your memory, do you remember attending such a discussion conference, at which Mr. Stanley Hornbeck was present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall it. I have been at various IPR-sponsored discussions where Mr. Hornbeck was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a trustee of IPR at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He has been a trustee of the IPR, I believe, in the past. I don't recall in 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he at that time? That was the question.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall.

Mr. FORTAS. May I inquire whether the witness wants a recess and whether that is the pleasure of the committee? We have been going about 2 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess for 10 minutes.

(Short recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, just before the recess, I asked you about your attendance at a discussion conference of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, in Washington, D. C., on or about December 9 and 10, 1938.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, still attempting to refresh your memory with regard to such a discussion conference, do you remember attending such a conference, at which Mr. James Pennfield was in attendance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember attending such a conference, at which Mr. Alger Hiss was in attendance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember attending a conference at which Mr. or Mrs. Steven Roudabush was in attendance?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just can't remember any such conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I can't.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I have just two or maybe three questions to ask Mr. Lattimore.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, have you had any Russian visit you in your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think one. You mean one not an American of Russian origin?

Senator SMITH. I mean a person from Russia.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think one.

Senator SMITH. Who was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was a man named Dolbin, D-o-l-b-i-n, who had been assigned by the Russians to accompany Mr. Wallace in Siberia, and then he was attached for a while here; I am not sure whether it was the Russian Embassy or the Russian United Nations delegation. And I invited him over to my house.

Senator SMITH. How long did he visit you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think he drove over for lunch and drove back the same day.

Senator SMITH. Now, when was that? About when?

I know it is difficult to remember the exact date.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably 1945.

Senator SMITH. Now, is the the only Russian individual that visited your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe so.

Senator SMITH. Did you never have a Russian individual, on further reflection, to visit you as your house guest?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am pretty sure not.

Senator SMITH. Was there ever any such occasion where you met a Russian flying into Baltimore, where you met him at the airport?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am pretty sure I never met a Russian flying into Baltimore.

Senator SMITH. And this one Russian is the only Russian individual that has been to your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is the only one I can recall.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the first name of this individual? I assume that was the last name you gave.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was the last name. I don't remember the first name.

Senator SMITH. May I ask one other question?

Did you have occasion to have a conference with this same man here in Washington?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I think I lunched with him once here in Washington.

Senator SMITH. Did you meet with him anywhere else?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In this country?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Now, at how many places did you meet him in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, he was attached to Mr. Wallace's party.

The CHAIRMAN. How many places did you meet him in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry, Senator. That question is not susceptible to an answer in terms of numbers, because he accompanied Mr. Wallace throughout his journey.

Senator SMITH. Now, is that the only occasion when you ever saw him in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Did you ever see him in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Was he an official of the Soviet?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was an official of the Soviet Union; yes.

Senator SMITH. Do you know what position he occupied?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; except that at the time of Mr. Wallace's trip in Siberia, Mr. Dolbin was described as assigned from the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator SMITH. You assumed, did you, that he was a loyal Russian official?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And consequently a Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I couldn't assume that he was a Communist, because I understand that many Russian officials are not Communists.

Senator SMITH. At that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time; I didn't inquire.

Senator SMITH. Did you discuss with him the situation developing then in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; only in the most general terms.

The CHAIRMAN. You did discuss it with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not with him alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it does not make any difference whether it was with him alone. Did you discuss it with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The subject was discussed while we were in Russia, and I couldn't recollect at this moment whether he was the man who discussed it or some other member of the party.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conference with him in the presence of anyone else, or with anyone else in Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was always in a group.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any idea how many conferences you had with him, or with him in a group?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't, because we were traveling in the same airplane, and therefore nobody would think of it in terms of conferences.

Senator SMITH. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, Senator?

Senator SMITH. I believe that is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this Russian come back with you on the plane?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But he came over after?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He came over at some later time; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And how did he contact you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Here?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did he call you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I think I contacted him.

Senator FERGUSON. At the Embassy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I called the Embassy; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you learn that he was here?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think from the newspapers; but I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. How long would you say he was at your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Two or three hours.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not meet him at the airport?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. The Senator asked you if you recalled meeting any Russian.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any Russian coming from the airport to your home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. There was one other question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Lattimore, you told us, and you published in your book, that Mr. Hamilton Owens flew from here to London for the purpose of meeting you. You spent the evening together, the night together, and he flew back the next day.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; we had dinner together at the airport, and we immediately thereafter boarded the plane for home.

Senator SMITH. I thought you said that you spent a night in a good soft bed for the first time, or something of that kind.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. That was when the journey was broken, in Ireland, and there was weather obstruction, and so on.

Senator SMITH. Did anyone else meet you with Mr. Owens when you were in London or in Ireland?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; except that the whole press was there at the airport.

Senator SMITH. I believe you told me you did not know any of those personally.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. You were not acquainted with any of them?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator SMITH. Did Mr. Owens take you any information with respect to these charges that had just been made against you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Did he have any documents or papers with him at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. What was the purpose of his meeting you, if you know, flying across the Atlantic to meet you and flying immediately back?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I suppose as the editor of a Baltimore paper, his reaction was "Baltimore boy makes headline."

Senator SMITH. He was a personal friend of yours?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I would say a friend and acquaintance of many years.

Senator SMITH. I was just interested in his purpose in flying across the Atlantic, if you were flying back in the next day or two. Was there any significance to that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I think he was proably trying to get a scoop.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he go with you to have breakfast with Carter after you landed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not go to that meeting when you saw the press release?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think I saw Carter after I landed.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought it was on the occasion of your landing that you saw Carter.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not see Carter at all after you landed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't think we did.

[To Mrs. Lattimore.] Did we?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. Your memory is what we want. Have you a question pending?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I will wait and get the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now that the name of Mr. Dolbin has been brought in, I have one question to ask about him. Did Mr. Wallace meet Mr. Dolbin?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. And knew that he was on the plane all the way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had some contact with him on the plane all the way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. He was attached to Mr. Wallace as an English-speaking Russian to facilitate Mr. Wallace's journey.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had frequent conversations with him, then, would you say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of a friendly nature?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, sir, send a message to Mr. Lauchlin Currie at the White House in November of 1941 or at about that time

indicating that Chiang Kai-shek had reacted adversely to the proposed modus vivendi for Japan?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I transmitted such a message at the instructions of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. He told you to transmit that message to the White House?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you urge to Mr. Currie that the President be told about Chiang's adverse reaction?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in your message to Mr. Currie state that it was being sent at Chiang's direction?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. The text of the message was drafted by myself and Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss with Mr. Vincent the fact that you had sent or would send or were sending such a message, or your intention to send such a message?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it the purpose of that message to convey a message from Chiang to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. My understanding was that Chiang was using all channels open to him to register in Washington his alarm.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any part in the drafting or preparation or submission of the message under date of July 14, 1944, the text of which appears on page 560 of the State Department white paper, which I now show you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. August 31, 1944? Is that the one?

Mr. SOURWINE. The message under date of July 14, 1944, on page 560.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I see. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is "No"? You did not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am assuming, Mr. Chairman, that page references to the white paper, which is a standard document, are sufficient for inclusion in this record by reference?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any suggestions with regard to that message?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about it at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know it was going to be sent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know it had been sent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did. My recollection is that I had no conferences with Mr. Wallace after the plane returned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the documents that that message itself refers to, that is, the Chiang telegram of July 8, and the letter to Chiang under date of June 12?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't know about those.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never saw such documents?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation or transmission of a message to Chungking on or about July 25, 1944, quoting or paraphrasing Amerasia magazine?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about a message sent to Ambassador Gauss in the fall of 1944, on or about September 19 of that year, over the signature of Secretary Hull, stating that he, Hull, and the President, then Roosevelt, were authorizing Ambassador Gauss to go over and speak very frankly to Chiang Kai-shek about the urgent need of trying to bring about a greater amount of unity in the military command of China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I am quite sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with the drafting or preparation of that telegram?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am quite sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time that it was to be sent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe this is the first I have heard of it, unless I noted it in the white paper when I first read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am referring to the telegram that appears on page 563 of the white paper, which I show you. Does that change your answer in any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I have no recollection of having anything to do with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know at the time that it had been sent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek in the fall of 1944 over the signature of President Roosevelt?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't recollect anything about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of such a telegram?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am quite sure I didn't. In the fall, when?

Mr. SOURWINE. In the fall of 1944.

Mr. LATTIMORE. What month?

Mr. SOURWINE. I can't place it more closely.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I am sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the contents of such a telegram?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss such a telegram or the contents or prospective contents of it with Mr. John Carter Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No: I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet Mr. John Carter Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In Peking about 1929 or 1930.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are sure it wasn't earlier than that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I don't remember meeting him before that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been while you were with Arnold & Co., Ltd., at Tientsin and Peking?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am sure I didn't know him then.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been between 1922 and 1926?

Mr. LATTIMORE. 1922 and 1926; yet. No; I have no recollection of knowing him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you regard Mr. John Carter Vincent as an expert on far eastern affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you good friends?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I would say quite good friends.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you last see him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It must have been several years ago.

Mr. Sourwine. You have not seen him recently?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you discussed with him any of the hearings before this subcommittee?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Or his appearance before this subcommittee? Or his actions here?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any correspondence with him about those matters?

Mr. Lattimore. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. John Carter Vincent get in touch with you when he got back from Switzerland, in November of 1940?

Mr. Lattimore. From Switzerland in November of 1940?

The Chairman. When he got back from Switzerland is the question.

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know when he did get back?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I couldn't tell you.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see him in November or December of 1940?

Mr. Lattimore. I have no recollection.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know when was the first time after December of 1940 that you did see him?

Mr. Lattimore. The first that I can recall seeing him is in Chungking when I got there in 1941.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see him at all between the time he got back from Geneva in 1940, in November, and the time he sailed for Shanghai in January or early February of 1941?

Mr. Lattimore. I should say it is quite likely, but I have no recollection of it.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you speak to Mr. Vincent by telephone during that period?

Mr. Lattimore. Again all I can say is that it is very likely, but I don't remember it.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you correspond with him while he was away?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I corresponded with him.

Mr. Sourwine. I ask those questions, Mr. Chairman, in connection with exhibit 379, which is already a part of this record.

Do you know anything about what part, if any, Mr. Lauchlin Currie played in securing your assignment to accompany Mr. Wallace on his mission to China?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't remember Mr. Currie having anything to do with it.

Mr. Fortas. Mr. Chairman, could he see exhibit 379?

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know anything about what part, if any, Mr. Currie played with respect to your assignment in connection with the Pauley Commission?

Mr. Lattimore. No; as far as I remember he had nothing to do with it.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know about Mr. Wallace's book, Soviet Asia Mission, before it was published?

Mr. Lattimore. Yes. The galley proofs were sent to me.

Mr. Sourwine. They were sent to you? By whom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. By—what was the man's name? Mr. Steiger, who assisted Mr. Wallace in writing the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did he send you the galley proofs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Presumably because my name was mentioned frequently.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he not say why he sent them to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he just send you the proofs with no note, no message?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, there must have been a covering letter of some kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember what was in it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember what was in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you do with the proofs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I read through them to check wherever my name was mentioned and sent them back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see the manuscript of that book at any time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I ever saw the manuscript.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or Mrs. Lattimore, to your knowledge ever work on the manuscript for that book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my recollection.

[To Mrs. Lattimore.] You didn't either; did you?

No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you correct the proofs at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make marginal suggestions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If so, they were very few. I don't remember them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you perform any editorial function with respect to that book or that manuscript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; nothing that I would call an editorial function.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you remember a publication or an article or literary work that bore Mr. Wallace's name, which your wife had a hand in the writing of?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was called "Our Task in Asia"; was it?

It was "Our Policy in Asia." Or "Our" something "in Asia."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with that publication in an editorial way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think my wife consulted me at times on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did discuss it with her while she was working on it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you perform any editorial function with respect to that book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I wouldn't say so, unless she made any changes as a result of talking with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write anything for inclusion in that book, or that manuscript?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I actually wrote anything.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you dictate anything?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think so. I think I talked it over or talked over parts of it with Mr. Wallace once or twice, but I don't remember much in detail about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say it was wholly Mrs. Lattimore's work?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; my impression is that it was primarily Mr. Wallace's work.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you referring to the pamphlet, "Our Job in the Pacific"?

Mr. LATTIMORE. "Our Job in the Pacific." That must be it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Dennett has testified that that project was initiated by you. Do you remember that testimony?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember some testimony to that effect, that the IPR asked me to speak to Mr. Wallace about it, or something of that sort. That is quite possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your question, now?

Mr. MORRIS. I was asking Mr. Lattimore if he had recalled Mr. Dennett's testimony on that subject.

Actually, what did happen with respect to it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember what happened in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what happened with regard to what? Let us get our line straight here.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I understand Mr. Morris is asking about the initiating of that pamphlet. I don't remember the steps.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go to Mr. Wallace about it, or speak to him about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say very likely; but I have no very clear recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Lattimore, did you consider at that time that he had knowledge on the subject that would be well worth while for the world?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I thought that the opinions of the Vice President of the United States were important for the world

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why he did not write it alone, and why your wife helped him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. My general recollection is that he had some ideas about America's increasing importance in the world and about various things that could be done in the way of development of trade, and investment, and so on, and that he didn't have first-hand knowledge of Asia, and therefore wanted some help on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the writing of that book was his idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That, I don't remember, whether it was his idea to begin with, or whether the idea came from somebody in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not your idea?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think it was my idea

Mr. SOURWINE. You are sure of that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am not sure about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not say that he did not know about Asia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe he had ever been in Asia.

Senator FERGUSON. And yet you were having him write as an authority, using the name of the Vice President, for the IPR?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I wasn't having him write.

Senator FERGUSON. If one of these witnesses is correct, you instigated it. You conceived the idea.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I remember, my general recollection, Senator, is that at that time there was a good deal in the press about Mr. Wallace's ideas of the development of unindustrialized countries that would be coming after the war, and presumably those references gave somebody the idea of getting Mr. Wallace to apply those ideas to what was eventually described in the pamphlet as "Our Job in the Pacific."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, in writing that, how do you account for the fact, then, that he got in touch with your wife to help him write the book?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember what the steps were.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at that point? The witness is in the field of pure conjecture. He has been for the last two or three answers. If it is true, as he states, that he does not remember, then his answer has to be "I can't explain it." A conjecture about what might have happened isn't any kind of an explanation at all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true, but he has been wandering around in that field for a long while, so there is nothing new about that.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead with your next question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Lauchlin Currie the matter of assigning or securing Mr. Vincent to accompany Mr. Wallace to China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember. I remember talking with Mr. Currie before we started, but I don't remember whether that was before or after Mr. Vincent had been appointed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, didn't you discuss it first with Mr. Vincent and then with Mr. Currie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I don't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it you do not remember, now, in regard to that question, Mr. Lattimore? You do not remember what?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember discussing it first with Mr. Vincent and then with Mr. Currie. Isn't that the order you put it in?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember discussing it with Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember talking about the trip with Mr. Vincent before we started, but whether it was before he was appointed or only after he was appointed, I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember talking about it with Mr. Currie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I remember talking about it with Mr. Currie; but, again, whether it was before or after the appointment of Mr. Vincent, I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean, do you remember talking about Mr. Vincent's appointment with Mr. Currie?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether Mr. Vincent's appointment was included in what we talked about or not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question at all. Will you read the question, Mr. Reporter?

(The reporter reads, as requested.)

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vincent has testified that he discussed with you his forthcoming trip with Mr. Wallace for some time before he left on a trip. Please tell us what you remember about those discussions.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I suppose we talked in general about the countries we were going to be going through, but I don't remember any details whatever.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Vincent ask you for advice?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe he asked me for advice. He may have asked me for opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give him advice?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not that I remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give him opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. May I answer that in this way——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Did you give him opinion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. If I gave him opinions, they were almost certainly directed to the frontier areas in which I was particularly interested.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you did or did not give him opinions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. All I can say is that I believe I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having any discussions with Mr. Vincent prior to the trip with Mr. Wallace, prior to leaving on that trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have a vague recollection of one or two very brief meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how they were arranged?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who called whom?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you can tell us about it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is all I can tell you about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. On how many occasions during the Wallace mission did you discuss with Mr. Vincent what had taken place in previous talks between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't recall Mr. Vincent discussing that subject with me.

Mr. SOURWINE. On how many occasions, if any, during the Wallace mission did you ever tell Mr. Vincent anything that had taken place or call his attention to anything that had taken place in a previous talk between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Did I tell Mr. Vincent?

Mr. SOURWINE. Or call his attention to anything that had taken place?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I was present at only one talk between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek, and I do not believe that I talked with Mr. Vincent about it afterward.

May I explain that?

My recollection of the subject of that talk is extremely hazy, because I was acting as one of the interpreters, and I always find it very difficult to concentrate on interpreting and afterward be able to give a connected account of what was said.

Mr. SOURWINE. On how many occasions did you discuss with Mr. Vincent other matters connected with the mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. A number of occasions?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Probably a number of occasions in a general way, since it was a continuous trip and we were constantly thrown together.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you have those conferences?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Usually in the plane, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about times when you were not in the plane.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Times when we were not in the plane, we were very frequently quartered separately. So I would say that our conversations were usually on the plane.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you meaning to testify that during this trip with Mr. Wallace, you didn't discuss with Mr. Vincent matters connected with the mission except when you were on the plane?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that our conversations were almost entirely on the plane. And may I add that I had no conversations with him on subjects that might be called "in the diplomatic field."

The CHAIRMAN. That is not called for in the question, and it is not even an explanation of your answer. The question did not call for anything "in the diplomatic field."

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony that except when you were on the plane you had no conversations with Mr. Vincent during the Wallace trip?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Certainly I had conversations with Mr. Vincent, but I don't recall them separately, or what they were about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever confer with him in his room?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever confer with him in your room?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever confer with him out on the street?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at more than one of the conferences between Vice President Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I believe only one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you at any time make any memorandum with regard to the conference at which you were present?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever transmit any such memorandum to Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever transmit to Mr. Vincent or have any part in the transmission to him of any report or memorandum concerning any conversation between General Chiang and Mr. Wallace?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was John Hazard at the talks between Mr. Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe he was at the one where I was present; and, of course, I can't speak for the ones where I wasn't present.

Mr. SOURWINE. While you were in China with Mr. Wallace, did you attend a conference with General Ferris?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes. I believe that was the one at which I was acting as one of the interpreters.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a conference about sending a mission into North China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The general subject of the conversation was to send an American observer mission to North China; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether Mr. John Stewart Service and Mr. John Carter Vincent were both present at that meeting?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't remember whether Mr. Vincent was present. I remember Mr. Service being present, as an assistant interpreter to General Ferris.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was General Stilwell at that conference?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Ferris was his representative?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think General Ferris was representing him. I believe we didn't meet General Stilwell all the time we were in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. During Mr. Wallace's entire mission, you had no conferences with General Stilwell?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of any conference between General Stilwell and John Carter Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. At that time?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, during that Wallace mission.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I haven't. My recollection is, as I say, that General Stilwell was not even in China during that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Wallace recommended that General Stilwell be replaced or superseded?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was General Stilwell pro-Communist?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I should say he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was General Stilwell a Marshall man?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have seen him so characterized in the press. I couldn't say of my own knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you have so regarded him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no knowledge on which to base such an opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had and have no opinion on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you accompany Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent to Kunming?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you stay while you were there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think I stayed at the American consulate in town.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did they stay?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think they stayed at General Chennault's headquarters outside of town.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any reason why you split up?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No particular reason.

Well, I think lack of accommodations at General Chennault's.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you invited to General Chennault's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had several meals there; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Were you invited to General Chennault's?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were invited to stay there?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I was invited to stay there. I think when we arrived the arrangements were made and I was quartered at the consulate.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you accompany members of the party on a visit to Mme. Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Wallace submitted a report to the President in writing after he returned from China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I know that from the press and from the hearings before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you, of your own knowledge, know whether Mr. Wallace submitted a report to the President in writing after he returned from China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Of my own knowledge; I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Wallace at any time such a report or the subject of such a report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I was excluded from those discussions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a rough draft of such a report or of memoranda prepared for such a report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I am quite sure I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever submit any suggested language orally or in writing for possible inclusion in such a report?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Such a report would have been a most important thing in connection with Mr. Wallace's mission, would it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your contemplation would there have been anything more important than his report to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say that was probably the most important thing in his mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. And yet you never discussed it with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I was not a member of the State Department, and I was excluded from all diplomatic activities.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you on any Government payroll at that time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I was representing OWI.

Senator FERGUSON. You were on that payroll?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any reports of your own with regard to the Wallace mission?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I made a verbal report to Mr. Elmer Davis.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "verbal," do you mean oral?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oral; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make any written report to anybody?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know about the so-called Kunming cable?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I knew about that until afterward.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss at any time with Mr. Vincent any matter connected with Mr. Wallace's report to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen the document which Mr. Wallace released as the text of his report to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I believe I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever seen the text of that document or any part of it before?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; it appeared strange to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. What part did you have, if any, in preparation of Mr. Wallace's speech to be given in Seattle upon his return from China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I believe I had no part in that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give him any information for inclusion in that speech?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk to him about the speech?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. I knew he was writing the speech; but I don't believe I talked to him about it.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't he ask you for any aid or any material at all?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I believe he was met by somebody who was going to act as his campaign manager, and they went into a huddle and composed the speech.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't Mr. John Carter Vincent work on that speech on the airplane on the way back?

Mr. Lattimore. That I can't remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give Mr. Wallace the benefit of notes you had taken in Siberia to aid him in the preparation of that speech?

Mr. Lattimore. I may have. I don't remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think that answer jibes with the last three answers you have just given?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't know whether it jibes or not.

The Chairman. The witness is held responsible for his own answers, and whether they jibe or not is a matter for the conclusion of the committee.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give Mr. Wallace anything? Did you give him any information, written or oral, or give him anything at all to aid him in the preparation of that Seattle speech?

Mr. Lattimore. I talked with Mr. Wallace whenever he wanted to talk to me; but I remember no talks the subject of which was a speech that he was about to write.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you furnish any substantial part of the factual information or the detail upon which that speech was based?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't recall the speech and so can't answer that. I know that in his book there are several references to information that he says came from me.

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Hazard assist in the preparation of that speech?

Mr. Lattimore. That I don't remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you go with Mr. John Carter Vincent to see Mr. Lauchlin Currie after you got back from the Wallace mission?

Mr. Lattimore. Very likely. But I have no recollection.

Mr. Sourwine. I am trying to find out whether you went with Mr. Vincent or whether you went alone. Can you not remember?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I can't.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you go alone?

Mr. Lattimore. I don't even remember going to see Mr. Currie after that mission.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you say you didn't go to see Mr. Currie?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I can't say I didn't.

Mr. Sourwine. Is it possible you might have gone to see him on one occasion with Mr. Vincent and on another occasion alone, or that you might have gone to see him with Mr. Vincent and then seen him for a time alone, Mr. Vincent having retired?

Mr. Lattimore. It is quite possible.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss with the President of the United States the question of declaring the Japanese Emperor to be a war criminal?

Mr. Lattimore. No; to the best of my recollection, I never mentioned that.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever discuss that with Mr. Vincent?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Vincent? Declaring the Japanese Emperor to be a war criminal? No, I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever go to see the President about the question of the fate of the Emperor?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. To the best of my recollection, I mentioned Japan only as it is mentioned in that memorandum that you have for the record, and it was not mentioned at all in conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Vincent your visit to the President on July 3, 1945?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I ever did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him the prospect of such a visit, the fact that you would go or might go?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss with him the fact that you had written a letter to the President?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you discuss that with anyone else in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe I discussed it with anybody in the State Department. I believe the only person with whom I discussed it was the president of my university.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why General Marshall's directive for his mission to China was initiated in the State Department?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't General Marshall perfectly competent to draft his own directive?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is a subject on which I can't speak with any authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hadn't General Marshall had a lot of experience in China?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't speak to that of my own knowledge. I have seen in the press that he was at one time stationed with the United States Fifteenth Infantry in Tientsin, I believe in the 1920's, but I didn't know him at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, he had served in China, hadn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is my recollection; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you didn't know that of your own knowledge?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had also served in the Philippines, hadn't he?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I didn't know that of my own knowledge, either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wouldn't that help his knowledge of China and the Chinese affairs?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Do you want me to speculate?

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, it is part of Asia. No, I think the Philippines and China are different enough so that knowledge of the Philippines is not necessarily part of the training of an expert on China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Marshall had to know about China when he was Chief of Staff, did he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I presume so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you not say that General Marshall knew more about Asiatic Affairs when he became Secretary of State than he did about any other sector of foreign relations?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I couldn't speak to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no opinion on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No opinion on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Marshall's appointment as Secretary of State was a good break for Mr. Acheson and John Carter Vincent, wasn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. That interrogation certainly calls for a farfetched conclusion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will the Chair indulge me for just three or four more questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose the witness drew those conclusions previously. They might be farfetched.

Mr. SOURWINE. General Marshall's appointment as Secretary of State was a good break for Dean Acheson and John Carter Vincent, wasn't it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't speak to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. If almost anyone else had become Secretary of State at that time, wouldn't it have been much tougher for them to put across their ideas of far eastern policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I can't speak to that.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. The answer is "I can't speak to that." What do you mean by that answer?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have no personal knowledge which would entitle me to an opinion of any value on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever express an opinion along that line?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, think a moment.

Mr. SOURWINE. If almost anyone else had become Secretary of State at that time, wouldn't it have been much tougher for Acheson and Vincent to put across their ideas with regard to far eastern policy?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I can't answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you agree that General Marshall's policy in China deflected the pressure somewhat away from Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I wouldn't be able to agree or disagree with that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't General Marshall bring about a change in the far estern policy America had been following, a change that involved a softer attitude toward Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't believe I could characterize it in that way.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever characterize it in that way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you agree that the Marshall policy moved us away from a show-down with Russia, whereas the policy we had been following before that time had been a get-tough policy that was moving us toward a show-down with Russia?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you do not have to ask your counsel.

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, these are rather unusual questions.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be unusual, but they are in line. He can answer it "Yes" or "No," or he can say he cannot answer.

Mr. FORTAS. Can we have that question again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you agree that the Marshall policy moved us away from a show-down with Russia, whereas the policy we had been

following before that time had been a get-tough policy that was moving us toward a show-down with Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I may have believed so at the time. I have no clear recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever express that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I might have.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know on what occasion?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, was not the same thing true with regard to Europe, that the Marshall policy deflected the pressure away from Russia and away from a show-down with Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That the Marshall policy in China——

Mr. SOURWINE. No. Wasn't the same thing true with regard to Europe, that the Marshall policy deflected the pressure away from Russia and away from a show-down with Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It might have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can't you see the comparison between the moves made in China and the moves made in Europe? Isn't that a fair comparison?

Mr. FORTAS. Is that a question, too?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Can you tell me what year you are speaking of?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any year in which that was not true?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, I am trying to recall the years in which General Marshall was Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he was Secretary of State to your knowledge was he not?

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that have been true in 1945, 1946, and 1947?

Mr. LATTIMORE. The reason I am asking, Mr. Sourwine, is that it seems to me there is an overlap here between what is sometimes called the Marshall policy in China at a time when Marshall was not yet Secretary of State, and the Marshall policy in Europe after the time when Marshall was Secretary of State and when the Marshall plan became the basis of policy in Europe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you think the Marshall policy in China and the Marshall policy in Europe were comparable?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think they were comparable, in the sense of trying to save the situation in both areas.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you believe that Chinese Communists now are controlled by Russia or that they are free to determine for themselves what course they will follow and to make whatever kind of a bargain they want to make with the Western Powers or with Russia?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Now? Right now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Right now I would say that the Chinese Communists are clearly ideologically subordinate to Russia. But the degree of Russian operational control is something that is disputed among different authorities in the field.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the same thing have been true in 1946 and 1947?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In 1946–47, I believe the Chinese Communists would have been perhaps more free to operate on their own.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think they would in 1946 or 1947 have been free to determine for themselves the course they were going to follow, to

make whatever kind of a bargain they might want to make with either the Western Powers or Russia, as they saw fit?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think that is possible.

Senator FERGUSON. When did the change take place?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I should say after the Korean war.

Senator FERGUSON. After the Korean war? When? Before they entered into the Korean war?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I would say once the Korean war began.

Senator FERGUSON. That is before China got into it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think Czechoslovakia or Poland would be free to break away from Russian domination and make peace with the non-Communist powers on whatever terms they might decide, without Russian influence?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think they could have done it in 1946 or 1947?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, Yugoslavia did at some period subsequent to 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. I spoke of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Oh, I thought you said Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Sorry.

I think that as of 1946–47, there was a reasonable prospect that Czechoslovakia and Poland might have become much less satellites of Russia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the Chinese Communists at that time were comparable with Czechoslovakia and Poland in that regard?

Mr. LATTIMORE. More comparable than they are now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, I hold in my hand a clipping of an article entitled, "The Marshall Policy—A Steady Pattern," by Owen Lattimore, from the New York Herald Tribune of August 2, 1947. I ask you if you wrote that article.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I wrote that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that may be inserted in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 605" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 605

THE MARSHALL POLICY—A STEADY PATTERN

EUROPE-CHINA PARALLEL DEMONSTRATES THAT EAST-WEST SHOW-DOWN IS STILL AN ILLUSION

(By Owen Lattimore)

BRATISLAVA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA.—As an old China hand with a summer vacation balcony seat overlooking the spectacle of Europe, I have been watching with absorbed interest the progress of United States policy as directed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall.

As an old China hand, I probably compare moves made in China with moves made in Europe more carefully than do most Americans. As an old China hand who happened to be in Europe at the moment when Czechoslovakia and the other Slav states turned down the chance to enter the Paris economic discussions, I have probably been more conscious than many people of the resemblance between

the result of certain moves made in China and recent moves made in Europe. For what my views are worth, here they are.

Czechoslovakia knows much more about America than America does about Czechoslovakia. Judging from the American cables and publications reaching Czechoslovakia, the prevailing belief is that the line has been drawn much more sharply than ever before between Russia and her eastern European satellites and America and Britain and their western European satellites. I am convinced that this is an illusion. The final lines have not yet been drawn and the final positions have not yet been taken.

The key to an analysis of the prevailing illusion is to be found by comparing the Marshall policy in China with the Marshall policy in Europe. In China at the end of the war the United States began with certain steps in the direction of a show-down with Russia. These steps may be described as an early version of the Truman doctrine, and they presumably were taken on the assumption that a show-down with Russia was either inevitable or desirable. Heavy emphasis was laid on the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the "only legitimate government."

Repeated allusions were made to Russia's treaty obligations to recognize and give aid and comfort only to that Government. An all-out American effort was made on an ostentatious scale to complete the equipment of the Kuomintang armies, even though the war was over, and to transport them to such advantageous positions that, should there be a civil war, it would be a push-over.

Then General Marshall was sent out to China. Instead of continuing in the direction of a show-down with Russia, he diverted the policy in the direction of a show-down between conflicting political and economic ideas in China, and the conflicting regional groupings of power that were already established there. He avoided being trapped by the Kuomintang into signing a blank check for American support in the civil war; but at the same time he continued American aid and maintained the American strategic positions on such a scale that the United States can always step back into the field to prevent a complete collapse of the Kuomintang.

Russian comments on American policy have been every bit as uncomplimentary as American suspicions of what the Russians may be up to in China. But it is noteworthy that in China the Russians followed the Marshall lead in the one respect which was all important: they did not act as though we were retreating. They did not rush in to follow us up or to tread on our heels. It can, in fact, be said that Russian policy in China has been responsive to American policy, although there has been no cooperation. As a consequence, if a way ever opens up for the renewal of negotiations between the two sides in the Chinese civil war on something resembling the original Marshall basis, then the way will also be open for a Russo-American understanding to underwrite the results of such negotiations.

In Europe, as in China, we had an early or "Truman" phase of American policy, followed by a second or "Marshall" phase. The Truman policy in Greece and Turkey, like the pre-Marshall policy of trying to set up the best possible civil war in China, took the form of highly publicized steps toward a show-down with Russia. The Marshall policy in Europe, like the Marshall policy in China (in spite of all the publicity about a show-down), has in fact deflected the pressure somewhat away from Russia and placed the emphasis instead on the European countries between Russia and the west. The original Marshall proposal did not call on the European nations to aline themselves; it called on them to group themselves.

The work of alinement can be fairly described not as the Marshall proposal, but as the Bevin policy. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin has in this respect (to continue the comparison with China), played the part of Chiang Kai-shek. The British Labor Party has played the part of the Kuomintang, with the dominant wing convinced that a good anti-Russian policy is better than a good European policy, while the weaker wing trails along but keeps hankering for a "common policy for all European Socialists."

The Bevin policy in Europe, however—like the Kuomintang policy in China—has not yet succeeded in forcing a show-down between America and Russia. The very essence of the situation is that American policy is still in a position of free maneuver, free to push forward, to draw back, or to modify its direction.

Russia, correspondingly, has not been forced into a corner, but is also still free to maneuver. And the Russian satellites, about whose alinement with Russia there has been so much excited comment, are in fact still free to come to terms with other European states, just as the Chinese Communists are still in

a position to come to terms, with strong bargaining power, with the rest of China.

This analysis is confirmed by the fact that neither in China nor in Europe has the United States said either "these are all my cards" or "these are all the cards I am going to play." Still less have we said: "Here is the exact sum of money that backs these cards—count it."

And the briefest summing up of the Russian policy is that in Europe, as in China, it has not been cooperative, it has certainly not been accompanied by complimentary language, but it has been responsive. It has followed the Marshall lead. The Russians have reserved for themselves the same freedom of maneuver that we have kept for ourselves. In Europe, as in China, therefore, to the extent that Europeans may find that they cannot get on without each other, America and Russia are free to endorse any renewed trend toward getting together.—New York Herald Tribune, August 2, 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lattimore, I show you an excerpt from the Congressional Record of January 24, 1947, being extension of remarks by the Honorable James E. Murray, of Montana, the full text of an article entitled "Asia and the State Department" by Owen Lattimore.

I ask you if that is the text of an article which you wrote?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; that is an article I wrote.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that may be inserted in the record at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 606" and is as follows:)

ASIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. JAMES E. MURRAY, OF MONTANA, IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 24 (LEGISLATIVE DAY OF WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15), 1947

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an article, Asia and the State Department, written by Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ASIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT (BY OWEN LATTIMORE)

WASHINGTON.—The appointment and speedy confirmation of Gen. George C. Marshall as Secretary of State have drawn a flood of comment. Most of it is interesting. Great men are not always interesting men, but General Marshall is one of the great men of our time who, in spite of his modest avoidance of publicity, has always had, without asking for it, the interest of the people.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in a book review in the current issue of the Atlantic Monthly, says acidly that "small men have now succeeded great men in the United States, but small problems have not succeeded great problems."

General Marshall stands apart from this sweeping condemnation. He is a great man who can cope with the greatest problems; and it is not only America that knows it. The world knows it.

Yet in all the comment about General Marshall, and about the problems that will now come to his desk, one most important combination of circumstances has been overlooked, and that is the significance, in the bureaucracy of the State Department, of General Marshall's exceptional experience in Asia and knowledge of Asiatic affairs. He is the first Secretary of State in our history whose knowledge of Asiatic affairs is greater than his knowledge of any other sector of our foreign relations, and the first Secretary of State to step into office directly from an assignment of topmost policy-making importance in Asia.

Only people who have been dealing with the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State over a period of years can fully appreciate the significance of the state. It is the literal truth that the upper crust of the State Department bureaucracy has always tended to reduce policy in Asia to a second or third priority, as compared to policy in Europe. Men in the Far Eastern Division and

its subdivisions have had to waste hours of ingenuity in wriggling through channels to get far eastern questions taken up—and taken up in time—by Secretaries preoccupied with European and Latin-American decisions, controversies, pressures, and counterpressures.

Particularly damaging to the development of a well-rounded national policy has been the practice—not dead yet—of subordinating the recommendations of various far-eastern desks to review by the desks dealing with European powers which have possessions and interests in Asia. These things are important in a bureaucracy, and the State Department is one of the most bureaucratic bureaucracies in Washington. The bureaucrats whose vested interests are in European policy have almost always been able to block, or at least to narrow, the channels by which the far easterners had to approach the Secretary.

It is true that Dean Acheson, as Under Secretary, has done a great deal to improve the working of a poor organizational system, by sacrificing an enormous amount of time to conferences at which all division chiefs have their say in the presence of other division chiefs. It is true also that the Far Eastern Division is at present exceptionally strong because its Chief, John Carter Vincent, in addition to his thorough grasp of far-eastern policy, has had a good deal of European experience and has a knowledge of European politics which puts him on a level footing with the European experts.

Vincent had the confidence of Byrnes, and he will certainly have the continuing confidence of Marshall; but had the successor of Byrnes been almost anyone but Marshall, Acheson and Vincent and the Far Eastern Division would have had to start once more on the old weary treadmill of "briefing" and educating a Secretary who, through no fault of his own, would instinctively have called the European expert in and kept the far-eastern specialist waiting in the corridor whenever he had to make a choice in the allocation of urgent demands on his time.

While people naturally think of Marshall very largely in terms of his recent China experience, it is important to recall that this is not his only far-eastern experience. He had an earlier spell of service in China with the Fifteenth Infantry, the American regiment which used to garrison Tientsin, and in that assignment he had a ringside view of China in the war-lord period. As a younger man, moreover, he had a brilliant record in the Philippines. Finally, as Chief of Staff in the war years, he had China within his field of view as well as Europe and Russia. It should not be forgotten that "Uncle Joe" Stilwell, that great man whose greatness has not yet been adequately recognized either in China or in America was a "Marshall man."

Because of all this, the Marshall appointment has almost as important a bearing on policy in Japan as on policy in China. The spectacular MacArthur shadow has fallen across the policy-making functions of Washington from the moment that General MacArthur set foot in Japan as conqueror, as the symbol of American policy, and as the exponent of American policy whenever criticized or even questioned by the Russians, the British, and sometimes the Chinese. It is not an exaggeration to say that General of the Army Marshall will be the first and only American since the death of President Roosevelt to approach problems of policy in Japan without the political and psychological handicap of being dwarfed by the giant stature of General of the Army MacArthur.

The relationship between the two will not work out in any vulgar controversy. Both men are too big for that. But Marshall is the Democratic Secretary of State in an administration which the Republicans can outvote at any time; and MacArthur, in the hero worship of some of the Republicans, is a strange heraldic figure both a Wild Bull of the Pampas and a Sacred Cow.

Although under Marshall Asiatic policy will take its proper and proportional place in American world policy without tedious bureaucratic lobbying and maneuvering, the other components of our world policy will not be distorted. Marshall has a full grasp of the transition from war policy to postwar policy. He has never succumbed to either the tradition of contempt for the British or the tradition of implacable hate for the Russians which are characteristic of many of our professional Army and Navy men, but there is not the slightest danger that he will be taken into camp by either the Russians or the British.

We may fairly expect from General Marshall an integration of the policy of safeguarding and advancing the American interest with a policy of retaining what needs to be retained from the grand alliance which won the war.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Might I inquire? Did you ask Senator Murray to put this in the record?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir; I don't believe I ever knew Senator Murray.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you send him a copy of this?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No. sir; I don't believe I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was this distributed?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was an article distributed through Overseas News Agency.

Senator FERGUSON. "Asia and the State Department"; is that right? That was the name of it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know what title they sent it out under. Such articles are printed under different heads in different papers. Is there an indication in which paper that was published?

Senator FERGUSON. No. That is why I asked.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have concluded all the questions I had to ask of this witness.

There is one matter I might call to the attention of the committee at this time. As the chairman and the members of the committee know, several requests have been received from persons who have been named in this hearing for the insertion of statements; that is, persons who feel that they have in one way or the other been maligned by this witness, or some other witness have written in asking that statements be inserted. It has been the policy of the committee, as the chairman and the committee know, to reply that there is nothing in the record except material under oath, and that if an affidavit will be submitted it will be considered.

In the case of Miss Freda Utley, such an affidavit has now been presented, and I offer it for consideration by the Chair for possible admission.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have seen the statement before.

It may be inserted in the record.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 607" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 607

1717 TWENTIETH STREET NW.,
Washington 9, D. C., March 21, 1952.

TO: The CHAIRMAN, THE MCCARRAN SUBCOMMITTEE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY.

DEAR SENATOR: Although I have not appeared as a witness before your committee, my analysis of Mr. Lattimore's writings before the Tydings committee, and in my book The China Story, have evidently caused him sufficient disquiet for him to have made a special effort to smear me before your committee. Although I feel honored to be included by Mr. Lattimore in the company of distinguished Americans such as Senator Knowland and Admiral Cooke, whom he also defamed Mr. Lattimore's false and malicious accusation that I have "A record of pro-Nazi utterances" is calculated to hurt my reputation should it go unchallenged.

This accusation of Mr. Lattimore's is based on the same false premises as those of the Communists and their sympathisers, namely, that to be anti-Communist was to be pro-Nazi, and that to advocate a policy leading to the enlistment of the German and Japanese peoples into the ranks of the defenders of freedom is proof of pro-Nazi sentiments. Thus, Mr. Lattimore, before your committee, has repeated the smear of the Communists and their sympathisers who condemned my 1940 book on Soviet Russia, called The Dream We Lost in which I wrote that Stalin was even worse than Hitler and even more dangerous—a fact which is now apparent to most of the American people.

Mr. Lattimore and his lawyers were allowed the utmost license to smear me before the Tydings committee, while I was instructed to answer only "yes" or "no" to their questions and those of Senator Green—a treatment in marked contrast to your patient hearing of Mr. Lattimore. They endeavored to prove by quotations out of context, and by citing unfavorable reviews of my books,

written by Communist sympathizers, that I was "pro-Nazi," because in my 1949 book called The High Cost of Vengeance, I pleaded for an intelligent, just and merciful policy toward the German people, and showed how those who favored the Morgenthau plan, or similar policies, were usually pro-Soviet. As I saw it, it was obvious that if we continued the policy of dismantling German industries and depriving millions of workers of their jobs, and continued to humiliate and revile the defeated people on the assumption that the Communist theory of collective guilt was valid, we should succeed in driving the despairing German people into the arms of Soviet Russia. The fact that the Morgenthau plan was written by Harry Drexter White, identified as a Communist or a Soviet agent before your committee, proves the truth of my argument that those who advocated a policy of vengeance were usually pro-Soviet. It is because I am both anti-Communist and anti-Nazi that I pleaded for the adoption an American policy which would prevent the Communist conquest of Germany, Japan, and China, and also prevent the revival of naziism. This fact was recognized by many reviewers, including William L. White, in the Saturday Review of Literature, but since you have correctly forbidden Lattimore to quote adverse reviews of my books I cannot quote the favorable ones either. However I hope it may be permissible to have inserted in the record the attached letter which I received from Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, which concerns both The High Cost of Vengeance and The Dream We Lost—republished in an abridged version in 1947 under the title "Lost Illusion."

As regards Mr. Lattimore's citations of my 1939 writings concerning the Chinese Communists, it is true that in 1938 in China at the time of the United Front against Japan, I was, foolishly, led to believe that the Chinese Communists had adopted a liberal policy. I have explained how this came about in my "China Story" which Mr. Lattimore, of course, ignores, however, as soon as I read Edgar Snow's November 1939 interview with Mao Tse-tung, published in the China Weekly Review in January 1940, I realized and acknowledged my mistake. For in that interview Mao made it abundantly clear that the Chinese Communist Party, like all other Communist parties, favored the Nazi side in the World War until Germany attacked Russia. Moreover the first Russo-Japanese pact, in 1940, led to the Chinese Communists directing their fire against the Nationalists instead of against the Japanese. From this time onwards I wrote articles and books showing that the Chinese Communist Party was as completely under Moscow's control as any other Communist Party in the world. All these facts are related in my 1947 book called Last Chance in China.

My lawyers have sent a letter to Mr. Lattimore, a copy of which is attached, demanding that he withdraw his libelous statement that I have a record of pro-Nazi utterances. This statement is, I understand, unprivileged since it was given to the press before Mr. Lattimore read it to your committee.

/s/ FREDA UTLEY.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *ss:* MARCH 21, 1952.

Freda Utley personally appeared before me. Eva B. Adams, a notary public in and for the District of Columbia, Miss Freda Utley, personally known to me, who being sworn acknowledged the above to be her signature and stated that the foregoing statement and that all of the facts therein are true except such facts as may be stated on information and belief and that with respect to such facts she believes them to be true.

[SEAL] /s/ EVA B. ADAMS, *Notary Public.*

My commission expires February 16, 1956.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington 2, D. C., July 1949.

MY DEAR FREDA: I have carefully read your last book, The Hight Cost of Vengeance. Inasmuch as I have read practically every book that you have written and many of your magazine articles, I feel qualified to state that The High Cost of Vengeance is one of your finest contributions to the literary field. I have often told friends that in my opinion your book Lost Illusion will one day be considered a classic. I think that your latest book, The High Cost of Vengeance, has reached similar literary heights. The clear and succinct analysis of developments in Europe should assist many leaders in arriving at sound con-

clusions concerning our unfortunate direction or execution of our responsibilities, essentially in Germany.

Sincere good wishes for your continued success and congratulations upon a real accomplishment in the field of decency in human relationships.

Ever faithfully,

/s/ Al

(A. C. Wedemeyer, Lt. General, G. S. C.)

Mr. Sourwine. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore, what have your dealings been with Walther Heissig?

Mr. Lattimore. I met Mr. Heissig when I was in Peking for about 48 hours, about Christmas time, 1945. He came to see me, and he offered to buy Mongol books for me, and I left some money for him. He did buy the books and sent them to me. Since then, I have been in correspondence with him off and on.

Mr. Morris. Well, now, of what duration was your association with Mr. Heissig at that time? You said for a 48-hour period. You didn't see him continuously for 48 hours.

Mr. Lattimore. No. I saw him for about half an hour.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you subsequently intervene on his behalf, after he had been convicted for 30 years by the military authorities?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I don't believe I did.

Mr. Morris. Did you intervene in any way on his behalf with the military authorities?

Mr. Lattimore. I wrote to General Thorpe, who was at that time in Military Intelligence, and told him that there was such a man, that I understood him to be in Germany, and that he might have information useful to General Thorpe.

Mr. Morris. And do you so testify that that is the only effort you made on behalf of Mr. Heissig?

Mr. Lattimore. I believe so. I answer a little hesitantly, because I believe that some former German journalist in China used something presented to a court in Shanghai, something that I had once written, which he claimed was evidence showing that his ideas were different from those of the Nazis. And where Heissig was included in that, I don't know.

Mr. Morris. And is it your testimony that whatever you did on behalf of Mr. Heissig was done on the basis of your association of about a half hour in this 48-hour period in 1945?

Mr. Lattimore. That's right. Mr. Heissig gave me copies of some of his publications, and I was able to estimate that he was a man who had been in touch with Mongol sources of information for several years at a time when Americans were totally excluded from the region.

Mr. Morris. Had anyone ever told you that Mr. Heissig has transferred his allegiance from the German staff to the Soviet staff?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I never heard that.

Mr. Morris. You had no reason to believe that at all?

Mr. Lattimore. No; I had no reason to believe it at all.

Mr. Morris. What had been your associations with INDUSCO?

Mr. Lattimore. Was I trustee of INDUSCO?

Mr. Morris. I would like your own associations, Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. Lattimore. My own associations I can describe only in a general way, that I was very much in favor of INDUSCO and did a good deal to promote fund raising for INDUSCO in this country and believed that it was a very constructive activity in wartime China.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you still an honorary vice chairman of INDUSCO?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That I couldn't tell you.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Not at the present time. No questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, I did want to ask one question.

In relation to Mr. Fairbank, did you visit Mr. Fairbank in the last year?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is John K. Fairbank.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Let's see. Between March 1951 and now?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Almost certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see him here in Washington, or in Georgetown?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to his home, or his mother's home?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was when he came down here first, expecting to have a hearing, and then the hearing was deferred, and he went back.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to see him to talk over the facts as to what he might say in his statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I had only a very general conversation with him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have any conversation about his attitude toward the committee or what it should be or would be?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In a general way; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it? What was your conversation with him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, that he was going to have a hearing before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but did you have any about his attitude toward the committee, what stand he would take or should take?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in detail; no.

The CHAIRMAN. In any way?

Mr. LATTIMORE. In a general way; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the conversation?

Mr. LATTIMORE. To the effect that he was going to say that the charges against him were totally unjustified.

Senator FERGUSON. Anything else? Anything about the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing at all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Nothing.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him how tough you were going to be to the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I had already appeared before the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, it was after you had appeared and read your statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is just recently that you saw him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I told you it was when he came down here to appear.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, but you did not give me the time.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am sorry. I thought I did. It was when he came down here expecting to be heard, and then his hearing was deferred and he went back. I think maybe a week later he came down again.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how did you come to know that he was down here to make a statement to the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He let us know he was coming down.

Senator FERGUSON. How?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know whether it was by phone or letter, or what it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him a copy of your statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I have sent him a copy of my statement. I think it was before then.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him that he should be more aggressive against the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, sir. I left that to his judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. Nothing was said on that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He did not show me a copy of his statement, so I did not know in detail——

The CHAIRMAN. The question is whether anything was said on that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. On what his attitude should be in relation to the criticism of the committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, he told me that his attitude was going to be that the charges were totally unjustified.

Senator FERGUSON. Had the committee charged John Fairbank?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Many charges had been made against him before this committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had the committee made any charges?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you discuss any charges that the committee had made?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't think we did.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you go to see him for?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He was an old friend.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that all?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to discuss what he might say and his attitude toward the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not in detail; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you come back to "not in detail." Give us what you did say about the committee.

Mr. LATTIMORE. He said that he was going to take a firm stand that the charges against him were unjustified.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that all that was said?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That was all.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I said I was glad to hear it.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did you see him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Maybe an hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was that before you were asked questions here about seeing people that were witnesses or going to be witnesses?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, it was after.

Senator FERGUSON. You went to see him after you were questioned?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire at that point, very briefly: Just to fix the date, Mr. Lattimore, you say that this occasion on which you saw Mr. Fairbank was about a week before he did in fact testify before the committee?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was that.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a day on which he had been scheduled to appear before the committee and it had been deferred?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was the day before he had been scheduled to appear before the committee. And when we went to see him, he said he had just heard that his wife had received a telegram deferring the hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he had come down here expecting to be heard; had he not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He had come down expecting to be heard.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had his statement all ready?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not send it to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had sent him a copy of your statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he had his statement prepared, and he did not show it to you?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you sent your statement up to him, up in Boston?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And how long before was it?

Mr. LATTIMORE. A couple of weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. What part of the statement did you think he would be interested in?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I thought he would be interested in the whole thing.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you write him a letter at the time?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't think I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You just put the statement in an envelope and mailed it to him?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think he was one among a number of people to whom I asked my secretary to mail copies.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is all you know about it, just that you mailed him a copy, no remarks or anything?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That is right, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. But he did not send you a copy of his statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. He sent me one subsequently.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. LATTIMORE. After it had been released.

Senator FERGUSON. Was yours sent to him before it was released?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No.

Senator FERGUSON. After it was released?

Mr. LATTIMORE. It was sent after it was released.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you released it one day and testified the next? Or was that 2 days?

Mr. LATTIMORE. I think it was released simultaneously with testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you mailed it after that?

Mr. LATTIMORE. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought you had released it to the press at least 1 day before.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I don't believe so. I think it was sent to the press at the same time; marked for release at the opening of the hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you sent it to the press?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did any of the papers print any of it before you testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. And had you mailed it to Fairbank before you testified?

Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I believe that all the copies to friends of ours went out, oh, some few days later, and some a week or so later, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We are about to close the hearings. Have you anything you wish to offer or say, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FORTAS. Senator, there are various documents that have been asked for and various types of information that have been asked for. I assume that those may be submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Beyond that I have nothing further to add at this time, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the hearings of the witness, Owen Lattimore, are now closed.

But the committee has something to say. What I am going to say now comes from the unanimous committee that has heard this hearing.

It has been the settled practice of this committee to reserve its conclusions, with respect to the substance of testimony that is taken, until the conclusion of the hearings on the particular matter under investigation. After careful consideration, however, this committee feels it proper at this time to make a statement with respect to the conduct of this witness, as a witness, during the time he has been before us. In doing this, the committee is not reversing its policy of reserving judgment. What the committee has to say now represents facts, not conclusions—not the findings of the committee, but its observations with respect to the deportment and conduct of Mr. Lattimore as a witness.

Mr. Lattimore came here at his own request to appear and testify. He came with a 50-page statement which was no casual document. It bore obvious indicia of careful preparation, and the witness testified he had been working on it for months, and had been assisted by his counsel. It was released to the press before delivery, and Mr. Lattimore's invective was scattered to all parts of the country. Many times when asked if he had facts to support his insulting conclusions, the witness replied that he did not.

The committee has been confronted here with an individual so flagrantly defiant of the United States Senate, so outspoken in his discourtesy, and so persistent in his efforts to confuse and obscure the facts, that the committee feels constrained to take due notice of his conduct. The United States Senate is a constitutional institution, representing the States and the people thereof. A deliberate affront to the Senate of the United States, or to the Congress, is not necessarily an affront to the individuals who compose those bodies, but is an affront to the people of this Nation, who are here represented.

The committee might have had a right to expect that a witness who claimed to be an objective scholar and a patriotic citizen would first objectively analyze the past policy of the United States in the Far East and help point the way to a determination of what has been wrong, and what corrective measures may be required. The committee might have had a right to expect that he would lend eager aid in exposing whatever Communist infiltration there may have been in the Institute of Pacific Relations, or in any other organization in a position to exert influence on the thinking of our diplomats and the conduct of our foreign affairs. The committee might have had a right to expect that Mr. Lattimore's statement would be calm, temperate, and factual.

Instead, the committee was confronted with an initial fusillade of invective, and a consistently evasive, contentious, and belligerent attitude.

Suggestions have been made that the committee should seek to discipline Mr. Lattimore for his contumacious and contemptuous conduct.

Clearly Mr. Lattimore did, on many occasions, stand in contempt of the committee. Clearly he took that position voluntarily and intentionally. Mr. Lattimore used, toward the committee, language which was insolent, overbearing, arrogant, and disdainful. He flouted the committee, he scoffed at the committee's efforts, he impugned the committee's methods, and he slandered the committee's staff. His language was frequently such as to outrage and offend both the committee as a whole and its members individually and, apparently, with intent to do so.

There has been no striking back on the part of the committee. The committee has employed no sanctions against Mr. Lattimore because, through forbearance, it has been found possible to make progress without desciplinary action. Despite Mr. Lattimore's recalcitrance at many points, the committee believes a record has been made covering his essential testimony with respect to the major matters here being investigated.

The fact remains that Mr. Lattimore was allowed to use the witness chair as a rostrum from which to attack the committee, its staff, and its hearings. He was, to use a phrase from his own prepared statement before the committee, "accorded the publicity facilities" of the committee's hearings; and the record shows in many ways that neither was he insensible of his opportunity in that regard, nor did he fail to take advantage of it. There is no other country in the world where a witness before a committee of the principal legislative body of the Nation would be granted any such latitude.

Few witnesses within the memory of the members of this committee have been permitted to use language as intemperate, provocative, and abusive of the committee as Mr. Lattimore used in his prepared statement, which he was permitted to read. No witness, so far as any member of the subcommittee can recall, ever before was given free rein to read, before a Senate committee, a prepared statement so clearly contemptuous of the committee and of the Senate.

The committee is aware that in this direction lies one of the present dangers to our democratic way of life: the fact that there are those in this country today who seek to use the right of free speech in furtherance of their efforts to set up a system within which freedom of speech will not exist. But the committee has preferred to err,

if at all, on the side of allowing the witness too much latitude, rather than on the side of allowing too little. That preference does not include any predilection toward allowing a witness to escape reproof for contumacy.

Contumacy may take many forms, as Mr. Lattimore has demonstrated during his appearances here. Willful unresponsiveness is one of the forms of contumacy often resorted to by disputatious witnesses, and this witness has proved himself expert at disputation. The committee frequently found it extremely difficult to get Mr. Lattimore to give a direct answer; and on numerous occasions he was reluctant to give any responsive answer at all. This witness, who had stated he was "not interested in fine or technical distinctions," proceeded throughout his testimony to split hairs with glib facility.

At times Mr. Lattimore refused to testify with respect to conclusions; at other times, he appeared eager to do so; and he did so testify on a number of occasions. In fact, in some instances he testified vehemently to conclusions which the committee found itself unable to draw from facts of record—as in the case of his testimony that he did not have any influence on United States foreign policy with respect to the Far East.

On this point, as on other matters of substance, the committee prefers to reserve its own conclusions. However, Mr. Lattimore's testimony is significant with respect to the facts. He testified that he wrote a letter to the President of the United States, in 1945, making certain statements with regard to conditions in the Far East, and urging a review of United States foreign policy with respect to the Far East, from which review then top officials of the State Department should be excluded. Mr. Lattimore testified that he saw the President personally, and left with him memoranda suggesting certain courses of action with respect to Japan and China; and that these memoranda included a recommendation for giving a larger measure of high authority to officials with China backgrounds.

Soon thereafter, according to Mr. Lattimore's own testimony, the then top officials of the State Department were replaced, including former Ambassador Grew. Further, the number and importance of top jobs in the State Department, held by persons with China backgrounds, was increased. Finally this witness testified that the policy advocated, shortly thereafter, in the so-called directive of December 15, 1945, on China policy, and which our Government sought to carry out in China, was substantially the same as the policy outlined in Mr. Lattimore's memoranda with respect to China; and that the policy adopted by the United States, with respect to Japan, was substantially the same as the policy with respect to Japan outlined in Mr. Lattimore's memoranda.

These facts, to which Mr. Lattimore testified before this committee, went unmentioned by him during his testimony before the Tydings committee.

Mr. Lattimore has testified to having a type of memory with which the committee is quite familiar. With respect to some matters, he has demonstrated that his memory is extremely good. But he has testified that his memory was unreliable with respect to matters which ordinary men might be expected to remember most clearly. Very few men forget about their visits to the President of the United States, if the number of such visits is small. But Mr. Lattimore, who

said he saw President Truman just once, wanted this committee to believe he had forgotten the incident when he testified before the Tydings committee with respect to his influence on foreign policy.

Mr. Lattimore also has testified before this committee that all during that prior Senate investigation he forgot the fact that he had a desk in the State Department Building for 4, 5, or 6 months during the last war.

The precise extent to which Mr. Lattimore gave untruthful testimony before this committee will never be determined. Human limitations will prevent us from ever attaining the complete knowledge of all his activities which would make it possible to assess each statement he has made and to catalog fully whatever untruths he may have uttered. That he has uttered untruths stands clear on the record. Some of these have been so patent and so flagrant as to merit mention at this time, as illustrative of the conduct and attitude of the witness.

The witness testified concerning an occasion when he had luncheon with the Soviet Ambassador to the United States. The date of this luncheon was later placed as during the period when Soviet Russia elected, for its own purposes, to team up with the Nazi war machine. But in spite of the anxiety which freemen throughout the world experienced at the alliance of those two totalitarian colossi, the witness testified that his luncheon with the Soviet Ambassador took place after the Soviet Union had abandoned its alliance with the Nazis. Confronted later with evidence that the meeting took place during the Hitler-Stalin pact, the witness admitted he had testified incorrectly.

In connection with that same matter, the witness testified there had been much publicity about his appointment as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, at the time of his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, with whom he had discussed the appointment, though the record shows that the announcement of the appointment was not made until 11 days after the luncheon meeting in question.

The witness testified that he never read an article by a Mr. T. A. Bisson which had provoked considerable controversy within the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1943. He testified further that the expressions of opinion in that article were contrary to what he himself was writing at that time. Thereafter the witness identified a letter over his own signature which indicated that he had not only read the Bisson article but had agreed with it; and that the only fault he found with it was that the underlying thoughts could have been expressed more convincingly.

Mr. Lattimore has given us many plausible but differing answers as to when he realized that Frederick V. Field was pro-Communist. The witness and Field have been shown by frequent and extensive testimony to have been closely associated in the Institute of Pacific Relations. The witness initially testified that he discovered that Field was pro-Communist sometime in the 1940's, and not until then. When presented with a letter which he said he received in 1939, and which clearly reflected the Communist expressions of Mr. Field, the witness said that "judging from this letter my memory was in error by about 2 years."

Later in the hearings, the witness was shown to have recommended the same Mr. Field, at a time subsequent to 1939, as a person who could supply personnel for the Defense Advisory Commission. Thereupon Mr. Lattimore avoided admitting that he had recommended to

the Defense Advisory Commission a man whom he knew to be at least pro-Communist, by reversing his preceding testimony.

In going back to his original position, he stated that at the time when he testified his "memory was in error by about 2 years," his admission was not accurate because he was weary from long days of examinations. This explanation took no account of the fact that the admission in question took place during the first day of examination after the witness had finished reading his statement, and apparently ignored the existence of the letter which had impelled the first change in testimony on this point.

The witness made no similar claim of being unsure of himself when he testified erroneously with respect to handling Mr. Lauchlin Currie's mail. In reply to the question "Is it your testimony that you did not, at the request of Lauchlin Currie, take care of his mail at the White House when he was away?" Mr. Lattimore replied, "that certainly is my statement."

Subsequently, Mr. Lattimore identified a letter which he had written in July 1942, which included the statement:

> Currie asked me to take care of his correspondence while he was away and in view of your telegram of today, I think I had better tell you that he has gone to China on a special trip. This news is absolutely confidential until released to the press.

When confronted with this letter, the witness said: "Obviously my memory was inaccurate."

When the witness was asked, in connection with discussion of a trip he had made in 1937 to Communist headquarters in China, "Did you or anyone in your party make prearrangements with the Communist Party in order to get in?" he answered, "None whatever." He was then presented with the text of an article which he had written for the London Times, and was asked if the statements in that article were true. After he affirmed that they were, he read into the record from that article—his own article—the statement: "I sent a letter to the Red Capital by ordinary mail and got in answer—"cordial invitation."

These are all instances of significant untruths, established as such. They all concern matters of obvious importance to this committee in trying to determine the nature of the organization, methods of operation, and influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The committee attempts to draw no conclusions from these matters at this time.

Aside from matters of self-contradiction, the record contains also instances of testimony by this witness concerning matters with respect to which other witnesses have testified to the exact opposite. Some of these instances concern matters which are highly relevant to the subject of the committee's inquiry and which are substantial in import.

For example: Over a period of 2 years, first before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, later before this committee in executive session, and then again before us in open session, Mr. Lattimore stated that he did not know that Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi was a Communist. Mr. Ch'ao-ting Chi was a man shown to have been an associate of the witness, and the witness admitted the association. But Mr. Lattimore testified that no one had told him that Chi was a Communist, or shown him a report that Chi was a Communist, or given him any reason whatever to believe that Chi was a Communist.

On the other hand, Prof. Karl Wittfogel of Columbia University, a witness before this committee, and E. Newton Steeley of the Review Board of the Civil Service Commission, have given testimony that flatly contradicts Mr. Lattimore's clear and unequivocal assertions in this regard.

Another instance concerns the question of whether Mr. Lattimore knew that a certain German Communist who wrote under the pseudonym of Asiaticus for the publication Pacific Affairs while Lattimore was editing it, was, in fact, a Communist, Mr. Lattimore has flatly asserted that he did not know or have reason to believe this writer to be a Communist. Contra, the record contains the testimony of Prof. Karl Wittfogel that he did tell Mr. Lattimore about the Communist background and the Communist affiliation of Asiaticus. Minutes of meetings in Moscow, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a letter written by Mr. Lattimore, are among the items of evidence in the record which also purport to show that Mr. Lattimore knew or believed Asiaticus to be a Communist writer.

One of the most important, relevant, and substantial questions respecting which the committee has been seeking the truth is whether when this witness was working with, and publishing articles for, certain Communists, he knew them to be Communists. The finding on this question is essential to a proper characterization of a whole series of actions by Mr. Lattimore, and will directly affect the committee's ultimate findings with respect to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The shaping of United States policy with respect to China was a factor in the success of communism in that land, in the establishment of firm roots for Soviet influence in all Asia and in the subsequent ordeal through which United States boys now are being taken in Korea, if this policy in its initial stages, or at any time, was affected by acts or strategems on the part of anyone having any slightest purpose except the welfare of this Nation, it would be a matter not to be lightly dealt with, nor one which the American people should easily overlook or forget. The intimate knowledge which this witness had of Asia and of Asiatic affairs, coupled with his deliberate and adroit attempts to mold American thinking with respect to those affairs, including his effort to establish certain concepts, in the mind of the Chief Executive of the United States, necessarily bring this witness within the orbit of any realistic appraisal of this whole situation. When, in the face of the record, he undertook before this committee a deliberate attempt to deny or cover up pertinent facts, this witness placed himself in a most unenviable position.

The hearing is closed.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., Friday, March 21, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

Appendix I

Exhibit No. 470

[Source: Pacific Affairs, vol XIII, No. 3, September 1940, pp. 279–319]

The United States, China, and the World Market

(By William Brandt)

"1. A MODERN MYTH

"The only thing that seems to weather revolution and war in the Far East is the myth of a Chinese market of 450 million legendary customers. Disregarding the historical conditions of the problem, the existence of the Chinese market is taken simply for granted, as if the only things to be decided were how to get at it and how to divide it. American writers like to describe this market in rosy colors as a prospect for American industry; in dark colors when they discuss it as a possible vehicle of Japanese competition. Japanese writers like to expatiate on the disaster of this 'vast market' falling to Russia.

"The truth is that the market problem of China is inseparable from the problem of the world market. No new market of world importance can be opened up without new investments of capital on a very large scale, and moreover, unless new markets are opened up, capital itself cannot continue to accumulate and grow. This is the hurdle, and it is capital that has to take the hurdle, both for the sake of itself and for the sake of the market.

"The undeveloped areas of the world that can still be tapped by capital are inhabited by the majority of the population of the globe—the 'prospective customers' of our modern mythology. Geographically, their heaviest concentration is in Asia, while by far the heaviest concentration of capital is in Western Europe and North America. These are the antipodes of our economic globe. The difficulty is that exchange between the opposite extremes of accumulated capital and undeveloped market is not the same thing as integration of the two in an expanded world order that is organically whole. Even if the backward countries were to be subordinated to the rule of capital, there are well-nigh insurmountable obstacles—economic, social, and political—to incorporation of them within the domain of capital.

"China is a huge potential market. The emphasis lies on the word 'potential'. Before speculating about its dimensions, the conditions that have so long kept it merely potential should be examined. Two processes in the operation of capital must be borne in mind—that by which it is accumulated and that by which it is reinvested for the further development of the market. These processes, moreover, work at two levels—the level obtaining in the advanced countries while they are developing their own internal markets, and the level of more acute competition when the internal markets have been saturated and the advanced countries turn to the development of the world market.

"These two levels are by no means entirely separate, because as long as the internal market in the advanced countries is capable of substantial further development, there is a real world market; capital can choose between investment at home and investment abroad. The world market can be justly thought of in terms of unlimited potentialities. After the saturation of the internal market, the horizon narrows. The world market is no longer an unknown quantity full of promising potentialities, but well-known, circumscribed, scanned and measured, even acquired (in the form of colonies), but with its development still down at the level of unrealized potentialities. When this phase has been reached, the problem of the external market for the advanced countries merges into the problem of the internal market in the backward countries. To expand the external market requires the development of the internal market in the backward countries.

"This describes, diagrammatically as it were, the situation of the world today. In India, the other British colonies, and China, alone, capital confronted with about one billion economically backward people. These people are becoming increasingly and desperately conscious both of the insupportability of their own backwardness and of the hopelessness of sufficient capital to lift them out of it. The very future of mankind depends, of course, on the reestablishment of normal economic intercourse between the advanced countries and this immense backward area. Can this be done by the development, through capital investment, of the stagnant market? The difficulty is aggravated by the fact that in China, which has become symbolical of the backward area as a whole, there is already going on a titanic struggle for political liberation from the economic deadlock. There is, accordingly, no better approach to the problem of the world market as a whole than through analysis of the different concepts and policies that interpenetrate and conflict with each other on the Chinese field of battle.

"2. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE CHINA MARKET

"The twin principles of equal opportunity and of the territorial and administrative integrity of China imply the interest of American capital in the industrialization and the development of the internal market of China as a prerequisite and concomitant of the penetration of American enterprise. Directly opposed to the American view and the American interest is the attitude of Japanese imperialism, which is openly inimical to the building up of native industries and the development of the internal market in China. As far back as 1932 the Japanese Foreign Office made clear this standpoint in a memorandum to the League of Nations: 'the development of capitalist enterprise in China will make the economic activities of all foreign nations in China very difficult or even impossible to carry on.' [1]

"The truth, as brought to light by subsequent events, is that it has not been 'the development of capitalist enterprise' but Japanese aggression launched for the specific purpose of preventing the development of China by international enterprise, that has made 'the economic activities of all foreign nations in China very difficult or even impossible to carry on.' The British, who in 1932 lent a willing ear to the Japanese argument, were the first to learn later on, with an unpleasant shock, the real meaning of it. The point, however, is that here we have concisely stated two diametrically opposed conceptions of the China market: the Japanese 'New Order in East Asia' and the American 'Open Door.' As the Japanese and American aspects of a problem which is of world scale, they correspond directly to the difference in the structure of the internal market in Japan and in America.

"Between these two extremes stands the British conception, which can best be illustrated by excerpts from a memorandum which Sir Arthur Salter submitted to the Chinese Government:

> "Most of the heavy industries (apart from the 'extractive' industries) must probably be considered unsuitable for China at her present stage of development. They usually demand very expensive capital equipment and need a large market.[2]

"The argument here is that the establishment of heavy industry (or, for that matter, as will be seen presently, of any large-scale industry) is impossible on account of the lack of a large market. It is not pointed out that a large market on the other hand, could be developed only by the establishment of large-scale industry. This second point, though crucial, is evaded, and thus the statement of the market problem in China is left in a kind of twilight. After discarding from the outset the possibility of large-scale industry in China (presupposing, by implication, the impossibility of large-scale capital export to China) Sir Arthur continues:

> "Since, with the exceptions indicated, China's industrial development must depend mainly upon the purchasing power of the Chinese public, it cannot be too emphatically stated that for China industrialization is not an alternative to agricultural development. On the contrary, the increase in the agriculturist's margin of production must be the essential foundation on which industrial development must be built.
>
> "* * * For these as for other reasons, the increase of the production of the average agriculturist remains the fundamental problem of China's economy, whether that increase is secured by extension of the areas of

[1] Japan Foreign Office, the Present Conditions in China, 1932, p. 39.
[2] China and Silver, New York, 1934, p. 93.

cultivable land; or a reduction of population (enabling the average farm holding to be enlarged); or improvements in methods of agriculture; or the development of handicraft or small rural industries by means of which those living on the land can supplement their agricultural production.[3]

"The British position is, as can be seen, half-way between the American and the Japanese. Native industries and the development of the internal market in China should be encouraged, but only to a strictly limited extent; there should be industrialization but not much of it. The British expert even prescribed that the rhythm of development should proceed 'stage by stage and gradually' (p. 89)..

"Yet at that very time (1934), economic and social catastrophe was closing in on China—not stage by stage and gradually, but by leaps and bounds. In this, incidentally, China was no exception. In no country in the world has industrialization ever proceeded stage by stage and gradually. Without exception, industrialization takes place by leaps and bounds, this being in the very nature of the accumulation of capital. In China, as a late-comer, a backward country existing side by side with very highly developed countries, this historical economic law of suddenly and forcibly accentuated development has worked with even more pronounced effect.

"The core of Sir Arthur Salter's argument, and the key to the traditional British view of the way in which the development of China should proceed, is in his statement that 'the essential foundation of industrial development.' He does not discuss the practical aspects of 'increasing the agriculturist's margin of production,' but they have been vividly described by a Chinese investigator:

> "While landlords take the lion's share of the products of the peasants in the form of rent, tax collectors who are usualy also landlords and merchants, take another considerable share of the form of levies, taxes, subtaxes, and so forth. Debts of the previous year often compel the peasant to give up the remainder of his meager earnings. If anything is left after the harvest it is as a rule little more than nothing. All he can do to maintain life and carry on his tasks during the rest of the year is to go to the landlords, pawnshops, local gentry, grain dealers, groceries, and sometimes rich peasants, to start the vicious circle of borrowing once again.[4]

"From this description it is plain that, under the conditions actually obtaining in China, the 'increase in the agriculturist's margin of production' is no solution at all, but, on the contrary, a factor effectively retarding both the industrialization of China and the development of its internal market. A radical change in the agricultural feudalism and peasant economy of China is the indispensable historical prerequisite both to industrialization and to the development of China's internal market. The fact must be faced what such a change would be not only radical but revolutionary, and that it would, in its incipient phases at least, tend inevitably to restrict drastically 'the agriculturist's margin of production': although—and because—it would tremendously increase the agriculturist's margin of subsistence, and would save millions from famine. The agriculturist's margin of production is that part of the results of his labor which goes to the Chinese landlord, usurer, and taxgatherer, and to foreign capital. The practice of increasing this 'margin,' by the process of tightening the farmer's belt beyond the limit of human endurance, is precisely what has conjured up economic and social chaos in China.

"Significantly, the Japanese experts do not try to confine the issue to such empty generalities. They are not afraid to go into the economic and social structure of China; but then, they want to prove a point slightly different from that of the British. The Japanese Foreign Office memorandum already cited gives the following picture of the economic and social structure in which, it asserts, Chinese Communism is rooted:

> "VI. Factors contributing to the rise of the Chinese Communist movement and its future.
>
> "* * * (2) Economic Factors:
>
> "Ever since the opening of China to foreign commerce, not only the cost of living has been increased through the introduction of foreign merchandise, but the subsidiary industries of the farming community such as sericulture, cotton spinning, and tea growing have declined. These economic factors, combined with political factors enumerated above such as civil war, over-

[3] Op. cit., pp. 94 sqq.

[4] "Merchant Capital and Usury Capital in Rural China," by Leonard T. K. Wu, in Far Eastern Survey, New York, March 25, 1936.

taxation and squeeze, have completely ruined agricultural communities. According to statistics, in the 4 years between 1914 and 1918 lands left uncultivated increased by 490,000,000 mu and farming households decreased by 6,000,000. In 1 year, from 1918 and 1919, the percentage of peasant proprietors was reduced from 53 to 49 percent, while that of tenant farmers increased from 26 to 32 percent. The middle-class farmers became poor peasants, and poor peasants turn proletarians. The industries in China being still too undeveloped to provide work for the vast proletarian mass, the majority of the rural unemployed become either bandits or vagabonds, soldiers or medicants.

"Of the total Chinese population of 400 millions, approximately 336 million are said to be agricultural. Of these, 55 percent do not own any land: 20 percent belong to the class of petty farmers possessing 1 to 10 mu of land: 12 percent are middle-class farmers possessing from 10 to 30 mu of land; so-called rich farmers owning 30 mu or more and still larger landed proprietors make up only 13 percent.

"* * * It is easy to see how the land policy of the Communists received the endorsement of an overwhelming majority of the Chinese rural population. * * * The fact that the Party had behind it Russia, which has renounced unequal treaties and certain rights and interests concluded and acquired in China during the Tsarist regime, won popular approval and confidence in its movement.[5]

"This picture of Chinese economic and social reality, drawn with a few bold strokes, contrasts strangely with the prim blue-print of the British expert. Withal, the two pictures are complementary. From both it is plain that there is economic breakdown and chaos in China. The protagonist of the status quo tries to get around this by a scheme for making the peasant, who already suffers most, suffer a little more. The antagonist of the status quo faces the real conditions boldly, because he is about to tackle them in his own way, by making them an excuse for aggression. The Japanese endeavors to make a strong case for himself out of the appalling conditions which actually exist, whereas the attempt to hush them up is the weak point of the British argument. The British expert expects a peaceful development 'stage by stage and gradually,' the Japanese braces himself for a violent attempt to overthrow the status quo; that is why he emphasizes its intolerability.

"The treatise of the British adviser could be reduced in simple, undiplomatic and unacademic language to the following propositions: 'Capital export to China is ruled out by circumstances. Let us, then, omit these circumstances, for they would mean either Japanese aggression or Chinese antifeudal and anti-imperialist revolution, or both. Either possibility is distasteful. The best advice I can give in the circumstances is to muddle through.'

"The Japanese counterproposition could be summarized in equally blunt language, as follows: 'The status quo is very honorable. However, considering the circumstances, particularly that absence of large-scale capital export from the West which is tacitly assumed by the British expert to be the cornerstone of the status quo, it is clearly impossible. The best thing I can do in the circumstances is to attack.'

"In actual fact, there are three links in the chain: (i) absence of large-scale capital exports from the West; (ii) Japanese aggression; (iii) Chinese struggle for national liberation. The decisive link is the Chinese struggle for national liberation, for by its final outcome will be determined the new forms of economic intercourse between China and the rest of the world.

"Both China's foreign policy and the policy of the Kuomintang within China are intimately tied up with the character of the unfolding Chinese Revolution since Sun Yat-sen. The one important point of orientation in foreign policy is the answer to the question whether or not Western capital help is indispensable for the success of the revolution. The answer itself depends on a definite view of the character of the revolution. If it is believed, as Sun Yat-sen originally believed, that the Chinese Revolution must lean, in order to be successful, on Western capital, the only policy that is possible is one which is resigned to the inevitably of semi-independence. The signal lesson of postwar history has been that China cannot successfully evolve 'stage by stage and gradually' from semi-independence to full independence; though it took some time for Dr. Sun himself to realize that Western capital would support the Chinese Revolution only as the rope supports the hanged man. It was the flat refusal of his memorandum

[5] The Present Conditions in China, Appendix III, "Communism in China," pp. 29 sqq.

to the Versailles Conference which taught him the crucial lesson that the success of the Chinese Revolution could not be staked on Western capital help.

"The whole conception had to be revised. It became obvious to Sun Yat-sen that the road to complete independence did not lead through an intermediary stage of semi-independence. A different course had to be envisaged. The concept of a period of 'tutelage,' before achieving complete independence and full popular sovereignty, which had been a cardinal part of his theory, had to be greatly modified if not eliminated altogether. For the period of tutelage was based on the assumption of a relatively long period of peaceful development, assured by foreign capital help. The realization that China would have to shift for itself reacted on the content and character of the revolution. It is a superficial and one-sided observation to say that from here on the revolution assumed an antiforeign complexion. This was a mere symptom at most, the thing that struck the foreign eye.

"The fundamental change consisted in grasping the only alternative left, in the absence of large-scale foreign capital help: the large-scale mobilization of the people; the speeding-up of the rate of the revolution; struggle instead of tutelage; a reaching out for complete independence after the hope of an intermediate stage of semi-independence turned out to be a dangerous self-deception. This resulted in a fundamental transformation of Sun Yat-senism. With the changed prospect of the Chinese Revolution thus envisaged by Sun Yat-sen before his death, a corresponding change took place in the character, content, leadership, and social composition of the revolution. With the mobilizing of the peasants the leadership shifted away from the radical intelligentsia to proletarian and semiproletarian elements. An agrarian upheaval became manifestly the content of the revolution. In foreign policy there was a degree of reorientation toward Soviet Russia, initiated by Sun Yat-sen himself.

"The bulk of the Kuomintang officialdom, however, was by no means ready yet to accept this legacy of Sun Yat-sen. Its leadership contested, frightened by the plebeian elements and methods of the agrarian revolution, it began to lean heavily (politically speaking, for its life) on the support of foreign capital. It lashed out violently against the agrarian revolution and solicited and got the support of Western capital for its military campaigns.

"It testifies to the greatness of character and acumen of Sun Yat-sen that he was able to discard the illusion of semi-independence after his experience with the Versailles peacemakers. Chiang Kai-shek's wasteful efforts to stamp out Communism (i. e., to crush the agrarian revolution) were a fateful departure from this final, mature form of Sun Yat-senism. The attempt to attain national salvation by pleasing foreign capital was futile. It did not achieve its end but courted Japanese aggression. Wang Ching-wei, the most consistent protagonist in the Kuomintang of leaning on foreign capital as a method of keeping down the 'excesses' of the agrarian revolution and as a guarantee of Chinese semi-independence, ended up as a Japanese puppet. The Japanese themselves appreciated better than Wang Ching-wei what was actually going on. The memorandum quoted above shows that they were keenly aware of the content and character of the struggle between Kuomintang and Communists to determine the agrarian future of China and watched its outcome. They launched their aggression when it became clear that the Kuomintang could not become an instrument of Japanese tutelage or, in their vernacular, could not 'cope with the red menace.'

"It was during the abortive period of attempted 'tutelage,' between 1927 and the beginning of the United Front in 1937, that the problem of the China market and of its development by foreign capital was threshed out, all of its conditions posed, its contending forces weighed, its possibilities tested. Any analysis that tries to solve the problem by overlooking this process and any theoretical solution of the problem that is not based on the analysis of it is bound to be barren.

3. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: TWO EXTREMES OF MARKET DEVELOPMENT

"In the classic examples of capitalism, in Western Europe and the United States, the creation of the market by merchant capital and its development by industrial capital occurred in two successive large-scale economic and social transformations. In the first stage only enough capital had been accumulated to subordinate the products of handicrafts and home industries to the control of merchants. In the second stage capital had become vigorous enough to take over the whole process of production. The transition was not primarily a technological performance (as the label 'industrial revolution' suggests), but required also a new structure of capital and a new grouping of society.

"The main source of the growth of capital at the first stage was the merchant's profit on his transactions with the small semi-independent producers. This primitive precapitalistic method of accumulation has a great survival vitality, and may be either a progressive or a retarding influence, according to circumstances. Even after it has ceased to be the predominant method of accumulating capital, it often survives after the transition to the second stage. It is a concomitant of the Feudal survivals which are never completely eliminated even in the most highly developed countries. It is the degree of survival that is important. If the particular circumstances permit the preponderance of merchant and usuary capital to survive as the prevalent method of accumulating capital, then the jump from the first to the second stage in the evolution of capital cannot be made; the economy, disintegrated but not yet lifted to a higher level, sticks at the stage of transition. This is as much as to say that the market has been created to a certain extent, but is not yet being developed.

"This has been the case with China, where, as Wu expresses it, 'The operation of the present system of usuary-merchant-landlordism must lead to disintegration of rural China . . . Usury-merchant-landlordism in China is destroying instead of creating markets.' [6]

"In the evolution of the world market the United States represents the highest stage of development and China the lowest. Japan, where the transition from the first to the second stage of the evolution of the market has been accomplished, but in a peculiar way and not to the required extent, stands historically between the American and the Chinese extremes. In comparing the development of the market in these three countries, it is necessary to take into account firstly the development of the internal market, and secondly the internal market as a stepping stone to the world market.

"The visible signs of a developed internal market are: (i) a railroad network stretching over the whole national area; (ii) a customs union and the introduction of a national tariff; (iii) a unified and centralized currency. All three of these have been in existence in the United States since the sixties, and all three are still lacking in China.

"It is significant that Japanese aggression in its drive to destroy the incipient internal market in China struck crippling blows at precisely these three things, by occupying the railroads,[7] seizing the customs, and undermining Chinese currency through smuggling and through compulsory circulation of the yen.[8]

"Taking the different countries historically, it may first be noted that in the United States the moving frontier of westward migration signified the development of the internal market. Railroad building was important in effecting both the westward expansion of the market from the trading and manufacturing centers of the Atlantic coast and the transition from merchant enterprise to full industrialism. Until this time, manufacturing had been an appendage of trading and shipping. It is important to make it clear, however, that they were not the cause which created it. The appearance of a new kind of market was not simply a technological miracle resulting from 'the spanning of the continent.' Both the market and the railroads were created by capital, and as far as the order of priority is concerned, the railroads followed in the wake of the expanding market. Having followed the market, however, they also created new capital and thus contributed to the additional expansion of the market. This they were able to do because the original great land grants to the railroad builders were in effect a levy in advance which converted part of the purchasing power of the farmers into capital, since the very large tracts of land turned over to the railroads drove up prices for all comers. Capital was thus created by a form of expropriation which had a distinctly political tone.

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[6] Leonard T. K. Wu, op. cit., p. 68.

[7] "At the end of 1938, fully two-thirds, or 6,500 kilometers, of the railway mileage of China proper, was in territory occupied by Japanese military forces, whereas less than half of that amount, or about 3,200 kilometers, remained under Chinese control." Economic Review of Foreign Countries, 1939. U. S. Department of Commerce, p. 212.

[8] "Already, China is staggering along under five different currency issues, all of differing values. First, there is the national currency which looks to Chungking for the maintenance of exchange values; second, there is the (Japanese-controlled) Federal Reserve Bank of North China, the attempts of which at currency stabilization have been a lamentable failure; third, there is the Japanese yen, circulating in the coastal regions, which is an unknown quantity; fourth, there are the Japanese military notes, an entirely unsecured issue totalling unknown millions, and fifth, there is the Hua-Hsing currency, issued at Shanghai by the Bank founded by the defunct Nanking reformed government (Japanese-controlled).

"If the Wang Ching-wei regime should ill-advisedly issue a sixth, it is contended that the confusion would be terrific and that probably all the interrelated issues would crash." Despatch from Hallett Abend, in New York Times, April 9, 1940.

"There followed a second process of expropriation, or preemption, more economic in tone, which transferred part of the purchasing power of the farmer to railroad capital, through the operation of freight rates. This in turn led to disparity between agricultural and industrial freight rates, and to such phenomena as the freight differential of the Southern States. In the economic history of capital, this meant that the railroads led the way in the first large-scale merging of industrial and banking capital. In social history, this was accompanied by migration on a national scale from the farm to the city. To say that this widened the social gap and spread the social differential between agricultural and industry is another way of describing the development of the market.

"China represents the other extreme of market development and railroad building. The spanning of the American continent was a saga of unbridled competition in creating and developing a vast internal market. The complete failure to span the Chinese continent, on the other hand, was the result of stultifying competition between the foreign powers for shares in the undeveloped Chinese market.[9] The internal market in China was paralyzed, its economy caught in the framework of transition between the trading centers of the eastern seacoast dominated by the foreigners, and the huge precapitalistic hinterland of the west. China's mass-migration to the west has not followed in the wake of the railroads but has been an exodus to escape the Japanese.

"Is railroad building, in the circumstances, the panacea? To suggest it is to put the cart before the horse, the building of railroads before the conditions requisite to it. Sixty million refugees have to be rehabilitated, and the problem that led up to this catastrophe has to be solved before the problem of the railroads can be dealt with. Under the conditions which now exist it is actually the Japanese military machine that is blazing the trail of the China market. It is therefore necessary to see what Japanese aggression means in economic terms.

"Reduced to its economic content, Japanese aggression is a primitive attempt to accumulate capital by land-grabbing and mass expropriation, under military sanctions. The resort to military methods was possible partly because the organization of the state power in Japan provided for military power, and particularly because in China itself the crude war-lord method of 'raising capital' (thus retarding the development of the internal market) had been preserved for an unduly long period by the intricate interlocking of feudalistic vested interests in the interior and imperialistic vested interests on the fringe of China. The way had thus been opened for Japan, because already, for a long time, outside imperialistic influences had operated as Chinese inside influences by reinforcing the native feudalistic elements, which in the specialized form of warlords took on an imperialistic tinge by becoming puppets of the great powers.

"This peculiar 'peaceful' set-up of a combined feudal-imperaliastic stranglehold on the Chinese internal market laid China open to military aggression by Japan, the very power which combines the characteristics of both feudalism and imperialism in the most concentrated form. It is accordingly not surprising that the Japanese-sponsored puppet regimes draw whatever strength they have from Japanese imperialism and the feudal landlord-merchant-usurer survivals in China. They represent an alliance of these two forces. Since their failure is a fair index of Chinese national unification achieved in the process of struggle against imperialist aggression, their abolition will mean riddance from both feudalistic and imperialistic vested interests.

"The disappearance of feudalism is clearly an indispensable prerequisite for the development of the Chinese internal market. This factor is bound to have a decisive influence on the forms the economic development of China is going to assume after the ending of the war. It might proceed under forms different from those we are familiar with under the name 'internal market.' One of these forms may be discernible already under war conditions in the shape of the industrial cooperatives of Ssuch'uan. A deviation in economic development away from the customary market form is, in turn, bound to have a decisive influence on the form taken by Western capital help and investment. The least one can say is that capital export to China is not likely to retain the form of a financial venture, necessitating by its very nature a risk premium.

"Not to recognize that Japan's attempt to conquer China is also an attempt to link up with an anachronistic internal system from which China is struggling to free itself means to lose orientation and to forsake objectivity of analysis.

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[9] China and the United States have about the same area in square miles, but the railroad mileage of China proper is about 9,000 miles, against 238,000 miles in the United States. Statesman's Year Book, London, 1940.

It means underestimating the character of the war and accepting the Japanese contention that it is a mere 'incident' and at the same time overestimating the possibilities of a Japanese imperialism which pretends that it is establishing a 'New Order' where in actual reality there is nothing but the unbridled reign of feudal imperialism and a relapse into pre-capitalistic methods of colonial rule.

"If the Japanese attempt at conquest goes no further than its present methods of plunder and expropriation, the great future market in China, in the modern capitalistic sense, can be neither created nor developed. This is indeed the insuperable difficulty that now confronts Japanese imperialism in China, after its military successes. The various 'Development Companies' remain in the stage of wistful projects.

"The point can be made plain by a simple comparison. It is as if the railroad entrepreneurs in America, after having accepted the land grants and pocketed the money for the railroad shares they had sold, had expressed heart-felt appreciation to the Government and to the public in general and retired with the curt statement that conditions for building the railroads were not favorable. Nothing of the sort happened, however, because conditions were favorable: a steadily swelling stream of capital, combined with a steady migration from the farms to industry, created the market which capital needed.

"These are the very conditions that are lacking in China, and in Japan too. The flood of landless peasants from the villages is there all right, but there is no steady flow of capital accumulation, no carrying strength of an internal market, with which it can combine. The primitive method of accumulating capital by military aggression is not in itself enough of a lever to create and develop the market. On the contrary, it is a steam roller destroying whatever is left of the internal market. Japan cannot make good economically in China.

"It is a reliable index of the degree of structural decay in Japanese economy that what is required most urgently for its maintenance is no longer additional markets, but new capital. It cannot recover through increased commodity exports, but must have capital imports for reexport. After the annexation of Manchuria the then Minister of Finance warned the Japanese Diet that capital export to Manchuria would acutely endanger the yen. Japanese imperialism launched its wholesale aggression against China when it found itself cornered by the limitations of its own internal market; when the export drive had suffered a set-back after making the yen more rickety than before; when the urgency of capital exports had been superimposed on the necessity of increased commodity exports.

"A military campaign supported by huge armaments is, of course, a form of capital export, however freakish. It means that the capital of the country is drained, concentrated, and switched for the purpose of forcibly expanding the external market. But it has to be followed up by 'peaceful' or 'genuine' capital exports in order to make the original outlay effective. It is here that the Japanese failed. Japan's rulers obviously reckoned on the help, whether grudging or friendly, of the great capital exporting countries of the West, eager to develop China as a market. In 1936, the Japanese promoter Aikawa was publicizing schemes of this kind; but help was not forthcoming, mainly because of effective Chinese military resistance, beginning in 1937, and the American reluctance to cooperate in the 'New Order in East Asia.' All that Japan's rulers could do in the circumstances was to complain about regrettable Western misunderstandings and misinterpretation of their intentions, and to fall back on a crude feudalistic monopolization of China's economic resources in the occupied areas. Ironically, this way of ruining the internal market is entrusted to what are known as 'development companies.'

"Turning now to the question of the way in which the transition is made, in economic history, from the mercantile age to that of industrialism, the point must be made that a tariff-protected internal market constitutes the economic foundation underlying the political process of national unification and the emergence of the modern national state. National industrial monopolization of the internal market is effected by the tearing down of internal tariff barriers and the erection of an outer tariff wall. The McKinley tariff is a classic case of protectionism designed to monopolize the internal market. The fact that in the same period Free Trade held sway in England was due to the unique historical circumstances that British capital virtually monopolized the world market. British Free Trade was doomed when Britain lost this dominance after the first World War.

"Against this background of the normal course of market development, China's tariff experience stands out in sharp contrast. The Chinese tariff, far from being a means of protecting the internal market for Chinese capital, was from

the outset a means by which the undeveloped Chinese market was laid under tribute to foreign capital, to which Chinese tariff revenues were from the beginning mortgaged.

"After the conditions for industrialization and the full development of the internal market were established in the United States, the advocates of free silver, who were the spokesmen of the farming interest, were defeated by the irresistible sweep of capital. Resistance to a unified currency was broken down by the forces promoting an unhampered development of the internal market. In China, on the other hand, the fact that the national economy 'stuck' at the stage of transition is reflected in the Chinese currency problem. The retention of silver as the metallic base of currency means that China did not complete the full transition from commodity economy to money economy. Silver is money, but not exactly and not definitively; for a certain high level of economic maturity must be attained before precious metal can be genuinely invested with the money function. This can be seen from the way in which a flight into silver, and a flight of silver away from the interior and away from the country altogether, is a normal occurrence whenever an economic adversity befalls China. At a higher level of economic development, such flights could be counteracted by capital movement. Silver has been looked upon, however, more as a valuable commodity than a means of exchange. That is why it is always on the jump for hoarding instead of for accumulation.

"Silver, in this behavior, reflects the predominance of mercantile, preindustrial exchange within China and in China's dealings with the more highly developed outside world. Through the manipulation of silver China has been made the prey of speculation and economic exploitation. At the same time, silver can serve this function only because of the 'sticking' of China's economy at the stage of transition. The 'silver question' is accordingly a sympton rather than an underlying cause; in case of economic or political adversity the interior is drained of silver, which flees to Shanghai and from there abroad. Thus the very presence of trading outposts of the advanced countries accentuates the prevailing economic stagnation and retrogression. Sir Arthur Salter states the facts:

> "China indeed, needing capital development more than almost any country, is not being capitalized but 'decapitalized' * * *
>
> "The result is not only a starving of new development but also, since the capital is in the form of silver, the country's currency, a secondary form of currency deflation, forcing prices down further. * * * The actual mechanism of trade is, indeed, in many cases breaking down.[10]

"What Sir Arthur does not see in that capital in the form of silver is, in China, a symbol of the fact that capital has been kept down at the lower historical level of merchant and usury capital. What has kept it at this level has been the fact that it has been easier for foreign capital to draw tribute from the internal market of China than to make it part of the world market. That is the point.

"With the precipitous fall in the price of silver after the onset of the world crisis China's economy was hit particularly hard. The devaluation of the chief gold currencies increased the price of silver in terms of gold, and thus increased the economic tribute sent abroad by China. The silver buying program of the United States Treasury intensified the drain of silver out of China. Eventually, in November 1935, China was forced of silver and left with a 'managed currency.' Managed by what forces, and to what ends? Chinese currency has always been managed, both in the sense of having a shaky national standing and in the sense of being at the mercy of the economic backwardness of China in its intercourse with the advanced countries. Silver stood for the export of economic tribute, made more onerous by the lack of capital imports.

"At this point it is useful to apply the comparison with America to the history of Japanese market development, in which three periods can be conveniently distinguished. The unification and monopolization of the internal market occurred simultaneously in the two countries, with the Meiji Restoration in Japan and the Civil War in the United States. However, for a number of reasons, feudal survivals were destroyed more thoroughly during and after the upheaval in the United States than they were in Japan. This resulted in the significant difference that the development of the internal market in Japan instead of proceeding by a relatively smooth evolution, was prompted spasmodically by subsequent wars abroad.

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[10] Salter, op. cit., pp. 7, 8, 11.

"In America the internal market had great scope in which to open out peacefully. This even mad a mitigating effect on the character of the war against Spain in 1898:

> "If the State Department and the Navy could have found adequate support in Congress, the American flag would have been hoisted in Eastern waters long before the Philippines were wrested from Spain in 1898.
>
> "But it took some time for the country at large to see the spheres of usefulness early discovered by the men in high posts of observation. Indeed the tariff policy introduced by Seward's party colleagues helped to relax temporarily the early economic interest in Pacific imperialism. Well protected by high duties in competing goods. American manufacturers commanded for many years after 1861 an immense and growing market at home, and, until that was saturated, felt no overpowering need for more foreign trading facilities.[11]

"It is interesting to compare this 'mild' American colonial war with the almost contemporary Japanese war against China in 1894–95. The Japanese war, instead of being 'toned down' by the desire to tend to opportunities at home, was already stimulated by the limitations of the internal market. Lack of opportunity at home encouraged adventure abroad.

"By 1914 the situation had changed so fundamentally that America began to follow the pattern sketched earlier by Japanese development. America's entry into the war was urged on by the limitations of the internal market. War activity, economic and military, promoted a far-reaching and sudden increase in America's agricultural and industrial production apparatus, and brought about a temporary expansion of the market to absorb the increased producing capacity. It was the most important turning point in modern history. The country with the strongest capital equipment entered a claim to an adequate share in the world market. All the appalling difficulties and vicissitudes of American economy, gravely accentuated after the outbreak of the Great Crisis in 1929, however, serve to drive home the signal lesson that for this greatest and best developed industrial country development of the world market by no means follows automatically on the acquisition of a 'fair share' in the market. The claim can be asserted by economic and political pressure, but actual development responds only to an increase in capital exports.

"At present we are living under conditions of war, on a world scale, for a further redivision of the world market. We should be warned, however, that the prospect of redivision does not of itself warrant the expectation of a development of the Chinese market, or any undeveloped sector of the world market, 'after peace is concluded.' It is essential to remember that the nondevelopment of the Chinese market was one of the chief underlying factors in unleashing the second world war which has followed on Japan's aggression in 1931. It is an illusion to think that China will arise, out of the holocaust, a 'huge market.'

"It would be far more reasonable to assume, by projecting into the future trends that already exist, that life will reassert itself in forms of human intercourse modified by sloughing off some of what have hitherto been essential characteristics of the market, the operation of capital, and their concomitant forms of social and international relations.

"The incipient industrial cooperatives of China are one of these prophetic trends. They certainly represent a step in the direction of overcoming the market form of economic relations, for what we mean by 'the market' is not simply the exchange of goods, but the exchange of goods under strictly defined historical conditions: hitherto, between private producers.

"A corresponding transformation is bound to affect capital. The sums collected abroad to aid the cooperative movement in China cannot be called capital in the strict connotation of the term. They are being advanced without expectation of the return of either principal or interest. Cooperative production is not being harnessed to the servicing of these 'capital outlays.' On the contrary, it is capital which is being harnessed to facilitate cooperative production.

"These are the sproutings of a new economic life which will flourish after the Japanese military machine has stamped out the remaining vestiges of what used to be the internal market. These new manifestations cannot be easily uprooted by Japanese aggression, because they depend primarily on the initiative of the people, evoked by aggression, and are taking root because they resist aggression successfully. Do they, however, increase China's 'capacity to receive'? On the answer to this question hinges the economic future of China, and

[11] Charles A. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, New York, 1929, vol. II, p. 491.

of the United States as well. The answer itself, of course, hinges on the outcome of the struggle in China.

"Assuming the victory of the Chinese people, it can be tentatively suggested that cooperative production will spread over the whole field of light industry, on a national scale, and will cease to be a merely local or regional matter. This in itself, however, presupposes and necessitates the building of heavy industry, together with means of transport and communication, which will require huge capital outlays that can be procured only from abroad.

"Assuming, further, that the required capital can be procured from the United States, what role will it play in China's economic development? By its very magnitude, its source of origin, and the fields in which it would be invested, it would be bound to play an economically superior, but not necessarily a dominating role. That is, its economic superiority would not be reinforced politically, and could not be used as a political instrument of pressure. The control and supervision of a sovereign Chinese Government would assure that, and at the same time assure the complete safety of the capital.

"In short, this would still be capital export, but of a new, historically higher type, lacking some of the old political features of 'normal' capital export. It could not serve to control the Government, for the Government would have the task of controlling this kind of capital import. Capital import would be modified by the modified nature of the internal market. Foreign capital would acquire no claim to property title. China's national wealth, developed and undeveloped, would henceforth be inalienable. Economic intercourse between backward China and highly developed America would be based on the cardinal principle of unchallenged independence and national sovereignty. Yet in the process of development foreign capital would reap the lucrative remuneration rightly due to its economic superiority. These profits would represent a tribute paid by China, but a tribute due solely to China's economic backwardness. It would thus tend to diminish in the course of China's economic development, and would not be reinforced by political means. This kind of tribute, shorn of political features, could not be perpetuated, but it would enable China to reach the point, in some calculable future, where foreign capital could receive a final indemnity for services rendered paid out of a steadily mounting export surplus from China.

"The final question is whether such a relationship would increase China's 'capacity to receive.' The lesson of history from the first to the second World War is that it is the only possible way in which to increase China's capacity to receive. American capital is caught in the Far East between war and revolution. The puny detachments of 20 and 25 million dollars thus far lent to China are patrols in an economic no-man's land. They do not represent capital export but short-term self-liquidating commodity credit. This is less than a palliative. Moreover, this insistence on self-liquidating capital transactions is ominous. If it practices such extremes of caution, American capital risks becoming self-liquidating in the true sense.

"What inducements would the relationship outlined above hold out to foreign capital? Would the inducements be outweighed by the infringements on the 'rights and freedom' of capital? The actual choice is not between freedom and control, but between control by Japan's imperialist 'New Order' or by the sovereign Chinese nation. To put it in another way: Japan can only get control over foreign capital by reducing China to a colonial status.

"All the rights, privileges, and freedom of foreign capital have not developed the Chinese market to such an extent that had new capital been attracted, China's capacity to receive would have been enhanced by it. Quite the contrary. Special rights and privileges have served as an effective barrier to further capital investments. The social and economic status of semicolonial China set definite limits to capital imports. Remer classifies these capital imports under two main subdivisions: 'Business Investment,' and 'Foreign Obligations of the Government.'[12] The peculiar character of both of these investment forms was determined by the economic weakness of the internal market and the political weakness of the Government. They had in common the feature of being mainly unproductive and highly political, serving the privileged position, property claims, and property titles of foreign capital.

"The privilege to be gained by foreign capital was the chief purpose of investment and the chief criterion in the choice between investment in business or in Government obligations. The money was invested, in both cases, in gaining

[12] C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China, New York, 1933.

a foothold. That is the main reason why foreign loans petered out after the intensification of the revolution and after the Japanese onslaught. The various foreign footholds thus established were converted into bases of Japanese agression; in launching its wholesale aggression against China, the Japanese army seized upon them immediately as military footholds and pawns of blackmail. This outcome was predictable long before the actual event, from the rate at which, and the methods by which, the Japanese foothold was augmented, as the following tables show:

Business investments in China by countries, showing percentage distribution [13]

	1902		1914		1931	
	Mill. U. S. $	Percent of total	Mill. U. S. $	Percent of total	Mill. U. S. $	Percent of total
Great Britain	150.1	29.8	400.0	36.9	963.4	38.9
Japan	1.0	.2	210.0	19.4	212.8	36.9
Russia	220.1	43.7	236.5	21.8	273.2	11.1
U. S. A.	17.5	3.5	42.0	3.9	155.1	6.3
France	29.6	5.9	60.0	5.5	95.0	3.8
Germany	85.0	16.9	136.0	12.5	75.0	3.0
Total	503.2	100.0	1,084.5	100.0	2,474.5	100.0

Holdings of Chinese Government obligations by countries, showing percentage distribution [14]

	1902		1914		1931	
	Mill. U. S. $	Percent of total	Mill. U. S. $	Percent of total	Mill. U. S. $	Percent of total
Great Britain	110.3	39.4	207.5	41.8	211.6	36.1
Japan	0	0	9.6	1.9	224.1	38.2
Russia	26.4	9.4	32.8	6.6	0	0
United States	2.2	.8	7.3	1.5	41.7	7.1
France	61.5	22.0	111.4	22.5	97.4	16.6
Germany	79.3	28.4	127.6	25.7	12.0	2.0
Total	279.7	100.0	496.2	100.0	586.8	100.0

[13] Remer, op. cit., p. 99.
[14] Op. cit., p. 138.

"The chief methods by which the Japanese foothold was augmented were through British lending to Japan, as in the building of the South Manchuria Railway, or through British lending to China to pay the war indemnities to Japan. The Chinese Government has been an indemnity-paying rather than a capital-importing institution.[15]

"Add to this the major diplomatic intrigues at the end of the first World War: the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1917, the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1919, and finally the way in which the assembled peacemakers in Versailles cold-shouldered Sun Yat-sen's plea for capital help. These data complete the picture showing why and how Japan gained its oversized foothold; how it used this, and the footholds of its 'friendly rivals,' for an attack on the whole of China; and why the Chinese people were eventually constrained to make a stand.

"In the economic and social set-up of an independent China the character and structure of capital imports would be radically changed. China's capacity to receive would not be hamstrung by the shakiness of the internal market and of the Government. The distinction between economic and political investment, very vague in a semicolonial China, would disappear insofar as the political objective of capital export would be eliminated. The distinction between business investments and Government obligations would fade out correspondingly, because investment in Government obligations would be economic in nature.

"By this radical change, moreover, the safety of capital would be assured. About the political guarantees an independent China could give for the safety

[15] Op. cit., p. 162.

of capital there can be no difference of opinion. However, the change in the nature of economic guarantees needs elucidation. The economic bases of sovereignty, like the customs revenue, would no longer be mortgaged for the servicing of foreign capital. At the same time cooperative production in light industry, greatly enhanced by the installation of heavy industry through capital import, would release increasing amounts of Government revenue, out of which foreign capital investments could be serviced. The increased productivity of the Chinese people would not be drained into the channels of private accumulation, but a great and increasing leeway would be left for taxation, out of which the economic tribute to foreign capital could be paid. Simultaneously, the burden of taxation could to a certain extent be shifted away from agricultural production.

"These are the dim outlines of the economic set-up for a free China and its intercourse with the better developed outer world. One could call it state capitalism, supplemented by economic concessions to foreign capital; but the label does not matter. What matters is the necessity, for China, of a greatly accelerated economic development after the war is over and this can take place only in an economic and political setting of national freedom. The economic prerequisite and counterpart of complete national unification is the nationalization of China's natural resources. Only if they are nationalized can the state organs of the sovereign Chinese people employ foreign capital for the utilization and development of these natural resources on the large scale required. Only in this way can the Chinese people maintain their sovereignty and turn it to good account economically.

"This represents a deviation from the norm of development in Western European or American capitalism; it is rendered imperative by the very circumstance that China has to make up for its backwardness as compared with Western Europe or America, and must do so, in order to succeed, not gradually but by leaps and bounds.

"The alternative is relapse into a colonial status. When the national unity of America was jeopardized by the threatening spread of the slave-holding system, Lincoln made it a strong point that 'this country with its institutions belongs to the people who inhabit it.' Chinese national sovereignty cannot be underpropped or asserted in any other way. The required rate of Chinese economic development is not possible without full sovereignty. If China emerges victorious, sovereign control over capital imports is prescribed by the sheer necessity to maintain its hard-won national independence. As far as American interests are concerned, it seems fairly certain that the principle of the Open Door can be put into practice in no other way.

4. CAPITAL EXPORT AND ECONOMIC TRIBUTE

"There are two kinds of economic tribute. In the primitive one, the money capital of merchants and usurers levies a tribute from pre-capitalistic production. Here the non-capitalistic producer, coerced by the need of money, gives something for nothing in every transaction with capital. The later economic tribute is that paid by the smaller and more weakly organized units of capital to the larger and more highly developed units. This latter form operates within the framework of capitalism, while the former is characteristic of exchange between capitalist and pre-capitalist economic formations.

"The primitive form of economic tribute has the virtue of enabling capital to take control of a pre-capitalistic economy and lift it to the level of capitalism. On the other hand, in order to accomplish this, capital itself has to hurdle this primitive level by developing form merchant enterprise and usury to the level of industrial capital.

"Whenever, for some reason or other, this historic jump cannot be taken by capital, we have a situation in which the prerequisites of the market have been created, by disintegrating the old economy and making it too narrow for the subsistence of the population, but in which the market itself cannot be developed. Self-sufficiency becomes anachronistic. It no longer means what it says, because it is no longer adequate for subsistence, but is merely self-sufficient in the sense of not being integrated with the market.

"This makes for social tension and eventually for an attempt on the part of the people to help themselves in the absence of capital help. This has clearly been the case in China, where it has provided the economic compulsion toward anti-feudal revolution. To make the point more striking we may take the opposite extreme of market development in the United States. Here the two forms of economic tribute can still be observed in the economic intercourse between

industry and agriculture. In all exchanges between the pre-capitalistic agricultural producer of the South and all forms of capital, including merchants, industry, and the banks, capital gets something for nothing. At the present time this sector of exchange transactions is tending to widen, instead of narrowing down, which means that the market generally is shrinking instead of being developed. It is in this sense that President Roosevelt's remark that 'the South is the number one economic problem of the nation' holds true.

"In contrast with the economic tribute paid by the South, the farmer who himself has capital pays economic tribute of the normal type, because of the difference in volume and the technological level between agricultural and industrial capital. This inequivalence tends to diminish as agricultural capital grows and becomes modernized. It disappears altogether when agricultural capital is fused with industrial and banking capital, as in certain Californian farming enterprises which require considerable capital investment, combined with high technological development. This kind of 'industrialized agriculture,' however, thrusts growing numbers of marginal farmers back to the pre-capitalistic level, thus widening the gap between the highest level attained by agricultural capital, and all other agriculture.[16]

"The difference (and it is all the difference in the world) is that in the case of the United States the tension sets in a very high level of capitalist development, whereas in the case of China it occurs at a very low level, at the very beginning of industrialization. The interconnection between these two extremes of market development is that in the United States the market stoppage and the superabundance of capital associated with it coincides with the cessation of capital export, whereas in China it is due to lack of capital import. When this happens, capital export loses its ability to weld economically advanced and backward areas into a structure of market relations, and the world market fails to develop.

"The anti-imperialist character of the Chinese revolution shows that capital is resisted if it aims at domination and does not at the same time carry forward market development and industrialization. The subordination of an economy is a preliminary step; its success depends on whether it leads up to the next stage, which is the incorporation of the economy in the domain of capital. Military subjection might or might not prepare the ground for these two successive stages of a successful colonizing. That depends, by and large, on the level of capitalist development on a world scale. In the present period of world capitalism military subjection serves not as a preliminary but as a substitute for the economic process; as such it means that these two economic objectives are incapable of attainment. (Italian imperialism in Ethiopia, Japanese imperialism in China.) China's resistance is focused against Japanese aggression because Japan, not possessing the power of peaceful penetration, market development, and industrialization by capital export, has launched into a clear-cut attempt to subordinate and dominate China's economy. The insistence of Japanese spokesmen that their intentions are misinterpreted by the West, and that all they want is to insure the safety of Western capital in China (under Japanse domination) seems, therefore, very logical. What they do not take into consideration is only that their own aggression is essentially a militarization of the preceding Western capital export to China, which also aimed merely at the domination of Chinese economy and not at its development. The Japanese method is to use arms instead of dollars. The fact that the difference is in methods rather than in aims accounts for the way in which Western capital hesitates to aid China resistance.

"Capital export combines 'primitive' and 'normal' economic tribute. If it is the primitive phase that predominates, capital export does not lift the economically backward areas from their precapitalistic level, but leaves them stuck at the state of transition. If, on the other hand, the 'normal' phase predominates, then capital export to a certain extent works against itself. For by promoting the industrialization of backward areas, capital export reduces the gap between their capital equipment and that of the advanced countries. As the productivity of backward labor grows by means of capital import, there is a decrease in the economic tribute it has to pay in the process of exchange with the highly developed countries. Moreover, with an increasing capital supply from abroad the rate of interest falls, and economic dependence thus tends to diminish, unless counteracted by simultaneously increasing political pressure. Since there is almost always an attempt to enforce continued political dependence, it is a

[16] See Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.

fallacy to look upon capital export as an economic category pure and simple, a vehicle of mere economic exchange between countries at different stages of economic development.

"The process as a whole can be termed the law of diminishing returns of capital export. That is precisely why 'normal' capital export never runs its full course, and why the industrialization of backward areas by means of capital import stops short at a certain point. History does not conform to the pattern of academic economies, which assumes an automatic flow of capital to the backward areas of the world. In terms of history the flow of capital, far from being automatic, ceased almost altogether after a point can be fixed at about the outbreak of the Great Crisis in 1929.

"A theoretical conclusion is here suggested: the flow of capital does not obey physical laws in the sense that capital automatically flows down from the higher to the lower plateau, from economically highly developed to economically backward countries. The flow continues, by and large, only as long as the graph of world capitalism moves upward, with expanding markets and growing capital accumulation mutually reinforcing each other. When these conditions no longer prevail the line is broken and the classic law of the flow of capital no longer holds.

"From 1929 on India and China, traditionally gold and silevr importing countries, released their gold and silver in increasing amounts to the advanced creditor countries of the West. The balance of payments were radically changed into the very opposite of their habitual structure. No 'norm' obtained any longer, in the sense of an academic scheme of the 'normal' course of economic events. The reversal of the normal trend of capital flow is both a symptom and an aggravating factor of the economic decay in the advanced countries which Sir Robert Kindersley was the first to formulate, with reference to Great Britain: 'From the point of view of the United Kingdom, a progressive deterioration in our position as a long-term creditor may in the long run result in a substantial and permanent decline in income from abroad. This would make it difficult to deal with the continued rise in imports without enforcing upon us a socially disurbing and detrimental reduction in the general standard, in order to lower costs and raise the volume of visible exports.' [17]

Capital export defeats itself in the long run. Balking at the prospect of diminishing returns, it attempts to compensate for the stoppage of capital export by raising the rate of economic tribute. After all, the motive power of capital export is not the requirements of industrialization in the backward country, but the profit requirement of capital in the advanced country. What might be a definitely too low level of industrialization from the standpoint of the capital importing country, may therefore be a definitely too high level of industrialization from the standpoint of those who have capital to export from an advanced country. The stagnation and deterioration of the French colonies illustrates this point. Here the initial spurt of capital export was predominantly speculative in character, and the motive for further capital exports was lacking. Capital export for purposes of industrialization could not possibly match the profits which had already accrued from sheer speculation and land-grabbing. Hence the long-standing economic and social grievances of the native population of the French colonies, the inability to raise the economic standard, the lag of industrialization behind other colonial empires.[18] At the point where a certain stage of industrialization by means of capital export threatens to upset the usual "terms of trade," the trend is reversed by the cessation of capital export.[19]

The prerequisites for the development of a huge internal market in China began maturing at a time when the effects of the diminishing returns of capital export were already clearly shaping up, on a world scale. This is the gist of the problem. It is aggravated by the fact that the concessions, which are the political and legal buttresses of the system of economic tribute laid on China, were so firmly established at the outset that they have not become an economic Chinese Wall, effectively barring both the development of the internal market in China and capital export to China.

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[17] "British Oversea Investments in 1935 and 1936" in Economic Journal, London, December 1937, p. 662.

[18] On the scandalous and detrimental practices of French finance in the colonies see the work of the former Minister of Colonies, Albert Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Francaise, Paris, 1923.

[19] "At the present time China's imports of machinery (valued at $42,000,000 in 1932) represent only 3/2 percent of her total imports. Textile machinery alone accounts for one-fifth of the whole." G. E. Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the West, London, 1935, p. 231.

5. DISINTEGRATION OF THE WORLD MARKET

"The system of economic tribute leads to an eventual reversal of the flow of capital, and this in turn intensifies the inequity of exchange, and results in a disintegration of the world market. Adam Smith's optimistic picture of world free trade as both the result and the vehicle of increasing international division of labor is hopelessly outmoded. The crashing of the world's leading currencies in the Great Crisis, beginning in 1929, with repercussions on the world's economically backward areas, marks a definite turning point in the competition between the capital-owning countries and the economic relations between them and the backward countries. Nor is it a coincidence that both the stoppage of capital export and the shrinkage of the world market became critical when this turning point was reached.

"It is important to note the order of succession in the different aspects of this crisis. Retarded industrialization of the colonial and semicolonial countries, caused by cessation of capital export, followed the crisis in the highly developed countries. Colonial retardation then backfired, choking industrial progress all over the world. While lack of capital prevented industrialization in the backward countries, it was in the most advanced countries, with the most capital, that the fall in the rate of new industrial production was most conspicuous. What made the problem of the world market as a whole so acute and desperate was the way in which nondevelopment of the internal market in the backward areas coincided exactly with deterioration of the internal market in the advanced countries.

"Professor Cassel estimates that the normal yearly rate of increase in world production is 3 percent. The following League of Nations figures show the change in yearly new production in the postwar period:

Yearly percentage changes of world production (per caput figures)[20]

	Production of crude foodstuffs (excl. meat and milk)	Manufacture of consumption goods	Manufacture of producers' investment goods
World (excl. U. S. S. R.):			
1920–1937	0.6	1.4	1.5
1920–1929	1.4	3.1	3.5
1929–1937	−.4	−.4	−.6
North America:			
1920–1937	−.9	.1	.1
1920–1929	−1.3	1.4	2.5
1929–1937	−.4	−1.3	−2.4

[20] World Production and Prices, 1937–38, p. 32.

"Cassel's 'normal' rate of increase is halved in the post-war period. In the prosperity decade of the twenties we have the normal rate but it is offset by a decline of production in the following crisis decade.

"If, moreover, we take America, economically the most highly developed part of the capitalist world, representing one-third to one-half of world production, the picture of the postwar crisis becomes even more striking. The per capita yearly rate of interest is negligible all through; in the crisis decade it becomes abruptly a minus quantity. The yearly rate of increase in the manufacture of producers' investment goods, which is the actual index of expanded production, is for the whole post-war period 1920–37 the same as for the manufacture of consumption goods—a startling measure of continued economic stagnation.

"A greatly increased rate of industrialization of the backward areas would be required to make up for the lagging rate of increase in the advanced countries. This, however, would necessitate greatly increased amounts of capital export, which would suddenly change the established system of economic tribute from the backward countries. Comparing this with the fact that the diminishing prospect of economic tribute is what militates against further large-scale capital export, we find ourselves back in our vicious circle.

"Disruption of the unified world currency system is a harbinger of the disintegration of the world market. The spreading depreciation of currencies stems from the inability of debtors to pay. This, in turn, makes worse their 'incapacity to receive.' The currencies of the backward countries depreciate at a higher rate

than those of the advanced countries, thus catastrophically widening the gap between the two structures, and increasing the amount of capital export that would be needed to bridge the gulf.

"In the second half of the nineteenth century and up to 1914 capital export increased the amount of economic tribute paid by the colonial and backward countries. Since the war and especially since 1929, the stoppage of capital export has raised the rate of economic tribute, in an effort to offset the dwindling amount. What was formerly the normal method of economic intercourse with the backward areas of the world, through the investment of capital, thus led up to something that is its very opposite. In the initial spurt of capital export, the primitive form of economic tribute predominated, because the exchange was between countries which had capital and countries which were precapitalistic. By and large, this gave way in the second half of the nineteenth century to capital export as a vehicle of normal economic tribute, based on differences in the level of capital equipment. We are now in a third phase, in which capital export is foundering on the rocks of diminishing returns, on account of what Sir Arthur Salter calls a 'too high degree of industrialization' in the backward areas. This phase includes both the last world war and the present one. When it was no longer profitable to develop backward markets by capital export, an attempt was made to tighten up the annexation of markets. Then the first world war broke out, and the development of existing markets yielded in importance to the acquisition of new markets. The surplus capital which had been employed in capital export was switched into armaments. This, however, did not solve the fundamental problem. The reallocation of the world market, divided into colonies and mandates, did not lead to further market development. The failure shows up in the following table of world currency depreciation after 1929:

Values of currencies as percentage of their gold parity in 1929 [21]

	U. S. A.	Mexico	Philippines	China	Britain	India	Malaya
1928	100.0	96.5	99.2	110.1	100.0	99.9	99.1
1929	100.0	96.7	99.8	100.0	99.8	99.2	98.7
1930	100.0	94.6	99.8	71.6	99.9	98.8	98.6
1931	100.0	85.5	99.8	53.3	93.2	92.3	92.4
1932	100.0	63.9	99.5	52.5	72.0	72.2	71.2
1933	80.7	45.7	80.6	49.4	68.1	68.2	67.8
1934	59.6	33.2	59.7	48.7	61.8	61.9	62.0
1935	59.4	33.1	59.3	52.0	59.8	60.1	59.8
1936	59.2	33.0	59.3	42.2	60.5	60.8	60.7
1937	59.1	32.9	59.3	41.9	60.0	60.4	60.3
1938	59.1	26.2	58.9	30.2	59.3	59.2	59.2

[21] Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, pp. 228, 229.

"In this table the two chief creditor countries are compared with colonies and semicolonies. As a result of a currency truce between the two chief creditor countries, their rate of depreciation has been the same. The currencies of their colonial dependencies have been depreciated—as a matter of policy—at the same rate. A higher rate of depreciation would have corresponded more closely to the economic status of the colonies, compared with the mother countries; therefore their currencies were actually overvalued when held at the former ratio. The explanation is that a higher rate of depreciation would have tended to decrease their imports and increase their exports, and would have made it difficult if not impossible to repay their debts. The enforced repayment of debts from the colonies was, however, one of the chief means by which the mother country, after the devaluation of its own currency, was able to avoid panic and keep a managed currency at the desired level of parity. This holds true particularly for India and Great Britain.

"In sharp contrast to this, the currencies of the semi-colonial countries like Mexico and China were allowed to fluctuate wildly, depreciating at a much higher rate. The silver-buying program of the Roosevelt administration did not stop the headlong depreciation but accentuated it by draining away the metallic base of their currencies.

"The complete failure of this panacea throws light on the fallacy of the monetary theory in vogue. The development of commodity production into a money economy, and of money into capital, follows two consecutive stages in the economic progress of backward countries. The precarious status of a backward country stuck at the stage of transition is revealed by the unstable equilibrium

of its currency, 'managed' by capital export, or the cessation of capital export, or the withdrawal of capital. When capital export to backward countries is withheld, and capital already invested is withdrawn, the currency is bound to deteriorate, both in quantity and in exchange parity, under the impact of this double pressure. The backward economies can no longer depend on the support of the advanced countries.

"For the economic support withheld and withdrawn there is substituted a 'support of the currency' by silver buying. This is a complete misnomer, for what it amounts to in the circumstances is an aggravation of the economic problem, by stripping silver of its quality as capital and even as money (means of circulation). The silver-buying program, as substitute for capital export and a means of facilitating the withdrawal of capital, amounts to no more than the manipulation of a particular commodity. It does not support the currency, which can be supported only by a strengthening of the economy itself. It leads to a 'deflation' in the backward countries which is really a switching back, through outside influence, from capital into money and from money into a particular commodity. This again does not support the currency, but undermines it by rendering it incapable of serving as the basis of circulation and as a medium of capital accumulation. Thus it is not only in the quantitative but in this qualitative, historical sense too that these countries have been 'decapitalized.' The agglomeration of gold at the other extreme of market development, in the United States, is a complementary phenomenon. Official gold hoarding in such unparalleled dimensions means that, to that extent, gold ceases to function either as world money or as the basis of world capital accumulation. Functionally, it is switched back, by uncontrollable forces, from a general equivalent into a particular precious commodity.

"From the standpoint of the advanced country the compound result is a widening gap between its own economic structure and that of the backward countries, increasing the onus of the economic tribute borne by the backward countries. The economic status of these countries, struck at the stage of transition between precapitalism and capitalism, becomes absolutely insupportable. They are forced to help themselves, lest they be strangled at the stage of economic transition. Hence the accentuation of the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolutions in both China and Mexico.

"If the backward countries can no longer rely on capital help, the powers rely more and more on political pressure as an instrument of economic policy. The silver-buying program is a remarkable example, for it is used as a sword of Damocles hanging over these semidependent countries. Mexico's expropriation of foreign capital illustrates the overlapping of the political and the economic aspects. American capital, constrained by the economic crisis at home, tried to speed up the recovery of its original investment in Mexico, and the accuring profits, by wage cuts in the oil industry. This was tantamount to a large scale withdrawal of capital, disintegrating the Mexican internal market. Mexico resisted by expropriating the foreign holdings, to which the retort was renewed pressure: demands for immediate payment, a boycott of Mexican oil, a threat to withdraw the American Treasury's support of silver. Yet immediate payment would have been possible only if American finance had extended long-term credits, to be serviced out of increased sales of Mexican oil to the United States. The vicious circle is here complete: for this would have been a form of capital export to Mexico, whereas the trouble had arisen out of the attempt to recover capital previously exported.

"One of the forms taken by the attempt to escape from the disintegration of the world market is the creation of huge political-economic-currency blocs, initiated by the creation of the Sterling bloc at the Ottawa conference. This was followed by the creation of the Yen bloc by Japan. After the breaking up of the Gold bloc, France and its dependencies formed a Franc bloc. The United States, Britain, and France then concluded a make-shift currency truce, which went to pieces after the outbreak of the war, was engaged in the creation of a Central and South-Eastern European Mark bloc.

"In significance, this trend outstrips the schemes of autarchy or a 'federated Europe.' It is both a symptom of and an aggravating factor in the disintegration of the world market. This splitting up of the world market into such watertight compartments additionally retards the economic development, through industrialization, of the colonial and semicolonial countries.

"Two examples illustrate the trend. In the Dutch East Indies:

> "Through the Regulation of Industry Ordinance of 1934 and the similar enactment of 1937, the Government obtained a further broad extension of its regulatory powers. By this authority, it may now intervene in all branches

> of industry to control the development of established industries or the creation of new ones. The purpose of the ordinance is to prevent 'destructive competition.' In less generalized terms, it is intended as a restriction of possible Japanese enterprise in the industries of Netherlands India; as a method of insuring the prosperity of present industries which are considered useful to the country by preventing an increase of production beyond effective consumer demands; as a safeguard against the establishment of new industries which might threaten existing native industries, for example the mass production of batiks; and as a means for preventing local production from entirely displacing imports in categories for which quotas have been assigned to the Netherlands or other supplying countries. The last point represents a new policy, since earlier, whenever local production was able to supply local demand, permissible imports in protected categories were regularly cut down.[22]

"This is open governmental intervention to prevent, forcibly, further industrialization and the further development of the internal market. It demonstrates the clash between the requirements of the internal market in the colonies and those of the capital of the mother country.

"French colonial policy follows the same pattern. 'L'Industrialisation de l'Indo-Chinese,' a report submitted by the official Société d'Etudes et d'Information Economique, gives the following date and conclusions:

> "France is the chief provider of Indochina, supplying about one-half of the colony's yearly imports, which in 1937 were valued at 1,578 million francs.
>
> "* * * The main difficulty appears to be that it is hard to find a market in Indochina or in the neighboring countries which can offer adequate compensation for any large-scale investment in industry.
>
> "The main conclusion reached was that any large-scale plan for the industrialization of Indochina was impractical.[23]

"This trend is accompanied by the confinement of a major portion of foreign trade within artificial currency areas. Half of Britain's trade is with the Empire. The same holds for France, and the tendency is greatly accelerated by the war. It applies equally to Japan. In 1939 the Japanese balance of trade was active by more than 600 million yen but after deduction of the trade with the yen bloc it was passive by 400 million yen.

"The very nature of modern imperialism undergoes a change through these developments. It relapses into a more sophisticated and destructive eighteenth century mercantilism. The 'terms of trade' run always against the backward countries, but less and less so as their industrialization proceeds; but this is now being actively interfered with by withholding large-scale capital export, and by official 'regulation' and dictation. The rapid industrialization of Manchuria, by heavy capital export from Japan for military purposes, is only an apparent exception. Actually, it confirms the rule, for it has not developed the internal market in Manchuria, but destroyed it, and has not been a genuine export outlet for Japan, but has further deteriorated the Japanese internal market by draining away capital. As the Shanghai correspondent of the London Economist puts it:

> "Manchurian imports last year rose in value by 40 percent and Manchurians exports increased by 14 percent, with Japan in each case accounting for the entire increase. A substantial portion of these increases in the value of trade resulted from sharp price increases in the Yen bloc countries. However, the Kwantung Army's influence upon the Tokyo Government proved strong enough to compel Japan, in spite of her own shortages of all sorts of commodities, to ship a considerable volume of supplies to Manchuria for the construction there of the new Japanese continental war industry base. The M$957,176,000 surplus of imports arose almost exclusively from trade with Japan. This import surplus was chiefly financed by means of Manchurian bond and industrial debenture flotations in Japan, where in 1939 Manchurian issues formed one-third of all nongovernmental bond issues.[24]

"These changes, shaping up behind the fire and smoke of war, are more fundamental than dreams of a Federated Europe or International Free Trade. Repercussions on the economy of the advanced countries are inevitable. The economic impoverishment of the backward areas of the world is lucrative while it lasts, but cannot be kept up. Individual countries may temporarily increase their markets

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[22] Far Eastern Survey, Aug. 16, 1939.
[23] Ibid., Feb. 15, 1939.
[24] Economist, March 2, 1940, p. 378.

at the expense of others, but this is no solution for the world market itself, the world economic system, and the economic destinies of the backward nations. It amounts to no more than individual attempts to extend internal markets by the addition of areas that used to be part of the external market.

"The trend is toward a monopolization, by each power, of its share of the World market. This monopolization is historically different from the monopolization of the internal market and therefore ushers in an epoch of more protracted and more exacerbated international conflicts and convulsions; trade wars, currency war, military collisions.

"To what extent does China share in the market? The figures are illuminating.

"The comparative figures of per capita import and exports show conclusively the relative economic weakness of China's economy, and serve to reestablish a sense of proportion for the problem of the Chinese market. They suggest the amounts of suddenly increased commodity and capital import that would enable China to become a 'huge market' for foreign capital. These are the lags that Sir Arthur Salter advises us to span 'step by step and gradually.'

Per capita trade, by countries (calendar year 1937)[25]

	Population estimates (thousands)	Per capita trade imports	(Current $) exports
United States	131,514	25.10	22.90
United Kingdom	47,029	108.20	54.85
Japan	71,252	15.25	12.85
China	466,786	0.60	0.55
India	338,171	1.80	2.25
Indochina	23,030	2.70	4.40

Imports and exports as percentages of the world total[26]

	Imports				Exports			
	1911–13	1935	1936	1937	1911–13	1935	1936	1937
United States	8.4	10.0	11.0	11.3	12.4	12.0	11.9	13.2
United Kingdom	17.4	18.0	19.1	18.6	15.3	12.4	12.1	11.7
Japan	1.5	3.5	3.6	4.0	1.4	3.8	3.8	3.6
China	1.8	1.7	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.1	1.0	1.0

[25] Foreign Commerce Year Book, Washington, D. C., 1938, p. 427.
[26] Ibid.

"The figures relate to the situation prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, which made them out of date but by no means irrelevant. For the economic backwardness and prostration of China and the economic lag between China and the surrounding world which large-scale capital export from the advanced countries failed to bridge, made Japanese aggression against China possible.

"The second tabulation might suggest the superficial view that China's share in world trade is almost negligible, and hardly capable of creating a problem for the time being. Though such a view may suit the conceptions of the adherents of gradualism, the very opposite holds true. Actually, China's share in the world market is too small not to create a serious problem. The one percent to the extent of which China participates in the world market is trifling if compared with the world market, but more than enough to disintegrate China's economy, and at the same time far from enough to develop China's internal market. That is the point. The 'negligible' one percent covers the whole ceaseless ferment that makes for wars and revolutions in the Far East. China's one percent, in relation to the hundred percent which is the world market, accounts for the contraction of the absolute magnitude that the hundred percent represents.

"Take the position of the two rivals—the United States and Japan—in the world market and the China market. In spite of its spectacular rise in the last two decades, Japan's share of commodity export in the world market remains small, and so does its capital export; but its share in China's trade and capital import has become second only to Great Britain's. It is exactly the other way about with the United States. Its share in the world market and in world

capital export is second only to that of Great Britain. Its share in the commodity and capital import of China remains, however, in spite of an accelerated rate of growth in the postwar period, trifling compared with those of Great Britain and Japan.

"These are precisely the factors that determine the trend of the struggle for the world market. The Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations observed in 1926 that 'trade is passing from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The fact that this observation has not been borne out is a fateful comment on the unfolding of the world market. The World Economic Survey of the League, 1935–36, from which the statement is quoted, adds:

> "The depression years 1929–32 saw a sharp reversal of the trend. The inherent trading strength of the European countries, combined with the creditor position of some of them, was such that the fall in export prices was concentrated mainly upon the agricultural-exporting countries, many of whom were outside Europe (p. 166).

"The international sugar, tea, tin, rubber restriction schemes aggravated this reversal of the trend and, at the same time, threw light on its causes and significance. Capital, in the form of financial investment, dictates the terms of production and trade. For the agricultural and raw material producing countries of the East this has meant enforced restriction of production and trade and enforced retardation of further industrialization and internal market development.[27]

"In conclusion, we may state the case broadly as follows:

"From the end of the fifteenth century the center of gravity of the world market shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. This resulted, at the time, in a deindustrialization of Northern Italy, which had been the cradle of capitalistic production. The beginning of a further shift of the center of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the first decades of the twentieth century would have resulted in industrializing the countries of the Far East, had it not encountered overwhelming obstacles.

"The conclusion is permissible that whereas the shift of the center of gravity of the world market from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic was a harbinger of its unfolding, all the obstructions to a further shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific are indicative of the beginning of disintegration. The obstructions hampering the industrialization of the East are thus intimately connected with those impeding the expansion and the complete unfolding of the world market, the capitalization of the globe."

New York, June 1940.

Exhibit No. 472

[Our Times, People's Daily World, vol. 12, No. 35, Section II. Friday, February 18, 1949]

A General Looks at the Soviet Union

(By Ralph Izard)

> Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, military aide to President Roosevelt, has spent 15 years in the U. S. S. R. His views on Soviet aims are somewhat at variance with "red menace" tales.

By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor most of the military "experts" writing for American newspapers were on a diet of newsprint. They were eating the columns in which they had predicted "defeat of the Russians" in six weeks, then three months, then six months.

Fortunately for the American people, President Roosevelt did not have to rely on Hearst generals, Scripps-Howard master minds, and such profoundly warped military opinion as that purveyed by Hanson Baldwin in The New York Times. In the time of our country's greatest peril, he put his faith in the intelligence provided him by Philip R. Faymonville, then a colonel and military attaché in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, now Brigadier General Faymonville, retired.

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[27] The military strategic necessities of the Allies in the first World War were the most potent single factor in accelerating the industrialization of the East. The same necessities might evoke a stepping-up of production and export from these countries in the course of the second World War, but the situation is modified by large existing excess capacities in these countries, built up and carried through in the postwar period. A consideration of these changes, however, is beyond the scope of the present article.

Then, as now, everything General Faymonville reported as the result of a professional lifetime spent in the Soviet Union ran counter to the barrage of lies laid down daily in the commercial press. And of the situation today, in which "the Russian menace" has replaced "the yellow peril" as a daily source of scareheads, General Faymonville says:

"There is no Napoleonism in the Soviet Union, no desire for the conquest of other peoples.

"After 1,000 years of invasions, defense is today the Number One objective of the Soviet government, and they will not yield one point of that defense. But there is no such thing in the Soviet Union as hostility to other nations, or a desire for their conquest."

The general speaks such astringent truths as a matter of personal knowledge gained during four tours of duty in the Soviet Union. His 15 years of roving the great land bridge that links Europe to Asia, his knowledge of the Russian language, his study of history, all combine to make him something far different than Wall Street's conception of "the very model of a modern major general"—which, perhaps, explains why he was retired from active duty.

Slender of waist and ruddy of face, General Faymonville was born in San Francisco, April 30, 1888. At the time of the 1906 earthquake and fire he was living with his family in their newly built home at No. 1 Presidio St. The general's mother fed and housed dozens of the refugees from the devastated sectors of the city, and with his father he made a survey of the hundreds who flooded the Presidio grounds, securing a list of their names for the city authorities.

Unmarried, the general now makes his home in San Francisco's Olympic Club, since for him there are only three cities in the world worth living in—"San Francisco, New York, and Moscow." In his retirement, which began last year, he is continuing his study of history, languages, music, and economics.

Occasionally the general speaks on the Soviet Union. What he has to say is often unpalatable to those force-fed by the Hearst press. Recently he was badgered by a questioner in the audience at a lecture he gave before the Council on World Affairs. The eager heckler asked, "Just where do the Communist parties of the various nations fit into the Soviet goal of peace?"

The general laughed quietly, then said:

"Communist parties are groups of nationals influenced by certain social and political doctrines that have grown up in the last 100 years. Such parties have nothing to do with the Russians. Political and social doctrine knows no national boundaries."

The general's interest in things Russian began when he was a mere shavetail, four years out of West Point, where he stood ninth among the 97 cadets in the Class of 1912. Stationed on Luzon in the Philippine Islands, he had come to the conclusion by the time World War I began that in the U. S. Army there was a glaring lack of knowledge about Russia and the Russians.

In 1918, after less than two years' study of the Russian language, he was ordered into a situation requiring its daily use. Maj. Gen. William S. Graves had been appointed commanding officer of an American expeditionary force to Siberia. For obvious reasons he selected General Faymonville as his ordnance officer.

The Army's Siberian adventure was a direct consequence of British pressure on Washington. The British Foreign Office sought American soldiers to "re-erect the Eastern Front." According to General Faymonville, it is due almost entirely to "President Wilson's stubbornness" that U. S. intervention in Siberia never assumed the disastrous consequences that would have ensued had Wilson yielded to the British.

General Graves' orders restricted U. S. troops to guarding certain military stores "which may be subsequently needed by the Russian forces"; to repatriating German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Czech soldiers from Siberian prisoner-of-war camps, and "to steadying any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians may be willing to accept assistance."

U. S. soldiers were thrown into battle against forces led by the Bolsheviks along the Ussuri river, shortly after the U. S. troops disembarked. This, the only large-scale action in which Americans took part, came about as a consequence of British intelligence, which represented the Czechs the Americans had been ordered to guard as "menaced by the Bolsheviks."

In the complicated diplomatic maneuvering of that time, the Yanks, according to General Faymonville, were on hand as much to "keep an eye on the Japanese," who were trying to take over the Trans-Siberian railway, as for any other reason.

But neither the Americans nor any of the other four intervening nations—Britain, France, China, and Japan—found friends or allies as a result of their

action. They found the White armies a rabble led by madmen, nobles, and ex-Czarist officers who had suddenly found themselves flung in the ashcan by revolution. But the U. S. Army's Siberian adventure only ended, General Faymonville says today, "when all the intervening powers found themselves facing complete defeat or starvation." Then, along with "the westward-bound Czechs," the German, Hungarian, and Austrian prisoners, the French, Chinese, and British military contingents, General Graves and the 8,000 men in his command cleared through Vladivostok.

General Faymonville was only gone from the bleak, gale-swept vastness for two years. He returned to the Maritime Provinces in 1921, as the official American military observer to what is now only a footnote to Soviet history. This was the formation of the Far Eastern Republic.

Set up as a coalition government nominally independent of Moscow and the Soviets, the Republic first came to public notice when its delegates appeared at the Washington Arms Conference of 1921. Their credentials unhonored, their country unrecognized, they proceeded nonetheless with negotiations for exploitation of the oil resources of their area.

These negotiations, conducted with Harry F. Sinclair, later to become involved in the Teapot Dome scandal, were undertaken in the expectation that U. S. aid in expelling the Japanese would follow the granting of oil leases. While these diplomatic maneuvers were going on, General Faymonville was roaming the Maritimes, from the Pacific Coast to Lake Baikal. He was back in Chita Nov. 13, 1922, when the Republic's national assembly passed what he calls "the most far-reaching resolution I've ever heard."

The resolution was the direct consequence of an evacuation agreement to which the Japanese had at last acceded. Thus, says the general, "the national assembly voted to dissolve itself, to turn over all its powers to a revolutionary committee, and to affiliate with the new Soviet republics." The great landbridge stretched unbroken from Europe to the Pacific.

This early experience with Japanese expansionist ambitions, and three later years as military attaché in the Tokio Embassy, prepared General Faymonville for the Tanaka Memorial. Baron Tanaka's blueprint for Japanese conquest spelled out Nippon's plans as completely as Hitler later outlined those of the Nazis in his book, Mein Kampf. And it met much the same reception from the world of capitalism.

Exposed by a Russian newspaperman, the document was belittled as mere Bolshevik propaganda. What it forecast was nothing less than Pearl Harbor, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, the Philippines, and all the bloody islands of the Pacific. General Faymonville vouched for its authenticity at the time it was published. But his voucher was no more acceptable to those in command of U. S. foreign policy than is a Stalin peace offer now.

General Faymonville has said of recent American-Soviet developments: "Despite the different answers found to social problems by the Soviet Union and the United States, the Russians firmly believe that they can coexist with other nations widely different in economic structure.

"The Soviet Union is completely sincere in backing global cooperation. Its leaders want an organized and peaceful world."

After his stay in Tokio, General Faymonville returned to the United States for further training. Between 1926 and 1931 he attended those Army schools reserved for the most brilliant officers of field grade and above—the Industrial College, the Chemical Warfare School, and the top strategy school, the War College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

He made the White House his home during 1933 and 1934, when he was senior military aide to President Roosevelt. The President, embarking on a new diplomatic policy that began with U. S. recognition of the Soviet Union, apparently respected the qualities of mind and personality he found in his senior military aide. Because in 1934 General Faymonville was asked to return to Soviet territory as military attaché in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow. He stayed until 1939, first serving with Ambassador William G. Bullitt, then with Joseph E. Davies, who laid the ground for American-Soviet cooperation to defeat fascism.

This was the period of the Trotskyist trials, of which so much was made in the U. S. press. Many of those tried were personal acquaintances of General Faymonville, and of them he says:

"Their betrayal—or attempted betrayal—of their country, was born of personal resentment. Most of them felt that as old Bolsheviks the rewards accorded them had been inadequate.

"Added to this was the programmatic defeat that they had also suffered. And moving freely as they did among high foreign officials resident in Moscow, they

fell in with a group of very active, very intelligent foreign agents. These agents took advantage of and played upon these points of resentment."

General Faymonville returned to Moscow in 1941, this time as coordinator for Lend-Lease at the Russian end of the 10,000-mile pipeline. As the man primarily responsible for the items of equipment received by the Soviet armies, the general is under no delusion that they were the decisive factor.

"What we sent the Soviet Union was most carefully planned in advance," he said. "Basically it was a question as to which would be the most effective, and which would take the least shipping space—the finished product, or the machine that could make that product.

"But of the total of war material used by the Soviet Union against Hitler, no more than 5 percent was of foreign origin."

What is the most vivid and lasting impression General Faymonville retains from his 15 years in the Soviet Union?

"The unity of Soviet man," he said, "is the most impressive thing to be found there. The peoples of the Soviet Union have a vast sense of humanity, of kinship with all mankind.

"Add to this their vast tolerance and their intense curiosity about everything. They are even intensely curious about such American activities as flagpole sitting, though they drop such an interest when they find it is without meaning for Soviet life."

As to the charge usually hurled by the Roman Catholic Church against the Soviet organization of society—that it is "gross materialism," the general says:

"The special feeling that the Soviet citizen has for the ballet is in itself a refutation of that charge.

"The same thing is true for his deep love of music, and the rapt attention he gives any stage production."

From this wealth of personal experience with the people of the Soviet Union, with her leaders in every walk of life, and his close study of Soviet intentions, General Faymonville knows the "get tough" and "gang up on Russia" schools of thought now dominating U. S. foreign policy are foredoomed to failure.

"Threats will not divert the Soviet Union from the path it has taken," he says. "The Soviet peoples are determined to take their place with the greatest nations of earth, and in this effort they have the complete support of the entire population."

Furthermore, the storms outridden by the Soviet government since its revolutionary birth in 1917 have given the Soviet peoples "supreme faith in the ability of their government to win through all situations."

It may be that the American people, halting the present drive to war short of disaster, will see fit one day to recall General Faymonville to active duty. After all, he will not be 61 until April 30. General Douglas MacArthur is still on active duty in Japan at 68.

Perhaps such considerations play some role in the general's thinking in his present retirement. He is continuing his reading in German, French, Spanish, and Italian, although he freely admits that his Japanese is now a bit rusty.

To keep his Russian polished and flexible he is taking an advanced course with the best instruction he could find in San Francisco—at the California Labor School.

EXHIBIT No. 477

WHO WANTED TO RECOGNIZE RED CHINA

Ernest T. Weir, Chairman, National Steel Corporation, in Statement on Our Foreign Situation, January 5, 1951, page 12

"If we refuse to recognize and deal with the present Chinese Government because it is communistic, we assume the dangerous position of trying to tell the people of other important nations what kind of government they must have.

"No matter what claims may be made that our attitude toward China is the result of Chinese aggression in Korea, I think the fact is very evident that if the present situation results in extension of the war it will be due to our refusal to recognize the Chinese Government because it is communistic."

Walter Lippmann, in New York Herald Tribune, January 2, 1950

"In theory * * * we could still refuse, alone among the nations concerned with Asia, to recognize Red China. We should have to explain this strange situation by saying that everybody is out of step but father."

William R. Herod, President, General Electric Company, State Department Conference, October 1949 (October 6–8, "Jessup Conference")

"I would suggest that we watch the situation daily, and if and when the Nationalists lose control completely and the Communists attain the position of having machinery of state that we at that time accord them recognition unless in the meantime there has been some other factor."

William S. Robertson, American and Foreign Power Company, State Department Conference, October 1949

"Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to associate myself with Mr. Herod in this question of recognition."

J. Morden Murphy, Vice President, Bankers Trust Company, State Department Conference, October 1949

"Therefore, I think that however inconvenient in the Council and in the Assembly the presence of Chinese Communist members may be, I think we have to take our chances when the time comes."

John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, State Department Conference, October 1949

"I would associate myself with those favoring recognition * * * although I want to say something about timing."

Arthur Holcombe, Harvard Professor, State Department Conference, October 1949

"I go along with those who have spoken and I guess most of us do—perhaps all—on the question of recognition and the question of timing and I take it that most of those who have spoken would also add that since to get exactly the right time is exceedingly difficult, it is better to be too early than too late. At any rate, that would be my view."

American Friends Service Committee Executive Board, as reported in the New York Times, January 19, 1950

"In an open letter to Mr. Truman the Quaker organization stated that 'further intervention will result in the hardening of Chinese resentment against America and the strengthening of Sino-Russian ties. By treating Communist China as an enemy and by refusing to recognize her,' the letter added, 'we are not isolating China, we are isolating ourselves and throwing away the chance of influencing the course of events in the Orient.' "

John A. MacKay, Chairman of the International Missionary Council, at a meeting of Protestant foreign missionary and world church leaders, as reported in the New York Times, January 5, 1950

"I think we will be obliged to recognize the new government. Otherwise we will be alienating the Chinese people who by their attitude repudiated the other regime."

Student Conference sponsored by the West Point Military Academy and the Carnegie Corporation and attended by 150 students from 52 colleges, as reported in the New York Times, December 10, 1950

"While expressing opposition to the expansion of communism, the conference adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the preesnt Chinese regime.

"It proposed that the United States declare itself willing to negotiate with the Chinese Communists through the United Nations; that the United States refrain from opposing their admission to the United Nations if the Communists accepted the United Nations resolution on Korea, and that the United States should not oppose any decision that the United Nations might reach on Formosa."

EXHIBIT No. 475

ONE WHO SURVIVED

(By Alexander Barmine (pp. 194–95))

"I began to understand this raid when I learned that the order of search had been issued by the district attorney of Mons, a city which I had never visited and where I had no friends or correspondents. Mons at that time was the scene of a miners' strike which had been full of dramatic incidents. The miners had greeted the moderate socialist minister, Vandervelde, with catcalls, had thrown

several police officers into the canal, and had locked a number of engineers and mine managers into their offices. Who was behind these excesses? It never occurred to anyone that the miners might have been sufficiently discontented and overwrought to resort to violence on their own. No, there happened to be at Brussels an official Bolshevik agent who pretended to be concerned only with matters of business but who in reality was doubtless spending his nights manipulating invisible threads which would set in motion a riot in a distant mining district!

"* * * I knew that the police inspector had submitted a detailed report in which he made a great point of the Bolshevik insolence of my attitude.

"'Police headquarters have got it in for you,' said my Belgian friends. 'Because of the Mons strikes, I supposed?' * * *

"The Belgian consul general there explained, with an air of considerable embarrassment, that he had received categorical instructions to refuse me a visa and inform me that I was forbidden to cross the Belgian frontier * * *

"I have since learned, more or less, what lay behind all this comic business. A former agent of the G. P. U., Agabekov, who had fled to Belgium after making a mess of various jobs in counterespionage in the Levant, had become the principal informer for the Belgian police in all matters connected with the Soviets. What he didn't know he invented. In order to maintain his status, he would himself recruit Belgians for a fake G. P. U. and then denounce them to the government. To him it would have been a small matter to invent a participation by the Soviets in the strikes at Mons."

EXHIBIT No. 476

WHO SAID THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WERE NOT REAL COMMUNISTS?

Patrick J. Hurley, Ambassador to China, in U. S. Relations With China, 1945, p. 86

"* * * the Communists are not in fact Communists, they are striving for democratic principles; * * *"

Hallett Abend, New York Times correspondent, in My Life in China, 1943, p. 125

"The Chinese Communists are not now, and have not for many years, been 'Communists' in the Soviet Russian meaning of that term—nor in the Lenin-Trotsky meaning, or in what is now called communist under Joseph Stalin. The so-called communist movement in China is an agrarian movement, a labor movement; it is a party organized against the tenant-farmer system of China, and against the exploitation of labor by what, before this war, was China's growing industrialism and capitalism. For years Chinese Communists have received neither cash nor munitions from Soviet Russia; even before Hitler attacked Russia in June of 1941, when regular shipments of munitions were being made into China over the long desert road through Sinkiang, these munitions went to the Chinese Government, not to the Chinese Reds."

Freda Utley

"The Chinese Communist Party, however, is less subservient to Moscow than the artificially created Communist parties of Europe and America; it has in recent years enlisted in its ranks many prominent intellectuals, men primarily liberals and patriots; and it is rooted in a peasant movement in no sense Bolshevik in its aspiration. It is doubtful, therefore, whether a majority of its members would obey an order from Moscow to abandon the war of national liberation for a civil war against Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang * * *," p. 279, "Japan's Red Flirtation," Nation, Feb. 24, 1940.

"Communism in China having become almost entirely an agrarian movement, had by 1935 been transmuted by the logic of history into a movement of peasant emancipation," p. 252 (China at War).

"The Communists seemed to me to be the greatest realists in the country, and in many ways the most modern-minded element. I believe that they are sincere in saying that what they hope for in China is some form of democratic State," p. 256 (China at War, 1939).

"Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party long ago abandoned the dream of establishing its own dictatorship. Now that its social basis is amongst the peasants of the most backward provinces in China, and amongst the middle-class youth and the liberal reformers, its aim has genuinely become social and political reform along capitalist and democratic lines," p. 254 (China at War, 1939).

In New Statesman and Nation, Jan. 28, 1939

"* * * the Chinese Communists today neither proclaim nor follow a revolutionary policy fatal to the processing classes or to Chiang Kai-shek himself * * *

"It would probably be better for China, and it would certainly clarify the position to the outside world, if instead of retaining the name of Communists they were to call themselves Radicals in the English Nineteenth century meaning of the word."

In the Nation, Feb. 24, 1940: "Japan's Red Flirtation"

"Since the Chinese Communists abandoned the class war in 1935, they have both advocated and practiced a policy of agrarian and governmental reform—not expropriation but rent reduction, not a Communist dictatorship but representative government."

EXHIBIT No. 599–A

WAY OF A FIGHTER, CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT, EDITED BY ROBERT HOTZ, G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK, 1949

FOREWORD

The United States is losing the Pacific war.

Three years after V-J day this country is facing the loss of everything it won during the four bloody years it took to defeat Japan.

Here are the facts:

General George C. Marshall told Congress in the spring of 1948 that if Manchuria were lost to the Chinese Communists, the United States position in southern Korea would be untenable.

Manchuria has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

General Marshall also told Congress that if the Chinese Communists controlled North China the United States position in Japan would be "extremely serious."

North China has been lost to the Chinese Communists.

General Douglas MacArthur warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 1948 that if the Chinese Communists take the lower Yangtze Valley and Shanghai the American military bastion on Okinawa will be outflanked and his position in Japan will be as exposed and untenable as it was in the Philippines during 1941.

As this is written, the Chinese Communists are fighting toward the Yangtze at Nanking. They are aiming to force a Yangtze crossing and sweep to Shanghai.

A complete Communist victory in China will channelize the undercurrents of native unrest already swirling through Burma, India, Malaya, and Indonesia into another rising tide of Communist victories. The ring of Red bases can be stretched from Siberia to Saigon. Then the stage will be set for the unannounced explosion of World War III.

I have completed a decade of observing and administering American policy in Asia. I am convinced that this policy is plunging us into a disastrous repetition of the errors that dragged us into World War II. I can hear the time fuse of a third world war sputtering in China as it burns toward the final powder keg, and I cannot stand idly by without making every effort in my power to snuff it out.

It was not an easy decision for me to publish this book. I have had my share of heartbreaks and have always felt it best to keep my peace. I have no taste for muckraking as a pastime, and I believe it is important for a people to have confidence in its leaders.

However, it is axiomatic that in periods of crisis a nation must have the very best of its leadership if it is to survive. The last war seared Russia to its heart. In the bloody catastrophes of the early war years the Russian leadership was pared to the hard, competent core that engineered Soviet survival. It is leadership of the very best the Russian can offer that we face today.

I am not so sure the United States has shaken down to its very best leadership. Even now the lingering fog of wartime military censorship obscures the sharp edge of disaster on which we teetered in the spring of 1942 when Japan swept the southern seas. In the flush of final military victory it was only human to forget the lessons of the mistakes that led us into jeopardy. In the relief of the slaughter's end it is all too easy to weary of the battle to keep the peace that follows every war.

Many of the things in this book have been set down with genuine regret. I realize that much written here may be painful for some of the personalities

discussed and that the countercriticism that is sure to come may be personally distasteful to me. But I can remain silent no longer. The stakes are now too high. I must take the long chance that by offering my evidence on the last decade in the Orient I may contribute something to an accurate estimate of the problems we now face and the direction in which we are drifting. Nothing less than our national survival depends on how well we understand this drift and navigate a new course.

China is the key to the Pacific. Politics are variable, but geography is a constant. It is the geography of China that makes that unhappy land so important. Whatever sentimental appeal there may be in the American aid for China, the United States attitude toward China should be based on a thoroughly realistic appraisal of China's value to the United States.

This country is now engaged in a world-wide struggle with Russia over organization of the world. The problem is whether war with Russia is inevitable or whether the world can be organized as a cooperative venture in peace. This decision depends entirely on the shifting balance of strength between the positions of the United States and Russia.

There is a growing accumulation of intelligence to indicate that Soviet leaders already consider their Asiatic victories of sufficient strategic importance to tip the world balance of power decisively in favor of Russia.

The Russians understand the role of China in this balance well. Since the beginning of the Chinese Revolution in the early 1920's Russians have been active in bending China to their purpose. After they lost their first chance to gain control of China in 1927, the Soviet leaders vigorously aided any cause that might weaken the Japanese program to hitch China to its imperialistic chariot. Now, with Japan defeated, Russia is again shrewdly exploiting the weakness of American policy in China to make her most determined bid for domination of that vast, strategic area.

The Russians seem to learn something from history. They have watched their German neighbors go down to shattering defeat twice in a two-front war. There is considerable evidence that the Soviet leaders are determined to avoid that pitfall. While Germany was a prewar menace on the western flank, Russia carefully avoided war with Japan despite ample provocation by the Japanese. Pitched battles using airplanes and tanks were fought on the Manchurian frontier in 1932 and 1936 between the Russians and Japanese, but the Russians refused to be baited into a full-scale war. Russia was also wary of taking on even a badly mauled Japan in 1945 until the Soviet victory over Germany was complete.

I seriously question that Russia will make anything more than probing skirmishes in Europe until her Asiatic flank is secure. The flurries of Russian activity in Europe are largely tests of American policy and smoke screens to divert attention from the fact that Russia is acquiring vast natural resources, strategic bases, and securing its most vulnerable flank in the Orient.

The Russians are well aware, even if most Americans are not, of the strategic implications of China. North China and Manchuria were the industrial bases that furnished more than one-third of all Japanese war production. From air bases built for the Americans during the last war at Chengtu, Sian, and Lanchow in northwest China, all of the vast Russian industry east of the Ural Mountains is open to air attack. From these same bases and dozens of others in North China the slender thread of Russian communications between eastern and western Siberia could be snapped by even a small air force. With North China controlled by a government friendly to the United States, Russia's only access to these fields would be across a thousand miles of Turkestan desert. As a result of the Communist sweep in China many of these vital fields are already in the hands of Chinese Communists. From Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines, American air power can only peck away at the perimeter of Russia's vitals. From North and central China the same force could strike deeply into Russia's industrial heart.

These, then, are the stakes for which we are playing in China. If China remains friendly to the United States, the Russians will dare not move deeper into Europe leaving their vitals exposed on the Asiatic flank. If the Asiatic flank is secured and American airpower is pushed out beyond a critical range, then the way will be open for new and more powerful ventures in Europe.

It is now obvious that the United States played its prewar hand in Asia badly. Initial Japanese aggression in Manchuria during 1931 and 1932 was the tip-off to the potential aggressors that the world would not be organized on a basis of collective security. It showed clearly that the Western powers would not stick together to keep the peace. It is the answer to precisely this same

question that the Russians are probing for today. On this answer will depend their future plans. Our record in China so far has provided them with the same answer as in 1931. If our China policy continues along its present course the Russians will probably be justified in concluding that our determination to preserve the peace is no stronger now than that of the Western nations in 1931–32. In that case, their decision will favor further aggression that can only lead to war.

After Japanese attacks on China in 1937 the United States failed to enforce its "Open Door Policy" in China and allowed Japan to exclude us from the Yangtze and China's costal ports. At the same time the United States sold enormous quantities of scrap iron, oil, and aviation supplies to Japan. We were awakened from that fool's dream one Sunday morning by the sound of Japanese bombs blasting Pearl Harbor.

Our wartime policy in China failed to retrieve our prewar losses. Primarily because of the leadership of General Joseph W. Stilwell, we failed to achieve either the Military or the political objectives desired in China. Not until Stilwell was succeeded by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer did American policy in China bear any resemblance to that of two allies fighting a common foe.

Immediately after the war Wedemeyer continued to execute a firm and constructive policy. Already he had regained much of the ground lost by Stilwell and had promising prospects of complete success. Collapse of Japan found the Generalissimo's armies still in South and West China far from the vital ports and industrial centers held by the Japanese. Chinese Communist armies, in contrast, lay along the lower Yangtze Valley and near all the major centers of North China. But in this race to relieve the Japanese the United States provided air lift that enabled the Generalissimo's armies to leapfrog Communist forces in their path and occupy the key cities. Navy transports later moved other Chinese divisions to Manchurian ports to begin occupation of the vital area.

To his everlasting credit, Wedemeyer diagnosed the situation accurately and acted with promptness and decision to avert this initial Communist crisis and prevent the Chinese Communists from taking over control of China's key areas from the Japanese. Later Wedemeyer made a thorough study of China's postwar problems and blueprinted a detailed plan for the type and quantity of American aid required to help the Chinese effectively reorganize their shattered country. The recommendations of this report were not only ignored but the report itself was ruthlessly suppressed, and the American people and their Congress have been deprived of the testimony of a man who is perhaps our best authority on postwar China. Even at this late date the Wedemeyer report on China should be made public.

After a summer of diplomatic maneuvering between the Generalissimo and Chinese Communist leaders, the civil war broke out into the open again in October 1945. The Generalissimo's armies still had their American-supplied equipment. Well equipped with trucks, artillery, machine guns, and mortars, they began a systematic mop-up of Communist troops wherever they could be found. The Generalissimo's offensive was well under way and progressing successfully when General George C. Marshall reached China in November 1945 as a special emissary. Marshall has now retired in poor health after devoting a lifetime of great service to his country. He carries with him the respect of all those, including myself, who worked with him during the war and of all who shared his labors during the trying postwar years.

It was unfortunate that his assignment in China was to carry out a policy set for him by the State Department that was utterly impossible to execute. The failure of Marshall's China mission had its roots in these faulty orders. Under normal circumstances it would seem less than fair not to ignore this episode in the career of a man who has done so much for his country. However, a full discussion of this period in our China policy is absolutely essential to understand what is going on in Asia and why our national survival is at stake. Here in Shanghai, with China crumbling before my eyes, I have no choice but to discuss the Marshall mission frankly.

Marshall was a rigidly disciplined "spit and polish" soldier of the "Black Jack" Pershing school, and he came to China fresh from five years as the head of the most powerful military organization in the world. Marshall was used to conducting his business through direct orders promptly executed without question. By the time Marshall reached China that country was reduced to a state of disorganization where getting things accomplished by the Chinese government required rare tact, flexibility, and judgment. Only four years of a far less brutal enemy occupation reduced France to a position where it is still impossible to organize a responsible government. China suffered eight years of occupation

interlarded with intermittent civil war that left economic chaos and political turbulence so violent it was impossible for an Occidental to understand it at first glance. Marshall's judgment of China by his strict soldier's standards and tight concept of organization could hardly have aided his understanding of the Chinese problems he came to solve.

Marshall also came to China with a set of orders utterly impossible to carry out. They were given to him by a State Department that was the source of a Russian policy now admitted to have been a grievous error. Marshall did not originate that policy, and, when he became Secretary of State, he was the leader in the fight to change it. However, in his China mission he was saddled with these State Department orders; good soldier that he was, he strove to carry them out to the letter despite all obstacles and regardless of how hopeless he himself may have thought the task set for him.

Marshall's orders were to bring an end to the Chinese civil war and stimulate a coalition government in China by taking the Chinese Communists into the existing government headed by the Generalissimo. These orders were the product of the Yalta-Potsdam political climate that based American policy on the assumption that it was both possible and necessary to cooperate with the Russians. During the period when this utterly mistaken notion guided American policy it was China that suffered the most serious consequences.

To guide him in this complex and difficult role, Marshall had the conflicting testimony of two of his close personal friends—Stilwell and Wedemeyer. Unfortunately, he accepted Stilwell's version of China and Chinese leadership almost at face value. This could not help but complicate his task.

Net result of Marshall's fifteen-month mission to China was much the same as Stilwell's earlier experience. The trend of a gradually stronger Central Government was reversed and the military balance shifted again in favor of the Chinese Communists.

Stripped to its essential, here is what the Marshall mission did to China. It forced a truce to the Chinese civil war at a time when the Central Government forces were winning. When the Generalissimo naturally balked at endorsing a policy that meant military disaster for his forces, Marshall applied pressure in the Stilwell manner by shutting off the flow of all American military aid to China including war surplus bought and paid for by the Chinese. This arms embargo lasted for nearly a year. He also summarily scuttled a Sino-American agreement made in September 1945 whereby the United States agreed to supply China with planes and equipment for an eight and one-third group air force including four-engine bombers. Marshall also extracted a promise from the Generalissimo not to use the Chinese Air Force already in China against the Communists on the grounds that this would constitute offensive action. Restricting the Chinese Air Force deprived the Generalissimo of his most potent weapon. It was also implied that discussions regarding a $500,000,000 loan to China could not be resumed until a truce was effected in the civil war. Marshall did not know then that the most effective Washington opposition to the Chinese loan was coming from Henry Wallace, a man whose position on Russia has since become quite clear.

The truce sponsored and pushed by Marshall, with all the diplomatic resources of the United States at his disposal, forced the Generalissimo to halt his anti-Communist offensive at a time when it was on the verge of wiping out large bodies of Chinese Communist troops. Some fifty truce teams each were dispatched to trouble spots all over China. Each was headed by an elderly American colonel specially picked for his white hair to impress the Chinese. Here are some specific examples of what they accomplished.

North of Hankow some 200,000 government troops had surrounded 70,000 Communist troops and were beginning a methodical job of extermination. The Communists appealed to Marshall on the basis of his truce proposal, and arrangements were made for the fighting to cease while the Communists marched out of the trap and on to Shantung Province, where a large Communist offensive began about a year later. On the East River near Canton some 100,000 Communist troops were trapped by government forces. The truce teams effected their release and allowed the Communists to march unmolested to Bias Bay where they boarded junks and sailed to Shantung.

The worst fiasco was at Kalgan Pass. This gap in the North China Mountains is a historic gateway between China and Manchuria. At the end of the war there were no organized Communists in Manchuria. Chinese Communists flocked from their base in northwest China through the Kalgan Pass to join the Russian troops in Manchuria. When the Chinese government troops occupied

Manchuria they found the great industrial centers stripped bare of machinery and the tremendous arsenals of the famed Japanese Kwantung Army empty. There was no trace of either the Kwantung Army or its equipment.

Early in 1946 a government offensive captured Kalgan and sealed off the pass trapping nearly a million Chinese Communists in northwest China who were moving toward Manchuria. The Communists complained that they were merely returning to their prewar homes in Manchuria. Marshall made strenuous efforts to get the Generalissimo to open the Kalgan Pass for these Communists. Eventually the Generalissimo yielded, withdrew his troops in June 1946, and the Communist horde poured into Manchuria. The Communists then broke the truce by fortifying Kalgan Pass. A year later Chinese government armies had to fight a bloody campaign to recapture the pass they voluntarily evacuated under the truce.

In January 1947 the mystery of what happened to the Japanese Kwantung Army equipment was solved. The poorly armed Chinese Communists who marched north the year before now swarmed south from Manchuria armed with Japanese rifles, machine guns, mortars, tanks, and artillery. They even had Japanese aircraft but no gas or pilots to operate them. The Russians had simply turned over the Japanese equipment to the Chinese Communists and thus endowed them with a rich military legacy.

Conservative estimates of the Japanese military stockpile in Manchuria seized by the Russians apprise it as sufficient matériel to supply a million men for ten years of fighting. By using Japanese munitions the Russians avoided the necessity of investing their own resources and are able to claim that no Russian arms were sent to China. The Manchurian booty represents the total investment the Russians can afford in China at present. They lack the industry in eastern Siberia to supply a sustained war effort even for themselves. Transportation facilities across Siberia are too meager to supply China from the Russian Ural industrial area.

It was these troops who marched under a safe-conduct of the American-sponsored truce through Kalgan Pass and returned with Japanese arms that won the decisive battles in Manchuria in the summer of 1947. They were opposed by the government's American-trained divisions. While the Communists were being rearmed by the Russians, the government divisions had their supplies cut off by what Marshall freely admits was a ten-month embargo on American military supplies to China. Since these Chinese divisions had been equipped in the spring and summer of 1945 their arms, ammunition, and trucks badly needed replacement. Two years of hard campaigning had worn their rifle barrels smooth, exhausted their ammunition, and battered the trucks they relied on for transport and supply. All of their equipment was American and without American replacements, spare parts, and ammunition it was virtually useless.

It did not take long for the well-armed Communists to chew up the government divisions armed only with the worn remnants of two-year old American equipment and minus an effective air force. The Chinese armies that Stilwell and Wedemeyer trained in India and West China perished early in 1947 on the frozen Manchurian plains. The stage was set for the final mop-up of Manchuria in the summer of 1948 and the Communist offensive into North China that at this writing has swept almost to the north bank of the Yangtze and gravely threatens Nanking and Shanghai.

Marshall also sought, as part of his orders, to force the Generalissimo into a variety of political changes including formation of a coalition government with Communists in the cabinet.

At the time of the Marshall mission the Chinese Communists terms for entering the Chinese National government were one-third of the cabinet members including the War Minister, retention of a Communist army of forty-eight divisions, and the governorships of all provinces where the Communist troops then claimed occupation of a majority of the area. The fate of Czechoslovakia has since proved how fatal this would have been to the existing government of China. Inclusion of Communists in a coalition front is a standard preliminary tactical maneuver in a Communist seizure of power. It is a technique that may well be attempted again in China if the Communists feel that an attempt to gain complete military victory may cost more than they can afford.

The Generalissimo had been dealing with Communists inside and outside the Chinese government for more than twenty years. He spent part of his education in Moscow's Communist academies. He thoroughly understood the Communist motives and techniques and knew that a Communist minority in a coalition government would actually result in complete Communist domination of China.

Marshall was then just beginning his political dealings with the Communists. It is obvious he has learned a good deal about their tactics since then. Marshall's orders in China did not permit him to act as though the struggle between the Communists and Chinese government were anything more than minor maneuvering between rival political factions. He was not able then to view it as the basic struggle that it certainly is wherever that issue is drawn. Marshall had to persist in professing the idea that including Communists in a coalition government was no more serious than adding a few Republicans to a Democratic cabinet. Too many Americans tend to interpret the life and death struggles of foreign politics in the same light as the bitter but by no means fatal rivalry of American politics. There is a vast difference.

When his coalition plans collapsed and fighting flared again, Marshall finally gave up his China venture. He returned to the United States with a "plague on both your houses" speech that was a remarkable confession that his early profession of faith in the integrity of the Communists was not justified by their subsequent actions. Marshall's disillusionment over the prospect of working with Communists on a basis of mutual trust was symptomatic of the general shift in American policy toward Russia that occurred during roughly the same period. American policy in Europe was adjusted to this realistic appraisal of the Communists and their intentions. Our China policy never changed.

While Marshall has done a good job of applying the lessons of his Chinese political education to Europe, he has been reluctant to undertake the fundamental reappraisal of his China policy required by subsequent events. Current American aid to China is largely food relief because of the State Department's insistence that military aid cannot be effective until the Chinese government inaugurates sweeping political and economic reforms.

In this policy I believe the State Department has the cart before the horse. Military aid should have top priority. Without a military decision there can never be the internal stability required for any effective reforms. Last March when the Marshall plan for China was presented to Congress, I was appalled to note that only one-sixth of the program was devoted to the military aid so desperately needed.

At the request of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, then headed by Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey, I flew from Shanghai to Washington to plead for a more realistic approach to China's problems and a more intelligent understanding of the United States stake in Asia. My fifty-one-hour flight in a great circle course from Shanghai to Washington via Northwest Airlines offered dramatic evidence of how the Pacific world had shrunk when compared with my initial fourteen-day steamship trip to China in 1937.

I told Congress last March that unless effective military aid was immediately forthcoming for China, the Chinese Communists would overrun Manchuria and be well on their way to taking all of North China within six months. Congress authorized military aid of $125,000,000 to China, but the summer was spent in endless dickering with the State Department and National Military Establishment over details of that aid, and not until October of 1948 did these munitions begin to flow to China. By then, seven months after my gloomy prophecy, the Communists had all of Manchuria and most of North China, and were marching toward Nanking.

The situation is now deteriorating so rapidly in China that I cannot venture further prophecy on its outcome. However, there are two salient facts of which I am sure. First is that the United States needs a new and effective policy in China. This will require a thorough reexamination of our present policy and our capacity to support any changes. But there is an acute danger that we may no longer have time for such consideration and that the Communists may win complete victory in China before a new American policy can be formed. Reliable reports indicate that the Communist generals are planning to force a Yangtze crossing early in the spring of 1949. Russians are now reported to be training a Chinese Communist air force near Mukden to provide the air cover without which a crossing of the Yangtze might be impossible. Captured Japanese planes and Russian second-line fighters are being turned over to the Chinese Communist air center.

In view of this situation the immediate goal of the United States must be some sort of holding action that will prevent a decisive Communist victory while our China policy is being debated. This action requires neither vast monetary nor military outlays. Its principal requirement is swift action lest we lose our chance forever. The recent history of China is studded with examples of how small, technically well-equipped forces can exert decisive influence in China out of all proportion to their size.

This holding action in China to prevent the Communists from organizing the great Chinese land mass against us is imperative if we are to gain the time required for a searching analysis of our world-wide foreign policy and the development of a sound method of working with the Chinese to replace our present policy of sticking a finger in the European dike while the Asiatic dam bursts.

My second certainty is that the price of peace in the Pacific world is going up at an astronomical rate, and we shall eventually have to pay that bill in full. Looking back over the last decade, we can easily trace the soaring cost of an effective American policy in China.

During the war, cost of such a program would have been negligible. During the twin goals of defeating Japan and establishing a strong, friendly Chinese regime were originally inseparable segments of a common goal. Stilwell's failure to recognize this fact lost that opportunity and helped set off the chain reaction that brought us to the brink of the current crisis.

Immediately after the war the cost of China aid rose only slightly. Thanks to the good work done by Wedemeyer and his staff and the availability of a vast stock of war surplus in the Pacific bases, the Chinese government could have been given the military power to withstand aggression and turn to the pressing problems of internal reform with little additional cost to the American taxpayer. Marshall's arms embargo on China squandered that opportunity and gave the Chinese Communists the breathing spell they needed to refurbish their ragged hordes at the captured Japanese stockpiles in Manchuria.

By the spring of 1948 official estimates of the cost of China aid had risen to a billion and a half dollars plus establishment of a large American military mission in China. That opportunity, too, was lost largely as a result of the State Department's insistence on "economic" aid that did little but waste American dollars, instead of the military aid required. How high the cost will eventually go or how many further opportunities we will allow to pass without action I cannot guess. I am only sure that eventually we shall have to pay it in full just as we had to pay the long-deferred bill for a decade's indifference to the Orient that Japan presented at Pearl Harbor just seven years ago.

We face essentially the same choice the British faced in 1938 in Munich. I am well aware of the dangers of bleeding American economy white through a vast arms program and foreign aid. That could be as disastrous as military defeat. But we must face up to our present problem as the British failed to do at Munich. Then they were appalled at the possible price for resisting German aggression. They felt they could not afford that cost. Yet that choice only boosted the final bill to the fantastic total they had to pay. When the bill was finally presented they had no choice but to pay it or accept the end of their nation. The failure to pay the price at Munich eventually cost the British five grinding years of war that eroded their national economy to a bare sustenance level and lost the bulk of their empire. The United States must not make the same mistake simply because we shrink from facing facts.

Many people now admit the validity of this thesis. Few, however, believe there is anything we can do about it. Can we really do anything? We most emphatically can. First we can throw in small, carefully selected military aid tailored to meet the specific problem of the moment in China—a holding action to defend the lower Yangtze Valley and Shanghai. If Shanghai can be held, it will prevent the Communists from organizing the north bank of the Yangtze well enough to support a military thrust across the river into South China.

Along with this aid we must send technically skilled and imaginative leaders who can improvise to meet rapidly changing situations and who can gain the confidence of the Chinese with whom they work. The Chinese may not understand the workings of an internal combustion engine, but they can see through a man and tell what makes him tick in an instant. They have been evaluating human nature for thousands of years and are experts. Naturally the Chinese will not work effectively with foreigners unless they feel these foreigners are genuinely sympathetic to their cause and country.

We must recognize that the Orient is a primary field of American interest and must stop allowing our affairs in this area to be conducted by second-rate men. We are only now beginning to develop some China experts in the field who show real promise, but policy in Washington is still formulated by incompetent scrubs in the State Department, not deemed fit to play in the European game, while men of Wedemeyer's caliber and ability sit on the side lines.

Many of our so-called China experts contend that things are so bad in China now that it is impossible to do anything to change them. This is sheer nonsense. This is the same type of thinking that said it was impossible for China to resist Japan in 1937. Yet it was Japan who suffered the final defeat.

The experts said the American Volunteer Group wouldn't last three weeks in combat, yet with 250 men and $8,000,000 we smashed the Japanese air force over China and kept bombs off Chinese cities for the first time in three years.

The experts wrote off China as finished again when the Japanese took Burma and cut the last land line of supply. They said the air lift across the Hump was impractical and impossible. The airmen of the Air Transport Command and China National Aviation Corporation did the impossible by flying more than a million tons across the Hump and kept China going on airborne supply for as long as was necessary. The military experts said the Japanese Army would run the Fourteenth Air Force out of East China, but again a handful of good men with good airplanes refused to be licked. In the spring of 1945 it was the starving Japanese Army that was getting out of East China as fast as its underfed legs could carry it, and not the Fourteenth Air Force.

Again after the war I was assured by the experts that it would be impossible for me to organize a new air line in China. Today that air line is flying 4,000,000 ton miles a month. I have been working with Americans and Chinese for so long now who have been doing the alleged "impossible" for many years that I have no patience with the critics who are experts only at inventing reasons for doing nothing. I think it is high time we scuttled them in favor of leaders who have the imagination, energy, and intelligence to accomplish the so-called impossible. That is certainly the type of leadership that has made the United States a great nation.

It is not yet too late for effective action in China. The Chinese Communist armies are operating off lines of supply that are badly stretched. Their present position is similar to that of the Japanese at the end of their initial push into East China in 1944 when they were vulnerable to the stranglehold of airpower. The Communists are now moving into territory that has not been politically organized in their favor as well as the northern provinces. The Communists, like the Japanese before them, do not—as yet—have the air umbrella necessary to protect their ground offensives against sustained air attacks. It is certainly not impossible for a small force of stout men who know the terrain to apply the best of modern equipment against critical Communist weak spots and halt the advance in its tracks. This would save the lower Yangtze Valley and South and West China as a base in which Chinese nationalism could reorganize, and after learning the lessons of its defeat, political and military, set out again under its own steam to liberate the rest of China.

Whatever happens in China's immediate future, if it is considered United States policy to prevent Communist organization of that country, it is necessary to maintain this base and maintain some form of non-Communist central government in China. If the territory not yet conquered by the Chinese Communists is allowed to revert to the domination of provincial war lords, it will eventually be divided, defeated, and absorbed by the Communists piecemeal just like the small separate states of eastern Europe.

The creation and preservation of a central government has been the historic role of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in modern China. He has been the driving will that has held together a country of loose political organization and primitive communications in even a semblance of national unity. It is significant that leaders of all the divergent political elements in China except the Communists have appreciated the necessity of Chinese unity. For this reason they have supported the Generalissimo on broad national issues regardless of their disagreements with him on internal policy. It is for this reason that I, too, have loyally supported the Generalissimo during my long residence in China. It was the Generalissimo who stood between China and surrender to Japan, and it was the Generalissimo who stood between China and complete chaos after the war.

Whatever the future may hold, it will be necessary to have some centralizing force to preserve the independent spirit of China and prevent its domination by foreign powers.

Despite a decade of American bungling in China this country still has a vast reservoir of good will among the Chinese people. The Chinese government now has little faith in us because of the long record of broken American promises and action that only served to strengthen the Communist opposition. In the coastal ports most Chinese look on the Americans as successors to the British and French economic imperialists whose only aim is to exploit China for personal profit. But in the vast hinterland there are millions of Chinese who still look on the United States as the only hope in establishing a peaceful and independent China and still remember the American airmen as the reason Japanese bombs stopped falling.

It would not take much concrete effective aid to capitalize on this sentiment. Many Chinese are now accepting the Communists only because they feel the United States has abandoned China to its fate. At the first real sign of American interest in China these marginal millions would abandon the Communists.

As a practicing warrior for many years, I am convinced of the complete futility of war. It settles only problems of the past and creates the new problems of the future. There is no place in the world today for the narrow, competitive nationalism that sparks the tinder of war. My long experience as an airman has taught me the folly of the artificial borders of political states. The ease with which the airman passes them by with his load of peaceful commerce or atomic destruction should have served notice long since that they are no longer necessary.

I am convinced that the people of this planet must ultimately and inevitably move toward a single form of world government if civilization is to survive. But is our immediate task to see that this world government comes as a mutual federation of free peoples rather than through the ruthless domination of a master state enslaving all the others. In this struggle there are still many battles that cannot be avoided. The most critical of these now is to prevent the Communists from organizing the vast and rich land mass of China under their whip and turning its weight against us and the other free peoples of the world.

CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT.

SHANGHAI, CHINA, *January 1949.*

INDEX TO PART 10

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

Page

Abend, Hallett ---- 3685, 3705
Abyssinia ---- 3583, 3584
Academia Sinica ---- 3637
Academy of Science (Institute of World Politics and Economics) ---- 3485, 3604, 3615
Acheson, Dean ---- 3389, 3400, 3401, 3405, 3406, 3407, 3408, 3409, 3410, 3416, 3542, 3644, 3662, 3667
Adams, Eva B ---- 3669
Adler, Solomon ---- 3504, 3530, 3594
Afghanistan ---- 3282, 3464, 3465, 3603, 3632
Agabekov ---- 3705
Air Transport Command ---- 3713
Alaska ---- 3224, 3326, 3632
Albertson, William ---- 3336
Aldo Cafe (Washington, D. C.) ---- 3641
Aleutian Islands ---- 3324, 3326
Alexander Kaun Exchange Fellowship ---- 3621
Alexander, Wallace M ---- 3612
Allen, George ---- 3640
Allen, James S. (Sol Auerbach) ---- 3343, 3344, 3345, 3346, 3348, 3349, 3350, 3351
Allen, Mrs. James S ---- 3348, 3349
Allied Labor News ---- 3543
Alsberg ---- 3482
Alteration Painters Union ---- 3336
Amerasia ---- 3331, 3332, 3333, 3482, 3579, 3580, 3587, 3588, 3589, 3590, 3591, 3592, 3650
America. (*See* United States.)
American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression ---- 3474, 3478
American Economic Foreign Policy ---- 3430
American Embassy (Chungking) ---- 3518
American Embassy (Peking) ---- 3472, 3508
American Embassy (Tokyo) ---- 3702
American Embassy (Moscow) ---- 3327, 3329, 3484, 3615, 3616, 3700
American Friends of the Chinese People ---- 3470, 3471
American Friends Service Committee (Executive Board) ---- 3704
American & Foreign Power Co ---- 3704
American Government. (*See* United States Government.)
American League Against War and Fascism ---- 3551
American Marine Guard ---- 3508
American Peace Crusade ---- 3556
American Peace Mobilization ---- 3458
American Quarterly ---- 3506
American-Russian Institute ---- 3449, 3450, 3452, 3479, 3484, 3486, 3487, 3506, 3517, 3617, 3619, 3620, 3621
American Student Union ---- 3513
American Youth for Democracy ---- 3477, 3478, 3479
Amsterdam ---- 3604, 3633
Amter, Israel ---- 3335, 3336
Anglo-Japanese Alliance ---- 3324, 3691
Angus, H. F ---- 3333
Anti-Imperialist Alliance ---- 3337

Page
Anti-Imperialist League 3336, 3337
Appelman, Morris L 3470, 3471
Appropriations Committee (United States Senate) 3412
Aquitania (steamship) 3331
Arctic Institute of America 3557, 3558
Arctic Research Institute 3557
Arnold & Co., Ltd 3651
Arnold, Thurman 3277, 3353, 3533, 3573, 3605, 3606
Asia 3580, 3628, 3654, 3661, 3667, 3703
Asia and the State Department 3666, 3668
Asiaticus (Hans Moeller) 3324, 3329, 3330, 3453, 3679
Associated Press 3536
Association of Atomic Scientists 3538
Astor, Lord 3483
Atkinson, Ellen Van Zyll de Jong 3516
Atlantic Monthly 3580, 3666
Atomic Energy Commission (UN) 3539
Austern, Hilda (Bretholtz) (Ray) 3505, 3592, 3593, 3612
Australia 3318, 3566, 3592, 3593, 3632
Austria 3592, 3702
Avery, Sewell 3450

B

Baerensprung, H. W 3505
Baldwin, Hanson 3700
Ball, MacMahon W 3566, 3591
Ballantine, Joseph 3371, 3377, 3400, 3409
Bank of England 3435, 3436
Bankers Trust Co 3704
Barmine, Gen. Alexander 3326, 3365, 3499, 3577, 3611, 3704
Barnes, Joseph Fels 3337, 3338, 3339, 3484, 3505, 3512, 3513, 3514, 3592, 3593, 3594, 3595
Barnes, Mrs. Joseph Fels (Kathleen) 3321, 3343, 3429, 3480, 3481, 3484
Barry, John D 3548, 3549
Beard, Charles A 3689
Bedacht, Max 3335, 3337
Beloff, Max 3585
Benes, Dr 3421
Benjamin, H 3335
Bennington College 3538
Berland, Sam 3336
Berman, Isaac 3336
Bernstein, Joseph M 3505
Bess, Demaree 3466
Bethune, Dr. Norman 3508
Best, Emery 3488
Bevin, Ernest 3665
Biddle, Francis 3299
Biedenkapp, Fred 3336
Bidien, Charles 3505
Big Three 3355, 3357, 3390, 3479
Bill of Rights 3365, 3499
Birobidjan 3318
Bisson, T. A 3284–3287, 3290, 3291, 3297, 3298, 3299, 3300, 3302, 3303, 3304, 3308, 3343, 3364, 3417, 3505, 3581, 3644, 3677
Black, Justice Hugo 3645
Blakeslee 3310
Bloch, Kurt 3522, 3523
Bloom, Representative Sol 3406, 3407, 3408
Blum, Leon 3305
Blumberg, Albert 3505
Bodian, Clara 3337
Bogartz, Herman 3336
Borodin, Michael 3505, 3506, 3530
Borton, Hugh 3587

Page
Boruchowitz, Joseph 3335, 3336
Bowman, Isaiah 3368, 3554
Boyd, Mrs. T. Kenneth 3450
Brandt, William 3680
Bransten, Louise R 3505, 3506, 3621
Bratislava (Czechoslovakia) 3664
Brazil 3592
Bremman, Y. P. 3481, 3484, 3485, 3586
Bristol, Admiral Mark 3475
British Foreign Office 3701
British Labor Party 3665
Bronk, Detlev 3557
Browder, Earl 3283, 3305, 3414, 3415, 3500, 3507, 3530, 3532, 3560
Bruno, John 3337
Bryn Mawr College 3518
Budenz, Louis F 3283
Budzeslawski, Herman 3507
Building and Construction Workers League 3336
Building Maintenance Workers Industrial Union 3336
Buitenkant, Jacques 3337
Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R 3582
Bullitt, Ambassador William C 3327, 3328, 3616, 3702
Bundy, Mr. Robert E 3562, 3607
Bundy, Mrs 3564
Buriat-Mongolia 3317, 3318
Burma 3342, 3623, 3632, 3713
Burma Campaign 3501
Burns, Reverend Clarence 3630
Burt, Samuel 3336
Buryat-Mongolia 3463, 3464, 3483, 3485
Butler, R. A 3589
Byrnes, James F 3398, 3667

C

Cairo 3503
California Labor School 3621, 3703
Cameron, Angus 3508
Canada 3471, 3472, 3575, 3582, 3592, 3632
Canadian Friends of the Chinese People 3470, 3471, 3472
Canadian Institute (Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton) 3604
Canadian League Against War and Fascism 3470, 3471
Canadian Legation (Tokyo) 3469
Canniff, Andrew 3451, 3453, 3581
Cannon, Mr 3511
Canton 3586, 3709
Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union, A 3443
Carlson, Brig. Gen. Evans F. (USMCR–Rt.) 3472, 3475, 3477, 3478, 3508
Carnegie Endowment 3637, 3638, 3704
Carr, E. H 3585
Carroll, Elizabeth H 3562, 3563
Carroll, Esther 3471
Carter, Bill 3343
Carter, Edward C 3277–3280, 3287, 3309, 3313, 3315–3325, 3326, 3328, 3329, 3331, 3332, 3338, 3343, 3344, 3346, 3347, 3354, 3359, 3360, 3362, 3365, 3366, 3367, 3376, 3380, 3381, 3382, 3391, 3396, 3415, 3417, 3419, 3422, 3423, 3424, 3425, 3426, 3427, 3428, 3429, 3430, 3431, 3434, 3445, 3447, 3448, 3451, 3453, 3455, 3460, 3462, 3466, 3469, 3473, 3474, 3480, 3483, 3484, 3486, 3487, 3497, 3506, 3522, 3523, 3546, 3569, 3579, 3581, 3582, 3585, 3587, 3588–3594, 3600, 3603, 3615–3617, 3633, 3634, 3638, 3641, 3642, 3643, 3649.
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 3484
Carter, Mrs. (wife of Prof. George Carter) 3555
Carter, Prof. George 3552, 3554

Page
Case, Mr---- 3644
Cashione, P---- 3337
Cassel, Professor---- 3695
Catholic Missionaries (China)---- 3629, 3630, 3631
Central Asian Society---- 3584, 3605
Central Technical School (Toronto)---- 3470, 3472
Chamberlain, William Henry---- 3457, 3466, 3467, 3585, 3586
Chang, Hsueh-liang---- 3306, 3584
Chansik, L---- 3337
Chapman, Abraham---- 3500, 3531
Chatham House---- 3316, 3318, 3435, 3436, 3441, 3453, 3483, 3484, 3589, 3593, 3633, 3634
Chen, Han-seng---- 3480, 3481, 3483, 3509, 3510, 3521, 3582, 3585, 3587, 3636, 3637
Chen, K. P---- 3313, 3314
Chennault, General Claire Lee---- 3342, 3358, 3359, 3389, 3395, 3411, 3412, 3622, 3624, 3625, 3626, 3658, 3706, 3714
Cheng, Chih-yi---- 3637
Chew, Tong (*see also* Hong, Chew-shi and Chu Tong)---- 3511
Chi, Chao-ting---- 3333, 3341, 3342, 3509, 3511, 3582, 3588, 3591, 3594, 3678
Chi, Harriet Levine---- 3340, 3341, 3509
Chi, Kung Chuan---- 3511, 3512–3514, 3597
Chi, Professor (old)---- 3340
Chiang, Kai-shek (Generalissimo)---- 3284, 3289, 3293, 3304, 3307, 3309, 3311, 3329, 3341, 3342, 3355–3357, 3374, 3377, 3388, 3391–3395, 3397, 3398, 3402–3405, 3408, 3411, 3414, 3416, 3475, 3476, 3498, 3501–3503, 3505, 3509, 3518, 3519, 3524, 3525, 3535–3537, 3541, 3549, 3583, 3586, 3595, 3600, 3608, 3610, 3623–3627, 3632, 3638, 3639, 3650, 3651, 3656, 3657, 3665, 3677, 3705, 3706, 3708–3710, 3713
Chiang, Madam Kai-shek---- 3356, 3477, 3551, 3632, 3650
Chiasheng---- 3613
Ch'in-Han---- 3614
Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po-ku)---- 3307
China---- 3284, 3287, 3294, 3305–3307, 3318, 3322, 3323, 3325, 3326, 3330, 3333, 3334, 3341, 3349, 3353, 3355, 3356–3357, 3360–3362, 3364, 3366, 3370, 3371, 3373, 3375–3378, 3382–3384, 3387, 3388, 3390–3409, 3411, 3413–3415, 3437, 3439, 3442, 3460, 3464, 3472–3477, 3480, 3483, 3490, 3495, 3502–3504, 3507, 3509, 3511, 3514, 3537–3542, 3545, 3567, 3568, 3581, 3592–3584, 3589, 3592, 3594, 3596, 3597, 3599, 3600, 3608–3610, 3621, 3623–3627, 3630, 3632–3636, 3638, 3639, 3645, 3647, 3651, 3652, 3655, 3657–3659, 3661, 3663, 3664–3670, 3676, 3679–3694, 3696, 3699, 3700–3702, 3705–3714.
China Aid Council---- 3550, 3551, 3560
China and Silver---- 3681
China Among the Powers---- 3312
China at War---- 3705
China Daily News---- 3511–3514
China Defense Supplies---- 3639
China Lobby---- 3277
China Press---- 3498
China's Communist Told Me---- 3304
The China Story---- 3668, 3669
China Today---- 3470–3472, 3522
China Weekly Review---- 3498, 3669
China's New Democracy---- 3500
Chinese Christians---- 3292
Chinese Communist---- 3284–3286, 3289, 3291–3293, 3299, 3302, 3303, 3353, 3355–3359, 3361, 3364, 3366, 3367, 3373, 3374, 3376, 3380, 3383, 3388, 3391–3398, 3400–3403, 3405–3409, 3411, 3412, 3415, 3475, 3498, 3500–3502, 3516, 3527, 3528, 3530–3532, 3537, 3541, 3558, 3559, 3569, 3577, 3582–3584, 3595, 3596, 3608–3610, 3622–3624, 3626, 3628, 3629, 3630, 3645, 3663–3665, 3669, 3682, 3684, 3704–3707, 3709–3714.

Page
Chinese Communist Air Force 3711
Chinese Communist Army 3289, 3304, 3307, 3361, 3366, 3374, 3393, 3406, 3407, 3503, 3524, 3559, 3584, 3623, 3625, 3708, 3709, 3710
Chinese Communist Central Committee 3501
Chinese Communist Government 3334, 3381, 3382, 3509, 3518, 3535
Chinese Communist Party 3289, 3293, 3304, 3305–3307, 3500, 3669, 3678
Chinese Christians 3629
Chinese Embassy (Washington) 3639
Chinese Government Research Institute 3637
Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance 3511, 3512, 3513
Chinese History Project 3578, 3613
Chinese Mohammedans 3631
Chinese Mongols 3300
Chinese Moslems 3300
Chinese Nationalist Government 3285, 3286, 3289, 3291, 3295, 3303, 3304, 3309, 3353, 3357, 3358, 3361, 3364, 3367, 3373–3375, 3388, 3392, 3398–3402, 3404, 3407, 3411, 3412, 3498, 3502, 3513, 3520, 3535–3537, 3582, 3592, 3596, 3608–3610, 3623, 3624, 3631, 3637, 3669, 3690, 3703–3705, 3710, 3712.
Chinese Nationalist Air Force 3709
Chinese Nationalist Army 3392, 3406, 3407, 3501, 3502, 3559, 3608, 3665
Chinese Soviet Government 3300, 3304
Chinese Tag Day 3337
Chinese Turkistan 3464
Chingyang 3308
Chiperfield, Representative 3407
Christian Science Monitor 3466, 3488, 3515
Chou, En-lai 3288, 3293, 3304, 3306, 3307, 3549
Chu, Teh 3288, 3292, 3293, 3301, 3302, 3304, 3305, 3306, 3308, 3559
Chu, Tong (*see also* Hong, Chew) 3510, 3597
Chungking 3311, 3329, 3341, 3342, 3356, 3388, 3405, 3518, 3537, 3549, 3553, 3566, 3567, 3594, 3595, 3600, 3624, 3626, 3650, 3652, 3685.
Churchill, Winston (Prime Minister) 3355, 3373, 3387, 3389, 3390, 3413
Civil Service Commission 3339, 3510, 3511, 3512
Civil Service Commission, Review Board 3679
Cleaners and Dyers Union 3336
Clubb, O. Edmund 3389, 3410
Coe, V. Frank 3514
Colegrove, Kenneth 3576, 3577
College of Chinese Studies (Peking) 3604
College of Pacific 3536
Collins, Henry 3515
Colonial and American Workers Washington Executive Council 3335
Columbia University 3611, 3637
Columbia University Press 3594
Comintern 3319, 3494, 3498, 3500, 3610
Comintern (Executive Committee) 3500
Commercial Press 3593
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 3473
Committee of One Thousand 3551
Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Unions 3335, 3337
Communism in China 3683
Communist Academy Library (Moscow) 3593
Communist Central Military Council (CCP) 3306
Communist China 3295, 3296, 3310, 3509, 3637, 3703, 3704
Communist International 3284, 3316, 3319
Communist Labor Herald 3529
Communist Party 3283, 3284, 3286, 3311, 3336, 3346, 3362, 3363, 3365, 3457, 3466, 3470, 3471, 3477, 3478, 3494, 3499, 3500, 3502, 3504–3506, 3508–3511, 3515–3518, 3521–3527, 3530, 3532, 3534, 3543–3548, 3550, 3557, 3560, 3566, 3568, 3570, 3582, 3597, 3601, 3628, 3637, 3645, 3647, 3668, 3669, 3675, 3701
Communist Party Bookshops 3362

Page
Communist Party (California) 3548
Communist Party (Germany) 3679
Communist Party (New York) 3335, 3557
Communist Party (Politburo) 3283, 3284
Communist Party (Russia) 3365, 3405, 3446, 3499, 3500, 3528, 3531, 3558, 3559, 3627, 3635
Communist Party (United States) 3305, 3335, 3357, 3362, 3415, 3507, 3531, 3555
Communist Political Association 3414, 3415
Communist Political Association (National Board) 3414
Compania 3349
Comstock, Ada L 3612
Connelly, Matthew A 3363, 3366, 3386, 3387, 3388, 3640
Conservative Party (Great Britain) 3373
Cooke, Admiral Charles M 3668
Coordinator of Informaion (COI) 3337–3339
Corbett, Prof. Percy E 3343
Corbett's Group 3343
Cornell University 3539, 3621
Cosmos Club 3280, 3311
Councils of Working Class Women 3336, 3337
Council on Arts of the Ukrainian Republic 3621
Council on World Affairs 3701
Cressey, George B 3323, 3483
Crowdy, Dame Rachel 3584
Currie, Lauchlin 3310, 3342, 3515, 3649, 3650, 3652, 3655, 3678
Czarist Russia 3457, 3464
Czechoslovakia 3420, 3421, 3430, 3585, 3586, 3601, 3631, 3632, 3664, 3665, 3710

D

Dafoe, J. W 3483, 3580, 3587, 3588, 3589, 3592
Daily News 3450
Daily People's World 3330
Daily Worker 3284, 3334, 3335, 3337–3339, 3345, 3475, 3556
Daily Worker Book Shop (New York) 3500
Daladier 3457
Damon, Anna 3335
Darcy, Sam 3335
Darrow, Clarence 3600
Davidson, John F 3472
Davies, John P 3484, 3625
Davies, Joseph E 3702
Davis, Elmer 3512, 3659
Deacon, William Arthur 3472
Deane, Hugh 3515
DeCaux, Len 3515
Decker, John W 3704
De Francis, Dr. John 3636
Defense Advisory Commission 3454, 3455, 3459, 3677, 3678
DeJong, Ellen 3515
Denmark 3592
Dennis, Eugene 3415
Dilemma in Japan 3555, 3556
Dimanshtein 3318
Dirac 3539
Dissertation by Levina 3485
Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourevitch 3485
Dolbin 3646, 3647, 3649
Dolsen, James 3516
Donaldson, Faith 3322, 3323
Dooman, Eugene 3377, 3400, 3409, 3489
Doroshkin, Sadie 3337
Douglas, Justice William O 3645
Downing, Elizabeth 3480, 3481, 3523, 3581
Draper, Theodore 3516
Dream We Lost, The 3668, 3669

Page
Drygoods Workers Union 3336
Dubs, Homer H 3611
Duclos, Jacques 3415
Duggan, Laurence 3516
Duke University 3611
Dunne, Bill 3335
Du Peld 3337
Dutch Navy 3325

E

Early, Steve 3640
Eastman, Max 3353, 3355, 3361, 3391, 3497, 3498
Eaton, Representative Charles 3711
Eaton, Dr 3406
Economic Handbook 3455, 3456, 3481, 3482
Economic Review of Foreign Countries 3685
Economist 3698
Eddy, Harold 3336
Egypt 3536, 3613
Eight Route Army 3304, 3306, 3476, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3586
Ellin, Nathan 3336
Eltenton, Mr. George Charles 3516, 3517
Eltenton, Dolly (Dorothy) 3516, 3517
Emmerson 3547
Empire Club (Toronto) 3604
Empire in the East 3323, 3324
England. (*See* Great Britain.)
English Missionaries 3629
English Workers Clubs 3337
Engels 3501
England 3318, 3324, 3374, 3387, 3484
Engdahl, J. L 3335
English Baptist Mission 3293, 3307
English Workers Press 3481
Epstein, Israel 3516, 3530–3532
Ethiopia 3693

F

Fairbank, John K 3516, 3517, 3547, 3671, 3672, 3673, 3674
Fairbanks, Alaska 3575
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie 3480, 3481, 3516, 3518
Fang, Gen. Chen-wu 3470, 3472
Far Eastern Republic 3702
Far Eastern Survey 3284, 3285, 3460–3462, 3506, 3523, 3617, 3618, 3682, 3698
Farley, Miriam S 3455, 3460, 3462, 3644
Fascist 3586
Fate of the World Is at Stake in China, The 3355, 3390, 3498
Faymonville, Gen. Philip R 3310, 3327–3330, 3616, 3700–3703
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 3339
Federal Reserve Bank of North China 3685
Federation of American (Atomic) Scientists 3539
Feigin, Abner 3336
Feng 3612
Feng, Dora 3536
Feng, Hung-chi 3536
Feng, Mildred 3536
Feng, Paul 3536
Feng, General Y'hsiang (Yu-hsiang) 3518–3520, 3535–3537
Ferris, General 3657, 3658
Field, Edith 3570
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt 3283, 3284, 3288, 3343, 3346–3348, 3422, 3424–3429, 3437, 3438, 3444, 3445, 3454–3459, 3465, 3481, 3482, 3485, 3580, 3582, 3587–3591, 3612, 3677
Field, Osgoode 3484, 3487
Fierstein, Chester 3336

Page
Fifteenth Infantry (U. S. Army) (Tientsin) 3661, 3667
Fiji 3592
Financial Situation in Japan 3485
Finland 3420, 3422, 3428, 3430, 3432
Finnish Campaign (*see* Soviet Invasion of Finland) 3430
Finnish Workers Federation 3337
First All-Soviet Congress in Juikin, Kiangsi 3306
Fitzgerald, William 3336
Flemming, Commmissioner 3512
Foley, Mr 3488
Food Workers Industrial Union 3336
Foreign Affairs 3470, 3580
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives (U. S.) 3405, 3406, 3711
Foreign Commerce Year Book 3699
Foreign Investments in China 3690
Foreign Policy Association 3290, 3300, 3304, 3415, 3551
Foreign Relations Committee (United States Senate) 3398, 3594, 3678
Forman, Harrison 3355, 3380, 3381, 3391, 3500, 3501
Formosa 3404, 3704
Fortas, Abe 3419, 3493, 3607, 3611
Fourteenth Air Force (United States) 3713
Fourth Route Army. (*See* New Fourth Route Army.)
France 3420, 3421, 3423, 3430, 3432, 3457, 3500, 3584, 3585, 3586, 3592, 3599, 3627, 3632, 3691, 3697, 3698, 3701, 3703.
Freeman, Miller 3482
French Indochina 3349
Friedman, B 3337
Friedman, Julian R 3520
Friends of the Soviet Union 3336, 3337
Fukien Province 3511
Furniture Workers Industrial Union 3336

G

Gannes, Harry 3521
Gardner, John 3637
Gauss, Ambassador 3651
Gayer 3430
Gayn, Mark 3521
General Electric Co 3704
General Looks at the Soviet Union, A 3700
Geneva 3652
Gerlach, Talitha 3636
German-Japanese Alliance 3323
Germany 3356, 3387, 3414, 3457, 3500, 3584, 3592, 3593, 3633, 3640, 3668, 3669, 3670, 3681, 3701–3703, 3707.
Gibarti, Louis 3521
Glasser, Harold 3521
Gold, Ben 3336
Gollanz 3317, 3322
Goodrich, L. Carrington 3611, 3612
Gordon, Representative 3407
Gordon, Mack 3337
Gourevitch 3485
G. P. U. (Soviet Secret Police) 3705
Grajdanzev, Andrew (Andrew Grad) 3343, 3450–3452, 3454, 3455, 3456, 3457, 3460, 3462, 3585
Granich, Grace 3284
Granich, Max 3521
Graves, William S 3701, 3702
Great Britain 3292, 3305, 3356, 3357, 3373, 3404, 3405, 3413, 3415, 3420, 3421, 3423, 3430, 3432, 3435–3437, 3457, 3467, 3476, 3483, 3500, 3581, 3583–3586, 3589, 3592, 3599, 3600, 3627, 3632, 3633, 3665, 3667, 3681–3683, 3691, 3694, 3696–3700, 3702, 3712.

Page
Great Falls 3575
Great Soviet World Atlas 3483, 3485
Green, G 3335
Green, Senator 3668
Greenberg, Michael 3522, 3523, 3530
Grew, Ambassador Joseph 3369, 3370, 3371, 3377, 3409, 3556, 3676
Grinnell College 3591
Gromyko, Mr. A 3311–3314
Guadalcanal 3502, 3702
Guerrilla Warfare in Manchuria 3485
Guggemoss, Brother Philotheus 3631

H

Haiti 3335
Hall, Bryant 3335
Hall, Otto 3335
Hancock, W. K 3313, 3314
Hankow 3586, 3709
Harmon, Francis S 3612
Harondar, H. M 3315–3317, 3322, 3323, 3484, 3582
Harper, Sam 3450
Harvard University 3611, 3704
Hatem, Dr. H 3525, 3530, 3531
Hazard, John N 3450, 3467, 3575–3657, 3660
Hawaii 3592
Hearst Newspapers 3700, 3701
Heissig, Walther 3628, 3670
Henderson, Loy 3616
Herald-Tribune 3430
Herod, William R 3704
Hickerson, Harold 3337
High Cost of Vengeance, The 3669
Hinton, Bertha 3601
Hinton, Mrs. Carmelita 3534
Hinton, Joan Chase 3534, 3535, 3538, 3542, 3601
Hinton, William 3534
Hirohito 3556
Hiroshima 3539
Hiss, Alger 3310, 3543, 3544, 3638, 3646
History of Medical Psychology 3621
Hitler, Adolf 3421, 3457, 3502, 3503, 3585, 3586, 3702
Hitler Germany 3414, 3703
Hitler-Stalin Pact 3498, 3677
Ho, Franklin 3331
Ho, Lung 3306
Ho, Gen. Yin Chin 3626, 3627
Holcombe, Arthur 3704
Holland 3600, 3633
Holland, William L 3278, 3286, 3287, 3328, 3339, 3340, 3348, 3430, 3469, 3480, 3581, 3582, 3585, 3587, 3588, 3593, 3594, 3627, 3632, 3634
Holland, Mrs. William L. (Doreen) 3340
Honan Campaign 3624
Hong, Chew Shi 3509–3512, 3514, 3597
Hongkong 3314, 3342, 3535, 3586, 3600, 3637
Hoover, Herbert 3479
Hoover Library 3546
Hornbeck, Stanley K 3310, 3645
Hotz, Robert 3624, 3626, 3706
House of Commons (Ottawa) 3470, 3472
House Un-American Activities Committee 3517
How Aid China 3610
Howard, Roy 3328
Hsu, Yung Ying 3333, 3334, 3335, 3337–3341, 3594
Hu, Han-min 3596
Hu, Dr. Shih 3638, 3639
Hu, T. P 3335

Page
Hu, T. Y. 3335
Hu, Tsangnan 3608
Hubbard 3580, 3581, 3592
Hubbard article 3450, 3451
Hubbard, G. E. 3436, 3452, 3453, 3456, 3457
Hubbard, L. E. 3448, 3450–3452
Hubbard, L. M. 3433–3436, 3441, 3443
Hudson, (Roy) 3336
Hull, Secretary 3651
Humelsine, Carl H. 3410
Hungary 3592, 3702
Hurley, Ambassador Patrick J. 3356, 3367, 3374, 3502, 3610, 3626, 3705
Hyman, Louis 3336
Independent Carpenters Union 3336
India 3504, 3512, 3592, 3599, 3605, 3622, 3632, 3681, 3694, 3696, 3699
Indochina 3586, 3699
Indonesia 3623
INDUSCO 3670
Inner Asian Frontiers 3614
Inner Mongolia 3328, 3538, 3539, 3542, 3638
Intercontinent News (Soviet) 3284
International Affairs 3580
International Association (Annual Report of) 3587
International Institute of Social Research 3611
International Missionary Council 3704
International Publishers 3481
Institute of Nuclear Studies 3539
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) 3279–3280, 3284, 3286, 3288, 3310–3316, 3319–3323, 3325–3326, 3329, 3331, 3333, 3337–3340, 3343, 3346–3348, 3354–3355, 3359, 3361–3364, 3376, 3379, 3415, 3420, 3422, 3424–3425, 3428–3430, 3434–3436, 3439–3442, 3446, 3449, 3450, 3452–3455, 3460, 3462, 3465–3467, 3469, 3473–3474, 3478–3483, 3487, 3509–3510, 3514–3517, 3520, 3522–3523, 3543, 3545–3548, 3551, 3569, 3577, 3579–3581, 3585, 3587–3588, 3590, 3593–3594, 3604, 3614–3616, 3636, 3638, 3642, 3645, 3654, 3675, 3677–3679.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 3284, 3316, 3334, 3344–3347, 3440–3442, 3447–3448, 3482, 3485–3486, 3506, 3611–3612, 3618, 3640, 3645–3646
Institute of Pacific Relations (Banff Conference) 3600, 3603–3604, 3632
Institute of Pacific Relations (British Council) 3316, 3438, 3441, 3486–3487, 3634
Institute of Pacific Relations (California) 3517
Institute of Pacific Relations (Central Library Honolulu) 3593
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese Council) 3285, 3316, 3331, 3438, 3593–3594, 3634
Institute of Pacific Relations (Dutch Council) 3587, 3633
Institute of Pacific Relations (files) 3283, 3294, 3447
Institute of Pacific Relations (Honolulu) 3604
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference) 3520, 3594
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference Caucus Meeting) 3514–3515
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat) 3311, 3315, 3440, 3442, 3448, 3483, 3485, 3550, 3587–3588, 3590–3592
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japanese Council) 3331, 3438, 3482, 3556, 3579, 3580, 3585, 3587, 3589, 3591, 3592, 3633
Institute of Pacific Relations (Mont Tremblant Conference) 3550, 3632
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York Office) 3294, 3440, 3442–3443, 3452, 3511, 3512–3523, 3522
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 3430, 3441, 3448, 3482, 3483, 3580, 3587, 3588, 3591, 3592, 3593
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine Council) 3349, 3350, 3483
Institute of Pacific Relations (Princeton meeting) 3581
Institute of Pacific Relations (Research Committee) 3509, 3531
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco Office) 3516
Institute of Pacific Relations (Secretary-general) 3277, 3603, 3638

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (Secretariat Inquiry) 3587
Institute of Pacific Relations (Stratford-on-Avon Conference) 3547, 3632
Institute of Pacific Relations (U. S. S. R. Council) 3316, 3317, 3319, 3320, 3321, 3322, 3435, 3436, 3438, 3453, 3481, 3482, 3483, 3484, 3485, 3486, 3582, 3603, 3633.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington Office) 3310, 3566, 3570
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite Conference) 3311, 3317, 3318, 3320, 3481, 3482, 3483, 3486, 3543, 3548, 3634
Institute of Physical Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R. 3621
Institute of World Politics and Economics 3485
International Friends of the Chinese People 3472
International Labor Defense 3336
International Labor Defense (New York Section) 3337
International Ladies Garment Workers Dnion (I. L. G. W. U.) 3335
International Workers Order 3337
Interprofessional Association 3548, 3549
Intourist 3484
Iran 3464, 3465, 3504
Isaacs, Harold R 3627, 3628
Ishii, Viscount 3587
Italy 3584, 3693, 3700, 3703
Izard, Ralph 3700
Izvestia 3318, 3460, 3461, 3484, 3536

J

Jaffe, Philip J. (J. W. Phillips) 3290, 3297, 3298, 3299, 3300, 3302, 3303, 3304, 3308, 3331, 3543, 3544, 3552
Jaffe, Mrs. Philip J 3290, 3298
Japan 3280, 3281, 3289, 3292, 3297, 3304, 3305, 3306, 3317, 3323, 3324, 3325, 3326, 3329, 3332, 3342, 3349, 3356, 3358, 3361, 3373, 3374, 3375, 3376, 3382, 3383, 3388, 3391, 3392, 3393, 3394, 3398, 3401, 3411, 3412, 3413, 3414, 3437, 3439, 3452, 3455, 3456, 3470, 3472, 3473, 3481, 3483, 3488, 3489, 3498, 3500, 3501, 3503, 3545, 3547, 3548, 3566, 3568, 3580, 3581, 3582, 3583, 3584, 3589, 3591, 3592, 3593, 3594, 3608, 3609, 3622, 3623, 3624, 3625, 3627, 3628, 3632, 3640, 3650, 3661, 3668, 3669, 3676, 3680, 3682, 3683, 3685, 3686, 3687, 3690, 3691, 3693, 3697, 3698, 3699, 3700, 3701, 3703, 3706, 3707, 3708, 3712, 3713
Japan Policy as Related to China Policy 3387
Japanese Army 3713
Japanese Communist Party 3567, 3577
Japanese Embassy (Washington) 3589
Japanese Emperor 3577, 3598, 3660, 3661
Japanese Foreign Office 3681, 3682
Japan's Emergence as a Modern State 3469
Japan's Red Flirtation 3705, 3706
Java 3592
Jefferson School Book Shop 3363
Jenkinson, Anthony 3543
Jessup, Philip C 3333, 3515, 3612, 3644
Jewish City Club Committee 3337
Johns Hopkins University 3368, 3389, 3404, 3423, 3430, 3442, 3448, 3454, 3490, 3509, 3510, 3522, 3552, 3557, 3558, 3563, 3567, 3580, 3581, 3582, 3585, 3588, 3590, 3636, 3638, 3641, 3642
Johnson, Representative 3406
Johnstone, Anne 3310
Johnstone, Bill (William C.) 3310
Joint American and Indian Conference (New Delhi) 3632
Joint Chiefs of Staff 3597, 3598, 3622, 3706
Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs 3350
Jones, Catesby 3641, 3642, 3643
Judd, Representative Walter 3388, 3403, 3404, 3409, 3478, 3490, 3501, 3609, 3610
Juikoff 3482
Justice Department 3284, 3487

K

Page

Kalgan ---- 3709–3710
Kalinin ---- 3484
Kamachatka ---- 3324, 3326
Kanner, David ---- 3337
Kapitsa, Peter L ---- 3620, 3621
Karr, David ---- 3369
Kasenkina, Mrs. Oksana S ---- 3536
Kazakh Republic ---- 3460, 3463–3464
Keene, Mrs ---- 3488
Keeney, Mrs. Mary Jane ---- 3545
Keeney, Philip Olin ---- 3545
Kellner, Reverend Henry ---- 3630
Kemenov ---- 3313–3314
Kennedy, George ---- 3470
Key Economic Areas in Chinese History ---- 3594
Kfare, Louis ---- 3336
Kiangsi ---- 3292, 3306
Kimoto, Jack Dinichi ---- 3341
Kindersley, Sir Robert ---- 3694
Kinkead, Robin ---- 3545
Kirghiz ---- 3463
Kislova, Miss ---- 3484, 3487
Kisselev ---- 3313
Kizer, Benjamin H ---- 3545, 3612, 3645
Klein, Alfred ---- 3514
Kleinman, I ---- 3337
Kleidmann, R ---- 3337
Knowland, Senator William F ---- 3330, 3668
Kohlberg, Alfred ---- 3277
Koide, Teiji ---- 3297
Korea ---- 3405, 3432, 3622, 3679, 3703–3704, 3706
Korean War ---- 3664
Korneichuk, Alexander ---- 3620–3621
Kournakoff, Sergei ---- 3545
Krasavtsev ---- 3486
Kravchenko, Victor ---- 3365, 3499
Kravel, Professor ---- 3318, 3486
Kremlin ---- 3333, 3357, 3405, 3500
Krivitsky, Walter ---- 3486
Kung, Madame ---- 3551
Kungchantang ---- 3608
Kung, P'eng ---- 3549, 3550
Kunming ---- 3658
Kunming (American Consulate) ---- 3658
Kunming Cable ---- 3625, 3659
Kuomintang Government ---- 3307, 3337, 3411, 3476, 3498, 3502, 3535, 3536, 3538, 3540–3542, 3586, 3595–3596, 3623, 3627–3628, 3683–3684, 3705
Kwantung Army (Japanese) ---- 3698, 3710
Kurile Islands ---- 3324, 3326
Kushinsky, Morris ---- 3336

L

Labor Party (Great Britain) ---- 3373
Labor Sports Union ---- 3336, 3337
Lamont, Corliss ---- 3359, 3360, 3396, 3415, 3545
Lamont, Thomas W ---- 3353, 3354, 3359, 3360, 3361, 3363, 3364, 3365, 3372, 3373, 3374, 3375, 3376, 3378, 3380, 3381, 3382, 3390, 3391, 3394, 3395, 3396, 3397, 3402, 3417, 3497
Landy, J ---- 3337
Lang, Olga ---- 3545
Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1919 ---- 3691
Lasker ---- 3592, 3593
Last Chance in China ---- 3669
Lattimore, David ---- 3340, 3601
Lattimore, Owen ---- 3277–3714

Page
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor Holgate) 3282, 3283, 3312, 3515, 3516, 3517, 3533, 3552, 3560, 3561, 3564, 3584, 3590, 3599, 3607, 3617, 3641, 3644, 3654.
Lattimore Whose Ordeal 3638
Laundry Workers Industrial Union 3336
Lawrence, William 3336
League of Nations 3332, 3584, 3695
League of Nations Economic Intelligence Service 3700
League of Nations Mission of Educational Experts the Reorganization of Education in China 3430
League of Nations Statistical Yearbook 3696
Leaning, W. J 3343
League of Nations 3681
Lee, Duncan C 3546
Leland Stanford University 3338, 3621
Lend-Lease Bill 3581
Lenin, V 3582, 3705
Leningrad 3633
Lenin of China 3500
Lenin Pedagogical Institute (Moscow) 3621
Leonov, Leonid 3620, 3621
Levin, Emanuel 3337
Levin, M 3337
Li, Li-san 3300, 3304
Li, T. H 3335
Li, Teh-chuan 3537
Liangchow 3631
Liao 3612, 3613, 3614
Liberator 3498, 3529
Liberty Magazine 3356
Library of Congress 3311
Licht, Sarah 3337
Lilienthal, Philip 3430
Lin, Yutang 3501
Lindley, Ernest 3609, 3610
Lindley, Sir Francis 3584
Lindsay, Michael 3476, 3545, 3546
Linton, Ralph 3611
Lippmann, Walter 3703
Literature on the Chinese Communist Movement 3316
Little, Brown & Co 3362, 3556
Litvinoff (Litvinov) 3311, 3313, 3333, 3484
Liu, Wellington 3593
Liu, Yu-wan 3317, 3486
Lo, Lita 3536
Lo, Robert 3536
Lockwood, William W 3343, 3344, 3345
London 3414, 3450, 3483, 3536, 3589, 3632, 3634, 3648, 3698
London School of Economics 3611
London Times 3288, 3291, 3294, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3353, 3629, 3678
Lorwin, Lewis L 3323
Los Alamos 3538, 3539
Lost Illusion 3669
Low Memorial Library (Columbia University) 3611, 3613
Lowe, T. B 3546
Loyalty Board (Appeal Board) 3410
Loyalty Board (President's) 3410
Lozovsky, S. A 3313, 3314
Luce, Henry 3388, 3403, 3404
Lustig, James 3336

M

Macadam 3453
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 3392, 3452, 3622, 3632, 3667, 3703, 3706
MacKay, John A 3704
MacLeod, A. A 3470–3471

Page
MacMillan ---- 3498
MacMillan Co., The ---- 3627
Mail and Empire ---- 3472
Making of Modern China, The ---- 3462, 3621
Malaya ---- 3596, 3623, 3696
Manchester Guardian ---- 3498
Manchu Dynasty ---- 3306
Manchukuo ---- 3630–3631
Manchuria ---- 3360, 3366–3367, 3393, 3401, 3406, 3453, 3454, 3463–3464, 3483, 3498, 3503, 3583, 3599, 3622, 3631–3632, 3687, 3698, 3706–3707, 3709–3712.
Mandel, William M ---- 3546, 3585
Mansfield, Representative Mike ---- 3409, 3490, 3608–3609
Mao, Tse-tung ---- 3288, 3292, 3293, 3297–3298, 3300–3305, 3307–3308, 3500–3503, 3593, 3669
Marine Workers Industrial Union ---- 3336
Markoff, A ---- 3335
Marshall, Gen. George C ---- 3397, 3399, 3400, 3406, 3408, 3622, 3624, 3658, 3661, 3662, 3664–3667, 3706, 3708–3712
Marshall directive ---- 3661
Marshall Mission ---- 3378, 3708, 3709
Marshall Plan ---- 3539, 3663, 3771
Marshall Policy—A Steady Pattern ---- 3664
Marsh, Mr ---- 3512
Martin, W ---- 3337
Marx ---- 3501
Maryknoll Mission in Fushun, Manchukuo ---- 3630
Masses ---- 3498
Matles, James ---- 3336
Matsumoto ---- 3589
Matusow, Harvey M ---- 3362
Maul, Grace ---- 3471
McCarthy, Senator Joseph ---- 3277, 3281, 3282, 3553, 3555, 3562, 3615, 3617
McCullough, Rear Adm. R. P ---- 3512
McDermott, Michael ---- 3410

M

McGarry, Mrs ---- 3340
McGovern ---- 3614
McKinley Tariff ---- 3687
McWilliams ---- 3588
Medynsky, Eugene ---- 3620, 3621
Meiji Restoration in Japan ---- 3688
Mein Kampf ---- 3702
Menges, Karl H ---- 3611
Menefee, Selden ---- 3546
Menges, Prof. Karl H ---- 3637
Menzies, A. R ---- 3472
Mexico ---- 3696, 3697
Mikhailovitch, General ---- 3503
Mikoyan ---- 3313, 3314
Miller, Robert T ---- 3546
Mind Medicine and Man ---- 3621
Minorities in the Soviet Far East ---- 3461, 3462, 3617, 3618, 3621
Minusinsk ---- 3463
Missionaries of the Sacret Heart of Issoudum ---- 3630
Mitchell, Miss Kate ---- 3481, 3483, 3581, 3587, 3588, 3592
Mitsubishi ---- 3583
Mitsui ---- 3583
Mo, James ---- 3335
Mongolia ---- 3318, 3463, 3488, 3552, 3599, 3634, 3638
Mongolian Atlas ---- 3322
Mongolian People's Republic ---- 3323
Montello, Dominick ---- 3336
Montreal ---- 3582

Page
Moon, P. T. 3546
Moore, Harriet L. (Gelfan) 3316–3318, 3321–3323, 3329, 3343, 3449, 3450–3452, 3454, 3456–3457, 3466, 3479, 3480–3481, 3483–3485, 3547, 3570
Moore, Richard 3335
Moose, Elizabeth 3556
Moose, Professor 3552, 3556
Morgenthau Plan 3669
Moscow 3277, 3284, 3317–3318, 3320, 3322, 3327–3329, 3331, 3332, 3365, 3388, 3405, 3434, 3439, 3466–3467, 3481, 3483, 3484, 3486–3488, 3499, 3500, 3502, 3503, 3533, 3536, 3538, 3558, 3559, 3596, 3603–3605, 3614, 3632–3634, 3638, 3702, 3703, 3705.
Moscow Daily News 3526, 3529
Moscow Meetings (1936) 3315, 3316, 3321, 3323, 3547, 3603, 3604, 3679
Moscow Trials 3364, 3466, 3468, 3499, 3581
Moscow Visit 3487, 3614
Moscow-Volga Canal 3484
Mosimien (China) 3630
Motylev, Dr. V. E. (Motiliev) 3311, 3315–3319, 3322–3326, 3331, 3333, 3434, 3437, 3443, 3446, 3450, 3453, 3457, 3481, 3482–87.
Moyer, Mr 3512, 3514
Mr. President 3640
Mu, Ch'Iao 3341, 3509
Mukden 3711
Munich 3421, 3712
Murray, Senator James E 3666, 3667
Murphy, J. Morden 3704
Mussolini 3586
M. V. Georgic (Steamship) 3480, 3481
My Life in China 3705
My 25 Years in China 3498

N

Nadal, Brother Paschal O. F. M 3630
Nakamura, Nobuyoshi 3297
Nan-ch'ang Uprising 3306
Nankai University (Peiping) 3593
Nanking 3289, 3281, 3294, 3304–3306, 3475, 3482, 3535–3537, 3582–3584, 3589, 3622–3623, 3685, 3706, 3710–3711
Narkomindel 3319, 3323
Nasu 3585
Nation 3465, 3705–3706
National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service 3630
National Committee to Win the Peace 3477–3479
National Library (Peiping) 3593
National Steel Corp 3703
Navy Department 3474
Nazi Underground 3387
Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union 3335–3336
Nehru, Prime Minister 3568, 3605
Nelson 3626
Nessin, Sam 3336
Netherlands 3592
New China Daily News 3596
New Delhi 3605
New Fourth Route Army 3476, 3523–3525, 3559, 3624
New Guinea 3702
New Leader 3638
New Masses 3297–3299, 3302–3304, 3465, 3529
New Republic 3465
New School for Social Research 3615
New Statesman and Nation 3706
New York Herald Tribune 3627, 3664, 3666, 3703

Page
New York Times ---- 3353–3355, 3360–3361, 3374–3376, 3382, 3390, 3396, 3503, 3518–3519, 3535, 3589, 3615, 3685, 3700, 3704–3705.
New York Worker Peasant Alliance ---- 3335, 3337
New Zealand ---- 3318, 3592, 3593
Neymann ---- 3318
Nimitz, Admiral Chester A ---- 3632
No Peace for Asia ---- 3627
Norin ---- 3287
Norman E. Herbert ---- 3469–3473, 3547–3548, 3568
North China ---- 3707–3708
North Korea ---- 3409
North Korean Communists ---- 3432
North Pacific Fisheries ---- 3481–3482
Norway ---- 3467, 3600, 3632
Nuhle ---- 3343

O

Oakie, Jack ---- 3517
O'Brien, Howard Vincent ---- 3450
O'Connor, Oleta ---- 3548
Odessa ---- 3536
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) ---- 3280, 3339
Office of War Information (OWI) ---- 3333–3334, 3338–3339, 3341, 3363, 3386, 3511–3514, 3517–3518, 3576, 3597, 3598, 3621, 3632, 3645, 3659
Office of War Information (China Division) ---- 3517
Office of War Information (OWI) (New York Office) ---- 3334, 3339, 3512, 3595, 3597
Office of War Information (Pacific Operations) ---- 3511
Office of War Information (Personnel Security Committee) ---- 3513, 3595, 3597
Office of War Information (OWI) (San Francisco) ---- 3285, 3287, 3339, 3545
Office of War Information (San Francisco Office, Chinese Section) ---- 3340, 3512
Office of War Information (Japanese Desk, San Francisco Office) ---- 3598
Office of War Information (Security Board) ---- 3510
Office of War Information (Washington) ---- 3363, 3389
Office Workers Union ---- 3336
Okinawa ---- 3622, 3625, 3706–3707
Olgin, M. J ---- 3335
One Who Survived ---- 3704
Orchard, John E ---- 3323, 3486
Ordeal by Slander ---- 3277, 3279, 3369, 3486, 3603, 3614, 3617
Organization of Soviet Science, The ---- 3621
Osborne, Clay ---- 3598
Oslo ---- 3467
OSS. (*See* Office of Strategic Services.)
Ostrander, Mr. S. Taylor ---- 3455
Ottawa ---- 3582
Oumansky, Ambassador Constantine ---- 3329, 3638
Our Job in the Pacific ---- 3654, 3655
Outer Mongolia ---- 3311, 3313, 3323, 3328, 3483, 3632, 3634–3636, 3638
Overgaard, Andy (Andrew) ---- 3336
Overseas News Agency ---- 3508, 3668
Owens, Hamilton ---- 3648
Ozaki, Hotzumi ---- 3548

P

Pacific Affairs ---- 3277, 3284, 3299, 3300, 3304, 3309, 3312, 3315–3317, 3319–3321, 3324–3325, 3329–3333, 3344–3345, 3348–3349, 3430, 3433–3438, 3440–3442, 3445, 3447–3449, 3451, 3453–3454, 3465–3467, 3469, 3472–3473, 3482–3484, 3486–3487, 3505, 3521–3522, 3529, 3545, 3548, 3568–3569, 3577, 3579–3582, 3585, 3588–3594, 3600, 3603–3604, 3615, 3633–3634, 3679–3680
Pacific Institute of Amsterdam ---- 3486
Page, R ---- 3480
Palestine ---- 3592
Pan American Clipper ---- 3600

Page
Pandit, Mrs. V. L. 3313–3314, 3605
Pan Pacific Club (Shanghai) 3604
Panyushkin, Mr. (Soviet Ambassador) 3311
Paris Exposition 3484
Parker, Philo W 3612
Patri, Giacoma 3621
Patterson, William 3336
Pauley 3489
Pauley Reparations Mission 3282, 3297, 3473, 3488–3489, 3521, 3632, 3652
Pavlenko 3484
Pearl Harbor 3391, 3411, 3623, 3700
Pearson, Drew 3368–3370
Pegoraro, Rev. Epiphany, O. F. M 3630
Peiping 3580, 3593
Peiping-Hankow Railroad 3477
Peking 3287, 3290, 3295, 3303–3304, 3322, 3568, 3632, 3634, 3651, 3670
Pelliot 3333
Pennfield, James 3646
P'eng, Mr. Kung 3341
Penrose 3323
People's Allied Anti-Japanese Army (1930's) 3538
People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University (Yenan) 3300, 3305, 3308
People's China 3538, 3542, 3543
People's Daily World 3700
People's Liberation Army 3541
Peffer, Nathaniel 3323, 3592
Pershing, General 3708
Philippine Islands 3323–3324, 3348–3349, 3483, 3592–3593, 3622, 3661, 3689, 3696, 3701, 3702, 3706–3707
Phillips, Lillian 3548, 3549
Ping, Tong 3335
Pinghan Railroad 3624
Pivot of Asia 3636
Pizer, Morris 3336
Platt, Leon 3335
Plumptre 3430
Pobeda (Russian motorship) 3536
Po-ku. (*See* Ch'in Pang-hsien.)
Poland 3592, 3631, 3633, 3664
Poland, Fred W 3549, 3550
Political Affairs 3414–3415
Pomona College (San Francisco) 3286
Porter, Catherine 3440–3441, 3465–3466, 3480–3481, 3581
Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in Japan 3485
Postolsky, Max 3337
Potash, Irving 3336
Potsdam 3378, 3413, 3709
Powell, J. B 3353, 3355, 3361, 3391, 3497, 3498
Pfotenhauer, Herr Hans 3593
Pravda 3365, 3460–3461, 3499, 3536
Pregel, Boris 3576
Preliminary Meeting of the American Delegation IPR Hot Springs Conference 3515
Present Conditions in China 3681
Present Situation and the Next Tasks, The 3414
Press Club (Tokyo) 3521
Pressman, Lee 3550
Price, Mildred (Coy) 3550–3551, 3560
Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea 3592
Problems of the Pacific 3483
Prokopovich, Professor 3444
Pushkin 3621
Putnam's Sons, G. P. (New York) 3624, 3626, 3706
Putney School (Vermont) 3601
Pyke, Richard 3481, 3483, 3486

R

Page

Radek, Karl — 3467
Rajchman, Ludwig — 3551
Rakovsky, George — 3467
Rate of Growth in the Soviet Union, The — 3451
Ray, Thomas — 3336
Reader's Digest — 3353, 3355–3356, 3361–3365, 3375, 3378, 3380–3382, 3390–3391, 3497–3498
Red Academy (Yenan) — 3292, 3299
Reichshauer — 3486
Remer, Carl F — 3280, 3281, 3310, 3311, 3690
Remington, William — 3556
Report from Red China — 3500
Rise of American Civilization, The — 3689
Road to the Ocean — 3621
Roberts, Holland — 3620, 3621
Robertson, William S — 3704
Robeson, Paul — 3477, 3556, 3570
Rockefeller Foundation, Inc — 3637–3638
Rodman, Samuel — 3551
Rogers, Representative — 3407
Rogers, Pauline — 3337
Rogoff, Vladimir (Rogov) — 3280, 3283–3284, 3309–3311
Rome — 3630
Romm, Vladimir — 3311, 3318
Roosevelt, President Franklin D — 3324, 3330, 3374, 3377, 3479, 3499, 3624, 3626, 3650–3651, 3658–3659, 3667, 3693, 3696, 3700, 3702
Roosevelt-Churchill pledge — 3503
Rosenberg, B — 3337
Rosenberg, Isadore — 3336
Rosenberg, Max — 3336
Rosenman — 3640
Rosinger, Lawrence K — 3551–3552
Ross, Charlie — 3640
Rotary Club, Peking — 3604
Rotterdam — 3604, 3633
Roth, Andrew — 3552–3556
Roudabush, Steven — 3646
Roudabush, Mrs. Steven — 3646
Rowe, David E — 3312
Royal Anthropological Institute (London) — 3604
Royal Institute of International Affairs — 3435–3436, 3486, 3582, 3604
Rubin, Jay — 3336
Russia — 3280, 3329, 3332, 3358–3359, 3361, 3365, 3373–3374, 3376, 3387–3388, 3390–3391, 3394–3397, 3403–3405, 3407–3408, 3411–3413, 3417, 3420–3424, 3428, 3430–3433, 3437, 3443, 3449, 3451, 3454, 3460, 3464, 3468–3469, 3498–3499, 3501, 3529, 3533, 3537, 3541, 3584, 3588, 3600, 3616, 3623, 3632, 3634–3636, 3640, 3646, 3648, 3662–3668, 3680, 3683, 3691, 3707–3711
Russian Army — 3365, 3484, 3709
Russian Embassy (Washington) — 3646, 3648
Russian-Japanese Nonaggression Pact — 3279
Russian Military Intelligence — 3327
Russian Mutual Aid — 3337
Russian Revolution 1917 — 3463
Russo-Chinese Border — 3463
Russo-Japanese Pact — 3522, 3523, 3669
Russian War Relief, Inc — 3615

S

Saigon — 3623, 3706
Saionji, Kimi Kazu — 3556, 3557, 3589, 3592
Salmen, Stanley — 3508
Salter, Sir Arthur — 3333, 3681, 3682, 3688, 3696, 3699
Samarins — 3536
San Francisco Daily News — 3581

Page
Saturday Evening Post ... 3466, 3508
Saturday Review of Literature ... 3669
Sazer, H ... 3335
SCAP ... 3452
Schiller, Harry ... 3337
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr ... 3666
Schneider, Helen ... 3557
Schneider, Isidore ... 3557
Schraven, Most Reverend Hubert Francis ... 3631
Science and Society ... 3568
Security—Can it be Retrieved ... 3333
Service, John Stewart ... 3410, 3552, 3553, 3554, 3555, 3657
Shall America Stop Arming Japan ... 3430
Shanghai ... 3281, 3308, 3317, 3411, 3498, 3540, 3586, 3599, 3622, 3623, 3625, 3634, 3652, 3688, 3698, 3706, 3708, 3710, 3712, 3714.
Shansi Province ... 3287
Shantung Province ... 3709
Shavelson, Clara ... 3337
Shelesnyak, M. C ... 3557, 3558
Shensi Province ... 3304, 3306, 3307, 3541, 3624
Sheppard ... 3336
Sher, Mort ... 3336
Shiman ... 3485, 3592
Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union ... 3336
Shu, Y. Y. (*See* Hsu, Y. Y.)
Sian ... 3287, 3289, 3291, 3292, 3304, 3306, 3625
Sian Incident ... 3305, 3307
Siberia ... 3324, 3365, 3499, 3623, 3632, 3646, 3660, 3706, 3710
Silverman, Harriet ... 3335
Simmons, Ernest J ... 3620, 3621
Simons, William ... 3337
Sinclair, Harry F ... 3702
Singapore ... 3596
Singer, Joseph ... 3337
Sinkiang ... 3323, 3463, 3464, 3705
Siskind, George ... 3335
Sino-American Pact ... 3626, 3709
Sino-Japanese War ... 3476
Situation in China, The ... 3316
Slavonic Institute in Prague ... 3444
Smedley, Agnes ... 3300, 3304, 3308, 3558, 3559
Smirnov ... 3484, 3487
Smith, Mr ... 3511
Smith, Adam ... 3695
Smith, Mr. Farrar ... 3514
Snow, Edgar ... 3291, 3300, 3304, 3355, 3380, 3382, 3391, 3500, 3501, 3669
Snow, Mrs. Edgar (*see also* Nym Wales) ... 3295, 3296, 3298, 3300, 3304, 3560, 3568
Snyder ... 3640
Socialist Party (United States) ... 3305
Society for Sino-Soviet Cultural Relations ... 3317
Soltan, Joseph ... 3337
Solution in Asia ... 3311, 3312, 3313, 3357, 3362, 3363, 3364, 3376, 3499, 3578
Some Aspects of Psychiatry in the U. S. S. R ... 3621
Soong, Sing Ling ... 3477
Soong, Dr. T. V ... 3551, 3626, 3639
Sorge, Richard ... 3560, 3566
Southard, Ordway ... 3560, 3561, 3562, 3565
Southard, Mrs. Ordway (Mary) ... 3560, 3561, 3562, 3565
Souvarine, Boris ... 3365, 3499
Soviet Asia Mission ... 3652
Soviet China ... 3306
Soviet Communism a New Civilization ... 3444
Soviet Constitution ... 3460
Soviet Culture in Wartime No. 3 ... 3617, 3618, 3619

Page
Soviet Embassy (Tokyo) 3482
Soviet Far East 3317, 3318
Soviet Foreign Office 3647
Soviet Invasion of Finland 3419,
3420, 3421, 3422, 3423, 3425, 3426, 3427, 3428, 3430, 3431, 3432, 3445
Soviet Polish Delegation (U. N.) 3551
Soviet Purchasing Commission (Washington) 3499
Soviet Region (China) 3308
Soviet Russia 3356, 3431, 3432,
3448, 3457, 3461, 3498, 3527, 3529, 3546, 3634, 3669, 3677, 3684, 3705
Soviet Russia Today 3426, 3427, 3428, 3529
Soviet Union 3289, 3313,
3317, 3325, 3334, 3335, 3355, 3360, 3365, 3366, 3367, 3390, 3414, 3425,
3444, 3453, 3457, 3460, 3463, 3464, 3466, 3467, 3480, 3494, 3500, 3504,
3537, 3542, 3584, 3586, 3592, 3603, 3608, 3621, 3647, 3679, 3701, 3703
Sovietskie Kraebedenie 3317
Spain 3430, 3467, 3584, 3586, 3592, 3614, 3703
Sproul, Robert Gordon 3612
Stalin, Joseph 3328, 3355, 3357, 3364,
3365, 3387, 3390, 3413, 3499, 3500, 3502, 3503, 3581, 3608, 3627, 3702
Stallman, Ben 3336
Standard of Living in the Soviet Union, The 3443
Stassen, Harold E 3404
Statesman's Year Book (London) 3686
State Department 3281, 3282, 3310, 3361, 3367, 3369, 3371, 3376,
3377, 3378, 3380, 3382, 3383, 3384, 3385, 3386, 3399, 3400, 3401, 3402,
3410, 3414, 3488, 3494, 3503, 3520, 3555, 3556, 3577, 3601, 3615, 3616,
3617, 3644, 3659, 3661, 3666, 3667, 3676, 3677, 3689, 3709, 3711, 3712
State Department Conference (October 6–8) 3704
State Department (Far Eastern Division) 3398, 3520, 3666, 3667
State Department White Paper 3406, 3650
State Department Loyalty and Security Board 3410
Steel and Metal Workers' Industrial Union 3336
Steely, Mr. E. Newton 3512, 3679
Stefansson, Mr. Vilhjalmur 3546, 3557, 3558, 3560, 3561, 3562, 3563, 3564, 3565
Stefansson, Mrs. Evelyn 3560, 3561, 3562, 3563, 3564, 3565
Steiger, Andrew 3567, 3653
Stein, Guenther 3331, 3566
Stepanov 3313, 3314
Stewart, Marguerite A 3640
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph W 3501,
3503, 3624, 3625, 3626, 3627, 3657, 3667, 3708, 3709
Straits Settlements 3592
Strong, Anna Louise 3523,
3524, 3525, 3526, 3527, 3528, 3529, 3530, 3533, 3534, 3559, 3567
The Strongholds of Chinese Communism, a Journey to North Shensi 3288
Suez 3632
Suiyuan Province 3539
Sullivan, Richard 3336
Suma 3589
Sun Fo 3598
Sun, Yat-sen 3300, 3304, 3475, 3476, 3477, 3498, 3537, 3595, 3683, 3684, 3691
Sun, Madame Yat-sen 3477, 3551, 3567, 3658
Sunday Worker 3529
Sweden 3592, 3600, 3632
Switzerland 3599, 3652
Symposium on China 3485
Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria 3485
Szechwan Province 3306

T

Tanaka, Baron 3702
Takayanagi 3587, 3592
Takeda, Shiro 3297
Tarawa 3502

Page
Tarr ---- 3588, 3589
Tass ---- 3284, 3536
Tawney, R. H ---- 3611, 3612
Taxi Workers Union ---- 3336
Taylor, George ---- 3584, 3594, 3611
Taylor, Jack ---- 3336
Tenth Army (United States) ---- 3625
This Is the Hour ---- 3621
This Soviet World ---- 3528
Thompson ---- 3600
Thompson, Dorothy ---- 3507, 3508
Thompson, John ---- 3581
Thompson, Miss Virginia ---- 3333
Thorner, Daniel ---- 3567, 3636, 3637
Thorner, Mrs. Daniel ---- 3637
Thorpe, General ---- 3547, 3548, 3670
Three Principles of the People or San Min Chu I ---- 3475
Tibet ---- 3292, 3552
Tientsin ---- 3651
Tikhi Okean ---- 3318, 3319, 3482, 3485, 3581
Ting Ling ---- 3300, 3304
Tingpien ---- 3308
Tito ---- 3503
Todd, Larry ---- 3310
Tokuda, Kyuichy ---- 3567, 3568
Tong, Hollington ---- 3536
Toronto ---- 3470, 3471
Tokyo ---- 3297, 3467, 3469, 3481, 3482, 3521, 3592, 3593, 3702
Trachtenberg, Alexander ---- 3283, 3335
Trade Union Unity Council ---- 3336
The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution ---- 3627
Trans-Pacific Air Service ---- 3324, 3325
Trans-Siberian Railroad ---- 3632, 3701
Treasury Department ---- 3569
Tribute to Alexander Kaun ---- 3620
Trone, Solomon ---- 3568, 3605
Trone, Mrs. Solomon ---- 3605
Trotsky, Leon ---- 3356, 3361, 3467, 3627, 3705
Trud ---- 3460, 3461
Truman Doctrine ---- 3539, 3665
Truman, President Harry S ---- 3355, 3357, 3366, 3368, 3370, 3371, 3372, 3375, 3376, 3377, 3378, 3379, 3380, 3382, 3383, 3384, 3385, 3386, 3387, 3388, 3389, 3390, 3394, 3395, 3397, 3398, 3399, 3400, 3401, 3402, 3403, 3404, 3409, 3412, 3413, 3416, 3493, 3494, 3495, 3496, 3497, 3573, 3574, 3639, 3640, 3661, 3665, 3676, 3677, 3704
Tseng, Yang-fu ---- 3404
Tsiang, H. T ---- 3337
Tsuru, Shigato ---- 3568
Turkestan ---- 3708
T. V. A ---- 3520
Tydings, Senator Millard E ---- 3282, 3286, 3480
Tydings Committee Hearings ---- 3345, 3350, 3493–3497, 3507, 3573, 3574, 3628, 3668, 3676
Tyler, Miss Charlotte ---- 3322, 3480, 3481

U

Ulan Bator ---- 3318
Unemployed Councils ---- 3336
United Front ---- 3293, 3306, 3307, 3586, 3669, 3684
United Nations ---- 3357, 3479, 3551, 3632, 3704
United Nations Charter ---- 3407, 3408
United Nations (Russian delegation) ---- 3646
United Nations (San Francisco Conference) ---- 3355

Page

United States- 3308, 3325, 3326, 3342, 3350, 3360, 3365, 3374, 3382, 3393, 3394, 3398, 3400, 3409, 3415, 3459, 3472, 3476, 3484, 3498, 3499, 3503, 3536, 3537, 3570, 3574, 3575, 3581, 3583, 3586, 3592, 3595, 3599, 3600, 3602, 3609, 3610, 3615, 3616, 3622, 3627, 3632, 3633, 3639, 3640, 3662, 3663, 3666, 3675, 3676, 3679, 3681, 3684, 3685, 3686, 3688, 3690, 3692, 3693, 3696, 3697, 3699, 3702, 3704, 3706, 3707, 3708, 3709, 3711, 3712, 3713, 3714
United States Armed Forces---------- 3399, 3406, 3541, 3667
U. S. Army---------- 3702
United States Army Chemical Warfare School---------- 3702
United States Army (Department of)---------- 3669, 3701
United States Army Industrial College---------- 3702
United States Army Intelligence (G–2)---------- 3327, 3670
United States Army War College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas---------- 3702
United States Army War College (Washington, D. C.)---------- 3643
United States, China, and the World Market, The---------- 3680
United States Department of Agriculture---------- 3693
United States Department of Commerce---------- 3685
United States Government---------- 3305, 3307, 3314, 3315, 3334, 3353, 3355, 3357, 3358, 3363, 3364, 3366, 3373, 3376, 3378, 3379, 3381, 3382, 3384, 3388, 3395, 3403–3405, 3413, 3435–3436, 3437, 3463, 3465, 3475, 3479, 3500, 3501, 3540, 3541, 3542, 3691
United States Marine Corps---------- 3473, 3474, 3509
United States Army Military Academy (West Point)---------- 3701, 3704
United States Navy---------- 3392, 3473, 3689
United States Navy (Office of Naval Intelligence)---------- 3556, 3557
United States Relations with China (State Department White Paper)---- 3705
United States Senate---------- 3674
United States Strategic Bomb-Survey Mission---------- 3297
United States Supreme Court---------- 3645
United States Treasury---------- 3364, 3688, 3697
United States Liberation of Philippines---------- 3324
United States Recognition of the U. S. S. R.---------- 3324, 3702
University of California---------- 3536
University of California Press---------- 3287
University of Chicago---------- 3538
University of Missouri---------- 3498
University of Pennsylvania---------- 3636
University of Washington---------- 3611
University of Wisconsin---------- 3538, 3539
UNNRA---------- 3645
Upper Canada College---------- 3472
Ushiba---------- 3317, 3331
Ussachevsky, Betty---------- 3640
U. S. S. R. (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)---------- 3307, 3317, 3320, 3323, 3325, 3326, 3329, 3330, 3335, 3346, 3382, 3423, 3435, 3436, 3449, 3453, 3475, 3476, 3483, 3484, 3487, 3533, 3592, 3608, 3615, 3695, 3700
U. S. S. R. Air Force---------- 3623
U. S. S. R. Army---------- 3498, 3499, 3703
U. S. S. R. Handbook---------- 3317, 3321, 3322
Utley, Freda---------- 3587, 3610, 3668, 3669, 3705
Uzbekistan---------- 3463

V

Van Kleeck, Mary---------- 3466, 3568
Van Walree---------- 3486
Varga, Eugene---------- 3313,3314
Versailles Conference---------- 3684
Victoria College---------- 3472
Vincent, John Carter---------- 3280, 3281, 3311, 3371, 3377, 3383, 3384, 3385, 3386, 3397, 3398, 3399, 3400, 3520, 3568, 3640, 3641, 3650, 3651, 3652, 3655, 3656, 3657, 3658, 3659, 3660, 3661, 3662, 3667.
Vinogradoff---------- 3484
Vinson---------- 3640
Virginia Beach Conference (1939)---------- 3482
Virginia Quarterly---------- 3333

Page
Vladivostok ---- 3484, 3702
Voi ---- 3313
Voitinsky, G ---- 3313, 3314, 3315, 3316, 3317, 3318, 3319, 3333, 3439, 3441, 3482, 3484
Vorys, Representative ---- 3407
Vox (Voks) ---- 3452, 3484, 3487

W

Wagenknecht, Alfred ---- 3337
Wales, Nym ---- 3568
Wallace, Henry A ---- 3460, 3461, 3462, 3567, 3575, 3576, 3625, 3632, 3646 3647, 3649, 3650, 3652, 3653, 3654, 3655, 3656, 3657, 3659, 3660, 3709
Wallace Mission ---- 3658, 3660
Walsh ---- 3580
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations ---- 3460, 3462, 3585, 3621, 3636, 3666
Wang, C. C ---- 3594
Wang, Ching-wei ---- 3595, 3596, 3684
War and the Working Class ---- 3309, 3310
War Department ---- 3626, 3627
Ward, Angus ---- 3616
Ward, Mrs ---- 3592
War and Peace in Finland ---- 3425, 3426, 3427, 3428
Wardsworth ---- 3584
Ware, James R ---- 3611
Warnshuis ---- 3486
Washington Arms Conference of 1921 ---- 3702
Washington Post ---- 3609, 3610
Way of a Fighter ---- 3411, 3622, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3706
Webb, Beatrice ---- 3444
Webb, Sidney ---- 3444
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C ---- 3356, 3625, 3627, 3669, 3670, 3708, 3709, 3710, 3712.
Wee, David ---- 3337
We Fought For Peace ---- 3477, 3478
Weiner, Robert William ---- 3283
Weiner, Tom ---- 3637
Weisberg, Isador ---- 3336
Weizmann Institute (Palestine) ---- 3558
Welles, Sumner ---- 3327
Welsh, Gertrude ---- 3335
Weyl, Nathaniel ---- 3347, 3543
What Korea Pays for Japanese Rule ---- 3581, 3592
White, Harry Dexter ---- 3568, 3569, 3669
White House ---- 3367, 3368, 3369, 3370, 3377, 3386 3387, 3401, 3409, 3412, 3480, 3493, 3494, 3495, 3573, 3625, 3649, 3650, 3678, 3702.
White, William L ---- 3669
Who Wanted to Recognize Red China ---- 3578, 3611, 3703
Who Said the Chinese Communists Were Not Real Communists ---- 3705
Why China Wants Peace ---- 3538
Wilbur, Ray Lyman ---- 3612
Williamson, J ---- 3335
Willoughby, Gen. Charles A ---- 3566
Wilson, President Woodrow ---- 3701
Wineberg ---- 3484
Winnick ---- 3337
Winter, Carl ---- 3336
Winter, Ella ---- 3569
Wiss, Helen ---- 3580
Wittfogel, Karl August ---- 3545, 3611, 3612, 3613, 3614, 3679
Wolfe, Mr ---- 3539
Workers Ex-Servicemen's League ---- 3336, 3337
Workers International Relief ---- 3337
Workers Monthly ---- 3529

3 9999 05018 335 7

Page

World War I ---- 3421, 3479, 3635, 3691, 3701
World War II ---- 3537, 3538, 3635, 3706
World War III ---- 3623, 3706
World Youth Festival (Prague) ---- 3601, 3636
Wortis, Rose ---- 3335, 3336
Wright, Quincy ---- 3323, 3324
Wu, Leonard T. K ---- 3682, 3685

Y

Yakhontoff, Victor A ---- 3569
Yalta Agreement ---- 3395, 3412, 3709
Yanaihara ---- 3581, 3592
Yangtze Valley ---- 3520, 3586, 3622, 3624, 3706, 3708, 3710, 3712, 3713
Yardumian, Rose (Stein) ---- 3280, 3309, 3310, 3311, 3552, 3566, 3567, 3570
Yarnell, Admiral Harry ---- 3478
Yasuo ---- 3587
Yekelchik ---- 3337
Yellow River ---- 3501, 3624
The Yen and the Sword ---- 3331
Yenan ---- 3289
3290, 3292, 3293, 3294, 3296, 3297, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3304, 3305, 3306,
3308, 3309, 3341, 3353, 3388, 3405, 3501, 3503, 3624, 3625, 3628, 3629
Yenan (American Mission to) ---- 3624
Yenan (Foreign Office) ---- 3288, 3300, 3304
Yenan (Trip to) ---- 3287, 3288
Yenchang ---- 3308
Yenching University ---- 3476
Yergan, Max ---- 3556, 3570
Young, Margaret ---- 3566
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) ---- 3602
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) ---- 3537, 3636
Youth ---- 3477, 3478
Yu-ch'uan ---- 3612, 3613
Yugoslavia ---- 3503, 3664
Yunnan ---- 3625

Z

Zhukov ---- 3313, 3314
Zilboorg, Gregory ---- 3620, 3620
Zucker, Edith ---- 3337

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 11

MARCH 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 25, AND 27, 1952

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CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Chi, Harriet Lavine	3949
Fairbank, John K	3715
Greene, Jerome D	3849
Holland, William L	3889
Lockwood, William W	3862
Matusow, Harvey M	3823
Rowe, Professor David N	3967
Thorner, Daniel	3955

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 12 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran and Smith.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before the hearing with respect to Mr. Lattimore is called to order, may I call attention, Mr. Chairman, to the fact that another witness, Mr. John K. Fairbank, has been subpenaed to appear at this time, on the expectation that by this time we would have concluded hearing Mr. Lattimore's testimony.

I should like respectfully to ask the Chair briefly to open a record on Mr. Fairbank, for the purpose of determining if he is here in response to the subpena and instructing him with respect to returning.

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend the hearing on Mr. Lattimore momentarily so that Mr. Fairbank may make his presence known, if he is here.

Mr. Fairbank.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am here, sir, but not in response to subpena; in response to a request to be heard.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Were you not subpenaed?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that Mr. Fairbank be instructed to return at 3 o'clock tomorrow for his executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that convenient for you, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; it can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about as convenient as we can possibly conjecture here at this hearing now, if you will kindly return at 3 o'clock tomorrow afternoon for executive session.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Fairbank has furnished the committee with a voluntary statement, and I now ask that this statement be admitted into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement will be admitted in the record.

(The statement referred to was read by John K. Fairbank, 41 Winthrop Street, Cambridge 38, Mass., on March 12, 1952.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make this statement in connection with the statement presented, and all others from now on: It will not be read by the witness. Under the rule of the committee and under the rule of the Senate, it will be submitted to the committee and its staff for consideration, and interrogation will follow the witness' presence here tomorrow in executive session.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that this statement is admitted as a part of the record in the executive hearings? I think that ought to be clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator SMITH. Therefore, it will not be made public now; is that right?

The CHAIRMAN. It will not be made public now.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Do I understand, Mr. Chairman, that it will be part of the public record later?

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter the committee will have to determine.

At the present time it will be in executive hearings.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then may I enter a protest for not being allowed to make that public statement, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You may enter your protest, if you want it, but the rule is as I have stated.

Senator SMITH. I judge that what Mr. Fairbank is raising is whether or not he will be prohibited from giving that statement after he testified in executive session.

Is that what you want to do?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would like to have the opportunity to present it in the public session, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter the committee will have to consider and determine.

Do you want Mr. Fairbank sworn at this time, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not think it is necessary, sir. We can do that when he comes in for executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(Thereupon, at 2:10 p. m., the committee proceeded to other business.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senators Smith, Watkins, and Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator SMITH. The hearing will come to order.

I would like to say that Senator McCarran is not able to be here this morning, so he asked me to open the hearing and preside, at least, for the time being, until he can get here.

The other day when Mr. Fairbank was here, Chairman McCarran made a ruling as to the admission of statements. He has talked to me over the phone about that, and he wishes me to make this statement:

One of the problems that this committee is concerned with and has to face is the bulk of the record, and the recent statement which we have gone over was a very bulky document with many charges and accusations against committee members and others.

The committee has felt that in the future we should accept no statements except the statements, oral statements, made under questioning by this committee.

However, the witness this morning, Mr. Fairbank, had had no notice of the committee's decision to restrict statements to be received by the committee, even though statements may be submitted to the committee and filed for future reference.

So Senator McCarran wishes me to say that, lest there be some misapprehension, in perfect good faith, on the part of Mr. Fairbank and others, as to the committee's ruling the other day, we are going to allow Mr. Fairbank to read the statement and then he will be cross-examined on the statement as we go along and at the end of it. But that is not a change in the decision of the committee concerning the future not to allow statements to be read verbatim because of the great length of time it takes and the possibility that a witness who is not acting in good faith might load the committee up with such tremendous bulk that we could never finish this job.

But for the present, Mr. Fairbank will be allowed to read his statement and then he will be examined. It may be that there will be breaks in the statement at which we can stop him and have cross-examination on a part of it.

There is one thing that you have not done that you should have done, Mr. Fairbank. Under the rules of the Senate, there should have been enough copies filed for one for each Senator. Do you have extra copies here which you could pass around to us now?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir, Senator. I just gave, I believe to Mr. Mandel——

Mr. MORRIS. You sent in three or four copies to the Senators just this morning.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, and I believe previously I sent in one a week or 10 days ago, and two on Monday morning.

Senator SMITH. How many is that all together that you have sent in?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Three previous to today, and I just gave three, I think, a moment ago.

Senator FERGUSON. We have seven members, Mr. Fairbank.

Senator SMITH. We have seven members besides the members of the staff. Therefore, we need several more copies of your statement. Do you have some available now?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator SMITH. Will you let us have those?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. For the purpose of the record, since you made the statement about the ruling of the committee, I want to say that I was not present when that ruling was made, and I did not know there was going to be any such ruling.

I have heretofore stated that this is a seven-man committee and that I make up my own mind on whatever is to be done here, and I may be overruled by the majority.

But I was not present, I did not know such a ruling was going to be made. I have a feeling that when a witness comes before the committee and seems to go out of his way to be contemptuous of the committee and abuse the committee from the very first, almost the very first, sentence, that he is offering in his statement, that there may be some consideration to refusing him to submit insults to the committee and to the Senate, and to the people who send the Senators here. After all, we are speaking for them.

But I feel on the whole that witnesses should be given a pretty fair latitude, particularly when their reputations have been questioned, to make some answers as they would like to make within the rules of decency and fair play.

I do not think they should be permitted to come in and accuse a lot of other people, unless they have the evidence to back it up, and I do not think they should be permitted to abuse the Senate.

Senator SMITH. I may say to the Senator that my cursory examination of the first part of Mr. Fairbank's statement does not seem to be of quite the flavor of Professor Lattimore's statement.

Senator WATKINS. I think it is entirely different, from what I have read of it.

Senator SMITH. What did you say?

Senator WATKINS. I said I think it is entirely different, from what I have read of it.

Senator SMITH. Of course, I think we all have to be reminded that one of the procedures so frequently adopted, as was demonstrated in the Communist case before Judge Medina in New York, the Communist case in California, the hearing going on now before the Sub-

versive Board, and perhaps that has been tried before this committee, is to vilify and abuse the committee with the hope that attention may be distracted from the person who is being examined, if there is anything against him.

I think all of us who had any experience in trying a lawsuit know that one of the favorite stunts of anybody charged, or his counsel charged, is to try the prosecuting attorney or some witness on the other side. So I did not take too seriously, although I resented them, the suggestions of Professor Lattimore.

But I do wish that Mr. Fairbank may have every opportunity to explain anything he wishes to say about the facts. After all, what we are here to do is to collect facts.

I can realize that a person whose name may have been mentioned in one of these matters cannot quite stick to the facts always because human emotions are involved.

But I do want to be certain that Mr. Fairbank may have every opportunity to state any fact that he wishes to.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to finish my statement.

I wanted to make the statement now because, as I heard the statement that the Chair made, as I understood it, it may refer to cases coming in the future. I want to be on record now that I do not agree with the point that they cannot read these statements. But, with some reasonable limitation on the matter that I mentioned, that they cannot come in here and insult the Senate and the committee from the very first.

If they have a fair statement and want to give a factual statement, I do not see any reason why they should not read it.

I would not want to be bound by what was said here on any future rulings on any future witnesses, because we may have a lot of witnesses here before we finish these hearings, not only this hearing but other hearings.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I feel this way about a statement: The witness should understand that what he is filing he is willing to swear to. You see, when these statements are prepared, they are not sworn to and they are filed. But if a witness is willing and it is competent and relevant evidence rather than just conclusion that a witness has, he ought to be able to put it before the committee as sworn testimony.

I think that is what we are facing this morning. If the witness does not read it, then it is not really sworn testimony, and it gets into our record and becomes a part of the official record. But it is never sworn to.

Then you come to the question, let us say, of immunity. As soon as it becomes a part of our record, he has the right of immunity even though it is not sworn to. Our practice in this particular hearing has always been that the witnesses are always sworn.

Mr. Fairbank yesterday, when I presided in an executive session, was sworn. Of course at that time I did not know of the statement having been filed because I was not present when it was put into the record the other day.

But if a man is willing to read a statement, under his oath, that is one thing, and if it is material and relevant. I do not think we ought to just take a statement and put it in the record and make it a part of the official record when a man is not swearing to it.

Therefore, I think he ought to read it so that we can cross-examine him as he goes along. I noticed here that he was complaining of hearsay.

Senator SMITH. Before we get to the body of it, do you not think the witness might go ahead, and then we will cross-examine him?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But I think we ought to examine whether his statements are hearsay, because that is the only way you can tell what the facts are.

Senator SMITH. I think Senator McCarran's ruling the other day, because I was present and I quite agreed with him, that we should not take up the time of the committee reading long, long statements that will keep up from ever finishing these hearings, is rather important. But apparently Mr. Fairbank's statement is 17 pages, with some exhibits, whereas Professor Lattimore's statement was some 50 pages with a great deal of abuse in it.

But now I am sure Mr. Fairbank understands that everything he is submitting in his statement is sworn testimony for which he is responsible as an individual.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I should be sworn now, I believe, too.

Senator SMITH. We will do that. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give in this hearing before a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD WAIT, ESQ.

Mr. WAIT. Should I identify myself?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. WAIT. Richard Wait, of the firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart, in Boston, counsel for Mr. Fairbank.

Senator SMITH. All right. I do not know, Mr. Wait, whether you know the rules under which we have been allowing counsel to participate here.

Mr. WAIT. My understanding is that I am not to interrupt.

Senator SMITH. That is it. If the witness wishes to ask you something as to his rights, and whether he should answer this or that question or not, then he is to have the right to ask you that question. But you are not to prompt his answers.

Mr. WAIT. I will not prompt his answers.

Senator SMITH. And you will not attempt to suggest answers to him. I am sure that you can understand the committee has to have that sort of a rule because sometimes we have counsel that are not hesitant about being obstreperous in places they should not be, perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think also if counsel wants to ask a question, if he will put it to the Chair, the Chair will then rule as to whether or not it ought to be asked, and the Chair will ask it or not ask it, as the Chair believes relevant.

Mr. WAIT. It is entirely within the decision of the Chair. I will not be obstreperous.

Senator SMITH. All right, sir. Mr. Fairbank, you will proceed.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Some 7 months ago this subcommittee began its investigation of the question whether subversive Communist influence on our far eastern policy may have operated through the Institute of Pacific Relations. Many accusations have been made by witnesses and many documents read into the record. Having been accused of communism by witnesses last August and having requested a hearing at that time, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and testify in answer to those accusations.

Throughout these hearings the subcommittee has been grappling with the problems posed by Communist subversion. We know today that this is a real and vitally serious problem. Communist totalitarianism stands fully exposed as a form of statism which would trample down the legal safeguards of the individual and grind all persons under the heel of an all-powerful government. We Americans are basically opposed to statism—Nazi, Communist, or any other kind. I should like to quote briefly a statement on "Freedom of Speech" inserted in the Congressional Record last October 2 by Senator Bridges and 24 other Senators, including Senator Ferguson, Senator Jenner, and Senator Watkins of this subcommittee——

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, the Chair observes right here an illustration of what Senator McCarran had in mind about loading the record with extraneous matters.

This is not a statement of fact as to whether or not you ought to be suspected or charged. This a precise illustration of one of the difficulties the committee has met in wishing to give everybody a full chance to be heard, and yet being faced with quotations from the Congressional Record or what somebody said.

I mention that now because I am sure that I want to be very clear why such a ruling must be recognized and enforced in the future to prevent just such statements that have no bearing on the facts in your particular case.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I should be happy to shorten this quotation.

Senator FERGUSON. It has been read on the Senate floor and it is familiar to the Senators.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. My object is to call attention to the statement of the Senators, which I think is an excellent statement in support of the freedom of speech.

So I will omit this quotation, although I think it is an excellent quotation, and I put it in here because I support it.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Fairbank, when you come to the question of the freedom of speech, it is your freedom and the other people's freedoms. It concerns both freedoms, is that not right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you feel that you have the same right to say things in this hearing, even though they might be considered by the other people to be accusations, is that not correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; if I feel they are true.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you start out by saying, "Many accusations have been made by witnesses * * *." That all depends upon the viewpoint of the witness, is that not true?

A person who thinks a statement is false says it is an accusation. The person who makes the statement and contends it is true does not say it is an accusation. He says it is the truth, does he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is true psychologically. I don't want to argue about this.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to know your view on it. That is why I stated it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think there are statements that can be called factual, more factual, and other statements that can be called more accusatory. For example, a hearsay statement, it seems to me, is more in the nature of being accusatory.

Senator FERGUSON. But if the person says and designates that it is hearsay, and the committee wants to accept it, that is something else. You see, there is no rule here in the committee, and I think that is something worth while knowing, saying that you cannot receive hearsay.

For instance, in courts of law certain hearsay statements are admissible. One of them is when a man was born. He can state when he was born by what somebody told him. Do you understand?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So hearsay is a relative term. So you get down here on the case of whether we want to admit hearsay. We may say that hearsay, under the circumstances, is good evidence, and we may say it is bad evidence.

For instance, this statement, I think, that you put in here is hearsay about this Congressional Record. Or did you read it yourself?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I read it from a sheet of the Congressional Record.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have knowledge that it was in the Record?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not feel that I am coming here to make accusations in the sense that I understand them.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that that is true. And you say a statement here now under oath, you say it is because you believe it to be true, is that not right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. May I make one observation of the witness?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. About that understanding that we have freedom of speech in this country, when witnesses go before a tribunal such as a court, for instance, they do not have complete freedom of speech. They are not free to go in there and berate the court and abuse the court in the presence of the court, or all respect for institutions would fall down.

So they do not have the freedom to say anything they please to the judge and the court. They might get outside and say it, but they do not say it in his presence in the courtroom. So you are coming before a tribunal of the United States Senate. It is not a court, it is an investigating group which sometimes may hear hearsay evidence that may lead to other evidence. That is the investigatory process. It is not a case like when you are on trial where you have certain rights to present your case this way or that way. It is just one of those matters that is incidental to investigations.

Sometimes people are accused of things because it comes out in the investigation. We do not pass judgment on whether the accusations are right or wrong, true or false, but we do have to hear them.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, you understand that all testimony taken before this committee has been sworn testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And you understand, of course, as long as this committee requires a witness who is to testify to be sworn, that that is all the committee can do. The committee cannot guarantee the truth or untruth of his statements.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am fully aware, and I fully support the concept that a senatorial investigation cannot be bound by judicial procedure. It must be absolutely free to admit any sort of evidence.

Senator SMITH. I do not mean that. I meant that when this committee requires a person to be sworn, to tell the truth before they do testify, that is as far as this committee can go toward being responsible for the truth or untruth of the testimony. You, of course, understand that.

We do not know this morning whether you are going to tell the truth or not. We have presumed that you would tell the truth. But somebody that you may make some statement against may say it is not the truth. Therefore, all we can do is to swear you to tell the truth.

When we have done that, we have done all we can do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we agree on the principle here.

Senator SMITH. All right, let us go ahead, then, and get through this statement.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then I will continue after the quotation.

Senator SMITH. The quotation from the Congressional Record is just discussing the freedom of speech. If you want to read it, go ahead and read it. But we do want to hurry.

I notice the first six pages of your statement are discussion and conclusions, and it is on page 7 before you get to any real facts about yourself. But go ahead whichever way you want to do it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This declaration of 25 Senators last October was, of course, directed against the danger of Government withholding of facts which the American public ought to have. Unless we have access to the facts, in all their variety and diversity, our free democratic process cannot go on.

You are of course aware that the IPR, Institute of Pacific Relations, claims to be interested in getting at the facts and making them available. It claims—

> to stand for objective fact-finding, free discussion in which many viewpoints are represented, and the dissemination of reliable up-to-date information.

The question which this subcommittee has been pursuing is the question whether and, if so, how far the IPR may have been subverted from this worthy aim by conspiratorial Communists, and used as a tool to mislead and confuse the American public, and undermine our far eastern policy in the Soviet Russian interest. This question indicates a fact we must face, that Communist subversion tried to make use of freedom of speech in order to set up a statism which, once in power, would deny freedom of speech and all our other freedom. The Communist technique of using freedom to subvert freedom is more insidious and cunning than any we have faced in the past.

Americans are beginning to agree that when confronted with the "clear and present danger" of this new Communist totalitarian subversion, we must set certain limits to our individual freedoms in order to preserve our general freedom. Obviously this doctrine if carried to excess could lead us astray. Yet the fundamental dishonesty of

the Communist, his effort to seem loyal and democratic while really conspiring and obeying a foreign totalitarianism, leave us little alternative. It is on this basis, I assume, that this committee has felt it desirable to admit hearsay testimony as evidence, which is compatible with the fact that this is a legislative fact-finding investigation and not a judicial procedure.

Many Americans facing this problem are reaching the conclusion that proved Communists cannot be trusted in positions of responsibility as teachers any more than they could be as Governmental officials. In other words, an honest and loyal Communist does not exist. The FBI, the loyalty and security boards, and congressional committees each in their own way are therefore investigating American personnel in the Government and now to some extent in the research centers and universities, including private research agencies such as the IPR. I do not see how objection can be raised against the principle that some procedure of investigation is desirable in the public interest.

However, the manner of investigation is important. An inefficient investigation may do the public interest more harm than good. Unwise procedures may really confuse the issue and weaken us instead of getting at the facts. If 1,000 loyal non-Communists were seriously damaged in the process of finding one Communist, for example, it might prove to be an inefficient operation, not really helping the public interest.

With these considerations in mind I should like to take myself as one example——

Senator FERGUSON. Before you take that, I think you have agreed in this statement so far that the committee has a right and really a duty to look into the question of whether or not Communists did infiltrate the IPR because the IPR was an institution that was trying to form opinion in Government as well as opinion among the public. Is that not correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I believe I would not want to make so blanket a statement as that. I would be happy to give you my formulation of that.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you say here? You say that—

* * * the Government and now to some extent in the research centers and universities, including private research agencies such as the IPR.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I say that because there is investigation going on of individuals all of the time, insofar as they are of potential value to the Government. The Government is investigating them in order to use them.

Senator FERGUSON. But do you not think that the Government has a right to investigate an institution like the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think the senatorial committee has a right to investigate anything, it seems to me.

Senator FERGUSON. But particularly the IPR, where it was taking information, distributing among the public, distributing to public officials that information?

For instance, we have an example here of Mr. Carter advising them to be sure and get to General Marshall and other people a certain book, and to see that certain Senators got it and read it.

If that was the province, and I say it was the province, if they wanted to do it, of the IPR doing that, is it not then proper that the

Senate of the United States, through this committee, look into the question as to whether or not that book—let us take that particular book—was written by a person that had pro-Soviet Communist leanings or even was a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that is perfectly proper, if the Senate committee so decides.

Senator FERGUSON. That, I think, is what they have decided. You may proceed.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am discussing a matter of judgment in the case.

Senator SMITH. Let us get along. If you can read a little bit faster, Mr. Fairbank, it will assist.

Mr. FAIRBANK. With these considerations in mind I should like to take myself as one example, the example I know most about, and indicate, with due respect, certain places where I think the committee on reflection may agree that their procedure has caused unnecessary damage or failed to gain effective results. I am aware from the record that I am probably regarded here with grave suspicion as a Communist or Communist sympathizer. I challenge such a view in the most absolute terms, and I appreciate the chance to testify against it.

I am a loyal American. I am engaged in one form of American free enterprise. My university is a private American corporation and I work under it with a responsibility as a professor to use my own initiative and ingenuity, to inaugurate and carry on my own researches, and run my own professional activities. My university exercises great care in the selection of professors but, once selected, it gives them maximum opportunity to use their own judgment and follow their own inspiration in carrying on their work. We believe that the individual professor can contribute most when given both the opportunity and the responsibility of freedom. This is the American system. As a China specialist I have been engaged for over 20 years in this kind of intellectual enterprise.

Now I submit that, just as our American process of government requires freedom of speech and freedom to criticize the Government, as the declaration of 25 Senators has stated, so our American process of education and research cannot go on without certain freedoms—specifically, the freedoms of thought and contact. A China specialist like myself must dig into all aspects of a question, just as a news reporter should seek to dig into all aspects of a news story. Like a journalist, a university research worker must have and exercise freedom of contact—freedom to talk to people of all shades of opinion, even when he violently disagrees with them. Only by examining all sides can we keep that intellectual grasp on our problems which will keep us intellectually better-based and more flexible, adaptable and powerful than our totalitarian Communist enemy.

The point of all this is in my case that I have exercised my American freedom of contact throughout my 23 years as a China specialist. Year after year I have consistently tried to meet and talk with persons of all shades of opinion, including Communists and pro-Communists. I have considered this my duty, and I feel sure that on reflection this committee will not question the necessity that a China specialist under our American system should have such freedom of contact. Contact with all sorts of persons is especially necessary for sound study of a foreign area, like China, on which we need all the information we can get.

Senator FERGUSON. That brings us to the point, then, of agreeing with you that you have and should have this right of contact. Then there should never be any question on the part of a witness to be examined on those contacts and, if it is true, freely admit that he had contacts with Communists, pro-Communists, and so forth. Is that not correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I agree; very definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. So there is nothing that should be hidden with that freedom, that it was exercised, is that not correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I see no reason to hide.

The question before this committee, I submit, is not whether I should have had such broad contact with persons of all sorts connected with China, but whether I engaged in such contact as a loyal American or engaged in it subversively.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not the nub of the whole situation?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think so.

The fact of my contact with all sorts of persons concerning China should be assumed as a matter of course, just as it is assumed for a press correspondent. The real question is whether I used this contact disloyally, or in the course of this contact was used by others with disloyal intent.

Getting down to cases, I should like first to state my own anti-Communist view for the record. Last September I sent Senator McCarran a notarized denial of communism dated September 6, 1951, with the request that he file it in the public record of this committee. Since I never received any acknowledgment of this letter, I now reaffirm for the record my original unacknowledged statement:

> I, John King Fairbank, resident at 41 Winthrop Street, Cambridge 38, Mass., do hereby solemnly declare under oath that I am not now and never have been a member of the Communist Party, that I do not now subscribe, believe in or adhere to the doctrines of communism or Marxism-Leninism, that I have never done so in the past, and that I have never knowingly attended or participated in activities of the Communist Party.

In the intervening 5 months since I submitted this denial the subcommittee has published and distributed five printed volumes of testimony in which a series of witnesses, after having executive sessions with the committee, have testified here publicly in such a way as to slander or deframe me.

Senator FERGUSON. There you claim it is slander and defamation because it was untrue, the testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. If the testimony was true, then, of course, it would not be slander or defamation?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. But your testimony is that they are untrue?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Using these five volumes of testimony, a columnist like Fulton Lewis, Jr., has been able, as on December 6, 1951, to repeat a long list of these defamatory statements about me which have been given congressional immunity. I am happy to say that other journalists, the press services and the newspapers had taken note of my denial of communism at the time I first made it.

Further, I believe the committee's information concerning me has been made inaccurate by the inclusion in the record of erroneous testimony. Out of several examples I submit the following——

Senator FERGUSON. When you use the word "erroneous" there, what do you mean by that?

Mr. FAIRBANKS. Well, statements of something contrary to fact. I don't say lies because that means the intent is to be erroneous. But the fact is not as stated in such a case.

Senator WATKINS. As I underestand it, you are not criticizing the committee's taking, but the testimony itself is what you are criticizing?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I say the information has been made inaccurate because this testimony has come before the committee.

Senator WATKINS. Of course, you understand we get a lot of testimony and some of it is not worth very much, but some of it may be worth something. We cannot determine at the time it is being presented whether it is worth very much or not. That is, in advance we do not know.

Senator SMITH. In other words, Mr. Fairbank, if we limited the right of another witness who might be antagonistic to you to say what he believed to be the truth, then we would have to limit you.

Of course, no one should be limited in presenting his side of the question.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir. I think my criticism, and which I come to later and which I want to put in, is as to the general discretion that has been used in the procedure of the committee; not as to principle.

Senator SMITH. You understand, of course, that we cannot hear but one witness at a time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

1. In response to committee questions, William M. McGovern testified publicly under oath on September 18:——

Senator FERGUSON. William M. McGovern is also a professor in a school, is he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you think the committee is probably all right in asking a professor to come down here and testify?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would not want a ban on professors testifying.

Senator FERGUSON. You would not put a ban on professors testifying?

Mr. FAIRBANK. But I think some professors are better than others.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have to agree because I have been in college.

Senator SMITH. Where is Mr. McGovern?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Northwestern University.

Senator SMITH. All right. Proceed, Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is the quotation of Mr. McGovern's testimony:

> I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937–38. He and Mr. Lattimore went to Peking at the same time for a very short period. At the same time, Mr. Reischauer, Mr. Lattimore, and Mr. Fairbank were all in Peking. * * *

The actual fact is that I was not in Peking at any time between the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1946. I was not in China any time between 1935 and 1942. I spent the winter of 1937–38 at Harvard.

I have never gone to Peking with Mr. Lattimore. I have never been in Peking at the same time as Mr. Reischauer. I do not recollect ever having seen Dr. McGovern in Peking. His sworn testimony is entirely untrue, false, and erroneous.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever been in Peking when Mr. Lattimore was there?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I met him there.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that in 1935?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I met Mr. Lattimore in 1932 in Peking, and he went away later that year, and he came back subsequently, 1933 or 1934, and I saw him again.

I am not sure exactly which years he was there. He moved around.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever go to Peking with Mr. Lattimore at the same time for a very short period? Forget the dates for a moment.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not recall ever having traveled to Peking with Mr. Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. But at one time you were there for a short period with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I was there for 4 years, and during that 4-year period, from early 1932 to the end of 1935, Mr. Lattimore was there at different intervals.

Mr. MORRIS. So you were there in 1935 with Mr. Lattimore and not 1937–38, is that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Whether he was there in 1935 I don't recall, because he had taken this job of editor of Pacific Affairs. I can ask my wife whether she recalls.

Well, I could research that. I can try to recollect. She thinks he was.

Senator SMITH. Let us see what his answer was.

Mr. FAIRBANK. My wife thinks he probably was there in 1935.

Senator SMITH. If you should discover that that was in error as to the date, you can advise the committee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to Mr. McGovern, I assume that you have corroboration in the records at Harvard University showing you were there during the period you so testified, and you probably refreshed your recollection on that. You checked to see where you were at that particular time when Mr. McGovern said you were in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes: I did. I have been in China only three times and I remembered, of course, exactly when. But my wife was with me, and we checked back and forth.

Senator WATKINS. If it became highly material to any question before the committee, the committee might deem it necessary to have corroboration because we have the flat statement that you were there and you say you were not.

It would be a help to the committee if you could submit to us some record evidence that you would have that you were in Harvard at that time. We would appreciate it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to now leave the words "entirely untrue" in here when you think that you were in Peking at the same time Lattimore was, in the year 1935? You take it that if he used the wrong date, that that makes it entirely wrong.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, I wouldn't like to give way to Mr. McGovern particularly. There are other things that he said that are also wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. You can point out what you claim to be wrong. But I am wondering on this one point whether you now want to leave the record "entirely untrue" when you do say that you were there with Mr. Lattimore at the same time, in 1935, instead of 1937–38.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would still say, judging by his text, which is all I have to go by, that it is entirely untrue.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any significance to the date 1935 as opposed to 1937–38? He did not imply anything about that particular time that would not be equally true about a different time? The dates have no significance whatever, do they?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, his first statement is: "I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937–38."

I was not there, I did not see Mr. McGovern there, and that statement is completely wrong.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see him in the winter of 1935?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know McGovern in Peking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't recall meeting him in Peking. I met him first when he came to Harvard to lecture.

Senator SMITH. When was that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Either 1939–40 or 1940–41.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, did you have to go back to refresh your recollection as to whether it was 1935 or what date that you were in Peking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I remember that. I have often put that on statements of my life history, and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. What professorship does Professor McGovern hold?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is in political science.

Senator FERGUSON. At Northwestern University?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Northwestern University.

Senator FERGUSON. He is a full professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Recognized in the trade as a professor in political science?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He has his critics.

Senator FERGUSON. And I suppose you find you have yours?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I do. But he is criticized for some things I am not.

Senator SMITH. The point that I understood Senator Ferguson was trying to make was that the date 1937–38 might have been an error of time as to Mr. McGovern's statement.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, if he substituted any other years it would be equally wrong.

Senator SMITH. Any other years other than 1935?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He says: "I saw Mr. Fairbank in Peking in the same winter of 1937–38."

If you put in 1934, '35, '36, '37, '38, '39, '40—any of those years—it would be wrong. In my recollection, I did not see him in Peking.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not say he did not see you.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. He says "I saw." He is not saying you saw him.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He may well have seen me across a room somewhere, and I didn't notice him. But he then goes on to say he has had long discussions with me, in his testimony.

Senator WATKINS. In Peking, does he say that he had these discussions with you in Peking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that comes up later. He says that he saw me—and I have left this out to shorten the record—he says he saw me in China in the spring and summer of 1945, when I was not in China. That is what the record seems to say. It is a little bit ambiguous. But it is just another of these imaginings of his.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, what you are trying to say is that you never did see him in Peking, and you were not there when he was there, at least when he was visible to you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. But you did not have any discussions with him in Peking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Ever?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, ever.

Senator WATKINS. That makes it clear. We want to make it clear, we want to be sure that that is what you testify.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In other words, I can only conclude that his imagination has played him falsely on this at great length.

Senator WATKINS. We want to get that straightened out.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. McGovern says, in his testimony on page 1025, "I have met the Fairbanks. I first saw them in Harvard when I was teaching at Harvard."

Senator FERGUSON. Is he wrong on that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; that is correct. And I haven't picked that up because that is when I first saw him, when he was teaching in Harvard. But when was that? In my recollection, I am quite certain it was 1939–40 or 1940–41. I think he just has things jumbled.

2. As an example of a distorted half-truth let me call attention to Elizabeth Bentley's testimony about me on August 14, 1951. She stated that I carried a letter from Madame Sun Yat-sen (whom she called "a top Chinese Communist") to the China Aid Council, which was a constituent member of United China Relief, but is termed by Miss Bentley a "spy ring."

My answer is, first, that in 1943 competent American observers definitely did not regard Madame Sun as a Communist, nor did I.

Senator FERGUSON. Elizabeth Bentley was a spy herself. Do you not think that she may have known what she was saying there, that Madame Sun Yat-sen was a top Communist, Chinese Communist? Could that not have been true, she being a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. On that kind of question, the conflict of testimony, it seems to me the circumstances of the witness have to be taken into account, whether the witness is acquainted with the subject at close hand or at distant hand.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but here she is a Communist spy in this country. Do you not think that she might know that this Madame Sun Yat-sen was a Communist and, further, that she knew that the China Aid Council was a member of the United China Relief, and that that was a spy ring?

She being a spy herself, would she not have more knowledge than the general public?

You say, in 1943 competent American observers definitely did not regard Madame Sun as a Communist, "nor did I."

Senator SMITH. The point about that, Mr. Fairbank, is that Miss Bentley might have been in a better position to know whether or not she was a spy than you would have been in a position to know about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let's leave me out of it because, of course, I am not interested. But let us compare Miss Bentley's testimony with that of A. T. Steele. I have a low opinion of spies, and I think Miss Bentley, having been in this spy business, may not be as reliable in the thought processes.

Senator FERGUSON. But do you not think she had an opportunity for a better knowledge than a lot of people outside of it? Is it not true that a lot of Communists do work outside in devious ways, and particularly when they are spies?

Here was our Government, FBI and all, G–2, and all of the other agencies, that did not know that she was a spy, apparently did not know it, until she personally went and confessed that she was a spy.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was in the United States. Now, A. T. Steele was in China. Miss Bentley was not. Let's compare Mr. A. T. Steele as a witness with Miss Bentley.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you feel Professor Steele is qualified to testify, Mr. Fairbank, to know whether a secret Communist is a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think he is qualified to have an opinion as to a person like Madame Sun Yat-sen, and more qualified than Miss Bentley, who had never met Sun Yat-sen and, so far as I know, had never been in China.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the madame is a Communist now?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know now.

Mr. MORRIS. She is an official of the Chinese Government.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Government is a so-called coalition, so they can take in the others. There is a fiction for their control. But whether she is a Communist, that is a different matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get down to what a Communist is. Are you talking here of a Communist only if they are party members?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I recall your definition of the other day. In my own thinking, that definition is a double thing, and has to be applied in both its parts.

Senator FERGUSON. There is an "or" in there.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I mean both parts should be considered. One part of the definition is that the person takes Communist Party discipline. And in that case, I would say that is a Communist Party member. I mean, that is a genuine Communist.

Now, the "or" part—could we have that definition read? It is a person who furthers the aims.

Senator SMITH. Let us take your definition as you set out on page 7 of your statement:

* * * never have been a member of the Communist Party, that I do not now subscribe, believe in, or adhere to the doctrines of communism or Marxism-Leninism * * *.

Is that not a pretty all-embracing definition of communism, what you said there? I thought you covered that quite well. I noticed it when I read it this morning.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would include in my denial both being a Communist and being a fellow-traveler.

Senator SMITH. Yes; I understood that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And the term "fellow-traveler," I think, is included in your definition of Communist. We could operate on that basis, if you would like.

Senator WATKINS. You understand a fellow-traveler to be the person who has the same ideas, who does not actually become a member of the party. Is that not what you have in mind?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say a fellow-traveler is a person within a certain zone, and there are gradations in that zone. A person who is not a member of the party and does not receive orders, but receives suggestions, or is sympathetic and picks up ideas, and finds out what is being thought by Communists, and then goes along with them——

Senator WATKINS. Does not the fellow-traveler suggest the very idea that he is traveling with the Communists in the same direction?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I thought a fellow-traveler meant, someone who is moving right along with the Communists. He would not be in the party necessarily, and he would not need to be called a Communist. But he would be going right along with the same idea.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But when the term "fellow-traveler" is used, I think you have a shading off into people who don't realize that they are accepting Communist inspiration or stimulus, who think that they are liberals.

Senator WATKINS. They may be thinking independently and still going along the same lines, and yet they would be fellow-travelers. Their aim is exactly the same.

They want to go to the same place, and they travel in the same direction.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In my definition, you have this gradation of people, and the aim of the fellow-traveler may be in much more idealistic terms and much less discipline, and much less concrete than the Communist aims.

Senator WATKINS. A shading between different types of fellow-travelers. But within the class there are fellow-travelers and fellow-travelers.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed, and you shade off from that into fuzzy-minded liberals and other categories.

Senator WATKINS. They are almost as dangerous as these fuzzy-minded liberals, are they not, if they are going to the same place and want to arrive at the same place as the Communists?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Perhaps a liberal is more dangerous than a Communist.

Senator WATKINS. And perhaps the fuzzy-minded is not quite so dangerous because he cannot quite say it so convincingly. But at the same time, he is going in the same direction.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get into the second part of this paragraph?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, with respect to your statement there about the China Aid Council, I have a question. In connection

with Miss Bentley's testimony that Mildred Price, the executive secretary of the China Aid Council, was in fact the Communist agent running that, we subpenaed Miss Price before this committee, and she refused to answer whether or not she was a Communist on the ground that her answer might incriminate her.

Do you not think that there is reason for someone to conclude, in view of that testimony, not only the testimony of Miss Bentley but the subsequent deportment of Miss Price before this committee, that there was some ground for believing the truth of those allegations?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Which allegations, sir?

Mr. MORRIS. Namely that the China Aid Council was a Communist organization.

If the executive secretary refuses to answer whether or not she, in fact, was a member of the Communist Party, would there not be a question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Miss Price refusing to answer has distressed me, as you can understand. I had believed, judging by what she said and her conduct, that she was not a Communist.

Now, the fact that she refused to testify suggests to my mind that, at some time, she had had some connection which she is now reluctant to divulge.

Senator FERGUSON. Not only reluctant but refuses on the ground it would tend to incriminate her.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. That is possible, perhaps, for an earlier period than when I knew her. I met her in 1946, and I became—whatever you call it—on this list of the China Aid Council in 1947. We will come to that later, perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you having trouble now with the proposition as to whether or not Miss Price deceived you? Is that what is wrong?

Mr. FAIRBANK. How do you mean having trouble?

Senator FERGUSON. I mean, you say that you are distressed over the fact that she refused to answer, and that you now think that she could be a Communist.

Do you now think that, with her testimony that she refuses to answer, leaves you in the position now that she deceived you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is possible, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not more than possible? Is it not probable?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure it is probable.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think yet that she deceived you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; because I have certain other evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she ever tell you that she was not a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall any such conversations on the subject at all.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that you never asked her, "Are you a Communist?"

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is no use asking a person if they are a Communist.

Senator WATKINS. In those days back there, they probably would have admitted it. They were rather proud of it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't think so.

Senator WATKINS. We had a fellow around here that seemed to have been in very high esteem at the time, with the Communists, and they did not object at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think it is possible, Professor that Madame Sun Yat-sen was deceiving you at the same time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I must go by the evidence I have. I must form my judgment and take the risk in contact with anyone.

Mr. MORRIS. The fact that she is an official of the Chinese Communist Government, and together with the other testimony before this committee, that she was, in fact, a Communist since 1926 to the contrary?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I have other evidence. For the record, she is not in the category of a Communist but of a democratic personage, and so on. I should like, if you wish, to go into the China Aid Council.

Senator SMITH. No, I think the point Mr. Morris was trying to bring out was that it is entirely possible and maybe probable that Madame Sun Yat-sen has fooled you as to whether or not she was or was not a Communist in the light of present situations and her connections.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir. That possibility applies to thousands of people. I mean the possibility is alway there.

When you are dealing with an area which is having a Communist revolution, you have always got the question, "Is this person possible under cover and one of them?" But you have to make up your mind as best you can because you just cannot avoid contact with everybody.

Senator SMITH. What you meant when you were saying down here about not relying on Miss Bentley and any other spy, you meant what we would say down our way that you would take what they say with a grain of salt.

Mr. FAIRBANK. A very large grain of salt, very unpalatable.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you would not take it at all?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, not in opposition to the testimony of a man like Art Steele, A. T. Steele. He is, I think, a very fine and reliable person.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead and read the statement, and we will proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. What then is the distorted half-truth, Professor Fairbank, that you mentioned there after No. 2?

I mean, you did take the message, did you not, to the China Aid Council?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the half that is true, and the half that I believe is untrue is that Madame Sun was a Communist at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the China Aid Council?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did not consider it a spy ring at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not whether you considered it, it was whether Miss Bentley knew whether it was or not, as to what she testified to. You are saying that is a half-truth.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am willing to set myself up for my own purposes as a judge for the China Aid Council in opposition to Miss Bentley because I must go by all of the evidence I have, not just by Miss Bentley. And on all of that basis, I judge it was not.

Senator FERGUSON. You are saying as far as Miss Bentley's testimony was concerned it was a distorted half-truth——

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. When she said that the China Aid Council was a constituent member of the United China Relief.

Mr. FAIRBANK. She didn't say that. She said it was a spy ring.

Senator FERGUSON. You say here, I am reading your text, not hers, "which was a constituent member of the United China Relief but is termed by Miss Bentley a spy ring."

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the way the text reads.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say she said a half-truth when she said that and it was distorted?

Mr. FAIRBANK. When she said it was a spy ring; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Even though the executive secretary comes in here and refuses to answer as to whether or not she was a Communist when she was operating that organization?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Perhaps we should define spy ring. You have front organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. Aren't they all spy rings? Do they not function as such? If there is any knowledge that they get, do they not funnel it over to the Kremlin?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I wouldn't think so in all cases because a spy ring has to operate on a certain operational basis of spying, and a front may be just for publicity.

Senator FERGUSON. And it may be for spying, too.

Mr. FAIRBANK. A spy ring in the China Aid would get statistics on child care in China, and not much else.

Senator FERGUSON. If it did get anything else.

Mr. FAIRBANK. They were wasting their time if they had a spy ring in the China Aid Council. I think we should distinguish between a front and an organized spy ring and different kinds of these things.

Senator WATKINS. Will it not be a good cover up for a spy ring to be enlisted in aid for children?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They could find out all about children.

Senator WATKINS. Yes, and they could find out about a lot of other things while they were there, could they not? Would that not be an excellent front, an excellent cover for an intelligence investigator?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know. I was trying to collect some intelligence during the war, and I wouldn't have gone to a child welfare organization particularly.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your cover?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I didn't have to have a cover. I was under the American Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. The American Embassy was your cover.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is not a cover. It is right out in the open.

Senator WATKINS. This other was out in the open, too. It was an aid society.

Mr. FAIRBANK. An embassy is supposed to collect intelligence. The China Aid Council is not supposed to be a spy ring.

Senator SMITH. I think what they are getting at, Mr. Fairbank, as you doubtless know, we did have in the South an organization known as the Southern Conference for Human Welfare. That sounded awfully good to a lot of people. It turned up finally as a Communist organization and so declared. I am sure you remember that. It was in the press generally. That is an illustration of a group taking a grandiose sounding name, Southern Conference for Human Welfare. Nothing could have appealed to us any more than that if that was what it was, but it turned out to be a Communist-front

organization. I think that is what some of the gentlemen are getting at when they said you probably didn't know that this was a spy ring. I understood you were not——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it might be useful to distinguish an infiltration effort which has not taken over an organization but is trying to, and, second, a front which has been taken over, and third, a spy ring which is really set up for espionage, for passing material. Those are three different things.

Senator FERGUSON. But is it not true that they use all of their organizations in the obtaining of facts and evidence which is considered spying?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. From all I understand of communism, I don't believe that they use a front for espionage necessarily. It may be too dangerous. It may be just not feasible, if you have a front operating, to do a publicity job and then to try to do an espionage job of passing secret messages and that kind of thing that you have to do in espionage. In this case here, because of Miss Price's testimony, I would say that there was an effort at infiltration. That would be the indication, probably. This effort of infiltration may have got to a certain extent. I don't know. That is just the question that is raised by her testimony. But you then get to a second point where the thing is a front. I don't think the China Aid Council had got to that point. If I thought so, I certainly would not have had anything to do with it. Then you get to the third point where it is a spy ring, and that is where I say it is untrue.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that when this Price girl was executive secretary of the China Aid Council, that it was not a front?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I did not think it a front at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask you, Professor, whether you thought it was. I am now asking you whether it was a front.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. One possible Communist in a thing does not make a front, according to the definition I am giving you where infiltration is being attempted but the thing has not yet been captured. There are many places where the Communists are trying to infiltrate.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think this China Aid Council was captured?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The successor agency is a captured Communist front, and that is why I have had nothing to do with it. It is called the China Welfare Appeal. One of my reasons for thinking Miss Price probably was not a Communist at the time I went into the China Aid Council was that she was the person thrown out by this real front that was organized, the China Welfare Appeal at the time that the China Aid Council ceased to operate. Miss Price was on the receiving end of a very dirty deal there and thrown out of her job. That is her testimony that I take into account in thinking that her refusal to incriminate herself indicates perhaps an earlier connection, but not that she was organized as a Communist when I knew this thing in 1946 and 1947.

Senator WATKINS. On the contrary, could it not be possible that under the circumstances if they had taken Miss Price in this obviously Communist outfit, it would have been a revelation that she had previously been a Communist? They wouldn't have taken her unless she was. It would have been giving away what had been going on if they had taken her.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There was a fight there of some kind. There was great acrimony. The Communist group who had infiltrated just broke out and took the contact with Madam Sun away.

Senator WATKINS. Miss Price refused to testify about the activities of this organization and her own connection simply on the basis that it might incriminate her. That is fairly strong evidence to most Americans of what the realization was.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, and Mr. Chairman, at the risk of laboring this point I have the letterhead of the China Aid Council, and I see on the six-man executive committee you have Dr. Ch'ao-Ting Chi who is now an official of the Communist government. Will you concede that he is a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is a man who was reported to me to have been either a Communist or connected with the Communists quite early in his career in the early thirties or perhaps earlier than that, and many Chinese, of course, have done that and broken away. When I saw him in Chungking in 1943 he was the highly trusted official under the Premier, Dr. Kung, who was in charge of the management of the foreign currency stabilization, which was the key operation of the Chinese Nationalist Government. At that time this man, Dr. Chi, told me, and in fact he pulled out and showed me his Kuomintang Party card. Maybe he was doing that just to make an effect. It just happens that he did that.

Senator SMITH. The question now is will you now concede that he was? Is that your question?

Mr. MORRIS. That is my question, Senator.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Knowing how many Chinese have shifted back and forth, I cannot claim that Chi was necessarily a Communist at that time in the sense of this definition. He may be just a gifted opportunist who is able to land on his feet. He may be a man who had dual membership in both the Communist and the Nationalist Parties.

Senator SMITH. Let's read that question again. Mr. Morris, state it again. I thought it was a simple question whether or not you would not concede now that he was or had been a Communist regardless of these explanations that might be made.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is no question now he is working with the Communists, and for the purpose of this definition he is either a fellow traveler or a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say the same thing for Israel Epstein?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say the same thing for Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; as of now.

Mr. MORRIS. And they were all active in the China Aid Council.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I have here a list of the persons on the letterhead of the China Aid Council at the time that I gave it my name. This is a letter from the head of it, Mrs. Carter, whom I have never regarded as a Communist or a fellow traveler, it is dated January 23, 1947. On this letterhead the first person is Madam Way Dow Ming, who was the wife of the Chinese Ambassador to the United States. I knew Madam Way and, of course, she is not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, is it not true——

Mr. FAIRBANK. There are other people of that type.

Mr. Morris. That in every organization of this nature where you do have a group of Communists—and I have named Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Israel Epstein, Ch'ao-ting Chi, Mildred Price—that they for strategic purposes will take people into the organization who are not Communists, and from the point of their advantage conspicuously not Communists? So when you cite the names of people who are not Communists on oath, are you not in fact bringing out the precise nature of the Communist organization, namely, something that is operated by a small score of Communists and which in fact have other people who are not Communists identified with it?

Mr. Fairbank. You are there describing a front which has been captured by the Communists. That is the way it would work. However, there is this other category that I have mentioned of an organization that is being infiltrated by the Communists before they have got it. Infiltration is very difficult to avoid, and in this particular case this infiltration was well known to me because I saw Epstein's name on this letterhead at the time I joined this thing.

Mr. Morris. What year was that?

Mr. Fairbank. 1947. That infiltration in my view had not taken over the China Aid Council at that time.

Mr. Morris. Do you think it was well known at that time that Epstein was what you say a fellow traveler of the Communists?

Mr. Fairbank. I would say so because he had been with the American Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, which was rightly named a subversive organization by the Attorney General. My reason for joining this thing at the time when General Marshall came back from China was along the line of General Marshall's effort to hold the two sides together. I believed in that Marshall policy in China. I know it has been criticized. I think it was worth trying. I joined this just 3 weeks after Marshall had come back and made his statements in January 1947 saying that the hope of China was to keep the sides together and to avoid a civil war.

Senator Ferguson. Dr. Fairbank——

Mr. Fairbank. It is in that spirit that I went into this.

Senator Ferguson. On the question that we are investigating, as to whether or not IPR was penetrated or was circulating Communist propaganda or fellow-traveling propaganda—pro-Communist propaganda—I wonder whether you will answer the question as to the weight to be given to the fact that Edward C. Carter wrote a letter on June 12, 1947.

Mr. Morris. That is the same time that you knew Israel Epstein, is it not, Professor Fairbank, in 1947? You just testified that you considered Epstein to be a Communist in 1947.

Senator Ferguson. Or a fellow traveler.

Mr. Fairbank. Or a fellow traveler.

Senator Ferguson. June 12, 1947.

Dear Miss Ford: This is to acknowledge Epstein's The Unfinished Revolution in China, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles, and John Carter Vincent, of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject

might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

What do you think of that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As to the proposition of reading a book by a Communist, I urge my students to read the writings of Mao, and I think all of us ought to read the writings of Lenin and of Stalin.

Senator FERGUSON. But why do you think Mr. Carter, as the head of IPR, was trying to use that means of getting a Communist book read by these officials? What do you think he was trying to do?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't feel like taking the responsibility for Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not say to a student if you gave him a Communist book, "This is by a Communist," but were they going to tell my colleagues that this was by a Communist? No; they were getting Little-Brown to do it because Senator Vandenberg might have been suspicious, Carter thought, if he would try to get them to read it. What do you think of that kind of business?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I admire Mr. Carter for certain good qualities and things that he has done.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this one of them?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would not have done that myself. I do not want to take responsibility for everything that he has done along that line.

Senator FERGUSON. Professor, you wouldn't send to me a book by a Communist to get me to read it, would you, and not tell me it was by a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read the P. S. on this letter?

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

P. S.—I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

So that indicates that Mr. Epstein was in on this, does it not, Professor Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sorry, I didn't follow that.

Mr. MORRIS. I will read it again:

I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

Does that not indicate to you that Epstein was in on this with Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was informed by Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think on this whole thing it would help if we looked at the book——

Senator FERGUSON. Let us forget what is in the book.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Because the book was the thing that was going to have the influence. That book, if you will look at it you can see, is based on the hand out stuff from the Chinese Communists and it doesn't pretend not to be. It quotes time after time the Chinese Communist radio, and all their phony statistics and that kind of stuff. It is perfectly obvious that that is a book which is pro-Communist, which

has been reviewed that way. I tell my students that is a book that puts together the Communist story on the liberated areas. Epstein was putting together this story and putting it out.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not just what Carter was trying to keep away from the Senators when he said——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't gather it was suppressed.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

A letter from me might lead a few of them to think I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

Then going over in the same letter:

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Sir, this has come up before in the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but you have not been here before.

Mr. FAIRBANK. You want my opinion on that?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I am going to read and then I will ask you some questions:

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he was generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically.

That is the book that you describe as phony Communist propaganda.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sorry. I said with phony Communist statistics. Communist statistics are always phony.

Senator FERGUSON. Communist statistics are phony. Here is the head of the institute saying this about John Carter Vincent. Don't you think he was trying to get the Communist line to Vincent in a well organized logical way and that he was trying to get it to these Senators and to the Secretary of State so as to influence their opinion on the Chinese policy? Is there anything else that you can read from that letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is a question of Mr. Carter and his personality and the way he does things.

Senator FERGUSON. No, it is a question of what the IPR was doing under Carter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't see that that follows, sir, because IPR is a much broader organization than Edward C. Carter, and this one letter of his may have been balanced by a number of others on other books. I haven't seen the files of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Just look at the next sentence. "If he were sold"—talking about Carter—"on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover." Here is a book that you recognize as Communist sending it to the Secretary of the Far Eastern Division here in 1947—this is June 1947. Marshall is then over in China trying to create a combination of the two governments.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He had come back then. In the beginning of 1947 he came back. He came back in January 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. He is still working on it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we disagree here about what is a book. I think that a book of this kind is something that you can take and look at and not be infected by. I think that General Marshall in particular is well able to look at a book from any source and make up his mind about it and not be overwhelmed or infected or led astray.

It seems to me that Mr. Carter's idea of spreading this book and I don't know how many other books he may have spread on other aspects, anti-Communist or anything else—this is only one book, I don't know the rest of the record on Mr. Carter and his book spreading, but it seems to me the spreading of this particular book is allowing people in the Government to see material which is pretty plainly pro-Communist. I don't believe that that is an undercover job.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, if you had wished to get a copy of this book into the hands of the men who have been mentioned by Senator Ferguson, you would have been willing to have done it on your own initiative openly and above board, would you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator SMITH. You would not have sought the intervention of Little-Brown & Co. to have gotten it to them without their appreciating or having been told that it was in effect Communist propaganda. You wouldn't have done that yourself, would you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I might well have asked my publishers to distribute it. I don't know what was in the mind of Mr. Carter in that ambiguous phrase about having the publisher do it instead of himself.

Senator SMITH. You heard what was read there about what his plans were.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me. Let me read you more of his plans. The thing that I am having difficulty with this morning is your defense of the IPR on this item.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let's establish what is my defense of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. From your answers, is all I can say.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I haven't said that.

Senator FERGUSON. I have some of your answers. Let's go a little further. He says: "Of course many will say that Epstein is a special pleader." You have said that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is how I described him.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders.

He is in a way advocating a sound analysis of the world with these phony statistics in this Communist-written book; is he not? He is advocating that in that sentence; is he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is advocating that it be seen, that it be looked at.

Senator WATKINS. Read from cover to cover also.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all? Is that all he is trying to do? Let's go a little further and find out. "I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice."

He certainly wanted a favorable report on this book, didn't he, and he thought the one man who could do it was Owen Lattimore.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say that Mr. Carter was promoting that book.

Senator FERGUSON. I think your answer——

Senator WATKINS. Is obviously correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure that the promotion of a book which is pretty obviously pro-Communist——

Senator FERGUSON. Not if it is out in the open. Why did he not say "Here is a pro-Communist book. Here is a book that has phony

statistics in it. Let's get it to the Senators; let's get it to the Secretary of State, to try to influence their opinion. Tell them that it is a phony." He didn't do that; did he?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have forgotten the phrase he uses there about his publisher sending it instead of himself.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Let's go on a little further, what he knows about this book. "I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the 'forbidden' list for import in China."

You would have thought so, too, would you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Probably.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Yat-sen, and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

In other words, get it in before the Government prohibits it from going in.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I ask, Senator—excuse me, do you want to continue?

Senator FERGUSON. No; that is the end of it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Do you want me on the basis of this letter to condemn the IPR?

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask you this question: Do you not think that the IPR on this particular case—let's isolate it—through Mr. Carter, was trying to influence the foreign policy of the United States of America in its relation to China and the Far East?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir. I think that Mr. Carter was trying to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you isolate Carter from the IPR and why do you do it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Because of the nature of the IPR. It is a private organization. It is a very disjointed decentralized kind of thing. It has these two main lines of work, one that Carter has organized, mainly of conferences, the other that William Holland has organized, mainly of a publication program which I think has made a real contribution in getting materials published, sound materials.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I tried to isolate this and get it in one case. Didn't Carter, the IPR, try to do this? It is among the IPR papers that we take.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say Mr. Carter was making that effort to promote that book, but I don't believe it is fair to say that the IPR as an organization is characterized by that incident.

Senator FERGUSON. You know that an organization must be responsible to its officers for what they do, is that not true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. And its members.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, its members, if they know what is going on. Were you on the board at this time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a trustee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. In 1947 I became a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. I take for granted you were not consulted about this.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly not. That was not an official act in my view. That was not an act of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell me why the IPR does not rise up in righteous wrath against Carter on this particular isolated case?

Mr. FAIRBANK. There have been criticisms.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had known he wrote that letter, what would you have said as a trustee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would have said that is a private letter.

Senator FERGUSON. What would you have said? How are you going to take him away from the organization that he is so closely allied with? What would you have said? Did you know about this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I never heard of it. If the IPR were better organized we would have written "personal" at the top of that because I suppose it was on IPR stationery. It is a Government procedure which is very desirable.

Senator FERGUSON. But he did not.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is true, I imagine.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I have the book for a minute? I will ask you some more questions later.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, let me ask you this: Who in the IPR exercised more authority or performed more services for and in the name of the IPR that Mr. Carter? Anyone?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is a rather broad question because of the nature of the IPR. I don't mean to take your time unnecessarily, but you know how it is set up with these 10 different councils.

Senator SMITH. I am just asking who in all that group acted for and in behalf of the IPR more than Mr. Carter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I wouldn't say that any one person acted for and on behalf of the whole organization. It wasn't set up to operate that way. It had groups and these numbers operated, and then it had committees and the committees operated, very loosely.

Senator SMITH. Regardless of how loose it may have been, and I can quite agree that that is probably true, is it not a fact that Mr. Carter acted to a great extent for and on behalf of the IPR than any other individual?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would not be certain about his acting for and on behalf in a formal sense. There is no question that he was very active as a person.

Senator SMITH. Who else performed to a greater extent for and on behalf of the IPR than Mr. Carter? I put that question that way.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is a head of the American Council of the IPR, which he was not. There is a head of the International Council of the IPR, which he was not. There is a head of each national council in each country, which he was not.

Senator SMITH. Can you name the names of those men offhand?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I can get them out of a book.

Senator SMITH. Can you name them offhand?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He has had continuity.

Senator SMITH. Can you name them offhand yourself? You can't, can you, no one else can, but you can name Mr. Carter, can you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I think he has been associated with the IPR continuously over a long period.

Senator SMITH. And represented in more different ways than any other one individual.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think you need to distinguish what is formal representation and what is Mr. Carter's activity being known as an IPR man.

Senator SMITH. What you are trying to say as I understand is that there may have been times when Mr. Carter acted beyond the scope of his authority.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There again I don't know that his authority was ever specifically statutorily limited because of this looseness of organization.

Senator SMITH. I was trying to help you out a little.

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you this question. Was he the spokesman for the IPR, internationally, and generally regarded as such?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say in human terms he was one of the most active people among the group who tried to build up this private organization to have conferences and promote research. He was one of the most active.

Senator WATKINS. He was in charge of the office, he was the executive secretary, he wrote the letters, he carried out the policies decided upon by the board, did he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He did at certain times.

Senator WATKINS. While he was the executive secretary he did whatever the board wanted him to do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There have been others.

Senator WATKINS. They gave him a lot of general authority, as a matter of fact, according to the testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There had been other executive secretaries. There were other people in a statutory position who had superior power to him.

Senator WATKINS. But they were not the spokesman. They didn't speak. They did not write for it. They were not active, were they?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, one point about the IPR has always been that it has no spokesman because it does not take a position in the Constitution and in every book it publishes it is stated the IPR does not take a position on matters of policy of any kind.

Senator FERGUSON. But when they publish the book and circulate it they take a position in publishing it, do they not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Like any magazine, like Foreign Affairs or the New York Times. They say we put this out as something that may contribute, but they put out a tremendous number of these things and only a very small proportion have any leftist tinge.

Senator SMITH. Let me ask you the question: With respect to this letter I believe you said you had never heard of it before.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I saw it in the testimony.

Senator SMITH. Therefore it was not authorized to be written by the governing board or the trustees of the IPR.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly not.

Senator SMITH. Therefore, to that extent that was a surreptitious maneuver by Mr. Carter, was it not, to do just what he was saying should be done there about getting this book across to these people without saying openly this is a Communist propaganda book?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Carter has been associated with the IPR and has been so useful partly because he is a promoter by temperament.

Senator SMITH. But you would say that was a surreptitious maneuver by him, would you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't think so. He sent a copy to one person and to other people the letter is in the file. The whole thing is wide open.

Senator SMITH. It was surreptitious as far as you were concerned, was it not, because you did not know about it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surreptitious means you are trying to keep it from somebody. He did not try to keep it. If I called him up he would send me a copy.

Senator SMITH. I am not talking about the book now. There is a difference between the book and the maneuver, the method. He didn't tell you he was doing this, did he?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly not; but I didn't ask him.

Senator SMITH. To that extent he kept it from you, did he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I wouldn't want him to send me copies of everything he does.

Senator SMITH. I didn't say the book. I said the maneuver, the method he adopted.

Mr. FAIRBANK. As far as his relation to me, I being a trustee and he writing this letter, I don't feel that it was surreptitious of him not to send me a copy of this letter because his letter was a personal letter, a personal act.

Senator SMITH. Has the board ever repudiated that maneuver of Mr. Carter's?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator SMITH. Why?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It has been under fire ever since this came out. No board under fire wants to start repudiating people.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you not come out when you are under fire and say this was a mistake?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, personally, I would be happy to say so.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you say now.

Mr. FAIRBANK. From my personal point of view, but purely in a personal matter of judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. But is it not true that the trustees held Carter out to do this or similar acts, to circulate books, to get information about the Far East out to the public, out to public officials? Was that not one of his jobs? You said you hired him because he was a promoter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We didn't hire him.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, he was hired by somebody.

Senator SMITH. Who hired him? That may be interesting. Who did hire Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is a question, how does a private organization get born?

Senator SMITH. He "borned" it, did he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't believe he was one of the first founders. I believe it began in Hawaii about 1925 with some people in the YMCA and in business. They brought in some professors. They have always had this tripartite business, scholarship, and so on. Mr. Carter became interested in it—I don't know why I should repeat his life history. I don't know it as well as he does.

Senator FERGUSON. Now answer my question.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He began to work in it.

Senator FERGUSON. You said he got working in it and was being paid by you. Now answer my question. Did not you people on the board of directors hold out to the public that he was authorized to promote just such matters concerning the Far East? Did you not hold it out to the public and to the public officials?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Being a trustee, I in effect gave him or any other officer a vote of confidence.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think I would still give them a vote of confidence.

Senator FERGUSON. After seeing this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; because this letter, while I don't approve of it, I don't think tore down the foundations of our state. I don't think it is highly subversive. I think it was an error in judgment in my own view——

Senator FERGUSON. You said they were phony statistics about the Communists in China.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we have got to know more about the Communists, including their phony statistics. We have to know more about them in every possible way in order to deal with them. The IPR is committed to that proposition, that you put out as much information as you can.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean to say that the policy in the Far East was the proper policy as far as you, as a historian, are concerned?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Now we leave the IPR, I trust, because the policy of the State Department is one that I supported when General Marshall was trying—I do support that policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You support that policy?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in China at the time and I saw no alternative to head off the civil war except that effort.

Senator FERGUSON. So if this book influenced our policy in the Far East it was perfectly all right as far as you are concerned?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let me put it this way: As a professor I favor books of all kinds being available to all kinds of people. If a publisher is willing to put out a book and if a fellow is willing to spend any time looking at it, I think that is up to him. I think everybody has to have that opportunity to look at this stuff.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that the public ought to know who his author is, who he really is, whether he is a Communist? Is that not just the purpose of this letter, to keep them from knowing that? The people he wanted to influence?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have said——

Senator SMITH. Let us see if you cannot answer that question because we have been getting a little far afield. Answer yes or no.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you say "yes"?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. FAIRBANK. The question is, should not Mr. Carter have advertised Epstein as a Communist when he advertised the book or when he promoted it.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Epstein was following the Communist line.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have said here that I regarded him as either a fellow traveler or a Communist. Mr. Carter did not take the stand of labeling Epstein as a subversive character.

Senator SMITH. The question is, when that was put in circulation should he not have done that?

Senator FERGUSON. Should he have?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say he should have only if he had evidence, only if he believed that Epstein was a subversive character. Maybe his opinion of Epstein disagrees with mine. Who am I to judge Mr. Carter's opinion of a third party?

Senator FERGUSON. You were not so careful about McGovern in your testimony this morning, were you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was as to a matter of fact. This has to be a matter of opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. Now wait a minute.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you knew the facts here about Epstein.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I testified I do now.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the facts about being in China.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I distinguish between the fact of a man's being in Peking in 1937, which is a physical thing, and the fact or opinion, whichever you want to call it, that a man is a Communist? My opinion was that Epstein was a Communist; but I had no factual proof.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this letter of Carter's not indicate that he knows what this fellow is, this special pleader, as he calls him, and so forth, and how he has organized it so well? He knows it is going to be prohibited by the Chinese from coming in. Now let's get it in first.

I will ask you this question: Isn't this exactly how the Communists do things? Isn't it exactly like they do things?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't follow that exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that this is what is known as the party line to get material that is communistic into the hands of people who do not know or have reason to believe it is communistic? Is that not part of the party line?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have pointed out, first, this book was pretty obviously pro-Communist.

Senator SMITH. Let us see if we cannot answer the questions as we go along.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have three in succession. Let's have them one after the other.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this not exactly the party line?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; not necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. You say that the Communists do not try to get Communist literature out in the hands of people who do not know or have reason to believe that it is the Communist literature, but that is their line, that is the way they penetrate public opinion. Is that not true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I am well aware of that effort of the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Now I ask you whether that is not the party line.

Mr. FAIRBANK. A line is a policy. The operation is what you are describing, I think. The line is a policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Is this not the way they do it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is the way they operate; yes. Others also——

Senator FERGUSON. As far as this particular case was concerned Carter was following the party line.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir. The party line——

Senator FERGUSON. Party operation.

Senator SMITH. You mean the method of party operation.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The question is was Carter following the Communist method.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We define that Communist method as putting out——

Senator FERGUSON. This kind of method.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Putting out something without indicating its source.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Knowingly.

Senator FERGUSON. Knowingly or having reason to believe it was the Communist propaganda.

Mr. FAIRBANK. First, I don't know whether Carter thought that Epstein was a Communist or not. I can't testify to that.

Senator FERGUSON. That wasn't what I asked you, whether you knew it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am trying to answer your question.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you whether it was the party line and whether he was following the line. Whether he did it consciously or unconsciously we will have to determine.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That word "line," sir, ought to be modified.

Senator FERGUSON. I know you do not like the word "line."

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a technical term.

Senator FERGUSON. You know what I mean.

Senator SMITH. They were following the Communist method of operation. That is the question you are willing to answer, rather than the party line.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. He was following the Communist method.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think many promoters follow a Communist method of operation in these terms. Many promoters follow that method. All kinds of lobbyists around the country.

Senator SMITH. That is what Mr. Carter was doing here, was it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; but that doesn't indicate he is doing a Communist operation. Because there are all kinds of American promoters.

Senator FERGUSON. We will draw that conclusion. We will have to.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator SMITH. What is the next question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I trust I have made myself clear on that. You can have a parallel type of operation, where a man is trying to promote something, and many Americans do it but they are not necessarily Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You read this letter; did you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have read it before; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think there is evidence in this letter that Carter knew that this fellow was a Communist or a fellow traveler, as you describe him?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not know how Mr. Carter would state that in his own mind. It seems to me plain that Mr. Carter knew he was sympathetic to the Communists and this was a Communist view, and he said so in the letter.

Senator FERGUSON. But he said to conceal that part and get it over there before they close in on them and put the bronze curtain down, get it to these Senators and the Secretary of State and this adviser to the Secretary.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was promoting it. There is no question about that.

Senator WATKINS. You do not think that was a function of Mr. Carter as executive secretary of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sure it was a personal act.

Senator WATKINS. Purely personal? It would not have been carrying out any of his duties in the IPR in doing that, according to your version.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't believe that is a regular function of his to undertake personal promotion.

Senator WATKINS. You were a trustee at the time and you would know.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There were 60 trustees scattered around the country and we met maybe once a year.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, the trustees left the operation of the IPR almost entirely to Mr. Carter, didn't they, to the executive secretary?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Only——

Senator WATKINS. They met once a year, scattered all over the country and they necessarily could not follow it if they returned over the operation to him and he in effect was their spokesman.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In one respect.

Senator WATKINS. And so held himself out.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In the organization of the conferences. In the same way they left to a vote of confidence of a committee the question of research. Then they had the question of finance and international organizations and so forth.

Senator WATKINS. When they met once a year how long would they meet?

Mr. FAIRBANK. All day.

Senator WATKINS. Spend 1 day on it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is all.

Senator WATKINS. And then turn this plan loose with the operation. He was the voluble member of the IPR, the vocal member I should have said.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it would be a misconception to consider the IPR as a highly integrated network, with a centralized head who could manipulate this thing and just make bells ring all over the country and influence opinion that way.

Senator WATKINS. He apparently did. You say you did not think it was organized that way, but that is the way it was actually operating, was it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not to my knowledge, sir. I think it is a distorted thing, loosely organized.

Senator WATKINS. We did not know about it but we are now calling it to your attention.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I read that and I know it is the kind of thing Mr. Carter would do as an individual.

Senator WATKINS. He did not make any distinguishing remarks to indicate that that was purely personal on his part and not as secretary of the IPR, did he?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We are operating here with a private agency, and I agree it is not tightly organized.

Senator SMITH. May I ask you now, Mr. Fairbank, the question I asked you away back and we sort of lost track of it. Mr. Carter was a full-time employee of the IPR. There were a few other full-time employees, were there not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Not very many?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Most of the work of the IPR was done by the people who were on committees and who donated their time, people like research committees and others who were handling publications. Most of the work is in publications.

Senator SMITH. I am trying to pin this down to get what were the duties and necessarily opportunities of Mr. Carter. He was really what we might call, determine as, and call the head man of the IPR organization.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not think so, sir.

Senator SMITH. Who——

Mr. FAIRBANK. It was not set up that way.

Senator SMITH. Among all the employees or officers of the IPR, who exercised more authority or more control or spent more time on the IPR affairs than Mr. Carter? Just give us the name because we certainly would like to get him up here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. If you take William L. Holland, he was then in charge of the research and publications much of the time. That was a full-time job.

Senator SMITH. All right, he was a subordinate of Mr. Carter, was he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not always.

Senator SMITH. Sometimes, we will say. We will say it that way.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure how that subordination works.

Senator SMITH. Did he recognize himself as subordinate to Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, we are discussing a 20-year period here. These people shifted around.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he eventually succeed Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. In which position, secretary general?

Mr. SOURWINE. In any position.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have briefed myself on my own affairs here, but I haven't briefed myself on the IPR.

Senator SMITH. You were a trustee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The way these people shifted around is sometimes confusing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were a trustee, and you have at least shown some interest in defending Mr. Carter, which, so far as I am concerned, is entirely all right. Now I am asking you who in the IPR organization, if anybody, was over and above Mr. Carter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is very plain.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us that. If it is plain, tell us that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Pacific Council of the IPR. It is called that. It represents all the different constituent bodies that had a head. The constituent head of it was the head of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. For a long time it was Dr. Dafoe, a man in Canada. At another time it was Dr. Tarr. Another time it was Corbett, professor from Yale.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't mean to compare the extent of their activities with Mr. Carter's, do you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. In my office, I come in 1 hour a day, and my secretary works all the time. The amount of work done——

Mr. SOURWINE. You better leave that out because, you see, I am a university trustee, too, and I have always said that professors work an hour a day and the rest of us do the work. Some of my professors won't like that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Sir, I spend the rest of the time in the library.

Mr. SOURWINE. Oh. Anyhow, can you name anybody who was over and above Mr. Carter in directing the affairs of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed. I can very definitely do that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The head of the Pacific Council. That was a man elected about every 3 years and he had the authority of being the head of the IPR. Mr. Carter was a paid secretary general.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was this man's name?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The man shifted every 3 years. Dr. Tarr, from Canada, is one man. Another one I remember——

Mr. SOURWINE. During the term of his office——

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He didn't move to New York to the headquarters?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. This is a case where you have a private organization. There are paid employees of it. The heads of the organizations take the responsibility. They met twice a year, usually, at an international gathering. It has to be. It traveled to England this past month, or wherever it was. They set down the main policies. They approve the main research program and the conference program, and then the paid people have to do the operating.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who would you say is the head of Harvard University? I believe that is your school, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is a very interesting point. The head of Harvard University is the Harvard Corp.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the organization.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And not President Conant. He is the president.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is the administrative head of Harvard University?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The provost, who acts for the president. Even Harvard University is a little bit disjointed.

Senator SMITH. It really has gotten that reputation, not to my way of thinking, maybe. Don't you know, Mr. Fairbank, just simply and plainly, that Mr. Carter, whatever way he may have been denominated, was really the head man in the IPR when it came to exercising the functions that were supposed to be exercised by the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. You do not think Carter was the head man then?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is a constitutional question. The constitution of the IPR does not set him up as the head man.

Senator SMITH. Do you not know that the records which we seized were seized on his farm, in his barn, and he had custody of them? How can you sit there and say——

Mr. FAIRBANK. My secretary has my files. She does not run me.

Senator SMITH. Does she have a farm she secrets them in, or a barn?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They are not that big.

Senator SMITH. You know that is not comparable, Mr. Fairbank. Do you not know that Mr. Carter was the head administrative officer of the IPR in its dealings with the public and with everybody else, that he was the head administrative officer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't mean to quibble here.

Senator SMITH. That is what you are getting to. I do not want you to quibble, either, because I want to give you a chance.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would have to say no to your question specifically but I would like to explain it.

Senator SMITH. Who then is over and above Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Pacific council.

Senator SMITH. The individuals. What individual has authority?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The head of the Pacific council.

Senator SMITH. What individual has authority over and above Mr. Carter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The head of the Pacific council.

Senator SMITH. Have you read the evidence of the efforts which Mr. Carter made to get money hither and yon for this institute and to carry on its work? You know he was the main ramrod, to put it another way, do you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was certainly the most active person. And there were other people very active.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you become a trustee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was elected first on April 11, 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. 1944.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did no active participation in any trustee activities. I was in Government service.

Senator FERGUSON. When did Kohlberg make certain charges against the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I met Mr. Kohlberg in China——

Senator FERGUSON. No. When did he make the charges?

Mr. FAIRBANK. After that.

Senator FERGUSON. After you became a trustee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. After I met him in China in 1943. I think it was about 1944 or after.

Senator FERGUSON. He made some charges about the IPR; did he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And did the trustees investigate them?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let me get straight my position as a trustee.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. I am not asking you about your position as a trustee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was not a trustee in 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they investigate him?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The investigation went on, as I understand it, in 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not going on in 1945?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It may well have been.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it not go on in 1947?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure how much further it went on in 1947, because the whole thing was discussed and voted on before 1947. Isn't that right? I don't remember these dates.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not voted on when you were there?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As to that, I am not sure. There was a gap, you see, when I was not a trustee after 1944.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom did you have investigate this thing; Carter?—when Kohlberg made his charges.

Mr. FAIRBANK. My recollection is that a committee of businessmen connected with the American council of the IPR formed an investigating committee, and they went into that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. When did you file this letter in the barn?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I guess it wasn't in the barn yet; was it? It was in the New York office.

Senator FERGUSON. Why didn't they find it in the New York office?

Senator SMITH. I would have been a lot easier.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say that for them to find that letter would have taken much more money and time than they had.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was too big a job to be done, so they just went blithely over it, whitewashed it, and said everything was fine. We are being accused here for finding these things, as I understand it; that we are going too deeply into this thing. Is that not one of the charges?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I didn't know you were being accused, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not accusing anybody of that.

Senator FERGUSON. No, but is that not one of the charges against the committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, I don't know what that investigating committee may have found. They may have read this letter and they may have said, "Here is Carter promoting again, and God help us," or something.

Senator FERGUSON. But they didn't tell the public "God help them."

Mr. FAIRBANK. They had to decide on the basis of that letter and all the other letters. There were lots of them. You haven't put out all the other letters because it is this one letter that you have pointed to.

Senator SMITH. We have not got to all of them yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Should this not be criticized by the trustees, this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think, if you are going to scrutinize an executive officer who has been a paid employee, you have to take this into account the total picture of what he has done. It is only fair to the man.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see the cagey letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was written back in the 1930's from Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. It was in 1938; yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was 8 years before.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a designation as to what he was doing. He didn't resent that. He went right along with it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have had a lot of discussion here, and I don't want to take the responsibility for this cagey letter you speak of.

Senator FERGUSON. I am not asking you to. I am wondering whether or not now you are satisfied with the investigation that was made by the IPR itself. Are you satisfied with that investigation?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am afraid so. I think that investigation was judging on the broad proportions, the main content of the activity of the IPR vis-à-vis Mr. Kohlberg's charges. Mr. Kohlberg's charges were quite specific in some cases and they were quite general in other cases. Those people dealt with him as best they could.

Senator FERGUSON. There was a charge by Kohlberg that there was penetration of the Communists into this organization. We now find that 11 of those people that did write and penetrated this organization have refused to testify on the ground that it would tend to incriminate them as to whether or not they were Communists.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I haven't that list. May I get that list of 11, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you can get that list.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Because I have heard of only three or four.

Senator FERGUSON. It is 11; is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir; it is 11.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is the fact. The IPR membership is something like—what is it?—1,500 or so.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I am not talking about the membership; I am talking about Kohlberg's charges. The membership didn't penetrate this.

Mr. FAIRBANK. These 11 are all employees?

Senator FERGUSON. No; the writers for it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Some are just members or some are writers.

Senator FERGUSON. No; they are writers. The 11 had something to do with writing for the IPR, and that was Kohlberg's charge.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Is it possible that there were perhaps 200 or 300 writers in all?

Senator FERGUSON. It could be.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And that this is maybe 2 or 3 or 4 percent of those writers?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So, then, you think Kohlberg wasn't justified unless they got more than 50 percent Communists?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am quite ready to state that I think an infiltration effort was made in the IPR and I don't think it got very far.

Senator FERGUSON. If it got 11 in there.

Mr. FAIRBANK. As indicated by 11. Eleven is a very small number of writers out of 200 or 300 or maybe 500 that they have had.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not indicate now that the secretary knew of the penetration and that he was helping it along by this letter that I just read to you here, the Epstein booklet?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that is going rather far.

Senator FERGUSON. How far do you want to go?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not that far.

Senator FERGUSON. How far?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think you have to build this up by specific instances, as you are doubtless doing, but not just one specific instance.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about this letter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We are trying to generalize here about hundreds of articles and books and hundreds of people. You name 11 persons, and then you say there is this one letter. I think that indicates——

Senator FERGUSON. I can show you many letters, but you can't do it all at once.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What about this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we are debating here a question of proportion.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your answer now to my question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure I remember your question.

Senator SMITH. We have just had a quorum call. I think we will now recess. There is one question I would like to ask you. Senator Ferguson can come back to these others later. When you were talking about these records, did you ever attend a meeting in Mr. Carter's barn in Lee, Mass., of people interested?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I have never been to his barn, and have never been to Lee, Mass.

Senator SMITH. Wherever it is, you have never been to Mr. Carter's barn where the papers are?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator SMITH. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH. The hearing will come to order.

Where were we at the time of recess?

Senator FERGUSON. Page 9, I think, after the word "I" on line 5.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right. You would like me to continue reading, Senator?

Senator SMITH. Yes; if that is your wish, Mr. Fairbank.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD WAIT, ESQ.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I had just referred to Miss Bentley's statement, and I was replying that competent American observers definitely did not regard Madame Sun as a Communist in 1943, nor did I. This continues.

As the widow of Sun Yat-sen, the so-called Father of the Chinese Republic and the so-called permanent director of the Kuomintang, Madame Sun seemed to be trying to stay above party. I attach below the expert opinions of reputable American correspondents, beginning with A. T. Steele of the New York Herald Tribune.

Senator SMITH. There is a question there. We don't want to cut anything out that you want to put in, but that manifestly is an unsworn opinion of somebody. If his evidence is going to be here, he ought to be here to cross-examine.

Mr. FAIRBANK. All of these people I am quoting are out of the country, I think; so it isn't possible.

Senator SMITH. From the standpoint of the committee we ought to have only facts here. I do not want to cut you off or quibble about

little things. But you are starting out to quote somebody who isn't here for us to cross-examine. The question is whether or not we should go ahead and put that in.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, if I have it right, the exhibit is October 5, 1951; so, it couldn't have been possibly known by the witness at the time that he brought this matter over. That was in what year?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't follow on this, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not have the Steele article—you did not know what his opinion was—when you brought the parcel over, or whatever it was.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let me explain. This letter from Steele is written to me at my request.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Over his signature.

Senator FERGUSON. But in 1951——

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; and I have a photostat of it.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not know at the time that the fact occurred that Miss Bentley was talking about.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is testifying as to his recollection. I am testifying as to mine. He is corroborating me; that is all I am proposing.

Senator SMITH. But the point is that he is not sworn.

Mr. FAIRBANK. He can't be; he isn't in the country.

Senator SMITH. That is the point. I know you appreciate the situation.

Mr. WAIT. Sir, may I suggest something to the witness? I think it could be shortened down and kept within its limits here.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, I have consulted my counsel, and I would say this: That I have received certain letters, and I have here, if the committee would like to see them, photostatic copies, and I believe these letters to be genuine; they were in response to queries that I made, and they, in my view, are from reputable correspondents who were named in the statement here. As a basis of having received these, I feel they corroborate my view. It isn't necessary to quote the unsworn testimony of these persons; so, I can move on to another page.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but, so the record is clear, they are all dated after the fact; they are dated just recently.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, can't we agree on this: Beginning with the words "I attach," on page 9—if your counsel will observe there—the rest of that page and all of page 10 is a quotation from letters or newspaper statements? Now, if you wish to submit those for further examination by the committee, that will be all right. But, could not those two pages be stricken out and get down to page 11, where you are beginning to talk about the facts?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Might it be usual, sir, if I gave you these transcripts and they were put into the record of the committee. They are not very long, and they do bear on this point, which I think is a matter of fact that you want to get at, and we won't have to read them and take your time.

Senator SMITH. The committee will be glad to consider them. Whether we should load the record with the opinion of somebody else not sworn is a different thing. In other words, a person could bring

in here a dozen, a hundred, or a thousand letters from people which would be ex parte statements, and one which we would not have a chance to cross-examine unless they were present. Manifestly, the committee cannot go that far. But you may file those letters, and the staff members will examine them. If you wish to make any further point later about them, I for one would be perfectly willing to let you do it.

Senator FERGUSON. Does counsel have a question?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was consulting them.

Mr. WAIT. I agreed with the chairman that these should be filed.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I pass these over to you, sir. This is a letter from Archibald Steele, dated Ankara, Turkey, October 5, 1951, a photostat. This is a letter from Tillman Durdin, dated Hong Kong, September 21, 1951, a photostat. This is a letter from Brooks Atkinson, dated New York Times, New York, September 26, 1951, a photostat. This is a letter from Christopher Rand, dated Hong Kong, October 23, 1951.

This is a letter from Robert P. Martin dated Nieman Foundation, Cambridge, Mass., October 4, 1951.

This is a photostat of the New York Times editorial page for Saturday, August 21, 1948, an editorial headed "China Reports." That is what is covered in this.

Senator SMITH. That is material, as I understand, Mr. Fairbank, which you gathered in preparation for this hearing.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And which you are going to tender to our committee so that we may make whatever use we wish to with it. Then that would mean that you will not have to go through reading pages 9 and 10, but can go to the top of page 11 where you start on the facts again.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. All right, we will proceed that way.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 557A, B," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 557–A

CHINA REPORTS

(New York Times editorial on Mme. Sun, August 21, 1943)

If there is one person in China who is recognized by most Chinese as standing above party and politics it is Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the father of modern China but a great lady in her own right. If there is one activity to which no ideological strings are attached, although a great deal of its work is done in areas held by the Communists, it is the China Welfare Fund, which she heads. Its work is told in a small booklet recently released by the China Aid Council, Inc., 1790 Broadway, which forwards American contributions to Madame Sun at the Fund's headquarters, 86 Kwantung Lu, Shanghai.

The booklet explaining the work of the China Welfare Fund is titled "Madame Sun Reports." It might well have been called "China Reports." For one of Madame Sun's cardinal principles is that help shall be given by the Fund only to those who help themselves. As an earnest of this attitude the Fund's strongest drive is made in China itself, where one-quarter of its money is raised. The booklet itself explains how Chinese of all political creeds cooperate in Madame Sun's work and how the recipients of grants from the Fund use its money only as a starting point for organization of their activities.

The most spectacular work of the China Welfare Fund has been in the Communist-held areas of North China—not to help communism but to aid innocent and suffering people. Through the impetus of money and materials sent in

by the Fund, a system of hospitals—called International Peace Hospitals or, just by their initials, IPH's—and medical schools have been established in areas that have never had such service before. They are all small. They all have been harassed, first by the war against Japan and since 1945 by civil war. But they have continued to grow and to carry to people who never before had known relief from pain in illness, or even the rudiments of sanitation and preventive medicine, the marvels of modern medical care and of sanitary practices that can keep in check the epidemic diseases that in ages past have decimated whole areas almost overnight.

No American who has been in China and who has had an opportunity to investigate the work of Madame Sun's Welfare Fund but who has enthusiastically endorsed it. Contributors can know that their money will go to help the Chinese people regardless of creed or political party.

EXHIBIT No. 557–B

COGITATIONS OF A SPY

(Copy of article in Moscow journal New Times, January 18, 1950, p. 23)

Last year's summer conference of the Harvard University staff heard four papers on U. S. policy in the Far East. These papers have now been published in the form of a pamphlet entitled "NEXT STEP IN ASIA."

One of them—"Communism in China and the New American Approach to Asia," by a certain John K. Fairbank—outlines a program of action which amounts in brief to this—that the United States must try to undermine the Asian national-liberation movements from within.

> "The containment of an all-encompassing revolution such as now convulses China," Fairbank writes, "cannot be achieved merely by setting up static military defence lines nor by arms shipments from abroad, but only by competition from rival groups within the country which make an equally valid use of the sources of revolutionary power."

Fairbank wants to wrench the peoples of Asia away from the democratic, anti-imperialist camp. In regard to China, he realizes, the United States is most unlikely to achieve results. "Our more active policy," he therefore declares, "should centre on non-Communist Asia"—Southeast Asia, Japan, Southern Korea, and also India. For these countries he proposes a rapid mobilization and allocation of American "specialized personnel," who would be able to "develop direct and intimate contact with Asiatic realities" and "assist local leaders."

Thus, according to Fairbank's plan, the American intelligence service is to seek out traitors and agents-provocateurs of the Hatta and Shahrir type, and to worm its men into the Communist Parties and other progressive organizations. Besides the training of special agents for this purpose, Fairbank proposes that the American missions, and such American organizations as the YMCA, should become more active. He also suggests establishing American "research institutes," tourists' "field stations," and similar footholds in the Asian countries.

The meaning of Fairbank's plans becomes still more evident after a glance at this Harvard history professor's record. The war found John K. Fairbank in China, where he had been living for seven years, and where he remained during the war, and for some time after its conclusion. In 1942–43, he was special assistant to the American Ambassador at Chungking; in 1945–46, head of the "U. S. Office of War Information in China"—in other words, an American intelligence agent of no small calibre. And this, it seems, remains his basic trade at Harvard as well. His professorial thoughts turn persistently in one direction: that of using learned institutions and scientific study as cover for espionage and sabotage.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Beginning at the top of page 11:

Secondly, regarding Miss Bentley's half truth as I have already stated on my own initiative to the Department of the Army, I did indeed accept a letter from Madame Sun and bring it back to the head of the China Aid Council when I returned from Chungking in December 1943. I understood Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report on her medical relief work, to which the China Aid Council contributed. I brought back several other letters or pack-

ages along with Madame Sun's letter, as travelers usually did in wartime China, and they all passed through the regular customs censorship inspection. I have no recollection or knowledge of what was in Madame Sun's letter in 1943. If I had thought it was Communist, I would not have carried it.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I just inquire then, about your statement, that "I understand Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report." If you did not know what was in it, how do you get that statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. An understanding, in my view, is a possible basis of one's action, whereas knowledge by seeing is something a little bit more.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a conversation with her as to what was in the letter or package or whatever it was you were bringing over in 1943?

Mr. FAIRBANK. My recollection of that period is not very precise. I was leaving Chungking in a great hurry, seeing a great many officials. I believe I went to call on her to say good-by. I had seen her once or perhaps twice before. I don't recall precisely the details of that period, I am sorry.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is the difficulty with receiving a statement like that in the record: I understood you to say in the statement, and it is under oath, "I understand Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report on her medical relief work, to which the China Aid Council contributed." Now, what is the basis of that statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, the basis, very definitely, is my experience in that period at the end of November, and the beginning of December 1943, in Chungking, when I was preparing to come back to this country. Now we come to the question what exactly was that experience? You see I obtain the impression from that experience, and I testify as to that.

Senator SMITH. I think, though, Mr. Fairbank, we ought to get down to the specific question asked. You say, "I understood Madame Sun's letter was a perfectly proper report on her medical relief work." Now, how can you say that, we are asking you, how can you say that in view of the further fact you stated just now that you did not read the letter and did not see the letter? How do you know what was in the letter, whether it was a report or not? She might have been asking for more funds and not reporting at all.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't want to repeat myself unnecessarily, but I distinguished, I think, a moment ago, between understanding, which is an intellectual impression, a conviction one receives.

Senator SMITH. It is supposed to be derived from some observation of facts, though, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Now, what are the facts that you observed that caused you to reach the conclusion that this was a perfectly proper report?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Those are the things that I do not recollect, and I am testifying as to the impression that I received from that experience of those facts. I think that is a very common thing in this kind of testimony. This is one very small incident, a long time ago, in a very crowded period of my activity.

Senator FERGUSON. But are you not also making objections to this committee receiving that kind of testimony? Isn't that your criticism of the Budenz testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't believe my testifying as to my understand—it is hearsay, I didn't hear it from anyone else, it is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but you have to get it from facts.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. What are the facts?

Mr. FAIRBANK. My experience at that period.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the experience?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, there are a number of different possible experiences I may have had, and I am not sure which one I had, either in talking to Madame Sun or not.

Senator SMITH. The point about it is, Mr. Fairbank, you made a statement that you understood it was a perfectly proper report, how come you make such a statement unless you say the report or read it, or had it read to you, or had it explained to you? How come you make such a statement, that it was a perfectly proper report?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I can make such a statement only on the basis of memory.

Senator SMITH. You say you do not have a memory.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I do have a memory.

Senator SMITH. About what was in the letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; about my understanding.

Senator SMITH. We are talking about the letter now.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have testified now—let me read it again. "I have no recollection or knowledge of what was in Madame Sun's letter."

Senator SMITH. I am willing to take that as a statement of fact, if that is true.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then I also testify I understood her letter was perfectly proper. Those are both facts, in my view.

Senator FERGUSON. But you say "I brought back several other letters or packages along with Madame Sun's. Were they from somebody else, or were they Madame Sun's letters?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, someone else. People in my office, friends of mine, and I don't recall precisely who they were. One was from my photographer, who was working there, to his girl.

Senator FERGUSON. You say it was unsealed, this letter, Madame Sun's letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't have the recollection of those details.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least you didn't read it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recollect that I did.

Senator SMITH. Did you have it read to you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recollect that it was.

Senator SMITH. Did you have anybody read it and tell you what was in it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recollect that.

Senator SMITH. You see, we are just testing the reasonableness of your statement and your conclusion here, to see whether or not you really had any foundation for the statement as to what you understood. Now, of course, if you had heard it read, or if Madame Sun had told you what was in the letter, that might have been one way of communicating what was in the letter, and therefore you would have an understanding from it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In other words, you want to test on what basis I achieved this understanding.

Senator SMITH. That is it, precisely.

Mr. FAIRBANK. And I am sorry I don't have details to offer.

After several years of testimony concerning Communists Louis Budenz remembered my name for the first time, so far as I know, in response to the committee counsel's question last August. He disclaimed any personal direct knowledge but referred to official party "reports" which were obviously unavailable. The entire interchange of two sentences hardly took 15 seconds and was as follows [reading]:

> Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist?
> Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; not by personally meeting him but by official reports, particularly in 1945.

No further questions were put to Budenz by committee counsel as to the specific factual evidence for his very serious charge, and may I suggest this is rather similar to the point you just made about me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he not say they were official reports, and you say now apparently they were unavailable because they were Communist reports and he is no longer a Communist and would't have them?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is what I say. I will continue. No further questions were put to Budenz by committee counsel as to the specific factual evidence for his very serious charges, which was left hanging in the public record, unsubstantiated and yet unassailable for libel. This allegation has of course been associated with my name ever since in the press and in the public mind, and I cannot help feeling that the committee's procedure has been a bit out of line with the American tradition of fair play.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now explain that. What was the fair play that you thought was violated by the committee's procedure?

Mr. FAIRBANK. If I were in the committee's position, I would want a witness like Mr. Budenz, in making a charge, which is so very damaging, to offer a little more, at least in the way of the circumstances, in which he received a basis for this charge. I really would. I think it would be only proper to the American rights of the individual, who should not be needlessly attacked, because this is, I think, a very damaging charge. I have suffered under it. It has been very expensive to me. It has damaged my university, it has damaged my work, which is more important, perhaps, than myself. I think my work is very important for this country, I really do. This sort of damage, before I would have it inflicted or executed in a committee session, I think I would try to get more circumstances as a basis.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not the answer say "Yes" and then he explained it? It was not from personal knowledge, he said, it was only—I am paraphrasing his words it was only by official reports, particularly in 1945.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I suggest, for example——

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what is the American tradition there that is violated? That is, of fair play.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Suppose, sir, that it were a legal proceeding, just for supposition, and you were questioning this man. You were representing a client, suppose you were representing me, and you were cross-questioning Mr. Budenz. You would hardly have stopped at

this point. Would you not have said, "Official reports of what kind?" It doesn't even say Communist Party reports. And reports from whom and to whom? And are they reports based merely on the press, or based on something in this country or reports coming from China or what? You see, there are many questions to be asked.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the press print that answer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The press printed only this.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That I have quoted.

Senator FERGUSON. The quotes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Because there was nothing else in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not that indicate that all he knew about it was from an official report?

Mr. FAIRBANK. If this is all he knew, then he would suggest that the committee is a bit out of line with the American tradition of fair play in putting that out.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee does not put this out, it becomes part of the record. It is just like your statement last night, when you released it to the press, Dr. Fairbank. You released it. These official meetings that are held in open session, the press is here, and they print it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Perhaps I am under a misapprehension, but I have understood that the committee has followed a practice of having executive sessions, such as I had yesterday, partly for the purpose of going over prospective points of testimony to avoid unnecessary damage to American citizens. I just heard that.

Senator SMITH. You approve of that system, do you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I do.

Senator SMITH. The point, I think, Mr. Fairbank, and I can appreciate what you were getting at, is that you seem to think that Mr. Bundenz was used as a witness against you in an action where you were being tried. You, of course, know we are not trying you, we are not trying anybody.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator SMITH. So that you think we should go further and cross-examine Mr. Budenz to see what the basis of this is, and whether he knows anything else about it. That is what you mean, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir; if it is correct, as I have understood.

Senator SMITH. The point is, when you make a statement here to us today, if we are satisfied, if we know nothing else except what you said, then that is your statement under oath.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator SMITH. Of course, we might say something that would draw all sorts of implications that were unfounded. Of course, we should not do that as a committee. We asked Budenz a question, he gave us an answer. Now, we are not responsible for whether that is truthful or not. When we finally wind up this whole hearing we may get to the point of expressing our opinion of what parts of the testimony are true and what parts are not. But we have not gotten that far yet. We have given you this chance to refute the very things Budenz said. I do not know what else we can do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I appreciate this chance to refute it, which I am attempting to do. Shall I continue?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. As for recent assertions that I was proposed along with my wife, but without our knowledge, for some kind of project of the Central Intelligence Agency, to work in some fashion along with Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and others, I never heard of this proposal before it was recently made public.

Senator FERGUSON. You draw a conclusion that there is an assertion that you and your wife had been on some kind of a project of the Central Intelligence Agency. Is that where you were proposed by Mr. Davies? How do you account for Mr. Davies proposing this, if you did not know anything about it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sorry, I don't want to hold you up. I was looking, sir, for a five-column headline of the Boston Post, and this derived from testimony here, as I understood from the news story, by a certain Mr. Munson.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, a responsible, as far as the committee knew, former agent of the CIA appeared before this committee, and he had, as evidence to refresh his memory, a statement to the effect that John Davies proposed you to him. Now, what should the committee do, refuse to take that testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Sir, I have not suggested that the committee should not have done that, in this statement of mine here. And I believe you had a question just a moment ago about Davies' proposing this: How could he do it without my knowledge?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, he did without my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, he did it without your knowledge. But how could we refuse to take Munson's testimony that this is what Davies did? Davies was an employee of the United States Government in the State Department. He proposes your name, and I think your wife's name, to the Central Intelligence Agency, along with Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong and others.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In making this statement, I am not, by any means suggesting that every act of this committee has been unfair, by no means.

Senator FERGUSON. What could we have done in that case?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have only mentioned that in this previous connection with Budenz. Now, in this connection with CIA I am going on to build up your record for you. Since I am here today, and Munson was here before, I am offering my testimony. And it is not testimony which criticizes the committee, as far as I read it.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not any personal knowledge as to whether Davies did what Munson said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have no knowledge, no.

Senator SMITH. Then so far as you know, Davies might or might not have done that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. And is it a fact that Davies sent a recommendation for you along with Anna Louise Strong and others, and you say you didn't know anything at all about it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator SMITH. And at the time this committee did not know anything about it, so it is testimony that has been adduced here, after the events took place, if in fact it did take place.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Department of State, evidently quoting CIA has pointed out "that the controlled use or exploitation of persons of all shades of political complexion is perfectly compatible with and customary in the business of intelligence, and that a suggestion of this kind carried no implications of disloyalty.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. From a release of the Department of State, a press release.

Senator FERGUSON. When? Have you got the press release?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Department of State, for the press, No. 128, February 18, 1952. The third paragraph has that statement in it.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I see it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently the State Department issued a press release after Mr. Munson testified, isn't that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, that is my understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. And they give, apparently, "the Department is advised". They don't say who advised them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, that is why I say "evidently" quoting CIA.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any evidence here that they were quoting CIA?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Someone must have advised them, and who would advise them about CIA? That was my thought. That is why I put "evidently" in as my word in the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> The facts given by Mr. Lyle M. Munson's appearance before the Senate Internal Security Committee on February 15, versions of which appeared in the press, have been known to the Department and to the subcommittee.

Who are they talking about? Do you know?

Mr. FAIRBANKS. I am not certain. Perhaps it is this subcommittee, I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> This matter was thoroughly examined by the Department at the time it occurred, more than 2 years ago, and found to be groundless in any implication that Mr. John P. Davies was suggesting anything inimical to the security interests of the United States.

Senator SMITH. There has not been any suggestion here in the suggestion of these names, that they were inimical, was there? There is no charge such as that made by the committee.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This committee does not make charges, I know.

Senator FERGUSON. The Department said that they knew about him sending your name in there. Is that not right? They say "has been known to the Department and to the subcommittee." Isn't that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the Department is advised, they go on—

> that the controlled use of exploitation of persons of all shades of political complexion is perfectly compatible with and customary in the business of intelligence, and that a suggestion of this kind carried no implication of disloyalty.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. They are talking about Davies.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not in that statement.

Senator FERGUSON. They are trying to clear Davies by a press release.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I say that last paragraph you just quoted——

Senator FERGUSON. "Of all political shades."

Mr. FAIRBANK. That refers to people like myself, does it not?

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

> Exploitation of all shades of political complexion is perfectly compatible with and customary in the business of intelligence and that a suggestion of this kind carried no implication of disloyalty.

They are talking about Davies' disloyalty, are they not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I read that to mean that I am not disloyal just because Davies proposed, without my knowledge, that I should be used in connection with somebody who is pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way you read it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the way I understand that, yes. The press, you see, played up, as you may recall, the idea that Davies had suggested that some accused or alleged Communists should be all put together in master-minding some propoganda. The people mentioned were Smedley, Strong, Snow, and myself, and two others who have not been accused of being Communists. But now you see, in the public press, because of the statement of Budenz here, I am now labeled as a person who has been accused of being Communist. That is the tag for my name in the press. What else could the press do?

Senator FERGUSON. Did they not only print the testimony of Munson?

Mr. FAIRBANK. There was a report on Munson's testimony, stories were written.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you think this committee knowing this press release—it is a subcommittee, that would be this subcommittee, and the State Department has known this for several years—of what Davies did, would not bring it to the public attention, as part of the IPR hearings?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, I don't get any connection with the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not know that Davies had some connection with the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I had not heard that.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. He was in the Far East, on this question of policy, as to whether or not——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in China but I did not because the Chinese revolution—I mean, you know, people are there. People even go to IPR conferences without really being a part of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, what would you say if Mr. Davies acknowledged before this committee that he did in fact recommend you for CIA work?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That would be further evidence of a factual nature. And you see, my testimony here is not to criticize the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you dispute his statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir, that is his statement, if it is his statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Do I take it you are disputing Mr. Munson's statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am trying to get the record straight, and I haven't seen Mr. Munson's statement in detail.

Senator SMITH. In this press release which you have produced here, it starts off by saying—

The facts given by Mr. Lyle H. Munson's appearance, "the facts" before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on February 15, versions of which appeared in the press, had been known to the Department and to the subcommittee.

That is a statement of fact that they did know these facts which Mr. Munson testified about.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is quite possible.

Senator SMITH. Did you not know about it, maybe, but whoever testified did know about it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. All right, go ahead, Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. FAIRBANK. My statement continues, sir. My friend John P. Davies had cabled me as follows:

Security considerations prevent me from adding to Department statement but if qualified officers want details they should approach top CIA and State officials. In general can say never regarded you [or] Wilma as having same outlook as Smedley, Strong or potentially their collaborators but as presenting views and approaches widely divergent from theirs.

Senator SMITH. What he is saying there is that even if your name was recommended he did not put you in the same classification as Smedley and the others?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read the statement that Munson put in the record?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I have had no access to that, sir. I haven't been in Washington enough to come up here and look at it. I don't know whether it would be available to me.

Senator SMITH. I will come back and let you see that, because I think you ought to see that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have never met Anna Louise Strong, nor had any contact with her. At the risk of being accused of making a so-called incriminating confession or a so-called startling revelation, I wish to volunteer the statement that I did know Agnes Smedley. Our acquaintance illustrates what I mean by "freedom of contact" as one of the freedoms necessary for research workers as well as for journalists. Among many hundred people I have seen professionally in the past 20 years, I saw the late Agnes Smedley on several occasions. She was always outspokenly pro-Communist, with which I never agreed. She was also a writer with unique first-hand experience among the Chinese Communist guerrillas.

I first met Miss Smedley in 1932 in Shanghai through an introduction from my aunt. My uncle—Gilbert E. Roe— had at one time given her legal advice in New York. In January 1933 Miss Smedley came to Peking, where my wife and I were living in a Chinese house, and arranged with us to stay several days in our extra courtyard, which we normally rented to a succession of paying house guests. She busied herself in organizing the China League for Civil Rights, and interviewed Dr. Hu Shih and other liberals for the purpose. From her conversation there was no doubt whatever of her strong pro-Communist views. We saw her a third time in Shanghai in late 1934, and did not see her again for 12 years.

On January 12, 1947, Miss Smedley spoke at the Boston Community Church and I recall I was invited to luncheon to meet her. She had

traveled with Chinese guerrilla forces as a war correspondent and written about it, but had contracted serious dysentery and seemed broken in health. In March 1947 she came to receive treatment at the Lahey Clinic in Boston and at that time stayed a few days in my house. I invited in some of the local people interested in China and Miss Smedley spoke of her interviews with the Chinese Communist general, Chu Teh, whose biography she was writing. She was, as usual, outspokenly pro-Communist so that her bias was self-evident.

Over the years I have similarly invited numerous non-Communists and anti-Communists to my house for similar informal sessions, including ambassadors, cabinet ministers, and other officials of the Chinese Nationalist Government, as well as American officials and scholars. Such contact has never meant that these persons agreed politically with me, nor I with them. At an American university we are not afraid of ideas from any quarter. We oppose the totalitarian statist kind of orthodoxy which some Americans, in a panic of fear, have been encouraging.

I shall be glad to take up in detail all the testimony and documentation concerning me which have been presented to this committee.

They have generally stressed my contacts rather than my views. This is perhaps understandable because my writings and speeches are a matter of public record, available for all to see, and they have been distinctly non-Communist or anti-Communist. For your record I submit a body of excerpts which include practically everything I have written on the subject of communism. I should be glad to be questioned further about my views. I think they are more important than incidental individual contacts.

My book, The United States and China, received the Willkie Award of the American Political Science Association as the best book on international relations published in 1948. This is a high honor, not carelessly conferred, by the American Political Science Association. My part of another book, Next Step in Asia, published in 1949, was so constructively anti-Communist that it was denounced in the Moscow journal New Times, a copy of which is attached as an exhibit, as the "cogitations of a spy." In particular, Moscow denounced my assertion in that book in 1949 that—

> The containment of an all-encompassing revolution such as now convulses China cannot be achieved merely by setting up static military defense lines nor by arms shipments from abroad, but only by competition from rival groups within the country which make an equally valid use of the sources of revolutionary power.

Moscow also denounced me because I proposed that in non-Communist countries of Asia there should be, and here they are quoting me—

> a rapid mobilization and allocation of American "specialized personnel," who would be able to "develop direct and intimate contact with Asiatic realities" and "assist local leaders."

This is the end of their quotation of me, and my quotation of them. As the Russian Communists put it, in their own terminology, and this is a quotation from them, "Fairbank wants to wrench the peoples of Asia away from the democratic, anti-imperialist camp." End of quotation from the Russians.

This is, of course, quite true: I do want to wrench the peoples of Asia away from the Soviet camp. A glance at my writings will indi-

cate how definitely they have aimed at this anti-Russian purpose. I think I can say without immodesty that my knowledge of modern China and the contacts I have had over the past 20 years make it possible for me to be of help in checking communism in Asia. I want to be of help. I am gratified to know that the Russians fear my activities and writings as a threat to their success. But I cannot be of help in this fight if I am discredited and repudiated by my own people. Prior witnesses before this committee have sought to do just this, and they have done it through irresponsible and unsubstantiated charges. Unless they are right, they are helping Russia. I know they are wrong. I believe also that upon a consideration of the entire record this committee must inevitably come to the same conclusion.

The Russians also say, and this is a quotation—

professional thoughts turn persistently in one direction, that of using learned institutions and scientific study as cover for espionage and sabotage.

That is the end of the quotation from the Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. From what source?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The same source, the New Times. I have a photostat.

Mr. MORRIS. It is all in there?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The dates are clearly marked.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, January 8, 1950. This Russian charge must be noted in connection with some of the insinuations spread abroad as a result of testimony before this committee. It produces a confusing picture: I am charged by Communist Russia with being a secret agent of the west, and I am charged before this Senate committee with being a secret agent of Russia. These charges are equally absurd and false. But there is a disquieting similarity between one aspect of the procedures of the Communist Russians and of this committee—both have been jumping to conclusions on the basis of hearsay evidence and scattergun accusations.

Senator WATKINS. Just a moment. You are saying that the committee has jumped to a lot of conclusions?

Senator SMITH. Tell us what conclusion. I think that is a good point.

Senator WATKINS. I just wondered. I had not thought the committee had made any expression. We had not written a report on this yet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I consult my counsel?

Senator SMITH. All right, go ahead.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I agree, the committee has not made a conclusion, and my statement here represents a criticism which I maintain. I think the wording of it is not precisely correct. I would be happy to reword it.

Senator WATKINS. What do you intend to say there? Let us get that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that the committee——

Senator WATKINS. You assume such a fair attitude all along on this matter, that I was quite disturbed when I see you going off.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I agree with your point, that this is literally not a correct statement. I would like to express my view, which is, nevertheless, I am afraid, a critical one on this point.

Senator WATKINS. You have a right to be critical, if you wish to be, yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that the committee has made possible a situation, and done it unnecessarily in some cases, where these scattergun accusations, and hearsay evidence, are put forth, and the public is led to a conclusion, by the fact of this evidence being put forth.

Senator WATKINS. We call in witnesses here, we ask them to answer questions, we swear them to tell the truth, and we try to get at these matters that we are directed by the Congress to investigate. We can't be responsible for what the answers are that they come up with. We simply have a duty to perform, and then we go along. We can't take them all at once. The newspapers play them up whenever we hold public hearings. If we do not hold public hearings, the people are dissatisfied, and if we do, the people named are dissatisfied. So no matter which way we go, we get into difficulty. As far as I can see, the committee has been fair. We have not made conclusions. There may have been individual members that have made statements, but that is their right to do so. But the committee has not made any conclusions, and won't do so, until they write a report, if they do write a report on this matter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I subscribe to the committee's system, and I wish to have it confirmed, if you wish to confirm it, the system of having executive sessions so that unnecessarily damaging or relatively unsubstantiated scattergun accusations, hearsay evidence, that does not seem warranted entirely, that kind of thing can be sifted out and not put into the public record.

Senator WATKINS. I can confirm that we have held many executive sessions on many other lines other than the investigation of the IPR, and its influence, that have been going on all of the time. I have taken part and have presided over many of those. I know that in many instances there, I am satisfied that the testimony that was brought in, the investigation showed that that matter should not be released, that there was very little justification for some of the statements that were made. But they have not all been made public, and all of them probably will never be made public.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then the committee made a decision, did it not, that the accusation of Budenz, for example, was a substantial accusation which should come out through the committee procedure, attacking me as Budenz did, in effect.

Senator WATKINS. He made a statement on a lot of people, and he was a man who was on the inside on this thing, and he was a witness who had the information. Wherever that information led, if he was willing to swear directly, and his testimony had been taken by the courts, had been believed by the juries, there is no reason for us to completely discredit him on our judgment alone, after he had been used by the Government itself on prosecutions.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, what you say here today is tantamount to saying that Mr. Budenz is just a liar, is it not? That is what you say, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As regards me, very definitely.

Senator SMITH. That is what I mean. That is what you said.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Now, do you think that we should jump to a conclusion that you are right and he is wrong, any more than we should

jump to a conclusion that he was right and you were wrong? It is sworn testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That does not operate equally. It is not that I call him a liar or that he calls me a liar. But he calls me a Communist, and he is an expert on communism. When I call him a liar, it doesn't hurt him the least. It is when he calls me a Communist that hurts me.

Senator WATKINS. What was the quote that you have pertaining to you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is two pages back here, page. 11. Committee counsel says: "Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist?" Budenz says, "Yes, sir." That is about all he says. Now, I think that not to screen that out not only did me a disservice but was, I would think, jumping to a conclusion in the sense that you decided, you sort of jumped to a conclusion, that this was worth putting in a public record without any more substantiation. You have evidently decided that in your executive session, and then it went ahead and it came out. Committee counsel asked a question. Committee counsel wouldn't do that unless the thing had been on the docket, so to speak, I mean the list of persons. Mr. Morris wouldn't bring it up just off his own back.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fairbank, there were documents introduced into the record at the same time. You have read the testimony, have you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have not seen any documents about me being a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. There are documents in here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But no connection with Mr. Budenz.

Mr. MORRIS. But there were documents introduced at the same time, were they not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You mean they are the basis for the committee's concluding I was a Communist?

Senator SMITH. We have not concluded that at all.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am glad to hear that.

Senator SMITH. What you are fussing about is because Mr. Budenz came here and testified against you. There have been other witnesses who have testified against him, and I imagine there will still be some disparity of statements between people that continue to come before us. But we haven't reached a point in deciding who is right and who is wrong. If it is sworn testimony, I do not know how we could refuse to hear Mr. Budenz on his sworn testimony any more than we have a right to refuse to hear you on your sworn testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have just had an exchange on that same point. I think that his testimony is much more damaging as testimony than my testimony is damaging as testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. But, Mr. Fairbank, do you not in effect accuse him of perjury? You say lying. Well, lying under oath is perjury.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course, I have my private view of him as a liar. But in this statement I don't need to go as far as to say it is perjury on his part because I just don't know what basis he had, if any.

Senator WATKINS. But he says, "I know that he is a Communist." That was all he said.

Mr. FAIRBANK. If he had a basis, it seems to me it should have been indicated.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know if I was here when he stated it.

Senator FERGUSON. He gave as the basis that it was in a record.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't think you can accept anything from me that is a statement of reports.

Senator FERGUSON. You want it definitely opened to show all the surrounding facts and circumstances; is that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I want it left out because it isn't true.

Senator FERGUSON. How could we strike that out now?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, specifically on this point of jumping to conclusion, and, in answer to your question, I think this committee, in the case of Budenz' testimony about me, if it was no more in executive session than it is in the public session here recorded, would have been following a better procedure, more fair, to say, "Well, we just won't bring that into the public session because it doesn't get us anywhere."

Now, you have there, to balance, the fact that it does damage an operation of which I am responsible for training American personnel to deal with the Asian problem. That is at Harvard University. I am not just an isolated individual. I operate in a university. There is a big investment there and a lot of people. We shouldn't damage it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Mr. Davies said about you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You read there, in sworn testimony, the statement referred to.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Which Davies is that?

Senator FERGUSON. John P. Davies, Jr. I have marked the parts in a statement that was made by Munson right after the conversation he had with Davies. He is going to put you as the head of these people, and he is going to put you in an office. Now you read it.

Senator SMITH. You mean read it into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It is official.

Senator SMITH. Suppose you read it.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it aloud.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is Friday, February 15, 1952, this subcommittee. And this is a public session?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. John P. Davies—you know who he is?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He is a good friend of mine. And he wouldn't do me any damage.

Senator FERGUSON. Read what he said about you.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is what Mr. Munson says that Mr. Davies says, is that correct?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK (reading):

> Mr. Davies expressed the feeling that the above-mentioned persons should be used by OPC, and that the consultation and guidance and materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach. Mr. Davies said that he would be perfectly confident to put Professor and Mrs. Fairbank at the head of a unit charged with producing such materials. He said that he was aware that they were considered Communists by some uninformed persons, but that they were not Communists, but only very politically sophisticated.

And the word "politically" is in parentheses.

> It was Davies' suggestion that the above persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices somewhere other than Washington, probably New York or Boston, and that, through a cut out of OPC choosing, these persons provide not only guidance but actually produce materials for OPC utilization.

That is Mr. Munson's statement, and whether Mr. Davies said that is still another question, is it not?

Senator FERGUSON. I know you do not believe Davies said it. But Munson swears to it and files this memorandum that he made at the time. And the State Department release indicates that they knew about it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I comment that Mr. Davies seems to think that the more politically sophisticated you get, the more leftist you are, which I wouldn't agree with. I don't know that Mr. Davies would say that either, really. It is a sort of a silly statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Does he not really say that they are going to put you in an office and, as heading up this group, that Munson says that he is going to put you in the office; that that is the suggestion of Davies, and that is what Davies is saying?—you are to head up the group, and you are to be unknown because you are going to have a cut-out.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Munson says that is what Mr. Davies says. What are we talking about, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. You are criticizing the committee taking testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. About Mr. Budenz; not about this.

Senator FERGUSON. I know; you want to pass this over, but I am going back to it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I will go back to it; I don't know what the point is.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the same thing that you are criticizing Budenz about. Whom are we going to believe, Mr. Fairbank, on this Munson-Davies story?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think you should take Mr. Munson's story. I think that is fine to put in the record. I think I should have a chance to reply to it. I am having a chance; that is good.

Senator FERGUSON. We are going to give you a chance.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you do not object, then, to our putting this statement in of what Mr. Davies said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. What Mr. Munson said Mr. Davies said.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't object to it, sir; and, I want to make it plain, I do not regard every act of this committee unfair, or anything of that kind. I am just pointing to certain things that have damaged me.

Senator SMITH. At the time you made your comments on the committee accepting Budenz' testimony, you didn't know about the existence of this evidence; did you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This comment in here, on Budenz' testimony?

Senator SMITH. No; in the record you just read from.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was in the press; that I read was in the press, and I knew about that when I wrote this statement here.

Senator SMITH. You don't like Mr. Budenz' testimony because he accused you of being a Communist.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz might not like your testimony because——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I can't accuse him of being a Communist.

Senator SMITH. You accuse him of being a perjurer, and I imagine your counsel will tell you——

Mr. FAIRBANK. I haven't accused him of perjury, because I don't know.

Senator SMITH. You said he lied; has not told the truth before this committee. That is perjury. And I am sure your counsel will advise you that there is no law against being a Communist, but it is a felony to be a perjurer. Therefore, what you have said about him, if you do indeed accuse him of being a perjurer, is far worse than what he said about you. You did not realize that; did you? I mean, in all fairness you did not realize it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think probably this is a good legal point, but could we bring in good common sense, too?

Senator FERGUSON. You want to throw the law out and bring in the common sense?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would, in this way.

Senator WATKINS. It happens that the law and common sense are in line on that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Liars are called liars all around the country, but it doesn't get them into the trouble it does if they are called Communists by ex-Communists who say they had a factual basis for knowing it. I say calling a man a Communist in 1950 or 1951 is a very serious thing, and calling him a liar is a run-of-the-mill thing. It happens all of the time in politics.

Senator FERGUSON. Even under oath.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, lying is an original sin.

Senator FERGUSON. Are we not trying to combat and fight perjury, too?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course. But this specific investigation is against communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but it does not want any perjured testimony.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly not.

Senator SMITH. Go ahead. We will probably ask you some more questions further down the page.

Senator WATKINS. I do not know the record on what Mr. Budenz was asked that day. I have not seen it, and I do not think I was present. I would like to call him back, since you say that there is not any basis for that, and we will investigate a little further to see what his basis is.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it would be very good.

Senator WATKINS. I think he probably will be called, and we will go into it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Particularly if someone can suggest the questions of cross-examination.

Senator FERGUSON. I will make a suggestion to your counsel that he prepare a list of questions that he wants on that point.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It would be very useful.

Senator FERGUSON. We may all be surprised what Mr. Budenz knows.

Mr. FAIRBANK. While no one questions the sincerity of this committee in seeking to combat communism, I think some of its methods have been dangerously at fault. It has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian "guilt by association."

Senator SMITH. We better ask you a question on what you mean by that, "totalitarian 'guilt by association'." "Totalitarian" isn't any too sweet a word in American understanding now; is it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is a frankly critical statement of the committee, and it is about the only one I have put in.

Senator SMITH. Let's see whether it is truthful or not. What is the basis on which you say that this committee has turned "our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt by association?'" Just what do you mean by those words?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Let's take the case of IPR. I was told this morning that there were 11 persons who had refused to incriminate themselves. If you think this is off the track, we can stop it, but the IPR strikes me as an example.

Senator FERGUSON. I have seen this carried in the press; some of the press carried only your criticisms of the committee. There was none of the praise that you had for the committee in the beginning. Now, you explain that statement.

Senator SMITH. What is the meaning of your words "totalitarian 'guilt by association'," as referred to this committee? Can you tell us what you mean?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; it has to be done by examples. I propose to begin with an example of the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Cannot you tell us in simple language, Mr. Fairbank? You are a man of great ability and educational experience. Cannot you tell us just what you mean by those words?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Or is that a fantastic statement of just a nebulous conclusion you reached without any foundation for it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir; I think there is a foundation.

Senator SMITH. What is it that this committee has done that justifies that conclusion of yours in those words?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It has said that because Miss Bentley—I mean, the situation has developed where it appears to the public that because Miss Bentley——

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by "appears to the public"? What are the facts, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course, I can begin sentences here all afternoon and never finish them.

Mr. MORRIS. Please give us facts, Mr. Fairbank. You can justify any erroneous facts with the statement you just made, what "appears to the public."

Senator SMITH. What are the facts that justify you in using the language "totalitarian 'guilt by association,'" as applied to this committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, let's start at it this way: the word "totalitarian" I associate with the idea of "guilt by association." So, it is one thing. Let's decide on the idea there. The totalitarians—the Communists, the Nazis, and those people—have a tendency to go by the associations a person has rather than following the idea of freedom of contact. I think that is plain.

Senator SMITH. Do you think that is all that "totalitarian" means?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I am just trying to get one idea set up here: totalitarian "guilt by association." If you are unorthodox in a Com-

munist country, your head may go off; you may go into a concentration camp or anything.

Senator SMITH. We are familiar with that. But I want to find out what you can tell us.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I can if I can finish the sentence. It may be a long sentence. Here we have the example of 11 persons—said this morning—having refused to incriminate themselves and who have been connected with IPR. This was put forward, as I got it, as a very serious charge against the IPR case, indicating that the IPR has had a really subversive influence—I got that impression; maybe I was wrong—because of these 11 persons. Who are these 11 persons: Field and Moore, and they have been pretty definitely connected with the IPR. That is two persons. Now, DeCaux, a man who was a trustee for a while and went to a conference. Mildred Price, a person who paid $6 and was a member for a few years, without taking any active part.

Senator FERGUSON. Did she write any articles?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; she wrote no articles, as far as I know. And, then, Lawrence Rosinger, a research worker for 2 years, 1948 and 1950. And, then, two people named Keeney, who had no connection with the IPR, as far as I can find out. I just called Bill Holland at lunchtime, and he says he knows of no connection. Perhaps we are wrong there, but we would like to see it.

Now, Mandel wrote a book on the Soviet Union, which the IPR sponsored, but was not employed by the IPR. Then a man named Allen wrote one or two articles in Pacific Affairs; no other connection. Then a man named Deane wrote one article; no other connection. And, then, Kathleen Barnes, who was a junior employee in the early 1930's. Those are the 11 persons. They are associated with the IPR to some degree, and two of them, Field and Moore, obviously have associated with the American council of the IPR in an important way, and that is an important point, but the nine others were not in an important way, and in some cases no way that I know about. That is association. And guilt is alleged from that association, against the IPR, in general, as an organization. Now, look at that organization. There are 60 trustees, and, you know, very responsible people. General Marshall is still a trustee in spite of all these attacks. They are scattered all over the country. With 11 councils, now 10 councils, in countries all around the Pacific area. In England, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a very respectable conservative organization, is part of the IPR, but the IPR in the public mind, because of "guilt by association," stands condemned as a Communist front or some kind of thing—nobody knows exactly what—because of reiterated statements here.

That, I think, is real criticism.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Field's connection with the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I have mentioned that.

Senator FERGUSON. He was practically one of the operators; was he not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was in the American council of the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Was he a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He became one. I didn't know of his becoming a Communist until after 1940. I just don't know Field.

Senator FERGUSON. When in 1940?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know Field; I have met him a few times.

Senator FERGUSON. When in 1940?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Maybe it was 1941—I don't know—about that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What makes you place that date 1940 or 1941, for Field's becoming a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, I have read a great deal from these hearings, and people keep talking about this question "When did Field become a Communist?" I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard the testimony of Mr. Weyl, who was a Communist at the same time, who said he became one in 1936 or 1935?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I haven't heard that testimony; I am sorry.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, I still get back to see if you can give me an answer.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did try to give you an answer.

Senator SMITH. I do not think you have touched it remotely. You say, "It"—this committee—"has turned our traditional American freedom of contract into totalitarian 'guilt by association,'" and you think you have explained what you meant by those words.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have talked about "guilt by association."

Senator SMITH. I am not talking about your talking about "guilt by association." I am asking you if you think you have answered the question as to the basis of fact for your statement "It has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt by association.'"

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think I have answered it, and done quite well.

Senator SMITH. You think you have?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. I do not think anybody else thinks so, because I cannot understand your talking about all of these other things when you said this committee "has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian 'guilt by association.'"

Mr. FAIRBANK. It may well be not the intent of the committee to have done that, but it seems to me that is what has happened from these hearings.

Senator WATKINS. You know that the purpose of this investigation is to find out ultimately if it had any effect, and to see if it still has effect, as a matter of guarding the internal security of the United States. You know this investigation isn't finished yet. We are still working on it. Would you have us disregard completely the matter of association?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not at all.

Senator WATKINS. Do you not think it has a proper place as a part of the evidence?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It should be taken into account.

Senator WATKINS. There is an old adage, isn't there, that you are judged by the company you keep? I think my mother taught me that when I was a small boy. "Remember, when you go out, the people you go with. You are going to be judged by that." That goes back in my memory, and I think it goes a few hundred years beyond that.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But I am sure you will agee, that judging by the company you keep is not judging by the individual, and that in this country we are to judge by the individual, and that your mother would want you to judge not by somebody you might meet or somebody seen with, but by your own qualities and integrity and character, as an individual. That is not guilty-by-association, that is judgment on the person.

Senator WATKINS. I understand all of that. But this is only one item. You say we shouldn't regard it. I think we would be neglecting our duty if we did not consider it. If a man runs around, for instance—this is a hypothetical situation—if a man is found in the company of people who are notoriously known to be thieves, he probably wouldn't be accepted by a bank as a teller, or anything of that sort.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely, he might have been a detective.

Senator WATKINS. He might be a detective. It is possible but not likely he would be a detective and then go in and get a position in the bank. But, as a matter of fact, that is one of the elements in every case. Now, we are hearing that along with the rest of them. We have the direct and positive statements of witnesses with respect to you and others. That is only one element. So, what you in effect try to say there is that we have prejudged you, and we have made a judgment on it simply by association. I see that in the press, occasionally. That is all they think we have before us. That is only one element. That is only one piece of evidence. It may have some weight and it may not have any. But we certainly should not ignore it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But may I ask about the judgment that is going on here about the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator WATKINS. There has been no judgment yet. We cannot be responsible for what the editors and the columnists do as they go along. They do it to us as well as to you, incidentally. You are not the only one on the receiving end.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, do you subscribe to these two sentences from a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States:

> One's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial one's reputation has been determined in part by the company he keeps.

Do you subscribe to that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; reputation determined in part by the company you keep.

Senator SMITH. There is, of course, I think—and other witnesses have brought it up—statements made outside this committee about judgment.

The next sentence I want to inquire about——

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I would not like to leave that. I want to ask some questions.

Senator SMITH. This is in the case of *Adler* v. *Board of Education, New York*, Mr. Justice Minton writing the opinion, March 3, 1952.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask whether or not the witness does not think that Mr. Field's association with the IPR was more than just association, as used by your expression guilt-by-association.

Mr. FAIRBANK. To be sure it was with the IPR activities. My reference was to the persons, all of the persons, connected with the IPR.

Now, Field is associated with those persons in the IPR. The IPR is not a person, it is an operation. And people are associated in an organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever get the idea that this committee was drawing the conclusion that anybody connected with the IPR as a trustee was a Communist? And, if so, where did you ever get that idea?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that would be going too far.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, is that not what you are saying here, "It has turned our traditional American freedom of contact into totalitarian guilt-by-association"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The committee has not attacked all the trustees of IPR. The witnesses before the committee have not attacked——

Senator FERGUSON. And the committee has not gotten a report out. The committee has not done anything yet, but asked questions.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I misspoke myself. The witnesses before the committee have not attacked all of the people of the IPR.

Senator SMITH. Of course not. We know there are plenty of good names of people that were sucked into the IPR.

Senator WATKINS. But according to the conclusion, I think the argument is being made that they probably all would be open to attack because they were associated with the other people. Of course, that would be very, very small evidence to convict them on or to charge them with.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I just refer to your statement, Mr. Chairman, people sucked into the IPR? Now, that perhaps has a connotation.

Senator SMITH. Well, I had in mind things that have come out in the evidence about the efforts of Mr. Carter and others to get people to come into the IPR and pay the dues and put up money for it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. By being sucked in, you meant that they were brought into something undesirable, did you not?

Senator SMITH. I did not say that at all. You may be sucked into conversation with a very charming group of ladies, for instance, you may be brought into that. In fact, a lot of people have been sucked into this hearing here, because they are interested in what you are going to say.

Senator WATKINS. That has no evil connotation.

Senator FERGUSON. Your next sentence clearly indicates what you want to convey to the public, "The committee has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence." Where did you get that? Did you ever see a report on the Institute of Pacific Relations by this committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I did not believe that a senatorial committee would allow an ex-Communist, who has testified about a great many people, some correctly and some incorrectly, to make an accusation of a person like myself who is not an isolated individual working in the Institute of Pacific Relations where the institution's good will and good name was important, would allow a man to make an accusation like that against me, unless the committee was making some sort of presumption.

Senator SMITH. Do you not think we should have heard you today?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Definitely. I think you should have heard me last September.

Senator SMITH. You have been denominated by at least one as an ex-Communist.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not ex, sir, that would be a great honor.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not seen any report by this committee or any conclusion, have you, on you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir. I have been judging by the operation of the committee.

Senator SMITH. So you want to condemn the committee here and say that it has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence. Now you cannot state one single fact to justify that, can you? And you have sworn to that. You realize that you have sworn to that statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir, and I state the fact which I alleged just now that the committee through its operation of having an executive session and screening the whole thing and putting it out in public, which we all have discussed and agreed was the operation, allowed Budenz to make an accusation against me which apparently had no more basis than what was in the record here, which was damaging to me and which could only have been made, it seems to me, that decision to have him testify that way could only have been made by people who really were prejudging and saying, "This man we are attacking because he says he is a Red."

Senator SMITH. Do you not think turnabout is fair play, if we heard him we should hear you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that system is good. I think discretion needs to be used in the operation of any system.

Senator SMITH. You would like this committee when they run across your name in some of these documents to delete that and keep that in executive session? You do not mean that, do you, Mr. Fairbank? You do not think this committee ought to show any favoritism between you and Mr. Budenz when we have taken sworn testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do not know about favoritism between me and Budenz. You are putting us on the same level as if I was coming before you to attack him when he had not attacked me. I am not doing that. I am not going around accusing people of being an ex-Communist.

Senator SMITH. Of course I do not know which one of you is right.

Senator WATKINS. I am interested in knowing the witness' view on this. Do you not know it to be a fact that there may be other evidence in the record, probably is, bearing on this question of whether you are or are not a Communist or you were or were not a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. There may be.

Senator WATKINS. When we get through we can go through that mass of evidence. We take it over a long period of time, day after day. We cannot judge on every one of these accusations because the investigation is not completed. In the end we may be able to say positively there is not anything that reflects on this man, the evidence does not justify such a conclusion.

Inevitably in an investigation by a committee of Congress, if we are going to follow any of the established procedures, how can we avoid taking evidence as we go along? You agree we probably should have the right to do it, you agree in a measure with it. How can we avoid taking evidence as we go along?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Do you, sir, have all the evidence in the open session which comes into the executive session? In that case, why do you have the executive session?

Senator WATKINS. I cannot answer entirely that question, whether all of it comes out or not. I do not know. I am not present. We have two or three different task groups in this committee investigating so many different fields that I could not answer.

I told you this morning in some cases if evidence presented or talk presented or rumors presented to the committee in executive session do not stand up, I do not think the committee would ever reveal it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I wish that had been done in my case. I think you can understand my case.

Senator WATKINS. You had a man swearing positively that he knows you to be a Communist.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But all evidence in executive session is under oath.

Senator WATKINS. Certainly, but it is a direct, positive charge. There is no wishy-washiness about the charge of Budenz. He just said, "I know him to be a Communist."

Mr. FAIRBANK. Sir, you understand my position, do you not?

Senator SMITH. I can understand your not liking what Budenz says. You know the saying, "No fellow who ever felt a halter draw had a good opinion of the law." You have heard that expression, I am sure. I bet your counsel has. I can understand how you do not like what Budenz said. I am not blaming you for disliking it, but I am talking about the unfairness of your statement here that we have, that this committee has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence, and we have done nothing of the sort.

I do not know where you get the basis for such an outrageous statement. It is just as bad against us as anything Mr. Budenz has made against you because you are swearing to this.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not damaging you.

Senator SMITH. You cannot quote any instance that would justify that conclusion. I am pointing that out not for the purpose of argument but for the purpose of showing you that you have done the very same thing you have found fault with Budenz for doing, accusing somebody without foundation.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think you can appreciate my situation. I do think I have a foundation.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you think it is true if you have a foundation. You are swearing to it, are you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have a foundation for not approving what the committee has done.

Senator SMITH. I asked you what is the foundation for your statement that the committee has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have stated that. I have a foundation. It is that you have allowed Mr. Budenz to testify, as he did, after an executive session where presumably no more evidence was presented than was presented in the open session, namely, no evidence at all. That is my position.

Senator SMITH. You say that means that we made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence. We have not said a word about you,

Mr. Fairbank, justifying a statement that we made a presumption against you at all.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But Budenz testified only in answer to the committee counsel, "Do you know?" and the committee therefore initiated the question and brought me into it. Budenz did not bring me into it except as the committee did.

Senator SMITH. You do not know whether we have a report to that effect or not.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is another question. As you have them, please bring them forth.

Senator SMITH. Do you want us to bring forth unsubstantiated reports?

Mr. FAIRBANK. If they are not substantiated, why do you use them?

Senator SMITH. If they are unsubstantiated we do not use them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Then you are in a position of letting Budenz go ahead.

Senator SMITH. But he swore you were a Communist. You turn around and say he is a perjurer. Some instrumentality may have to decide who is telling the truth. I do not know, and I am not attempting to say.

Mr. MORRIS. On this point documents have been submitted to the witness as of yesterday in executive session. We had a paper, the probative value of which we could not determine, and what we did was let the witness have it overnight in order that he might look at it and very thoroughly come to a sound conclusion as to whether we should put any probative value on it. I would like the record to show that he has had it overnight, and it can be considered evidence, the probative value of which we cannot determine, but we have asked him to look at it.

So I think in that sense, to that extent, certainly Professor Fairbank has been unwarranted in some of the statements he has been making. He has had this document overnight.

Is that not true?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Would you like me to bring this up and report to you on it?

Senator FERGUSON. Professor Fairbank, is it not true that some other agency of Government has been considering this question as far as you are concerned?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You are referring to the Department of the Army?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course their decision was taken on August 17, whereas the testimony against me here by Miss Bentley was on August 14. Now I don't know whether there was a casual connection or not.

Mr. MORRIS. This newspaper you had overnight is dated 1950, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. Let us examine this newspaper if you like. It is interesting.

Senator FERGUSON. You say here that we have already made up our minds as far as you are concerned. Is that correct?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, in a few words, I come here now 5 months after I was accused by Budenz to defend myself. I think you can say I am coming to defend myself, to defend my good name. Now that could only happen if I was accused, and I was accused 5 months ago. That is a situation which has grown up under the auspices of

this committee where I was presumably judged very questionable, dubious, or guilty, and it has to be cleared up now.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a college professor. You are familiar with court trials?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not awfully, but I can consult my counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. There are many times that a paper, an affidavit, or a bill of complaint or a declaration is filed in the court against a man, and he is only a witness, and his name is in it. He does not have a chance to answer at all. Now is that not what we are talking about here as far as you are concerned? You are having this time to answer.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is also the consideration of national interest sometimes as to override personal liberties and rights, that is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, should he finish that sentence or go into it?

Senator SMITH. Go ahead. He did not finish reading that paragraph, did he?

I believe you read down to "the result."

Mr. FAIRBANK. It has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence. The result has been wholesale and indiscriminate attack on American China specialists, whose effective work must depend in part upon freedom of contact. In other words, we are attacked for doing the very thing we have to do to serve our country.

We must all fight Communist subversion. But to preserve our democratic freedoms, we must conduct the fight accurately—with sights and a rifle and not with a blunderbuss; with facts, not hearsay and suspicion; with faith, not fear.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask you a question there, Mr. Fairbank. You say the result has been wholesale and indiscriminate attack on American China specialists, whose effective work must depend in part upon freedom of contact. It is true, is it not, that before so many of these China specialists got to work on our situation in the Far East we had several million Chinese on our side?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. And today we have none on our side practically?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I could go further than that, sir. I could say when I was in China, until 1946 China was still largely on our side, and shortly after that I left China, and China became Communist. Was that because I had been in China?

Senator SMITH. It was probably because somebody else went over there. There was a change in policy?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say that China went Communist mainly because of the Chinese situation. Perhaps we disagree on this, but my fundamental view on this is that the Americans couldn't make a terrific difference one way or the other in the China sense. We might have done better or worse, but whatever we did we were outsiders and that vast mass of people in a country as big as this and three times as numerous, it is a terrible thing to deal with on the other side. You could only deal with it by working inside through some kind of Chinese organization, the way the Russians are doing.

Senator SMITH. We did have a change in policy in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We had a policy of supporting the Nationalist Government. We gave them quite a lot of support.

Senator SMITH. Then we did change that policy, did we not, and try to amalgamate the Communists and Nationalists?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You are referring to the Marshall mediations?

Senator SMITH. Somebody tried to amalgamate them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. I was there at the time. We were trying to get the Chinese Communists not to fight a civil war but to lay down their arms, and Marshall's military arrangement would have brought their divisions bridaged in with superior numbers of Nationalist divisions.

Senator SMITH. He tried to amalgamate them.

Mr. FAIRBANKS. If it had worked, they would have been immobilized, and they could not have taken over. The chances are that they couldn't have taken over, but it didn't work.

Senator SMITH. After that conditions in China began to deteriorate?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It was deteriorating very steadily.

Senator SMITH. You do not think there is hope for us to accomplish anything worth while in China with any of our programs?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I thing we have to have a program toward China. We have to make an effort. It has to be ideological. That is why I feel I am very important. That is why I don't want to be damaged by being accused as a Communist.

Senator SMITH. I believe if we had kept the professors away from there, the better we would have been in China. The more we send over there, the worse they get.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I read from page 6 of the witness' own statement:

> The question before this committee, I submit, is not whether I should have had such broad contact with persons of all sorts connected with China, but whether I engaged in such contact as a loyal American or engaged in it subversively. The fact of my contact with all sorts of persons concerning China should be assumed as a matter of course, just as it is assumed for a press correspondent. The real question is whether I used this contact disloyally, or in the course of this contact was used by others with disloyal intent.

Certainly we have the right to make investigation and take testimony. In effect you admit you had a lot of these contacts. You admit it is a perfectly proper procedure to find out just what the nature of those contacts was, whether you were there as an investigator in the objective sense, or whether you were there as an associate of those folks. That is all there is to this statement, and I think that is why your own statement contradicts what we had a right to do.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear the expression of "guilt by association"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am afraid I just can't recall. It is a rather recent term that has been used more recently than before. It might have been written by some eighteenth century fellow. I just don't remember it.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know when you first ran into that phrase?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear it used by the Communists in some of their writings?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first hear this expression "freedom of contact"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know. I sort of invented this to try to express my idea. I don't think it is a new term, but it does express my idea.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that is your own expression, "freedom of contact"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sure many people have said it many times before. I just don't know where.

Senator FERGUSON. You used the two expressions, "guilt by association" and then the counterremark of "freedom of contact," is that right?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Suppose you have a situation where people are in contact or in association in a sort of neutral way. One interpretation is that because we are associated the guilt of one is transmitted to another or presumed to be attached to another because he associates. According to freedom of contact, you do not go that far, and you say that these people may have contact, but you have to take them as individuals, by cases as persons, according to what they do and think, and judge them on their merits as persons.

I think that is more of the American tradition. I am sure you do.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you used this expression as if it is a crime because of your associates, the people look on it as a crime because you have associated with somebody. Is that not right? Is that not the way you have used that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. People impute guilt because of contact.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is guilt by association. I think I agree with you.

Senator FERGUSON. And you claim that the man has a right to that freedom of contact without public opinion feeling that there is some guilt by that association, by that contact?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think on the whole the individual should be given the benefit of doubt. This is a matter of degree between extremes. Particularly a press correspondent or a diplomat or a professor or researcher where they are working in a foreign country, they have to see people in that foreign country. If the country is going Communist they probably have to see some Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. It would apply to a lawyer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Surely.

Senator FERGUSON. If he was found associating with criminals, you do not think that ought to affect his reputation as a lawyer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It might be his business.

Senator FERGUSON. It might be, certainly, and it might not be.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think this is a matter of degree; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I am trying to get at here. You think the public has no right to say that association has anything to do with it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Isn't that an extreme statement, sir? Isn't that one end of the spectrum here?

Senator FERGUSON. You know what the Supreme Court said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It said in part by association.

Senator WATKINS. That is all we have said, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, but, you see, the thing that strikes me over and over again in connection with the IPR, the committee, it does not seem to me, has really dealt with this matter of the publications

of the IPR. Now there have been certain publications picked out and jumped on and some of them rightly so. Incidentally, Epstein's book we discussed this morning is not an IPR publication.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. But the great bulk of IPR publications, which is the main thing it has done—it has worked year to year getting those available—most of those books are useful, good books and we couldn't get along without them.

Senator SMITH. We have not attacked them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. When you attack the organization you have made it more difficult for those boooks to come out. The IPR has to fold up, and somebody else has to do that job. IPR is a private agency trying to do this job in an honest, factual way.

Senator SMITH. Somebody else might have a different view.

Mr. FAIRBANK. In general, yes.

Senator SMITH. We have heard testimony about IPR. I expect we know a lot more about it than you do, even though you were a member.

Senator FERGUSON. You know they have given us most of the books they published, do you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. But they have not been read, I should imagine.

Senator SMITH. We could not sit here and read all those books. You do not think that, do you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would suggest that in so important a matter as this, with people involved and reputations and everything, that a research staff of one or two people, if you could find a budget to go through the IPR publications and read the whole works and line them up, it would be a proper service.

Senator SMITH. We have lined up some of them.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Instead of just picking out the bad eggs you might find in the basket.

Senator SMITH. If they are bad, there is no reason to disturb the good eggs. You do not think we should involve the good because there may be some bad?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You see, if they have all the IPR label and the IPR label becomes a garbage word, it is all garbage. That is what I mean by guilt by association among books.

Senator WATKINS. The object of this committee is to protect the internal security of the United States. We are only looking for those things that may involve the security. You may find something just like it was in Japan with Sorge and Ozaki; there were only two of them apparently, and yet they did incalculable damage to the Germans and the Japanese, just those two fellows.

Now, you cannot go out after the whole group. Ninety-nine percent of them probably are all right, very fine people and good citizens, but these spies work in with people and ingratiate themselves and become very powerful people, and they are never suspected. They were not suspected until the very last thing, until they had done the damage.

Senator SMITH. I believe Mr. Fairbank had finished reading his statement. Mr. Morris, do you have any questions to ask of Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I would like to ask Professor Fairbank about a newspaper that was given to him last night. Professor Fairbank, you read Chinese, do you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I do.

Mr. Morris. Have you read the Central Daily News of September 3, 1950, which was given to you last night?

Mr. Fairbank. I have read one passage.

Mr. Morris. Did you read the passage which purported to be the confession of Mr. Li Peng?

Mr. Fairbank. I read the passage in his confession which referred to me and others.

Mr. Morris. We had a translation made by the Library of Congress, and that translation reads:

> Wittingly or unwittingly, they—

referring to you and two other State Department people—

> leaked out diplomatic secrets which were transmitted through the embassies of third countries into the ears of Soviet intelligence personnel.

Is that an accurate translation of that passage?

Mr. Fairbank. Could I see the transcript?

Mr. Morris. Yes. This committee knows nothing about Chinese, Professor Fairbank. We are going to rely on you to translate it.

Mr. Fairbank. Do you have also the synopsis statement you showed me last night?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Fairbank. You recall I was given this synopsis statement to look at as a basis for comparison with the Chinese text?

Mr. Morris. That is right.

Mr. Fairbank. I made that comparison, and I have here a report on that comparison.

Senator Smith. Could you answer his question?

Mr. Morris. Why do you not translate it for us, Professor?

Senator Smith. He asked you about a translation. Can you not answer that question?

Mr. Fairbank. I am reading here from a special edition of the Central Daily News which contains a transcript, stated transcript, of a statement made by a Chinese named Li Peng. The passage which I was shown last night in English synopsis reads as follows. Shall I read this?

Mr. Morris. You see, we have two translations, the one I gave you and the one you were shown last night. The committee vouches for the authenticity of neither one. All we can do is send it to the Library of Congress for translation.

Mr. Fairbank. The one I see today is more accurate. I will read you the one given last night.

Mr. Morris. That is the one we told you we would have the first thing in the morning.

Senator Smith. You want him to read both of them?

Mr. Morris. I think the second one is the one we will address ourselves to. It is the one I brought up for the record.

Mr. Fairbank. And you want just the references to myself?

Mr. Morris. That is right. I think it is just as well, Senator, although I do not know, there are two other names mentioned there. I think we should try to restrict this just as much as possible.

Senator Smith. If that does not involve Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. Morris. It does involve Mr. Fairbank, but two other people in the State Department. I think it would be my preference, Senator, that we not mention the other two names at this time.

Senator SMITH. Is that all right with you, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I will leave out the other names.

Mr. MORRIS. Unless Mr. Fairbank feels he has to mention them.

Mr. FAIRBANK (reading):

In addition, at the time the person in charge of information and intelligence in the American Embassy, the Director General of the United States Information Service, Fairbank—

and then certain other persons are named—

were all persons who were fundamentally dissatisfied with the Nationalist Government. Their prejudices frequently superseded their duties to maintain secrecy relating to the nation's concern. Wittingly or unwittingly they leaked out diplomatic secrets which were transmitted through the embassies of third countries into the ears of Soviet intelligence personnel.

As I understand it, this translation was made at the Library of Congress, and I should say it is substantially accurate. It is more accurate than the one you showed me last night.

Mr. MORRIS. The one showed you last night, Professor, was shown to you with apologies because it was made up hurriedly and we told you we were having another one prepared.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is labeled "synopsis?"

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The part that I examined.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know from the reading of the transcript that that purports to be a confession of Li Peng who was executed by the Chinese Nationalists for being a Soviet espionage agent?

Mr. FAIRBANK. So I understand.

The part that I have examined I would confirm reads as follows:

Wittingly or unwittingly disclosed diplomatic secrets which then were transmitted by way of the embassies of third party countries to the blank intelligence officers' ears.

Now this is a peculiar thing here, but the Chinese character where I said "blank" and which in the interpretation, the translation, reads "Soviet," is missing from the Chinese text. I don't know why. The context would indicate that it should be Soviet at that point. But here is the place where that character should be, and it is missing in the text. There is just a blank spot there. I don't understand that.

Now I can go ahead with more description of this.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, when did you first hear that there might be some question about leaks to other embassies or through other embassies to the Soviet from China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have not heard of any charge against me of leaks.

Senator FERGUSON. I did not say of charges against you. I just say there was some question of leaks through our Embassy to other embassies or through them to the Soviets.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall hearing of any particular case, and I don't recall hearing, in other words, of leakage.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of it until you saw this paper last evening?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I don't think so. You see, for one thing I was not concerned in the Embassy in 1945 and 1946 with intelligence. The statement is incorrect. I was concerned with an information program which was under the auspices of the Embassy, but operationally separate, and which was entirely a clear output operation of information material, not an intelligence operation at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not indicate this morning that you did get some evidence of some intelligence?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is when I was earlier in China in 1942 and 1943 under the Embassy more directly.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you never heard that there might have been a leak or was a leak?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall any such story.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that there were leaks to the British and from the British to the Soviets?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have heard a story of a leak to a British paper, and I don't know what the details of it are. We discussed that last night.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you hear of that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Last autumn.

Senator FERGUSON. That was before this was printed? What is the date of this paper?

Mr. FAIRBANK. September 3, 1950, and the testimony is dated April 1950. I heard of this after this was printed. Whether it is the same thing I have no way of knowing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be admitted into the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 558" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 558

[Source: China Daily News, September 3, 1950]



NOTE.—In the smaller illustration the blank character discussed by Mr. Fairbank is in the third column from the right and would be the fifth character up from the bottom.

(The material below is a translation of the illustration)

It will be recalled that it was in 1945 that United States Ambassador to China (Patrick J.) Hurley personally went to Yenan. In October, Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking, and came to an agreement in talks with the government

to solve internal political controversies by political means. At the end of December (George C.) Marshall arrived at the subsidiary capital (Chungking), bearing the title of Special Representative of the President of the United States. At the beginning of the next year, the government convened the Political Consultative Conference, composed of various parties and groups. This was followed by the issuance of the cease-fire orders, the reorganization of the units of the armed forces, the establishment of the Executive Headquarters after the return to the capital (Nanking), and Marshall's six successive trips to Lushan (Kuling). During this whole period, peace talks were being conducted like an endless string for a period of two years. During those two years, the conduct of the internal and foreign policies of our country can be said to be centered around relations with the United States. It is only natural that the intelligence collection work of the Soviet Union was also directed along these lines. But the interests of different countries were at variance, so that the degree of interest and the points of concentration were also dissimilar. By coincidence, during these few years, the two successive American Ambassadors to China were Hurley and (J. Leighton) Stuart. One of them conducted himself in the direct-line approach of a military man. The other was an educator endowed with broad sympathies toward worldly affairs. Both of them lacked the strict training of career dliplomats in keeping secrets. In addition, at the time, the person in charge of information and intelligence in the American Embassy, the Director-General of the United States Information Service, (John K.) Fairbank, and his successor, as well as the person assisting Ambassador Stuart in the formulation of China policy, the Counselor with Ministerial rank, were all persons who were fundamentally dissatisfied with the National Government. Their prejudices frequently superseded their duties to maintain secrecy relating to the nations concerned. Wittingly or unwittingly, they leaked out diplomatic secrets, which were transmitted through the embassies of third countries into the ears of the Soviet intelligence personnel.

Mr. MORRIS. Now in connection with the translation, Mr. Chairman, we have a problem. I would be inclined to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we accept Professor Fairbank's translation of that document, and then the staff can confirm through special sources the translation that he gives us here.

Senator SMITH. Do you have a copy of the photostat you are going to put in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It has some names in it that you want to keep out.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I spot geographically for you the place where this blank occurs?

Senator FERGUSON. Why not put a circle there?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would rather not mark this. It is a blank already. If somebody will look here, it is in the center of here on one side.

Mr. WAIT. Could it be stated that it is directly opposite the middle of the picture appearing on the mat sheet?

Senator FERGUSON. Read it the way it is and then read it the way you think it should be.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The way it is:

Wittingly or unwittingly disclosed leaks of foreign policy or diplomatic secrets, then by way of——

Mr. MORRIS. Those are the aforesaid three people, one of whom mentioned is you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, and the other two are in the Embassy also.

* * * then by way of third party countries' embassies transmitted to blank—

that is pidgin-English, but that is where the blank comes—

intelligence officers' ears.

Senator FERGUSON. So the word "Soviet" is out of it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I don't know why because the context would make it perfectly plain it should be Soviet. That is what they are talking about.

Senator SMITH. What is the next question, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I have some questions I would like to address to the witness.

Senator SMITH. All right, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Were you giving a literal translation or the substance?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was literal, sort of pidgin-English.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fairbank, have you ever carried messages or uncensored mail from Communists in China to Communists in the United States?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever carry messages from Madame Sun Yat-sen to the China Aid Council?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I carried a message or a letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever carry messages for Israel Epstein to persons in the United States?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever receive messages from Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, the wife of Israel Epstein, to persons in the United States?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Received from them for persons in the United States?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. No. I received in Kweilin, and I have accepted the letter in your evidence as being substantially probably correct, I received from them reports or something to take to Chungking, and not only to Chungking——

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you took it from Kweilin to Chungking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. They were messages from Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I am willing to accept that although I do not recollect the details, the incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here reference to exhibit 112 in our public record which reads as follows, being a letter from Israel Epstein to W. L. Holland:

DEAR HOLLAND: I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters on Saturday.

One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions.

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would like to have these back when you are through.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York.

Sincerely,

(Signed by I. EPSTEIN).

SEPTEMBER 6.

Will you identify H. and Elsie in that letter, please?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would assume that refers to the Chinese research man, Chan Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you concede that Chan Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley are Communists, Professor Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As of today I do not know. As of 1943, I did not consider them Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Fellow travelers?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Chan Han-seng was reputed to have been a Communist and to have broken away from them.

Senator FERGUSON. What about the lady?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did not have any impression of her politics. She was an English girl, escaped from Hong Kong. I did not, incidentally, have any ideas that what they were giving me was anything to do with Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, but did you consider her a fellow traveler?

Mr. FAIRBANK. At that time in Kweilin I would not have said so. A fellow traveler being someone who promotes Communist interests?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. She was working for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, which was not a Communist project.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was not a Communist project?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the head of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Technically Dr. H. H. Kung, but the most famous man connected with it is a New Zealander, Rewi Alley.

Mr. MORRIS. He is still in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I believe he is today.

Mr. MORRIS. And the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives is also known as Indusco, is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Indusco is an American cooperative which represents them here.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Now, you were associated with Indusco, were you not, Professor Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I was, and I secured evidence on that at your request.

Mr. MORRIS. You were connected with Indusco for what period of time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have reference here to one of those connections where I give my name to be on an advisory board. The date when I did that I have found no record of. Presumably it would be after I left Government service and returned to this country, presumably 1946 or 1947. However, I have secured from my secretary by telephone the following information as to my separation from Indusco, if you would like it.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I would, Professor.

Mr. FAIRBANK. There is in my files in Cambridge a form letter from Indusco, mimeographed, sent out to persons addressed "Dear Friend," dated November 1950, no day, just November 1950, and on the back I believe I and my wife are included in a list of the advisory board.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the one about the Bailie Memorial Technical Training School?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the one I have here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The same letter, probably the same form or circular letter.

I wrote to Miss Ida Pruitt on January 8, 1951, and my letter included this statement:

Noting that Peter Townsend has written in China Weekly Review about CIC—

That means Chinese Industrial Cooperatives—

I wonder if it is still meant to be functioning. Naturally I think we would both want to disassociate ourselves from it in the present state of affairs in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Because you felt it was serving a Communist purpose?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the end of quotation.

I then have another of these form letters sent out by Miss Pruitt on Industrial stationery, dated April 6, 1951, in my files in Cambridge on the back of which is listed an advisory board which does not include my name or that of my wife.

Mr. MORRIS. That is at a time subsequent?

Mr. FAIRBANK. April 6, 1951, subsequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Peter Townsend the husband of Rose Yardumian?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And Rose Yardumian was secretary of the Washington office of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; she was about 1944, at some time during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. So you will concede that Indusco is an organization that is now serving Communist purposes?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You said so. That is no inference drawn from Miss Yardumian marrying Peter Townsend?

Mr. MORRIS. No. I mean over all. Based on your experience with Indusco and what you know about it and knowing that they are now operating in Communist China, you would concede they are an instrument of the Communist organization?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, you have the Christian Church still operating in China, but it is under difficulties, and I would assume that the Industrial Cooperatives either have been taken over or in great danger of being taken over or at least are being pushed around. I don't know the fact of that situation in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fairbank, will you identify that as a letterhead of the organization about which we have been talking?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed. This is the letterhead of Indusco, Inc., American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, honorary chairman, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, office in New York.

Senator SMITH. Do you want that in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 559," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 559

Honorary Chairman: Admiral Harry E. Yarnell.
Honorary Vice Chairman: Frances Curtis, Marshall Field, Owen Lattimore.

INDUSCO INC.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE IN AID OF CHINESE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATIVES

"Gung Ho"—Work Together

439 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

Telephone MUrray Hill 3-3792

NOVEMBER 1950.

DEAR FRIEND: The weekly letters from the Bailie Memorial Technical Training School in Sandan tell of the progress in the projects which your gifts have helped to make possible. There is so much to be said for the remarkable job the school has done and continues to do.

There is the desert land that grows wheat, vegetables, and flax where nothing grew before. There are the numerous production centers that turn out cloth, chemicals, rugs, pottery, machines, glass, paper, and many other articles where nothing was produced before. Most important of all are the young people—future machinists, chemists, animal husbandry experts, cooperative specialists, scientific farmers and producers for the villages of China—who but a few years ago were poverty-stricken youngsters without a future or hope.

What a truly great gain for freedom from want.

What makes it meaningful to us is that Americans join with people from all over the world to help make the Sandan Bailie School a living center of international good will, where your friendship is a concrete and creative thing.

I want to urge you to continue to keep the Sandan Bailie School a splendid example of this friendship and help. The cost of running the school had decreased considerably because of the school's ability to supply many of the things it needs. But our help—and it is getting through to them and getting through in record time these days—is needed for teachers' salaries, for new teaching equipment, for replacement of worn equipment, for medical supplies in the school hospital, and for development of experimental projects.

We would like to be able to say to Sandan at Christmas—"your American friends are with you; we can promise the funds you need to carry you to the next year's harvest."

Won't you send us as generous a check as you can today?

Very sincerely,

[s] Ida Pruitt
IDA PRUITT.

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Mr. FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, there was read just now a letter about Kweilin and H. and Elsie and so on. Could I call your attention to a letter written by Mr. Holland at my request inasmuch as the letter just read refers to Mr. Holland? I mean I am just a third party in that letter. My name is just mentioned. Mr. Holland is a principal, and I have a letter from him which I have given a photostat of to Mr. Morris. Would it be useful in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Why don't you tell us of your conversation with Mr. Holland about that, and as to Mr. Holland's letter itself, why not allow that to go in the record when Mr. Holland is here. You can tell us what you like about Mr. Holland and the conversation.

If the witness wants to tell us about his conversation with Mr. Holland, I suggest that we accept that into the record but allow Mr. Holland's letter to go over until Mr. Holland is here.

Mr. FAIRBANK. This will probably just delay you, and there is not much to say except that I phoned Mr. Holland and said, "Will you send me your comment on these four different letters you were connected with which incidentally referred to me, since you (Holland) were a principal and I was just connected"——

Senator SMITH. He did that? You can refer that to us and we will have that to examine Mr. Holland when he comes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. He makes plain incidentally in that respect that these reports that I was bringing were those of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, in 1943 at the time when it was under the Nationalist Government of China.

There is also a letter from Graham Peck of which I gave you a photostat.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, sir; I know him. I have met him several times.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Mr. Rosinger was the editor of the last large publication of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He was the editor of the State of Asia which was a symposium.

Mr. MORRIS. That was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, was it not, and it was an extensive project of the IPR?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a thick book of some 500 pages because it is the putting together of chapters by a lot of people. I don't know how big a project I would call it.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your practice to review manuscripts of Lawrence K. Rosinger?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I recall seeing one manuscript of his. I of course review perhaps 30 or 40 manuscripts every year. As a professor, they are sent to me and people from different parts of the country say, "Will you kindly read and give us your comments?" publishers, authors, and students and so on. I recall receiving this manuscript of Rosinger's which you have reference to.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I want to call your attention, Professor Fairbank, to our exhibit No. 128. This is already in the record, Mr. Chairman. It is addressed to John Fairbank, and it reads:

DEAR JOHN: I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part, from page 47 onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice as much but had to change his plans because of his illness and lack of time.

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then for a few minutes.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Now will you relate to us the references in that letter? You did review the manuscript of Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. I feel quite certain that I did because you have these letters in the record and I have a general, vague recollection. This manuscript of Rosinger was sent to me in Washington and I looked at it, at least at the latter part. Here is the book that resulted from the manuscript.

Mr. MORRIS. Did other people in the State Department contribute to this pamphlet? I mean that is the reference in there, "waiting for some comments from people in the State Department."

Mr. FAIRBANK. As to that, I don't know. I note you have in your record that reference to—will you check me on this? This is from memory. Don't you have a letter from Rosinger to Holland saying, "I am waiting for the comments of Hiss and Fairbank," dated December 30 or something, 1943?

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the letter to which you refer, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; this is the one I have seen in your testimony. I had no previous knowledge of it. I assume that refers also to this Rosinger manuscript. That is just my assumption.

This letter is from Holland to me. Would you like me to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Holland says to me in a letter dated February 23, 1952, referring to page 482 of the committee's testimony:

Lawrence K. Rosinger, then on the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, had at my invitation written a research report for the IPR on Chinese Wartime Politics, later published by the Princeton University Press. Following the regular practice of the IPR, I sent copies of the first draft to a number of qualified people for criticism. Among these were several Government officials, including John Carter Vincent, Alger Hiss, both of whom were then concerned with Chinese affairs, and yourself. From the dates it would seem that when Rosinger wrote, December 30, 1943, I actually had not yet sent you the manuscript because, as appears on page 479 of the hearings, it was not until February 21, 1944, that I sent it to you, apparently because other people had been slow sending in their comments.

Rosinger's study was a competent piece of scholarly work, did not propagate any Communist line, and was not based on classified reports. It was favorably reviewed in the press and learned journals.

That agrees substantially with my recollection. I have no recollection of Vincent or Hiss having seen this or I having been connected with their seeing it or having discussed it with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Maxwell Stewart made a contribution?

Mr. FAIRBANK. He wrote a pamphlet, Wartime China.

Mr. MORRIS. Does not the reference in this letter of Rosinger's to Holland say "Thanks for the comments from Stewart"? From that is it not apparent that Stewart himself made contributions to the Rosinger article?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You were telling us about Stewart's pamphlet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. You have a letter in which I made reference to Stewart's pamphlet. It is in your testimony. I have here a copy of that pamphlet also. My connection with it is indicated in the letter that I wrote which is in your testimony. I don't know whether I have a copy of that letter here, but perhaps we could see that here somewhere.

At any rate, I criticized that pamphlet for being too outspokenly or undiplomatically critical.

Mr. MORRIS. This is exhibit No. 176, Mr. Chairman. May the witness read the first two paragraphs of this letter or the first three paragraphs?

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. This is not actually about me at all, but it is a memorandum from Miss Miriam Farley to Mr. Holland dated February 4, 1944. You are interested in the second——

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would read the first three.

Mr. FAIRBANK (reading):

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent, among others. Vincent said (in confidence), with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

I am now editing the manuscript in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent, and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless, I am making some changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not very likely enough to satisfy him

completely. My position is that I am willing—in fact, anxious—to go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, providing this does not destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it.

Those are the first three paragraphs. Would you like my comment on these?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I would like to have your point of view on it.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have here a photostat of a letter from Miss Farley to me dated February 19, 1952, which gives her recollection of this transaction.

Mr. MORRIS. No; I would like to have your own recollection.

Mr. Chairman, that, you see, would be what Miss Farley thinks about this at some subsequent time.

Senator SMITH. You can leave that with the committee and we can go into that when, as, and if.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 559A" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 559–A

FAR EASTERN SURVEY

OFFICE OF THE EDITOR

American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1 East 54th Street,
New York 22, N. Y.

FEBRUARY 19, 1952.

Professor JOHN K. FAIRBANK,
127 Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR JOHN: I doubt if this will be much help to you but here goes. I do remember discussing with you Max Stewart's pamphlet, "War-time China," although I recall few details, only the general impression. We had sent the manuscript for comment to you and several others. You then called me on the telephone—I think at my home, it must have been on a holiday, or perhaps in the evening—and we had quite a long conversation. So far as I now recall you did not raise any objection to the content of the pamphlet, i. e., on the ground that it was inaccurate or biased or otherwise not up to proper research standards, although you may have criticized at least some passages. Your principal contention as I recall it, which you put very forcefully, was that publication of this material at this time might be harmful to Chinese-American relations in general and to relations between the IPR and its China Council in particular. You feared that the pamphlet would arouse hostile reactions in China and might lead to the China Council's leaving the IPR. I disagreed with you on the main point; I felt that it was the IPR's duty to present to the American public a true picture, as nearly as humanly possible, of conditions in Nationalist China, giving the dark side as well as the bright, although I also felt that as China was our friend and ally the less pleasant features ought to be described and explained in a friendly and sympathetic, not in a hostile or critical manner. I felt that a sound relationship between China and America could not in the long run be based on concealment of facts from the American public, and that it was better for the American public to learn the facts from China's friends than from her enemies. ("China," of course, meant Nationalist China.) Also I did not believe that publication of the pamphlet would cause the China Council to leave the IPR.

As I recall it I did, partly as a result of your comments and partly on the basis of my own judgment, persuade Max Stewart to modify some passages in the original manuscript in order to make them as palatable as possible to Chinese opinion without actually suppressing or distorting important facts.

As I remember it my discussion with you was concerned chiefly if not entirely with Max Stewart's account of Nationalist China, not with the brief passage on the Chinese Communists which has been cited in McCarran committee hearings.

I do not recall the date of my conversation with you, in case that matters, but as the pamphlet was published in April 1944 it must have been two or three months before that.

You might be interested in the following extract from a letter, dated April 6, 1944, which Tyler Dennett wrote to Raymond Dennett, then secretary of the American IPR:

> Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. It ought to do some good even in Chungking. There may be enough new developments between now and the end of the year to require some additions or supplements to the text but I should suppose it would do for the documentation for the next conference. It's about the best booklet I have seen out of the IPR.

(That's all he said about the pamphlet; the rest of the letter dealt with other subjects.) Raymond Dennett passed the letter on to Peggy Stewart and myself with the following note: "Tyler is not prone to make comments of this sort—I know, having been around him these many years. I think you are due a bow!" This is probably not relevant to your problem but might be of use in case anyone should ask you what you thought of the content of the pamphlet, as distinct from the advisability of publishing it in 1944, since it indicates that Tyler Dennett, who was hardly a Red, found nothing objectionable in it.

I purposely wrote the above before refreshing my memory by looking up the memorandum from me to Bill Holland quoted on page 629 of volume II of the hearings. As you see, the two accounts of my conversation with you are not inconsistent, although the one written in 1944 is naturally more specific.

If you wish, you may show this letter to anyone you like.

Warmest regards and good luck. I hope to see you at the Boston FEA meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Miriam

MIRIAM S. FARLEY.

Mr. MORRIS. One thing that did not appear in this pamphlet is the paragraph which reads in this fashion:

> As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other countries and you can also find resemblances to the grass-roots populist movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic processes."

Those views are contrary to the views which you have expressed before this committee, are they not? That is page 45. Would you care to read it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. You are referring there to the opinion expressed by Maxwell Stewart in a pamphlet published in 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that not the same pamphlet that we are discussing in this letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it is; yes. Maxwell Stewart makes this statement which you have quoted, and this statement is a rather broad one. I mean it does not say these Communists are mere agrarian reformers, which was the Communist line at one time in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. It says everything but that, Professor.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It quotes Raymond Gram Swing.

Mr. MORRIS. It does not express disapproval with Raymond Gram Swing on the subject.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say on the whole that this goes along with the idea of the Chinese Communists being different from the Russian Communists in a peculiarly Chinese way, and that idea was quite wide-

spread up to this period and even later among Americans and among observers in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hold that view?

Mr. FAIRBANK. At this time I think I would have subscribed to the statement that the Chinese Communists were in many ways like the Russian Communists and in many ways not like the Russian Communists. In other words, you had to describe them not by applying the cliches of Russia but looking at their activity on the Chinese scene. I have studied that since then, and we have a book coming out which goes into the whole history of Chinese Communist ideology and our analysis is that it has been remarkably Leninist in its form of organization. We don't know how close the tie-up has been with Russia at all times. Of course we know there is a tie-up today.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, you see Miss Farley writing to Holland in this letter says:

> Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Doubtless he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Of course you have taken a quotation from that letter and sought to link it up with this paragraph on page 45 of this pamphlet, have you not?

Mr. MORRIS. I am talking about the whole pamphlet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Fine, I am glad to know that.

Mr. MORRIS. "The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others."

Obviously you read the whole pamphlet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I assume I read it through.

Mr. MORRIS. If we are looking at the pamphlet, we can address ourselves to particular items in that pamphlet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this not one of the important paragraphs in that manuscript?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would not say it is the key paragraph. It is on page 45.

Mr. MORRIS. Here is a pamphlet that represents the Chinese Communists to the American people as agrarian reformers. Would you not say that is an integral part of that pamphlet?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I say you go too far in saying it represents them as agrarian reformers and nothing else.

Mr. MORRIS. It says "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices."

Mr. FAIRBANK. And quoting Swing above, you find it resembling Communist movements in other countries. In other words, Stewart was trying to do a balanced job. I think he is an honest man myself. I thought this pamphlet at the time was a realistic thing. As a matter of fact, in another connection I have made a list of the table of contents here of this pamphlet. I would like to leave that with you. It is just extracted here. It indicates the headings that Stewart put into this thing.

The main headings are "Wartime China," "China's wartime activities," "Obstacles to China's war effort," "Political divisions," and the Communists are just one of a dozen things there. This whole thing is an effort to explain China to the American people at a time when

the censorship of wartime prevented the American people from understanding the realities of the Chinese situation. This is something that lies behind our disaster in China, the fact that we did not really know what was going on, and we did not make the effort we could have made for reform programs in China before it was too late.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think if more people had read that pamphlet we would have been better off in China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think we would have been.

I do not think this one paragraph in here outweighs that pamphlet. There is praise in here of the Generalissimo and everything else. Given the amount of left-wing stuff that was flying around, it seems to me Stewart fell for very little of it at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. May the professor's notations on the pamphlet be put in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 560" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 560

WAR-TIME CHINA

(By Maxwell Stewart)

Wartime China:
- China's New Strength
- China Fights In Spite of Internal Difficulties
- Wishful Thinking vs. Understanding China

China's wartime achievements:
- Serious deficiency of Supplies. Supply Routes
- War-Time Economic Progress
- Industrial Cooperatives
- Birth of Political Unity
- Age-Old Divisions Subordinated
- Unity for National Liberation
- Steps Toward Democracy
- The People's Political Council
- Criticism of Draft Constitution
- Put Yourself in Chinese Boots

Obstacles to China's war effort:
- Inflation
- Poor Planning
- Speculation
- Farm Problems
- Inflation Multiplies Difficulties
- Graft, Abuse of Laws Cause Unrest
- Military Weakness
- Traditions To Be Overcome

Political divisions:
- Business-Banking Group
- Political Science Group
- The CC Group
- The Army
- Three Important Generals
- Secret Police
- T. V. Soong
- Chiang Kai-shek's Leadership Essential
- The Communists
- Agrarian and Political Policies
- Military Efficiency
- Kuomintang-Communist Relations
- Threat of Civil War
- Kuomintang Demands
- Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties

Strengthening China's War Effort:
- Supply Routes
- Army Reorganization
- "One For All, All For One"
- Strong War Government Needed

China Plans for the Future:
- Industrial Potentials
- Goals
- Need For Irrigation
- Democracy's Future

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read T. A. Bisson's article in Far Eastern Survey in July 1943, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. That article came to China when I was there, and I must have read it. I remember very well it made quite a reaction from the Chinese Government.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the one that made reference to Communist China as a democratic China and Nationalist China as a feudal China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your view as to that particular pamphlet?

Mr. FAIRBANK. As I recall, at that time in Chungking, the summer of 1943, with the circumstances of the war effort bogging down and all of those things that were going on that seemed disastrous for the future, those of us that were out there, including me and practically everybody I know, welcomed a pamphlet or a book, the things of Hanson Baldwin or Pearl Buck, which had a much wider distribution in the Reader's Digest and Life magazine, and also Bisson's article of which there were 300 copies or a thousand in Far Eastern Survey, welcomed criticism which was realistic.

The two terms "democratic" and "feudal" I think are cliche terms and not particularly realistic. That is not all of Bisson's pamphlet.

I do have a copy of Baldwin's article in Reader's Digest of August 1943 in which he says that China is not a nation in our sense of the word but a geographer's expression. Boy, did they hit the ceiling in Chungking. That was a terrible thing to say from the point of view of the Nationalist Government. Baldwin said that, trying to be realistic about the problem we faced in China. Bisson's was in that general category.

Now in retrospect I do not support his use of these terms, "democratic" and "feudal." Those are cliche terms. He may have picked them up from Communist inspiration or stimulus to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that not the change in the party line at that time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in China at that time and was in no position to judge whether it was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. You say he may have picked them up from Communist inspiration?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They used the term "democratic" for many years before that about Communist China and "feudal" about Nationalist China. I think the change of line that has been suggested among the Communists in that period was something about attacking Chiang more vigorously, breaking up the united front.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever advocate giving the Communists Army material in 1945?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The question never came to me. I was not in that line of work. Now if it had come to me, I am not sure what I would have done. I recall that in that period a lot of people wanted to try to get more war effort in China; General Stilwell, as a matter of fact, General Donovan.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it not a fact that Chiang Kai-shek had to keep part of his army engaged to try to keep the Communists from attacking him?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That was part of the civil war situation.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Then if you had given them arms you would have been making the job harder for him and making our own job harder.

Mr. FAIRBANK. If they had used them against the Japanese, it would have helped. That was the old Stilwell argument. I was not in this argument. I was there with the Embassy and not dealing with that subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever advocate it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I never did because I was in no position to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you this letter, Professor Fairbank. I will ask Mr. Mandel to identify that letter.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 19, 1945, addressed "For T. A. Bisson," and it is signed by JKF with the typed signature of John K. Fairbank.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at that and see if you can recall having written that letter?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I don't recall writing it. I would like to read it though. The initials are not mine at the bottom definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not yours?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, I would not recognize those as initials made by me. I don't make my initials that way. If you will allow me to read it a minute, I have not seen this before.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Now I have read that. I would say as to those initials that are not mine, that must be my secretary signing for me. I had a Chinese girl as secretary. She makes the type of initial which is the same general type that I would make with a bar for the top of a "J," probably signing for me. This sounds to me like a letter that I would have written.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be received in the record?

Senator SMITH. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 561" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 561

(Chungking)
SEPTEMBER 19, 1943.

For T. A. BISSON.

DEAR TOM: I send herewith a Chinese translation of your recent article in Far Eastern Survey, which has been published together with the May 10 article by Pearl Buck. The publisher is doubtless a fake, and one naturally suspects that it was done by the opposition party. Many people, however, have distributed typed copies of the English versions of both articles, and this booklet was given me by a nonparty member.

I send this souvenir to indicate the great value of such critical expressions as an influence in the local political scene. No one here doubts that you have really helped to hold the situation together by indicating that American criticism would be very outspoken and direct if the KMT (Kuomintang) went through with the proposal for a liquidation of their opponents by force. Officials here are truly hypersensitive to American opinion, partly because American help is regarded as essential for postwar development. One good observer has suggested to me, however, that the recent decision of the CEC (Central Executive Committee) not to use force now was prompted in part by CKS' (Chiang Kai-shek) realisation that many leaders in the provinces are restive and would seize any opportunity to shake off central government control; in other words, American opinion was perhaps not as influential as the fear to start any internal military operations here lest potential warlords or provincial separatists take advantage of the resulting commotion and deny or decrease central government authority. This tendency to break up is of course aggravated by the communications breakdown.

We are appalled and amused here by the American editorials praising the KMT (Kuomintang) for its decision to be democratic, as proved by postponing the constitution and end of tutelage to an indefinite future. I hope some Americans realize the situation and are using their praise as a weapon, but it is almost too much to hope for.

I am sorry I cannot write at length, but I thought I would give you some fan mail, at least.

Best regards,

JFK
(JOHN K. FAIRBANK).

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Fairbank, will you read that, please?

Mr. FAIRBANK. "For T. A. Bisson." It is dated September 19, 1945.

DEAR TOM: I send herewith a Chinese translation of your recent article in Far Eastern Survey, which has been published together with the May 10 article by Pearl Buck. The publisher is doubtless a fake, and one naturally suspects that it was done by the opposition party. Many people however have distributed typed copies of the English versions of both articles, and this booklet was given me by a nonparty member.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall this particular Chinese translation of Bisson's article?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Is your testimony you cannot recall that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall who gave you that particular booklet then? You say, "this booklet was given me by a nonparty member." Who was that, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't have a recollection. You asked me about such a translation yesterday. I didn't remember it. I don't today.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, "The publisher is doubtless a fake." Does that recall anything to you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. With my knowledge of Chungking during that period—you see, this is evidently something published in Chinese and so a publisher's name is attached to it. My statement, "The publisher is doubtless a fake," would suggest it was probably a Communist source publishing this translation. That is what you would expect. All these things that were critical were immediately picked up by the Communists and spread around.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was given to you by a nonparty member.

Mr. FAIRBANK. That might have been almost anybody. You see, I was head of the American Publication Service of the American Embassy. I was buying Chinese books every day. Things were coming in and out of the office. I don't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony you do not recall this episode at all, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. A letter like this which I am inclined to acknowledge I think I must have written, this helps me to reconstruct, but I have no more recollection than I had yesterday. In other words, I don't recall the incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in order to save time, I think the whole letter is in and the professor's opinions of the Chinese Government expressed in the letter speak for themselves unless you have something else.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think it is important to indicate what I mean by this letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like to continue?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I will continue reading the letter first.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK (reading):

I send this souvenir to indicate the great value of such critical expressions as an influence in the local political scene. No one here doubts that you have really helped to hold the situation together by indicating that American criticism would be very outspoken and direct if the KMT (Kuomintang)—

I wonder why that is in—

went through with the proposal for a liquidation of their opponents by force. Officials here are truly hypersensitive to American opinion, possibly because American help is regarded as essential for postwar development. One good observer has suggested to me, however, that the recent decision of the CEC (Central Executive Committee) not to use force now was prompted in part by CKS' (Chiang Kai-shek) realization that many leaders in the province are restive and would seize any opportunity to shake off Central Government control; in other words, American opinion was perhaps not as influential as the fear to start any internal military operations here, lest potential war lords or potential separatists take advantage of the resulting commotion and deny or decrease Central Government authority. This tendency to break up is, of course, aggravated by the communications breakdown.

Would you like my comment on that?

Mr. MORRIS. If you have something to add; yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The point of that statement is—look, you have 1945 on this. You have the wrong date on this thing. I think the photostat is 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. 1943 is right. The stencil is wrong. The Bisson article did appear in 1943.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. Let us get that straight. So this is wartime China, and the war effort is the object of the American people in China. In the summer of 1943, there were various very extensive rumors that the people in the Nationalist military organization, Hu Chung-han is the man mentioned, had a plan for attacking the Communists in Northwest China, which would have used the better part of their troops, those that were held down there, plus a lot more probably, with American equipment, starting a civil war at the time that the Japanese were by no means defeated in China or anywhere else, and when we were making every effort, by turning programs, by bringing stuff over the hump, by every possible means, to hold China in the war. Now the whole idea that they should start a civil war in the middle of 1943 would have been a disaster to the American cause in China and the American war effort against Japan. I am sure the policy of the Embassy was against that and my view was against that.

I am saying to Bisson here that I thought his article helped to oppose that idea in Free China at that time.

Now, you see the spot that Americans are in, in this kind of Chinese situation, because the article, Bisson's article, criticizes the Central Government. On the one hand, the Central Government is very sensitive, and on the other hand the Communists will pick it up and start beating the Central Government with it, spreading it all around and saying "Yah, yah, the Americans are criticizing the Nationalist Government."

Senator FERGUSON. Could that not be a reason for Bisson writing the article?

Mr. FAIRBANK. That is the possible reason, but knowing Bisson, who was my student in 1940, I don't believe he would knowingly play the Communist game.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know he joined the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, subsequently?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I do; I would not do it myself. I still don't feel justified in calling him some name.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you going to read the rest of that, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know whether you need it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is in the record.

Did you use "care of Lauchlin Currie" in the White House, as your address during the war, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I used it on some occasions when I received mail which was sent to me at his office, because of the fact that I had been assigned officially to work by Dr. James Phinney Baxter, head of the Research and Analysis Branch of Strategic Services, in which I was the head of the China section.

Since Lauchlin Currie was the central coordinating person as Administrative Assistant to FDR, he was the logical person with whom should be attached as a liaison officer a person from the Coordinator of Information, and this was worked out in the fall of 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you use that address?

Mr. FAIRBANK. During the winter of 1941–42 in Washington I went repeatedly, sometimes every day I would drop in at Currie's office. Part of the time I was on assignment there to do a report, a recess report, which was done for the Coordinator of Information, and published, confidential classification, I think in January of 1942. It was on American aid to China, trying to give the whole story which Currie had the record of, of setting up General Chennault and the Flying Tigers, trying to give aid to Free China. The main burden was that the aid had been too little and too late. I was there for that purpose.

When I came back from China at the beginning of 1944 I was again under OSS, and this liaison arrangement was still in a sort of status quo ante.

I transferred in March of 1944 to the Office of War Information, and the man who brought me in there, George Taylor, urged that I continue this liaison relation with Currie, because Currie was in the White House, working on China. So I continued to drop in his office. He had an extra office. I did not do any work for him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Currie have access to your correspondence?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not that I know of.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he ever prepare any material on the basis of your correspondence that you know of?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; during the war when I was in China I was under the American Embassy and I had really three jobs. First, I was collecting Japanese documents and sending them back for intelligence purposes. That was paid for by OSS, who sent me out.

The second job was that I was the representative in the Far East of the Library of Congress, and for that purpose collecting Chinese publications, which eventually were brought back to collections in this country.

The third job was that I was under the Embassy, working on some of their cultural-relations activities. Now, this cultural-relations activity of the Embassy was in connection with these other people, the same sort of people that I was dealing with on these publications, I mean intellectuals. That was my special line. I was getting publications from them; I was giving publications to them, I was dealing with cultural relations.

In that connection, in the Embassy I developed a number of projects which were for the purpose of helping Chinese intellectuals. I can give you a long list of these projects and cumber up the record. I don't want to bother you with all these activities, projects to help Chinese intellectuals.

There was one in particular on which I got Currie's help. I sent him letters occasionally. Every little while when I was writing to various people I would write to him, and one of these projects was arrangement in Kunming by which the American Army there that had a big base invited some Chinese professors to come and lecture to the American troops, trying to have good will and solve some of our public-relations problems in China.

Now, to indicate the nature of that kind of work I have here a letter of commendation from the State Department, from the Embassy, which may be of interest to you—I can show it to you.

Mr. MORRIS. We may save time, Professor. I have here a letter which Mr. Mandel will identify.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a photostat of an original on the letterhead of the White House, dated May 22, 1943, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and signed by Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this obviously makes reference to the testimony being given by the witness. May it be received in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to, subsequently read in full in the record by Mr. Morris, was marked "Exhibit No. 562.")

Mr. MORRIS. It reads, Professor—

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 22, 1943.

DEAR CARTER: I am enclosing some material on the plight of the intellectuals in China, mainly from the personal correspondence of John Fairbank. I am afraid that I cannot let you have more official stuff, but I will be glad to show it to you if and when you come to the office. I know that you will use this material discreetly and protect John in such a way that his views cannot possibly be carried back to the Chinese.

I had a good letter from Graves, which made his position clear, but which, I am afraid, means that he is not available for this particular job—

Is that Mortimer Graves?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would assume so.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

I am therefore relying more than ever upon you. As time is pressing, I hope that you will have some good word for me shortly.

Sincerely,

LAUCHLIN C.

It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, the Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is certainly the type of project, and there were several of those projects. I considered them important. It was important to save these Chinese professors, keep them alive, and keep them coming our way, because you know how important they are in the Chinese scene. The Communists have them now, and that is one of the Communists' strengths. They have them under control.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Guenther Stein?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I met him in Chungking during the war.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you express interest in his writings?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I know, of course, this letter in your record, and I think this is the only expression of interest that I can imagine.

Mr. MORRIS. You refer to Exhibit No. 84, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Volume II, page 378, it refers to Guenther Stein's stuff.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. Will you read that for us, please?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a memorandum from Lockwood to Carter, and Holland, giving only their initials, but I assume that is pretty obvious, is it not?

JUNE 24, 1942.

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest.

I note, if I may call it to the attention of the committee, on page 378 committee counsel inserted the statement "Now, at that time, Mr. Fairbank was associated with the OWI."

Senator FERGUSON. Were you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was not, sir. I think it would be worth while to correct that error.

Senator SMITH. What were you connected with at that time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

Senator SMITH. That was OSS?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Which had been set up on June 13. I had been with that Research and Analysis Branch for the preceding year. That part of OWI which amalgamated in that branch was not in that branch. So I was not in the predecessor of OWI.

Mr. MORRIS. You subsequently did go to OWI?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I did, after my return in 1943. Do you want these corrections for the record?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. FAIRBANK. On page 378 the committee counsel says:

I would like to read this into the record, Mr. Chairman, as evidence of the fact that the Office of War Information at that time was expressing a great deal of interest in seeing Guenther Stein's—as Mr. Lockwood says—"stuff," in Washington.

On page 383, committee counsel says:

* * * Fairbank, who was then head of the China Section of OWI—

and then the statement is made:

In other words, the Office of War Information was actively promulgating Guenther Stein's material—so it apparently served another function at that time, did it not, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would agree with you; yes.

And on page 399, committee counsel says:

John FAIRBANK. Mr. Chairman, was head of the China desk of OWI at that time.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say, as an interested bystander, that this letter is almost conclusive and highly indicative of the techniques that they employ in recommending each other and disseminating their work.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean Communist work?

General WILLOUGHBY. People then ran from communism to fellow-traveling, befuddled liberals, and whatever that category has been described so often in the current press reports.

I think that testimony is based on this misconception.

Senator FERGUSON. That you were in OWI?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I was in the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a secret-service branch; was it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir; that was not. That was the group which has now become part of the State Department. Of course, it was classified work, very definitely, and we were doing a wartime job.

Senator FERGUSON. It was even more classified than OWI; was it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't know how you have more or less. "Confidential" is "confidential," and "secret" is "secret" all over the Government.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it all secret?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; in this Research and Analysis Branch we got large collections of printed matter from the public domain. We filed all kinds of newspaper clippings. We had a clipping service, got materials from abroad.

We did everything we could to bring up the record in one place of what was going on, in China, in this case. When Lockwood came to see us there was absolutely no idea of showing him classified material or trading classified material. You see, he says that we "might be asked to trade." Now, I have here his letter dated February 19, 1952, giving his recollection of this memorandum.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not read this yet.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I will read that memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. The Research and Analysis Section of OSS was the agency, was it not, that supplied information to the people who were formulating war plans?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They were, among others, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The gravity of supplying Guenther Stein's stuff, as this memorandum says, to that agency is even more serious, is it not, than in the case of OWI?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say it is even more essential, because the people formulating war plans need to have every kind of material come in which they are well able to evaluate.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you gathering Guenther Stein's material as Communist material?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, we were gathering it as material coming out of China by a man who was a reporter, who had a status as a correspondent, and who was a reputable correspondent at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not label it as Communist material; did you?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We had no occasion to.

You will see that Lockwood's memorandum describes how it was rather factual, not dealing with policy, nothing to do with the Communists, and so on. That is Lockwood's statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you acknowledge that Guenther Stein was a Communist agent?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have read sections of the book by General Willoughby, where that is alleged, and a case is built up.

If you ask me: Would I feel happy in dealing with Guenther Stein now?—I would not. I would suspect him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you suspect him at this time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you send any caveat in the material that you sent in to the OSS at this time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. The material was not sent in, as far as I know. It came to our files, and our files had all this kind of newspaper stuff. You see, this came out through the censorship of the Kuomintang by radio as a regular news dispatch to the IPR, instead of newspapers, and they paid for it. They were trying to get material out of China that would give them some factual information.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they trying to get Communist material?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Not that I know of.

Senator SMITH. You had better read this letter.

Mr. FAIRBANK. The memorandum says:

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it, and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the trade?

Mr. FAIRBANK. There was no trade that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the proposed trade?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This, of course is Lockwood's statement, not mine. I can only infer from this. I do not recollect this conversation. We had lots of people coming in. I can only infer from this that I may have said—this is supposition—that if the IPR is doing a research project and they are giving us unclassified material from the public domain which has come through the Kuomintang censorship by way of radio, from Stein, for example, then, as noblesse oblige, they could come and look at our open newspaper files, of which we had a big supply.

Senator FERGUSON. Would they not have had access to those newspaper files without any trade?

Mr. FAIRBANK. They could have, but perhaps not in so convenient a form. You see, we were trying to get material from all around.

I am not sure that I made that statement. That is Lockwood's declaration. I have here the letter, he being the material person connected with it.

Did I give you a copy of this letter?

Mr. MORRIS. No. Why don't you leave it, professor, and we will take it up with Holland.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think I gave you the letter from Lockwood last night.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you oppose bombing of Manchurian Red China, professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. At what time?

Mr. MORRIS. In May 1951.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I went to the meeting of the Associated Harvard Clubs in Chicago in May 1951. I believe it was in May.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write in the Harvard Crimson that you opposed the bombing of Manchurian Red China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I did. I spoke at that meeting. It was published, and I gave my reasons at that time.

Mr. Morris. Is the article you wrote at that time a fair expression of your views?

Mr. Fairbank. As of that time, certainly.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this is the Harvard Crimson of Wednesday, May 9, 1951, which contains an article by John K. Fairbank, class of 1929.

Is that the article you wrote, Professor Fairbank?

Senator Smith. Do you want to put that in the record?

Mr. Morris. May it go in the record?

Senator Smith. Yes, we can put that in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 563" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 563

[From the Harvard Crimson, Wednesday, May 9, 1951]

Fairbank Opposes Extending Conflict to China, Sees No Real Advantage in Bombing Manchuria—Professor Says Airplane Attacks Would Spur Chinese on, Not Destroy Military Power

(By John K. Fairbank '29, Professor of History)

The furious debate as to how much further we should go in fighting China is rather skimpy in its analysis of the situation inside China. The leaders of American public life seem pretty vague about the actual state of things among the Chinese people.

It is safe to say that none of them, any more than the rest of us, have swung a hoe in a paddy field or experienced the hatred of landlords ("feudalism") and foreign invaders ("imperialism") which has been the lot of so many of the Chinese people. Although we are much handicapped by the Communist news barrier and propaganda blackout, there are at least a few major points which can be kept in mind.

In the first place, China, even more than Korea, provides a type of military terrain with which we have not had much experience. I refer not to the fact that the country is big nor to the fact that it is heavily populated, but to the remarkable density of the agrarian population in the countryside on the flood plains of the great rivers where the bulk of the Chinese populace live.

As the Japanese found to their cost over a decade, a densely populated countryside has some of the characteristics of a country-wide city in that the rural population are numerous and ubiquitous, and every peasant is a potential participant in military operations as an auxiliary for espionage, communication, transportation or other services.

The Japanese found that sending a military column through the densely populated Chinese countryside was a different proposition from sending one against an enemy in an unpopulated terrain. The chief result of this feature of the Chinese countryside is the tendency for invading spearheads to bog down, lose their communications and fight a war of rapier-against-haystack.

WHAT IS WORTH BOMBING?

Another military feature in China is the comparative lack of installations which are worth bombing. South and Central China where most of the people live is served by a network of waterways which make railroads largely unnecessary. The significant thing about the Canton-Hankow line is not that a single track connects these two major centers but that a single track is all they need between them in "normal" times.

Bombing canals is hard work compared to bombing railroad tracks since the bomb craters are just as likely to improve and deepen, as to injure, a river or canal system.

Similarly, the industrial production of China is incredibly small compared to the size of the country; and the age-old self-sufficiency of the farm economy is still great enough to make our experience in Germany and Japan no guide for China. The wartime bombing of Germany and Japan is said by many specialists to have been a much overrated operation in respect to its military effect. The

physical set-up in China would inevitably make bombing much less effective than in those cases.

ON TO GREATER EFFORT

The danger is therefore that the bombing campaign proposed by General MacArthur, instead of being a knock-out blow, would be a campaign of harassment and pin pricks which would spur the Chinese people on to an ever greater military effort against us without destroying their military potential as we might hope.

After all there is a great deal of land in China, much of it marked by towns and villages, but there are few major concentrations of industrial capacity. Outside of Manchuria, automotive engines are probably not yet produced anywhere in this whole great country, nor are we likely to find any petroleum cracking plants, much less roller bearing factories like those of Schweinfurt or centers of aircraft production.

The probable military ineffectiveness of our bombing campaign makes it something to think twice about since we can of course be sure of its psychological effectiveness, both in mobilizing the Chinese populace against us and also probably in losing us allies or admirers elsewhere in Asia.

GENERAL OVER-ALL FALLACY

This concept of somehow solving our problem in Korea by fighting elsewhere strikes me as part of a general over-all fallacy—namely, the tendency to expect that we can get desirable results in Asia by the application of greater force. There is no question about the need of punishing aggression by force and being constantly prepared to use force against Russian and other Communist expansion as a general proposition.

There is considerable question, however, whether the enlarged application of force in Asia by itself can solve any problems for us there. For example, the Chinese Communist regime has been reported by most observers to be a good deal more efficient and effective in handling some of China's problems that its predecessor.

The successful campaign to stop inflation and the efforts to increase production are examples of greater governmental efficiency, even though combined with some of the Communist methods of deceiving people by lying propaganda and controlling them by fear of the police.

Supposing that we were eventually able by force to destroy the present power of the Chinese Communist regime, what would take its place? I doubt if anyone but Chiang Kai-shek believes that he could form a government to take over and administer again the 400 millions of the Chinese subcontinent. The strength of the Chinese Communist regime, which is now being manifested against us, has not been built in a day but over a whole generation of activity in organizing the peasantry in the populous countryside.

It may bring China no happiness, even though the trains may run on time, but the fact remains that it has certain elements of strength and organization which have been acquired painstakingly and over a period of more than a decade. What would we put in its place? Where are the program and the personnel to take over?

No doubt, our best chance of finding them would be in Formosa, where many competent administrators and patriotic Chinese remain. But there is little sign that this island of 7 million with its quarter of a million Nanking Government refugees can provide the personnel and leadership now to run China.

If we were to have a program of bombing, we would need an equally important program of recruiting and training the young people and the civil servants who could establish a regime and meet the needs of the Chinese populace. The only alternative is chaos and the continued totalitarianism to which it conduces.

Thus, the advocates of force to suppress Communism in Asia, if they have their way, can no doubt destroy the Communist power holders in various places. But they give us no indication of what would come afterward. Are we to take over and run Asia with American personnel? Can we find competent puppets? Do we seek a new colonialism? Or do we expect western libertarian democracy to appear miraculously overnight?

The fact is that Asia has a background of political despotism and this tradition lends itself to the modern totalitarian developments. Our best chance of getting stability in the Far East, in addition to a balance of power system between China and Japan, lies in securing a situation in which revolutionary China is checked from being warlike abroad or toward us while left to work out her own destiny internally.

BEST FOR RUSSIA

It may be impossible for China to have any regime but a totalitarian one for some time to come, and we must assume that a purely totalitarian regime will be aggressive and militaristic toward us.

But this unhappy prospect does not seem to me to lead to the conclusion that an all-out war with China now would serve our interests. On the contrary, it might provide the best opportunity for Russia to take Western Europe and put us in a forked stick.

WILLIAM M. SIMMONS, *President*
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THE HARVARD CRIMSON

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

(Full text enclosed with passages marked. For release: Thursday, May 10, 1951)

Bombing Manchuria would spur the Chinese on to a greater military effort against America and would not destroy their military potential, John K. Fairbank, noted far eastern expert, warned today.

Such a United States move would also probably lose allies and admirers elsewhere in Asia, Fairbank added. Fairbank outlines, instead, a different approach which he calls "our best chance."

While agreeing that aggression must be punished by force, Fairbank—a Harvard history professor—said, "There is considerable question, however, whether the enlarged application of force in Asia by itself can solve any problems for us there.

"For example, the Chinese Communist regime has been reported by most observers to be a good deal more efficient and effective in handling some of China's problems than its predecessor."

The statement—appearing in the Harvard Crimson, the university daily—continues, "Thus, the advocate of force to suppress communism in Asia, if they have their way, can no doubt destroy the Communist power holders in various places. But they give us no indication of what would come afterward. * * * Do we expect western libertarian democracy to appear miraculously overnight?"

Fairbanks says that "our best chance of getting stability in the Far East * * * lies in securing a situation in which revolutionary China is checked from being warlike abroad or toward us while left to work out her own destiny internally."

Although agreeing that China may continue to have an aggressive totalitarian government, Fairbank concludes "this unhappy prospect does not lead to the conclusion that all-out war with China now would serve our interests.

"On the contrary," he says, "it might provide the best opportunity for Russia to take Western Europe and put us in a forked stick."

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your article, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. This is an article for the Harvard Crimson. It is not the occasion that I speak of, over which President Conant was presiding, in Chicago.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write this article?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am sure. Nobody else would put this picture in but the Harvard Crimson, surely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Would you like me to comment on this?

Senator SMITH. Is that your picture?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is hard to identify, but that is it.

Senator SMITH. We will put that in.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you on a number of occasions asked recognition of Red China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have at certain times.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make the statement in 1950 that recognition of and veto power for Red China in the United Nations would not be detrimental to the United States?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I believe that came up in a debate with Admiral Cook, possibly, or somewhere.

Mr. MORRIS. I am making reference to your article that appeared in the Reporter of January 3, 1950. I think you say here, Professor Fairbank:

In this context, diplomatic recognition is only the first step. Since Russian aid to Chinese Communists during the civil war has been relatively meager, we have little basis for applying the Stimson doctrine.

The change of government in China has followed a genuine civil war, and not military aggression from outside. Diplomatic relations, so necessary in our dealings with Communist Russia, are equally necessary, now that the cold war extends to Communist China.

Recognition is not moral approval, only realism. The Chinese veto in the United Nations can have only a little more nuisance value than the present Russian veto.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I see that?

I would be inclined to acknowledge that; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have several other quotations.

Mr. FAIRBANK. May I add the comment, that was long before we were fighting the Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that the Chinese Communists changed their nature between 1950 and the present date? It is the same Chinese organization; is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I would say they changed their relationship to us. They became more overtly armed, militarily aggressive enemies.

Mr. MORRIS. It is a matter of degree; is it not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Their intent, I would say, has remained very similar all along. The problem is: How do we deal with that intent? That is where the argument comes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the same article you wrote:

The hardest idea for us to accept about China today is the seeming paradox that the new Peking regime is both Communist and popular. It is definitely a Communist regime, and in the Russian camp. Yet it shows promise on its record thus far of being the best government that modern China has had.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Could I have the date of that? I am sure I said that.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same article; that is January 3, 1950.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; that is about the time when the British were recognizing it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this whole article go in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes; it may be inserted into the record. Do you want to read any more now?

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 564" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 564

[Source: The Reporter, January 3, 1950, pp. 23–25]

IN SEARCH OF A CHINA POLICY

When Mr. Acheson told the world last August, in the State Department's White Paper on China, that we look forward to a reassertion of "the democratic individualism of China," he was using our best political vocabulary. But his good phrase was unexpectedly seized upon by the propagandists of Communist Peking

and turned against us with devastating effect; for "individualism," translated into Chinese, has become a garbage word, meaning everyone-for-himself-and-devil-take-the-hindmost. The Chinese Communists neatly identified it with the disruptive antisocial selfishness that disgraced the last days of the Kuomintang.

The misunderstanding between Washington and Peking is more than verbal. The plain fact is that Asia is very different from America, socially, culturally, ideologically—in all the institutions and values of everyday life. We speak in different language systems, with only part of our vocabularies translatable with any accuracy. Our legal conceptions were so different a century ago that westerners demanded the right to be tried in China by western law under extraterritoriality, a system only recently ended. It is not surprising that neither Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek was ever able to put up a reasonable semblance of Anglo-Saxon parliamentary democracy.

So now that a new order has come to China, the American mind is ill-equipped to deal with it. As the world's oldest surviving revolutionaries and youngest defenders of the established order, we fail to appreciate the attitudes and feelings of revolutionary Asia. We assume that the American ideals of political freedom and economic development, having been good enough for us, are good enough for the Chinese, Indonesians, Japanese, and Filipinos. With our instinctive horror of the totalitarian police state and the evil deeds of Russian imperialism, we assume that no intelligent Asiatic could really desire Communism or, having been duped into it, could avoid eventual disenchantment.

If we approach Asia on these terms we will be defeated. This has just happened in China, where we backed a decadent régime in the effort to secure a "strong, united, and democratic" China, independent of Russia and friendly to ourselves. Had China been an industrialized democracy of western Europe, a revivified Kuomintang might be in power today. But China is uniquely different and Asiatic, densely populated but thinly industrialized, intensely self-conscious but noncohesive, one of the oldest civilized states in the world, convulsed by the newest revolution.

In forming a new policy toward China we must face several very tough and unpleasant realities. If we want to maintain any contact with China at all we have to recognize the new Chinese Communist régime. Yet recognition will not necessarily preserve for our one thousand or more missionaries, our trading firms, our students, professors, and our journalists the position and influence which they have had in modern China heretofore. We have to fit our China policy into a larger over-all policy toward Asia. Yet our effort to put the Japanese economy on its feet (so as to take it off our necks) will continue to provoke the bitter enmity of patriotic Chinese.

In tackling all these problems, our freedom of choice is narrower than we may think. If we no not recognize the Chinese Communist government, Russia will have even greater influence in China. If we do not encourage Japanese trade with China, Japan will become an even greater financial burden and a more dangerous political powder keg. We are the losers and cannot expect to be the choosers as much as we were before. What we have to offer may interest Asia less than we expect. We must assess wherein our real contribution can be—mainly in material goods and technology, or in the realm of ideas and values.

Our first need is therefore to face the truth. No amount of bluster, nor the sending of marines (or even legionnaires) can keep the Chinese Communists from putting consuls like Angus Ward in jail if they choose to. We may feel certain there are Russian machinations behind the scenes, but we have to deal with China as though it were an independent foreign state. Chinese patriotic sentiment demands this with complete sincerity. If the Chinese people are in reality falling victim to police terror and the Russian squeeze, we have to let them find it out for themselves.

Meanwhile, as advisers and foreign friends, our influence is at a low ebb. It falls steadily lower as Nationalist planes, gifts of the United States, continue to drop American-made bombs on open Chinese cities. The American public forgets that since VJ-day our aid to Chiang has contributed to the killing and maiming of many thousands of Chinese civilians. More than a thousand bombing casualties have been reported from Shanghai since the Communist take-over—enough to blacken our name and strengthen the Communists' moral position.

The hardest idea for us to accept about China today is the seeming paradox that the new Peking régime is both Communist and popular: It is definitely a Communist régime and in the Russian camp, yet it shows promise, on its record thus far, of being the best government that modern China has had. This proposition is hard to take. In recent years some Americans have preferred to

think that the Chinese Communists were mere "agrarian reformers," do-gooders in the countryside, and not real Communists committed to the police state and allegiance to Moscow. Many Americans have chosen, on the other hand, to deny altogether the record of Chinese Communist good works and reforms for the peasant masses. Either of these beliefs—that the Communists weren't real Communists, or that they weren't real reformers—was a way out. But now we are up against it. Mao Tse-tung has taken over China with a minimum of slaughter and is making some initial progress in solving China's gigantic problems, while proclaiming his allegiance to Moscow.

Revolutionary Asia seems a paradox to us partly because we don't understand its degrees of social and economic difference from the West. The old order of personal government (landlord rule in the countryside and official corruption in the towns) is so far below our own modern standards that a party dictatorship, which seems a backward tyranny to us, may seem a forward step in Asia. The Chinese people are not yet accustomed to the protection of a legal system which is independent of the government in power, nor do they take the rights of free assembly and political self-expression as matters of course. The mere preservation of order, the lessened fear of arbitrary seizure by the police, have been a relief to Chinese intellectuals after their experiences under the Kuomintang. The fact that the new régime may at any time resort in its turn to arbitrary arrest and coercion makes it no worse than its predecessors. It will be judged by the Chinese masses according to their traditional touchstone—whether there is enough rice to eat.

Our ignorance of China leads to sad miscalculations. We overestimated the Nationalist armies' will to fight and oversupplied them with American arms. We sent them field-artillery pieces, key tools for capturing walled cities. But the Nationalists held the walled cities and the Communists remained dispersed in the countryside, where artillery could not reach them. When the besieged Nationalists grew demoralized, the artillery began to change hands, and soon the cities did too. Since our armament of Chiang outran his troops' desire to use it, the Communists today have the best-armed forces in Chinese history, American-equipped.

We can make similar mistakes in other parts of Asia. Suppose, for example, that our economic-development plans overlook the social effects of industrialization. Done our way, industrialization will create big cities in Asia, which will draw their cheap labor from the farms of the countryside. But this will disrupt the old family relationships, upset the traditional amenities of the individual's life within his community of kin and neighbors, and make him the more ready to give his allegiance to revolutionary causes. American-style industrialization in the crowded East may increase the material satisfactions of the Indonesian or the Indian, and yet also increase his psychological frustration and spiritual dissatisfaction. All these things are interrelated, and our technological aid cannot help having deep social repercussions. Our well-meant injections of technology into underdeveloped economies under Point Four can be misused to entrench backward régimes in power, and so lead us into a whole series of disasters like the one we have suffered in China.

These unhappy facts suggest that American policy can no longer afford to project American ideals into Asia unless they are translated into Asiatic terms. The freedom of the individual, the democratic process, the good life we seek to defend, seem to most Asiatics to be all right for Americans, but beyond their own reach. They must settle for what they can achieve in their own countries, with the meager resources at hand and the historical traditions they have inherited—through Communism, if no better means presents itself. Can America offer an alternative, not in New York or Washington, but in Batangas Province and the paddy fields outside Bangkok?

Our forebears, as traders, missionaries, and educators, began the revolutionary process in Asia. It is high time that we took a hand in helping it along. Containment of Communism, to keep it out of countries undergoing social metamorphosis, is like containing a forest fire. It is better to build a back-fire.

It is not beyond our capabilities to work closely with the native non-Communist leadership of Asia, once we acquire the will and the vision. Asia is still our farthest West, the final frontier to which our westward expansion has brought us. It is now also our strategic frontier, where American ways and ideals are on trial, a border area of cultural ferment and change where modern science can either remake the ancient East or else enslave it. We will bear some responsibility for the outcome.

Our policy must be cast in a new pattern of relations between the American people and peoples of Asia. Elements of this new pattern may be suggested as a series of operating principles.

First, American private citizens and private agencies must be enlisted and given opportunity to work in Asia—business corporations and private enterprisers, missionary and student workers, teachers and technicians of all kinds. They should not be dominated by government, but advised and helped. We must avoid our recent error in China, where we funneled enormous amounts of aid into the government channels of China and overloaded them. We should not place our bets on governments but on the long-term interests of peoples, and we should seek to work with the peoples of Asia at all possible levels of planning and technical development. Naturally, the governments of the new Asia will be largely "socialist" in their plans for the future, since *their countries generally lack a strong middle class.*

Second, our new contact with Asia, both private and governmental, must be on a basis of equality and reciprocity. First of all, Asia's independent sovereignty and freedom of action must be fully acknowledged. This means the full recognition of nationalist aspirations in Indonesia, Viet-Nam, and other areas, even when we know that the new leadership is weak and untried. Colonialism and the old Anglo-Dutch imperium in Southeast Asia are finished, and we cannot fill the vacuum with a new American imperialism of our own invention. Our only recourse, as a trading power at a great distance, is to nurture nationalist movements and try to treat them as independent even while they are weak.

Finally, insofar as we can plan our part of this relationship with the new nations of India and Southeast Asia, we must seek to keep it balanced and integrated within an over-all program, so that military armament does not outrun social reform, and industrial development does not overshadow the welfare of peasants. Trade among Far Eastern countries, for instance, is quite as necessary as trade with us.

If we regard China with these considerations in mind several principles emerge: First, we must help the various new nations of the Far East to work their way toward political independence and economic development, so that increasingly they form a local international community, a segment of the world order. Japan is an integral part of this community and must trade with it. Such a growth must inevitably attract Chinese participation. Yet China is not likely, in our lifetime, to be in a position, economically or strategically, to dominate this community.

Second, our interest is to maintain as best we can our contact with the Chinese people, rather than to push them behind a Russian-type iron curtain. Their new government, having ridden to power on a wave of nationalism, is in no mood to accept Russian dictation and police surveillance in its domestic affairs. It is by no means certain yet that the Chinese Communists want to subordinate themselves fundamentally to Russia, or that they wish to eliminate American contact, or that, if they do, they can succeed soon. No matter what the Chinese Communists want, China is still oriented toward the West in many ways. We should try to keep it so, neither by hostility nor by appeasement, but by standing on solid American principles: national independence, economic welfare, personal freedom. These are positive things we are for, not against, and in our relations with Communist China we should mainly talk about them, rather than about "anti-Communism."

In this context diplomatic recognition is only a first step. Since Russian aid to the Chinese Communists during the civil war has been relatively meager, we have little basis for applying the Stimson doctrine. The change of government in China has followed a genuine civil war, not military aggression from outside. Diplomatic relations, so necessary in our dealing with Communist Russia, are equally necessary now that the cold war extends to Communist China.

Recognition is not moral approval, only realism. A Chinese veto in the United Nations can have only a little more nuisance value than the present Russian veto. Meanwhile, persistent nonrecognition would constitute desertion of the century-old American interest in the Chinese people—a denial of American principles of humanitarianism, and friendship for the four hundred millions of China. Recognition is a necessary first step in our continuing competition with Russian influence in China. To withhold recognition beyond the time when the State Department can work out the details would be defeatist and essentially isolationist. It would be playing into Russia's hands. Our aim must be to follow a middle course, free of the illusory hopes and fears that have

dogged our China policy in the past, ready to deal with the Communists in China but under no compulsion to take their terms, without expecting either that their regime could be destroyed by our hostility or that it could be enticed out of the Russian orbit by appeasement.

—JOHN K. FAIRBANK.

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing you want to call our attention to in that article, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Well, it is difficult for the American public to understand the problems of government in China and how ineffective modern government there has been. It is because of the fact that the Communists are totalitarian and bring in a strict control, that in the honeymoon period, when they are first in there are certain apparent gains for the populace. They get a better food supply in the cities, they get peace and order and that sort of thing. That is the honeymoon period. And that has given way long since, of course, to the period when the Communists' squeeze begins to operate to get everybody in his spot under control, isolated, and being used by the Communist state.

But nevertheless you have, I think, if you are dealing with China, to recognize how the Chinese people are reacting to the Communists, and in that honeymoon period of 1950 they were reacting on the whole much more happily that we would have reacted, because we don't like Communists in this country, and they are in China.

Mr. MORRIS. In that same article you also advocated, did you not, that we should put pressure on Japan to trade with China?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall. It may be that. "Pressure" I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, "urge Japan."

Mr. FAIRBANK. As a general proposition I would say today that Japan is going to explode or collapse on our hands if trade cannot be developed from Japan with other countries, and it is a real tough problem: how is Japan going to feed her people by trade without doing something or other with the Chinese mainland?

Mr. MORRIS. That is your opinion today, is it, Professor?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is, yes. We are really up against it.

Mr. MORRIS. That is substantially the same thing you said in this article.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes. It is a continuing problem. It is a very, very tough one.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell the committee what positions you have held in the Government in the past?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Beginning in August 1941, I went to Washington to join this Coordinator of Information Office. I remained in it until about August of 1942, when I was sent to China under OSS, but specifically under the interdepartmental committee for the acquisition of foreign publications, which was doing the job I described, in China.

Having reached China, I think in September 1942, I stayed there under the American Embassy, until the end of 1943, and came back in December, and was in Washington, home from the field, with that interdepartmental committee, in January and February of 1944, and I believe I moved into OWI, at Mr. Taylor's invitation, in March 1944.

I remained in OWI in Washington, or in China, until it became the Interim International Information Service after the war, and, in

turn, became the United States Information Service about 1946, or before then, perhaps. I remained with that until the summer, July or August, of 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Professor, if there are other writings of yours that we come across, may we verify that they are your writings by consulting your attorney?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, indeed. Consult me directly, too.

Mr. MORRIS. I will not take any more time introducing articles at this time.

I have no more questions.

Senator SMITH. Are there any more questions?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Senator SMITH. Is there anything else you wish to say, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel that you have had a full hearing?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes, I do. We haven't covered everything. Of course, we could keep on forever.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have anything more that you want to add?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't want to be sentimental, but I feel we have here the democratic process in operation.

I regard the American Senate as one of the citadels of the democratic process and it is within that context that I have said anything critical that I may have said. But I have the greatest respect for the American Senate and for the Senators, in their efforts to deal with these problems.

I feel that I have had a full hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to confer with counsel as to whether or not he has any question?

Mr. WAIT. No; except to thank you very much.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fairbank, did you read Professor Lattimore's statement about his testimony?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I have read a copy; yes.

Senator SMITH. When did you and he confer about your respective statements, if you did, indeed, confer?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have not conferred about these statements. I sent him a copy yesterday. He had not seen it before—that is, my statement. His statement was sent to me when he was sending it out. I received a copy in Cambridge. I had not seen it before.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that was?

Senator SMITH. Did you read it?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I read it just a few days later.

Senator SMITH. Do you know when that was that you got a copy?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It was well after the beginning of the hearings, about a week later. It came in the mail.

Senator SMITH. Now, you sent him a copy of your statement yesterday, I believe you said?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Had you had any telephone conversation, or any correspondence with him during the time you prepared your statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. After I prepared my statement and sent it down, I sent it down here, you recall, on February 29, to be here in time for

March 3, which was the first date I was given. I actually came to Washington by error, not having been held by the telegram which went on Saturday. So I was here the week end before last, in Washington, at my house.

Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore stopped there as they came in to Washington from Baltimore. I saw them then. I saw him again here yesterday or the day before. He talked at that time about his hearing, and so on. I did not show him my statement.

Senator SMITH. Did he counsel you to make an attack on the committee, or suggest to you that you do that?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I do not recall that he did.

Senator SMITH. Did he make some suggestions along that line?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall actual words, but I certainly have the impression that his advice to me, if I had asked him for it, would have been—at least I got the impression this is what I should do—that I should be vigorous and outspoken and not hesitate to state what I really thought. Now, I don't recall any counsel to me to make any attack on the committee.

I think it is quite plain that my approach to this whole thing has been a little bit different. At least I feel the response has been different, and I am gratified by that, because I feel we are on common ground here.

Senator SMITH. If you had followed what you thought, after talking with him, was his line of advice, you would have been much more critical than you were in your statement, would you not?

Mr. FAIRBANK. My modifications of that statement were made after I had read it over several times, and I would not say it was as a result of Mr. Lattimore's suggestions, because he did not see the statement, and he had no opportunity to make those suggestions.

Senator SMITH. But the restraint which you may have shown in your statement was not provoked by any advice from Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. When he saw you at your home here in Washington, he had made the attack on the committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. And he had been attacked in return for some time. It was after a whole week.

Senator FERGUSON. He had made the attack?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you had his copy at that time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I really don't recall. The copy that I received I left in Cambridge. It wasn't around when he was present. He was very tired and not much interested in discussing anything.

Senator FERGUSON. But he did discuss an attack on the committee? You stated that he said you should be vigorous.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I am not sure that he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Why are you having trouble on this statement? It has just been recent.

Mr. FAIRBANK. It is a week ago. I am under oath here. I do not want to misrepresent a conversation which was very casual and brief. He was tired. He didn't want to say much of anything. He was on his way. He thought that I was going on the next day.

When I told him he was on the next day, then he felt even more tired, and sort of depressed, and pretty soon they left.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your statement completed at that time?

Mr. FAIRBANK. It was completed, mimeographed, and submitted to you.

Senator FERGUSON. It has not been changed since then?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Only the modifications that I sent, that I called to your attention in two or three sentences on the last page.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you change on the last page?

Mr. FAIRBANK. We can compare those modifications.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you change the sentence: "It has made a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence"?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I merely made it an independent sentence. These changes were made for clarity and in a way they were mollified rather than sharpened.

If you would like to compare these two copies——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss that sentence with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No; I did not discuss my statement with him at all in any way. That is very definite. That was a policy on my part. I did not want to.

Senator FERGUSON. When you wrote that paragraph on page 17, next to the last paragraph, did you have a copy of his statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I may have—I don't know, but his statement did not influence my statement. I will make that as a flat assertion.

Mr. WAIT. Perhaps I could refresh his recollection on that.

Senator SMITH. That is all right with me, counsel.

Mr. WAIT. That was written in my office, and we discussed it at considerable length. It was discussed with Mr. Fairbank and me and my partner, who thought he was coming down. It was at least a week before March 3 that we arrived—there may have been some slight revision, but it was mimeographed in my office. I have never seen that one.

Senator SMITH. You understand that the chairman is trying to compliment Mr. Fairbank on being more restrained?

Senator FERGUSON. But you know that Mr. Lattimore had attacked the committee for bad faith, in his statement?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall those words, but it certainly was an all-out—well, a lot of things were said.

Senator SMITH. Several words.

Mr. FAIRBANK. Several words; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you intending by that paragraph to attack the good faith of the committee?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir. I say very definitely in both these: "No one questions the sincerity of this committee," and that means good faith.

Mr. WAIT. The conference that we had at which this was drafted was on February 25. I remember Mr. Fairbank calling me on Saturday, the 23d. I had just gotten back from a skiing holiday.

We then got word it was to be set for the 3d, which I could not attend because I was moderating at the time in Harvard.

We got together on Monday, which was the 25th, and apparently Lattimore had not gotten the statement out at that time.

Senator SMITH. At that time Professor Lattimore had communicated with you, though. You had had some sort of communication with him?

Mr. FAIRBANK. When I wrote this statement?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. FAIRBANK. I don't recall any talk about statements, or anything of that sort.

Senator SMITH. How long had you known Professor Lattimore?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I knew him quite well. I stopped and saw him at Christmas time, as we were coming through Baltimore. He had been up in Cambridge. His son is going to college there. And we have seen each other back and forth.

In supporting Mr. Lattimore, as I have, ever since he was attacked, 2 years ago—and I have the documents here somewhere—I have consistently inserted a clause that I do not agree with everything he has said by any means. I make that plain.

I merely say I think he is an honest man, and it is all right for him to be heard.

Mr. MORRIS. You will supply, will you not, the translation of that transcription that appeared in the Chinese newspaper?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; I have it here.

Mr. MORRIS. That is our only copy, Professor.

Mr. FAIRBANK. We have typed out——

Mr. MORRIS. You have the translation already?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Yes; we have copies, and can distribute it, if you want.

Senator SMITH. Are there any other questions?

Mr. WAIT. I am to get, I understand, documentations that Professor Fairbank was at Harvard the academic year 1937 and 1938 and we are also to get the date in 1935, to find out whether Lattimore was in Peiping at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. We will have Mr. Lattimore here again. I think the latter we can ask him about.

Mr. WAIT. Then I will simply get the material with reference to his being in Cambridge during the academic year 1937 and 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Is there anything else?

Is there anything else you have to say, Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, thank you.

Senator SMITH. Will you let us know if anything occurs to you and you want to come back and give it to us?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. Up to now, then, do you think the committee has been perfectly fair with you in this hearing today?

Mr. FAIRBANK. I think this hearing today has allowed me an opportunity to express myself; it certainly has. I think the intent of this committee hearing was certainly very fair.

I am afraid I can't go all the way of saying what really would be inconsistent with what I have said here, which is a really considered opinion, about the committee in general.

Senator SMITH. Have you anything else you want to say now, today?

Mr. FAIRBANK. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. You have had a full chance to have your say?

Mr. FAIRBANK. Certainly; on the things we have covered.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anything else you want to cover?

Mr. Fairbank. No; I do not think there is. I appreciate the attitude that you gentleman have had.

Senator Smith. You have not gotten the impression that was the attitude we had toward Mr. Lattimore from what he had said?

Mr. Fairbank. From the press reports, too, I must agree; yes.

Senator Smith. If you want to fuss with the press, you can pick out whichever one of those men you want to go after and take him on.

All right. If there is nothing further, the hearing will adjourn.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m. the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland, O'Conor, and Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator EASTLAND. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Matusow, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary is the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MATUSOW. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HARVEY M. MATUSOW, DAYTON, OHIO

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Matusow, will you give your full name and address to the reporter, please.

Mr. MATUSOW. Harvey M. Matusow, 1308 Grand Avenue, Dayton, Ohio.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. MATUSOW. I am a staff member of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission. It is a joint committee of the Ohio State Assembly.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long have you held that position?

Mr. MATUSOW. Since my release from the Air Force, in December.

Mr. MORRIS. December 9——

Mr. MATUSOW. 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Matusow, did you serve in World War II?

Mr. MATUSOW. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What service were you with?

Mr. MATUSOW. United States Army, the Infantry, in Europe.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the American Youth for Democracy?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the American Youth for Democracy a Communist organization?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was. It is no longer in existence.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the circumstances surrounding your joining the American Youth for Democracy?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was just a kid out of the armed services and looking for something. I was just psychologically right for being recruited into the American Youth for Democracy.

88348—52—pt. 11—— 8

Mr. MORRIS. Did you subsequently join the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, in October 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Who recruited you into the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. A few of the club members of the AYD, one Julie Sheik.

Mr. MORRIS. And who else?

Mr. MATUSOW. One Lee Scharf.

Mr. MORRIS. How long had you been a member of the American Youth for Democracy before you joined the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. About 1 year.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you in the course of your activities with the Communist Party, become disillusioned with the principles of that organization?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do at that time?

Mr. MATUSOW. I contacted the FBI in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us approximately when that was?

Mr. MATUSOW. Early February 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. When you contacted the FBI in New York, did they show interest in the information that you possessed at the time?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; they did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they urge you to stay in the Communist Party and report to them?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; they did.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you so report to the FBI the activities and the information that you discovered in the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. I did, until January 1951, when I was expelled from the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you expelled from the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. The charge was that I was suspected of being an OSS agent.

Senator FERGUSON. What is OSS?

Mr. MATUSOW. Office of Strategic Services.

Senator FERGUSON. Not the FBI?

Mr. MATUSOW. Not the FBI.

Senator FERGUSON. They had not caught on to the FBI?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, sir. It was a matter of circumstances, and witch hunting in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there an OSS in existence at that time, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; there was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they start their own loyalty program within the party to find out whether there were any subversives in the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir. As they called them, "enemy agents."

Senator FERGUSON. But they started their own loyalty program.

Mr. MATUSOW. During my whole time in the Communist Party, they adhered to witch hunting and purges.

Senator FERGUSON. But they had their own loyalty program, finding out if they had disloyal people in the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. They had a former New York City police conducting interrogations.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was he?

Mr. MATUSOW. I didn't get the name, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Matusow, did you work at a Communist Party book shop while in the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I worked at three different book shops.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what they were?

Mr. MATUSOW. The Jefferson School Book Shop; that is, at the Jefferson School of Social Science, 565 Sixth Avenue, in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us what the Jefferson School is.

Mr. MATUSOW. It is the Communist Party educational institution in New York. They state that they are a school which studies Marxism and Leninism. They are run by the Communist Party educational department, national educational department.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that from your own experience?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, when I worked at the school.

Mr. MORRIS. That is one of the three Communist Party book shops that you were associated with?

Mr. MATUSOW. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the other two?

Mr. MATUSOW. The other was the Workers Book Shop, at 48 East Thirteenth Street. At the time it was located in the national headquarters of the Communist Party, and was a part of the Communist Party literature-distribution set-up.

Mr. MORRIS. That is openly affiliated with the Communist Party; is it not?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it was.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the third?

Mr. MATUSOW. The third was the Camp Unity Book Shop, at a summer camp in New York State. At that time I was on the payroll of the Communist Party State literature department, and receiving my checks from them.

Senator FERGUSON. How much were you getting?

Mr. MATUSOW. It varied, sir. The maximum was $45 a week at any one time.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you working at other jobs?

Mr. MATUSOW. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever stay at Camp Unity?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I managed the book shop there in the summer of 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Communist Party camp?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it was run by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Completely by the Communist Party. It isn't an infiltrated group; is it?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; it was set up originally by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Communist organization?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; set up by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. In meetings with James Nesi, a teacher at the Jefferson School and a lecturer at their camp.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by the camp?

Mr. MATUSOW. That was in 1948, Camp Sherwood, in Monticello, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a Communist camp?

Mr. MATUSOW. A Jefferson School camp, and in that relation Communist Party-dominated. Mr. Nesi is an instructor at the Jefferson School, and one of the lecturers of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. I was very friendly with Mr. Nesi, and we used to discuss the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. On more than one occasion. I had visited in the office of the committee at 799 Broadway and picked up certain material, such as China Digest, which was published in Hong Kong, and I believe later became People's China, published in Peking, distributed through the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. Also distributed there was a publication turned out monthly or every 2 or 3 months, whenever they got their material, called Letters From China, which were letters from Chinese Communists who at the time were behind the lines when Chiang Kai-shek was still on the mainland. It was part of the propaganda set-up in the United States. They mimeographed this letter-sheet.

Senator FERGUSON. What were they trying to do with this literature in the United States?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1948 they set up a program of what they called—I will quote from this, if I may——

Mr. MORRIS. What is that you are quoting from?

Mr. MATUSOW. This is a study outline prepared and issued by the New York State education department of the Communist Party, 35 East Twelfth Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you get that, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was given to me when I was in the party to help prepare an educational program for the Communist Party club that I was in.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember who gave it to you?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was handed down through the county educational department. At that time I believe the county educational director was Ted Bassett.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this a pamphlet or a booklet that was circulated to everybody, non-Communist as well as Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, sir; this was circulated to leaders of the Communist Party only.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was advisory to you?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. As a Communist.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. It is entitled "The Great Victories in China, and the New Dangers of American Imperialist Intervention. Club Discussion Outline on the Significance of the Recent Events in China, and the Tasks of All of the Clubs."

On page 5, paragraph 3, underlined, "Support the greetings to the liberation fighters of China," issued by the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. At that time their address was 111 West Forty-second Street.

Senator FERGUSON. Am I right in saying, then, that the purpose was to try and keep America out of the Far East as far as it would harm the Communists taking over of all of China?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And this literature was to go out among Chinese in New York, or all of them?

Mr. MATSOW. I might cite the example of this greeting to the liberation fighters in China, and the future greeting was a scroll. It said, "Recognition of the People's Republic of China." At one rally the Progressive Party had at the Yankee Stadium in September 1948, where I believe some 65,000 people were in attendance, the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, in conjunction with party workers, had circulated those petitions and gotten a great number of signatures. They used that to collect money. They put out little buttons that looked like the Red Cross buttons with a red flag crossed with an American flag, and urged you to wear that, too. And also published a magazine called Far East Spotlight.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the name of the book that you want to show?

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead, Mr. Matsusow.

Mr. MATUSOW. I believe I was saying that they published the magazine called Far East Spotlight, which was set up by the party, the Communist Party, distributed through the Communist Party literature set-up. I differentiate between something that was not published by the Communist Party or recommended by them, in that it might have just been sold in the book shop, and material that was actually distributed through the party organization, in the clubs.

Senator FERGUSON. The party book shop, was this book shop a Communist book shop?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right, operated by the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Operated by the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. There were three of them in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. I assume that they sold all kinds of books, non-Communist as well as Communist, as a front?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. They only sold Communist or pro-Communist books?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And they had to be orthodox Communist books, did they not, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. No deviation from the party line. I would like to cite the example of a book that was published in 1949, entitled "Tomorrow's China," by Anna Louise Strong. That book was published by the party in New York, as well as a pamphlet on Korea, by Miss Strong. Three or four weeks after publication date, the Soviet Union expelled Anna Louis Strong as being a spy, and 2 days after that expulsion became known the Communist Party took all of the books off the shelves, and they haven't been sold since.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the store at that time?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You were working for the party as a member?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you explain how that got to the book store; what the pipeline is?

Mr. MATUSOW. On Miss Strong's book?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; why it was taken out in 2 days. I want to try to get the pipeline from Moscow, whether she was expelled, to your book store, to take the books off the shelf, what the party line would be. and how the line was conducted.

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, the announcement was made in the press—New York Times, Herald Tribune, et cetera, and in other papers—saying Miss Strong had been expelled from the Soviet Union. The party did not act on that yet, because they did not have the party's fact. If they just acted on the basis of a story in the New York Times, for instance, there would be dissension in the ranks of the party. They waited until a correspondent for, maybe Tass, or one of the Communist newspapers here in the United States, for instance, had gotten copy on it for distribution, or a Daily Worker correspondent.

For instance, Joseph Starobin was in Europe. I don't know if he was there at that time. But there has usually been a Daily Worker correspondent in Europe.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this actually what happened or is this your speculation?

Mr. MATUSOW. This is not speculation.

Senator FERGUSON. He is giving me how this chain of command comes from Moscow over here to stop this sale in the book shop.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. When either the correspondent or somebody in the position of leadership or know-how, I don't know who the person was——

Senator FERGUSON. You can't name the person, but you are giving me the modus operandi.

Mr. MATUSOW. The information would be received in New York It might also have been received at the time through its Cominform Journal, a newspaper called For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy. At that time the New York State or the national committee of the Communist Party would hold a meeting and decide "We will not support or sell the book Tomorrow's China by Anna Louise Strong, and it will be taken off the bookshelves." The State literature director, one Bordofsky, at that time issued an order to the bookshop to just take the books off the shelf.

Senator O'CONOR. You mentioned before that there were three such stores in New York under direct control of the Communists. Do you happen to know whether simultaneous action was taken at all three at about the same time?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct; just a phone call was all that was necessary.

Senator O'CONOR. But regardless of the type or the manner in which the word was communicated, what was the result as to their action, whether it was uniform and taken at the same time or not.

Mr. MATUSOW. Taken at the same time. Within a 5-minute period you could not find a copy of the book.

Senator O'CONOR. In any one of the three stores?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator EASTLAND. You say that the only books that were carried in those three bookstores were official Communist publications, is that right?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, sir; I did not state that. I stated that anti-Communist books, for instance, a book by Whittaker Chambers, would not be carried in the Communist Party bookshop, nor would a book on economics that did not teach Marxist economics be carried, but books of other publishers that were written by Marxist or Leninist writers were carried.

Senator EASTLAND. They were Communist publications?

Mr. MATUSOW. Written by Communists but not by a Communist Party publishing house. There is a difference.

Senator EASTLAND. The difference was that books that were not published by an official Communist publishing house were carried provided the book was promoting Communist policy, is that right?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, did you carry books by Owen Lattimore?

Mr. MATUSOW. We did, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Why?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1948, as I think this document will show, the Communist Party literature set-up had not caught up with the fast-moving events in China; that is, the war in China and the setting up of the Chinese Communist Government. The only material they had published by the Communist Party, either International Publishers or New Century Publishers, were a pamphlet by Mao Tse-tung, the Turning Point in China, and China's New Democracy. Two pamphlets, nothing else. Well, the party had to get the line disseminated. People were asking "What is the line on China?" And we had instructions in the bookshop that came down from the New York State educational department of the Communist Party, to refer the members of the party to the following books: The Unfinished Revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, and Mr. Epstein was a member of the Communist Party and an instructor at the Jefferson School.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir; I did. Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, was used in the Communist book shop at the Jefferson School and the workers' book shop. It was required or recommended reading for students at the school. The book, Red Star Over China, by Edgar Snow, was also recommended reading. The book—I am trying to think of the name of it—by Harrison Forman, the title slips my mind at this point, was another one of the books that was recommended reading. Those books I just outlined were basically the books that the party stated carried out party line on China.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, you said that the party stated that these books carried the party line on China. Now, you were a Communist, were you not?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you consider those authors Communists?

Mr. MATUSOW. On the basis of the reading? You mean in actual dues-paying Communist Party members?

Senator EASTLAND. Well, you draw a distinction now. Did you consider those authors Communists?

Mr. MATUSOW. My own opinion at the time; yes; I did.

Senator EASTLAND. You considered Lattimore a Communist, you considered Snow a Communist, and you considered Epstein a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. Epstein I knew was a Communist on the basis of his work at the school.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not necessarily mean that everybody that wrote a book that was sold in that book shop was really a member of the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever carry a card?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did you stop carrying a card?
Mr. MATUSOW. In 1949. The party no longer issued cards.
Senator FERGUSON. So you had a card up to 1949?
Mr. MATUSOW. That is right, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Now, you said that your mental reaction of the three people that wrote the books, Epstein, Lattimore, and Snow, was that they were Communists. Will you give us a definition of what you meant by the term "Communist" when you said they were Communists?
Mr. MATUSOW. In thinking, their political ideology, on the basis of their books, to use the party's terms, I felt that they agreed with and adhered to the principles of dialectical materialism, or Marxist philosophy, and perpetrated the line through their books.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you understand those were the only kind of books that were sold in those book shops, that if it was not party literature it was not sold?
Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.
Senator FERGUSON. It did not make any difference whether the person consciously or unconsciously followed the line?
Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.
Senator FERGUSON. But if the line was actually in the book, do I understand then it was sold in the bookshop?
Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.
Senator FERGUSON. And if they consciously carried it, then you would consider that person a Communist. Now, unconsciously, would he only be a fellow traveler?
Mr. MATUSOW. Yes. I would like to point out an example of the book which does not deal with the subject of China, of an example of somebody who wrote a book and was not a Communist, and the book carried the party line. There was a book called, I believe, American Freedom and Catholic Power, by Paul Blanshard, which was published while I was still at the bookshop. That book adhered to the Communist line in relation to the Catholic Church. It was a good text as far as it went. They would not recommend the book because in the book Mr. Blanshard stated he was opposed to communism. Though he carried the party line through in his book, it was not considered recommended reading for Communists.
Senator FERGUSON. Because of that one sentence, or that one line, and not meaning the party line, but the fact that he had mentioned that he personally was opposed to communism, they felt that that was enough deviation from the line that they would not sell that book in their bookshop?
Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how many such bookshops were in the United States?
Mr. MATUSOW. I stated the three in New York. There was a bookshop in Boston, there was one in Washington, D. C., Chicago, Cleveland, Ohio.
Senator FERGUSON. Is there one in Detroit?
Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; there was one in Detroit.
Senator FERGUSON. Do you know the name of it?
Mr. MATUSOW. Most of the bookshops were called Progressive Bookshops. I don't remember the names of all of them.
Senator FERGUSON. Some catch phrase?

Mr. MATUSOW. Usually dealing with the word "progressive" or "world" bookshop.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think you could get us the names of all these bookshops in the various cities? Do you know any way you can get them?

Mr. MATUSOW. I might be able to. I am going to New York tonight, and in New York I might be able to get the list of them. I might say that most of them are out of business now, except the one in California, the California Labor School Bookshop, and one in Los Angeles that is still operating that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know why they are out of business?

Mr. MATUSOW. A certain amount of publicity in certain cities had been given to the bookshops, and they were highlighted and therefore couldn't operate.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean to tell me that only Communists bought in these bookshops, or were they open to the world?

Mr. MATUSOW. They were open to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. The name "Communist" did not appear in any way with it?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator EASTLAND. He has gone further than that, though. He said that the books that he mentioned, that Communist Party members were advised that those books represented the Communist Party China policy. Is that correct?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. That was Lattimore's book.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am getting a general idea, rather than just Lattimore's book, that if I came in to that bookshop to buy a book, I wouldn't know anything about it being a party-line book.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But suppose I come in as a Communist. Did you ever have anybody come in the bookshop and say, "I am a Communist, and I want such a book"?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, in my position in the bookshop, I knew by sight probably 10,000 Party members in New York. I had seen them at various mass meetings or they knew me to be a Communist. We will put it that way. On that basis, many people would come in to me and say, "We are holding a club educational at this meeting," at so and so club tonight, and "we have to prepare for the subject of China." They might not have had this outline or had the outline and wanted to expand on it. "What book is recommended to supplement the outline or recommended reading for the club?" That happened on many occasions. On the question of China, I was told to recommend Red Star Over China by Snow; and Solution in Asia by Lattimore. I left out one before—and that was Agnes Smedley's books—in that other group. Israel Epstein's book and Harrison Forman's book Report From Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. On the China group?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Could I ask one question: You stated that you were instructed to recommend. By whom, just what method was followed to give you the authority or the word that that was to be the book or books recommended?

Mr. MATUSOW. That came down from the New York State educational department of the Communist Party, through the State literature director who was a member of that commission.

Senator O'Conor. Did it last over any considerable period? I mean, was there any revocation of it or any change in that regard?

Mr. Matusow. It lasted over the period of my employment in the bookshops, and that was 1948, and through December 1949.

Mr. Morris. Did you handle through the Communist Party bookshops the IPR pamphlet, Job in the Pacific?

Mr. Matusow. Yes; we did.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything in particular that you recall about that particular pamphlet?

Mr. Matusow. Job in the Pacific, I believe, was written by Henry Wallace, put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was used in the same light as the books we have just mentioned, in that we supplemented Mao Tse-tung's pamphlet, the title there "China Today," or rather "New Democracy in China," or "Turning Point in China," with the pamphlet by Henry Wallace put out by the IPR.

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the publication New China Daily News?

Mr. Matusow. Yes; I was.

Mr. Morris. What was the New China Daily News?

Mr. Matusow. I was told by Mr. Jim Nesi, one of the lecturers for the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, that the New China Daily News was the Chinese language version of the Daily Worker in New York, and that its editor, a Mr. Chu Tong, I believe, was a member of the party.

Mr. Morris. Did Chu Tong ever lecture at the Jefferson School?

Mr. Matusow. He did. I was present when Mr. Tong lectured at the Jefferson School.

Senator Ferguson. Would it not be possible for Chu Tong to lecture at that school, if he was not a Communist?

Mr. Matusow. No, it would not, not in that period of time.

Senator Ferguson. Was that because of a rule that that school was actually teaching Communist line and Communist principles?

Mr. Matusow. That is right. I will state, though, when the school was originally set up, they did have non-Communists lecturing and teaching but in 1948, or after the indictment of the Communist Party leaders, in 1948, the policy of the school was no lecturer or instructor at the school—I mean, nobody can lecture or teach at the school, unless they are a member of the party.

Senator Ferguson. You being in the educational line of the Communist Party would know something about this school first-hand, is that it?

Mr. Matusow. I worked at the school.

Senator Ferguson. You worked at the school.

Mr. Matusow. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. In what capacity?

Mr. Matusow. I worked in the bookshop at the school.

Senator Ferguson. The bookshop at the school.

Mr. Matusow. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. That, I assume, was a Communist bookshop.

Mr. Matusow. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. The same as these other bookshops.

Mr. Matusow. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. What was the name of the one here in Washington?

Mr. MATUSOW. I just don't remember the name of it offhand. It closed about a year ago.

Senator FERGUSON. There was once a cooperative bookshop. What was the name of it? The Washington Bookshop. Was that it? You are going to try to get those names. Did you know a man by the name of Chi?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. You know something personally about this newspaper that you were talking about, the Communist newspaper?

Mr. MORRIS. The New China Daily News.

Mr. MATUSOW. As I stated, members of the Communist Party who I discussed that with at the time of Mr. Chu Tong's lecture at the Jefferson School stated that it was a Chinese Party newspaper, controlled by the party.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you sell newspapers in your bookshops?

Mr. MATUSOW. We did not have any call for the China Daily News.

Mr. MORRIS. That was a Chinese language paper, was it not?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not that newspaper, the New China Daily News, was a Chinese sheet?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I stated it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You are sure of that?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you also knew, as a matter of fact, that Chu Tong was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not only your deduction from the fact that he was a lecturer at the Jefferson School?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, at that time just to make doubly sure that we did not offend people when they lectured at the Jefferson School, in my position at the bookshop, I had to cover the lectures in that on any given subject I had to prepare certain literature for sale and distribution to the audience. And before anybody lectured, I usually made doubly sure by checking with the director of the school as to whether that person is a member of the Communist Party or whether it be known that they are a member of the Communist Party, and how far can we go on distribution of literature. In other words, can we sell Communist Party literature, material published by the party.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the name and label.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. In the question of this one lecturer, I was told, "Yes, Mr. Tong is a member of the Communist Party, and you can sell Communist Party literature at the affair."

Senator FERGUSON. You mean to tell us then some people were Communists but the Communist Party did not want it known that they were actually members of the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And some were known and it did not make any difference whether they were held out to the world by the Communists themselves as Communist members?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; at times.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would allow you to sell books, actually published under the label or the name of the Communist Party, if they were to be known as Communists.

Mr. MATUSOW. Right. Or if they had not so much been known as Communists or whether or not they would be personally offended at times, or certain members of the audience who they would attract. I mean, you use a certain name to get a group of people to a lecture, and if you feel that you are going to offend or alienate your audience by openly saying so and so is a Communist or the material here is being published by the Communist Party. If we know we would alienate those people, we didn't at the time distribute Communist Party literature.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know the Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Association?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, the information I had about it was in relation to the China Daily News and information gotten from the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. And I recall the day, I believe, the official announcement that, I believe they called it, the New People's Republic of China was established, the Red flag of China was run up over the building of the Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Association in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Who told you that?

Mr. MATUSOW. That came down from the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Israel Epstein to be a Comunist Party member?

Mr. MATUSOW. I stated, "Yes"; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. And you also knew that he was a lecturer at the Jefferson School?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you know he was a member?

Mr. MATUSOW. They stated, on the question of employment at the Jefferson School, a prerequisite in 1948 and '49, that you had to be a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have occasion to visit Frederick V. Field's library?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Mr. MATUSOW. The address, I believe, is 26 West Twenty-sixth Street. And prior to a trip that I had taken to Puerto Rico in 1949, under the auspices of the Communist Party, I was told to go to the Frederick V. Field Library on Twenty-sixth Street and there I would be able to find all the reference material that I would need to prepare myself for the trip to Puerto Rico.

Mr. MORRIS. And you did go to the library?

Mr. MATUSOW. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you leave that, did you meet Field?

Mr. MATUSOW. I have seen him at other occasions, not at the library.

Senator FERGUSON. Not at the library.

Mr. MATUSOW. You see, he turned this house over to a number of groups, the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the Civil Rights Congress, the Council on African Affairs, and a few other groups that used his house that he turned over to the party.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get into the library to use it? Could anyone go in and use it?

Mr. MATUSOW. It was open to the public.

Senator FERGUSON. It was open to the public.

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, that is, the party public. You can call up and make an appointment and go up there. They had two librarians on duty.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to tell us that it was his library at that time, or had he disassociated himself from the library?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, it had his name on it, the Frederick V. Field Library.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was it located?

Mr. MATUSOW. 26 West Twenty-sixth Street. I might be wrong on the 26. It might be 26 or 25.

Senator FERGUSON. How large a library was it?

Mr. MATUSOW. One of the largest I had seen of a private nature.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it have Communist books in it published by the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, the Political Affairs, Daily Worker, Masses in Main Stream, New Masses, Main Stream, every publication that the party put out was in the library, Communist Party pamphlets and books.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any non-Communist books in it?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, they had that, as I say, for reference.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know William Mandel?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was William Mandel a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; he is.

In 1949, when I was working at the Jefferson School Camp, and managing the book shop there, my duties were to handle the distribution of the literature for its lecturers that appeared at the camp during the summer. Mr. Mandel was one of the lecturers. There again I had to find out in advance whether someone was a member of the party, for the purpose of literature distribution. Mr. Mandel at the time lectured on his book, I believe it was called Handbook to the Soviet Union or Handbook to Russia. I met him and we talked at length about the question of the Soviet Union and the party. I mean, I spent a number of hours with him at that visit, and the year before at the Jefferson School Camp, the same situation existed.

Senator FERGUSON. From your conversation, then, you are telling us that he was a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. More than my conversation. Officials of the New York State Communist Party notified me that he was a Communist. In my conversation with him, we discussed questions of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with Evans Carlson?

Mr. MATUSOW. Not directly; just the question of, first, the American Youth for Democracy publication, Youth, in two specific issues there were articles or references made to Evans F. Carlson. One was an article which he coauthored with Paul Robeson, on the question of—I don't believe I remember the title. The other one was a photograph or a reproduction of a letter that he had written to the national office of the American Youth for Democracy. This one club in New York, had written him a letter asking if they could use his name for the club, the Evans Carlson Club, and he wrote a letter back stating he was proud to be associated with the American Youth for Democ-

racy, and that they could go ahead and use his name. It was reproduced and used in the magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. When a book, a biography of Evans F. Carlson, came out, called The Big Yankee, it came out in 1948, it was first distributed by the Communist Party Book Club, the Liberty Book Club, in New York. I had a number of discussions in relation to the book, with, again, this Jim Nesi of the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. And Nesi stated that in the 1930's, when Carlson had been to China, he was very close to Mao Tse-tung and helped train remnants of the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army for the Chinese Communists. That was before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the publication China Today?

Mr. MATUSOW. I know of the publication China Today and have seen back issues of it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is no longer published, is it, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. It is not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, from your Communist experience, if that was a Communist publication?

Mr. MATUSOW. If I may quote from this outline here.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means. Mr. Chairman, will you receive this whole outline into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; we will admit it.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 565" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 565

[Stamped:] Library of HARVEY M. MATUSOW

THE GREAT VICTORIES IN CHINA AND THE NEW DANGERS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION

CLUB DISCUSSION OUTLINE ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECENT EVENTS IN CHINA AND THE TASKS OF ALL CLUBS

(Issued by: New York State Education Dept., Communist Party, 35 East 12 Street, New York City, November 20, 1948)

CHINA DISCUSSION OUTLINE

1. VICTORIES OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN CHINA

The victories of the Chinese Red Armies over the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship now embrace Manchuria and Northern China, an area embodying 200 million people.

1. Chinese People's Liberation Armies move steadily forward from victory to victory.

Manchuria is completely in hands of the People's Liberation Army. The Liberation Armies have moved into North China and are moving on Peiping and Nanking.

An area comprising some 200 million people of China is in the hands of the People's liberation forces.

Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, speaking of the shift of the Chinese liberation forces from the defensive to the offensive, said in a speech on December 25, 1947: "This is a great event. * * * *Once it has taken place, it will of necessity more toward nation-wide victory.*"

It is moving toward nation-wide victory. On Nov. 10, 1948, Chu Teh, Commander in Chief of the People's Liberation Armies, said: "The complete liberation of China is near."

2. Demoralization, defeatism, disintegration, pessimism and economic chaos permeates the Kuomintang areas.

3. The coalition of democratic forces in China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, has steadily broadened its base and influence among the people while that of Chiang Kai-shek narrows and he becomes daily more isolated.

II. THE MAGNITUDE AND MEANING OF THE VICTORIES OF THE CHINESE LIBERATION FORCES

1. Mao Tse-tung, in his speech "The Turning Point", delivered December 25, 1947, said:

"This is a turning point in history. * * * This is a great event. This event is great because it occurs in a country of 450 million people. Once it has taken place it will of necessity move toward nation-wide victory. *This event, furthermore, is great because it occurs in the eastern part of the world where there is a population totalling more than one billion (half the population of mankind)*" suffering from the oppression of imperialism. The turn of the Chinese people's war of liberation from the defensive to the offensive *cannot but bring jubilation and encouragement to the oppressed nations. At the same time, it is also a form of aid to the oppressed peoples now struggling in various countries of Europe and the Americas.*"

2. American imperialism, center of world reaction, main prop of the colonial system, is severely weakened by the disastrous defeat it is suffering in China. This aids the struggle of the progressive, anti-imperailist people within the United States as well as all other peoples who are fighting American imperialist exploitation.

3. China is a "preview" of the futility of the Marshall Plan program. In China it has now been fully demonstrated that no amount of American dollars poured in to support an oppresive, reactionary government can bring either recovery or stabilization nor can it destroy the people's movement for greater democracy and independence.

Henry Wallace's statement is completely borne out: "More and more it becomes certain that the Chinese fiasco will be the first to drive home to the American people the complete bankruptcy of our foreign policy."

Hence the struggle in China powerfully aids the democratic people's struggle for world peace and is of immeasurable aid to change our foreign policy.

4. *Leadership and contribution of the Chinese Communist Party, especially of Mao Tse-tung.*

These victories have been won under the leadership of the Communist Party, which is the acknowledged leader of a *broad coalition of all democratic forces.* The Party, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, was able to apply the universal science of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete situation in China, especially in respect to: (*a*) agrarian revolution; (*b*) the nature of the new democracy in China; (*c*) the role and building of the Communist Party.

III. ON THE NATUBE OF THE WAR

The war in China is a liberation war for independence.

"The war launched by him (Chiang Kai-shek) is a counter revolutionary war directed by American imperialism against the independence of the Chinese nation and the liberation of the Chinese people. * * *"

—Mao Tse-tung in Turning Point, P. 4.

That is why all progressive forces in America sympathize with and support this war of the Chinese people as a just war for national liberation.

It must be underscored that *American imperialism has emerged in the postwar period as the chief bulwark of the decaying colonial system.*

American imperialism has buttressed, aided, and armed British, French, and Dutch imperialism in the struggle against the liberation movements of Asia, such as the French against Viet Nam, the Dutch against Indonesia, British in Malaya and Burma. Its own role in Philippines and Korea.

No place in the world has American imperialism, in its own right, intervened on so vast a scale and in so many ways as in the most decisive of all Far Eastern countries—*China.*

A. Nature of American Intervention in China

1. Total cost to American taxpayer—6–10 billion dollars (breakdown attached) in the form of—

Direct military intervention by U. S. Army, Navy, Marines, Air Corps.

Vast military program to train and equip Chiang Kai-shek's armies under the name MAGIC (U. S. Military Assistance Group in China).

Similar program for Chinese Navy based on American built and operated naval base at Tsingtao.

Transfer of Chiang's armies to civil war fronts by American planes and vessels.

American troops have guarded Chinese lines of communications.

Enormous American munition dumps have been turned over to Chiang's forces.

Under illegally extended lend-lease hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment transferred to Chiang from Okinawa and other Pacific Islands.

B. Purpose of U. S. Policy of Intervention

1. To stop the march of the Chinese people toward democracy and independence under the slogan of "containing Communism."

2. To gain military control over China and extend military bases against the U. S. S. R.

3. To stem the upsurge of colonial liberation movements in whole Far East, which is profoundly affected by what happens in China, thereby endangering the rich monopoly holdings of Western European nations and America in the Far East.

IV. FUTURE AMERICAN ROLE IN CHINA

Further intervention by Truman Administration, unless balked by the action of the people, may take any of the following forms:

1. Direct military intervention—landing of American Marines (Vice Adm. Badger, C. O. American Naval forces in China declared on Nov. 5, that he is considering landing of marines in Shanghai and sending American naval vessels up the Yangtse to protect American lives and property. U. S. may provide bombers, airplanes, for onslaught against industrial cities (Manchuria) in hands of Communists. Also American military personnel to direct operations, as in Greece.

Chiang, it is reported, may declare Shanghai an open city and invite American troops in to protect it from advancing Communist forces.

2. Truman Administration finding Chiang useless to it may give direct support to a number of local war lords in an effort to stave off nation-wide victory for the Communists.

3. Pour more funds into China in an attempt to bribe wavering elements in the Chinese democratic front and split their ranks, causing disunity and chaos, prolong the civil war, perpetrate killing of Chinese people, delay consolidation of victory.

Although all these forms of intervention must fail in long run—they mean throwing away more of the American workers' money, accelerating inflation at home and further blackening the name of the U. S. in the eyes of the Chinese people whose suffering would be prolonged.

Our own struggle against U. S. imperialism would receive setback if U. S. imperialism were able to win even limited objectives in China. Hence, activity to halt intensified intervention is urgent. Wall Street's policy in the Far East is based on rebuilding and strengthening Japan as a war base and the Japanese as gunmen for the Wall Street gangsters.

Program of Action

1. Demand a reversal of present disastrous Truman policy, complete withdrawal of American military forces in China and cessation of all forms of intervention. Connect this with the fight for world peace, for withdrawal of armed forces from Greece, Turkey, etc., and for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Plan an effective program of action for your club against intervention against the Chinese people. These actions should be based on the type of work the club is engaged in, such as—

Distribute agitation folder on China in your shop, community, etc.

2. Bring the Chinese issue to the American people through forums, meetings, literature.

3. Tie China issue with our inflation at home. Make the point that Truman cannot fulfill his pledges for progressive legislation on the domestic front while carrying out an imperialist, reactionary war-making foreign policy. Show the oneness of domestic and foreign policy.

4. Enlist the speakers and the help of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy in preparing educational material for the broad masses of people.

Support the actions initiated by the Committee Against American Intervention in China.

5. Read and sell subscriptions to the Committee's publication "Spotlight on the Far East," for the most authoritative and progressive approach on all Far Eastern questions.

Support the campaign of "Greetings to the Liberation Fighters of China." Issued by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, 111 West 42d St.

Role of the American Progressive Movement in Aiding the Struggle of the Chinese Liberation Movement Against American Imperialism and Chinese Semi-Feudalism.

"The victory of the working class in the developed countries and the liberation of the oppressed peoples from the yoke of imperialism are impossible without the formation and the consolidation of the United Revolutionary Front.

"The formation of a United Revolutionary Front is impossible unless the proletariat of the oppressor nations renders direct and determined support to the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples against the imperialism of 'their own country'."

—Stalin: Foundations of Leninism.

1. The American progressive movement has a long and honorable record of support to the Chinese people's movement in the past.

a. 1934—American Friends of the Chinese People, and its magazine "China Today" mobilized support for the struggles of the Chinese people.

b. 1938—Boycott against Japanese goods.

c. 1938—Longshoremen on West Coast stopped shipments of scrap to Japan.

d. 1945—Newly constituted C. P. USA resolution on China and subsequent Times Square demonstration against Hurley mission.

e. GI demonstration in Pacific theatre.

2. 1946—At present we must self-critically admit there has been a serious lack of education, discussion and action in support of the world-shaking struggle of the Chinese people against "our own imperialism," American imperialism.

Bibliography

Mao Tse-tung—Turning Point in China—China's New Democracy.
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Mr. Morris. Will you identify that, Mr. Matusow.

Mr. Matusow. Issued by the New York State Educational Department, Communist Party, 35 East Twelfth Street, New York, November 20, 1948; title "The Great Victories in China and the New Dangers of American Imperialist Intervention. Club discussion outline on the significance of the recent events in China and the tasks of all clubs."

Mr. Morris. Did you receive that from your official position in the Communist Party?

Mr. Matusow. Yes, as a club leader in one of the Communist Party clubs. On page 5, paragraph 1, I would like to quote this in relation to the tasks of the Communist Party, its context here:

The American progressive movement has a long and honorable record of support to the Chinese people's movement in the past: A. 1934. American friends of the Chinese people and the magazine China Today mobilized support for the struggles of the Chinese people.

Relating to the Chinese Communists, we were told to use this in our discussion.

Mr. Morris. In other words, if you had any research to be done, and if you went to China Today, you could accept China Today as an orthodox source of information; is that right?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right, carrying the party line.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us when you were working in the bookshops as to whether or not there was a large or small sale of Solution in Asia?

Mr. MATUSOW. I wouldn't like to give you an exact figure.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is the reason I use the word large or small.

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, it wasn't a large sale. All of the books I have mentioned on China had a large sale in that period. We sold a number of Solution in Asia and the Agnes Smedley books, and the Edgar Snow book, Red Star Over China, and——

Senator FERGUSON. What about the Epstein book?

Mr. MATUSOW. The Epstein book had the largest sale because it was the newest book at the time. Solution in Asia, I believe, was published in 1945. The Epstein book came out in late 1947 or early 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say now that the Solution in Asia book did not have a large sale?

Mr. MATUSOW. It has a smaller sale than the Unfinished Revolution in China.

Senator EASTLAND. Because it was an earlier book?

Mr. MATUSOW. Correct.

Senator EASTLAND. But you also say that the Chinese organization in the State of New York had instructed you that the book, Solution in Asia, represented official Communist policy?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. And therefore you would have promoted the sale?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like if you think it is within the scope of the inquiry to ask the witness some questions on the Book and Magazine Guild. The Book and Magazine Guild was a local of the United Office and Professional Workers Association. It had a contract with the IPR to cover the employment of the employees of the institute.

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the United Office and Professional Workers of America?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the Book and Magazine Guild?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; local 18.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Were you a member of the Communist Party when you were a member of that union?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you, from your own experience, testify that the Book and Magazine Guild was controlled by the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I can.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. All of the locals, local 16, 18, and a few of the other numbers, were located in a building on Twenty-ninth Street, at the office of the United Office and Professional Workers of America. The leaders of that union I knew to be party members because I attended the Communist Party meetings with them. The head of the local 16, Norman Aronson, some of the business agents, one was Jack

Greenspan, a former head of the AYD; Winifred Norma; the Communist Party author, Aaron Kramer, and the head of the placement bureau or union hiring hall, Ethel Beech. I had had a number of meetings with these people in relation to concentration in certain shops or places of employment that were under contract to the UOPWA, and the Book and Magazine Guild. The policy of the Communist Party that was set up by the State Union Committee in New York, disseminated to the union and carried forward, was that all organizations such as trade-unions that had contracts with UOPWA, all political organizations, such as the American Labor Party, the Communist Party, et cetera——

Senator FERGUSON. What others?

Mr. MATUSOW. The American Labor Party, the Progressive Party, the Communist Party; all fraternal organizations or nonprofit organizations, which IPR fitted in that category and was one of the shops or places that were mentioned. They included some direct Communist Party fronts, like the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy, People's Songs, Inc., Civil Rights Congress, Council on African Affairs, Institute of Pacific Relations, et cetera.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you deal with the Institute of Pacific Relations as a front?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; what I am stating here, I didn't refer to all of these organizations as fronts. I am stating that all organizations that fit into the category of nonprofit organizations or had dealt in any way with anything of a political nature, that the party felt would be a place to infiltrate.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know the Lawyers Guild?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; I had no contact with them. Well, as I say, the policy here was that when a vacancy existed in any of these shops, that in the 10-day interim period they had to supply somebody to fill the vacancy——

Mr. MORRIS. That is when the employer had the opportunity to fill the vacancy.

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, the contract, I believe, all of the contracts with these organizations had stated that if the union cannot furnish suitable personnel within 10 days, the employer could seek out personnel elsewhere. But the party concentration policy was that within that 10-day period "We shall furnish a Communist Party member to that organization."

Senator FERGUSON. You mean to say that the union would come to you during that 10 days to supply a Communist Party member?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, they wouldn't directly come to me.

Senator FERGUSON. No, but the Communist Party.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. They would, through certain members in the union, who were in the various youth clubs, for instance, or community clubs. Word would be sent down that there was a vacancy in a shop, and somebody was needed, and always somebody is unemployed to do clerical work, and they would send that person up to get employment.

Senator FERGUSON. So that a Communist would get the job.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, and they high-lighted these organizations that I just mentioned. There were others, but I don't recall all of the names of all of the organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were endeavoring to get as many Communist Party members into organizations, charitable and otherwise, that were dealing in political questions, like the IPR.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the more Communist members you could get into the staff and into the employees, the better off the Communist Party would be.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And IPR was one of those unions that you know that the Communist Party recommended members to?

Mr. MATUSOW. One of the organizations that the union, through the Communist Party, would send party members up to get employment.

Senator EASTLAND. Was Paul Robeson a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. I don't know whether he was directly. I did belong to a club with his son, but not with him directly.

Senator EASTLAND. His son was a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the son's name?

Mr. MATUSOW. Paul Robeson, Jr.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the publishing firm Little, Brown and Co.?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I am.

Mr. MORRIS. They published Solution in Asia.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of anybody in that organization who is a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I belonged to a Communist Party club with Harry McIntyre, the son of the former President of Little, Brown. I believe Mr. McIntyre died a few years ago, and Harry McIntyre was one of the main beneficiaries in the will.

Mr. MORRIS. It was the son of Harry McIntyre?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, we called him Harry McIntyre. He was recruited at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. But the son is the one who was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. I belonged to a club with the son.

Mr. MORRIS. A Communist club?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; a Communist Party youth club on the lower East Side of New York.

Senator FERGUSON. If it does not take too long, will you tell us how they recruited at the university?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1945, a fellow named Art Saha, with a few other fellows, set up a Marxist study group, not called a Communist Party club. That is, using the principles of academic freedom to attract students who are interested in learning all sides of the subject. They get a number of people in the Marxist study group, and on the basis of their appearances there, they would attempt to recruit, and were successful in many cases.

Senator FERGUSON. When they recruited you, did they recruit you directly as an invitation to join the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. In 1947; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In 1947?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So they used this Marxist club as a kind of a front to tell who was interested before they would approach them?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were recruited directly into the party——

Mr. MATUSOW. Not through the Marxist club, but through the AYD, on the same principle.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the same principle. Do you know how many members there were in New York?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, I know the NYC student section of the Communist Party, and I got this from a 1948 convention report of the Communist Party, New York County, stated 900 students on the campuses of New York City schools are members of the party. The total city membership was approximately 25,000.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the publication Science and Society?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Communist publication?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it was.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Matusow?

Mr. MATUSOW. Science and Society was a publication that was required reading for members of the Communist Party and distributed through the party organization rather than solely through the party book shops.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what role James S. Allen had in the Communist Party? Tell us, based upon your own experience in the Party.

Mr. MATSOW. James S. Allen was, and still is, I believe, one of the leading theoreticians on the question of minority groups and the colonial question. In 1935 or 1936 he wrote a book called Negro Question in the United States, which, when I left the party, was being revised as a basic text for Negro people. He also wrote a book on the reconstruction period, called Reconstruction. He wrote one called, I believe, War Minority and Capital.

Senator FERGUSON. Were those books all party-line books?

Mr. MATUSOW. Published by the party, not by any publisher but by the party itself. I believe he had a total of eight or nine books published by the Communists over a period of 1935 to the present day.

Mr. MORRIS. He was also the foreign editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. And his affiliation with the Communist Party was as well known to the members of the party and people close to the party as that of, for instance, Earl Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think, from your experience in the Communist Party, Mr. Matusow, that a man like Fred Field could be active in the Communist organization, interested in an organization for 10 years, without expressing and advocating Communist principles?

Mr. MATUSOW. No; he could not. He would have to, sometime in that 10 years, advocate Communist principles. In the magazine China Today, he did.

Senator FERGUSON. China Today you sold in the book shops.

Mr. MATUSOW. No; we didn't. It was mostly for reference material. I had seen and read copies of the book at the Jefferson School library. According to this, in 1934, and I believe Mr. Field was one of the editors of China Today in 1934——

Senator FERGUSON. Are you testifying now to Frederick Vanderbilt Field being a Communist?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you know that?

Mr. MATUSOW. When I worked at Communist headquarters at 35 East Twelfth Street I got that information. I was a full-time employee of the Communist Party at one time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that when you people worked for the Communist Party, in the positions that you were, that when you got that information you relied on it?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, if it came down from a State or a functionary of the party, somebody in a position to know, you had to take it on its merit. You presumed that a full-time employee or a State officer of the Communist Party is not lying about something. If a man says to me John Doe is a member of the Communist Party, and he is an organizer and has access to membership roles, and so forth, I am not going to think he is lying.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are not going to question it?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. How did they catch on that you were giving information outside of the party line?

Mr. MATUSOW. They never did. It seemed that in 1948 and 1949, I had sold 326 subscriptions to the Sunday Worker in about a 9-week period, and they didn't believe it was possible for anybody to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. They did not think that a good Communist could be disloyal to the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, they thought I was just too active, and they felt that anybody who is too active in the party, doing too much work, must have an ulterior motive. It was strictly a matter of witch hunting and circumstantial evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. You know, they talk a lot about witch hunting outside. They talk about witch hunts here in Washington, of trying to discover or disclose who are Communists in the United States Government. They use that expression, do they not?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you Communists use it in your own organization.

Mr. MATUSOW. No; they never did. I am using it because that is actually what it is.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did they try to ferret out disloyal members to the Communist Party?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; they did. But in most cases, when they booted somebody out of the party, they very seldom had anything to base it on.

Senator FERGUSON. I thought you said in the beginning they were always trying to ferret out disloyal members.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And trying to ascertain whether or not they may be spies in their own organization.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, what method did they have to discover spies?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, they took a quote from one of Lenin's documents where it says that anybody who is too active or works very hard,

you know, over and above that of the normal party members, is somebody who you might suspect because usually he is the agent provocateur.

Senator FERGUSON. That is how they found you. That is, they got suspicious of you.

Mr. MATUSOW. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. Because you did something over and above the line of duty, did they not?

Mr. MATUSOW. They called it that; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And they thought that because you had sold—how many?

Mr. MATUSOW. 326, in 9 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. 326 subscriptions, that you came, probably you did come, within the definition of a saboteur.

Mr. MATUSOW. Or somebody who would be looked upon with suspicion.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and that is how they really discovered and got you out?

Mr. MATUSOW. One of the things. They also found in my library some issues of the Communist Party organ Political Affairs that I had purchased in a second-hand bookshop, that had the stamp of the Office of Strategic Services on the front cover. There were six covers. In fact, I was working in Communist Party headquarters at the time, and picked them up in a second-hand bookshop, next door to Communist Party headquarters. That was in 1948, and I brought them up to party headquarters, and showed them to a few people and we had a good laugh about it. But in 1951, somebody brought that up to me.

Senator FERGUSON. And said that because you had them, they discounted the fact that you actually bought them in a second-hand bookshop and thought you had them from the OSS?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right. Then they claimed that I was getting a disability compensation from the Government for injuries sustained in the last war, which I was. But they didn't believe that. They thought I was getting income from somebody else.

Senator FERGUSON. Rather than from the Government?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So they have a means of checking on the loyalty of their members.

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, and they maintain dossiers on most of the membership.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they find these in your library? Had they gone into your library?

Mr. MATUSOW. I had brought them up to party headquarters when I bought them, and I imagine somebody up there made a note of it, and put it on file, and 2 years later it was brought out on charges.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there is quite a bit of suspicion among members of the Communist Party as to whether or not there is disloyalty in the party itself.

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, sir; and there was another charge, and they stated that I committed an act of white chauvinism and the charge was that I was working for a Negro newspaper, Amsterdam News in New York, and because I was working for a Negro group, I was

keeping a Negro out of a job, for a short period of time, and that I was not contributing to the working class or to the class struggle, because I worked for this anti-Negro newspaper.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a Negro newspaper.

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes; it was the Amsterdam News and because I worked for that newspaper that was opposed to the struggles and the fights of the Negro people.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was still a Negro newspaper?

Mr. MATUSOW. And I recall the person who made that charge, and I said, "What did he do?" and he said he sewed mink coats in the garment district of New York.

Senator FERGUSON. When they suspended you, did they give you a trial?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, a good kangaroo court.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us something about the trial, how did they try you?

Mr. MATUSOW. I was called up to Communist Party headquarters and sat in the back room on the twelfth floor, at 35 West Twelfth Street. This former New York policeman and Communist Party member conducted the interrogation along the lines that I just mentioned, "Were you an OSS agent, where do you get your money, how much money does your father have, how much money does your mother have. Did you sell so many subscription to the Daily Worker, how come you were able to do that?" At the end of the meeting, I said, "What are the specific charges?" They said, "There are none." I said, "What are they?" and they said they can't say. "You tell us."

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have a lawyer?

Mr. MATUSOW. No, it doesn't exist in the party.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it an open hearing?

Mr. MATUSOW. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How many people were at the trial?

Mr. MATUSOW. Two.

Senator FERGUSON. The two you mentioned?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And anybody else present?

Mr. MATUSOW. Nobody.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the three of you?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And at the end, what happened?

Mr. MATUSOW. They told me if I know what is good for me, I better stay away from Communist meetings and Communist groups or I might get into some trouble, and at that point I picked up my hat and stole away.

Senator FERGUSON. They announced the verdict right there.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. The policeman and the other man?

Mr. MATUSOW. Just one of them, Joe Bucholt.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his connection with the party?

Mr. MATUSOW. He was a State organizer of the Labor Youth League and a State chairman of the Communist Youth movement in New York State.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he announce the verdict?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes, he did. And then it was announced in the Daily Worker about 5 days later.

Senator FERGUSON. What did it say in the Daily Worker?

Mr. MATUSOW. That I was expelled from the Communist Party for being an "enemy agent." I had engaged in irregularities in the subscription drive in 1949. I had just come back from the Southwest. They gave a description of me, and that was all.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what you call an official ouster?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct. On the basis of that, I was thrown out of a few meetings since.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you tried to get back into some meetings?

Mr. MATUSOW. I attended a few. I attended one 2 months ago, in Ohio.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened to you there?

Mr. MATUSOW. I got away with it until I testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and they found out who I was and were very unhappy about it. I tried covering the founding convention of the National Negro Labor Council, for the Dayton News; tried to cover that meeting. As soon as I arrived, I was informed that since I was expelled from the Communist Party, I could not cover the meeting of the National Negro Labor Council, which is supposedly a non-Communist group.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have to have any particular method of getting into these Communist meetings?

Mr. MATUSOW. Well, if you walk in and know their terminology and when to laugh and when to be mad, you can get away with it, if they don't know your face.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have to know the party line to sit in there?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have been able to use the right smile or the right anger and so forth, to stay in some of the meetings?

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think this will help you with the Communists, this meeting here this morning? It is public.

Mr. MATUSOW. I don't think it will hurt me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may have a hard time getting in their meetings; is that it?

Mr. MATUSOW. I doubt it.

Senator FERGUSON. You think you can still get in some?

Mr. MATUSOW. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You appreciate that you are under oath here.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that what you are saying here about certain people is under oath.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that what you say about their work is under oath.

Mr. MATUSOW. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And you want to leave the record stand now just as it is?

Mr. MATUSOW. Right again, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. No further questions.

Senator EASTLAND. Thank you, sir.

We will recess.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m. the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland, Watkins, and Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Greene, will you be sworn.

Senator WATKINS. Stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GREENE. I do.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JEROME D. GREENE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1929–33, ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that Mr. Greene has been called here today at the suggestion of the institute as a person who has known the institute for many years and who, according to the institute, is in a position to testify before this inquiry today.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a statement that you would like to put in the record?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, and I would like to read it.

Mr. MORRIS. You would like to read it?

Mr. GREENE. I would like to read it, yes. It will take about 6 minutes, I suppose.

Senator WATKINS. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. That is perfectly all right. You go ahead, Mr. Greene.

Mr. GREENE. The heading of my statement states the offices I have held in the Institute of Pacific Relations which is my main competence to speak. Some of my experience in various positions I have held in the meantime have a bearing on it, and I wonder if you would like

me to go into my previous experience at all and the positions I have held or not.

Senator WATKINS. As background, Mr. Greene, I think if you want to give us a brief outline. We don't want to spend too much time on it.

Mr. GREENE. My interest in the Far East is primarily due to the fact that I was born there. My father was a Christian missionary in Japan. I lived there in my boyhood. I came home to go to school and college. After a considerable period at Harvard in administrative posts I became manager of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. Later I was the chief executive and organized the Rockefeller Foundation. I was in there for 4 years. Then I went into the banking business for 15 years, during which I made four trips to the Far East and had a considerable acquaintance with people out there. I might say in particular that I had dealings with five members of the Japanese Cabinet, three of whom were Prime Ministers, one was Minister of Finance, all assassinated because they stood in the way of militarist demands which culminated at Pearl Harbor.

On returning after 15 years, in 1932, to my great surprise I was invited to serve as professor of international politics at the University College of Wales in England, a position for which I felt no qualification because I had not had the discipline and training of a scholar, but I was told they didn't want a pundit, they wanted somebody who was familiar as a businessman with political conditions, which have to be considered in connection with national credits.

Senator WATKINS. You are an American, are you not?

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. A natural-born citizen?

Mr. GREENE. I vote for President. Many people think the Constitution says that you have to be a native citizen. It doesn't. It says you have to be a natural-born citizen. I am a natural-born citizen.

Senator WATKINS. Anyway, you are a citizen and did not come in by naturalization.

Mr. GREENE. No; I did not.

Senator WATKINS. I just asked that because when you suggested they asked you over to Wales to be a professor over there that was something rather extraordinary; was it not?

Mr. GREENE. Well, as a matter of fact, I think they were very anxious to have an American. The chair that I held was founded by a rich Welshman, Lord Davis, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson, and he called the chair the Woodrow Wilson Professorship of International Politics, so there was perhaps a certain propriety in my being there.

I then came back and I have been in various trusteeships in Boston, which have kept me busy, but I consider myself retired.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor, would you like to read your statement?

Mr. GREENE. I would like to; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, by all means.

Mr. GREENE. I think I can be most helpful to the subcommittee in its inquiry into the conduct of the Institute of Pacific Relations by a statement of the origin, purposes, and activities of the institute, as to which my testimony as one of its founders may be considered competent. As a matter of fact, I wrote the constitution in 1927. My most active connection with the institute was limited to the period

from 1927 to 1933. In 1932 I went to Great Britain for 2 years, except for a brief return to the United States to attend the institute's conference in 1933 at Banff. On returning to this country in 1934 I moved my residence from New York to Cambridge. I continued as a trustee and a member of the executive committee and attended meetings until 1939. After that it became impossible for me to attend meetings regularly and I therefore resigned. I continued, however, to keep fairly well informed about the institute's activities and publications. In a general way, not in a detailed way.

A group of public-spirited persons in Honolulu and the Pacific coast, alarmed by the bitterness of nationalistic feeling and the apparent conflict of national interests in the countries bordering the Pacific, felt that something should be done to promote international understanding and thus avert a crisis that might lead to war. Let us put an end, they said, to making faces at each other and exchanging verbal recriminations from opposite sides of the Pacific, and instead organize periodic conferences at which unofficial but competent people from different countries can sit round a table and try to reconcile their divergent interests by frank discussion leading to mutual enlightenment, if not agreement.

The decision to try such an experiment in the promotion of mutual understanding and good will was made at a preliminary conference held in Honolulu in 1925, which I did not attend, with members from the American mainland, Hawaii, China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The meeting demonstrated so well the advantages of such a conference that it was decided to form a national group in each country and at a second conference, 2 years later, to form a federation of such groups in an international body. The national groups were duly formed in advance of the 1927 conference, with the addition of a group from Great Britain, and each came prepared with papers on matters of timely importance (121 in all) which were circulated to all members of the conference and furnished reference material for the discussions. Observers attended from the League of Nations and the International Labor Office.

While national antagonisms were not without some emotional expression, particularly by the Japanese and Chinese, the discussions were held under admirable restraint and exhibited a degree of mutual forbearance and good will that fully realized the hopes of the members. The greatest importance was attached to research and publication both by the national groups and under the auspices of an international research committee. Not the least important byproduct of the conference was the formation of acquaintances and friendships among the participants.

Thus a pattern was set for future conferences, and before adjournment a constitution was adopted providing for the establishment of a Pacific Council consisting of one member from each national group and having charge of the institute's affairs between conferences, to call conferences, and to secure the funds needed for the conferences and for the international research committee. I had the honor of presiding over the Pacific Council from 1929 to 1931, having succeeded Dr. Wilbur and being in turn succeeded by Newton D. Baker. With the foregoing statements as my background, I shall give the result of my experience and observation as regards the integrity of the

institute in adhering to its exclusive aims of competent, disinterested research, of fact-finding in the areas of possible conflict, and of conference in which divergent views could be frankly expressed and efforts made to reconcile them.

To guard against any temptation for the institute as such to espouse one side of an international dispute, whether as between nations or as between political, economic, or social theories, the rule was established from the beginning and strictly adhered to that no resolutions should ever be passed concerning such matters. Neither the institute nor anyone purporting to speak for it could advocate one international or domestic policy or another. It merely sought to make available to the public in the several countries the facts bearing on a dispute, including such national or individual divergences of opinion or interest as a dispassionate judgment would take into account.

The record of research, publication, and conference during the past 25 years reveals many differences of opinion, not only between national groups but also between individuals in the same group. In the publications of the institute the sole responsibility for opinions expressed and facts presented has rested in the authors. This wise policy has also been adopted by other private research organizations and is admirably expressed in every issue of that distinguished quarterly, Foreign Affairs, as follows:

> The articles in Foreign Affairs do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that by keeping clear of mere vagaries, Foreign Affairs can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can be identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.

Similar disclaimers are applied to all publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

As a citizen I would deplore any evidence that the Institute of Pacific Relations or any other organization either purposely or as a tool of a foreign power attempted to influence or control the policy of our Government. As one of the founders of the institute I would be shocked and humiliated by any evidence that it had thus betrayed its fundamental ideals. The hundreds of members of the institute in all parts of this country, representing every variety of political and economic views, and united only in their confidence in its spirt and methods, would not tolerate such a betrayal if they had grounds for suspecting it. I have seen no evidence that their confidence has been impaired.

Senator WATKINS. Let me ask you a question at that point, Mr. Greene. "I have seen no evidence that their confidence has been impaired." In other words, if that means what it seems to mean, you have examined all the evidence and you have given the institute a complete clearance and acquittal of any accusations of any kind.

Mr. GREENE. I can't say that I have made an examination of everything that has been published and written, but I have kept fairly close track of the adherence to the general policy that I have mentioned. I may say that yesterday I went through the minutes during the years when I was less in contact with the institute, and time and

again the caution was insisted upon that the institute as such took no position on any question whatever, political or economic.

Senator WATKINS. When you say "I have seen no evidence that their confidence has been impaired"——

Mr. GREENE. I mean by that if they had done what has been alleged, there would have been any number of members, including myself, who would have made the most violent protest.

Senator WATKINS. If you had known it, I do not think there is any doubt about it. If you had known that some things were going on, for instance, which have been called to the attention of this committee, you probably would have protested.

Mr. GREENE. I don't know whether I would have protested or not. It depends on what it was.

Senator WATKINS. Have you read the evidence before this committee?

Mr. GREENE. I have read some of it. I don't know whether I would have protested or not because I think some of the things which may have been objected to in this committee are things which represent a legitimate or at least a frank divergence of opinion. That is one thing which the institute stands for all the time, the freedom to express their opinions.

Senator WATKINS. Some of the evidence may have been of that character, but I have listened to a great deal of it and I am trying to catch up on the reading of this evidence, and it seems to me that there is something there which certainly requires explanation.

Mr. GREENE. I think I perhaps cover that a little bit by what I say further.

Senator WATKINS. When you said "I have seen no evidence," I wondered just how far you had gone, if you had read the complete hearings.

Mr. GREENE. There would have been a very general protest by the membership at a departure from what they all recognize as fundamental principles. That does not mean that the institute controls the utterances of every individual ever connected with it. It didn't mean that. But it meant that the institute as an institute was very careful to protect the integrity of its fundamental principles as I have outlined them.

Senator WATKINS. Just how close were you to the operations of the Insitute of Pacific Relations after you were president? Were you a member of the board of trustees?

Mr. GREENE. I was a member of the board of trustees I think until 1940. Up to that time, up to 1939, I attended with some regularity. After that I found that I could not, and I resigned for that reason.

Senator WATKINS. How often did you meet?

Mr. GREENE. I think the executive committee met, I think, once a month.

Senator WATKINS. Did you meet with them once a month?

Mr. GREENE. I met with them occasionally but not regularly.

Senator WATKINS. Where did they meet?

Mr. GREENE. They met in New York.

Senator WATKINS. Could you tell us about how much of the time—because this has something to do with what you have said there and probably what you will say. I would like to get the background in

the record of just how close to the operation of this association you were during this period of years.

Mr. GREENE. I was living in Boston. I wasn't living in New York. I wasn't dropping into the office all the time. I didn't pretend to have that kind of familiarity. But at the meetings that I did attend I learned what decisions were before them and what publications were in prospect or had been completed. There was no shred of evidence that there was anything there inconsistent with what we were aiming to do.

I confess an element in my confidence was my confidence in some of my colleagues. I mention that later here.

Senator WATKINS. Just which ones?

Mr. GREENE. I place it first in Mr. Holland. I think that the committee has got to weigh, as I have said later here, the perfectly patent integrity of people who are testifying before it as against allegations and insinuations by some of your witnesses——

Senator WATKINS. There have been of course witnesses here——

Mr. GREENE. Who have nothing like the record and reputation that these people have.

Senator WATKINS. That may be true, but at the same time if you are investigating a matter of this kind that has to do with the security of the United States, you know that you can't for instance get people who are operating in an apparatus like the Communists have had here who probably have the best reputation. They wouldn't have. The only way you can get any evidence of what was going on is by some of the men themselves telling you about it.

Mr. GREENE. I deal with one instance of that later on in my paper, if you will allow me.

Senator WATKINS. I want to find out just how much contact you had with the actual operations of this group. I would like to ask you this: Is it not a fact that the principal activities of the association were turned over, that is, the carrying out of the policies was turned over to the executive secretary?

Mr. GREENE. Naturally, yes; any executive is supposed——

Senator WATKINS. He was given rather wide latitude, rather wide powers to go ahead and carry out the policies as he interpreted them.

Mr. GREENE. So long as he had the confidence of his employers.

Senator WATKINS. During the time that you were president who was the executive secretary?

Mr. GREENE. In 1931 Mr. Edward Carter became secretary general. I can't remember when his term expired or when his tenure expired.

Senator WATKINS. Then who followed him during the time you had direct contact with the association?

Mr. GREENE. I think Mr. Lockwood was secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barnes became secretary up until 1934.

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And then Mr. Field was secretary.

Mr. GREENE. Yes, I can't remember those dates. I knew Barnes pretty well.

Senator WATKINS. During each of these secretaries you were in close touch, attending these executive meetings that you have spoken of?

Mr. GREENE. I saw them occasionally; yes.

Senator WATKINS. Occasionally. How often?

Mr. GREENE. I don't want to overstress my familiarity with it. The main point of my paper is to bring out the fact that nothing ever happened to my knowledge to change the policy of the responsible people who were the trustees. I am dealing later in this statement with what may have been done by people who had some connection with the institute which didn't in the least affect that general policy of the trustees.

Senator WATKINS. Do you not concede that it would be possible for a subversive movement to infiltrate if they tried, an organization of this kind which was left largely to one or two men to operate?

Mr. GREENE. I can imagine their trying it, yes; and I can also imagine their being very much disappointed in the results.

Senator WATKINS. We will see as you go on. I thought maybe in support of this statement you made you could outline how——

Mr. GREENE. I have seen no evidence of it.

Senator WATKINS. You probably haven't, and maybe a good many other people haven't, because they were not in contact with it.

Mr. GREENE. I wish most emphatically to place on the record with this committee my conviction that the institute has not departed from its declared principles. No evidence that it has can be construed from the extreme views or misconduct of individuals, or from that "Broad hospitality to divergent ideas" which is not only accepted, but stoutly defended. On the other hand, no one whose conduct or writing is open to a serious question of subservience to a foreign power or of advocating the overthrow of our Government by violence has the slightest claim to immunity because of a connection with the IPR or any other organization. That is individual responsibility and deserves the strictest scrutiny by law enforcement agencies.

As regards American policy toward China, it is not easy to say, even with the advantage of hindsight, just what it should have been. An overconfident judgment on that point betrays ignorance rather than political insight. For the problem has been a baffling one at every stage, and still is. The problem of mutual understanding between cultures, manners, and methods of thought and action as far apart as those of China and the United States is a formidable one. That is one of the many problems that the Institute of Pacific Relations set itself to study; but what remains to be learned and to penetrate popular understanding is vast compared with the little that has been learned. But of one thing we can be sure; the technique of independent research and conference is right.

Your committee has been concerned about the possibility of Communist infiltration in the staff or among writers of IPR publications. This raises two questions; first, has there been any such infiltration; and second, if so is there any evidence that has compromised the institute's fundamental policy of abstaining from expressing, or even formulating, corporate judgments or actions in favor of or against governmental action?

As for infiltration I do not exclude the possibility that it has been attempted. Its results must have been disappointing to any who made the attempt. For I know no evidence that the institute has ever succumbed to any such insidious influence that may secretly have been brought to bear on it.

At this point I should like to interpolate some observations bearing on the much-discussed question of guilt by association. During the

period following our recognition of the Soviet Government, when the iron curtain was less tightly drawn than it is today, many Americans, and especially so-called young liberals, cherished the vain hope that by promoting friendly contacts between the American people and the Russian people and by making an open-minded study of the workings of the Communist system, national antagonisms might be softened. Some went so far as to make the Soviet Government regard them as friends in a political sense and thus as possible tools of Soviet policy.

The Stalin-Hitler alliance destroyed the illusions of most of these young people, but the record of their Russian contacts remained to plague them. The question of their guilt by association can be justly considered only in the light of their subsequent behavior when the sinister implications of fellow traveling along the Communist line gained a clearer significance. These young people and some of their elders may have been suckers for Soviet propaganda, but they were no more fooled than were the Russians who had counted on them as tools of Soviet intrigue. Yet their credibility as loyal Americans today seems often to have been less accepted than that of Communist turncoats whose guilt by association was that of admitted traitors.

If I may, I would like to say I am tempted to adopt a verse of Scripture by saying there seems to be more joy in the heaven of Washington investigation authorities over one avowed American Communist or foreign spy, who has professed conversion to democratic ideals than over 90 and 9, whether once taken in by Soviet deception or not, who always were and still are loyal Americans.

Communists love confessions, whether it be to justify the punishment of their political victims or to save their own skins.

Mr. MORRIS. That is not part of your statement.

Mr. GREENE. No.

Senator WATKINS. Are you adopting that? Did somebody else say that?

Mr. GREENE. No, sir; I thought of that after I had finished my speech.

Senator WATKINS. So you want to make that part of your statement?

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

So far as the Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned, I do not believe that in the staff or among the members there were any individuals, whatever their relations with Russians or with subversive organizations may have been alleged to be, who succeeded, if they tried, in deflecting the institute by a hair's breadth from its principles as I have stated them. Even in the case of Frederick V. Field, who ceased to be employed by the IPR in 1940 and was requested in 1947 to resign from the board of trustees, when his commitment to the Communist line became manifest, long before the present investigation, his earlier excellent services in administration and research showed nothing but complete fidelity to the corporate policies of the institute. He was the author of an economic handbook of the Pacific, an objective, scholarly, and authoritative work. During the period of my most frequent association with Field, especially in connection with three IPR conferences, I admired his industry, ability, and liked him personally. I was subsequently pained and shocked by his defection, almost as a father would feel whose son had betrayed his confidence.

I have spoken above of the young so-called liberals who were beguiled into interest in, or sympathy with, communism. Their radicalism contained two elements. The first, and I think the dominant one, was a revolt against reactionary attitudes and against being expected to accept ready-made economic and social doctrines. They were determined to be critical and to think for themselves. It was often a rather callow and juvenile attitude deserving a tolerant sympahty rather than contempt. Nothink did more to goad and confirm it than the intolerance and stand-patism of some of their elders. The manifestation of the latter qualities, in my opinion, tends to produce more pinks and reds than all Moscow's efforts in that direction, which the common sense of the American people can be trusted to reject. Most of us are prone to take the radicalism of young people too seriously. It is something like measles, from which most of them recover.

The second element in youthful radicalism is youthful idealism. This is its saving grace, and a failure to recognize it tends rather to confirm than to cure the radicalism.

The inclusion of Russia, having obviously large territorial interests in the Pacific area, in the international body of the Institute of Pacific Relations at a time when she had diplomatic relations with all the other countries concerned, was a matter of elementary fairness and common sense. An organization for the study of international relations in the Pacific that left out of account Russia could not pretend to be making a comprehensive or realistic study of the area. The Russians had to be offered membership. In 1929, on my way to the IPR conference in Kyoto, Japan, I went by way of Moscow for the express purpose of asking the Soviet authorities to permit an unofficial group of Russians to attend the Kyoto conference. I went first to the head of the official Society for Cultural Relations and was referred by him to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinoff. He was civil, not not too cordial. "My colleagues," he said, "do not like going to international conferences only to be treated like pariahs." But quickly he added, "though personally I find it stimulating." He finally consented to allow two Soviet newspaper correspondents in Japan to attend the conference as observers. At the same time, however, an official Soviet newspaper denounced the institute as a tool of Wall Street imperialists.

Before the following conference held in Shanghai in 1931 the formation of a Soviet unit of the institute was authorized but no delegates were sent to that conference. It was hardly surprising that Russian participation in the institute amounted to little and was abandoned in 1939. The pattern of unofficial representation was hardly to be appreciated by a country whose citizens were not free to express their own opinions. Free discussion violated the most sacred of Soviet principles.

In conclusion allow me to express the hope that in weighing the testimony heard in this investigation so far as it relates to the integrity of the Institute of Pacific Relations, your honorable committee will give due weight to the matter of the integrity of its most responsible leaders, with whom I have felt it an honor to be associated—Ray Lyman Wilbur, Newton D. Baker, Cary L. Alsberg, Philip C. Jessup, and Robert G. Sproul. Not one of them would have tolerated the

slightest departure from those principles for which the institute has always stood and without which it could have made no claim on their interest and support. Integrity and loyalty, after all, are factors in the light of which irresponsible charges and malicious innuendoes have little weight in unprejudiced minds.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Greene, how much of the proceedings before this committee have you read?

Mr. GREENE. I have glanced through I think a couple of volumes.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Mr. GREENE. I don't pretend to be familiar with them at all.

Mr. MORRIS. You served on the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the year 1941, did you not, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. Probably; if that says so.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the last time you served?

Mr. GREENE. I think so; yes. It must have been.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to offer you this, which is a list of staff members and the make-up of the nominating committee in 1941, Mr. Greene.

The nominating committee in 1941 was made up of Miss Harriet Moore, chairman; Frederick V. Field; and you, Jerome D. Greene. We also have ex officio Edward C. Carter and Ray Lyman Wilbur. Can you recall that particular meeting, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. No; I certainly cannot. I must have been very dependent on my colleagues to suggest names of people that I didn't know. Some of them I did know.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the function of the nominating committee to your recollection?

Mr. GREENE. It was to prepare a list of nominations for action by the trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this not indicate that Miss Moore, Mr. Field, and yourself made up a list of officers to serve?

Mr. GREENE. I think so; yes. I don't know how far Mr. Carter and Mr. Wilbur made suggestions.

Mr. MORRIS. Were the ex officio members actually present, do you know?

Mr. GREENE. I suppose so; but I don't know that Dr. Wilbur was. I suppose Carter must have been; I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recall this particular meeting?

Mr. GREENE. I don't recall it particularly; no. These things are pretty formal things. A list of names is gotten together. Somebody draws up a list. Then somebody makes suggestions of additions or omissions. Then we agree, and the thing is done. That was 11 years ago. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Greene, we have had testimony from several witnesses that both Miss Moore and Mr. Field were Communists. We brought both Miss Moore and Mr. Field down to answer the charges, and both of them elected to refuse to answer the question whether or not they had been Communists, on the grounds that their answer would incriminate them.

Mr. GREENE. I am ashamed of them for doing so.

Mr. MORRIS. Then as we look at this nominating committee in 1941, which is made up of Miss Moore, Mr. Field, and yourself, with the two ex officio members, do you think it is possible that they in the light

of that evidence which I have just mentioned could have exercised some Communist influence on the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. GREENE. I think the best judgment as to that would be formed by somebody who is familiar with the persons nominated.

Mr. MORRIS. You were present, though, Mr. Greene, at this meeting of the nominating committee.

Mr. GREENE. I can't pretend that I knew everybody on the list.

Mr. MORRIS. I am just talking about the nominating committee there. According to this list, Miss Harriet Moore, chairman, Frederick V. Field, Jerome D. Greene, Edward C. Carter, ex officio, Ray Lyman Wilbur, ex officia.

Mr. GREENE. Now, the question is, Whom did they nominate?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. We have the list here.

Mr. GREENE. I would have to be shown that list to refresh my memory.

Mr. MARKS. We have a list here, Mr. Morris, of people they nominated.

Mr. GREENE. The chairman was Ray Lyman Wilbur, the vice chairman Miss Ada L. Comstock, then William R. Herod, Philip C. Jessup, Benjamin H. Kizer, Philo W. Parker, Robert Gordon Sproul, acting secretary Edward C. Carter, assistant secretary Miss Katrine R. C. Greene, treasurer Francis S. Harmon, Mrs. Rose W. Landres. I can't read any infiltration into that list.

Mr. MORRIS. The question, though, Mr. Greene, is do you think in view of the testimony we have had about Miss Moore and Mr. Field who were your associates on this nominating committee, that it is possible in view of that evidence that they may have caused some Communist influence to have been brought into the institute?

Mr. GREENE. No. Quite the contrary. I think it is a manifestation of the fact that whatever leanings they may have had in that direction, which I suppose would develop progressively during that general period, had no visible effect in the direction of infiltration or affecting the make-up of the slate of officers. To me it is a very gratifying evidence. I will admit that from your point of view it looks mighty suspicious. Miss Moore refused to answer, Mr. Field refused to answer. But as a matter of fact those people were perfectly capable of understanding the limitations of qualities for membership in the institute and observed those limitations.

Mr. MORRIS. I draw your attention to the secretariat at that time, Mr. Greene. I made a list of that on that same page. Did you know Mr. Chen Han-seng in the secretariat of that year?

Mr. GREENE. No. Would you like me to tell you who I did know?

Mr. MORRIS. No. This is the secretariat now. Do you know what the function of the secretariat was in the IPR?

Mr. GREENE. It was a staff to which the general secretary assigned various jobs of publication, research, and various administrative things. They were the staff, the method by which the general secretary carried out his work.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Marks, do you have a question?

Mr. MARKS. The secretary to which you are referring is the Pacific council, the international council. I believe Mr. Greene's associations were with the American council, is that correct, Mr. Greene? So we wouldn't——

Mr. GREENE. Yes; the American council.

Senator WATKINS. Cannot the witness explain? Does he understand?

Mr. MARKS. I am sorry, I was just going to suggest that it is 11 years ago and he might not recall——

Senator WATKINS. He can say so.

Mr. MARKS. All right.

Senator WATKINS. In court or anywhere else the witness does his own testifying.

Mr. MORRIS. Your point, Mr. Marks, is that this is the international secretariat.

Mr. MARKS. I think that is right. You can ask him the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was the international secretariat lodged, Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. At that time in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you have any experience with the people mentioned on this list of the secretariat?

Mr. GREENE. This list that you gave me?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; the secretariat list. That was in the same year these people served on the secretariat and, as Mr. Marks pointed out, it is of the international council.

Mr. GREENE. I remember Miss Austern, Ruth Carter, P. E. Corbett—is that the Corbett, of Portland, Ore.?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No.

Mr. MORRIS. The point is, Mr. Greene, if you feel any of those people were Communists at the time.

Mr. GREENE. I certainly did not; no. Nobody had any anxieties on that point at that time, I can assure you.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that four of those people are now in Red China?

Mr. GREENE. No; I don't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Several of them are officials of the Red Chinese Government.

Mr. GREENE. I will depend on you for that information.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all in our hearings here, Mr. Greene. I don't like to supply information. I should only ask you questions.

Did you know, for instance, that Y. Y. Hsu, Chen Han-seng, and Ch'ao-ting Chi are now three officials of the Chinese Communist government? Shouldn't that give us reason to believe that perhaps these people were exercising a Communist influence on the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. GREENE. I can see no sign of it. Even in the case of Field, as long as he was there, there is not the slightest evidence that he was working in that direction. His final defection, as I recall it, came as a shock and a grief to everybody.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not closely supervise the work of these people, though?

Mr. GREENE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You know, for instance, that Michael Greenberg has been identified as a Communist here. As I said, Harriet Moore. And Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is now over in Red China.

Mr. GREENE. By identified, you mean proved to be?

Mr. MORRIS. People who were in the Communist movement together with them and who have abandoned the Communist movement have so testified.

Mr. GREENE. Yes. The testimony I suppose is unequivocably accurate?

Mr. MORRIS. We don't know.

Mr. GREENE. The strong presumption is against the character of the witnesses affecting the work that the IPR carried on under these auspices.

Senator WATKINS. I will say to you that some of these witnesses have testified in the courts of the United States and they have been believed by juries and they have been used by the prosecuting arm of the Government as genuine witnesses who were telling the truth. So when you say that the presumption is against them, I think that may be in your mind, but the fact of the matter is that the Government has taken an entirely different position.

Mr. GREENE. I am not passing upon the guilt or innocence of those people. I am talking about the effect upon the policies of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. You were characterizing these people, and I am just calling your attention to the fact that the presumption is not against them. The presumption has been that they were telling the truth, because the Government has taken them and used them as witnesses.

Mr. GREENE. I have not said there was a presumption in their favor. I am saying there is no presumption in favor of the charge that they affected the institute. It is perfectly possible for some of these people who were extremely leftist to be competent secretaries and clerks and researchers. It is perfectly possible that they could give good services, and if the service they rendered turned out to have a Communist slant, it would have been rejected.

Senator WATKINS. If it had been known. I take it for granted, Mr. Greene, no one is thinking for a moment that you would knowingly have taken a Communist in and put him in any of these positions.

Mr. GREENE. No.

Senator WATKINS. Because as we understand communism it is part of their doctrine to overthrow this Government by force and violence.

Mr. GREENE. Therefore——

Senator WATKINS. I take it many of these men—in fact I think the large majority of them are men of very high character and would not for a moment have stood for anything of that nature had they known it, but that isn't our problem. We know that many organizations in this country have been infiltrated by Communists because they could not have accomplished the things they have accomplished unless they had done that. They have done it in other nations and there is no reason why we shouldn't look at it. It is our job to find out whether it is true or not true.

Mr. GREENE. The best evidence as to whether the infiltration, if it took place, was successful is to how it was effected in the utterances, in the publications of the institute. So I think a search of the very voluminous records of the IPR is your source for any indication that the responsible activities of the institute had that leaning.

Senator WATKINS. That is one source.

Mr. GREENE. I feel almost like challenging you to produce any evidence that the publications of the institute show that tendency on the part of the institute. There has to be a wide hospitality to divergent views. As a matter of fact, apart from the question of totali-

tarianism, which identifies the Nazis and the Soviet people pretty closely, apart from that you can't prevent having people thinking of the philosophical merits of Marxism. Even Tolstoy was a philosophical anarchist. Those differences of theoretical opinion have got to be recognized, and there is no way of controlling individual beliefs or expressions as far as that goes. But so far as disloyalty to the Government goes, the evidence has got to be apparent in the only way in which the Institute of Pacific Relations expresses itself, which is through its publications and conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Do I take it, then, Mr. Greene, that the summation on these two items of your testimony on this score is that even if Harriet Moore and Frederick V. Field served with you on this committee, and were Communists at that time, in your opinion they did not give expression to any Communist ideas or Communist purposes?

Mr. GREENE. Involving the Institute of Pacific Relations, certainly. I say that positively.

Mr. MORRIS. If there were Communists on this list of the secretariat, you feel that their expressions and their writings did not reflect their Communist connections——

Mr. GREENE. I wouldn't say that at all.

Mr. MORRIS. In the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. GREENE. As far as the responsibility of the Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned, they did not affect it.

Mr. MORRIS. Then at the same time you did not know the individual work of these people on the secretariat?

Mr. GREENE. I became acquainted with Miss Harriet Moore I think for the first time at Banff in 1933. I knew of her as an extremely able, I believe summa cum laude, graduate of Bryn Mawr College.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. I have none.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. GREENE. Do you excuse me, then?

Senator WATKINS. Yes; and thank you for your testimony.

Call your next witness, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Lockwood, will you stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give in the matter pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, N. J., ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a statement, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you like that to go into the record or would you like to read it?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I would like your permission to read it if I may.

Senator WATKINS. I would rather he read it because then he is

under oath. Otherwise, there is a question whether it is sworn to or not.

Mr. Lockwood. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this committee as a witness and to place at its disposal such information as I have concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations.

For many years I have been closely associated with the American Council of the Institute as a staff member, a trustee, and an American citizen professionally concerned with research and teaching in the far-eastern field. From 1935 to 1940 I was on the American council's research staff, and was its secretary from 1941 to 1943. Since 1946 I have been a member of the board of trustees of the American IPR, and have had occasion to use the institute's publications extensively in following far-eastern affairs. For 15 years or more, therefore, I have had a fairly close knowledge of its activities; particularly I should say those of the American council.

First let me say I fully share the aversion of members of this committee to communism and all its works. I believe that totalitarianism in any form is a threat to every ideal we cherish in American life, and every hope of betterment in the rest of the world.

It is for this very reason that I was first attracted to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and have long cooperated in its activities. For the preservation of free institutions depends upon knowledge and its wide dissemination. And knowledge depends upon free inquiry, such as the institute was organized to encourage in our relations with the vast, turbulent, and little-understood continent of Asia. No one would be more indignant than I to discover that the IPR had become, wittingly or unwittingly, the tool of Communist conspiracy or of Soviet designs upon the free world.

The truth is, in my opinion, that the Institute of Pacific Relations has never been subverted to Communist ends. From fairly extensive knowledge of its operations I believe it has remained true to its principles of nonpartisan investigation and free discussion. If the Communists tried to use it to further their designs, then on the record they failed. One need not endorse every single publication or action associated with the institute to affirm this conviction. It rests on an appraisal of the full record.

The outstanding fact about the institute is the tremendous contribution it has made to knowledge of the Pacific area. For this the whole free world is in its debt. It has striven to provide the first requirement of an intelligent and successful approach to Asia: an understanding of its basic facts and problems, arrived at by free inquiry. This is hardly a Communist objective, nor one which the Communists welcome. They themselves view everything from the premise of a rigid and infallible dogma, prescribed for everyone. They can succeed in Asia only as the democratic world fails to understand and deal intelligently with the forces at work. The best guaranty of this is dispassionate study, and an open market for free ideas where we may search for the truth.

Now free inquiry means controversy, of course, in a situation as explosive as that of Asia. For a decade the Far East has been an arena of war and revolution. Facts were often scanty; interpretations differed; feelings often ran high. Anyone with a knowledge of the problems of operating the Institute of Pacific Relations in this tense

atmosphere can testify to the difficulties. Especially with the advantage of hindsight it is not difficult to point out certain errors of judgment.

Nevertheless, it is striking fact that the great body of scholars and close observers of far-eastern affairs in all countries outside Communist control will testify to the good faith of the institute's leaders, and its large measure of success in maintaining high standards of objectivity.

Senator WATKINS. Do you take in all of its leaders in that broad generalization?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. The great body of scholars and close observers of far-eastern affairs, Mr. Chairman. I don't exclude the possibility, in other words, that an individual here and there may take a critical view, and I think almost all persons with knowledge of the institute's activities would find a good many points here and there which they would feel was subject to criticism.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you do not mean by that that these people would approve men like Field and some others who have refused to answer the question—the $64 question as we put it—whether or not they have ever been Communists or are now Communists. When they refuse to answer that you don't mean that these people would approve those individuals. Some of them have been active in the institute.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I can't really generalize about the opinions of a great many people here on any specific issue of that sort.

Senator WATKINS. I think you are taking in a lot of territory when you say all of these people will testify unless you have contacted them to find out whether they will or won't.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I think my phraseology was that the great body of scholars and close observers. This does not mean 100 percent but means an overwhelming majority, and that is my impression based on considerable acquaintance with, particularly of course, the American scholars and other people especially interested in the Far East.

Senator WATKINS. You go so far as to say that they will testify, and I assume that that is an opinion, although you don't say so.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, on that point just to support the point, I call attention to a great many letters, copies of which I have seen, letters written in recent months reaffirming the confidence of these people who know the institute in its integrity and its great contribution to knowledge.

Senator WATKINS. Do you know whether any of them have ever read the record that is being made in this matter before the committee?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I can't generalize, again, about that except to say that I have seen, that Mr. Holland has shown me just now, a number of copies of letters received within the last 2, 3, or 4 weeks——

Senator WATKINS. That is hardly an answer to my question. Do you know whether or not any of these close observers and scholars have ever seen the record of the hearings or have read the testimony that has been presented here in this matter.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I can't say of course how many such people have read the record of the hearings.

Senator WATKINS. Have you read it?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have read considerable parts, not all.

Senator WATKINS. Newspaper accounts or the actual record?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have followed the newspaper accounts generally and have read a considerable part of the record insofar as it has appeared to date in print.

Senator WATKINS. You mean you have had the volumes of testimony?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes; especially those parts bearing directly on the institute.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I should like to make three points more explicitly concerning the record of the Institute of Pacific Relations. These are fundamental to the committee's investigation, as I understand its purpose.

The first is the wide and diversified character of the institute's associations, necessary to the conduct of its work.

The second is the support and participation it has enjoyed generally from scholars and men of affairs in all Pacific countries, except those behind the iron curtain.

The third concerns the actual character of its publications and its conferences which, far more than associations alone, provide the real criterion by which it should be judged.

On the first point—associations—the most casual inspection of the institute files will show (*a*) how diverse have been its contacts in the United States and other IPR countries; and (*b*) how overwhelmingly non-Communist those associations have been.

Only by the narrowest and most partisan selection of facts can it be made to appear that the participation of Communists or Communist sympathizers bulks significantly in the record. To conjure up this picture it is necessary to ignore the vast majority of people who have dominated the institute program and who cannot be labeled Communist in any way, shape, or form. It would be necessary, for example, to pass over most of American Council's 50 trustees and 1,000 to 2,000 members, not to mention their counterparts in the United Kingdom, the Pacific Dominions, China, or Japan. It would be necessary to ignore almost all of the 300 or more books published by the institute, as well as the contents of Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern Survey over 25 years. It would be necessary to disregard hundreds of leading citizens of the United States and other countries who have made up the IPR conferences held periodically since 1925 to discuss the problems of the Pacific. These facts are a matter of public record, easily verifiable.

If association alone is the test, indeed, it would be easier to conjure up a picture of the institute as Wall Street, rather than Communist, controlled. Some of the most influential policy makers in the institute have been distinguished representatives of American business. Prominent American corporations have also been among its leading financial supporters. It is hard to believe that this group, along with some of our greatest foundations and large numbers of individual members, could have been duped to finance Communist subversion through the institute.

The charge of "Wall Street control" is exactly the one that the Communists make, of course. The institute is denounced in Russia

as the tool of American capitalism. Apparently the Soviet authorities never viewed the IPR with anything but deep suspicion. The best evidence of their attitude, I suggest, is their refusal to let Soviet scientists take any significant part in institute research or conferences. On the occasion of the latest conference, held at Lucknow, India, in 1950, the institute was bitterly assailed in the Soviet press as "one of the unofficial channels by which American imperialism exercises influence over the Asian countries."

Both pictures are false, I submit. In fact, the IPR has provided a forum and coordinating center for cooperative study of Pacific problems on the widest possible platform. For this it has required and invited the participation of all sorts of people. Its corresponding obligation, of course, was to see that it did not allow itself to fall under the domination of any particular group with any particular ax to grind. I believe it has succeeded in doing this about as well as humanly could be expected. Certainly its associations, so far as they are the test, have been—to repeat—overwhelmingly non-Communist in character.

My second point about the institute is its reputation for integrity among people professionally concerned with the study of the Far East. Few Americans acquainted with its work take seriously the charge that it has been Communist-controlled, or that it has sought improperly to influence American policy.

This can be readily ascertained by questioning any number of university presidents, professors, newspaper editors, foundation officials, business people or other men of affairs who actually know the institute. Many of them have publicly defended it since these hearings began, though their views receive far less publicity than those of irresponsible critics. They are the people most familiar with its books and periodicals, its round-table conference, and its various services to the world of scientific research. They should know whether the institute has perverted its ideals, and specifically whether it has lent itself to Communist purposes.

From such informed persons, both here and abroad, you can get criticism on many details and phases of the IPR program. For 25 years nevertheless they have given it their confidence and loyal support. When we speak of the institute we speak mainly of these people, for they are the writers and members and contributors who have carried on its work. To indict the IPR is virtually to indict a whole generation of study of the international problems of the Pacific in the United States and other institute countries.

Finally, and most important, the real test of the Institute of Pacific Relations is its actual record of achievement—its output.

Here the record is easy to judge in one respect, and difficult in another. It is easy in that the institute's chief activity from its inception has been the collection and publication of information and ideas about the Pacific area. Its hundreds of books and thousands of periodical issues are on the shelves of libraries all over the world. There is nothing mysterious about them; they speak for themselves.

For example, the IPR inquiry series on the Sino-Japanese conflict exists in the form of 30-odd volumes published between 1938 and 1945. It is unnecessary to search through office correspondence for clues as to its character. These books are readily accessible to anyone who cares to examine them. For the most part they are factual studies

of the course of wartime developments in China and Japan, and the policies of the Western Powers toward the conflict.

The difficulty in appraising IPR publications is that, while they are a matter of open record, they are also very voluminous. It is difficult for anyone to give a summary judgment who has not worked with them for a long time. And the hostile critic can easily select individual items, still more particular sentences or passages, to "prove" almost any kind of bias. Without going into details, I should like briefly to offer two observations. They are based on acquaintance with a large part, though not all, of the IPR literature.

First, the great bulk of institute research and publication has consisted of nonpolitical studies of Pacific countries—resources, trade and investment, agriculture, industrialization, living standards, press and public opinion, treaty relations, and so forth. Totaling tens of thousands of pages, they cover an enormous area of subject matter. They include basic researches which all scholars use, for example, J. Lossing Buck's monumental work on Chinese agriculture, G. C. Allen's and T. Uyeda's studies of Japanese industry, or the volumes of J. S. Furnivall, the English authority on southeast Asia. To evaluate the influence of the institute it is necessary first and foremost to appraise this extensive research program.

Second, a much smaller share of institute publications, and particularly its periodicals, deal with political problems of a more controversial nature. It is to the institute's credit, I believe, that it never shied away from controversial issues. This would have been the safe and easy thing to do. But equally the institute would not have served the purpose for which it was formed. For example, in 1938 the Japanese objected vehemently to IPR studies of the war in China. When the institute went ahead anyway, they withdrew on this issue. I have already referred to the general distrust of the IPR by the Russians, and their refusal to take any effective part in its work. At various times the institute also aroused the ire of groups in Britain, in Holland, in China and the United States, because of the way certain problems were handled in the IPR forum of publications and conference discussions.

This is what you must expect of course, if you are going to face the real issues of the day. The alternative is to retreat to some ivory tower—if any remains. Actually the IPR constituency always insisted on frank discussion of conflicts in the Pacific, without the exclusion of any view entitled to consideration, and without the organization itself becoming identified with any single view. How well the institute succeeded can only be judged in terms of the record as a whole, and by people who take the trouble to find out the real content of its publications and related activities.

I am myself convinced that no consistent IPR line has ever existed, except for an underlying faith in the ideals of democracy, nonaggression, and human betterment.

It is true that institute publications and discussions have inevitably reflected the general range of information, interest and opinion current among scholars and writers in the Far Eastern field. This is necessarily so, since few IPR books or articles are staff-written. A program of this scope could only be carried on through the voluntary cooperation of hundreds of experts and laymen in the United States

and other IPR countries. If it has been inadequate—say, in the foretelling the course of events in China—it has reflected in the main the limitation of insight and prophecy under which all such people have worked. The remedy for these shortcomings is a greater and better-equipped effort, for there is no other way a democracy can proceed.

These are very general remarks, I realize. To people familiar with the Institute of Pacific Relations they will even seem commonplace: the diverse character of its associations, its reputation for integrity, its substantial record of research. They can readily be verified by anyone who will inquire into the facts.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, do you believe that a person can be a Communist for a long period of years and yet not give expressed to thoughts and ideas that are Communist thoughts and views?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am by no means an expert on communism, but I should think it would be difficult for a person to be a Communist in the full sense of the word—that is, subscribing to the basic philosophy of Marxism-Leninism—and submitting to the discipline or the organization without giving expression sooner or later certainly to the line, the views that that implies.

Mr. MORRIS. And purposes, too.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You heard the testimony of Mr. Greene in connection with his attending this nominating committee meeting of 1941. There we had the arrangement by which Miss Moore was the chairman, Mr. Field was a member of the nominating committee and Mr. Green was the third member. As you know, Miss Moore and Mr. Field have been identified by witnesses before this committee as Communists, so we brought them in and asked them whether or not they had been, and they refused to answer on the grounds it would incriminate them. Do you think that we can draw any probative conclusions from the fact that Moore, Field, and Greene served together on a nominating committee to select officers for the Institute of Pacific Relations? Do you think that it is fair to assume that there was some Communist influence ipso facto from that fact?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I think the best evidence as to whether there was or not is represented in the list of nominations which it was the responsibility of that committee to present. If I may, I would like to identify the persons whose names Mr. Greene read off. As he pointed out, I believe, Ray Lyman Wilbur was, I think, then still president of Stanford University and, of course, at one time a Cabinet member under President Hoover.

Miss Comstock was president of Radcliffe College; William R. Herod was at the time either vice president or president of the International General Electric Co.; Philip C. Jessup, professor at Columbia University; Benjamin Kizer, an attorney of Spokane, Wash.; Philo W. Parker, president of Standard Vacuum Oil Co.; Robert Gordon Sproul, president of the University of California. Those five people were named as vice chairmen; Edward C. Carter as acting secretary, and Mrs. Katrine Greene as assistant secretary. Both of them, of course, were staff members. Francis S. Harmon was an executive of—I am not sure I have the exact title—the Motion Picture Producers

Association. And Mrs. Rose Landres, assistant treasurer, a staff member.

Mr. MORRIS. You were secretary of IPR for a while; were you not, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes. I was secretary from about, I think, November 1941 to early summer of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. As secretary, you would have dealings with this secretariat—would you not?—that we have been discussing this morning.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes; I would have dealings of various kinds with them in connection, of course, with the fairly close working relationships which existed in certain phases of the IPR program between the American council and the international secretariat.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear complaints at any time that any of these people listed on the secretariat at that time were Communists?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Did I hear complaints at this time?

Mr. MORRIS. 1941. You have a list of these; have you not?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I do not recall any complaints or allegations at the time that any of these people were Communists. I am relying here, of course, on memory.

Mr. MORRIS. For instance, do you recall Roger S. Greene complaining about the Communist nature of the secretariat?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have no recollection of that. May I add a further supplementary remark: that it would not surprise me if people had expressed criticism of views expressed by one person or another on this list. It is rather a long list, and it is difficult for me to recall exactly correspondence and comment going on at this time 10 years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, the members of the secretariat are the people who actually did the work around the IPR office; were they not?—under supervision, of course.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. They were people who did the office work. Actually, an overwhelming majority of the books, the contents of the periodicals, were written by outside people all over the world. The conferences were made up largely of nonstaff people. These people were—I am testifying now, Mr. Chairman, about a staff with which I was not directly connected, but they were in various capacities—they include, for example, Professor Corbett, a distinguished expert from McGill and now at Princeton, who was there engaged in a specific study of the postwar plans. They ranged from Professor Corbett, on the one hand, to people whose functions and responsibilities were, I think, entirely clerical or administrative.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these documents, please?

Mr. MANDEL. These are letters, carbon copies of letters, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The first one is a letter dated January 20, 1942, addressed to Mr. Roger S. Greene from William W. Lockwood, secretary. The second one is a letter addressed to Mr. W. W. Lockwood, dated January 23, 1942, signed "Roger S. Greene." And the third, which really should precede the others, is a letter dated January 16, 1942, addressed to William W. Lockwood, signed "Roger S. Greene".

Mr. MORRIS. Can you identify that exchange of correspondence, Mr. Lockwood? [Documents handed to Mr. Lockwood.]

Mr. MORRIS. Can you identify those as having been written by you and to you, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. They appear to be carbon copies of correspondence exchanged between Mr. Greene and me on the dates indicated.

Senator WATKINS. You don't doubt their accuracy; do you? You do not doubt the fact that they are copies of the actual correspondence?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they be received into the record?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The three letters referred to were received and marked, respectively, "Exhibits No. 568, No. 569, and No. 570" and are read in full below).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, will you read the letters, please. Read them aloud, please.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. The first is the letter dated January 16, 1942, signed by Mr. Roger S. Greene, 348 Lincoln Street, Worcester, Mass.:

EXHIBIT No. 568

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Before the next annual meeting that is, the 1943 meeting—will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to the board of trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of vacancies to be filled? The present system gives the members no chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few if any members would care to undertake.

For example, while I have had a high opinion of Fred Field's personal character, his judgment during the past 2 years has been so strange that it seemed to me that he must be almost in a psychopathic state. If a man like that is to be nominated, surely one ought to have a chance to pick an alternate instead of him. When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic, and social subjects on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with a party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging intellectual freedom.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER S. GREENE.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Roger S. Greene, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I was acquainted with Mr. Greene at this time and over a period of several years, not closely but through occasional contact, and I cannot identify him specifically as to his institutional connections. I believe that at one time he was connected with the Peking Union Medical College in Peking, China, and was undoubtedly a member of the American council at this time, as indicated.

Senator WATKINS. You think he was an official in the American council?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure whether I can verify that from——

Mr. MORRIS. Perhaps Mr. Holland can help us on that.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Greene, from my recollection, was a member. I have no recollection that he was ever a trustee or officer. He is a brother of Mr. Jerome Greene, and it is true he had been an official of the Peking Union Medical College in China. He returned from China, I think, somewhere around 1941; and, as I recall it, was fairly active in this country in organizing the committee to boycott trade in war materials with Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a member of the American delegation to the seventh conference.

Wouldn't it appear on the basis of this letter, Mr. Lockwood, that Mr. Greene was registering a complaint about the political orientation and political complexion of the secretariat and staff that we have been talking about?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No. If I understand the letter, Mr. Morris, that is not the nature of his complaint.

Mr. MORRIS. He says there [reading]:

When Chinese, of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to more cautious.

There is a flat assertion on Mr. Greene's part at that time.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes, but the purpose of Mr. Greene's letter, as I read it, is to comment on the manner of electing trustees to the board of American council. In that connection he makes this comment on Mr. Field. From memory, I am unable to establish the link here between these two paragraphs and exactly what his meaning is. Perhaps my reply will indicate something. May I refresh my memory?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read it, please?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. This is a letter to Mr. Roger S. Greene, dated January 20, 1942, and signed by me in my capacity as secretary of the American council:

EXHIBIT No. 569

DEAR MR. GREENE: Thank you very much for your note on the procedure followed in submitting nominations to the American council's board of trustees. I agree with you that the present method is not very satisfactory. Some people feel as you do: that it looks too much like a perfunctory "railroading" job. Others—for example, one of our most interested members, whom I saw yesterday—would prefer that we make the board self-perpetuating in some fashion and not bother them with a ballot at all. Some time this year I hope to be able to give the matter careful consideration and work out a more suitable plan. Frankly, since taking office late in 1941, I have been so preoccupied with immediate questions of wartime program that I have not been able to give this matter the attention it deserves.

I also am completely unable to understand and justify Fred Field's political reasoning during the past 2 years At the same time, his long experience with the IPR and his high technical competence in the field make him, in my opinion, an exceedingly valuable trustee. As for the present staff, it is hard for me to see how anyone could believe that it merits the criticism you cite. Actually, the staff represents a wide range of political opinion, and in this respect it is quite representative of American public opinion at large. This is as it should be; don't you think?

With best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

Mr. Chairman, I would conclude from my own letter that the question at issue here is the nomination of Mr. Field to membership on the board of trustees; and Mr. Greene's feeling, for the reasons he indicates, is that Mr. Field is an inappropriate nominee.

Do you wish to comment briefly on this question of nominations and elections to the board?

Mr. MORRIS. I was going to get to that, Mr. Lockwood. Perhaps you had better read the third letter, too, and then we can discuss the whole thing.

Mr. Lockwood. Right. A letter to Mr. Lockwood dated January 23, 1942, and signed by Roger S. Greene.

Mr. Marks. I note that the date is marked in pencil on this copy, January 23, 1942. It is not typed in. I don't think that is very significant.

Exhibit No. 570

Mr. Lockwood (reading):

My Dear Mr. Lockwood: Thanks for your letter of January 20. Perhaps I took too seriously some of the criticisms that I have heard of the alleged leftist tendencies of many of the IPR staff. I may say that, except in Field's case, they never gave me any direct concern, though at times I thought I detected a kind of sentimental attitude toward Soviet Russia that seemed to me somewhat amateurish. I quite agree that a variety of opinion should be represented. My contention was not that Field should necessarily be excluded but that one should not be compelled to vote for him.

With regard to election of trustees, I should myself have no objection to a self-perpetuating system. That might actually produce more thorough consideration or candidates than the present plan.

The War Department public-relations office has asked me to join a panel of speakers to go to Army camps. I have, of course, consented, though the new kind of audience to be faced causes me some anxiety. As I understand that you suggested my name, I may later be asking you for suggestions. In the meantime I expect to have additional information from Washington that will answer some of the questions that have arisen in my mind on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Roger S. Greene.

May I say in elaboration that the question of Mr. Field raised by Mr. Greene here is not a question of membership on the staff of the American council or of the international secretariat, but the nomination of Mr. Field to the board of trustees. May I say, if my memory is correct, Mr. Field did serve as trustee for several years after the war. The dates I don't recall, but evidently it included 1942.

(Senator Eastland took the chair.)

Mr. Morris. There are two issues I would like to ask you about, Mr. Lockwood. One is the complaint on the part of Mr. Greene that members of the staff were, as he said, too much under Russian Soviet influence. Then he distinguished here. He says [reading]:

I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic, and social subjects on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with the party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging intellectual freedom.

I say isn't that at least evidence that at that time Mr. Roger Greene, the brother of Jerome Greene, who testified here today, was complaining to you about the nature of the staff that we have been discussing? I presume it is the same staff a copy of which you have in front of you.

Mr. Lockwood. Mr. Morris, I believe that Mr. Greene's statement is that certain Chinese were saying that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence; and, while you may think he implies some degree of agreement with that, that is not his own statement as given in the letter.

In the second place, I would interpret the latter part of his paragraph, which you just read, to refer to Mr. Field, though it is a little ambiguous, I grant, as it is stated.

Mr. MORRIS. It talks about the staff there. It talks in the plural. He says "too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence."

Mr. LOCKWOOD. This is his quotation of the opinion of certain Chinese.

Mr. MORRIS. He doesn't say that; does he?

Mr. LOCKWOOD (reading):

> When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. Then he goes on to make his independent statement.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes. With the exception of that sentence in the middle of the paragraph, all of the other sentences in the paragraph refer to Mr. Field and the question of his nomination to the board of trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. Then the part that I read doesn't refer to Mr. Field. Anyhow, Mr. Lockwood, you yourself have complained in the past, have you not, to individual members of the institute that there were too many pro-Communists on the staff?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Morris, I don't recall any such complaint.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you think that?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. That there were too many?

Mr. MORRIS. That there were many pro-Communists on the staff.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. You are speaking now of the American council staff?

Mr. MORRIS. It doesn't make any difference, either the secretariat staff or the American council staff.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Morris, I knew the American council staff fairly well, and, and I do not believe now and I do not recall ever believing that there were, as you say, too many pro-Russian Communists on the staff.

Senator EASTLAND. Russian Communist. Any kind of Communist. American Communists.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it your opinion that there were any Communists on the staff?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Of the American council?

Senator EASTLAND. Or the secretariat.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I am aware of course of the allegations that have been made before this committee. So far as my own personal knowledge is concerned, I do not know of any Communists on the staff of it.

Senator EASTLAND. He said pro-Communists.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Pro-Communists?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARKS. May I ask——

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir. I want an answer to that question. Is he the attorney?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. I want an answer to the question.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I was just trying to interpret the word "pro-Communist" in naming my answer. Let me put it this way. If by "pro-Communist" you mean someone who subscribes to the basic philosophy of communism and systematically followed the gyrations of the

Communist Party line in international affairs, then I am not aware that there were any Communists by that definition of the term on the staff of the American council.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever tell, for instance, Mr. Dennett that you thought there were any pro-Communists on the staff? Raymond Dennett was your successor, was he not?

Mr. Lockwood. After an interlude he followed me. I do not recall telling Mr. Dennett that there were pro-Communists on the staff.

Senator Eastland. Was Mr. Frederick V. Field a member of the staff?

Mr. Lockwood. Mr. Field was a member of the staff from, I think, 1934 to 1940; perhaps earlier than that. At any rate, his staff connection was terminated in 1940. Of course, I am well aware of the activities and expressions of opinion of Mr. Field in recent years which would certainly create a strong presumption that in this period at any rate if not an active party member, he is at least thoroughly pro-Communist in his outlook. So far as the period when I knew him on the staff of the American council is concerned, I did not know then and do not know now of any Communist associations, and in his IPR activities and the handling of his IPR responsibility I saw no evidence whatsoever that he was attempting to intrude partisan views or displaying a lack of objectivity and so on. As has already been pointed out, I think his chief writings for the institute consisted of two books; the first was a study of American participation in the Chinese consortium which was to my recollection a thoroughly objective study. The second was an economic handbook of the area, a very dry and full but useful collection of economic statistics, with a foreword by Mr. Newton D. Baker. In his writings therefore, as well as in his conduct of American council affairs I did not find the evidence which one would presume to be there if he had been at the time a genuine Communist. I don't attempt to say whether he was or was not. If he was, then I am puzzled to explain the lack of evidence of this in his activity.

Mr. Morris. How about some of the other members of the secretariat? Do you know of the work of Chen Han-seng?

Mr. Lockwood. I am generally familiar with one or two books which he has written on economic studies of Chinese agriculture, yes, and I have had some activity with him informally over a period of time in New York.

Mr. Morris. Would you say now, in view of all the evidence before this committee and as you have experienced yourself, that Chen Han-seng was at that time a pro-Communist?

Mr. Lockwood. I would not exclude that possibility certainly.

Mr. Morris. How about Ch'ao-ting Chi?

Mr. Lockwood. I would not exclude the possibility there, though in Mr. Chi's case his record is difficult to interpret. After the time when he left the IPR or subsequently he became, as you recall, a high-ranking and evidently trusted official of H. H. Kung, the Minister of Finance in Chungking.

Mr. Morris. All this time he was active in the Communist-controlled publication, China Today; was he not?

Mr. Lockwood. That I don't know.

Mr. Morris. Do you know that?

Mr. Lockwood. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. How about Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. My recollection is that she was on the staff of the national secretariat in a secretarial capacity. I had casual personal acquaintance with her, and from that would not have had any basis for supposing that she was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that she and her husband are now in Communist China?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have heard that; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that change your opinion of her?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Is my opinion now different from what it was 10 years ago?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I would say that so far—I am not at all familiar really with her activities in recent years, but so far as I have heard about them they would indicate to me certainly a very friendly attitude toward the Chinese Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact——

Mr. LOCKWOOD. One which I did not see displayed, however, at the time she was on the staff.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand; but you have now changed your opinion?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. If I may I would like to leave it as I stated it.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to answer the question "yes" or "no" and then explain it. Have you now changed your opinion? You said you know they are in Communist China. Have you changed your opinion?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes; I would have certainly much more, some reason now to take a different view than I did at the time.

Senator EASTLAND. You have changed your opinion of Mr. Frederick V. Field, too, have you not?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Andrew Grajdanzev? Did you consider him to be pro-Communist at that time? Were there not frequent complaints at the office about Mr. Grajdanzev's writings?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I am trying to recall whether I have enough information on it to answer the question. Mr. Grajdanzev wrote, I recall, a book on Formosa, which was mainly a compilation of factual material. I remember him as having strong views on the need for land reform, for example, in Japan and along the line of General MacArthur's subsequent program.

Mr. MORRIS. How about his pro-Communist expressions?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I don't recall, Mr. Morris, pro-Communist expressions which would lead me to make a general statement.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Michael Greenberg? In view of the testimony that has been brought out about Michael Greenberg, would you revise your opinion of him now?

Senator EASTLAND. Ask him if he knows about the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know about the testimony concerning Michael Greenberg?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I recall it has been alleged—by whom I don't remember—that he was or is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Prof. Karl August Wittfogel and Elizabeth Bentley have both testified that he was a Communist to their own personal knowledge.

Senator EASTLAND. Does that change your opinion of him?

Mr. MARKS. What is the question? The opinion of whether he is now——

Senator EASTLAND. The opinion which he, the witness, expressed.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. In other words, what was my opinion at the time?

Mr. MORRIS. You expressed the opinion, did you not, Mr. Lockwood, that none of these people at that time were pro-Communist in their activity or in their expressions.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I think my statement referred to the American council staff, and this is the international secretariat staff, which I knew much more casually and concerning many of whom I really lack the knowledge to express an opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe——

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I wish to be responsive to the question, but——

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe that at that time these people were pro-Communists in their writings and in their activities?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Recognizing the allegations that have been made here, I have not personally knowledge which would lead me to conclude that they were in a general sense. May I say there in elaboration that particularly when it comes to the Far East over this period, over the period from 1937 to 1945, it is especially difficult to apply the test in terms of whether views expressed did or did not parallel the Communist line.

Mr. MORRIS. You had no difficulty coming to a conclusion in reading your statement, Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. May I continue?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. From 1937 on of course there was one issue in the Far East, namely the Japanese invasion of China. On this issue the Russian opinion, the opinion expressed in the Russian press and so on was very anti-Japanese. At the same time there were a great many Americans non-Communist in their general philosophy who also were anti-Japanese. Therefore, there was a parallelism of outlook which ranges all the way from extreme Communists on the one hand and Mr. Henry L. Stimson on the other, who headed the boycott movement against the Japanese.

Similarly, in China, in the internal conflict within China, the Communists were of course bitterly anti-Chiang Kai-shek through most of this period, but so were many others heavily critical. This makes it difficult, I think, to judge the presence or absence of communism in a person's outlook by the particular things they happened to say about Japanese aggression or Chinese policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; but knowing what you now know, will you concede that there was reason to believe that at that time some of these people were at least pro-Communist in their activities and in their writings?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I certainly would not exclude that possibility.

Senator EASTLAND. You would not exclude that possibility.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Y. Y. Hsu, on this list?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Very slightly.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he is now an official of the Chinese Communist Government?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. So I have heard.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Owen Lattimore at that time?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider now that any of his activities or writings were pro-Communist?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Many of the opinions that Mr. Lattimore expressed of course have coincided in one way or another with the Communist line. Many of the opinions he has expressed to my recollection have not. I find it difficult, therefore—I find it impossible, in fact, from my knowledge of his writings to believe that he has been consistently a fellow traveler or a Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. We will recess until 2 o'clock. I want you back at 2, please, sir.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m. the committee was recessed until 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, N. J., ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, OF COUNSEL—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the nominating committee, how did that operate, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. During the time that I was secretary of the council, as I recall, and in later years when I have been a member of the nominating committee, my recollection is about as follows: There would be sometimes preliminary discussion or correspondence considering various possibilities. The amount of actual personal meetings which the nominating committee would have would depend on the possibility of getting all the people together and what issues were to be considered. In advance of the date when the nominations were to be put forward the committee would come to some agreement on the slate to be proposed to the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Then the nominating committee would come out with one slate, would it not?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Then the membership would vote on the administration slate?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. During the time that you were secretary was there any effort made to destroy the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I am aware of only one incident, which has been brought to my attention within the last few months, indicated in a memorandum to Mr. Field and from me, a memorandum which I can't quote exactly but of which I think I can give the substance, if you wish.

Mr. MORRIS. Please do, yes.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. It makes reference to certain correspondence which had come in from our San Francisco office, from the secretary of our San Francisco division——

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. John Oakie, O-a-k-i-e, if my memory is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this the letter you refer to? "Perhaps I am a Casper Milquetoast * * *"?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. May I see it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Would you look at that, please. Will you read that aloud? Do you recall writing that letter?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not. Will you read it aloud, please.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 571

FVF from WWL:

Perhaps I am a Casper Milquetoast, but with all the investigations which have been carried on or are likely to be undertaken in Washington, I am a little nervous about any documents coming to rest in our files which suggest any questionable dealings between the American council and private corporations, especially as regards the relations of those corporations with the Government. There are one or two passages in this file of correspondence which for a person who is out to get us might suggest something improper.

If you agree, I suggest destroying the compromising parts of Oakie's letters of February 14 (first paragraph) and January 23 (third paragraph, first sentence). In addition, Sherlock Holmes suggests that you throw this note in the wastebasket and direct Oakie to destroy the carbons of these two letters together with your letter of instruction to him.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the writing in longhand? Do you recognize that handwriting?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I think that is presumably from Field's writing. It is signed with the initial "F."

P. S.—We have a lot worse already filed—just remember where the bad stuff is for der Tag.

Signed "F."

Mr. MORRIS. Now do you recall having written that memorandum?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I don't recall having written it; but I presume it is a photostat of a memorandum which I did write.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please.

Senator EASTLAND. It came from the files.

Mr. MARKS. There is one word in handwriting. The word "questionable" is in Mr. Lockwood's handwriting. Maybe that would help him identify it. Did you notice that word in handwriting?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that first, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 23, 1939, headed "FVF from WWL," with some penciled notes and the initial "KS," Lockwood's name at the upper right-hand corner, and the penciled note—"I have no idea what this means." Clayton Lane, June 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Whose initial is after the penciled note?

Mr. MANDEL. "F."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that be received into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. It is admitted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 571" and was read in full:)

Mr. MARKS. You don't know whether that is your handwriting?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Mr. Marks calls attention to the word written in pencil here and I cannot identify the writing.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I cannot.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this memorandum recall any episode to you, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No, Mr. Morris, it does not. It does recall a problem of a general character which was always in my mind at the time, and if you wish I will explain that.

Mr. MORRIS. We would like to have your testimony on this particular episode.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I have no recollection of this episode except for what is contained in this memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any questions on that?

Senator EASTLAND. No questions.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. May I make one comment?

Mr. MORRIS. Surely, Mr. Lockwood.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I recall that at this time the American council was engaged in a number of research studies relating to American trade and investment and other particularly economic subjects, that is, trade, investment, et cetera, in the Far East, and of course at the same time we were receiving contributions for the support of the council's general program from a number of prominent American corporations, including certain corporations on the Pacific coast like the American President Lines, Crockett National Bank, and so on. For this reason we were always acutely conscious of the problem of preserving not only the substance of the integrity and independence in our research work with respect to the sources of financial donations, but also avoiding even the appearance of bias or control or influence of improper character. My inference, therefore, which I think is supported by the substance of this memorandum, is that certain passages in this correspondence seemed to suggest or might be taken by some outsider to suggest an improper relationship with certain American business concerns. This was evidently the reason why I was uneasy about its going in the files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify those letters, please.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 4, 1942, addressed to American People's Fund, 16 West Twelfth Street, New York City, from William W. Lockwood, secretary.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. How many letters have you there, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Seven.

Mr. MORRIS. Were all those seven letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; they were.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, may I show you these eight letters and ask you if you can recall having written those?

(Witness examining documents.)

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lockwood, do you recognize those letters as copies of the letters having been written by you?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Those appear, all of them, to be letters or memoranda written by me. Some of them deal with subjects which I recall, and others quite beyond my present memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they be received in the record.

Senator EASTLAND. That has already been ordered.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 572 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 572–A

SEPTEMBER 4, 1942.

AMERICAN PEOPLE'S FUND,
16 West 12th Street, New York City.

DEAR SIRS: The purpose of this letter is to make application for a grant of $2,500 from the American People's Fund toward the educational and research program of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.

The reasons for this request, and the purposes to which the requested sum would be devoted, are sketched in the following paragraphs:

I. CURRENT PROGRAM OF THE IPR

War in the Pacific has created an unprecedented demand for authoritative information on the peoples and problems of the Far East. This has doubled and redoubled the demands on the Institute of Pacific Relations, the sole private agency wholly devoted to objective study of the Pacific area.

There have been urgent requests from many quarters for I. P. R. studies—published, in proof, or in manuscript. Institute research volumes will be found on scores of Government desks in Washington, London, Canberra, New Delhi, and Chungking. Far eastern experts trained by the IPR are in a dozen war agencies of the United States. American council members now in key positions in the Pacific world include J. C. Grew, former Ambassador to Tokyo; W. H. Standley, Ambassador to Moscow; Henry F. Grady, who recently headed the special economic mission to India, and Owen Lattimore, personal political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Large numbers of American council pamphlets have been purchased by the Army and Navy for use in training camps and on shipboard. Few educational tasks are more important today than that of meeting this need on the part of the armed forces.

Editors, radio commentators, business firms, teachers and students likewise call on the institute daily for library and information services. United China Relief has relied heavily on the IPR staff in planning aid to China. The American Council on Education has asked its help in a new effort to improve teaching on the Far East in secondary schools. Other agencies have requested assistance in radio and motion-picture projects.

So far the institute has managed to meet these and many similar demands which have flooded into its offices since Pearl Harbor. It is greatly in need of additional staff and financial resources, however, to cope with the wholly new situation created by the war.

Twenty-one IPR books and reports have been rushed to completion since the outbreak of hostilities. Together with earlier studies, particularly the IPR Inquiry Series on the far eastern conflict, they provide information vitally needed for the war effort, as well as for postwar settlement and reconstruction in the Pacific.

This basic IPR research is in turn the foundation for various educational services to the American public:

Popular pamphlets like China—America's Ally; Meet the Anzacs; Asia's Captive Colonies: Our Far Eastern Record.

A weekly radio program, Spotlight on Asia.

School texts and teaching materials. A new series of five cheap textbooks on the peoples of the Far East will be published in September.

A biweekly bulletin of reliable information on the Pacific area, the Far Eastern Survey—widely used by editors, college students, and adult-education groups.

Conferences by American citizens on wartime and peacetime cooperation among the United Nations—for example, recent week-end conferences in Princeton, Cleveland, and Seattle, and teacher meetings in Houston, Chicago, Des Moines, and San Francisco.

Advice to Government agencies on far eastern personnel and research materials.

The knowledge, contacts and educational experience necessary for this diversified program could not be improvised overnight. They are the product of many years of preparation.

Founded in 1925, the institute consists of a series of national councils in 10 countries of the Pacific. Together they cooperate in international research and conferences. One of these councils is the American council, a nonprofit membership corporation under the direction of an elected board of trustees now headed by President Robert G. Sproul, of the University of California. The council's 1942 budget of $80,000 is provided in part by foundation grants, and in part must be secured through contributions from members and friends.

The IPR has been responsible for the bulk of the pioneering study of the past 15 years on economic, political, and social developments in the Far East. It has sought to mobilize the best scholarly resources of a dozen countries for this common purpose. Among the institute's most active leaders have been outstanding scholars and men of affairs like Newton Baker, Ray Lyman Wilbur, and Philip C. Jessup of the United States; John W. Dafoe of Canada; Hu Shih and W. W. Yen, of China; R. H. Tawney, of Great Britain; Walter Nash, of New Zealand; H. J. van Mook, of the Netherlands Indies, and V. Motylev of the U. S. S. R.

One of the products of its work has been the training of a whole new generation of young scholars equipped with the scientific and linguistic tools for far eastern study. This training program now urgently requires expansion in the United States. Present and future needs for trained experts far exceed the available supply; this is a serious bottleneck in Government agencies and in American education.

II. NEW NEEDS AND PLANS

The opportunities of the IPR today arise directly from the critical war situation in the Pacific. The next 5 years will be the most fateful in a century in the relations of America with the Orient. Together with her United Nations partners, America must reverse the tides of military defeat and in the victory over Japan and her Axis partners. In so doing she must also create a basis of mutual confidence between the western democracies and their allies in Asia—one which will survive the strain of victory and place the future relations of East and West on a new footing of equality and interdependence.

A vital role can be played in this by the IPR. Its international task, first of all, is to mobilize all its resources among the United Nations for cooperative study of the issues of a future peace settlement, and, most important, of their implications for war time policy and attitudes.

This international program is shared by all the IPR councils—especially the British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, Chinese, Soviet, Dutch, and American. The first stage is being planned around an international study meeting on wartime and postwar cooperation in the Pacific, to be held next December in this country. This conference will be one in the regular series of IPR conferences: Virginia Beach, 1939; Yosemite, 1936; Banff, 1933; Shanghai, 1931, etc.

In preparation for this meeting, a series of studies are in progress, participated in by leading scholars and men of affairs, members of the IPR from the countries of the United Nations fighting in the Pacific. Out of this conference study will grow a continuing program of research and discussion. The special IPR research series on the far eastern war, now numbering 20 volumes, provides the indispensable foundation for this evolving inquiry.

The American council naturally is being called upon to play a leading role in this international process. It hopes to draw on the best intellectual resources available in this country, and to give the widest possible dissemination of results. In the critical period of the next 6 months it needs special funds to accomplish this purpose.

No less important than the above research and international conference program is the whole field of popular education on the Far East. The war has opened up an unprecedented opportunity, with the public now awakened at last to the importance of the Pacific half of the world, and eager for knowledge. The IPR has an immense store of information packed in its scores of research publications. This now needs to be disseminated in simplified forms to a wide audience.

Fortunately the American council has a tested program and staff in this field. Its staff is already overburdened, however, and seriously needs expansion. The past 8 months show that there is a new opportunity at almost every turn, if the personnel and funds can be secured to capitalize on the situation.

For example:

1. There is a great demand for popular pamphlets and teaching materials on the peoples of the Far East and the problems of war and postwar settlement

in this area. American schools and colleges are deplorably lacking in authentic materials on Asia; today for the first time teachers realize this and are seeking to remedy the situation. Experience shows that sales returns will now cover publication costs on new pamphlet materials, but not the staff and overhead expenses incidental to the program.

2. During the past year the IPR has experimented successfully with its own radio program on the Far East, and with documentary films. Both of these new channels of education should now be exploited on a large scale.

The newly completed IPR motion picture, Know Your Enemy—Japan, is expected to find a wide audience through defense councils, the Army and Navy, schools, adult-education groups, etc. It should be followed this year with a series of additional educational films on modern India, China, the colonial areas of southeast Asia, etc. Similarly, the success of the council's weekly CBS program, Spotlight on Asia, argues for a more ambitious radio effort presented in more dramatic terms and with still more effective techniques. Both projects call for a staff person with the special competence required and with a full-time assignment to develop a program.

3. The education of the American worker in international affairs is something scarcely touched yet by adult-education groups. A new opportunity now presents itself, particularly in war industries. To capitalize on it requires a special approach taking into account the interests, vocabulary and outlook of the worker. The council would like to recruit for its staff a young person directly from the field of labor organization and education, and to provide him with modest funds for travel, conference, and publication. With this might be linked certain work with editors and writers of cheap fiction magazines having a mass appeal; there are indications that they might welcome assistance in presenting more objective information and attitudes on the peoples and problems of the Far East. A successful demonstration of the possibilities here might revolutionize traditional programs in popular education on international affairs.

For some time the council has been working at least experimentally in all the above fields. It has a membership of 1,300 citizens scattered from Maine to Hawaii, a number of regional offices, long-established contacts with many educational groups, valuable library collections, and a nucleus of highly trained staff. It has two other assets especially important in this war period: a long-standing reputation for objective, nonpropagandist study, and membership in a working international community of scholars and educators from many countries.

To push ahead rapidly and vigorously along these new lines of wartime education, however, it is in great need of added staff and working funds. The opportunity unquestionably is there: the problem is only to find the resources to realize it. If this can be done, the IPR will be in a position to make a fundamental contribution toward a new understanding of the Far East at a decisive turning point in the history of our relations with the billion people of Asia.

The council will greatly appreciate a contribution to its 1942 budget in furtherance of the objectives outlined above. If any further information is desired, we shall be glad to supply it.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

P. S.—For your records, I am forwarding a copy of the council's latest annual report, 1940–41. The 1941–42 report will be published shortly and will be mailed to you when it becomes available.

EXHIBIT NO. 572–B

NOVEMBER 18, 1936.

Mr. ROY VEATCH,
1028 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR ROY: I am sorry to have delayed so long in answering your request for suggestions as to possible candidates for the new Philippine office. I have been away from the office several days and this has held up the matter.

Fred and Carter and I have all discussed the question and have picked out several possibilities. On a number of them our information is rather incomplete, and, consequently, it is difficult to arrange them in a very definite order of priority. Obviously the appointment is of great importance, however, and we are anxious to see a thoroughly first-rate man in the position.

From what we know of him, Kenneth Colegrove is a promising person. His little pamphlet on "Militarism in Japan" seems to be a first-rate job, and Fred got a very favorable impression of him personally in a recent interview. Our personal contact with him, however, has not gone beyond this brief meeting. Possibly he suffers the handicap of having worked largely in the field of government rather than economics, but I should imagine that you would be primarily concerned in getting a man of first-rate ability with a broad understanding of far eastern affairs rather than a technician in the field of trade, etc.

There come to mind the names of a number of people whom you must know better than we. There is Bill Stone, for example, who should be able to do a corking good job. What about Hayden, former vice governor, or Arthur Young, formerly of the State Department and recently with the Chinese Ministry of Finance? Both of them should have a thorough understanding of the Far East, combined with a good deal of administrative experience. Is either one available, and does either have the qualifications you are looking for?

One of the very best men you could have in that position is Phil Jessup, professor of international law at Columbia. Whether you would be able to secure him is a question, but he is a person of great promise. I have heard him mentioned as a successor to Butler at Columbia. Another possibility is Bisson. As you know, he is a first-rate research man with a liberal social philosophy. I am somewhat doubtful as to whether he has the right personal qualifications for the office, and perhaps his greatest contribution can be made right where he is. It may also be true that his known views would disqualify him, but we would put him well up on the list of possibilities.

In addition, there are several other people, largely from the academic field, who might be worth your consideration. These include Nicholas J. Spykman, professor of international relations at Yale, Joseph Barnes, formerly secretary of the American council and now with the Herald Tribune. Charles E. Martin, professor of international law at the University of Washington, and Rupert Emerson of Harvard. Spykman we do not know very well, and perhaps his Dutch origin would disqualify him. Joe Barnes would probably do well if he could be lured away from journalism. Martin is perhaps the most available of these three, but the least imaginative. He is greatly interested in the Far East, and was an active participant in the Yosemite conference, though his approach is primarily that of the international lawyer. Rupert Emerson occurs to us as a possibility, largely because of his studies of colonial government in British Malaya under the auspices of the Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau of International Research.

It is apparent that there is a dearth of people with some special knowledge of the Philippines or of economic tendencies in the Far East. I am wondering whether you do not know someone of the Princeton group like Fetter or Whittlesay who might merit consideration. I wonder too whether Dr. Ernest Gruening might not be able to propose a likely candidate. Of course, I personally do not think you could do better than to kidnap Fred Field. He could do a superb job, but his departure from here would leave our organization completely flattened out. The papers report that Tugwell is out of a job. Now there is your man.

I hope these suggestions may be of some use to you. They do not exhaust the possibilities by any means, but the list may include one or two names that you have overlooked. We shall be greatly interested in the choice that is made.

If you are still expecting a visit from Fred and me, how would Tuesday, December 1, suit your convenience? We might come down that day if you can assemble your group.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, JR.

WWL:AA

EXHIBIT No. 572–C

NOVEMBER 15, 1937.

MR. MAXWELL M. HAMILTON,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. HAMILTON: At Mr. Frederick Field's suggestion, I am sending you herewith a manuscript of a pamphlet on American policy in the Far East which we are shortly to publish.

We should be very grateful if you or someone in the Far Eastern Division would consent to look over this manuscript and send along any criticisms or suggestions which you might care to make. It often happens that outsiders writing upon these subjects make errors of factual statement or interpretation which can readily be pointed out by those to whom these matters are of direct and official concern. Before issuing this pamphlet to the public we would welcome suggestions and comments from someone who speaks with authority in this field. I should add that this pamphlet is not intended to be a review of details of American policy nor an argument for any particular line of policy, but a simple presentation of the general background and of the major issues today.

I shall greatly appreciate any suggestions which you will care to make.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 30, 1937.

Confidential

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, Jr.,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 15, 1937, with which you enclosed a manuscript entitled "America and the Far Eastern War, World in Arms," with the request that I or someone in the Far Eastern Division look over the manuscript and send along any criticisms or suggestions which we might care to make. In accordance with that request the manuscript has been studied in the Division and certain comments thereon as to statements of fact are set forth in a memorandum attached to this letter. You will realize, of course, that neither the Division of Far Eastern Affairs nor the Department of State should be cited as the source of these comments.

Sincerely yours,

[s] MAXWELL M. HAMILTON.

Enclosures:
Memorandum.
Secretary Hull's statement of July 16, 1937.
Manuscript.
(Penciled note:) Envelope double-sealed in wax.

EXHIBIT No. 572–D

JANUARY 4, 1938.

IPR REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON

BL from WWL:

If, as your letter indicates, the proposal for an IPR Washington representative has come up for discussion, there are a few suggestions I might offer as to the functions which such a person might perform. Obviously it is important to have rather definitely in mind what our representative could most usefully do before laying any plans, even though it is true that a resourceful and energetic person would naturally create his own job to a large extent.

As for Washington "society," I never made much use of the black or white tie in Washington, and I don't know what the possibilities really are. Doubtless there are potential contributors there, but I see little reason to suppose that we should set out to cultivate directly the elderly dowagers of Washington any more than the social set of any other city.

Nor is it likely that Washington is a particularly opportune place for a local educational program. Outside of the comparative small circle of government people, Washington is a rather provincial town with a good deal of the lethargy of a huge bureaucracy hanging over it, and with so much public affairs as its daily business that it is bored with the whole thing and is rather unreceptive to lectures, dinners, discussion groups, etc.

The really important contacts in Washington are as follows:

(1) administrative officials and legislators.
(2) newsmen.

(3) private educational agencies (League of Women Voters, National Council; FPA, WIL, etc.

(4) embassies, especially Chinese and Japanese, and Filipino delegation.

(5) universities.

It would be the job of our representative there to work with these groups, first, to extract from them the information, aid, and support which they can give to our national program, and second, demonstrate the value of the IPR and of himself to them in a variety of ways.

Given our present program and set-up, it should be recognized, I think, that the value of a Washington office would be somewhat limited. It would become invaluable, however, as our program develops along new lines, as it is likely to do. The present limitations in this regard are threefold: First, as long as our chief and almost sole current publication is the Survey, we have little practical use for the political information for which Washington is the preeminent source, both its official and its newsmen. If we did get the hot dope from the State Department, what would we do with it?

Second, as long as our publications deal mainly with the general course of events in China and Japan rather than with the specific American angle of such events or with American affairs which have some relation to the Far East, Washington contacts are also of limited aid. Excepting for the embassies—and this is a doubtful exception—I doubt if one can get in Washington a great deal of news from the Far East which is not available here. Its preeminence is as a source of information on what is going on in the United States, and the value of an IPR agency there would depend in part on how much we propose to concern ourselves with American shipping, investments, education, public opinion, etc.

Third, our value to the people in Washington and the welcome we would receive depend on what we can give them in the way of information as to events, publications, and what not in the Far East. It would hinge on whether our contacts through our international set-up enable us to offer anything of distinctive value. At present the IPR is so loosely knit and our contacts in the Far East so haphazard that we have little to offer in Washington through the continuous personal relationship which an IPR man might have there. The people there already have access to most of our sources of information and more besides. We can offer them a limited educational outlet and the support of our research program such as it is, it is true, and in this way we can enlist the interest and support of persons anxious to enlighten public opinion. On the whole, however, an IPR man starting out in Washington today, would find himself in the position of going hat in hand for information and assistance rather than bringing something the people there are eager to get.

There are a good many things an IPR agency in Washington could do and it might be a swell job for someone to tackle. If there are limitations such as I have described and if they should be overcome, one way of contributing to this end would be for someone to start in down there. Some of the possibilities are as follows:

(1) The Washington bureaus--agriculture, commerce, tariff, maritime, etc., are stuffed full of information on all aspects of American economic life and of economic developments abroad. Moreover, for most subjects of this sort with which we deal there are men who have spent their lives cramming up on the data and they are usually quite willing to cooperate with outsiders. I should say that roughly, a third of the Survey should be devoted to American-Far Eastern topics and that such studies can be done in Washington better than anywhere else. One obvious function of an IPR agency, then—although not the most important one—would be to serve as a branch of the New York research staff for the execution of certain projects. Moreover, the ideas and information picked up in Washington through this broadened contact might help to shape our whole program more realistically.

(2) Our Washington man would doubtless have to spend a great deal of time drifting around among officials, Congressmen, and newsmen, developing personal contacts and making himself a person to whom individuals might turn when an issue of Pacific relations and policy arose (Bill Stone has done this rather successfully, especially as regards armaments and naval policy). The importance of the Washington newspaper corps ought to be emphasized in this connection. The Washington correspondents are the most influential group of reporters in the country. Moreover, they have a wide editorial leeway in their dispatches. Also, they are fairly close knit and accessible as a group since their offices are practically all in one building ,and since Washington is a comparatively small place. An able IPR man could make himself useful feeding them stuff, prompting various stories, securing Washington releases on IPR studies, etc.

As regards Congressmen, we should have to be quite wary. Under no circumstances do we want to engage in lobbying. By slow personal contact, however, a relationship with the IPR which is now totally lacking might be built up informally. It is not difficult to imagine that under the circumstances of the last six months this contact might be valuable. The same, I think, can be said of relationships with administrative officials, and especially with the junior group who do most of the real brain work in Washington. This part of the job ought to be thoroughly enjoyable providing it was not aimless, and in the end it would be helpful all around.

The value of such contacts with Congress, the State Department, and the correspondents would depend in part, I should think, on whether we plan to go into the field of political journalism. If we do, an agency in Washington would be just as indispensable for us as for the FPA. I doubt that we want to go very far in this direction, but as matters now stand we lack channels for effectively using the political information to be had in Washington. If we should eventually take over Amerasia or if we should start a mimeographed news sheet for American Council members, or something like that, it would be different. In any case if we expand along the lines of regional educational activities, a Washington bureau might be helpful in a variety of ways.

(3) The universities in Washington are rather poor on the whole, and there is no use looking to them for a lot of good research in our field (Brookings stands in a somewhat different category). Nevertheless, there is a good deal of educational effort in the field of public affairs and a growth of specialised training for government work. Our man might be able to associate himself with these activities through doing some teaching, taking part in discussion groups, etc., but this sort of thing would not add up to a great deal in its value to the IPR.

(4) Another minor phase of the opportunity in Washington is a closer relationship with a handful of private agencies, including the ones named above, with the embassies, and with such offices as the ILO, etc. This need not be rated very high in the scale, for such contacts can be maintained from New York, but it would be all to the good if we had a man on the spot.

(5) One more function of the IPR representative, and doubtless a fairly troublesome one, would be to trundle foreign visitors around.

Thus the job suggests a combination of research and of contact work both to secure and supply current information and to pick up leads for our general national program. I dare say it would be something of a gamble at the start, but it seems to be a logical step in expansion. This step is especially important—in fact, it is essential—if we are to move further and further away from a strict research program appealing only to the academic world. It goes without saying that the individual chosen for the job would have to know his onions and be able to make his way as a person; otherwise he can do us a lot of damage.

Incidentally, as a measure of economy it might be possible for the IPR representative to share the office and secretarial services of the FPA in Washington.

EXHIBIT No. 572–E

JANUARY 28, 1941.

Miss RUTH CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR RUTH: In answer to your Father's note I do not think I had better accept this radio engagement. Some time in the near future I shall probably be taking a jump across the country. If I sign up for March 5th in New York, I'm likely to find that this is just when I want to be in, say, Sun Valley. I think, therefore, that I had better be counted out although I regret to turn down the suggestion because right now people ought to be as helpful on this sort of thing as possible.

As soon as I can dig up my copy of Corbett's manuscript I will send it along as requested by your Father. I have it at home with the intention of preparing a critical note but perhaps someone else can put it to better use.

Stevens of the R. F. told me Friday that an urgent request had come from some Government department for an emergency training course in the Japanese language. Someone in Washington wants 30 or 40 competent language people overnight. A special course may be organized this spring, possibly at Harvard. Stevens mentioned this in passing and I didn't have a chance to get details. My information may not be quite accurate but further dope could doubtless be had

from him. Your Father may be interested in knowing about this. It's ironical that the country neglects a matter of this kind over a long period of time despite the obvious need and then suddenly someone wakes up and wants a whole generation of trained linguists at 9 a. m. on Monday morning.

Alger Hiss of the State Department was surprised to learn from me last week that Fred had resigned from the American council. I mention this because I rather inferred from what he said that some people in Washington may have associated Fred's views as expressed in the October AMERASIA as the present "line" of the American council.

If and when the American council has another discussion conference on far-eastern policy I wish that Alger Hiss could be invited. Unless he felt too much muzzled I think that he could make a valuable contribution.

One of the men in the State Department showed me two letters—or was it three—from Bill Elliott of Harvard more or less apologizing for the pro-Japanese slant of Mrs. Schumpeter's book and emphatically dissociating himself and the Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau from this point of view. This same State Department economist told me that he had concluded Mrs. Schumpeter's book was useless as source material because of its uncritical acceptance of Japanese sources.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

WWL:JB

EXHIBIT No. 572–F

Copies to ECC and WLH

DECEMBER 23, 1942.

MR. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Room 228, State Department Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR LAUCH: Enclosed herewith is a staff memorandum on the high points of the Mont Tremblant Conference. You may feel free to use the memorandum confidentially in any way you wish.

Brief summaries of this sort never succeed in conveying the color and vitality of the round-table process, but I hope you may nevertheless find this of some value.

The IPR now has the job of building on the foundation of this postwar discussion. In this connection we ought presumably to establish contacts with Governor Lehman's office—both to insure that full use is made of whatever value there may be in the conference documentation and discussion, and also to see what further IPR work would be most useful for the purpose of Governor Lehman's program. After the first of the year we would like to discuss this with you.

In a few days I will send you under separate cover a new set of IPR schoolbooks on the countries of Asia. They are just out and are already getting an enthusiastic reception. One wishes that the State Department's Cultural Relations Division and the Office of Education could see their way to assisting substantially in developing work of this type. The Rockefeller Foundation has now decided not to go extensively into this field, thus leaving pretty flat for the moment the ambitious plans of the IPR and American Council on Education for capitalizing on the new interest in the Far East among school authorities.

One other matter—Wilma Fairbank has just written to say that she does not feel that she can accept our offer to her of the Washington IPR secretaryship. If you happen to think of anyone who might be a candidate, we would welcome nominations.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 572–G

Copies to: ECC
MSF
RL
HM
TGS

APRIL 9, 1943.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
American Peoples Fund, Inc.,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City

DEAR FRED: This is to express the thanks and appreciation of the American council for the action of the board of the American Peoples Fund, Inc., in voting a grant of $2,500 to the American council for the year 1943.

I hope to see you shortly to discuss the questions raised in your letter of the seventh. At the moment Harriet Moore is out of the office with German measles, so perhaps we had better wait her return.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

AMERICAN PEOPLES FUND, INC.,
16 West Twelfth Street, New York City, April 7, 1943.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Your allplcation for a grant from the American Peoples Fund was considered at a meeting of the board of directors on April 2. The board voted a grant of $2,500 to be paid in one sum or installments at the discretion of the officers during the calendar year 1943, with the added reservation that before an initial payment is made projects of mutual interest to the IPR and the fund shall be worked out in greater detail with the directors of the fund.

The IPR memorandum on a labor program for the American council, received the day of our board meeting, seems to indicate in general the kind of education and research on Pacific affairs which the fund's directors would like to see launched in cooperation with labor groups. I look forward to an opportunity to discuss more fully the possibilities of this program.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 572–H

MAY 18, 1943.

To: ECC.
From: WWL.

Thank you for the invitation to the May 27 meeting on collective security. It now looks as though I would not be in Washington on that date, but off somewhere writing the final report on Lehman Study. If I am there, however, I would like very much to attend.

A day or two after the last meeting, Alger Hiss spoke to me and said he felt that the purpose of the series was not clear, either from the selection of people attending or the agenda.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Frederick Field was the head of the American People's Fund?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall having written to the American People's Fund asking them for a grant?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I recall that the American People's Fund did make a contribution to the American council and I presumably had correspondence with them in that connection.

I would like to point out if it is appropriate——

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. There are two points I would like to make. One is that the total contribution from this source was, as I remember, $2,000, $3,000, or $3,500 perhaps in a year, in relation to a total budget of anywhere from $70,000 to $100,000. Second, that to my knowledge no conditions of any kind were attached to the contribution, nor was understood to be present by the council.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified that the contributions from this source, American People's Fund, was $3,500?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Two to three.

Mr. LOCKWOOD. I don't remember the amount; two or three thousand or $3,500. The record of course will show.

Senator EASTLAND. Has Mr. Holland been sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. No; he has not been sworn yet.

Senator EASTLAND. Hold up your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give the Internal Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you remember what that contribution was?

Mr. HOLLAND. To the best of my recollection, Senator, it is $3,500.

Senator EASTLAND. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. For what year was that? Is that for one year, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. That I can't quite recall. I think we do have a record of it in one of the annual reports or financial statements.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you get that information, please, and put it in the record? Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of Mr. Lockwood. Have you anything else, Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. LOCKWOOD. No, sir; I think not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, SECRETARY GENERAL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, COUNSEL

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do you have a statement with you?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a prepared statement here which I would like the permission of the committee to read.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you give me a copy?

Mr. MORRIS. This is your second statement, is it not, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true.

Senator EASTLAND. I am going to order the statement printed in the record.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, do I understand that you do not wish me to read it, then? I am just asking for information. I am not aware of the significance of your remark.

Mr. MORRIS. The problem, Mr. Holland, is that Senator Eastland is pressed for time.

Mr. HOLLAND. I see.

Mr. Morris. The point is, everything in this statement is true, is it not?

Mr. Holland. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. It is going to be put into the record in its entirety. Will you make available copies of all of this to the press?

Mr. Holland. I will be glad to do so.

Senator Eastland. In fact, he has already done so.

Mr. Holland. Yes; I have.

Mr. Morris. So would any additional advantage accrue to you if you read the statement?

Mr. Holland. I don't believe so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Morris. You have been here before, have you not, Mr. Holland?

Mr. Holland. I have.

Mr. Morris. You have made a statement.

Senator Eastland. If you want to read it, I will let you read it.

Mr. Holland. I appreciate your courtesy, sir. I think in that case if I might I would like simply to mention rather briefly four or five of the main points so as not to take up your time.

Mr. Marks. There is one small point on this. There are two appendixes.

Mr. Morris. We haven't come to that yet.

Mr. Marks. They are referred to in the statement. It is just a question of what is going to be in the record. I didn't understand that the Senator said what would happen to these, Mr. Morris. He mentioned that he would order that statement into the record.

Mr. Morris. That is right.

Mr. Marks. But I wondered whether the Senator had ruled upon the appendixes.

Mr. Morris. Yes, there is a question about the appendixes. I suggest, Mr. Holland, that you submit them to the Chair for consideration.

Mr. Holland. Very well.

Mr. Morris. You have noticed, Mr. Chairman, that the appendixes are not sworn statements.

Mr. Holland. That is true.

Mr. Morris. At the same time many of the statements in appendix I go back as far as 1947, I believe. In fact, the last man who gave testimony is now dead.

Mr. Holland. I have now removed those from this particular collection, Mr. Morris. These include testimonials covering the years 1950 or later.

Senator Eastland. I will take that under advisement.

Mr. Morris. There are two of those.

Senator Eastland. I say I will take them under advisement.

You may file them for consideration of the committee.

(Mr. Holland's prepared statement follows:)

Statement by William L. Holland, Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations, Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations for Presentation to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security at His Second Public Hearing on March 19, 1952

I am presenting this statement partly in order to supplement the prepared statement which I submitted in my previous hearing on October 10, 1951, and partly to clarify a number of points which have emerged from subsequent hearings of the subcommittee. I respectfully ask permission to read it, as other witnesses have been given this privilege and I was not give the opportunity to read my previous statement of October 10.

I

I believe such a statement is now needed because the subcommittee's hearings have gone on so long and ramified so far beyond the organization and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations that it is increasingly difficult for the ordinary person to know precisely what the subcommittee is really trying to investigate or to establish. At times it has appeared as if the subcommittee were conducting a general inquiry into American Far Eastern policy. At other times the subcommittee seems to have been investigating the private opinions and writings of certain individuals. Again, at other times, the subject of inquiry seems to have been the opinions, policies, hopes, and programs of the Communist Party.

A considerable part of the hearings has been devoted to matters which have no clear and direct relationship to the aims and work of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Supposedly the institute is the object of investigation, and the printed record of the hearings carries the words "Institute of Pacific Relations" in prominent type on the top of the front page. Yet large sections of some volumes concern questions which have nothing whatever to do with the institute, or contain views of persons who have exerted no influence whatever in the policies or program of the institute.

The subcommittee has the power to frame its own rules of procedure and to enlarge the scope of its inquiry as it pleases. But I feel it would be only fair that the subcommittee should make a more consistent effort than it has done hitherto to point out to the press and the public when it is really investigating the institute and when it is concerning itself with other problems, persons, or organizations which have little or nothing to do with the institute.

On the assumption that the subcommittee wishes to observe the "high standard of evidence and truly objective approach" to which Senator McCarran referred at the opening session last July, I venture to point out a few ways in which the subcommittee has thus far failed to take certain obvious steps which would seem essential to any impartial inquiry into an organization.

In the first place, the subcommittee has thus far given no public indication of having made any careful analysis and appraisal of the hundreds of books, pamphlets, conference papers, and articles which have been issued under IPR auspices during the past quarter century and by which it is mainly known to the scholarly world and to the general public. The IPR officers and most reasonable people maintain that its publications are by far the most important evidence of the institute's value as a nonpartisan research organization and are the true measure of its influence in advancing knowledge about far eastern and Pacific countries.

On March 1 and again on August 13, 1951, after the subcommittee's counsel had assured me of his desire to study any materials which the institute's officers wished to submit, I sent several hundred representative publications of the institute covering a wide range of countries, topics, and periods of time. However, many weeks later at the time of my own hearing on October 10, I observed the packages in which these publications had been sent lying still unopened outside his office. There is still no evidence in the subcommittee's record to indicate that the institute's publications have been analyzed.

I recognize that the Senators with their many other duties may not feel that they have the time to read and appraise a substantial portion of the institute's published output. It may also be that the subcommittee's staff lacked the time or expert knowledge to analyze some of the numerous specialized or technical publications of the IPR. Nevertheless, it would seem only reasonable to expect that after these many months during which they have found time to make the most minute examination of old and often inconsequential IPR correspondence files, they would have been able to insert into the public record a general description and analysis of the content of at least a representative sample of the institute's publications.

If the subcommittee is unable to take this necessary step, then I suggest that the time has come for it to seek the independent opinion of outside Far Eastern scholars who are familiar with the IPR's research activities and publications and can readily supply a professional appraisal of them. There are many eminently qualified persons who are available and have played no significant part in the formulation or execution of IPR programs. I have in mind such people as current or past presidents of the Far Eastern Association (which is the principal learned society of far eastern specialists).

The IPR, like other voluntary private research organizations in the field of international affairs, can exist and continue to maintain its reputation and

financial support only to the extent that it preserves proper standards of scholarship, accuracy, balance, and comprehensive coverage. Its success or failure in doing this must be measured by the professional judgment of qualified scholars and experts in the field. This statement remains true even though there are bound to be cases where the experts will differ among themselves on particular issues or publications.

From my own long and intimate acquaintance with the institute's conferences, research projects and publications, I am confident that any dispassionate examination of the approximately 1,190 titles (containing about 114,460 pages) and the 18,480 pages of periodical articles which the IPR has issued or sponsored will show that only a tiny fraction deal with communism. Of this fraction, only a very small portion could be described even by the most hostile critic as Communist propaganda. There were, of course, a few documents which were clearly labeled as Communist and which were presented for informational purposes. As I pointed out in my statement of October 10, 1951, no IPR publication has advocated communism or urged acceptance of Communist policies or programs.

I stress the importance of such an independent appraisal of IPR publications because we are here concerned with the great principle of freedom of expression and freedom of scholarly publication generally. In the course of the subcommittee hearings, a very small number of articles, pamphlets, or books (or frequently isolated or unrepresentative passages from them) have been cited as examples of IPR publications which someone has alleged to contain Communist propaganda. Yet, because of the subcommittee's failure to describe the character of the overwhelming majority of the IPR publications, the general public, reading about the investigation in the newspapers, is likely to get the idea that much of the material published or sponsored by the IPR is somehow tainted with communism. The fact is, however, that no one has made any such allegation either before the subcommittee or elsewhere.

That is why I think the subcommittee should make it clear to the public that not even the most biased witness called has alleged that anything more than an infinitesimal proportion of the institute's total output could be called communistic.

Having said that, let me now make it plain that I do not think the value and integrity of the institute should be judged by the very negative test of how little pro-Communist material it has published. It should be judged far more by the test of its positive contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge and public understanding of Far Eastern and Pacific area problems. I would note that such contributions to knowledge in the present state of affairs in the Far East certainly ought to include descriptive and unemotional accounts of Communist policies and practices in such areas as China and southeast Asia. There would indeed be something seriously wrong with the IPR if, for fear of attack by partisan critics, whether Communist or anti-Communist, it became so timed as to refrain from publishing articles or books which described what important Communist governments or groups are saying or doing in the Far East.

II

Let me turn now to the allegation that the Communists secretly got control of the IPR in past years and exerted, through it, a sinister influence on the policies of the Government. Much of the evidence so far produced on this point before the subcommittee is flimsy and not even plausible. Some of the assertions made by witnesses are, I believe, demonstrably untrue, while others are vague or irrelevant. A good many documents from the IPR's own files have been introduced, often out of context, and with the most farfetched interpretation put on them.

I believe that the American press and public are intelligent and fair-minded enough to make their own interpretation. Visits to Moscow, conversations with Russian Communists, and the like, can be interpreted only by a violent distortion of meaning as evidence of some secret Communist conspiracy. It is incredible that if IPR people were really engaged in a secret conspiracy they would have left such voluminous, frank, and detailed written records and have allowed the FBI to examine them. The same facts can, however, be interpreted much more reasonably as part of the normal operations of a nonpartisan international organization engaged in work in or concerning many countries, including Russia.

Now just suppose that the second interpretation is correct, that the IPR is what its officers and members claim it is, a private research organization trying to advance public knowledge of Asia. That would account for the fact that various IPR people who have been questioned by the subcommittee about things that happened or were written 10 or 15 years ago have often had to reply that they don't remember, or that their memory was inaccurate. Only if you start out with the idea that these people were conspirators would such answers seem evasive. If you start with the idea that these people were perfectly innocent, then their conduct appears quite normal. It would be extraordinary to find someone who could give, offhand, a full, precise account of a letter that he wrote a decade ago or a casual conversation that he had with a colleague, which was part of his normal routine of work and didn't seem unusual or important at the time.

What, then, can be said of allegations that Communists "infiltrated" the IPR? First of all it should be noted that the word "infiltrate" in this context is a very nebulous term, with many different meanings for different people. To some people, however, the testimony before the subcommittee may suggest that a good many years ago some Communists hoped or tried to use the IPR to spread disguised Communist propaganda. It does not show that they succeeded in this aim. On the contrary, it can be demonstrated that if such an attempt was made, it failed ignominiously.

The clearest proof of this lies in the IPR's publications, which are its principal activity, and which have not followed a particular line but have represented many different and often conflicting schools of thought.

Why did the Communists fail to make any appreciable headway in the IPR? Very few people in the 1930s and early 1940s in the IPR or elsewhere believed there was any serious danger of Communist infiltration. Investigation of the political beliefs or affiliations of its employees or members or writers to keep out anyone who might be a Communist sympathizer was alien to the traditions of American scholarly research.

The reason why the Communists could not get control of the institute was simply because the IPR has operated on the democratic principles of free inquiry and open discussion, and Communist propaganda cannot succeed in such an atmosphere.

Anybody who is an American citizen can join the American IPR, whatever his political beliefs or affiliations. Hence the membership of the American IPR is a pretty good cross section of American opinion, and if there are any Communist members they are swamped in the mass, as they are in America as a whole.

To do its research the IPR has always sought the services of the best-qualified scholars it can find. It does not inquire into their political affiliations, only into their scholarly competence, but actually very few of the persons who have written for the IPR have even been alleged to be Communists. If any Communist author ever got his work published by the IPR by passing himself off as a non-Communist, it was only because in that piece of writing he had confined himself to accurate, factual reporting or had watered down his Communist views to the point of invisibility.

There is a moral in all this which all Americans today might do well to remember. It is that in the long run we cannot fight communism merely by looking under the bed for Communists. We have to be working for something, not merely against something. In the IPR's case it has been working for the advancement of knowledge through free, rational, scientific study and democratic discussion. If any disguised Communist got into the organization, he could not do any harm in an atmosphere of open discussion. He was not able to infect a healthy organism.

Being strongly opposed to communism myself, I think it right to combat Communist propaganda and expose Communist activities. But I think we ought always to remember that if, in our zeal for combatting communism, we jettison our American ideas of fair play, free inquiry and free speech, then we are really laying ourselves wide open to communism itself.

III

May I now call attention also to an indirect result of the subcommittee's activities which not only affects the IPR itself but may have very serious results for innocent people? There are thousands of loyal and respectable people who have had some connection with the IPR in its 27 years of existence—as members, or employees, or delegates to conferences, or members of study

groups, or contributors to its publications, or publishers of its books—and against whom witnesses before the subcommittee have made no charges whatever. If, as the result of headlines inspired by the subcommittee's hearings, the IPR comes to be associated in the public mind with the idea of a Communist conspiracy, or espionage or subversive activities, any of these people may, in the present climate of American opinion, suffer serious injury, even though no one has ever suggested that they had anything to do with communism or espionage.

It therefore seems to me urgently necessary that the subcommittee should in fairness make it very clear in a public way, and repeatedly, that the many loyal citizens who have worked or been associated with the IPR are not suspect on that account.

Moreover, the allegations mostly refer to things that are said to have happened many years ago. So far as I know, no one has seriously made the claim that the IPR today is under Communist control. (Of course, I am certain that it was never under Communist control—and I have been with the organization since 1929.)

But even the most biased witnesses before the subcommittee would probably agree that there is no reason to impugn the reputation of the IPR as it exists today—an organization which is doing a much-needed job of advancing American knowledge of the Far East.

IV

I now come to another example of how the subcommittee has thus far neglected to take an obvious step to bring out the truth about the institute's claim to be a nonpartisan organization. I refer to the question of whether the IPR or its officers have attempted to influence the policy of the State Department in a pro-Communist direction. Surely one of the best ways to find out the truth on this question would be to seek information from the men who were responsible officers of the Department concerned with Far Eastern affairs during the period when the alleged attempts took place, and could thus speak with knowledge. I therefore urge the subcommittee to call on such present or former senior officials as Stanley K. Hornbeck, Joseph C. Grew, Maxwell Hamilton, Eugene Dooman, Abbot Low Moffatt, Joseph W. Ballantine, Walter Butterworth, and John Allison and ask them whether they, or other Department officials to their knowledge, ever received or sought advice in United States foreign policy from the IPR or its officers. Mr. Ballantine has already written the IPR that he knows of no such cases of IPR advice being offered or requested.

At least one of these officials, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, has already been questioned by the subcommittee in executive session, and part of his testimony has been made part of the public record. If Dr. Hornbeck was asked in executive session the question suggested above, neither the question nor the reply has been made public. Mr. Eugene Dooman also testified at an earlier public session but not on the institute, and there is no indication whether he was asked the above question. I think the public, the IPR officers, and the members of the subcommittee have a right to know how the above-mentioned officials would answer such a question. It is my firm belief that their replies would show that the State Department in fact never allowed its formulation or execution of United States foreign policy to be shaped by advice from the IPR.

The subcommittee's counsel has made a labored effort to imply that the presence of some present or former American IPR employees or trustees at the State Department's conference on Far Eastern problems in October 1949 is an indication of IPR "influence." This contention will not hold water. It was made perfectly clear that the persons present (from banks, universities, and research institutions) were not speaking for the organizations to which they were attached, but only for themselves. Indeed, it is noteworthy that neither of the institute's two executive officers (Mr. Clayton Lane and myself) was invited to the conference. Moreover, it was plain that among those persons attending, who happened to have some present or past connection with the IPR, there was no identity of views.

V

The subcommittee has made much of the fact that several people, alleged to be connected with the IPR, have refused to state under oath whether they are or were Communists. Most of these, as the subcommittee must have known, never

had any significant connection with the institute. Only four of them were ever IPR officers or employees. Only two (including Mr. Frederick V. Field) had ever held executive positions and neither, while holding these positions, ever gave any sign of departing from the institute's tradition of nonpartisan research or of allowing it to be used for Communist propaganda purposes.

Personally, I regret and deeply deplore the action of the persons who refused to answer. I know that their refusal creates a suspicion in the minds of some people that they really were Communists at one time. Nevertheless, suspicion is not proof of guilt, and one can envisage circumstances in which a person, especially if already accused by others of having been a Communist or "considered" as a Communist, would decline to answer even though knowing the accusation to be untrue. Moreover, the refusal of the four above-mentioned persons certainly does not prove that they were Communists when they were IPR employees. I can only reaffirm that their writing and other work for the IPR was good, and in their conduct as IPR employees there was no ground for criticism.

I stress this particularly in the case of Mr. L. K. Rosinger, since it was I who engaged him in 1948 to prepare a survey since published as "The State of Asia." Rosinger already had an excellent reputation as a writer and lecturer on the Far East and had been for several years the Far Eastern specialist of the Foreign Policy Association. In his work for the IPR, I found him completely candid and honorable and a scrupulously careful researcher who sought and gladly accepted criticism of his manuscripts and meticulously respected the institute's tradition of scholarly work. Many other Far Eastern scholars who know him and his writings could testify in the same way about him. I recognize that many will now feel doubtful about his past affiliations. Personally I feel certain that he was not a Communist when he worked for the IPR. Even though I have sometimes disagreed with him on specific points, I do not believe that his writings and lectures were those of a Communist.

In a memorandum dated October 8, 1951, to me, Mr. Rosinger made the following remarks which I still believe to be sincere and truthful:

"I have worked at the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of three years: from September 1939 through August 1940, and again from September 1948 to mid-October 1950. Neither in these years nor at any other time have I seen even the slightest evidence of the existence of any 'cell,' Communist or otherwise, within the IPR or in connection with it. In reading IPR publications over the years, I have not observed in them an adherence to any particular approach to Far Eastern questions, but rather a variety of viewpoints. As far as my own work is concerned, my sole guide in everything I have written has been my independent judgment of the facts, based on painstaking study, without adherence to any line, Communist or otherwise. In accordance with standard IPR procedure and my own desire, the books I have written for the IPR have been submitted before publication to specialists of widely different viewpoints in an effort to insure balance and accuracy. It has been my practice to take such outside comments into account in revising my manuscripts for publication."

VI

The subcommittee has made repeated references to T. A. Bisson's article, "China's Part in a Coalition War" in the Far Eastern Survey for July 14, 1943. This point deserves special attention because it concerns one of the serious and specific charges made against Mr. Bisson and the IPR, namely that this article was written and "planted" in the magazine on instructions from American Communist leaders as part of a plan to attack the Chinese Nationalist Government and play up the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers. It seems extraordinary therefore that the subcommittee has not yet taken the obvious step of asking the author for a statement on the matter.

As a matter of elementary fairness to Mr. Bisson and the IPR, I maintain that the subcommittee should take note of his memorandum of September 15, 1951, to me in which he states: "In my experience with the institute I saw not the slightest evidence that the organization was part of a 'Soviet espionage network' or that it contained a 'Communist cell' that was influencing its policies. I am not and have not been a Communist and I deny most emphatically that any of the numerous articles appearing under my name in institute publications was written at the behest or under the influence of the Communist Party." (In the appendix to this statement I present the full text of Mr. Bisson's memorandum with an accompanying letter of commendation from Gen. Courtney Whitney, his former chief in SCAP Headquarters, Tokyo.)

I request the subcommittee to make these documents part of the printed record and also to insert as exhibits in the record the whole text of Mr. Bisson's article, "China's Part in a Coalition War" together with Dr. C. L. Hsia's reply to it and Mr. Bisson's further comment in the August 11, 1943, issue of the Far Eastern Survey.

VII

For the same reasons of fairness I ask the subcommittee to insert as exhibits in the record the other documents in the appendix, consisting of letters or statements which the institute has received from several other persons who have been accused by witnesses before the committee and have not yet had an opportunity or have not been able to appear publicly before the subcommittee. (Joseph Barnes, Benjamin Kizer, Laurence E. Salisbury, and Marguerite A. Stewart), together with memoranda, prepared by me and my staff, correcting misleading impressions which have appeared in the subcommittee's hearings concerning the content of three IPR publications: Land of the Soviets, Wartime China, and Our Job in the Pacific.

VIII

In a recent letter to the institute's legal counsel, the chairman of the subcommittee has indicated that he may be prepared to consider the possibility of allowing me to present a number of testimonials and other statements from Far Eastern specialists and other persons well qualified to speak of the value of the institute's work. Accordingly, I submit herewith, as appendix II, a preliminary collection of such statements with the request that they be made part of the subcommittee's printed record. I also respectfully request the permission of the subcommittee to present, before the subcommittee completes its work, additional statements of this kind which the IPR may receive from qualified persons in this country and abroad.

IX

As an institute officer, with some natural pride in its purposes and achievements, I would be less than human if I did not feel some resentment at the way in which the subcommittee has sometimes operated. By the one-sided character of its earlier proceedings, I feel that it has permitted the good name of the IPR to be blackened in the eyes of the public and its work to be misrepresented by witnesses who are utterly ignorant of its aims and methods and clearly unqualified to express opinions on it. Nevertheless I have made, and am still eager to make, an earnest effort to aid the subcommittee in completing its inquiry in a more orderly and impartial manner. The institute officers did not and do not object to a fair and comprehensive investigation of its past or present work and will not be afraid to acknowledge current or former mistakes if these are clearly demonstrated on the basis of an impartial appraisal of all the evidence.

The institute officers will not hesitate to admit, if the evidence justifies it, that Communists or ex-Communists may have been employed on the IPR staff or have written for its publications. The possibility of this, and the possibility of Communist attempts to influence the character of the institute's publications, has always been recognized. This is a risk which the IPR has shared with dozens of other organizations.

But on the kind of evidence thus far produced by the subcommittee I cannot see that any fair-minded person would agree that the institute was either controlled by the Communists or successfully infiltrated and "taken over by Communist design and made a vehicle for attempted control and conditioning of American thinking and American policy with regard to the Far East." These were the words used by Senator McCarran in an interview given to U. S. News and World Report on November 16, 1951. Even more emphatically do I reject and deny the slanderous insinuations which have emerged from some of the subcommittee hearings that the institute has been an espionage organization.

Similarly I reject the repeated but unsubstantiated suggestions of some subcommittee members that the institute officers or staff were engaged in a conspiracy to advance Communist or Russian aims and I protest, as legally and morally unwarranted, the continued assumption of an unproved conspiracy (which I am certain did not exist) as the excuse for the admission of flimsy and untested hearsay testimony. I do not question the right of the subcommittee to listen to hearsay testimony, but I do challenge the use of spurious arguments which would give such hearsay a wholly unjustified legal validity.

Because I believe that there is still time for the subcommittee to conclude its work in an impartial manner and thus perform a valuable public service as well

as render justice to the IPR and to the many loyal citizens who are connected with it, I earnestly appeal to the subcommittee to accede now to the reasonable requests which the American IPR chairman, Mr. Gerard Swope, and the institute's legal counsel made last year and which have not yet been answered. Those requests included the following: that the institute officers be given access to its files which the subcommittee illegally seized over a year ago; and that the institute officers be granted adequate opportunity (with due notice and sufficient time for preparation) to reply to charges against it.

My main purpose in making this statement has been to appeal, in a spirit of reasonableness, to the basic American instinct of fair play. The uncovering of subversive forces is, of course, a serious business and one which must continue to engage the full energies of such highly competent professional agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice. The IPR officers have cooperated loyally and gladly with those agencies ever since the institute invited the FBI to examine its files in 1950, and are still cooperating actively. I suggest, in no flippant sense, that the excessive concentration of attention which the subcommittee is giving to the IPR is undeservedly flattering to this small and unexciting organization. I have sometimes rubbed my eyes in wonderment that this institute, with its tiny staff of only 4 senior members and 11 junior and clerical workers, can be the object of so much valuable senatorial time and expenditure of public funds.

I have tried, but vainly, to adjust my mind to the idea that all those dull IPR publications on my shelves, most of them so specialized and uninteresting that it is a constant struggle to find publishers for them, can somehow have been an instrument of Communist subversion or espionage. I have tried to imagine that the hundreds of informal letters and interoffice memoranda, some thoughtful, some dull, some silly, jocular, and inconsequential, which were casually stored in never-locked office files, can now by some psychological change of political climate be transformed into sinister evidence of infiltration and diabolical undermining of United States Far Eastern policy planners. I have asked myself: Can it be possible that this institute, which for decades had the warm and active cooperation of conservative Chinese scholars and businessmen and prominent men in the Chinese Nationalist Government, which received financial support from such groups right up to 1949 when the Communists took over the country, could have worked to bring about the Communist victory in China?

I have tried hard to imagine these things, but my imagination balks at such leaps into the world of fantasy. And so, in all earnestness, I urge the subcommittee members to ask themselves: May we not have been given a wrong steer? Might it not be wise instead to look into the real motives of those who induced the subcommittee to launch this investigation by illegally seizing the IPR files and who obviously wish to thwart free scholarly inquiry and discussion on the vitally important problems of the Far East?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, are there any parts of this prepared statement that you would like to have emphasized?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I think I can do it quite briefly if you will permit me.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. HOLLAND. On page 2, I stress and earnestly bring to the attention of the subcommittee the fact that we believe that a much more detailed and serious attempt should be made by the subcommittee staff before it concludes its work to analyze the content and balance and general scholarly standing and validity of the very large quantity of publications which the institute has put out, and a large selection of which I sent many months ago to the subcommittee. For reasons that the two previous witnesses today have given, we feel that these publications constitute the major test and measurement of the value of the institute's work.

Senator EASTLAND. What about your present files? I think the staff will have to have access to them.

Mr. HOLLAND. To our present files, sir?

Senator EASTLAND. Certainly.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, the situation as I understand it at the moment is that the staff of the committee has complete access to any and all files of the institute whether here or in New York, and Mr. Morris and Mr. Mandel have in fact been through our files there and made a number of selections.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. HOLLAND. That remains the case, I think. Those are open at all times.

Mr. MORRIS. The committee is exploring the possibility of making these available to you for a period of the next few weeks, Mr. Holland. I think you have asked for a period of 1 month.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is one of the other points in my statement here.

Mr. MORRIS. If you would be willing to have someone work here in the Senate building, most of the files would be accessible to you upstairs. If you have someone there, they would be working under the same conditions that our people work under, not the most agreeable conditions, but at any time you want to do that, the committee wants you to have full access to all those files.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to express the thanks for this. I take it that this is the formal answer to the request which our counsel have addressed to te committee which up to now has not been answered.

Mr. MORRIS. You can appreciate that it would be impossible for us to turn them back to you again because many of them are still being used. At the same time you require for your side of this maybe something in here that supplements some of the evidence that we have.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I might say in passing that I think this is a substantial evidence of what I could call fairness on the committee's part and I would like that to be noted.

The other point which I want to stress in my statement is the fact that, as we think, the most conclusive evidence of the failure of any possible attempts at Communist infiltration in the Institute of Pacific Relations in the past years is to be found in the character of its conferences and publications, that had there been a successful infiltration this must have shown itself in the bias of the publication.

Senator EASTLAND. Would all these Communists be swarming around you if they didn't penetrate your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. Senator Eastland, I think you asked me that question last time I was here, and I felt obliged to answer as I do now, that I do not find evidence of a large swarm of Communists, as you put it.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not find evidence of a large swarm of Communists in your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. I find evidence of a small number of people who are alleged to have been Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Who were they? How many Communists were in your organization there?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I can tell you the name of only one whom I feel positive was a Communist at the time that he either worked for IPR or is——

Senator EASTLAND. That is Field, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir; it is not.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not think Frederick V. Field is a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I indicated in my last testimony that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow traveler but at the time he worked for the

institute I did not so feel and even now I am not convinced that he was a Communist at that time. In his recent activities as I indicated I regard him as a decided pro-Communist.

Senator EASTLAND. You think he is a pro-Communist but not a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no evidence, sir, that he was a party member, but his actions were such that I regard him as a 100 percent fellow traveler.

Senator EASTLAND. How many pro-Communists did you have swarming around your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I cannot accept your word "swarming" or even the implication that there are a large number. If you want my candid opinion, I would emphasize based on testimony which has come out before this committee, I would say there are possibly three or four people whom I can think of whose subsequent actions suggest to me that they may have been Communists, but whom I cannot feel there is certainty. I am quite willing to name those. I would say that in his subsequent activities there is a likelihood that Mr. Chi was a Communist. I have not seen evidence which convinces me that he was a Communist when he worked for the IPR. On the contrary, the evidence is the other way, that he was——

Senator EASTLAND. Come, now. Who else was pro-Communist? Name the others.

Mr. HOLLAND. The only other ones it seems to me there is a reasonable possibility that they may have been—I can't say more than that—are Mr. Y. Y. Hsu——

Senator EASTLAND. Is that all?

Mr. HOLLAND. I said three or four, Mr. Chairman. The other one that I want to mention here is Mr. Israel Epstein, and I judge him simply by his actions in the last 2 or 3 years.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. Here is testimony that is undisputed that one of the big shots in the institute wrote a book, and that book was laid down by the Communist Party—not a front organization but by the Communist Party—as party doctrine in this country. The students of communism, Communist Party members—the testimony is undisputed—were instructed to read that book to get the official Communist policy for Asia. That does not arouse any suspicion—no question mark—in your mind that that man was a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I will have to ask you to whom you are referring.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. HOLLAND. If it is Mr. Lattimore's book, Solution in Asia, or Situation in Asia, then I have to point out to you, sir, that these were not IPR books and Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the institute at that time and had not been for many years.

Senator EASTLAND. He molded your policies. You know that.

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir; I deny that categorically, sir. These books had nothing to do with the institute. They were written many years after Mr. Lattimore ceased to be and he was not even in a position where he could influence the policy of the institute.

Senator EASTLAND. It is very strange, then, to me that these people were all wool and a yard wide when they worked for IPR, when their actions to any reasonable mind would tend to show that they were, to say the very least, fellow travelers and under discipline. Then later

when it gets out and they openly affiliate with Communists, you say they might have been years later, but they were all right when they were with us. How do you know that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I have indicated I do not know for sure.

Senator EASTLAND. Then why do you make the statement that they were not Communists when they were with your organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. Because there is no conclusive evidence that they were, sir, and I believe that a committee like this should base its findings, as I should, on conclusive evidence. I do not think——

Senator EASTLAND. You think we should be reasonable men.

Mr. HOLLAND. I do not rule out the possibility, sir, that these people may secretly have been Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course.

Mr. HOLLAND. The only ones that I feel there is a reasonable possibility on that, are these ones that I have just now mentioned. I felt I should do that in frankness.

Senator EASTLAND. Is there anything else that you want to point out there, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I want just to point out that in this statement I suggest one or two courses of action which it would seem to me, if taken by the committee, would insure a more fair-minded appraisal at the end of the committee's work of the true nature of the institute. One of those is that one of the best ways of testing the quality of the institute's public work is to seek the opinion of qualified professional people in the far-eastern field. I know I have no power to tell the committee how to conduct its work, but I do suggest——

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute. That is a question that the committee will go into.

Mr. HOLLAND. I recognize that, Mr. Chairman, but I do mention this is one of the points in my statement.

The next one is that a great deal has been made out of the fact that the institute has in undesirable or improper ways influenced the policy of this country, particularly the far-eastern policy. I suggest that one of the crucial ways in which to test the truth or the falsity of that allegation is very simply to ask the responsible officers who were connected with the Far Eastern Division of the State Department over those years, and I therefore venture to suggest here that the committee ask this question of such people as Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Grew, Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, Mr. Eugene Dooman, Mr. Abbot Low Moffatt, Mr. Joseph Ballantine, Mr. Walton Butterworth, and Mr. John Allison.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you read Mr. Dooman's testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, sir; and I remember very clearly that Mr. Dooman spoke to me immediately afterward in this room and said that he had made a point of not discussing the affairs of the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. That testimony stands for itself.

Mr. HOLLAND. But it was not concerned about the IPR, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. I think it was. I think it very definitely was.

Mr. HOLLAND. I will have to register my disagreement on that, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish also to register this fact—and I do this again because I think I should be frank with the committee—that I per-

sonally very much regret and deplore the action of the persons here who have refused to answer the question of whether they were or were not Communists. I know that their refusal to do this creates a suspicion in the minds of some people that really were at some time——

Senator EASTLAND. That suspicion is reasonable, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have indicated that I recognize it does create a suspicion in the minds of some people.

Senator EASTLAND. It is a reasonable suspicion, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to state what I have——

Senator EASTLAND. No; I want you to answer my question.

Mr. HOLLAND. My answer, sir, is that in some of these cases it seems to be a reasonable suspicion and in some it does not. In particular I want to emphasize that suspicion is not proof of guilt, and at least in some cases I am myself certain that these people were not Communists when they worked for the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. Wouldn't you think that man who is accused of treason to his country—that is what a Communist is—who is accused of being the very vilest and lowest creature that there is, when he is asked the question whether he is guilty or not, would be most anxious if he wasn't guilty to say he was not guilty?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is the way I myself would react, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. Why, of course.

Mr. HOLLAND. But I do know that there are circumstances in which a person to whom it has been indicated that there are three or four witnesses who are prepared to testify against him to this fact, would decline to answer even though he himself felt that the accusation was untrue, simply because he would feel that in the event of a perjury suit his word would not stand up against the words of four or five other witnesses.

Senator EASTLAND. Any man would be most anxious to answer such a question, and you know that, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I cannot alter my testimony on this point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had difficulty trying to subpena as witnesses 19 people whose correspondence and whose association with the Institute of Pacific Relations have arisen in connection with this investigation. We have asked Mr. Holland if he would aid us in locating these people, and Mr. Holland has written us a letter, together with various comments to the whereabouts of these 19 people. I would like Mr. Holland's letter with his qualifications and with his answer to go into the record.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you write such a letter, sir?

Mr. HOLLAND. I did, sir. I am glad to have it go in the record.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be placed in evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Holland has ventured to give us where these 19 people are now.

Senator EASTLAND. That is fine.

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 573," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 573

JOHN W. DAVIS
ALLEN WARDWELL
WILLIAM C. CANNON
HALL PARK MCCULLOUGH
J. HOWLAND AUCHINCLOSS
EDWIN S. S. SUNDERLAND
THEODORE KIENDL
MONTGOMERY B. ANGELL
GEORGE A. BROWNELL
WALTER D. FLETCHER
CARROLL H. BREWSTER
LEIGHTON H. COLEMAN
EDGAR G. CROSSMAN
RALPH M. CARSON
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ
MARION N. FISHER
PORTER R. CHANDLER
EWEN CAMERON MACVEAGH
THOMAS O'G. FITZGIBBON
EDWARD R. WARDWELL
S. HAZARD GILLESPIE, Jr.
D. NELSON ADAMS
ANDREW Y. ROGERS
TAGGART WHIPPLE
CHARLES H. WILLARD
FRANK L. POLK
MORTON FEAREY
JOHN C. HOVER

DAVIS, POLK, WARDWELL, SUNDERLAND & KIENDL
15 Broad Street
NEW YORK, N. Y.
Cable Address: Stetson

MARCH 4, 1952.

Re Institute of Pacific Relations.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws,
Room 424–C, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: We acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 26, 1952, relating to our letter of November 13, 1951.

With reference to Mr. Holland's next appearance before the subcommittee, we again request that because of the press of business Mr. Holland not be called before March 19. Your cooperation in this respect will be much appreciated.

As to Mr. Jerome D. Greene, Prof. John K. Fairbank, and Mr. Herbert S. Little we believe that the subcommittee ought to call those gentlemen if it is interested in obtaining a fair picture of IPR activities. We think, too, that you ought to call Prof. William W. Lockwood, to whom we referred in our letter of October 16, 1951. If you desire to hear them, we suggest that you communicate with them directly and make arrangements with them concerning their traveling expenses and fix dates convenient to them. In order to facilitate your communication with them, we are enclosing their addresses.

We object to your including within the term "Institute of Pacific Relations people" persons on your list whose relation with IPR is and was, as you know from testimony already received by your subcommittee, insignificant or of short duration in the fairly remote past. We likewise object to the unfair implication in your last two sentences that the IPR ought to know the present whereabouts of such persons, or that the IPR has any "good offices" for bringing them before your subcommittee. The subcommittee itself is aware from documents and other testimony received by it in earlier hearings that several of the persons named in your list are not in the country, and are not now connected with the IPR. In order to assist the subcommittee, however, Mr. Holland has prepared the enclosed list setting out all the information available to him concerning the whereabouts of the persons named.

We wish to repeat once again the request made in our letter of October 16, 1951, that you return to us the IPR records you seized, illegally, at Lee, Mass. In letters to Mr. Morris dated October 9, 1951, and December 4, 1951, Mr. Marks requested the return of papers which the IPR turned over to you on the understanding that you would complete your examination of them and return them to the IPR within a short time after receipt. Some of these papers have now been in your hands 11 months. Will you please let us know when you intend to return them. As we indicated in our letter of October 16, your continued retention of these papers and the papers seized at Lee is one of the factors making it impossible for us currently to prepare a defense of our client. We therefore assume that in accordance with the request set forth in our letter of October 16, 1951, we will be allowed at least a month after your counsel has finished introducing evidence to study the whole record with a view to suggesting further evidence or to providing a statement for consideration of the Senators, or both.

Very truly yours,

[s] DAVIS, POLK, WARDWELL, SUNDERLAND & KIENDL.

Mr. Jerome D. Greene, 54-A Garden Street, Cambridge, Mass.
Mr. Herbert S. Little, 1510 Hoge Building, Seattle, Wash.
Prof. John K. Fairbank, 127 Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.
Prof. William W. Lockwood, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.

THE FOLLOWING HAVE NEVER BEEN EMPLOYED ON THE IPR STAFF

Solomon Adler (now working at the Economic Research Institute at Cambridge University, England. Never an IPR member).
Anthony Jenkinson (last address, 133 West Forty-fourth Street. Might be located through Allied Labor News, 401 Broadway, New York. Canceled IPR membership June 1947).
Anna Louise Strong (according to some reports is living in California. Could probably be reached through her last publishers, Doubleday Doran, New York. Never an IPR member).
Victor Yakhontoff (listed in New York telephone directory. Never an IPR member).
Ella Winter (address unknown. Subcommittee has files. Never an IPR member).
Israel Epstein (reported in earlier hearings of subcommittee as having left this country in 1951 with his wife, who was formerly Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley. Later reported as having left England for Hong Kong or China).
Fred W. Poland (address unknown but possibly in Canada. Never an IPR member but attended 1945 IPR conference. Might be located through Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto. Is Canadian citizen).
Andrew Roth (now in London, England, as correspondent for The Nation, New York. Could probably be reached through The Nation. Canceled IPR membership June 1947).
Guenther Stein (exact address unknown but has been reported as working as newspaper correspondent for Hindustan Times in Geneva, Switzerland. Canceled IPR membership March 1946. Was temporary IPR correspondent in Chungking in 1943).
Michael Lindsay (now lecturer, National University of Australia, Canberra, Australia. Never an IPR member but attended 1947 IPR conference).
Abraham Chapman (last address, 76-23 Commonwealth Boulevard, Bellrose, Long Island, N. Y. IPR membership lapsed May 1947).
Andrew Steiger (last address, 49 Claremont Avenue, New York. Canceled IPR membership April 1947.)

THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN IPR EMPLOYEES IN PAST YEARS

Y. Y. Hsu (last heard of in Shanghai, China, March 1947. Employed as translator and research assistance by IPR international secretariat, New York, 1941–45).
Michael Greenberg (last address, Trinity College, Cambridge University, England. Now reported working in a business firm in Switzerland. Employed by IPR international secretariat, 1941–42).
Chi Ch'ao-ting (last address, Research Department, Central Bank of China (1949). Reported in newspapers as Chinese Communist government's nominee for United Nations Economic and Social Council. Employed as research associate by IPR international secretariat, May 1938–January 1941).
Chen Han-seng (last address, Care of Asia Institute, New York. Now reported to be in China. Employed as research associate by IPR international secretariat, 1935–39. Later employed at University of Washington, University of Pennsylvania, and Johns Hopkins University).
Rose Yardumian (now married to an Englishman, Peter Townsend, and living in London, England. Latest address: 34 Lyndale Avenue, London NW 2. Employed by IPR 1942–45. IPR membership lapsed May 1948).
Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley (last address, 235 Rutledge Street, Brooklyn, N. Y. Reported by subcommittee as having left the United States in 1951 with her husband, Israel Epstein. Was employed as secretary by IPR international secretariat, 1935–39).*
Ellen Atkinson (last address, 3447 South Wakefield Street, Arlington, Va. IPR

*Canceled IPR membership April 1947.

membership lapsed 1951. Employed as junior research associate by American IPR, February 1940–August 1941).

Mr. HOLLAND. May I continue briefly for a moment?

I also have pointed out in my statement that one of the most serious allegations made against the institute has been the fact, according to some witnesses, that an article called China's Part in a Coalition War, published in our magazine the Far Eastern Survey in 1943, was written by the author, Mr. T. A. Bisson, on instructions of the American Communist Party as part of a plan to discredit the Chinese Nationalist Government and to play up the Chinese Communists as democrats and agrarian reformers. I feel in justice to Mr. Bisson that the committee should either call him to get his own sworn statement on that or if that is not possible because he is in California, just as a matter of fairness to him the committee should take note of his memorandum to me, which is one of the documents in that green volume there, in which he said specifically:

In my experience with the institute I saw not the slightest evidence that the organization was part of a "Soviet espionage network"——

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am quoting from his memoranda.

Senator EASTLAND. It is just a self-serving memorandum in which we are denied the right of cross-examination. You are smarter than that. That is propaganda that you are trying to get in this record.

Mr. MARKS. I object to that.

Senator EASTLAND. I do not care what you object to now. I am running this hearing. I want all of that stricken, and we are going to subpena Mr. Bisson and take his testimony under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. That is far more satisfactory, I agree, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Not some self-serving propaganda.

Mr. HOLLAND. Sir, I point this out simply because after this long delay when the accusation has been on the record Mr. Bisson has not had a chance to answer it. If you will recall——

Senator EASTLAND. We are taking these people as fast as we can get to them and we do not need to be lectured, Mr. Holland, by you or anybody else as to procedure. You have just stated that we have conducted the hearing fairly.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Bisson will be given a chance to testify on this point. That is all I ask for.

Mr. MORRIS. In this connection you see there have been some 60 people named as Communists, Mr. Holland, and it is a very difficult thing to bring all of them in, particularly inasmuch as we are having such a great deal of difficulty in locating most of them. As you yourself admitted, 5 of them are in Red China now, and there are at least 10 or 15 others who are in Europe somewhere. So I think Mr. Bisson is one of the few people we haven't called. He is out on the west coast. We were hoping that he might be East some time before we do it.

Mr. Chairman, there is one affidavit in here by Mr. Kizer that we were going to introduce into the record during the course of events. May I say that in that case will an exception be made inasmuch as it is a sworn statement, and will Mr. Kizer's statement go into the record at this time?

Senator EASTLAND. I will have to read it. Where is it?

Mr. HOLLAND. In the blue one. I might say there is another sworn statement by Mrs. Marguerite A. Stewart, which is there, too.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, I will admit that into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Stewart is on the east coast here.

Mr. HOLLAND. She is in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. It may be that we will be able to bring her down without too much difficulty. It would be a clear imposition to bring Kizer all the way over just to affirm that.

(The Kizer affidavit was marked "Exhibit No. 574" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 574

KIZER

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
County of Spokane:

Benjamin H. Kizer, being first duly sworn, on his oath, says: My attention has been called to the testimony of Louis Budenz, on August 22d, 1951, before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee, in which he testified that I am a member of the Communist Party. This affidavit is made in reply to that charge.

This testimony is wholly false. I am not now, nor was I ever at any time a member of the Communist Party, nor have I ever been a communist, nor have I ever been in sympathy with communist doctrine.

Budenz further testified that he knew of my membership "through official information given me by Jack Stachel, and also by the district leader of the Party in Washington, Henry Huff."

This is likewise wholly false. I never even knew Jack Stachel or Henry Huff or either of them, and I have never had any dealings with them or either of them. I do not remember ever to have heard of the names of either of these men, until I read them in the testimony of Budenz. Nor have I ever known or met Louis Budenz.

I have never even contemplated any kind of association or connection with the Communist Party, or with any organization avowing communist principles, which I have always held, and to which I remain devoted. Communism's totalitarianism is exactly as contrary to my democratic outlook.

I have lived a happy and contented life in this little city of Spokane ever since I was twelve years old. I have never aspired to hold political office of any kind, and have been content with my life as a lawyer and private citizen.

I have always been deeply grateful for the privilege of being an American citizen, living under our federal and state constitutions, to whose basic principles I am attached, and have tried to express my gratitude for these inestimable privileges by serving my community and my state in a considerable number of civic and state uncompensated tasks.

I do not hesitate to avow my membership in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, later known as the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I became a member of the Institute in 1933, became a trustee in 1935, and have served as such trustee ever since save for the year of 1946. I have also served as one of its vice chairmen in 1936–1939. My experience with the Institute is that it is a research and conference-holding organization of the highest repute and integrity, engaged in collecting and publishing scholarly studies prepared by leading specialists and students of the Pacific Area and the Far East. Of its many publications that I have read in the last 18 years, I have never discovered any that were communistic in tenor, or that tended toward communism. If I had ever detected communist influence in the Institute, I would have resigned at once. Since I have not done so, I propose to continue my membership in it.

[s] BENJAMIN H. KIZER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of September 1951.

[SEAL] [s] (signed) ELIA HOPE,
Notary Public in and for the State of Washington, residing at Spokane, Wash.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you anything else, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. The only other thing I request is indicated in my statement, that in accordance with the earlier letter from Senator

McCarran indicating that the committee might be prepared to admit into its record a number of testimonial letters written by qualified far eastern specialists, I now request that those be admitted, and this includes the earlier ones which were sent to the committee some months ago. I am willing to exclude those older ones prior to 1950, but I would like to have added the very recent ones included in this yellow volume here which have come in quite recently. I think that is all I need to say, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. That is a matter for the whole committee. We will let him file it for consideration of the committee.

Do you have further questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I have.

Mr. Holland, did you employ the pseudonym of Sinicus?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what publications you wrote for under that name?

Mr. HOLLAND. Only one. I wrote one article in what is called the International Journal, the publication of our Canadian affiliate, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. I am willing to give you the reason why I did so because I have very rarely done this.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write under the name of Sinicus for any other publication?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write for the publication China Today under the name of Sinicus?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I didn't know there was such.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't know there was a Sinicus?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I didn't know that.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you get the name?

Mr. HOLLAND. I invented it, Mr. Chairman. The reason for my doing this, I wrote this article on the present economic situation in China just before our international conference in England in 1947. It was suggested to me by some of our Canadian friends that since we were going to have this conference at which some Chinese would be present, it would be unfortunate if I gave the impression of expressing opinions on a current very controversial situation in China, and therefore I adopted this device of using a pseudonym.

Senator EASTLAND. No one suggested the name?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. It was my own. I chose it partly because it was a mixture of something to do with China and also sounded like as if it had something to do with "cynical."

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, did you know Miss Lucy Knox?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I did. She was a stenographer in the very early days of the institute in Honolulu in 1929, and I think worked partly for the China branch of the institute in 1931. Subsequently after she left the institute in 1932 I think she did some work for the Lytton Commission in the Manchurian incident and then went to Moscow. I think for some years there she worked in some capacity, I don't exactly what, on the Moscow Daily News.

Mr. MORRIS. Her mailing address is the Moscow Daily News?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. I wrote her a letter there myself.

Mr. MORRIS. Why would you refer to her as "my dear comrade Lucy"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I was not aware I had done so, but I know one of the letters I wrote her was in a flippant vein in which I kidded her and said she was in the wrong country if she wanted to study revolutions because she ought to be back here—this was in the early days of the New Deal—and see a real social revolution going on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon of a letter and the carbon comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 27, 1934, addressed, "Miss Lucy Knox, Moscow Daily News," with the typed signature of W. L. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having written that letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't precisely recall it, but I am sure it is one that I have written, Mr. Morris. I note that in the letter I describe myself as a capitalist. I don't know why. But I see I refer to myself as "which my capitalist eye." I was apparently asking Miss Knox to try and get an article from B and I think B was the well-known Soviet figure, Borodin, who had played an important part in the Chinese Nationalist revolution.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 576" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 576

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, January 27, 1934.

Miss LUCY KNOX,
Moscow Daily News, Petrovski Per. 8,
Moscow, Russia.

MY DEAR COMRADE LUCY: Your letter about Uzbeks and things in Russia excited the office enormously. I showed it to Lasker, Barnes, and Lattimore before sending it on to the Keesings (whose address, by the way, is 14 Northwick Mews, St. John's Wood, London, N. W. 8, England). There was much discussion as to whether we should not print most of the letter as it stands, but we finally decided to ask you to expand it without abandoning its slightly evangelical style, and let us have it for an article in the June issue of Pacific Affairs. This is not a request, but a peremptory demand, so you had better start getting to work. Quite seriously, we want the article to be as vivid and enthusiastic as the letter itself. At the same time, I hope you will find occasion, here and there, to expand one or two of the slight criticisms which my capitalist eye seems to see lying hidden in your letter. I have no desire at all to prove that the Soviet policy toward minority peoples is all blah or all wrong, but we should really like to know, in as objective a fashion as possible, just how much of the existing cultures are being preserved or are worth preserving and how far the Russification which you speak about is inevitable in spite of all official protests to the contrary.

We are really counting on the article from B., and I hope you will keep prodding him, if you are on sufficiently good terms to do that sort of thing.

I hope you safely received the $50 which I sent along with my Christmas card to you. Doreen and I leave New York about March 1st, travelling in the general direction of Japan. I shall have a fortnight in Honolulu and then go on to Tokyo, leaving Doreen with her mother for about a month in Hawaii before she rejoins me. It is going to be great fun looking for a house in Tokyo. We hope to get comfortably installed just in time for the Japanese agrarian revolution or the war with either Russia or the United States. Everybody in this country has quite decided that the war is coming very soon, but there is a little doubt as to whom Japan is going to fight. The only thing in this country which distracts attention from the war and keeps young men from rushing to enlist are the controversies in every household about how much the dollar is really worth, and whether the workers of the country are all going to rebel when the Civil Works Administration stops doling out its millions to all the unemployed. We

are having great fun in the New York office of the Institute just now, with hundreds of waiters and bellboys picketing the Waldorf Astoria.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon of a letter, the carbon being taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 8, 1934, addressed to Miss Harriet Moore, and the typed signature of W. L. Holland, research secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I ask you if you recall having written that letter.

Can you recall having written that letter, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Again I do not recall it precisely, but I feel quite certain that it is a letter from me.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the last paragraph, please?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. The last paragraph, addressed to Miss Moore, who was apparently then in England:

I quite envy you your job and I look forward to seeing a swell report as a result of it. I hope, however, that you will not stay forever in Russia, but will at least find time to come and see Doreen and me in Japan or China. Perhaps this will easily be arranged when China and Japan have become dependent territories of the Soviet Union so that you can come here and study the nationality problems of the natives. Here's to the day.

The Doreen mentioned in here is my wife.

Senator EASTLAND. What did you mean "here's to the day"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot honestly remember, Mr. Chairman. I think in all honesty I ought to say it seems an extraordinarily silly and flippant thing to me now to have said at any time, but in the previous paragraphs I notice that I was suggesting that Miss Moore, who was about to undertake a study of Asian peoples, the Asian sections of the Soviet Union, I was suggesting that she ought to treat them as some of our other studies had been treated; namely, as problems of the government of dependent territories.

Senator EASTLAND. That statement in there was a letter to a lady in Moscow, "Dear Comrade"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am sorry, this is not the one. This is a different one.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand that, but there is another letter which went in here, addressed "Dear Comrade" that was a flippant statement.

Mr. HOLLAND. Certainly.

Senator EASTLAND. How many of those flippant statements——

Mr. HOLLAND. I think there are very few in my total record.

Senator EASTLAND. How many?

Mr. HOLLAND. Probably half a dozen. I don't know since I have not seen them.

Senator EASTLAND. Those things are cumulative; are they not?

Mr. HOLLAND. They are.

Senator EASTLAND. That is a circumstance. Wouldn't you consider it so, sir?

Mr. HOLLAND. It shows that at that time I was being much too casual and flippant about matters which I ought not to have been.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 577" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 577

NOVEMBER 8, 1934.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,
Care of Mr. E. C. Carter, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S. W. 1.

DEAR HARRIET: I was greatly pleased to learn from Carter and from your letter of September 25 to him that you will be able to work for the Institute for 6 months in Russia. As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Carter, I strongly approve your first choice of study, namely, Nationality Problems and the Soviet Union. I believe that you should give practically all your time to this work and that you should only take up the question of standards of living, if the Moscow group agrees to appoint you as an assistant on a standards of living study to be carried out under their auspices. I suggest this simply because I believe we should encourage the new Soviet group to participate directly in the international research program and not because I have any doubt whatever about your own ability to do a good piece of research in the question of standards of living. As a matter of fact I think that you and Mr. Carter should try by all means possible to arrange things so that you will at least be kept closely in touch with all stages of any standards of living study which the Moscow group carries out. This again is not because I question the capacity of the research workers whom the Soviet group may choose, but simply because you will be able to point out to them many points which will be very interesting to foreign readers, but which they themselves might be apt to take for granted or to neglect.

As regards the study of nationality problems I know too little about the question to presume to advise you. My only suggestion is, however, that you should tackle the work on the understanding that it will form an integral part of our studies in cultural relations. This means that it should be linked up in some way with the study which Owen Lattimore is going to make of cultural relations on the northern and western frontier in China, particularly since the same people of Mongolia and Turkestan are now being brought into intimate contact with a totally different kind of cultural influence from Russia. In this work I presume you will want to study how far the Soviet policy of encouraging autonomy in matters of language, custom and art is actually working out in practice or how far the process of Russiafication is going on in spite of the official wishes of Moscow.

A second part of your work, it seems to me, should be an attempt to treat the problem as a question of the government of dependencies and minority peoples. In this work you might proceed somewhat along the lines suggested in Kessing's two books on Samoa and Philippines and his earlier syllabus on dependencies and native peoples prepared for the 1931 conference. In this you will presumably discuss questions of political autonomy, economic policy, social and educational policy looking at the question from the point of view of observing whether the impact of a socialist modern civilization brings about the same kind of cultural disintegration among traditional civilizations, as has been the case in other parts of the world under capitalist imperialism.

I am asking both Keesing and Lattimore to let you know as soon as possible what other points they think might be brought up in your study. The only other point I should like to make is that your work should be confined as far as possible to the eastern part of Russian Central Asia and to Siberia and the Far East. That is to say, I think you should exclude the problems of southeastern Russia and the territories north of Persia and Afghanistan.

I am writing separately to Mr. Carter suggesting one or two specific points which he should ask the Moscow group to study, when they decide to go ahead with a research program on the question of standards of living.

I quite envy you your job and I look forward to seeing a swell report as a result of it. I hope, however, that you will not stay for ever in Russia, but will at least find time to come and see Doreen and me in Japan or China. Perhaps this will easily be arranged when China and Japan have become dependent territories of the Soviet Union so that you can come here and study the nationality problems of the natives. Here's to the day.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND, *Research Secretary.*

WHL: MI.
Copies to Mr. Field.
Mr. Loomis.
Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 6, 1942, addressed to Miss Agnes Smedley, with the typed signature of W. L. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having written that letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I feel certain this is a genuine letter which I wrote. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph?

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute. Did I understand you to say you feel certain this is not?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, no, that it is a genuine letter. I don't happen to recall writing it.

Mr. MORRRIS. Will it be admitted into evidence?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, I will admit it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 578" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 578

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
February 6, 1942.

Miss AGNES SMEDLEY,
R. R. 2, Box 57, Ojai, Calif.

DEAR MISS SMEDLEY: This is to acknowledge your letter of January 31 about Mr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. The Chens are old and very close friends of mine and I am as eager as you are to do everything possible to assist them. Mr. Carter and I will make inquiries about the possibility of having them put on some exchange list of war prisoners. I think you will realize, however, that we have to move very cautiously since it is at the moment very unlikely that any Chinese will be included in lists of prisoners handled by the American Red Cross. It might even be highly dangerous for the Chens if their names were included in a list that eventually came to the attention of the Japanese authorities.

There is always the chance that Han-seng and his wife have been able to conceal themselves among the million or more other Chinese in Hong Kong and that they may succeed in escaping in disguise via Kowloon or Masao (?). We have had reports that several thousand people have already escaped in this way. From what I know of Han-seng's previous experience in China he would be pretty resourceful in escaping if the Japanese were not able to discover him as soon as they occupied Hong Kong. I realize, of course, that because of his wife's illness he may have decided to stay, but even so he may be in hiding and planning to escape.

I know it seems absurd, but I think that nationality is going to play a large part in the question of compiling lists of prisoners. However, we shall certainly make discreet inquiries without revealing Chen's name and will do everything we can to find out whether the Chens are actually still in Hong Kong, and if so, to get them released.

We have heard that several other members of our Institute are also in Hong Kong including Dr. Franklin L. He and Mr. W. L. Lin, as well as the wife and family of our Chinese secretary, Mr. Liu-Yu-wan.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Senator EASTLAND. Read it, please.

Mr. HOLLAND. All right, sir.

DEAR MISS SMEDLEY: This is to acknowledge your letter of January 31 about Mr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. The Chens are old and very close friends of mine and I am as eager as you are to do everything possible to assist them. Mr. Carter and I will make inquiries about the possibility of having them put on some exchange list of war prisoners * * *—

The Chens at this time were at Hong Kong—

* * * I think you realize he will have to move very cautiously since it is at the moment very unlikely that any Chinese will be included in list of prisoners handled by the American Red Cross.

Senator EASTLAND. Chen was a Communist; was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. At this time to my knowledge and belief he was not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Since then?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have not even now seen any evidence that he is, but the fact is that in the last year he went back to Communist China and is taking part in a publication there.

Senator EASTLAND. A Communist publication ?

Mr. HOLLAND. A Communist publication.

Senator EASTLAND. In Communist China. And you do not think he is a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. It seems to me much more likely that, like other Chinese, he changed his mind and decided to throw his lot with the present Chinese Government.

Senator EASTLAND. I see. There is always an excuse.

Mr. HOLLAND. Not always, sir, but in this case I feel sure——

Senator EASTLAND. O. K. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, the institute was instrumental in bringing Chen over here, was it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Some years later.

Mr. MORRIS. When was he brought over here?

Mr. HOLLAND. In the first place he was brought over here before the war, about 1938, I would guess, and he was brought back again after the war around 1943 or 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Chen Han-seng was also associated with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy; was he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. In recent years he was; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know under what name he wrote for the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure. I know that he wrote some things under the pseudonym of Raymond Brooke, but whether he did for this particular organization or not I don't know.

Senator EASTLAND. Was that a Communist-front organization?

Mr. HOLLAND. I regard it so, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. But you do not regard him as a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I said specifically just a moment ago, sir, that in recent years I think there were indications.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead and read the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would rather not have Mr. Holland read the letter. I would like to find out to what extent the institute was instrumental in having Chen Hen-sang come to this country.

Mr. HOLLAND. In the first place before the war. I can't recall the exact details, but it is probably true that the institute invited him to come here as a research worker to undertake the study of some aspect of Chinese agricultural problems. I think it has to do with something in the problems of the southernmost province of China. At that time he was a well-known and very reputable authority on Chinese agricultural problems. He was a member of one of the most distinguished——

Senator EASTLAND. What year are you speaking of?

Mr. HOLLAND. When he was brought here either 1937 or 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you attempted to get him exchanged as a war prisoner?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am not sure whether we did attempt, Mr. Chairman. The point is Miss Smedley had written us a letter earnestly begging us to try to help him escape from Hong Kong. In fact he and one or two others did escape, but not with our help.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Miss Smedley a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no means of knowing. I have been told that she was never a Communist member, that she tried very hard to be made a member of the Chinese Communist Party but was never in fact accepted by the Chinese Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. She is dead now; is she not?

Mr. HOLLAND. She is dead. I have always regarded her as a very decided pro-Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is she buried?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You know she is buried in Communist China?

Mr. HOLLAND. Miss Smedley?

Mr. MORRIS. Weren't her ashes scattered over Communist China?

Mr. HOLLAND. The only thing I know about her is she bequeathed her estate, whatever it was, to a Chinese Communist general.

Senator EASTLAND. That is right.

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't remember her being buried in China. I don't believe she is.

Senator EASTLAND. At her request, at the request of this lady who willed her property——

Mr. HOLLAND. Ten years later.

Senator EASTLAND. To a Communist general and whose ashes are scattered over Communist China, at her request, you attempted, your organization attempted, your non-Communist organization attempted, to get a Communist writer exchanged as a war prisoner, and there is no communism involved at all? That is your testimony?

Mr. HOLLAND. I wish to dispute your statement, Senator, because at this time we knew this man, we had no knowledge that he was a Communist when he was interned in Hong Kong in 1941. We did know that he had had an excellent reputation as a Chinese scholar. He was widely known throughout the world.

Senator EASTLAND. There are just dozens of cases——

Mr. HOLLAND. I cannot feel any apology for having helped the Chinese escape from the Japanese.

Senator EASTLAND. I am asking a question, based on your sworn testimony. There are dozens of these cases where a man is not a Communist when he affiliates with you, so you say, and then several years later you say he is a Communist now.

Mr. HOLLAND. This is simply a fact, sir. Many people are changed. There are hundreds and hundreds of well-known Chinese intellectuals and officials who changed their minds in the last few years.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it not a fact that those people when they were in this country around the Institute of Pacific Relations, attempting to mold the policy of this Government, were hiding the fact that they were Communists?

Mr. HOLLAND. I dispute every part of your statement, Senator. They were not attempting to mold policy. There is no evidence that they were Communists at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. All right. We will submit that on the record.

Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, photostat of a memo, dated January 3, 1941, marked ECC from WLH.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having whitten that letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe that Iwrote this letter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the first paragraph, please?

Mr. HOLLAND. There is a letter to Mr. Edward C. Carter, who was then my chief:

Thank you for your memorandum of December 28 about Chi's future work. I agree that is probably wise in accepting a job with Universal—

Universal was Universal Trading Corp.—

and you are right in thinking that I would prefer him to finish his IPR assignment in the next 6 months. Accordingly, I enclose a note to Chi approving his plan of hiring Mr. Y. Y. Hsu for an initial period of 2 months beginning as soon as possible on a date suitable to Chi and Hsu, the arrangement to be subject to renewal or revision after I have conferred further with you and Chi about it—

There seems to be a word missing—

early next month. This will enable Chi to make a start on the project and at the same time will not commit us indefinitely if we find the arrangement is not working out well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. He has read it already in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. He has read the first paragraph.

Senator EASTLAND. All right, I will admit all of it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 579" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 579

GIANNINI FOUNDATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., January 3, 1941.

ECC from WLH:

Thank you for your memorandum of December 28 about Chi's future work. I agree that he is probably wise in accepting the job with Universal, and you are right in thinking that I would prefer him to finish his IPR assignment in the next six months. Accordingly, I enclose a note to Chi approving his plan of hiring Mr. Y. Y. Hsu for an initial period of two months, beginning as soon as possible on a date suitable to Chi and Hsu, the arrangement to be subject to renewal or revision after I have conferred further with you and Chi about the early next month. This will enable Chi to make a start on the project and at the same time will not commit us indefinitely if we find that the arrangement is not working out well.

From your knowledge of Chi's financial situation and his obligations to Universal, do you personally think that the proposed division of funds is a reasonable one? The grant we have made to Chi was $1,250, this being intended to represent five months salary at $250 monthly. In addition we agreed to pay up to $600 for incidental expenses involved in the collection of materials in China and have already paid $100 for this purpose.

Enclosed: Letter to Chi and copy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 28, 1940, headed WLH from ECC.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having received that letter? Obviously it is from Mr. Carter to you, is it not?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I am going to ask you to read the first two paragraphs.

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall it, but it seems to be the preceding letter to what I have just read.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, will that be admitted into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. The whole letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 580," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 580

DECEMBER 28, 1940.

WLH From ECC:

Chi is at last recovered though he still looks rather pulled down by his succession of three illnesses.

His contract with K. P. Chen expires early in January.Since his return, however, the Universal people here in New York have given him a formal invitation to join permanently their research and administrative staff in a very important relationship. Chi feels that he has no alternative but to accept for the following reasons: (1) It appears to be a patriotic duty; (2) it will give him access to materials that would not otherwise be available but which will be essential for his completing the assignment that the IPR has given him; (3) it enables him to provide for the support of his wife and children and makes it unnecessary for him to live the uncertain life of depending on lecture engagements which so interfere with an orderly scholary life.

He asked me whether in view of this new job he should take a couple of years to finish the assignment you gave him at Berkeley, or whether you and I would prefer to have him finish it in the next six months. I told him provisionally that I thought you would prefer the latter course and I knew I would. The latter course he could adopt, provided with the grant you have made him you would approve of his hiring a research assistant who can read the Chinese periodicals and make the first draft of the report under Chi's direction. The assistant he has in mind is Y. Y. Hsu, a graduate in economics of Stanford. Hsu has been working for Chi's father, knows Chi's outlook and method of work, and according to Chi, is first-class. Chi would employ Hsu at $125 a month, paying this out of the grant you have made, and would use the balance for his own time in supervising Hsu's work and in writing the final report.

At the moment I haven't by me the details of your commitment to Chi, and Chi's commitment to you, so I cannot say how Chi's proposal will strike you. Please write me frankly as to your wishes. Hsu if employed, would have a desk in the IPR office and would keep up our Chinese files. Chi will have to keep office hours every day at Universal, but as the office is at 5th Avenue and 52nd Street, he will always be in easy reach.

Now that Chi's future is assured, I am hoping that we can get a higher and more regular rate of production out of him than when his life was disordered by uncertainity. Let us hope that our wishes in this matter will be realized.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like you to read the first two paragraphs, Mr. Holland, as I have several questions to ask you.

Mr. HOLLAND (reading):

Chi has at last recovered, though he still looks rather pulled down by his succession of three illnesses.

His contract with K. P. Chen expires early in January. Since his return, however, the Universal people here in New York have given him a formal invitation to join permanently their research and administrative staff in a very important relationship. Chi feels that he has no alternative but to accept for the following reasons: (1) it appears to be a patriotic duty; (2) it will give him access to materials that would not otherwise be available but which will be essential for his completing the assignment that the IPR has given him; (3) it enables him to provide for the support of his wife and children and makes it unnecessary for him to live the uncertain life of depending on lecture engagements which so interfere with an orderly scholary life.

Mr. MORRIS. The next paragraph?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes [reading]:

He asked me whether in view of this new job he should take a couple of years to finish the assignment you gave him at Berkeley, or whether you and I would prefer to have him finish it in the next 6 months. I told him provisionally that I thought you would prefer the latter source and I knew I would. The latter course he could adopt, provided with the grant you have made him you would approve of his hiring a research assistant who can read the Chinese periodicals and make the first draft of the report under Chi's direction. The assistant he has in mind is Y. Y. Hsu, a graduate in economics of Stanford. Hsu has been working for Chi's father, knows Chi's outlook and method of work, and according to Chi, is first-class.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you pause at this point. What was meant by he "knows Chi's outlook"?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't be sure. This is Mr. Carter's letter to me. I myself would interpret it that he knew Dr. Chi's analysis of Chinese society. Chi was the author of a well-known book on the key economic areas in Chinese civilization. And the assignment which we were giving him was a report on wartime economic developments in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you aware of the Communist record of Y. Y. Hsu which has been introduced into our record?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think I read in the press or in the transcript some allegations but I don't recall the details that you have in mind.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Y. Y. Hsu's first contact with the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. So far as I know, yes; but I can't be sure about that.

Mr. MORRIS. It would seem from that, would it not, Mr. Holland, that Chi brought Hsu into the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. This would suggest that he recommended him in the first place as an assistant for himself.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall any experience with Hsu before that?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I cannot.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 25, 1940, marked "confidential," addressed to W. L. Holland from Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall having received that letter from Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I believe this is a letter which I received from Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be received into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 581" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 581

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam London Manila Moscow New York Paris Shanghai
Sydney Tokyo Toronto Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

25TH APRIL, 1940.

CONFIDENTIAL (hand written)

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
Care Giannini Foundation, University of California,
Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: K. P. Chen is asking Chi to go to China with him, sailing on May 15 to act as his personal research secretary. Chi is to keep his files, draw up memoranda, and carry forward such studies as will reinforce Mr. K. P. Chen's highly responsible work. It will not be a government position, so Chi will be much more free than would be the case if he was on the government payroll. Chen will, I think pay Mrs. Chi here in New York $250 monthly and in addition will take care of all of Chi's expenses out to China, in China, and back from China. Chi will travel with Chen, stay with Chen, eat with Chen, travel all over the new highways and investigate various economic and other projects.

I am keen to have Chi accept this offer, both because it will give Chi invaluable contacts and materials for his later research "The Principle of Economic Reconstruction in China" and also because it enables him to render an immediate direct service to his country as a patriotic Chinese at a very crucial period in Chinese history.

Incidentally, it overcomes the difficulty of which you have just written with reference to a grant from the International Research Fund for Chi's project now that the Rockefeller Foundation has failed us in the matter of a fellowship for Chi.

As I understand it you have felt that the International Research Committee could not make a grant of say $2,500 or even $2,000 for Chi to make a study to be undertaken in New York and Berkeley. If, however, it were possible for Chi to get out to China and possibly get two or three first class Chinese working under his direction in Chungking and Kunming, I surmise that you think you could get a grant not to exceed $2,500 for a study somewhat like that which Chi has proposed, but under a slightly different title.

I agree with you that a great deal of the work for such a study can only be done effectively in China by someone in touch with the actual work of reconstruction. It is certainly true that even so well-informed a person as Chi in an attempt to lay down principles of reconstruction from America can hardly fail to be academic.

I know that he feels this just as strongly as you do. This is one of the reasons for his feeling obligated to accept Mr. K. P. Chen's invitation. It gives him a grass roots opportunity such as that which you feel is so fundamental.

In the development of the Chi study, it is desirable for you to tell Chi that you will have to coordinate his study with that of Chen Han-seng on Agrarian Problems in Southwest China and W. Y. Lin's Migration of Capital into Southwest China. I understand that you recognize the need of integrating all of these studies with the China Council's effort to complete the study of industrialization of Southwest China originally assigned to D. K. Lieu.

I am sending off this news about Chi before it becomes public in the hope that you can send me by air mail your reaction and thus put me in a position to take it up with Chi immediately in a preliminary way preparatory to his having a conference with you en route to China.

I will write later about the P. T. Chen project and also about Miss Mitchell's views. I am returning your copy of Chi's tentative outline.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward C. Carter.
EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Adam Von Trott?

Mr. HOLLAND. Von Trott I didn't know very well, but as I recall it, he was a German, a Prussian, of rather aristocratic background in Germany, who chose to start at the wrong end, who was implicated in the coup against Hitler and was one of those who was executed. At that time or just before he had risen to a high position, I think he was chancelor or something in the German Foreign Office in the middle of the war. Before the war, I think about 1939, or thereabouts, he had been a Rhodes scholar. He has been educated in England and knew Lord Lothian, the then British Ambassador here, very well. I think partly through Mr. Carter he was suggested as a person who ought to spend the third year of his Rhodes scholarship in the Far East before he went back to Germany. He, therefore, came to this country for a few months and actually attended our conference at Virginia Beach in 1939 and then went on across the country and visited Japan and China and went back through Russia to Germany. I believe while he was here he contacted a number of German scholars, most of them exiles, whom he had known previously, but what the purpose of that was I was not informed. I do know that he had some contact with the former German chancelor who was at Harvard University, Bruning, but that part of his work I don't know. I saw relatively little of him, and I must confess I was quite startled when I heard that he had taken part in the coup against Hitler, because I was extremely suspicious of him myself. He seemed to me much more like a Nazi who was trying to ingratiate himself with Americans, and I was very dubious indeed whether he was really on the level in trying to pretend that he was critical of the Nazi regime. I don't know even now whether he was playing a double game.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he work with the Soviet forces in that 1944 uprising?

Mr. HOLLAND. I had not known this but I think in one of our executive sessions you mentioned that, but that was news to me.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know anything further on that from your own experience?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated January 17, 1940, headed WLH from ECC, and attached thereto is another memorandum dated January 16, 1940, a memorandum to ECC from FVF.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I wonder if you can reall that particular memorandum?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall it, but the note on the bottom of the reply is in my handwriting, and I undoubtedly received it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that go into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 582," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 582

JANUARY 17, 1940.

WLH from ECC:

With reference to the enclosed from Fred, I shall reply that Mangahas is no longer on the Secretariat, that von Trott continues, that Chi continues, and also Chen Han-seng and Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley. Is Fred right that Wittfogel is still working on the book for the I. R. C.?

(pencilled note:) Yes, but that is no reason for regarding him as a research associate. I doubt if the book will be ready for two years and it will have practically no bearing on our current program even though it may be a monument of scholarship.

WLH

JANUARY 16, 1940.

Memorandum to: ECC.
From: FVF.

Continuing our correspondence regarding the important question of who, if anyone, is to list Wittfogel on his staff, I shall be very glad indeed to recommend to you whichever move you wish to make. If you think it is advisable to drop Wittfogel from your current listing, it can probably be done on the ground that Wittfogel is no longer spending the major portion of his time on Pacific Council work. If it is done, however, it is quite clear that Mangahas and von Trott would also have to be dropped from the category of "Fellows" in the PACIFIC AFFAIRS listing. I suppose Chi would have to be dropped from the Secretariat, to be consistent. Or is he still working for you? I am not entirely clear as to the status of Chen Han-seng or Elsie Fairfax-Chomeleg. I had thought that she, if not Chen, had been loaned to the China IPR in which case I should not think that she would be listed as a member of the Secretariat.

I mention these other names because I feel that it is important to be consistent in this matter, particularly in view of the fact that, if I am not mistaken, Wittfogel is still writing a book for the I. R. C., representing the first volume of his interpretation of Chinese economic history.

I shall be very glad, if you drop Wittfogel, to write him a letter telling him that he can henceforth, for some time, regard himself as a research fellow of the American Council. But in return for this I am afraid he will have nothing but such a letter in his files.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what position Dolly Eltenton had in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't believe I can answer completely. The only part I know is relatively recent. In 1947 when we held our conference in England she was already there. She is a Britisher. I asked her to serve temporarily as a secretary on the conference staff at that meeting in Stratford, England. I know that previously—I have forgotten the circumstances and dates—she had worked either part time or for a period in the San Francisco branch of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated November 29, 1942, addressed to "Dear Bill" signed "Phil."

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall having received that letter, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall it, Mr. Chairman, but it is undoubtedly from my colleague, Mr. Philip Lilienthal, the present editor of Pacific Affairs.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted in evidence.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 583," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 583

Lilienthal
WWL
ED
KRCG
RET
WLH

15 MACONDRAY LANE,
San Francisco, November 29, 1942.

DEAR BILL: Thanks for your note of the 14th, with its enclosure of the letter from Hinder which I was extremely interested to read. Will you please pass on to her the enclosed note, or send it to her if she isn't at the Conference? Did her latter-day Shanghai experiences take any of the starch out of her? Somehow I imagine that nothing short of the apocalypse could do that.

I suppose that you'll be in Canada when this reaches you. I hope that it's going to be a very interesting and almost enjoyable meeting, and that the weather will be decent. If you think of it, will you send me a list of those in attendance; I'd like to know who's going to sleep with whom. Dolly Eltenton left for the east last night. It's a good thing that she's going, and I think that you'll find her a nice gal to have around. She's very wide awake and enterprising, and very amusing, too. I'm sure that you won't need to be reminded that she is still a bit new to the IPR, its names and customs, and that it would doubtless make the Conference more valuable to her if someone were to keep a friendly eye on her for the first day or two until she's had a chance to get her bearings. Will Doreen and the Graces be going along to Canada with you, or have you detailed them to polish the keys of your piano in your absence? I think that you finally showed sense in getting the piano, and I'm sure that it will give you and the family a great deal of pleasure. The thought of your being able to play a piano under your own roof, after so much time, gives me a lot of the afore-mentioned pleasure.

You've surely heard of the little discussion group which met in the local IPR office a couple of times 2 weeks ago to hash over the Japanese problem. I was able to attend one of the meetings and thought it good enough to warrant more groups of the kind. What made this particular meeting interesting to me was the presence of several persons of some influence in the community who were frankly anti-Japanese to the extent of wishing to disenfranchise the Japanese-American citizens after the war. The IPR simply has got to take greater cognizance of this sort of attitude than I think it has done in the recent past. In fact, the deliberations of your present meeting won't have much validity unless the enlightened intellectuals are compelled to descend occasionally from the realm of pure theory and dirty their hands with dealing with the great unwashed. I hope that you and Dolly Eltenton will be able to formulate some sort of program whereby the IPR, at least in the city, will be able to enlist the support of conservative groups which are not in the habit of letting their thoughts cross national boundaries. But before this can be done, the IPR will have to secure considerable factual information on, let's say, the record of the Japanese in America, and then have it presented by men who are known to be hard-headed. Much as I like Galen and admire the work that he is doing, it seems to me that anything that he touches nowadays is at once suspect because he himself, by virtue of his record in this Japanese business, is suspect. None of this, however, implies that I think the IPR, in any of its manifestations in this country, should engage in anti-Japanese activities. I most certainly do not think so.

News of myself is not especially electrifying. I'm still messing about on the Oakland docks, not accomplishing a great deal but managing to keep fairly calm through the device of telling myself, every hour on the hour, that I might be in the army instead of a free agent and thus mustn't complain. Nevertheless, sometimes I think that I could load the ships singlehanded more quickly than actually they are loaded. In the past months, while riding to and fro on the Key trains, I've been learning to read Italian and have now got to the point where I can read the local rag, L'Italia, without too much cheating. It's a pleasant language, I think, and I'm having fun with it in a harmless sort of way. I believe that I must be the first person ever to have learned to read Italian without the express purpose of reading Dante.

A few days ago I moved from the hotel to a little flat on Macondray Lane, on Russian Hill and not far from Telegraph Hill. It's a nice neighborhood, with more grass and trees than paving. Really my dump is a house rather than a flat, and the occupants of the other half of the house are not here now, so I'm a landholder. It's an attractive and extremely unusual sort of place (a flagged walk before the house, a good view of the Bay and Alcatraz, no auto traffic nearby, monk's cloth on the walls, a fireplace, lots of books left by the previous tenant whom I know of old, and the sort of neighborhood which is not unlike Greenwich Village in its informality but is far, far more attractive in its physical aspects. There are disadvantages in the present set-up, but on the whole they're not too serious. Only I do wish that the ceiling would leak a little less, or at least that the carpet would dry more quickly.

Mother wrote at length on the subject of the lecture which she heard you give some weeks ago on China, at the Women's University Club in New York. She said that you were perfectly marvelous. Later she wrote that a talk by Sir George Sansome had been rescued from utter failure by remarks which you made at its close. Isabel tells me that you're giving a course at the New School, and I wonder if you're enjoying it.

Well, I've written a far longer letter than you deserve. Don't forget to send me a list of the Conference personnel if you have an extra one, along with whatever scandalous matter you may have on tap. Please give my fondest greetings to the gals. All the best to you.

Yours,

[s] PHIL.

(Penciled:) If George Glazebrook shows up at the Conference, please give my best.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, are you acquainted with the testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee in connection with Charles and Dolly Eltenton?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I am not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall a meeting of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1947, where a vote was taken on whether or not Mr. Field should be continued as a member of the executive committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I cannot remember this occasion. I have heard about it of course because it was a momentous occasion, but I don't believe I was present and I was not myself at this time a member of the American IPR. So I have only heard about it afterward.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you hear about it, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. That there was a great deal of discussion as to whether it was proper for Mr. Field because of his activities and writing for Communist magazines, such as New Masses, to remain on the board of trustees. I know that the upshot of it was that Mr. Carter wrote a letter to Field saying that he thought under the circumstances he should offer his resignation and that Field wrote back rather resentfully, implying he didn't think it was very fair, but nevertheless submitting his resignation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record at this time from the minutes of the board of trustees of March 18, 1947, which has been made part of the public record on page 483 of the hearings held by the subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, the following notations from the minutes:

With regard to Mr. Field, President Sproul had been of the frank opinion that the best way out might be for Mr. Field to agree to withdraw from the executive committee. During the course of the discussion, Mr. Dean and Mr. Gilchrist had pointed out that Mr. Field was one of the most valuable and objective members of the executive committee and that they had never known him to show any political bias whatever as far as the IPR had been concerned. They also argued that if Mr. Field were removed from the committee, it would be welcomed by Mr. Kohlberg, who would then concentrate his efforts on getting rid of other members who participate actively in the IPR. They had further pointed out that Mr. Field had been reelected to the board with a majority—that, in fact, he had received a majority of the votes of the California members. It was noted in this connection that the nominating committee in preparing the ballots for the new board of trustees informed the entire membership that Mr. Field was a member of the editorial board of the New Masses.

Then later on, on page 485:

Mr. Dean then called for a vote on the question of whether Mr. Field should be included in the executive committee for 1947. Fourteen trustees voted in favor of Mr. Field's serving on the executive committee for 1947 and one voted against.

Does that square with your recollection of the episode as you heard it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I must say that this is news to me. I knew there was a vote and there was disagreement, but it implies to me that after this, despite the vote, there must have been private conversations of people who frankly told Mr. Carter that they didn't see how they could continue to raise money for the IPR. It was as a result of this that Mr. Carter finally wrote the letter to Mr. Field asking him to resign. I am afraid I don't remember the dates of that, and I am speaking here only from what other people have told me, including Mr. Carter. But I was not in the meeting and I am afraid I had not read that particular thing or known that the vote was so strongly in favor of Mr. Field.

Mr. MARKS. What was the date of that meeting, Mr. Morris, please?

Mr. MORRIS. March 18, 1947.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated June 13, 1940, addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland, care of the Giannini Foundation, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall having received that letter, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall receiving it, but it seems to me to be an authentic letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read the second and third paragraphs, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. This letter says I am enclosing a series of letters Hanwell from Block, Block from Hanwell, Field to Block, and Hanwell from Block [reading]:

As I remember it, you are ultimately to be the doctor on the Hanwell manuscript. To what extent do you wish to give avuncular advice to Hanwell now before it is too late. Please return all of this correspondence ultimately unless you wish to have Mrs. Ward make copies for your files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go in the record?

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted in the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 584," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 584

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, June 13, 1940.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
c/o Giannini Foundation,
University of California, Berkley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: For your private information I enclose a docket containing the following:

Letter to Norman Hanwell from Kurt Bloch dated March 27, 1940.
Letter to Kurt Bloch from Norman Hanwell dated April 25, 1940.
Memorandum from Fred Field to Kurt Bloch dated June 4, 1940.
Letter to Norman Hanwell from Kurt Bloch dated June 4, 1940.

It is an exciting melange of different points of view with a grand climax in which Fred Field assumes a gorgeous sound and fatherly role.

As I remember it, you are ultimately to be the doctor on the Hanwell manuscript. To what extent do you wish to give avuncular advice to Hanwell now before it is too late. Please return all of this correspondence ultimately unless you wish to have Mrs. Ward make copies for your files.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the original of a memo from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 4, 1940, headed, "WLH" from "ECC."

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted into the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 584–A" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 584–A

JUNE 4, 1940.

WLH from ECC:

Your letter of May 27, asking whether Field and I have been thinking of the effect on the program of the IPR of the United States entry into the war, I shall share with him and my colleagues of the Secretariat.

Field alone can speak for the American Council. I do know that he has been giving a great deal of thought to the very questions you raise.

The attitude of Alexander, Corbett, and Shepherd has been to question the Chatham House action in placing itself at the disposal of the British Government. I have no idea what Field's attitude to that or to a similar proposal on behalf of the American Council would be.

My own feeling is that principal tasks for the International Secretariat should include the following:

(1) Accelerating and deepening our work on the Inquiry. This should include the kind of correlative study which Corbett is making of the relations of the Asiatic and European wars and of international organization after the wars are over. Here the IPR is doing something which may be more fundamental than the work of any other society anywhere in the world. It won't be fully accomplished if we do not think out new ways of going to Corbett's aid.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the second paragraph of that, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND (reading):

Field alone can speak for the American Council. I do know that he has been giving a great deal of thought to the very questions you raise.

Mr. MORRIS. What is meant there by "Field alone can speak for the American Council," Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I will have to read the whole letter.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Mr. HOLLAND. This memorandum from Mr. Carter to me in June 1940 begins:

Your letter of May 27, asking whether Field and I have been thinking of the effect on the program of the IPR of the United States entry into the war, I shall share with him and my colleagues of the Secretariat.

Then the second paragraph says:

Field alone can speak for the American Council. I do know that he has been giving a great deal of thought to the very question you raise.

I assume from this that I had written a letter asking both Mr. Carter and Mr. Field what their views were, and since Mr. Carter at that time was the Secretary of the international IPR, not of the American Council, he is here dissociating himself and making it clear that Field is the one who will have to give the answer so far as the American IPR is concerned, and then he goes on to make some comments relating to the international.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 26, 1940, headed WLH from ECC.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall having received that memorandum from Mr. Carter, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't recall receiving it and I don't know what the allusion is, but as far as I can tell it seems like an authentic memorandum from the IPR files.

Mr. MORRIS. This makes reference to Abend's dispatch. Does that recall any episode to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I am afraid it doesn't.

Mr. MORRIS. It ends up saying:

Fred has received an avalance of congratulations, among others from Jessup, Shotwell, Bruce, Bliven, Goodrich, Hu Shih, Mrs. Jessup, and a great many others.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't recall the incident.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced?

Senator FERGUSON (presiding). Yes; it will be received.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit 585," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 585

APRIL 26, 1940.

WLH from ECC:

It is perfectly all right to show Rowell and Oakie Abend's dispatch and poster that appeared in the Times on April 22 and Field's letter which appeared the next day, but I don't think there is any point in showing them my letter, as my activities in this matter might be misunderstood in certain quarters.

Fred has received an avalanche of congratulations, among others from Jessup, Shotwell, Bruce, Bliven, Goodrich, Hu Shih, Oumansky, Mrs. Jessup, and a great many others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, can you recall the circumstances of Michael Greenberg's coming into the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't recall them exactly, Mr. Chairman. I do know that somewhere about 1938—I am afraid I can't even remember the year correctly, but it was somewhere in that period just before or just after the Second World War began in Europe that Mr. Greenberg, who I think at that time had been on a fellowship at Harvard, making a study of early British trade with China, was invited, I think by Mr. Carter to come on as a research assistant or editorial assistant to the International Secretariat of the IPR. Then later after Mr. Lattimore ceased to be editor of Pacific Affairs in 1941, Mr. Greenberg I think was given the title of managing editor. Mr. Carter and I at that time being the actual editors, but Mr. Greenberg was responsible for the production job and most of the donkey work.

Mr. MORRIS. Who sponsored him in the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. That I don't recall, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 6, 1940, addressed to W. L. Holland, with the typed signature of E. C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do you recall having received that letter?

Mr. HOLLAND. As before, I don't recall it but it seems to me to be an authentic letter from Mr. Carter, telling me that Mr. Greenberg apparently wants to work for the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be received in the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in evidence.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 586," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 586

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y., *May 6, 1940.*

W. L. HOLLAND, ESQ.,
Giannini Foundation, University of California,
Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: Michael Greenberg visited us last week. He seems to be more eager than ever to have the advantage of study and collaboration as a member of the International Secretariat. He would like to spend a year studying the effect of the European war on the Far East.

I wonder whether, if he does this well, this should not be a good Inquiry study. Or would it be more appropriate in the International Research Series or as an unclassified Secretariat paper?

I have told him that the Secretariat is long on ideas but short on money. He is going to try to get the authorities at Harvard to make his Choate Fellowship next year applicable to work in the New York office even though it is supposed to be awarded for study at Harvard. If the Secretariat can carry on its activities at the University of California and Johns Hopkins, I can see no reason why Harvard shouldn't conversely carry on its activity at Fifty-second Street.

Please write me frankly.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Toledano, a Mexican?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have never had the pleasure of meeting him. I have heard of him.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active in the Institute of Pacific Relations' affairs?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 12, 1949, headed "WLH" from "ECC."

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall that particular document, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. This is a note from Mr. Carter to me saying would there be any point in our considering inviting Lombardo Toledano as an observer to the Mont Tremblant conference.

I have never met him but Greenberg speaks enthusiastically about him.

Then in my handwriting underneath I have put:

Might it be a good scheme. Better see him first.

Then, "Lunch," with a query. Underneath I put:

Greenberg suggests Sr. Rosas of the Mexican Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider Toledano to be a Communist?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't say. I have certainly heard him described in press reports as being a very strong Communist sympathizer, but I am afraid I haven't followed his career enough to know whether he is considered a party member or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Ordinarily would Greenberg's recommendation for a conference like Mont Tremblant conference be enough to warrant a recommendation?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; it was rather exceptional because normally since we don't have a Mexican council, it would only be guests or observers who would come from those countries. I would say Greenberg's recommendation would be given very low priority in any such case, not because of Greenberg but because he was just a junior staff member.

Mr. MORRIS. What further factor caused you to think that was a good idea?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't recall, Mr. Morris, and I can only assume that I thought that it would be a good idea to have a Mexican; but that is only a supposition. I can't recall the exact reasoning.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 587" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 587

OCTOBER 12, 1942.

(Penciled:) ECC.
WLH from ECC:

Would there be any point in our considering inviting Lombardo Toledano of Mexico City as an observer to Mont Tremblant?

I have never met him, but Greenberg speaks enthusiastically about him.

(Penciled:) Might be a good scheme. Better see him first. Lunch? WLH.

Greenberg suggests Sr. Rosas of the Mexican Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a group of documents. One is a carbon copy of a memorandum dated April 16, 1940, headed "WLH" from "ECC." Attached thereto is an original memorandum dated April 16, 1940, headed "HA, KM" from ECC and signed with the handwriting signature of "Kate".

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Tsuru active in the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge. In the last 2 years he is now in Japan and as an important professor in Japan He contributed one document to our last conference in Lucknow in 1950. I think he is a member of the present Japanese IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he related to Saionji, who was the secretary of your Japanese Council?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

I wonder if you recall having received that document from Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. I don't remember the incident, but this is a note from Mr. Carter:

Tsuru came to see us last week and the following day at my suggestion he brought in Mrs. Tsuru for a visit. She is studying music and is exceptionally bright and attractive. She is some kind of relative of Saionji's.

Tsuru would like Yasuo's job on the secretariat, though I think that if Harvard, offered him an appointment that would be his first love.

Mayeda spoke to me in the highest terms of Tsuru and said that he thought he would be an admirable successor to Yasuo and that I could quote Mayeda to this effect in a cable to Tokyo. I have taken no action in this matter for two reasons: (1) I wished to consult you and get your final judgment on Tsuru; (2) I learned from a young Foreign Office fellow named Matsumoto who is on his way to the Japanese Embassy in London, that he feels it is of the utmost importance that either Usiba or Saionji succeed Yasuo. Matsumoto has told them that they are wasting their time mixing in internal politics in Japan, and that it is high time they got out of the Tokyo atmosphere and got the kind of view that they can best get in New York.

Of course, if there is a chance of either Ushiba or Saionji coming, it might be a mistake to put forward Tsuru's name. What is your advice? Of course, Yasuo's ideal successor would be Yasuo.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the actual termination of that episode? Yasuo became associated?

Mr. HOLLAND. Not to the best of my recollection, because in fact we did get another man from Tokyo whose name was Matsuo. Neither Ushiba nor Saionji was able to come, but we did finally get anoth-

er man to succeed Yasuo. Neither of these people. Tsuru as far as I know never was appointed in the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the letter be received?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in evidence.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 588" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 588

APRIL 16, 1940.

(Penciled:) HA and KM ret ECC.
WLH from ECC:

Tsuru came to see us last week and the following day at my suggestion he brought in Mrs. Tsuru for a visit. She is studying music and is exceptionally bright and attractive. She is some kind of relative of Saionji's.

Tsuru would like Yasuo's job on the secretariat, though I think that if Harvard offered him an appointment that would be his first love.

Mayeda spoke to me in the highest terms of Tsuru and said that he thought he would be an admirable successor to Yasuo and that I could quote Mayeda to this effect in a cable to Tokyo. I have taken no action in this matter for two reasons: (1) I wished to consult you and get your final judgment on Tsuru; (2) I learned from a young foreign office fellow named Matsumoto who is on his way to the Japanese Embassy in London, that he feels it is of the utmost importance that either Ushiba or Saionji succeed Yasuo. Matsumoto has told them that they are wasting their time mixing up in internal politics in Japan, and that it is high time they got out of the Tokyo atmosphere and got the kind of view that they can best get in New York.

Of course, if there is a chance of either Ushiba or Saionji comong, it might be a mistake to put forward Tsuru's name. What is your advice? Of course, Yasuo's ideal successor would be Yasuo.

APRIL 16, 1940.

(Penciled:) HA
KM

From ECC:

You will, I think, be interested in the attached copy of my letter to Holland regarding an eventual successor to Yasuo. Have you any comments?

(Penciled:) From the point of view of contacts with the Japanese Council, it would certainly be better to get someone who knows the IPR ropes in Tokyo. However, if that proves impossible, I should say Tsuru would be excellent for general research and translation work, as well as providing an intelligent Japanese point of view on the Far Eastern situation. I know Norman regards him very highly.

KATE.

Mr. HOLLAND. This other memorandum seems to be from Kate Mitchell, also saying it would be better to get somebody from Tokyo.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what Kate Mitchell's salary was in the IPR?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, I am sorry, Senator Ferguson, I don't recall that.

Senator FERGUSON. Was she considered a minor or a major employee?

Mr. HOLLAND. In two different stages. She began in a very minor capacity as a sort of secretarial assistant. I would say in the last few years of her work there she was promoted to be a research assistant because by that time she had written a rather serious book on the industrialization of eastern Asia. I am afraid I don't recall what salary she was getting.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original document dated November 22, 1934, on the letterhead of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to W. L. Holland, 306 Osaka Building, Tokyo, and it is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do you recall having received that document from Mr. Carter?

Mr. HOLLAND. This seems to me to be an authentic letter which Mr. Carter sent me. I don't recall receiving it, but there is no doubt that I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will this be received into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 589" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 589

(Penciled) SU
Carter

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HONOLULU, HAWAII

Chatham House, 10, St. James' Square, London, S. W. 1

November 22, 1934.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
306 Osaka Building, Tokyo.

DEAR BILL: Here are copies of Kantorovitch's letters to me of October 15th, 16th, 20th, and 21st, and also of my replies. Would you, on my behalf, take up with Urumatsu the question of sending all of the Japanese IPR publications to Kantorovitch. Of course, the list is not large, but it is symbolical as well as actual, and it is of great importance that, at the earliest convenient date, everything that has been published in Japanese since the beginning of the Japanese IPR be sent to Moscow.

In my letter to Kantorovich, you will see the reasons that I have given for choosing New York instead of Honolulu as the depository for the Soviet publications. Ultimately I hope that there will be a Russian speaking member on the staff of both the Chinese and Japanese Councils, so that the fullest use can be made of materials in the Russian language.

I am counting on you, of course, also to explore with Urumatsu the question of whether the Japanese Council will want to have some Soviet publications sent to them. (Penciled.) We don't want to ask for any until we are sure they will be used.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward Carter.
EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, this is Carter writing to you:

Here are copies of Kantorovitch's letters to me of October 15th, 16th, 20th, and 21st and also of my replies. Would you on my behalf take up with Urumatsu the question of sending all of the Japanese IPR publications to Kantorovitch. Of course, the list is of great importance that, at the earliest convenient date, everything that has been published in Japanese since the beginning of the Japanese IPR be sent to Moscow.

Was it a practice of the institute to send all the records and files at the request of the Soviet council?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; it was not the records and files, Mr. Morris. The practice was to exchange the publications. In other words, all of the national councils usually made a practice of sending complimentary copies of their publications to all of the other national councils. Kantorovitch as I recall it at this time, was the secretary of the Soviet

council which had only just recently been started. Mr. Carter apparently had been visiting there and was stirring me up to see that the Japanese IPR sent this new council their own publications; in other words, the back numbers, and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. It was only the actual publications, nothing to do with the files.

Mr. HOLLAND. Nothing to do with the files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a carbon of a two-page letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated November 23, 1934, addressed to A. J. Kantorovitch, 20 Basin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R. There is no signature. In the upper left-hand corner it says, "WLH for your information, ECC."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that particular document?

Mr. HOLLAND. Again I don't recall it; but it seems to me to be an authentic letter and is, I should judge, following up the practice which I just described a moment ago. In other words, Mr. Carter is here suggesting that this exchange process be continued and that the books received from the Soviet council be kept in the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you see the paragraph there, Mr. Holland, that begins, "New York has a great advantage over Honolulu"?

Mr. HOLLAND. Do you wish to read it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; would you please read that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes [reading]:

* * * As what may be a temporary depositary, New York has a great advantage over Honolulu in that, in addition to a considerable Russian-speaking American population in New York, there are always a considerable number of Soviet employees in the Soviet consulate and Amtorg, whom we have always found ready to assist the IPR whenever requested. The Pacific Council's Library can supplement the Russian collection—

and so on.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent was that true, Mr. Holland, with respect to employees of the Amtorg?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I can't speak with any knowledge at all, Mr. Morris. I had nothing to do with these Soviet publications nor any contact myself with the Soviet consulate or Amtorg at that time. My assumption from that letter is that the assistance he refers to is assistance in the matter of translation, but I can't be sure. You would have to ask Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received in evidence.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 590" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 590

W. L. H. For your information. E. C. C.

CHATHAM HOUSE,
10, ST. JAMES'S SQUARE,
London, S. W. 1., November 23, 1934.

A. J. KANTOROVICH,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MR. KANTOROVICH: This is in reply to your letter of October 20th, proposing a most interesting and useful exchange of publications between the Soviet group and the Pacific Council. Immediately I received your letter, I discussed the matter with several of my colleagues, including Frederick V. Field, the newly

elected secretary of the American Council, and Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, who serves jointly on the staff of the American and Pacific Councils.

In view of the fact that, at present, we have no Russian-speaking member on our staff in Honolulu, I have decided for the next two years to establish at New York the Pacific Council's depositary for all Soviet and Russian language publications. Mr. Field has offered housing and free library service for the Pacific Council's Russian collection, so that during this two-year experimental period, I wish to have all of the Soviet publications that you are able to send, addressed *not* to Honolulu, but to: *Pacific Council's Library, 129, East 52nd Street, New York.*

Mrs. Barnes, who, as you know, has a good command of the Russian language, and has studied in the Soviet Union, will be in charge of the Russian collection, which you are aiding us to establish. As what may be a temporary depositary, New York has a great advantage over Honolulu in that, in addition to a considerable Russian-speaking American population in New York, there are always a considerable number of Soviet employees in the Soviet consulate and Amtorg, whom we have always found ready to assist the IPR whenever requested. The Pacific Council's Library can supplement the Russian collection in the New York Public Library and Library of the California University.

In recognition of the Pacific Council's making the American Council its depositary for the Soviet publications which you decribed in your letter of October 20th, Mr. Field has undertaken to supply the Soviet IPR with copies of all the English language IPR publications and a small but very carefully selected number of English language books on the Pacific Area not published under the auspices of the IPR be also sent to you. I am hoping that if Mr. Field's first shipment of books from New York has not yet reached you, it will, nevertheless, be in Moscow well in advance of my arrival on December 23rd.

With reference to the rather extensive shelf of books in the general field of international affairs published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs here in London, I wish to report that I made a special appeal to the IPR Committee of the Royal Institute at its meeting on November 20th, immediately following my arrival in London. The Committee listened most sympathetically to my appeal, but, while favouring the recommendation in principle, they could not give an immediate affirmative answer because the matter has to be acted on both by the Finance Committees will probably be reached before I arrive in Moscow. I feel quite certain that some of their most important publications will be made available, though it may not be possible for them to donate their entire shelf. I ought to add that the secretary of the IPR Committee informed me that all the publications of the Royal Institute are sent automatically to the Library of the Communist Academy.

Copies of a few of the very recent books of the IPR were, I think, presented to your office by Miss Moore on her arrival in Moscow.

I am writing to the secretaries of the Japanese and Chinese Councils with reference to IPR literature in the Japanese and Chinese languages, but it may be that it will take a little time to work out a satisfactory basis of interchange with Shanghai and Tokyo because of the fear which a number of the police officials in some of the Far Eastern cities still have of Soviet scientific publications. It may pay to leave the final consummation of the arrangements till I am able to explore all aspects of the matter with my colleagues Liu in Shanghai and Urumatsu in Tokyo.

Sincerely yours,

———— ————.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here four letters from Mr. Carter and one letter to Mr. Holland, which Mr. Mandel will identify and Mr. Holland will look at them, and may they be admitted into the record without comment, unless Mr. Holland may want to comment.

Will you identify those documents as documents having been taken from the files of the institute?

Mr. MANDEL. First we have a photostat of a document dated April 18, 1940, addressed to W. L. Holland, signed Edward C. Carter. Second is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 5, 1937, addressed to Mr. Wm. L. Holland, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. Then next

is an original letter on the letterhead of the Institute of Pacific Relations marked "urgent" dated February 8, 1937, addressed to Mr. William L. Holland, and signed by Edward C. Carter. Then we have a letter here dated January 9, 1935, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. W. L. Holland and signed A. J. Kantorovitch. Attached thereto is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dealing with a visit of the secretary general. It is headed "The Pacific Institute of U. S. S. R. (Soviet Council of the IPR)."

Finally, there is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 22, 1941, addressed to Mrs. Martha Czarnowska, with no signature, but the title here is research secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I wonder if you would identify those documents for the record, please.

Mr. HOLLAND. The first letter of April 18 from Mr. Carter appears to me to be an authentic letter which I received.

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead, Mr. Holland.

Mr. HOLLAND. The second letter, the 5th of March, Mr. Carter to me, apparently referring to a copy of the proceedings of the trials of the Soviet generals, I don't recall but it seems to me to be an authentic letter.

The letter of February 8 from Mr. Carter to me, apparently suggesting a number of changes in a manuscript which Miss Moore seems to have had something to do, also seems to me to be an authentic letter.

The letter from Kantorovitch to me, addressed to me in Tokyo, January 9, 1935, the material sent along, a report on the activities of the Soviet council to be put in our house bulletin, IPR notes. That seems to be an authentic copy.

Finally, the letter of April 22, 1941, addressed by the research secretary to Mrs. Martha Czarnowska——

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who she is, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't—Oh, yes; I do now. I couldn't remember at first. This is the married name of the daughter of Dr. Ludwig Rajchman and she had prepared a book of maps on the Far East for us. These are my comments on the first draft of the maps, pointing out errors. I think undoubtedly the letter is mine.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Rajchman's connection with the institute?

Mr. HOLLAND. Rajchman so far as I know had no connection, but I believe he may have attended one conference as an observer, possibly in 1931 when he was working for the Chinese Nationalist Government on behalf of the League of Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. You have seen the testimony in our record about the recommendation that he attend the Mont Tremblant conference?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You know of no other activity of his?

Mr. HOLLAND. No. I met him once or twice in New York on casual visits when he had great pride in his daughter and spoke to me a number of times about how pleased he was at the book, these maps that she had done.

Mr. MORRIS. He is now with the Polish Soviet delegation, is he not?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't know that. I thought he was connected with the International Children's Emergency Fund.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he with the Polish delegation now?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am afraid I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. He could be in that capacity, but he could be representing Poland?

Mr. HOLLAND. He could be in both, surely.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits 591–A, 591–B, 591–C, 591–D, 591–E" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 591–A

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam London Manila Moscow New York Paris Shanghai
Sydney Tokyo Toronto Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y.

APRIL 18, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
Care of Giannini Foundation, Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: It is difficult to condense all that Cripps said, for I think I must have heard him speak a total of five hours.

In general his analysis is similar to that of Holland, Field, and Carter.

I did not hear his talk on India, but learned from Shridharani and Margaret Taylor that he seemed to have a pretty rounded understanding of Indian problems and a high regard for Nehru and Gandhi. He is reported to fear that the premature launching of civil disobedience might lead to a prolonged and bloody civil war.

With reference to the United Front he feels that in the present period it is growing stronger and that the Generalissimo is disciplining the rightists. He is agnostic as to the continuation of Kuomintang-Communists cooperation after Japanese pressure is withdrawn.

He gave a vivid picture of Sinkiang and its two-fisted ruler. Trade for geographical reasons is primarily with the U. S. S. R. There are Russian experts, but as far as he could discover no Russians in administrative positions. The relations between Sinkiang and Chungking are formal, correct, and cooperative, but the ruler in Sinkiang has pretty nearly full independence. He is keener on Sinkiang for the Sinkiangese than he is for either Russia or China, but he accepts the Generalissimo as his chief.

Cripps gave an inside picture of the reasons for the breakdown of the Anglo-French negotiations in Moscow before the war. He feels that the British could have come to terms with Russia if they had treated the Russians as equals instead of inferiors. Just before the Finnish-Russian war began Cripps was trying to bring London and Moscow together. But the efforts of the British Embassy in Stockholm to dissuade the Finns from coming to terms with Moscow prevented his being, I gather, a mediator between Maisky and Halifax.

In Chungking he talked to the Soviet Ambassador who personally approved of Cripps going on to Moscow from Sinkiang. This was presumably approved by Halifax. Cripps had long talks with Molotov and on his return to Chungking with, I assume, the approval of Clark Kerr, sent a lengthy cable to London urging in the strongest terms renewed effort on the part of London to establish some relations with Moscow.

I imagine that supplementing his cable will be one of the principal aims of Cripps on his return to London. He and Geoffrey Wilson sailed last Saturday on the *Rex*. I assume that he will get home before Italy comes off the fence.

Cripps spoke in high terms of CIC and of the educational possibilities of the CIC if properly staffed as a method of adult education in democracy.

Cripps had talks with Arita, Grew, Craigie, and others in Tokyo and, I think, felt that Grew and Craigie in their two speeches had the same objectives but that Grew had done it in the right way and Craigie in the wrong way.

After Tokyo, Cripps visited Formosa. And he has seen a great many people in Washington, Baltimore, and New York. To a large and predominantly right-

wing dinner at Council House he made a very able talk principally on the Far East, and all of the capitalist members with whom I talked afterward were full of admiration for the balance, vividness, and accuracy of his analysis. No one in the room seemed to share the bitter view of Cripps that some English tory and some English labor leaders take.

I myself am worried at the continued hostility to the U. S. S. R. on the part of the Washington and London governments. I am afraid that if the British do not take a different line in their relations with Moscow they will suffer.

It seems to me that it would be a great mistake for the Allies to go to war with the U. S. S. R., even though some of them may think that the Allied cause would more quickly gain American support if the Allies were fighting both Russia and Germany instead of Germany alone.

Mrs. Kittredge has just had a letter from her husband who was in Oslo the week before the invasion and left Oslo as the Germans came in. During that week end he saw the head of the university, the Foreign Minister, the Trustees of the Nobel Fund, and many similar people. They were all feeling a new strength, a new sense of Scandinavian solidarity. They felt that Scandinavia had now once more found its soul as a result of the Soviet invasion of Finland and the German sinking of Scandinavian ships, and now Norway was going to gird itself so as to make certain that there should be no further German aggression. Apparently not a single Norwegian of all those that Kittredge saw had the slightest suspicion during that week end of what was to befall them on Tuesday.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—Unless you get the information from other sources, please do not report to others what I have said regarding Cripps' negotiations with Maisky and Molotov.

EXHIBIT No. 591–B

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 5, 1937.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Food Research Institute,
Stanford University, California.

DEAR BILL: You will, think, be able to help people who have been perplexed by the recent Moscow Trials to realize that they make sense by loaning them a copy of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collgium of the Supreme Court. January 23–January 30, 1937. I have just managed to secure a few copies and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you will find it fascinating and will want to read it all the way through.

I think also that the very able law professor whom Alsberg so greatly admires will want to read it also.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials not withstanding.

When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would most appreciate it, it should be put in the Library of the I. P. R. in San Francisco.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 591–C

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam Honolulu London Manila Moscow New York Paris
Sydney Tokyo Toronto Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 8, 1937.

Air Mail.
(Penned:) Urgent.

DEAR BILL: Enclosed is a copy of Motylev's letter to me of the 15th of January regarding the manuscript for the Soviet chapter of Problems of the Pacific. As a result of a conversation with Harriet I have just wired you as follows:

Air mail me copy all you have written in problems regarding Takayanagi-Motylev discussion.

When you read Motylev's letter you will realize that Harriet and I are helpless in dealing with Motylev's paragraph 4 without seeing how you have treated this incident.

Now we will deal with Motylev's points as far as is necessary seriatim.

Harriet is mildly upset that after we had all voted in favor of eliminating her first paragraph the manuscript was sent to Motylev with this still intact. It is easy, therefore, for Harriet to accept Motylev's strong plea for eliminating this. She desired that it be eliminated and thought it had.

(1) Harriet feels that we should put Motylev's reply to Takayanagi in direct quotes (unless you have done it in your chapter) but that we should not yield to Motylev with reference to direct quotes of his other statements for two reasons; first, we have used direct quotes for a good many of his statements; second, where we have not done so his English was so involved that Harriet feels indirect speech more successfully expresses his ideas.

(2) Harriet is willing out of deference to Motylev to give the spokesman in her chapter greater authority by building them up in the manner proposed by Motylev, especially in relation to the German-Japanese discussion. You can use your own judgment about adopting a similar procedure in your own chapter.

(3) Harriet feels that we can include Yoshizawa's reply to Mr. Sarraut as proposed by Motylev.

(4) If you have quoted Takayanagi in full in your chapter, Harriet's proposal is that she quote Motylev's reply in full in her chapter and cross-reference it to the quotation of your chapter. This would end the Soviet chapter. Does such a proposal meet with your approval?

(5) Motylev's suggest accepted.

(6) 1st paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

2nd paragraph—Instead of putting paragraphs from the Constitution into the body of the text, my proposal is that they be quoted in a footnote. Harriet would recommend that we merely make a footnote to these clauses instead of quoting them *if* you would prefer to save space, (Penned) otherwise Harriet accepts my proposal.

(7) 1st paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

2nd paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

3rd paragraph—Harriet proposes to change the sentence regarding "dumping" from a statement of fact to a point raised by members of the Conference. In its new form it will read "Some members asserted that in the past certain markets have been affected by so-called Soviet dumping."

4th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

5th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

6th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

7th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted by omitting.

8th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted (His original manuscript used both terms indiscriminately).

9th paragraph—Motylev's suggestion accepted.

10th paragraph—We assume that Motylev's suggestion is carried out in substance in the various chapters and that, therefore, there is no need of an appendix of Chairmen's statements. Before writing Motylev, However, we would like from you a clarification of this point.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

Enclosure.
(Penned:) Please reply by air at the earliest moment.

(EXHIBIT No. 591-D)

JANUARY 9, 1935.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
I. P. R. Notes, Editorial and Publication Office,
306 Osaka Building, Tokyo, Japan.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I enclose herewith the quarterly report of the Pacific Institute of U. S. S. R. to I. P. R. NOTES, which was promised in our letter of December 20, and about which Mr. E. C. Carter cabled you from London.

I hope it will reach you in due time to appear in the next issue of the I. P. R. NOTES.

Sincerely yours,

[s] A. J. KANTOROVICH.

THE PACIFIC INSTITUTE OF U. S. S. R. (SOVIET COUNCIL OF I. P. R.)

VISIT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

At the end of December 1934, the Soviet Council was visited by Mr. E. C. Carter, Secretary General of the IPR, who stayed in Moscow from December 20, till the 31st. The Secretary General's party included the following members:

Miss Kate Mitchell, permanent private secretary.
Mr. Stephanus V. C. Morris of Lenox, Mass.
Mr. Simon Wingfield Digby of Sherborne Castel, Dorset, England.

The party of the Secretary General was joined by Miss Harriet Moore, a member of the IPR staff, who is at the present time a resident in Moscow where she is doing research work on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

On December 29, the Secretary General was received by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov.

During his visit the Secretary General had two conferences with the Praesidium of the Soviet Council (Mr. V. E. Motylev, President; Mr. G. N. Voitinsky, Vice President; Mr. A. J. Kantorovich, Secretary General of the Council), and was in daily intercourse with Mr. Kantorovich.

The Secretary General availed himself of the opportunity to renew his contact with different scientific institutions of the U. S. S. R. partly connected with the Soviet Council of the IPR. Mr. E. C. Carter and his party have had interviews with The Chamber of Commerce, The Institute of World Economics and World Politics of the Communist Academy, The Supreme Board of the Great Northern Sea Passage, The All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, The Institute of Scientific Publications of the Great Soviet World Atlas, The Institute of Oceanography, The Institute of Soviet Construction and Law, two Agrarian Institutes. Some of these institutions the Secretary General visited in person, while some sent representatives who took part in conferences arranged at the office of the Pacific Institute of U. S. S. R.

During the Secretary General's stay in Moscow the Praesidium of the Soviet Council had the opportunity of discussing and adjusting several questions pertaining to the current work of the Soviet Section and its plans for the future.

CONFERENCE PREPARATION

During the Secretary General's visit the question of the agenda of the next IPR Conference and of the data papers to be prepared for this Conference has been discussed in Moscow.

The Praesidium of the Soviet Council informed the Secretary General that it has no objections to the agenda as stated in the circular letter of the Secretary General dated Amsterdam, December 18.

However, the Soviet Group does not agree with the proposal of the American Council to shift the question of International Status of Manchoukuo to item "C" of the agenda (Soviet Far East). The Soviet Council's suggestion is to leave this question as originally proposed by the Secretary General's circular or to transfer it to items "D" and "A".

EXCHANGE OF PUBLICATIONS

With the assistance of the Secretary General, an agreement has been tentatively established between the American Council and the Soviet Unit for exchange of publications along the following lines:

1. Exchange of all publications issued by the respective Councils.
2. Exchange of all important books published in both countries dealing with the Far East.
3. (Subject to further adjustment.) Exchange of a collection of standard books of a general character on the Soviet Union and U. S. A., respectively.

* * * * * * *

PUBLICATIONS

The following monographs are in the course of preparation by the Soviet Council, as part of the documentation for the 1936 conference:

1. Economic Struggle on the Pacific Ocean, by Professor V. E. Motylev, President of the Soviet Council.
2. The National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Soviet Far East, by Mr. S. M. Dimantshtein, Head of the Institute of Minor Nationalities.
3. Results and Prospective Plans of Socialist Construction in the Soviet Far East, by the research staff of the State Planning Commission in the Soviet Far East.

It is expected that these monographs will be ready in Russian towards the end of August or the beginning of September of the current year. Later on they will be translated into English and published in this language.

At the same time the Soviet Council has decided to proceed with the publication of a symposium of articles on a number of important questions pertaining to the Pacific Ocean and the Far East.

The preliminary outline of contents is as follows:

Relations between Japan and China during the World War.
Reasons of the Denunciation of the Washington Treaty and the Situation in the Far East.
Problem of Unification of China.
Social and Economic Consequences of the War and the Crisis in Japan.
Anglo-Japanese Struggle for the World Markets.
The Silver Problem and the Colonial Countries in the Far East.
Ideological War Preparation in Japan.
Economic, Social and Political Development of the Soviet Far East during the First and Second Five Year Plans.
National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East and in the Northern Regions of Siberia.
Establishment of the Autonomous Jewish District in Birobidjan.
Significance of the Great Northern Sea Passage.

The symposium will be published in English and will probably consist of about three or four hundred pages. It is expected that the manuscript will be ready at about the middle of the current year.

* * * * * * *

MISCELLANEOUS

The Secretary General of the Soviet Council started to collect a library of Russian and Foreign books on the Pacific Ocean and the Far East.

A complete catalogue has been prepared of all literature published in Russian in the Soviet Union beginning with 1922 on questions pertaining to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, including those on the Soviet Far East.

* * * * * * *

On invitation from the Secretary General of the IPR the Soviet Council decided to undertake the preparation of a report on the subject of the Legal Status of Aliens in the U. S. S. R. to be incorporated into an international handbook on the subject to be published by the IPR.

Similarly on the suggestion of the Secretary General the Soviet Council will submit as a contribution to the international study on this subject a report on communications in the Soviet Far East.

Both reports are expected to be ready around March 15th.

* * * * * * *

The Soviet Group suggested that all National Councils prepare a brief bibliographical survey of the literature on subjects which are of interest for the IPR published in their respective countries, which surveys could be circulated every three months or so.

EXHIBIT No. 591–E

Copy to ED

GIANNINI FOUNDATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., April 22, 1941.

MRS. MARTA CZARNOWSKA,
The Lodge, 8080 Rockville Pike,
Bethesda, Md.

DEAR MRS. CZARNOWSKA: Thank you very much for your letter of April 16 and for the five maps. I have now had an opportunity to examine these with some care, and as a result have decided to send them back to you instead of sending them to our New York office as I had originally intended.

I am doing this because, as you will see from the pencilled annotations on the maps, there are a number of errors which ought to be corrected. In addition to the points I have marked, I am sorry to note that there are also a number of puzzling inconsistencies between one map and another, e. g., your location of principal Australian railways differs somewhat as between maps 3 and 4. In map 5, although you show the principal Malayan and Thailand railways you omit the coastal line of Indo-China and also the important east-west line running east from Chuchow almost to Hangchow and Ningpo in eastern China. Moreover, you show the railways across northern Manchuria, but not the important south Manchurian and Korean lines. Incidentally in this map I should prefer you to include the principal lines in the Japanese occupied regions. In maps 3 and 4, you show a line running from Bangkok into southern Indo-China, whereas the line actually stops at the frontier. You also show a railway running south from the Trans-Siberian to Ulanbator, but I doubt very much whether this railway has been constructed.

In map 1, you show the Chinese east-west railway from Chuchow to Hangchow, as if it were uninterrupted, whereas actually several miles of it are under Japanese control at Nangchang. On this map you also use the French "Baie de Cam Ranh" instead of the English, Cam Ranh Bay. I am also puzzled to know what the word "Hungsuhi" just below Kunming refers to and also why you have used abbreviations for towns like Changsha, Kweilin, etc., when there seems to be plenty of room to print them in full.

On Map 2, I wonder why you have given the names of tin mines in Burma and the Netherlands Indies but not in the other countries, and similarly why you have not indicated the location of oil wells in Burma. It will be necessary to add an explanatory note to map 2, indicating that you have included India, south China and Australia as part of southeast Asia. Most definitions of southeast Asia exclude those areas.

I note that you mostly use the word "Thai" instead of the more correct English form Thailand, even in cases where there is room to print the full name. In map 4, it would be desirable to substitute the word "Auckland" for "Devonport" in New Zealand, as the latter is simply a suburb of Auckland. For the French island Uvea northeast of Fiji you should either use the native names Uvea and Futuna, or the English names Wallis and Horne. The southern part of the Solomon group is British and the northern half is part of the Australian mandated territory. Western Samoa should be called New Zealand mandate and not British. You should also include the important phosphate island Nauru on the equator west of the Gilberts.

These errors and inconsistencies are so numerous that I feel it is essential for you to correct them before I send them to our New York office, as otherwise they may create a rather bad impression on our editorial staff. I am somewhat surprised that you did not give me the opportunity to examine the preliminary sketches of the maps so that I could have pointed out these matters in advance

and thus saved you the trouble of making corrections in the finished drawings. I hope it will be possible for you to make these corrections promptly and return the maps to me for further examination before I send them to New York. In the meantime, I am authorising our treasurer to send you a preliminary payment of $75 and will instruct her to send the balance on receipt of the corrected drawings. Until these corrections are made, I think we had better postpone definite plans for doing additional maps, although I think it is probably that we shall want you to do at least two more of the whole Pacific area, showing principal lines of communication and transport.

I am sorry to say that it has not yet been possible for us to make satisfactory arrangements for the text to accompany these maps. However, we have now secured a competent person and hope to be able to persuade him to do work so that the text and the maps together could be issued as a pamphlet late this summer.

While I agree with you that it would have been preferable to have a new and up to date edition of the Atlas of Far Eastern Politics, it was financially impossible for us to arrange this, and accordingly we adopted the second best procedure of importing the 375 remaining copies of the English edition. We shall probably include an explanatory note in these, stating that a supplementary pamphlet will be issued later this year. I am afraid there would be no use in our asking Hudson to write the additional text as he is so busy with war work that he had to abandon another piece of writing that he had begun for the IPR. The copies of the English edition are probably on the way, and I am desperately hoping that they will not be torpedoed. Since there is no question of an American edition (as Distinct from the English edition which we have purchased outright from Faber and Faber) it will not be necessary for you to send me a copy of your contract.

I am not sure when I shall be returning to New York, but there is a possibility that I may make a short visit toward the end of the summer. I shall, of course, let you know when I am coming. In the meantime, please do not hesitate to call at our New York office if you want further information or books. Miss Downing, Miss Greene, Miss Farley, Miss Porter, Mr. Greenberg, Mr. Grajdanzev, and Mr. Matsue will all be willing to help you on specific points. In the meantime, however, the important thing is to complete the corrections on the present maps.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

———— ————, *Research Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Marks, I have here a score of other documents. It would save the time of everybody if we could work out a stipulation in connection with letters to be introduced into the record. I think Senator Ferguson has some questions to ask possibly in connection with your statement.

Mr. MARKS. If Mr. Holland wants to make a comment on any of these letters, will there be a way we can do that?

Mr. MORRIS. Surely.

Senator, we are going to stipulate as to the introduction of other documents, but I thought you perhaps would like to ask Mr. Holland some questions now on the basis of the statement.

Senator FERGUSON. I have gone over the statement but I don't care to ask any questions at this time.

Mr. HOLLAND. Might I inquire, Mr. Morris, perhaps to facilitate our work, in the case of letters originating with Mr. Carter, if we are going to do it by the stipulation method, would it not be just as easy to ask his to identify his own letter? I have no objection to this, but usually it would seem to be better if the sender of the letter can identify it. That is of course for you to decide.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you see Mr. Carter in the near future?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one letter that he is very anxious to have, and we have now found the letter. You can take with you a copy if you like.

Mr. HOLLAND. Very good.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the July 10, 1938, letter that has been disturbing him. I will give you one and send one to him, both.

Mr. HOLLAND. All right, thank you.

May I inquire as a matter of time-saving, Mr. Chairman, if I should wish to make comment on any of these letters that we go over together, may I also make comments on any other letters affecting me which have been previously introduced into the testimony and about which I have not been questioned?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be understood if you send it in and it is in writing, it is considered as part of the testimony and under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; I will be glad to do that, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. That it is sworn testimony.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Fairbank was on the stand here he introduced a memorandum in connection with an explanation on your part of episodes that had taken place involving him. At the time he tried to have that introduced into the record, it was pointed out to him that the testimony was that of Mr. Holland and it wasn't sworn testimony and should be deferred until you were here. Are you acquainted with that document?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am. I have a carbon copy of it here.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you swear that the answers given in those—are there four?

Mr. HOLLAND. Four; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are those four points true to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. HOLLAND. They are.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they be received in the record at this time?

Senator FERGUSON. Under those circumstances it may be received as sworn testimony.

Mr. HOLLAND. Do you have Mr. Fairbank's original copy?

Mr. MORRIS. We have the original copy.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 592," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 592

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

FEBRUARY 23, 1952.

Professor JOHN K. FAIRBANK,
41 Winthrop St., Cambridge 38, Mass.

DEAR JOHN: Here are my explanations or comments on the references to you which appear on pages 436, 482, 651, and 652 of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Page 436: Israel Epstein's letter to me refers to you as having come in from Kweilin and of his having received something, through you, from "H. and Elsie." Epstein wrote this note to me in Chungking when I was visiting there in September 1943 with Mr. E. C. Carter at the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek. Epstein was then an accredited foreign correspondent in Chungking (he wrote some articles for the New York Times, I recall) and I had asked him and some Chinese colleagues, including Dr. Ta Chen, the well-known sociologist, to collect material for an I. P. R. study of wartime labor problems in China. Epstein was

also doing some work for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives in China and he gave me some of their field reports to bring back to their New York office. His reference to "H. and Elsie" means Dr. Chen Han-seng and Miss Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley, both of which were then working in Kweilin for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. I assume that you brought back some of the field reports from Kweilin to Epstein in Chungking and that these were among the reports which he gave me to bring back to New York.

Page 482: Lawrence K. Rosinger, then on the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, had at my invitation written a research report for the I. P. R. on China's Wartime Politics (later published by the Princeton University Press). Following the regular practice of the I. P. R. I sent copies of the first draft to a number of qualified people for criticism. Among these were several Government officials, including John Carter Vincent, Alger Hiss (both of whom were then concerned with Chinese affairs), and yourself. From the dates, it would seem that when Rosinger wrote (Dec. 30, 1943), I actually had not yet sent you the MS, because (as appears on page 479 of the Hearings) it was not until Feb. 21, 1944, that I sent it to you, apparently because other people had been slow sending in their comments. Rosinger's study was a competent piece of scholarly work, did not propagate any communist line, and was not based on classified reports. It was favorably reviewed in the press and learned journals.

Page 651: I was writing Prof. Chien Tuan-sheng, the well-known Chinese Political Scientist, then teaching at the Southwest Associated University in Kunming about his research report for the IPR on Chinese Government and Politics (later published by the Harvard University Press). Because of the great uncertainties and delays in sending bulky manuscripts by ordinary mail from China at that time (April 1944), I suggested as a precaution that the author might try to have it sent by the diplomatic bag to you in Washington. This would have involved Chien's getting someone in the U. S. Consulate or in one of the government agencies in Kunming to forward the MS. Because of the abnormal state of the mails, such favors were sometimes extended to prominent scholars in China. Whether a draft of (initialed: WLH) the MS was actually sent in this way I do not recall, but I think it very unlikely, as I remember that the completion of the study was delayed for several years and you will recall that Chien himself finished the final draft in Cambridge about 1947. I certainly have no record or recollection that any draft of his MS was received by the IPR office via the diplomatic bag or via you. As you know, Chien was a highly respected person in Kuomintang circles and there was nothing in his report of a pro-communist nature, nor was any of it based on classified materials. This seems to be a case of my having suggested a possible course of action which in fact was not adopted because of the author's delay in finishing his study.

Page 652: Here I apparently sent you a letter addressed to Liu Yu-wan, then Secretary of the China Institute of Pacific Relations and asked you to inquire whether it could be taken by hand or sent via the APO to Liu in Chungking. What the letter to Liu was about I don't recall, as he was the person with whom I normally corresponded about all IPR business in China. Whether you did in fact send it to him by hand or via APO I also don't know. I note that I gave you an opportunity to decline my request. Liu was not and is not a communist sympathizer. In fact he later became the Nationalist Chinese Minister in Korea and is now on the Nationalist Chinese delegation at the United Nations. My reason for asking you to forward the letter to him was, of course, to avoid the very long delays of the ordinary mails (sometimes over three months).

Sincerely,

[s] Bill

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, *Secretary General.*

P. S.—I would remind you that during the period covered by the above letters I was research secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations and that the China Institute of Pacific Relations was one of the most important national councils of the organization. My colleagues and I were making special efforts at this time to keep the China Council alive and participating actively in the over-all IPR research program. The China IPR was never pro-communist. On the contrary it was largely supported by Dr. H. H. Kung and Dr. T. V. Soong.

[s] WLH.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else, Mr. Holland, that you would like to request the committee to do at this time? The files will be available. The bulk of the files will be available to you starting

today. I think if you get in touch with Mr. Hasser here, he will try to make the working conditions as agreeable as possible. I assure you that they are not agreeable at any time. In that way you can show us things that should go into the record in order to correct a wrong impression given by any letter, if that is the case.

Mr. MARKS. Do you know whether you now have plans to call any more people concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Oh, yes.

Mr. MARKS. Counsel would like time after the close of your receipt of testimony about the institute to prepare a statement or to advise our client.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Marks, it is assumed, however, at all times that while this thing has been going on you have been taking cognizance of the matter and making preparations.

Mr. MARKS. Yes, but until today of course we haven't had the advantage of being able to examine our files and to examine what is going on in the light of what the files show.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. Chairman, at the same time it is understood by the committee that while these hearings are going on you are taking cognizance and preparing whatever answers you consider appropriate.

Mr. MARKS. We are doing our best under the circumstances. There is the question of getting hold of transcripts, and so forth. There are apparently only five printed parts. Again I must say that it is going to take us a while, just as it has taken you quite a while, to go over those files.

Senator FERGUSON. How long does counsel think it will take?

Mr. MARKS. I don't know what they look like, Senator Ferguson. I have never seen them. I imagine they are pretty voluminous. I would like to hear Mr. Morris give an estimate of how long it would take to go over the files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland requested a month in his letter. That is what the committee has agreed upon.

Mr. MARKS. I wonder whether Mr. Holland was referring to the month that we requested to prepare something in the nature of a defense after the testimony had been closed.

Mr. HOLLAND. I will have to refer back to the phraseology of the letter. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. The month referred to by the committee, Mr. Marks, is that as of today the files are available, and they will be available for 30 days. That doesn't mean that is all it is, but that is the way it stands.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the way it stands at the present time.

Mr. MARKS. I understand. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. There is one letter that Mr. Carter had particular reference to. A copy of that may be picked up today.

Mr. MARKS. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. I can't think of anything else.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to have it go on record that while in the past I have registered some objections to procedure, I feel that what Mr. Morris has just proposed is very fair and satisfactory, and not only that, but Senator Watkins' actions this morning in permitting the two previous witnesses to read their statemens is very much appreciated by us.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to read anything now into the record?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have already done that as far as I think it was necessary.

Senator FERGUSON. I am sorry my work today has been such that I could not be here except now.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that it is well that the record shows, Mr. Chairman, that if you do care to have the privilege of reading it, the statement has been given out to the press, it does go into the record with the full force as if it had been read into the record, and I think that very little would be gained if you did read it. Senator Eastland was pressed for time.

Mr. HOLLAND. I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I say, if you want to read it now——

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate your offer. I don't believe it is necessary, sir. The only point I would put forward as a request—I know the committee will have to pass on it—is that in line with the earlier letter from Senator McCarran the committee do give favorable consideration to the idea of introducing the testimonial letters we have received and also those letters and the replies there which concern people whom you are not going to call to give direct testimony. In other words, where people have been accused and are not in a position to come and testify for themselves, if they can submit a statement, even though technically it may seem hearsay, I feel it is only fair that it should be taken into account. But that is for the committee to decide.

Mr. MORRIS. The only one we haven't settled on in that category is Mr. Bisson and Mr. Barnes.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; in that particular group.

Mr. MORRIS. Barnes has not been connected with the institute since when?

Mr. HOLLAND. 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. He has been a member of the board of trustees since then.

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I think not.

The other three documents, there are three memoranda prepared by me analyzing three IPR pamphlets in an attempt to show that earlier descriptions of them in the testimony were not, in my opinion, balanced. If necessary, I would like to have the privilege of swearing to those three documents at the back of that green book.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you swear to those?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I will receive them as part of the evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Those three publications.

Mr. HOLLAND. They are all memoranda on the three publications.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 593A, No. 593B, No. 593C," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 593–A

MEMORANDUM ON "LAND OF THE SOVIETS" BY MARGUERITE A. STEWART

During testimony by Louis Budenz before the McCarran Subcommittee, August 22, 1951 (Hearings, Vol. 10, p. 1101 et seq.), the Subcommittee's research director, Benjamin Mandel, read aloud three excerpts from "Land of the So-

viets" by Marguerite A. Stewart, and published in 1942 by the Webster Publishing Co., for the American IPR. These were taken from a larger collection of such excerpts which was filed for the record as Exhibit No. 142. Budenz was asked to comment on the excerpts and said they represented "thoroughly a Communist point of view."

Mrs. Stewart denies this emphatically, stating that "Land of the Soviets" represented no viewpoint but her own. Both Mr. and Mrs. Stewart affirm that they have never been Communists or Communist sympathizers. In their association with the IPR, they have given no evidence of Communist sympathies. Budenz's comment was made on the basis of three short passages taken out of context and quoted by Mandel. There is nothing to indicate that Budenz had ever read the book which he branded as "Communist."

During the testimony of Raymond Dennett (Hearings, Vol. 17, pp. 1786–92), further excerpts from "Land of the Soviets" were read into the record by Mandel. The excerpts cited by Mandel in Exhibit No. 142 are obviously selected as being favorable to the Soviet Union. Mandel failed to mention that the book also contained many passages giving the darker side of the Russian picture. Examples are given on the attached sheets.

In her introductory chapter (p. 2), Mrs. Stewart stated:

> "Americans * * * want the facts, both bad and good, about the Russian people and the system under which they live. Most people have become confused, at one time or another, by conflicting descriptions of life in the Soviet Union. Some returning visitors have pictured it as a land of perfection, and others have described it in the blackest possible terms. As a matter of fact, neither is correct. Like other countries, Russia has brilliant successes as well as dark failures in its record."

This impartial approach is not that of a Communist. But since Mrs. Stewart sought to give both sides of a complex picture, it is obviously possible to go through her book and pick out isolated passages showing Russia in either a favorable or an unfavorable light.

Another important fact about the book which Mandel did not mention is that it was published in 1942. Since 1942 many things have happened which have changed the climate of American opinion about Russia. If Mrs. Stewart were to write, and the IPR to publish, a book about Russia in 1951, its content and tone would be different from those of a book published nine years ago.

In 1942 the United States was fighting a war and the Soviet Union was its ally. At that time government officials, leaders of all parties, businessmen, and military men, including Winston Churchill and General MacArthur, were warmly praising the Soviet war effort. Our American ambassador to Russia was lavish in his praise of the Soviets and their achievements. Whatever their private opinions of the Soviet system, patriotic Americans were refraining from hostile statements which might disrupt the inter-Allied cooperation that was vitally necessary to win the war. This book sought to give a sympathetic picture of life in the Soviet Union, although not an uncritical one. At that time, many American business and political leaders were praising Russia in much more unqualified terms than did Mrs. Stewart in this book.

During the war many Americans hoped that peaceful cooperation between Russia and the democratic countries would be possible in the postwar period. This hope was doomed to disappointment by the aggressive policies pursued by Russia. The virtual conquest by Russia of Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, the provocative actions of Russia in Eastern Germany incidents like the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty and the arrest of William Oatis, Soviet military aid to North Korea and China—such things are uppermost in Americans' minds when they think of Russia today, and it is hard to remember the days when everyone was cheering Russian victories at Stalingrad. But as none of these events had happened in 1942, it is obvious that Mrs. Stewart could not include them in her book, nor could they have affected her attitude at that time. It is clearly unfair to judge an author in the light of events *which had not occurred at the time she wrote*, or to brand as Communist a hope and assumption which, though it was later to be proved illusory, was held by many patriotic Americans in the war years.

During a discussion of "Land of the Soviets" (Hearing, Vol. 17, p. 1786), Mr. Morris, counsel for the committee, said: "*It is important, Mr. Chairman, to know whether or not this* ["*Land of the Soviets*"] *is a typical publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.*" Nevertheless the committee failed to bring out in public testimony facts which clearly indicate that this pamphlet is *not* typical of the publications of the Institute, or even of the series of high-school

texts of which it formed a part. It is not typical of institute publications because (1) it is not a research volume, (2) it deals with the Soviet Union and not with a purely Pacific or Asian country.

Russia does not fall within the Institute's normal area of study, except for its policies in the Far East and that part of its territory which lies in Asia. Only a tiny fraction of the Institute's hundreds of publications deal with Russia as such, and in its research program it has never attempted to survey conditions, problems, and policies of the U. S. S. R. as a whole. The pamphlet, "Land of the Soviets", which is not a research publication, was prepared at the special request of the Webster Publishing Company, which wanted a pamphlet on Russia because of public interest in that country during the war years.

This pamphlet was one of a series of nine high-school texts published by the American IPR and the Webster Publishing Co. between 1942 and 1946. Some of them were written by well-known anti-Communist writers. The full list is as follows:

"Modern Japan" by William Henry Chamberlin (1942)
"Changing China" by George E. Taylor (1942)
"Peoples of the China Seas" by Elizabeth Allerton Clark (1942)
"Land of the Soviets" by Marguerite A. Stewart (1942)
"Land Down Under" by C. Hartley Grattan (1943)
"Twentieth Century India" by Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshal (1944)
"Behind the Open Door" by Foster Rhea Dulles (1944)
"Spotlight on the Far East" by Joseph M. Bernstein (1945)
"China Yesterday and Today" by Eleanor Lattimore (1946)

So far as the Institute is aware none of these pamphlets, with the exception of "Land of the Soviets," has ever even been accused of containing Communist bias. Yet this one pamphlet has been singled out for extended discussion by the committee and held up by it for public censure. The effect of this procedure is to undermine public confidence in the hundreds of Institute publications against which no charges whatsoever have been made or could be made.

W. L. Holland,
Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations.

New York, *October 6, 1951.*

Excerpts From Land of the Soviets

"* * * Even the Russians themselves admit that their results (of economic planning) have not been altogether satisfactory. They have had great difficulty keeping a balance between industry and agriculture. Faulty plans have led to breakdowns and waste. They have suffered from a shortage of skilled labor and have had difficulty preventing men from changing jobs too rapidly. Their overhead costs, overstaffing, and red tape are well known. Many more man-hours are consumed in a Russian factory than for a similar quantity of production in the United States. Spoilage and breakage, while declining, have been high" (pages 49–50).

"And all Europe was aware of the fact that many peasants in the Ukraine and other districts had bitterly resisted the Soviet farm program in the early 1930's. Hadn't they killed off most of their cattle and eaten them as a protest against efforts to put them on collective farms under the First Five-Year Plan? Hadn't they brought about a serious lack of foods in 1933 by refusing to sow sufficient crops to feed the cities? And, as a punishment, hadn't the Moscow government forcibly removed thousands of offenders to new farms in Siberia or to dig canals or fell trees in the far-off Arctic?" (page 53).

"* * * in the middle 1920's * * * the peasants suddenly took the position that they wouldn't sell their products unless they could be assured of an equal amount of manufactured goods in exchange. Since factory materials were still scarce and expensive, it was impossible to comply with these demands, whereupon the peasants—particularly the wealthier ones, who could afford to—hoarded their grain, refusing to sell it to the government at the price established by law" (page 55).

"As a result of this overenthusiastic organizing, the first year fifty-five percent of the peasants found themselves members of kolkhozes, when in all too many cases they were not sure they wanted to join. * * * The situation was made worse by the fact that the government, which had planned to collectivize only about twenty percent of the peasant population that year, was not prepared for such a large number. It didn't have enough tractors * * * fully half the

new collectives could not get equipment at all. The peasants felt tricked and cheated" (pages 57–58).

"People in other countries have been bitterly critical, not so much of the collectives themselves, as of the punishments the Soviets meted out to those who opposed the kolkhoz movement. The government made serious mistakes" (page 59).

"By far the most serious example of organized resistance with which the Soviets had to cope was the sabotage (sab-o-tazh), or intentional destruction of property, of some of the large peasants of the rich Ukraine. In protest against the large proportion of grain they had had to sell to the government, which was at that time storing grain as an insurance in case of a possible attack at the hands of Japan, they suddenly refused to cultivate more land than was necessary for their personal needs" (page 60).

"* * * the agricultural policy of the Soviets in the years following 1918 had been ruthless and drastic" (page 54).

"The Supreme Soviet, however, is not the national lawmaking body in the sense that our Congress is. The Supreme Soviet usually meets for a few days twice a year, during which time it takes many actions almost without debate. The real decisions are made elsewhere, and the Supreme Soviet does little more than ratify them. All important matters have been threshed out in advance within the Communist Party" (pages 65–66).

"In actual practice citizens are not yet always assured of these basic rights. Critics of the Soviet Union have charged that they were set forth in the Constitution solely for propaganda purposes. They declare that these rights have frequently been violated by the Government. What does freedom of speech amount to, they ask, when no Russian is permitted to criticize basic government policy or to form a capitalist party to rival the Communist Party? And how can you have freedom of the press when all newspapers and magazines are controlled by the government? And what about the purge (purj) of 1933–36 when thousands of Soviet citizens were seized and their homes searched—was this in keeping with the Constitution? These are basic questions. Few will deny that the Soviet press is rigidly controlled or that the Russians do not interpret freedom of speech to include opposition to government policies" (page 71).

"It is true, too, that Russians of every walk of life were caught in the net of the purge. No one knows how many were tried and sentenced. Charged with plotting with foreign agents to overthrow the government and committing acts of sabotage, they were spirited away from their homes and imprisoned. Scientists, engineers, writers were brought to trial. * * * There were competent western observers who, while convinced of the guilt of some of the prisoners, expressed the belief that many of those who confessed were not guilty but were being punished as a sort of political vengeance" (pages 72–74).

"People are still quite free to attend places of worship. But all possible means of propaganda were employed—through the press, the radio, theater, movies, lectures, and anti-religious museums—against the church. Sunday and religious holidays were done away with. A Society of the Godless was formed" (page 79).

"Both countries (Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany) are frankly dictatorships. Political opposition has been ruthlessly suppressed in both; each permits but one legal political party" (page 81).

'We don't want a foot of any other country's territory, but we'll fight to the death for every inch of our own. Ever since 1921 this slogan has been quoted widely in Russia. Westerners who had followed Soviet developments were amazed, therefore, at the Soviet occupation, in 1939 and 1940, of the territories taken from them in 1917—eastern Poland, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia (bes-*a*-ra-bi-a), and especially at the invasion of Finland" (page 87).

"Lenin and his followers had made no secret of the fact that they believed in the principle of world revolution" (page 89).

EXHIBIT No. 593–B

"WAR-TIME CHINA"

(By Maxwell S. Stewart)

During the Budenz testimony (Hearings, Vol. 10, p. 1099), after Mr. Budenz had testified that Maxwell Stewart was a Communist, Mr. Mandel read a short excerpt from "War-Time China," a pamphlet written by Mr. Stewart and pub-

lished by the American IPR in 1944. The excerpt, which dealt with the Chinese Communists, was described by Budenz as deceiving the American people.

A more authoritative opinion than that of Budenz is that of the late Dr. Tyler Dennett, noted authority on the Far East, member of the State Department before 1931, and later president of Williams College. In a letter to his son, Raymond Dennett, then Secretary of the American IPR, dated April 6, 1944, Dr. Dennett said:

> "Maxwell Stewart's booklet seems to cover very well the ground about the internal conditions in China. Probably the Chinese will not like it but it seems to me that he almost went out of his way to give all the extenuating circumstances and to qualify the criticisms. * * * It's about the best booklet I have seen out of the IPR."

Mr. Stewart's pamphlet is an account of the situation in China at the time of writing (1944). It describes the heroic efforts and achievements of China in her struggle with Japan, and also the deterioration of conditions in China as a result of 7 years of war. In discussing the problem of Nationalist-Communist relations, the author presents the positions of both parties as stated by themselves. Only 3 pages out of 61 are devoted to conditions in Communist-controlled areas, where the war effort against Japan is described as relatively better organized than that in the Nationalist area. The tone of the pamphlet is generally very friendly to China and to Chiang Kai-shek, as is shown in the following quotations:

"* * * the degree of national unity that has been achieved in China since 1937 under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership is truly remarkable" (p. 16).

"Even Chiang's enemies pay tribute to the skill with which he has maintained the stability of the National Government during the past 15 years. It is doubtful whether any other Chinese leader could have held the government together during this critical period. Chiang's real authority derives from his own outstanding qualities of leadership and from the enormous prestige which he enjoys among all factions in China and among the people at large" (p. 42).

"There is every reason to believe that the creation of a strong war government headed by Chiang Kai-shek and supported by positive assistance from the United Nations would be extremely well received within China" (p. 56).

"Today China is recognized as one of the 'Big Four' powers of the world" (p. 3).

"In the future, China will be counted on as one of the chief guardians of peace in the Pacific basin" (p. 5).

"We have been filled with admiration at the way in which the people of China, in the face of almost incredible hardships and disappointments, have stood up to the Japanese year after year without giving in" (p. 6).

"* * * the miracle of Chinese resistance—and it is miraculous—has not been accomplished without a price. China has suffered tremendous losses in men and materials. Her people have undergone physical hardships almost inconceivable to us. Not least is the psychological strain of seven years of unremitting warfare, with the hope of large-scale aid from her allies still unfulfilled" (p. 7).

"When measured against the handicaps which she has had to overcome, China's war effort is truly impressive" (p. 20).

"China is not as strong, either economically or politically, as she was in 1937. The drain on her resources has been too great. We must grasp this fact if we are to discharge our obligations as friends and allies of the Chinese people" (p. 22).

"Chiang's ability to take his country more actively into the war will rest on the concrete arrangements which are made to provide the Chinese armies with modern equipment and adequate supplies" (p. 56).

"At present, China is passing through a very difficult phase in her history—one in which she greatly needs the sympathy, understanding and forbearance of her friends abroad" (p. 58).

"With her vast population and undeveloped resources, China may be expected to take her place among the great powers of the world. * * * In the postwar period China will need American help—American capital, technical aid and diplomatic backing. China deserves our continued support, which, indeed, is in our own interest as well as hers" (p. 63).

"Most of all, perhaps, Americans can help China by trying to understand the magnitude of the task which she faces in transforming an ancient medieval society into a modern democratic nation. Only if we appreciate her difficulties as well as her achievements can we deal fairly with China. And we must remem-

ber that many of the difficulties which she faces today and in years to come are the result of seven years of war in which China fought our battle almost unaided" (p. 63).

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations.

OCTOBER 6, 1951.

EXHIBIT No. 593–C

MEMORANDUM ON "OUR JOB IN THE PACIFIC"

During the public hearing before the McCarran Subcommittee on September 26 Mr. Benjamin Mandel, the subcommittee's research director, read into the record several quotations from a pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, written by Henry A. Wallace and published by the American Institute of Pacific Relations in 1944. These quotations were torn from their context in such a way as to give a completely distorted impression of what Mr. Wallace had written. While the entire text of the pamphlet was put in the record as an exhibit, the Senators present had to rely on the bits that were read aloud. So did the press, and many newspaper picked up the Free Asia quotation mentioned below, so that newspaper readers throughout the country received a false idea of the nature of this Institute publication.

This quotation, as read by Mr. Mandel, was as follows:

> "Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact. * * *" (page 24).

The complete text of this passage quoted below, makes clear that Mr. Wallace was contrasting the independent countries of Asia with those which at that time were still under colonial rule:

> "Whereas after the war we shall find Asia economically still largely in a stage of primitive agriculture, politically we shall find it divided in two parts: Free Asia and Subject Asia. While Lincoln's phrase cannot be applied literally, yet in the larger sense it is true that neither a country nor a region can indifinitely continue to exist half slave and half free.
>
> "Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest to have become a freedom bloc in fact. It will include the Philippines, which has been promised its independence, Korea, which has also been promised freedom in due course, and Thailand, which though independent before Japan's conquest, is one of the small countries which could probably not preserve its freedom except as part of a larger structure of free nation.
>
> "Subject Asia or Colonial Asia will include the countries whose present rulers have not yet committed themselves to definite dates for the emancipation of their colonial subjects. If peace came tomorrow, this would include India, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, and a great many small Pacific islands.
>
> "This large bloc cannot be described as 'antifreedom', but rather as 'not yet having freedom'. It is to our advantage not to perpetuate this division but to see an orderly process of transition so that the area of Free Asia will grow and the area of Subject Asia continually diminish" (page 24).

Another passage quoted out of context by Mr. Mandel was as follows:

> "The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs" (page 28).

In the pamphlet, this is immediately preceded by the following (pages 27–28):

> "Dr. Hu Shih [former Ambassador of the Chinese Nationalist Government to the United States] has described as follows the importance of Sino-Russian friendship.
>
> "'It is my sincere hope that the time will come when China and the Soviet Union may work shoulder to shoulder not only in fighting a common foe, but in all time to come. With a common frontier extending nearly five thousand miles, China and Russia should work out a permanent scheme of peace, nonaggression, mutual assistance, and general security, somewhat along the same lines as the latest British-Soviet treaty. The historical example of 3,500 miles of undefended common frontier between Canada and the United States can be emulated by China and Russia to our mutual benefit. The peace and prosperity of Asia demand such a mutual under-

standing between these two great countries which comprise three-quarters of the continent.' "

In all, Mr. Mandel quoted five short passages from the pamphlet, all of which mentioned Russia. They are completely unrepresentative of the contents of the pamphlet as a whole, in which only about three pages deal with Russia out of a total of 43 pages of Mr. Wallace's text. The principal argument advanced by Mr. Wallace was in favor of a program of economic aid to Asia, with main emphasis on agriculture. Many other postwar problems were also discussed, including the colonial problem (see above), the future of Japan, America's strategic needs, international organization, etc. In fact, many of Mr. Wallace's arguments were very similar to those which have in recent years been adopted as the underlying basis of the E. C. A. and technical assistance programs for the Far East.

In view of allegations (e. g. by Louis Budenz on August 22) before the subcommittee that institute publications had followed the Communist line by criticizing the Nationalist Government of China, it is pertinent to call attention to the following quotation from pages 28–29 of Mr. Wallace's pamphlet:

"[China] has maintained through seven years of war a unity which many doubted. She has also maintained steadily the pledge that she is fighting for the democratic order defined in Sun Yat-sen's 'Three Principles of the People.' This pledge has been confirmed by a promise to call a constitutional convention within a year after the end of hostilities. China will then have her historic opportunity to refute the skeptics who have so long maintained that regionalism and factionalism are incurable blemishes of the Asiatic political heritage. The use which China makes of this opportunity will have an effect far beyond her own borders. The steadfast leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek, which has already made China a world power, is an assurance that China's political aspirations are not limited to her own but stand for the hopes and progress of all Asiastic peoples."

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations.

OCTOBER 1951.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I suggest if you have anyone send in a statement, let's say other than a character witness or something like that, that it be sworn to.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, in affidavit form.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, fine.

And then the committee can consider it in a different light than just a plain statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Before you came in, Senator Ferguson, Mr. Holland had submitted this list of testimonials.

Senator FERGUSON. They are in a different category. They are not necessarily statements of fact. They are more character witnesses or testimonials as to what their opinions are. But if a person wanted to deny a statement that is in the record which is already under oath, at least he should do it by affidavit.

Mr. HOLLAND. I understand, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That leaves us with the question of what to do with these 19 people that we can't locate, Senator. We have asked Mr. Holland to make suggestions as to how to find them, and there will be at least those 19, Senator, who will not be called in here. We have made every effort to get in touch with them.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a situation that everybody faces.

Mr. HOLLAND. Might I comment, though, that as I recall one or two of them were people who it would seem to me can be reached fairly easily by the Senate committee. I seem to recall that Mr. Yakhontoff—I don't know his present job, but I happen just for the sake of finding out I looked up in the New York telephone book and find him listed there, so it should not be too difficult to locate him.

Senator FERGUSON. That is why I think counsel suggested if you know of any information, you let us know.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any of the others you think are available, Mr. Holland?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think I gave all the information I could. Some of that is vague, I know. I would like to ask this question: In the case of the people who are in Europe, does the committee wish to write and ask them whether they wish to or propose to make a comment or denial?

Senator FERGUSON. If they want to make a denial and do it under oath——

Mr. HOLLAND. In their case is it permissible for them to get an affidavit from an American consulate?

Senator FERGUSON. I suggest they do it under oath.

Mr. HOLLAND. I wondered what the legal status was.

Senator FERGUSON. When it comes in the committee will pass upon admitting it.

Mr. HOLLAND. In that case I take it it is in order for me to write those people and say, if you wish to make a denial, do so, but have it sworn to before an American consul.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sworn testimony.

Is there anything else?

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all.

Senator FERGUSON. You want to recess until what date?

Mr. MORRIS. We have an executive session at 10 tomorrow and we may open up after that.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow in executive session.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m. the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Thursday, March 20, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Will you raise your right hand and be sworn, please?

You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before the subcommittee, a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. CHI. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HARRIET LEVINE CHI, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY HER COUNSEL, JOSEPH FORER

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address, please?

Mrs. CHI. Harriet Levine Chi, 406 East Thirteenth Street, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mrs. Chi?

Mrs. CHI. I am an office worker.

Mr. MORRIS. What office do you work at?

Mrs. CHI. I decline to answer that question because my answer may incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. You decline to give your present employment to the committee because your answer may incriminate you?

Mrs. CHI. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occupation you held before your present position, Mrs. Chi?

Mrs. CHI. I had a gift shop.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Chi, are you presently married?

Mrs. CHI. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was your husband?

Mrs. CHI. Ch'ao-ting Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is he?

Mrs. CHI. In China.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what he is doing in China?

Mrs. CHI. I believe he is vice president of the Bank of China.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Communist China?

Mrs. CHI. That is the bank in Peking.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last hear from your husband, Mrs. Chi?

Mrs. CHI. I don't remember exactly when.

Mr. MORRIS. Has it been in the last 2 years?

Senator FERGUSON. Can you place it in years?

Mrs. CHI. Yes, within the last 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Chi, have you ever been an employee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. CHI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What year?

Mrs. CHI. 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you act as secretary to Mr. Owen Lattimore during that period?

Mrs. CHI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you act as secretary to Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. CHI. In New York City and in Lee, Mass.

Mr. MORRIS. In whose home in Lee, Mass., or whose office?

Mrs. CHI. Well, at Mr. Lattimore's office, home.

Mr. MORRIS. In New York City? Mr. Lattimore's office in New York?

Mrs. CHI. No.

Mr. MORRIS. His office in Lee, Mass.?

Mrs. CHI. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was his office in his home?

Mrs. CHI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you put into the record the China Daily News of March 12. 1952?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a copy of the China Daily News of New York dated March 12, 1952, and I have a translation from an article in that paper which has been certified by the Orientalia Division of the Library of Congress.

CHINA WILL TAKE PART IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE PREPARATORY WORK BEING VIGOROUSLY PURSUED AT CAPITAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF NAN HAN-CHENG, MA YIN-CHU, AND OTHERS

[Special to this newspaper]

According to a Peking dispatch of the Hsinhua (New China) News Agency, for the sake of promoting international economic cooperation, an International Economic Conference, initiated by industrial and commercial leaders of many nations, is due to convene in Moscow in the early part of April. In China, national financial and economic workers, persons in the fields of industry and commerce, cooperative workers, trade-union workers, and students of economics, have organized a National Preparatory Committee. The National Preparatory Committee consists of 14 members; they are: Nan Han-Cheng——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you just give us the names of those on the committee relating to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Included in this list is member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese National Industrial and Commercial Association, Chi Chao-ting, member of the board of directors and assistant manager of the Bank of China.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your husband?

Mrs. CHI. I believe so.

Mr. MANDEL. Further, we find also the name of Chen Han-seng, vice chairman of the Chinese Economic Society.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that gentleman?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question because my answer may incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will become a part of the record.

(The document was marked "Exhibit 594" and made a part of the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 594

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
REFERENCE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION OF ORIENTALIA,
Washington, D. C., March 19, 1952.

INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE,
424–C Senate Office Building, Washington 25, D. C.

(Attn: Miss Marion Walker.)

DEAR SIRS: We have carefully checked the enclosed translation, regarding the International Economic Conference, against the Chinese text, which was published in the March 12, 1952, issue of the China Daily News, New York. We find that it is an accurate translation. We may point out, however, that the names of some of the persons mentioned in the article are not transcribed according to the Wade-Giles system, which is generally used in this country. We have noted in the margins of the translation the standard Wade-Giles forms.

Sincerely yours,

[s] EDWIN G. BEAL, Jr.,
Acting Chief, Orientalia Division.

CHINA WILL TAKE PART IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE PREPARATORY WORK BEING VIGOROUSLY PURSUED AT CAPITAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF NAN HAN-CHENG, MA YIN-CHU, AND OTHERS

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—CHINA DAILY NEWS, New York, March 12, 1952.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Chi, when did you marry Chi Chao-ting?

Mrs. CHI. 1934.

Mr. Morris. How long did you live with Mr. Chi?

Mrs. Chi. I don't think I want to answer that. It is a personal question. I am separated from him now.

I will change that after conferring with counsel; we were separated in 1947.

Senator Ferguson. Was he living in this country at that time?

Mrs. Chi. No.

Senator Ferguson. He was living in China?

Mrs. Chi. He was.

Mr. Morris. At the time of your employment, at the time of the commencement of your employment with the IPR, who was it that recommended you for employment, Mrs. Chi?

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. You refuse to answer who recommended you for a position in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mrs. Chi. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Who recommended you as an aide to Owen Lattimore while you were in the institute, do you know?

Mrs. Chi. That I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. You do not remember that?

Mrs. Chi. No.

Senator Ferguson. How long did you work in Lee, Mass.?

Mrs. Chi. Three weeks.

Senator Ferguson. What did you work at there, the same kind of work that you worked——

Mrs. Chi. Secretarial work, typing.

Senator Ferguson. Owen Lattimore was doing what kind of work there?

Mrs. Chi. I don't recall. He was writing I suppose, but I couldn't remember in any detail what he was doing.

Senator Ferguson. Was he writing for the institute? The work you were doing was institute work?

Mrs. Chi. Yes; it was institute work.

Senator Ferguson. Was he writing, these articles that you were acting as his secretary on, IPR work?

Mrs. Chi. I assume it was IPR work. I can't remember in detail what work he was doing.

Senator Ferguson. But your salary was being paid by the IPR?

Mrs. Chi. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Chi, have you done any writing on your own?

Mrs. Chi. No.

Mr. Morris. You do not write?

Mrs. Chi. I do not.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Y. Y. Hsu?

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the previous reason because my answer may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Chen Han-seng?

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer for the same reason.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever been in China?

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us to what extent you have traveled in various countries of the world?

Mrs. Chi. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Well now, Mrs. Chi, we have had testimony before this committee that you were a member of the Communist Party. Were you in fact ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. Nathaniel Weyl?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever adhere to the principles of the Communist Party?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever advocate the principles of the Communist Party?

Mrs. CHI. I refuse to answer that question for the same reason.

Senator FERGUSON. I take it that when you say "the same reason," you mean on the ground that it may tend to incriminate you?

Mrs. CHI. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the record may be clear.

Mr. MORRIS. I cannot think of anything else, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess until 2 o'clock today.

Mr. MORRIS. This witness, however, is excused?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you are excused.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene at 2 p. m. of the same day.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4:45 p. m., pursuant to call, room 424 Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The witness will be sworn.

Raise your right hand. You do solemnly swear, in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. THORNER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL THORNER, BALA-CYNWYD, PA., ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, JOSEPH A. FANELLI

Senator FERGUSON. State your full name and your address and your occupation.

Mr. THORNER. My name is Daniel Thorner. My address is 127 Birch Avenue, Bala-Cynwyd, Pa., and I am employed at the University of Pennsylvania as an assistant professor.

Senator FERGUSON. What are you professor of?

Mr. THORNER. I am assistant professor of economic history, and I teach primarily on modern south Asia, which is primarily India and Pakistan, and I also teach economics.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, do you have something you want to put into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

All during the Lattimore hearings we did not take the time out to introduce this letter into the record, and it is part of the record in connection with our testimony about Alger Hiss.

Senator FERGUSON. Will the research director, Mr. Mandel, read it into the record?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter dated February 21, 1952, addressed to Hon. Dean Acheson, The Secretary of State, from Pat McCarran, chairman:

EXHIBIT No. 608

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: A witness before the Senate Internal Subcommittee, Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, testified yesterday that, in the course of her official duties at the Department of State, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Alger Hiss taken at Yalta which were available to her in her work of postwar planning.

Dr. Fluegel was an employee of the Department from 1942 to 1948.

On the basis of this testimony, the Internal Security Subcommittee agreed that these hand-written notes of Alger Hiss should be made available in the original, or photostatic duplicate, to the committee.

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

(The document read by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 608" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the committee has not as yet received an answer to that letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Here is another letter to which we have received an answer, being dated March 19, 1952.

Mr. Mandel, would you read that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran, from Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary, Department of State, dated March 19, 1952:

EXHIBIT No. 609

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Reference is made to your letter of March 3, 1952, in which you inquired of the action being taken by the Department on the questions raised in your letter of August 27, 1951. Reference is also made to the Department's September 1, 1951, acknowledgement of your August 27, 1951, letter. In your previous correspondence you requested information concerning an alleged meeting held at the State Department on October 12, 1942, in which Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Laughlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, participated.

I regret the delay that has occurred in replying to your previous letter, but it was found necessary to begin anew a complete search of the Department's files. As indicated in the Department's reply of September 1, 1951, a thorough but unsuccessful search of Departmental files for a copy of such a memorandum was made in response to a similar request from a member of Congress in 1950. More recently, research and inquiry among officers formerly with the Department have furnished some details regarding the meeting between Mr. Welles and Mr. Browder.

From the Department's investigation of this matter it would appear that:

(1) An interview did take place October 12, 1942, between Mr. Welles and Mr. Browder concerning United States policy in the Far East. We have been unable to determine from our records whether Mr. Robert Minor and Mr. Laughlin Currie participated in this meeting.

(2) Our information indicates that a memorandum reflecting United States policy in the Far East was prepared and handed to Mr. Browder by Mr. Welles at the conclusion of their meeting. While the Department has been unable to locate a verified copy of such a memorandum, it would nevertheless appear from the information available that the memorandum inserted into the Daily Worker by Mr. Browder was identical with the memorandum which was handed Mr. Browder by Mr. Welles.

In the event that further information is found bearing on this matter, it will be furnished you promptly.

Sincerely yours,

_____, _____,

(For the Secretary of State).

(The above letter read in full by Mr. Mandel was marked "Exhibit No. 609.")

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Mandel, as research director of the committee in this matter, have you a copy of the memorandum that was inserted in the Daily Worker?

Mr. MANDEL. We have it. That has become part of our record.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you refer to the page number?

Mr. MANDEL. Page 599.

Senator FERGUSON. They do not, of course, say in this letter how they know that that was a copy that was in the Daily Worker, except that they verified that it is.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No other explanation has been made as to why they cannot find a copy of this memorandum in the State Department, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. No explanation.

Senator FERGUSON. Except this letter.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Thorner, this was not concerning your testimony. We will now proceed with your testimony.

Mr. THORNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, do you teach now at the University of Pennsylvania?

Mr. THORNER. I do, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you teach there?

Mr. THORNER. I teach courses on the history of India, on contemporary India. At times I have participated in seminars, and they teach some economics. It isn't the same each year.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you a full professor?

Mr. THORNER. Oh, no. I am a research assistant professor of economic history.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you belong to any far eastern and Asiatic societies?

Mr. THORNER. You mean societies concerning——

Mr. MORRIS. Academic societies.

Mr. THORNER. Academic societies concerned with the Far East?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. THORNER. I belong to the Far Eastern Association.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that all?

Mr. THORNER. I believe that is so, Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you in the past belonged to any others?

Mr. THORNER. I was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations for, I should say, about 4 years; perhaps 5. I joined in 1944. I continued to receive their quarterly journal, but I found that you can subscribe to the journal without being a member of the Institute of Pacific Relation and there is a considerable savings involved when you are on as low a salary as I am.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, did you hold a fellowship at the Walter Hines Page School at Johns Hopkins University?

Mr. THORNER. I did, Mr. Morris, in the year 1947–48.

Mr. MORRIS. Who arranged for you to have that fellowship at the Walter Hines Page School?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Owen Lattimore invited me to accept an appointment as a Page School fellow.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him prior to that?

Mr. THORNER. Very slightly.

Senator FERGUSON. Where had you met him?

Mr. THORNER. I had met him, I believe, in Washington, Senator, as I explained before, at public luncheons, which were held when visiting notables, say, from India or Indonesia would speak, such as the Prime

Minister or Ex Prime Minister of Indonesia, or a high Indian official would speak to a public luncheon. And I ran into him there. I did say that I heard him speak in 1941, but I didn't know him then.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him when you were working for the Government?

Mr. THORNER. Not at all, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. What positions did you hold with the Governmem, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. I joined the Government in 1941 and I worked in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which was headed by Colonel Donovan.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was instrumental in your obtaining that position?

Mr. THORNER. In the fall of 1941, it was very difficult for anyone to obtain academic employment. I believe that selective service was under way, and teaching appointments were becoming short. I could not find one and I made inquiries through the American Historical Association, since I was trained as a historian, to find out what kind of openings there were generally in the Government. And I was told that there probably were vacancies——

Mr. MORRIS. Told by whom, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. I believe by some of my former professors at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. Notably——

Mr. THORNER. Notably, I believe, Carlton Hayes.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time did William Martin Canning, in his testimony, before the New York legislative inquiry testify that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. I cannot answer that precisely, Mr. Morris, but I can say that I believe that insofar as there were any public hearings, my name is not mentioned. I am not acquainted with the private hearings at which Mr. Canning testified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, were you a contributor or a coauthor with Owen Lattimore to Pivot in Asia?

Mr. THORNER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How many of you prepared that volume, Pivot in Asia?

Mr. THORNER. About seven or eight people prepared that volume.

Senator FERGUSON. Who asked you to help on that volume?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Lattimore asked me.

I should say that it was in connection with my special knowledge of India. I had been working on India from about 1936 on, and my work on that volume had nothing to do with the Far East as such, meaning China or Japan, but it did have to do with my own field of special interest. That is, the area to which the attention of that volume was directed, was Chinese Central Asia, which long has been an area of comforting pressures from China, from the Old British Empire in India, and from Russia. And the particular part to which Mr. Lattimore has asked me to direct my attention was that based upon the concern of India, particularly British India with the area. And my contribution in particular dealt with the period from 1800 to 1917.

It is a historical account, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. At the time that you wrote that, I ask you the question as to whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. I must respectfully decline, Senator, on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments and all other constitutional rights and privileges available.

Senator FERGUSON. One of the reasons in the fifth amendment is that it would tend to incriminate you, is that one of the reasons?

Mr. THORNER. That is right, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. The next question is, Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. I must respectfully decline, on the same grounds, Senator.

Mr. Morris, could I add something to that—if I may continue, Senator—that the grounds upon which I claim privilege have nothing to do with the Institute of Pacific Relations or with Mr. Owen Lattimore; nor did Mr. Lattimore have any reason to inquire as to any possible political connections of mine.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. You are drawing the conclusion that he had no reason. Do you know what his knowledge was of your activity?

Mr. THORNER. He knew me very slightly, and what he did know was not for at least half a dozen years or more, perhaps even 10 years, one might say, I had been specializing on India. India is not an area which has received much attention in this country. There are very few people so qualified.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you write this book?

Mr. THORNER. Over the year 1947–48.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Lattimore ask you as to whether or not you were a Communist?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Lattimore did not ask me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that would have been a pertinent inquiry if you were going to write on a subject such as you and Mr. Lattimore were writing on, as to whether or not a person that was going to help him write the book was or was not a Communist?

Mr. THORNER. I believe that Mr. Lattimore was primarily interested in my scholarly record, which spoke for itself.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait a minute. Do you think that a record indicates as to whether or not a man is or is not a Communist, that is, the scholarly part of the record, where he graduated, and so forth?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Lattimore particularly was anxious to have some one do a historical background of India's interest in Central Asia, particularly the British Empire.

I must say, Senator, if you will permit, sir——

Senator FERGUSON. I will permit you to say what you want to say.

Mr. THORNER. Thank you very much, Senator; I appreciate that. I don't know anyone else who has read for so long and tediously the records of British parliamentary debates, particularly concerned with India and its external neighbors.

At one time, Senator, if you will think that this is credible, I read every reference to India from the 1840's to the 1870's in the parliamentary debates, for a much larger work that I projected, but I have not been able to get around to completion.

Senator FERGUSON. I would say that would be quite a record of reading.

Mr. THORNER. It increased the strength of my eye glasses, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you the question as to whether or not you think that a Communist can write without displaying his Communist leanings?

Mr. THORNER. I believe, Senator, that in purely scholarly matters, people who are not Communists can make serious errors. I believe that no matter what a man's political convictions may or may not be, that scholarly work can be done regardless of those political connections.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you feel that a Communist can do that? Do you think that there is any freedom of thought with a real Communist?

Mr. THORNER. Senator, that is a very large question.

Senator FERGUSON. It is not so large.

Mr. THORNER. I would have to say, in answer to that, that some don't; perhaps some do.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever known one that did have freedom of thought?

Mr. THORNER. Senator, I must respectfully decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. On the ground that it will tend to incriminate you?

Mr. THORNER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I recognize your reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, several years ago, Owen Lattimore appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. THORNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not he sent in your name as a person who wrote in a letter on his behalf, expressing respect and admiration for his writings at that time?

Mr. THORNER. I believe, Mr. Morris, to answer that question as precisely as I can, that I wrote Mr. Lattimore a letter at that time expressing my support of him. I believe that that was a personal letter; it was not a letter intended for a wider public.

Mr. MORRIS. Have I refreshed your recollection by showing you the appendix of the Tydings hearings, wherein your name appears on a list of those who had written such letters?

Mr. THORNER. Yes, sir. What I thought you had asked me before was whether I had written a letter to this committee, or something of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. No. You had written a letter to Lattimore?

Mr. THORNER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time, were you a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. As I explained before, Mr. Morris, I must respectfully decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, why did you volunteer a while ago the statement that your declination to answer had no bearing on the Institute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. THORNER. Because I think that my connection with this inquiry is tangential in the sense that I never worked for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was never an employee of theirs.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever write anything for them?

Mr. THORNER. I published one part of a work that was later published in full. That is a frequent practice so that you can draw attention.

Senator FERGUSON. You did do some writing for them?
Mr. THORNER. No; I wouldn't put it quite that way, if I may say so.
Senator FERGUSON. How would you put it?
Mr. THORNER. I submitted an article to one of their journals to publish. But it was not writing for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I publish articles in, I suppose, half a dozen to a dozen journals.
Senator FERGUSON. But did you publish it in their journal?
Mr. THORNER. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. Did they pay you for it?
Mr. THORNER. I think they paid me $25, Senator.
Senator FERGUSON. At that time, were you a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. THORNER. I must respectfully decline, Senator, to answer that question, on the same grounds.
Senator FERGUSON. I recognize your reason.
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, may I draw your attention to exhibit No. 73 of our public hearings, which is a list of research fellows and students at the Walter Hines Page School in the years 1940 to 1951.
Mr. Chairman, this is already in the record.
Will you indicate to this committee how many of those people you know, Mr. Thorner?
Mr. THORNER. I do not know Dr. David F. Aberle. I do not know Dr. William M. Austin.
Mr. MORRIS. For the sake of brevity, will you just indicate those you do know, Mr. Thorner?
Mr. THORNER. I know Mr. Schuyler Cammann.
I know, or knew earlier, Mr. Chih-yi Chang.
Mr. MORRIS. He was a collaborator with you on the book Pivot in Asia, is that right?
Mr. THORNER. That is right.
Mr. MORRIS. Is he now in Red China?
Mr. THORNER. To the best of my knowledge he is.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Dr. John DeFrancis?
Mr. THORNER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you see Dr. John DeFrancis very frequently?
Mr. THORNER. I have seen him from time to time.
Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us whether or not Dr. DeFrancis is a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. THORNER. I have no reason to believe him to be a member of the Communist Party.
I do not know Mr. Clive E. Glover or the next gentleman.
I have known Dr. Chen Han-Seng.
The Dilowa Hutukhtu, I do not know.
Mr. Ike I have met.
Mr. Catesby Jones, I have met.
I have met Mr. Kahin.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you say you have met Mr. Catesby Jones?
Mr. THORNER. Yes; I have met Mr. Catesby Jones.
Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Ike in the Hoover Library now in California?
Mr. THORNER. I believe he is.
Mr. MORRIS. What does Mr. Catesby Jones do now?
Mr. THORNER. I believe that Mr. Jones is right now at the Walter Hines School of International Relations.
I have met Dr. Karl H. Menges.

I have heard Dr. Michael speak, but I do not know him.

I do not know Mr. Onon.

I have heard Dr. Pelzer speak and perhaps exchanged a word or two with him.

I do not know Mr. Ring.

I do not know Mr. Schraml.

We can skip myself.

I cannot pronounce and do not know the next name.

Mr. Vreeland I may have heard deliver a paper once, but I don't know him.

I do not know Mr. Waibel, and Mr. Thomas Wiener was one of the contributors to that book that has been referred to.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, William Canning has testified before this committee that you were a member of the Columbia University unit of the Communist Party. Were you in fact, a member of the Columbia University unit of the Communist Party?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Morris, I must respectfully decline, on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Prof. Karl Wittfogel has testified before this committee that you were active in what he called a Communist study group near Columbia University in the years 1937 and 1938. Were you a member of such a group?

Mr. THORNER. I believe that Mr. Wittfogel is under a major misapprehension. In 1937–38, the year to which he refers, I was president of the Graduate History Club at Columbia University, which held regular meetings on the campus and invited distinguished speakers to come and talk to it. One of the speakers that year was Dr.. Wittfogel.

Now, I should say that he was either second or third speaker. The first speaker was a professor of American history; the last speaker was Mr. Carlton Hayes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of the first speaker?

Mr. THORNER. I believe it was the later Robert C. Bingham.

Those meetings, I should say, Mr. Morris, were held in the Men's Faculty Club at Columbia University. They were placarded with large signs all over the campus. Anyone who wished to come was perfectly welcome so long as he paid for his luncheon.

Our first meeting was very largely attended. There were about 60 or 70 people, many more than we expected. Mr. Wittfogel was our second speaker and we were confident that on an important topic like China, this being right after the fall of Nanking and the Japanese push into China, there would be a large attendance. And about 23 people showed up. There was a table as long as this room, and I can still see 35 uneaten grapefruits on that table. Mr. Wittfogel was considerably crestfallen at that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Thorner, do you know of a study group that met at the home of Moses Finkelstein?

Mr. THORNER. I think if you referred to informal Sunday evening music circles, to which different people came at different times, primarily to hear phonograph records from the excellent music collection of Mr. Finley, you would be more accurate in the posing of the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any Communists present at those groups?

Mr. THORNER. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you present at those groups?

Mr. THORNER. I went to a few. I was fairly young at that time. I was not a senior person in any sense. It was an invitation for which I was grateful. Generally people there were older. They discussed things like Wagner's operas, whether they were bad or whether they were good. They listened to Gilbert and Sullivan. They discussed art appreciation and such topics.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know William Canning?

Mr. THORNER. Mr. Canning was the reader of students' papers in my senior year at the College of the City of New York. He uniformly gave me A's.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Theodore Geiger?

Mr. THORNER. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Moses Finklestein?

Mr. THORNER. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. He is now Mr. Finley, is he not?

Mr. THORNER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What university is he connected with now?

Mr. THORNER. I believe he is at Rutgers University.

Mr. MORRIS. Does he have a fellowship with Ford Foundation, do you know?

Mr. THORNER. He may very well have.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. Edward Rosen?

Mr. THORNER. He was one of my teachers at college.

Mr. MORRIS. And Benjamin Nelson?

Mr. THORNER. Yes; I know Mr. Nelson. He was a student on a fellowship at Columbia when I came down to Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have in our record, exhibit No. 77, which was introduced in the public session of August 7, 1951, which mentions Mr. Daniel Thorner:

* * * Daniel Thorner who is in the COI working under Scholar Brown's direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner—

and that he was a New York man and he studied at Columbia University.

Have you read our exhibit No. 77, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. Yes; I have read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the facts appearing in that letter, which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, accurate?

Mr. THORNER. I would have to reread the letter in this connection.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, read it.

Mr. THORNER. Have you indicated who signed this letter, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is a letter from Catherine Porter.

Of course, just read the portions that refer to you, Mr. Thorner.

Mr. THORNER. I thought you meant the entire letter.

Mr. MORRIS. No; just the facts that refer to you, the bottom paragraph of the first page.

Mr. THORNER. Let me say, first, Mr. Morris, that the statement that I probably know more about, the transport problem in India than any other person in this country, as of June 2, 1942, at which I was 27 years old, is a flattering statement, Mr. Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. You think there may be some doubt about that?

Mr. THORNER. I think, depending upon your temperament, you will allow for exaggeration.

What I am saying is that, first, the news that such a proposal about me or that such a letter about me existed, came last summer. That is the first knowledge that I had of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know they were considering you for any job?

Mr. THORNER. No; I did not know at all, and no one mentioned that to me.

The facts of my salary are correct. I was getting either 2,600 or 3,200 at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you attend a luncheon for Michael Lindsay held under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations on April 26, 1946, at Barker Hall at the YWCA?

Mr. THORNER. I have no recollection of ever meeting or hearing Michael Lindsay.

As I have said perhaps before, Mr. Morris, my particular field of interest is India rather than the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and call your attention to the fourth name on the second page of a list which purports to be a list of people who attended the luncheon and ask you if that refreshes your recollection?

Mr. THORNER. April 26, 1946. It is perfectly possible that I could make an error, but if you would indicate what topic he spoke on——

Mr. MORRIS. There is nothing that says there that these people actually did attend. It could be people who were hoping to attend.

Mr. THORNER. I believe it was people who were invited to attend; that is my guess.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, do you want to receive that into the record, inasmuch as the witness does not recall about it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify it?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a list of names for the Michael Lindsay luncheon, Washington Office, Institute of Pacific Relations, held April 26, 1946, Friday, at 12:30 p. m., at Barker Hall, YWCA.

(The document referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 610" and is as follows:)

MICHAEL LINDSAY LUNCHEON, WASHINGTON OFFICE, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, APRIL 26, 1946—FRIDAY, 12:30 P. M.—BARKER HALL, Y. W. C. A.

Dr. C. O. Arndt
Ellen Atkinson
Robert Barnett
Patricia Barnett
Milton Berger
Mrs. Boyden
Ardeth W. Burks
Elizabeth Burns
H. A. Butts
William Brown
Mrs. Alfred D. Charles
Irene Corttneff
Nicholas Cottrell
Mrs. Cabot Coville
Esther Crane
Ellery Denison
Karl de Scheinitz
Captain Domke
Eleanor Dennison
Joe Du Bois
Len De Caux
Dr. and Mrs. Leslie Falk
Mr. Duncan Hall
Dr. E. S. C. Handy
Mrs. E. S. C. Handy
Lowell H. Hattery
Mrs. Harrison
Mrs. Isabel Higgins
Mr. Janow
D. R. Jenkins
Shirley Jenkins
Mrs. Philip Keeney
Edward A. Kracke, Jr.
Mrs. Helen Lamb
Lewis Lorwin
Emmanuel S. Larsen
Robert M. Magill
G. W. Morris
George Masselman
Arthur Mayfield

Raymond Moyer
Carl Nelson
Ann Page
Ruth Pardee
J. K. Penfield
Eleanor Perkins
Edwin O. Reischauer
Edward Rice
Jay Robinson
H. F. Seitz
John Kita Sako
Mr. Sassaman
Lauriston Sharp
Arthur W. Hummel
Robert S. Hummel
John Stenhouse
H. M. Spitzer
Laura Thompson
Daniel Thorner
Elizabeth Ussachevsky
Vladimir Ussachevsky
J. Parker Van Zandt
Dr. Harold Vinacke
Benjamin B. Wallace
Clifford Watson
Guy P. Webb
Mrs. S. M. Wheeler (handwritten)
Bill Lockwood
Henry Owen
Mr. and Mrs. Bowen Smith
R. C.

SPEAKER'S TABLE

Mr. Michael Lindsay
Dr. C. O. Arndt—U. S. Office of Education
Mr. Ralph E. Collins—Canadian Legation
Mr. Len de Caux—CIO
Colonel Dusenberry—War Department
Mr. Hubert Graves—British Embassy
Mr. Joseph Harsch—CBS
Dr. Arthur W. Hummel—Library of Congress
Dr. William C. Johnstone, *presiding*
Colonel and Mrs. William Mayer
Mrs. Audrey Menefee
Mr. Selden Menefee—NBC
Mr. E. Herbert Norman
Dr. John A. Pollard—IPR
Mr. Arthur Ringwalt—Department of State

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations in October 1946?

Mr. THORNER. I believe I was, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a list of Washington, Maryland and Virginia members of the Washington Institute of Pacific Relations, but in view of Mr. Thorner's statement that he was a member, I see no need of introducing it at this time into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever used an alias of any kind at any time, Mr. Thorner?

Mr. THORNER. I must respectfully decline to answer that question, on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments, as stated before.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the statement that you volunteered, that your declinations here in answer to certain questions bore no reflection on the Institute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore, did anyone ask you to volunteer that statement?

Mr. THORNER. I have no recollection of anyone from the Institute of Pacific Relations asking me to write an article under anybody else's name.

Mr. FANELLI. I don't think you understand the question.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not the question at all.

Mr. MORRIS. I said, did anybody make a recommendation to you, in connection with your testimony here today, that you add that voluntary statement to your answers?

Mr. THORNER. No. That is my own.

Mr. MORRIS. And nobody made that suggestion or request?

Mr. THORNER. That is my own.

Senator FERGUSON. Did anyone contact you in the last year about this committee?

Mr. THORNER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or about your testimony?

Mr. THORNER. No, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You have not talked to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. THORNER. I have relied upon my counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. Just your counsel?

Mr. THORNER. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But you have not talked to Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. THORNER. I have not talked with Mr. Lattimore about my testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Lockwood, or Carter?

Mr. THORNER. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all?

Mr. MORRIS. Nothing further.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all of this witness.

Mr. FANELLI. Are we excused?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. THORNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Before we close the record, I want to say the place where the Welles statement to Browder appeared on page 599 of the record, it is exhibit 162.

I also wish that the research director would ask Mr. Humelsine how he accounts for a document that is as important as this not being in the files. In particular, it is a document relating to our policy toward communism in China, where this statement appears:

> The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic context and publicity, that the United States favors complete unity among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof.
>
> With regards to the specific charges that "these officials continue the old policy of war against the Communists in China," this Government has had no such policy, either old or new. This Government has, in fact, viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the "serious menace" of "communism" in China.

How would it be possible that that would not be in the files? See if he has any explanation.

Mr. MANDEL. Are you directing me to write such a letter, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I direct that such a letter be written to obtain that for the record. It is a very important document, and how do they account for the fact that it is not in the records?

If those documents of that kind are not in the records of the State Department, then what provision do they have for destroying such documents as that?

The committee will recess now until tomorrow, the time to be set later.

(Thereupon, at 4:45 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

Mr. MORRIS. Will the record show, Mr. Chairman, that the witness has been sworn in executive session?

Senator WATKINS. Will you give his name?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you state your name, sir?

Mr. ROWE. David N. Rowe.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your address?

Mr. ROWE. New Haven, Conn., for business. Residence, Hamden, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, what is your present occupation?

Mr. ROWE. I am professor of political science at Yale University.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you held that position?

Mr. ROWE. I have been connected with Yale since 1943. I have been professor since 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. What other post do you hold in New Haven and in the United States Government?

Mr. ROWE. I am a member of various committees and things of that kind in the university.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you specify what they are?

Mr. ROWE. I am a member of the committee on international studies at Yale, which has general charge of the program of graduate studies in international relations.

I have been at various times director of graduate studies and far eastern studies at Yale, but am not operating in that capacity as of the present time.

As far as the Government is concerned, my history of employment by the Government goes back to the summer of 1941 in any significance when I was first attached to the Library of Congress in connection with the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications under Dr. Harold Lasswell.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Coordinator of Information assignment?

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Mr. Rowe. No. That was before. That was before the Coordinator of Information Office had been organized.

Then I was attached to the Department of Justice in the fall of 1941 in connection with the Special Defense Unit, Department of Justice.

In the fall of 1941 I was taken on by the Coordinator of Information, which later became OSS, Office of Strategic Services, and in that capacity I was sent to China as the first OSS man to reach China in connection with the Pacific war, arriving there just 10 days before Pearl Harbor. I remained there until May.

I came back and got out of OSS in the summer of 1942 and resumed my connection with Princeton University, where I had been teaching up to that point.

During the war I was a consultant to various Government organizations, but the main work I did was in connection with our wartime training programs on far eastern languages and area studies in which we had a very large program at Yale University.

I am a lieutenant colonel in the Military Intelligence Reserve. My last tour of active duty was a period of about 6 weeks in the summer of 1950 just after the outbreak of the Korean war.

I have also been and still am a consultant to the Air Force in several different capacities, consultant to Air Force Intelligence, operating at top level in Air Force Intelligence; consultant to General Disosway, the director of Air Force training, and various Air Force assignments.

I have worked with the Department of State on several different occasions.

The assignment in Chungking under the Coordinator of Information involved an attachment to the Embassy in Chungking where I was officially listed as special assistant to the Ambassador for the purposes of carrying on the Coordinator of Information work.

In the summer of 1948 I took on an 8-weeks' assignment with the State Department in the consulate general in Shanghai, where I was a special consultant to the information activity, usually called, I believe, Voice of America.

I was employed to take a thorough look at the United States Information Service work in China and to make out a report commenting on it, criticizing it, and making suggestions for possible improvement, which I did.

This was rated as a confidential report and was turned in, and after I came back I had consultations with the Under Secretary for Public Affairs on this sort of thing.

Senator Watkins. What has been your experience with China?

Mr. Rowe. My experience with China, of course, starts out with the fact that I was born in China of missionary parents and lived there almost all my life until I became of near college age.

Senator Watkins. Do you speak Chinese?

Mr. Rowe. Yes; I speak Chinese fluently; have spoken it from early infancy, childhood, and grew up bilingual in English and Chinese. I cannot remember when I couldn't speak the language.

Senator Watkins. How old were you when you came back to the States to live?

Mr. Rowe. I came back to go to school in this country. I was in my seventeenth year. I proceeded to go through my last year in high school and 4 years of college and a number of years of graduate train-

ing before I ever went back to China again, which was in the summer of 1937 when I went back under a Rockefeller Foundation grant to allow me to study in Peking, China, for a year.

Senator WATKINS. Were your parents still over there when you returned?

Mr. ROWE. No; neither parent was there in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, in the academic field have you been active in such organizations as the Far Eastern Association, Institute of Pacific Relations, and organizations of that nature?

Mr. ROWE. I have never been active in the Far Eastern Association, although I have been a member of the association since its earliest founding.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that organization?

Mr. ROWE. The Far Eastern Association is an association of people who study the Far East academically, and people who are interested in the Far East. It its modeled on the lines of the ordinary and regular scholarly organizations like the Political Science Association, the American Historical Association, et cetera.

It publishes a quarterly under the title of The Far Eastern Quarterly, which is filled with learned articles and book reviews, and so on, and it holds annual meetings.

The next one is to be held this coming week in Boston and Cambridge. It sponsors scholarly monographs. It helps to secure funds for sponsoring research in the field of far-eastern studies.

As far as the subject matter is concerned, it runs across all the normal lines of subject matter. It is not devoted peculiarly to any one of them, but is distinguished from the so-called the American Oriental Society by being less exclusively concerned with problems of philology and linguistics.

It is more humanities outside of language and literature, and social sciences.

Mr. MORRIS. What other such organizations have you been active in?

Mr. ROWE. The Institute of Pacific Relations, of course.

Mr. MORRIS. May I come back to that later?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any others, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. Of course, outside of the far eastern field I have been active in the American Political Science Association, the American Historical Association, the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, all of which I have held membership in and am still a member of the Political Science Association.

Mr. MORRIS. What positions have you held in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. Starting out with ordinary membership, I believe I entered in 1939—it was no later than 1940—and then I became a trustee of the American IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you become a trustee?

Mr. ROWE. If you will allow me just a second here, I want to get the precise date on that.

I was elected to membership on the board of trustees at the annual meeting held February 18, 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain a member of the board?

Mr. ROWE. I remained a member of the board until the early part of 1950 when I resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you resign?

Mr. ROWE. I resigned for a variety of reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. What reason did you give at the time of your resignation?

Mr. ROWE. At the time of my resignation I plead too many organizations, too many things to do, and got out on that basis.

In the spring of 1951 I was approached by Mr. Holland in a letter asking me to rejoin the board and at this time I told him that it would be futile to suppose or to act as though I had never had any dissatisfactions with the IPR, or my situation in it, and at that time I pointed out that I thought I had a rather anomalous position of the board of trustees and that I was rather convinced that the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations—and I use this word "staff" designedly; I do not wish to characterize the entire membership of the IPR, but that the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations was by and large fundamentally opposed to most of the things I stood for in the Far East.

I therefore felt that I did not wish to remain a member of the board. I asked Mr. Holland in my letter whether there was any prospect of there being a different situation for me to be in in the IPR in the future, but there was no answer given to that in his subsequent reply.

I did not think it was likely to change.

Mr. MORRIS. So, therefore, on that basis you declined the offer to rejoin the board?

Mr. ROWE. To rejoin the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any letters covering those points, Professor Rowe, with you?

Mr. ROWE. I do not have here a copy of my letter of resignation or a copy of the subsequent refusal to rejoin, but I can supply you with those documents if you are interested.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would.

Mr. ROWE. I will do so.

Senator WATKINS. They may be inserted into the record.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 612A, B, and C," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 612–A

MAY 29, 1951.

Dr. DAVID N. ROWE,
214 Hall of Graduate Studies, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: Thank you for your note of May 28 returning Dutt's manuscript. I agree with you that some of the information in it might be usefully made available, possibly in mimeographed form, for limited circulation. However, before doing this, I have decided to get some further detailed criticism of the study from one or two other readers, including Harold Sprout.

I realize this must be a very busy time for you, but I do hope you will let me know sometime soon how you are coming along with your book on Far Eastern security problems. I suppose you will have material for a chapter or two in the current Washington hearings.

Later on, when you are not quite so pressed, I do hope you will consider writing an article for *Far Eastern Survey* on some aspect of American security problems in Eastern and Southern Asia. Is there any chance of your being able to do this during the summer months? If there is another topic which would be more convenient for you, please feel free to tell me. I may tell you quite frankly that in making this request, I am concerned not only to get the benefit of your long study of Far Eastern security questions, but also to see your general point of view on American Far Eastern policy expressed in an I. P. R. publication. I am still old-fashioned enough to hope that the I. P. R.

can be a platform on which a variety of responsible viewpoints can find expression. For that reason, I have long been a little sorry that you withdrew from the I. P. R., and I would very much like to have you consider the possibility of renewing your membership. Later on, if you approved, it would then be possible to reappoint you to the Board of Trustees. Since Ray Kennedy's death, we have lacked a representative from Yale on our Board. In many ways you are the appropriate choice. How about it?

All good wishes.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

P. S.—As you may have heard from Milton Sacks, Professor Latourette will be writing a short book on American Far Eastern Policy Since 1945 for the I. P. R. during the summer. Later on, when he has completed his revised outline, I hope to circulate it to a dozen or so Far Eastern specialists including yourself for comments and suggestions. I do hope you will be willing to give me your views on it.

(Signed) WLH.

EXHIBIT No. 612–B

JUNE 8, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street,
New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Your letter of May 29 raised a number of questions. The first of these has to do with the possibility of writing an article for *The Far Eastern Survey* on some aspect of our American security problem in Eastern and South Asia. To give you an idea of my situation I need only point out what you must already realize, namely, that I have not published one word since the volume on Japan which I edited for the Yale Press and which came out last September. I now anticipate another full year during which I will do no work for publication. Thus the chance of writing articles for any journal is almost nil.

In this connection I would like to talk with you sometime about *The Far Eastern Survey* as a platform for the expression of a variety of responsible viewpoints, as you put it.

As to my withdrawal from the IPR somewhat over a year ago, that is also something on which I would be glad to talk with you. In this connection I wish to point out that I have also dropped my membership in the American Oriental Society. I retain membership in the Far Eastern Association. In this organization I am very much on the side lines, but I do not object to this as a thing in itself. What I objected to regarding my previous experience as one of your trustees was the rather anomalous position in which I found myself. I wonder if there would be any change in this respect if I were to come back on the board. I tend to doubt it.

I guess what all this boils down to is my strong feeling that over the years the American IPR has taken on a definite character. Quite apart from the contents of its publications or the bias of its writers, it seems to me that the American IPR is manned primarily by personnel up and down the line to whom the kind of thing I stand for in current Far Eastern affairs is probably abhorrent. Therefore, it seems to me that for me to rejoin your board would be a useless gesture at best.

As far as I am concerned American IPR can be anything it wants to be. I am not interested either in certifying that the American IPR is different from what it seems to me to be, or in trying to change it to something else. Within obvious limits, I believe in free association, with likeminded people. I hope you will find it possible to accept these statements in the spirits in which they are made.

I do not want to indicate that my resignation from IPR was essentially based on matters such as these. I also want to say that I would not have raised these matters with you at all except for your letter of May 29 in which you asked about my possible willingness to rejoin the American IPR. I do think that the position I take above is one on which I am inclined to stand at present. I would welcome the opportunity to talk with you about these matters if you feel inclined to do so.

Many thanks for your letter. I will be glad to look at the revised outline of the book you plan on American Far Eastern Policy Since 1945, by Professor Latourette. Incidentally, why not appoint him to the board of IPR? He is the senior member here at Yale in the field of Far Eastern studies. I do not need to tell you of the eminence he has attained in that field.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID N. ROWE,
Professor of Political Science.

DNR: me.

EXHIBIT No. 612–C

JUNE 26, 1951.

Dr. DAVID N. ROWE,
Department of Political Science, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: Many thanks for your letter of June 8 which I am sorry not to have answered sooner than this. I greatly appreciated your writing me in such a frank and friendly vein, and I very much hope we will have a chance to talk about the matter further before long. Do call me me up if you find time when you are in New York. I would particularly like your suggestions on the *Far Eastern Survey*. I can quite understand your position in regard to membership on the American I. P. R. board, and for the present I suggest we let the matter ride, though I may want to revive the question with you next year. In the meantime, however, I hope you will take me seriously when I say that I am genuinely anxious to do everything I can to refute the impression that the American I. P. R. membership is pretty much limited to like-minded people of a similar general political outlook. I don't believe that is true today, but I would like to make it even more apparent to the outside observer by including in our periodicals contributions from more people like yourself.

In the meantime, let me say that I am grateful for what you are doing to aid Milton Sacks in his study of Communism in Indochina, which, as you know, I hope to have published under I. P. R. auspices.

All good wishes.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

WLH:abs.

P. S.—I thought you might like to see a copy of the enclosed recent pamphlet on the I. P. R.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations were you able to draw any conclusions about the position of the Institute of Pacific Relations with respect to the international politics?

Mr. ROWE. This was something that I was very much interested in because of my special interest in international affairs. In the political science field I am not only a specialist on the Far East from the institutional point of view, but I have spent a great deal of my time working on the international relations of the Far East, both inside the Far East and of the Far East with other areas.

In my opinion there was a time when the Amerian Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations took a very definite position in the international field. I have a feeling that a great deal of emphasis has been given to the possible efforts of the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence American policy makers on far-eastern affairs and on international relations.

I think less attention has been given to the position of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the American council, as one council among a large group of national councils, in which you have a sort of a little international society.

In this little international society, the American Institute of Pacific Relations always took pretty strong positions on issues.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us examples of that, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. I will give you an example in the open fight which was waged between the American council and its people and such people as the British, French, and Dutch, for example, and this fight being waged on the issue of colonialism and anticolonialism.

There was a time when the whole International Institute of Pacific Relations was threatened with dissolution or at least with the resignation of important members. This, I believe, arose over the open policy on the part of important American IPR council members of attacking the colonial system.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. I believe it came to a head about 1945, but these attacks had gone on intermittently for years before. I think it came to a head in two of the meetings that they held, one at Mont Tremblant and the other at Hot Springs, these being international meetings with all the various councils represented, and in which the American IPR publicly took a very strong position, or the members thereof at least took such a position in public against the British, French, and Dutch, attacking their position in the Far East.

You could say that this was merely the reflection of the positions of the individuals in the American IPR, reflecting their belief and indicating what they believed the facts to be, and so on, but the thin line between the expression of fact and the advocacy of policy is a very, very thin line indeed, and at times of this kind it seemed to me it almost entirely tended to disappear, so that the American IPR was labeled, and I think pretty accurately and justifiably, by the people in the other councils, such as the British, French, and Dutch, as being very anticolonial and therefore being very anti-British, French, and Dutch.

Remember, this happened when the war was still on.

The importance and significance of this in international affairs, I think should not be underestimated at all. The British threatened to walk out of the international IPR and so seriously did the Americans take the threat that they put up a compromise deal. They promised to tone down their utterances.

They, above all, got a new head of the international IPR in the person of Prof. Percy Corbett, who was a colleague of mine at Yale at the time.

Professor Corbett's position is an interesting one because, being a Canadian—I am not sure whether at this time he had yet acquired American citizenship—and working in an American institution, being very friendly to the Americans and very friendly with the American IPR, he was almost an ideal individual to mediate between the British and Americans.

All this I cite merely because I think it shows the significance of the IPR in international affairs.

These foreign councils, these non-American councils, that were members of the international IPR probably had a far better system of liaison with their own home governments than our IPR ever managed to build up.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, how does this attack on colonialism affect international politics? Would you develop that for us, please?

Mr. Rowe. Of course, the attack on colonialism is right down the Russian line from a doctrinal point of view.

If you go into Marxism, you find very early stated the view which they have solidly promoted ever since, that the place to attack capitalism is in the colonial areas. They are the marginal regions, the outer regions, the places in which empires tend to decay and where the British, French, and Dutch could be best attacked, and, of course, we know what has happened since the war along this line.

The colonialism in the Far East has suffered very serious blows.

It is not altogether without interest that Mr. Jessup who was so prominent with the American IPR was in his official capacity as an American representative at the United Nations so strongly in opposition to the Dutch and so strongly in support of Indonesian nationalism and eventual Indonesian independence, and I am sure that my colleagues among the Dutch would feel that this is a perfect illustration of how IPR not only affects American policy making, but how it plays international politics.

Mr. Morris. Have you had any other experiences other than that of colonialism?

Senator Watkins. May I go back to that in just a minute? I think it has been explained here by so many witnesses from the IPR that this organization did not take up the matters of support for any international policies.

Their whole objective was to get the information from the various groups so that people could be better informed. It was more or less a fact-gathering organization to get the facts to the people and discuss these problems without taking any particular line.

Mr. Rowe. I would like to present in the strongest terms——

Senator Watkins. That is what I think has been testified. If you read these hearings I think you would find that in them.

Mr. Rowe. I would like to present in the strongest possible terms my own belief that no such framework as that is adequate to explain the terrific friction that arose in the international IPR over this issue of the Americans on the one side against the colonial powers on the other.

The business of pure factual information and fact gathering, no propaganda, no point of view, is completely irreconcilable with what happened.

Senator Watkins. You understand, do you not, that that is the claim of the officials that have testified here in these hearings?

Mr. Rowe. I understand that.

Senator Watkins. Do you take issue with that?

Mr. Rowe. I very definitely would take issue with it. Actually it is very difficult for any research organization to operate without some kind of a focus.

The first effort you make to focus research on problems commits you to some kind of a point of view at least by the significance and the importance of the problem.

Then, you proceed from there.

You may say, "All right, we are going to have Mr. A take this up from one point of view, and Mr. B take it up from another, so we will get all kinds of different approaches to the problem."

But supposing you only believe in the point of view that Mr. A is proposing. Then, you are going to allow a dominant position in your

publications and your allocation of funds, and all this to that single point of view.

It is very, very, very easy to manipulate these research programs in such a way that what you come out with is a homogeneous, unified, coordinated point of view, in spite of the fact that you can always go to the multifarious publications of as large an organization as the Institute of Pacific Relations and find something on the other side.

The problem here is not whether you can find something on the other side; the problem is what you have the most of and what is given prominent play and what the people talk about when they go into an international meeting such as was involved at Hot Springs.

This is the place where the point of view of the organization is given away.

Senator WATKINS. You are speaking of the American council only, or of the international?

Mr. ROWE. I am speaking of the American council in this particular case of where they had this fight with the British, French, and Dutch, but, of course, we have to understand that in spite of the fact that the international council is an international council, the operation was centered largely in New York. The money was largely American money.

Senator WATKINS. Who dominated it? The international?

Mr. ROWE. I would say the Americans dominated it to a large extent. If this would not be so, the British would not have threatened to get out of the organization as they did. That was the only recourse they had.

Senator WATKINS. Did that reach the print of the public press?

Mr. ROWE. I do not think it did to any great extent.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this issue of colonialism come up at any of the conferences?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; it came up very definitely at the conference at Hot Springs.

Mr. MORRIS. What about at Atlantic City?

Mr. ROWE. It didn't come up so much at the Atlantic City conference. That was an interim conference that was purely supposed to deal with operational and organizational functions.

It was not a subject-matter conference the way the other ones were, but at the Atlantic City conference the extent of the friction between the British, French, and Dutch, and ourselves, was perfectly clear; I think particularly the British and Dutch delegations.

I was a member of the American council delegation at the Atlantic City conference—this was in early '45, I believe—and I was very much interested in trying to cooperate with the British. I found this extremely difficult because the automatic reaction of the British was that any member of the American delegation was not out for their good and they were hostile, unfriendly, and in a formal, cold sort of way; not, of course, in an overt fashion, but I couldn't get to first base trying to cooperate with the British.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a unity of outlook among the American delegation?

Mr. ROWE. At the Atlantic City conference?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

In other words, did you caucus, or anything, there?

Mr. Rowe. Oh, yes; there was a regular caucus system. I found myself very quickly in a rather embarrassing position. I had been invited to be a member of the American delegation by Mr. Carter, E. C. Carter; that is, when he visited us in New Haven one time, and I accepted.

At that time he asked me whether I would have any objection to Mr. Frederick V. Field being a member of the American delegation. I think this is a very interesting fact in itself, and I said no, but when I got to Atlantic City I found that Mr. Field was not only a member of the American delegation, but he was the spokesman for the delegation.

In these caucuses the point of view would be put up, Field would make the initial pronouncement at the open meetings, and then the American members were supposed to speak up in support.

I am afraid I proved rather uncooperative at this point. I refrained from supporting some of the things Mr. Field said, and I was taken to task for it at the time, but I am afraid that I was still rather obstinate and did not create a particularly good impression.

Senator Watkins. Who were the other members of that delegation?

Mr. Rowe. Mr. Jessup was one of them. Mr. Carter, of course, was there. This was at the time when they were about to shift over from Carter to another general secretary of the American IPR. A guaranty that they would make such a shift was part of the arrangements which they made in an effort to placate the British, because the British recognized that Carter was the spearhead of the anti-British element in the American IPR.

Senator Watkins. Do you think these proceedings and the discussion and the friction would be reflected in the minutes of the American Institute or of this international group, in the reported proceedings of their meetings?

Mr. Rowe. I doubt very much if it would.

Senator Watkins. For policy reasons, it would be kept out of the public?

Mr. Rowe. That is right. I doubt if that would be reflected, although I can't certify on the basis of having read those minutes recently at all.

Senator Watkins. You recognize the fact that what you are saying here has an important bearing on much of the testimony that has been given here?

Mr. Rowe. The relationship between this testimony and the previous testimony is, of course, something you people have to evaluate, but I say this in full willingness to accept the responsibility for what I am saying.

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, in addition to colonialism, has there been any other element of international politics that you have noticed at the IPR as exerted influence?

Mr. Rowe. Now, you are speaking of an influence in international affairs?

Mr. Morris. That is right.

Mr. Rowe. Well, in the early years, of course, there was this whole matter of the attitude on the Japanese war against China.

Mr. Morris. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. Rowe. The first contact I had with that was in the fall of 1938. I had just returned from China and had joined the faculty

at Princeton University and was invited to attend one of these American Council IPR meetings held at the Princeton Inn in Princeton, N. J., and at that point the general line seemed to be that the Chinese were bound to succeed in their war against the Japanese.

They were building the Chinese up very strongly, in other words, and it went so far that at least one member of the American group asserted that if the Chinese kept on fighting the Japanese the way they were at that point they would have the Japanese running back out of North China within a year's time.

Well, if this is the best result that fact-finding can give you, I submit that it wasn't very good. I took precisely the opposite point of view and asserted that the only way the Chinese could win the war against the Japanese was with an extensive external intervention by some third power in favor of the Chinese Government.

This was an unpopular thing to say with those people because whereas they were interested, I always though, in supporting and encouraging the Chinese, they did not want to dramatize the necessity for an overt kind of support and intervention if the Chinese were going to win.

They kept talking all the time about the guerrillas and how the Chinese could get all the arms they needed from the Japanese.

I thought it was a particularly romantic kind of view as far as the Chinese war was concerned; but it was the orthodox doctrine at this time by most of these people.

I was definitely in the minority on that business. I do not think this sort of thing ever had a serious impact in the international field as involving the other international councils. I may be wrong on that. It was very early in my association in the IPR and I wasn't even yet a member of the organization at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any trouble with the Chinese council?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; they got into increasing trouble with the Chinese council because of the open oppositon to the Nationalist Govenrment by members of the IPR.

The open statements made against conditions under Chiang Kai-shek and all that increased more as the war wore on, you see, after Pearl Harbor. There wasn't so much of that before Pearl Harbor.

Senator WATKINS. Can you be more specific about those statements and say who made them; where they were made, and when, and under what circumstances?

Mr. ROWE. I think that would be a matter of simply searching for the record of publications. I think you would find in various IPR publications critical articles of this kind. I cannot name you one offhand, but the Chinese IPR got into a very disturbed state over all this business because the Chinese IPR was composed largely of people affiliated with the Nationalist Government, or at least on its side.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that the Chinese were disturbed by these developments?

Mr. ROWE. I think available correspondence between the IPR members inside the organization indicates that they were taking measures to either avoid hostility toward the Chinese IPR or to mitigate the effects of their policy.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask about the Russian Institute and its connection with the international and its relationship with

the other institutes. How were they getting along with these others at that time?

Mr. Rowe. Which time are you speaking of?

Senator Watkins. The time you were just speaking of when this discussion about China was going on.

Mr. Rowe. I don't think I could say much of much use along that line because I was never in on the inside of that particular thing, on the matter of the relations between the American IPR and the general IPR and the Soviet Council of the IPR.

Of course, we all know the Soviets became increasingly noncooperative, but in the early years of the war it seems that they did have a regular council and participated to a certain extent in IPR work, but as the war went on they increasingly withdrew and contacts diminished.

It seems to me that is the general history of the thing.

But I had no connection of any direct kind with these matters.

Mr. Morris. How active were you in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Rowe. I was a trustee. I did not attend meetings more than about once a year. That's about all it came to.

Mr. Morris. How many were held? They were held more frequently than that, were they not?

Mr. Rowe. I think so. I was for a while rather more active when Raymond Dennett was the executive secretary of the American IPR. At that point, Dennett asked me to join the research advisory committee and I did so and I participated rather fully in its activities.

This was the committee that had the job of promoting research activities, judging their desirability and undesirability, their value or lack thereof, and I attended quite a few meetings of that committee.

However, my activities on that committee came to a halt, I think about 1946. I never had any explanation of the reason for this, but my name was just dropped off the membership list.

Mr. Morris. How do you account for the difference that during the time that Dennett was secretary you were more active than after?

Mr. Rowe. I think Dennett made a real effort to broaden out the membership on these various policy elements in the American IPR. I think he very definitely wanted to get a more general representation of points of view. I got along very well with Dennett. I talked with Dennett about my failure to understand why I had been dropped off the committee. I talked with him about this matter at a considerably later date and Dennett said to me, "Well, what did you expect? You were different."

Mr. Morris. What did he mean by that?

Mr. Rowe. I don't know precisely what he meant by it; but he meant that I was in general not in conformity with the views and opinions held by the majority of the important members of the IPR, I suppose.

Mr. Morris. Was Owen Lattimore active in the IPR at that time?

Mr. Rowe. He got more active again after the war ended.

Mr. Morris. What do you mean, again, Professor?

Mr. Rowe. I mean he had been active before. He had been, of course, editor of Pacific Affairs and had been very, very active in the IPR, both the American IPR and the international IPR. After the war ended he came back from his activities in the OWI and he became

more active again in American IPR matters. I have theorized that maybe it was in connection with this that my name was dropped off that committee, but I have no way to prove whether this was so or not.

Mr. MORRIS. How well have you known Owen Lattimore, through the years, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. I never knew him well. I first met him in China in 1937, in the fall of 1937, and I had various purely professional contacts with him from time to time. I have spoken on the same lecture platform with him, and I asked him, for instance, to read a paper at Princeton at one of the bicentennial conferences at Princeton, and so on, but I have never been a close friend of his. It's been that sort of contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you known Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. ROWE. I have known Mrs. Lattimore considerably better, but a long time ago. My acquaintance with Mrs. Lattimore was first in China in 1921–22 when she and her parents and one of her sisters came out to Nanking, the city I lived in. Her father was a professor of mathematics and dean at Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill., and they came out to spend their sabbatical year in Nanking and he taught mathematics in the University of Nanking. It was at this time that I became rather well acquainted with Eleanor Holgate, as she was then, and knew her quite well during that time and the period up through the early summer of 1924. At that point she and my eldest sister who had become very close friends, went to Peking, and I didn't see Mrs. Lattimore again to speak to her until the fall of 1937, a period of 13 years or more, and I have seen very, very little of her since that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there any Communist associations that you knew of in her life at that time?

Mr. ROWE. The Communist associations that I knew of in her life were in the period 1923–24, around in there.

Mr. MORRIS. What were they?

Mr. ROWE. She was acquainted with such a man as Prof. Harry Ward, the late Prof. Harry Ward of Union Seminary, New York, and with such people as Anna Louise Strong, for example, and the way I know this is because at that time she and my sister were planning a trip to China from New York going by boat across the Atlantic and then planning to cross Russia and Siberia by train to get to Peking through Manchuria, and whereas the visa problem did not seem to be particularly difficult with Miss Holgate, it was difficult as far as my sister was concerned, and I understood that help on this matter was gotten from people like Harry Ward and Anna Louise Strong through Miss Holgate's intermediation in the matter.

I was present at one visit she made to Professor Ward's home in the spring of 1924. I did not hear all the conversation because part of it was conducted out in the garden where she and Professor Ward went, but I knew that it was in connection with this matter of a trip they were planning through Russia and Siberia.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, have you known the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations through the years? Are you well acquainted with them?

Mr. ROWE. The question of whether I am well acquainted with them is a question which would be hard to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, do you know them?

Mr. ROWE. I know them; yes. I know most of them, of the top level people.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us a general idea of what extent you know the leaders of the institute such as Mr. Jessup and Mr. Lockwood?

Mr. ROWE. If you want to introduce their names one by one I will be glad to comment that way, or do you want me to comment on the general group?

Mr. MORRIS. The reason for going into this is to show to what extent Professor Rowe has known the leaders of the Institute of Pacific Relations and therefore bears on the qualifications of discussing this general subject.

Senator WATKINS. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jessup?

Mr. ROWE. I have known Mr. Jessup both inside and outside of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He has at various times been associated with the Yale Institute of International Studies in informal ways, and I knew him in connection with this Atlantic City conference. I haven't seen him for several years now.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Biggerstaff?

Mr. ROWE. I know Biggerstaff fairly well. He is a professor of history, I believe, at Cornell University and was formerly a student at Harvard and studied in Peking. I first met him in this country. I couldn't tell you the precise year, but I see him every once in a while. I have been on a radio program with him.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. ROWE. I have known Fairbank ever since 1936 when he first came back to Harvard and joined the faculty there after a period of study in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. ROWE. Could I say one more word on Fairbank?

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry.

Mr. ROWE. I would say that I know Fairbank quite well. He and I were together in the OSS. He went out to China in 1942 to take over the job that I had started up there in 1941 and I have had frequent professional contacts with him since that time. During the year 1936–37 I saw quite a bit of him in Harvard. He was taking some courses there at the same time as well as teaching there.

Mr. MORRIS. In your dealings with Professor Fairbank have you seen any manifestations of sympathy on his part toward communism or Communist movements?

Mr. ROWE. There is unquestioned sympathy on the part of Fairbank for the Chinese Communists. I say that and feel that very strongly.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. You know it from his writings. You know it from the way he talks about Chinese politics.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you heard him talk about Chinese politics?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; I've heard him talk about Chinese politics. The most recent time, of course, was out in Denver in January when we were on the same platform together and at that time the amount of disagreement that might have developed between us was diminished by the fact that we decided to get together and see what we could agree

on to say in public, but I think any analysis of Fairbank's writings shows a very sympathetic attitude toward what he calls the Chinese revolution.

This is one of these phrases that you have to know the meaning of. When, for instance, I wrote an article in 1947—it was published in the Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science in January 1948—I sent a copy to Fairbank in which I advocated immediate American military intervention in favor of the Chinese Nationalists to prevent the Chinese Communists from coming down out of Manchuria and eventually to recover Manchuria. Fairbank wrote me a letter in which all he said of any great importance along this line was that I was 98 percent wrong because I failed to take into account the Chinese revolution. Well, if you don't know what the people mean by the Chinese revolution, this phrase they constantly use, you don't understand. But what this is is the agrarian revolution: the Communists have seized it; we have to back the revolution no matter who controls it. And that's the way in which these people push when they are sympathetic to the Chinese Communists.

Now, this is a different thing from saying that a man is either a Communist or is generally in favor of communism. It's merely to ask however the question: In a specific situation like that in China which involves Communists, does he or does he not back the interests of the Communists? And in this case there was no question certainly up to the Korean war but what I would say Fairbank was a consistent backer in the interests of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Morris. You knew Fairbank in China, did you not?

Mr. Rowe. I never knew Fairbank in China; no. My first acquaintance with him was in the fall of 1936 when he was at Harvard. Then I knew him in Washington when I came down to join the OSS. I have never been with Fairbank while we were both in China. Our paths have never crossed there.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Mr. Rosinger?

Mr. Rowe. Yes; not very well. I first met Rosinger in connection with IPR activities in New York, I believe, in 1938–39 when he was a student. I was present at a meeting at Mount Holyoke College in the summer of 1947 where he was. I never had much to do with Rosinger personally.

Mr. Morris. Is Mr. William Lockwood one of the leaders of the institute?

Mr. Rowe. Yes. I think his position in the American council of the IPR has always been rather an important one and not always to be analyzed purely on the basis of what office he has held. Even when he is out of the organization, from a formal point of view, while he is still maintained as a trustee, for example, he has had a very important influence. As a matter of fact, I would say that the controlling people in the American IPR include the following names. These are the people that really run the thing and that really control the making of important policy decisions as distinguished, first, from the general membership that has no influence at all, and from the other people like the other board of trustee members—take me, for example—that have no real say in the American policy.

Senator Watkins. Why would you say you did not have any?

Mr. Rowe. Because the important decisions are always in the hands of an executive committee and the committee will operate so as to

screen out the policy possibilities and then the results of the committee activity will be presented to the trustees and all boards of trustees tend to take on a rubber stamp character, and this was no exception.

Mr. MORRIS. As a member of the board of trustees would you ever take part in elections?

Mr. ROWE. I suppose technically, yes; but actually these things were never issues by the time they got down to that level.

Mr. MORRIS. When you were a member of the board did you ever take part in the election of a secretary?

Mr. ROWE. Not that I can remember; no. I remember one meeting of the American board of the IPR at which I was present at which the question of an executive secretary to the American IPR to succeed Mr. Carter was brought up. It was explained to us that this was in the hands of the executive committee or a special committee, I think it was in this case, empowered to handle the matter. They did not think it was desirable to mention the names of the various candidates they were considering. They did not want this to get out to the public and they were sufficiently secret about this so they didn't even mention these names before the whole board of trustees. Now, I had the impression that other members of the board of trustees who were not on this particular committee knew who the people were, but I never had any knowledge of it, and when Mr. Clayton was finally selected it was just as much news to me as it would have been if I had been a member of the general public with no connection of any kind with the IPR. It is things of this kind that led to my statement in the letter to Holland that I just never thought I really belonged.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "Clayton," you mean Clayton Lane?

Mr. ROWE. Clayton Lane; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were telling us on the basis of your experience who the leaders were.

Mr. ROWE. I got started on that: E. C. Carter, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Lockwood, Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Biggerstaff, Mr. Fairbank—these are the professionals. I want to point out one thing: That all these people are professional students either of international relations or primarily of Far East with the exception of Mr. Carter who came into this IPR thing from an entirely different approach.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he come into it?

Mr. ROWE. I understood that he had been YMCA secretary in his early life.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, I give you a list of names of the people in the Institute of Pacific Relations around whom our testimony has revolved for the most part through all these hearings. There is a list of 83 names here and this was a list presented to Mr. Carter at the outset of our hearings here on the general theory that these would be the people that we would be talking about. I ask you if this list was presented to you this morning in executive session and were you asked in executive session how many of that particular list you know of?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; that is true. I replied to your question in executive session by marking this list with the marks to indicate which of these names were familiar to me from actual personal contact.

Mr. MORRIS. Familiar and known to you?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; that is right.

Mr. Morris. Will you supply those names for the record?

Again, Mr. Chairman, this again bears on qualifying this witness as being in the position of commenting on the various activities of these people through this hearing.

Senator Watkins. You may proceed.

Mr. Rowe. Do you want me to just read the names off?

Mr. Morris. Just indicate the name.

Mr. Rowe. I will do so: Solomon Adler, Robert Barnett, T. A. Bisson, Evans Carlson, Chen Han-seng, O. E. Clubb, Lauchlin Currie, John P. Davies, John K. Fairbank, Frederick V. Field, Julian R. Friedman—I am afraid that's one name I omitted this morning—Randall Gould—that's another omission—and Andrew Grajdanzev, Michael Greenberg, Haldore Hanson, Alger Hiss, Eleanor Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, Michael Lindsay, Lawrence K. Rosinger, Mr. K. Saionji, John S. Service, Edgar P. Snow, Mrs. Edgar Snow, Marguerite Stewart, Maxwell Stewart, and John Carter Vincent. I guess that's all the names that are on this list that you have just given me here.

Mr. Morris. And they are people you met and conversed with principally in your experiences with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Rowe. Some principally in connection with the IPR, but others in various capacities.

Mr. Morris. Did you have dealings with Robert W. Barrett? Did you find him to be a leader, one of the people active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Rowe. I don't think Barnett was ever a leader in the making of IPR policy. He was closely associated with them and my contact with him initially was at a time when he was supported by a grant which was at least administered through the American IPR if it was not directly granted by them. I visited him in the IPR offices in New York at that time and I have since been in irregular contact with him.

Mr. Morris. In connection with your experiences with Owen Lattimore during the course of years have you been in position to follow Chinese Communist policy and Communist policy in general on an international level?

Mr. Rowe. Oh, very much so; that's been one of the main interests in my study, in political study.

Mr. Morris. And to what extent do you follow that?

Mr. Rowe. It would be hard for me to tell you what precise proportion of my time I devote to following it.

Mr. Morris. I wish you would try.

Mr. Rowe. I certainly try to keep up with the chief policy pronouncements, for instance, made by the top Chinese Communist policy makers. I read very carefully all the available translation I can get from the Chinese press and occasionally have to dip over into the Chinese material itself. I follow these writings in the content of Chinese propaganda and I would say in general I am fairly well acquainted with the Chinese Communist Party line over a period of years.

Mr. Morris. How about Chinese politics? Do you follow Chinese politics?

Mr. Rowe. Yes. That is getting increasingly difficult to do these days. In the first place, there is less politics and the kind of thing we talk about as normal politics. In the second place, the iron curtain is intervening and it is more and more difficult to get information out, but insofar as I can, I certainly try to keep up with it.

Mr. Morris. Have you had an opportunity to follow and to read the works and the expressions of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. Rowe. Oh, yes; I have read various of his books, articles, and other publications as they have come out from time to time.

Mr. Morris. I was wondering, Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the experience this professor has had in following the Chinese Communist Party line, Communist movements and activities, and at the same time his knowledge of Chinese politics and the fact that he has followed the writings and the expressions of Owen Lattimore, if we could ask him on the basis of that experience to what extent he can say Owen Lattimore's writings and expressions have coincided with the Communist Party line.

Senator Watkins. In other words, you want him to pass some judgment as a specialist in this field?

Mr. Morris. That is right; qualified as he is by the experiences he has testified to here, whether he is in a position to give an opinion, an expert opinion in this case, on Owen Lattimore.

Senator Watkins. I think that would be a proper matter to go into and a proper matter to testify to in view of his background.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about your conclusions of Owen Lattimore?

Mr. Rowe. I have for a number of years labeled Lattimore as a fellow traveler. At the time when the original investigation of Lattimore took place in the spring of 1950 I was asked by Professor Fairbank to write a testimonial letter on behalf of Mr. Lattimore. I wrote Mr. Fairbank a letter, but I refused to try to establish through any such letter what I chose to call "innocence by association." I have heard of guilt by association. I think this business of trying to establish innocence by association is probably equally unjustifiable.

I said, "I will wait for the evidence to come in. I would be extremely surprised if proof were given that Mr. Lattimore was anything but a loyal American, but," I said, "since these questions are raised and since I can't state whether Mr. Lattimore to my knowledge is a formal Communist affiliate, and this seems to be one of the important elements in this business, I will wait for the evidence to come in."

I think in the last 2 years even more evidence has come in than we ever had before, and I will say now that my subjective opinion, which is not based upon a provable statistical approach, for example, to the writings of Owen Lattimore in which you could demonstrate this thing once and for all—it is not based on any such detailed analysis as that—but my subjective opinion for what it is worth, in the light of my knowledge of the subject matter, my 20 years of study in the far eastern field, is that as of today among far eastern specialists in the United States Lattimore is probably the principal agent of Stalinism. Now, I use this word "Stalinism" by design.

Senator Watkins. What do you mean by "agent"? That is the important thing. You know, it has been charged that he is the chief architect of our foreign policy with respect to China and the Far East, and I think some have gone so far as to say he was actually an

agent, and by that word they meant that he was an official representative in a way in the background or under cover.

Mr. Rowe. To show you the meaning that I am attaching to that word in this case, I merely want to reiterate what I just said as to the fact that I have no positive knowledge by which I could identify this man as a formal Communist affiliate. In other words, I can't prove one way or another whether he was ever an agent of the Russians. I think I am now using the word "agent" with the meaning that you have in mind.

Senator Watkins. I do not know whether you know what I have in mind. I am trying to find out what you mean. I am trying to find out what you have in mind.

Mr. Rowe. When I said he was an agent of Stalinism, I am talking about ideologies and ideas and that he is promoting these ideas and ideologies.

Senator Watkins. That is what you had in mind when you described him as a fellow traveler rather than a Communist?

Mr. Rowe. That is correct.

Senator Watkins. All right; you may proceed now.

Mr. Morris. What do you mean by Stalinism?

Mr. Rowe. That is the next thing I was coming to, and what I am talking about here is the Stalinist version or historical development of Marxism. Let us go back again to this statement I just made. As far as far eastern specialists are concerned—that is the area in which he operated—I don't mean to indicate at all that what you have here is a general operator in the Communist ideological field, but he is a specialized operator within the field of far eastern studies, Asiatic studies, and particularly of Chinese studies, and in this field I consider him principal agent for the advocacy of Stalinist ideas. Does that clarify my position on that?

Senator Watkins. Are you tying that down to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. Rowe. Yes; that would be it, but it is not limited to the Chinese Communists. It would also involve, for instance, Japanese affairs.

Mr. Morris. Through the years have you expressed yourself to various people on policy being pursued by the United States in the Far East?

Mr. Rowe. I have a considerable list of publications on this matter.

Mr. Morris. I mean, you have expressed yourself on these?

Mr. Rowe. Oh, yes; very much so.

Mr. Morris. Will you develop that for us?

Mr. Rowe. I could make available a copy of my bibliography to you in which my articles have been published in which this point of view has been promulgated, my point of view on far eastern affairs. Over the years, of course, I have as a teacher, for example, promoted my point of view and pushed my own point of view on far eastern affairs. Long before the Pacific war ever began I insisted that you will never get a rapprochement of any kind between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. I am sure I could document that with the testimony of my colleagues in this field.

In 1947 in a public address given at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor I came out flatly for an American military intervention in the Far East subsequent to the collapse of General Marshall's efforts to bring the Communists and the Nationalists together. I

based this on the idea that we have tried this, I never thought it would succeed, but as long as it has now failed we must now pick somebody to back; since it seems impossible to pick the Chinese Communists to back we have to pick the Nationalists to back; nobody is going to advocate backing the Chinese Communists militarily in eastern Asia; we must back the Chinese Nationalists. And to this end I advocated—and this was an article published later in the January issue in the Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science—military intervention on the mainland of Asia in order to prevent the Chinese Communists from coming down out of Manchuria and in order to regain eventually Manchuria back from Chinese Communist control. I said that if we don't do this the Communists will win. I prophesied that they would be between a year and 6 months in causing the collapse of the Chinese Nationalists. This prophecy was, I think, clearly borne out by the developments and the facts of history. I foresaw that that would happen. Without it of course nobody would accept this point of view either inside of outside of the Government. I couldn't get any place with the people in the State Department on this.

Senator WATKINS. Did you try?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; copies of these articles were sent by me to State Department people, for example.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever appear in person before any of them, the Secretary of State or others?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes. I never appeared in person before a Secretary of State. I have had a conversation with Mr. Acheson, but it was before he became Secretary of State. I pushed these lines of policy with people like George Kennan, who is the head of the Policy Planning Staff, with John Davies in an earlier appearance before the Policy Planning Staff, the precise date of which I can't remember now, but could easily get out of my files. This was well before the emergency developed as it developed in 1948 and 1949, but I got nowhere with any of this.

Mr. NORRIS. Did you have any dealings with John Carter Vincent?

Mr. ROWE. Of course I worked in the Embassy with Vincent in Chungking in 1941 and 1942 during the time I was there. I have never had any dealings with him of this kind since I left Chungking. I talked once in a while on policy matters with him there.

Senator WATKINS. What was the reaction of the members of the Department of State when you presented these views?

Mr. ROWE. I would like to present as a very interesting case in point the reaction I got out of Mr. Kennan early in 1949. At this point the Chinese Communists had not yet taken all of China. There was a great territory still available. I came back from a 5½ months' trip to the Far East during the summer and fall of 1948 convinced more than ever that something had to be done militarily by this country to stem the Communist tide in eastern Asia.

I merely point out parenthetically at this point that eventually we had to do it and we did it in Korea and we are still fumbling away with it, but this has always seemed to me to justify any advocacy of an earlier kind of military intervention in the Far East. However, when I presented this argument to Mr. Kennan I got two very interesting reactions from him. I couldn't make sense out of the reaction, but for better or for worse here it was:

First, he said, "China doesn't matter very much. It's not very important. It's never going to be powerful." I attributed this kind of mistaken view to his complete history of involvement in European politics. He approached the Russian problem from the point of view of Europe.

Mr. Kennan said once in my hearing some years before this time that the struggle between ourselves and the Soviet Union will be resolved somewhere on a line drawn between Stettin on the north and Trieste on the south. I considered this an extremely limited view and I questioned him at the time about where the Far East came in the settlement of our problem with the Soviet Union, but never got any satisfactory answer out of him. That was the first reaction: China is not very important, doesn't count.

The second reaction he gave me was in response to my response to this first one. When he gave me this I said, "China as a thing in itself, no, but China tied to the Soviet Union is an entirely different business. The Soviet Union and China are natural complements and supplements to each other, and you are going to find when the Chinese Communists get control the Russians are going to help them. They are going to build them up and make them dangerous and difficult."

At this point Mr. Kennan reacted this way. He said to me, "When the Chinese Communists get control over 450 million people,"—I began to pick up my ears at this, because he seemed to be making some implications in the field of power at this time—"the Russians will never be able to control them."

Now, if China is so weak that it doesn't count, this means that the Russians will be able to control. If China becomes sufficiently strong and gets control of 450 million people, strong enough to control the Russians, keep the Russians from controlling them, then you have to worry about China.

I say that you get yourself into a complete logical impasse at this point, and I said that if any of my students ever presented me with anything that was so completely illogical as this I probably would flunk him, but I couldn't flunk Mr. Kennan. That's the kind of response I got. I got this with amazing regularity and amazing pertinacity when I approached State Department people. There was a perfect piece of nonsense. These were the top brains of the Department of State. These are the people that are supposed to sit in rooms by themselves and think about policies on the highest possible level.

Senator WATKINS. I would say that you had company in that I recall very distinctly others taking that same point of view. In fact, without knowing very much about China I took the same point of view in my first speech in 1947, that we had to reverse our policy in China and make good on our guaranty for the independence of Korea, and that we should take a very vigorous, affirmative stand, and I know others were taking that same position.

Mr. ROWE. I had not been aware of that, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. Well, I am just a Senator from the sticks and you probably would not hear anything about it.

Mr. ROWE. It is my fault for not knowing what you said.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, we have, I would estimate very roughly, from the questions prepared here, about an hour and a half or 2 hours more of testimony. Would you want to take a recess now, or would you want to go on some more?

Senator WATKINS. I think it would be a good idea to take the recess now and come back into session later.

Mr. MORRIS. When will you set the time?

Senator WATKINS. We will make it 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., Thursday, March 27, 1952, a recess was taken, to reconvene at 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in order. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID N. ROWE—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, in going back over the material that we covered this morning, you were present at the Atlantic City interim conference, were you not?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you present at the Hot Springs conference?

Mr. ROWE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Jessup at the Atlantic City conference?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he take an important part in that conference?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; he was very important. As I said this morning—I believe I said it this morning—Mr. Field was the leader, the spokesman, of the American delegation. Yes; I know I covered this. It was an interesting thing to me, the precise position that Mr. Jessup occupied in relation to myself, and it is sort of an amusing story.

I was there representing the American council's committee on Research, research advisory committee, and in the committee meetings of the whole conference at which these subjects were discussed, committee meetings organized by subject matter in which the representatives of the various national councils were included, I was of course a logical individual to represent the American council, but it seemed fairly clear to me that Mr. Jessup was asked to attend each one of those meetings, and in his extremely effective way acted as the spokesman on the subject of American research interests.

Now of course I had indicated my "untrustworthiness" as a member of the American delegation by refusing to follow the line laid down in the caucuses to the exclusion of my own point of view, and maybe this is the reason why they wanted to be cautious; but it was a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the difference in the line between that advocated by you and that proposed by the caucus?

Mr. ROWE. In general I was trying to take a most conciliatory attitude toward members of our other national councils like for instance I stated it this morning. I tried to be as friendly as I possibly could be toward the British. I found this extremely difficult because the British were extremely suspicious of any member of the American delegation.

As a result, when Field would make the initial leading statement, the other members of the American delegation would follow after and support what he said. I am afraid that there were times when I quite definitely hung back. I think I would characterize it that way; that was the essence probably of the difference.

Senator FERGUSON. Dr. Rowe, had you any opinion on whether or not Field was or was not a Communist?

Mr. ROWE. Well, at the Atlantic City conference I remember one incident. We were discussing informally matters relating to the Far East, and I cited as an authority on Chinese agriculture Prof. John Lossing Buck, of Nanking, probably one of the greatest authorities on Chinese agriculture. I was, I am afraid, rather startled by the reaction Field took toward some of the statements put out in Buck's book about the relation between Chinese agriculture and Chinese society.

It seemed fairly clear that Field challenged Buck's authority and in the course of doing so followed the Communist line on this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. ROWE. That was in the early part of 1945, during the winter of 1944–45.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you known him prior to that time?

Mr. ROWE. Field?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ROWE. No; I wouldn't say I had known him. I am sure I had met him before, but this was the first time I had ever worked in an organization with him.

Mr. MORRIS. But at that time in 1945 he did have a leading part in the American council?

Mr. ROWE. Very much so. As I said this morning, he was indicated by Carter to be the spokesman of the American delegation. I want to point out this fact, that no appointment, no other appointment than Field, could possibly have reinforced as this appointment did the suspicions of the British that the Americans were still going to be intransigent because Field was known to be a critic of the British on such points as colonialism.

Senator WATKINS. Was Jessup on the committee?

Mr. ROWE. He was a member of the delegation.

Senator WATKINS. He did not act as spokesman?

Mr. ROWE. No.

Senator WATKINS. When was that that you mentioned?

Mr. ROWE. That was on the subject, committee meetings at the conference. You would have a meeting discussing one of the particular subject matters of the conference, and in this case it was research plans. I went into this committee, being the American on the delegation who had been in the research advisory committee of the American IPR. They sent Jessup along, and Jessup did most of the talking.

Senator WATKINS. That was still in another group?

Mr. ROWE. This was in a subgroup of the Atlantic City conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Bill Johnstone at that conference?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; he was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he in the State Department at that time?

Mr. ROWE. I think he was still a dean at George Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. He is now in the State Department, is he not?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; he is connected with the business of the international exchange of persons. He supervises it if and when it happens and comes, the Japanese equivalent of the Fulbright business for Japan, exchange of students and professors both ways.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Carter himself at the delegation?

Mr. Rowe. Carter was there, and Mrs. Carter was there also. I remember Mrs. Carter giving voice to a very interesting expression one morning at breakfast, as I remember it, when she said in a rather positive way that the only good Chinese were the northern Chinese. I suppose this doesn't mean anything very much to any of you, but it is a fact that at that time instead of using the term Communist Chinese, people used this phrase, northern Chinese, or the Chinese of the north.

You have to get onto the lingo before you can even understand what is going on around you.

Senator Watkins. They meant the Communists?

Mr. Rowe. Yes; the only good Chinese were the Communists.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that you indicate now it is not an easy thing at times to catch the plain intent of a person who wants to give the Communist line?

Mr. Rowe. You couldn't have said a truer thing. If you have been in the middle of the business, you have to study it constantly to know what the words and phrases are, the way in which they are used at the moment in order to know what people are talking about. That is why it is so easy for an uninitiated person or group to be hoodwinked.

Senator Ferguson. And to adopt it as being fact?

Mr. Rowe. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Whereas as a matter of fact it is not fact but Communist propaganda and party line?

Mr. Rowe. That is right, it is perfectly possible.

Senator Watkins. I would like to take you back to the subject that we were discussing just before we recessed. You spoke about appearing before people at the State Department, various ones, and talking to them about your views that we ought to get in and support the Nationalists and all that sort of thing?

Mr. Rowe. Yes.

Senator Watkins. You mentioned Mr. Kennan. Did you finish what you had to say about your interview with Mr. Kennan?

Mr. Rowe. There is one more thing I would like to bring out about that, and I found it extremely interesting. I called for a sophisticated, important, and formidable program of political warfare involving propaganda, persuasion, even involving what we may term in nice language the judicious use of money. A lot can be done with it in the Asiatic framework.

Senator Watkins. Silver bullets?

Mr Rowe. Silver bullets.

When I put this up to Mr. Kennan, and I put this up as part of my presentation, I wouldn't want to leave anybody with the impression that I am a person who would rely wholly on military activity. When you put this up, Kennan said: "That is impossible. We can't do that kind of thing; we don't have people with the kind of know-how to conduct sophisticated political warfare."

I thought this was one of the most futilitarian, I repeat, futilitarian statements I ever heard from a Government official.

Senator Watkins. Would you know any time in our history in the war when we did use so-called silver bullets to win our way?

Mr. Rowe. I would put it this way: I had always thought that the way to justify the use of substantial funds, substantial arms, and

things of that kind is on this kind of level instead of as we tried during the Pacific war to use them in order to help us fight the war, period. You see what I mean? In other words, that aid to the Chinese National Government should have been considered primarily as political aid and for its political impact and not in the expectation that you are going to get a heavy, strong, important addition to your fighting forces.

I said this from the start. I think that is the framework in which you always had to approach those people.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, we had been using a lot of money in Asia, had we not, with the Chinese?

Mr. ROWE. You mean at what period, before the war began, before Pearl Harbor, for example?

Senator WATKINS. After Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes; we used money in the shape of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation work, famine relief, and all that sort of thing. There was a great deal of it used that way.

Senator WATKINS. We used direct help to the Chinese, had we not? We had given them cash?

Mr. ROWE. We made, early in 1942, a $500,000,000 cash grant to the Chinese National Government.

Senator WATKINS. Are you acquainted with what went on between our representatives and the Communists during the time of the war when the Communists were also supposed to be fighting the Japanese? Did we not help them then? Did we not help the Communists as well as the Nationalists to fight the Japanese?

Mr. ROWE. I didn't think we had in the form of arms, but in the shape of medical supplies.

Senator WATKINS. Things that money could buy?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, yes.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to have you tell us any other people that you approached in the State Department because that is a very interesting thing if this was called to their attention by a man who was qualified; it is very important to know.

Mr. ROWE. There are two other illustrations that I would cite. I would point out one feature: that there has not been much of this in the last few years.

Senator WATKINS. What?

Mr. ROWE. My getting into the State Department. I have been on the wrong side of the fence, so to speak.

Senator WATKINS. You are going the other way, the reverse of what they were doing?

Mr. ROWE. There is one thing people don't like, and that is to be reminded of advice they should have taken before.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that your remark means that the State Department seeks advice that is in compliance with what they desire to do rather than to get advice to aid them in the formulation of a proper foreign policy?

Mr. ROWE. I am glad you brought it out. You people have probably had brought out to you that a lot of attention was paid to the meeting at the State Department called in October 1949.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Stassen and others were there?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. Now it is a very interesting fact that, as far as the Institute of Pacific Relations is concerned and the people in its office—people that operate it—only those people from the IPR were invited

to this conference with whom I would violently, for instance, disagree.

My colleague at Yale, Bernard Brodie, for whom I have great respect and admiration, was invited to go. Brodie came to me with a telegram which was sent to him over the signature of the Secretary of State and said, "What is this all about? Why are they inviting me to this conference and not you?"

I said, "Your guess is as good as mine, but I urge you to go, and I will help brief you and do everything I can to help you out."

Brodie is an expert on the atomic bomb and American armaments and military technology and all this, but he hardly knows one Chinese from another. I helped brief him, and I think it was Mr. Stassen—was it?—that said Brodie was on the right side in the conference. I wasn't there.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out that during the testimony of Mr. Stassen he commented—Stassen commented—that he was surprised that Professor Rowe had not been invited in view of his experience in that particular field.

Mr. ROWE. Brodie went to Francis Russell, who, on behalf of the public-relations people in State, had organized this meeting, set it up, and asked Russell why I hadn't been included. Russell said that my name had been on two or three of the lists—preliminary lists—for the membership of the conference, but that when these lists went up to the far eastern desk that my name had been taken off in each case.

Senator FERGUSON. And you are an expert in the Far East?

Mr. ROWE. Senator, I don't personally like the word "expert," but I say I am a specialist on the Far East. I spent 20 years studying it. I have lived in China almost half of my life, and so unfortunate in this particular farmework as to write and say the wrong things.

Senator WATKINS. Wrong things from other people's point of view?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean as far as the State Department is concerned?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it is your real belief now that you were left off because they did not desire your particular viewpoint?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; and they had reason to know what that particular viewpoint was because early in 1949 I had a conference with Mr. Butterworth, and this is another one of the contacts.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I wanted.

Mr. ROWE. Mr. Butterworth, accompanied by Mr. Sprouse, and the then executive officer of the Far Eastern Division, Mr. Weigle—the three of them—I had a talk with them in Mr. Butterworth's office, and I laid out the general line of recommendation that I had been laying out for 2 or 3 years before, and I didn't get anywhere with Mr. Butterworth on this.

It was rather interesting what happened because Mr. Butterworth, if you will pardon the phrase I use, treated me to the best illustration I could possibly have wanted to find of what is known as a filibuster. We were in there about 2 hours, during the course of which he took occasion to deliver me a long lecture on the difficulties that General Marshall had had in the negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists.

I interrupted him two or three times and told him I thought I knew that story pretty well, that he was giving me in fact detail

that I had not known before, but that I wanted to interrupt and interject my own statement. Then, about 10 minutes before I was due to go up for an appointment with the Under Secretary for Public Affairs, Mr. Butterworth turned to me and said, "Well," or words to this effect, "we thought you had something you wanted to say to us."

I more or less opined that I had had, but that time was so short that I would leave on his desk a document which I had brought with me in anticipation that I might not be able to get my "two bits" in, as we say. I walked out with the document remaining on his desk. That is the kind of luck I had with Butterworth. It was the most complete brush-off anybody could have had.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. ROWE. Early 1949, about January of 1949 just before Mr. Acheson became Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that it could be the reason that Butterworth had seen you and had your views that they did not invite you down to this other thing?

Mr. ROWE. That was the only reason I could figure out. Brodie was not the only one that remarked about my absence at that conference, because other members such as Quigley from Minnesota, Fairbank from Harvard, both asked Brodie why I wasn't there. Brodie, of course, did not have any answer.

Senator WATKINS. Is that all you have about Mr. Butterworth?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Could you go on with the next one?

Mr. ROWE. Well, this is an earlier one, but it is also the policy-planning staff. I believe this happened about 1947 as well as I can remember it, 1946 or 1947. I could find the precise date in my files in New Haven, as I have all the correspondence. At this point the policy-planning staff decided that they would call in a series of Far East specialists to consult with them individually a day or so at a time on what to do about China.

I don't know who all these people were, but I do know that Professor Wittfogel was one; I was another, and Professor Biggerstaff and Professor Fairbank were the others. I don't know who all else. I received a very courteous hearing, but I got nowhere in trying to convince Mr. John P. Davies, who was running the particular show at the time, that we ought to keep on supporting the Chinese Nationalists. That was my line.

His line was in general that these people are disorderly; this government is disorganized; there is no stability in China, and the whole thing is going to break up. I said to him, as I remember it, "Well, when old Chiang Kai-shek wants to restore a bit of order by shooting a few people, you people get revolted by the idea, but in some cases there is nothing else you can do."

This evoked a very, very negative response. I am afraid what is happening in Korea today shows that there are times when that is just what you have to do; but, you see, this outrages the so-called liberal mentality.

Senator WATKINS. What were you urging at this conference?

Mr. ROWE. I was urging the continued support of the Chinese National Government by all means.

Senator WATKINS. You spoke this morning of military aid. Did you mean, by that, that we send our own Army, Navy, and Air Force to China to back them up?

Mr. ROWE. I never considered, Senator, that any large-scale involvement of this kind would have been required if the action had been taken at the appropriate time. If the action had been taken before the Nationalist collapse set in under Communist pressure, it could have been done with a very small representation of American personnel.

I want to give you another very interesting item on this. When I was in China in 1948, on that 5½-month trip I took through China, Japan, and southeast Asia, I had two private interviews with Maj. Gen. David Barr, who was the commanding general in charge of the American military advisory group in Nanking. Barr was telling me what I, of course, knew to be true; namely, that the great problem in material aid to the Nationalists was the same problem as was faced by Stilwell and Wedemeyer and all the rest of them of seeing to it that the aid get efficiently distributed and used in an efficient manner. Of course, Wedemeyer went a long distance in the direction of solving this by distributing American military personnel down to the company level, a one- and two-man number in each case.

I said to General Barr, "Would this sort of thing work at the present time?"

Barr said to me, "if I had 10,000 American military personnel in China, I could see to it that every bit of aid we give to the Chinese National Government would be efficiently and honestly used."

That was in September of 1948, mind you, just a few months before the Communist sweep down from Manchuria began. At that point he was convinced that that would work. He never got that kind of implementation. Of course, he never got the material either. The argument against distributing the material was based on that fact: That efficient use could not be guaranteed.

Senator WATKINS. You did not have in mind, as I understand it, that we send in a large force, either air force, ground troops, or naval forces?

Mr. ROWE. No; but the point is that, by refusing and failing to do it at the time when it should have been done, we have now got ourselves in the position in the Far East where what you are saying is precisely what we had to do. The difference is that we are fighting this war in Korea at very heavy cost with Americans. What is it? Well over 100,000 casualties, and fighting it in what I consider to be a small corner of Asia where, if you win a victory all the way to the Yalu River, you haven't done anything world-shaking from the point of view of strategy.

The fact is you do this after you have lost the main issue, which is China. I have never been able to make sense out of this sequence of events.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, we get into the fight in Korea when that is merely the tail of the dog?

Mr. ROWE. That is correct. Whereas, half of the military involvement that we have today, if it had been done 3 years earlier in 1947 instead of today, would have had the effect of preserving China, certainly China south of the Great Wall, which is bulk of China, from the Chinese Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it not apparent that when you divided Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel and put the Communists on the one side and the people we were supporting on the other side that you were going to have just what has now happened in Korea? How could you keep from having a war?

Mr. ROWE. You either would have a war between North Korea and South Korea or you would have what neither the North Koreans nor the South Koreans could accept—that is, a division of their country.

Senator FERGUSON. That was inevitable?

Mr. ROWE. Precisely.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to know whether with respect to this conference with Mr. Davies you advanced your ideas about the kind of help we should give.

Mr. ROWE. I don't think we ever got down to this kind of discussion of helping the Nationalists, because the whole topic of helping the Nationalists was so far out of his thinking, as I evaluated his thinking, that we never got to the question of how to do it.

Senator WATKINS. You never got down to what to do?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. As I remember, you said there were others there besides you and Mr. Davies?

Mr. ROWE. Other State Department personnel?

Senator WATKINS. Yes.

Mr. ROWE. One of the individuals was—I know his name will come to me in a short while. He was a Ph. D. from Chicago University in Far East history and studied at Harvard for a couple of years and was born in China of missionary parents. It is absurd; I will think of it before the afternoon is over.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not Ludden; was it?

Mr. ROWE. No, no. This man has since joined the policy-planning staff of the State Department. I will get it for you before we are through. It is just one of those lapses of memory.

Senator WATKINS. Have you finished with your statement of what occurred between you and Mr. Butterworth?

Mr. ROWE. I think that is all I need to say about that.

Senator WATKINS. Then the other gentleman was Mr. Davies?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. What about the other?

Mr. ROWE. These were the three outstanding cases of this kind where it involves conversations within the State Department office in Washington. Of course, in my service abroad I have had reason to discuss these matters with people, but never on a basis of being asked as an outsider to come in with advice, advice given by someone specializing in these problems as a civilian.

Senator WATKINS. Were you asked to make these contacts? Were you asked to come in and give them your advice?

Mr. ROWE. I was asked to come in, in the case of the policy-planning staff, under Davies. In the case of Butterworth, this contact was on my general initiative and was arranged from the outside. The same was true in the case of Kennan. I had met Kennan before, and I told him I would like to come in and talk to him.

Senator WATKINS. Did you get any satisfaction whatsoever with Mr. Kennan with respect to your suggestions about the Far East and China?

Mr. Rowe. No; my general impression was that he completely refused to accept any general approach to the Chinese problem in the Far East.

Senator Watkins. Just what was your approach in some detail?

Mr. Rowe. My approach was that you have to do what is necessary to keep all of China out of control of the Chinese Communists. If you don't, then you are going to be faced with a Russian-Chinese combination which, although it may take some time to develop the results of it, will confront you finally with a shift in the world balance of power that will be castastrophic to the interests of the free world. That was my general approach.

As I said this morning, his response was a double one. First, he said China was not important. Then he said, "China can't win with Russia because the Chinese will become too strong for the Russians to dominate." I talked with him at considerable length trying to clear up in his own mind the confusion that I thought existed there on this business of talking as though the Russians and the Chinese could have only one kind of relationship; that is to say, one in which the Russians would dominate the Chinese. This is absolutely incorrect. It doesn't fit either the Russian psychology or the Chinese psychology.

I outlined briefly to Kennan at that meeting the Chinese traditional ideology on the subject of international relationships. I teach this stuff to my students every year, and it is standard with me to indoctrinate them and teach them this way, involving an entirely different feeling about relations than we westerners have. If you go back in Chinese history you find, for example, that there have been long periods of time in which the only international relations the Chinese have had have been with satellite states around the Chinese border.

There weren't any other nations with which the Chinese were in contact. Out of this centuries-long experience has come a system for the organization of relations between what we would call a dominant state, on the one hand, and a satellite, on the other, with this difference, namely, that the status of a satellite is an honorable status.

Senator Watkins. They do not regard it as a subordination?

Mr. Rowe. No, indeed. You can't get anywhere a symbolism of that kind. The word "satellite" that we use has a denigrative meaning. When we use the word "satellite" it is with the implication that there is something wrong with him, but in the Chinese system, well, take their relations with Korea. The Koreans had an honorable relationship with the Chinese over centuries, and the same thing was true of Indochina.

I want to point out to you the fundamental meaning this has in the situation where the Koreans and Chinese were both satisfied with the relationship under which, for example, the Chinese had a viceroy in the Korean capital. This viceroy had as his function seeing to it that from the point of international relations Korea was on the right side. This was accompanied by a total ideological taking over and a total subordination of their foreign policy.

That is to say, they could not make any independent foreign policy, and with a total state of internal self-government. This is an honorable estate.

Now, let's switch the thing around, and let's point out that if the Chinese know how to do that with satellites, they expect it when they are satellites. This is the normal thinking about Chinese pattern

of their relationship with the Russians. It is: We don't care whether the western world thinks Russia is dominating us. That word doesn't express it at all. This is a workable, happy, satisfactory marriage for mutual adjustment, mutual interest; that is all it is.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, they would not feel that they were the inferior people simply because they were regarded as a satellite?

Mr. ROWE. Let us put it this way: The Chinese in their relationship of ideological subordination to the Russians feel privileged, they feel privileged. They do not feel that the fact that they swallow a foreign ideology puts them in some kind of bad light. They have the inestimable privilege of becoming disciples of Marx.

Senator WATKINS. How do you reconcile that with the Chinese family system?

Mr. ROWE. I reconcile it with the whole Confucian system. The essential feature of the Confucian system is their belief in authoritarianism. Here is where you have to study the tradition in order to understand what the Chinese Communists are doing. They are imposing a foreign ideology on the masses of the people who are accustomed to subordination, only they don't call it subordination, it is an honorable relationship of father to son.

That is the basis of the Confucian relationship of father and son. It takes a lot of explaining.

Senator WATKINS. For the first lesson in Chinese background I think you have done very well. If the students have done as well as you have, then they will be all right.

Mr. ROWE. Thank you.

Senator WATKINS. What other members of the State Department did you have contacts with in trying to get your views over to them?

Mr. ROWE. Well, I had this contact I mentioned with the Under Secretary for Public Affairs in early 1949 who later became I believe the Ambassador to—he had been in the Middle East as a State Department official and was at this time Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs, which meant that he runs——

Senator FERGUSON. Allen?

Mr. ROWE. Allen, that is the fellow. He runs the Voice of America, United States Information Service, and that is what he was doing at that time. With him I came back having had this 8-week contract with the consulate general in Shanghai in the summer of 1948, being asked, as I said this morning, to make a survey of their public information service in China.

Senator WATKINS. This is for the Chinese Government?

Mr. ROWE. No; for the American consulate general in Shanghai, United States Information Service. I reported to him on some of the, what I considered to be, obvious defects in our Foreign Service in China having primarily to do with the personnel problem, insisting that you have to have a team, at least a team comprised of specialists on China who know the Chinese language, people who understand policy from the official State Department point of view, and then pure technicians—that is, radio technicians, publishing technicians, and people of that kind—and particularly to break down in China a monopoly in the acquisition of Chinese language as a skill, which monopoly was held in the hands of the so-called political officers who were trained as so-called Chinese language officers. You see, the trouble

was that the United States Information Service could never get the necessary members of a team of this kind, although they wanted it because first they weren't allowed to draw at that time upon the body of trained Chinese language officers.

These people were preserved for the reporting function, the political function in the State Department. Second, they weren't allowed to train their own people. This was one of the defects I put up that had to do with State Department training policy. I didn't get anywhere much with Mr. Allen on that; as a matter of fact, as to the recommendations I put so much work into, I never saw that they had the slightest effect.

I wasn't too surprised because some of the things that I was asked to look at and report on and try to do in Shanghai in 1948 in the summer were the same things I had looked at, reported on, and tried to do in Chungking in 1941 and 1942, and the situation hadn't changed a bit.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you confer with Mr. Barnett when he was in the State Department?

Mr. ROWE. Never on this sort of thing. I don't think I have ever had a contact of this kind with Mr. Barnett.

Senator WATKINS. What was Mr. Allen's position in the State Department?

Mr. ROWE. At that time?

Senator WATKINS. Yes.

Mr. ROWE. He was, I believe, Director of Public Affairs, that is, Under Secretary for Public Affairs.

Senator WATKINS. As I understand it, that long tour that you had in China was under the auspices of the State Department?

Mr. ROWE. The trip in the Far East, 5½ months in the summer of 1948, was financed jointly by the Yale University Department of Area Studies, by the Yale Institute of International Studies, and by a grant to me by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Senator WATKINS. Did you at any time represent anyone besides yourself when you went into the State Department and tried to talk with these men about this program that you thought ought to be adopted?

Mr. ROWE. I represented the Yale Institute of International Studies; yes. As a matter of fact, the paper that I left on Mr. Butterworth's desk that afternoon was a paper on which I had the advantage of consulting all of my colleagues in the Yale Institute of International Studies, and it represented our joint agreement on what ought to be done.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have a copy?

Mr. ROWE. I have a copy in New Haven.

Senator WATKINS. I think it would be well if you could submit a copy to this committee.

Mr. ROWE. I will be glad to supply you with a copy. I am positive that I can locate it.

Senator WATKINS. When was it offered to the State Department?

Mr. ROWE. It was offered in January 1949.

Senator WATKINS. While we are on this subject, do you have any views now as to what ought to be done under the current circumstances that you could express here? This committee here would want to do some constructive work along the line of our internal security and I

presume anything that will preserve us from without as well as from within is of great interest to us.

Mr. Rowe. I think I would remove my focus of recommendation either directly from China or directly from Korea and point to the situation in Indochina as the most immediately dangerous one today.

Senator Ferguson. Even more than Korea?

Mr. Rowe. We have, of course, a stalemate which is very unsatisfactory; we are not getting anywhere with a settlement. We have forces there that can stop anything that the Communists can throw at us.

Senator Ferguson. When is the last that you had any real information on that point?

Mr. Rowe. If you mean by real information anything outside the public print, it has been a good long time. But I think in Indochina we don't have anywhere near as satisfactory a situation, if you call it that, as we have in Korea. I think Indochina bids fair to present us shortly with a very difficult decision, and the trouble with it is that if we make an arrangement in Korea by which we stabilize the situation there, the Chinese Communists may very well throw their entire force or a very, very large segment of their force into the war in Indochina.

Senator Watkins. Would they trust us—that we will not attack if they did that?

Mr. Rowe. It is possible. They know we are more trustworthy in a situation like that than they are. They are sure of it.

Senator Watkins. At least they know their own views, and we have gone along pretty well on our agreements.

Mr. Rowe. I think in Indochina if they do anything more than they are doing now, which involves several thousand technicians and personnel that they have in there, if they send in massive forces the French will be driven out and Hanoi taken.

Senator Watkins. Have you ever been in that territory?

Mr. Rowe. I have never been there. If I were in a position to push buttons and get results pushing buttons, and this means that I am now talking entirely in unrealistic terms because I haven't any idea that I could do anything, I would recommend precisely this: The United States issues a positive and open statement that if the Chinese intervene that way, in Indochina, there will be a counterbalancing American intervention with whatever it takes.

Senator Ferguson. Would you send ground troops in?

Mr. Rowe. If necessary.

Senator Ferguson. You think it is important enough, Indochina, to send Ameircan ground troops in?

Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you think it was important enough to send them into Korea?

Mr. Rowe. Absolutely.

Senator Ferguson. Would you advocate then a stalemate where we are at the thirty-eighth parallel as we now propose?

Mr. Rowe. Well, what I would advocate is that you make every effort that you can to get more than a stalemate—that is, a settlement, which means something that will result in the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists out of North Korea or withdrawal out of the

present defense line, combined with the policy of providing a South Korean defense force strong enough to hold that business.

Senator FERGUSON. You think that can be done?

Mr. ROWE. It can be done, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. How long?

Mr. ROWE. How long would it take?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; to have the South Koreans able to maintain that line?

Mr. ROWE. That might take a year's time.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that Russia would supply the North Koreans?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; they are supply them now.

Senator FERGUSON. In the future, though?

Mr. ROWE. They would continue to. That is the only place the North Koreans can get anything. They have no facilities to make anything for themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. And the South Koreans would have to get it from us?

Mr. ROWE. That is right. The manpower is what they can supply, nothing else.

Senator FERGUSON. Then suppose that your idea is right, that we say they are not allowed to go down into Indochina?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But they do go down in there after we make this settlement?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And they feel our pressure down there. What is to stop them from putting another army in Korea?

Mr. ROWE. Nothing can stop them from breaking a truce any time, no matter what you do any place.

Senator WATKINS. Is that not history?

Mr. ROWE. That is true.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you not anticipate that that is what would happen?

Mr. ROWE. It is very possible. I don't have any feeling of confidence about any agreement we can make with the Communists, including the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans.

Senator WATKINS. Then it would be unsafe to trust them?

Mr. ROWE. It would be unsafe to lower your guard. If what you are talking about is lowering your guard and decreasing your military commitments, then I say it would be completely unsound, quite as unsound as was the previous withdrawal prior to the attack from the north under the conditions of a South Korean Army armed only with so-called defensive weapons. That was the most fantastic decision I ever heard of.

Senator WATKINS. Are you acquainted with any of the Communist Chinese leaders?

Mr. ROWE. I never met them.

Senator WATKINS. You were over there for quite a while with the Information Service?

Mr. ROWE. No; I was only attached to the Information Service during that 8-week period in the summer of 1949 in Shanghai.

Senator WATKINS. Did you have any service with the United States Intelligence Service?

Mr. Rowe. At present I am a lieutenant colonel in the Army Intelligence Reserve. My last tour of duty was 6 weeks in the Pentagon shortly after the opening of the Korean war.

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, were you in the United States Embassy in China in 1941–42?

Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. What position?

Mr. Rowe. I was listed as special assistant to the Ambassador.

Mr. Morris. Was John Carter Vincent there?

Mr. Rowe. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What was his position?

Mr. Rowe. Counselor of the Embassy.

Mr. Morris. Was John Stewart Service there?

Mr. Rowe. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Did Owen Lattimore come to China at that time?

Mr. Rowe. He was there when I arrived there. I arrived in Chungking about 10 days before Pearl Harbor. One of the first acts I performed in an official capacity was to call on Lattimore as a member of the American group.

Mr. Morris. Were you in a position to observe that Lattimore and Vincent were closely associated?

Mr. Rowe. My opinion was, and this was observed only during the period of November to early February when Lattimore left to come back to this country, that Vincent and Lattimore were very friendly indeed, extending to the business of mutual exchange of information, and they were both, for instance, interested in the Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what they were, Professor?

Mr. Rowe. The Chinese industrial cooperatives were an effort on the part of the Chinese and westerners to organize small-scale production and distribution behind the Japanese lines in free China in order to maximize the economic power of the Chinese to resist in free China.

Now one of the features of the Chinese economy is the fact that many of the industries were small-scale industries based on handicraft located in the villages, making use of surplus time of the farmer, for instance in the winter, making use of work and time of the farmer's wife and so on.

The Chinese industrial cooperatives tried to provide better techniques and better tools for this small industry, one of the features being that as the Japanese advanced territorially into China, these could be picked up and carried away.

Senator Watkins. You did not mean a moment ago that they were actually behind the Japanese lines?

Mr. Rowe. Some of them remained behind the Japanese lines. I mean behind the lines in the free China area beyond the Japanese zone.

Senator Watkins. You are differentiating there from occupied China?

Mr. Rowe. That is right, occupied China.

Now this Chinese Industrial Cooperatives was significant from a political point of view. You have to remember that the great task of the Chinese National Government was to preserve what little social

and political unity there was in China and to prevent this unity from being subverted by people in all kinds of organizations.

As they say about the Chinese, any time you get three of them together, you have an organization. They are very organization-minded, they come to that very naturally through a long history of social organizations typified by their guilds and associations, insurance systems and things of that kind.

In Chinese history these organizations have often played vital parts in Chinese politics. It is in these organizations that revolutionary tendencies accompanying the fall of dynasties can be located and centered and covered up by these organizations. As a result, the National Government had an iron-bound law for the regulation, registration of organizations of this kind. You see, they were faced with the fact that in a country like this, tied together as loosely as it was, organizations of this kind could be very easily used as centers of disturbance and political dissidence. They were afraid of these Chinese industrial cooperatives and they had some reason to suspect some of the people that were interested because if you take, for instance, Dr. Chen Han-seng, who has been mentioned in these hearings and in the testimony I had read as at least being a Chinese Communist sympathizer, he was strongly interested in the Chinese industrial cooperative movement.

I talked to these people very often and found that they were interested in more than the production of products. They were interested in using the organizations for political purposes.

Senator WATKINS. When you said "these people"?

Mr. ROWE. The Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Senator WATKINS. When you said "these people"?

Mr. ROWE. I am talking of the Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were they, Professor?

Mr. ROWE. In Hong Kong, when I went there in 1941, Chen Han-seng was one of them. He was prominent in Hong Kong in support of the industrial cooperatives. His wife was there also at the time. In China the outstanding European in this business was a New Zealander by the name of Alley, A-l-l-e-y.

Mr. MORRIS. His first name?

Mr. ROWE. R-e-w-e, who described himself to me as an old-line New Zealand Socialist.

Mr. MORRIS. He is in Red China now, is he not?

Mr. ROWE. He is in Red China and has enthusiastically welcomed the Chinese Communists taking over.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Ida Pruitt there?

Mr. ROWE. She was not in China at that time, but she was active in this country and active in what at that time was called Indusco, of which I later became a member of their board, which was the American organization to support the Chinese industrial cooperatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley there?

Mr. ROWE. I believe she was also on the board.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she active?

Mr. ROWE. I never had any contact with her. Other members who were involved, other people who were involved were Edgar Snow and his wife, Eleanor Lattimore, Miss Gerlach, Mrs. Fisher, wife of a bishop in the Methodist Church, and a whole string of other people.

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, I show you our exhibit 559 and ask you if that is the letterhead of the organization you are now talking about?

Mr. Rowe. Yes, this is it, dated November 1950, but this is a comparatively recent letterhead, and you will find that names of the board of directors change, of course, through time. This is not the board of directors as it was when I was a member of it.

Senator Watkins. Had there been any Communist infiltration into these cooperatives?

Mr. Rowe. I can't certify as to that as far as inside of China, but I do think, and this is why I resigned from Indusco, and I have available a copy of my letter of resignation from the Indusco board, that Indusco was very, very heavily taken over by people who were in favor of the Chinese Communists—very strongly so. These were the people who acquainted me with a lot of this terminology like "Chinese of the north," and so on. They were always scheming as to how they could get their help given to the Chinese of the north. They sent it through Shanghai after the war and all that, but one of their principal objectives was to get it to the people of the north.

Senator Watkins. When you say "they," who are you talking about?

Mr. Rowe. The general group on the board at that time—Miss Pruitt, Dr. Chen Han-seng, and so forth, the whole group.

Senator Watkins. They seemed to show more concern over the people in the north than south and central China?

Mr. Rowe. Sir, I used that term, the "people of the north," and defined it in the terminology of these people as meaning the Chinese Communists. That is what they used the term to cover.

Senator Watkins. What help were they in a position to give?

Mr. Rowe. Very important technical help involving, for instance, machinery, tools, and equipment like that that was hard to buy, medical aid, technical advice, they sent over technicians who knew something about small scale production to help improve the methods of production in the Chinese villages, and this was one reason why I was attracted to the thing in the first place, because it did strike at the roots of the Chinese production problem in the villages, at the roots of the village economy, but I got out of the organization because I saw the extent to which these people were interested in promoting the welfare of the Chinese Communists.

Senator Watkins. Were they also interested in promoting the interests of the others?

Mr. Rowe. As little as they could get away with.

Senator Watkins. Were there any arguments on the board?

Mr. Rowe. Never any arguments.

Senator Watkins. You were on the board. Did you agree with them?

Mr. Rowe. I didn't agree with them, but you can't get an argument with one man. You can kick up a fuss.

Mr. Morris. You mean these people controlled the policy of Indusco?

Mr. Rowe. That is right.

Senator Watkins. I wondered if it was a subject of discussion?

Mr. Rowe. Not very much discussion on that. They were also interested in evading the controls over their activities that the Chinese

Government tried to exert through their control of all kinds of organizations of this type, as I mentioned before.

Senator WATKINS. That would be substantially along the Communist way of thinking, too, at that time, would it not?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, the Communists of the north, they were not actually physically under the control of the Nationalist Government at that time?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. They had their own type of government set-up there?

Mr. ROWE. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. How would you evaluate the effect of these cooperatives upon the Chinese political thinking?

Mr. ROWE. Well, I don't think that the effect that these people would have liked to have had ever was had. After all, the use of cooperatives as a method of organizing anti-Government, anti-Chinese Government, activity was a very small element in what eventually led to the downfall of the Nationalist Government, which was engineered by the top Chinese Communist command with Russia helping finally on a military basis. It was a large-scale take-over in Manchuria with the Russians equipping the Communist Chinese with the Japanese arms collected but tipping the balance of power against Chiang early in 1948.

You see, early, in 1945 Chiang won almost every battle he ever engaged in with the Communists. This is often lost sight of when we talk about the corruption and inefficiency of the National Government. He won as long as he had an even break in armaments. As soon as the Japanese armaments got distributed by the Russians, and as soon as the Communists got well organized in Manchuria, they then began to use against him positional warfare, using artillery combined with their normal method of attack, which was a very sophisticated use of combined economic warfare and guerrilla warfare.

The business of shutting the Government up in the cities, cutting rails, starving the economy, inducing inflation, inducing bureaucracy, all that helped to make the Nationalist resistance a hollow shell long before they pushed in and began to win full pitched battles which they had not done before that time. That is something people forget.

Senator WATKINS. Were you there while General Marshall was there?

Mr. ROWE. No.

Senator WATKINS. Were you there any part of the time he was there?

Mr. ROWE. No; I was in this country. I will say that I predicted flatly that Marshall would never be able to get the Communists and the Nationalists together. The fact that it worked out that way was too bad, but that is the way it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Getting back to John Carter Vincent, did you write the book, China Among the Powers?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; that was written by me and published by Harcourt, Brace under the auspices of the Yale Institute of International Studies.

Mr. MORRIS. Did John Carter Vincent ever express criticism of your book?

Mr. Rowe. As a matter of fact, the book was sent to him in page proof. I want to correct at this point a statement which he made in his testimony, that I had sent the book to him. I did not; it was sent by the Institute of International Studies, and the indication which he seemed to leave in the testimony is that this book was published by the IPR, which it was not.

Those two things are both wrong, and I think should be corrected.

It was very interesting to me that Mr. Vincent, while he praised the book primarily, primarily he was in approval of it, criticized it at a point the significance of which I could only grasp later and as time went on. You may remember that Mr. Vincent accompanied Lattimore, Hazard, and Vice President Wallace on that long trip into China and Asiatic Russia, around the Chinese borders I think in July 1944.

It is an interesting fact that the primarily adverse criticism that he made of my book had to do with my treatment of Chinese border problems, problems of Tibet, Sinkiang, and Manchuria in connection with which he mentioned the serious difficulties connected with post-war Chinese policy and particularly in regard to Manchuria; made the significant observation that my statement that Manchuria is territorially a part of China does not cover the question; that Russian interests in Manchuria could not be so summarily disposed of in this manner.

Now this doesn't become terribly important until we see the Yalta agreement under which precisely Russian interests in Manchuria were recognized, and the Chinese Government was required to recognize those interests and to allow the Russians to come back in and reestablish their pre-1905 position in Manchuria.

At that point I read this letter and dug it up. Here is the genesis of this policy.

Mr. Morris. What letter are you referring to?

Mr. Rowe. I am referring to the letter written by Vincent to Professor Dunn commenting on my book.

Mr. Morris. How did you happen to have a copy of that letter?

Mr. Rowe. It was in the institute files, and I was asked to answer the letter on behalf of Dunn.

Mr. Morris. Is that a copy of it?

Mr. Rowe. That is a photostat.

Senator Watkins. That letter seems to praise your book?

Mr. Rowe. As I said, most of the letter supports the book, but the interesting thing is the places in which he doesn't support it, that is the significant aspect of it.

Senator Watkins. Will you point those out?

Mr. Rowe. The places here in which he talks about Sinkiang and Tibet [reading]:

> With regard to Sinkiang and Tibet, I believe that more serious problems than Mr. Rowe seems to anticipate will arise unless China adopts an enlightened policy for the treatment of minorities.

I didn't know what this enlightened policy could be, but the interesting thing about this is that this is Owen Lattimore. You couldn't express Owen Lattimore's views or his interest in Chinese policies better than they are expressed right there.

Senator Watkins. Do you have in mind any part of the writings of Lattimore?

Mr. Rowe. Sure, several books: Inner Asian Frontiers in China, Solution in Asia, The Problem of Asia, all those three books are very heavily concerned with what we call border problems. Of course, these borders happen to bound on the Soviet Union, which makes them a far more significant feature in international politics than any other part of China on which this letter was written.

The first Communist inroads into China were made into these borders and were worked out in the Yalta agreement of 1945 in which, as I say, the Russians were restored to their pre-1905 position in Manchuria, involving all kinds of derogation from Chinese sovereignty.

Another interesting thing about this is that as I read Mr. Vincent's testimony here before this committee, Mr. Vincent claimed that when he heard about the Yalta agreement he was shocked; that he said the Yalta agreement involves derogations from Chinese sovereignty but in September 1944 he was talking precisely in terms of taking very good account of Russian interests in what he agreed was Chinese territory in Manchuria.

It is obvious to me that this man must have been thinking in the very terms that gave rise to the Yalta settlement long before the Yalta settlement was made. This man was, as he signed himself, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. How anybody can be surprised that the Yalta agreement was arrived at would puzzle me greatly. Why Mr. Vincent should be shocked by it when he was fully intellectually prepared for it far in advance of it is something I can't make head or tail of.

Senator Watkins. Did you ever discuss the matter with him?

Mr. Rowe. No, sir. I just found his statement in the testimony he gave before this committee a few days ago. I think Mr. Vincent stuck his neck out on that; he really did.

Senator Watkins. You mean when he wrote this?

Mr. Rowe. No; by saying he was so shocked about Yalta when months before he had indicated full intellectual preparation for, as he says, "not dismissing with such a statement or with the simple declaration that Manchuria is an integral part of China." You and I know what that kind of statement means. My statement would be that it is or isn't an integral part of China. If it is, you keep it a part of China, and if it isn't, sure, you let the Russians in.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that letter go into the record?

Senator Watkins. It will be made a part of the record.

Mr. Morris. It is a letter, Mr. Chairman, that John Carter Vincent sent December 4, 1944, to Mr. Frederick Sherwood Dunn, Director, Institute of International Studies at Yale University, of which this witness was a part and which this witness handled, discussed.

(Exhibit No. 613 was marked and is as follows:)

Department of State,
Washington, December 4, 1944.

Mr. Frederick Sherwood Dunn,
Director, Institute of International Studies, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

Dear Mr. Dunn: With reference to your letter of November 13 and my reply of November 15, I have received and read over the page proofs of David Rowe's new book, China Among the Powers.

I was very favorably impressed with Mr. Rowe's book. I could not pretend, of course, to know whether many of his statements of fact are correct (I assume

they are), but I do find myself in general agreement with his conclusions. If he errs at all, it seems to me he errs on the side of pessimism, but that might not be in effect bad, knowing the general optimism with which Americans usually view China.

With regard to the postwar industrial development of China, I think that Mr. Rowe, in view of developments during recent months, places too much emphasis on nationalization. It looks now (and I realize that such was not the case when Mr. Rowe wrote his manuscript) as if the tendency were away from nationalization except in a limited number of fields such as transportation, public utilities, and industries directly related to national defense.

I doubt that the situation in Outer Mongolia (I was there with Vice President Wallace in July) will lend itself to the "financial" solution suggested by Mr. Rowe. I cannot conceive of Russia's paying China to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, but I do realize that a solution of the problem must be found.

With regard to Sinkiang and Tibet, I believe that more serious problems than Mr. Rowe seems to anticipate will arise unless China adopts an enlightened policy for the treatment of minorities.

With regard to Manchuria, I believe, as Mr. Rowe seems to, that the Russians do not have territorial ambitions with regard to that area, but I do not think the problem can be dismissed with such a statement or with the simple declaration that Manchuria is an integral part of China where over 90 percent of the population is Chinese. Manchuria, as you know, has for decades held a somewhat autonomous position in China and it will be up to the Chinese Government to adopt policies in the postwar period which will really accomplish the integration of that area with China proper.

But I end my letter as I began: Mr. Rowe has written a very good, very instructive, and very useful book, and I am mindful of his own statement that in the space allowed he could not cover adequately all the problems that may arise in relation to China in the postwar period.

Sincerely,

[s] JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs.

P. S.—I am returning the page proofs to you rather than to Harcourt, Brace & Co. for disposal.

Mr. ROWE. I handled this letter by Vincent. I wrote the reply of the Institute to Vincent.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have the reply?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. I think that also ought to go in the record if you have it.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 613A," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 613–A

DECEMBER 12, 1944.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Your letter of December 4th to Mr. Dunn regarding my book, China Among the Powers, has been called to my attention. I am naturally extremely gratified that you have been able to take the time to read the book while it is still in page proof, and also that you have found it possible to make such friendly comments respecting it. Coming from one who knows China as well as you do, such comments cannot help but be most pleasing to me.

I note your specific interest in the general field of Chinese border problems. As you note, I could not, for want of space, deal with all of these problems in much detail. I agree with you as to the complexity of the adjustments that must be made in case China's border regions are to be integrated into the body of the postwar Chinese state.

I would like very much to place a copy of my book in our Chungking Embassy. Would it be possible to secure your cooperation in sending this book to Ambas-

sador Hurley? If this seems possible, could you let us know and we will send you a copy to be forwarded to Chungking.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID N. ROWE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has asked for a 5-minute recess at this point.

Senator WATKINS. We will take a short recess.

(A short recess was taken.)

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

Mr. ROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more that you can tell us about the Chinese industrial cooperatives?

Mr. ROWE. Well, there is a great deal, but I think I have mentioned most of the features that are relevant to what we have been talking about and what the committee might be interested in.

Senator WATKINS. There is one thing about them. Were they Communist creations?

Mr. ROWE. No; they were not Communist creations. In my opinion, they were definitely not Communist creations. But they were organizations that were made to order for subversive purposes.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, they were susceptible.

Mr. ROWE. That is right. They could be taken over.

Senator WATKINS. How do they compare with the cooperatives we have in this country? I take it you know something about them.

Mr. ROWE. I don't know anything much.

Senator WATKINS. Farm cooperatives?

Mr. ROWE. Well, there are marketing devices and insurance and groceries and things of that kind.

Senator WATKINS. In China?

Mr. ROWE. In this country; are there not?

Senator WATKINS. Well, they are largely farm cooperatives, buying and selling.

Mr. ROWE. I know in my home town in Connecticut there is a grocery store that is a cooperative.

Senator WATKINS. These farmers have nothing to do with a cooperative of that kind. Theirs is the buying of crops and the supplies they need for the operation of their farm.

Mr. ROWE. They get better prices for what they sell in bulk lots, and so on. Isn't that the essence of it?

Senator WATKINS. What I was trying to find out: Are they like our cooperatives here? So that we will have something to compare them with.

Mr. ROWE. Very little along that line. You see, they were mostly industrial, as their name indicates.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, they gathered together handcrafts and so on and sold collectively for these people and bought their supplies collectively.

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. It is very much the same type. So that, as a matter of fact, they were not the creations of or organized by the Communists as a part of their Communist program?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, no.

Senator WATKINS. They just tried to use them, as I understand.

Mr. Rowe. You see, Senator, if they had been organizations of that sort, they would never have gotten organized in Nationalist territory in the first place.

Senator Watkins. What was their history? How long were they in existence?

Mr. Rowe. I don't know precisely how many years. They were founded before the Japanese war.

Senator Watkins. Were they in existence when you were in China, living there?

Mr. Rowe. They were certainly in existence when I was there in 1937 and 1938.

Senator Watkins. I was referring to the previous time.

Mr. Rowe. I have no knowledge of that, but I am quite sure they were not.

Senator Watkins. Did you have occasion to get out into the country when you were there before?

Mr. Rowe. Oh, yes. I traveled throughout the interior of the Yangtze Valley.

Senator Watkins. How much did you get acquainted with during that time?

Mr. Rowe. All in the Yangtze area, roughly between Shanghai and a place called Kiukiang in the Yangtze Valley area.

Senator Watkins. Now, going over to another matter that has been called to my attention, did you have occasion to get the views of Mr. Vincent, John Carter Vincent? I think he was over there with you at the time.

Mr. Rowe. This was in the period of my service in the Chunking Embassy in 1941–42, and he was counselor of the Embassy.

Senator Watkins. You have already characterized what you thought about Mr. Lattimore. What about Mr. Vincent?

Mr. Rowe. In Vincent you have an entirely different sort of thing. Vincent never expressed any views on policy openly that I ever heard. I never discussed policy problems with Vincent. The main problem I had to discuss with Vincent was how I could foster and promote the work of the agency of the United States Government that I was there representing. That later became the OSS; was at that time called the Coordinator of Information—COI.

Senator Watkins. Did that have anything to do with the information he would gather together as a part of the diplomatic corps?

Mr. Rowe. Not that he would gather together; no. I was there in an information-gathering capacity, but in the capacity, you might call it, of a librarian. I was supposed to gather books, pamphlets, articles, and material of that kind, open sources, because in Washington at that time we simply did not have that kind of material on China available. And I was sent by the Coordinator of Information to do just that job.

Senator Watkins. To get this information?

Mr. Rowe. That is right. And in order to get it over here, since we could not send it over physically, on account of the transport problem out of western China, we photographed a lot of the stuff on film and sent it over in that form.

You know, that makes it possible to digest it down into a very small volume.

Senator Watkins. How closely did you become acquainted with Mr. Vincent while you were there?

Mr. Rowe. I wouldn't say "closely." I had mostly business contacts with him in the Embassy, having to do with the conduct of my official business.

Senator Watkins. Had you ever discussed with him the relative merits of the Nationalist and the Communist contentions?

Mr. Rowe. No; I had not, at that point.

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, are you acquainted with the Far Eastern Association?

Mr. Rowe. Yes; I am a member of the Far Eastern Association.

Mr. Morris. Do you find that there is any identity of personnel between the association and the IPR?

Mr. Rowe. I think this is a pretty important topic. I would like to go back a little way on this one and sketch in some of the background.

Mr. Morris. Please do.

Mr. Rowe. There was a period when the people in the Institute of Pacific Relations were rather alarmed by the tendencies that they saw arising in Government regarding themselves as an organization. It was at this time, as you may know, that the IPR was put on some kind of list of subversive organizations in California, I believe, by the California Legislature, or a committee or organization thereof.

Senator Watkins. What time was that? Would you remember the year?

Mr. Rowe. Let's see.

Mr. Morris. Maybe Mr. Mandel knows.

Mr. Rowe. I believe this was in the latter part of the war or immediately thereafter. I believe that is when it comes in.

Senator Watkins. That would be along in 1945.

Mr. Rowe. Something of that kind, I believe.

Senator Watkins. When you said that they were becoming quite concerned, who do you mean by "they"? The membership of the institute, or the staff?

Mr. Rowe. I am talking about the staff, the governing people, those who ran the thing administratively.

Senator Watkins. How did you know that?

Mr. Rowe. It was common talk. I could not even cite to you who it was that talked this way. But I think of Mr. Holland's name in this connection. I couldn't certify that I ever heard Holland say this.

Senator Watkins. Whom did you hear say it?

Mr. Rowe. It was general common talk among people in the Far East business and people connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. And the problem of what to do if this thing went on further and the Institute of Pacific Relations itself was put on, say, a list by the Attorney General, for example, and named as a front organization, alarmed these people at least enough so that they decided they would have to set up some kind of organization to hold the bag for them in case this happened.

Senator Watkins. Well, now, just a moment. You are making some charges or statements there, where you ought to have some specific instances in mind on which you base that. That is very general. Do you know it of your own knowledge? Did you discuss it with anybody? Was it discussed in your trustees' meetings? Or were you a trustee at that time?

Mr. Rowe. This would never be discussed in trustees' meetings. It wasn't the kind of thing.

Senator Watkins. How do you know they were concerned? What is the evidence? That is what I am trying to get at.

Mr. Rowe. Let's cite one little item. I don't know whether you will consider this the sort of evidence you are after or not, but it is the way this kind of information would be picked up.

At a meeting, I think, of the American Historical Association, at a luncheon connected with this, there were at the table several of us, including Mr. Biggerstaff and Mr. Fahs.

Senator Watkins. These were men on the staff?

Mr. Rowe. No; Biggerstaff was on the board of trustees and was involved in the early planning.

Senator Watkins. Were you at that time on the board of trustees?

Mr. Rowe. I don't believe so; no.

Senator Watkins. You were a member, I take it, of the association?

Mr. Rowe. Yes. I have been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations between 1938 and the time I resigned in 1950.

Senator Watkins. Pardon my interruption. Now go back to your statement.

Mr. Rowe. Where this matter of forming a new organization was brought up, this was what later became the Far Eastern Association, and the question specifically discussed was the question of how this organization should be differentiated from the Institute of Pacific Relations. At that time, I myself, for example, wrote a memorandum. I do not know where you would find this, and I do not know how I could ever produce a copy of it. It was on the need for a new organization in the Far East field. There was growing dissatisfaction with the Institute of Pacific Relations because of the very large part it was playing on controversial issues and the part that it took in talking about policy, instead of acting as a straight scholarly organization with the interest of promoting research and study, serving the interests of the scholarly fraternity, by affording them publication media, meetings at which they could read their papers, and all the activities of a learned society. And I remember writing that at that time in connection with this agitation for a new society.

Senator Watkins. You said "writing." Did you write a letter, or an article?

Mr. Rowe. I wrote a memorandum on this. I believe this memorandum could be found in the IPR files if you look for it.

Senator Watkins. It was sent to them; was it?

Mr. Rowe. I think I sent it to Holland. Or it may have been a letter or a memorandum I wrote to Biggerstaff and Fairbank and other people of that kind.

Senator Watkins. The purpose, then, was, or it was being discussed at that time, to get away from charges like the one that had been made by this California committee of the legislature?

Mr. Rowe. That is the idea, as I understood it, at the time.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, Mr. Mandel has the California citation.

Mr. Mandel. According to the California Committee on Un-American Activities, in its report of 1948, the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations was cited as a Communist front which received funds from the American People's Fund, another front or-

ganized and directed by Frederick V. Field as a repository for funds to be distributed to Communist enterprises. As a result of later negotiations, I believe this citation was withdrawn by the California committee.

Mr. Rowe. It never went any farther than that, anyway. And the fears that it might, which naturally would be aroused by this kind of thing starting in a State legislature, never were justified by subsequent events. But the Far Eastern Association was set up, nonetheless.

Senator Watkins. Who organized that? Do you know?

Mr. Rowe. The moving spirits in this were Fairbank, Fahs, and Biggerstaff. Those are three that I can name from memory.

Senator Watkins. Did you have any part in this?

Mr. Rowe. None whatever.

Senator Watkins. You joined it; did you not?

Mr. Rowe. Yes; I joined it subsequent to its organization, and I am still a member of it, but I have never held an office under it.

Senator Watkins. Does it have close relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Rowe. That was the point, Senator, that I wanted to develop.

At the beginning you had a very strong interlocking directorate, so to speak, between these two concerns. And a lot of the people that you run across in your study of the Institute of Pacific Relations are involved on the control directorate of this association. This is February 1951.

The connection and the duplication of personnel, this interlocking directorate I talk about, is not as close now as it was at the original formation.

Senator Watkins. Can you point out specifically what it was at that time?

Mr. Rowe. In February 1951?

Senator Watkins. Or whenever you say it was when it was first organized, and there was a close interlocking directorate.

Let us have specific illustrations.

Mr. Rowe. Mr. Holland, for example, was represented on the advisory editorial board, I believe. And on an organization of the Far Eastern Association, which I think has since gone out of existence, which was the committee on research work. They now have a monograph series, and they have as editor of the monograph series Mr. Dirk Bodde, professor at the University of Pennsylvania, a very strong supporter of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He supports it all the time in the public press. Mr. Biggerstaff, who was and probably is on the IPR trustees, was secretary in 1950. John K. Fairbank was at that time vice president. Wilma Fairbank was at that time news editor of the quarterly.

Let's see if there are any other of these names. William L. Holland was a member of the board of directors in November 1950. Owen Lattimore was a member of the board of directors in 1950. George E. Taylor was a member of the board of directors in 1950.

Now, there is a great amount of duplication still at this point.

It may be said, of course, that the number of far eastern specialists in the United States is not very large, and the claim could easily be made that these are the most eminent people in the field. But I would say that as far as general political views are concerned, all those people I named probably share about a 90 percent consensus. And that is

the thing I am talking about. They agree with each other on current questions of far eastern politics very strongly.

Senator WATKINS. I am not quite satisfied in my mind about the evidence, as you say, that this new organization was organized for the purpose of having a place to go if the Institute of Pacific Relations became unpopular through it being named as a Communist front organization.

Mr. ROWE. Well, Senator, I doubt if I can satisfy you. I can't provide you with a document. I can't provide you with a copy of any statement on this. But I would like to call attention to the fact that if this were so, without assuming whether it is or not, it is extremely unlikely you will ever find any documentary evidence on it.

Senator WATKINS. Well, I thought maybe if you were present when this matter was discussed with any of these men who actually organized it, that might be evidence. But I will say to you that Professor Lattimore, when he was here, objected strenuously because we did not cross-examine the other witnesses like we did him. I am not trying to give you a workout, or anything of that kind, but if you do have evidence I would like to have it.

Mr. ROWE. Yes. It is perfectly understandable. You see, I was never closely connected with this new organization in its inception. I was in favor of a scholarly organization which would be highly differentiated from the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I always considered had gone off the deep end on trying to make policy, indicate lines of policy, engage in propaganda—or you can call it education if you want to.

Senator WATKINS. Do you think they were actually engaged in propaganda?

Mr. ROWE. Oh, absolutely.

Senator WATKINS. You have made a study of that, I suppose.

Mr. ROWE. As a matter of fact, propaganda and public opinion is one of my major technical fields.

Senator WATKINS. I do not want to ask you to do it now, but I wonder if you could supply for this committee a listing of the quotations from the various publications of the institute which, in your judgment, indicated clearly that it was engaging in propaganda.

Mr. ROWE. Well, I would say on that, Senator, that the best source on that is this pamphlet series, which has a very, very wide dissemination. If you do not like the word "propaganda," use anything else. Use the word "education" if you prefer it.

Senator WATKINS. Well, call it public information or something of that sort.

Mr. ROWE. All right. Public information. The persuasion of the public with a definite slant, a definite view on far eastern affairs, was indeed a major business of this organization. It was conceived of under the classification of contributing to general education in this country. And there has always been a great job to do in general education on the Far East in the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Has that been done, Professor, do you know?

Mr. ROWE. What are you referring to at this point?

Mr. MORRIS. I mean this analysis of the publications of the IPR.

Mr. ROWE. Well, there have been numerous cases in which analysis of the contents of the IPR publications has been done. I believe

Mr. Lattimore supplied you, for instance, in this formal statement that he made, with a copy of his analysis of Pacific Affairs during the years in which he edited it, in which he makes a tabulation of the material, indicating right wing, left wing, neutral authors, what proportion of the writings was done by each. But I do not think this is a very accurate analysis. I think it is far from satisfactory. As a matter of fact, one of my colleagues at New Haven has made an analysis, which is not mine. I have not done the work. He did it, but it seems to me it is probably a good deal more accurate.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. ROWE. Richard Walker. He is assistant professor of history at Yale. He was a student of ours there and got his degree with us a few years ago, and then was appointed to the faculty in the history department.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with that study?

Mr. ROWE. Yes; I have read it, and I have here a portion of it in which he gives his statistical analysis of the editorial character, the editorial approach, to the Institute of Pacific Relations publications, and presents some rather startling figures.

Senator WATKINS. I think probably that ought to be received by the committee, for what it is worth. It is, of course, hearsay evidence.

Without calling the man who prepared it, unless the committee thinks he ought to be called, I think that ought to be put into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose we accept that and have that scrutinized by the director of research, and then if necessary we can call Professor Walker down to personally add testimony to what we have already done here.

Senator WATKINS. Who is the director of research? To whom do you refer?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel. I mean, it may well lend itself to analysis that can be determined as a matter of fact, and we would not require Mr. Walker. Yet, if it is necessary to have Mr. Walker here, then let us consider that possibility.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we find out what it is from Professor Rowe before we decide what should be done with it.

Senator WATKINS. That probably is a good suggestion.

If you will leave a copy with Mr. Mandel, the director of research, that will be satisfactory.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe should explain it, though, Mr. Chairman. It will only take a few minutes.

Senator WATKINS. Very well.

Mr. ROWE. This is an analysis made by Mr. Walker on the basis of counting pages put in, contributed to IPR publications, Pacific Affairs, Far Eastern Survey, the inquiry series monographs, and the pamphlet series.

Using as a basis for this set of statistics, two lists of persons. In order to identify these persons, I am going to read from a copy of Mr. Walker's manuscript. And this is his manuscript as it reads:

On pages 679–680 of the "Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup" there is a table listing 37 persons as IPR personnel who have been identified during the course of the McCarran investigation as sympathetic to communism.

I want to put in a statement of my own at this point.

This identification of these people as sympathetic to communism is not precisely what the identification was in the testimony introduced before your committee here.

Mr. MORRIS. It was much more precise. It was either "Communist" or "identified with some Communist organization."

Mr. ROWE. Well, the precise identification of these is—

identified in sworn testimony by witnesses as a member or under the discipline or direction or influence of or rendered services to the Communist Party, the Soviet Union, or the international Communist movement.

And I am reading here from the document as it appears in the hearings on the nomination of Mr. Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. And that, Mr. Chairman, was not a complete list.

Mr. ROWE. That ends my parenthetical statement. I am going to resume reading from Mr. Walker's article.

To this list can certainly be added the names of three other persons who contributed to IPR publications and who were identified as Communists in the hearings printed by the McCarran subcommittee: Kate Mitchell, Mrs. Edgar Snow, and Philip Jaffe, bringing the list up to 40.

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups—

another parenthetical statement:

The first group is Mr. Holland's group of "47 writers well known for their active opposition to communism whose work the IPR has published."

Senator WATKINS. That was the group he gave to the committee?

Mr. ROWE. Yes. [Reading:]

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups to IPR publications in number of pages indicates that, even granting the need to weigh the reliability of some of the identifications involved, the McCarran probers should indeed look into IPR publications on a systematic basis. The following table represents a comparison of number of pages contributed by these two groups to the IPR publications listed between 1934 and 1947. The initial date marks Owen Lattimore's assumption of editorship of Pacific Affairs, and the terminal date is the year in which F. V. Field was asked to resign as a trustee of the IPR. The period of Owen Lattimore's editorship of Pacific Affairs is listed separately because of the controversy which has surrounded his name. It is apparent from the table that Mr. Holland's listing includes mainly those contributors whose works were published after the terminal date.

That is 1947.

Senator WATKINS. The terminal date, you mean, of Mr. Lattimore's connection with the institute in the capacity of editor?

Mr. ROWE. I believe that is so. Yes, Senator.

Now, here are the statistics that come out:

Pacific Affairs, volumes VII–XIV, No. 2, Owen Lattimore, editor, 13 of the 47 anti-Communists who contributed; and they contributed 196 pages, consisting of 21.4 percent of all contributed by either the 47 anti-Communists or the 40 listed as pro-Communist; only 21 percent. Number of the 40 pro-Communists who contributed, on the other hand, is 18, with 729 pages, comprising 78.6 percent of all the pages as between these two groups. In other words, over three times as many pages as the other people.

Then Pacific Affairs, volume XIV, No. 3, to volume XVI, No. 4, inclusive: 14 people from the 47 anti-Communists who contributed. They contributed a total of 146 pages, constituting 29.2 percent, as between these two groups; 14 of the 40 pro-Communists contributed,

but they contributed 354 pages, constituting 70.8 percent, as between these two groups.

Far Eastern Survey, volume IV, No. 1, to volume XVI, No. 21: Number of the 47 anti-Communists who contributed, 8. They contributed a total of 196 pages, comprising 34.6 percent of the total contributed by the two groups. On the other hand, 16, twice as many, of the 40 pro-Communists contributed, and they contributed 370 pages, consisting of 65.4 percent of the total contribution of the two groups. In other words, twice as much.

In the inquiry series monographs—these, of course, are books; not articles but books—4 anti-Communists listed contributed books of 488 pages, comprising 33.7 percent as between the two groups—5 of the 40 pro-Communists contributed, but they contributed 962 pages, comprising 66.3 percent of the total of the two groups, again twice as much.

In the pamphlet series, none of the anti-Communists contributed. You will remember, parenthetically, that I pointed to the pamphlet series as the prime vehicle for this persuasional activity.

Senator WATKINS. They had a much wider distribution?

Mr. ROWE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. And they were used, some of them, in the indoctrination of our Armed Forces.

Mr. ROWE. That is right. None of these 47 listed as anti-Communist by Mr. Holland ever wrote in the pamphlet series, thus contributing zero pages, zero percent. Four of the forty listed as pro-Communists contributed a total of 261 pages, that is, 100 percent of all the work done in the pamphlet series.

The total, just the cumulative total, for the so-called——

Mr. MORRIS. That is 100 percent. But that is not of the whole——

Mr. ROWE. No. Throughout here this is 100 percent of the contribution as between these two groups.

The total pages contributed by the members of this group of 47 listed by Mr. Holland as anti-Communist was 1,026, constituting in the bulk 28.3 percent of the total as between the two groups. The total of the pro-Communist writers was 2,656 pages, constituting 71.7 percent, which comes to about two and a half times as much, cumulative.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest, in connection with these statistics—I mean, this is the third time it has come up here, Mr. Lattimore mentioned it, Mr. Holland mentioned it, and Professor Rowe mentions it. I understand Professor Walker raises the point in this article, that I believe comes out today. I understand it is offered by way of a criticism of the work of the committee, in the sense that the committee has not made such an analysis. I think the staff has been working on that for some time, Mr. Chairman. And may we receive this, just as a factor, as one of the many methods of approach to this task that the committee unmistakably has?

Senator WATKINS. I would say yes, we may receive it, and it may be filed with the committee, but not to actually have the whole thing made a part of the record.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, it will not be for our conclusions, Senator, but for the approach that it takes toward our solving this problem.

May it be received with that understanding?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 613B" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 613B

In his lengthy statement to the committee, Mr. Holland gave a list of 47 "writers well known for their active opposition to communism, whose work the IPR has published. This should dispel any notion that the IPR tended to favor authors sympathetic to Communism." Such an ability to distinguish between groups of writers for Institute publications evoked no comment by the counsel. On pages 679–680 of the "Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup" there is a table listing 37 persons as IPR personnel who have been identified during the course of the McCarran investigation as sympathetic to Communism. To this list can certainly be added the names of three other persons who contributed to IPR publications and who were identified as Communists in the hearings printed by the McCarran Subcommittee: Kate Mitchell, Mrs. Edgar Snow, and Philip Jaffe, bringing the list up to 40.

1. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PUBLICATIONS?

A comparison of the contributions of these two groups to IPR publications in number of pages indicates that, even granting the need to weigh the reliability of some of the identifications involved, the McCarran probers should indeed look into IPR publications on a systematic basis. The following table represents a comparison of number of pages contributed by these two groups to the IPR publications listed between 1934 and 1947. The initial date marks Owen Lattimore's assumption of editorship of *Pacific Affairs*, and the terminal date is the year in which F. V. Field was asked to resign as a trustee of the IPR. The period of Owen Lattimore's editorship of *Pacific Affairs* is listed separately because of the controversy which has surrounded his name. It is apparent from the table that Mr. Holland's listing includes mainly those contributors whose works were published after the terminal date.

Publication	Number of 47 anti-Communists who contributed	Pages contributed	Percent of total contributed by all 87	Number of 40 pro-Communists who contributed	Pages contributed	Percent
Pacific Affairs, vol. VII-XIV, No. 2, Owen Lattimore, Ed	13	196	21.4	18	729	78.6
Pacific Affairs, vol. XIV, No. 3; vol. XVI, No. 4 inclusive	14	146	29.2	14	354	70.8
Far Eastern Survey, vol. IV, No. 1; vol. XVI, No. 21	8	196	34.6	16	370	65.4
Inquiry Series monographs	4	488	33.7	5	962	66.3
Pamphlet Series	0	000	0	4	261	100
Total pages:						
For anti-Communist writers	1,026		28.3			
For pro-Communist writers					2,656	71.7

In these four published categories the 40 pro-Communist writers contributed over 250 percent more pages than the 7 more anti-Communist writers listed by Mr. Holland. The list given in the statement does not necessarily "dispel any notion that the IPR tended to favor authors sympathetic to communism." These proportions would, it can easily be realized, depend in large measure on the sympathies of the editor of the particular publication involved.

Senator WATKINS. And I will also say for the committee that we, of necessity, cannot make an analysis of the evidence until the evidence is all in, and it would be very foolish for us to try to start making an analysis of it before we have finished the inquiry.

Mr. MORRIS. As I say, as I understand it, the article mentions by way of possibly constructive criticism that something should be done and it has not been done.

Senator WATKINS. I anticipate that that is exactly what the staff is going to do. Since the charge is made that the over-all picture was

all to the good, and this is a very small percentage—a few writers came in, and that was necessary by way of objectivity. So that is very interesting. We are not accepting it as completely accurate, because we do not know, but it will help our staff in making their evaluation.

Mr. Rowe. I want to make my own reaction to this quite clear. I have never checked these figures. I haven't, in other words, done over again everything that he has done in doing this. So that I can't certify, you, see, that you are going to come out with the same percentage points.

But I will say this: In my opinion, Professor Walker is one of the most careful and conscientious research workers you could possibly want to have. And I personally, if I were being asked to prepare such a thing as this under my auspices, would be glad to accept a hundred percent what he says.

I just give that as a personal impression of what he says.

Senator Watkins. I would like to make this observation also, that I do not think a case should be rested upon the number of pages that each group had, one or the other. One very effective writer might only have a hundred pages, and if he did a good job in that hundred pages, it would have more effect than all the hundreds of thousands or millions of words somebody else might write. So, after all, it may be a straw, may be some evidence, but it would not be conclusive, in my opinion.

Mr. Morris. I point out that those facts are not facts that are available to Professor Walker alone; that the staff here may undertake to check that and come out with a conclusive answer. So it may not be necessary to consult with Mr. Walker at all on this.

Mr. Rowe. It would be very easy for you to check these results; no problem at all.

Senator Watkins. I think that would be a problem for the committee to take up with the staff, of course.

Mr. Morris. Had you any experience, Professor Rowe, of editors or editorial directors of the IPR editing articles in such a way as to reflect a pro-Communist bias?

Mr. Rowe. Yes; I have. I would like to cite two instances of this that are known to me, one from first-hand evidence and the other from a statement made to me by one of my students.

I think maybe I had better introduce the second of these first.

The first one I will talk about has to do with Mr. Rosinger, in this volume he has put out recently, called the State of Asia, I believe it is. One of the chapters in this was written by a former student of mine, a Dr. Paul Kattenberg, who is now employed in the Research Branch of the State Department, a very able and energetic fellow, who was asked to write this chapter, and you can refer to it in the published volume. The volume was edited by Mr. Rosinger.

When Mr. Kattenberg submitted his chapter to Mr. Rosinger, he was asked to come down and confer with Rosinger regarding it. He did so and he came back and reported to me in great excitement because, as he said, "Every change he wanted to make involved trying to get me to follow the Russian line."

He said, "I was absolutely amazed by this experience," and he dilated on this at some length.

Mr. Morris. This is what Kattenberg told you?

Mr. Rowe. This is what Kattenberg told me in my office at New Haven.

That, as I say, is second-hand, but it is the report of an available witness and you can check it. He is right here in Washington.

Senator Watkins. Did the book come out under that sponsorship?

Mr. Rowe. Yes, sir.

Senator Watkins. And was it changed to meet Rosinger's idea?

Mr. Rowe. I never have seen the original manuscript. I don't know what changes were involved in Kattenberg's manuscript.

Senator Watkins. It would be interesting to know what changes were made.

Mr. Morris. The witness is testifying to a conversation he had with Kattenberg.

Senator Watkins. I realize that.

Mr. Rowe. The second instance is one on which I have documentary evidence. This is a manuscript written on communism and the Hukbalahap. You know, the Hukbalahap are the local Communist forces in the Philippines. They were a cause of great trouble. This was written by my colleague at Yale, Assistant Professor of Political Science Henry Wells.

Without commenting on the article—and he later got it published in the identical form in which he submitted it to the Institute of Pacific Relations—he first submitted it to the IPR, and Miss Miriam Farley edited it, and I have here the original editing of this in her handwriting, with the suggested emendations and suggested items to be struck out, indicated by pencil, and so forth.

Now, she has some written comments along the line, here, which are interesting in themselves, but the things that she wants removed from the article are striking. She wants removed from the article everything that identifies the Huks as Communists.

Mr. Morris. Will you give us examples of that, Professor?

Mr. Rowe (reading):

> Communist purposes in any locality are always to be understood in terms of the available data concerning the pattern of Communist activity the world over. Local Communist leaders, as is well known, normally take their cue from Moscow * * *.

Mr. Morris. Is that recommended to be deleted by Miss Farley?

Mr. Rowe. Cut out; yes.

Senator Watkins. Before you go any further, when was this manuscript presented, and when was this editing done?

Mr. Rowe. Let me see.

Senator Watkins. Give us the approximate time.

Mr. Rowe. 1949, I would say.

Senator Watkins. That was very recent.

Mr. Rowe. Yes; that was recent.

Senator Watkins. That was after the so-called awakening of the American people to all these fellow travelers, to what has been going on.

Mr. Rowe. Oh, yes.

Then, handwritten in here for insertion, instead of this sort of thing, is the following, written by Miss Farley. And I am quoting:

> In one sense, the Huk movement may be viewed as part of a world-wide scheme of Communist expansion; in another sense it is a product of local conditions.

That is what she wants substituted.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the second was what she wanted substituted for the first?

Mr. ROWE. That is right.

Continuation of what she wanted cut out:

The Hukbalahap in the Philippines, like the Communist-dominated movements in the archipelagos to the north and south, Japan and Indonesia, is to be regarded as an advance guard, a propaganda-distribution center, and an organizational pivot in a compaign that looks to the eventual capture of the archipelago for the forces of communism.

This is to be removed from the article on her recommendation.

Senator WATKINS. Did she have any substitute for that?

Mr. ROWE. No substitute at this point. Just cut it out. As a matter of fact, half the article would have been cut if those recommendations were followed.

Senator WATKINS. No reason given as to why that was to be cut?

Mr. ROWE. No reason.

Next item recommended for omission is this, and you can see that about three-quarters of the page is to be cut out [reading]:

Though their grievances lead them into the Hukbalahap—

this is a recognition of the local grievances—

the ordinary peasants do not determine its policies and activities. As in all Communist-dominated movements, the leaders, not the rank and file, call the tune. Recent events have shown that the men who run the Hukbalahap are not interested in solving the agrarian problem on non-Communist terms. Their agitators use it as a means of gaining adherence for the Communist Party line, of spreading anti-American propaganda, and of provoking civil strife under a government committed to friendly relations with the United States. Like Communists everywhere, they seize upon the legitimate grievances of the oppressed to advance their own quite different ends.

To be omitted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received into the record?

But I think probably, in fairness to Miss Farley, we should ask her if that is her handwriting on the manuscript.

Senator WATKINS. Well, if it were a court procedure, I would say it would be admitted subject to further proof. I think we can receive it in evidence here as a part of our investigation.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 614" and is herewith inserted.)

Mr. MORRIS. But do you suggest that we find out from Miss Farley whether or not that is her handwriting?

Senator WATKINS. Certainly. We want Miss Farley here. She has been here once, has she not?

Mr. MORRIS. No; she hasn't.

Senator WATKINS. I think the suggestion is very well made.

Mr. MORRIS. At least for the limited purpose of asking her if that is in fact her handwriting on it.

Senator WATKINS. And you will probably want to know from her why, and she will probably want to have the right, and should have the right, to tell why. I do not think we should limit it as to whether that is her handwriting.

Mr. MORRIS. No; that is the minimum, Senator.

COMMUNISM AND THE HUKBALAHAP

BY HENRY WELLS

In the Philippines, as in China, Southeast Asia, and the Balkans, the Communists have turned long-standing agrarian troubles to their own advantage. Using familiar Communist techniques of propaganda and of organization, they have won a following in the region where the peasants' grievances (poverty, usury, absentee landlordism) have long been most acute - i.e., in central Luzon, where they control the peasant movement known as the Hukbalahap.

Analysis of any Communist-controlled organization must proceed on two levels: (a) that of the hard core of trained Communists and their purposes in leading the organization, and (b) that of the rank and file and their purposes in joining it. The aims of these two groups should not be identified, save on the basis of clear evidence of their coincidence. Communist purposes in any locality are always to be understood in terms of the available data concerning the pattern of Communist activity the world over. Local Communist leaders, as is well known, normally take their cue from Moscow; their policies in local situations are primarily tactical implementations of a global strategy. Rank-and-file purposes, on the other hand, tend to be reflections of pressing needs and desires on the part of the masses from whom the members are drawn.

This distinction should be kept in mind in considering the nature and significance of the Hukbalahap. Viewed as a movement directed ultimately from Moscow, the Hukbalahap is merely an instrument of Communist expansion. There is good reason to suppose that the Kremlin's Far Eastern strategy involves the progressive consolidation of the Asiatic continent under Communist control (a process now well under way, as witness the southward push of the Chinese Communist armies) and piecemeal subjugation of the chain of archipelagos lying off the

east. The Hukbalahap in the Philippines, like the Communist-dominated movements in the archipelagos to the north and south, Japan and Indonesia, is to be regarded as an advance guard, a propaganda-distribution center, and an organizational pivot in a campaign that looks to the eventual capture of the archipelago for the forces of Communism.

From the point of view of the rank and file, however, the Hukbalahap is a primarily local phenomenon - an instrument of mass protest and revolt. The ordinary members are peasant farmers who, in the strict sense, are not Communists. They know nothing about the subtleties of Marxism-Leninism, are largely unaware of the cold war, and owe no allegiance, emotional or intellectual, to Stalin and his henchmen. They are in the main simple, illiterate (or at most semi-literate) country folk who have long suffered economic injustices and are now attempting to force long-overdue economic reforms.

Though their grievances lead them into the Hukbalahap, the ordinary peasants do not determine its policies and activities. As in all Communist-dominated movements, the leaders, not the rank and file, call the tune. Recent events have shown that the men who run the Hukbalahap are not interested in solving the agrarian problem on non-Communist terms: their agitators use it as a means of gaining adherents for the Communist Party line, of spreading anti-American propaganda, and of provoking civil strife under a government committed to friendly relations with the United States. Like Communists everywhere, they seize upon the legitimate grievances of the oppressed to advance their own quite different ends.

In order to explain the difference in aims between the leaders of the Hukbalahap and its rank and file, we may conveniently begin with the latter; for it is the very legitimacy of the peasants' grievances that, undeniably, has given the Communists their opportunity.

The peasants' troubles have their origins in the distant past - in the quasi-feudal social system that prevailed even before the Spanish arrived in the Islands. Then, as later, Philippine society was divided mainly into two classes, a small minority of landholding chiefs and aristocrats and a large majority of landless peasants, who were either serfs or slaves.

In Spanish times, most of the land continued to be held by a relatively small group - the native aristocrats (the caciques) and the Roman Catholic Church, together with its monastic orders. The mass of the people continued to live as serfs on the haciendas of the landowners. Relations between the two groups were governed by traditional understandings respecting tenancy: the peasant either shared his harvest with the landlord (the tenant kept at most half of the crop, and considerably less than half if the landowner supplied implements and work animals), or rented a plot of land for cash and retained all of the yield for himself.

These tenancy arrangements kept the peasants' standard of living at a very low level. The plot that the average tenant cultivated was so small (especially in central Luzon, where population pressures were great) and his methods of cultivation were so primitive that he could not earn enough to sustain himself and his family from one harvest to another. He was forced to borrow from the landlord at usurious (though well-established) rates of interest.[1] Peasant debts grew to mountainous

1 "In the Philippines, where usury has become highly formalized in at least a dozen types of commonly practiced credit, each one of which bears a specific name, the annual rate of interest sometimes exceeds 400 per cent." James S. Allen, "Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines," Pacific Affairs, vol. 11, p. 58 (March 1938). See also Erich H. Jacoby, Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia, New York, 1949, pp. 187-91.

proportions and were passed on from one generation to the next. The peasant was, as a result, economically dependent upon the landlord;

he was in effect bound to the hacienda; and he was defenseless against special services and fines if the landlord chose to exact them.

Peasant resistance against these conditions first broke out on the haciendas owned by absentee landlords, notably on the great estates of the "friars" and the Church; on their rich farmlands there occurred, particularly in the last half of the nineteenth century, frequent uprisings among the peasants. Elsewhere, by contrast, the tenant farmers appear to have been relatively content with their lot. Peace tended to reign wherever the landowner lived on his hacienda. The old-style cacique knew all of his tenants and practiced toward them a kind of paternalism that gave them a sense of security and "belonging" if not of physical comfort. He kept them in debt, but was usually prepared to advance loans in planting season and in periods of sickness or famine - loans tacitly understood on both sides to be in the nature of compensation and not repayable in full. The peasants, though poor, had enough to satisfy their meager expectations; and they felt they had in the cacique a friend and protector.

American annexation of the Islands at the turn of the century set in motion changes that profoundly altered these traditional relations between caciques and peasants. The former, as markets for Philippine sugar, copra, and other products opened up in the United States, became notably richer, and were soon aspiring to a more luxurious way of life. Nor was this all: the Americans gradually enlarged the sphere of local self-government, and the caciques, once they had tasted the the sweets of/increased power that thus accrued to them, developed new interests of a non-economic character. Beginning as advisers and subordinates to their American governors, the caciques (the only educated Filipinos) gradually acquired their present near-monopoly of political power in the Islands.

Under the impact of these changes, the old paternalistic system began to break down. The caciques began to take up residence in Manila or in the provincial capitals, and soon they were living on the haciendas only during harvest seasons. The rest of the year their affairs were left in the hands of hired plantation managers, many of whom undertook to operate the haciendas on a "strictly business" basis. The managers tended to press the tenants for repayment of loans, to charge them for services rendered, to exact extra labor from them, and to substitute impersonal efficiency for the old-style easy-going paternalism.

Meanwhile, the social chasm between cacique and peasant began to widen. The landowners began to enlarge and renovate their country houses, installing modern conveniences, while the peasants continued to live in their primitive huts. The landowners put their tenants to work constructing good roads (often using for this purpose the cédula taxes collected from the peasants), one consequence of which was the spectacle of young bloods of the landed families speeding through the countryside in high-powered cars. The clothes worn by the caciques and (especially) by their womenfolk became more and more unlike the traditional garb of the peasants. These contrasts, while specially noticeable in the province of Pampanga, where for centuries the extremes of wealth and poverty had been more marked than elsewhere, grew to be common throughout the central Luzon provinces.[2]

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2 One reason for the slow development of agrarian unrest in the sugar-plantation areas of Negros is the fact that many landowners continue to live on their haciendas and to practice the old-style paternalism. Tension between landowners and tenants in Negros is growing, as the latter become increasingly aware of the contrast between the wealth of the caciques and their own humble condition, but no revolts or organized political action on the part of the peasants has yet developed. It is significant, however, that peasant guerrilla bands which took to the hills during the Japanese occupation of Negros returned to the plantations under cover of darkness often enough to set fire to and destroy most of the great country houses.

The upshot of increasing absentee landlordism and of an ever-widening gulf between owner and tenant was a new attitude on the part of both. The caciques became indifferent to the welfare of their tenants, tended to regard them with suspicion, and suppressed demands for improved conditions. They began to hire private police, called "civilian guards," to protect their persons and haciendas and to enforce the now widely criticized crop-sharing arrangements. As legislators, executives, and judges, they did not hesitate to use the force of law to maintain the status quo.

The tenants, on their side, viewed the caciques with increasing resentment and distrust, and tended to rally credulously behind any leader who promised them a new order of things, whether economic or political. Three peasant uprisings burst briefly into flame: the "Colorum" troubles of 1923-24, the "Tayug rebellion" of 1931, and the "Sakdal" revolt of May 3-4, 1935. Because of poor organization and irresponsible leadership, none of these came to anything. During the same years, however, peasant organizations were being formed under more competent leadership. The most important, the National Peasant Confederation, had by the early thirties come under the control of Communists, who continued to dominate this, and other peasant movements as well, until the outbreak of the war.

The Hukbalahap, ostensibly launched as a resistance movement against the Japanese,[3] was a lineal descendant of the earlier Communist-

3 For a thorough treatment of the early years of the Hukbalahap, see William A. Owens, "Will the Huks Revolt?" Asia and the Americas, vol. 46, pp. 53-57 (February 1946). A valuable but nearly inaccessible treatise is E. M. Manuel, A Manual for the Study of the Hukbalahap Problem, an M.A. thesis of April 1944, on file in the Silliman University Library, Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, Philippines.

dominated peasant groups. Organized in March 1942, it functioned ~~partly as an army conducting~~ effective guerrilla operations against

the invaders and against Filipino collaborators, but more importantly as an instrument of Communist propaganda and of political and economic change.

Communists controlled the Hukbalahap from the very beginning.[4]

4 Though nominally organized by representatives of a wide variety of left-wing groups (including the Communist and Socialist Parties, the National Peasants Union, the Civil Liberties Union, and the Chinese Communist Association), the Hukbalahap was dominated by Communists from the start. Two members of the Philippine Communist Party, Luis Taruc and Casto Alejandrino, became Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively, of the Huk "Military Commissariat." Other members of the Commissariat were Juan Feleo, Communist Party organizer and leader of the National Peasants Union (the "PKM") in Nueva Ecija; Mariano Balgos, labor leader, who is today General Secretary of the Communist Party; and "Mr. Lee," a Chinese Communist. Closely associated with the Huk leadership were Communists Guillermo Capadocia and Helen del Castillo, both of whom had been trained in Moscow.

but they were careful at first to direct their efforts along lines that would attract a large following. In resisting the Japanese they were able to evoke sentiments of nationalism and patriotism among the masses. In prosecuting collaborators, most of whom were members of the ruling class, they were able to arouse the peasants against both oppressors and betrayers. In pursuing a radical socio-economic program, they were able to win for the Hukbalahap a reputation of militancy in championing the peasants' rights.

Among those activities, the last took highest priority. One aspect of it was indoctrination of the peasants. Huk soldiers received instruction in Marxist-Leninist doctrine from "political commissars," one of whom was attached to each squadron. From a school established in the Candaba swamps, headquarters of the guerrilla army,

> ...hundreds of political propagandists went out, in some cases as far south as Laguna Province. Usually they traveled in groups of from six to ten, including both men and women. On arriving in a barrio, they would call the people together with singing and dancing, or with a dramatization of the deeds of one of their heros. They would recite, with variations, what they had learned in school. The peasants could not understand "dialectical materialism," but they could understand that the masses were downtrodden, that rich landlords took advantage of them, that they never received enough for their labor, and that taxes and interest rates were too high. 5

5 Owens, op. cit., p. 58.

Under the leadership and protection of the Huks, the central Luzon peasants translated these principles into action. Ignoring the pre-war share-cropping arrangements, they kept the entire harvest of the rice fields for themselves - less the amount requisitioned by the Huks to supply their forces. Most of the landowners had, meantime, fled to the comparative safety of their Manila houses. In the absence of duly constituted authorities, the Huks organized municipal and even provincial governments, administering their own brand of justice, enforcing their decrees, performing marriage ceremonies, and in general exercising full authority over the peasant population.

The wartime activities of the Hukbalahap undoubtedly increased the political maturity of the peasants. Communist propaganda awakened in them a hitherto latent class consciousness and expressed their hitherto inarticulate demands. Furthermore, work in the Hukbalahap (especially the use of firearms) gave them a new sense of power. As a result, they were willing to strike back when their former landlords sent troops into the field to suppress them. The anti-Huk forces, known as the "USAFFE guerrillas," were led by men of the cacique class who had taken ROTC courses in the universities or had served in the United States Army Forces Far East. Pitched battles took place in Pampanga and elsewhere between the Huks and the USAFFE units prior to the arrival of American troops. When the Americans came into the area in the spring of 1945, they recognized the USAFFE guerrillas as allies, sided with them against the Huks, and seized the Huk leaders Taruc and Alejandrino, holding them in custody for several months.

Up to this point the purposes of the Huk leaders and those of the rank and file seemed to coincide. They began to diverge, however, soon after the capitulation of the Japanese. The leaders' policy was to convert the war against the Japanese into a civil war, turning the Huk military forces against the returning landlords, whereas the peasants

were more dismayed by such flagrant and overt re-establishment of civil authority in the area.

The policy of the landlords coincided as the newly restyled Huks successfully resisted the rather feeble efforts of the Osmeña government to reassert control over central Luzon. Resistance to authority assumed much more serious proportions after the defeat of Osmeña in the presidential elections of April 1946. The victor in that rancorous contest was Manuel Roxas, leader of the Liberal Party and idol of the USAFFE guerrillas, who was hated by the Sakdalenga because of his views, his background, and his associations - to say nothing of his dubious record under the Japanese, with whom he was believed to have collaborated. Roxas was a caciquo, he was related by marriage to one of the most powerful and reactionary families of central Luzon, and he had close ties with Filipino, Spanish, and American capitalists in the islands. His elevation to the Presidency was widely considered in Sakdalenga to mean a return to the pre-war pattern of caciquo domination.

One of the first acts of the Roxas regime seemed to justify this interpretation. His Liberal Party majority in the House of Representatives refused to seat seven Congressmen, including the "Supreme" Luis Taruc, who had been elected from central Luzon districts under the banner of the Democratic Alliance, a coalition of left-wing groups including the Sakdalenga. This action provided the Huk leaders with an excuse to stiffen their resistance against the government. Refusing to obey an order to surrender their arms, the Huks engaged in endless skirmishes with government troops sent to force their compliance. Fuel was added to the flames by the return of the landlords, some of whom brought with them private armies to protect their holdings from Huk depredations; clashes between the Huks and the "civilian guards" intensified the disturbance.

In July and August 1946 President Roxas attempted to work out

with Huk leaders a plan for the restoration of "peace and order," but the negotiations broke down, each side claiming bad faith on the part of the other.[6] The subsequent passage of legislation raising

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6 See "Huk-Roxas Correspondence," Far Eastern Survey, October 8, 1946, pp. 314-18, for the points at issue between the government and the Hukbalahap, as expressed by the leaders on each side. The charges and counter-charges in this exchange make clear why no rapprochement was possible.

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the tenants' share of the rice crop from 50 per cent to 70 per cent did nothing to allay the armed conflict in central Luzon. Since the situation was, if anything, deteriorating, Roxas finally gave orders to the Military Police Command (a branch of the Philippine Army) to put down the Huks by any means necessary.

It must be supposed that this state of affairs suited the purposes of the Communist leaders of the Hukbalahap. It was to their ultimate advantage that peasants should be in open rebellion against landlords, that the latter should retaliate with mercenary troops, and that the government should wage war against its own citizens. For every fresh outbreak of violence in central Luzon tended to lessen the power and prestige of the oligarchy-controlled Republic of the Philippines, "Pacific partner" of the United States.

It seems clear, however, that the Huk leaders overestimated the extent to which they could carry the peasants with them in their program to foster civil war. As the months went by they progressively lost support among the rank and file. Weary of strife and eager to resume the orderly rounds of life in their villages, rice paddies, and cane fields, the peasants gave increasingly grudging response to Huk appeals and demands. They were becoming demoralized by the losses inflicted upon their families and friends as government forces took a mounting toll of Huk lives. Depleted by casualties, the Huk ranks were further diminished by desertions, as more and more fighters

drifted home to help support their families.

This is not to say, however, that the Communists had lost their power to foment unrest. As late as March 1948, when Roxas formally outlawed the Huks, their attacks on Constabulary outposts and patrols and their forays into populated sections in search of food, money, and recruits were still frequent enough to keep the rice-bowl provinces in a state of constant uneasiness. Constabulary raids on villages suspected of harboring or aiding Huks were still a source of instability. Conditions were so unsettled that many schools remained closed. Certain cane planters were as yet unwilling to cultivate their lands, and production of both cane and rice was far below normal.

On Roxas' death in April 1948, the situation in Bukidnon temporarily entered a new phase. Chiefly responsible for the change was the new President, Elpidio Quirino.[7] Soon after taking office he launched

7 Unlike most Filipinos in public life, Quirino is not a cacique. Born of a poor family in Ilocos Sur, a section of northern Luzon where the hacienda system has never taken root, he worked his way up the ladder of Philippine politics without ever closely identifying himself in the public mind with cacique interests.

a plan for minimizing the baleful influence of the Bukidnon. Taking advantage of the widespread desire for peace and of the Huks' considerable loss of support, he entered into negotiations with Taruc looking toward a truce between government forces and the Huks. Although the negotiations dragged on for several weeks, an agreement was reached at last; and on June 21 Quirino (in the presence of Taruc) signed a proclamation granting a twenty-day amnesty to the outlawed Huks. The proclamation specified that the Huks and members of the PKM would "present themselves with all their arms and ammunition" to government authorities within twenty days, whereupon the government would drop its charges against them.[8]

8 New York Times, June 23, 1948.

The amnesty met with widespread approval. Both of the major political parties supported the maneuver, and the average citizen hailed it with enthusiasm and relief. The Philippine Congress quickly ratified the amnesty proclamation and placed a P2,000,000 "peace and order" fund at the disposal of the President. The House of Representatives meanwhile hastened to grant Taruc permission to take the seat that it had denied him two years before. The Manila press was euphoric at this turn of events. Pictures of "Congressman" Taruc appeared in every issue, and countless articles described his daily round of official conferences, receptions, luncheons, and dinner parties. Reports from the provinces told of Huks pouring into the towns, ready to present themselves to the authorities and to turn in their firearms. Old animosities had seemingly disappeared, and on all sides hopes were high that the troubles in Huklandia were over.

It soon became obvious, however, that the terms of the amnesty were not being fulfilled. Leaders of the Huks hibernated outside the towns announced that their men were willing to register but would not be ordered to do so until the "go ahead" signal was received from Taruc. The instructions from Taruc were not forthcoming. Just before the deadline of July 18, the President extended the amnesty to the 31st.

Still the Huks did not sign up. In an attempt to secure their cooperation, President Quirino called a conference between Huk leaders and government officials in which a six-point program of "social amelioration" was supposedly agreed upon. It committed the government to purchasing haciendas for conversion into model agricultural communities, opening up new agricultural colonies, building roads and bridges in rural areas, opening schools in Huklandia, extending crop loans to small farmers, and providing central Luzon peasants with immediate relief in the form of food, clothing, and medicine. Almost at once, however, the Huks began to insist upon further commitments

from the government as the price of their cooperation, demanding abrogation of the post-war trade agreement with the United States, "expropriation of all haciendas over fifty hectares," and "amelioration of the plight of the populace," struggling as it was in "the clutches of American imperialists."[9]

9 Manila Times, July 31, 1948; Manila Bulletin, July 26, 1948.

Using one excuse after another for postponing compliance with the terms of the amnesty, the Huk leaders gained time in which to carry their Communist propaganda to the masses. On the pretext of "instructing" their followers in the details of registration, they organized mass meetings in several of the rice-bowl provinces. Addressing each meeting in turn, Taruc and other Huks delivered scathing attacks upon the Quirino government, charging "graft and corruption" in high places and accusing Cabinet members of being "tools of fascistic and reactionary imperialism." In every speech Taruc attacked the United States as an "imperialist" power and "the source of all the economic ills of the Philippines." At a rally of some 15,000 peasants in Nueva Ecija on July 31, he urged unity upon the Huks and shouted, "Should democratic processes fail us, we shall know what to do."[10]

10 Manila Bulletin, July 26 and August 2, 1948; Manila Chronicle, August 1, 1948.

In spite of these unmistakable warnings that the Huks were not acting in good faith, the general public clung to the hope that the amnesty terms would be complied with and that the temporary peace in central Luzon would become permanent. Hence popular approval greeted the news that Quirino had extended the amnesty for two more weeks - until August 15. Hopes were again disappointed, however, for the Huks continued to pursue their earlier tactics: new excuses for the delay in registration and further incendiary speeches before mass audiences.

As the final deadline approached, Taruc made his position unequivocally clear. On August 12 he issued a press release which read in part:

> ...the Communist Party of the Philippines, of which I am a member, besides fighting for the eventual achievement of socialism, is also fighting for land for the peasants and other agrarian reforms and for the full and complete independence of our country from all forms of foreign domination. ...I have instructed my men to...refuse to submit to a fascist peace imposed by imperialist-feudal guns and bayonets. 11

11 Manila Bulletin, August 13, 1948. A few weeks later Taruc stated in a letter released to the press that in case of war he would side with the Soviet Union, which "represents the cause of democracy, peace and progress in the world," against the United States, which "represents imperialist aggression, warmongering, and fascist tendencies." (Manila Times, September 7, 1948.)

When midnight of the 15th arrived, Taruc had already taken refuge in the mountains of central Luzon. Almost immediately clashes began between the Huks and the constabulary, and within a few weeks provocative action by Huk raiders led to large-scale military operations against them on the part of the government.

Civil war has continued in central Luzon since last September. News dispatches from the Philippines during the fall and winter reported a series of government victories, including the capture of major Huk strongholds, but subsequent reports indicate that Huk units are still active and are, indeed, becoming more aggressive. This development, according to the press, has led to still more intensive military action on the part of the government.[12]

12 On April 28, 1949, Mrs. Aurora Aragon Quezon and party were killed in ambush deep in Huklandia. Although the slayers have apparently not yet been identified, the government has responded to this action by intensifying its campaign against the Huks, using planes, mortars, and patrols against them. See New York Times, April 29, 1949, and New York Herald Tribune, May 9, 1949.

As matters stand now, the Communists have every reason to feel satisfied with the way in which their plans for the Philippines are working out. The Huk rebellion continues to be a thorn in the side of the

pro-American Quirino administration, whose failure to cope with the movement has cost it dearly in terms of prestige and causes it to rely for support upon groups that oppose any steps calculated to solve the underlying agrarian problem in central Luzon. Continued unrest provides the Huks with ample opportunity to spread anti-Quirino and anti-American propaganda. The unsettled conditions have encouraged the opportunistic leaders of the Nacionalista Party to bid for the support of the Huks and to reinforce their strictures against American "imperialism" and the Quirino regime. José Laurel, Nacionalista candidate for President in the November 1949 elections, is campaigning on a platform indistinguishable on most counts from the Communist Party line.[15] These are all windfalls for the Communist leaders of the Huk-

15 New York Herald Tribune, May 23, 1949. Having served as puppet President under the Japanese, Laurel is apparently willing to become a puppet President once again, this time as a tool of the Communists.

balahap, who have, for the rest, received indirect help from political squabbles within Quirino's Liberal Party, now divided into two virtually irreconcilable factions and seriously handicapped in its campaign for reelection in November. It may well be that the days of friendly United States-Philippine relations are numbered. In any case, the future of the Philippines as a bulwark of anti-Soviet strength in the Far East hangs in the balance.

Senator WATKINS. Because that carries with it some implications that perhaps she would want to explain; and I think, in fairness, she should be permitted to explain it.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that published, Professor Rowe?

Mr. ROWE. I will have to look that up. It will take a minute. But I have the necessary documentation on that.

As we go along, I will say that I have permission from Professor Wells to submit this in evidence before the committee.

Senator WATKINS. You mean this entire document?

Mr. ROWE. Yes, sir.

This is a letter from Professor Wells, 13 March 1952, with a postscript:

As you may recall, the article was published in the winter of 1950 issue of American Perspective, in substantially its original form.

May I interject a request at this point?

Would you make a copy of this and give me back the original? Is that feasible?

Senator WATKINS. We cannot do that until at least we have given Miss Farley that opportunity referred to.

Mr. ROWE. I was thinking of a photographic copy, which would contain all this.

Mr. MORRIS. We will give it back to you within a short time.

Mr. ROWE. I would be satisfied with a photostat, myself.

Mr. MORRIS. No; we will give you the original.

Did Andrew Grajdanzev study at Yale University under a grant?

Mr. ROWE. Andrew Grajdanzev, whose name at that time had been changed to Andrew Grad, was at New Haven during an academic year under a grant secured on his behalf by Mr. Holland from the Rockefeller Foundation, constituting in effect a subsidy to allow him to carry on his research.

The idea of having him come to New Haven was that we gave him the facilities of the library. We gave him consultative privileges with the members of the faculty. And we were supposed in general to supervise his work. This was in 1947 or 1948, I think.

He spent one academic year there only, although the original intent was to have him spend two academic years with us. The reason he left at the end of 1 year with us was that we disapproved of his work. This was a unanimous agreement on the part of all the faculty there.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you disagree?

Mr. ROWE. We considered his work not to have sound scholarly method in it. It was so bad from that point of view that we finally reported adversely to Mr. Holland in a letter signed by myself and at least four of my colleagues, everyone of whom, including an economist, a sociologist who specialized on Japan, the late John Embree, who was my colleague there at Yale; a geographer, Karl Pelzer, who is a great expert on Asiatic geography; Prof. Chitoshi Yanaga, who was associate professor of political science at Yale. And the general agreement was that the work simply did not stand up from a scholarly point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Did it show any pro-Communist bias?

Mr. ROWE. It is pretty hard to nail anything of that kind down in this particular manuscript. The bias of the manuscript was—I think you could call it left wing without any strain on the fact, or without

straining the interpretation too much. But that wasn't the fundamental basis of our objection to it. As a matter of fact, we wouldn't have raised objection from a point of view aspect. We raised objection from a methodology aspect, and we simply came to the conclusion that this man was not a sound scholar in the field. And, as I say, it was a unanimous agreement on our part.

Now, this grant from Rockefeller for Grad, administered through IPR and then through us, was a very unsatisfactory result, but it was typical of a number of others done at that time.

Mr. Morris. Do you know of any other?

Mr. Rowe. For instance, there was a grant for T. A. Bisson, secured by IPR from Rockefeller Foundation, and there was another one to help finance Rosinger, secured from Rockefeller Foundation through IPR.

Mr. Morris. That last was the one that enabled Mr. Rosinger to publish this book, the State of Asia; was it not?

Mr. Rowe. I believe that is what it was used for.

Senator Watkins. All these three men did not work at Yale; did they?

Mr. Rowe. No; Rosinger and Bisson worked in the IPR headquarters in New York, as I understood it. And then Bisson was later sent from New York out to Berkeley, the University of California, where he was supported by further grants from Rockefeller Foundation, and he is still there on the staff of the political-science department in the University of California at Berkeley, as I remember.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bisson has been subpenaed to appear before this committee on Saturday.

Are there any others you care to mention?

Senator Watkins. Mr. Rosinger has already been here?

Mr. Morris. Rosinger has been here and has refused to say whether or not he was ever a Communist.

Professor, has the IPR been active in obtaining grants from the foundations?

Mr. Rowe. Oh, yes, indeed. A great amount of money has been spent this way by the foundations through IPR. After our unhappy experience with Dr. Grad, we decided that we would never accept any other such grant again; that if a man were to work at Yale supported by a foundation, the grant would be made to this man directly through us and not through the Institute of Pacific Relations. Because, whereas Mr. Holland indicated that he wanted us to assist Grad in his work and to advise him and to generally supervise, when it came down to the question of what kind of manuscript this was, and what to do with it, Holland took the ball from us and proceeded to act as though our objections didn't cut any ice, and this was not going to be done by us any more.

We have had subsequently much more pleasant experiences with other people that have been sent directly to us by Rockefeller Foundation, and for whom we have the whole responsibility, and whom we control, and to whom our supervision has sanctions behind it and has meaning. But this was not the case in the case of Mr. Grad, which was a very undesirable arrangement from our point of view. And it meant that Grad was, in effect, controlled by Holland and not by us; with all that that implied in the nature of his work, approval of the product, further support. Because after Grad left us, with this bad

mark we gave him, Holland went right back and got more money to keep on supporting him, and sent him up to Columbia and had him affiliated there.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything, Professor, of the general tendency, to integrate studies and to bring about unanimity of agreement on any particular subject, with the foundation?

Mr. ROWE. If I start out on that, Mr. Morris, I hope you will restrain me from talking too long. This is one of the subjects that is of peculiar and particular interest to me, and on which I am in general disagreement with a lot of my colleagues.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you discuss it, Professor Rowe, with the limitations on it, to the extent that, say, Mr. Holland and the IPR have been a factor in this general tendency?

Mr. ROWE. Well, let's take a possible hypothetical case. Let's assume that organization A wants to promote point of view B and they get money from foundation C and allocate it to a lot of people. They want to have a place for these people to work. They want to maintain them. So they send them around to universities like Yale, Columbia, and California, three I have mentioned where this actually happened, you see. And they hold the final strings.

Now, of course, in the interests supposedly of efficiency, integration, coordination, and all these shibboleths of the American foundation point of view, maybe this is a good thing. From my point of view, the foundations and these research organizations like the Institute of Pacific Relations have gone hog wild on the coordination of research. They have committed themselves so thoroughly to coordination of research that in fact instead of supporting a great variety of research projects, which would enrich the American intellectual scene through variegation, which is a value I very basically believe in, you have a narrowing of emphasis, a concentration of power, a concentration of authority, and an impoverishment of the American intellectual scene.

These people like organization. They like to have a man in a university, for example, who will take the responsibility for organizing research around a narrow topic. This means he acquires a staff, and you go to work on a special project. You may spend $250,000 or $500,000 working on some narrow field, which may or may not ever yield you any results.

If I were doing the thing, I would talk in terms of supporting individual scholars, and not in terms of supporting these highly organized concentrated narrow specialized research projects that are supported in some of the universities.

Now, as I said, I am off on a hobbyhorse at this point. But it is of particular interest, because by exercising power over research in this way, you see, by insisting on the integration of research activity, anybody who wants to, can control the results of research in American universities. And I think this is a very questionable business that the public ought to look at very, very closely, and see whether they want a few monopolies of the money, like, for instance, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corp., who have done immense amounts of good, to emphasize narrow concentration to the extent that they have.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, can you think of a particular example of how this would be applied, Professor?

Mr. Rowe. Well, I can cite cases in which I think this method has been overdone, this kind of an approach has been overdone, cases in which a quarter of a million dollars is allocated over a 10-year period for research on a narrow topic in Chinese history, let's say, in which the graduate students who come into this field in that university are pushed into confining their research to this narrow field so as to contribute to it; where the personnel drawn into the university is drawn into this framework; and where, as a result, the broad general interest in the whole field of Chinese history is made difficult to maintain. All this is done in the interest of efficiency, you know, the great American shibboleth.

I often say that if we try to become as efficient as the really efficient, supposedly, people, the dictators, then we destroy American scholarship and everything that it stands for. And I often wonder whether my colleagues realize who won the last war. Intellectually speaking, this country has a great danger of intellectually trying to imitate the totalitarian approach, in allowing people at centers of financial power—they aren't political powers in this sense—to tell the public what to study and what to work on, and to set up a framework.

Now, of course, as you know, scholars like freedom. Maybe they come up with a lot of useless information. But in my value standard, as soon as we diminish the free exercise of unhampered curiosity, free curiosity, by channeling our efforts along this line, we then destroy the American mentality. Because the great feature of the American mentality is the belief in allowing people to rush off in all kinds of different directions at once. Because we don't know what is absolutely right. You can't tell that far in advance.

If I may just continue one moment more, Senator, I would like to point out to you that Adolf Hitler very effectively crippled atomic research in Germany by telling the physicists what he wanted them to come up with. Now, this is true. And if you can do that in atomic physics, you can do it 10 times as fast in the so-called social sciences, which really aren't sciences at all, where really opinion, differentiation of opinion, is the thing that matters and what we stand for in this country.

That is why I become very much inflamed when I even smell the first hint of a combination in restraint of trade in the intellectual sphere.

Now, you see what I am talking about with this interlocking directorate? That is what bothers me about it. I don't mind if the boys go off and have a club of their own. That is their own business. But when you get a tie-in of money, a tie-in of the promotion of monographs, a tie-in of research, and a tie-in of publication, then I say that the intellectuals are having the reins put on them and blinders.

Senator Watkins. Otherwise, they do not get on the team.

Mr. Rowe. That is right. They don't get on the team, and they don't get a chance to carry the ball.

Now, to the faculty member, this means money, income, what he lives on. It is vital. It is not just some recreational thing, you see.

Senator Watkins. What I wanted to ask you was this: As a matter of practice, is it not true that in graduate schools of most of our American universities and colleges, the head of the department usually pretty well dictates to the young man who is working for his Ph. D. or

master of arts what he is going to write about or what field he is going to investigate?

Mr. Rowe. No, sir, Senator, not in any department I have ever been connected with. The student is in an open market, where he can go and buy the specialty that any professor has got to offer.

Senator Watkins. It has to be approved, though.

Mr. Rowe. Oh, yes. It has to be approved. But remember this. At this point, you get into the activities of the club. And this is one of the ways in which the individual has a chance to assert himself, because, as you know, if Mr. X doesn't approve of Mr. Y's project, then Mr. Y doesn't have to approve his project. I mean, there is a trade back and forth business.

Senator Watkins. There is an interlocking group.

Mr. Rowe. In the interlocking group it is a different business. This has to do with monopoly of funds and support for research work in the large. I am not talking now about students and dissertations and things of that sort.

Senator Watkins. This is more or less research when the student is taking his work for his Ph. D. and he has to write his dissertation.

Mr. Rowe. But you see, actually, Senator, the only place I know of where all students in the field of Chinese history are integrated into the study of one 15-year period of Chinese history, is in connection with one of these research projects.

That is the only case in the United States that I know of. I have never seen it operate any place else.

This kind of thing is supported by foundation money. And, of course, the temptation is to bring everybody in and integrate, through a genteel process of bribery. That is to say, you support the student, you give him a fellowship, if he will buy your subject matter area. And if you do this for 15 years, the only Ph. D.'s you turn out will be people who know that 12-year period or 15-year period of Chinese history. I say this is intellectual impoverishment.

Senator Watkins. You think that is not true, however, elsewhere?

Mr. Rowe. It is not generally true.

Senator Watkins. I hope it is not, because I thought maybe it might be in some universities I know about.

Mr. Rowe. It is not generally true, but it is the inevitable kind of thing which happens with this hot pursuit of efficiency, integration. And, of course, remember this. The foundation people have to have jobs. They have to have something to administer. They don't want to give away the money to the universities and say "Go ahead and spend it any way you want." They want to see that the activity pays. That is, we have got to have a regular flow of the so-called materials of research coming out. We want to see this flow in certain quantity. It has to have a certain weight in the hand. And to see that this happens, we do not just give it to a university, where they are going to allow any Tom, Dick, and Harry of a professor to do his own thing. "No, we want an integration."

As I warned, Mr. Morris, you see—he set me off, here.

Senator Watkins. I take it that is a pretty good plea for the university as against the foundation.

Mr. Rowe. Absolutely. And, as a matter of fact, I couldn't find a better illustration of the dangers of consistently over the years do-

nating very large sums of money to organizations, you see, for research purposes, than is involved in the very Institute of Pacific Relations itself. It is a fine illustration of the fact that power corrupts, and the more power you get the more corrupt you get.

Mr. MORRIS. Does the Far Eastern Association work with the Institute of Pacific Relations on such projects, or is their function different?

Mr. ROWE. There is a general coordination back and forth.

Mr. Holland, at the outset of the Far Eastern Association, was on their relevant committee having to do with publications. Well, any banker can recognize that this is an interlocking directorate. At this point, the Institute of Pacific Relations, in coordination with the Far Eastern Association, has a great deal of influence in the field of publication, you see. Not so much sponsorship of research by local grants, and so on. They do some of that, too. But if you want to get your book published, you go to them, you see, and ask them for a subsidy to get it put out. This is done quite a bit. That shows an interrelationship between these two organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what part does Mortimer Graves have in the general field of grants and research?

Mr. ROWE. Well, Mr. Graves is connected with and has been for years, the American Council of Learned Societies. This is an organization with offices in Washington, and it is a council in which the interests of all the various learned societies are promoted and advanced.

For a long time, particularly in the early phases of the development of far eastern studies in the United States, Mr. Graves occupied an important position there, because of his interest in the training of people to become far eastern specialists.

Some subsidies are still given to people of this kind through the Council of Learned Societies, but this is now merely a trickle to what it used to be, and proportionately it is a minor proposition. Most of the subsidies are now given otherwise.

I will say that the biggest single subsidizer of recent far eastern studies has been the United States Government, through the GI bill of rights. That is a fact. But that is now running out.

Mr. MORRIS. Professor Rowe, has Mortimer Graves, to your knowledge, been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. ROWE. I don't know much about any activity he had in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. He is a member of the present board of trustees, is he not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. ROWE. He is very closely involved in anything having to do with the far eastern field, far eastern studies. He knows all the people.

For years, he used to keep a card file of people in the field at varying stages in their preparation, and during the time when universities were expanding in this field, that is, when the university would want to set up a department or get a man in this field, they would often be referred directly to Mr. Graves for recommendations of personnel. And he did a very efficient job of keeping records along this line.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any inducement ever made to you in connection with your membership in the Institute of Pacific Relations that would indicate it would be favorable to you to——

Mr. Rowe. Well, I would say this. I was indoctrinated at some point in my education with a general distaste for joining many organizations. I have a feeling I got this from my former professor of politics at Princeton, Prof. William Starr Myers. But wherever I got it, it is a fact. And when I first came back from China and entered into my first academic job in Princeton in 1938, I refrained from joining the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I was approached and invited, but I refrained from joining. And I will say that the only reason I ever did join was on account of a letter I got from Mr. Lockwood, who was then in the organization, the general tenor of which was that young people just starting out in the far eastern field are "well advised to become a member of this organization." It was a very genteel statement, but the meaning of it was quite obvious. And I joined only because I got that letter. It is the sort of a letter that a young man beginning in a profession can hardly afford to disregard. Five dollars a year to protect yourself? O. K. You pay. You join. That is the only interest I had at the time.

I later got involved in the organization, and as I told you this morning became a member of the board of trustees in 1947. But in 1938, well, $5 was pretty important to me in those days. On a salary of $2,000 a year, I didn't join more organizations than I had to.

Senator Watkins. You were not a professional joiner, then, at that time?

Mr. Rowe. No, sir.

Senator Watkins. We have had some witnesses who apparently did not take that course.

Mr. Rowe. I only belong to two professional organizations now, the Political Science Association and the Far Eastern Association.

Senator Watkins. I would like to ask your age.

Mr. Rowe. I was born in October 1905, which makes my next birthday coming up 47.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else in your experience that you think should be added to our record with respect to our inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Rowe. Let me take a moment to think that over, and see.

Mr. Morris. Have you told us completely about your experiences with INDUSCO?

Mr. Rowe. Oh, by far not completely, but I think I brought in the significant element.

I do think there is one thing I ought to take care of if I haven't done so already. And I don't believe I have entered this.

Two years ago, almost precisely 2 years ago, dated March 27, 1950, I got a letter from Professor Fairbank, circulated as a personal letter to various friends and colleagues in far eastern studies, and marked "Urgent" in capital letters, requesting that I write a testimonial in favor of Professor Lattimore. Did I mention that this morning?

Mr. Morris. Yes; you did.

Mr. Rowe. I wanted to cover that, to be sure that it was taken care of, precisely what I said at that time.

Senator Watkins. What did he ask you to do? Just a generalization is all that we have for the record, I think, at this time.

Mr. Morris. Professor Rowe, will you put your answer in the record?

Mr. Rowe. I would be glad to put in, first, the invitation, second, the copy of the letter that Fairbank himself sent to Senator Tydings, and third, my reply to the letter from Dr. Fairbank. I will put that all in the record, if you want.

Mr. Morris. Yes; please do.

Mr. Chairman, may that be received?

Senator Watkins. They may be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 615, 616, 617" and are as follows:)

Exhibit No. 615

127 Littauer Center, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass., March 27, 1950.

Urgent

A Personal Letter to Various Friends and Colleagues in Far-Eastern Studies

Dear Dave: Having known Owen Lattimore pretty well since 1932, I am naturally appalled at McCarthy's reckless and irresponsible name-calling and I have no doubt that Owen will give a good account of himself when he gets back from Afghanistan early in April.

Personally, I am thoroughly convinced that Owen Lattimore is a completely loyal American. I imagine McCarthy can extract sentences from his voluminous writings which, out of context, may sound "pro-Soviet" on some points or issues, since Owen has expressed himself freely on many controversial subjects and is creative rather than orthodox in his thinking; but this is far different from being actually "pro-Soviet" or disloyal to our country.

It seems to me all of us in the far-eastern field face the prospect that McCarthy's smear tactics in this one case may make our proper professional work more difficult for all of us. If Owen Lattimore, a leader in American research and writing on Asia and a member and officer of bodies like the Far Eastern Association and the Institute of Pacific Relations, remains publicly besmirched as of doubtful loyalty, the taint can easily spread to those of us who know him personally and/or professionally and we can all be put on the defensive in our efforts to contribute to realistic public understanding of our urgent Asiatic problems. If American scholars are intimidated or put under public suspicion, in their study of Asia, it can contribute to great disasters for the American people, in their difficult relations with Asia.

Naturally, if McCarthy produces some new and convincing evidence about Owen to support his sensational charges, I would rely on our government's appropriate action to judge the case on its merits. But if Owen is to be judged by the record of what he has said and written over the years, I feel a deep obligation to testify in some way concerning this record. After all, those of us in the field of Far Eastern studies are in a position to judge Owen's published views professionally, as Senators and the press and the public are not. It seems to me we owe it to our profession (to say nothing of the personal interests of Owen Lattimore and of ourselves as individuals), to put our individual opinions on record. Our primary object should not be to help a friend (though this may be a strong sentiment with you, as it is with me), but to help our country and perform our proper function as citizens who are also professional workers. If Owen's writings have been anti-American, disloyal, or the like, in our opinion as students of the Far Eastern scene, we should let our government and the American public know this opinion. Similarly, if we do not think he has been "pro-Soviet," as far as we can judge, we should let this be known.

I therefore urge that you state your opinion for public record at once in a letter to Senator Millard E. Tydings, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. Since his mail is already mountainous, it would help even more if you would send a carbon copy of your letter to Owen's attorney, Mr. Abe Fortas, firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter, Ring Building, Washington, D. C.

Sincerely yours,

John K. Fairbank,
Professor of History, Harvard University.

EXHIBIT No. 616

MARCH 27, 1950.

COPY FOR YOUR INFORMATION

Senator MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: Senator McCarthy's allegation that Owen Lattimore is a "top Soviet agent" seems to me completely incredible, on the basis of my long acquaintance with Mr. Lattimore and with his writings. I have specialized on Chinese history since 1929, have known Owen Lattimore since 1932, and in the course of my professional work have had occasion to read a very considerable amount of what he has written, both in books and in articles. I have also heard him speak many times and have had conversations with him many times. I have never heard him express views or make statements which were disloyal in character, and I firmly believe him to be a thoroughly loyal and law-abiding American citizen who is devoted to the free, democratic way of life of this country.

Among his writings, I recall having read in particular The Desert Road to Turkestan, High Tartary, Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict, The Mongols of Manchuria, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Solution in Asia, Situation in Asia, and Pivot of Asia, the last of which (on Sinkiang province) I reviewed on the front page of the New York Herald Tribune Book Review two weeks ago. I have also read a great many of his articles in Pacific Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and other journals. I have not agreed with everything that Mr. Lattimore has said in this very extensive body of writing, but I am absolutely convinced in my own mind that its general tenor has been loyal and not disloyal to the United States and that it has not been "pro-Soviet" nor pro-Communist.

On the contrary, I regard Owen Lattimore as one of the most creative and independent-minded of American scholars on Asia. I further believe that his unusual capacity for thinking in terms of the broad and abstract principles of historical change and international relations, has undoubtedly led him to make statements in some of his books which can be extracted from their context and pointed to by some persons with suspicion, providing the context of such statements is disregarded. He has specialized (and I would say he has become a "national strategic asset") on the little-known frontier regions between Russia and China, where the Soviet record has to be compared with the Chinese record of recent years. As I have stated above, he has made some interpretative statements and comments with which I personally would not agree, but in no case have these statements seemed to me to involve disloyal, anti-American, or pro-Communist leanings.

Considering our urgent national need, in the dire struggle against Russia in Asia, for expert knowledge of Asia such as Mr. Lattimore demonstrably possesses, it seems to me the national interest demands that the accusation of disloyalty against him be thoroughly investigated and publicly disproved, as I am confident it will be, so that his future usefulness to his country will be impaired as little as possible.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK,
Professor of History, Harvard University.

EXHIBIT No. 617

Professor J. K. FAIRBANK,
127 Littauer Center, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR JOHN: I received your round-robin letter of March 27 and the enclosure of the same date. I subsequently received from you the copy of Paul Linebarger's letter to Senator Tydings, all these documents having to do with the case of Owen Lattimore and the investigation of him initiated at the suggestion of Senator McCarthy.

I would like to indicate to you my view on the subject of your letter. Senator McCarthy may fail to prove his charges against Owen Lattimore. However, I must confess complete ignorance on the question of his most serious charges. I am certainly not qualified to state anything, either pro or con on the question of whether Owen is a Communist agent or not. I suppose that the investigation is intended to bring out proof one way or the other on this question. Since, however, I have practically no contacts which would provide me with any evi-

dence on affiliation of this kind one way or another, I believe I am completely disqualified to write Mr. Tydings a letter, since such a letter would be based upon subjective impression or belief, and not upon knowledge or facts in the case. Any such letter might lay me open to a charge of participating in an attempt to establish "innocence by association."

On this matter of subjective impression or belief. I would personally tend to follow your opinion that Owen Lattimore is a completely loyal American. This has nothing to do with whether Lattimore's writings or public utterances contain material which duplicates the Soviet line on Far Eastern Affairs, a subject on which I have as yet seen no evidence of careful, scientific investigation as a basis of generalized statement. Along this line, I would like to say that the second paragraph of your round-robin letter seems pretty much beside the point. The question of whether McCarthy can extract sentences from Lattimore's writings which, "out of context", might sound "pro-Soviet on some points of issue," at least *out* to be completely irrelevant to your case. It does seem to me that the McCarthy investigation so far, as it relates to Lattimore, has stressed this sort of thing, without, however, basing evidence upon any scientific content—analysis of Lattimore's writings.

The investigation now seems to have shifted to the question of whether Lattimore has had formal or direct affiliations with, or disciplined subordination to, established agents or agencies of the Russians. This sounds too fantastic to possibly be true. But as I said before it is a subject on which I personally have no information that I could offer Senator Tydings and his committee as evidenced one way or the other. Therefore, I believe the only course of action is to wait for the results of the committee investigation. If, as Owen claims, McCarthy's charges will fall flat on their face, all well and good. If, on the other hand, these charges should be proved then the fullest possible opportunity ought to be given for such proof to be submitted.

As far as Linebarger's letter of March 27 is concerned, I am fully in agreement with his views of Owen Lattimore's ideas on our Far Eastern policy. I must, however, state that in my opinion the third paragraph of his letter is completely irrelevant. Linebarger has used the old tactic, the reverse of the "guilt by association" idea, that of reduction to absurdity. The investigation itself may quite possibly reduce McCarthy's charges to absurdity, but Linebarger's efforts to do so in advance of the submission of whatever evidence there is, are to say the least, completely premature.

There is also no question but that an investigation of this kind may quite conceivably result in injury to an innocent person. If and when these charges against Lattimore are proved groundless, then I believe that the final paragraph of Linebarger's letter calling for a resolution of apology by the Senate to each individual who has been injured by this investigation, would become quite relevant.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID N. ROWE,
Professor of Political Science.

Mr. ROWE. These are stenographic copies I hasten to add, that is, copies from the originals. They are not photostatic copies. I have every reason to believe they are reasonably accurate.

Senator WATKINS. You have seen the originals, and you have read them through to see that they conform?

Mr. ROWE. You might find a few commas out of the way, but by and large, I believe the secretary did a pretty good job.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you able to testify that at that time Dr. Fairbank was organizing a defense for Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. ROWE. It seems to me the plain implication from this. He circulated this around to, as he said, friends and colleagues in the far eastern studies. And he asked us to write letters to attorneys for Professor Lattimore supporting Lattimore. And my answer I characterized this morning, and it is embodied in this document.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WATKINS. I have none, either.

I want to thank Professor Rowe for coming here. I think he has given us a very intelligent discussion of the subject matter.

Mr. ROWE. I am glad to be of any service possible.

I think this is a very important investigation.

Senator WATKINS. I am not attempting to give any judgment as to the weight that ought to be given to your various conclusions, Mr. Rowe.

Mr. ROWE. I understand that, sir.

Senator WATKINS. But I think you have been fair and you have been responsive to the questions we have asked.

Mr. ROWE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Professor Rowe, this will be returned to you in its original form. That is the Welles' article.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:45 p. m., Thursday, March 27, 1952, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Friday, March 28, 1952.)

88348—52—pt. 11——21

INDEX TO PART 11

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

Page

Abend ---- 3923
Aberle, Dr. David F ---- 3961
Acheson, Dean (Secretary of State) ---- 3813, 3955–3956, 3986, 3993
Adler, Solomon ---- 3903, 3983
Afghanistan ---- 3909, 4028
Agrarian Institutes ---- 3934
Agrarian Problems in Southwest China ---- 3916
Agrarian Reformers ---- 3798, 3815, 3895, 3981
Alcatraz ---- 3919
Alexander ---- 3922
All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries ---- 3934
Allen, G. C ---- 3867
Allen, George ---- 3997, 3998
Allen, James S. (Sol Aurbach (?)) ---- 3842
Alley, Rewi ---- 3791, 3793, 4002
Allied Labor News ---- 3903
Allison, John ---- 3894, 3900
Alsberg, Cary L ---- 3857, 3932
Amendments (first and fifth) ---- 3959
Amerasia ---- 3887
America and the Far Eastern War, World in Arms ---- 3884
American ---- 3723–3726, 3748, 3757, 3767, 3782–3783, 3797, 3802, 3810, 3812, 3814, 3816, 3850, 3856–3857, 3864, 3866, 3874, 3876, 3879, 3882, 3917, 3932, 3942, 3974, 3989, 4002, 4007, 4021, 4023, 4028–4030.
American Communists ---- 3790, 3856, 3873, 3895
American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. (*See* INDUSCO.)
American Council of Learned Societies ---- 4026
American Council on Education ---- 3880, 3887–3888
American Freedom and Catholic Power ---- 3830
American Historical Association ---- 3969, 4011
American Labor Party ---- 3841
American Military Adviser Group in China. (*See* MAGIC.)
American Oriental Society ---- 3969, 3971
American People's Fund ---- 3879, 3880, 3888–3889, 4011
American Policy in the Far East ---- 3883
American Political Science Association ---- 3767, 3969, 4027
American President Lines ---- 3879
American Publication Service of the American Embassy ---- 3803
American Youth for Democracy (AYD) ---- 3823–3824, 3843
Amsterdam ---- 3934
Amsterdam News ---- 3845–3846
Amtorg Trading Corp ---- 3928–3929
Anglo-French Negotiations ---- 3931
Anglo-Japanese Struggle for the World Markets ---- 3935
Ankara, Turkey ---- 3757
Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science ---- 3981, 3986
APO (Army Post Office) ---- 3939
Archbold, Mrs. Anne ---- 3794

Page
Arita 3931
Arndt, Dr. C. O 3964
Arnold, Fortas & Porter 4028
Aronson, Jack 3840
Asia 3767–3768, 3771, 3811–3812, 3815–3816, 3863, 3866, 3881–3882, 3885, 3887, 3893, 3908–3909, 3926, 3943, 3946–3947, 3955, 3959, 3970–3971, 3986, 3991, 3994, 4028–4029.
Asia Institute 3903
Asia's Captive Colonies 3880
Asiatic 3758, 3815, 3947, 3957, 3990, 4005
Atkinson, Brooks 3757
Atkinson, Ellen 3903, 3964
Atlas of Far Eastern Politics 3937
Austin, Dr. William M. 3961
Australia 3851, 3881, 3936
Australian railways 3936
Austern, Hilda 3859

B

Badger, Vice Adm 3838
Baie de Cam Ranh 3936
Bailie Memorial Technical Training School 3792–3793
Baker, Newton D 3851, 3857, 3881
Baldwin, Hanson 3801
Ballantine, Joseph W 3894, 3900
Baltic countries 3944
Bangkok 3815, 3936
Bank of China 3950
Barnes, Joseph F 3854, 3883, 3896, 3907, 3941
Barnes, Kathleen 3775, 3929
Barnett, Patricia 3964
Barnett, Robert W 3964, 3983
Barr, Maj. Gen. David 3994
Barrett, Edward W 3998
Berger, Milton 3964
Bassett, Ted 3826
Batangas Province 3815
Baxter, Dr. James Phinney 3805
Beech, Ethel 3841
Behind the Open Door 3943
Bentley, Elizabeth T 3730–3731, 3733, 3755–3756, 3758, 3774, 3781, 3875
Bernstein, Joseph M 3943
Bessarabia 3944
Biggerstaff, Prof 3980, 3982, 3993, 4011–4012
Bingham, Robert C 3962
Bisson, T. A 3793, 3800–3804, 3883, 3895–3896, 3904, 3941, 3983, 4022
Black, Mrs. Hugo 3794
Blanchard, Paul 3830
Bliven 3923
Bloch, Kurt 3921
Bodde, Prof. Derk 4012
Book and Magazine Guild 3840–3841
Bordofsky 3828
Borodin, Michael 3907
Boston Post 3763
Boyden, Mrs 3964
Bradley, Rev. Dwight J 3793
Bridges, Senator Styles 3721
British 3788, 3813, 3837, 3922–3923, 3958–3959, 3973–3975, 3988–3989
British Embassy in Stockholm 3931
Brodie, Bernard 3992
Brooke, Raymond 3911
Brookings Institution 3886
Brooklyn, N. Y 3903
Browder, Earl 3843, 3956, 3966

Page
Brown, Percy S---- 3794
Brown, William---- 3964
Bruce---- 3923
Bruening (former German Chancelor)---- 3917
Bryn Mawr College---- 3862
Bucholt, Joe---- 3846
Buck, J. Lossing---- 3867, 3989
Buck, Pearl---- 3801–3803
Budenz, Louis--- 3760–3763, 3769–3770, 3773, 3778–3781, 3905, 3941–3942, 3944, 3947
Bulgaria---- 3942
Burks, Ardeth W---- 3964
Burma---- 3837, 3936, 3946
Burns, Elizabeth---- 3964
Butler, Dr. Nicholas---- 3883
Butterworth, Walter---- 3894, 3900, 3992-3993, 3995, 3998

C

California---- 3831, 3904, 3961, 4010, 4011–4012
California Committee on Un-American Activities---- 4011
California Labor School Bookshop---- 3830
California Legislature---- 4010
Cambridge, Mass---- 3715, 3726, 3757, 3792, 3797, 3812, 3818–3819, 3821, 3851, 3903, 3938, 3939, 3969, 4028, 4029
Cambridge University, England---- 3903
Cammann, Mr. Schuyler---- 3961
Camp Sherwood, Monticello, N. Y---- 3825
Camp Unity Book Shop---- 3825
Canada---- 3851, 3881, 3919, 3946, 3973
Canadian Institute of International Affairs---- 3906
Canadian Legation (Washington)---- 3965
Canberra---- 3880
Canning, William Martin---- 3958, 3962–3963
Canton-Hankow Railroad---- 3810
Capital Preparatory Committee---- 3950–3951
Carlson, Evans F---- 3835–3836, 3983
Carnegie Corp---- 4023
Carpenter, J. Henry---- 3794
Carter, E. C---- 3724, 3738–3753, 3742–3743, 3755, 3778, 3806–3807, 3854, 3858–3859, 3868, 3882, 3909, 3910, 3913–3918, 3920–3932, 3934, 3937–3938, 3940, 3966, 3976, 3982, 3989–3990
Carter, Mrs. E. C---- 3737
Carter, Miss Ruth---- 3860, 3886
Catholic Church---- 3830
Central Bank of China---- 3903
Central Daily News---- 3786
Central Executive Committee (CEC)---- 3802, 3804
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)---- 3763–3764
Chamberlin, William Henry---- 3943
Chamber of Commerce (Moscow)---- 3934
Chambers, Whittaker---- 3828
Chang, Chih-yi---- 3961
Chang, Nai-chi---- 3951
Changing China---- 3943
Chapman, Abraham---- 3903
Charles, Mrs. Alfred D---- 3964
Chatham House (London)---- 3922, 3927–3928
Chen, Han-seng---- 3790–3791, 3859–3860, 3874, 3903, 3910–3911, 3916–3918, 3938–3939, 3951–3952, 3961, 3983, 4002–4003
Chen, P. T---- 3916
Chen, Dr. Ta---- 3791, 3938
Chen, Wei-chi---- 3951
Chen, Y. G---- 3794, 3914, 3916
Chennault, Maj. Gen. Claire L. (retired)---- 3805
Chi, Dr. Ch'ao-ting---- 3737–3738, 3860, 3874, 3899, 3903, 3913–3918, 3949–3952

Page
Chi, Harriet Levine---- 3949–3953
Chiang, Kai-shek Generalissimo---- 3791, 3800–3802, 3804, 3811, 3814–3815, 3826, 3836, 3876, 3880, 3931, 3938, 3945, 3977, 3993, 4004
Chien, Prof. Tuanshend---- 3939
China---- 3725–3726, 3728, 2730–3731, 3735, 3738, 3740–3741, 3746, 3747, 3752, 3757–3758, 3767, 3782–3783, 3785–3788, 3791, 3798, 3796–3801, 3803, 3804, 3807–3814, 3817, 3821, 3829–3831, 3837–3840, 3851, 3855, 3865, 3867, 3870–3872, 3874, 3876, 3880–3881, 3885, 3892, 3897, 3903, 3906, 3909, 3910, 3911, 3914–3917, 3920, 3923, 3929, 3936, 3945–3947, 3949–3952, 3958, 3962, 3966, 3968–3969, 3976–3977, 3979–3980, 3987, 3990–4009, 4024, 4025, 4027, 4029.
China Aid Council---- 3730, 3732–3738, 3757–3759, 3790
China—America's Ally---- 3880
China Among the Powers---- 4004, 4006–4007
China Daily News---- 3788, 3833, 3834, 3950, 3951
China Digest---- 3826
China Export & Import Co---- 3951
China League for Civil Rights---- 3766
China Plans for the Future---- 3800
China Policy, in search of---- 3813, 3814, 3817
China Today---- 3832, 3836, 3839, 3843, 3874, 3906
China Yesterday and Today---- 3943
China Welfare Appeal and China Welfare Fund---- 3736, 3757–3758
China's New Democracy---- 3829, 3832, 3839
China's Part in a Coalition War---- 3895, 3896, 3904
China's Wartime Activities---- 3799–3800
China's Wartime Politics---- 3795, 3796, 3939
Chinese Communuist---- 3730, 3739, 3746, 3782, 3783, 3790, 3792, 3797–3800, 3811–3816, 3829, 3837, 3860, 3875, 3895, 3911, 3945, 3980–3981, 3983–3987, 3990, 3994, 3996–3997, 3999–4000, 4002–4004
Chinese Communist Government---- 3731, 3800, 3803–3804, 3860, 3876, 3911, 3913, 3945, 3950, 3961, 4002, 4005, 4010
Chinese Communist Guerrillas---- 3766
Chinese Economic Society---- 3951
Chinese Government and Politics---- 3939
Chinese Hand Laundrymen's Association---- 3834
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. (*See* INDUSCO.)
Chinese Ministry of Finance---- 3883
Chinese National Cooperative Association---- 3951
Chinese National Industrial and Commercial Association---- 3950–3951
Chinese Nationalist Army---- 3804
Chinese Nationalist Delegation at the United Nations---- 3939
Chinese Nationalist Government---- 3737, 3767, 3787, 3788, 3794, 3797, 3800–3801, 3804–3805, 3895, 3897, 3904, 3930, 3945, 3947, 3977, 3981, 3985–3986, 3991–3995, 3997, 4001–4002, 4004, 4007, 4009, 4010
Chinese Nationalist Minister in Korea---- 3939
Chinese Nationalist Revolution---- 3907, 3981
Chinese Navy---- 3838
Chinese People's Bank---- 3951
Chinese Trade Union Association---- 3951
Christian Church (China)---- 3792
Chu, Teh General---- 3767, 3836
Chuchow (China)---- 3936
Chungking---- 3737, 3758–3759, 3790, 3801–3803, 3806, 3874, 3880, 3916, 3931, 3938–3939, 3968, 3986, 3998, 4001, 4007–4009
Churchill, Winston---- 3942
Civil Rights Congress---- 3834, 3841
Civil Works Administration---- 3907
Clark, Elizabeth Allerton---- 3943
Clark, Evans---- 3794
Clement, Harry G---- 3794
Clubb, O. Edmund---- 3983

Page
Cogitations of a Spy ---- 3758
Cohn, Dr. Alfred E ---- 3794
Colegrove, Prof. Kenneth ---- 3883
Colins, Ralph E ---- 3965
College of the City of New York ---- 3963
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) ---- 3882
Columbia University ---- 3842, 3868, 3883, 3958, 3962–3963, 4023
Columbia University—Graduate History Club ---- 3962
Cominform Journal ---- 3828
Committee Against American Intervention in China ---- 3839
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy ---- 3738, 3804, 3825–3827, 3832, 3834, 3835, 3836, 3838–3839, 3841, 3911
Communism in China and the New American Approach to Asia ---- 3758
Communism in Indo China ---- 3972
Communist ---- 3721, 3723–3726, 3731–3732, 3737–3739, 3741, 3748–3749, 3767–3768, 3798, 3800, 3808, 3813, 3873–3877, 3892, 3894, 3912, 3924, 3931, 3960, 3989–3991, 3994–3995, 3999–4000, 4004, 4006, 4008, 4015, 4019–4021, 4028–4029.
Communist Case in California ---- 3718
Communist Party ---- 3726, 3731, 3733, 3824–3825, 3827, 3829, 3831, 3836, 3874, 3891–3892, 3899, 3904, 3905, 3944, 3953, 3958–3962, 4015
Communist Party Book Club ---- 3836
Communist Youth Movement in New York State ---- 3846
Compton, Karl T ---- 3794
Comstock, Ada L. (Notestien) ---- 3859, 3868
Conant, James Bryant ---- 3751, 3812
Congressional Record ---- 3721–3723
Cook, Admiral Charles Maynard ---- 3813
Cooke, Morris L ---- 3794
Coolidge, Mrs. John G ---- 3794
Coordinator of Information (COI) ---- 3805, 3817, 3958, 3963, 3967–3968, 4009
Corbett, P. E ---- 3751, 3860, 3869, 3886, 3973
Cornell University ---- 3980
Corttneff, Irene ---- 3964
Cottrell, Nicholas ---- 3964
Coughlin, Edward J., Jr ---- 3812
Council on African Affairs ---- 3834, 3841
Counselor with Ministerial Rank ---- 3788
Coville, Mrs. Cabot ---- 3964
Coy, Mrs. Wayne ---- 3794
Coy, Wayne ---- 3794
Cradle of Conflict ---- 4029
Craigie ---- 3931
Crane, Esther ---- 3964
Cripps, Sir Stafford ---- 3931–3932
Crockett National Bank ---- 3879
Crouter, Errol Edgerton ---- 3794
Currie, Lauchlin ---- 3805–3806, 3887, 3956, 3983
Currie, Mrs. Lauchlin ---- 3794
Curtis, Frances ---- 3793
Czarowska, Mrs. Marta ---- 3936
Czechoslovakia ---- 3942

D

Dafoe, Dr. John W ---- 3751, 3881
Daily Worker ---- 3828, 3835, 3843, 3846, 3847, 3956, 3957
Davies, John P ---- 3763–3766, 3771, 3772, 3983, 3986, 3993
Davis, Lord ---- 3850
Davis, Michael M ---- 3794
Dayton News ---- 3847
Dean, Mr. Arthur ---- 3920
Deane, Hugh ---- 3775
DeCaux, Len ---- 3775, 3964
Decker, J. W ---- 3794

Page
DeFrancis, Dr. John 3961
DeLacey, Hugh 3794
Demorest, Dana J 3794
Denison, Ellery 3964
Dennison, Eleanor 3964
Dennett, Raymond 3798, 3942, 3945, 3978
Dennett, Dr. Tyler 3798, 3945
Department of the Army 3758
Department of Justice 3897, 3968
Department of State 3738, 3740, 3746, 3763–3765, 3786, 3806, 3808, 3813, 3816, 3883, 3884–3887, 3894, 3945, 3956, 3957, 3965, 3966, 3968, 3986, 3987, 3989–3992, 3995, 3997, 3998, 4006, 4007, 4018.
Department of State—Cultural Relations 3887
Department of State—Division of Chinese Affairs 4006–4007
Department of State—Far Eastern Division 3740, 3883, 3884, 3894, 3992, 4030
Department of State—Policy Planning Staff 3986
Department of State—Under Secretary for Public Affairs 3968, 3997, 3998
der Tag 3878
de Scheinitz, Karl 3964
Desert Road to Turkestan 4029
Digby, Simon Wingfield 3934
Dimantshtein, S. M 3935
Disosway, General 3968
Domke, Captain 3964
Donovan, Gen. "Bill" 3801, 3958
Dooman, Eugene 3894, 3900
Doubleday Doran 3903
Downing, Miss 3937
DuBois, Joe (Josiah) 3964
Dulles, Foster Rhea 3943
Dulles, John Foster 3738
Dunn, Prof. Frederick Sherwood 4005, 4006, 4007
Durdin, Tillman 3757
Dutt, Mr 3970

E

East China Financial and Economic Council 3951
Eastern Germany 3942
Eastman, Nicholson J 3794
ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) 3947
Economic, Social, and Political Development of the Soviet Far East during the First and Second Five-Year Plan 3935
Economic Struggle on the Pacific Ocean 3935
Eighth Route Army 3836
Eliot, Thomas H 3794
Elliott, Bill 3887
Eltenton, Charles 3920
Eltenton, Dolly 3918, 3919, 3920
Ely, Gertrude 3794
Embree, John 4021
Emerson, Rupert 3883
England 3775, 3786, 3903, 3906, 3907, 3917, 3932, 3935, 3968
Eppeisheimer, Daniel S 3794
Epstein, Israel 3737, 3738, 3740, 3741, 3746–3748, 3754, 3785, 3790, 3791, 3829, 3830, 3831, 3834, 3840, 3899, 3903, 3938, 3939.
Espionage 3787, 3895, 3904
Establishment of the Autonomous Jewish District in Birobidjan 3935
Europe 3904, 3943, 3948, 3987, 4002
Executive Headquarters (Peiping) (U. S. Army) 3788

F

Faber & Faber 3937
Fahs 4011

Page
Fairbank, John K---- 3715–3822, 3902, 3903, 3938, 3980–3984, 3993, 4011, 4012, 4027–4029
Fairbank, Wilma (Mrs. John K.)---- 3766, 3771, 3794, 3887, 4012
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie (Mrs. Israel Epstein)---- 3737–3738, 3790-3791, 3874, 3903, 3917–3918, 3938–3939, 4002
Falk, Dr. and Mrs. Leslie---- 3964
Far East---- 3742, 3745, 3746, 3758, 3765, 3782, 3805, 3811, 3812, 3826, 3838, 3850, 3863, 3864, 3876, 3878, 3880, 3881–3887, 3892, 3894–3897, 3909, 3924, 3930, 3932, 3943, 3945, 3956–3958, 3964, 3969, 3970, 3972, 3974, 3982, 3985, 3986, 3987, 3989, 3992, 3994–3996, 3998, 4010, 4011, 4013.
Far East Spotlight---- 3827
Far Eastern Association---- 3891, 3957, 3969, 3971, 4010–4012, 4026, 4027
Far Eastern Quarterly---- 3969, 4012
Far Eastern Scholars---- 3891
Far Eastern Survey---- 3797, 3800–3803, 3865, 3880, 3885, 3895, 3896, 3904, 3970–3972, 4014, 4016, 4017.
Farley, Miriam S---- 3796, 3797, 3799, 3937, 4019, 4021
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)---- 3724, 3824, 3897
Felles---- 3966
Fellow-traveler---- 3732, 3738, 3747, 3877, 3898, 3984, 4019
Fetter---- 3883
Field, Frederick V---- 3775, 3776, 3777, 3834, 3843, 3844, 3854, 3856, 3858, 3859, 3862, 3864, 3868, 3870, 3871–3875, 3877, 3878, 3882, 3883, 3887, 3888, 3895, 3898, 3918, 3920–3922, 3928, 3929, 3976, 3983, 3988, 3989, 4012, 4015, 4017.
Frederick V. Field Library---- 3834, 3835
Field, Marshall---- 3793
Filipino---- 3814
Finkelstein, Moses (also Finley)---- 3962, 3963
Finland---- 3932, 3944
Finley, Mrs. John H---- 3794
Finley, Moses (*see* Moses Finkelstein)---- 3963
Finnish-Russian War---- 3931
First Five-Year Plan (Russian)---- 3943
Fisher, Mrs. Frederick B---- 3793, 4002
Fluegel, Dr. Edna R---- 3956
Flying Tigers---- 3805
Ford Foundation---- 3963
Foreign Affairs---- 3744, 3852, 4029
Foreign Policy Association---- 3796, 3885, 3886, 3895, 3939
Forer, Joseph---- 3949
Forman, Harrison---- 3829, 3831
Formosa---- 3811, 3931
Forsythe, Margaret---- 3794
Fortas, Abe---- 4028
Fox, Mrs. Manuel---- 3794
Friedman, Julian R---- 3883
Fulbright Act---- 3989
Furfey, Msgr. Paul Hanly---- 3794
Furnivall, J. S---- 3867

G

Galen---- 3919
Gandhi---- 3931
Gardner, Charles S---- 3793
Garfield, John---- 3794
Geiger, Theodore---- 3963
Geneva, Switzerland---- 3903
George Washington University---- 3989
Gerlach, Talitha---- 3793, 4002
German Foreign Office---- 3917
Germany---- 3785, 3810, 3917, 3932, 3944, 4024
GI Bill of Rights---- 4026
Giannini Foundation---- 3913, 3916, 3921, 3924, 3931, 3936
Gilbert, Frank B---- 3812

Page
Gilbert and Sullivan 3963
Gilchrest 3920
Glazebrook, George 3920
Glover, Clive E 3961
Godere 3793
Goodrich, L. Carrington 3794, 3923
Goshal, Kumar 3943
Gould, Randall 3983
Grad, Andrew. (*See* Grajdanzev, Andrew.)
Grady, Henry F 3880
Grady, Mrs. Henry F 3794
Grajdanzev, Andrew 3875, 3937, 3983, 4021
Grattan, C. Hartley 3943
Graves, Mortimer 3806, 4026
Great Britain (United Kingdom) 3851, 3865
Great Victories in China, and the New Dangers of American Inperialist Intervention, The 3826, 3839
Great Wall (China) 3094
Greece 3838
Greenberg, Michael 3794, 3860, 3875, 3903, 3923–3925, 3937, 3983
Greene, Jerome D 3849–3862, 3872, 3902, 3903
Greene, Miss Katrine R. C 3859, 3868, 3937
Greene, Roger S 3869, 3870–3872
Greenspan, Jack 3841
Greetings to the Liberation Fighters of China 3839
Grew, Ambassador Joseph C 3880, 3894, 3931
Gurney, Ronald W 3794
Guthrie, Anne 3794

H

Hale, William B 3794
Halifax, Cord 3931
Hall, Duncan 3964
Hamden, Conn 3967
Hamilton, Maxwell M 3883, 3884, 3894, 3900
Hammond, Mrs. John H 3794
Handbook to the Soviet Union or Russia 3835
Handy, Dr. E. S. C 3964
Handy, Mrs. E. S. C 3964
Hangchow (China) 3936
Hanoi 3999
Hanson, Haldore 3983
Hanwell, Norman 3921
Harcourt, Brace & Co 4004, 4007
Harmon, Francis S 3859, 3868
Harris, Helen M 3793
Harrison, Mrs 3964
Harvard Clubs, Associated in Chicago 3809
Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau of International Research 3883, 3887
Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.) 3727, 3728, 3729, 3730, 3730, 3751, 3758, 3771, 3797, 3812, 3821, 3850, 3883, 3903, 3917, 3923–3926, 3939, 3980, 3981, 3993, 4028, 4029.
Harvard University Press 3939
Harvard Crimson 3809, 3810, 3812
Hatta 3758
Hattery, Lowell H 3964
Hawaii 3745, 3851, 3882, 3907, 3927
Hayden 3883
Hayes, Carlton 3958, 3962
Hazard, John N 4005
Hearings on the Nomination of Philip C. Jessup 4014, 4017
Hedges, Marion H 3794
Herod, William R 3859, 3868
Hersey, John R 3794
Higgins, Mrs. Isabell 3964

Page
High Tartary 4029
Hinder, Mr 3919
Hindustan Times 3903
Hiss, Alger 3795, 3796, 3887, 3888, 3939, 3955, 3956, 3983
Hitler, Adolph 3917, 4024
Hobson, Dr., Rt. Rev. H. W 3794
Holbrook, William S., III 3812
Holcombe, Arthur N 3794
Holland, William L. (pseudonym—Sinicus) 3742, 3750, 3775, 3791, 3794, 3795, 3796, 3798, 3854, 3864, 3867, 3889–3948, 3970, 3972, 4010–4012, 4015–4017, 4021–4023, 4026.
Hong Kong 3757, 3791, 3826, 3903, 3910, 3912, 4002
Honolulu 3851, 3906, 3907, 3927, 3929
Hoover Library 3961
Hornbeck, Ambassador Stanley K 3894, 3900
Hsia, Dr. C. L 3896
Hsinhua (New China) News Agency 3950, 3951
Hso Ti-hsin 3951
Hsu, Y. Y 3860, 3876, 3899, 3903, 3913, 3914, 3915, 3952
Hu, Shih, Dr 3766, 3881, 3923, 3946
Hu, Chung-han Gen 3804
Hudson 3937
Huff, Henry 3905
Hukbalahap 4019, 4020
Hull, Cordell (Secretary of State) 3884
Hummel, Arthur W 3794, 3965
Hummel, Robert S 3965
Humelsine, Carlisle H. (Deputy Secretary of State) 3956, 3966
Hurley, Gen. Patrick J 3788, 3839, 4007–4008
Hutukhtu, Dilowa 3961

I

Ideological War Preparation in Japan 3935
India 3758, 3882, 3931, 3946, 3955, 3957–3959, 3963
India, Special Economic Mission to 3880
Indochina 3936, 3946, 3999, 4000
Indonesia 3814, 3816, 3837, 3957, 3974
INDUSCO, Inc. (American Committee for Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives) 3791–3794, 3939, 4001–4003, 4008, 4027
Ingraham, Mrs. Henry A 3794
Inner Asians Frontiers in China 4006, 4029
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) 3721, 3723–3725, 3738–3744, 3746, 3749–3754, 3765, 3774, 3775, 3777, 3778, 3784, 3785, 3792, 3794–3798, 3802, 3806, 3809, 3832, 3840–3842, 3849, 3850, 3852, 3853, 3855–3863, 3865–3874, 3877–3882, 3884–3887, 3890–3905, 3912–3943, 3950, 3952, 3957, 3959–3961, 3963–3965, 3969–3980, 3983, 3991, 4005, 4010–4015, 4018, 4019, 4022, 4023, 4026–4028.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 3743, 3753, 3775, 3797, 3798, 3859, 3862, 3865, 3870–3874, 3876, 3878–3881, 3883–3885, 3890, 3893, 3897, 3904, 3905, 3918, 3920, 3922, 3929, 3935, 3942, 3943, 3945, 3946, 3969, 3971, 3972–3979, 3981–3983, 3988, 3989, 4011, 4021, 4026.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American delegation to Atlantic City) 3975, 3976, 3980, 3987–3989
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Board of Trustees) 3870–3872, 3969, 3971, 3972, 3978, 3982
Institute of Pacific Relations (American officers in 1941) 3859, 3868, 3869
Institute of Pacific Relations (China Council) 3797, 3916, 3918, 3927, 3939, 3977
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Council) 3743, 3869, 3973, 3975
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat) 3860, 3872, 3917, 3922–3924.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japan Council) 3825, 3927, 3928
Institute of Pacific Relations (Mexico Council) 3924
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 3751, 3852, 3859, 3877, 3918, 3928–3920, 3934

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco office) 3918, 3932
Institute of Pacific Relations (Soviet Council) 3928, 3930, 3934–3936, 3977, 3978
Institute of Pacific Relations (Banff Conference) 3851, 3862, 3881
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference) 3870, 3973, 3975, 3988
Institute of Pacific Relations (Kyoto Conference) 3857
Institute of Pacific Relations (Mont Tremblant Conference) 3887, 3924, 3925, 3930, 3973
Institute of Pacific Relations (Stratford-on-Avon Conference) 3918
Institute of Pacific Relations (Virginia Beach Conference) 3881, 3917
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite Conference) 3881, 3883
Institute of Pacific Relations (History) 3881
Institute of Pacific Relations (Inquiry Series) 3880, 3924, 4014
Institute of Pacific Relations (Notes) 3934
Institute of Pacific Relations (pamphlet series) 4016, 4017
Institute of Pacific Relations (publications) 3887, 3892, 3893, 3897, 3927, 3935, 3970, 4015, 4017
Institute of Oceanography 3934
Institute of Scientific Publications of the Great Soviet World Atlas 3934
Institute of Soviet Construction and Law 3934
Institute of World Economics and World Politics of the Communist Academy 3934
Intelligence, Air Force 3968
Intelligence, Military Reserve 3968, 4001
Intelligence service (American) 3758, 4000
Interim International Information Service 3817
International Children's Emergency Fund 3931
International Economic Conference 3950, 3951
International General Electric Co 3868
International Journal 3906
International Labor Office 3851
International Peace Hospitals (IPH) 3758
International Publishers 3829
International Research Fund 3916, 3924
International Status of Manchoukuo 3935
Ives, Senator Irving M 3738

J

Jaffe, Philip J 3794, 4015, 4017
Jaffe, Mrs. Philip J 3793
Janow, Mr 3964
Japan 3758, 3785, 3801, 3804, 3810, 3811, 3814, 3817, 3851, 3857, 3865, 3867, 3870, 3876, 3881, 3882, 3885, 3907, 3909, 3910, 3912, 3917, 3919, 3929, 3936, 3944–3947, 3958, 3962, 3976, 3977, 3985, 3991, 3994, 4001, 4004, 4009, 4021
Japanese Cabinet 3850
Japanese Embassy in London 3925, 3926
Jefferson School Book Shop and Camp 3825, 3926
Jefferson School of Social Science 3825, 3829, 3832, 3833, 3835, 3843
Jenkins, D. R 3964
Jenkins, Shirley 3964
Jenkinson, Anthony 3794, 3903
Jessup, Philip C 3857, 3859, 3868, 3881, 3883, 3923, 3974, 3976, 3980, 3982, 3988, 3989, 4014, 4015, 4017
Jessup, Mrs. Philip C 3923
Johns Hopkins University 3924, 3957
Johnson, Hon. Nelson T 3794
Johnson, Mrs. Nelson T 3794
Johnstone, Mrs. Anne Hartwell 3794
Johnstone, William C., Jr 3794, 3965, 3989
Jones, Catesby 3961

K

Kahin, Mr 3961
Kane, Albert E 3794
Kantorovitch, A. J. 3927, 3928, 3930, 3934

Page
Kass, Rudolph 3812
Kattenberg, Dr. Paul 4018, 4019
Keliher, Alice V 3794
Keeney, Philip O 3775
Keeney, Mrs. Philip O. (Mary Jane) 3775, 3964
Keesing, Mr. and Mrs. 3907, 3909
Kennan, George 3986, 3987, 3990, 3995, 3996
Kennedy, Ray 3971
Kerr, Clark 3931
Kittredge, Mrs 3932
Kizer, Benjamin H 3859, 3868, 3896, 3904, 3905
Know Your Enemy—Japan 3882
Knox, Lucy 3906, 3907
Kohlberg, Alfred 3752–3754, 3920
Korea 3758, 3811, 3837, 3851, 3946, 3986, 3987, 3993–3996, 3999, 4000
Korean War 3968, 3981, 4000, 4001
Kowloon 3910
Kracke, Edward A., Jr 3964
Kramer, Aaron 3841
Kuling, China 3788
Kung, Dr. H. H 3737, 3791, 3874, 3939
Kunming 3806, 3916, 3936, 3939
Kuomintang Communist Relations 3800
Kuomintang Party (KMT) 3737, 3755, 3782, 3783, 3800, 3802, 3803, 3809, 3814, 3815, 3836, 3931, 3939
Kweilin 3790, 3791, 3936, 3937, 3939

L

L., Dr. Franklin 3910
Labor Youth League 3846
Lahey Clinic in Boston 3767
Lamb, Mrs. Helen 3967
Land Down Under 3943
Land of the Soviets 3896, 3941–3944
Landres, Mrs. Rose W 3859, 3869
Lane, Clayton 3878, 3894, 3982
Lang, Olga 3793
Larsen, Emmanuel S 3964
Lasker, Bruno 3884, 3907
Lasswell, Dr. Harold 3967
Latourette, Professor 3971, 3972
Lattimore, Owen 3718–3720, 3727–3729, 3741, 3753, 3793, 3818–3822, 3829–3831, 3877, 3880, 3899, 3907, 3909, 3923, 3950, 3952, 3955, 3958–3960, 3965, 3966, 3978, 3979, 3982–3984, 4001, 4005, 4009, 4012–4017, 4027–4030.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (nee Eleanor Holgate) 3793, 3819, 3943, 3979, 3983, 4002
Lawyer's Guild, National 3841
Leach, Mrs. Henry Goodard 3794
League of Nations 3851, 3930
League of Women Voters—National Council 3885
Legal Status of Aliens in the U. S. S. R 3935
Lehman, Governor 3887, 3888
Lenin 3739, 3944
Leo Jen-ming 3951
Letters from China 3826
Lewis, Fulton, Jr 3726
Li, Chu-chen 3951
Li, Peng 3786, 3787
Liberty Book Club 3836
Library of Congress (U. S.) 3786, 3787, 3805, 3950, 3951, 3965, 3967
Library of the Communist Academy 3929
Lieu, D. K 3916
Life Magazine 3801
Ligutti, Msgr. L. G 3794
Lithienthal, Philip 3918

Page
Lin, W. L---- 3910
Lin, W. Y---- 3916
Lindsay, Michael---- 3903, 3964, 3965, 3983
Linebarger, Paul---- 4029
Littell, Bishop S. Harrington---- 3793
Little, Herbert S---- 3902, 3903
Little Brown & Co---- 3739, 3842
Litvinoff, Maxim—Commissar of Foreign Affairs---- 3857, 3934
Liu, Ning-yi---- 3951
Liu, Tse-chiu---- 3951
Liu, Miss Wu-Kou---- 3791
Yiu, Yu-wan---- 3910, 3929, 3939
Livingston, Mrs. Goodhue---- 3794
Lockwood, William W---- 3807–3809, 3854, 3862–3889, 3902, 3903, 3965, 3966, 3980–3982, 4027
London---- 3880, 3903, 3907, 3909, 3927, 3929, 3931, 3932
Longfellow, Mrs. Frederick W---- 3794
Loomis, Mr---- 3909
Lorwin, Lewis---- 3964
Lothian, Lord---- 3917
Lowdermilk, W. C---- 3794
Loyalty and Security Boards---- 3724
Lu, Dr. Gweidjen---- 3794
Lu, Hsu-cho---- 3951
Luchnow, India---- 3866
Lushan, China---- 3788
Lytton Commission---- 3906

M

Ma Yin-Chu---- 3950, 3951
Macao---- 3910
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas---- 3811, 3875, 3942
MacVeagh, Ewen Cameron---- 3902
MAGIC (U. S. Military Advisor Group in China)---- 3837, 3994
Magill, Robert M---- 3964
Main Stream---- 3835
Maisky, Mr.---- 3931
Malaya---- 3837, 3946
Malayan and Thailand Railways---- 3936
Manchuria---- 3809–3811, 3836, 3838, 3979, 3981, 3986, 3994, 4004–4407, 4029
Manchurian and Korean lines---- 3936
Manchurian Incident---- 3906
Mandel, William M---- 3775, 3835
Mangahas, Mr---- 3917, 3918
Mao Tse-tung---- 3739, 3815, 3829, 3832, 3836–3837, 3839
Marks, Stuart---- 3849, 3862, 3889
Marshall, Gen. George C---- 3724, 3738, 3740, 3746, 3775, 3783, 3788, 3985, 3992, 4004
Marshall Plan---- 3837
Martin, Charles E---- 3883
Masselman, George---- 3964
Masselman, George---- 3964
Masses in Main Stream---- 3835
Mather, Rufus G---- 3794
Matsue, Mr---- 3937
Matsumoto, Mr---- 3925, 3926
Matusow, Harvey M---- 3824–3847
Mayeda, Mr---- 3925, 3926
Mayer, Col. and Mrs. William---- 3965
Mayfield, Arthur---- 3964
McCarran, Senator Pat---- 3797, 3891, 3896, 3955, 3956
McCarthy, Senator Joseph---- 4028, 4030
McGill University---- 3869
McGovern, Prof. William M---- 3727–3729, 3747
McIntyre, Harry---- 3842

Page
McNutt, Mrs. Paul V---- 3794
Medina, Judge (New York)---- 3718
Meet the Anzacs---- 3880
Melish, Rev. William H---- 3793
Menefee, Mrs. Audrey---- 3965
Menefee, Selden---- 3965
Meng, Yung-chien---- 3951
Menges, Dr. Karl H---- 3961
Michael, Dr---- 3962
Migration of Capital into Southwest China---- 3916
Militarism in Japan---- 3883
Military Weakness and Military Invention---- 3800, 3985, 3986
Miller, Mrs. Helen Hill---- 3794
Millikan, Clark B---- 3794
Millikan, Robert A---- 3794
Mindszenty, Cardinal---- 3942
Minister of Finance (Japanese)---- 3850
Ministry of Textile Industries (Chinese)---- 3951
Ministry of Trade (Chinese)---- 3951
Minor, Robert---- 3956
Minton, Justice Sherman---- 3777
Mississippi Valley Historical Association---- 3969
Mitchell, Kate L---- 3926, 3934, 3943, 4015, 4017
Modern Japan---- 3943
Moffatt, Abbot Low---- 3894, 3900
Mongolia---- 3909
Mongols of Manchuria---- 4029
Moore, Harriet L---- 3775, 3858–3860, 3862, 3868, 3888, 3908, 3909, 3929, 3930, 3933, 3934
Morris, G. W---- 3964
Morris, Homer L---- 3794
Morris, Stephanus V. C---- 3934
Morse, Senator Wayne---- 3738
Moscow---- 3815, 3828, 3857, 3880, 3892, 3908, 3909, 3927–3929, 3931, 3932, 3934, 3943, 3950, 3951, 4019
Moscow Daily News---- 3906, 3907
Moscow New Times---- 3758, 3767, 3768
Motion Picture Producers Association---- 3868
Motylev, V. E---- 3881, 3933–3935
Mount Holyoke College---- 3981
Moyer, Raymond---- 3965
Munson, Lyle M---- 3763–3766, 3771, 3772
Murray, Philip---- 3794
Myers, William Starr---- 4027

N

Nan, Han-cheng---- 3950, 3951
Nanking---- 3788, 3836, 3962, 3979, 3989, 3994
Nash, Walter---- 3881
Nation, The---- 3903
National Broadcasting System---- 3965
National Negro Council---- 3847
National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East and in the Northern Regions of Siberia---- 3935
National Preparatory Committee---- 3950, 3951
Nazi---- 3721, 3774, 3862, 3917, 3944
Negro Question in the United States---- 3843
Nehru---- 3931
Neiman Foundation---- 3757
Nelson, Banjamin---- 3963
Nelson, Carl---- 3965
Nesi, James---- 3825, 3826, 3832, 3836
Netherlands Indies---- 3881, 3936
New Century Publishers---- 3829
New China---- 3839
New China Daily News---- 3832–3834

Page
New Deal 3907
New Delhi 3880
New Democracies in China 3839
New Masses 3835, 3920
New People's Republic of China 3834
New York Herald Tribune 3755, 3828, 3883
New York Herald Tribune Book Review 4029
New York State 3824, 3826, 3828, 3836, 3839, 3958
New York State Communist Party 3835
New York Times 3741, 3744, 3757, 3828, 3938
New Zealand 3791, 3851, 3881, 3936, 4002
Next Step in Asia 3758, 3767
Ningpo, China 3936
Norma, Winifred 3841
North China 3757
Northwestern University 3727, 3729, 3979
Norway 3932
Nobel Fund, Trustees of the 3932

O

Oakie, John 3878, 3923
Oatis, William 3942
Obstacles to China's War Effort 3799, 3800
Office of Strategic Services 3805, 3807–3809, 3817, 3824, 3845, 3846, 3968, 3980, 3981, 4009
Office of War Information 3758, 3805, 3807, 3808, 3817, 3978
Ohio State Assembly 3823
Ohio Un-American Activities Commission 3823
Okinawa 3838
Oldham, Rt. Rev. G. Ashton 3794
Onon, Mr 3962
Osaka Building (Tokyo) 3927, 3934
Oslo, Norway 3932
Our Far Eastern Record 3880
Our Job in the Pacific 3832, 3896, 3946, 3947
Outline on the Significance of the Recent Events in China 3826
Owen, Henry 3965
Ozaki, Hotzumi 3785

P

Pacific 3856, 3857, 3863, 3865, 3866, 3867, 3880, 3881, 3929, 3935, 3943, 3945, 3968, 3985
Pacific Affairs 3728, 3775, 3865, 3888, 3907, 3918, 3923, 3978, 4014, 4015, 4017, 4029
Pacific coast 3851, 3879
Pacific Theater and War 3839, 3991
Page, Ann 3965
Pakistan 3955
Pardee, Ruth 3965
Parker, Philo W 3859, 3868
Pearl Harbor 3836, 3850, 3880, 3968, 3977, 3991, 4001
Peck, Graham 3794
Peffer, Nathaniel 3794
Peking 3727, 3729, 3747, 3766, 3813, 3814, 3821, 3826, 3836, 3870, 3950, 3951, 3969, 3979, 3980
Peking Union Medical College 3870
Peking University 3951
Pelzer, Dr 3962
People's China 3826
Peoples of the China Seas 3943
People's Liberation Army or Armies 3836
People's Songs, Inc 3841
Perkins, Eleanor 3965
Persia 3909
Philippines 3837, 3851, 3882, 3884, 3909, 3946, 4020

Page
Pierson, Mrs. Warren Lee 3794
Pinchot, Mrs. Gifford 3793
Pivot in Asia 3958, 3961, 4029
Point 4 3815
Poland 3931, 3942, 3944
Poland, Fred W 3903
Polish-Soviet delegation 3930, 3931
Political Affairs 3835, 3845
Political Consultative Conference 3788
Pollard, Dr. John A 3965
Pope, Arthur Upham 3794
Porter, Catherine 3937, 3963
Praesidium of the Soviet Council 3934
Price, Mildred (Coy) 3733, 3736, 3738, 3775
Princeton University 3869, 3883, 3903, 3968, 3977, 3979, 4027
Princeton University Press 3796, 3939
Principle of Economic Reconstruction in China 3916
Problem of Asia, The 4006
Problems of the Pacific 3933
Problem of Unification of China 3935
Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court 3932
Progressive Party Bookshops 3827, 3830, 3831, 3841
Pruitt, Ida 3793, 4002, 4003
Puerto Rico 3834

Q

Quigley 3993

R

Radcliffe College 3868
Rajchman, Dr. Ludwig 3930
Rand, Christopher 3742, 3757
Ratner, David L. 3812
Raushenbush, Stephen 3794
Rautenstrauch, Walter 3793
Reader's Digest 3801
Reasons of the Denunciation of the Washington Treaty and the Situation in the Far East 3935
Red Cross 3827
Red Star Over China 3829, 3831, 3840
Reischauer, Edwin O 3727, 3728, 3965
Relations between Japan and China during the World War 3935
Reporter, The 3813
Research and Analysis Branch of Strategic Services 3805, 3807, 3808, 3809
Results and Prospective Plans of Socialist Construction in the Soviet Far East 3935
Rex, steamship 3931
Rhodes scholar 3917
Rice, Edward 3965
Richardson, Gerald 3794
Ring, Mr 3962
Ringwait, Arthur 3965
Robeson, Paul 3835, 3842
Robeson, Paul, Jr 3842
Robinson, Dr. G. Canby 3794
Robinson, Jay 3965
Rockefeller Foundation 3795, 3850, 3887, 3916, 3969, 3998, 4021–4023
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research 3850
Roe, Gilbert E 3766
Rogers, Daisy Fiske 3794
Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin D 3794
Rosas, Sr. (Mexican Embassy) 3924, 3925
Rosen, Edward 3963
Rosinger, Lawrence D 3775, 3794–3796, 3895, 3939, 3980, 3981–3984, 4018, 4019, 4022, 4023

Page
Roth, Andrew 3903
Rowe, Prof. David 3967–4031
Rowell 3923
Royal Institute of International Affairs 3775, 3929
Rumania 3942
Russell, Francis 3992
Russia. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Russian 3767, 3768, 3782, 3811–3813, 3816, 3817, 3856, 3857, 3870, 3871, 3892, 3896, 3931, 3942, 3943, 3985, 3987, 3996, 3997, 4004, 4030

S

Sacks, Milton 3971, 3972
Saha, Art 3842
Saionji, Kimikazu 3925, 3983
Sako, John Kita 3965
Samoa 3909
Sandan Bailie School 3793
Sansome, Sir George 3920
Sarrant, Mr 3933
Sassaman, Mr 3965
Sayre, Mrs. Francis B 3794
Scharf, Lee 3824
Schraml, Mr 3962
Schumpeter, Mrs 3887
Schweinfurt 3811
Science and Society 3843
Secretary of State 3740, 3741, 3749, 3955, 3956, 3986, 3993
Seitz, H. F 3965
Service, John S 3983, 4001
Shahrir 3758
Shanghai 3757, 3766, 3814, 3838, 3857, 3881, 3903, 3919, 3929, 3997, 3998, 4000, 4003, 4009
Shanghai Industrial and Commericail Association 3951
Sharp, Lauriston 3965
Shattuck, Mrs. George C 3794
Sheean, Vincent 3794
Sheik, Julie 3824
Sheng Pi-hua 3951
Shepherd 3922
Shotwell 3923
Shridharani 3931
Siberia 3909, 3943, 3979
Sidwell, Alfred E 3793
Sigal, Marlowe A 3812
Significance of the Great Northern Sea Passage 3935
Silver Problem and the Colonial Countries in the Far East 3935
Simmons, William M 3812
Sinicus. (*See* W. L. Holland.)
Sinkiang 3931, 4005, 4007, 4029
Sino-Japanese War 3866
Situation in Asia 4029
Smedley, Agnes 3763, 3765–3767, 3831, 3840, 3909, 3912
Smith, Mr. and Mrs. Bowen 3965
Smythe, Lewis S. C 3794
Snow, Edgar 3765, 3829, 3830, 3840, 3983, 4002
Snow, Mrs. Edgar. (*See* Nym Wales.)
Social and Economic Consequences of the War and the Crisis in Japan 3935
Society for Cultural Relations 3857
Solution in Asia 3829, 3831, 3840, 3899, 4006, 4029
Soong, T. V 3800, 3939
Sorge, Richard 3785
Southeast Asia 3758, 3816, 3882, 3892, 3936, 3994
Southern Conference for Human Welfare 3735

Page
Southwest Associated University of Kunming ---- 3939
Soviet Union. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Soviet Ambassador (Chungking) ---- 3931
Soviet Consulate (New York) ---- 3928, 3929
Spitzer, H. M ---- 3965
Spotlight on Asia ---- 3880, 3882
Spotlight on the Far East ---- 3839, 3943
Sproul, Robert G. ---- 3857, 3859, 3868, 3881, 3920
Sprouse, Philip ---- 3992
Sprout, Harold ---- 3970
Spykman, Nicholas J ---- 3883
Stachel, Jack ---- 3905
Stalin ---- 3739
Stalin-Hitler Pact ---- 3856
Stalingrad ---- 3942
Stalinism ---- 3984, 3985
Standard Vacuum Oil Co ---- 3868
Standley, Admiral W. H ---- 3880
Stanford University ---- 3914, 3932
Starobin, Joseph ---- 3828
Stassen, Harold ---- 3991, 3992
State of Asia (symposium edited by Lawrence Rosinger) ---3795, 3895, 4018, 4022
State Department. (*See* Department of State.)
State Planning Commission in the Soviet Far East ---- 3935
Steele, A. T. (Arch) ---- 3731, 3742, 3755, 3756, 3757
Steiger, Andrew ---- 3903
Stein, Guenther ---- 3806, 3809, 3903
Stenhouse, John ---- 3965
Stevens ---- 3886
Stewart, Marguerite A ---- 3798, 3896, 3905, 3941, 3942, 3983
Stewart, Maxwell S ---- 3793, 3796, 3797, 3798, 3799, 3800, 3942, 3944, 3945, 3983
Stilwell, General Joseph ---- 3801, 3994
Stimson, Henry L. (Secretary of War) ---- 3816, 3876
Stone, Wm. T ---- 3883, 3885
Straight, Michael ---- 3794
Strong, Anna Louise ---- 3763, 3765–3766, 3828, 3903, 3979
Stuart, Ambassador Leighton ---- 3742, 3788
Study of Wartime Communications ---- 3967
Subversive Activities Control Board ---- 3719
Sun, Fo ---- 3742
Sun, Yat-sen, Dr ---- 3755, 3814, 3947
Sun. Yat-sen, Madame ---- 3730, 3731, 3734, 3742, 3755, 3757–3760, 3790
Sunday Worker ---- 3844
Supreme Board of the Great Northern Sea Passage ---- 3934
Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) ---- 3895
Swing, Betty Gram ---- 3794
Swing, Raymond Gram ---- 3798, 3799
Swope, Gerard ---- 3897

T

Takayanagi ---- 3933
Tarr, Dr ---- 3751
Tasks of All of the Clubs ---- 3826
Tass ---- 3828
Tawney, R. H ---- 3881
Taylor, Deems ---- 3794
Taylor, George E ---- 3805, 3817, 3943, 4012
Taylor, Margaret ---- 3931
Terlin, Rose ---- 3794
Thirty-eighth parallel ---- 3999
Thompson, Laura ---- 3965
Thornburg, Mrs. Pherbia ---- 3794
Thorner, Daniel ---- 3955–3966
Three Principles of the People ---- 3947
Tibet ---- 4005, 4007

Page
Tientsin Industrial and Commercial Association 3951
Tokyo 3855, 3907, 3925, 3926, 3927, 3929, 3930, 3931, 3934
Toledano, Lombardo 3924, 3925
Tomorrow's China 3827, 3828
Tong, Mr. Chu 3832, 3833
Townsend, Peter 3792, 3903
Trans-Siberian Railway 3936
Trials of the Soviet generals 3930, 3932
Truman Administration and Truman Policy 3838
Tsingtao 3838
Tsuru, Mr 3925
Tsuru, Mrs 3925
Tugwell 3883
Turkestan 3909
Turning Points in China 3829, 3832, 3837, 3839
Twentieth Century India 3943
Tydings Hearings 3960
Tydings, Senator Millard E 4028, 4029, 4030
Tyson, Russel 3794

U

Ukraine 3943, 3944
Ulanbator 3936
Unfinished Revolution in China, The 3738, 3829, 3840
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Russia) 3775, 3787, 3790, 3835, 3856, 3881, 3907, 3908, 3909, 3917, 3929, 3931, 3932, 3935, 3942, 3943, 3944, 3945, 3946, 3958, 3979, 3987, 3996, 4000, 4006, 4015, 4018, 4029, 4030.
Union Seminary, New York 3979
United China Relief 3730, 3734, 3880
United Front 3931
United Nations 3813, 3880, 3881, 3945, 3974
United Nations Economic and Social Council 3903
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 3991
United Office and Professional Workers Association 3840
United Revolutionary Front 3839
United States of America 3742, 3787, 3790, 3835, 3856, 3881, 3907, 3908, 3909, 3917, 3929, 3931, 3932, 3935, 3942, 3943, 3944, 3945, 3946, 3958, 3979, 3987, 3996, 4000, 4006,
United States Army G–2 (Intelligence) 3731
United States Army, Navy, Marines, Air Corps 3800, 3806, 3823, 3837, 3838, 3880, 3994, 4016
United States Congress 3769, 3779, 3944, 3956
United States Consulate General in Shanghai 3968
United States Embassy in China 3735, 3787, 3788, 3801, 3805, 3968, 3986, 4001, 4007, 4009, 4010
United States Far Eastern Policy 3721, 3891, 3894, 3896, 3897, 3900, 3956, 3970–3972, 4030
United States Government 3723, 3724, 3763. 3790, 3844, 3854, 3862, 3880, 3892, 3966, 3967, 3986, 4010, 4013
United States Government Agencies 3880, 3885
United States House Un-American Activities 3847, 3920
United States Information Services 3797, 3798, 3818, 3968, 3997, 3998, 4000
United States News and World Report 3896
United States Office of Education 3965
United States Senate 3722, 3818
United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee 3960
United States Senate Judiciary Committee 3862, 3889
United States Senators 3902, 3946
United States Supreme Court 3784
Universal Trading Corp 3913, 3914
University of California 3868, 3881, 3913, 3916, 3921, 3924, 3929, 3936, 4022, 4023
University College of Wales (England) 3850
University of Michigan 3985

Page
University of Nanking ... 3979
University of Pennsylvania ... 3903, 3955, 3957, 4012
Universtiy of Washington ... 3883
Urumatsu ... 3927, 3928, 3929
Ushiba ... 3925, 3926
Ussachevsky, Elizabeth ... 3965
Ussachevsky, Vladimir ... 3965
Uveda, T ... 3867
Uzebeks ... 3907

V

VJ-Day ... 3814
Vandenberg, Senator Arthur ... 3738–3740
Van Mook, H. J ... 3881
Van Zandt, J. Parker ... 3965
Veatch, Roy ... 3794, 3882
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade ... 3834
Viet-Nam ... 3816, 3837
Vinacke, Dr. Harold ... 3965
Vincent, John Carter ... 3738, 3740, 3796, 3799, 3939, 3983, 3986, 4001, 4004–4007
Voice of America ... 3968, 3997
Voitinsky, G. N ... 3934
Von Trott ... 3917
Voorhis, Jerry ... 3794
Vreeland, Mr ... 3962

W

Waibel, Mr ... 3962
Wales, Nym (Mrs. Edgar Snow) ... 3793, 4015, 4017
Walker, Richard ... 4014–4016, 4018
Wallace, Benjamin B ... 3965
Wallace, Henry ... 3832, 3837, 3946–3947, 4005, 4007
Walter Hines Page School (John Hopkins University) ... 3957, 3961
War Department ... 3872, 3965
War Minority and Capital ... 3843
Ward, Angus ... 3814
Ward, Mrs ... 3921
Ward, Prof. Harry ... 3979
Wartime China (by Maxwell S. Stewart) ... 3944–3946
Wartime China (book by Rosinger) ... 3796, 3799–3800, 3896
Washington Bookshop ... 3833
Washington, D. C ... 3771, 3795, 3807, 3809, 3814–3815, 3819, 3830, 3832, 3844, 3856, 3878, 3880, 3882–3888, 3931–3932, 3939, 3957, 3965, 3970, 3981, 3995, 4007, 4009, 4019, 4026, 4029
Watson, Clifford ... 3965
Watts, Richard, Jr ... 3793
Way, Madame Dow Ming ... 3737
Webb, Guy P ... 3965
Webster Publishing Co ... 3942–3943
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C ... 3994
Weigle ... 3992
Welles, Benjamin ... 3742
Welles, Sumner (Under Secretary of State) ... 3956
Welling, Mrs. John Paul ... 3794
Wells, Henry ... 4019, 4021, 4031
Western Powers ... 3867
Weyl, Nathaniel ... 3776, 3953
Wheeler, Mrs. S. M ... 3965
White House ... 3805–3806
White Paper on China ... 3813
Whitney, Gen. Courtney ... 3895
Whittlesay ... 3883
Wilbur, C. Martin ... 3793
Wilbur, Dr. Ray Lyman ... 3851, 3857–3859, 3868, 3881

Page
Wiener, Thomas ---- 3962
Wiley, Robert L., Jr ---- 3812
Willett, Mary Jane ---- 3794
Williams College ---- 3945
Willkie Award ---- 3767
Willoughby, Gen. Charles A ---- 3807–3808
Wilson, Geoffrey ---- 3931
Wilson, Woodrow ---- 3850
Winter, Ella ---- 3903
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl ---- 3875, 3917–3918, 3962, 3993
Women's University Club in New York ---- 3920
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ---- 3903
Worcester, Mass ---- 3870
Work Together ---- 3793
Workers Book Shop ---- 3825
World War II ---- 3823
Wright, Mrs. Quincy ---- 3794
Wright, Thomas ---- 3793

Y

Yakhontoff, Victor A ---- 3903, 3947
Yale Institute of International Studies ---- 3980, 3998, 4004–4006
Yale Press ---- 3971
Yale University (New Haven, Conn.) ---- 3751, 3883, 3967–3968, 3970–3973, 3992, 3998, 4014, 4019, 4021–4023.
Yalta Agreement ---- 3956, 4005–4006
Yalu River ---- 3994
Yanaga, Prof. Chitoski ---- 4021
Yangtze ---- 3838
Yangtze Valley ---- 4009
Yankee Stadium ---- 3827
Yardumian, Rose ---- 3792, 3903
Yarnell, Admiral Harry E ---- 3793
Yasuo ---- 3925–3926
Yen, W. W ---- 3881
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) ---- 3745, 3758, 3982
Yoshizawa ---- 3933
Young, Arthur ---- 3883
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) ---- 3964

Z

Zhdanov, A. A ---- 3839

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 12

MARCH 28, 29, 31, AND APRIL 1, 1952

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CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Bisson, Thomas Arthur	4159
Field, Frederick V	4033
Finley, Moses	4152
Friedman, Julian R	4289
Renwanz, Lt. Col. Rowland H	4072

ence would indicate something as to the circumstances. As I recall, the institute moved its office from East Fifty-second Street to its present address on Fifty-fifth Street, or whatever it is, at about that time. They moved into a smaller place. And I believe they asked a number of people if they had room to store a lot of excess files that apparently were not in current use, and it finally came around to me. I had nothing to do with this. I forget who asked me, somebody in the institute who was active in the administration at that time. And I did have a private house, and it has a substantial cellar in it. It was practically empty, and I agreed. Those are the circumstances in which the files were placed there.

Mr. Morris. I believe that Mr. Holland testified that in 1947 the bulk of them was taken away.

Mr. Field. I remember at that time, if that was 1947, that I believe I wrote a letter to the then Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, Mr. Lane.

Mr. Morris. Clayton Lane?

Mr. Field. Clayton Lane, yes—requesting him to remove the files, because they at that time were cluttering up my place and I didn't want them. And after some time I thought they had been taken away. I believe I was away on the west coast or somewhere at the time they came down to remove them. And I remember not checking whether they were all removed or not, and then discovering very much later that some of them had been left there. And I think from there on——

Mr. Morris. What happened when you discovered there was some left?

Mr. Field. I telephoned Mr. Holland.

Mr. Morris. You went to his office and told him?

Mr. Field. Or went there and told him.

Mr. Morris. On a Saturday morning?

Mr. Field. Well——

Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Holland come down to your home then and go through the files?

Mr. Field. He came down and verified them that they were there, and some days later, I forget when it was, he took them——

Mr. Morris. How much time did he spend in your basement at that time?

Mr. Field. Mr. Holland?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Field. I don't think longer than to verify that such and such cases were IPR files.

Mr. Morris. I see. He was there on two occasions, was he not?

Mr. Field. He came back to pick them up; yes.

Mr. Morris. But you cannot recall how much time he actually spent on the files?

Mr. Field. No; except it wasn't a long time. As I say, it was to verify the fact that these were the IPR files. I had some private stuff of my own down there.

Mr. Morris. And that was about a year ago?

Mr. Field. I guess that was; yes.

Mr. Morris. You say you had some private things down in among the IPR files?

Mr. Field. It is my house, and I have my own stuff down there, and he naturally went to verify what he was taking out was not my private property but the institute's.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, when did you first meet Mr. Barnes, Joseph Barnes?

Mr. Field. In college, I suppose 19—it was my freshman year, whatever that was, 1923, I think it was.

Mr. Morris. And you knew him quite well during college?

Mr. Field. Yes; I knew him quite well.

Mr. Morris. Who worked for the Institute of Pacific Relations first? You or he?

Mr. Field. I did.

Mr. Morris. Were you instrumental in his coming into the organization?

Mr. Field. I testified to this before, I believe, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. In executive session.

Mr. Field. I forget whether it was in executive session or not. I think that I was instrumental in the sense that I knew him and I suppose—I can't recall the exact circumstances. I suppose I introduced him to Mr. Carter or to someone else. And I was not instrumental in the sense that I had no authority myself at that time to hire anybody or make such decisions.

Mr. Morris. You were both in Moscow together in 1931, were you not?

Mr. Field. No; we were not.

Mr. Morris. When were you in Moscow?

Mr. Field. I went through Moscow on my way to China in 1929.

Mr. Morris. And then the next time?

Mr. Field. That is the only time I have ever been there.

Mr. Morris. Were you and Barnes together in Shanghai?

Mr. Field. Can I go back to that other question?

Mr. Morris. By all means.

Mr. Field. I have only been in Moscow once. I don't think Barnes was in Moscow in 1929. It is easily verified. We only would have been there together if we both attended the IPR Conference of the Far East, which I think was at Kyoto that year. I don't think Barnes had joined yet, but I am not sure.

To go back to your last question, there was a subsequent IPR conference probably 2 years later, in 1931, in Shanghai. I think it would have had to be moved from some other city because of the Manchurian incident which had broken out at that time. I believe Barnes was at that conference, and if he was we were certainly together in Shanghai.

Mr. Morris. Do you know if Barnes was ever an employee of the Soviet Council of the IPR?

Mr. Field. I certainly have no knowledge that he was. From my personal knowledge I would say he never had been.

Mr. Morris. You were in a position to know at that time, you were an official on the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Mr. Field. I worked in the institute. From that experience and any other I have had my answer would be "No." I have no other way, or I have no other source of knowledge. I have no other way of knowing.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have found one paper generally in connection with one item. There were quite a few questions put to Mr. Field the last time he was here in connection with his application for an Army commission.

Senator O'Conor. I recall that. That was dealt with quite extensively, you may recall.

Mr. Field. Yes.

Mr. Morris. We have made an effort and the Army has made an extensive effort to find the papers on that case, but apparently all the papers have been destroyed in connection with an Army order to clear all files. And the only thing we were able to obtain was a copy of his medical comment. Now, however, just very recently we did find a paper which throws some light on this general item, and I would like to introduce that into the record at this time.

Senator O'Conor. The destruction of the papers was not, however, peculiar to this case? That is to say, there is no significance in the fact that they were destroyed? As I understand it, no records of that general kind are available.

Mr. Morris. Well, we just have no records. I would like to just say that without comment.

Senator O'Conor. I see.

Mr. Morris. And Mr. Mandell is getting that now.

Did you know Mr. Lawrence Duggan?

Mr. Field. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Was he in school with you, too?

Mr. Field. He was in college with me.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever make an effort to start a Latin-American Branch of the IPR?

Mr. Field. No, I never made such an effort. There are probably documents on this. My offhand recollection is that it did come up for discussion, and, as I recall, I personally opposed the idea of doing it.

Mr. Morris. What was the reason for the opposition?

Mr. Field. I can't recollect, and I wouldn't be too definite about this, but I have sort of a vague recollection I thought it was a poor idea. We had plenty to do otherwise, and I didn't see very much point. The Latin-American countries had relatively little relation to the Pacific at the time.

Mr. Morris. Lawrence Duggan was the person with whom you carried on the negotiations at this time?

Mr. Field. I carried on no negotiations.

Mr. Morris. You carried on correspondence or had conferences on the subject with him, did you not?

Mr. Field. Perhaps I did, I don't recall it. It is possible I did, but I don't recall it.

Mr. Morris. Was Corliss Lamont a class mate of yours?

Mr. Field. No, he was not. He was, I forget, maybe 3 or 4 years—he preceded me by 3 or 4 years.

Mr. Morris. Is he a close personal friend of yours?

Mr. Field. Yes, he is a good friend of mine.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, have you contributed money to the China Daily News or the New China Daily News?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that to do so might tend to incriminate me, and I invoke the fifth amendment.

Mr. Morris. Did you contribute on the 26th of March, 1948, a check for $500 which was endorsed by Chu Tong for the New China Daily News?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. On August 10, 1948, did you contribute a sum of $360 to the New China Daily News?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. On December 17 of the same year did you contribute $450 to the New China Daily News with a check that bore the endorsement Hom Q Pan and Eugene Moy?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. On August 8, 1949, did you contribute $500 to the New China Daily News with a check which bore the endorsement of Chu Tong?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the New China Daily News has come up several times in our hearings, and we are trying to determine the political nature of the New China Daily News. We have sent a subpena to Eugene Moy and Chu Tong in order to complete this part of the examination, and we have been informed that Mr. Chu Tong is now in Red China with the Voice of China. However, Eugene Moy is believed to be in the country and he should be subpenaed here next week.

Did you know Eugene Moy?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Chu Tong?

Mr. Field. I also decline to answer that question.

Mr. Morris. Do you know if Chu Tong is now in Red China?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Were you in Vladivostok in 1930?

Mr. Field. The trip to which I previously alluded took me across the Soviet Union and we were book on that Trans-Siberian Railway that normally takes you down to Manchuria. As I recall we got to the border just after the tracks had been taken up, and I guess it was the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute, and we had to be routed north of the Amur to Vladivostok and get a boat down to Japan.

Mr. Morris. Who was with you at that time?

Mr. Field. There were a number of Americans and Englishmen, all of whom were going to this IPR conference.

Mr. Morris. Was Marcel Scherer in your party?

Mr. Field. No; he was not.

Mr. Morris. Did you meet Marcel Scherer?

Mr. Field. Do you want me to answer the question about who was there?

Mr. Morris. Yes. I am trying to refresh your recollection.

Mr. Field. I am trying to recall. I remember reasonably distinctly that Prof. William Kilpatrick was there from Columbia; there was a Professor Webster from one of—from the British university called Aberyswyst; there was a woman professor from the London University whose name escapes me at the moment; I think Professor Chamberlain, Joseph P. Chamberlain, was on the trip, and I think Prof. James T. Shotwell, but I am not absolutely certain; Jerome Green was on the trip; there was a lawyer from Boston who had just worked on whatever the current reparations plan for Germany was, whether it was the Dawes plan or the Young plan, he is now dead and I forget his name, but that can be easily identified from the membership of that conference. The lady, the British woman professor, was Eileen Powers.

That is without refreshing my memory from looking at a list. That is probably as far as I can go now, and I am not perfectly certain about one or two of those.

Mr. Morris. Did you meet Marcel Scherer on that trip?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question. Let me consult with my attorney.

Mr. Morris. By all means.

Senator O'Conor. You may.

(Mr. Field confers with his counsel.)

Mr. Field. I just don't remember.

Mr. Morris. Did you know personally Mr. Shippe who wrote under the name of Asiaticus?

Mr. Field. Mr. who?

Mr. Morris. Mr. Shippe—S-h-i-p-p-e.

Mr. Field. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Did you know the man who used the pen name Asiaticus?

Mr. Field. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. Did you have correspondence with him?

Mr. Field. I can't recollect any. Mr. Shippe?

Mr. Morris. S-h-i-p-p-e.

Mr. Field. Just offhand, I haven't heard the name before. I may be quite incorrect.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Herbert Bieberman?

Mr. Field. May I consult my counsel?

Senator O'Conor. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Field. At that time?

Mr. Morris. At any time.

Mr. Field. I decline to answer, Mr. Morris, on the same grounds I have given previously.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have a series of questions here based on correspondence from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations about Mr. Field's associations and dealings with the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet consul here and the Amtorg Trading Corp.

I would like to ask Mr. Field a few preliminary questions, and if he declines to answer I would like simply to put the documents in the record.

Senator O'Conor. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, what has your association with the Amtorg Trading Corp. been?

Mr. Field. May I again consult my counsel? Do you want to refresh my memory?

Mr. Morris. I will ask the question first, but I do want to say we have some letters here, and we would like to know to what extent you would be willing to testify about your dealings with the Amtorg Trading Corp.

I think the witness should answer the question first.

Senator O'Conor. Just a moment. Repeat the question.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Senator O'Conor. I think the witness has a right to consult his counsel.

Mr. Morris. I have given him a copy of the first letter. It is possible Mr. Field in some capacity could have had a formal association that he might be willing to testify to.

Mr. FIELD. No, I will decline to answer that question on the grounds that I have previously given.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. V. F. Prosin?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record two letters here. One is a copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations from Mr. Field to Mr. V. F. Prosin of the Amtorg Trading Corp., and another from a Mr. Prosin who is listed as Chief Economist of the Amtorg Trading Corp.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify those letters, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated November 6, 1935, addressed to Mr. V. F. Prosin, Amtorg Trading Corp., with a typed signature of Frederick V. Field. Attached thereto is an original letter on the letterhead of V. F. Prosin, 261 Fifth Avenue, signed V. Prosin, chief economist, Amtorg Trading Corp., addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, director, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. May they go into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; they will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 618" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 618

NOVEMBER 6, 1935.

Mr. V. F. PROSIN,
Amtorg Trading Corp.,
261 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. PROSIN: I am very glad to reply to your letter of October 31st, with the following statement, which you are free to use in the Soviet newspaper ZA INDUSTRIALIZACIU in connection with the forthcoming anniversary of the Soviet Republic:

> Any observer of the U. S. S. R. is inevitably impressed by the tremendous strides that the Soviet Union has made in its economic development. The speed at which industrialization has been carried on, the rate at which mastering of industrial technique is being achieved, the results of this progress as evidenced in the recent abolition of food rationing, give confidence in the internal strength of the U. S. S. R. We, of our Institute, have watched especially closely the economic development of the eastern sections of the Union as an indicator of the increasing unity and balance of the internal economy of the country. The importance of this progress is most obvious in international relations as it gives weight and substance to the determined stand for peace which has been taken by the Soviet Union.

I regret that I have delayed several days in sending this to you but I trust that by dispatching it by special messenger it will reach you in time.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

V. E. PROSIN

261 Fifth Avenue

NEW YORK

OCTOBER 31, 1935.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Director, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

MY DEAR MR. FIELD: In connection with the forthcoming anniversary of the Soviet Republic, the Soviet newspaper ZA INDUSTRIALIZACIU, organ of the Heavy Industries of the U. S. S. R., has requested me to secure expressions of opinion

from prominent leaders of science and education, for cable transmission to Moscow, on the following subjects:

1. Achievements of the U. S. S. R. in economic development;
2. The peace policy of the Soviet Union.

I hope that you will find your way clear of favoring us with a statement on this matter, and thanking you in anticipation of your cooperation, I am

Sincerely yours,

[s] V. Prosin,
Chief Economist, Amtorg Trading Corporation.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these documents?

Mr. Mandel. These are invitations to celebrate the adoption of the new Soviet constitution issued by the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and they are dated in the different years, and they cover various celebrations at the Soviet Embassy. I can give each one separately.

Mr. Morris. I do not think it is necessary. I would not like to take that much time. There are nine invitations to various official Soviet functions which purport to be invitations to the witness Mr. Field, and I would like to institute a line of questions to the witness on that particular subject if he would be willing to answer.

(Documents handed to Mr. Field.)

Senator O'Conor. All right, Mr. Morris, will you proceed?

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, are you prepared to explain to us the circumstances surrounding your receiving these invitations?

Mr. Field. I imagine that I have no control over the mail that I receive. However those things came to me, I assume, through the mail.

Mr. Morris. Do you remember receiving these?

Mr. Field. No; I don't remember it.

Mr. Morris. How many of these functions did you attend?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Michael Gromov?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Mr. Andrei Yumashev?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the questioning along the line of this particular subject be discontinued on the ground that we are not going to get any information from this particular witness.

Will you take into the record nine such invitations?

Senator O'Conor. Yes; they will be admitted into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 619" and are as follows:)

Exhibit No. 619

The Chargé d'Affaires
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Oumansky
request the pleasure of your company
at a reception in honor of
Michael Gromov, Andrei Yumashev, and Sergei Danilin
on Tuesday evening the twenty-seventh of July
at nine o'clock
at the Embassy

Summer dress or black tie 1937

Please present this card at the door R. s. v. p.

To Celebrate the Adoption of the New Soviet Constitution
The Consul General
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Arens
request the honor of the company of
Mr. Frederick V. Field (penned in)
at a reception
Tuesday evening, the fifteenth of December
at nine o'clock
at the Consulate

1936

R. s. v. p. Please present this card at the door

(Pencilled) REGRET

To Celebrate the Adoption of the New Soviet Constitution
The Ambassador
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Troyanovsky
request the honor of the company of
Mr. and Mrs. Frederick Field (penned in)
at a reception
Thursday evening the tenth of December
at nine o'clock
at the Embassy

1936

R. s. v. p. Please present this card at the door

The Consul General
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
requests the honor of the company of
Mr. Frederick V. Field (penned in)
at (penned in) luncheon
on (penned in) Friday, June fifth
at (penned in) one o'clock
at the Consulate General
Seven East Sixty-first Street

R.s.v.p. 1945

(Pencilled) ACCEPT

The Consul General
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Tolokonski
request the honor of the company of
Mr. and Mrs. Frederick V. Fields (penned in)
at a reception
on the occasion of the Anniversary of the October Revolution
on Wednesday, November Seventh
between 4 and 6:30 o'clock
at the Consulate General
7 East 61st Street

R.s.v.p. 1942

(Penned in) Farewell to Mr. and Mrs. Neymann.
(Pencilled) ACCEPTED

The Consul General
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Arens
request the pleasure of the company of
Mr. Frederick Field (penned in)
at (penned in) a tea
on Monday, September thirtieth (penned in)
at (penned in) five to seven o'clock
at the Consulate General
Seven East Sixty First Street

R.s.v.p. 1940

Messrs. Michael Gromov, Andrei Yumashev
and Sergei Danilin will give the first account
of their flight from Moscow to San Jacinto, California,
across the North Pole

To Celebrate the Twentieth Anniversary
of the Great October Socialist Revolution
The Acting Consul General
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Borovoy
request the honor of the company of
(Penned in) Mr. Frederick V. Field
at a reception
on Saturday, November the sixth
from five until seven o'clock
at the Consulate General
Seven East Sixty-first Street

R. s. v. p. Please present this card at the door
1948

(Penned in) ACCEPT

The Consul General
of the U. S. S. R. and Mrs. Tolokonski
and Mr. Peter A. Bogdanov
Chairman of the Board, Amtorg Trading Corporation
request the honor of the company of
Mr. and Mrs. Frederick V. Field (penned in)
at a reception and showing of the film
Chelyuskin
on (penned in) Thursday, September twenty-seventh
at (penned in) eight-thirty o'clock p. m.
at the Consulate General
7 East 61st Street

R. S. V. P. 1945

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated July 23, 1937, addressed to

the Honorable C. Oumansky, chargé d'affaires of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C., with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, I offer you this letter and ask you if you can recall having sent that to Mr. Oumansky.

Senator O'Conor. That is, the original of which that is a carbon.

Mr. Field. I decline to answer, Mr. Morris, on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the fact it is identified by Mr. Mandel as a document taken from the files and purporting to be signed by Frederick V. Field, will you accept it into the record?

Senator O'Conor. Yes; it is admitted under those circumstances.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 620" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 620

July 23, 1937.

The Honorable C. Oumansky,
Chargé d' Affaires of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Oumansky: I am exceedingly sorry that I shall not be able to attend the reception you are giving in honor of the three Soviet fliers. It is impossible for me to get to Washington at that time. You can imagine how greatly pleased my colleagues and I have been over the success of the two recent flights.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick V. Field.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter please?

Mr. Mandel. I have here an original memorandum dated March 22, 1939, from E. C. C. with penciled notes in the corner marked "E. C. C." and "Fred."

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, can you recall having received that letter from Mr. Carter? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. Field. I don't remember, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Will you read that for us, Mr. Field, please?

Mr. Field (reading):

Exhibit No. 621

F. V. F. from E. C. C. March 22, 1939.

I assume that Mr. Oumansky sends regularly to you or Mrs. Barnes copies of speeches such as those recently made by Stalin and Molotov and communiqués such as the text of the note from Litvinov to the German Ambassador. If, however, he is not doing so, I would be glad to include you in my circulation of these.

(Penciled note:) E. C. C.: Yes; he usually does include us. Fred.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive that into the record?

Senator O'Conor. Yes; it will be admitted for the record. Of course the witness does not himself identify it.

Mr. Morris. I understand.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 621" and was read in full.)

Mr. Morris. Can you recall, Mr. Field, whether or not it was the regular practice of Mr. Oumansky to send regularly to you or to Mrs. Barnes copies of speeches made such as those recently made by Stalin and Molotov?

Mr. Field. Excuse me a moment.

Senator O'Conor. Yes, indeed.

(Mr. Field confers with his counsel.)

Mr. Field. I have no recollection of that, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original letter on the letterhead of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 9, 1939, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, New York office, and signed "Frederick V. Field."

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall having sent that letter, Mr. Field? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. FIELD. It seems to be my signature, Mr. Morris, but I do not have a personal recollection of correspondence that far back.

Mr. MORRIS. Or the meeting mentioned in the correspondence?

Mr. FIELD. I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; it will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 622" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 622

Officers: Carl L. Alsberg, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada Comstock, Vice Chairman; Philip C. Jessup, Vice Chairman; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

1795 California Street, San Francisco; Telephone: Tuxedo 3114; 129 East 52nd Street, New York City; Telephone: PLaza 3-4700. Cable: Inparel

NEW YORK CITY, *January 9, 1939.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
New York Office.

DEAR MR. CARTER: This is to thank you for your note of January 7th and to say that I shall be very glad to lunch with you at the Century Club on Wednesday at one to meet Plopkin and Mr. Oumansky.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Fred,
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to F. V. Field, Esq., with the signature of E. C. Carter dated December 31, 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, do you recognize that letter as a letter sent to you by Mr. Carter? [Handing witness.]

Mr. FIELD. I don't remember that letter, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you receive that into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted as a part of the records of the IPR. That is a part of the records of the IPR?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 623" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 623

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, December 31, 1939.

F. V. FIELD, Esq.

DEAR FRED: Last night at a workers meeting I described the need of the American Council. Ten gifts of one dollar each were immediately made. They were made on condition that they be anonymous. Here are the ten gifts. Will

you at your convenience request the Treasurer to make out ten receipts each bearing the designation anonymous.

Sincerely yours,

E. C. CARTER.

12/30/39. (Not clear) B. M. #3994 to #4003.
I will pass on the receipts to their destinations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, in this letter Mr. Carter sent to you:

DEAR FRED: Last night at a workers meeting I described the need of the American council. Ten gifts of $1 each were immediately made.

Do you know what the reference there is to the workers' meeting the night before?

Mr. FIELD. No; I don't know, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. You could not give us any information?

Mr. FIELD. I am afraid not.

Mr. MORRIS. That is December 31, 1939.

Mr. FIELD. It doesn't recall anything specific to my mind.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations what purports to be a memorandum prepared by Mr. Field concerning his application for a commission with the United States Army. I would like Mr. Mandel to identify that as a letter taken from the files of the institute.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Frederick V. Field: Events Leading Up to Disapproval of My Application for United States Army Commission and for United States Civil-Service Appointment." It is undated and unsigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, I wonder if you would look at that and tell us if you can recall having written that.

Mr. FIELD. May I have time to read this, please, sir?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, certainly.

(Mr. Field consults document.)

Senator O'CONOR. The witness has inspected the paper, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that for us, please, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. Do you want me to read it aloud?

Mr. MORRIS. Would you, please?

Mr. FIELD (reading):

EXHIBIT NO. 624

FREDERICK V. FIELD: EVENTS LEADING UP TO DISAPPROVAL OF MY APPLICATION FOR UNITED STATES ARMY COMMISSION AND FOR UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT

1. During December 1941 I made numerous inquiries regarding places where a far eastern specialist could be useful in the war effort. Early in January I had a long interview with Colonel Sharp of the Army Intelligence office in New York City. During this interview (as in all subsequent interviews) I brought me the question of my having been associated with the American Peace Mobilization and the consequent unfavorable report which the FBI would unquestionably give on me. Colonel Sharp assured me that appointments for specialist jobs were made on a basis of "common sense," not political prejudice.

Colonel Sharp informed me that he did not at that time have a staff appointment to offer me, but that if I were willing to work for a few weeks on a volunteer basis he would later recommend me for an official position provided the arrangement had by then turned out to be mutually satisfactory. I accepted this offer, and Colonel Sharp sent my credentials on to Washington for approval as a volunteer.

2. It appears that these credentials came to the attention of another branch of the Army, for a few days later Capt. Malcolm W. Moss, of the Army Air Corps

Intelligence, asked me if I would be interested in a position as Far East specialist in Air Intelligence. The job described was one of extraordinary interest to me, and I told Captain Moss of my eagerness for an official appointment. He asked me to go to Washington for further interviews.

My first interview with Captain Moss took place on January 5 or 6.

I could insert for the record here, on the basis of my recollection, this would have been January of 1942.

On January 8 I had interviews in Washington with other officers of the Air Intelligence: Maj. William Ball, chief of the particular section in which I was to work; Captain Barr, administrative officer of that section, and a number of officers and civilians engaged in research on other geographical divisions.

I was accepted by the officers of that section, Major Ball himself taking me around to the personnel division to start the process of securing a commission as a captain. Captain Moss took me to the division in charge of handling civilian appointments. In their opinion a civilian appointment could be put through much quicker than the commission, which would take a month or two, and as they were in a hurry for me to start work they wished me to apply for a temporary civilian appointment pending the commission.

3. During the next few days I filled out all the questionnaires, application forms, etc., for both the commission and civilian appointment (the latter being described as "economic analyst, P–4, $3,800 per annum"). On January 10 I took my Army physical examination at 90 Church Street, New York City.

4. On Tuesday, February 10, Captain Moss telephoned me from Washington to say that he regretted to inform me that the applications for both civilian and military appointments had been disapproved in "higher quarters." He suggested that I try to locate the cause and place of the disapproval and see if I could do anything to reverse it. In that telephone call, as well as in conversation in Washington 3 days later, he informed me that he was not authorized to tell me the reasons for the disapproval; that, as a matter of fact, his section knew very little about it. I have been unable to get any further information myself.

5. Finally, a brief word as to the job itself. It is concerned with developing a theory for bombing Far Eastern objectives. My part of the job would be largely economic-industrial research designed to determine key objectives in the Japanese economy.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, 16 WEST TWELFTH STREET, NEW YORK CITY
(GRAMERCY 7–8265)

Born: April 14, 1905, New York City
Education:
- Hotchkiss, 1922
- Harvard A. B., 1927
- London School of Economics and Political Science, 1927–28

Activities:
- Staff of Institute of Pacific Relations, 1928–40
- Secretary-treasurer, American Cooperating Committee for Chinese Mass Education Movement, 1928 to date
- Served as secretary to Chinese Mass Education Movement, director, Dr. Y. C. James Yen, during his tour of United States, 1928–29
- Assistant to Edward C. Carter, 1928–35
- Member, Economic Mission to Far East (Hon. Cameron Forbes, chairman) 1935
- Secretary, American Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 1935–40; trustee and member, executive committee, 1935 to date.
- Chairman, editorial board, Amerasia (monthly journal on Far East). 1937 to date
- Executive secretary, American Peace Mobilization, September 1940 to July 1941
- Attended international conferences of Institute of Pacific Relations as follows: Kyoto, 1929; Shanghai, 1931; Banff, 1933; Yosemite, 1936, Virginia Beach, 1939

Travel in Far East:
- Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok, 1929
- Japan, September through November, 1929
- Travel through Luzon, P. I., December through February 1929–30
- Hongkong, Canton, Pakhoi, Tongking, Yunnan, March–April 1930

Shanghai, Nanking, Hangchow, June 1930
Tientsin, Peiping, Paotingfu, July–Septemer 1930
Returned to Far East (Japan, Manchuria, Peiping, Shanghai) for 4 months in 1931
Worked in Honolulu, winter 1932–33
Five months in London, working at Royal Institute of International Affairs, winter 1933–34
Returned to Japan and China as member American Economic Mission in 1935

Author:
American Participation in the China Consortiums (University of Chicago Press, 1932)
Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area (Doubleday-Doran, 1935)
General editor, Economic Survey of the Pacific Area, 1939–42
Numerous articles in Far Eastern Survey, Asia, Amerasia, Pacific Affairs, Current History, etc.

Miscellaneous:
Married, three children
Member, Century Association, Harvard Club, Council on Foreign Relations, Public Affairs Committee

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Field, I think we have covered the substance. May it go into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; it may be admitted into the record in toto.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Unless, of course, the witness feels there is anything important that in fairness to himself ought to be mentioned.

Mr. FIELD. I think almost all of it has been testified to previously, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 624" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. All the circumstances?

Mr. FIELD. I say most of it. In general, I think exactly the same picture was presented in the last session.

Mr. MORRIS. We have an executive session here with Colonel Church. In connection with this, Colonel Church of the Army had sent a man over here and we were going to have him read this into the record, but he seems to have gone. Suppose we have another session on that.

Senator O'CONOR. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, did you know Vladimir Romm?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that to do so might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the representative of the Soviet Council at an IPR Council in the United States; was he not?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Senator O'CONOR. Just before you take up a new subject, have you concluded the line of questioning on the commission?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, unless there is something else.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Field, in the period which has intervened since you were asked about the application for the commission and the endorsement of others in your behalf, is there anything that you can add to what you previously testified to?

Mr. FIELD. No, sir; I think not. I reread the record of my testimony in open session the other day, and I don't think I have any amendments to it.

Senator O'CONOR. At that time I think you said that——

Mr. FIELD. There are names in here which I couldn't then recall and I am glad to testify to as far as I can recollect as to the accuracy of those names. I think those are the people that I saw.

Senator O'CONOR. It occurred to me that possibly, in the exchange of correspondence or communications or in the questioning of persons mentioned, you might have thought of something else that would bear upon the subject-matter.

Mr. FIELD. I have had no opportunity to read the proceedings of your committee since I last appeared except my own.

Senator O'CONOR. In that testimony there was mentioned the name of Lauchlin Currie, you recall.

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. And also the name of Owen Lattimore.

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I do.

Senator O'CONOR. In connection with either of those parties, is there anything further that has occurred to you, or anything that might be added by way of additional information as to their interest or their activities in regard to the proposed application?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Chairman, as I recall the gist of my testimony at that time, this is what I would repeat again: It was that with respect to Mr. Lattimore my recollection was that I probably did go to him to act for me. It was likely that I did under the circumstances. With respect to Mr. Currie, I was then, and I am now, almost certain that I did not go to him, but I conceded the possibility that some other friend of mine might have involved him indirectly.

That is as concrete as I could possibly be on this question.

Senator O'CONOR. I see. There is no other bit of information that you could give that might help us?

Mr. FIELD. No; I have no other information on that.

Senator O'CONOR. Just one question further before you leave this. Have you concluded the questions with regard to the contributions made in the name of Mr. Field for the time being?

Mr. MORRIS. They may come up again.

Senator O'CONOR. There was one question about it. You previously have declined to respond to questions, and what I am about to ask is of course not for the purpose of asking you to reopen that except on another angle of it. Apart from the question of fact of whether you did make such contributions, I would like to ask you whether you made any request of the Internal Revenue for exemption for any contributions made to any of the organizations or parties referred to in the previous questions?

Mr. FIELD. I would answer you, sir, if I may, in a very limited fashion, that in previous sessions my contributions to the Institute of Pacific Relations have been raised, and I acknowledged such contributions, and I did claim and was granted the usual exemption on those contributions.

With respect to the others I would have to decline as I did previously.

Senator O'CONOR. I would like to ask the question with respect to the organizations mentioned by Mr. Morris in the previous questions.

Mr. FIELD. At today's session?

Senator O'CONOR. At today's session, as to whether or not you made a request of the Treasury of the United States, or the Bureau of In-

ternal Revenue for exemption of any contributions made to any of those organizations or parties.

Mr. FIELD. May I consult my counsel?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, indeed.

(Mr. Field confers with his counsel.)

Mr. FIELD. Sir, without acknowledging such contributions or admitting them, I might state that I did not make such application.

Senator O'CONOR. That is all I wanted to know. I was not attacking the fact of a contribution, but only as to anything on your part in connection with the Treasury Department.

Mr. MORRIS. You said a while ago that you had not seen the transcript of our open hearings?

Mr. FIELD. Except for my own testimony. That is the only one I have read.

Mr. MORRIS. The committee has been sending you, as it sends all witnesses, Mr. Field, one or I think maybe two copies of all transcripts that are published. You have not been getting those?

Mr. FIELD. I have not been receiving my mail regularly because I have been in prison until recently.

Mr. MORRIS. You had access to them, though?

Mr. FIELD. I had access to nothing whatsoever. I haven't caught up. I don't know if these things are in my mail. I haven't run into them since I have been back.

Mr. MORRIS. They would be sent to you at the address you gave the reporter.

Mr. FIELD. I suppose so. I haven't run into them. I do have this one which contains my own testimony, but I have only read my own testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it is the practice of the committee to send to all witnesses, I believe, two copies of all public testimony, so Mr. Field should have that. At least it has been sent to him at his home address.

Will you identify that last letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a handwritten note from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the stationery of the Cunard-White Star liner *Queen Mary* dated November 5, 1936. In the upper right-hand corner is written "Foreign Department, Yzvestia Moscow." It is addressed to "Dear Mr. Field" and signed "V. Romm."

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall having received that letter? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. FIELD. I have no recollection of it, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read that letter?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 625

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am very sorry I missed you when I left, but I hope we will meet again somewhere. It has been very pleasant to know you and to cooperate with you on some problems.

My plans are not very certain as my paper wants me to go to London. I will see clearer when I am in Moscow, as I feel a little worn-out for the moment and need a rest.

Very truly yours,

V. ROMM.

Mr. FIELD. May I ask whether there is a date on that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. November 5, 1936.

Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Romm get the rest he mentioned there, Mr. Field?

Mr. Field. I am afraid I can't help you out on that.

Mr. Morris. What do you mean by that, Mr. Field? Is it that you do not know or you refuse to?

Mr. Field. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. Do you know what happened to Mr. Romm?

Mr. Field. I have no idea.

Mr. Morris. He was purged, was he not?

Mr. Field. I don't know.

Mr. Morris. You don't know first-hand?

Mr. Field. I don't really know second-hand.

Mr. Morris. Do you remember reading anything about Mr. Romm?

Mr. Field. I don't remember anything specific. I have a general impression that he was one of the people who got into trouble there, and what happened to him I haven't the slightest idea or never heard.

Mr. Morris. Would you receive that into the record?

Senator O'Conor. Yes; it will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 625" and was read in full.)

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the witness has declined to answer in connection with the name of Herbert Biberman. I have here a telegram and an exchange of correspondence, or, rather, it is not an exchange of correspondence, but one is a telegram from Herbert Biberman to Edward C. Carter and the other is a telegram from the witness, Frederick Field, to Edward C. Carter, and they seem to be related each with the other.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify those letters, please?

Mr. Mandel. I have here two telegrams from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. One is addressed to Edward C. Carter, dated "September 3, 1940," signed "Herbert Biberman," and the other is addressed to Edward C. Carter, dated "September 3, 1940," signed "Fred."

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Morris, what is the source of those?

Mr. Mandel. They both come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Morris. The one telegram from Herbert Biberman, addressed to Edward C. Carter on September 3, 1940, says:

Exhibit No. 626

Beg you to make it easy for Fred Field to accept new position with American Peace Mobilization. Warmest personal regards.

It is signed "Herbert Biberman."

The other telegram, signed "Fred," reads:

Have accepted job but sincerely trust no publicity. Going Washington today address Washington Hotel. Hope see you New York, Thursday.

Mr. Field, will you look at those two telegrams and answer whether the second telegram was in fact sent by you? [Handing to witness.]

(Mr. Field confers with his counsel.)

Mr. Field. Mr. Morris, I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. As to whether or not this telegram was sent by you?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the first telegram is the telegram from Biberman to Carter but it relates to the second telegram. I was wondering if you will, under the circumstances, accept both of those into the record.

Senator O'Conor. Well, as to the probative force of it, I do not think it is quite clear. Certainly there is nothing as yet bearing on the witness, but as coming from the records of the Institute of Pacific Relations it will be admitted to that extent.

Mr. Morris. Yes.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 626" and was read in full.)

Mr. Morris. I would like, ordinarily, Mr. Chairman, since there is an indication here that Mr. Biberman was influential or instrumental in having Mr. Field accept the position with the American Peace Mobilization, to institute a series of questions on that, but if Mr. Field declines to answer anything about Mr. Biberman, I think we have to discontinue that.

Senator O'Conor. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. Morris. Is that correct, that you will not answer any questions in connection with Mr. Biberman?

Mr. Field. I have already claimed the privilege with respect to Mr. Biberman.

Senator O'Conor. You are entitled to know what the questions are, if you so desire.

Mr. Field. I don't like to make a blanket statement, but I have so far used the privilege.

Mr. Morris. Was Mr. Biberman instrumental in causing you to take a position with the American Peace Mobilization?

Mr. Field. I do decline to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Will you give us the circumstances surrounding whatever effort Mr. Biberman did make to have you go to the American Peace Mobilization?

Mr. Field. I also decline to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, will you tell us your recollection of what the people in the Institute of Pacific Relations did when it became known to them that you were going to accept a position with the American Peace Mobilization? I mean, presenting to the world and to the council the news of your being a member of the American Peace Mobilization presented a problem to them, did it not?

Mr. Field. May I have a moment, Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'Conor. Yes, indeed.

(Mr. Field confers with his counsel.)

Mr. Field. Mr. Morris, what I am looking for is the record which is appended to the proceedings of my previous appearance here which contains certain statements relating to the question you have just asked.

Mr. Morris. Yes. And, Mr. Field, in that connection here is a letter apparently from Mr. Jessup to Mr. Carter which discusses a statement you may have made at that time. That may aid you in your recollection. [Handing to witness.]

Mr. Field. Mr. Morris, I feel that the records with respect to this matter have already been made public, and I have read them, and it seems to me that they do describe the circumstances——

Mr. MORRIS. This one is not in the record yet, Mr. Field, the one I handed you. This is a letter from Philip Jessup to Edward C. Carter and it says:

I don't really think we can use Fred's statement as it is, much as I would be glad to help him with his cause. How about a combination of the two, something like this.

Apparently that indicates that you did make a statement for the institute, that you suggested that they release, and apparently Mr. Jessup didn't like that one and wanted to make a compromise on that. I was wondering whether you could give us any testimony along those lines?

Mr. FIELD. I cannot give you any testimony as to what Mr. Jessup did or what he wrote Mr. Carter, no, Mr. Morris.

I do agree that the circumstances, insofar as I know them with respect to this question, are indicated in these documents that have been made public already and are appended to my own appearance here at page 122 and I guess 123, too.

Mr. MORRIS. So you can give no testimony bearing on this letter?

Mr. FIELD. No, I cannot.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here the difficulty of whether or not we should accept this into the record at this time or whether we should have Mr. Jessup or Mr. Carter acknowledge the authenticity of it.

Senator O'CONOR. Of course I do not think the groundwork has been laid sufficiently for its introduction at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. If the witness had recalled that he had ever seen it, it might be. So Mr. Chairman, may this be submitted to the attorney for Mr. Carter who has appeared before this committee and has indicated that he would acknowledge the authenticity of things addressed to Mr. Carter or written by Mr. Carter together with Mr. Holland and other witnesses?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, that would be in order, but its introduction at this time is not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, in that connection, I offer you this next letter and ask you if that recalls any particular episode to you? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Morris, I have claimed the privilege with respect to questions related to the American Peace Mobilization, and I must continue to do so. I have, however, just a moment ago endeavored to go as far as I felt I could in discussing surrounding circumstances.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original letter on the letterhead of the American Peace Mobilization, 1116 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, D. C., dated December 19, 1940, addressed to Edward C. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations, and signed "Fred" with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field. The document is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember having written that article?

Mr. FIELD. No, I have no recollection.

Senator O'CONOR. That letter?

Mr. FIELD. I haven't heard the letter, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. I showed it to you a minute ago. [Handing to witness.]

Mr. FIELD. I have already claimed the privilege on this.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, under the circumstances, will you receive that into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, it will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 627" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 627

Rev. John B. Thompson, Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Executive Secretary; Marion Briggs, Administrative Secretary

AMERICAN PEACE MOBILIZATION

1116 Vermont Avenue NW. Washington, D. C. Republic 7965

DECEMBER 19, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for sending me the copy of your December 14th letter to Phil Jessup in which you suggest that ways should be found for using his ten-point program presented at the end of our Princeton discussion. Without at the moment making any suggestions as to how the document can be used, I should like to make two comments regarding my own degree of support of the program outlined.

One of the points calls for an immediate armistice between China and Japan. I gathered from the few remarks that were made a number of those present at Princeton interpreted this as meaning that a status quo arrangement would be made, with the Japanese armies and other officials remaining in their present positions in occupied China pending the negotiations of a permanent arrangement. I would not agree to this. The program at this point would have my support only if it specifically called for an armistice based on a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops and other pressure groups from China, including Manchuria. Or, if you prefer, I would base the terms of the armistice with respect to the degree of Japanese withdrawal on whatever arrangement was acceptable to the Chinese government.

The second point has to do with the part of Jessup's program calling for immediate steps in the direction of liberating the colonial possessions in Eastern Asia. To have my support this point would have to be made more specific so as to include certain conditions regarding time, rate of liberation, circumstance under which the liberation would take place, etc. I should also like it to be perfectly clear whether the phrase "colonies" used in Jessup's recommendations includes Korea and Formosa, and particularly whether it included Singapore, Hongkong, Guam, Samoa, and other military outposts.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Fred,
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Hilda Austern?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I do know her.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Nat Bretholtz?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, in the summer of 1938, turn over your apartment to the use of Mr. and Mrs. Nat Bretholtz—that is, in 1938?

Mr. FIELD. Yes. What was the address of my apartment? Do you remember?

(Document handed to M. Field.)

M. FIELD. I apparently did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Hilda Austern?

Mr. FIELD. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember writing this letter to Mr. Gibbs?

Mr. FIELD. I haven't read it, but I am perfectly willing to acknowledge the likelihood. That apparently is my letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that letter, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 628

(Attention Mr. Gibbs.)

24 WEST 55TH STREET,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. GIBBS: I have invited friends—

This is written from San Francisco, June 20, 1938—

to occupy my apartment No. 11–F during the summer, as I shall unfortunately have to remain in San Francisco. I have already given them a key to the apartment, and I am sending them a copy of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

_____.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Nat Bretholtz is Hilda Austern?

Mr. FIELD. She was.

Mr. MORRIS. She was an official of the IPR, was she not?

Mr. FIELD. She was on the staff.

Mr. MORRIS. She was treasurer or assistant treasurer?

Mr. FIELD. Assistant treasurer. She was the bookkeeper.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 20, 1948, air mail, addressed "Attention Mr. Gibbs," 24 West Fifty-fifth Street, New York, N. Y., with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 628" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original of a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 3, 1936, headed "FVF from ECC."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, can you tell us what your dealings have been with the following people: Colonel Stimson, Fred Osborn, Russell Leffingwell, Frank McCoy? You will testify about those people, will you not?

Mr. FIELD. I believe; yes; I think—I would like to see the list again. Colonel Stimson is obviously the former Secretary of State.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would read that whole letter for us.

Mr. FIELD (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 629

FVF from ECC.

This is addressed to me, apparently a memorandum, not a letter.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. FIELD. It is dated December 3, 1936 [reading]:

Herewith I return Chamberlain's letter. My recommendations are as follows:

1. That you refrain from pressing Chamberlain.

2. That we drop the idea at this time of roping in Colonel Stimson, but that at the right time, if he has not already contributed, you make a financial appeal to him.

3. That in the last fortnight of December, either at your instance or mine, I have a long talk with Fred Osborn to follow up your initial approach. Please let me know which of us should take the initiative.

4. That if we get Osborn moving along a little further we reconsider the possibility of a Leffingwell, McCoy, Osborn meeting with or without Stimson. It might be better to have Baker present instead of Stimson.

Mr. Chairman, this obviously is a memorandum referring to persistent efforts at that time to raise funds for the organization and refers to one of these plots that are concocted in an office to get certain people together and get contributions from them.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it not indicate to you that you were trying to influence their political thinking?

Mr. FIELD. It most certainly does not. This is most obviously a letter to endeavor to rope Colonel Stimson in, to make a financial appeal to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the next sentence, please?

Mr. FIELD (reading):

That in the last fortnight of December, either at your instance or mine, I have a long talk with Fred Osborn to follow up your initial approach.

Mr. MORRIS. Continue, please.

Mr. FIELD (reading):

Please let me know which of us should take the initiative.

Mr. MORRIS. Continue, please.

Mr. FIELD (reading):

That if we get Osborn moving along a little further we reconsider the possibility of a Leffingwell, McCoy, Osborn meeting with or without Stimson. It might be better to have Baker present instead of Stimson.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that that is in connection with the fund-raising and not with the——

Mr. FIELD. Very clearly and obviously, and I would like to make that clearer to your original question, what my relations to those men were. Mr. Leffingwell is or was a partner in J. P. Morgan. I believe at the time he was chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. He is chairman of the board now.

Mr. FIELD. I think he is now chairman of the board. And McCoy is General McCoy, obviously. Fred Osborn was formerly a member, American member, of the U. N. Atomic Commission. I had known Mr. Osborn because he is related to me, and I approached him to try and get his interest in the institute. General McCoy, I had known for a long time because of his own responsibilities in the Far East and his membership in the League of Nations mission that went to Manchuria, the name of which escapes me at the moment. He was the American member of that.

I don't believe I knew Mr. Leffingwell myself, and I don't believe I ever met Mr. Stimson except, perhaps, at some public gathering.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that memorandum be received into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; that will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 629" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, was it a practice of yours when you were Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations to send IPR material to people high in Government?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the purpose of that practice?

Mr. FIELD. It was inherent in the purpose of the organization itself, as a research and educational body which tried to spread its findings as widely among the American people as it could, and did so as

far as it was able in all groups, all kinds of levels of the American population.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these three letters.

Mr. MANDEL. These are photostats of documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. First we have a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter dated October 27, 1938, addressed to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury Department, Washington, D. C., with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field.

Next we have a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter dated October 27, 1938, addressed to Hon. J. C. Grew, with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field.

Then we have a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter dated October 27, 1938, addressed to Hon. Nelson T. Johnson, with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field. In each case the title of secretary is below the name of Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, can you remember sending those three letters? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Morris, I don't recall. I don't have a real recollection of any correspondence dating that far back. It seems to me clear that these are letters, and I certainly would acknowledge that they are the kind of letters that I most likely sent out, and these probably were or are copies of such letters.

Mr. MORRIS. And it was in line with the practice of sending, in this case, reports to high officials in the United States Government.

Mr. FIELD. And all others. It is quite clear a selection here has been made to pick out certain Government officials. You will find similar letters in the files to non-Government officials.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this represent a selection, or were these three letters found together, Mr. Mandel? Do you recall?

Mr. MANDEL. These were found together. You will notice they are all of the same date. It is evidently a circular letter that was sent to the three individuals, and perhaps others.

Mr. MORRIS. But that was not a selection on your part from the group?

Mr. MANDEL. No; it was not a selection on our part.

Mr. MORRIS. May these go into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 630" and are as follows:)

(Pencilled:) Farley-Amco. Far Eastern Policy

NEW YORK, N. Y., *October 27, 1938.*

Mr. HENRY MORGENTHAU,
Secretary of the Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORGENTHAU: We are sending you a copy of "American Far Eastern Policy and the Sino-Japanese War," a report of the seven discussion conferences held under the auspices of the American Council in the spring of 1938. A similar series of meetings is to be held during the winter on "The United States and the Post-War Situation in the Pacific."

We should appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have regarding this report.

Very sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD, *Secretary.*

(Pencilled:) Farley-Amco. Far Eastern Policy

NEW YORK, N. Y., *October 27, 1938.*

Hon. NELSON T. JOHNSON,
The Embassy of the United States,
Peiping, China.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: We are sending you a copy of "American Far Eastern Policy and the Sino-Japanese War," a report of the seven discussion conferences held under the auspices of the American Council in the spring of 1938. A similar series of meetings is to be held during the winter on "The United States and the Post-War Situation in the Pacific."

We should appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have regarding this report.

Very sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD, *Secretary.*

NEW YORK, N. Y., *October 27, 1938.*

Hon. J. C. GREW,
American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: We are sending you a copy of "American Far Eastern Policy and the Sino-Japanese War," a report of the seven discussion conferences held under the auspices of the American Council in the spring of 1938. A similar series of meetings is to be held during the winter on "The United States and the Post-War Situation in the Pacific."

We should appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have regarding this report.

Very sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Chen Han-seng, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the grounds previously employed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Chen Han-seng when he was at the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed from 57 Post Street, October 19, 1937, addressed to Mr. Chen Han-seng, Institute of Pacific Relations, and is signed with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field, this being a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, I offer you this letter and ask you if you can recall having written that to Mr. Chen Han-seng? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive this into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, as a part of the records of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 631," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 631

(Written in) (CHEN)

57 POST STREET, *October 19, 1937.*

Mr. CHEN HAN-SENG,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR HAN-SENG: Your analysis of the Japanese super-Cabinet is very excellent indeed and a great help to me who did not know the background of all the people

involved. You are, of course, quite right as to trends in that country. I cannot make up my mind whether Japan is a great deal stronger than we like to believe or not. It seems to me that historically people have always been inclined to underestimate the toughness of countries in that situation. This was certainly true of Germany in 1914. My guess is that unless we blockade Japan's trade, we shall not find any crack-up of her social or economic structure taking place for a very long time.

I wonder what your thoughts are on the conduct of the Chinese defense? I am still greatly disturbed by the absence of any drastic shakeup in the Nanking Government. I am afraid that if this war lasts a long time, we are in for a great deal of internal difficulty in China. This is always what happens when you have at the head people who do not have the guts or conviction to clean out their opponents in a crisis. I am also worried about the enormous effort the Chinese are putting into positional warfare in Shanghai. In view of the fact that the trade of Shanghai and therefore the customs receipts have presumably stopped anyway, it does not seem to me that it is very much to fight for. While it is quite true that had Japan taken Shanghai easily and then marched up the Yangtze River to Nanking in the first few weeks of the war Chinese morale might have collapsed all over the country. The first defense of the Shanghai positions was, therefore, an essential political move on the part of the Chinese Government. I wonder, though, if this defense has not gone much too far and whether it is not now merely a waste of men and war materials, the latter being so difficult to replace. Personally, I should like to see much more efficient Chinese troop movement in the North to support the 8th Route Army in its guerrilla tactics. I am not at all certain about my views on Shanghai, though, and if you have a spare moment or two sometime I wish you would straighten me out.

I have sent Bill Lockwood by the same mail a long letter regarding our research program and I should be grateful if you would take a look at it. It may, I think, be possible for us to organize a fairly large study into the whole war situation. We could, I think, make a sufficiently penetrating analysis of the internal scenes in both China and Japan to provide a large part of the explanation as to why this war has occurred. The disturbing thing is that once we make that sort of an analysis—it has, after all, been made repeatedly although not exhaustively with respect to both countries—nobody acts upon it. I should say, for instance, that it was perfectly clear what has been happening in Germany or Italy, as well as in Japan, but this seems to me to have very little effect on the policies of foreign countries.

Thank you, also, for a copy of the original draft of the review of Harry Gannes' book. I am sorry that Jaffe refused to use it in AMERASIA. If I had been there, I should have been inclined to argue the point, although I think I understand why he felt it would not be good policy. My point of argument would have been that if our friends write bad books, we should expose them. Nothing can hurt the things in which we are interested so much as sloppy work.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

FVF rb

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, just so that you will know what some of these are about I would like to say this. I know it must be an awfully dull hearing under the circumstances, but I assure you it is very difficult to conduct an examination under these circumstances.

This reads:

Your analysis of the Japanese supercabinet is very excellent indeed and a great help to me who did not know the background of all the people involved. You are, of course, quite right as to the trends in that country. I cannot make up my mind whether Japan is a great deal stronger than we like to believe or not. It seems to me that historically the people have always been inclined to underestimate the toughness of countries in that situation.

The purpose of introducing this into the record would be to ask Mr. Field to testify as to the source of the information and the practice in which he engaged at the time of exchanging information with Chen Han-seng, but apparently we can get nowhere on that line of questioning, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'Conor. It is obvious that the witness will not testify in regard to this, and I do not see any purpose in pursuing that line of inquiry any further.

Mr. Morris. In the exchange of correspondence between Mr. Field and Mr. Chen Han-seng a letter from Chen Han-seng reads:

Dear Fred: Herewith I enclose a copy of an interesting document, which please share with Owen. I don't think it is advisable to show it to anyone else.

The document was mailed to me in Chinese from Hankow. It was originally presented to Chiang Kai-shek confidentially, and as I understand it, Chiang has accepted many major points for decisive reform in the light of this presentation. Even in abstract form it is interesting because it shows both China's strength, which is potential, and China's weakness which we have reason to believe is transitory.

Then the related document is marked "Private and confidential," dated the 17th of June 1938.

I will ask the witness if he can recall having seen the letter from Chen Han-seng to him or the accompanying report. [Handing to witness.]

Mr. Field. Mr. Morris, I decline to answer on the grounds previously stated.

Senator O'Conor. Would you identify, or are you disposed to make any reference at all to the word "Owen" in here or as to the inclusion of that reference?

Mr. Field. I am willing to do so in the abstract, but not with reference to that letter.

Senator O'Conor. In the abstract.

Mr. Field. In the abstract, if I employed the word "Owen" it was most likely to relate to Owen Lattimore.

Senator O'Conor. I meant to refer to it without reference to its being embodied in that communication.

Mr. Morris. Will you identify that last document, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of an original letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on a letterhead marked 129 East Fifty-second Street. It is dated July 20, 1938, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field and signed Chen Han-seng. Attached thereto is a memorandum marked "Private and confidential," dated June 17, 1938. Chen Han-seng's name is in the upper right-hand corner. It is headed "Abstract from a joint-report of the Chinese journalists on the Tientsin-Pukow war front, regarding the points of weakness of the Chinese Army at present."

Mr. Morris. Will you receive that into the record?

Senator O'Conor. Yes, it will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 632" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 632

129 East 52nd Street,
New York, 20th July, 1938.

Mr. Frederick V. Field,
1795 California Street, San Francisco.

Dear Fred: Herewith I enclose a copy of an interesting document, which please share with Owen. I don't think that it is advisable to show it to anyone else.

The document was mailed to me in Chinese from Hankow. It was originally presented to Chiang Kai-shek confidentially, and as I understand it, Chiang has accepted many major points for decisive reform in the light of this presentation. Even in abstract form it is interesting because it shows both China's strength,

which is potential, and China's weakness, which we have reason to believe is transitory.

The people in China are laboring under a tremendous amount of corruption and inefficiency, similar to that of the Czaristic regime. But considering their poor heritage they are really doing well both politically and militarily. Chiang Kai-shek is now very friendly to both the Chinese people and the Soviet Government.

If you see Owen, you may tell him that his friend Freda Utley has excited immense interest among my Chinese friends in Hong Kong and Hankow where she arrived by plane on July 9th. She will return to England two months from now.

Sincerely yours,

[s] HAN-SENG
CHEN HAN-SENG.

[Private and confidential]

(Written in:) CHEN, Han-seng
17TH JUNE 1938.

ABSTRACT FROM A JOINT REPORT OF THE CHINESE JOURNALISTS ON THE TIENTSIN-PUKOW WAR FRONT, REGARDING THE POINTS OF WEAKNESS OF THE CHINESE ARMY AT PRESENT

1. RELATING TO THE MILITARY PROBLEM IN GENERAL

1. Relating to strategic matters

(a) Overrespect for public opinion. Some commanding officers try to win the support of public opinion to the extent that they often neglect what is really advantageous from military viewpoints. To this end, the desire for popularity exceeds the realisation of the necessity for general cooperation and often leads to unnecessary sacrifices.

(b) The inadequate application of the scorched-earth policy. Some troops try to hold an obviously untenable position; and, when they finally have to withdraw, they have no time to destroy what may be utilised by the enemy. The Tsa-chuang coal mine in Shantung and the railray tracks near Hsuchow are two cases in point.

2. Relating to the troops themselves

(a) The bogging of commanding officers in administrative affairs. In the majority of cases the organisation of staff people is incomplete, hence the commanding officer is bogged down by miscellaneous administrative affairs. Military mistakes are often due to lack of preparation and thought.

(b) The commanding officers do not have the spirit of learning from experience. The high commanding officers are still indifferent to learning lessons from the most precious and costly experience of their subordinate officers on the battlefield.

(c) Lack of encouragement to the soldiers and lower officers. Rewards and promotions are far from being sufficient for this purpose.

(d) The commanding officers do not adequately realise their responsibilities. There is a strong tendency on the part of some commanding officers to fight to the finish at critical moments, instead of obeying their superior's orders to carry out other instructions. There is a general idea of glory in fighting to the death, which is not a true realisation of carrying out their responsibilities.

(e) Poor intelligence service. The intelligence work itself is incomplete, partly because of material insufficiency but also partly because of the poor personnel. The crucial point is that the troops have not sufficiently utilized the people in general for intelligence service—a point which the Japanese cannot take advantage and of which the Chinese have not fully done.

(f) Poor political training among the troops. Generally speaking, the political workers in the troops (the 8th Route Army excepted) are still puppets of the commanding officers. Among the troops there are heaps of dry-cut military orders, but educational measures are still very rare. In some troops there has not been a single lecture given since the beginning of the fighting.

3. Relating to recruiting

(a) In numerous cases able-bodied peasants have been illegally bound with ropes and thus forced into military service. There is still, therefore, a lot of resentment among the new soldiers.

(b) The organizations for training new soldiers need to be completely reformed; otherwise the training of new soldiers will always remain poor.

(c) The treatment of the new soldiers is of the most miserable kind. The Szechwan soldiers fighting in the Hsuchow area still wear padded cotton uniforms, and their monthly allowance is several months in arrears. The constant change of commanding officers and the squeeze system from one layer to another still operates to crush the spirit of the new soldiers.

4. Relating to the problem of blockhouses

(a) During the years of the anti-Communist campaigns, many provincial authorities have built up numerous blockhouses originally designed by General Von Seckt. It was useful to the Nanking troops whose weapons were superior to the Red Army to set-up such blockhouses, but now these same blockhouses are useful only to the Japanese whose weapons are superior. Once the Japanese get hold of them, it is advantageous to the Japanese, both in offensive and on the defensive. The Chinese troops could have reached Tsinan after their victory in Taiehrchuang had it not been for the blockhouses in the southern part of Shantung, which had been occupied by the Japanese. It is obvious, therefore, that the blockhouses must be destroyed before the enemy captures them.

II. RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL MOBILISATION

1. Relating to civil administration in the war area

There is a lack of unity of administration in the war area around Hsuchow. While General Li Tsung-jen was the commanding officer of the fifth war area—Hsuchow is its center—his orders to the civilians never took effect. The old system of local "pao chia" simply cannot cope with wartime political functions.

2. Relating to mass mobilisation

(a) Mass mobilisation committees (the territory covered by the 8th Route army excepted) so far only exist in name. Party prejudices have worked against the actual functioning. Those appointed by the authorities simply have no idea whatsoever of mass mobilisation.

(b) The real masses still remain untouched as far as mobilisation goes. For instance, there are 30,000 to 40,000 railway workers on the Tsienpu and Kiaotsi lines, 40,000 to 50,000 coal miners in Shantung, and numerous peasants in the war zone eager to participate, but so far without any direction.

III. RELATING TO THE PROBLEMS IN THE REAR

1. War refugees

Until now the war refugees have not been taken care of, and their free and unregulated movements cannot but affect the people both on the war front and behind the lines, and furthermore create an additional burden for the government. Any relief of a passive and negative nature cannot cope with this problem and must ultimately disappoint the refugees. If this problem is not properly handled, therefore, it will objectively be giving the enemy a good chance to utilize the situation. From now on a positive policy must be adopted which must demand as its maxim that the refugees should return to their home places. Before they are sent back, however, they must be given an adequate training, both political and technical, so that when they return they will be organised to take up activities against the enemy. The present relief funds can be used for sending them back.

2. Wounded soldiers

The miserable treatment of the wounded soldiers at present is partly due to inadequate supply of medicine and medical workers but is also partly due to the inefficiency and corruption among governmental officials whose duties are for public health administration.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Based upon common and accurate observations described above, the following four items are deemed to be of immediate necessity:

1. Intensification of the spirit of national resistance. Everybody should be told and have explained that there is no possibility of halfway measures in the matter of war and that before the final victory it is impossible to hope for one's

individual future. Only in this way can opportunism, indifference, and factional strife be eliminated.

2. Thorough mobilisation of the masses. The power of the masses is unlimited, but they must be organised. Mere decrees and posters will not do. Without real strength for organisation, there will be no result.

3. Further and better organisation of political and military administrations. (a) The relations between political parties must be legalised and systematised to avoid unnecessary frictions. (b) the existing "pao chia" system for local defense must be improved by increasing its finance and by improvements in staff work. This can easily be achieved by reducing the number of higher officials and also by appointing new and efficient workers. (c) More emphasis should be laid on the organisation of general staff work in the troops.

4. More emphasis on political work. As political work is the basic soul of all organisation, both civil and military activities, especially under emergency, require discipline and resoluteness. This can only be achieved by intensifying and widening political work everywhere. Without such political work it is difficult to eradicate the present corruption in officialdom.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, did you make any effort to amalgamate your activities in the Institute of Pacific Relations with those of the movie industry in any way?

Mr. Field. I guess the word "amalgamate" is a little confusing.

Mr. Morris. Integrate.

Mr. Field. I have no doubt that I made every effort to try and raise some funds in Hollywood in any connection that we may have had.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 25, 1939, addressed to Miss Margaret R. Taylor, care of Miss Eloise Requa, Library of International Relations, 86 East Randolph Street, Chicago, Ill., and it has a typed signature of Frederick V. Field.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, can you recall having written that letter? Here is an extra copy that I think will be easier to read. [Handing to witness.]

Mr. Field. I do not recall the letter, Mr. Morris, but generally it does refresh my memory as to the kind of thing we were trying to do.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. Field. From the evidence itself, or the letter, I managed to reach Mr. Frederick March on the long-distance telephone, and he seems to have made a very favorable impression on me, at the same time not making it possible for me to visit him. And I convey to Miss Taylor certain suggestions he made of people who should be seen on the west coast.

Mr. Morris. Who is Marion Sister?

Mr. Field. Her name means nothing to me. She is here described as of the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League.

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League?

Mr. Field. No; I wasn't. I have heard about it, but I knew nothing personally about it.

Mr. Morris. You will notice down in the next paragraph—go ahead, Mr. Field.

Mr. Field. I would like to continue. In this letter I probably conveyed to Miss Taylor that Mr. March had suggested trying to get in touch with Mr. Melvyn Douglas, who was the active secretary or director of something that sounded over the phone like the Motion

Picture Democratic Committee, about which I know nothing at all. He suggested the Motion Picture Artists Committee, in connection with which I seemed to have written down two names, John Stewart and Charles Page. At the moment, Mr. Morris, neither of those names means anything to me at all. All through the conversation he kept mentioning the name of Biberman, but in what connection I cannot recall.

Mr. Morris. Is that the Biberman we have been talking about?

Mr. Field. I don't know, but from the evidence here I didn't know his name, and I say here, which is very familiar, but in what connection I cannot recall.

Mr. Morris. Do you know any man by that name?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated. Apparently I didn't at that time know any such person, as it would seem to be clear.

Mr. Morris. Will you read the next sentence?

Mr. Field (reading):

According to March, Biberman is mixed up in every organization in Hollywood, so that it is quite likely that he is Joe Stalin's personal representative.

Mr. Morris. Is that the same Mr. Biberman that you refused to testify about?

Mr. Field. I haven't the slightest idea, and obviously that is not a sentence which is of careful political formulation.

Had I been talking face to face with March, I would have told him that it was unwise for organizations like ours to work exclusively through these left-wing Hollywood groups.

Mr. Morris. What did you mean by "left-wing Hollywood groups"?

Mr. Field. Do you want me to read that sentence, Mr. Morris?

Senator O'Conor. Yes. I think it is only fair.

Mr. Field (reading):

Had I been talking face to face with March, I would have told him that it was unwise for organizations like ours to work exclusively through the left-wing Hollywood groups. It is quite possible that he would have replied that you have to work through them or not work at all, because they represent the only socially active people out there. You will have to find out about this on the spot. It has just occurred to me that my cousin Shirley Burden, Bill Burden's brother, is married to Douglas Fairbanks' niece—a marriage, I may say, on which the Fairbanks family frowned but which was greeted from my end in the hopes that it would revitalize the palpably growing decadence. In any case, this may be a way by which to get in touch with the Fairbanks family. Burden himself has a show of his own, doing educational pictures. I am told that he is a really first-rate cameraman (incidentally, he did his apprenticeship under Marion Cooper, to whom you have a letter). I have never met his wife, but I am told that she is a right nice gal. I doubt if you can get money from Shirley, but you might try. I imagine that his business runs at a big deficit.

And I give the address. Do you want me to go on?

Mr. Morris. I would like to ask a few questions.

Mr. Field. All right.

Mr. Morris. What did you mean when you said that it would be unwise for organizations like yours, the Institute of Pacific Relations, to work exclusively through the left-wing Hollywood groups?

Mr. Field. I didn't say that. The letter states——

Mr. Morris. It is your letter, is it not?

Mr. Field. I told you earlier, I have no recollection of it, but I certainly don't deny that it might have been and probably was. The letter states:

> Had I been talking face to face with March, I would have told him that it was unwise for organizations like ours to work exclusively through these left-wing Hollywood groups.

I engaged in a hypothetical conversation which never took place between March and myself.

Mr. Morris. You did refer, however, to these left-wing Hollywood groups clearly in reference to the groups that you have been talking about?

Mr. Field. In the context it would seem that way.

Mr. Morris. Is there anything else you can tell us about that letter, Mr. Field?

Mr. Field. No; there isn't. One thing is that, as I recall, we got practically nothing out of these efforts.

Senator O'Conor. Mr. Field, there is mentioned parenthetically there the name of Marion Cooper.

Mr. Field. Yes.

Senator O'Conor. I recall that that name was mentioned in connection with your application for a commission in the Army, and I wondered whether it was the same person.

Mr. Field. I remember reading that. Wasn't it his brother who had interviewed me? His brother was in some academic connection. I believe it was in that connection.

Senator O'Conor. There is a letter signed "Fred" and addressed to E. C. Connor of February 18, 1942, stating, "Someone suggested the other day that Marion Cooper, our friend John Cooper's brother, was fairly high up in the Army Intelligence."

Mr. Field. It is the other way around; yes. I don't think that is the same——

Senator O'Conor. I was wondering whether there was a connection between the two.

Mr. Morris. It is a different name.

Mr. Field. It is a different one. This Marion Cooper was a movie director who was a brother of a John Cooper who was associated with the institute who is a businessman; he was president of a company.

Senator O'Conor. I wondered whether there was any relation, either family or otherwise.

Mr. Field. I must say I don't know, but I don't think it is the same person.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Field, did you know E. Herbert Norman?

Mr. Field. Yes; I did.

Mr. Morris. What were your associations with E. Herbert Norman?

Mr. Field. I knew him—he was a member or perhaps at some time a staff member of the corresponding body in Canada, which I believe was called the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and I knew him in that capacity, and in this way I would have known him in the Royalist School of International Affairs in England or other corresponding bodies.

Mr. Morris. Did you meet him in connection with your association with the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the premise previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he was a member of the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. FIELDS. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this letter, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the American council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 19, 1938, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter and signed "Fred" with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, I offer you that letter and ask you if you can recall having seen that? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. FIELD. I am sorry. What was your question? Whether this was my letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. As in the case of these other letters, Mr. Morris, I don't recall it, but it seems to be my signature.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the letter, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. It is a letter that I might well have written [reading]:

EXHIBIT No. 633

SAN FRANCISCO, *April 19, 1938.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am delighted to learn that the Rockefeller Foundation has given E. H. Norman a third year on his fellowship and that they have assigned him to your secretariat inquiry. He is an excellent man. You will perhaps have noticed from the very first issue of Amerasia up to the next to the last issue that Jaffe, Chi, and I have been making all possible use of him. You could not have made a better choice.

Sincerely yours,

FRED.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you instrumental at all in securing the Rockefeller Foundation grant?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know, I might have been. This was a period when I was secretary on the American council. No, come to think of it, I wouldn't have been, because he didn't come under our jurisdiction, being a Canadian, and I imagine that they handled it themselves.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the Association of American Friends of the Chinese People, did it have an affiliate, the Canadian Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how active was Mr. Norman in the publication Amerasia?

Mr. FIELD. I would acknowledge any article you have listed in the files. From this it seems that he wrote some articles. To answer your question more precisely, if he did write some articles, and I assume he did, that would be the limit of his association. I don't believe he was at any time a member of the board, but again I would stand by the masthead.

Mr. MORRIS. You say "He is an excellent man. You will perhaps have noticed from the very first issue of Amerasia up to the next to the last issue that Jaffe, Chi, and I have been making all possible use of him."

Mr. FIELD. That is the reason I say that I assume he had been writing articles.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether he used a pseudonym at all?

Mr. FIELD. I do not. I can't testify for Mr. Norman.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know as a matter of fact whether or not he did?

Mr. FIELD. No.

Mr. MORRIS. You were the editor of the publication, were you not?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know, I assume he didn't. You probably have the files. Let's look it up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the Margaret R. Taylor letter go into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; the original.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; the original.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 633 and 634." No. 633 was read in full; and 634 is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 634

[Air mail]

NEW YORK CITY, *September 25, 1939.*

Miss MARGARET R. TAYLOR,
% Miss Eloise ReQua,
Library of International Relations,
86 East Randolph Street, Chicago, Ill.

DEAR MARGARET: For your information you will find enclosed a brief report in which I have tried to note the progress or lack of it made in various lines we have been trying to promote during the last few weeks.

I am sorry to say that the best I was able to do with Frederic March was a very lengthy long-distance telephone conversation. He could not have been more cordial but I naturally regret that I did not have a chance to sit down and tell him in a great deal more detail than I could over the telephone what we were driving at. It turned out that he was leaving with his wife on a motor trip to the South yesterday and, incidentally that I could not have seen him at the theater if I had stayed over on Friday evening. Over the telephone he suggested that we get in touch with Miss Marian Sister of the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League. As my end of the conversation was held from my famous New Hartford party line, I had a hell of a time getting names straight in spite of the fact that he spelled each of them out. When you are in Hollywood, therefore, you will have to garble names like Sister and see if you can get a precise reaction from any informant you can find. March told me to use his name in approaching this lady, that she was a close personal friend of his wife and himself, and that she knew all the progressive people in the movie industry. He gave the impression that we could count very heavily on her. I suggest, therefore, that you call on her and find out what she has to suggest.

March also suggested that we get in touch with Melvin Douglas who, he tells me, is the active secretary or director of something that sounded over the phone like the Motion Picture Democratic Committee. He also suggested the Motion Picture Artists Committee in connection with which I seem to have written down two names, John Stewart and Charles Page. All through the conversation he kept mentioning the name of Biberman—which is very familiar but in what connection, I cannot recall. According to March, Biberman is mixed up in every organization in Hollywood, so that it is quite likely that he is Joe Stalin's personal representative. Had I been talking face to face with March I would have told him that it was unwise for organizations like ours to work exclusively through these left-wing Hollywood groups. It is quite possible that he would have replied that you have to work through them or not work at all, because they represent the only socially active people out there. You will have to find out about this on the spot. It has just occurred to me that my cousin Shirley Burden, Bill Burden's brother, is married to Douglas Fairbanks' niece—a marriage, I may say, on which the Fairbanks family frowned but which was greeted from my end in the hopes that it would revitalize the palpably growing decadence. In any case, this may be a way by which to get in touch with the Fairbanks family.

Burden himself has a show of his own, doing educational pictures. I am told that he is a really first-rate cameraman (incidentally, he did his apprenticeship under Marion Cooper to whom you have a letter). I have never met his wife but I am told that she is a right nice gal. I doubt if you can get money from Shirley but you might try. I imagine that his business runs at a big deficit. Their address is 939 Seward Avenue, Hollywood. Use my name freely in trying to get after him. I haven't seen him in 10 years but my brother Osgood sees him quite frequently. You will find him a very nice, unintellectual guy and beautiful to look at.

I am sending a copy of this letter on to Scott in the hope that he may run across a few of these names and addresses for you before you reach Los Angeles and thus help you get started a little faster.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Copy to Mr. Scott.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Chao Ting Chi?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this?

Mr. FIELD. Could I have just a moment on that last question?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, indeed.

Mr. FIELD. Which name did you ask me there?

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Chi, Dr. Chao Ting Chi.

Mr. FIELD. What I want to do is, I think you asked me the same question on my last appearance here.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. And I believe I acknowledged knowing him. If I did then, I would certainly do so again at this time, but I would like to verify whether I did. Do you remember from your personal knowledge whether I did?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, you discussed him at length.

Mr. FIELD. All right, so I knew him.

Mr. MORRIS. From some recent contact you had with him.

Mr. FIELD. So I knew him then. I won't use the privilege.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of two documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. One is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter dated April 20, 1938, air mail, addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter with the typed signature of Frederick V. Field. The other is a Western Union telegram, a photostat of an original, addressed to Frederick V. Field, signed Edward C. Carter, dated April 19, 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Are these taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. They are.

Mr. MORRIS. The telegram signed by Mr. Edward C. Carter was directed to Mr. Frederick V. Field and it reads:

EXHIBIT No. 635

Confidential if we should decide to send Chi to China for 5 months for inquiry air mail me what topics in China outline you feel he could most usefully tackle.

Do you remember Mr. Carter sending you this telegram?

Mr. FIELD. No, I don't have any recollection of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make use of Mr. Chi in your work in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. He was never on the staff of the American council. On that the answer to that is "No, I did not."

Mr. Morris. What is the reference to that Mr. Carter makes there?

Mr. Field. He asked for my advice, apparently, on the use to which he in his capacity in the international organization presumably would put Mr. Chi.

Mr. Morris. Now, this other letter is from you to Mr. Carter dated April 20, 1938. I wonder if you will read the first few paragraphs of that, Mr. Field?

Mr. Field. It is from San Francisco, April 20, 1938 [reading]:

Dear Mr. Carter: I am very glad indeed to learn from your nice letter received this morning that you are considering sending Chi to China for 5 months on behalf of the secretariat's inquiry.

That would be the International Secretariat—

I shall keep this matter confidential until you have made a decision, with the exception, however, that I shall reveal it to Lattimore who has recently asked me what Chi's plans were for the summer.

It happens that I can give you fairly definite suggestions as to the topics which Chi could most usefully tackle because in another connection he has very recently outlined three subjects which he is particularly interested to investigate and with regard to which he feels qualified.

One of these subjects is a study of the economic and political process of development of the southwestern provinces (Szechuan, Kweichow, and Yunnan) from a regional entity into a part of a united China. As Chi describes it "this will involve an investigation of the historical developments of this region, the part it plays in the present war, and the inevitable transformation of the economy and politics of that region that is bound to occur as a result of the war." You would, I imagine, want to cut down the historical aspect of this subject and ask him to concentrate on very recent and current developments.

The second subject is a study of the socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions in the Northwest with special reference to the prosecution and the aftermath of the war.

The third subject involves a study of the changes in Chinese foreign trade resulting from the war and a discussion of foreign trade policy from the point of view of the interest of foreign traders as well as that of China's future economic development.

All three of these subjects, it seems to me, fall within the scope of our staff memorandum entitled "Outline for a Proposed Study of Chinese Political Unification and Economic Reconstruction, 1931–38." If I had not had these specific interests of Chi's before me I would have replied to your telegram simply that Chi should be asked to document the project on nearly all the subjects contained in the outline. That is, indeed, what his own three suggestions amount to, stated, however, in a more concrete form than I would have been able to do.

I hope most sincerely that this plan goes through and that, if it does, you can arrange to have Chi stop over in San Francisco for at least a week on his way out. I could then arrange to have him pick up information and documents for the Economic Handbook project which we may have considerable difficulty in securing in this country. I would, of course, undertake not to put such a load on him that it would interfere with whatever instructions you give him.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick V. Field.

Mr. Morris. Does that refresh your recollection on your dealings with Mr. Chi?

Mr. Field. On my dealings with Mr. Chi?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Field. No.

Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Chi help you in your Economic Handbook?

Mr. Field. No; I don't believe he did. I don't believe anything ever came of that. I had another Chinese associate on the Handbook.

Mr. Morris. Who was that?

Mr. Field. Mr. Liu Yu-wen.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you this extract from the New Masses, this review in the New Masses, and ask you if you can recall that particular review?

Mr. FIELD. I don't recall the review itself, Mr. Morris. I had a file of all the reviews of this book, because I edited the book and naturally kept all of the files with reviews I could find myself, but I don't remember this particular one.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that review by?

Mr. FIELD. I don't know. It says John Phillips. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know who John Phillips is?

Mr. FIELD. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive this letter of Mr. Field's to Mr. Chen Han-seng, the telegram, and the one to E. C. Carter into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; they will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 635", read in full above, "and 636," as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 636

1795 CALIFORNIA STREET,
San Francisco, March 28, 1938.

Mr. CHEN HAN-SENG,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HAN-SENG: It was very good of you indeed, in reply to my wire of March 12th, to prepare an article for Amerasia on the present military situation in China. I had great pleasure in reading it and was particularly interested to see your supplementary comments on the information you received from Hongkong.

Thank you for sending me the translation of the Eighth Route Army's oath of loyalty. I agree with you that the developments which are taking place in China are hastening a London-Tokyo rapprochement. As we all know, when a united front of liberal elements in any country (whether it be Spain, France, or China) is organized, the tendency is for this united front to move to the left. This is an inevitable development in that in each case the united front has been led by the Communist Party which has, also in each case, furnished the most able leadership. The result, naturally, is to crystallize the opposition. British policy, if it has tried to do anything in the last several years, has been directed. first, against the successful defense of Spain by the Government, second, in an effort to break up the popular front in France and, third and most recently, it is becoming alarmed at the success of the very processes which a year ago it was advocating in China.

I have no inside dope on the London-Tokyo rapprochement, unless some elementary knowledge of the course of modern history can be regarded as inside dope. Judging from the extraordinary ignorance of most of our statesmen regarding the almost inevitable developments in the world, I am beginning to think that this elementary knowledge is privileged information. In any case, it is quite clear from all the evidence that the British Government wants to make a deal with Japan for the mutual exploitation of China and for mutual protection against a left-wing government being successful in emerging after the far eastern war. I learned only today (although this has very likely been in the New York papers) that the British Counselor of Embassy in China has spent the last two weeks in Tokyo. I doubt if he is on vacation.

Just as Great Britain has been absolutely powerless to curb Japan, I rather imagine that it will not be very effective in now supporting her. Though I think that a London-Tokyo rapprochement emphasizes the danger to China I doubt very much if it will materially weaken the present efforts of the Chinese Government or strengthen those of the Japanese.

A more alarming international development which, I fear, may possibly have eventual implications in the United States policy towards fascism and aggression is the recent development in Mexico. The expropriation of American oil interests puts the question squarely up to the State Department whether or not

it is actually going to support free and independent developments in Latin-American republics or whether it is to return to the more obvious phases of Monroe Doctrine imperialism. Judging from the Government's first reaction, namely the Treasury Department's move on silver, I am afraid that we are going to interfere very seriously with what should be a purely domestic question in Mexico. As I understand it, the Mexican Government has been entirely legal in expropriating its own oil lands, that is so long as they compensate the foreign interests. Our Government may criticize the methods employed, they may regard it as too drastic, but it should be left at that, merely at the point of disagreement. It should not be allowed to pass on to active intervention in the form adopted by the Treasury Department. The reason that I fear this Mexican development may have repercussions in other regions is that up to this time the United States has been able to oppose fascism because it was taking place in regions fairly remote from our borders. When the question is brought directly to our back door we may, in what is supposed to be self-interest, take an opposite course and oppose a fairly left-wing people's government with the result that we shall gradually have to extend this attitude in your relations to other regions.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive this into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Which is this?

Mr. MORRIS. This is a review in the New Masses.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, this will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 637" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 637

[New Masses, August 14, 1934: Review of Economic Handbook of the Pacific]

DEAD FIGURES ON THE PACIFIC

(Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area, edited for IPR by Frederick V. Field, Doubleday, Doran and Company. $5)

Here is a book of 650 pages closely printed with innumerable tables, figures, and data on the economic factors underlying the structure of the many countries touching the Pacific Ocean totalling half the population of the world. In addition to the so-called Far East with its nations, colonies and territories, there are also included such countries as the United States, the U. S. S. R., Australia, Canada, etc. There is no question that the vast quantity of information gathered in this handbook is very valuable to students of the Far East. Many subjects are dealt with: Population, Land Utilization, Food, Transportation, Finance, Capital Movements, Trade, Minerals, Agriculture, and Textiles. The bibliography itself is very useful.

But what is the purpose of this compilation? Frederick V. Field who edited it for the Institute of Pacific Relations writes in the preface that "the volume may now be defined as concerned entirely with the material aspects of the vastly complicated and increasingly important economic problems of the peoples of the Pacific area." So far so good. But, then the next sentence reads: "Among these problems the elemental factors of population and the use people make of the land on which they live are of first importance." They are of first importance only in liberated peoples. Facts of real first importance are unfortunately omitted from the book. Does not Mr. Field know that the "use people make of land" is entirely dependent upon their power and freedom to use it. Especially is this an important point in the Far Eastern colonies where imperialists are rampant. What have the Chinese or the Philippine masses of their own accord to do with using land?

Newton D. Baker in a foreword gives us the answer. He says: "They (the statistics in this book) are addressed to no existing controversy and are not aimed to support or combat any thesis. They are just facts without emotion." Yes, facts do not need emotion, but facts need a lot of explanation and analysis before they can take on any meaning. Otherwise, facts become dead, as indeed the facts and statistics in this handbook are dead and meaningless. This review is not an attempt to belittle the importance of the book, but it is precisely those facts and explanations which are omitted which would bring this book

to life and stir people to action against a small group of imperialists and financiers who are impoverishing a world of plenty.

A few illustrations will help to clarify the point. In the chapter on "Land Utilization" there appears the following statement: "The utilization of land depends upon such factors as temperature, rainfall, topography, the quality of soils, etc." True enough, but what about the land that was destroyed by Japanese bombs around the area of the Great Wall of China which made twenty million Chinese homeless last year. What about the 108,813,115 famine victims in China from "natural and human calamities" reported last year by the Investigation of International Relief Commission? If the money spent for civil warfare against the Chinese masses were used instead for defense against floods and drought, there would be no "natural calamities." What about the vast acres of the most arable land in China which are converted to opium growing so that the militarists and imperialist lackeys can draw large funds for the support of their armies. What about Soviet China (one-fourth of China proper) and the remarkable progress it has been making toward building up a plentiful food supply? Where are these figures? Why are they omitted? The answer is easy. These omitted facts and figures would prove a "thesis" that would endanger the power of the imperialists and bankers.

In the same chapter there is a table giving the remarkable increase in productivity on the collective farms of the U. S. S. R. Doesn't it seem important to the editor to explain the reasons and the economic philosophy behind this amazing growth? And when the Roosevelt A. A. A. program of taking acreage out of production is discussed, isn't it a vital statistic to show that while wheat and cotton are plowed under, millions are starving and nearly naked?

In the chapter on "Transportation," the editor apparently is not aware that only 30 percent of the railways Japan is building in Manchuria is warranted on economic grounds. That 70 percent is planned for military reasons, for the preparations of an attack against the U. S. S. R. Certainly such clarification belongs to an economic handbook.

In the chapter on "Public Finance" there appears the figure of over 300 million dollars (50 percent of total expenditure) in the Chinese figures for military expenditures. Does not Mr. Field know that every cent of it is spent to fight the Chinese people in the Soviet territory? Who covers the Nanking government's deficit? Who supplies the Nanking government with military aeroplanes, pilots, and instructors? Where are these facts and figures?

Such omissions are so numerous that they become conspicuous by their absence. Their inclusion would light up the figures into a "thesis" that Newton Baker and his colleagues fear so much.

JOHN PHILLIPS.

Mr. FIELD. May I point out that this book was reviewed by every newspaper and journal in all the academic publications. It received quite favorable reviews, even if I say so myself. And simply because one of a very many reviews happens to come from the New Masses is no reflection whatsoever on the book itself or the work of the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. May we have a short recess? I have some urgent business that calls me outside.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I think 10 minutes will do.

Senator O'CONOR. We will recess for 10 minutes.

Mr. FIELD. Could I ask roughly how much longer it is going to take?

Mr. MORRIS. I think another half hour.

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please be in order.

Mr. Morris, will you proceed?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a representative of the War Department here. I wish he would identify himself. Colonel, will you identify yourself, please?

Senator O'CONOR. Will you come around, please?

STATEMENT OF LT. COL. ROWLAND H. RENWANZ, PERSONNEL SECURITY BRANCH OF THE SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G–2 (INTELLIGENCE), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Colonel RENWANZ. I am Colonel Renwanz.

Senator O'CONOR. And your first name?

Colonel RENWANZ. Rowland—R-o-w-l-a-n-d.

Mr. MORRIS. Colonel, have I shown you a copy of the executive session testimony of Colonel Church of Friday, January 11, 1952, presided over by Senator Ferguson?

Colonel RENWANZ. You have.

Mr. MORRIS. Have we the permission of the War Department to introduce that into our public record?

Colonel RENWANZ. Yes, sir; you have.

Mr. MORRIS. This is an examination of Colonel Church in connection with terminating the questions about the efforts made on the part of the Army to find the papers connected with Mr. Field's application for a commission. We have a statement from an Army representative. If there is no objection on the part of the Army to introducing this into the record, may it therefore be introduced into the public record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, sir; it will be received.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much.

(The record referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 638" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 638

[Executive session—confidential]

INTERNAL SECURITY

United States Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D. C., Friday, January 11, 1952

The subcommittee met at 10:45 a. m., pursuant to call in room 139 Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: Subcommittee Counsel Robert Morris.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been sworn, Colonel?

Colonel CHURCH. Yes, I think that was the first of August.

TESTIMONY OF GERALD L. CHURCH, COLONEL, ARMY GENERAL'S STAFF, ROOM 2E–519, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been sworn, Colonel, but for the record please state your full name.

Colonel CHURCH. Gerald L. Church.

Senator FERGUSON. And you came in this morning to give us a memorandum. Would you explain what it is and where you obtained it.

Colonel CHURCH. This is a record that was discovered as a result of a search, a further search, of The Adjutant General's files that I agreed to you that we would make at the time I testified on August 1, 1951. A great number of files have been searched, and this was discovered in The Adjutant General's files at Alexandria, Va.; and came to me on the 5th of December. At that time, of course, Congress was not in session, and this is the first opportunity that I have had to bring it over. Do you wish me to read this for the record?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't think he ought to read it, but I think the stenographer ought to keep a copy of it. We will receive the whole thing in evidence and he can make a copy for our record.

Colonel CHURCH. Very well. I would like to draw attention to the fact that the document is classified confidential.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, February 14, 1942.

Memorandum to: The Assistant Secretary of War for Air.
Subject: Mr. Frederick V. Field.

1. On or about January 5, 1942, the attention of this office, Operations Unit, A–2, was directed to the above individual by the New York office of G–2 (Col. Frederick D. Sharp), as being qualified for employment in the Operations Unit, on either a civilian or commissioned status. Mr. Field was at that time interviewed in New York by an officer of the Operations Unit who was there at the time on other business. The results of the interview indicated that he was a candidate of sufficient promise to justify further interviews by the chief and other officers of the Operations Unit.

2. Mr. Field, accordingly, was interviewed in Washington by several officers of the Operations Unit on or about January 8, 1942. It was suggested that he make application for civil-service appointment in order that his services might become available at as early a date as possible, and also apply for a commission, in which capacity his services would be of greater value later on.

3. About January 25, Colonel Sharp of the G–2 New York office informed one of the officers of the Operations Unit by telephone that he had received an adverse report on Mr. Field from an ONI investigator (Mr. Peterkin). Mr. Peterkin was put on the phone and stated that Mr. Field's connections were unfavorable; that his contacts with the Japanese in New York, with Mr. Joseph Lash, and with the Communist Party were such as to render his employment in intelligence activities undesirable. The Civilian Personnel Division was, accordingly, requested to withdraw Mr. Field's application.

4. Mr. Field inquired by telephone on about February 10, 1942, as to the status of his application and was informed that it had been disapproved by higher authority. He appeared in person at the Operations Unit on February 13, 1942, and was informed that this office was not in a position to give out any information; that if he wished further information is would be necessary for him to investigate the matter himself. He stated that he would make an effort to see Mr. Lovett and Mr. Curry and try to get the matter straightened out.

For the Chief of the Army Air Forces:

[s] E. P. CURTIS,
Lieutenant Colonel, Air Corps,
Secretary of the Air Staff.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a name mentioned there, the name of Currie. From your knowledge of all of the facts, who would you say that was?

Colonel CHURCH. It appears to me from a perusal of all of the files pertaining to Field that the Currie mentioned here is Laughlin Currie.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was attached to the White House.

Colonel CHURCH. Attached to the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Colonel Church, will you make an effort to have that declassified? The reason I say that is that the confidential aspect of that report has now been outworn, I think you will grant that, in view of all of the publicity. Will you try to get a declassification?

Colonel CHURCH. I will request authority. I do not have the authority myself.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand that. And, Colonel, is it your opinion that the Army or the Air Force would like more time to continue the search for these papers that are missing, particularly the application of Field, the application itself of Field, from this committee?

Colonel CHURCH. We are continuing to make inquiry and are making every effort to discover anything more pertaining to the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. So your answer, then, Colonel, would be that you do want more time to continue the search?

Colonel CHURCH. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it indicates now clearly from this memorandum that he had made an application.

Colonel CHURCH. This so states, in effect.

Senator FERGUSON. And apparently when he was turned down he said that he was going to Lovett, that is, Bob Lovett, who was then Under Secretary of Air.

Colonel CHURCH. Then Under Secretary of War for Air.

Senator FERGUSON. He is now Secretary of Defense.

Colonel CHURCH. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And Laughlin Currie at the White House. That is what it indicates.

Colonel CHURCH. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But yet, as far as the files are concerned, the only thing that you had prior to this was a medical examination?

Colonel CHURCH. That is the only thing that we could find. Now, I want to tell you this; it is possible that we will not be able to find any more, for the reason that the files of the Army, particularly The Adjutant General's files, are periodically reviewed and papers which have no apparent present or future value are destroyed. That may have been done to any further papers in this. That, I don't know. I couldn't say. There wouldn't be any record in that case.

Senator FERGUSON. I am wondering why they would destroy the application and not the medical examination.

Colonel CHURCH. If it was a question of destruction, it might be that they were in two separate files, and one was destroyed and one wasn't. It would be a question, again, of misfiling. During the war, of course, they had many incompetent file clerks.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look through the Currie file, let Mr. Morris see the Currie file, the 201 or any other file you have on it?

Colonel CHURCH. Intelligence files?

Senator FERGUSON. Any file you have on Laughlin Currie.

Colonel CHURCH. We wouldn't normally have a 201 file.

Senator FERGUSON. No; because he wasn't in the military service. But how about the intelligence file? You may find this whole Field thing in the Currie file.

Colonel CHURCH. We will search that file.

Mr. MORRIS. One other thing, and I have spoken to some of the Senators on this. Will you give us a report on your search in about 30 days? Don't let it go much longer than that. We will have to come to some sort of a conclusion, and you have been given as much time as possible. But maybe 30 days more would be helpful.

Colonel CHURCH. All right. Say by the 10th of February.

Mr. MORRIS. That would be fine.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 10:55 a. m., the subcommittee recessed subject to call.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I ask you if you will identify this letter for us, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a carbon copy of a letter which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated August 1, 1940, addressed to Frederick V. Field, Esq., with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, can you recall having received that letter? Here are extra copies [handling to witness]. Will you read it aloud, Mr. Field?

TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK V. FIELD, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, HAROLD CAMMER—Resumed

Mr. FIELD (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 639

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., October 1, 1940.

DEAR FRED: I have been wondering how your resignation and your new job can be announced both constructively to the board and membership of the American Council and most constructively for the purposes of you yourself and your new enterprise.

There is much in your new program that should appeal to the vast majority of the members of the American Council. I wonder whether it isn't better for Jessup or me to consider an announcement which will put your new work in its appropriate setting instead of having the American Council members one by one get garbled, prejudiced, and hostile accounts.

You have doubtless seen the very stimulating proposal that Robert S. Lynd has made to the Earle Committee for a study of the potentialities of democratic process in a period of mobilization. You yourself, either in your former or your new capacity, might have drafted a very similar outline. You are probably familiar with a somewhat similar but less ambitious proposal being worked on by Raymond Gram Swing, Arthur Upham Pope, and others, proposing that for the stupid morale work carried on in the American Army during the last war, a totally different program be adopted in the Army for maintaining and deepening democratic process.

Would you care to draft something for an announcement, or would you prefer to send me samples of all the mimeographed and printed material that APM has issued and have us prepare something? Naturally, I would prefer that you make the first draft if you approve of the idea at all.

If we do something along this line it might refer to you alone, or your change might be included in a circular to the board describing a number of staff changes. This could include a description of Lockwood's work, of Lasker's, of far eastern journeys of Mr. and Mrs. Barnett, the coming of Miss Jorgenson and Miss Howie—in fact, a record of all staff changes. Which do you think would be the best procedure?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall receiving that letter?

Mr. FIELD. No, I don't, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be received into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 639" and was read in full.)

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, as a matter of fact, in connection with the fourth paragraph there reading:

Would you care to draft something for an announcement, or would you prefer to send me samples of all the mimeographed and printed material that APM has issued and have us prepare something?

Send samples of all APM material into Mr. Carter in connection with that suggestion?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original of a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 2, 1940, headed "C. P. from E. C. C." and it is signed "C. P. and the initial "F."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Field, is that your initial on that letter? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. FIELD. It is just the penciled initial "F." I haven't the slightest idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Does the memorandum look familiar to you?

Mr. FIELD. No, there is nothing familiar in it whatsoever. It doesn't look like it. Actually I make an "F" the other way around. I don't know what this is. I don't think it is my initial.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest we not accept that into the record under the circumstances.

Senator O'CONOR. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I have a batch of letters here——

Mr. FIELD. I would like to assert for the record that C. P. refers doubtless to the initials of the staff member in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. I was making reference to the P. S. That was Catherine Porter, was it not?

Mr. FIELD. It must be.

Mr. Morris. But we are making reference here to the P. S. on the letter with the initial "F."

Mr. Chairman, we have about 40 letters which all relate to the particular witness before us today. They are letters either sent by him or sent to him. In order to save time, I would like to have counsel and the witness look over that stack of letters, and if he will acknowledge either that he was the author, or in reverse, that they were sent to him, I would like them to go into the record, Mr. Chairman.

I think that if the witness and his attorney would look at them we will be able to save some time and not go through each individual letter.

Senator O'Conor. May I suggest that in looking over them, if this will expedite matters, that they put in different piles, as to those which may be readily identified, and just judging from what has transpired, it may be that they will not be remembered by you, or otherwise they may.

Mr. Morris. There is one in particular I would like to ask you about.

Mr. Chairman, I would like this inserted into the record.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that letter?

Mr. Mandel. This is a telegram taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Frederick V. Field and signed "Hilda." It is dated October 20, 1937.

Mr. Morris. Do you remember receiving that telegram, Mr. Field? [Handing to witness.]

Mr. Field. I don't recall it specifically, no, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, it reads:

Exhibic No. 640

Carter asks reprint his October Amerasia article, distribution editors, Congressmen, Cabinet ministers, institute countries. Suggest reprinting pamphlet form survey as is. Out today preparedness China-Japan rather than Amerasia. Not replacing pamphlet series. Please wire opinion and how finance 3,000 copies costing $170. Thanks. Wired agenda also. China manuscript excellent.

Signed "Hilda."

Mr. Field, was it the practice of sending certain manuscripts and certain articles that appeared in Amerasia to various Congressmen and Cabinet ministers? Was it the practice of the IPR as far as you knew?

Mr. Field. Just speaking generally on the question, the practice as far as I was concerned, what I could testify to, would have to do only with this country.

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Field. And I just would refer to the testimony I gave on that subject a little while ago—that we did on occasion circularize members of the Government and Members of the Congress, as well as persons in all other walks of life in this country whom we could reach.

Senator O'Conor. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 640" and was read in full above.)

Mr. Morris. Did you know Mr. David Drucker?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously employed.

Mr. Morris. Did you know his wife, Esther Drucker?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not he has been an attorney for the Amtorg Corp.?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he an attorney for the corporation in which you had an interest?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Adam Von Trott?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a host of Adam Von Trott in this country?

Mr. FIELD. A host in what sense?

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, did you have him at your home for dinner? Did you take him to lunch? What were your dealings with Adam Von Trott?

Mr. FIELD. He attended one of the institute conferences, and I believe the one that was held at Virginia Beach, in whatever year that was. It was during the early part of the war, wasn't it? You've got the year; I forget.

Mr. MORRIS. At Virginia Beach was the early part of the war.

Mr. FIELD. It was before this country was in the war. It must have been late 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. How often did you see him?

Mr. FIELD. I saw him primarily at that conference, and I imagine I saw him a few times in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you his host at luncheon or dinner?

Mr. FIELD. I might have been. I couldn't possibly remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Ludwig Rajchmann?

Mr. FIELD. Before I answer that, could I identify him? Had he been a League of Nations adviser in China?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the one.

Mr. FIELD. Yes, I did know him.

Mr. MORRIS. What were your dealings with Ludwig Rajchmann?

Mr. FIELD. He was simply a man that I met on one of my trips to China. I had no dealings with him in any sense that I can remember. I remember sitting in a conversation, I have heard him talk, but I never had any personal dealings.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the occasions of your sitting in conversations with him and talking?

Mr. FIELD. I have no clear recollection. At Shanghai, at the time I was there, a great deal of talk went on in the middle of the night at night clubs. I think he was working with Soong, T. V. Soong. I remember it was the custom of Mr. Soong and other Chinese officials to have late meetings in night clubs. I think it is possible at one of those sessions I was on. I don't have a clear recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last see him?

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Rajchmann? I don't think I ever saw him except in China, which would have been in the early thirties.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Anthony Jenkinson?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I did. He stayed at my place.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time?

Mr. Field. I don't remember how long a period of time. In the question of the housing shortage there was a period when he couldn't find an apartment of his own. He stayed at my place.

Mr. Morris. For what duration?

Mr. Field. I don't remember how long.

Mr. Morris. Approximately?

Mr. Field. Well, it was a good many weeks, I know that, and I don't remember exactly how long.

Mr. Morris. Was he associated with the Allied Labor News?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question, Mr. Morris, on the same grounds previously used.

Mr. Morris. Now, did the Gellhorns, Walter and Kitty Gellhorn, stay at your place at all?

Mr. Field. It is possible that they used it, did use the house on occasion. I couldn't identify when. I knew them well.

Mr. Morris. Did they register from your place at all? Do you know that?

Mr. Field. No, I couldn't speak for myself on that. I couldn't tell you accurately there. There was a period when—I was trying to think why I wasn't using the house myself. I think they did. I just haven't got a clear recollection of that.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever collaborate with Archibald MacLeish in writing an article?

Mr. Field. No.

Mr. Morris. Do you know George C. Eltenton, the husband of Dolly Eltenton? Do you know Dolly Eltenton?

Mr. Field. Well, that name strikes some recollection, but I cannot identify her at the moment. I don't remember.

Mr. Morris. She was a staff worker in the IPR office in San Francisco.

Mr. Field. Not at the time I was there.

Mr. Morris. Do you know George Eltenton?

Mr. Field. I don't think so. I don't believe I met him.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Abraham Chapman?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously employed.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Colonel Faymonville?

Mr. Field. I don't think I ever met him.

Mr. Morris. You never met Colonel Faymonville?

Mr. Field. I don't think so. If I did it would have been at such a large public gathering that I would have no recollection of it.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Charlotte Honig?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously employed.

Mr. Morris. Now, did you ever meet Mr. Louis Budenz?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Have you ever met Vincente Lombard Tolidano?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever make an effort to create an interest on the part of Mr. Tolidano in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Field. May I consult with my attorney?

Senator O'Conor. Yes, indeed.

(Mr. Field confers with his counsel.)

Mr. FIELD. I have no recollection, Mr. Morris. It is possible that I did, but I have no recollection of anything.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Harry Gannes?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously employed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mildred Price?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever make a contribution to the China Aid Council?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you contribute $63,950 to the publication Soviet Russia Today between October 3, 1946, and April 28, 1950?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. It is not that I am giving you a figure and taxing your memory.

Mr. FIELD. No, I decline to answer on the grounds to do so might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a stockholder of the Trade Union Service?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever contribute to the Chinese Laundrymen's Association?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether the Chinese Laundrymen's Association was connected with the New China Daily News?

Mr. FIELD. No: I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no knowledge of that. Are you acquainted with the North American Trade Consultants, of 150 Broadway, which shares office space with AVCO? Are you acquainted with the AVCO International Corp.?

Mr. FIELD. What was the first name there? The North American Trading——

Mr. MORRIS. Let me put it this way: Were you vice president and treasurer of the AVCO International, Inc.?

Mr. FIELD. May I consult?

(Mr. Field confers with his counsel.)

Mr. FIELD. That first, that North American whatever it was, I don't recall at all. With the second one I did have such an association.

Mr. MORRIS. You were vice president and treasurer?

Mr. FIELD. If those were the offices on record. I am sure I was an officer of it.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the purpose of that company?

Mr. FIELD. A trading company.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you trade in?

Mr. FIELD. We did no business whatsoever, as I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Who organized the company?

Mr. FIELD. That I don't remember the details of.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember who the incorporators were, Mr. Field?

Mr. FIELD. The actual incorporators? No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the stockholders?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that to do so might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the directors of the corporation?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. You will testify you were the vice president and treasurer of the company?

Mr. FIELD. I was an officer of it; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Ernest Thornton in Australia?

Mr. FIELD. May I identify him? His name came up here in the testimony in the last week or so. I have read the name in the——

Mr. MORRIS. I don't think so.

Mr. FIELD. Ernest Thornton?

Mr. MORRIS. Ernest Thornton.

Mr. FIELD. This is somebody quite different, then. From Australia?

Mr. MORRIS. Australia.

Mr. FIELD. I will have to decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Carlos Contreros Labarca?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with him on July 6, 1945, at 16 West Twelfth Street?

Mr. FIELD. Who is this? Carlos——

Mr. MORRIS. Carlos Contreros Labarca.

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer on the grounds that to do so might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Tung Pi Wu?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Chang Han Fu and Chen Chia Kang, asistants to Tung Pi Wu?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Y. Y. Hsu?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Hsu have dinner at the home of Mrs. Selali Chamberlain on April 30, 1945?

Mr. FIELD. Mrs. who?

Mr. MORRIS. Chamberlain; the first name is S-e-l-a-l-i.

Mr. FIELD. It is S-e-l-l-a-h, Sellah.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Hsu have dinner at the home of Mrs. Chamberlain on April 30, 1945, in your company?

Mr. FIELD. I don't recall that.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Max Yergan?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you, Dr. Yergan, Chen, and Kang, assistants to Tung Pi Wu, have dinner together at the home of Charlotte Honig in New York City, 320 West Eighty-third Street, in 1945?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you associated with the organization, Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you and Eugene Dennis propose that Grace Granich pinch-hit and run the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern

Policy until such time as they would get more respectable names to run that organization?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you give checks in the amount totaling $610 to Mr. Y. Y. Hsu on March 19, 1946, and July 19, 1946?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where Mr. Hsu is now?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you connected with the American Chinese Export Co., of 51 Pine Street?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Charlotte Honig vice president of that corporation?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Saul Mills?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Saul Mills associated with you in the American Chinese Export Co.?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you give Saul Mills on March 22, 1950, $4,000?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you give him $2,000 on May 15, 1950?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question also on the the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Martin Popper the secretary of the American Chinese Export Co.?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Mr. Popper a member of the Sunnyside branch of the Communist Party in Queens?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet a man by the name of J-u-a-n, the next part of the name is M-a-r-i-v-e-i-l-l-i, and the next name is V-i-d, and the last part of his name is A-u-r-i-e-a, who is president of the Chuman Communist Party? I will read that again. The first name is J-u-a-n, the next part of his name is M-a-r-i-v-e-i-l-l-i, the next part of his name is V-i-d, and the next part A-u-r-i-e-a.

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with him on April 10, 1946?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Mr. Chairman, may I just say a word, that I have endeavored, and I wish to continue, to answer as fully as I can any questions pertaining to the Institute of Pacific Relations, but I feel that in self-protection I must decline to answer questions that go far astray from this particular matter.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Field, let me ask you just a few questions along that line that might be a little closer, and they pertain to the library. I think that was located at 26 West Twenty-sixth Street, was it?

Mr. FIELD. Of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator O'CONOR. No; of yours.

Mr. FIELD. My own library?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. FIELD. Yes; that is right; 23 West Twenty-sixth Street.

Senator O'CONOR. 23 West Twenty-sixth Street. Did you know Israel Epstein?

Mr. FIELD. May I confer?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, indeed.

(Mr. Field conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. FIELD. I must decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you know Edgar Snow?

Mr. FIELD. I also decline to answer that question on the same grounds.

Senator O'CONOR. And you have previously testified concerning Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I knew him.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, with regard to the publications of each of those three individuals, I would like to just ask you a few questions. One, the book entitled "Unfinished Revolution in China" by Israel Epstein. Do you know of such a book?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I did know of such a book.

Senator O'CONOR. And do you know of Red Star Over China by Edgar Snow?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. Third, Solution in Asia by Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FIELD. Yes; I know of such a book.

Senator O'CONOR. I would not expect you to know all the books in the library, but do you know whether those books were included in the library?

Mr. FIELD. Well, in other words, whether I own those books? Is that your question?

Senator O'CONOR. Well, if you desire.

Mr. FIELD. I should like to explain, sir, that the library at 23 West Twenty-sixth Street is my personal library.

Senator O'CONOR. That is right.

Mr. FIELD. I own the books there. So your question is whether I own these three books you have mentioned.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, you may answer, if that is your desire, on that question. Mine was not directed to that particularly, but I will ask the question as long as you put it that way.

Mr. FIELD. I have, I do own Lattimore's book, and I think I have Snow's. I offhand don't think I happen to have the other one, Epstein's book.

Senator O'CONOR. The point to which I was directing the question was as to whether or not a library as such was made available to any particular groups or to the public generally, or was it restricted in its use?

Mr. FIELD. No; it is a library which adjoins my office in a large—just adjoining my personal office, which is a personal office. And I simply had a policy of leaving the door open, and I don't think I have ever thrown anybody out of the place. I have never gone into any special efforts to get anybody into it, but anyone who wanted to consult the books on the premises could do so. I have had a policy of not permitting people to take books out.

Senator O'Conor. I see. Was there any standing arrangements, to your knowledge, whereby members of any particular groups would have access to it and would be admitted and have the run of it?

Mr. Field. No; no groups as distinguished from any other groups.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, in connection with this line of questions, I grant you that some of these questions and the association with some of these people with the Institute of Pacific Relations are at best marginal, but under ideal conditions the purpose of this investigation would be to find out whether or not these people were actually connected with Mr. Field's work in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I grant you in some cases that may not be the case, but we should have answers from Mr. Field to find out whether in fact they are or not.

Certainly, Mr. Y. Y. Hsu, about whom we have been talking, was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and Mr. Adam Von Trott was connected with the institute.

Mr. Field. I replied with respect to him.

Mr. Morris. I have a series of questions; the next five are connected with Mr. Von Trott. I grant you that it may be unfair to the Institute of Pacific Relations to continue this line of inquiry, but since we have a witness here we would like to find out whether or not there is any connection with these people. It may well be that the answer is "No," but we do not always get that answer from a witness.

Mr. Field. The problem, Mr. Chairman, for the witness, or a witness, at least, in my position, is that, while wanting to answer all questions possible, to protect myself from opening up a particular line and waiving the privilege, I have had that disastrous experience, and I have suffered from it, and I don't want to repeat it, and therefore I am somewhat zealous in attempting to protect myself. This is the problem: If I was assured of the complete line of questioning on any particular person or line that Mr. Morris wanted to open up, it certainly would be something to consider.

Senator O'Conor. I does occur to me that it might be desirable for you to indicate the scope of the inquiry; and, if it is in a limited area in which the witness feels that he may go without jeopardizing any rights, it may be that it would be productive of results if it is indicated that it is just to be encompassed within a certain area.

Mr. Morris. In connection with the matter that we have gone over, Senator, we have the episode of Tung Pi Wu's visit to the United States, which is important to this inquiry, who met Tung Pi Wu while he was in New York, and then whether or not any people associated with you in the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Field, were in the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. Field. In that case, that would be a case where I clearly would feel it might tend to incriminate me, and I would have to invoke the privilege.

Mr. Morris. How about any questions in connection with the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Affairs?

Mr. Field. On that also I feel it would tend to incriminate me.

Mr. Morris. In connection with Charlotte Honig, was she associated with you in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Field. Let me consult with my counsel.

(Mr. Field conferred with his counsel.)

Mr. Field. Let me answer that this way, Mr. Morris: To the best of my recollection, this person was in no way associated with me in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Morris. There we have an answer, Mr. Chairman.

Now, did you have cocktails with Adam Von Trott on November 28, 1939?

Mr. Field. I have no idea whatsoever.

Mr. Morris. Do you remember having cocktails with him?

Mr. Field. How could I possibly remember? It is 13 years ago.

Mr. Morris. Can you remember his having cocktails with you?

Mr. Field. I can't. I told you that it is very likely that I knew him. I had seen him in New York. Whether we had cocktails or steaks or what, I haven't the slightest idea.

Mr. Morris. Is it consistent with your recollection that you met him five time in New York in 1939?

Mr. Field. I will grant you that it is quite conceivable.

Mr. Morris. When did you last hear of Mr. Von Trott?

Mr. Field. When did I last hear of him? The last I heard of him was when he was executed in Germany.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Harrison George?

Mr. Field. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. Morris. I cite that as an example of the difficulty that we have.

Mr. Field. May I say on this point, I think perhaps I could anticipate. I can give the same reply that I did with respect to the other person.

Mr. Morris. Charlotte Honig?

Mr. Field. That is right, that I recall no association that I had with this person in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have had evidence that Harrison George in 1931 did have a discussion with Mr. Browder in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and therefore it would be only plausible if we know that Mr. Field did know Mr. Harrison George that we should ask him if he had any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and he has answered that he had not.

Mr. Field. And I repeat the answer in light of what you have said.

Senator O'Conor. You want to repeat the question?

Mr. Field. I repeat the answer after the additional remarks that Mr. Morris has made.

Mr. Morris. You appreciate the difficulty of conducting examination into an area where you do not know whether or not the people are going to be connected with the institute, people whom you do as a matter of fact know that he was associated with.

You understand that, Mr. Field, and you appreciate the difficulty. We want to be fair here to the institute.

Mr. Field. On the question of Mr. Harrison?

Mr. Morris. Harrison George.

Mr. Field. Harrison George. It seems to me I have been responsive insofar as stating definitely, categorically, that I had no association with him in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Morris. We appreciate that, and yet at the same time, Mr. Field, you must know that if we have evidence before this committee that there was a connection between Harrison George and the institute and at the same time we have reason to believe that you knew Harrison

George, it is only a fair question and we should ask you if there is any connection there.

Mr. FIELD. I don't deny your absolute right to any question. I am not appraising that issue.

Mr. MORRIS. We have had a conflict, Mr. Field, in the evidence before this committee as to whether or not you used the name Frederick Spencer or Lawrence Hearn in writing for China Today. Would you clear up that conflict for us?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question on the grounds previously used.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. T. A. Bisson?

Mr. FIELD. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he associated with the publication China Today?

Mr. FIELD. I decline to answer that question—I will take that back and reply to you differently. I think the publication itself will show whether or not he wrote articles for the magazine. I think it is likely that he did, but I couldn't possibly recall a specific article.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall——

Mr. FIELD. As a matter of fact, he may have been on the editorial board at a certain period. Again the masthead will show it and I will stand by it.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not know whether he used a pseudonym on that publication?

Mr. FIELD. I have no knowledge of that, that he ever did.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that he ever used the name Frederick Spencer?

Mr. FIELD. No, I cannot testify to anything Mr. Bisson did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hear that he did?

Mr. FIELD. I have no reason—I have no knowledge of this.

Senator O'CONOR. May I ask how much more you have?

Mr. MORRIS. I am finished now.

Senator O'CONOR. There does remain the one matter of the identification of the letters in the interrogation. I was wondering whether that will probably take some time.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator O'CONOR. At this point the hearing will be recessed.

Mr. MORRIS. We will have a short session this afternoon.

Senator O'CONOR. We will recess this hearing until then.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee was recessed, to be reconvened at 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator O'CONOR. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Let the record show that this is an open hearing and that Mr. Field has come back, having gone through all of the exhibits that we presented to him at the termination of the last session which closed at about 12:30.

Mr. Field, have you gone through the exhibits that I have presented to you?

Mr. FIELD. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do they appear to you to be copies of letters that were written to you and written by you in connection with your duties in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FIELD. In your absence, Mr. Morris, I dictated, or, rather, I will put it this way: I divided these documents into four groups, and then dictated my evidence with respect to each of the four groups, and I would suggest that what I have already dictated be incorporated now as my evidence with respect to them.

Mr. MORRIS. He has explained it on the record, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. That is what I had originally intended after you had seen the letters, to suggest such a course as that, because I felt they might fall into several categories, and by segregating them according to whether or not they were certain or doubtful or otherwise it might simplify the handling of it.

Mr. FIELD. Could I just add that I did this in the presence of your associate counsel?

Senator O'CONOR. Good.

(The testimony dictated that was above referred to is as follows:)

Mr. FIELD. Mr. Morris, I have reviewed the batch of letters and memoranda which you gave to me and divided them into four groups. The first group purports to be memoranda signed by me as follows: A carbon of a letter dated October 11, 1938, from San Francisco, to Miss Nettie Duskis. A carbon of a letter dated July 26, 1937, to Miss Susan T. Smith, attached to which is a letter from Susan T. Smith to me dated July 12, 1937, and a list of books.

A letter dated June 16, 1937, to Mr. T. A. Bisson. A letter dated October 11, 1938, to Miss Margaret R. Taylor. A letter dated November 9, 1937, to Miss Catherine Porter. A letter dated March 29, 1938, to Edward C. Carter. A letter dated November 15, 1937, to Mr. Theodore Draper, attached to which is data concerning Mr. Draper's application for a Guggenheim Fellowship, and a letter of November 9, 1937, to Mr. Draper.

A letter dated March 10, 1938, to Mr. Edward C. Carter. A memorandum dated July 24, 1939, to "RS, MSF, KB, MRT, HA, WWL."

Letter dated March 23, 1942, to Mr. Edward C. Carter attached to which is a letter dated March 3, 1942, from Edward C. Carter to Frederick V. Field and a letter dated March 12, 1942, from Edward C. Carter to Mr. John A. Pollard.

Letter dated May 4, 1933, to Mrs. Ruth Young. Telegram dated November 23—no year but bearing the notation "Estimated 1942" to Edward C. Carter.

Memorandum to "CP from FVF" dated February 23, 1937, and "FVF from CP" being probably Catherine Porter.

Letter dated August 23, 1934 to Newton D. Baker. Letter dated April 20, 1933, to Mr. Loomis, attached to which is a memorandum dated May 2, 1933, to Mr. Loomis from an unidentified person, apparently other than myself.

Memorandum dated January 22, 1940, to "BL."

Letter dated July 26, 1937, to Nathaniel Peffer.

Letter dated September 4, 1935, to Mr. Owen Lattimore.

Letter dated April 22, 1940, to Mr. Owen Lattimore.

Letter dated March 17, 1938, to Mr. Edward C. Carter.

Letter dated March 17, 1938, to Mr. Carter.

Letter dated January 31, 1938, to Miss Catherine Porter.

Letter dated December 17, 1934, to Mr. E. C. Carter.

Letter dated October 4, 1934, to Mr. Lawrence Duggan.

Letter dated October 9, 1939, to Mr. Edward C. Carter.

Letter dated May 15, 1940, to Mr. Owen Lattimore.

Letter dated April 25, 1939, to Mr. Carter.

Letter dated May 31, 1940, to Mr. John H. Oakie.

Letter dated April 9, 1940, to Mr. Philo W. Parker.

Letter dated December 20, 1938, to the American League for Peace and Democracy.

Memorandum dated April 11, 1939, to "AB," attached to which is a letter to the State Department from Annette Blumenthal.

Letter dated November 10, 1936, to General Victor Yakhontoff, attached to which is a letter dated November 3, 1936, from Robert T. Crane to Frederick V. Field, attached to which is a letter to Dr. Robert T. Crane from Frederick V. Field dated November 2, 1936.

Almost all of the foregoing letters are carbons or photostats of carbons of letters. I do not have any present recollection of having sent these letters,

although from their contents I would assume that they were sent as they appear to have been to the persons whose names appear thereon, but I do not presently remember them. Except where I have indicated otherwise each of the letters and memoranda referred to in the first group appear to have been sent by me.

The second group of letters and memoranda appear or purport to be letters or memoranda to me from other persons as follows:

Memorandum dated November 6, 1939, to FVF from ECC.

Letter dated September 7, 1937, from Edward C. Carter to which is attached a cable dated August 25, 1937, from Carter to INPAREL, New York.

Letter dated March 4, 1936, from Edward C. Carter, to which is attached a telegram from "Fred" to Edward C. Carter dated March 2, 1936.

Memorandum from Liu Yu-wan to F. V. Field, E. C. Carter, E. J. Tarr, P. C. Jessup, dated November 21, 1939.

Letter dated January 4, 1935, from Edward C. Carter.

Memorandum dated October 27, 1944, from Raymond Dennett to Philip C. Jessup, William C. Johnstone, Frederick V. Field, and Rose Yardumian.

Letter dated January 12, 1937, from Owen Lattimore.

Memorandum or letter dated March 9, 1943, from Edward C. Carter.

Letter dated May 2, 1940, from Charles F. Loomis.

Memorandum dated March 20, 1939, from "ECC."

Letter dated July 2, 1937, from Charles F. Loomis.

Letter dated December 4, 1934, from Everett Case.

Letter dated October 7, 1937, from William W. Lockwood, Jr.

Letter dated July 16, 1934, from Edward C. Carter.

Memorandum entitled "Excerpts From Letter to Frederick V. Field From Newton D. Baker, Dated August 6, 1934 (Cleveland, Ohio)."

Letter dated April 29, 1939, from Edward C. Carter.

Letter dated March 20, 1939, from Earl H. Leaf, to which is attached by clipping an onionskin report entitled "The Attached Report, Compiled and Written by the Shanghai Branch of the British Army Intelligence Service, Is Strictly Confidential."

Letter dated August 12, 1938, from Kathleen Barnes.

An onionskin copy of what appears to be a resolution unanimously adopted by the American Council in appreciation of the work of Frederick V. Field, undated.

Letter dated October 11, 1938, from Owen Lattimore.

Almost all of the foregoing are unsigned carbons or photostats of unsigned carbons of letters purporting to have been sent by the persons whose names appear thereon to me except where indicated otherwise, and except that the letter which the confidential report of the British Army Intelligence Service is now attached by clip does not contain any reference to such confidential report. Except for such confidential report I have no present recollection of ever having received the letters referred to in this second group. However, I am entirely willing to assume that they were sent by the persons indicated thereon and received by me. As to the confidential report, I am quite sure that I have never previously seen it, and am unwilling to make that assumption.

The third group of communications which I have examined—and I have examined all of them hastily and within limited time, as you know—purport to be letters sent by me as follows:

Letter dated March 4, 1943.

Letter dated July 3, 1940.

Letter dated August 27, 1938, to which attached a letter dated August 22, 1938.

A letter dated September 1, 1938, to which is attached a letter dated August 25, 1938.

A letter dated April 12, 1938.

A letter dated December 5, 1940.

A telegram dated March 11, 1938.

A memorandum dated January 12, 1938.

The foregoing letters which I have examined appear to be in substantially the same form as the other letters, that is, photostats or carbons in the main. As to these letters I must respectfully decline to answer in the exercise of my privilege against self-incrimination.

The fourth group of letters purport to be letters sent to me, or memoranda sent to me by various persons bearing the following dates:

March 9, 1937; March 16, 1936; March 23, 1935; July 1, 1940; March 30, 1937, attached to which purports to be a letter from me dated March 9, 1937, and a letter dated March 6, 1937; March 30, 1938, to which it attached another letter dated March 30, 1938; letter dated April 26, 1938, to which is attached a memorandum dated April 26, 1938; a letter dated October 15, 1937; a letter dated March 24, 1938; a letter dated September 22, 1937, to which is attached a memorandum of four pages undated; a letter dated June 4, 1938.

As to the fourth group of letters and memoranda I respectfully decline to answer in the exercise of my privilege against possible self-incrimination.

Senator O'Conor. I might also say just for the record that all of the proceedings, including, of course, this hearing as well as the examination and segregation of the papers all happened in the presence of Mr. Field's counsel.

Mr. Morris. Yes; and Mr. Haaser.

Do you have any objection to introducing any of these in the public record?

Mr. Field. There is a group of those I claim the privilege on.

Senator O'Conor. It would be understood that any in respect to which you claim the privilege would, of course, not therefore be chargeable to you.

Mr. Field. I have nothing to do with those.

Senator O'Conor. Of course, they will be received in evidence if they are originally records from the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Morris. That is right. The question was directed more to: Do you have any reason to believe that they are not authentic records?

Mr. Field. I have claimed the privilege on those particular documents, and therefore I don't think I can make any comments.

Senator O'Conor. With regard to that particular class there would be nothing imputed to Mr. Field in regard to that one group in connection with which he does claim his privilege. The rest of them, I understand, are authenticated.

Mr. Field. We divided them into four groups. Two groups were divided as to whether they were addressed to me or whether I addressed them to others, in which I had no specific recollection of a document but was willing to assume that they were documents so addressed to me or sent by me. And the third and fourth groups were documents similarly divided to which I claim the privilege.

Senator O'Conor. Very well.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may all of these documents be received into the record?

Senator O'Conor. They will be, if, as I understand is the case, they are all part of the records taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations files or records.

Mr. Morris. That will be subject to Mr. Mandel's identification.

Senator O'Conor. That is right. I want to attach that condition so as to be sure they are traceable to that source.

(For Mr. Mandel's identification see p. 4158.)

(The documents referred to are as follows and were marked with exhibit numbers, as follows:)

Group I: Nos. 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672.

Group II: Nos. 673, 674 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692.

Group III: Nos. 693, 694, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699.

Group IV: Nos. 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710.

EXHIBIT No. 641

(Handwritten:) Duskis

SAN FRANCISCO, *October 11, 1938.*

Miss NETTIE DUSKIS,
Science and Society, 30 East 20th Street,
New York City.

DEAR MISS DUSKIS: I have just returned to my office and find your letter of September 16th. As my secretary wrote you, I have already reviewed Bisson's JAPAN IN CHINA. I happen to think it is the most important single book which has appeared on the war and very much hope that you will find a first-rate reviewer and give it good space. The only suggestion which comes to me offhand is Nathaniel Peffer at Columbia. I happened to discuss the book with him at luncheon last week when I was East and thought that his comments were very interesting. Perhaps I suggest him because his impression of the book is very much the same as mine.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g

Editors: Edwin Berry Burgum (New York University), V. J. McGill (Hunter College), Margaret Schlauch (New York University), Bernard J. Stern (Columbia University), D. J. Struik (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Foreign Editors: J. D. Bernal (Cambridge University), Maurice Dobb (The Marshall Library, Cambridge), Lancelot Hogben, F. R. S. (University of Aberdeen), Paul Langevin (College de France, Paris), H. Levy (Imperial College of Science, London), H. J. Muller (Institute of Genetics, Moscow), Joseph Needham, F. R. S. (Cambridge University). Contributing Editors: J. W. Alexander, Francis Birch, Louis B. Boudin, Theodore B. Brameld, Dorothy Brewster, Ralph J. Bunche, Kenneth Burke, Addison T. Cutler, E. Franklin Frazier, Louis Harap, Granville Hicks, Eugene C. Holmes, Leo Huberman, Corliss Lamont, Oliver Larkin, Robert Morss Lovett, H. F. Mins, Jr., Broadus Mitchell, Fulmer Mood, Brooks Otis, Herbert J. Phillips, David Ramsey, Samuel Sillen, Harry C. Steinmetz, D. J. Struik, Paul M. Sweezy, Genevieve Taggard, Louis Weisner

SCIENCE & SOCIETY

A Marxian Quarterly

30 East 20th Street

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Gramercy 7–1021

SEPTEMBER 16, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK FIELD,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, California.

DEAR MR. FIELD: We are very eager to have you review Bisson's book on *Japan in China.* If by any chance you have reviewed it for another periodical will you please recommend a person who will do an adequate job as we are anxious to see it well reviewed.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Nettie Duskis,
NETTIE DUSKIS, *Secretary.*

SAN FRANCISCO, *September 20, 1938.*

Miss NETTIE DUSKIS,
Science and Society, 30 East 20th Street,
New York City.

DEAR MISS DUSKIS: This is to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 16th to Mr. Field. Unfortunately, this has arrived during Mr. Field's absence from San Francisco. Upon his return in about ten days it will be brought to his attention promptly.

For your information I may add that Mr. Field's review of JAPAN IN CHINA has appeared in the current number of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Sincerely yours,

_____,
Secretary to Mr. Field.

g.

EXHIBIT No. 642

JULY 26, 1937.

Miss SUSAN T. SMITH,
Berkeley Public Library, Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR MISS SMITH: I have heard from Mrs. Barnes that she was able to discuss with you your book list on Soviet Russia when she passed through the Bay Region two weeks ago. I have therefore consulted Miss Harriet Moore, who had already heard from Mrs. Barnes, regarding her own recommendations. I am enclosing the memorandum which Miss Moore has sent me rather than trying to paraphrase it. I hope that these comments will be of some help to you.

There is only one point which I do not find included in Miss Moore's memorandum which I know she would like to have me pass on. We both feel, as do some of the others whom I have consulted, that Harry Stekoll's HUMANITY MADE TO ORDER should be omitted from the list as it seems to so truly fall into the category of straight propaganda. I do not by any means want to suggest that we should not include in the book list critical references to what is going on in the Soviet Union, but it seems to me that the list includes plenty along that line without Stekoll's book, which seems to go a good deal further than merely being critical.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

BERKELEY PUBLIC LIBRARY,
Berkeley, Calif., July 12, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK K. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52d Street,
New York City.

DEAR MR. FIELD: The Library Committee of the Pacific Coast Branch of the Institute has been working for some time on a list on Russia for use in Libraries, similar to the ones we compiled on China and Japan.

This has been much more difficult. We first planned to make a general list including old and new Russia. Our purpose is to select material that is in print, not too expensive, readily available for purchase and suited to the mind of the average reader. We were unable to choose twenty-five titles to cover the whole subject of Russia with any degree of comprehension.

We then decided to concentrate on Soviet Russia, eliminating, if possible, books that were too markedly propagandist, for or against. The books we finally selected from about fifty read, are on the enclosed list.

We are not satisfied with it and we didn't agree as a committee on some that were included, and some omitted. The list to me lacks balance and continuity. I talked with Mrs. McLaughlin yesterday and she suggested I write to you and ask you to submit the list to Mrs. Katherine Barnes and Miss Harriet Moore for criticism and suggestions as to titles to be included.

Will you return it so the committee may have your comments before August first.

Yours sincerely,

[s] SUSAN T. SMITH, *Librarian.*

P. S.—I have just heard that Mrs. Barnes is here in California and will be in my office Wednesday. I am sending the list just the same. (The P. S. is handwritten.) S. T. S.

STS:M
Enc.

(Handwritten:) HM to FVF
(Handwritten:) July 24, 1937

COMMENTS ON THE BOOK LIST, LIBRARY COMMITTEE, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

I agree with Mrs. Barnes suggestion that the following be included in the list:
John Reed—Ten Days that Shook the World
General Graves—American Intervention in Siberia
Zostchenko—Russia Laughs
Duranty—Reports Russia

These are to be substituted for:
Skariatina—Little Era in Old Russia
The works of Alexander Pushkin
Feval—Tovarich
Duranty—I Write as I please

There are several aspects of Soviet life which are not covered in this list. I would suggest that there be added: M. S. Callott—Russian Justice, or if you want a more academic account, add: Zelitch—Soviet Administration of Criminal Law.

There is also no book on Soviet medicine. The only comprehensive report on this at present is: Newsholme and Kingsbury—Red Medicine. This account is, perhaps, too uncritical to be included in your list. However, in the fall, a new book is to be published by Dr. Henry Sigerist of Johns Hopkins. This might be more suitable.

The list omits all reference to foreign affairs. There are several good books on this subject:

Louis Fischer—Soviets in World Affairs
The Soviet Union in World Problems, edited by Samuel Harper
Yakhontoff—Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East
Lobanov-Rostovsky—Russia and Asia

Also these books may be heavier than most of those on your list, nevertheless, it seems essential to include something on foreign relations.

There are also one or two other books of a general nature which might be interesting:

Louis Fischer—Soviet Journey, a well-written and interesting travel book by a sympathetic observer
Sholokhov—Soil Upturned (Seeds of Tomorrow), sequel to "And Quiet Flows the Don"

Anyone of a number of the Maurice Hindus books on Soviet agriculture would be an addition, as your list is very weak in regard to agriculture, as well as industry. Unfortunately there is no book on Soviet industry which would meet your requirements, although there are several Soviet novels picturing industrial development. These however, might seem to you to be too biased.

Telephone: Murray Hill 2-0313 Cable Address: Amruscult

THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

For Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union, Inc.,
Fifty-Six West Forty-Fifth Street, New York

Board of Directors: Harry Elmer Barnes, Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, Aaron Bodansky, Harold Clurman, Mrs. Ethel Clyde, George S. Counts, Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean, John Dewey, Wm. O. Field, Jr., Lewis Gannett, Mortimer Graves, Wm. S. Graves, Alcan Hirsch, John A. Kingsbury, Mary van Kleeck, Wm. W. Lancaster, William Lescaze, Robert Littell, Harriet Moore, William Allen Neilson, Mrs. George F. Porter, Raymond Robins, Geroid T. Robinson, John Rothschild, Whitney Seymour, Lee Simonson, Graham R. Taylor, Frederick Tilney, S. A. Trone, Allen Wardwell, Richard Watts, Jr., Maurice Wertheim, Avrahm Yarmolinsky, Mrs. Efrem Zimbalist

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JULY 23, 1937.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: I just noticed that your Library Committee wants this list returned for the first, so I am sending it to you post haste.

Kathleen has sent me in detail her corrections and additions with which I agree. I will make a few other suggestions on this list.

I find it a little difficult to be civil about the list because it is so obviously biased under the cloak of being unbiased, but under the circumstances I suppose I should be glad that the books which the branded "propaganda" are included in the list at all. Therefore I will make no comment on the list which you can forward to Miss Smith. But if you have any way of influencing Miss Smith, I would suggest that you get the Stekoll book removed as it is by far the worst.

Sincerely yours,

[S] Harriet Moore
HARRIET MOORE.

HM: KB

EXHIBIT No. 643

JUNE 16, 1937.

Mr. T. A. BISSON,
c/o North China Language School, Peiping.

DEAR ART: Many thanks indeed for your letter, which I have shared with Chi. What you have to say is of very great help and has strengthened Chi in his decision to delay his acceptance of the job in China for a few months. He had after all definitely agreed to assist in the editing of a large study of the economic history of China and he could not very well go away without first obtaining a release from that job. This he cannot look into for another two or three months.

How are things going with you and your family? You don't know how much I envy your being in the Far East. Your article, which as you doubtless have already seen we published in the last issue of AMERASIA, was a swell job, particularly as it was written before the Diet elections. It is going to be difficult to get as good analyses of the Konoye Cabinet because it does not lend itself to such clear-cut interpretation as did the Hayashi group. Nevertheless we are looking around for what we can find. I hope you will be sending us a piece on China pretty soon. Through printing first-hand reports we can perform a pretty important job in keeping people accurately informed and their minds working along fruitful channels.

With best regards,
Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

280 Chin Yo Hutang—(Handwritten).

EXHIBIT No. 644

Officers: Carl L. Alsberg, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Philip C. Jessup, Vice Chairman; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary, Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

1795 California Street, San Francisco; Telephone: Tuxedo 3114—129 East 52d Street, New York City; Telephone: Plaza 3-4700
Cable: INPAREL

SAN FRANCISCO, *October 11, 1938.*

(Handwritten:)

Miss MARGARET R. TAYLOR,
129 East 52d Street, New York City.

DEAR MARGARET: Here is a letter to Marion Paschal, Doris Duke Cromwell's secretary. The Cromwell *entourage* arrived in New York, as I recall, by plane shortly before I left for the West and, restless as Doris is reputed to be, I should think there was a fairly good chance that they were still there. Will you be so good as to fill in Paschal's address which can be found in my files and mail the letter along with the Farley pamphlet? There should also be in my files her office telephone number which cost me six or seven cocktails to obtain but which is now somewhere in our records.

I really don't know what technique to suggest if you and Carter are able to get an appointment. Paschal is terrific over cocktails but whether that is the way to do business with her I don't know. It is apparently essential to get by her before Doris herself can be approached because she acts not only as secretary and financial advisor on gifts but also as companion and best friend. Both gals are evidently restless and romantic and are under the impression that they delve deep into American life by making occasional visits to boys' clubs, slums and settlements. I have talked with Paschal a good deal about Doris' terrible money problems, the problem being knowing what to do with her income and giving enough of it away to exactly balance the income tax schedules. I know that about two years ago they were seriously considering setting up a foundation but I don't think anything has come of that. At that time their main adviser was Edwin Embree, president of the Rosenwald Fund. Carter knows him and his peculiarities better than I do. He too, I should say, was a somewhat romantic figure but then so is the IPR so I don't see why we can't all get together.

Finally, my own advice is to make a perfectly frank and direct approach on this money question and to completely avoid maneuvering. I should also sug-

gest, if you get a hearing, hitting at a figure of about five thousand dollars for the first year on some specific project. I am glad to give you full authority to invent new projects as the occasion warrants.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Fred
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 645

Officers of San Francisco Bay Region Committee: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairman; Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; William F. Morrish, Treasurer; John H. Oakes, Secretary

Officers: Carl L. Alsberg, Vice Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer; Carl L. Alsberg, Research Chairman

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

57 Post Street

SAN FRANCISCO

Telephone ExBrook 5089

Cable Address: INPAREL

(Handwritten:) CONFIDENTIAL.

NOVEMBER 9, 1937.

Miss CATHERINE PORTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, New York.

DEAR CATHERINE: I failed, I believe, to report to you a part of the conversation which Carter and I had with Miss Walker of the Rockefeller Foundation two weeks ago. Miss Walker informed me that the Foundation was now prepared to appoint some of the recipients of its international fellowships through the Foreign Policy Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and ourselves. She wishes each of these organizations to find and call to the attention of the Foundation persons who they believe will be promising and in return the Foundation will permit the holder of the fellowship to work on the staff. I gathered that we could probably have two such persons.

Coming west on the train, I ran over what I considered to be the best possibilities. These included Walter Radius of San Francisco, Norman Hanwell who is now an instructor at the University of Minnesota, Theodore Draper who is now on the staff of the *New Masses*, Ernest Hauser, and Lawrence K. Rosinger. In my own mind I have eliminated Rosinger from immediate consideration because I do not think he has developed sufficiently to work successfully with a staff and because, in any case, he should be encouraged to continue his concentration in languages (including an American pronunciation of English). Hanwell already being provided for, and the importance of having young persons of his ability in our universities, could also be temporarily eliminated. Perhaps we could consider him in another year. The other three, however, seem to me to be good candidates.

I should add a few comments on Theodore Draper, whom none of the staff knows. The fact that he is on the board of the *New Masses* indicates that he is a Communist. Whether he is a member of the party or not I haven't the least idea and I don't care. However, whether because of this connection he would not be well received by the Foundation is another matter. If you or Lockwood or someone else will look over the last eight or ten issues of the *New Masses* you will find a number of articles by Draper on the Far East. In several instances he has naturally overgeneralized in order to make his argument suitable for the magazine for which he was writing. Other articles, however, are more carefully written and represent, to my mind, a pretty shrewd interpretation. However, I don't think it is quite fair to judge a person from articles which he has to write for a popular magazine any more than I should like to have my candidacy for the honorary degree from the University of Hawaii, which I am still looking for, judged on the basis of my AMERASIA pieces.

I know Draper fairly well and have had a number of long talks with him. He is a little too aggressive and a little too dogmatic for many people's taste. On the

other hand he strikes me as having a first class mind and as being seriously interested in leaving journalism and concentrating on a long term study of the Far East, particularly as it ties up with the United States. He has recently written me as follows:

"I have been in a quandary for some months now on my future course. For the past three years I have worked at some form of journalism which, while very productive and fruitful, became more and more irksome and undesirable. I am not altogether cut out for journalism in the sense that I cannot resist going into questions more deeply and extensively than a journalist can afford. The work requires a dispersion of efforts rather than a concentration. * * * Right now, I should like to spend a few years digging deeply."

I am writing to Draper suggesting that he get in touch with either you or Lockwood so that you can meet each other. I am not telling him definitely about the availability of these Rockefeller fellowships because for one thing I am not at all sure that he can qualify academically and for another I am not sure that you and Lockwood would support my interest in him. I am writing him merely that I should like him to know some of my colleagues so that if some opportunity arises, we can help him find the sort of opportunity he is looking for. He and Lockwood will probably not agree on a single point with regard to the Far East, but the main point I would like from you both is your general impression of him.

Radius seems to me in every respect a suitable candidate, in fact I have from the beginning put him at the top of this list. I find that he is anxious to return to more academic work after two years' experience with an investment firm and his academic record being excellent and his personality unusually favorable, there is no question in my mind but that we can secure the fellowship for him. I shall try, in his case, to obtain sufficient traveling expenses in the fellowship to permit his remaining for part of the time in the New York office and the remainder here.

This leaves Hauser and here I find myself in a rather complicated position. I need your advice badly. The job I put up to him and hired him for in September was definite and concrete. It was (a) to make an occupational analysis of the American Council members; (b) to take charge of Carter's itinerary for November and December; (c) to bring American Council work to the attention of persons whom we could later approach for money; (d) to continue preparing our press releases, and (e) to cooperate in general staff work wherever possible. The only job available in our budget was the financial one and it was therefore necessary to make it clear that he had to justify his presence on the staff with respect to that aspect of his work.

Although I didn't go into this fully in New York, it was quite apparent to me that Hauser was not making himself useful with regard to (a), (b), and (c) of the above list. The work on Carter's itinerary had almost completely fallen on Hilda's shoulders and very little that I could see had been done in the direction of the other two items.

I am not blaming Hauser entirely for this because it was clear from the beginning that he was not the most suitable person in the world to find for this sort of work. I thought, however, that in order to insure his own place on the staff he would break his neck in making good on these tasks.

In view of the terms of his job, which I quite clearly described to him in conversation, I would have no hesitancy in telling him that the arrangement had not worked out satisfactorily and that therefore we would have to drop him from the staff at the end of December. If you and the others agree with my analysis of what he has done, I would be perfectly justified in doing this. If I do so, I should, of course, give him plenty of time to look around for something else. It is very hard for me in planning next year's budget to see how I can possibly justify adding his salary to our research expenses. I am afraid that his presence on the staff has to be in large part justified by his ability to advance our business connections. In that case, I would feel justified in putting him under the provisions of a finance secretary. I am fully aware of the fact that we need all the good people we can have on the research side, but here, unfortunately, we are strictly limited by the possibilities of our budget and these possibilities, I am afraid, we have already overreached. Please, therefore, take this up with others on the staff and send me at your early convenience your joint recommendations.

Sincerely yours,

[S] Fred.
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

FVFrb

P. S.—Please include Kate Barnes in any meeting with Draper.—FVF.

EXHIBIT No. 646

SAN FRANCISCO, *March 29, 1938.*

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: My interest in Chi's career is so great that I feel somewhat responsible for seeing to it that he gets some sort of employment, at least during the summer months when the lecture season, off which he has managed to live this year, is at low ebb. I wonder therefore if you have considered the suggestion I made to you in a letter some weeks ago that Chi be connected with your International Secretariat inquiry. I have not heard of your plans but recall that in the original application to the Rockefeller Foundation there was some mention of an augmented staff. I write now simply in order to keep Chi's name prominently before you in case you wish special work done on China. Chen Han-seng would, I think, give him a very high recommendation.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g

EXHIBIT No. 647

NOVEMBER 15, 1937.

MR. THEODORE DRAPER,
The New Masses, 31 East 27th Street,
New York City, N. Y.

DEAR TED: Moe of the Guggenheim Foundation has referred your fellowship application to me and I have just sent him a strong endorsement of your candidacy. I hope you have some luck in that direction.

Incidentally, the statement of your projected study, which you included with your application, is excellent and I hope that in some way or another, you will be permitted to carry it out.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

FVFrb

RECOMMENDATION IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR GUGGENHEIM FELLOWSHIP, WRITTEN FOR THEODORE DRAPER, NOVEMBER 17, 1937, BY FREDERICK V. FIELD

I am very glad indeed to comment on the application of Mr. Theodore Draper for a Guggenheim fellowship.

I have known Draper personally for about two years during which I have had a number of long conversations with him regarding American Far Eastern policy. He is a serious student with a good mind. Because of his job on the editorial board of *The New Masses*, his energies have had to be scattered over a much wider field than anyone could handle thoroughly. He has felt increasingly uncomfortable at this situation and has wanted an opportunity to be temporarily relieved from these editorial duties in order to go more deeply into American relations with the Far East, the subject in which he is particularly interested.

I think that I have read everything that Draper has written in *The New Masses* on the Far East. Several of the articles have shown a rather deep insight into what was going on in China. I recall particularly an article which he published early during the current phase of the war on China's defense strategy. He showed excellent judgment in analyzing the war situation in China and in predicting the probable strategy of the nation's defense and the chief weaknesses which would appear as the fighting dragged on.

Draper seems to have a first rate training in Marxism which whether or not it provides all the answers for studying the American scene is unquestionably useful in analyzing the Far East. He has a flexible mind which avoids mechanical and dogmatic interpretations. I should think that if he were given a year in which to concentrate on American Far Eastern policy, he would develop to be an important worker in this field.

Draper has, to my knowledge, absolutely no funds of his own so that his only chance of becoming an expert in this kind of work early in his career is to secure a fellowship which will give him at least a year's freedom from economic worry.

Before knowing that he had applied for a Guggenheim fellowship, I had occa-

sion to make a list of four or five of the younger Americans who had made promising beginnings in the study of the Far East and who deserved support in which I included Draper. I am, consequently, very glad to know that he has filed his application with you and am very happy to recommend strongly his candidacy.

57 POST STREET, *November 9, 1937.*

Mr. THEODORE DRAPER,
The Masses, 31 East 27th Street,
New York City, N. Y.

DEAR TED: I am terribly sorry that it was absolutely impossible for me to have a talk with you when I visited New York 10 days ago. I was in a terrible hurry to return to San Francisco and internal affairs in the Institute had to receive first consideration.

The proposition you put up to me is certainly a sound one. I have no immediate answer for it except that I am strongly endorsing your candidacy for a Guggenheim fellowship. What your chances there are I don't know, except for the fact that the Guggenheim people seem to have been moving to the right in recent years. Their infrequent excursions on the left seem to be concentrated in the arts rather than in the social sciences.

There are one or two vague possibilities in the near future which are still too uncertain to put down on paper, but which are worth exploring. I would like very much to have you meet one or two of my colleagues on the American Council staff so that you can get to know each other and so that they have their own impressions of your abilities. I have written them, specifically Miss Porter who is in charge of the office in my absence, and Bill Lockwood, an economist who does a fair amount of our research work. You have probably seen some of his stuff in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. You have probably disagreed with his conclusions, for in most instances I have myself. You will, nevertheless, find him an unusually agreeable person and in the field known as orthodox economics he is first rate. Either he or Miss Porter will expect you to get in touch with them so that you can get together and see what each other looks like, etc. I have also suggested that Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, who is our expert on the Soviet Union, join the gathering.

I am not going to forget what you have said in your letter and I have hopes that before long we can find some way of providing an opportunity for you to concentrate on Far Eastern developments and the American connection with them. The meeting with some of my associates which I have suggested above is a necessary first step in anything that we can do.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

FVFrb

EXHIBIT No. 648

1795 CALIFORNIA STREET, *March 10, 1938.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I do not know how your plans for carrying out the large inquiry are developing but I want to make certain that you have in mind the possibility of using Ch'ao-ting Chi and Tsuro, the young Japanese at Harvard about whom I think I spoke to you and who has met Chen Hanseng and Kate Mitchell. With regard to Chi, his schedule of work is such that I know he would be able to come on your staff on a part- or full-time basis should you want to employ him in any capacity. I need not, I think, point out to you his qualifications which are already entirely familiar to you.

I should, however, add a word in confidence regarding the possibility of Chi's being employed by Wittfogel to edit his Chinese materials for you would not want to make any move which would interfere with that project. From talking with both Chi and Wittfogel at some length during my recent visit I came to the conclusion that they would probably not be working together. This arises from the fact that Wittfogel will demand and require a tempo of work which Chi, with his other interests, will find it impossible to maintain. Chi has offered to work for Wittfogel four days a week but, if the latter purposes to edit his materials as rapidly as he now plans, this will not, I know, be adequate. Furthermore, Chi's primary interest lies in current economic and political situations

rather than in historical analyses. While no one could support Wittfogel's work more strongly than Chi, I feel that he would a little bit prefer being connected with something more current.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

F/g

EXHIBIT No. 649

JULY 24, 1939.

~~RS~~
~~MSF~~
~~KB~~
~~MRT~~
~~HA~~
WWL

We have not reached a decision on how to solve our problem of keeping our lay members for whom the Far Eastern Survey is a little too specialized closely in touch with and interested in our general program. Negotiations regarding the taking over of Amerasia, which some of us have felt would at least in part meet this problem, have reached a plateau because of our Chairman's not being convinced that we have found the correct formula. Jessup is not, I think, opposed to our taking over Amerasia for any reason except that he doubts whether a magazine of that or any other nature is what we really need to introduce into our program. He has a feeling that a magazine, no matter how popularly written, remains a fairly substantial item to give people. He is skeptical that it will meet the demand which he assumes exists among these lay members for a periodic, quick glance at the high spots of Pacific area relations.

While the Amerasia idea is by no means dead and while Jessup himself will be very glad to look into that suggestion further, I think there is enough substance in what he says to warrant exploring a rather different scheme. I am consequently attaching to this memorandum a copy of the latest one-page bulletin from the Council on Foreign Relations. These bulletins are issued at irregular intervals, perhaps twelve or fifteen times a year. They are never longer than a page and the page is always divided as this one is, half illustration, half prose. Do you think that something along this line could be done by this office on a regular periodic basis without overtaxing our staff or budget? I have not gone into the cost of reproducing and mailing 1,500 of these but doubt whether it comes to very much.

I should like very much to have your further ideas. Let me emphasize that I am submitting the attached bulletin not as an exact example of what we might do but in order to start your minds working along that general direction.

FVF

EXHIBIT No. 650

16 WEST TWELFTH STREET, *March 23, 1942.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank for sending on Mr. Pollard's recent letter. I have taken off a copy for my files and am herewith returning the original. I have also to thank you for sending me a copy of the changes from the first draft of the letter you sent him.

Progress, if any, is slow in my investigations. I am informed, however, that the matter has been brought to the attention of Mr. Patterson, the Under Secretary of War. We are now waiting a report from Mr. Patterson's office on which will depend the next move.

Glad to read the news about RWR's spring offensive.

Sincerely,

[s] Fred
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, March 3, 1942.

Mr. Frederick V. Field,
16 West 12th Street, New York City.

Dear Fred: I wonder whether you would be willing to draft a reply from me to Pollard in answer to this letter which has just reached my desk.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter.

(Handwritten.) Not sent?

129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, March 12, 1942.

Mr. John A. Pollard,
Special Reports Division, Coordinator of Information,
270 Madison Avenue, New York City.

Dear Mr. Pollard: Thank you for your letter of the 28th regarding Mr. Field.

I have no hesitation in testifying to Mr. Field's political integrity and freedom from activities which might place his loyalty in question.

I was associated with him intimately from 1929 until September 1940. During this period his Americanism was of the most rugged and valuable character. He was an indefatigable and exceptionally able student of domestic and foreign policy and became one of our foremost authorities on the Far East. He saw the menace of Japan, and I do not know of anyone who more unerringly envisaged the inevitable movement of Japan into Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies. He again and again called attention to the costly appeasement policy of London and Washington, and as I remember, indicated that if the United States was not willing to fight to prevent the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, all of Southeast Asia would fall to the Japanese.

In the autumn of 1940 Mr. Field broke with me in the sense that he resigned from the staff of the Institute because he recognized that it was impossible for him to continue on the Institute staff and engage in political activities as planned by the American Peace Mobilization. He felt that the war as defined by the London and Paris Governments in 1939 was in danger of involving the United States in Chamberlainism, in the underwriting of British Imperialism, and in the ultimate appeasement of Germany and Japan as advocated at various times by the Cliveden set. He therefore resigned from the IPR, threw himself into the APM, carried on a nation-wide educational campaign, and to gain publicity for this campaign organized the picketing of the White House.

Though I had a great deal of sympathy for many of his ideas I had tried to dissuade him from joining the APM because I thought it might endanger both his research and political usefulness, and also because I felt that the sooner the United States got into the war the sooner it could be transformed from an imperialist war into a people's war against the new and terrible imperialisms of Germany and Japan.

The Congress of the United States, many employees of our government and a great many trusted officers of our armed forces were in 1940 in my view as inadequate in their political analysis as Mr. Field. A very high percentage of loyal Americans were working, as Mr. Field was working, to keep us out of the war. They did this for all kinds of motives and all kinds of reasons. Yet the vast majority of these are accepted today as citizens of integrity, completely free from activities which might place their loyalty in question. I would trust Mr. Field's integrity more than I would certain well known isolationists, because I think he possesses more than most a keen awareness of the essence of our American democracy.

There will, of course, be wide difference of opinion as to the wisdom of APM's picketing the White House. Personally, I think it was an ill-advised move. It was defended by its protagonists on the ground that APM felt obligated to expose the nature of what they regarded as the phony war which was being waged at the beginning. The difference between APM and certain genuinely subversive movements was that APM was attempting to do everything in the open, and its picketing of the White House was an attempt to bring out into the open before the American people and the American government the important issues which it believed must be faced by the American people.

That Mr. Field could be guilty of any disloyalty to the United States is inconceivable. The great advantage he has over many is that his political analysis of the Far East has been far in advance of most of our best informed citizens.

His knowledge of the Far East is very extensive. His capacity for work is great. His usefulness to the Government would, in my view, be beyond question.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 651

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, New York, May 4, 1933.

Mrs. RUTH YOUNG,
Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California.

DEAR MRS. YOUNG: Several of the officers of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs were in New York when I arrived and I took up with them the point you raised in regard to entering Canada for the purpose of taking up employment there during the time of the Banff Conference. They confirmed your suspicions that there might be some difficulty involved and urged us to attach you to the secretariat before you entered Canada.

I am writing Loomis in regard to this point and assume that you will soon be hearing from him.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Acting Research Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 652

PHILIP C. JESSUP

CONFERENCE MEMBERS

* PHILIP JESSUP, Professor of International Law, Columbia University, New York.

Source: PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC, 1933, Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Banff, Alberta, Canada, August 14–26, 1933. Page 456

(* indicates chairman of round table)

INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS OF THE IPR

PHILIP C. JESSUP, Chairman, Pacific Council. Professor of International Law, Columbia University, New York.

Source: PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC, 1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 7th Conference, Virginia Beach, Virginia, November 18 to December 2, 1939 (page 273)

AMERICAN COUNCIL NATIONAL OFFICERS

PHILIP C. JESSUP, Vice Chairman

Board of Trustees

PHILIP C. JESSUP

Source: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE IPR, 1938 (page 58)

Conference Members

PHILIP C. JESSUP (1933, 1939), Chairman Pacific Council, I. P. R. Professor of International Law, Columbia University. Assistant Solicitor, U. S. Department of State, 1924–25. Legal Adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Member Executive Committee, Harvard Research in International Law. Chairman United States delegation.

Source: WAR AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC. A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime and Postwar Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East. Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4–14, 1942 (page 159)

Conference Members

JESSUP, PHILIP C. (1933, 1939, 1942), Professor of International Law, Columbia University. Former Chairman of the Pacific Council, I. P. R. Chief, Division of Personnel and Training OFRRO; Secretary pro-tem of Council of UNRRA,

1943. Legal adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Author: "The United States and the World Court," 1929; "International Security," 1935; "The Life of Elihu Root," 1938. Chairman, United States delegation.

Source: SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC, A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Virginia, January 6–17, 1945 (page 157)

Western Union Telegram

WINSTED, CONN., Nov. 23.

WUT23 7 XC—1032A
EDW. C. CARTER:

Approve nominations suggest Jessup for research chairman.

FRED.

EXHIBIT No. 653

FEBRUARY 23, 1937.

CP from FVF:

What is the story of Owen Lattimore's Mongolian sheep which Tony Jenkinson wants? Please return with any information.

FVF from CP: What Tony has in mind is probably Owen's long discourse on Mongolia during the first general session on the U. S. S. R. The verbatim notes of this are not in the office at the moment, but here is the part about the sheep as finally edited by Owen and included in the forthcoming Problems of the Pacific:

"The nomadic Mongols had a self-sufficient economy in which the sheep was the economic unit. The wool of the sheep is fairly coarse, but it is excellent for making felt tents. The skin makes a warm coat. The sheep is an "all-round" animal unlike the specialized western type. The meat is of good quality and supplies food. It supplies milk in the summer rather than meat. In the steppes which are treeless, sheep dung is used for fuel. From this one animal the Mongols get food, clothing, housing, and fuel."

(Tony will doubtless remember that it was at that point that Owen added that the sheep furnished practically everything but amusement—which classic thought was carefully edited out.)

If by any chance Tony wants the whole story about improving the wool, etc., it can be found on page 37 of the typescript of Chapter III of the Proceedings which is in Kate Mitchell's hands.

EXHIBIT No. 654

AUGUST 23, 1934.

MR. NEWTON D. BAKER,
Chairman, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
Union Trust Building, Cleveland, Ohio.

DEAR MR. BAKER: I am very happy to accept the position of Secretary of the American Council and to assume office on the first of September.

It is most encouraging to know that I have your support and that I may occasionally confer with you in regard to the development of our activities.

I look forward to assuming this new responsibility with enthusiasm and hope that I shall be able to carry it out with the success that has attended the efforts of my predecessors.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 655

APRIL 20, 1933.

MR. LOOMIS: Before leaving, I should like to summarize briefly a few points in regard to the Central Secretariat.

One of the principles laid down early in the Institute's history was that the work of the organization should be carried out through already existing bodies insofar as possible, and the creation of an elaborate Institute organization, as

such, minimized. This policy has been strictly adhered to in all branches of our work and in every National Council, or at least in all those formed especially on behalf of the Institute. The principle that the organization of the Institute should limit its activities to the stimulation and coordination of the work carried out by others, designed to fulfill the aims of the institute, has been closely followed.

In order properly to perform these functions of initiation and coordination, skillful administration is necessary and as the Institute's full program has gotten under way the burden of administration has naturally increased—not only that, but the application of general policies and philosophies of the Institute has become more and more complex and at times a matter for delicate handling. And so while adhering strictly to the original principle of minimizing the organization set-up, considerations of efficiency in administration and coordination and the activities of others have pointed to the importance of maintaining a well-equipped staff in each of the National Councils and particularly in the Central Secretariat.

It was with these general ideas in mind that some of the Secretaries of the Shanghai Conference presented a memorandum to the Pacific Council urging the appointment to your staff of three or four Junior Secretaries from various important National Councils. On account of the financial situation and for other reasons it has been possible to put this recommendation only in partial operation. I would suggest, nevertheless, that the experiment that we have been conducting here for three months with a strengthened Central Secretariat has at least indicated the possibilities of making the arrangement permanent and even somewhat augmenting this temporary staff. It is quite impossible to apply to specific situations and specific countries the general policies of the Institute without the active and continuous cooperation of representatives from the larger National Councils who are in close touch with the peculiar conditions in their countries and with the offices of their respective National Councils. A common line of action has to be carried out in one way in the United States and very likely in quite another way in Japan. The successful application to these general lines of action must be made by qualified representatives of each country who by long association with the Institute have a thorough understanding of its methods and philosophies.

In the light of the above points, I was very much pleased in the resolution approved by the Advisory Committee yesterday to the same effect. I hope very much that the Pacific Council will support the principle of maintaining a strong central office, always on the understanding, of course, that the activities of such a staff will be limited to administration and coordination.

I would have some hesitancy in making these remarks which apparently call for explanation and additional financial burden during these impossible times were it not for certain considerations. Among these are the fact that you have somehow managed this winter to augment the staff on a greatly reduced budget, the fact that by stimulating the interest of various National Councils greater support from each may be anticipated, and the fact that the more for which you have to raise money, the more you are likely to raise. I think that with the type of organizational set-up I have in mind, we can do a good job. If this is true, our chances of securing support are proportionately great.

FREDERICK V. FIELD.
Acting Research Secretary.

(Matsukata to Loomis)

MAY 2, 1933.

MEMORANDUM

Mr. LOOMIS: Having read what Field wrote before he left here, I find myself in complete agreement with his opinion on the necessity of strengthening the Central Secretariat. The fact that I am in complete agreement with him seems to show that we were working very closely in these months since February, and were building up opinion in the course of and from the result of our cooperative works. And this, perhaps, is one of the great advantages the Institute method provides.

To have enforcement in the form of Associate Secretaries, or otherwise, from the National Councils at the Central Secretariat is very advisable, as Field writes, from the standpoint of efficiency and administration, but it is also very desirable for more intensive cooperation of the various National Councils. To make the National Councils feel at home with the work carried on in the Central

Secretariat and to make them feel that they are actually contributing to the common cause of the Institute, the system we have had for the last three months seems to be essential and necessary. In other words, to work our cooperative scheme is very important to bring forth cooperative feeling, which is the basis of all the activities of our Institute.

When I left Japan I had two definite aims. One was to serve the Central Secretariat and the other was to serve the Home Council, i. e., to help the Japanese Council in their preparation for the Banff Conference and at the same time to help them build up a stronger National Council. For the first point, I am not in a position to judge as to my achievement, but for the second point I am pretty certain that my presence here has helped a great deal in making the people in Japan work in closer touch with the central office. At the same time I felt I could help the Home Council to carry on organization of the council on a more serious basis. It is essential, I think, for healthy development of the Institute as a whole.

To have the assistance of Chinese and Japanese secretaries seems to me very useful for bringing out a really well-balanced "Pacific Affairs." I am not at all satisfied with what I did in this respect, namely, in helping the editor of the magazine, but still I am confident that it is essential for the steady development of our Institute organ. Moreover, having such cooperation of people who can take care of current topics, first hand, regarding their respective countries, seems to be exceedingly advisable for developing our library along the unique line of being a "Pacific" library. But before we decide as to the future of the library there seem to be many things to be agreed upon such as the nature of our future research work, the strength of the Central Secretariat, etc. At any rate, from the standpoint of the Central Secretariat having a well-organized library at its headquarters will mean that it is not only the administrative center of the Institute, but also the center of studies of the Pacific area. (See "Memorandum on Pacific Library.")

I have emphasized the points which were not referred to by Field but it does not mean, as I wrote in the beginning of this memorandum, that I have anything to criticize on the opinion which he expressed, but I would repeat once more that I am in complete agreement with what Field says.

EXHIBIT No. 656

(Pencilled:) Lasker
JANUARY 22, 1940.

Memorandum to: BL
From: FVF

Here is a manuscript for a forthcoming Public Affairs Committee pamphlet on "Propaganda and the War." I wonder if you would be interested in reading it and giving me any comments you may have and which I could pass on to the editor, Maxwell Stewart. I am also rather anxious to ask Dorothy Borg to look it over, so I would appreciate it if you could arrange with her so that both of you could give me comments before the early deadline of January 30th.

(Pencilled: Lasker's comment 1/23/40 sent to Max Stewart 1/23/40 except following paragraph.

Paragraph attached (pencilled out):

The Foreign Policy Association which has done so much to educate the American public to a tolerant reception of diverse views on, and interpretations of, current international issues, should be first among the organizations that are trying to promote a similar learning process in relation to printed literature, instead of joining in the unintelligent hue and cry against "propaganda."

JANUARY 23, 1940.

EXHIBIT No. 657

JULY 26, 1937.

MR. NATHANIEL PEFFER,
c/o Consulate General of the United States,
Tokyo.

DEAR PEFFER: Many thanks indeed for your letter of June 24 from Peiping and your later note of July 2nd. Regarding the first, your views are most interesting though I still think that in the long run China has more to lose by continuing its peasantry in a condition of extreme poverty and by becoming

increasingly subject to Japanese exploitation than by a strong fight. I see frightful destruction either way, but Great Britain, France, ourselves, and other foreign countries completely lacking in both intellect and guts. I see no third way out of the Sino-Japanese situation.

I note your remarks regarding those people whom you believe greatly overestimate (a) the strength and importance of the Chinese Communists, and (b) the fighting strength of China as a whole. I surely am one of those whom you have in mind. These points require much thought and discussion which cannot be undertaken in a letter. But at this point my one comment is that we are putting an enormous amount of emphasis on the political content of an army at war as a substitute for military training and material equipment. On political content the Chinese will have it all over the Japanese and this differential will increase as fighting becomes prolonged. In my opinion this will more than compensate for China's material and military weaknesses. This is one of the important points, it seems to me, which explained the Red Army's ability to remain intact from 1928 to Sian. I think it will count similarly on behalf of all Chinese troops versus the Japanese military machine.

For the last three weeks the one great question in our minds has been whether or not Chiang Kai-shek was going to support the 29th Army. It is clear that China has already lost temporarily at least the Peiping-Tientsin area. It could have saved it only by bombarding the Japanese troops as they came into the country. Once the Japanese army got into position nothing on earth, let alone Chinese troops, could move it. China must therefore, or so we suppose from our New York desks, make a stand if it intends to make a stand at all, at a line no further north than Paoting. Still the question remains, is Chiang Kai-shek really going to take a stand or is he merely going through enough motions to rationalize what he is doing before his own people without becoming involved in any headlong collision with the Japanese? If it is the latter, and I suspect that is the case, then in a few months' time all of Hopei will be lost and the road will be cleared for the next provinces, which I suppose will be Shansi and Shantung.

Having engaged in the utter absurdity of writing to you who are in Peiping what is going on in China, let me now reply to your second note regarding Miss Agnes Roman. Some weeks ago I had a long letter from her as well as a note speaking most highly of her from Bill Holland. It happens that Russell Shiman, the Editor of our FAR EASTERN SURVEY, is leaving for the Far East via Europe and a Rockefeller Fellowship at the end of this week. I have asked him to look up Miss Roman when he is in Shanghai and to see if he cannot work out something with her in relation to the SURVEY. We are not now in a position to take anyone on our staff because we have a tough enough time as it is paying those who are already here. If something breaks for us, however, or if I suddenly discover how to stomach money raising, I'll keep her prominently in mind.

Do I gather that you are not to be here until December? We had hoped to see you much earlier. I know your sister will be disappointed. She, incidentally, is a swell person and is doing practically a one-man job at putting AMERASIA through the press each month. We were lucky to have found her.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 658

SEPTEMBER 4, 1935.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Peiping,

DEAR OWEN: Since I first learned that you had arranged for an article on the Chinese Communist movement from Harold Isaacs I hoped that it would be possible to find someone to write a reply. I was very pleased with the way the Isaacs article turned out, but it is after all a very controversial interpretation of the Chinese situation. I would not like to see PACIFIC AFFAIRS leave the Chinese Soviet movement go with a Trotskyist exposition. Certainly an orthodox Communist view is needed to counterbalance it.

I knew of no one in this country whom we would invite to reply to Isaacs. It would be difficult for a foreigner who wanted to return to China in the near future to present an orthodox Communist view, and it would be impossible for a Chinese. For PACIFIC AFFAIRS to accept an article on this sort of subject by someone using a pseudonym would seem to me nonsense. Whether you could find someone in China to write the article I questioned, for the same reason that it seemed impossible to find someone in this country.

Happily what seems to me a solution is at hand. In the September issue of China Today, which as you know is published in New York by a left-wing group of Chinese, appears a reply to Isaacs' Pacific Affairs article by someone who signs himself Hansu Chan. I think the article is well written and the points he makes are certainly the correct orthodox Communist rebuttals to a Trotsky position. I am enclosing that article and also an editorial appearing in the same issue of the magazine on "The Spread of the Soviet Movement in China."

My suggestion is that you incorporate excerpts from Hansu Chan's rebuttal in an extended editorial comment signed by yourself. You could word your own comments in such a way as to disavow any responsibility for the rebuttal and so as not to involve yourself personally in the controversy. I urge this simply because it seems to me that the subject of the Chinese Communist movement is of paramount importance and that therefore Pacific Affairs must analyze it from different angles. This view is shared by four or five of my colleagues on the American Council staff.

Of course this whole scheme may strike you as much less important than it does me. I am simply expressing my own views and that of a few others here in the hope that the suggestion corresponds with your own thoughts on the matter. Catherine Porter is away on vacation, otherwise she would be writing this note rather than I.

Yours sincerely,

Frederick V. Field.

Exhibit No. 659

(Handwritten:) Lattimore

New York City, *April 22, 1940.*

Mr. Owen Lattimore,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

Dear Owen: I wonder if you have replied to the rather strange memorandum (attached—see also Yarnel's comment to ECC herewith) on the embargo question by Colonel Ottosen of the University of Washington R. O. T. C. which Charles E. Martin sent to you. While Ottosen makes two or three interesting points he by no means covers the subject. The points that he passes over without comment—as for instance the little item of petroleum being used for airplanes—are by all odds the most important. It seems to me that it would be worth while getting an answer to this memorandum in his hands, perhaps via Martin. If you have done nothing about it I thought I might send it over to Harry Price and get him to work out a reply which he might then get Yarnell to endorse.

Speaking of the embargo reminds me that I am afraid I did not get enough consideration of your point of view at the Council on Foreign Relations dinner the other night. Those are somewhat peculiar gatherings and I don't think they can be used to change people's points of view. For one thing, the sessions are too short and the dinners too long. All I tried to do was to get general participation in the discussion and this I did, you will recall, by the elementary procedure of calling on people in order to wake them up from their cigars, and the result was, of course, a very confused series of expressions.

I think it is very important that, by a little serious discussion supplemented perhaps by occasional letters, we try to reanalyze our own views on the embargo. I am giving very brief thought to the matter on busses and between phone calls here. I have recalled that during the early stages of the war in the Far East we were pressing hard for an American embargo on exports with the warning that if we did not take action soon it would be too late. I am inclined to think that we were right and that it is now important to remember that we always added that proviso about action before it was too late. I am more and more inclined to think that we must now recognize that the time for an embargo has perhaps passed, that is that it is already too late. I am now inclined to think that an embargo would actually be a dangerous move because of the European war and particularly because of the inability of the Allies to get the upper hand in the first months of the war and the additional factor that an election year makes American policy even more haywire than usual. The Far Eastern scene is one in which Japan may very likely take further provocative steps. The danger of their invading some area in southeastern Asia, not necessarily the Netherlands Indies, seems to me a real one. They might quite possibly be provoked by our establishing an embargo. If we concluded that this was the likely result and if we hold to our original belief that the spreading of the Japanese war area to

southeastern Asia would be one of the most important steps involving us directly in the Far Eastern war, I think we should discontinue advocating the embargo policy.

I still hold to the view that the only purpose of positive policy is to provide the minimum risk of eventual involvement in war.

Whether these considerations pertain to restrictions of one sort or another on United States imports from Japan, I am not sure. I am inclined to think that import restrictions should be advocated as the most powerful and reasonably safe course that is now open to us. It is hard for me to see how Japan can retaliate in a military way against United States tariffs on her goods. Certainly the danger of such retaliation would not be great if the tariffs were imposed gradually and in such a way that they were based on the well-established principles of nondiscrimination in international trade. Again, however, if we do advocate import restrictions, we must introduce the timing factor and point out that here again the time when they can be imposed safely, if we so concluded, is limited. Obviously the longer we continue narrowing the safe alternatives of policy the more certain we are of not being able to take the constructive steps which seem to me essential if we are to avoid almost certain hostilities.

I wish you would write me your thoughts on these questions for while I know that you are still peaking in favor of an embargo I imagine that these same doubts have occurred to you. One further consideration I should add is that whereas before the outbreak of war in Europe the possibility of a clash between the United States and Japan was not something to terrify us if it had to take place, it will now certainly link us immediately into the European war and that is something which is to my mind unthinkable.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 660

Officers of San Francisco Bay Region Group: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairman; Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Jesse Steinhart, Treasurer; John H. Oakie, Secretary

National Officers: Carl L. Alsberg, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer; Carl L. Alsberg, Research Chairman; Galen M. Fisher, Counselor on Research & Education

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SAN FRANCISCO

Telephone ExBrook 1458—Cable Address: INPAREL

1795 California Street

MARCH 17, 1938.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am very much interested to learn that you are to speak at the Hippodrome on the Soviet Union and present world events in a meeting being arranged by Corliss Lamont. I wish I could be there to hear you.

I cannot think of any special points which I would like to have you make on behalf of the American Council. I very much doubt whether either Mr. Morgan or Mr. Rockefeller will be in your audience so that strictly financial problems will probably not have to be considered. Your speech will doubtless be concerned entirely with the subject you have been asked to handle. I cannot think of anything I can suggest to add to your own close knowledge of the Soviet position nor to your interpretation with which I find myself completely in agreement. There are points which, it seems to me, have to be made over and over again to American audiences. They include:

(a) The fact that to anyone who will take the trouble to read the detailed proceedings of the famous Moscow trials and even to people who will read enough American newspapers to correct the obvious prejudices of any one of them, this whole series of trials makes sense. The story of the internal revolt against what is called the Stalin regime, but what is actually a large hierarchy of committees of which Stalin is the chief secretary, is to my mind a clear one

and a consistent one. Most Americans genuinely object, as I do, to ruthless methods of suppression. I do not try to defend this in the Soviet Union and I see no point in anyone's doing so. I object to the same thing in the suppression of labor activities in this country where evidences of brutality during the last eighteen months, if brought together, would make a very ominous record. Obviously, the important thing is to stress the fundamental background on which, it seems to me, there should be general sympathy with what the Soviet Union is trying to do, and to isolate the details which one can very legitimately criticize.

(b) The Soviet Union's foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the Far East and here particularly as it affects China's inland frontier. The prevailing view is the one represented by the so-called Peter Fleming mind, namely, that Soviet imperialism is just the same thing as British or American or Japanese imperialism. You will find in the current issue of AMERASIA what is to my mind an exceptionally clear article by Owen Lattimore which does pretty well in distinguishing between the admittedly expanding Soviet influence in the Mongolian region and the military imperialism of the Japanese.

(c) More and more people are including the Soviet Union among the fascist dictatorships. The names of Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler are often grouped with the implication that each stands for the same system. To my mind, as you know, there is an extremely fundamental difference between the Soviet dictatorship and those in Germany, Hitler and Japan. There is not, however, a very great deal of difference in the superficial characteristics of these dictatorships. The methods employed by each are often similar; the important thing is not only the situation in which the dictatorships operate but the purposes for which dictatorial methods are employed.

I could go on through the alphabet but think I had better leave it at these few points which happen to be in the front of my mind. I certainly don't think it is our job to defend the Soviet Union. My interest is in defending the United States by trying to bring some clarification in the public's mind as to what is going on abroad in which we are vitally concerned.

Wishing you lots of luck.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Fred
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g

EXHIBIT No. 662

Officers of San Francisco Bay Region Group: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairman; Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Jesse Steinhart, Treasurer; John H. Oakie, Secretary

National Officers: Carl L. Alsberg, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer; Carl L. Alsberg, Research Chairman; Galen M. Fisher, Counselor on Research and Education

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

57 POST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO

Telephone ExBrook 1458—Cable Address: INPAREL

(Handwritten:) FVF—1:00 (Fri. luncheon, 18th—129), Wittfogel.

JANUARY 31, 1938.

Miss CATHERINE PORTER,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR CATHERINE: Will you call a meeting of the Executive Committee for whatever day is generally convenient, the week following my arrival on the 17th? If the meeting could be held the following Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday it would give me time after my arrival to prepare the agenda and send the necessary reports to those attending.

As nearly as I can figure now, the agenda should include the following items:

(1) Approval of the budget for 1938.

(2) Plans for raising funds in 1938, including special arrangements to be made with Mr. Carter.

(3) A report on the development of our groups on the West Coast.

(4) The question of affiliation as a consultative member of the National Peace Conference.

(5) Plans for the New York discussion conference of the American Council members.

(6) The location of the New York office.

This last point is not an urgent one, though I should like to have it given consideration fairly soon. We now pay a large enough rent in New York so that if we moved away from the center of the city we could probably get very much more space with more protection against fire at the same price. What would you think of our moving up near Columbia, for instance? And if so, could you find out for purposes of discussion what sort of rent is charged for the sort of house on 117th Street which the Carnegie Endowment, the International Institute of Social Research, and other such organizations occupy. Those houses are rather dark but they provide a fair amount of office space and good rooms for books and meetings. I cannot see that there is any very great advantage to being located in the middle of the city except that heretofore the office was located near my own apartment. In view of my moving downtown when I return to New York, this significant point will be eliminated.

Totally unrelated to the above is the fact that the American Council will definitely move its offices in about three weeks to a residence at 1795 California Street. You may, therefore, tell Hilda to go ahead with the printing of the new letter paper, although we do not yet know what our new telephone number will be.

Aside from the many things which I shall have to discuss with you and the other members of the staff in New York, I shall want to have sessions of an hour or so with Peffer, Wittfogel, and Christy. It might be a good idea to arrange for these appointments at Columbia, say the Monday or Tuesday after my arrival, arranging for luncheon with Wittfogel and times before and after luncheon with the other two. Is Mortimer Graves likely to be in New York during my visit? If so, I shall also want to reserve a good deal of time for conferences with him. I shall also want to spend several hours with my AMERASIA colleagues and would appreciate it if you would let them know my dates.

I think it would be a good idea if you would arrange a list of topics which I should discuss with the members of the staff so that we can proceed in an orderly fashion. I think you know the points to be raised as well or better than I so I shall not attempt to make suggestions.

Your letter of January 25th brings up a few points to which I should reply. In the first place, I shall be gald to see Mr. Walworth of Houghton, Mifflin Company when I am in New York.

Secondly, I have not included John Fairbank of Harvard in the more recent list of candidates for membership secretary because I am reasonably certain that he would not want to concentrate as much on money raising as the job demands. I have a very high regard for him and would some day like to see him associated with us in some other capacity.

The list to whom Lockwood recommends that I write asking for further suggestions regarding candidates for this job is in part a good one and I am today dictating letters to Spykman, Stacy May, Donald Young, E. E. Barnett, Lobenstine, and Water Van Kirk. I am asking them to send their replies to you in New York. You will find enclosed a sample letter. In the meantime I trust you are approaching the three or four people whom I recommended in a recent letter. You might also add to your list Dr. Stephen Duggan in case I failed to mention him before.

If an expert on China is badly needed for the FAR EASTERN SURVEY, as I am sure that he is, why not speed up a decision on another Rockefeller Foundation fellow and pick someone who would fill this gap in our present staff? In my opinion we have already lost two or three months of such a person's time by our inability to decide on a candidate.

I am delighted that Miss Cynthia Power has made such a favorable impression. I shall look forward to seeing her in San Francisco and I hope that you will especially recommend to her that she call on us in our new quarters as soon as she arrives. We have fewer German hofbraus in San Francisco than you do in New York but my researches on the last two Saturday nights indicate that there are a number of substitutes. Incidentally, is Miss Power the daughter of Sir John Power? I assume that she is.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Fred
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

FVF/g

EXHIBIT No. 663

Telephone, Plaza 3–4700 Cable, INPAREL, New York

Officers: Newton D. Baker, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Edward C. Carter, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Mrs. F. Louis Slade, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer; Carl L. Alsberg, Research Chairman
Staff: Joseph Barber, Jr., Kathleen Barnes, Annette Blumenthal, Miriam S. Farley, Elizabeth B. Field, Nancy S. Hughes, Catherine Porter, Jeanette D. Randolph, Russell G. Shiman, Helen Wiss

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

129 East 52d Street, New York City

DECEMBER 17, 1934.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Chatham House.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for the copy of the bibliography on Economic China prepared for the I. P. R. by Leonard G. Ting, of Nankai. There does not seem to be anything I can do about this with respect to Kantorovitch inasmuch as our arrangement simply calls for my supplying English language books from this office. I suggest that Chinese language material be exchanged directly between Liu's office and Moscow.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Fred
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

P. S.—May I add that if it proves embarrassing for a direct exchange to be set up between Shanghai and Moscow, or Tokyo and Moscow, I shall be glad to have documents routed through this office.

EXHIBIT No. 664

Address Official Communications to The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 3, 1934.

DEAR FRED: I have made some inquiries since my return about the possibility of the holding of a Naval Conference in 1935. There seems to be considerable doubt as to whether it will be held, and this doubt should be cleared up by the conversations to be held shortly in London. I suggest that you hold off making any preparatory studies until these conversations are completed. The naval situation appears to have reached a crisis and all signs indicate a showdown at the forthcoming conversations.

I find that the gentleman who made the study of Japanese labor conditions is Mr. Latourette of the International Labor Office. Feis says that he seemed to have a clearer picture of conditons there backed by statistical data than anyone else he has talked to.

In connection with the trade agreements, a Foreign Service officer has been recalled from the Far East to give advice upon the Japanese situation. His name is Sturgeon, and I would be very glad to introduce you to him when you come to Washington.

I am looking forward to seeing you and hope that you will be able to have lunch or dinner with me.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Larry
LAWRENCE DUGGAN.

OCTOBER 4, 1934.

Mr. LAWRENCE DUGGAN,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR LARRY: The information you give me in your letter of October 3rd is very welcome. I was on the point of writing you to find out the name and author of the study on Japanese labor conditions which you mentioned when you were in this office a few weeks ago. I hope that when I come to Washington I shall be able to see this monograph.

Thank you also for offering to introduce me to Sturgeon. When I come to your city I shall certainly ask you to carry this out.

Your paragraph on the naval conference bears out what I had supposed was happening. Even if the 1935 conference is called off, however, the type of study which I have in mind will still be very useful. I am not so much interested in the measurements of guns or bullets or the tonnage of ships or even the nineteenth century diplomacy which surrounds these questions; but I am interested in the social and economic setting of the whole navy question. Regardless of whether or not they hold a conference next spring, the problem of navies in the Pacific is bound to be prominent. With our fleet dashing around the Aleutian Islands and Japanese and American admirals shooting off their faces every other minute, the subject can be counted on to remain on the first or second page of the papers. A monograph, therefore, tying the question down to the day-by-day life of the average American citizen seems to me altogether pertinent.

I have already talked to Walter Millis of the Herald Tribune, whom you probably know is the author of "The Martial Spirit," about this point. There is every likelihood that he will undertake the thing for us. I have great confidence in his intelligence and ability to interpret this type of question and I think that anything he produces will be interesting. We will have quite a hand in whatever he does in this office, which may or may not suggest to you further assurance of the validity of the undertaking.

Just at the moment I am overwhelmed with selling the Institute and myself to the people from whom we expect large donations. As soon as this unpleasant duty is over I shall take the first train to Washington.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 665

(Handwritten)
WLH
JS 3
KM

Philip C. Jessup, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman; Philo W. Parker, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Francis S. Harmon, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INCORPORATED

1795 California Street, San Francisco; Telephone: TUxedo 3114—129 East 52nd Street, New York City; Telephone: Plaza 3-4700

Cable: Inparel

NEW YORK CITY, *October 9, 1939.*

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Upstairs Office.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Owen has sent me a copy of his letter to you of October 5th with regard to his editorial on collective security, as he calls it, which we all damned. I should like to make a few comments in case you want to give further consideration to the possibility of covering this difficult concept in a early issue of the magazine.

My first feeling is to drop the expression "collective security" as it has in my opinion been rendered virtually meaningless not only by the use to which it has been put but also by the damage which has been done to the concept as it was originally used. It seems to me that what we as an organization are interested in is the question of future security in the Pacific area. This may be attained by a collective system, or by re-establishing some sort of balance of power (which is quite another thing from collective security), or by some sort of unilateral domination of the area's most controversial regions, e. g., by Japan, by the Soviet Union, by the United States. I cannot see any way for an organizational magazine like Pacific Affairs to discuss the question other than by asking a number of prominent persons to express their opinions in its pages. It is not something for one officer of the Pacific Council, either Lattimore or you, to express unless you are included in a group of others all writing on the same subject and unless you very clearly write as an individual.

I should be very must interested in having Owen explore this possibility of a symposium. I should want him to make every effort to get divergent points of view expressed, falling, however, somewhere short of either Father Coughlin or Trotsky. I should define the limits of legitimate opinion somewhere between the two poles of Beard and Browder. I should also make certain that we did not fall into the error of believing that this was one of those question which has two sides. It obviously has as many as authors can be found.

Sincerely yours,

[S] Fred.
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Copy to Mr. Lattimore.

EXHIBIT No. 666

(Handwritten:) Lattimore
NEW YORK CITY, *May 15, 1940.*

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland,

DEAR OWEN: I have read the manuscript by Maurice Shore entitled "Lenin, Sun Yat-senism, and China." As to the possibilities of its publication, I feel reasonably confident in my views but as to a good deal of the content I feel much less certain.

On the question of publication, while the manuscript contains a lot of material which it would be useful to have around in such handy form, it would not in my opinion find much of a market in pamphlet form. I hope therefore that you will be willing to struggle with a condensation. As a magazine article it could probably retain most of its present thesis and still have the usefulness for reference purposes that I have in mind.

I should like to have a first-rate Marxist read the manuscript because there are a few points where I suspect the author has misinterpreted Lenin's teaching. I suggest this most uncertainly, however, for I don't know Lenin's writings at all well and I have never consistently gone through all the stuff he wrote on China. As a matter of fact the bringing together of those writings in this article seems to me its most interesting aspect. A good deal is made in the article of Lenin's carlier disagreement with Sun Yat-sen over the latter's belief that by instituting quickly certain socialist measures the stage of capitalism could be altogether avoided, and the later alleged reversal of this position on Lenin's part. This question touches the complicated controversy that you ran in PACIFIC AFFAIRS a year or so ago between Edgar Snow and Asiaticus. It also touches a lot of the theoretical questions which have been disputed in all of Edgar Snow's writings. Without really knowing what I am talking about my impression is that Lenin never maintained that the capitalist stage could be altogether skipped in China. My understanding of the Chinese Communist Party's doctrine, moreover, is that it hopes to do no more than truncate the regular historical process, that is shorten the period between feudalism and socialism. This is an example of a theoretical point which I should like to have checked by someone who is really well versed in Marxist literature.

Another illustration is the flat statement on the part of the author, on page 41, that Lenin and Sun Yat-sen did agree on the "elimination of the doctrine of the class struggle from the revolutionary program of China."

I cannot believe that this is so as regards Lenin although of course it was true as regards Sun Yat-sen. The class struggle is at the very base of Marxist dialectics and I have never heard of any exception from it being made for a particular situation, and certainly not for China.

At the opening of the article, the references to Maurice William's claim interested me because some years ago when I knew William quite well I documented a rather elaborate memorandum for Shotwell on the relation between Sun Yat-sen' Third Principle—The People's Livelihood—and Maurice William's book, THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. I haven't looked up my memorandum for a good many years—and it is very likely that if I did I could not find it. I remember, however, the central point in which we were then interested. Maurice William claimed in his second book, SUN YAT SEN versus COMMUNISM, that Sun was converted from Communism to a milder form of social reform because of his reading of THE SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. I remember working out the chronology of the publication of William's book and

the history of the single copy which apparently ever got to China, together with the chronology of Sun Yat-sen's lectures on the Three People's principles and finding pretty conclusive evidence that William's claim was wholly unjustified. What apparently happened was that Sun Yat-sen, because of other influences bearing on his life, had come around to about the position which Maurice William argued in his book and then had found the book and found in it a convenient expression of these views. Consequently, in one of his final lectures in Canton when he first put forward the Three People's principles, it was fairly natural that he should quote this otherwise extremely obscure book.

This point about Maurice William is of no vast importance in the manuscript under discussion except that if my interpretation is correct it calls for a modification of two or three sentences.

Let me know if I can do anything more with regard to this job. I am returning the manuscript herewith.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Telephone: UNiversity 0100, Ext. 43

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Published Quarterly by The Institute of Pacific Relations

Amsterdam—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

Please address reply to:

300 GILMAN HALL,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., May 9, 1940.

Mr. F. V. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Herewith I am enclosing the manuscript of an article on "Lenin, Sun-Yat-Senism, and China," which I think may interest you. There are 48 pages of it—much too long for PACIFIC AFFAIRS undess very considerably cut. Before doing anything else, I am therefore writing to find out whether you may think the article is worth publishing separately as a pamphlet. If you do not think so, but think that the article could be condensed to a length suitable for PACIFIC AFFAIRS, I am willing to attempt the condensation.

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ OL
OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 667

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INCORPORATED

1795 California Street, San Francisco—129 East 52nd Street, New York City

NEW YORK CITY, *April 25, 1939.*

Air mail.
Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Olympic Hotel, Seattle, Wash.

DEAR MR. CARTER: As you perhaps know, for some time a few members of the American Council staff have been forming a unit of the Book and Magazine Guild in my office. I am now informed that a bare majority of the members of the staff have joined the union which therefore makes the unit eligible for the negotiation of a contract. Before proceeding with this contract, however, I understand that the group intends to sign up two or three additional members of the staff so that they will represent a good deal more than a bare majority.

I am writing you at this time because, in view of the progress which the office union is making, I rather expect to be offered a shop contract by them before you have returned from your trip. As I shall want to secure the approval of the Executive Committee and, in addition, of certain other Trustees, to any decision which I shall be inclined to recommend, I am writing to ask if you would be so

good as to send me by letter your preliminary thoughts on this subject. It is my present intention, if the contract which the office union offers closely resembles the contract which other units of that union have already entered upon with such organizations as the Foreign Policy Association, to recommend its approval. This would mean the formal signing of a contract between the staff and myself as the representative of the employers.

Unless the office union makes demands which I do not now anticipate, the contract will call for practically no changes in the present wage-and-hour scale. Nor will it call for any actual changes in our method of giving notice of termination of employment, or leave of absence due to illness, vacations, and the like. It may involve our agreeing to what is known as a "preferential shop" whereby, in the employment of new persons, we would first give the union a chance to fill the vacancy from its own ranks, but where they are unable to supply a suitable candidate, we could look elsewhere. It may also oblige us to set aside a moderate reserve which would be used to guarantee salary payments for a certain number of weeks should the organization unexpectedly and suddenly be liquidated.

Aside from the fact that I am personally sympathetic with the principle of unionization, its occurrence in my office has a rather definite advantage. The office union would set up a shop committee for the purpose of presenting any demands or grievances and for the purpose of settling among themselves, if possible, problems in the office. This will mean that the salary scale and the salaries paid to individuals in the office will no longer rest on the arbitrary decisions of the Secretary—a situation which I personally regard as highly unsatisfactory. It will mean that there will be a group responsibility for any decisions reached. The terms of the contracts which I have looked over, in relation to other organizations, present a salary scale which is, in practically every instance, considerably below what we now pay. This, to my mind, would not mean that we would reduce salaries to the union minimum but it would indicate that we had nothing to fear by way of group pressure for an increased salary scale.

In the light of these remarks, I should appreciate it very much if you would send me an expression of your opinion on this whole subject. Without having the details of the proposed contract before you, I should like to know whether, in your opinion, it would be proper and desirable for the American Council to enter into negotiations with the union and to conclude a contract, provided that the details could be worked out to the satisfaction of both parties. Certain of our Trustees will, I think, look to you, among others, for advice on this matter when I bring it to their attention. It would therefore be very useful to me to have a general expression of your views on hand when the appropriate time comes.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Fred
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 668

Pencilled (Oakie)

(Handwritten:) See FVF to Yarnell, 6/1/40.

NEW YORK CITY, *May 31, 1940.*

MR. JOHN H. OAKIE.

DEAR JACK: I have just read your latest INPAREL with considerable interest for the subject of the Netherlands Indies is at the forefront of our minds as well as of yours. We had a discussion with some thirty to thirty-five people on Monday which was led by Admiral Yarnell and which I wish you could have attended for his point of view differs from your report in INPAREL at most points. Although there follow my summaries of some of his views, the meeting was a private one and he should not be quoted by name.

I am inclined to disagree with Yarnell in several places but it may interest you to know with reference to the six items which you list on your second page that Yarnell's ideas run somewhat as follows:

(1) That while Batavia may be nearly as far from Nagasaki as from Pearl Harbor, the problem of fleet operations moving down from Japan and west from Pearl Harbor seems to be altogether different. Japan's navy would move via its own possessions, the Mandated Islands, Formosa and Hainan, to say nothing of the China coast, whereas our navy could probably not even move straight across the general route now traveled by the clippers. It would probably be forced to go south of Australia.

(2) Yarnell believes that the Japanese navy is in first-rate shape and is exceedingly well equipped relative to any opposition it is likely to face. It is not now being used in the China campaign with the exception of a few second-class cruisers and such ships.

He says it possess not only the ships with which we are familiar but a well-rounded fleet of supplementary craft for supply purposes and for tending airplanes, submarines, etc. He also reports with considerable conviction that it is now known that Japan is building 45,000-ton battleships and very likely from six to ten light cruisers which in speed and armaments surpass anything in the American navy. He went so far as to say that if Japan actually did turn out these cruisers she would have at the present moment command of the entire Pacific Ocean.

(3) It follows that Yarnell does not think that Japan is short on shipping from a naval point of view. From a supply point of view he indicates that the Japanese were able to take care of the very heavy demands put on their shipping in the first year of the China campaign, a demand which has now been very considerably relaxed, and that not only these ships could be diverted to a new southward campaign but that a great deal of Japan's shipping which is now plying the regular trade routes could likewise be diverted.

(4) Yarnell envisages a possible naval war between Japan and the United States as involving primarily a series of raids on each other. To that extent he would perhaps support your point that Japan's supply lines running south through Formosa and Hainan would be vulnerable to attack. The point as you make it is open to question "attack by whom?" If the United States actually declares war the answer is "by the United States." But there seems to be a grave question whether Japan's lines would be as vulnerable as our own.

(5) Yarnell does not think highly of the Netherlands Indies defenses. He reported that while they had a few submarines and probably some good coastal guns and absolutely first-rate airplanes—although probably not more than two hundred of these—the local militia, made up largely of about 70,000 native troops, was not reliable. The point seems to be a good deal who gets to the Indies first. If it were possible for this government to send our ships there now, basing them perhaps on Singapore, the opinion seems to be that Japan, although provoked and angry, could not afford to launch a campaign. On the other hand, not one of us at our discussion believed that there was any possibility of a democracy such as ours taking such a drastic preventative step. I should also like to comment with regard to your remark about the prompt Dutch round-up of fifth columnists in the Netherlands Indies. I am extremely skeptical on this point just as I would be if Congress followed to a logical conclusion the absurd definition of what constitutes a fifth column by throwing in jail every alien in this country. It is not those people nor the actual German Nazi spies in the Netherlands Indies who constitute fifth columns but it is the reactionary, fascist-minded leaders in your own country. It was not, it seems to me, aliens or spies or undercover agents who sold out Poland and Norway but their own leading generals and a good many of their cabinet members. Ditto for Holland. With a much more complicated situation and involving a good deal of historical explanation, ditto for Belgium and apparently for at least some armies in France. (Footnote: Please take a look at the Associated Farmers in California.)

(6) While it is agreed that the Dutch, with the full cooperation of American and British interests, would destroy oil wells and cracking plants in the Indies, it is also generally agreed that Japan has enough fuel stored for extensive naval operations lasting from 12 to 18 months. This comes from as authoritative sources as one can possibly find. In other words, that represents about the time required to put blown-up wells and machinery back into operation. It is also pointed out, although I don't think the point has been sufficiently grasped, that while we could put great pressure on Japan through an economic embargo in the event of their invading southward, once they had established even a naval blockade around the Netherlands Indies and the adjacent regions they could put on an equally or perhaps more effective embargo against the United States.

It would be very interesting to learn from you whether the general views which you have put forward in INPAREL in this issue reflect military opinion in your part of the country. It would not surprise me at all to learn that it did for there seems to be no more agreement among those boys than among any other group.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 669

(Handwritten) Parker

Copy to EvZdJ

NEW YORK CITY, *April 9, 1940.*

MR. PHILO W. PARKER,
26 Broadway, New York City.

DEAR MR. PARKER: I wonder if I can ask your help in the preparation of an article on aviation gasoline in the Far East which we are writing for the FAR EASTERN SURVEY and would like to complete by next week. The occasion for the article arises from a notice in a paper just received from Netherlands Indies which announces that the Shell people have recently opened a high-octane gasoline plant at Pladjos and plan to build a second one, to be completed by the end of the year. It was also announced that the Standard group is constructing a plant at Palembang which is to produce an average of 560 barrels a day. We should like very much to know whether these reports are accurate and, if so, to obtain a little more detail with regard to them.

Available statistics do not help very much in straightening out the story of aviation fuel in the Pacific area and as this is very important in connection with U. S.-Japanese trade, it has seemed to us that the more accurate information we could unearth, the better. Japan, for instance, is reported to have imported a little over half a million barrels of aviation gasoline from the U. S. in 1939 against a consumption of over two million barrels.

Did Japan produce the remainder itself, or did it import aviation fuel from other sources? If high octane is to be produced in Netherlands Indies, is most of it likely to go to Japan? If so, will it affect the export of aviation fuel from California to Japan or will it more likely compete with Japanese refineries?

There is then the question of whether gasoline of around 75 to 82 octane content is exported to Japan and there blended to produce higher octane fuel or whether it is exported as 100-octane gasoline from the source. We have been told that some of the newer planes themselves are equipped to do the blending—a leading process, I believe, while in flight.

I would very greatly appreciate it if you would permit my colleague, Miss van Zyll de Jong, and myself to have a talk with you or one of your associates sometime this week. As usual, we do not want to publish an article which is inaccurate.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 670

(Handwritten) Am. League for Peace & Democracy

NEW YORK CITY, *December 20, 1938.*

AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY,
112 East 19th Street, New York City.

DEAR SIRS: In reply to your request that the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations be represented by an observer at your forthcoming American Congress for Peace and Democracy, I am writing to say that I believe that several of our members will be in attendance. As you know, the nature of your work prevents our taking any official part in activities of a political sort. Our membership, however, is so chosen as to represent a fairly good cross section of various types of occupations and activities in this country and in that way we are well assured that we will be unofficially represented at this sort of meeting.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g

FRED: The American Congress for Peace and Democracy wants us to send an observer to their meeting January 6–8, as we did last year. Will you take care of this?

KBEG.

CALL TO ACTION

American Congress for Peace and Democracy

January 6, 7, 8, 1939, Washington, D. C. Fifth National Congress, American League for Peace and Democracy

To the American People

The world-wide offensive of fascism, which threatens the peace and democracy of every country including our own, requires immediate and energetic action by the American people. It requires American leadership and initiative to rally and organize the forces of democracy and peace.

The forces of reaction within our own country are seeking by every open and concealed means to destroy our basic and democratic rights. Suppression of civil rights, attacks on the rights of labor, the promotion of the "red scare" and anti-Semitism, the fomenting of religious and racial hatreds, show the forming pattern of American Fascism.

On a world scale the threat of Fascism brings with it the threat of a new World War. Renewed war preparations demonstrate that this menace has been increased by the Munich agreement. In China and Spain the theat is already a tragic reality. Millions have been slaughtered; tens of millions are without homes or hope or bread. The war-makers have served notice that they will wage the most ruthless warfare in history against the peoples of the world.

The United States cannot isolate itself from these developments. We cannot hope to remain aloof from a Fascist-instigated world war. Sooner or later we would become involved as we were in the last war. Our only hope is to prevent such a world war from developing; to use our international influence and economic power to stop Fascist aggression. No Munich agreements for Spain and China.

To that end the American League for Peace and Democracy calls you to an extraordinary American Congress for Peace and Democracy. Let your representatives in the seventy-sixth United States Congress know the strength of your desire for peace. Come to Washington, D. C., on January 6th-8th. Make your voice heard in the demand for a new peace policy for America at the expiration of the present unneutral Neutrality Act. Help us work out a program for the defense of our democracy and for peace.

We summon representatives of the organizations of the American people—trade unions, farm bodies, peace societies, religious organizations, fraternal orders, civic bodies, organizations of veterans, women and youth. At this Congress the democratic peace forces of America will map out a program for the defense of democracy and peace—a program based on the necessity to: Protect and extend democratic rights for all sections of the American people: Keep the United States out of war and help keep war out of the world.

Congress endorsed by—

(These endorsements are personal, not organizational)

Rabbi Michael Alper, Associate Editor, "Reconstructionist"
Sherwood Anderson, Writer
Reverend Edgar R. Artist, Historian, Eastern Baptist Association of New York
Roger Baldwin, Director, American Civil Liberties Union
Lewis Alan Berne, President, Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists & Technicians
George Biddle, Artist
Crissie Birrell
Professor Franz Boas, Columbia University, New York City
John H. Bosch, President, National Farm Holiday Association
Mrs. W. Russell Bowie, President, New York State Consumers League
Hon. Usher L. Burdick, U. S. Representative, North Dakota
John D. Butkovich, President, Croatian Fraternal Union of America
Joseph Cadden, United States Chairman, World Youth Congress
William F. Cochran, Vice President, Church League for Industrial Democracy
Rabbi Samuel M. Cohen, Executive Director, United Synagogue of America
Hon. John M. Coffee, U. S. Representative, Washington
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Jerome Davis, President, American Federation of Teachers
John P. Davis, Secretary, National Negro Congress
Barrington Dunbar
Paul de Kruif, Writer
Melvyn Douglas, Actor
Theodore Dreiser, Writer
Professor Henry Pratt Fairchild, New York University
Dorothy Canfield Fisher, Writer
Abram Flaxer, President, State, County & Municipal Workers of America
Miguel Garriga, Vice President, Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Alliance
Albert Ghidoni, Secretary-Treasurer, District Council No. 9, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers of America
Professor Willystine Goodsell, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City
Rudolph Harju, Secretary, Cooperative Unity Alliance
L. O. Hartman, Editor, "Zions Herald"
Clarence Hathaway, Editor "The Daily Worker"
Donald Henderson, President, United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing & Allied Workers of America
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Reverend William Lloyd Imes, St. James Presbyterian Church, New York City
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Bishop Francis J. McConnell, New York Area, Methodist Episcopal Church
Rhoda E. McCulloch, Editor, "The Womans Press"
Katherine McInerny, Executive Secretary, League of Women Shoppers
Lewis Merrill, President, United Office & Professional Workers of America
Morris Muster, President, United Furniture Workers of America
Professor Reinhold Neibuhr, Union Theological Seminary, New York City
Samuel Ornitz, Writer
Bishop Robert L. Paddock
Reverend Elim A. Palmquist, Executive Secretary, Philadelphia Federation of Churches
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Mervyn Rathborne, President, American Communications Association
Reid Robinson, President, International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers of America
Hon. Byron N. Scott, U. S. Representative, California
Reverend Guy Emery Shipler, Editor, "The Churchman"
Viola Brothers Shore, Writer
Reverend H. Norman Sibley, University Heights Presbyterian Church, New York City
Robert G. Spivack, Secretary for the U. S., International Student Service
Reverend William B. Spofford, Executive Secretary, Church League for Industrial Democracy
Donald Ogden Stewart, President, League of American Writers
Edward E. Strong, Secretary, Southern Negro Youth Congress
Hon. Henry G. Teigan, U. S. Representative, Minnesota
Reverend Worth M. Tippy, General Secretary Emeritus, Social Service Dept., Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America
Rose Troiano
Frank Tuttle, Motion Picture Director
Professor David D. Vaughan, School of Theology, Boston University
Mrs. A. H. Vixman, Former National Executive Director, Young Judaea
Dr. Goodwin Watson, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City
A. F. Whitney, President, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
Dr. Max Yergan, Director, International Committee on African Affairs

NATIONAL OFFICERS, AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

Harry F. Ward, National Chairman
Mrs. Victor L. Berger, Vice Chairman
Robert Morss Lovett, Vice Chairman
Margaret Forsyth, Acting Treasurer

All organizations and groups that stand for democracy and peace are invited to elect delegates to the Congress. Organizations with memberships up to 200 are entitled to one delegate. Organizations with membership from 350 to 500 are entitled to two delegates. Organizations with membership over 500 are entitled to three delegates.

A registration fee of one dollar for every delegate will be charged to help meet the expenses of the Congress.

National organizations are entitled to three delegates at a special registration fee of three dollars each.

DELEGATES CREDENTIAL FORM No. 1

To be sent with registration fee to the National Office of the American League for Peace and Democracy

_____
(Name of delegate)

_____ _____ _____
(Street address) (City) (State)

_____
(Organization or group represented)

_____
(Address of organization or group)

_____ _____
(Number of members) (Secretary or officer of organization)

DELEGATES CREDENTIAL FORM No. 2

To be retained by delegate as means of identification at Washington, D. C.

_____
(Name of delegate)

_____ _____ _____
(Street address) (City) (State)

_____
(Organization or group represented)

_____
(Address of organization or group)

_____ _____
(Number of members) (Secretary or officer of organization)

Send credential form No. 1 and fee, and address all inquiries to—

AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

268 Fourth Avenue 398 New York, New York

Dr. Harry F. Ward, National Chairman. City Executive Committee: Eleanor Grannan, Chairman; Rev. David Licorish; Arthur J. McLaughlin; Isidore Sorkin. Vice Chairman; Helen R. Bryan, Executive Secretary; Oscar Schneller, Acting Organization Secretary; Albert Hyman, Treasurer; Israel Amter; Mrs. J. N. Cohen; Abraham Feingold; Jacob Mirsky; Cyril Philip; Rev. Frederick Reustle; Katherine Terrill. Staff: William Males, Legislative; Ruth Dobrer, National Minorities and Race Relations; Cyrus S. Porter, Campaigns; Brian Heald; Morris Engel. Education: Anna C. Schneiderman, Women; Clifford Welch, Publications; Gordon Sloane, Youth; Ray Aversa, Trade Union; Herman Stolley, Anti-Nazi Dept.; Albert Prentis, Cultural. Advisory Board: Prof. E. B. Burgum, John Chamberlain, Malcolm Cowley, Martha Foley, David Freeman, Rev. William Lloyd Imes, Milton Kaufman, Vito Marcantonio, Rev. A. Clayton Powell, Jr., Rev. Herman F. Reissig, Elmer Rice, Prof. Margaret Schlaugh, Lee Simonson, Prof. Robert K. Speer, Ashley P. Totten, Thomas Young

AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

NEW YORK CITY DIVISION

112 East 19th Street, New York City

ALgonquin 4-9290

IPR

NOVEMBER 25, 1938.

DEAR FRIEND: The AMERICAN CONGRESS FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY which will be held in Washington, D. C. on January 6-7-8, 1939, more than ever will focus the attention of the entire country and its lawmakers on the consolidation and strengthening of the forces for peace. To quote from Dr. Harry F. Ward's editorial in the November issue of THE FIGHT, called "After Munich":

> "No ocean barriers, no tradition of isolation, no pacifist idealism, can prevent the United States from feeling the effects of the impetus the Munich agreement has given to Fascism as a world force. In due time the results will be seen and felt in the increased strength of Fascist movements and tendencies in Latin America and in Canada, and in the development of Fascist potentialities in the United States."

Are we going to permit, through inertia, such potentialities to become realities in our country? In a country founded on the sacred principles of freedom of worship and of minorities, are we to remain passive in the face of the wrathful racial and religious persecution now unleashed?

We believe it is absolutely necessary in these times to meet such challenges with unity of number, strength and effectiveness. This, our Congress, by its broad and widely inclusive character, will achieve with the cooperation of allied groups and individuals.

We are confident you will bring this vital Congress to your organization, elect delegates and return the enclosed credential blank as soon as possible.

We are ready to send a speaker to your organization. Please use enclosed postcard for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Guy Emery Shipler
Rev. GUY EMERY SHIPLER,
Editor, The Churchman.

UOPWA No 16.
Enc.

(Handwritten) 52-36

EXHIBIT No. 671

APRIL 11, 1939.

Memorandum to: AB.
From: FVF.

Would you kindly inquire of the Department of State what is the safest way of sending material (both letters and printed materials such as the *Survey*) to State Department officials stationed in China? We have noted in letters from such persons that they have taken great care to indicate mailing by United States gunboats, etc., and they have also asked us to write by registered mail. Is the best thing to address all communications to the Department of State, for them to forward through their regular channels?

When you hear from the Department, will you let me know?

f/g

NEW YORK, N. Y., *April 12, 1939.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIRS: We are most anxious to learn of the safest way to send materials (both letters and printed matter) to State Department officials stationed in China, and we are wondering if it is best to address all communications to the Department of State, Washington, D. C., to be forwarded through the official mail pouch.

I shall greatly appreciate it if you would inform me whether the above-mentioned is the best procedure, or if you have another other suggestion to offer.

Sincerely yours,

ANNETTE BLUMENTHAL, *Subscription Manager.*

EXHIBIT No. 672

NOVEMBER 10, 1936.

General VICTOR YAKHONTOFF,
522 Riverside Drive, New York, New York

DEAR GENERAL YAKHONTOFF: My reply from the Social Science Research Council with regard to your proposed volume on Outer Mongolia is extremely negative. Its Executive Director, Robert T. Crane, writes me that "there is no way in which this Council can provide funds for the proposal of General Yakhontoff. * * * The Council has come to limit itself to advice directly to sources of funds when they ask for advice on a proposal made directly to them by the proponent." This information is somewhat contrary to the impression which Holland and I had.

I am somewhat at a loss to know what further move I can make on your behalf. The largest source of funds, of course, is the Rockefeller Foundation, but because of the grants which they have already made to us we cannot approach them on an individual project. What I could do, and would be more than glad to do, however, is to recommend your project after you had initiated the idea with them. That is, if you took the matter up directly with the Foundation, then suggested that they refer to us, I would be glad to give them a favorable impression. You, however, may have some other idea as to how we may be more directly helpful, and if you do I hope you will not hesitate to communicate with me.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

Staff: Robert T. Crane, Executive Director; Donald Young; John E. Pomfret; Carolyn E. Allen, Controller

230 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY

Cable Address: SOCSCIENCE, New York

Members—American Anthropological Association: Alfred M. Tozzer, Harvard University; Robert Redfield, University of Chicago; Clark Wissler, American Museum of Natural History. American Economic Association: Alvin H. Hansen, University of Minnesota; Sumner H. Slichter, Harvard University; Frank H. Knight, University of Chicago. American Historical Association: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Harvard University; Guy S. Ford, University of Minnesota; Roy F. Nichols, University of Pennsylvania. American Political Science Association: William Anderson, University of Minnesota; Charles E. Merriam, University of Chicago; Lindsay Rogers, Columbia University. American Psychological Association: Gardner Murphy, Columbia University; A. T. Poffenberger, Columbia University; Gordon W. Allport, Harvard University. American Sociological Society: Thorsten Sellin, University of Pennsylvania; Shelby M. Harrison, Russell Sage Foundation; William F. Ogburn, University of Chicago. American Statistical Association: Seymour L. Andrew, American Telephone & Telegraph Company; Edwin B. Wilson, Harvard University; William A. Berridge, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Members at Large: Carl L. Alsberg, Stanford University; Isiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University; John Dickinson, University of Pennsylvania; Charles H. Judd, University of Chicago; Wesley C. Mitchell, Columbia University.

NOVEMBER 3, 1936.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52 Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. FIELD: Without circumlocution, I might as well say at once that there is no way in which this Council can provide funds for the proposal of General Yakhontoff. The situation is simply that the Council has no funds at its disposal for work of this kind, nor would it seem to me desirable for the Council to examine the merits of this particular proposal with a view to seeking funds, since experience has shown us that this is an ineffective procedure in raising funds. The Council has come to limit itself to advice on a proposal made directly to them by the proponent.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT T. CRANE.

RTC/set

NOVEMBER 2, 1936.

DR. ROBERT T. CRANE,
Social Science Research Council,
230 Park Avenue, New York, New York.

DEAR DR. CRANE: General Victor Yakhontoff has presented to us a research project in which we are interested but toward which, unfortunately, it is impossible for us to put up any funds, and I have wondered if his scheme would fall into the interests of the Social Science Research Council. Briefly, his proposal is this: that he prepare a book on the Outer Mongolian People's Republic, containing a historical account, general description of the country and its people, and full information on current economic, social, and political developments. General Yakhontoff has secured the promise of documentary assistance in Moscow, and knowing something of the material that exists in Russian and the cooperation with Russian authorities which Yakhontoff has secured on previous volumes, I interpret this as a very important and favorable factor. He believes that he should spend around three months in Moscow and then proceed to Outer Mongolia for a period of several more months, the whole project to take roughly a year. His publishers, Coward McCann, have agreed to take the book and have also, I believe, agreed to advance at least a portion of the funds required.

General Yakhontoff is the author of three volumes on the Far East: THE CHINESE SOVIETS, RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FAR EAST, and EYES ON JAPAN. All three contained useful summaries of existing material and a certain amount of original research. The latter is particularly true of the volume on Chinese Communism, and it will have to be more true of the one on Outer Mongolia because of the absence of secondary source material.

General Yakhontoff served under the Czarist regime as a high military official and had considerable experience in the Russian Far East and as military attaché to the Russian embassy in Tokyo. He was one of the first emigres to make his peace with the Soviet authorities and as far back as 1929 or 1930 was taken into their confidence and given free access to the Moscow archives pertinent to the questions he was then investigating.

I have no idea whether this proposition will interest you. We should like to see the book written, but the financing of it does not quite fall within our terms of reference. It is for this reason that I am taking the liberty of asking whether you would be interested in going into it further.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT NO. 673

NOVEMBER 6, 1939.

FVF from ECC:

Farrar and Rinehart would like your suggestions as to a kind of list to circulate concerning "Humane Endeavour" by Haldore Hanson.

Would Amerasia like a review copy? Can one of your staff easily supply me with a good list of magazines which should receive review copies?

EXHIBIT NO. 674

HOTEL RICHMOND,
Geneva, Switzerland, 7th September, 1937.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. Y.,
United States of America.

DEAR FRED: There were two reasons for my cabling you to send copies of *Amerasia* from the beginning in separate mailings to Moscow. The first was because Motylev had only received the first issue, the second was because he understood you had sent him eight copies of the July issue, but the package had never reached him. He was a little disturbed that you had published his article written for *Pravda* without consulting him. He realized that any journal had a perfect right to use an article appearing in a newspaper, but I think he felt that the close relationship which he thinks exists between *Amerasia* and the IPR would call for consultation in advance. He had not seen the July *Amerasia* and had the feeling that the article which he had written for the specialized constituency

of *Pravda* was not suitable for the general *Amerasia* audience. I told him that I had read the article in the home of a friend and that it seemed to me admirably suited to *Amerasia's* audience.

To make doubly sure he gets a copy I am now sending him one of my own copies which has just arrived from China.

While I am on the subject of *Amerasia*, may I congratulate you on the very penetrating statement which you made in the July issue on page 194 under the heading "Politics in Tokyo."

Etienne Dennery, one of the closest French students of Far Eastern affairs told me that he had never heard of the existence of *Amerasia*, and I suggest that your circulation department send him one or two sample copies and a subscription blank.

I have read with care and profit every issue of *Amerasia*. I see no reason whatever for it to continue its existence separate from the American Council. I think the arguments in favor of its becoming an American Council publication are overwhelming.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

LONDON, *August 25, 1937.*

NLT
INPAREL,
New York:

Send Motylev all Amerasias from beginning separate mailings. Stop. Cable your views my requesting all councils immediate report activities enabling their publics understand nature Far Eastern crisis. Also their suggestions program Pacific Council International Secretariat in present situation.

CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 675

MARCH 4TH, 1936.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
Rainier Club, Seattle.

DEAR FRED: This is to acknowledge the telegram reading as follows:

"Bridges has taken first papers out but cannot become full citizen for another year Stop Rowell has accepted."

Another letter is going forth to you today which explains my inquiry regarding Bridges.

It is most satisfactory that you have succeeded in getting Chester Rowell to take charge of publicity at Yosemite. Doubtless you will be writing to tell me of your arrival on March 10th and the details of the arrangements you have made.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 676

[Telegram]

1936 MAR 2 AM 3 14

FV5 18NM SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 1

EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52 St., N. Y. C.:

Bridges has taken first papers out but cannot become full citizen for another year Stop Rowell has accepted.

FRED.

EXHIBIT No. 677

Memorandum

NOVEMBER 21, 1939.

To: F. V. Field, E. C. Carter, E. J. Tarr, P. C. Jessup.
From: Liu Yu-Wan.
In re: Chinese Denial of Recent Domei News Agency Reports.

In view of the fact that the Domei News Agency has been repeatedly spreading the rumors regarding the estrangement of the relations between the Kuomintang

and the Chinese Communist Party, you may be interested in learning that Dr. Hu Shih received a telegram from Chungking yesterday (dated November 19th) concerning a statement published by Sin Hua Jih Po (the organ of the Chinese Communist Party) on November 2nd, the gist of which follows:

"(1) Domei News Agency reported that the Chinese Communist Party has requested the Central Government that China's Northwest be sovietized. This is groundless. The Chinese Communist Party will cooperate to the bitter end with the Kuomintang in upholding the National United Front and in endeavoring to achieve victory for National Resistance and realize the Three People's Principles.

"(2) Domei News Agency also alleged that the Eighth Route Army has been withdrawing from Shansi to Shensi. This is ridiculous. The Eighth Route Army has not only not withdrawn a single soldier to Northern Shensi but also has recently, in cooperation with other national units, taken a toll of more than 10,000 enemy troops in the Southwest of Shansi.

"(3) Domei reported that General Chu Teh had flown to Moscow. This is also false, in view of the fact that General Chu has never left the Front in North China since the War."

The declaration also added that the Japanese Army in consequence of its failure both militarily and politically in China has chosen to make an endeavor to estrange the relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Nationalist Party with the view towards jeopardizing China's good relations with the foreign powers.

(*See, for example, New York Times, Oct. 27, 1939.)

EXHIBIT No. 678

Mr. Holland—for your information

CHATHAM HOUSE,
St. James's Square, London, S. W. I., 4th January, 1935.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York.

DEAR FIELD: You will, I hope, like the review which "P. J." has given of the "Economic Handbook" in the current "International Affairs," which is out today.

You doubtless know that "P. J." is a highly confidential nom-de-plume for F. Ashton-Gwatkin, C. M. G., who is a Foreign Office official and head of the Japanese section. He is a member of the IPR committee and has a high standing as an authority on the Far East.

You know, of course, that none of us are supposed to know this nom-de-plume, and no reference should be made in any of our letters or publications which would give anyone the clue as to who "P. J." is.

While I am on this subject, would you please tell Catherine Porter that I have just been talking with Miss Cleeve about Miss Porter's enquiry as to who John Keith is. This is the nom-de-plume for E. H. Carr, of the Russian section of the Foreign Office. Catherine wanted to know how to describe him in the Who's Who of "Pacific Affairs." Tell her that of course no reference should be made to him by his correct name, neither should any reference be made to his connection with the Foreign Office. She can describe him, however, as "An English authority on Soviet Russia."

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 679

MEMORANDUM ON PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION

OCTOBER 27, 1944.

To: Philip C. Jessup.
William C. Johnstone.
Frederick V. Field.
Rose Yardumian.
From: Raymond Dennett.

It seems unlikely that, with the time at our disposal, we shall be able to get to any really definitive statements of fundamental agreement among the American delegation. We ought, however, to be able to do two things:

1. Agree as to what line American public opinion would take as the result of a given line of action by another power in the Far East. (What would be the reaction of the American public on internal dissension within China, on refusal of the British to relinquish some portion of their control of India, too.)

2. Identify major differences of opinion on various points within the American delegation which can be amplified by getting those who differ most vehemently to state their position in brief notes which are to be circulated to the entire delegation before January.

We have brought down three previously prepared statements which can be circulated at the appropriate time:

1. A statement on a possible position on the internal problems of China.
2. A statement on American attitudes on colonial problems.
3. A brief statement on what might be a minimum program for the political treatment of Japan.

The first two statements are couched in terms of what the American public is likely to feel if certain things do or do not happen, the last is of a more technical character, in which technical knowledge of the situation in Japan is assumed.

To start the meeting off in a lively fashion, I would suggest something along the following line:

1. A general statement by PCJ of the nature of IPR conferences, and the purpose of this meeting. Included in this would be a statement that we are not seeking to establish a "line" to be taken by the American delegation, but to do two things:

(a) To acquaint members of the delegation with each other's points of view so that when they speak in roundtable they can truthfully say that their opinion agrees with, or is in disagreement with other American opinion.

(*b*) To discover whether we can agree on a minimum American position which we will maintain if pushed into any corners by other delegations.

2. A brief statement by Fred Field drawn from past conferences illustrating other examples of the kind of problems faced at these affairs than those mentioned by PCJ.

3. Supporting comment by WCJ on the basis of his attendance at Atlantic City, with the suggestion that we may find it desirable at Hot Springs to meet as a body from time to time to compare notes and to see whether we individually are accurately reflecting the opinion of the group in some of the problems presented.

4. To illustrate what we mean, to turn immediately to the question of the internal situation in China, upon which they have been given a suggested position. PCJ, FVF, or Owen Lattimore might be asked to give a brief statement of the internal situation, pointing out the line taken by the Chinese at Atlantic City, and saying that we have to be prepared to deal with this. In connection with the prepared comment, it is worth pointing out:

(*a*) It does *not* deal with the facts of the situation at all as each delegate can obviously talk to that point in accordance with his own knowledge of the facts.

(*b*) It does deal with what American public opinion is likely to be if the Chinese take certain kinds of action.

Is the delegation agreed that American public opinion would react as stated if the Chinese took any of the actions mentioned? If we agree, then we can always fall back upon this line as a more or less minimum position.

5. Turn to the prepared agenda as circulated and to start off talking about treatment of Japan using the prepared statement to stir up opening comment.

6. The afternoon session can be started in the same way with the prepared statement on dependencies.

In general the limited objectives of the meeting as stated above call for brief discussion of a number of points to a place where definite differences of viewpoints emerge, and exhaustive discussion of only those points on which there appears to be a good chance of getting a pretty general agreement. I would suggest, therefore, that the Chairman periodically try to summarize what the general opinion on a given point is or what the conflicting attitudes are. If he gets away with his summarization, we shall have in the recorders' minutes a statement of general agreement; if he accurately states the differences, he can

then try to persuade individuals to make brief notes and send them to me. I would suggest that if WCJ, FVF, or RD pitch in to help the Chairman if, at any point, they think they have identified general agreement or areas of differences. If the Chairman is met with a blank silence upon the introduction of a new topic (as may be likely as we approach the cocktail hour), Mrs. Stewart and Miss Farley might be called upon to lead off in a provocative manner:

On some points it might be useful to try the technique used successfully at the Conference Committee meeting last month and ask one or two people to draft brief statements of their positions during lunch or dinner for presentation at the following session:

It may be desirable to get in a brief statement at some point on

(*a*) Transportation arrangements.

(*b*) The fact that Virginia is dry and the obvious conclusions to draw.

EXHIBIT No. 680

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Honolulu, Hawaii

11 Heathcroft, Hampstead Way, London, N. W. 11

OFFICE OF THE EDITOR,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, 12 January, 1937

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: Although I have been so long in commenting on the material you have sent me about *Amerasia* I have felt shielded by the fact that I, myself, had had no reply to my long letter to you of November second. I was getting ready this morning to be the first to write when I received your letter of December thirty-first, which puts you definitely ahead of me.

First your general memorandum on the new magazine. I think this is extremely good, and have no modifications to suggest, and only one question to ask—are you going to ask for material from non-Americans who are not resident in America such as Freda Utley and George Taylor? There is also Dr. Herbert Rosinski whose address is: Christian Student Movement House, Russell Square, London, W. C. I. Rosinski's position in Germany has become untenable because of one Jewish grandfather. He has no leftist affiliations or, so far as I know, sympathies. He has for a long time been in Germany concerned with questions of policies regarding Japan and the Far East. Owing to this he has an exceptional insight into the not always very closely fitting relationship between the propaganda and the *Realpolitik* aspects of such questions.

There is no particular comment to be made on the subject of Colegrove's letter to you about the magazine, except that I have a dubious feeling about the name *Amerasia* which is like his only more durable. I note in your letter received today that you are planning to print the name superimposed on a map of the North Pacific. If my memory of the map of this part of the world is correct, the result would be to have "Amer" printed on the map of Asia and "Asia" printed on the map of America, although of course you could get "Asia" back into Asia and "Amer" back into America by printing the word "Amerasia" up side down. This in itself might be acceptable as a comment on the tempter of our times but perhaps slightly adolescent. I admit however that I have no better title to suggest.

One particular question: Is the magazine an organ of the American Council?

Now for the suggestion of turning part of my letter into an article. This has got me all flustered and flattered. From your long silence, I had begun to develop a sinking feeling that I had committed just another blundering amateur analysis worth only the silent horror of you and your friends. Naturally, on the rebound, I am tickled to death at your willingness to print my opinions, even though this too may indicate that you feel my amateurism has merely a momentary usefulness.

I am enclosing a reworking of the material which I hope you will find satisfactory.

With reference to your mention of the fact that you are negotiating for an article from Reischauer, I am enclosing herewith an article which he sent me for PACIFIC AFFAIRS. You may wish to take this over from me. It is too late for inclusion in the March number of PACIFIC AFFAIRS and may be out-dated by June. It has also a number of touches which might make it unsuitable for PACIFIC AFFAIRS without damaging it in the least for the kind of magazine you are planning.

Don't think from anything I have said above that I am snorting and prancing in a nasty way about what I think about what you think about what I think and so on. As you know, I really am only groping my way toward an understanding of what I think about what I think. I hope you won't mind if I continue to send you an occasional memorandum. If you will criticize any such material in the closest possible way, it would do me the invaluable service of giving me a firm point on which to steer—even if I don't evetually steer in that direction.

With all the best,

Yours,

[s] OL
[t] OWEN LATTIMORE.

P. S. (inked in)—You said that in my original draft, which was hastily dictated and unrevised, some phrases were open to question. *Please* use your discretion in editing the amplified version. Cut or add. The article will not make me a roaring, popular favorite, and therefore all the more it ought to be invulnerably worded.

EXHIBIT No. 681

139 EAST 52ND STREET,
NEW YORK, N. Y., *March 9, 1943.*

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
Council for Pan-American Democracy,
112 East 19th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR FRIEND: I hope you enjoyed Major Eliot's scathing attack on Sokolsky in today's Tribune as much as I did. Sokolsky certainly had it coming to him.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 682

Hawaii Group—Executive Committee: Riley H. Allen, Chairman; A. L. Dean, Vice Chairman; Frank C. Atherton, Treasurer; Charles F. Loomis, Secretary; Robbins B. Anderson; Paul S. Bachman; Peter H. Buck; David L. Crawford; W. F. Dillingham; Gerald W. Fisher; Peyton Harrison; Shao-chang Lee; Frank E. Midkiff; Iga Mori; Philip S. Platt; Oscar F. Shepard; Yasutaro Soga; Hugh C. Tennent; Heaton L. Wrenn

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

501 Dillingham Building

HONOLULU, HAWAII

MAY 2, 1940.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR FRED: This will introduce Lt. Colonel George E. Arneman, who for the past three years has been one of the most useful and active members of the Hawaii group, IPR.

He is the one who engineered the two Schofield conferences for us and has been a member of several of our study groups. He was the G–2 intelligence officer at Schofield Barracks and has had two different tours as military attaché in Baltic countries.

I want him to see the library and general workings of the Top Floor and hope it will be possible for him to participate in one of your regional conferences. His immediate assignment is to the state of Maine.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Chas.
[t] CHARLES F. LOOMIS, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 683

MARCH 20, 1939.

FVF from ECC:

Enclosed is a copy of an air mail letter just received from Captain Carlson which is self-explanatory.

From one point of view I wish that Captain Carlson could have kept his position in the Navy Department.

Have you any suggestions as to ways in which the public here and in the Far East can profit by his new freedom?

EXHIBIT No. 684

Hawaii Group—Executive Committee: Peter H. Buck, Chairman; Frank E. Midkiff, Vice Chairman; Frank C. Atherton, Treasurer; Charles F. Loomis, Secretary; Riley H. Allen; Robbins B. Anderson; Paul S. Bachman; Royal N. Chapman; David L. Crawford; A. L. Dean; W. F. Dillingham; Shao-Chang Lee; Iga Mori; Phillip S. Platt; Oscar F. Shepard; Yasutaro Soga; Hugh C. Tennent; Heaton L. Wrenn

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

316 *Dillingham Bldg., Honolulu, T. H.*

JULY 2, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: On receipt of your letter regarding bigger and better textbooks for the social science teachers of America I immediately wired you:

> "Expect no difficulty financing 1,500 dollars for 750 books. Will confirm clipper Monday. Stop. Need books early fall."

As I was able to get the Atherton Estate to have a meeting during the day and guarantee the $1,500 (that was the only thing I could do as the Superintendent of Schools is in the Orient and Barnes, the principal of Kamehameha school, is on the mainland and I could not get advance orders from them), I sent you another wire so that you and Helen could get busy immediately getting the manuscripts to press!

> "Hereby confirm order—committee hopes price includes maps, pictures (we think this is essential). Progressive and coast schools should easily absorb balance—send copy for promotion circulars. (I thought that I might decide to print some circulars for distribution to the delegates at the World Education Conference and knew that your office has more advertising brains than ours so thought you would be willing to prepare the copy for a circular.) Send clipper regarding Los Angeles set-up. (Before acknowledging Sproul's letter I wanted your reactions to my queries and suggestions regarding our work in Los Angeles this fall—I especially refer to my clipper letters of June 2, June 19, and June 22, which I trust you received.)"

I must apologize for bombarding you with radiograms regarding Carter's query about my going to Manila. The reason I seemed impatient was because I had to decide that week whether to keep my booking to the mainland in August as there are long waiting lists on all the steamers this summer. I have not received an answer from my cable to Carter of June 24 and as I received your radiogram of June 29, "URGE YOU GO LOS ANGELES AS COAST WORK MUST DEVELOP RAPIDLY", I decided to keep to my original schedule as given in my letter of June 2. I hope that you can give a full week to Los Angeles and can arrive there as near September 4 as possible.

I have written Mrs. Ward privately and unofficially, asking her if she could spend September and October in Los Angeles assisting me with the financial campaign in case I have a secretary and she can be spared from the San Francisco office. She replied that she would be very happy to do this if the matter can be arranged. Unless there is some Los Angeles person in mind as a permanent secretary, I think that using Mrs. Ward would be the best plan. If you approve, kindly make the necessary arrangements with the San Francisco office or authorize me to.

This week we hung leis around the Leebrick and Blakeslee families and they are guests at an I. P. R. dinner being held tonight at the Pacific Club. Blakeslee is going to speak on "American Foreign Policy in the Light of Coming Philippine Independence." C. H. Lowe, the flood relief man who was at Yosemite, also will be one of the guests.

The other day we had the pleasure of entertaining Takaki's friends, Doctor and Mrs. Kawai. He is assistant librarian at Toyko Imperial University. Mary Pickford and Jeannette MacDonald arrived yesterday on their honeymoons but I don't think I will interrupt their play to ask for subscriptions for Los Angeles. There also is a young Vanderbilt here who seems to be having a good time. Is he one of your relatives, and, if so, should we do anything for him?

The Navy Intelligence Department tells me that H. C. Fornwall, one of DuPont's man in Japan who arrived yesterday, has the low-down on the military situation in Japan, so I have just asked him to have lunch with five or six of the keymen in our recent Far Eastern study group, giving them a chance to pump him.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

[s] Chas.
[t] CHARLES F. LOOMIS.

CFL:db
Via airmail.
Cc via clipper.
(Handwritten:)

P. S.—Be sure and give me your ideas regarding Los Angeles membership and goals—and office program set up [s] L.

EXHIBIT No. 685

6 MERCIER CIRCLE,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 4, 1934.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
Secretary, American Council Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.

DEAR FRED: I was very glad indeed to learn that when Joe Barnes retired you had consented to take his place. Because Jo and I would like to cooperate in every way we can it is particularly hard to decline your first request. Unfortunately, the job I have undertaken here is proving to be a much longer assignment than I had bargained for and the state of our finances simply will not permit us the luxury of responding. I can only promise that once this job is succeeded by one which is somewhat more remunerative we will be quick to return to the roll of your faithful contributors.

Sincerely yours,
EC:MMA

[s] EVERETT CASE.

EXHIBIT No. 686

OCTOBER 7, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: Thanks for your wire. I am somewhat apprehensive as to the story which reached the newspapers concerning my Washington speech. The situation was something like this: A week or ten days ago I talked to a meeting of Quakers in Philadelphia. There were present at the meeting several representatives of the National Council for the Prevention of War, and in response to their request I gave them a copy of the manuscript. This Wednesday, that is,

yesterday, I attended the annual conference of the National Council in Washington and opened the discussion on the topic, "What Should Be the Objectives of American Policy?" After the meeting one of their people confessed that she had issued a release to the papers based not upon my remarks yesterday, but upon the manuscript of the Philadelphia speech. I am still ready to stand by the latter, but I am somewhat suspicious of the selection and arrangement of statements which were made by the representative of a group which takes a rather limited isolationist point of view.

As a matter of fact, at the meeting yesterday I said very little about neutrality except to emphasize more strongly than I had in Philadelphia its obvious limitations as a policy in this situation. Knowing the attitude of Libby and of this group, I made the burden of my remarks an insistence on the fact that we are heavily and irrevocably involved in the Far East and that we must necessarily work out a long-run constructive policy based on the principle of cooperative action. Probably it did not go over very well, but I am sorry that if there was to be a newspaper story it was not based on this line of thought rather than on the question of applying the Neutrality Act. I still think that there is a valuable safeguard in this neutrality position which makes it an instrument of policy not to be lightly tossed overboard; but it increasingly apparent that it does not deal with the major problems in this particular case.

In regard to the SURVEY article, too, it now appears in the use which has been made of it that the qualifications, conditions, and restrictions upon which the argument is based, although explicitly stated, are not given a prominent enough position. I suppose that one always faces the difficulty that other people will abstract the particular parts of an argument that support their case and so distort the conclusions of the author.

While in Washington I tried without much success to find out the meaning of the President's speech. There wasn't much more information available than the speculations which the newspapers had carried. One political cynic suggested an angle which is perhaps not to be overlooked. In his view the speech was an adroit political move in the President's best manner and one taken quite without regard to the international situation. FDR was on his way back to Washington faced with the most difficult personal problem of his career—the Black case. He was definitely on the spot, with absolutely no one on whom he could shift the responsibility this time. According to this view he took his dramatic way of blotting out the Black issue at just the time when it was most embarrassing. For three days now and for some time to come the newspapers are filled with the implications of the speech and its response here and abroad. In this way the President has resorted to the old trick of diverting attention to foreign affairs in the face of a difficult domestic situation.

I cannot believe that this is the whole story, although it may account for the timing of the speech and for its emphasis. It is difficult to believe that as adroit a politician as FDR would make a move so effective in domestic politics unconsciously. On the other hand, we have known for a long time that he has been seeking an opportunity to make a dramatic move in world politics. No occasion could have been more favorable from an emotional point of view, whatever possibility there may be that the proposal for some effective action can actually be implemented. Someone who had read a good many newspaper comments on the speech said that he was impressed by the fact that those parts of the speech which received the strongest approval were the sentences declaring the President's determination to keep the country out of war.

At the same time there cannot be much doubt that the neutrality position which was already crumbling as a result of moral indignation over Japan's actions has received a tremendous blow. Probably this speech definitely removes the possibility that the Neutrality Act can be strengthened in the next session of Congress, and events before that time may even lead to its repeal. They would have to go a good deal further, though, before there is much likelihood that Britain and the United States could get together on sanctions, and the recent despatches from London indicate that the British Government is flatly opposed to any such proposal. The administration, I should think, would have to go to Congress to get authority for any effective program, even applying impartial neutrality restrictions effective enough to support sanctions undertaken by another country. Senator Pittman argues that the President can do anything in the way of economic intervention under the recent Supreme Court decision; but it sounds a little fantastic to say that the general discretionary power of the President in matters of foreign policy give him a blank check with reference to trade and finance in time of peace as well as war. It is conceivable that the

President could lead opinion along to the point where he could make a successful appeal to Congress, and it is just this possibility which has made the isolationist senators so insistent on tying his hands so far as possible. The story goes that they were infuriated and alarmed a year and a half ago when the President, in discussing the matter of discretionary neutrality powers with a small group, leaned across the table, banged his fist, and said with great emphasis, "Gentlemen, I can get this country in a war in 10 days."

While in Washington I picked up a few bits of gossip, which may interest you. It was indirectly reported to me that the Military Intelligence Division believes Japan to have 2,000,000 men under arms—a half million in China, a half million in Manchuria, Korea, and at ports of embarkation in Japan; and the remainder in preparation. The Germany military advisers are people in good standing at home, who simply have orders not to be captured or found dead on a battlefield. It is reported that there are two American majors, retired or reserve, directing China's air operations, and, less reliably, that two hundred American pilots have landed in Hongkong. Referring again to the Germans, a Chinese told me here that Germans were under orders from home to remain as long as China did not receive direct military aid from the Soviet Union.

I greatly appreciated your extensive and generous comments on the pamphlet manuscript. I was myself dissatisfied with the manuscript in a number of the points which you raised, and I think the present revision is some improvement. It still has to be done over again and as yet I haven't sat down to that business with your letter in front of me. Anne Johnstone thinks there will be considerable demand for something of this sort and quoted Fred Libby as saying that a 10¢ pamphlet has ten times the sale of a 25¢ one. With the situation moving as it is, it is clear that the discussion should be broadened with the neutrality section greatly curtailed. I am glad now we did not rush through a pamphlet focusing on neutrality two weeks ago.

I am very reluctant to agree with you that we must submit this kind of thing to Hornbeck, and Lasker feels the same way. If we sent it to a high government official we would be more or less forced to adopt whatever suggestions he cares to make. My own feeling is that while in this case it might make no great difference, it is a bad precedent and just the kind of thing which we criticise in other countries. I will follow out your request unless I hear from you to the contrary.

We have had a number of requests for the American Stake pamphlet which we are unable to fulfill. Anne Johnstone thinks that a new edition, prepared in the near future and revised in such a way as to summarize not only the economic stake but also existing political commitments and diplomatic machinery, etc., would be useful. I wish we had someone around who could do a really first-class graphic portrayal of this subject.

Sincerely yours,

[t] Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.

Exhibit No. 687

The Institute of Pacific Relations

Honolulu, Hawaii

129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., July 16, 1934.

Mr. Frederick V. Field,
New Hartford, Connecticut.

Dear Fred: You doubtless received from Rajchman a copy of his Report as Technical Delegate of the League in China. That Report, you will remember, was based on ten Annexes published by the National Economic Council in China. If you do not have a copy of these Annexes, and desire to do so, I can send you a volume containing all ten.

Sincerely,

[s] Edward C. Carter
[t] Edward C. Carter.

(Pencilled note:) No; I have never seen the report—and even less I have not even heard about it. I should greatly appreciate a copy.

[s] Fred.

ECC/NSH

EXHIBIT No. 688

EXCERPTS FROM LETTER TO FREDERICK V. FIELD FROM NEWTON D. BAKER, DATED AUGUST 6, 1934 (CLEVELAND, OHIO)

I have just had a two-day visit from Joe Barnes. It was really a very delightful experience for me and I was flattered out of all description by the candor and completeness with which Joe permitted me to see the inside of his mind, and, as I gathered, to some extent, the inside of your mind. I tried to tell him that although I am an old man, I am still in full possession of all the ideals of my youth, which do not differ from those which you and he cherish, and that the only difference between him and me lies in the fact that I have ceased to expect the same rate of progress which he thinks not only possible but necessary.

All of this is important so far as this note is concerned only because I want to urge you to consider the secretaryship of the American Council. Mr. Carter has telegraphed me that Mr. Alsberg has definitely decided that he will not undertake it. I was perfectly content to have him invited, but my first suggestion when Mr. Carter talked with me about it was that you should do the job. I hope you will consider it favorably, and, as you see, I have not learned from Joe all the things which you might think it important for me to know and I still am very enthusiastic in urging the invitation on your attention.

EXHIBIT No. 689

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—Honolulu—London—Manila—Moscow—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

ENROUTE,
Seattle-Victoria, April 29, 1939.

DEAR FRED: Yours of April 25 has only just arrived. It deserves a better answer than is possible at this last minute.

Apparently you want my reaction to a specific situation rather than the general assurance that for years I have advocated the development of the American Labor Movement. I wish you had raised these questions when I was in New York for then I could have understood the nature of the difficulties you and your colleagues are facing.

I was quite surprised for example to learn from Lockwood the evening I left New York that he anticipated difficulty with the Board.

Now your letter comes with the implication of wide difference of opinion within the staff.

To express an opinion on objections from the Board or the staff I ought to know the nature of these objections.

Lockwood's remark was the first hint I had had that you had not been carrying a majority of your colleagues on the Executive Committee with you concurrently with the efforts of your immediate colleagues on the staff to get a majority of the staff to join the Union. In a cooperative enterprize like the I. P. R. where the Executive Committee and the Board are not "profit makers" but volunteer cooperators, I should have thought this indispensable.

What are the objections of staff members? If I learned, for example, that so conscientious a member as Shiman did not want to join the Union I would want to know his reasons before casting a vote in the Executive Committee, which he might regard as coercion. I do not mean that I would be unwilling to go against "x" or "y" on the American Council staff. I would first want to know what the staff objections are.

I should hope that if unionization in the American Council is effected the parallel of the F. P. A. would not be featured because (a) Buell opposed the union whereas you favor it (b) the F. P. A. had a bad labor policy whereas you have had a good one. Are there not better parallels, i. e., where unionization represents the mature, intelligent cooperation of socially minded adults not the "employer" "employee" squabble in the F. P. A.

If for any reason unionization is delayed I should think that as an interim measure the Executive Committee and the staff ought to work out without delay a formulation of the present safeguards and standards including the creation

of a joint committee which will relieve you of your present responsibility for fixing salaries, etc.

If you yourself finally decide to urge the Executive Committee to authorize you to sign a contract you may wish also to recommend that the Committee consider whether the financial position of the Council is not such that it can increase slightly its salaries to one or two lowest bracket staff members, *if* the *only* obstacle to their joining the union is the size of the dues.

An immediate general formulation is clearly indicated for otherwise if you were run over by a bus and succeeded by a less socially minded person there might be a worsening in the standards you have established.

If you think it will help please do not hesitate to share this letter with Jessup. If you do please tell him in his Pacific Council capacity that I understand there is no parallel proposal among the members of the International Secretariat to ask the P. C. for a contract. I assume this must invoke joint and concurrent examination of the question from the start by the P. C. and the members of the Secretariat as the situation in the P. C. and the A. C. appear to be somewhat different.

Sincerely but hastily yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

I have discussed the union with no one on your staff save Lockwood on Monday and Austern briefly about a month ago.

EXHIBIT No. 690

212 EAST 48TH ST.,
New York City, March 20, 1939.

Dr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d St., New York City.

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am sure that you will be interested in meeting Lieut. Arthur Read who has just arrived in this country from China and has a very interesting story to tell.

Mr. Read, who is an Army Reserve Lieutenant, has been instructing Chinese soldiers at Kwangtung and in Hankow for more than a year and will be in the United States for the next few months on a lecture tour.

I have asked him to look you up when he returns from Washington the latter part of this week.

Letters of introduction from China express a glowing appreciation for the splendid work he has done for the Chinese forces.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] EARL H. LEAF.

EHL: vr

The attached report, compiled and written by the Shanghai branch of the British Army Intelligence Service, is STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

It is well worth a careful study, however, as providing a means of estimating the *actual* number of casualties when studying the *official* Japanese casualty reports.

EARL H. LEAF.

JAPANESE CASUALTIES

1. Although it is difficult to do more than a rough approximation, the following attempt has been made to assess the Japanese casualties incurred from the outbreak of the LUKOUCHIAO incident on July 7th, 1937, to about the middle of November 1938, a period of over 16 months of hostilities.

2. The official Japanese Army figures of killed in action are as under:

(a) Up to about mid-Nov. 1937—North China: Approxi. 6,500; Central China: Approxi. 10,000.

(b) Up to 7th July 1938—nearly 37,000 on all fronts. Between mid-November 1937 and July 1938, most of the heavy fighting had occurred in the North China Front, in SHANTUNG, especially TAIERCHWANG, in SHANSI, and North HONAN. It is suggested that this figure of 37,000 might be subdivided into 19,000 North China: 18,000 Central China.

(c) During HANKOW advance from about the middle of August to the middle of October: 6,153.

This would give, with an admitted South China casualty list of 77, a grand total of 43,000 killed. It would appear reasonable to add another 2,000 to represent "official" casualties in North China subsequent to 7th July 1938, and "official" casualties in Central China other than those incurred during the HANKOW advance as stated above.

It is suggested, therefore, that the official figures to date would be in the neighborhood of 45,000 killed, of which not less than 25,000 will have been incurred in Central China.

3. (a) These figures suffer from two defects. In the first place they are "official" lists, and in the second place they do not, it is understood, include those died of disease. They may be considered to be a serious understatement of the true state of affairs.

(b) As regards the accuracy of the "official" lists, it is a fact that the "official" casualties at the CHANGKUFENG Incident in July-August 1938, were given at 158 killed. Later lists of killed, by name, gave a total of 523 (see Summary No. 42). A greater proportion of casualties were probably suppressed on this occasion than is usually the case (the true casualties being over 200% more than the official ones), as there were particular reasons to emphasize how gallantly and successfully the Japanese had resisted the Russians.

It is also of interest to record that continuous reports have been received of the number of ashes evacuated through TANGKU and that these reports give a total, up to the end of October, of over 60,000. These ashes will certainly include died of disease and probably also civilians, but even allowing for a 50% exaggeration, the subsequent total of 40,000 is twice the "official" total of 20,000. Figures for SHANGHAI and TSINGTAO are not obtainable, but the impression gained from the reports of ashes arriving in Japan fortifies the belief that the dead are very considerably greater than is officially announced.

It is suggested that the numbers killed in action are about 60% above those officially admitted, and that they are probably over 70,000.

(c) Figures of "dead from disease" are more difficult to estimate, but the following information is of assistance:

(i) The Japanese admitted to 300 deaths from cholera near SHANGHAI in August and September, 1937, and to outbreaks of cholera up the Yangtze this summer, especially at KIUKIANG. Their admission of cholera deaths near SHANGHAI is probably an understatement.

(ii) The South Manchurian Railway, who have been operating certain railways in North China for some months, have announced the deaths of 28 Japanese employees from disease. The number of Japanese S. M. R. employees in North China is not known, it is suggested an average over the period under discussion may be about 2,000. These figures, taken by themselves, must not be pressed too far, as many of the 28 deaths might have occurred in one isolated outbreak of disease in one isolated area, and the total of 2,000 Japanese S. M. R. employees may be an understatement. On the other hand, it might be remembered that these civil employees will usually be working under conditions making them both less liable to serious disease, and, with better treatment more quickly available, more likely to recover, if attacked.

(iii) Other factors to be borne in mind are the reported 60,000 ashes from TANGKU, which will have included deaths from disease, the admitted prevalence of dysentery both in North and Central China, the bitter cold faced in the winter of 1937–38, which undoubtedly caused frostbite, pneumonia, and other serious winter ailments, and the almost tropical conditions of the summer fighting in the YANGTZE this summer.

(d) It is suggested that the deaths from disease in the Japanese Army in China may be taken as something under 10,000, and that the total number of deaths from all causes is some 80,000 men.

4. (a) The numbers of "seriously" wounded and sick must also, to a considerable extent, be a matter of conjecture, and it is difficult to draw an exact line between "serious" and "slight" cases. It is intended that "serious" cases should cover not only men permanently incapacitated for military service but also, generally speaking, all those whose absence from duty is about 3 months or more and who, therefore, have a serious effect on the fighting strength of the Army.

(b) It is understood that as a result of the experience of the Great War a proportion of 4 wounded to 1 killed may be expected in action. Of these 4

wounded 1 will be able to walk in a Walking Wounded Collecting Centre and the other 3 will have to be helped or carried by stretcher. The 1 walking wounded can probably be taken as a "slightly wounded," and a small percentage of the 3 nonwalking wounded may also be only "slightly" wounded, the nature of the wound preventing walking.

It is possible that in the present war in China, with most Japanese casualties being caused by comparative cleaner and less serious bullet wounds, that the proportion of "slightly" wounded is higher than it was in France, and it is suggested, therefore, that the number of "seriously" wounded will be about 140,000.

(c) The number of "seriously" sick will, of course, bear a higher proportion to died of disease than wounded to killed.

Cholera, dysentery, beri-beri, pneumonia, frostbite, all causing a high degree of "serious" wastage, have been prevalent at different times among the Japanese forces. The immediate "serious" wastage from venereal disease have probably not been high, though the ultimate loss is bound to be serious in view of its widespread existence in the Japanese army and the little or no preventive measures taken. Malaria has obviously caused a very high immediate wastage, but it is possible that its "serious" wastage (i. e., over 3 months absence from duty) is less than dysentery, which has probably been the chief scourge to the Japanese troops. There have also probably been a not-inconsiderable number of "heat" diseases from the summer campaigning in the YANGTZE Valley.

It is suggested that the number of "seriously" sick will be about 60,000.

(d) These two figures give a combined total of 200,000 "serious" casualties, wounded and sick.

Owing to the Japanese using, quite legitimately, hospital transports as well as hospital ships for the evacuation of wounded and sick, it has not been possible to obtain data of movements of hospital vessels from China, as the hospital transports are not recognizable as such. Two facts, however, have recently become known from the journey of certain foreign newspapermen up the YANGTZE in October, tending to confirm the above estimate.

The first fact is connected with a visit paid to the Japanese Army YANGTZPOO Clearing Hospital, SHANGHAI. This is not the only Japanese Army hospital in SHANGHAI, but it is believed to be now the principal one in existence. During the SHANGHAI fighting there were, of course, several others. Sick and wounded from SHANGHAI area and from HANGCHOW are evacuated to these SHANGHAI hospitals. Sick and wounded from upriver are evacuated to hospitals at NANKING and KIUKIANG, etc., and thence moved direct to Japan. It will thus be seen that this YANGTZEPOO Hospital, though an important one, only deals with a proportion of the Army casualties in Central China. On the occasion in question when the foreign journalists were being conducted round, the O. C. Hospital admitted that since the opening of the hospital in September 1937, 60,000 patients had been dealt with, of whom 40,000 had been evacuated to Japan.

The second fact is connected with the visit of the foreign journalists to KIUKIANG a few days later. There, the KIUKIANG Army Hospital was full, with a total of between 2,000 and 3,000 patients. It was estimated that about 60% were "sick" and 40% "wounded." The chief sicknesses were dysentery, malaria, and beri-beri.

The final suggested figures of Japanese Army casualties in China are therefore 280,000 wounded or sick. These figures are considered reasonable, though it is possible that the proportions between one class of casualty and another may need alteration.

The Japanese Navy admitted to 1,000 killed on July 7th, 1938. On a comparable basis, with loss of Naval aircraft and with Naval landing parties operating up the YANGTZE, the Naval casualties may be assessed at 2,000 dead and 5,000 seriously wounded or sick. It is suggested that, to cover possible overassessment, the Naval casualties are considered as included in the Army losses suggested above.

In Summary No. 44, page 8, it was estimated that the "official" Japanese Army total of killed in China between July 7th, 1937, to about the middle of November 1938 would be "in the neighborhood of 45,000." The official figures published on December 26th, 1938, for the period 7th July, 1937, to 30th November, 1938, are given as 47,133 officers and men "killed in action or succumbed to wounds."

It is considered that this higher figure tends to confirm the totals suggested in the article in question of 80,000 Army and Navy killed, died of wounds, died of disease, and 200,000 seriously wounded or sick. There have also been various

small additional incidents confirming the belief that the "official" casualties have been greatly understated. Such incidents are:

(a) An account in the "OSAKA MAINICHI" of the wastage from disease among the reporters of that newspaper with the forward troops. It was stated that "more than 60" reporters had to be withdrawn "to the rear" on account of ill health. It is also of interest that Lt. General TOKUGAWA, C. O. C., Air Force in China, was evacuated to Japan in December 1938, suffering from typhoid.

(b) A photograph in the JAPAN ADVERTISER of 94 ex-members of the Metropolitan Police Board, TOKIO, killed or died of disease in China.

(c) The arrival of a very large number of ashes in Japan at the end of December. On one occasion 1,821 ashes were received at TOKIO and about a similar total at KOBE or OSAKA.

In this connection, reports from TIENTSIN state that during the two months November and December, 1938, 4,350 ashes were embarked at TANGKU, making the estimated grand total of ashes despatched from that port about 65,000.

(d) The large number of people met in Japan who had lost relatives in China.

EXHIBIT No. 691

Officers: Carl I. Alsberg, Chairman; Wallace M. Alexander, Vice Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Philip C. Jessup, Vice Chairman; Benjamin H. Kizer, Vice Chairman: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman: Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Charles J. Rhoads, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

1795 California Street, San Francisco; Telephone TUxedo 3114—129 East 52nd Street, New York City: Telephone: PLaza 3–4700

AUGUST 12, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: Situation on the Soviet-Japanese front seems well in hand and my bet is that hostilities will not again break out, unless the ominous European situation erupts. There were a bad few days, however, when I was holding my breath. It was very difficult to arive at any clear-cut explanation, and I spent considerable energy collecting opinions.

In view of the armistice which would signify a Japanese desire to avoid real trouble to the north, the most logical explanation as I see it is something along the following lines. The incident was Japanese provoked, prompted by some request or at least understanding with Germany. The latter has been so insistent in expressions regarding its lack of desire for this incident and its unwillingness to give Japan more than "sympathy" that this alone would arouse suspicion. Also in the present jockeying re Czechoslovakia, it might well be to the interest of Germany to have some illustration given to France that the Soviets can only look with one eye toward Europe. Without some prompting from Germany, or at least, assurance that if the worst eventually should come from the incident, Germany would also engage the U. S. S. R.'s attention, it is inconceivable that Japan should have started something of so grave a magnitude or at least should have let it develop as it did. For home consumption, Japan might also well have been motivated by a desire to give some concrete illustration of why it is not progressing faster in China and why it has to adopt such extreme economic measures. It can now be pointed out that a great part of Japanese manpower and resources have to be kept earmarked for Manchukuo and therefore the country can in no way be considered as exercising its full strength in cleaning up the "China incident." Again, for Japan's attempts to prevent increased stiffening of attitude by England and the United States against Japan, the Soviet border trouble may also prove of value. It is a reminder that if Japan is allowed to get too weak, it may prove unable to cope with the Soviet "menace." It has always been my belief that the leading circles in these countries have always hoped that Japan and the Soviet Union may counteract each other. Japan may well try to point out that unless she is given assistance, a different complexion will evolve in the East—see Peffer's article in last Sunday's *Times*. It is possible that the trouble began by autonomous action on the part of the Kwantung army, but the composition of the Cabinet would indi-

cate that there is not much separation between the Army and the forces in control. I would say that the Cabinet either planned it from the beginning or immediately utilized a few pot shots.

Regarding Thompson's explanation, which bases Japanese action on knowledge of present Soviet weakness, I have of course no immediate or personal knowledge regarding the condition of the Red Army. However, I would refer to a recent article in the Saturday Evening Post by Demeree Bess on the undeclared war between Japan and the Soviet Union, in which particular reference is made to the fact that the Far Eastern army was untouched by the purge. Also Russell of the *Telegram* in a recent series of articles has drawn a pretty glowing picture of the Soviet forces, apparently from personal observation in his recent trip over the Trans-Sib. He mentions particularly the unstrained, confident bearing and manner of the officers and men whom he observed. I would also think that the events of the fighting and the armistice as well as the tone of Litvinov's conversations with Shigemitshu indicate Soviet strength rather than weakness. My own belief is that the Soviet Union has never felt itself as strong as it does at present.

I hope all this makes some sense. Regarding Europe, everyone seems to be keeping their fingers crossed, particularly during this month.

Yours faithfully,

[s] Kate
[t] Kathleen Barnes.

Frederick V. Field

It was voted unanimously to record the American Council's appreciation of the work of Frederick V. Field as follows:

It was with the deepest regret that the Board of Trustees learned that the Executive Committee had found it necessary to accept the resignation at its meeting of September 18 of Mr. Frederick V. Field from the Secretaryship of the American Council. As the minutes of that meeting showed, the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Parker, had asked the Chairman of the American Council whether he felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the Secretaryship. Dr. Jessup had replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final.

Mr. Field joined the staff of the American Council in 1929. During his 11 years of service he has demonstrated an unusually high quality of leadership. The program of the American Council has expanded notably under his direction, partly because of his own untiring efforts, and partly because of his imaginative leadership in developing the cooperation of the entire staff. Mr. Field was one of the Founders of the Far Eastern Survey. He was the author of "American Participation in the China Consortiums", published by the University of Chicago Press, and presented as a research study at the Hangchow-Shanghai Conference of the Institute of 1931. In 1932 and 1933 he acted as Editor-in-chief of the "Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area," which was published by Doubleday-Doran and Company in 1934 with a foreword by the late Mr. Newton D. Baker. In this monumental work his own research abilities, together with his rare capacity for stimulating research on the part of his colleagues, were strikingly exhibited. It was largely through his initiative that the series of regional conferences on American foreign policy were developed in various parts of the United States in 1938, 1939, and 1940.

While he was executive secretary the membership of the American Council more than doubled, but it is impossible to make a full record of his services to the American Council, because in innumerable unknown and anonymous ways he has contributed to the maintenance and expansion of the IPR program. His capacity to surround himself with young and able scholars has served as a compelling example in other National Councils. His services likewise to the International Secretariat and the Pacific Council have been a major contribution to the development of the Institute's international work.

Throughout his connection with the Institute he has been most scrupulous and exacting in maintaining the highest objective standards for his own IPR writing and that of his colleagues. He has combined personal modesty with the capacity to inspire high achievement on the part of others. He has been noted for his practical wisdom in counsel and amazing energy in action.

The Board of Trustees desire that the officers assure Mr. Field that his job on the American Council staff will be awaiting him when he completes his present work.

EXHIBIT No. 692

300 GILMAN HALL,
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., October 11, 1938.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
1795 California Street,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: Enclosed I am sending a copy of a recent letter from Snow: also a copy of a recent letter I wrote to Harold Isaacs, who suddenly wrote to apprise me that his history of the Chinese revolution is about to be published by Secker and Warburg in London. He particularly requested me not to have it reviewed by any of the "next of Stalinists" in our New York office!

If you are interested I should like very much to send you occasional samples of correspondence like these. I hope it might help to keep us in touch both personally and perhaps for the occasional benefit of PACIFIC AFFAIRS and AMERASIA.

We got the first part of our settling down managed very handily, but have now entered the tag-end phase, which may take an indefinite time.

How is Edith? We both send our love.

Yours,

[t] OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 693

Chairman: Clifford T. McAvoy. Secretary-Treasurer: A. J. Isserman. Executive Committee: Mrs. Edmond Barach, Franz Boas, John Bright, Louis Colman, Joseph Curran, David Efron, Frederick V. Field, Michael Garramone, Hugo Gellert, Ben Golden, Marina Lopez, George Marshall, Herman P. Osborne, Samuel Putnam, Charles Recht, Arthur G. Silverman, Ferdinand Smith, Tredwell Smith, Max Yergan. Staff—Executive Secretary: Marion Bachrach; Frederick V. Field; Romolo Lachatanere; Joan Madison

COUNCIL FOR PAN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

112 East 19th Street

NEW YORK, N. Y.

GRamercy 3-2709

MARCH 4, 1943.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have been very much surprised to learn of the extraordinarily hostile attitude which Manchester Boddy of the Los Angeles Daily News has been taking toward the Soviet Union. The progressive newspapers on the west coast carry a blast against him about every week, a sample of which I enclose.

Their position seems to me to be well documented. Do you still know him, and have a good contact with him? If so, wouldn't it be worth trying to influence his point of view which, if it remains where it now is, will simply continue to poison the mass of his readers.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Fred
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

FVF: AP

["Peoples World," 2/26/43]

EDITOR BODDY, THIS IS FORGERY!

In his column of Wednesday, February 24, Manchester Boddy, editor-publisher of the Los Angeles Daily News, prints a statement purportedly made by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in 1939.

We charge that it is a forgery worthy of the pen of a Goebbels or a Valtin-Krivitsky stooge.

Here it is:

"* * * If we accept the Reich's offer of collaboration, the latter will not hesitate to crush Poland; England and France will thereupon be drawn fatally into war. There will result a thorough destruction of Western Europe, and

remaining outside the conflict we can advantageously await our hour. If Germany wins, she will emerge from the war too exhausted to dream of an armed conflict against us. We must accept the pact proposed by Germany and work to prolong the war the maximum possible. * * *"

A telephone call to Mr. Boddy's secretary from a People's World reporter failed to elicit the source from which Mr. Boddy quoted Stalin.

Mr. Boddy's secretary replied that the statement was contained on a typed index card in the publisher's files.

For a person holding as responsible a position in influencing public opinion as Mr. Boddy to give credence to as obvious forgery as the one typed on his index card, which after all might have been filed under "Nazi propaganda," seems incredible.

The only purpose which the printing of such a forgery could accomplish is to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies in this war of survival, a tactic which President Roosevelt warned against in his recent speech as being inspired by Berlin.

Mr. Boddy should be made to answer publicly for his irresponsibility.

For the present, we challenge him to present proof that will authenticate the scurrilous slander printed above as having come from Stalin.

Failing such proof (as fail to produce it Boddy must), we challenge him to meet the responsibilities imposed upon him as a public figure by publicly retracting this attack upon our great Russian ally.

EXHIBIT No. 694

NEW YORK CITY, *July 3, 1940.*

Miss JOY HUME.

DEAR JOY: Thanks for your note written just as you left for Wisconsin. If the FBI has not put you and the other representatives of American youth in jail I hope that you will take the initiative in getting in touch with me when you return to the Pacific Council office. I am anxious to have a talk with you but as I shall be spending most of my time out of the office I shall probably miss you unless you take pains to see that I don't.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 695

CHINESE YOUTH DELEGATION
Parkins

SAN FRANCISCO, *August 27, 1938.*

Miss HELEN PARKINS,
The Chinese Youth Delegation,
12 West 32nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MISS PARKINS: I have your letter of August 22nd asking me to join the sponsoring committee for the good-will tour of the Chinese Youth Delegation. I am entirely sympathetic with the purpose of this tour and shall be glad to do anything I can privately to aid it but I shall have to decline your invitation to join the committee and have my name appear on the letter paper. The staff of our organization, which is essentially a research one, at the outbreak of the war a year ago agreed to join no committees on behalf of one belligerent or another although we reserved the right to express our private opinions in writing and speaking as freely as we wished. As you perhaps know, I have taken advantage of this opportunity in writing a good many articles on behalf of China but I have felt that it was wiser all around to decline such an invitation as you have given me.

Please, however, be assured that I shall be eager to do anything I can to help the tour, particularly when it comes to the West Coast.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g

LAckawanna 4–5761

COMMITTEE FOR THE TOUR OF THE CHINESE YOUTH DELEGATION

12 West 32nd Street

NEW YORK CITY

317

AUGUST 22, 1938.

MR. FREDERICK C. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
San Francisco, California.

DEAR MR. FIELD: A group of Chinese young people, delegates to the World Youth Congress, are now in the United States. These young men and women, representing various religious and youth organizations in China, plan to spend three months in the United States, after the World Youth Congress is over, touring through our principal cities, visiting our educational institutions and civic centers. The reception which will be accorded them will be an expression of the international fellowship between youth of America and China. Their tour will truly be one of good will.

Wherever the delegation stops, local community leaders are planning a welcome, climaxed in most instances by a mass meeting. The Chinese delegates will tell their own stories, their experiences in the New Life Movement in China, and what they have gone through in this past year of war. It is our hope that the listeners, moved by these accounts, will aid the cause of civilian relief in China.

The tour is being sponsored by a number of organizations, including the American Youth Congress, the United Council for Civilian Relief, the Young Men's Christian Association, the American Association of University Women, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Chinese Benevolent Association, the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy, and other groups engaged in China Aid work.

The planning committee is now engaged in securing a sponsoring committee for the Good Will Tour, of those men and women prominent in public affairs who will indicate how strongly America supports the cause of all wounded and suffering peoples. Among those who have already accepted are Mrs. Samuel McCrea Cavert, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and others.

We should like very much to have you join them as a member of the Sponsoring Committee. In that capacity your name will appear on our permanent stationery, and we hope you will be able to greet the delegation when it reaches your city. We are sure you realize the importance of your cooperation in this matter, and look forward to receiving your acceptance.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] Helen Parkins
HELEN PARKINS, *Chairman.*

hp ; rk
uopwa ; 16

Lackawanna 4—5761

COMMITTEE FOR THE TOUR OF THE CHINESE YOUTH DELEGATION

12 West 32nd Street, New York City, 317

AUGUST 25, 1938.

MR. FREDERICK FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, California.

DEAR MR. FIELD: It has been suggested to me that you might be able to help us in the personnel problem that we have.

The American Youth Congress and other cooperating organizations are to tour four of the Chinese delegates to the World Youth Congress over the United States this fall. There will be two tours with two Chinese each. We are at present looking for two people to accompany the Chinese on these tours to act in the capacity of advisors and business managers. They would also be expected to speak on the platform with the Chinese perhaps concerning their own experiences in China, and they would probably be expected to make collection speeches in many places.

I think you will understand that we need two people of very high caliber for these two jobs and I wonder if you would be able to suggest to us some Americans who have recently returned from China and who might be available.

Since our time is growing short, I would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] MARIE REED, *Director.*

mr; rk
uopwa; 16

CHINESE YOUTH DELEGATION
Reed

SAN FRANCISCO, *September 1, 1938.*

Miss MARIE REED,
The Chinese Youth Delegation,
12 West 32nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MISS REED: It is very hard for me to suggest Americans who might tour the United States with the Chinese Youth Delegation for those persons are much more likely to be found in the East than here. I should think that it would be quite possible to find recent American graduates who had attended the Youth Congress at Vassar who would be interested in furthering the aims of the Chinese tour and who would have sufficient funds to stake themselves to the trip. I know one such person whom we have already signed up for work with our own organization. This is very much the kind of thing I did the first year I was out of college and I should think that there would be a good many people in the same position and with the same interests available for this service now. The thing to do would be to get in touch with persons connected with several Eastern universities and colleges sympathetic with what you are trying to do. I feel quite sure that they would have a number of nominations to make.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

f/g

EXHIBIT No. 696

SAN FRANCISCO, *April 12, 1938.*

Mrs. KITTY GELLHORN,
440 Riverside Drive, New York, New York.

DEAR KITTY: I bother you with this request only because I want to be certain that I get an adequate reply and it is just possible that I would not get one by writing impersonally to the League of Women Shoppers' headquarters.

The American Friends of the Chinese People have in the last six months organized a fairly active branch in San Francisco and from time to time they have asked me to help. At the moment they want to undertake a very aggressive campaign on behalf of a Japanese boycott, and I have urged them to put forward literature giving advice to San Francisco shoppers. They don't seem to be aware of the excellent pamphlet which I have seen and which I believe originated with the League of Woman Shoppers. The first question is, therefore, could you have two or three copies of this pamphlet, if I am correct in its sponsorship, forwarded to me?

I would also be very grateful if you would let me know what you, as an average New York shopper not specializing in Far Eastern questions but interested in social and political problems in general, have run into with regard to this Japanese boycott question. What influence, whether in the form of a piece of literature, an organizational effort, or a lecture, has particularly guided your own decisions? I ask this because, if I am not mistaken, the last time I looked at your legs they were clad in lisle, so I assume someone has influenced you. I would be very grateful for any information you could send me and also for a fairly early reply.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 697

Rev. John B. Thompson, Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Executive Secretary; Marion Briggs, Administrative Secretary

AMERICAN PEACE MOBILIZATION

1116 Vermont Avenue NW

WASHINGTON, D. C.

National 1274

DECEMBER 5, 1940.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street, New York, City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I had at first intended to reply to your mimeographed, circular letter of November 20th before the Trustees meeting. On rereading it a couple of times, however, I was unable to put my teeth into precisely what sort of reply you were after. I thought the letter presented an interesting political survey of the Pacific area situation, though one with which I disagreed at a number of points, without making it clear how you wished all this to be considered vis-à-vis the IPR program. Except, of course, to give more of a go-ahead signal than ever.

A good many of these questions were touched upon at the Trustees meeting. I thought Carroll Binder's statement, and to a less extent Luce's, were good, but I felt ashamed as an American that it was necessary to repeat such incredibly elementary stuff at the close of the year 1940. It was necessary, nevertheless, in the light of Wilbur's either vicious or childish (I suppose the latter) remarks. I wish they could be expunged from the record; I trust they will be disregarded.

[(Penned:) From here on possibly share with other members of the Staff? FVF.]

The new section in the Far Eastern Survey is going to be an exceedingly difficult thing to handle because I cannot see how political subjects are going to be written in a way that our fancy friends will regard as "objective." If your November 20th letter is an example, I beg to submit that that is by no means impartial. It states, for instance, that "it has become plain that the two wars are inextricably linked." With this important assumption I totally disagree. I believe the wars are not linked, which does not mean that they do not affect each other. I believe it to be the policy of both Great Britain and the United States to see that they become linked, and ditto for the policy of Germany. I disapprove of that policy because I believe the two wars to be wars of a completely different nature. The one in Europe is like the preceding world war, one of rival imperialisms neither of which stands for any issues in which I'm interested. The one in the Far East will, if won by China, lead to positive progress, not to the return of an old system which breeds war (as will be the case whichever side wins in Europe). So that assumption about the wars being inextricably linked, while sounding objective enough, is in my mind, loaded.

And the same for other points in the November 20th letter, which I shall not discuss because my object is not to criticise that letter but to point out the virtual impossibility of "objective" political writing. If the IPR takes the line that Great Britain and China are fighting the same kind of war, a war for democracy, I shall be alienated; if it adopts my political point of view Wilbur, Binder, Luce, et al., will be alienated.

So, what the answer? I think it can lie only in the kind of scheme we had under discussion for many months last year and earlier this year. The scheme of setting up (either by taking over Amerasia or by promoting a new venture) a journal of political debate and interchange and information, a journal where all sides and arguments would have a chance, where I'd write my personal interpretation, you yours, Wilbur his, etc. The IPR's role would then indeed be impartial in that it would be simply offering an agency for the exchange of political interpretation, it would be making none of its own as an organization. I'm scared of the Far Eastern Survey idea for the very reason that space and the nature of the proposal will not permit of an interchange of views, and because as I have illustrated earlier in this letter I don't think there is any such thing as impartial political writing.

I must hastily correct a possible misinterpretation from a remark in an above paragraph. The new scheme, even if I don't like it will *not* serve to alienate my

interest in the IPR. That remark was no piece of blackmail; I made it simply to illustrate a point.

Now, as to 1941 program—the answer is obvious. First, continue research as the basis of the whole show; second, make that research as widely available as possible through education; third, improve facilities for Oriental studies, and stimulate new scholarship; fourth, provide every possible facility and occasion for the discussion of political views, of policy. The latter means not only discussion conferences, but also an Amerasia. Meanwhile make it continually and conspicuously evident that the IPR is not a political but a study-research-education pressure group. Finally, while not losing sight of the importance of the American Council being part of an international show, remember, that its primary function is in the United States.

With best regards,

Fred
FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 698

Western Union

MARCH 11, 1938.

Mr. CHEN HAN-SENG,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, New York:

May we use your brief account China war situation dated March eighth for April Amerasia. Please confer with Chi.

(Signed) FRED.

krcg
Charge: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1795 California Street.
4:45 p. m.

EXHIBIT No. 699

JANUARY 12, 1938.

Memorandum to Chen Han-seng from Frederick V. Field.

This is to remind you that you were going to write letters of introduction for Joris Ivens to persons in China whom you think may be useful to him in preparing the moving picture of Chinese defense. In our discussion it was suggested that you write letters which get him to Generals Pai and Li and to the editor of the *Pacific Digest*. Any others which you think might be useful would be welcome.

As you will recall, Joris Ivens, in association with Ernest Hemingway, made the picture *Spanish Earth*. He has just wired me that his trip has been postponed a few days so he will not be coming through today, as first planned.

EXHIBIT No. 700

Office of the President

YENCHING UNIVERSITY,
Peiping, China, March 9, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. FIELDS: I am writing to ask your good offices in ascertaining from Mr. Chen Han-sheng whether or not he would care to consider an invitation from Yenching University to join our Department of Economics. This would take effect, if possible, with the coming academic year. If Mr. Chen would care to consider this proposal, will you kindly communicate with Dr. B. A. Garside, Yenching University, 150 Fifth Avenue, and ask that an interview be arranged with him or someone else from that office, as to further details. Dr. Garside could communicate with us by letter or cable, and we shall ourselves be glad to answer any further questions if Mr. Chen is sufficiently interested.

Thanking you in advance for this assistance, and with greetings to Mr. Chen himself, believe me.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] J. LEIGHTON STUART.

jls c

EXHIBIT No. 701

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AMERICAN LEAGUE AGAINST WAR AND FASCISM

A movement to unit in common resistance to War and Fascism all organizations and individuals who are opposed to those allied destroyers of mankind

112 E. 19th Street, Room 702

NEW YORK CITY

Telephone: Algonquin 4-9784
9785

MARCH 16, 1936.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. FIELD: I am very anxious to talk with you again about our work which you have helped us to develop. I also want to show you factually in the office some of the things that are being done. Is it at all possible for you to drop around on Wesdnesday afternoon at 4:30 P. M.

I am sorry I cannot offer you more alternatives but this is the only spare time I have this week. You will appreciate how much I am rushed in trying to look after the policy of the League in addition to my other duties.

Hoping that it may be possible to see you, I am,

Faithfully yours,

[s] HARRY F. WARD, *National Chairman.*

HFR: DM
BS&AU
12646

EXHIBIT No. 702

Harry F. Ward, Chairman; Robert Morss Lovett, Vice Chairman; Lincoln Steffens, Vice Chairman; Earl Browder, Vice Chairman; William P. Mangold, Treasurer. National Bureau: Roger Baldwin, LeRoy E. Bowman, Elmer Carter, Paul Crosbie, Margaret Forsyth, Clarence Hathaway, Donald Henderson, William P. Mangold, Samuel C. Patterson, Harry F. Ward. Secretarial Staff: Executive—Paul M. Reid; Administration—Clara Bodian; Affiliations—Charles C. Webber; Organization—Waldo McNutt; Publications—Liston M. Oak: Women—Dorothy McConnell: Youth—James Lerner

AMERICAN LEAGUE AGAINST WAR AND FASCISM

A movement to unite in common resistance to War and Fascism all organizations and individuals who are opposed to these allied destroyers of mankind

112 E. 19th Street, Room 605

NEW YORK CITY

Telephone: Algonquin 4-9784
9785

MAY 23, 1935.

FREDERICK V. FIELD,
129 E. 52nd St., New York City.

DEAR FRED FIELD: I am sure you will be glad to learn of the progress that has been made in the past three months. New Jersey and California (and the entire Pacific Coast as well) are at least getting permanent Regional Organizers. A grant from the Elmhirst Fund will help to maintain these men in the field. We have the perspective of sending a third permanent organizer into the Mid-Western States during the summer, and we have two men now touring the country. Their reports are extremely encouraging, and once we can get organizers into our six concentration points, we can expect the League to really come into its stride.

In addition, a grant from the Garland Fund will enable us to put our publications business on a realistic basis. Once this is firmly established, we will be in a position to further our educational program by spreading our literature far and wide.

All this is in preparation for our next Congress, our Third. We are working toward it through the medium of regional conferences called by our local committees, with the specific aim of electing delegates to the Third Congress. In order to do this however, we must get those 6 organizers into the field. We are now starting a campaign to get sufficient funds to keep our salaries and overhead up during the slack summer months so as not to incur a deficit, and to maintain these men in the field. You will see from this how important and how useful the renewal of your contribution would be and I trust you will find it possible to renew it for the month of June.

There are two other things I hope you can do for us. A Japanese labor leader, Kanju Kato, about whom I wrote you before, will soon be in this country. We had trouble in getting his visa but finally secured it by getting the sponsorship of an officially respectable organization. We will have meetings for him under joint committee auspices in various cities. We would like one or two under auspices quite apart from these. Therefore, I am quite anxious that you should arrange a little meeting, luncheon, or otherwise, under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Can you let me know what you can do on this, just as soon as possible.

Also we need your help on material for a speaker's outline concerning our policy in relation to Japan. Could you prepare a few notes on this and indicate some source of material? It would be very much appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] HARRY F. WARD, *National Chairman.*

HFW : DP

EXHIBIT No. 703

Officers: Philip C. Jessup, Chairman; Miss Ada L. Comstock, Vice Chairman; Benjamin W. Kizer, Vice Chairman; Philo W. Parker, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Ray Lyman Wilbur, Vice Chairman; Frederick V. Field, Secretary; Frances S. Harmon, Treasurer; Miss Hilda Austern, Assistant Treasurer

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INCORPORATED

209 California St., San Francisco—129 East 52nd St., New York City

JULY 1, 1940.

DEAR FRED: It was too bad that in the rush of this past week I was unable to talk with you. As I have been released from the staff this summer, I have accepted an invitation to represent Local 18, UOPWA, at the Youth Congress in Wisconsin, during the coming week. Beginning on July 9, I shall be working on maps for Chi's book, up in the Pacific Council offices, for about 10 days. After that I shall probably return to Nature with my family during August.

I have just been arranging with Oliver Caldwell for the disposition of some 5,000 books from the Youth Congress, I hope to round up this project for the summer, and to get in touch with you further. The Publishers' and microfilm committees will need a shot in the arm by that time. There is little else that needs immediate attention on the project.

Yours sincerely,

[s] JOY HUME.

EXHIBIT No. 704

THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, INC.

Fifty-Six West Forty-Fifth Street

NEW YORK

MARCH 6, 1937.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City.

MY DEAR MR. FIELD: At this point we are badly in need of some comments on the things which we have put out. Would you be good enough to let me know what you thought of the Yakhontoff pamphlet?

If I can hear from you soon, I shall appreciate it.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Virginia Burdick
[t] VIRGINIA BURDICK.

VB:KB

MARCH 9, 1937.

MISS VIRGINIA BURDICK,
The American Russian Institute,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS BURDICK: In reply to your letter of March 6th asking for my comments on the materials which you have been publishing, I have a great deal of praise to offer and only one possible criticism.

To record the latter first, I have the feeling which may be the result of my not being closely familiar with your many problems, that you are overcautious. I believe that there are occasions when a group of importance and prestige such as yours must act with some boldness to present facts and authoritative interpretations on controversial issues. I have in mind, of course, occasions such as the very confused and uniformed state of public opinion in this country during and since the recent Moscow trial. One searches the regular newspapers, periodicals and pamphlet material in vain for authoritative statements of fact and interpretation. The country with which you are supposed to be promoting friendly relations is allowed to be scandalously misrepresented all over this country without, as far as I have been aware, a single concerted effort on the part of a reputable group of American citizens to correct the false impressions made. I dare to suggest that you should have done something in the face of this situation because I think you could have participated in the controversy with dignity and without embarrassment. There is much that the Americans could have been told in a purely objective way; the judicial procedure in the Soviet Union, the history of the divergent policies of the two Russian groups, a more detailed and unbiased analysis of the testimony given at the trial than appeared in the newspapers, and perhaps even an analysis of the propaganda respecting the trial originating in this country. I think you could have gone further safely, and as an organization reassured the American public for whatever the names of your Board of Directors are worth, and they are worth a good deal, that the whole episode did not compromise the Soviet government and in no way shattered your Institute's confidence in the work which is being done in that country.

The praise is easy and need not take more than a few sentences. The monthly bulletin seems to me excellent and comes about under the same category as that admirable contemporary of yours, the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. The Yakhontoff pamphlet was so good that I was prompted to write the author immediately after I read it praising him for saying so much in so few words, for the bibliography, and for the chronology. With regard to the Pushkin pamphlet, I can only say that it is the only thing I have ever read on that gentleman and having read it I feel quite well informed.

I hope you will forgive me the liberty I have taken in the one criticism I have made. I have taken you at your word that you wanted my comments.

Sincerely yours,

[t] FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Tele. MUrray Hill 2-0313

Board of Directors: Harry Elmer Barnes, Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, Aaron Bodansky, Harold Clurman, Mrs. Ethel Clyde, George S. Counts, Mrs. Vera Micheles Deans, John Dewey, Wm. O. Field, Jr., Lewis Gannett, Mortimer Graves, Wm. S. Graves, Alcan Hirsch, John A. Kingsbury, Mary van Kleeck, Wm. W. Lancaster, William Lescaze, Robert Littell, Harriet Moore, William Allan Neilson, Mrs. Frances Flynn Paine, Mrs. George F. Porter, Raymond Robins, Gerold T. Robinson, John Rothschild, Whitney Seymour, Lee Simonson, Graham R. Taylor, Frederick Tilney, S. A. Trone, Allen Wardwell, Richard Watts, Jr., Maurice Wertheim, Avrahm Yarmolinsky, Mrs. Efrem Zimbalist. Executive Secretary, Virginia Burdick; Editor, Harriet Moore

THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, INC.

Fifty-Six West Forty-Fifth Street

NEW YORK

MARCH 30, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK FIELD,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

MY DEAR MR. FIELD: Thank you for your letter of March 9th. I have taken the liberty of delaying my reply in the hope that I would have something definite to tell you before you returned from your trip. However, even now I can tell you very little which is definite concerning the Institute's policy in regard to the recent Moscow trial. Needless to say, I was very grateful for your opinion in this connection.

At the present time, the matter has been taken up both by the Board of Directors and by various members of the Executive Committee. It has not, however, been discussed by the Executive Committee at a meeting at which a quorum was present. So far, there has been a definite division of opinion within the organiaztion, and personally, I feel that there is something to be said on both sides of the question. As you know, the December 1936 issue of the "RESEARCH BULLETIN ON THE SOVIET UNION" carried an article on Criminal Law in the U. S. S. R. For the March issue of the Bulletin, Mr. Carter has written a review of the verbatim report of the "Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center." Beyond this, we have at present no plans for publications on this subject.

I shall be delighted to let you know if we are going to do anything further. I cannot tell you how valuable it is to have the opinion of persons like yourself on a matter of this kind. With many thanks for the words of praise on the publications,

Sincerely yours,

[s] Virginia Burdick
[t] VIRGINIA BURDICK.

VB:LB

EXHIBIT No. 705

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 30, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, California.

DEAR FRED: May I congratulate you and your colleagues on the current issue of PHOTO HISTORY. I would be interested to know how widely you are using this for cultivation purposes for members and potential contributors.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

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129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 30, 1938.

Mr. CHARLES F. LOOMIS,
216 Dillingham Building, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR CHARLES: As an illustration in the way in which the Institute of Pacific Relations makes available its material through outside channels to a wide audience, I take please in sending you a copy of the current issue of PHOTO HISTORY.

It is not until you reach page 66 that the editors come to acknowledgement of sources and there you will find that every one of the books mentioned, with the exception of those by Lyde and Smedley, are by I. P. R. authors. You will notice also that the editors acknowledge their indebtedness to the Institute of Pacific Relations Library and the Far Eastern Survey.

It is barely possible that Mr. Atherton, Mr. Anderson, Riley Allen and others will be interested in this.

Sincerely yours,

[t] Edward C. Carter.

Exhibit No. 706

129 East 52nd Street,
New York, 26th April, 1938.

Mr. Frederick V. Field,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, California.

Dear Fred: The other day three copies of the first volume of the famous Soviet Atlas arrived at this office, one for the Amco, one for Carter and one for Holland, and we have all thumbed through it enthusiastically.

I wonder if you have already seen the Atlas itself; but if not, I think you may like to see this note which I have drafted for possible use in I. P. R. Notes. Perhaps you would be kind enough to pass this on to Owen.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Han-seng
[t] Chen Han-seng.

26th April, 1938.

Note on the Great Soviet World Atlas

Parallel to their other record-breaking achievements, the Russians have now made a notable advance in a new field. The appearance of the first volume of the Great Soviet Atlas last November, which is to be followed by a second volume this year and a third volume early in 1939, marks the height of modern cartography. Not only are there many innovations of presentation but the bulk itself is extremely impressive. The size of the first volume alone is equal to any major atlas that has so far appeared anywhere in the world.

In spite of the fact there are single page maps of 17½ by 10 inches, double page maps of 17½ by 21½ inches and some folding pages, the Atlas is still easily handled by means of a simple loose-leaf device. This metallic lever and the multiple coloured sheets—often 15 to 20 colours on one map—testify to the advance of Soviet industry, and the host of new ideas evidently behind the drafting, particularly in the political and economic spheres, makes this Atlas almost a revolution in cartography.

The total number of pages of the Soviet Atlas more than doubles that of Stiller's Atlas in German or the Times Atlas in English, and this is also true of the actual map space; yet in this case the time for production has been halved by means of a huge staff of 175 editors and cartographers. Indeed a special institute for the Atlas has been established in Moscow and this will work on subsequent revisions. Professor V. E. Motylev, the Chairman of the U. S. S. R. Council of the I. P. R. is the Director of this Institute, and concurrently one of the five on the Editorial Committee of the Atlas.

Whereas the second volume of the Atlas will deal with the regions of the Soviet Union and the third volume with other countries in detail, the first volume is devoted to 83 world maps in the first part and 85 maps of the entire Soviet Union in the second part. The maps of the Soviet Union in this volume begin with the political and administrative aspects followed by the topographical and the geological, the meteorological and the mineral, the vegetative and animal distributions, the heavy and light industries, the chemical and electric industries; forestry, agriculture and collective farming; general economic and the technical culture, communications and commerce, and finally, as an apparent appendix, a map showing the Russian administrative regions as existed on January 1st, 1914.

The first part of this volume, however, will probably claim the widest interest. It can be divided into three groups. The first group is physicogeographical, including astronomical, topographic, geological, seismological; meteorological, both aerial and oceanic in January and June; and maps showing the develop-

ment of cartography, geographical expeditions, the Arctic and the Antarctic, magnetic aberrations, soil conditions, and vegetative and animal distributions. The second group is that of socio-economic maps which show population and migration, nationalities and religions, electric power, coal output, metal production; mechanical, chemical and textile industries; timber and paper manufacture, agriculture, commerce, communications, and the export and import of capital and financial dependence. The third group consists of political maps of the world, one for 1783, one for 1784 to 1876, and one for 1877 to 1914, one for the strategic military movements on the European theatre of the War of 1914–1918, and a contemporary political map of the world. In addition, there follow special maps showing the political and economic situation of the Pacific area at present.

EXHIBIT No. 707

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—Honolulu—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

129 East 52nd Street

NEW YORK CITY

15TH OCTOBER, 1937.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: As you may well imagine, some of us here have had some interesting chats with Karl August since his arrival. His general view of the political developments in China are less optimistic even than mine—and you know what that means. At any rate, while he would give only 5 percent on chance for Chiang Kai-shek to become a second Kemel Pasha, I would certainly give at least ten percent.

You will recall that my open letter to AMERASIA refuting Roger Greene's article on China has caused some embarrassment; but I am glad to inform you that since Hu Shih's arrival in New York there has been a "rapprochement." The other day, Hu Shih insisted upon my meeting Roger, for according to Hu he is pro-Chinese, while his brother, Jerome, is pro-Japanese. At any rate, we three had a good chat in Hu's room and the good news is that Roger is going to offer his lectures free in an attempt to rally medical aid for China. Incidentally, I may say, it was due to Roger's effort that the American Red Cross did not give a smaller sum than $100,000; but of course, Hu agrees with me that he does not know how to write articles.

It is interesting that no sooner was this "rapprochement" established than I ran into another controversy—this time with the columnist of the DAILY WORKER. I have written a review of Harry Gannes' book on China, originally for AMERASIA, and that is why the first draft is so long. Later when the Managing Editor told me that they were not going to use it, I cut it to half its length and offered it to PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Another piece, reviewing the same book, will appear in the LIVING AGE, under my name. I am enclosing the original draft which you may care to read.

I wonder if you have noted an AP wire from Tokyo, dated October 13th, that tells in effect the poor show in Japan as regards the subscription of the 200 million yen war bonds. In Japanese history, such a subscription of bond issues has always been led by the government to rally public enthusiasm, and the subscription of government and semi-government institutions is usually prearranged immediately beforehand. The fact that this subscription only amounted to 12 million yen on the first day certainly anticipates rather slow and inadequate private enthusiasm.

Surely you must have been impressed by yesterday's news that in Tokyo, the Emperor has appointed in the presence of the Privy Council Members a Cabinet Advisory Council. I am inclined to think that this is the first and foremost significant phenomena in the Japanese political world since the outbreak of the present war. On the one hand it shows that even the well represented and unified cabinet, such as the present one, indeed the strongest Cabinet since 1905, proves inadequate to cope with the present situation. We can readily infer that the Japanese textile interest together with other people in the light industry

for export, (the textile being perhaps the best organized of all industries in Japan) have been greatly irritated by the loss of market, curtailment of raw material import, and the prospect of a long war.

On the other hand, however, this new super-Cabinet is the surest and most definite indication of Fascistic development in Japan. Nominally, the ten members of this council are "accorded the same treatment and rank as Cabinet ministers." They are in reality more or less like premiers or a body of premiers since only the premier and not the ministers, hitherto, has been appointed by the Emperor directly. In other words, the newly appointed ten people will remain in power regardless of subsequent Cabinet changes. Even if the next general election in Japan should by chance set up a liberal parliament and therefore perhaps a liberal cabinet, this super-Cabinet will remain in power. These ten people can advise the Emperor and at the same time dictate to the Cabinet. The consolidation of Japanese Fascistic forces is clearly reflected in the actual standing of these new appointees.

Indeed what seems to me equally significant is that the Japanese militarists are utilising the wartime urgency to successfully bring together military groups which hitherto have not been reconcilable, and to a much lesser extent this is also true of the navy. General Araki (1), the famous leader of the younger military elements is now appointed together with General Ugaki, (2) former governor general of Korea and a military figure who is capable of the most effective political intrigues and coup d'etat. This well-known opportunist, with all his prestige, has commanded a group of military people both young and old; and now sitting together with Araki in the same Council, brings his followers into cooperation with the group led by his colleague. Admiral Suetsugu (3), is perhaps the parallel of Araki, in the navy and Admiral Baron Abo (4), is somewhat parallel to Ugaki, but less opportunistic and more refined in personal manner. Suetsugu is very outspoken and an ardent advocate of Japanese naval equality and of denouncing the Nine Power Treaty. Abo is not so extreme a nationalist as Suetsugu, being older in years and representing the traditional polished manner of the high-born Japanese. By appointing both these admirals the loyalty of the entire navy is ensured for whoever does not like the one is bound to like the other.

Two party politicians have been appointed, but they are careerists who at any moment are ready to betray their party. Chuji Machida (5), president of Minseito, now sits together with Yonezo Maeda (6), who is Secretary-General of Seiyukai. (The President of this party, Seiyukai, is Sutsuki, but he has been in bad health for a long time.) Both are important in representing certain financial and business interests. The Minseito is known as the spokesman for Mitsubishi, while the Seiyukai still represents the landlord interests. It is interesting to note that Mitsubishi needs only to be indirectly represented in the new Council through Machida, because, unlike Mitsui, no direct representation is really necessary. Since Mitsubish, more than any other firm, has gone into the ammunition industry, they feel sure that their interest is already represented by the war itself. Mitsui is directly represented by Seihin Ikeda (7), who was not long ago Minister of Finance and is now president of the Bank of Japan. This famous pro-fascist financier has been long regarded as the chief staff officer for Mitsui. The interest of Sumitomo, which includes the interest in Korea, and that of the Osaka financiers, may be said to be represented by Ugaki who also has a persuading influence over certain light industry people. Then I see the appointment of Matsuoka (8) may mean more than merely representing the S. M. R. (of which Mitsubishi holds a large interest); I suspect that this outspoken type of fascist is now charged with the task of rallying the support of the independent financiers and industrialists in Japan.

The appointment of another famous pro-fascist is found in the person of Baron Goh (9), who you probably met in 1935 in your Far Eastern economic mission. You may recall that he can speak both German and French, and he is certainly a distinguished leader in what I may call the Japanese "Liberty League," which was organized nearly ten years before the American one came into being. The tenth appointee is a distinguished bureaucrat, Kiyoshi Akita (10), a former Seiyukai member who became "independent" two years ago. You may recall reading his name as Vice Minister of Home Affairs and of Communications during the famous Tanaka Cabinet.

Of the ten only two are 100 percent fascist both by personal conviction and by reputation (Araki and Matsuoka), and only two are stout fascists (Goh and Ikeda) because they have long supported financially, fascist organisations. With this set-up and during war time, however, it is very easy for the extreme

nationalist, opportunistic politicians and bureaucrats to fall into the fascist net. Perhaps you may ask me who on this new Council represents the controlling interest in the rural districts? First, I would answer, that there is no need in the super-Cabinet, of such a representation and then, the present Cabinet can well take care of this issue. The present Minister of Agriculture, Count Arima, is from Kyushu (the Nagaski region) and is capable of influencing the peasant unions in western Japan. But more important in this respect is the north of Japan, especially the rice and silk region of Nigata, etc., and here we find the majority of the 5,000,000 followers of the "Living Buddha," i. e., Count Ohtani, the uncle of Emperor Hiroshia and the real leader of the famous Nishi Honganji Temple in Kyoto. Count Ohtani is now serving as Minister of Education in Japan.

You must not think that I make any political analysis, but the news of this new political council in Japan so impressed me that I have not been able to help writing this rambling letter and at least I would like to recommend to you this brilliant political strategy of our common enemy.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Han-seng,
[t] CHEN HAN-SENG.

EXHIBIT No. 708

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—Honolulu—Shanghai—Manila—London—Moscow—New York—Paris—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

129 East 52nd Street,

NEW YORK CITY

24TH MARCH, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
San Francisco, California.

DEAR FRED: In response to your wire of March 12th, I began to write a sketch showing the general military situation in China so as to continue the chronological description in the March issue of AMERASIA. In the process, however, I found the original MS from Hong Kong, though to a certain extent already revised, inadequate and unsubstantial. With some additional information from other sources, I decided to rewrite the whole thing. Enclosed is a copy of what I have not sent to the AMERASIA office here. As it is not intended in any way as an article I have asked not to have my signature appear on it.

Have you by any chance seen the translation of the 8th Route Army oath of loyalty? I enclose a copy with underlines. From the indications from several directions, it is quite certain now that China is on the threshold of a new era, and as this fact becomes more apparent it can not but hasten the attempts of a London-Tokyo rapprochement. Have you any inside dope on this?

With greetings to Edith and yourself.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Han-seng.
[t] CHEN HAN-SENG.

LOYALTY OATH TAKEN BY 8TH ROUTE ARMY

Japanese imperialism is the mortal enemy of the Chinese nation. The imperialists strive to enslave our country and destroy our nation; they kill our relatives and friends, violate our mothers, wives and sisters, burn down homes, destroy our farms, implements, and cattle. In the name of our nation, our country, our fellow countrymen, in the name of our children and grandchildren, we swear to resist the Japanese aggressors to the end.

For six years already we have been fighting to save our fatherland from the Japanese aggressors. A united national front has already been established. *Our army has been renamed the People's Revolutionary Army*, and we are setting off to the front lines to destroy the enemy.

We sincerely support the National Government and Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Military Council, *who are* in charge of the defense of our country *against the Japanese aggressors*. We undertake to subordinate ourselves to the single

command of the Military Council, strictly to observe discipline and *not to return home until the Japanese aggressors have been driven out of our country, until all national traitors are wiped off the face of our land.*

We, sons of workers and peasants, swear that we shall not deprive the population of a single thread; we swear always to serve the interests of the people, to adopt a brotherly attitude to troops fighting shoulder to shoulder with us against the common enemy; we swear *to be devoted to the revolution.* We are *prepared to accept the criticism of comrades* and *to answer for it with all the severity of revolutionary discipline should we violate the interests of the nation.*

EXHIBIT NO. 709

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—Honolulu—London—Manila—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

129 East 52nd Street

NEW YORK CITY

22ND SEPTEMBER, 1937.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: Herewith I enclose a copy of the review of Shuhsi Hsii's book, which I promised to send to you. This review has been sent to the CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW because Owen sent one in written by himself for PACIFIC AFFAIRS. He criticised Hsü severely because of his unfairness to the Chinese Communists and the Mongols, and I certainly prefer to have his review in our quarterly because it contains more of political and educational value, mine being technical and historical.

I hope the mild aid in California will materially assist Edith in her quick recovery, and that you are daily unearthing things of interest in your own work.

With greetings to both of you,

Sincerely yours,

s] Chen Han-seng
[t] CHEN HAN-SENG.

[Sent to the *Canadian Historical Review*]

THE NORTH CHINA PROBLEM

(By Shuhsi Hsü, Ph. D., Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1937, pp. 112)

The large scale military resistance in China against further Japanese aggression in the summer of this year, must have come as a surprise to those who did not fundamentally understand the Sino-Japanese relations. Even such a noted political scientist as Shuhsi Hsü, did not anticipate this in the spring when he wrote the chapter, "The Outlook," in the present volume. Chinese unity after the Sian incident, the changing international situation, were taken by the author as hopeful factors which might induce "the rulers of Japan to revise their policy concerning North China."

Apparently Dr. Hsü has attempted to present a brief review of Sino-Japanese relations since 1933, chiefly covering the Hopei-Chahar phase, the Inner Mongolian problem and the eight conferences between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador from September 15th to December 3rd, 1936. The main revelation of this volume, however, lies in a clear exposé of the general policy followed by the National Government throughout those past years. A mere perusal of this report would unmistakably make the reader aware that Nanking was not only pursuing a policy of nonresistance but at certain times was even attempting to reach a conditional "readjustment" of its relations with Japan. After the friendly visit of Dr. C. H. Wang to Tokyo in the spring of 1935, and the special efforts of General Chiang Tso-pin in Tokyo during the autumn, as narrated by this author, at the beginning of 1936, General Chang Chun, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, "courageously invited the Japanese to open negotiations." These negotiations were abruptly suspended owing to the Tokyo

military coup d'état of February 26th, but "the readiness of the Nationalist Government to carry on discussion with Tokyo in spite of the Hirota Principles created a great deal of misgiving among the members of the Southwestern Political Council."

After the suspension of the series of conferences between Chang Chun and Kawagoo, because of the Suiyuan invasion, and after the Sian incident, the leaders of the National Government still found an opportunity to express their willingness for cooperation and readjustment. In the middle of March, 1937, when a mission of Japanese industrial leaders arrived in Nanking, General Chiang Kai-shek proceeded from Kuling to greet them with a speech in which he "asked the distinguished visitors for their sympathy for China in this period of national reconstruction, which he compared with the Restoration and early Meiji Era in Japan." The Generalissimo concluded his pleading by offering to the Mission a classical quotation which reads: "Benevolence and love are real treasures," and their friendly tone was further stressed by the Minister of Industry, Wu Ting-chang, who said that the way of cooperation between the two countries must lie in "shaking hands" and not "shaking fists."

Such speeches may merely have been diplomatic gestures, but they are undoubtedly indicative of their anxiety for peaceful adjustment at that time. Readers must remain indebted to Dr. Hsu for his elucidation of the Nanking attitude without an understanding of which many important events in China during the past few years cannot be made intelligible. For instance, in March, 1933, "the troops before Shankaikwan were ordered to retreat to the Luan River as a gesture of pacific intention towards the Japanese," and "by July 12, 1933, Chahar was cleared of the Japanese. At this point the Central Government stepped in. In order not to give the Japanese a pretext to start trouble again, General Feng was advised to disband his troops and leave the province."

Throughout the book, however, there is no indication whatsoever as to the reason why the Japanese on their side have never yielded to the Nanking argument. Thus the author has not touched the fundamental point of the subject on which he was writing. After reading this book, one cannot help feeling perplexed as to just why the Japanese launched a new attack this summer, nor can one fully appreciate the reasons for the Generalissimo's last stand and military resistance.

One cannot help entertaining doubts when one reads such a statement as that "the Shanghai incident was settled on the whole in a satisfactory way." Is it not true that the demilitarized zone established by the Shanghai Truce in 1932 was the first of a series of such zones as created later by the Tangku Truce, the Ho-Umetsu Understanding and the Chin-Doihara Agreement? Is it generally thought that such arrangements can be called "satisfactory"? Then it is indeed difficult for a layman to understand why "Japanese connivance at the narcotic trade in North China, though iniquitous, can scarcely be taken as a policy for the exploitation of what they consider to be their special position there," especially when one reads further that Dr. C. H. Wang, when seeing Hirota on January 22nd, 1935, expressed the wish that Japan would not support the narcotic trade. For the narcotic question, reference is made to the Information Bulletin of the Council of International Affairs, Nanking, which is directed by the author himself. But this bulletin simply points out that "there can be no end to this vast narcotic traffic until there is an end to extraterritoriality, although there is a remote possibility that the Japanese authorities may see the wisdom of taking measures against it."

Further, one is led to doubt whether the author really understands the internal politics of Japan as related to foreign policy, when one finds that he believes that the Japanese industrial leaders were no longer, to such an extent, the silent partners of the militarists after the February coup d'etat of 1936. One is also surprised by his incomplete information on the Japanese economic penetration in North China. While he mentions the Japanese gain in the salt industry and shipping and the Chinese loss in the Tientsin textile mills, he has not brought out the advance made by the Japanese in cotton production and the electric industry. Certainly, the chapter on the Diplomatic phase of the North China problem is very inadequate. Such important and significant items as the German-Japanese Alliance and the American Neutrality Act are not discussed at all, and even if he did wish to confine himself to press comments, one wonders why an opinion from a no less important quarter than those quoted, Moscow, should be omitted. No attempt has been made even to clarify the Chinese internal politics as related to the North China problem. One finds frequent references to "the renegade Chinese irregulars," the "Manchukuo irregulars" and

the "Jehol irregulars," without any enlightenment as to their origin and nature. The author correctly reported that Prince Teh "repeatedly declared that it was not his intention to cut Mongolia loose from China, but rather to place it under the direct control of the Central Government," but there is not a single word of elucidation on this point.

If these are the defects, Dr. Hsü's book can hardly be regarded as good history. It is however an excellent document both as a record of Nanking's policy in the past few years and as a pointer to what may be Chinese academic limitations.

C. H-s.

EXHIBIT No. 710

FEDERATED PRESS,
EASTERN BUREAU,
30 Irving Place, New York City, June 4, 1938.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
129 E. 52nd Street,
New York City.

DEAR MR. FIELD: We are inviting the friends of the Federated Press to a reception for Carl Haessler, of Chicago, FP managing editor. Mr. Haessler, who has been publicity director for the large West Side Local of the United Automobile Workers in Detroit for the past year, has been in the thick of the fight Michigan workers are currently engaged in to maintain the wage scales won during the great strikes of the winter of 1937.

The occasion will also serve to introduce Alexander L. Crosby, recently appointed news editor of the FP Eastern Bureau, and Henry Zen, Washington Bureau manager.

The three bureau chiefs will speak briefly of the various vitally important labor developments and issues as they see them from the inside.

The reception is to be at the home of Ernest L. Meyer, New York Post columnist, 60 Gramercy Park, at 5 o'clock, Monday afternoon, June 13. We shall be delighted to have you come.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Marc Stone
[t] MARC STONE, *Business Manager.*

Central Bureau: 160 N. La Salle Street, Chicago, Ill.
Washington Bureau: 1410 H Street NW, Washington, D. C.

Senator O'CONOR. Very well, I believe that is all. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 2:10 p. m., the committee was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume the session.

TESTIMONY OF MOSES FINLEY, ENGLEWOOD, N. J. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, JOSEPH A. FANELLI)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Finley, you have been sworn.

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. FINLEY. Moses Finley, 216 Tryon Avenue, Englewood, N. J.

Senator WATKINS. The record will show at this point that the witness was sworn in executive session, today.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. FINLEY. I am a teacher.

Mr. MORRIS. Where are you teaching?

Mr. FINLEY. At Rutgers University.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you operating under a grant from the Ford Foundation?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How long have you had that?

Mr. FINLEY. Since July 1, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Finley, are you now a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FINLEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FINLEY. I must respectfully decline to answer on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments and whatever other constitutional privileges are available to me.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you claim if you gave an answer to that question, it might incriminate you?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was a Communist study group ever held at your home?

Mr. FINLEY. No; it was not. But I am aware of the fact that in previous testimony by Dr. Wittfogel, such charge was made. Now he said, for example, that he knew that one of these study groups was under the chairmanship of Daniel Thorner, and that I said to him—that is, Wittfogel—that this was our history study group. Apparently what he has confused there is the Graduate History Society of Columbia University, which is one of the official organizations that exists in every department of a university, of which Daniel Thorner was president. Its main function was to have various faculty speakers, and Thorner invited Wittfogel to address one of the regular meetings of the Graduate History Society, but I am completely at a loss to understand another reference that he made——

Mr. MORRIS. Just one minute. Have you heard the testimony of Mr. Thorner saying that there was a group that studied music that met at your house?

Mr. FINLEY. I haven't heard the testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that testimony true?

Mr. FINLEY. That it was a group studying music is putting it a little formally.

Mr. MORRIS. Did a group meet at your house?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes. We had open house for friends of mine on Sunday evenings.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a Communist at that time?

Mr. FINLEY. I must decline to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know if Thorner was a Communist?

Mr. FINLEY. I have no reason to believe he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Yet when we asked Mr. Thorner if he was at that time, he refused to answer.

Senator WATKINS. When you say you have no reason, just what do you mean, "no reason"?

Mr. FINLEY. I have none whatsoever, Senator.

I have studied just enough logic to know that for anyone but yourself you can never answer flatly and absolutely you know of something.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever hear him discuss communism?

Mr. FINLEY. Not that I remember.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever hear him declare he was or was not a Communist?

Mr. FINLEY. I certainly have never heard him declare he was. I don't remember whether I heard him declare he was not.

Senator WATKINS. Was there anything in his conduct that led you to think that he was in any way a Communist?

Mr. FINLEY. No.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever discuss communism with him?

Mr. FINLEY. In any formal sense; no.

Senator WATKINS. You never heard it discussed by others or him in your presence?

Mr. FINLEY. I find it hard to answer that in the conditions of the 1930's. We talked about current events.

Senator WATKINS. You would not say now that communism was not discussed with him, would you?

Mr. FINLEY. Flatly, no; no, I wouldn't say.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you would say as a matter of fact that you would not remember whether it was or was not?

Mr. FINLEY. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. It could have been?

Mr. FINLEY. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make a statement, Mr. Finley, that you would not know conclusively whether any other person was a Communist except yourself?

Mr. FANELLI. No; as to a person in general, as to a name, that the only person you could be sure about, that one was a Communist or was not, was yourself.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what I meant. So that by asking Mr. Finley questions we could never know that anybody was a Communist.

Mr. FANELLI. What he is saying is as to membership in an organization, as to whether one was not at any time in an organization. You can be sure of no party but yourself.

Mr. MORRIS. You are saying that you can never be sure that one was not a Communist except with reference to yourself.

Mr. FANELLI. Unless you were a Communist with him. I am sure he does not mean to deny that.

Senator WATKINS. What does the witness understand by the meaning of Communist? What does it mean to you?

Mr. FINLEY. Primarily membership in the Communist Party.

Senator WATKINS. Your answers are based on that definition?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Do you think a man could be an advocate of the Communist cause without being a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FINLEY. I suppose so, yes.

Senator WATKINS. You keep that definition in mind with respect to future questions that are asked because I think maybe we will be splitting hairs on the question of whether a man is a card-carrying Communist or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever see Daniel Thorner pay Communist Party dues?

Mr. FINLEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. Herbert Norman?

Mr. FINLEY. I never met him and I never heard his name until I saw it in Wittfogel's testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Under that name or any other name?
Mr. FINLEY. I can only presume that I never knew him under any other name.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. Lawrence K. Rosinger?
Mr. FINLEY. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Lawrence Rosinger ever attend meetings at your home?
Mr. FINLEY. To the best of my recollection, no.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Andrew Roth?
Mr. FINLEY. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Andrew Roth ever attend meetings at your home?
Mr. FINLEY. I am sure not.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. Cristanzi?
Mr. FINLEY. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. John Hazard?
Mr. FINLEY. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Hazard ever attend meetings at your home?
Mr. FINLEY. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. Wittfogel?
Mr. FINLEY. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Wittfogel ever attend a meeting at your home?
Mr. FINLEY. I do not think so. I have no recollection of his ever attending a meeting at my home. He has been at my home.
Mr. MORRIS. In the company of more than one person?
Mr. FINLEY. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Under circumstances that could conceivably be called a meeting?
Mr. FINLEY. All right.
Mr. MORRIS. I do not know. The difference may be whether something is formally a meeting or a collection of people discussing a common subject.
Mr. FINLEY. He was there under circumstances of common discussion; yes.
Senator WATKINS. How many would be there at that meeting?
Mr. FINLEY. Presumably four or five people.
Senator WATKINS. Why presumably? Do you not have a recollection of how many would be there?
Mr. FINLEY. Senator, all this is 1938 and 1939, and I don't have a recollection of three or five people sitting in a living room, that precise. That is my difficulty.
Senator WATKINS. You say the meetings were all small ones?
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. William Mandel?
Mr. FINLEY. I have met him very casually, maybe twice.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to know that Mr. William Mandel is a Communist?
Mr. FINLEY. I know nothing about Mr. William Mandel.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. Theodore Guiger?
Mr. FINLEY. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Guiger ever attend a meeting at your home?
Mr. FINLEY. Yes.
Senator WATKINS. Do you know any Communists?
Mr. FINLEY. I must decline to answer on the grounds previously stated.

Senator WATKINS. Even now, even under the present condition where you say you are not a Communist? I am asking if you know any Communists?

Mr. FINLEY. I know no one now who I know to be a Communist.

Senator WATKINS. How far back from now would you make the same answer?

Mr. FINLEY. I must decline to answer on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. FANELLI. I think Mr. Morris understands our position on that. I went over it this morning.

Senator WATKINS. Maybe he does. Probably I do not.

Mr. FANELLI. I want to make it clear.

Senator WATKINS. At the present time I want to make it clear that he is willing to say now he is not a Communist but he is not willing to answer the question with respect to other times in the past.

Mr. FANELLI. Let me say this: He is entirely willing to answer a question as to the date in the past if it is one question; and put it 5 years back, he is perfectly willing to answer that question. However, if counsel is going to go on or if the Committee is going to go on and ask him 6 years, 7 years, there comes a point where his privilege evaporates, and since I have no assurance that the committee will not go on, I have advised him to answer now questions as to the past. If this committee will assure me that it will ask him one question as of a given date, I probably would advise the witness to answer.

Senator WATKINS. We can give no assurance whatever. We are making no agreements with any witness. We want the truth.

Mr. FANELLI. That is the reason he is not answering questions of the counsel, because I do not know how far back the committee is going to go.

Senator WATKINS. Do you agree with the statement of your counsel?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes.

Mr. FINLEY. Yes, I am taking counsel's advice. I will take counsel's advice on all these matters.

Senator WATKINS. That is your stand, as he has just stated?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you an instructor to the School for Democracy?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. What school and about when?

Mr. MORRIS. Was the School for Democracy a Communist school?

Mr. FINLEY. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there Communists teaching at the school?

Mr. FINLEY. I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the Communist Party at that time?

Mr. FINLEY. I must decline to answer on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there people who were dismissed from the staff of City College of New York for being Communist instructors at the school, School for Democracy at the time you were instructor in the School for Democracy?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. There were?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were some of those teachers?

Mr. FINLEY. Benjamin Paskoff, Louis Lerman.

Mr. MORRIS. I do not think it is necessary for the witness to continue adding names. The names I don't believe are people within the scope of our inquiry. The question was more to determine to what extent the witness would give testimony before this committee on that subject. So, unless you think otherwise, I will ask him to discontinue.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to have the question repeated.

Mr. MORRIS. I asked the witness, Mr. Chairman, if he were teaching at the School for Democracy at the same time as instructors who had been at City College and who had been dismissed for Communist activities at the same time.

The answer was "yes" and he did name several of the teachers. So I am satisfied with the witness' answer on that score. I say he does not have to continue to answer questions along that line as far as I am concerned.

Senator WATKINS. If you want to pass it, so shall I.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, it brings out the difficulty that a committee such as our committee would have of determining who is a Communist. Here the witness stated awhile ago that to his knowledge he does not know anybody today who is a Communist. It poses quite a problem, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. I wonder if he can answer a few more questions. Have you ever studied communism?

Mr. FINLEY. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. When?

Mr. FINLEY. As a graduate student of history.

Senator WATKINS. Graduate student of history, when?

Mr. FINLEY. In the middle thirties.

Senator WATKINS. Do you think you would know a Communist if you saw one and heard one talk?

Mr. FINLEY. Probably, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. If you knew a man was a Communist a month ago and I addressed the question to you, "Do you know anybody who is a Communist?" Would you still answer in the negative? If you knew a man 30 days ago to have been a Communist?

Mr. FINLEY. Would you repeat the question, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I grant you that it is a complicated question. But suppose you knew that Mr. X yesterday was a member of the Communist Party and I asked you the question today, "Do you know anybody today who is a member of the Communist Party?"; how would you answer that question?

Mr. FINLEY. I would probably say that I know somebody who I knew was a member of the Communist Party but I don't know whether he is one today or not.

Mr. MORRIS. So when you answered the question of Senator Watkins, "Do you know anybody today who is a Communist?" and you said, "no", were you making such a reservation?

Mr. FINLEY. I do not know anyone today whom I have ever known to be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom you have ever known to be a Communist?

Mr. FINLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Senator, we have gone far beyond the purpose for bringing the witness here today.

It was in connection with that study group in his home. But I think that the witness' presence here today does raise a lot of problems that I think point up the difficulties that this committee is confronted with in determining the Communist Party members.

Senator WATKINS. That difficulty has been with us all the time, not only with us, but every other agency that is trying to uncover communism in the United States or anyone else that is underground.

Are those all the questions that you have?

Mr. MORRIS. I have one more question.

Did you ever meet Max Granich?

Mr. FINLEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all I have, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. Do you want anything more of the witness?

Mr. MORRIS. That is all.

Senator WATKINS. You may be excused.

Mr. MORRIS. We have subpenaed Mr. T. A. Bisson for tomorrow morning and we plan to have an open hearing at 11 o'clock. But he is coming from California and we have no assurance from him that he actually is going to comply with the subpena. We presume he will.

Senator WATKINS. You want to adjourn then until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning?

Mr. MORRIS. We will set the hearing at 11 o'clock if he comes, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. What I am trying to find out is whether I can make a definite statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Chairman, at the close of this morning's session an agreement was entered into between Mr. Frederick V. Field and his attorney and Mr. Morris to place into the record certain documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, giving Mr. Field and his attorney the opportunity to go over these records.

Now, they have gone over these records and I now ask that these documents——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify whether they are documents taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. They are documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relatins.

Senator WATKINS. Have you marked them for the purpose of identification?

Mr. MORRIS. They are properly marked and there is a full description in the record as to what they are and what the witness' answers have been.

Senator WATKINS. All right, they may be received and made a part of the record.

(For the documents referred to see p. 4088.)

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 11 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 5 p. m., a recess was taken to reconvene at 11 a. m., Saturday, March 29, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, MARCH 29, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

Will you raise your right hand and be sworn?

You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BISSON. I do.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS ARTHUR BISSON, BERKELEY, CALIF., ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH A. FANELLI, ESQ.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you state your name?

Mr. BISSON. Thomas Arthur Bisson.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your address, Mr. Bisson?

Mr. BISSON. 97 Kingston Road, Berkeley, Calif.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that your formal residence?

Mr. BISSON. That is my formal residence.

Mr. MORRIS. You no longer have the residence of 40 Richards Road, Port Washington, N. Y.?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Bisson?

Mr. BISSON. University teacher.

Mr. MORRIS. You are an associate professor?

Mr. BISSON. I am a lecturer in political science in the political science department of the University of California.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long have you held that position, Mr. Bisson?

Mr. BISSON. Since September 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. September 1948.

Now, did you operate under a grant?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a grant from any one of the foundations?

Mr. BISSON. In addition to my connection with the university, yes.

Mr. Morris. Are you now the beneficiary of a grant of any kind, Mr. Bisson?

Mr. Bisson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. Bisson. The Carnegie Corp. is supporting a group of four projects, two members of the political science department of the University of California, one member of the history department, and, I think, one member in the oriental languages department.

Mr. Morris. Will you identify those people, Mr. Bisson, who are the beneficiaries of the Carnegie grants?

Mr. Bisson. The two in the political science department are myself and Dr. Robert A. Scalapino; in the history department, Delmer M. Brown; in the oriental languages department, Donald Shively.

May I just say there I think Donald Shively is in the oriental languages department. It is possible he is in the history department.

Mr. Morris. You have been the beneficiary of what other grants, Mr. Bisson?

Mr. Bisson. In 1937 the Rockefeller Foundation advanced a grant to me covering a field research trip in the Far East for the year 1937.

Mr. Morris. Have you had any other grants. You had a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation through the Institute of Pacific Relations, did you not?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. When was that?

Mr. Bisson. That grant began in 1947, I think.

Mr. Morris. How much money was involved in that one?

Mr. Bisson. I think the amount was $3,000, as I remember it.

Mr. Morris. What is your present grant? What is the amount of that?

Mr. Bisson. Where the four people are involved?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Mr. Bisson. That is a $20,000 grant.

Mr. Morris. Four people, however?

Mr. Bisson. That money, however, does not come to the four people engaged in the project. It does not amount to a salary addition to any one of the four people, but is rather to provide research assistance, travel assistance in this country, and also travel assistance to the field.

Two or three of those men may be in Japan this summer, and next year, under that grant.

Senator Ferguson. Will you go?

Mr. Bisson. I am not expecting to go.

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations have anything to do with getting your present grant for you?

Mr. Bisson. The present grant——

Senator Ferguson. The one at California?

Mr. Bisson. The Carnegie grant?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

Mr. Bisson. I do not think so. To the best of my knowledge, that was prepared by the Institute of East Asiatic Studies in the University of California through the University of California authorities.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know a Professor Odegard?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Did he have anything to do with getting you this or any other grants or fellowships you have had?

Mr. Bisson. Yes. He had something to do with the other Rockefeller grant.

Mr. Sourwine. But not with the present one?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know that he and Mr. Holland were the two who jointly recommended you in regard to the Rockefeller grant?

Mr. Bisson. I think they were; yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Have you been a staff member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. What period of time?

Mr. Bisson. 1943–1945.

Mr. Morris. Have you been listed as acting editor of the Pacific Affairs?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. For what period of time?

Mr. Bisson. It was during those 2 years. Exactly how long a period in those 2 years, I am not certain. I mean if you ask me by month.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Lattimore was the editor of Pacific Affairs until 1941 and he was succeeded by Mr. Carter and Mr. Michael Greenberg?

Mr. Bisson. I think so.

Mr. Morris. Did you succeed Mr. Greenberg?

Mr. Bisson. I am not certain as to whether there may not have been another editor between Mr. Greenberg and my association. The acting editorship I think——

Mr. Morris. Were you an employee of the Foreign Policy Association?

Mr. Bisson. I was.

Mr. Morris. What period of time?

Mr. Bisson. 1929–1942.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what Government positions you have held, Mr. Bisson?

Mr. Bisson. I was a principal economic analyst with the Board of Economic Warfare.

Mr. Morris. For how long?

Mr. Bisson. For the period January 1942 to May or June 1943.

I was with the Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan, Japan side, from October 1945 to, I think, March or April 1946.

Mr. Morris. What was the nature of your duties with the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan?

Mr. Bisson. I was attached to the over-all economic effects division of the bombing survey. Our task was to assess the general economic effects of strategic bombing during the war on Japanese economy.

Mr. Morris. What was your job? To interrogate various individuals on the effects of the bombing?

Mr. Bisson. I participated in some interrogations. We collected materials and data on the Japanese economy from research institutions, educational institutions, and so on.

Mr. Morris. What other Government position did you have after that?

Mr. Bisson. May I ask, are you coming back to this?

Mr. Fanelli. He will give you a chance to get in any documents. He has some documents he wants to get in.

Mr. Morris. What was your other Government employment?

Mr. Bisson. I had a third post as special assistant to the chief of Government section, General Headquarters, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, Tokyo.

Mr. Morris. Where was your office in connection with that employment?

Mr. Bisson. My office was in what was called the Dai-ich Building, the general headquarters in Tokyo.

Mr. Morris. What was your salary in that position?

Mr. Bisson. It was $10,000.

Mr. Morris. And when did you return from that position?

Mr. Bisson. I returned from that position in the spring of 1947. I think I left the field early in May and probably got back to this country toward the end of May 1947.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bisson, have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. Bisson. I have not.

Mr. Morris. Have you ever been a member of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. Bisson. I have.

Mr. Morris. Do you know that that is an organization that has been cited by the Attorney General as a subversive organization?

Mr. Bisson. At the present time, I do.

Mr. Morris. Do you know that it is?

Mr. Bisson. I do.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us, were you a member of the board of directors of that organization?

Mr. Bisson. I was.

Mr. Morris. For what period of time were you a member of the board of directors?

Mr. Bisson. The period would, I think, cover from 1947 to 1949. I am not certain about that because I do not have the actual data here.

Mr. Morris. Were you also a consultant for that organization?

Mr. Bisson. I was.

Mr. Morris. Did you formally resign from that organization?

Mr. Bisson. I did.

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions?

Mr. Bisson. I resigned on one occasion, which had to be repeated, in a sense. Under June 23, 1949, I addressed a letter to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy reading:

> Dear Sirs: During the past year I have been unable to keep in adequate touch with the activities of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. This condition will exist even more strongly in the future, as I am planning to move permanently to California within a short time.
>
> I am therefore submitting my resignation to the committee at this time. Will you kindly see that this resignation takes effect immediately?
>
> Yours truly,
>
> T. A. Bisson.

Senator Ferguson. How long before you wrote that letter did you decide to resign, or was that your decision?

Mr. Bisson. In the period preceding that letter I had been increasingly dissatisfied with certain aspects of the policy and activities, and at this time I decided to make my severance complete.

In the preceding year or so I had had virtually no connection in an active sense.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn that the Attorney General had cited this organization as subversive?

Mr. Bisson. I have no recollection of the exact date when I may have known that.

Senator Ferguson. Was it before you wrote the letter?

Mr. Bisson. I am not certain.

Senator Ferguson. Do you say that that entered into your judgment as to withdrawing from this organization?

Mr. Bisson. That was not what was primarily in my mind at that time.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the fact that it was subversive did not cause you to resign?

Mr. Bisson. I was primarily interested in the fact that the organization was one that no longer acted along lines that I approved.

Senator Ferguson. But at least it was not the fact that it had been cited by the Attorney General, because you do not state it in your letter and you have not stated it here.

Mr. Bisson. That did not enter into it.

Senator Ferguson. That did not enter into your mind.

Now, in the May issue of 1949 you were listed as a consultant.

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. That would be a fact, in the May issue, because it was printed prior to May, or in May?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And your resignation did not come until June?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you get the pamphlets, the so-called Spotlight pamphlet?

Mr. Bisson. I assume that I did.

Senator Ferguson. You assume that you did. Did you know that there was an article, The Committee Versus Tom Clark, by Maud Russell, executive director, Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

I will read you the first part of it:

> The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy has learned from the press that it has been designated as "subversive" in a new list circulated by the Civil Service Commission with a covering letter by Attorney General Tom Clark. The committee was not notified of the accusation; neither was it heard at any inquiry nor given preliminary opportunity to answer the charge.

I assume you read that.

Mr. Fanelli. Did you?

Mr. Bisson. I am not certain that I read that; no.

Senator Ferguson. Does not that refresh your memory that you read it?

Mr. Bisson. I may have; yes.

Senator Ferguson. And would you not say that it was subversive? Is not that one of the reasons why you resigned, but did not put in your letter? Or was it?

Mr. Bisson. That was not the reason that motivated my letter.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the fact that this institution was a subversive institution was not one of the reasons that caused you to resign?

Mr. BISSON. I have been increasingly dissatisfied with the type of materials and the activities of that organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not put it in the letter that that was true?

Mr. BISSON. I had worked with these people. I think it is only normal that one would not necessarily write a letter that would antagonize them.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean, "antagonize them"? Why did you not tell them the truth?

Mr. BISSON. I did tell them the truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Speaking as of this moment in this witness chair, have you an opinion as to whether or not this organization that we are speaking of, the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, was a subversive institution?

Mr. BISSON. I would not be prepared to say so; no.

Senator FERGUSON. You were on the board and you have been getting the pamphlets and all, and now you are not in a position to say so?

Mr. BISSON. I would not——

Senator FERGUSON. Even as of this date?

Mr. BISSON. I would not necessarily say so.

Senator FERGUSON. I will put the whole article in the record so it will not be taken out of context.

(The information referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 711" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 711

[Source: Far East Spotlight—vol. V, No. 5. May 1949]

THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TOM CLARK

(By Maud Russell, executive director, Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)

The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy has learned from the press that it has been designated as subversive in a new list circulated by the Civil Service Commission with a covering letter by Attorney General Tom Clark. The committee was not notified of the accusation; neither was it heard at any inquiry nor given preliminary opportunity to answer the charge.

Despite the fact that this statement is not likely to get even a small fraction of the publicity given to Mr. Clark's announcement, the committee now feels impelled to restate its record and aims for the American press and public.

REWARD FOR TRUTH

Since its founding in 1945, the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy has steadfastly advocated an American foreign policy in Asia that would be in accord with the Atlantic Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, and international undertakings entered into by the United States Government. For 4 years it has continually warned of the dangers of a failure-doomed policy of military support of a moribund and corrupt minority government in China; a policy bound to destroy both Chinese friendship for the United States and the prestige and honor of America among the peoples of Asia.

Now that events have confirmed the bankruptcy of this policy and demonstrated the public service we performed in warning the American people, the committee is listed as subversive.

A COWARDLY ATTACK

Such a listing, in the opinion of the committee, is intended to wreck the good name that the organization has acquired, on the merits of its record, for reliable, factual reporting. It is intended to intimidate members of the organization and brand its workers in the eyes of their friends. It can only be regarded as flagrant and cowardly attack on any who disagree with current policies and exercise the American right of free speech to voice their opinions.

WE SHALL CONTINUE

The committee protests against the listing. Whether it stands on the Civil Service Commission books or is revoked, we shall continue to work unceasingly and with all vigor and strength to publish the true facts on the situation in Asia and the effect of United States policies there. We shall continue to perform our four-year patriotic service of exposing and calling for changes in United States policies that earn hatred for Americans by obstructing the inevitably victorious struggle of Asia's people to free themselves from foreign exploitation, social oppression, and the resulting indescribable poverty in which no man on this earth should be forced to, or will much longer consent to, exist.

Mr. BISSON. May I indicate further here that I learned later that, in spite of my request, they had not completely disassociated my name from their formal material.

Mr. MORRIS. For instance, I notice in February 1950 there is a favorable review of your book by Mr. Philip O. Keeney. It appears on page 13 of the February 1950 Far East Spotlight.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you learn, Mr. Bisson, that they had not disassociated your name?

Mr. BISSON. I had not seen any of their materials for a long time, and sometime during the spring of 1951 I either saw it in the library or someone called it to my attention, and for that reason I wrote this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. What letter?

Mr. BISSON. A second letter, that I am about to read.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about it.

Mr. BISSON (reading):

DEAR SIRS: Some 2 years ago, when I resigned from your committee, I assumed that my name would be taken off all of your publications. Recently I noted that my name is still carried on your regular letterhead. I would appreciate it if you remove my name from your letterhead immediately.

Yours truly,

T. A. BISSON.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. BISSON. June 4, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you signed it and mailed it on that date?

Mr. BISSON. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive into the record this review by Philip O. Keeney of Mr. Bisson's Prospects for Democracy in Japan? It appears on page 13 of the February 1950 issue of Far East Spotlight.

Senator FERGUSON. The record also shows on this May issue that Mr. Keeney was treasurer.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. The official record of the committee shows that he refused to answer questions as to whether or not he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, on the grounds that his answers would tend to incriminate him.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 712" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 712

[Source: Far East Spotlight, February, 1950, vol. V, No. 11]

FAR EAST READING

(Philip O. Keeney)

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN, By T. A. Bisson, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1949, 143 pp. $2.75.

Mr. Bisson was an adviser on the staff of SCAP's Government Section which supervised Japanese legislation.

After analyzing the political forces that were in power when MacArthur began the occupation, he concludes by saying: "This Japanese oligarchy, confronted with the necessity of military surrender, marshaled its forces for a postwar struggle to preserve the political and economic bases of its power. * * * The society that had produced them (armed forces) once would produce them again as soon as opportunity arose. If such an outcome was to be avoided, the society itself must be so changed as to eliminate * * * the forces that had originally impelled it to embark upon a course of military aggression."

The first directives designed to change the framework of the prewar Japanese Government were greeted by a popular response "of such proportions that it took the occupation authorities by surprise." The two old guard parties who were in control of the government machinery found themselves faced with a vital problem, viz., to keep in check the newly rising popular forces. The simpest way to solve this problem was an election before new leadership arose to guide the common people of Japan. The situation became so bad that in 1946 a general strike was ordered. MacArthur prevented it. In order to save face with the Japanese people he scheduled a second election for April 1947.

The reactionary forces were returned to power again though neither of the two old line parties gained a majority in the lower house of the Diet. For this reason a social democrat was chosen to form a coalition cabinet. The widely different points of view in this Cabinet produced long drawn out debates. Despite such delays certain reforms were instituted and investigations set in motion. One investigation became a major scandal when it was discovered that the army before the occupation had turned over to the Zaibatsu vast quantities of food and materials.

Mr. Bisson sums up his analysis by saying that "this country failed to achieve the announced aims of its initial postsurrender policy toward Japan, primarily because those aims could not be achieved through the instrumentality of Japan's old guard."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bisson, were you ever a member of an organization called the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that that was an organization that has been cited by the Attorney General as a subversive organization?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony before this committee that that organization was controlled by a Communist faction which regularly met within the organization?

Mr. BISSON. I have not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write for the publication of that organization, called China Today?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write under a pseudonym?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write under your own name in addition?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what pseudonym you used in writing for that publication of the American Friends of the Chinese People, which has been cited as a subversive organization?

Mr. BISSON. Frederick Spencer.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you use the name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. BISSON. I was working at that time with the Foreign Policy Association, a nonpartisan research and educational organization.

I wrote under an assumed name for reasons that I would presume motivated Mr. X when he wrote his article in Foreign Affairs. I wanted to be able to express my views with full force without any feeling that I was bound by limitations existing in terms of the writings that I did for the Foreign Policy Association.

Senator FERGUSON. But Mr. X was a public official and was writing about a foreign country and a foreign government. You were not such, were you?

Mr. BISSON. I was not such, but I assume that I have the same right. I was in a position that was relatively similar, even if not the same.

Mr. FANELLI. The only question was, "You were not such" and the answer was "No."

Answer the Senator's questions.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you now whether or not you knew or ever heard that Frederick Spencer was the name that Frederick Vanderbilt Field used on the records as a Communist? That was his Communist name?

Mr. BISSON. I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know that?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. But if that is a fact and our records show that, this official record of the committee shows that, that would lead the people to believe, who were Communists, that you were a Communist, would it not? Or, at least, the man writing the letter was a Communist?

Mr. BISSON. No; I do not see that.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think that is true? Here is an official name on the record, Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Frederick Vanderbilt Field is on the official Communist records as Frederick Spencer.

Now, you knew Field, and you were writing under the name of Frederick Spencer. Would not that lead people who were Communists reading the article to believe that it was written by Field the Communist?

Mr. BISSON. Let me get this clear. I think when you say it is on the official record, what you are saying is that one of the witnesses before this committee has identified Frederick Vanderbilt Field——

Senator FERGUSON. And it has not been denied by Mr. Field.

Mr. BISSON. As Frederick Spencer.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. I am now saying that that particular attribution by Mr. Budenz was mistaken.

Senator FERGUSON. Why? Why do you contradict Mr. Budenz on that, unless you know something about it?

Mr. BISSON. I do know something about it.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us about it.

Mr. Bisson. I know that I was writing under the name Frederick Spencer. I know also that Frederick Field, to the best of my knowledge, at the same time, was writing in the same magazine under the name of Lawrence Hearn. I, therefore, think that Mr. Budenz was mistaken when he says that Mr. Field was writing under the name of Frederick Spencer.

Senator Ferguson. I was not saying he was writing under the name of Frederick Spencer. His official name on the Communist records was Frederick Spencer.

Mr. Bisson. I have no knowledge of what his official name on the Communists' records are.

Senator Ferguson. That is what our records show now—that Frederick Vanderbilt Field's Communist name was Frederick Spencer.

Mr. Bisson. I am saying what I know from my knowledge of China Today. I do not know——

Senator Ferguson. Why do you contradict Mr. Budenz when he says that the official Communist name of Frederick Vanderbilt Field was Frederick Spencer? Why do you contradict that?

Mr. Bisson. I am not contradicting that. I am saying that in terms of the writers on China Today I do not think that Frederick Vanderbilt Field was Frederick Spencer.

Senator Ferguson. Coming back to my other question, which you apparently misunderstood, if he was carried on the official Communist records as Frederick Spencer, and then you wrote articles under that name, would not that lead the Communists to believe that that was Fred Field, the Communist, writing?

Mr. Bisson. Yes; but what I want to say here is that I have no knowledge that Frederick Spencer appeared as Frederick Vanderbilt Field on the Communist records.

Senator Ferguson. But Frederick Vanderbilt Field knew that you were using the pen name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. Morris. He was associated with China Today; was he not?

Mr. Bisson. He was.

Mr. Morris. And he knew that you were using the name Frederick Spencer?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. I would like to offer you, Mr. Bisson, a copy of China Today, February 1935, which contains a statement to the American people, and you will note that this statement is signed, among others, by Mr. T. A. Bisson and by Mr. Frederick Spencer.

Now, you did not sign that twice, did you?

I mean, obviously, there are two people, are there not?

Mr. Bisson. I assume so.

Mr. Morris. So would it not indicate to you that certainly in this instance some other person was using the pseudonym Frederick Spencer?

Mr. Bisson. It would seem to so indicate.

Mr. Morris. And you notice that Mr. Field's name does not appear in this list of people to whom this statement was addressed.

I will let you examine it.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Morris, may I suggest that that statement and the list of names appended as signators be offered for the record at this time?

Senator Ferguson. The whole list will be received in evidence.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 713" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 713

[Source: China Today, vol. 1, October 1934–September 1935. February 1935, p. 90]

TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Today 450 million Chinese people are struggling for national liberation—for the simple right to be a free people, masters of their own destiny. The greatest obstacle to the success of this heroic struggle is the active interference of the foreign imperialist powers. The United States is one of those powers, the very country that was itself engaged in a great struggle to free itself from British colonial oppression a little more than a hundred and fifty years ago.

It is in China that we are at this moment specifically interested because there we are witnessing a drama of tremendous power and significance—the breath-taking struggle of a great people to free itself from oppression and to establish its independence.

And what has been the role of the United States in this struggle? Is it giving to an oppressed nation the same moral and material support that it received in its own revolutionary war? On the contrary, the United States, under the deceptive guise of the "open door policy," is playing a ruthless part in suppressing the Chinese masses and fomenting civil wars among them. It was American gunboats in March 1927 that took the lead in shelling Nanking and set the stage for Chiang Kai-shek's treacherous turn against the Chinese revolution. Today America is still staking its fortunes in China on Chiang Kai-shek and his Nanking terroristic government. Only recently the United States Senate investigation into the munitions industry revealed the fact that at least ten million dollars of the wheat and cotton loan from the U. S. to the Nanking government was used to buy munitions for war against the 90 million Chinese people who are living under the flag of the Chinese Soviets. Not only has the American government provided the funds for munitions to be used in this civil war, but it has also permitted the sale of hundreds of aeroplanes to the Nanking government by American aviation companies—a transaction that could not have been completed without specific permission from the State Department. From these aeroplanes have fallen thousands of death dealing bombs on innocent non-combatants—bombs spreading terror, destruction, and devastation over thousands of villages and millions of inhabitants. It has also supplied the funds for the building of aeroplane factories at Hangchow, Shaokwan, and other places. And furthermore, the American government goes even so far as to supply army and navy aviators who are released from active service in order to be sent to China as demonstrators, advisors, and pilots actually participating in bombing. We find among these instructors such outstanding names as Captain Frank Hawks. Major Doolittle, and the late Lieut. Dorsey who recently lost his life in this service. Thus, as someone has so aptly stated, we are permitting our own American soldiers to become the Hessian troops of the Chinese Revolution. Without this support, according to many competent observers, the reactionary Nanking government could not retain its power for any length of time.

This direct interference by America in the internal affairs of China has but one purpose—the furthering of its imperialist designs at the expense of the Chinese people. The profit-mad munition makers, aeroplane manufacturers, industrialists, and bankers, seeking new fields of exploitation for their surplus capital, are turning greedy eyes towards war-torn China. They look to American troops to protect their newly won fields. Major General Smedley D. Butler in his recent Armistice Day address summed up briefly but completely this condition when he said: "For thirty-three years and four months I was an active agent in the greatest debt-collecting agency in the world, the U. S. Marine Corps."

General Butler ought to know—he was for many years Commander of the U. S. Marines in China.

Thousands upon thousands of American people deeply resent this interference by the United States in the internal affairs of China. In the name of these thousands, we demand:

1. That the American government stop the sale of aeroplanes to China;
2. That the American government stop the release of army and navy pilots for military use by the reactionary militarists in China;
3. That America withdraw all gunboats, marines, and other armed forces in China;

4. That America stop the shipment of munitions and financial assistance to Chinese militarists.

Signed: Roger Baldwin, T. A. Bisson, Earl Browder, Winifred Chappel, George S. Counts, Malcolm Cowley, Edward Dahlberg, Ethel L. Dewey, Theodore Dreiser, Waldo Frank, Joseph Freeman, Beals E. L. French, Myrtle M. French, Mike Gold, Katherine Graham, Mary H. Gleason, R. M. Gyles, Granville Hicks, Josephine Jack, Orrick Johns, Corliss Lamont, Robert Morss, Lovett, Thora Lund, Edith de Nancrede, J. W. Phillips, Isidor Schneider, Frederick Spencer, Maxwell S. Stewart, Katharine Terrell, Harry F. Ward, Victor A. Yakhontoff.

Senator FERGUSON. The question is: Do you find Frederick Field's name on there?

Mr. BISSON. May I ask this?

Mr. FANELLI. I have no objection.

Senator FERGUSON. Frederick Fields' name is not on there, is it?

Mr. BISSON. No, it is not.

Senator FERGUSON. Is Earl Browder's?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Earl Browder's is?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Earl Browder a Communist at that time?

Mr. BISSON. I assume that he was; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You know he was, do you not?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you sign with Earl Browder?

"To the American people," it is headed.

Mr. FANELLI. May I examine this, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. I see no reason why I could not on occasion have been associated in that way with Mr. Earl Browder.

Senator FERGUSON. That was your privilege and I want to know why you did it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Bisson, the Senator asked you why. Why did you sign with Browder? He did not challenge your right to do so? He simply asked you why.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. BISSON. I presumably agreed with the positions being taken in that case by Mr. Browder.

Senator FERGUSON. You must have read this thing before you signed it.

Mr. BISSON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you sign under both names, or did Fred Field sign under Spencer's name, signing his Communist name?

Mr. BISSON. I would not know.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not sign both ways, did you?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. BISSON. I do not think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us under oath that you did or did not sign under the name of Bisson and the name of Spencer?

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know another Fred Spencer?

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. This was a group of people. Will you tell us how many you were acquainted with?

Mr. MORRIS. Let the witness see the list.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the list of names. Tell us how many. Tell us first how many are on it, and then how many you were acquainted with or knew.

Mr. BISSON. Roger Baldwin; yes.

My own name.

Mr. Browder, yes.

Winifred Chappel, no.

George S. Counts, yes——

Mr. SOURWINE. By yes, you mean you knew the person and by no you mean you did not?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Malcolm Cowley, yes.

Edward Dahlberg, no.

Ethel Dewey—I am not sure whether this is the wife of Dr. Dewey. After all, this is a list of names I have not seen for many years.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we understand that, Mr. Bisson.

Mr. BISSON. If this is the wife of Dr. Dewey, I would know her; otherwise not.

Senator FERGUSON. Speak a little louder.

Mr. BISSON. Theodore Dreiser, no.

Waldo Frank, no.

Joseph Freeman, no.

Beals E. L. French, no.

Myrtle M. French, no.

Mike Gold, no.

Kathering Graham, no.

Mary H. Gleason, no.

R. M. Gyles, no.

Granville Hicks, no.

Josephine Jack, no.

Orrick Johns, no.

Corliss Lamont, yes.

Robert Morss Lovett, yes.

Thora Lund, no.

Edith de Nancrede, no.

J. W. Phillips, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was J. W. Phillips known to you by another name?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was J. W. Phillips?

Mr. BISSON. Philip Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. He was associated with you in this publication China Today?

Mr. BISSON. He was.

Isidor Schneider, no.

Frederick Spencer—I knew no other by the name of Frederick Spencer.

Senator FERGUSON. Except your own?

Mr. BISSON. I thought that this was my own assumed name.

Katherine Terrell, no.

Harry F. Ward, yes.

Victor A. Yakhontoff, yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Bisson, do you know, or do you have any reason to believe that any of those persons whose names you have just read were under Communist discipline or had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. Bisson. I assume that Earl Browder was in that category.

Mr. Sourwine You stated earlier that you knew Earl Browder was a communist; is that correct?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Anyone else?

Mr. Bisson. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Sourwine. You are stating that there is no one else on this list that you just read whom you either knew or had reason to believe was either under Communist discipline or had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives; is that your statement, sir?

Mr. Bisson. I would have to divide that question. I would not know any of these persons as Communist Party members.

Mr. Sourwine. I did not ask you that. All right, I will divide the question.

Do you know, or have you any reason to believe, that any of these persons was at any time under Communist Party discipline or Communist discipline?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Other than Mr. Browder?

Mr. Bisson. I do not.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know, or have you any reason to believe that any of these persons at any time voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. Bisson. I assume that Mr. Phillips may have done so.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. Bisson. Mr. Jaffe, yes.

Mr. Sourwine. You say you assume. On what basis do you assume?

Mr. Bisson. I assume that because on later occasions it was indicated that he was connected with Earl Browder, or associated with Earl Browder.

Mr. Sourwine. As a matter of fact, you do not assume that about anybody under a question like that. Do you know, or do you have reason to believe? You either do or do not. You do not assume that anybody is a Communist, do you?

Mr. Bisson. The distinction that I am trying to make here, however, is a time distinction. Some of these people at the present time under later conditions have clearly become known under that category as associating with Communist activities.

Mr. Sourwine. What we want you to do, Mr. Bisson, is to name those persons on this list whom you either know or have reason to believe voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives, and then tell us what you know about them and then tell us what you know that gives you reason to believe that.

Mr. Bisson. And I am saying that a time distinction is necessary in that question because if I simply say "Yes"——

Mr. Fanelli. Go ahead and make your time distinction and answer his question.

Mr. Bisson. The time distinction is that in later years it has become obvious that Mr. Phillips was associated with Earl Browder.

Senator Ferguson. You mean Philip Jaffe?

Mr. Morris. Was associated with Earl Browder, did you say?

Senator Ferguson. Philip Jaffe.

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Was the end of your statement that he was associated with Earl Browder? Was that the end of your statement just now?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. This man Phillips is Jaffe?

Mr. Bisson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you not think also that Spencer in this particular list is Field, because they were both using fictitious or alias names?

Mr. Bisson. The questioning thus far has led me to believe——

Senator Ferguson. If you will just not try to find out what we are trying to put in this record by the questions. We are trying to get out of your mind by questions what you know.

Mr. Fanelli. For the record, I do not believe there has been any indication that he has been trying to do that.

Senator Ferguson. He indicates by this last thing that he does——

Mr. Fanelli. He does not have any knowledge on this subject, and you are asking for an opinion.

Mr. Sourwine. The counsel is testifying as to what the witness has knowledge of and I hope the Chair will——

Mr. Fanelli. He has already testified that he does not know about that.

Senator Ferguson. We have not cross-examined at all on this; whether or not he knows. We might be able to refresh his memory by a few questions.

I know that Mr. Sourwine wants to ask him some questions because this thing does bring out in one's mind a lot of questions.

Do you know Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. Bisson. I do.

Senator Ferguson. Did you read his name on there?

Mr. Bisson. I don't think I did.

Senator Ferguson. It is on there, is it not?

Mr. Fanelli. I don't believe it is, Senator.

Mr. Bisson. I may have skipped that as I was reading.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, his name is on there, is it not?

Did you read Mike Gold?

Mr. Bisson. I did read that name.

Senator Ferguson. You knew he was a Communist writer, did you not, for the Daily Worker?

Mr. Bisson. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that? You did not know that?

Mr. Bisson. I did not.

Mr. Morris. Did you know his brother, Max Granich?

Mr. Bisson. I did later.

Mr. MORRIS. Granich was the editor of that paper, was he not, China Today?

Mr. BISSON. I think he was in a later period.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, would it be permitted to go through this list of names now and make the question very clear so there will be no possibility of the witness misunderstanding?

Mr. BISSON. I assure you that if I missed any name on that list it was done inadvertently.

Mr. FANELLI. Let them go ahead and ask the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question, Mr. Bisson, is this; First, did you know the person?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want you to say whether you did or did not know when I name the name.

Then, I want you to state whether you knew, or had any reason to believe, that this person had at any time been under Communist discipline.

And, third, I want you to state whether you knew or had any reason to believe that this person had at any time voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with members of the Communist Party in furtherance of Communist Party objectives.

Now, if your answers are "no," we need go no further on a person whom you identify as one with respect to whom you had no such knowledge.

If you have such knowledge or belief, then we will ask additional questions.

The first name here is Roger Baldwin.

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that Bene Baldwin? That is not; is it?

Mr. BISSON. I would not know Bene Baldwin.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you any reason to believe he was either under Communist discipline or had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next name is your own, T. A. Bisson. Were you ever under Communist discipline?

Mr. BISSON. I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever voluntarily and knowingly cooperate or collaborate with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Just on that, do you know what this article is? Was this not a Communist objective sponsored by the Communist Party under Browder? Is it not clear that that is what that was?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I suggest you read some of that.

Senator FERGUSON. I want the witness to answer that. You just answered the question by Mr. Sourwine. Now, what was this article about in reference to the question Mr. Sourwine just asked you?

Mr. BISSON. I do not think it was necessarily a document that was under Communist authorization.

Senator FERGUSON. Not necessarily, but was it not under the domination of the Communists because Earl Browder is on it? You do not think Earl Browder was advocating something that was not a party line in 1935, do you?

You were an educated man at that time, an intelligent man. You do not think that he was advocating something that was not the party line at that time, do you?

Mr. BISSON. Presumably not.

Senator FERGUSON. It is correct that it is presumably not. Then you were voluntarily and willingly on that particular article advocating the party line, were you not?

Mr. BISSON. On that particular article my views coincided with the views——

Senator FERGUSON. But you were advocating it. You say now that the reason was that your views coincided?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. However, you were actually advocating the party line there and knowingly doing it with a Communist, Earl Browder; is that not a fact?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Your answer was yes on the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think it will speed this up a little if we may have an understanding with the witness that a single no will mean that he does not know the person and that the answer to the other two questions is no if he does not know the person, as to the other two questions.

If he did know the person, but the answer is "No," on the other two questions, he will simply say "I knew him, but the answer is 'No.'"

Is that agreeable, Mr. Bisson?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Earl Browder?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him to be a person under Communist discipline?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you knew him to be a person who had knowingly and voluntarily cooperated and collaborated with other Communists necessarily?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Winifred Chappell?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. George S. Counts?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Malcolm Cowley?

Mr. BISSON. No. Now, wait. The first question here is do I know them?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know Mr. Malcolm Cowley?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your answer to the other two questions, "No"?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Edward Dahlberg?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Ethel L. Dewey?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Theodore Dreiser?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Waldo Frank?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Joseph Freeman?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Beals E. L. French?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Myrtle M. French?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mike Gold?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know Mike Gold?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know him now?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Katharine Graham?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mary H. Gleason?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. R. M. Gyles?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Granville Hicks?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Josephine Jack?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Orrick Johns?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Corliss Lamont?
Mr. BISSON. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you knew him?
Mr. BISSON. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And your answer to the other two questions?
Mr. BISSON. Are "No."
Mr. SOURWINE. Robert Morss Lovett?
Mr. BISSON. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And your answer to the other two questions?
Mr. BISSON. Are "No."
Mr. SOURWINE. Thora Lund?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Edith de Nancrede?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. J. W. Phillips?
Mr. BISSON. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him as Philip M. Jaffe?
Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him to be under Communist discipline?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any reason to believe him as such?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know, or have any reason to believe that he had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. BISSON. Not at this time. Later I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you come to know that later?

Mr. BISSON. Later there were evidences of association with Earl Browder, of activities involved in the Amerasia case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are those two separate things, or are they one thing in your mind?

Mr. BISSON. They are separate things.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it come to your attention that he was associating with Earl Browder?

Mr. BISSON. To my knowledge, I just learned it from conversation, or——

Mr. SOURWINE. Conversation with whom, with Jaffe?

Mr. BISSON. Could have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. With Browder?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. It could have been with Jaffe?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else could it have been with?

Mr. BISSON. No one that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then was it with Jaffe?

Mr. BISSON. It may have been; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it could have been with Jaffe, it could not have been with anyone else? It was with Jaffe, was it not?

Mr. BISSON. At a later period, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You learned of Browder's association with Jaffe, from Jaffe?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isidore Schneider?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Frederick Spencer?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Frederick Spencer who signed this?

Mr. BISSON. That's in terms—I say "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. You know the name Frederick Spencer?

Mr. BISSON. I know the name Frederick Spencer.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do not know the man who signed the same Frederick Spencer on here; is that right?

Mr. BISSON. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. I know him, and the other answer is "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no reason to believe, or any knowledge that he was ever under Communist discipline or ever had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Katharine Terrell?
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Harry F. Ward?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And the other two answers to the two questions?
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Victor A. Yakhontoff?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And the answers to the other two questions?
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. How was this article prepared? Did you prepare it?
Mr. Bisson. I do not remember that I had any connection with it.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it presented to you for signature?
Mr. Bisson. I assume so.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it in a long sheet of paper with a place at the bottom for the names to be signed?
Mr. Bisson. I cannot recall.
Mr. Sourwine. You did not sign your name on a piece of paper that did not have this writing at the top; did you?
Mr. Bisson. I assume not.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you, in fact, sign your name to this article?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. How many names were on it when you signed it?
Mr. Bisson. I do not recall.
Mr. Sourwine. Were the names signed one below the other?
Mr. Bisson. I do not recall.
Mr. Sourwine. All right, Mr. Chairman. This has been admitted—has it not—for the record?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Bisson. May I state that this is what year?
Senator Ferguson. 1935.
Mr. Bisson. This is, after all, 17 years ago, and I think I should perhaps be pardoned for not knowing every detail.
Mr. Sourwine. The committee has not criticized you for not remembering. We are only trying to find out what you do remember.
Mr. Fanelli. You do not have to apologize.
Mr. Sourwine. You are not being asked to testify to anything here that you do not remember. We want your best recollection and belief; what you know.
Mr. Bisson. I was trying to answer an assumption.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may I call attention to this one paragraph in this article?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Morris (reading):

> This direct interference by America in the internal affairs of China has but one purpose: the furthering of its imperialist designs at the expense of the Chinese people. The profit-mad munition makers, aeroplane manufacturers, industrialists, and bankers, seeking new fields of exploitation for their surplus capital, are turning greedy eyes toward war-torn China.

Mr. Bisson, did you ever speak on a platform with known members of the Communist Party?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Mr. Bisson. I spoke at a meeting in connection with the organization, American Friends of the Chinese People.

Mr. Morris. When was that? Can you recall?

Mr. Bisson. I do not; presumably sometime in the midthirties.

Mr. Morris. I offer you this issue, November 1934, of China Today, Mr. Bisson, and ask you if you can recall whether or not that advertisement of a meeting is the correct one?

Mr. Bisson. I assume that that is correct.

Mr. Morris. They mentioned that the following speakers would speak: Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Malcolm Cowley, General Yakhontoff, Frederick V. Field, and Hansu Chan.

Did you speak on that occasion?

Mr. Bisson. I assume that I did.

Mr. Morris. You notice that the tickets were sold in two places there, at the New Masses and at the Workers' Bookshop, the Workers' Bookshop being the official bookshop of the Communist Party.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you at the time know that any of those persons were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. What is that?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. What was the objective of the meeting that you were speaking at?

Mr. Bisson. I think it was to raise funds for the magazine China Today.

Mr. Sourwine. Is that a Communist publication?

Mr. Bisson. I would not call that a Communist publication.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it Communist-controlled at all?

Mr. Bisson. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. Was it a front?

Mr. Bisson. I am not sure of the distinction between Communist-controlled and front.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what a Communist-front paper is?

Mr. Bisson. I am not certain in terms of your question at this point.

Senator Ferguson. You cannot answer my question if you do not know what it means, if you do not know what a front means.

Mr. Bisson. I presume you mean an organization which Communists control.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and are using.

Mr. Bisson. I am not clear on the distinction between front and the organization that he spoke of.

Mr. Sourwine. Was China Today a publication that was in any measure controlled or used by the Communist Party?

Mr. Bisson. It could have been; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Was it?

Mr. Bisson. I am not sure.

Mr. Sourwine. You were associated with the magazine?

Mr. Bisson. I was associated with it.

Mr. Sourwine. Yes. Was it?

Mr. Bisson. I am not prepared to say that it was fully controlled by the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if it was controlled or used in any way by the Communist Party?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not?

Senator FERGUSON. What do you think Earl Browder was doing in there if he was not using it? Do you think Earl Browder was advocating a capitalist front, speaking to the capitalist movement at this meeting and raising the funds? Is that your opinion now?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it was a front; was it not?

Mr. MORRIS. The tickets were sold by the New Masses and the Daily Worker.

Mr. FANELLI. Let him answer one question.

Either he knows, or he doesn't know.

Senator FERGUSON. It was a front; was it not?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

I might say that under these circumstances one could consider it a front organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that these Communists were there to help this meeting for the raising of funds for China Today because they wanted to see funds raised for China Today?

Mr. FANELLI. I object to that. The only evidence I have heard so far was that there was one Communist at that meeting, Earl Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Hansu Chan?

Mr. BISSON. He was one of the editors of China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that a pseudonym?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the real name of Hansu Chan?

Mr. BISSON. Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Chi?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He is an official of Communist China today; is he not?

Mr. BISSON. I am not certain whether he is an official today. He has been reported as such in the last 2 or 3 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say that he is a Communist?

Mr. BISSON. He is a Communist; yes, today.

Mr. MORRIS. So, there we do know that Mr. Browder and Mr. Hansu Chan are Communists.

How about Frederick V. Field? Would you consider that he is a Communist today?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; he would be.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, just so the record could speak freely, counsel objected, and I do not know to what extent the Chair is going to permit objections by counsel——

Mr. FANELLI. Mr. Sourwine——

Mr. SOURWINE. If you please. I should like to point out that this question has been asked before, the question in the plural, if he spoke with Communists, and he said "Yes"; and this witness was asked if he knew at that time that they were Communists, plural, and he said "Yes," which seems to me to be adequate foundation for the question which I asked.

Senator FERGUSON. I will take the objection merely as a suggestion to the Chair to see whether or not in the opinion of the Chair it is objectionable.

Will you repeat or read the question?

Mr. FANELLI. Senator, I withdraw my comment.

Senator FERGUSON. I am afraid that the witness does not remember.

Do you know what the question is?

Mr. BISSON. I am afraid not.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, we had better have it read.

Mr. SOURWINE. In order to lay the necessary foundation——

Mr. FANELLI. I withdraw my comment.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us go right ahead.

Repeat the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Bisson, is it your understanding that any Communists who were on the platform with you at that meeting were there because they wanted to see funds raised for China Today?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was why you were there?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doesn't that mean you were cooperating or collaborating with them?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that you were cooperating or collaborating with them in furtherance of their objective?

Mr. BISSON. Objectives which I associated myself with at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. And at that time was that not a Communist Party objective: to raise funds for China Today? They would not have been there if that had not been; would they?

Mr. BISSON. I assume it was; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Bisson, do you know what was at 50 East Thirteenth Street, New York?

Mr. BISSON. 50 East Thirteenth Street?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the Communist headquarters at that time; was it?

Mr. BISSON. I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether the Workers Bookshop was a Communist shop?

Mr. BISSON. I assume that it was. I do not know that shop.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what the New Masses was? Was that a Communist front?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So, the tickets for sale were sold at a Communist front, the New Masses, 31 East Twenty-seventh Street, and the other place was at the Workers Bookshop, 50 East Thirteenth Street?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. At least one of the places was a Communist-front place?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. We will put the whole ad in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 714" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 714

[Advertisement in China Today, November 1934, p. 39]

BANQUET AND DANCE

Celebrate the appearance of

CHINA TODAY

and hear the following speakers

T. A. BISSON
EARL BROWDER
MALCOLM COWLEY
GEN. YAKHONTOFF
FREDERICK V. FIELD
HANSU CHAN

and enjoy

NATIVE CHINESE FOOD (SERVED CHINESE STYLE)

Dance to the music of the well-known

CLUB VALHALLA ORCHESTRA

Saturday, November 10th—Irving Plaza, 15th Street & Irving Place, New York
$1.25 for Banquet and Dance Reservations in advance only. Service at 6:30 sharp.
50¢ Dance ticket entitles you to hear speakers at 8:30—65¢ at the door.
Tickets for sale at NEW MASSES, 31 East 27th Street; WORKER BOOKSHOP, 50 E. 13 Street, or at our Headquarters

Auspices

FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

168 West 23rd St. Chelsea 2-9096

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bisson, when you were working in General MacArthur's headquarters, and when you were working for the United States strategic bomb survey, did you make disclosure to your authorities that you had these Communist associations in the past?

Mr. SOURWINE. By "authorities," you mean superiors, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. Your superiors and the people with whom you made application for employment?

Mr. FANELLI. The answer is "yes" or "no" to them. Tell them you did or didn't.

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you mention that you had written for this Communist publication, China Today, under a pseudonym?

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you mention that you had spoken on the same platform with Frederick V. Field, Hansu Chan, and Earl Browder?

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you think that they would have reposed confidence in you if you had?

Mr. BISSON. I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in Tokyo, Mr. Bisson, did you ever meet with Mr. Philip Keeney?

Mr. FANELLI. In connection with the last question just asked, he has some documents he would like to introduce. Do you want them now?

Senator FERGUSON. Answer the question. Then we will get to the documents.

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. Morris. How often did you meet with Mr. Keeney in Tokyo?

Mr. Bisson. Mr. Keeney was a member of occupation headquarters. He was living in the same hotel with me. I saw him a number of times a week.

Mr. Morris. Would you say that you were on very close terms with Philip O. Keeney?

Mr. Bisson. I would not.

Mr. Morris. You did, however, meet him two or three times a week?

Mr. Bisson. We were working in different sections. He was in the educational work.

Mr. Morris. But even though you were working in different kinds of work, you did meet him two or three times a week, did you not?

Mr. Bisson. We were living in the same hotel and dining in the same hotel. Therefore, I met him several times a week. I would not know whether they were twice a week or six times a week.

Mr. Morris. He was a friend of yours, was he not, Mr. Bisson?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. And you had known him before he went out to Japan, had you not?

Mr. Bisson. No. I met him first in Japan.

Mr. Morris. You were then subsequently associated with him in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy; were you not?

Mr. Bisson. I was.

Mr. Morris. Did you know that he was disqualified from service in the Far East command?

Mr. Bisson. I did.

Mr. Morris. Did you know the reason for his disqualification?

Mr. Bisson. To the best of my knowledge he could not find out when he was there.

Mr. Sourwine. The question was: Did you know?

Mr. Morris. Did you know why he was disqualified?

Mr. Bisson. I did not.

Mr. Morris. And that did not interfere with your decision of becoming associated with him—he was treasurer, was he not, of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy—and that did not interfere with your becoming associated with him in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy when you returned to the United States?

Mr. Bisson. It did not.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you ever know or have reason to believe that he was under Communist discipline or had voluntarily and knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communist Party members in furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. Bisson. I did not.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever meet Mr. Susumo Okano? Did you ever meet Mr. Susumo Okano in Japan?

Mr. Bisson. Yes; I think I did.

Mr. Morris. He was an official of the Japanese Communist Party, was he not?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. In fact, he was the leader of the Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. Bisson. He is.

Mr. Morris. Did you choose to describe him as a Japanese liberal who should be included in the Japanese Government?

Mr. Bisson. I do not remember of describing him as a liberal. I may well have described him as one who could enter the Japanese Government.

Mr. Morris. I have now your article, which appears in Pacific Affairs of 1944, September 1944, in which you say, among other things, here:

> There are many such liberals, including Takao Saito, expelled from the House of Representatives for denouncing the war against China; Kanju Kato, jailed for his aggressive and uncompromising trade-union leadership; Daikichiro Togawa, member imprisoned for suspected opposition to the war in China; Wataru Kaji, who has for years aided the Chinese armies in propaganda work; Tatsukichi Minobe, eminent constitutional lawyer driven from the House of Peers for his liberal views on the Emperor; Susumo Okano, Communist leader of the Japanese Peoples' Liberation Alliance, organized February 1944 in Yenan, China; Baroness Ishimoto—

and so forth.

Did you advocate that Susumo Okano listed among those other people as liberal by you be included in the Japanese Government?

Mr. Bisson. I did.

Many I make a comment on that?

Mr. Morris. Yes. You wanted to introduce something into the record at this time?

Mr. Bisson. Yes. We have been discussing my Government connections in Japan and I should like to speak both to——

Senator Ferguson. Before you go into that, I would just like to inquire from Mr. Morris how long he thinks this hearing will take.

Mr. Bisson. I think I can finish this in 2 or 3 minutes.

Senator Ferguson. It appears that we cannot finish today and we can finish in about an hour and a half, so we have a full meeting on Monday at 10:30, and, therefore, we will start this hearing sharply at 9 o'clock Monday morning.

We will recess now until 9 o'clock Monday morning.

If you do not finish at 10:30 when the committee comes in as a whole, you have another meeting at 2, do you not? We have another meeting at 2?

Mr. Morris. We have another meeting and another witness subpenaed.

Senator Ferguson. If there is any question we could start this one at 1 o'clock to finish it, so we would have 2½ hours.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you want to get this material in he is offering?

Mr. Fanelli. It won't take a minute, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Bisson. I want to note that Major General Willoughby, former head of G–2 in occupation headquarters at Tokyo, has charged before the committee that I was among certain people "unloaded" on headquarters from the States in the spring of 1946.

The fact is that the Deputy Chief of Government Section, Col. Charles L. Kades, invited me to join that section in the fall of 1945, when I was in Japan with the strategic bombing survey.

My commitments with the survey did not permit me to accept the offer at that time. By the spring of 1946 I had fulfilled these commitments, including the writing of one of the chapters in the official survey volume prepared by the Over-all Economic Effects Division, to which I was attached.

From the War Department I received later an official scroll of commendation for my contribution to the work of the strategic bombing survey.

Having completed my work with the survey, I took up the offer previously made by Government Section in Tokyo, stipulating that I stay only 4 months, and that my status be raised from the grade of P–7 to P–8, the highest professional category.

These matters are all subject of record and can be easily verified by investigation. It was under these conditions, which do not take on the character of being "unloaded" on occupation headquarters, that I assumed my duties with Government Section in April 1946.

With regard to my period of official service with occupation headquarters in 1946–47, the appropriate source to consult is my immediate superior, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Courtney Whitney, Chief of Government Section. He gave me a letter of commendation when I left the field.

Under the urgings of my official superiors in Government Section, I extended the stipulated term of 4 months to 13 months.

The letter he gave me reads as follows——

Senator FERGUSON. Just offer it and we will put it in the record.

Mr. FANELLI. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you disclose to any of these people that you mentioned, Mr. Bisson, your past Communist associations?

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive that commendation letter in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 715" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 715

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,
Tokyo, Japan, May 8, 1947.

Mr. T. A. BISSON,
Tokyo, Japan

DEAR MR. BISSON: It is with a sense of sincere regret that I note your departure from your post here for the United States. I have, however, realized for some time that your personal affairs required your presence at home, and that you were staying during the national and local elections at my request only at considerable personal sacrifice.

As special assistant to the Chief, Government Section, since early in 1946, you have devoted yourself indefatigably to the democratization of Japan. The advice and untiring assistance which you gave in the preparation of legislative programs during the several sessions of the National Diet contributed materially to the successful formulation and adoption of laws of a progressive and enlightened character fully in keeping with the liberal spirit of the new Constitution of Japan.

Nor can I commend too highly the vision and judgment which you exhibited in the development of plans for the deconcentration of political and economic power in Japan and the establishment of a social pattern in which a system of private enterprise may function free from monopolistic influences and totalitarian controls. In fact, the zeal, patience, and initiative with which you performed your manifold day-to-day duties have won the deep respect and admiration of all your colleagues in this headquarters, as well as my own gratitude and appreciation. We will all miss you.

With best wishes for your continued success, I am,

Very sincerely,

(Signed) COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Brigadier General, United States Army,
Chief, Government Section.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess now, until 9 o'clock on Monday morning.

(Thereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 9 a. m. Monday, March 31, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, MARCH 31, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director or research.

Senator FERGUSON. Come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you put into the record the citation of the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a correction of the previous statement.

The American Friends of the Chinese People, which was the organization that sponsored China Today, was cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives in its report of March 29, 1944, pages 40 and 147. It was not in existence at the time the Attorney General's list was promulgated. That is why it is not on his list.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean it had passed out of existence?

Mr. MANDEL. It had ceased existing at the time the Attorney General's list was put out.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't actually know why it wasn't on the Attorney General's list; do you?

Mr. MANDEL. I know only that the organization did not exist at the time the first Attorney General's list was put out.

Mr. FANELLI. I think it ought to be noted the Attorney General's list has many organizations that are out of existence such as the American League for Peace and Democracy. That is just for your information, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS ARTHUR BISSON, BERKELEY, CALIF. ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH A. FANELLI, ESQ.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bisson, have you written in justification of the Soviet-German Pact?

Mr. BISSON. I have not, so far as I know.

Mr. FANELLI. He has one correction in his testimony of Saturday at any point where it is convenient.

Senator FERGUSON. Do it now.

Mr. BISSON. My position of mascot of Pacific Affairs was associate editor, not acting editor. The same is true for Michael Greenberg. In these years, Mr. Holland or Mr. Carter was the editor. What I wanted to indicate here is that I did not have editorial responsibility at the time, as this masthead shows.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did the masthead read, "associate editor?"

Mr. BISSON. Associate editor; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you perform the duties that an editor would normally perform?

Mr. BISSON. I performed on occasion routine editorial administration. I did not have editorial responsibility.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who decided what was going into the magazine?

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Carter when he was editor or Mr. Holland.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, himself, personally submitted manuscripts and decided what to reject and accept?

Mr. BISSON. Sometimes we had editorial sessions in which the whole group of editors would meet. There would be discussions there. The final decision in those discussions always lay with Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make recommendations to him?

Mr. BISSON. We all made recommendations, depending on what we felt about all of this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you the top man on the publication except for Mr. Carter?

Mr. BISSON. May I see the masthead of the Pacific Affairs?

Mr. SOURWINE. From your memory, not from the masthead.

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Belshaw was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there someone over you except Mr. Carter?

Mr. BISSON. I would like to see the masthead.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you remember?

Mr. BISSON. My memory is "No."

Mr. MORRIS. I want to refresh the witness' recollection by referring to our exhibit No. 71, which appears on page 307 of the public transcript. This is a letter from Wilma Fairbank to you dated October 19, 1943. Wilma Fairbanks writes:

> DEAR ART: Harriet writes me that Chien Tuan-Sheng's article on local government is going to be published in the December issue of Pacific Affairs. I understand that you are now acting editor.

Mr. BISSON. "I understand"—she wasn't certain. I think that is quite clear and what she is saying is that she thinks I am the editor and would like me to take this into consideration. She wasn't certain. That would be my interpretation of it.

I assure you the point here is whether an article should go in or not and that was up to Mr. Carter.

Mr. FANELLI. You have answered the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the question put to the witness, "Did you support the Hitler-Stalin Pact?" I would like to introduce into the record an article that appeared in Amerasia of September 1938, signed "TAB," which is entitled "Japan Picks Up the Pieces."

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your article?

Mr. BISSON. That is my article.

Mr. FANELLI. Let me see it, please.

Mr. MORRIS. I will show you this next article in order to save time.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you say about that article?

Mr. BISSON. I have not had a chance to complete reading it yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why haven't you had a chance to complete reading it?

Mr. BISSON. I would like to have my counsel read this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Mr. Fanelli know whether you wrote this?

Mr. FANELLI. I would like to know what he has been asked and is being asked.

Senator FERGUSON. We are trying to find his knowledge.

Mr. BISSON. I have said I wrote it.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the answer we are waiting for.

Mr. MORRIS. I now offer you this article from Soviet Russia Today.

Mr. FANELLI. Senator, I have no objection to its being in the record, but it doesn't show any support of the Russian-China Pact.

Senator FERGUSON. It will speak for itself.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you the May 1941 issue of China Today and on page 5 is an article entitled "The Soviet-Japanese Pact in Historical Perspective," by T. A. Bisson. I ask you if you wrote that.

Mr. BISSON. I wrote that article.

May I look at it in more detail?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. FANELLI. Would you mind waiting a minute while I read it, if you are going to ask him about this?

Mr. MORRIS. Counsel has asked permission to read the article, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long is the article?

Mr. FANELLI. Two pages. It will take me 2 minutes. I have not previously seen this article. I take it he is going to ask about its contents.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you plan to ask Mr. Fanelli any questions?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Why should counsel read it?

Mr. MORRIS. I have no reason.

Senator FERGUSON. It is what the witness knows about it, not counsel, unless there is some constitutional question in it, or legal questions that you do not want to answer on the ground that it would tend to incriminate you.

Mr. BISSON. May I consult with counsel? If so, I think it would be necessary for him to read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you identify it as an article you have written?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you known counsel?

Mr. BISSON. About a week.

Senator FERGUSON. Who introduced you to your counsel?

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Maxwell Stewart.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you been in Washington now?

Mr. BISSON. Since Friday night?

Senator FERGUSON. Last Friday night?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first meet your counsel? You said about a week.

Mr. BISSON. Half a week.

Senator FERGUSON. A half a week?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. When did you meet your counsel?

Mr. Bisson. I first met my counsel Friday night.

Senator Ferguson. Who took you to meet your counsel?

Mr. Bisson. I went by myself.

Senator Ferguson. Nobody with you?

Mr. Bisson. Nobody was with me.

Senator Ferguson. Was he in his office or in his home?

Mr. Bisson. He was at his office.

Senator Ferguson. You said that Maxwell Stewart introduced you to your counsel.

Mr. Bisson. By introduced, I took to mean, got me in touch with him.

Senator Ferguson. When did you contact Mr. Maxwell Stewart about counsel?

Mr. Bisson. Mr. Stewart telephoned me in Berkeley, Calif.

Senator Ferguson. He telephoned you, or did you telephone him?

Mr. Bisson. He telephoned to me.

Senator Ferguson. Had you been in contact with Maxwell Stewart before?

Mr. Bisson. I had not.

Senator Ferguson. Who is Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. Bisson. You mean in terms of his business position?

Senator Ferguson. What is his business?

Mr. Bisson. I think he is head of a public affairs committee, puts out some pamphlets.

Senator Ferguson. He is the head of a public affairs committee that puts out pamphlets. What kind of pamphlets?

Mr. Bisson. I am not sufficiently aware of the type of pamphlets.

Senator Ferguson. How long have you known Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. Bisson. I have known Maxwell Stewart 15—20 years, a long time.

Senator Ferguson. Was he ever on the Institute of Pacific Relations with you?

Mr. Bisson. He was not, not that I know of.

Senator Ferguson. Did he ever work in Government?

Mr. Bisson. I do not think so.

Senator Ferguson. When did Maxwell Stewart get in touch with you?

Mr. Bisson. You mean the telephone call to which I referred?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. When was that?

Mr. Bisson. To the best of my knowledge it was Wednesday.

Senator Ferguson. Last Wednesday, Maxwell Stewart called you in California?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. When were you subpenaed?

Mr. Bisson. The telegram arrived on Tuesday, I think.

Senator Ferguson. The telegram arrived on Tuesday of last week saying that you were to come here?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. And Maxwell Stewart called you on Wednesday?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your conversation with Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. Maxwell Stewart said that he understood I was to testify here in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. He understood you were going to testify here in Washington, and what else?

Mr. BISSON. And suggested if I needed a lawyer he could recommend one.

Senator FERGUSON. What else?

Mr. BISSON. Then he gave me his telephone number.

Senator FERGUSON. Maxwell Stewart's telephone number?

Mr. BISSON. No; Mr. Fanelli's telephone number.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell him you wanted a lawyer?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You realize that many witnesses have appeared without lawyers?

Mr. BISSON. I did not so realize.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know a witness in a court case to have a lawyer? Have you ever appeared as a witness in a court case?

Mr. BISSON. I have not. I am rather inexperienced in legal matters.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever attended a court trial?

Mr. BISSON. I don't know as I actually have.

Senator FERGUSON. You don't think you have?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever known a witness to have a lawyer before?

Mr. BISSON. I just wouldn't know the answer to that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the only conversation you had with Maxwell Stewart? You are under oath, you understand.

Mr. BISSON. No; that is not the only conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what the conversation was that you had with Maxwell Stewart. I have been trying to get it.

Mr. BISSON. I also had a conversation with Maxwell Stewart in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. BISSON. Friday.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to New York and meet Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you meet him in New York?

Mr. BISSON. I met him at his offices.

Senator FERGUSON. He has an office in New York?

Mr. BISSON. He has.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he telephone you from Washington or telephone you from New York?

Mr. BISSON. He did not telephone me.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. BISSON. Oh, you mean on the day that we are now speaking of, or earlier?

Senator FERGUSON. Now you told me that he telephoned you last Wednesday.

Mr. BISSON. But we are now speaking about Friday, and I am asking you whether you are speaking of Friday or Wednesday.

Senator FERGUSON. I am talking about your first telephone call from Maxwell Stewart.

Mr. BISSON. That is exactly what I was not clear about. Now I am clear about it.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you have your first call from Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. On Wednesday afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. From where?

Mr. BISSON. I don't know as he exactly stated. I presume he was in New York City.

Senator FERGUSON. You presume he was. You were where?

Mr. BISSON. In Berkeley.

Senator FERGUSON. How long did the telephone call take?

Mr. BISSON. I suppose 3 or 4 minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say to him? What did he say to you?

Mr. BISSON. I have told you what we said.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the only conversation? He said: "You are going to be subpenaed?"

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. "You are going to be subpenaed?"

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. "Do you want a lawyer?"

Mr. BISSON. He asked me whether I needed a lawyer.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say?

Mr. BISSON. I said I did not have one and I would like to have one.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he name the lawyer?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you who would pay for the lawyer?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask him?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything said about paying the lawyer?

Mr. BISSON. There was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you a contract now to pay your lawyer?

Mr. BISSON. I have.

Senator FERGUSON. How much?

Mr. BISSON. $250.

Senator FERGUSON. For what, for a day?

Mr. BISSON. For a day.

Senator FERGUSON. A day?

Mr. BISSON. No, $250.

Senator FERGUSON. For the whole appearance?

Mr. BISSON. Yes. This was originally understood to be only a day's appearance.

Senator FERGUSON. It was to be $250. Were you to pay it personally?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you pay any down?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you make an appointment with Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get to New York to see him if you did not make an appointment?

Mr. BISSON. I went down to New York City to see him.

Senator FERGUSON. You told us the conversation on Wednesday and there is nothing in it about you going to New York.

Mr. BISSON. There is nothing to prevent me from going to New York when I got here in Washington, is there?

Senator FERGUSON. Not a thing.

Mr. BISSON. That is exactly what I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You came to Washington when?

Mr. BISSON. I came to Washington on Friday morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to see your counsel?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you go in Washington?

Mr. BISSON. I did not go anywhere in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get off the train or plane?

Mr. BISSON. I was on a plane.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get off the plane?

Mr. BISSON. I got off the plane, asked whether I could purchase an extension to New York, and returned to the plane.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you do that?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact anybody while you were here in Washington?

Mr. BISSON. I did not. I merely had time to make the shift.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you change your mind about going on to New York?

Mr. BISSON. I didn't change my mind. The Government TR called for a San Francisco to Washington trip. I could not change that. What I could do was to extend it on my own funds.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have another conversation on the telephone with Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Where were you to meet Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. I was not. We made no arrangements to meet.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went on to New York?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know where Maxwell Stewart's office was in New York?

Mr. BISSON. I did not know the exact address.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go on to New York?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Who else did you see in New York?

Mr. BISSON. I saw Mr. Holland.

Senator FERGUSON. You saw Mr. Holland?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see anybody else?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Is Maxwell Stewart a lawyer?

Mr. BISSON. No; not as far as I know.

Senator FERGUSON. He is a public-relations man?

Mr. BISSON. I would not call him a public-relations man.

Senator FERGUSON. What is on his office door?
Mr. BISSON. Public Affairs Committee.
Senator FERGUSON. Committee for what?
Mr. BISSON. The committee publishes pamphlets. It does not necessarily mean—I do not think he operates for any person as a public relations expert in terms of his business.
Senator FERGUSON. What kind of pamphlets does he publish? What are the pamphlets?
Mr. BISSON. I have not seen them for many years. They are small pamphlets, something of this size, a little larger, various subjects, most of which I think are domestic.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you go to see Stewart before you went to see Holland?
Mr. BISSON. I did.
Senator FERGUSON. You went to see Stewart first?
Mr. BISSON. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. You didn't have an appointment with him?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Senator FERGUSON. You are sure about that?
Mr. BISSON. That is right. He is my friend.
Senator FERGUSON. What was your conversation with Stewart about?
Mr. BISSON. It resolved generally around the procedures in a committee hearing of this kind with hints to help me out in conducting myself.
Senator FERGUSON. How to conduct yourself?
Mr. BISSON. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. What did he tell you about that?
Mr. BISSON. Well, there are a number of points we discussed. I suppose I can remember some of them.
One was to try to keep cool. Another was to make sure you knew the question before you attempted to answer it. Another was to look at a document that was read to you.
Senator FERGUSON. Look at it when it was read to you?
Mr. BISSON. If I am not familiar with its contents.
Senator FERGUSON. To have your counsel read the document also?
Mr. BISSON. No.
Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you that?
Mr. BISSON. No, he did not say that. Just to make sure that I had the content of a document on which I was being questioned if my memory was not complete about it.
I do not remember any other details. He thought we should—it was almost lunch time then—go out for lunch.
Senator FERGUSON. How long did you talk with Maxwell Stewart?
Mr. BISSON. I suppose it was 15 or 20 minutes. We then telephoned Mr. Holland and made a luncheon appointment with him.
Senator FERGUSON. You and Stewart went to Holland?
Mr. BISSON. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. And had luncheon with Holland?
Mr. BISSON. That is right.
Senator FERGUSON. What did you talk about there?
Mr. BISSON. In general, the same problems.
Senator FERGUSON. How to conduct yourself before a committee?
Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk about Owen Lattimore's testimony?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Was his name mentioned?

Mr. BISSON. I don't believe it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Think a minute.

Mr. BISSON. To the best of my knowledge, his name was not even mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Mr. Stewart say that he had talked to counsel, that the counsel would take your case?

Mr. BISSON. Yes. I think he said that he had talked to Mr. Fanelli.

Senator FERGUSON. And Mr. Fanelli would take your case?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you that Mr. Fanelli had any experience in this particular case?

Mr. BISSON. That is, my case?

Senator FERGUSON. No, in the IPR case.

Mr. BISSON. No; I don't think so, except that he told me he had been his lawyer here when he was here.

Senator FERGUSON. And Mr. Fanelli had represented Mr. Maxwell Stewart as a witness before the committee?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you knew Maxwell Stewart had been a witness here?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you as to whether Mr. Fanelli had represented anybody else before the committee?

Mr. BISSON. He did not.

Senator FERGUSON. That he had gotten other people to go to Mr. Fanelli to have Mr. Fanelli as a lawyer before this committee?

Mr. BISSON. He did not. We did not discuss any of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you discuss Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BISSON. We did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he mentioned?

Mr. BISSON. Not that I remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you that Mr. Fanelli was the man who had given certain evidence to the attorney for Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. BISSON. He did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't he tell you that?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you that Mr. Fanelli had given evidence to Mr. Fortas, Abe Fortas?

Mr. BISSON. He did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the name of Abe Fortas mentioned?

Mr. BISSON. It was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk about any deportation cases?

Mr. BISSON. We did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Have we got about your conversation with Holland?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Were any of these documents mentioned?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator FERGUSON. How long was your conversation with Holland?

Mr. Bisson. There was no separate conversation with Holland. It was a general conversation in the office and then we had lunch. As a matter of fact, as I remember, finally only Mr. Stewart and I went to lunch.

Senator Ferguson. Holland did not go with you?

Mr. Bisson. Holland finally did not go to lunch.

Senator Ferguson. Then you and Stewart went over to Holland's office?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. How long a time did you spend there?

Mr. Bisson. I would estimate a half or three-quarters of an hour.

Senator Ferguson. You were about three-quarters of an hour at Holland's office?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Who suggested getting Holland?

Mr. Bisson. I expect I said that, since Mr. Holland is acting as head of the IPR it would probably be well if I saw him.

Senator Ferguson. Who called Holland?

Mr. Bisson. Maxwell Stewart did.

Senator Ferguson. Then you went to lunch with Stewart?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Could you give us the conversation?

Mr. Bisson. I am afraid I don't recall any of the details. We passed on to general subjects then. We were discussing family matters, my son's position, and so on.

Senator Ferguson. What is that?

Mr. Bisson. We had certain matters to deal with with reference to my son, and I asked him about his family. We were discussing mainly family matters over lunch.

Senator Ferguson. Did you call the lawyer—he was not your lawyer then, because you had not talked to him——

Mr. Bisson. No.

Senator Ferguson. Did Stewart call him?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Senator Ferguson. Did anybody call him?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Senator Ferguson. How did you know you were going to meet him Friday?

Mr. Bisson. I did not know I was going to meet him Friday.

Senator Ferguson. When did you leave New York?

Mr. Bisson. I left New York right after lunch.

Senator Ferguson. What time?

Mr. Bisson. On the 1:30 train.

Senator Ferguson. You arrived here at what time?

Mr. Bisson. I think it was around 5 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you go then?

Mr. Bisson. I went to my hotel.

Senator Ferguson. Where?

Mr. Bisson. Hotel Stratford.

Senator Ferguson. Then where?

Mr. Bisson. I then telephoned Mr. Haaser.

Senator Ferguson. Who is Mr. Haaser?

Mr. Bisson. I was directed to telephone him when I arrived.

Senator Ferguson. By whom?

Mr. Bisson. Who directed me to do that?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Bisson. The telegram here.
Senator Ferguson. Did you get him on the phone?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Then what?
Mr. Bisson. I reported I had arrived. He said the hearing was scheduled for——
Senator Ferguson. About what time was that?
Mr. Bisson. I suppose that must have been about 5:30, a quarter of 6.
Senator Ferguson. Then you had not contacted the lawyer yet?
Mr. Bisson. No.
Senator Ferguson. When did you contact him?
Mr. Bisson. I made a telephone call to him after that.
Senator Ferguson. You had his number because Maxwell Stewart gave it to you?
Mr. Bisson. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Was he at his office?
Mr. Bisson. Yes; he was at his office.
Senator Ferguson. You went to the office?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Then you appeared Saturday morning?
Mr. Bisson. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have some questions, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. Just one or two.
What time did your plane get into Washington Friday morning?
Mr. Bisson. I think it was about 9 o'clock. I am not exactly certain.
Mr. Sourwine. What time did you take off for New York?
Mr. Bisson. I think it was about a half an hour.
Mr. Sourwine. That would be about 9:30 that the plane took off for New York?
Mr. Bisson. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. What time did you get to New York?
Mr. Bisson. As I remember, the flight took about an hour or a little over.
Mr. Sourwine. You got into LaGuardia Field?
Mr. Bisson. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. That would be about 10:30 or a little later?
Mr. Bisson. 10:30 or a quarter to 11.
Mr. Sourwine. What time did you get into Manhattan?
Mr. Bisson. I had to wait for the bags. I went in the limousine. I suppose it was 11 o'clock or 11:15.
Mr. Sourwine. Where did you get off? Where did the limousine leave you?
Mr. Bisson. As I remember, I got off at the uptown stop.
Mr. Sourwine. Where was that?
Mr. Bisson. I wouldn't remember the exact street. It was around Fifty-seventh Street, something like that.
Mr. Sourwine. Fifty-seventh and what?
Mr. Bisson. Lexington.
Mr. Sourwine. Then what did you do?
Mr. Bisson. My problem was I did not know where to get off the limousine because I did not know the address of Mr. Stewart's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is around a quarter to 12?

Mr. BISSON. No; this is a quarter after 11.

So I went into a drug store or something, and looked at a telephone book, and found his address and got a taxicab and went to his office.

Mr. SOURWINE. How is he listed in the telephone book?

Mr. BISSON. I think I looked up Public Affairs Committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the Manhattan telephone directory?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is the office?

Mr. BISSON. The office—I am not exactly certain. It is down——

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you go?

Mr. BISSON. It was about 20 blocks downtown, I think, a little below Forty-second Street, around Fortieth Street.

Mr. SOURWINE. Fortieth and what?

Mr. BISSON. That is what I was trying to remember. I think it is on the east side of Fifth Avenue a couple of blocks.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all you can remember about it?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know the name of the building?

Mr. BISSON. I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it have a name?

Mr. BISSON. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You went there in a cab?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got there when? About 11:30?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just walked in on him unannounced?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was there?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You talked with him for a while?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr SOURWINE. Then one of you suggested calling Mr. Holland?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it was you?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then Mr. Stewart did call Mr. Holland?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. He found him in?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Stewart had talked to Mr. Holland before about your coming?

Mr. BISSON. I do not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know?

Mr. BISSON. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you made any contact with Mr. Holland by mail or otherwise to let him know you were coming?

Mr. BISSON. I had not.

Mr. SOURWINE. So you went over to Mr. Holland's, you and Mr. Stewart?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. In a cab?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. What time did you leave to go to Mr. Holland's office?

Mr. BISSON. I think we must have got to Mr. Holland's office about 12 o'clock. It may have been a little before or after.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you get right in to see him?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You talked with him for about how long?

Mr. BISSON. Well, our talk was interrupted. Mr. Shannon McCune came in. Maybe we talked for 10 or 15 minutes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. who?

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Shannon McCune.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know him?

Mr. BISSON. I know him to some extent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he with IPR?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does he do?

Mr. BISSON. I think he is a university teacher up in New York State somewhere, Syracuse, or something.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was he doing there? Do you know?

Mr. BISSON. He just happened to come into the office at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You talked with him for about 15 minutes in the group?

Mr. BISSON. No; he came in, he talked to Mr. Holland. Maxwell Stewart and I were on the side.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was an interruption?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you talked with Mr. Holland altogether about 15 minutes?

Mr. BISSON. I would say about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you went to lunch?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask Mr. Holland to go to lunch with you?

Mr. BISSON. I think he said he had another engagement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask him to go with you?

Mr. BISSON. No. We were going out to lunch, but he had another engagement.

Mr. SOURWINE. So it was then about 12:15; is that right?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You went out to lunch?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you eat near the office building there?

Mr. BISSON. No. We decided we didn't have too much time and we went down to the Pennsylvania Station eating house, I think one of the Savarin's there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take a cab down there?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were taking your bags with you?

Mr. BISSON. We went down in the subway.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were taking your bags with you from place to place?

Mr. BISSON. Yes. The reason we did that was that it was quicker and very convenient from 1 East Fifty-fourth Street. You get on the subway there.

Mr. Sourwine. Were you at 1 East Fifty-fourth Street?

Mr. Fanelli. I didn't hear the question.

Mr. Sourwine. Nobody asked you what you heard.

Mr. Fanelli. I am entitled to know the questions. I just didn't hear that. He had his hand over his mouth.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Fanelli has repeatedly interrupted here. This time he has interrupted at a very important point in the examination.

Were you at 1 East Fifty-fourth Street?

Mr. Bisson. We were at Mr. Holland's office. That is the address.

Mr. Fanelli. I will object to "repeated interruptions." I have not made repeated interruptions.

Senator Ferguson. The record will speak for itself.

Mr. Fanelli. I know. He need not describe it that way. It is not true.

Senator Ferguson. You may proceed.

Mr. Sourwine. You took the subway down to the Pennsylvania Station?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. You ate at the Savarin?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Just the two of you?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. Then you got on the 1 o'clock train for Washington?

Mr. Bisson. 1:30.

Mr. Sourwine. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fanelli. May I read this document? I am awaiting your ruling on it. I understood there was an objection to my reading it.

Senator Ferguson. No; there is no objection to you reading it, but we do not want to delay the examination.

Mr. Sourwine. Neither of those two items identified previously by the witness has been offered for the record. The purpose for waiting has been to give you an opportunity to read it.

Mr. Fanelli. I have been listening to your questions. I cannot do two things at once.

Mr. Sourwine. Is it your thought that you have the right or privilege to object to the offer of any of these for the record?

Mr. Fanelli. I have not objected to the offer. I understand this committee does not permit me to object.

I may make a suggestion. I have not objected to the offer. I would merely like to understand what is going on. I may have to confer with my witness about it.

Senator Ferguson. Those two documents will be filed for the record. You may proceed now with the questioning.

(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits No. 716 and No. 717 and are as follows:)

Exhibit No. 716

[Source: Amerasia, vol. III, September–February 1939–40]

Topics In Brief

JAPAN PICKS UP THE PIECES

Somewhere in Europe, possibly in Switzerland, a Japanese mission is cooling its heels. Responding to Mr. Hitler's personal invitation, it had left Tokyo late in July to attend the Nazi Congress at Nuremberg. The Party consisted of General

Terauchi, Admiral Osumi, and two distinguished Japanese businessmen. Its announced purpose was the strengthening of Japan's ties with Berlin and Rome under the "anti-Comintern" pact. Some reports indicated that the long-deferred military alliance with the Axis powers was about to be concluded, and that the Japanese mission was to touch up the final details. The group landed in Europe at the moment when the Soviet-German nonaggression pact was announced. Since then the Nuremberg Congress has been called off, thus completing the discomfiture of Japan's envoys.

The plight of this mission reflects in miniature the larger predicament into which Japan has been plunged by the Soviet-German pact. Throughout the first week, Japan's militarists and politicians fumbled for an answer to the acute dilemma. At Berlin they presented a feeble protest against violation of the "spirit" of the "anti-Comintern" pact, while privately they seethed at the lack of "advance information" on a move which affected their international position so profoundly. In China some of the acts of the Japanese military exhibited a childish exasperation; the slappings administered to German nationals obviously provided no answer to their problem.

Japan's difficulties were serious enough before conclusion of the nonaggression pact, which has greatly strengthened the possibility of effective intervention on behalf of China by the Soviet Union. For several months the Japanese leaders, counting on the European crisis to immobilize all opponents, had been pursuing a recklessly provocative policy in the Far East. Hostilities on the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier were permitted to reach serious proportions, apparently in the belief that they might discourage the formation of an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. At the same time, the Japanese were carrying on a bitter campaign against foreign rights and interests in China. The effort to single out Britain for special attack at Tientsin was too transparent to go down; it was obvious that American and French interests stood or fell with those of Britain. From the beginning of Japan's campaign in the spring, in fact, there had been definite collaboration by London, Paris, and Washington in defense of their position in China. Secretary Hull's denunciation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty must have made this point clear in Tokyo, if it had not been realized earlier. But by this time Japan had gone too far to retreat. It was carrying the fight directly to Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and indirectly to the United States and France. For international support, it was relying on its "anti-Comintern" partners—Germany and Italy.

On the eve of the current European crisis, Japan's campaign had been temporarily checkmated. The essential issue revolved around the scope of the concessions which Japan could milk from the Craigie-Arita "formula" of July 24. In the beginning, the prospects appeared hopeful to Tokyo. The Japanese leaders were gambling for big stakes. Beyond the immediate policing issues affecting the British Concession at Tientsin, they looked for Britain's cooperation in consolidating their economic domination of "occupied" China, particularly in currency matters. And still further, they aimed to secure Britain's aid in coercing China into a "peace" maker, Japan hoped to gain a victory in China which it had proved unable to win by force of arms.

In the beginning of the Craigie-Arita negotiations, all went well. Secretary Hull's denunciation of the trade treaty, however, had considerably strengthened Britain's hand at Tokyo. After making the expected compromise on the policing of the Tientsin Concession, the British negotiators balked. Japan's demands on currency and other economic issues in North China were given lengthy consideration, involving consultation with Washington and Paris officials. On August 18th Britain essentially rejected these demands by stating that they could only be dealt with in multilateral conversations involving all interested powers. The stage was set for another turn of the Japanese screw. Ominous signs of renewed army pressure on British centers in China were evident as the European crisis entered its rising curve. At Shanghai a shooting affray, in which a British sergeant killed two China policemen of the local puppet regime in self-defense, was taken as the point of departure. Japanese military and naval officials met and conferred, demands were made by the local Japanese-dominated authorities, and a force of 6,000 Japanese troops was landed near Shanghai. At Hongkong, meanwhile, Japanese military forces had occupied the mainland areas along the Crown Colony's border, and extensive military-naval precautions were taken by the Hongkong authorities.

Announcement of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact occurred as Japan's preparations for renewed pressure on Britain were reaching a climax. The blow struck Tokyo with crushing force. Only a month before it had suffered the shock

of an action which registered the disapproval of the United States. Now it suddenly found itself deserted by Germany. It had nothing but its own strength—or lack of strength—to undergird the reckless moves which it engaged upon. An unfinished war with China, hostilities with Russia on Outer Mongolia's border, a serious conflict with Britain, latent tension with France, and the undisguised hostility of the United States—all these to carry on its own shoulders, plus the unpredictable effects on the sudden access of strength to the Soviet Union in the Far East. It was high time to reconsider and take stock of the new situation.

The first reactions were evident in China. A sudden damper was put on the anti-British campaign. No more was heard of the demands on the Shanghai Municipal Council, or of the 6,000 Japanese troops landed in the neighboring area. At Hongkong the Japanese troops were withdrawn from the borders of the Colony, and local Japanese officials discounted any talk of aggressive moves.

A more significant reaction appeared in Tokyo on August 28th, when the Hiranuma Cabinet resigned en bloc. The military-fascist extremists in Japan, who had been clamorously demanding an outright alliance with the Berlin-Rome axis, appear to have suffered their most decisive political set back of the past three years. Preliminary reports with regard to the composition of the new Cabinet indicate a decided falling off in the influence of army extremists. General Nobuyki Abe, the new Japanese premier, is not a member of the extremist clique; his past associations and record tend to place him among the more moderate of the army elements. Even the new War Minister, General Shunroku Hata, comes from a wing of the army that cannot be classified as extremist. Most significant of all is the consideration being given to the appointment of Mamoru Shigemitsu, now Ambassador to London, as Foreign Minister. Prior to his service in London, Shigemitsu held the post of Ambassador at Moscow for a period of several years. An old career diplomat of the civilian school, Shigemitsu will undoubtedly be called upon to play a conciliatory role in relation to the Western powers. Another sign of discomfiture of Japan's military-fascist exponents may be seen in the projected recall from Rome and Berlin of Toshio Shiratori and Lieutenant-General Hiroshi Oshima. These two Ambassadors participated in the original formation of the "anti-Comintern" pact in November 1936, and during recent months had actively campaigned to convert the pact into an outright military alliance.

After the events of recent months in China, the new Japanese leadership may expect to find some difficulty in convincing the Western powers that it comes honestly bearing an olive branch. The real test is whether Japan is willing to give up its brutal attempt to subjugate the Chinese people. Of this there is as yet no sign. The Abe Cabinet reaffirms its intention of establishing the "new order in East Asia"—an "order" which involves not only the conquest of China but the eventual elimination of all Western interests in the Far East. The scenes at Tientsin are of too recent memory to be erased by a sudden shift of tactics dictated by temporary necessity. If cleverly applied, conciliatory tactics hold out more danger to China's efforts to maintain its independence than the recklessly arrogant policy of the Japanese extremists. To Britain, in particular, they would appeal with especial force at the present time. A bribe may often be more effective than a blow. In order to conclude a "deal" that would sacrifice China, Britain would have to receive a *quid pro quo*. Is the present Japanese Cabinet able to make such an offer? And would it be garnished with the plea that Japan must be conserved as a makeweight against the increased strength and influence which the Soviet Union can exert in the Far East? It is to be hoped that any such offers, if tendered, will be recognized for what they are worth.

In the ultimate disposition of Far Eastern affairs, moreover, reckoning must be had with another power—the United States. Editorial reaction to Secretary Hull's denunciation of the Japanese-American trade treaty, as shown in a representative selection of newspapers from coast to coast, is indicative of what the American people have come to believe on the current issues of Far Eastern policy. Approval of Secretary Hull's move is virtually unanimous, while a surprisingly large majority favors implementation of this act by severance of America's trade in war materials with Japan. The result of a nationwide Gallup poll, announced on August 30th, shows that 81 percent of Americans approve the abrogation of the American-Japanese trade treaty, while 82 percent believe that the United States should refuse to sell war materials at the end of six months when the treaty expires. There can be little doubt that, short of a complete reversal of its attempt to dominate China, Japan can expect no aid or support from the United States. This country, as a result of our misnamed Neutrality Act, has already rendered—and is still rendering—far too much assistance to Japan's undeclared

war on the Chinese people. Today popular opinion overwhelmingly approves the adoption of measures which will bring to an end America's partnership with Japan's war makers. It would be unfortunate if small but powerful groups representing the vested interests of minorities should bring to bear sufficient influence to thwart this expressed will of the American people.

T. A. B.

EXHIBIT No. 717

[Source: China Today, May 1941]

THE SOVIET-JAPANESE PACT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(By T. A. Bisson)

Interpretations of the Soviet-Japanese pact have about equally the number of its interpreters. All sorts of motivations have been ascribed to it, some of which obviously cancel each other out. Hitlerian diplomacy may be very clever, but even the Nazis cannot square the circle. Germany cannot be at once the father of the pact and the object against which it is directed.

The plain fact seems to be that the pact was greeted with considerable reserve in Berlin and Rome. For this, the reasons are fairly obvious. Germany had hoped to induct the U. S. S. R. into the Axis-Japan alliance via a Soviet-Japanese agreement. It did not achieve this aim. The neutrality pact signed at Moscow on April 13 was clearly an independent transaction, which cuts two ways. If it bars Soviet aid to the United States and Britain in a war against Japan, it also bars Japanese aid to Germany in the event of a Soviet-German collision.

In concluding this agreement with Japan, as in its earlier pact with Germany, the Soviet Union joins neither of the opposing coalitions into which the world has been divided. Rather is the independence of its position strikingly demonstrated. To recognize this fact, it is only necessary to look at the course of Axis diplomacy during the war.

Last September Tokyo adhered to the Axis by signing the military alliance drafted by Hitler in Berlin. But the full scope of the Hitlerian project was still unrealized. It required the Soviet Union as a full-fledged member in order to be completed. Adherence of the U. S. S. R. would have rounded out the Axis-Japan alliance on a grand scale—Eurasian, two-continental. But the Soviet Union has not entered this projected military combination, any more than it entered the original Berlin-Rome Axis in August 1939. It has, instead, signed a separate nonaggression pact with Germany and a separate neutrallty pact with Japan, thus fending off both these powers and retaining the maximum degree of diplomatic independence for itself. There is nothing to prevent the Soviet Union from concluding neutrality or nonaggression pacts with Britain and the United States tomorrow, if these powers seriously desired such agreements. The major restriction on the Soviet Union's freedom of action comes in this respect—that it will not join the Anglo-American front in war against either Germany or Japan. This result, of course, is not especially welcome to those British or American circles which would like to see the U. S. S. R. come into the war on their side. They have merely the negative satisfaction that the Soviet Union is also pledged not to join the Axis-Japan alliance in war against the Anglo-American coalition.

What have been the historical factors which have led to the evolution of Soviet policy along these lines? For to those who are willing to look facts in the face, there is nothing mysterious or enigmatic about the development of Soviet policy during recent years. The Soviet-German pact of August 1939 was a logical result of the course taken by British diplomacy in Europe during the immediately preceding years. Similarly, the Soviet-Japanese pact of April 1941 is the logical outcome of British and American policy in the Far East since 1937.

At this time it is instructive to look back for a moment upon the Anglo-French diplomacy of appeasement in 1933–1939, to which the United States—by its embargo on the Spanish Loyalists and its failure to embargo the Japanese militarists—was also a party. In all three countries—Britain, France, and the United States—a large body of opinion condemned appeasement as suicidal for the democracies, argued that it served to strengthen Germany, Japan, and Italy and encourage the spread of their aggressions, and advocated a policy of collective restraint of the Fascist aggressors. At Geneva, through Maxim

Litvinov, the Soviet Union championed this policy of collective security and fought for its application by a united front of all powers opposed to Fascist aggression. The ruling groups in London, Paris, and Washington thought otherwise, and translated their belief into a series of actions which demonstrated their essential unity of outlook with the Fascist powers. Britain, France, and the United States stubbornly persisted in "building up" the aggressors by one surrender after another—the Anglo-German naval agreement, the Ethiopian fiasco, the rearmament of Germany, the Rhineland remilitarization, "nonintervention" in Spain, the Austrian occupation, and, finally, the Munich pact by which Czechoslovakia was sacrificed.

In the Far East, Britain, France, and the United States failed to extend effective help to China, but continued to arm Japan liberally. Official Washington, it must be reemphasized, did not oppose the diplomacy of appeasement but pursued a policy of "parallel action" which supported Chamberlain to the hilt. We twisted our neutrality laws in such a way as to ban the shipment of American arms to the Loyalists in Spain, even while we permitted an enormous flow of war supplies to Japan. American statutes were twisted and distorted, but there was no contradiction in the intent and effects of the policy which these distortions allowed us to pursue. It enabled the Fascist troops of Mussolini and Hitler to win in Spain, and it helped the Japanese armies to overrun China.

The betrayal of democracy by the democracies during the appeasement era is the factor mainly responsible for the difficulties in which we find ourselves today. It defeated the program of collective resistance to Fascist aggression, which could alone have maintained peace, and crushed the League of Nations. It started the train of "little nation" casualties—numbering Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Spain before the European war broke out in September 1939. It built up Germany's strength to the point at which Hitler could openly launch his drive for conquest and hegemony.

It also accomplished one further result. It drove the Soviet Union out of the concert of the democracies. The Munich Pact enforced a temporary international isolation of the U. S. S. R. Although Soviet interests were vitally affected by the decisions reached at Munich, Chamberlain and Daladier did not see fit to include the Soviet Union in the negotiations which decided Czechoslovakia's fate. The Munich Pact reduced to a travesty the mutual assistance treaties which the U. S. S. R. had concluded with Czechoslovakia and France. By breaking Czechoslovakia, moreover, Britain and France opened up a path for Hitler toward the Soviet Ukraine. Did they hope that Munich would usher in a German-Soviet war? Only nine months later these powers were seeking a military alliance with the U. S. S. R. at Moscow. The latter chose to reject this alliance, to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany, and to remain neutral in the ensuing war—a war, be it noted, caused not by the Soviet-German pact but by the Anglo-French-American policy of appeasement in the 1933–1939 era. In order to ensure peace, Britain, France and the United States would have been obliged to oppose Fascist aggression rather earlier, by some five years at least, than 1939. The Soviet Union chose to stay out of what it considered an imperialist war, which the Anglo-French-American rejection of a collective security program, designed to restrain the aggressors and keep the peace, had made possible.

When we turn to the Far East, we are struck by an amazing coincidence. The same broad pattern of events as occurred in Europe has been repeated there. The Anglo-American failure to restrain Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931–1933, indeed, marked the opening phase of the appeasement era, encouraging Hitler and Mussolini to follow Japan's example. After the Japanese wholesale assault on China began in 1937, the diplomatic parallel between European and Far Eastern appeasement becomes even more striking. Washington officials issued a continuous series of statements condemning Japan's activities, but the United States consistently supplied more than half of Japan's imports of war materials; if the British and Dutch empires are added in, the democracies have supplied more than three-quarters of such imports. In 1940, despite sharp declines in November and December, we still shipped Japan goods valued at $227 million, only $5 million less than the 1939 total. Nor have we ever given adequate aid to China—in munitions, which China needed most, support by either the United States or Britain has been negligible.

Our continued refusal to embargo Japan (even at the current rate we are still supplying more than $100,000,000 worth of goods annually to Japan, including the bulk of its petroleum imports) and to give adequate aid to China (plane shipments are just beginning on a very limited scale) has had the same

results in the Far East as the policy of appeasing Hitler and Mussolini had in Europe. It has kept Japan's military machine in good running gear, spread Japanese aggression from Manchuria to Indo-China, and raised the spectre of a Japanese onslaught against Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. And once again the Soviet Union, this time by a neutrality pact with Japan, has sharply dissociated itself from the logical outcome of Anglo-American policy in the Far East. The pact signifies quite clearly that the U. S. S. R. will take no part in a Japanese-American conflict, if such a conflict occurs. It means that the United States cannot expect Soviet assistance in a war against Japan, any more than Britain has received Soviet assistance it its war with Germany. The Soviet Union obviously feels that such conflicts have been made possible as much by British and American support of the German and Japanese aggressors, as by the aggressiveness of the Nazis and the Japanese militarists themselves. So far as lies in its power, it is evidently determined not to engage in them.

For Americans, therefore, the Soviet-Japanese pact constitutes a sharp challenge—a challenge to think through the implications of our Far Eastern policy. Some have been quick to say that the pact has freed Japan's hands for an attack in the south Pacific, and that it thus encourages a Japanese-American conflict. But if Japan's hands are really free for such an attack, which may be the subject of some doubt, what has actually freed them? What has spread Japan's aggression from Manchuria to Indo-China? It is not the neutrality pact signed at Moscow. It is rather the consistent unwillingness of the United States and Britain to oppose the spread of that aggression, either by effective embargoes against Japan or effective aid to China. If Britain and the United States must now prepare to fight Japan in the Far East, it is because of their own failure to oppose Japanese aggression in the past—first in 1931, but more especially since 1937.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the U. S. S. R. has been the single power that has consistently supported China's struggle against the Japanese invasion since 1937, not only by diplomatic notes but in actual deeds. Its loans to China, considerably larger than ours, have been translated into finished munitions for the Chinese armies; we have been satisfied to send trucks and petroleum. While our war trade with Japan boomed, the Soviet-Japanese trade turn-over rapidly dwindled from over 50 million yen in 1936 to a few hundred thousand yen in 1939–1940. Throughout the period since 1937, the Soviet Union was making it less possible for Japanese aggression to spread by offering real and consistent opposition to it. This opposition was not wholly without risk—it involved severe military conflicts with Japan on the borders of Manchoukuo in 1938 and 1939. Had we joined hands firmly with the Soviet Union after 1937 in opposing Japanese aggression, we could have long since brought it to a halt. We have not assumed the lesser risks of firm and unequivocal opposition to Japanese aggression, but we have accepted the greater risk of permitting it to spread and offering it aid and comfort in the process. We were loath to see the threat when Japan merely devastated China; today we see the threat of our tin and rubber supplies in southeast Asia quite clearly. The threat exists because of our policy—American, British and French policy—and not because of a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.

Nor has the Soviet Union, in signing this pact, agreed to give up its policy of extending aid and support to China. It has notified Chungking that it will continue to send military supplies to the Chinese armies. This aspect of the neutrality pact has, in fact, been sharply attacked by some of the more aggressive Japanese circles. The recognize the sharp distinction which Moscow has drawn—a distinction between maintenance of peaceful relations with Japan and its people, and continued opposition to Japanese aggression in China.

It is this distinction which many supporters of China's struggle in this country would like to see drawn by the American Government. The American people have no quarrel with the Japanese people. But they are distinctly opposed to Japanese aggression in China, and are anxious to see that adequate American aid is given to the Chinese people's struggle for freedom. They are not satisfied that Washington is applying this program with sufficient vigor. Concrete measures of support for China continue to lag. Complete and unequivocal denial of American aid to Japanese aggression has yet to be effected. Such a policy is still the best insurance against a Japanese-American war in the Pacific. Signs of hesitation on Washington's part, or any remnants of the old feeling that a "deal" might be arranged with Tokyo at China's expense, would be the surest invitation to catastrophe.

Mr. Bisson. Mr. Chairman, may I consult with my counsel on this question?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Bisson. I would like to consult with him as soon as he reads the article.

Senator Ferguson. You want to consult with him about that article?

Mr. Bisson. I want to consult with him about the problem that has arisen at this point in the hearing.

Senator Ferguson. What is the problem?

Mr. Bisson. The material that has just been submitted and the questions that are presumably to be asked.

Senator Ferguson. If you want to confer with your counsel you may.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions to ask after that point. They are on a different matter. Perhaps we can save time and get them in while counsel is reading that. The witness can interrupt counsel if he feels at any point he needs to consult him. These are other matters entirely.

What does the phrase "Corbett group" mean to you?

Mr. Bisson. How would you spell that?

Mr. Sourwine. C-o-r-b-e-t-t—Corbett group.

Mr. Bisson. I have never heard of it.

Oh! Corbett group.

Mr. Sourwine. That is what I said.

Mr. Bisson. Is that in terms of a Mr. Corbett who wrote a study of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Sourwine. I asked you what the phrase meant to you.

Mr. Bisson. It means nothing to me.

Mr. Sourwine. Were you in Peking, China, in the winter of 1937–38?

Mr. Bisson. Up to nearly or about the beginning of December. Maybe I was there the first week in December.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. John K. Fairbank there at the time you were there? The winter of 1937?

Mr. Bisson. I do not think so.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see him there in Peking at that time?

Mr. Bisson. I do not remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mrs. Fairbank there, Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. Bisson. I don't remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Owen Lattimore there?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mrs. Lattimore there?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see him?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Frequently?

Mr. Bisson. I would not say frequently; occasionally.

Mr. Sourwine. Socially?

Mr. Bisson. Socially.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Mr. Reischauer there at that time?

Mr. Bisson. Yes; he was.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see him?

Mr. Bisson. I think I saw him once or twice.

Mr. SOURWINE. Socially?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend a meeting of the World Affairs Council of Northern California?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend such a meeting in December of 1949?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that meeting, did you do anything indicating that you favored reorganizing Communist China?

Mr. BISSON. I would suppose that in a discussion group in the course of the conference I may have so indicated; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any memory as to whether you did?

Mr. BISSON. I think I probably did.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in favor of it at that time?

Mr. BISSON. I was. May I extend my answer to that question, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask one question? What part of November was it?

Mr. SOURWINE. It was December.

Mr. BISSON. December.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we were at war.

Mr. BISSON. No; that is exactly the point. We were not at war with Korea at that time, and at that time there was considerable sentiment in favor of a recognition of the Peking government. It was by no means a limited group that so felt that way about the situation at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. The entire World Affairs Council, or the majority of it at this meeting was in favor of recognizing Communist China; wasn't it?

Mr. BISSON. I have here a statement of the world trade department of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. This appeared, I suppose, about 2 months before the conference, October 18, 1949. Under a heading, "Realistic policy in China recommended by chamber," there are these statements:

Adoption of a realistic and positive policy by the United States toward the Far East, particularly China, in place of the present watchful waiting by the State Department has been strongly urged by the chamber's board of directors. Recommendations of the board include first, continued American private business and trade with the Chinese as far as possible without dangerously increasing that country's war potential.

(2) Give all possible aid to and continue financial support of American privately endowed enterprises, educational, medical, and missionary.

(3) Keep open our Embassy and consular offices in China, staffing them with the ablest personnel available so that we may meet with our best capacities the serious problems still ahead.

(4) Accept the fact that we may soon have to recognize in such areas as they control the Communist Government as the de facto government, whether we like it or not.

This established policy is crystallized in our new recommendations into a strong, clear position now necessary in the face of indecision of crises.

Recognition of the Chinese Government as the de facto government is essential. It is thoroughly realistic and necessary. Nothing could be gained by declaring an embargo against the Communists.

I merely want to indicate I was not adopting a unique position at that time.

As you have indicated, most of the conference which is now under reference seemed to favor that policy. The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce also did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You recall the question I asked you a few minutes ago about Corbett?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I direct you attention to page 253 of our printed hearings, part 1, where appears the text of a letter dated May 29 from Edward C. Carter to W. L. Holland, the last paragraph of which reads:

> Last week we had a special meeting on Soviet policy in the Pacific made up of some members of Corbett's group, but it was an ad hoc meeting. Those present were: Kathleen Barnes, Lockwood, Grajdanzev, Corbett, Muhle, Bisson, Moore, Field, James Allen, Bill Carter, E. C. Carter, and Owen Lattimore, and Leaning.

Mr. BISSON. I had completely forgotten that particular meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does this refresh your memory?

Mr. BISSON. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about that meeting.

Mr. BISSON. I remember nothing at all about it. If I had remembered anything about it, I think I would have recalled when you first mentioned it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what is meant by "Corbett's group"?

Mr. BISSON. It is still very vague to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you remember about it?

Mr. BISSON. Apparently I can only recall what you just stated, that this seems to be a group that is studying Soviet policy problems.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember any of the members whose names I read there?

Mr. BISSON. I do know—remember as attending that meeting?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. BISSON. You are asking do I know these members?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a Lockwood? Would that have been William Lockwood?

Mr. BISSON. Probably; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a Grajdanzev?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that have been Andrew Grajdanvev?

Mr. BISSON. Probably.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Corbett?

Mr. BISSON. Yes. That is why I originally asked you whether this was Charles Corbett.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it Percy Corbett?

Mr. BISSON. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know both a Charles and a Percy Corbett?

Mr. BISSON. Not to my knowledge; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a Corbett connected with the IPR?

Mr. BISSON. Yes, it must have been Percy Corbett.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was his connection with the IPR?

Mr. BISSON. I remember him as doing a study on international peace problems. Is there any indication he published a book on international paths to peace, or something of that kind?

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no indication right here as to what he may have published, Mr. Bisson.

Do you know a Mr. Muhle?

Mr. BISSON. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know anyone with that name?

Mr. BISSON. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You appeared to have attended a meeting with him for the purpose of studying Soviet policy.

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember that person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Moore?

Mr. BISSON. I would have to know his first name. There are lots of Moores.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been a Miss or Mrs. Moore?

Mr. BISSON. It could have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could it have been Harriet Moore?

Mr. BISSON. It might have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any memory as to whether it was?

Mr. BISSON. I have no memory as to whether it was at that particular meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a Mr. Field?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. BISSON. I would not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of a meeting?

Mr. BISSON. Not of this meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a James Allen?

Mr. BISSON. Would you spell that?

Mr. SOURWINE. A-l-l-e-n.

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know a James Allen?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Apparently you attended a meeting with him.

Mr. BISSON. That meeting has completely passed from my memory.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a Bill Carter?

Mr. BISSON. I do; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. BISSON. I think he is the son of E. C. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. E. C. Carter?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know a Mr. Leaning?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the best of your knowledge, sir, do you know, or did you ever have any reason to believe, that any of these persons who have been named as attending this meeting were under Communist discipline or had voluntarily, knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Community Party members in the furtherance of Communist Party objectives?

Mr. BISSON. Would you read the list?

Mr. SOURWINE. Kathleen Barnes.

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Lockwood.

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Grajdanzev.
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Corbett.
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Muhle.
Mr. Bisson. I don't think I know him.
Mr. Sourwine. Moore.
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Field.
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Bill Carter.
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. E. C. Carter?
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Owen Lattimore?
Mr. Bisson. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Leaning?
Mr. Bisson. I don't know.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know how many times you met with Mr. Corbett's group for the study of Soviet policy?

Mr. Bisson. Would you give me the date of this again?

Mr. Sourwine. No; my question is: Do you know how many times you met?

Mr. Bisson. This will help me to answer that question.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember whether you met as many as 10 times?

Mr. Bisson. Could you give me the date of the meeting?

Mr. Sourwine. This was in May 1940.

Mr. Bisson. May 1940?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

Mr. Bisson. To the best of my knowledge, I never attended that meeting again, that group. If I was at that particular group at that time, I have no remembrance of being at any other meeting of that group.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you think you might have attended a meeting of that group at some other time?

Mr. Bisson. I doubt it very much.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you attend other meetings for the purpose of studying Soviet policy?

Mr. Bisson. I did not. You are speaking of this group?

Mr. Sourwine. No.

Mr. Bisson. No; I did not.

Mr. Sourwine. I am trying to find out what could have confused you in your mind if you did not do it elsewhere and did not do it here except once, so there should not be any problem for you.

Mr. Bisson. The problem here is very simply this: You have given me an indication that I attended one meeting of this group. When you gave me that indication, the group meant nothing to me and it still does not as far as my memory is concerned, and I have no memory ever meeting with that group again. At that time I was not in the IPR. I may have been invited on that particular occasion and may not have been invited to that group again.

I am inclined to think that is the situation, because my memory is so defective.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing further on that point.

Mr. FANELLI. Could we take a 2-minute recess at this point?

Senator EASTLAND (presiding). We will take a 2-minute recess.

(Short recess.)

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bisson, have you read this article: The Soviet-Japanse Pact in Historical Perspective?

Mr. BISSON. I have looked it over.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you the author of that article?

Mr. BISSON. I am.

Mr. MORRIS. May I read this one sentence here?

For to those who are willing to look facts in the face, there is nothing mysterious or enigmatic about the development of Soviet policy during recent years. The Soviet-German pact of August 1939 was a logical result of the course taken by British diplomacy in Europe during the immediately preceding years. Similarly, the Soviet-Japanese pact of April 1941 is the logical outcome of British and American policy in the Far East since 1937.

I introduce that and the whole article, and suggest that the whole article be placed in the record bearing on the questions addressed to the witness that he did not support the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939.

Senator EASTLAND. How long were you with the IPR?

Mr. BISSON. I was with the IPR for 2 years, a little over 2 years?

Senator EASTLAND. Were you associated with Mr. Field?

Mr. BISSON. May I make a correction to a statement he just summarized there?

Mr. FANELLI. Answer the question first.

Mr. BISSON. I think in the summary of his concluding sentence to which my mind was paying attention, he said that I said that I had not supported this pact. I think my original statement was to the best of my knowledge, which you did not add.

Mr. FANELLI. Answer the Senator's question.

Senator EASTLAND. Were you associated with Mr. Field?

Mr. BISSON. I was.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know the officials of the institute?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to be perfectly frank. You considered the institute—and I want you to think before you answer the question—you considered and so said that the institute was a Communist-dominated organization, did you not?

Mr. BISSON. I never said anything of that kind.

Senator EASTLAND. You deny that?

Mr. BISSON. The Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. I want you to think now. Think before you answer. Before you place yourself in the position that you never made a statement, think.

Mr. BISSON. Have you completed your statement?

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to answer my question.

Mr. BISSON. To the best of my knowledge in the slightly over 2 years that I was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, I saw no evidence that it was an organization that was controlled by Communist influence.

Senator EASTLAND. You say, "to the best of my knowledge," you saw no evidence. Is that what you said?

Mr. BISSON. I am prepared to say I saw no evidence.

Senator EASTLAND. You also state flatly that you never made the statement that it was Communist-controlled?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you go to Yenan in 1937?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there any prearangements made on that trip, prearrangements with Communist authorities?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What arrangements were made?

Mr. BISSON. May I begin at the beginning?

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir; I want you to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Just tell us about the prearrangements.

Mr. BISSON. Lattimore and I decided we wanted to go to Yenan. Mr. Snow, who had been in the area and had come out, was in Peking. We therefore naturally contacted him to see whether there was any possibility of making contacts that would enable us to get into the area.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "we," you mean you and Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Lattimore and me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Mr. Snow arrange for you to get permission to go into Yenan?

Mr. BISSON. I know nothing about the details of what Mr. Snow did. All I know is that he apparently, through persons that he knew, received assurances that we could enter the area and so notified us some 3 or 4 weeks later.

Mr. MORRIS. He notified you arrangements had already been made and you did have permission to go into the area?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He notified you and Mr. Lattimore of that fact?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. How did he notify you?

Mr. BISSON. He just told us.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bisson, did you meet Mao Tse-tung in your trip to Yenan?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have an interview with him?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write up that interview in Amerasia of October 1937?

Mr. SOURWINE. What Mr. Morris wants to know is whether this article in the named issue is one written by you.

Mr. BISSON. Yes; that is what I am trying to decide at this moment. Yes, apparently I wrote this interview. But apparently, as it indicates in the foreword there was an interview given to all of us.

Mr. MORRIS. Did anyone help you in writing this article?

Mr. BISSON. No; not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the facts stated here true, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. BISSON. They are.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced?

Mr. EASTLAND. It will be entered in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 719," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 719

[Source: Amerasia, vol. 1, September–February 1937–38, pp. 360–365]

MAO TSE-TUNG ANALYZES NANKING IN INTERVIEW

(By T. A. Bisson)

EDITORS' NOTE.—During the latter part of June, three members of the editorial board of AMERASIA, T. A. Bisson, Phil'ip J. Jaffe, and Owen Lattimore made a trip together into the Chinese Soviet area in Shensi Province. During a stay of several days in the capital, Yenanfu (Fushin), they interviewed extensively most of the important political and military leaders. Much of the material gathered is not yet in sufficiently organized fashion for publication, but the following interview with Mao Tse-Tung, at the time Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, is here presented in the hope that our readers will be the better able to follow the future developments in the now accomplished united front between the Communist and Kuomintang Parties. The following interview was written by T. A. Bisson, though all three of the editors were present during the interview. Since this interview was given 2 months before the completion of the united front, its significance becomes more apparent in the light of such consummation. A discussion of the Communist-Kuomintang rapprochment is given in another article in this issue, THE FAR EAST AT THE CROSSROADS, by P. J. Jaffe.

QUESTION: What has been the evolution of Nanking's policy toward Japan since 1931? Is it possible to distinguish several phases in this development?

ANSWER: Two periods may be distinguished. The first period began with September 18, 1931, and ended with the Kuomintang Second Plenary Session in July 1936. In this period the Kuomintang continued the policy which it had really initiated in 1927; it depended on imperialism, made concessions to imperialism, and suppressed the people.

After September 18 it gave up Manchuria unconditionally. Due to the Shanghai War the Chinese bourgeoisie were afraid of Japanese imperialism. They had prepared no defense works at all in the coastal provinces and were ready to give up these provinces to Japan. During the Shanghai War they prepared to move to Loyang as the provisional capital, and then to Sian if necessary. Only after Nanking saw that Japan began the Shanghai War as a means to legalize the seizure of Manchuria, and that the Japanese troops had no intention of occupying the coastal provinces, and that Great Britain and the United States made some efforts against Japan—only then did Nanking decide not to move the capital. So they returned to Nanking, but they were still afraid of Japan and continued so until after the North China developments in November-December 1935.

In 1935 Japan wanted to occupy North China at once and so frightened Nanking that it signed the Ho-Umetsu compromise agreement. This attitude prevailed until the Fifth Congress, in November–December 1935. At that time Nanking continued to say that if peace was still possible it didn't want to fight, i. e., it was prepared to surrender further.

Only in July 1936, at the Second Plenary Session, did Nanking begin to change its tone toward Japan. At this session it declared that if Japan would not further violate Chinese sovereignty, would not take more territory, it would not fight. Thus it explained the limit of sacrifice it was prepared to make, defining this as the maintenance of the status quo. The actual steps to represent this change of line were the negotiations between Chang Ch'un and Kawagoe, when Nanking rejected the Japanese demands. From 1931 to 1936 this was the first time that Nanking showed any evidence of a change in its capitulation policy.

QUESTION: Are these periods related to an inner political struggle at Nanking? If so, what are the main groups involved in this struggle? What social-economic forces do these groups represent?

ANSWER: Now we shall consider the reasons for Nanking's change of policy. Three main factors were responsible for the change:

(1) The anti-Japanese struggle waged by the Chinese people, the patriotic troops, the Communist Party, and the Red Army. This includes the Manchurian volunteers, the Nineteenth Route Army, Chi Hung-chang's army which fought the Japanese in Chahar in 1933, the actions of the Red Army, the student movement, and the National Salvation movement of wide masses of the people.

The Kuomintang thought that Japanese aggression could not be resisted. We know that the Manchurian volunteers have resisted and are still resisting. The

Kuomintang thought that the anti-Japanese movements of the people would give Japan a pretext to carry its aggressions further. Actually, these actions gave such serious blows to Japanese imperialism that they dared not easily occupy more territory; they discouraged and disheartened the Japanese. The Kuomintang thought of the Communists as the eternal, irreconcilable enemy, but did not look upon Japan as the enemy. So the Kuomintang sought to exterminate the Communists, but the Communist united-front policy acquired such a great influence in the country that it forced the Kuomintang to take stock of the success of this policy. This was the first cause leading to a change in Nanking's policy toward Japan. From this point the Kuomintang began to realize that in the people lay the real and whole national strength. Thus it began to feel a little more bold and courageous, and its fear of Japan was lessened by this movement.

(2) The second factor was the international situation. The sympathy of the Soviet Union with China in its struggle against Japanese aggression may be taken for granted. Also the capitalist world is divided into two rival sectors: the one in favor of peace and the status quo; the other the Fascist aggressors and provokers of a new world war. The relative change in British policy in the Far East also had much influence on Nanking. From these two factors came the third factor conducive to Nanking's change.

(3) The differentiation in the ruling class and party at Nanking. There are several groups and cliques, but fundamentally there are two blocs—the pro-Japanese and the anti-Japanese. This differentiation had already begun in September 1931. But only with the North China autonomy movement of 1935 did a kind of public opinion form within Kuomintang areas that China must and could resist Japanese aggression. Formerly this opinion was shared by only a few persons; now it became more general. At this time this opinion became so widespread that it exerted an influence on Nanking politics and policy, having a real effect for the first time.

These three factors, taken together, made the Kuomintang reconsider its former policy, and obliged Nanking to change from compromise and concession to resistance.

QUESTION: What groups or individuals at Nanking favor or oppose the united front? What evidence is there of progress toward the democratization of the Nanking government? Do you expect further progress along this line in the near future?

ANSWER: We come now to the next phase, that of the present and the future. The change in Nanking's policy, which began during the Chang Ch'un-Kawagoe negotiations, continued and was clearly expressed in the Third Plenary Session in February. In this session Kuomintang policy really began to change in various fields. After this session the Kuomintang's attitude to Japan became stronger, and a policy of internal peace was formally adopted by Nanking, i. e., no civil war. This development was closely related to the policy of the Communist Party, which had long propagated the necessity of centralizing all Chinese forces to fight Japan.

The most needed thing, however, is a change of Kuomintang policy in relation to democracy. On this question, Nanking did not resolutely give up its military policy, its dictatorship; this change has not been made by the Kuomintang. This is now the most important task—the realization of democratic reform. In order to consolidate internal peace and unite the country, democracy is the most important requisite. Without it the task of resisting Japanese aggression cannot be achieved. So in this period the mass slogans of the movement are these: (1) Internal peace; (2) Democracy; (3) Anti-Japanese war—all under the general slogan of the national united front and a democratic country. In this second period, the three factors noted above as influencing the Kuomintang's policy will have an increasing influence on the Chinese people. With the help of these three factors, we can realize the three slogans. As to the groups opposing the united front, these may be considered under three heads:

(1) On the international side, chiefly Japanese imperialism. But Japan does not stand alone. Germany is in this Fascist bloc, and also Italy. They want to induce the Chinese ruling class to join their front. They want China not only as a colony but also as a force to fight against the peace front. This is the first menacing factor.

(2) The pro-Japanese clique within the Chinese ruling class, and Trotskyism in the social sphere. They fought and are fighting against the united front policy and the three main slogans. This is the second factor of danger.

(3) The danger of irresolute, wavering elements. These exist in the ruling class and in society; they agree with the principle of fighting Japan, but not

with giving democratic rights to the people. Their difficulty is that they have a foot on two different boats; in the end they will either be drowned or else will stand with both feet on the Japanese boat. This is the element which provoked the students to fight at Shih Ta in Peiping on May 4, and which keeps the National Salvation leaders in prison. Yang Li-K'uei of Shih Ta (Peiping Normal University) is one of these elements.

These three groups occupy virtually the same standpoint. They are opposed to the united front policy of the Chinese people. Whether the tasks or slogans can be realized depends on whether the anti-Japanese elements, the democrats and liberals, all those who are for consolidation can overcome these three kinds of opponents. If so the slogans can be realized, if not. * * * The outcome will be decided by the struggle between these two forces.

As to how the struggle between these two is proceeding, it should be observed that the anti-Japanese front has taken the first steps toward success. The main feature is that China was prevented from entering the Fascist front, and turned to the anti-Fascist front. On this point Japan has been defeated. The Communist Party has done all in its power to prevent China from entering the Fascist front. This was expressed in the long period of its work before the Sian coup, in its efforts for the concentration and centralization of all Chinese forces in the united front. It was also expressed in the peaceful solution of the Sian incident, instead of exploiting it on the lower plane of trying to create an advantage for ourselves in the civil war. It was further expressed in the actions taken by the Communist Party after Sian, directed toward the uniting of all Chinese forces to fight Japan.

QUESTION: What political advantages were gained by foregoing the possibility of forming a united Northwestern Army during the Sian incident and after?

ANSWER: In the first place, China did not enter the Fascist front. Secondly, the work of unification of all patriotic forces in China to fight Japan achieved the first step toward success. Only by such a policy can China be saved.

QUESTION: Does not acceptance of Nanking as leader of the national forces tend to confuse the students and other mass organizations? What lines of action can be laid down to avoid this difficulty?

ANSWER: We are convinced that the students and masses will see clearly the whole situation and will have no doubt of the success of the Communist policy. The masses will have no doubt about the question of leadership. The leader depends not on the weight of forces, but by the program and the efforts which will be made by this leader. The Communist Party does not have its own partial interest to serve. It only has the interests of the majority of the people, of the nation, the toiling masses. If the fight will succeed, if Japan is turned back, if events move in this direction it means that the movement is under the leadership of the Communist Party. The way pointed out by the Communist Party cannot be obstructed by any kind of force. If the whole nation goes the way of the Communist Party program, then the iron wall of the enemy front will be broken. Whether it be Japanese influence, the pro-Japanese groups, or the wavering elements—one and all will be destroyed by the struggle of the people led by the Communist Party. The life of these elements will not be long. We, not they, will have the long life. Our American friends will see the result.

QUESTION: In the student elections at Yenching after the Sian incident, the left forces seemed in doubt as to what course to pursue. They did not strongly contest the election and as a result the reactionary students obtained control of the higher offices in the union. More recently, a meeting of Yenching student union delegates, called by the new leadership, voted to withdraw from the Peiping Student Union.

ANSWER: Such conditions were the result of one side of the Sian incident. In the beginning this was an anti-Chiang-Kai-shek uprising—a feature that changed only after the efforts made by us. Later it was converted into general union, under the acknowledged authority of Chiang Kai-shek; and it was the Red Army which thus converted mutiny into consolidation. By this move the Communists did not capitulate, but on the contrary Communist influence and strength have greatly enlarged over the bigger part of China. At first sight, it may seem that Red influence at Yenching has diminished; but this is not really true. In point of fact, Red influence and authority are not decreasing but are increasing in many other cities, places, and universities throughout the country.

QUESTION: May not Britain be strengthening China as against Japan to prevent war and protect her interests, and by balancing one against the other utilize them both against the Soviet Union? Could not this also envisage a

Fascist military dictatorship at Nanking that might later attempt to crush the Chinese Communists?

ANSWER: The strengthening of British influence in China is a contradictory phenomenon of today. In the fight against Japan, because of China's colonial position, it is possible for a third Power to strengthen its position in China. Can it then be said that this is pushing the tiger out the front door and letting the wolf in the back door? No; that would not be correct. This question must be treated differently.

Japan cannot be considered as the same imperialist Power as Britain. One is tied up with the aggressive front, the other is not. To treat them equally would not be right. If we treated them as equal imperialist Powers, we would in the end have to fight them both, or have to fight all imperialism at once. This would be wrong and dangerous. It is a conclusion drawn only by Trotskyists, that we must fight against all imperialists. On its face it seems very revolutionary, but it really drives Britain to the side of Japan; it is making a net to catch yourself with.

The policy of the Communist Party is just the opposite. We must get help to fight Japan from any country which opposes it. We know from experience that if China is subjugated by the Fascist Powers, as in the case of Manchuria, there is little value to be gained from Trotsky's beautiful phrases. As to the help extended by other imperialist Powers to China, this must be different from that of the Japanese. The policy of such Powers must be different from that of Japan. Principally it must differ on this point, that China's sovereignty must be preserved.

Formerly Great Britain was the leader in the crusade against the Soviet Union, the holy task of the British Empire was to fight against Bolshevism. Now Germany and Japan are taking over this task, and Britain is changing its attitude toward the Soviet Union. England now adopts a conservative policy of maintaining its own position. Although Britain does not like the Soviet Union, yet this situation means Britain cannot like Germany and Japan very much. Of course, the Anglo-Saxon people have always prided themselves on their freedom of thought. They can have any kind of thought they like, but in the end they must come to the conclusion that it it better to preserve their privileges with the help of the Soviet Union. Thinking is not always the same as acting.

It is impossible for Britain to establish the kind of Far Eastern balance of power which you have outlined. It is true that Britain long ago adopted the balance of power policy and has traditionally followed it. But if two sides of the balance are unequal, it is necessary to add here and subtract there in order to achieve a balance. Under contemporary world conditions, any such balance can only be temporary. In Europe, Britain also wants to establish a balance, but the Fascist Powers may be depended upon to destroy any balance that is set up. To help itself, Britain is obliged to help the democratic forces. In some cases, because of the rapid advance of the Fascist Powers, Britain must utilize anti-Fascist forces. So it cannot obstruct the growth of the revolutionary anti-Fascist forces. The policy of compromise, of balance of power, allows the revolutionary forces to grow. The example of France and Spain well illustrates this process. In these two countries there exist certain pro-Fascist forces, but it is too dangerous for Britain to permit these elements to get power. Although England does not like the united-front governments, it must somehow cooperate with them. There are many contradictions in British policy. Its compromise procedure also helps the Fascists rise, but the flood of Fascism carries the revolutionary wave up with it and thereby the Soviet boat floats higher.

The same reasoning holds true in the case of China. Britain may wish to set up a balance in the Far East, but Japan wants to dismember China. To establish a balance, Britain must adopt the policy of uniting China. If it helps to unite China, that is good. With the realization of the united front, the uniting of the country, the cessation of civil war, there is a great opportunity for China's free development. How can you prevent the growth of the Chinese revolutionary movement under these circumstances?

The situation has some analogy to the position of France in Spain. The Huangp'u clique faces two enemies—the Communist Party and Japan. If it forms an alliance with Japan to fight the Communists, then it plays the part of Franco. As in Spain, there would be a civil war of the revolutionary forces against the Huangp'u clique, i. e., Franco. If the Huangp'u clique wants to fight Japan determinedly, then it must use the unified strength of the Chinese nation. Then it must unite with the Communist Party. So it cannot obstruct

the growth of the Communist Party. Either way, the influence of the Communist Party will increase.

As to a Kuomintang military dictatorship, it is very clear that from September 18, 1931, to now Nanking has always been a military dictatorship. In the first period, there was dictatorship plus a pro-Japanese policy. Now that it has changed its foreign policy, it must also change its internal policy. It is impossible for the Kuomintang at one and the same time to suppress the people and fight against Japan. It may be true that Nanking is not deeply and permanently committed to an anti-Japanese policy. There is not yet the anti-Japanese war, not yet democracy. This can only be a temporary situation. The present period bears a transitional character: it is passing from one situation to another. We are now in the midst of this transitional period.

The same holds true in the world at large. So it is possible to observe many unhealthy phenomena. In China we see the arrest and trial of the National Salvation leaders, the suppression of the mass movement, the remnants of the old policy not yet fully given up. On the other side is the struggle of the healthy trend against the evil remnants. It is not necessary to be over-anxious because we can see the other side. Look at the struggle that is going on objectively; this struggle is the specific character of this period. If some Kuomintang members maintain the old policy and don't want to change, they are free to adopt this attitude. But the new anti-Japanese, democratic forces are growing up, and will call a halt to the activities of these people.

Mr. Bisson. May I extend my remarks on this question of the trip to Yenan?

Senator Eastland. Yes.

Mr. Bisson. The trip to Yenan was part of a general study of far-eastern political conditions, I was making that year.

Senator Eastland. Are you reading that?

Mr. Bisson. I am referring to a paper that I have in front of me.

Senator Eastland. Who wrote that?

Mr. Bisson. I did.

It was part of a general field of study of far-eastern political conditions that I was making that year. I was making it under the auspices of a Rockfeller Research grant given to me as a member of the research staff of the Foreign Policy Association.

The importance of Yenan in the international and the political picture of the Far East at that time was very great. The major political issue at that time concerned relations between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists.

In Japan where I went first, the Japanese were very interested in this relationship. I was in Japan for 2 or 3 months until the first part of the year studying political conditions there. I then went on into Korea for a week or so, then into Manchuria for another week or two and came into north China at sometime toward the end of March 1937.

I visited the Nationalist capital of Nanking in March to April 1937, and then wanted also to visit the Chinese Communist capital to complete my study of political conditions in the Far East.

By undertaking this trip to Yenan I was carrying through the purpose for which the Rockefeller Foundation made the research grant. This was one of the vital areas of the far-eastern political developments at that time and it was necessary for me to visit it if my research trip was to be complete. As a matter of fact, at these interviews we were told by the Chinese Communist leaders that negotiations were going on for the conclusion of a truce between the two sides in fear of a Japanese attack. So that when we came out of Yenan we were able to confirm reports that up to that time had only

been reports and rumors. In other words, I was more sure of my data on one of the more crucial issues in the Far East at this time.

Mr. Sourwine. Does that complete your statement?

Mr. Bisson. Except to say that as a result of this year's field study I published a book, Japan in China. This is a whole volume. I suggest that the committee should indicate that there was not just a trip to Yenan. This was a general study of the Far East resulting in a book published 6 or 8 months later.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you leave a copy of that book with the committee for study?

Mr. Bisson. It is my only copy. It is an out-of-print book now.

Mr. Sourwine. We will return it. I know it is out of print.

Mr. Bisson. Yes; certainly.

May I say the war in China broke out during the middle of this year. It interrupted my trip to South China which I was intending to make that year. The Japanese occupied North China.

Most of this book was written in manuscript while the Japanese were occupying Peking. I had to smuggle the manuscript out of Peking under the eyes of the Japanese and through Japan in order to bring it home.

Mr. Sourwine. I have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.

While you were in Yenan, did you address a mass meeting?

Mr. Bisson. I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Who else spoke at that mass meeting?

Mr. Bisson. My remembrance is that Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Lattimore also spoke.

Mr. Sourwine. Philip Jaffe and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Senator Eastland. What was the object of the mass meeting?

Mr. Bisson. The object of the mass meeting was to meet the western guests and to let the Chinese Army see us and become aware of the fact that we were among them.

Senator Eastland. You mean the Communist army see you?

Mr. Bisson. The troops in command is what I am saying.

Senator Eastland. It was a Communist army, was it not?

Mr. Bisson. The Chinese Communist troops; yes.

Senator Eastland. Say that then. Go ahead.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Chu Teh one of the speakers?

Mr. Bisson. He was.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall anyone else who spoke there?

Mr. Bisson. I do not.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you speak in Chinese?

Mr. Bisson. I did not.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you speak in English?

Mr. Bisson. I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Who translated it for you?

Mr. Bisson. I do not remember. It was one of our local interpreters.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you see any of the other Caucasians out of the four who composed your party while you were in Yenan?

Mr. Bisson. Yes; there were two other persons there, Mrs. Edgar Snow—and one reason why Mr. Snow wanted us to go in was because he wanted us to bring his wife up. She was there. That was one reason why we cooperated in making the contacts.

The other person there was Agnes Smedley.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there many foreigners, foreign to Yenan, non-Communists?

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember any others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't the place full of tourists?

Mr. BISSON. The place was not full of tourists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see any missionaries while you were there?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Lattimore had testified before this committee under oath that there were a lot of tourists around when you were there?

Mr. BISSON. A lot of tourists?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. There were a lot of tourists in——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he so testified?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I just wondered if you had known it. You did not see any missionaries while you were there?

Mr. BISSON. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you left, did anyone give you or any members of your party messages to be taken to other persons in other places?

Mr. BISSON. I think probably there were messages we took back to people in Peking.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, communications were very bad and they crowded around you to try to get you to take messages, did they not?

Don't accept my word for that. Tell me what happened.

Mr. BISSON. I am not certain of that. I don't remember any crowding around us. I am willing to say we probably took some messages.

Senator EASTLAND. Regardless of whether they crowded around you or not, did a number of people attempt to ask you to carry messages out for them?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all.

Senator EASTLAND. About how many?

Mr. BISSON. I suppose two.

Senator EASTLAND. Then other people contacted other members of the party, did they not?

Mr. BISSON. Other people? I am not sure who you mean.

Senator EASTLAND. Other Chinese contacted other members of your party to take messages out?

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember the Chinese——

Senator EASTLAND. What did you say at that mass meeting?

Mr. BISSON. As I remember, I said the same thing I had said in a meeting at——

Senator EASTLAND. I did not ask you what you said at a meeting before. Just tell me what you said at that mass meeting.

Mr. BISSON. I indicated that the lull in Japanese-Chinese relations at that time was, in my opinion, false; that the Japanese were very likely preparing an active invasion of China. Therefore, I advocated that this group and other groups in China should attempt to settle their differences in order to present a firm and effective defense against possible Japanese attack.

May I extend my remarks? May I amplify what I said?

Senator EASTLAND. Wait just a minute. I will let you extend your remarks.

That was the line that the Communists were using then, was it not, for the Nationalists?

Mr. BISSON. That was the line most Chinese were using.

Senator EASTLAND. Answer my question. That was the Communist line?

Mr. BISSON. That was the line that almost all Chinese were using.

Senator EASTLAND. Was it the Communist line? Answer the question "Yes" or "No."

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. FANELLI. Answer the question.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, you desire to extend your remarks. Do so.

Mr. BISSON. I want to extend my remarks on two points here.

The political issue that was paramount at that period was the issue "Could China defend herself against Japanese attack if it came?"

Therefore, in my talks in China, wherever it was, that was the crucial problem that I was dealing with. I remember a talk that I gave in Peking maybe a month or 2 before, before this Peking group. I think you can verify this to some extent, at least through recollection in regard to Col. David Barrett, who was the American military attaché there, who I remember attended that meeting. He was an old friend of mine, and we had been in school together.

At that meeting I said, "There is a lull at present. I think it is deceptive. I think the necessities are that all groups in China get together."

On that occasion I emphasized particularly the southwestern groups because there were a couple of groups involved here.

I have one other point; that is, that while it is true that the Communists were trying to get China united at that time, it is also true that sentiment all over China was in favor of unity at that time. It was growing very strong in Nanking. Official policy there was veering toward——

Senator EASTLAND. I want you to be fair with the committee. Arrangements for you to go into Communist areas were made by Communists. You were one of the few people who got to go into Yenan, were you not?

Mr. BISSON. There were——

Senator EASTLAND. You were one of the few Caucasians that got to go there, were you not?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; although I would not say they were few. There was a considerable group that went.

Senator EASTLAND. You testified you only saw two there.

Mr. BISSON. Others went later.

Senator EASTLAND. Agnes Smedley is one of them. She is buried in Communist China, is she not?

Mr. BISSON. I don't know.

Senator EASTLAND. You know she is a Communist. You saw a Communist there. You met the chief or the head of the Communist Party in China who is now the dictator of China. They entertained you and they gave a mass meeting, had a big mass meeting for you to speak to. To be perfectly frank, you were considered a pro-Communist, were you not, by the Chinese?

Mr. Bisson. By no means. We were considered as people who had come in and were visiting that area. They had not seen western people for many years.

Senator Eastland. They could not get in. Why was it you could get in?

Mr. Bisson. Other people could get it if they wanted to get in. It was not an impossible feat.

Senator Eastland. It was practically an impossible feat, as you well know, and if you wanted to be entirely frank, sir, you would admit it, because you know that is true. It was an impossible feat except for fellow travelers, those who were considered sympathetic to communism, whether they were Communists or not.

I am not accusing you of being a member of the Communist Party. I do not know whether you were or not, but isn't a fact now, that they considered you sympathetic to their objectives in China and let you in, entertained you and gave a mass meeting for you to speak to?

Mr. Bisson. I am not prepared to say that——

Senator Eastland. Why?

Mr. Bisson. That they considered us sympathizers.

Senator Eastland. Do you think they would have called a mass meeting for somebody to make a speech to take issue with the policies of their government?

Mr. Bisson. I stand by my original statement.

Senator Eastland. I want you to answer that question, though.

Mr. Bisson. What is the question?

Senator Eastland. In dictatorships, do they call mass meetings at which people speak and take issue with the government?

Mr. Bisson. No. The answer is "No."

Senator Eastland. Of course they do not. Then, if you were not considered pro-Communist, why did they call a mass meeting for you to address it?

Mr. Bisson. We were considered guests, western guests who had arrived.

Senator Eastland. They do not call mass meetings for guests to take issue with their policies. If they called that for you, it was their impression that you were sympathetic with those objectives; is that right?

Mr. Bisson. I see no reason to accept that statement. I was there as a political observer and so were the others which were entertained as one might expect outsiders would be entertained.

Senator Eastland. But you certainly do not ask me to believe that they called mass meetings for foreigners to address and by so doing vouch for those foreigners unless they think those foreigners are sympathetic with their objectives. In fact, that was the object of the mass meeting, was it not, to help solidify sentiment behind the policies of the Communist government?

Mr. Bisson. I do not see that that was the object. The object was just as much to show the western guests that were in the city at that time.

Senator Eastland. You have just testified that no dictatorship, Communist dictatorship would call a mass meeting to be addressed by a foreigner who would take issue with their government. How do

you square that statement that you made a minute ago with your statements now?

Mr. Bisson. I see no real contradiction. We were not there—I did not intend to take issue with their policy.

Senator Eastland. Of course you did not intend to take issue with their policy.

Mr. Bisson. I was willing to be a friendly guest. I was interested in observing what I could see. I was not interested in disputing their policies. What I was anxious to do was to talk to them, to have them——

Senator Eastland. You made a speech at the mass meeting and you are 100 percent right when you say you were not there to take issue with their policies.

Mr. Bisson. I was there to find facts.

Senator Eastland. Wait a minute. Is it not true that mass meeting was called because you were sympathetic with those policies?

Mr. Bisson. No; I would not accept that.

Senator Eastland. You may proceed.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Bisson, did you ever make any protests when China was attacked by the Communists in the period of 1946 and following?

Mr. Bisson. When China was attacked?

Mr. Morris. When the Chinese Government was attacked by the Chinese armies from the north, did you protest on behalf of China on that occasion?

Mr. Bisson. I don't understand the idea of the Nationalists——

Mr. Fanelli. If you understand the question, answer it.

Mr. Morris. The Nationalist Government was attacked by the Chinese Communists, was it not?

Mr. Bisson. The Communists were perhaps attacked by the Nationalists.

Mr. Morris. You defended your action, your previous association with Communists, on the grounds that you were interested in the integrity and the defense of the Chinese Government.

Hasn't that been your defense to your Communist associations all along?

Mr. Bisson. I don't understand that question. I am very sorry about this.

Mr. Morris. You do know, however, there was a war between the Chinese Government and the Communist armies?

Mr. Bisson. There was a civil war going on.

Mr. Morris. Did you express any support for the Chinese Nationalist Government for the period of 1946 to 1950?

Mr. Bisson. I do not think so.

Mr. Morris. You expressed no concern whatever for the Chinese Government under those circumstances?

Mr. Bisson. I do not think so.

Senator Eastland. Why?

Mr. Bisson. For much of this period, I was in Government service and could not express an opinion.

Senator Eastland. When you were in Government service, what about that?

Mr. Bisson. I do not understand.

Senator EASTLAND. You say "for much of the period I was in Government service and could not express an opinion."

Now, the time you were not in Government service——

Mr. BISSON. I was in Government service in 1946 and 1947.

Senator EASTLAND. The time you were not in Government service now.

Mr. BISSON. I was engaged in writing a book in 1947–48 and wrote no articles at all at that time, either on Japan or China.

Senator EASTLAND. You were never hesitant to express an opinion at any other time, were you?

Mr. BISSON. Senator, what I am trying to say is that on some of these other occasions, I was regularly writing for periodicals when I was with the Institute of Pacific Relations and when I was with the Foreign Policy Association.

In these later years I was not in that position. I wrote virtually no articles. I was either in Government service or writing a book.

Senator EASTLAND. When is it that a Government official cannot express an opinion? I thought we had a bunch of pro-Communist statements coming out of the State Department during that time, pro-Chinese Communists.

Mr. BISSON. I assure you I could not write articles on the Chinese political situation from the Government section in occupation headquarters. I was not permitted so to write.

The CHAIRMAN. From where? You say you were not permitted, from where?

Mr. BISSON. I was on duty as an official in General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo in the first part of the period referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not permitted to write?

Mr. BISSON. I was doing official duty, and as a Government official I was not engaged in writing articles. If I wanted to write an article——

The CHAIRMAN. Your answer, which I caught, was you were not permitted to write. Is that true? What is the fact?

Mr. BISSON. Well, put it this way: That a Government official——

The CHAIRMAN. You are under oath: are you not?

Mr. BISSON. Yes. A Government official in that capacity would not normally be writing articles for periodicals. If you say "could he never write an article?" the answer would be that, if he went through channels and they got special permission and his article was read properly, that article might be published.

I did not go through any such effort to get an article published at that time. I was busy with my official duties.

The CHAIRMAN. You departed from your first answer. You said in your first answer: "I was not permitted to write."

Mr. BISSON. I do not consider that a departure.

The CHAIRMAN. You have left that entirely and you have smudged that over with another statement.

Mr. BISSON. I do not consider that a departure.

The CHAIRMAN. I do consider it a departure. Not being permitted to write is one thing and not writing is another.

Mr. BISSON. A Government official——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking for any answer except to clarify your first answer.

Do you want to stand on your first answer, or on the rest that you have stated?

Mr. BISSON. Let me state it this way: A Government official did not normally engage in articles for periodicals. On special occasions he might receive permission. That is the testimony I should like to make to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you want to recede from your first answer you were "not permitted to write"?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell the committee what your job was at Tokyo in the period terminating in 1947?

Mr. BISSON. I was acting as Special Assistant to the Chief of Government Section.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bisson, did you negotiate with Mr. Holland in connection with the possibility of your taking up IPR work when you terminated your Government contract at Tokyo?

Mr. BISSON. I do not so remember. I may have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the IPR dated August 21, 1946, addressed to Mr. T. A. Bisson, with the typed signature of William L. Holland, secretary general. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall having received that letter? Will you read the first paragraph, please?

Mr. BISSON (reading):

This is just a note to say hello and to ask whether you have now had enough of MacArthur and are in a mood to think of IPR work again. I have been wondering whether you have made any definite plans yet about returning and about working on any particular project for the IPR. Though there's no great rush I would be interested to hear your ideas regarding this, so that I can make preliminary arrangements about finances. As you know, I am ready to request a grant that will enable you to work for 6 months on a project coming within the general scope of our international research program.

Mr. MORRIS. Does reading this rather refresh your recollection as to whether Mr. Holland did write this?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be received, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 720" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 720

AUGUST 21, 1946.

Mr. T. A. BISSON,
c/o Mrs. T. A. Bisson, 40 Richards Rd.,
Port Washington, L. I., New York.

DEAR ART: This is just a note to say hello and to ask whether you have now had enough of MacArthur and are in a mood to think of IPR work again. I have been wondering whether you have made any definite plans yet about returning and about working on any particular project for the IPR. Though there's no great rush, I would be interested to hear your ideas regarding this, so that I can make preliminary arrangements about finances. As you know, I am ready to request a grant that will enable you to work for six months on a project coming within the general scope of our International Research Program. I assume you will want to write on some aspect of Japanese politics or economics, but it would be a good idea if you could submit a brief outline of two alternative studies which I could present to Sansom and the research advisers. I would hope to have the project done under the nominal auspices of the American Council even though it is financed by the International Research Fund.

If you preferred to work part-time on some other job, I don't believe there would be any objections, although we would still hope that you could finish your report within nine months, and could also make some part of it available in the form of a Conference paper by April 30, 1947.

Will you let me have your reactions on this?

I wrote Harold Quigley recently suggesting that he with Miriam Farley, Herbert Norman and yourself might organize an informal study group in Tokyo to meet occasionally with some of the Japanese who might take the lead in a new Japanese Council of the IPR. I know you don't have much time for these extra-curricular activities but I do hope you can lend a hand.

We greatly miss not having more news from you and I wish you could take the time to write a general newsletter which you could share with your family and the IPR staff. How about it?

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, *Secretary-General.*

P. S.—Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the announcement.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mr. H. H. Fisher, of the Hoover Research Library?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you had any negotiations with him for employment?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter, the carbon being taken from the files of the IPR. It is dated May 20, 1947, addressed to Mr. T. A. Bisson, with the typed signature of William L. Holland, secretary general.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you this letter and ask you if you will read the first paragraph and answer whether or not you can recall having received this letter. Read that aloud, please.

Mr. BISSON (reading):

Welcome back to the land of the loyalty tests! We are all looking forward to seeing you, and I hope that you can spare us a day or two at the office before you go on your vacation. I hope you will also take a couple of days to visit some of the university people at Berkeley and Stanford. I have written H. H. Fisher, director of the Hoover Library at Stanford, asking him to see you and tell you something of his Far East research program. It is possible that you may see some suitable opening for work there next year. At Stanford, you might also try to see Claude Buss if he is still around.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall if Mr. Holland wrote that letter?

Mr. BISSON. I never said I do not recall.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you recall?

Mr. BISSON. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that be received?

Senator EASTLAND. It will be admitted.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 721," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 721

MAY 20, 1947.

Mr. T. A. BISSON,
% *San Francisco Institute of Pacific Relations,*
417 Market Street, San Francisco, California.

DEAR ART: Welcome back to the land of the loyalty tests! We are all looking forward to seeing you and I hope that you can spare us a day or two at the office before you go on your vacation. I hope you will also take a couple of days to visit some of the university people at Berkeley and Stanford. I have written H. H. Fisher, Director of the Hoover Library at Stanford, asking him to see you and tell you something of his Far Eastern research program. It is possible that

you may see some suitable opening for work there next year. At Stanford, you might also try to see Claude Buss, if he is still around. At Berkeley, I hope you will see Woodbridge Bingham and George McCune in the History Department. George is writing a conference paper for us on political developments in Korea. If you get time, you might also see Conliffe and Kerner.

Staley may want you to talk to the IPR group in San Francisco and I hope you can do so. You may not have heard that the IPR in San Francisco is being amalgamated into a San Francisco World Affairs Council and, as a result, there is a good deal of bad feeling between the San Francisco and New York offices. Carter and I will be interested to know what you hear about all this. The main point of disagreement at present is the recent move by the San Francisco people pressing for a national merger of the American IPR and the FPA plus, possibly, some other organizations. As you can imagine, there is a good deal of resistance to the idea from many quarters.

All the best,

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, *Secretary-General.*

Mr. MORRIS. You worked for the Board of Economic Warfare; did you not?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. For what period of time?

Mr. BISSON. For the period from January 1942 to May 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your assignment there?

Mr. BISSON. My assignment there was to analyze the economic weakness and vulnerability of Japan in order to enable advantage to be taken of such weaknesses as we could detect in conducting the war against Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. While you worked in the Board of Economic Warfare, did you supply material to the IPR which you have obtained in your work for that Board?

Mr. BISSON. While I was working at the Board——

Mr. MORRIS. Did you supply the IPR with information and material from the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. BISSON. I might have; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about it?

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember any specific details.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a memorandum from the files of the IPR dated September 14, 1942, headed "MF, WWL from RB, and WLH."

Mr. BISSON. May I see that?

Mr. MORRIS. You may see the letter.

Mr. BISSON. This is the photostat that you have just mentioned?

Mr. MORRIS. I have the photostat. Will you read the first paragraph?

Mr. BISSON. (reading):

> Bisson has returned Miriam's interesting draft on recent developments in Japanese-occupied southeast Asia. Obviously reflecting the line taken in his own BEW job, he thinks current studies are less valuable than fundamental anlysis of the prototypes of recent Japanese activity—Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, north and central China. Such studies, he maintains, would imply current practices. He and Peake predicted a month ago the Greater East Asia Ministry.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who MF is?

Mr. BISSON. I should think that would be Miriam Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. And WWL?

Mr. BISSON. William Lockwood.

Mr. MORRIS. WLH?

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. And RB?

Mr. BISSON. Robert Barnett, I should suspect.

Mr. MORRIS. It was the common practice that you know of the IPR staff to use initials in exchanging memoranda?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

May I make a comment on this, Mr. Chairman?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. As I read that first paragraph, and so far as my memory goes, this was not a case of my sending Government material to Miss Farley. This was a case of Miss Farley writing a draft about Japanese developments in southeast Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. You do recall this particular incident?

Mr. BISSON. Let me continue.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not going to direct a line of questions to that, and it is not related to the previous question.

I do want you to recall the fact that Miss Farley did send a draft to you.

Mr. BISSON. You have her private memoranda?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. BISSON. May I say——

Mr. MORRIS. It has nothing to do with Government, and there is no indication it has anything to do with BEW material.

Mr. BISSON. I see.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you send BEW material to Miss Farley?

Mr. BISSON. I did not. That is what startled me.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the last two paragraphs?

Mr. BISSON (reading):

> They have supplied no new information, which is a disappointment, but not one which should surprise us.

Who is "they"?

Mr. MORRIS. The first two preceding paragraphs deal with "Peake and Bisson."

Then the other one says: "On page 14, Peake and Bisson suggest." The next one reads: "On page 16, the terms 'rigid' and later 'wholesale' seem too extreme to Peake and Bisson."

The last or next to the last paragraph reads:

> They have supplied no new information which is a disappointment—but not one which should surprise us.

Read the last paragraph, please.

Mr. BISSON (reading):

> Bisson says that Jessup has fought through red tape and succeeded in getting a whole file of BEW Pattern of Occupation Reports for use at Columbia. Bisson sees no reason why the IPR should not have the stuff, too. The approach should be made through Jessup who now knows the ropes.

Mr. MORRIS. I am asking you if that refreshes your recollection, or whether or not you did supply IPR with BEW material.

Mr. BISSON. I did, but I would like to make a comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's straighten that out, Senator Eastland.

This does refresh your recollection? That is the question.

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You did furnish the material?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any comment to make?

Mr. Bisson. Yes. The comment is that this was not material that referred to policy matters. This happened to be a study that I was making myself. It was merely a collection of Japanese techniques in regard to occupation documents of all kinds.

When the Japanese were in Manchuria, what kind of documents came out in terms of their methods of occupying and controlling that area. The same for other parts of China, for southeast Asia, a technical series of documents with no comment, no policy recommendations, no policy treatment here at all.

So, under those circumstances, it would be quite possible for a Government arrangement to be made with a private organization that the documents go to.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will this document be received in the record as the document that refreshed the witness' recollection on that series of questions?

Senator Eastland. Yes.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 722" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 722

(Handwritten:) Barnett
W. Holland

700 Jackson Place NW.,
Washington, D. C., September 14, 1942.

MF
WWL from RB
WLH

Bisson has returned from Miriam's interesting draft on recent developments in Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia. Obviously reflecting the line taken in his own BEW job, he thinks current studies are less valuable than fundamental analyses of the prototypes of recent Japanese activity—Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, North and Central China. Such studies, he maintains, would imply current practices. He and Peake predicted a month ago the Greater East Asia Ministry.

From our point of view, his suggestion helps little. We've done most of the descriptive job. Comprehensive reanalysis calls for staff which even BEW with its bulging expense accounts cannot snag.

Peake and Bisson made several comments on points of fact. On page 2, they suggest that the Japanese are less intransigent than they sound and really hope for a negotiated peace. This is a *Gripsholm* opinion of considerable generality. The Japs treated Sassoon tough, but held out sweet hopes to other businessmen.

On page 14, Peake and Bisson suggest that properties are not confiscated outright but expropiated legally and held in trust in accordance with The Hague rules of war. This is a question of fact upon which they are informed and we are not. However, as other cases of similar Japanese practices, they cite Japanese dealings with Chinese owners in China. I cannot agree in the importance which they attach to *pro forma* practices of the Japanese. The test of their importance would appear when the Japs began to retire for good. Where this has happened in China, property has been ruthlessly destroyed.

On page 16, the terms "rigid" and later "wholesale" seem too extreme to Peake and Bisson.

They have supplied no new information which is a disappointment—but not one which should surprise us.

Bisson says that *Jessup* has fought through red tape succeeded in getting a whole file of BEW Pattern of Occupation Reports for use at Columbia. Bisson sees no reason why the IPR should not have the stuff, too. The approach should be made through Jessup who now knows the ropes.

Mr. Bisson. May I be excused for a few minutes?

Senator Eastland. Yes.

(Short recess.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bisson, while you were in Tokyo, did you meet with other members of the IPR in furtherance of the work of the institute?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How often did you do that?

Mr. BISSON. Well, I would say maybe three or four times.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the people you met with?

Mr. BISSON. When Mr. Holland came through, I would meet with him. I think he came through once or twice—probably twice while I was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else?

Mr. BISSON. There were also efforts being made to reorganize the old Japanese Council that had been dissolved by the Japanese militarists when the war broke out. I remember, it seems to me, attending one or two meetings where they were trying to get a group together that would not be an official Japanese Council because they could not, under the existing circumstances, but they might become an embryo for development of a new Japanese Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with Miriam Farley for that purpose?

Mr. BISSON. Miriam Farley was also in occupation headquarters. We probably met.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with Herbert Norman for that purpose?

Mr. BISSON. We might have, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Harold Quigley?

Mr. BISSON. Yes, I should think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the fourth paragraph in the letter of August 21, 1946, that has already been introduced in the record?

Mr. BISSON (reading):

> I wrote Harold Quigley recently suggesting that he with Miriam Farley, Herbert Norman, and yourself might organize an informal study group in Tokyo to meet occasionally with some of the Japanese who might take the lead in a new Japanese Council of the IPR. I know you don't have much time for these extracurricular activities but I do hope you can lend a hand.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with members of the Japanese Council?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. BISSON. The only thing I remember about it is that this group and some Japanese scholars whose names I am sure you will ask and I do not think I can recall——

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet with Yanaibara?

Mr. BISSON. I might have been there.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Yokota?

Mr. BISSON. Possibly, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Matsukata?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew him well?

Mr. BISSON. He was one of the members of the old Japanese Council of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew Matsukata?

Mr. BISSON. Matsukata.

Mr. MORRIS. And Saionji?

Mr. BISSON. No, I do not remember him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever remember meeting him?

Mr. Bisson. I don't remember meeting him in Tokyo. I think he was at the 1936 Yosemite conference.

Mr. Morris. Will you identify this letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the IPR dated October 8, 1946, addressed to Mr. T. A. Bisson, Government Section, SCAP, APO 500, care of Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif., with the typed signature of William L. Holland, secretary general.

Mr. Morris. I offer you this letter and ask you if you will read aloud the first paragraph of this letter?

Mr. Bisson. I was trying to take a look at the letter.

Mr. Morris. If you read it aloud, it may refresh your recollection and we will not lose time.

Mr. Bisson (reading):

I am most grateful to you for your letter of September 22 containing the very interesting report on recent developments in the Japanese IPR. On the whole the group strikes me as a very able and progressive one and I hope very much that you can unofficially convey my warmest good wishes to them (particularly to Yanaibara, Yokota, Matsukata, and Saionji). Will you also please tell Matsuo that I hope he can write me more frequently and let me know if there is any way we can assist the new group; e. g., by supplying more IPR publications.

Mr. Morris. Does that letter refresh your recollection as to the fact you did meet with these Japanese in the formation of a Japanese Council of the IPR?

Mr. Bisson. I think I indicated in every case, except Mr. Saionji, whom I did not remember, that I had met with them. Obviously I did.

Mr. Morris. You did that work regularly for the IPR?

Mr. Bisson. Regularly.

Mr. Morris. Tell us how frequently you did it.

Mr. Bisson. This was one operation to get this group restarted. We may have had one or two meetings about it. It was not a regular thing. That is why I objected to the term "regular."

Mr. Sourwine. There was not anything irregular about it?

Mr. Bisson. It was irregular rather than regular. So far as the meetings were concerned on this project, that is.

Mr. Morris. Was the purpose of the committee to determine the extent to which you did need these people because very often the files do not show?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will this be received?

Senator Eastland. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 723" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 723

October 8, 1946.

Mr. T. A. Bisson,
Government Section, S. C. A. P.,
APO 500, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

Dear Art: I am most grateful to you for your letter of September 22 containing the very interesting report on recent developments in the Japanese IPR. On the whole the group strikes me as a very able and progressive one and I hope very much that you can unofficially convey my warmest good wishes to them (particularly to Yanaibara, Yokota, Matsukata, and Saionji). Will you also please tell Matsuo that I hope he can write me more frequently and let me know if there is any way we can assist the new group, e. g., by supply more IPR publications.

I am interested to hear of the symposium on current problems and hope you can arrange to supply me with two or three copies of the various chapters as they are completed. Are they to be in Japanese or in English, and if the latter, will any arrangements be made to publish them in Japan?

I would like you to convey to the new group my earnest hope that they will make an early start on one or two projects of fundamental scholarly research, preferably not too closely related to immediate political issues. You might point out that the chances of readmittance to the IPR will be greatly improved if they can demonstrate that they are conducting a scholarly research program by well-qualified people. Though I can make no promises at this moment, it is conceivable that we might be able to give some financial assistance next year for an important piece of research subject, of course, to the necessary approval of SCAP. You will know better than I what subjects are feasible after discussing the matter with the group—but you and Herb Norman and Andrew might keep in mind the standing economic history of Japan (or, alternatively, of Japan since 1868). There may be other noteworthy studies in Japanese sociology, economics, or give some consideration to the possibility of completing, perhaps in modified form, one or two of the older Japanese Council projects in the International Research Program. For instance, Nasu's studies on Japanese agriculture and on rural standards of living were never really completed to a point where he felt justified in printing it in English, though we did put out a mimeographed edition. I fully realize that Nasu may not be the right man now to continue the study, but it should be possible to make some arrangement to bring it more up to date by including a few chapters on the principal agriculture developments during the war years, and also by revising the existing study (parts of which were censored by the authorities in 1941). This is something which you might discuss with Andrew so that there would be a minimum of overlapping with his own study of Japan's agriculture. Another possibility that strikes me as promising would be a book of writings on Japanese agrarian problems during the past decade, somewhat along the lines of Agrarian China, prepared by Chen Han-seng some years ago.

Another unfinished project which could be considered was one on the Japanese family system; in view of the fact that we have recently published Olga Lang's book on the Chinese family, it would be interesting to have a corresponding study from Japan based either on the original project or on some other outstanding Japanese book in this field.

Quigley may also have some suggestions for work in the field of political science and diplomatic history, but this may get too much into the field of political controversy.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bisson, did you ever meet with Tung Pi-wu?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances? Who was Tung Pi-wu?

Mr. BISSON. He was one of the older members of the Chinese Communist group at Yenan. He was there when we were in Yenan.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he come to the United States later on?

Mr. BISSON. He did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him at that time?

Mr. BISSON. I probably met him in New York; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing in New York?

Mr. BISSON. He was attending the founding conference of the United Nations as the Chinese Communist delegate officially recognized.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances of your meeting with Tung Pi-wu in New York?

Mr. BISSON. As well as I remember, he came along with a couple of other Chinese who were with him, his aides or something, to the IPR, and we had a chat with them. We may even have had lunch with the group. I am not sure as to whether we went to lunch.

Mr. Morris. Did you discuss the interest of China with him?

Mr. Bisson. I have no recollection as to what was actually discussed at that time. It probably concerned his operations at the United Nations Conference and what he thought of the founding conference.

Mr. Morris. What did he think of it?

Mr. Bisson. His aspects of his trip to the United States, and so on.

Mr. Morris. What did he think of it?

Mr. Bisson. I say it probably concerned that. I wouldn't remember the details.

Mr. Morris. Are they the only times you met Tung Pi-wu in New York?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever give an expression of support to Ernst Thaelmann?

Mr. Bisson. I did.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the circumstances?

Senator Eastland. Repeat that, please.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever give an expression of support to Ernst Thaelmann? Who was he?

Mr. Bisson. He was an imprisoned German Communist leader.

Senator Eastland. He was the head of the Communist Party in Germany, was he not?

Mr. Bisson. He was imprisoned.

Senator Eastland. But before he was imprisoned he was the head of the Communist Party in Germany?

Mr. Bisson. Before he was imprisoned he was.

Senator Eastland. He had been a candidate for president of the Communist Party in Germany, had he not?

Mr. Bisson. He had.

Senator Eastland. Proceed to answer the question.

Mr. Morris. Did you join in an expression of support to him?

Mr. Bisson. I would not answer "Yes" to the question as so expressed.

Senator Eastland. What did you do?

Mr. Bisson. On that occasion, as I remember the details, the daughter of the Socialist Prime Minister of Norway was coming to this country to conduct a general campaign to gain popular support for freeing a political prisoner held by Hitler. I went as a member of a group to receive her when she came to this country.

Senator Eastland. Who was the political prisoner?

Mr. Bisson. The political prisoner was Mr. Thaelmann. He was one of the victims of Hitler's tyranny.

Senator Eastland. He locked up a Communist agitator who was attempting, by revolution, to overthrow his government and set up a Communist dictatorship that was subservient to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Fanelli. There is no quesion there.

Senator Eastland. Yes, there is.

And you expressed your support of him; is that right?

Mr. Bisson. Not quite in that way.

Senator Eastland. You know you expressed your support of him, regardless of "not quite that way"?

Mr. Bisson. I expressed my support of a campaign to get him out of jail under the Hitler regime.

Senator EASTLAND. So he could set up a Communist government in Germany?

Mr. BISSON. That is your interpretation, Mr. Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Is it not yours? Was that not what you wanted?

Mr. BISSON. I was primarily concerned that this was a symbol of political oppression by the Nazis in Germany.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else did you intercede for? Hitler had thousands of political and racial persecutees in jail in Germany. Did you intercede for any of the others?

Mr. BISSON. I was generally opposed, yes, to all of them.

Senator EASTLAND. Answer my question. Did you intercede for any of the others?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Who?

Mr. BISSON. So far as I remember I was——

Senator EASTLAND. Who was it you interceded for?

Mr. BISSON. I do not know a specific name.

Senator EASTLAND. He had Catholic leaders in prison. Did you intercede for any of them?

Mr. BISSON. Not that I know of.

Senator EASTLAND. He had leaders of the extreme right in prison. Did you intercede for any of them?

Mr. BISSON. Not that I know of, not by name.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course you did not. He had racial persecutees in prison. Did you specifically intercede for any of them?

Mr. BISSON. Not for a specific individual.

Senator EASTLAND. You did intercede specifically for the head of the Communist Party in Germany; did you not?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course you were not a Communist sympathizer and were not pro-Communist. You deny all that?

Mr. BISSON. I do.

May I say in extension of my remarks here that so far as I remember I engaged on occasion in general acts against the Hitler tyranny.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course you did. All Communists did.

Mr. BISSON. This happened to be one instance.

Senator EASTLAND. All Communists did that, but no Communist would intercede for the release of the Catholic leadership which was anti-Communist. No Communist would intercede for the release of the leaders of the extreme right like Count von Plettenberg who were in prison. All the Communists all over the world interceded for the release of Ernst Thaelmann so he could get up a government.

I may say you were following the regular Communist line as laid down by Moscow. You say you are not a Communist. Maybe you are not.

Mr. BISSON. May I comment that this campaign was after all headed by a Social Democrat personage, the daughter of the Socialist Prime Minister of Norway.

Senator EASTLAND. That is the Communist strategy all over the world, to put some Social Democrat out in front. All the front organizations in the country had some big name that did not know what was happening behind the scenes. But I cannot understand that when the chips were down that you always turned up on the Red

side of things. I cannot understand if you were not a Communist how you were used.

Mr. BISSON. The point I am making here is people of all political persuasions were against this political imprisonment. They operated for all of them.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; but it is very strange that you just picked out of all of them that Communist leader to specifically help.

Mr. MORRIS. Do we have any document that reports the fact that Mr. Bisson did in fact support Ernst Thaelmann, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a publication called International Press Correspondence which has previously been identified as the official organ of the Communist Internationale. It is volume 15, No. 50, dated October 5, 1935, and on page 1263 is an article entitled "The World-Wide Campaign for Thaelmann," which publicizes the activities of the international release committee which is working for the release of Thaelmann there appears as a member of the committee the name of Bisson and Field.

I offer this page for the record.

Mr. BISSON. Was that committee headed by Sonya Branting?

Mr. MANDEL. All the names are given.

Mr. BISSON. She was the daughter of the Socialist Prime Minister.

Senator EASTLAND. That is the alibi to hide behind if it is charged it was a Communist set-up. It will be placed in the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 724" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 724

THE WORLD-WIDE CAMPAIGN FOR THAELMANN

We have received the following statement from the International Release Committee:

In all parts of the globe, even the most remote, the struggle for the release of Thaelmann is on the increase. New groups of trade-unionists, intellectuals, new great organisations and factories take the fate of the menaced German fighters for peace into their protecting hands.

The two great Congresses of French trade-unionists, that of the C. G. T. and of the C. G. T. U., adopted resolutions of protest against the imprisonment of Thaelmann, Mierendorff, Ossietzky, Brandes, and Maddalena. Jouhaux, the well-known French trade-union leader, declared at the opening of the C. G. T. congress that Caballero and Thaelmann are to be elected as honorary chairmen of this great congress. Many hundred union and branch secretaries of the two congresses, representing the French trade-union movement, which is now marching in a united front, signed a protest and demanded the release of Thaelmann, Mierendorff, Claus, Kayser, and of the thousands of imprisoned trade-unionists captured in the illegal struggle for the trade-unions in Germany.

In the United States of America the well-known Swedish lawyer, Sonia Branting, daughter of the former Swedish Prime Minister, Hjalmar Branting, is touring the country on behalf of the International Thaelmann Release Committee. Prominent American intellectuals have formed a Branting reception committee and are organising a campaign of meetings, lectures, and conferences all over the country. The committee includes Judge Anna Cross; Bisson, Secretary of the Committee on Foreign Relations; Field, director of the Institute; the lawyers Hays, Ernst, and Lucile B. Milner. The leader of the Socialist Party of the United States, Norman Thomas, a leading figure in American public life, has quite recently agreed to sit on the committee. The American press featured the first lectures of Sonia Branting in extensive articles.

The "New York American" pointed out that Sonia Branting was well-acquainted with conditions in Germany as she had been a delegate to the recent penal reform congress held in Berlin and had received a lasting impression of the level to which the administration of justice had sunk in Germany. The "New York Post" reported a lecture of Sonia Branting at length. She had especially stressed

the barbarism of the methods of sterilisation, a procedure even applied as a punitive measure to political opponents. Sonia Branting drew a true picture of the German machinery of justice which obeys the commands from above and which will judge Thaelmann at just such commands from above. The "New York Times," in reporting a lecture of Miss Branting, quotes the attitude of the speaker to the coming Olympic Games, which are to be held in Germany. The paper points out that nonparticipation in the Olympic Games is an act of protest against the persecution of opponents in the Third Reich and would be an act of sympathy on the part of the civilised world for the men and women humiliated and tormented in Germany. The "New York Tribune" writes that Miss Branting received a telegram from leading French writers and journalists, asking her to form a release committee in the United States for the liberation of Thaelmann and all other imprisoned anti-fascists.

On October 5 a great Thaelmann meeting will be held in Yorkville. Sonia Branting and a number of other prominent speakers will speak. On October 17 a great banquet will be held with the participation of men and women prominent in the intellectual life of New York. Sonia Branting will speak. The great mass meeting on October 25 will to a certain extent be a culminating point. It is to be held in New York for the release of Thaelmann and of all German anti-Nazi prisoners. The mass movement against the Nazi terror in the United States has already provoked the New York Nazis to outbursts of impotent rage and provocative threats. They have announced that they would organise counter-demonstrations. But the rising anti-Nazi feeling in the United States will nip in the bud the provocative plans of the Hitlerites, especially after the tremendous success of the Bremen affair.

Even in the distant islands of New Zealand a wide mass movement is in progress on behalf of Thaelmann, Mierendorff, Ossietzky, etc. A great conference of trade-unions, peace societies, and student clubs adopted a resolution demanding the release of Thaelmann, held in custody unlawfully for nearly three years, the release of all other anti-Nazi prisoners, and the cessation of the persecution by the Hitler regime of political and religious opponents.

A delegation of three handed the German consul, Herr Penseler, a copy of this resolution on behalf of the working population of New Zealand. The consul declared that his government had informed him that Thaelmann was being "decently treated." He promised to forward the resolution to the Hitler government.

The New Zealand committee of the Movement Against War and Fascism has addressed a mass appeal to the workers, trade-unionists, and farmers of New Zealand.

In Spain the popular movement for the release of Thaelmann has been considerably intensified during recent weeks. A committee composed of intellectuals and representatives of various parties appointed September 14 as Spanish Thaelmann Day. A public meeting was held in one of the largest halls of Madrid which holds 5,000 persons. Over 15,000 people came to buy tickets. Representatives of the Radical Party, of the Republicans, of the Socialists, and a number of non-party intellectuals spoke. A unanimously adopted resolution demanded the release of Thaelmann and of the imprisoned German anti-fascists.

On the same day a mighty mass demonstration took place in Valencia, in which a number of representatives sent by other Spanish cities were present, and here as well as in Madrid the speakers included representatives of all progressive parties.

In five cities of the Balearic Islands mass demonstrations were held on the same day demanding the release of Thaelmann.

In almost every Spanish prison the political prisoners celebrated Thaelmann Day in their own particular way. About fifty letters came out of the prisons, fifty letters representing the result of discussions between thousands of captive workers. In these letters the prisoners, themselves victims of the terror, express their indignation at the barbarians now ruling Germany and demand the release of Thaelmann.

A campaign has been undertaken in Spain to get five million signatures for a petition to release Thaelmann. In Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville, etc., one sees posters and stickybacks everywhere demanding the release of Thaelmann.

The Spanish Legal Commission of Inquiry into the Thaelmann Trial, whose chairman is Victoria Kent, the well-known lawyer, recently adopted a resolution protesting against the further imprisonment of Thaelmann. The resolution was signed by the following jurists, all practising at the Madrid bar: Viktoria Kent, Luis Zubillaga, Enrique Porua, Francisco Lopez, de Goispechea, Benito Pavon,

E. Ortega y Gasset. A delegation presented this petition of protest to the German consul in Madrid. A great number of Spanish newspapers printed the text of this petition and declared their sympathy with the demand for the release of Thaelmann.

In the Scandinavian countries the campaign against the Hitler terror is making good progress. In Norway a release committee for the liberation of German anti-fascists is in the course of formation. Prominent scientists and writers, teachers' organisations, Socialist student clubs, and intellectuals have expressed their willingness to cooperate with the committee. In September the Oslo "Dagbladet" published a lengthy article on the scandalous sentence passed on Claus and Kayser. Various individuals prominent in public life have addressed an open letter of protest to Hitler, demanding the rescinding of the death sentence passed on Claus and Kayser. The whole action and the names of the leading personalities participating in it was described in a detailed communiqué issued by the official Norwegian news agency.

A world-wide movement is now on foot to free the German fighters for liberty, who are now threatened by death! The liberation of Dimitrov and the release under duress of Berthold Jakob have shown that only the mighty pressure of international public opinion can save our courageous and tormented brothers. The trial of the 25 anti-fascists of Neu-Koelln, now in press in Berlin and revealing the barbarous methods employed by German justice, has warned the workers of the whole world that our menaced comrades are in deadly danger. Thus in this Berlin trial, which is ultimately intended to bring Thaelmann's head under the axe, a number of perjuries, the falsification of sworn statements and false testimony by bribed Nazi witnesses have already been proven beyond a doubt.

Although the world is already in motion against the horrors of the Hitler regime, those harbingers of the horrors of the coming war—this movement is as yet only a start. Only if it is tremendously increased can Ernst Thaelmann and the other hostages of the Nazi war policy be wrested from the clutches of the fascist incendiaries and warmongers and restored to liberty.

(English Edition, Internationl Press Correspondence, vol. 15, No. 50, 5th October, 1935, p. 1263.)

Senator EASTLAND. Who approached you to become a member of that committee?

Mr. BISSON. I don't know anyone approached me.

Senator EASTLAND. You just voluntered?

Mr. BISSON. I may have discussed it with Mr. Field.

Senator EASTLAND. In fact now, to be frank, Mr. Field got you to become a member of that committee, did he not?

Mr. BISSON. I may have gotten Mr. Field to become a member of the committee. We were seeing each other in terms of our far-eastern work at that time.

Senator EASTLAND. You and Freddie Field, of course.

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Field was then in the IPR.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand he was.

Mr. BISSON. I was in the Far Eastern Policy Association. We were both interested in far-eastern matters both officially and otherwise.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand Mr. Field was in other things, too.

How did you get your job with the Board of Economic Welfare?

Mr. BISSON. To the best of my knowledge——

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute. Why say "To the best of my knowledge"? You know very well who recommended you for a place on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Mr. BISSON. I don't know. I don't remember specifically.

Senator EASTLAND. What is the best of your knowledge?

Mr. BISSON. I would probably have had support from the head of the Foreign Policy Association, Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy.

Senator EASTLAND. But you don't know you did?

Mr. BISSON. He was my official superior in the organization that I was working with.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know him?

Mr. BISSON. How could I help but know him. He was my superior. He was the president of the Foreign Policy Association. I was a member of the research staff there. I feel sure that I have a recommendation from him for that position.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you have a recommendation from Mr. Field?

Mr. BISSON. I might have.

Senator EASTLAND. What about Mr. Earl Browder?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know Mr. Browder?

Mr. BISSON. I have met him.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you meet Earl Browder?

Mr. BISSON. We spoke on the same lecture platform.

Senator EASTLAND. Where?

Mr. BISSON. In New York.

Senator EASTLAND. What lecture platform was that?

Mr. BISSON. I think it was a meeting that was concerned with the magazine China Today.

Senator EASTLAND. What about Jack Stachel? Did you know him?

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember knowing him.

Senator EASTLAND. You don't remember knowing him?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Senator EASTLAND. Have you been in Browder's office?

Mr. BISSON. Have I?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. I have not.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you speak; in Union Square?

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember. I expect it was in some restaurant or dining place.

Senator EASTLAND. In some restaurant?

Mr. BISSON. It was an evening, as I remember, an evening engagement. We probably had dinner first and then we had speeches.

Senator EASTLAND. You and Browder had dinner and had speeches.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the occasion that there has been testimony about here already?

Mr. BISSON. I am a little confused as to exactly which meeting that has reference to.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many meetings did you ever speak at with Mr. Browder?

Mr. BISSON. It is this China Today meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Answer the question.

Mr. BISSON. One.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only one?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the one we have had testimony about?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think that was in a restaurant?

Mr. BISSON. That was my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a memory of speaking with Browder at some time with him in a restaurant?

Mr. BISSON. No; I do not have any specific memory.

Senator EASTLAND. The tickets for that banquet were sold by New Masses and the Worker Book Shop, which was a Communist headquarters, were they not?

Mr. BISSON. A Communist headquarters?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes; 50 East Thirteenth Street. Is that not Communist headquarters?

Mr. BISSON. I do not know. Not to my knowledge.

Senator EASTLAND. You do know New Masses was a Communist Party publication?

Mr. BISSON. I do.

Senator EASTLAND. I will tell you now that the tickets for this lecture that you made with Mr. Browder were sold at the Communist Party headquarters and New Masses. Was Mr. Hansu Chen present?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; I think he was.

Senator EASTLAND. He was a Communist?

Mr. BISSON. I have no reason to know he was.

Senator EASTLAND. He was one of the speakers who appeared with you and Browder; was he not?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. As a matter of fact, to be perfectly fair, Chen is a Communist?

Mr. BISSON. I know him as such today.

Senator EASTLAND. You know him as such today. Frederick Field was a speaker also?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. There was Bisson, Browder, Field, and Chen who were the speakers?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. They were all Communists but you?

Mr. BISSON. I do not say that.

Senator EASTLAND. You just said you knew Chen was a Communist. You know Earl Browder is a Communist?

Mr. BISSON. It was not clear at that time what is clear today.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you mean to say it was not clear to you that Earl Browder was a Communist?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; but I am speaking of the other two individuals, Mr. Field and Mr. Hansu Chen.

Senator EASTLAND. It was not clear to you Freddie Field was a Communist?

Mr. BISSON. Not at that time; no.

Mr. MORRIS. When you worked for the Board of Economic Welfare did you testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent did you testify before the House committee?

Mr. BISSON. I am not sure what you mean "to what extent."

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you testify?

Mr. BISSON. I was called before them once.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a second appearance?

Mr. BISSON. I do not think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a planned second appearance?

Mr. BISSON. Not that I know of.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you discuss with IPR confreres of yours the possibility of having a second appearance before the Dies committee?

Mr. BISSON. I may have. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what efforts you made in order to clear yourself before the Dies committee? Did you ask the IPR to help you?

Mr. BISSON. I may have. As I remember, there was a counsel of the BEW at that time and I can't remember his name, but it seems to me he gave us some help and came along to the session with me.

Mr. MORRIS. The counsel to the Board of Economic Warfare went to the hearings?

Mr. BISSON. This particular person.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. BISSON. I cannot recall his name.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent did you ask the IPR to help you in your appearance before that committee and before the——

Mr. BISSON. To my knowledge very little. My chief efforts were getting help from the agency with which I was connected.

Mr. MORRIS. You did, however, have the IPR to help you?

Mr. BISSON. I may have. I do not recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter on the letterhead of "353 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Md." It is a handwritten letter addressed to "Dear Mr. Carter" and signed "T. A. Bisson." Date, April 26, 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It was.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that letter, please?

Mr. BISSON (reading):

DEAR MR. CARTER: I appreciate very much your generous assistance on the moving expenses, which will ease things up for us on the transfer very materially. If our dates work out, I should be ready to take up my new duties on June 2 or 3.

Thanks very much for sending me the copy of Buell's characteristic letter. I find the BEW appropriation bill has just gone in, so I may still have to run the gauntlet here early in May before the Kerr committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, sir.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 725" and was read in full.)

Senator EASTLAND. What was the Kerr committee?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have any recollection of that committee?

Mr. MANDEL. The Kerr committee was a special committee of the House of Representatives, a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee which at that time dealt with loyalty cases.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you write this letter?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Senator EASTLAND. What do you mean "so I may still have to run the gauntlet of the Kerr committee"?

Mr. BISSON. It means I would have to appear before the Kerr committee.

Senator EASTLAND. Does it not mean more than that? Does it not mean there was a probability in your mind your loyalty to your country might be questioned?

Mr. BISSON. It was a security test; yes.

Senator EASTLAND. That was in April 1943, April 26, while this country was at war with Germany and Japan. Did you not mean here "So I may still have to run the gauntlet here early in May before the Kerr committee" that you thought your loyalty to your country might be questioned?

Mr. BISSON. It might be questioned; yes. It still remained to be proved.

Senator EASTLAND. I understand that, but you thought conditions were such that your loyalty might be questioned. Why did you think your loyalty might be questioned? You were bound to have known the reasons that would cause them to question your loyalty to your country.

Mr. BISSON. There was a group of 12 or 15 BEW individuals who were undergoing this scrutiny. Several of them appeared before the Dies committee.

Senator EASTLAND. How did you know you would be called?

Mr. BISSON. Some of them had been called and therefore I assumed I would be called, too.

Senator EASTLAND. Why did you assume you would be called?

Mr. BISSON. I was among the group that was being investigated and they were dealing with us in a more or less similar way.

Senator EASTLAND. What had you done?

Mr. BISSON. Nothing.

Senator EASTLAND. What was the accusation against you? Why were they investigating your loyalty?

Mr. BISSON. I would not know.

Senator EASTLAND. You are bound to know. On what basis were the others being questioned as to their loyalty?

Mr. BISSON. I do not know the details.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know the details? You say that you knew they were investigating others, Mr. Bisson. Is that true?

Mr. BISSON. That is true.

Senator EASTLAND. How did you know they were investigating them? From talking to them?

Mr. BISSON. The names were generally known.

Senator EASTLAND. You had talked to them about their appearances, had you not?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; although I remember no specific individuals that I talked to.

Senator EASTLAND. Of course if you talked to them about their appearance before the committee, you certainly knew that the basis was that their loyalty was being questioned?

Mr. BISSON. When I talked with them we were primarily concerned as to what the situation would be before the committee.

Senator EASTLAND. You know very well that if you asked a man about his appearance, you asked him on what grounds they were questioning him. Didn't you do that?

Mr. FANELLI. The answer is yes or no. You either did or did not.

Mr. BISSON. I was not sure what ground I would be questioned on.

Senator EASTLAND. You did not ask what grounds you would be questioned? When you asked the other people who had been called before that committee about their appearance, you certainly asked them the grounds on which their loyalty was questioned, did you not?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Senator Eastland. You did not?

Mr. Bisson. I do not remember so asking.

Senator Eastland. How do you know it was a security check on them if you did not do that?

Mr. Bisson. This was the general assumption.

Senator Eastland. You asked them? You say you knew it was a security check. How did you know?

Mr. Bisson. The Kerr committee was organized, as I remember after the Dies committee.

Senator Eastland. Is your answer you just assumed?

Mr. Bisson. I had not finished my answer. Since the Kerr committee was organized later, we assumed that perhaps the same group would go before that committee.

Senator Eastland. On what ground? The ground of loyalty?

Mr. Bisson. It was a security test.

Senator Eastland. That is a loyalty test?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Eastland. Why was it you thought you would be called before them and questioned about your loyalty?

Mr. Bisson. I would not know. I don't recall.

Senator Eastland. Do you mean to tell me with your country at war and you an official of the American Government who was called before a committee of the American Congress to determine whether you were loyal to your country or not, in other words, whether you were a traitor or not, you would not know on what grounds your loyalty was questioned? Or you would not know on what grounds there was suspicion of treason against you? Do you mean to tell me that?

Mr. Bisson. Yes. That is exactly what I said. I went before the committee. I knew nothing of what I was being charged with.

May I add a statement here? I have just been called a traitor before this committee.

Senator Eastand. No, you have not.

Mr. Fanelli. Let's get on.

Senator Eastland. Let's straighten the record out. You have not been called a traitor. I said there was a question as to your loyalty by the Kerr committee; that that meant there was a question as to whether you were guilty of treason or not, and with an accusation like that you were certainly bound to know the facts on which it was based. Whether it was true or not I do not know. I am making no charges against you.

Mr. Bisson. May I be excused for a second?

Senator Eastland. No; I want to proceed with the hearing.

Mr. Bisson. I would like to go outside for a second.

Senator Eastland. All right.

(A short recess was taken.)

Mr. Morris. Will you identify this letter, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. This is a photostat of a handwritten document from the files of the IPR on the letterhead of the Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C., dated April 14, with no year given, addressed to "Dear Mr. Carter," signed T. A. Bisson, and the initials in the corner are ECC, WLH, KP, and HA.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that letter, please?

Mr. BISSON (reading):

EXHIBIT NO. 726

DEAR MR. CARTER: I cannot begin to tell you how heartening the letters from New York have been. There has been no second hearing yet, which is all to the good. In fact, the weight of the letters may be alone sufficient to prevent one, though I am not too sanguine on this point. The Kerr committee has to feel strong enough to reject the transcript of my testimony before the Dies committee, and the letters are therefore just what is needed.

Unless complications develop, I am expecting to be at the Princeton conference this week end where I shall hope to have a chance to discuss things with you.

Please express my thanks and pass on this word to any who may inquire. I appreciate your efforts more than I can say.

Sincerely,

T. A. BISSON.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write that letter?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that refresh your recollection whether the IPR aided you in your difficulty in Washington at that time?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you testify further on that subject?

Mr. BISSON. One of the things that we were doing was securing letters from persons that knew us in our previous careers that could testify to our loyalty to the United States and also to our general competency in the field that we were in. Mr. Carter, among others, was attempting to help me out in getting letters of that kind. I remember, for instance, that one letter came from Dr. Hu Shih who was, if not then a little later or a little earlier, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony you can now recall this where you could not recall it 5 minutes ago?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You seem to have a clear memory now.

Mr. BISSON. I had forgotten who helped out on these letters. I knew about the letters but I had not read that the IPR, through Mr. Carter, was helping me get those letters. There is nothing unusual——

Mr. MORRIS. There was no implication anything was unusual. We are asking if you had used the instrumentality of the IPR to aid you in your difficulty in Washington.

Mr. BISSON. The answer is "No." I had asked my personal friend, Mr. Carter, to help me, and he was helping to get those letters.

Mr. MORRIS. May that letter go in?

Senator EASTLAND. It is submitted.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 726" and was read in full.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a handwritten letter from the files of the IPR on the letterhead addressed "353 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Md.", dated April 30, 1943, addressed to "Dear Mr. Carter" and signed T. A. Bisson.

Senator EASTLAND. Right here, to save time, all these letters and documents will be admitted into the record unless challenged by the witness and his attorney. Then I will pass on them.

Mr. MANDEL. Attached thereto is a carbon copy from the files of the IPR dated April 30, 1943, addressed to "Dr. Joseph P. Chamberlain." It is unsigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that letter, please?

Mr. BISSON. You mean the ink letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; the one in your handwriting.

Mr. BISSON (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 727

I enclose copy of a letter to Dr. Chamberlain for your information. My hunch is that the case here will develop into a large and politically significant fight. At the moment, however, it looks as though Watson and Dodd will provide the test cases over which the battle in Congress will be waged, leaving the rest until after that decision is reached.

Sincerely,

T. A. BISSON.

May I comment on that?

Mr. SOURWINE. May I see that letter while you are phrasing your comment?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to know, too, if that second letter is a letter written by you?

Mr. BISSON. I will see.

The comment I wanted to make on this original one was that Watson and Dodd had had their salaries stopped apparently that the decision hinged on that because it was a question whether the salaries would be stopped before a decision had been reached, in other words, before the court test or the loyalty hearing, or whatever it was, that was concluded and a decision was reached as to whether the person was cleared or not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that other letter a copy of a letter you wrote? What is the date of that?

Mr. BISSON. That is April 30, 1943.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom is it addressed?

Mr. BISSON. Dr. Joseph P. Chamberlain.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a letter you wrote?

Mr. BISSON. May I look at it? It is a long letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

Mr. BISSON. Yes; that is a letter I wrote to Dr. Chamberlain.

Mr. SOURWINE. May they go in the record?

Senator EASTLAND. I ordered them all in the record unless they are challenged.

(The letters referred to were marked "No. 727" (read in full), and "No. 728" and is as follows:)

APRIL 30, 1943.

Dr. JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN,
510 Kent Hall, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

DEAR DR. CHAMBERLAIN: Some of the recent developments in the handling of the congressional investigations here may be of interest to you. Three persons have appeared so far before the Kerr committee. As you know, Schuman was exonerated while Dodd and Watson were convicted. It seems possible that hearings of the others involved will be delayed until Dodd and Watson are ousted from office by congressional vote.

The ouster will apparently be attempted through attachment of riders to appropriation bills indicating that no funds from any source shall be utilized to pay the salary of the accused. Passage seems likely in the House, but a stiffer

fight is in prospect in the Senate, doubtless with considerable attendant publicity. The issues in debate will probably extend beyond the narrower problem involved into such broader questions as to whether Dies, Fish, and the other isolationists or the accused were correct in estimating the course of international developments in the past decade and as to whether political liberalism can survive in this country in the near future if this preliminary attack succeeds.

The normal arbitrary procedures of a congressional committee have, of course, been applied in this case. The Dies committee permitted a legal representative of each agency involved to attend the hearing as an observer, but not to participate in the hearing or act as legal counsel for the accused. The Kerr committee has refused to permit a representative of the agency involved to attend the hearings even as an observer. No list of charges is furnished to the accused in advance of the hearing.

In one case certain members of the Kerr committee sought to pin the accused down to "Yes" or "No" answers, thus seeking to prevent the introduction of evidence into the hearing. This created a dispute within the committee which was finally resolved in favor of the accused. On the next day the same members of the committee again sought "Yes" or "No" answers and refused to be bound by the previous committee decision. When the accused picked up his papers and prepared to leave, however, the atmosphere cleared and the accused was again allowed to proceed with the introduction of evidence.

The Kerr committee's report on the Watson-Schuman-Dodd case (Congressional Record, April 21) has applied an extraordinary definition of "subversive" to certain organizations, defining them as such by reason of the judgment of the "court of public opinion" in the United States. Association with organizations so defined then involves the individuals concerned in "subversive activity."

The Kerr committee is on firmer legal ground apparently when it connects an individual with organizations listed as subversive in a statement by the Attorney General (cited by Dies on the floor of Congress last January). There is some question, however, as to whether this list was merely an interoffice memorandum within the Justice Department to which the Attorney General's name became attached by some unexplained means. This point would bear clearing up because it affords by far the strongest ground that has ever been afforded Dies in his campaign.

All of this information may be already known to you, but I have set it down here on the chance that some of the details may be new to you and of interest. I presume you have seen the 26-page statement issued by the Federal Communications Commission in defense of its employees.

Sincerely yours,

———— ————.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a question, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify these letters, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a handwritten letter from the files of the IPR on the letterhead "353 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Md." dated April 21, 1943, addressed to "Dear Mr. Carter," and signed "T. A. Bisson." An attachment thereto is a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the IPR addressed to "Hon. John H. Kerr, chairman, Special Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives," with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is already introduced in the record as Exhibit 260.

Mr. Bisson, will you read your letter, please?

Mr. BISSON (reading):

DEAR MR. CARTER: My formal letter of resignation here went in yesterday, effective for June 1. Stone just called me and the decision was made final.

The replies by Kerr make it seem that the matter may not be carried any further for the moment. Formal clearance, however, seems unlikely.

May I again express my deep appreciation for your help?

Sincerely,

T. A. BISSON.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify these letters, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here several carbon copies of letters from the files of the IPR. The first one is dated April 12, 1943, addressed to "Dear Dr. Evans, The Rockefeller Foundation", with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. The second one is a carbon copy of a letter dated April 12, 1943, addressed to Miss Pearl Buck, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

The third is a carbon copy of a letter dated April 12, 1943, addressed to Dr. Goodrich with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

The next is a carbon copy dated April 12, 1943, addressed to Dr. Raymond Leslie Buell, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

And finally, a carbon copy of a letter dated April 12, 1943, addressed to Mr. Richard J. Walsh, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, these all seem to be worded in the same fashion. The first paragraph begins:

The Dies Committee is after T. A. Bisson who for the past year has been working for the BEW. Bisson desires a few of his friends to write letters testifying to his loyalty as an American citizen, adding anything that the writer feels free to say.

That seems to be the form that Mr. Carter followed in all of these letters, Mr. Chairman. The letters will speak for themselves. May they go into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. They are ordered in unless there is objection.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 729" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT 729

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 12, 1943.

Dr. ROGER F. EVANS,
The Rockefeller Foundation,
49 East 49th Street, New York City.

DEAR DR. EVANS: Here is a copy of my letter to Honorable John H. Kerr, Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., regarding Mr. T. A. Bisson.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Copies of the following letter were sent to: Miss Pearl Buck, R. D. 3, Perkasie, Pennsylvania; Dr. L. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University, New York City; Dr. Raymond Leslie Buell, Fortune Magazine, Time and Life Building, Rockefeller Plaza, New York; Mr. Richard J. Walsh, Asia Magazine, 40 East 49th Street, New York City.

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 12, 1943.

DEAR ——— ———: The Dies Committee is after T. A. Bisson who for the past year has been working for the BEW. Bisson desires a few of his friends to write letters testifying to his loyalty as an American citizen adding anything that the writer feels free to say.

Enclosed is a copy of what I have written. Would you feel free to write directly to Honorable John H. Kerr, Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., sending a copy of your letter to T. A. Bisson at 353 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. Morris. This was not written by Mr. Bisson but it bears on the point of to what extent the IPR was an instrumentality in obtaining signatures or sending testimonial letters for Mr. Bisson.

Mr. Bisson. "To what extent Mr. Carter was." He was not necessarily acting as an IPR official but as an individual.

Mr. Morris. These were from the files of the IPR, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Eastland. Proceed.

Mr. Bisson. Are you turning to a new subject?

Mr. Morris. Do you have some comment?

Mr. Bisson. Yes. I think it is pertinent to this last half or three quarters of an hour's testimony to note that I was under investigation at this same time by the Civil Service Commission. As some of you may probably remember from that period, people were hired in a great hurry and went into the departments in large numbers and then the Civil Service Commission proceeded to conduct its routine investigation.

In the spring of 1943 the Civil Service Commission's formal clearance for me was suitable and fit for Government employment and that came through. They had conducted this investigation during the whole period when the Dies committee and the Kerr committee were operating. The decision of the Civil Service Commission was that I was suitable and fit for Government employment as indicated by that formal clearance.

I do not have a copy of that with me, but I presume this fact I am now stating can be verified.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, at that point may I interrogate very briefly?

I have before me what purports to be a copy of the Form 3721 personal history statement which this witness executed in connection with his Board of Economic Warfare employment. I do not ask this go in the record because this is not the best evidence. The committee is securing and will have in its possession later today a photostatic copy of the original form. I ask that the photostatic copy go in.

Senator Eastland. Yes, proceed.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 730" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 730

United States Civil Service Commission,
Washington, D. C., March 31, 1952.

Honorable Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

Dear Senator McCarran: As requested in telephone conversation between my secretary and Miss Walker of your staff, I am enclosing a photostat copy of Form 3721, filled out by Mr. Thomas Arthur Bisson, born November 8, 1900. This is the only personal history statement for this person we were able to locate in our files.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Ramspeck, *Chairman.*

Inclosure 142384.

Form 2749
June 1941

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Washington, D. C.

U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RECEIVED APR 10 1942 INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION

SPECIAL ATTENTION.

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

This form must be executed in the applicant's own handwriting, in ink. If additional space is needed for any item in this form, entries should be continued on a separate sheet, each entry numbered to correspond to the number of the question on the form.

1. Name: (Print) Thomas (First) Arthur (Middle) Bisson (Last)

2. Address: 920-26th Place South (Number) (Street) Arlington (City) Va. (State)

3. Place of birth: New York (City) N.Y. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

4. Date of birth: November (Month) 8 (Day) 1900 (Year)

5. IF FOREIGN-BORN, GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

(a) Date of arrival in U. S.: (Month) (Day) (Year)
(b) Port of entry:
(c) Name of vessel or other means of arrival:
(d) Place of naturalization: (City) (State)
(e) Date of naturalization:
(f) Court of naturalization:
(g) Naturalization certificate No.:
(h) Name under which naturalized: (First) (Middle) (Last)

6. IF CITIZENSHIP WAS DERIVED THROUGH PARENT OR THROUGH MARRIAGE, GIVE FOLLOWING INFORMATION REGARDING PERSON THROUGH WHOM CITIZENSHIP WAS DERIVED:

(a) Name and relationship:
(b) If husband, date and place of marriage:
(c) Date of arrival in U. S.:
(d) Port of entry:
(e) Name of vessel or other means of arrival:
(f) Place of naturalization: (City) (State)
(g) Date of naturalization:
(h) Court of naturalization:
(i) Naturalization certificate number:
(j) Name under which naturalized:

7. (a) Name of father: Noel Bisson
(b) Address: Deceased
(c) Place and date of his birth: (City) Ile Maligne (State) Province of Quebec (Month) (Day) (Year)

8. (a) Name of mother: (including maiden name) Marie Louise (Fréchard) Bisson
(b) Address: Sugartone Park, Morris Plains, N. J.
(c) Place and date of her birth: (City) Montreal (State) New York (Month) (Day) (Year)

9. EDUCATION — GIVE IN BLANKS BELOW A DETAILED STATEMENT OF YOUR EDUCATION, INCLUDING DATES:

(a) Grammar school: Attended from September, 1906 to June, 1915. Highest grade completed: Eighth.
(b) High School: Name and location: Englewood High School, Englewood, N. J. Attended from September, 1915, to June, 1919. Highest year completed: ---------- Were you graduated? ----------
(c) College or trade or technical school: Name and location: Rutgers College, New Brunswick, N. J. Attended from: Sept., 1919, to June, 1923. Highest year completed: Senior. Were you graduated? Yes.
Kind of courses pursued, and degrees, if any, received: History major; B.A.



10. EXPERIENCE

Below, give a statement in chronological order of all your employment, beginning with your first full time employment and including your present employment, any periods of unemployment during the preceding five years, and periods of personal work which you have devoted during such periods. If in the military or naval service during the past five years, give names of organizations, and dates and location of service with ranks and grades, dates, type of discharge, and name of final discharge.

Name of Employment	Date of Employment	Name and Address of Employer	Position and Salary	Names, positions, and present address of one supervisor and one associate in each employment	Reasons for leaving (If discharged or forced to resign, give details. If promotion, give comparable salary if possible.)
Self-employed Kobe, Japan	From: Sept. 1924 (Mo.) (Year) To: July 1928	Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions	Educational Missionary $780-$900	Mr. George T. Scott, Montclair, N. J. Rev. Frank S. Hilts, Princeton, N. J.	Work disrupted by the Canadian Pacific strike. Returned home on furlough.
City: New York State: N. Y.	From: Sept. 1928 (Mo.) (Year) To: Sept. 1929	Postgraduate study at Columbia University	✓	Mr. L. C. Goodrich, Chinese Department, Columbia University	Sought employment after death of father.
City: New York State: N. Y.	From: Sept. 1929 (Mo.) (Year) To: 1942	Foreign Policy Association, 22 E. 38 St., N.Y.C.	Research Worker on Far East Upon $4,000	General Frank R. McCoy, President Hugh L. Keenleyside, Asst. to the President Miss Alice Ballard, Executive Assistant	Called to government service
City: State:	From: (No.) (Year) To:				
City: Wash. State: D.C.	From: Jan. 1942 (No.) (Year) To: April 1942	Board of Economic Warfare, Commerce Bldg.	Principal Economist $5600	Mr. Rogers, Chief of Far Eastern Division Mr. Ralph J. Tuneur Comm. Bldg.	(Called to the Board)
City: State:	From: (No.) (Year) To:				
City: State:	From: (No.) (Year) To:				
City: State:	From: (No.) (Year) To:				

(If additional space is required for experience, continue on another page)

11. Indicate marital status by check: Single ☐ Married ☑ Widowed ☐ Divorced ☐

12. If married, give name of husband or wife (Maiden name of wife should be given): Faith Williams

13. Place and date of birth of husband or wife: Kanazawa (City) Japan (Country) October (Month) 25 (Day) 1900 (Year)

14. If divorced, give particulars of action: (a) (Date) (Month) (Year) (b) Place: (c) Name of court:

(d) Were you plaintiff or defendant? (e) Grounds on which action was based: (f) If minor children or alimony involved, give judgment of court with respect thereto:

15. Names and relationships of dependents: Son – Thomas Noel; Daughter – Jean; Mother – Marie L. Pierson.

16. List all outstanding debts, and to whom owed:

1. $2,000 – Mrs. John E. Williams (my wife's mother).
2. $1,000 – Miss Mary Cochran (" " sister).

These amounts are secured on our house at Point Washington, N.J.



(a) Have you ever been married?
No
(Yes or No)

(b) If so, give details, such as date, place, court, amount of each judgment and final disposition:

19. Have you ever been adjudicated bankrupt or made assignment for benefit of creditors?
(a) No
(Yes or No)

(b) If so, give date, name, and location of court:

(c) Date of discharge in bankruptcy:

19. Within the past 12 months have you used alcoholic beverages to excess?
No
(Yes or No)

20. Prior to the past 12 months have you used alcoholic beverages to excess?
No
(Yes or No)

20a. If you have answered "Yes" to either question 19 or 20, explain briefly:

21. Have you ever been arrested, and/or convicted for any breach or violation of any law, police regulation, or ordinance whatsoever?
If so, list each arrest, giving date, age at the time, place, court, charge, and disposition:
No
(Yes or No)

22. List all Federal Civil Service applications filed, and Federal Civil Service examinations taken, giving name of organization, date, and grade received:
None

23. List Members of your family or relatives in any part of the government service, giving names, addresses, relationship and type of service:
Robert Caldwell — Consultant on Latin America, former Minister to Portugal.
Kenneth Caldwell — American Consul-General, Tientsin, China
[Relatives of wife to be listed]

24. List Members of your family or relatives residing in any foreign country, giving names, addresses, relationship, and occupation of each:
Dr. William Cochran — Taotungfu, China (?) — [illegible]
Medical missionary in charge of hospital.
Brother-in-law (husband of Mary Williams Cochran).

25. Are you a member of any Communist or German Bund organization or any political party or organization which advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of government in the United States, or do you have membership in or any affiliation with any group, association, or organization which advocates or supports advocating the overthrow of our constitutional form of government in the United States?
No
(Yes or No)

If so, name the organization:

and give complete details in the space immediately below, or on a sheet to be attached hereto



8.

28. List your residences during the past five years, including your present (now) address. Give also the names of, and the present addresses of, two nearest neighbors in each case, or the names of roommates, foster-lodgers, landlords, or realty companies.

From Jan. 1937 (Month) (Year) to Dec. 1937 (Month) (Year) No. (Number) 8th investigation trip in Japan, (Street) (City) (State)

NEIGHBORS: 1. China, Korea, Manchuria (Name) (Address)

2. (Name) (Address)

From Jan. 1938 (Month) (Year) to Sept. 1941 (Month) (Year) No. 115 (Number) Monterey Road, Fort Washington, L.I. (Street) (City) (State)

NEIGHBORS: 1. Mr. and Mrs. Frank L. Kent (Name) 118 Monterey Road (Address)

2. Mr. Kenneth Dewey (Name) 111 Monterey Road (Address)

From Oct. 1941 (Month) (Year) to Dec. 1942 (Month) (Year) No. 72 (Number) Lincoln Ave. (Street) Fort Washington, L.I. (City) N.Y. (State)

NEIGHBORS: 1. Mr. and Mrs. Leonard W. McClung (Name) 6 Tower Place (Address) Fort Washington, L.I.

2. Mr. Kirke Wy. Lissing (Name) 37 Lincoln Road (Address) Fort Washington, L.I.

From Jan. 1943 (Month) (Year) to Feb. 1943 (Month) (Year) No. 1643 (Number) 46th St. (Street) New York City (City) N.Y. (State)

NEIGHBORS: 1. Not on speaking terms with anyone there. (Name) (Address)

2. (Name) (Address)

From (Month) (Year) to (Month) (Year) No. (Number) (Street) (City) (State)

NEIGHBORS: 1. (Name) (Address)

2. (Name) (Address)

From (Month) (Year) to (Month) (Year) No. (Number) (Street) (City) (State)

NEIGHBORS: 1. (Name) (Address)

2. (Name) (Address)

I certify that the foregoing statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

T. A. Bisson (Signature of applicant)

April 17, 1945 (Date)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1941—[illegible]

ARTICLES: (written in)

New York Times
" " Herald Tribune
Magazine of Wall Street
The Nation
The New Republic
Pacific Affairs
Political Science Quarterly
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
China Today
The Saturday Review of Literature
Americana

BOOKS: (written)

Japan in China — Macmillan, 1938

American Policy in the Far East, 1931-1940. Inquiry Series, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1940.

In addition, the Reports, Bulletins, Pamphlets and Headline Books.

Headline Book — Shadow Over Asia — War Department published 30,000 copies for distribution to army camps.

ORGANIZATIONS: (membership)

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.
American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression.
American Friends of the Chinese People.

Was probably on the mailing list of the American League for Peace and Democracy. Never a dues-paying member.

T.A. Bisson

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall filing a personal history statement while you were with BEW?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked for that?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was some time after you had actually begun work?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you actually went to work did you file a Form 57, or an application form of any sort?

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember. Presumably there was some form. I do not recall at this time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not recall how you made application for work with the Board?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was head of the Board of Economic Warfare when you went to work?

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Perkins, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he remain the head of that Board throughout your entire tenure?

Mr. BISSON. No. I think he was replaced by the Vice President.

Mr. SOURWINE. What Vice President?

Mr. BISSON. Mr. Wallace.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. BISSON. I am not sure just when that occurred, presumably in 1942.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Wallace still the head of the Board when you left?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you filed this personal history statement—it is dated April 1, 1942—does that strike any discord with your memory? Are you willing to accept that as the date it was filed?

Mr. BISSON. I think that would be right.

Mr. SOURWINE. The purpose of that statement was to inform the Government as a basis for a civil-service check-up of where you had worked and what you had done; is that correct?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had this statement typed up, did you not?

Mr. BISSON. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the portions of the statement which you had typed out did you give any information about your connection with IPR?

Mr. BISSON. I had no connection with the IPR before that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had not?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then the answer would be "No"?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give any information about your connection with the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give any information about your connection with American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give any information about your connection you may have had with the American League for Peace and Democracy?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give any information about your connection with the International Release Committee that we have spoken about here?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give any information about your connection with Amerasia?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Mr. Sourwine. This is the information that you were furnishing as the basis for the check-up that the Civil Service Commission was going to make on you?

Mr. Bisson. No; this, as I remember, was a check sheet asked by our employer in our section. It was not a sheet that was to be filed with the Civil Service Commission. He wanted to know the jobs we had held and what our background was in general.

Mr. Sourwine. You felt you were answering that question and giving him the desired information even though you did not give any of these items of information I have referred to?

Mr. Bisson. Certainly. It did not necessarily mean one was to give every possible organization that one had been connected with. He was primarily interested in the career background.

Mr. Sourwine. After you had filed this, weren't you subsequently told that you should have made mention of some of these organizations you belonged to?

Mr. Bisson. I may have been; yes.

Senator Eastland. Were you? You remember if you had been told that.

Mr. Bisson. I think I was.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you get the application form back, the Form 3721 back, and make additions to it in your own handwriting?

Mr. Bisson. I may have.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you make the additions under the heading "Membership organizations," with the first the American Council of the IPR?

Mr. Bisson. I may have.

Mr. Sourwine. You just said you had no connection with the IPR.

Mr. Bisson. I had no business connection with them. That merely a membership. I assumed you were referring to a business connection.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you add, in your own handwriting, the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression?

Mr. Bisson. I may have; yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you add American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. Bisson. I may have.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you add "Was probably on the mailing list for American League for Peace and Democracy; never a dues-paying member"?

Mr. Bisson. Yes. Incidentally, may I make a comment on that point?

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me continue, please.

Your purpose for adding these was because you had been told there should be some mention of the organizations you belonged to on this sheet; is that right?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You added them?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why didn't you add your membership in the International Release Committee?

Mr. BISSON. In terms of my background, that was so unimportant that it never even occurred to me. My only relation with that committee, so far as I know, was this one occasion on which this greeting was made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why didn't you add your connection with Amerasia? Was that completely unimportant in regard to your background?

Mr. BISSON. Amerasia was a magazine. It was not really an organization. I may have thought that a magazine was not called for here.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know why you didn't add it in?

Mr. BISSON. I would say that would be the reason.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it the reason? You said it must have been.

Mr. BISSON. Yes. That was the reason. That is the only magazine among that list so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions.

Mr. BISSON. I would like to make one point here; that is, this takes on the appearance here of a very formal business. My recollection was that this was handled very informally. There was just a memorandum coming around saying "Get up some kind of sheet showing what your background was." I got that sheet up. That was the original one.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is a printed form; isn't it? The original one is a printed form?

Mr. BISSON. No. The original one was not. It was merely a typewritten manuscript that I typed out myself. Later on the head of our section said, "We want more information than has been given on these. Let's make them more complete and adequate." This was not a formal filing of applications for anything. It was merely an interoffice procedure.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were already employed by BEW?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had been employed there January 22, 1942?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You worked there until July 10, 1943?

Mr. BISSON. That was my formal severance date.

Mr. SOURWINE. This form 3721 is dated April 1, 1942. That is more than 3 months after you began working there?

Mr. BISSON. Yes, but what I am saying is that the first operation on that was just a memorandum saying "Set down some of your background for us for the use of the person that is in charge of this department."

Then later on it may have become formalized. I had forgotten there was a formal form. The thing was made more complete.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean your hiring by BEW was a very informal thing?

Mr. Bisson. This was not hiring.

Mr. Sourwine. I am asking about the time you were hired. It was a very informal thing. You made no formal application. You were not required to give a statement of your employment?

Mr. Bisson. On the contrary. I think I did give a formal statement of employment. This was an informal thing within the department afterward.

Senator Eastland. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Morris. Do you know whether or not Dr. H. H. Fisher consulted personnel of the IPR in connection with his desire to increase the teaching and library facilities in the Far East in connection with his Hoover War Library?

Mr. Bisson. In connection with what?

Mr. Morris. His Hoover War Library.

Mr. Bisson. Did he consult with IPR?

Mr. Morris. With IPR personnel including yourself?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us what you know about it?

Mr. Bisson. I do not know the details on it.

Mr. Morris. Did he consult with you on it?

Mr. Bisson. What is the date of this?

Mr. Morris. In 1945.

Mr. Bisson. Yes. I do not remember the details.

Mr. Morris. Will you identify that letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. I have here a memorandum from the files of the IPR dated January 24, 1945, headed "RD from ECC."

Senator Eastland. Who is RD?

Mr. Morris. Who is RD?

Senator Eastland. Was it Raymond Dennett?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Eastland. How do you spell it?

Mr. Bisson. D-e-n-n-e-t-t, I think.

Mr. Morris (reading):

Exhibit No 731

RD From ECC

Yesterday Dr. H. H. Fisher of the Hoover War Library came in in connection with Stanford's desire to increase its teaching and library facilities on the Far East.

In addition to meeting Grajdanzev and Bisson, I arranged for him to have a talk with Salisbury, who will doubtless report to you the substance of his conversations.

Does that refresh your recollection on the fact that you had a conversation with Dr. H. H. Fisher in connection with the question that was put to you?

Mr. Fanelli. He said he did, as I recall.

Mr. Bisson. My original statement was that I probably did talk with him; that I didn't remember the details.

Mr. Morris. Doesn't this indicate you did as a matter of fact talk with him?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Can you recall the conversation?

Mr. Bisson. I cannot. I said at the time I did not recall the details. I do not recall the details.

Mr. Morris. May this go into the record to establish the fact there was a conversation?

Senator Eastland. It will be admitted.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 731" and was read in full.)

Mr. Morris. Did you ever write for the publication, Soviet Russia Today?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. On how many occasions did you write for Soviet Russia Today?

Mr. Bisson. At least once.

Mr. Morris. With whom did you negotiate in your writings for Soviet Russia Today?

Mr. Bisson. Presumably it would be with the editor.

Mr. Morris. Did you negotiate with Jessica Smith?

Mr. Bisson. Yes; I probably did.

Senator Eastland. Did you negotiate with her?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Who is Jessica Smith?

Mr. Bisson. It has been indicated she is the editor of——

Senator Eastland. Was she? Testify, please.

Mr. Morris. Was she?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Did you know her personally?

Mr. Bisson. I do not actually remember seeing her.

Mr. Morris. How did you carry on negotiations?

Mr. Bisson. I don't know. Presumably by letter.

Mr. Morris. Is that your only recollection on the subject?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Do you remember signing a letter entitled "To All Active Supporters of Democracy and Peace," which is an open letter calling for greater unity of anti-Fascist forces and strengthening the forces against aggression, released on August 14 by 400 leading Americans, which appeared in Soviet Russia Today in September 1939?

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may it be admitted into the record? I just call attention to this first point which seems to be called for in this open letter?

Senator Eastland. Yes; it may be admitted. When was it published?

(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 732" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 732

[Source: Soviet Russia Today, 1939, September]

To All Active Supporters of Democracy and Peace

The text of an Open Letter calling for greater unity of the anti fascist forces and strengthening of the front against aggression through closer cooperation with the Soviet Union, released on August 14 by 400 leading Americans.

One of the greatest problems confronting all those engaged in the struggle for democracy and peace, whether they be liberals, progressives, trade-unionists, or others, is how to unite their various forces so as to achieve victory for their

common goals. The Fascists and their allies are well aware that democracy will win if its supporters are united. Accordingly, they are intent on destroying such unity at all costs.

On the international scene the Fascists and their friends have tried to prevent a united antiaggression front by sowing suspicion between the Soviet Union and other nations interested in maintaining peace.

On the domestic scene the reactionaries are attempting to split the democratic front by similar tactics. Realizing that here in America they cannot get far with a definitely profascist appeal, they strive to pervert American antifascist sentiment to their own ends. With the aim of turning antifascist feeling against the Soviet Union they have encouraged the fantastic falsehood that the U. S. S. R. and the totalitarian states are basically alike. By this strategy they hope to create dissension among the progressive forces whose united strength is a first necessity for the defeat of fascism.

Some sincere American liberals have fallen into this trap and unwittingly aided a cause to which they are essentially opposed. Thus, a number of them have carelessly lent their signatures to the recent manifesto issued by the so-called Committee for Cultural Freedom. This manifesto denounces in vague, undefined terms all forms of "Dictatorship" and asserts that the Fascist states and Soviet Russia equally menace American institutions and the democratic way of life.

While we prefer to dwell on facts rather than personalities, we feel it is necessary to point out that among the signers of this manifesto are individuals who have for years had as their chief political objective the maligning of the Soviet people and their government, and it is precisely these people who are the initiators and controllers of the committee.

A number of other committees have been formed which give lip service to democracy and peace while actually atacking the Soviet Union and aiding reaction. Honest persons approached by such committees should scrutinize their aims very carefully and support only those groups genuinely interested in preserving culture and freedom and refusing to serve as instruments for attacking the Soviet Union or aiding Fascism in any other way.

The undersigned do not represent any committee or organization, nor do they propose to form one. Our object is to point out the real purpose behind all these attempts to bracket the Soviet Union with the Fascist states, and to make it clear that Soviet and Fascist policies are diametrically opposed. To this end we should like to stress ten basic points in which Soviet socialism differs fundamentally from totalitarian fascism.

1. The Soviet Union continues, as always, to be a consistent bulwark against war and aggression, and works unceasingly for the goal of a peaceful international order.

2. It has eliminated racial and national prejudice within its borders, freed the minority peoples enslaved under the Tsars, stimulated the development of the culture and economic welfare of these peoples, and made the expression of anti-Semitism or any racial animosity a criminal offense.

3. It has socialized the means of production and distribution through the public ownership of industry and the collectivization of agriculture.

4. It has established nationwide socialist planning, resulting in increasingly higher living standards, and the abolition of unemployment and depression.

5. It has built the trade-unions, in which almost 24,000,000 workers are organized, into the very fabric of its society.

6. The Soviet Union has emancipated woman and the family, and has developed an advanced system of child care.

7. From the viewpoint of cultural freedom, the difference between the Soviet Union and the Fascist countries is most striking. The Soviet Union has effected one of the most far-reaching cultural and educational advances in all history and among a population which at the start was almost three-fourths illiterate. Those writers and thinkers whose books have been burned by the Nazis are published in the Soviet Union. The best literature from Homer to Thomas Mann, the best thought from Aristotle to Lenin, is available to the masses of the Soviet people, who themselves actively participate in the creation of culture.

8. It has replaced the myths and superstitions of old Russia with the truths and techniques of experimental science, extending scientific procedures to every field, from economics to public health. And it has made science and scientific study available to the mass of the people.

9. The Soviet Union considers political dictatorship a transitional form and has shown a steadily expanding democracy in every sphere. Its epoch-making new

Constitution guarantees Soviet citizens universal suffrage, civil liberties, the right to employment, to leisure, to free education, to free medical care, to material security in sickness and old age, to equality of the sexes in all fields of activity, and to equality of all races and nationalities.

10. In relation to Russia's past, the country has been advancing rapidly along the road of material and cultural progress in ways that the American people can understand and appreciate.

The Soviet Union has an economic system different from our own. But Soviet aims and achievements make it clear that there exists a sound and permanent basis in mutual ideals for cooperation between the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. on behalf of world peace and the security and freedom of all nations.

Accordingly, the signers of this letter urge Americans of whatever political persuasion to stand firmly for close cooperation in this sphere between the United States and Soviet Russia, and to be on guard against any and all attempts to prevent such cooperation in this critical period in the affairs of mankind.

Among the 400 signers of the open letter are:

Dr. Thomas Addis, professor of medicine, Leland Stanford University
Helen Alfred, executive director, National Public Housing Conference
Prof. Newton Arvin, professor of English, Smith College
Dr. Charles S. Bacon, honorary president, American Russian Institute, Chicago, Ill.
Frank C. Bancroft, editor, Social Work Today
Maurice Becker, artist
Louis P. Birk, editor, Modern Age Books, Inc.
T. A. Bisson, research associate, Foreign Policy Association
Alice Stone Blackwell, suffragist, writer
Marc Blitzstein, composer
Anita Block, Theater Guild playreader
Sterling Bowen, poet
Richard Boyer, staff writer, The New Yorker
Millen Brand, writer
Simon Breines, architect
Robert Briffault, writer
Prof. Dorothy Brewster, assistant professor of English, Columbia University
Prof. Edwin Berry Burgum, associate professor of English, New York University
Fielding Burke, writer
Katherine Devereaux Blake, teacher
Meta Berger, writer, widow of the first Socialist Congressman
Prof. Robert A. Brady, professor of economics, University of California
J. E. Bromberg, actor
Bessie Beatty, writer
Vera Caspary, scenario writer
Maria Cristina Chambers, of the Authors' League
Prof. Robert Chambers, research professor of biology, New York University
Harold Clurman, producer
Robert M. Coates, writer
Lester Cohen, writer
Kyle Crichton, editorial staff of Collier's Weekly
Miriam Allen De Ford, writer
Paul De Kruif, writer
Pietro Di Donato, writer
William F. Dodd, Jr., chairman Anti-Nazi Literature Committee
Stanley D. Dodge, University of Michigan
Prof. Dorothy Douglas, department of economics, Smith College
Muriel Draper, writer
Prof. L. C. Dunn, professor of Zoology, Columbia University
Prof. Haakon Chevalier, professor of French, University of California
Harriet G. Eddy, library specialist
Prof. George B. Cressey, chairman of the department of geology and geography, Syracuse University
Prof. Henry Pratt Fairchild, professor of sociology, New York University
Kenneth Fearing, poet
Prof. Mildred Fairchild, professor of economics, Bryn Mawr College
Alice Withrow Field, writer
Sara Bard Field, writer
William O. Field, Jr., chairman of the board, American Russian Institute
Irving Fineman, writer

Marjorie Fischer, writer
Angel Flores, writer, critic
Waldo Frank, writer
Wanda Gag, artist
Hugo Gellert, artist
Robert Gessner, department of English, New York University
Prof. Willystine Goodsell, associate professor of education (retired), Columbia University
Mortimer Graves, of the American Council of Learned Societies
Dr. John H. Gray, economist, former president of the American Economics Association
William Gropper, artist
Maurice Haiperin, associate editor, Books Abroad
Earl P. Hanson, explorer, writer
Prof. Samuel N. Harper, profesosr of Russian language and institutions, Chicago University
Rev. Thomas L. Harris, national executive secretary, American League for Peace and Democracy
Dashiell Hammett, writer
Ernest Hemingway
Granville Hicks, writer
Prof. Norman E. Himes, department of sociology, Colgate University
Charles J. Hendley, president, Teachers' Union of the City of New York
Leo Huberman, writer
Langston Hughes, poet
Agatha Illes, writer
Rev. Otis G. Jackson, rector of St. Paul's Episcopal Church, Flint, Mich.
Sam Jaffe, actor
Orrick Johns, poet
Matthew Josephson, writer
George Kauffman, playwright
Prof. Alexander Kaun, associate professor of Slavic languages, University of California
Fred C. Kelly, writer
Rockwell Kent, artist
Dr. John A. Kingsbury, social worker, administrative consultant, WPA
Beatrice Kinkaid, writer
Lincoln E. Kirstein, ballet producer
Arthur Kober, playwright
Alfred Kreymborg, poet
Edward Lamb, lawyer
Dr. Corliss Lamont, writer, lecturer
Margaret I. Lamont, sociologist, writer
J. J. Lankes, artist
Jay Leyda, cinema critic
John Howard Lawson, playwright
Emil Lengyel, writer, critic
Prof. Max Lerner, professor of government, Williams College
Meridel LeSueur, writer
Meyer Levin, writer
Prof. Charles W. Lightbody, department of government and history, St. Lawrence University
Robert Morss Lovett, Governor of the Virgin Islands, an editor of the New Republic
Prof. Halford E. Luccock, Yale University Divinity School
Katherine Du Pre Lumpkin, writer
Klaus Mann, lecturer, writer, son of Thomas Mann
Prof. F. O. Mathiessen, associate professor of history and literature, Harvard University
Dr. Anita Marburg, department of English, Sarah Lawrence College
Dr. George Marshall, economist
Aline MacMahon, actress
Clifford T. McAvoy, instructor, department of romance languages, College of the City of New York
Prof. V. J. McGill, professor of philosophy, Hunter College
Prof. Robert McGregor, Reed College
Ruth McKenney, writer

Darwin J. Meserole, lawyer
Prof. Herbert A. Miller, professor of economics, Bryn Mawr College
Harvey O'Connor, writer
Clifford Odets, playwright
Shaemus O'Sheel, writer, critic
Mary White Ovington, social worker
S. J. Perelman, writer
Dr. John P. Peters, department of internal medicine, Yale University Medical School
Dr. Emily M. Pierson, physician
Walter N. Polakov, engineer
Prof. Alan Porter, professor of German, Vassar College
George D. Pratt, Jr., agriculturist
John Hyde Preston, writer
Samuel Putnam, writer
Prof. Paul Radin, professor of anthropology, University of California
Prof. Walter Rautenstrauch, professor of industrial engineering, Columbia University
Bernard J. Reis, accountant
Bertha C. Reynolds, social worker
Lynn Riggs, playwright
Col. Raymond Robins, former head of American Red Cross in Russia
William Rollins, Jr., writer
Harold J. Rome, composer
Ralph Roeder, writer
Dr. Joseph A. Rosen, former head of Jewish Joint Distribution Board
Eugene Schoen, architect
Prof. Margaret Schlauch, associate professor of English, New York University
Prof. Frederick L. Schuman, professor of government, Williams College
Prof. Vida D. Scudder, professor emeritus of English, Wellesley College
George Seldes, writer
Vincent Sheean, writer
Viola Brothers Shore, scenario writer
Herman Shumlin, producer
Prof. Ernest J. Simmons, assistant professor of English literature, Harvard University
Irina Skariatina, writer
Dr. F. Tredwell Smith, educator
Dr. Stephenson Smith, president, Oregon Commonwealth Federation
Hester Sondergaard, actress
Isobel Walker Soule, writer, editor
Lionel Stander, actor
Christina Stead, writer
A. E. Steig, artist
Alfred K. Stern, housing specialist
Dr. Bernhard J. Stern, department of sociology, Columbia University
Donald Ogden Stewart, writer
Maxwell S. Stewart, associate editor, the Nation
Paul Strand, producer and photographer
Prof. Dirk J. Struik, professor of mathematics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Robert Tasker, scenario writer
C. Fayette Taylor, aeronautical engineer, head of automotive laboratories, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
James Thurber, artist, writer
Rebecca Janney Timbres, social worker, writer
Jean Starr Untermeyer, poet
Louis Untermeyer, poet
Mary Van Kleeck, economist, associate director, International Industrial Relations Institute
Stuyvesant Van Veen, artist
J. Raymond Walsh, economist
Dr. William Henry Walsh, physician
Prof. Harry F. Ward, professor of Christian ethics, Union Theological Seminary
Lynd Ward, artist
Morris Watson, New York Newspaper Guild
Clara Weatherwax, writer

Max Weber, artist
Dr. Gerald Wendt, director of science and education, New York World's Fair.
Rev. Robert Whitaker, clergyman and lecturer
Albert Rhys Williams, writer
Dr. William Carlos Williams, writer
Ella Winter, writer
Richard Wright, writer
Art Young, artist
Leane Zugsmith, writer

Mr. MORRIS. In Soviet Russia Today in September 1939.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. The one point is:

The Soviet Union continues as always to be a consistent bulwark against Fascist aggression and works unceasingly for the goal of a peaceful international order.

Senator EASTLAND. Did this witness sign this?

Mr. MORRIS. He has stated he is one of the signers of this letter.

Senator EASTLAND. That was on the eve of the attack on Finland?

Mr. MORRIS. No, this is September 1939, subsequent to the announcement of the Hitler-Stalin pact.

Senator EASTLAND. It was on the eve of the attack on Finland.

Mr. MORRIS. It was before, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this offered for the record?

Mr. BISSON. I signed that.

Senator EASTLAND. Had Poland been attacked at that time?

Mr. BISSON. Not that I know of.

Senator EASTLAND. Not that you know of?

Mr. BISSON. I don't think so. My field was primarily the Far East, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you mean to say because you are a far eastern expert you would not know whether Germany attacked Poland in September 1939 or not?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Theodore Draper?

Mr. BISSON. I may have.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish you would recall whether or not you know him.

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember meeting him.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a photostat of a letter, on the letterhead of New Masses, 31 East Twenty-seventh Street, New York City, dated Septemper 23, 1937, addressed to "Dear Field" and signed "Theodore Draper."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read the first paragraph here:

DEAR FIELD: I have wanted to talk things over with you for some time but circumstances always intervened to make it impossible or to cause me to postpone it. Your absence from New York made me decide to write you a rather longish letter though perhaps I may see you again before long. Our friend, Chi, suggested that I tell you frankly what is bothering me, though it is wholly personal, for what advice or assistance you could suggest. With that as introduction. * * *

Paragraph 4 reads:

For this reason, I am going to take a crack at the Guggenheim fellowships this year. Incidentally, I am grateful for your permission to use your name in the application. Professor Laski of Great Britain has also consented and I am now looking for one or two more, besides yourself and Bisson.

Does that refresh your recollection at all?

Mr. Bisson. This would seem to indicate that he was looking for a letter of recommendation from me. I do not remember whether I gave him such a recommendation. I do not remember that I saw him, which was my original statement.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I suggest we not under the circumstances introduce this into the record at this time.

Senator Eastland. Has the FBI attempted to talk with you?

Mr. Bisson. Yes; it has.

Senator Eastland. Did they ask you a number of questions?

Mr. Bisson. You mean quite recently?

Senator Eastland. Yes.

Mr. Bisson. Yes.

Senator Eastland. Did you give them whatever information they asked?

Mr. Bisson. Yes. I answered their questions.

Mr. Morris. Will you identify these letters, please, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. Mandel. These are documents from the files of the IPR, photostatic copies of handwritten letters. The first one is dated September 2, 1946, addressed to "Dear Bill" and signed "Art."

The second is addressed "Dear Bill," dated September 22, 1946, and signed "Art Bisson."

Mr. Morris. Will you identify those letters as having been written by you? There is going to be no question on them. They are going to be put into the record. They are in your own handwriting. I would like you to identify them as having been written by you.

Mr. Bisson. Yes. These are my letters.

Mr. Morris. May they be admitted?

Senator Eastland. Yes.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 733, 734" and are as follows:)

Exhibit No. 733

Dai-ichi Hotel,
Tokyo, Sept. 2, 1946.

Dear Bill: The impossibility of really describing the complicated nexus of things here has operated as a bar to writing letters ever since I've arrived except those to Faith. In literal terms my output has been none with the one exception of a letter carried by Major Everett Sherbourne which I hope he has delivered yon by now. His book should be a first-class job and I trust that he and the IPR may get together on it.

Your letter reached me here just as I put in for travel orders on October 1st. There is some reluctance to let me go, however, and the work here is sufficiently rewarding and significant that I am in a state of some indecision myself. The most difficult problem, of course, is that of a continued separation from the family. I should have some definite answer on the matter within a few days now, and will write fully then.

In my reading of your letter I am in some doubt as to whether you mean that I can do the project you have in mind while a full member of the staff of the American Council. I should much prefer that working basis, as it would give me a greater feeling of stability and permanence in my job.

A reorganization of the former membership (along with new members) of the old Council has occurred here, as you probably know if you have received letters from Matsuo. So far as I have followed it a good job has been done in a rather delicate situation, although some of the older members are still left out and

there may be some heart-burnings there. I will, of course, join with Herb, Quigley, and Miriam in keeping contact with the Japanese group.

Please give my best regards to all at 1E54. I trust that my exile over here will not continue much longer.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Art.

Exhibit No. 734

PEL	ECC
MH	MAS
MK	LES

(Penciled notes:) HER—10 copies of marked paras.

Tokyo, *Sept. 22, 1946.*

Dear Bill: If I'm going to be a fixture here, I've decided to do a little more letter writing than before—I've been remiss almost completely thus far.

Andrew and I have spending considerable time the last week or so checking up on the land reform bill now going through the Diet. It still has some defects but on the whole Ladijinsky has done a good job, and I'm more hopeful about a thoroughgoing landlord abolition than Zaibatsu dissolution.

Eleanor Hadley has been working closely with me on virtually all economic phases of the occupation, but particularly the Zaibatsu problem and the economic control agencies. She is an excellent economist and a grand person, and knows Japan well (she was here in 1938–40). You (or Bill Lockwood) probably know of her work on the proto—SWNCC directive on the Zaibatsu when she was in the State Department. She returns to Harvard this January to do her thesis on the Zaibatsu—she has already passed her Radcliff generals for the doctorate. I've asked her whether she couldn't do for the conference a study of what has been done on the Zaibatsu under the occupation—not too long a piece, but a sort of balance sheet of accomplishments and the job yet to be done. If this suggestion is of any use to you please let me know and give some indication of length desired. Eleanor would make a most excellent woman member for your Amco delegation to London.

Friday afternoon I had a long talk with Matsuo on the recent developments re the new Japan Council. A preliminary organization meeting on September 18 crystallized the long job that has been done here during the past six months to weed out the older conservative elements and merge those left from the past with a new and more liberal group.

The chairman (or president) of the new Board of Directors will probably be Dr. Takano (Twasaburo), currently president of Radio Tokyo, formerly chief of the Ohara Institute of Social Research. The research secretary will be Professor Ouchi (Hyoe) of the Public Finance (senior professor) section of Tokyo Imperial. Ouchi is a close friend of Tsuru, who hopes that he (Ouchi) will be the nucleus around which the liberal-radical academic circle can be drawn into the new Council's work. This group already has under way a symposium on Japan's current problems (mainly the economic side) to which I have been asked to contribute a foreword.

These two will be members of the Board of Directors ex-officio. Other directors include:

Professor Yanaibara (Tadro), of Tokyo Imperial (specialist or International economics.

Prof. Yokota (Kisaburo), of Tokyo Imperial, specialist on International Law.

Prof. Suekawa (Hiroshi), of Kyoto Imperial University, law faculty.

Matsukata, Saburo.

Hani (Motoko), prominent woman publicist, with articles in many journals. She is associated with Jiyu Gakuin, a coed school in Tokyo.

Koike (Atsunosuke), businessman, head of Yamaishi Securities Company.

Saionji, Kinichi.

Present at the meeting was also Shibusawa, Keizo. He is willing to stay in background (he was Finance Minister in the Shidehara Cabinet earlier this year) and help to corral some much needed financial support. On the other hand, he may come into the open as Treasurer and member of the Board of Directors. With the research secretaryship in Ouchi's hands, Shibusawa is not likely to run away with the organization.

It seems unlikely that Takaki (who has been most outspoken in support of a Tenno system stronger than the Draft Constitution permits) or Takayarogi (active in the war crimes defense) will join, although both of them maintain an indirect and unofficial link with the new organization.

A Council (Shoin) of about 30 members is being organized of persons from various fields. This body may formally choose the directors at the formal organization meeting expected in mid-October. Name is Taiheiyo Mondai Chosakai (Pacific Problems Research Institute)—same as old. When asked, I advised them to keep the literal translation for the present instead of calling it the Japan Council of the Institute. Immediate problems are office space and money.

Miriam transferred to me your letter to Zhulsou, but unfortunately he had just left when I sought to reach him. I presume you do not wish me to mail it to him?

Many thanks for your advice and counsel to Faith when she called you. Give my best regards to Mr. Carter and all my friends on both floors.

ART BISSON.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify this, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the IPR dated September 29, 1939, addressed to Mr. T. A. Bisson, Foreign Policy Association, with the typed signature of Owen Lattimore, and at the top the initials KM.

Mr. MORRIS. I ask you if you can recall having received that letter from Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. BISSON. Are you going to ask questions on this?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Mr. BISSON. Yes; this letter was received by me.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be received?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 735" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 735

300 GILMAN HALL,
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., September 29, 1939.

Mr. T. A. BISSON,
Foreign Policy Association,
8 West 40th Street, New York City.

DEAR ART: You may be out on a limb, but it looks to me like a strong and springy limb. In fact, I think it is a splendid article. By this mail I am sending a copy, as edited. I made a few minor changes, most of them intended to make the article less "American," in view of the circulation of PACIFIC AFFAIRS abroad.

That, incidentally is one of our great problems, as people outside of the United States are tremendously interested in the American angle of the Far East, and in the way in which America reacts to each move and each stage out there, but at the same time it is better not to write for them just as if they were American.

Well, now what? Are the British and French going to fight? You tell me! This morning the Baltimore paper reports an "appeasement" article in the "New Statesman and Nation," which of course has always been against Chamberlain's appeasement.

I can see the futility of fighting to restore the kind of Poland that Lloyd George never liked anyway; but what I can't imagine are the specific terms on which the French and British could back down in front of Hitler.

In the meantime the Russians have got everything they asked for in the first place as the conditions for entering an alliance with the British and French—security against German occupation of the whole of Poland, security against German-engineered putsches in the Baltic States. They have got this at the cost of terrific hostility in the press, and the jolting up of, I suppose, all their more loosely attached adherents abroad. Am I right in supposing

that they may begin to recover from this? In the first place, they are actually extending revolutionary principles, at least in Poland. In the second place, there are many who respect strength and power who are not penetrable by intellectual arguments.

All this European side of things is a puzzle and a tangle to me; all I can see clearly is that the Chinese are certainly not weakened, and probably, or at least potentially, strengthened.

Yours,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL:Y

Mr. MORRIS. Did you write an article in the Far Eastern Survey in August 1944 in anticipation of a negotiated peace with Japan, or in connection with peace with Japan?

Mr. BISSON. What is the title?

Mr. MORRIS. Japan Prepares for Peace Offensive.

I show you the Far Eastern Survey of that date and ask you if that is your article?

Mr. BISSON. Are there going to be questions on this?

Mr. MORRIS. Is this your article?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; it is.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be received into the record?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 736" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 736

[Source: Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, August 9, 1944, vol. 13, No. 16]

JAPAN PREPARES FOR PEACE OFFENSIVE

(By T. A. Bisson)

The Tojo Cabinet's resignation en bloc on July 18 is an impressive tribute to the weight of the Pacific offensive, currently tearing the vitals out of Japan's strongholds in the Marianas. This onslaught was seconded by the first massive blows from the B–29's on Japan's home soil—a factor which also counts heavily in Japanese home-front reactions. There is deep-seated apprehension among the Japanese that no preparations which their rulers can make will be sufficient to overcome their country's peculiar vulnerability to attack from the air, once such attack becomes large-scale and continuous. Finally, even before the attempt on Hitler's life, the Japanese were painfully noting the ominous collapse of Germany's military power, spectacularly evident in the crumbling of the eastern front before the Russian drives but also seen in the breaching of Hitler's boasted Atlantic Wall and the steady Allied progress in Italy.

The series of drastic Japanese defeats in the Pacific, culminating in the loss of Saipan, directly forced the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet. Between July 10 and 18 Tojo desperately maneuvered to save his cabinet by concessions which separated the military and naval staff commands from the War and Navy Ministries. Admiral Shigetaro Shimada first insisted that he should be divested of one of his two concurrent posts—Chief of the Naval Staff and Minister of the Navy. To this measure Tojo was forced to consent, and for the purpose appointed Admiral Naokuni Nomura to the Navy Ministry on July 17, leaving Admiral Shimada as Chief of the Naval Staff. Admiral Nomura must have set an unusual precedent, since—if the announced dates are correct—he retained his new post for exactly one day. But this concession was not enough to appease the opposition to Tojo and on July 18 it was announced that General Yoshijiro Umezu had become Chief of the Army Staff, succeeding General Tojo, who had "been relieved of his concurrent post." These dates, it should be noted, are announcements by the Cabinet Board of Information after the changes had been made. The actual changes may have preceded the announcements by a day or two, since the entire cabinet finally resigned on July 18. Thus Tojo's eleventh-hour attempt to save his cabinet completely failed.

While the cabinet resignation may be attributed mainly to Japan's military-naval defeats, for which Tojo was made to accept responsibility, an additional set of factors must be taken into account in order to explain the composition of the new cabinet. These factors are in part external, affecting the current status of the war in its global aspects. Japanese leaders, military as well as civilian, are not unaware of the effects which the coming defeat of Germany will have on Japan's war prospects. The Japanese leadership has always been acutely sensitive to the world setting within which it has plotted the successive steps in the program of national aggrandizement. It now begins to recognize, with full dread of the consequences, that the attack on Pearl Harbor constitutes the greatest miscalculation of Japanese diplomacy in the 76 years since the Restoration. And it is now taking the preliminary internal measures which, it hopes, may offer a prospect of salvaging the essential portions of the Empire from the wreckage of defeat. It is cleverly preparing the groundwork for that offer of a negotiated peace against which the United Nations must gird themselves in the aftermath of Nazi Germany's collapse.

These external factors, however, are but a part of the total complex situation in Japan which helps to explain the composition of the Koiso cabinet and gives us some assurance in gaging the role which it is expected to perform. The evolution of the Tojo cabinet, which has held office for the lengthy term of nearly 3 years, has logically concluded in the establishment of a government which relegates the armed services to their purely military and naval functions and assigns one man to do one job.

TOJO CABINET UNIQUE

In these respects, the Tojo cabinet was an extraordinary anomaly in Japanese constitutional history. For a Japanese minister to hold two concurrent posts was a common practice. But never before did one man succeed in grasping so many of the reins of government in his hands as did Tojo. At the outset, in October 1941, Tojo was Premier, War Minister, and Home Minister. He held the latter post until the success of the initial attacks was complete, thus assuring no untoward reactions on the home front. The first two posts he held until the end. To these he had added the extremely important offices of Munitions Minister, in control of war production, and Army Chief of Staff.

Two points may be made in this regard. No one man could be Premier, War Minister, Chief of Staff, and Munitions Minister, all at the same time, without detriment to administrative efficiency. In actual fact, much of the routine and even policy-forming activities of these positions had to be carried out by the Vice-Ministers or the Vice Chief of Staff. But—and this is the second point—such a condition immediately tended to create friction or animosity and to lead to charges of one-man dictatorship. So long as things went well, Tojo could reply that his unimpeded control gave unity and cohesive direction to the war effort. When defeats came in monotonous succession, this position could no longer be maintained; at the end it turned into a disadvantage for Tojo, culminating in his downfall.

On the eve of the July 18 overthrow, the earlier scope of Tojo's dictatorial powers had in reality been whittled down to a considerable extent. Under his effective control was left essentially the general direction of the cabinet and of the Army, but other phases of domestic administration had largely slipped from his grasp. This evolution, in accordance with normal Japanese constitutional practice, had come about so gradually as to be almost unnoticed. Over a period of nearly 3 years, many changes in cabinet portfolios would necessarily occur in Japan and it is by these changes that the political current is to be discerned. In the Tojo cabinet the ministerial shifts had been even more numerous than usual. They had occurred, as might be expected, largely in response to the changing fortunes of the war but also as a result of the pressure of those groups in the ruling circle which felt that Tojo had invaded their legitimate spheres.

The general drift is clearly indicated by several of the more important shifts. On September 1, 1942, despite the Midway defeat, Tojo was still able to announce establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry, to accept the protest resignation of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, and to appoint Masayuk Tani, an Army favorite, in place of Tojo. The snub to the Foreign Office crowd was pronounced. With the loss of Guadalcanal, however, it became increasingly apparent that Tojo was meeting opposition to which he was forced to make concessions. He overplayed his hand in seeking extraordinary dictatorial powers to cope with the

crisis of production, met unexpectedly strong opposition on this score in the Diet in January-February 1943, and ultimately—on March 17, 1943—announced that a ministerial-rank Council of seven financial and industrial magnates would advise him on the application of his emergency powers.

Further cabinet shifts on April 20, 1943, brought Mamoru Shigemitsu, a Foreign Office stalwart, to the Foreign Ministry and introduced two of the old party leaders into the cabinet. Within the Munitions Ministry, formed November 1, 1943, Tojo's undivided control was challenged by the business leaders, especially in the person of Ginjiro Fujihara, who was made State Minister without Portfolio on November 17 and became increasingly active in the production effort. The trend was unmistakable. It meant the return to the Foreign Office, of the business magnates, and of the party leaders to their old spheres of jurisdiction within the normal balance of group interests.

Under these internal conditions, added to the external factors of the military defeat in Europe and Asia, the Emperor's advisers were confronted on July 18 with the Tojo cabinet's resignation. In this case, it is important to observe that everything was done pro forma. Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was received in audience by the Emperor to discuss the selection of the next cabinet. The Elder Statesmen who used to perform the delicate constitutional function of advising the Emperor on the choice of a new Premier are no longer available, but since their passing a new constitutional practice has been sedulously developed. With Marquis Kido came the seven living ex-Premiers, the President of the Privy Council, Yoshimichi Hara, and the outgoing Premier, General Tojo. A glance at the ex-Premiers is instructive, in view of the crucial significance of their new constitutional role. The list comprises Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki, Admiral Keisuke Okada, Koki Hirota, Prince Fumimore Konoye, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, General Nobuyuki Abe, and Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai. Everyone in this group has distinguished himself, in one war or another, by working against the Army extremists. Hara and Kido are naturally of the same stamp. By the addition of Tojo, the overwhelmingly conservative cast of this group of constitutional advisers is hardly altered. This factor must be steadily kept in mind when future cabinet changes are under consideration.

In the present instance, i. e., the formation of the Koiso cabinet, the group of advisers worked in expert fashion to secure the results desired. The basic essential, of course, was to reconstitute a strong fighting team which would carry on the war with the utmost energy, efficiency and unity, so far as the fighting services were concerned. There can be little doubt that this objective was achieved. Five senior military and naval men hold the major posts. Koiso, as Premier, has the key position. As an old Kwantung Army man, he will obviously work hand in hand with General Yoshijiro Umezu, new Chief of the Army Staff, who comes directly from command of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, evidently a capable naval technician, retains his post of Chief of the Navy Staff. Admiral Yonai, as Navy Minister, and Field Marshal Gen Sugiyama, as War Minister, able leaders but by no means extremist, bring to the cabinet posts a conservative weight that balances the whole team. The principle of "one man to one post" is rigidly adhered to in these changes, and there can be no blinking the fact that a vigorous prosecution of the war can be expected from this group of leaders.

The political constituents of the new cabinet, however, carry the evolution which was proceeding within the Tojo cabinet to a new stage. General Koiso holds the single post of Premier, and no other. Not only is his direct outreach far less than that of Tojo, so far as cabinet portfolios are concerned, but in addition Navy Minister Yonai—a former Premier of moderate outlook—has been made Deputy Prime Minister. There is no good reason to believe that the creation of this post, rather unusual in Japanese constitutional practice, implies that Koiso and Yonai may work at cross purposes.

Koiso is, like Tojo, and old Kwantung Army man of the most aggressive type, and as such a good front man personifying determination to wage the war to a successful conclusion. He was, however, a colleague of Yonai's in the Hiranuma cabinet of 1939, as Overseas Minister, and held the same post in the 1940 cabinet headed by Yonai. During this period Koiso showed himself exceedingly active in furthering the Navy's program of expansion in Southeast Asia, especially as affecting the Netherlands Indies. There is thus every warrant for believing that the yoking together of General Koiso, the "extremist" Premier, and Admiral Yonai, the "moderate" Deputy Premier, will prove a

smooth-working combination instead of the reverse. It will help to overcome the friction that had clearly developed between the Army and Navy commands at the close of Tojo's administration.

The marked curtailment of General Koiso's power in the new cabinet, as contrasted with Tojo's former position, is nevertheless a political factor of great importance. This change goes much further, moreover, than in relegating Koiso to the premiership alone and appointing a deputy to act with him. All the other traditional Japanese group interests—the diplomats, the businessmen, and the former party leaders—have resumed the regular administrative spheres and powers held in normal times.

CONSERVATIVES STAGE COMEBACK

Take the position of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu as one outstanding example of the shift back to normalcy. He, and not an Army man, holds the only major concurrent post in the cabinet. The Greater East Asia Ministry, set up by the military in order to keep administration of conquered territories in their own hands, now passes back to control of the Foreign Office. The change is boldly stated to be aimed at securing unified diplomacy. At one stroke the long history of the Army's determined efforts to maintain administrative control of territory conquered since 1931, exemplified in the political struggles attending formation of the Manchurian Affairs Board, the China Affairs Board and GEA Ministry itself, is nullified. The Foreign Office returns to its own—and, be it noted, thereby becomes responsible for the conduct of negotiations which could affect the disposal of Japan's nexus of ruling groups—such agreement will be forthcoming.

Hardly less significant of the changing political tide is the appointment of Ginjiro Fujihara, outstanding Japanese industrialist, as head of the Munitions Ministry. Tojo himself had held this portfolio in the old cabinet and the Vice-Minister had been Shinsuke Kishi, a former Manchukuo bureaucrat. Fujihara, carrying the ball for the business interests, had been critical of Tojo's production efforts even before the Munitions Ministry was established. After its formation, as noted, he had played an increasingly significant role in spurring production as State Minister. Now he takes over full control.

In addition no less than four of the old-time Koiso cabinet. Yonezo Maeda, former Seiyukai leader, becomes Transportation and Communications Minister, while Toshio Shimada is made Agriculture and Commerce Minister. These posts cover the administrative sphere which was normally occupied by the party leaders in the heyday of their power. Both Chuji Machida, former Minseito presided now described as dean of political circles, and Count Hideo Kodama, from the Kenkyukai group in the House of Peers, are accorded the dignified posts of Ministers of State Affairs (without portfolio).

Appointments to other cabinet posts follow the same trend. The Home Ministry goes to Shigeo Odate, a career bureaucrat in the legal field with some Manchukuo experience, instead of to an Army man. The Finance Ministry is taken by Sotaro Ishiwata, a bureaucrat who held the same post in the Hiranuma and Yonai cabinets. (Nine out of the 16 newly appointed ministers held office in these two cabinets, in itself a very revealing fact.) Taketora Ogata, State Minister and President of the Information Board, was vice-president of the ASAHI, also representing a shift from the career bureaucrats that have previously held this post. Hiromasa Matsuzaka, New Justice Minister, had been the Procurator General, while Hisatada Hirose, Welfare Minister, had also been a member of the Yonai cabinet. Lt. Gen. Harushige Ninomiya, as Education Minister, is the sole military leader holding a normally civilian post.

The far-reaching political realignment indicated by these changes does not imply that there will be a slackening in Japan's war effort. More probably the reverse is true. The caliber of the men chosen to lead the war and home fronts, characterized by ability, experience, and seniority, may well infuse greater efficiency and drive into the prosecution of the war. The Koiso cabinet's personnel, moreover, despite surface indications to the contrary, is essentially far more unified than Tojo's cabinet had become. Most of its members have worked closely together in the past, understand each other thoroughly, and have confidence in each other's ability. For the immediate continuation of a stubborn defensive fight, therefore, vigorous leadership may be expected from this cabinet.

Looking somewhat beyond the next few months, however, it is vitally necessary to recognize the second line of defense which the Emperor's far-seeing advisers

have established in the making of this cabinet. Its political complexion proves unmistakably that it is a way-station on the road to the offer of a compromise peace. Only one additional change remains to be made in the cabinet as now constituted in order to give the political authority to seek terms. This change would be in the premiership. Yonai, already Deputy Prime Minister, could succeed Koiso; or General Nobuyuki Abe, who succeeded Koiso as Governor-General of Korea, could be brought home for the task. Such a development is virtually inevitable, as the blows in the Pacific strike closer to Japan. And the scope of the political shift already made indicates that the final change will be smoothly accomplished. If the elder statesmen's plans succeed, there will be no civil disturbances, as in Germany, when the decision to make the peace offer is eventually taken. The groundwork has been too carefully laid already in the Koiso cabinet. Japan's Army-Navy leadership will in all probability support the move toward a compromise settlement.

POSSIBLE TERMS OF PEACE OFFER

This offer will be carefully timed. We can probably expect it in the wake of Germany's final collapse, when Britain and the United States are in the trough of the wave, wrestling with such problems as the transfer of armed forces and equipment to the Pacific, and industrial reconversion. The terms will go far, possibly even to the extent of relinquishing all Japan's southern conquests and all of China Proper. Manchuria and Korea will not be offered, since they are both necessary for Japan if it is to remain a great power.

Is there any danger that this offer will be favorably entertained by the United States and Britain? If so, the time to reckon with the threat is now, for the Koiso cabinet strongly indicates that the day of the offer is approaching. Some voices will almost certainly be raised in favor of acceptance. It is to be hoped that they will be a small minority. There can be no question as to what such acceptance would mean. With the raw materials and industrial facilities of Korea and Manchuria, both intensively developed in the past decade, Japan would have all the necessary resources to heal the wounds of this war and lay careful plans for a full success in the next one. Within Japan itself the domination of the armed services, the monarchist bureaucracy and the business groups would be confirmed, and the Japanese people would again be yoked to the war chariot of their oppressors. China, disillusioned in the Western democracies, might fall an easy prey to the machinations of Japan's agents engaged in the work of preparation for the new conflict. These are the essential factors which make it necessary that the task now well begun be fully completed. The cost of stopping halfway to victory in the Pacific is too great to pay.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you a partial list of writings by T. A. Bisson which has been compiled by Mr. Mandel. I ask you if you will look at that list and determine whether or not there are any inaccuracies.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest that may not have to be done today. If the witness simply indicates he will so comply with this request, we can do that by subsequent correspondence and save time.

Mr. BISSON. Yes; that is all right. This is supposed to be a complete compilation?

Mr. MORRIS. Read the heading there.

Mr. BISSON. Partial list.

Mr. MORRIS. If you want to add anything to that list by title, by all means do it.

Look at the last page, please. The last page is writings of Frederick Spencer. There are nine articles on that list, I believe. I guess there are more than nine. There are 14 articles and reviews written for China Today under the name of Frederick Spencer. At the same time will you tell us whether or not all of those articles were written by you?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified that you used the pen name of Frederick Spencer?

Mr. Bisson. You mean when I send back a statement on this.

Mr. Morris. On this, we will have to have sworn testimony and we should do that here. Whether or not all of these 14 items, reviews and articles were in fact written by you I mean. Can you determine that now?

Mr. Bisson. Do you have copies of those magazines here?

Mr. Morris. We have, Mr. Chairman. I wish you could determine now in the interest of time.

Mr. Bisson. It was my testimony and it is my knowledge of the articles in China Today under Frederick Spencer were by me, so that should cover this.

Senator Eastland. That may be admitted.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 737" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 737

Partial List of Writings by T. A. Bisson

America's Far Eastern Policy, IPR Inquiry Series.

Aspects of Wartime Economic Control in Japan, Secretariat Paper No. 2, 9th Conference IPR, Jan. 1945.

American Policy in the Far East, 1931–40, IPR Inquiry Series, 1939.

Japan's War Economy, Publication International Secretariat, IPR, Macmillan Co., 1945.

America's Far Eastern Policy, IPR Inquiry Series, Macmillan Co., 1945.

Prospects for Democracy in Japan, Published Under Auspices International Secretariat, IPR, 1949.

Japan in China, Macmillan Co., 1938.

AMERASIA

(Editorial)	Sept. 1935.
Behind Japan's Internal Crisis	June 1937.
Mao Tse-tung Analyzes Nanking—An Interview	Oct. 1937.
Aikawa Asks for Fifty Millions	March 1938.
Aikawa's "Open Door" (editorial)	April 1938.
Lessons of Taierhchwang (editorial)	May 1938
After Suchow, What? (editorial)	June 1938.
Japan Beats a Retreat (editorial)	Aug. 1938.
A Bold Proposal (editorial)	Sept. 1938.
Observations on Fascism in Japan	Sept. 1938.
Japan and the Open Door (editorial)	Oct. 1938.
No Collaboration With Chamberlain (editorial)	Nov. 1938.
Reviews:	
Imperial Japan: 1926–1938, by A. Morgan	Nov. 1938.
Japan: The Hungry Guest, by G. C. Allen	Nov. 1938.
Hemisphere Armaments and the Open Door	Dec. 1938.
Mr. Bisson Replies to Mr. Nagano	Jan. 1939.
How the Axis Became a Triangle	Feb. 1939.
Japan's Next Move (editorial)	March 1939
Can Britain "Deal" With Japan (editorial)	July 1939.
Another Chance for Chamberlain (editorial)	Aug. 1939.
Japan Picks Up the Pieces (editorial)	Sept. 1939.
What Kind of "Peace" in the Far East	Nov. 1939.
No Progress in Puppet Land Puppetry (editorial)	Dec. 1939.
Review: The Inner Asian Frontiers of China, by Owen Lattimore.	May 1940.
Review: India Today, by R. Palme Dutt	Dec. 1940.
Japan's "New Structure" Falters	May 1941.
Toward Winning Far Eastern Security	Oct. 1941.

FAR EASTERN SURVEY

The Suzuki Cabinet ---------- May 9, 1945.
Nationalization by Request ---------- Aug. 1, 1945.
People's Army in Japan ---------- Aug. 15, 1945.
Japan Prepares for Peace Offensive ---------- Aug. 9, 1944.
China's Part in a Coalition War ---------- July 14, 1943.
Japan's New Industrial Conversion Program ---------- Sept. 8, 1943.
Reparations and Reform in Japan, Vol. XVI, 1947.

FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

America's Dilemma in the Far East ---------- July 1, 1940.
Japan's "New Structure" ---------- April 15, 1941.

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

Showdown in the Orient, World Affairs Pamphlets, No. 8 ---- Apr. 1940.
Clash in the Pacific, by T. A. Bisson and Ryllis Alexander Goslin, Headline Books.
Shadow Over Asia—the Rise of Militant Japan, Headline Books.

SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY

Far Eastern Front Against Aggression ---------- Nov. 1938.
To All Active Supporters of Democracy and Peace—Open Letter signed by T. A. Bisson. Sept. 1939.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS

The United States and the Far East ---------- Jan. 1932.
Review: Sun Yat Sen vs. Communism, by Maurice Williams ---------- Sept. 1932.
The United States in the Pacific ---------- Dec. 1932.
Japan Without Germany ---------- Dec. 1939.
The Price of Peace for Japan ---------- Mar. 1944.
Review: Battle Hymn of China, by Agnes Smedley ---------- Mar. 1944.
Review: The Japanese New Order in Asia, by Paul Einzy ---------- June 1944.
Japan as a Political Organism ---------- Dec. 1944.
The Zaibatsu's Wartime Role ---------- Dec. 1945.
The United States and the Orient, American National Survey, IPR 1118, 1930, Vol. III.
Problems of War Production Control in Japan, 1943, Vol. XVI.
Increase of Zaibatsu Predominance in Wartime Japan, 1945, Vol. XVIII.

CHINA TODAY

Under pseudonym of Frederick Spencer

Nanking Clasps Hands With China ---------- Oct. 1934.
Japan Takes Over Shanghai ---------- Nov. 1934.
Review: Twilight in the Forbidden City, by Reginald F. Johnston ---------- Do.
Chiang Kai-shek's Dictatorship Stumbles ---------- Dec. 1934.
Review: China, by L. A. Lydall ---------- Do.
To the American People (Open Letter) (signed by T. A. Bisson and Frederick Spencer). Feb. 1935.
Chiang Kai-shek Yields to Japan ---------- Mar. 1935.
Chiang Kai-shek "Rehabilitates" Kiangsi ---------- May 1935.
Review:
The Case for Manchoukuo, by Geo. Bronson ---------- Do.
Toward Understanding Japan, by Sidney L. Gulick ---------- Do.
Japan Calls the Tune ---------- July 1935.
The Missionaries Must Choose ---------- October 1935.
Chiang Kai-shek Licks Japan's Boots ---------- Nov. 1935.
The Same Old Wheeze ---------- Do.
Students Resist Nanking Betrayal ---------- Feb. 1936.
Case Studies in Japanese Imperialism ---------- Do.
Behind the Murders in Tokyo ---------- April 1936.
Viscount Ishii, Imperialist Diplomat ---------- June 1936.
The Gangly Days of American Imperialism ---------- August 1936.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Esther Carroll?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Mr. Morris. How well?
Mr. Bisson. I knew her from the American Friends of the Chinese People.
Mr. Morris. Were you a member of that organization?
Mr. Bisson. I was.
Mr. Morris. Did you ever speak under the auspices of the American League for Peace and Democracy?
Mr. Bisson. Yes; I imagine so.
Mr. Morris. What year?
Mr. Bisson. I don't recall the date.
Mr. Morris. Did you meet Susumu Okano in Japan?
Mr. Bisson. Yes. Mr. Okano, as I remember, was interviewed by several members of the Government Section.
Mr. Morris. He was the head of the Japanese Communist Party?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Did you meet him in connection with official duties?
Mr. Bisson. Yes.
Mr. Morris. I have no more questions. We do have one more exhibit. This is the Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting of the American Friends of the Chinese People, dated January 23, 1938.
Senator Eastland. It will be admitted.
(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 738," and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 738

Annual Membership Meeting of the American Friends of the Chinese People

January 23, 1938—2:00 P. M.

Meeting opened by Mr. Julius Loeb who introduced the chairman for the day—Mr. Maxwell S. Stewart.
Mr. Stewart announces the Order of Business:

1. Discussion by Mr. T. A. Bisson.
2. Reports of work.
3. Discussion on reports.
4. Election of officers.

Mr. Bisson: Mr. Bisson pointed out the more optimistic perspective of the Chinese situation. Whereas five years ago all China was rent with partisan difference and political disunity, today the country is united. Despite Hirota's three demands, the infiltration of Japanese control in East Hopei and the attempt to invade Suiyuan, the Kuomintang was still waging war on the Communist forces.
The demand for unity was, however, growing steadily until finally the Generalissimo was detained at Sian by the rebellious troops under Chang Hsueh-liang who refused to fight their countrymen while the enemy kept advancing. In the spring of 1937 the Kuomintang could no longer hesitate and this led up to the present united-front situation. There are, however, some groups within the Kuomintang opposed to the arming of the population.
China more and more takes her place among the anti-fascist nations of the world. Her relations with the Soviet Union are more cordial than they have been in the last ten years.
Mr. Bisson concluded his report with an analysis of the military situation. He emphasized the necessity of organizing the peasantry for active defense and the extension of guerrilla warfare.
A brief period of questions and discussion followed.

REPORTS OF WORK

Mr. Julius Loeb (on history of organization): This organization was started on January 4th, 1933. Our activities during the past were mainly educational. Our Lecture Bureau, which includes Chinese, Japanese, and Korean speakers,

has sent lecturers to all sorts of groups, and who have spoken to thousands of people monthly. We have a research staff and a School for Far Eastern Studies. Our other activities consist of holding mass meetings, sending delegates to various peace congresses and conferences, picketing, and holding demonstrations before the Japanese Consulate's Office and at Brooklyn docks where Japanese ships are being loaded with scrap iron. Several years ago we produced a documentary film, "The Birth of New China."

We started to publish a "Monthly Bulletin" in July 1933. By January 1934 the mimeographed CHINA TODAY was issued. The printed form was published October 1934, and has been issued consecutively every month since. It is the only magazine of its kind printed in the English language. Subscription price is $1.00 yearly; single copy, 10¢. We print ten thousand copies. The magazine circulates throughout the United States and in foreign countries. Our publication is barred in Japan.

The educational activities have been intensified and the membership and subscribers of our magazine have increased. A branch has been established in San Francisco, Portland, Chicago, and a group is functioning in Los Angeles. In the international field, Friends of the Chinese People have been established in Canada, Mexico, France, and in the Philippine Islands. A smaller group which has been operating in England recently merged with other larger groups which are helping China.

Having anticipated the present events in China, we were not unprepared for what we have to do now. We are holding larger meetings, have created a Boycott Committee, have held several anti-silk parades, and increased our picketing work, started to send organizers and lecturers out of town, and are increasing our efforts for the collection of funds for China's aid. From now on our work will be more national in scope than ever before. We must assist the Chinese people in all possible ways. By so doing we will justify our name, the American Friends of the Chinese People.

E. A. Schachner (editor, CHINA TODAY): "I don't know of any organization anywhere, considering the size and the number of people working with it, who do more good in the direction it wants to go than this organization. Perhaps the most effective weapon in the country on China is the magazine CHINA TODAY. The problem that faces us is very clearly this: to continue to make CHINA TODAY an effective factor in disseminating accurate information on China. We have got to be an expression in this country of all the various movements that are helping China at this moment.

"Our main object is the problem of funds. We have now the best correspondents on China as contributing editors. Our big difficulty is to get this magazine in the hands of the tens of thousands of interested Americans. We hope to improve the format considerably and increase the circulation in the very near future. We may start this very month with a new cover. We have already increased the size of the magazine by four pages. We haven't a circulation manager as yet, but hope to remedy the condition. I think if we get the cooperation from the executive council and from the friends of the organization, we can feel sure that the fine traditions of the organization will be continued and that CHINA TODAY will continue to be an important weapon in the country for the help that all of us want to give to the liberation and independence of the Chinese people."

Esther Carroll (Organization Secretary): "In 1934–35 only small groups of people were ready to listen to the message of China. All doubted Chinese willingness and ability to fight for her territorial integrity and independence. Then our speakers, our magazine CHINA TODAY, our forums, brought to the American public a better understanding of China's history, China's art, China's culture, and China's love for freedom. * * *

"When aggression in Spain broke out we knew that aggression in the Far East would follow. We knew that the aggressive fascist powers would want to ignite the flames of war in Asia too. But this time when Japan struck at China, when the heavy boot of the Japanese military swept through the ancient and beautiful cities, when the bombs of the Japanese war planes brought death and ruin to Shanghai, Nanking—a united and determined China came into being. The rest of the world, stirred and indignant, called for all support to the Chinese people and defeat of the Japanese aggressors. It was the voice calling for defense of a free Spain. * * *

"Such peace-loving Japanese friends like Mr. Kubota, Miss Matsui, Mr. Okano and others made it possible for us to act properly, timely. It was this teamwork and wise counsel that made it possible for us to organize the first big protest meeting on August 4th at the New School for Social Research to organize

the successful and colorful mass meeting at Madison Square Garden together with the American League for Peace and Democracy on October 1st, for the airplanes and tugboats equipped with loudspeakers protesting the shipment of scrap iron to Japan, for the organization of the antisilk parade in New York, the participation of ten delegates equipped with speakers, posters, leaflets who went to the Congress for Peace and Democracy held in Pittsburgh. The sending of fraternal delegates to the American Federation of Labor and Committee for Industrial Organization conventions. It was with the help of our Japanese friends that we gave deserving 'receptions' and 'send-offs' to the Japanese war envoys who came to this country. And the special introductions which we gave for the Japanese labor misleader Bunji Suzuki who came here to defend his government. So much so that he never reached the east coast but went crying about the lack of appreciation on the part of American labor for the humanitarian aims of his government.

"It was with the help and advice of our Chinese and Japanese friends that we were able to have a series of demonstrations in front of many Japanese consulates throughout the country the day following the bombing of the 'Panay' and to distribute 120,000 leaflets in one week in the city of New York alone during the showing of the film. Over half a million pieces of literature and hundreds of thousands of buttons were sold and distributed.

"Branches of our organization were set up nationally and internationally. Everywhere people are clamoring for help and guidance. We hope to immediately after this meeting and with your help to raise the necessary funds for the purpose of sending out the best people of our staff on a tour together with Jack Chen and other Chinese friends who have kindly consented to participate and help.

"Relief work is not going fast enough. But good beginnings were made everywhere. Funds should be raised for medical aid, for doctors and nurses, and food to go in a constant stream to China. The boycott movement—well on its way must be rolled uphill faster. China Today, our magazine, must gain 2,000 new subscribers and thousands of additional readers in the next few months. We must intensify and increase throughout the country, pressure brought to bear on our government for an active peace policy, aid to China, and an embargo against Japan the aggressor. Let us help the people of our country to, in the spirit of true American tradition, give every substantial, moral, and material help to China in her fight for freedom, independence, progress, and world peace."

Conrad Komorowski (Educational Director) : Mr. Komorowski reported that the work of the Educational Committee was not quite satisfactory as yet. He pointed out that the feeling of sympathy for China is growing much faster than our organizational work is. The movement is growing by such leaps and bounds that we find ourselves lagging behind it. As an example of the good work the Educational Committee has done he mentioned the fact that in the last six or seven weeks the Lecture Bureau has sent out speakers who have reached approximately 10,000 people. He stressed that we must make new contacts—church groups, peace organizations, and trade-unions. We must utilize the radio. Another shortcoming is that we have no meetings for the speakers where they can discuss their work and settle mutual problems. This must be done soon, and also the issuance of a bulletin dealing specifically with the problems of the speakers and outlining facts for them.

The Library must be enlarged and improved to the point where it will be an actual help to the research workers. In this connection Mr. Rodgers was commended for the splendid work he has been doing in the research field. A research committee must be built around him to help carry on the work. The much-discussed speakers' class will be started some time in February. The plan is to get many new people from different organizations who can take our course and then return to their organizations to carry on the work there. One of the functions of the Educational Committee is to take care of the publicity that comes out of the office. With a larger, more efficient committee this can be done.

Mr. Komorowski concluded his report by appealing for volunteers for the Educational Committee. He urged all the members to bring to him the names of organizations, particularly church, peace, and trade-unions, which can be contacted by the Committee. In this way we can expand the work of the Committee and the organization.

Helen Holman (on Negro work) : Miss Holman spoke briefly on our work among the Negro people in Harlem. She emphasized that with Negro nationalist movements flourishing in Harlem, it is very important for our organization to become entrenched among the Negro people there and dispel all incorrect impressions that "Japan is a friend of the darker races," etc.

Mrs. Julia Church Kolar (Boycott Committee) : "In reviewing and setting down the actual work done by this committee since the first date recorded, that of September 10th, I came to this conclusion, that the results are amazing in comparison to effort put forth. On October 2nd in the 'Nation' we read the first call for the boycott in the voice of Mr. Maxwell Stewart. On October 6th, fifteen women picketed a Woolworth store and ours were the first feet to be marching for the boycott as far as I know. * * *

"We visited the Woolworth management in the Woolworth Building; we also called upon the executives in Macy's, Gimbels, Wanamakers', H. L. Green Co. We suggested they remove Japanese goods from their counters and make a statement to that effect. Leaflets were distributed. In December we had the Christmas banners. On Oct. 19th we had a picket line at the Commodity Exchange followed by a street meeting which was very successful, drawing a large crowd and which was written up in the papers. On Oct. 13th we visited the Viscous Company to get information about rayon for hose, and on the 14th five of us went as a delegation to the National Hosiery Manufacturers Association meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria where we had an interview with Mr. Consadine, the national director. * * *

"Oriental stores, stores selling only Japanese goods, wholesale houses, etc., were visited in order to get information and advise the trade what we were doing on the boycott. Letters came into the office from colleges, from students ,and from professors, from organizations in different parts of the country asking information about the boycott. We distributed thousands of buttons, visiting, meeting with them, and with leaflets. On November 10th two young women and myself boarded the S. S. *Normandie* with 2,000 cards which we distributed to oncoming possengers and handed in to staterooms. These announced that two fellow travelers—Baron Okura and Admiral Godo were Japanese envoys who were here on a so-called good will mission, and urged they be boycotted These cards were received with splendid response. A picket line was on the outside of the pier during this time. * * *

"Then began plans for the Women's Anti-Silk Parade which was held on December 11th when more than 2,000 women paraded in the name of peace. Among the women's organizations participating were: Theatre Arts Committee, League of Women Shoppers, Women's Division American League for Peace and Democracy, Women's Division, Medical Bureau for Spain. Free Synagogue Women, Progressive Women's Council, University Settlement Mothers Clubs, I. W. O. Women, Harlem Peace League, Workers Alliance, Union of Office and Professional Workers, Retail Store Employees, Federal Writers Project, W. P. A. Teachers Local, Teachers Union, Women's Advertising Guild, Social Workers, American Artists Union, International Labor Defense, Students, Chinese women and Spanish women, etc. Other prominent women who endorsed the parade were: Miss Hester Sondergaard, actress; Miss Frances Farmer, actress; Miss Claire Luce, actress; Miss Phoebe Brant, actress; Miss Edith Barret, actress; Mrs. Isobel Walker Soule, writer and editor; Mrs. Anna Rochester, writer; Miss Genevieve Taggart, poetess; Miss Grace Lumpkin, writer; Miss Muriel Rukeyser, poetess; Miss Eda Lou Walton, poetess. * * *

"On December 18th our committee was well represented at the Boycott Conference held at 99 Park Ave. I was placed on the resolutions committee. On January 19th we visited the directors office of the National Lamp Shade Manufacturers Association during the showing of the products to the trade. He told us how much the lamp shade business had changed, how no silk shades were made to sell for more than $15.00 where previously many had sold as high as $50.00. The following day they snapped two of our committee outside the Hotel New Yorker holding up signs urging buyers not to buy silk shades. We hope this photograph will be in the trade journal. * * *

"In concluding, I may make a few observations as to the future program of the boycott committee. So far we have not here in American been able to gain much support from church or religious groups. The Free Synagogue stands for the boycott. On February 6th at the Community Church Forum, the program is on the boycott with Dr. Sidney Goldstein and myself speaking in support of the boycott and the Women's Peace Union opposing the boycott.

Our Committee is now interested in getting out a film on the boycott. One last fact that strikes me as so humorous is that now manufacturers and wholesalers and employers generally are weeping over the hardship to the hosiery workers. Surely we all regret if any hardship must be endured by them, but some of these people I mentioned have not wept a single tear for the ten million now unemployed or the 20 million who were idle a few years ago. Surely we are sorry

for any workers who may be temporarily out of jobs—American or Japanese, but our object is to save lives by smashing Japan's war machine and the boycott must go on, and it will.

"A mass meeting is to be held in Brownsville, Brooklyn. A women's antisilk parade in Brooklyn is scheduled for Lincoln's Birthday. Another women's antisilk parade should be held in Manhattan in the spring. Demonstrations on the waterfront, plans have been discussed as to a delegation to visit Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., asking him, in the name of humanity, to refuse more oil to Japan. We have made contact with the Federation of Women's Clubs and this is an important objective. There is work to be done in the trade unions.

"These are some of the activities that will be carried out and more will develop as events will determine and new ways to spread the boycott will be thought of. We ask all of you who are interested in this part of our work to join our Boycott Committee."

Jean Stanley (Finance): "You will all agree that money is one of the most important organizational matters. In the past half year, with war in the Far East, our organization has grown threefold and our great job is teaching the American people how they can help the Chinese people. Similarly our expenses have increased during this period, while our income, too, has been greater. In the next six months we must not only continue to carry out our work as we have been doing, but that we must also increase both our work and our scope. With this in mind, it is necessary to look into a budget for the next three months of our activity.

"The great items in a budget for our organization are: Publication of our organ in, CHINA TODAY and wages for our people who devote their full time to the organization and the magazine. There are four people on our payroll. Their salaries, based on a minimum living wage amounts to only $294.00 a month. We are considerably understaffed. CHINA TODAY, which will in the future come out in a color cannot be published for less than $275.00 a month. The circulation of our magazine has increased 250%. With these great leaps ahead, we have not yet been able to afford to add a circulation manager.

"Our income is derived from subscriptions to CHINA TODAY, cash sales of the magazine and newstand distribution both nationally and locally, and lecture fees from our speaking engagements. Here we must give due recognition and express our gratitude to Marcella Loring for donating and devoting her full time to the lecture bureau of our organization.

"In the budget for the next three months there will be a monthly deficit of $250.00 per month. This money will have to be realized from special affairs run for CHINA TODAY and the American Friends of the Chinese People as well as finding new friends to contribute regular monthly sums of however large or however small amounts each month. I hereby earnestly appeal to our membership and friends. If you know of anyone who can give even a small sum, as small as $1.00 a month, towards furthering the work of our organization, inform him of our needs".

Jack Chen (visitor from China): "If we stop Japan today the Rome-Berlin-Tokio axis is weakened, the fascists discouraged. America will not be alone in its efforts to stop Japan. $25,000 has already been sent from Soviet Russia to China for medical aid and civilian relief. In England a China Campaign Committee has been formed with three main aims: medical aid to China, the education of the English people on the Chinese question, and the furtherance of the boycott movement against Japan. Many churches, including the Unitarian Church are supporting this committee. Mass meetings of thousands of people have been arranged. At the Queens Hall meeting the Dean of Canterbury and various Members of Parliament were present as speakers.

"Demonstrations have been held at Trafalgar Square. Dockers of Southampton have refused to unload and ship Japanese goods. The dockers of Liverpool have pledged not to unload Japanese goods. Trade unions have gone on record for the boycott and imposition of sanctions. On February 14th an International Conference for the Boycott of Japanese Goods is being held in England. Delegates for all leading countries will attend. China must win, because China's struggle is the struggle for peace and for the welfare of the people of the world—and this cannot lose."

The floor was taken by an anonymous gentleman who introduced himself by saying that he had spent twenty-five years in Japan. He commended our work on the boycott. He warned us that the merchant dealing in Japanese goods must not be antagonized. We must approach them in a very nice way so that we will win them over as allies, instead of forcing them to become enemies. He also men-

tioned the fact that many Japanese students are not in accord with their government's policy. They are very carefully watched and are called to account by the Japanese Consul. We should seek these students out and encourage them to take a determined stand.

Bertram Loeb (Youth Director) : "Youth in China have taken leadership in the anti-Japanese fight. Youth here are also in the leadership in the movement for peace. The American Youth Congress passed a motion at its last Congress of solidarity with the Chinese youth. The American Student Union passed a Boycott resolution. The Youth section of the American Friends held a banquet commemorating the Peiping students demonstration. A China project was arranged for a group of office workers. Future work: Model Youth Legislature to have a resolution on the boycott. World Youth Congress being held in Washington this summer and should be attended by our representatives."

Mrs. Isadora W. Kerr: "I represent the University Settlement, the oldest settlement house in the city. We are affiliated to the American Friends of the Chinese People and some of us have individual membership in it. All of our people wear lisle hose. We have looked into the question of buying from Japan. We know that Macy's is sending their buyer to Denmark instead of Japan this year."

Miko Kubota : "I would like to send greetings of Japanese people to the American Friends. Esther Carroll pointed out that the Japanese people in New York have done something to help this organization. This is true and it is also true that this organization has done more for the Japanese people in New York as well as throughout this country. I appreciate this help. We Japanese will take care of the military-fascists of our country but we need your help. At present the greatest help which you can give us is your activities for aid to the Chinese people. Direct help to the Chinese people directly affects the Japanese people."

J. H. Lin: "On behalf of the Chinese people I express my sincere appreciation of the work you are doing. You have done your work very well considering the means at your disposal. You do your work with great devotion and your work not only affects the Chinese people in the United States but affects policy in China itself. I see that your activities are reported in the Chinese press. I hope that now we Chinese in the organization will be able to do more work than we have been doing. I think there are many tasks which confront us besides the dissemination of information on China, for there are some well-meaning pacifists who say 'what is the use of boycotting Japanese goods.' But the war is just beginning. The Chinese people will fight very well and will win this war. We must further developments on the boycott. We must render medical and moral aid to China. After all, the Chinese people are fighting a life and death struggle—but not for China alone. They are fighting for the peace and democracy of the entire world."

James Anderson: "I wish to speak briefly on our waterfront activities. We have organized meetings and demonstrations in front of the NYK and OYK lines in Brooklyn in the Red Hook district. I think in the near future we shall have to do what Jack Chen mentioned in his speech as regards the dockers of Southampton and Liverpool. On January 29th we intend to have another demonstration. We must begin on a real active period.

Other friends took the floor to criticize and further elaborate the reports given by the various officers.

Mr. J. H. Lin, on behalf of the Nominating Committee, proposes the following people as our national officers: Maxwell Stewart—National Chairman; Julius Loeb—National Vice Chairman; Helen Mallery—National Treasurer; Esther Carroll—Organizational Secretary; Manvil Rodgers—Recording Secretary. Motion made to accept these people as read. Seconded. Passed unanimously.

Mr. Julius Loeb in behalf of the Nominating Committee proposes enlarging Executive Council to 25 seats, leaving 5 seats open for possible additions. Proposes the following for the Executive Council: James Anderson, Esther Carroll, Helen Holman, Mrs. Julia Church Kolar, Mrs. Robert Kalvar, Mr. Conrad Komorowski, Mr. Kubota, Mr. J. H. Lin, Julius Loeb, Helen Mallery, Percy Quick, Manvil Rodgers, Ruth Rubin, Eugene Schrachner, Maxwell Stewart, Heng-chi Tao. Mr. Rothman moves to accept. Motion seconded and passed.

Mr. Julius Loeb announces that the National Advisory Board is in process of formation. The names being considered include: Miss Margaret Forsythe, Prof. Lovett, Mrs. J. C. Guggenheimer, Prof. J. Nash, Prof. McCall, and others.

Mr. Stewart in Summation : The American Friends of the Chinese People works under difficult conditions, but produces good results. New tasks lie ahead. While many of the things which need to be done by our organization are not, we must

realize that no one organization can meet the needs of China. He emphasized that because we are the only organization in America today that is really initiating vigorous work for China, we have a stupendous task ahead of us. We have failed in the past because we haven't gone far enough. Our job calls for the various activities which have been mentioned today. Primarily we have to do what Jack Chen indicated is being done in Great Britain today. Firstly in aiding the people of China. Secondly raising money for relief. There are also a few other agencies which have attempted to do this. Thirdly, develop active resistance to the boycott. I really believe that the boycott alone can bring Japan to her knees. We should work among American workers and work for a government embargo. The primary challenge is to be a national organization—to spread out in the country. Branch out in church groups, settlements, youth groups, peace groups, etc. We must carry on the complete program which has been outlined by the speakers today. The first thing is to challenge—the next thing to do is to take it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the IPR in 1938 ask you to write a book on American policy in the Far East?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write it?

Mr. BISSON. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you paid for it?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much were you paid?

Mr. BISSON. My memory is it was $250. It was not very much.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the name of the book?

Mr. BISSON. The book was United States Policy in the Far East, or Toward the Far East, something of that kind. I am in doubt, because the title changed in the revised edition.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a grant of any sort while you were writing that book?

Mr. BISSON. Well, the writing of that book coincided or overlapped, I think, with the time of the grant that covered my research trip to the Far East.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say the title changed. What did it change to?

Mr. BISSON. America's Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Under that name by whom was it published?

Mr. BISSON. The Institute of Pacific Relations and MacMillan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember meeting Mr. Karl Wittfogel, Chao ting Chi, and Mr. Jaffe in late 1934?

Mr. BISSON. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say whether such a meeting took place?

Mr. BISSON. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there was testimony with regard to such a meeting in these hearings?

Mr. BISSON. I did. I saw that. I could not recall that meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you have gone over all of the testimony in the published volumes of these hearings that concerns you, have you not?

Mr. BISSON. I have gone over the testimony that concerns me. I am not sure that I know it all.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you have had it pointed out to you?

Mr. BISSON. Yes. What I am saying is I am not sure I would remember everything that I have read about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write an article in 1943 for Pacific Affairs in which you discussed the democratic character of the Chinese Communist Party and referred to Chiang Kai-shek's party as feudal?

Mr. BISSON. You have your magazine wrong. You mean Far Eastern Survey.

Mr. SOURWINE. I will accept your correction.

Mr. BISSON. Is it July 1943?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You published it in the Far Eastern Survey?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that printed in the Far Eastern Survey of July 14, 1943?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But while you were preparing that article you were employed by the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were employed by the Board of Economic Warfare until July 10, 1943?

Mr. BISSON. No. May I say my salary continued to that date. I think my last official duties, actually performed duties with the Board, were at the end of May. I think I had a vacation of about a month or so before I joined the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you telling us you prepared this article during the month of June 1943, after you had left BEW?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did so in its entirety?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. By what time did you have to have it in order to have it published in the July 14 issue of Far Eastern Survey?

Mr. BISSON. I would not remember exactly. I think about a week or maybe 10 days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you did this whole article in a month or less?

Mr. BISSON. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the manuscript of Lawrence Rosinger's book, Wartime Politics in China?

Mr. BISSON. The manuscript of it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Do you remember anything about the manuscript of that book?

Mr. BISSON. Not particularly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that manuscript sent to Mr. John Carter Vincent?

Mr. BISSON. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask him to send it back?

Mr. BISSON. I do not recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the excerpt in that regard which is in the record of this committee?

Mr. BISSON. Apparently not; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that on page 487 of this committee's record, exhibit No. 127, there is a letter dated November 12, 1943, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent purporting to have been signed by you, saying:

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this time, I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the original copy of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was sent to you for criticism, but with your new responsibilities there is no reason to burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we are anxious

to have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer if it is conveniently possible to have it sent back. Hoping to see you in New York soon.

Sincerely yours,

T. A. BISSON.

Did you write that letter?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now remember any of the circumstances?

Mr. BISSON. Yes. It seems to me that, as I recall now, that manuscript had been sent to him sometime earlier and we had not heard from him, and we wanted the manuscript back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was it sent to him?

Mr. BISSON. Presumably they wanted his comments and criticisms for any changes that might be made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you send other manuscripts to Mr. Vincent?

Mr. BISSON. Did I?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. I may have. I would not know whether I did actually.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whose idea it was to send manuscripts to Mr. Vincent?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it standard procedure? Was he one of those to whom manuscripts were sent?

Mr. BISSON. I should think so. It was standard procedure with the Foreign Policy Association in the earlier years.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was the IPR, not the Foreign Policy Association.

Mr. BISSON. It bears on this point, and I think I should state it. When I wrote a manuscript for the Foreign Policy Association reports, it was very often sent to Stanley K. Hornbeck. It would come back from him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who would send it to him?

Mr. BISSON. Either I would or the secretary of the Foreign Policy Association, asking him for his comments.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember participating in a draft of a statement which it was hoped or intended would be signed by Mr. Thomas Lamont and sent to the New York Times?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consult with Mr. Lattimore about that matter; Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BISSON. I do not remember any consultation with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Carter write to you about that matter?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; I think there was a memorandum he wrote to me about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember anything about your participation in that?

Mr. BISSON. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember making a statement to the Daily Worker giving an interview urging President Truman to avert the danger of civil war in China by letting the Japanese surrender to the Communist Party?

Mr. BISSON. Is this a general letter with many signatures. I am not clear which you refer to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. This is a statement specifically quoting you. It contains 20 other signatures. The statement was in a telegram signed by 20 other persons.

Mr. BISSON. You are asking whether I signed that statement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

No, I am asking first whether you gave any interview to the Daily Worker. I will ask you about the statement in regard to the President in a moment.

Mr. BISSON. I do not recall any interview I gave to the Daily Worker.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you sign the telegram to the President?

Mr. BISSON. Yes; I think I did.

Senator EASTLAND. Were you ever interviewed by the Daily Worker?

Mr. BISSON. Not that I know of.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever write an article for the Daily Worker?

Mr. BISSON. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. New Masses?

Mr. BISSON. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see Andrew Grajdanzev's report on Formosa in 1942?

Mr. BISSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that in connection with your official duties?

Mr. BISSON. Yes. It was because I was head of a Manchuria-Korea-Formosa unit in the Board of Economic Warfare.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything to circulate that report?

Mr. BISSON. Yes, probably. It was probably circulated among the members of the Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do anything to circulate it other than among the members of the Board?

Mr. BISSON. Outside the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. BISSON. I may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. What might you have done to circulate it outside the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. BISSON. I do not recall specific individuals I may have sent it to, but it is possible that there were other outside individuals that I wanted to have read this.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you did send it to outside individuals, did you not?

Mr. BISSON. I probably did. I do not recall any specific individuals.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you write an article for Spotlight on the Far East in February 1948?

Mr. BISSON. I probably did.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to show you page 1018 of our hearings and ask you if the article there is one which you wrote? It has been identified as an article which you did write. Is that something you wrote?

Mr. BISSON. No; I do not think I wrote this at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. You deny having written that?

Mr. BISSON. This is a summary of what occurred at the conference mentioned in here.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't think you are looking at the same thing.

Mr. BISSON. I am looking at the wrong one.

Mr. SOURWINE. The one right at the top of the page.

Mr. BISSON. This is again a similar situation, someone writing in Spotlight reporting what I said at this conference.

Mr. Sourwine. I did not say you wrote it. I am asking you if you did write it?

Mr. Bisson. No.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give an interview to Spotlight on the Far East about that matter?

Mr. Bisson. About the conference?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

Mr. Bisson. I do not remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you give them any memoranda about it?

Mr. Bisson. I may have given them a memorandum. I made some remarks at the conference, and they may have wanted to know what those remarks were.

Mr. Sourwine. That publication is published by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. Bisson. That is right.

Mr. Sourwine. That is all.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you receive into the record this page 276 and up to page 284? It begins a new subject. It is from Amerasia of 1943.

Senator Eastland. It will be filed as an exhibit.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 739" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 739

[Source: Amerasia, September 1943, pp. 276–278]

The Two Chinas

This all-important question of the present trend in Chinese policy was discussed at some length by T. A. Bisson in an article on "China's Part in a Coalition War" published in the *Far Eastern Survey* of July 14. Mr. Bisson is extremely critical of the shortcomings of America and Britain in their dealings with China, but he also believes that the present political situation in China is cause for well-justified apprehension, since it affects "not only the current prosecution of the war, but also the prospects for the postwar emergence of a stable, united, and democratic China." Together with many other students of Chinese affairs, Mr. Bisson considers that "the early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of Chinese unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic reforms has not been fulfilled." Instead, the conservative elements in the Kuomintang, alarmed by the growing influence of the Communist-led armies in the guerrilla areas of North China, and by the agrarian reforms and democratic electoral procedures introduced in these areas, have imposed a military blockade against them. Thus two Chinas have emerged, "each with its own government, military forces, and territories, and each with its own characteristic set of political and economic institutions."

These two areas are commonly referred to as Kuomintang China and Communist China, but Mr. Bisson maintains that the terms "feudal China" and "democratic China" more accurately describe the basic distinction between the two regions. His use of the term "feudal," Mr. Bisson explains, is intended to define a society "in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship." Its application to Kuomintang China is justified, in his opinion, by the fact that no serious effort has been made to uproot the landlord-usurer system, and that the great landlords have become the economic mainstay of the Kuomintang regime, while political power is exercised solely by the Kuomintang bureaucracy, with no provision for popular representation or control.

In so-called "Communist China," on the other hand, economic and political reforms have combined to free the peasant from "the crushing burden of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges levied by a feudal economy," and to introduce a system of local democratic government in which all classes of the population, including the landlords and merchants as well as the peasants and workers, participate. "The task of statesmanship," declares Mr. Bisson, "is

to merge these two Chinas into one. To be sound, such unification must come on the high plane of social advance and democratic reform. Until unification is achieved on this plane, China's full strength cannot be placed behind the war effort."

Mr. Bisson's use of the term "feudal" to describe conditions in Kuomintang China was sharply criticized by Dr. C. L. Hsia, Director of the Chinese News Service in New York, as well as by Chinese officials in Chungking. In a letter to the editors, published in the *Far Eastern Survey* of August 11, Dr. Hsia contends that Chinese landlords do not exercise any control over the Chinese government, and that the present land tax system and land reform policy pursued by Chungking have served to restrict the influence of the landlords and place greater financial burdens on them. Furthermore, Dr. Hsia argues that if one accepts Mr. Bisson's definition of feudalism, "we may say that practically all countries in the world, with the exception of the U. S. S. R., are feudal. Outside the U. S. S. R., we find peasants and landlords everywhere, whether the landlords are owners of large farms, great estates, oil wells, or iron and coal mines."

Dr. Hsia also criticizes Mr. Bisson for failing to state the specific means by which Chinese unity is to be attained, and contends that it is utterly impossible for the Chinese Government to introduce far-reaching political and agrarian reforms in the midst of war, disregarding, apparently, Mr. Bisson's contention that such reforms are being carried out today in the guerrilla regions. Dr. Hsia appears to be chiefly incensed, however, by the assertion that the mobilization of China's resources is being hampered by the feudal character of her political and economic structure. But if Chinese feudalism "passed away some twenty-one centuries ago," as Dr. Hsia maintains, how does he explain the statement made by Chiang Kai-shek on December 10, 1928, that the two basic objectives of the Chinese Revolution are international equality and the overthrow of feudalism?[1] It is also difficult to reconcile his claim that the power of the landlords is decreasing with the statement by Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, that "The landlords" share of the taxes is still too small, while the small owners are shouldering an increased burden. During recent years, the landlord class has been greatly enriched. * * * The big landlords are employing their surplus funds to increase their holdings. * * * Land ownership is more and more concentrated in the hands of the landlords." (*Ta Kung Pao*, October 16, 1942.)

The persistence of feudal or semifeudal elements in a country's political and economic strncture is certainly not peculiar to China. In essence, similar conditions exist in the southern states in this country, as well as in many parts of Europe. It is significant, for example, that the new Italian Action Party, headed by Count Sforza, has for one of the planks in its liberal, democratic platform: "wide agrarian reform looking toward the elimination of feudalism." The point to be stressed here is that the liberal and progressive forces that exist in Kuomintang China are being seriously hampered in their efforts to secure an extension of democracy in both the political and economic spheres as an essential factor in strengthening China's war effort. In their view, a program of land reform which would limit both the political and economic power of the great landlords is not only possible but essential in time of war in order to give the Chinese people a greater incentive to carry on the struggle. Furthermore, they maintain that greater political democracy is essential to secure the close cooperation of all anti-Japanese groups in China in the war against the invader. In this connection it is worth noting that not only the Chinese Communists but also many of the smaller political parties in China, some of them even more conservative than the Kuomintang, have demanded that they be granted legal status as minority parties and given the opportunity to be represented in the government by popularly elected delegates.[2]

At the moment, however, there appears to be little prospect of any change in the attitude of the Kuomintang leaders toward other political parties in China. On the contrary, recent reports have stressed the rising political tension in Free China, resulting from the Chungking Government's efforts to suppress the activities of all non-Kuomintang organizations. As applied to the Chinese Communist Party and the armed forces under its control, this policy has been expressed in the continued blockade of the guerrilla areas in the north by Central Government

[1] The speech containing this statement appeared in a book entitled "Collected Speeches of the Generalissimo" (in Chinese), published by the Cheng Chung Book Shop, Chungking, 1938, p. 5.

[2] For a detailed account of the organization of the "smaller parties" in China into the Federation for Political Democracy, see Amerasia, Spring Quarterly, April 25, 1943, pp. 97–120.

troops. No large-scale armed clashes have occurred between the Kuomintang and Communist forces since the "New Fourth Army Incident" of January 1941, but reports have reached this country in recent weeks that certain elements in the Kuomintang favor immediate steps to force the dissolution of the Border Region Government and of the armies under Communist leadership.

[Source: Amerasia, September 1943, pp. 278–281]

THREAT OF CIVIL WAR IN CHINA: A SOVIET OBSERVER'S VIEW

The most outspoken of these reports was contained in a United Press dispatch from Moscow on August 6, quoting excerpts from an article on China published in the official Soviet trade union journal, *War and the Working Class*. Its author, Vladimir Rogov, recently returned to the Soviet Union after serving for twelve years in China as a representative of the Tass agency, and the prominence given his report would seem to indicate that the Soviet Government is seriously disturbed by the current Chinese situation. For purposes of record, the full text of Mr. Rogov's article is published herewith:[1]

"During six years of war, the Chinese command, at the cost of considerable territorial losses, succeeded in saving its troops from defeat. Despite heavy odds, the Chinese army preserved its capacity for resistance. The Japanese militarists failed in their plan for a rapid conquest of China, and proved incapable of breaking the resistance of the Chinese people. The war in China became prolonged, threatening Japan with ever-increasing complications.

"In defensive battles on an extremely long front, the Chinese army gained the necessary time for reorganizing its troops and strengthening their fighting capacity. Soon after the fall of Wuhan (Hankow) in October 1938, Chiang Kai-shek outlined a program for the reorganization of the country's armed forces, the principal points of which were as follows: First, China's national policy must become the policy of a long, defensive war. Second, the guerrilla movement must be developed. Third, in order to conduct a general counter-offensive, a new army must be created, many millions strong and trained in the use of the most up-to-date war equipment.

"However, the plans of Chiang Kai-shek met with covert resistance from the outset. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new units, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of creating an economic base for war was not accomplished. The main reason for this was the divisive work of the 'appeasers,' the defeatists, and capitulators.

"The war economy resources of National China (Free China) are large and afford an adequate base for the rearmament and supply of the army. On its territory National China has all the strategic raw materials necessary for the conduct of a prolonged war. Nevertheless, large-scale construction has not been undertaken because industrial and financial circles prefer to engage in profiteering rather than invest their capital in the armaments industry.

"This situation has led to the weakening of the army's fighting capacity and to greater dependence on the supply of arms from the United States and Great Britain who, owing to their own war, find it extremely difficult to supply China. Elements favoring capitulation have sabotaged the measures for the mobilization of China's internal resources intended to establish the national economy on a war basis, as well as the measures for waging economic warfare against the Japanese invaders.

"China has no lack of human reserves, but the Chinese army receives no regular reinforcements. There are insufficient trained reserves. There is no organized military registration of the population, and law providing for universal military service is not fully enforced. The army also receives a large percentage of men unfit for service.

"The main defect of the Chinese army is the shortage of trained commanders. All foreign military observers who have visited the Chinese army agree that the Chinese soldier is tenacious and enduring in the field and is undemanding as far as food and uniforms are concerned; whereas the commanding personnel is extremely weak and backward in military and technical training. The army's equipment is still at a low level, and the organization and control of the troops

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[1] Since Mr. Rogov's original article in Russian has not yet arrived in this country, this text is based on the English translations cabled from Moscow by the United Press and Inter-Continent News.

is far from perfect. One of the defects of the Chinese army is the lack of an effective united command and of coordinated operations on the separate fronts. The internal friction and suspicion among the generals cannot help but affect the fighting capacity and discipline of their troops.

"In Chungking, of course, there are no open advocates of surrender, but this does not mean that there is a lack of capitulators and defeatists there, some of whom occupy important positions in the Kuomintang. These defeatists elements have evolved a theory of an 'honorable' peace with Japan, and are weakening China by their political intrigues. There is no doubt that these elements represent a serious menace.

"Since December 1941, the Japanese have concentrated their attention on the war in the Pacific, while the war in China has receded into the background. This has led to the appearance among Chinese political and military leaders of a certain complacency, and the Japanese are taking advantage of this attitude to intensify their 'peace offensives.' They are now making every effort to deepen and sharpen internal conflicts in China to weaken Chinese resistance and strengthen their own position. In this attempt they are aided by the maneuvers of the Chinese 'appeasers' who are doing their utmost to undermine the military collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and to incite the persecution of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies which, as units of China's united national army, have inscribed many heroic pages in the history of the resistance of the Chinese people to the Japanese invaders.

"These armies consist of the most progressive, steadfast, and self-sacrificing people of China. They are led by the Chinese Communist Party which enjoys merited prestige among the broad masses of the working people as the organizer of their struggle for national freedom and independence. Today, by direct military pressure, new attempts are being made to bring about the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party and the liquidation of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. The Chinese high command has transferred new divisions to the districts where these armies are stationed, with large supplies of munitions and food, obviously in preparation for an attack on the Eighth Route and New Fourth. If these moves are crowned with any success, anti-democratic and anti-popular forces will gain the upper hand in Chungking, and if fratricidal war results, it will lead to fatal consequences for the Chinese war of liberation. Such an unprovoked attack by the Chungking generals against the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies would be tantamount to a knife in the back of the Chinese people, and would be of incalculable aid to the Japanese imperialists.

"A number of outstanding Kuomintang leaders strongly oppose the treacherous activities of the appeasers, capitulators, and provocateurs, and demand closer collaboration with all anti-Japanese groups. The discontent with the Kuomintang's policies in this respect is widespread throughout China. However, the Chinese Government has shown no firmness in eliminating the capitulators who are undermining national unity and weakening China's resistance against Japanese aggression.

"In the last few years I have had occasion to visit more than fifteen provinces of China. Both at the front and deep in the rear, in occupied Shanghai and Manchuria, representatives of various groups in China watch with grave concern the criminal activity of the traitors, turncoats, defeatists, and saboteurs. Nevertheless they are unanimous in their confidence that all efforts to provoke civil war are doomed to failure because the people of Free China, in hard fighting, have accumulated great strength and will not permit the cause of national liberation to die.

"With large strategic raw material resources and tremendous manpower reserves at her disposal, China has every possibility for victory over the enemy. The necessary conditions for this victory are the realization of radical measures for reorganizing the entire economy on a war footing, subordinating all economic life to the needs of the front, and strengthening the armed forces against capitulation and defeatism, and, most important of all, the genuine unity of all national forces in the struggle for freedom and national independence.

"The extent to which Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking authorities recognize the importance of this principal condition and succeed in averting the danger of internal struggle, now being fostered by the enemies of the Chinese people, will determine whether the exhausting war forced upon China by Japanese imperialism will be brought to a successful conclusion in the interests of the Chinese people as a whole."

Many Americans presumably discounted Mr. Rogov's comments on the grounds that he is naturally prejudiced in favor of the Communist-led armies of China and therefore inclined to take an exaggeratedly hostile and alarmist view of Kuomintang policies. But though one may question his contention that as of today China possesses all the strategic raw materials necessary for the conduct of the war, and his implication that today she has the potential strength to defeat Japan single-handed, his warning regarding the dangers of renewed civil strife in China cannot be dismissed as merely pro-Communist propaganda.

As we noted earlier in this article, many competent American students of China have expressed concern in recent months over the suppression of liberal forces in China and the growing influence of reactionary elements within the Kuomintang. These include writers who have staunchly supported the Chinese Government for many years, and who can in no way be regarded as Communist sympathizers. Their view is simply that the preservation of Chinese unity and the strengthening of the liberal, democratic forces in China are essential not only for the success of the United Nations war effort in Asia, but also for the emergence of a strong and stable China in the post-war world. For this reason, they are sincerely concerned over the fact that the trend toward greater political unity and democracy in China, which appeared so promising in the early years of the Sino-Japanese war, has now been reversed in favor of a strengthened dictatorship by the Kuomintang and the suppression of groups seeking political and economic reforms.

An excellent analysis of the basic cause of the political crisis in China was provided by Mr. Raymond Gram Swing on August 11. Mr. Swing has earned a well-merited reputation both in this country and abroad as an informative and reliable news analyst, and it may be assumed that his appraisals of the Chinese situation was based on the authoritativeness by millions of listeners throughout the world, but in view of their importance, it seemed desirable that they should be made available to Amerasia readers in printed form. We are therefore including in this record, with Mr. Swing's permission and approval, that portion of his broadcast which dealt with China.

[Source: Amerasia, September 1943, pp. 281–284]

An Appraisal of Conditions in China by Raymond Gram Swing

An item crept into the news yesterday about China which calls for careful appraisal. It came first from London. Chineses circles there authoritatively denied that the Chinese Government is taking military action against the so-called Chinese Communists. And the same denial later reached this country from Chungking direct, in a wireless to the New York Times. The denials were evoked by an article appearing in a trade-union newspaper in Moscow, by a writer named Vladimir Rogov, who has spent the last twelve years in China, and stated the appeasement and defeatist sections of the Chinese Government have been undermining the war effort by seeking to provoke internal trouble and urging dissolution of the Communist units of the Chinese forces. He said that the Chineses Government is facing serious internal difficulties that could result in civil war or Japanese victory. The Chinese authorities quoted in the New York Times categorically denied these assertions and the Times correspondent adds an observation: "In view of month-old rumors of trouble with the Communists breaking out again, this news is considered of the highest importance."

These rumors have reached this country, too, and caused great concern, for a forcible attempt to liquidate the Eighth Route or Communist army, repeating the attack on the Fourth Army, would do a most unwelcome injury to the United Nations war against Japan. They were accompanied by reports that the Chinese Government has yielded quite visibly to reactionary influences, and that the prospects of early democratization, in our sense of the word, were fading away. Thus the Chinese cooperatives, while not suppressed, were finding it hard to maintain themselves. Accepting the news as true that no forceful measures are planned against the Communists, the situation in China still remains critical and disquieting. And it is a situation not appreciated by the public in this country, though it is well enough known by the China experts. The simplest statement of the facts is enough to show that the problem is well-nigh unsoluble. The

Communists hold sections of Shensi, Shansi, and Kansu Provinces, a fairly small territory, with a population of approximately five or six million. Here they have instituted their agrarian and social reforms. For these are not Marxian Proletarians, these so-called Communists, they are agrarian radicals, trying to establish democratic practices and particularly to break up the great estates, so that the farm worker can have individual status and now own property. A word is in order about these agrarian radicals. They should not be called Communists, whatever their origin may be. They have developed in another direction. At the same time that the Kuomintang has gone to the right, the Communists have become versed in the democratic art of compromise. They have had to deal with the landlord, too, to convince him they are not simply going to expropriate his land. T. A. Bisson, writing for the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, objects to the labels, Kuomintang China and Communist China. "These are only party labels," he says. "To be more descriptive the one might be called feudal China, the other, democratic China." The Communists have their own army, and though it is only a small percentage of the total of Chinese forces, it has produced more than two-fifths of the casualties inflicted on the Japanese in 1941 and 1942. The Communists were the ones who first insisted on resistance to Japan. They precipitated the union of action against the Japanese. But they settled down in the territory they occupied, established their own regime, maintained the independence of their army, which they now refuse to give up.

Obviously this is a contradiction of unity, and the Central Chinese Government—the Kuomintang Government—feels it cannot permanently tolerate it. Chiang Kai-shek, who had waged war against the Communists before the war opened against Japan, now has blockaded the Communist territory, and is using some half million troops to isolate it from the rest of China. Some of Chiang's crack troops are kept there. They have not smelled gunpowder in any clash with the Japanese. They are on guard to hold the Communist movement in check. I should add that Communist influence extends much farther than the blockaded province. It seeps throughout the North, and the celebrated Chinese guerrillas operating against the Japanese in the North function not as agents of the Central Government but of the Communists. So the Communist movement is far more pervading and significant than a regime established in provinces of five to six millions.

When the Comintern was abolished, some leaders in the Central Government argued that this meant the severance of Russian connection with the Chinese Communists, and steps could safely be taken to liquidate them as an independent movement. So the troops blockading the Communists were apparently strengthened, though that has been denied, and it is believed that the Communists were presented with terms. They had to join Central China and put their army under Chiang or disband it. They either had to become a minority party, or accept membership in the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang is the single party which rules China today and does it with the trappings of a secret police, a youth movement, and the successful elimination of most civil rights. The Communists are believed to have rejected the terms. If they turn their army over to the Central Government they lose their identity. If they lose their identity they lose their cause, and abandon hope of introducing their social and agrarian reforms in all China. And they do not believe that as a minority party they would be allowed to exist. From their point of view, they are just as logical as the Central Government. And there is little that outsiders have been able to suggest as a solution of the problem. If the Communists were to come into Central China and serve as a minority and opposition party they would have to have a guarantee that they were to be allowed to function. But the only convincing guarantee that Chiang could give them would be to show some interest in their reforms. He might introduce some of them. But that is out of the question, because Chiang Kai-shek derives most of his power from the very landlord class which the Communists are seeking to dethrone. His power is from these great owners, and from militarists and bureaucrats in sympathy with them. So whatever Chiang may feel about the reforms, he would be powerless to institute them.

As to Chiang himself, it used to be thought that he was sympathetic with the reforms, and that he looked forward to the introduction of true democracy after the war, which obviously would bring reforms in its train. Democracy is the end goal of the Yat-sen policy to which Chiang is committed. But doubts have been raised as to Chiang's own views. He has recently published a book on

foreign and domestic policy [1] which now becomes the official guide and textbook for Kuomintang, a kind of bible of Chinese policy.

It has not been translated into English, as Chiang decided not to permit it to be translated. In spirit it is an antiforeign book. It also is anti-imperialist, and it lays down the principle that China itself will not pursue an imperialist policy. But it does not much differentiate between American policy and imperialism, and it is not friendly to the tenets of Western liberalism.

On the subject of Democracy, Chiang writes that there can be other types of it than the Western kind, and states that the destiny of China rests with the Kuomintang. In other words, while there can be other factions in theory, China will keep the one-party system, continuing its youth movement, and presumably its rigid controls. There is no mention in the book of land reforms. So there is no basis in this doctrine on which to build hopes for what we should consider a democratic movement in which the agrarian radicals would have some political weight. The news that the Central Government is not going to use force against the Communists is, as the Times correspondent pointed out, of the highest importance. It means that China will not be engulfed in a civil war at once. But it also is clear that this simply postpones a crisis for which no solution appears available. While it is undeniable that this is an internal affair of the Chinese it is not one that China's allies can ignore, while the war is in progress. Nor will this country be able to ignore it after the war is over. The Chinese people have all the sympathy of this country, and deserve it all. They will need American loans and equipment after the war. Their place as a power and their leadership for stability and development must be assured. So long as the United States has Pacific responsibilities what happens in China will affect us, and hence interest us. And though it is important news that force is not going to be used against the Eighth Route Army, one can only wish that the crisis might have a constructive solution, not merely a postponement.

Senator EASTLAND. You may be excused and the hearing is closed.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., the hearing was closed, subject to call.)

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[1] "China's Destiny," not to be confused with "Resistance and Reconstruction" recently published in this country by Harpers. "China's Destiny" is published only in Chinese, and is reported to have already sold over a million copies in China. It is virtually impossible to obtain a copy in this country.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:45 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland and Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter?

TESTIMONY OF JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN, BERKELEY, CALIF.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Julian R. Friedman, 2466 Hilgard Avenue, Berkeley, Calif.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. At the present moment I am a lecturer in political science in the department of political science, University of California.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a full time job?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No; it is a three-fourths time job at the present time, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your salary?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am receiving for this term—I have just started as of January 1952—about $1,700, $1,680.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your age, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am 31 years old.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that the witness has been sworn in executive session.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been sworn. You understand that.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yesterday; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Friedman, were you ever an employee of the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I was an employee of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. What position or positions did you hold at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In September 1943, I was employed by the State Department as a junior professional assistant in what was then the Office of the Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs. Subsequently that office became the Division of Labor Relations, and I believe, while I was still there, the Division of International Labor, Health, and Social Affairs.

I remained in the Division until, officially, November 20, 1944, when I was appointed Divisional Assistant in the Division of Chinese Affairs.

At the time I left the Division of Labor Relations, I was then the assistant to the Chief, with the rating of P–2, transferred to the Division of Chinese Affairs also with the rating of P–2. I was in the Division of Chinese Affairs until my assignment, my appointment, to the Foreign Service Auxiliary, which was officially made, I believe, on October 5, 1945.

In the period in which I was a member of the Division of Chinese Affairs, I was officially assigned to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco from, I believe, April 18, until July 1, 1945, and served on the Internatonal Secretariat as the Assistant Secretary of Committee 2, Commission 1.

Mr. Morris. That is, you were assigned by the State Department to the International Secretariat for the United Nations Conference?

Mr. Friedman. I was made available to the Secretariat.

Mr. Sourwine. What is the difference between "made available" and "assigned"? You used the term "made available."

Mr. Friedman. The specific difference, I think, is that the International Secretariat was not an American Secretariat but an international one, for which several governments made personnel available.

Mr. Sourwine. Were you required to go there? Was that a part of your duties?

Mr. Friedman. When I was assigned and accepted, it was part of my duties; yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. A part of your duties for the State Department?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir. At the assignment to the International Secretariat, my duties were entirely for the International Secretariat.

Mr. Sourwine. Did the State Department pay you during that time?

Mr. Friedman. I believe the State Department did. Yes; I believe the arrangement was that each government would pay the personnel which it made available to the International Secretariat. I am not quite sure on that point, but I think I am correct.

Mr. Sourwine. Is it your judgment that during that period of time you owed no allegiance to the State Department which was paying you, but you did owe allegiance to the International Secretariat?

Mr. Friedman. I believe I owed allegiance or loyalty for the duration of the conference to the International Secretariat, that I would perform my duties as an international civil servant for that period.

Senator Ferguson. Was this before the Charter had been approved by the Congress?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. How could you, as an employee of the United States Government, the State Department, accept employment from an international organization without a transfer over to them?

Mr. Friedman. To the international organization? I am not sure of the details under which the arrangement was made. I know I was one of several persons from the State Department, which the State Department made available to the conference. I am certainly not familiar——

Senator FERGUSON. You were not, then, when you were on that conference out at San Francisco, working for the United States Government. You felt that your duty was to a foreign organization, an international organization?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Excuse me, sir. Not a foreign organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, at least foreign to the United States, because it was international.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, it was international in the sense that the United States was also a participant and a principal participant and the host at San Francisco. I should make that clear, that the United States Government was the host to the conference.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how many of our employees were assigned to international organizations like that, out of San Francisco?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I cannot say specifically the number of persons, sir, but my impression was that the international conference probably was staffed, oh, with 95 percent Americans made available from the State Department and other agencies of the United States Government.

Senator FERGUSON. That was at least your understanding, that you were working for the international group.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. For the International Secretariat, to which the State Department provided part of the personnel; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after you left college did you go into Government?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I graduated from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Medford, Mass., in, I believe, June 1943, and entered the State Department in September 1943.

Senator FERGUSON. Just afterward?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. A few months, yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Friedman, were you assigned by the State Department to the Hot Springs Convention of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were sent there on official duty for the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what were your duties at Hot Springs?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. My principal duty was to serve as a reporter of committees of the conference, which was an international conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That was my principal duty; in addition to which I arranged, at the conference, a party, a social gathering, on behalf of some members of the American delegation, particularly Mr. John Carter Vincent, who was an American delegate to the conference; and subsequently, subsequent to the conference, I helped the Protocol Division of the State Department arrange a cocktail party or tea party for the delegates at Blair House.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire about that Blair House conference? Because we have been interested in that.

You were the person who helped the Protocol Division arrange it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that I helped make the arrangements; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were your duties in connection with those arrangements?

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall specifically. I think principally to inform the Protocol Department that it was desirable to have such a reception.

Mr. Sourwine. Wait a minute. That is a little different from helping them arrange it. That is bringing it about, isn't it?

Senator Eastland. Let him finish his answer.

Mr. Friedman. Thank you, Senator.

If I am not mistaken, the party was to be given on behalf of the Under Secretary, who was Mr. Joseph Grew at that time. Mr. Grew was the host.

The Protocol Department consulted the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, the Division of Chinese Affairs, as to the type of party that was wanted—the number of persons who might be expected.

Mr. Sourwine. You spoke of your duties in convincing the Protocol Department that such a party should be held.

Mr. Friedman. Not convincing the Protocol Department. It was decided in the Department that the Under Secretary should offer a party, since so many of the delegates to the conference were distinguished persons from many foreign countries.

Mr. Sourwine. How was that decided?

Mr. Friedman. That I don't know, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Who gave you your first instructions with regard to it?

Mr. Friedman. To the party?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall.

Mr. Sourwine. Did anyone ask you to go to protocol and tell them there should be such a party?

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall that, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you make the first contact with protocol about this party?

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall that either.

Mr. Sourwine. What was it that you had in mind a moment ago when you started to say something about telling protocol, or informing protocol, of the need for having such a party?

Mr. Friedman. That the Department had decided that such a party should be held—a party given by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Grew.

Senator Ferguson. You mean the State Department?

Mr. Friedman. The State Department; yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have anything to do with selecting the list of guests for that party?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you know that that party had been suggested initially by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall whether the institute took the initiative. I don't quite recall the details for arranging that affair. The point was that there were so many distinguished guests in Washington that it seemed to be one of the desirable duties of the Under Secretary to entertain them following the institute's conference. I am not sure whether the arrangements were made or proposed by the institute. I am not sure whether they were proposed before the conference was over or subsequent to the conference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that the institute had anything to do with it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Since the party was for delegates to the international conference, I presume that the institute itself was consulted.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked what you know, Mr. Friedman.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't know specifically.

Mr. SOURWINE. You vouchsafed the information here that you had assisted in preparing for that party.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, will you tell us anything about what you did, what your duties were, in connection with that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, as I say, specifically my duties were at that time in connection with the Protocol Department, informing them of the number of guests, the type of party that was desired.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do that on behalf of Mr. John Carter Vincent? Was he your chief then?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He was my chief at that time; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spoke in his name when you made those arrangements?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am not sure that I did, sir. I am not sure whether I spoke directly in his name.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got your authority by virtue of your position in his Division, did you not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. My authority was my State Department contract. I was a member of his Division. And this Division was interested in this party at Blair House.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever tell anybody you were a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I don't believe I have told anyone.

Senator EASTLAND. You don't believe you did. Do you not know?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am quite certain I did not, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Quite certain?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, why is there a little question in your mind, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, since——

Senator EASTLAND. Now, do not hesitate. You can answer the question without hesitating. You have been making a good witness.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have just been on the cautious side, since in a sense over the past years I have spoken to people, and as I say I am almost certain that I have never told anyone that I was a member of the Communist Party. I am almost prepared to say that I never told anyone I was a member of the Communist Party.

Senator EASTLAND. Almost prepared?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You know, his question did not say "a member of the Communist Party."

Senator EASTLAND. No.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am taking that to mean, sir, a member of the Communist Party.

Senator EASTLAND. Why is there a question in your mind about whether you told people you were a Communist or not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Just on the cautious side, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Cautious, why? Because you might have?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I have, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. But you are cautious because you might have told somebody you were a Communist. Then if you specifically denied it, you would be guilty of perjury; was that your reason?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I just want to be accurate and provide the information that the committee is seeking.

Senator EASTLAND. Go ahead.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last assignment with the State Department, Mr. Friedman? We left you at the United Nations Secretariat, did we not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. After that what were your duties with the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. When I returned from San Francisco I remained with the Department until my appointment to the Foreign Service or Auxiliary, which I believe I said was October 1945.

I went to Shanghai as a junior economic officer assigned to the American consulate general in Shanghai, to perform the duties of a labor attaché in China. And I remained in that post from October 1945, or perhaps it was November 1 by the time I got started, until my return to the United States, which was when I departed from Shanghai in November 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, what was your next employment after that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. From February 1947, when I landed, reached the United States from China—I took a slow boat from China on the way back—I remained in the New York area. I visited Harvard University. I visited Johns Hopkins University, to lecture on China. I visited Washington, D. C., to lecture at a local meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was unemployed for——

Senator EASTLAND. Had you been connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations in any way?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I had been a member of the institute following the conference in 1945, Senator.

I believe I took out my membership about January 1945 or February 1945.

Senator EASTLAND. Why?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Why did I take it out?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. Why did you join the institute?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I must say that my experience at Hot Springs impressed me with two things—its international nature, and secondly, the high level of discussion and material which was identified with it.

Senator EASTLAND. And it was a fact that the institute was influential with the State Department. That was a factor?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; that did not come into it, as I recall. I also wanted to get the publications of the institute, which I believe required taking out some form of membership.

Senator EASTLAND. But while it did not influence you in joining, you also knew that the institute was very influential with the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Influential in what sense, Senator?

In respect of what?

Senator EASTLAND. Policies and personnel.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I did not know that the institute was influential with reference to policy and I certainly did not know that the institute, as you suggest, was influential in respect of personnel.

Senator EASTLAND. Then, if they were not influential, why did the Department assign you to Hot Springs?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Since the Institute of Pacific Relations has, over the I believe past 20 or 25 years—I am not sure of the exact length of time—held international conferences, the United States was the host country in this case, and the institute wanted to have a representative of the American delegation, and it wanted, I believe, to provide the American delegation with an opportunity of sending observers who were neither delegates——

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. Now, what other private organizations did the State Department assign personnel to, to cover their conferences?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In this matter, sir? That is, personnel to serve on the Secretariat?

Senator EASTLAND. Just like you were assigned to Hot Springs.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't know, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, as a matter of fact, no other organization. Is that not right?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am not familiar with whether the Department had a policy in this respect. All I know is in a sense my own empirical experience.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you not think that the institute was influential with the State Department, and, in fact, that it is demonstrated that it is, when you, as an employee of the State Department were assigned to that conference? Now, you want to be fair about this thing.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, let me put it this way: This was one of the international meetings which I mentioned. These were international meetings in which personnel of the first eminence attended.

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. I understand all that. Now, answer my question, "Yes" or "No," and then you can explain.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Could I have the question again, please?

Senator EASTLAND. Do you not think that, by virtue of the fact that you, an employee of the State Department, were assigned to that conference at Hot Springs, Va., it showed that the institute was influential with the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would say that I just can't answer "Yes" or "No," Senator, to that.

Senator EASTLAND. You can answer "Yes" or "No" and then explain your answer.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would say "No," sir; it did not show that the institute was influential with the State Department.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, you answer is "No," then.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I explain my answer, sir?

Senator EASTLAND. After you answer it, I am going to let you explain.

Now, what is your answer?—"Yes," or "No"?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The answer is "No," Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. All right. Now explain.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not believe that the institute was influential with the State Department in respect of policy or personnel; that

the Department considered the conference in Hot Springs in 1945 of sufficient significance to make available personnel when the Institute of Pacific Relations made it known that personnel would be welcomed.

Senator EASTLAND. All right; now you say, in regard to policy and personnel, that the institute was not influential with the State Department. That is your answer; is it not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. All right; and in what respect was the institute influential with the State Department? You limited your answer to two things: that they were not influential in policy and personnel.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I took the two points that you had mentioned before, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I should say that the institute, to my knowledge, was not influential in any other respect as far as the State Department was concerned.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when you lectured at John Hopkins University, with whom did you negotiate to carry on that lecture?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. With Mr. Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time, you were unemployed?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I was unemployed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever get any compensation for that lecture?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe not, sir; no, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. What was your next employment, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. My next employment was the London School of Economics of the University of London.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you there?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Which began in January 1948. If I may just fill in the period——

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In September 1947, I went abroad to be a graduate student at the London School of Economics. I arrived in London, in September, registered for courses at the school, and in January there was a vacancy of an assistant lecturer in the field of colonial social science. I was appointed to the lectureship after appearing before a selection board of distinguished British scholars.

I was appointed to the assistant lectureship, and then subsequently, I think in October 1950, after serving in the assistant lectureship, I was appointed a lecturer in colonial administration at the London School of Economics.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when did you become active in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have never been active in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy; although I have written a piece for its publication and I have spoken on the public platform, where I believe the sponsor of the meeting was the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at the time that that was a Communist organization?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not know at the time that that was a Communist organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recognize it as such now?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have not had contact with that organization, if I recall, for about 3 to 4½ years, and I could not answer that question. I just have no opinion on whether it is or it is not.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, with whom did you speak when you spoke under the auspices of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, now, if I may just refresh my memory: On March 6, 1947, I spoke on the platform, or I should say under the auspices of the committee, with a speaker named Mr. Chu Tong. C-h-u T-o-n-g.

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry. I didn't hear you, Mr. Friedman.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chu Tong was the other speaker that day.

Mr. MORRIS. He is a Communist; is he not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. He is now in Red China; is he not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the transcript of our public hearing, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. With reference to what, sir?

Mr. MORRIS. This Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have gone over the transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you notice our exhibit 8, which is a letter from the Communist Party of New York State, signed "May Miller, Assistant Organizing Secretary," which ends up in the last paragraph [reading]:

> Any inquiries in relation to further activity can be received by writing to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy at 111 East Forty-second Street, New York City.
>
> Comradely yours.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I look at that?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means. I am asking you if you had read that. That is bearing on your present knowledge as to whether it was a Communist organization, at this time.

Mr. Mandel, we have put in your citation that this organization has been listed by the Attorney General; have we not?

Mr. MANDEL. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy was cited as subversive by Attorney General Tom Clark on April 27, 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever inquire as to whether any of these organizations were Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. You are referring to the organization, the Committee for a Democratic——

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; the organization that you were joining and speaking for.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I did not inquire whether this was a Communist organization when I was speaking for the organization or writing for its publication in 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. You never made an inquiry?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an economist by profession?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am a political scientist by profession.

Senator FERGUSON. You are a political scientist. And you are well acquainted with communism?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I won't say "well acquainted," sir. I am familiar with some of the writings in the field.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, can you recognize communism when you see it or hear it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I could recognize a Communist point of view if I heard it spoken, or I probably could recognize communism by looking at a book; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the question was, then: When you were speaking at this organization, did you know it was Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not, sir; no, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you receive into the record the guest column of the Spotlight on the Far East, which is a publication of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, dated April 1947, a guest column entitled "China's Unions Refuse To Be Puppets," by Julian Friedman.

That is your article; is it not, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you receive that, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will receive it.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 740" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 740

[Source: Spotlight on the Far East, published by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, vol. II, No. 4, April 1947]

CHINA'S UNIONS REFUSE TO BE PUPPETS

(By Julian Friedman)

(For the past two years the author was United States labor attaché in China. He became personally acquainted with all ranks of trade-unionists and speaks with authority on the Chinese labor movement.)

Genuine trade-unionists are not easy to find in Kuomintang China. To reach them, you have to visit obscure, innocent-looking alleys or out-of-the-way fields in the suburbs of the cities.

But it is most dangerous for them to be known as trade-unionists or to work openly for real trade-unionism.

The Chiang Kai-shek government is absolutely opposed to trade-unionism because it means democracy, a menace to Chiang's plutocracy. Genuine trade-unionists are certainly opposed to the present anti-labor National Government.

Many were originally either company-union or Kuomintang headquarters' appointees. There were also secret-society agents and gangsters in labor roles. The latter are quickly exposed today by the workers themselves.

As for the company-union and bureaucratic-union officials, the workers have given them every opportunity to work for the real trade-union movement. So they now face this dilemma: serve as Kuomintang stooges and "finks" and lose support among the workers or fight with the workers and be attacked by the fascists.

That several have chosen the latter course has enraged the National Government and Kuomintang, which has retaliated with arrests, threats of violence, expulsion from official labor circles, purging of official unions, and reorganizing them.

Nothing illustrates the change in labor so aptly as the Shanghai anti-civil-war demonstration of June 23, 1946. On the day before, the government had called official trade-union representatives to a meeting and dictated resolutions which said that no workers or unions would participate in the demonstration, and that any persons in the demonstration could not be considered workers. The resolutions were "unanimously adopted" because the government chairman said so, with no one else given a chance to speak. But more than 100,000 workers turned out the next day. And the representatives who had "passed" the resolutions the previous day marched at their head.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read Herbert Philbrick's book, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not read the entire book.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read that that portion which pertains to you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I looked at the index and saw my name there, and turned to that portion of the book where my name appears, and Mr. Philbrick says I spoke on the public platform, if I recall it, of the Twentieth Century Association, which he describes as a traditional liberal organization of Boston; that I spoke with Mr. Lewis Lyon, the curate of the Nieman Foundation, I believe formerly editor of the Boston Globe, who was chairman of the meeting, and I believe the other speaker was Mr. Philip Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did he say who arranged that meeting?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I knew that the meeting had been arranged at the request of the Boston committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Not who asked you, but who made the arrangements for you to go up there and speak.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was in Boston at the time, or, rather, I should say that I was planning to go up to Harvard in Cambridge at the time. I think these plans of mine were known by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, and that they asked me would I be available as a speaker, and I believe Rev. Stephen Fritchman, of the Unitarian Service Committee in Boston, actually sent me the invitation.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with Senator Eastland's question, have you ever told anybody that you were a member of the Communist Party?

I am asking you if you were associated in any way with the arbitration proceeding of Betty Levin.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There are two questions? Or just one question?

Mr. MORRIS. One question is: Are you acquainted with the arbitration proceedings of Betty Levin?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I am acquainted with the arbitration proceedings of Betty Levin.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give us a little background material on that subject, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. My recollection of the testimony is that you were acting behind the scenes in that arbitration.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mrs. Levin testified?

Mr. MORRIS. No; Mrs. Widener, a witness before this committee, has testified that you were active behind the scenes in the arbitration proceedings of Betty Levin.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I just read Mrs. Widener's statement? She does not quite say that.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means. I am just asking your recollection of the episode.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mrs. Widener contended that she made some inquiries about my participation in these proceedings, and she first went to a Miss Sarah Hodgekinson, a friend of hers, employed, so the record says, by the State Department's Mission at the United Nations, and Miss Hodgekinson referred Mrs. Widener to a reporter, who eventually referred her to Mr. Frederick Woltman, of the New York World-Telegram.

Mr. Morris. Yes. Now, Mr. Friedman, I do not want to go into that with too much detail. I just want to know what your connection was. I just made general reference. I think she said you were working behind the scenes on it.

Mr. Friedman. May I say she is quoting Mr. Frederick Woltman.

Mr. Morris. No; she is not.

Mr. Sourwine. Counsel and the witness need not argue about what is in the record.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You just answer his question.

Mr. Morris. What was your activity with the arbitration proceeding about Betty Levin?

Mr. Friedman. I became aware of this case through two sources. The first source, I believe, was the New York press. And this was some time after I had returned from China, was in the United States, and clearly after the case had gone to arbitration.

Mr. Morris. Now, what did you learn from the New York press, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. Friedman. I learned of the existence of the arbitration.

Mr. Morris. What was the problem there? Tell us what the problem is, Mr. Friedman.

Mr. Friedman. May I finish, Mr. Morris? I would like to be helpful in this case.

Mr. Morris. Go ahead.

Mr. Friedman. The thing that caught my eye about the reports of the case was references to a number of books on China, if I recall correctly, and also references to an organization called the China Aid Council. And I believe—I am not sure whether this was in the press—the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. Morris. And you had been connected with all of those things?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir. If I may explain chronologically——

Mr. Morris. It is all right to explain that, Mr. Friedman, but I think there is a chairman here, and some Senators.

Senator Ferguson. We want to get along as fast as we can.

Mr. Morris. Not only that, but we also would like to know what the case was about. You haven't told us that, Mr. Friedman.

Mr. Friedman. If I may tell how I came into the case, since it is really, Senator, not my full knowledge of the entire case that I can give——

Senator Ferguson. How did you get into it? Answer that question.

Mr. Friedman. I volunteered my services, because I was interested in the issues, and I approached the counsel for the union in this case.

Mr. Morris. What was that counsel?

Mr. Friedman. The firm was the New York law firm of Boudin, Glickstein, and Cohen. I am not quite sure if that is the right name, but I know that the Boudin name is identified with it.

Mr. Morris. What was the union involved?

Mr. Friedman. The union involved, if I may read from the arbitrator's award, was the Social Service Employees Union, Local 19, United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO.

Mr. Morris. That has been expelled by the CIO as a Communist-controlled union, has it not?

Mr. Friedman. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Morris. Proceed. Tell me this, Mr. Friedman. Was not the issue in that case whether or not Betty Levin had been putting books

into the council library, the subject council library, in such a way as to cause a certain partisan interpretation, a partisan atmosphere, to the whole library?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe it was the library, Mr. Morris.

I believe that what was involved in the case were book lists which she made up in the course of her educational work on behalf of the national council.

Mr. MORRIS. That's right. What came to your attention were books that you had been acquainted with from your own experience in China and in the State Department; is that correct?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, although I had to look over one or two of the books at the time, since I was not too familiar with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, tell me this, Mr. Friedman. You were acquainted with those books, were you not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was acquainted with almost all of the China books.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the books?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, if I may read the list of books:

Red Star Over China, by Mr. Edgar Snow
The Good Earth, by Pearl Buck
Man's Fate, by Andre Malraux
The Challenge of Red China, by Gunther Stein
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore
Battle Hymn of China, by Agnes Smedley
Report from Red China, by Harrison Forman
Shark Fins and Millet, by Ilona Ralph Sues

And the other book is Village in August by T'ien Chun.

These are the books on China.

Mr. MORRIS. You said you had recognized those books. Where had you seen those books before?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I had seen these books in book shops and libraries. I have read some of these books, because I possessed them.

Mr. MORRIS. You had read them, and you were acquainted with them.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I had read most of them, and at the time of the arbitration proceeding, I was not familiar, not fully familiar, with the book called Village in August, which was a novel; and I do not believe it was one of the books on which I had to comment.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell me further about the books. Now, had you used those books when you were in the State Department, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think that I had read these books in the course of my preparation—at least those which were available at the time I was in the State Department—read them in the course of my preparation for the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they general background reading for the State Department people?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; these were books which were generally available, which one wanting to find out something about China could read.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they anti-Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. These books, sir? I don't think I can answer that question, Senator, because I don't think that one can—at least, an academic man with intellectual honesty cannot simply say whether a book is pro- or anti-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you tell us whether any of them were anti-Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. This is purely opinion you are asking for, but I believe Mr. Lattimore's Solution in Asia might be classified as an anti-Communist book, although I would not want to say that any of these books were essentially anti-Communist or pro-Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you think the Communist book stores would sell an anti-Communist book?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't know the selling policies of Communist book stores, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know there is now testimony that these books were recommended as the party line and sold in Communist book stores?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have not seen that testimony.

Senator EASTLAND. The testimony was stronger than that: that the employees were instructed by the party to recommend these books to party members as a Communist program.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman, do you remember what you testified in executive session with regard to the book, Shark Fins and Millet, by Ilona Ralph Sues?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I believe I said that this book was critical, particularly critical, of Nationalist China.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not what you said, but is that a fact? Was it particularly critical of Nationalist China?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, may I go into that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Just answer the question, yes or no.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I would say it was particularly critical of one important section of Nationalist China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it procoalition Government?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. If I recall correctly, I believe that was the general tendency of the book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it proradical reform in China?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, what I would call radical reform.

Mr. SOURWINE. You testified to that effect in executive session, did you not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you want to say the book is not pro-Communist.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir. I would not say that this book is necessarily pro-Communist, any more than I would like to say any of the books are pro- or anti-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was certainly pro the Chinese Communists, was it not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am just trying to remember the book. I haven't looked at it in a long time. I came to this book for a rather special interest at the time I was employed by the State Department. May I explain that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, if you can do it in a few sentences.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. All right. Fine.

This book has an unusual description of Miss Sues' meeting with a very famous Chinese Nationalist leader closely identified with the Generalissimo. And that is a Mr. Tu Yueh-Sen, and also identified with Mr. Tu Yueh-Sen was Mr. Chu Sueh-Fan, the Chinese Association of Labor Chairman, a person who, in my official duties, as labor attaché, I would have to meet. And consequently this was one

of the books on which I got, you might call it, personality data on Chinese labor officials and a brief description of Chinese labor association.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember testifying in executive session that Miss Sues was friendly to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I did say that, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you mean her personally? Or her book?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would say personally, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know her personally?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have met Miss Sues in connection with the book.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Have you read her testimony before this committee that she was a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall it, sir. If it is in the first five volumes, I perhaps have read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Friedman, when did you first meet Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I met Owen Lattimore some time in November or December 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you meet him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I met him, I believe, in the State Department building.

Mr. MORRIS. In whose office?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe it was the office of Mr. John Carter Vincent, the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing there?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall—no, I don't even know the purpose of Mr. Lattimore's visit. I do know Mr. Vincent informed me that Mr. Lattimore was coming into the Department, and that I might meet him on that occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you look forward to that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I certainly did, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you show him any State Department papers at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I showed him, if I recall correctly, a memorandum, a background memorandum, which I was preparing on the subject of Sinkiang, this far western province of China, which was at that time going through some troubles.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Chairman, may I get back to that arbitration proceeding?

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask one question about this memorandum, first?

By "background memorandum," do you mean a memorandum covering the available information about Mr. T'ien Chun?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. This was a memorandum that summarized the available information.

Mr. SOURWINE. That summarized the available information about T'ien Chun?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, within, I believe, about a page or page and a quarter, which was a space assigned to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You got all the available information about T'ien Chun summarized in a page or a page and a quarter?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. As far as I could, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He told you it was a good job you had done?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, Senator. And as I recall, I was rather pleased at this, that Mr. Lattimore, who was a recognized authority in the field of inner Asia, thought that I had done a good job.

Senator FERGUSON. And you let him read it, and he approved it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did let him read it, and Mr. Vincent knew that Mr. Lattimore was reading the memorandum.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Friedman, did you aid Betty Levin in her arbitration difficulty?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I appeared in the arbitration proceedings as an expert witness, put on the stand by the union of which Miss Levin was a member. And I was on the stand, on the scene, on the record, in front of Mr. James Lawrence Fly, who was the arbitrator, and I was cross-examined, answered questions on books put forward to me by the counsel for the National Council of Jewish Women.

Mr. MORRIS. With whom in particular in that union did you carry on negotiations prior to testifying in that proceeding?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The only person I carried on negotiations with, if you want to use that term, the person in a sense who suggested I might appear as an expert witness, was the attorney for the union, Mr. Boudin.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you meet any union officials?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The only union official I can remember meeting then was Mr. Bernard Siegel; my dealings in respect of the case were entirely with the lawyer for Miss Levin and the union.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, did you testify about the books that you have just mentioned?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was asked to testify to the best of my knowledge, having recently returned from China, on the accuracy and the content of the books. That was my principal service, to read, go over these books, and to make known whether I thought the books portrayed the situation to the extent that I knew it accurately, and whether the books represented in that sense competent work.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any question in that case as to communism?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That was not the particular issue, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it an issue at all?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. Generally speaking; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That she was a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not believe I heard that charged.

Senator FERGUSON. Or pro-Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The reference of "pro-Communist" certainly appears in the case; yes, sir. And the arbitrator himself points out that there was a bias in the book list, or a lack, certainly, of nonpartisanship.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you point that out when you testified about the books?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think that the principal part of my testimony concerned the content of the books, the accuracy in terms of the scene that I was familiar with. I recall vaguely being asked whether any of the books were pro-Communist or anti-Communist. I also recall that I believe it was the counsel for the National Council of Jewish Women—that would be Mr. Jesse Friedon—asked me whether I thought the books taken together would be pro or anti; and I remember that I was also asked, I believe by the arbitrator, although I don't

recall whether it was the arbitrator of Mr. Boudin or Mr. Friedon, whether I could make up a list of books, could recommend a list of books which would be pro-Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you run down now?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Have I run down now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you answer the question now, please?

Did you in your testimony point out to anybody that these books had bias?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not recall whether I pointed that out, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why didn't you say that in the first place, instead of going on here for 3 minutes with stuff that had nothing to do with the question? You are fencing with this committee, sir, and you are wasting the committee's time.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir. I apologize to the chairman if he feels that I am fencing with the committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us try and keep it on the track and answer the questions directly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, one of those books was definitely pro-Communist, wasn't it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. One of the books on the list could be taken as pro-Communist, but I still would prefer to refrain from "pro" or "anti."

Mr. SOURWINE. Which one?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The one book in my estimation you could consider pro-Communist was probably Battle Hymn of China by Agnes Smedley.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, regardless of what you said here this morning about not characterizing anything as pro-Communist, you did characterize that book as pro-Communist in the executive session, didn't you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Voluntarily, sir, in reply to questions put to me. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, if you were not acquainted with communism any more than you indicate this morning, how could you be an expert on these books?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I testified on the books, sir, to the extent of my own experiences and my preparation reading on the subject. I did not put myself forward as the only authority, as a supreme expert.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were asked to testify as an expert?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was asked to testify as an expert; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore, you had to read the books to find out.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. I am familiar with almost all of these books. The ones which I do not believe I had to testify one were the novels, sir. I may be mistaken on failing to recall that accurately, but I believe it was essentially the books with which I was most familiar by actual experience.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, now, has anyone told you that Betty Levin is a Communist, is or was a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have heard second hand that Miss Levin was a Communist. And that was only recently.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, had anyone told you at that time, or had you any reason to believe at that time, that Betty Levin was a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not recall that anyone told me at that time that Miss Levin was a Communist, and I had no reason to believe at that time that she was a member of the Communist Party or a Communist in the sense of being a Marxist. All I knew at that particular time—I did not know Miss Levin when I came into the affair. The proceedings were already under way, and my relations were principally with Miss Levin's attorney, Mr. Boudin.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask the counsel as to whether or not his client was a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask anyone?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not believe so; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went in there to testify as an expert on these books, and you made no inquiry as to whether or not the person was a Communist that you were in effect defending?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In effect, sir, I wanted to stick to the books and not to participate in the larger issues of the proceeding.

Senator FERGUSON. Sure. The larger issue was whether or not she was a Communist, whether she was putting out Communist propaganda. And you did not want to know about that. You just wanted to go in and testify as an expert on the propaganda.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. On the books. Excuse me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you inquire from any Communist as to whether these books were pro-Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I did not. The opinions that I gave the arbitrator were my own opinions, based on knowledge of the books and knowledge of the areas which these books dealt with.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you indicate at that time that you thought Agnes Smedley's book was pro-Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that at the request of the arbitrator, in saying which books I would include if a pro-Communist list were being made up, I believe I included Miss Smedley's book; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. How does that answer the question? In other words, you did indicate at that time that you thought it was pro-Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That it would fit in with a list of pro-Communist books; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But the others you said would not fit in with such a list.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that was my testimony, yes, sir. I do not recall it in detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you written anything under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, I have written something under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a chapter or supplement, rather, on Labor in Nationalist China, 1945–48, and this appears in a larger publication of the institute called Notes on Labor in Nationalist China.

Mr. MORRIS. Who compiled those notes?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The notes, I believe, were originally compiled by a Chinese writer, but written up in this country, I believe, or written up anyway and published under the name of Mr. Israel Epstein.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would have reason to believe he is pro-Communist sir. I do not know whether he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe you told me yesterday he was in Peiping.

Mr. MORRIS. I didn't tell you that yesterday.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe it was suggested to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he is in Peiping?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe he is in Peiping.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any other information, other than the information you think you got last night?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I believe I saw an article of his in a Chinese publication. Not China Today; an English language Chinese publication which Mr. Epstein has written recently.

Mr. SOURWINE. What publication?

Mr. MORRIS. Was it China Monthly?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. China Review?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this a paper published in Communist China that you are talking about?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe it is published either in Communist China or Hong Kong. It used to be published in Hong Kong.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you read it regularly?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Didn't you testify in executive session that you discovered, you thought, that Israel Epstein was a Communist when you heard about his departure for Peiping?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I believe I may have testified to that effect.

Mr. MORRIS. You did know he left for Peiping, then, at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you hear that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I heard—now, how did I hear this? I am not quite sure how I learned that Mr. Epstein had left for Peiping. I believe I heard while I was still in London, but I am not quite sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Did some Communist tell you that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't know, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how was it that you happened to collaborate with Israel Epstein in this writing project for the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not collaborate with Mr. Epstein in this project. I was invited by Mr. William Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations, invited in 1948, to write an introduction to this study of Chinese labor, which Mr. Epstein was preparing under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I agreed to write the introduction, and then subsequently was informed by Mr. Holland that he preferred to have a supplement covering the period in which I was in China and the events immediately following. In writing to Mr. Holland, I agreed to receive Mr. Epstein's manuscript, and read over the manuscript, and I replied with criticism of the manuscript. And it was on that basis that I did write the supplement, and I believe it was eventually published some time in 1949. Or I should say mineographed. It was not published in ordinary book form.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you ever met Israel Epstein at the time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I had met Mr. Epstein on one or two occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Where had you met him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I met him first of all—I may again be mistaken—in connection with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. And I dined with Mr. Epstein at his home in Staten Island some time in 1947, at a time when he wanted to introduce me to a correspondent for the famous Chinese newspaper, the Dagoon Bow.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the correspondent?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe Miss Yang Gong.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is she now?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't know where Miss Yang Gong is now.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the Chinese writer who prepared the original notes which Mr. Israel Epstein converted into this particular book?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall at the moment. Perhaps Mr. Mandel would let me see, and I could read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Is People's China the name of the publication wherein you read that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; People's China is correct. It used to have another name.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you receive copies of that magazine?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Oh, I think one can buy it on newsstands in many places.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that how you get it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I do not subscribe to it.

Mr. MORRIS. In the October 16, 1951, issue of People's China, there is an article by Israel Epstein entitled "Return to New China."

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want to receive that?

Mr. MORRIS. I just want it noted.

Do you know Israel Epstein's wife, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I do know Mrs. Cholmeley.

Mr. MORRIS. How well do you know her?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I met her at the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, where she was employed, and I met her at her home. I may have met her on the occasion on which I spoke, under the auspices of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy in New York. And I saw her in London, England, in January, I believe January 1951. But I am not quite sure whether it was 1950 or 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you go to the offices of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall, sir. In this period of time, I was in New York City, and I may have dropped in frequently or infrequently. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that she is in Red China now?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know that definitely; no, sir. When I saw her in London, she informed me that she was returning to the United States, and I did not see her after that occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Israel Epstein connected with the Allied Labor News?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I believe that is the same Israel Epstein. And also Time magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you tell Mrs. Widener that you were active on behalf of Betty Levin in the arbitration proceeding?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. From what I can recall of the conversation in the company of Mrs. Widener on this evening, the date of which neither Mrs. Widener nor I seemed to remember, but which must have been

in April or May, 1947, some months after I was out of State Department employment—what I recall is that I probably did discuss the case. And that is particularly the relationship of the books.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you probably did.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Don't you have any clear recollection of that conversation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I do not, sir. This evening in question was of the least significance and importance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that you did talk to Mrs. Widener?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I could answer that, sir; no, and yes. She was not Mrs. Widener at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know the person that we are referring to when we ask that question, don't you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have reason to believe I know the person, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the person who is now Mrs. Alice Widener?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. If she was the former Mrs. Alice Berezhovsky, then I do know the person and met her one evening at the home of Mr. Clark Andrews, or rather Mrs. Clark Andrews, and I saw her some weeks later, I believe at the wedding of Mr. and Mrs. Andrews, at which she was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk to Mrs. Berezhovsky at the time of your meeting?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I remember that we did have conversation that evening; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anything about what you talked about?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not specifically; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you do not deny what she said.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do deny it, sir. I should deny it on the basis, sir, that had she said some of the things which she claims she said, had I said some of the things which she claims I said, I would certainly have remembered that evening.

May I add a word to that, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have asked Mr. Berezhovsky, who was subsequently divorced, a year or perhaps 2 years after this conversation which Mrs. Widener talked about. Mr. Berezhovsky informed me that in his memory he cannot recall any single time——

Mr. MORRIS. He was not there, was he?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Excuse me, Senator. He was present.

Mr. MORRIS. He was not there at that conversation.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He came to the home of Mrs. Andrews, at that time Mrs. Ullman—he came to pick up his wife and take her home. He had previously, as I recall, been at a concert, which he was either conducting or participating in. He came later in the evening, and I recall Mrs. Berezhovsky going home with Mr. Berezhovsky.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you quite sure about that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes I am, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are under oath here. There is no question in your mind about it. That much you remember clearly. The rest may be vague, but that much you remember clearly?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not only do I remember it to that extent, sir, but I have discussed this with Mr. Berezhovsky and with Mr. and Mrs. Andrews, and both, or all three of them, remember that Mr. Berezhovsky came later in the evening and left the house with Mrs. Berezhovsky.

Mr. SOURWINE. Oh, you have tried to refresh your memory about this incident, have you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. When I——

Mr. SOURWINE. Answer that "Yes" or "No."

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have done that since you have read testimony in these hearings about it, is that right?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, with all of your efforts to refresh your memory about this, you still can recall nothing about it other than what you have told us?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir, I have asked Mr. Andrews and Mrs. Andrews and Mr. Berezhovsky, who was present part of the evening, whether they could remember what was discussed.

The most they could tell me they remember was that in a sense politics was discussed, but that there were no references which Mrs. Berehovsky herself says were made that evening.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified a while ago that you could not recall whether you had mentioned the arbitration proceeding.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I said I believe I explained the arbitration proceeding.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that is what you said?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Excuse me, sir?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that is what you said, that you had explained the arbitration proceeding?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe the record will show that I was interrupted as I was explaining.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the record will show that you said you explained the arbitration proceeding to Mrs. Widener?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I explained to the persons in the room at the time what the arbitration proceeding was and why it was so interesting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mrs. Berezhovsky in the room at the time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe she was, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, when Mr. Morris asked you if you had told Mrs. Berezhovsky—using the name Widener; but you didn't make the claim that you didn't know who he meant—when he asked if you had told her about your connection with the arbitration proceedings, we had a great deal of difficulty getting the answer.

Now, the answer to that question is "Yes," then, isn't it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that I did tell her, yes, sir. But based on recollection, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But that is all you can recall about the conversation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. About that particular conversation, yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, have you read the testimony of Eugene Dooman before this committee?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever leak information from area committee meetings in the State Department to correspondents, left-wing correspondents?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I did not leak information to left-wing correspondents.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you leak it to any one?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir. The best of my recollection is I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, wait. You ought to have a recollection on that, if you leaked information out of a Department of Government. Did you leak any information to any one outside of Government?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Will you please define "leaked"?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give information that you were working on in Government, or obtained as an employee of Government, to people outside of Government?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I believe, sir, that I have discussed with a number of people matters which were matters of our foreign policy.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. But I do not remember specifically—in fact, I would say that specifically I did not leak information.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you and I are having difficulty, then, over the word "leak"; is that it? Did you give any pamphlets or any memorandums of any papers to anyone?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. In the course of my employment in the State Department, I have officially given out publications in the course of my duties. And in connection with one matter, and that is a study on Japan, I did make available some notes.

Senator FERGUSON. Some notes. And whom did you give those notes to?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Those notes were given to Lt. Andrew Roth.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now, you do not classify him as a left-wing correspondent?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Roth at that time was known to me only as a lieutenant in the United States Navy, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, what was a lieutenant in the United States Navy doing coming to you for notes on foreign policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. These were not notes on foreign policy, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. What were they on?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. These were notes on the history of the Japanese labor movement.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, what did Roth want with the notes on the Japanese labor movement?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Roth at that time had written but had not yet published a book entitled, "Dilemma in Japan," and he wanted to check, if I may continue just a moment, sir, the accuracy of his own material against the notes which I had.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was Government material.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Which was material—yes; which one I think would properly say was Government material. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, were we at war at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. We were, sir. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And this was material that you had obtained as an employee of the United States Government?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; this was information in my possession as an employee of the United States Government.

Senator FERGUSON. And you gave it to Lieutenant Roth?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. This was information which I had compiled on the history of the Japanese labor movement, mainly, if not all, from public sources, from the usual books on the subject. I had put it together, and Roth wanted to use the material.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were paid for your labor by the United States Government?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was in the employment of the United States Government at the time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And were paid for your work?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, did you ever give anybody else information?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. While I was employed by the Government?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Or did you take any away with you when you quit employment with the Government, and give it to them? You showed Mr. Lattimore this memorandum that you had prepared.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was work that you were working on.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give anything to Y. Y. Hsu?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you give to Hsu?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mr. Hsu had written to the Department to see if we could provide him with a map which could be used in his study on conditions, I believe social and economic conditions, in the liberated areas of China. And I replied by sending him a nonrestricted map which had come in from the Far East, and which he accepted, in exchange for which I believe he sent the Department first copies of his report.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, whom did you consult about turning this matter over?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall whether I consulted anyone specifically, sir. I probably took this act on my own.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you give Roth this information?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would say perhaps March—I am not quite sure—probably March or February 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was shortly after I met Mr. Roth.

Senator FERGUSON. And when was he prosecuted, or a case made against him? When was he arrested?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe he was arrested some time in June of '45.

Senator FERGUSON. And one of the things they arrested him for was the taking of information out of the State Department, or the obtaining of information out of the State Department; is that right?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall the exact charge, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of the Amerasia case?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. Of course, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew Roth was one of the parties in the Amerasia case?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had given him information out of the State Department in March of the same year that he was arrested?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In February or March the same year, I gave him some notes on Japanese labor history; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever give him any other papers?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not that I recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, try to recall.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am almost certain, sir, that I did not give Mr. Roth any other papers. In fact, Mr. Roth gave me some papers which were not official publications, but what he called information which he had gotten from outside sources and which I had passed on to Mr. Vincent.

Senator FERGUSON. You say you obtained that information from Roth out of the Navy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I do not believe this was naval information.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he in uniform at the time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I believe he was.

Mr. MORRIS. When we are talking about Y. Y. Hsu, did you know Y. Y. Hsu at the time you gave him that material?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Where had you met him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I first met Y. Y. Hsu through Miss Ilona Ralph Sues, at the time I was interested in this labor section of her book, which I described before. And then I subsequently, if I recall correctly, saw Mr. Hsu at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference at Hot Springs, and it was at that time that he raised the question of getting a suitable map for the publication which he was writing under the auspices of the institute, and I believe after that he wrote me at the Department asking if such a map were available or any maps were available which would be suitable, and we paid to him, sir, the same courtesy we paid to most scholars in the field, helping make available what was not restricted, and which would, in a sense, advance the cause of scholarship.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he was a Communist at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you acquainted with his Communist record at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe he is in Red China.

Senator FERGUSON. Another question. You were working for Mr. Vincent at the time these papers were given to Lieutenant Roth?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had a desk in Mr. Vincent's office?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. For part of the time, sir, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. For part of the time. At the time you gave these papers to Roth?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe so, no, sir. I am not sure at which time I had a desk in the same room as Mr. Vincent and at which time I was outside in the larger room.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Service?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, I met Mr. Service.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever give any information to Service?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The information that I must have given Mr. Service was official information of the State Department while he was on assignment to the Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. But he was working in your Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He was visiting our department at that time. He was on leave from China, if I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know one Philip Jaffe?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not know Mr. Philip Jaffe while I was in the service of the United States Government. I did meet Mr. Jaffe after I had left Government service.

Senator FERGUSON. And that was after the case against Jaffe?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Long after the case against Jaffe; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you ever give any other papers out, to anyone?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give any papers to Rose Yardumian?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I did give a paper to Rose Yardumian, again a nongovernmental paper, concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations, which—and I refreshed my memory on this—which I believe originated with Mr. Ullman, and was handed someone in the State Department, who in turn handed it on to me, and since it concerned the institute, I let Miss Yardumian have a copy for Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know if she has recently been in Red China?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe she either is in Red China or has been recently in Red China; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know her sister?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I have met her sister.

Mr. MORRIS. What is her first name?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Isabel.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was she married to?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. She is now Mrs. Stein, Mrs. Gunther Stein.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to now take up the investigation that the State Department made of leaks or papers going out of the Department.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall that investigation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, no sir; because I was never at any time interrogated by the Department officials on this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean to say that papers disappeared out of the office of Service and Vincent, and you were an employee there, and——

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was one of several employees.

Senator FERGUSON. But you were an employee?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And that no investigation was ever made by the State Department to ascertain how the papers might have got to Jaffe and Roth and Service—the papers in the Amerasia case?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. I do not recall any departmental investigation, but my answer to your question is that I was never at any time interrogated by the Department on this matter.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. That is what I am getting at. So, as an employee, at the time, and now telling us that you did give information to Roth, you tell us that the State Department never made an investigation in that office to your knowledge.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. To my knowledge, sir, the Department did not make an investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, they did not question you about leaks, and you had given a leak in March to Roth.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Excuse me, sir. That was not a leak.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Call it what you will. I am going to use the word "leak."

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think that fails to describe the situation, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. The record will show. You gave him information.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I gave him information on the history of the Japanese labor movement.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir. And you had prepared it, and it was Government property.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; as I was in the employ of the Government, it was Government property.

Senator FERGUSON. Sure. And it was in this office, and it was just a month or two or three before he was arrested for taking papers or having papers that were obtained in the Government.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And the State Department itself never made an investigation, to your knowledge, in that Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. To my knowledge, sir. May I add——

Senator FERGUSON. All right. But to your knowledge they never made an investigation.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. At least no one ever came to you and questioned you as to how he may have obtained those papers?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No one in the Department; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No one in the Department.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Friedman, did you know any correspondents for the following publications, anyone in Washington for the following publications: The New Republic?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. I believe after June 1945, I knew Miss Helen Fuller of the New Republic.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the Washington correspondent?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently did you see Miss Helen Fuller?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe I saw her more than two or three times between the time I met her and the time I departed for China in October 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have lunch with her?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall. I remember having a splendid dinner at the home of Mr. Uhl of PM, who was another correspondent whom I knew, and I believe only since June 1945, or around that period, perhaps before——

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have lunch with him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I cannot——

Senator FERGUSON. Knowing what you do know now, about the Amerasia case, are you not amazed that the State Department did not make an investigation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am not saying the State Department did not make an investigation, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never knew what they did?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I never knew that they made an investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not seem extremely strange that they would not ask you about the disappearance of papers or the fact that papers got out of the Government?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, sir, I think that perhaps one might answer this question with a bit more information.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, can you answer it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; that at the time of the arrest of the accused in the Amerasia case, I believe a number of officials in the State Department were interrogated by the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and at that time I was in San Francisco and spent a day or two providing information on the previous period to two agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I heard nothing after these 2 days of interrogation, until I read, in fact in the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the reply of Mr. Milton Ladd, the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who, in reply to a question, "Were there any other employees of the State Department involved in the removal of confidential documents that you know of," Mr. Ladd said, "No, sir." And this was after I had a discussion with special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Senator FERGUSON. But I mean the State Department itself did not come to you and ask.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Vincent never asked?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you tell Ladd what you had actually give to Jaffe?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not speak to Ladd, and I did not give anything to Jaffe, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or not Jaffe. To Roth.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. To Roth? Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not a witness in that case?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. One question, and I will finish my subject, Senator.

Did you meet the Daily Worker correspondent, Frederick V. Field, at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. To the best of my recollection that is where I met Mr. Frederick Field. It was in the press room of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you speak with him on that occasion?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't have the slightest recollection, but there were a number of pressmen there, and Mr. Field was one of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have just two questions, sir. They are both susceptible, I think, to very short answers.

When you came back from Great Britain, in 1951, did you bring with you a number of publications of the British Communist Party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I brought back from England a number of publications put out by several bodies, most of which were put out by the British Government. But also among the publications were those of British political parties, including the British Communist Party; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you give some of those to Mr. Jaffe?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. In the summer of 1951, I saw Mr. Jaffe. He was interested in the political situation in England. And I made available to him a number of these publications.

Senator FERGUSON. The Communist publications?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Communist and non-Communist; yes, sir, including the debates of the House of Commons.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jaffe was primarily interested in what he thought were changes in the Communist line of the British Communist Party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That was one of the things Mr. Jaffe was interested in. He was also interested at that time in the background of the so-called Bevanite or Bevanism movement in the British Labor Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you knew specifically that he was interested in the changes in the Communist line of the British Communist Party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Of the British Communist Party; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you gave him these documents because of his interest in that connection?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess now until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., this same day.)

AFTER RECESS

Senator WATKINS (presiding). The committee will resume session. Mr. Morris, have you a witness to be sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Friedman has been sworn and we are well into our testimony, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. If he has been sworn, then, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. At the termination of today's testimony, you stated that you had met Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who was acting as a Daily Worker correspondent at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in 1945.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Frederick Field on any other occasion after that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe, Mr. Morris, that I met Mr. Field in 1947, and I believe at the Committee for Democratic Foreign Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet him at the Committee for Democratic Foreign Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall. I think just one occasion, if I recall directly.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified earlier that you also met Israel Epstein and Fairfax Cholmely at that time. Were they together at that time or did you meet them on separate occasions?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that I met them on separate occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever met them together?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I think I said before that I had been to their home.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean Field and Epstein.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not that I recall; no, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. So your recollection of meeting Field after the United Nations Conference at San Francisco was at the Committee for Democratic Foreign Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; that is what I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Then you also met Epstein and Elsie Fairfax Cholmely at the same place but not at the same time as Field?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I say I am not sure on that particular point.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you know Mildred Price?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon the interruption, does that mean that you do know that you met them at the same place, but you are not sure whether it was or was not at the same time, speaking now of Field and Cholmely?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I have said that I have seen Mr. Field, Mr. Epstein, and Miss Cholmely at the same place—that is, the Committee for Democratic Foreign Policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. It is a question of whether that was at the same time or different times that you are not clear about.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe at different times.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mildred Price?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I do know Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she the secretary of the China Aid Council?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with Mildred Price, either individually or in the capacity of secretary of the China Aid Coucil?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about them?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Surely. If I recall correctly, I met Miss Price in New York, January 1945, at a party at the home of Mr. Gunther Stein. I am not quite sure about that. But the next time I did see her was in China sometime between October 1945 and my departure in November of 1946. I don't recall the exact dates of her visit to China. She was in China on behalf of the China Aid Council which at that time was a section of the United China Relief. I saw Miss Price infrequently in China, perhaps once or twice to the best of my recollection, since she traveled about the country and at that time I was held down at Shanghai. I was particularly interested in one or two projects that Miss Price's organization was sponsoring or supporting and particularly the project of the Yutsai School of Dr. Tao Heng Chi.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the first one?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Tao.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any reason to believe at the time you met Miss Price that she was a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; no reason at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. We have a question that has been asked a great many others. It is phrased slightly differently. Do you know of any reason to believe that Miss Price at any time voluntarily and intentionally cooperated or collaborated with members of the Communist Party for the furtherance of Communist objectives?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not know that she has done so and I do not believe she has done so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you had any reason to believe.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have no reason to believe.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no reason even now, and in view of the fact that when she appeared before this committee and was asked if she

was a Communist she refused to answer on the grounds that it might incriminate her? You would not consider that to be a reason?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I would not consider such a constitutional answer to the committee to be a reason.

Mr. MORRIS. A reason for you to believe that she may have been a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; that would not be a reason.

Mr. MORRIS. It is not a reason for you to believe that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Exactly.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you first met her at a party given by Gunther Stein at his home?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Gunther Stein very well?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I now know Mr. Stein quite well. In the time of my employment in the State Department, I think, I may have seen Mr. Stein at the most on three or four occasions. I met Mr. Stein, first of all, at the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, Hot Springs, 1945, when he was one of the members of the British delegations. I attended a party that Mr. Stein gave some time after the conference, in New York City, and it is on this occasion that I believe that I met Miss Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the evidence in the charges relating to the fact that Gunther Stein was a member of the Sorge espionage ring in Japan?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have heard of the charges. I have not read the evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last see Mr. Stein?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I saw Mr. Stein in London I think in 1950 or the beginning of 1951. I don't recall correctly. He had just come from France and I believe was on his way to Switzerland.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether or not he was deported from France for espionage?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He was deported from France but I do not know that it was for espionage.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that enter into your relationship with him at all—the fact that you knew he had been deported from France?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else was at Gunther Stein's house when you met Miss Price?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't really recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, there were more than three people.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There must have been other people, yes, sir, but I just don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there people who were frequently in attendance at meetings for the Committee for Democratic Foreign Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Talitha Gerlach?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I met Talitha Gerlach. I know her name, but I don't think on any occasion I did meet her.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't think she was at the party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. If she were, I don't recall meeting her. I am almost sure that she wasn't. Since I have seen the name many times in connection with China Affairs, I am quite sure I have never met her.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Doctor Ch'ao-ting Chi?

Mr. Friedman. I have met Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi.

Mr. Morris. Where did you meet him?

Mr. Friedman. I met Dr. Chi, I believe, first of all at the Central Bank of China which is along the Bund in Shanghai and this would be again sometime between October 1945, and November 1946.

Mr. Morris. What was the occasion of your meeting him there?

Mr. Friedman. The occasion was to make available some information for the bank's monthly publication and to obtain from his research staff some information, I believe, on either social insurance schemes or wages, labor problems in Swatow, on which his staff was working.

Mr. Morris. Did he ask you to come to the bank or did you volunteer to go to the bank?

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall.

Mr. Morris. Did you offer him information before he gave you information? You give it in that order, you testified in that order, that you gave him some information that he wanted.

Mr. Friedman. I gave information for the bank publication, yes. I don't recall.

Mr. Morris. What was the nature? Was that Government official information that you gave him?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir; I do not believe it was.

Mr. Morris. What was it?

Mr. Friedman. I think it was essentially from American labor publications. Perhaps, if I am not mistaken, it was from the Monthly Labor Review of the Department of Labor, which, I should have added, is really a Government publication.

Mr. Morris. Did you meet Dr. Chi on any other occasions?

Mr. Friedman. I think that I have met Dr. Chi socially but I just don't recall. I am sure that I have met him at parties of the Ambassador and of the consul general in Shanghai.

Mr. Morris. You do know what he looks like?

Mr. Friedman. I think I would have recognized—I know what he looked like then; yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Do you have eany reason now to believe that he was a Communist?

Mr. Friedman. Well, I think that his participation as a member of the government in Peking might indicate that he is a Communist; yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Do you have any reason to believe that he was a Communist at the time you were giving him information?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir; I only identified him with Dr. H. H. Kung at that time.

Senator Watkins. Did you know any Communists at all in this period of time about which Mr. Morris is inquiring about?

Mr. Friedman. In China?

Senator Watkins. Did you know any?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator Watkins. And yet some of these who have refused to answer the question if they are asked if they have ever been a Communist or now a Communist, they rely on the fifth amendment and say it might incriminate them, you don't think that has any bearing on it at all, whether or not they are Communists?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It may have some, but I just wouldn't venture an opinion on the basis of this refusal to answer questions and the reliance on the fifth amendment.

Senator WATKINS. Now, with respect to Mildred Price, did she advocate any principle or any policies or line of conduct for this country that might seem to be going in the same direction as the Communist line?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Certainly not in the period that I have known her; no, sir.

Senator WATKINS. How long have you known her?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think either as far back as January 1945 or perhaps sometime between October 1945 and November 1946, and I have known her since and am still friendly with Miss Price.

Senator WATKINS. And you don't think there is anything in her conduct that would indicate to you that she was a Communist or that she was a fellow traveler. Let us put it that way.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Certainly nothing in her conduct in the period I have known her would indicate to me that she was a Communist. Could you be more specific on the fellow traveler?

Senator WATKINS. Well, someone who believes pretty much the same and advocates the same line.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; then she does not fit that category; not to my stipulation.

Senator WATKINS. You have had enough experience with Communists to know one when you see one, have you not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I haven't had much experience with them, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. No experience.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I haven't had much experience. I have met some Communists.

Senator WATKINS. Have you ever studied communism?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have studied Communist literature, yes, sir. Not all of it; some of it.

Senator WATKINS. I am probably at a disadvantage. I wasn't here this morning. What position in the State Department did you hold?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was in originally what was the Division of Labor Relations, Division of International Health and Labor and Social Affairs, from September 1943 until November 1944, and then subsequently I was in the Chinese Affairs Division, roughly from November 1944 until October 1945, with a period of assignment to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. And then I was a junior economic analyst, serving as the American labor attaché in China from October 1945 until November 1946.

Senator WATKINS. Was it any part of your job to acquaint yourself with the conduct of Communists and their policies?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Insofar as it had bearing on labor reporting, yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. That would be reporting?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, indeed. But I don't say that I have become an expert on the subject.

Senator WATKINS. I don't expect you are an expert, but you ought to be able to tell one if you saw one, and talked to him.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would have to talk at some length, I presume, to get some idea.

Mr. Morris. What was the extent of your acquaintance with Mildred Price?

Mr. Friedman. I have known Miss Price for a considerable period of time, and my stipulation is that she was not a Communist, and I do not have any reason to believe that she is a Communist.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Solomon Adler?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir. I know Solomon Adler.

Mr. Morris. How well do you know Solomon Adler?

Mr. Friedman. I would call Solomon Adler a friend of mine.

Mr. Morris. When did you last see Solomon Adler?

Mr. Friedman. I believe I saw him in Cambridge, England—it was either Cambridge, England, in the late summer of 1951 or it was in London—no, excuse me, not the summer of 1951 but 1950, and possibly sometime at the end of the year in 1950 or 1951 when he came to town. He is on the staff of Cambridge University.

Mr. Morris. Do you now have or did you ever have any reason to believe that Solomon Adler was a Communist?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir; never.

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the testimony of Chambers and Bentley before this committee with respect to Adler?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir; I believe the name came up. I don't recall the testimony.

Mr. Morris. You have not read the testimony?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir; I have gone over the testimony, but I don't recall at the moment exactly what they testified.

Mr. Morris. You mean it isn't of any concern to you whether some man you call a friend has been identified before a Senate committee by two witnesses as a Communist?

Mr. Friedman. In this particular case of Mr. Adler, I believe he is not a Communist and I disregard the testimony of the committee. I simply wait until the committee files its reports.

Senator Watkins. That wouldn't make much difference, would it? You would rely on the evidence more than you would the report itself.

Mr. Friedman. Well, I place great weight in the judgment of the Senators, Senator.

Senator Watkins. I am glad to hear you say that. Some people don't.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever give him any information, any official information?

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Adler was the Treasury attaché of the Embassy, and I was the labor attaché of the Embassy. I think that we exchanged information on wages, on labor conditions, inflation in China. It was part of our official duties.

Mr. Morris. How frequently did you see Solomon Adler in those days?

Mr. Friedman. I certainly saw him, I think, only once here in Washington, D. C., before I went to China, and I couldn't say how many times I saw him in China, but I know not too frequently because he was in Nanking and I was in Shanghai; but I must say probably four times.

Mr. Morris. Did you know that he and John Service shared the same apartment together.

Mr. Friedman. Mr. Adler was married in the period I knew him, and I believe I have read that in the testimony, some references.

Mr. MORRIS. But that was not at the time that you were seeing Mr. Adler.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Tung Pi-wu?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I believe Mr. Tung Pi-wu was one of the Chinese delegates to the San Francisco conference.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a Communist delegate; wasn't he?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He was a delegate of the National Government of China, selected——

Mr. MORRIS. To represent the Communists in China?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No sir; he was sent here to represent the Chinese Government, and he was nominated by the Chinese Communists under a plan of General Hurley.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you meet him while he was here?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. I met him in San Francisco.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occasion of your meeting him in San Francisco?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe in meeting the Chinese delegation. I believe actually the time in which I met him was either a Chinese luncheon or dinner party which was given by either Mr. Liu Chieh, who is now the Chinese Ambassador to Canada, or one of the other senior officials of the Chinese Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him in the United States?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In addition to this occasion?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; in addition to this occasion.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall seeing him again. Yes; I think he did pay a courtesy visit to the State Department in Washington while he was here, although I don't quite recall the occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet him at a party—at a social party—given under the auspices of the Committee for Democratic Foreign Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall. Could you give me the date?

Mr. MORRIS. No; just if you can recall meeting him there.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No; I just don't recall meeting him.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you ever meet Alger Hiss?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I met Alger Hiss in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think the first occasion I met Mr. Hiss was—I am not quite sure—this was the meeting of the Area Committee on the Far East of the State Department, of which, I believe, he was a member when I was a member representing the Labor Division of the State Department. I can remember, I believe, seeing him—I think, meeting him at San Francisco, when he was a secretary general of the conference—and I recall being in a committee meeting with him upon my return from San Francisco, at which committee meeting the State Department was preparing its case or rather making its preparations for the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations Assembly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I interrupt to clear something up there? We found confusion in the records during the testimony of previous witnesses about the phrase "Far East" or "Far Eastern Committee." I wonder if you would clear up just what committee you were referring to there.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I believe that it would be the same committee that Mr. Dooman refers to—that is, the Far East Area Committee of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that have anything to do with the Far East Committee of SWINK—State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am not sure of the relationship between the two.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what SWINK was?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I believe SWINK was a State, War, and Navy Department committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. By definition it wasn't. It was the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee. But do you know about the existence of that committee?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I have heard of the existence of that committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with any subcommittee of SWINK?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The only committee that I had something—now, I have to clear this up. I was a participant in the State Department's Area Committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to get, first, the question of whether you had anything to do with any subcommittee of SWINK, any subcommittee of the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, you see, I am just trying—am wondering whether you consider the Area Committee a subcommittee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you. You were the expert. You were the man who was a member of something there.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Let me say I was a member of two committees.

Mr. SOURWINE. You might have been a member of any number of committees. I want to know if you were a member of any subcommittee of SWINK. Certainly you know whether you were or whether you weren't.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I wasn't a member of any subcommittee that called itself a subcommittee of SWINK. So I am not sure of any relationship between certain State Department committees and SWINK.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in Vincent's office for some time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew that Vincent headed the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I believe he became the Chairman of that at the time I was preparing to depart or had already departed. Actually the committee of which I was a participant was headed for most of the period by Mr. Ballentine, Mr. Joseph Ballantine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Headed by Mr. Ballantine?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know of Mr. Dooman's position before Mr. Vincent became head of the China Division?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. If I recall, Mr. Dooman was the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, that is, Mr. Grew, at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Dooman headed the Far Eastern Committee of SWINK?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I don't recall that, sir. All I know is that Mr. Dooman did not generally preside at the meeting of the Area Committee, that Mr. Ballantine presided and Mr. Dooman would sit in, I believe, when Mr. Ballantine was not present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what the Far East Commission is?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The Far East Commission located in Washington?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what the Far East Commission is?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There is a Commission in Washington which is made up of representatives of the various governments that participated in the war against Japan. Is that the Commission to which you are referring?

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the Far Eastern Commission? Is there any other Far Eastern Commission that you know about or Far East Commission that you know about?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Is there not a Commission that existed in Tokyo to advise the Supreme Commander which was a Far Eastern Commission also made up, I believe, of representatives of those nations which participated in the war against Japan?

Senator WATKINS. The committee will suspend for a moment.

(Short recess.)

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am trying to find out is whether while you were with the State Department, you were actually a member of any of the subcommittees of State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, speaking specifically of the Far East Subcommittee of State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I was a member of the Area Committee of the State Department, which called itself the Area Committee of the State Department, and I do not know whether that fits the description of a Subcommittee of SWINK.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether the Area Committee was or was not a Subcommittee of SWINK?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you know of the Subcommittee of SWINK which first Mr. Dooman and later Mr. Vincent was Chairman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir, I don't believe I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend the meetings of any committee or subcommittee having to do with the Far East as a Deputy for Mr. Vincent or in Mr. Vincent's stead or representing him or his office?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I think that I probably attended some meetings of the State Department's Area Committee on the Far East on behalf of the Division of Chinese Affairs. But actually, if I may say so, my representation in that Committee was generally for the Division of Labor Relations and the Division of International Labor, Health, and Social Affairs, pending that Division obtaining some one to represent the Division in the Committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the answer to my question, "Yes" or "No"?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Could you repeat the question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you have the question in mind?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I haven't.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was whether you ever attended a meeting of a State Department committee or subcommittee having to do with the Far East as a deputy to Mr. Vincent or in his stead or representing his Division?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I did represent his Division on some occasion, yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before what committee was that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. This would be the Area Committee on the Far East of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you not know whether that had anything to do with SWINK?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. While you attended such committee meetings, was there any leak of information that came out through the press or through the radio that you know of?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall on my own, although having read the record I see that Mr. Dooman testifies to that point.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any? Do you know whether any newspaper or radio programs came out with any news that took place within the committee hearing room?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir, other than what I have read in your record.

Mr. MORRIS. But you know of nothing at the time of your own personal knowledge?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we were asking the witness of his experiences with Alger Hiss.

Will you go on? Is that the only time you saw Mr. Hiss?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think that I was saying that I was a member of a committee which was making the preparations for the United States Government participation in the forthcoming U. N. meeting. I believe that was the only time or the last time I saw Mr. Hiss while I was in Government employment.

Mr. MORRIS. Who recommended you to go out to San Francisco in connection with your job out there?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Actually I was recommended or selected by Dean Robert Stewart, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in connection with your assignment as Assistant Secretary?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Exactly. Doctor Stewart was at that time working with the State Department group making preparations for the San Francisco conference.

Mr. MORRIS. And he knew you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Knew your work and recommended you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He wanted me on the staff and Mr. Vincent made me available; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you next meet Alger Hiss?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I think that was the last time I met Alger Hiss, although subsequent to my departure from the State Department and when he was the chairman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I wrote to Mr. Hiss seeking a fellowship with which I could sustain myself while studying abroad. Mr. Hiss replied that he was unable to make any provisions of a fellowship for me.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, in connection with this arbitration proceeding, may I get back to that, you said that you first knew about that case by reading the New York press?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that was my original contact with the case, was through the press.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read the World-Telegram accounts of those hearings?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I read some of them. I don't recall specifically.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you the New York World-Telegram, an excerpt from the New York World-Telegram, of August 11, 1947, which is the announcement after James Fly announced his decision in that case, and ask you if you had read that? Do you mind reading aloud, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Surely.

[New York World Telegram, August 11, 1947, p. 6]

ARBITRATOR ORDERS REHIRING OF WOMAN FIRED AS PRO-RED—SECRETARY ACCUSED OF ADHERING TO THE PARTY LINE

(By Nelson Frank, World-Telegram staff writer)

In an important arbitration decision, James L. Fly, former Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, after holding that an employee dismissed for attempting to insert the Communist Party line into her work "acted improperly" prepared a "biased" reading list, and "deviated" from the policy of her employer, nevertheless has ordered the worker returned to her job "with the hope for unity."

At the same time he stated that the National Council of Jewish Women, the employer, need not pay the employee for the 7 months she has lost since being dismissed for "malfeasance" last January.

The worker, Miss Betty Levin, a member of the Social Service Employees Union of the United Office and Professional Workers (CIO) has been defended by the union which hailed Mr. Fly's award as "a signal victory * * * for the entire labor movement."

The arbitration hearing before Mr. Fly lasted for 23 days, a record for any labor dispute before any American Arbitration Association member. Mr. Fly's award takes 65 printed pages.

The charges against Miss Levin, an area secretary assigned to educate the sections of the council along the lines of its program were that she consistently gave a pro-Soviet view and recommended pro-Soviet or pro-Communist books, magazines, and organizations.

In his decision, Mr. Fly states that the area secretary deviated from the council's policy and program in recommending her list of books, organizations, and publications in three key cities. Among the publications advocated by Miss Levin were The Protestant and In Fact, both consistent followers of the Communist Party line. Books on China were pro-Communist except in one instance where a pro-Government book was listed with the notation "a partisan account."

During the period leading up to the arbitration, said Mr. Fly, "so high did the mutual distrust and suspicion mount (in the council's office) that at one point a private investigator was hired by the council to guard its files."

It was at this time that the social service branch of the Communist Party, one of whose members is Bernard Segal, executive director of the union——

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me. Notice how that particular reporter describes Bernard Segal.

Mr. FRIEDMAN (reading):

One of whose members is Bernard Segal, executive director of the union.

Mr. MORRIS. Read the full paragraph.

Mr. FRIEDMAN (reading):

It was at this time that the social-service branch of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. "Of the Communist Party——"

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Go ahead.

Mr. FRIEDMAN (reading):

One of whose members is Bernard Segal, executive director of the union, called the case a test case to determine whether a progressive * * * may be Red-baited out of a job.

Among the organizations recommended by Miss Levin were People's Songs, a group which writes the Communist May Day tunes, the Council on African

Affairs, and China Aid Council, both well-known Communist fronts, and the National Council of American Soviet Friendship, key pro-Soviet propaganda outfit in this country. Also recommended by her was the Communist front, National Committee to Win the Peace. It was of this organization that Mr. Fly accused her of acting "improperly * * * (in that) her response to the Chicago section was designed to encourage cooperation * * *" with this committee.

However, because she was not previously warned that her actions were against the council's policy, he has ordered her reinstated.

Mr. Morris. Is that one of the articles you had read in the New York Press?

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall, Mr. Morris. This would be August 1947. I don't recall whether I read this specific article.

Mr. Morris. You were in New York at that time, were you not?

Mr. Friedman. Let me think. I believe I was; but I am not sure.

Mr. Morris. You will notice that that particular news article presents the problem in rather a different light from what you have testified here.

Mr. Friedman. I have presented the problem in the light of the arbitrator's statements of it, yes.

Mr. Morris. Did you have high marks at Harvard? The reason I ask that, Mr. Chairman, is that a witness who has given some testimony before this committee has testified that the person she was talking about was a person who had gotten high marks at Harvard. So that is why that question is appropriate.

Mr. Friedman. May I read that section just from the report of the committee, Mr. Chairman? It is just a sentence or two, and then I can reply fully to it.

Senator Watkins. I don't see any objection to that.

Mr. Friedman. Thank you. This is Mrs. Widener, speaking on page 758 of the committee's hearings, part 3.

Senator Watkins. This committee?

Mr. Friedman. This committee; yes, sir [reading]:

Prior to Mr. Friedman's arrival, Mr. Andrews had told me that Mr. Friedman had graduated with the highest honors from Harvard University. I believe he graduated with either magna or summa cum laude.

Mr. Chairman, I perhaps hate to admit this to the committee but I did not graduate either magna cum laude or summa cum laude or cum laude at Harvard, although the marks that I had were considered Dean's highest marks but not honor marks at Harvard University. And I believe that I could introduce, if the committee wanted it in its record, the Harvard indication that I was not an honor candidate at that time.

Senator Watkins. But you are sure that if you had received such honors you would be likely to claim them rather than deny them.

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Can you recall attending a meeting in Shanghai at which the following people were present: Rose Yardumian, Mary Barrett, Gerald Tannenbaum, Dorothy Campbell? Those individuals or any combinations of them?

Mr. Friedman. I don't really recall attending any meeting with those individuals together.

Mr. Morris. This meeting was held at the Hamilton House, room 812, just before Christmas of 1946.

Mr. Friedman. Then I don't recall such a meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not recall such a meeting?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever attend a meeting in Shanghai at which Rose Yardumian was present?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I have attended a meeting in Shanghai of the International Committee of the Chinese Industrial Cooperative at which Miss Yardumian was present and I attended as an observer from the United States State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Were not Mary Barrett, Gerald Tannenbaum, and Dorothy Campbell also active in that organization?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think so. Certainly not Mr. Tannenbaum who is not in that organization, nor Miss Barrett whom I believe, again I am not sure, was at that time employed by the United States Foreign Service. The name Dorothy Campbell doesn't come back to me at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you invite to attend a meeting of the Chinese industrial cooperatives another labor attaché from the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that, Mr. Morris. When you say another attaché of the State Department, you mean in China?

Mr. MORRIS. In China.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. There was no other labor attaché.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was your successor?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall whether I had a successor or not. I don't believe the Department did formally succeed me. I don't know if any one subsequent to my departure carried on the labor-reporting program.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that there was not another labor attaché present at that time in China from the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; as far as I know, there was no other labor attaché from the State Department in China at the time I was present.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you did not invite any other labor attaché to attend a meeting at which these people were present?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I certainly don't recall the meeting. I certainly don't recall meeting with such persons present. I don't recall inviting another labor attaché to such a meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you ever remember telling another labor attaché of the State Department that you were a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir. May I say perhaps two "No, sirs," to that question. That is, I do not remember telling any labor attaché, and I am sure that I did not tell any labor attaché that I was a Communist, because I was not a Communist.

Senator WATKINS. At that or any other time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. At that or any other time.

Mr. MORRIS. The issue, Mr. Chairman, is whether or not this witness told a labor attaché in Shanghai at that time whether or not he was a Communist.

Do you know a man named Willis R. Etter?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Willis R. Etter? I don't recall the name unless—was he a member of the American consulate general in Shanghai?

Mr. MORRIS. I believe he was.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, I believe I do remember that name, but he certainly was not the labor attaché in my tenure of office. If I recall Mr. Etter worked in the consular section or the shipping section of

the consulate, but certainly not in any labor attaché section while I was there. May I, Mr. Morris, introduce——

Mr. Morris. Wait until I finish these questions. Did you ever meet Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir. I did not meet Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever meet John K. Fairbank and his wife, Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir; I know the Fairbanks very well indeed.

Mr. Morris. When did you last see the Fairbanks?

Mr. Friedman. I believe I saw the Fairbanks in the autumn of 1951 at their home in Cambridge, Mass.

Mr. Morris. Did you meet the Fairbanks in China?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir; I met the Fairbanks in China.

Mr. Morris. Did you see them frequently in China?

Mr. Friedman. No, not too frequently, because Mr. Fairbank was mainly in Nanking while I was in Shanghai, and Mrs. Fairbank did a good deal of traveling for the Cultural Office of the Embassy.

Mr. Morris. What was her position?

Mr. Friedman. She was the cultural officer for the United States Embassy.

Mr. Morris. She was there in China?

Mr. Friedman. Yes; I believe she was there for part of the time the Marshall mission was there.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever meet Mr. Benjamin Kizer? Do you know him well?

Mr. Friedman. Not very well, sir.

Mr. Morris. When did you last see Mr. Kizer?

Mr. Friedman. When did I see Mr. Kizer? I believe I saw Mr. Kizer in Shanghai in the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946, but I don't think I have seen him since. I have seen members of his family since that time.

Mr. Morris. What was his position during the war? Was he the head of the China Division of UNRRA?

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall. I recall Mr. Kizer when he was the Director of UNRRA for the China operation.

Mr. Morris. That is what I meant.

Mr. Friedman. Yes; he was for some time its Director.

Mr. Morris. What were his duties, do you know, at that time?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir; I do not know.

Mr. Morris. You do not know what his duties were?

Mr. Friedman. I do not know what his duties were.

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the Stilwell dispute? I mean the dispute that arose over the dismissal of General Stilwell.

Mr. Friedman. Dispute between whom?

Mr. Morris. There was a general controversy. There was a controversy that took place in many of the newspapers at the time.

Mr. Friedman. I can remember in particular Mr. Brooks Atkinson's famous New York Times story on that.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Brooks Atkinson opposed the removal of Stilwell, did he not?

Mr. Friedman. I don't recall at the moment.

Mr. Morris. You said you recalled Brooks Atkinson.

Mr. Friedman. I just recall the article because of its importance. I presume, if I may, that probably Mr. Atkinson—you see, I would

like to say definitely by looking at the article, but I believe that he was generally opposed to the removal of General Stilwell.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you favor the removal of General Stilwell?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't quite recall exactly what position I took at that time, but I certainly now, having gone back over the period, do favor the recall of General Stilwell. And I probably, if I may put it in terms of probability, favored his recall at that time, because I did, in a sense, admire much of the work that General Hurley was doing in the Middle East and in the Far East in that period of time.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that the Daily Worker took issue with Brooks Atkinson in his opposition to the removal of Stilwell?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't know anything about that; no, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. The reason I asked that was that you are acquainted with the episode in connection with the Atkinson article, and it was the Atkinson article with which the Daily Worker took issue.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. But I know that as a reader of the New York Times, and not of the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. But you did favor the removal of Stilwell?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am saying now that I probably did favor the removal of Stilwell, simply because he was a man who would not get along with the government with which he was at the time. My opinion is further confirmed by Earl Mountbatten's reports when he describes his great difficulties with General Stilwell, plus General Stilwell's own book, which is not altogether diplomatic, either in its words or its tone.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever visit Owen Lattimore at his home?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, I have been at the home of Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occasion?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The only occasion that I recall, Mr. Morris, is an invitation to lecture at his seminar at Johns Hopkins. This was in the early—it must have been either February or March of 1947, after I had left the Government service. And I remember either staying with the Lattimores just before the seminar or just after the seminar, before proceeding to Washington, where I spent the night at the home of the Lattimores.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with Alger Hiss, did you ever write to Alger Hiss in connection with his trials?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I don't recall specifically on that. I think it is possible that I may have written him at the very beginning of his troubles a letter of sympathy or lamentation. But I don't recall this definitely, and I haven't found any such letter among my own papers or a copy of any such letter among my own papers.

Senator WATKINS. Were you in the habit of keeping copies of your letters?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not everything, Senator. I think that if I did at the time, it was because of his negative but nevertheless kind response from the Carnegie Endowment to which I had written for a fellowship.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, he acknowledged your letter, but did not do anything for you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Pardon me?

Senator WATKINS. He acknowledged your letter but he did not do anything for you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Exactly.

Senator WATKINS. So you felt kindly about that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well——

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mark Gayn?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, I have known Mr. Mark Gayn.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first meet Mark Gayn?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I met Mr. Mark Gayn at a party of Mr. Gunther Stein in January or February 1945, to which we have already referred.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give him any State Department official information?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. You gave him no information and no papers of any kind?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, might I inquire at that point very briefly?

I show you, sir, five lines, typewritten. I ask you if you have ever seen documents with that statement or inscription written or imprinted upon them?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I believe I have seen some documents. I couldn't vouch for the title, sections, and so forth, but I believe something of this nature.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is generally familiar to you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen it on documents in the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall so much, because the State Department's classification system in the period I was there tended to be either nothing at all or "restricted" or "secret," with a simple stamp rather than with this.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then your testimony is that you do not remember having seen this on documents?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. On State Department documents as distinguished from any documents that may have come in to the State Department from any other agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. This note reads:

Warning. This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage law, title XVIII, U. S. C., titles 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person in any manner is prohibited by law.

Mr. Friedman, did you ever give to any unauthorized person any documents bearing this stamp or imprint?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I certainly believe not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give to any unauthorized person any documents bearing any stamp or imprint indicating them to be classified?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Certainly within the State Department——

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't limit the question, sir. Answer it "Yes" or "No."

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not believe so.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have any hesitation in answering that? In fact, you indicate by your manner that you do have some doubt.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. This morning we discussed a matter, Senator, and that was the matter of some notes to Mr. Andrew Roth, notes on the history of the Japanese labor movement which I prepared.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they classified matter?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I finish, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they classified matter?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. These notes, to the best of my recollection, at the time I had it, were not classified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then they do not affect your answer to this question, do they?

Senator WATKINS. There is not any doubt in your mind as to whether they were classified?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir. The reason I raise the question is that I think, in the final preparation of the paper, that these notes may have played a part in the background section, and that is why I want to be quite specific and frank with the committee. This is a matter which was mentioned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the time of the Amerasia affair, and I believe that the notes, as I gave them to Mr. Roth, were quite unclassified. But they were historical background material from published sources.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that those notes subsequently became a part of classified material?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am not sure of what the history of the documents was, that is, any final document. But these are notes which I was working up, and which were used in connection with a paper on Japanese labor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I would like to get back to the question I asked earlier. Did you ever give any unauthorized person documents bearing a stamp or imprint indicating they were classified?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do not believe so, no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That answer indicates that you think there is a chance that you might have.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. This is some years ago, sir, and many papers have passed over my desk, and I should like to leave the answer, "I do not believe I have ever given any person classified material."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean by that that there is some doubt in your mind?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir. I want to be on the cautious side.

Senator WATKINS. You would not answer categorically, "No," that you did not, because you think there is a possibility that you might have done so?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think there is a possibility.

Senator WATKINS. Why do you not say there is not any possibility?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would like to leave the answer as it stands, Senator, if I may.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman, did you ever see a report on the subject of the need of an American policy toward the problems created by the rise of the Chinese Communist Party, a report indicating that the Communists were about one-fifth of the population, and that they were going to have a definite influence on the future of China?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever see a report on the subject of the growth of the new Fourth Army, an example of the popular democratic appeal of the Chinese Communists, indicating that the popular support of the Chinese Communists shows their policies and methods are democratic?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Again, I don't recall offhand such reports.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall having seen a document entitled, "The Views of Mao Tse-tung, America and China," dated March 1945?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Again, I just don't recall offhand.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that those papers were circulated through your division at the time you were a divisional assistant?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I say I don't recall the document, so I don't know whether they were circulated through the division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that all three of those documents mentioned were among the so-called Amerasia papers?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir, I do not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Friedman, have you ever knowingly associated with people you knew to be Communists?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. On what occasions?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. On social occasions only. Certainly not on political occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the extent to which you have done that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, it is not very frequently. In this country, in England or France when we traveled about, we have met people——

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "we," who do you mean?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In recent years, my wife and I. And we have been in homes of persons who were known to us to be Communists; yes, sir. But this is not in the period of the State Department, but post-period.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were those people you knew to be Communists?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think the one name I mention is a Mr. John Horner of Great Britain.

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you say the one that you could name?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I say one whose name comes to me, because it was within the last year or so, I should say within the last year and a half, when we were in England.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell me this, Mr. Friedman: If you were now in the State Department—this is a hypothetical question—would you give information as you have in the past, say, to Y. Y. Hsu, and to Rose Yardumian, and to—who was the other one you mentioned? Just take those two. Would you now give such information to Gunther Stein?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would rather not answer a hypothetical question of that sort, Senator. Is is so open to——

Senator WATKINS. That reveals your present state of mind. It may have some bearing on your answers that you have given in the past.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think the answer is quite simple: That I would follow all of the rules and regulations of the State Department with reference to the circulation of materials which is governmental and State Department material.

Mr. MORRIS. And you would impose no higher standard than that on yourself?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I would follow the rules of the Department by which I was employed; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose you knew that a Communist wanted some particular information for a purpose to further the Communist conspiracy in the world, and he came to you and asked you for that information. If there were no State Department prohibition against it, would you give it to him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir. I would report it to my senior official.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you so report as to Y. Y. Hsu, when you gave him a map that he wanted?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Pardon me?

Mr. MORRIS. Did you report to your official in the State Department the fact that Y. Y. Hsu wanted a map from you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that I did. I am almost sure that I discussed the matter with a Mr. Chase, but I take full responsibility.

Mr. MORRIS. And he gave you permission?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It wasn't a question of permission. It was a question of an unrestricted map on the liberated areas of China. It was for Mr. Hsu's book, copies of which came to the State Department shortly afterward.

Mr. MORRIS. Knowing what you know about Mr. Hsu now, do you think that his motive in obtaining that map was completely harmless?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. At that particular time, it was harmless. It was for publication, and was published subsequently.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, do you concede now that Y. Y. Hsu was a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir. I just don't know anything about that. I believe we have said that he is in Peking, and I presume that he is. But other than that, I couldn't say any further, on the basis of my own knowledge of Mr. Hsu.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman, have you ever seen or read the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I have read the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever read State and Revolution by Lenin?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I have, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what that book is?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. That is one of the reasons I don't think I read it, because I couldn't say what the contents are.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever read Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder by Lenin?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, indeed; I have read that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read Foundations of Leninism by Stalin?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have read, I think, a part of that book. In fact, I haven't read that, because it was a matter in which I was looking into quite recently.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean, "looking into"? You were looking into the book, or looking into the matter of whether you had read it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir, into the book itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would say you have been exposed to it, but didn't catch it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. As I say, I am pretty sure that I have not read that book.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you dipped into it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. I haven't gotten it yet.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean when you said you were looking into it? Do you mean you have ordered it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I haven't ordered it yet, either, but I was going to read it sometime in the course of the year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who recommended that book to you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Nobody in particular.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, authored by the central committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir, I have never read that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read, Program of the Communist International and its Constitution, the third American edition?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I have; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Any edition?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, a thesis of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; that, I believe, I have read.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us, sir, something of the circumstances under which you read those books to the reading of which you have just testified?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I just don't recall the circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you perhaps read them because you felt they were necessary or desirable as background for your work?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I would say that I have read those books because I thought that some of them were necessary as part of the literature of an educated man.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not feel that any of them were necessary in connection with your work in the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Absolutely not; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read any of them in connection with study groups, with others?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I don't think I have ever been in the study group of the type I believe you are referring to.

Mr. SOURWINE. You read all of these books on your own initiative?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. No one recommended them to you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Anthony Jenkinson at any time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I don't believe I have ever met Mr. Jenkinson. I can identify the name, I think, with the Allied Labor News.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the one; yes. Your testimony is that you have never met him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I ever met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he is an Englishman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe it is Jenkinson; yes. I have heard that he was an Englishman.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not see him on your trip to London?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Michael Lindsay?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When was the last you met Michael Lindsay?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think I met Lindsay, Michael Lindsay, sometime in London in the last 2 years, I believe prior to his departure as a research scholar for a university.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet him in the United States?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; at Harvard University in 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet him at the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know his wife?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have met his wife; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was his wife?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Mrs. Lindsay.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know her before she married him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Agnes Smedley at any time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I met Miss Smedley.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you meet Miss Smedley?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. When did I meet Miss Smedley? I met Miss Smedley sometime in 1947 after I left the State Department. I shouldn't be surprised if I didn't meet Miss Smedley at the office of the China Aid Council or the home of Miss Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Were they closely associated?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think they were quite friendly, yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Miss Smedley active in the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I wouldn't know, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet Miss Smedley when she was in London?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I saw Miss Smedley in London.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occasion of that?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was invited to an occasion by Lady Selywyn Clark, whose husband was the British governor of the Seychelles Islands and was a very eminent and distinguished medical officer of Hong Kong.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the circumstances?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was just a social occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any of these other people you have been discussing today present at that party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Just my wife present in addition to Miss Smedley and Miss Clark.

Mr. MORRIS. How many times did you see Miss Smedley in England?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am sure not more than twice.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you see her at about the time that she died?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Just before, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about the circumstances surrounding her death?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you read about the circumstances?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, I have read about the death, but I don't know any of the circumstances.

Mr. Morris. You could not tell this committee about any of the details surrounding the death?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. You did read her will in the papers, did you not?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, I believe I have. I am not quite sure. I have seen references to it if I haven't actually read the will in the paper.

Mr. Morris. You do know that she willed the property to Chuh Teh, the Chinese Communist general?

Mr. Friedman. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Did that surprise you?

Mr. Friedman. Not at all.

Mr. Morris. In fact, that was consistent to the person Agnes Smedley?

Mr. Friedman. I know she had the greatest admiration for General Teh, about whom she was writing an autobiography.

Mr. Morris. Did you ever meet Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. Friedman. Yes; I have met Anna Louise Strong.

Mr. Morris. Where did you meet her?

Mr. Friedman. I met her in Shanghai in 1946, I believe. She came to me and was introduced to me because she was interested in Chinese labor problems, and I was the American labor attaché to whom many Chinese even turned for explanation of the Chinese labor scene.

Mr. Morris. Did you turn to her for explanation of the Chinese labor scene?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. Where else did you see Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. Friedman. This is the only period.

Mr. Morris. Did you see her in the United States?

Mr. Friedman. No, I have never seen her in the United States. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. Did you know Victor Yakhontoff?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir, I don't believe I have ever.

Mr. Morris. Have you ever met him?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. Do you know who he is?

Mr. Friedman. The author of Chinese Soviet; is that the one to whom you are referring?

Mr. Morris. I believe that is the same man, yes.

Mr. Friedman. I don't know him. I have never met him.

Mr. Morris. Do you know Michael Greenberg?

Mr. Friedman. I don't know him.

Mr. Morris. You did not see him in England?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. He is there now?

Mr. Friedman. I don't know. His book has just been published.

Mr. Morris. From London?

Mr. Friedman. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Are you acquainted with the testimony before this committee about the Communist associations of Michael Greenberg?

Mr. Friedman. Not specifically. I am sure I have read them.

Mr. Morris. Have you testimony to believe that Michael Greenberg is or was a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't know. I just don't know the man.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever met the Snows, the Edgar Snows?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I believe Mr. Edgar Snow and the person, Mrs. Snow, the writer Nym Wales. I don't recall the occasion for meeting Edgar Snow, unless it was at the State Department. I remember meeting Mrs. Snow, Nym Wales, at the San Francisco Conference, United Nations Conference.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity was she there?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she in the press room or one of the official rooms?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I just don't recall.

Mr. MORRIS. She was there?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I am pretty sure she was.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say you thought you met Edgar Snow in the State Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. As I say, I don't recall the circumstances.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Dolly Eltenton?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe I did; no, sir. I don't know the name.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know the name?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Chen Han-seng?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Chen Han-seng.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity did you meet Dr. Chen Han-seng?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I met Dr. Chen in his capacity as a research scholar at Johns Hopkins University, and I met Dr. Chen in New York, I think, at the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy. I believe that is where I saw him in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Bisson, who was a witness here yesterday?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I know Mr. Bisson.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him in connection with the Committee for Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I believe I met Mr. and Mrs. Bisson at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference in Hot Springs. I don't recall seeing Mr. Bisson, I don't think, even in 1947 when I was back in America, and I have seen him recently where he is a colleague of mine at the University of California.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could I interrupt?

Do you remember testifying with regard to your duties while you were divisional assistant under Mr. Vincent?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember testifying that material coming into the office reached your desk after it had gone over the desk of Mr. Vincent or the assistant chief of the division?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I suggested I was down at the bottom of the routing list.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the exception to that, I believe you stated, was when Mr. Vincent would give you something directly.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. Well, that was still routing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it true that you had a number of specific duties while you were in Mr. Vincent's office?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, specifically in the sense of writing memoranda; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did write memoranda?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. For Mr. Vincent?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you summarized dispatches on occasion?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I believe I did.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you did prepare correspondence for his signature on occasion?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I believe I did that, too.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you sometimes initiated reports or communications which sometimes involved policy. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; I think it is a fair statement.
Mr. SOURWINE. I have been attempting to cut through what took us several pages in executive session, and I do not want to put words in your mouth if that is not a fair statement.
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that some of the memos or writings may be considered policy matters, but at my level they were not policy.
Mr. SOURWINE. No; but you said you did sometimes initiate memoranda and they subsequently became policy?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with drafting any documents which subsequently or ultimately received the signature of the President of the United States.
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall clearly.
Mr. SOURWINE. I will give you an example. Mr. Vincent testified that certain documents had been prepared in his office and that persons in his office had worked on them, which ultimately became a part of the directive to General Marshall. Did you work on any of those documents?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I don't believe I have ever worked on what would be the preparatory material for General Marshall.
Mr. SOURWINE. There was a document, a letter or communication, from President Roosevelt to President Chiang Kai-shek under date of July 14, 1944, which appears at page 560 of the so-called white paper of the State Department.
Can you tell me whether you had anything to do with the drafting of that or a paper preliminary to it?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Would you repeat the date, please?
Mr. SOURWINE. I will be glad to show it to you in the white paper—the one on the left-hand page there [handing document].
Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; this was before I was a member of Mr. Vincent's division.
Mr. SOURWINE. You were with the State Department, but before you were a member of the division?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. In that category of papers, did you ever, to your knowledge, prepare a memorandum for inclusion in, or what ultimately became, a paper or document for the signature of the Secretary of State?
Mr FRIEDMAN. I just don't recall. Again, if you could be specific——
Mr. SOURWINE. If you had prepared a document which was subsequently signed by the Secretary of State, you would be very likely to remember it, would you not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not necessarily, because I might not know that it had become a document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, if you knew about it.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I probably would remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. We all follow our brain children.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Some of us have pride of authorship; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you exclude yourself?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that if you had written something which substantially, in the form in which you wrote it, was ultimately signed by the Secretary, you would have known that, would you not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe so; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge of that happening?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Turning to another question, do you know Georgi Dimitroff?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Would you repeat that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Georgi Dimitroff.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Could you identify him for me?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you if you know him.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe I know anyone by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that a man of that name was head of the Communist International?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes; now I know of whom you are speaking.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do place that Georgi Dimitroff?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of his writings?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I at this point introduce a number of documents which I think fit appropriately in the record of the committee?

Senator WATKINS. I would say that if you want to submit them to the committee that we do not allow the promiscuous introduction of any documents. You see, your testimony is supposed to be sworn to here. If you want to leave them with the committee, we will have our staff check them, and we will make the ruling later as to whether they will be admitted as a part of the record.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Perhaps if I may take a moment of your record to get further guidance on this point.

In the record, the printed testimony of Mrs. Widener, there is a statement, there is a letter, from Mr. Durbrow of the State Department to this committee, explaining that I was terminated from the State Department without prejudice, and, first of all, Mr. Morris, in summarizing the letter at one point, substituted—and I am sure inadvertently—"dismissed" for "terminated."

Senator WATKINS. What is the difference?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The difference is, sir, that the phrase "termination without prejudice" is the equivalent of an honorable discharge, and that the term "dismissed" suggests something very uncomplimentary.

Senator WATKINS. I just wanted that for the purpose of the record.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I should like to submit into the record, to correct this inadvertency, the copies of my retirement papers or termination

papers, and a subsequent letter from the State Department to me explaining the meaning of the term "without prejudice."

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you offer those one by one, identify them, and let the Chair take them under advisement with regard to inclusion?

Senator WATKINS. That would be proper.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record to show, Mr. Chariman, that I did ask Mr. Friedman earlier today if he had such papers if he would submit them to me by way of facilitating their introduction into the record, and he declined to show them.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Would the record, Mr. Chairman, also show that I took the initiative in mentioning this to Mr. Morris?

Senator WATKINS. You mentioned it, but did you decline to let him have them?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I suggested that I would wait until you arrived, sir.

Senator WATKINS. As I indicated, the Chair will allow you to leave the documents here for the purpose of checking them to see whether or not they are properly admissible.

We do not know what is in them; we have not seen them. We want to know what goes into this record. In other words, that is our responsibility.

Mr. SOURWINE. The first specific offer you are making is your record?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The first specific offer is a Department of Foreign Service personnel notice, dated October 14, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. That is identified sufficiently, I take it, for the purpose of the record. I do not want you to read what is in it.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I want to describe what is under the words "nature of action" since it will then identify the document.

Senator WATKINS. Is that not self-apparent without you explaining that it is there?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I feel at this point that if I am leaving it for the committee perhaps I should identify it by its title.

Senator WATKINS. Proceed.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. "Nature of action, termination of services without prejudice."

The second document, also Division of Foreign Service Personnel, dated June 4, 1947, with the title "Termination and lump-sum payment."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman, when a man resigns from the State Department, is that technically a termination of services without prejudice?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am introducing into the record——

Mr. MORRIS. You are offering to be introduced into the record.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am offering. Excuse me. I am not familiar with the procedures.

Senator WATKINS. You can give the date of the letter, and if it is your letter, without telling us what is in it. That is what we want.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. This is a letter dated November 6, 1951, signed by Elbridge Durbrow, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.

Senator WATKINS. That is enough identification.

Mr. SOURWINE. My question, sir, which remains unanswered, is when an official of the State Department or an employee of the State Department resigns, is that technically termination without prejudice?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I believe it is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you resign?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I did not resign.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your severance was involuntary as far as you are concerned?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; my severance was voluntary, and I waited for the State Department procedures to effectuate the act of termination.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you elected to leave?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I desired to leave; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you communicate your desire to the superiors or superior in any way?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did not resign?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I communicated my desires to my chief in Shanghai on at least two occasions, and I informed Mr. Vincent in Washington, and he was still the Director, that I was preparing to leave the Foreign Service of the United States.

At that time, legislation on the Foreign Service was about to go into effect, and I waited for that legislation to take place.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you technically in the Foreign Service of the United States?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was on the Foreign Service auxiliary which terminated with this new legislation of November 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did not resign?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I did not submit a letter of resignation, no, sir.

Senator WATKINS. What you did was tantamount, was it not, to a resignation?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It was my wish to leave.

Senator WATKINS. That is what you say, "I want to leave." That was a resignation. "I want to leave, and I am going to leave, the service."

Mr. FRIEDMAN. If I may just explain this point, since Mr. Sourwine has raised it, that when the State Department inquired which wanted to stay and which wanted to leave, in the Foreign Service, and this was in August of 1946, I then informed my superior that I was prepared to stay on until about June 1947, in the course of which I was hoping a successor would come out and I would break him in.

Then subsequently I decided that I would like to leave by the first of the year, and the Department decided that the best date was this date of the new legislation taking effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have another specific offer for the record?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. This will be your offer number four.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Will I receive from the committee a receipt for these documents?

Senator WATKINS. I think we can.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want the documents returned to you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I should like them returned to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are offering them for the record. How are we going to have them in the record if you want them returned?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Perhaps after the conclusion, if the committee decides to include them in the record, the actual documents will be returned to me.

Mr. Sourwine. I do not see how we can put a document in our record and return it to you at the same time?

Mr. Friedman. Perhaps a copy can be made for that purpose.

Mr. Morris. They are photostatic copies, are they not?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. In any event, the record stands clear that you desire to have these documents returned to you.

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. These are not originals, are they?

Mr. Friedman. These are photostatic copies.

Mr. Sourwine. Who procured the photostats?

Mr. Friedman. I did.

Mr. Sourwine. Yourself? You did not make them, did you?

Mr. Friedman. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. They were made commercially?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. From the originals?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. The originals are in your possession?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. If the originals are in your possession, why do you want the photostats back?

Mr. Friedman. Well, if the committee would prefer the photostats, I would prefer to keep the originals myself.

Mr. Sourwine. I asked you if the originals were in your possession, why do you want the photostats back?

Senator Watkins. In other words, what you are submitting here are photostats, and we are wondering why you want those back, if you have the originals.

Mr. Friedman. I think just to preserve them and not to have to make any new ones, if there are any further hearings.

Mr. Sourwine. What you are offering the committee here are photostats that you have had made of original documents in your possession, and you are asking that the photostats be returned to you?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.

May I also offer another exhibit which I believe will complete the description of Mrs. Widener, who testified before the committee, and whose civil service was introduced into the record with the exception of her letter of resignation or termination. Therefore, I should like to submit for the record and the consideration of this committee two articles that appeared——

Senator Eastland (presiding). You may proceed. Let me get my bearings. If you want to offer something, you want to offer something in the record?

Mr. Friedman. Yes, sir.

Senator Eastland. You have to submit it to the counsel.

Mr. Friedman. I was following—I don't quite know the procedures.

Senator Eastland. I say submit it to the counsel and I will hear from him whether he wants to object to it.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, generally if we have witnesses who want something introduced into the record, by way of expediting and facilitating its entry into the record it is our practice, either in executive session or in formal hearings before the committee——

Senator EASTLAND. Wait a minute. I understand the background. But whatever goes in, it should be submitted to the counsel, and when it goes in I will hear from the counsel, whether he objects to it or what.

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness wanted the record at this time to show what he was offering for the chair to pass upon after counsel had had an opportunity to study it.

Senator EASTLAND. Have you objections?

Mr. MORRIS. I have objections. I think it is an unnecessary step that the witness is taking. We have been most liberal in introducing things into the record.

Senator EASTLAND. What I want to do is to file the stuff with you, all of it. Then when you go over it I will hear from you as to what your objections are, and pass upon it at that time.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Then you just wish me, without saying anything further, to hand this to Mr. Morris?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, file the stuff with him.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Will we be able to identify them?

Mr. MORRIS. They will be properly identified.

Senator EASTLAND. It will be properly identified if I let it go into the record. I will let it go into the record if he does not object. If he objects, I will hear his grounds of objecting, and then I will pass upon it.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I see. But may I just say a word to indicate to Mr. Morris which articles I am introducing?

Senator EASTLAND. I wish you would just let him have the stuff that you want to go in. You can make a list of it, if you want to, get him to sign it, if you want to, and he will give you a receipt for it.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I then offer another document, sir, which is a typewritten copy of a testimonial?

Senator EASTLAND. The same ruling is going to apply to all of those. With anything like that, just give it to him and if you want a receipt for it, he will give you a receipt.

(The documents referred to were marked exhibits Numbers 741A, 741B, 741C, 741D, 741E, and 741F, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 741–A

FP:ACS

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE: Oct.14,1946
JOURNAL NO: 10-22

NAME (LAST)	(FIRST)	(INITIAL)	DATE OF BIRTH	CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Friedman	Julian	R.	6.2.20	

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT.

SERVICE: Auxiliary

NATURE OF ACTION	EFFECTIVE DATE	APPROPRIATION
Termination of services without prejudice	to be established	1970509

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE	Jr. Economic Analyst	
GRADE AND SALARY	$3648	
POST	Shanghai	
BASIC SALARY	$3648	
AMOUNT OF TEMPORARY INCREASE	nil	
APPROPRIATION	1970509	
POSITION NUMBER	A-2873	Abolished

REMARKS

Reason of termination due to liquidation of Auxiliary Service.

Effective date to be established after arrival in U.S. Travel should be completed before 11.12.46

353

DATE OF OATH	DATE ASSIGNED	NATURE OF POSITION: PERM	TEMP	FULL	PART	MARITAL STATUS AND CHILDREN UNDER 21
		x		x		single

SEX	AMERICAN OR FOREIGN BORN	LEGAL RESIDENCE	RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS: YES	NO
male	American		YES	

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Albert W. Gray

1

CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

EMPLOYEE'S COPY

EXHIBIT No. 741–B

FORM FS 348 REVISED 1-4-46

FP:JDB

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE 6-4-47
JOURNAL NO.

NAME (LAST)	(FIRST)	(MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
FRIEDMAN	Julian	R.	6-2-20	

THIS IS TO NOTIFY YOU OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ACTION CONCERNING YOUR EMPLOYMENT.

NATURE OF ACTION	EFFECTIVE DATE	SERVICE (AND CLASSIFICATION)
Termination & Lump-sum Payment	COB 11-15-46	FSS 1970551

	FROM	TO
POSITION TITLE	Jr. Econ. Anal.	Period Nov. 11-15/46 is approved as transit allowable by air from Shanghai to Rockville Centre, N.Y.
GRADE AND SALARY	FSS-11 $3720	
POST	Shanghai	
BASIC SALARY	$3720	
AMOUNT OF TEMPORARY INCREASE	Nil	
APPROPRIATION	1970551	
POSITION NUMBER	SH-69	

REMARKS: Termination of services without prejudice effective COB 11-15-46 Lump-sum payment authorized for 13 1/2 days cumulative annual leave and 52 1/2 days accrued current annual leave. Payment to be made by Department. Further communications regarding lump-sum payment should be addressed to the Division of Finance.
Address: 18 Davison Place, Rockville Centre, New York.

DATE OF BIRTH	DATE ASSIGNED	NATURE OF POSITION: FROM	TEMP	FULL	PART	MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS UNDER 21
				X		Single

SEX	AMERICAN OR FOREIGN BORN	LEGAL RESIDENCE	VETERANS PREFERENCE: YES	NO
Male	American		X	

FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

1

CHIEF OF THE DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL

EMPLOYEE'S COPY

0990 728849

EXHIBIT No. 741–C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 6, 1951.

In reply refer to: FP

Mr. JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN,
18 Davison Place, Rockville Centre, New York.

DEAR MR. FRIEDMAN: Your letter of September 28, 1951, regarding an article appearing in the September 19 issue of the Herald Tribune has been referred to me for reply.

In 1946, you were one of approximately 80 officers in the Foreign Service who were terminated as a result of the liquidation of the Foreign Service Auxiliary. As you know, this was a temporary wartime branch of the Department of State which was abolished on November 12, 1946, following the passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. The term "Without prejudice" was rather broadly used at that time for separation of employees because of reductions in force, resignations for personal reasons, or, as in this case, terminations due to the discontinuance of the Auxiliary branch of the Foreign Service.

It will not be possible to supply you with the various communications you request, since the policy of the Department precludes the release of this material. Furthermore, the Department released no information to the press regarding your employment or your termination from the Foreign Service. Any statements purportedly made by Mr. Eugene Dooman were made by him as a private individual, and not as a State Department official. Mr. Dooman has not been an employee of the Department of State since 1945.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Elbridge Durbrow
ELBRIDGE DURBROW.
Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.

EXHIBIT No. 741–D

THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

(University of London)

Houghton Street, Aldwych,

LONDON, W. C. 2

Mr. JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN was accepted by this School as a graduate student in March 1947. His knowledge of and interest in the social and allied problems of colonial territories attracted the attention of his supervisors, and as there was then a vacancy on the teaching staff of the School he was invited to become an assistant lecturer in colonial social science in the autumn of 1947. At that time the London School of Economics was conducting a course in colonial social studies at the request of the Colonial Office, and it was in the arrangements for the teaching for this course that Mr. Friedman participated. We were entirely satisfied with the way in which he carried out his duties, and in October 1950 he was appointed to a lectureship in colonial administration, since it was in this particular sphere that his interests were concentrated. Once again we were entirely satisfied with the manner in which he discharged his duties. He has now decided to return to the United States, and indeed he had told us from the beginning that his stay in this country would only be for a short period of years.

Mr. Friedman has been a most welcome member of the staff and has taken a full part in the social life of the School. He served for a period as the secretary of the Senior Common Room. The teaching duties allotted to him were not easy to carry out because the field is not very clearly defined; there is an absence of literature and no established tradition of instruction. Mr. Friedman overcame these difficulties. He is a careful and conscientious teacher who has the interests of his students much in mind. Some of these students have been officers of British colonial governments seconded to this country for the purpose of taking a year's course at this School. It was obvious that this country to undertake the instruction of students of this class. Mr. Friedman showed that he possesses the tact and accomplishment necessary for this unusual and difficult duty, and this is a very considerable tribute to him. He has shown in his publications considerable breadth of mind and power of understanding; and he has greatly deepened and enlarged his interests since he has been with us. He is in a sense an explorer in a new country, the boundaries of which are not clearly visible. Thus it is more difficult than elsewhere to produce results. It is greatly to his credit that he has not rushed in and attempted to make contributions before he had consolidated his background. What he has contributed shows great promise of the future.

I have no hesitation whatever in recommending Mr. Friedman as a most valuable member of the staff of a university.

(Signed) A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS,
Director.

28th May, 1951.

Original to Dr. B. Stewart, Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts.

Copied by: JRF.

Checked by: ——— ———.

EXHIBIT No. 741–E

[New York Journal-American, Wednesday, December 12, 1951]

ACCUSES VOICE OF CENSORING SLAPS AT REDS—WRITER SAYS SCRIPT CUT

(By Howard Rushmore)

Voice of America scripts which contained "too hard-hitting criticisms" of Russia and not enough of the State Department's official "subtle and indirect approach" to the subject were censored by the local voice office, a veteran radio writer charged today.

Mrs. Alice Widener of 829 Park ave., said portions of her original scripts were cut to eliminate "criticisms which I considered factual and direct based on thorough research and investigation."

Mrs. Widener, who prepared 40 scripts for the Voice of America's overseas short wave at the standard rate of $40 per script said some of these documents were now being studied by the Senate subcommittee on Internal Security.

HER SCRIPT SUBPOENAED

Mrs. Widener, who appeared as a witness before the Senate group in public hearings last Summer in connection with public hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, said she had testified "for two hours in closed sessions on the Voice of America."

Copies of her original scripts and those used in the actual broadcast were then subpoenaed by the subcommittee, Mrs. Widener said.

The free-lance writer worked for the State Department's local office, 224 W. 57th st., from January to June of this year.

Mrs. Widener said her chief objection came when her scripts dealing with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund were cut to eliminate criticism of Russia "turning this worth-while cause" into "a political football, while refusing to contribute funds."

Since the UN organization was founded in 1946, the United States has given $75,000,000, with 45 other nations giving $115,000,000 including such "war-wrecked nations as Belgium and Holland," Mrs. Widener said.

"I was asked to prepare a script for international broadcast pointing up the value of this children's group," she added.

"Three paragraphs of my script were directly critical of Russia's refusal to contribute to the world's hungry children. They were cut out of the broadcast with only a one-sentence rebuke to Stalin left in."

DELETED ITEM BARED

Mrs. Widener produced her original script and the official State Department broadcast which eliminated the following criticism:

"A representative of the Soviet Union does play a political part in UNICEF by setting on the executive committee. However, this man and his government seem perfectly content merely to sit and talk about suffering children.

"Today millions of grateful mothers whose children have thrived and progressed under UNICEF care can say 'the Communists sit and talk about defending children. But people in free countries act to defend children."

The official broadcast mentioned Russia's refusal to contribute money to children's relief but all other criticism was removed by Mrs. Widener's superiors.

RUMANIA SCRIPT CUT

On another occasion, Mrs. Widener said she had been assigned to prepare a script answering a Rumanian propaganda statement that a mother of nine children in that satellite nation had gone to work on a factory night-shift to show her loyalty to Stalin.

Her original script contained the following paragraph which was cut by the Voice of America in the final broadcast:

"People in free countries wish to know about the sincerity of Olena Pichkova's (the Rumanian mother) gratitude to Stalin. Is it really possible that a woman can be grateful to a political leader for the fact that her nine sleeping children are left without a mother's care at night."

Another script by Mrs. Widener dealing with the same subject had the following criticism deleted in the actual broadcast:

"It's easy to understand just why these Rumanian women and all women in Communist lands are so worried about what a mother can do for her small children while she's away at work.

"Now that millions of these women have been lured and forced by Communists to take jobs outside the home, mothers are facing the tragic fact that neither the Soviet government nor any other Communist regime can provide enough child-care centers and day nurseries to meet maternal needs."

Mrs. Widener said she was dismissed after six months and was told that her scripts "were too hard-hitting and not the subtle and indirect approach" required of State Department writers.

"My superiors were not Communists," Mrs. Widener told the N. Y. Journal-American. "They were merely following their orders from Washington. But most of the principal propaganda points in my scripts were either eliminated or weakened here.

"But I believe that people behind the iron curtain who risk their lives to listen to our broadcasts want direct truth and not 'subtle and indirect' propaganda. That was what I tried to give them. And I found that the Voice of America didn't want it."

EXHIBIT No. 471–F

[New York Journal American, December 13, 1951]

"TIME LIMITATIONS"—OFFICIALS EXPLAIN "VOICE" DELETIONS

(By Howard Rushmore)

Voice of America officials today said that deletions were made in the Anti-Russian scripts of a writer for the State Department's propaganda agency because of "time limitations" and "too much editorial content."

Mrs. Alice Widener, 829 Park Ave., had charged that cuts were made in some of the 40 programs she did for the Voice because her superiors told her the scripts "were too hard-hitting."

Foy D. Kohler, chief of the Voice of America, said at his office, 251 W. 57th St., that Mrs. Widener had "never done anything we considered at all useful."

ACTION DEFENDED

In reply Mrs. Widener's accusation that the Voice wanted more "subtle and indirect" writing dealing with the Russian scene, Kohler said:

"We never considered her one of our psychological warriors, skilled in various forms of propaganda. We have been accused of being too hard-hitting by Western European audiences where we must use the subtle approach.

"We have to tailor our broadcasts to fit the audiences."

Mrs. Widener's immediate superiors, who terminated her employment as a free lance script writer last June, complained that Mrs. Widener "used too much editorializing in her scripts after her point had been made."

DELETION QUOTED

Mrs. Widener had stated one of the important deletions of her script dealt with Russia's refusal to contribute any money to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

The deletion which the State Department now claims was too "editorial" for their anti-Russian propaganda follows:

"A representative of the Soviet Union does play a political part in UNICEF by sitting on the executive committee. However, this man and his government seem perfectly content merely to sit and talk about suffering children.

"Today millions of grateful mothers whose children have thrived and progressed under UNICEF care can say 'the Communists sit and talk about defending children. But people in free countries act to defend children'."

"SURPRISED"

Mrs. Widener said that she was surprised that Kohler had accused her of incompetence.

"Last Summer Mrs. Olive Remington Goldman wrote Mr. Kohler praising my assistance and advice given during the sessions of the UN Commission on the Status of Women at which Mrs. Goldman was the United States delegate," she declared.

"In this letter, Mrs. Goldman told Mr. Kohler that the Voice should be praised for having me connected with it.

"I never knew that Mrs. Goldman sent this letter until she told me several weeks later. She expressed surprise that Mr. Kohler had not told me about it."

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Fine, thank you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Friedman, I want to run through a list of publications here, and I will lay the foundation very briefly.

In connection with your work in the State Department and your interest in the Far East, did you think it necessary or desirable to do any reading in literature having to do with the Chinese Communist movement?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, I did believe it desirable to read.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read some such literature?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. I believe at the time that I read such a book as Mr. Gunther Stein's Red Challenge.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to read through this list and if you remember having read any of these please say so.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. That is, remember reading them at the time of my employment in the State Department?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you remember you ever read the book. Years of Fulfillment, by Harriet Moore?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe I read parts of that; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Soviet State, by B. W. Maxwell?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Racial Myth, by Paul Radin?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I have read Mr. Radin's book.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read Ryuiche Kaji's review of that, by any chance?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Soviet Russia Fights Crime, by Lenka von Koerber?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that volume. Is that a book or a pamphlet? Would you have some indication?

Mr. SOURWINE. The distinction between pamphlets forms and book forms is one I would not be prepared to answer with regard to that publication.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. It might assist.

Mr. SOURWINE. A Soviet Study of the American Position in the Far East, by Harriet Moore?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe I have read that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Literature on the Chinese Soviet Movement, a bibliography prepared by the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Agricultural Economy of China, by L. Madyar?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I don't recall that volume.

Mr. SOURWINE. Karl Radek's Theoretical Analysis of Chinese History?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir, I don't believe I have ever read that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Safarov's History of the Development of Chinese Society?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am not familiar with that first-hand, no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies, Thesis of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I may have read that, yes, sir. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Between the Fifth and the Sixth World Congresses, 1924–28: A report on the position of all sections of the world Communist Party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am not sure of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yelk's The Chinese Revolution?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Would you spell the author's name, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. Y-e-l-k.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I don't believe I have read that volume.

Mr. SOURWINE. British Imperialisms in China, by G. Voitinsky?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that volume either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Hansu Chan, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Revolution, an article in China Today?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Would you pronounce that again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Hansu Chan, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Revolution?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Situation in China by G. Voitinsky?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Again I don't recall that one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Resolution on the Chinese Question Passed by the Sixth Plenum of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Again I don't recall whether I have read that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever read any of the volumes of the publication Imprecorr?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe not, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know what that publication is?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe it would be a publication of the Communist International.

Mr. SOURWINE. International press correspondence, yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. International press correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are correct about the publication.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I have read that, no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read a speech by Stalin in the Chinese Commission of the Seventh Plenum which was published in pamphlet form?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Again I believe I have read speeches by Stalin on China and I am pretty sure that would have been included.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have just a few more questions?

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other country?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I am not a member of the Communist Party of the United States; I have never been, and I am not a member and have never been a member, of the Communist Party of any country.

Senator EASTLAND. Were you ever solicited by any one to join the Communist Party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I don't believe so.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you ever discuss it with any member?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have never discussed joining the Communist Party.

Senator EASTLAND. Have you ever discussed communism with members of the party?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir; I have.

Senator EASTLAND. Who were they?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I referred to Mr. John Horner, of the British Communist Party, of whom I have discussed communism; yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Who in the United States?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I have ever discussed communism with any American Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. What Communists or pro-Communists have you associated with in this country?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In this country?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes. That is, such as Mr. Lattimore. Who else?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Are you identifying Mr. Lattimore as a Communist or pro-Communist, Senator?

Senator EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The only answer I can give is that I have associated with Mr. Lattimore; yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, if you could be more specific, perhaps I can give you a specific answer.

Senator EASTLAND. I cannot be specific. I want information. I am asking a question to get information.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think I——

Mr. MORRIS. You have associated with Israel Epstein have you not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have met Mr. Epstein; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You have associated with him, have you not?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have been at his home; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you think he is a Communist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think I can say that he is a pro-Communist; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you being responsive to Senator Eastland's question under the circumstances?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. If you mentioned Epstein, yes; I know Epstein.

Senator EASTLAND. I did not mention it. I asked you the question. Who else is there?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I just don't recall any American Communists or pro-Communists with whom I have discussed communism.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever discuss it with Agnes Smedley?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think I have discussed China with Agnes Smedley without discussing communism with Agnes Smedley.

Senator EASTLAND. You associated with Agnes Smedley? She was an associate of yours?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. She was not an associate. I have been acquainted with Agnes Smedley; yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Are you a Marxist?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think so, and I don't think the Marxists consider me one, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Would you call yourself a sympathizer to communism?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I would not call myself a sympathizer with communism. I have my own affirmative views on matters political and they are certainly not consistent with the views of the Communists.

Senator EASTLAND. Proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever knowingly assisted the Communist Party of any country, or any person or persons known to you to be Communists or pro-Communists?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I don't believe I have ever done so knowingly, and I don't think I have done so unknowingly.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been asked to do so?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I don't believe I have ever been asked to—yes, I am sure I have made suggestions to Miss Smedley or Mr. Epstein or Mr. Horner.

Mr. MORRIS. Such as what kind of suggestions?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I just don't recall specifically.

Mr. MORRIS. You said you are sure you have made such suggestions to those persons.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well, I mean suggestions in the sense of "Won't you come over for dinner?" or "Won't we go out for a walk?"

Mr. MORRIS. Beyond that you have not made any?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been asked or invited or urged to join the Communist Party of any country?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; I do not believe I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever received any advice or directives on policy from any Communist or pro-Communist source during the entire time you were employed by the United States?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever received any money, reward, emolument, decoration, or praise from any Communist government or its representatives at any time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, sir; not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EASTLAND. That will be all. You are excused.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Tuesday, April 1, 1952, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.)

A

Page

Abe Cabinet (Japanese) 4202
Abe, General Nobuyuki 4202, 4267, 4269
Aberyswyst University (British) 4037
Abo, Baron (Admiral) 4148
Addis, Dr. Thomas 4258
Adjutant General, The 4072, 4074
Adler, Solomon 4322
Advisory Committee 4101
Agrarian China 4231
Agriculture 4070
A. A. A. (Agriculture Administration Act) 4071
Agricultural Economy of China, The 4352
Air Force in China 4134
Akita, Kiyoshi 4148
Allen, Carolyn E 4119
Allen, G. C 4270
Allen, James S 4208, 4209
Allen, Riley 4125–4126, 4146
Aleutian Islands 4109
Alexander, J. W 4089
Alexander, Wallace M 4044, 4092—4093, 4105–4106, 4108, 4109, 4134
Alfred, Helen 4258
Allied Labor News 4078, 4308, 4336
Allport, Gordon W 4119
Alper, Michael (Rabbi) 4115
Alsberg, Carl L 4044, 4092–4093, 4105–4106, 4108, 4119, 4130, 4134
Ambassador (German) 4043
Amerasia 4046–4047, 4058, 4069, 4076, 4093, 4097, 4103, 4106–4107, 4120–4121, 4124, 4136, 4141, 4147, 4149, 4188, 4200, 4212–4213, 4254, 4270, 4282–4284, 4286, 4312, 4314, 4316, 4333, 4334.
Amerasia case 4177
American Ambassador 4099–4100
American Anthropological Association 4119
American Arbitration Association 4327
American Artist Union 4275
American Association of University Women 4138
American, British and French policy 4205
American Chinese Export Co 4081
American Civil Liberties Union 4116
American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression 4252, 4253
American Communications Association 4116
American Cooperating Committee for Chinese Mass Education Movement 4046
Amco (*see* Institute of Pacific Relations-American Council) 4146
American Congress for Peace and Democracy 4114–4115, 4118
American Consulate General in Shanghai 4329
American Council of Learned Societies 4259
American Delegation (October 27, 1944) 4122–4123
American Economic Association 4119, 4259

Page
American Far Eastern Policy---- 4056–4057, 4095, 4278
American Federation of Labor (AFL)---- 4274
American Federation of Teachers---- 4116
American Foreign Policy---- 4135, 4164
American Foreign Policy in the Light of Coming Philippine Independence (speech)---- 4127
American Friends of the Chinese People---- 4064–4065, 4139, 4166–4167, 4169, 4187, 4252–4253, 4272, 4276–4277
American Historical Association---- 4119
American Intervention in Siberia---- 4090
American League Against War and Fascism---- 4118
American League for Peace and Democracy---- 4086, 4114–4115, 4118, 4138, 4187, 4253, 4259, 4272, 4273
American League for Peace and Democracy (Women's Division)---- 4275
American Friends of Chinese People---- 4065
American Museum of Natural History---- 4119
American Neutrality Act---- 4151
American Participation in the China Consortiums---- 4047, 4135
American Peace Mobilization---- 4045–4046, 4051–4053, 4075, 4098, 4140
American Political Science Association---- 4119
American Psychological Association---- 4119
American Red Cross---- 4147
American Red Cross (Russia)---- 4260
American Russian Institute---- 4091, 4144–4145, 4258
American Sociological Association---- 4119
American Statistical Association---- 4119
American Student Union---- 4116, 4277
American Telephone & Telegraph Co---- 4119
American Youth Congress---- 4138
Amter, Israel---- 4117
Amtorg Trading Corp---- 4038–4039, 4042, 4077
Anderson, James---- 4277
Anderson, Robbins B---- 4125–4126, 4146
Anderson, Sherwood---- 4115
Anderson, William---- 4119
Andrew, Seymour L---- 4119
Andrews, Clark---- 4309–4310, 4328
Andrews, Mrs. Clark---- 4309–4310
Anglo-American Coalition---- 4203
Anglo-French-Soviet Alliance---- 4201
Antarctic---- 4147
Anti-Comintern Pact (November 1936)---- 4201–4202
Anti-Japanese Policy---- 4217
Anti-Nazi Literature Committee---- 4258
Araki, General---- 4148
Arens, Mrs---- 4041–4042
Arima, Count---- 4149
Arneman, Lt. Col. George E---- 4125
Arctic---- 4147
Artist, Rev. Edgar R---- 4115
Arvin, Newton---- 4258
Ashton-Gwatkin (C. M. G.) F. ("P. J." per name)---- 4122
Asia---- 4047, 4165, 4267, 4273, 4286
Asiaticus. (*See* Mueller, Moeller, Shippe.)
Associated Farmers in California---- 4113
Atherton, Frank C---- 4125–4126, 4146
Atkinson, Brooks---- 4330–4331
Atlantic Charter---- 4164
Auriea, Juan Mariveilli Vid---- 4081
Austern, Miss Hilda (Mrs. Nat Bretholtz)---- 4044, 4053–4054, 4076, 4086, 4092–4094, 4097, 4105–4106, 4108–4109, 4131, 4134, 4143, 4241.
Australia---- 4070, 4080, 4112
Austria---- 4204
Authors' League---- 4258

Page
AVCO International Corp 4079
Aversa, Ray 4117
Axis-Japan Alliance 4203

B

Bachman, Paul S 4125–4126
Bachrach, Marion 4136
Bacon, Dr. Charles S 4258
Baker, Newton D 4054, 4070–4071, 4086–4087, 4100, 4108, 4130, 4135
Baldwin, Bene 4174
Baldwin, Roger 4115, 4142, 4170–4171, 4174
Ball, Maj. William 4046
Ballantine, Joseph 4324
Bancroft, Frank C 4285
Bank of Japan 4148
Barach, Mrs. Edmond 4136
Barber, Jr., Joseph 4108
Barcelona, Spain 4235
Barnes, Harry Elmer 4091, 4145
Barnes, Joseph F 4035, 4126, 4130
Barnes, Kathleen 4043, 4086–4087, 4090–4091, 4094, 4096–4097, 4108, 4135, 4144–4145, 4208–4209
Barnett, E. E 4107
Barnett, Robert W 4075, 4226–4228
Barnett, Mrs. Robert W 4075
Barr, Captain 4046
Barret, Miss Edith 4275
Barrett, Colonel David 4220
Barrett, Miss Mary 4328–4329
Batavia 4111
Battle Hymn of China 4305
Beard, Mr 4110
Beatty, Bessie 4258
Becker, Maurice 4258
Belgium 4113, 4349
Bentley, Elizabeth 4322
Berezhovsky, Mrs. Alice. (*See* Mrs. Alice Widener.)
Berger, Mrs. Victor L. (Berger, Meta) 4116, 4142, 4258
Berkeley Public Library 4090
Berlin, Germany 4136, 4200, 4203, 4234
Berlin-Rome Axis 4202
Bernal, J. D 4089
Berne, Lewis Alan 4115
Berridge, William A 4119
Bess, Demaree 4135
Biddle, George 4115
Bieberman, Herbert 4038, 4050–4051, 4063, 4066
Binder, Carroll 4140
Bingham, Woodbridge 4226
Birch, Francis 4089
Birk, Louis P 4258
Bisson, T. A 4085–4086, 4089, 4092, 4158–4159, 4288, 4339
Blackwell, Alice Stone 4258
Blake, Katherine Devereaux 4258
Blakeslee, Mr 4127
Blair House 4291, 4293
Blitzstein, Marc 4258
Block, Anita 4258
Blumenthal, Annette 4086, 4108, 4118
Board of Economic Warfare 4161, 4226–4228, 4236, 4238–4241, 4245–4246, 4252, 4254, 4279, 4281
Boas, Prof. Franz 4115, 4136
Bodansky, Aaron 4091, 4145
Boddy, Manchester 4136–4137
Bodian, Clara 4142

Page
Bogdanov, Peter A---- 4042
Book and Magazine Guild---- 4111
Borovoy, Mrs---- 4042
Borg, Dorothy---- 4102
Bosch, John H---- 4115
Boston Globe---- 4299
Boston University---- 4116
Boudin, Louis B---- 4089, 4304–4306
Boudin, Glickstein, and Cohen---- 4300
Bowen, Sterling---- 4258
Bowie, Mrs. W. Russell---- 4115
Bowman, Isiah---- 4119
Bowman, LeRoy---- 4142
Boyer, Richard---- 4258
Brady, Robert A---- 4258
Brand, Millen---- 4258
Brandes, Mr---- 4234
Brameld, Theodore B---- 4089
Brannan, Eleanor D---- 4142
Brant, Miss Phoebe---- 4275
Branting, Hajalmar---- 4234
Branting, Sonya---- 4234–4235
Breines, Simon---- 4258
Bremen Affair---- 4235
Bretholtz, Nat---- 4053
Bretholtz, Mrs. Nat. (*See* Hilda Austern.)
Brewster, Dorothy---- 4089, 4258
Bridges, Harry---- 4121
Briffault, Robert---- 4258
Briggs, Marion---- 4053, 4140
Bright, John---- 4136
British and American Policy in the Far East---- 4203, 4211
British Army Intelligence Service---- 4087, 4131
British Communist Party---- 4316–4317, 4353
British Government---- 4128
British Labor Party---- 4317
British Policy in the Far East---- 4214, 4216
Bromberg, J. E---- 4258
Bronson, George---- 4271
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, District Council No. 9---- 4116
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen---- 4116
Browder, Earl---- 4084, 4110, 4142, 4170, 4172–4175, 4177, 4179–4180, 4182, 4237, 4238
Brown, Delmar M---- 4160
Bryan, Helen R---- 4117
Bryn Mawr College---- 4258, 5260
Buck, Pearl---- 4245, 4301
Buck, Peter H---- 4125–4126
Budenz, Louis---- 4078, 4167, 4195
Buell, Dr. Raymond Leslie---- 4130, 4239, 4245
Bunche, Ralph J---- 4089
Bund in Shanghai---- 4320
Burden, Bill---- 4063, 4066–4067
Burden, Shirley---- 4063, 4066–4067
Burdick, Usher L---- 4115
Burdick, Virginia---- 4091, 4144–4145
Burgum, Edwin Berry---- 4089, 4117, 4258
Burke, Fielding---- 4258
Burke, Kenneth---- 4089
Buss, Claude---- 4225–4226
Butkovich, John D---- 4115
Butler, Maj. Gen. Smedley D---- 4169

C

Page
Caballero, Mr ---- 4234
Cabinet Advisory Council (Japanese) ---- 4147
Cadden, Joseph ---- 4115
Caldwell, Oliver ---- 4143
Callott, M. S ---- 4091
Cambridge University ---- 4089, 4322
Campbell, Dorothy ---- 4328–4329
Canada ---- 4064, 4070, 4099, 4118
Canada Institute of International Affairs ---- 4064, 4099
Canadian Friends of the Chinese People ---- 4065, 4273
Canadian Historical Review ---- 4150
Canton, China ---- 4046, 4111
Carlson, Captain ---- 4125
Carnegie Corporation ---- 4160
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ---- 4107, 4326, 4331
Carr, E. H. (John Keith) ---- 4122
Carr-Saunders, A. M ---- 4349
Carroll, Esther ---- 4272–4273, 4277
Carter, Bill ---- 4208–4210
Carter, Edward C ---- 4043–4046, 4050, 4052–4053, 4065, 4067–4069, 4074–4076, 4086–4087, 4092–4100, 4104–4106, 4108–4109, 4111, 4121–4122, 4125–4126, 4129–4131, 4136, 4140, 4145–4146, 4161, 4188, 4208–4209, 4239, 4241–4242, 4244–4246, 4255, 4263–4264, 4314.
Carter, Elmer ---- 4142
Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center ---- 4145
Case, Everett ---- 4087, 4127
Caspary, Vera ---- 4258
Cavert, Mrs. Samuel McCrea ---- 4138
Central Bank of China ---- 4320
Central China ---- 4131–4133, 4226, 4228
Central Committee of the Communist Party ---- 4336
Century Association ---- 4047
Century Club ---- 4044
Chamberlain, John ---- 4117
Chamberlain, Dr. Joseph P ---- 4037, 4054, 4243
Chamberlain, Neville ---- 4204, 4264
Chamberlain, Mrs. Sellah ---- 4080
Chambers, Maria Cristina ---- 4258
Chambers, Robert ---- 4258
Chambers, Whittaker ---- 4322
Chan, Hansu. (*See* Chi, Ch'ao-ting.)
Chang, Gen. Chun ---- 4150–4151
Chang, Ch'un-kawagoe ---- 4213–4214
Changkufeng Incident (July to August 1938) ---- 4132
Chang, Hsueh-liang ---- 4272
Chahar Province (China) ---- 4151
Chapman, Abraham ---- 4078
Chapman, Royal N ---- 4126
Chappel, Winifred ---- 4170–4171, 4175
Chase, Mr ---- 4335
Chatham House (London) ---- 4108, 4122
Chelyuskin (film) ---- 4042
Chen, Han-seng ---- 4057, 4059, 4060, 4069, 4095–4096, 4141, 4146, 4149–4150, 4231, 4339
Chen, Jack ---- 4274, 4276–4278
Cheng, Chung Book Shop ---- 4283
Chevalier, Haakon ---- 4258
Chi, Dr. Ch'ao-ting ---- 4065, 4067–4068, 4092, 4095–4097, 4104, 4141, 4143, 4179–4180, 4182, 4238, 4352, 4261, 4278, 4319, 4320
Chi Hung-chang's army ---- 4213
Chi, Dr. Tao Heng ---- 4318
Chiang Kai-shek ---- 4059–4060, 4103, 4147, 4149, 4151, 4169, 4215, 4271–4272, 4278, 4283–4284, 4287–4288, 4298, 4302, 4340.

Page
Chiang, Gen. Tso-pin---- 4150
Chien, Tuan-sheng---- 4188
Chin-Doihara Agreement---- 4151
China---- 4035, 4047, 4053, 4068–4069, 4071, 4076, 4077, 4090, 4092, 4095, 4102–4103, 4106, 4110–4111, 4115, 4118, 4121–4123, 4133–4134, 4139–4141, 4147, 4149, 4169, 4178, 4184, 4202, 4215–4217, 4219–4220, 4222–4223, 4228, 4232, 4269, 4271–4273, 4276, 4278, 4282, 4285–4286, 4298, 4300–4301, 4303, 4312, 4321, 4329, 4330, 4333, 4335, 4352–4353.
China Aid Council---- 4079, 4138, 4300, 4318, 4328, 4337
China Monthly---- 4307
China Today---- 4085, 4104, 4166, 4169, 4171, 4174, 4179–4182, 4187, 4189, 4203, 4237, 4269–4271, 4273, 4274, 4276, 4307, 4352
Chinese---- 4058–4061, 4068–4070, 4096, 4102–4104, 4138, 4182, 4214, 4215, 4216, 4218–4220, 4231
Chinese Association of Labor---- 4302, 4303
Chinese Benevolent Association---- 4138
Chinese Communist---- 4103, 4120, 4150, 4216–4218, 4222, 4231, 4283, 4286, 4287
Chinese Communist Army---- 4059–4061, 4103, 4215, 4218, 4222, 4282, 4286
Chinese Communist Government---- 4207, 4313–4314, 4323, 4333
Chinese Communist Group at Yenan---- 4231
Chinese Communist Movement---- 4103, 4104
Chinese Communist Party---- 4022, 4283, 4285, 4333–4334
Chinese Communist Party Policy---- 4110
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (INDUSCO)---- 4329
Chinese Laundrymen's Association---- 4079
Chinese Nationalist Army---- 4103, 4170, 4205, 4222
Chinese Nationalist Government---- 4022, 4058, 4069, 4071, 4150–4152, 4207, 4214, 4222, 4285–4287, 4298, 4302, 4323
Chinese Revolution---- 4136, 4169, 4216, 4352
Chinese Soviets---- 4103, 4120, 4169, 4352
Chinese Youth Delegation---- 4137–4139
Cholmeley, Elsie Fairfax---- 4308, 4317–4318
Christian Student Movement House---- 4124
Christy, Mr---- 4107
Chu, Sueh-fan---- 4302
Chu, Te (Chu, Teh)---- 4022, 4218, 4338
Chu, Tong---- 4036–4037, 4297
Chun, T'ien---- 4301–4302
Chungking---- 4022, 4205, 4283, 4285
Church, Col. Gerald L---- 4047, 4072–4073
Church League for Industrial Democracy---- 4115–4116
Churchman (publication), the---- 4116, 4118
City College of New York---- 4156, 4259
Civil Service Commission (United States)---- 4045, 4163–4165, 4246, 4253
Civilian Personnel Division---- 4073
Clark, Lady Sclywyn---- 4337
Clark, Tom---- 4163–4164, 4297
Claus, Mr---- 4234, 4236
Cleaners, Dyers and Truck Drivers Union---- 4116
Cleeve, Miss---- 4122
Cliveden Set---- 4098
Cooperative Unity Alliance---- 4116
Club Valhalla---- 4182
Clurman, Harold---- 4091, 4145, 4258
Clyde, Mrs. Ethel---- 4091, 4145
Coates, Robert M---- 4258
Cochran, William F---- 4115
Cohen, Mrs. J. X---- 4117
Cohen, Lester---- 4258
Cohen, Rabbi Samuel M---- 4115
Coffee, John M---- 4115
Colegrove, Kenneth---- 4124
Colgate University---- 4259

Page
College de France, Paris ---- 4089
Collier's Weekly ---- 4258
Colman, Louis ---- 4136
Columbia University ---- 4037, 4089–4099, 4107, 4116–4117, 4119, 4227–4228, 4245, 4258–4259, 4260
Comintern (*see* Communist International) ---- 4287
Committee Against Tom Clark, the ---- 4163–4164
Committee for Cultural Freedom ---- 4257
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy ---- 4080, 4083, 4162–4164, 4183, 4282, 4296–4300, 4308, 4317–4319, 4323, 4337, 4339
Communists ---- 4061, 4103–4104, 4154–4157, 4166–4167, 4170, 4172, 4174–4175, 4177, 4179–4185, 4187, 4207, 4211–4212, 4214, 4215, 4218, 4220, 4221–4222, 4232–4234, 4303–4304, 4307, 4313, 4317, 4319–4322, 4329, 4335, 4338, 4350–4354.
Communist Book Shop ---- 4302
Communist China ---- 4180, 4220, 4282, 4287
Communist International ---- 4234, 4341, 4352
Communist Manifesto ---- 4335
Communist Party ---- 4069, 4073, 4153–4154, 4157–4158, 4162, 4172, 4174, 4177–4181, 4183, 4209, 4213–4217, 4220–4221, 4238, 4293–4294, 4296–4297, 4299–4302, 4306, 4318, 4327, 4336, 4352–4354
Communist Party (Chuman) ---- 4081
Communist Party in Germany ---- 4243, 4233
Communist Party in Japan ---- 4183, 4272, 4280
Communist Party (New York State) ---- 4297
Communist Party (Sunnyside) ---- 4081
Comstock, Miss Ada ---- 4044, 4092, 4093, 4105–4106, 4108–4209, 4134, 4143
Congress for Industrial Organization ---- 4274
Congress for Peace and Democracy ---- 4274
Connor, E. C ---- 4064
Conliffe, Mr ---- 4226
Consadine, Mr ---- 4275
Constitution of Japan ---- 4185
Cooper, John ---- 4064
Cooper, Marion ---- 4064, 4067
Corbett, Charles ---- 4206, 4208, 4210
Corbett, Percy E ---- 4208
Costigan, Howard ---- 4115
Coughlin, Father ---- 4110
Connell of International Affairs ---- 4151
Council on African Affairs ---- 4327, 4328
Council on Foreign Relations ---- 4047, 4093, 4097, 4104
Counts, George S ---- 4091, 4145, 4170–4171, 4175
Cowley, Malcolm ---- 4117, 4170–4171, 4175, 4179, 4182
Council for Pan-American Democracy ---- 4125, 4136
Craigie-Arita "Formula" of July 24 ---- 4201
Crane, Dr. Robert T ---- 4086, 4119, 4120
Crawford, David L ---- 4125–4126
Cressey, George B ---- 4258
Crichton, Kyle ---- 4258
Criminal Law of the U. S. S. R ---- 4145
Cristanzi, Mr. ---- 4155
Croatian Fraternal Union of America ---- 4115
Cromwell, Doris Duke ---- 4092
Crosbie, Paul ---- 4142
Crosby, Alexander L ---- 4152
Cross, Judge Anna ---- 4234
Cunard White Star Co ---- 4049
Curran, Joseph ---- 4136
Currie, Lauchlin ---- 4048, 4073–4074, 4330
Curtis, Lt. Col. E. P ---- 4073
Cutler, Addison T ---- 4089
Czaristic regime (Russia) ---- 4060, 4120
Czechoslovakia ---- 4134, 4204

D

	Page
"Dagbladet" (publication)	4236
Dahlberg, Edward	4170–4171, 4176
Daily Worker	4116, 4147, 4173, 4180, 4280–4281, 4316, 4331
Daladier	4204
Danilin, Sergei	4040, 4042
Davis, Jerome	4115
Davis, John P	4116
Dawes Plan	4037
Dean, A. L	4125–4126
Dean, Mrs. Vera Micheles	4091, 4145
DeFord, Miriam Allen	4258
de Goispechea	4235
de Kruif, Paul	4115, 4258
de Naucrede, Edith	4170–4171, 4176
Department of Labor (U. S. Government)	4320, 4323
Deputy Chief of Government Section	4184
Dennery, Etienne	4021
Dennett, Raymond	4122, 4124, 4255
Dennis, Eugene	4080
Dewey, Ethel L	4170–4171, 4176
Dewey, John	4091, 4145, 4171
Di Donato, Pietro	4258
Dickinson, John	4119
Dies, Mr	4244
Dies Committee	4239–4242, 4244, 4246
Diet (Japanese)	4092, 4166, 4263
Dilemma in Japan	4311
Dillingham, W. F	4125–4126
Dimitroff, Georgi	4341
Dimitrov, Mr	4236
Dobb, Maurice	4089
Dobrer, Ruth	4117
Dodd, Mr	4243–4244
Dodd, William F., Jr	4258
Dodge, Stanley D	4258
Domei News Agency	4022, 4121
Doolittle, Major	4169
Dooman, Eugene	4310, 4323–4326, 4348
Dorsey, Lieutenant	4169
Doubleday-Doran & Co	4047, 4070, 4135
Douglas, Prof. Dorothy	4258
Douglas, Melvyn	4062, 4066, 4116
Draper, Muriel	4258
Draper, Theodore	4086, 4093–4096, 4261
Dreiser, Theodore	4116, 4170, 4171, 4176
Drucker, David	4076
Drucker, Mrs. Esther	4076
Duggan, Lawrence	4036, 4086, 4108
Duggan, Dr. Stephen	4107
DuPont, Mr	4127
Dunbar, Barrington	4115
Dunn, L. C	4258
Duranty, Mr	4090–4091
Durbrow, Mr. Elbridge	4341–4342, 4348
Duskis, Miss Nettie	4086, 4089
Dutch East Indies	4205
Dutt, R. Palme	4270

E

Earle Committee	4075
East Asia, New Order in	4202
East Asiatic Studies (University of California)	4160
Eastern Baptist Association of New York	4116
Economic China	4108
Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area	4047, 4068, 4070, 4122, 4135

Page
Economic Mission to Far East 4046–4047
Economic Survey of the Pacific Area 4047
Eddy, Harriet G 4258
Editorial Committee of the Atlas 4146
Efron, David 4136
Eighth Route Army 4058, 4060–4061, 4122, 4149, 4169, 4285–4286, 4288
Einzig, Paul 4271
Eliot, Maj. George Fielding 4125
Elmhirst Fund 4142
Eltenton, Dolly 4078, 4339
Eltenton, George C 4078
Embree, Edwin 4092
Emperor Hiroshia 4147–4149, 4184
Engels, Morris 4117, 4335
England 4060, 4134, 4136
Epstein, Israel 4082, 4306, 4308, 4317–4318, 4353–4354
Ernst, Mr 4234
Ethiopian Fiasco 4204
Etter, Willis R 4329
Eurasian 4203
Europe 4103, 4105, 4135, 4200–4201, 4216, 4267
European Theatre of the War of 1914–1918 4147
European War 4104–4105, 4204
Evans, Dr. Roger F 4245
Eyes on Japan 4120

F

Fairbank, John K 4107, 4206, 4330
Fairbank, Wilma (Mrs. John K.) 4188, 4206, 4330
Fairbanks, Douglas 4063, 4066
Fairchild, Henry Pratt 4116, 4258
Fanelli, Joseph A 4152, 4159, 4187, 4189, 4195
Far East ..... 4046 4047, 4055, 4070, 4092–4099, 4103–4106, 4114, 4120, 4122–4125, 4128, 4139, 4140, 4201, 4202, 4204, 4207, 4216–4218, 4225, 4255, 4261, 4273, 4276, 4312, 4323, 4324, 4325, 4331, 4351.
Far Eastern Commission 4325
Far East Spotlight 4163–4166
Far Eastern Affairs 4021, 4202
Far Eastern Policy 4202, 4205
Far Eastern Survey ..... 4047, 4096, 4098, 4103, 4107, 4114, 4128, 4135, 4140, 4144–4146, 4265, 4279, 4282, 4283.
Farley, Miriam S 4086, 4097, 4108, 4124, 4225, 4226–4229, 4263, 4264
Farmer, Miss Frances 4275
Farrar, Mr 4020
Fascist 4069–4070, 4115, 4118, 4203, 4204, 4214–4216, 4256–4257
Faymonville, Col. Philip R 4078
Fearing, Kenneth 4258
Federal Bureau of Investigation 4045, 4137, 4261, 4316, 4333
Federal Communications Commission 4244, 4327
Federal Writers Project 4275
Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians 4116
Federation of Women's Clubs 4276
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America 4116
Federated Press 4152
Feingold, Abraham 4117
Feis, Mr 4108
Feng, General 4151
Feval, Mr 4091
Field, Edith (Mrs. Frederick V. Field) 4136, 4149
Field, Elizabeth 4108
Field, Alice Withrow 4258

Page
Field, Frederick V ---- 4033–4152, 4158, 4167, 4173, 4179–4180, 4182, 4208–4209, 4211, 4234, 4236–4237, 4238, 4261, 4316–4317.
Field, Mrs. Frederick V ---- 4041
Field, Sara Bard ---- 4258
Field, Jr., William O ---- 4091, 4145, 4258
Fifth National Congress (ALPD) ---- 4115
Fight, the (publication) ---- 4118
Fineman, Irving ---- 4258
Finland ---- 4261
Finley, Moses (*also* Mose Finkelstein) ---- 4152–4158
Fish, Mr ---- 4244
Fischer, Louis ---- 4091
Fischer, Marjorie ---- 4259
Fisher, Dorothy Canfield ---- 4116
Fisher, Galen M ---- 4105–4106
Fisher, Gerald W ---- 4125
Fisher, H. H ---- 4225, 4255
Flaxer, Abram ---- 4116
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ---- 4291, 4326, 4349
Flores, Angel ---- 4259
Fly, James Lawrence ---- 4304, 4327–4328
Foley, Martha ---- 4117
Food Research Institute ---- 4099
Forbes, Cameron ---- 4046
Ford, Guy S ---- 4119
Ford Foundation ---- 4153
Foreign Policy Association ---- 4093, 4102, 4111, 4130, 4161, 4167, 4217, 4223, 4226, 4236–4237, 4258, 4267, 4271, 4280
Forman, Harrison ---- 4301
Formosa ---- 4053, 4112, 4113, 4281
Fornwall, H. C ---- 4127
Forsyth, Margaret ---- 4116, 4142, 4277
Fortas, Abe ---- 4195
Foundations of Leninism ---- 4335
France ---- 4069, 4103, 4133–4134, 4136, 4202, 4216, 4264, 4319
Franco ---- 4216
Frank, Nelson ---- 4327
Frank, Waldo ---- 4170, 4171, 4176, 4259
Frazier, E. Franklin ---- 4089
Free Synagogue Women ---- 4275
Freeman, David ---- 4117
Freeman, Joseph ---- 4170–4171, 4176
French, Beals E. L ---- 4170–4171, 4176
French Friends of the Chinese People ---- 4273
French, Myrtle M ---- 4170–4171, 4176
French Indochina ---- 4098
Friedman, Mrs. Julian ---- 4334
Friedon, Jesse ---- 4304–4305
Fritchman, Rev. Stephen ---- 4299
Fujihara, Ginjiro ---- 4267–4268
Fuller, Miss Helen ---- 4315

G

Gag, Wanda ---- 4259
Gallup poll ---- 4202
Gannes, Harry ---- 4058, 4079, 4147
Gannett, Lewis ---- 4091, 4145
Garland Fund ---- 4143
Garramone, Michael ---- 4136
Garriga, Miguel ---- 4116
Garside, Dr. B. A ---- 4141
Gayn, Mark ---- 4332
Geiger, Ted ---- 4155

Page
Gellert, Hugo ---- 4136, 4259
Gellhorn, Mrs. Kitty ---- 4078, 4139
Gellhorn, Walter ---- 4078
George, Harrison ---- 4084
George, Lloyd ---- 4264
Gerlach, Talitha ---- 4319
German-Japanese Alliance ---- 4151
Germany ---- 4037, 4058, 4084, 4098, 4106, 4113, 4129, 4134, 4137, 4140, 4201, 4203, 4205, 4214, 4216, 4232, 4234, 4235, 4240, 4261, 4266, 4269, 4271
Gessner, Robert ---- 4259
Ghidoni, Albert ---- 4116
Gibbs, Mr ---- 4053–4054
Gleason, Mary H ---- 4170–4171, 4176
Godo, Admiral ---- 4275
Goebbels, Mr ---- 4136
Goh, Baron ---- 4148
Gold, Mike ---- 4170–4171, 4173, 4176
Golden, Ben ---- 4136
Goldman, Mrs. Olive Remington ---- 4351
Goldstein, Dr. Sidney ---- 4275
Goodrich, Dr. L. Carrington ---- 4245
Goodsell, Willystine ---- 4116, 4259
Government Section in Tokyo ---- 4185, 4224, 4230
Goslin, Alexander Ryllis ---- 4271
Graduate History Society (Columbia University) ---- 4153
Graham, Katherine ---- 4170–4171, 4176
Grajdanzev, Andrew ---- 4208, 4210, 4255, 4281
Granich, Grace ---- 4080
Granich, Max ---- 4158, 4173, 4174
Granna, Eleanor ---- 4117
Graves, Mortimer ---- 4091, 4107, 4145, 4259
Graves, Gen. William S ---- 4090, 4091, 4145
Gray, Dr. John H ---- 4259
Great Britain ---- 4103, 4140, 4202, 4264, 4269, 4276, 4278, 4284, 4316, 4334
Green, H. L. Co ---- 4275
Green, Jerome ---- 4037, 4147
Greenberg, Michael ---- 4161, 4188, 4338
Greene, Roger ---- 4147
Grew, Ambassador Joseph C ---- 4056–4057, 4292, 4324
Gromov, Michael ---- 4040, 4042
Gropper, William ---- 4259
Guadalcanal ---- 4266
Guam ---- 4053
Guggenheim Fellowship ---- 4086, 4095, 4096
Guggenheim Foundation ---- 4095, 4261
Guggenheimer, Mrs. J. C ---- 4277
Gulick, Sidney L ---- 4271
Gyles, R. M ---- 4170–4171, 4176

H

Haaser, Stephen G ---- 4088, 4196
Hadley, Eleanor ---- 4263
Haessler, Carl ---- 4152
Hague Rules of War, the ---- 4228
Halperin, Maurice ---- 4259
Hainan ---- 4112–4113
Hammett, Dashiell ---- 4259
Hamilton House (Shanghai) ---- 4328
Han Fu, Chang ---- 4080
Hangchow, China ---- 4047, 4133, 4169
Hankow, China ---- 4059–4060, 4131–4132, 4284
Hansen, Alvin H ---- 4119
Hanson, Earl P ---- 4259

Page
Hanson, Haldore 4020
Hanwell, Norman 4093
Hara, Yoshimichi 4267
Harap, Louis 4089
Harju, Rudolph 4116
Harlem Peace League 4275
Harman, Francis S 4109, 4143
Harper, Prof. Samuel N 4091, 4259
Harpers Magazine 4287
Harris, Rev. Thomas L 4259
Harrison, Peyton 4125
Harrison, Shelby M 4119
Hartman, L. O 4116
Harvard Club 4047
Harvard University 4046, 4096, 4107, 4119, 4259–4260, 4263, 4294, 4328, 4337
Hata, Gen. Shunroku 4202
Hathway, Clarence 4116, 4142
Hauser, Ernest 4093–4094
Hawks, Capt. Frank 4169
Hayashi, Group (Japan) 4092
Hayes, Max S 4142, 4234
Hazard, John N 4155
Heald, Brian 4117
Hearn, Lawrence 4085
Heminway, Ernest 4141, 4259
Henderson, Donald 4116, 4142
Hendley, Charles J 4259
Hicks, Granville 4089, 4170–4171, 4176, 4259
Himes, Prof. Norman E 4259
Hindus, Maurice 4091
Hiranuma, Baron Kijchiro 4267
Hiranuma Cabinet (Japanese 1939) 4202, 4267, 4268
Hirose, Hisatada 4268
Hirota, Koki 4151, 4267, 4272
Hirota Principles 4151
Hirsch, Alcan 4091, 4145
Hiss, Alger 4323, 4326, 4331
History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union 4336
History of the Development of Chinese Society 4352
Hitler, Adolph 4106, 4200, 4203, 4232–4233, 4235–4236, 4264–4265
Hitler-Stalin Pact 4188, 4261
Ho-Umetsu Compromise Agreement 4213
Hodgekinson, Miss Sarah 4299
Hoffman, Alexander 4116
Hogben, Lancelot 4089
Holland (Europe) 4113
Holland, William L 4034, 4052, 4103, 4109, 4119, 4122, 4160–4161, 4188, 4193–4196, 4198–4200, 4208, 4224–4231, 4241, 4262, 4263, 4307, 4349
Hollywood Anti-Nazi League 4062, 4066
Hollywood Groups (Left-wing) 4063–4064, 4066
Holman, Helen 4274, 4277
Holmes, Eugene C 4089
Hom, Q. Pan 4037
Hong Kong 4046, 4053, 4060, 4069, 4129, 4149–4150, 4201–4202, 4307, 4337
Honig Charlotte 4078, 4080, 4081, 4083–4084
Honolulu, Hawaii 4047, 4124–4126, 4129
Hoover Research Library 4225–4255
Hopei 4103
Hopkins, Johns (Institute) 4091
Hornbeck, Ambassador Stanley K 4129, 4280
Horner, John 4334, 4353–4354
Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance 4116
Hotel Richmond, Geneva, Switzerland 4120
Houghton-Mifflin Co 4107
Ho-Umetsu Understanding 4151

Page
House Appropriations Committee 4239, 4244–4245
House of Peers (Japan) 4184
House of Representatives (Japan) 4184
House Un-American Activities Committee 4238
Howie, Miss 4075
Hsia, Dr. C. L 4283
Hsuchow, China 4060–4061
Hsu, Shuhsi 4150–4152
Hsu, Y. Y 4080–4081, 4083, 4312–4313, 4334–4335
Hu, Dr. Shih 4022, 4147, 4242
Huangpu Clique 4216
Huberman, Leo 4089, 4259
Hughes, Langston 4259
Hughes, Nancy C 4108
Hull (Secretary of State), Cordell 4201–4202
Humane Endeavour 4120
Hume, Miss Joy 4137, 4143
Hunter College 4089, 4259
Hurley, Gen. Patrick 4323, 4331
Hyman, Albert 4117

I

Ikeda, Seihin 4148
Illes, Agatha 4259
Imes, Wm. Llyod (Rev.) 4116–4117
Imperial College of Science, London 4089
India 4123, 4270
Indo-China 4098, 4205
Inner Asia 4304
Inner Mongolia 4150, 4226, 4228
Inparel 4087, 4105, 4106, 4108, 4111, 4113, 4121
Institute of Genetics (Moscow) 4089
Institute of Pacific Relations 4033, 4035, 4038–4039, 4042, 4044–4046, 4048–4052, 4054–4057, 4059, 4062–4063, 4065, 4067, 4070, 4074–4075, 4078, 4081, 4083–4085, 4088, 4091–4093, 4097–4101, 4105–4106, 4108–4109, 4111, 4114, 4119–4120, 4122–4127, 4129–4131, 4134, 4136, 4138, 4140–4141, 4143, 4145–4147, 4149, 4158, 4160–4161, 4190, 4195, 4199, 4206, 4208, 4210–4211, 4223–4231, 4236, 4239, 4242–4246, 4252, 4261–4262, 4278–4280, 4292, 4294–4296, 4306–4307, 4313–4314, 4339, 4349
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) 4034, 4044, 4046, 4056–4057, 4065, 4067, 4074, 4087, 4092–4094, 4096, 4099, 4100, 4104–4109, 4111–4112, 4114, 4124–4127, 4130, 4134–4135, 4141, 4143, 4145, 4225–4226, 4253, 4262–4263, 4265, 4287, 4352.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Central Secretariat) 4100, 4102
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Atlantic City) 4123
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Banff, 1933) 4046, 4099, 4102
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Hangchow-Shanghai, 1931) 4135
Institute of Pacific Relation (Conference, Hot Springs, American Delegation) 4123, 4201, 4294–4296, 4313, 4319, 4339
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Kyoto, 1929) 4035, 4046
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 1942) 4099
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Princeton) 4242
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Schofield) 4125
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Shanghai, 1931) 4046, 4101
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Virginia Beach, 1939) 4046, 4077, 4099, 4100
Institute of Pacific Relations (Conference, Yosemite, 1936) 4046, 4121, 4127, 4230
Institute of Pacific Relations (executive committee) 4106, 4111, 4125, 4126, 4130–4131, 4135–4136, 4145
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hawaii Group) 4125–4126
Institute of Pacific Relations (Inquiry Series) 4270
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat) 4068, 4095, 4131, 4135, 4150, 4270

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japanese Council) ---- 4102, 4229–4231, 4263–4264
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) ---- 4099, 4101, 4121, 4135, 4137, 4143
Institute of Pacific Relations Library ---- 4146
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco Branch) ---- 4093, 4105–4106, 4226
Institute of Pacific Relations (Secretary-General) ---- 4130, 4147, 4149, 4224–4226, 4230–4231
Institute of Pacific Relations (Soviet Council) ---- 4035, 4047, 4146
Inter-Continent News ---- 4284
International Committee on African Affairs ---- 4116
International Conference for the Boycott of Japanese Goods ---- 4276
International Industrial Relations Institute ---- 4260
International Institute of Social Research ---- 4107
International Labor Defense ---- 4275
International Labor Office ---- 4108
International Press Correspondence ---- 4234, 4236
International Release Committee ---- 4234, 4253–4254
International Relief Commission ---- 4071
International Research Program ---- 4224, 4231
International Research Fund ---- 4224
"International Security" ---- 4100
International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers of America ---- 4116
I. W. O. Women ---- 4275
Isaacs, Harold ---- 4103–4104, 4136
Ishii, Viscount ---- 4271
Ishimoto, Baroness ---- 4184
Ishiwata, Sataro ---- 4268
Isserman, A. J ---- 4136
Ivens, Joris ---- 4141
Italian Action Party ---- 4283
Italy ---- 4058, 4201, 4203, 4214

J

Jack, Josephine ---- 4170–4171, 4176
Jackson, Rev. Otis G ---- 4259
Jaffe, Philip J. (*see* J. W. Philip) ---- 4058, 4065, 4171–4173, 4176–4177, 4213, 4218, 4278, 4299, 4314, 4316–4317
Jaffe, Sam ---- 4259
Jakob, Berthold ---- 4236
Japan ---- 4037, 4046–4047, 4053, 4057–4058, 4061, 4069, 4071–4073, 4076, 4090, 4096, 4098, 4101–4104, 4106, 4108–4109, 4112–4114,4123–4124, 4129, 4131–4132, 4134–4135, 4147, 4149, 4151, 4160, 4161, 4166, 4183, 4200, 4201–4202, 4214–4216, 4218–4219, 4223–4226, 4229, 4231, 4240, 4270–4276, 4285–4286, 4311, 4313, 4332–4333.
Japan Advertiser ---- 4134
"Japan in China" (book) ---- 4089, 4218
"Japan Picks Up the Pieces" (publication) ---- 4188, 4200
Japanese-American Commercial Treaty ---- 4201
Japanese-American Trade Treaty ---- 4202
Japanese-American war in the Pacific ---- 4205
Japanese Army ---- 4022, 4131–4133, 4265
Japanese Army Yangtzpoo Clearing Hospital ---- 4133
Japanese-Chinese Relations ---- 4219
Japanese Government ---- 4184
Japanese Navy ---- 4112–4113, 4133, 4265
Japanese-Occupied Southeast Asia ---- 4226
Japan Prepares for Peace Offensive ---- 4265
Jenkinson, Anthony ---- 4077, 4100, 4336
Jessup Philip C ---- 4044, 4051–4053, 4074, 4087, 4092, 4097, 4099, 4100, 4109, 4121–4123, 4131, 4134–4135, 4143, 4227–4228.
Jewish Joint Distribution Board ---- 4260
Jiyu Gakuin School (Tokyo) ---- 4263

Page
Johns Hopkins University 4104, 4111, 4119, 4136, 4294, 4296, 4331, 4339
Johns, Orrick 4170–4171, 4176, 4259
Johnson, Nelson T 4056–4057
Johnston, Reginald 4271
Johnstone, Anne 4129
Johnstone, Wm. C 4087, 4122–4124
Joint Report of Chinese Journalists 4060
Jones, E. Stanley 4116
Jorgenson, Miss 4075
Josephson, Matthew 4259
Jouhaux 4234
Judd, Charles H 4119

K

Kades, Charles L. (Colonel) 4184
Kaji, Ryuiche 4351
Kaji, Wataru 4184
Kalvar, Mrs. Robert 4277
Kamehameha School 4126
Kang, Chen Chia 4080
Kantorovitch 4108
Kato, Kanju 4143, 4184
Kauffman, George 4259
Kaufman, Milton 4117
Kaun, Prof. Alexander 4259
Kawagoo 4151
Kawai, Dr 4127
Kawai, Mrs 4127
Kayser 4234, 4236
Keeney, Philip O 4165–4166, 4182–4183
Kelly, Fred C 4259
Kelly & Walsh, Ltd 4150
Kent, Rockwell 4116, 4259
Kerner 4226
Kerr Committee 4239–4246
Kerr, Mrs. Isadora W 4277
Kerr, John H. (Hon.) 4244–4245
Kiaotsi 4061
Kido, Marquis Koichi 4267
Kilpatrick, William (Professor) 4037
Kingsbury, Dr. John A 4091, 4145, 4259
Kinkead, Beatrice 4259
Kirstein, Lincoln E 4259
Kishi, Shinsuke 4268
Kiukiang 4132–4133
Kiukiang Army Hospital 4133
Kizer, Benjamin H 4044, 4092, 4109, 4134, 4143, 4330
Knight, Frank H 4119
Kobe, Japan 4134
Kober, Arthur 4259
Kodama, Count Hideo 4268
Kohler, Foy D 4350, 4351
Koike (Atsunosuke) 4263
Koiso Cabinet (Japan) 4266, 4267, 4268
Koiso, General 4268, 4269
Kolar, Mrs. Julia Church 4275, 4277
Komorowski, Conrad 4274, 4277
Konoye Cabinet 4092
Konoye, Prince Fumimore 4267
Korea 4053, 4129, 4148, 4207, 4217, 4226, 4269, 4272, 4281
Kreymborg, Alfred 4259
Krivitsky 4136
Kubota, Miko 4273, 4277
Kung, Dr. H. H 4320

Page
Kuomintang 4022, 4121–4122, 4214, 4272, 4282–4288, 4298
Kuling 4151
Kwangtung 4131
Kwantung Army 4134, 4267
Kweichow 4068
Kyoto Imperial University 4263
Kyushu (Nagaski region) 4149

L

Labarca, Carlos Contreros 4080
Labor in Nationalist China, 1945–48 4306
Lachatanere, Romolo 4136
Ladd, Milton 4316
Ladijinsky, Wolf 4263
Lamb, Edward 4259
Lamont, Corliss 4036, 4089, 4105, 4170–4171, 4259
Lamont, Margaret L 4259
Lamont, Thomas 4280
Lancaster, William W 4091, 4155
Land, Clayton 4034
Lang, Olga 4231
Langevin, Paul 4089
Lankes, J. J 4259
Larkin, Oliver 4089
Lash, Joseph 4073, 4116
Lasker, Bruno 4075, 4102, 4129
Laski, Prof 4261
Lasser, David 4116
Latin America 4118
Latin-American Republic 4070
Latourette, Kenneth S 4108
Lattimore, Owen 4048, 4059, 4068, 4082, 4086–4087, 4100, 4103–4104, 4106, 4109–4111, 4123–4124, 4136, 4150, 4161, 4195, 4206, 4208, 4210, 4212–4213, 4218–4219, 4264–4265, 4270, 4280, 4296, 4301–4304, 4331, 4353
Lawson, John Howard 4259
Leaf, Earl H 4087, 4131
League of American Writers 4116
League of Nations 4055, 4077, 4204
League of Women Shoppers 4116, 4139, 4275
Leaning, W. J 4208–4210
Lee, Shao-chang 4125–4126
Leebuck 4127
Leffingwell, Russell 4054–4055
Left Wing Communism and Infantile Disorder 4335
Leland Stanford University 4099, 4119, 4225–4226, 4258
Lengyel, Emil 4259
Lenin 4110–4111, 4257, 4335
Lerman, Louis 4157
Lerner, James 4142
Lerner, Prof. Max 4116, 4259
Lescaze, William 4091, 4145
LeSeuer, Meridel 4259
Levin, Betty 4299–4300, 4304–4306, 4308, 4327
Levin, Meyer 4259
Levy, H 4089
Leyda, Jay 4259
Li, Choh-ming 4141
Li, Tsung-jen (Gen) 4061
Libby, Fred 4129
Library of International Relations 4062, 4066
Licorich, Rev. David 4117
Lightbody, Prof. Charles W 4259
Lillenthal, Philip E 4263
Lin, J. H 4277

Page
Lindsay, Michael 4336–4337
Littell, Robert 4091, 4145
Little Era in Old Russia 4091
Litvinov, Maxim 4043, 4135, 4204
Liu, Chieh 4323
Liu, Yu-wan 4087, 4108, 4121
Living Age 4147
Living Buddha 4149
Lobanov 4091
Lobenstine 4107
Lockwood, William W 4058, 4075, 4086, 4093–4094, 4096–4097, 4107, 4129–4131, 4208–4209, 4226, 4228, 4263
Loeb, Julius 4272, 4277
London 4047, 4049, 4098, 4108, 4124, 4128, 4136, 4201, 4204, 4286, 4307–4308
London School of Economics 4348
Loomis, Charles F 4086, 4099, 4100, 4125–4127, 4145
Lopez, Francisco 4235
Lopez, Marina 4136
Loring, Marcella 4276
Los Angeles Daily News 4136
Lovett, Robert Morss 4073, 4089 4117, 4142, 4170–4171, 4176, 4259, 4277
Lowe, C. H. 4127
Loyang (China) 4213
Luan River (China) 4151
Luccock, Prof. Halford E 4259
Luce, Miss Claire 4275
Luce, Henry E 4140
Lui, Yu-wen 4068
Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937) 4131
Lumpkin, Miss Grace 4275
Lumkin, Katherine DuPre 4259
Lund, Thora 4170–4171, 4176
Luzon, P. Islands 4046
Lydall, L. A 4271
Lyde 4146
Lyon, Lewis 4299
Lynd, Robert S 4075

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 4182, 4223, 4224
MacDonald, Jeannette 4127
MacLeish, Archibald 4078
MacMahon Aline 4259
MacMillan Co 4166, 4270, 4278
Machida, Chuji 4148, 4268
Macy's 4275
Maddalena 4234
Madison, Joan 4136
Midrid (Spain) 4235, 4236
Madvar, L 4352
Maeda, Yonezo 4148, 4268
Malaya 4098
Males, William 4117
Mallery, Helen 4277
Malraux, Andre 4301
Manchuria 4047, 4053, 4055, 4071, 4129, 4205, 4216–4217, 4226, 4267, 4269, 4281, 4285
Mandated Islands 4112
Mandel, William 4155
Mangold, William P 4142
Manila 4125
Mann, Klaus 4259
Mann, Thomas 4257
Mao, Tse-tung 4212–4213, 4270, 4334

	Page
Marburg, Anita	4259
Marcantonio, Vito	4117
March, Frederick	4062–4064, 4066
Mariana Islands	4265
Marshall, Dr. George	4136, 4259
Marshall, Gen. George C	4340
Marshall Library (Cambridge)	4089
Martial Spirit, The	4109
Martin, Charles E	4104
Marx	4335
Marxian Quarterly	4089
Massachusetts Institute of Technology	4089, 4260
Masso, John	4142
Mather, Kirtley F	4116
Mathiessen, Prof. F. O	4259
Matsui, Miss	4273
Matsukata, Saburo	4101, 4229–4230, 4263
Matsuo	4230, 4262–4263
Matsuoka	4148
Matsuzaka, Hiromasa	4268
Maxwell, B. W	4351
May, Stacy	4107
McAvoy, Clifford T	4136, 4259
McCall, Professor	4277
McCann, Coward	4120
McConnell, Dorothy	4142
McConnell, Francis J	4116
McCoy, Frank	4054, 4055, 4236
McCulloch, Rhoda E	4116
McCune, George	4226
McCune, Shannon	4199
McGill, Prof. V. J	4089, 4259
McGregor, Prof. Robert	4259
McInerny, Katherine	4116
McKenney, Ruth	4259
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred	4090, 4093, 4105–4106
McLaughlin, Arthur J	4117
McNutt, Waldo	4142
Medical Bureau for Spain (Women's Division)	4275
Meiji Era (Japan)	4151
Merriam, Charles E	4119
Merrill, Lewis	4116
Meserole, Darwin J	4260
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co	4119
Metropolitan Police Board, Tokio	4134
Mexico	4069–4070
Mexican Friends of the Chinese People	4273
Meyer, Ernest L	4152
Middle East	4331
Midkiff, Frank E	4125–4126
Midway Island	4236
Miller, Prof. Herbert A	4260
Miller, May	4297
Millis, Walter	4109
Mills, Saul	4081
Milner, Lucile B	4234
Minobe, Tatsukichi	4184
Mitsui	4148
Mins, H. F., Jr	4089
Minseito	4148
Mierendorff	4234
Mirsky, Jacob	4117, 4142
Mitchel, Kate L	4096, 4100, 4109, 4264
Mitchell, Broadus	4089
Mitchell, Wesley C	4119

Page
Mitsubishi 4148
Modern Age Books, Inc 4258
Moe 4095
Molotov 4043
Mongolia 4100, 4150, 4152, 4202
Monroe Doctrine 4070
Monthly Labor Review 4320
Mood, Fulmer 4089
Moore, Harriet L 4090–4091, 4145, 4188, 4208–4209, 4351
Morgan, A 4270
Morgan, J. P 4055, 4105
Morgenthau, Henry 4056
Mori, Iga 4125–4126
Morrish, William F 4093
Moscow 4035, 4042, 4049, 4108, 4120, 4151, 4203, 4284, 4286
Moscow Trials 4105, 4144, 4145
Moss, Malcolm W 4045–4046
Motion Picture Artists Committee 4066
Motion Picture Democratic Committee 4062–4063, 4066
Motylev, V. E 4020–4021, 4146
Mountbatten, Earl 4331
Movement Against War and Fascism (New Zealand) 4235
Moy, Eugene 4037
Muhle 4208, 4209
Muller, H. J 4089
Munich Agreement 4115, 4204
Murphy, Gardner 4119
Mussolini, Benito 4106, 4204
Muster, Morris 4116

N

Nagano, Mr. 4270
Nagasaki (Japan) 4112
Nankai (China) 4108
Nanking (China) 4047, 4133, 4150–4151, 4169, 4213, 4215, 4217, 4220, 4271, 4273, 4322
Nash, Prof. J 4277
Nasu 4231
Nation, the 4260, 4275
National Committee to Win the Peace 4328
National Council of American Soviet Friendship 4328
National Council of Jewish Women 4304, 4327
National Council for the Prevention of War 4127
National Diet (Japan) 4185
National Farm Holiday Association 4116
National Hosiery Manufacturers Association 4275
National Lamp Shade Manufacturers Association 4275
National Negro Congress 4116
National Peace Conference 4105
National Public Housing Conference 4258
National United Front 4022
Nazi 4205, 4235–4257
Nazi, Congress at Nurenberg 4207
Needham, Joseph 4089
Neibuhr, Reinhold 4116
Neilson, William Allen 4091, 4145
Netherlands Indies 4098, 4104, 4113–4114, 4267
Neu-Koellu 4236
Neutrality Act 4115, 4128, 4202, 4203
New China Daily News 4036–4037, 4079
New Fourth Route Army 4284–4286, 4333
New Masses 4069–4071, 4093–4094, 4179–4182, 4238, 4281
New Republic 4259, 4315
New School for Social Research 4273
New Statesman and Nation 4264

Page
New York American 4234
New York Journal-American 4350
New York Post 4234
New York State Consumers League 4115
New York Times 4235, 4280, 4286, 4330–4331
New York Tribune 4234
New York University 4089, 4116, 4258–4260
New York World-Telegram 4299, 4326–4327
New Yorker, the 4258
New Zealand 4235
Newsholme 4091
Newpaper Guild (New York) 4260
Neymann, Mr 4042
Neymann, Mrs 4042
Nichols, Roy F 4119
Nigata 4149
Nine Power Treaty 4148
Ninomiya, Lt. Gen. Harushige 4268
Nomura, Admiral Naokumi 4265
Norman, E. Herbert 4064–4066, 4154, 4225, 4229, 4231
Normandie (steamship) 4275
North American Trade Consultants 4079
North China 4058, 4131–4132, 4201, 4214, 4218, 4226, 4228
North China Language School 4092
North China Problem, the 4150
North Honau 4131
North Pacific 4124
North Pole 4042
Northern Shensi Province 4022
Norwegian News Agency 4236
Norway 4113, 4236
Nuremberg Congress 4201

O

Oak, Liston M 4142
Oakie, John H 4086, 4093, 4105–4106, 4111
O'Connor, Harvey 4260
Odate, Shigeo 4268
Odegard, Professor 4160
Odets, Clifford 4260
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations 4099
Ogata, Taketora 4268
Ogburn, William F 4119
Ohara Institute of Social Research 4263
Ohtani, Count 4149
Okada, Admiral Keisuke 4267
Okano, Susumo 4183–4184, 4272–4273
Okura, Baron 4275
Olympic Games (Germany) 4234
Oregon Commonwealth Federation 4260
Ornitz, Samuel 4116
Osaka, Japan 4134, 4148
Osaka Mainichi (Publication) 4134
Osborn, Fred 4054–4055
Osborne, Herman P 4136
Osgood 4067
O'Sheel, Shaemus 4260
Oshima, Lt. Gen. Hiroshi 4202
Oslo, Norway 4236
Ossietzky 4234
Osumi, Admiral 4201
Otis, Brooks 4089
Ottosen, Colonel 4104
Ouchi, Professor (Hyoe) 4263
Oumansky, Constantine (Mr.) 4043–4044
Oumansky, C. (Mrs.) 4040
Outer Mongolia 4118, 4202

Outer Mongolian People's Republic ---- 4120
"Outline for A Proposed Study of Chinese Political Unification and Economic Reconstruction," 1931–38 ---- 4068
Outlook, the ---- 4150
Ovington, Mary White ---- 4260

P

Pacific Affairs ---- 4047, 4089, 4102–4104, 4109–4111, 4124–4125, 4135, 4147, 4150, 4161, 4184, 4188, 4264, 4271, 4278
Pacific Club ---- 4127
Pacific Digest (Publication) ---- 4141
Paddock, Robert L. (Bishop) ---- 4116
Page, Charles ---- 4063, 4066
Pai, Chung-hsi ---- 4141
Paine, Mrs. Frances Flynn ---- 4145
Pakhoi, China ---- 4046
Palembang ---- 4114
Palmquist, Elim A. (Rev.) ---- 4116
Paochia ---- 4061–4062
Paoting ---- 4103
Paotingfee, China ---- 4047
Parker, Philo W ---- 4086, 4109, 4114, 4135, 4143
Parkins, Helen, Miss ---- 4137–4138
Paris, France ---- 4201
Paschal, Marion ---- 4092
Paskoff, Benjamin ---- 4157
Pass, Joseph ---- 4142
Patterson (Secretary of War) ---- 4097
Patterson, Samuel C ---- 4142
Pavon, Benito ---- 4235
Peake ---- 4226–4228
Pearl Harbor ---- 4112, 4266
Peffer, Nathaniel ---- 4086, 4089, 4102, 4107, 4134
Peiping, China (Peking) ---- 4047, 4057, 4102, 4141, 4218, 4220, 4227, 4307, 4335, 4206, 4212
Peiping Normal University. (*See* Shih Ta.)
Peiping Student Union ---- 4215
Penseler, Herr ---- 4235
Peoples Government ---- 4070
People's Livelihood, The ---- 4110
Peoples Revolutionary Army ---- 4149
People's World (Publication) ---- 4137
Perkins ---- 4252
Perelman, S. J ---- 4260
Peters, Dr. John P ---- 4260
Philbrick, Herbert ---- 4299
Philip, Cyril ---- 4117
Philippine Friends of the Chinese People ---- 4273
Philippine Masses ---- 4070
Phillips, John ---- 4069, 4071
Phillips, J. W ---- 4170–4173, 4176
Phillips, Herbert J ---- 4089
"Photo History" (publication) ---- 4145
Pichkova, Olena ---- 4350
Pickford, Mary ---- 4127
Pierson, Dr. Emily M ---- 4260
Pittman, Key (Senator) ---- 4128
Pladjos, (N. Indies) ---- 4114
Platt, Phillip S ---- 4125–4126
Plopkin ---- 4044
PM newspaper ---- 4315
Poffenberger, A. T ---- 4119
Polakov, Walter N ---- 4260
Poland ---- 4113, 4136, 4261, 4264–4265
"Politics in Tokyo" ---- 4121
Pollard, John A ---- 4086, 4097–4098
Pomfert, John E ---- 4119
Pope, Arthur Upham ---- 4075

Page
Pope, James P---- 4116
Popper, Martin---- 4081
Porter, Prof. Alan---- 4260
Porter, Catherine---- 4075, 4086, 4093, 4096, 4100, 4104, 4106, 4108, 4122, 4241
Porter, Mrs. George F---- 4091, 4145
Porua, Enrique---- 4235
Powell, Jr., Rev. A. Clayton---- 4117
Power, Cynthia---- 4107
Powers, Eileen---- 4037
Power, Sir John---- 4107
Pratt, George D. Jr---- 4260
Pravda (Russian newspaper)---- 4020
Prentis, Albert---- 4117
Preston, John Hyde---- 4260
Price, Harry---- 4104
Price, Mildred (Coy)---- 4079, 4318–4319, 4321–4322, 4337
Princeton University---- 4053
Problems of the Pacific---- 4100
Progressive Women's Council---- 4275
Propaganda and War---- 4102
Prosin, V. F---- 4039
Prospects for Democracy in Japan---- 4165–4166
Public Affairs Committee---- 4047, 4102, 4190, 4194, 4198
Puskin, Alexander---- 4091, 4144
Putnam, Samuel---- 4136, 4260

Q

Queen Mary (steamship)---- 4049
Quick, Percy---- 4277
Quigley, Harold---- 4225, 4229, 4231
Quigley, Herb---- 4263

R

Racial Myth, the---- 4351
Radek, Karl---- 4352
Radin, Prof. Paul---- 4260, 4351
Radius, Walter---- 4093, 4094
Railway, Chinese Eastern---- 4037
Railway, Trans-Siberian---- 4037, 4046, 4135
Rajchmann, Ludwig---- 4077, 4129
Ramsey, David---- 4089
Ramspeck, Robert---- 4246
Randolph, Jeanette---- 4108
Rathborne, Mervyn---- 4116
Rautenstrauch, Prof. Walter---- 4260
Read, Arthur---- 4131
Realpolitik---- 4124
Recht, Charles---- 4136
Reconstructionist---- 4115
Red Star Over China---- 4082
Redfield, Robert---- 4119
Reed, College---- 4259
Reed, John---- 4090
Reed, Marie---- 4139
Reich (Germany)---- 4136
Reid, Paul M---- 4142
Reis, Bernard---- 4260
Reischauer, Mr---- 4125, 4206
Reissig, Herman F---- 4117, 4142
Renwanz, Lt. Col. Rowland H---- 4072
Reports Russia---- 4090
Requa, Eloise---- 4062, 4066
Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union---- 4145
Resolution on the Chinese Question Passed by the Sixth Plenum of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International---- 4352

Page
Retail Store Employees 4275
Reustle, Rev. Frederick 4117
Revolutionary Military Council 4213
Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies 4336, 4352
Reynolds, Bertha C 4260
Rhoads, Charles, Jr 4044, 4092–4093, 4105–4106, 4108, 4134
Rice, Elmer 4117
Riggs, Lynn 4260
Rinehart 4120
Robins, Raymond 4091, 4145
Robinson, Geroid T 4091, 4145
Robinson, Reid 4116
Rochester, Mrs. Anna 4275
Rockefeller, John D., Jr 4105, 4276
Rockefeller Foundation 4065, 4093–4095, 4103, 4107, 4119, 4160, 4217, 4244
Rodgers, Manvil 4277
Roeder, Ralph 4260
Rogers, Mr. Lindsay 4119, 4274
Rogov, Vladimir 4284, 4286
Rollins, William, Jr 4260
Roman, Agnes 4103
Rome, Harold J 4260
Rome (Italy) 4201, 4203
Romm, Vladimir 4047, 4050
Roosevelt, Franklin D 4071, 4128, 4137, 4340
Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr 4138
Root, Elihu 4100
Rosen, Dr. Joseph A 4260
Rosenwald Fund 4092
Rosinger, Lawrence K 4093, 4155, 4279
Rosinski, Herbert 4124
Rostovsky 4091
Roth, Andrew 4155, 4311–4314, 4316, 4332–4333
Rothchild, John 4091, 4145
Rothman, Mr 4277
Rowell, Chester 4021
Royal Institute of International Affairs (England) 4047, 4064
Rubin, Ruth 4277
Rukeyser, Miss Muriel 4275
Rumania 4350
Rushmore, Howard 4349, 4350
Russell 4135
Russell, Maud 4163–4164
Russell Sage Foundation 4119
Russia 4090–4091, 4120, 4122, 4132, 4137, 4144, 4146, 4202, 4257–4258, 4264–4265, 4287
Russia and Asia 4091
Russian-China Pact 4189
Russian Embassy (Tokyo) 4020
Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East 4091, 4120
Russian War Relief 4097
Rutgers University 4152

S

Safarov, Mr 4352
Saionji, Kinichi 4229–4230, 4263
Saipan Island 4265
Saito, Takao 4184
Salisbury, Lawrence E 4263
Samoa 4053
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce 4207, 4208
San Francisco World Affairs Council 4226
Sansom 4224
Sarah Lawrence College 4259

Page
Sassoon ---- 4228
Saturday Evening Post ---- 4135
Savarin ---- 4199–4200
Scalapino, Robert A ---- 4160
Schachner, A. E ---- 4273
Scherer, Marcel ---- 4037–4038
Schlauch, Prof. Margaret ---- 4089, 4117, 4260
Schlesinger, Arthur M ---- 4119
Schoen, Eugene ---- 4260
School for Democracy ---- 4156–4157
School of Economics and Political Science (London) ---- 4046
Schneider, Isidor ---- 4170–4171, 4177
Schneiderman, Anna C ---- 4117
Schneller, Oscar ---- 4117
Schrachner, Eugene ---- 4277
Schuman, Prof. Frederick L ---- 4243–4244, 4260
Science and Society ---- 4089
Scott ---- 4067
Scott, Byron N ---- 4116
Scudder, Prof. Vida D ---- 4260
Secker & Warburg (publishers, London) ---- 4136
"Security in the Pacific" ---- 4100
Seiyukai (Japanese Political Party) ---- 4148
Seldes, George ---- 4260
Sellin, Thorsten ---- 4119
Sen, Henry ---- 4152
Service, John S ---- 4313–4314, 4322
Seville, Spain ---- 4235
Seychelles Islands (British possession) ---- 4337
Seymour, Whitney ---- 4091, 4145
Sforza, Count ---- 4283
Shanghai, China ---- 4035, 4047, 4058, 4077, 4103, 4108, 4131–4132–4150, 4201, 4271, 4273, 4285, 4298, 4318, 4320, 4322, 4328–4330, 4338
Shanghai Muncipal Council ---- 4202
Shanghai Truce, 1932 ---- 4151
Shankaikwan (China) ---- 4151
Shansi Province, China ---- 4103, 4122, 4131
Shantung, China ---- 4060–4061, 4103, 4131
Shaokwan, China ---- 4169
Sharp (Colonel), Frederick D ---- 4045, 4073
Sheean, Vincent ---- 4260
Shensi Province, China ---- 4122, 4213
Shepard, Oscar F ---- 4125–4126
Sherbourne, Maj. Everett ---- 4262
Shibusawa, Keizo ---- 4263
Shidehara Cabinet (Japan) ---- 4263
Shigemitshu ---- 4135
Shigemitsu, Mamoru—Ambassador to London (Japanese) ---- 4202, 4267, 4268
Shimada, Admiral Shigetaro ---- 4265, 4237
Shimada, Toshio ---- 4268
Shiman, Russell G ---- 4103, 4108, 4130
Shipler, Guy Emery (Rev.) ---- 4116, 4118
Shippe (Asiaticus) ---- 4038, 4110
Shiratori, Toshio—Japanese Ambassador in Rome ---- 4202
Shively, Donald ---- 4160
Sholokhov ---- 4091
Shore, Maurice ---- 4110
Shore, Viola Brothers ---- 4116, 4260
Shotwell, James T ---- 4037
Shumlin, Herman ---- 4260
Sian ---- 4213–4214, 4272
Sian Incident ---- 4150–4151, 5215
Sibley, H. Norman (Rev.) ---- 4116
Siegel, Bernard ---- 4304,4327
Sigerist, Dr. Henry ---- 4091

Page
Sillen, Samuel ---- 4089
Silverman, Arthur G ---- 4136
Simmons, Prof. Ernest J ---- 4260
Simonson, Lee ---- 4091, 4117, 4145
Singapore ---- 4053, 4113, 4150, 4205
Sinkiang ---- 4303
Sino-Japanese War ---- 4056–4057, 4103, 4286
Sister, Marion (Miss) ---- 4062, 4066
Situation in China, the ---- 4352
Sixth World Congress of the Comintern ---- 4336, 4352
Skariatina, Irina ---- 4091, 4260
Slade, Louis F. (Mrs.) ---- 4108
Slichter, Sumner H ---- 4119
Sloane, Gordon ---- 4117
Smedley, Agnes ---- 4146, 4219–4220, 4271, 4301, 4305, 4306, 4337, 4353–4354
Smith College ---- 4258
Smith, Ferdinand ---- 4136
Smith, Jessica ---- 4256
Smith, Stephenson ---- 4260
Smith, Susan T. (Miss) ---- 4086, 4090, 4091
Smith, Readwell ---- 4136
Snow, Edgar ---- 4082, 4110, 4136, 4212, 4218, 4301, 4339
Snow, Edgar (Mrs.) (Nym Wales) ---- 4218, 4339
Social Interpretation of History, the ---- 4110
Social Science Research Council ---- 4118, 4120
Social Work Today ---- 4258
Socialists Student Clubs ---- 4236
Soga, Yasutaro ---- 4125–4126
Sokolsky, George E ---- 4125
Solution in Asia ---- 4082, 4302
Sondergaard, Hester ---- 4260, 4275
Soong, T. V ---- 4077
Sorge, Richard ---- 4319
Sorkin, Isidore ---- 4117
Soule, Isobel Walker ---- 4260, 4275
South China ---- 4132, 4218
South Manchurian Railway ---- 4132
Southeast Asia ---- 4098, 4104–4105, 4228, 4267
Southern Negro Youth Congress ---- 4116
Southwestern Political Council (Chinese) ---- 4151
Soviet Administration of Criminal Law ---- 4091
Soviet Atlas ---- 4146
Soviet China ---- 4071
Soviet Communism ---- 4351
Soviet Embassy (Washington) ---- 4038, 4040
Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact ---- 4187, 4201
Soviet-Japanese Pact ---- 4211
Soviet-Japanese Pact in Historical Perspective, the ---- 4189, 4203, 4211
Soviet Journey ---- 4091
Soviet Russia ---- 4039–4040, 4043, 4060, 4071, 4091, 4105, 4122, 4134, 4146, 4257, 4276
Soviet Russia Today ---- 4079, 4189, 4256, 4261
Soviet State, the ---- 4351
Soviet Union ---- 4037, 4039, 4090, 4105–4106, 4109, 4129, 4134–4136, 4144, 4201–4204, 4214–4216, 4256–4258, 4261, 4272, 4284, 4349, 4351
Soviet Union in World Problems ---- 4091
Soviets in World Affairs ---- 4091
Spain ---- 4069, 4115, 4216, 4235, 4273
Spanish Earth (motion picture) ---- 4141
Spanish Legal Commission of Inquiry ---- 4235
Speer, Robert K., Prof ---- 4117
Spencer, Frederick (*see also* T. A. Bisson, Frederick V. Field) ---- 4085, 4167, 4170–4171, 4173, 4177, 4269, 4270
Spivack, Robert G ---- 4116
Spofford, Wm. B. (Rev.) ---- 4116, 4142
Spotlight on the Far East ---- 4281, 4283, 4298

Page
Spread of the Soviet Movement in China 4104
Sproul, Robert Gordon 4093, 4105–4106, 4109, 4126, 4143
Spykman, Nicholas J 4107
St. Lawrence University 4259
Stachel, Jack 4237
Staley 4226
Stalin, Joseph 4043, 4063, 4066, 4105–4106, 4136–4137, 4335, 4350, 4352
Standard Oil 4114
Stander, Lionel 4260
Stanley, Jean 4276
State, County and Municipal Workers of America 4116
State Department 4069, 4086, 4099, 4108, 4118, 4169, 4207, 4223, 4263, 4289, 4291, 4293–4296, 4301–4302, 4311–4316, 4319, 4321, 4323–4326, 4329, 4332–4334, 4336, 4340–4343, 4347–4351.
State Department (Area Committee) 4323, 4325
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs) 4290, 4303, 4321, 4325
State Department (Division of International Labor, Health, and Social Affairs) 4289, 4321, 4325
State Department (Division of Labor Relations) 4289
State Department (Foreign Service Auxliary) 4290, 4294, 4342–4343, 4348
State Department (Mission at the United Nations) 4299
State Department (Office of the Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs) 4289
State Department (Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Division of Chinese Affairs) 4292
State Department (Protocol Division) 4291–4293
State and Revolution 4335
State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 4263, 4324–4326
Stead, Christina 4260
Steffens, Lincoln 4142
Steig, A. E 4260
Stein, Gunther 4301, 4318–4319, 4332, 4334, 4351
Stein, Mrs. Gunther 4314
Steinhart, Jesse 4105–4106
Steinmetz, Harry C 4089
Stekoll, Harry 4090
Stern, Alfred K 4260
Stern, Dr. Bernhard J 4089, 4260
Stewart, Dean Robert 4326, 4349
Stewart, Donald Ogden 4116, 4260
Stewart, John 4063, 4066
Stewart, Mrs. Marguerite A 4124, 4263
Stewart, Maxwell S 4102, 4170–4171, 4173, 4177, 4189–4199, 4260, 4272, 4275, 4277
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph 4330, 4331
Stimson (Colonel) 4054, 4055
Stolley, Herman 4117
Stone, Marc 4152, 4244
Strand, Paul 4260
Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan 4161, 4184
Strong, Anna Louise 4338
Strong, Edward E 4116
Struik, Prof. Dirk J 4089, 4260
Stuart, J. Leighton 4141
Sturgeon 4108–4109
Suekawa, Prof. (Hiroshi) 4263
Sues, Ilona Ralph 4301–4302, 4313
Suetsugu (Admiral) 4148
Sugiyama (General) 4267
Suiyuan Invasion 4151
Sumitoma 4148
Sun, Fo 4283
Sun, Yat Sen 4110–4111, 4271, 4352

Page
Sun, Yat-senism ---- 4110–4111
Sun, Yat-Sen versus Communism ---- 4110
Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (General Headquarters, Tokyo) ---- 4162, 4166, 4185, 4230–4231
Sutsuki ---- 4148
Suzuki, Bunji ---- 4274
Swedish Prime Minister ---- 4234
Sweezy, Paul M ---- 4089
Swing, Raymond Gram ---- 4075, 4286
Switzerland ---- 4200, 4319
Syracuse University ---- 4258
Szechwan ---- 4061, 4068

T

Taggart, Miss Genevieve ---- 4089, 4275
Taiehrchuang ---- 4061, 4131
Taiheiyo Mondai Chosakai (Pacific Problems Research Institute) ---- 4264
Takaki ---- 4127, 4264
Takano, Dr. Twasaburo ---- 4263
Takayarogi ---- 4264
Tanaka Cabinet ---- 4148
Tangku (China) ---- 4132, 4134
Tangku Truce ---- 4151
Tani, Masayuk ---- 4266
Tannenbaum, Gerald ---- 4328–4329
Tao, Heng-chi ---- 4277
Tarr, E. J ---- 4087, 4121
Tasker, Robert ---- 4260
Tass ---- 4284
Taylor, C. Fayette ---- 4260
Taylor, George ---- 4124
Taylor, Graham R ---- 4091, 4145
Taylor, Margaret R ---- 4062, 4066, 4086, 4092, 4097
Teachers' Union of the City of New York ---- 4259
Teh, Prince ---- 4152
Teigan, Henry G ---- 4116
Ten Days That Shook the World ---- 4090
Tennent, Hugh C ---- 4125–4126
Terauchi, General ---- 4201
Terrill, Katherine ---- 4117, 4170–4171, 4178
Thaelmann, Ernst ---- 4232–4236
Thailand ---- 4098
Theatre Arts Committee ---- 4275
Theoretical Analysis of Chinese History ---- 4352
Third Reich ---- 4235
Thomas, Norman ---- 4234
Thompson, Virginia ---- 4135
Thompson, Rev. John B ---- 4053
Thorner, Daniel ---- 4153
Thornton, Ernest ---- 4080
Three People's Principles ---- 4111, 4122
Thurber, James ---- 4260
Tientsin (China) ---- 4047, 4134, 4151, 4201–4202
Tientsin-Pukow War Front ---- 4059–4060
Tilney, Frederick ---- 4091, 4145
Timbres, Rebecca Janney ---- 4260
Times Atlas in English ---- 4146
Time magazine ---- 4038
Ting, Leonard G ---- 4108
Tippy, Worth M ---- 4116
Togawa, Daikichiro ---- 4184
Togo, Shigenori ---- 4266
Tojo ---- 4265-4268
Tojo Cabinet ---- 4266
Tokugawa, Lieutenant General ---- 4134

Page
Tokyo 4108, 4134, 4147, 4150, 4182–4185, 4200–4201, 4224–4225, 4262
Tokyo Imperial (Public Finance Japan) 4263
Tokyo Imperial University 4127
Toledano, Vincent Lombard 4078
Tolokonski, Mrs 4041–4042
Tongking (China) 4046
Totten, Ashley P 4117
Tovarich 4091
Tozzer, Alfred M 4119
Trade Union Service Association 4079
Tredwell, Dr. F 4260
Troiano, Rose 4116
Trone, S. A 4091, 4145
Trotsky, Leon 4104, 4110, 4216
Troyanovsky, Mrs 4041
Truman, President Harry S 4280
Tsa-chuang 4060
Tsienpu 4061
Tsinan 4061
Tsingtao (China) 4132
Tsuro 4096
Tu, Yueh-sen 4302
Tung, Pi-wu 4080, 4083, 4231–4232, 4323
Tuttle, Frank 4116
Twentieth Century Association 4299

U

Ugaki, General 4148
Uhl, Alex 4315
Ullman, Mr 4314
Umezu, Gen. Yoshijiro 4265, 4267
Unfinished Revolution in China 4082
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U. S. R. R.) 4040–4041, 4043, 4070–4071, 4100, 4134, 4203, 4257, 4283
United American Artists 4116
United Automobile Workers (West Side Local) 4152
United Cannery, Agriculture, Packing and Allied Workers of America 4116
United China Relif 4318
United Council for Civilian Relief 4138
United Furniture Workers of America 4116
United Nations 4231, 4286, 4316–4317, 4321, 4323, 4326, 4339
United Nations Atomic Commission 4055
United Nations Commission 4351
United Nations (Conference in San Francisco) 4232, 4290
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) 4349–4351
United Nations (International Secretariat) 4290–4291, 4294
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 4099, 4330
United Office and Professional Workers of America 4116, 4143, 4275
United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO (Social Service Employees Union Local 19) 4300, 4327
United Press (UP) 4284
United States of America 4083, 4094, 4098, 4105, 4109, 4113, 4118, 4120, 4128, 4131, 4134–4135, 4137–4141, 4158, 4169, 4183, 4202, 4207, 4231–4232, 4234, 4242, 4258, 4288, 4264, 4269, 4271, 4284, 4298, 4300, 4308, 4323, 4332, 4334, 4337, 4353, 4354
United States Army 4035–4036, 4045, 4064, 4072, 4074–4075, 4185
United States Army Air Force 4045, 4073
United States Army Intelligence (G–2) 4045–4046, 4064, 4072–4073, 4125, 4184
United States Attorney General 4162–4164, 4166, 4187, 4244
United States Congress 4072, 4076, 4098, 4113, 4128–4129, 4241, 4290
United States Government 4056–4057, 4069–4070, 4164, 4290–4291, 4311–4312, 4326, 4348
United States gunboats 4118
United States House of Representatives (Special Committee on Un-American Activities) 4187

Page
United States International Student Service 4116
United States, Justice Department of 4244
United States Marine Corps 4169
United States Navy 4113, 4311, 4313
United States Navy Intelligence (Office of Naval Intelligence) (ONI) 4073, 4127
United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Japan) 4161, 4182
United States Treasury Department (Internal Revenue) 4048, 4049, 4069
United States Senate 4116, 4169, 4244
United States Senate (Foreign Relations Committee) 4316
United States Supreme Court 4128
United States, War Department 4071–4073, 4185
United States and the World Court, the 4100
University of Aberdeen 4089
University of California 4159, 4160, 4225, 4226, 4258–4260, 4289, 4339
University of Chicago 4047, 4119, 4135, 4259
University of Hawaii 4093
University of London 4037, 4296
University of Michigan 4258
University of Minnesota 4093, 4119
University of Pennsylvania 4119
University Settlement Mothers Clubs 4275
University of Washington 4104
Untermeyer, Jean Starr 4260
Untermeyer, Louis 4260
Utley, Freda 4060, 4124

V

Valencia (Spain) 4235
Valtin 4136
Van Kirk, Walter 4107
Van Kleeck, Mary 4091, 4145, 4260
Van Veen, Stuyvesant 4260
Vanderbilt 4127
Vassar College 4260
Vincent, John Carter 4279–4280, 4291, 4293, 4303, 4313–4314, 4324–4326, 4339–4340, 4343
Vaughan, David D 4116
Vixman, Mrs. A. H 4116
Vladivostok 4037
Voice of America 4349–4351
Voice of China 4037
Voitinsky, G. N 4352
Von Koerber, Lenka 4351
Von Plettenberg, Count 4233
Von Seckt, General 4061
Von Trott, Adam 4077, 4083–4084

W

Wakatsuki, Baron Reijiro 4267
Wales, Nym. (*See* Mrs. Edgar Snow.)
Walker, Miss 4093
Walking Wounded Collecting Centre 4133
Wallace, Henry A 4252
Walsh, J. Raymond 4260
Walsh, Dr. William Henry 4260
Walton, Miss Eda Lou 4275
Walworth, Mr 4107
Walsh, Richard J 4245
Wanamakers' 4275
Wang, Dr. C. H 4150–4151
War and the Working Class 4284
Ward, Harry F 4116, 4118, 4142–4143, 4170–4171, 4178, 4260
Ward, Mrs. Harry F 4127
Ward, Lynd 4260

Page
Wardwell, Allen ---- 4091, 4145
Wartime Politics in China ---- 4279
Washington Commonwealth Federation ---- 4115
Watson, Dr. Goodwin ---- 4116, 4243–4244
Watson, Morris ---- 4260
Watson-Schuman-Dodd Case ---- 4244
Watts, Richard, Jr ---- 4091, 4145
Weatherwax, Clara ---- 4260
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice ---- 4351
Webber, Charles C ---- 4142
Weber, Max ---- 4260
Webster, Professor ---- 4037
Weisner, Louis ---- 4089
Welch, Clifford ---- 4117
Wellesley College ---- 4260
Wendt, Dr. Gerald ---- 4261
Wertheim, Maurice ---- 4091, 4145
Western Europe ---- 4136
Western Union telegram ---- 4067, 4100, 4141
Whitaker, Rev. Robert ---- 4261
White House ---- 4073–4074, 4098
White Paper ---- 4340
Whitney, A. F ---- 4116
Whitney, Courtney ---- 4185
Who's Who of Pacific Affairs ---- 4122
Widener, Mrs. Alice ---- 4299, 4308–4309, 4310, 4328, 4341, 4344, 4349, 4350–4351
Wilbur, Ray Lyman ---- 4044, 4092–4093, 4105–4106, 4109, 4134, 4140, 4143
Williams, Albert Rhys ---- 4261
Williams College ---- 4259–4260
Williams, Maurice ---- 4110–4111, 4271
Williams, Dr. William Carlos ---- 4261
Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A ---- 4184
Wilson, Edwin B ---- 4119
Winter, Ella ---- 4261
Wiss, Helen ---- 4108
Wise, James Waterman ---- 4142
Wissler, Clark ---- 4119
Wittfogel, Karl August ---- 4096–4097, 4106–4107, 4147, 4153, 4155, 4278
Woltman, Frederick ---- 4299–4300
Womans Press, the ---- 4116
Womens Advertising Guild ---- 4275
Women's Peace Union ---- 4275
Woolworth ---- 4275
Workers Alliance of America ---- 4116, 4275
Worker's Bookshop ---- 4179, 4181–4182, 4238
Works Progress Administration (WPA) ---- 4259
W. P. A. Teachers Local ---- 4275
World Affairs Council of Northern California ---- 4207
World Education Conference ---- 4126
Worldwide Campaign for Thaelmann, the ---- 4234
World Youth Congress ---- 4138, 4277
Wrenn, Heaton L ---- 4125–4126
Wright, Richard ---- 4261
Wu, Ting-chang ---- 4151

Y

Y Gasset, E. Ortega ---- 4236
Yakhontoff, Victor A ---- 4086, 4091, 4119–4120, 4144, 4170–4171, 4178–4179, 4182, 4338
Yale University ---- 4259–4260
Yamaishi Securities Co ---- 4263
Yanaibara ---- 4229–4230
Yang, Li-K'uei ---- 4214
Yangtze ---- 4132
Yangtze Valley ---- 4133

Page
Yangtze River 4058
Yangtzepao Clearing Hospital 4133
Yarmolinsky, Aorahm 4145
Yarnell, Admiral Harry E 4104, 4111, 4113
Yardumian, Rose 4087, 4122, 4314, 4328–4329, 4334
Yarmolinsky, Avrahm 4091
Yelk, Mr 4352
Yen, Y. C. James 4046
Yenan (China) 4184, 4212, 4217, 4220
Yenanfu (Fushin) 4213
Yenching University 4141, 4215
Yergan, Max 4080, 4116, 4136
Yokota, Prof. (Kisaburo) 4229–4230, 4236
Yonai, Admiral Mitsumasa 4267–4268
Yonai Cabinet (Japan) 4268
Young, Art 4261
Young, Donald 4107, 4119
Young, Judaea 4116
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) 4138
Young Plan 4037
Young, Ruth (Mrs.) 4086, 4099
Young, Thomas 4117
Youth Congress at Vassar 4139
Youth Congress in Wisconsin 4143
Yumashev, Andrei 4040, 4042
Yunnan (China) 4046, 4068
Yutsai School 4318
Yzestia Moscow (Newspaper) 4049

Z

Za Industrializaciu (Soviet Newspaper) 4039
Zaibatsu 4166, 4263
Zelitch 4091
Zhulsou 4264
Zimbalist, Mrs. Efrem 4091, 4145
Zions Herald 4116
Zostchenko 4090
Zubillaga, Lius 4235
Zugsmith, Leane 4261

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 13

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CONTENTS

	Page
Bentley, Elizabeth	4775–4804
Bogolepov, Igor	4479–4520
Bullitt, William C	4521–4593
Carter, Edward C	4466–4478
Chambers, Jay David Whittaker	4775–4804
Chennault, Claire Lee	4763–4775
Farley, Miriam S	4445–4455
Farrell, Frank	4407–4438
Hillenkoetter, Roscoe H	4775–4804
Jones, Catesby	4358–4391
Jones, Mrs. Catesby	4392–4399
Kaplan, Irving	4738–4761
Lattimore, Eleanor	4455–4466
Massing, Hede	4798–4804
Miller, Robert T	4401–4407
Moy, Eugene	4355–4358
Philbrick, Herbert A	4782–4804
Weintraub, David	4627–4737
Yergan, Max	4595–4626

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4 p. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. James O. Eastland, presiding.

President: Senators Eastland, O'Conor, and Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you give the reporter your name, please?

Mr. MOY. Eugene Moy, M-o-y.

Senator EASTLAND. Will you stand? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MOY. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, we have had testimony before this committee concerning the New China Daily News. We have introduced into the record a letter from Mr. Owen Lattimore to Mr. Joseph Barnes, in which he makes recommendations of personnel for the Office of War Information, with which both Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Barnes were employed at the time; and Mr. Lattimore's recommendation in connection with the New China Daily News says here:

> One of the outstanding rallying points of the unaffiliated Chinese in America is the New China Daily News in New York.

Then he goes on to give some comment on the nature of the New China Daily News.

Now, today we subpenaed two of the editors of the New China Daily News. At least, they have been editors of the New China Daily News. Mr. Chew Hong was mentioned in this letter at the bottom of page 2:

> Mr. Chi and Mr. Chew Hong, both of our New York office, conform excellently to these requirements.

Mr. Chew Hong, we are informed by the marshal's office, is now in Red China, and therefore is not here today. We have here, however, Mr. Eugene Moy, and we would like to determine whether he is one of the editors of the New China Daily News.

Senator EASTLAND. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Moy, are you an editor of the New China Daily News?

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE MOY, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BENEDICT WOLF

Mr. MOY. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean you won't even tell this committee whether or not you are now one of the editors of the New China Daily News?

Mr. MOY. I have stated as I did this morning when you asked me questions.

Mr. MORRIS. In executive session?

Mr. MOY. That the Federal grand jury is conducting an investigation of the New China Daily News.

Senator EASTLAND. Are you a citizen of the United States?

Mr. MOY. Should I finish?

Senator EASTLAND. No, I asked you a question, and I want you to answer it.

Mr. MOY. Yes, I am.

Senator EASTLAND. How did you become a citizen?

Mr. MOY. Because my father was born here.

Senator EASTLAND. Where were you born?

Mr. MOY. I was born in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You were saying you refused to answer on the grounds that the Federal grand jury in New York is conducting an investigation of the New China Daily News.

Mr. MOY. Of the New China Daily News. And I have been subpenaed to appear before the grand jury several times, to be exact, four times, in connection with that investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. So therefore you will not even tell us whether you are an editor of that paper. Your name appears upon the masthead, does it not?

Mr. MOY. That would tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, tell me this, sir. Does your name appear on the masthead of the New China Daily News?

Mr. MOY. I decline to answer on the ground that it would tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a question right there?

Is it not required that there be published reports as to who are the editors or publishers of newspapers in New York State?

Mr. MOY. Yes, it is.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, have such reports been made, and are they being made currently?

Mr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you have those reports? Are they available?

Mr. MOY. You mean in the newspaper?

Senator O'CONOR. Either in the newspaper or copies of reports that you make to the State authorities in accordance with law.

Mr. MOY. I decline to answer that, because it would tend to incriminate me.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, now, I am not asking you as to what you did. I am asking you whether this particular publication has made reports; which may not include you; may or may not include you. But I am asking you whether such reports have been made.

Mr. MOY. I noticed that papers do make reports.

Senator O'CONOR. Papers do make reports. Well, do you know whether this particular publication has made a report, in accordance with the law of the State?

Mr. MOY. In accordance with the law of the State, all papers do.

Senator O'CONOR. All papers do. And this paper did?

Mr. MOY. I think it does.

Senator O'CONOR. You think it did. When, to your knowledge, did the paper make the last report as to its ownership and publishers?

Mr. MOY. Oh, the paper usually does it on October 1.

Senator O'CONOR. And to your knowledge did this paper do it on last October 1?

Mr. MOY. All papers do.

Senator O'CONOR. All papers do. Well, that is a matter of public record, is it not?

Mr. MOY. I think it is.

Senator EASTLAND. Well, if it is a matter of public record, why can you not answer the question?

Mr. MOY. I have stated the facts, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last communicate with anyone on the continent of Asia?

Mr. MOY. I decline to answer because of possible self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, that question has nothing to do with the New China Daily News. Will you answer the question now?

Mr. MOY. My answer stands.

Mr. MORRIS. It is still the same?

Mr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Even though the question was the first of a series of questions that had no relation whatsoever to the New China Daily News?

Mr. MOY. My answer stands.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when did you last communicate with Mr. Chew Hong?

Mr. MOY. I decline to answer on the same ground.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the ground?

Mr. MOY. Of possible self-incrimination.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think we can get any information from this witness. I would like the record to show we made an effort to find out the nature of the New China Daily News.

Senator EASTLAND. And that is even though he claims to be an American citizen. He insists, by his silence, in aiding and abetting a country that is now murdering American boys. I think if he is an American citizen, he is a disgrace to the United States, and the quicker we get rid of such cattle the better off this country will be.

You may stand aside.

EUGENE MOY

410 OCEAN AVENUE

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, *April 9, 1952.*

INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE,
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

(Att.: Robert Morris, Counsel.)

GENTLEMEN: With reference to the hearing in executive session at which I appeared in Senator Ferguson's office on April 3rd, 1952, you asked me whether I had ever endorsed a check whose face bore the signature of Frederick V. Field.

I had no recollection of such endorsement at the time and I therefore answered "no". Since then my recollection has been refreshed, and I now wish to inform you that in December 1948, I endorsed a check which had been signed by Frederick V. Field, made out to cash, for $450.00. I therefore want to correct the record, and ask you to make this part of the record of the hearing in executive session.

Very truly yours,

EUGENE MOY.

Call your next witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you get the next witnesses?

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). Will you kindly stand?

In the presence of Almighty God, do you swear that the testimony you give the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JONES. I do.

Mrs. JONES. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, what is your present occupation?

TESTIMONY OF MR. AND MRS. CATESBY T. JONES, BALTIMORE, MD., ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR COUNSEL, JOSEPH FANELLI

Mr. JONES. I am a graduate student of the Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. MORRIS. And what is your residence?

Mr. JONES. My residence is 5413 Falls Road Terrace, Baltimore 10, Md.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, have you ever held a fellowship at the Walter Hines Page School?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you hold that fellowship?

Mr. JONES. From October 1949 to June 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. Who obtained that fellowship for you?

Mr. JONES. Owen Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he do that?

Mr. JONES. I have no idea.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, did you ask him to?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. He voluntarily obtained the fellowship for you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, testimony has come up in our public record to the effect that you and Mr. Owen Lattimore, Mrs. Lattimore, and Edward C. Carter met in a restaurant, the Aldo Cafe, here in Washington, after a public session of this committee. Did you, in fact, have a meeting in the Aldo Cafe with the persons that I just mentioned?

Mr. JONES. We had dinner in the Aldo Cafe.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date?

Mr. JONES. To the best of my recollection, the date was August 22, 1951.

Mr. MORRIS. August—what was the date?

Mr. JONES. The 22d.

Mr. MORRIS. And who was the witness before the committee on that day?

Mr. JONES. Mr. Louis Budenz.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you attend the meeting that day?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Of this committee? You sat in this room while Mr. Budenz testified, did you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did Owen Lattimore ask you to attend the hearing that day?

Mr. JONES. No, sir, he did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you voluntarily attend the hearing?

Mr. JONES. I attended the hearing at the request of Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Of Mrs. Lattimore. And what did you do after you attended the hearing?

Mr. JONES. I went to the law offices of Arnold, Fortas & Porter.

Mr. MORRIS. And what did you do there?

Mr. JONES. I presented the notes that I had taken to Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you meet Mr. Carter in Mr. Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing there?

Mr. JONES. I don' t know, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But you did meet him?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I met him.

Mr. MORRIS. So, in Mr. Fortas' office that evening there were yourself, Mr. Owen Lattimore, Mrs. Lattimore, and Mr. Fortas?

Mr. JONES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Fortas present?

Mr. JONES. Oh, oh; excuse me, sir. Mr. Fortas was not present.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any member of the firm present?

Mr. JONES. No senior member of the firm was present.

Senator EASTLAND. No senior member? What does he mean?

Mr. JONES. Well, there were employees. That is the only thing I was trying to cover, Senator.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else was present?

Mr. JONES. Oh, typists.

Senator EASTLAND. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what did you do at the request of Mrs. Lattimore that afternoon? Will you tell the committee in great detail precisely what you did?

Mr. JONES. That afternoon, I came to this committee room and took notes on the testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Mrs. Lattimore here in the room?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; she was not.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether she attended any of the preceding hearings?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I don't know that for a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Carter in the room?

Mr. JONES. I believe he was; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Carter, did you not?

Mr. JONES. No, at that time I didn't know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that.

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I was not a member of the Communist Party at that time.

Senator O'CONOR. Had you been before that?

Mr. JONES. And I will add that for the past 10 years I have not been a member of the Communist Party, nor connected in any way with communism, Communists, or Communist activities.

Senator O'CONOR. Had you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. FANELLI. You may claim privilege.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments and any other constitutional rights that may be available to me.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, previously you said that you had received a fellowship to the Johns Hopkins University through the efforts of Owen Lattimore. That is correct?

Mr. JONES. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. How long have you known him?

Mr. JONES. I met him in the spring of 1949.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you discuss with him any of your connections prior to 10 years ago?

Mr. JONES. No political connections, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, to what extent.

Mr. JONES. Employment and academic record. That was all that was discussed.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you mean to say that Owen Lattimore recommended you for a fellowship with no greater knowledge than that of your past background and affiliations?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the fact that you had been a Communist prior to 10 years did not make any difference?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I will respectfully have to decline to answer that question.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, let us put it this way. Did Owen Lattimore ever inquire as to what possible connections you had with the Communist Party?

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer.

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you ever volunteer or discuss with him anything as to any of your connections prior to 10 years ago?

Mr. FANELLI. You may claim privilege on that.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I decline to answer that. I respectfully decline to answer that on the same grounds.

Senator EASTLAND. Now, let us see. Will you repeat the question? I did not understand.

Senator O'CONOR. My question is whether or not, even though Owen Lattimore had not asked you as to your possible connections with the Communist Party, you had volunteered to him any information.

Senator EASTLAND. In other words, whether he gave Owen Lattimore information as to whether or not he was a Communist 10 years ago?

Senator O'CONOR. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. And he declines to answer on the grounds that it might incriminate him?

Senator O'CONOR. Is that right?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. And of course that means that he did, and then Lattimore recommended him.

Mr. FANELLI. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, wait. The witness refused to answer that question, as to whether or not he did tell him.

Mr. FANELLI. If you will ask him about the time of the fellowship, I will instruct him to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. I am asking him whether, at or before the time that Lattimore recommended him for the fellowship, he, the witness, had discussed with Lattimore his prior connections if any with the Communist Party.

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that question.

Mr. JONES. The answer to that, sir, is "No."

Senator O'CONOR. Did you ever volunteer any information to him as to your past possible connections with the Communist Party?

Mr. FANELLI. Senator, at any time?

Senator O'CONOR. At any time.

Mr. FANELLI. On that you will claim privilege.

Senator EASTLAND. We are right back where we were at first.

Mr. FANELLI. But the difference was between at or before, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. Therefore, I broke it down into two parts.

Mr. FANELLI. He will claim privilege on the second question.

Senator O'CONOR. So that you now decline to answer whether or not you discussed with Lattimore your possible connections with the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. When Owen Lattimore recommended you for the fellowship, did he have information that you at any time had been a Communist or connected with the Communist movement?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. He had no such information?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. To your knowledge?

Mr. JONES. To my knowledge.

Senator EASTLAND. And you had never given him such information?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, when you met with him subsequent to the hearing in this room, did Owen Lattimore have any information of your possible past connections with the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

(Short recess.)

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, this morning in executive session, were you asked the question: "Were you a member of the Communist Party at the time that you, at the request of Eleanor Lattimore, attended the hearings before this committee on August 22, 1951?" Were you asked that question this morning in executive session?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, I believe I was asked that.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your answer at that time?

Mr. JONES. My answer was "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait. Did you say that you refused to answer on the ground that it might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. I probably did, sir. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in good faith, this morning, when you answered that question, that on August 22, 1951, you were at that time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. This morning no date was mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. The date was when she talked to you about coming down here.

Mr. MORRIS. That was the date of the hearing that you attended. Were you in good faith when at that time you said you refused to answer on the grounds that an answer would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, I was in good faith.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when that same question was asked you today, this afternoon, why did you give a different answer?

Mr. JONES. I consulted with counsel today.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know, Mr. Jones, that when you claimed your privilege under the fifth amendment by declining to answer on the grounds that it might incriminate you, you were saying to the committee that, in your opinion, if you answered that question it might incriminate you? That is, in your opinion if you answered it truthfully it might incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you meant this morning when you declined to answer that question?

Mr. JONES. I would like to consult with counsel, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. By all means do so.

Mr. FANELLI. May we have a minute, Senator?

(Mr. Jones leaves the room to consult with his counsel, returning shortly thereafter.)

Senator FERGUSON. Now what is your answer?

Mr. FANELLI. What was the question, Senator? I have forgotten.

Senator O'CONOR. The question is whether or not at the executive hearing this morning your answer to the question as to whether or not you were a member of the Communist Party as of the date when you attended the hearing here last August—whether your answer was not that you declined to answer on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, that was my answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then the question was, Mr. Jones, if the Chair will permit me, as to whether, in answering in that manner, you intended to tell the committee that, in your opinion, if you answered that question truthfully, it might incriminate you?

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, how do you reconcile that answer? This afternoon, it does not tend to incriminate you. This morning it did.

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that.

Mr. JONES. I would like to make that perfectly clear. This morning I answered questions in the way I did in good faith on the advice of counsel. This afternoon, counsel has conferred with me further. The only thing involved this morning was a question of waiver. My counsel has checked up on this question of waiver, and now, on advice of counsel, I am answering more fully.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, your counsel came to the conclusion and told you so, that you were not waiving, that you could claim it on any question?

Mr. FANELLI. You don't have to answer as to what your counsel told you.

Senator O'CONOR. Just a minute, Counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot ask you what you told him, but there is no reason why he cannot tell me.

Mr. FANELLI. I don't think he has any objection.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead and tell me, then.

Mr. JONES. What was that again, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Your counsel advised you that you could claim privilege on any particular question; is that right?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you did not waive it, if you did answer one question. It would not waive as to another question.

Mr. JONES. In the 10-year period; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1942? That is 10 years and 1 day from today.

Mr. FANELLI. You may answer that.

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you leave the Communist Party, Mr. Jones?

Mr. FANELLI. You will decline to answer that.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I decline to answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we have a situation here in which counsel is telling the witness in advance of each answer as to whether to answer or not to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. Counsel, that is manifestly improper. You are not to make responses to the questions of counsel. The witness, of course, has a right to consult you for your advice, but you are not testifying.

Mr. FANELLI. Mr. Senator, I didn't mean to testify. I am merely indicating advice that is helpful. It is helpful to the committee if I can advise him.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you enlighten us on some testimony that is in this record to the effect that you gave an envelope to Owen Lattimore containing the record in an immigration case? Would you clear that up? Or gave it to Fortas?

Mr. FANELLI. No; not to Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. To Fortas?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you clear it up and tell us where the record came from, so that we would know whether it was the official record?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you do that now?

Mr. FANELLI. Certainly. I have no objection, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you desire to be sworn?

Mr. FANELLI. If the committee is going to ask me just about this, I am perfectly willing to tell it under oath or otherwise, Senator, as you desire. I am glad to accommodate the Senator. There is no secret about this.

Senator FERGUSON. I would be glad to know.

Mr. FANELLI. At the time of the Tydings hearings—it is no longer in my memory as to when those were; it may be a year ago, so I would have to check the date—but at the time of the Tydings hearings, I called Mr. Fortas. I had read in the paper that Mr. Budenz had testified in connection with Mr. Lattimore. There was an accusation of some sort. He might have testified that he was a member of the party. I don't remember that exactly. I wasn't following these

hearings closely. I had the copy of the transcript of a deportation proceeding against a Mr. John Santos.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was your client?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, he was. I was cocounsel in that case, as an immigration expert. It happens to be my primary field.

In that proceeding, one of the charges, I think the main charge, against Santos, was that he had been a member of the Communist Party, a charge that he had denied. I was cocounsel in that proceeding, and was given an extra copy of the transcript. I may say that the chief counsel in that proceeding, who had theretofore been counsel for the union, the Transport Workers Union, of which Santos was an officer at the time, was Mr. Harry Sacher, who has achieved some notoriety since.

Senator FERGUSON. He was sentenced for contempt in the 11 Communists trial?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he also receive a copy of the transcript?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes. It must have been, because I was in Washington, and he was in New York, and we were both on the case.

I would like it noted also for the record, Senator, that after the hearings in that case I withdrew from that proceeding. The reason I withdrew is that I was unable to get along with Mr. Sacher. I want to be fair to Mr. Sacher. It had nothing to do with any political difference, although I am sure there must be political differences between him and I. But I just couldn't stand him as cocounsel. Now, that is how I had this copy of the transcript.

Now, when I read in the paper that Mr. Budenz had just testified or was about to testify, I knew I had this transcript, which included a cross-examination of Mr. Budenz. He had been cross-examined in that proceeding.

Mr. MORRIS. By whom?

Mr. FANELLI. By Sacher. Sacher had done all the cross-examining. My function in that case was primarily to advise on questions of law, on immigration law.

In the course of that, he had claimed privilege a number of times. And I called Fortas, whom I know by reason of the fact that I was once at the Interior Department. We are not close friends, but I knew him in that connection. I knew he was Lattimore's counsel. And I asked him whether this material would be of interest to him and to the Tydings committee, and said if so he could have it.

He said he at least would like to look at it. I didn't give it to him in an envelope, that I can recall. He may have sent over for it. Maybe it was in an envelope addressed to him.

Thereafter, it has never come back, and I don't know what has happened to it, except that there have been some little items in the newspaper about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you had an extra copy of the transcript.

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir; two copies were made.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the Immigration Service had stated that only one copy was given, and that that was given to counsel for purposes of appeal?

Mr. FANELLI. May I say I heard something to that effect here, at one of these hearings within the past week. Or maybe I read it in

the paper. I have seen it or heard it stated, that the Immigration Service has said that; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In fact, you are stating that there were two copies.

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that one was given to Mr. Sacher and one to you?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that the copy which you gave to Mr. Lattimore's attorney for his use before the Tydings committee was not the same copy as that which was given Mr. Sacher?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you know that the copy which was given Mr. Sacher for use on appeal was under the restriction that it would not be otherwise used?

Mr. FANELLI. That may be. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the copy that was given you under any such restriction?

Mr. FANELLI. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who gave you that copy?

Mr. FANELLI. The reporter was requested to give me another copy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who requested the reporter to give it to you?

Mr. FANELLI. I suppose the presiding official at the time.

Mr. SOURWINE. And it was done without any restrictions?

Mr. FANELLI. No, sir. I may say that was a public hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; and you understand that you got that transcript without any restrictions?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that any restrictions which the record shows applied to Mr. Sacher would apply also to you?

Mr. FANELLI. I doubt that there would be any restrictions applicable to him. I don't know, in fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there were, in fact, restrictions on him, would they apply equally to you?

Mr. FANELLI. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you felt you had the transcript without any restrictions?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

I would like to say this, Mr. Sourwine: I am sure that if the immigration office in New York, that is, the head of that office or one of its officials, informed the committee that the record shows that Sacher only had—or that there was only one copy of this that went to Sacher, that must be the occasion in the record, and they were telling what they believed to be the fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the rules in immigration cases?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any rule with regard to the handling of the transcripts of such cases?

Mr. FANELLI. There is a—it is not a regulation. Usually, almost invariably, let's put it that way, a deportation proceeding is not a public hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Do you know of any rule applicable to the transcripts of such hearings?

Mr. FANELLI. Not a rule, but I am going on to answer your question. In deportation proceedings, which generally are not public proceedings—I mean usually they aren't—a transcript is given to counsel for the respondent in a deportation proceeding, and he usually is asked to sign a receipt for that, which states, as I recall it, that he will not make a copy of it, and he will return it. It is a loan.

Senator FERGUSON. And it is for the lawyer alone?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir; in a deportation proceeding, which is a private proceeding, and that is for the protection, as I understand it—it is a receipt. It is for protection.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave this out without the consent of your client?

Mr. FANELLI. Sir, it was a public hearing.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; but you gave it out, though, without the consent of your client?

Mr. FANELLI. There was no consent required. But the answer to your question is "Yes." I gave it out without my client.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are saying that the Santos hearing was a public hearing?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. And all of the testimony in this transcript was testimony that had been given in public?

Mr. FANELLI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that you signed no receipt at the time you got the transcript?

Mr. FANELLI. That is my best recollection, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it certified as a true transcript?

Mr. FANELLI. Gee, I would have to see it. I doubt it, since mine was a copy, but I am just not sure, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. I think I had asked Mr. Jones if he had been a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1942.

And you had stated that you were not.

Mr. JONES. I answered "No."

Mr. MORRIS. Now, had you been a member of the Communist Party in April 1941?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I decline to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement that the witness has volunteered in his preceding answers in connection with the questions about his association with the Communist Party, I ask that he be directed to answer that question.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. The Chair directs that you answer that question.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I still have to decline, respectfully decline, under the first and fifth amendments and any other constitutional rights that are available.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you telling the committee by that declination that in your opinion, if you answer that question truthfully, it might incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, were you a member of the Communist Party on the first of October 1942?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party on the first of October 1941?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party on January 1, 1942?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member of the Communist Party on December 1, 1941?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you resign from the Communist Party or otherwise sever your connections with it?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you resign from the Communist Party? Could you tell us the procedure?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you have never resigned from the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I am not a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if you have ever resigned from the Communist Party.

Mr. JONES. I would like to consult with counsel.

(Mr. Jones confers with his counsel.)

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Senator O'CONOR. On the grounds that the answer, if given truthfully, might tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, Mr. Jones, in the light of your previous response that you do not know how a resignation is effected, how, then, do you feel that your answer as to whether you did resign as of a certain date would incriminate you, if you are not aware of the manner or method of resigning?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I am going to have to consult with counsel again. I am sorry.

(Mr. Jones confers with his counsel.)

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that. I am not competent to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Wait. What do you mean by "not competent"?

Mr. JONES. I respectfully decline to answer that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On what ground?

Mr. JONES. On the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones, did you answer truthfully when you answered Senator Ferguson's question as to whether you knew how a resignation from the Communist Party was effected, when you said "I don't know"? Was that a truthful statement?

Mr. JONES. I will have to consult with counsel.

Mr. FANELLI. Answer it.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had ever resigned from the Communist Party you would know how it was done; wouldn't you?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; not necessarily.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you could have resigned from the Communist Party without knowing how it was done?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'Conor. How? Explain your answer on that, Mr. Jones. How could you have taken an action without knowing how that action was to be pursued? How could that possibly be?

Mr. Jones. Memory could fail with all little technical formal things.

Senator O'Conor. Explain.

Mr. Jones. Failure of memory. I don't remember all the details of bookkeeping throughout my life.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you forgotten how you resigned from the Communist Party?

Mr. Jones. I would like to consult with counsel.

(Mr. Jones confers with his counsel.)

Mr. Jones. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1917?

Mr. Jones. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1910?

Mr. Jones. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the Communist Party on April 1, 1900?

Mr. Jones. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. Sourwine. Were you alive on April 1, 1900?

Senator O'Conor. How old are you, Mr. Jones?

Mr. Jones. I am 39 years old.

I would like to consult with counsel, Senator.

Senator O'Conor. As to how old you are?

Mr. Jones. I will tell you that. Thirty-nine years old.

Senator O'Conor. If you will listen to the questions, you were asked a minute ago whether you were a member of the party on April 1, 1910. That was 42 years ago. I just want to give you an opportunity——

Senator Ferguson. How could you decline to answer that in good faith and say it might incriminate you, when you were not born yet?

Mr. Jones. I can explain myself, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Explain. We do not want to make these proceedings foolish with these answers.

Mr. Jones. No, sir; and I am certainly not trying to. I am not a trained lawyer. It is merely a question of a law of privilege, and I have to fall back on the advice of counsel. That is all.

Mr. Fanelli. May we consult a little bit? If we go outside, maybe we can save some time.

Senator Ferguson. We will probably end up with the fact that after he was born he will decline to answer, and before that he will answer.

Mr. Fanelli. Senator, that I don't know.

(Mr. Jones and his counsel leave the room briefly.)

Senator Ferguson. Now, was he a Communist before he was born?

Mr. Fanelli. Might I say I have advised him to answer the question to this committee as to any period prior to January 1, 1936, and claim privilege as to any time thereafter.

Senator Ferguson. Is that right—January 1, 1936?

Mr. Jones. January 1 is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Prior to that, you answer "No"?

Mr. JONES. "No." And as to January 1, 1942, I answered "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. And prior to January 1, 1936, your answer is you were not a Communist?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. At any time prior to that date, you were not a Communist?

Mr. JONES. January 1, 1936; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is there any date between January 1, 1936, and November 1, 1941, on which you were not a Communist?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the witness be directed to answer that question?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes; you are directed to answer that, Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. I am very sorry, sir, but I respectfully have to decline to answer that.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to go and get these instructions that you had to attend this meeting, when Budenz was testifying.

Mr. JONES. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I think it is the 22d of August.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you give us the instructions that Owen Lattimore gave you?

Mr. JONES. The instructions given to me by Mrs. Lattimore?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you talk to Owen Lattimore at all?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; not when I received the instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it on the telephone that she talked with you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what did she instruct you?

Mr. JONES. "Would you come down to Washington and help us?"

Senator FERGUSON. Had you talked to Owen Lattimore about the case before?

Mr. JONES. In a vague social way. In no organized way; in a vague social way.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had you not done some investigation or looked up some matters for them in the case?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. My recollection is not precisely accurate. I didn't discuss his whole testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. You discussed some things of it?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had agreed in effect to help him?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I had.

Senator FERGUSON. And then his wife called you on the phone and said what?—"I want you"? or "We want you"?

Mr. JONES. I honestly can't recall the difference between "I" and "We" there.

Senator FERGUSON. But they wanted you to come down here and listen?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And what were the instructions?

Mr. JONES. The instructions were to come to room 424 and to take as full notes as I possibly could on the testimony to be given that day.

Senator FERGUSON. By Louis Budenz?

Mr. JONES. I believe that was the man testifying.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the man. And then where were you to go?

Mr. JONES. Then I was to deliver my notes.

Senator FERGUSON. To——

Mr. JONES. To the law office of——

Senator FERGUSON. Abe Fortas?

Mr. JONES. Abe Fortas; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did she say that she and Owen Lattimore would be there?

Mr. JONES. I don't know whether she made it explicit, but it certainly was implicit.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you go from here to the Abe Fortas law office?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And took your notes?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you met whom?

Mr. JONES. I met Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. E. C. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. E. C. Carter. Did you see Carter in this room when you were here?

Mr. JONES. I recall I did; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you went directly from here to the Abe Fortas office?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long would you say it took you? You left when they closed the testimony?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How long would you say, then, it took you to go to Abe Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Of course, the answer would have to be approximate, but certainly not over a half hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Not over a half hour. Then there was Owen Lattimore and his wife in Abe Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you saw them. Was Carter there before you?

Mr. JONES. I believe he was, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. He got there before you did. And you went into Abe Fortas' office, and Abe, as I understand it, was not there?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you had a conference with Owen Lattimore and his wife?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you told them what you had heard up here at the hearing, read it to them or gave it to them?

Mr. JONES. I read it to them and gave it to them, both.

Senator FERGUSON. You read it to them and gave it to them, both. Now, did you stay with Owen Lattimore until you went to the Arbor Cafe?

Mr. SOURWINE. The Aldo Cafe.

Mr. JONES. The Aldo, Senator. I stayed in Abe Fortas' office.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and Owen Lattimore was there in the immediate vicinity?

Mr. JONES. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you and Owen Lattimore and his wife and Carter were there together?

Mr. JONES. Well, there were times when I left the room, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You left the room. But they did not leave the office, the whole office?

Mr. JONES. No, the whole suite; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, they stayed in the suite with you during the time until you went to this restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Oh, just a moment, sir. Just as a point of detail, E. C. Carter left for his hotel before we went to the restaurant.

Senator FERGUSON. He left for his hotel, and he went to the hotel?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And, as I understand it, you suggested the restaurant you would like to go to?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So, you then, and Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore, went directly from Abe Fortas' suite of offices to the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; we went and picked up E. C. Carter at his hotel.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went by his room?

Mr. JONES. We went via the hotel.

Senator FERGUSON. Via the hotel. Did you go to his room?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; we met him in the lobby, I think.

Senator FERGUSON. And what hotel was that?

Mr. JONES. My recollection is inexact. It is one of two hotels, either the Lafayette or the Carlton.

Senator FERGUSON. Either one. And you met him there, not in his room, but he was downstairs?

Mr. JONES. Downstairs.

Senator FERGUSON. And then you went directly to this restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When you were over at Abe Fortas' office, one of the things which was done by Mr. Lattimore was to prepare an answer to Budenz for the press?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you talked about that answer? You saw it?

Mr. JONES. Yes; I saw the answer. I did see the answer, sure.

Senator FERGUSON. And was that not one of the purposes of getting the testimony, so that they could answer immediately and have it appear in the same story?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And one of the reasons that you took the notes was so that he could prepare his answer?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And be rather accurate?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You at one time had been a newspaperman?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that this was to be in order to get the news out to the press?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Before Senator Ferguson pursues that: Was there any reason assigned as to why the statement would be prepared so promptly and issued for publication?

Mr. JONES. Well, it was just a matter of—that is a matter of opinion, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. No; I am not asking for a matter of opinion. I am asking you for a matter of fact, as to whether there was any reason given or assigned by anyone at the conference as to why the statement should be issued so promptly.

Mr. JONES. No, sir; there was no such explanation made.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, was there any statement made as to when it was going to be issued? Right away, or given out to the press that evening, or later, or when?

Mr. JONES. That evening; yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. And who made that statement?

Mr. JONES. I have no recollection, sir. It is just a matter of mechanics of delivering the thing to the press. That is all.

Senator O'CONOR. But it was discussed, as to giving it out that evening?

Mr. JONES. Actually, I cannot recall. I don't know. I assume it was discussed. I mean, it is just reasonable that it should be. But I have no exact recollection of that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether it was released to the press?

Mr. JONES. As to the hour; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there anything said by Mr. Carter that he had taken notes here of the Budenz testimony? Because he was at the Fortas office when you got there?

Mr. JONES. I don't recall any explicit mention by E. C. Carter of taking notes here.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he have any notes?

Mr. JONES. I honestly don't recall. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you know how you got from this office here that you are in now, the Senate Office Building, to Abe Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Certainly, sir. I took a taxi.

Senator FERGUSON. And you went reasonably fast?

Mr. JONES. Through traffic; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you have thought that Mr. Carter would have had time to leave here at the end of the hearings and go down to his suite and come back to the office?

Mr. JONES. Oh, no. That is a misunderstanding. He didn't go to his suite first.

Senator FERGUSON. He did not?

Mr. JONES. No, sir. He left the hearing room. When, I don't know, because I wasn't paying—I hadn't met the man at that time, wasn't paying attention to him. He may have left half an hour earlier for all I know. But when I arrived at Fortas' office, he was there.

Senator FERGUSON. He was there. There wasn't any doubt about that?

Mr. JONES. There wasn't any doubt about that; no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then he left some time that evening before you went to the restaurant, and went to the hotel. You met him in the lobby with Owen Lattimore and his wife, and then you went to this restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you remember seeing Mr. Sourwine at the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. No recollection whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that your party left so fast that Carter forgot his hat? When you say that the counsel for the committee just happened to be eating at that restaurant? Do you remember that incident?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I don't. As a matter of fact, I do remember that Mr. Carter left his hat.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. JONES. Yes, I do. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. How do you come to remember that?

Mr. JONES. I think because the next day when I was down here, he said—I am under oath, you know.

Senator FERGUSON. Sure you are under oath.

Mr. JONES. I am interested in being explicit.

Senator FERGUSON. You are being truthful.

Mr. JONES. I am being truthful.

Senator O'CONOR. There is no reason for you to falsify as to that.

Mr. JONES. No reason whatsoever. I do remember it, and the reason I remember it I think is because sometime the next day, Mr. Carter said he was put to the inconvenience of going back to Aldo's for his hat. It was a little oddity, something that might stick in your mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have your dinner at the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, we did, in a leisurely fashion, too.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you finish it?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, we finished it.

Senator FERGUSON. What time did you get to the restaurant, would you say?

Mr. JONES. Oh, my goodness. Now, here again——

Senator FERGUSON. Well, about. I understand that.

Mr. JONES. 7:30, let's say.

Senator FERGUSON. 7:30?

Mr. JONES. Approximately.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, about when did you leave?

Mr. JONES. About 8:30, maybe not quite that long.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to put in the two newspapers where I found this press release by Owen Lattimore. The one is on August 23, 1951, being the New York Herald Tribune of Thursday, August 23, 1951, on page 3. It is under "Budenz asserts Pacific Institute was Red tool," and the Lattimore statement is in black type.

In reply to Budenz' testimony, Mr. Lattimore issued the following statement. * * *

and then it is quoted. I will ask that be made part of the record.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be made part of the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 742" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 742

[New York Herald Tribune, Thursday, August 23, 1951, p. 3]

BUDENZ ASSERTS PACIFIC INSTITUTE WAS RED TOOL—TESTIFIES PARTY LABELED IT "LITTLE RED SCHOOLHOUSE"; IDENTIFIES THREE AS REDS

(By Don Irwin)

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22.— * * *

* * * * * * *

LATTIMORE'S STATEMENT

In reply to Mr. Budenz's testimony, Mr. Lattimore issued the following statement:

"Budenz has repeated his last year's discredited testimony. He now says that he heard my name mentioned in 1937 as a member of a Communist cell in New York. The fantastic nature of this lie is underscored by the fact that I was not even in the United States in 1937, except between Christmas and New Year's.

"I have already testified under oath that I am not and never have been a Communist, and I am prepared to do so again.

"Budenz is now also suggesting that because in 1945, like a great majority of Americans, I was hostile to the great industrial monopolists who built the Japanese Navy and equipped the Japanese Army, I must have been a Communist. This suggestion will not be much comfort to the thousands of Americans whose sons died to defeat Japanese militarism."

* * * * * * *

Senator FERGUSON. And the New York Times, as of the same day—and these are library papers—on page 7 had also a line or two of his statement.

Senator O'CONOR. They will both be admitted.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if the Senator desires, there is also here the article which was printed in the final edition of the Washington Star on the evening of the 22d. Would the Senator desire that introduced also?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That may give us the time that this was issued.

Mr. SOURWINE. It does not fix it, but it indicates that it did get into the Washington final Star of the 22d, whatever time their deadline may be.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 743" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 743

[The New York Times, Thursday, August 23, 1951, p. 7]

SORGE'S SPY RING HELD COPIED IN U. S.—GEN. WILLOUGHBY TELLS SENATORS OF RED ESPIONAGE IN ORIENT—BUDENZ ACCUSES LATTIMORE

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UP)—* * *

* * * * * * *

As General Willoughby testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Louis F. Budenz, former editor of The Daily Worker, told the Senate Internal Security subcommittee that Owen Lattimore and Frederick Vanderbilt Field were described in Communist party councils as key members of a Communist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations, a private organization that promotes knowledge about the Far East.

Mr. Lattimore, a professor at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, promptly labelled the testimony a "fantastic lie."

* * * * * * *

Mr. Budenz, who broke with the party in 1945 to rejoin the Roman Catholic Church and is now Assistant Professor of Economics at Fordham University, said that in meetings of the party's American "politburo" or top governing body, Mr. Lattimore was "specifically mentioned as a member of the institute's Communist cell under instructions."

Mr. Lattimore said in a statement that this was "a new lie" that Mr. Budenz had added to "his discredited last year's testimony."

* * * * * * *

[Washington Star, August 22, 1951]

LATTIMORE DISCOVERS "ONE NEW LIE" IN BUDENZ' TESTIMONY

Owen Lattimore this afternoon issued the following statement on Louis Budenz' testimony before a Senate subcommittee identifying him as a Communist:

"Budenz seems to have told one new lie about me in addition to his discredited last year's testimony. He now says that he heard my name mentioned in 1937 as a member of a Communist cell. The fantastic nature of this lie is underscored by the fact that I was not even in the United States in 1937, except between Christmas and New Year.

"Budenz had an opportunity to tell this same lie last year under immunity, and did not. His telling it now is merely proof that his memory is inventive as well as elastic.

"I have already testified under oath that I am not and never have been a Communist, and I am prepared to do so again."

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to inquire a little more, if I might. Did you have any discussions with Owen Lattimore after you were at that meeting, about you going there, and what you had done here, after you got the press release and had dinner and went home?

Mr. JONES. My impression is not. The conversation at the meal was trivial, as I recall.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you certain that that is the only time you ever had dinner with Mr. Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, and his wife, in that restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are positive of that?

Mr. JONES. Positive of that.

Senator FERGUSON. So we could not be mistaken in the record here about some other meeting.

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the day that Budenz testified. You remember that?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; August 22.

Senator FERGUSON. August 22, 1951.

Mr. JONES. That was the only time I have ever eaten with the Lattimores in that café.

Senator FERGUSON. So that places the date and the only time.

Now, did you take notes the next day when Budenz testified?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. And where did you take those notes to?

Mr. JONES. I also took those to Abe Fortas' office.

Senator FERGUSON. And he met you there?
Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. That is, Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore?
Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Was Carter there?
Mr. JONES. I simply cannot recall.
Senator FERGUSON. All right. You don't recall Carter. But you recall them there?
Mr. JONES. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you give them the notes?
Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. And did you go to any restaurant to eat that day, with them?
Mr. JONES. I think not.
Senator FERGUSON. You do not think so?
Mr. JONES. I do not think so.
Senator FERGUSON. At least, you did not go to where these——
Mr. JONES. Certainly we didn't go to the Aldo.
Senator FERGUSON. You only went the one time there?
Mr. JONES. That is right.
Senator FERGUSON. Any other time did you take notes and give them the notes?
Mr. JONES. At one of these hearings? No.
Senator FERGUSON. That is the only 2 days when Budenz testified?
Mr. JONES. That is quite correct.
Senator FERGUSON. Now, the second day, did Lattimore know that you were going to take the notes before you took them?
Mr. JONES. I don't understand the question.
Senator FERGUSON. Did Lattimore know that you were coming back the second day to take the notes?
Mr. JONES. Oh, yes, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Now, was Lattimore surprised when you came into Abe Fortas' office and had the notes on the Budenz hearing the day you went to eat at the restaurant?
Mr. JONES. He was not surprised, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. No. You had no doubt that he knew you were up here taking the notes?
Mr. JONES. Well, I am being asked to answer——
Senator FERGUSON. Well, was he surprised?
Mr. JONES. There is a little detail here.
Senator FERGUSON. All right. Give us the detail.
Mr. JONES. The detail is that the notes were delivered to his wife. Owen Lattimore was at that time very much preoccupied. He was sitting at a desk, a big lawyer's desk. I came into the room. I gave the notes to Mrs. Lattimore, sitting in a chair, sat down next to her, and talked to her about them. He was writing at a desk. So that is why I can't speak to that.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you not discuss the notes with him? Because he had to make his press release on your notes, did he not?
Mr. JONES. I don't know whether I did discuss them with him or not. I went over the notes in great detail with Mrs. Lattimore; I mean, so that she could understand my handwriting, any amplifications I could make. Now, whether I, as well as Mrs. Lattimore, explained those to Mr. Lattimore, I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he not prepare his statement from your notes?

Mr. JONES. Partially; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So he knew you had made those notes here?

Mr. JONES. Surely. The only detail that I add here is that the man was receiving the assistance of a reportorial secretarial nature, and he might not focus his attention on the person who was doing it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were there and talked to him. He knew you. You were a graduate student, and he had given you a fellowship. Is that not right?

Mr. JONES. Sure. He knew me.

Senator FERGUSON. Sure. Now, the next day, did he come personally and tell you to take the notes and bring them back to him?

Mr. JONES. I can't recall whether it was he or his wife who told me that.

Senator O'CONOR. Was it discussed that you were coming back the next day?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. So he knew you were going to come back for that purpose?

Mr. JONES. Surely.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had no doubts that he knew that you were going to come back for that purpose?

Mr. JONES. I had no doubts, no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The second night did he prepare any release?

Mr. JONES. I prepared no release.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he?

Mr. JONES. He may have, but I don't remember that he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go home with the Lattimores that night?

Mr. JONES. No; I took the train home.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you see Abe Fortas that night?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I didn't. I left early. I think if you look at your committee records, you will find the second day of the Budenz testimony did end early. And my little girl was having a birthday party, and she wanted me there, and so I just beat it right up. I didn't hang around. I left them in Washington. So I don't know who they saw.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the last secretarial service you rendered to Lattimore in this case?

Mr. JONES. The last reportorial service; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did help him, you and your wife, to set up these copies that were delivered of what he was going to say to the committee?

Mr. JONES. The mechanical work.

Senator FERGUSON. The mechanical work.

Mr. JONES. Sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. By "mechanical," do you mean mimeographing?

Mr. JONES. Actually—No, sir. Actually, I mean stapling, to be very precise there.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Senator asked a question about secretarial work. Did you, subsequent to this date of August 22, 1951, perform any secretarial work for Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; not secretarial.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you do any other kind of work?

Mr. JONES. Research; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You have done that since?

Mr. JONES. Research; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In connection with these hearings?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Research into what?

Mr. JONES. Oh, I looked up some things in the New York Times, I believe, in the library.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you examined or studied the committee hearings in connection with any work you have done for Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did you pick the Aldo Cafe on that evening? Had you been there before?

Mr. JONES. Oh, years ago I had been there before.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not a customary eating place of yours?

Mr. JONES. When I lived in Washington, it was not customary. Occasional, sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been back there since that evening?

Mr. JONES. No; never.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you see Mrs. Lattimore here at these hearings on the 22d of August?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see her here at the meeting of this committee on the 23d of August?

Mr. JONES. I can't recall, sir. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see her here at these hearings on any other occasion?

Mr. JONES. No, sir. I haven't been here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see Mr. Carter here on any occasion other than the 22d? You did see him here on the 22d, I think you said.

Mr. JONES. The 22d and the 23d.

Mr. SOURWINE. You saw him here on both the 22d and the 23d?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in answer to a previous question of Senator Ferguson's, I understood you to say that on the evening of the 22d, you had not "met the man," referring to Mr. Carter. Is that what you said?

Mr. JONES. That is not precisely what I said. There should be some clarification here, and I am very glad to make it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a moment. Was the evening of the 22d the first occasion on which you met Mr. Carter?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; it was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first meet him?

Mr. JONES. The noon of the 22d was the first occasion.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that at this hearing?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; it was not at this hearing. It was at Mr. Fortas' office. You see, during the noon recess I went over to Mr. Fortas' office.

Mr. SOURWINE. And met Mr. Carter there?

Mr. JONES. I met Mr. Carter there.

Mr. SOURWINE. And who introduced you to him?

Mr. JONES. I cannot recall whether it was Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore, one of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore. That was noon on the 22d?

Mr. JONES. That was noon on the 22d.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then you and Mr. Carter both came back to this hearing in the afternoon, did you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; but not together.

Mr. SOURWINE. But not together. Then you both went back to Mr. Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. Yes; but not together.

Mr. SOURWINE. And then you both came down here on the 23d. And did you see him at Mr. Fortas' office before the hearing at all?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I believe not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at Mr. Fortas' office before the hearing on the 23d?

Mr. JONES. I don't think I went into the office; no sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, after the hearing on the 23d, you and Mr. Carter both went back to Mr. Fortas' office?

Mr. JONES. For myself, I can give you a simple "yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. But not together?

Mr. JONES. My memory is not clear enough. If Mr. Carter did, it was unimportant, so I don't——

Mr. SOURWINE. And you don't know whether he did or not?

Mr. JONES. Under oath I wouldn't want to say precisely that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know whether he was there?

Mr. JONES. He might have been. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he was there, he had to go back there?

Mr. JONES. Oh, sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. But at any rate, you didn't go there together?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you didn't leave together?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you leave before he did or did he leave before you did?

Mr. JONES. I can't answer that. My memory is not good enough.

Senator O'CONOR. If I can just clear one thing up, you stated that you were together with Mr. Carter at the noon recess on the 22d, and then the two of you came back again to the meeting, although you came back separately, and then you went back again to the office after the hearing that day.

Mr. JONES. That is quite correct, Senator.

Senator O'CONOR. And that Owen Lattimore was there both at noon and in the evening?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Where was he in the meantime? Where did he go in the meantime?

Mr. JONES. I have no idea.

Senator O'CONOR. Was there any discussion of that? Because he did not come down to the meeting here, did he?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; he didn't

Senator O'CONOR. Was not any comment made as to where he would go or what he would do in the meantime?

Mr. JONES. I think not.

Senator O'CONOR. Did you expect to see him when he returned subsequent to the afternoon session?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, sure.

Senator O'CONOR. How did you know you were going to meet him there? Did he say?

Mr. JONES. Not being a lawyer—Of course, I expected to meet one of the Lattimores there, somebody competent to take my notes. So the natural assumption would be that he would be there. I mean, there wouldn't be a thing that you would speculate on.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Jones, I was trying to get the facts here. Why did you not tell me about going back at noon to Lattimore's office and meeting Carter? Because you indicated here in your testimony that in the afternoon, when you went down there and saw him, that evening, you had not seen Carter before.

Mr. JONES. That was a mistake in recollection on my part, a failure of memory.

Senator FERGUSON. You understand, "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth"?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Did you go back there at noon?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I went back.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, who asked you to come there at noon?

Mr. JONES. Either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore—oh, it was Mrs. Lattimore who asked me to come there at noon. I can answer that definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. And you and Carter and the two Lattimores talked in Abe Fortas' office at noon?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There was not any doubt about that?

Mr. JONES. No doubt about that whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. And that is the first day, the evening of which you went to the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. Noon of the 22d.

Senator FERGUSON. Noon recess.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt about that.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You left your notes there with Lattimore and his wife?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Came back and took more notes?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And went back?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is the story that you told us of going back in the evening a correct story? Or do you want to change it?

Mr. JONES. I would not like to change it, except that the first time I met E. C. Carter was at noon.

Senator FERGUSON. Instead of at night?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the only thing you want to change?

Mr. JONES. The only thing I want to change.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not want to change it about going to the hotel and picking up Carter?

Mr. JONES. That hotel testimony is to the best of my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. That is an accurate description of it?

Mr. JONES. Certainly, sir. I regret I can't specify which of those two——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever read what Owen Lattimore swore to under oath about these meetings?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I haven't read it in full.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that between the time you were on the stand in executive session and the time you came here for this public session, you did not go back over that testimony or have your attention called to it?

Mr. JONES. No, sir. No; I didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not mean that? Or you do mean that? I am not trying to confuse you. I mean, did you have that testimony called to your attention?

Mr. JONES. Mr. Sourwine, I can make this very clear. I have never reviewed the formal transcript. The formal transcripts are not available for a long, long time afterward.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been told what Mr. Lattimore testified to?

Mr. JONES. Yes. I have been told a small section of it.

Senator O'CONOR. By whom?

Mr. JONES. By Mr. Lattimore.

Senator O'CONOR. In other words, he, after the hearings, repeated to you what his testimony had been?

Mr. JONES. No; he didn't. He just read to me a small section where he had mentioned my name before this committee. That is all.

Senator O'CONOR. What was the purpose of his reading to you his formal testimony in this hearing?

Mr. JONES. Just simply he wanted to get my recollection of it.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, was he trying to coach you or to induce you to say things that were in accordance with his testimony?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. What was his reason for reading you his testimony, then?

Mr. JONES. My name had been mentioned, and he knew that I had received a subpena.

Senator O'CONOR. Oh. It was after you got the subpena that he came to you with his testimony?

Mr. JONES. He didn't come to me. I went to him.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, regardless of the circumstances, when you two met, he then had a copy of his testimony?

Mr. JONES. Yes; he had the copy of the testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. And he read to you the exact version that he had given?

Mr. JONES. Not the full testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. But the part that affected you?

Mr. JONES. Where my name was mentioned there, and, oh, a half dozen questions or answers in that section of the testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. And what explanation did he make for taking that unusual course to read to you from his sworn testimony?

Mr. JONES. He wanted me to know that my name had been mentioned in this testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. Could he not have done that without reading the verbatim testimony?

Mr. JONES. As a matter of fact, I don't think he did read it aloud to me. I think he handed it to me.

Senator O'CONOR. He handed it to you. So that he did make it available to you?

Mr. JONES. Indicating where in the testimony it was. And I don't even know whether it was he. I think it was, again, the missis that handed it to me.

Senator O'CONOR. Was Owen Lattimore present?

Mr. JONES. I think so. I think he was in the house.

Senator O'CONOR. So that Owen Lattimore did know that you were actually refreshing your recollection from his testimony, his sworn testimony in the hearing?

Mr. JONES. In a limited sense; yes. The only reason I say a "limited sense" is that I haven't read the whole testimony.

Senator O'CONOR. Is it not a fact that you rehearsed it so that your two stories would coincide?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. That is what it seems to us, or seems to me. Because I cannot understand why it would be necessary, if you are only anxious to tell the truth and to give your best recollection, for Lattimore to take the unusual step of virtually coaching you by reading or allowing you to read from his testimony.

Mr. JONES. Oh, Senator, I can straighten you out on that.

Senator O'CONOR. Suppose you do, because it is a very important thing, and it is a very unusual thing.

Mr. JONES. I can straighten you out on that very easily. I had no idea why I was called before this committee. That is the simple truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when were you called?

Mr. JONES. Oh, Thursday or Friday.

Senator FERGUSON. Of last week?

Mr. JONES. Last week. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead, now. You said you can straighten me out. You have not done so yet.

Mr. JONES. Well, the subpena read that I was to come down here and tell what I knew about the IPR. All right. I knew it was a Lattimore hearing. The natural thing to do would be to go to Mr. Lattimore. He was available. He was in the same city. And ask him, "What does this mean?"

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that the first Lattimore had ever told you that your name was mentioned?

Mr. JONES. Oh, yes, sir. That was the first occasion I had heard that my name was mentioned in that testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore, neither one, ever checked up with you to find out if you were the person who was with them in the Aldo Cafe on the night of August 22? Is that what you are testifying here?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. They never did come and check with you to see if you were with them?

Mr. JONES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Until after you had been subpenaed here? Are you sure about that now?

Mr. JONES. I am not a hundred percent sure, but I think so; yes. I think so.

Senator O'CONOR. Counsel, I do not want to be discourteous. You indicated you wanted to say something.

Mr. FANELLI. I just wanted to indicate that there was a question Mr. Sourwine asked before which remains unanswered, which I think got lost in the discussion, and I would like to put it again. He asked, if I understood him correctly, whether Lattimore's testimony on this point was rehearsed or gone over in any way.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, my question was whether it had been called to his attention, or whether he had seen it or had it called to his attention, between the time he was in executive session and when he came back. I had not forgotten the question.

Mr. FANELLI. I thought you might have, and I want him to answer it.

Mr. JONES. What was it?

Mr. FANELLI. He still doesn't get it.

Mr. SOURWINE. After we were through with the executive session this morning, did you thereafter refer to Mr. Lattimore's testimony, or did anyone talk to you about it, or tell you what Mr. Lattimore had testified, either actually word for word, or in substance?

Mr. JONES. Between 11 o'clock this morning and 4 o'clock this afternoon? No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was the question.

Senator FERGUSON. How many pages of testimony did you see after you got the subpena?

Mr. JONES. At most three, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Three or four?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. In your opinion, do you think Owen Lattimore told the truth about your meeting down here and going to the restaurant?

Mr. JONES. It is a very inadequate description.

Senator FERGUSON. Inadequate? I will say you do not exaggerate on that. You know that he did not tell the truth, do you not?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I don't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Now, you look at it, and you tell us whether or not in your opinion Owen Lattimore told the truth about that meeting. [Handing.]

Mr. Chairman, I think here is a case that indicates clearly that witnesses before this committee have not told the truth.

Mr. FANELLI. Senator, you are not speaking to Mr. Jones.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking him now. I want him to look at this.

Mr. JONES. Here is something in testimony that just makes no sense to me. It says:

> Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr. Lattimore.
> Mr. LATTIMORE. No, I don't remember at all.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not the truth, is it?

Mr. JONES. That is just plain meaningless, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was not the truth. Because you had a meeting. You had gone down there at noon and delivered your notes to him. You had gone at night. He got out a press release. You had gone to lunch, or dinner. The next day you took notes for him.

And he comes in here and tells us he does not remember a thing and does not know anything about it.

Mr. JONES. Well, sir, I don't know how much this "I don't remember at all" covers.

Senator FERGUSON. Read it. You must have read that last Friday or Saturday. Why, he did not even remember your name. It took him another day to get him back here to remember your name.

Mr. JONES. Well, sir, I will say this is neither truth nor a lie.

Senator FERGUSON. What is it?

Mr. JONES. It is just inadequate, meaningless testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. I ask you, if a man is sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, whether or not that is true.

Mr. JONES. This just indicates a confusion and a failure of memory. That is what it indicates to me.

Senator O'CONOR. On what did you base your answer to Senator Ferguson that, in your opinion, Owen Lattimore's description of this particular episode was inadequate?

Mr. JONES. Because of the confusion here.

Senator FERGUSON. Confusion? It is not confusion. Let me read something, here. The question: "I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr. Lattimore." They were talking then about:

"He is a graduate student at Johns Hopkins." That is you?

Mr. JONES. That is me.

Senator FERGUSON. "And I am one of the supervisors of his thesis work." That is referring to you?

Mr. JONES. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. "Did he come over to Washington from Johns Hopkins with you on that day?" And the answer is: "No, I don't believe he did."

There was not any doubt that you did not come over with him.

Mr. JONES. Sir, I was doing reportorial work. Why should he take interest in me, when he has his full attention focused——

Senator FERGUSON. Answer my questions for a little while. Did you come over with him on that day?

Mr. JONES. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. This is his answer: "No; I don't believe he did. I believe we must have run into him here."

Is that a truthful answer? Why, you were there to meet them down at the place. Now he tells us: "I believe we must have run into him here." Is that a truthful answer?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I would like permission to consult.

Mr. FANELLI. No. There is no privilege. Give him your honest recollection.

Mr. JONES. That is an inadequate answer, certainly inadequate.

Senator O'CONOR. It is a misleading answer, is it not? Because in the one case he gave the committee to understand that his meeting with you was accidental. He said, "run into him." And your testimony is that you came over by appointment and design. The two things are contradictory. Is that not true?

Mr. JONES Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. I am going to read you the next:

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just trying to find out what you know, Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. LATTIMORE. No; I don't remember at all.

You do not think that is a truthful answer, do you?

Mr. JONES. I have no way of judging it, sir. It is a matter of opinion. I don't know how well Owen Lattimore can remember or forget. That is another man.

Senator FERGUSON. The next question: "Do you know how he happened to be invited to that meeting?" The answer: "No. I presume we just ran into each other and went to dinner together."

Is that a truthful statement? Or are you telling the truth now? Which is true?

Mr. JONES. That statement is inaccurate. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it is not true, is it?

Mr. JONES. Not the precise truth, but it is not a willful lie, either.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is yours a willful lie, or is this a willful lie?

Mr. JONES. Mine is the truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Yours is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, Mr. Jones, you are giving us, to the best of your knowledge an accurate, detailed description of what happened that day, and you are not withholding anything, and you are giving the facts?

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, obviously there is a willful omission in his statement, is there not, of the most important happening of that day of your meeting. Your very purpose in being over here was to carry out your mission, to wit, to get the notes together on which he could base his press release. And he has omitted to state that entirely, or even to refer to it. Is that not correct?

Mr. JONES. He has omitted it, but I have no way of judging whether it was willful or not.

Senator O'CONOR. Well, you describe it as inaccurate, do you not?

Mr. JONES. It is imprecise, yes, inaccurate.

Senator FERGUSON. Now listen to another question:

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was long enough for a casual meeting and then just a suggestion to go to eat?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Yes; I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where you casually met?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Well, we went to the hotel that Mr. Carter was staying at, where we met Mr. Jones. I don't remember.

Now, that certainly is not the truth, if you are telling the truth.

Mr. JONES. That is plainly inaccurate.

Senator FERGUSON. Plainly inaccurate?

Mr. JONES. Plainly inaccurate. And, Senator, it indicates to me a failure of memory.

Senator FERGUSON. I am going to suggest and ask that this testimony be immediately sent to the Attorney General.

Senator O'CONOR. I agree with you, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Because I think if there were ever flagrant untruths in a hearing, that is indicated here.

Senator O'CONOR. It does call for study and consideration, I think, because the two statements are diametrically opposed to each other, yours and his. His indicates that there was a casual chance happening, not by design or by prearrangement. Yours is that there was a

planned meeting or a planned assignment which you carried through from beginning to end.

Mr. SOURWINE. A series of meetings.

Senator FERGUSON. And we cannot function as a committee if we have to take statements like we have in this record on this point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is another statement this witness made which I would like to inquire about, if the Chair will indulge me.

Senator O'CONOR. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember stating a moment ago, and I am not sure if I heard you accurately: "I don't know how well Owen Lattimore can remember or forget"?

Mr. JONES. Under these circumstances, yes; under these particular circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you know Mr. Lattimore fairly well, don't you?

Mr. JONES. Not with intimacy. That is a professional——

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not asking you to draw a conclusion. I am going to ask you a series of questions. You don't have to draw one conclusion.

You know him fairly well, don't you?

Mr. JONES. Fairly well; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long have you known him?

Mr. JONES. Since May 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. During how many semesters have you attended lecture courses that he has given?

Mr. JONES. Oh, four.

Mr. SOURWINE. During how many semesters have you attended seminars that he has conducted?

Mr. JONES. Four.

Mr. SOURWINE. During how many months, approximately, have you performed secretarial or research services for him?

Mr. JONES. Oh, about 9 months, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is there any question about the fact that you respect Mr. Lattimore's intellect?

Mr. JONES. None whatsoever.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any question about the fact that you look up to him?

Mr. JONES. I look up to him as a scholar; yes, sir. As a scholar.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, does that jibe with the statement: "I don't know how well Owen Lattimore can remember or forget"?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; it does. Because an academic matter is very different from a matter of daily life.

Mr. SOURWINE. Haven't you heard Mr. Lattimore give lectures for relatively sustained periods of time, giving names, dates, facts, circumstances, knowing that he was speaking accurately and from memory?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, doesn't he have a reputation with his students for having an unusually good memory?

Mr. JONES. Oh, not superior to others——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Lattimore's reputation among his students is for memory?

Mr. JONES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know?

Mr. JONES. Not precisely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Lattimore's reputation is among his students for being able to forget?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you don't know how well he can remember. And you don't know how well he can forget.

Mr. JONES. No. I can't give any opinion on Mr. Lattimore's whole mind.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Jones, did I understand you to say before that you were the supervisor of thesis work? Did you say that?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. What was said as to any work that you had in regard to——

Mr. JONES. Well, Mr. Lattimore was merely one of the supervisors of my dissertation. That is all.

Senator O'CONOR. I misunderstood you, and I am just trying to get it straightened out, really. Had you been doing any supervisory work for him in the class work there?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. I want to get it straight.

Mr. JONES. No; it was the other way around.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your opinion, Mr. Jones, is Mr. Lattimore's memory as good as yours?

Mr. JONES. That is a question of opinion, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I am asking you for.

Mr. JONES. Yes, his memory is as good as mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't think you have a better memory than Owen Lattimore?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You haven't any question about the clearness with which you remember these facts and details that you have testified to, have you?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I ask: Do you want to make any changes in your testimony that you have given here?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. JONES. To the best of my ability; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, whatever you are doing here, you are doing willfully, with knowledge.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that not right?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are testifying willfully?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, where were you born?

Mr. JONES. I was born in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. From what schools have you graduated?

Mr. JONES. Oh, I graduated from a preparatory school called Hedgehill, Carmel Hill, N. Y., and then I went to the University of Chicago and graduated from there in 1938. I received a master's degree from the University of Maryland in 1949.

Mr. MORRIS. You were in the infantry during the war, were you not?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, did you work as a newspaper reporter at any time?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. For what newspapers?

Mr. JONES. The Daytona Beach News-Journal and the Daytona Beach Sun-Record.

Mr. MORRIS. Any other newspapers?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you told us now all the newspapers for which you have worked?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; all the newspapers for which I have worked.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever live in Chicago?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you work for any newspapers in Chicago?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with a publication in Chicago called the Midwest Record?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I have heard of it.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the Midwest Record?

Mr. JONES. Well, to the best of my recollection, it was a little paper put out there for a few years. I have no very precise memory of it.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you received any other grants or fellowships other than the one you told us about today?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know Philip Keeney and Mary Jane Keeney?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When have you last seen them?

Mr. JONES. I think I saw them somewhere in New York. I ran into them in New York last year sometime. But I haven't seen them in a long time.

Mr. MORRIS. How frequently had you seen them prior to that time?

Mr. JONES. About a dozen times; no more.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not close friends of yours?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that either Mr. or Mrs. Keeney either is now or was at any time a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. No, sir; I have no reason to believe that.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever known any Communists?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date that you used? January 1, 1942?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. After that date have you known any Communists?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are positive of that?

Mr. JONES. I am positive of that; nobody I knew to be a Communist; no, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You did know Mary Jane Keeney after that time?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any reason to believe that Mary Jane Keeney is a Communist?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Or has been a Communist at any time since January 1, 1942?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, have you performed any act that is overtly anti-Communist that you would like to let this committee know about?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, I have. In speaking before seminars I have been extremely critical of Soviet Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, is there anything of record that you can give this committee by way of——

Mr. JONES. Unhappily, there is no printed record; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever been to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with facts about subversive activity at any time?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You have never gone to the FBI?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever gone to any other Government agency to give them facts or information that you may have acquired in your experience?

Mr. JONES. No. sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Jones, right in that connection, without asking you to reveal anything that happened, as to your membership, if such there was, between 1936 and 1942, after 1942 did you ever give to the authorities the benefit of any experience that you had prior to 1942 that might have been helpful to this country in regard to the anti-Communist effort?

Mr. JONES. No. sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn who Louis Budenz was?

Mr. JONES. Oh, I had heard of him back in the thirties.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you knew him as a Communist?

Mr. JONES. I never knew the man. I knew he was a Communist; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew he was a Communist. Now, how do you account for Mrs. Lattimore and Owen Lattimore in the afternoon session asking you to come up here and take notes on the testimony of a Communist, one whom you knew as a Communist, and as this record rather clearly indicates was a Communist, and when you had been a Communist at one time—asking you to come, of all people, and take those notes? Was it because Budenz knew you?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew Budenz?

Mr. JONES. I didn't. I have never met the man, to the best of my recollection. Never met him.

Senator FERGUSON. But you knew him, to see him?

Mr. JONES. From the press I knew who he was; from the press.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew he had been a Communist. He is a confessed Communist. Is not that right?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you, an ex-Communist, coming and taking the notes and taking them back to Lattimore. How do you account for that? Is it just a coincidence?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. On the ground that it may tend to incriminate you? Have you ever heard of the statute of limitations?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, might I request respectfully that the witness be instructed to answer the question that Senator Ferguson just asked, and which he refused to answer?

Senator O'CONOR. I will ask the reporter to read the question.

(The reporter read the question, as requested.)

Senator O'CONOR. Having consulted with counsel, will you answer the question?

Mr. JONES. I respectfully decline to answer the question.

Senator O'CONOR. The Chair instructs you to answer, and you still persist in your declination?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You know what the statute of limitations means, that a person cannot be prosecuted after a certain number of years. Do you know that?

Mr. JONES. I understand that; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And is it not true that the date that you refused to answer on, in 1942, is a longer period than the statute of limitations?

Mr. JONES. I don't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you ask counsel?

(Mr. Jones confers with his counsel.)

Mr. FANELLI. This is a fact, now. It is not a matter of privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. He says he does not know, and I want him to ask you.

Mr. FANELLI. I don't know that there is any statute of limitations on the 1940 statute. You may answer that you don't know and counsel has told you he doesn't know.

Senator FERGUSON. If you do not know, Counsel, that is all right.

Mr. FANELLI. I know of none that applies to that statute.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not the general attitude one that covers it?

Mr. FANELLI. It is not at all clear. The point has never arisen, Senator. At least that is my best opinion and research on the subject, and I have had to advise him in the light of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, did you ever tell Owen Lattimore that you had been associated in any way with the Communist Party?

Mr. JONES. I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not asking you now if you ever had been associated in any way with the Communist Party, but did you ever tell Owen Lattimore that you had been?

Mr. JONES. I will still respectfully decline to answer that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. On the grounds that it might incriminate you, Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you are asserting to this committee, through that claim of privilege, that if you answered that question truthfully, it might incriminate you?

Mr. JONES Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Jones, without telling us what the precise conversation might have been, if such a conversation had been held, did you ever discuss with him any possible membership that you may have had? We do not want what the answer was or what the exact information was that you conveyed to him. But was that a matter of discussion between you two?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Jones, were you a member of the American Student Union?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. On the ground that it would tend to incriminate you? You see, if you do not put that in, that is not sufficient.

Mr. JONES. On the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the American Student Union is or was a Communist organization?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the John Reed branch of the Young Communist League?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I respectfully decline to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, let us get this record straight. When you say that, do you mean that you refuse to answer on the grounds of the Constitution giving you the protection if it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the record is clear—you just say you refuse to answer that question. And that is not a sufficient claim of privilege.

Senator O'CONOR. We want to understand that, so as to avoid unnecessary repetition. When you say that you refuse to answer, is that what you mean?

Mr. JONES. When I say that, may it be so understood?

Mr. FANELLI. That is his ground. He is not being disrespectful.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not want to keep interrupting him, but the record is not clear on that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. There might be a circumstance in the record or hereafter in which the witness would decline to answer for any other reason, so I think that should be made clear.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in Europe in 1935, Mr. Jones?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any contact in Europe in 1935 with any member of the Communist Party of any country?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions of this witness.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one question. Perhaps it will lead to one or two more.

Have you at any time in the last 10 years been subject to Communist discipline?

Mr. JONES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you at any time in the past 10 years knowingly and voluntarily collaborated or cooperated with members of the Communist Party for the attainment of Communist objectives or purposes.

Mr. JONES. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. We have Mrs. Jones here, and I can make it a very short hearing, if you want to finish with this case today.

Senator O'CONOR. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Jones, will you give your name and address to to the reporter?

Mrs. JONES. I am Mrs. Catesby T. Jones.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been sworn?

Mr. FANELLI. They were both sworn.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. I recall that.

Mrs. Jones, will you just speak out loud, so that the reporter can hear you?

Mr. MORRIS. What is your maiden name?

Mrs. JONES. Alice Ratcliffe Gernett.

Mr. MORRIS. Gernett?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born?

Mrs. JONES. Chicago, Ill.

Mr. MORRIS. What schools have you attended?

Mrs. JONES. You mean grammar school and high school?

Mrs. MORRIS. Well, high school.

Mrs. JONES. Melrose High School, Massachusetts.

Mr. MORRIS. What college?

Mrs. JONES. Radcliffe College.

Mr. MORRIS. What year did you graduate?

Mrs. JONES. 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever do any graduate work?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you do your graduate work?

Mrs. JONES. Columbia University Library School.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mrs. JONES. Class of 1939, 1938–39.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Have you assisted Owen Lattimore in any way in connection with a statement he may have issued in connection with his testimony before this committee?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do for Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. JONES. I helped assemble and staple a 50-page statement. That was before this committee? The 50-page statement was before this committee?

Mr. MORRIS. That is within the last month?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And what else did you do for Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. JONES. I found some mistakes in spelling and helped correct them.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now, did you assist Mr. Jones in connection with the effort that he made on behalf of Mr. Lattimore back in August?

Mrs. JONES. You mean taking notes? No.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that they were the only acts that you performed for Mr. Lattimore in connection with his testimony before this committee?

Mrs. JONES. No; I think Mrs. Lattimore might have asked me to get a book or return a book or look up a date in the newspaper, or some-

thing like that, some kind of library research or something. But I did one or two errands, just little dirty jobs it would take time to do—or I don't mean dirty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you live close to the Lattimores?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How close?

Mrs. JONES. About—I think about 3 miles.

Senator O'CONOR. Your address is 5413 Falls Road Terrace in Baltimore?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you work?

Mrs. JONES. Not outside the home.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no reason to come in contact with Mrs. Lattimore, then, in your normal activities, do you?

Mrs. JONES. My normal activity is as the wife of a graduate student.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that take you to the campus frequently?

Mrs. JONES. To return books perhaps.

Mr. SOURWINE. When Mrs. Lattimore asked you to do these little favors, would she do that by telephone?

Mrs. JONES. She might do it by phone, or she might——

Mr. SOURWINE. She would not come to see you for that purpose?

Mrs. JONES. Yes; I believe she telephoned me one time and asked me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever telephone her and ask if "there is anything I can do today"?

Mrs. JONES. I believe I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one instance?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you lived 3 miles away?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you compensated for these little favors?

Mrs. JONES. No. May I say anything more?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, indeed, if you wish to.

Mrs. JONES. I have a little girl, who likes to take a ride in the country. And she would like to go with me on such a ride.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Jones, have you been married before?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To whom were you married?

Mrs. JONES. Robert Leroy McLean.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is he now?

Mrs. JONES. He was killed in service, overseas.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever a member of the Library of Congress unit of the Communist Party?

Mrs. JONES. I decline to answer on the grounds of the first and fifth amendments and any other constitutional protection that might be available to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named David Wahl, W-a-h-l?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What were your associations with Mr. Wahl?

Mrs. JONES. He was an employee of the Library of Congress when I was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you work for the Government outside of the Library of Congress?

Mrs. JONES. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you belong to any other unit of the Communist Party while you were employed as an employee of the United States Government other than the one in the Library of Congress?

Mrs. JONES. When?

Senator FERGUSON. At any time. While you worked for the United States Government?

Mrs. JONES. For the last 10 years, I have not been a member of the Communist Party or had any Communist connections or associations or activities. And beyond that, I respectfully decline to answer on the same grounds.

Senator FERGUSON. My question was, while you worked for the Government. You had several appointments with the Government. At any time were you a member of any unit of the Communist Party?

Mrs. JONES. For the last 10 years I was never a member of any unit of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to that time?

Mrs. JONES. Prior to that time I respectfully decline to answer on the grounds previously stated.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last date of employment with the Federal Government?

Mrs. JONES. 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. What position did you have at that time?

Mrs. JONES. Overseas documentation specialist.

Mr. MORRIS. With what branch?

Mrs. JONES. The Libraries and Institutes. I have forgotten the exact name.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. How long have you held that position?

Mrs. JONES. For about 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you give as a reference for that position?

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give David Wahl as a reference?

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember H. Bowen Smith?

Mrs. JONES. Yes; he was a supervisor of mine at one time.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you ever give the name of Philip O. Keeney as a reference?

Mrs. JONES. He was my supervisor. I might have given him in that connection.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever give the name of Edward Stone as a reference?

Mrs. JONES. I believe I did. He was my supervisor for a while.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you last see Mary Jane Keeney?

Mrs. JONES. I think it must have been 2 or 3 years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you see her then?

Mrs. JONES. In New York.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the occasion of your seeing her at that time?

Mrs. JONES. I was in New York for Christmas.

Mr. MORRIS. And you looked her up?

Mrs. JONES. I believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Or did she look you up?

Mrs. JONES. I believe I looked her up.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you work for the War Department in February 1941?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you also work for the Office of War Information?
Mrs. JONES. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold there?
Mrs. JONES. In the Office of War Information, I was a P–1, and I have forgotten my exact title.
Mr. MORRIS. I mean, did you work in Far Eastern Affairs?
Mrs. JONES. No; not Far Eastern.
Mr. MORRIS. You also worked in the Bureau of Economic Warfare?
Mrs. JONES. The Board of Economic Warfare.
Mr. MORRIS. The Board of Economic Warfare.
Mrs. JONES. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you subsequently work for the State Department?
Mrs. JONES. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever work for OSS?
Mrs. JONES. No.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, at any time, in applying for various positions, did you indicate that you had been at any time a member of the Communist Party or any organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Government by force and violence?
Mrs. JONES. No.
Senator FERGUSON. When did you work for the State Department?
Mrs. JONES. From September 4, 1945, to June 30, 1947.
Mr. MORRIS. What were your duties in the State Department?
Mrs. JONES. When I first went over there, I was hired individually as an adviser on libraries.
Mr. MORRIS. I see. Who hired you?
Mrs. JONES. A man by the name of Worvill. I mean, he was the supervisor, but then there was a personnel man that interviewed me first. And I have forgotten his name, but I might remember it later.
Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you give as references?
Mrs. JONES. I don't remember, but I suppose I gave the persons who had been my supervisors previously. I mean, I should think I would have done that.
Senator O'CONOR. Mrs. Jones, might I ask you if at any time during your relationships with either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore, you discussed with them any possible membership you had either in the Communist Party or in any of its affiliated organizations?
Mrs. JONES. No. That is a very long question, but it is "No."
Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the Washington Bookshop Association of Washington?
Mrs. JONES. I belonged to the Washington Cooperative Book Shop.
Mr. MORRIS. Were you a member of the League of Women Shoppers?
Mrs. JONES. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is there such an organization as the Washington Bookshop Association, so far as you know?
Mrs. JONES. I am not familiar with that title.
Mr. SOURWINE. You never belonged to such an organization?
Mrs. JONES. I don't remember any such title as that.
Mr. SOURWINE. You never belonged to such an organization, did you?
Mrs. JONES. My experience is of paying $2 to the Washington Cooperative Book Shop, with the idea of buying books at a discount.
Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you now about——

Mrs. JONES. Now, I may be wrong, or you may be wrong about the wording. Or I shouldn't say you may be wrong. That other designation may be at variance.

Mr. SOURWINE. Consider the possibility that there is more than one organization with the words "book shop" in it. I am asking you if you ever belonged to an organization called the Washington Book Shop Association?

Mrs. JONES. Well, I would have to say I may have. Do you understand me? You do understand me, don't you?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not sure that I do, but perhaps I do.

Mrs. JONES. Well, I believe that I belonged to the Washington Cooperative Book Shop.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will let that stand. Did you also belong to an organization called the Washington Cooperative Book Shop?

Mr. FANELLI. Did you belong to one organization, or two?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fanelli, if you don't mind, let me ask the questions, please.

Mrs. JONES. I would have to say I don't know, because I am not sure what you mean by the Book Shop Association.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is possible that you belong to more than one organization having the words "book shop" in its name?

Mrs. JONES. No; I don't think that is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you stating that you never belonged to more than one organization having the words "book shop" in its name?

Mrs. JONES. That is my belief.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I am trying to ask.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever secretary of local 28 of the United Federal Workers of America?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long did you act as secretary of local 28 of the United Federal Workers of America?

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember, but it might have been about a year.

Senator FERGUSON. And when was it?

Mrs. JONES. It must have been in 1937–38.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever tell Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore that you had been the secretary of local 28 of the United Federal Workers of America?

Mrs. JONES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever relate to them that you were connected with that union in any way?

Mrs. JONES. With the whole union?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, the Federal Workers of America, Local 28.

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were Mr. and Mrs. Keeney, Mary Jane Keeney and her husband, friends of yourself and your husband?

Mrs. JONES. That is a double question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mrs. JONES. I mean, they were friends of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But not of your husand? Do you mean, there was no social intercourse between the two families.

Mrs. JONES. There was the slightest social intercourse.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did visit once or twice?

Mrs. JONES. Once or twice.

Mr. SOURWINE. I note that both you and your husband remembered the last occasion of your meeting, which apparently was in New York some years ago.

Mrs. JONES. Excuse me. Will you repeat that statement? Because I am not sure that I understand the same thing you do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, it is immaterial. I will start again.

You have stated your recollection of your last meeting with the Keeneys.

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you know that your husband has also stated his recollection of the last meeting with the Keeneys?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, would you say Mary Jane Keeney was your friend?

Mrs. JONES. Was? Has been? Is? I haven't kept up with her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she your friend?

Mrs. JONES. I believe she was my friend.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think she may still be your friend?

Mrs. JONES. Will you define "friend"?

Senator FERGUSON. Suppose you define it.

Mrs. JONES. To me a friend can be somebody that you go around with, or can be someone who is not an enemy. I mean, to say I used to know her, when I used to work in Washington—I haven't seen her for ages.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you sufficiently interested to know that she had worked for the United Nations?

Mrs. JONES. I read that in the paper.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you read in the paper was that she had been fired from the United Nations, wasn't it?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you know why she was fired from the United Nations?

Mrs. JONES. I don't believe that the reason was given. I think it just said she was fired.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't note in the paper why?

Mrs. JONES. I believe it was an administrative firing of some sort. I mean, it was a sort of a privileged firing or something. It wasn't detailed.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't believe Mr. Catesby Jones has been formally excused yet.

Could I address a question to him at this time?

Mr. Catesby Jones?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones, do you remember reading the newspaper accounts of the firing of Mary Jane Keeney by the United Nations?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you are a former newspaper man, and perhaps you read newspaper stories carefully. Do you remember anything in those stories about why she was fired?

Mr. JONES. I am very sorry, sir. I don't remember the exact reason. Under oath, I just can't venture something out of my failure to remember the reason. I just don't remember the reason.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Jones, do you know that the United Federal Workers of America has now become the United Public Workers?

Mrs. JONES. Yes; I know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason to believe that that is a union controlled by the Communist Party?

Mrs. JONES. I will have to give a separated answer. I have not kept up with that union for some years, so I don't know what is going on now. To my knowledge, when I did know anything about it—to my knowledge, it was—now, what was your question again?

Mr. MORRIS. Controlled by the Communist Party.

Mrs. JONES. To my knowledge, it was not so controlled.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it influenced?

Mrs. JONES. To my knowledge, I can't say. I mean, I don't know whether it was influenced or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that an answer you have given to this committee in good faith?

Mrs. JONES. I don't know how broad you mean "influence." I mean, if somebody died, it influences the whole community.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any influence?

Mrs. JONES. Influence in the sense of predominant influence, not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was originally: Do you have any reason to believe that this union is a Communist union.

Mrs. JONES. Is a Communist union? Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to believe it is a Communist-dominated union?

Mrs. JONES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know it was expelled by the CIO for Communist control?

Mrs. JONES. The United Public Workers of America? I did not know that.

Can you tell me when? I am just curious.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know. I am just asking if you knew that.

I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say this.

We had subpenaed here today Robert T. Miller, formerly of the State Department, who has been named as a Communist in our hearings, and we had subpenaed him to give him an opportunity to affirm or deny the allegation made. We received today from Robert T. Miller the following telegram:

Senator PAT MCCARRAN,
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.:

Informed by my wife that subpena left at my home during my absence calling for my appearance Wednesday. Respectfully request either postponement or new subpena.

ROBERT T. MILLER.

I would like to call your attention to the fact, Mr. Chairman, that that telegram does indicate that Mr. Miller has notice of the fact that the committee wanted his appearance here today.

Senator O'CONOR. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I just ask one question of Mrs. Jones?

Did you know anything about the fact that your husband was coming down here on the 22d and 23d of last August at the Budenz testimony?

Mrs. JONES. Will you repeat that question?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about the fact that your husband was coming down here to take notes or to be present at the Budenz testimony before this committee?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you learn that?

Mrs. JONES. When did I learn what? That he was going to come?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mrs. JONES. I don't remember, but I suppose it would be the day before. I suppose. I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not come down with him?

Mrs. JONES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know anything about the conversation he had with Mr. Lattimore or Mrs. Lattimore about coming down.

Mrs. JONES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know anything about the work that he did here, the making of notes and taking them there at noon and again in the evening and going to the restaurant?

Mrs. JONES. Not of my knowledge. I mean, I have heard what has gone on today.

Senator FERGUSON. But I mean prior to today, you did not hear about it?

Mrs. JONES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know that your husband had read the minutes of the hearing last Friday or Saturday?

Mrs. JONES. The hearing last Friday or Saturday? Read that; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That we had given him the minutes of the hearings last Friday and Saturday and that he read it?

Mrs. JONES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he make any comments about the testimony that Lattimore had given, about what took place?

Mr. JONES. He must have said something, but I don't remember what he said.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you recall at all?

Mrs. JONES. He said, "This must be why they subpenaed me."

Mr. JONES. I did say that.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that about what you said?

Mr. JONES. That is about what I said.

Senator O'CONOR. With that, we will suspend.

The hearing will be adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 6:40 p. m., Wednesday, April 2, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senator Smith (North Carolina).

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator SMITH. Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Senator.

Senator SMITH. With whom?

Mr. MORRIS. Robert T. Miller.

Senator SMITH. Will you stand up and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear the evidence you shall give in this proceeding being conducted by a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MILLER. I do.

Senator SMITH. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT T. MILLER, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY NORMAN S. ALTMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Miller, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

Mr. MILLER. Robert T. Miller, 2731 Palisade Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. MILLER. Public relations.

Mr. MORRIS. In what respect do you engage in public relations?

Mr. MILLER. I am a public-relations consultant.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you work for a particular firm?

Mr. MILLER. I consult for a firm, self-employed, but I consult for a firm.

Mr. MORRIS. For what firm do you consult?

Mr. MILLER. Medical Pharmaceutical Information Bureau.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is that office?

Mr. MILLER. New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Where?

Mr. MILLER. 80 Sixty-first Street.

Mr. MORRIS. What has been your most recent employment, that is prior to that?

Mr. MILLER. With Randall Philleys Associates in New York, a firm which no longer exists, public-relations firm.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Miller, at any time have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MILLER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever paid Communist Party dues at any time?

Mr. MILLER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with Elizabeth T. Bentley?

Mr. MILLER. I knew her under another name.

Mr. MORRIS. What other name did you know her by?

Mr. MILLER. Helen John or Johns.

Mr. MORRIS. What were the circumstances of your knowing her?

Mr. MILLER. She was introduced by a businessman whom I knew in New York in 1940 or 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that businessman?

Mr. MILLER. A man whom I know as Jacob Friedman.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that Jacob Golos?

Mr. MILLER. So I have learned to believe. I have been shown a picture of this person who used to be him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Gregory Silvermaster?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read the testimony before this committee by Elizabeth Bentley to the effect that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MILLER. I have never read an actual transcript of it; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Miss Bentley has testified before this committee that you were a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MILLER. As far as actually seeing it in a committee transcript, I haven't, so that to that extent it's hearsay, but I believe she did; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mrs. Hede Massing?

Mr. MILLER. Hede Massing? No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a man named Julian Gumperz? Do you know a woman who was the wife of Julian Gumperz?

Mr. MILLER. The name means nothing to me. No, I don't know them.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know a woman who was the first wife of Gerhart Eisler?

Mr. MILLER. No; I have never known any such person.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you do not know of such a person, or you cannot recall such a person?

Mr. MILLER. I do not know any such person.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your association with Gregory Silvermaster?

Mr. MILLER. We were neighbors. We lived in Chevy Chase, just a block or two from there.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been in his home?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions?

Mr. MILLER. I wouldn't remember. We knew them over a period of at least a year or two.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Miller, were you dropped from the State Department for security reasons?

Mr. MILLER. I resigned from the State Department without prejudice.

Mr. MORRIS. I have noticed in the House hearings, Mr. Miller, that a record was introduced at the time which reads as follows:

Mr. Miller is presently employed in the Department as Assistant Chief of the Division of Research and Publications in charge of the Publications Branch, P–7, salary $7,437.50. The information developed by the FBI in its current investigation of Mr. Miller supports the conclusion that his continued presence in the Department constitutes a strong risk to the security of the departmental functions and to the classified information of this Department. It is recommended, therefore, that his services be terminated in accordance with Public Law No. 490.

Are you acquainted with that, Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. My only acquaintance with that is when Mr. Stripling read it at that hearing. As I said then, I had absolutely no knowledge of it before that whatever.

Mr. MORRIS. Your impression is that your termination of employment with the State Department was brought about by your resignation?

Mr. MILLER. That is my impression. That was actually the case. In fact, I am quite sure I had a paper that shows I resigned without prejudice.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I read the testimony of Mrs. Massing in connection with the witness?

Senator SMITH. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the testimony taken before this committee on Thursday, August 2, 1951: (Part 1, p. 243.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, did you know a man named Robert T. Miller?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what you know about Robert T. Miller?

Mrs. MASSING. I know not too much about him really. I met him on, I believe, my second courier trip on a boat. He was on his way to the Soviet Union. I didn't know him then. I met him on the boat and we started to discuss politics. As far as I remember, he was anti-Soviet. I tried, as I tried during those years, to convince everybody that the Soviet Union was the solution to all problems in this world.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was this?

Mrs. MASSING. That was probably in 1934. I would not know exactly. It might have been 1935. It must have been 1934. We discussed at great length. He was going on a trip to the Soviet Union quite determined not to like it. I told him that he doesn't understand, that he doesn't know, and I offered to give him a letter of recommendation to Mrs. Louis Fischer, Markoosha Fischer, provided that he take chocolate to the sons of Louis Fischer, who were little boys at the time. There was no chocolate in the Soviet Union and everybody who had a chance to send food in the Soviet Union did, and I told Miller if he would buy a lot of chocolate in Germany, I would in exchange give him a letter of introduction to Markoosha Fischer, who would then show him around in Moscow and explain the Soviet Union. She, being a Russian and the wife of an American newspaperman, was the appropriate person to introduce to him the great secrets of the Soviet Union. He accepted it. He did buy chocolate and he did meet Markoosha Fischer, who took him to the Moscow Daily News, where the indoctrination was completely taken out of her hands because he married an American Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the American Communist?

Mrs. MASSING. I don't know. I heard her name. I don't know her personally. I wasn't there. He stayed on some time, I understand, and left as a Communist. This is all I know about him. I have never seen him since.

Do you remember such an episode, Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. I certainly don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet anyone in Moscow whom you subsequently married?

Mr. MILLER. I certainly did.

Mr. MORRIS. Whom did you meet in Moscow?

Mr. MILLER. I met an American citizen named Jenny Levy.

Mr. MORRIS. What was she doing at that time?

Mr. MILLER. She was working as a secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Of what organization?

Mr. MILLER. She was working for an American business woman.

Mr. MORRIS. In the Soviet Union?

Mr. MILLER. In Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Did she subsequently work for the Moscow Daily News?

Mr. MILLER. She worked for it before that.

I would like to say specifically she wasn't a Communist then or ever.

Mr. MORRIS. You say she was not a Communist?

Mr. MILLER. Was not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it be possible to work for the Moscow Daily News without being a Communist, Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. Oh, sure, sure; at least well, I certainly shouldn't speak with such authority, but I believe so; perhaps not now, but I think it would have been then. If you recall, that was the period in Russia when there was a certain amount of friendliness developing toward foreigners.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mrs. Louis Fischer?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Markoosha Fischer?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you first meet her? Did you have any letter of introduction to Mrs. Fischer?

Mr. MILLER. That was 20 years ago. I don't think so. I have no recollection of any. The way that was was that when a new American arrived in Moscow there were very few others there and everybody met everybody else quite soon.

Mr. MORRIS. And you cannot recall being introduced to Mrs. Louis Fischer, or Markoosha Fischer, with a letter of introduction such as was described by Mrs. Massing in this testimony?

Mr. MILLER. Absolutely not.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with Elizabeth Bentley, is it your testimony you did not at any time pay Communist dues to her?

Mr. MILLER. It is my testimony that I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is your testimony that you were not in the Communist Party and that you did not know her to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MILLER. Was not and did not know her to be one.

Mr. MORRIS. However, you did know Elizabeth Bentley under another name?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Jacob Golos under another name?

Mr. MILLER. So far as his being identified with the picture that I saw, the man I knew under another name, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might ask a question? I apologize for being late. Does the record show the other names under which the witness knew these two persons?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Miller's name came up in the IPR files as someone who had conversation with Mr. Edward C. Carter and Mr. Alger Hiss.

Did you ever have a conversation with Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. MILLER. Yes, I had one.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that conversation?

Mr. MILLER. That was a conversation just about research on foreign affairs and about research in general which I had with him, as I recall, early, probably in January 1947. It was not intended to lead to anything in particular and it didn't. I didn't see Mr. Carter again. We just discussed our mutual interest in that field.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Alger Hiss at that time?

Mr. MILLER. I had just met him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the letter in question here is a letter from Edward C. Carter, dated February 5, 1947. It is written to Alger Hiss.

It reads:

DEAR ALGER: Yesterday at your suggestion I had a delightful and illuminating talk with Robert T. Miller, whom I hope to see again. He brought me the good news that you had succeeded Dr. Butler as president of the endowment. I hope this will mean frequent visits to New York, if not permanent residence.

Is it your testimony you did not see Mr. Carter again?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And your testimony, as you just described to this committee, refers to this "delightful and illuminating talk" referred to in this letter by Mr. Edward C. Carter?

Mr. MILLER. It must be; but, of course, if it means anything, I had no idea he was going to write Hiss about this. I didn't really know what that's all about.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you ever had a partner named Jack B. Fahey?

Mr. MILLER. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a partner in what project?

Mr. MILLER. The Hemisphere project, which published a weekly newsletter of Latin America.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a Communist publication?

Mr. MILLER. No, indeed. It was subscribed to, I might say on that point, by practically all, or all American diplomatic missions in Latin America, by many banks, by many Government departments, many business firms.

Mr. MORRIS. When you liquidated that corporation, what did you do with the assets?

Mr. MILLER. We transferred those to Washington——

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "to Washington," what do you mean?

Mr. MILLER. The organization was put under contract to the Coordinator of American Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. And it was taken over by the Coordinator?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any intermediate step?

Mr. MILLER. It worked under contract for about a year or so and then the whole thing was just merged into the Coordinator's office.

Mr. MORRIS. Who else was associated with you on that project?

Mr. MILLER. Well, the other principal person was Joseph Gregg, who was a friend of Jack Fahey's.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Joseph Gregg a Communist?

Mr. MILLER. Certainly not, to my knowledge, and I would have said not.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you seen any testimony to the effect that he was a Communist, seen or heard of any?

Mr. MILLER. I can't honestly say I remember any; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Jack B. Fahey a member of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade?

Mr. MILLER. I don't know. I just don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he serve with the American Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain?

Mr. MILLER. Yes, he did; but the point I am making is that I don't know whether he joined the veterans of the international brigade of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, whatever it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you had any association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MILLER. No, sir; other than that one conversation with Mr. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, do you have any questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. It may be that this point has been covered. If it has, I do not want to inquire. Has the point been covered, Mr. Morris, as to whether in bringing to Mr. Carter the good news which is referred to in this letter of Mr. Carter to Mr. Hiss, whether the witness was acting at someone's request? Let me go into that a little bit.

Mr. Miller, do you recall telling Mr. Carter of the succession Alger Hiss to the position of president of the endowment succeeding Dr. Butler?

Mr. MILLER. No; I have no recollection of that. I do remember that that fact was around. I gather from this letter—I had completely forgotten the context—that it must have been in the stage of unpublished scuttle butt at that point, but evidently I mentioned it to Mr. Carter. I frankly am surprised that I was the first person to tell him about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not know at the time that you were the first person to tell him?

Mr. MILLER. I frankly don't remember it at all. I evidently didn't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how you learned about that?

Mr. MILLER. I don't. I don't; unless it must have been around the State Department.

You see, Mr. Carter, again, to the best of my recollection—I couldn't be a hundred percent certain of this—but, as I recall it, I talked to Hiss, just within a week or two before or after leaving the State Department, about research in general on the basis that he was going into this new job, to see whether he had any plans where any project of mine might fit, and so on, and in the course of discussing research, he mentioned evidently Mr. Carter. My recollection is that he suggested that he was somebody I should see.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that why you went to see Mr. Carter?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On Mr. Hiss' suggestion?

Mr. MILLER. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that it was quite natural for you to mention Mr. Hiss' new job when you saw Carter?

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was not a case of Hiss suggesting that you tell Mr. Carter about it as though you went as a messenger, in any sense?

Mr. MILLER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just that you went to Mr. Carter at Mr. Hiss' suggestion?

Mr. MILLER. Yes; and I'm sure that I couldn't have been a messenger, but, again, this is years ago, but I am practically certain there were a number of people in the State Department that knew about Hiss' job at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your reason for bringing it up was not primarily that you thought Mr. Carter might have any interest, but because Mr. Hiss was the man that had sent you to Carter?

Mr. MILLER. Roughly, I suppose; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Ludwig Ullman?

Mr. MILLER. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. What were your associations with Ludwig Ullman?

Mr. MILLER. He was living with the Silvermasters at the time we knew them.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been to Alaska in the last 7 or 8 years?

Mr. MILLER. No; I've never been to Alaska.

Mr. MORRIS. I think they are the only questions we have.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one general question.

Mr. Miller, do you know anyone in the State Department with respect to whom you have any reason to believe that person to be a member of the Communist Party or a person who knowingly and willingly has collaborated or cooperated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. MILLER. No, sir; I do not.

Senator SMITH. Is that all, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Very well.

Senator SMITH. Do you have another witness, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. We have Mr. Frank Farrell.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Farrell, will you stand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear the evidence you shall give in this hearing being conducted by a Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FARRELL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK FARRELL, COLUMNIST FOR THE NEW YORK WORLD-TELEGRAM AND SUN, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, what is your present occupation?

Mr. FARRELL. Newspaper columnist for the New York World-Telegram and Sun.

Mr. MORRIS. Where do you reside?

Mr. FARRELL. Hotel Weylin, New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the address of the Hotel Weylin?

Mr. FARRELL. Madison Avenue and Fifty-fourth Street.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, were you a Marine Corps officer during the last war?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What rank did you attain?

Mr. FARRELL. I went into active duty status as a lieutenant and subsequently have been promoted to a major in the reserve.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with your duties in the Marine Corps, were you ever on the prosecution staff in the prosecution of Walther F. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could that name be spelled for the record?

Mr. FARRELL. The full name was Dr. Walther, W-a-l-t-h-e-r, middle name was Franz, F-r-a-n-z, last name Heissig, H-e-i-s-s-i-g.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Heissig's formal position in China, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Ostensibly he was a university professor and a scholar, linguist, and a Far Eastern expert on the subject of Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. How did he make his living?

Mr. FARRELL. As a spy for the German High Command while he was in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that as a matter of fact, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; I have records.

Mr. MORRIS. How did Walther Heissig first come to your attention, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. He was arrested by the United States Armed Forces.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was he arrested?

Mr. FARRELL. China theater. He was arrested in Peking, China.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was he arrested?

Mr. FARRELL. He was arrested because he was a member of the German High Command Intelligence, Sabotage, and Propaganda secret underground in the Far East, and because this corps continued action hostile to the United States and other nations of the United Nations on behalf of the Japanese Armed Forces subsequent to the unconditional surrender of Germany up until the final surrender of Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the date of the official surrender of the German Army?

Mr. FARRELL. May 8, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Dr. Heissig and others continue their resistance after May 8, 1945?

Mr. FARRELL. They continued until the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this group of which Dr. Heissig was a member collectively arrested?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people constituted that group?

Mr. FARRELL. Collectively 27 people were brought into the court room.

Mr. MORRIS. What relative rank within that group did Dr. Heissig hold?

Mr. FARRELL. Outwardly he was a cog in the wheel, actually second in command of the Peking branch of the German High Command Intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that he was associated with the German intelligence?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, in the round up of these people after we acquired information as to what they had been up to——

Mr. MORRIS. You were then with what organization, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. I was on detached service from the First Marine Division on a series of secret intelligence missions in the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. What particular assignment did you have in connection with the arrest of Mr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. At that time I was attached to the Judge Advocate's Office of the United States Army in Shanghai and my particular assignment with them was chief investigator or chief investigative officer of this Far Eastern network of German high command intelligence, and subsequently was named a special prosecutor on the prosecution staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you examine Heissig on the witness stand?

Mr. FARRELL. I personally did not examine him. Colonel Jeremiah J. O'Connor, who was Assistant Judge Advocate conducted the examination.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you act as the assistant prosecutor?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it generally known that Dr. Heissig was in fact a German intelligence officer?

Mr. FARRELL. It was not generally known. It was only generally known that he had some attachment to the consular offices in Peking and among the people in German intelligence they knew he was in some subordinate role, or they suspected he was in a subordinate role.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you come to discover his affiliations with the German intelligence?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, we captured documents, in the first place, a couple of days after August 15 which gave us almost everybody on the staff of what was known as the Bureau Ehrhardt. Senior among the personnel in the branch office at Peking was the name of Dr. Heissig. Subsequently, unknown to Heissig, I uncovered documentary proof that he was much more important in the Far East intelligence network than he posed as, and even much more important than his own German confederates suspected.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that, Mr. Farrell.

Mr. FARRELL. In trying to get rid of records the German embassy in Nanking made one mistake and on account of that mistake some very important papers came into my hands. Among them was one of which I hold a photostat in my hand and a translation in English of the German document.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the witness has described this as a document which was seized by the United States military authorities, a copy of the document seized by the United States military authorities in Peking.

Mr. FARRELL. This document was seized in Nanking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not a copy, Mr. Morris; a photostat.

Mr. MORRIS. A photostatic copy.

Who made this translation, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. I think the name might be on there. It was the United States Army there. There's no name attached to it, but it's a United States Army translation of the original.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the original of this document one of the documents that was used in the trial in which you were one of the prosecutors?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right, and it is part of the court record.

Mr. MORRIS. Under the circumstances, Mr. Chairman, will you receive this into the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 744" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 744



18/42

Helsing
Teking 61/43

Walter Pesno 5.12.

Wien

Einbürgerung 1935

Oesterreich seit 1935 gottgl. arisch

verh. 1 1941

1913 Dr. Phil., Ethnologe

Karl Staatsbeamter arisch

Helene Pitsch arisch

Aenne Helsig, Darmstadt-Griesheim, Pfützenstr. 25b

Aenne Müller arisch D.-Griesheim, Pfützenstr. 25b

Realgymnasium, Univers. Berlin/Wien Englisch, Mongolisch

C5 Berlin

Ers.Res. I

Mai 1941 Wien

Higashi Dan Giro 201

Hsinking. ~~Kenkuo-kodo 4 Ga bei Nürnberg~~

Wien IX, Nürlgasse 9

Bezirksamt Wien Wien II

Polizeiamt Wien II 17.Febr.41 17.Febr.1943



Consular Office in	No.—
Hsinking	18/42
Peking	51/43

Last name: HEISSIG. First name: WALTER.

(2) First name: Walter. Middle name: Franz.
(3) Birth date: Day: 5. Month: 12.
(4) Birthplace, state _____ Borough _____ County _____
Vienna.
(5) Obtained German citizenship through _____ foreign citizenship.
Naturalization 1935.
Former citizen of Austria. German citizen since 1935.
(6) Religion: Believe in God. Race: Arian.
(7) Family: Married. No. of children: Sons: 1 (Year of birth, or death).
Daughters: 1941.
Year of birth: 1913.

(8) Profession: Dr. Phil., Ethnologist. Present Occupation _____
Profession: Father's first name: Karl. Profession: Civil Service. Race: Arian. Died on _____
Cath.: Mother's first name: Helene, nee Pitsch. Race: Arian. Died on _____
Prot.: (9) Brothers: (Year of birth and death). Sisters: (Year of birth and death).
Pg.: Address of the next of kin: Aenne Heissig, Darmstadt-Griesheim, Pfuetzen Street 25b.
DUF: Wife's first name: Aenne, nee Mueller. Race: Arian. Address: D-Griesheim, Pfuetzenstr. 25b.
Org.: (10) Schools: High School, Univ. of Berlin, Vienna.
(11) Foreign Languages: English, Mongolian.
(11a) Any connections with branches of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Worker's Party) etc. Date of Entry, leaving. S. S. *Berlin.* Grade of foreign army service for which qualified: 1st Reserve
(12) Special family or commercial connections
(13) Moved here on May 1941 from (former residence, state and borough): Vienna.
Address: Hsinking, Higashi Jun Jiro 201.
(14) Last address in Germany: Vienna 9, Hoerlgasse 9.
(15) Member of the NSDAP or affiliated organizations _____
(16) Member of German clubs or organizations _____
(17) Home Office certificate issued at the Borough Office, Vienna _____ in Vienna 2 on the _____ valid until _____
(18) Passport issued at the Police Station in Vienna 2 on the 17 Feb. 41. Valid until 17 Feb. 1943.

CHANGES AND ADDITIONS

(1) Address: Moved on the 30.11 to Peking. State—Country: China. Street: 23 Ta Hsiang Feng. no. Htg.
(2) Family: Wife. Sons _____. Daughters: Brigitte.
(3) Military Service: 1935–36. Rifle Rgt. 2 Meiningen, from 1939 to 41 served in a rifle Rgt., Kradschuetz Company (Panzer (Armored) Division).
(4) Club memberships _____

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that document, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. This is the usual form that a person in a foreign country, that is, a German person, would fill out for his embassy. It's a fairly routine record of his name, birth, birthplace, education, parents' names, the schools that he attended, his party connections if any, his last police check with the Gestapo, his current residence, and a brief of his military service that was required by the Third Reich.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any significant bits of information on that document, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. There is one very important line in this document. That's the line which registers him as a party connection with the Gestapo in Berlin.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is that, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. That is on line 10a, where it says: SS Berlin.

Mr. MORRIS. Does that indicate he is a member of the SS Corps?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that Sicherheitsdienst?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes.

In the case which lasted from October 1946 until February 1947, Dr. Heissig generally and specifically set forth that he had no party connection whatever. He posed purely as a scholar and a professor. He belittled whatever espionage efforts he had made in behalf of the German Government.

Under oath on the witness stand he swore that he had never done anything against the United States and absolutely denied that he had any connection with the SS or the SD.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the SD?

Mr. FARRELL. The SD is a German designation for the Sicherheitsdienst, which is the internal corps of SS Intelligence. This was a select group of highly qualified men who were operating under cover at all times, usually as secretaries or attachés, the way Richard Sorge was in General Ott's office in Japan, for the specific purpose of reporting directly to the High Command in Berlin on the loyalty of embassy and consulate personnel, including the ambassador and the consular general and consuls.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you confront Dr. Heissig with that document?

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel O'Connor actually confronted him with it.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you present at the time?

Mr. FARRELL. I was present at the time and straight on through the prosecution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he admit his SS association at that time?

Mr. FARRELL. He was coldly stunned by the appearance of this document in the trial.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "he was coldly stunned," exactly what do you mean, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Up until that time Dr. Heissig was very self-confident of himself and extremely arrogant——

Mr. MORRIS. Self-confident?

Mr. FARRELL. Self-confident and extremely arrogant on the witness stand. As of the moment this was presented to him for identification and explanation, he paled and seemed to be on the verge of faint.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he admit his associations with the SS?

Mr. FARRELL. He subsequently admitted this document was a genuine document and that the——

Mr. MORRIS. That the facts on it were correct?

Mr. FARRELL. That the facts were correct on it.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he did admit that he had been associated with the SS Corps?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes. He went into no further detail about that. It was interesting to note that upon presentation of this document and revelation that he was actually a member of the Gestapo and of the SD, I would say, most of the prisoners who were in the dock with him were as surprised as German people in the court room who were watching the proceedings.

Mr. MORRIS. How about his co-defendants?

Mr. FARRELL. The co-defendants?

Mr. MORRIS. The co-defendants were surprised at the revelation of the connections of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he convicted by that military court?

Mr. FARRELL. He was convicted by the military court and sentenced to 30 years at hard labor to be served in our military prison in Germany. I forget the designation.

Mr. MORRIS. But it was in Germany?

Mr. FARRELL. It's the prison where the major war criminals are incarcerated.

Mr. MORRIS. During the course of that particular military proceeding, did Owen Lattimore intervene on behalf of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Owen Lattimore's name surfaced in this before the criminal proceedings.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. FARRELL. As early as 1946 when the question of repatriation of certain Germans who were considered detrimental to the interests of the United States in the Far East was concerned, Owen Lattimore entered an almost immediate plea, as soon as the subject of repatriation came up, and the plea was specific for the exemption of Dr. Walter Heissig.

Mr. SOURWINE. How was that plea entered?

Mr. FARRELL. It first came to my attention verbally through the G–2 of General Wedemeyer's staff of the China theater.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean orally ?

Mr. FARRELL. Orally; I'm sorry. It was hearsay at first and subsequently I got an oral confirmation of it from the G–2 himself that Lattimore was interested in this man's case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Lattimore made any representations in writing in that regard at that time?

Mr. FARRELL. At that time, I was under the impression that he had, but I wasn't positive that he had written a letter. Subsequently, according to testimony here, Mr. Lattimore testified before this committee that he wrote one letter and that it was not a very strong letter and under no circumstances could it be considered pressure.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that testimony now before this committee, or before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. I am not positive of that. I have the file of correspondence.

Mr. MORRIS. The one that you have in front of you there is the testimony of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. FARRELL. That's the file I refer to.

Senator SMITH. Look at the title page.

Mr. FARRELL. I just changed books. Somebody gave me the wrong book on that when I first came in here.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you subsequently seen letters that Owen Lattimore did write on behalf of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he did write a number of letters, did he not, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. He wrote a great number of letters, apparently.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about your experiences back in China at the time of the prosecution of this case?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, will the Chair permit me an intervention at this point? "A great number of letters," is very indefinite. What do you mean by that?

Mr. FARRELL. It's certainly more than one and I had very tangible indications from my position in the Far East that if there were not letters outstanding there were other communications. Whether it was cable by way of State Department communications, or cable by way of military communications, or courier, I am not aware, but I became painfully aware of Mr. Lattimore's interference in this case.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many letters or communications did you see from Mr. Lattimore about this case?

Mr. FARRELL. Unfortunately, on my echelon, I have no access to general officers or embassy mail.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not have to say whether it is fortunate or not; just how many did you see?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, it was unfortunate in my case because I wasn't able to ascertain where the brickbats were coming from, but actually I did not see any letter while I was in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many letters do you know he wrote or other communications?

Mr. FARRELL. There is a file of numerous letters right here.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "right here"?

Mr. FARRELL. In this book.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the appendix of the reports of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. What pages?

Mr. FARRELL. It starts on page 1881 and continues through 1892, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about those letters beyond what's in that book?

Mr. FARRELL. No; I only know them to be documents submitted by Owen Lattimore, as the file of correspondence that he had in behalf of Heissig.

Mr. SOURWINE. That record will speak with regard to what they are in that record, will they not?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply wanted the record to speak with regard to the great number of communications that you spoke of.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, that may be my fault. I was asking him in connection with these things that he had heard back at the time of the prosecution, that letters had been written, and it was I who asked him if——

Mr. SOURWINE. It is no question of fault. You asked the question as to whether there had been more than one and he said "a great number" and I wanted the record to indicate what he meant by "a great number."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, will you continue to tell us to what extent you had heard that Owen Lattimore was intervening in that case? You have testified that the G–2 did confirm to you that in fact Owen Lattimore had intervened on behalf of Dr. Walter Heissig.

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any other efforts that were being made at that time on behalf of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. I did not know at that time what correspondence was outstanding in terms of type of correspondence or actual numbers of letters, cables, or other communications involved. However, from where I was working, I got a great number of indications that there were many more than one communication involved in Mr. Lattimore's imploring on behalf of Dr. Heissig.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what those indications were?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, in the first place, I heard—and this was through G–2 channels—that Mr. Lattimore had employed Doctor Heissig. I subsequently heard that this had to do with the purchase of books on Mongolia, for which Mr. Lattimore had given him money. Then, I learned that this man, who was an enemy national and listed for repatriation as dangerous to our interests in the Far East and who also was the subject of a war crimes investigation and possible trial

for same, was bearing a letter of credentials from Mr. Lattimore attesting that he was a representative of Mr. Lattimore and Johns Hopkins University.

Subsequently, I found out that Mr. Lattimore had very carefully arranged for this man to have the privileges of our uncensored Army post office out of China by way of the Army's G–2 office with Colonel Mayer on one occasion, with an OSS officer in Peking on another occasion, and there were other references.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you learn these things, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Because I was curious to know how Dr. Heissig was maintaining communications with Mr. Lattimore and fulfilling his obligations. It had to be through official channels because a German national did not have the use of either Chinese mail or United States mail in that country at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know he was communicating with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. FARRELL. I did not know it. I suspected it at first and then subsequently I found out from an OSS officer in Peking that he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was: How did you find out that he was using these APO facilities, and you told us why you found out, because you were suspicious.

Mr. FARRELL. I told you how I found out, too. I said by way of an OSS officer in Peking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think that tells us how?

Mr. FARRELL. Well, he told me and he was assisting Dr. Heissig. As a matter of fact, he was one of Dr. Heissig's witnesses in the trial, so I think I could take his word.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was testimony that came to you in your official capacity, then?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I was trying to get at.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, is there any confirmation of that fact that you have just testified to among the letters that you have read by Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; I notice two reference to it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what they are?

Mr. FARRELL. Do you want the reference as to the credentials?

Mr. MORRIS. I think if you just read what they are, Mr. Farrell; they are not very long, are they?

Mr. FARRELL. Suppose I read the excerpts that pertain to what I have testified to:

Under date of March 11, 1946, and addressed to Dr. Walther Heissig, at Fu-jen University in Peiping, China, is a letter from Owen Lattimore, in which he notes:

I am not quite sure when this will reach you. I understand that the air mail is now subject to many delays owing to the shortage of crews to fly the planes and therefore I am sure that it is better to wait until I hear of someone who is actually going to Shanghai.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is writing this, now?

Mr. FARRELL. This is Mr. Lattimore writing to Dr. Heissig.

I am also suggesting to Colonel Mayer that he make inquiries to see whether a request can properly be made that you not be deported from China.

And in another paragraph, he wrote that he is sending $200 for some books that he wanted, and then quoting another paragraph:

I enclose herewith a letter certifying that you are empowered to act as my agent for purchases of books and manuscripts.

That is all from that communication.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any reference to the APO there?

Mr. FARRELL. No, except that he is arranging to send the $200 to Heissig by way of Colonel Mayer.

Let me see this. Here is a reference in this letter which pertains to how he is delivering books:

DEAR DR. HEISSIG: Your letter of February 7 and the first shipment of Mongol books have safely arrived. I have already sent an acknowledgment to Lieutenant Walton, but did not enclose a letter to you because I was not sure whether he would still be China or might have already returned to this country.

Lieutenant Walton was an officer in OSS in the Peking branch.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there not a letter dated December 27, 1946, there, American Embassy, Rome, Italy, from Floyd E. Mastin, attaché, to Owen Lattimore which reads:

Shortly before I left Peiping last spring, I mailed you some Mongolian books, ones which Dr. Walter Heissig said he had purchased for you. The books were mailed through the APO on April 5. Naturally I'm curious to learn if the same ever reached you. I'm returning to China next spring (May). If there are some contacts I can make for you, I would be very happy to help you.

Does that indicate in any way that the APO was in fact used by Dr. Walter Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time did the use of APO obviate the use of censorship regulations?

Mr. FARRELL. At that time it did, because censorship regulations diminished and disappeared shortly after the surrender of of Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Would the use of an APO insure freedom from censorship to anybody using that APO?

Mr. FARRELL. It would almost guarantee it, unless the package was spot-checked by the United States customs coming into the country. I believe the ratio was something like 1 to 100. There were an awful lot of souvenirs being sent home at that time and the customs opened one package out of every so many.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if I might ask a question on this point.

Mr. Farrell, you just read a letter which mentioned credentials furnished by Mr. Lattimore to Dr. Heissig.

Are those the credentials which you testified about earlier?

Mr. FARRELL. Not yet; no.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you had found out that Dr. Heissig had some credentials. I wondered if these were the ones.

Mr. FARRELL. These are the ones that I referred to; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there anything in these credentials to purport to show that Dr. Heissig was representing not only Owen Lattimore, but also the Johns Hopkins University?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; it's here, if I may read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. FARRELL. Owen Lattimore enclosed with the letter of March 11, 1946, which we have just discussed, another letter dated also March 11, 1946. It is addressed:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that Dr. Walter Heissig is fully empowered to act as my agent in the purchase of Chinese, Japanese, Mongol, Manchu, and other books and manuscripts.

(Signed) OWEN LATTIMORE,
Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
The Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will these letters be inserted in the record?

Senator SMITH. They will be inserted.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 745–A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, and Q," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 745–A

FU-JEN UNIVERSITY,
Peiping, 7th February 1946.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University, North Charles Street,
Baltimore, Maryland, U. S. A.

DEAR SIR: I hope you have already returned safely to the United States. On the very day after our pleasant conversation—for which I wish to thank you once more—I plunged into the business of purchasing books and have already been able to accumulate a small number. At the moment, however, the book market offers a rather meager assortment, because booksellers are holding back until the Chinese New Year festivals are over.

On the 22nd of January I mailed you the first two parcels of books through the kindness of a friend. Their contents you will find on the attached book list. Meantime I have got together, partly through purchases and party from duplicates in my possesion, a complete series of publications appearing in Kailu (given out under the direction of Bokekesik). These I shall dispatch within the next few days. I was also able to lay hands on an extremely rare Koke sudur edition of thirteen volumes, with 1,985 pages. Since those Kailu publications, collectively and individually, were printed in very small editions, they are very scarce and their prices accordingly high. At the next mailing opportunity I shall also send you a set of the Mongolian monthly periodical, Koketuy (Blue Banner), which was published in Manchuria, as well as a few political propaganda magazines from Inner Mongolia.

The purchase and supply of Mongolian prints from Inner Mongolia is complicated and very slow, since this region is still occupied by the Communists and it will be some weeks before direct contact can be made. However, even then it will be difficult to procure successive series of all Mongolian publications, since the Kalgan Press has been dissolved and many books burned.

I have also obtained a big number of new Japanese publications for you and have already included a few small ones in the first two parcels.

I would greatly appreciate it if you could send me some money as soon as possible, since I am now hardly able to cope with the continually increasing book prices with my own small capital. I have made inquiries here and have been given to understand that you can send me any amount of U. S. currency by means of traveller cheques. Please do not send any money through the bank, because then I shall only receive for one American dollar C. N. C. $500.— instead of the official Peking exchange rate of approximately 1300.—.

It would also be of great advantage if you were to confirm, by letter, the fact that you have commissioned me to purchase books for the Johns Hopkins University on this and that scientific field in the Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese languages. Such a confirmation would not only minimize difficulties when purchasing bigger amounts of books from Japanese, but would also facilitate mailing them and would, likewise, have a certain helpful significance for me.

Many years ago you began the printing of bibliographies in Pacific Affairs with the "Personal Chronicle of the First Manchu Emperor" by Fuchs. May I

now contribute thereto with a "Bibliography of Mongolian Publications in Japanese Occupied Areas from 1939–1945," which is on the verge of completion and will be sent you in the near future. It not only contains dry titles but also brief historical introductions to every section.

Of those books already sent you, I would like to recommend to your special attention the last chapter in Mongyol un uysayatan kiged teuke sudur about the autonomic development of Inner and Outer Mongolia, because therein the Japanese viewpoints are clearly recognizable. Also of interest is the Japanese propaganda magazine, "Tabin on-u Qoyinaki mongyol ayimagtan" (The Mongol Tribes after Fifty Years), wherein valuable material for a history on Japanese politics in Mongolia and their plans is contained.

Once again my very best thanks for the interesting conversation in the Hotel de Wagon Lits. Please acknowledge receipt of the first two parcels of books.

In the hope of hearing from you shortly, I remain, dear Sir,

Yours respectfully,

W. HEISSIG.

Contents of first two parcels:

1 Ex. Tusimei-un jasay-un ciqula-yi quriyaysan bicig. (Administration), 36 pg.
1 Ex. Yeke jegun aziya-yin bayiduyan (Propoganda), 67 pg.
1 Ex. Ayimay qubiyaysan jakidal-un bicig. (Administration), 162 pg.
1 Ex. Lu oboytan-u jokiyaysan baya keuked-un ugulel-un bicig (Education), 118 pg.
1 Ex. Gung-un juu-yin gegen-u suryal (Lamaistic), 33 pg.
1 Ex. Yurban bodylya kemeku bicig (32 pg.) (Education).
1 Ex. Tabin on-u qoyinaki mongyol ayimaytan (Pol. Propaganda), 250 pg.
1 Ex. Sine jil-un qous uyangya (Folklore), 36 pg.
1 Ex. Eng-un medel-un jayun setub (Pol. Propaganda), 95 pg.
1 Ex. Boyda-yin suryal-i sengggregulku bicig (History), 162 pg.
1 Ex. Oyirod-un galdan bosuytu qayan-u teuke (History), 16 pg.
1 Ex. Mongyol usug-un yosun i todorqayilan altan toli (Grammar), 18 pg.
1 Ex. Mongyol-un ysayatan kiged teuke sudur (Modern History), 259 pg.
1 Ex. (in Chinese) (Lit. History), 161 pg.
1 Ex. (in Chinese) (Chrestomatie), 82 pg.
1 Ex. (in Chinese) (History), 206 pg.
Total: 16 Vol.——US $11.50.

EXHIBIT NO. 745–B

MARCH 11, 1946.

DR. WALTHER HEISSIG,
Fu-jen University, Peiping, China.

DEAR DR. HEISSIG: Your letter of 7 February and the first shipment of Mongol books have safely arrived. I have already sent an acknowledgement to Lt. Walton, but did not enclose a letter to you because I was not sure whether he would still be in China or might already have returned to this country. I am now writing to tell you how much I appreciate your energy and promptness in sending me such interesting material immediately. I am arranging to send you U. S. $200 through Col. William Mayer, who is an officer on the Headquarters Staff of General Wedemeyer in Shanghai * * *. I am not quite sure when this will reach you. I understand that the air mail is now subject to many delays, owing to shortage of crews to fly the planes, and therefore am sure that it is better to wait until I hear of someone who is actually going to Shanghai. I am also suggesting to Colonel Mayer that he make inquiries to see whether a request can properly be made that you not be deported from China. * * *

In addition to the initial sum of $200 which I am sending I shall of course be prepared to send further funds for book purchases as soon as you let me know the amount you need. The first shipment is excellent in character and shows that you fully understood the range of my interests. I am just as much interested in material of a propaganda character as I am in historical and literary material, since one of my purposes is to attempt to reconstruct as far as possible the Japanese propaganda and political approach toward the Mongols. I am also interested in any statistical and factual material on population, economics, trade, etc.

I enclose herewith a letter certifying that you are empowered to act as my agent for purchases of books and manuscripts.

With regard to bibliographical articles in Pacific Affairs I shall be glad to recommend your "Bibliography of Mongolian Publications in Japanese Occupied Areas 1939–1945" to the present editor of Pacific Affairs. I myself have had no connection with Pacific Affairs since 1941, but of course I am still closely in touch with the Institute of Pacific Relations and I think I can assure you that the present editor will be interested in your material.

Please give my respects to Dr. Fuchs.

Thank you again most cordially for your promptness and energy.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745–C

MARCH 11, 1946

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that Dr. Walther Heissig is fully empowered to act as my agent in the purchase of Chinese, Japanese, Mongol, Manchu, and other books and manuscripts.

OWEN LATTIMORE,
Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
The Johns Hopkins University.

EXHIBIT No. 745–D

12 FANG CHIA HUTUNG,
AN TING MEN NEI,
Peiping, June 6, 1946.

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: May we ask for your assistance in an urgent matter which concerns all scholars of the Far East. Dr. Walter Fuchs and Dr. Walther Heissig have been ordered deported to Germany and will be interned on June 10, prior to their departure. Local foreign and Chinese scholars are doing everything in their power to have their deportation at least delayed. But after careful investigation we have found that the final decision will, in some curious way, rest with our State Department.

Both Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig have been appointed to professorships at Yenching University: Dr. Fuchs, Professor of Manchu, and Dr. Heissig, Professor of Mongol. President Leighton Stuart has personally appealed to the Chinese authorities to retain both men here.

We have been authoritatively informed that the future careers of these men and their continued usefulness for Far Eastern studies depend upon the opinion which American scholars express to the State Department. We have cabled Dr. William Hung, who is at present at Harvard, and we hope he has already communicated with you. Dr. Hung is fully acquainted with the local situation, and before leaving China in the spring did all he could to help these men. Dr. Stuart's support of them should be ample proof that they in every way deserve the support of American scholars.

We hope that you will intercede immediately with the State Department to forestall this deportation which would deprive us of two outstanding experts. Their inclusion in the deportation list can be based only on oversight or faulty information. It is up to us, their American colleagues, to correct that mistake before it is too late. We have good reason to believe that the State Department will attach great weight to your opinion in this matter, owing to the Department's increased interest in the development of Far Eastern studies.

We are writing on this matter to Professors Goodrich, Lessing, Hummel, and Gardner. If you know of other scholars willing to appeal to the State Department in this matter, we should be very grateful to you for sending this information to them.

Yours truly,

ARTHUR F. WRIGHT.
MARY CLABAUGH WRIGHT.

EXHIBIT No. 745–E

HARVARD-YENCHING INSTITUTE,
Cambridge, Mass., June 19, 1946.

Professor OWEN LATTIMORE,
Walter Hines Page School,
Baltimore, Md.

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: I arrived in Cambridge about two weeks ago and shortly after my arrival I received a cablegram from Mr. Arthur F. Wright in Peiping. It was stated that Dr. Walter Fuchs and Dr. Walter Heissig were in danger of immediate deportation from Peiping to Germany. It was suggested that American scholars interested in Far Eastern studies be mobilized to intercede with the American Department of State on the behalf of these two scholars.

Dr. C. S. Gardner, to whom I have shown the cablegram, expresses his kind interest in the matter and has already written to the Secretary of State and will probably communicate with you as well as other American scholars interested in Chinese studies.

I have now received a letter from Mr. Wright dated June sixth, in which he gives more detail about the matter. It seems that Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig were to be interned on June tenth, to be shipped to Tangu and then to Shanghai, until they were to leave China. Chinese and foreign scholars in Peiping have been doing everything in their power to have their deportation at least delayed, "but after investigation," says Mr. Wright, "We have found that the final decision will in some curious way rest with our State Department."

When I was in Peiping I had already heard rumors about the possible internment of Drs. Fuchs and Heissig. I tried to get some of the Chinese authorities interested in these two scholars and I thought they would be safe from then on. The new turn of events is indeed a surprise to me.

I may state that to the best of my knowledge these two scholars had more or less nominal connections with the Nazi Party, but there interests and activities during the period they have been in China were confined only to scholarly pursuits. Dr. Fuchs is a German sinologist especially gifted in Manchu literature. Dr. Heissig is an Austrian Mongolist. He is probably not as well known as Dr. Fuchs. His recent papers are mostly published in Monumenta Serica. According to Mr. Wright's letter. Dr. Heissig's long book on the Genghis Khan Epic appeared on the fourth of June. Of course, I have not seen the book.

Mr. Wright is a Fellow of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. He and his wife were both interned by the Japanese in Weihsien. They were not released until after the Japanese had surrendered.

Dr. Gardner is of the opinion that it would be perhaps better not to have an organized petition to the State Department. In would be better for each scholar interested in the question to write individually to the State Department. I am inclined to agree with Dr. Gardner, and it is my hope that you may do something to help.

With kindest regards,
Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM HUNG.

EXHIBIT No. 745–F

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES,
Berkeley, Calif., June 19, 1946.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I enclose a letter I wrote to Mr. Vincent which I hope is self-explanatory. I wonder whether you would join the group of American scholars who are trying to stave off the worst from these two men. I learned today that the repatriation has been postponed for some time so it would not be too late to take action on their behalf.

I understand that you have inquired after Dr. Heissig. All I know about him is contained in the enclosed letter. If you wish to have a list of his publications I can supply it. Today I received a volume of several hundred pages published by him (it is just off the press) entitled, "Bolus Erike." It is a Mongolian chronicle of the 18th century. I am preparing a review of it for the JAOS. Professor Boodberg authorizes me to state that he shares my views regarding the scholarship of both Dr. Fuchs and Dr. Heissig.

I hope that you, Mrs. Lattimore, and David are enjoying the best of health. It would be pleasant to have some news of you.

I am scheduled to give a series of lectures for the Lowell Institute in the last half of October and the first two weeks in November. Following the lectures I plan to go to China on the first ship sailing after November 15th. I will stay in China until August or September of 1947, at which time I shall resume my duties at this University. I am looking forward to the trip to China and hope that the political situation will not interfere with my work there.

With kindest regards to you and all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

F. D. LESSING.

(1) Author: Rasipung Suy.
Ansd.: 13 July 46, Sydney, N. S.

EXHIBIT No. 745–G

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES,
Berkeley, Calif., June 17, 1946.

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: My colleague, Dr. Woodbridge Bingham, has permitted me to use his name in introducing myself to you.

I have just received a letter from Mr. and Mrs. Arthur F. Wright, dated Peiping, June 6, to the effect that two scholars, Dr. Walter Fuchs, a German, and Dr. Walther Hessig, an Austrian, residents of Peiping, China, are going to be repatriated within a few days. I am anxious to join the group of American and English scholars who have appealed or will appeal to the State Department on behalf of these two men.

I have known Dr. Fuchs for twenty-two years and I have not the slightest doubt as to his scholarly and personal qualifications. I met him first in 1924 when he was an assistant in the Far Eastern Department of the Museum für Volkerkunde in Berlin, where he had a very fine record. Since that time I have followed his scholarly development with growing respect. I have read his many contributions in the field of Sino-Manchu studies and I share the admiration of my American colleagues who have had an opportunity to use these works. Among these persons I wish to cite Professor Knight Biggerstaff, of Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, whose sound judgment can be relied upon.

My personal relations with Dr. Fuchs have been merely sporadic, but I have always regretted that a closer contact was not possible. As to his political activities I cannot make a statement based on personal observation, but I have indirect evidence which leads me to believe that he has never harbored pro-Nazi views. I base this opinion also on my acquaintance with his family. I have reason to believe that his antecedents would have prevented him from siding with the enemy.

I do not know Dr. Heissig personally, but I have received several letters and reprints of his articles from him since December of last year. The letters furnish me with a clear picture of his scholarly achievements and projects so far, and the reprints give me a clear insight into his methods. I am impressed with the soundness and erudition as demonstrated by his writings, and I am sure that we can expect from him many important contributions in a much neglected field. He is about 35 years old. People who know him speak very highly about his moral character and personality.

To send these people back to what was formerly Germany and Austria would be tantamount to wrecking their scholarly careers and depriving American and international scholarship of the results of a highly specialized but very important work in a field in which they are generally recognized authorities. I understand that very few, if any, collections of Oriental books and manuscripts

are left in Central Europe for the pursuance of research, and it is imperative for the continuance of their research that they have access to original sources.

I wonder whether it would not be better to secure, in some form or other, their cooperation in the development of Oriental studies in this country, or in an American institution in the Orient. I feel that the problems of the postwar period especially in Orientology are so pressing and the scarcity of experienced workers is so great that no honest, well-trained worker can be spared, and we just cannot afford to waste the life work of anyone qualified and ready to work with us. The very fact that judicious Dr. Leighton Stuart has singled out these two men and appointed them professors at Yenching University should vouchsafe for their reliability and capability.

I trust that it will be possible for you to take immediate action on behalf of these two men.

Very sincerely yours,

FERDINAND D. LESSING,
Agassiz Professor of Oriental Languages.

EXHIBIT No. 745–H

MUSQUASH LAKE, MAINE, *21 June 1946.*

Mr. JOHN KULLGREN,
2800 Woodley Road NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN: We are on our way through to Nova Scotia, and yesterday in Bangor we picked up a batch of mail, in which was your letter, mentioning Torgny's MS and also Heissig and Fuchs. I was very much relieved to hear the Obergs had got the money I sent them, and I hope I shall be able to find a publisher for the MS, though on a thing like that you never know. I very much appreciate your taking the trouble to bring the MS.

You must have had a fascinatingly interesting time, staying in Peiping as much as three weeks. I was there only three days, and wasn't nearly satisfied.

About Heissig and Fuchs, I'll write to the State Department. I don't feel that I can give a carte blanche recommendation for the clearance of men when I don't know yet whether the military have cleared them. However, in the case of Heissig I had already cabled Chu Chia-hua, Minister of Education. The Chinese certainly need scholars in Manchu and Mongol; and if Yenching is willing to offer them jobs, so much the better, as their work will also be available to American scholarship.

We'll be back in Baltimore about August 1.

With regards to both you and your wife,

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745–I

MUSQUASH LAKE, MAINE, *June 21, 1946.*

Mr. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN CARTER: We are on our way through to Nova Scotia, and in Bangor yesterday a batch of mail caught up with us. In it were letters from John Kullgren, who is, I believe, still a civilian employee of the War Department, and from Arthur F. Wright, writing from 12 Fang Chia Hutung, An Ting men nei, Peiping—both writing about the cases of Walter Fuchs and Walther Heissig, the first a German scholar in Manchu (and in several other languages), and the second a German scholar in Mongol.

Both men have been accused of Nazi intelligence activities in the part of China occupied by the Japanese, where they spent the war years. Fuchs, however, has now been offered a professorship in Manchu at Yenching University, and Heissig a professor in Mongol. President Leighton Stuart of Yenching has interested himself on behalf of both men.

Fuchs and Heissig are, however, both liable to deportation from China by the Chinese Government. The question is whether American scholars should show an interest on their behalf, and express their interests to the Department of State.

My feeling is that political clearance of these men depends primarily on the opinion of them formed by the Army's investigators in China. Without knowledge of their views, I should certainly not recommend the admittance of either man to America. On the other hand, I can see good reasons why both men should be allowed to stay in China. The Chinese are seriously short of men trained in the Manchu and Mongol languages. If these two men can be employed at Yenching, their work will be accessible to American scholarship also.

Since Leighton Stuart has already interested himself in their behalf, I believe that a favorable expression of interest on the part of the American Embassy would be appropriate.

Regards to Betty. We'll be back about August 1.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745–J

JANUARY 23, 1947.

Ambassador LEIGHTON STUART
American Embassy,
Nanking, China.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: A friend has shown me a clipping from a Shanghai paper, already several months old, indicating that at that time Walter Heissig had not yet been either cleared or sentenced as a Nazi. This news was a surprise to me, as I had earlier heard that he had already been repatriated to Austria. Because I believed he was no longer in China, I had taken no further steps to help him; but if he is still in China, and if you should think that he deserves help, I should be glad to do anything further in my power.

My attitude in the matter is that I do not want to do anything to help any man who was a genuine Nazi. I do not, however, believe in persecuting people who merely because they were in a position where they were under the control of Nazis complied enough to "get by." The newspaper clipping which I saw indicated that you were sufficiently convinced of Heissig's good character to offer him a position at Yenching.

I am glad to have this opportunity to tell you how much I admire the teamwork between you and General Marshall. I am convinced that we may yet see a coalition Government in China in which "coalition" does not consist of the appointment of powerless men who are only nominally not members of one dominating party, and does consist of the grant of proportionate power as well as proportionate representation to all major political movements and regional interests in China.

Wishing you every success.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745–K

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Nanking, February 7, 1947.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I have your letter and am writing at once to explain that I had made active efforts on behalf of Walter Heissig before coming into my present post. This was based on what I had known of him and had learned from others who knew him better. When, however, the American military authorities demanded his detention for investigation because of information they had, there seemed nothing more that I could do. I understand that the inquiry was as thorough and impartial as would be expected under these circumstances, but I have no inside knowledge as to the evidence against him.

Thanks for your kind words about what General Marshall and I have been attempting. It was no slight compensation in all these difficulties to have the opportunity to know him at close quarters. I wish it were possible to discuss these problems with you and in the light of the latest developments benefit by your opinions.

With warm personal regards.

Very sincerely yours,

LEIGHTON STUART.

EXHIBIT No. 745–L

JANUARY 23, 1947.

Mr. FLOYD E. MASTEN,
American Embassy, Rome, Italy.

DEAR MR. MASTEN: Many thanks for your letter of December 27. I am delighted to have this opportunity of thanking you for the Mongolian books which you mailed to me on behalf of Dr. Walter Heissig. I am also glad to know that you are going back to China again. Since you have imperiled yourself by making the offer, I shall almost certainly pester you with requests of one kind or another. After the great difficulty of publishing books and research work during the war in China, a number of good publications are beginning to come out, and I am anxious to get hold of those which deal with Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria.

I should appreciate it very much if you would write me your frank opinion of Dr. Heissig. He made a very favorable personal impression on me on the one occasion on which I saw him; but it is always possible to be fooled. I have tried to help him as far as I could on the question of being repatriated from China. My feeling is that as a German he was in a position where he had to comply with requests for reports when these were demanded of him. On the other hand, the volume of scholarly work which he produced while in China would indicate that he did not have much time left over for spying. My attitude in such matters is that I see no need for persecuting people whose choice was between martyrdom and stringing along with the Nazis who had control over them. I like to be cautious, however, because I decidedly am not interested in helping to save the skins of people who really believed in the Nazi cause and really worked to make it succeed.

Your very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 745–M

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
American Embassy, Rome, Italy, 27 Dec. 46.

Dr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR PROFESSOR LATTIMORE: Shortly before I left Peiping last spring, I mailed you some Mongolian books, ones which Dr. Walter Heissig said he had purchased for you. The books were mailed through the APO on April 5. Naturally I'm curious to learn if the same ever reached you. I'm returning to China next Spring (May). If there are some contacts I can make for you, I would be happy to help you.

My address in China will be % American Consulate General, Shanghai, China.

Very truly yours,

FLOYD E. MASTEN, *Attaché.*

(Return address on envelope:) Floyd E. Masten, Am. Embassy #1, P. M., N. Y., N. Y., APO 528.

EXHIBIT No. 745–N

DEARING FARM,
Bethel, Vermont, July 12, 1948.

Dr. WALTHER HEISSIG,
(13b) Landsberg (Lech), Hindenburgring 12,
American Zone, Germany.

DEAR DR. HEISSIG: Your letter of June 9 has reached me safely and I am delighted to be in touch with you again. I am particularly encouraged to know that in spite of all difficulties you are able to some extent to keep up your Mongol studies. I shall of course continue to keep in touch with your case, though I must frankly say that my influence is extremely limited.

I am writing this from the country, where I was working for the summer. Consequently, I do not have most of my Mongol books with me. The Japanese book about Old Stone Monuments in Manchuria may be with some other Japanese books which I lent to a colleague who reads Japanese. I am writing to Baltimore to see if he can identify the book. If so, I shall ask him to have photostats made of the two inscriptions which you need. Otherwise, this may have to wait until I get back to Baltimore at the end of August.

I was out in California 2 weeks ago, and there had a very pleasant visit with Arthur and Mary Wright.

Yours very sincerely,

———— ————.

EXHIBIT No. 745—O

(13b) LANDSBERG (LECH) HINDENBURGRING 12,
June 9, 1948.

Dr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
W. Hines Page School of International Relations,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: Thank you so much for your kind letter which I received the other day. I am very thankful that the interest you have shown on my behalf and I sincerely hope that your efforts will prove successful.

I was greatly relieved by your information that you received all books purchased formerly at Peking. That I could not finish my biography of all the Mongol modern publications published during the war makes me feel sorry. But there remained many other things I could not finish. But Lowenthal's information is right: I am able to keep my knowledge intact. I am working in a very limited way during my leisure on the biography of the Lamaist missionary Neyici toyin who was in the seventeenth century the great adversary of Shamanism in eastern Mongolia. I have with me the Peiping xylograph of his Mongol biography and am transcribing and editing it, as well as preparing an English translation. The problems arising from it are fascinating: it is the only Mongol authentic source which tells us about the ways in which the subjugation as well as amalgamation of Shamanism has been done. But as long as I am here nothing final is to be expected.

It might be of some interest to you that Messrs. Roever, Reel, and Donovan, Attorn. Boston, Pemberton-House, Pemberton Square, will file or have already filed a habeas corpus writ for the whole case in which I am involved. Besides that it was sent to Judge Sears, International Institute of Buffalo, 610 Deleware Avenue, Buffalo 2, N. Y., Judge of the Appellate Court of the State of New York and a former presiding judge at Nuremberg, an elaborate statement about the particular phase of the Peiping group. I do not know what Judge Sears undertook, as we have no answer. It may interest you to contact Judge Sears and obtain the brief for further information.

In the last paragraph of your letter you proclaimed your willingness to do something for me. My chief aim is to leave my present whereabouts in order to proceed in my research work. The present ratio of nourishment in Germany does not help to remain fit for work, however. I may ask you in the next weeks to help me in obtaining some material concerning the seventeenth century in Mongolia.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

P. S.—Amongst the books I have purchased for you was also a small booklet in Japanese language about Old Stone Monuments in Manchuria. It deals about two stone inscriptions concerning early Lama missionaries in Mandju, Mongol-Tibeton, dated 1638 and 1658. Of the text of these two inscriptions I urgently would need fotostates. Could you kindly arrange that for me?

HEISSIG.

EXHIBIT No. 745—P

LANDSBERG (LECH) HINDENBURGRING 12,
14.111.49.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: I feel ashamed that I trouble you again with a letter within such a short time. Yet I think it necessary to inform you about the present state of my affairs because you showed all the time such friendly interest in my fate.

Developments here in Germany were the following:

(1) Few weeks ago a Reviewing Board under Judge H. Picthford, of the Judge Advocate Office, Munich, reviewed the Nanking Case by order of the

War Department as well as of the Judge Advocate General, Heidelberg. The results of this review were: (a) All prisoners convicted in the Nanking case (amongst them I) are *not guilty*; (b) did not commit any war crime; (c) would not have committed a war crime even assuming all facts charges with were true.

(2) Result of this review were handed over to JAG Heidelberg, where a Colonel Fleischer is the officer in charge of this case. He promised to deal with this case within the next weeks. Colonel Fleischer informed at March 3d, 49, a spokesman of the Evangelical Churches, that General Clay does not intend to intervene in the form of clemency and that instead of it the outcome of our procedures before the Circuit Court of Washington concerning habeas corpus will be waited for.

Development in U. S. A. were the following now:

(1) Our lawyer, Mr. Frank Reel (Roever, Reel, and Donovan, Boston, Pemberton House), filed an appeal against the denial of habeas corpus with the Washington Court of Appeal. There was already one session, in which the president of the court declared that he was much more bothered about the legal situation uncovered there than he had ever expected to be. Final decision is still pending.

(2) In the cause of this procedure our lawyer had to publish all legal material pertaining the question of jurisdiction, etc. Amongst them were some very peculiar documents from the side of the respondents, i. e., Mr. Royall, Forrestal, etc. From these documents, held until now as restricted or secret material, but uncovered now by the course of legal procedure, the following things could be detracted: (a) the trial at Shanghai was held for purely political reasons. Telegram, April 19, 1946, sent by the China Command to Washington asking permission to start a trial against Germans, has the following passus: "Local political situation makes trial by United States military commission in China strongly advisable" (cf. Respondents Exhibit No. 3).

(b) Upon this telegram granted Washington, War Department, with telegram, July 6, 1946, authority to the United States Forces, China Theater, to try "violations of the laws and customs of war and German soldiers, civilians * * * who are charged with violation of the German surrender terms" (cf. Respondents Exhibit No. 4). Authority was granted to try the Germans "provided the Chinese Government acquiesces."

(c) The Chinese Government acquiesced not earlier than November 26, 1946, to try before an American Military Commission war criminals only who had committed crimes against Americans. At that time I and the other men of the Nanking case were already arrested by the American authorities for several months, served with charges, and the prosecution had at that time already nearly finished their part. When at the beginning of the trial in the early days of October a Chinese defense counsel, Mr. Yang, of Shanghai, asked for dismissal of the accused on the basis that no authorization by the Chinese Government could be shown, the court ruled against him, although at that time existed in reality no such authorization. I, furthermore, have to point out, that Washington had made distinct discrimination between "the violations of the laws and war" and "violation of the German surrender terms," and that the Chinese Government at November 26, '46, acquiesced only to trial of war criminals. Yet we were charged with violation of surrender terms, for which no authorization was given by the Chinese and which constitutes no war crime.

(3) When Mr. Frank Reel, our American lawyer, inquired with the War Department about the finding of the Munich Reviewing Board, he was answered that "although action is being considered, probably in the nature of clemency, as yet no final action had been taken," (letter of Mr. Reel, February 16, 1949). To this Mr. Reel gives the following commentary: "My guess is that the opinion to that effect, that the prisoners did not commit a war crime, even assuming all facts charged were true, may never be published, and that instead clemency will be granted so that the habeas corpus remedy ceases to exist."

In spite of the fact that we legally are already for nearly three years imprisoned innocently and unjustified, nobody seems now willing to take the responsibility for set us free. Public opinion seems to be stronger than justice.

I wrote all this in details to you because I think it is now the time to do something about. Already many Senators and leading people took an interest in this case. It will over a long be impossible to prevent leaking the truth out.

The turning point seems to be that the same person who as Judge Advocate of the China Theater conducted the trial in Shanghai, is today in a responsible position in the War Crimes Section of the War Department. But is it justified that the face of somebody is saved for the price of the fate of 18 men who according to the finding of all law experts are not guilty and no war criminals?

It might interest you, that a professor of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Mr. Ernest W. Puttkammer, working on his own about this case, came to the same opinion as the Reviewing Board at Munich. Now Mr. P. has offered his services, as well as that of some colleagues of his of the University of Chicago, to the Judge Advocate General in Heidelberg for making an expert's opinion about the legal situation.

Thus things from the legal point are clear but nobody wants to take the responsibility—and I am still here and wonder how long that shall continue although it is now black on white that I am not guilty and no war criminal.

The facts I presented to you are no allegations; you can find them printed in the booklets presenting the exhibits for the proceedings before the appellate court. Mr. Reel, of Roever, Reel and Donovan, Boston, Pemberton House, will gladly give you access to this.

I beg you to understand me why I wrote you in such a length. I sincerely hope that there is a way to bring this stagnant situation to a solution. To create a legal scandal is in nobody's interest; there must be a way to solve all this mix up.

I hope you received my letter as well as the paper about Nayici toyin. Please let me know what you think about. Once more, forgive me for stealing so much of your valuable time with this my letter.

Sincerely yours,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

EXHIBIT No 745—Q

LANDSBERG (LECH), HINDENBURGRING 12.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., U. S. A.

DEAR MR. LATTIMORE: Thank you so much for your kind letter of April 20th. I am very much delighted about the news that you shall bring my Neyici Toyin edition to print. I hope it can be done. As already announced in my previous letter, I shall forward to you the final manuscript (which contains only minor changes) within the next few weeks. I am, of course, well aware of the fact that my notes—i. e., the English of my notes—need to be brushed up. But I hope that will make not too great a difficulty.

I have to thank you too for your quick consent to the translations of your two books by Mr. Albricht and me. Would you kindly let me know soon of the results of your inquiry about the copyright situation, as I should like to convey this to the interested German publishers. I hope that the copyright situation will not make insurmountable difficulties, because I have learned that in many cases of translations of American books the copyright situation made no difficulties at all.

Your consent for having the books translated by Mr. Albricht and me is for us a good asset in further negotiations with the publishers. In case it should be necessary, I perhaps shall have to ask for a more explicit authorization to do the translations, yet I do not think it necessary.

In the meantime I think you will have heard from my attorney, Mr. Reel, about my legal situation. Since my previous letter I have learned that a Senate committee, consisting of the Senators Mr. Richard B. Russell, Estes Kefauver, and with Raymond E. Baldwin as a chairman, is going to investigate the legal situation of the whole China case.

And now I want to bet you for the favour to get a copy of your newest book—Situation in Asia—which was due for (Ea ar).

Once more, thank you very much for all your kindness, and I hope you will let me know soon more about the possibility of having the Neyic Toyin Monogr. published.

Finally I send you my congratulation to the enlivening of Mongol Studies at your university, which doubtlessly is due to your efforts.

I remain,

Your very sincerely,

WALTHER HEISSIG.

Mr. FARRELL. I was pointing out a series of events which brought home to me that there was pressure and fairly powerful pressure being brought to bear in some very high place in China that caused the amount of curiosity involved in this case, because no sooner was Dr.

Heissig apprehended and confined in the Ward Road jail along with others than a number of propositions were made. One coming directly from Lattimore was one in which it was suggested that Dr. Heissig was a very valuable man on the subject of Mongolia and that he should be released from jail and employed by OSS. I wish to emphasize that this was done in the face of war crime charges outstanding against the enemy national at that time. I wish also to point out that Mr. Lattimore in making this move ignored the fact that this intervention on his part on behalf of Dr. Heissig had to do with the entire war crimes case as it was stacking up because the other enemy nationals who had been arrested and charged as a group would have to be released if we released Dr. Heissig because he was an important enough personality in this general group for us to require his presence in the court room for trial.

There was a letter written to the United States Ambassador in China that came to my attention when I was called up to the Embassy in Nanking by the minister plenipotentiary, W. Walton Butterworth, who informed me that Mr. Lattimore was interested in this case and it seemed complicated.

Mr. MORRIS. Butterworth told you that Lattimore was interested in the case?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Senator SMITH. What was Butterworth?

Mr. FARRELL. He was minister plenipotentiary in the United States Embassy in Nanking at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what positions he subsequently held? Do you know anything about his subsequent movements?

Mr. FARRELL. I had a Christmas card from him in Stockholm. Well, he returned to the United States before I did, and I had a Christmas card from him when he was head of the Far East desk and subsequently I had another card from him when he was in our Embassy in Stockholm, and I haven't heard whether he's changed from there. I don't know his present location.

I explained the case to Mr. Butterworth, and in the strongest terms he asked me to convey a message to the judge advocate in Shanghai to prosecute the case with all vigor.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "in the strongest terms," Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Mr. Butterworth explained to me that he had similar difficulties with Nazi or German enemy nationals in Spain. I don't recall the specific position he had in our Spanish Embassy, but it seems that he was confronted with a problem immediately after the German surrender.

He told me that he could have repatriated every considered dangerous enemy national from Spain back to Germany within the first 2 weeks following the Germany surrender if the Army had given him any cooperation or if the Air Force had given him any cooperation, but failing in that, he was stuck with these people, and the longer they were allowed to tarry in Madrid the more arrogant they became and the Spanish antipathy toward them dwindled coincidentally, so that what originally might have been a justified removal of these people who were going to use Spain as some place not to be extradited from fizzled while he was waiting for transportation, and he

intimated that I could expect the same kind of delays in dealing with the Army and that I was not to be discouraged by it, that he would give me any help that he could.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was his attitude one of ordering you with regard to taking certain action with regard to Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Actually I don't think Mr. Butterworth could have ordered me because this was half in the military province and half in the State Department province and this was an effort to bring the military and the State Department together on one subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was asking you about his attitude, because you said he made this request "in the strongest terms."

Mr. FARRELL. He encouraged it in very strong terms, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was urging it upon you?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, he was urging it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any other efforts that Mr. Lattimore made on behalf of Dr. Walter Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. I cannot say for sure whether he communicated with General Marshall, but I gathered on my next trip back to the Embassy that he did, because I was told by Mr. Butterworth that the general had become interested in the case and wanted full particulars on it, and I suggested that perhaps in dealing with the general it would be better for the judge advocate, who was in command of the operation from a military standpoint, to see General Marshall, and that was done.

Mr. MORRIS. And did the judge advocate see General Marshall?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, he did. That was Col. E. H. Young.

May I point out a quick succession of things that happened that also indicated pressure from above on this case?

Mr. MORRIS. If it is in line with the general questions directed toward you, will you tell the committee whatever you know about what efforts Owen Lattimore made on behalf of Walter Heissig?

Mr. SOURWINE. I might insert one question before he begins that testimony.

Were you told anything by Mr. Butterworth as to how he learned of Mr. Owen Lattimore's expression of interest in this matter?

Mr. FARRELL. Not specifically.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not tell you whether Lattimore telephoned or called someone else, or wrote him a letter or what?

Mr. FARRELL. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can answer Mr. Morris' question now.

Mr. MORRIS. You were going to give more evidence in reply to that question.

Mr. FARRELL. I was going to give a similar example of the worry on the part of our senior command officers as to this case, not because of its merits and not entirely because of its complications, but because of somebody higher than them was worried about it and they wanted to know what their footing was. That's what I gathered in talking to Gen. Ray T. Maddocks, who was General Wedemeyer's chief of staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Morris, forgive me if I might interrupt. I think we need a little closer tie.

Mr. Morris' question was about any other instances you know of of intervention by Mr. Lattimore. You have prefaced your remarks by a statement that you were going to tell about other instances of concern by persons in the Armed Forces because their superiors were in-

terested. That is not quite a close enough tie to show that it is responsive to Mr. Morris' question.

Mr. MORRIS. I wish, Mr. Farrell, you would just restrict your answers to evidence that came to your attention directly or indirectly that Owen Lattimore had intervened on behalf of Dr. Walther Heissig.

Mr. FARRELL. General Wedemeyer's staff G–2 at that time was a Colonel Ivan D. Yeaton and he called Colonel O'Connor, the judge advocate's assistant to his office and said in words, to this effect: That this was a hot potato, that Mr. Lattimore was interested in the case, and that it left the Army in the position of taking the words of a marine captain against the word of Owen Lattimore as to whether Dr. Heissig engaged in the things that he was charged with.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you present at this interview?

Mr. FARRELL. No; but Colonel O'Connor reported this to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Was any evidence adduced at the prosecution, Mr. Farrell, that would indicate that Dr. Walther Heissig was guilty of the charges preferred against him?

Mr. FARRELL. May I have that question again, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read the question back for the witness, please?

(Whereupon, the record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. FARRELL. The United States military authorities, that is, the United States military commission which tried the case, believed the evidence presented and Dr. Heissig was convicted and sentenced.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the evidence presented to the court? Will you tell us about it?

Mr. FARRELL. The evidence presented at the court had to do with a description of the functions of the intelligence organization with which Dr. Heissig was connected. I think I can best and most compactly describe these to you by quoting from the Japanese intelligence officers who took the stand and testified as to what kind of intelligence the Germans were collecting for themselves and for the Japanese high command.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the testimony of the Japanese officers who testified at that trial?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this testimony that you heard, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. This is testimony that is in the court record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you presenting an authenticated copy of the court record?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I am. These are original documents from the court record.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you just generally summarize it for us, Mr. Farrell? We don't need great detail.

This is really a collateral matter, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want those documents in the appendix?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; I would like them introduced in the appendix.

Senator SMITH. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 744A" and appear on p. 4439.)

Mr. MORRIS. Will you just very quickly tell us the general nature?

Mr. FARRELL. Here are the general functions: Bureau Ehrhardt, German high command intelligence function in the Far East continued activities in defiance of the German surrender on behalf

of their Japanese axis allies. These functions were described by Col. Hidaka Tomiaki, former G–2 in charge of foreign intelligence, China headquarters, of the Japanese Army in Peking.

The principal missions of the organization in Peking were to get all available information on the following:

1. Possible landings of United States forces on the China coast.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this subsequent to May 8, 1945?

Mr. FARRELL. This is before and after May 8, 1945.

They continued in the same operations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, any acts committed before May 8, 1945, would not have been actionable before your court, would they?

Mr. FARRELL. That is true. These men would merely have been serving their government in the capacity assigned to them.

Mr. MORRIS. So anything prior to May 8 should not go into the record at this time because they would not have been crimes for which they would have been convicted.

Mr. FARRELL. No, sir. The Japanese have testified that this is what they were doing before and after, so in entering these functions this is also what German intelligence actively engaged in subsequent to the German surrender.

2. Movements of the United States Air Forces against north China.
3. United States Naval Fleet movements.
4. United States submarine activities along the China coast.
5. Relations between United States and Russia.
6. Relations between United States and Yenan.
7. The Soviet supply route in Northwest via Lanchow.
8. The supply route of the Chungking Chinese armies via Hsian.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Farrell, without interrupting, what we would like to have would be a very concise statement of what the evidence was to the effect that Heissig did, in fact, carry on his hostile activities against the United States after May 8, 1945.

Could you not give us just a general résumé of that? We cannot go into that much detail. We have to adjourn shortly.

Mr. FARRELL. He and the others concerned with the Bureau Ehrhardt were engaged in the collection of military, economic, and secret intelligence against the United States and its allies in the United Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. And individual incidents and individual acts committed by Heissig were testified to during the court proceeding?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; as to what his functions were in the organization in Peking; what was he doing.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the military court find him guilty on the basis of that testimony?

Mr. FARRELL. It did.

Mr. MORRIS. And he was in fact sentenced to 30 years?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. During this period, Mr. Farrell, was there any evidence that came to your attention that Dr. Walther Heissig may have been connected with some Soviet organization?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; there were several instances of that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. The first came from the colonel whom I was just referring to.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the Japanese military intelligence colonel?

Mr. FARRELL. Japanese military intelligence chief in Peking, Colonel Hidaka.

He complained somewhat bitterly about Mr. Heissig, looking back after the Japanese surrender, when he realized that for months prior to Russia's entry into the war against Japan in the Far East, Heissig, whom he had counted on as his most reliable intelligence source, had repeatedly assured him that this was entirely out of the question. It must be understood that Heissig was an analyzer of code intercepts and open broadcasts by way of Russia and Mongolia.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. This came out in testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. In testimony during the proceeding?

Mr. FARRELL. And the Japanese, through their lighter probing along the Manchurian border, had reason to believe that the Russians were mounting an offensive, but repeatedly looking back on the situation, Colonel Hidaka sized it up as being absolutely deceitful on Dr. Heissig's part that he should have tried to persuade him to believe that not only were the Russians not mounting an offensive, but they were, on the contrary, demobilizing.

Mr. MORRIS. So this Colonel Hidaka told you that Dr. Heissig was giving him misleading advice as to the mobilization of Soviet forces with respect to the Japanese forces; is that right?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right, and he suspected that, if not from the beginning of Dr. Heissig's intelligence operations in the Far East in 1941, then certainly for from 6 to 9 months before the Russian attack across the Manchurian border into Japanese territory, certainly during that time he was in some way playing a double agent on behalf of both Russia and Berlin in the same pattern that Richard Sorge had done in Japan.

There was another instance of this from one of the more prominent members of the German community of China, and that was from Baron Ernst von Reichenau, who was the brother of Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he the man who conquered Poland?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Baron von Reichenau had probed pretty deep into Soviet infiltration of the German communities in China, so much so that, at the end of the war, our intelligence agencies established very close liaison with him to procure the information that he had.

Baron von Reichenau said that he suspected Heissig of being a double agent working for both the Soviet Government as well as the German.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he cite any instances to support his conclusion?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes. He mentioned something about an intercept of information that was made along the camel-caravan route across Mongolia which indicated that Heissig had some clandestine contact with Soviet interests on the other side of the desert that Nazi intelligence knew nothing about. For that reason, a Gestapo man named Schmidt was sent from Shanghai to Peking.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name?

Mr. FARRELL. Schmidt, S-c-h-m-i-d-t.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this still part of what Von Reichenau said?

Mr. FARRELL. No; I finished with Von Reichenau.

Mr. SOURWINE. To whom did he say that?

Mr. FARRELL. Mr. Schmidt told this to me.

Mr. MORRIS. The Gestapo agent did tell you this?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was he doing at that time?

Mr. FARRELL. He had Dr. Heissig under surveillance as a suspected double agent. Beyond that, a French intelligence officer connected with the French consulate——

Mr. MORRIS. Let me see if I understand that. This Gestapo agent, Schmidt, told you that in fact he did have Dr. Walther Heissig under surveillance in connection with a security check that the Nazis were conducting on Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Which indicated to you that they suspected him of betraying——

Mr. FARRELL. It indicated that the Gestapo chief of either China or Japan was double checking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it merely indicate it, or did Schmidt tell you that Von Reichenau had suspected——

Mr. FARRELL. Schmidt had nothing to do with Von Reichenau.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said Schmidt told you about the Von Riechenau story, or perhaps I am confused.

Mr. FARRELL. I'm sorry if I have confused you.

Von Reichenau told me what I testified to.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to find out. I misunderstood you, I guess, because I thought you said that Schmidt told you what von Reichenau had to say.

Mr. FARRELL. No; Von Reichenau gave me his personal observation.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did he tell you then that he did suspect Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; he did.

Schmidt, I might add, was an unsavory character whom it was generally rumored in the German community in Shanghai had disposed of a German suspect with Soviet connections in the Shanghai community via the American gangster route of being taken for a ride.

After this was done, he had moved up to Peking and when we questioned him there we weren't concerned with what he had had to do with Shanghai police or with his orders as far as the suspected murder in Shanghai was concerned; we were interested in what his regard for Heissig was.

I mentioned also a French intelligence officer in Peking.

Mr. MORRIS. What's his name, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Lieutenant Leouzon. He informed me that I should look into Dr. Heissig's past, it might involve or prove very interesting because he had a long history of double dealing, and that he suspected that he was a double agent during the—I think it was a year before the final surrender—serving both Soviet and Nazi intelligence but he gave me no tangible evidence that I could investigate further in that except that I went back into Heissig's history and found out that here is a highly intelligent Austrian who served in the Austrian Legion, which was an organization that provoked riots and caused incidents that gave the Ribbentrop command its excuse for moving in to quell disturbances.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that show up on any official document that you introduced into the record?

Mr. FARRELL. It shows up in an interesting way in that this man, besides suddenly changing citizenship as of the date—I don't understand German. Is there an English copy?—besides changing citizenship in 1935 and adopting German citizenship, suddenly turns out to be an SS officer almost overnight, which is according to German thinking his reward for having served and betraying his own country, Austria, to the German high command, or having helped to do it.

Mr. MORRIS. Where is Dr. Heissig now, do you know?

Is he still serving his 30-year sentence?

Mr. FARRELL. I am under the impression that through the intercession of a number of people along with Owen Lattimore, Dr. Heissig, whom I regard as one of the most dangerous international espionage agents that I have ever read about or come across, is now free in our occupied zone of either Germany or Austria.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Farrell?

Mr. FARRELL. Because after the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Shanghai military commission——

Mr. MORRIS. Under which Dr. Heissig was convicted?

Mr. FARRELL. Under which he was convicted—and I am referring to the United States Supreme Court—after the Supreme Court confirmed their convictions and the jurisdiction in the case, in answer to any pleas that came to my cognizance, I believe all the people who were sentenced in Shanghai were released in Germany. I can't say this as a matter of fact, but there again you run into the same thing—if you freed any, you would have to free all, because the sentence in this case ran from life, 30, 20, 15, and down.

Mr. MORRIS. This line of questioning, Mr. Chairman, is directed to what Dr. Heissig is doing at the present time.

Senator SMITH. But now we are getting into a discussion of something else, it sounds like.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you given us your full information, Mr. Farrell, as to the present whereabouts of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes. I don't know specifically where he is, but I should like to call attention to these letters already in your record without my reading them into this testimony——

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any knowledge bearing on the letters that are already introduced into our record?

Do you have any knowledge that will add to the letters that are in the record?

Mr. FARRELL. I have one observation that might be valuable to you, and that is that in this document [indicating transcript] Mr. Lattimore testified that quite by chance and for only a half hour, he met in Peking, China, a man named Dr. Heissig, and became so fascinated with him for some reason that he has spent an enormous amount of time obviously——

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what Mr. Lattimore testified to in that record?

Mr. FARRELL. How is that worded again?

Mr. SOURWINE. What did Mr. Lattimore testify to in that record?

Mr. FARRELL. Mr. Lattimore testified in here—when questioned on whether or not he had written a letter or whether he had been intervened in behalf of Dr. Heissig—he said that he remembered writing a letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say you have some comment on that?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I do.

It is my understanding that this is supposed to be Mr. Lattimore's complete file of correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by "this"?

Mr. FARRELL. The letters entered in here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which we have already by reference inserted in this record?

Mr. FARRELL. All of the pages that we mentioned a while ago.

Senator SMITH. Letters in the Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. MORRIS. They are in our record, too, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. FARRELL. This is supposed to be a complete record and this testimony reveals another letter that does not appear in here and it has no date, strangely.

I am curious about the date because it recommends Dr. Heissig's services to United States military intelligence in Germany, a letter addressed to an American general.

Mr. MORRIS. That was General Thorp, was it not? That is the reference to General Thorp in the Lattimore testimony?

Mr. FARRELL. That's right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge of Mr. Lattimore's dealings, if any, with Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. No, I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if he ever met him and if so, where, and for how long?

Mr. FARRELL. I only know from his testimony that he said he met him for a half hour in Peking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any personal knowledge as to when he met him, where, and for how long?

Mr. FARRELL. No, I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you told us all the instances of which you have any knowledge of intercession by Mr. Lattimore in behalf of Dr. Heissig?

Mr. FARRELL. All except a peculiar incident that occurred during the trial in which a man, whose name I don't recall at the moment, but who was assigned by the State Department as special adviser to T. V. Soong in Shanghai.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was this?

Mr. FARRELL. During the closing weeks of the trial in either—it probably was December of 1946 or January of 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right; go ahead.

Mr. FARRELL. This man approached one of the members of the United States Military Commission in Shanghai and represented himself as bearing the sentiments of Owen Lattimore and told this member of the military commission that the United States Embassy in Nanking was not in any way interested in this case, and thought the whole thing detrimental to the prestige of the United States in China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the member that he approached?

Mr. FARRELL. He approached Colonel Mallan who was the senior member of the court.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who told you about it?

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel Mallan decided that there was something suspicious about this——

Mr. SOURWINE. Who told you about it?

Mr. FARRELL. I am trying to explain how it came to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know who told you about it.

Mr. FARRELL. A conference was called by the judge advocate, Colonel Young——

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to know who told you about it. You can explain it afterward.

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel Young. May I tell you the circumstances?

Mr. SOURWINE. Please do.

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel Mallan thought this of such serious and such extraordinary nature that he went to the judge advocate——

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know what Colonel Mallan thought, do you?

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, I do; as a matter of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know?

Mr. FARRELL. Because he expressed himself in the group that was assembled. The judge advocate called together the entire prosecution staff and the entire defense staff——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hear Colonel Mallan say what he thought?

Mr. FARRELL. I heard Colonel Mallan tell all of us that morning what had happened to him——

Mr. SOURWINE. A minute ago, you said that a man by the name of Young told you.

Mr. FARRELL. Yes, and Colonel Young called us together, and before the meeting Colonel Young told me—after all I was on his prosecution staff—he told me what the prosecution was.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not trying to hamper you or to hurt your testimony, but if you heard somebody tell what his state of mind was, you can tell this committee what it was. Otherwise you have no way of knowing what a man's state of mind was.

Mr. FARRELL. Perhaps I am approaching it obliquely, but when I tried to tell you in a progression, you interrupted me, and brought me back to Colonel Young.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did that because I do not want this record to indicate a deviation.

Mr. FARRELL. Is it straight now?

Mr. SOURWINE. I hope so.

Go right ahead.

Mr. FARRELL. It is straight as far as I am concerned, I think.

Colonel Young called Colonel O'Connor and myself to his office and told us that somebody had approached one of the military commission, ostensibly with a message from the United States Embassy in Nanking that it was no longer interested in this case, and so forth, and that he was calling a meeting of both staffs in the morning to decide what the various lawyers thought they should do about it, whether there should be a mistrial, or a check on whether this message was correct or not.

Subsequently a courier was dispatched to Mr. Butterworth to check with both General Marshall and Ambassador Leighton Stuart, and reassure the court that there was no such——

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon me, do you know whom he checked with?

Mr. FARRELL. I know that Colonel O'Connor went up to see Mr. Butterworth.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Butterworth said he checked?

Mr. FARRELL. Mr. Butterworth said that he checked and informed Colonel O'Connor to go back to the court and say that there was no truth at all to that, that the attitude of the United States Embassy had not changed with regard to the trial.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Butterworth said he had checked with both General Marshall and Leighton Stuart?

Mr. FARRELL. That is right.

Mr. SOURWIE. And then you heard from two persons with regard to this matter, two colonels?

Mr. FARRELL. With regard to what, this visit?

Mr. SOURWINE. That's right.

Mr. FARRELL. There was another meeting called the following morning—there was a recess in the trial—and both staffs were present and Colonel O'Connor reported back his conversation with Mr. Butterworth.

Mr. SOURWINE. As to the state of mind that we spoke of just a minute ago, you heard the colonel himself express his state of mind?

Mr. FARRELL. Colonel Mallan?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FARRELL. Yes; I did.

Senator SMITH. Is that all?

Mr. MORRIS. I am finished; yes.

Senator SMITH. We will recess, then.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p. m., Friday, April 4, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

EXHIBIT No. 744A

Secret Intelligence

PEIPING ** MAIN OFFICE
Chief: Col. T. Hidaka
Ass't: Lt. Shimura

UNITED STATES & Gt. BRITAIN
Chf: Natsuda

GERMAN EMBASSY	OFFICE OF FUELLKRUG Agency of the FUEHRER'S Hq.	GERMAN NEWS AGENCIES Europa etc.	D N .B.
Charge d'Affaires ALTENBURG. GUTZEIT (Miss) In cases necessary collected diplomatic information through personal conversations	Chf: FUELLKRUG HEISSIG STOCK MARSH HANSEMANN LICHTER Mrs. MÜLLER Collected political economic & military information regarding Great Britain, the United States and Soviets through irregular meetings.	ABSHAGEN (Europa) von BRIESSEN CORDES WEDEKIND (Peking Chronicle) TICHY Collected general information regarding world affairs through regular meeting.	Chf: MÜLLER ABSHAGEN LUCKENHAUS SPESHNEFF (D.A.Sov.) JUNG Collected general information regarding world affairs through irregular meetings.

This is a certified true copy of a diagram of German intelligence sources in Peiping, the services of which were available to the Japanese Army in North China. The original of this diagram was given to U.S. Army Headquarters in North China by Colonel Hidaka's Office in Peiping.

/s/ F. T. Farrell
/t/ F. T. FARRELL
Capt., USMC



This is my command of chain of command of various offices in China connected with the German Embassy in China. /s/ Franz Huber
Major of Police

Witnessed this date, 3 October 1946, at Shanghai, China, by:
/s/ Marvin M. Gray
USWD

PROS. TRANS. EX. #

STATEMENT

Colonel HIDAKA, Tomiaki, former G-2 in charge of foreign intelligence of China Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Peking, makes the following statement of his own free will and desire and without any payment or other consideration therefor:

At the time of the German surrender in May, 1945, we were advised by Tokyo radio that, in surrendering without notice to Japan, Germany had deserted her Axis partner and should be treated as an enemy.

However, as a matter of actual fact, the Germans in the Far East were treated differently. That is because so many important Germans were willing to cooperate with the Japanese. For instance, German Ambassador Stahmer and the German Gestapo Chief in the Far East, Mr. Meisinger, were extremely pro-Japanese. The German firms such as Defag and Melchers in Shanghai offered us their stocks of merchandise.

When the United States Forces took over Defag in Europe I asked Dr. Haas, head of Defag here in Peking, what his sentiments were. He told me that no matter if Defag officials in Europe cooperated with the U. S. Forces, the Germans in China will continue to collaborate with the Japanese.

The German Embassy office in Peking never announced to the Japanese any formal surrender of Germany. I have an opinion concerning this. In my opinion the Germans believed that it was possible for Japan to carry on the war for an indefinite period. During that period it was possible that the United Nations would split or sue for peace with Japan. In either event since (CHOP) the Germans in the Far East had never surrendered formally to anybody, it was possible for them to consider themselves a German Government in exile somewhat like the DeGaulle Government of France when France was occupied. If the United Nations split, suffered reverses, met (CHOP) defeat by some long chance, or if the United Nations sued for peace with Japan it was possible under this unique device that the Germans in the Far East might have been able to salvage something from the severe terms of unconditional surrender for Germany in Europe.

It is my opinion that Ambassador Stahmer and Mr. Meisinger had something to do with such an arrangment in Japan, and that this was the reason the Japanese did not treat the Germans as deserters, that this was the reason for the German desire to cooperate to a certain extent with the Japanese after the German surrender, and that this was the basic reason behind the fact that the Germans in China never formally notified the Japanese Government of surrender.

Although I do not speak or read English well enough to understand this, I have had it translated for me by my interpreter, Mr. Richard Hiroshi OYAMA, and I fully understand what I am about to subscribe to officially.

This statement consists of two (2) pages.

I swear that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection of the facts.

[s] T. Hidaka
[t] HIDAKA, TOMIAKI.
[s] (In Japanese characters)
(CHOP)

Witnessed this 27th day of May, 1946, in Peking, China, by:
[s] F T Farrell
[t] F. T. FARRELL, *Capt., USMC.*
Pros, Trans. Ex. #.

STATEMENT

(CHOP)

Colonel HIDAKA, Tomiaki, former G-2 in charge of foreign intelligence of China Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Peking, makes the following statement of his own free will and desire and without any payment or other consideration therefor:

(CHOP)

The principal missions of my organization in Peking were to get all available information on the following:

(1) Possible landings of United States Forces on the China Coast.
(2) Movements of United States Air Forces against North China.

(3) United States Naval Feet movements.
(4) United States submarine activities along the China coast.
(5) Relations between United States and Russia.
(6) Relations between United States and Yenan.
(7) The Soviet supply route in the Northwest via Lanchow.
(8) The supply route of the Chungking Chinese Armies via Hsian and Lohoku.
(9) The relations between Chungking and Yenan.
(10) The military intentions of Chungking and Yenan in North China.
(11) How United States assistance to Chungking was progressing via Persia, Armata and the Northwest Route.
(12) Russian shipping via Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk.

Of course, the German intelligence agency in Peking under Mr. Fuellkrug submitted to me any information it obtained on all of the above subjects. However, the principal missions of the Fuellkrug Office were to collect all available intelligence concerning:

(1) Russia and her political and military intentions.
(2) Chungking and her political and military intentions. (Mr. Fuellkrug got his Chungking information by radio interception by use of a head agent who was a former Chinese Government official from Ninghsia who worked agents in and out of Hsian, and from the headquarters of the Bureau Ehrhardt in Shanghai.)
(3) Yenan and the political and military intentions of the Chinese Communist Government.
(4) The Russian shipping out of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, ship to shore communications and communication between Moscow and Vladivostok. All Russian coded messages intercepted were sent to the Bureau Ehrhardt in Shanghai to be decoded and analyzed.

By agreement Mr. Fuellkrug's office gave me copies of all intelligence it obtained and was prohibited from collecting any information concerning the Japanese in North China.

Although I do not speak or read English well enough to understand this, I have had it translated for me by my interpreter, Mr. Richard Hiroshi OYAMA and I fully understand what I am about to subscribe to officially.

This statement consists of two (2) pages.

I swear that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection of the facts.

Witnessed this 27th day of May, 1946 in Peking, China, by:

[s] T. Hidaka
[t] HIDAKA, TOMIAKI.
[s] (In Japanese Characters)
(CHOP)

[s] F. T. Farrell
[t] F. T. FARRELL, *Capt. USMC.*

Pros. Trans. Ex. #.

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11 APRIL 1946.

Major Hidaka, Takashi, former staff officer of the Japanese Chinese Expeditionary Forces in Charge of Information in Nanking, now Liaison Officer between the American and Japanese forces in Nanking, makes the following statement of his own free will and desire without payment or other consideration therefor:

I assumed charge of the information office at the Japanese Army Headquarters in Nanking in April, 1945 and continued in that post until the end of the war.

During that period we received information from ten radio intercepting posts in China, the most important of which were Canton, Shanghai, Peiping and Hankow.

The principal concern of the Japanese was in an American landing on the coast of China and as a result the most important information furnished us was that regarding American Fleet and troop movements.

We received from the Misumi Kikan in Canton much information secured from monitoring American military and naval broadcasts. We were not able to break the American codes so with messages sent in code we kept track of the frequency on which they were sent and kept a record of the number of messages and the number of times they were sent.

During the battle of Okinawa and certain movements of the American Fleet we were able to get reports on the radio conversations between elements of the forces on Okinawa and between warships which were in clear English.

The Japanese did not have high-speed apparatus in Canton so it was not possible for them to pick up much of these American broadcasts. The Germans in Canton under Captain Heise did have this high speed apparatus and furnished us with the intelligence regarding American movements. I never met Captain Heise nor asked him for this information nor expected it after the German surrender. But he continued to furnish the Misumi Kikan with information regarding American Fleet and troop movements.

Upon receipt of this information I would evaluate it and then send it to the Chief of the Second Section (which is concerned with information), who would in turn pass it on to the Chief of Staff. The information would then be given to the Officer in Charge of Operations for action, either in Tokyo or in China. In the event that an intercepting post would get news of immediate importance such as the location of a crippled American airplane carrier in the South China sea, it would send this message immediately and simultaneously to all airfields or battleships who would be in a position to take action.

I neither read nor speak English but this statement has been translated for me by Lt. Kimura, Shoji who reads and speaks both English and Japanese fluently and I understand the meaning of this statement completely.

This statement consists of two pages.

I swear that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection of the facts.

[s] TAKASHI HIDAKA.
[s] (In Japanese characters).

Witnessed this 11th day of April, 1946 in Nanking, China, by:
[s] John T. Thompson,
[t] JOHN T. THOMPSON.

Pros. Trans. Ex. #.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

SATURDAY, APRIL 5, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:40 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Present: Senator Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will resume session.

Mr. Morris, have you a witness to testify this morning?

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Miriam Farley is here to identify two documents, Senator. Miss Farley has just been sworn in executive session.

Senator WATKINS. The record will show that she has been, and you may proceed with the examination.

TESTIMONY OF MISS MIRIAM S. FARLEY, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, ESQ.

Mr. SOURWINE. For this record, Miss Farley, will you give your name and address.

Miss FARLEY. Miriam S. Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your address?

Miss FARLEY. American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your present employment?

Miss FARLEY. I am a member of the staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where do you reside?

Miss FARLEY. In New York.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is your address?

Miss FARLEY. 622 West One Hundred and Fourteenth Street.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Farley, I hand you a manuscript entitled "Communism and the Hukbalahap," by Henry Wells, and I ask you if you have seen it before.

Miss FARLEY. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I might explain that this is a manuscript which is in our records and I ask permission to identify it by our exhibit number for our record.

Senator WATKINS. You may do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this a manuscript which you read at some time, Miss Farley?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are the marginal notations in the manuscript yours?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. They are in your handwriting?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you desire to tell us anything about the circumstances in connection with your reading of this manuscript, how it came to you, and make any explanation you wish about the marginal notations which you made on it?

Miss FARLEY. I would like to make a very brief statement on that point, if I may. This manuscript was submitted to the Far Eastern Survey in 1949, when I was the editor, by Mr. Wells. I liked the manuscript very much and told Mr. Wells so. I was anxious to publish it. I thought that it could stand improvement at a few points. I made, therefore, a number of suggestions to Mr. Wells for his consideration which I thought would improve the article. Mr. Wells did not reply to my last letter to him, and he eventually published the article elsewhere. I therefore concluded that he was one of those authors who cannot take criticism, even friendly criticism.

With regard to the statement or implication by Professor Rowe that my marginal notations on this manuscript showed a pro-Communist bias——

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me. Is this a manuscript concerning which Professor Rowe testified——

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before this committee?

Miss FARLEY. .Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And have you read his testimony?

Miss FARLEY. I have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Miss FARLEY. I would like to reject the insinuations that there was any pro-Communist bias in the suggestions which I made to Mr. Wells, which I think will be borne out by a detailed examination of the notations on this manuscript, and if I may, Mr. Chairman, I should like to submit to the committee another article which did appear in the Far Eastern Survey on the same general subject as that by Mr. Wells.

Senator WATKINS. Is that about the same time?

Miss FARLEY. About 2 years later.

Senator WATKINS. May I see it?

Mr. MORRIS. Is that on the Huks?

Miss FARLEY. That is on the Huks.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is the author of this article you have now offered?

Miss FARLEY. Prof. Russell H. Fifield, of the University of Michigan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this during your editorship of the magazine?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this a substitute for the Wells article?

Miss FARLEY. No; there was no connection between them.

Senator WATKINS. I understand this was written 2 years later.

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Actually, Miss Farley, you don't know when this was written, do you, but it was published 2 years later?

Senator WATKINS. We will assume it was written probably somewhere near the time of publication.

Miss FARLEY. If I remember correctly, Mr. Rowe stated that I had cut out of Mr. Wells' article everything which identified the Huks movement with the Communists. If I might draw your attention, sir, to the two passages which I have underlined in that article, I would like to put them in the record, if I may.

Senator WATKINS. I do not see a date on this.

Miss FARLEY. It is down at the bottom, sir, in the little box.

Senator WATKINS. That was in January 1951, is that correct?

Miss FARLEY. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire?

Senator WATKINS. You may.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Farley, is it your purpose to refute or deny the charge made by Mr. Rowe with respect to what you cut out of this manuscript that you have identified?

Miss FARLEY. It is my purpose, it is my desire, to refute Mr. Rowe's allegation that my editing is biased in a pro-Communist direction, which I deny.

Mr. SOURWINE. You speak specifically of his charge that you had cut out of this article or indicated for deletion all the passages identifying the Huks as Communists.

Miss FARLEY. That is not true.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I wanted to get at. You say that is not a true charge.

Miss FARLEY. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize, of course, that the question of what was published in an article 2 years later has nothing to do with that charge, don't you?

Miss FARLEY. I think it bears on Mr. Rowe's testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it has nothing to do specifically with the question of what you cut out of this article, does it?

Miss FARLEY. Yes. Well, I did not cut out of this article everything which identified the Huks with the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wonder if you would point out in that article the passage identifying the Huks as Communists which you did not cut out or indicate for deletion.

Miss FARLEY. There are several of them. Here is one right on the first page of the Wells' manuscript.

Senator WATKINS. Give the first name of this Wells man.

Miss FARLEY. Mr. Henry Wells [reading]:

> In the Philippines, as in China, southeast Asia and the Balkans, the Communists have turned long-standing agrarian troubles to their own advantage. Using familiar Communist techniques of propaganda and of organization, they have won a following in the region—

and so forth.

Mr. MARKS. I think Miss Farley neglected to read the whole sentence there.

Mr. SOURWINE. The whole thing is in the record. (Exhibit No. 614, pt. 11, p. 4020.)

Mr. MARKS. As long as you have asked for an illustration——

Mr. SOURWINE. I was asking Miss Farley to point out what she considered to be the passages in this article which identified the Huks as Communists and which she neither cut out or deleted. The choice is hers. We are not limiting her.

Miss FARLEY. There are other examples. I will continue with this sentence [reading]—

they have won a following in the region where the peasants grievances (poverty, usury, absentee landlordism) have long been most acute—i. e., in central Luzon, where they control the peasant movement known as the Hukbalahap.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your marginal comment?

Miss FARLEY. None on this comment.

Mr. SOURWINE. What are the notes written on that page?

Miss FARLEY. That is on the next paragraph.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where does that note appear? Opposite what paragraph does it appear?

Miss FARLEY. The next paragraph, following the one I just read.

Mr. MORRIS. It appears between the first and the second, does it not, Miss Farley? I mean, doesn't the arrow indicate there that it appears between the first and the second paragraph?

Miss FARLEY. It apparently relates, as far as I can tell, to the following paragraph which apparently I suggested cutting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you read that note, Miss Farley.

Mr. MARKS. Before we leave that——

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Marks, if you please.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that.

Miss FARLEY. As near as I can tell, from looking at this manuscript, I suggested cutting out the next paragraph following the one I just read.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you read your marginal note?

Miss FARLEY. And substituting the following sentence [reading]:

In one sense, the Huk movement may be viewed as part of the world-wide scheme of Communist expansion. In another sense, it is a product of local conditions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, because the question has arisen as to where a marginal note appears in the margin with respect to certain language, I ask the Chair to order that in our record this document appear in facsimile.

Senator WATKINS. May I see the record? May I see the manuscript? By that you mean substitute a photostat?

Mr. SOURWINE. We will have it photostated and have it reproduced as plates in the record, sir, because of the difficulty of expressing in the written or printed word the exact relationship between a marginal note and other paragraphs. There is an arrow there which my description would be inadequate to convey a proper appreciation of.

Senator WATKINS. If you put it in as it is, in facsimile, it will indicate just what the markings are, the markings of the arrow indicating that it might possibly apply to the first, but then you have the line drawn, sort of brackets, which takes in the two next paragraphs and you have a long diagonal line, a pencil line, drawn through the two paragraphs below. Of course, the witness would be entitled and should explain just what she intended, if she remembers at all what

she intended to cut out, and to have this marginal note appear as the substitute for it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It will be ordered, then, in facsimile?

Senator WATKINS. Yes, you may have it. Do you mean the whole document?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I believe that is desirable. There are changes all the way through.

Miss FARLEY. I should be very glad to have the whole document with notations in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the fairest way all around. And I believe that answers the objection Mr. Marks was going to voice.

Mr. MARKS. That is exactly right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. You will note the position of the arrow here on this marginal note which you have read, and I would like to ask you whether it was your intention that that note be inserted at the point where the arrow is, that is, following the first paragraph of the article itself.

Miss FARLEY. Apparently that was my intention.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have inserted that note preceding the matter which you read from in the article, would it not?

Miss FARLEY. No; after.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the material you had read from.

Miss FARLEY. After.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Would you indicate the other portions of that article, if any, which you feel identify the Huks as Communists and which you did not cut out or mark for deletion?

Miss FARLEY. Yes, one moment. This sentence on pages 6 to 7, I will read it in the form as edited by me with slight verbal changes:

Organized in March 1942, the—

that is, the Huks—

conducted effective guerrilla operations against the invaders and against Filipino collaborators while serving also as an instrument of political and economic change and of Communist propaganda.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, are there any other passages you want to call attention to?

Miss FARLEY. There are several more which I can mention.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think you should have that opportunity.

Miss FARLEY. Continuing from the part I just read:

Communists controlled the Hukbalahap from the very beginning, but they were careful at first to direct their efforts along the lines that would attract a large following.

That is the end of that quotation. I think there was another on page 11. This is perhaps more important than the one on page 11.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the page of the one you just referred to?

Miss FARLEY. Seven; six to seven. There is one on page 14. This is referring to Luis Taruc, the leader of the Hukbalahap. I am quoting from Mr. Wells:

On August 12 he issued a press release which read in part—

this is quoting from Taruc—

the Communist Party of the Philippines, of which I am a member, besides fighting for the eventual achievement of socialism is also fighting for land for the peasants and other agrarian reforms—

and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. What page is that?

Miss FARLEY. That is page 14.

Mr. SOURWINE. You passed page 11, then?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That is material that you say you left in that indicated——

Miss FARLEY. This is material which I left in which Luis Taruc identifies himself as a Communist. There is also a footnote to this quotation which I would like to read. The footnote says "A few weeks later, Taruc stated in a letter released to the press, that in case of war he would side with the Soviet Union which 'represents the cause of democracy, peace, and progress in the world' against the United States which 'represents imperialist aggression, war-making and Fascist tendencies.' "

This again identifies Taruc with the Communist line.

Mr. SOURWINE. The portion that you have read previously, from page 6, at the bottom of page 6, and 7——

Senator WATKINS. Let her finish this, and then go back to that.

Miss FARLEY. I am willing to let it go at that, to save the committee time. I think two or three others could be found.

Senator WATKINS. Never mind the time, if it is important.

Miss FARLEY. If the whole document is going into the record——

Senator WATKINS. It is already in the record, the whole document is in the record. Please do not make any other marks on there. The marks are now in question and we shouldn't put any more on there.

Miss FARLEY. Yes, that is one reason I had trouble in identifying it.

Mr. MARKS. We don't have an extra copy here, and it is difficult to work with.

Miss FARLEY. Is it permissible, sir, to read one or two characteristic notations from Mr. Fifield's article which I did publish?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fifield's article has nothing to do with this one.

Miss FARLEY. I think it bears on the question of my editing.

Senator WATKINS. It may bear on that, however it is 2 years later. We will check this article and see whether it is material or not. We are already getting a very large record and if it does not have a bearing, and does not throw light on the inquiry, we probably won't want to put it in the record. But if it does, it will be received. You can make your explanations to why you did what you did, why you struck them out. If you do not tell us why you struck these articles out, we will probably ask you. So if you want to save time, you can indicate why you struck the paragraphs out that you did, or deleted the language.

Miss FARLEY. That is another question.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chairman will permit, might I inquire about the instances that Miss Farley has specifically mentioned. Would that be in order?

Senator WATKINS. Yes, and then we can come back and let her explain why she suggested a deletion of these articles or a change.

Mr. SOURWINE. At the bottom of page 6, Miss Farley, you read a sentence. Originally, as the manuscript came to you, that sentence read, did it not—"Organized in March 1942 it"—referring to the Hukbalahop, "functioned partly as an army conducting effective guerrilla operations against the invaders and against the Filipino

collaborators, but more importantly as an instrument of Communist propaganda and of political and economic change."

Is that correct?

Miss FARLEY. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you change that sentence or indicate that it should be changed to read "organized in March 1942, it conducted effective guerrilla operations against its invaders and against Filipino collaborators while serving also as an instrument of Communist propaganda, of political and economic change"?

Miss FARLEY. That is not quite right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, correct me.

Miss FARLEY. I read this whole thing before.

Mr. SOURWINE. You read it correctly before.

Miss FARLEY. With Communist propaganda coming at the end of the sentence. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. You changed it to read "An instrument of political and economic change and of Communist propaganda."

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Now, this sentence started that paragraph "The Hukbalahap, ostensibly launched as a resistance movement against the Japanese, was a lineal descendant of the earlier Communist-dominated peasant groups." Is that correct?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you changed that to read "The Hukbalahap, launched as a resistance movement against the Japanese, was a lineal descendant of earlier Communist-dominated peasant groups."

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. On page 14, you have a note in the margin which appears to read—can you read that note? It is difficult to read on this photostat.

Miss FARLEY. "Taruc denied responsibility. Has Huk responsibility been proved?"

Mr. SOURWINE. What Huk responsibility were you referring to there?

Miss FARLEY. This refers to footnote 12, referring to the murder of Mrs. Quezon.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were questioning whether the Huks were responsible for the murder of Mrs. Quezon?

Miss FARLEY. I was questioning whether it has been proved that they were responsible for that particular atrocity.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if the witness desires to make any further comments about her editing of this manuscript, it might be a good time.

Senator WATKINS. If you wish now to explain why you altered or suggested an alteration of the manuscript, or changed it to read differently than it was submitted, please take the time now to do so, and indicate where you are doing it.

Miss FARLEY. Yes. May I point out in the first place that all of these notations on the manuscript, and so on, were suggestions to Mr. Wells to be adopted or not adopted as he saw fit. This is a very usual process of consultation between author and editor.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you convey those suggestions to him?

Miss FARLEY. Partly by letter and partly orally. I believe he came in the office once.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you return this manuscript to him?

Miss FARLEY. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get it back in the IPR files?

Miss FARLEY. It is not in the IPR files, as far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Miss FARLEY. With regard to some of these passages, which I apparently indicated should be cut out, to the best of my recollection it was partly because he thought they were largely repetitive, that he had made his point once and there was no use in saying it over and over again. It may also have been simply for the purpose of saving space, though that I do not precisely recall at the moment. But it is clear that I did leave in a good many passages which identified the Huks with the Communists.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, in editing this article, reduce its anti-Communist tenor in any way, modify its anti-Communist attitude?

Miss FARLEY. I think that would be a matter of opinion.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking your opinion as the editor.

Miss FARLEY. In my opinion, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions about that article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions of this witness, except this one letter that has been in the record that I would like to ask the witness for one comment on. I refer to your exhibit No. 95, part 2, page 395, Miss Farley, which is a letter from you to Mr. Holland, written April 8, 1946, from Japan. In your last paragraph of that letter you say:

> I have been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly report. There will be a sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

What did you mean by that?

Mr. MARKS. May we see that letter, please? This letter is where, Mr. Morris? I see, top of page 396.

Mr. MORRIS. You have seen that letter before, have you not, Miss Farley?

Miss FARLEY. I have seen the stenographic transcript of this part of the hearing. Do you wish me to read the whole letter?

Mr. MORRIS. No, I would like to know what you meant by the last sentence there. Will you read the last sentence.

Miss FARLEY. The one you just read?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Will you read it for the chairman?

Miss FARLEY (reading):

> I have been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly report. It will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

That is obviously a flippant and somewhat humorous statement in a letter to a friend. It is always very difficult to explain a joke, but I will try.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean that was a joke?

Miss FARLEY. Yes. With the chairman's permission. At that time, quite a number of us who had previously worked for private research institutions, such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, had gone into Government service, and we used to kid each other about being bureaucrats and so on. We did wonder, there was a serious point behind this, about the extent to which, as research workers working for the Govern-

ment, we would be able to apply the same standards of objective research which we had been trained to use in the IPR and other similar organizations. What I may have had in mind in connection with this, with the monthly report, was certain discussions which I had had quite openly with senior members of Government sections in Tokyo where I was employed.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say, Miss Farley, "what I may have had in mind," do you mean by that that you do not recall this particular episode?

Miss FARLEY. I don't recall writing this particular letter; no. But I am willing to take it that I did write it.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you then testify that it was a joke?

Miss FARLEY. By interpreting it now. I think I can interpret my own words.

Senator WATKINS. Does it bring back any memories of the situation when you wrote it, and what you intended to put in the letter?

Miss FARLEY. It does. It brings back memories of the general situation at that time.

Senator WATKINS. Was there any reason why you should say that you wondered how much you could get by with? What did you have in mind when you said that, even as a joke?

Mr. MARKS. You are explaining it, Miss Farley, I think.

Miss FARLEY. Yes; I was just trying to. What I think I had in mind about getting by with was getting by with what I had been trained to believe were proper standards of objective research. As I was saying, I recall having several discussions on this point with senior colleagues in the Government section with regard to the drafting of the political section of General MacArthur's monthly reports to which I was assigned for a time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those persons with whom you had had discussions, had they led you to believe, or given you any reason to believe, that there was objection in MacArthur's headquarters to proper standards of objective research?

Miss FARLEY. The discussions as I remembered them were on this line: That I contended that so far as space and our facilities permitted we should give a full and balanced record of what had happened in Japan in the month in question, that when things were going well we should report that and occasionally when they were not going so well we should also report that. My contention was that on the whole the occupation was going very well and the record was a good one and that if we put out a report which had nothing but favorable data, it might hurt the reputation of SCAP, of which I was a member, because such reports would be accused by unfriendly critics of being a whitewash. That idea did not find favor in the higher quarters, however, in SCAP. The tendency was to omit anything which could conceivably be construed as unfavorable.

Senator WATKINS. Is that the instruction of any of your superiors, that you leave out anything that might be considered unfavorable?

Miss FARLEY. I would not say that there was a specific instruction to that point; no; but that was the idea which I gathered, from instructions, from conversations, with my superiors. I discussed this with them quite openly once or twice, and I did not get by with my argument. That was what I was trying to get by with. Following that, I quit arguing and in all the reports which I prepared for SCAP

I followed the instructions as to how such reports should be prepared even when I personally did not altogether agree with the instructions. I considered that my duty.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any more comment that you care to make about this article now before we pass to another matter?

Miss FARLEY. Only that I should like to read into the record just one sentence from a document which I did publish which is an additional example of material which I did not cut out but actually published, which identifies the Huks and the Communists very clearly.

Mr. MORRIS. You do understand this is 2 years later, and at that time the Huks were much more openly Communists than they were in 1949. So the issue isn't the same.

Miss FARLEY. I think the issue of my alleged Communist bias is the same. I have had no pro-Communist bias at any time.

Senator WATKINS. I think the witness will be permitted to read the sentence and comment on it. It will be the question of the weight of the testimony anyway, considering that it is 2 years later. So if you wish to do that, you may proceed.

Miss FARLEY. I would like to offer this whole article for the record as an example of an article on the same general subject as Mr. Wells' article.

Senator WATKINS. That we will decide a little later after we have read it. We have not had an opportunity to read it.

Miss FARLEY. And it was one which I did publish. The general conclusions are similar to Mr. Wells'. The difference, in my opinion, is that Professor Fifield's article is done in a rather more scholarly manner. The general nature of Professor Fifield's article is indicated by these two sentences which I quote:

> The Communist movement in the Philippines, commonly called the Hukbalahap, has not been successfully checked, is spreading in the islands and is now in a dangerous stage of political development.

The second sentence, also on the first page of the article [reading]:

> Although the Hukbalahap movement originated in the long-standing agrarian unrest of central Luzon, the leadership has now been completely captured by the Communists. Its goal is at last openly stated as the overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed force, and the Huks are now an integral part of the general Communist efforts in Asia.

I would appreciate it if the whole article could be put in the record.

Senator WATKINS. We will have it checked, and if we feel it is material at all—it is a rather long article—if we feel it is material, it will all be put in. But it is subject to that checking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a letter on the letterhead of the Far Eastern Survey, office of the editor, dated February 19, 1952, and purporting to be signed by Miriam S. Farley, with the handwritten name of Miriam. It is addressed to Mr. John P. Fairbank, and it was offered by Mr. Fairbank for inclusion in the record. That request is found on page 6147 of our record. He requested it. I would like to hand it to the witness and ask if that is hers and if that is her signature.

Miss FARLEY. That is my letter and my signature.

Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that this letter be inserted in the record at the point where Mr. Fairbank offered it with appropriate cross-references to this identification in the record.

Senator WATKINS. That may be done.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions of Miss Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, thank you.

(For the material referred to, see Exhibit 559A, p. 3797.)

Senator WATKINS. Who is your next witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Lattimore.

Senator WATKINS. Give her full name.

Mr. MORRIS. Give your full name and address to the reporter, please.

Senator WATKINS. Have you been sworn before? I am going to swear her, but I would like to have it in the record who we are swearing.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give your full name?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. My name is Eleanor Lattimore. My residence is Ruxton, Md.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you appeared in executive session before this committee?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I appeared with my husband in executive session last July.

Mr. MORRIS. You were sworn at that time?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I was sworn then.

Senator WATKINS. Are you sure the record shows she was sworn?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know who the chairman was at that particular session.

Senator WATKINS. Maybe you had better stand and be sworn. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are giving in the matter now pending before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MRS. ELEANOR LATTIMORE, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL, ABE FORTAS

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, I asked Mr. Morris if he would kindly have a subpena for Mrs. Lattimore because she has not been subpenaed, and I assume that you will give that to Mrs. Lattimore after the hearing or at your convenience.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, what would your ruling on that be?

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the purpose of that?

Senator WATKINS. She is appearing at her own request?

Mr. FORTAS. No; she is appearing at the request telephoned to me by Mr. Morris.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no question about the fact that her appearance is at the request or, if you wish to put it that way, at the order of the committee.

Mr. FORTAS. I would rather have it "order."

Mr. SOURWINE. There is no objection to the record showing that is the reason for her appearance.

Mr. FORTAS. Can't you supply her with a subpena so the record will be clear on this?

Mr. SOURWINE. There seems to be a considerable confusion about subpenas before congressional committees, and as I am sure counsel recognizes, the subpena of a congressional committee is really in the nature of a summons. The question is, Did the witness have notice

or knowledge that the committee desired, requested, or commanded appearance at a certain time?

Mr. FORTAS. Is there any difficulty about supplying Mrs. Lattimore with a summons or order in the usual form?

Mr. SOURWINE. None whatsoever; I simply wanted the record to show as to why she desired it at this time.

Senator WATKINS. I simply wanted to know if she was here at her own request. If she would like to have a subpena issued, a subpena will be issued, and it will be dated in time in which she can respond in response to that subpena.

Mr. FORTAS. I telephoned Mr. Morris about this, and asked that she appear, so she is here by order of the committee.

Senator WATKINS. The record already shows it, and if it will help any you can have a subpena.

Mr. SOURWINE. She is, I might say, Mr. Fortas, entitled to her witness fee on the basis of her appearance and response to the committee's request, whether there is a formal request or not.

Mr. FORTAS. At the hearing of Mr. Catesby Jones before committee on April 2, 1952, there were certain comments made by members of the committee that were based, in my opinion, upon an inaccurate or incomplete recollection of the examples of Mr. Owen Lattimore on February 28 and March 21, 1952. For the committee's convenience, I have prepared a memorandum summarizing the record. If you would like me to state very briefly what is in this, I will be glad to.

Senator WATKINS. You may leave it with us, and if it will help us in the analysis of the record, and the record will have to stand on its own feet and the testimony likewise, if it will help us in that we will use it. But I cannot say to you now we are going to include this as a part of the record.

Mr. FORTAS. I merely thought it would be helpful because there was a confusion as to dates and a confusion as to persons referred to.

Mr. SOURWINE. We will try to avoid that confusion today.

Senator WATKINS. Let it be offered and left with us for our information and our staff in checking the matter.

Mr. FORTAS. I thought in particularly Senator O'Conor and Senator Fergusion might like to see that. I believe it is an entirely factual memorandum.

Senator WATKINS. Thank you. We will receive it for that purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might state that Mrs. Lattimore has been asked here, as the chairman knows, specifically for the purpose of attempting to clear up what appears to be contradictions in testimony with respect to the occasion of a meeting between Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones and Mr. Carter on the 22d of August 1951. Mr. Carter has also been asked to come over here to testify with regard to that matter, and will appear subsequent to Mrs. Lattimore's testimony. Is it the Chair's desire that I proceed with the inquiry now?

Senator WATKINS. I think you may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Lattimore, do you remember the occasion of the dinner which you and Mr. Lattimore had with Mr. Carter and Mr. Catsby Jones at the Aldo Cafe in Washington the 22d of August 1951?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us how it came about that you four had dinner together on that evening?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. To the best of my recollection we were together before the dinner and someone suggested that we go out and eat together, and I believe Mr. Jones suggested this particular cafe which was unfamiliar to us, and we went there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Jones testified before this committee with regard to that matter?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I read the transcript of his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you know, of course, what Mr. Lattimore testified because you were here, were you not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. On the occasion in question, you have said you were together. Where were you together on that day prior to the dinner?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I said we were together. I didn't say "weren't together."

Mr. SOURWINE. No, I said, "Where were you together prior to the dinner?"

Mrs. LATTIMORE. We were in the offices of Arnold, Fortas & Porter.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were you doing there?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. My husband was preparing a brief statement for the press in connection with the hearing which had taken place here that day.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you there together in those law offices for a matter of several hours?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think Mr. Jones was there for much less than several hours.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you and Mr. Lattimore were there longer?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Mr. Lattimore come over to Washington on the morning of that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't actually remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, did you come over on the afternoon of that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Lattimore, weren't you in Mr. Fortas' office at the noon hour of that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Mr. Jones has so testified, and I do not dispute his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, but your own memory.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not actually remember myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember whether you were in Mr. Fortas' office during noon hour?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it Mr. Lattimore or was it you who made arrangements with Mr. Jones to come over on that day and attend the hearings before this committee and take notes with regard to Mr. Budenz' testimony?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. It was I.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do so at your husband's request?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was entirely your own idea?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Lattimore desired to issue a press release on Mr. Budenz' testimony or following it?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was your purpose in seeking to have Mr. Jones take these notes, cover this hearing for you, so to speak?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. There were two purposes: One was that I thought it probable that newspapermen would be calling my husband after Budenz' testimony, asking for a statement. I did not wish to go myself, and so I asked him to go and take notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had attended a number of other sessions of the committee; had you not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. At that time, I think I had attended only one. I attended a number after.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why was it you didn't want to go yourself?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I thought it would be a very painful experience.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did Mr. Jones come over from Baltimore with you or with your husband?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you come over from Baltimore that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you own an automobile?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you drive?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Probably.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you go home that night, or did you go home that night?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you don't remember how you came or how you went home, whether by train or automobile?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Bus or taxi?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who drives the car, you or Mr. Lattimore? What was the answer?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who drives the automobile, you or your husband?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. We both drive it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Normally, if you were coming over from Baltimore, would there have been any usual arrangement as to who drove?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, it isn't a case of he usually does or you usually do?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did it happen that you met Mr. Jones in Mr. Fortas' office after our hearings on that day?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. My recollection is that I told him that we would be there and met him there.

Mr. SOURWINE. We; meaning you and Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Lattimore know that Mr. Jones was going to cover the hearings?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I suppose so, but I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. You wouldn't make an arrangement like that without even telling your husband about it; would you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. He knew someone was covering the hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. He knew that you had arranged to have someone cover the hearing?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But he didn't know who it was?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am not sure. He may have known.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Jones was his student; was he not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Jones also a good friend of yours?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you happen to select Mr. Jones for this particular job?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. He had asked a number of times if there was anything he could do for us, and he—I don't remember how I happened to select him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you call him up on the telephone or send him a written communication about it?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I certainly didn't send him a written communication. I probably called him up. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember that. Do you think it possible that he might have simply been there at your home at the psychological moment and you told him you wanted him to come over?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't consider that possible? Is there any other possibility other than a phone call that you do consider within the realm of possibility as to how you communicated with him?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I simply don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. That answer is not completely responsive.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. If you want me to speculate, the other possibilities would be that I saw him at my husband's office or at the Page School but I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think those are both possibilities?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. If Mr. Jones was at the Fortas law office at the noon recess on the 22d, would that have been because you instructed him to meet you there?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Probably.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any memory as to whether you did so instruct him?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am sorry; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do remember that you told him to meet you there in the evening; is that right, after the hearing?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Mr. Sourwine, it is very difficult for me to distinguish between what I actually remember and what I was reminded of by his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not remember his testimony, but I am afraid I do not actually remember myself what I said to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean, by that, that, having read his testimony, there is nothing in his testimony to which you take exception?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is nothing in Mr. Catsby Jones' testimony which to you sounded unlikely, improbable, or untrue?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. As far as I remember.

Mr. FORTAS. You mean as factual statements?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. I had no reference to any opinion that Mr. Jones might have expressed.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. As far as I remember, there is none.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do want to go just a little further with this question of your own memory. Do you remember being in Mr. Fortas' office on the following day; that is, on the 23d?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not actually remember it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember seeing Mr. Jones there again on the 23d?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember at any particular time taking from Mr. Jones any notes that he had made concerning Mr. Budenz' testimony before this committee?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I do not remember taking notes from him; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Receiving notes from him?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I had notes from him. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get them?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I would therefore assume I had received them; but, if you ask me if I actually received them, I assume I received them.

Mr. SOURWINE. For all you know, your husband might have handed them to you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Possibly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just don't know how they came?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. When is it that you remember having those notes in your possession? At what time did you have them in your possession according to your present recollection?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. At some time subsequent to the 23d.

Mr. SOURWINE. At some time subsequent to the 23d. You were the keeper of the files, so to speak; weren't you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And still are?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Did you get an answer to that?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would have been the normal and routine thing for such things, if notes, if retained, to have found their way into your hands at some time subsequent to the 23d for the files; is it not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what happened?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no further questions of this witness, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a few questions?

Senator WATKINS. You may.

Mr. MORRIS. Generally, did you have what might be called a team working here in Washington covering our hearing in Washington, Mrs. Lattimore?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I attempted to have someone here at all hearings at which I could not myself be present.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have anybody else working for you, other than someone covering the hearings?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about that, if you think that is proper testimony at this time, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. What is claimed for it?

Mr. MORRIS. Just general information on that general subject of to what extent Mrs. Lattimore has had people working on our hearings in Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question bears properly on the witness' recollection with regard to the coverage of these hearings. There have been questions with regard to her recollection of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Jones' coverage, and I think it would be interesting for the record to find out what she remembers about other coverage in that nature.

Senator WATKINS. We will let her answer.

Mr. FORTAS. I am afraid the question is not clear. I am not sure that Mr. Morris and Mr. Sourwine are asking the same question.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have anybody working on these hearings other than the one person that you just testified to has been covering the hearings at all times on behalf of you and Mr. Lattimore?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about them, please?

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Morris, I don't believe you intended your questions to mean that Mr. Jones covered the hearings at all times.

Mr. MORRIS. No. She tried to the best of her ability to have somebody cover all hearings. Did you not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. As I understand, you want to know who it was.

Mr. MORRIS. No; I don't, Senator. I want to know who else has been working for Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore in connection with our hearings here.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I thought I just said.

Go ahead and answer it.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I will try my best to answer that question, to the best of my recollection. Over a period of 8 or 10 months, a great many people have offered in any way they could and a number of people have been of use to us. It is very difficult for me to remember just who did what.

Senator WATKINS. Well, of course, you have a perfect right to have anybody cover the hearings you want to. These hearings are public. You can come yourself or have your lawyers or anybody else come and cover them for you. It is in connection with Sourwine's statement that I am permitting it to be asked.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I will be more specific. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 4, 1951, addressed to Mr. William Holland, and signed "Eleanor Lattimore."

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you this letter and ask you if you can recall having written that letter. Will you read it for the committee, please, Mrs. Lattimore? Will you read it aloud for the committee?

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me lay a foundation. Is that your signature, Mrs. Lattimore?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, that is a photostat of the letter.

It isn't the real letter. Let's make it letter because, when we say "Is that your signature?" that is a photostat of your letter.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is a photostat of my signature.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read the letter aloud and tell the committee whether you remember having written it?

Mrs. LATTIMORE (reading):

DEAR BILL——

Mr. MORRIS. That is addressed to Bill Holland.

Mrs. LATTIMORE (reading):

EXHIBIT No. 747

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: We went over to Washington yesterday morning expecting to find you there with the transcripts of the first two hearings for us to look at. I had understood from Carter and from your telephone conversation with me that you were coming down on Thursday for a few days.

If you have a minute to let us know your plans, we would appreciate it. Owen is anxious to see the transcripts as soon as possible as he feels that he has a great deal of work to do in preparation for his hearing and needs as many early warnings as possible about the accusations he will have to deal with.

One thing he would like to know right away is just what Fred actually said and what Carter said about whether Owen did or did not talk with Currie about Fred's commission. Owen can remember absolutely nothing about this, and as you know, O'Conor has been taunting him about his dodging comment on it. If you do not have the transcript of the second day, or cannot spare it yet, perhaps you have some notes on this part.

If you cannot spare the transcripts within the next few days, perhaps I ought to come up to New York to read them, and see a few people at the same time who might do some useful work for us. I am enlisting some help both in Baltimore and Washington, but I am finding it difficult as everyone we know is out of town. By next week I think I will have a good team in Washington, who could do leg work for you as well as us if you need any help. Be sure to let me know.

We have a lot to tell you when we see you.

All the best from both of us.

Mr. MORRIS. Read the P. S.

Mrs. LATTIMORE (reading):

Could you return my Pacific Affairs file?

Mr. MORRIS. The question addressed to this witness was who made up the team that Mrs. Lattimore had working in Washington that is referred to in that letter.

Senator WATKINS. Let her answer. That is the information you want?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Well, I think, as often occurs in a personal letter, perhaps we aren't very exact in our terminology. There was nothing like an organized team. I used "team" in the very loose sense.

Mr. MORRIS. We would like to know. Whatever it was, Mrs. Lattimore, will you tell us?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. In Baltimore, there were several of my husband's students and colleagues who helped to some extent.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned the team in Washington.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes. And I hoped to find people in Washington, but at this moment I can't seem to remember that I did.

Senator WATKINS. At least you had someone here each day, did you not, while the hearings were going on?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. At the hearings we had someone here each day when we thought that it was probable that there would be something come up which had to do with my husband.

Senator WATKINS. A matter of investigating when his name would come up. You never knew.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. So you had to have someone here practically all the time.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. At the beginning we didn't, because we didn't realize how much he was going to be brought into the hearings. But after a half dozen hearings in which he had been brought in we did try to have someone here each time.

Senator WATKINS. You know who the people are who you had come here, generally speaking. If you cannot name them all, you can at least name most of them, can you not, who came to cover the hearings?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. One that came over one day is Mr. Harold Vreeland, who is a colleague of my husband's in the Page School. At a number of the hearings there was always someone here from the Institute of Pacific Relations. So if someone from the Institute of Pacific Relations, such as Mr. Carter, was going to be here, we didn't always try to have someone else. I came to a great many of them myself, after the first few.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I inquire at that point, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. Let her finish. You understand what we want now. Try to give us the names of the people you had doing this work for you.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. The only person I remember who came to a hearing at my request was Harold Vreeland.

Senator WATKINS. How many times did he come?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. He came once.

Senator WATKINS. We have had numerous days of hearings. That would not begin to cover it.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No. But I believe Mr. Carter was here at most of the early hearings.

Senator WATKINS. And he was covering it for you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No; but I attempted to see him after each hearing and hear from him what happened. After the first hearings, as I said, I was here most of the time myself. But in this letter I meant not only covering hearings but looking up various things that we needed to know which we could not remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else worked for you on that, looking up various things you needed to know, or otherwise assisting, so far as you can remember, if you can remember any names?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. My husband's secretary did a great deal.

Senator WATKINS. Give us the name.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Her name is Dorothy Kreger. And I know that other colleagues and students of my husband's did, but I am not just sure. I am sorry; I am sorry that I don't remember more specifically, but this is a very confused time for me and a very painful time, and we were working very hard. I am very sorry that I don't seem to remember more accurately just who did what, but there were a number of people who helped us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were these people who had come at your request, or with whom you had made arrangements that they should help, these persons whose names you don't remember who were students and associates of your husband? Were they the persons with whom you had made arrangements?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. These are people who had done things for us in Baltimore, I suppose at my request.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether it was at your request or your husband's request?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I am sure some of it was at my request.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't remember specifically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Vreeland, then, and Mr. Catsby Jones are the only two who you remember of being requested to do certain things?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. To come to hearings.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Dorothy Borg here at any time for you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes; she was here for us and also for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Vreeland make notes for you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he give the notes to you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that he did?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you can't remember whether Mr. Catsby Jones gave notes to you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I had his notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. But there is a difference there. You remember that Mr. Vreeland did give you his notes?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I remember that I did have Mr. Vreeland's notes. I don't actually remember his having handed them to me, but I remember having the notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your situation there is the same. After the hearing you did have them, they did go into your files which you were keeping, and you don't know just how they came to you. Is that right?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if it doesn't interrupt your line of inquiry, I would like to go now to the question of the dinner now, briefly. On the occasion of this dinner at the Aldo Cafe, do you remember seeing anyone in the cafe that you recognized?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Outside of our party?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mrs. LATTIMORE. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that is all Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will that letter which was read by Mrs. Lattimore and identified as having been written by her go into our record?

Mr. SOURWINE. It has been read by Mrs. Lattimore. Would the purpose be served if it is given an exhibit number?

Mr. MORRIS. I think not. There is one other question I would like to ask. In connection with that footnote, they mentioned your Pacific Affairs files. Did Mr. Holland return it to you?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think he did; as far as I recollect.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you make that available to this committee?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Surely.

Senator WATKINS. The letter will be received into the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 747" and was read in full.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Before the witness leaves the stand, here is a formal subpena covering your appearance today, Mrs. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make arrangements with Mr. Fortas whereby we can obtain the Pacific Affairs files which is mentioned in that letter.

Mr. FORTAS. Yes; my office will transmit it to you as soon as Mrs. Lattimore furnishes it. Can you furnish it next week?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. This file you will give us will constitute the whole file that is referred to in this letter?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. Yes, sir. May I say that this was a file which was prepared for a Tydings committee hearing and which we had still in our files.

Mr. MORRIS. A great part of the testimony of Mr. Lattimore concerned his editorship of Pacific Affairs, and I think as such it is relevant to this inquiry.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have one concluding question, if the Chair will permit.

Senator WATKINS. Wait for Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Fortas will supply it and Mrs. Lattimore now testifies that what she will supply Mr. Fortas will be the whole file which is referred to in this letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. My concluding question is, having read, as you have testified you did, the testimony of Mr. Jones and having been present during Mr. Lattimore's testimony, did you find any conflict therein?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I found no conflict.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you disagree with Mr. Jones with respect to his characterization of Mr. Lattimore's testimony?

Mr. FORTAS. Don't you think, after all, that that is a question that ought to be made very specific. Mr. Jones' testimony is quite confusing in terms of the opinions that he stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, I will separate that into two or three different parts. Do you agree with Mr. Jones that Mr. Lattimore's testimony on this point was inadequate?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I don't believe he used that word, did he?

Mr. FORTAS. Mr. Chairman, I ask that you consider whether you wish to allow that question. This is a wife that is being asked to comment on a characterization of her husband's testimony.

Senator WATKINS. I will say very frankly it probably would not be permitted in court, but we have rather a broad latitude here.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I withdraw that question and rephrase it.

Senator WATKINS. I think you had better withdraw it because I think probably it is not necessary to have that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mrs. Lattimore, is there any comment you desire to make before you leave the witness stand with regard to the completeness, adequacy, or accuracy of Mr. Lattimore's testimony concerning this dinner and concerning Mr. Catsby Jones' presence here?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. I think the difference between Mr. Catsby Jones' testimony and my husband's testimony was that Mr. Jones simply remembered more than my husband remembered.

Mr. SOURWINE. He remembered more than you remembered, too; did he not?

Mrs. LATTIMORE. He remembered more than I remembered. But I think this was quite natural.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all.

Senator WATKINS. Anything further?

Mr. MORRIS. Nothing further, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Anything further?

Mr. SOURWINE. Nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, ESQ.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Carter, you have been previously sworn and have previously testified several times, have you not?

Mr. CARTER. I have, Senator Watkins.

Senator WATKINS. All right, we won't swear you again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, do you remember the occasion of the dinner at the Aldo Cafe on the 22d of August 1951, present at which were, in addition to yourself, Mr. and Mrs. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I remember a dinner. Whether it was August or September I couldn't remember. I have looked up the Journal American and saw that reminded me of some aspects of it, and then I understand that there was some reference to it in one of the reports which I have not seen. I mean, I don't know whether there is a discrepancy in dates in various accounts or not. But I can't remember specifically on what date the dinner was. I know such a dinner—I was one of four at such a dinner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember eating a dinner with the other three persons named in the Aldo Cafe?

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't have remembered the name of the Aldo Cafe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember the grapes which have figured in the testimony here before?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. Late yesterday afternoon when Mr. Morris asked me to come down here, he referred to the Aldo Cafe and that didn't ring a bell. But he said there were grapes hanging from the roof, and then I remembered very vividly a semi-open-air restaurant with a lattice at the top and not phony grape vines but real-life grapes hanging down.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did eat dinner in that restaurant with Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. Well, until reminded by the Journal American, I wouldn't have remembered the name Aldo Cafe, but I remember the grapes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did eat dinner in the cafe described and identified by the grapes with Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I did so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do so on more than one occasion?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember a meal at that restaurant at any other time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you been back to that restaurant at any time since?

Mr. CARTER. It was warm weather and I left my hat, and I went back a day or two later to retrieve my hat.

Mr. SOURWINE. That wasn't what I was trying to get at. I meant had you ever been back to the restaurant for another meal since then.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember any such.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, your memory is that you only ate dinner at this particular cafe once?

Mr. CARTER. It was a single feed.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would remove, it would appear, a question as to dates. You do not remember the date but you were there only once, and other witnesses have testified positively with regard to the dates.

Mr. CARTER. Do the witnesses, Mr. Sourwine, agree as to the date?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you please, the record will speak as to what the witnesses agree on. I want to ask you now, Do you remember being present at this committee during the testimony of Mr. Louis Budenz?

Mr. CARTER. I remember being here during part of it. Whether I was here the whole span, I can't specifically answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you first meet Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. In Washington. And I just wanted to add, Senator Watkins, that my impression of him was not sufficiently vivid to have remembered what his name was, or I am not certain that I could describe whether he was blond or brunette. If he came into the room, I probably would remember him as the person who ate dinner.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you could have had dinner with Mr. Catesby Jones, a man of his dark complexion, and with his dark mustache, and have been unable afterward to have said whether he was a blond or brunette? You didn't really mean that, did you, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I did. He just passed out of my mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us where in Washington you first met Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you meet him at the office, the law offices of Mr. Fortas and his partners?

Mr. CARTER. I did, but on what date or what time on that date I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at those law offices during the noon recess of this committee on the day Mr. Budenz testified, August 22, 1951?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You might have been?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you there on the afternoon or evening of that day?

Mr. CARTER. I believe that I was either present in the late afternoon or early evening and that at some point there was a discussion, it was the end of the day, of where we should have dinner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. And I do remember that, as it was a warm night, that I suggested the air-cooled coffee shop at the Statler. I imagine this

Johns Hopkins student graduate suggested something a little more decorative and ultimately we went to the live-grapes joint.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you go in a group?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. I know we went by motorcar.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whose car?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember it was—I know it wasn't a taxi. I don't know whether it was the Lattimores' car. I don't know whether Mr. Catesby Jones had a car, and if he did, whether that was the car.

Mr. SOURWINE. You went in either Mr. Catesby Jones' car or the Lattimores' car; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. I would swear to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember who drove?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't the faintest recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't drive, did you?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you sat in the front seat or the back seat?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the dinner, where did you go?

Mr. CARTER. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you went back out and got in the car you had come in; didn't you?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; and was dropped, presumably, at whatever hotel or home I may have been staying at.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know where you were staying?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you take any notes during Mr. Budenz' testimony before the committee here?

Mr. CARTER. Very scrappy. I unfortunately don't take shorthand, and I think they were very rough, abbreviated notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did take some notes?

Mr. CARTER. Usually someone gives me a pad and I scribble down a few notes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you said they were very brief, short, scrappy notes. I am simply asking you did you take some notes. Is that correct?

Mr. CARTER. Clearly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what did you do with those notes, do you remember?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, you were up at Mr. Fortas' law office. Mr. Lattimore was attempting to write a press release. Mr. Catesby Jones had provided his notes. Didn't you also provide your notes? As a matter of fact, didn't you give either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore your recollection of what took place and supplement them with your notes?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember doing so, Mr. Sourwine. At that period I was relying almost exclusively on the Alderson Reporting Co.'s notes, and I remember several times I went to the Alderson office the next morning so that I would have their very accurate record.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was the evening of the hearing that I am talking about, the afternoon.

Mr. CARTER. The reporting company's notes would not have been available the same day. You can't get them until the next morning.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Lattimore was planning to write or was going to write a press release with regard to Mr. Budenz' testimony?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember specifically, but my recollection is that he was at least contemplating it and may have been working on the draft.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were you doing in that office for several hours, if you weren't aiding in the getting out of that press release?

Mr. CARTER. Well, frankly, I was very much interested in Mr. Lattimore because of his long connection as a distinguished colleague of mine in the institute——

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course you were, and you were there to help, and you did help, didn't you?

Senator WATKINS. You can answer that. That doesn't seem to me it should take so long, whether you did or did not.

Mr. CARTER. I was there ready to help. Whether my notes were of any use or not, I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you were there ready to help and you helped to the best of your ability, is that your statement?

Mr. CARTER. Certainly, absolutely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you all remained there. Your dinner was delayed until after this press release had gotten out, isn't that correct?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't leave before the press release had been gotten out, did you?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. I may have gone out to do an errand or I may have stayed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you have said you were very much interested in this.

Mr. CARTER. Yes. But it was Mr. Lattimore's press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Well, in any event you didn't all go to dinner before the press release had been gotten out, did you?

Mr. CARTER. I assume we didn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew that Mr. Lattimore was in charge of getting out this press release, didn't you?

Mr. CARTER. He was the master draftsman.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mrs. Lattimore had a function or duty to perform in connection with getting it out, didn't she?

Mr. CARTER. She was Mr. Lattimore's chief of staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. And you had some function in that regard, did you not?

Mr. CARTER. I was at least a friendly wall flower.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, so it is conceivable to you that you would have all gone off to dinner before that job of getting out the press release was completed?

Mr. CARTER. The gentlemen of the press would know when the deadline was of getting it out.

Senator WATKINS. We are trying to get it for the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are trying to ask what your recollection was. I don't know why we should have to fight about this.

Mr. CARTER. I am not fighting at all. I am just trying to remember whether I stayed until the press release was finally composed or whether I slipped out on some errands.

Senator WATKINS. Did you see it and read it before you left?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Senator WATKINS. Did you see that press release before it was issued to the press?

Mr. CATRER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it possible that you slipped out and did not come back and actually didn't go to the Aldo Cafe in this car?

Mr. CARTER. No, I went to the Aldo Cafe, and I must have known the general outline of the press release.

Mr. SOURWINE. You went to the Aldo Cafe with Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Jones, didn't you?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. From Mr. Fortas' office, didn't you?

Mr. CARTER. That, I can't remember. As I say, some time late in the afternoon of early evening I am almost certain I slipped out. Whether the four of us left Fortas, Porter, and Arnold's office at the same time, or whether they picked me up at whatever hotel I was staying at, and then going to the Aldo Cafe, I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection on that?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, can you tell us whether you went from the morning session of this hearing on the 22d to the office of Arnold, Fortas & Porter?

Mr. CARTER. I can't. I remember some time, in midday, going to one of the hotels near here, where occasionally I stayed, the Congressional or the Dodge, and sometimes going to——

Mr. SOURWINE. We are talking about this particular day.

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember on this particular occasion whether you came back and attended the afternoon session of Mr. Budenz' testimony?

Mr. CARTER. I am almost certain I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you remember whether, after that afternoon session you did go to the office of Arnold, Fortas & Porter?

Mr. CARTER. I am sure I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did there meet Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore and Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were they all there when you got there?

Mr. CARTER. I can't say.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility that you went from here to that office with Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. Conceivably.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wouldn't you remember it if you had?

Mr. CARTER. No. Mr. Catesby Jones was not a prominent figure in my life at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us whether you came down here to the afternoon session with Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. It would be likely, if we had been together in the noon hours.

Mr. SOURWINE. It would be likely. But you can't remember?

Mr. CARTER. Can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you come here on the second day of Mr. Budenz' testimony, that is, on the 23d of August?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you come here with Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, after the conclusion of that morning session, go back to the office of Arnold, Fortas & Porter?

Mr. CARTER. I may have, or I may not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember whether you went there with Mr. Catesby Jones?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember anything about the occasion of writing of the press release or the dinner that you haven't told us about?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, I think at the restaurant there was some kind of very attractive shellfish that we ate or that I ate, and I think that at the Arnold, Fortas, and Porter office, as you now refresh my memory by your questions, I am pretty sure that Mr. Lattimore and Mrs. Lattimore were busily preparing a press release, and I stood around available in case they thought I had anything to contribute. Whether I had anything to contribute or not, I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, as a matter of fact didn't you all have veal scallopini for dinner that night?

Mr. CARTER. That is Italian, isn't it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. I should have sworn that I had some shellfish.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you had brought up shellfish and I simply wondered. Your memory was good enough to remember what you ate. Were you just tossing in the shellfish or do you remember eating shellfish there.

Mr. CARTER. I couldn't swear one way or the other. I may have.

Senator WATKINS. In fact, the matter is that you do not remember very much about this but you went to dinner?

Mr. CARTER. The grapes.

Senator WATKINS. And it was a joint, as I think you said.

Mr. CARTER. I will edit that in case the manager of the restaurant feels hurt about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, while you were in the Aldo Cafe on that evening of the dinner, did you see anyone there whom you recognized?

Mr. CARTER. Other than the three other people at the table I saw no one. Apparently some one who identified us was also there but I saw no one. Well, I don't remember seeing any one that I had ever seen before other than the three guests.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone at the table say anything in your hearing about having recognized anybody in the cafe?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. They may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Just one thing. Is it also your testimony that you do not recall the name Catesby Jones? When it turned up in these hearings, that name meant nothing to you?

Mr. CARTER. It meant nothing to me until it turned up in these hearings. When you are introduced to people, sometimes you have a photographic memory, and yet sometimes the introducer sort of mumbles, "Do you know Mr.———."

Mr. MORRIS. But you do have a flair for interesting names, don't you, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I didn't have a flair for that name.

Mr. MORRIS. The name Catesby Jones was not interesting for you to remember 7 months later?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you read Mr. Jones' testimony before this committee?

Mr. CARTER. I have not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not read it. Do you know what he testified to before this committee?

Mr. CARTER. I saw the story in the April 3 New York Journal American.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all you know about it?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Holland told me that at another session of this committee if I remember rightly, some reference was made. But I don't remember just what the point was. I think Mr. Holland's point was that maybe this wasn't the whole story and that one should read other parts of the testimony. I had no copies of the testimony covering this period, and haven't looked it up since.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read Mr. Lattimore's testimony with regard to the occasion of this dinner?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you discussed it with him or with Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any more questions, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

Mr. Chairman, I do have a few questions by way of identifying documents to address to Mr. Carter in view of the fact that he is here. I have taken up these two matters with Mr. Carter and his attorney. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original handwritten memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, with L. E. S. marked in the corner, words looking this——

Mr. MORRIS. Just identify the document.

Mr. MANDEL. There is no date on it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did that come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It came from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, I offer you that document and ask you if that is your handwriting there.

Mr. CARTER. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you offering that for the record, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. I want to be sure that Mr. Carter identifies it as his handwriting.

Mr. CARTER. It looks to me, Mr. Chairman, as though it were a piece of scrap paper——

Senator WATKINS. Please do not write on it now.

Mr. CARTER. On which I made two separate memoranda. One is in ink, which appears to read "boarded type" either 10 cents or $1, and then "341 face armory, rent." That is in ink. Then in pencil is "friend of Alger Hiss," and then underneath that line is the name "Robert Miller." And up in the left-hand corner, in pencil, are the initials "L. E. S."

Mr. MORRIS. L. E. S. stands for Lawrence Salisbury?

Mr. CARTER. I should presume so. What he would do with either of these pen scratchings, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't the notation there written that Robert Miller is described as a friend of Alger Hiss?

Mr. CARTER. That could be so interpreted. That line reads "friend of Alger Hiss," the next is "Robert Miller."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there has been a conflict of testimony before this committee as to whether Mr. Carter knew Robert Miller and knew him to be a friend of Alger Hiss, and also when we had Mr. Miller on the stand yesterday, Miller did not concede that he was a friend of Alger Hiss. In view of that conflict may this be introduced in the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, I don't mean to interfere with the offer of this for the record. I think it should go in the record. But at this point, it should go into the record as a piece of paper coming from the Institute files and as a piece of paper that the witness discussed. The evidentiary value is for the committee to determine.

Senator WATKINS. Go ahead. We will hear your question and the answer, and maybe that will help.

Mr. CARTER. May I ask my attorney for a comment on the question?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you want to consult with your attorney, consult with him.

Mr. MARKS. I was just going to suggest this facsimile procedure. I am not going to talk about any answers to any questions, but the question of how it gets into the record. If this is part of the printed record, may we have this in facsimile, as we did with Miss Farley.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that should be done.

Mr. CARTER. And I would hope some device would be had for showing that one item was in pen and the other was in pencil.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record shows that the upper item is in pen and the lower item and the initials in the upper left-hand corner are in pencil.

Senator WATKINS. You have so described it accurately and definitely.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you if you remember anything about this memorandum.

Mr. CARTER. As Mr. Morris hinted, I think, I forgot even what hearing it was, I was presented with a letter from myself to Alger

Hiss who, at that time, was president of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. This was several years ago. And in that letter, if Mr. Morris will refresh my memory, I told Hiss that I had had lunch with Robert Miller. "I had a delightful and illuminating talk." Then I call attention to the fact that he brought me the good news that Hiss has succeeded Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler as president of the endowment and that I hoped Columbia University would be as eminently successful in getting a successor to Dr. Butler as the endowment has been.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is all of that responsive to the question, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I thought Mr. Morris asked me to read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember what the question was? Do you remember?

Mr. CARTER. I asked if I could see the text of the letter and he handed it to me.

Senator WATKINS. There is no question.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a question pending and the witness has gone far afield. I wonder if the reporter would read the question back so we can all know what it was.

(The reporter read from his notes as follows: "Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask you if you remember anything about this memorandum.")

Mr. CARTER. I remember that this letter was introduced——

Mr. SOURWINE. Let's get back to the memorandum, Mr. Carter. We have rambled on to this letter once before. I want to know if you remember anything about this memorandum. It is before you. You have laid the book on top of it. But I want to know if you remember anything about this memorandum.

Mr. CARTER. I see.

Mr. SOURWINE. That book wasn't anywhere near your hands when you were asked that question.

Mr. CARTER. The memorandum had the name of Miller.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Do you remember anything about that memorandum?

Mr. CARTER. I remember nothing except that Mr. Morris, before this morning's session began, handed it to me and asked me to identify it as to whether it was my handwriting, and I affirmed that it was my handwriting.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember nothing else of the circumstances on which you made that notation; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. And has it refreshed your recollection, Mr. Carter, on whether or not you do, in fact, remember Robert T. Miller?

Mr. CARTER. I remember nothing more about Robert Miller other than what I testified here, and my memory at that session was very vague, except that in answer to my question in your office this morning as to who he was, you explained that he was public-relations man, and then you added something——

Mr. MORRIS. That he testified he was a public-relations man.

Mr. CARTER. I stand corrected.

Mr. MORRIS. Will this go in the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator WATKINS. That will be placed into the record in facsimile.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 748," and is as follows:)



Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I give to the witness our exhibits 478, part 9, p. 3136, 485, part 9, p. 3172, and 519 part 10, p. 3323, which are minutes of meetings which took place in Moscow, and ask Mr. Carter if he can recall who actually prepared those minutes?

Senator WATKINS. Are these already in the record?

Mr. MORRIS. They are already in the record, the three exhibits I have read.

Senator WATKINS. All right. Do you want to see them before you try to answer?

Mr. SOURWINE. He has photostats in front of him.

Mr. MARKS. We don't have the exhibit numbers.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have been mentioned for the record. You have the documents.

Mr. MARKS. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore could not testify, when he was asked, as to who actually prepared those minutes. You were present at those meetings and we are asking you if you know who prepared those minutes.

Mr. MARKS. Has Mr. Carter testified that he was present at the meetings?

Mr. CARTER. My initials are on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at those minutes and indicate whether or not they can aid you in answering the question, Were you present at those meetings?

Mr. SOURWINE. If there is any question about that we had better clear it up, because Mr. Lattimore has testified that he was present.

Mr. CARTER. It is a meeting of April 6; the year is not given, but I assume that it was 1936 because that was the only year in which Mr. Lattimore, as far as I know, was in Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the only year that you were in Moscow?

Mr. CARTER. No, no. I think I have said before I have been there ten or a dozen times. A meeting April 6. Motiliev, that is a Soviet geographer who was the chairman of the then Soviet IPR; ECC, myself; OL, Owen Lattimore, presumably; FD, Faith Donaldson—she was one of those who was acting as one of my voluntary staff, and an American——

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Carter. I have also given Mr. Marks exhibit 518 which is a similar copy of minutes of one of these meetings.

Mr. MARKS. This is a copy.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the fourth one.

Mr. CARTER. Is that the same one?

Mr. MORRIS. Either one of those four meetings.

Mr. SOURWINE. The first three are photostatic copies of the original and the fourth one referred to just now by Mr. Morris is a mimeographed copy of the exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. All we would like to ask you, Mr. Carter, is if you can tell us who the person or persons were. Who actually prepared these.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question has been raised as to whether Mr. Carter was there. Let's settle that.

Mr. CARTER. I was present.

Mr. MORRIS. At those four meetings?

Mr. SOURWINE. We want the witness to testify as to whether he was present.

Mr. CARTER. Yes; I was present at those four.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now Mr. Morris' question.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what person or persons prepared the minutes of those four meetings?

Mr. CARTER. They probably were different at different times. But I will have to scan them to make certain.

In the April 6 meeting, they might have been recorded on the Russian side by Mr. Harondar, who was a part-time secretary of the Soviet IPR, and an expert in American movies. On our side, either F. D. or H. M. FD, Faith Donaldson, a woman speed champion, and Harriet Moore, who was studying Mongolian problems in Moscow at the time, on behalf of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did both of those women write in shorthand?

Mr. CARTER. I don't think either of them did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility that minutes prepared by Mr. Harondar would have found their way into the files of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. I think it is extremely unlikely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do these appear to you to be and can you identify them as memoranda which were prepared on your side, that is by——

Mr. CARTER. Absolutely.

Mr. SOURWINE. By the American delegation?

Mr. CARTER. Or the international—I was there as secretary general of the Pacific council.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were prepared by someone under your authority who had gone there with you?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, under non-Soviet authority.

Mr. SOURWINE. These are the minutes which were kept for your information and for your files; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Now we are going to identify the others as to who prepared them.

Mr. CARTER. April 6—the previous one, I have not looked at.

April 2. Mr. Carter; Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore; H. M., that would be Harriet Moore; Harondar, the Russian. I have not read this, but it is a discussion regarding the exchange of books and periodicals.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is in our record. You don't necessarily need to describe it. The question is who prepared it so far as you can tell. If you can tell.

Mr. CARTER. There is no signature at the bottom.

Presumably, Harriet Moore.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Go on to the next one.

Mr. CARTER. April 2—you got April 6?

What is the next consecutive one? Meeting on Pacific Affairs, April 8, Motiliev, Voitinski—he was the research man in the Soviet IPR in China—E. C. C., myself——

Mr. SOURWINE. That is your best description of Mr. Voitinski, research man in what was it you said?

Mr. CARTER. In the Soviet IPR. He was in the IPR world. That was his role. He had been out in that role because he had been in China at a certain purple period in Chinese political history, vis-á-vis Russia, and a very tough guy. He had been a prisoner of war in Kamchatka.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel the phrase you used adequately describes Mr. Voitinski?

Mr. CARTER. The phrase describes his formal IPR connection. He was chairman of the research committee of the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. CARTER. E. C. C., myself. O. L., Owen Lattimore. Harondar, the Soviet man. H. M., Harriet Moore. And this was—well, you aren't interested.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who prepared it?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably Harriet Moore.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, now, the fourth one.

Mr. CARTER. April 12, Motiliev; Voitinski; ECC, Carter; O. L., that is Owen Lattimore; R. M., Harriet Moore; and Harondar.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who prepared that?

Mr. CARTER. Presumably Harriet Moore. I imagine that as she was making the draft she finally showed it to me, to see whether I felt that it gave a fair and balanced impression of what happened.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would say you had approved these as fair and balanced reports of what did happen?

Mr. CARTER. To the extent that I made a few copies and circulated them to a few of my colleagues.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would say they were——

Mr. CARTER. I did not submit them to the Soviet IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, no; but they were for your information and your files, weren't they?

Mr. CARTER. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was no reason to submit them to the Soviet?

Mr. MORRIS. If there had been any serious inaccuracies you would have corrected them?

Mr. CARTER. I would hope so.

Mr. MORRIS. And to the best of your recollection, Harriet Moore was a good and active reporter of meetings?

Mr. CARTER. Excellent.

Mr. MORRIS. And Faith Donaldson?

Mr. CARTER. Faith Donaldson had not had the benefit of a Bryn Mawr education that Miss Moore had.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of the fact that on three of these occasions Harriet Moore was present and Faith Donaldson was not, do you have any feeling as to who actually prepared the minutes on the occasion when both of those ladies were present?

Mr. CARTER. The major drafting would have been done by Miss Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in recess.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. Monday, April 7, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, APRIL 7, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Will you be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I do.

TESTIMONY OF IGOR BOGOLEPOV

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name to the reporter.

Mr. BOGOLEPOW. My first name is Igor, I-g-o-r. My last name is Bogolepov, B-o-g-o-l-e-p-o-v.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am a Federal employee in the service of the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. You are in service abroad, are you?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you born, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the Russian Empire.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1904.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you born in Siberia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was.

Mr. MORRIS. What has been your service in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I graduated from the University of Petrograd, now Leningrad.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year did you graduate from the University of Petrograd?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1923. I entered the foreign service of the Soviet Union, the foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. In that same year, 1923?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At the end of 1923.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you entered the foreign service of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your first position in the Soviet Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the legal department of the foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in the Soviet Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time until 1926.

Mr. MORRIS. Until 1926.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you have during the period 1923 to 1926?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First I was secretary of the department and then officer of the department.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you terminate your connection with the Soviet Foreign Office in 1926?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I did for a time.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did you do that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was drafted into the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you serve, therefore, with the Red army?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First I was a private in the First Rifle Division in Moscow. Then I finished the school for second lieutenants, and in the summer of 1927 I was assigned to the general staff of the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your rank at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Second lieutenant.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the extent of your military training at that particular period?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did that end, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As I said, in the summer of 1927.

Mr. MORRIS. In the summer of 1927.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was transferred to the general staff of the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain on the general staff of the Red army?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until the middle of 1929.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Then what did you do?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was liaison officer between the general staff and the foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. With what rank?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Colonel.

Mr. MORRIS. The rank of colonel.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Correct.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain liaison officer between the Soviet Foreign Office and the Red Army?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. About one-half year.

Mr. MORRIS. One and one-half years?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next assignment after that, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In that time I participated in the conference on disarmament at Geneva.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As interpreter and secretary of the Soviet delegation.

Mr. SOURWINE. What year was that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1927–28.

Mr. MORRIS. That is while you were in military service?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. I was secretary to the military delegation of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. That was in 1927 and 1928?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And that coincides with the period of your military service which you have just described to this committee?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. With the general staff, that is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened to you after 1929?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Then I returned back to the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was an officer in the trade relations and policy division first. Then in 1931 I was working for a short time in the press department of the same office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you retain your military rank during this time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. I was officer of the reserves.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the reserves.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Now will you tell us your further experience in the Soviet Foreign Office after 1931?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. From 1931 to 1937 I was acting as assistant to the chief of the League of Nations division.

Mr. MORRIS. Chief of the League of Nations division of the Soviet Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, assistant.

Mr. MORRIS. From the period 1931 to 1937?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, with some interruption for the Red Army again.

Mr. MORRIS. Then in 1937 you say you were impressed into the service with the Red Army again?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In 1937 I was sent to the army armored forces school in Leningrad for 3 months. I learned then the Spanish language, and I was sent with our troops to Spain, where the civil war was going on at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You used the expression "our troops." You mean the Soviet troops?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I meant Soviet troops.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you have in the Spanish Civil War?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was liaison officer between Marshal Kulik——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that name?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. K-u-l-i-k. And General Paalov——

Mr. MORRIS. Were you liaison between him and General of the Army Paalov and Spanish Republican General Miaja? Is that M-a-i-h-a?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. M-i-a-j-a. And other Communist and Republican leaders of Spain.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Several weeks only because in December 1937 a special commission from Moscow came to Spain and proceeded to arrest all the generals and the officers.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you arrested then, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was arrested with all other officers or most of the other officers who were sent previously with me, with two Soviet marshals and then we were sent back to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now will you explain the nature of those arrests, if you know?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the prison I was first told that I was an agent of General Franco and a Trotskyist.

Mr. SOURWINE. A Trotskyist, you say?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. The same kind of accusation was against the whole group of the Soviet military people.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the real reason? That was the formal reason given, wasn't it?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the real reason, if you know? Will you tell us if you know the real reason for your arrest at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I wasn't told other than what I told you. So I spent several months in Lubianka jail. That is central political prison in Moscow. And then I was released with reinstitution of all my rank and capacity.

Mr. MORRIS. You were reinstated?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was your arrest at that time connected with the arrest of Marshal Tukachevsky?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Tukachevsky was arrested first in June of 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. When was your arrest?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was arrested in December 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you know there was no connection between the two?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say that. The people who arrested me later were themselves arrested and shot, so I can't say what happened.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were reinstated in 1938?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you then hold?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Then I was assigned back to the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. In what capacity?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was made foreign editor of the publication of the Foreign Office in the French language in Moscow, Journal du Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that for the committee, please?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. J-o-u-r-n-a-l Moscow, M-o-s-c-o-w.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that connected with Izvestia in any way?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, a little bit, but it was not connected with the Foreign Office. It was an unofficial publication of the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. About 1 year.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if you will permit me, I was unable to hear whether the witness said that was an official publication of the Foreign Office or an unofficial one.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. An unofficial, thank you.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Foreign Office controlled it, is that right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Indirectly.

Mr. SOURWINE. And dictated who should be its editor?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is how you got your job?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. But it was not an official publication?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, it was not an official publication.

Mr. MORRIS. During this period, were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, I wasn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you not a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was impossible at that time for people of nonproletarian origin to join the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were of nonproletarian origin?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; I was descended from a bourgeois family.

Mr. MORRIS. You were descended from a bourgeois family and therefore you were ineligible at that time for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was your father? Do you have any objection for security reasons to telling us who your father was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have no objection because my father is dead now.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us who he was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He was a professor, he was a member of Academy of Science of the Soviet Union, he was a member of State Planning Commission, he was a member of the board of directors of the State Bank of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in the czarist government?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the Soviet Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever apply for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you apply?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened when you applied in 1939 for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time after the 18-party congress, after the big purges when the party and the administrative apparatus and the army were deprived of much of their prominent members, the decision was taken that they should have new members, and so although they formerly rejected people of nonproletarian origin, now they started to drag them into the party. As a matter of fact, my application was done not involuntarily, but I was asked to make application.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not volunteer, but you were asked to apply for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is correct, but I will add to it that even if I wasn't asked, I did it because it was my long-time intention to get into the Communist Party and to get a prominent position in order to sabotage the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, what was the first movement on the part of the Soviet authorities to your application, to your formal application for membership in the party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. What do you mean by the first move?

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, did you become a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I filed the application, and they checked the application for several months because I was, as I told you, arrested. It was a rather complicated matter. They had to go through many instances in order to approve. Then I became, according to the rules, a candidate for the party.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you a candidate for membership in the Communist Party?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until the time I left the Soviet Union in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1942.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Right.

Mr. MORRIS. So in the period between 1939, which was the date of your application, until you left the Soviet Union in 1942, your status was that of candidate for membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. I became the candidate in 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. You became candidate in 1940.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were in the legal office of the Foreign Office; is that right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time I was already chief of the League of Nations Division of the Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that an extension of your work in the legal office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; that was nothing to do with legal work.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position then subsequent to 1939?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Immediately after I received the candidate card there was no more instances to my work as it was before. As you have seen, I was merely in a deparment which has no political assignments, the legal department or I was acting as an expert. But now when I became a candidate and was a member of the party, I had the same right and the same opportunity concerning a career in the Soviet Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I interrupt, Mr. Morris? If the Chair will permit? Did I understand you correctly, sir, that while you were permitted to work in the Soviet Government before you became an applicant or candidate for membership in the party, up until the time when you did become such a candidate you were kept in nonpolitical jobs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And after you became a candidate you are now about to tell us you branched out into or were transferred into political jobs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were permitted to handle political jobs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead and tell us about that.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. So after this I was assigned to the job of counselor to the foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. Counselor to the foreign office.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in the period following 1939?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. In that capacity I was able to attend the meetings of the Foreign Commissar Litvinov and his assistants. I have the possibility of probing in top secret files, to read ciphered telegrams which referred to my immediate task, and my immediate task, consisted again with the problems of League of Nations first and in part with the problems of organization infiltration of our influence on the Western Press, administration, and social life.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until Litvinov was dismissed and Molotov came in, and Molotov didn't like Litvinov and his work, so in a very short time, actually in several weeks, he dismissed all people who had been working with Litvinov.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was 1939, in the summer of 1939.

Mr. MORRIS. Did that have anything to do with the Hitler-Stalin pact?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Litvinov was dismissed because of the coming Stalin-Hitler pact.

The CHAIRMAN. Who succeeded Litvinov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Molotov.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your next assignment?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Then I was transferred to the Radio Moscow system, to that part of Radio Moscow which dealt with the foreign broadcast programs, and I became first the vice chairman of the Soviet Foreign Broadcast System and later chairman of this system. Soviet broadcasts were translated in 18 and later in 21 foreign languages, including English and American. In that capacity I had under me a lot of American people who were working in broadcasts for America, and at the same time I was able to contact the Comintern people.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you did have working under you Americans, and this is the Voice of Moscow, is that right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us who those Americans were?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, I can't because according to the rules of the organization I knew only the first names of these people.

Mr. MORRIS. So you can't identify them?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They were John, and so on. Even to me, the Chief of the Service, their real names were not disclosed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether they were native born Americans? Were they people who had been born in this country?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, I didn't ask that question.

Mr. MORRIS. You couldn't tell by their accent? Did they have an accent or did they have all the appearance of being native born Americans?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. There was one Negro, and there was one lady who was dismissed because the American Communist Party sent us a letter saying that our feminine speaker was not very good, that she had not an American but an English cockney accent, and that was the reason

why she was dismissed. I guess these people were at least not from South America.

Mr. MORRIS. Not from——

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not from the Southern States.

Mr. MORRIS. Not from the southern part of the United States?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; because I couldn't understand——

Mr. MORRIS. You could understand?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can understand better people from the North.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us for how long you stayed in that assignment, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until the summer of 1940, 1 year. In June 1940 I was sent with Vishinsky, Zhdanov, and Dekezoniov—Zhdanov was a member of the Politburo then and right hand of Stalin, Vishinsky was then Vice Foreign Commissar, and Dekezoniov was Deputy Foreign Commissar, and at the same time Chief of Foreign Service of the Political Police.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where were you sent with these men?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. To Baltic countries, for the occupation of the Baltic countries.

Mr. MORRIS. By that time the Baltic countries had been taken over by the Soviet Union.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not yet. We came under false names and false passports. They were independent countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequently those Baltic countries were taken over by the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Very soon.

Mr. MORRIS. You were there to work on the sovietization of those particular countries?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Right. I became director of the radio system of the Baltic countries.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you hold that position, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Until the beginning of the war which came, as you know, for the Soviet Union on the 22d of June 1941, for 1 year again.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened at the commencement of the war? What happened to you?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I joined the staff of the northwestern front of the Red Army, defending the Baltic countries and the approach to Leningrad, first under Marshal Voroshilov, later under Marshal Zhukov.

Mr. MORRIS. With the rank of colonel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The rank of colonel.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about your military experiences commencing on June 22, 1941.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. For about 1 month I was with the retreating army from the borders of the Soviet Union through Latvia and Estonia to the approach to Leningrad. We arrived in August 1941 to Leningrad, but without our army, which surrendered to the Germans; only general officers and commissars, no army. At that time we got new reserves and made a good stand against the Germans on a front around 100 kilometers of Leningrad. At that time I got word from a good friend of mine, General Vlassov, who was one of the commanders around Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was one of the commanders?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Defending Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Constituting the defense of Moscow.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You got word from him?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I came to Moscow to see him. I talked with him about the political and military situation of the Soviet Union. I knew him pretty well. He knew pretty well myself. We took the decision that the time had arrived to bring about a great change, to use the defeat and the war in Germany for the overthrow of the Soviet Government. The best solution——

The CHAIRMAN. Give me that again, please, that last sentence. The time is ripe for what?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. For overthrow of the Soviet regime in Russia. In this conference with General Vlassov I, with another general, decided that the best way is to go over to the Germans, to join the 4 million Red soldiers and officers already in German hands——

Mr. MORRIS. You say 4 million?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. About 4 million; yes—and to try to convince the Germans of the possibility of turning arms against the Communist regime in our country. General Vlassov surrendered to the Germans in March 1942. I escaped across the front lines at the very beginning of 1942, and I met him again in a German PW camp.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you remain in that PW camp?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was first in a Gestapo jail, and then after the Germans cleared me—because it was the order of Hitler to shoot all commissars and all Jewish people. First, I wasn't a Jew, and second, I wasn't a commissar. The Gestapo carried me back to the German Army officials, and the German Army officials let me free and proposed that I work on propaganda against the Soviet Union. I agreed to do this, and for about 1 year I was leading a powerful transmitter for the German Government on the outskirts of Berlin, carrying out the anti-Communist propaganda. It wasn't until 1944, due to the political quarrels between different groups of Nazis, the Wehrmacht, the German Army, and the German Propaganda Ministry under Goebbels, that they were ready to help us to carry out propaganda, and so on, and even to organize an anti-Communist army, whereas the Ostministerium, Rosenberg and Hitler himself were against it. One of the results of the struggle between the different cliques of Nazis was that my station was shut down, and I retired.

Mr. MORRIS. This is what year now? You retired in 1944 when your station was shut down?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Then I tried to do some work with General Vlassov, who at that time was also relieved from the camp, but soon I discovered the impossibility to work with the Germans.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you discovered the impossibility of working with the Germans?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. It was not that the Nazis were too bad. When I came over and knew that they were no good. But I didn't know that the Germans were so silly as they are. Here I made my mistake. In 1944 I simply retired to a German farm in Bavaria, working as a manual worker on a German farm and waiting until the American troops came and the war was over, which was in April 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened then in April 1945?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In April 1945 I and many other people like me, the Russians, the French, the Poles, and so on, went to meet the Amer-

ican troops with the first spring flowers as our liberators, but the people from Eastern Europe were obliged to hide from Americans because they started to consider us as collaborators and to turn us over to the Soviet repatriation commission. So from 1945 to the beginning of 1947 I was obliged to keep myself hidden in Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you generally with a group of people with General Vlassov at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. I have the opportunity and the honor to be before you now only because I left the troops of General Vlassov and his organization, because Vlassov troops and the organization of Vlassov who believed the Americans and capitulation which was signed by the general and the surrender were all turned over to the Soviets.

Mr. MORRIS. How many people were involved in that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say precisely, but according to the estimates of my comrades there were only a few left. We had had three full divisions, which means around 45,000 people.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, are you from your experiences in Moscow acquainted with an organization called the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have mentioned to you that at the same time when I was working for the Foreign Office I was involved in some literary and scientific activities in so-called Communist Academy or, better to say, in the Institute for World Economics and Politics, whose chief was Eugene Varga.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Institute for World Communists?

Mr. SOURWINE. World Economics and Politics.

The CHAIRMAN. World Economics and Politics, the official name of the institute?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As you perhaps know, the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations was a part of this institute. So actually I was working under the same roof and with the same people who were connected with the American Institute of Pacific Relations. Here was the chief source of my information, which I will give you right now. The second part of my information I got directly from the secret files of the Soviet Foreign Office.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what was the Institute of Pacific Relations as you saw it at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First, it was not an institute, but a desk or a group of research workers on China, Japan, and other far-eastern countries.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was a group of research workers on the countries that you just named?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, yes; a Chinese group, a Japanese group, and so on. At that time, I think it was the beginning of the thirties, they did literary research work.

Mr. MORRIS. You say in the early thirties they did research work?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. They worked as Marxist and Communist scholars, but still as scholars. But in the course of time, toward the middle of the thirties, the situation became, in my opinion, changed. First, the people were changed who were working in our Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us some details on that? You say the people were changed in the middle 1930's. What changes do you know from your own experience?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. From the old people who were working in the twenties and the beginning of the thirties in this body about which I am speaking now, only one person remained. The other sinologists——

Mr. MORRIS. Sinologists? Experts on China?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. On China and Japan—had disappeared and were out then instead of them came in the true Communists who had not very much to do with science, but very much to do with some other matters.

Mr. MORRIS. What other matters do you refer to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean military intelligence and political intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us who the one person who remained was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That was Anatole Kantorovich. He was a nonparty man. He was a real scholar and very nice person.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the people who came in and took the place of the scholars that you just described?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You want me to call the names?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; to the best of your ability.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First of all was a certain Mr. Voitinsky.

Mr. MORRIS. Voitinsky. Will you tell us who Mr. Voitinsky was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mr. Voitinsky was known to me in different conferences as a man who in the 1920's was a big wheel, big cog, big shot in Siberia when he liquidated a lot of former officers.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he liquidated them?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. He was vice chief of the Siberian Cheka according to this own words. That is the first name of the secret police.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Comintern man?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Just a minute. For this he had the Order of the Red Banner which he displayed often to us. I can't tell you all of this, but at the time when I met him he was already an old hand in the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was an old hand in the Comintern?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. To me he was not a scholar and not a member of the institute with which I had been working, but first a man of the Comintern. He was carrying through the political line of the Comintern, and science was to him only a media to carry out his political Comintern line.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Voitinsky has appeared throughout our hearings as one of the officials of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He presided at several of the meetings on which we had considerable testimony here during the last few weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The second whom I remember of this group was Mr. Abramson.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you go to Mr. Abramson, I would like to ask you a question about Mr. Voitinsky, if the Chair will permit.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Voitinsky a research man? Did he himself engage in research?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Will you please repeat the question? I didn't get it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what research is?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Research. Did Mr. Voitinsky do that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, with the help of other people. He didn't work himself. He had a lot of secretaries and assistants to whom he gave directives to get him the data, and he arranged all this or more often it was that he put only his signature on articles which were written by other people.

Mr. Abramson, not unlike Mr. Voitinsky, was a scholar. Of course you must understand that when I use the word "scholar," you can't compare it with your American or western notion of scholar, because in our Soviet country a scholar is a politician who is working in the field of science. He is not a pure scientist. He does not know what objectivity is, and he doesn't care to be objective. He is carrying out the slogan of Lenin even before the revolution, saying that there is no impartial science, that there is only party science. So when I say that Mr. Abramson was a scholar, he was a Marxist and Communist scholar. Sometimes he met Mr. Abramson in a military uniform, not of course in the rooms of the Institute for World Economics and Politics, but outside. He was clad in the uniform of the fourth division of the General Staff of the Red Army, the military intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. So Abramson was an officer in the fourth division of the Soviet Army which was the military division?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I saw him in military uniform in his bureau in the fourth division of the General Staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember his rank? Was the rank indicated on his uniform?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am afraid I would make a mistake. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a high officer?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Either a colonel or major.

Mr. MORRIS. To the best of your ability you would estimate him to have been a major or colonel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he a field officer? Do you know that he was a field officer?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, he was a staff officer.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the other people who came into the Institute of Pacific Affairs at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Then I can mention a man who has two names, Abolin, and the second name Avorin.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that is one person?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. One person, yes. In Moscow he was known as Aborin, in Manchuria when he was for a time consul general either in Munkiang or Kirin, I don't remember he was Avorin. He has a surname which I do not remember. Under this surname he was known to me in the same fourth division of the Red Army, but I do not remember how he was called then there. That is about Abolin or Avorin.

This man succeeded Kantorovich. When Kantorovich was arrested and executed, then Avorin took up his functions of secretary general of the Soviet Council of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Arosev?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mr. Arosev, yes I knew him personally. He was chairman of the VOKS. That is Soviet for Cultural Relations between Soviet Union and the Western World.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the nature of the operations they were conducting in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sorry. I would like to add one more.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me. Go ahead, please do.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have to mention one more name, that is, a certain Kara-Murza. This man was also intelligence officer, in charge of Mongolian relations. Later when I have to testify about some of the American members of some of the institutes this name would be mentioned by me once more. That is why I bring it up.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know the nature of the operation that they were conducting in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As I told you before, with the change of personnel, the nature of the activities of our institute changed, too.

Senator EASTLAND. Military intelligence took it over, did it not? Soviet military intelligence?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mostly Soviet military intelligence, also the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator EASTLAND. It became an agency of the Soviet Government.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

I didn't work myself in military intelligence, so I can't tell you precisely what kind of operations the Fourth Division of the General Staff had carried out concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations. I can only guess from indirect facts. For example, in the files of the Foreign Office I met more than once evidence that the people who were working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations had been asked to ask their American counterparts to give some information concerning the fisheries in the Pacific area, and looking into the file I found always that as background for this information was always the request of naval intelligence. So I feel myself better prepared to answer the second part of the question rather than military intelligence activities. Perhaps when you will ask me some questions I will remember some isolated facts.

I got the impression from talks with my comrades working in the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations, in the Foreign Office, that they considered this institute as a very valuable organization from two points of view. As one of my former comrades expressed it, it is like a double-way track. On one line you get information from America through this institute. On the other hand, you send information which you would like to implant in American brains through the same channel of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the double-way track that you refer to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean two channels. One was the in-going channel, the second out-going channel.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The in-going channel was military intelligence. We extracted military information.

Mr. MORRIS. When you talk about two-way track, do you mean that military intelligence was extracted from outside the Soviet Union through the medium of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And on the other hand, by the out-way track you mean information that you wanted to impart to the outside world was transmitted through that medium?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. Propaganda, you mean. Soviet propaganda that the Foreign Office desired implanted in foreign minds would be sent through the facilities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. That is what you mean?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is mostly propaganda, but I would say even a little more than propaganda, because not only organizational propaganda but even the organization of a network of fellow travelers in your and other countries.

Senator WATKINS. I want to ask this, Mr. Chairman: I understood you to say that you got this information from talking with your associates.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Were you free to converse back and forth about what this group was doing?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly not. If I had been free I could give you more information.

Senator WATKINS. How did you get what you did get? Were they not under some sort of surveillance, and not able to talk freely or speak freely as to what they were doing?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, when we discussed some common business, necessarily you have to exchange information. Of course it was not a full report about what this or other bodies were doing and what are their functions, but when I had, for example, to deal with the problem of fisheries in the Pacific, necessarily we had to speak about this matter. I gathered information from them and they got some information from me. Besides this, the human relations even in the Communist world are still human relations, and if you have good friends you can always say a couple of words, not so much, but something.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, you could discuss it some.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not too much, but still you can do a little bit, very few, of course.

Senator EASTLAND. You had access to the documents, you said, secret files?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I pause in the interrogation at this point to review our exhibit No. 430, part 8, page 2701, which is one of the many exhibits we have introduced on the questions of minutes taken at Moscow?

The CHAIRMAN. That is the minutes taken in Moscow during the meeting in Moscow?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. This is our exhibit No. 430 used in the open hearings of February 12, 1952:

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL CONVERSATION AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY, VOLKHONKA 14, MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1934

The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes, Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese.

1. Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September Pacific Affairs on the romanization of Chinese. They invited Voitinsky to write for the December issue on the land problems of Soviet China or the land problems of China generally.

I would like to skip down to paragraph 3, Mr. Chairman, and read this paragraph to the witness:

3. Mr. Voitinsky said that he believed the IPR could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports on the following subjects:

(*a*) The inner situation in Netherlands India—the economic interdependence of the peasant and the city worker, and also the interdependence of these on capital and trade in Holland. The whole situation as portrayed in official documents in Netherlands India and in Holland would be of the greatest interest to the Communist Academy. The academy would also welcome information on the nationalist movement in the Netherlands India. At the moment the academy has no Dutch-speaking member, but could easily get all Dutch documents translated.

(*b*) He would appreciate—

this is Voitinsky again—

all the information the IPR can send him regarding the agrarian movement in Japan and the financial dependence of Japan on other countries. He would like to compare Lenin's theses on Japan, which he feels is stated in algebraic terms transformed into arithmetical terms, through a study of finance and trade. He would like very much more information than is at present available on the evolution of the labor movement and the close relation between the village and the city.

Mr. Chairman, he goes on at length, and it all indicates that Voitinsky, about whom we have been taking testimony, was asking in this meeting for information through the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Is this the same Mr. Voitinsky about whom you have been testifying?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I guess so.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this document reveal anything to you, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I do not remember myself this problem of ours.

Mr. MORRIS. This particular meeting, you mean?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not the particular meeting, but this particular problem which you enumerated here, but it seems to me very familiar because I do remember other occasions when, as I told you, military intelligence, the foreign office or Cominform asked questions of other people to get from their American colleagues.

Mr. SOURWINE. To get what from their American colleagues?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Information. If you would like an example, I remember a question posed concerning some parts of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question was posed concerning parts of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. By Voitinsky to the American members of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why did he do that? Had someone asked him about that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was a command either of military intelligence——

Mr. SOURWINE. Military intelligence wanted that information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Through Voitinsky?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. From the American IPR?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he got the information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the nature of the information that he asked for?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They mostly asked——

Senator FERGUSON. No; on Alaska.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. On Alaska? Concerning the construction of roads, the food situation, and especially about the climatical conditions for polar flights.

Senator FERGUSON. From whom were they to get this information? You say the Institute of Pacific Relations. Who in the institute?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Was any name mentioned?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; you have to understand that when names were mentioned, it was the business of intelligence work.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you made the policy as to what you desired.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. As to who was to do it. That was intelligence.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That was not our business. That was military intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Who suggested that the Institute of Pacific Relations might get you the information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That particular case which I am speaking about was taken from the file on Pacific relations of the Foreign Office, and unless I make a mistake a list of the questions concerning Alaska and the Aleutian Islands was written and presented for approval of the foreign office before it was sent to Voitinsky or who else I don't know, and was approved by the chief of the far eastern division of the General Staff of the Red Army and the far eastern intelligence.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what year this was in?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not quite precise, but it was 1936 or 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was this conversation?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was not a conversation. It was official correspondence.

Senator FERGUSON. Official correspondence. Where was it written?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was in our foreign office files. There was a copy of a letter of the military intelligence asking us to go through the Institute for World Economics and Politics investigations concerning thus and thus problems.

Senator FERGUSON. That file was in what city?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Moscow, in the foreign office. The military intelligence never asked directly. In this case they asked it through the Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. The military intelligence asked the Foreign Office to ask the institute?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose job in the Foreign Office would it be to ask the Institute of Pacific Relations for that kind of information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Office, which was occupied with the problems of China and Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Morris, don't we have some evidence in the record now showing that they inquired about some economic and geographic information in the Far East?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir. There is considerable on that. I had given this as a sample of that.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean there was some other testimony, was there not?

Mr. MORRIS. Abundant, Senator. I will offer you these, which are documents which we will be coming to soon, if you would like to look at them.

Senator FERGUSON. No. If you are going to put them in the record I know they exist.

Mr. MORRIS. Some are in, and some we plan to put in.

Mr. SOURWINE. If it wouldn't interrupt the train of discussion at this point I have one thing to clean up, Mr. Chairman.

Do you know what the address of Soviet IPR was in Moscow, the Moscow address of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. First it was located at 14 Volkonka, the same apartment the institute was located in.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are sure about that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. And then later I guess when Motylev took over he put the whole business in his own office on Razin Street. I don't remember the number.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it 20 Razin Street?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify that document, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do that, was the American Institute of Pacific Relations and the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations housed in the same building? Were they in the same building, under the same roof?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Americans?

Mr. MORRIS. When the members of the American Institute of Pacific Relations visited Moscow, did they spend time in the same building as to the Soviet Council of the IPR members spent their time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say that, sir, because on only one occasion I saw myself the American members of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Moscow.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a Russian Institute of Pacific Relations, wasn't there, a branch of the American?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they both housed in the same building, the American and the Russian?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. What Americans? I can't understand.

The CHAIRMAN. The Institute of Pacific Relations was the international, and there was the Russian branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they all in the same building?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, the Americans came only from time to time to Moscow. So far as I am informed, they came not often to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Whenever they were there they had temporary quarters there?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Temporary quarters, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Since you did mention, Mr. Bogolepov, the fact that you did see some Americans, will you at this time tell us about that meeting?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. All right. But I have to call to your attention that the second part of the activities has not yet been covered.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by the second part? Tell us about that.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The second part of our utilization as a media for propaganda infiltration of general ideas favorable to the Soviet Union and some particular problems which we would like to implant in American minds according to the aims of Soviet foreign policy. For this aim the members of the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations by way of their personal meetings, by way of suggestions to solve the problems, by way of sending their own writings and in other ways tried not only to influence the American colleagues of their own but to make of these people media for infiltration of ideas favorable for Soviet foreign policy in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose policy was that, the intelligence of the army or was it the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office we have had a special, I think you call it joint committee, where representatives of different branches of the administration were present. In this joint committee we present the members of the Foreign Office, then of military intelligence, executive committee of the Cominform, and a representative from the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This important body was responsible directly to the political commission of the Politburo for carrying out the infiltration of ideas and men through the iron curtain to the Western countries. I have to make the point that the problem which we are discussing right now with you, the problem of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to me in Moscow was only a small and not a greatly significant part of the activities. It was a very big business of ours.

Senator FERGUSON. What was? Propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The infiltration.

Senator FERGUSON. Infiltration in other countries.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In other countries. Ideological infiltration, the creation of fellow travelers, inducing the western intelligentsia to write books and articles which were favorable to the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that one of the missions of the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. To get people in other nations to write articles and books in favor of Russia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In favor of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they ever pay any money to get that done?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The singular or the particular character of the situation is that the majority of the Soviet agents outside as well as inside are unpaid workers.

Senator FERGUSON. State that again. I did not quite get you.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean it is the general situation that we do not pay the agents. The agents work out of their sympathy toward the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you get people to write books without paying them subsidies, and so forth?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Why do we have to pay for books? There are American publishers to publish the books and pay for them. Why do we spend our own money?

Mr. MORRIS. At this point, Senator Ferguson, may I offer this letter. I think this is directly in point here. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this, please?

Senator FERGUSON. You don't think, then, that Russia would print any books in Russia favorable to America.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In Russia, but not in the Soviet Union.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I meant, in the Soviet Union.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Report of the visit of the secretary general to Moscow," dated December 20–31, 1934.

Mr. MORRIS. I am reading from page 10 of this document, Mr. Chairman. Here it gives a list of people who were present at the particular meeting which Mr. Carter, the secretary general, attended and apparently was responsible for these minutes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is this document in our record, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Not yet, sir. I am going to comment on it and ask the chairman if you will introduce it into the record. This is on the 25th of December 1934. I won't read all the names of the people present, but present was Kuliabko, the acting president of VOKS (Arosev was in Paris), Rabbins of the VOKS staff, Carter, Moore, Wingfield Digby, Mitchell, Morris, Mr. Cherniavsky, Miss Linde [reading]:

> Mr. Kuliabko asked Mr. Carter what, in his opinion, would be the most arrangement for distributing VOKS publications in the United States.

It reads just that way.

The CHAIRMAN. What is VOKS?

Mr. MORRIS. The witness has just testified to the nature of VOKS, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read this whole paragraph and then I will go back to this particular thing [reading]:

> Mr. Carter suggested three possibilities, (*a*) through the medium of the Russian-American Society, (*b*) through some commercial publisher by having them take a stock on consignment, and (*c*) through the American Council of the IPR. This last method could not be offered officially until Mr. Carter had consulted the American Council.
>
> Mr. Kuliabko also requested information as to the names and personnel of American societies and institutions in the fields of ethnography, physics, ethnology, and geography with which VOKS should try and establish relationships. Mr. Carter promised to have this information sent from New York.

Will you tell us again what VOKS is?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The name of VOKS, the official translation of this abbreviation is Society for Cultural Relations Between Soviet Union and Foreign Countries. Actually it was one of the cover organizations for, again, these double tracks, getting information from abroad to the Soviet Intelligence, and sending infiltration of ideas and selling Communist ideas to the west.

Mr. MORRIS. He talks here of distributing VOKS publications in the United States. Would that be Communist propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it necessarily be Communist propaganda?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly. We have no other propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, I then offer this as an example of a concrete example of what the witness has been testifying to.

Senator WATKINS. What page were you reading from?

Mr. MORRIS. Page 10.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. May I give another example to Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Give another example of what you were talking about.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me. Mr. Chairman, as such, may this go into the record as a document identified by Mr. Mandel as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Senator WATKINS. What does the document purport to be?

Mr. MORRIS. This is a report of the visit of the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations to Moscow, December 20 through 31, 1934.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom was it compiled? I do not believe we have enough about it.

Senator WATKINS. Specifically, who did it?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter was the secretary general. As to who on his staff actually prepared the minutes I am not prepared to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has this been identified by Mr. Carter?

Mr. MORRIS. No, it has not. It has been identified by Mr. Mandel as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we ask Mr. Carter if he will authenticate it?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. I would like to have one more link in the authentication of it, who prepared it, whether it was anyone connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. A fugitive instrument might creep into the files of the Pacific Relations. I think it can be identified.

Mr. MORRIS. On its face, Senator, it is a report of the secretary general, you see.

The CHAIRMAN. On its face it appears to be. Does the secretary general identify it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, since this document has been discussed with the witness, would the Chair wish to order it into the record as the document the witness has discussed, subject to future identification by Mr. Carter?

The CHAIRMAN. It may go in the record now. The question as to its weight and as to the admissibility will be finally fixed when, as, and if it is identified by Mr. Carter or someone else.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 749," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 749

REPORT OF THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO MOSCOW

December 20th–31st, 1934

The newly formed Soviet Council of the IPR could hardly have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the Committee (listed on page 2 of the October issue of IPR NOTES.) are members of the Party. All are influential and all are operating large organizations with substantial resources.

Dr. V. E. Motylev, the Chairman, as Director of the Great Soviet World Atlas, has a budget of 12 million roubles per year, a large staff, and the cooperation of every leading scientific institution and library in the U. S. S. R.

Voitinsky, the Vice Chairman, as head of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Communist Academy, likewise has substantial library and staff resources at his command, as well as funds for editing "Pacific Ocean" and other research studies on Far Eastern subjects.

S. S. Joffe, who, together with Schmidt, was the hero of the Chelyuskin expedition, is famous as a mathematician, as an aviator, as well as an explorer. It is commonly said that Joffe and Schmidt are in charge of everything in the U. S. S. R. north of the 62nd parallel, a region which includes vast mineral and timber resources and a population of five million people.

A. S. Swanidze is Director of the Bank of Foreign Commerce which finances all of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics, speaks English perfectly, and is naturally extremely well-informed on the international relations of the U. S. S. R.

Janson, as Head of the Chamber of Commerce, has a large organization at his command, which not only issues information on economic questions, but carries on extensive research work for the improvement of Soviet products.

The Institute of Oceanography is also a very important body. It handles both the economic and the scientific side of the entire U. S. R. R. fish industry. Its work is of great importance to the whole future food supply of the U. S. S. R. and has a direct political bearing on the situation in the Far East because of the constant friction between Japanese and Soviet fishermen, and because of the scientific competition which exists between the U. S. S. R. and Japan in the development of the fish resources.

A. Kantorovitch, Secretary of the Soviet Council, is able, frank, and well-informed and a most efficient administrator. He speaks English rapidly and vigorously. He was a member of the Soviet Embassy in Peiping. His special field of study is American policy in China and he has just completed a book on this subject which will be published shortly.

Kantorovitch has as his assistant Eugene Harundar, who speaks English, French, and German fluently and can take dictation and type rapidly in all. Harundar was recently political, or foreign affairs, secretary to the Commisar of Heavy Industries.

The office of the Soviet Council is housed in the headquarters of Institute of Scientific Publications which is producing the World Atlas. It therefore can make use of the machinery whereby the Atlas staff can draw on every library in Moscow for books and other materials.

During his stay in Moscow the Secretary General had several very full and lengthy discussions with the members of the Praesidium of the Soviet Council, Motylev, Voitinsky, and Kantorovitch, and with Kantorovitch alone, at which the organization of the IPR, the personnel of the different National Councils, the research program, the conference technique, the publications of the Institute, its financial set-up, and many other institutional questions were thoroughly discussed. The members of the Praesidium showed the keenest interest in learning of the activities of the IPR and an obvious desire to cooperate fully with the other Councils and with the International Secretariat in every way possible. Full details of all these discussions are on file in the Secretary General's office. The following is merely a summary of the more important points which developed.

1. Standard of Living Studies

The Praesidium was anxious to know:

(a) What was the purpose of these studies?

(b) What type of studies will be made?

(c) Does the scope of the studies go beyond wages and hours?

(d) How will the final report on standards of living appear?

(e) What is the conference to be held in connection with these studies? Is it regional or international?

Mr. Carter explained the reasons which had led the International Research Committee to select this field of study. It is hoped that the studies will serve, first, to gather more accurate and complete data on the way people in certain selected industries and communities live. The groups selected for study will be chiefly those whose products enter directly into international trade and competition. From the data obtained it should be possible to determine whether there is any scientific method for comparing the living standards among different countries. The eventual aim is help in finding means of raising the standards of living in all countries. The methods used are at the moment largely experimental. Each country is expected to describe, in addition to the usual data on wages, hours, budgets, etc., the factors peculiar to its own standard of living, i. e., its

special social and psychological values which play an important part in the question of how the people's needs and wants are being satisfied under present economic and social conditions.

The research conference to be held in Tokyo will be as international as possible and will attempt to work out a common methodology for all future work in this field and Mr. Carter hoped that it would be possible for the Soviet Council to be represented. If possible, he hoped that Mr. Motylev could arrange to advance his trip to the Far East by a few weeks so that he could be present.

Mr. Motylev explained that this might not be possible, but that he would very much like to go if it could be arranged. Meanwhile, the Soviet Council would consult with various specialists in the field of standards of living and would then send to Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland a memorandum embodying the Soviet Council's views on the question of possible research projects in this field within the Soviet Union.

2. Exchange of Publications and materials between the Soviet Council and the Pacific Council, the American Council and the other National Councils of the IPR, especially Chatham House

Mr. Kantorovitch explained that in accordance with the arrangements made by letter with Mr. Carter and Mr. Field, 73 books and magazines have already been sent to New York for the Pacific Council's Russian library now housed in the office of the American Council, with Mrs. Kathleen Barnes as librarian. This consignment does not by any means cover the whole field of modern Soviet scholarship on Pacific problems. There are some fifty more which he could send if desired. There are also a number of more general books on Russian economic and political problems. He asked what books the Soviet Council would receive from the United States in return.

Mr. Carter replied that these could be classified into three categories:

(a) All IPR publications. These would all be sent to Moscow.

(b) All important American books on the Far East and the Pacific area. These books would be sent if Kantorovitch desired it.

(c) General books on American economies, politics and social conditions.

In this third category it was agreed that the exchange should consist of a small carefully selected collection to be decided on directly by Kantorovitch and Field.

Kantorovitch asked whether a similar exchange arrangement could be made with Chatham House. The Soviet Council is prepared to supply Chatham House with all important Russian books on the Pacific area. Mr. Carter promised to take this matter up with Miss Cleeve when he returned to London.

On several occasions Kantorovitch, Voitinsky and Motylev all expressed the wish that some ararngement could be worked out whereby the Soviet Council could be supplied regularly with a list of what the IPR groups in the United States and Great Britain considered the important books appearing in the English language on subjects important to the Pacific area. Such a list, with possibly the addition of such reviews as had appeared in reliable journals, would be of great value in the Soviet Union. If possible such an information exchange might be developed among all the National Councils. The lists when received could be used by the Council receiving them in any way it chose, i. e., for educational purposes, to spur translations, to stimulate an interest in language study, etc.

3. IPR conference

The members of the Praesidium were deeply interested in hearing about the organization of IPR conferences, the "round table" technique, the methods used for guiding the discussion, the work of the program Committee, the round table Chairmen and Secretaries, etc. Mr. Carter explained all these matters very fully and Mr. Motylev expressed satisfaction with this form of organization which he said would be something quite new in Russian experience. He felt that it had many advantages, one of the most important being that it gave each member of the conference an opportunity to express his opinion on the subjects under discussion.

Mr. Motylev also discussed the points raised in the letter sent by the Secretary General to the members of the Institute from Amsterdam on December 18th, 1934. In general he was in full agreement with the provisions contained therein. With regard to a few specific points he felt that it would be better to leave the question of the Status of Manchoukuo for discussion under topic "(e)", rather than follow the suggestion of the American Council that it could be discussed

under "(c)" and "(d)." Mr. Voitinsky felt that topic "(e)" was very well formulated and should prove valuable in summarizing the problems brought out during the discussion of the first four topics.

With regard to the data papers which the Soviet Council will prepare, Motylev explained that it had been decided to combine Nos. 4 and 5 into one paper dealing not only with the economic but also with the political struggle in the Pacific. This paper will therefore furnish the Soviet data for the final Round Table.

Motylev raised the question as to whether the National Councils were still to be allowed to prepare an optional paper, as stated in the Secretary General's June 21st memorandum. Mr. Carter said that this provision still held good. Motylev explained that the Soviet group had not decided on any additional paper, but wished to be free to contribute one if international conditions should make it advisable.

Kantorovitch added that the Soviet Council would send a definitive list of data papers to the Secretariat by April 1st, 1935, a list of probably conference members by December 1, 1935.

Mr. Carter told the history of the various suggestions as to the location of the 1936 conference, and said that at present there were three places under consideration, Tokyo, Hongkong and California. The Soviet group much preferred California.

4. International Committee appointments

Mr. Carter explained that each National Council was entitled to representation on the various international committees of the IPR, the Pacific Council, the Program Committee, the Finance Committee, the Research Committee, the Publications Committee, and a correspondent for PACIFIC AFFAIRS. He described briefly the work of these Committees, and the Praesidium agreed to discuss the matter with the Council and to inform Mr. Carter of their nominations.

5. Pacific affairs

The Soviet Council had already received a letter from Lattimore and are willing to cooperate. Voitinsky will try to write his article on the Chinese Agrarian problem sometime in the near future. Kantorovitch is very favorably impressed with the magazine, especially by Toynbee's article in the March issue. He was also eager to work out some method whereby regular Soviet contributions could be assured. Mr. Carter asked that Kantorovitch write directly to Lattimore suggesting possible articles and authors. Lattimore could then choose those which best fitted into his general editorial program. This Kantorovitch agreed to do. He also promised to send a regular Soviet contribution to IPR NOTES.

The Soviet Council also ordered a full set of all back issues of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

6. The proposed Bibliographical Service

Kantorovitch had noted in the annual report of the American Council a mention of the proposed bibliographical service, and wished to have more specific information about it. Mr. Carter explained the steps which had already been taken, emphasizing that the whole project was still entirely tentative. He then asked Kantorovitch whether it would be possible for the Soviet Council to provide a central staff with a list of, say, the 100 most significant books and articles on the Far East and the Pacific, appearing each year in the Soviet Union, together with a short description and critical comment on each. In answer to Kantorovitch's questions, Mr. Carter explained that the plan, as tentatively sketched, would call for books and articles to be reviewed and criticized, first, by a competent group in the country concerned, second, by competent scholars of a different nationality, and, finally, by the central staff. The service would be either annual or semiannual and would most probably be centered in New York. The reason for the threefold character of the review would be to set a truly qualitative standard, and to get an agreement that the books and articles included were of real international significance. To achieve this form of critical review would, of course, require the voluntary cooperation of scholars in every country. In discussing the question as to what form the final critical note would take, Kantorovitch favored a "symposium review" rather than a synthesis of the various opinions obtained. He felt that two or three short paragraphs of comment, each signed by the author, and representing widely differing schools of thought, would carry greater weight than an impersonal integration of contradictory attitudes and opinions.

With regard to the number of books and articles which should be listed each year, Kantorovitch thought 100 was a rough estimate, and that there would undoubtedly be more articles than books.

At this discussion and at later meetings with the Praesidium some doubt was expressed as to the desirability and feasibility of such a service. In the opinion of the Soviet group there was considerable doubt as to whether it would be possible to make a qualitative judgment on books dealing with controversial subjects, in view of the radically different ideologies among the countries of the IPR.

They felt that a mutual exchange of information among the National Councils, as to what books and articles were appearing, with a brief descriptive comment of each, would be of greater value, and would obviate the need for critical comment.

Mr. Carter explained that there were many among the numbers of the IPR who were anxious to get away from the exhaustive, uncritical type of bibliography, and to work out some method for a qualitative description. Kantorovitch agreed that this was desirable and remarked in this connection that there were two standards of quality which were always employed in the Soviet Union in judging the worth of a new book. First, whether it contained new material, or material presented from a fresh view point. Second, whether the author showed that he was thoroughly familiar with everything that had already been done in his field.

It was obvious that the Praesidium felt that in a bibliographical service conducted from New York or Washington, by a staff which would presumbaly be predominantly capitalistic, it would be difficult to describe either Soviet or other books in a manner which could be regarded as objective by both communist and capitalist readers. It was even more obvious that unless the service included English language publications, it would not be greeted with any very enthusiastic support in the Soviet Union.

7. *Exchange of Staff and research workers*

On behalf of Mr. Frederick V. Field of the American Council, Mr. Carter extended a formal invitation to Mr. Motylev to send Mr. Kantorovitch to New York for a period of three to six months for the following purposes:

(a) to confer with Mr. Field regarding the establishment of a regular exchange of IPR research workers between New York and Moscow, according to which, for several months each year, a Soviet student proposed by the Soviet IPR would study in New York, and an American student nominated by the American IPR would study in Moscow.

(b) to confer with the American IPR with reference to the whole question of the American study of the language and life of the Soviet Union.

(c) to study the program and methods of the IPR in the United States.

He also extended an invitation from Mr. Field for Mr. Motylev to follow Mr. Kantorovitch's visit with the appointment of a Soviet research worker who will go to New York to pursue some line of study, under the direction of the IPR in Moscow and New York, which could be better carried out in the U. S. A.

Mr. Carter explained that Mr. Field hoped that for an experimental period of three years there can be an annual exchange between New York and Moscow, similar to the present unilateral appointment of Miss Harriet Moore.

Mr. Carter suggested that it might be possible to work out a plan whereby the IPR group in each country would be responsible for the travelling expenses of its representatives, but that all living expenses would be paid by the Council to whom the representative was sent.

Mr. Carter emphasized that this form of bilateral exchange was something in which the Pacific Council was deeply interested, and that as Secretary General he would do everything possible to aid in establishing and extending it.

Mr. Motylev said that he was thoroughly in agreement with the principle involved in the matter of staff exchange. He added that the financial aspect need not prove a handicap. The Soviet Council could, if it desired, send students at its own expense, as it had been given a certain endowment in valuta. The working out of the principle might, however, take time, as the Soviet Council would first have to attract research workers and students interested in the idea of such an exchange.

Mr. Kantorovitch expressed his gratitude at the invitation of the American council. It was, of course, impossible for him to leave Moscow at present but it might be arranged at a later date.

In this connection Mr. Motylev expressed regret that Miss Moore had not asked for more help from the Soviet council. He explained that his Institute had a special department for securing all necessary materials for his staff, and he hoped Miss Moore would make full use of it. He also promised to arrange any special consultations with experts in various fields which would be useful for Miss Moore in carrying out her study. Miss Moore expressed her appreciation

of this offer and explained that up till now she had been concentrating on her study of the language and had not yet begun much actual work on her research project.

8. The Language Problem

(a) The Russian language School in the United States.

(b) Experiments with Basic English in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Carter described the work of the Harvard Summer School and the plans for the School at Columbia University in the summer of 1935. He mentioned the need for a second instructor and the fact that Prince Mirsky's name had been mentioned in this connection. The Praesidium knew nothing of Mirsky's qualifications, but saw no reason why he should not be approached if it seemed advisable.

The question of teaching methods and textbook materials for use at the School was discussed, and they agreed to put Miss Moore in touch with someone who could give her the best information on this question, which she could then pass on to Mrs. Barnes in New York.

Mr. Carter then described briefly the IPR's interest in basic English as a method of learning and teaching the language in a much shorter length of time than that required by the usual methods. He told of Litvinova's work and showed Motylev, Krupskaya's letter in PRAVDA, in which she mentions Basic, and urges better language teaching, the leader in PRAVDA which says how bad Russian language teaching is, and third, Litvinova's letter in reply, which was edited to omit any mention of Basic.

Mr. Motylev expressed great interest and promised to get in touch with Litvinova at once.

9. The Proposed Activities of the Soviet Council

(a) The Soviet Council is preparing a catalogue of all Russian materials on Siberia, the Far East, and the Pacific area. This catalogue will be available in the office for use of all students working on any subject in this field.

(b) The Soviet Council has agreed to contribute a section to each of the two international research projects, *Status of Aliens*, and *Communications*.

(c) In addition to the data papers for the next conference, the Soviet Council is planning to prepare, in English, a symposium of articles on the foreign relations of Pacific countries. Although the plans for this were not yet definite it will probably include the following:

i. Sino-Japanese relations during and after 1931.
ii. The end of the Washington Agreement and its effect on China.
iii. The unification of China.
iv. Anglo-Japanese Trade rivalry.
v. The ideological preparation for war in Japan.
vi. Internal Economics in Japan.
vii. The Mongolian Problem.
viii. The Silver Policy in the Far East.
ix. Nationalities in the Far East.
x. The great northern sea passage.

In connection with this symposium which is expected to be ready in June 1935, The Soviet Council asked Mr. Carter whether he thought it would be possible to arrange for its publication in either America or Great Britain, as they felt that this would secure a much larger distribution. Mr. Carter said that he would be glad to take up the matter with an American or British publisher when the manuscript was ready.

10. Finance.

At the request of the Praesidium, Mr. Carter described the financial organization of the IPR and gave the contributions which each National Council had made over the last few years. He also explained the financial set-up of the International Research Committee.

Mr. Motylev said that so far the IPR had not proved itself in the Soviet Union sufficiently for him to guarantee a definite financial contribution at this time. It was, however, not a question of principle—the Soviet Group can and wants to participate fully in all the work and responsibilities of the IPR. The question of financial support will be discussed with all the institutions represented in the Soviet Council.

The Secretary General had expressed the desire to visit as many of the members of the Soviet Council as possible in their own organizations in order that he might learn from them of the activities on which they were engaged. Mr. Kan-

torovitch accordingly arranged for the Secretary General and his party a number of interviews, brief notes of which are herewith included.

Meeting at the Communist Academy, 25th December 1934

At this informal discussion there were present, in addition to the Secretary General and his staff, Varga, Director of the Communist Academy, Voitinsky, head of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet, A. S. Swanidze, director of the Bank of Foreign Commerce (who interpreted for Mr. Varga), Miss Frieda Utley of the research staff of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet.

Mr. Varga described the organization and program of the Communist Academy, its publications and its main lines of study. Mr. Voitinsky then described in more detail the work of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet which is primarily concerned with the study of China, Japan, and the Far East. The conflicts and contradictions of imperialism as manifested in the Pacific area are being investigated, both in their present stage, and in their historical background. The social problems of Japan and China are also being studied, as well as the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements in these countries. The foreign relations of the Far Eastern countries, the role of the S. M. R. in the expansion of Japan, Anglo-Japanese trade rivalry, etc., are other subjects on which research is at present going on. Attached to the staff are translators who study and translate the leading press articles from China and Japan.

In discussing the future of China, Voitinsky expressed the view that the mass of the Chinese people would sink lower and lower as long as they continued to be oppressed by the landlord and militarist classes. The leaders in China were beginning to realize this and to come out with agrarian policies, partially inspired by the challenge of Soviet China. He also felt that it was impossible to reconcile the capitalist and the precapitalist factors in China's economic organization and that it would be better to skip the stage of capitalist organization entirely in favor of some form of agrarian cooperation more suited to the traditional way of life of the Chinese peasant population.

Mr. Carter asked if there had been material economic results in Soviet China. Voitinsky said that the program had been a difficult one to realize and that many mistakes had been made, particularly in the methods used in redistributing the land. He felt however that some definite results had been accomplished and that "Communist China," even if destroyed will prove to be a big factor in the future agrarian policy of any Chinese government.

Mr. Carter asked what solution could be found for the densely populated agricultural regions of China, where the subdivision of land had been carried so far that any method of modern mechanized farming was impossible. Mr. Varga mentioned three possible solutions. (1) There was still a great deal of unutilized land in China. Most of it was elevated and required a new system of water supply to make it available. (2) An improved water supply would also mean that the land at present under cultivation could be better utilized. (3) Inner colonization to Mongolia and the Northwest provinces might do something to relieve the more densely populated areas.

Meeting at VOKS, 25th December 1934

Present: Kuliabko, the Acting President of VOKS (Arosev was in Paris), Rabbins of the VOKS staff, Carter, Moore, Wingfield Digby, Mitchell, Morris, Mr. Cherniavsky, Miss Linde.

Mr. Kuliabko asked Mr. Carter what in his opinion would be the most arrangement for distributing VOKS publications in the United States. Mr. Carter suggested three possibilities, (a) through the Medium of the Russian-American Society, (b) through some commercial publisher by having them take a stock on consignment, and (c) through the American Council of the I. P. R. This last method could not be offered officially until Mr. Carter had consulted the American Council.

Mr. Kuliabko also requested information as to the names and personnel of American Societies and Institutions in the fields of Ethnography, Physics, Ethnology, and Geography with which VOKS should try and establish relationships. Mr. Carter promised to have this information sent from New York.

Mr. Carter mentioned various matters which he thought would be of interest to VOKS. Among these were the CHINESE ATLAS, recently published by V. K. Ting, W. W. Weng, and S. Y. Tseng, the most important piece of cartography ever done in China. A copy of the Atlas was to be in Moscow within a few days,

and would be presented to Dr. Motylev in connection with his work on the Great Soviet World Atlas. The I. P. R. was at present exploring the possibilities of having an English edition of the Atlas produced, either in Great Britain or in China. Mr. Carter also described the Russian Summer School and other efforts on the part of the I. P. R. to further the study of the language and contemporary life of the Soviet Union, particularly in the United States and Great Britain.

Mr. Kuliabko then described some of the work which VOKS is carrying on at the present time:

VOKS represents 218 institutions and societies in the Soviet Union, scientific, cultural, literary, musical, and artistic. Its purpose is to establish relationships with similar organizations in foreign countries. It also maintains direct contacts with many universities and schools in other countries. It organizes exhibitions of the work being done in the Soviet Union and brings foreign exhibitions to the U. S. S. R. Its book exchange now amounts to many thousands of books each year. It furnishes facilities to foreign students. It publishes a journal and numerous special periodicals in English, French, and German. It arranged for the American Institute which was held in Moscow last summer and which is to be repeated in 1935 for all English-speaking foreigners, etc.

At the end of the meeting Mr. Carter asked two questions:

1. How can foreign students live honestly *and* cheaply in Moscow?

Ans.: No general arrangement is possible but ways are always found for meeting individual cases.

2. What relations has VOKS established with the recently formed International Cultural Society in Tokyo, and does political tension make any difference in the amount of cultural cooperation between Japan and the Soviet Union?

Ans.: Political tension has made no difference, and there is a good deal of cooperation between the two countries. No relation has as yet been established with ICR because it has so recently been formed.

* * * * * * *

Moscow Chamber of Commerce

Mr. Carter and his staff had a conversation with Janson, President of the Chamber of Commerce, at its headquarters in what was formerly the Moscow Stock Exchange.

Janson described the research and publicity activities of the Chamber of Commerce; its fortnightly and bimonthly publications on economic conditions in the U. S. S. R.; its efforts to improve the quality of Soviet products; and the meetings which it arranges at which members discuss questions of foreign and internal trade. At present there is a membership of some 200 economic organizations, with branches in all leading cities of the Soviet Union.

Both the export and import trade of the Soviet Union have been greatly reduced in the past two years, as nearly every machine, previously imported, can now be manufactured in the Soviet Union. The future development of foreign trade will therefore depend on the conditions offered by other nations.

A very striking exhibition of Soviet products was being arranged in the building; the resources, principal exports and imports destinations and sources of the foreign trade of the Soviet Union being displayed by means of samples of goods, maps, charts, etc., in a most effective manner.

* * * * * * *

Institute of Oceanography

Mr. Carter had a long conference with the eight heads of the departments of the Institute. Research is being carried on with reference to all of the underlying principles of Oceanography, including hydrography, hydrographical chemistry, ichthyology, the organization and technique of fishing; the economic advantages of mechanization; the economic return from fishing in the open sea and along the coasts; technical problems of packing, salting, and improving the final product.

It is estimated that the Soviet Union's capacity to consume fish will always be greater than the capacity of all the lakes, rivers, and oceans to produce fish, in spite of the enormous gains made through scientific research and the mechanization of the industry.

The Institute presented Mr. Carter with a complete set of all the most important Soviet publications on every aspect of the fish industry to be sent to the Pacific Council library in New York.

INTERVIEW WITH TRININ,* OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOVIET CONSTRUCTION AND SOVIET LAW (20, RAZIN STREET, DECEMBER 28TH, 1934)

Mr. Trinin called to see Mr. Carter at the office of the Soviet Council. Miss Moore and Mr. Digby were also present.

The function of the Institute of Soviet Construction is scientific study of the social, political, and legal questions of the whole U. S. S. R. Mr. Trinin himself is particularly informed with regard to matters pertaining to the Minor Nationalities in the Soviet Union.

In a short sketch of the Nationalities policy of the Soviet Union, Trinin emphasized the contrast with the old regime, under which national minorities had been exploited and oppressed with the present system under which they are given every chance of economic and cultural development, and of acquiring or maintaining national characters. The use of their own language was encouraged, schools have been established, and the economic resources of the various regions developed.

The principle of self-determination is firmly adhered to. The right of secession from the Union by vote is provided in the Soviet Constitution. According to Trinin there was no further danger of secession movements in the Ukraine, which, when it had had an independent government had failed to deal with the agrarian problems of the region. The present Ukrainian government has from 70 percent to 80 percent Ukrainians in it.

Trinin said that minorities within minorities were well protected, e. g., Tartars and Germans in the Crimea.

He thought that the loyalty of the Far Eastern Province to the Union was very strong, owing partially to the fear of Japanese aggression.

* * * * * * *

The Secretary General and his party had expressed a desire to learn more about the agrarian policies and program of the Soviet Union, especially the development of collectivized agriculture. The Soviet Council accordingly arranged a meeting at the Communist Academy at which the following were present:

D. G. Lurie, Director of the Agrarian Institute of the Communist Academy.
J. A. Anisimov, Director of the Institute of State Farms.
A. A. Karavaev, Assistant Director of the Agrarian Institute.
V. Mullin, Scientific Collaborator of the Agrarian Institute.
S. P. Matzkevich, Scientific Secretary of the Agrarian Institute.
Stankevich, Assistant Scientific Secretary of the Communist Academy.
Kubanin, Agricultural Economist.

INTERVIEW WITH LITVINOV AT THE COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DECEMBER 29TH, 1934

The Secretary General discussed with Litvinov the founding of the new Soviet Council of the I. P. R. Litvinov expressed himself as extremely gratified that the Soviet Union was to participate fully in the work of the I. P. R. He had always wished for this, but had not felt until the present time that adequate cooperation on the part of scholars in the Soviet Union was possible because they were all so busy with their other activities. Mr. Carter assured Litvinov that he felt confident that the Soviet Council would contribute fully and valuably to the work of the I. P. R. Mr. Carter also expressed his deep satisfaction with the personnel of the I. P. R. group and the splendid way in which they were undertaking their responsibilities as members of the I. P. R.

Mr. Carter also mentioned the talk he had had with Litvinova with regard to her work in teaching Basic to a class at the Foreign Office, one in the Kremlin, and one in the Red Army. He explained the I. P. R.'s interest in Basic as a method for teaching English in a shorter length of time, as one avenue of attack on the language barriers separating the different member countries. Another method by which the I. P. R. was trying to meet this problem was the intensive three months' course in the Russian language which the I. P. R. in the United States had put on in cooperation with Harvard University in the summer of 1934 and which was to be repeated at Columbia University during the summer of 1935. In this connection, Mr. Carter told Litvinov that Mirsky's name had been mentioned as a possible Instructor for the School, and asked whether there would be any difficulty in his getting permission to go to the United States if the offer was made and he wished to accept. Litvinov explained

* (Committee records indicate name should be spelled Trainin.)

that the granting of passports was in charge of the Commissar for Internal Affairs, but that he did not think there would be any difficulty if Mirsky or any other candidate wished to go.

In addition to these more formal discussion meetings, there were many opportunities for the Secretary General and his party to talk freely and informally with the members of the Soviet Council and others, both with regard to their own work and to conditions in the Soviet Union, and the foreign relations of the U. S. S. R.

The atmosphere of the entire visit was one of the most friendly hospitality and cordial cooperation. It seemed evident that the Soviet Group has determined to cooperate fully with the I. P. R. both in principle and in fact.

* * * * * * *

SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING INSTITUTE OF THE GREAT SOVIET WORLD ATLAS

(Director, Dr. V. E. Motylev)

Dr. Motylev is an economist by training, but has a wide background of experience in other social and physical sciences. He was formerly head of the Soviet Encyclopaedia. He speaks English and German well and has traveled widely in both these countries.

At the request of the Secretary General, Dr. Motylev described the program of the Great Soviet World Atlas, and the methods being used in its preparation. He then took the Secretary General and his staff on a tour of inspection of the Scientific Publishing Institute to see the maps in process of preparation, and also the great collection of other Atlases, ancient and modern which Motylev has collected from every country in the world.

The aim of the Atlas is to give a Marxist-Leninist cartographical picture of the world, i. e. a comprehensive picture of the epoch of imperialism and particularly the period of the general crisis of capitalism. The Atlas will be three times the size of any existing Atlas, containing 150 two-page maps of 43x53 cm, and a like number of one page maps of 23½x43 cm printed on the reverse side of the big maps. The Atlas will be divided into three sections, maps of the world, maps of the U. S. S. R. and maps of foreign countries.

In the work of preparation the Institute has enlisted the help of specialists and scholars from every part of the Soviet Union, and has the right to call on any Scientific institution for aid. Extensive research has gone into questions of scale, projections, colour and design and the proper type for the various denotations.

The special interest of the Atlas lies in the special economic and social maps which supplement the more usual maps on climatic conditions, political divisions, hydrography, soils, etc. A few examples of these special maps will show the difficulties of the task which is being attempted, as well as the great interest which the Atlas will have for all students of economic and social conditions. Thus, the section devoted to maps of the world includes maps of agriculture, of raw materials, of international agrarian relations, of fisheries, mining, power and fuel resources, electrification, metallurgy, chemical and textile industries, trade and goods traffic, the struggle for raw materials, the international financial dependence of the countries of the world, the problems of the Pacific area, etc.

In the section on the U. S. S. R. the chief emphasis is on the contrast in economic and social development of the various regions and republics of the Soviet Union with conditions in Tsarist times. Maps showing agrarian development light and heavy industries, power, fuel and mineral resources, foreign and internal trade, communications, schools, literacy, etc. both for the whole Union and for the separate regions, are contrasted with maps illustrating the same factors under the old regime.

In the section on the principal foreign countries, the political and physical maps are accompanied by maps on agriculture, the general economic organization and resources of the country, industrial resources and development, and also by maps showing revolutionary movements, the position of minorities, spheres of influence of imperialist powers, etc.

The general underlying aim of the Atlas is to present as fully as possible the contrasts between the two great systems of the world, capitalist and communist, in their social, economic and political policies, objectives and achievements.

INTERVIEW WITH MRS. V. N. KLUEVA, FROM THE TECHNIKUM OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

The Technikum provides for the teaching of Russian at Komintern, the Moscow Daily News, the Foreign Workers Publishing House, and for groups at the Technikum itself. None of this teaching is in intensive courses, because all of the students have regular work in addition to their studying.

The method of teaching at the Technikum is called the "synthetic method" (Coblenz method). No text books are used. Each lesson is prepared in connection with the special interests and needs of the group being taught. For instance, the students at the Daily News must learn to talk for reporting while the students at Komintern need a more particularly political and economic vocabulary for reading. Therefore the selection of vocabulary taught to the two groups differs.

The "Synthetic method" is based on the principle that the sentence is the unit of speech and that it is impossible to translate literally, word for word. It is only possible to translate the idea. Therefore in each lesson there is given a "standard." A "standard" is a sentence, such as "*I have a book*" which is the idiomatic way of conveying that idea and which also provides the idiomatic structure of all similar ideas, such as "*he has a pencil.*" Every "standard" must have: 1. a whole idea. 2. a grammatical aspect. 3. the possibility of being used as the form for expressing another, similar idea.

They teach their students to speak and from the use they learn the grammar. The grammar is never taught separately. After the fifth lesson, the students have to give oral reports. They find that with the nominative, genative, and prepositional cases it is possible to speak intelligibly.

Not until the second year do they do any translation, except in short reviews, and then only from Russian into English.

They have started to compile a minimum vocabulary. They already have the sets of words that they find most necessary for the specific groups with whom they are working. They find that the newspapers provide a good political vocabulary and they use the Komsomol Pravda.

They have done some work on slavic roots, but they do not use them as a teaching method.

The Foreign Workers' Publishing House is also doing some research work on teaching. Some of the military schools and possibly the Institute of Vostokvedenie may be giving intensive courses in Russian, but, of course, these wouldn't be for English Speaking students.

INSTITUTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE I. P. R.

Institute of Scientific Publications of the Great Soviet World Atlas. 20, Razin street.
Supreme Board of the Great Northern Sea Passage. (S. S. Joffe) 12, Razin street.
Voks (All-union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) (A. J. Arosev) Bolshaya Gruzinskaya, 17.
All Union Chamber of Commerce (J. D. Janson) Ilyinka, 6.
Foreign Trade Bank (A. S. Svanidze) Neglinnaya, 14.
Institute of Oceanography of the U. S. S. R. (K. A. Mekhanoshin) Krasnoselskaya, 17.
Institute of World Economics and World Politics (G. N. Voitinsky) Volkhonka, 14.
AKO (Kamchatka Company) (Adamovich) Nikolskaya, 6.
Vostokryba (Eastern Fisheries Trust) (J. M. Berkovich) Nikolskaya, 6.

CONFERENCE AT THE AGRARIAN INSTITUTE, DEC. 29, 1934

Volkhonka, 18

D. G. Lurie, Chairman of meeting, Director of the Agrarian Institute, Doctor of Economic Sciences
J. A. Anisimov, Director of the State Farms Institute, Professor
A. A. Karavaev, Assistant Director of the Agrarian Institute, Professor
V. Mulin, Scientific Worker, Specialist of the Agrarian Institute
S. P. Matzkevich, Scientific Secretary of the Agrarian Institute
Stankevich, Assistant Scientific Secretary of the Communist Academy
Kubanin, Professor of Economics of Agriculture

CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSTITUTE OF OCEANOGRAPHY, KRACNOSELSKAYA, 17, DEC. 28, 1934

Prof. Baranov, T. E.
Prof. Chesnokov, M. J., Chairman of meeting (Assistant Director of the Institute)
Prof. Somov, M. P. from Murmansk Branch
Prof. Ilyin, B. S.
Prof. Bogorov, B. G.
Dr. Ambroz, A. J. from Vladivostok Branch
Dr. Iniasevsky, A. N.
Prof. Chugunov, N. L.

CONFERENCE AT VOKS, BOLSHAYA GRUNZINSKAYA, 17

Mr. Kuliabko, Vice President
Mr. Rabbins, Head of the Reception dept.
Mr. Cherniavsky
Miss Linde

INSTITUTE OF SOVIET CONSTRUCTION AND LAW, FRUNZE, 10

Mr. Trainin, Specialist on nationalities

COMBINATE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES, SRETENSKI BOUL., 9

Mrs. V. N. Klueva

Senator FERGUSON. Now will you give the other example.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You asked me how they had made——

Mr. MORRIS. Through the Foreign Office you had people in other countries write books favorable to the Soviet point of view.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. One British and one American. You certainly remember the British labor leaders, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, very reasonable people. They visited the Soviet Union in about 1935 or 1936, and the result of their visit was a two-volume work, Soviet Communism and New Civilization.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, after the Webbs got back to England, having been in Soviet Russia——

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. They wrote a two-volume work on Russia or the Soviet?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Now give us an example of Americans.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I didn't finish it yet.

Senator FERGUSON. Pardon me. Go ahead.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The materials for this book actually were given by the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. Given to the Webbs.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. They had only to remake a little bit for English text, a little bit criticizing, but in its general trend the bulk of the material was prepared for them in the Soviet Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. In the Soviet Foreign Office.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the Soviet Foreign Office, and I participated myself in part of this work.

Senator FERGUSON. So you were really preparing it under the Soviet, giving it to the Webbs so they might write it in English so it could be distributed in English.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Anything more on that book?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. An American example. You know perhaps Professor Hazard of Columbia University. He is an expert on the Soviet

legal system, as you know. Professor Hazard before leaving the Soviet Union, where he spent 2 or 3 years, was given by the Soviet Foreign Office a bunch of papers concerning the Soviet law system and courts, which were later translated by him into English and published here in the United States as his own research work. Actually a lot of that material was presented to him in Moscow and is either Soviet propaganda or nonsense having no relation to the Soviet at all.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Foreign Office was careful to see that the Soviet line, the Communist line, was followed, and they could do that by preparing the information, and the American or the British or the other country's subject would take that and merely translate it and put it into books that would look as if it was the Webbs or the Hazards own material collected as facts, is that correct?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. How large a staff or how large an organization did you have in the Foreign Office to do that kind of work?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It wasn't necessary to have all these people in the Foreign Office itself. It worked this way. For example, we had to write for Hazard concerning the legal system, so we passed the order through the central committee of the party to the Soviet legal experts and they wrote it.

Senator FERGUSON. And they would prepare the material and pass it in to the Foreign Office and you would give it to Hazard?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did the Webbs, of Britain, write on? What subject did the Webbs write on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They described the Soviet way of life, which they found better than the British way of life.

Senator FERGUSON. Where would they find that material? Where would that come from to the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. For example, the chapter concerning the very humanitarian way of Soviet detention camps and jails was written by the Soviet secret police itself.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I received it from the chief of one of the divisions of the NKVD, the Soviet secret police.

Senator FERGUSON. You personally received?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Personally I received from him when he came to my office in the Foreign Office, and then I gave this material to the chief of the western division of the Soviet Foreign Office, the vice chief of the western division, Veinberg, who was attached to the Webbs and who proceeded to translate that material.

Senator WATKINS. Did you read the English books after they were published, and you have compared the information with what was given out?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. When I came here to the west, I found this book and I read it with much interest. I found that the material which I prepared was so well done that the Webbs didn't change it any.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the English people or the American people would take a book like that written by the Webbs, who were at least Socialists at the time, Marxists, and it was in fact prepared by the secret police of Russia.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In that particular part.

Senator FERGUSON. In relation to the jails.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. So, the American people would get the idea that this was a British writing on a subject and, therefore, at least it would be true facts.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That was the idea. Once I read a memorandum written by Molotov in our secret files where the problem was discussed of our participation and utilization of the western press. I have to explain that before 1931 it was a general rule that the Communists should not write in the foreign press. It was a shame. It was a disgrace. But Trotsky was expelled from the Soviet Union and he had written articles against Stalin in the Daily Express, and these articles became very popular because they were written in the British newspaper. This gave the idea to the Soviet authorities that it was wrong to seek only the Communist papers. In the memorandum of Molotov, which evidently laid down the foundation for the new trend of Soviet policy, written in 1931, it was stated [reading]:

> Who reads the Communist papers? Only a few people who are already Communists. We don't need to propagandize them. What is our object? Who do we have to influence? We have to influence non-Communists if we want to make them Communists or if we want to fool them. So, we have to try to infiltrate in the big press, to influence millions of people, and not merely hundreds of thousands.

After this argumentation the position was taken that we had to change drastically our policy, as I said before, and do our best in order to carry out the Communist ideas through non-Communist press.

Senator FERGUSON. The so-called policy or line then was changed in 1931.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. By Molotov's order.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes. It was the Politburo. Molotov made the report, and that completely turned over our policy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that a part of Molotov's program for seeking recognition of the Soviet Union in the Western World?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No. I can't make a connection between these.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any other example of an American coming to Russia and getting material and coming back and its being published?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I do, but——

Senator FERGUSON. You are not rich enough to defend yourself in a libel suit?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have named one American, and I am reluctant to call any more.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you understand, if you are telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth——

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly, sir.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing). Testifying before this committee on question, you cannot be sued for libel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; I don't know that.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the law. With that in mind, now can you honestly state any other authors?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I can.

Senator FERGUSON. Or any other books?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I can.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you do it now?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Frederick Schuman, Soviet Politics Abroad and at Home.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he write on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He wrote a book which, in my opinion, is full of nonsense.

Senator FERGUSON. Outside of its being nonsense, what was it on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was very important nonsense because, if you learned the wrong things about the Soviet Union, your thoughts are also wrong. That was the idea, to sell nonsense to the foreign newspapers.

Senator WATKINS. Can you give us an example?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Give us an example of what was in the book.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. All right. For example, the book by Frederick Schuman stated that the unfriendly attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Western World was not caused by Communist doctrine or any other consideration on the part of the Soviet leaders themselves, but it was caused by western intervention during the civil war. Mr. Schuman lets the American readers of his book believe that it is only because the American, Japanese, French, and English peoples made their so-called intervention on the side of the Russian national against the Communist that the Communist Soviet Union is now reluctant to have good relations with the British. If you compare Schuman's book with the corresponding page of the official History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union you will very easily recognize that they say the same thing. Frederick Schuman got his ideas from the Soviet propaganda.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any others?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I recall Mr. Joseph Davies, the former American Ambassador to Moscow. Mr. Davies was in very good relations to Foreign Commissar Litvinov, in such good relations——

The CHAIRMAN. Joseph Davies?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Davies. [Continuing] In such good relations that some of the instructions which this American Ambassador received from the State Department——

Senator FERGUSON. You mean the American State Department?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. [Continuing] Along confidential lines were simply read by the American Ambassador to Foreign Commissar Litvinov. He received a cable from Washington. He came to the office of Litvinov and he consulted Litvinov on what to do with this cable.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't understand that, Mr. Bogolepov. Will you explain that again?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Foreign Commissar Litvinov told me when I asked him how he happened to know this thing. He asked me directly what to do, and I asked him, "Why do you assume that the Americans will do this?"

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you knew that the Americans were going to react in a certain way on a particular problem?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you remember what problem that was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; that was the problem of intervention in Spain.

Mr. MORRIS. Intervention in Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were speculating with Litvinov as to what the American reaction was going to be on the intervention in Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Litvinov told me, before my going to Spain: "We have to say this-and-this thing." I don't remember all of the details; and, when I asked him "Why do you suppose the Americans would do this thing and not another," he said, "Well, I saw only the day before yesterday the American Ambassador, and he read me the card from Washington, with instructions on this card."

Senator FERGUSON. That was just the reverse of what you have been saying. You said that they gave to the Americans what to write.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. This is a case where you said that it reversed; that Mr. Davies told the Russians what our policy was.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, but I don't know what Litvinov told Davies, and when I read the——

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reverse of what you have been telling us. Do you know anyone else that got the propaganda from the Foreign Office or any Russians to write and did write in American books or in British books or outside books, or outside of Russia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In the same book of Davies I found, for example, his considerations of the trials in Moscow in 1937 and 1938. Now I think about the book Mission in Moscow. There the point of view is represented that this big trial in Moscow should be considered by Americans in a favorable light, because Stalin got rid of the fifth column, and saw the forthcoming disposition against the forthcoming attack. It is not known to me whether Mr. Davies was instructed particularly on this.

Senator FERGUSON. You said "it is not known" to you.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not known to me. But it is known to me. I read myself in the record that this explanation of the program should be implanted in western minds during the year.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know of any actual instructions like you gave on the Schuman book, and the Webb books, and the Hazard book, whether the material was prepared by the Foreign Office and given for writing?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In the case of the Davies book, Mr. Bogolepov, you only know that you have seen a directive on that idea, and the same idea showed up in Davies' book. You don't know, as a matter of fact, that it was the same.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; in this particular case, I don't know. Well, the first sample I can give you was a book of Kahn and Sayers, two American authors.

Senator FERGUSON. Albert Kahn.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it Manuel Sayers? Michael B. Sayers?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. I do not remember the title of this book. It was something about the spies or aggression against the East; something like that.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that book?

Mr. MANDEL. Conspiracy against the Soviet Union, by Michael Sayers and Albert Kahn.

Senator FERGUSON. All right; go ahead.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The largest part of this book which is known to me was written by a certain Veinberg, who was a vice chief of the southwestern division of the Foreign Office in Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. What part of the book?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The largest part of the book.

Senator FERGUSON. The largest part of the book?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. I saw myself the Russian manuscript before it was sent to New York to be there.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was written by a Russian, Veinberg, who was the fourth secretary.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Vice chief of the southwestern division.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the third?

Mr. MORRIS. And you say you saw the manuscript before it was sent to New York?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The Russian manuscript; that is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Before it was sent over here?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you read the book now?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I looked through it.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it the same as the manuscript?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; it was. They rearranged it, perhaps, but the facts and the ideas are the same. That is why I mentioned it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the Foreign Office dealing directly with the writers of that book?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, sir. We have had, as in the case of Institute of Pacific Relations, many cover organizations. For these things, on which I talked to Senator Ferguson, we had a special organization which name is Litag. That is the abbreviation for the name literary agent. This was a nonparty organization, independent organization, as you in the west like to have them. Very solid people were in the head of this organization, a Russian professor, and the Foreign Office used this organization in order to contact the foreign scientists, scholars, to give them materials or even, as in the case of the Webb mentioned books, the full text was sent of them.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you have established here in America and in other countries an agency that Americans can go to and get material in order that they may write books. In other words, we find that Russia's Foreign Office is really ghost writing American books. Do you know what I mean by "ghost writing"?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; not quite.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, having somebody else prepare all of the material and then the writer merely puts it out as his own.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, or even he changes to American taste. But still the ideas and the main facts are given.

Senator FERGUSON. The facts are from Russia. It is the party line, and they just change it enough to make it palatable to the American people. Is that right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How much of that is going on?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can say only about the books which I saw myself.

Senator FERGUSON. The ones you saw yourself.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. But did they have a large office there in which they did this work?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can say, sir, it is a big operation.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a big operation.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. A big operation.

Senator WATKINS. What I would like to ask you about is this: You say they prepared these statements and furnished this information for these men who wanted to write books. What about the information? Was it accurate? Was it an accurate picture of what was going on in Russia? Was it the truth?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; it was propaganda. It was perverted.

Senator WATKINS. Let's take the ones, for instance, on Ambassador Davies, the information he wrote in his book. What about the statements about the courts or those trials, those purges?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was completely untrue. It was a mere propaganda, a full perversion of truth.

Senator WATKINS. You understood what was taking place with respect to these purges? Did you know first-hand about those, about the purges?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, I knew about those.

Senator WATKINS. You know the facts?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, I knew the facts.

Senator WATKINS. And you knew that this information that they gave out was not true?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As I told you, I was myself arrested at that time, and I came through all these proceedings, so I am speaking from my personal experience.

Senator WATKINS. There was one other matter with respect to those conversations between Mr. Davies and was it Litvinov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. You said he read his instructions to him, or was it what was supposed to tell the Russian Foreign Office, or was it the instructions that were given to Mr. Davies personally to govern his conduct?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He received a cable from the State Department on one particular problem, the conditions in Spain, and instead of speaking, as Litvinov said, discussing with him the problems, the whole background here, he simply took from his vest this document and gave it to Litvinov.

Senator WATKINS. Gave the instructions to him as Ambassador?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Rather than the material that he was to give out to the foreign office of the Russian Government.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Perhaps these instructions were to go to Commissar Litvinov and tell him this and that and that, but do not tell him this and that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what was in that table?

Senator EASTLAND. In fact, he showed him the telegrams? The telegram stated what the American policy was toward Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he gave Litvinov that information?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Litivinov, then, was able to advise you how this country would react?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Because he had seen the American Government's secret instructions to its Ambassador to Moscow; is that true?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Were the instructions secret?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I haven't seen myself the instructions, so I can't say that.

Senator EASTLAND. What Americans connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations did you meet in Moscow?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Just one.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mr. Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. Mr. Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Senator EASTLAND. Where did you meet him?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I met him just once in Moscow, in Volkhonka 14, in the spring or in the winter, I guess, of 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the headquarters of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Institute of World Economics and Politics.

Mr. MORRIS. But the Institute of Pacific Relations was in the same building.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time.

Mr. MORRIS. What were you doing in that building at the time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. As I told you, besides my work for the foreign office, I was also a member of the institute, a research worker, and I used to work two or three times a week in the library of this institute. In this library, by the way, worked also Mrs. Freda Utley, which name I remember having seen during your investigations. And when I was working in this library one of these mornings, a group of people entered the room, the library, headed by Eugene Varga, who was director of the institute.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you spell that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Varga, V-a-r-g-a. Eugene Varga. There were in this group of people some of them which were known to me and some which were unknown to me. Among the people known to me, I remember Mr. Abramson, Mr. Kantorovich, and Mr. Kara-Murza.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me ask you to pause there. Varga was a Comintern man?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Varga was a member of the executive committee of the Comintern, the highest body.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Kara-Murza?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Kara-Murza was intelligence officer in charge of Mongolian relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Abramson?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Abramson, as I told you, was a member of the Pacific group of this institute, and at the same time also intelligence officer.

Mr. MORRIS. And then you say among them was Owen Lattimore?

The CHAIRMAN. He has not said that yet.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Was two or more foreigners, and among them was Mr. Lattimore. And when they entered the room and while talking, they moved towards me, and I was sitting not far from my big map of central Asia, covering Sinkiang, Mongolia, and a part of Man-

churia. Mr. Kara-Murza just returned from a big trip to Mongolia on some other mission.

Mr. MORRIS. Kara-Murza returned from Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. So the talk started between these people, who went into the room, concerning the Mongolian relations.

Senator WATKINS. Was it in English?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was partly in English, partly in Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that, partly in English, partly in Russian?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean it was in translation. My own English at that time was particularly bad, so I couldn't present myself what the American guests were speaking. But I do understand what kind of answers they were giving in Russian, which were later translated into English. I didn't participate myself in the conversation, for as I have told you I have no connection with the affairs of this Institute of Pacific Relations. I was just witness there, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you meet Mr. Lattimore there at that time? Were you introduced to him, or did you meet him?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Mr. Varga said that is Mr. So, and that is Mr. So, and this way. But I didn't speak neither to him nor to any other of the group. My memory retains two topics of conversation: One was discussion of the route through Mongolia from Manchuria, or to Manchuria, I do not remember whether it was discussing the way from the east to the west or vice versa. And while discussing this problem, Kara-Murza, who I mentioned before, observed that showing on this map, this route, saying that "this way is the best one for we are using it always in our relations with the Soviet parts of China."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Kara-Marza pointed out the route to the foreign visitors that they were using to deal with Soviet China.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a secret fact?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly it was not revealed anywhere.

Mr. MORRIS. That was not well known, what route they were using at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; to nobody it was never published. The nature of our relations with the Soviet region of China were never discussed in the press or anywhere. So I little bit wondered when I heard such observations in the presence of foreign visitors. Then Kara-Murza got explanations of how the sovietization of Mongolia is progressing, and he described how they are purging the Mongolian population from the parasitic class of clergymen.

Mr. MORRIS. They are purging the parasitic class of clergymen from the Monogolian people?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Explaining that our policy there is to get Mongolian people, get them from the feudal state to the communism, passing away this state of capitalism.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Kara-Murza's explanation to the foreign guests?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Lattimore, you say, was present at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He was present.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he engaging in the conversation?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; they talked. But I give you only the summary of the conversation which I remembered, because I couldn't

follow each word. By the way, I was not standing by. I was a little apart, two or three desks further. After the society left the room, I asked Kara-Murza to remain with me, and who were these people, Comintern people or not, bearing in mind that he told a little bit more than is advisable to tell to the foreign visitors. He said that "No, they are not Comintern, not Comintern people, not quite Comintern people, but that is quite all right with him."

Senator EASTLAND. Not quite Comintern, but it is all right?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I have nothing to say.

Senator FERGUSON. You asked the question?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I only registered the fact and, to say the truth, I had forgotten this fact, because I saw so many people coming to Moscow and getting information, and giving information, that to me it was not a very unusual factor to see.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you had forgotten the fact. For how long had you forgotten that fact?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. How long? It was in 1936. So perhaps 8 months or 9 months in 1937—7 or 8 months, I don't remember—I was reporting on the station of the collegium of the Foreign Office. Collegium, that is the meeting of the Foreign Commissar and his other commissars, five people in all. This Board of Commissars is convened twice a week.

Senator FERGUSON. You were personally reporting to them?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was personally reporting, yes, as every chief of the service is reporting the matter of his interest to this Board of Commissars.

Mr. MORRIS. And this, you say, is approximately, to the best of your recollection, 8 months after you had met Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was in the winter or early spring of 1937. Because in 1937 I left already for military service for Spain.

Mr. MORRIS. So it was sometime before you left.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes. The problem was, which I have to report, of getting the so-called popular Republic of Mongolia into the League of Nations. The Soviet Union was very eager to get one voice more in the League of Nations. Mongolia was, just before the Second World War, just one satellite country of the Soviet Union. In the west there was a strong feeling that Mongolia is not an independent country, not a country at all. And when I reported the information which I received from our delegates to Geneva, then I asked in the meantime, by preparing my own report, the opinion of our Ambassadors in the United States, in Paris, and in London. And, summarizing all these unfavorable reports about the prospective of getting Mongolia as a member of the League of Nations, Litvinov said, "Well, the situation is still not ripe. We have to prepare the terrain."

Mr. MORRIS. Prepare the terrain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; prepare the terrain for the action.

Senator EASTLAND. You mean you had to prepare public sentiment.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. That is what I would like to say. "It is necessary," said Litvinov, "to mobilize the writers and journalists and other people, to describe for the Western World the progress which is achieved in Mongolian Popular Republic, to say how life is progressing," and so on and so on. This was the first decision which

was taken after my report. The second part of decision, the second point, was considering who will make this in different countries, whom we have to charge with this—how do you say, sir?

Senator EASTLAND. You mean the man who will be placed in charge of mobilizing public sentiment in the west?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, whom we have to ask to do the job.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that man who was decided upon?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Litvinov asked the officer of Mongolian desk of the Foreign Office, who was present——

Mr. MORRIS. What was his name?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Parnoch, P-a-r-n-o-c-h—whom he would recommend, and before Parnoch could give his answer he asked "Lattimore, perhaps?"

Senator EASTLAND. Litvinov said "Lattimore"?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. "Lattimore, perhaps"? yes. And Parnoch answered, "Yes, we will try to do that."

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a formal decision made by that body?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. There was a formal decision which was obliging for the corresponding bodies of the Soviet foreign group to take measures in order to fulfill the decision.

Senator FERGUSON. After that, do you know whether Lattimore did write anything in relation to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, sir; because as I told you, in the spring of 1937 I was sent to Spain, and for more than a year I lost any contact with the Foreign Office.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask the research director now as to whether or not he knows of anything written by Mr. Lattimore after that time on Mongolia.

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Lattimore has written several books on Mongolia.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. MANDEL. We can give you the exact title and date.

Senator FERGUSON. I want you to put that in the record.

Senator EASTLAND. I do not want to lead you too far off, but this is something for my information. About how many soldiers did the Soviet Union send to Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They didn't send soldiers. They sent only generals, officers, and surgeons. As you see now, in Korea, the Soviet Union never fights with his own soldiers in foreign countries. He has always enough——

Senator EASTLAND. Sent officers to train the Spanish Army.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. To train and direct them.

Senator FERGUSON. How many officers and agents did they send to Spain, if you know?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I was in headquarters of the so-called Segrae-Ebro front, in Barcelona.

Senator FERGUSON. You were there yourself?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was there myself; yes. And I was one of a body of approximately 2,000 Soviet officers.

Senator FERGUSON. Were they general officers? What was your rank?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I was colonel.

Senator FERGUSON. You were a colonel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How low in rank and how high did they go, these 2,000?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. From sergeant in the tank corps or our fliers, up to the marshals. We had two marshals.

Senator FERGUSON. You had two marshals?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Senator EASTLAND. That 2,000 was on one front?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, in Barcelona only. The bulk of our instructors were on the Madrid front.

Senator FERGUSON. About how many were there?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Thousands?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Thousands.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know a man named Gustavo Duran in Spain?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Duran?

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know a Durano?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, at this point, Senator Smith has called a meeting of the subcommittee of the alien property investigation. He wants a short meeting. I suggest that we cannot finish with this witness this afternoon, and tomorrow we have another witness, a very important witness. But I think at the conclusion of that testimony we can conclude with this witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the other witness is due at 11. Suppose I try to get in touch with him and ask him if he can be here at 10. Perhaps he can finish in the morning and then we can have this witness in the afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that very much because it is very important to conclude both of these witnesses tomorrow. I might say now, that the witness tomorrow will be Mr. William Bullitt, former Ambassador to Russia.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in the Foreign Office when he was there?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, sir. I remember him in Moscow.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection we will now recess. I think both the Senator from Mississippi and the Senator from Michigan are on that subcommittee.

Senator EASTLAND. No, sir; I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not? Well, the Senator from Michigan is. I think we will have to go to Senator Smith's office.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m. Tuesday, April 8, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bullitt has been sworn in executive session. Inasmuch as a different chairman presided at the session I thought perhaps you might like to swear him again in open session.

The CHAIRMAN. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BULLITT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM C. BULLITT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, will you give your name and residence to the reporter, please?

Mr. BULLITT. William Christian Bullitt, 2447 Kalorama Road NW., Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BULLITT. At the present time I write articles, on foreign affairs usually, of one kind or another.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, will you relate your diplomatic experience to this committee, please?

Mr. BULLITT. I think I might begin toward the end of it, otherwise it will be a long document. I was Ambassador to the Soviet Union from the autumn of 1933 until I was appointed Ambassador to France in the summer of 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. You then were the first United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union?

Mr. BULLITT. I was.

I then was Ambassador to France from 1936 to the autumn of 1940. In 1941 I was personal representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador for all countries. Those are the only strictly diplomatic jobs that I have held since 1933.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, yesterday we had testimony from a former official of the Soviet Foreign Office about the connection between Mr. Owen Lattimore and the Soviet Foreign Office. This committee would like to know from you whether, while you were Ambassador to the Soviet Union, you had ever encountered Owen Lattimore.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. In the end of March 1936 I received a note from Mr. Carter, who was the secretary-general, I believe, of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was written from a Moscow hotel, and it said that Mr. Owen Lattimore was arriving.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me, Mr. Bullitt. May I interrupt at this point? Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a carbon copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 28, 1936, addressed to the American Ambassador, Moscow, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, you mean this is a photostat of a document which was in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that document was a carbon copy of a letter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, I will ask you if you will look at that letter and tell us whether or not that was the letter that you received from Mr. Carter.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes; that, I believe, is a photostat of the letter that was sent me by Mr. Edward C. Carter with regard to Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. MORRIS. You were testifying on this point, Mr. Bullitt. Will you proceed?

Mr. BULLITT. I received this letter and I told one of the secretaries in the Embassy that I would see Mr. Lattimore after he arrived in Moscow. I also told him to invite Mr. Carter and Mr. Lattimore and the other members of their delegation—I think it can be called a delegation—there were a number of women, if my memory is correct, as well as men—to an Embassy meal at some time, and they did so. In the early days of April Mr. Lattimore asked for a definite appointment, and I received him. He told me that he was there for this meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations with, I believe, the Soviet section of the institute, and that he wanted to meet the men in charge of Far Eastern Affairs for the Soviet Foreign Office, especially Stomonyakov and Karakhan.

Mr. Morris. Will you spell the names?

Mr. BULLITT. S-t-o-m-o-n-y-a-k-o-v, Stomonyakov; and Karakhan, K-a-r-a-k-h-a-n.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what positions they had in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BULLITT. Stomonyakov was Assistant Commissar in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs, and Karakhan had been for many, many years Assistant Commissar. Indeed when I was sent in to negotiate with the Soviet Government, sent in by the American Government in 1919, he was already an Assistant Commissar. Whether at that particular moment his title was Assistant Commissar I cannot say actually, but he was a man that I knew very well.

I told Mr. Lattimore that I would ask one of the secretaries of the Embassy to attempt to arrange such an appointment or appointments for him.

Mr. Lattimore then began to give me a long description of the situation in the Far East as he saw it. Finally, he said, "I have"—I should rather not make this a direct quotation, but indirect. He finally said that——

Mr. MORRIS. This is Lattimore talking?

Mr. BULLITT. This is Lattimore talking. He finally said that he had one very important matter that he wanted to take up with me, that a most inspiring thing had happened, that the Mongols had at last achieved full independence and he hoped they were once more going to start on the road to being a great nation as they had been many years in the past. He said that in his opinion the so-called People's Republic of Outer Mongolia was fully independent. I asked him if there was no Soviet control of the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia or rather they call it the Mongolian People's Republic. It is in Outer Mongolia, not Inner Mongolia. And he replied that there was no Soviet control whatsoever. I asked him if the Red Army had no control there, and he said no. I asked him if the GPU which at that time was the title of the Soviet secret police, had no control there, and he said they did not, that the Mongolian People's Republic was independent, and that his advice, which he urged me to telegraph at once to President Roosevelt, was that the American Government should immediately recognize the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.

This to me was a very extraordinary statement, and I therefore questioned him further on it, and he reiterated what he had said and reiterated his advice that the United States should recognize at once the Mongolian People's Republic.

I have said it was an extraordinary statement for several reasons. In the first place, Outer Mongolia, which was ruled at the moment by the so-called Mongolian People's Republic, was under Chinese sovereignty. It was a part of China.

Mr. MORRIS. That is formally speaking.

Mr. BULLITT. Formally. In 1921 the Communists had set up a Communist republic there, as much Communist as anything can be in a country largely inhabited by nomads. Then there had been a series of wars back and forth until 1924, when the Communists got pretty well on top. However, in 1924 the Soviet Government in a note which was signed I believe by Chicherin, recognized the Mongolian People's Republic as a part of the Republic of China, but stated in that note that it enjoyed autonomy. It did enjoy a certain amount of freedom as nomads do, and in the autumn of 1934, if my memory is correct, the Soviet Government got a bit disturbed, and I received information that Karakhan, one of the gentlemen referred to before, had been sent out to Outer Mongolia, the People's Republic, so-called, to finish off any signs of restiveness under Soviet control. When he returned from that trip he came to the Embassy——

Mr. MORRIS. Did he return in 1934?

Mr. BULLITT. He returned toward the end, I believe. Actually on November 27, 1934, there was made a gentlemen's agreement for mutual assistance. In other words, this was a——

Senator FERGUSON. Between what countries?

Mr. BULLITT. Between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. This was kept quiet for a time. Karakhan returned, if my memory is correct, after the signature of that agreement. He came

to the Embassy one day, and I said to him—I don't mind testifying about Karakhan because he has since been shot and therefore no harm can come to him from the testimony that I am to give.

Senator FERGUSON. Who shot him?

Mr. BULLITT. By the Soviet Government.

Senator FERGUSON. He was liquidated?

Mr. BULLITT. He was liquidated.

I said to him that I heard he had been out there to finish off the People's Republic of Outer Mongolia or rather any signs of independence in it, and he said indeed he had, but it was a very small affair——

Senator FERGUSON. You were telling Lattimore this?

Mr. BULLITT. No; I never said a word to Lattimore about any of this. I am explaining to you why the statement that he made to me was so extraordinary. He said that he had indeed been sent out to finish it off, but he had only been sent out at the last minute, that the Soviet Government first completely infiltrated the Outer Mongolian Army and police force with GPU agents and that when everything was prepared to liquidate the Mongols that the Soviet Government did not like there, that he had been sent out simply to oversee the operation, that he had gone out, and then he explained, "After all, in a country of nomads there are only 300 or 400 people that count, and all I did on a given night was to have about 400 people seized by the GPU agents in the army and police force, and I had them shot before dawn and installed the people that the Soviet Government wished to have installed and Outer Mongolia is now completed ruled by the GPU"; that is to say, the Soviet secret police.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the substance of whose statement to you?

Mr. BULLITT. Karakhan's.

Senator WATKINS. What position did he occupy in the Soviet Government?

Mr. BULLITT. At that time he was Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Senator WATKINS. Do you not think that rather strange, that he would take you into his confidence and tell you what he had done out there?

Mr. BULLITT. I had known Karakhan since 1919, and he was in the habit of talking to me with great frankness. Karakhan had been No. 3 in the Soviet Foreign Office when I was sent in there by the American Government to attempt to negotiate a treaty ending the 21 wars then in progress on the territory of the former Czarist empire. The Soviet Foreign Office at that time consisted of Chicherin No. 1, Litvinov No. 2, and Karakhan No. 3. I had known him since that time and he was a fellow who was in the habit of talking to me with a great deal of frankness.

Senator WATKINS. I wondered about the explanation because ordinarily the Soviet officials wouldn't talk to you with that degree of frankness, would they?

Mr. BULLITT. A great many of them talked to me with considerable frankness. Karakhan at the particular time he was talking to me was at daggers drawn with Litvinov. Litvinov wanted him liquidated and he wanted Litvinov liquidated. After all, even human beings who are engaged in doing nefarious things have their personal emotions, as you see when we get a gang war. They are apt quite often to talk quite frankly. At least they were at that time.

Senator WATKINS. I felt that that situation required an explanation. That is the reason I asked you those questions.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

All this preceded Mr. Lattimore's visit to Moscow. On the 12th of March 1936 about a month before Lattimore arrived in Moscow, the Soviet Government and the Mongolian People's Republic Government, controlled by the GPU, signed a protocol of mutual assistance at Ulan Bator, which is the capital of the so-called Mongolian People's Republic. This was not revealed at the moment, but on March 27, before Mr. Lattimore's arrival in Moscow, there was a news dispatch from Ulan Bator saying that this protocol had been approved by the Little Khiral, which is the legislative institution set up there. On the 2d of April 1936, this protocol was officially communicated to the Chinese Government. On the 7th of April the Chinese Government made the strongest kind of a protest against this infringement of the sovereignty of China. On the 8th of April the Soviet Government through Litvinov replied, "Neither the fact nor the signing of the protocol nor its separate articles violate in the slightest degree the sovereignty of China," et cetera.

Mr. Lattimore therefore at the time when the Soviet Government did not yet dare to come out and say that Outer Mongolia was no longer under Chinese sovereignty, was advocating to me that I should persuade the President of the United States to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and the cessation of Chinese sovereignty.

I was obliged to conclude that either Mr. Lattimore knew nothing about the subject on which he was supposed to be the leading American expert or that he was deliberately attempting to assist in the spread of Communist authority through Asia.

I left the matter at that, with a question mark in my mind. I had seen him only once. I did not know what sort of man he was.

Senator WATKINS. Of course you did not follow his advice.

Mr. BULLITT. Certainly not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he explain to you his negotiations with the Russians in relation to IPR and getting articles from IPR?

Mr. BULLITT. No.

Senator FERGUSON. He didn't talk over the details of the IPR?

Mr. BULLITT. No; not with me.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. He talked over with you this recognition, is that correct?

Mr. BULLITT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. There was a witness yesterday who testified that Russia's aim, the Communist line at that time, was to try and show independence of Outer Mongolia, as an indication——

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In order that it might become a member of the League of Nations.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore would give to Russia through a satellite another vote.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think now, from that testimony and Mr. Lattimore's name being mentioned in relation to the idea of proving to the western world that Outer Mongolia was an independent nation, that that had anything to do with the conversation he had with you about its independence and the recognition by America?

Mr. BULLITT. It was entirely obvious that if we should recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, since the Soviet Government was in complete control of Outer Mongolia, it would give the Soviet Government another vote in the League of Nations.

Senator FERGUSON. If Mongolia became a part of the League of Nations.

Mr. BULLITT. If it became a part of the League of Nations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this letter be introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted into the record.

(The letter was marked "Exhibit No. 750" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 750

HOTEL METROPOLE,
March 28, 1936.

The AMERICAN AMBASSADOR,
Moscow.

DEAR BULLITT: To meet my colleague Owen Lattimore, who arrives via the Trans-Siberian from the Far East, I have just arrived in Moscow, and shall be here for at least the next ten days. Since I saw you last I have been again in China and Japan, also British India, Australia, and New Zealand. Lattimore comes fresh from North China and yet another trip into Mongolia.

You are so alive to the relation of the Far Eastern developments to the international situation in general, that I know you will want to get from Lattimore his fundamental analysis of land versus sea power in the whole of eastern Asia. I, too, am eager to see you and talk with you regarding Soviet-American relations, and more particularly facilitating full Soviet participation at the conference of the Institute in Yosemite Park next August. This I want to do fairly soon.

I ought to report to you that Lattimore is accompanied by Mrs. Lattimore and Miss Dolly Tyler, who has been doing in China much the same work on Basic English that Litwinowa has been doing in the U.S.S.R. With me are Miss Harriet Moore, whom you will remember as one of the I.P.R. experts on the Russian Language, and Miss Faith Donaldson, my private secretary.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you encounter Mr. Lattimore again, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. As far as I am aware I have seen him only once more, except that I am under the impression that he was at dinner, at that dinner which, as I told you, I told the secretary to arrange for the whole outfit from the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in Moscow in 1936?

Mr. BULLITT. In Moscow in 1936, but so far as I can remember I had no conversation with him on that occasion. I talked mostly with Mr. Carter.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us as to whether or not Mr. Carter or any other member of the delegation explained to you what IPR was trying to do through Russia?

Mr. BULLITT. No, Senator, but it is perfectly possible that they explained to one or another of the secretaries of the Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. But not to you personally?

Mr. BULLITT. Not to me personally.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I should like, if the Chair will permit, to read two or three pages of the testimony of a previous witness before this committee and ask this witness to comment thereon.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question on the matter we have just been discussing? It would be part of your job to find out just what this delegation from Mr. Carter and Mr. Lattimore were doing there, would it not?

Mr. BULLITT. The business of the delegation which arrived there, supposedly at that time and so regarded, was as a scientific organization, organized for the purpose of gathering facts. There was a great deal of business to be done in Moscow at that moment, and I have no doubt that either Mr. Loy Henderson, who was acting as First Secretary at the time, or Angus Ward, who was another First Secretary, or some other one of the Secretaries followed this up and made a report on it, which is perhaps in the Department of State files. But that sort of thing was not followed up by me personally ever.

Senator WATKINS. What I meant was at least the officials of the Embassy would find out what they were doing there and what they were attempting to do.

Mr. BULLITT. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. Because it might involve the United States——

Mr. BUILLIT. That is right.

Senator WATKINS. And its citizens in some difficulties.

Mr. BULLITT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, might I request that you advise counsel to see whether or not we are able to get a report from our Embassy in Moscow in 1936 in relation to the delegation that was there and what they were doing?

Mr. MORRIS. That is, the report that Mr. Bullitt mentioned that may have been made to Mr. Loy Henderson or Angus Ward.

Senator FERGUSON. Or somebody else.

The CHAIRMAN. Any memorandum or report bearing on this subject. That will be the order to the staff.

Senator WATKINS. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sourwine wanted to read from the record already made. From whose testimony did you wish to read?

Mr. SOURWINE. The testimony of Mr. Owen Lattimore, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. To avoid reading out of context I will read everything from the point where I begin.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Page 3634 of part 10 [reading]:

Question. Mr. Lattimore, do you recall having testified here with regard to whether you ever suggested in any of your writings that Soviet Russia might be reaching out for Mongolia or might be planning to take over Mongolia?

Answer. No, I don't recall that.

Question. Do you recall whether you ever did suggest?

Answer. No, not offhand.

Question. Did you ever take the opposite tack, that Mongolia was independent, and that there was no threat of Soviet domination?

Answer. I think I have frequently written that Outer Mongolia is an independent state in the sense of never having been incorporated in Russia; but I have also qualified that by describing it as a satellite state.

Question. You think now it is a satellite state?

Answer. Very much so.

Question. How long have you held that opinion?

Answer. That would be hard to say. I think it would be hard to say particularly, because the expression "satellite" is a postwar expression.

Question. When would you say you first expressed the opinion that Outer Mongolia was a satellite state, if you did ever express it

Answer. Probably about 1945.

Question. Now, prior to that time, did you take the view or hold to the view that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian influence?

Answer. Not free of Russian influence. I think in the terminology of that time, before people were using the word "satellite" I would have referred to it more as a Russian protectorate or a state under Russian protection, or something of that kind.

Question. Let me rephrase the question, or perhaps I should ask a different question.

Did you ever take the position or argue that Outer Mongolia was an independent state free of Russian domination?

Answer. Yes, I think I did, before the war, describe it as free of domination.

Question. You have changed your view since then?

Answer. I think the situation has changed since then.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Have you changed your view?

Answer. I have changed my view, in line with what I consider to be a changing situation.

Question. When do you think the situation changed? Can you give an approximate date?

Answer. No. I should say some time after the war, if I had been able to get to Outer Mongolia, I might have a more sharp opinion on that, but it is very difficult to determine from outside.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: When do you think the situation changed? If you do not know, you can say so.

Answer. I don't know. Some time after the war.

Question. When did you first reach the conclusion that Outer Mongolia was an independent state and free of Russian domination? Do you know?

Answer. Some time in the 1930's.

Question. Do you know when you first argued that or first expressed that view publicly?

Answer. No.

Question. Can you tell us now when, in fact, Outer Mongolia did become an independent state and free of Russian domination?

Answer. Well, I would say that—I forget the exact year; 1920 or 1921 or somewhere along in there, the Mongols who had previously declared their independence of China came into close relations with Communist Russia, and certainly the Russian influence from that time on was very strong. But my impression was that it was primarily at the request of the Mongols themselves.

Question. You say the Russian influence was very strong from about 1920 or 1921 on?

Answer. That is right.

Question. Now, if I understood you correctly, you said a moment ago that the situation changed after the war. What war did you mean? The First World War?

Answer. No; the Second World War.

Question. How did it change? Did the Russian domination become stronger after the First World War?

Answer. No. I would roughly characterize the 1920's and 1930's as a period when the close relations between Russia and Outer Mongolia could hardly be described as Russian domination, because it was largely or chiefly at the instance of the Mongol Government itself.

Question. There was, however, during that time a large measure of Russian influence. Is that your testimony?

Answer. Surely.

Question. And you recognized that at the time?

Answer. Oh, surely.

Question. And you never argued to the contrary; is that your testimony?

Answer. I don't believe so.

Would you comment on that, sir?

Mr. BULLITT. It is a very long statement to comment on offhand. I can only say that when Mr. Lattimore talked to me he certainly attempted to produce in my mind the impression that there was no Soviet Russian influence in Outer Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that was in 1936?

Mr. BULLITT. That was in April of 1936.

The CHAIRMAN. Just so we may get the date straight with reference to the time that you had the talk with the emissary from the Soviet who was sent in to——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Karakhan?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karakhan. When was it that you had the meeting with Lattimore, the conversation?

Mr. BULLITT. The meeting with Karakhan took place more than a year before my conversation with Lattimore, to the best of my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. So, at the time of your conversation with Lattimore you had in mind or had a right to have in mind the statements that had been made to you by Karakhan?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, you started to relate to us other experiences during which you met Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. BULLITT. I have seen Mr. Lattimore so far as I know only once more in my life, and that was when he and I were invited to take opposite sides of debate by the Town Meeting of the Air.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. BULLITT. I have here the volume that the Town Meeting of the Air people publish here, and I can give you the exact date. That was January 6, 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened at that time, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Lattimore and I obviously were having a debate, but we also had an argument on a given point inside the debate. Mr. Lattimore stated—I am quoting from the record here—"on the contrary, it has become clearer and clearer that the Communists"—these were the Chinese Communists—"rely mainly upon American equipment surrendered by disgusted, war-weary Government troops."

When it came my turn to speak again I said:

> I should like to ask Mr. Lattimore a question. He states in his address that the Communists rely mainly on American equipment surrendered by disgusted, war-weary Government troops. I spent a very considerable period in China and Manchuria this summer, and I would like to ask Mr. Lattimore if he doesn't know that it is true that there were no Chinese Communists in Manchuria on VJ-day, that the 250,000 were brought into Manchuria and armed by the Russians with the excellent equipment of the Japanese Army.

I don't think you will be interested, perhaps, in the whole of this. If you want the whole text I will be very glad to read it. If I may just be allowed to give you excerpts, you might have it printed later.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Lattimore, I thought, dodged the answer to this question in the subsequent reply, so I said again, quoting from myself:

> Again my question has been evaded. I don't want to take up the entire time this evening on that subject, but I should like to ask this: The Chinese Communists moved into Manchuria. They were there equipped with Japanese equipment. The equipment they have today is Japanese equipment. They got that equipment from the Soviet Government. Is that true or not, Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. Lattimore replied: "I don't know. I wasn't there."

Whereupon, I commented:

> You don't know, you weren't there, but everybody who was there knows and the American Government knows and the American Army knows and you should know. You are the head of a school on international relations. You have no right to evade it.

From this extraordinary statement of Lattimore's, the first statement that I read, "that the Communists rely mainly on American equipment surrendered by disgusted, war-weary Government troops,"

from the fact that Mr. Lattimore made this statement over the air to a Nation-wide audience, when everyone who took the trouble to read the columns of the New York Times or any other newspaper which prints foreign news knew that the equipment of the Chinese Communists in Manchuria was the equipment which had been surrendered to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Army—this led me to conclude that either Mr. Lattimore was once more behaving either as a man who was interested in promoting the conquest of the Far East by the Communists or, as I said before, that he was simply a charlatan who knew nothing about the subjects on which he took positions and that he had no business to be at the head of a school on international relations of a distinguished university.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, one of the trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations was Mr. Alger Hiss. In your diplomatic experience did you ever hear any suspicion voiced about Alger Hiss, or something stronger than suspicion?

Mr. BULLITT. Once.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. In the autumn of 1939 the French Prime Minister said to me——

The CHAIRMAN. Where was this?

Mr. BULLITT. In the autumn of 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. Where.

Mr. BULLITT. In Paris. I was American Ambassador to Paris, and this specifically was in the office of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister said to me that he thought I would be interested to know that the French Intelligence Service had given him a report that there were two officials in the Department of State who were Soviet agents. I replied that I would be very much interested indeed and that I would like to know their names. He then looked at a memorandum that he had there, and he said, "They are two brothers named Hiss." When he said this I, in my ignorance, laughed. I said to him that I had never heard of any official of the Department of State named Hiss, I didn't think there was any official of the Department of State named Hiss, and that furthermore Hiss wasn't even a name. It was a noise made by a snake and that I thought he had better ask his Intelligence Service to get better information.

Mr. MORRIS. This was in the summer of 1939?

Mr. BULLITT. This was in the autumn of 1939. It was after the war was on and was approximately October–November.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you convey that information imparted to you by Premier Daladier to any one in the United States Department of State?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I did. I was firmly convinced in my own mind, very foolishly, that there was nobody named Hiss in the Department of State, but I was having a very serious conversation one day with Dr. Hornbeck——

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was this, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. This was in 1940 about the end of February or the first days of March, if my memory is correct. It was a few months after the conversation with the French Prime Minister. I did a great deal of business in Paris with the French Government on the Far East. We attempted to keep the French Government working with us very closely on all far eastern questions. Dr. Hornbeck, who had been a friend of mine for a great many years, we had worked to-

gether since 1918, used to discuss with me what should be our policy in the Far East. We were having such a discussion, a very serious one, when the door behind me suddenly opened and I turned around, and there was a nice looking young man who said something to Hornbeck. Hornbeck made a reply, and this fellow said something else, Hornbeck made another reply, and then he walked out of the room. I didn't think that anybody ought to walk in on the kind of conversation we were having, so I said to Dr. Hornbeck, "Who was that?" He said, "That is Alger Hiss." I said, "What? Is there a man named Hiss here in the Department of State?"

He said "Yes." I said, "What does he do?" He said, "He is my chief assistant."

I then said to him, "Has he a brother?" He said, "Yes, he has." I said, "Does he work in the Department of State?" and he said, "Yes, he does."

I then repeated to Dr. Hornbeck exactly what the French Prime Minister had said to me, and I advised him to have an immediate investigation made of the reliability of his chief assistant, Mr. Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he tell you what Donald Hiss was doing in the State Department?

Mr. BULLITT. No; I don't know that he knew. I don't recall that at all. I may say that nothing that I know reflects on Donald Hiss in any way, aside from that original statement made by the French Prime Minister.

I left Washington at that time. A few days later I returned to my post in Paris where I was Ambassador. That is all I know about Hiss.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did this conversation take place with Hornbeck?

Mr. BULLITT. Dr. Hornbeck?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BULLITT. In his office in the Department of State. He was at the time Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in Washington?

Mr. BULLITT. His office was on the third floor of the old State Department Building, overlooking the White House, about the middle of the corridor.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, are you acquainted with the operation of the United States Embassy in Nanking in the post World War II period? Were you there at any time?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. I was in Nanking in 1947 for a considerable period, and I was in Nanking in 1948 on two separate distinct trips, one in the spring and one in the autumn.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us anything about the operation of the Embassy at that time as to who operated it and who were in control?

Mr. BULLITT. Could you be more specific? I would be glad to answer any question.

Mr. MORRIS. Did we have an Ambassador in Nanking at that time, Mr. Bullitt?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. Dr. Leighton Stuart was our Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Solomon Adler have a prominent position in the Embassy at that time?

Mr. BULLITT. Solomon Adler was, if my memory is correct, financial attaché, and a very intelligent and clever fellow.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Raymond Ludden?

Mr. BULLITT. Raymond Ludden, in 1947 when I arrived, was the ranking diplomatic officer in the chancery. His title, I believe, was first secretary, but there was at that time no counselor of embassy present, and he was therefore the ranking diplomatic officer.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Leighton Stuart exercising his functions of Ambassador at that time?

Mr. BULLITT. Oh, yes. He, however, was not in the habit of going down to the chancery, but of doing his work in his residence, and, as he had a Chinese constantly with him in the residence, the chancery was not in the habit of sending up to him telegrams of a highly secret nature.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, on page 215 of George Bundy's book, The Pattern of Responsibility, the statement is made that you submitted a memorandum to the October 1949 round table conference.

Mr. Chairman, we have had considerable testimony in the past on the make-up of the individuals attending the October 1949 conference. Twenty-some people have been identified in varying degrees with the Institute of Pacific Relations. This book reports a fact that doesn't seem to square with the testimony about that particular episode. It says here, "Among those submitting memoranda were such men as Joseph W. Ballentine, William Bullitt, Joseph C. Grew, Roger Lapham, and Admiral Yarnell."

Mr. Bullitt, did you submit a memorandum at that time to the Department of State?

Mr. BULLITT. I received a letter written to me August 18, 1949, by Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large. This is the letter [indicating]. I don't think it is worth while to read the whole thing. Perhaps it is:

EXHIBIT No. 751

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, August 18, 1949.

DEAR MR. BULLITT: As you doubtless know, the Secretary of State has requested Mr. Raymond Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case, and myself, in conjunction with the officers of the State Department concerned with far eastern affairs, to review United States policy toward the Far East as it is affected by current developments there. In making this survey we are seeking, insofar as time permits, the views and guidance of those Americans who have either had extensive personal experience in the Far East or have made the area or some part of it the field of their special study.

We should very much appreciate it if you could find time to draw up and send to us at the earliest possible date a summary of your views as to the objectives which United States policy should pursue and the methods which it should employ at this time either in the Far East as a whole or in that part of it with which you have been particularly concerned. A contribution from you will be most helpful and will assist us materially in providing for our survey the broadest possible base of expert knowledge and advice.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Ambassador at Large.

To that I made—do you wish that?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I think, Mr. Chairman, we would like to have that in our record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibits Nos. 751 and 752" and were read in full.)

Mr. BULLITT. To that I replied from the country, R. F. D., Conway, Mass., on the 28th of August 1949. This is my letter to Hon. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, of the Department of State:

EXHIBIT No. 752

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Your letter, dated August 18, asking for my "views as to the objectives which U. S. policy should pursue and the methods which it should employ at this time" in the Far East, has finally reached me at the above address.

I am reluctant to reply. The Department of State's publication of its White Book on China, after the appointment of Mr. Fosdick and Mr. Case but *before* their report, seems to indicate that those distinguished gentlemen, for whom my respect is high, have been summoned not for the purpose of inventing effective policy but in the hope that some of the weight of the Far Eastern Albatross, which now hangs on the neck of the Truman Administration, may be shifted to their shoulders.

The White Book prejudges the case. By half-truths culled from reports of incompetent public servants it produces a picture so remote from reality that its chief interest lies in its proof of the lengths to which our government officials will go to protect their vested interest in their own mistakes. To publish an inquest on a faithful ally—not yet dead but fighting in despair to preserve its national independence—is incompatible with any standard of decent conduct. And our Department of State has done this not to serve a national American interest but to serve domestic political expediency.

Furthermore, Mr. Acheson, in his Letter of Transmissal, has written:

"The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the Civil War in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed the result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it."

One may say politely that this statement is somewhat doubtful or one may say impolitely that it is an outrageous lie. In any event, it shows a condition in Mr. Acheson's mind which will wreck any effort by anyone to protect the remains of our vital interests in the Far East. For nothing effective can be done so long as Mr. Acheson endorses the acts of the men who have thrown away the security which was won for us by our soldiers, marines, sailors, and aviators who fought and died in the Pacific area. Thanks to the policies of the Department of State, we now face a threat on the Pacific side far more dangerous than the threat of Japan ever was. The men responsible deserve ill of their country. Mr. Acheson endorses them and their acts.

Yet to all the yellow races they smell of death. The most frequent remark I heard in both China and Japan last December was: "Your government is making it too dangerous for anyone in the Far East to remain a friend of the United States." Thanks to the White Book on China, the nationalist leaders in Indochina, Burma, and Siam will now expect similar inquests before their countries too are dead. And they will not begin to recover confidence in our government until all the men responsible for our Far Eastern policy shall have been dismissed from government service. These men although underlings persuaded their superiors, who were ignorant of the Far East, to base American policy on the illusion that the Chinese Communists were somehow not quite Communists and that we—and the Chinese government—could get along with them very nicely. They are the gravediggers of our national security on the Pacific side. Their influence in the Department of State is still great. Mr. Acheson thinks well of them.

For these reasons I consider it useless to add new recommendations to the scores I have made to officials of the Department of State during the past two years—none of which have been followed.

Nevertheless, I have no desire to put the Department of State in position to say that my advice was asked and that I refused to give it. I enclose, therefore, the text of my last public statement on the subject. An address to a joint session of the Texas Senate and House of Representatives on April 27, 1949. And I reiterate four statements which I have made frequently to officials of our Government Departments.

1. Adequate economic and financial aid, and military supplies, should be given at once to all Chinese Government centers of resistance; and the utilization of this aid should be controlled by competent Americans.

A. Chungking: This aid should be given with a view to maintaining nationalist resistance and preventing the Chinese Communists from reaching the borders of Indochina and Burma.

B. Formosa: Adequate economic and financial aid and military supplies should be given at once to the nationalists in Formosa to be utilized under American supervision. Competent American military and naval officers, like Admirals Cook and Badger, should be detailed to advise on defense of the island and enforcement of the nationalist blockade of Communist China.

C. Arms and ammunition and military advisers should be flown at once to the Generals Ma.

D. General Chennault should be helped effectively to build up an air force to supply and defend the Chinese Northwest and the other areas of resistance.

2. Indochina: The French—two years late—have taken more or less the right line in Indochina. But I met no one in Indochina who believed that the country could be defended successfully if the Chinese Communists should reach the borders of Tonkin. Southwest China is the key to both Indochina and Burma. But it is the policy of the Department of State to do nothing to prevent Communist seizure of Southwest China. If this policy should be reversed, an American representative of the highest ability who speaks French fluently should be sent to Saigon.

3. Hong Kong: No commitment should be made by the American Government for defense of Hong Kong. If the Communists take Kwantung the position of Hong Kong will become economically untenable—except on terms which will make Hong Kong an asset to the Soviet Union. Hong Kong lives on legitimate trade and smuggling to and from China. If the Communists should cut off the trade and smuggling of Hong Kong, the city would die rapidly. Furthermore, the white British residents in Hong Kong, who number less than 10,000, have been able to rule 1,000,000 or more Chinese—there are no reliable population statistics—by keeping the highly unionized Chinese divided into Kuomintang and Communist groups hostile to each other. The drift from Kuomintang to the Communist side is now rapid. Strikes by United unions controlled by Communists could strangle Hong Kong swiftly.

These facts are well known to British bankers and businessmen in Hong Kong, and their only hope of economic survival lies in the possibility that they may be able to make themselves so useful to a Communist Government of China that they will be permitted to go on making money. Their dream now is to become compradores for a Communist China. Their fear now is that the Communists may not want their services and that the American Government will consider it contrary to our national interests to permit them to render such services. If the entire coast of China should fall into Communist hands, Hong Kong would be able to earn its own living only by serving the Communists to their entire satisfaction.

4. A personal representative of the President for the Far Eastern area should be appointed at once, with orders to devise ways and means to protect our vital interests. Nothing effective can be done to stop Communist conquest of the mainland of Asia and the islands of the Western Pacific without the presence of one man of high integrity and ability, clothed with authority. General Wedemeyer would be an appropriate choice.

His instructions should be the exact reverse of those given General Marshall. He should be forbidden to attempt to produce reconciliation between Communists and Nationalists, and should be ordered to use all available means to stop further Communist advance.

Secretary Acheson, in his letter of transmissal of the White Book on China writes: "The Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to the foreign power, Russia." They did that 22 years ago. But the officials of the Department of State, including Acheson, have just discovered the fact. And their errors have permitted the Soviet Government to add such areas, races, and resources to its war potential that it will feel strong enough to attack us in its own good time. Our Department of State has thus prepared the ground for a third world war. In our Army, a general who loses a division through incompetence is court-martialed. In the State Department and the foreign service, officials who lose whole countries and endanger the survival of the United States are promoted—if they know the right people.

How much in blood and freedom the people of the United States will have to pay for the prolonged and incomplete education of Secretary Acheson and his associates remains to be seen. Perhaps Mr. Case and Mr. Fosdick can do something to reduce the cost. In any event, they have every good wish from,

Yours very sincerely,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT.

Senator WATKINS. When was that letter sent?

Mr. BULLITT. That letter was written to Mr. Jessup in answer to his letter to me. It was mailed on the 28th day of August 1949 from Conway, Mass.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I have one or two questions raised by what Mr. Bullitt said in this memo. I notice you made some recommendations. I thought I got them. There was a reference to Formosa.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.

Senator WATKINS. Have you recently been in Formosa?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. I spent the month of last December in Formosa. I arrived I think on the third day of December, and I left the last day of December.

Senator WATKINS. Had you been there previous to that time?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I had been. I went down to Formosa in the spring of 1948. I went all over the island at that time. That was before the Government was down there.

Senator WATKINS. What was the purpose of your visit there?

Mr. BULLITT. When; in 1948?

Senator WATKINS. No; the last time.

Mr. BULLITT. I wanted to see what was going on. I have attempted to keep up with what has developed in China for some years, and I wanted to know exactly what conditions were in Formosa at the present time.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to the recommendations you made in this memo to Ambassador Jessup, what changes, if any, would you make in those recommendations as of today after you have made this recent visit to Formosa?

Mr. BULLITT. When I wrote that letter to Ambassador Jessup in response to his letter, the mainland of China was by no means fully occupied by the Communists.

Senator WATKINS. Where were the battle lines at that time?

Mr. BULLITT. The battle lines were in the south and in the west. The west was still being held by the anti-Communists and the south and southwest also. It was a period in which there were large forces of anti-Communists on the mainland. At the present time there are no forces of anti-Communists on the mainland except the guerrillas. There are a number of guerrillas scattered through the countryside in small bands or larger bands, but there is no organized army fighting against the Chinese Communists in continental China. The only free forces of China are those that are either on Formosa or on the large island of Auemoy, which is at the mouth of the harbor of Amoy, and on various other islands up the coast and down south of Formosa. The main body is in Formosa today. There are about 600,000 men in Chiang Kai-shek's armed forces.

Senator WATKINS. About 600,000?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Are they fully armed?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. But they are badly armed. There are about 320,000 of them who are ground troops and the others are in the air force and the navy. Of the equipment which we promised to send to them by the 1st of July 1951, only 38 percent had been delivered by the 1st of January 1952. Their armament is by American standards entirely inadequate. They have rifles and machine guns and small

artillery, and they have one or two pieces of heavier artillery. In the navy they have six DE's.

Senator WATKINS. They do have a navy?

Mr. BULLITT. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, it has been quite an efficient force, although it is forbidden to act in any way by fiat of our Government which has given orders to our fleet to prevent it from stopping the Communist supply ships going up to Korea. They sail right by Formosa, loaded with Soviet munitions put in the Polish Communist ships in Gdynia. They come all the way around and go right by Formosa and sail past there taking those munitions up, taking those weapons up to be used to kill American soldiers in Korea, and by order of our Government the Chinese Navy is flatly forbidden to stop them on their way up there.

Senator WATKINS. Would the Chinese Navy have the power, except for that order, to intercept them and capture them?

Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, without question, without question.

Senator WATKINS. That was the result of your observation? You know that from your own observation?

Mr. BULLITT. I know that of my own knowledge.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to your recommendation that you made in that memo to Ambassador Jessup, as of today what changes, if any, would you make by reason of the changed situation?

Mr. BULLITT. The situation as it exists today is this: Stalin is engaged in pushing a long-term project to take over the whole of Asia. The first step in that was the conquest of China. He now has recently had built down to the northern border of Indochina a new railroad from Nanning to a point opposite the Lang-son Gap. He has also had three new airfields built there just north of the border. He also has had the Chinese Communists station 250,000 troops there. They are there, poised to strike. The war in Indochina——

The CHAIRMAN. When you say the border, Mr. Bullitt, what border, please?

Mr. BULLITT. The border between China and Indochina. They are on the Chinese side of the border. The war in Indochina is a bloody stalemate. The thing has gone on now for more than 5 years. The French lose there annually as many officers as they graduate from their military academy, St. Cyr. They have out there an enormous proportion of their officers and of their noncommissioned officers. They have about 175,000 men in the French Army there, and they have about 110,000 in the Vietnamese army who are their allies, of course, and they have in addition about 70,000 Vietnamese auxiliaries. At least those figures are approximately correct. I don't say they are absolutely correct because they change from day to day.

On the other hand, Ho Chi Minh, who is the Communist leader in Indochina, has about 300,000 men. They are now very well trained. Their officers have been trained in China by the Chinese Communists and Russian instructors, and they are receiving a very considerable quantity of military supplies of all sorts from Communist China.

The consequence is that if these Communist Chinese troops north of the border should come across the border and attack as "volunteers" in the manner that they did—"volunteers" in big quotes—the way they did in Korea, they probably would wipe out the French and the Vietnamese. If they were able to take Indochina, the fall of Siam and Malaya would be extremely rapid and the fall of Burma would also be

very rapid. Indonesia would go and finally India. That is what Stalin is playing for in my opinion at the present time. When you get that, life becomes absolutely impossible for Japan unless she accepts Stalin's economic and political terms for trade for the continent of Asia. Japan cannot live except on trade with the continent of Asia. She depends on raw materials from the continent of Asia and selling her finished products there. Therefore, the defense of Indochina is vitally important to the United States.

Senator WATKINS. Where does Formosa fit into that?

Mr. BULLITT. It fits in in a very simple manner. The French cannot be reinforced adequately unless they take every single battleworthy division they have in Europe away from Eisenhower's troops and send them out there. The British will send nothing. And I personally trust no American ground troops are going to be sent to Indochina. It is ideally ill-adaptable to American physique and to American ways of fighting. Actually, in those swamps, in those rice paddies where that malaria mosquito is all over the place, and where prickly heat is also prevalent—which you get no matter how hard you try not to get it—a yellow soldier is much more effective than a white soldier. The white soldier requires 15 times the amount of supply that the yellow soldier requires. Therefore, I trust no one will be foolish enough to send American ground troops to Indochina.

There is only one force that can be used there, and that is the Chinese Nationalist force on Formosa. That force can strike on the flank of any Chinese Communist army going down to conquer Indochina, and I believe that if we do not intend to have that whole area go into Mr. Stalin's hands, it is essential for us to give adequate arms, adequate supplies, to the Nationalist army, navy, and air force on Formosa. I tried to make it brief, but it is too long.

Senator WATKINS. Of course, with reference to Indochina you made that explanation. How about the Korean situation? We are talking about what has happened in the past on the far eastern policy. Now what about the present policy? What about the use of these Nationalist troops on Formosa in Korea?

Mr. BULLITT. Obviously, Chiang Kai-shek offered to send 30,000 troops immediately, just as soon as the attack of the North Koreans took place. Our Government refused to accept them. He not only offered 30,000, he also offered to send as many more as we wanted. I would have taken a great quantity of them. I think if you had taken them, and put them into the fight, we would have won it in the very early days, before Stalin sent an air force out there, and before the Communists came in.

Senator WATKINS. As of January, when you were over there, or as of now, you are talking still about the past, what could have happened if we had had them in a hurry.

Mr. BULLITT. Senator, all I can say is this: With regard to Korea, there you have an extraordinarily complicated military problem. The air force does not want to use what good bombers it has.

Senator WATKINS. You say they do not want to use them?

Mr. BULLITT. They don't want to use them because they think they have to keep them to bomb the Soviet Union in case the Soviet Union should attack us.

Stalin has so many MIG–15s, and we have so few F–86s, that this lot of MIG–15s he sent out there, just as a side issue to the Chinese

Communists, to use in Korea, outnumber our F–86s to a fantastic degree. I don't think it is wise to try to give accurate figures. But to a fantastic degree. The question is now of what we can do, if I may say so. We are caught in this Korean thing, and my own personal instinct is that you don't go to war unless you intend to win the war, and then you use every means you can to win it as rapidly as possible. Whether that is today feasible under the conditions in which Stalin has built up his military strength so much faster than we have built up ours, I don't know.

Senator WATKINS. What about the replacement of our soldiers with some of these Nationalists from Formosa?

Mr. BULLITT. It could be done, and the Nationalists would be delighted to do it.

Senator WATKINS. What is the state of their morale?

Mr. BULLITT. That is the most extraordinary thing because their morale is very high. But it is very high for just one reason: That the Chinese all love their homes and their country, especially their villages, very much. The idea of living permanently exiled from their own native land, their own home, their own village, is intolerable to them. They live with just one passionate idea, which is of being able to fight their way back to their own country. They know they can only go back to their own country as victors. If they go back under any other conditions, they will all have their throats cut because they all went as volunteers to Formosa.

The consequence is that you have this absolute determination to fight their way back, and they would prefer today rather than tomorrow to begin the attempt. In my opinion they would require a period of equipment before they could be used effectively, because although each one of them is equipped they are not equipped with enough modern weapons. Such planes as the Air Force now has are completely antiquated, just as our World War II planes can't live in the air for more than 1 minute with a MIG–15. So that they would need equipment right down the line.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator WATKINS. Yes. We asked Admiral Cooke a number of questions. He had also been over there. I thought we might bring this inquiry as to our far eastern policy up to date.

Do you have any suggestions or recommendations with respect to that far eastern policy?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. I think that we ought to instantly equip the forces, Chinese Nationalist forces, on Formosa so that they can fall instantly on the flank of any Chinese Communist attacks going southward. And if they become good enough, I would risk, certainly, sending them back again. They have a perfect right to fight their way back into their own country if they can do it, and with the present discontent in Communist China, which is absolutely enormous, where you have not only the guerrillas but you have an enormous number of peasants who would like to throw the Communists out, and there is a very good chance that a Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland in a well selected spot and with proper preparation would snowball rapidly——

Senator WATKINS. Is there any considerable body of Asiatics who are anti-Communist other than these Nationalist troops in Formosa?

Mr. BULLITT. Who will fight, you mean?

Senator WATKINS. Yes, who will fight.

Mr. BULLITT. Well, the Vietnamese, who are fighting on the French side, they fight beautifully. But they are already drawing on them to the extent of about 180,000.

Senator WATKINS. That is only a small force compared to the 600,000.

Mr. BULLITT. The difficulty there is training officers, also.

Then you have a number of other peoples who would like to resist but they are not too good. I mean the Siamese certainly don't want to be ruled by Chinese Communists. Actually, the Burmese don't either, although a lot of their country is in the hands of Communists today; and so on. The Malayans very feebly resist a few Chinese Communists that there are in the jungles of Malaya. The only force out there at the present time that is ready to act is the Nationalist force on Formosa.

Senator WATKINS. That is what I have been told, and I was wondering whether that is true.

Mr. BULLITT. It is true.

Senator WATKINS. That is the only force that is ready of the Asiatics themselves?

Mr. BULLITT. That can be used. And I would infinitely prefer to see fighting on the continent of Asia done by Asiatics rather than I would by American soldiers.

Senator WATKINS. It would be at least making it somewhat different than a white man's war against the yellow people.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. Sourwine had some matters he wanted to put into the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I have one or two things here which should go into the record in order to make it complete. First of all, here is a letter addressed by the Chairman to the Secretary of State, under date of February 20, 1952, asking for a copy of a letter addressed by the Secretary of State, under date of April 18, 1947, to Senator George, with which was enclosed a memorandum entitled "Analysis of Allegations Against Mr. John Carter Vincent."

What I have is the carbon copy of that letter of the Chairman to the Secretary. I have the original reply signed by Carlisle H. Humelsine for the State Department. He is Deputy Under Secretary. It is to the Chairman, transmitting what Mr. Humelsine says he believes to be the letter requested. Then we have the full text of the letter as requested.

Without attempting to tie this into the record now, Mr. Chairman, I will say that it contains the statements made by the Secretary of State in 1947 with respect to a number of matters which have since been the subject of testimony before this committee, and I believe it should be a part of our record. I offer these three document for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 753, 754, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 753

FEBRUARY, 20, 1952.

Honorable DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Mr. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Information has come to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee with respect to a letter which you addressed, under date

of April 18, 1947, to Senator George, with which you enclosed a memorandum entitled "Analysis of Allegations Against Mr. John Carter Vincent".

It is respectfully requested that a copy of this letter and memorandum be furnished to the Internal Security Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT NO. 754

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, February 27, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: With reference to your letter of February 20 to the Secretary, I am happy to transmit herewith a copy of what is believed to be the letter you requested; namely, a letter from Secretary Acheson to Senator George, dated April 18, 1947, with which was enclosed a memorandum entitled "Analysis of Allegations Against Mr. John Carter Vincent Made in Memo Transmitted With Letter From Senator Bridges of April 7, 1947, to Senator Vandenberg."

Sincerely yours,

[s] CARL HUMELSINE
[t] CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Enclosure: As stated.

APRIL 18, 1947.

The Honorable WALTER F. GEORGE,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR GEORGE: I refer to Senator Bridges' letter of April 7, 1947, to Senator Vandenberg, which you transmitted to me, and in which Senator Bridges encloses a memorandum submitted to him by someone whose name is not given setting forth a number of charges relative to the policies and record of Mr. John Carter Vincent, whose nomination for the promotion to Career Minister is under consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee. Although Senator Bridges does not express any opinion on the credibility or validity of the memorandum, he believes that an investigation into Mr. Vincent's fitness for the post is warranted.

I have made a careful investigation of all the charges made against Mr. Vincent and believe that they are wholly groundless.

I attach a point-by-point analysis of the allegations against Mr. Vincent. For the sake of convenience I have divided Senator Bridges' memorandum into 12 numbered paragraphs and have followed each paragraph with my answer or comments on the allegations contained in it. I have, in some places, rearranged slightly the text of the memorandum in order to shorten it and to make the charges stand forth more clearly. Inasmuch as the chronology and itinerary of Mr. Vincent's assignments and movements are substantially correct, I have omitted any reference to them from my summary.

I have known Mr. Vincent well throughout my service in the State Department. I recommended him for his present post and have worked intimately with him during my service as Under Secretary during which period he has reported directly to me. Increasing knowledge has brought increasing respect for his judgment and admiration for him as a gentleman and a disinterested and loyal servant of our Republic. He is a man of the finest intellectual quality and the highest character.

I am enclosing two copies of this letter, together with the analysis which you may want to submit to Senator Vandenberg.

Sincerely yours,

[t] DEAN ACHESON, *Acting Secretary.*

ANALYSIS OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MR. JOHN CARTER VINCENT MADE IN MEMO TRANSMITTED WITH LETTER FROM SENATOR BRIDGES OF APRIL 7, 1947, TO SENATOR VANDENBERG

I. It is alleged that "the actions, advice, and recommendations of Mr. Vincent" have been coordinated with the steps outlined in two official Communist documents:

1. "The Program of the Communist International and its Constitution." Workers Library Publishers. 1928. 3d American Edition, 1936.

2. "The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies," adopted as a resolution by the 6th World Congress of the Comintern, Sept. 1, 1928.

Comment.—Mr. Vincent advised me that he has never even read the two Communist documents under reference. I have never read them myself. I state categorically that any advice given by Mr. Vincent or any action taken by him was not coordinated, either intentionally or coincidentally, with these documents. The author of the memorandum presented to Senator Bridges does not quote from the documents and does not cite any specific instances in which Mr. Vincent's policies and actions have paralleled the supposed Communist line. The effect of citing these documents at the outset of a bill of particulars against Mr. Vincent is tendentious and unfair.

II. It is charged that while at the Embassy in Chungking in 1941 Mr. Vincent "expressed dislike for Ambassador Gauss," "a general dislike of the Chinese," and "an anti-Japanese viewpoint (prior to adoption of the Russo-Jap nonaggression pact in mid-April 1941)," and that he "expressed sympathy for Communist aims and ideology" and dislike for "alleged American exploitation of cheap Chinese labor."

Comment.—The allegation regarding Mr. Vincent's personal feelings toward Ambassador Gauss or vice versa bears on Mr. Vincent's fitness for this promotion only in its imputation of disloyalty. The contrary is the case. Mr. Vincent lived with Ambassador Gauss for two years (from 1941 to 1943), and their relation appears to have been close and amicable. I discover in the record only loyalty on the part of Mr. Vincent, both to the person of Ambassador Gauss and to the policies and actions advocated by him.

The allegation that Mr. Vincent has expressed a "general dislike of the Chinese," I find wholly untrue. Mr. Vincent has dedicated a great part of his life to friendship with the Chinese, the betterment of conditions in China, and toward good relations between that country and the United States of America.

With respect to his alleged "anti-Japanese viewpoint" it is quite true that from the beginning of Japanese aggression—and entirely unaffected by the Russo-Japanese arrangements in 1941, a wholly tendentious insinuation—Mr. Vincent and many others, among whom I include myself, were actively advocating measures to counteract that aggression.

Mr. Vincent has no "sympathy for Communist aims and ideology" and I am willing to state that he has never expressed any such sympathy directly or indirectly.

Mr. Vincent tells me that he knows of no instances of American exploitation of cheap Chinese labor and has never discussed the subject.

III. It is charged that, in 1945 while Mr. Vincent was first Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs and later Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, personnel in the State Department engaged in private correspondence with personnel of the Embassy in Chungking, via diplomatic pouch, and that this private correspondence was "leaked" to the Communists. It is stated that General Hurley's resignation came two months later.

Comment.—The implication is that Mr. Vincent conducted or permitted, a clandestine personal correspondence on official matters undermining the policies of General Hurley. It is further implied that the substance of this unapproved correspondence was being illicitly conveyed to the Communists. It is further implied that this was the cause for General Hurley's resignation.

In 1945, Mr. Vincent was at the San Francisco Conference from the middle of April to the end of May, at the Potsdam Conference from early June to early August, at the Moscow Conference from early December to the end of the year.

The entire subject of this alleged unofficial correspondence and contact with the Communists was thoroughly ventilated in the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during December 1945 on the charges brought by former Ambassador Hurley against the loyalty of certain Foreign Service officers. Secretary Byrnes said before the Committee:

"The other complaint of Ambassador Hurley is that some official or employee did not merely express a different view of his superior officer, but advised someone associated with the Communist forces that the Ambassador did not accurately represent United States policy. For such action there would be no excuse. I would be the first to condemn it and to dismiss the person guilty of it. But Ambassador Hurley has not furnished me, nor do I understand that he has furfurnished this Committee, any specific evidence to prove that any employee was guilty of such conduct."

The Committee took no action whatsoever on General Hurley's charges and failed to find the matter worth a published report. Furthermore, Mr. Vincent has at no time engaged in or countenanced private correspondence on official matters. I think, therefore, that we may consider the case as without foundation.

However, for whatever interest it may have, I should like to point out that on the basis of records available to us, Mr. Vincent's name appears to have been mentioned only three times in the course of these hearings, and not at all in connection with the question of the alleged clandestine correspondence. Ambassador Hurley referred once to a letter addressed to the President by Mr. Maxwell Stewart finding fault with Mr. Hurley, which Mr. Vincent acknowledged on reference from the White House without commenting on the substance of the letter.

Secretary Byrnes in his testimony referred to a report from General Hurley, dated December 24, 1944, and said that "there was a message signed by Mr. Stettinius with the initials of Mr. Vincent in the corner stating that the position of Hurley was sound."

There was only one other reference to Mr. Vincent during the hearings. Ambassador Hurley stated that he did not know Mr. Vincent well in spite of the fact that he and Mr. Vincent shared an office in the Department for a month in the spring of 1945 and went on to say that Mr. Vincent was in sympathy with George Atcheson (now Ambassador and Political Adviser to General MacArthur) and the others who were trying to undermine U. S. policy in China.

IV. It is stated that "a statement issued by President Truman on December 15, 1945, at the time of the appointment of General Marshall as Ambassador, presumably drafted by Vincent, entirely overlooked the principles of the Open Door, made no mention of the November 26, 1941, note to Japan, and in brief invited the Republic of China to 'agree to the Communistic terms for a coalition government or get no more aid from us.' This constituted a repetition in China of the policy so disastrously followed in Yugoslavia and Poland previously."

Comment.—This paragraph is a criticism of the policies enunciated in a statement issued by President Truman on December 15, 1945, and its apparent intent as well as the intent of the entire memorandum is to imply that Mr. Vincent had improperly exerted his influence to compel the Chinese authorities to incorporate Communists in the government. This implication is entirely false.

As to the Presidential statement, it was not drafted by Mr. Vincent, or under his supervision. It was prepared under the direction of Secretary Byrnes, General Marshall, and myself. It was revised and approved by the President. Mr. Vincent was in entire agreement with its contents.

The statement at no place indicates that Chinese Communists must be brought into the Chinese Government. The Communists are mentioned only twice. It is stated that the United States Government believes it essential that "a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists * * *" Further on in the document it is stated that "the existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist Army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China." Incidentally, I note that in the above-quoted paragraph of the memorandum under discussion, an internal quotation appears of which the source is not given. If this is intended to summarize the purport of the President's message, it is clearly a misrepresentation.

As is well known, the subsequent course of events prevented the establishment of internal unity in China. When General Marshall arrived in China in December 1945, he found that provision had been made by the National Government for a People's Consultative Council made up of representatives of the National Government party (Kuomintang), the Communists, and two other minority par-

ties. There were also a number of nonparty members. This Council had not met due to inability of the authorities to arrange for a cessation of hostilities. General Marshall immediately exerted his influence to bring about a truce and was able to do so as of January 10. On the same day the People's Consultative Council met. This Council of its own initiative and with the approval of Chiang Kai-shek drew up a series of resolutions and agreements providing for representation by all parties in a State Council (the National Government party retained control over the Council), for the adoption of a constitution, for abolition of one-party government and representation by other parties in the government on a minority basis, and for unification of all armed forces in a nonpolitical national army. It was these resolutions and agreements, freely adopted by the Chinese, which General Marshall used as his guide in his subsequent efforts to assist the Chinese toward peace and unity. He became a member of a 3-man committee (a National Government representative, a Communist representative, and himself) to supervise a truce agreement and prepared for the amalgamation of the armed forces.

Subsequent developments in China gradually undermined and finally wrecked the chances of bringing about peace and unity in accordance with the People's Consultative Council resolutions and agreements. General Marshall has set forth clearly in his statement of January 7 the reasons for this disappointing development.

V. It is stated that "in September 1946, six members of the Military Affairs Committee of the House, visited General MacArthur in Tokyo. They issued (PM, N. Y., Sept. 10, 1946) 'an alarming statement about Soviet intentions in the Far East.' The next day General MacArthur issued a warning about the danger of communism in Japan. This 'was deeply resented by John Carter Vincent.' "

Comment: Mr. Vincent has given me the following account of the incident to which this paragraph apparently refers:

"The story regarding my alleged resentment over a statement made by General MacArthur is as follows: On September 2, 1946, a newspaperman (New York Herald Tribune) called to ask me what I thought of the statement that had just been issued by General MacArthur. I told him I had not read the statement. He asked whether there had been any change in policy regarding Japan. I told him there had been one and went on to explain that American policy towards Japan was expressed in the Potsdam Declaration, Terms of Surrender and certain papers of the State-War-Navy Committee that had been made public. The newspaperman manufactured out of whole cloth the story that 'an official of the State Department' took exception to General MacArthur's statement. The story was untrue; the newspaperman subsequently apologized to me. The fact that he was eventually discharged by the Herald Tribune proves nothing in this connection."

VI. It is charged that:

(*a*) Mr. Vincent presented a draft statement to Secretary Byrnes "in the fall of 1946" which "recommended withdrawal of all aid to the National government." Senator Bridges' document then indicates that this alleged draft by Mr. Vincent could be compared to the act of the Soviet Union in continuing aid to the Communists in China despite its undertaking to support the Central government in the Sino-Soviet pacts of August 14, 1945.

(*b*) Mr. Vincent on November 11, 1946, while Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, delivered an address in which he said that it was "unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles; where a government is wasting its substance on excessive armament, where the fact or trend of Civil War exists."

The memorandum in reference characterizes this speech as an "indirect expression of American foreign policy in China" and points to the editorial disapproval of the speech as expressed in the New York World Telegram and approval given it by the Daily Worker, the Chicago Star and Communist party dailies.

Comment.—As to (*a*), I have not been able to find any record of any such recommendation or draft prepared by Mr. Vincent or anyone else. The only draft presented by Mr. Vincent to the Secretary in the fall of 1946 was the paper which subsequently became the basis of the President's statement of December 18, 1946. It was prepared at my request and approved by the Secretary of State, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and by General Marshall. In no draft of the statement was there any recommendation that we withdraw all aid to the National Government. On the contrary, the statement provided, in a para-

graph drafted by Mr. Vincent, for aid to China under the indicated conditions: Mr. Vincent has consistently advocated the extension of credits to China when conditions in China are such that the credits can be effectively utilized to improve economic conditions and promote a revival of American-Chinese business relations. He was, furthermore, active in supporting the grant by the Export-Import Bank of the $500,000,000 credit to China in March 1946. This was in accord with the expressed view of General Marshall.

I believe that the best comment on the allegation in paragraph (*b*) above is the text itself of Mr. Vincent's speech. I attach a copy.

There are also attached for your information copies of two letters, one from the National Foreign Trade Council and the other from the China-American Council of Commerce and Industry, the two trade organizations most actively interested in commercial relations with China. You will note that the President of the National Foreign Trade Council states that Mr. Vincent's "enunciation of the attitude and policies of the United States with respect to our interests in the Far East was most impressive." The President of the China-America Council states that Mr. Vincent's speech was discussed at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Council and "appreciation expressed for the clear-cut statement of policy of the Department of State as presented in his address." In addition to these two statements of approval, there have been received in the Department a large number of letters from businessmen, who heard or read Mr. Vincent's speech, expressing their appreciation and approval.

As to press reaction to Mr. Vincent's speech, criticism appears to have been confined to the Scripps-Howard press. It is reported that certain Communist dailies approved this speech but I might add to the list of those expressing approval the following: New York Journal of Commerce, New York Herald Tribune, Washington Post, Washington Times-Herald, etc.

VII. It is stated that Mr. Vincent accompanied "Owen Lattimore, member of the Editorial Board of Amerasia, pro-Communist magazine on Asia," and Henry Wallace on his trip to China in 1944. Mr. Wallace's report of his journey is said to have been "prepared with the direct assistance of Mr. Vincent" and it is alleged that it "should be examined for further indications of Mr. Vincent's approval of the Communist program in China, opposition to the support of the Nationalist Government and furtherance of extension of the influence of Russia in China."

Comment.—Mr. Vincent was assigned by the Secretary of State to accompany Mr. Wallace, the Vice President of the United States, on the journey mentioned. Mr. Vincent did not prepare or assist in the preparation of the report and does not know what recommendations it contained. Mr. Vincent had never met Mr. Wallace prior to the trip to China, saw him only a few times on official business after their return, and has had no contact with him since his resignation from the Government.

VIII. It is alleged that "examination of the top secret and secret documents required by General Hurley, and passing between the State Department (Mr. Vincent) and General Hurley at the time of his incumbency, would prove revealing of the policy and aims of Mr. Vincent, contrary to the best interests of this country and contrary to its avowed Foreign Policy in China."

Comment.—The allegation does not cite any particular document or reference to support the charge that the aims and policies of Mr. Vincent were contrary to the best interests of this country and contrary to its foreign policy in China, and indeed could not do so. At no time have the policy and aims of Mr. Vincent been contrary to our best interests in China or to our foreign policy. No documents ever went directly from Mr. Vincent to General Hurley and any documents from the Department to General Hurley were prepared or approved by Mr. Ballantine, then Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, or Under Secretary Grew who were responsible for the formulation of policy with regard to China at that time, subject to the close review of the Secretary of State and the President.

IX. It is charged that "at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, Vincent, aware of the secret Yalta agreement with respect to agreement that Russia was to have certain rights in Manchuria, failed to properly advise Mr. Byrnes of this text, made a great show of opposing Russian demands with respect to China, and furthered a final agreement (which still remains secret) which gave Russia even more than agreed at Yalta. Under date of Oct. 31, 1946, Mr. John M. Patterson, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of Public Liaison, Department of State, replied to the request of the American China Policy Association, Inc., for release that 'No secret agreements concerning China were concluded at the Potsdam Conference.' It is thought that Mr. Vincent instructed Mr. Patterson in the writ-

ing of this letter (Why did Mr. Vincent conceal (if he did) from President Truman and Secretary Byrnes at Potsdam, the precise nature and extent of the previous secret Yalta commitments? It would seem that only the Russians could have been benefited by the concealment, as they were thus able to squeeze more concession from our negotiators who were ignorant of the exact terms which had been squeezed from President Roosevelt).

Comment.—Mr. Vincent had no knowledge of the Yalta Agreement until he reached Potsdam. Moreover, Mr. Byrnes was fully informed concerning the Yalta conversations. He attended the Conference and was thoroughly familiar with the full text of the Yalta Agreements before he departed for the Potsdam Conference. It is therefore absurd to suggest that there was anything which Mr. Vincent could have withheld from Mr. Byrnes even if he had known it.

As you are aware, the full texts of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements have now been made public. The Potsdam Agreement does not contain any "final agreement which gave Russia even more than agreed to at Yalta."

Mr. Vincent does not know Mr. John M. Patterson and gave no instruction to him in the writing of any such letter as that referred to.

X. It is stated that "in late July or early August 1945, Ambassador Hurley finally secured clearance to show the Yalta text to the Chinese. He then exerted every effort to force T. V. Soong and Foreign Minister Wang Shi-hsueh to go to Moscow. When they got there, the Russians made additional demands and the Chinese Government appealed to Hurley to mediate. 'Somehow or other Washington learned of this' and Hurley received a cable believed to have read somewhat as follows: 'You will not advise, you will not mediate, you will not assist in Chinese Russian negotiations.' It was signed 'Grew,' but it is believed that Under Secretary Grew, who was then being forced out, did not compose it."

Comment.—This allegation is completely inaccurate. There is no record of information reaching the Department at the time cited of any "additional demands" made by representatives of the U. S. S. R. during the Sino-Russian conversations nor of any appeal by the Chinese Government that General Hurley "mediate." The Chinese Government had been informed a year prior to that time that the United States did not desire to place itself in any position in which it might appear as a "mediator" between China and other countries and Ambassador Hurley had been apprised of this as early as six months prior to the alleged time. This policy had the full approval of Mr. Grew and of the President.

XI. It is charged that apparently in the summer of 1945 "Henry Luce of Time-Life-Fortune, who was represented in China by Theodore White, a strong pro-Communist, became uneasy about 'angled' dispatches and applied for a passport to fly out and see for himself. The State Department refused it. He appealed to General Hurley who cabled recommending the issuance. In reply Hurley received a reprimand advising him not to interfere. Mr. Luce finally obtained an official invitation from Chiang Kai-shek which brought the passport, investigated, and fired White for pro-Communist propaganda. White is a great admirer of Vincent and, like him, has been connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations."

Comment.—Mr. Vincent has never been consulted or informed with respect to any grant or refusal of travel permission from Mr. Luce.

XII. It is charged that "during the past two years, the Far Eastern Division of the State Department has been denuded of its former heads who were not pro-Soviet. Hornbeck, former Far Eastern Division head, who has been advanced to Political Adviser to the Secretary, was packed off as Ambassador to the Netherlands; Grew was forced to retire, as was Dooman, Drumright, and the Chief of China Section was sent to London. Now in control of the Far East Division, Lattimore and Vincent (Lattimore having no official connection although he lectures to Department personnel, and to the War College, and is known to advise Dean Acheson and President Truman as well as Vincent) have sent to General MacArthur, as well as to China, men and women of Red sympathies. A few names sent MacArthur are John S. Service (ardent pro-Communist, arrested in 1945 for turning State Department papers over to Communist Philip Jaffe of AMERASIA), Theodore Cohen (Labor Adviser), Miriam Farley, and T. A. Bisson of the Institute of Pacific Relations, listed as a Communist front by the Dies committee of 1944, of which Vincent and Lattimore are both trustees). Lattimore, close friend and associate of Vincent, is reported to have loaded the OWI with Reds (both Chinese and American) and helped to secure the appointment of a man without qualifications (also without a Communist record) as head of UNRRA for China and helped him staff this division of UNRRA with pro-Communists."

Comment.—This allegation seeks to suggest a purpose and design behind the various personnel changed and transfers referred to which, I can say, from personal knowledge did not and does not exist. Insofar as Mr. Vincent is concerned he had nothing to do with the transfer of Mr. Hornbeck or the retirement of Mr. Grew and Mr. Dooman. Mr. Drumright had long desired an assignment to London which he eventually received.

I do not recollect ever having met Mr. Owen Lattimore; he has never advised me nor has he ever had anything to do with the operations of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. I do not care at this time to go into the charges made against him which, in view of the above, are irrelevant to the present inquiry.

Mr. Vincent had nothing to do with the assignments of any of the persons whose names are listed as having been sent to General MacArthur. With respect to Mr. John S. Service, whose name is included, I would point out that, prior to his assignment to Tokyo, he was cleared of all charges which had been made against him.

Mr. Vincent is not a trustee of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He was elected to the post in 1944 with the permission of his superior, Mr. Joseph Grew. He was never able actively to serve in that capacity and was not reelected in subsequent years. It might be pointed out in this connection that such substantial citizens as Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, Mr. Henry F. Grady, Mr. Paul G. Hoffman, and Mr. Robert G. Sproul are trustees of the institution.

NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL,
26 BEAVER STREET,
New York 4, N. Y., December 20, 1946.

The Honorable JAMES F. BYRNES,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We wish to record with you the appreciation of our Council, and of the Thirty-Third National Foreign Trade Convention, of the attendance and participation of the Government officials, as listed in the enclosed list of over twenty-one hundred delegates at the Convention.

We also have the pleasure to enclose a copy of the Final Declaration which includes "A Proposed Foreign Economic Policy for the United States," and Recommendations in support of this Foreign Economic Policy.

It is also most highly appreciated that the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Hon. William L. Clayton, addressed the Convention, on the occasion of its annual dinner, on the subject of "The Foreign Economic Policy of the United States."

It is also particularly gratifying to refer to the constructive addresses of the Secretary of Commerce, the Hon. W. Averell Harriman, and Mr. John Carter Vincent, Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, whose enunciation of the attitude and policies of the United States with respect to our interests in the Far East was most impressive.

This annual convention of leading representatives of Government and foreign trade interests of the United States as a recurrent opportunity for conferences and conclusions has been of the utmost value to a mutual understanding of the problems and policies affecting our foreign commerce.

Sincerely yours,

E. P. THOMAS, *President.*

cc. Mr. John Carter Vincent.

CHINA-AMERICA COUNCIL OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, INC.,
December 17, 1946.

The Honorable WILLIAM L. CLAYTON,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CLAYTON: At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Far East-American Council yesterday, the address of Mr. John Carter Vincent at the Far East Luncheon of the National Foreign Trade Council on November 12th was discussed and appreciation expressed for the clear-cut statement of policy of the Department of State as presented in this address.

I take this occasion, therefore, to bring the foregoing to your attention with the thought that the Council's approval as above noted may thus be made a matter

of record in the Department and may further be brought to the attention of other officials concerned with international trade policy matters.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR B. FOYE, *President.*

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it will be remembered that Mr. John Carter Vincent testified at length before this committee with regard to certain memoranda which he had prepared in connection with or antedating the directive which was given to General Marshall on December 15, 1945. Mr. Vincent identified as his draft the memorandum which was signed by the Secretary of State and which became one of the enclosures that was a part of that so-called directive. The directive, the committee will remember, consisted of the President's letter of transmittal, this memorandum of the Secretary of State—to which I have referred—a statement of policy with regard to China by the President, and a press release with respect to that statement of policy.

Mr. Vincent, as I say, identified the memorandum signed by the Secretary of State as his draft. He also said that he had drafted a two-page memorandum which he said he had given to General Marshall, and which had never been returned to the State Department files. He then spoke of a document which he had drafted under date of November 28, 1945, and said he had discovered a copy of that in the Far Eastern Division files, although there was none in the general State Department files, and suggested the committee could get that document if the committee asked for it.

The record appears to indicate some confusion—at least, the record reads as though perhaps the November 28 document was in fact the two-page memorandum which he said he had written and given to General Marshall.

The chairman wrote to the State Department requesting this November 28 document, and I ask, Mr. Chairman, that there may be inserted in the record at this point the letter of the chairman in that regard, which quotes from our record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 755," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 755

MARCH 14, 1952.

Honorable DEAN ACHESON,
The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 2, 1952, in public session, Mr. John Carter Vincent on the stand, the record of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was, in part, as follows:

"Mr. SOURWINE. I also ask permission, Mr. Chairman, to offer for the record a letter under date of October 3 addressed to Senator McCarran and signed by Mr. Humelsine of the State Department.

"Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

"(The letter referred to was admitted as Exhibit No. 390, and was read in full as follows:)

"Mr. SOURWINE. I would like permission to read this letter.

"'MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of September 19, 1951, requesting "A Draft of General Marshall's directive which he took with him when he went to China in 1945" referred to by General Wedemeyer in his testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, September 15, 1950; and also the names of individuals who prepared this directive. According to your letter of September 19, General

Wedemeyer testified that he saw the initials "J. C. V." on the requested directive.

" 'I am enclosing a photostat of the Department's file copy of the memorandum to which, I believe, General Wedemeyer referred.' "

Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I want to state that this photostat which has just been offered for the record is the photostat which was submitted with this letter from the State Department.

" 'This memorandum was one of the enclosures of the President's letter of December 15, 1945, to General Marshall. As you are aware, the President's letter of December 15, 1945, and its enclosures constituted General Marshall's written directive for a China mission.

" 'A search of the Department's files reveals that none of the other documents of the Presidential directive which General Marshall took with him to China in 1945 bears the initials "J. C. V." or the name of Foreign Service Officer John Carter Vincent.

" 'As to the authorship of the enclosed memorandum, it would be impossible for the Department to provide a list of all those who contributed to or edited the memorandum. At the time the memorandum was drafted, Mr. John Carter Vincent was the director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and hence the responsible subordinate officer for the drafting of the memorandum. It should be pointed out, however, that in important memoranda of this kind, it is generally the case that many officers participate in the drafting, even though the record copies (such as the enclosed) only show the name of the responsible subordinate officer. Since this particular memorandum was addressed to the War Department and since it was signed by Secretary Byrnes and approved by the President, it is entirely possible that in addition to Mr. Vincent and other State Department officers, military officers as well as Secretary Byrnes and even the President may have a hand in the drafting.

" 'In this connection, Mr. Acheson's detailed account of the drafting of General Marshall's directive is contained on pages 1848 and 1849 of part 3, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, First Session.

" 'Sincerely yours,

" 'CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.' "

So presumably the two-page memorandum which was handed to General Marshall was never returned to the State Department file? Would you assume that from this letter?

"Mr. VINCENT. I would assume that from this letter.

"Mr. SOURWINE. That memorandum did bear your initials or your name; did it not?

"Mr. VINCENT. It did.

"Mr. SOURWINE. But it was not in the State Department files in October, so presumably it never came back to the State Department?

"Mr. VINCENT. The original never came back to the State Department, but let me testify here that in my search after I came back from leave this time I found a carbon copy of this November 28 document to which I refer, which was in the Far Eastern office files and had never gone into the regular State Department files.

"Mr. SOURWINE. How would you identify that so that we might request it?

"Mr. VINCENT. I could identify it by date and I could describe it.

"Mr. SOURWINE. Would you do that?

"Mr. VINCENT. I will put it this way: You don't have to identify it, because I would like to have it now to complete this record of all the difficulty there has been about the draft.

"Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure we all would because there has been a lot of confusion.

"Mr. VINCENT. It would be well to have it in. I would like to have it. If you would write the State Department, there will be no difficulty in identifying it as the document concerning which Mr. Vincent testified here.

"Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think there will be any difficulty in getting it?

"Mr. VINCENT. I can't promise that, sir.

"Mr. SOURWINE. You at least are anxious that we should have it?

"Mr. VINCENT. I would like to have it now. That, I think, would clarify one other thing in General Wedemeyer's testimony, what document did General Wedemeyer see with my initials on it, and I am inclined to think

that what he saw was my November 28 memo when he testified that he saw something over my initials."

If the above-quoted portion of the record makes possible identification of the document referred to, the two-page memorandum written by Mr. Vincent which formed a basis for the subsequent six-page directive to General Marshall, it is respectfully requested that the Department furnish the Internal Security Committee with a true copy or photostat of the document in question. (A photostat would, of course, be preferable.)

You will note Mr. Vincent's testimony that very recently he found a copy of what he refers to as the "November 28 document" in the files of the Far Eastern office. If this "November 28 document" is not the two-page memorandum hereinabove requested, it is further respectfully requested that a copy of this "November 28 document" also be furnished to the committee.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. SOURWINE. A reply has been received from the State Department, again signed by Mr. Carlisle Humelsine, and enclosing a photostatic copy of the November 28 document referred to by Mr. Vincent in his testimony. This is a four-page document, Mr. Chairman, so it still leaves some uncertainty as to the whereabouts or the identity of the two-page document which Mr. Vincent also said he wrote and gave to General Marshall.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that this letter and the text of the document may be inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 756" and is as follows:)

(See p. 2207, pt. 7, for the November 28 document.)

EXHIBIT NO. 756

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, March 24, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I refer to your letter of March 14 to the Secretary in which you request a true photostatic copy of a "November 28 document" concerning which Mr. Vincent testified before the Internal Security Subcommittee on February 2, 1952.

Enclosed is a true photostatic copy of what is believed to be the memorandum you seek.

Sincerely yours,

(s) CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Enclosure: Memorandum, Outline of Suggested Course of Action in China, drafted by John Carter Vincent on November 28, 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Mr. Chairman, because Mr. Vincent had testified in terms which were not completely clear as to their import, but had testified that he had drafted a statement which—and he did not like the word "basis"—which had been incorporated into the President's statement on foreign policy, the staff of the committee has attempted to make an analysis of this document, a copy of which has been furnished us by Mr. Humelsine, the so-called November 28 document, which would compare it with the statement of policy by Mr. Truman on December 15, 1945. That comparison has been made in the form of a two-column, parallel placement of identified paragraphs from the two drafts.

Now in order to see how that has been done, Mr. Chairman, and I believe it is important for the record, I respectfully suggest that the

text of the President's statement, the text of Mr. Vincent's memorandum, both be inserted with the paragraphs numbered as indicated here, which was the basis for this staff study, and that it then be ordered into the record the study itself showing the parallel columns with the numbered paragraphs placed opposite one another. That will mean a duplication in the actual printing of the text, but it will be done in such a way that the record will show how the studies were made.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the ultimate object?

Mr. SOURWINE. The ultimate object is to show, and it is the opinion of counsel that this does clearly show, that as Mr. Vincent has testified his memorandum was incorporated in the President's statement, that everything in his memorandum got into the President's statement, and that there is not anything in the President's statement that is contrary to what was in his memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. What part did the President's statement play?

Mr. SOURWINE. This is the statement of policy on China which became a part of the directive to General Marshall.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. It will be inserted into the record.

(For the document referred to see p. 2208 of pt. 7.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, those are the only two matters that I have for insertion at this time. I should like to ask, if the Chair deems it not improper, that the insertion with regard to the November 28 document and this analysis of it might be physically placed in the record at the time when Mr. Vincent testified about it, when he identified it as being in the State Department files, and suggested that the Chair write to it.

The CHAIRMAN. That can be done. The January report is out, I think, and in galley-sheet form.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir; it is in galley form. It is a physical printer's problem. It could be laid in, if the Chair will so order.

The CHAIRMAN. If it can be done, that will be the order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bullitt, did you know John Carter Vincent?

Mr. BULLITT. No. The only time I ever saw John Carter Vincent in my life, so far as I can remember, was at a large banquet given in Switzerland in 1948, I think it was.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you add anything from your experience to these series of letters introduced into the record by Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. BULLITT. No; I can't. I don't know anything about Mr. Vincent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I pose this question for the Chair's consideration: The directive that went to General Marshall, as I have indicated, consisted of four documents, a letter of transmittal, a memorandum signed by the Secretary of State, a statement of policy by the President, and a press release with regard to that statement of policy.

The white paper issued by the State Department carries the full text of three of those documents, and omits the full statement of the press release with the statement that the press release was subsantially the same as the statement of policy.

Just as a cross check, the committee has obtained from the White House a copy of that original press release. I might say that, on a comparison—not a detailed comparison but a hurried comparison, because it came up this morning—it does appear to be precisely what

the State Department white paper said, substantially the same as the policy statement. Does the Chair desire that this document, which is not printed anywhere so far as I know, should be included in our record, or is this statement with regard to it sufficient?

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a part of the transaction?

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a part of the transaction; yes, sir. It was included in the directive to General Marshall.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it should go into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 757" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 757

HOLD FOR RELEASE

DECEMBER 15, 1945.

Confidential: The following statement by the President on United States policy toward China MUST BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE Until released.

Note:

Release is for SUNDAY morning (December 16, 1945) newspapers.

Release by radio commentators, news broadcasters, etc., NOT EARLIER THAN 7:00 P. M., E. S. T., SATURDAY, December 15, 1945.

CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT PREMATURE PUBLICATION.

CHARLES G. ROSS,
Secretary to the President.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA

The Government of the United States holds that peace and prosperity of the world in this new and unexplored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in the United Nations organization.

It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future. The United States Government has long subscribed to the principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the sovereign nations. Events in this century, however, would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is thus in the most vital interest of the United States and all the United Nations that the people of China overlook no opportunity to adjust their internal differences promptly by methods of peaceful negotiation.

The Government of the United States believes it essential:

(1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control, including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces.

(2) That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal strife—a solution which will bring about the unification of China.

The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China.

The United States and the United Kingdom by the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by adhering to the Potsdam Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of August 1945, are all committed to the liberation of China, including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control. These agreements were made with the National Government of the Republic of China.

In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese

influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the United States has been assisting and will continue to assist the National Government of the Republic of China in effecting the disarmament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The United States Marines are in north China for that purpose.

The United States Recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China. The United States is convinced that a prompt arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective achievement of this end. United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.

The United States has already been compelled to pay a great price to restore the peace which was first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a united, democratic and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in China.

The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country. Hence, the United States strongly advocates that the national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government. It is recognized that this would require modification of the one-party "political tutelage" established as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation toward democracy by the father of the Chinese Republic, Doctor Sun Yat-sen.

The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China. With the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army.

In line with its often expressed views regarding self-determination, the United States Government considers that the detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign government in these matters would be inappropriate. The United States Government feels, however, that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace—a responsibility which is shared by the National Government and all Chinese political and military groups.

As China moves toward peace and unity along the lines described above, the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a military organization capable of discharging China's national and international responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order. In furtherance of such assistance, it would be prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is all of Mr. Bullitt.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, the committee is indebted to you for your presence here, and we are grateful to you for your very intelligent statement.

Mr. BULLETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we do have another witness. When is it your pleasure to hear him?

The CHAIRMAN. We have the witness that we did not conclude with yesterday. I thought we would go on with him this afternoon.

We will recess now and reconvene at 2 o'clock.

Mr. MORRIS. We will have Mr. Bogolepov here at 2 o'clock, Senator.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF IGOR BOGOLEPOV—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document, please.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Meeting, April 9." No year is given. Institute of Oceanography, and initials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read several paragraphs from this document which has been identified by Mr. Mandel as a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I would like to ask a few question of this witness on this document.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Perhaps he can identify it better.

Mr. MORRIS. This, Senator, purports to be a meeting or the minutes of a meeting held in Moscow April 8, which is one of a series of meeting which took place in 1936. The first two paragraphs read:

> Mekhanoshin said that they had received the books sent them from America. They were very useful and he apologized for not thanking us for them sooner.
>
> Mekhanoshin said that the general outlines of their work had been explained to Mr. Carter last year, but in 1935 certain changes and reorganization had been effected. The fishing industry needed more scientific work and the biological and oceanographical character of the work had not been satisfactory. Now this work has been improved. Previously they did not know the whole cycles of the life of the fish, but now they are studying it. Their new method of study is to make detailed studies of small regions where the fish are caught. They are now working in the north Caspian on an intensive survey. The study of the physics and chemistry of the sea are brought into practical application. On a basis of their year-round studies they are able to publish bulletins every 5 days during the fishing season telling where the fish are to be found, etc.
>
> They are now doing new meteorological work, making climatic maps of the fishing regions.

Mr. Bogolepov, do you know Mekhanoshin?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. May I see the name, myself?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Mekhanoshin is the right name. Yes, I know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was he?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Which year is that?

Mr. MORRIS. 1936.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1936? If I make no mistake, at that time he was the vice chief of naval intelligence of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Vice chief of——

Mr. MORRIS. Of naval intelligence of the Soviet Union. Mr. Chairman, we have had considerable evidence up to date in these hearings on the extensive efforts made by IPR personnel in connection with their fisheries project, and this is another document along the same lines; namely, about the fact that they were working on this fishing project. We have asked this witness to identify the man who seems to be in charge of this over-all project, at least the man whose name appears on this particular document, and ask this witness to identify him and to place him as a man who was associated with naval intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was a Russian.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a Russian.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you propose to connect up that he was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, of the Soviet Union?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, these are minutes of the meeting, and he was the—it says here "April 9, Institute of Oceanography, ECC, Mr. Carter, OL, Owen Lattimore, Harondar," who has been identified, and the next name is Mekhanoshin, head of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there anything in our record to connect the Institute of Oceanography with the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. This is a meeting at which all these people were present.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, but is there any indication in here or in our record that the Institute of Oceanography had anything to do with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov gave testimony on that subject yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. We know that E. C. Carter, Owen Lattimore and Harriet Moore were connected with the International Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. But the Institute of Oceanography might simply have been a Soviet institute and yet they might still have had a meeting with them. Does our record show anything yet as to anything about this particular fisheries project?

of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask the witness at the outset whether he knows anything about this particular fisheries project?

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, of course. There were two different organizations, this institute where Mekhanoshin was in charge, and the Institute of Pacific Relations. But, as far as American members of the Institute of Pacific Relations called a meeting with the member or the chief of this institute, or another institute, it looks to me all things were connected together. And whether there was no or any formal connection between these two organizations, the facts that the man who was actually working for naval intelligence asked some information from American members of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to me showed that formally or nonformally but still the American Institute of Pacific Relations had something to do with the naval intelligence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, it had something to do with them. Now, as a matter of fact, this only looks as though they had something to do with them. There is nothing here that would indicate that the Institute of Oceanography of the Soviet Union had anything to do with the Institute of Public Relations, is there?

The CHAIRMAN. Except that the initials indicate that members high in the ranks of the Institute of Pacific Relations are on the heading of the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, sir, and this has all of the appearance of being minutes of the IPR meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is minutes of a meeting taken by some IPR people who were over in Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me read one paragraph of this.

ECC asked if they would be interested in the research to be done by the American and Canadian groups on the penetration of the Japanese in the fishing industry. They said that at the moment the situation in regard to the

Japanese was not serious for them. However they were interested in it and would probably do some research on it in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I am presenting this document in order to show exactly what the connection is from these minutes between the people who were engaged in the work of the Institute of Oceanography and the people who were interested in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are offering it for the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it may be admitted. I think the question is rather, again I say, as to the weight of the evidence. Whether it has any bearing or not is a matter of inference.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 758" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 758

MEETING: April 9, Institute of Oceanography; ECC; OL; HM; Harondar

Mekhanoshin—head of Institute
Chugonov
Chesnokov
Bogorov—Specialist on Plankton
Il'yin
Yansan—head of the Far Eastern filial of the Institute
Freiman—Specialist on sea animals
Klemova—Specialist on sea geology

Mekhanoshin said that they had received the books sent them from America. They were very useful and he apologized for not thanking us for them sooner.

Mekhanoshin said that the general outlines of their work had been explained to Mr. Carter last year, but in 1935 certain changes and reorganization had been effected. The fishing industry needed more scientific work and the biological and oceanographical character of the work had not been satisfactory. Now this work has been improved. Previously they did not know the whole cycles of the life of the fish, but now they are studying it. Their new method of study is to make detailed studies of small regions where the fish are caught. They are now working in the north Caspian on an intensive survey. The study of the physics and chemistry of the sea are brought into practical application. On a basis of their year-round studies they are able to publish bulletins, every five days, during the fishing season, telling where the fish are to be found, etc.

They are now doing new meteorological work, making climatic maps of the fishing regions.

The information on the Far Eastern fishing regions is very inadequate, especially in view of the fact that the industry is growing very rapidly there. The demand for far eastern fish products, especially crabs, is growing. Next summer an expedition is to be sent there to study for two years—to do special regional studies such as are being done in the Caspian.

They are also working on improving the technique of catching fish, getting new instruments, etc. For the first time they are collaborating with the Aero-hydrodynamics Institute (one of the biggest scientific institutes). This work is very important, because fishing technology is very backward and they need to develop cadres of engineers in the fishing industry.

They have started submarine research. Previously the fish were studied from the surface, but now they are constructing special means of studying below the surface.

They have experimented in using electrical currents in fishing. By creating electrical fields in the water they can concentrate the fish in one place, and prevent them from going into other electrical fields. This experiment has now reached the stage where it can be applied on a commercial scale. They have tried it at Murmansk. It is a very important development especially for fishing in gulfs and inlets. Previously they have had to block the mouths of gulfs with nets, which were very expensive and often were destroyed in storms. This idea will probably be used by other countries also.

Last year an institute of studying the preparation of fish products, etc., was added to the institute, and therefore the institute now covers all branches of the industry.

This year there are to be several additions to their investigation fleet,

In Murmansk they have two new ships, in the Far East is a new trawler, and three new ones on the Caspian. They also have an airplane on the Black Sea. They now have 60 investigations of fishing regions. 16 are in the Caspian directing the survey. They have 23 stations in various places. In the Far East they have branch institutes in Vladivostok, on Kamchatka, and Sakhalin, and smaller units in other places along the shore. In the Far East sections there are 471 workers of whom 115 are scientific workers.

The demand for fish in the U. S. S. R. is unlimited. At present the demand of the Kholokhoze is growing particularly rapidly. The supply in the sea is likewise unlimited, but in internal waters is more complicated. The development of new hydraulic works and of irrigation effects the water conditions internally. But, since all these projects come under government control, the fishing industry will be protected and they expect that in the long run the fishing in internal waters will be improved in connection with this construction.

There is little scientific information on the question of the extermination of fish. However they are taking measures to prevent this possibility, especially in connection with the Far Eastern crabs.

The new Volga canal could be disastrous for fishing, but measures will be taken to prevent this. The delta of the Volga will be greatly improved. They have made investigation to find new fishing grounds, both in the internal waters and in the open sea. Each year they are now able to give a forecast of where fish are to be caught and how big the catch will be. These forecasts have become very accurate.

The report that the fishing catch on Kamchatka was low for the first quarter is of no significance, because the season does not really begin until June. The low catch in Murmansk is due to the fact that the herring did not come in to the shore. Likewise the weather was very bad there and the gulfs froze, which is most unusual. In the trawling fishing they are having better results than ever before. The herring didn't come in, because their feeding period in the open sea was much longer than usual. This happens fairly frequently, and makes the industry very irregular. Therefore they are trying to develop "active fishing" which means that they find where the fish feed in the open sea and catch them there, instead of waiting for them to come in to the shore.

They are working on experiments to acclimatize fish in new regions. They have already brought Far Eastern crabs to Murmansk. This is a very complex problem, because they have to select the right species, etc., in order not to upset the feeding complex in the new region.

ECC asked if they would be interested in the research to be done by the American and Canadian groups on the penetration of the Japanese in the fishing industry. They said that at the moment the situation in regard to the Japanese was not serious for them. However they were interested in it and would probably do some research on it in the future.

They also study whales, seals, etc. Most of the whale hunting is done in the antarctic where the new Norwegian methods are causing a real decline in the supply. In the Pacific, where the supply is not as great, the catch is also lower. It is stabilized around 40,000 per year and the balance is maintained. However, in European waters there is real danger of extermination.

The seals which they hunt are migrating entirely within Soviet waters. There are two groups, one of which goes to Alaska and the other to the U. S. S. R., after breeding in the open sea, near Wrangel Island. Each year they estimate the number of seals, by aerial photography. The fur of these seals is not important. In 1929–30 there was a big expedition to the Far East to study sea animals. This was the first thing of its kind, as there is little scientific work on Far Eastern waters. They are very interested in the work that is being done in the U. S. in this connection.

They exchange information with Scripps Institute in California and with Woods Hole. Prof. Vaughan at Scripps; Prof. Bigelow at Woods Hole; Prof. Kafoid at the University of California, San Francisco.

They are interested in getting more of the IPR literature. They plan to study more carefully the problems of the IPR this year. They consider themselves as active members of the IPR. They are also interested in the work done in America in connection with fish hatcheries, with studies of the Great Lakes, etc.

Yanson asked that ECC visit their Far Eastern Branch.

In 1913 the total catch of Russia was 13 million centners; in 1929, 9 million and this year 15 million. The Japanese have the largest catch and the U. S. S. R. comes second, USA third, and Norway fourth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if I might comment on that, with the Chair's permission, if in fact this was a meeting held by Mr. Carter and the IPR people who were with him, with representatives of the Institute of Oceanography of the Soviet Union, and that institute actually had no connection with the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, this would be an extremely important document for this record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I refer back to exhibit No. 37, part 1, p. 189, which is a document which was put into the record on that day, which was——

Mr. SOURWINE. Exhibit No. 37, Mr. Morris, indicates that Mr. Mekhanoshin was one of the founders of the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations; isn't that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. But this document which has just been admitted into the record does not show a meeting with Mr. Mekhanoshin as a founder with the Institute of Pacific Relations. It purports to show a meeting with the Institute of Oceanography, does it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Apparently, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are drawing too fine a line there. Again, I say it is a question of weight to be given to the instrument itself, and merely shows association of certain parties along a certain venture.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask this witness a couple of questions, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the names which follow that of Mr. Mekhanoshin are those of officials or employees of the Soviet Institute of Oceanography? Do you recognize any of those names as such?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't know the people who were working in the institute, so I can't answer the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. No; I mean, do you know those names?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, just at this point, I want to revert to a matter the witness testified to yesterday. It has been troubling me to some extent. On yesterday the witness testified to a matter that was related to him by a Russian authority, whose name I can't recall. He was high in the councils of the Soviet Union. And in which it was related by the witness that this man had told him that Mr. Joseph Davies showed him, the Soviet authority, a certain communication. I think that that matter should be cleared up if there is anything more that the witness has to relate as to that incident. It should be cleared up because it is hearsay and extremely remote. I would rather have it cleared up now, if it can be cleared up, if there is anything more to sustain it. Some question should be propounded to this witness as to what more, if anything, he knows, or what more was said to him to tie the parties together, or what was in the communication. Something should be done to clear that situation up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, will you tell us in more detail than you did yesterday about this incident? The question that came up yesterday was casual, Senator, a collateral issue, and was asked by one of the Senators.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. But, to stand there in the record, it is just the same. And that is the reason it has troubled the chairman ever since.

Mr. MORRIS. We would like to reexamine you, Mr. Bogolepov, on the question of Joseph Davies, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Will you tell as specifically as possible, and with as much detail as possible, what you know about Mr. Joseph Davies.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You asked me the question not pertaining to this particular incident I reported yesterday. But you want me to say to you all I know about the activities of Mr. Davies?

Mr. MORRIS. About yesterday, in the first place. You say that he turned over a dispatch, a United States State Department order to him, to a Soviet official; did you not?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not quite.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you say?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I said only that Mr. Joseph Davies, while visiting the Foreign Commissar Litvinov, read to him the contents of the dispatch which he received from the State Department in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Now, you got that information from Mr. Litvinov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Himself; that is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you tell us anything more about Mr. Davies that might cast some light on that particular incident? I think you said yesterday that you did not know that the telegram or the dispatch which Mr. Davies received from the United States State Department was secret.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not know that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I didn't know that.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't know that it was not secret, but you did not know that it was secret?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything else about Mr. Davies that might cast light on that act?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. This incident I reported yesterday to the committee wasn't extremely amazing to me, because I was informed about the very close and good relations which existed between the Foreign Commissar Litvinov and the American Ambassador, and which, in my appreciation, had gone beyond the official relations which should exist between a foreign ambassador and the Foreign Secretary of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the relations went "beyond" that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. They went beyond that.

Mr. MORRIS. What led you to make that conclusion, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. At that time—I mean 1936 or 1937 Mr. Davies was persona grata.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was persona grata?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Persona grata in the Soviet Foreign Office. He called the Soviet Foreign Commissar more often and more informally than any other foreign ambassador could do. At that particular time it had come to my attention that we more than often had in our files photocopies of papers of the State Department of the United States as well as of American Embassies in Moscow and in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get that clear. At that time it came to your attention that there were in the files of the department of the Soviet Government in which you operated papers from the State Department of the United States?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you say "photocopies"?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Photocopies.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you attempt to link that up with Mr. Davies?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; I do not. I just only state the fact—two facts: the friendship between the American Ambassador and the Soviet Foreign Commissar and the ease with which our Foreign Department could get the papers of the State Department. I have not had any opportunity to link these two facts. I merely relate it to you. Coming back to the person of Mr. Joseph Davies, I know from Foreign Commissar Litvinov himself that on many occasions Ambassador Davies consulted with him about these trips that he had to make as American Ambassador, or some of the points in his report to Washington which he was supposed to write, asking Mr. Litvinov to clarify some points, and his advice on what he had to write to his superiors in the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. There would be necessarily nothing improper about that, though; is there, Mr. Bogolepov? I mean, was there anything about that fact that you have just testified to that would seem improper?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You ask my opinion now?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I find it was improper.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, will you give us your reason for it, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't think that any foreign ambassador has to ask the government to which he is accredited what he has to answer for his own government, and that was the case with the American Ambassador asking Litvinov what he has to report about the Soviet Union; whereas, in my opinion, he must have his own conclusions made on these points.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you think of a particular example of such procedure?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was all routine business that was rather difficult for me to remember particular conditions of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, may I ask a question with the Chair's permission?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your testimony that Mr. Litvinov told you that Mr. Davies had asked him, Litvinov, what he, Mr. Davies, should answer in response to a communication that he had received from the American Government?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. Or better to say Litvinov told me that on several occasions, especially during the Moscow trials, Mr. Davies was asking him how to understand this or another thing, and the interpretation of Mr. Litvinov was inserted in the reports of Mr. Davies going to the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Litvinov say he knew that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I know that, because I read the reports of Mr. Davies later in photocopies.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you have access to those?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In photocopies.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that Mr. Litvinov would tell you what he had told Mr. Davies was the proper interpretation, and you would subsequently see photocopies of Mr. Davies' reports containing that interpretation?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is what I mean; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your testimony?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. That clears the matter up to some extent. Standing out as it did yesterday, being brought out here by just an off-hand question which led the witness to make the statement, I didn't like it without further implementation.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else, Mr. Bogolepov, that you might add to this now before we close this collateral issue?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I would like to state only that in all the facts reported by me now, and concerning the personality of Mr. Joseph Davies, I have had and I still have no evidence which linked him intimately with the pro-Soviet activities. I merely stated the several facts which I reported to this committee, which in my opinion shouldn't have taken place in normal relations between a foreign ambassador and foreign government.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you may proceed now, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here a document that was our exhibit No. 1 in executive session with Mr. Edward C. Carter on June 15, 1951, and was authenticated by Mr. Carter at that time. I will have Mr. Mandel identify it again for the open record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated January 16, 1935, addressed to "Dear Fred," with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. And it has been acknowledged, Mr. Chairman, by Mr. Carter as a document—that is what it purports to be on its face—namely, a letter from Mr. Carter to Field.

The CHAIRMAN. It has a number now in our files.

Mr. MORRIS. As of this time in our open hearing, no. It was our exhibit No. 1 in our executive session. Mr. Carter writing to Mr. Field, in January 1935 [reading]:

DEAR FRED: From copies of letters which I have already sent you, you must have realized by now that the U. S. S. R. group could not have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the committee are members of the party. All are influential; all are operating large organizations that have very substantial funds.

Motilev, the chairman of the committee, for example, has budget of 12 million rubles a year for the World Atlas. Voitinsky, the vice chairman, as head of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Communist Academy, has a large staff, a large library, and ample funds for publishing the new magazine, The Pacific Ocean.

Joffe, together with Schmidt, the hero of the Cheliuskin expedition, is famous as a mathematician, as an aviator, as well as an explorer. It is commonly said that Joffe and Schmidt are in charge of everything in the U. S. S. R. north of the sixty-second parallel. This does not simply mean millions of acres of ice and sea between the Atlantic and Pacific and tens of millions of reindeer and polar bears; it also means immense mineral and timber resources and 5,000,000 people.

Swanidze is head of the Bank of Foreign Commerce, is the head of the Soviet State Bank, which finances all of Russia's foreign trade. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics; speaks English perfectly; does not look as if he was over 35. Although one of the busiest men in the U. S. S. R., he took it

as a matter of course when he was asked to translate for us at a 2-hour session on December 25 with the great Varga at the Communist Academy.

It goes on to list more individuals who are active, according to Mr. Carter, in the Institute of Pacific Relations. A later paragraph, Mr. Chairman, which I am now reading from, paragraph 8:

I am sending you a list of all of the fisheries publications which the Institute of Oceanography is receiving from the United States. I would be grateful if you would have this checked through to see whether there are any important publications not on this list which they should secure. Would you send this bibliographical information to them through Kantorovich. They would also like to get from you reports from the private commercial firms engaged in every aspect of the fish business in the United States and Canada. I told them that you and Mrs. Barnes would do your best to get these, but that the scientific work of American business corporations are not always very extensive and that their financial statements were sometimes intended to obscure rather than reveal the economic basis of commercial activity. It will, however, pay you to dragnet the two countries to get the reports of the various fish companies, for, about the time you get this letter, your library will receive about a cubic yard of the most important Soviet publications on every aspect of the fish industry. You should immediately notify the principal fishing authorities in Washington and elsewhere of the existence of this priceless and unique collection on your shelves.

Mr. Bogolepov, judging by what I have just read to you, does that seem to be the same project that you have given testimony about before? Namely, that the Soviets were using the IPR to collect information of interest to the Naval Intelligence under the cover of this fishing study?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It looks like so.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, can you develop that any further?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. May I see the document, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, both Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Field, who are being asked to collect this information, have been witnesses before this committee and have refused to say whether or not they were Communists on the grounds that their answers might tend to incriminate them.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, sir, perhaps the best I can do is just to tell that from nine people mentioned here in this document, in this letter from Frederick Field to Mr. Carter——

Mr. MORRIS. That is from Mr. Carter to Mr. Field.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sorry; that is right. [Continuing.] There are only three names which I can identify as having something to do with research work. All of the rest of them are members either of Military Intelligence or of Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify them for the record, please?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Motilev, Professor Motilev, the Red professor, a party member charged by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for leading the project of Council for Foreign Relations; Voitinsky, member of Comintern. Joffe—I would be reluctant to say anything about Joffe because there is no first name and I knew five Joffes in Moscow; so, I don't know about whom you are speaking. Swanidze, who is said to be a director of some kind of bank, in reality was one of the Chiefs of the Foreign Administration of the Soviet secret police, NKVD. Varga, one of the most important people on this list, was the member of the executive committee of the Communist International. Eugene Harondar, who is assigned here as being a secretary of the Soviet Council for Foreign Relations, actually is a man of Political Intelligence—I mean, of the secret police. Jan-

son was also a member of the Foreign Administration of NKVD. And the last person mentioned in this list, Kantorovich, as I told you yesterday, was a nonparty man and a real scholar. They introduced him in order to have somebody who could speak about some research work.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any doubt in your mind that if Mrs. Barnes and Mr. Field, at the suggestion of Mr. Carter, obtained this information from the American commercial firms that it would repose in the files of the Military Intelligence of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I guess so.

Mr. MORRIS. The question is, do you have any doubt?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No doubt.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this letter, please.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated September 12, 1937, addressed to Mr. Owen Lattimore, with the typed signature of Edward C. Carter. It is a photostat of a carbon copy of the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is Mr. Carter writing to Mr. Lattimore, on September 12, 1937. This has been identified by Mr. Mandel as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The first paragraph [reading]:

DEAR OWEN: This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip. He wants to arrange things so that you and he can go together. Because of exceptionally heavy pressure on him in connection with completing the next stage of the Atlas, this year is quite out of the question for him to go to Mongolia. Had he been free he would have come to the Soviet Far East to meet me, but Atlas pressure tied him to Moscow. He sent Bremman, the secretary general of the U. S. S. R. council, who speaks Japanese, and Krasavtsev, who speaks Chinese. As one is a party member and one a nonparty member and each has had the richest kind of personal experience both in the Soviet Union and in the Far East, they made an exceptionally useful, delightful, and informing combination.

Mr. Bogolepov, do you know either of those two men?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The first one by name, simply.

Mr. MORRIS. Bremman?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Bremman.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what the regulations were to foreigners going in to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The same as for the Soviet citizens—no admission.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean Soviet citizens were not allowed to go to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know from your own experience that that was the case?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Because there is no cases when somebody of the Soviet citizens on private business could go to Mongolia. To Mongolia we send only people in charge of military missions, of intelligence or on party duties, and then only on official missions. But no one, private citizen, no scholar, nobody else could go to Mongolia, and certainly no foreigner.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say, to your knowledge, that no foreigner was allowed to go into Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. For a short time, approximately 1936, when I was obliged to work on the problem of admission of Mongolia to the League of Nations, I was rather closely connected with Mongolian matters. I read a lot of things in our Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Office, and this confirmed, in my opinion, that the Mongolian border was closed to anybody else, save the people on highly official missions.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you allowed to go to Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I didn't ask about it. If I would ask on my proper interest, certainly I would be rejected.

Mr. MORRIS. You think you would have been rejected?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Certainly. If I would be sent by the Soviet Government, that is another thing. But if I, for my own proper interest, would like to go to Mongolia, certainly the answer would be "no."

The CHAIRMAN. From whom would that rejection come, from the Soviet authorities or from the Mongolian authorities?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. There is not and never was such a thing as Mongolian authority, sir. There is only Soviet authority which commands that.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have been the Soviet authorities which would command your entry into Mongolia?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. If, as a private citizen, I would like to go there; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this a significant sentence: "Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip"? That is Carter writing to Lattimore.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. What is the date?

Mr. MORRIS. September 12, 1937.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Approximately a couple or 3 months after the incident I reported yesterday to you, when Lattimore was assigned with a mission to prepare the terrain.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Will you tell us about that with a little more detail? We had not quite finished that episode yesterday. Will you tell us again, stretching as much as possible the details, about that decision which you now refer to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. You would like me to repeat what I said yesterday?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. All right. As I reported already, in the collegium session of the Foreign Minister and his deputies, which was held twice a week in the building of the Foreign Office in Moscow, the question was discussed about the necessity and ways to bring so-called Popular Republic of Mongolia into the League of Nations, in order that the Soviet Union would obtain one more voice and assume more support.

While making this report, going from the point of view of the statute of the League of Nations and how Mongolia could be accepted, I reminded the negative impression which was received on that particular point from our ambassadors in foreign countries, including Washington, who say that it looks like it is quite impossible.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that all your foreign offices advised that it would have been impossible for Mongolia at that time to be admitted to the League of Nations?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, because nobody in the West considered Mongolia as an independent country.

Mr. MORRIS. Because nobody in the West considered Mongolia as an independent country?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Then we discussed a little bit what we have to do on that particular case, and Litvinov said that in that case we have to make some arrangement so that the opinion of the West would be changed in our favor, and he asked that we have to put to work some—I don't remember his expression—did he say the people are on our side or our people—I am not sure on the correct expression of him, but he said that we have to put people to work for us and to make the situation more favorable before we should take any official and formal statement.

While discussing this point, he made the suggestion that some of the foreign scholars and writers, et cetera, in foreign countries—and in the first place in England, France, and the United States—would be put immediately at work on that line.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say these people would be put on that particular assignment——

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Would they be subject to the Soviet Foreign Office direction?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No. As I explained yesterday, the Soviet Foreign Office merely elaborated the suggestions—what would be preferable to do.

You have to understand, gentlemen, that there is a big difference between the Soviet Foreign Office and the State Department, for example, for the role foreign policy of the Soviet Union isn't carried by the Soviet Foreign Office only but through other organizations, first of all through the Executive Committee of the Comintern, through the Soviet Secret Police, and other organizations.

We were working in the Foreign Office only in the diplomatic field which does not correspond always with the political field.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, policy is not always set by the Foreign Office?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No.

Mr. MORRIS. More likely by the Executive Committee of the Comintern or by the military police?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. All important suggestions which we make in the Foreign Office had to be submitted to the so-called political commission of the Politburo. This political commission took the decision and then assigned who was to fulfill, to carry out in life this decision, either the Foreign Office itself or the Secret Police, or the Comintern, and so on. And on that particular matter which I am reporting now—I mean, making the people to do some propaganda in our account—that was not the Foreign Office in charge, but some other organization; in the first place, Comintern and intelligence.

So all we did, we made our suggestion that the public opinions in the west must be worked out, must be changed in our favor.

And as far as concerns the United States, Litvinov's own suggestion was to put on this business Mr. Owen Lattimore, who was known to us as one of America's outstanding experts on the far eastern matters. And so this decision was taken. How it was carried out or whether it was carried out, I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the decision was made. Was there an actual decision made by that body which convened at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you describe that yesterday, Mr. Bogolepov—that body that was there convening, that group that was meeting at that time?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is the Foreign Commissar and his deputies, and they took the decision that Mr. Lattimore should write an article, a book, I don't know what about—I don't know what—about Mongolia which makes the situation favorable for the aims and problems of the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. You called that the Collegium yesterday; did you not?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Under the circumstances, would Mr. Lattimore have been under Soviet direction to carry out such an undertaking as you stated at that meeting?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I didn't get the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it have been necessary for Mr. Owen Lattimore to be under the Soviet direction if he were to carry out the assignment which was agreed upon at that meeting which you are now testifying to?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. In other words, you are asking me whether Mr. Lattimore was obliged to carry out the decision or not?

The CHAIRMAN. He interprets your question just about right. That is not the way you intend it, maybe. He is keen enough to see your point.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain it, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I still don't understand what you want me to answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. To put it another way, Mr. Bogolepov, could this decision which was made by the collegium have been a decision merely to seek to hire an independent American writer to do something, or was it in the nature of a decision to send orders to a man who was subject to the orders or instructions of the collegium?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Would you please tell me, Mr. Sourwine, if you will ask me, for example, that I have to kill somebody else, and you will do me this proposal, do you think if you make this proposal I am not prepared to do this business?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, that is not an answer to the question. There is no proposal here that anybody kill anyone.

I would like to have you think over that thing and see if you cannot give us an answer to it which is more responsive to the question than that.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Perhaps I took not a very good example.

Mr. SOURWINE. No, you did not.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. But what I mean is that Litvinov proposes somebody to do some kind of business. Evidently he meant that this business will be done. That is what I mean. It was not a question that "we will go to Mr. Lattimore and ask him to be so kind and write this story, and maybe he will say "No."

In my opinion, it was said so short and in such a categorical form that there was no slightest doubt left to me that Mr. Lattimore was the right man who was to take this assignment. Does that answer it?

Mr. SOURWINE. That answer is responsive.

Mr. MORRIS. And, Mr. Bogolepov, we will get back to the second sentence in the letter of September 12, 1937, on which you were giving me an answer, and on which you referred back to this episode which you have now elaborated upon.

The sentence is:

Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. To me, the sentence in the letter you have worded looks like logical development of the story I just reported to the committee. If Motylev was eager to get Lattimore going to Mongolia—you must understand it was not his personal wish and interest because a member of the party has no personal wish or interest. He is acting always on the directive of higher organizations, and so, to me it looks, at least, like a carrying out of the directive of the collegium, at which I was present myself, in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it indicate to you that Mr. Lattimore was acquiescing to this project?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Acquiescing?

Mr. MORRIS. Agreeing?

The CHAIRMAN. Your question there is pretty deep, pretty conclusive. I think you better let the witness testify. He is an intelligent witness.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I call the witness' attention to the P. S. in this letter, which reads:

P. S.—Perhaps I ought to add that Motylev may not find it easy to get permission for you to go to Mongolia. It took him weeks finally to get permission for me to go to certain parts of the Soviet Far East and I gathered from what he said that he anticipated even more effort would be required in the case of Mongolia. But he is so definitely committed to getting the permission so that he and you can go together that nothing further needs to be except to leave everything in his hands.

Would you comment on that postscript?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, I can. Perhaps you will think that the difficulties or the troubles which the project of getting Lattimore going to Mongolia, which you are referred to do not corroborate with my statement. But I have to draw your attention to the fact that if you think that in the Soviet Union, in that totalitarian police state, everything is O. K., you are certainly mistaken. There is a struggle between the authorities. There is competition between the authorities. One of the greatest enemies of the Foreign Office in the field of internal policy or relations between the different branches of administration was always military intelligence and political intelligence, secret police.

In this case, this particular case, the Soviet Foreign Office would let Lattimore go to Mongolia. But it looks to me like military intelligence didn't like him to go to Mongolia. And so some kind of a struggle was behind the doors on that particular case, but nothing more.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions on that particular letter, Mr. Chairman. May the letters be inserted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. They will be inserted into the record.

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 759 and 760" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 759

Copy: W. L. Holland. Please do not publish this letter and do not make any reference to the financial basis of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. This letter should

not be shown to others but you can share its more general information with the officers of the Japanese Council orally.

E. C. C.

SS "CHITRAL,"
Port Said, 16th January 1935.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York,
U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: From copies of letters which I have already sent you, you must have realised by now that the U. S. S. R. group could not have begun to work under better auspices. A majority of the members of the committee are members of the party. All are influential; all are operating large organisations that have very substantial funds.

Motilev, the Chairman of the Committee, for example, has a budget of 12 million roubles a year for the World Atlas. Voitinsky, the Vice-Chairman, as head of the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Communist Academy, has a large staff, a large library, and ample funds for publishing the new magazine, "The Pacific Ocean."

Joffe, together with Schmidt, the hero of the Cheliuskin expedition, is famous as a mathematician, as an aviator, as well as an explorer. It is commonly said that Joffe and Schmidt are in charge of everything in the U. S. S. R. north of the 62nd parallel. This does not simply mean millions of acres of ice and sea between the Atlantic and Pacific and tens of millions of reindeer and polar bears; it also means immense mineral and timber resources and five million people.

Swanidze is head of the Bank of Foreign Commerce, is the head of the Soviet State Bank, which finances *all* of Russia's foreign trade. He is a graduate of the London School of Economics, speaks English perfectly, does not look as if he was over 35 although one of the busiest men in the U. S. S. R. took it as a matter of course when he was asked to translate for us at a two-hour session on December 25th with the great Varga at the Communist Academy.

Janson, as head of the Chamber of Commerce, has a big organisation at his beck and call, has moved from the old building in which you and I saw the Chamber of Commerce when it was under the direction of Bunsch-Osmolovsky. The new building is the famous old headquarters of the Moscow Stock Exchange. It houses the offices of the Chamber and also its very strikingly arranged exhibit of Soviet products.

The Institute of Oceanography is similarly a very important body. It handles both the scientific and economic side of the entire U. S. S. R. fish industry. Its work is of immense scientific importance to the future food supply of the U. S. S. R., and has a direct political bearing on the situation in the far east because of the constant friction between Japanese and Soviet fishermen and because of the scientific competition that exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R. in the development of the fish resources.

When, for example, I asked to meet the head of the Institute on Oceanography, a group of the eight principal heads of departments came for a long afternoon conference. There were experts from the Bering Sea, the Arctic, the Black and Caspian, and from the rivers. Research is going on with reference to all of the underlying principles of Oceanography, including hydrography, hydrographical chemistry, ichthyology, the organization and technique of fishing, including the type of vessel; the life of the nets; the economic advantages of mechanisation; the economic return from fishing in the open deep seas and along the coasts; technical problems of finishing, salting, packing, and improving the quality of the final product.

I am sending you the list of all of the fisheries publications which the Institute of Oceanography is receiving from the United States. I would be grateful if you would have this checked through to see whether there are any important publications not on this list which they should secure. Would you send this bibliographical information to them through Kantorovich. They would also like to get from you reports from the private commercial firms engaged in every aspect of the fish business in the United States and Canada. I told them that you and Mrs. Barnes would do your best to get these, but that the scientific work of American business corporations was not always very extensive and that their financial statements were sometimes intended to obscure rather than reveal the economic basis of commercial activity. It will, however, pay you to dragnet the two countries to get the reports of the various fish companies for, about the time you get this letter, your library will receive about a cubic yard of the

most important Soviet publications on every aspect of the fish industry. You should immediately notify the principal fishing authorities in Washington and elsewhere of the existence of this priceless and unique collection on your shelves.

The tale of the work of the Institute of Oceanography could be written into a thrilling "Pacific Affairs" article. The mechanisation of the fish industry, the transplanting of small boats with trawlers, the maintenance of motorboat stations, the diversion of fishermen to other industries as the result of mechanisation, altogether a most impressive story.

It is interesting to know that it is estimated that the Soviet Union's capacity to consume fish will always be greater than the capacity of all the lakes, rivers, and oceans to meet the demand, in spite of the enormous gains made through scientific research and the mechanisation of the industry.

Kantorovich, the Secretary-General, is able, frank, well-informed, and speaks English rapidly and vigorously. He was a member of the Soviet Embassy in Peiping. He is not a member of the Party but would never have been made Secretary-General if he was not trusted implicitly by Party members. His special field of study is American policy in China. He has just finished a big book on this subject which will shortly go to the printers. He knew, personally, a great many of our mutual Chinese and foreign friends in China. He has got an excellent critical faculty and is a really first-class administrator. The speed and precision with which he made engagements for us while we were in Moscow was in striking and refreshing contrast to the delays of former visits.

Kantorovich's office is in the office of the World Atlas. His office assistant is Eugene Harondar, who speaks English, French, and German perfectly and can take shorthand in several languages and types rapidly in all. He gives half time to the I. P. R. and the other half is given to deciding what of all that is appearing in the movies magazines in the world in various languages, is worth translating into Russia. He was recently political, or Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Commissioner of heavy industries. He is in close contact with everyone in the Movie, Ballet, Theatrical, and Operatic world.

The housing of the I. P. R. in the office of the World Atlas is appropriate from many points of view. The Atlas is able to draw on every library in Moscow; thus Kantorovich and Harriet Moore have automatically a machinery for bringing to their desks, every needed book and periodical. Molitev himself is an economist, a professor in one of the Universities and was until recently head of the great Soviet Encyclopedia. He has travelled widely in England, Germany, and France. Both his English and his German are excellent. He is likely to go to China and Japan this summer. We are hoping that he will go early enough to attend the Tokyo meeting. He has a gold limit for the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. of four or five thousand gold roubles. If this is not enough for this year's expenses he is prepared to appropriate an approximately equivalent amount from his Atlas budget. He is determined that no necessary piece of work which the U. S. S. R. I. P. R. should do, shall fail for lack of funds.

You have already had the list of the Russian books which the Soviet I. P. R. is sending to the joint Russian library which is now being established in New York under the auspices of the American and Pacific Councils. The list of the books that you are sending is much appreciated. I have just one comment on the list which you have sent. From one of your first letters I gathered that you were going to send quite an important collection of American books that had not been published by the I. P. R. If it possible for you to carry out your plan in this connection it would be enormously appreciated. There are many books coming out in America which are not directly on the Pacific, but which nevertheless are essential in a Pacific library, e. g., the recent books of Alsberg and Hutchins on America's International Economic Relations; the four Brookings Institution books on America's capacity to produce and consume, etc.

I am asking Harriet Moore to write you at length as to her ideas as to what New York should sent to Moscow in response to what Moscow is sending to New York.

You will be glad to know that in accordance with a request I have made, Motilev is going to present to the I. P. R. library in New York, not only the twelve volume small edition of the Soviet Encyclopedia, but the entire big edition, which will ultimately be some 66 volumes. Some of the earlier volumes are out of print, but he is having a search made so that a full set of the volumes already published will be sent and copies of the volumes still to be published will be sent to New York as they appear. These two gifts in themselves are so generous that I hope your plan of a presentation of American books to Moscow can be developed on an equivalent scale.

I think I have already told you that von Valree, the head of the Amstal Bank and head of the Pacific Institute in Amsterdam is going this month to Moscow on an unofficial trade mission from the Netherlands, and is to establish direct contact with Motilev. I have already urged you to get Wu to Moscow before Miss Moore leaves.

I have given the British and French groups a fairly adequate picture of the development of the I. P. R. in Moscow. At the meeting of the French group, when I did this, Hirschfelt, the Councillor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was present. He has followed the work of the I. P. R. with interest and is glad that so competent students as Mrs. Barnes and Miss Moore are continuing to labour in the Russian field.

Motilev and Kantorovich will secure every facility that Miss Moore can get from any source. They are highly pleased with the way she has gone about her job. The only criticism has been that she has not made more demands on them.

I saw Litvinova and he, as usual, was frank and cooperative. He said that he had hesitated to urge the formation of the Moscow group when it first proposed it because the Soviet Union was so short of personnel that he did not favour Soviet participation in the I. P. R. until the Soviet contribution could be adequate. He hoped that we would not expect too much at this early stage as they are still short of personnel.

I was told by Motilev that my visit to Litvinova in Geneva last summer had been a decisive factor in the favourable decision.

In connection with our discussions of the language problem and the emphasis on Russian studies in England and the United States, it was possible to take steps which would put Motilev in touch with Litvinova in the matter of Basic English. As you know, Litvinova is teaching classes of Basic English in the Red Army, the Kremlin and the Foreign Office.

The Praesidium informed us the last day that the Soviet group would prepare chapters for the studies on the status of aliens and communications. This was a sort of supreme yardstick of their willingness to cooperate in every major project, because Mackenzie had supplied us as models of what he desired for these two studies; samples which in one case were unfinished and another inaccurate. They were quick to notice absence of editorial mastery which Mackenzie's samples exhibited, but were willing nevertheless to provide their own materials.

Their official hospitality was discriminating and yet overwhelming in its abundance. They realised that our main job was serious discussion, but their provision for entertainment was a striking demonstration of the fact that the whole machinery of the State and of the scientific world was at the disposal of the Secretary-General.

This letter, as you will note, is a mixture of personal impressions and I. P. R. information. It is not, therefore, for general circulation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

SS "CHITRAL,"
Port Said, 16th January 1945.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: With reference to paragraph 2 on page 3 of my letter of this date, there is one other very minor comment which I have to make, namely, that you have given titles without authors on your list, so that it is a little difficult to identify just what you are sending.

Sincerely yours,

(s) Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Handwritten:) The enclosed may be shown to all in the office who are interested & to Jerome Greene. You will know better than I whether Baker & Escott Reid would like to see it. I guess you better *not* show it to Reid because of the mention of McKenzie. Do not have any reference made in print to the financial basis of the U. S. S. R. I. P. R.

EXHIBIT No. 760

HOTEL RICHMOND, GENEVA, *September 12, 1937.*

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
33A Ta Yuan Fu Hutung,
Peiping, China.

DEAR OWEN: This is to report on my conversation with Motylev regarding your trip to Mongolia. Motylev is as eager as ever to have you make the trip. He wants to arrange things so that you and he can go together. Because of exceptionally heavy pressure on him in connection with completing the next stage of the Atlas, this year is quite out of the question for him to go to Mongolia. Had he been free he would have come to the Soviet Far East to meet me, but Atlas pressure tied him to Moscow. He sent Bremman, the Secretary-General of the U. S. S. R. Council, who speaks Japanese and Krasavtsev who speaks Chinese. As one is a Party member and one a non-party member and each has had the richest kind of personal experience both in the Soviet Union and in the Far East they made an exceptionally useful, delightful and informing combination.

As I think you know, Motylev arranged for me to go to several places in the Soviet Far East to which no non-Soviet citizen has ever been invited. The people in the British and American Embassies in Moscow were most envious and wanted to use my visit as a precedent to get permission to go to places like Komsomolsk themselves. It seems that the justification for my going was as the chief executive of an international organization in which a representative Soviet scientific organization is an active member.

Motylev had been planning to go the Nanking meeting of the Pacific Council and was hoping that if this were possible he might be free soon after to go to Mongolia with you.

Now, of course, the war situation makes the future for him and the Institute most uncertain, so that for the time being it will be a good scheme for you to make your plans for next year in such a way that if Motylev can go to Mongolia and if the war situation makes it possible for him to get your permit and for you to go, a Mongolian trip would be a possibility. But until we know more than we do now as to the duration and consequences of Chinese resistance and Japanese endurance and Soviet involvement there is nothing to do but keep plans flexible as you and I have formed the habit of doing during recent years.

With reference to PACIFIC AFFAIRS the atmosphere was totally different from that which characterized our discussions when you and I were in Moscow. At that time, you will remember, Motylev was on the offensive, particularly because of the Isaacs article and relationship. This year Motylev and Bremman were not even on the defensive. They humbly admitted that they had not carried out their promises to you and me and their obligations to the Institute and that there was no use of their offering the excuse that it was difficult to get Soviet citizens to write for PACIFIC AFFAIRS when neither of them had themselves found time to write articles. They wanted me to explain to you that they were thoroughly ashamed of their failure to send articles and they made the most solemn kind of resolves to themselves write and send you something in the near future.

I told them that both you and I wished that the Voitinsky article had been sent to PACIFIC AFFAIRS instead of being published in TIKHII OKEAN. I said that we both felt that it was precisely the kind of article that we wanted in PACIFIC AFFAIRS, whereupon Motylev meekly admitted that Voitinsky had written the article especially for PACIFIC AFFAIRS, that Bremman and Voitinsky were keen to have it sent to you, but that Motylev felt that the other Councils would regard it as too provocative and tendencious and so had it shifted to TIKHII OKEAN. Bremman, of course, was delighted that you and I sided with him. I think that the incident has this value that Motylev now has a concrete example of what we all would like from the Soviet Council in PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Brennan, who at that time had only seen the first issue of AMERASIA, felt that the policy of the magazine promised to be defeatist, and that instead of educating American public opinion in the realities of the Far Eastern situation, it was likely to intensify the ostrich-like attitude of the American people and the American Government. I told him that I felt sure that both you and Fred would welcome incisive criticism of AMERASIA, in case they wished to contribute an article on the subject of PACIFIC AFFAIRS. I cabled Fred to send Motylev the whole file of AMERASIA from the beginning.

I read between the lines that they welcomed my suggestion that if they didn't think the time had come for them to be the first Council to come out with an article analysing Japanese policy, they might render a very great service by an article analysing either American or British policy.

You will have gathered by now that the Soviet I. P. R. extended to me every possible facility and courtesy throughout my stay in the Soviet Union. The members of no Council have made more comprehensive plans for a visit of an officer of the International Secretariat or incurred as great expense.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,

P. S.—Perhaps I ought to add that Motylev may not find it easy to get permission for you to go to Mongolia. It took him weeks finally to get permission for me to go to certain parts of the Soviet Far East and I gathered from what he said that he anticipated even more effort would be required in the case of Mongolia. But he is so definitely committed to getting the permission so that he and you can go together that nothing further needs to be done except to leave everything in his hands.

Copies: W. H. Holland.
Harriet Moore.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I would like to refer to our exhibit No. 499, part 9, page 3243, which was introduced at the open session of March 1, 1952. This is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev, and it is dated February 10, 1936 [reading]:

This is to confirm our interchange of cables, as follows:

"Lattimore and I propose visit Moscow March Twenty-nine to April seventeen. Please cable whether convenient for you.

"CARTER."

"Will be glad see you. Lattimore suggested time.

"MOTYLEV."

It was delightful to discover that the dates which I proposed would be convenient, for I know Lattimore for a long time has been anxious to meet you, to visit Moscow, and to advance his knowledge of the affairs and ideas of the Soviet Union. After the Yosemite conference he hopes to learn the Russian language with a view of a more extended visit of the U. S. S. R. in 1937. But as a preliminary to all that, the visit which I have proposed in my cable, will, I am sure, greatly facilitate all his future studies of Soviet affairs. As you know, Mongolia is one of his areas of concentration but his interests are wide.

Does that suggest anything to you, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Would you let me see it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The last paragraph, in my opinion, is very interesting.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the last paragraph?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV (reading):

The American Council desires that I raise with you the question of arranging for the Soviet IPR representatives to meet influential groups of American citizens in New York, Washington, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco.

To me, it looks like this organization was used by the Soviet Government as a channel to bring people to the United States who otherwise, perhaps, might have some trouble in getting in under the cover of research work and scholarship, and under the sponsorship of one of the American leading scholar organizations. It would be easier to get American visas. And I know, from my experience, that it was the way on which we have been working, not only on this particular case. We were always trying to put our people not directly but through somebody else, through other channels as neutral as possible, and for this particular thing we plant agents in foreign organizations whose representation was particularly well fitted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that letter is already in our public record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this next document, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked "Confidential, not for distribution outside the office." It is not dated. There are 11 pages.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph of this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is it signed by?

Mr. MORRIS. This is an unsigned memorandum, Mr. Chairman, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is entitled: "Report on Soviet Relations With the Institute of Pacific Relations, Confidential, Not for Distribution Outside the Office."

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know by whom it was made?

Mr. MORRIS. No, sir. It was a letter taken from the files of the Institute.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Paragraph midway on page 3, reads:

> The fiction is even more potent in the Soviet Union than, for example, in Japan, but it is quite apparent that the Soviet Union itself is going to maintain it. Several Soviet organizations, such as VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and TASS, the Soviet News Agency, have been established with very careful legal autonomy. Whether the Soviet council of the institute is established under VOKS, or as a separate organization, the institute would do well to regard it in correspondence, etc., as an entirely independent and unofficial organization.
>
> Such a policy would have advantages outside of the field of institute relations with the Soviet Union. It is fairly important to take safeguards against any circumstance arising which might provide ammunition for those non-Soviet members of the institute who may suspect Bolshevik propaganda in the work of the Soviet council. If a clear distinction is established and maintained in institute circles between the Soviet council and Narkomindel, it will help in any such contingency."

What is Narkomindel?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. The foreign office.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comment to make on those two particular paragraphs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I don't know whether I should, because it is so completely clear.

Mr. MORRIS. What does it mean to you?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It means to me, first of all, that when they are speaking about some legal autonomy of one or the other Soviet organizations, it means that they do not know anything about the Soviet conditions.

Secondly, and what is yet more important, that all the organizations which are mentioned here, this VOKS and TASS of the Soviet Union, besides their direct work, are cover organizations for Soviet intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I know it from my own experience. In other words, when this document, this confidential document, wants these organizations as very respectable and legal, it means to me, as I told you, either they don't know anything about Soviet realities, or they help this subversive organization to be whitewashed in foreign countries.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other questions on that document?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions on that document, but I think there is a loose end hanging, if I might revert to something before you go on to another question, with the permission of the Chair.

We had some discussion earlier at today's session with regard to this meeting on April 9, 1936, of certain IPR people with the Institute of Oceanography, and I believe I inquired at that time whether there was anything in our record to show that the Institute of Oceanography was connected with the Soviet council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I believe the record is not clear on that point, and I would like to ask now, is it not a fact that our record does show that when the Soviet council of the Institute of Pacific Relations was founded in 1934, one of the organizations which joined in founding that Soviet council of IPR was the Institute of Oceanography, and that the Institute of Oceanography was at that time represented by Mr. Mekhanoshin, who has been here identified, and whose name appears on these minutes?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I believe I read that from our previous exhibit, No. 37, part 1, page 189, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. So the Institute of Oceanography is, then, or was, at least in 1936, at the time of this meeting, an affiliate of the Soviet Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. According to our records.

I would like to ask this witness a question: Did you know of the existence of an organization called the Institute of Oceanography in Soviet Russia in 1936?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that an official organ of the Soviet Government?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; in so much as all organs are official in the Soviet Union. There are no nongovernmental organs.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, there are no private, independent research organizations in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Mr. Mekhanoshin, concerning whom you have testified here, held a position in naval intelligence, did you say?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So while he is identified here as head of the Institute of Oceanography, he was also, to your knowledge—what did you say his position was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Vice Chief of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Vice Chief of Naval Intelligence of the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, with respect to that last document, may that be introduced into the record as the document concerning which I questioned the witness, and may I also take up with Mr. Carter the possible authentication of that document?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And there was another one yesterday.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

I think if we keep them all together we can do it in one operation.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that this could be identified in a more satisfactory manner. Perhaps, if you hold off until Mr. Carter is brought back on the stand, you can identify both of them—everything you have on that. The only identification now is that each was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I will withhold the ruling on it until you bring Mr. Carter or somebody else to identify it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make reference to our exhibit No. 485, part 9, page 3172, which was introduced into the open record on February 29, 1952. This is a memorandum on a meeting in Moscow at which the following people were in attendance: Motylev, Voitinsky, Carter, Harriet Moore, and Mr. Haronder.

Paragraph 4 reads:

Owen Lattimore said that he would like to meet the Soviet suggestion as far as possible in re having a more definite opinion expressed in PA. He has not been able to do this before because he has not had close cooperation from the various councils. He said that if the Soviet group would start on such a line, he would be able to make the others cooperate more fully. Voitinsky said that the main trouble was that the articles in PA did not come out against the aggressor, and the aggressor was not analyzed from within. Therefore, there was no indication of the internal weakness of the aggressor. OL asked for an article on the structure of the Japanese Empire. This might bring out the point that continental aggression was not antithetical to maritime aggression, but the two supplemented each other. Voitinsky said that this would probably be possible. He also suggested that there should be an article on aggression against Outer Mongolia, as this was so important now.

Do you know the importance referred to in those two paragraphs?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. 1937?

Mr. MORRIS. No, 1936; April 12.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, certainly. Starting with 1932 and 1933, the Soviet Government was pretty well concerned with the defense of Mongolia as well as the Soviet Far East against possible Japanese aggression. It was the time, I remember, when in the high Soviet organizations the mood was rather close to panic because all thoughts indicated that the Japanese might every day start the attack against the Soviet Far East and Mongolia. Whereas, the particular military measures were taken at that time by the defense commissariat, the NKVD was to mobilize the public opinion of the West, especially in England and the United States, in order to make pressure on the Japanese Government and to create an international atmosphere which would disturb the Japanese plan of attack on Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Far East.

So the passage you quoted here and which perhaps might look to you as a discussion between two scholars actually was the carrying out by the Soviet of the political directive of the Soviet Government.

Mr. MORRIS. It says here that this was so important. Voitinsky said that was important—that was important to the Soviet Union.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Important to the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. In the next paragraph, I read here:

OL said that this had been done in regard to the article on the Chinese land tax. A Chinese version of the article had appeared, but this was revised to meet the needs of a non-Chinese audience. The material was the same, but differently organized. OL said that he would like about six articles a year from the Soviet council. Voitinsky said that they would do one on Outer Mongolia to be ready for the next issue, to be mailed on May 20, and then one on Korea and one on the Japanese Empire. He said that he would like to write an article in reply

to White's article. OL said that they would make it possible to have two Soviet articles in one issue. Voitinsky said that these articles would be done on the basis of the material which had already appeared in Tikhii Okean, but would be polished for export.

Did you know anything about such a procedure?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. At the beginning of the operation infiltration, as I can call the big program of poisoning the western mind with the Soviet propaganda, about which I have spoken yesterday, the trouble arose because our people were rather cumbersome. They were accustomed to speak to the Communist-minded people in very rough and political language, and so our first effort to send abroad the article written by Soviet authors failed mostly because of the improper language, and the western reader couldn't digest the Soviet propaganda done in the same way as it is done inside the Soviet Union.

So the question arose, as it is said in this document, to polish our documents which are sent for publication abroad.

And so there developed in the course of time a big branch of propaganda industry—I mean, the preparation of the propaganda material specially designated for western tasks. The quotation which I hear right now is just one of the examples of this kind of business. I can understand from hearing this paper why the Soviet delegates were insisting on bringing the material in the American magazines.

What I can't understand is why the American members were eager to get Soviet propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. It goes on to say here:

He said that the articles would have to be translated here—

"here" being Moscow.

What is the significance of that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is perhaps only taking a point, as far as I understand it.

Mr. MORRIS (reading):

es
the OL brought up the question of editing the vocabulary in left and Soviet articles.
In regard to the Asiaticus article, he had to revise the vocabulary considerably
or otherwise the article would have been discounted as propaganda. In the
de Kantorovich article, OL had edited out a number of things but the New York office had put them back in. Voitinsky said that that would be impossible with their articles because they cannot give in on their point of view. No such editorial changes could be made without their approval. He said that he understood the problem of PA and knew what sort of thing they would have to write for it.

Have you any comment on that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can say that you heard that an editor is editing the articles, not the author. But in this particular case it is the author who dictates to the editor what to do. That looks to me that way.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have quite a few minutes which have already been introduced into the record. Would you like the record to show their being interpreted by this particular witness based on his expert knowledge of the situation in Moscow at that time?

It might take a little time, and I do not know to what extent we should go into that, Mr. Chairman. They are along the same lines as we have been discussing.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that not a matter for the conclusion of the committee? As a matter of fact, are we not capable of forming our own conclusions?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you think that this particular witness cannot add to it——

The CHAIRMAN. He might add to it, but I think it is pretty clear.

Mr. MORRIS. May I go on, then, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. As regards this exhibit that you have offered here and the one that you offered yesterday, it is possible that the present occupant of the chair might not be in the chair at some other meeting and this matter will be up here.

It seems to me that they could be admitted with the understanding that they are to be identified later on. I understand they can be identified by Mr. Carter or by his attorney.

Mr. SOURWINE. I was going to ask Mr. Morris if it was not true that there is a stipulation, an arrangement with Mr. Carter's attorney for a stipulation, of Mr. Carter about the files of the IPR which are authentic.

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what the stipulation is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only that he will, in cases which we offer him for the record and which are authentic, and which he knows to be authentic, stipulate to that effect without going back on the stand.

The CHAIRMAN. And if he does not stipulate to it, then this will go out of the record. Is that right?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right, at the Chair's order.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, then; the exhibit offered yesterday and the one today will be admitted under those conditions.

(Documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 761," which is as follows, for "Exhibit No. 758" (see p. 4555).)

EXHIBIT No. 761

CONFIDENTIAL—NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE OFFICE

REPORT ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

The three folders of documents, which form part of this report, are divided as follows:

1. U. S. S. R.—Pacific Council (this contains correspondence and other papers in reference to the formation of a Soviet Council of the I. P. R.).
2. U. S. S. R.—Research (this contains letters and reports in reference to the centers of research activities in the Soviet Union which have an interest in the Pacific).
3. U. S. S. R.—American Council (this contains correspondence and other papers in relation to the attempts of the American Council to develop and encourage Russian studies in this country).

Whatever the composition of the recently formed Soviet Council, the I. P. R. will have to continue its direct interest in this field for some time. It is unlikely that the new council will be prepaid at once to assume an independent role, direct encouragement will have to be given in the particular projects in which the I. P. R. is interested, and, finally, there is a very large field in connection with Soviet studies, as with Japanese or Chinese studies, in which the Institute and its various councils can do effective work without reference to the national council concerned.

In the past, this activity has been carried on by the American Council on behalf of and in cooperation with the Pacific Council. The ideal solution would be to concentrate it entirely in the hands of an international secretariat. For the present, it would seem to be imperative that the American Council continue to lead in the work, if possible by sharing personnel and resources, such as library materials, etc., with the International Secretariat. Only one of the reasons for this recommendation is the fact that in no other country on the Pacific could a full program be developed in this field at the present time with no fear of legal difficulties.

Because of this situation, the following report will embody recommendations addressed both to the American Council and the Pacific Council. Activities recommended, except under I. below, could most profitably be carried out by a staff located in New York, supported jointly by the American Council and the Pacific Council, until such time as the International Secretariat has a permanent working base adequately equipped to take them over.

I. SOVIET MEMBERSHIP IN THE I. P. R.

A. *Pacific Council.*—The Soviet Union accepted membership in the I. P. R. in 1931. The committee which was formed existed only on paper. More recently, a new attempt has been made to organize a Soviet Council, much more promising of success. The formulae of international cooperation are difficult for the Soviets to master, and our chances of getting the full substance of cooperation will decrease in measure as we put emphasis on the constitutional and organizational problems involved.

The Secretary-General, on his trip to Moscow in the fall of 1934, should be able to determine who are the four or five most active members of the Soviet Council, who is the titular head, and how far the services of VOKS will have to be used as a clearing house. As has been the case in China, the best results are likely to be secured by direct cooperation with the individuals and institutions represented on the Soviet Council. It is extremely unlikely that VOKS, or the titular head of the Soviet Council, will serve adequately as a clearing house, like Chatham House for example. The Soviets are not likely to object to any arrangement by which, for instance, projects might be organized directly with individuals in the Soviet Union, copies of the correspondence being forwarded to VOKS or the office of the Chairman of the Soviet Council.

In the past, many of the Institute's contacts in Moscow have been made with Narkomindel, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Several I. P. R. official invitations have been extended to the Soviet Union through this department. In the future, it is recommended that the Institute be punctilious in treating the Soviet Foreign Office as it would the Japanese or British. This means that it is legitimate to cultivate it, and to make every effort to secure its unofficial support. At the same time, it would be well to recognize the same fiction of independence as in other countries.

The fiction is even more potent in the Soviet Union than, for example, in Japan, but it is quite apparent that the Soviet Union itself is going to maintain it. Several Soviet organisations, such as VOKS, the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and TASS, the Soviet news agency, have been established with very careful legal autonomy. Whether the Soviet Council of the Institute is established under VOKS, or as a separate organisation, the Institute would do well to regard it in correspondence, etc., as an entirely independent and unofficial organisation.

Such a policy would have advantages outside of the field of Institute relations with the Soviet Union. It is fairly important to take safeguards against any circumstances arising which might provide ammunition for these non-Soviet members of the Institute who may suspect Bolshevik propaganda in the work of the Soviet Council. If a clear distinction is established and maintained in Institute circles between the Soviet Council and Narkomindel, it will help in any such contingency.

B. *Research.*—Instead of snowing the new organisation under with the many projects which the Institute has under way at the moment, it would be vastly more effective to concentrate energies on a few. One of the first tasks of the secretary or other staff worker assigned to this field should be to attempt to secure some study for MacKenzie's Status of Aliens coordination and/or for his Communications project from the Soviet Union. The Secretary General should be equipped before his approaching visit with definite suggestions along this line to hand over as the first official Institute request for cooperation.

The Secretary General should also present to the officers of the new Council a short, clear statement of the Standard of Living program with some indication of what kind of contribution from the Soviet Union would be desirable. This is likely to make a special appeal to the Soviets, but a definite effort will have to be made to get them to go beyond the simple accumulation and presentation of whatever studies have already been made in this field. The initial request should be for such a bibliography, and the staff worker assigned to this field could then prepare definite suggestions, to be supported by a grant as in the case of the other national councils, for further work.

C. *Program and Conference.*—It is difficult to predict whether the Soviet Council will be very much or very little interested in this aspect of the Institute, or to decide which would be the more to be deplored. At first, there would be little to be gained by worrying them about this, beyond short discussion of time and place and assurance of the demand for Soviet representation. In reference to data paper presentation, the Secretary General should describe the kind of brief document on the Five-Year Plan with special reference to Siberia which would be desired. With this, as with the other recommendations made above, presentation of a request officially by the Secretary General will be enormously strengthened by the subsequent sending of short, clear, and simple written statements, both to the titular authorities and to the principal scholars concerned.

II. SOVIET RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS INTERESTED IN THE PACIFIC

As in any other country, the ultimate strength of Institute suport depends on the activity and interest of the research and educational institutions which have been drawn into the work. The present favorable sentiment in the Soviet Union towards the Institute is based more than anything else on a questionnaire addressed this summer to the more important of these institutions by VOKS. It is extremely important that this interest be strengthened and extended. In part, over a period of years, this will be possible only by visits on the part of the Secretary General and other staff members. A great deal, however, can be done by intelligent correspondence.

The reports in the attached folder cover the more important of these institutions, with each of which some sort of legitimate contact has at present been made. In addition, the office has now acquired complete published biographical volumes on all the scientific workers of the Soviet Union. The increasing relaxation of antiforeign feeling and the increasing readiness and ability of Soviet scholars to correspond are factors enhancing the possibility of success. Here, as in other correspondence, every effort should be made to establish a basis on which all letters are written in the language of the country where they are written. For this purpose, a Russian-reading staff member is essential. In the Soviet Union letters in English are adequate except where some special importance or diplomatic courtesy warrants their translation into Russian.

Special comment is necessary on the use of letters of introduction, particularly by the Secretary-General or other officers using them officially rather than personally. Big shots and stuffed shirts should be sent to their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union, and not to the Communist Academy or the Institute of Orientology. Students should be sent only with selection and with restricted appeals to the good nature of the addressees. Tourists should not be given letters at all.

The two most important institutions in the Soviet Union for cultivation are the Institute of World Economics and Politics, which is a part of the Communist Academy and which is itself a sort of holding company for the Institute on China, and the Library of the Communist Academy. These are separate institutions. Their advantages over other organizations are principally two: (1) They have the best of the available personnel and equipment; and (2) they are politically not afraid to move and to take responsibility. As soon as the Institute of Pacific Relations is in a position to show some concrete measure of help, such as a research grant, or possibly a little later an offer for staff exchange between Moscow and some other IPR office, it would be very useful to take advantage of it to strengthen our relations with these two institutions.

III. AMERICAN COUNCIL ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET FIELD

Because of the reasons stated in the introduction to this report, a great many activities are listed below which would serve in some respects other councils than the United States. If the American Council does not undertake them, it would still be worth while for the International Secretariat or some other National Council to consider doing so. From whatever center they are organized, their results could be made available, if there were a demand for them, through regular Institute channels to the other councils.

A. *Exchange of publications.*—The shortage of valuta in the Soviet Union and the high legal price of rubles to foreigners makes exchange almost the only practicable way of building up resources in books and periodicals about the Soviet Union. Arrangements for exchange of Pacific Affairs and the IPR memoranda are listed in the attached folder. A special file in Miss Austern's charge contains full details of exchange arrangements. With three or four organizations, such

as the Institute of World Economics and Politics, the Communist Academy Library of Moscow and the Communist Academy Library of Leningrad, rather fuller exchange relations have been established, covering printed books and documents. This is carried out by the periodical exchange of lists and the rough balancing of orders against each other, with no cash payments.

The only libraries in the Soviet Union which are at present to be considered in any sense as IPR depositories are the Library of the Communist Academy in Moscow and the Library of the Commissarriat of Foreign Affairs. As the position of the IPR grows stronger in the Soviet Union, it might be desirable to substitute the Lenin Library of Leningrad for the latter of the two mentioned above. Both of those mentioned have received complete sets of the Banff papers and have accumulated substantial collections of earlier IPR publications.

B. *Establishment of a Research Library.*—Except for the New York Public Library, there is no effective Russian library in New York. Especially on questions of current interest and involving the Pacific, there is really no good library at all. Such a library would not be hard to develop over a period of years and the demand for it would be very large. The present collection of the American Council constitutes an excellent nucleus. It has been built so far by exchange and gift, and very little support would be needed to catalogue it and enlarge it.

The possibility of the Soviet authorities endowing or supporting a New York library to the extent of making it a depository for a very large number of Russian publications has been discussed frequently in recent months. If the American Council wished to pursue the idea, and were in a position to provide the necessary staff, there is no reason why it should not be made such a depository for books on international economic and political relations, on Siberia, etc. Such a move would have to be made jointly by the American Council in New York and Washington and by the Secretary General in Moscow. A good staff worker on a full-time basis could probably manage such a library at least in the initial stages. On a half-time basis, any library plan would have to be more modest.

C. *Clearing House for Research Projects.*—There is at present no organization in the United States which collates or even files record of the research projects which are being undertaken in the field of Soviet studies. The Institute has been requested to do so by many of the specialists in the field, and a beginning has been made, documents concerning which are included in the attached folder.

Organization on a better basis and continuation of this work would have advantages for the Institute in constituting a record of what is being done and would fill a real need of American scholarship. Any staff worker engaged in this field would necessarily be in contact with the very few organizations where such projects are important, and it would require relatively little effort to keep a file or card catalogue up to date. The quarterly publications of the learned societies in the humanities and the social sciences provide the best record available at present, but those are scattered, difficult of access, and seldom up to date.

D. *Russian Language Teaching.*—In 1934, through funds secured from the Rockefeller Foundation, a special experiment in the intensive teaching of Russian was begun under the auspices of the American Council at Harvard University. A list of the thirty students admitted to this school is included in the attached folder. A separate folder contains a full record of the school.

It may be considered at the end of the first trial that the experiment is not worth repeating. This does not at present seem likely to be the case. The University of California and Columbia University have officially invited the Institute to cooperate in the establishment of similar summer schools next year, and the attitude of the Rockefeller Foundation toward requests for further assistance is likely to be receptive, although no commitments have been made. Although the American Council should perhaps not engage in the educational field itself, this seems to be a case where an initial project serves to encourage and establish a legitimate activity which otherwise might never have started. As is the case with Chinese and Japanese studies, the Russian field cannot even be adequately surveyed without some initial work on the development of a linguistically trained research personnel. In this sense, continued interest for at least one more year in this project would seem to have much in its favor.

E. *Coordination of the Entire Field of Russian Studies.*—There is no single organization in the United States comparable to the Ost-Europaisches Institut in Berlin or the School of Slavonic Studies in London which serves to center and head up work in the whole field. A small conference of specialists called by the American Council in November 1933, a report of which meeting is included in the attached folder, urged this function on the American Council and specifically

recommended a rather wide range of activities, such as coordination of library purchase plans, readjustment of university curricula, establishment of fellowships, etc.

In view of the central function of the American Council, such a policy as would be required to achieve this would have many heavy liabilites. A great, even preponderant, share of Soviet problems are not in the first instance Pacific problems. The field is relatively new and politically dangerous. Finally, it is a function which could only be performed legitimately and well by a large university. The conference in question was eminently successful in charting an immediate plan for American Council activity. In the future, however, it would seem to be very much wiser to confine activities in this field to specific, limited, and fairly concrete projects. In the first instance, it may be necessary to undertake some projects, such as the Harvard Russian Summer School, which do not appear to have immediate Pacific implications. As they develop, however, they should be turned over more and more to other organizations leaving the American Council free to concentrate its modest resources on the problems of most direct concern to it.

F. *Bibliography on Russian and Soviet Problems.*—There has emerged from time to time a demand for a bibliography or reading list in this field which would be comparable to but better than Quigley's pamphlet on the Far East. The attached folder contains a draft memorandum on the subject prepared in this office in 1933 and now out of date, and a copy of the bibliography used by Professor G. T. Robinson at Columbia.

There is no question but that such a bibliography would be a real addition to the work the American Council has done. Its priority in a crowded program is a different question, and some effective way might be found of checking in advance the extent of the demand for it. The preparation, however, of such a list could be effectively done by the staff member in charge of this work along with other work his job would involve.

G. *Exchange of students.*—One of the specific activties urged on the American Council by the conference called in this office in 1933 was the elaboration of some plans for facilitating the living, archive, financial and other problems of American students going to the Soviet Union for study. A series of documents in the attached folder indicate the reasons which can be adduced to support a negative attitude on this proposal. The difficulties involved, the fate of such projects as the Anglo-American Russian Summer School, and the vastly more pressing urgency of other things point to the desirability of leaving this field strictly alone. Professor Cross, Dr. Duggan, and other American educators who have recently been in Moscow, have reached this same conclusion although they were committed beforehand to some attempt to work at the problem.

For serious students who have already equipped themselves with some command of the language and who are prepared to make the living adjustments necessary, there is a very real service which the American Council can and at present does perform. The only guides to archive material which are available in the East are in the American Council office and are being used by quite a few different outside students. In suggesting centers of research activity and methods of getting the maximum advantage out of them to qualified advanced students, the taff of the American Council could perform a legitimate service.

H. *I. P. R. Memoranda and Book Reviews and Articles for Pacific Affairs.*—Although Soviet contributions to Pacific Affairs are likely to grow in number and quality, the Soviet Council cannot be relied upon to do the necessary work in orienting I. P. R. publications properly in the Soviet field. This applies to some monograph studies, but primarily to the I. P. R. Memoranda and to Pacific Affairs. There is no field, not even the Japanese or Chinese, which is so open and unexploited at the present time, and both the American Council and the Institute stand to gain prestige and reputation by their work in it. The development of an adequate library and particularly the employment on the staff of a well-trained research worker who reads Russian readily and follows the work of others in the field are prerequisites. Without these two, it would be safer to leave the field alone.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, how well did you know General Varga?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. How well?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us how well?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, I met him in the Soviet Union in Moscow before he left for China. He left for China in 1938 or 1939. I do not know precisely the date. He left as a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek assigned by whom, the Soviet Military Intelligence?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. By the Soviet Government. He was a regular officer of the army. I mean General Vlassow. And he went to Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. Spell that, please.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Chungking, the capital of China. In Russian, it is quite different spelling, so I was having difficulty.

After this, I met him during the war, in the fall of 1941, when General Vlassow was commanding one of the section of the front, defending the approach to Moscow. I had flown to him, from the headquarters of the Soviet troops on the Leningrad front, and I discussed with him the military situation and political situation, too.

We agreed that the time had become ripe for doing anything for a change in the Communist regime in our country. I remember that he and some other people who were present and whom I wouldn't like to identify, because they are still in the Soviet Union now, holding high positions in the Soviet Army, were speaking about the ways in which we can use the confusion which certainly would arise in the case when the Germans would take Moscow.

After this talk, I returned back to the northwestern front, near to Leningrad, and toward the end of the same year, I heard that General Vlassow, after having beaten the Germans at the gates of Moscow, was assigned to the task to pierce through the German lines in order to get across the Baltic countries to the Baltic Sea, at the head of a special second army group created for this purpose.

He attacked with his army, but was defeated. His army was dispersed, and he himself, several weeks later, was captured by the Germans.

Shortly before, I went myself over the front lines to the Germans with some other officers and, as I told you yesterday, we tried to convince Germans to use the many millions of Russian PW's in German camps as a Russian army of liberation. But very soon after our talks with German military and political leaders we discovered that this was not the German object, to make Russia liberated from communism. They wanted to have Russia, Communist or not, as their colony, to enslave our people and to ruin our country.

So there was nothing left to talk with the Germans about. The talks were brought out. I landed in the Gestapo jail in Berlin.

As I told you yesterday, only with great difficulty, with the help of some of the higher officials of the German Foreign Office which were known to me during my work in Moscow, I escaped something worse, and for the third time, I met General Vlassow in Germany already at the beginning of 1943.

We had talked about the possibility, still the possibility, of organization of the Russian anti-Communist Army with the German help, with the German assistance, bearing in mind that first of all we have to get rid of Communist regimes, and then we will see how we could liberate ourselves from the enemy number two—I mean, from the Germans.

During all these talks and conversations, once I discussed with General Vlassow the problem of his China experience in Chungking, and General Vlassow, among other things which are of no immediate interest to this committee so I will not quote them, had spoken about the fact of his intelligence activity in China capitals.

Mr. MORRIS. This is General Vlassow's intelligence activities in the Chinese capital, of Chungking?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right. He had some intelligence officers, and certainly he had to carry out all of the intelligence activities.

While speaking about his impressions, I asked him whether it was very difficult for him to do this special work because there were high British and American missions around. He said that, "yes, the British people were rather uncooperative."

Mr. MORRIS. Did you say were uncooperative?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Uncooperative, yes. And I asked, and said, "The Americans?" And he laughed and said, "The Americans were the best channels for my activities."

Mr. MORRIS. What Americans did he refer to there?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Americans—I don't know who. He didn't mention the names, or perhaps he mentioned them and I don't remember yet. But the Americans who were there in Chungking with the American military mission or other organizations working for Chiang Kai-shek.

The meaning of his words was that during his political and intelligence activities, he did get a great deal of assistance from the Americans. Nevertheless the fact that his political and intelligence activities were directed not in the favor of the United States or China but only in the favor of the Soviet Union——

Mr. MORRIS. And there were was no further indication of the general classification of what these Americans were? That is, of what general classification they were? Did they work for the United States Government?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; they were officials of the United States Army and the United States Government, which was this mission in Chungking at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, did you know General Feng Y'hsiang?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I knew him—better to say—for he is dead now.

Mr. MORRIS. That is what I mean. Will you tell us what you knew about General Feng Y'hsiang?

Mr. Chairman, along these lines, when Mr. Lattimore was a witness before this committee we asked him to what extent he knew General Feng Y'Hsiang, and he has testified in the following fashion on that subject:

> Did you know General Feng Y'Hsiang?
>
> Mr. LATTIMORE. General Feng Y'Hsiang, I met first in Chungking when he was one of the deputies to Chiang Kai-shek, and I met him afterward in this country.
>
> Mr. MORRIS. Was he ever a guest at your home?
>
> Mr. LATTIMORE. He stayed overnight at my home once.
>
> Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever travel in the United States with him?
>
> Mr. LATTIMORE. Let me see. I think I traveled from Philadelphia to Boston with him. I had gone up to Bryn Mawr, where I was requested to act as a translator in a speech he gave at Bryn Mawr College.
>
> Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you did not know or had no reason to believe that he was a Communist?
>
> Mr. LATTIMORE. I had no reason to believe he was a Communist; anything but.

What do you know about General Feng Y'hsiang?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, he was not a Communist, of course, but he got the money from the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean by that, that is the Chinese Marshal Feng Y'hsiang, as we say in Russia, was one of the biggest and more important agents of the Soviet Government in China.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was an agent of the Soviet Government in China?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. A paid agent, I should say, for I know from Mr. Borodin.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Michael Borodin?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right—who makes business with Feng Y'hsiang first, that he is a very expensive agent. This Marshal Feng Y'hsiang got in connection with the Soviet Government already at the beginning of the twenties, and he got a regular fee from the Soviet Government in order to carry out the line which was prescribed to him by the Soviet Government.

In the vaults of the Soviet office, especially in the files of the Far Eastern Division and in the personal files of the Deputy Foreign Commisar, Karakhan, which was mentioned today by Mr. Bullitt, I saw on many occasions, I remember, that Marshal Feng Y'hsiang was still a paid agent of the Soviet Union.

My last connection with these matters relates to 1937, I guess.

After this, I didn't hear about him any more, save the short notice in Soviet newspapers 2 or 3 years ago that he found accidental death in the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bogolepov, did you know Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I did know Anna Louise Strong.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you know about Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not very much, because she was a noisy, nice person in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a Communist?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; she was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. What can you tell us about her?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Not very much, sir, because I didn't work in any close connection with her. For the last time, I saw her in the office of Michael Borodin, which was just before the war. Michael Borodin was editor in chief of the Moscow Daily News. That is a Soviet publication in English language, published in Moscow. And Anna Louise Strong was working as his deputy editor, I guess. At that time, I know also that the doors of the Foreign Office were closed for Anna Louise Strong when she came in. She talked too much and it was impossible to get rid of her. So there was a strong directive not to let her go in the Soviet Foreign Office, for we have to work, and she took off of it too much time of ours.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean, this was during the time that she was deputy to Michael Borodin, or did you say deputy editor?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Perhaps deputy editor she was. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was closely associated with, and under, Borodin at the time the doors of the Foreign Office were closed to her?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Wasn't that a little unusual?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; it wasn't unusual because Michael Borodin was also out of the Foreign Office. He was in disgrace at that time. And I know also that she married a Russian Communist by name Shubin.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you spell that name for the reporter?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. S-h-u-b-i-n; who was formerly, I mean, in the twenties, working in the press department of the Foreign Office but later on, also coming into disgrace, and acted, I guess, as a free-lance journalist in Moscow.

So, as a matter of fact, as you see, I saw this person, I met her on several occasions. But she was not a persona grata in Moscow because I think that there was not much use of her which somebody could extract.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Constantine Oumansky?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes; I knew him.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Constantine Oumansky an intelligence man?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't say whether he was an intelligence man during his stay in the United States and Mexico.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you can or cannot?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I can't. I don't know. I know only that he came to the Foreign Office directly from the intelligence school, military intelligence school.

Mr. MORRIS. He came to the Foreign Office from the military intelligence school?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him personally?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I know him pretty well personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one paragraph from an exhibit that we introduced at the executive session on June 21, 1951, when the witness was Kate Mitchell. This is a letter written to Mr. Holland, dated March 12, 1936. Miss Mitchell wrote in the last paragraph:

> Carter and I spent about 4 hours with Oumansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday and got quite a lot of interesting sidelights on the Moscow trials, particularly with regard to Romm.

Can you cast any light on that paragraph for us, Mr. Bogolepov?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. Michael Romm——

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Michael or Vladimir?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sorry. I make mistake on the first name. Maybe I am wrong. He was officially one of the big shots in the Soviet press agency, going the world around. But he and the second big shot in Soviet journalism, Rogov, these two men were also key people in military intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Romm and Rogov were both key men in Soviet intelligence?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I hear you to use the words "free-lance newspaperman?" Did you say somebody was a free-lance newspaperman in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes. There are still the remnants of capitalism.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean there are, or were, free-lance newspapermen in the Soviet Union?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Very few of them; but they still existed; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How recently?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Well, for the last time, I saw these people just before the war, 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say free-lance newspaperman, do you mean by that an independent newspaperman who need not be a Communist, who can write what he pleases, for whatever publication he pleases?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No, sir; certainly not. I mean only those who are not employed officially in one of the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean by free lance, then?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. That is perhaps right. You have, maybe, another understanding of the word.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to quibble with you, sir. Just what do you mean by it?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I mean that these people were not employed in one of the newspapers, Soviet newspapers, but simply wrote articles for them. But, of course, they were obliged to write only in the matters which are in the lines of set policy of the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did a man have to be a Communist to be what you call a free-lance newspaperman?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; mostly it was nonparty people who couldn't get a position in Pravda or Izvestia.

Mr. SOURWINE. For instance, would a foreigner be permitted to come in and write as he pleases?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. No; only Soviet citizens living in Moscow, and they were not important people because all important people were assigned to the staff of the papers, Pravda or Izvestia. But those who, because of their nonparty affiliation, couldn't work in the newspaper, they were just writing some chronicle or some little articles from time to time. Perhaps I use the term not correctly.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have his comments on some of these documents, but it would not necessarily require any open session.

Could he be instructed to stand by and work with the staff a few days on some of these documents?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; he is going to have to stand by anyway. He is under subpena and will have to stand by anyway.

What is his status? Is he in the custody of the sergeant at arms?

Mr. MORRIS. He is in the custody of the sergeant at arms of the Senate. And several of the United States intelligence services have asked us if he would do certain things for them in the next few days. After that, maybe we can go back and review some of these things in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. I have just a few more points.

You had said that you knew Rogov and Romm to be intelligence agents?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue with that comment on this paragraph:

> Carter and I spent about 4 hours with Oumansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday and got quite a lot of interesting sidelights on the Moscow trials, particularly with regard to Romm.

Do you wish to add anything more to that comment? What happened to Mr. Romm, do you know?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. He was shot in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was he shot?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Because he was affiliated with opposition inside the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comment on the fact that Edward Carter and Kate Mitchell spent 4 hours with Oumansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday? Is that an unusual amount of time to give a foreign visitor?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It means that these people were considered by Ambassador Oumansky as important people. He had lost 4 hours to give them his instructions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish the identification of some personnel who have turned up in our IPR hearings from time to time.

Michael Borodin?

Mr. BOGOPELOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what his role was in the Soviet organization?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. His role in the twenties was a great deal known. He was the chief engineer of the first Chinese revolution. He was assigned with the duty of conducting the revolution which happened in China in the early twenties into a Communist one. He failed to do this because Chiang Kai-shek, in the very last minute, in 1927, destroyed the Communist plans. This point makes Borodin a lost man. He was called back from China to the Soviet Union. He was under investigation for many, many months, and, as I told you today, the position which he held with the Soviet Union up to the outbreak of war was not a very important one, an editor of a not very important English-speaking newspaper in Moscow. So actually he was a finished man, far from the politics.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have one more document here. I am afraid it will have to be in the classification of the other two. It purports to be a memorandum on the Communist Academy and its China Institute, dated April 1934.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is it taken from?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an original document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, headed "Communist Academy, Volkonka 14, Moscow, U. S. S. R." It is dated April 1934, and is a carbon copy, which is taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations' files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one excerpt from a paragraph here, and then ask a few questions of this present witness.

I—

The author of this document—

mentioned Chen Han Seng, found that Abramson knew him very well personally, that while they think him still a little nearsighted they consider him the best man in China in his field and a man with a very real future. I referred to the pamphet he wrote for Banff and was told without a quiver that they not only knew, it, but that it had been translated and would appear, with suitable editorial notes pointing out its inadequacies, in the next issue of Problems of China

Did you know what the Communist Academy was?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was it?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was the highest scientific organization in the Soviet Union. If you speak of the science in the Soviet Union, you understand only the Marxist and Communist science. So it was the program where the Marxist theory was developed, where the Marxist scholars were prepared for different branches of Soviet administration, for Comintern, for different branches of Intelligence, for journalistic fields, and so on.

It was a very important organization which has been preparing the people for work in Soviet administration.

Mr. MORRIS. I read you again this sentence:

I mentioned Chen Han Seng, found that Abramson knew him very well personally, that while they think him still a little nearsighted they consider him the best man in China in his field and a man with a very real future. I referred to the pamphlet he wrote for Banff and was told without a quiver that they not only knew it, but that it had been translated and would appear, with suitable editorial notes pointing out its inadequacies, in the next issue of Problems of China.

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. I am sure that if a Communist says this man is the best one, it is to take to granted he is the worst one, from our point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may we submit this to Mr. Carter under the arrangements for stipulation?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted with the same ruling as the other two. The other letters will also be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 762 and 763," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 762

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—Honolulu—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

MARCH 1, 1937.

DEAR BILL: Thanks for your letters of the 24th and 25th. I checked with Ishii and found him convinced that Fred had concurred in having the book issued under Institute auspices. I checked with Fred and found that Ishii had been in with his page proofs to show Fred last Friday; that Fred thought you had agreed to have the thing issued under American Council auspices and therefore O'Kayed the text of Ishii's note to that effect on the title page. Fred has now written Ishii explaining the mistake and I have cabled P. S. King as you suggested. Ishii was perfectly nice about it, but naturally a little puzzled because of his recent conversation with Fred.

Fred sent you the Spykman outline last week so I assume it has now arrived. With regard to Waldheim, I'm certainly against giving him another assignment, but it seems to me that Alsberg's letter to him of February 13th is practically a definite promise of at least a two-months job on the shipping study. However, maybe I'm reading it in the wrong way.

The other points raised in your letter have, by implication at least, been answered in Carter's telegram to you.

I have sent the Windett manuscript to Macmillan's but have of course heard nothing from them as yet.

Carter and I spent about four hours with Umansky at the Soviet Embassy on Saturday and got quite a lot of interesting side lights on the Moscow trials—particularly with regard to Romm.

My best to Doreen, and happy voyagings.

(Signed) KATE.

(Penciled in:) P. S.—What did you and R. L. P. agree on with regard to the page proofs of Problems? Chapter III is presumably coming to N. Y. I would also welcome a chance for a final look at Chapter V—Is a cable needed?

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
March 6, 1937.

DEAR KATE: This is to answer your letter of March 1 and your wire of March 5. I agree with your suggestion of having the index and page proofs of the proceedings done in London. I was about to suggest the same thing and I suppose we should be ready if necessary to pay Oxford up to about $50 for the indexing (but only if they raise the question of payment, of course!).

I have still have the following manuscript to send (next week) to Oxford: some additional pages to Chap. II; four or five pages on economic adjustments which, with your permission, I should like added as a tail to your Chap. V; four or five pages of Introduction to the whole book; the Preface which I shall send after showing it to Mr. Carter. I shall send all of this to you for forwarding to Oxford, except the material for Chapter II which I shall send direct, sending you a complete carbon copy of the whole chapter.

I'm telling Oxford to set the remainder of Chap. II direct into page proof as I won't have any further changes. I would suggest that you tell them to do the same with the Preface, Introduction, and balance of Chap. V. I will not want to see proofs of my chapter.

It seems to me that you need do no more from now on except look over the final page proof of the whole book.

Yes, certainly, make any changes you want in the China chapter. I've no doubt there is room for further editing in addition to the considerable changes I made. The chapter is still written in a different key from the rest of the book but I don't know that that matters very much and don't see how we can change it to correspond completely with the other chapters.

I'm intrigued by your tantalizingly brief remark about Umansky's comments on Romm. Do tell. Thanks for fixing up the Ishii affair.

Yours,

W. L. H.

EXHIBIT No. 763

COMMUNIST ACADEMY

Volkhonka 14

MOSCOW, U. S. S. R.

APRIL 1934.

VARGA.
KHMELNITSKAYA.
VOITINSKY.
ABRAMSON.

The Communist Academy is the citadel of the faith in Soviet Russia. It is charged with the task of training leaders for the next generation, and it is inevitable that these leaders should be trained essentially as political leaders. The theoreticians and the dogmatists are both trained here. It has of course immense political power, can commandeer funds or people more easily than any other research or educational organization, has access to materials and documents elsewhere unavailable.

It has had almost since its inception a section which dealt with China. It has been variously named and organized, according to the political fortunes of its leaders. At present it retains its old name of the China Institute, but is also known as the National and Colonial Sector of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics, which is itself a part of the Communist Academy. The set-up within the Academy is not very clear; evidently there are so-called subject cabinets, and an effort is obviously made to keep the stratifications from growing frozen.

Primarily concerned with China, Japan and the Far East at the moment there are about nine men, with a dozen or more secretaries and translators attached to them. In addition to these, however, there are of course many other experts, on silver, on foreign trade movements, on agriculture, etc. It is difficult to find out who is chief, or how responsibility is divided.

Varga is and has been for many years one of the principal theoreticians on foreign affairs in the Soviet Union. Voitinsky is a theoretician only by virtue of the refusal of the Chinese to make him an executive; he has a long and interesting career behind him in China. Khemlnitsky seems to be the lady who keeps things going around the office of the Institute, although she herself is a person of importance. Abramson is a young fellow, who speaks and reads Chinese, speaks English slowly and makes the best impression possible of an able, well-educated young Marxist.

The staff is floating. Men are called from here for more responsible work, and sent back here for periods of further study. Galkovitch, who was Troyanovsky's right hand man in Tokyo and who is now Consul-General in San Francisco, is one of these perapatetic staff members.

Most of the really good and serious stuff which appears on the East in Russia, outside of the more academic research done by specialized institutes, comes either from or through this organization. It started publishing Materials on the Chinese Problem in 1928. Sixteen numbers appeared under this title. It then became Problems of China, thirteen numbers of which have appeared. Back numbers of both of these are very hard to get. Number 11 of the latter has a good cumulative index. A new journal has recently been started, called Colonial Problems, two numbers having appeared. Finally the first number has been issued of a journal called Contemporary Japan which may or may not be continued. The regular periodicals for the Academy, which are numerous, can also be used for articles on the East.

The more important work is published in monograph form. To list these would be to make a good bibliography of Russian materials on China and Japan. Mif's book on Chinese politics, Madyar's two works on Chinese economics and agriculture, Safarov's history of China, Erenburg's Manchurian Problem, Skatchkov's really good bibliography on China (a continuation of which is being worked on at present)—these are some of them. Then there are the more current and popular books, like Terentiev's Danger of War in the Far East or Skladyar's Manchuria. On Japan, Popov is writing a further study, Avarin is completing his work on the economic relations between Japan and Manchuria (first volume already published). Two of the largest projects at present being done are a study of America and China which will be very long and pretty good, and the 33rd volume of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, which will be on China and which has been turned over entirely to this outfit to be written. The place hums with activity, gives every evidence of being extremely efficient and well-informed. They have a library of over 10,000 books on the Far East, possibly the best in the Soviet Union, which is kept apart from the regular Communist Academy library.

They are very much interested in a dozen other projects. One is the latinization of Chinese. Abramson has worked out an alphabet together with a group of Chinese scholars, and it has been slowly passed through a great many official bodies for approval. It is at present being applied in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and other sections of Siberia, but has not yet been officially adopted. In 1933 they had a conference in Vladivostok, which they claim was attended by representative Chinese, and it was decided to postpone a full international conference on the subject until the results of some practical experience with it could be presented. He claims that a great many sinologues outside of Russia are interested in the proposal, but that it will never get across except against the scholars. Alexeief, the greatest sinologue in Russia, a pupil of Elyssiev's before the war, has finally given a grudging approval, but probably for political reasons, and the Academy does not expect any Chinese scholars ever to support the proposal whole-heartedly. One of Alexiev's students, named Drogunov, has worked with Abramson on it. They are convinced that the problem would not even arise were it not for the enormous illiteracy of China. Since there is no vested interest in the ideograph alphabet except among a closed society of professional scholars, they see no reason to stick to it if an improved alphabet of thirty-eight letters could serve as well. They know a lot about the 1,000-character system but reject it as being typical of the middle class assumption that the poor do not really need to know a great deal after all. They have a paper appearing in Khabarovsk in the new script every other day, and have published a small number of short books in it.

They are very cordial towards the Institute and are eager to cooperate, but we shall have to have concrete proposals before we accomplish anything. They get our publications at present, either through exchange or by direct purchase, and think fairly well of them. Abramson sat down one afternoon and discussed China with me for two or three hours. He referred himself to Buck, Remer, Clark, Fong, Orchard, and a half-dozen other books, knew of our relation to them, and made extremely good criticisms of each of them. Naturally, they are intolerant of much of what we do, but they find other parts of it useful. Remer has been translated in part for office use, and they are at present considering translating the whole book for publication. The last number of their magazine contains a scathing review of Sokolsky's *Tinder Box of Asia.* I mentioned Chen Han Seng, found that Abramson knew him very well personally, that while they think him still a little nearsighted they consider him the best man in China in his field and a man with a very real future. I referred to the pamphlet he wrote for Banff and was told without a quiver that they not only knew it, but that it had been translated and would appear, with suitable editorial notes pointing out its inadequacies, in the next issue of Problems of China.

They speak with more reserve, but with evident willingness to explore the matter, of articles for Pacific Affairs. If we will give them concrete proposals, length, title, etc., will do their best, and if they can get something they are not ashamed of themselves, they will be glad to let us have it. Book reviews are a little more difficult, and they made the suggestion that we send books to them for review in one of their magazines, printing our own translation of the review at the same time, since the magazines are not likely to compete in any public in the world. One of the principal difficulties here is an old one in the Soviet Union, too few qualified people and too much work. Everyone there is quite obviously overfreighted with work, and they are naturally reluctant to take on new commitments. I think that if possible we should give them a very definite list of articles we want, and then send them, fairly early in the spring, a half dozen good books for review. If we could once get some of their material in Pacific Affairs, and a check in payment in their hands, we would find further development relatively easy.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that the Soviet organization used the Institute of Pacific Relations to collect information not only in the United States but on other countries, such as Japan and China?

Mr. BOGOLEPOV. It was my impression that, at that time—I mean before the war—when I was in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Intelligence was more interested not in the United States of America, but in Japan and other countries which were in direct conflict with the Soviet Union.

It was also my impression that the Institute of Pacific Relations was merely used by Soviet Intelligence in order to get, via America, the information on Japan and China and Great Britain.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Ferguson asked, I believe yesterday, for writings of Mr. Lattimore on Mongolia. Mr. Mandel has compiled quite a few of these, and I would like them to go into the record at this time.

Mr. MANDEL. We have received from the Library of Congress a list of the writings of Owen Lattimore. It shows that prior to his visit to Moscow in November 1930, he wrote Political Conditions in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, for the Annals of the American Academy, and that further he wrote Mongol Journeys, published in 1941; Mongols of Manchuria, written in 1934; and, also, in his book Solution in Asia, published in 1945, there are a good many passages on Mongolia. I offer three samples for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that in response to Senator Ferguson's request?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. May they go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They will go into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 764" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 764

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

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[SEAL]

WRITINGS OF OWEN LATTIMORE

SELECT LIST

Books

America and Asia; problems of today's war and the peace of tomorrow. Claremont, California. (Published by Claremont College for the three associated colleges at Claremont) 1943. 52 p. D767.L3.

China (resumen historice). Mexico, D. F. Ediciones Minerva, S. de r. l., 1945. 209 p. DS735.L3815.

China; a short history. New York. W. W. Norton and Co., Inc. 1947. 218 p. DS735.L38 1947.

The desert road to Turkestan. Boston. Little, Brown and Co. 1929. 373 p. DS793.M7.L3 1929.

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Eclipse of the rising sun by Richard Hart with a statement by Owen Lattimore (pp. 88–90). New York. Foreign Policy Association. 1946. 96 p. E744.H43 No. 56.

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High Tartary. Boston. Little, Brown and Co. 1930. 370 p. DS793.E8.L16.

Inner Asian frontiers of China. London, New York. Oxford University Press. 1940. 585 p. DS706.5.L3 1940 A.

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The making of modern China. London. G Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1945. 212 p. DS735.L38 1945.

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Pivot of Asia; Sinkiang and the inner frontier of China and Russia. Boston. Little, Brown and Co. 1950. 288 p. DS793.S62.L3 1950.

The situation in Asia. Boston. Little, Brown and Co. 1949. 244 p. DS518.1.L315 1949.

Solution in Asia. Boston. Little, Brown and Co. 1945. 214 p. DS518.8.L3.

Solution in Asia. London. The Cresset Press. 1945. 143 p. DS518.8.L3 1945 B.

Solutions in Asia. Washington. The Infantry Journal. 1945. 138 p. DS518.8.L3 1945 A.

Articles

Korea ; we win a round. *Nation.* July 21, 1951. p. 44.
What kind of peace for Japan? *New Republic.* June 11, 1951. pp. 13–14.
When Japan has a treaty. *Nation.* August 4, 1951. pp. 88–89.
Asia reconquers Asia. *United Nations World.* March 1950. pp. 21–24.
Japan is nobody's ally ; excerpts from Situation in Asia. *Atlantic.* April 1949. pp. 54–58.
Lattimore strikes back ; excerpts from statement before Senate Hearing. *New Republic.* April 17, 1950. pp. 17–21.
Our failure in China. *Nation.* Sept. 3, 1949. pp. 223–226.
Point four and the third countries. *Annals of the American Academy.* July 1950. pp. 1–7.
Rebuilding our policy in Asia. *Atlantic.* January 1950. pp. 21–23.
We need Asia. *Nation.* December 16, 1950. pp. 556–559.
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Czeck exception disproves the rule. *New Republic.* September 22, 1947. pp. 6–7.
Opening of Asia. *Atlantic.* March 1949. pp. 29–33.
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Political pressures in Asia. *Atlantic.* February 1945. pp. 56–61.
Sacred cows of Japan. *Atlantic.* January 1945. pp. 45–51.
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Asia in a new world order. *Foreign Policy Report.* September 1, 1942. pp. 150–163.
China opens her wild west. *National Geographic.* September 1942. pp. 337–367.
Fight for democracy in Asia. *Foreign Affairs.* July 1942. pp. 694–704.
How to win the war. *American Magazine.* June 1942. pp. 14–15.
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Rising Sun, falling profits. *Atlantic.* July 1938. pp. 22–26.
On the wickedness of being Nomads. *Asia.* October 1935. pp. 598–605.
Political conditions in Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan. *Annals of the American Academy.* November 1930. pp. 318–327.
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Desert road to Turkestan. *National Geographic.* June 1929. pp. 661–702.
High Tartary. *Asia.* February 1930. pp. 112–117. May 1930. pp. 334–340. June 1930. pp. 430–435.
Leave taking. (poem). *Atlantic.* January 1930. p. 86.
(Source : Readers Guide to Periodical Literature.)

STEPHEN A. LANGONE,
History and General Research Section,
December 4, 1951.

THREE SAMPLES OF WRITINGS ON MONGOLIA BY OWEN LATTIMORE

"In Asia the most important example of the Soviet power of attraction beyond Soviet frontiers is in Outer Mongolia. It is here that we should look for evidence of the kind of attraction that Russia might offer to Korea in the future. Outer Mongolia may be called a satellite of Russia in the good sense. That is to say, the Mongols have gravitated into the Russian orbit of their own accord (and partly out of fear of Japan and China) ; they have neither been subjected to a military conquest nor sold to the Russians by traitors among their own people. They have gone through their own revolution. They have taken away the titles, revenues, and powers of the hereditary princes and aristocrats; but the sons and daughters of these aristocrats are full citizens with full equality of opportunity, including government service."

(Source: Solution in Asia. Owen Lattimore, pp. 141–142. 1945.)

"Soviet policy in Outer Mongolia cannot be fairly called Red imperialism. It certainly establishes a standard with which other nations must compete if they wish to practise a policy of attraction in Asia. Russo-Mongol relations in Asia, like Russo-Czechoslovak relations in Europe, deserve careful and respectful study."

(Source: Solution in Asia, Owen Lattimore, p. 144. 1945.)

"It was not until after the Soviet Union had been formed in 1924 that Bukhara and Khorezm voted to become socialist and applied to join the Soviet Union. Their application was accepted in 1924 and ratified in 1925, and they became the Republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia.

"They were influenced in their decision by the Soviet power of attraction for the majority of the people."

(Source: Solution in Asia, Owen Lattimore, p. 136. 1945.)

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Baltimore, Md., April 29, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Internal Security Subcommittee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: Herewith I am returning the list of my writings which you asked me to verify. I note that this list was compiled by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, using as source Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. As such, the list appears to be fairly representative. It should be noted however that the entry on page 4, "A. E. F. Gets a Chief," from *Time*, July 7, 1941, refers not to something that I wrote but to a news story about me.

Yours sincerely,

Owen Lattimore,
OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL: c

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you will instruct the witness to work with the staff under the arrangement we mentioned a while ago, I think we can adjourn for the day.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

You will hold yourself available, please, to work with the staff of this committee.

When we recess we will recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Some Senator will share the hearing because the chairman will probably not be here.

We will stand in recess until the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 3:55 p. m., Tuesday, April 8, 1952, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senators Ferguson and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator FERGUSON. The meeting will come to order.

Doctor, will you raise your right hand? You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. YERGAN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAX YERGAN, OSSINING, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the reporter, please?

Mr. YERGAN. Max Yergan, Pines Bridge Road, Ossining, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. What does that "doctor" stand for?

Mr. YERGAN. Doctor of humanities; also an honorary LLD.

Mr. MORRIS. Where did you obtain that?

Mr. YERGAN. Lincoln University.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Doctor Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. I am self-employed at present as a student of racial and colonial questions.

Mr. MORRIS. How recently have you been abroad?

Mr. YERGAN. Last year. About 8 or 9 months ago I went off to East Africa and to India.

Mr. MORRIS. Under what auspices?

Mr. YERGAN. I went to India under the auspices of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. I went to East Africa under the invitation of some Government officials and African educational leaders. I went to Europe after my return to America from Asia. I went back to Europe during the sessions of the UN for purposes of conferring with Africans and with Government representatives there who carry an administrative responsibility in Africa.

Mr. MORRIS. Doctor Yergan, where were you born?

Mr. YERGAN. Raleigh, N. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you been an executive of the Young Men's Christian Association?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. From 1916 to 1936, I was an executive of the Young Men's Christian Association.

Mr. MORRIS. What position did you hold in that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. I was secretary for the student interracial division here in America for the first year. In 1916 I was sent out to India as an educational secretary to work among Indian troops. In 1917 I was sent to east Africa to carry on educational work among Indian and Indian and other troops. Then, in 1920 I was sent out to South Africa as the national executive secretary in charge of the work of the YMCA for southern Africa, including the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your highest position in that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. I was what was called the senior secretary of the international committee of the Young Men's Christian Association.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you associated at any time with the National Negro Congress?

Mr. YERGAN. I was. I was back in America on furlough the year the National Negro Congress was organized, which I think was 1936, and I was at its opening meeting in Chicago. I was elected president of the National Negro Congress, I think, in 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, was the National Negro Congress a Communist-controlled organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you knew that at the time, did you not?

Mr. YERGAN. Not at the very beginning.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain the circumstances leading up to your becoming involved with the National Negro Congress?

Mr. YERGAN. As I said a moment ago, I went out to the meeting where the congress was organized—I think it was 1936—in Chicago, along with several hundred other Negroes who were interested in all of the questions affecting Negroes here in America. There were Communists present at that meeting, but I paid no particular attention. I did not know them too well.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were these particular Communists that you mentioned at this time?

Mr. YERGAN. James W. Ford was there. Earl Browder was there. I remember there was quite a furor due to the fact that there was a strong feeling in the city of Chicago against Browder speaking and, as I remember, he did not speak.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you come back from Africa, Doctor?

Mr. YERGAN. In 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. 1937?

Mr. YERGAN. 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time did you become acquainted with any Communists?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what the Communists did when you came back, you having been a worker among the colored people and for their betterment and welfare? Just what did the Communists do?

Mr. YERGAN. I came back from Africa in 1937. I left the work of the YMCA because I felt that a new committee at that time was needed

which could deal much more directly with the issues then developing in Africa. They were political and economic. I thought that the American public needed to be informed in a way which I could not do too well under the YMCA. Now, the Communists made a strong plea for me when I came back. I knew James W. Ford. I had known him as a student. I think he must have been one of the Communist leaders who was told to make a strong plea for me. I was invited to speak at meetings which ostensibly had the interests of Africa as their purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you later find that this interest was not genuine; that they had Communists rather than the people of Africa in mind?

Mr. YERGAN. Without hesitancy, my experience in these organizations led me as early as 1947 to the conviction that the Communists as such are not interested really in improving the conditions of Negroes or any other minority. They are certainly, I discovered, not interested in improving the conditions of hitherto underprivileged colonial peoples. They are interested in exploiting their conditions. They are interested in exploiting their grievances. They are interested in stirring up strife and in really preventing the solution of the problems along democratic lines.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, you find that they wear the cloak of humanity but, in fact, they are not for it at all; they have their own selfish and political interests in mind.

Mr. YERGAN. That is my conviction, sir. Anyone who looks to Communists for moral leadership or for wise political guidance looks in vain.

Senator FERGUSON. When you came back from Africa, will you tell us some of the people that won your friendship and came to you?

Mr. YERGAN. I mentioned James W. Ford.

Senator WATKINS. At that time what position did he occupy that would identify him as a Communist?

Mr. YERGAN. I think even at that time he was sort of a perennial candidate for some office in the Communist Party. He was a member of the national committee, I think, at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Whom else did you meet and did they have meet you?

Mr. YERGAN. Benjamin J. Davis, I knew. I knew him when he was a student. That was before I went out to South Africa. They had me meet Earl Browder.

Senator FERGUSON. What about William Z. Foster?

Mr. YERGAN. I met him later.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Dennis, the secretary of the Communist Party?

Mr. YERGAN. I met him later, not during the early years.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet Gates, who was editor of the Daily Worker?

Mr. YERGAN. I met him at a later date, also.

Senator FERGUSON. But they did have these Communists meet you and in effect take you under their wing?

Mr. YERGAN. They made it possible for me to meet them. I think an accurate description is that I was cultivated. I was sought after. I say that with a degree of modesty. I made some record as one really interested in working out some sort of solution of what we spoke

of then as the racial problem here in this country. I was certainly tremendously interested in the colonial question, as I had studied it and observed it in Africa at that time. I had been given certain awards which Negroes who accomplish things receive, and so they made a plea for me. They made a beeline for me and sought to capitalize my interest in these questions.

Senator FERGUSON. And in effect did they really take you over?

Mr. YERGAN. Not in the sense that I was made a member of the Communist Party, but I suppose I was the victim of their flattery to some extent. I was identified with many of their organizations.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they get to use your name in their organizations?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, yes; my name was placed on a number of their organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. May I just break in there? You were actively associated with Communists during that period, were you not, Doctor?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. It was not as if you did not know the nature of the organization in which you were operating. I mean, you knew the general nature of it?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, yes; I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, you were acquainted enough with the Communist organization that you had access to their headquarters?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you have been on more than one occasion at Communist Party headquarters?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been in the office of the Daily Worker?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you met all the Communist officials that Senator Ferguson has mentioned here today?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, did they not in some cases take you more into their confidence than they did some actual party members?

Mr. YERGAN. I think that is true.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, how long did this period exist? You say it roughly commenced in 1936. By 1940 you had become president of the National Negro Congress, and how long did this confidential relationship exist?

Mr. YERGAN. It continued up to 1947.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened in 1947?

Mr. YERGAN. In 1947 I began to see clearly the nature of the Communist apparatus in the organizations to which I belonged. For instance, in the National Negro Congress I saw how constantly they shifted from one issue to another, which revealed to me the lack of any fundamental interest in improving the conditions of Negroes. I saw, secondly, the absence of ordinary democratic methods. Decisions were taken by a board on which there were Communists and non-Communists. The executive staff very often failed to carry out those decisions and when inquiry was made I was told that the decisions were not carried out because Communist headquarters had advised to the contrary.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the Communists were running the thing and they put things down on paper as the object of the

organization, but paid no attention and did only what they wanted to do?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And did they make decisions and bring them in already made and just force them through?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. That is an example of the absence of democratic procedure. Instead of having questions thoroughly discussed, an already decided matter was brought in and instructions given to the executive staff to carry out those instructions.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you now believe those to be Communist decisions?

Mr. YERGAN. I believe them to be decisions, yes, in which the Communists had the major voice and which were a reflection of their interest and of their line at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned that you were associated with several organizations at this time that were controlled by the Communists. I wonder if you would list three or four of the more notable ones at this time, and I want you to include the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy because, as you know, this committee is concerned primarily with the Communists in the far-eastern field.

Mr. YERGAN. I will begin with that. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy in the Far East——

Mr. MORRIS. When was that formed, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. When was your first hearing of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know whether you ever said whether or not you ever met Frederick V. Field.

Mr. YERGAN. I am just about to say that now, sir. Frederick Field asked me to attend a meeting at his house.

Mr. MORRIS. At this time you knew Frederick Field quite well, did you not?

Mr. YERGAN. I knew him well. Our offices were in the same building and I saw him frequently.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, when you purchased some property a deed on record shows that Mr. and Mrs. Field and you were the owners.

Mr. YERGAN. That is right. I represented the Council on African Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. You in your representative capacity and they in their individual capacities were the owners of the building.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, at 23 West Twenty-sixth Street.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that known as today?

Mr. YERGAN. It is known as the home of subversive organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean the general formal name for it.

Mr. YERGAN. 23 West Twenty-sixth Street?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Does that building bear a name?

Mr. YERGAN. It doesn't come to me right off.

Mr. MORRIS. You were talking about this organization, Doctor.

Mr. YERGAN. Field came to me and said that he was under instructions, by way of making clear to me the importance of the project in hand, from Dennis——

Mr. MORRIS. That is Eugene Dennis?

Mr. YERGAN. Eugene Dennis.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he then the head of the Communist Party?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what his office was in the Communist Party?

Mr. YERGAN. Eugene Dennis?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. YERGAN. At that time he was the general secretary of the Communist Party. Field was under instruction to set up a committee and it was very important and urgent, and he asked would I meet with a group of individuals at his home. I said "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. This meeting is going to be in furtherance of the directive Eugene Dennis gave to Frederick Field to form an organization?

Mr. YERGAN. That is a very clear inference to which I subscribe.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what Field told you, that Dennis instructed him to form this organization?

Mr. YERGAN. He did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And he was calling this meeting to form the organization?

Mr. YERGAN. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. This, then, is the first meeting of that organization to be formed and the meeting is being held in the home of Frederick V. Field?

Mr. YERGAN. This is the organizational meeting, I suppose you would describe it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is more than an inference, then, is it not, Doctor? You knew as a matter of fact before the organizational meeting that it was being called by Mr. Field pursuant to the directive given him by Mr. Dennis?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us who were present at that meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. As far as I can remember, there was Field; a man named Epstein.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that Israel Epstein?

Mr. YERGAN. Israel Epstein and his wife.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she known as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. And then Mr. Stewart Maxwell.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. YERGAN. Maxwell Stewart. There were two meetings. At one of them was the wife of Mr. Snow, Mrs. Edgar Snow.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she also known as Nym Wales?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. A Miss or Mrs. Pruitt.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Ida Pruitt?

Mr. YERGAN. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Rose Terlin present?

Mr. YERGAN. Rose Terlin.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Talitha Gerlach present?

Mr. YERGAN. And Miss Gerlach.

Mr. MORRIS. I am now reading, Mr. Chairman, from the names given by the witness in executive session this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. You were sworn in executive session and that testimony you gave in executive session was true?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So Mr. Morris is taking the names from that testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, was Mrs. Maxwell S. Stewart present at that first meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. She was present at one of those meetings, I know.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, there was a subsequent meeting of the same group and it is your testimony that Mrs. Maxwell Stewart, who is Marguerite Stewart, was present at the first or second meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the relevancy of the testimony today about these people that have attended this meeting is that they have turned up time and again as people involved in the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mrs. Maxwell Stewart at this period of time was the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I mention that, Mr. Chairman, having in front of me the Windows on the Pacific, the biennial report of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944–46.

Senator FERGUSON. Was not Field also connected with the Institute?

Mr. MORRIS. Frederick V. Field had been secretary of the organization up until 1940 and was a member of the board of trustees until 1947, but there is other evidence in the record to show that his interest continued beyond that. Marguerite S. Stewart is listed as secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in this 1944–46 report. Israel Epstein was the editor of a publication put out under the auspices of the international secretariat of the IPR in 1949; Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, by Israel Epstein. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley was a member of the secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and there has been some association with some of the other people.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear mentioned the Institute of Pacific Relations from any of these people?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, there was reference made at one of these two meetings to organizations that were interested in these same issues that this proposed committee was interested in, and the Institute was among those organization referred to.

Senator FERGUSON. The Institute was mentioned as one of the organizations that was interested in the same cause; is that right?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, I would say that is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, these organizations had the same outlook and the same approach to the questions being discussed by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, the same interests and the same outlook. I am not quite sure about the same approach, but the same interests, the same outlook, the same sphere of interest. Reference was made, for instance, to some of the Institute's literature and there was interest expressed in that literature.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this group approved the literature that had been put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. YERGAN. There was no formal action of approving but there was interest in it.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was discussed?

Mr. YERGAN. It was discussed, that is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the prevailing officer at this meeting, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. Field was the prevailing officer, Frederick Field.

Mr. MORRIS. In the discussions that took place at that time, was there general agreement on the part of all those people participating in the meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. I don't recall any conflict of views on any matters of policy. There was a discussion with regard to the place for headquarters, and there was a discussion also about the name, I recall, but on questions of policy I don't recall any conflicting views expressed. Proposals were brought in by Field, and they were usually adhered to and acted upon favorably.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was Field's policy?

Mr. YERGAN. I would say that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And Field had told you that Dennis had ordered him to organize this for a specific purpose; is that so?

Mr. YERGAN. He didn't go into the purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. But he said Dennis had ordered him to organize?

Mr. YERGAN. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they tell you what the purpose was of this organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Well, the purpose was discussed both formally and informally at these two meetings, that being to discredit Chiang Kai-shek, to use all of the influence possible to turn material to the forces in China that were opposing Chiang Kai-shek. That was the general point of emphasis with regard to the purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any word about trying to influence public opinion here on the question of being against Chiang Kai-shek and also in favor of the forces against him?

Mr. YERGAN. There was a fairly general discussion of releases to be sent out, of publications to be issued by the organization, and of meetings to be held.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that to influence American public opinion?

Mr. YERGAN. I would say so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, where they were going to circulate this literature was at the time in the United States?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, primarily in the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. Were the Negro people to be used also in this?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. I recall a lady who was identified in an executive capacity, Miss Russell.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Miss Maud Russell?

Mr. YERGAN. Miss Maud Russell; and the Reverend Stephen Fritchman.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he come from?

Mr. YERGAN. He was a Unitarian minister from Boston I think. They came once to me requesting that I give them the names of some leading Negroes whom they wished to have as sponsors both for the organization and for a proposed meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think or do you know that the Communists have used the Negro people in this country to sponsor Communist activities and Communist propaganda?

Mr. YERGAN. I both think it and know it.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us how you know it.

Mr. YERGAN. I know it because of a request made upon me to suggest Negroes who might be brought into various organizations. I think I am an example also of the use that is made. As I said at the beginning, I have reached the considered opinion that this is primarily a use made of people who are carrying on an effort to improve their conditions. I have no confidence in the sincerity or the good faith of the Communist Party or of Communists so far as Negroes and their efforts are concerned.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it does not make any difference; whether it is a white man or a colored man, or whoever it might be, they will use him if they can to further their objectives?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct. I believe that. Negroes in this country are interested in achieving the largest possible measure of democracy for themselves and for the country. The Communists are not interested in achieving that.

Senator FERGUSON. But they claim to get your help, do they not?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, they claim it, but my experience leads me to the conviction that that is a false claim.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a few questions, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Yergan, you spoke a few moments ago about certain objectives of the organization, and you named them. How did you know those were the objectives of the organization? Did Mr. Field say so, or did Mr. Dennis say so, or who said so?

Mr. YERGAN. That statement which indicates what I believe to be the objectives was made at the meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. By whom?

Mr. YERGAN. By individuals who were present. There was general agreement on those statements.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who?

Mr. YERGAN. Field made the statement, and I don't recall any opposition expressed to that statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Field made the statement and that was it?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. Other people amplified it in support.

Mr. SOURWINE. And those objectives were carried out by the actual operations of the organization; is that right?

Mr. YERGAN. I take it that they were. Certainly in the literature that I saw—I only attended those two meetings—afterward indicated that those objectives were being acted upon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you helped to form that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, I was present. I would say that by my presence I must have contributed in one way or another to it. I think that follows.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the only way you contributed to it, Dr. Yergan, by your presence?

Mr. YERGAN. I think the fact that I was asked to come indicates that they felt that I would not be in opposition to it.

Mr. SOURWINE. A little more than just being asked to come and the fact that you did go. As a matter of fact, did you not at that time and in that framework actively assist in the formation of that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. I have said that, sir; by my presence there I think that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean by more than your presence there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you participate in the conversation?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, based on your experience with Communists and Communist organizations, and your experience during that meeting and the subsequent meeting that you make reference to, do you have any doubt whatever that that was a Communist organization coming into being at that time?

Mr. YERGAN. No, I don't have any doubt.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you attended a second meeting of this organization, Dr. Yergan.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, I have been talking here about the two meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand that, but I want to make it clear that there were two separate meetings.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anybody at the second meeting who was not at the first meeting whose name you have not mentioned here today? Your estimate of the number of people present at each meeting is what, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, 12 or 15.

Mr. MORRIS. You have not given us that many names.

Mr. YERGAN. No, I don't remember them all.

Mr. MORRIS. You have seen a list of names. We have submitted to you in the executive session a list of names of people connected with the institute and that did not refresh your recollection, did it, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. If I could see that list it might.

(Witness is shown list referred to.)

Mr. YERGAN. Epstein, I have mentioned. Gerlach, I have mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Maud Russell present at either one of those meetings?

Mr. YERGAN. I think so. I am fairly certain that she was. Maxwell Stewart I have mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Gunther Stein present at either one of those meetings?

Mr. YERGAN. I don't remember him.

Mr. MORRIS. Kumar Goshal?

Mr. YERGAN. I knew him, but I don't recall that he was present at one of those meetings. He may have been, but I don't recall it.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, have you told us as much as you can about the policy that was set down as the policy of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy at that time? You said it was to undermine Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How was that to be done?

Mr. YERGAN. To discredit him.

Mr. MORRIS. How was it to be done?

Mr. YERGAN. Through literature, through public meetings, to represent Chiang Kai-shek as the symbol of feudalism and of corruption in government, and to represent the forces that were opposed to him as the forces that stood for democracy.

Mr. MORRIS. Was also an active campaign to be waged that would encourage nonintervention on the part of America and Americans in China?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there also a policy to build up the Chinese policy, that is, to build up the Chinese Communists as people who were free and people of good works?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That was established in both of these meetings as a policy of that organization?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to show you exhibit No. 174, which has been introduced into our public record. This is from the Daily Worker of Friday, August 17, 1945. It is entitled "Americans in Plea to Truman on China." It reads:

> Twenty-one prominent Americans urged President Truman to avert the serious danger of a civil war in China. They demanded immediate steps to prevent American planes and other military equipment from being turned over to the Chungking Government.
>
> Pointing out that Chiang Kai-shek has made a direct appeal to the Japanese troops "to retain their arms and equipment for the maintenance of public order," the telegram to Truman stated that "the only American policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender of Japanese troops to patriotic Chinese groups on the spot."
>
> The message to President Truman noted that the Communist-led Eighth Route and new Fourth Armies which Chiang Kai-shek is preparing to attack "have borne the brunt of the allied fight in north central China."

Among the signers we have Mr. T. A. Bisson, Mrs. Edward C. Carter, Israel Epstein, Mr. Frederick V. Field, and then I believe at the very end is Dr. Max Yergan, Director of Council on African Affairs. Do you recall that particular episode.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. I received a telephone call from Frederick Field asking if my name could be used in connection with that letter and I said "Yes."

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether that was before or after these two meetings about which you have been testifying?

Mr. YERGAN. It could have been before, but my impression is that it was along about the same time.

Mr. MORRIS. I will mention some of the other names here: Martin Popper, Ilona Ralf Sues, Mrs. Edgar Snow, Richard Watts, and I ask you in general if that is not the same group of people who participated in the two meetings and the organization that was subsequently formed?

Mr. YERGAN. Substantially. I see here the names of many people who were present at those two meetings; not all of them, certainly not.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe that as an incident that was representative of the campaign that was being carried on by this organization?

Mr. YERGAN. You mean——

Mr. MORRIS. This particular incident that took place.

Mr. YERGAN. You mean this letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, I think so. That's typical of the campaign that was being carried on.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave them consent and they used your name?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about the truth of the statements in that letter that was signed at that time, Dr. Yergan? From your experience now, your general over-all experience, will you comment on the truth of the letter that was sent to President Truman at that time?

Mr. YERGAN. I think there was a certain amount of truth. I think there was room for improvement certainly in the administration of Chiang Kai-shek, just as there is room everywhere, but underneath all of this—and I think this is the real issue—the purpose was, as I think back upon it now, to promote the Communist forces, to strengthen the Communist forces, and to discredit the forces in China that were opposed to the Communist forces.

Mr. MORRIS. And they wanted to use the names of all those people, sending a letter to President Truman so that that fact, the facts set forth in that letter, would be brought to the attention of as many people as possible and therefore to influence public opinion?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, do you know whether they obtained any other names through your name on that letter?

Mr. YERGAN. Perhaps modesty would lead me to say perhaps not, but being perfectly frank, I was a man with some influence and I think people noticing my name on this letter would pay attention to it.

Senator FERGUSON. And the President would probably be influenced by the fact that you had represented the colored people, and he would be moved by the fact that you were on there; do you not think that is true?

Mr. YERGAN. Well, I'd put it just slightly different. I think the fact that they sought to involve me indictes that they wanted to use me and to use such influence and such status as I have achieved.

Mr. MORRIS. It mentions here that you were the Director of the Council on African Affairs.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I assume that is one of the organizations that you are going to tell us about today. Will you tell us the general nature of that organization that you are here listed as director of? You were the leading director, were you not?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes. There is one organization that constitutes a slight exception. I founded it and when I founded it I was under no influence of the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. That was what year?

Mr. YERGAN. That was in 1937. The only individual that I now recall who was definitely associated with a Communist outfit who was on the committee is Paul Robeson, as I recall. However, Communists were brought into the organization. They were proposed by Robeson. I think I must have proposed some. Certainly I didn't object to those who were brought in, so that I take some responsibility for their presence. This organization had one or two main purposes: One, to inform American opinion about the changes that were taking place in a more or less unknown great colonial area of the world. During the war we sought to involve Africans as fighters on the allied side through correspondence with governments in Europe and the South African governments. We didn't succeed too much in that.

We were interested also in developing a helpful interest, not only from a humanitarian point of view, but in terms of developing the democratic idea and winning Africans who would be coming into positions of leadership to the side of the democratic cause. Now, the Communists saw that and they saw that here was an organization that appealed to Negroes and to non-Negroes in this country, because Africa was then becoming of great interest. By 1945, by the end of the war, the Communists' strength in the organization was considerable. They didn't have a majority of the people, but it was considerable. Robeson was chairman and I was executive head. By the end of the war, actually in 1946, in the organizations to which I belonged, the National Negro Congress, the Civil Rights Congress, I began to see clearly the issues on which and the procedure on which I could not agree with the Communists.

In the Council of African Affairs, particularly, there was a real effort on the part of the chairman and other leaders, the educational director, to use every occasion to criticize American and allied policy with regard to Africa and to promote Russian policy with regard to Africa and the colonies in general. That became so clear and so pointed that it was the basis for the opposition or the conflict that developed in the council between the Communist-led forces and the forces which I led, which were the non-Communist forces in the council.

Mr. MORRIS. The net result of the whole thing was that you were put out of your own organization?

Mr. YERGAN. I was put out of the organization even though I had a majority of votes on my side.

Mr. MORRIS. How was that effected?

Mr. YERGAN. Because the chairman refused to act in accordance with ordinary parliamentary rules.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, they would not count them?

Mr. YERGAN. They would not count them. I had the actual votes and the proxies, but they wouldn't count them and so the usual methods were resorted to until it became perfectly clear to me that I'd use the rest of my life in court or otherwise fighting them, so we lost to the Communists. We lost property. We lost one of the best libraries on Africa in this country, and other things.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying, Dr. Yergan, in effect, that as long as you cooperated with the Communist purposes in the organization it rocked along, but when you refused to do that they forced you out? Is that the fact?

Mr. YERGAN. That is one interpretation, but that is not exactly what I was saying. That is one interpretation, to be sure. I raised the issues. I said this organization was founded and exists to aid Africa, not to promote Russian foreign policy and not to attack everything in America.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long after you raised these issues were you forced out?

Mr. YERGAN. These issues were raised early in 1947. I was forced out early in 1948.

Mr. SOURWINE. And how long prior to the time you raised these issues had the organization existed without friction?

Mr. YERGAN. It had existed from its beginning without too much friction.

Mr. SOURWINE. About 10 years; is that not so?

Mr. YERGAN. From 1937 to 1946, nearly 10 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, are you acquainted with the China Aid Council?

Mr. YERGAN. There's so many of these committees on China.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a letterhead of that organization which has been introduced into the record, our exhibit No. 348. I show this to you.

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a member of that?

Mr. YERGAN. I was a member of the American League for Peace and Democracy and the China Aid Council, as I recall, was a subdivision of that over-all organization.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, how did they ever get you into so many of these Chinese things when you had a task of your own?

Mr. YERGAN. Well, I can think of two reasons: One, because at that time China was considered as a colonial problem, and, secondly, because the Communists thought to capitalize on the fact of color. They sought to lump nonwhites together and indicate that there was a common bond, or should be a common bond amongst peoples who had color in common. The assumption there was perhaps that whites do not have any color.

Senator FERGUSON. They made that cause, though, appeal to you as wanting to help your people?

Mr. YERGAN. That's right.

Senator FERGUSON. That if you helped the Chinese cause you would be helping your own; is that correct?

Mr. YERGAN. That's an inference; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So they got your name.

Mr. YERGAN. And the other reason is my name stood for something.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, and they were using it wherever they could; is that true?

Mr. YERGAN. That is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are being completely frank here, Dr. Yergan, I know, and I think your answer to Senator Ferguson's question indicates that. As a matter of fact you are not contending that throughout this you were——

Mr. YERGAN. An innocent victim.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not your contention at all?

Mr. YERGAN. No, not at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, your motives throughout were not entirely for the sole purpose of elevating the condition of the Negro race, were they?

Mr. YERGAN. My motives primarily had a racial basis, and a racial basis in the sense of American Negroes and in the sense of Africa. My primary concern and my primary interests were in the racial question here and in the colonial question in general, but primarily in Africa, and I think it's because they knew of my interest in the colonial question that I was brought into these organizations that dealt with China.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps I phrased my question badly. The fact I am attempting to reach is whether throughout this period of 10 or a dozen years of association, whatever it was, where your name was used by Communist causes for the furtherance of Communist ob-

jectives you were during all of that time misled as to the objectives of the organization, or whether you were at the time and for a period an active cooperator and collaborator.

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct. I was not misled in that I didn't know what I was doing.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not entirely innocent?

Mr. YERGAN. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought at times it would help your cause?

Mr. YERGAN. Frankly, I was conscientious about it. I was naive, as I look back on it now. I wasn't a Marxist. I've known more about Marxism since I've been fighting the Communists than I knew during the time I was considered a cooperator.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back, then, to the China Aid Council? Is there any doubt in your mind either now or then that the China Aid Council was a Communist organization?

Mr. YERGAN. No; there is no doubt in my mind now.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Mr. YERGAN. I know that name.

Mr. MORRIS. I believe that you are associated with that organization at one time; were you not?

Mr. YERGAN. I think so. As I remember, that's one of the organizations with regard to which I was called and I agreed——

Mr. MORRIS. You were a member of the national advisory board in 1939, according to a listing of that organization.

Mr. YERGAN. That I must stand by.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you well enough acquainted with the organization to tell us that that in fact was a Communist organization?

Mr. YERGAN. If I could get the names.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this time, while Mr. Mandel is getting that I might say that during the course of these hearings it has been observed that personnel associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations were associated with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, the organization about which we have been taking testimony here today. Mr. Mandel, director of research, has prepared a list of people who were connected with both organizations, and I would like to offer this to the Chair now and after certain comments and certain limitations are pointed out I would like to ask if the chairman would receive this into the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to ask Mr. Mandel, research director, whether or not he did prepare this list and whether he now says it is accurate.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a list of the interlocking between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy showing the names of the individuals, the connection with each organization, and the source of the information. In all there are 44 such names.

Mr. MORRIS. When there is listed, for instance, after the name of Charles Bidien the word "consultant," how do you know in fact that Charles Bidien was a consultant for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. MANDEL. That is taken from a letterhead dated May 21, 1948, in our possession.

Mr. MORRIS. You have not, however, have you, Mr. Mandel, checked with each individual to find out whether they were in fact a consultant?

Mr. MANDEL. No; it is impossible.

Senator FERGUSON. It merely shows that you did have the letterhead and that is what it indicated here?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. We have the source of reference.

Mr. MORRIS. The inadequacy of this report is, although it does serve a purpose, that it is conceivable that someone may have been listed in one of those organizations and never actually have been affiliated with it. That is one limitation of this list, but still I think it is a source of explanation.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it with that explanation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1334" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1334

Interlocking between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy

Name	Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy		Institute of Pacific Relations	
	Connection	Information source	Connection	Information source
Bidien, Charles	Consultant	Letterhead, May 21, 1948.	Writer	Far Eastern Survey.
Bisson, T. A	do	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Member	International Secretariat Bien Report 1944-46.
Bodde, Derk	Writer	Spotlight, Apr. 5, 1950	Collaborator.	IPR book Chinese Ideas in the West, 1948 Far Eastern Survey, Nov. 16, 1949.
Brooke, Raymond D., pseudonym for Chen, Hanseng.	do	Spotlight, June 1949	Writer	Pacific Affairs, June 1937.
			Member	International Secretariat 1949.
Carlson, Evans F	Chairman	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Writer	Far Eastern Survey, 1941.
Chapman, Abraham	Director	Letterhead, Apr. 18, 1951.	do	Pacific Affairs, June 1946.
Cholmeley, Elsie Fairfax	Editor	Spotlight, October 1949.	Member	International Secretariat 1935-41.
Deane, Hugh	Consultant	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	do	Letter, Oct. 10, 1940.
Epstein, Israel	do	do	Writer	IPR book Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China, 1948.
Field, Frederick V	Director	do	Secretary	American Council IPR, 1936-40.
Forman, Harrison	Consultant	do	Author	Book promoted, IPR bulletin Mar.9, 1945.
Friedman, Julian	Writer	Spotlight, April 1947	Member	Ninth IPR conference 1945.
Gayn, Mark	Book promoted.	Spotlight, October 1950.	Author	Book promoted, Pacific Affairs, April 1944.
Gerlach, Talitha	Member executive committee.	do	Supporter	Letters, Feb. 4 and 6, 1943.
Goodrich, L. Carrington	Sponsor	Dinner folder Apr. 3, 1946.	Trustee	American Council 1946, 1951 (annual reports 1946, 1951).
Goshal, Kumar	Consultant	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Coauthor	IPR pamphlet Twentieth Century China, 1944.
Hersey, John	Reference	Circular, 1946, quoting New Yorker, May 5, 1946.	Trustee	American Council 1946, 1947, 1951, annual reports.
Jaffe, Philip	Consultant	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Member	Seventh IPR Conference 1939.
Keeney, Philip O	Writer	Spotlight, July 1948, February 1950.	Speaker, writer.	Dec. 11, 1947. Far Eastern Survey Jan. 28, 1948.

Interlocking between the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy—Continued

Name	Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy		Institute of Pacific Relations	
	Connection	Information source	Connection	Information source
Lang, Olga	Recommended reading.	Spotlight, January 1947 p. 7.	Writer	Pacific Affairs 1940, p. 110.
Lattimore, Eleanore Frances.	do	do	IPR staff	May 1944–June 1947, W. L. Holland list.
Lindsay, Michael	Consultant	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Writer	Far Eastern Survey April 1945; September 1947.
Mandel, William	Writer	Spotlight, Apr. 5, 1950	do	IPR book Soviet Far East and Central Asia, 1943.
McWilliams, Carey	Sponsor	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	do	IPR pamphlet: What About Our Japanese Americans? 1944.
Menefee, Selden	do	do	Member	Washington, D. C., 1946.
Melish, William H	do	do	Writer	Far Eastern Survey July 14, 1943.
Mitchell, Kate L	Consultant	do	Staff writer, editor.	Pacific Council and International Secretariat, 1934–41 Far Eastern Survey 1936, 1937, 1945.
Rosinger, Lawrence	Recommended reading.	Spotlight, January 1947, p. 7.		
Salisbury, L. E	Consultant	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	Editor	Far Eastern Survey 1944–45.
Seeman, Bernard	do	do	Writer	IPR pamphlet: Cross Currents in the Philippines, 1946.
Smedley, Agnes	Writer	Spotlight, October 1950	Member	Carter testimony, p. 73.
Snow, Edgar	Member Executive Committee.	Spotlight, July 1948	Writer, member.	Pacific Affairs 1937–38, Carter testimony, p. 73.
Snow, Mrs. Edgar	Director	Letterhead, Feb. 11, 1947.	do	Far Eastern Survey Aug. 28, 1946, Carter testimony, p. 73.
Stein, Guenther	Consultant	do	do	Carter testimony, p. 73, Pacific Affairs, 1936–37, 1939, 1941, 1943, 1946, 1948. Far Eastern Survey 1942 1943, 1947
Stewart, Maxwell	do	Letterhead Feb. 11, 1947.	do	Carter testimony, p. 73 IPR pamphlet Wartime China, 1944.
Straus, Donald	Sponsor	do	Member	Board of Trustees, 1949 to 1951.
Strong, Anna L	Director	Spotlight June 1948	Member writer.	Carter testimony p. 73 Pacific Affairs June 1941.
Sues, Ilona Ralf	Consultant	Letterhead Feb. 11, 1947.	Author	Book promoted Far Eastern Survey Mar. 8, 1944.
Tewksbury, Donald	Writer	Spotlight October 1950	do	IPR book, Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies, 1950.
Van Kleeck, Mary	Director	Letterhead Apr. 18, 1951.	Member writer.	Carter testimony p. 73 Pacific Affairs September 1936; June 1938.
Wallace, Henry A	Writer	Spotlight July 9, 1949	Member	Board of Trustees, 1946.
Watts, Richard, Jr	Director	Letterhead Feb. 11, 1947.	Writer	Far Eastern Survey Oct. 10, 1945.
Weltfish, Gene	Sponsor	Letterhead Feb. 14, 1947.	do	Far Eastern Survey Aug. 28, 1945.

NOTES

Spotlight refers to Far East Spotlight, published by Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.
The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy has been cited as subversive by Attorney General Tom Clark in a letter to the Loyalty Review Board, released April 27, 1949.
Far Eastern Survey, published biweekly by the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.
Pacific Affairs, published quarterly by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, there are a couple of items I would like to ask you about. After the name of Mark Gayn you have the expression "book promoted." Will you explain that?

Mr. MANDEL. That simply means that his book was favorably reviewed or recommended for reading purposes.

Mr. MORRIS. After the name of John Hersey you have another reference. What is the explanation of that reference? You have the word "reference."

Mr. MANDEL. There were quotations from some of his writings which were set aside as references.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the only connection we have of John Hersey?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; with the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. After Olga Lang and Eleanor Lattimore you have "recommended reading." Will you explain that?

Mr. MANDEL. Spotlight on the Far East, the official organ of the Committee for a Far Eastern Democratic Policy, there is a feature in each issue with recommended reading, and the books of Olga Lang and Eleanor Lattimore were recommended to the readers of the Spotlight.

Mr. MORRIS. But everything else, Mr. Mandel, is listed here as a result of your research in connection with the publications of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, and the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. The name "Lattimore" came up here. Did you ever know Owen Lattimore?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes, sir. I met Owen Lattimore on one occasion.

Senator FERGUSON. What was that occasion?

Mr. YERGAN. At a social gathering, a cocktail party in San Francisco, in the early 1940's. I think it was 1942 or 1943. It was at the home of Mrs. Chamberlain, whose daughter was at that time the wife of Frederick V. Field.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Field at the meeting?

Mr. YERGAN. He was not at the meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any known Communists were at that cocktail party?

Mr. MORRIS. Was Paul Robeson there?

Mr. YERGAN. Paul Robeson was there; a man by the name of Philip Lilienthal.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. YERGAN. I did not, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I asked you of any known Communists.

Mr .YERGAN. I am sorry. I was answering the second question. I don't know of any known Communists who were there.

Senator FERGUSON. Were there any people there who had worked with you as Communists?

Mr. YERGAN. Well, Robeson was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Field was not there, was he?

Mr. YERGAN. He was not there.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know at that time that Robeson was a Communist?

Mr. YERGAN. No; but I knew that there never was any expression of opposition from him to the Communist point of view.

Senator FERGUSON. Then, you knew him to be under the discipline of the Communists?

Mr. YERGAN. I don't know, sir, the use in which I have the word "discipline."

Senator FERGUSON. Were you under——

Mr. YERGAN. I was never under the discipline in the sense that I was bound by them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you actually comply with their directives?

Mr. YERGAN. Not always, and it is in that sense that I was not under their discipline.

Senator FERGUSON. You did have some freedom, then, of action, outside of the Communists; is that right?

Mr. YERGAN. I would like to say, sir, that I had complete freedom of action, so that it is for that reason that I take the responsibility for the mistakes that I made, because I did make a mistake in identifying myself with them, and I now have to take the responsibility for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, what was discussed at this meeting at which you were present and, according to your testimony, Paul Robeson, Mrs. Frederick V. Field, her mother, Philip Lilienthal, and Owen Lattimore, among others?

Mr. YERGAN. I would not say it was a discussion. It was a conversation. It was informal. The general question dealt with the issue in China: Why does America continue believing in Chiang Kai-shek? Why doesn't America see that the real exponents of democracy in China are the Communist forces? That was the tenor of the discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there general uniformity of agreement on this?

Mr. YERGAN. I don't recall any opposition.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you recall, for instance, Owen Lattimore objecting to any of those sentiments you have just described?

Mr. YERGAN. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Then there was unanimous opinion of that discussion?

Mr. YERGAN. I would say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have we established that Mr. Lattimore was there and heard it?

Mr. YERGAN. I think that is established.

Senator FERGUSON. You are satisfied that that was true?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Lattimore, when asked about this meeting, acknowledged that he was present, and that Paul Robeson was present, and that Dr. Max Yergan was present. He has not testified as to what the conversation was at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever meet Mrs. Lattimore?

Mr. YERGAN. No, sir: I've never met her.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, would you look at that "American Friends of the Chinese People" there?

Mr. YERGAN (complies). Yes, I've looked at that. I see the names here of several people who were asked to sign and support Communist projects. I see a lot of names that I think that they were pretty fortunate in getting to lend dignity to the thing, but I don't have any question about it being an effort on the part of Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, you got to know Frederick V. Field quite well, did you not?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you able to observe the degree of monitoring or supervision that the Communists exercised over his activities, during his activity within the Communist scope of endeavor?

Mr. YERGAN. There was a Miss Bachrach——

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Miss Marion Bachrach?

Mr. YERGAN. Marion Bachrach, who seemed to function as a political expert in such meetings as I attended where they were present.

Now, there was a meeting of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and other meetings which discussed the colonial question in general, and she appeared as a sort of political expert there.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say within the Communist sphere of things, it appeared to you that Marion Bachrach was superior to Frederick V. Field?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes; I would say that.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Alexander Trachtenberg? Did he monitor the actions of Frederick V. Field?

Mr. YERGAN. Not at those meetings, but at the meetings of the board of Jefferson School—I was on that board also—Mr. Trachtenberg's voice was usually the authoritative voice.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever teach at that school, or lecture?

Mr. YERGAN. I've lectured there.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether that was a Communist-dominated organization?

Mr. YERGAN. I would say, sir, that it was.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt about it, do you?

Mr. YERGAN. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Yergan, did you know Mr. Lawrence Duggan?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes; I met him on one occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that occasion?

Mr. YERGAN. At a meeting held at 23 West Twenty-sixth Street, dealing with Latin-American questions. This was a meeting that Fields' organization on Latin America held, and Lawrence Duggan was there, under the invitation of Field. They constituted a sort of panel which received and answered questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Lawrence Duggan at that time was an official in the United States State Department, was he not?

Mr. YERGAN. I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. He appeared to you to be a political intimate of Frederick V. Field at that time, did he not?

Mr. YERGAN. Yes; he appeared to be a very close friend of Field.

Mr. MORRIS. And what year was that, Dr. Yergan?

Mr. YERGAN. I'm not sure about the year, but I think that was 1944.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Frederick V. Field an important functionary as far as you could observe, of the Communist policy, with respect to far-eastern policy?

Mr. YERGAN. Oh, yes; I would say that he was, on the basis of what he wrote, and the fact that he wrote almost exclusively on far-eastern questions. I would say that he was set up and regarded as an authority.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a few more exhibits. It will only take us 5 minutes if we can put them in the record at this time. These are things that have appeared in recent testimony, Senator,

and have been called for as a general supplement to the paper—what is that paper?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an advertisement in China Today of October 1935, advertising a meeting, dated October 9, and showing as speakers Frederick V. Field, Maxwell Stewart, Earl Browder, Hansu Chan, and others.

I offer that for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1335" and is as follows:)

[Source: China Today, October 1935]

October 9th—Night Extraordinary

EARL BROWDER

MAXWELL S. STEWART,
Editor, The Nation.
WILLIAM GROPPER,
Famous Cartoonist and Nemesis of Emperor Hirohito.
DR. HANSHU CHAN,
Chairman of Editorial Board of China Today.
FREDERICK V. FIELD,
American Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
HARU MATSUI,
Well-known Japanese Woman Writer.
J. W. PHILLIPS—Chairman,
Exec. Sec'y, American Friends of the Chinese People, Editorial Board of China Today.

WILL GREET THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF CHINA TODAY AND CELEBRATE THE 24TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC AT THE

"CHINA TODAY" BANQUET

Wednesday, October 9th, at 6:30 P. M., at Manhattan Lyceum, 66 E. 4th St., Bet. 2nd & 3rd Aves.

$1.25 PER PLATE

Genuine Native Chinese Food.
Native Chinese Instrument Program.
Famous Filipino Dance Orchestra.
William Gropper will draw what he really thinks of Emperor Hirohito of Japan.

SEE LARGEST MAP OF CHINA EVER MADE

To be used by speakers of the evening

35¢ Tickets Sold at Door Only, Will Admit Holder to Hear Speakers, Entertainment & Dance. Program Begins at 8 P. M.

Tickets for Banquet Obtainable in Advance at China Today, 168 W. 23rd St., and Worker's Bookshop, 50 E. 13th St.

RESERVE WEDNESDAY EV'G, OCTOBER 9

Mr. MANDEL. I have compiled a list of contributors to China Today from their magazine, who are also asociated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I offer this list, giving the name of the contributors and the source of the information.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1336" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1336

CHINA TODAY

Official Organ of the American Friends of the Chinese People

Contributors associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations

Name	China Today		Name	China Today	
	Date	Page		Date	Page
Alley, Rewi	1/40	4, 13	Mitchell, Kate	2/41	4, 5
Barnett, Patricia Glover	6/40	4, 9	Moore, Harriet	9/39	4, 10
Barnett, Robert	5/40	4, 5	Norton, Robert	9/39	4, 8
Bertram, James	2/39	3, 8	Price, Harry B	9/39	4, 12
Bisson, T. A	2/39	3, 5	Pruitt, Ida	10/39	4, 12
Carlson, Evans F	1/40	4, 5	Rosinger, Lawrence K	8/40	4, 12
Chi, Ch'ao-ting (Hansu Chan)	11/35	26	Roth, Andrew	1/41	4, 13
Deane, Hugh	2/41	4, 9	Schoyer, B. Preston	8/40	4, 12
Fabyan, Eleanor B	11/39	4, 11	Snow, Edgar	4/41	4, 5
Field, Frederick V	12/41	2, 4	Stewart, Maxwell S	2/39	3
Goshal, Kumar	3/42	2, 6	Strong, Anna Louise	3/42	2, 6
Jaffe, Philip J	2/39	3	Thompson, Virginia	11/40	4, 12
Lattimore, Owen	5/41	4, 5	Yakhontoff, Victor	8/39	4, 12

NOTES

The American Friends of the Chinese People has been cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities in its Report, March 29, 1944, pages 40 and 147.

China Today has been cited as a magazine "published by the Communist front, Friends of the Chinese People, at 168 West Twenty-Third Street, New York City" by the California Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, in its Report, 1948, page 198.

China Today has been mentioned by the Massachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activities in its Report, 1938, page 281, as distributed by the Communists' Progressive Book Shop in Boston, Mass.

TYPICAL QUOTATION FROM CHINA TODAY

"If the people of the United States know what is happening in China, if they know the glorious history of the Chinese Communists * * * there will rise a storm of protest against American and European aid for Chiang Kai-shek * * *. Thus is telling the story of China to our people, your magazine is helping to protect the future of the Soviet Union." (Waldo Frank in China Today, December 1934, page 42.)

Fred Brown, also known as Alpi, a Comintern operative, in an article in the COMMUNIST of March 193-, pages 261 and 262, has paid tribute to the work of the American Friends of the Chinese People as follows: 'Credit is due to the good work of the American Friends of the Chinese People."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, on that point, let me ask Mr. Mandel a question:

Is it not true that what you have here is a list of persons whose names appear in China Today as contributors?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no knowledge as to whether, in fact, although it is presumptive, that they are, in fact, the respective authors of the articles that appeared therein?

Mr. MANDEL. That is the way they appeared in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. What is next?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State dated November 23, 1951, signed "W. K. Scott, Acting Deputy Under Secretary" addressed to Senator McCarran.

Mr. MORRIS. What does that letter say?

Mr. MANDEL. This deals with a document known as the Economy of Communist North China, 1947–49, and identifies the document.

Mr. MORRIS. Have these documents been introduced into our record?

Mr. MANDEL. They have been introduced in introducing the front sheet of each one.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that identified in the record as a physical document taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It was.

Mr. MORRIS. Does this show it was not taken from the files of the institute, but, in fact, taken from the files of the State Department, and you made a mistake in identifying it?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, is it a case of this letter showing that you made a mistake, or are you testifying that with this letter refreshing your memory, you know that you made a mistake.

Mr. MANDEL. The latter, that is, the documents were kept in a cabinet and were confused with IPR documents, and as a result of testimony, there seemed to be some disagreement so I checked on the matter and found that it was a document from the Department of State.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1337" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 1337

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, November 23, 1951.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In Mr. Humelsine's absence, I should like to answer your letter to him of November 13 in regard to the photostatic copy of Economy of Communist North China, 1937–45 (No. 3024) which Mr. Humelsine sent you at your request, and also in regard to the summary appraisal of this study.

With reference to your questions concerning the summary appraisal quoted by Mr. Humelsine in his letter to you of November 6, this appraisal was prepared routinely at Mr. Humelsine's request after receiving your letter of October 3, and was quoted in full in his letter. Mr. Humelsine quoted this appraisal because he thought it might be helpful to you and your committee in evaluating the study. (Another copy of this appraisal is enclosed.)

The Department does not believe that individual(s) who drafted the appraisal should be identified. The disclosure of the authorship of internal memoranda by subordinate officers inevitably leads to inhibited and inconclusive writing and counsel on their part if they feel that they will be held accountable to unknown others in addition to their superiors. Similarly, the Department cannot release the name of the author of the study itself even though he left the Department in 1947.

In regard to the circulation of the document (Economy of Communist North China, 1937–45), a search of the Department's files has failed to reveal what circulation was made. Because the unsatisfactory nature of the study was clearly recognized at the time, however, it is probable that it was given a very limited circulation.

I regret that the Department is unable to furnish certain of the information requested.

Sincerely yours,

W. K. SCOTT,
Acting Deputy Under Secretary.

Enclosure.

APPRAISAL OF OCL NO. 3024, ECONOMY OF NORTH CHINA, 1937–45

The subject report, approximately 250 pages in length, was published in nine sections, the first describing the area of Chinese Communist control, the second summarizing Chinese Communist economic policies, and the remaining seven sections dealing with Chinese Communist policies in various fields such as agriculture, industry, labor, etc. According to the introduction, the series of reports was "to compromise a comprehensive analysis of economic conditions and policies in the Communist-held area of North China during the period of Japanese occupation. As thus defined, the studies will provide information on a stage of Communist economy which orginally evolved in the course of the anti-Japanese struggle and now forms the basis for the new economic stage ushered in by the Japanese surrender" (3024.1, p. 1).

When this report was undertaken, available information on this important subject was extremely limited, consisting largely of materials from Communist sources (Chinese Communist pronouncements, directives, and doctrinal statements). As a research paper, it suffers basically from the fact that this material is used with little critical evaluation and without proper appreciation of Communist political tactics. In consequence, the report tends to overstate Communist administrative and productive achievements in North China, the degree of popular support they enjoyed in the area, and to assign a "democratic" character to Chinese Communist economic and political policies during the war. Chinese Communist statements regarding their endorsement of moderate policies in the postwar period are presented uncritically. The fact that the Chinese Communists are real Communists tends to become blurred.

At best this report may be viewed as a somewhat sloppy and inadequately unqualified presentation of Communist policies based on Communist statements.

The flavor of the report can adequately be obtained by reading Section two, Summary of Economic Policies (3024.2).

Mr. MORRIS. What is the next document?

Mr. MANDEL. The name of Ordway Southard has come up in testimony. This is a clipping from the Daily Worker of August 20, 1952, page 3, showing him as a candidate for Governor on the Communist Party ticket.

Mr. MORRIS. The chairman of the preceding meeting requested that that go in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1338" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 1338

(Source: Daily Worker of August 20, 1942, p. 3)

THREE COMMUNISTS QUALIFY FOR ALABAMA ELECTION

(Special to the Daily Worker)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA., August 19.—Three candidates nominated by the Communist Party of Alabama have qualified to run in the general election No. 3, it was announced in the State capitol today.

The candidates are Mary Boggs Southard, for State Senator; Rob F. Hall, for Congress from the Ninth Congressional District: and Ordway Southard for Governor.

Mrs. Southard is district secretary of the Young Communist League. She was born in South Carolina 27 years ago and was reared in Birmingham. She graduated with highest honors from Phillips High School and Agnes Scott College.

Hall was born in Mississippi in 1906 and was reared in Mobile, Ala. Since 1935, he has been district secretary of the Communist Party.

Ordway Southard, 30, is a native of Cambridge, Mass., where his father, the late Dr. Ernest Southard held the chair of neuro-pathology in the Harvard School of Medicine. He is the grandson of former Governor Horace Austin of Minnesota one of the pioneer governors of that State. Southard has lived in Birmingham for the past 5 years and is District Daily Worker director.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the next one?

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter from the Chinese Embassy dealing with an organization known as Indusco, and the Chinese Embassy gives an analysis of the organization from their viewpoint.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you accept that into the record?

I want to call your attention here to what it is.

The Indusco is an organization that was concerned with bringing relief to certain organizations in China, and the staff requested the Chinese for an analysis, that is, the official Chinese Government, of that. I was wondering whether you would receive that into the record for just what it is?

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive it for what it is. It is an explanation from the Chinese Embassy.

Mr. MORRIS. It is over the signature of Wellington Koo to Senator McCarran.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1339" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1339

CHINESE EMBASSY,
Washington, February 12, 1952.

Senator PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In reply to your letter of January 19, I am sending along a study prepared by one of my staff members on the subject. I hope that the materials contained therein answer your question adequately.

With sincere good wishes,

Sincerely,

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

INDUSCO

The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (Indusco, or C. I. C.) was organized in Hankow early in 1938, the second year of the Sino-Japanese War. Its founders were Rewi Alley, a New Zealander, and Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

The Indusco was nominally governed by a Board of Directors, with headquarters in Chungking. At its peak in 1940, there were 1,738 societies, with a total of 25,682 members.

The cooperative societies were financed by three main sources: (1) Chinese Government appropriations, (2) loans from the Farmers' Bank of China, and (3) private donations.

A considerable portion of private donations came from abroad, principally the United States. In 1939, an "International Committee for Chinese Industrial Cooperatives Production Relief Fund," usually known as the International Committee, was set up in Hong Kong, to receive funds donated from abroad and to send these funds to the different societies.

Donations from abroad during the war years, 1938–1945, totalled some CNC$140,800,000, of which CNC$118,200,000 came from the American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (Amindusco) in New York, CNC$22,-180,000 from the British United Aid to China Fund, and CNC$400,000 from other miscellaneous sources. This compared with CNC$84,000,000 appropriated by the Chinese Government, and CNC$48,500,000 loaned by the Farmers' Bank of China. In other words, the finances of Indusco depended considerably from donations outside of China.

As originally conceived, Indusco was supposedly to operate in three broad regions of wartime China—the Northwest, the Southwest, and the Southeast. From the very beginning, however, attention was centered in the Northwest region, with Paochi, in Shensi Province as the key point of operation. Rewi Alley himself, for instance, was stationed there almost permanently. So was the Chinese secretary, Lu Kwang-mien (K. M. Lu).

The organizational pattern was that, at certain key points, a headquarters would be set up, which was surrounded by depots which served the cooperative workshops. As an example, Paochi was one of the headquarters, and Yenan (the wartime Chinese Communist capital) was one of the depots.

One of the main problems connected with the Indusco was its propaganda activities both in China and abroad. Rewi Alley himself became some sort of a prophet for social democracy. A bronze statue was made of him in London. American magazines featured him in numerous articles under such titles as "Alley, the Man." Books were written about Indusco, such as that by George Hogg entitled "I See a New China." Hollywood made a film about it. Many visitors came to the Paochi headquarters, including Ida Pruitt, Nym Wales, General Evans F. Carlson, Henry Luce, Clare Boothe Luce, the British Parliamentary Mission to China, Lady Cripps, and many, many others.

The propaganda exaggerated and distorted the facts. For instance, while there were only some 25,600 members, the general figure in circulation was that there were 50,000.

One of the propaganda stunts, originated by Rewi Alley and widely circulated by General Carlson, was to coin the Chinese phrase "Gung Ho," which was translated into "Work together." This was done because the Industrial Cooperatives in the Chinese language was known as *Gung-yeh* (meaning industrial) *Ho-tso* (meaning cooperatives), and for abbreviation purposes, like the alphabetical names of Washington government agencies, it was known as *Gung Ho*, a term which, like SHAPE, carried no particular meaning in itself.

But both Alley and Carlson saw fit to exploit this abbreviated term to mean "Work Together," which was ridiculous. They carried the term further to do propaganda in favor of the *United Front* (between the Chinese Government and the Communists), which was the Comintern policy at the time. The Indusco thereupon became a Communist propaganda agency, symbolized by its operation both in Nationalist and Communist territories.

It will be recalled that in 1938, when the Indusco was first set up, the Communists had pledged allegiance to the Chinese Government for joint prosecution of the war against the Japanese aggression. It was the period of the *United Front.*

However, as the war dragged on, the position of the Communists became increasingly recalcitrant, and an open break between the Chinese Government and Communists took place in 1942 in the famous incident of the New Fourth Army. It was also at this time that a serious schism began between the Indusco headquarters in Chungking and the local office headed by Rewi Alley in Paochi, which resulted in the termination of the services of Alley by the Chinese Government on September 21, 1942.

From then on, the Indusco gradually declined, although the international propaganda mills were still grinding out the usual stunts on its behalf.

In short, the Indusco was conceived as a means to speed up production in wartime on a cooperative basis. Unfortunately, those who championed it were politically inclined, and it soon came under the direction of men who preferred to exploit it as a propaganda agency for the so-called *United Front;* i. e., the working together of the Nationalists and the Communists. This followed the Comintern line, and efforts to divert it from that channel into its original conception brought only schism within the organization itself. The Communists, naturally, were in favor of the Indusco because it served their propaganda purposes. This was true especially of such men as General Evans F. Carlson, whose championship of "Gung Ho" in the United States was tireless until his death. It was equally apparent that, when the so-called *United Front* was no longer real in China, the Indusco turned against the Chinese Government, and apologists for Indusco, such as General Carlson, outspokenly attacked the Chinese Government. (General Carlson, for instance, was one of the sponsors of the three-day conference, October 18–20, 1946, in San Francisco, "to call upon our government to withdraw all United States armed forces from China, to cease arming and financing the Kuomintang, and to allow the Chinese people to settle their internal affairs in their own way." Other sponsors included Harry Bridges, Bartley Crum, Joseph Curran, Hugh de Lacy, Paul Robeson, Vito Marcantonio, Maud Russell, Guenther Stein, Frederick V. Field, Harrison Forman, etc.)

It is an ironic commentary that, when the Communists came to power in China, no effort at all was made to revive the Indusco. The propaganda agency had served its purpose, and served it well.

Mr. MORRIS. What is next?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated July 30, 1951, from the Postmaster General, showing the interchange of subscribers between China Today and Amerasia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you if you will introduce that into the record.

It says here:

This will acknowledge your letter of July 19 concerning China Today and Amerasia.

These publications were formerly admitted to the second class of mail matter. In a letter dated March 19, 1942, the publishers informed the postmaster of New York that issuance of China Today had ceased and that "the subscribers to this publication will be informed that the unexpired portion of their subscriptions

will be covered by issues of Amerasia, which has assumed to responsibility for this list."

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received. Amerasia has been mentioned before.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1340" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1340

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Washington 25, D. C., July 30, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This will acknowledge your letter of July 19 concerning China Today and Amerasia.

These publications were formerly admitted to the second class of mail matter. In a letter dated March 19, 1942, the publishers informed the postmaster of New York that issuance of China Today had ceased and that "the subscribers to this publication will be informed that the unexpired portion of their subscriptions will be covered by issues of Amerasia, which has assumed to responsibility for this list." The second-class mailing privilege of China Today was then revoked.

Our records indicate that the second-class mailing privilege accorded the publication Amerasia was canceled August 11, 1947, pursuant to a letter dated August 4, 1947, from the editor advising that that publication ceased publishing with the issue dated July 1947.

Sincerely yours,

J. M. DONALDSON, *Postmaster General.*

Mr. MORRIS. We have testimony that when Amerasia closed the Far Eastern Survey, which was a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, took over from them. This bears on the fact that when China Today closed its existence Amerasia took it over.

What is the next one?

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter dated July 13, 1951, addressed to Senator Pat McCarran from Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, giving the civil-service records of persons who have been named in our hearings. I can read those names.

Mr. MORRIS. Will they be admitted into the record? It is routine, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1341" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1341

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Washington 25, D. C., July 13, 1952.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of June 27, 1951, wherein you request information concerning thirteen persons who you state have been employed by the Civil Service Commission.

The specific questions asked in your letter concerning these individuals are as follows:

1. Are they still employed by the Civil Service Commission? If so, in what capacity?

2. Have they severed their employment with the Civil Service Commission? If any questions of loyalty were involved, would you please indicate? What were the circumstances of their severance?

The records of the Civil Service Commission show that although all of these individuals have been employed in the Federal service, none has been employed in any capacity at any time by the Civil Service Commission.

A full report showing the Federal service of each of the thirteen individuals you list is being furnished herewith for your information.

Julian R. Friedman was employed by the Department of State from September 2, 1943, until November 15, 1946, when his employment was terminated without prejudice. There is no record of subsequent Federal service by Mr. Friedman.

Thomas Arthur Bisson received an appointment as Principal Economic Analyst with the Board of Economic Warfare on January 22, 1942, in which position he served until July 10, 1943, when he resigned voluntarily. On October 4, 1945, Mr. Bisson was appointed to a position with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Department of War. His employment with that department was terminated on May 23, 1947, due to the completion of his contract. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Mr. Bisson.

Esther Caulkin Brunauer has been employed with the Department of State since March 8, 1944. In connection with her employment with that Department, Mrs. Brunauer was the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order 9835, as amended. As a result of this investigation, she has been suspended for security reasons.

Emile Despres was employed as a Senior Economist with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from September 5, 1939, until he resigned on October 5, 1941. On October 6, 1941, he received an appointment with the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which agency was later transferred to the Office of Strategic Services. He was separated from his position with the latter agency on September 30, 1945, for transfer to the Department of State. Mr. Despres resigned from the Department of State on January 2, 1946. Later, he received a W. A. E. appointment as a Consultant with the Economic Cooperation Administration. His employment with that agency was terminated on November 12, 1948, upon completion of his assignment. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Mr. Despres.

Ellen Van Zyll De Jong Atkinson was employed by the War Department from October 22, 1941, to April 30, 1945, when she resigned. In connection with an application for a position with the Office of War Information, Mrs. Atkinson was the subject of an investigation as to her qualifications, including loyalty. Mrs. Atkinson was not appointed and the investigation of her was discontinued. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mrs. Atkinson's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of her loyalty has been resolved.

Michael Greenberg was appointed to a position with the Board of Economic Warfare on November 9, 1942. On July 7, 1944, he was transferred to the Foreign Economic Administration and on September 27, 1945, he was transferred to the Department of State. His employment was terminated due to reduction in force on June 15, 1946. In connection with his employment with the Foreign Economic Administration, an investigation of Mr. Greenberg was conducted by the Civil Service Commission to determine his general qualifications for Federal employment. As a result of this investigation, Mr. Greenberg was barred from competing in civil service examinations on March 7, 1947, because of questionable loyalty.

John N. Hazard was employed by the Office for Emergency Management from July 21, 1941, to July 7, 1944; with the Foreign Economic Administration from July 7, 1944, to December 12, 1945; and with the Department of State from December 12, 1945, to July 31, 1946, when he resigned to join the staff of Columbia University. He later received an appointment to the position of Attorney-Adviser with the Department of State on a W. A. E. basis. This employment was terminated on November 30, 1949, due to completion of assignment. In connection with this latter employment, an investigation of Mr. Hazard was initiated under the provisions of Executive Order 9835 but was discontinued when it was learned his employment with the Department of State had terminated. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mr. Hazard's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of his loyalty has been resolved.

Jefferson Franklin Ray was employed by the Office for Emergency Management from June 23, 1941 to February 1, 1944; by the Foreign Economic Administration from February 1, 1944 to September 7, 1945, when he resigned to accept a position with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. On March 31, 1948 he received an appointment with the De-

partment of State as a Foreign Affairs Specialist, in which position he served until March 18, 1949 when he resigned to accept a position in the foreign service with the Economic Cooperation Administration. Mr. Ray was employed with the latter agency until December 1, 1950 when he resigned. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Mr. Ray.

Michael Lee was employed from June 18, 1942 until August 5, 1943 with the Board of Economic Warfare; from August 5, 1943 to July 7, 1944 with the Office of Economic Warfare; from July 7, 1944 to December 1, 1944 with the Foreign Economic Administration; from December 1, 1944 to June 16, 1945 with the Office for Emergency Management; from June 16, 1945 to December 18, 1945 with the Foreign Economic Administration; and from December 18, 1945 until November 16, 1950 with the Department of Commerce. In connection with his employment with the Department of Commerce, Mr. Lee was the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. As a result of this investigation, Mr. Lee was suspended for an indefinite period on September 8, 1950 pending final decision on contemplated removal action under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. He resigned while under suspension. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mr. Lee's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of his loyalty has been resolved.

Charles Flato was employed with the Work Projects Administration from February 23, 1937 to July 13, 1937; with the Department of Agriculture from December 16, 1938, to March 15, 1939; with the National Labor Relations Board from March 16, 1939 to October 11, 1939; from October 12, 1939 to November 2, 1940 with the Department of Agriculture; with the Federal Security Agency from January 13, 1941 to January 31, 1941; with the Department of Commerce from February 1, 1941 to June 30, 1941; with the Federal Works Agency from June 30, 1941 to December 21, 1941; with the Office for Emergency Management from December 22, 1941 to October 6, 1942; with the Board of Economic Warfare from October 7, 1942 to September 25, 1943; with the Foreign Economic Administration from September 25, 1943 to March 17, 1945 and with the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion from March 17, 1945 to June 30, 1945. In connection with Mr. Flato's employment with the Office for Emergency Management, he was subject to an investigation by the Civil Service Commission to determine his general qualifications, including loyalty. As a result of this investigation, he was rated ineligible and on April 23, 1945, the Foreign Economic Administration was instructed to terminate his employment. That agency advised the Commission that Mr. Flato's employment had been terminated on March 16, 1945 by transfer to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. The latter agency was then advised of the facts in the case and Mr. Flato was removed from his position with the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion due to unsatisfactory investigative report.

Olga Lang was employed by the War Department from January 28, 1940, to January 8, 1949, when her services were terminated due to completion of employment agreement. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Miss Lang.

Lawrence K. Rosinger was employed by the Department of State as a Consultant (without compensation) from October 6 to 8, 1949. His employment was terminated due to completion of assignment. There is no record of subsequent Federal employment by Mr. Rosinger.

Harold Glasser was employed by the Department of Agriculture from May 1, 1936, to November 22, 1936; and with the Treasury Department from November 23, 1936, to December 31, 1947, when he resigned. In connection with his employment with the Treasury Department, Mr. Glasser was the subject of an investigation under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9835, but this investigation was discontinued when Mr. Glasser resigned. Precautionary measures were taken to prevent Mr. Glasser's reemployment in the Federal service at a later date until the question of his loyalty has been resolved.

You will note that in the reports given above on Julian R. Friedman, Thomas Arthur Bisson, Emile Despres, Jefferson Franklin Ray, Olga Lang, and Lawrence K. Rosinger, no reference is made of loyalty that may have been involved or the circumstances of their severance. The reason this information is not set forth is that the six individuals were either excepted employees or employees of the Economic Cooperation Administration, in which case the investigative reports were forwarded directly to the agency for consideration. All reports on persons

occupying excepted positions or given absolute appointments prior to October 1, 1947, the effective date of Executive Order No. 9835, were adjudicated by the particular agency under the provisions of Executive Order No. 9300. Such reports would not come into the possession of the Civil Service Commission.

All reports of investigations on employees of the Economic Cooperation Administration are referred directly to that agency by virtue of the statute creating the Economic Cooperation Administration and do not fall within the jurisdiction of Executive Order No. 9835. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission would have no knowledge of a question of loyalty that may have been involved in the circumstances surrounding a separation from the Economic Cooperation Administration.

However, if any of these six individuals reenter the Federal service in any department or agency, other than the Economic Cooperation Administration or the Atomic Energy Commission, they will fall within the jurisdiction of Executive Order No. 9835, as amended, and a determination as to their loyalty to the Government of the United States will be made.

If I can be of further assistance to you at any time, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT RAMSPECK, *Chairman.*

Mr. MANDEL. Finally, is a letter from the Treasury Department, signed by William W. Parsons, Administrative Assistant Secretary, dated August 31, 1951, giving the Treasury Department records of certain individuals who had been mentioned in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. One of the Senators requested that in part.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1342" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1342

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 31, 1951.

[SEAL. Administrative Assistant Secretary]

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Room 409 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary asked me to reply to your letter of August 27, 1951, requesting data for the use of the Internal Security Subcommittee regarding the title and status during the period 1942 to 1945 of four former employees of the Treasury Department. The information you requested is indicated below:

Name	Date	Title
Harry Dexter White	Jan. 1, 1942	He was serving as Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of Monetary Research, Grade P-8, $9,000 per annum.
Do	Jan. 24, 1945	Appointed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury with compensation at the rate of $9,000 per annum. This appointment was made by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
Solomon Adler	Jan. 1, 1942	He was serving as Senior Economic Analyst, Grade P-5, $4,600 per annum, in the Division of Monetary Research.
Do	June 9, 1942	Promoted to Principal Economic Analyst, Grade P-6, $5,600 per annum. From the latter part of 1941 to February 19, 1943. Mr. Adler served as the Treasury Economic Adviser to the United States Member of the Chinese Stabilization Board.
Do	Feb. 19, 1943	His appointment in the Treasury was terminated as he was appointed by the Chinese Minister of Finance as the alternate American Member of the Chinese Stabilization Board.
Do	Mar. 1, 1944	He was reinstated in the Treasury as an Economic Analyst, Grade P-7, $6,500 per annum in the Division of Monetary Research.
Do	May 1, 1945	Promoted to the position of Treasury Attache in China and Far East, Grade P-8, $8,000 per annum.
V. Frank Coe	Jan. 1, 1942	He was serving as Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Grade P-7, $7,000 per annum.
Do	Feb. 1, 1942	Transferred from the Treasury to the Board of Economic Warfare to serve as Assistant to the Executive Director. In November of 1943, he was appointed Assistant Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration.
Do	Feb. 16, 1945	Transferred back to the Treasury as Director of Monetary Research, Grade P-8, $9,000 per annum.
Irving S. Friedman	Jan. 1, 1942	He was serving as Economic Analyst, Grade P-4, $3,800 per annum, in the Division of Monetary Research.
Do	June 9, 1942	Promoted to Senior Economic Analyst, Grade P-5, $4,600 per annum.
Do	Aug. 26, 1943	Promoted to Principal Economic Analyst, Grade P-6, $5,600 per annum.
Do	May 1, 1945	Promoted to Economic Analyst, Grade P-7, $6,500 per annum.

These employees are no longer with the Treasury Department.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM W. PARSONS.
Administrative Assistant Secretary.

Senator FERGUSON. I believe you have a short statement of two pages that you wanted to read or put in the record, Doctor?

Mr. YERGAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be quite satisfied to put it in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you ought to give it to the press. It is a résumé of what you think about communism?

Mr. YERGAN. That's right, and I would like, Mr. Chairman, the record to show that I came voluntarily here today.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. YERGAN. I came here voluntarily today because I am appreciative of the service that this committee is rendering our country.

This statement, which I will hand over to the press, is a reflection of my views, with regard to the relation of communism and Communist agents, to the issues confronting Negroes and colonial peoples today.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, I will receive it in evidence as part of our record, and it will be passed to the press officially.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1343" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1343

(STATEMENT BY DR. MAX YERGAN)

It is my considered opinion that Communism, its agents and its dupes constitute one of the deadliest dangers to freedom, democracy, and therefore our country, today. It is for this reason that I appear voluntarily before this committee which is rendering vital service to our country in routing out and

exposing the activities and influence of Communists in the most important aspects of our national life today. I testify with a sense of conscious pride in my American citizenship, my membership of the Negro race, and the fact that my three sons serve as officers in the United States Air Force.

My experience leads me to the strongest possible conviction that the Communist forces mean no good to Negroes in America, to the people of Africa, or to other hitherto underprivileged people who now seek and are on the threshold of a better life. I speak here out of an experience of nearly twenty years in Africa as an Executive of the Young Mens Christian Association, as a lecturer in Negro history at the College of the City of New York, and more recently as the founder of the Council on African Affairs, President of the National Negro Congress, and a less active member of a number of other organizations which by every test are quite accurately described as Communist fronts. I founded the Council on African Affairs, but to my everlasting shame I permitted the Communists to take control of it, and it is with a sense of shame also that I recall that I was among those duped by Communists and other organizations.

They look in vain who expect moral leadership or even wise political guidance from Communists for those who desire and work for an over-widening democracy.

I returned a few months ago from a visit to East Africa and India. In numerous conferences and public meetings I was glad to bear witness to two things: First, to my belief that American democracy is surely solving what many people a quarter of a century ago thought of as an insoluble national problem in America, and secondly, that the reactionary Communist force of today not only is unable to advance the cause of human progress but, because of the very nature of this vicious force, is the greatest stumbling block in the way of human progress.

Surely Negroes, other minorities, along with all American people, know that the Communists have nothing to contribute to the society and to the life which we are trying to build here. We are not perfect but we do have the opportunity to work continuously toward something better. I say without hesitation to Negroes in America, to my people in Africa, shun Communism and its agents as one shuns poison. This is a force that threatens the cherished institutions of our country and would destroy them as it would destroy our country. It is for this reason that I refer to it not only as a force of evil, of an unprincipled character, but a conspiracy against human freedom and the deadliest enemy of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. We want to thank you for appearing here voluntarily, and explaining your part, and what the Communists had to do in relation to activities here in the United States, how they subverted certain good causes for their own use and benefit, and under the guise of being humanitarians, they were attempting to take over in their own behalf, for Communists and for Russia.

You feel that they have done that?

Mr. YERGAN. I do. I agree fully with what you have said, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you, Doctor.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m. the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the chairman.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:45 p. m., in room 424 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator Ferguson. The committee will come to order.

Will you raise your right hand and be sworn. You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID WEINTRAUB, DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, N. Y.

Senator FERGUSON. State your full name and address.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. David Weintraub, 34 West Seventy-fourth Street, New York City.

Senator FERGUSON. You are an official of the United Nations Organization?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your official title?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Director of the Division of Economic Stability and Department of Economic Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you ever connected with the IPR in any way?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever attend any IPR meetings?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was informed by you that a meeting I had attended was called a study group of the IPR. I attended that meeting as an official of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the record, Mr. Weintraub, I want to state that you were not informed by me nor by anyone else that any meeting you attended was called a study group of the IPR. You were

asked if you attended a discussion group on United Nations cooperation sponsored by the United Nations on March 15, and you said you did. The use of the words "study group" was your own, is that a fact?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record will speak, of course, of the executive session.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that that particular portion of the colloquy that took place in the executive session this morning be entered in this record at this point.

Senator FERGUSON. It will.

Mr. SOURWINE. As counsel will designate when it is transcribed.

Senator FERGUSON. And it will speak for itself.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chair will include that order to cover all of the answers and questions this morning with regard to that particular meeting we need not go further into that right now.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be made a part of the record.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1344A" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 1344A

(The portion of executive session testimony of May 15, 1952, of David Weintraub referred to above appears as follows:)

Mr. SOURWINE. I have explained to the witness our procedure of holding an executive session first, and thereafter going into public session. I assured him we would try to do it all today so he could go back to New York.

Were you ever a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations in any way?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend any of its meetings?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you attend a discussion group on United Nations Cooperation under auspices of IPR on March 15, 1943?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any memory of it at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think I remember attending a meeting which was organized in OFRAR of the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that word?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation of the State Department. But I was at the State Department at the time, and it was attended by a white-haired gentleman whose name slips me, who was with IPR, but I do not know that it was a study group of the IPR or what it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember anyone else who attended it, sir?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. A lady Congressman, I remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. A lady Congresswoman, whose name I don't remember.

Senator FERGUSON. Was she on the Foreign Relations Committee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I could not say.

Senator WATKINS. Can you describe her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what State she was from?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Ohio comes to my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Would it be Mrs. Bolton?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. From Cleveland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. She is on the Foreign Relations Committee of the House. I just assumed that is who it would be, because of her connection with the Foreign Relations Committee. She does come from Cleveland.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember any others who were at that meeting?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was a very small group, as I recall it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was Dr. Frank Coe there?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Could be; yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Michael Greenberg?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Edward C. Carter?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Carter is the white-haired gentleman I had in mind.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. W. L. Holland, of the IPR?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. William Johnstone?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. L. B. Pearson, then Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. It could be.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Rifat Tirana, member of the Board of Economic Warfare?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is possible.
Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. Pearson?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. How well did you know him in those days?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I knew him in those days.
Mr. MORRIS. You know him now?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Len DeCaux, was he there?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. DeCaux?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I know the name, but I don't think I know him.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Mr. Chairman, I do not want it to appear in the record that I am in any way noncooperative.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course not.

Senator FERGUSON. Every witness has a right to state what he understood the testimony to be.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was just I don't recall having been aware of that meeting as being a study group of the IPR. It may well have been that. I attended it as I recall, and it is now 9 years ago, as a member of the staff of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation who was in charge of research work for that office. As I recall it, I was asked to attend it. I don't remember any more by whom, and I regarded it as part of my duty to attend it. I have no objection to its having been a study group of the IPR, it is just that my recollection is not quite so sharp and that is all I meant to indicate.

Senator FERGUSON. You attended it as an official of the United States Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And took part in it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. I am assuming that you do not remember the facts, what you learned there.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. You are quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then it might have been beneficial or detrimental to the United States.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I doubt very much that it was detrimental to the United States in view of the fact that Congresswoman Bolton was there.

Senator FERGUSON. I meant for your job as to whether or not it gave you any information.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It presumably helped me in my job. I just don't remember what transpired at that meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Irving Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he employed under you at the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his employment by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee about that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Sometime in 1947 Mr. Kaplan got in touch with me. We talked about his availability for employment. He indicated that he might become available sometime in the future for employment in the United Nations. I told him that when he was, to let me know. He let me know eventually and I sent him around to see several people and eventually he was employed by the United Nations.

Senator FERGUSON. What was he working at, at the time you had that conversation about the fact that he might be available?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If I recollect correctly he was working on something that had to do with wage legislation or annual wages or something like that.

Senator FERGUSON. For the United States Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall whether it was the United States Government. To the best of my recollection that was on some project that was headed by Mr. Murray Lattimer, but I don't know whether it was a governmental project or not. It probably was.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know him as a Government employee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I did.

Senator FERGUSON. How long had you known him as a Government employee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Since 1935.

Senator FERGUSON. He was a Government employee from 1935 up until about the time he went with the United Nations.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. So far as I know, I don't know his entire career but I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Weintraub, did you have anything to do with the appointment of Owen Lattimore as head of the United Nations mission to Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee the circumstances of Mr. Lattimore's selection and appointment to that post.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The United Nations received a request for technical assistance from the Government of Afghanistan.

Senator FERGUSON. That was economic assistance?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Technical assistance for economic development of Afghanistan. After discussing this request with my superior, Mr. David Owen, and with representatives of the Afghanistan Government it was decided by Mr. Owen that before any technical assistance could be extended, a further investigation on the spot in Afghanistan would be necessary and that a mission would be organized for that purpose, and we then cast about for a person qualified to head that kind of mission.

Senator FERGUSON. What is Mr. Owen's first name? You see, we have an Owen Lattimore and Mr. Owen, so we had better be careful to keep this record straight.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. David Owen.

Senator FERGUSON. Is he an American citizen?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he is a subject of the United Kingdom.

We then tried to think of properly qualified persons and Mr. Owen Lattimore's name was suggested by me as a possible qualified person for that post.

Mr. SOURWINE. On what bases did you make that suggestion, Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. On the bases of general knowledge of Mr. Lattimore's work as a political scientist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him at the time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I had never met him before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had never met Mr. Lattimore before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had anyone suggested to you that he would be suitable for the job or for a job of this kind or for employment by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect anyone having suggested that to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just chose his name yourself?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him as an expert in Afghanistan matters?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I knew of him only as an expert in general far-eastern affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whether he had written anything about Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whether he had been in Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider Afghanistan a far-eastern nation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Technically Afghanistan is classified as a middle-eastern country.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider Afghanistan to be a nation within the sphere of Mr. Lattimore's specialty or his expertness?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I thought so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Because I knew that Mr. Lattimore had spent considerable time in countries adjoining Afghanistan and I believed that the general condition, mode of living, were sufficiently similar to feel that Mr. Lattimore could handle that job.

Mr. SOURWINE. What countries adjoining Afghanistan had Mr. Lattimore been in, to your knowledge?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Mongolia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where does Mongolia join Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I will have to ask for a map to help me on that. I just don't have that clearly enough in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You had been in neither one?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had been in neither one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think Mongolia does adjoin Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am sorry; I would like to have a look at a map at this point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it your impression at the time you picked Mr. Lattimore that Mongolia did adjoin Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was Mongolia, Tibet.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was Mr. Lattimore in Tibet?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Certain parts of India. I couldn't tell you when Mr. Lattimore was in Tibet.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know if he was ever in Tibet?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know it for a fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was he in India?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know Mr. Lattimore well enough to know about his travels.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the customs and mores of Mongolia are similar to those of Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would rather not answer that kind of question because——

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you have an opinion on that subject? If you don't, you need only to say so.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't have an opinion on the subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an opinion on the subject as to whether the customs, mores, of India are similar to those of Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is the same kind of question that I would rather not answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an opinion on the subject?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Sir, I have a general view that the economic condition and developments of many countries in that part of the world are rather primitive and in their primitiveness have many similarities.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you think that a political scientist, one that had to do with politics, would be the proper man to send in to determine what economic aid they ought to have and what should be done?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To my way of looking at it, a political scientist is aware of the relationships between economic, social, and political problems. And to my knowledge Mr. Lattimore is that kind of political scientist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying now that you selected Mr. Lattimore because he was an able political economist rather than because he was an expert in the area to which you were sending him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; because he was an expert in the general area to which we were sending him.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the general area of Afghanistan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; that general area which includes those other countries that I have mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the general area which includes Mongolia, India, and Afghanistan and Tibet?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a pretty good-sized general area.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is a good-sized general area.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is an expert in that whole general area?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To my view he was sufficiently expert for me to make the suggestion to Mr. David Owen and I did not finally appoint him, it was not for me to appoint him. The judgments of four other people came into that after a discussion with Mr. Lattimore.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you initiated it, you initiated the suggestion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Without a prompting from anyone or suggestion from anyone?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Without any prompting or suggestion from anyone that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. And solely on the basis of your feeling that Mr. Lattimore was an expert in this general area?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. My feeling that Mr. Lattimore was a sufficiently expert person in this general area to be looked——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know where he was employed at the time you suggested his name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I knew that he was with the Johns Hopkins University.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you know that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is a kind of fact that people pick up and know. One knows that Owen Lattimore is associated with Johns Hopkins.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you read his book?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had read some parts of books that he had written. I remember looking into one dealing with China, if I remember correctly.

Senator FERGUSON. You thought that would qualify him if he knew about China?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I thought that he was a person whose qualification ought to be looked into by my boss and if he wanted, after that, to appoint him, that was up to him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know which side, if any, he was on in the China problem? When did this happen? When did you suggest his name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Early in 1951, I believe it was. No; I think it must have been early in 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. 1950. Had you known at that time which side, if any, Owen Lattimore was on in the Chinese problem, the Chinese conflict.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't you know he was broadcasting and issuing statements and so forth on one side or the other?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect, sir, that I knew at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it that caused you to name Lattimore for this job? What was there in the book or anywhere that his name came to you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is a very difficult question to answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact the State Department?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that not have been one of the places to contact if there was an American that had knowledge of Afghanistan or that territory that they thought you might contact and see who would do it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It might have been one of the places; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact any other government as to whether or not they had a subject or a citizen that might have done that job?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Out of a clear sky, the name of Owen Lattimore came along?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know how names occur to one, sir. I only recollect that when the question arose, Mr. David Owen and I considered whom we might possibly consider for the job, that the name of Owen Lattimore occurred to me. I suggested that and it was felt

that it was sufficiently interesting to have a chat with him to find out what he thought of it, to find out whether he thought he might be able to do it. We then had a meeting with him. Mr. Owen requested that he come to a luncheon which was attended by Mr. Owen and myself, two other members of the staff of the United Nations, and over luncheon we discussed it and after that Mr. Owen came to the conclusion that Mr. Lattimore would do for that job.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you contact Lattimore?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I may have. If I did it was at Mr. Owen's request to do so.

Senator FERGUSON. You think you may have?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think I may have talked to him.

Senator FERGUSON. As a member of the United Nations staff, it wouldn't have made any difference to you which side of the dispute he was on in China between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Communist government, that would not have made any difference, would it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know that question ever arose actually.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I meant, you were not concerned really with the question of loyalty to any country or anything like that.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. We were concerned with Lattimore's technical ability to do the job.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right, and not any question as to what he may have represented in his thinking.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think that would be a correct way of describing it, using him as a technician.

Senator FERGUSON. If you had thought of a man who was then back of the iron curtain, say a Russian, you would not have hesitated to suggest his name to go there as the head, because those problems are not involved in your work in the United Nations, are they?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They are not involved.

Senator FERGUSON. The question of whether a man is a Communist or not a Communist is not involved in your work in the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That explains the situation. You just selected the man that you thought could do it. Is that right?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, that is correct, we selected the man we thought could do the kind of job we had.

May I interject, Senator, just so there is no misunderstanding in the matter. The United Nations has since then dispatched many missions to many other countries, and I think it is rather rare that a chief of a mission, which is what Lattimore was supposed to be, is selected primarily for his abilities as an economist. The chiefs of missions of the United Nations are frequently lawyers, judges, sociologists. Their qualifications to a very considerable extent are judged in terms of their ability to deal with high government officials. And it is assumed that chiefs of missions have as their assistants technicians and specialists, and for that reason the mission that was headed by Mr. Lattimore was a mission of several people, including among them an engineer, an economist——

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get your staff? From what countries? America was represented by Lattimore. What others?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. An Englishman went along as the economist. I believe either an Australian or South African went along as an engineer. I forget exactly what his nationality was. I don't recollect offhand who the other members were.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you pick these men up from these countries? Do you do that through their foreign office or how do you get them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It varies. Rarely are people picked through foreign offices.

Senator FERGUSON. In fact you take an oath that you will not be subject to the dictation or the influence of any other country or any nation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, we take an oath that we are not subject to orders of any other nation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean of any nation, not of any other nation.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, of any single nation; that is correct. I don't remember the exact words of the oath but that is certainly the sense of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The substance of it is that you will take orders only from the Secretariat of the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you talk to Mr. Lattimore either in person or over the telephone before you made your suggestion to Mr. Owen?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not at any time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not before I have made the suggestion to Mr. Owen. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, after this luncheon at which it was discussed, did you tell Mr. Lattimore or indicate to him that he was going to be appointed to head that mission?

Mr. WEINTRAUR. I don's recollect that I did but I may have. As I told you, my superior, Mr. Owen, was there. My recollection is that in one way or another Mr. Lattimore was left with the impression that he was certainly seriously being considered for that appointment and he was subsequently notified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who notified him, do you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect. He was probably notified by letter. He was possibly notified by telephone that the letter was coming and although I certainly do not recollect that I notified him it is possible that it was I.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you speak with him in person or over the telephone at any time after that luncheon?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about the occasion or occasions when you did so.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I recollect one occasion only at the moment. Mr. Lattimore came to Lake Success for the purpose of making arrangements for that mission, and he came to my office, and we spent a couple of hours talking about the mission, the organization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just the two of you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, no. Mr. Caustin was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had been at the luncheon also, had he not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is your deputy?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is my deputy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else was there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was a rather small group, I don't recall all of them, but Mr. Rosenborg was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you spell that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. R-o-s-e-n-b-o-r-g.

Mr. SOURWINE. From what country is he a national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is a Swede.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a deputy to Mr. Owen?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is, I believe, called a special assistant to Mr. Owen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who else was there? This is the meeting at Lake Success after Mr. Lattimore had the designation to head the mission?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Mr. Kaplan there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, Mr. Kaplan was not there.

Senator FERGUSON. Did his work take him into this field at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. It would not take him in there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, it would not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Kaplan have anything to do with the selection or appointment of Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, he did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or briefing Mr. Lattimore on this matter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Kaplan ever met with Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever meet with Mr. Lattimore in your presence?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you remember anyone besides Mr. Rosenborg who was at this meeting in Lake Success?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am trying to recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, other than Mr. Rosenborg and Mr. Caustin.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't swear to it, but I believe a Mr. Ed Henson was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he from?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is an American.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is on the United Nations staff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is.

Mr. SOURWINE. In what capacity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I couldn't tell you exactly. He is now a member of the staff of the Technical Assistance Staff of the United Nations, but I couldn't really describe it.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time he was also a member of the same staff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. At that time he was a member of my staff. There was no Technical Assistance Administration in existence at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. How much was Lattimore paid for this mission?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I couldn't answer that exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. How did they pay him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I don't think I could answer it exactly, but it is likely to have been a specified amount per day.

Senator FERGUSON. About what did they average, those kind of jobs, per day?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Somewhere between $40 and $50 per day.

Senator FERGUSON. And expenses?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Plus any other expenses.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would include transportation and meals and, everything, traveling?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I wouldn't care to specify precisely what it includes. It includes what per diems normally include.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. And travel expenses.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, the $40 per day is compensation, that is not per diem.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Salary.

Senator FERGUSON. Five- or six-day week, or seven?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am again afraid I couldn't answer that exactly. Normally one is paid when actually employed, but draws per diem on week ends. I couldn't tell you exactly what that arrangement was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know approximately how much Mr. Lattimore received for this mission?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I do not. One could try and estimate it roughly, but I just don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he explain how he could get away from his teaching to make a mission like this?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recall it, it was his problem rather than our problem.

Senator FERGUSON. But did he explain that he would have to get a leave of absence, was that understood?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I suppose it was understood that he would have to get permission from his university to leave unless he was free during that period anyhow, but I just couldn't answer that one exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all on that subject?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record may contain your background, sir, I would like to go over very briefly what we went over in the executive session this morning.

You were born February 14, 1904, in Kozlow, K-o-z-l-o-w?

Mr. WIENTRAUB. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Austria-Poland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does that mean, it was Austria then, Poland now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I suppose since you have it on your record, what it must mean when I was born it was Austria, when I left it was Austria. Subsequently after the First World War that part became Poland, and that is what I suppose your notation means.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Where did you receive your early education?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In Vienna, Austria, and in New York City high schools and universities.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In 1921.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were at that time 17 years old?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I must have been.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were naturalized a United States citizen in the eastern district of New York on July 3, 1928?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You attended eastern district high school in Brooklyn and the Washington Square school?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. CCNY?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Acquiring a B. S. degree from CCNY in 1928?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And attended at Columbia University, majoring in economics and receiving your M. A. in 1932 or 1933?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe it was 1932.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you did get an M. A. degree from Columbia?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You started to work for the Government when?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think it was July or thereabouts of 1933.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that right after you graduated or did you do something else for a year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did something else for a year.

Senator FERGUSON. What was it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I worked for the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was that located?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Located in New York City. That is a private nonprofit research organization, and I was research assistant there.

Mr. SOURWINE. During that time did you ever work for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, just prior to coming to Washington I did a 1 or 2 weeks' special job for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, where, I might add, I was, so to speak, on loan from the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the only payment I received, if I remember, was reimbursement for expenses.

The incident came about because in the National Bureau of Economic Research Dr. Leo Wolman was my superior.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that Leo or Louie?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Leo, professor of economics at Columbia University, L-e-o Wolman, W-o-l-m-a-n. Professor Wolman was simultaneously the director of research for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers at that time, serving with the NRA in Washington. I was asked to assist Mr. Sidney Hillman in preparation of a brief for the NRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. To assist Mr. Sidney Hillman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was for a period of about 2 weeks?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Approximately.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was a longer period, however, was there not, when you physically worked in the quarters of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, because as an employee of the National Bureau of Economic Research I was required to work in close proximity to Dr. Wolman, who spent most of his time at the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and an office was assigned to me in the building of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.

Mr. SOURWINE. During that period of time, or most of it, were you in fact working on a project for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I was during that period working on a project for the Bureau of Economic Research.

Mr. SOURWINE. It had nothing to do with the Amalgated Clothing Workers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It had nothing to do with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Professor Wolman assist you to get into Government service?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recollect it, Professor Wolman called me from Washington one day and suggested that I come up to Washington. When I came he told me that Mr. Harry Hopkins was looking for an assistant, and would I go up and see Mr. Hopkins. I did, and I was subsequently asked to join the staff of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration for what was supposed to be a temporary period of 6 months, and I requested leave of absence from the National Bureau of Economic Research for that purpose, and that was the beginning of my governmental career.

Senator FERGUSON. It is a sign that once you get in temporarily you cannot get out, is that it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well——

Mr. SOURWINE. Bringing this up chronologically, sir.

I beg your pardon, I do not think the witness had a chance to answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you went from the United States Government in 1944 into the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not quite. From the Government I went to UNRRA in early 1944, I don't remember the exact date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Going back to 1930 to keep this chronological, were you ever an organizer for the Young Communist League?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hold any other job with the Young Communist League?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a member?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were a member of the Young Socialist League?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That had no connection with the Young Communist League?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And never was merged with it or associated with it as far as you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were in 1933 an instructor in economics at CCNY?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1933 you were a statistician with the FERA in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. 1933 to 1941 you were Director of the National Research Project on Reemployment Opportunities and Recent Changes in Industrial Techniques of the Work Projects Administration?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where were you at that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In Philadelphia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now how long did that last?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Until I was asked to joint the staff of the War Production Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which was in what year

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Which was, I believe, September or October of 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend the Russian purges of 1936 and 1937?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever maintain that the Russian purges were necessary?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that you saw nothing wrong with the Russian purges of 1936 and 1937?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever study that problem?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not seriously.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you study it at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, I read about it in the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. What conclusion did you come to?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, I don't know that I came to any special conclusions except that it was a very depressing affair, something like that. I don't recollect any more.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take the position that Stalin was fully justified in agreeing to such a pact?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you economic adviser for the Redistribution Division of the War Production Board, 1941 to 1943?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you Chief of the Division of Studies and Reports, Office of the Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, United States Department of State, in 1943?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was briefly for a period of months, was it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was from very early in 1943 until that staff was merged into UNNRA, which was at the beginning of 1944.

Mr. SOURWINE. In 1943 you were assigned as adviser to the Director General at the First Council Session of the United Nations Relief meeting in Atlantic City?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was Director General at the time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Gov. Herbert H. Lehman, now Senator Lehman.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never returned to the State Department after that, did you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you went over to UNRRA on assignment first and then subsequently shifted over to the UNRRA payroll?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Morris Rosenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the same Rosenthal who was formerly in charge of the Director of Imports Office of the Foreign Economic Administration?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Vaguely I think he is in some import business, but I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is out of Government as far as you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. So far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever assist Mr. Rosenthal to secure employment or promotion in the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Murray Lattimer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the same Murray Lattimer who was employed in 1943 with the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabiliation Operation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again vaguely I understand he is in private business.

Mr. SOURWINE. Out of the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Out of the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Is his wife's name Eleanor, do you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Murray Lattimer is different from the other man we have been discussing. There was some confusion in our record at one time, Senator.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have a close association, social or business, with either Morris Rosenthal or Murray Lattimer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None with Morris Rosenthal.[3] With Murray Lattimer, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was employed by the Industrial Relations Counselors in New York some time I think the end of 1929, early 1930, as a research assistant, and Murray Lattimer was a member of that staff, and although I did not work for him there, I did meet him several times right there in the office.

The next association with Murray Lattimer was when I was director of this national research project that you mentioned, and one of the activities of that project involved some work which was to be done by the staff of the Railroad Retirement Board, and that was probably sometime in 1936 or 1937.

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[3]Mr. Weintraub in a letter dated May 22, 1952, said: "I appear to have said, 'none with Morris Rosenthal.' I meant to say, 'not with Morris Rosenthal.' As my other testimony showed I did have some business association with Rosenthal."

The next association was in the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation in the State Department when Mr. Murray Lattimer became one of the assistants to Governor Lehman. We were both there as members of the staff of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, OFRRO, which was headed by Governor Lehman.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did your association with him cease?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think when he left OFRRO.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your association then was wholly in a business way?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now did you ever assist Mr. Lattimer to gain employment or promotion in the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I shouldn't think so; he was always in positions much superior to mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge did he ever assist you to gain promotions or positions in the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were Secretary of the Committee on Supplies of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in 1944?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. That last group of questions was about Lattimer, L-a-t-t-i-m-e-r.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct. You were Chief of the Bureau of Supply of UNRRA from 1945 into 1946?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You became Director of the Division of Economic Stability and Development, Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations in September 1946?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You still hold that position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that you have been under consideration for promotion within the United Nations organization?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Very vaguely. I understood that I might possibly be promoted to a vacancy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in 1951 attend a United Nations conference in Chile?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you returned from that conference in April of 1951?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you return before the conference was concluded?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I believe I left hours after the conference was concluded.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you hurry back, would you say?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I tried to hurry back.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any particular reason why you were hurrying back?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I had a lot of work to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of that work involve in any way any persons who had been dismissed or separated from the United Nations or were about to be dismissed or separated from the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in 1951 or thereafter take an active part in protesting against the dismissals or separations of United Nations employees?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mary Jane Keany?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the person?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I saw the person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know her yourself?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take any part in protesting the dismissal or separation from the United Nations of Mary Jane Keany?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know she was going to be dismissed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was a matter of newspaper talk and general discussion; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all you knew about it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no information about it except from the newspapers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. There was some gossip in the corridors.

Mr. SOURWINE. Otherwise, you had no information?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you take sides?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever express yourself on it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Benedict Solomon Alper?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; again, simply as a name that was talked about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Alper was employed by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And was dismissed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take part in protesting his dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know John Picon, P-i-c-o-n?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, again, only as a name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Picon was employed by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that he was dismissed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you take any action in any way with regard to his dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you protest it? Excuse me.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I certainly did not protest it. I have a vague recollection that Picon is a woman rather than a man, and that is the reason for my hesitation.

Mr. SOURWINE. The name as I have it is spelled J-e-a-n; that might be a woman, of course.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I merely wanted to explain my hesitation in replying.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know why they were dismissed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No. These names became cases before a board, and there were some papers circulated as to the hearing, and in those papers some of those names were stated.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with the board?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. With the papers.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were the papers that were circulated? You mean official papers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not speaking of some kind of petition about the matter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; some releases about the action of the board.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never signed a petition with regard to these three persons?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there were petitions out to keep them from being discharged?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, during this entire incident, as I remember, I was not in New York; I was in Geneva.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever take the position that the point 4 program should be administered by an international organization and not by the United States?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you care to expand on that? You might feel that in justice to yourself you should do so.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. The program in question is a program of technical assistance for the economic development of underdeveloped countries. That question had been under discussion in the United Nations for years—meaning, by that, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and various committee and commissions—and along with others I felt that that kind of activity is peculiarly suited for an international organization so as to put underdeveloped countries in a position of receiving economic assistance of that character from an organization of their own rather than receiving it on a bilateral basis from individual governments.

I agree with that position, and I am sure I must have said so to to many people at various times.

Senator FERGUSON. How much are you administering now under the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I personally?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I meant the United Nations.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The United Nations has a technical-assistance program which involved $20,000,000, funds contributed by some 60 different countries for the period of middle 1950 to the end of 1951, and early in 1952 an additional approximately $19,000,000 was pledged.

Senator FERGUSON. What is our percentage, the United States?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The United States percentage is roughly 60 percent of that contribution.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of the entire $39,000,000?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have we paid in our share?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I couldn't answer that. Normally the United States pays its share.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Have any of the other nations paid in their shares?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. They have?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. The other 40 percent has been paid in?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I didn't say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much of it has been paid in?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I couldn't answer that; I would have to look at the records. My impression is that a good proportion of it has been paid.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the Soviet Union's share, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None.

Senator FERGUSON. They are not a member of that; are they?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They did not contribute to it. I can't answer your question technically; that kind of question doesn't arise.

Senator FERGUSON. Are they supposed to contribute, and are they in default?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; the contributions to that particular fund are voluntary. That is why I can't answer your question, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there, sir, some 1,500 persons approximately under you in the "National research project" of the Work Projects Administration?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of those persons to your knowledge Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were any of them pro-Communists so far as you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any reason to believe that any of them were Communists or pro-Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever assist a person known to you to be a Communist or seek to assist such a person to secure employment in the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize your name to be used as a reference by any Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know of Harry Samuel Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he employed by the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist him to secure employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If he gave my name as reference, I probably gave him a good reference.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist him actively in securing employment under you in the "national research project?"

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Under me?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. He was employed under you, was he not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. You asked me did I assist him?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I must have hired him. He came to work for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to get at this point. Was he employed at a level which required you to hire him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; definitely not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say you did hire him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was the responsible person, and I would therefore have to say yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you authorize him to use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall, but I well may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in fact give him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have you any reason to believe that Harry Samuel Magdoff is or was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I certainly do not have any reason to believe that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have you any reason to believe that Mr. Magdoff ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with the Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does it surprise you to hear his name mentioned in that connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No. because I had seen his name mentioned in the newspapers before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before when?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Before now.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you ever seen his name mentioned in the newspapers before you hired him for the "National research project?"

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything of the circumstances under which he ceased to be employed under the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As far as I can recollect, he left the "National research project" to go to another Government agency, probably the Department of Commerce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that it was in fact the Department of Commerce?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe it was the Department of Commerce.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not recommend him to the Department of Commerce?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If I wrote a letter, it must have been to whatever agency it was.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is perfectly obvious that if you wrote a letter it was addressed to the person to whom it was addressed. I am asking you whether you wrote a letter.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's quite likely I wrote a letter, but I don't recall it as a matter of fact. I am not surprised if I did. If he went to the Department of Commerce, that is where the letter was addressed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying that if he went to the Department of Commerce you wrote a letter to the Department of Commerce, or

are you saying that you do not recall writing a letter for him anywhere?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not recall writing a letter for him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you know Irving Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist in securing his employment there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, he worked in the FERA together with me before then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. We both went together to the "National research project," I went as director and he went as associate director.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend him for the post of associate director?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect the exact facts, but I well may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his selection as associate director?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you not know that you did have?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am not trying to dodge your question; I am trying to be sure of the facts.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to be sure of the facts, too.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He worked with me, we worked well together. When the question arose as to how the project should be operated, I may well have and probably did say that I need someone to help me, Kaplan will be perfectly all right, and Kaplan went. That is the answer to your question.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, do you not know, sir, that initially when you were approached on the matter you were not simply told, "We will select an associate director for you," you were consulted about who you would have on the job?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's 17 years ago, and I think you are probably right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were asked the question whether or not you had any Communists or pro-Communists working under you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your answer to that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever known a pro-Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I probably did; I just don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot think of any? Did you ever know any Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; other than persons who probably are Communists who are in the United Nations, non-United States citizens.

Mr. SOURWINE. Shall we proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOUTHWINE. Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Excuse me, sir. Mr. Chairman, might I just state for the record that Mr. Sourwine is quite right. I must have made the suggestion within FERA that Mr. Kaplan should be an associate director. I can't imagine that it would have been done without that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you subsequently recommend Mr. Kaplan for any other Government employment or assist him to secure any other Government employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give him permission to use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is quite possible. I think he would have had a right to assume that he could use my name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever ask you for permission to do so?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't specifically recollect that, but that is quite possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Kaplan is or was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Kaplan ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with the Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or did you know Mr. Whittaker Chambers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not and did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Chambers employed by the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I wouldn't have known that he was, but I recollect that I saw somewhere in the newspapers that he stated he was employed by some part of the "National research project."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his employment in that capacity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so; I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize him to use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend him to anyone for employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am quite sure I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that Whittaker Chambers is or was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I read that in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. That he what?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That he stated he was a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know as a matter of general knowledge that Mr. Chambers has declared under oath that he was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I guess so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never read any of his testimony?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I never read his testimony except what I saw in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do know that he was at one time employed by the "National research project"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only from the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only from the newspapers. Did you ever give the right to use your name as a reference to Abraham George Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give the right to use your name as a reference to Solomon Adler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever write a letter of recommendation for either Mr. Silverman or Mr. Adler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it surprise you to learn that both of those men had in fact given you as a reference in connection with an application for Government employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It would not surprise me with respect to Mr. Adler. I think it would surprise me with respect to Mr. Silverman because again his positions were superior to mine, and I don't think my reference would have done him much good, and he never worked for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. When a person is given as a reference in Government it is customary to check the reference, is it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether in fact any agency of the Government ever checked with you with regard to Mr. Silverman on the basis of a reference which he had given—that is, his listing of you as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so, I certainly don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many employees are there in your division at the present time in the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Approximaately 125.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that any of those people are Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only to the extent that some of those employees are nationals of countries with Communist governments.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many of those employees are nationals of the Soviet Union?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I recollect at the moment only one.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I may have the name not quite right, but I think it is something like Pavolov.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you spell it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I could spell it only phonetically, probably P-a-v-o-l-o-v, but I am not quite certain of that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he perhaps an employee in a rather subordinate or lesser capacity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Below the policy-making level?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there any employees in your division at or above the policy-making level? In other words, a line of demarcation of the policy-making level with respect to whom you have knowledge or believe or have reason to believe that they are Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The line of demarcation is a rather vague one, but one of my immediate assistants is a national of Poland.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, Mr. Michael Klecki?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. K-l-e-c-k-i?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is his position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Assistant director of the division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is Mr. Klecki now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is probably in Poland right now on leave.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now with regard to the two gentlemen you have named, are there any other employees in your division whom you know or have reason to believe are Communists or pro-Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, I do not know of any such.

Mr. SOURWINE. Outside of those two whom you have named, Mr. Pavolov and Mr. Klecki, are there any other employees in your division whom you know or have reason to believe have ever knowingly cooperated or collaborated with the Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Harold E. Caustin?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a national of the United Kingdom?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is, and is my deputy in the division.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is your deputy?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is my deputy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he has ever knowingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the furtherance of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we have an understanding that with regard to the list of people concerning whom I am about to ask you, when I ask the question, Communist connections I am referring to this whole phrase as I have used it repeatedly here, "Do you know or have any reason to believe that this person ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?"

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Phillis Chait, C-h-a-i-t?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know the person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not know the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Howard Daniel?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not now, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. How recently?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is employed by the Technical Assistance Administration?

Mr. SOURWINE. And was until recently employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Until about a year ago, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. When he left was it a promotion or an advancement?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I don't think it was either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just a transfer?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Just a transfer.
Mr. SOURWINE. He is a national of Australia?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does he have a Communist connection or affiliation?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.
Mr. SOURWINE. Sarah L. Diska?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know of her.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. She is employed in my division.
Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.
Mr. SOURWINE. Adolfo Dorfman, D-o-r-f-m-a-n?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know of Adolfo Dorfman.
Mr. SOURWINE. Argentina?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. A national of Argentina.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is he employed in your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I ask there, do I understand from your answers previously in executive session that the question of a person's political belief is not a qualification for employment with the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That, so far as I know, is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. A person's political belief is not a question of employment in your particular branch?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that if all of them were Communists that would be within the scope of the employment there, or if they were all capitalists, that would be within the scope, is that correct?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; it would be; that is correct, theoretically.

Senator FERGUSON. Or is there an endeavor to try to match the Communists and anti-Communists so that you have a ratio? Is there anything like that in the employment? In other words, there being so many Communist nations, their population so many, so many capitalist nations have so many, and so many Socialist nations? Do you try to do like they do in some places, try to distribute the positions according to the political thinking of the respective nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Sir, I am really not competent to speak to that question. I can say that the charter of the United Nations includes an article somewhere, and I could not recite it to you verbatim, which states that the secretariat of the United Nations should be selected on the basis of competence to do the job first, but insofar as possible the secretariat is to reflect the geographic distribution of the world and that is understood to mean that all nations that are members of the United Nations should be appropriately represented among the secretariat staff members.

Senator FERGUSON. But certainly one of the qualifications is not a matter of political thinking?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it would not make any difference to the United Nations that a person was a citizen of the United States and believed in communism and not capitalism as far as getting a job in the United Nations was concerned?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I wish, sir, you directed that question to the people who can answer you.

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking you to your knowledge.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To my knowledge that is not a factor.

Senator FERGUSON. That is right; that is not a factor.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

One other question. When you take this oath of allegiance to the United Nations, have you ever found difficulty in your thinking that you also owe allegiance to the United States and owed allegiance to the United Nations? Has that been a conflict in your mind?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Never, my allegiance to the United States is an allegiance which I hold as a citizen of the United States, and that is in no way affected by the oath which I took to the United Nations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now do you think that a Communist, your knowledge of a Communist, do you think that he can take an oath such as you took and be loyal to that oath?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. You are now asking my personal view of that?

Senator FERGUSON. Sure.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I should think not.

Senator FERGUSON. I see.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am trying to say I should think he would have difficulty.

Senator FERGUSON. He would have difficulty?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In paying allegiance to his oath that he took to the United Nations owing to the allegiance that he owes to communism, that is what you have in mind?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. That he would have difficulty.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Now as I understand it, you conferred with the counsel of the United Nations before you came down here?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did.

Senator FERGUSON. You have been answering the questions believing that you are within the rule that he laid down for you to answer questions?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so, yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. May I say, sir, that he simply said to me that there was no objection on his part to my answering questions that the committee puts to me, and I am doing that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You volunteered that, did you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, were you not told that you might be asked questions about Mr. Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that if certain questions were asked about Mr. Kaplan the answer was to be thus and so?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the "thus and so"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That Mr. Kaplan has been terminated by the United Nations as of the 29th of May.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were warned that you might be asked why?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not quite, but I was told that the Secretary General gave no reasons for the termination.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were told to say that; were you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I was told to say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, is that the same thing as being told that they have no objection to answering all questions fully and freely?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was told both things.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Do you know Lottie Adler Fields?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. She is a national of the United States?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection, and by that I mean do you know or have any reason to believe that she has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Anna Friefeld?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. A national of Canada?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sidney Glassman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Michael Klecki we have already discussed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a national of Poland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is presently in Poland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He has a Polish passport?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that not necessarily indicate that he is persona grata to the present Polish Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would suppose that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he ever knowingly or willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Since you ask me that question this morning, I thought about that one again, and the only thing I can say to you is that I recollect that sometime before he came to work with the United

Nations he spent several months in Poland assisting the Polish Government in elaborating their economic plan as an economist.

Mr. SOURWINE. What bearing do you think that has on the question I asked you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, you asked whether he in any way had assisted in the attainment of Communist aims.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer then necessarily is "Yes"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would suppose under those circumstances I would have to say "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Irving Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is employed by you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no knowledge or reason to believe that Mr. Kaplan has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of a Communist objective?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I have no knowledge or reason to believe that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now will you tell us what you know of the reasons for Mr. Kaplan's termination by the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, as I told you, the Secretary General gave no reasons for his termination.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, does not the United Nations protect an employee against summary dismissal without any reason?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No. There is a regulation—which I cannot quote to you verbatim—which states that, with respect to employees who are not on a so-called permanent contract, the Secretary General has the right to dismiss them without stating any reason. I understand that the Secretary General has availed himself of that right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead. What do you personally know about the reasons for Mr. Kaplan's dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, as to the reasons, I am afraid my answer would have to stand that, so far as I know, the reasons were not given. Now, all I can tell you is something about a sequence of events. First I think I would have to say that the director of the personnel office more than a year ago told my superior, Mr. Owen, and me that he suggested the replacement of Mr. Kaplan by some other person who was more eminent in the field. That was over a year ago, and I perhaps ought to state that I had forgotten to mention that this morning; that just slipped my mind.

Second, that sometime early in April Mr. Kaplan was called before a grand jury, and a few days later I was called before a grand jury. In the course of the questioning before the grand jury——

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand it, you have talked to the grand jury, and they said there was nothing secret about what they were telling you or what you told them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They specifically told me that anything that transpired at that hearing I was free to discuss outside.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, you may proceed now.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They then told me that they had directed certain questions to Mr. Kaplan, and that he had refused to answer those questions, and they wished to know what I was going to do about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did they tell you what the questions were?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were they?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They said——

Senator FERGUSON. First, did they think that he worked for you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They asked me that, and I told them that he did.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, go ahead and give us the questions.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They told me that they had asked him whether he was a member of a spy ring, and to the best of my recollection that is the substance of the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they use the word "spy" or "espionage"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the best of my recollection they used the word "spy."

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say for what country?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; and that he had refused to answer that question. The second question, as I recollect it, was that, when they asked him where his loyalties would lie in case of a war between the U. S. S. R. and the United States, he had refused to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you asked the same questions?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I was.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your answers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I said "No"; that I was not a member of a spy ring nor never was, and in case of a war between the U. S. S. R. and the United States my loyalties would definitely be with the United States of America. They then wished to know what I was going to do about that and whether I wasn't going to fire him. I told them that I certainly would wish to ask Mr. Kaplan some questions, and told them that I neither hired nor fired for the United Nations. They then wanted to know who did, and I told them it was Mr. Lie and Mr. Owen, my superiors. They wanted to know wasn't I going to tell them about this matter, and I said I probably would, and I in fact did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend Mr. Kaplan's dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That question did not arise when I reported the matter. I was told, having reported the matter, it was now out of my hands.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend Mr. Kaplan's dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not recommend against Mr. Kaplan's dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did not; that question did not come up.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you express any position with respect to his dismissal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You simply recited what happened before the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you had no further function to perform?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Exactly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, in the light of all that recital, is it still your contention that you do not know and do not have any reason to believe that Mr. Kaplan is or was a Communist or pro-Communist or whether he has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with the Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, because before I came to that kind of conclusion I would certainly want to investigate a matter thoroughly, it being a serious conclusion to come to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, and he said to me he was not.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you discuss it with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. "Discuss" is perhaps too broad a word. When he reported to me about the grand-jury matter.

Senator FERGUSON. He reported to you about the grand-jury matter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you what questions they asked?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ask him whether or not he was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He said to me he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me get this straight. Mr. Kaplan reported to you on his appearance before the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As soon as he had come from the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he told you nothing about any of the questions that were asked him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he told me that he had been asked a number of questions about the United Nations and its operations and that he had refused to answer those questions, and he wished to get instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you that he had been asked questions about his own possible membership in the Communist Party or his attitude toward the party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he simply reported to me the official matter that he, as a United Nations employee, had been questioned, and he asked what should he say. I sent him to my superior, Mr. Owen.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you anything about communism in connection with his report of what had taken place in the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not at that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then why did you ask him if he was a Communist at that point?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did not ask him if he was a Communist at that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. After I had been to the grand jury.

Mr. SOURWINE. Oh. That is what we wanted to get. That does not sound quite like your earlier testimony, and perhaps we misunderstood you on that. You did not ask him until you had been to the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you asked him. Just what did you ask?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I told him that I had been informed about this and what were the facts in the matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He told me that he was not a Communist; that he didn't answer these questions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you what questions he did not answer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Some of these questions. I told him what the grand jury had told me.

M. SOURWINE. You only knew about two questions; is that right?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You told him about those two questions?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did tell you he refused to answer them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you whether he was a member of a spy ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He said he was not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he tell you why he did not answer those questions at the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; he did.

Senator FERGUSON. Why?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe as I recollect it that he said he had consulted counsel and that counsel had told him he did not have to answer these questions, and so he didn't answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he tell you whether he would owe loyalty to the United States or Russia in the event of a war between those two countries?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did he tell you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He would owe it to the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he volunteer that he was not a Communist, or did you ask him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect exactly whether I asked him or he told me, but he certainly left me with the impression that he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he just leave you with the impression that he was not, or did he state voluntarily or in response to a question from you that he was not a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall that I asked him the specific question. What he said to me was that he had every confidence that he could disprove any specific accusation on all of these matters, both with respect to being a Communist, being a member of a spy ring, and matters relating to that, and I left it at that and reported that to my superiors.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now testifying that you never did ask him if he was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I said to him, "Are you?" and he said, "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what we wanted to get. Did you ask him that, or did you not ask him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think the best honest answer I can give you is that I believe I asked him and he said to me no, he was not. At any rate, that certainly was the impression I was left with.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you asked him it means that you did take the logical step and go through the question of what could be proved by him or anybody else and go to the ultimate fact of was he. If you did not ask him it means that you did not go to that ultimate fact.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I must say that I did not conduct an investigation. I meant to go to that ultimate fact. I did not keep a record, and I can't say that I specifically asked it in these words. That was my intention, and what I got satisfied me that he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would say that you satisfied yourself that he was not a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In terms of his answers, "Yes."

Senator FERGUSON. There, Mr. Weintraub, I am wondering why you inquired about that, it not being one of the qualifications or requirements in the job he held, whether he was or was not. What difference did it make? In other words, from what you told us?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only because the question arose in terms of this grand jury investigation, and it was in that context that I asked that. Perhaps I had no right to.

Senator FERGUSON. It was not as an employee of the United Nations; this was rather a personal matter, was it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It probably could be put that way; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you put it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I had by that time become personally involved in the thing, and I was interested to know.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you become personally involved?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In this sense, that I was asked, if I remember correctly by the grand jury, would I knowingly hire a Communist.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you tell them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Or recommend one; and I replied to the grand jury that I would not. It was for that reason that I wanted to satisfy myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was Mr. Kaplan's dismissal announced?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't believe it was announced, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn of it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The closing days of April.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew of it before the 1st of May?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so, I think it must have been the 28th of April.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was it that you appeared before the grand jury?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In the early days of April; I don't remember the exact date.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was Mr. Kaplan notified of his dismissal, do you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. On the same day that I was told about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you the one that notified him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I was not. It was done through formal channels.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I return to the list of names?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Karol, K-a-r-o-l, Kracziewicz, K-r-a-c-z-i-e-w-i-c-z?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I presume my pronunciation is very bad?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is atrocious.

Mr. SOURWINE. The person in question is a national of Poland?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so; I couldn't swear to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. A woman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, a man.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is he employed by you?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he is not.
Mr. SOURWINE. Has he been employed by you?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Has he been employed by your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is employed?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. If we are speaking of the same person, he is in the Personnel Bureau.
Mr. SOURWINE. Of the United Nations?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Of the United Nations.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the attainment of Communist objectives?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not. I really don't know the person except as an official.
Mr. SOURWINE. Leo Malania, L-e-o, M-a-l-a-n-i-a?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know him.
Mr. SOURWINE. A national of Canada?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Employed in your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he employed, if you know?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. At this time he is employed in the Secretary-General's office.
Mr. SOURWINE. Of the United Nations?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Of the United Nations.
Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.
Mr. SOURWINE. Susan Morris?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know of her.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?
Mr .WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.
Mr. SOURWINE. Jacquelin Rosenborg?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Where is she employed, if you know?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. On the secretariat of the Technical Assistance Board.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was she at one time in your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; she never was.
Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.
Mr. SOURWINE. Margaret Rukovina, R-u-k-o-v-i-n-a?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I know of her.
Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Where is she employed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In the Technical Assistance Administration.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was she ever in your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you help her get her present job?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a promotion?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect whether it was or not.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did it carry a salary increase?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect; it is conceivable that it did.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend her transfer?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I recommended her.
Mr. SOURWINE. It was not because you wanted to get rid of her?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, no. As a matter of fact, I wanted her to come and work for me very much.
Mr. SOURWINE. Communist connection?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I know of.
Mr. SOURWINE. Marcia Singer?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall the name.
Mr. SOURWINE. A United States national?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know the name.
Mr. SOURWINE. Alfred James Van Tassel?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I know of him.
Mr. SOURWINE. United States national?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he employed?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Now in the Technical Assistance Administration.
Mr. SOURWINE. Formerly in your division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Formerly in my division.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you assist him to get his transfer or new position?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was it a promotion?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't say. He came to me one day, in fact, he came to me with a letter from Senator MacMahon, as I remember it, having worked here on the Hill, but I don't know whether he came directly from here or whether he had been somewhere in between.
Mr. SOURWINE. You say you do not know whether he got a promotion when he left your division and went to the Technical Assistance Division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. When he left my division?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I doubt if he did; I think it was a straight transfer.
Mr. SOURWINE. You were not trying to get rid of him when you recommended him to the other division?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. That whole Technical Assistance was moved away and organized into a separate department, and he moved along with it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communist connection for Mr. Van Tassel?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know of any.
Mr. SOURWINE. Dimitry, D-i-m-i-t-r-y, Vladimar, V-l-a-d-i-m-a-r, Varley, V-a-r-l-e-y?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with hiring him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You hired most of these people, did you not, who are in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I hired most of the people you have named; yes, sir. I mean, hired is the wrong word to use. As I told you, I neither hire nor fire. There is a procedure for that. There is a Bureau of Personnel, there is a special department that handles that.

Senator FERGUSON. But you recommended?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I certainly recommended some of those names which you have mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know any Communist connection for Mr. Varley?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. David Zablodowsky, Z-a-b-l-o-d-o-w-s-k-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I know him.

Mr. SOURWINE. In your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think he is in a section of the secretariat that deals with the printing of documents.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Weintraub, is this a fair statement, that you never inquired about any of these people when you were recommending them as to whether or not they were Communists?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct. I might say that some of those names you mentioned, I know that David Zablodowsky I did not recommend. I don't want you to be under the impression that I admit to knowing more people than I recommended.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To answer your question, sir, we are not supposed to ask that kind of question.

Senator FERGUSON. That is not one of the requirements, is it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not ask a man whether he is a Communist or not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. If he is working in an espionage ring, how would that affect his job at the United Nations? He is sworn to allegiance there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I wouldn't know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am just asking you if you know. Would that make any difference as long as it was not against the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the extent—exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. What?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. You are quite right.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as the rule is concerned that if the espionage, the spy ring, was not a spy ring against the United Nations it would not make any difference, would it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would suppose it would not make any difference.

Senator FERGUSON. I have taken that from your answers that when a man owes allegiance to the United Nations and he is not in a spy ring that involves the United Nations, disloyal to the United Nations,

the United Nations would not be involved in it as you have given these answers; is that right?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct. But I ought to state that I do not make personnel policies.

Senator FERGUSON. But that is your understanding there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. My understanding is that; yes, sir.[4]

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communist connection within the limits of the phrase that I constantly use here for David Zablodowsky?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Marjorie Zap?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you employ her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have anything to do with her employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She is working for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communist connection of hers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Herman Zap?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he related to Mary Zap?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He is her husband.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is employed in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he is not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is he employed?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In the Technical Assistance Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he formerly in your division?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend him for his present position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know anything of a Communist connection for him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know what kind of a spy ring the grand jury may have been investigating from what they say to you and said that you could report out?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. They never told me.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not from the questions put to you it was a spy ring against the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man named Field?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a Philip Morton Field?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize a Philip Morton Field to use your name as a recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

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[4] Mr. Weintraub in a letter to Senator Ferguson dated May 22, 1952, said: "I should have added, 'But I am sure that nobody in the United Nations would knowingly hire anyone who is in any kind of spy ring'."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize a Philip Morton Field or anyone who was using that name to give your name as a recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give a letter of recommendation to a Philip Morton Field or to anyone under that name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think you might have?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so. I might simply say, sir, not necessarily in connection with that name, but as you have elicited here, I have had over the past 20 years several thousand people working for me and I must have written several hundred letters of recommendation in the normal routine process of people stating they worked for me, they are good people, technical people, and I certainly cannot remember all the names and letters that I have written.

Now I certainly do not recall having ever employed such a person or having written such a letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Just from the newspapers.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know him personally?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man named Adler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Solomon Adler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Solomon Adler.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he the only Adler you ever knew?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the best of my recollection. I can't think of another Adler.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any close association with him on either social or business matters?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He worked for the same project.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, the research project?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The research project.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize him to use your name as a recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect it, but I may well have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's quite possible, but I don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Max Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did ever have any business contacts with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any social contacts with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Cocktail party kind of social contacts perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that he was anti-FBI?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had read a review of a book that he had written a couple of years ago, I think, somewhere.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever discuss that question with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there a rule to your knowledge in the United Nations that they will not hire any American that has ever worked for the FBI as an agent?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I have never heard of such a rule, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell the committee about your business contacts with Mr. Max Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recollect it, Mr. Max Lowenthal was in charge of a unit in the FEA, I guess the Foreign Economic Administration, during the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your first contact with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no contact with him back at the time when you had something to do with Sidney Hillman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so; I don't think I had ever met him before.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I said, he was head of a unit in the Foreign Economic Administration during the war, and both OFFRRO—that is, the Office for Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, I guess it was—in the State Department, and subsequently UNRRA had a great deal of business involving economic matters, and the Foreign Economic Administration was in fact one of the agencies through which the UNRRA dealt with the United States Government.

Consequently I had fairly frequent contact as a person in UNRRA dealing with supply questions with what might in a way be called my opposite number in the United States Government, which was Mr. Lowenthal, and many of his people. So I did have dealings with him, and that was the nature of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did it terminate when he and you or he or you left your respective posts, the ones you have mentioned?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe it terminated when he left his post because I think he left his post before I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Whenever the organizational arrangements were changed, it must have been some time in 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have had no business connections with him since then?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None at all.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you seen him since?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so. I don't recollect having seen him since.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned the possibility of a cocktail party. You might have seen him at some cocktail party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's conceivable.

Mr. SOURWINE. Outside of a casual meeting at some function sponsored by a third party organization, would you say you had not seen him or had conferences with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not had any appointments with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Abraham Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us what you know about Mr. Silverman.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I first met Mr. Silverman when he was a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and I was a research assistant. That must have been some time in 1930.

I think I subsequently met him here in Washington sometime during 1933. After that when I was the director of this "National research project"——

Mr. SOURWINE. That was 10 years later, was it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, no. As I said, in 1933. I became director of the "National research project" I believe in 1935.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. Did you know him during that intervening 2 years?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I said I met him here in Washington in business connections.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it business or social connections?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Both.

Mr. SOURWINE. During the period from 1931 to 1933?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I had any contact with him between 1931 and 1933.

Mr. SOURWINE. Between 1933 and 1935, both social and business?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead and pick it up at 1935.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In 1935 or 1936, thereabouts, this "National research project" of which I was director was carried out in conjunction with several agencies of the Government, one of which was the Railroad Retirement Board. Mr. Silverman on the Board conducted some of that work for the "National research project," and I had fairly frequent contacts with him there concerning that work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you help him in any way to get his position with that Board?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir; I certainly don't recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think that those are the only business contacts that I had with him except that when I came back to Washington in 1941 I did see him from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any contact with him between 1935 and 1936 and 1941?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, and throughout this project, which lasted from about 1935 to 1941, we had on this work that was being done at the Railroad Retirement Board, frequent contact.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you mean when you "came back to Washington"?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I told you earlier, in 1941 I joined the War Production Board.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He being in Washington, I meant when I came back to Washington I saw him from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see. But that was not a resumption of the association because the association had continued, had it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. I am trying to give you the story year by year as I recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right, it was a continuation except that the business end of the association ended with my leaving the "National research project," that is what I meant.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was what year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That was in 1941.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. But having known him we continued the association on an occasional lunch basis kind of thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you met with him periodically at lunch?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, from time to time we would run across each other and have a drink together.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make luncheon appointments?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you do that with some regularity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. As often as once a month?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Three times a year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Conceivably, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As often as four or five times a year?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I would say three is nearer to the number than five, something like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who used to make the appointments, you or he—that is, who initiated them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't say that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Both ways?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Quite possibly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sometimes you? Did you sometimes initiate luncheon appointments with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Quite possible, I am quite sure I must have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he sometimes initiate luncheon appointments with you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on other occasions you just ran across him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Continue.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen him since then?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I haven't seen him since I left Washington.[5]

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever had any dealings with Mr. Silverman other than social or governmental?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever leave a package with Mr. Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No. sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you give or hand him a package at any time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize Mr. Silverman to use you as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever do anything to assist Mr. Silverman in getting a commission in the Air Force?

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[5] Mr. Weintraub in a letter to Senator Homer Ferguson, dated May 22, 1952, made the following statement:

"With respect to the last reply, I subsequently recollected that I saw Silverman again about half a dozen times in New York shortly after I joined the staff of the United Nations. As I recollect it, he was negotiating for a job in New York and looking for an apartment. He got in touch with me and since he indicated that he was having difficulty in getting a hotel room during his visits to New York I told him to feel free to stay over at our house whenever he wanted to. At that time we lived in a furnished 10-room apartment at 955 Park Avenue and had plenty of spare rooms since our normal requirements are about 5 rooms. Mr. Silverman availed himself of that invitation on several occasions. As near as I can recollect it, this was near the end of the year 1946, and I have not seem him since then."

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my recollection. I didn't know he had a commission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had applied for a commission in the Air Force.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever recommend Gregory Silvermaster for a commission in the Air Force?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Silvermaster?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could I finish with Silverman, Senator, before we get to the next person?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know that Mr. George Silverman had used your name and the names of Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie as references in an application for a commission in the Air Force?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever knew that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did not the Air Force check with you about that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I certainly don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now if the Senator wants to pursue the question about Mr. Silvermaster?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I knew him.

Senator FERGUSON. Here in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Here in Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. How well did you know him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Very casually, he was an employee of the FERA when I was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Superior?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. We didn't have anything to do with each other actually. He was working somewhere else, and I just knew that he was there.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you met him recently?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When is the last time you saw him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Probably when I left the FERA, which must have been in 1935.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Elizabeth Bentley?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I read her name in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could I ask about some other names, Mr Chairman?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know George Perazich, P-e-r-a-z-i-c-h-.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did I pronounce that name properly?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us about your association with Mr. Perazich?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was an employee of this same project, the national research project.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you had anything to do with his employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so beyond having general responsibility.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, go ahead. What else do you know about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe that he also was subsequently an employee of OFRRO in the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with securing that appointment for him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that I did, but had he given me as a reference I probably would have given him a good reference, but I don't recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize him to use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not specifically, but again I think he would have had a right to feel that he could, having worked for me.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. What else do you know about Mr. Perazich?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He, subsequently, as I recall it, was also employed by UNRRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his employment there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so, but it is quite likely that he transferred over with the OFRRO staff to UNRRA. In any case he did not work for me either in OFRRO or in UNRRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead, what more do you know about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. There is very little more I think that I can tell you. As I recall it, he was sent off on a mission to Yugoslavia.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sent off by whom?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. By someone in UNRRA, not myself, but normally that would have been handled by a part of the shop which I think was called area studies—not area studies—Bureau of Areas, I think it was called.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the end of him?

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean "the end of him"?

Mr. SOURWINE. He says he does not know what happened to him, and he went on a mission to Yugoslavia.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am trying to recall now. Well, he came back, I know that, but I really couldn't tell you what happened to him after that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know where he is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any social or business contacts or dealings with him other than those you have told the committee about?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, he was a fellow with green fingers.

Senator FERGUSON. With what?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I owned a house here, and I had a garden. I had no time to do anything in the garden, and as I remember it, George loved to work with flowers, and for a time when his family wasn't here he used to come around on Sundays and just putter away,

and that is the only other contacts that I can recall, and I appreciated that very much.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have Mr. Perazich use your name as a reference?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall that I authorized him to, but again I wish to say that he would have had the right to use my name as a reference, having worked for me before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Perazich was a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE Were you ever a member of any organization of which Mr. Perazich was also a member?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of any organization of which Mr. Silverman was also a member?

Senator FERGUSON. Any group?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so short of, I am a member of the American Economic Association, and I would assume he is likely to be, it is that kind of technical association.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of any group or organization other than the technical kind that you have mentioned of which Nathan Gregory Silvermaster was a member?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No. sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that at the time Mr. Perazich was a member of the Bentley ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man named Harry Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever authorize him to use your name as a recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I don't recollect the specific authorization, but he worked for me, and he would have had the right to use my name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give him a letter of recommendation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is quite likely that I did, although I do not specifically recall that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any social association with Mr. Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, a casual sort. In Philadelphia when he worked on the project that I was director of, I remember he lived only a block or two away from me, and their babies and my babies were born about the same time, and we used to admire each other's babies in baby carriages and so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. He did not have a green thumb?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. At least I don't know of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. With him it was a mutual interest in babies and with Mr. Perazich it was a mutual interest in gardening?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If you care to put it that way. It wasn't mutual, I had no interest in the gardening.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just had the garden?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I just had the garden, and that lasted only for a brief period, but I didn't want to leave it out since you asked me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Anatoli Borisovitch Gromov?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Never head of him.

Mr. SOURWINE. A former first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall the name.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Gubichev when he was with the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Judith Coplon?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever in contact with Mr. Gromov?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so, although I must say I was in contact with the Soviet Embassy as an employee of UNRRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Throughout my employment with UNRRA.

Mr. SOURWINE. That would have been what period by years?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. 1944 to 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they make contributions to UNRRA, the Soviets?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the administrative fund of UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. Just the administrative fund?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Specifically were you in contact in December of 1944 with Mr. Gromov?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I certainly don't recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever go to the Soviet Embassy to see him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that, but it's possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever call him on the telephone?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is possible, but I don't recollect the name at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever go to the Soviet Embassy at any time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. In what connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I recall several cocktail parties at the Soviet Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that on May Day?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. More likely on the anniversary of the Revolution, which is sometime in November.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever go to the Soviet Embassy other than to a social function, and by social function I mean an affair to which many were invited?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so, but I fairly frequently went to the Soviet Purchasing Mission.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Silverman and Perazich and Magdoff and Kaplan and Gromov, of whom we have been talking, all have been named by Elizabeth T. Bentley, who is a self-confessed former Soviet agent, as having been members of an underground group in Washington, the purpose of which was to gather and forward information to the Russian Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I knew of some of those names. I don't think I recall all of them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which of those names did you remember?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Would you mind repeating them?

Mr. SOURWINE. Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I remember that was one.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first learn about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I was in Geneva at the time when the thing broke in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you learned about that at about the time that Miss Bentley testified?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perazich?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever heard about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I think that was another name that came to light at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. About the same time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You learned about that at the same time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Which was that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Irving Kaplan.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Gromov?

Senator FERGUSON. Just a moment. Is that the same Kaplan as the man sitting here today?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you knew when Elizabeth Bentley testified about his so-called connection with the espionage ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That was exactly the question Mr. Sourwine asked me.

Senator FERGUSON. You seemed surprised that the grand jury would ask him a question like that.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I didn't say I was surprised.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew the open testimony before the Senate connected him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you disbelieve Miss Bentley's testimony?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, I didn't believe it.

Senator FERGUSON. You didn't believe it?

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was shocked.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any basis of knowledge concerning the facts to which she testified?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. This much, that when I heard of the name Kaplan I think I heard that first through a memorandum which was received in Geneva when I was there. That memorandum was received by Mr. Owen, my superior, from a man who was then in charge of the department in New York, a Mr. Goldet, G-o-l-d-e-t, and as I recollect it, the memorandum stated that Mr. Kaplan had come to see him; that Mr. Kaplan had told him that this was a ridiculous charge; that it was not true; that he had every faith that on any opportunity to disprove it he could do so. That is the memorandum that was received in Geneva.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Kaplan's job at that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was the job that he has now. He was then working for the United Nations in my division.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Kaplan was ever thereafter given the opportunity to disprove the charge?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe Mr. Kaplan had stated, but I don't recollect it very exactly, that he had offered to come to the same committee before which Miss Bentley had made the charges and that I think he was never called.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he ever was called?

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever voluntarily appear before the committee and ask to be heard?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know that, but as I recollect it, he either told me or told Mr. Owen that he had offered to come.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he ever did in fact appear?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not think he ever in fact appeared, but I cannot say that I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make any effort to find out whether he had in fact appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I can't recollect it exactly, but I think I asked him, and he said to me no, he was never called.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand now that he had been working for the United Nations and nothing had been said about it although Bentley testified before a committee of the Senate and one of the House that he was in an espionage ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But when the grand jury tells you about it, you go back and tell the United Nations, and either by coincidence or something else he loses his job?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Those are the facts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Has there been a change in attitude on the part of the U. N.? I am talking of your personal knowledge.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't answer that.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean your personal knowledge.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To my knowledge I know of no changes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now with regard to Mr. Perazich, you said you did not know of Miss Bentley's charges concerning him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct; I don't recall having heard.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Magdoff; did you disbelieve her charges with regard to Mr. Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I was surprised.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is a difference between surprise and disbelieving. Did you disbelieve?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believed that Magdoff could probably prove that it wasn't so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever talk to him about it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I never saw him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did disbelieve her charges then?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think it would be correct to say that I had confidence that he could probably disprove that.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you believe it about anyone she had said that they were in the ring?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. There are many names that I never heard of.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean that you knew.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not. I felt the same way.

Senator FERGUSON. About all of them?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. About all of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you question these people as to whether or not she was telling the truth?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. Most of these people I never saw since then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Whittaker Chambers had testified that these people were members of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I could say I knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had testified that any of them were members of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I never read the testimony of Whittaker Chambers.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is not the question, did you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Consequently I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are saying that you did not know, for instance, that Mr. Whittaker Chambers had ever testified that Abraham George Silverman was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not recollect that I knew it as a testimony by Whittaker Chambers. Conceivably I saw it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that anybody had testified in support of Miss Bentley's charges in that regard?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I am afraid I cannot answer you as a matter of positive knowledge because I believe I was in Europe at the time and did not follow the thing closely and what I saw, I saw bits and snatches that appeared in the European press, and I never went back to the testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never got any information about Whittaker Chanmbers' testimony?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is not correct. I got information again through the newspapers, and as I recall it, it was primarily a matter of Alger Hiss, but I don't recall the names.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you know Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. How well did you know Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only casually, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever work in the State Department with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not with him, but I think I met him casually at that time, and I subsequently met him when he was president of the Carnegie Fund where he on several occasions came to the United Nations, and there was a meeting or two about some report that Carneige Fund was writing about the United Nations. I met him then again.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him information on that report?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. About the United Nations?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I gave any information directly to him, but to some of his people. I think some of his people went to see quite a number of people in the United Nations about its structure and so forth, and I am sure I talked to one or more of his people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the Perlo group?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know what the Perlo group is or was?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know a man named Perlo, P-e-r-l-o?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. What was his first name?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I can't recollect it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was it Victor?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, it was.
Mr. SOURWINE. When and where did you know him, and how long did the association continue?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect exactly, but some time somewhere in Washington in some official connection, I believe it was, in the War Production Board. I remember meeting a man named Perlo in some official capacity and that is about all I can remember of that.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have——
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever had any other contacts, social or otherwise.
Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of the Perlo group?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet with any other persons in a room with Perlo?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.
Mr. SOURWINE. To your knowledge, did your wife Sylvia ever attend any Communist meetings?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was she present at a fraction meeting or fraction meetings of the Communist Party in the Philidelphia area?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did she ever attend any Commuinst Party meetings in Washington, D. C.?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Was she ever a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. What was the Coordinating Committee for Postwar Rehabilitation?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember the name at all.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who the members of that committee were at all?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I say, I don't remember the name of the committee.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does it refresh your recollection that the members of that committee might have been Murray Lattimer, Morris Rosenthal, and yourself?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. There never was such a committee.
Mr. SOURWINE. There never was a committee of which you, Murray Lattimer, and Morris Rosenthal were members?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. There never was any such committee.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, Mr. Lattimer, and Mr. Rosenthal ever meet together?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is possible.
Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Quite possible.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you ever recall any such meetings?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. What was the occasion of any meeting of that nature?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I don't remember any such meetings, and when I say it's quite possible, it is simply because Murray Lattimer was Governor Lehman's deputy in OFRRO, I was a top-ranking employee in OFRRO at that time, Rosenthal was a top-ranking employee of the Foreign Economic Administration. We must have had common business, and it's quite conceivable that the three of us met sometime, but I just don't recollect it specifically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the three of you ever meet with Max Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That again is possible, but again I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. On more than one occasion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have frequent meetings with Max Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Alone, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. The group.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or you and one of the other two?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You may have met with him, you say, on more than one occasion. Do you remember any such meeting?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. Again it is rather vague in my mind. I remember I once came to the offices of the FEA, there was a meeting of which Lowenthal was chairman. I represented either OFRRO or UNRRA, and we conducted some business, but I don't remember exactly what it was any more.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and Murray Lattimer or you and Morris Rosenthal or you and both Mr. Lattimer and Mr. Rosenthal meet with Mr. Lowenthal outside Government offices?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect any such meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Parker McAllister?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Director of rehabilitation for the Balkan area.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss Mr. McAllister's appointment with anyone?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I said, I don't remember McAllister's name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you have discussed Mr. McAllister's appointment with Mr. Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I doubt it very much since I don't remember McAllister's name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss any appointments with Mr. Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Lowenthal ever to you or in your hearing question the appointment of any man not known to be a liberal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Norman Bursler, B-u-r-s-l-e-r?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who is he.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's very vague in my mind. He seems to have been one of the employees of the National Research project in its very early days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with his employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only in my general capacity as the person responsible for the project.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there has been testimony under oath that he was a member of an underground group for the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Frank Coe?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well did you know him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I first met Mr. Coe in the summer of 1933 when he was working for an employers' group in the clothing industry in Chicago, as I recall it, when I assisted Mr. Sidney Hillman on the brief, and he did a technical job on the other side, and I never

Senator FERGUSON. Was that an economic brief or a legal brief?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was an economic brief. He more or less performed the same kind of function for the employers' group that I did on the union group.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there any attorneys associated in that matter?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall that. I simply did a technical job on the brief, and he did a technical job on the other side, and I never had anything further to do with it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all you ever had anything to do with Mr. Coe?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; that was the first time I ran into him. I don't think I ran into Coe again for years until I came back to Washington and was working in UNRRA. I think that Coe at that time occupied some position in the Foreign Economic Administration and that I again began to run into him there, but that was rather infrequent, and subsequently I believe I had again some contacts with him when he became secretary of the International Monetary Fund.

I had occasional lunch with him, and that is about all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you now informed the committee fully with regard to the extent of your association with Mr. Coe?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so. I have had, as I said, occasional contacts with him of that kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there had been sworn testimony that Mr. Frank Coe was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you learn that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I think when I was in Geneva. As I remember it, it appeared in the newspapers at the same time as Mr. Harry White's name was mentioned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Mr. Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us the extent of your association with Mr. Currie?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It's again a casual kind of association stretching over quite a number of years, probably going back to something like 1934 or thereabounts. I remember attending some meetings together with Mr. Currie involving discussions about some economic matters and problems.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those meetings which you attended in your official capacity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. I remember meeting him from time to time in various places, and I would say that the contacts I had with Mr. Currie from the years 1934 to about 1947 or 1948 were probably no more than half a dozen to a dozen contacts over that whole stretch of years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that there had been sworn testimony that Mr. Currie was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you learn that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. About the same time as I heard about Harry White and Coe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a person named Bela, B-e-l-a, Gold?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear that name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a Sonia Gold?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear that name?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that name either.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have testified about Abraham Silverman; have you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you told the committee fully concerning your knowledge and association with Mr. Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know William Taylor?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The name sounds familiar, but I don't recall now.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory of a Mr. William Taylor?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I say, only as a familiar name, but I just couldn't place it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a person named William Ludwig?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever heard the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you testified fully with regard to your knowledge of and association with Victor Perlo?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know an Edward J. Fitzgerald?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee what you know about him and what your association with him was, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was one of the employees of the "National research project." As I recall it, he left the project to go to work for some Government agency, and I don't recollect exactly which it was. I don't believe I have had any contact with him since then; at least, I don't recall it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there had been sworn testimony that Mr. Fitzgerald was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I heard that.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you hear it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember any more, but it appears to be associated in my mind with that same Bentley testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You read all of this in the newspapers; is that right?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, about Fitzgerald?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And about these other people that you said you learned at the same time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Harold Glasser, G-l-a-s-s-e-r?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us what you know about him and inform the committee concerning your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recall it, I first met Harold Glasser when I worked in the State Department in OFRRO just prior to the calling of the first UNRRA Council when we were preparing certain documents for the Council in collaboration with other departments of Government; and, as I remember it, Harold Glasser represented the United States Treasury in a series of meetings that we had about the financial plan for UNRRA.

Subsequently Glasser was one of the representatives of the United States Government in a series of meetings that lasted over years dealing with UNRRA, involving the United States contribution to UNRRA, and involving a committee of an intergovernmental committee of UNRRA which dealth with the ability of governments to pay for the relief supplies; and, since I was secretary of that committee, I met him at every meeting.

I think that is the total of my association with Glasser.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there has been sworn testimony that Mr. Glasser was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I don't recollect that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Charles Kramer?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No. sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Charles Krevitsky, K-r-e-v-i-t-s-k-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Solomon Leshinsky, L-e-s-h-i-n-s-k-y or L-e-c-h-i-n-s-k-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us what you know about him. First, do you know which spelling is correct?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know about him? What is your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Leshinsky was an employee of the "National research project" in Philadelphia, if I remember correctly, and subsequently was an employee of UNRRA. In both instances I was his superior, although not his immediate superior. That is about all I can tell you about Leshinsky.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have anything to do with his employment; that is, employing him, securing employment for him, or recommending him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Only in this general way. I don't remember specifically employing him or recommending him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know there has been sworn testimony that Mr. Leshinsky was a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I had heard that.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you hear it, and when?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As a matter of fact, now I recall Leshinsky dropped into the U. N. offices—it must be several years ago—and told me that himself, if I remember correctly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why he did that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; he came in. I think, as I remember it, one day my secretary told me "Mr. Leshinsky is outside and wants to see you." I think he just came in and said, "Well, I happened to be in New York and wanted to drop in and say hello." He said he hoped I didn't mind wasting my time on that, and I said I did not.

As I recall it now, he told me he had a farm and that, as he expressed it, he was being hounded by an accusation of this kind, and it was a lot of nonsense, but it certainly was taking up a lot of his energy and things like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you believe his denials?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you subsequently make any investigation with respect to the truth or falsity of the charges against him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you fully informed the committee with regard to your knowledge of and association with Harry Magdoff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Allan Rosenberg, A-l-l-a-n, R-o-s-e-n-b-e-r-g?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It sounds like the name of a man who was in the FEA, if I remember correctly. Could you refresh my memory? Was he in FEA with Lowenthal or something like that?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am unable to state. I am asking you for your recollection.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the best of my recollection, I seem to remember a man of that name in the FEA in that same group that Lowenthal was in as a person with whom I had dealings during UNRRA days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Allan Rosenberg has been cited in sworn testimony as a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Donald Niven Wheeler?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Harry Dexter White?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you informed the committee fully concerning what you know about Mr. White and your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe you didn't ask me anything about Mr. White.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us, please?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The association with Mr. White was also a rather casual one stretching over quite a number of years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you first meet him in a business connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. When?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall exactly, but I think it must have been around 1934 or 1935, somewhere in the Federal Reserve Board or something like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you not know him before that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I think what we will do at the present time is to suspend with the witness, and counsel has a few letters he wants to put in the record at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. First is an extract from the Far Eastern Survey dated June 30, 1943, and it is entitled "The Navy Needs Men for the Military Government Program."

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344B" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344B

THE NAVY NEEDS MEN, SPECIAL PROGRAM 108–43 (MILITARY GOVERNMENT)

The Navy needs exceptional men capable of accepting an over-all range of executive responsibilities to serve as administrative officers in the Military Government of occupied areas. A college degree is essential, preferably with a major and postgraduate work in international relations, law, trade, or finance; or the domestic fields of political science, economics, public administration, law, or finance. The age limits are from 28 to 45. Civilian experience must have included at least three years of executive-administrative work.

Government, business, and education are the three fields which can contribute most of these higher-caliber executives. Backgrounds of foreign service in any of these three fields, with a knowledge of languages and customs of individual foreign countries (preferably the South Pacific and Far East area), are particularly desirable, but not absolutely essential.

"Officers in Military Government will be expected to serve beyond the expiration of the war. This message is not intended for men engaged in essential war industries or employed by a federal agency. Candidates should apply at the nearest Office of Naval Procurement or write to the Secretary of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc."

—FAR EASTERN SURVEY, *June 30, 1943.*

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Raymond Dennett to Mr. Robert Morris, special counsel, dated February 7, 1952, asking that a certain change be made in the testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, this is a letter which was received by you here?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. And connected with it is a carbon copy of your reply. Do you desire that to go in also?

Mr. MORRIS. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be made a part of the record.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344C" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344C

RAYMOND DENNETT
21 LOWELL ST.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., *February 7, 1952.*

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Special Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In reading over the printed record of my testimony before the subcommittee I have discovered minor errors to which I should direct your

attention. The first is clerical, and the second a misunderstanding on my part of the question you asked as we were rushing to adjourn.

On the third or fourth page of my testimony where I am describing the set-up of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the printed record states, in regard to the Washington office, that Mr. Lattimore was later associated with that office. It was Mrs. Lattimore and not her husband who was on our payroll.

The record also shows that the final question you asked me was whether Gunther Stein attended the Hot Springs conference as a member of the American delegation and that I answered that this statement was correct. I understood you to ask whether Gunther Stein attended the Hot Springs conference. Stein did attend, but, as *Security in the Pacific* shows, he attended as a member of the United Kingdom and not the United States delegation.

I thought these two corrections should be brought to your attention and, if you consider it desirable, entered in the record.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT.

RD:jw

FEBRUARY 12, 1952.

Mr. RAYMOND DENNETT,
21 Lowell Street, Cambridge, Mass.:

DEAR MR. DENNETT: Thank you for your letter of February 7th. I shall ask the committee to insert your letter into the record with the two changes that appear therein.

Thank you for calling this to our attention.

Sincerely,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel.*

RM/al

Mr. MORRIS. I have here a request by Senator Pat McCarran addressed to the Honorable Henri Bonnet, Ambassador of France, and the reply from Mr. Bonnet to Senator McCarran, dated April 17, 1952, stating that Andrew Roth had been barred admission to Indochina.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344D," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1344D

APRIL 8, 1952.

Hon. HENRI BONNET,
Ambassador of France.
2535 Belmont Road, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Would you kindly let us know, for the use of the Internal Security Subcommittee, whether or not in the 1940's, possibly about 1945, a writer named Andrew Roth was refused admission to Saigon on the order of the French High Commissioner. If so, I would like to have the reasons for such action.

Kindest regards and all best wishes.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, AUX ETATS, UNIS,
April 17, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.,

MY DEAR MR. SENATOR: With reference to your letter of April 8th concerning Andrew Roth, I have the honour to inform you that this journalist has been refused admission to Indochina since 1949 because of his extremely violent attacks in American, Chinese, and Indochinese newspapers against the French presence in that country.

Between 1946 and 1949, Andrew Roth had made several journeys to Indochina.

HENRI BONNET.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is an exchange of correspondence between Senator McCarran, who writes to the Honorable Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense, dated January 19, 1952, and a reply to Senator McCarran signed by William C. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated January 29, 1952, in connection with the publication the Making of Modern China, being published in the Infantry Journal of the United States Forces.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344E," and is as follows:)

(The booklet, the Making of Modern China, by Eleanor and Owen Lattimore, was filed in committee files for reference.)

EXHIBIT No. 1344E

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, January 29, 1952.

Senator PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Inclosed are copies of a paper-backed edition on "The Making of Modern China" by Eleanor and Owen Lattimore, and Army Talk No. 66, published by the Army during the summer of 1945 on the subject of "Our Ally China," as requested in your letter of 19 January 1952.

You will note that the booklet "The Making of Modern China" was published by the Infantry Journal and not by the United States Armed Forces Institute. So far as the Armed Forces of the United States are concerned, both of these publications are obsolete and have been withdrawn from circulation. The entire stock of the book was declared obsolete and salvaged in December 1947 except a few file copies, from which I was able to obtain the inclosed copy. The Army Talk, "Our Ally China," was declared obsolete by Army Circular No. 346, dated 26 November 1946. Neither of these publications has been distributed or referred to in publications of the Armed Forces of the United States since the above dates.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM C. FOSTER,
Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Inclosures—2.

JANUARY 19, 1952.

Hon. ROBERT A. LOVETT,
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: For purposes of the inquiry of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee into the affairs of the Institute of Pacific Relations, we would like to obtain a copy of a paper-backed edition of "The Making of Modern China" by Eleanor and Owen Lattimore, published by the United States Armed Forces Institute at Madison, Wisconsin, and a copy of an Army fact sheet published for orientation work in the Armed Forces during the summer of 1945 dealing with China. A photostat of the latter would do.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

[Restricted]

ARMY TALK—ORIENTATION FACT SHEET 66

WAR DEPARTMENT—WASHINGTON 25, D. C.—7 APRIL 1945

Note For This Week's Discussion

There are three main points to develop in this week's discussion: (1) China, in spite of her extreme poverty and lack of sufficient numbers of well-trained, well-equipped troops, has waged a heroic war against Japan; (2) A united, progressive China can hasten the final defeat of the enemy; the present internal political tension within the country is a serious problem; (3) Only a strong, forward-looking, democratic China can give leadership to the people of the Far East and function as a leading member of the United Nations. (Suggested references: Fact Sheet Nos. 27 and 28; also Changing China by George E. Taylor, and The Making of Modern China by Owen Lattimore—both of these volumes were issued in the basic reference library for Information and Education officers.)

OUR ALLY CHINA

There is no need to tell you that great numbers of American soldiers are fighting the Japanese in the Pacific. Many of them are fighting alongside our Chinese ally—on the soil of China. And many more—perhaps some of you—will eventually get there.

This is certainly not the first time you have talked about China—you have undoubtedly read articles about the Chinese people and their heroic struggle with the Japanese since as far back as 18 September 1931.

Today we will spend our hour in an attempt to get at several important points that we ought to know about China—there is a lot more to talk about but this will not be our only opportunity.

Newspaper stories, magazine articles, and books have been written about what is supposed to be going on within China. Sometimes authors tell conflicting stories. Often enough it is hard to tell whether the conflicting reports are the result of individual bias or inadequate information.

One hears a lot of phrases that seem to have special meaning: The Nationalist Government, the Chinese "Communists," guerrilla fighters, lack of unity, war lords, Japanese puppets, and so on. Later, we will try to get a clearer picture. Right now let us remember that China is big—China is poor—China has about 450 million people—people like yourself and myself—all of whom very likely want the same things that you and I do: peace, a chance to make a decent living, and a chance to have some fun out of life. There isn't a GI in our Army who doesn't want these things—and that is about the same for the Chinese GI.

China, like the United States—like any nation—has her problems. Some are internal, others are related to the War. We can't begin to consider all of them. But it is important for us to know how some of her major problems affect the United Nations war effort and how they will affect the peace to come.

We are vitally concerned in the affairs of our Chinese ally. We each need each other in the battle against Japan. And when the War has been won—we will still need each other. America and the world need a strong, forward-looking, democratic China ready to give leadership to the people of the Far East and prepared to function as a leading member of the United Nations.

(The foregoing may be useful as a brief introduction to the topic for discussion.)

WHY IS CHINA BACKWARD?

(Question: Why does China, by American standards, seem poverty-stricken and backward?)

Many reasons might be given for China's poverty and economic backwardness. Here are a few of the most important.

1. *China has an enormous population.*—Even with all her dependencies, she is not a great deal larger than the United States, yet she has between three and four times as many people—about 450 million, as compared with the 130 million of the United States. Much of her land is either mountainous or so dry that it cannot support agriculture without artificial irrigation. As a result, most of her people are crowded upon a comparatively small part of the land. Forty-six

Chinese farm families have to get a living out of the land that *one* American farm family of the same size would have.

As things now stand, the overcrowding of land means poverty for most people. About 80 percent of China's population are farmers. And it also means that in the past, the existence of an almost limitless supply of cheap manpower as acted as a definite check upon such a development of labor-saving machinery as we have had in the West.

2. *China is an old country.*—Considerable parts of China have been under continuous and intensive cultivation for more than 3,000 years, yet they still produce large crops today. This is only possible because of the infinite and painstaking toil that has been put into the soil by generation after generation of Chinese farmers. In the United States we have had quite a different situation. But that would happen if we were as crowded as the Chinese, or if we had been forced to stay settled on the same land for two or three thousand years. Taking these factors into account, perhaps it will be easier for us to realize what the Chinese are up against.

3. *China is poor in natural resources.*—Coal is the only basic resource that is plentiful, except for large deposits of a few of the rarer metals, such as tungsten. But in iron her known reserves would last only nine years at the annual U. S. rate of consumption. Her situation as to oil is even worse. This helps to explain why the Chinese are so far behind us in industrialization. They do not have our almost limitless and easily accessible natural resources. The annual output of iron in China is only three pounds per capita (as compared with 550 pounds in the United States), and even in coal she annually produces only 100 pounds per capita (as compared with 10,000 pounds in the United States).

Much of China has never been properly surveyed for minerals, and future explorations, especially in China's little known western regions, will undoubtedly on the War, and in spite of certain other inequities in the distribution of wartime burdens, the harrowing fact remains that the average Chinese is living under conditions but one step removed from starvation. But in spite of all this, the Chinese are still fighting with us today, though the battle has not been going too well.

MILITARY SITUATION CRITICAL

(*Question: What is the present military situation?*)

At he start of 1945, the military situation in China looked worse than it has in all her seven years of war. The United Nations suffered a major defeat when the Japanese succeeded in joining together their forces in northern and southern China. Three major gains accrued to Japan from this move—she virtually established a continuous land corridor between her base in Manchuria and her conquests in Indo-China and the East Indies; she drove us from our principal air-bases in South China; she placed herself in a position to prevent the Chinese from coming to our aid should we attempt a landing on the China coast.

At present Japan is garrisoning the coast of China, in greater strength, to prepare for the threat of American landings.

reveal many hitherto unknown resources. As things stand today, these figures point clearly to why China is a poor country.

4. *China has been fighting a war, on her own soil, for seven years.*—Actually China's war with Japan began in 1931 when the Japanese struck in Manchuria. However, after rapidly overrunning this province, the Japanese turned to the problem of exploiting its resources, and did not strike again until 1937. But between 1937 and 1939 the Chinese had lost to the enemy precisely those parts of their country which were richest and economically most developed. They were forced back into the deep interior regions that were the least modernized parts of the country. Before 1937 that part of China which is now not occupied by the Japanese possessed only about ten percent of the industrial plants, and 20 percent of the railroads; it mined only 22 percent of China's coal and milled less than three percent of her flour.

Millions of Chinese preferred to flee from Japanese rule into the interior of Free China, thus complicating the problem of food and support. The entry of America and Britain into the Far Eastern war and the resulting blockade against our shipping made China's economic position worse rather than better, because its immediate result was to cut off China almost entirely from the outside world. Is it any wonder, then, that there is a terrible scarcity of almost all kinds of goods in Free China today; a resulting inflation that has raised price levels to several hundred times what they were in 1937; and that

black markets and profiteering activities have sprung up on all sides? This blockade has reduced China's normal poverty to misery and suffering. Thousands of highly cultivated Chinese people who were accustomed to some of the normal comforts of living are gradually dropping below the minimum standard of health requirements. In spite of the profiteers who are fattening

These gains by the Japanese have been blamed on many things—insufficient supplies from us, corruption and bad management in the Chinese government, and poor leadership in the Chinese Army. We shall take a closer look at these complaints a little later.

IS GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATIC?

(*Question: Why do some people find it difficult to call China a "democracy?"*)

Since 1912 China has been a republic. We Americans have been told many things about China's heroic struggle for human freedom. But there are certain things that may seem startling or even appalling—things that don't seem to fit into the usual pattern of what we think of as a republic. A one-party form of government, for example, controlled by the Kuomintang (Gwoh-min-dahng) or National People's Party; a president but no popular elections; and governmental control over the press and other institutions that are run as private enterprises in our own country. In other words we find in China that the terms "republic" and "democracy" do not always necessarily mean the same thing. Though China, by abolishing the monarchy, has become a republic, she hasn't yet fully worked out the democratic processes that we think should go with a republican form of government.

ONE-PARTY RULE

The control of the government by a single party, the Kuomintang, is the result of historical circumstances, for it was the Kuomintang that, under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, overthrew the monarchy in 1912. In China the men who created the revolution were a comparatively small group of ardent revolutionaries. They had to struggle against reactionary forces of all kinds. Thus the Kuomintang tends to look upon itself as a very special and select group, better qualified than others to lead China in her new path.

Sun Yat-sen and his followers believed that the introduction of representative government in China could only be done very slowly. Therefore they regarded the revolution as a gradual and continuing process that would include three different stages: The first, that of *military operations*, came to an end in 1929, after the Kuomintang armies, led by Chiang Kai-shek, had reunified China after the disorders that had followed the overthrow of the empire. The second stage that followed, that of *political tutelage*, was a period when China was being prepared, under the leadership of the Kuomintang, for full democratic government. In 1937 it was to have been followed by the third phase, that of full *constitutional government*, when the Kuomintang would give up its one-party rule and hand the government over to the entire Chinese people. But, unfortunately, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the same year made this last step impossible. Thus China still remains in the stage of political tutelage, and is still under the government of the Kuomintang.

During the last 100 years China has been politically weak—so weak that it has sometimes been referred to as "a loose sheet of sand." During the last 20 years the Kuomintang has done very much to change this situation, but in the process it has inevitably been led to the use of forceful and sometimes even repressive measures. Since 1937, too, its centralized control has been considerably increased. Whether China can make a smooth transition to constitutionalism at the end of the War, or whether reactionary forces win out is a question of vital importance.

ROLE OF THE "COMMUNISTS"

(Question: What is the difficulty between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists?")

One of the most serious bars against the realization of full representative government in China is the continuing tension between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists." When we speak of the Chinese "Communists," we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "communist." In the first place, unlike communists of the orthodox type, they

believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of China's farmers, many of whom own but little land themselves, and rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese "Communists" are not, like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of the Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of North China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against the Japanese.

The present situation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists" has a long and complex history behind it. The Chinese Communist Party got its real start when certain Soviet advisers were sent by the USSR to China in the early 1920's to help the Kuomintang in its work of uniting the country.

In 1927, shortly before this unification was completed, a split developed between the Kuomintang and "Communist" groups, and in the years following this split led to serious civil war, in the course of which the Kuomintang armies finally drove the "Communists" into the northwest part of China. Their capital is at Yenan (Yen-ahn) in Shensi (Shen-see) province.

But late in 1936, when the threat from Japan was growing, the feeling became general that this costly internal conflict must end. This resulted in the creation of an armed truce.

During the first years of the War this truce operated very well. But as the years passed by, and China became almost completely isolated from the outside world with resulting inflation and economic suffering of incredible proportions, the old tensions and mutual suspicions reappeared. The "Communists" accused the Kuomintang of failing to send them necessary military supplies and withholding the cooperation needed for the common struggle against Japan. The Kuomintang, on the other hand, accused the "Communists" of failing to obey the orders of the Central (Kuomintang) Government, and of wanting to set up an independent state for themselves in the northwest.

The situation is so complex and has such an involved history, that it is very difficult for any outsider to say definitely who is right and who is wrong. Probably some degree of right and wrong attaches to both sides. The "Communists" say that they are trying to carry out certain economic and political reforms that the Kuomintang has up till now been unable or unwilling to make. Some American and other observers who have visited the "Communists" agree that their program is a moderate one, and that the things they have been doing in their areas are quite in accord with what we think of as a liberal democracy.

In the early autumn of 1944, Chinese press censorship was temporarily relaxed and American correspondents in China were able to give us a clearer picture of the Chinese situation in general, a situation which came as somewhat of a shock to the American public.

NEED UNDERSTANDING AND HELP

We Americans are accustomed to newspapers which freely express their views. We have a long heritage of political freedom. We have fought for the rights of trial by jury, habeas corpus, and freedom of speech. With us the idea of a secret police run by a government is so obnoxious that no government would dare try it. But we sometimes forget that part of the reason that we have and keep these liberties is that we also have enough to eat, and a certain security in our lives which is unknown in the Orient. The years of war against Japan, the terrible malnutrition of the people and the internal conflicts have produced, in China, conditions which require both economic and political improvement. We, on our part, must try to understand China's problems and help her in solving them. All who know this patient people, cheerful under unbelievable hardships, believe they have a chance of coming through.

Recently there have been indications that internal affairs in China have been improving. Negotiations and talks between Chungking and Yenan have been continuing over the past nine months, with General Chou En-lai as the chief representative of the "Communists." Dr. T. V. Soong, whose attitude toward the "Communists" is considered moderate, has been made premier of the Central Government. Early in December 1944, the Generalissimo withdrew large numbers of troops from the armies that had been blockading the "Communists" for six years and rushed them south to Kweichow (Gway-joh) province where they have helped to repulse the Japanese. In March, Chiang announced a National Assembly to convene on 12 November 1945, to draw up a constitution. All par-

ties, including the "Communists," are to be invited and all are to have equal status.

OUR BASIC CONCERN

(*Question: How would you summarize the essential problem of China?*)

In brief, our basic concern with China's problems is related to the winning of the War and the peace that will follow. China needs supplies—China needs well-trained and well-equipped troops—but perhaps most of all China needs internal unity.

The issue in China is not so much the tension that exists between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese "Communists" as it is between those elements within each camp who place their personal prestige, ideas, and ambitions ahead of winning of the War. A strong, democratic, and united China will hasten the end of the war in the Pacific and make it possible for China to assume her important role in the Far East and among the United Nations.

Who's Who in the Chinese Situation

CHENNAULT, MAJOR GENERAL CLAIRE L., commanded the famous "Flying Tiger" volunteer force of American airmen who fought for China before the United States entered the War. He now commands the U. S. 14th Air Force operating against the Japanese from bases in China.

CHIANG-KAI-SHEK is China's Generalissimo and Head of State. A follower of Sun Yat-sen, he became the most powerful leader in the country after Sun's death.

CHOU EN-LAI, CHU TEH, and MAO TSE-TUNG are leading Chinese Communist figures. Chiang fought them before the War and drove their forces into northern China, but they later united with him in resisting the Japanese. Chou En-lai has been one of the principal negotiators with Nationalist representatives in trying to settle the differences between the two groups.

SOONG is the most important family name in modern China. T. V. Soong, one of the country's foremost financiers, was appointed Foreign Minister soon after Pearl Harbor. He succeeded H. H. Kung as acting President of the Executive Yuan recently. His three sisters all married leading Chinese figures. One is the widow of Sun Yat-sen, one is the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, and one is the wife of H. H. Kung.

SUN YAT-SEN, who died in 1925, was the great leader of modern China, and has been called "China's George Washington." His "Three Principles of the People"—nationalism, democracy, and livelihood—are the great guiding lights of the nation, to which most of its leaders subscribe in theory while sometimes quarreling about methods of achievement.

WEDEMEYER, LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALBERT C., was placed in command of U. S. Army Forces in China when the CBI theater was divided after General Stilwell's recall. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan was given the India-Burma part of the command.

AIDS FOR DISCUSSION LEADERS

Following are some special guides for AAF, AGF, ASF, and Officer Group discussion leaders, also supplementary material for the background information of all group leaders. Importance of this material precludes printing this week of the usual Outline for Discussion.

SPECIAL GUIDES

Army Air Forces

Two phases of the Chinese situation will probably be of particular interest to Air Forces personnel: (a) the record made by the Air Transport Command in flying supplies across the Himalaya (Him-AHL-ah-yah) Mountains while the Burma Road was closed; (b) the activities of our combat airmen in China. Here are a few basic facts on each operation:

(*a*) "*Flying the Hump.*"—After the Burma Road was closed by the Japanese in April 1942, the only way to supply China from India was by air. This involved flying cargo planes from fields in northeastern India over mountains as much as three miles high. At first the totals were small, but more planes, more

fields, and improved methods boosted the record. A War Department report in October 1944 stated that 23,000 tons were flown over the "Hump" in one recent unnamed month, adding: "Air freight from India to China long ago started flowing in greater volume than ever went via the Burma Road." This was more than twice the tonnage for December 1943. In January of this year, General Stilwell said that 35,000 tons a month were now being flown in. The supplies carried included gasoline, munitions, trucks, and jeeps.

One writer, discussing the old Burma Road, which supplied 20,000 tons a month, said: "Such a supply line could hardly maintain a single American Armored division in combat." It must be remembered, too, that supplies brought in had to be divided between General Stilwell's Chinese troops and General Chennault's air force. Also, part of the cargo had to be high octane gasoline for the Air Transport Command itself.

(*b*) *Combat air forces in China.*—The "Flying Tigers," the American Volunteer Group, had been fighting the Japanese for about five months before Pearl Harbor was attacked. Out of this organization ultimately grew the U. S. 14th Air Force. Starting almost entirely with fighter planes, this force eventually added medium and heavy bombers. It has not only fought for the defense of China; it has aided our Pacific operations, having destroyed about 275,000 tons of Japanese shipping off the China coast in a single year's time. Chinese pilots trained by Americans made up part of the personnel.

The story of this air force has emphasized again the importance of air-ground coordination. The force has worked closely to support Chinese ground troops, but the fact that China and the Allies have not been able to equip ground forces on a sufficient scale has resulted in the enemy driving us out of many forward air bases simply by ground action. This is well worth pointing out to Air Forces personnel—that final victory against the Japanese in China can only come through combined action.

Army Ground Forces

Many Ground Forces discussion leaders may want to emphasize particularly the point that the United Nations may ultimately engage the main body of the Japanese army in China. One question is most likely to be raised in this connection: If the Japanese do fight on in China, will large numbers of American troops be sent there?

Any attempt to answer this question would be speculative, of course, but it is possible to point out the factors that will be involved.

One factor would be the scale of Japanese resistance in China. China's Chief of Staff estimated in February that the Japanese have assigned up to 50 divisions—two-fifths of their army on the Chinese mainland—to prevent an American landing on the coast.

Another factor would be the extent to which China's military effort can be built up. China recently announced that 500,000 new men would be drafted by the end of March "to meet the demand for the all-out Chinese counter-offensive in conjunction with the coming landing of American forces on the China coast." The big need, however, will still be proper training and equipment for Chinese armies.

One other question of particular Ground Forces interest may rise: Would troops in China encounter a new set of conditions there?

In general, China's likely battle areas are not unusual fighting terrain. The country lies roughly in the same latitudes as the United States, with about the same range of climates. The outstanding terrain difficulties are mountain gorges in some sections and rivers which cause great floods from time to time. The enemy troops encountered are likely to be tough. China has been a great practical training ground for the Japanese, and many Japanese soldiers there have had years of experience in combat under the conditions our forces would meet there.

Army Service Forces

Emphasis upon supply in inevitable in any discussion of the Chinese war situation. For Service Forces groups, discussion leaders will have the opportunity to show in this particular theater more clearly than in most others just how vital supply activities are in relation to combat success. To an unprecedented degree, China's difficulties have been the result, not of lack of manpower, but of lack of the means to equip the millions of soldiers in its armies. It has necessarily been our task—a slow and painful one—to attack that problem.

The building of the Stilwell Road was an example of cooperative effort by ground and service troops. Some of the difficulties involved were described by Secretary of War Stimson in his press conference of 2 February 1945:

"The construction of the Ledo Road was a great engineering as well as military achievement. Part of the Ledo Road was built at a time when enemy attack and harassing raids were an ever-present possibility. Terrific rains, bottomless mud, mountains, jungles, and malaria had to be overcome. Much of the job was done working around the clock 24 hours a day using flood lights at night. During the last monsoon period a two-mile wooden causeway had to be built for maintenance purposes across a stretch of flooded jungle land inundated with four to six feet of water. This causeway, comprised of one million board feet of lumber, was cut by two G. I. lumber mills in the Hukawng Valley. Altogether 487 miles of road had to be built or improved from India to the China border. It is permanent all-weather supply highway."

The road was started in December 1942, so that it took slightly over two years to complete. Though it is a two-way highway for most of its length, in some places it had to be hacked along the sides of 4,000-foot mountains and is scarcely more than a jeep-track. To build each mile of the road, engineers moved an average of 750,000 tons of rock and earth and laid 1,000 feet of culvert. In many cases they worked after dark by the light of oil flares.

In Burma, the troops faced malaria, dysentery, and leeches, in addition to the ever-present mountains and jungles. There was also the monsoon season, beginning in May and lasting four or five months; during that period, the rainfall may be as high as 50 inches a month.

As is the case of "flying the Hump" (see Army Air Forces section), this road will not be a complete answer to China's supply problem. But as long as the Chinese knew that their allies were bending every effort to complete it, they had evidence of our good faith and the hope that ultimately more vital equipment would be on the way. They knew, too, that while the road was being built, trucks and stockpiles were being accumulated at its far end to be rushed to them as soon as possible.

The Chinese have had so little equipment to work with that a little more can mean a great deal to them. Service Forces troops will understand, for instance, how important a few trucks are to the Chinese Army when they are told that when the Burma Road was closed, it was estimated that there were perhaps 15,000 trucks operating on China's roads. Two years later, there were perhaps one-third that number which could operate regularly.

The vehicles in the first convoys coming in over the Stilwell Road will be left in China to ease this shortage. Drivers can be flown back over the Himalayas on return trips of the Air Transport Command.

Answers to the question—Will we need many supply troops in China?—are partly contained in the above information. It is clear that the scale on which Japanese troops fight in that theater will be the real determining factor. If there is major combat activity there over a long period, many Service Forces men must be kept busy. Some will be in port areas in India and Burma or at supply dumps at one end or the other of the Stilwell Road. Others will be driving vehicles. Still others will be doing service and supply jobs in China. If we make landings on the China coast, large numbers of service troops would inevitably be involved. The importance of China in the Far Eastern picture, at any rate, advances the possibility that Service Forces men of all branches face the possibility of serving in or near that country.

Officer Discussions

Where separate officer discussion groups are held, there is an excellent opportunity to drive home a point in which understanding by leaders is very important: the whole subject of relations between Americans and Chinese as individuals. It is vital to emphasize:

1. That the Chinese have fought the Japanese with very little outside help, have suffered more than 5 million casualties, and have lost most of the best industrial facilities of their country.

2. That in spite of this, they still fight on, and that they have earned the right to our respect as good allies.

3. That although their standard of living is very low by comparison with ours, they are working for a better life, and that the ways in which they are like us are more important than any superficial differences between Chinese and Americans.

4. That the Chinese are a living proof of the falsehood of the Japanese claim that this is "a white man's war."

5. That American soldiers in China by their actions and attitudes are contributing to the picture that the Chinese people form of all of us and of our country. Behavior based on mistaken notions that the Chinese are "inferior" not only betrays a lack of familiarity with the ordeals China has been through; it can also do incalculable harm during the War and in the peace that follows.

A Few Interesting Facts On China's Industrial Progress

China's first railroad, a line ten miles long between Shanghai and Woosung, was built in 1876. Shortly afterward it was completely torn up, owing to the superstitious fears of people living along the right of way, who believed it brought bad luck. But at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Chinese owned over 7,500 miles of railroad, exclusive of over 3,700 miles in Manchuria lost to the Japanese in 1931.

China's first motor highway was built in 1912. By 1937 there were about 70,000 miles, of which 15,500 were surfaced.

In 1912 there were almost no modern factories. But by 1937 there were 3,849, among them many cotton textile mills, having a total of over five million spindles.

In Free China, the region that before 1937 was the most backward part of China, this progress has been continued since 1937, despite overwhelming difficulties. In some fields it has even been speeded up. Here is part of what has happened:

Railways: About 800 miles built up to December 1942.

Highways: About 3,720 miles built up to the summer of 1942, and 3,350 miles under construction or surveyed.

Coal production has been increased in Free China by 59 percent; iron by over 150 percent; oil by 1,194 percent.

Of the 3,489 factories in pre-war China, 452 have been moved to the interior. This involved the transport of over 120,000 tons of machinery and other equipment, much of which had to be taken apart and carried in small pieces for hundreds of miles on the backs of men.

Most of this progress in Free China has been made entirely by Chinese, without help from any outside source. Thus it is evident that the Chinese have both the ability and the determination to carry out the modernization of their country even under the most heartbreaking conditions. After the War it will undoubtedly continue at a much faster rate.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

BASES AND COOPERATION

"Even if we destroy the Japanese fleet, we still couldn't defeat them on the sea. We have to have bases in China to cut off their lines to Manchuria. * * * I still feel that Japan will be defeated from bases in China."

—*Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, August 1944.*

"Following on the heels of the Cabinet reorganization, and closely related to it, came important changes in the Chinese system of military supply and far closer cooperation between the Chinese and American high commands. * * *

"There is more likelihood that moderate elements in the Kuomintang will continue to gain power, adding to the chances of genuine cooperation between the National Government and the Communists. * * * Such cooperation, if attainable, will be of historical importance both in speeding the progress of the war and in strengthening the bases of the peace."

—*Donald M. Nelson, in a special report to the President, early this year.*

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

Aside from its internal political problems, China's big problem has been supply After Japan closed China's seaports and captured its best industrial areas in the early years of the War, both military and civilian demands grew harder to meet. Whole manufacturing plants were transported piece by piece and set up in the interior, but lack of modern methods and machinery has made the supply job tremendously difficult. Now, however, efforts we have made to aid the country are beginning to show results.

Even since April 1942, when the Japanese closed the Burma Road, China has been almost entirely cut off from outside help except for supplies—at present,

perhaps 35,000 tons monthly—being flown in over the Himalayas. In January the Japanese were finally driven from northern Burma so that engineers could complete a new road from Ledo through Myitkyina (MYIT-chi-nah) connecting with the old Burma Road near the Chinese border. The first convoys, carrying ammunition, ambulances, and medium and light artillery, have now passed over the route, which Chiang has named after General Stilwell, "in memory of his distinctive contribution and of the signal part which the Allied and Chinese forces under his direction played in the Burma campaign and in the building of the road." The world's longest oil pipeline, roughly paralleling the road, has also been constructed.

In another move to improve the Chinese supply situation, Donald M. Nelson, formerly chairman of our War Production Board, paid two visits to the country, the first in September 1944. As a result of that trip, Chiang agreed to the creation of a Chinese War Production Board. Nelson returned to this country in November for a talk with President Roosevelt, and then went back to China with a small group of production experts. The Americans worked with Chinese officials headed by the Minister of Economics, on a basic law granting wide powers to the new WPB. Arrangements were made for close liaison between it and U. S. Army Ordnance representatives in Chungking. Nelson also left behind him steel and alcohol experts to work with plant managers on output, quality, and cost. By the spring of this year, he estimated, China's total war production will double the November rate.

This program, of course, is mainly aimed at bettering China's war situation. It can be important for the future, too. As the Nelson report puts it: "The success of China's venture in planned war production, if properly followed up through American Government and business channels, will make for closer postwar economic relations between China and the United States. China has the capacity and the desire to develop herself industrially with American aid. If that aid is realistically planned, and if financial arrangements are put on a sound business basis, China should soon after the War begin to replace Japan as the leading industrial nation of the Orient. In that event, a market of enormous size should progressively open up for American export industries."

CHIANG STATES AIMS

"Internally we strive for the realization of local autonomy throughout the country, consolidation of national unity, establishment of government by law and consummation of the democratic rule. Externally we seek to cultivate closer relations with our friendly nations, to win the war against aggression, to collaborate with our allies in establishing permanent world peace after the war, to develop our rich natural resources, and carry out economic reconstruction and to enhance the well-being of mankind through self-exertion as well as internation collaboration."

—*Chiang Kai-shek, on the 32nd Anniversary of the Chinese Republic, 10th October 1943.*

CHINESE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS

"As a whole, Chinese people have incredible fortitude. I have rarely heard a Chinese complain about the miseries of wartime existence. China's remarkable spontaneous sense of humor, which makes it easy for Americans and Chinese to get on together, keeps the Chinese people sane and congenial during a period of bleakness and slowly accumulating disaster.

"These are some of the things for which the Chinese people are to be respected. But for our own self-respect we must be realistic about China's many shortcomings. Some of them are inevitable and cannot be remedied; some of them are due to the incompetence of a government that puts its political security ahead of the War against Japan. * * *"

—*Brooks Atkinson, N. Y. Times*, 21 November 1944.

CHINA AND THE FUTURE

"China's future policies toward Japan, toward Russia, and toward colonial Asia, like China's domestic development within the homeland of the 450,000,000 Chinese, will be of primary concern to all men living in the world today. The abolition of the unequal treaties by America and Britain has already symbolized the end of the hundred years of China's semicolonial subjection. China's part in the final victory will give significance to that symbolic act by Britain and

America; it will mark the beginning of the end of the colonial system as a whole.

"No longer will the destinies of Asia be dictated by imperial powers. Nor, on the other hand, is an Asiatic counter-imperialism to be expected. Japan tried that and failed. The truth is that we no longer live in a world of 'the European question,' 'the Balkan question,' 'the Russian question,' 'the Far Eastern question.' That era is over. Henceforth we live in a world where there are only local aspects of the world question. Whether we make a success of that new world will depend on the interaction of two things: the success or failure that each nation makes of its own affairs, and the success or failure of all nations in dealing with each other as neighbors in a world order."

—*Owen and Eleanor Lattimore in The Making of Modern China.*

(Prepared by Army Orientation Branch, Information and Education Division, ASF [A. G. 353 (16 Jan. 44)].

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter from Mr. Richard Wait, counsel for John K. Fairbank, to Robert Morris, dated April 25, 1952, together with a carbon copy of a letter sent by Robert Morris to Richard Wait dated April 23, 1952, asking that three articles purportedly written by his client be identified for the record.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 1344F" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344F

SH: FW

FAIRBANK WITNESS.

APRIL 23, 1952.

RICHARD WAIT, Esq.,
Choate, Hall and Stewart, 30 State St.,
Boston, Mass.

MY DEAR MR. WAIT: The following three articles, purportedly written by Professor John K. Fairbank, are being introduced into our public record of the hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations:

"The Mechanics of Imperialism in China." (AMERASIA, September 1937, pp. 295–300).

"China's Prospects and U. S. Policy." (FAR EASTERN SURVEY, July 2, 1947, pp. 145–149)

"Communism in China and the New American Approach to Asia." (NEXT STEP IN ASIA, Harvard University Press, 1949, pp. 1–24.)

Would you kindly have professor Fairbank send us a statement confirming the fact that he is the author of these specific writings?

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel.*

John L. Hall, Stuart C. Rand, Charles O. Pengra, Harvey H. Bundy, Claude R. Branch, James Garfield, Charles P. Curtis, Richard C. Curtis, Marcien Jenckes, Robert Proctor, Richard Wait, Simon P. Townsend, Brooks Potter, Samuel L. Gwin, Bailey Aldrich, Franklin Dexter, John M. Hall, Charles H. Stockton, Raymond W. Ellis, John Dane, Jr., Wm. Arthur Dupee, Jr., Franklin R. Johnson

CHARLES F. CHOATE, JR., 1899–1927. RALPH A. STEWART, 1904–1926

CHOATE, HALL & STEWART

30 STATE STREET

Telephone CApitol 7–5020

BOSTON 9, MASS., *April 25, 1952.*

ROBERT MORRIS, Esquire,
Special Counsel, United States Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Senate Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: I have your letter of April 23. My client, John K. Fairbank, confirms that he was the author of the three articles listed in your letter. You will recall that pages 13 and 14 of the digest of his writings touching upon communism, which was an exhibit to his statement submitted to the

Committee, contains excerpts from the article "Next Step in Asia" which is the third article referred to in your letter.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD WAIT.

RW : KV.

FAR EASTERN SURVEY

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

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Trends in China toward collectivism work against American efforts to foster a capitalist-American way of life in that country.

CHINA'S PROSPECTS AND U. S. POLICY

(By JOHN K. FAIRBANK)[1]

The American fear of communism, if we yield to it blindly, may inspire us to aggressive anti-communist policies in China of the most disastrous sort. Our defense against totalitarianism will be ineffective if it is blindly fearful, and we must therefor try to assess clearly the Chinese political tradition and China's trend toward some form of collectivism. What kind of Chinese state must we be prepared to get along with in the future?

I assume that, as an alternative to understanding Asia's long-term prospects, we may embark on an emotional program of aid to anti-communist regimes which attempt to suppress popular movements in areas like Indonesia, Indochina, the Philippines, or China, in the belief that such aid will somehow defend American democracy. Far from helping us, such a program would be likely to help communist leadership of those popular movements become firmly established, since communists would be able to champion the people's cause and focus anti-foreign and anti-imperialist sentiment against the United States. Thus, after setting out to fight communism in Asia, the American people would be obliged in the end to fight the peoples of Asia, in the effort to make them develop liberal political and economic institutions which are outside their tradition and beyond their means.

This is the danger we face if we try to defend ourselves in Asia blindly and without regard for Asiatic tradition and institutions. *Aggressive anti-communism in Asia could easily reinforce a trend toward anti-communist authoritarianism at home. Such a trend will come only if we let our fear of communist totalitarianism stampede us into acquiescence in an American type of fascism, and this may seem unlikely.* But we must recognize that corruption of our democratic process may begin overseas, and that if we set ourselves to stamp out popular movements in Asia, we can only undermine, rather than fortify, American-style democracy at home. If we take China as the decisive theater, what political institutions are the Chinese people themselves now tending toward?

MAIN LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

In China's political reformation we can expect three main lines of development, in the economic, political, and cultural spheres, respectively. They add up to a new Chinese-style collectivism.

In the economic sphere the main determinant of China's future will be population increase, made possible by the continuation of the general process of industrialization and modernization, particularly in public health and medicine and in production and transportation of food. These developments will lower the infant mortality rate, increase the number of baby girls that grow up to produce children, and so raise that proportion of the population which is in the child-bearing age-group. The population increase after several decades will level off with an increase of possibly twenty percent or even more, at any rate an enormous net increase.

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[1] Dr. Fairbank is Associate Professor of History and Associate Chairman, China Program, Committee on International and Regional Studies at Harvard University. His most recent periods in China were with the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information.

KEY FACTOR FOOD SUPPLY

The key factor in this process will be the increase of food supply. Lack of food in China, as in India, appears to be the chief factor which has been deterring population growth. That is, the demographic picture is Malthusian. Food supply is likely to be increased, first, through government stimulation and organization of increased production. The current example is the Chinese Communists' production drives, which work through communist-led farmers' bodies and use political means to encourage farmer cooperation and initiative. Anti-communist campaigns oblige communist areas further to encourage this local production. Second, food supply will also be increased by scientific and technical improvements--plant- and stock-breeding and improved farm management and crop diversification--such as those developed particularly by agencies under the National Government, and also by Japanese during the occupation of North China. American technical aid, through official State Department channels or through academic and missionary channels as at the University of Nanking, should continue to help in this scientific aspect of rural reconstruction. The chief need is for a closer coordination of mass political organization and technological know-how. The present separation of political mass organization (as in the Communist areas) and imported technology (as in the Kuomintang areas) is disastrous for China. The key to agrarian reform lies in getting the Chinese farmer, by political means, to act differently in the economic sphere.

The same coordination of politics and technology is possible and may be expected sooner or later in the field of public health. Over a decade ago the Ting Hsien experiment, for example, made it plain that in traditional circumstances rural China can be remade efficiently only by combining technological improvements with political support of such improvements. The reason is that any program of change in the countryside, to be effective, must be on a mass scale. Anything on a mass scale in traditional China had to be under government purview, just as in the new China mass activity may also be under government inspiration.

Improvements in food supply and public health are only two of the factors in population increase, others being improved transportation channels, rural farm credit facilities, industrial production of cheap consumer goods in factory cities, increased foreign trade, and the like.

In the slowing down and leveling off of the population increase in China the key factor will be the general rise of the standard of living among the broad mass of the people. Industrialization, generally speaking, means both an increase of population and a rise of the standard of living, but the latter lags behind the former. Increased production of food in China, so to speak, will be used first as a basis for increased survival of people, after which the increase of material goods gradually will be used less for increasing the quantity of people and more for improving their quality of living. The slowly rising standard of living may be expected to cut down the birth rate, through the operation of many factors--not merely contraception but also a later age of marriage, some decline of fertility, and the like.

SOCIAL WELFARE OR MONOPOLY

The crucial question is, will the standard of living in China rise soon enough and cut down the birth rate fast enough to permit the Chinese people individually to enjoy the fruits of industrialization? Or will industrialization and its attendant population increase merely multiply the present coolie poverty and mass misery? Will China use modern technology to support a greater volume of human life or a better quality of life? The outcome depends on whether or not the fruits of modern technology and production can be spread rapidly and broadly among the mass of the people. This rise in living standards in turn depends on whether the political and economic system aims at social welfare rather than upper class interest or monopoly.

In this context *Chiang Kai-shek's archaic Confucian ideas, as expressed in China's Destiny, do not seem as hopeful as the ideas expressed by Chinese Communist leaders. Since the raising of mass living standards is the particular stock in trade of the Chinese Communists rather than of the anti-communists, American support of anti-communist regimes in China will be likely therefore to exacerbate the Chinese population problem.* In general, we must be prepared for a trend toward political organization of the economy adequate to sustain a larger population but inadequate to raise its standard of living rapidly.

This key importance of government-for-social-welfare rather than for upper-class interest brings us from the economic to the political sphere, in which we must expect the growth in China of an authoritarian state system at variance

with traditional American ideals of individual freedom, particularly the ideal of economic free enterprise which now forms the ideological basis for our large-scale capitalism. This growth of authoritarianism has a solid basis in China's history and institutions.

There is for example the Chinese tradition of the unity of the empire, one sun in heaven and one ruler in the world, or as Kuomintang slogans put it, "one nation, one party, one leader." This deeply ingrained feeling that the whole of China must have one single top authority stands in the way of movements for federation of autonomous areas and reinforces extremist opponents of coalition government. It lies behind the mutual distrust of the Kuomintang and the Communists who each feel that the other must be aiming at monopoly of the government power. It impedes the growth of a two-party system, since the control of government has traditionally been vested in a single dynastic house, ruling monolithically through a single universal bureaucracy personally loyal to it. Traditionally the opposition to the government has found organized expression only through secret societies which defied the government's monopoly of political organization. All these traditions undoubtedly influence the present scene.

Let us analyze certain elements in this sociopolitical tradition. First, China has had a two-class or bifurcated society. The lower class or stratum has been the illiterate and custom-bound mass of the peasantry. The upper class or stratum has been that small proportion of the Chinese population who have in one way or another had enough leisure to become literate. Language has been used to preserve this class structure. Anyone learning the Chinese written language must be supported for several years by the labor of others. Consequently literacy has been a luxury mainly confined to the land-owning class, from which has been produced the scholar class, to which has been attached, under its wing, the merchant class. *This small literate ruling class of landowners, scholars, officials, and also merchants has been the bearers of China's culture and has had every reason to hang together in support of a bureaucratic authoritarian government.*

TRADITIONS OF TWO-CLASS SOCIETY

In the second place, the two-class society of China has naturally had a tradition of government as the responsibility of the bureaucracy, not of the people. To be sure, Confucius, Mencius, and others developed the idea that the ruler and his officials would be well advised to rule in the interests of the mass of the people. in order to retain their tacit acquiescence in the continuation of the regime, that is, the Mandate of Heaven. But this was rule for the people, not by the people.

This idea is now echoed in the present-day doctrine of party dictatorship and political tutelage. The Kuomintang, for example, still runs the national government of China on behalf of the Chinese people, who are considered to have surrendered their voice to it. The Chinese Communists have a similar party structure topped by a Party Congress and a Central Executive Committee, which is like the Kuomintang in form.

ROLE OF SCHOLAR

Third, modern China has inherited the tradition that the scholar class is the reservoir from which the officials of the bureaucracy are chosen, but that the scholar when out of office has no particular responsibility concerning public affairs. It is true that the memorials of courageous scholars were one chief expression of public opinion under the empire, but this was offset by the generally passive attitude of the nonactive members of the scholar-official class, who, as the saying goes, were Confucians when in office and Taoists when out of office. This tendency may be seen among Chinese scholars today, of the type who are inclined to deplore both communist ruthlessness and Kuomintang corruption and keep their skirts clean of both. (They have their counterpart among American liberals, and are similarly impotent and unhappy.) This irresponsibility of the liberal in China accounts for the relatively small number of technically trained personnel who have moved to join mass movements in the countryside.

Fourth, it has taken a long time for the Chinese intellectuals to begin to overstep the ancient class boundary and provide leadership for the modern mass revolution. The great Taiping Rebellion of the period 1851–64 was a peasant movement but it failed to enlist the leadership of the Confucian scholar class. The scholars were active in the Reform Movement of 1898 but failed to organize any sort of mass support. Even Sun Yat-sen in organizing the revolution of 1911, while he used the secret societies, failed to extend his organization into the

masses of the cities or the countryside. The Kuomintang did not finally achieve national leadership in the revolution of 1925–27 until it used Soviet tactics of mass organization.

In the long course of the Chinese revolutionary process, one great stumbling block has been this inability of the scholar and the coolie to get together and work together. This tends to leave the bureaucrat today in a strategic position between the two. As long as the official stratum of political organizers, military officers, and civil bureaucrats can replenish its ranks from a relatively small literate educated class, it can continue to dominate the illiterate agricultural masses. It is essential to the Kuomintang, for instance, that it continue to screen all candidates for technical training abroad and try to absorb them into government institutions on their return. By controlling the sluice gates of western technology, the ruling class in modern China is able to absorb the scholar back into itself and so perpetuate the two-class type of society. This two-class system necessarily implies authoritarian government of the lower farmer class by the upper official class.

In this respect the Chinese Communists are truly secular and not merely cyclical revolutionists in their effort to draw an official class directly from the peasantry. China's chief hope is to stimulate and permit the peasant to participate in politics and find representation, preferably in our democratic forms, and at least through the bureaucracy of a social-welfare government. If the Communists cannot quickly wipe out the ancient class barrier of illiteracy and shatter the old two-class system, their administration will more easily succumb to the traditional evils inherent in bureaucracy.

GOVERNMENT FROM THE TOP

The continuing tendency toward government from the top down, by a ruling bureaucracy which monopolizes the higher learning and technology as well as control of public utilities and large-scale enterprises of all kinds, is best seen among the conservative ranks of the Kuomintang as the party entrenched in power. *Kuomintang authoritarianism is buttressed by the use of the ancient Confucian virtue-ethic exemplified in Chiang Kai-shek's book;* also by the slogan of the Confucian reformers of the late nineteenth century—"Chinese learning for the fundamental structure and Western learning for practical use"—in other words, traditional Chinese values, like the two-class society, can be preserved, while modern technology is used in the service of such values. The prostitution of Western science in the service of outworn oriental despotism is nothing new in Asia. Continued American assistance in this prostitution, as in military missions, would not be new either.

If we lift our eyes from the Kuomintang, however, we find still a considerable prospect of authoritarian government under the Chinese Communists. Quite aside from the controversial question how far the Russian example might be followed in China, we must face the exigencies of the Chinese situation in itself. Supposing that the Chinese Communists avoid both the evils inherent in the Confucian political tradition, and also the political evils developed under the communist dictatorship in Russia, they will still be subject to two very powerful factors in China making for autocratic centralized control from the top down. One of these factors is the urgency of China's problems. So much must be done in so short a time, if any government is to avoid disaster. This urge toward police rule will be the greater among the Chinese Communists in proportion as they take responsibility for the government of urban areas and areas in which they have not had sufficient time to build up indoctrinated mass organizations, responsive to propaganda rather than to police control.

NEEDS AND RESOURCES

The second factor calling for central control, no matter what party or parties eventually unify China, will be the size of China's needs in proportion to her resources. Raw materials, capital resources, and trained personnel are all so scarce that only an autocratic top authority can undertake great tasks of reconstruction, can make great investments, and can organize great projects.

American policy will also influence this trend. *The Chinese Communists rely heavily on mass support, which cannot be entirely manipulated, and their declared policy is to proceed toward socialism through an inevitable intermediate stage of bourgeois-democratic small-scale capitalism, by which they hope to build up the productive powers of their society, and to develop democratic institutions.*

But it is doubtful if the Chinese Communists will be allowed favorable circumstances in which they can follow out this gradual program.

On the contrary, American efforts to save China from totalitarian communism, by increasing the material obstacles in the way of the Chinese revolutionary movement, are likely to oblige the revolution to follow more ruthless, dictatorial, and totalitarian leadership than would otherwise be the case. For example, American acquiescence in the legally recognized Chinese government's blockade of the communist areas has already increased the doctrinaire ignorance and lack of technology which are the Communists' weakest points. American support of the anti-communist military effort, for another example, permits the unmilitary Chinese liberal movement to be liquidated, and the leadership both of liberalism and of communism to become concentrated in military communism. The attempt to suppress social change by the sword ensures that social change will come only by the sword. Liquidation of die-hards, secret police surveillance, an iron curtain against foreign influence, all may develop to preserve the gains of the communist revolution.

The pernicious results of our intervention policy are already apparent. American support of Kuomintang authoritarianism now allows the Kuomintang to destroy Chinese liberalism in its area. Consequently the extremist totalitarian elements among the Chinese Communists have less need to compete with the Kuomintang in order to win the support of Chinese liberals. They more easily inherit the liberal cause as a poor ally of the communist cause. By backing one extreme and supporting Chinese fascism we shall soon wipe out independent Chinese liberalism.

In the long run we may expect Chinese individualism and humanism, which are so ubiquitous in the conduct of personal relations in Chinese society, to reassert themselves in politics. But the fundamental fact is that in the poor countries of agrarian Asia food comes before civil liberties. The American type of political freedom, being as yet unknown there, will not be demanded until the standard of living has risen considerably. Thus the economic trend toward a greater population, at a low living standard, and the political trend toward an authoritarian government dominating the vast peasant mass through bureaucratic controls will reinforce each other. *We must recognize that Asia is ready to modernize through mass organization rather than follow the nineteenth century example of the United States and modernize through individual enterprise.*

This *un-American type of political and economic development*, which may be called forth in part by American stupidity, is likely to be further reinforced by Chinese cultural trends. In this sphere the main background factor is the ancient tradition of Chinese cultural superiority to the barbarians roundabout. As a culture island in East Asia, the early Chinese developed, instead of nationalism, a sort of culturism, judging the foreigner by his conformity or nonconformity to the Confucian way of life. In time of invasion and alien domination the Chinese scholar class took refuge in the demonstrable superiority of the art, literature, philosophy, and customs of Chinese life. This has formed the basis for a national pride which, as the world shrinks, can increasingly be used to nourish xenophobia, nationalism, and chauvinism, contempt for the foreigner, and aggressiveness, when circumstances allow, in foreign relations,

DEMOCRATIZATION OF CLASSICAL TRADITION

One factor which may facilitate this modern superpatriotism is the democratization of the Chinese classical tradition. The spread of literacy to the masses, presumably through some form of phonetic script, cannot be delayed forever. Like the spread of political organization and political consciousness which accompanies it, the spread of literacy and enlightenment is a constant possibility in the Chinese countryside today and offers to those who spread it the opportunity to assume the leadership of the awakened masses and thereby gain great power and accomplish great changes. It is this potentiality of mass awakening which gives the Chinese revolutionist a long-term advantage which is not possessed by the die-hard conservative.

USE OF EDUCATING MEDIA

Within the context of authoritarian government, this means that the media of mass enlightenment which accompany industrialization—radio, press, publishing, schools, and screen—can be used for the political purposes of a ruling

bureaucracy. Techniques of thought control and of propaganda are to be expected and are already being used by poth parties as far as present circumstances allow. The diffusion of a highly selfconscious interpretation of Chinese history and cultural traditions among the vest ocean of the common people can contribute to a new and vital popular culture, such as the new folk drama and simple pictorial art of North China, or the modern theater of the cities. All this cultural development can be stimulated, guided, and used to support a new order of society. The point to note is that the new mass culture is developing pari passu with mass political organization and controls, not ahead of them as happened in Western countries.

Finally we must not forget the distinction between the fascist-conservative and the communist-progressive forms of totalitarianism. Whatever may be the case elsewhere, there is no doubt whatever that the Chinese communist movement, as the party out of power, is strongly motivated to show a broad concern for the masses of the people, since it is from mass support that it derives its strength. This cannot be said of the Kuomintang regime in power, as now constituted. Since the long future belongs to those who prove that they act for the welfare of the Chinese people, *our support of anticommunism in China will be a losing battle as long as the Chinese communist movement retains popular support. This it will be helped to do as long as we attack it and thereby confirm communism as the defender of the Chinese masses.*

In summary, a much larger but still economically poor and insecure population will call for a more efficient but still necessarily authoritarian government, which will reinforce its position through the use of a new and democratized but still essentially Chinese and nationalistic mass culture. Given China's size and poverty, she has no other road to follow. In order not to remain poor, ignorant, individualistic and disorganized she will become less poor, more educated, and collectivized. It follows that efforts to foster in China an illusory, capitalist-American way of life, which China cannot afford, will only delay the process of creating China's new way of life and if persisted in will eventually range China against us.

[Amerasia, September 1937]

The Mechanics of Imperialism in China

(By John K. Fairbank)

Several features of the present Japanese expansion in northeastern Asia are reminiscent of the process by which England opened China to Western trade a century ago. Puppet régimes, smuggling wars, the narcotic trade, opportune "outrages," "insults" and "incidents" are in China an old story. In greater or less degree they were characteristic of the British commercial conquest in the 1840s and '50s just as they are typical of the present Japanese aggression, which is the lineal though brobdingnagian descendant of its British forerunner.

Imperialism in China, like most other importations, soon becomes Chinese. Granted that Japan seeks territorial control where Britain sought only peaceful trade, and that the evil concomitants of the present conquest are intensified many fold by modern improvements in warfare, finance, and propaganda, still there are certain recurrent phenomena which seem to distinguish a foreign invasion in modern China from its counterpart elsewhere. One of these is the fact that the invader can attain his ends only with the help of a certain type of opportunist, the so-called "Chinese traitor" (*han chien*) so roundly denounced in Chinese documents of the last century. Another persistent phenomenon has been the opium trade, with which is allied the business of smuggling dutiable goods past the customs. Also, because of the numerical weakness of the invaders, the maintenance of their prestige has always been a peculiarly important consideration. In these and other respects the early British experience forms a parallel which provides instructive comment on current Nipponese activities.

It took the British four campaigns and many minor skirmishes to effect the opening of China in the years between 1840 and 1860. Their first war led to treaties in 1842–43 which opened to trade five seaports on the southeast coast. But the trade soon outgrew these coastal ports. British merchants clamored for access to the interior, into which the foreign trade was already making its way. The second war and the treaties of 1858–60 completed this seemingly irrestible process, and foreign merchants and missionaries, pro-

tected by gunboats and extraterritoriality, were soon bargaining for the goods and souls of the natives all over the country. Of course, we believe that the result improved China, since it made her more like ourselves. The fact remains that China was opened, without her consent, by a subtle process of temptation and intimidation.

What are the chances of the same thing happening again today, on a vaster scale? To what extent are the circumstances that helped the British likely to help the Japanese?

As in most cases of imperialism, the dynamic element in the British advance was the man on the spot. Her Majesty's Consuls, pen in hand, played then the role which Doihara and his colleagues now bustle through in military trappings. It was the Consuls in the treaty ports whose ambitious minds saw problems crying out for regulation, insults that demanded immediate redress, opportunities ripe for the taking. Moreover Her Majesty's servants had their careers to make, and they were hand-picked for self-reliance and fidelity to the interests of British trade. After the first war, for example, the Government in London was adverse for a time to the acquisition of even an island base in China, such as the merchants had desired for generations. Sir Henry Pottinger, who negotiated the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, finally obtained the cession of Hongkong on his own responsibility, in excess of his instructions. This was typical of British expansion. The men on the spot were often several jumps ahead of their superiors in London. When the dynamic Harry Parkes, who was the Chinese *bête noire*, the Doihara of the period, precipitated the second war in 1856, the first impulse of people in England was to disavow him; and they might have done so had they not been convinced that Britain's honor, meaning at Canton Britain's face, was at stake. Loss of face would entail loss of trade. Again, when Consul Alcock installed foreigners in the Chinese custom house at Shanghai and so laid the foundations of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, the greatest boom the China trade has ever had, his superiors at home washed their hands of the experiment almost at once and two years later actually ordered the whole thing abolished. Not being on the spot even in imagination, at a time when the telegraph to China stopped in Italy and most people traveled to the Orient only to make money or to fight, or perhaps both, the officials of the Foreign Office were seldom interested in expansion in China. It was only under a man with Palmerston's imagination or under the pressure of the commercial associations in England that the Consuls in China were energetically supported.

It goes without saying that the British merchants of the 1850s, like the great financial houses of modern Japan, were actively interested in expansion. Their enthusiasm was that of pioneers. They saw before them virgin territory awaiting exploitation. In many respects the early treaty ports were frontiers, such as Manchuria seems to be today. It is often forgotten that for two hundred years the East India Company had been confined to Canton while its contemporaries, the Massachusetts Bay and Virginia Companies, and their successors had been conquering the American continent. The barriers of an alien civilization had been more formidable than those of nature, and after two centuries of contact the Western merchants in China still lived perched on the rim of a vast hinterland into which they seldom ventured beyond the treaty limits of a day's journey. The missionaries who traveled and even dwelt in the interior in defiance of treaty law (before 1858) were hardy voyageurs, trail breakers for their itinerating descendants.

The treaty port frontier was a place for young men and for money making. In their middle thirties the older residents often went back to Scotland with a fortune. Fortunes were made in buying teas and silks and selling opium, but the idea of hour hundred million Chinese each adding an inch to his cotton shirt-tail was soon conceived and began to haunt the thoughts of Lancashire and the Board of Trade. Vast potentialities for Western manufacturers were seen in the Chinese market. For England, wrote Consul Alcock, "to whom the necessity of commercial expansion is a law of existence and national power . . . China alone remains a virgin soil, with a population numbering probably more than a third of the whole human race, with facilities of trade which no empire of similar extent has ever enjoyed, and with ready formed capabilities of consumption which time can scarcely exhaust." No Japanese paean over Manchuria could exceed the optimism of the early treaty ports. Hongkong was to become "a second Carthage, with a population equal to that of ancient Rome."

And yet the Chinese demand for Western manufactures grew with disappointing slowness. A second war was fought and new ports were opened, but British

goods found few customers. The plain fact was that China was not only conservative but, for all its size, a poor country, as others have since discovered, and what ready capital there was became involved first in the tea and opium trades.

In the opium trade the British had a wonderful solvent for the hard shell of China's exclusiveness. The importation of opium from India had only begun about 1800—opium smoking is a modern vice in China—and until 1858 the trade had to make its own way in the face of Chinese official opposition and British official nonsupport. Actually, of course, the Chinese local authorities of the day generally connived at it, and the British for want of a better solution quietly let Hongkong become the great distributing center for the rest of the China coast. Opium certainly was not forced upon China. It was merely supplied to her, although it must be noted that the opportunity to supply it was got and maintained chiefly through force. The distinction is significant because it indicates the importance, in the trade, of the Chinese opium importer and distributor without whom the drug could never have reached its consumer. This unchronicled class of opportunists, trafficking in their neighbor's weakness, were an essential link in the process of supply, not as lovely to contemplate as the stately British and American opium clippers and undoubtedly more dangerous to China. Through them the drug spread over the interior, where poppy growing was well begun by 1850. With the opium trade went official corruption and demoralization, since the trade was still illegal by Chinese law and yet too lucrative for the average mandarin to ignore. The British officials of the time reasoned simply that if China wanted opium someone would supply it, and British India, which needed the revenue, could do it more regularly and respectably than anyone else. To this argument there was no practical answer so long as the opium receiving-ships had only to wait for the Chinese smuggler to come out and take delivery of what he wanted.

By way of contrast the present situation in North China, where Japan is reputably unable to prevent the pumping of narcotics into the country, seems more iniquitous in proportion as it is more intensive. Now, instead of chests of crude opium it is heroin and similar derivatives, which can kill in months instead of years, and delivery is made not f. o. b. the opium store-ship but direct to the consumer's divan. The poppy fields of Jehol and Manchuria are closer than those of India once were, and the agents of the trade are now reported to be chiefly Koreans, who are protected by Japanese extraterritorial rights, rather than purely Chinese as in the old days.

The early Chinese opium merchants were members of that great class of "Chinese traitors" who dealt with the foreign devil. This is a feature of British expansion in China which has been generally overlooked—the fact that it was conducted in large part by the Cantonese, such as those of Sun Yat-sen's native district, Heung Shan, near Macao. The merchants and boat people of Kwangtung Province had been longest in contact with the bearbarian and had early learned to work with him through the medium of pidgin English. As compradores, linguists, bearers, and body servants, these "brisk and handy natives of the south" were an indispensable element in the foreign penetration. Through them the resident of old Canton had done much of his business. When the first new ports were opened, at Amoy and Foochow in Fukien and Ningpo and Shanghai farther north, the arrival of the Westerner at those places meant the arrival also of his staff of Cantonese servants, tough fellows who spoke a different dialect and often ganged together to prey upon the natives. It is a question whether these compradores and their hangers on, coming from another province, were not more detested than the handful of foreign devils who brought them. They started riots and assaulted the local women, and on at least one or two occasions the local populace rose to massacre them. In such instances they sought the protection of their British employers, until the Consul at Foochow at one time forbade any more Cantonese servants being brought into port. To the people of Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu these Cantonese could not have seemed more alien, and certainly were more to be feared, than the Korean and Formosan adventurers who now carry on their activities under Japanese protection in the North and South, respectively.

Aided and abetted by such fellows, it is small wonder that the foreign merchant of a century ago broke the laws of China and often flouted the objurgations of his Consul. The lawlessness of the Canton River was imitated eslewhere. An export trade in coolies and copper cash and rice, all of them forbidden by Chinese law to leave the country, might be carried in foreign vessels, but it was Chinese crimps and smugglers who supplied the cargo. Evasion of

the customs duties flourished by arrangements between the merchant and the customs collector, neither of whom was averse to "taking it out of the Emperor." Thus the sharpest elements of the Chinese population flocked to the treaty ports, like the ex-hong-merchant of Canton, Samqua (Wu Chin-chang), who rose by purchase to be the leading official at Shanghai in the early 1850s. He prided himself on his knowledge of English, which was actually little better than pidgin, and cultivated the affable American merchants of Russell and Co. in order to learn the weaknesses of the British. In the end his study of English undid him when he allowed his custom house to take promises from the foreign vessels in port that *each* one of them would pay *half* the regular duties if *all* the others paid *full* duties.

If Chinese officials would not coöperate with the barbarian, they could sometimes be used anyway, as when the Governor of Kwangtung, Po Kuei, was captured by the British in 1858 and installed as head of the Provisional Government of Canton with a guard of British bluejackets to keep an eye on him and Harry Parkes to give him orders. For about two years Canton was under a puppet régime, necessitated by the fact that the British had conquered the place but could not rule it. A mixed British and Chinese police force kept order and it was six months before the unfortunate Governor was denounced to the Emperor for having written all his cheering reports at the dictation of his captors. The foreign occupation was described in terms applicable to other times and places; it was reported to Peking that the invaders had built barracks and blockhouses, printed a newspaper, and collected the local taxes. "Every day they measure the streets and make maps. They look upon Kwangtung Province as their own * * * they have ruined the Confucian Temple, seized the Treasury * * * and torn down the houses of the populace." Chinese meeting barbarians in the street were required to take off their hats, and it was forbidden to say the two words "foreign devil" (*fam kuei*). In all this the barbarians were being aided by more than a hundred hired Chinese, who acted as advisers, secretaries and spies.

This example of puppet government at Canton was not carried further because the British were not territorially ambitious, but it illustrates the procedure which Japan has since followed.

Just as the administrative difficulties of an invader are complicated by the size of the Chinese population, so, consciously or unconsciously, his fears are aroused. When to this is added a consciousness of the importance of preserving face, the alien intruder not infrequently becomes pathologically sensitive. It is not surprising that the first foreign residents of the treaty ports—barely a thousand males in 1850 surrounded by millions of Chinese—felt actively on the defensive and rejoiced at the sight of a gunboat. When rebels of a native secret society in 1853 seized the citadel of Amoy and the walled city of Shanghai adjoining the foreign settlements, the British and American merchants had good cause to think of their lives and their warehouses. In such circumstances their prestige was their chief protection. When it was lowered, so were their chances of safety. As in India, "lowering the flag" was a cardinal social sin. In particular no Consul could afford to do it. And so the very thinness of the British spearpoint served to make it sharper.

It was soon found that the Chinese authorities yielded to pressure firmly applied, yielded at least as long as the pressure *was* applied. When three Englishmen, for instance were stoned near Shanghai in 1848, the British Consul ordered his one gunboat to blockade the river when several hundred grain junks with thousands of truculent seamen were about to carry valuable tribute grain to the capital. The blockade, really a gamble, actually worked. The local authorities wanted as always to avoid trouble, the grain fleet could not be delayed, culprits were found and punished, and the Consul became the hero of the treaty ports. Foreign prestige could not always be maintained so easily, however, because in the last analysis it was merely an idea in the minds of the Chinese. At Canton British troops twice routed the defenders of the city but each time withdrew for diplomatic reasons. As a result a third campaign and the final capture of the place were necessary in order to establish British supremacy.

Such a situation breeds incidents. Any successful manifestation of disrespect, or even a good joke if it destroys the oppenent's face, may be an insult—before their second war the British published a Blue Book on "Insults in Chin..."—or as the more quaint Japanese phraseology goes, such actions may demonstrate Chinese "insincerity." Faced with insults or insincerity, as the case may be, the invader cannot stand still. He must either advance and retaliate, or retreat.

And if he retreats at all he might as well go home. Hence the British learned early in the game never to make a threat or a demand which they were not prepared at once to back up with force. Following this policy they were led steadily forward in a vicious spiral. Once they had demanded freedom for Western trade, there seemed to be no alternative but to open the whole of China or abandon the project entirely Of course the steady expansion of trade gave them the impetus to go forward. But if at some point the trade had become stabilized, even then it seems most unlikely that they could have stopped, short of a minister at Peking and the opening of the interior, and still maintained their supremacy. Motives of prestige as well as of gain drove the British irrevocably forward, just as they appear to be driving the Japanese today.

When the British commercial conquest of the mid-nineteenth century, picturesque but relatively mild-mannered, is compared with Japan's present activities, the contrast is enormous. But it may be questioned whether the difference is not one of degree only, rather than of kind. Modern methods are more intensive and the Japanese program is more far-reaching. Instead of the inevitable and beneficent triumph of Free Trade, now we are to be shown the splendor of the Great Asia Principle. The light-draft paddle-wheel gunboat has given way to the bomber, and the artery between North China and the Yangtze is the railway rather than the Grand Canal, which the British blockaded at Chinkiang. But the fact remains that the Japanese cannot gain their objectives as the British gained theirs unless, like the British, they get the cooperation of a certain type of Chinese. Unfortunately the "Chinese traitor" is still to be found, and when Yin Ju-keng, head of the puppet government east of Peiping, proves no longer useful, his secretary perhaps can be promoted in his place. Economic necessity still operates and job seekers have flocked to Manchoukuo just as Chinese merchants swarmed into Hongkong and the Shanghai settlement a century ago. But behind the pressure of population that makes a full rice bowl palatable whatever its provenance, there lies certainly another factor, call it a lack of nationalism or a rational individualism—a quality which in different contexts has been recognized as one of the great Chinese virtues. The experience of many centuries seems to have endowed the realistic Chinese individual with the conviction that he gains very little by dying and that if everyone takes care of himself everyone will be taken care of. It was this sophisticated and really far too civilized atomic point of view which facilitated the humbling of the Manchu dynasty by a few thousand British troops. How far it has been extirpated by the rapid development of nationalist China remains to be seen. In 1840 the British attacked Canton with the aid of a Chinese coolie corps, but now in 1937 Cantonese stevedores are reported to have refused to load Japanese ships.

Judging by the British experience, it is an obvious conclusion that China's present crises will differ from that of 1840–58 insofar as the new forces of nationalism are found to have gained power within the country, power sufficient to repress those atavistic elements willing to give aid and comfort to the enemy.

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Next Step in Asia

John K. Fairbank

COMMUNISM IN CHINA AND THE NEW AMERICAN APPROACH TO ASIA

Our Problem of Understanding.—The danger of a Communist victory in China has been foreseen for a good many years by China specialists both inside and outside the government. Formulation of American policy to forestall such a victory, however, has depended upon conditions in the United States as well as in China.

The first prerequisite when dealing with a revolutionary situation in a foreign land is surely to study and understand it. But the American people have generally lacked either formal education or first-hand experience concerning the Chinese revolution. The second prerequisite, when dealing with 450,000,000 people, is surely to take account of the realities of their immediate situation. But Americans of the postwar period have generally been so aware of the obvious undesirability of Communist revolution in this and other countries of the West that they could not imagine it being welcomed by anyone worth mentioning in China. Thus our China policy became involved in the disastrous duality advocated, for example, in the famous Wedemeyer report; we urged that reform was

the only way to forestall Communism yet at the same time we kept on giving aid to anti-Communists like Chiang who felt they did not have to reform because they were getting our aid. These alternatives were by nature mutually incompatible, but we became involved in trying both at once. This was because our policy makers in the various branches of the government represented a variety of views, while the country as a whole had no one over-all view.

Now at last the past advocates and opponents of American military aid to Chiang Kai-shek are at one in facing the fact of Chinese Communist military ascendency. As indicated in the State Department's eloquent White Paper on China of August 1949, it is time for stock-taking and appraisal, as a basis for new and more effective action, not only in China but in all of Asia. As a sign of the times, it is worth noting that one staunch advocate of military aid against Communism in Asia, General Claire Chennault, has finally acknowledged (in Life for July 11) that areas of anti-Communist resistance "must be sufficiently progressive and enlightened both politically and economically that the people of China and of all Asia can have living proof that democracy can meet their material, political, and spiritual aspirations better than can communism. We must insist that the necessary policies and reforms are carried out to make certain that this will be true." Presumably if this condition is not fulfilled, any resistance program, by Chennault's own argument, would not be effective. There are thus essential political, economic, and spiritual ingredients which must accompany any military program against Asiatic Communism. Lacking these ingredients, a military effort is likely to fail, leaving us in an even worse position than before.

Our situation is even more difficult then General Chennault realizes, because the political, economic, spiritual, and military ingredients with which to oppose Communism are at present inadequate within China and cannot be supplied by us from the outside. This pessimistic judgment is not defeatism but realism, the only basis on which we can build a new policy toward Asia free from dangerous wishful thinking.

Three Realities.—There are three points we must accept if we want to be realistic: first, the Chinese Communists have achieved military domination over the Nationalists and there is no firm evidence of any Nationalist capability to prevent the Communist consolidation of power over the whole of China. Once this Chinese Communist power is established, it is not likely to wither overnight.

Second, the Chinese Communist leaders are genuine Communists, as far as ideas can make them; they are not "mere agrarian reformers," but hope to apply to China many of the methods developed in Soviet Russia.

Third, from the point of view of the Chinese common people, the Chinese Communist regime, judging it in Chinese terms by its record to date, now offers promise of being the best government which China has had in modern times. (Note that this is a relative statement.)

Before we look at the record in China, we must recognize the problem of understanding created for us by these last two points: Chinese Communism is real Communism, but is seems, thus far, to be a relatively good thing for the Chinese masses. It is easy to accept either one of these points, but not both of them together. For instance, there have been some people who have liked to think that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists but merely do-gooders in the countryside—on this basis, Chinese "Communism" might very well be a good thing for the peasant since it seemed to lack the evil aspects of Russian Communism. On the other hand, there have been some observers who assumed that Chinese Communism, being Communism, could not possibly represent anything but evil, even if the peasant was temporarily persuaded into thinking so.

Americans who accepted either one of these positions have heretofore had a way out of our present dilemma: either it wasn't real Communism in China, or else it wasn't a good thing for the masses and they might eventually find it out and turn against it.

The proposition that Chinese Communism is genuine Communism and is also, thus far, a relatively good thing from the point of view of the Chinese common people, is not only more realistic according to the evidence available; it also makes our problem in China many times more difficult than we formerly realized it to be. Compared with the easy denunciations of the extreme right wing, who say, "It is Communism and so to hell with it, let us exterminate it," our predicament is much more serious. We are really up against a movement

which is winning and organizing the support of the Chinese people and yet is fundamentally opposed to our political order.

The key to this paradox lies, of course, in the backwardness of the old Chinese system of government and in the fact that modern China has been going through a social revolution on which the Chinese Communists have capitalized and of which they have taken the leadership. This paradox of Chinese Communism can be understood only in Chinese terms, not in American terms. We have to forget temporarily that we as Americans have no use for Communist and totalitarian methods in this country, and put ourselves in the position of the Chinese peasant.

Chinese Communism as a New Dynasty.—The first thing that strikes one in the Chinese scene is the incredible poverty of the peasant masses, who are so crowded upon the land that their standard of living is as low as any in the world. This poverty is easy to describe in statistical terms but hard to realize—food without meat, shoes without leather, houses without iron, illiteracy and ignorance, disease and famine, an average life expectancy of twenty-five or thirty years, and all of this accepted as a matter of course, forming part of an ancient way of life. The important point which has too often been overlooked is that China's political standard of living cannot rise far above her economic standard of living. To put it another way, the level of politics is held down by the low level of economic life. Depotism thrives on poverty, and since poverty has been an institution in China, so has despotism. The two actually seem to reinforce each other, forming a society entirely different from our own. This can be understood if we look at the Chinese Communists within the context of the Chinese political tradition.

The dynastic political system which developed in China over a period of almost thirty-seven hundred years without serious interruption came to an end only thirty-seven years ago. Behind the Chinese Communists' success thus far may be discerned the traditional features of a new dynasty's rise to power. Not all of the twenty-five dynasties chronicled in the official Chinese histories went through the same life cycle, but in a good many cases the new regime came to power by leading and organizing a peasant rebellion, helping the impoverished countryside to rise against the economic domination of the towns and cities. Redistributing the land or otherwise lessening the peasants' burden, at which Mao Tse-tung has thus far outdone Chiang Kai-shek, has been a common denominator in these rebellions, no matter what their ideology.

Use of the Peasantry.—In the traditional style, the new contestant for the Mandate of Heaven was usually a competitor among other regional war lords, but he won out because he excelled them in his concern for the common people—the lao-pai-hsing of the farming villages. His troops usually treated the people less violently, his area was less disordered and therefore more productive, his conduct more exemplary. "Winning the hearts of the people" (te jen hsin) was an operation that had to be performed in the countryside, not among the city proletariat. The dynastic founder therefore developed his military power on the basis of peasant cooperation, which gave him troops and the food to feed them. Peasant enthusiasm and mass participation in the new regime were not expected; tacit popular acquiescence constituted the Mandate of Heaven. The winner might be helped by his fanatical followiing (sometimes religious and mystical), military ferocity, and organizing ability, and by demoralization of the old regime and the war-weariness of the people. Having come to power to the accompaniment of agrarian reform, the new dynasty had the chance to consolidate its rule by preserving peace and order, levying the land tax efficiently, and maintaining the public works—canals and postroads for transportation, irrigation systems for agriculture, dikes against flood, and granaries against famine. It also kept up the official examinations to provide competent bureaucrats, and the official ritual observances to sustain the imperial prestige. For these public works the regime conscripted China's manpower.

In this Chinese political order there was little room for the political rights of the individual under a legal system. Government was a paternalism guided by the Confucian ethic, which was superior to written law. So long as the people prospered sufficiently not to rebel, the ruler retained Heaven's Mandate. The ruler's despotism was sanctioned by the people's maintaining a livelihood. It is no accident that Chiang Kai-shek, in his book Chinese Economic Theory, in the effort to build a strong modern state should consider it the government's duty "to satisfy the people's wants on the one hand and to restrict them on the other . . . to support the people—the people's livelihood— on the one hand, and to protect the people—national defense—on the other." Each farming

unit, he urges, should be a military unit—production and defense combined on the land.

Against such antediluvian political competition, Communist success in China has been a foregone conclusion. One need not be an Anglo-Saxon democrat to be more democratic than Chiang and the Confucian sages. "Democratic centralism," with its single-candidate "elections", is below the Western European-American political level, but above that of traditional China. As long as the masses are successfully fed and clothed, Chinese Communism can be despotic in our view and remain "democratic" in the eyes of the lao-pai-hsing. This is hard for us to remember, but important. When the Chinese Communists ask the peasant villager to participate in political meetings they are breaking the precedent of centuries, even though they are not catching up with the Anglo-Saxon practice. In Chinese terms, the Communist-organized village councils and elections are more "democratic" than anything in the past. We can understand the success of Communist "democracy" in China only by comparing it with China's past, not with our own.

Heaven's Mandate.—China's political tradition may also help us to understand the amazing speed of the Communist success during the past year. In Chinese terms, the Mandate of Heaven has passed from the Nationalists to the Communists, which means that the Communists are acknowledged to be the winners of power, much as an American presidential candidate is acknowledged to be the winner on the day after an election. By long training in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, Americans will unanimously acknowledge an election winner, even though an actual majority of the American voters may have voted against him. We abide by the rules of the game and proceed with our government. By an even longer training in the Chinese tradition, the Chinese public assume that one of the contestants in any civil war will emerge as the ruler of all China. When one contestant has demonstrated that he is superior in getting the peasant masses to fight for him and feed his army, any traditional Chinese observer knows that he has "won the hearts of the people" and so won the entire country. Resistance thenceforth is useless, and everyone, including the defeated army, proceeds to join the bandwagon.

Use of the Literati.—After its military rise to power, each new dynasty has faced the problem of organizing civil government to collect the surplus product from the land in taxes and maintain the public works. For this purpose the dynastic founder, once he had conquered by the sword, had to woo the scholar class. The great Manchu rulers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made themselves Confucian scholars and patrons of the literati. The Taiping rebels of the mid-ninteenth century failed to found a new dynasty because their strange psuedo-Christianity was too fanatically anti-Confucian to win over the Confucian scholar class. The Communists today have been making a great play for the support of modern intellectuals and trained professional personnel, who are almost too scarce in China to provide effective administration even if they all cooperate. Communist efforts to enlist the collaboration of these non-Communist groups illustrate the perennial need of victorious organizers of the peasant masses to get the help of the literate few after the fighting stops.

Among the student class in Communist China today there is widespread and intense enthusiasm. Thousands of boys and girls have joined up in new training centers, inspired by the prospect of peace and the challenge of building a new China, modernizing antiquated ways, and bringing a new life to the great masses of the peasantry. This passionate idealism is a relief and a reaction from the long and hopeless years of Japanese invasion and civil war. Although it is guided by the Communist regime, there can be no doubt that this idealism genuinely inspires the heart and mind of young China. The accession of a new regime to power is always a time of hope and enthusiasm, when everything is still possible, when the cause of reform has overcome its enemies and has not yet been defeated by circumstance. To many Chinese this seems like one of the great periods of hope in China's history. This hope does not spring merely from the fact that a new broom is sweeping out the old corruption and self-seeking in politics; it springs mainly from the fact that the Chinese Communists are leading a real social revolution. Indeed, this is the secret of their rise to power.

This view, that China's Communist revolution is also a social revolution and not merely a seizure of political power or change of one dynasty for another, is still denied by some American social or political scientists, who as scholars ought to recognize a revolution when they see one but who prefer to deny that a great social upheaval is occurring in China under Communist leadership. Here again a refusal to admit reality would lead us into the pitfall of underestimating what we are up against.

Chinese Communism as a Social Revolution.—The social system which still exists in noncommunized parts of China was one of the great human achievements of ancient times. Its persistence down to our own day after a century of Chinese contact with the West is proof of its original solidity. It has also been one cause of China's persistent backwardness.

This system has been based, first, upon the family as the social unit instead of the individual; and secondly, upon a distinction between the literate upper classes who participated in government and the illiterate peasant masses who did not. In this traditional society of old China, the Son of Heaven relied upon the Confucian literati as his flesh and bone. They were the link between the ruler who headed the bureaucracy and the landlord gentry who dominated the countryside. To understand this connection, we must recall the composite nature of China's literate upper strata. They included the landlords whose takings from their tenants' production allowed them to live in the towns and cities, the scholars whose landlord families supported them from this agrarian surplus while they mastered the time-consuming written language and the classics, the officials who were chosen by examination from among these scholars, and the merchants and other hangers-on who depended upon official patronage. All these people, possessing literacy and access to official power through personal contact, formed a mobile upper class in the towns and cities. The illiterate peasantry, who constituted four-fifths of the Chinese population, formed a static lower class in the villages. The landlord-gentry families stressed the obligations of family relationships, while the Confucian classics bred filial piety toward the patriarch and loyalty toward the Emperor. Confucianism held father and ruler, family and dynasty, gentry, and bureaucracy all together in one ideological apparatus, the most stable ever devised. The peasant masses touched this ruling stratum through the landlord gentry but were themselves inert in politics. They suffered the paternalism of the Emperor and his officials, of the literati and the landlords, all of whom participated in the higher life and culture of old China. There was no caste system, families rose and fell, and there was a good deal of social mobility. But the peasant did not participate in the imperial government, any more than did peasants under the ancient empires in the Near East or the West.

The New Class Structure.—Today for the first time this old-class structure has been widely broken down. The social significance of Chinese Communism is that it is consciously committed to destroying the landlord-gentry class. The mechanism for this is the Party, which now takes the place both of the dynasty and of the gentry. The Party uses the nation and the leader as foci of loyalty, instead of the family and the Emperor. By breaking up familism as one would smash atoms, the Party releases enormous human energy. Young people become party workers, and "Liberation" moves like a chain reaction through the households in the towns and villages. The Party and its government now bypass the local landlords and reach down all the way directly to the peasant (and his wife and family) to organize them for production and defense. This is a political activation of the peasantry such as China has never seen before. The old gentry-scholar-official superstructure is brushed aside and the Party steps in.

This profound social change was inherent in the Nationalist Revolution in which Sun Yat-sen and the Comintern collaborated in the early twenties. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang after 1927 could not escape the pattern, though they wanted to delay the process. The Nanking Government, in its efforts to control and reform, had to reach down into the villages. It inculcated loyalty to Nation, Party, and Leader. It enlisted a Youth Corps and did everything but face the problem of the political activation of the peasantry, which could only come at the expense of liquidating the gentry.

Today the local gentry and big landlords in backward regions like Szechwan realize that Communist infiltration can mobilize the peasantry against them. They are quite ready to cooperate, no doubt, with General Chennault or anyone else who will fight their battle for survival, while the Communists are supremely confident that the old landlordism is doomed, whether or not the Unitd States supports it. It does little good for American economists to prove that agricultural production is limited in China less by landlordism than by the actual insufficiency of land. The Communists are championing the peasant's cause against his age-old adversary, and have developed a well-tried method for getting and organizing peasant support.

One of their devices for the mobilization of social change is the organized emancipation of women, a movement which has been supported by missionaries

and by Madame Chiang Kai-shek and others for years past, but which the Communists have now put on a paying basis. Domination of the male over the female has been part of the traditional family and village society. Communism brings the village women into a woman's association. The school girl is enlisted in party work. A tremendous source of social energy is unlocked.

Another appeal which Communism makes to the unlettered peasant is the opportunity it offers him to become literate and rise in social prestige and status. The literacy movement, begun by western missionaries and carried forward by the Nanking Government, is still another worthy cause which the Communists have harnessed to their chariot.

This would suggest that the special status of the modern Chinese literati will disappear in proportion as the New Democracy spreads literacy among the villages. The new Party and government bureaucracy can be recruited directly from the masses by a system of schools and party cells, instead of through gentry families. Trained personnel, technicians and administrators, are more necessary than ever. But the scholar's monoply of literacy is doomed and with it the special position of the scholar class. The returned students from the West, who have played such a part under the Nanking Government and represent such an achievement in Sino-western cultural cooperation, are eventually replaceable.

In the long run, because the Communists must get more efficient production on the land, they will have to educate the Chinese peasant. Just as the Han and subsequent dynasties found that private property in land was a necessary incentive for intensive irrigated agriculture, so any increase of agrarian production today will require a literate farmer who can learn to apply modern technology to the land. But this rural technician, whether or not collectivized, will not be an Anglo-Saxon type of liberal.

What I have been saying about the constructive efforts of Chinese Communism could be amplified from the testimony of unimpeachable neutral sources, the eye-witness observations of non-Communist western medical workers and relief administrators, the first-hand impressions of reliable journalists and travelers in the Communist area. All this evidence shows a revoluntary movement dedicated to rebuilding China "for the common people", trying in a backward country to achieve the degree of literacy which the United States had a century ago, the social status for women which American women have had for a generation, the amount of public health and medical service which we had, say, in 1880, a standard of production which most Americans would think still too low for survival. With most of this Chinese revolution the American people have always been in sympathy, since in fact American missionaries helped to start it. Here again, we strike a problem of understanding; how does it happen that this necessary and desirable modernization of Chinese life can be led constructively by the ideology of Communism?

Communism as a Chinese Ideology.—If we try to look at Communism in Chinese terms as an ideology of the state, it is at once apparent that it seeks to supplant the Confucianism of the traditional dynasties and the famous Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen and the early Republican, and perform the age-old function of giving the new regime an ethical and philosophical sanction.

In traditional China a military victor found Confucianism ready at hand to form the sanction for his rule, providing only that he qualified by his conduct for the role of the Confucian monarch. This was not hard to do, since every schoolboy had memorized the deeds of model Emperors: it was the function of the Chinese ruler both to set an example of proper conduct as a person and to perform the ritual function of his office. This was, briefly, to take responsibility for the maintenance of the moral and material order of mankind. Here was the meaning of Heaven's Mandate: the actions of men must harmonize with the processes of nature, and the Son of Heaven was the great Harmonizer. Hence he set the calendar so that the crops would be planted on time, he ordered public works so as to maintain the people's livelihood, he rewarded virtue and punished crime, performed sacrifices and issued penitential edicts, and gave the final answer on all matters. This tradition of personal administration by the monarch, so different from the Japanese tradition, has lingered on in modern China. The extent to which Chiang Kai-shek was a modern Son of Heaven may be judged by his administrative habits and personal masterminding of war tactics, as well as by the speed with which his regime broke up once he left it. The apotheosis of a party leader, be it Sun, Chiang, or Mao, may therefore be viewed as a Chinese tradition quite as much as a Russian importation.

Personal leadership is still unusually important in Chinese politics.—But what has taken the place of Confucianism as the leader's ideological base? Sun's late acceptance of Comintern help in 1923, after he had himself failed to lead the Republic out of warlordism, was a confession that his own ideology, of mixed Chinese and western principles, was insufficient. Chiang's reversion in recent years to a revived Confucianism has been a further confession that Sun Yat-senism, which the Nanking Government tried so hard to propagate throughout the thirties, was not quite adequate to China's needs. Mao accepts Sun's ideas in their pro-Communist version of 1924, as a convenient first approach to China's long process of revolution and reconstruction. It now remains to be seen whether Mao's version of Marxism, in the way that he translates it into the Chinese language and applies it to Chinese situations, will prove adequate to his needs. In approaching this imponderable subject, we can remember that the Taiping rebels' failure in the 1850's, after they had conquered the greater part of China, was essentially a failure of intellectual leadership; and that neither Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek was able to present an interpretation of the world and China's place in it which could inspire the modern intellectuals of China. Can Marxism with its oversimplifications and nineteenth-century blindspots do much better?

The Marxist Appeal.—Superficially, the utility of Marxism to a modern dynastic founder in China seems hard to beat. The Chinese peasant has seen his two chief enemies as grasping landlords and foreign invaders. To call them Feudalism and Imperialism, respectively, is no very difficult propaganda feat. Communist propaganda can picture concretely the way in which native Feudalism and foreign Imperialism are supposed to reinforce each other in the persons of Wang Ching-wei and Tojo, or Chiang Kai-shek and General Marshall. This is easy when foreign arms are being used on Chinese soil against the peasants who are being indoctrinated. To youth and intellectuals, meanwhile, Chinese Communism has offered the great valid ideal of twentieth-century Asia, the liberation of the peasant masses from ignorance, poverty, disease, and exploitation. This is expressed in a real cult of the *lao-pai-hsing*, for whom the Communist labor hero labors, the student studies, and the soldier fights. Chinese youth are no doubt more receptive to this ideal because of the century of humanitarian effort invested in China by western missionaries of all sorts. But unfortunately the western evangelism, which has done so much for China, came hand in hand with western commercial exploitation and political domination, which international Communism claims to eschew. Marxism has had its chance in China thus far without the incubus of contemporary Russian expansionist pressure on that country (except for the unexplained rape of Manchuria in 1945, concerning which the Chinese Communists have had very little to say).

Marxism's claims to universality may also help it in China. Confucianism was a system of allegedly universal validity which took no account of color or origin so long as one behaved in the Confucian way. Any barbarian could become Chinese by acting Chinese, whereas Christianity, Anglo-Saxon liberalism, and fascism all reached China in circumstances which suggested a specific overseas origin among so-called advanced western peoples. They each had an aroma of foreign cultural superiority which made them less palatable to the Middle Kingdom. Perhaps the same odor will attach to Marxism as Marxism ripes in China. But in the past two decades of Russian passivity there, relatively speaking, the Marxist creed has achieved a local footing reminiscent (in this one respect) of the early days of Buddhism when the monks of the fifth century visited India and returned to make coverts of their disordered homeland. Chinese Communism is accepted in China as a genuinely Chinese movement. Mao Tse-tung proudly announces that his movement has "found the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, which holds good everywhere."

A wise Russian policy will certainly avoid pressures on Chinese Communism which might destroy the cosmopolitan and yet patriotic appeal of Mao's doctrines. Under Maoism young Chinese patriots can feel themselves participating in a practical world-wide movement in which China is an esteemed and self-reliant colleague, not an appendage. This is a good feeling after a century of humiliation.

Communism and Nationalism.—Part of the Communist ideological success against the Kuomintang has come from their capture of the sentiment of nationalism. It is a stratling paradox that Communists, so closely allied to China's inveterate continental enemy, Russia, should have been able to turn the force of patriotism against Chiang Kai-shek, who came to power as its symbol.

Chiang's chief ideological sanction was the theme of national unity, strength, and independence, toward which he at one time provided historic leadership. Yet the Communist propaganda claims that it has succeeded in mobilizing patriotic sentiment against Chiang as a "running dog of American imperialism," a traitor who sold his country to foreigners in order to stay in power. Few American administrators of aid to China will agree that Chiang was a subservient ally; he would take our aid more easily than our advice. How fundamentally, then, has Chinese Communism actually been able to use the sentiment of nationalism against him? This subject awaits study, but I suggest that Chiang's real failure was on the domestic front, not the international. It was his reliance on civil war instead of reform, as his means of competing with the Communists to solve China's manifold ills, that made him seem finally to be an enemy of the people. He lost public support not because he accepted American help but because he did not use it for the popular welfare and reform. The American policy of military aid to help an unpopular government suppress a social revolution played into Communist hands, as serious students predicted. It is noteworthy that the Communuist hold upon Chinese patriotic sentiment has been achieved at a time when the United States was open to the charge of putting its own strategic interest ahead of the interest of the Chinese people. This self-seeking American policy gave Communist propaganda its chance to focus public indignation on Chiang's American-made and supplied bombing planes while picturing Russia as a friendly neutral.

Now that Chinese Communism has come to power, it is rapidly cementing its ideological base by a widespread indoctrination of the Chinese people in the Communist interpretation of China and the world scene. The study of Marxist texts today is reminiscent of the traditional study of the Confucian classics. But Communist methods today include the study-group, the individual's criticism of himself and of his colleagues, and public confession of errors-psychological techniques in which Communism bids fair to outshine its rival, the Church of Rome. By these methods the Communists hope to reduce the inveterate individualism of the old China, the personal jealousies and frictions which have undermined the cohesion and effectiveness of Chinese group activity of the past.

Bases of a Chinese Totalitarianism.—In summary, if we survey these political, social, and ideological aspects of Chinese Communism, we can hardly deny that it has its roots deep in the Chinese scene. After almost thirty years of trial and error and adaptation to Chinese circumstances, the Chinese Communist movement might indeed be expected to have firm roots, not superficial and not easily dislodged. The fact that Marxism is a two-edged sword which may be used first to liberate the populace but later to enslave it is not out of keeping with the Chinese political tradition. The Marxist emphasis on a monopoly of power by the state machine is compatible with the old Confucian theory of benevolent depotism. Modern Chinese who have seen the impossibility of reforming their ancient crowded country by unorganized individual efforts are more ready to accept the need of disciplined organization and central direction. China still consists of the illiterate peasant masses and a small literate elite, and both these groups in Chinese society will accept the idea that the Party must lead and the masses must follow, an idea which neither Sun Yat-sen nor Chiang Kai-shek could dispense with. The crowning point in the Chinese Communist success story, finally, is the fact that western missionaries and educators and western-trained liberal reformers in modern China have had their chance to remake and modernize this ancient society but have failed to do so because they failed to secure and use political power to carry through revolutionary changes. Fundamental reform, according to the Communist arguments, is impossible without military and political power behind it, just as the ancient rulers could not be benevolent until they had become despots.

Thus the same political, social, and ideological conditions in Chinese society which have permitted and facilitated the rise of Chinese Communism to power now provide a sanction for the use of that power in the totalitarian pattern. This includes the control of all political association, the activation and guidance of all social movements, the indoctrination of the people, manufacture of information and control of the press, manipulation of education and of mass movements, suppression of dissent and of civil liberties as we think of them. All these things are potentially a part of the new Communist order, including the systematic inculcation of the bogey of "capitalist imperialism" and denunciation of American "spies" and "sabotage" against the "peoples democracy" which the Chinese Communist Party has created.

Toward this new, complex, revolutionary China we are now making the effort to formulate and develop a new American policy. We must recognize that many excellent popular reforms are being carried forward by doctrinaire Chinese Communist leaders who are imbued with a dogmatic and provocative hostility to the United States.

Bases of a New American Policy.—In this effort to set up a new policy we can expect little or no help either from the left or from the right. Any credit that we give the Chinese Communists will be accepted by them as a matter of course, and any criticism denounced as capitalist American lies. Conversely, the emotional anti-Communist in the United States will assume that all criticism of Chinese Communism is obvious, and any praise is pro-Communist propaganda. One may therefore expect to be called both a stooge of the Kremlin and a lackey of American capitalism.

Mao Tse-tung has proclaimed that his movement looks to Moscow for leadership, that the world is divided into two camps, that there is no middle ground and everyone must be for him or against him. With a curious similarity, the extreme right represented by the religious dogmatism of the Roman Catholic Church, sees itself locked in mortal combat against Communism for the soul of mankind and proclaims that there can be no neutral ground. Chiang Kai-shek says we must support him or fight a third world war. So does Chennault. Apparently both right and left are implacably determined that we must fight—Mao because he assumes as a Marxist that our capitalism must be imperialistic and that the revolution must come by violence. Chiang Kai-shek because he considers Communism insatiable and also probably hopes that war between Russia an the United States will save his political fortunes.

We must recognize that this kind of extremist thinking does not provide us with a policy short of war. The cold war in which we find ourselves with Russia calls for armament as a deterrent of warfare, but also for constructive policies to build the peace. Yet in seeking constructive policies toward Asia we cannot profit greatly from our experience in western Europe, where we have followed a dual policy: Marshall-plan aid to revive the prewar industrial economy and a defensive military alliance, the Atlantic Pact, to maintain political stability. In eastern Asia (excepting Japan) there is little prewar industrial economy left to revive, industry has still to be built up, and meanwhile the degree of social and political instability makes a defensive alliance less possible than in western Europe. For an Asiatic program we have to strike out on new ground.

A few years ago we might have fallen back on the principle of the self-determination of all peoples and relied on an appeal to Asiatic nationalism. This principle that peoples should be left free to work out their own political systems is as old as our republic. It has been applied in Asia in our program for Philippine independence and in our doctrine of the territorial and administrative integrity of China. In the process of maintaining an open door for our trade and cultural contact, we have stood against the domination of China by any outside power.

Yet the application of this doctrine today is peculiarly obfuscated by the fact that the Chinese Communists are Chinese and, in spite of their professed ideological tie to a foreign power, have won a greater degree of popular support than their opponents could muster even with general American economic and military assistance. We cannot claim that the Russian interventionist activity in China since V-J Day has been greater than our aid, much as we may deplore the former and approve the latter. The chief of the American military aid mission which tried unavailingly to help Chiang Kai-shek has testified that no battles were lost by the Nationalists for lack of American arms; what the Nationalist troops lacked was something worth fighting for as an alternative to Chinese Communism. On balance, I am afraid we must put the Communist victory in China down as a case of self-determination, not of outside aggression. An American military effort to save the Chinese people now from their dangerous ideological tie to Russia would find the vast majority of patriotic Chinese lined up against us. Thus, the simple formula of backing Asiatic nationalism against Communism in the name of self-determination is not enough.

The implication of this very unpleasant fact is that we cannot expect to have an opportunity to develop toward China the beneficent programs of economic and social assistance of which we might be capable. The Chinese Communists have no intention of letting us compete with them in areas they control. More-

over, since our access to Indo-Chino is limited to the narrow confines within which the French are unsuccessfully trying to avoid the fate of the Chinese Nationalists, we must also expect little opportunity there. Thus we are already limited to south Asia and the islands on Asia's periphery; Japan, part of Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, as well as India, Siam, and states which have been or are under British control.

The Lesson of Our Old China Policy.—The American public are slow to realize that for some time to come we must be content with a very minor role in Chinese affairs. We can no longer expect to play the important part in China's national life that we have played during and since the war. Our major activity in Asia must shift to other areas. Yet if we seek to follow there the pattern which we followed in China, we shall meet similar disasters. The most trenchant conclusion to draw from our China failure is that material means (food and goods, arms, ships, and planes) are inadequate to defeat a social revolution which operates in the realm of the spirit and of national sentiment and psychology as much as on the economic and military levels. In this context it is a nice question whether our arms to Chiang Kai-shek did not actually help the Communists more than it hindered them.

We may expect our position in the rest of Asia to worsen steadily until we respond to its dangers in a more than military manner. It is therefore high time to apply to the rest of Asia the lesson which we should learn from our disaster in China.

This lesson may be stated in a series of points: First, Asia's peasant masses are now ripe for social revolution and political activation. The Asiatic farmer is ready to become a participant in politics. Whoever can lead and organize him in his own self-interest can use him as a basis for political power. But the Asiatic peasant is astute, like any farmer, and not easily led into new paths. The resolutionary leadership, as Mao Tse-tung tells his followers, must get close to the common people and stay close to them, experience their problems, live their life and think their thoughts, much as an American Congressman must retain close contact with his electorate. The revolution must be "for the comman people."

Second, the political leadership of Asia's rural masses can come only from their own countrymen, not from foreigners. The Chinese Communist leaders are native Chinese, even though a number have been trained in Russia.

Third, the creation of a native non-Communist leadership for the modernization of Asia and the liberation of its peoples from poverty, disease, and ignorance can be achieved only in response to a revolutionary idealism which is ruthlessly dedicated to the people's welfare. If we are really interested in the fate of Asia's peasant masses, and not just in our own security and comfort, now is the time for us to show it. Communism derives its power originally from its ideal of helping the common people; so strong is this ideal that it partially sanctions the evils of the Communist police state even after it has begun to coerce the common people. To put it another way, Communism is winning in Asia because it combines genuine idealism with a ruthless urge to power; it cannot be combated by power alone. Nothing we can offer in arms and material goods can buy the support of Asia; such support as we seek and need must be inspired by ideals and visions of a better life. This is a great test for western Christendom—having begun by inspiring the modernization and liberation of Asia in modern times, can we now continue the job?

Fourth, the ideas and ideals with which to inspire a native revolutionary leadership in Asia are not lacking in the American background; our Declaration of Independence, for instance, is impressed in the minds of many Asiatic patriots; our concern for the individual, our humanitarianism, our technology, and our cultural values are known and admired. Yet the spiirt to make these things come alive in our approach to Asia since the war has been lacking, because we plainly put ourselves first and Asia second in our policies. Take for example our distrust of socialism abroad: a great many Americans oppose the growth of federal government power and activity in the United States as a trend toward a dangerous and unnecessary totalitarianism or statism; on this ground some of us denounce all American efforts to help regimes abroad which are developing socialist types of government ownership and operation; yet it will be difficult if not impossible to find in Asia a creative leadership which is not fundamentally socialist in its thinking. This is because the backward peasant societies of Asia generally have a ruling or official class but lack an entrepreneurial middle

class: capital is not in private hands, and private enterprise on the American model cannot be their primary means of development. The Asiatic states must lead the way in many aspects of their own modernization and industrialization. If we would consult the needs of these Asiatic peoples, instead of our own fears or predilections, we could give them more inspiration. The Tennessee Valley Authority is still one of the most inspiring examples that we have set before Asia's leaders, because in the TVA government capital has done a job in the interest of the local common people which their own local private capital could not do.

Here, then, is the challenge. The American people have the skills and technology, the cultural values and ideals, to make us the guide and friend of revolutionary Asia. Thus far we lack the will and vision to use them.

What we could do, if we would, can be vividly imagined: we could help to bring literacy and education, medicine and public health, production and welfare to a third or a half of mankind, and bind them to us as cooperating partners in a new world. We cannot do this, however, by purely material means—by the mere shipment of cargoes, least of all by the supply of arms alone. The job requires, first, study and undertanding, a grasp of the problems; second, trained personnel who are inspired by a sense of dedication as real as that of the American missionaries who spread over the world in the nineteenth century. American technicans, administrators, and advisers sincerely dedicated to the development of Asia will have at hand the most powerful tools and methods that man has ever devised for the remaking of his own society. The things that America produces, supplies and equipment of all kinds, are only a first element among our resources; economic aid is only the first step, and may not be the main one. We also have available the media of mass communication and of individual education—books, periodicals, pictures, radio, motion pictures; the methods by which science is applied to the age-old problems of agriculture and husbandry; the techniques, both scientific and social, by which science can be used to meet human problems anywhere; the ideal of individual and community initiative as the key to prosperity and welfare.

Our first problem of all, in such a program, would be to relate it constructively to our own domestic economy. The development of Asia must be an integral part of American business, education, and administration. Obviously, it cannot depend solely on the profit motive for its inspiration; as the American business community is the first to declare, the profit motive alone and unaided cannot save either Asia or ourselves from the menace of totalitarianism.

In summary, the lesson of our defeat in China is that we have let our policy become more anti-Russian than pro-Chinese. In our endeavor to thwart Russian expansion we have let ourselves become aligned against genuine Chinese popular sentiment. The ill-advised zeal of the Eightieth Congress, when it further increased our arms aid to Chiang Kai-shek, played into Communist hands; for the Chinese Communists not only got the arms in the end but have been able to turn popular feeling against us, in spite of all the help that we have given the Chinese people in the past. The fact that Moscow and Chinese Communism have loudly exploited our error against us must not obscure the fact that we consciously put our own strategic interest, which is to check the spread of Russian influence, ahead of the Chinese popular welfare, which was served by our economic aid but not by our military aid. The defeat of our policy will have been a small price to pay if we can learn from our experience in China how to harmonize our strategic interest with the popular welfare of the rest of Asia.

It is not by any means too late to relate ourselves constructively to the revolutionary process at work in China and the rest of Asia, providing we accept these principles: (1) The containment of an all-encompassing revolution such as now convulses China cannot be achieved merely by setting up static military defense lines nor by arms shipments from abroad but only by competition from rival groups within the country which make an equally valid use of the sources of revolutionary power. (2) Such competition in agrarian Asia must stress the remaking of peasant life and its political activation, and must therefore parallel those elements in the Chinese Communist "Liberation" movement, like the emancipation of women and the use of medicine and technology, which are desirable things in themselves. (3) The American role in all of Asia must therefore be to help and inspire an Asiatic leadership which seeks constructive and rapid change in all aspects of society, a genuine social revolution in the people's interest. (4) This policy of working with and not

against the Asian revolutionary process requires intensive study of Asiatic conditions, needs, and sentiments and an immediate vigorous development of the President's Point Four program. It calls for an intellectual effort greater than in wartime, the use of American resources and idealism to forestall a world-wide defeat from which arms alone cannot save us.

Practical Steps.—The details of a new and more active American program toward Asia must be worked out by administrators who face the concrete problems, but a general outline may be suggested. In China it is too late for military or other interventionist adventures, which could only strengthen the Communist position against us. We must strive to maintain contact with the Chinese people as best we can, preserving educational and cultural activities whenever possible, cooperating with United Nations agencies, developing whatever commercial and cultural exchange the new Chinese regime will permit and we ourselves consider desirable. In our propaganda we should try to keep the record straight and provide an example of freedom of opinion and criticism. We have more to lose than to gain by any further support of Chiang Kai-shek, or by the use of American force to keep Formosa out of Chinese Communist hands. Similarly, we probably have more to gain than to lose by according a new Chinese central government some sort of *de facto* recognition if they seek it, and by not responding too violently to any provocative acts against us. We must remember that our hostility is essential to Chinese Communism, to preserve the Communist myth of world history and keep popular sentiment mobilized against "capitalist imperialism." The development of a discriminating trade with China, on a selective basis to eliminate strategic materials, should be a cardinal point in our policy. China is not now in the Russian orbit economically, and we will gain nothing by pushing her into it. In spite of Mao Tse-tung's vigorous adherence to Moscow, China's foreign trade is still oriented toward the West. We should try to keep it so. All this, however, can add up to little more than a holding action in our relations with China.

Our more active policy should center on non-Communist Asia. Here the essential step, fundamental to all others, is a mobilization and allocation of American manpower to provide the specialized personnel who can develop direct and intimate contact with Asiatic realities. American shipments are less necessary than Americans on the spot in Asia, ready and able to study local problems and assist local leaders. This personal firsthand understanding of Asiatic needs is the only way of safeguarding an American program of development, for all programs will fail which are not geared to the life of the common people so as to help them effect great social changes. Revolution or rapid change is inevitable in all aspects of Asiatic life. Revolution in the people's interest is part of the American heritage. We must revive the pioneer revolutionary spirit in our approach to Asia. This will come if public-spirited Americans are given a closer view of Asia's problems and potentialities. Training programs, research institutes, field stations, and cultural exchange at all levels are therefore in order, with a movement of students and specialists of all sorts in both directions between the United States and Asia. The cost is relatively little. All these things can be done once we realize that American security and Asiatic welfare are indivisible.

It is time, therefore, to reactivate our approach to Asia through private American agencies—missions, the YMCA and student movement, universities and foundations, our great business corporations. Our free society must respond to Asia's challenge through private as well as governmental channels, through a new recruitment of talen, on all the many levels of which we are capable.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is an excerpt from the Vandenberg Diary received from Mrs. Helen Reid of the New York Herald-Tribune and the reference to the Vandenberg Diary was made in a photostat.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, on this point I should like to request that this extract from the diary be printed. It is in photostatic form and is presented in reduced size as a plate, and I ask that the text also be printed because the reduction will make the text practically unreadable and yet it is desired that the position of the note on the text be shown on the plate.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be done in that way.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344G" and is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM

4 February

Miss Barrows, Matt Connelly's office, 'phoned to ask the Senator to be at a meeting with the President tomorrow at 11 o'clock; it's a very much off the record meeting. Connally, Eaton, Bloom, the V.P., and Acheson will be present. East Entrance, White House.

S

R.S.V.P.

Saturday; February 5, 1949.

This meeting proved to be about China where the Nationalist Government (which we support) has all but collapsed and is now trying to negotiate peace terms with the Chinese Communists. Under ECA we granted $125,000,000 of American military aid to Chang Kai Shek. About half has been delivered this past year. The other half (about 60 millions) is now in process of delivery - some on ships ready to sail/ * * * The President met us in the Cabinet room. He was very serious. He said that his National Security Council and his military advisors had recommended this week that he suspend all export licenses on all further shipments to the Nationalists because of their imminent collapse and, therefore, that these supplies probably would simply fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists (or, in the event of Chang's fall, be sold by the Chinese in the black market). He asked our view. Two or three of the gentlemen immediately fell in with the idea of stopping all export licenses forthwith. I kep silent until the President asked for my view. This is substantially what I said. * * * "Chang and his Nationalist government may well be on their last legs. They probably will collapse in the near future. Our shipments to them, therefore, might well fall into the hands of the Northern Chinese Communists (as has been the case with American equipment furnished to eight American-trained Nationalist Divisions which surrendered without firing a shot). But there is something here vastly more important than what happens to $60,000,000 worth of supplies. The American Government already is charged with a large share of responsibility for Chang's Government's fate because of our previous policies and our failure to give it adequate military supplies. (This charge is only partially justified up-to-date). But if, at the very moment when Chang's Nationalists are desperately trying to negotiate some kind of a peace with the Communists, we suspend all military shipments to the Nationalists, we certainly shall make any hope of a negotiated peace impossible. We shall thus virtually notify the Communists that they can consider the war ended and themselves as victors. We virtually withdraw our recognition of the Nationalist Government. We seal China's doom. Regardless of the justification of previous charges that our American policy has been largely responsible for China's fate, if we take this step at this fatefully inept moment, we shall never be able to shake off the charge that WE are the ones who gave poor China the final push into disaster. Millions of our own people will be shocked; and we shall seriously lose prestige throughout the world. I decline any part of any such responsibility. I beg of you, at the very least, to postpone any such decision for a few more weeks until the China question is settled by China and in China and not by the American government in Washington. This blood must not be on our hands. My point is further emphasised by the fact that the title to almost all of this 60 millions in supplies has already passed to the Nationalist Government which is waiting for these export licenses. Therefore your order will be much more than a withholding of American supplies in American hands. It will be a ban on the Nationalist Government - and that will be "the last straw". I make it plain that I have little or no hope for stopping the immediate Communist conquest. That is beside the point. I decline to be responsible for the last push which makes it possible." * * * After a moment of silence, the President said that, of course, I had posed the real question. Then he asked the Vice President for his view. Barkley said he agreed with me. * * * That ended the conference. I doubt whether the President will issue any "orders" for a while to come.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is an exchange of correspondence from Senator McCarran to the Honorable Dean Acheson. Senator McCarran's letter is dated April 1, 1952, and the reply from Mr. Carlisle Humelsine to Senator McCarran is dated April 11, 1952, and this bears on the significance of the Japanese-Soviet Pact which took place in 1941 with a characterization thereof by Secretary Hull.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344H" is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344H

BM: MW

APRIL 1, 1952.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Will you kindly send us, for the use of the Internal Security Subcommittee, a copy of former Secretary of State Cordell Hull's statement characterizing the Russo-Japanese Treaty. This statement was released after April 13, 1941.

I would appreciate having this as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, April 11, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: With reference to your letter to the Secretary of April 1, there is attached a copy of the statement you requested.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE.

Enclosure: Copy of press statement by Department of State, No. 180, April 14, 1941.

For the press.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
April 14, 1941
No. 180

In reply to inquiries at his press conference today, the Secretary of State made the following statement:

"The significance of the pact between the Soviet Union and Japan relating to neutrality, as reported in the press today, could be overestimated. The agreement would seem to be descriptive of a situation which has in effect existed between the two countries for some time past. It therefore comes as no surprise, although there has existed doubt whether the two Governments would or would not agree to say it in writing. The policy of this Government, of course, remains unchanged."

Mr. MORRIS. Next is a letter from Carlisle Humelsine dated July 16, 1951, addressed to Senator McCarran bearing on the employment of seven people whose names have been referred to as having been employed in the Department of State.

Senator FERGUSON. That will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344I," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344I

JULY 16, 1951.

In reply refer to SY.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I refer to your letter of June 27, 1951, in which you request information with regard to certain individuals who may have been employed at one time or another by the Department of State.

Although it would appear that I am precluded by Presidential directive from discussing whether the investigative facts of a particular case raise a question of loyalty, I am pleased to inform you that the records of the Department contain the following information with regard to the status of the persons concerned:

Julian R. Friedman is not an employee of the Department at this time. He was previously employed, receiving a War Service Indefinite appointment on September 2, 1943, as a Divisional Assistant. He transferred to the Foreign Service Auxiliary on October 10, 1945, and was assigned to the American Consulate General at Shanghai as a Junior Economic Analyst. Mr. Friedman was terminated from this position on November 12, 1946, due to the liquidation of the Foreign Service Auxiilary.

Emile Despres is not employed by the Department at the present time. He was appointed to the Department on September 30, 1945, by transfer from Office of Strategic Services under the provisions of Executive Order 9621. Mr. Despres resigned from the Department on January 2, 1946.

Michael Greenberg is not now an employee of the Department. He entered the Department on September 27, 1945, by transfer from the Foreign Economic Administration under the provisions of Executive Order 9630. He was separated from the Department by reduction in force on June 15, 1946.

John N. Hazard is not employed by the Department of State. He is a former employee who entered the Department on December 12, 1945, by transfer from the Foreign Economic Administration. He resigned from the Department on July 31, 1946. He was again appointed to the Department on November 15, 1949, for a period not to exceed thirty days. Mr. Hazard was terminated from this position on November 30, 1949.

Jefferson Franklin Ray is not an employee of the Department. He was previously employed, having been given a temporary appointment on March 31, 1948. He resigned from this position on March 18, 1949.

Mrs. Esther C. Brunauer's suspension by the Department from her job as Policy Liaison Officer, GS–14, was announced April 10, 1951, and resulted from the suspension of Mr. Brunauer by the Department of the Navy. Consideration of Mrs. Brunauer's case is pending in accordance with established loyalty and security procedures.

Mr. John S. Service, whose case is also pending, is a Foreign Service Officer, Class 2, on detail in the Department to the Division of Central Services.

Thomas Arthur Bisson is not now, and has not been, an employee of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,
Deputy Under Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

Mr. MORRIS. This is a letter dated December 12, 1951 from Argyle R. Mackey, Commissioner of Immigration, to Senator McCarran bearing on the deportation of one Charles Bidien, who has written for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 1344J," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1344J

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Washington 25, D. C.

Please address reply to: and refer to this file No. A–2987117—Inv.

DECEMBER 12, 1951.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This is in response to your letter of December 1, 1951, requesting full information regarding the deportation proceedings of Charles Bidien.

Your inquiry appears to relate to the Charles Bidien who is the subject of immigration file A–2987117. He was born at Acheh, Sumatra, Indonesia, on

July 18, 1904, and is an Indonesian citizen of the Malayan race. His name in his native land was Sheh Bidien Ben Aroon.

A warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings was issued against him on September 16, 1948, charging him with: (1) membership in an organization advocating the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States; (2) membership in an organization that circulates, or distributes printed matter advocating such overthrow; (3) being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigration visa at time of entry; and (4) being an alien ineligible to citizenship and not entitled to enter the United States under any exception.

He was accorded a hearing under this warrant of arrest on November 1, 1949, at the New York Office of this Service. Charges (3) and (4), above, were found sustained by the evidence. Charges (1) and (2), above, were not sustained as no evidence was adduced bearing upon these charges. Admissible evidence to sustain these latter two charges was not available for production at the hearing.

According to the record, Bidien last arrived in the United States February 8, 1930, at Boston, Massachusetts, as a seaman aboard the S. S. *City of Rangoon*, and deserted the vessel at the port of Philadelphia. He was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

On December 21, 1949, an order of deportation was entered. The warrant of deportation was issued on the same date. His deportation was effected on the S. S. *Batory*, which sailed foreign from the port of New York, January 20, 1950.

I hope that the foregoing satisfactorily answers your inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ARGYLE R. MACKEY,
Commissioner.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess at this time until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, May 16, 1952.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in room 424 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson, presiding.

Present: Senator Ferguson.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator FERGUSON. The subcommittee will come to order. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Weintraub, when we suspended your examination yesterday, we had concluded a question about Mr. Harry Dexter White.

Do you or did you know Michael Greenberg?

TESTIMONY OF DAVID WEINTRAUB, DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, N. Y.—Resumed

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Joseph Gregg?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that name either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Maurice Halperin?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir, I don't recollect that name either.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know J. Julius Joseph?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. The same answer. I just don't recollect those names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Duncan Chaplin Lee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Robert T. Miller?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know William Z. Park?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Bernard Redmont?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. What is the name again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Bernard Redmont, R-e-d-m-o-n-t.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Helen Tenney, T-e-n-n-e-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have, I think, answered a question as to whether you know William Remington.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe you asked me the question yesterday. I know who he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't know him personally?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Harold Ware?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know John J. A-b-t?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us of your acquaintanceship with Mr. Abt, your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Mr. Abt, I believe, was a member of the general counsel staff in FERA some time during the time that I was there, and I knew him as such.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the full extent of your knowledge of him and association with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir. I kept seeing him on and off; I had some business with him from time to time related to the FERA, but that is about all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen him in recent years?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect running into him in recent years at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you maintain your acquaintanceship?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Abt had been named in sworn testimony as a member of an underground group of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I read that in a newspaper once.

Senator FERGUSON. When you read in the paper about these people, the fact that Chambers and Bentley had testified, as I understand it you discounted all that testimony and did not believe it.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, that is only partly correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get your idea. I did not want to put words in your mouth. But from what you said yesterday, I drew that conclusion. That may be your testimony.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, some of those names I knew only as names, and I don't know that I had any particular reaction, other than that it was odd, or interesting, or something like that. With respect to some of the other names, of people with whom I had a working relationship, many of those people, those of them that had worked for me, I knew as competent technicians, with whom I had had associations, with respect to whom I never had any reason to believe that they would do anything of that sort. I was shocked, and I suppose I assumed that when put to the test those people would probably be able to show that that was not true. It is in that sense that I disbelieved it.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you believe that a man who is a Communist can be an economist and really be objective in his thinking in America?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know that I could answer that question, not having been a Communist myself. All I can say is that since I knew these people had done good objective work that stood up in public, I therefore felt that these people probably would be able to show that they were not Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you have not made much of a study of this question of communism, have you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I am afraid I have not. My specialties are in another field.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how can you be a economist and not know that philosophy?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In a general way I do know the philosophy. But I certainly have not made any intensive study of it. I have been busy doing other things.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an economist now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that your work?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is my work. And I am essentially an administrator of economic research.

Senator FERGUSON. Let me take our own point 4 program. Do you think that a Communist who claims to be an economist could properly appraise and evaluate and recommend projects for point 4?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, I think when we talked yesterday about some of the people who worked for me, I answered a question to the effect that Mr. Michael Kaletsky, for example, who is a Polish national, is on my staff in a senior capacity. He is an economist.

Senator FERGUSON. I was not thinking of the United Nations. I did not want to put that in, because I understand that the United Nations has to deal with this problem on a Communist and Socialist and capitalist basis. And would you even include anarchy, believing in no government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I wouldn't say.

Senator FERGUSON. At least the others are all combined in the United Nations, and you have to deal with it on that basis, and you cannot eliminate any one of those thinkings—out of the solution of your problem in the United Nations. Is that not correct?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But here in the United States, do we not have a different philosophy? We were talking about your work when you were with the State Department and the various other agencies. Do you think that Communists should be permitted to be economic advisers to our officials?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, to answer your question——

Senator FERGUSON. And not known to be Communists? That is what I am getting at.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is partly for that reason that I answered the question as I did yesterday. These people worked for me. So far as I knew, they did objective work that stood up. And for that reason I had to answer the question that as far as I knew, to my knowledge, I had no reason to believe that they were Communists and were doing work along those lines. I suppose that answers your question, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you never saw any evidence of communism or socialistic thinking in any of the economists or political scientists that you worked with in Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. None at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. None that I can recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you would not say, from the evidence that has been presented in court, that Hiss was a menace? You would not say that he was not a Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, there was a court, a jury, an appeal. That is a fact, and I accept that.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Nathan Witt, W-i-t-t?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Lee Pressman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us of your knowledge of him and your acquaintance and association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was essentially the same as that of Mr. Abt. He, too, was a member of the Council, the staff of the FERA, with whom I had dealings.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the extent of your association with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Alger Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The extent of your knowledge of him you have fully explained to this committee already?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Donald Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the extent of your knowledge and acquaintance with him you have already explained to the committee, have you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I don't believe you asked me about him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you do that now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is the most casual—I think I simply ran into him once or twice sometime. I believe it must have been in the State Department, but that is all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he related to Alger Hiss?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I thought he was his brother.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Henry H. Collins?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The name sounds familiar, but I don't recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Charles Kramer or Krevitsky?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No; I think you asked me about that yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you have already been asked about Victor Perlo; have you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you did know him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Weintraub, I have asked you about the names of the 10 persons who, according to the Bentley testimony and other sworn testimony, made up the Silvermaster group. You knew 6 of the 10. I asked you about the 10 names that made up the Perlo group. You know 8 of the 10. I asked you about the nine names that made up the Ware-Abt-Witt group, and according to such testimony you knew six of the nine and were doubtful about a seventh. I asked you about the names of 10 persons who, according to this testimony, were Communists but unattached with any of those three groups. You went

right down the list of 10 and didn't know any of them. Is that entirely coincidence, sir?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't know, sir. I don't remember, as a matter of fact, which of those were in one or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had no knowledge as to which were in which category at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Certainly not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Anne Triano?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Wilder Foote, F-o-o-t-e?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about him, what you know and the extent of your association with him, if any?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Wilder Foote, I believe I must have met for the first time sometime during UNRRA days, but I couldn't fix any date, as a member of the State Department staff, probably related to public relations. Wilder Foote has, for several years now, been a member of the staff of the United Nations, and during those years I have known him quite extensively, see him frequently, as a man in the public relations field. That is about the extent of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he is a Communist or pro-Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know or have any reason to believe that he has ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the furtherance or obtainment of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. May we, on the rest of this list, let the phrase "Communist connection" stand for that whole last question?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If you wish, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Benedict S. Alper?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Isn't that the name you mentioned yesterday as a member of the U. N. staff?

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe it is.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I just know the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know the person?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think I ever met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Do you know Max Beer, B-e-e-r?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Ursula Wasserman, W-a-s-s-e-r-m-a-n?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she a member of the United Nations staff?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She was a member of the United Nations staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. She is not now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not so far as I know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did she work? In what division or branch?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If I remember correctly, she worked in the Trusteeship Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with securing her employment?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she resign, or was she dropped? Do you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did she leave?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not know that either, but it is some time ago, at least over a year ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where she is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe she is—well, the last time I saw her, as a matter of fact, was in Paris. I have a vague recollection that she had something to do with some newspaper agency, but that is all I could tell you, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Marie Ginsberg?

Mr. WEINRTAUB. No, sir. I don't recollect the name at all.

Could that stand for most of those things that you ask me? When I say I don't know, I simply don't recollect the names.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Jeanne Goodsteinsinger?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir, I don't recollect the name at all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harold Porter McKeever we have already discussed; have we not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir; never heard the name before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Helen Smerling?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Marshall D. Schulman, S-c-h-u-l-m-a-n?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. J. Donald Kingsley, K-i-n-g-s-l-e-y?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The name, Kingsley, is familiar, but I don't associate that with those initials. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir Arthur Rucker?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir. That probably makes it the same as Kingsley. Both Mr. Kingsley and Sir Arthur Rucker are names to me. I have met Mr. Kingsley, I think once, but I don't remember ever meeting Sir Arthur Rucker. They are associated with the International Refugee Organization, if I remember correctly.

Mr. SOURWINE. John C. Ross?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Millard Lampell, L-a-m-p-e-l-l?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Norman Lewis Corwin?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. What is the name again? Corwin?

Mr. SOURWINE. Norman L. Corwin, C-o-r-w-i-n.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harry Byard Price, P-r-i-c-e?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jan Galewisz, G-a-l-e-w-i-c-z?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Jeri, J-e-r-i Stary?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Steiger?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Allen Atkinson?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were asked about Michael Endelman; were you not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember being asked about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Connors asked you about him.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, yes; that is correct.
No, sir, I don't know the name at all.
Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Grad?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Red?
Mr. SOURWINE. G-r-a-d, Grad.
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Andrew Grazdanzef?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Victor Yahkontoff?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir. The name is simply familiar to me as someone who is doing translation work, I think, in the United Nations, who wrote some books, if I remember correctly, books on Siberia or Russia or something like that.
Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know the man?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Jefferson Franklin Ray, Jr.?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, you will recall your testimony that Harry Magdoff was employed under the research project.
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did he have a top-rank position there?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I suppose you would call it that. He came in at a fairly low level, and by the time he left he was doing some very important work in the sense that his work finally could be published.
Mr. SOURWINE. He is a writer; isn't he?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was a statistician.
Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't he also write?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, he wrote up the results of his statistical research which were published.
Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't he write speeches?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not that I knew of.
Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you know that Harry Magdoff ever wrote speeches for anybody?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not for me. No, sir, I didn't know.
Senator FERGUSON. Did you make speeches?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. I don't know that he ever wrote speeches.
Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know that he ever wrote speeches for anybody?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. He might have. I don't know.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you keep up connections with Mr. Magdoff after you and he had severed connections with that research project?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he ever wrote any speeches for Henry Wallace?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir; I do not know that.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Lewis Corey?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us what you know about Lewis Corey?
Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I met Mr. Corey sometime when I worked for the national bureau of economic research at the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, where he used to visit from time to time, and I met him there.
Mr. SOURWINE. What was his connection?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recall it, he wrote some things for the Amalgamated from time to time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all you know about him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Subsequently, he lived about a block away from where I lived.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where was that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In Sunnyside, Queens.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall his address?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. And I used to see him from time to time there socially. That is essentially all.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what he is doing?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Louis C. Freina, F-r-e-i-n-a?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Corey's name had at one time been Freina?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never knew that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know or have any reason to believe that Mr. Corey had ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I believe I had heard something of that sort, possibly from him directly, but I don't remember any more.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't remember any details?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whether he had broken with the party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is what I meant. As you put it, he had been and was no longer at the time that I knew him.

Senator FERGUSON. You had heard that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever discussed it with him?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, if you didn't discuss it with him, how is it possible that you could have heard it from him directly, sir?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, to that extent. This is a matter of some 20 years ago. To the best of my recollection, now that you have mentioned it, I seem to remember that he had been and was not at the time. Now, I think he must have told me. If he didn't tell me, someone else must have told me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Esther Corey?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She is his wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew her?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Only as his wife?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As his wife.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was not your friend?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I told you we lived a block away from each other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this a family friendship?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, we dropped in there. They dropped into our house now and then.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mrs. Corey a particular friend of Mrs. Weintraub?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. To the same extent.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mrs. Weintraub know whether Mr. and/or Mrs. Corey had ever been members of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I imagine to the same extent that I knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that all you knew about it, just that you imagined?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. We must have talked about it, and I would say that my wife knew the same thing I knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell her or did she tell you, or did the four of you talk as a group, or how did it come about that the knowledge was the same?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, as I say, I don't know whether I knew it directly from him. If I knew it directly from Corey, it was quite possibly the result of possibly a four-cornered conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no memory at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not exact enough to be able to say that it was that.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you and Mrs. Weintraub knew the Coreys well enough that it could have been a four-cornered conversation among you discussing their prior Communist connections?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes. sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was your wife ever a Government employee?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What department?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She was an employee in the National Bureau of Standards during the war.

Senator FERGUSON. How many years did she work there?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. From approximately 1941 or 1942, until we left Washington in 1946.

Senator FERGUSON. Is she employed now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had she worked for United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was her line of work with the Bureau of Standards?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. She was a chemist.

Senator FERGUSON. Is she a chemist by profession?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your wife, to your knowledge, ever discuss with Mrs. Esther Corey the question of who was who in the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you were never present when there was any such discussion?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, when you left UNRRA, did you do so of your own choice?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us the circumstances under which you left UNRRA?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. At the time I left UNRRA, Mr. Fiorello LaGuardia was Director General, and he asked me to resign.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why, if you know?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He never told me why.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, sir, didn't it involve a question of instructions which you had sent concerning an accusation that Russia was selling machinery for export, selling UNRRA material for export?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, that was a—that is a fact. Now, whether that prompted him to ask me for the resignation or not, I do not, as a matter of fact, know.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you tell us what was said by you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir. As I recollect it, I was then Deputy Director General of UNRRA in charge of supply, and therefore in charge of the shipping of all kinds of goods to countries receiving relief supplies.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, Russia was not in UNRRA, not furnishing any money for UNRRA?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. The U. S. S. R. was paying part of the administrative expenses of UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. Just part of the administrative expenses?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Not the operating.

Senator FERGUSON. Not the operation or the matériel?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct. And to be exact, the question involved was the shipment of tractors to the Ukraine, which, incidentally, was a member of UNRRA in its own name in addition to the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. As an independent state?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It was an individual member of UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. It at least got that listing?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right. And the question involved the shipment of tractors to the Ukraine from the United States. Those tractors were obtainable only through the allocation machinery then in effect in the United States. I received a call one day from the State Department, which in substance was to the effect that there were some rumors that tractors were being shipped out of the U. S. S. R. to Argentina. And if that were a fact, the shipment of tractors to the Ukraine could not go forward, unless I could state to the State Department, and through them to the allocating authorities, that that was not so, that tractors were not being shipped out of the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, it was not fair for UNRRA, principally out of American funds, to ship tractors out to Russia and at the same time have Russia selling tractors to the Argentine or any other country.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That was the view. I thereupon dispatched a cable to the UNRRA chief of Mission in the Ukraine repeating the statement that had been made to me and asking some questions concerning it, namely, "Are they or are they not shipping? And if they are, whither are they shipping it, and how much are they shipping?"

I did that for the purpose of getting at the facts so that I could present them to the State Department.

Senator FERGUSON. You sent it to the Ukraine, now, instead of to Russia?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I sent it to the UNRRA chief of mission, who was our man in the Ukraine.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I recall it, I received a reply saying no tractors were being shipped, that it was ridiculous to say so, or something of that sort. I conveyed that information to the State Department. And, as I recall it, the tractors went forward.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did you think that was a sufficient examination of the facts?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. May I——

Senator FERGUSON. Let me ask you that question. Did you think that that was a sufficient examination of the facts?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I thought that that was sufficient information. That was the only information I had to convey to the State Department who, in the final analysis, were the people who had the judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question at all.

My question was: Did you think that that was a sufficient examination of the facts?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I do not recall what I thought then.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think so now?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. And I do not know precisely how the man went about obtaining the information.

Senator FERGUSON. That was not my question either.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Sir, I simply am trying to reply to the question in these terms. The chief of mission was a responsible individual in whom a certain amount of faith resided.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not ascertain from other sources whether Russia was shipping tractors to the Argentine or any other country?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Because I followed the established channel.

Our way of getting information at that time was through our man who was stationed there. And I therefore went through that channel.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that LaGuardia discharged you for doing it in that way?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Now, that is why I asked you to please let me complete my story, and I think perhaps it will come out.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Apparently a newspaper correspondent, who was at that time in the Ukraine, met either the chief of mission or one of his people in the Ukraine and asked him some questions about how things were going and received a reply to the effect that the people in Washington in the central organization were crazy, in that they asked such ridiculous questions as to whether the U. S. S. R. was exporting tractors, when it was perfectly obvious to everybody around there that they didn't have any tractors. That story appeared in the newspapers, or something to that effect. That is the story that Mr. LaGuardia saw.

Mr. LaGuardia then said, "Whoever sent such a crazy cable?" or some words to that effect; and apparently seemed to feel that I shouldn't have sent that cable.

Now, what else he felt, I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. What did he say? He usually spoke out, did he not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Oh, yes. He asked me why I sent the cable, why I sent such a ridiculous cable. He seemed to agree with our people in the Ukraine, that that was a nonsensical question to ask.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, as a matter of fact, sir, didn't Mr. LaGuardia feel and express to you his feeling that your instructions with regard to that matter had not been tough enough?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is incorrect?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is incorrect.

Senator FERGUSON. He would not have made any inquiry at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. My impression was that he felt that I should not have made the inquiry.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell Mr. LaGuardia that you had received this communication from the allocation authorities stating that no more tractors would be made available to UNRRA unless you gave them assurances?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I did, except that it was not the allocation authorities; but the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. The State Department; but it originated with the allocation people, wouldn't you say?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you get from Mr. LaGuardia any expression as to how he thought it should have been handled?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that. Mr. LaGuardia spoke mainly about: why didn't I clear the cable with him before I sent it. I perhaps ought to say that my recollection then was, and I told him so, that I had shown him the cable, but he claimed he had never seen it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, wasn't it a situation in which the cable in Mr. LaGuardia's opinion was not designed to produce a real investigation of the facts or disclosure of the situation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. He didn't indicate that at all?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir. In fact, it was rather the other way around. It was that this was such a ridiculous rumor that I had no business taking it seriously and starting inquiries of that sort. That certainly was the impression that I got.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you gather that Mr. LaGuardia would have had you ignore the State Department's communication, or that he would have had you send a denial without checking the facts?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I couldn't say that. My impression perhaps was that Mr. LaGuardia would have gotten on the telephone and burned up some wires telling people that he wasn't going to chase around every rumor that appears in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. But the sole complaint against you so far as you know, so far as Mr. LaGuardia told you, was that you had sent the cable?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And because of that Mr. LaGuardia requested your resignation?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, as I said before, Mr. LaGuardia never told me. Moreover, we had had several other run-ins before.

Mr. SOURWINE. About what?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I remember Mr. LaGuardia once coming into the office and telling me that he had met somebody over the week end and had bought some thousands of cases of liver paste.

I said to Mr. LaGuardia that he couldn't do that. That upset him very much. He thought he could do anything. I then pointed out to him that we were not in the business of buying directly, that we had to buy through the Department of Agriculture. He then wanted to know why I had three hundred-odd people working for me if we weren't doing the buying.

Senator FERGUSON. That was a pretty good question, was it not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, it certainly sounded good.

I also told him that even if we did, I would not have bought liver paste, because I wanted bread, and there was no use having liver paste if you didn't have bread to put it on, and we didn't have any money to spend on liver paste. We had quite a "go" on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long before the tractor incident was the incident of the liver paste?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. A couple of months, I would say.

Mr. SOURWINE. How soon after the tractor incident were you fired?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Perhaps a couple of weeks.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was the liver paste or the tractors that had the most to do with it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think it was an accumulation of things. As I said, that was one incident. There were other incidents.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you have other things besides the liver paste and the tractors, bring them out. Let's hear it.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, we had another incident that had to do with grain allocations, if I remember correctly. There was some meeting of a committee of one of the allocating bodies. I forget the details now, but that allocating body didn't want to allocate as much grain to UNRRA to ship as we wanted, as we thought we were entitled to. It was an off the record kind of meeting. There were papers floating around there, with all sorts of figures on them, about what the allocations might be, should be, could be, and so on.

Mr. LaGuardia, at that meeting, became terribly excited and finally stalked out of the room and said he wasn't going to stand for this any more and asked all of his staff to come along with him, and as he went along he picked up a sheet of paper from the table and put it in his pocket; which was a confidential piece of paper, and the chairman protested it and asked him to return the paper.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was the chairman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect any more who the chairman was. Vaguely I recall he was a Canadian.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you come into that picture?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I was in charge of supply, and I was the man who dealt with requests for allocations, and so on. As we left the place and got back to the office, I told Mr. LaGuardia that he ought to return that piece of paper.

We had a little argument about that, or rather quite an argument about that.

Senator FERGUSON. I was wondering whether LaGuardia ever had a "little" argument.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is right. It was quite an argument. And as I recall, he eventually returned the piece of paper, but he was quite angry.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was on the paper?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. As I remember, some confidential figures of some sort. And I had said to him that he had no right to take it.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position at that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He wanted more food for UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. But what was his position at that time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was the Director General for UNRRA.

Senator FERGUSON. And what happened?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I complained that he should return it, and he at first said he thought he didn't have it, and I said, "Look in your pocket," and he put his hand in his pocket, and he had it, and he eventually returned it. It was a very unpleasant affair.

I remember another incident. I don't know why—well, you want to know. I will tell you. I recall another incident shortly before the firing, as a matter of fact. UNRRA had bought a lot of meat, as I recall it, through the Department of Agriculture, against my advice, and I kept insisting that we ought to cancel those meat orders, because we didn't have any funds, and we ought instead to use those funds to buy grain. Apparently Mr. LaGuardia had, through the Secretary of Agriculture, previously done a lot of work to obtain the allocation of this meat from the Department of Agriculture.

And what I was asking Mr. LaGuardia to do was to go back on that and cancel that and instead spend the money for bread.

It took several weeks, as I recall it, of arguments about that, until finally Mr. LaGuardia was convinced that he ought to do that.

He went up to see the Secretary of Agriculture, and I went along with him. We had a brief talk with the Secretary. He did all the talking. The Secretary was quite glad to accept the cancellation and merely asked Mr. LaGuardia to write him a letter about that, so that he would have it on the record.

Mr. LaGuardia and I left the Secretary's office, got into his car, and on the way back to our office I said to Mr. LaGuardia, just before we were to leave the car, that I would be glad to draft his letter to the Secretary; which netted me perhaps some of the worst abuse I ever received from anybody, to the effect that did I think that he didn't know how to draft a letter, or something of that sort. It was a most unpleasant affair. I don't remember any more what I said to him and what he said to me. It was one of those things I would rather forget, as a matter of fact.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are there any other instances which come to your mind which you feel may have been part of the background for your dismissal from UNRRA?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Perhaps I also ought to state for the record, sir, so that you don't get the wrong impression; in between those incidents, we got along extremely well sometimes. I was asked to submit my resignation not directly by Mr. LaGuardia but by General Rooks, who was then his deputy; and 2 days after the resignation, I received a telephone call from Mr. Rooks asking me whether I would join the UNRRA staff again, on some assignment in Europe, as I remember it; and as I recall, I said there wasn't room enough for both Mr. LaGuardia and me in the organization. Perhaps that rounds

out the general picture. It was one of these flare-ups-and-downs kind of affair.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Arthur Stein?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he a former president of the UFW, United Federal Workers?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever have anything to do with that organization?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think he held some kind of office with that organization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he ever dismissed from Government employment, to your knowledge?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he ever employed by the Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He was employed in the NRA, if I remember correctly, at first. Later on he worked in the FERA.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have anything to do with securing his employment, helping him to get a Government job at any time?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It is quite possible. He is my brother-in-law. I don't think I had anything to do with his first employment, but it is quite possible, since he later worked in the FERA, that I did have something to do with it, although I don't recollect it specifically.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you help many people to get in Government?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, I think the answer would have to be "Yes," in the sense that people used my name as a recommendation, and in some instances I proposed them.

Senator FERGUSON. And have you helped many to get into the United Nations?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again I think the same answer would be true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You remember we discussed your acquaintance with and knowledge of Mr. Abraham George Silverman?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And did you state that you had no knowledge or reason to believe that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or a pro-Communist?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or that he had ever willingly cooperated or collaborated with Communists for the furtherance of Communist objectives?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you know that when he was testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1950—and let me ask: Did you know he had testified there in 1950?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I think I read that in the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that when he was testifying before that committee he had been asked:

What was the nature of your association and relationship with Mr. David Weintraub?

And that he had replied:

* * * on the advice of counsel, I refused to answer that, decline to answer that, in the exercise of my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment, since what I would say might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. That he was then asked: "Do you know where he is now?"

And he replied: "I decline to answer on the same grounds."

And that he was asked:

What positions did he hold with the United States Government, to your knowledge, other than that of economic adviser of the War Production Board?

And Mr. Silverman conferred with his counsel and then replied:

I decline to answer in the exercise of my constitutional privilege, under the fifth amendment, since what I would say might tend to incriminate me.

Did you know that?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give this committee any possible explanation for why Mr. Silverman took that position?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you never heard that before?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever at any time engage with Mr. Silverman in any discussions, activities, joint ventures, or any other type of activity which, if known, would incriminate him criminally?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you not even curious when it appeared in the paper that he had been before the Un-American Activities Committee? Was any of this ever printed in the newspaper?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect having read that in the newspaper.

I remember vaguely that I read somewhere that he had refused to answer questions. I don't remember the date of this.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that he refused to answer questions in relation to you?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Nobody ever called that to your attention?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard it before?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I never heard it before.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you surprised at it?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Rather; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just "rather?"

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir; I am surprised at it.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you do not show much surprise on these questions of communism, here, or your investigation of them. Were you curious about all this testimony going in about your friends down here in Washington?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. In a general way; yes, sir.

Mr. FERGUSON. Just generally curious?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You could not quite fathom why these people would be taken before the Un-American Activities Committee, and

refused to answer on the ground that it would tend to incriminate them? That did not even incite your curiosity?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, it incited my curiosity, but obviously not sufficiently for me to make any serious investigations of it to go into the testimony and the records.

May I say, sir: I don't remember the date of this particular thing, but you might possibly help me on that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I will try to help you.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was August 1950.

Senator FERGUSON. As late as August 1950.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, in August 1950, I was in Europe. I read about this thing very briefly in the European press. I was busy with other things. By the time I returned, I was tied up in other things, and I didn't make any special investigation of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that Silverman also refused to answer a question in relation to Irving Kaplan?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was a friend of yours?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Irving Kaplan was a friend of yours?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. He certainly was associated with me for many years.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman, for this witness.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. May I, Mr, Chairman, before I am excused, make one or two small points?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. One, I would like to make a correction of something I said yesterday. I believe I gave the name of one of the employees working under me who is a national of the U. S. S. R. as Pavlov, indicating that I wasn't sure of his name. I subsequently recollected that the name is really Ivanov, I-v-a-n-o-v.

As a second point, I believe either you, sir, or the counsel asked me yesterday about some kind of coordination committee that existed some time in the forties having to do with postwar reconstruction, of which Mr. Lattimer, myself, and either Lowenthal or Rosenthal were members, and I think I indicated yesterday that I have no recollection of such a committee. If I have made a positive statement that no such committee ever existed, I had no right to say that.

There were many interdepartmental committees at the time, and if some kind of committee existed having to do with postwar reconstruction, I may well have had something to do with it, but I simply would like the record to show that I have no recollection of any such committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did in connection with that prior testimony to which you have now referred testified that you and Mr. Murray Lattimer, or you and Mr. Rosenthal, had never met with Mr. Lowenthal in connection with such a committee or its activities or prospective activities. Is that substantially correct?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. If I said we have never met, I would like to say that if any such committee existed, I may have, but I have absolutely no recollection of any such committee or of ever having met with these people about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have testified earlier here yesterday that you and Mr. Lattimer—L-a-t-t-i-m-e-r—and Mr. Rosenthal had met on several occasions with Mr. Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Would you mind repeating that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Do you think that you might have testified on yesterday that you and Mr. Murray Lattimer and Mr. Rosenthal might have met on several occasions with Mr. Lowenthal?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I may have testified to that effect.

Mr. SOURWINE. That could have been true?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. It could have been true.

Mr. SOURWINE. In view of your having thought it over, overnight, and coming in here to make your correction, you still say that could have been true?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, it could have been true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no recollection of whether it was or not?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I have no recollection of its being true.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. Do you have anything else to say in relation to adding to or amending your testimony?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Yes, one more point, as far as I am concerned.

You made a statement earlier about certain groups of people, of whom apparently I knew a major proportion, and another group of people of whom I knew a similar number, and another group of which I knew none, and you seemed to draw some kind of conclusion from that, as if this were something that——

Senator FERGUSON. An unusual coincidence?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Something of that sort.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked you if it were a fact, but I am sure I stated no conclusion for the record, sir.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, sir, I merely would want to say that in my almost 20 years of professional work I have known probably literally thousands of people. Some of those names you mentioned whom I knew were individuals who I am sure thousands of people in Washington knew. They were in positions which made it almost necessary for other people in related fields to run into and deal with them all the time. I simply would like the record to show that in my activities as a Government official I was one of the thousands, I am sure, with whom they dealt and with whom I dealt. And that is all, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, just on that point, you remember you stated you did not know Mr. Michael Greenberg.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was with the Board of Economic Warfare and with the Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated you didn't know Joseph Gregg.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in the Research Division.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Well, I never had anything to do with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated that you didn't know Maurice Halperin.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect the name.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was head of the Latin American Division in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, and head of the Latin American Research and Analysis Division of the State Department.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. Again, I had nothing to do with Latin America at the time, but I did have to do with Europe.

Mr. SOURWINE. You stated you did, or did not, know Robert T. Miller?

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recollect that name, either.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was head of Political Research for the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, a member of the Information Service Committee, Near Eastern Affairs, the State Department, and Assistant Chief, Division of Research and Publications of the State Department.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't attempt to draw any conclusions from these, but we had here four groups of persons, all of whom had been cited in sworn testimony as members of the Communist underground. Three of them were in groups, the Silvermaster group. That was Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Solomon Adler, Norman Bursler, Frank Coe, Lauchlin Currie, Bela Gold, Mrs. Bela Gould—Sonia Gold—Abraham George Silverman, William Taylor, and William Ludwig Ullmann.

Your testimony was that you knew 6 of those 10 persons.

The Perlo group was Victor Perlo, Edward J. Fitzgerald, Harold L. Glasser, Charles Kramer, or Krevitsky, Solomon Leshinsky, Harry Magdoff, Allan Rosenberg, and Donald Niven Wheeler; and you knew 8 of the 10.

The Ware-Abt-Witt group was Harold Ware, John Abt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Alger Hiss, Donald Hiss, Henry H. Collins, Charles Kramer, and Victor Perlo. You knew six of those and were doubtful about the seventh.

And then there were 10 unattached individuals. That is, they were employed in the Government. It was testified by Miss Bentley that they had cooperated in obtaining information from the files of the Government for the use of Russian agents. And those 10 names you didn't know any of. I simply ask if there was any coincidence, if you had any explanation with regard to it.

Mr. WEINTRAUB. I can only say that it must have been coincidence, that those others were names of people who were apparently prominent and moved around a great deal, and consequently I knew them. If those others didn't move around, and I had no direct business relations with them, I didn't know them. It appears to be coincidence. That is all I can say, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next witness is Mr. Kaplan.

Will you raise your right hand, sir?

You do solemnly swear that in the matter now pending before the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your full name, and your address?

TESTIMONY OF IRVING KAPLAN, NEW YORK, N. Y. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, MILTON FRIEDMAN, NEW YORK, N. Y.)

Mr. KAPLAN. Irving Kaplan, 130 West Seventy-eighth Street.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you speak louder?

Mr. KAPLAN. I have a voice that doesn't carry very well. I will try to.

Senator FERGUSON. You have a lawyer with you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your counsel's name?

Mr. KAPLAN. Mr. Milton Friedman.

Senator FERGUSON. And what is your address, Mr. Friedman?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. 522 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your office address?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You may proceed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you stated your address for the record?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you acquainted with David Weintraub, the gentleman who has just testified here, and who is Director of the Division of Economic Stability and Development of the United Nations?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What has been your association with him?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am employed in the United Nations in the division of which he is director.

Senator FERGUSON. The division of what?

Mr. KAPLAN. The division of which he is director. With respect to any other associations outside of the U. N., I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me or degrade me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, wait. You merely say now that you will answer that one question, that you work under him, and that as to any other question you offer voluntarily the answer, "I refuse to answer any of the other questions on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me"?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That isn't what you said, is it?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, that is not what I said.

The question that I was answering was a very general one as to what were my associations with him.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean. Any other questions about your association with him you refuse to answer?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer as to any associations prior to my employment at the United Nations or any personal associations with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that the witness means to say, Mr. Chairman, that he did have other associations with Mr. Weintraub outside the United Nations, but that in that area he will respectfully decline to answer questions on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him.

Mr. KAPLAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You heard Mr. Weintraub's testimony, did you not?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes. I heard most of it. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. You heard most of his public testimony?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You could hear what he was saying?

Mr. KAPLAN. Not always, but I think I heard the better part of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Your answer indicates, as far as he is concerned, that you leave the inference, as to him, that there must have been something wrong with his negotiations with you.

Mr. KAPLAN. I intend no inferences whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. But you refuse to answer on the ground that it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know that Mr. Weintraub testified to associations with you other than the association which you have testified to, do you not?

Mr. KAPLAN. I heard him so testify; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did he testify to anything which, so far as you know, was false?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do I understand that any relationship that you had with the previous witness, outside of the United Nations, your actual job, you refuse to answer? That you refuse to answer as to those relations or activities or relationships or friendships, on the ground that it would tend to incriminate you? Is that right?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That leaves it that you may not get much information on that line.

Mr. SOURWINE. We may get a good deal, Mr. Chairman.

Did you participate in any way in the assignment of Owen Lattimore to Afghanistan?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had been assigned to head a mission to Afghanistan for the United Nations?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that, at or about the time he was so assigned?

Mr. KAPLAN. I knew it at or about the time he was so assigned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss that with any of your superiors in the United Nations?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never did discuss it with Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Mr. Weintraub participated in the assignment of Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. KAPLAN. I heard him testify that he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, so far as you know, did he testify truthfully in that regard?

Mr. KAPLAN. As far as I know, he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have testified your name is Irving Kaplan?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever known as Isador?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the name you were given at birth?

Mr. KAPLAN. I was given a name in Jewish at birth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; the equivalent of either Isador or Irving.

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right. The equivalent of Israel, Isadore, or Irving.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you testify as to where you were born, sir?
Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And where was it?
Mr. KAPLAN. Poland.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the place?
Mr. KAPLAN. I can spell it.
Mr. SOURWINE. Would you do that? I couldn't pronounce it, either, sir.
Mr. KAPLAN. Z-d-z-i-e-n-c-i-o-l.
Mr. SOURWINE. And that was in what might be termed the Province of Nowagrodek?
Mr. KAPLAN. I think that is right.
Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?
Mr. KAPLAN. September 23, 1900.
Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that your school and college records indicate that you were born December 12, 1900?
Mr. KAPLAN. I think some records did.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is incorrect?
Mr. KAPLAN. Those were incorrect, those that did; yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Your parents were Morris Kaplan and Jenni Kaplan?
Mr. KAPLAN. Right.
Mr. SOURWINE. They were both born in Grodno, Russia?
Mr. KAPLAN. Well, I couldn't be sure, but they were born in that same vicinity.
Mr. SOURWINE. Your father was a naturalized citizen of the United States?
Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you acquired your citizenship by derivation from him?
Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. Were you born in Russia, or Poland?
Mr. KAPLAN. Well, it has been listed as Poland. I think it is an area that has shifted around in the post-World War I period and subsequently.
Senator FERGUSON. You were classed as Polish, though, rather than Russian?
Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.
Mr. SOURWINE. Are you aware that your father's naturalization papers show that you were born September 1, 1901 in Russia?
Mr. KAPLAN. I am not aware that they show any date.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you remember testifying in executive session that you came to the United States about 1904?
Mr. KAPLAN. About 1904 or 1905, yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. You know that your parents entered the United States on March 17, 1902, at New York City?
Mr. KAPLAN. I say it must have been my father who entered at that time, and I entered a year or two later.
Mr. SOURWINE. And your father was, on December 18, 1911, admitted to citizenship?
Mr. KAPLAN. Approximately. That must be right.
Mr. SOURWINE. Has your American citizenship ever been questioned, Mr. Kaplan?
Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You attended elementary school and high school in the public schools of the Bronx, N. Y.?

Mr. KAPLAN. And Manhattan.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Manhattan.

The City College of New York, 1919, 1920; Columbia University, 1920, with an A. B. degree June 6, 1923?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You attended Fordham Law School from September through April 1929?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is approximately correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you a lawyer?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not receive a law degree?

Mr. KAPLAN. I had a year and a fraction of law in night school.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you an economist?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were employed in New York City and later in San Francisco, Calif., in various positions as statistical clerk, research analyst, and statistician, between July 1918 and July 1935; is that right?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think that is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you work in any other cities during that period except New York City and San Francisco?

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. In July 1935, you secured employment as a principal statistician with the Government in Washington?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the early 1930's, were you employed by the Pacific Gas & Electric Co. in San Francisco?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a fellow worker named Frederick J. McConnell?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Frederick J. McConnell took an active part in Communist demonstrations in San Francisco?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that he was regarded as an active Communist among his fellow workers?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend any Communist Party meetings with Mr. McConnell?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Senator FERGUSON. Has he ever been prosecuted in any way in connection with communism?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you ever been made a party to any litigation, criminal activities, in relation to communism?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were employed by the national research project of the WPA in Philadelphia in November of 1935?

Mr. KAPLAN. Correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And remained in that employment until August of 1938?

Mr. KAPLAN. Till when?

Mr. SOURWINE. August of 1938.

Mr. KAPLAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were associate director of that research project, working under Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have previously refused to testify on the grounds that it would tend to incriminate you about any association with Mr. Weintraub other than the United Nations.

You are now testifying about an association with Mr. Weintraub other than the United Nations.

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not intend to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did do so, didn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. It was in error.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did so testify right here, didn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I wish to withdraw that testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can't withdraw it. It is true, isn't it?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it would tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You refuse to answer whether the testimony you just gave here was true?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this witness be directed to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I do direct the witness to answer.

Mr. KAPLAN. It is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were then employed as associate director under Mr. Weintraub?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Weintraub assist you to get that position?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you consulted with counsel with regard to your refusal to answer on that, after you have opened it up with regard to the association?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You had better consult him again.

Mr. KAPLAN. All right.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I adhere to my position.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the witness be directed to answer that question.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read the question?

(The question referrred to was read by the reporter.)

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think I will require him to answer that, if he refuses on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him. They are not directly connected with the fact that he worked under him, and the fact as to whether or not he helped him get the job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any Communists or former Communists who were employed by the national research project of the Works Projects Administration?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever know that McConnell was a Communist, this person you have been asked about?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you basing your answer on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate or degrade you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am basing my answers on the constitutional privilege.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said it might incriminate or degrade you. Do you think you have any right to refuse to answer a question before this committee on the grounds that it might degrade you or tend to degrade you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am resting on the incrimination.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not contend that you have any right to refuse to answer on the grounds that it might degrade you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are not contending that you do? You are not claiming any such right?

Mr. KAPLAN. I said I am not claiming that.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. You have said that several times, and I wanted for your sake to have your position clear.

The questions you have refused to answer, then, have been refused on the grounds that they might tend to incriminate you if you answered them truthfully; is that correct?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Harry Samuel Magdoff?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the grounds it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Irving Kaplan?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am Irving Kaplan.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Whittaker Chambers?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that Mr. Magdoff and Mr. Chambers were employed by the Research Project while you were there?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you employed as a special assistant to the Attorney General in the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, from 1938 to 1940?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who helped you to get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was your immediate superior?

Mr. KAPLAN. I guess Thurman Arnold.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Arnold employ you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Senator FERGUSON. You refuse to answer the question that was asked as to whether Thurman Arnold employed you, on the ground it would tend to incriminate you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know, as a matter of fact, offhand, what the employment procedure is. I imagine I was employed by the Attorney General.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you withdraw that claim that it would tend to incriminate you, on the question of whether he did hire you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I withdraw that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consult with Mr. Thurman Arnold before you were employed by the Department of Justice?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did talk with him?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Over the telephone, or in person?

Mr. KAPLAN. In person.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you make your appointment?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Kaplan, you can't open up a line like this and then refuse to go further with it.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. May I speak?

Mr. SOURWINE. Certainly.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think he has opend up that line, sir. He has answered questions which do not have a tendency to incriminate, and when you then ask a question which he thinks tends to incriminate him he reserves his privilege.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have to rule that he may refuse to answer that. A Communist, you see, may have made the connection.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell Mr. Arnold who had sent you to him?

Mr. KAPLAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and he discuss the question of your references?

Mr. KAPLAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not?

Mr. KAPLAN. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you and he discuss the question of your qualifications?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Kaplan, do you think that a Communist could be a proper employee to help a man in the Antitrust Division of the Attorney General's office of the United States?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a research analyst, Federal Works Agency, Washington, D. C., from February 1940 to February 1942?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think those are the right dates, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell the committee how you acquired that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Kaplan, do you know whether Communists were aiding people to get into the various agencies of the United States Government?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there a ring in Washington, where Communists were active, to get other Communists into the United States Government?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you head program progress analyst for the War Production Board, February 1942 to September 1944?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you in charge of Reconstruction and Foreign Economic Development in the Foreign Economic Administration from September 1944 to July 1945?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Lauchlin Currie?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever employed by the Treasury Department?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doing what?

Mr. KAPLAN. I was employed first on an assignment to Germany with the military government.

Senator FERGUSON. The military government?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Mr. Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. KAPLAN. I didn't know him personally; no.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Harry Dexter White?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he help to get you the job in the Treasury?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were employed in Germany from July 1945 to December 1945?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think those are the correct dates.

Mr. SOURWINE. And while you were there, you served as economic adviser, Foreign Funds Control Section, assigned to the United States Group Control Council in Germany?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think that is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And in that capacity you traveled to Europe to assist in carrying on the liberated areas program of the Treasury Department?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What year was that?

Mr. KAPLAN. 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether they inquired as to whether or not you were a Communist at that time, before you got that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether any other Communists—or any Communists; I will put it that way—were with you on that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were transferred from economic adviser, Division of Monetary Research to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, as an economist, on May 19, 1946?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You retained that position until the discontinuance of the agency, January 31, 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you get that job?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever call upon you for any information?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't understand that question.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever call upon you for any information?

Mr. KAPLAN. You mean while I was working in the Treasury Department?

Senator FERGUSON. Either while you were working, or otherwise.

Mr. KAPLAN. Why, certainly. I had assignments, or I couldn't work there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever call on you for any personal information, information about you, yourself?

Mr. KAPLAN. I filed an application.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever call upon you for any personal information, about you?

Mr. KAPLAN. After that, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir, I don't recall that they ever did.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give any people's names, that they could get information about you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Presumably. That is required by the application form.

Senator FERGUSON. So the applications would show those?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am pretty sure they would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who did recommend you to the Treasury? Who did you give as reference?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the Treasury Department ever ask you whether you were a Communist? Or about Communist affiliations, or about any charges that you had such affiliations?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir, I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. They never asked you about that?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recall that they did.

Mr. SOURWINE. They didn't seem to be interested in that?

Mr. KAPLAN. There was no occasion for it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department ever call on you for any information?

Mr. KAPLAN. I never worked for the State Department. I was on an interdepartmental committee for a short time while I was with the FEA, and if you mean by my participation in that committee as being called upon to provide information, then the answer is "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did the State Department security officials ever ask you for any personal information?

Mr. KAPLAN. State Department security officials?

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot hear you.

Mr. KAPLAN. I am just trying to get the significance of that question. I don't recall that there ever could have been any occasion for that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you employed as economic affairs officer, Economic Development Section, United Nations, in January of 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not?

Mr. KAPLAN. Not in January 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you hold a job of that nature?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. When were you employed?

Mr. KAPLAN. In 1948.

Mr. SOURWINE. January of 1948?

Mr. KAPLAN. Beginning in February, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. February 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you testify when you left the United States Government employment?

Mr. KAPLAN. No. Some time in 1947, about the summertime.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a Government job after the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was discontinued in January 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not?

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was the Government employment that you left some time in the summer of 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think the termination of that project took place actually, with respect to me, at that time.

Mr. SOURWINE. In the summer of 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. About June or July. I don't remember how long.

Mr. SOURWINE. The agency didn't exist after January 31, 1947?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think there was a technicality. There was a formal discontinuance. The work of completing the report continued until March or April. And my pay with the annual leave involved in it continued into the summer.

Mr. SOURWINE. You entered on duties at the United Nations February 9, 1948?

Mr. KAPLAN. February 2, I think. I am not sure.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many employees are there in the Economic Stability and Development Division of the United Nations?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know. I heard Mr. Weintraub say there were about 125.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that about right?

Mr. KAPLAN. It sounds to me about right.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know William Remington?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Alger Hiss?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many of the employees in the Economic Stability and Development Section of the United Nations are Communists?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many of them have Communist sympathies?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether or not the United Nations inquires into a man's political beliefs, as to whether or not he is a Communist or a Capitalist or even an anarchist?

Mr. KAPLAN. It is my understanding it does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Dean Acheson?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Solomon Adler?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Larry Adler?

Mr. KAPLAN. I know he is a harmonica player.

Senator FERGUSON. A what?

Mr. KAPLAN. I know he is a harmonica player, and I have heard him perform.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know him?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Ferri, F-e-r-r-i Asakian, A-s-a-k-i-a-n?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recall ever having heard that name before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Alben Barkley?

Mr. KAPLAN. I know he is Vice President of the United States.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Veet Bassie, B-a-s-s-i-e?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know V. Frank Coe?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know you are being pretty selective about which ones you will answer and which ones you won't answer, don't you? What is the reason for that?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Henry Hill Collins?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Henry Hill Collins, Jr.?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know of any such person.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know of any such person as Henry Hill Collins, Jr.?

Mr. KAPLAN. What was the previous name you read?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about this name now. Do you or did you know Henry Hill Collins, Jr.?

Mr. KAPLAN. Oh. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You just said you didn't know any such person, didn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I didn't have any idea who you meant. I thought it must be a different person from the one you read before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then you do know a Henry Hill Collins?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You see, you did testify you didn't know any such person as Henry Hill Collins, Jr., didn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I answered to that question, and it seemed to me it must be a different person from the other, and the "Junior" made me think it must be an infant that I don't know anything about.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, didn't you testify that you don't know any such person as Henry Hill Collins, Jr.?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes; I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that true?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know of any child by the name of Henry Hill Collins.

Mr. SOURWINE. I didn't ask you about a child. I asked you if you knew Henry Hill Collins, Jr., and you said you didn't know any such person, and I am asking you now: Was your testimony true when you said that?

Mr. KAPLAN. My answer meant at the time that I didn't know what I was thinking of as that name, as distinguished from a name that had been given me before.

Mr. SOURWINE. What were you thinking of?

Mr. KAPLAN. I told you I was thinking of a child.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you now not what you meant, but I am asking you now whether your testimony was true when you said you didn't know any such person as Henry Hill Collins, Jr.

Mr. KAPLAN. If you mean the same person as Henry Hill Collins, I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the answer your counsel just told you to make, isn't it?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right. That is the answer I am giving you on advice of counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. He leaned over and asked you to say that, without your asking him anything.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That isn't a fair statement. We have been conferring for the last 3 minutes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I asked the witness a question, and I ask counsel to please remain quiet.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I ask the Senator's permission to make a comment, since that does reflect on me.

Senator FERGUSON. The question is now: Did he confer with you, Counsel?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He did confer with me several times in the last few minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. And do I understand that you are just giving him legal advice, rather than advice on the facts?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Most definitely, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may I have the witness who is under oath answer the question that I asked him?

Didn't your counsel lean over and tell you what to say in answer to that question, without your asking him?

Mr. KAPLAN. Sir, I consulted counsel at the very beginning, saying that I couldn't see what kind of person this might be, if it is distinguishable from the first one, and whether I shouldn't say I don't know of any such person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you answer the question?

Senator FERGUSON. He is answering it.

Mr. KAPLAN. My consultations continued after that. They were never interrupted. And my counsel advised me at the end as to how to give the explanation, which I think is exactly the same explanation I have been giving over and over again.

Mr. SOURWINE. Answer the question categorically.

Didn't your counsel lean over and tell you what to say in answer to that question without your having asked him?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think you will have to drop the "without your having asked him."

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't turn to him and say, "What shall I say?", did you?

Mr. KAPLAN. This was a continuing consultation.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. He had been leaning over and telling you what to say in answer to any question, hadn't he?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't think that is fair, either.

Certainly, it is an improper paraphrase.

Mr. KAPLAN. I have indicated that I consulted with counsel on this question from the start, because it seemed to me to be a tricky question. There were parts of the name that were in common, and then there was something else. And my consultations were continuing, as I see it, and the fact that it became a three cornered conversation I don't think changed the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. But your actual testimony is now that you do not know this person? Or you refuse to answer? Which is it?

Mr. KAPLAN. My actual testimony is that if by this person is meant someone who is a junior, an offspring, of any Henry Hill Collins, then my answer is, "I don't know."

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know the junior? If it is the other fellow you know him?

Mr. KAPLAN. If it is the same person, I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your answer is that if the person I asked about, to wit, Henry Hill Collins, Jr., is a junior and offspring of a Henry Hill Collins, you don't know any such person? Is that your answer?

Mr. KAPLAN. That is right. I don't know any such person.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a Tom Collins?

Mr. KAPLAN. You mean a drink?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know a person named Tom Collins?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't think so. It may be a very common name.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't think I am making that name up, do you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am sure there are lots of Tom Collinses. I don't recall knowing any.

Mr. SOURWINE. For your information, there is a Tom Collins on the professional staff of this committee.

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know him, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been asked if you know Mr. Laughlin Currie.

Mr. KAPLAN. I have been asked that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Laughlin Currie ever recommend you for a position with the Government?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Pauline Friedland?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she ever live at 9 Greenwood Court, Queens, N. Y.?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know the address.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she related to you in any way?

Mr. KAPLAN. She is my sister-in-law.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your sister-in-law?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your wife's sister?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she ever live in Queens?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am not sure, but she very well may have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you know whether your sister-in-law ever lived in Queens?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know for certain. I know that she once worked out in Long Island, and presumably lived somewhere around there, but I wouldn't know whether it is Queens.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether the Pauline Friendland of your acquaintance was ever associated in any way with the Communist Party?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know that she ever was.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether she ever was.

Didn't she ask you in 1936 to sign a Communist Party nominating petition for State and city elections?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a person could have asked you to sign a Communist nominating petition if they were not a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. You realize that a refusal to answer—

I will rephrase that. I don't want to presume to be giving legal advice. I suggest you ask your counsel whether refusal to answer on those grounds will be any protection to you against perjury committed here.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes, I realize that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have said, have you not, that you did not know whether Pauline Friedland was a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she was in any way associated with communism or with Communist Party objectives?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Edward J. Fitzgerald?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Barry Fitzgerald?

Mr. KAPLAN. The name seems familiar to me, but my counsel tells me it is a movie actor's name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your counsel tells you it is a movie actor. Do you know him?

Mr. KAPLAN. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Patrick F. X. Fitzpatrick?

Mr. KAPLAN. That sounds like a familiar name, but the only reaction I have is that the components of the name are familiar ones. I don't recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't recognize that as a Communist name, do you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recognize it as the name of any person at the present time.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't recognize the name of Patrick F. X. Fitzpatrick as a Communist name?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recognize it as a name, I say, of any person that I have knowledge of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Isaac Folkoff, F-o-l-k-o-f-f?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Isaac Folkoff was a charter member of the Communist Party in 1918?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Folkoff was a man who Whittaker Chambers testified he contacted in 1935 in San Francisco at a time when he, Chambers, had a money belt that was to be delivered to someone whose identity he did not know?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understand I am only asking you if you knew about Whittaker Chambers' testimony.

Mr. KAPLAN. I understand.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you refuse to answer?

Mr. KAPLAN. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or did you not know Jacob Golos?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Charles Kramer?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Ferdinand Kransky—K-r-a-n-s-k-y or K-r-a-n-s-k-i?

Mr. KAPLAN. I know of no one by that name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Solomon Lischinsky?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Harry Samuel Magdoff?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know David Neyhaus—N-e-y-h-a-u-s or N-e-i-h-a-u-s?

Mr. KAPLAN. The name is unfamiliar to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know David Niles?

Mr. KAPLAN. I recognize the name as a former executive assistant to the President. I don't believe I ever met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to seem out of order. It is my opinion, without hearing the conversation, that counsel is advising the witness what to answer on every question.

If the Chair desires that that continue, I will have no more protest. If the Chair wants to ask counsel to sit one seat apart from the witness, so that if the witness wants to confer he will have to do so voluntarily——

Senator FERGUSON. I think this ought to appear on the record. When you want to confer with counsel, ask whether you may confer with counsel.

Mr. KAPLAN. Ask on the record?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I take it that I am not required to comment on counsel's statement that I have been giving answers?

Senator FERGUSON. No. In the future, you will ask whether you may confer with counsel. Then there will be no misunderstanding on the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Isadore Gibby Needleman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I should like to confer with counsel.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. The question, as I recall it, is: Do I know Isadore Gibby Needleman? The answer is "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know that he is a former attorney for the Amtorg Trading Corp.?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. How well do you know him?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any business dealings with him?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Chair desire to require the witness to answer those questions?

Senator FERGUSON. No; I believe not. Maybe in his mind he thinks that would tend to incriminate him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know George N. Perazich.

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Victor Perlo?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Lee Pressman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Helen Witte Silvermaster?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recognize that as a name of a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have answered one question here with regard to whether you recognized a name as that of a Communist, haven't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you didn't recognize it as the name of anybody, didn't you?

I gave you the name Patrick Fitzpatrick, and you said you didn't recognize it.

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. On fact, or on law?

Mr. KAPLAN. On law.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You may confer with him.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. What is the question I am supposed to answer?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recognize the name of Helen Witte Silvermaster as the name of a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then I asked you the question as to whether you had not answered such a question with regard to Henry Patrick Fitzpatrick.

Mr. KAPLAN. I answered that I don't know of any such person.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Well, if you didn't know of such a person as Helen Witte Silvermaster, you could answer the question the same way, couldn't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. If I didn't know of the existence of any such person?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel on that?

Mr. SOURWINE. Surely.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Harold Ware?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you or do you know Harry Dexter White?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your wife, Dorothy, ever a member of that organization?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties had been designated as Communist by the Attorney General?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a woman named Bentley?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Miss Bentley in testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee had testified with regard to you:

He was employed in the WPB. He was in a very peculiar position, because he was paying his dues to the Perlo group and giving his information to the Silvermaster group. Somehow the two groups got a little scrambled at that point.

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan consults with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew she had so testified?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was her testimony truthful?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Alger Hiss?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Charles Kramer?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Charles Kramer, when testifying under oath, and asked, "Do you know Irving Kaplan?" stated, "I must decline to answer that question, on the grounds it may tend to incriminate me"?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I didn't know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is not a case of your doing him now the same courtesy he did you then?

Mr. KAPLAN. You expect me to answer that question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Abraham George Silverman, testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and asked, "Do you know Irving Kaplan?" had stated, "On advice of counsel, I refuse to answer that question, in the exercise of my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment"?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I didn't know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hold any meetings at your apartment that were attended by any of these persons: Veet Bassie, Harry Magdoff, Edward J. Fitzgerald?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever attend meetings at the apartment of Abraham George Silverman which were attended by those persons, or any of them?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. You used to play ball with Harry Victor White?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he had testified under oath that you used to play ball together?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think so. I think I saw a press account.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he testify truthfully?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, you may.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Bela Gold had testified that he knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Sonia Gold has testified that she knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Frank Coe had testified that he knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I am not certain, but I have some vague recollection that I knew Frank Coe had testified, and testified with respect to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he testify truthfully when he said he knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me or degrade me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Whittaker Chambers had testified that he knew you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Mr. Chambers had testified that he asked George Silverman to get him a job in the Government, that J. Peters agreed to that separately, that Silverman referred him to Irving Kaplan, at that time co-head of something called the Federal Research Project, or the National Research Project; that Mr. Kaplan was then living in Philadelphia, that he, Chambers, went to Philadelphia, and spent an evening with Mr. Kaplan and discussed the problem? Did you know he had testified substantially to that effect?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I can't say I knew that whole sequence as read there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Whittaker Chambers come to see you?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the grounds that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Mr. Whittaker Chambers testified that he had known you before and that you knew his real name?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel on that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. No, I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you in fact know Mr. Whittaker Chambers' real name?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel on that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know or do you know Marion Bachrach?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that in testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee, Marion Bachrach, being asked, "Do you know Irving Kaplan?" replied, "I refuse to answer," claiming her privilege under the Constitution?

Mr. KAPLAN. I did not know that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was your wife ever a member of the Washington League of Women Shoppers?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know the Washington League of Women Shoppers had been cited as a Communist-front organization?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel about that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SURWINE. Were you ever a member of the United American Spanish Aid Committee?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make any donations to that committee?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know you were on the mailing list of that committee?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that committee had been designated as Communist by the Attorney General?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever belong to the Southern Conference for Human Welfare?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Bella Rodman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't recall any such name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Bella Rodman was associated with the Southern Conference for Human Welfare?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether Bella Rodman was a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did your wife know Bella Rodman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you or did you know Henry Fowler?

Mr. KAPLAN. You are talking about the man who is now head of the National Production Authority?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am talking about the man who was chairman of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare in 1946.

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the man who was chairman of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare in 1946 the same Henry Fowler who has just been named to replace Manly Fleischmann?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, surely.

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the Henry Fowler who has just been named to replace Manly Fleischmann?

Mr. KAPLAN. I think I have met Henry Fowler on some occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you contact him in July of 1946 or at any other time for the purpose of making arrangments for your wife, Dorothy, to furnish assistance to the Southern Conference for Human Welfare?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you still say you don't know whether this is the same Henry Fowler who was with the Southern Conference for Human Welfare?

Mr. KAPLAN. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the Southern Conference for Human Welfare had been cited as a Communist-front organization?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Jay David Whittaker Chambers at Columbia University in the early 1920's?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you at that time in frequent association with Socialists?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that Abraham George Silverman was employed by or collaborating with the Communist Party or a Communist group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give Mr. Silverman any information to be passed on to Nathan Gregory Silvermaster?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know Nathan Gregory Silvermaster?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know he was the head of a Communist group in Washington?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever give data to the Silvermaster group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever belong to the Silvermaster group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay dues to the Silvermaster group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you belong to the Perlo group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay dues to the Perlo group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the Bentley group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you belong to the Bentley group?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know whether Elizabeth Terrill Bentley ever was a Communist?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you know, as a matter of fact, that she is a self-confessed Soviet espionage agent?

Mr. KAPLAN. I am aware of reports that she has confessed.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you know about a lot of her testimony. On various occasions you have shown familiarity with her testimony. You must know she has testified that she was a Soviet espionage agent, don't you?

Mr. KAPLAN. Was that your original question?

Mr. SOURWINE. I am just asking you now: Do you know that she was a Soviet espionage agent?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Mr. SOURWINE. Sure.

Mr. KAPLAN. I know that she said so. I don't know whether she was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever know Earl Browder?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay Communist dues to Earl Browder?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever furnish Government information to any unauthorized persons?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you, on May 29, 1949, decline to even discuss an allegation that you had furnished Government information to an unauthorized person?

Mr. KAPLAN. Will you read that question again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you on May 29, 1949, decline to even discuss any allegation that you had furnished Government information to any unauthorized persons?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you state that any such charge was ridiculous?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now state that any such charge is ridiculous?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever furnish unauthorized Government information to Abraham George Silverman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you on May 29, 1947, deny that you had furfinished unauthorized Government information to Abraham George Silverman?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same ground.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the provisions of the Alien Registration Act?

Mr. KAPLAN. Not especially.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about the provisions of section 20 (a) of the Internal Security Act?

Mr. KAPLAN. Not especially.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has it ever been suggested to you that you might be required to register under the terms of that act?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever registered as a representative or agent of a foreign government?

Mr. KAPLAN. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay dues to the Communist Party?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now a Communist Party member?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a Soviet espionage agent?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you a Soviet espionage agent now?

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever conspire to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)

Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you now engaged in an active conspiracy to overthrow the United States Government by force and violence?

Mr. KAPLAN. May I consult with counsel?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes.
(Mr. Kaplan confers with his counsel.)
Mr. KAPLAN. I refuse to answer, on the same grounds.
Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator FERGUSON. That is all.
We will recess without a particular day.
Mr. SOURWINE. You are excused from the subpena, Mr. Kaplan, and we will fix up your travel papers.
(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., Friday, May 16, 1952, the hearing was recessed, the committee to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 29, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER SECURITY LAWS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a. m., in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator Homer Ferguson presiding.

Present: Senators O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator FERGUSON. The committee will come to order.

As has been the custom, General, we swear all witnesses in this particular hearing. You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this committee, being a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT, ACCOMPANIED BY THOMAS CORCORAN, ESQ., WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, will you give your full name and your present occupation to the reporter.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Claire Lee Chennault, major general, United States Army, retired. I am presently employed as an executive in Civil Air Transport, an airline operating in non-Communist areas of the Far East.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you operating that airline now in the non-Communist areas of the Far East?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in China during World War II?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes; I was in China from May 31, 1937, until I departed August 8, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. And you were there continually during that period?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Except for two or three trips outside of China for conferences.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, General Chennault has been called here today to be asked questions under oath concerning statements that appeared in his book that have been relevant to this inquiry. It is for that limited purpose that General Chennault has been brought here today.

General Chennault, were you in China when General Marshall in late 1945 went to China with his orders in order to bring about a coalition government between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I came to the United States in 1945, after the Japanese war, and returned to China, I believe on January 4, 1946. I did remain in China thereafter while General Marshall was there.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that General Marshall, as you say in your book, applied pressure in the Stilwell manner by shutting off the flow of all military aid to China including war surplus bought and paid for by the Chinese? You have made that statement in your book, General. Is that a fact?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes; that is correct according to the best of my information and knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know that? Will you tell us precisely how you know that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I know it because I was informed by the Chinese Government officials that they had ceased to receive war equipment manufactured by the United States. When I inquired why, they said that General Marshall had forbidden its shipment from American-held islands and from the United States. That embargo did not last the entire time that General Marshall was in China, but was imposed some time in the spring of 1946 or early summer and did continue thereafter for the entire period that General Marshall was there.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of this embargo?

Mr. CHENNAULT. War materials of any kind could not be shipped from the United States territory or territory held by the United States at that time, including the islands of the Pacific, to China.

Senator FERGUSON. That was military material?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it could have been used for military purposes in China if it had been shipped?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was in effect held from the Nationalist government which was really the only government at that time in China?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say the embargo extended not only to the aid that we were giving the Chinese but what they themselves could buy on the free and open market?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I was told that the Chinese had actually purchased considerable quantities of what we designated surplus war materials on the former Japanese islands in the Western Pacific, particularly Okinawa, Guam, and other islands, and that this embargo applied to material purchased by the Chinese as war surplus.

Senator FERGUSON. You were in what authority at that time, that you were told this, General?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Strictly as a friend and wartime companion at arms of the Chinese officials. I was not in any official position in China at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time you were not a general in the United States Army?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I was retired. I had no official position with the Chinese Government at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any reason to doubt that that order was in existence?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, sir; I had no reason to doubt it. On the other hand there were other indications that these reports were true.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it true because the material was not coming in?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right. I lived in Shanghai, which is the port of entry for all of this stuff, and it simply was not coming in.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you were in Shanghai, a port of entry, and there were no shipments coming through that port?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And you say that is the principal port where they would have brought it through?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is the principal port where this stuff would have come through.

Mr. MORRIS. You say General Marshall extracted a promise from the Generalissimo not to use the Chinese force already in China on the ground that this would constitute an offensive action? How do you know that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Throughout the so-called trust period, the Chinese Air Force was restrained from attacking the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Again I was told by responsible Chinese officials. The chief of the Chinese Air Force had been a close companion of mine throughout the war. I worked with him on very intimate terms and he informed me.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you have known, because of your position at that time, of any extensive Chinese air offensives against the Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. I had other sources of information through other Chinese Air Force officers with whom I was well acquainted.

Mr. MORRIS. But because of your experience as an air fighter in China would you have known of such an offensive if one had been undertaken?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. I might explain to you that for a period of more than 2 years I was appointed, with the consent of our President, as Chief of Staff of the Chinese Air Force. For that reason I was intimately acquainted with all of the top ranking and many of the lower ranking Chinese Air officers.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, are you acquainted with the various truces and the general truce that General Marshall tried to impose on the Chinese Government at the time they were fighting the Chinese Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. That was common knowledge in China. General Marshall proposed a truce, with a cease fire, and with each side to occupy the positions held at that time. The truce was accepted and the truce came, within a point, to consist of one Nationalist officer, one Chinese officer, and one American officer. They were dispatched to all of the principal points held by both Nationalist and Communist troops to enforce the cease fire. That cease fire lasted for almost a year, according to my recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. How would a truce team operate, General?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I described the composition of the team already. They went to the principal points held by the Nationalist and Com-

munist troops and remained in observation of troop activities so there would be a cease fire.

Mr. MORRIS. You say in your book here that very often the Chinese Government would have a Communist military force defeated when a truce would be imposed on them. What do you know about that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. There were several instances where that occurred. I think the first instance occurred down on East River, east of Canton and north of Hong Kong. The East River Communists had a line by the Nationalist forces, and with the cease fire they were induced to cease attacking them. Those troops were moved out by sea, in vessels furnished by the United States, according to my recollection, and moved up to Shantung Province by water. That is the first instance I recall where Communist troops were saved by the intervention of Americans.

The next instance I recall, I believe was with the Communist force pinned up in the mountains north of Hankow, in the northern Hunan Province. They were almost entirely surrounded by Nationalist troops, and again American officials headed by General Marshall intervened and persuaded the Nationalists to let them off, and marched them off into Shantung. The third instance that I recall was Kalgan Pass.

Mr. MORRIS. That was one of the most important.

Mr. CHENNAULT. The Nationalists had taken Kalgan Pass by force of arms, and as long as they held the Communist troops to the south and southwest were unable to move to the northeast. The Nationalists were persuaded to pull out of the pass and open the highway through there so the Communists could move northeast. They did that and they moved into Manchuria where they received arms from sources we will name later.

Mr. MORRIS. How did they receive those arms that you refer to later on?

Mr. CHENNAULT. My information was that they were given arms by the Russians who had occupied Manchuria previously and who continued to occupy Manchuria after this Japanese surrender.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the source of your information on that point?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Chinese officials. No American was in that area at that time. I didn't get in there, therefore I could not have first-hand knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. As far as you know, General Chennault, was the Chinese Government at that time a one-party government?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No; the Chinese Government was a government of several parties. The Kuomintang was merely the strongest party. I recall two other parties to mind, the Youths Party and the Social Democratic Party. There were other parties also, but I can't remember the names now.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say there were other parties in the Government, did they have seats in a national assembly?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. Under the agreement or terms which were agreed to before the election of the National Assembly, each party was allotted a certain number of seats, regardless of whether the candidates of that party won in the election or not. The Kuomintang Party was by far the strongest, and, as a matter of fact, the Kuomintang Party did give up seats that their candidates had won in the

election in order to have more parties represented in the Assembly.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Generalissimo assign any seats to the Chinese Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, the Communists were assigned a definite number of seats, but the number was calculated to be in fair proportion to the number of Communists as compared to the number of party members of the other parties.

Mr. MORRIS. In the excerpts of the book, General, that we have introduced into our record you make the statement that:

> At the time of the Marshall mission the Chinese Communists terms for entering the Chinese National Government were one-third of the Cabinet members including the War Minister, retention of a Communist army of 48 divisions, and the governorships of all provinces where the Communist troops then claimed occupation of a majority of the area.

Is that a true statement, General Chennault?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Those are the conditions that were published in the press at that time, or approximately the same conditions that were published. I can't recall whether they are exactly the same in every condition or not. But those were substantially the conditions published in the press and accepted as being the actual terms of agreement with the Communists; I mean, proposed by the Communists. They never did accept it.

Mr. MORRIS. What else do you know about the Communist demands at that time, General Chennault?

Mr. CHENNAULT. In my recollection, each time the Communist demands were met, either wholly or partly, the Communists would bring up fresh demands and thereby go into further negotiations and delays.

Senator FERGUSON. Somewhat like we are going through today in Korea, is that it?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, a great deal of the general tactics, to make demands today and have fresh demands tomorrow, or changes in demands that made them a little more territory.

Senator FERGUSON. We discovered during those periods, at the time General Marshall was there, that you couldn't negotiate a real truce or peace with Communists, did we not?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I was convinced of that. I don't know whether everyone was or not.

Senator FERGUSON. It was demonstrated rather clearly.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Clearly demonstrated. The record was there.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, the Communists and many people writing of military activities in China have stated that the Chinese Communist guerrillas did extensive fighting of the Japanese. Could you give us any testimony along those lines?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I heard those reports and I disagreed with them. I don't believe, after 1941, that the Communists did any extensive fighting with the Japanese except in a few areas, just a few areas held strongly by the Communists where the Japanese had to clear them up in order to open the lines of communication, and the Communists did fight until driven out of those areas. But afterward, the Communist fighting, according to my information, and I was on the ground at the time and had intelligence officers all over the country, was limited to sporadic raids on small Japanese garrisons, of taking food and ammunition, arms.

Mr. SOURWINE. General, you said there was no extensive fighting of the Japanese by the Communists, except in a few places. Do you mean to imply that there was extensive fighting of the Japanese by the Communists at any point?

Mr. CHENNAULT. At a few places, where the Communists were in great strength and held the place for some time and when the Japanese desired to clear a railroad through there, there was hot fighting in that area.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was not any extended fighting.

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, sir; it was not in accord with any general plan or order of fighting, simply sporadic and occurred in isolated areas where the Communists had been entrenched for several years.

Mr. SOURWINE. By extensive in that regard you don't mean over a wide area or with large numbers of troops involved, do you?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. There wasn't, then, a planned campaign by the Communists against the Japanese.

Mr. CHENNAULT. There was no evidence of such campaign.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, were you in China when General Stilwell was in command of American forces in China and when he had on his staff as political advisers John Davies, Paul Ludden, and John K. Emmerson and John S. Service?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you able to observe the political activities of those four advisers to General Stilwell?

Mr. CHENAULT. Some of them I did. I didn't have opportunity to observe Ludden, for instance.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you able to observe the activities of John P. Davies?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. Not under my immediate observation, but I had first-hand reports of his activities. I would like to explain that my headquarters were in Kunming, where General Stilwell was in Chungking 420 miles by air and much farther by ground. So I didn't have direct observation.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, in your book you said:

> I do not think that Stilwell had any political motives in encouraging his Chungking staff to function as a public relations bureau for the Yenan Communists. It was of a piece with his earlier dalliance with the Kuomintang reactionaries. He was simply unconcerned with anything but his immediate objectives. The Yenan Communists shrewdly tickled Stilwell's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his military prowess and clinched him as an ally by shrewdly letting it be known that they would be delighted to have him command their armies.

At the end you said:

> Since it was still official American policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chungking Government, it was a common joke that Stillwell's headquarters were definitely opening a private foreign policy with John Davies as Secretary of State.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That was a common report.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what you know about that, General?

Mr. CHENNAULT. The staff at Chungking gave dinners at which prominent Chinese officials were invited and also attended by prominent Americans. They repeatedly told the glowing stories of the Communist fighting. They finally permitted an evacuation plan to leak out. According to the evacuation plan, all Americans in Chung-

king were assigned definite positions in vehicles and the line of retreat or evacuation of Chungking was to be over the Old Tea Road, that is up through Lanjo, out through Tsinan Province, one of the old tea roads. All of that not only tended to reduce national morale, but actually did reduce it. They got the jitters because the Americans were fully prepared to evacuate. That was one evidence of the bewilderment of the National Government by the Chungking staff. When I use the words "leak out," you know, of course, that an evacuation plan is supposed to be secret and should not become public information.

Mr. MORRIS. You mention in your book, General Chennault, that General Stilwell wanted to take an army after the battle of Okinawa, wanted to take an army and land on the north China coast and commence operations against the Japanese.

Mr. CHENNAULT. In late July of 1945 our ambassador at Chungking, who was then Mr. Hurley, received a message from Washington with instructions to transmit it to the Chinese Government. The substance of that message was that General Stilwell commanded the Tenth Army on Okinawa, and proposed to move part or all of his Tenth Army to the coast north of Shanghai, north of Shensi River, and on an approach to Yungso, there he would arm some two hundred or three hundred thousand Communists and turn south to take Shanghai. Had that been done, of course, the Communists would have occupied the mouth of the Yangtze River, which is the vital artery of all central China, and had been in possession of Shanghai and the Shanghai River Valley. It would have been impossible for the Nationalists to come out of Shanghai after the war was over. This plan, of course, met with great disfavor from the officials of the Chinese Nationalist Government and was dropped. That was in late July, just before the Japanese surrender.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, did you have any indication of learning what the official position was with respect to aiding the Chinese Nationalists in the period 1946 to 1949?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I have already told the story of the embargo on shipment of war materials during 1946 and part of 1947. After the embargo was removed some war materials purchased by the Chinese did come into China. It was not until December—let me ask you, When was Shanghai taken? Was it in 1948 or 1949?

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault's question was, When was Shanghai taken, 1948 or 1949. I think it was 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. What month would it be in?

Mr. CHENNAULT. May of 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. It was May of 1949.

Mr. CHENNAULT. I should remember, but I have forgotten. It was not until December the year before the fall of Shanghai——

Mr. MORRIS. December of 1948.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That the first shipload of materials arrived from the United States. The ship was diverted from Shanghai to Formosa, on orders of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. But you see, they started to move over into Formosa in the early fall or summer of 1949. They were driven out.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, that ship was diverted from Shanghai to Formosa and was held in a harbor for a period of about two weeks.

This came to my personal attention because Chinese officers came to me and asked me to use my best efforts to have the ship sent back to Shanghai. The fighting was then close to the Yangtze Valley. The fighting was just north of Nanking at that time. So war materials given to the Nationalists after 1947, after the removal of the embargo, did not reach the Nationalist Army in the field.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have an opportunity to observe the attitude of any United States officials in China at that time, with respect to the assistance given to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Observe activities——

Mr. MORRIS. Of American officials in China at that time.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. Just as a matter of common knowledge, I was in Nanking and Shanghai most of the time. I saw our counsul general in Shanghai often. I saw the Ambassador rather frequently. So I did have a chance to observe them.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were some of the officials that you spoke with at that time? Did you ever speak to Mr. Philip Jessup?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, I don't remember speaking to Mr. Jessup in China at that time. I talked to our Ambassador, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you speak to Jessup at any time about these matters?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, I did, in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. On what occasion was that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I had two or three talks with Mr. Jessup here in Washington. During those talks, I urged immediate aid to the Nationalists in order to prevent the Communists from continued conquest of China. At the last talk I had with him, I was told that a white paper was going to be issued in a few days, telling the whole story of Sino-American relations. My opinion was asked as to whether it should be issued, and I replied—I urged that it not be issued——

Senator FERGUSON. Did you give him a reason?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, I said it would certainly destroy what morale remained in the Nationalists and on the other hand would raise the morale of the Communists to a considerable extent if we issued any such paper.

Mr. MORRIS. And did he express opposition to the Nationalist Government at that time? Did he express opposition to aiding the Nationalist Government?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, but the paper was issued in a few days.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he say why they were issuing it at that particular time?

Mr. CHENNAULT. To explain Sino-American relations.

Senator FERGUSON. That was his only explanation, to explain the relations?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right, and he never explained to me why it was issued, over my protests.

Senator FERGUSON. After you saw it, what do you have to say now about issuing it at that time? Did it do what you said it would do?

Mr. CHENNAULT. It did. It destroyed moral in China to a great extent, Nationalist China, and increased the morale of the Communists a great deal.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chenault, based on your knowledge of the situation in China at that time, was it clearly understood by you that

if the Nationalist Government did go down to defeat that the only force remaining would be the Communist force in China?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you comment on that, General Chennault?

Mr. CHENNAULT. It was my feeling all along.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it more than a feeling on your part?

Senator FERGUSON. Were you convinced of that from the facts that you knew?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. When I use the word feeling, I mean that it was my inmost sentiment, my strongest belief.

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any other force in China that could possibly take over if the Nationalist Government was defeated?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Absolutely not, and that proved to be true.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean other than the Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Other than the Communists. I mean, a third force.

Senator FERGUSON. It was well organized by that time, was it not?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Very well organized.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any doubt at any time that the Communists of China were tied directly to Moscow?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And part of the international Communists.

Mr. CHENNAULT. I had no doubt whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. And that came from the facts that you learned while you were there in China?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, were you acquainted with the ultimatum that was delivered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek by General Stilwell in late 1944? Have you any knowledge of that?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Not first-hand knowledge. I was not present. I was in Kunming at that time, and this took place in Chungking. I did have reports from people who were present at the time. My most recent report was from General Stilwell's confidential aid, who is a brigadier general in the Chinese army.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his name, General? Was it General Ferris?

Mr. CHENNAULT. John Lee, a brigadier general. In fact, the whole time Stilwell was in China he was with him, and the most trusted adviser and Chinese interpretive aid. John Lee told me the whole story, because he did interpet it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what happened from that source of information?

Mr. CHENNAULT. John Lee told me that during this series of conferences in October of 1944 General Stilwell kept insisting on command of the Chinese armies, and the Generalissimo finally agreed to let him have command of the army in China. Then at one of the last conferences General Stilwell mentioned that he would like to arm the Chinese Communist armies and employ them. They had offered him command of the armies previously and still offered it to him. The Generalissimo replied that he didn't trust the Chinese Communists and would oppose it. After thinking it over a day or two, the Generalissimo sent for General Stilwell, and at that time General Stilwell had delivered his final message that had been reported by numerous witnesses here before, General Wedemeyer among others, I believe, in which a cable from the President insisted that Stilwell be made com-

mander of the Chinese armies. The Generalissimo then withdrew his agreement to appoint Stilwell as commander of the Chinese Army and refused to do so. He then cabled Washington and asked for Stilwell's release. That is the report John Lee gave me.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time, did the Generalissimo oppose General Stilwell?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes. I don't think he opposed him, but after the Burma debacle in the early summer of 1942 the Generalissimo lost confidence in General Stilwell as a field commander. You remember, the Chinese armies put under Stilwell's command were lost with all of their equipment.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know when the Generalissimo first asked that General Stilwell be relieved of his command?

Mr. CHENNAULT. No; I don't know when that was.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that in June 1944 Vice President Wallace recommended that Stilwell be replaced by General Wedemeyer?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes; I have information to that effect, information which I consider reliable.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what you know about that episode, General?

Mr. CHENNAULT. When Vice President Wallace visited China he soon learned that there was a lack of harmony between the Generalissimo and Stilwell. He took pains to question numerous officers regarding that rift, and finally in my opinion it became his opinion that the release of General Stilwell was necessary in order to restore the best relations possible between China and the United States. I believe that Vic President Wallace did recommend his relief at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. At that time General Stilwell was advocating arming the Chinese Communists; was he not?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long had he been doing that; do you know?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I don't know, except as a matter of recollection he had advocated using the Chinese Communists all the time he had been theater commander. I will go back further. If you remember, the war with Japan really began in August 1937, and the Chinese Communist armies operated under the over-all command of the Generalissimo until about the winter of 1941, when they refused to obey his orders about crossing to the south of the Yangtze River. After that instance, it was that the Nationalist armies destroyed Communist units south of the Yangtze River, that the Communists broke off from their close cooperation with the Nationalists. But General Stilwell continued to advocate the use of the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, could you tell us something about the extent to which the political advisers of General Stilwell reflected his good disposition toward the Chinese Communists?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes; they did that. One illustration of that fact is the military mission first at Yenan. General Stilwell obtained permission from the Generalissimo to establish a mission at Yenan, primarily, according to his statement to the Generalissimo, to collect intelligence in the areas controlled by the Communists in the north. Later, that mission was expanded to include meteorological observation parties, and to include American diplomatic or consular officials, or both. I have forgotten just how they were assigned. They remained in Yenan until after Stilwell was relieved of his command in

China, and until Wedemeyer ordered them back, and the mission at Yenan was closed down by Wedemeyer's orders. A very interesting incident occurred in relation to that mission which has not been published.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. CHENNAULT. In February 1945 both Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer returned to the United States on orders for conferences. Before departing from the China theater General Wedemeyer issued an order and required every officer under his command in China, every American officer, to sign this order as evidence that he had read it, and returned it to his headquarters in Chungking for file. This order said substantially, "You are directed to execute American policy in China and not to make it."

The situation had become so bad that General Wedemeyer considered it necessary to issue a very unusual order and require all officers to sign it and return a signed copy to his headquarters for file.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, there was feeling that some people in China, Americans, were making the policy?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right; influencing it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, then, General Wedemeyer issued the order, and required them to sign that they had read it.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. That the duty of Americans was to carry out and execute policy that had already been made in America.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right, and not to make it in China.

Senator FERGUSON. And not to make it in China or to influence it in China, is that right?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right. May I continue the story of this incident? After the departure of General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley, I became the senior officer in the China theater. Therefore, I was acting commander of the theater. I was busy fighting the Japanese at the time, and I remained at my headquarters in Kunming, rather than go to Chungking, the theater headquarters. The chief of staff of the Chungking headquarters was approached by a member of the diplomatic corps, who requested the use of a C–47 airplane to go to Yenan. General Wedemeyer had closed Yenan and ordered all personnel to stay away. The chief of staff loaned the airplane to this official and he flew it to Yenan for the party. My first knowledge of the C–47 party at Yenan came when the chief of staff showed up in my headquarters one morning, he flew from Chungking, and showed me a long cable from Washington demanding to know his reasons for permitting a C–47 with a party of Americans aboard to go to Yenan. He, of course, didn't have any good reasons. I was acting theater commander so I advised him to sit down at my desk and to write out a reply. The reply, in substance, was that it had been customary for the military to loan airplanes to civil authorities, diplomatic officials particularly, on request, and that he had not thought anything of it, but had loaned the airplane almost automatically. His reply went to Washington and he was then ordered to have the party removed from Yenan as fast as possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that party?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Mr. Service was included in the party. I don't know who the other members were.

Mr. MORRIS. That is John S. Service?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I believe so. There were two Services in China at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. He was connected with the State Department.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. General Chennault, you stated that General Wedemeyer found it necessary to give a directive that State Department subordinates of the Ambassador and theater commander in China would have to follow United States policy and not set policy.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Wait a minute, you are mistaken there. Wedemeyer issued it only to the military officers.

Senator FERGUSON. And they signed that they had read it?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes, sir. Hurley was in charge of the Embassy at that time. Wedemeyer was theater commander for the military.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know, as a matter of fact, what the United States policy was with respect to China during that period?

Mr. CHENNAULT. I can't quote it, but substantially it was to aid the Nationalists in fighting the Japanese.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there people in China who were creating a different policy?

Mr. CHENNAULT. There were.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the other policy that was being formulated by people?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Those people continued to advocate arming and aiding the Communists, presumably to fight the Japanese, too.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not think we should use the information on the lend-lease program until we can get clearance from the Department. I cannot see any reason for marking it "secret, security information," back in 1941 to 1945. It seems absurd to mark what we shipped. That has been known and published everywhere. We get it now and it is marked "secret, security information." But I wish that a space in the record would be held at this place so that we can get clearance from the Department to put it in.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Smith, we have here the figures on what assistance was actually given to the Chinese Government during the period 1941 to 1945, then a period early 1945, and then subsequent to June 30, 1946. We have those figures here, but the figures appear in a document that is marked "secret." That is the issue that we have here.

Senator FERGUSON. I think we better get clearance.

Senator SMITH. Could the record show that that was presented but it was not put into the record until it was cleared? Would that not be the way to do it?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Let us do it that way.

(The information to be supplied appears as exhibit No. 1395 in pt. 14.)

Mr. MORRIS. We have covered the points that General Chennault has written in his book. The purpose of this hearing, Senator Smith, was to put into our record as sworn testimony General Chennault's knowledge of those points in his book. I have now covered those points, and I wondered whether we might ask him generally whether there are any other evidences or experiences that he has that should go into our record at this time.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Before replying to that question I would like to preface all of my remarks with a statement.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the statement?

Mr. CHENNAULT. That I have appeared here in response to a subpena by this committee; that I did not seek this opportunity to testify, but I am testifying because of that subpena.

Mr. MORRIS. I think our record shows that. At the commencement of this hearing it will show that, that you were called here today principally to give the testimony concerning the items that you mentioned in the book, which parts of the book are already in our record.

Mr. CHENNAULT. And I did not invite or seek this opportunity to testify.

Senator SMITH (presiding). In other words, you are replying here to a subpena and the duty placed upon you to come in and answer these questions.

Mr. CHENNAULT. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Senator.

Senator SMITH. You were not trying to do like we are trying to do in certain parts of the world, butt into everybody's affairs.

Mr. CHENNAULT. That is right.

Senator SMITH. General, is there anything else that you would like to add?

Mr. CHENNAULT. Only a general statement. The events which I reported in that book and the predictions I made on the probable course of events are all a matter of record, and the predictions I made have been fulfilled almost to the last one, 100 percent. I have tried to report the events that occurred under my observation of first-hand knowledge, and I think it constitutes the record of why we lost China, and how we did.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Anything else, General? We would be glad to hear anything you have to say.

Mr. CHENNAULT. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much.

All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this meeting today is to put onto the record various facts and various experiences that the witnesses who are here today, because of their peculiar experiences, are in a position to testify to. We have Admiral Hillenkoetter, we have Whittaker Chambers, and Miss Bentley. Admiral Hillenkoetter has not been sworn before this committee, so I wonder if you might do that. Both Mr. Chambers and Miss Bentley have.

Senator SMITH. Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH BENTLEY, WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, AND ROSCOE H. HILLENKOETTER

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Hillenkoetter was director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

One of the things that we would like to establish as a matter of record here today, Senator, is the difficulty of establishing the rela-

tionship of an agent. When we talk about the agent in that sense, Senator, we mean somebody who is acting as an agent for the CIA, somebody acting as an agent for the FBI, or somebody acting as an agent for the Communists. We want to get some testimony on the nature of that agency and the difficulty of proof in establishing such agency, if it is difficult to establish it.

I wonder, Admiral Hillenkoetter, if you could tell use from your own experience in the Central Intelligence Agency of the difficulty of establishing proof of agency.

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. The difficulty is that if the agent is any good at all he will not have any identification, he can't possibly have. It is only childish if he does carry identification concerning himself. He must have the identification and live the part of the agent that he is playing. If he is an agent, say, acting as an insurance man, he must know insurance, he must have all of the credentials of insurance. If he fails to have that, he is no good as an agent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, would you make any comment on those lines?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't know what I can add to what Admiral Hillenkoetter has said, beyond the fact that it is all but impossible to penetrate the Communist apparatus, with which I am familiar, except by means of deserters from the apparatus of the Communist Party. I might be asked now if I suppose there are any Communists still in the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, I was going to say, Mr. Chambers, how could a committee such as ours at this time determine whether or not there are any agents, Communist agents, high in the United States Government.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I was coming to that, if I may finish. I would have to answer to my direct knowledge there are no Communist agents in the American Government.

Mr. MORRIS. That is to your direct knowledge.

Mr. CHAMBERS. To my direct knowledge. But it would be childish to suppose that there are none. It would be childish for any security agent, say, to go on that assumption. Anyone with any knowledge of the recent past at least would have to presume that attempts are constantly being made to penetrate the Government and that there are in fact agents within the Government, agents of one kind, stature, or another.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, Mr. Chambers, when you left the Communist organization there were then still in existence a considerable number of Communist agents; were there not?

Mr. CHAMBERS. When I broke with the Communist Party there were still within the Government a number of Communist agents.

Mr. MORRIS. Do Communist agents by nature bring other Communists into the Government?

Mr. CHAMBERS. They tend to; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that point, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think by now everybody is familiar with past testimony of Miss Bentley and mine and others, about the way the Communist apparatus recruited the other agents into the Government, by securing jobs for them and by advancing them within the Government once they are in.

Senator SMITH. In other words, Mr. Chambers, the more astute the agent is, the better job he will do for the Communist Party, and likewise the more difficult it would be for a person not Communist to detect his activities.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is quite true.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, is there in existence within the general Communist framework really two organizations, one the regular Communist Party and other people operating outside the Communist Party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The Communist Party is normally divided into an open Communist Party and an underground Communist Party. The underground Communist Party takes many organizational forms. There are also people who are extremely important to the Communist Party who are not in fact members of the Communist Party, organizationally, but who assist the Communist Party and go to great lengths to assist them.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chambers.

Would a person who was a member of the Communist underground be answering truthfully if he is asked by a Senate committee whether or not he has ever been in the past a member of the Communist Party, if he denies that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That, of course, depends on the facts. If he has assisted the Communist Party in espionage activities, let us say, and has not been organizationally a member of the party, and is asked if he was a member of the party and says "No," he is telling the truth.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, do you have any comment to add on that particular point?

Miss BENTLEY. No; except with regard to——

Mr. MORRIS. When you were in the organization, you first were a member of the Communist Party.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I first joined what I called the semiopen party.

Mr. MORRIS. And then after that when you left the party you worked for the Soviet military police directly?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. During my days, they tended to take the undercover espionage activities away from the Communist Party and run them directly through the Embassy because of a question of safety.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were working in the espionage activities, you actually had to stay away from the Communist Party, did you not?

Miss BENTLEY. I was told to stay away as much as possible; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you add anything to the points that have been made so far, Miss Bentley, on the points that we have covered now?

Miss BENTLEY. First, on the point as to whether or not there are Communists still in the Government, I agree with Mr. Chambers on that.

Mr. MORRIS. In what respect?

Miss BENTLEY. I agree with him that quite obviously there still are Communists in the Government, partially because it is an obvious thing and partially because I was told by one of my Soviet contacts about the existence of other groups in the Government.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you knew there were other espionage rings other than your own in the Government and you know they haven't been exposed.

Miss BENTLEY. I know they haven't been exposed. I was not told who they are, but since they were not exposed, obviously they are still operating.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew of two individual rings working under you?

Miss BENTLEY. Two individual rings plus a collection of individuals I dealt with individually.

Mr. MORRIS. One was the Silvermaster ring?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And the other?

Miss BENTLEY. We called it the Perlo group.

Mr. MORRIS. You had some indirect knowledge that Alger Hiss was operating in the Communist framework, did you not?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. One of the members of the Perlo group had at one time been taken out of that group by Mr. Hiss and turned over to the Russians, and I discovered that during the course of my talking to one member of the group.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, there was still a third group that you knew of that existed at that time.

Miss BENTLEY. There was a third group that I knew of because of Mr. Hiss, and there was another group that was mentioned to me by my Soviet contact without identifying it further.

Mr. MORRIS. That is still a fourth group.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know, as a matter of fact, that neither one of those two groups, as far as you know, have been exposed as of this date?

Miss BENTLEY. As far as I know, they haven't been exposed.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you comment in any way, Miss Bentley, on the difficulty that a committee such as ours would have in determining who are members of some of these espionage groups?

Miss BENTLEY. Obviously, you would have a great difficulty because any espionage agent, and particularly your Soviet espionage agent, they have had years of training and experience, and would be very difficult to detect, because they were told to take the local coloration. For example, often they were told to pose as right-wing Republicans or Fascists, or whatever might be a handy cover for what they might be doing.

Senator SMITH. In other words, they were told not to tell the truth when asked if they were espionage agents.

Senator O'CONOR. When you appeared before our committee several years ago and, as a result of your disclosures, the Remington case was developed. Do you recall it was a direct result of your testimony? And with what has happened since, do you feel it has borne out the representations that you made at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; definitely.

Senator O'CONOR. At that time you described the method of operation of the one group that you were most familiar with.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Senator O'CONOR. In reference now, to the other group, the nature of which you learned from your contacts, was there any explanation given as to whether they operated in the same manner or were there any details given of the way in which they operated?

Miss BENTLEY. No, there were no details given. Actually, their method of operation was rather flexible. It adjusts itself. If it is

easier for them to act a bit openly they can do it. If they have to go further undercover they can do it. They have the whole thing set up so they can shift from one basis to another almost overnight.

Senator O'CONOR. What I was leading up to was whether or not there was any indication as to whether it reached high in the Government or in any of the executive departments.

Miss BENTLEY. There was no indication where it was or how high it went, but I imagine it must have gone fairly high because they certainly wouldn't have been too interested in mere clerks who had access to nothing.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, some of the people that you did deal with, one of them was an Under Secretary and the other was an executive assistant to the President, were they not?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Possibly Mr. Chambers might give us some information along these lines, or Miss Bentley. Some of the people who appeared in our hearings would frequently, from time to time, confer with Soviet officials, members of the Sovet foreign office, members of Tass, and members of the embassies here in Washington. I wonder if you could comment on the significance of that, Mr. Chambers?

I don't mean to ask you about Mr. Lattimore in any way, but from time to time Mr. Lattimore would have occasion to confer with Mr. Oumansky or various other Soviet officials. One man named Dolbin was here in the Soviet office, and they had a conference down in Lattimore's home. Again, without asking you to comment in any way on the question of Mr. Lattimore, I was just wondering if you could tell us some thing about the significance?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Speaking purely as a layman, I would say that if embassy or diplomatic officials of the Soviet Government visited anyone I knew, on almost any occasion, I should find it of extraordinary interest, at least. I actually have no experience of this kind, but I believe Miss Bentley has experience.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, could you comment on that?

Miss BENTLEY. It was my understanding from what I was told that Soviet officials do not confer with Americans, especially in their homes, which happened in one instance with some of the people that I dealt with, and Mr. Bromoff, who was then first secretary of the Embassy, unless there was something very important afoot. They are not encouraged to deal with Americans at all, here in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. And you think a conference of several hours' duration would have considerable significance?

Miss BENTLEY. I would think so. I would look into it.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it make any difference if such a conversation took place, say, during the Hitler-Stalin pact? Would that have any significance at all to you, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I wouldn't think it would make any difference; no.

Mr. MORRIS. Would it make any difference to you?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I wouldn't understand what difference it might make. It would make a historical difference, I assume, but I could only speculate.

Mr. MORRIS. During the Hitler-Stalin pact the foreign policy of the United States and Soviet Union were conflicting. During a period of cooperation, there at least would be a framework within which somebody having the interests of the United States could

confer with an official of the Soviet Union. Do you think that might cause a difference?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think it is a reasonable distinction, but I should think that any such traffic as you have described would be of a fact that would interest the security agencies.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, we have to consider the question here in dealing with people who are Communist writers, people who have been shown to have Communists in the past have done considerable writing on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In all cases the writing has been political in content. Is it conceivable from your experience in the Communist organization that a person could be a Communist and not write in such way as to reflect his Communist nature?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should have to answer that it is in general possible, but it would be extremely difficult for any man, any Communist, to write without, in some degree, reflecting his political opinions. He might very consciously try to angle his opinions in such a way as to cover his real intentions. We know that there are people very skillful at that line. But I think that a careful study of any such writings would nearly always reveal a line in the writing at least a point of view which would be rather inescapable.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comments on that, Miss Bentley.

Miss BENTLEY. No, except that I agree with Chambers. Except to those who are rather skilled in tracking that down, it might be unperceptible, but nevertheless somewhere in that writing would be the traces of the political line.

Mr. MORRIS. If we establish in our record that somebody was, as a matter of fact, say 2 years ago or 3 years ago, a member of the Communist Party, what kind of a conclusion can we draw from that, as to his present party membership. Can you tell us anything about that, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am afraid I am going to have to ask you to repeat that question.

Mr. MORRIS. If we have established in our record that an individual, as of 2, 3, or 5 years ago, was, as a matter of fact, a member of the Communist Party, to what extent can we conclude from that that he is recently a member of the Communist Party? How good is the presumption that if a man is shown to have been working in the Communist organization, that that relationship continues.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should think that would depend a great deal on what you knew of the individual's activities and expression during the period between the last time you knew of his membership in the Communist Party and your current interest in him.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose that his associates remained the same, suppose that he continues to work with the same people as he worked with prior to the time of a point where we could establish he was a Communist.

Mr. CHAMBERS. The presumption would then be very strong that he was a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. When a man changes from being a Communist to a non-Communist, are there any actions discernible on his part that would help us to evaluate whether or not he is presently a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. There are actions discernible on his part and on the part of his former associates, namely that he leaves the circles in which he formerly moved, usually with a great deal of strong feeling on his part and also on the part of his former associates who tend to leave him.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, if we can establish that a man is at some time in the past a Communist and that from that time on his associations remain the same, his general political expressions continued pretty much along the same lines, we are warranted in drawing some kind of a conclusion about the continuation of his membership.

Senator WATKINS. Would it be difficult for a man to disengage himself from a party, having been with it for a number of years?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think it would depend on what area of the party he was active in.

Senator WATKINS. What do you mean by area? You don't mean geographical area, do you?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No; I mean organizational area. If he was active in the open Communist Party, he might fall away from it without very much stress on the inside, particularly if he has not been very active. If he was active in any underground organization, there would, of course, be precautions taken by the Communist Party or the apparatus which is a branch of the party, and he himself, if he broke violently with the underground, might take precautions for his own safety.

Senator WATKINS. What I was trying to get at is maybe a man would not make a violent break or keep away from them for a time, even though he might have made up his mind that he was not going to be a Communist any longer.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is quite possible.

Senator WATKINS. That is why I was asking in connection with what you just answered to Mr. Morris.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't see what the line of the question is. I don't understand it.

Senator WATKINS. Well, if it is a difficult matter to break with the party, to get out of the party, a man might go along for a time, although he, in his own mind had broken with them.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is quite possible; yes. That is entirely possible. I think most cases of deserters from the Communist Party would probably show that that is a general pattern, that the intellectual break precedes to one degree or another the actual organizational break. Some momentous step is scarcely taken later.

Senator WATKINS. In your own case you had difficulty, did you not?

Mr. CHAMBERS. It is perfectly true in my own case.

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). I just wanted to ask Mr. Chambers a question or two in regard to any of the procedures with respect to appointment in the U. N., as to whether there is anything he can give to the committee which might be of interest. I have for instance, in mind, a case such as the Irving Kaplan case.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Of course, Irving Kaplan's employment by the U. N. comes long after my last direct knowledge of Kaplan. I am entirely unfamiliar with how Communists are able to penetrate the U. N. assuming that they are, and I do so assume.

Senator O'CONOR. Have you reason to believe that that is true, that there is that penetration, that the Communists are in the U. N.?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I can think of one or two names, Kaplan being one of them, and I have no reason to suppose that Kaplan has broken with the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he is an example. If he has been keeping the same associations during the past 5 or 6 years that he kept prior to that time or possibly for periods longer than that, you yourself would draw the conclusion that he has kept his allegiance to the Communist organization which you knew about personally.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think there is a further step in here that we have not touched on, namely, that the Communist who leaves the party leaves the party because he believes that it is no good, has come to believe that from actual experience. Therefore, he tends to seek quite different and new associations. Perhaps some of them he had in the past and has repudiated. He goes back to them. So that a Communist who has actually broken is generally seen in the context quite hostile to the Communist Party as a rule, even though he himself may have decided not to take any direct actions against the party if he can avoid it, for personal reasons. Does that answer your question at all?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Herbert Philbrick has just arrived, and I wonder if you will swear him.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you swear that the testimony you shall give before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I do.

TESTIMONY OF HERBERT A. PHILBRICK

Senator O'CONOR. For the record, will you give your full name.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Herbert A. Philbrick.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chambers, I think I interrupted you, really when you were giving some detailed explanation of the procedures, or of anything that you had to say in regard to employment by the U. N.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am afraid that I won't be able to help you in that respect, Senator. I really don't know anything about it.

Senator O'CONOR. The reason I was asking you is that it did seem to me that there might very well be some dereliction on the part of some of the United States officials in regard, for example, to the Irving Kaplan case in the light of the revelations that have been made in the past. I was wondering whether there was any further information that you could give us in that regard.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I know of no such dereliction, I have no such information.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, one of the difficulties that we have encountered is to find sources of evidence on people whose membership in the Communist organization is current. We have found that principally the only way of arriving at such conclusions would be from somebody who participated in the organization, somebody who was an ex-Communist, or somebody who had the experience such as Mr. Philbrick, who was an agent for the FBI. At the same time we have found that there have been three witnesses that I know of, three potential witnesses, who have broken with the Communist Party, in

my opinion, having dealt with them and conversed with them at length, within the last 2 or 3 years. But it seems to me that they have not brought themselves around to the position where they will testify. One man who knows a great deal about the subject that we have been covering here says that if we call him he will refuse to answer on the grounds his answers will incriminate him. At the same time, he does know a great deal about it and is generally cooperative. It seems to be a phenomenon that we encounter continually, namely, that it takes quite a period of time for a man, once he has left the Communist Party, to comport himself in such a way as he will discuss the thing freely before the Senate committee.

I would like to get some testimony on that point because I think it goes to the difficulty that we have in establishing proof of these various things.

Senator O'Conor. It undoubtedly would be very pertinent and I think very timely to have that testimony.

Mr. Morris. I think some of our witnesses before this committee have said it took them 5 or 6 years, really, to make a break from the Communist organization. I would like to have some testimony on that score.

Mr. Chambers has another appointment, Senator. That is why I have been directing most of my questions to him, so he can get away early.

Mr. Chambers. Will you ask me specific questions?

Mr. Morris. How long did it take you to really break away completely from the Communist Party?

Mr. Chambers. I would think the better part of a year. I am speaking of the organizational break.

Mr. Morris. It took a year to break away?

Mr. Chambers. But you must bear in mind, it is extremely difficult to establish the point at which the break actually began, and that if any ex-Communist were able to go far enough back into the past, he would probably find small tell-tale traces of an incipient break of which, at the time, he was not conscious or barely conscious, and which he then put out of his mind if he was still active. So it is extremely difficult to state any definite period for that.

Mr. Morris. Now, at the end of that year, Mr. Chambers—you say it took you about a year——

Mr. Chambers. That is purely an arbitrary figure, I think.

Mr. Morris. Well, now, would you, if you can really look back to that period with a clear eye, would you then have testified before a Senate committee such as ours, about your associations in the Communist Party?

Mr. Chambers. After I broke?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

Senator O'Conor. And within that period of time.

Mr. Morris. That is right, at that period, at the end of 1 year.

Mr. Chambers. I am speaking of the period prior to my break. I think there is confusion here. I think you are speaking of the period after I broke. I was speaking of the period before I broke. After I broke with the Communist Party, as you know, it took me from April of 1938 to September 1939 to go to Mr. Adolph Berle, which is, I think, the answer to your question.

Senator WATKINS. Was one of the reasons why it takes a long time to make that break any fear of reprisal from the Communists because you are making the break?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I don't think fear of reprisal from the Communists enters in at all. An adjustment, very grave adjustment, was taking place.

Senator WATKINS. From your knowledge of the way the Communists work in this country, is there any great fear of physical reprisal upon the person of the former Communist, when he breaks away?

Mr. CHAMBERS. If the former Communist has broken from a Soviet apparatus, I think he is fully justified in fearing reprisals of the violent kind, depending of course on his function in that apparatus. But, in fact, for the ex-Communist to state his story openly, to tell his story openly, lessens the danger of reprisals.

One of the things that the party would like to prevent is the ex-Communist telling what he knows. Once he has told it, it scarcely becomes worth while to remove him.

Senator WATKINS. During your experience as a Communist, do you know of anyone who was the subject or object of reprisals, a physical reprisal by the party, who had broken from the party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I had reason to suppose that Julian Steward Points did, a former member of the central committee.

Senator WATKINS. Do you have any evidence to support that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I have no direct evidence.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever hear it discussed in Communist circles?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I never heard it discussed in Communist circles. It took place not too long before my own break, I think. I have forgotten the break.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have a conversation with General Krivitsky?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any evidence that he was done away with by the Soviet organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have no direct evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think that is a possibility?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe that he was murdered.

Mr. MORRIS. When you had your talk with General Krivitsky, Mr. Chambers, did you discuss with him espionage apparatus in the United States?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Probably, I don't remember in detail.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anything about the conversation with General Krivitsky at that time that you can tell us for our record, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, in the first place, General Krivitsky and I had a number of conversations. You may have in mind the initial conversation which I described at some length before. In that conversation the thing that stands out in my mind is Krivitsky saying that in our time, informing is a duty. Krivitsky was, I believe, at that time or shortly thereafter cooperating with the British Government.

Mr. MORRIS. May I get back to this other point, Mr. Chambers, about the long delay.

As I said, Mr. Chairman, we have three people who have apparently clearly broken with the Communist Party but they are very, very much afraid of being put in the position where they have to be a witness. However, I would like to develop that for the record to show that in the first place it takes time for someone who is in the Communist Party to break away from the Communist Party, and then apparently there seems to be a long period where a person expresses an extremely great reluctance to give any testimony, and then the reluctance continues even after that. I think, Mr. Chairman, that having dealt with the witnesses from time to time, almost every witness who has been called here has been most reluctant to testify. I think that is a fact that should go into our record somewhere, that there is a strong reluctance to testify. One witness I remember, Mr. Kornfetter, stated that in his opinion it was a period of 4 to 5 years before he could ever bring himself around to the position where he would have given testimony before a Senate committee such as ours after he broke with the Communist Party. It is something along those lines, Mr. Chambers, that we would like to have possible further explanation.

Senator O'Conor. From your experience, would you be able to say that that is a correct statement of the situation?

Mr. Chambers. I think in general it is. You have to remember that a very strong human factor enters into these matters, I mean the fact of human relations. It is a personally destructive experience for the man who must testify, to testify against people with whom he has been close friends or has close associations. There are very few people who willingly do such a thing. As a rule, only some very powerful pressure, such as the pressure of history at various times, can bring them to do that. It seems to me that that is readily understandable. There are very few of us who would testify against any group of people with whom we have been closely associated, good people or bad people.

Mr. Morris. Could you develop that point at all for us, Miss Bentley?

Miss Bentley. I agree with Mr. Chambers that actually it is a bit difficult to say exactly when you did start the break. There were little things that first you rationalized, and it is a long process. In my case I think it was well over a year before I could bring myself to break and go to the FBI. It is not pleasant testifying. Every time you do it, you feel the same feeling all over again, whether these people are still Communists, and dangerous, that they were once friends of yours, and you worked with them, and you cannot get rid of that feeling. I think it is very understandable that the ex-Communist does not like to testify.

Senator Watkins. Is it because of a fear that they may have some personal vengeance brought upon them?

Miss Bentley. No; particularly when you work in Soviet intelligence. You have about reached the stage where you realize that for all you know you may be living on borrowed time. You accept that fact when you have done intelligence work and you don't worry about that. You know that there might be that chance, although probably what has become public, that is minimized. You know there is a chance of a great deal of mud being slung at you, but you accept

that. That is a personal risk. But what you cannot accept is the fact of hurting someone else.

Senator WATKINS. In your own case you did not have any fear, then, of any reprisals being brought upon you by the Communists?

Miss BENTLEY. I did until these things became public; yes. You see, I worked under cover for the FBI for a period.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, when you left the Communist organization and came over to our side of the fence, or left that particular world and came over to our world, did you have a feeling that you were deserting the winning side and coming over to the losing side?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you develop that for us, please?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, from what I had been able to see, the Communists were the strong ones. The forces of history seemed to be headed that direction. Whether I liked it or not, that seemed to be the kind of world that was coming into being, but I did not like that kind of a world. I decided that even though I was going to be on the losing side, I still was going to go back, and to the people that I thought were important. I might as well die fighting.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have such an experience as that, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; I had almost an identical experience. As you know, I have already said that I thought I was deserting the winning side for the losing side. As I look around me at this moment of history, I am not greatly heartened.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that based upon the fact, I will ask this to Miss Bentley, that some of the people you were dealing with were people who were high in power, and that they seemed to be going ahead and moving the Communist organization to even greater heights here in the United States.

Miss BENTLEY. Not completely. Yes; I did see the ease with which they could move in circles here, but it also tied in with the international picture. Those of us who worked for the Soviet underground had to keep track of international developments, and I could see that tying in very closely with a sweeping tide from abroad, and it began to look as though the first estimate the Communists had made about it being quite some time before communism could come in were entirely wrong, that it was coming in faster.

Mr. MORRIS. When you first broke with the Communist Party, you say for a while you worked with the FBI, Miss Bentley.

Miss BENTLEY. That is right; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And then did you tell the story of your experience to the Federal grand jury?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. That was a little better than 2 years after.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have the attitude that you were disturbed that nothing was being done about the revelations that you had made?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, I did. The jury seemed to drag on for about a year and nothing seemed to be happening.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you attach any significance to the fact that Mr. Hiss, whom you knew and worked with for many years, and concerning whom you gave testimony early in 1949, that he continued to go up in Government, did you consider that as evidence of a condition in the United States Government at that time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I can't answer that question in just those terms, for the reason that I didn't know how high Alger Hiss had gone in

the Government at the time. But in general, as nothing was done about the information I had given Mr. Burley, I must say I developed very strong feelings about it.

Senator WATKINS. What were those feelings?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The feeling that there was no particular desire to rout out Communists, in fact, if anything, that there was a desire to act against those who might testify against Communists.

Senator WATKINS. Well, you did not think that Mr. Burley was guilty of that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I understood that Mr. Burley was an anti-Communist and a very serious one. I have never had any reason to change my mind.

Senator SMITH. Did that feeling on your part continue, Mr. Chambers, as you just described in answer to Senator Watkins' question, that there appeared not to be a desire to route out the subversives in the Government?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; it did.

Senator SMITH. Over an extended period of time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. We have had considerable testimony before this committee, Mr. Chambers, that Frederick V. Field, who was the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1934 to 1940, and who remained active in the Institute of Pacific Relations and served on the board of trustees until 1947, we have had considerable testimony from people interested in the Institute of Pacific Relations that while Mr. Field may have been a Communist during that period of time, he comported himself in such a way as never to inject Communist Party activities into the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Based on your experience, do you think such a fact is possible, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't believe that it is possible.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify on that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I would have to assume that one of the reasons Mr. Frederick Field was in the Institute of Pacific Relations was to use his position there for whatever purpose the party saw fit.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, if he were a full-fledged Communist, he would be there in order to do Communist work.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I would expect that, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Particularly if he devoted the major portion of his time to that project?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Especially in that case.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you comment on that, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say the same thing, that it would be quite impossible for somebody to be in that position and not be doing Communist Party work.

Senator SMITH. Would it be logical to assume that when the individual is not only giving a substantial portion of his time but also sizable financial support?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. If you are talking about Mr. Field, the added fact that he was a link between Earl Browder and the Communist Party cell of the far eastern field would certainly add to that conclusion. I happen to know that was correct.

Senator WATKINS. Is there not a period of time, however, before the conquered Communist really finds out the conspiracy? Couldn't there be a period when he did not know that the Communists had in mind the overthrow of this Government, for instance, by force and violence?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he could. It would depend entirely on whether he behaved rather actively as a Communist, if he was in, say, the semi-open party, that sort of thing. But in the case of Mr. Field, who was in pretty deep, I don't think you can draw that.

Senator WATKINS. Was he not a part of the open party?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, and no. He had one foot underground and—he had one foot underground and one foot over the ground, so to speak. But he, I understand, had been a Communist for a good many years.

Senator WATKINS. As a matter of fact, he was even aiding the pickets, wasn't he, before the White House on one occasion?

Miss BENTLEY. He might have been, I don't know. But any one who was that close to Earl Browder, and had that assignment, certainly knew what was going on.

Senator WATKINS. You were not a member of the open party, were you?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I joined the open party originally.

Senator WATKINS. How long was it before you became a part of the underground?

Miss BENTLEY. Roughly about two and a half years.

Senator WATKINS. During that period before you became a part of the underground, did you know at that time of the objectives of the Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. I didn't. But the situation for me was entirely different. I was a member of a unit which is the lowest group of the party.

Senator WATKINS. A member of what?

Miss BENTLEY. A member of a unit which is the lowest group in the party?

Senator WATKINS. A lawless group?

Miss BENTLEY. No, the lowest group, the lowest in the party, mainly around Columbia University. In that case, there was no particular reason why I should have found out the inner secrets of the party. But a person who is around Communist Party headquarters associates with Earl Browder, and acts as his emissary, certainly he is in a position to find out the facts, and if he didn't then I would say that he is not quite bright.

Senator WATKINS. In other words, he wouldn't be very intelligent if he could not find out if he was a close associate of Earl Browder.

Miss BENTLEY. I would say so, definitely.

Senator WATKINS. I have happened to have known people in my own State, for instance, who thought they were Communists, and I doubt very much that they knew anything about the conspiracy that is being carried on by the Communists to bring about the overthrow of this Government.

Miss BENTLEY. I imagine today there are probably minor members of the Communist Party in the units who can still be fooled by the fact that they do not believe the Communist Party really believes in violence. They may rationalize and say, "Oh, yes; it would happen in Russia but it couldn't happen here." That could very well happen.

But they would have to be minor members of the party in groups which had no connection with the higher-ups in the party, very definitely.

Senator WATKINS. You do not consider Mr. Field a minor member of the party?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely not.

Senator WATKINS. From his conduct, would you still believe that he is a Communist at the present time?

Miss BENTLEY. As far as I have been able to determine, it sounds to me as though he is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sourwine has a few questions that I think he probably wants to put to Mr. Chambers now inasmuch as Mr. Chambers is going to leave soon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, there is one subject that I think we would like to have the opinion of all of these witnesses on, and more than their opinion we would like to have their statement of what they know as fact bearing on the situation. The situation I refer to is the position in which an undercover agent, an espionage agent, an underground agent, is and must remain with respect to any documentary evidence of his underground activity. I think I can phrase a question which I should like to have each one of the witnesses answer and then we can get a little more general on it.

Mr. Chambers, during the time that you were an underground agent, was there, to your knowledge, in existence documentary evidence of the fact that you were an underground agent?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, it was part of your job to see that there was no such evidence, was it not?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know enough of the procedures of the operation of the underground to be able to say whether there would be any likelihood of ever finding evidence of the underground activity of an underground agent while he or she continues to be such an agent?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think as phrased the answer would have to be "Yes." But I believe that you mean whether there would be documentary evidence. I think it very improbable that there would be any documentary evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you expand on that a little bit, please?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't know that I can add any more to it, except to say that there are no formal articles of convention. So far as I know, no one signs any recruitment blanks. All underground agents of the kind we are talking about would automatically deny that they were underground agents or even members of the Communist Party. That is a part of the operation in any such operation, regardless of whether it is for the Communist Party, or specifically for the Soviet Government or Albanian Government or the Norwegian Government. It is part of the organizational pattern of intelligence work.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Bentley, while you were such an underground agent, was there in existence documentary evidence of the fact that you were such an agent?

Miss BENTLEY. No, except possibly in Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you feel that it was your business to make sure that there was no such documentary evidence?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely. I took every possible precaution.

Miss SOURWINE. Can you expand at all on the subject of whether there would be any likelihood of being able to get documentary evidence of the fact that an active underground agent is in fact such an agent?

Miss BENTLEY. You mean documentary evidence in the form of written evidence? I doubt it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Philbrick, while you were operating as an underground agent was there in existence, so far as you know, documentary evidence of that fact?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I don't believe there was any at all, sir. Of course, I operated in a dual capacity, underground agent for the Bureau, FBI, and supposedly for the Communist Party, too. So far as the Communist Party was concerned, in 1947, when I was ordered by the party to go into the real underground section of the party, I was also at the same time ordered to destroy any and all documentary evidence. I was ordered, for example, to destroy a party card if I held one and never to carry one again.

Senator SMITH. Was there any documentary evidence besides that that you were specifically ordered to destroy?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I forget what I had. There was some material around the house which the party knew I had, and they said get rid of it. Well, there were many factors that entered into it, too. One was, for example, that I was working for Communist Party headquarters in district 1, in Boston, doing some work for them, and I was still to continue to do some work for them. In order not to have any documentary evidence that Philbrick was a party member, I was given a party name, the name of Arthur Trowbridge, and if I ever had to send anything in the form of a document to the headquarters, it would go under the name of Arthur Trowbridge so there would be no evidence of Philbrick being identified with the party. I, along with the other members of that group were told, for example, never to go near the State headquarters of the party from that time on, and never to telephone the State headquarters even from the pay stations. There was a tremendous amount of this type of instruction, and all of it was specifically given to guarantee there would be absolutely no evidence that any counter-espionage agent could find.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the same true with regard to your connection with the FBI? Was equal care taken to avoid the existence of any evidence that you were in fact working for the Bureau?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I would say so; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to address a question to Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Sir, from what you can speak of your knowledge of underground activities, what can you tell us of the likelihood that an active undercover agent could be proven to be such by documentary evidence?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. Well, the only way you could ever prove he was an agent by documentary evidence is that he would be very stupid. He would certainly not be worthwhile having if he had any documentary evidence. The first thing would be to do away with all of the documentary evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't want to ask you to disclose any confidential information with regard to the activities of any Government agency, but I think perhaps you can tell the committee without any such disclosure, generally speaking, whether the CIA does or does not take

care to avoid the very existence of documentary evidence with regard to underground agents and their identities.

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. I can't answer for that now, I am no longer there. But they certainly did when I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was no documentation?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, it is common practice in connection with all underground organizations to seek to avoid documentation, is it not?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. It very definitely is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Names are used, psuedonyms are used, they are changed with some frequency. Sometimes procedures become quite devious, solely for the purpose of avoiding any documentation of the existence or the identity of agents, is that right?

Mr. HILLENKOETTER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, that is the point I wanted to inquire about particularly.

Senator O'CONOR (presiding). Any further questions?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to ask Mr. Chambers a question of the existence of the documents that were used in the case of the trial of Mr. Hiss. Was that an extraordinary development, that such documents and therefore something that could be used as evidence at the trial were in existence at that time.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I don't understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it an extraordinary event, was it out of the ordinary course of things that you should have had those documents and that therefore those documents could have been evidence of a trial, in this case in the trial of Mr. Hiss?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Under proper organizational circumstances the documents would have been destroyed.

Mr. MORRIS. Would have been destroyed?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. So in the ordinary course of things, the prosecution cannot look for the existence of such evidence in order to prove the relationship of someone's being a Communist agent?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The prosecution should always try to look for such evidence, I think, but it is very unlikely that they will find it.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, your having those so-called pumpkin papers was an extraordinary development.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Certainly, it was part of a special history.

Mr. MORRIS. When you left the Communist organization, did you take any documents with you, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. No, like Mr. Chambers, I didn't.

Mr. NORRIS. Were there any documents in existence that you know of that could have been used to establish the fact that you were a Communist while you were a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Not that I know of. In the normal course of events, everything that I took in was automatically handed over to the Soviet superior within a matter of 24 to 48 hours. Nothing was left behind.

Mr. MORRIS. Some of the members of your espionage gave you reports that you turned over to Soviet officials, is that right?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How many copies of those reports would be made?

Miss BENTLEY. You mean when I retyped some of them?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, without going into any names, if you have a man who is high in government, let us say, who gave you a report on certain information that the Communist organization wanted, what would you do with that report?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, that depended entirely—most of the documents went right straight through to the Russians.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say most of the documents, what form did they take?

Miss BENTLEY. I mean documents, I mean microfilms. I mean anything that was a carbon copy of the documents or the original documents.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you yourself make copies to keep on file?

Miss BENTLEY. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there a regulation covering that particular point?

Miss BENTLEY. Very definitely. I was supposed to have no material left around whatsoever. It was supposed to go right straight through.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, when you turned a copy of something over to the Soviet authorities, there was no other trace of that letter or document or paper or whatever it was in your organization?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. And they were so very fussy about this whole matter that when they sent me a typewritten sheet of instructions I had to read it and burn it in front of the person who gave it to me, because they didn't want me found with that in my handbag in case I got careless.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, can you think of any other such precautions taken by the organization that you worked for to destroy any evidence or any vestige of whatever evidence there was that could possibly be used by the opposition?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, with all the precautions we took—but it is all the sort of thing that any intelligent outfit, if it is any good, does engage in.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Philbrick, while you were in the Communist organization for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on what level were you able to observe the scope of Communist activities?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I don't quite understand the question, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you operated in Boston, did you not, Mr. Philbrick?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it possible for you to know all the Communists who operated in Boston?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Oh, no.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the scope of your being in a position to know who Communists were in your particular area?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Well, it varied from time to time, and the policy of the party was with me the same as with others who were recruited and brought into the party, so that we were started out on a low level. And I guess Miss Bentley has already mentioned that comrades in some of these initial cells would have very little information concerning the real picture of the Communist Party. That is very deliberately kept away from them. Only by slow degrees is the new comrade introduced to any real secrets of the Communist Party, and then it is done very cautiously. The Communist Party instructors and leaders make very sure or try to make very sure that the new comrade

is completely dependable; that is, that he has absorbed everything up to a certain level—before he is advanced to the next level.

That means that over the period of years the picture changes, you see, and at various stages you are able to get glimpses of some section of the Communist Party organization.

But all of the time, the party tries to narrow the scope of your information to prevent any party members, any Communist Party members, since they don't trust each other, from knowing too much about the Communist Party as a whole.

Mr. MORRIS. And by the same token, of course, there were no documents around listing all the members of the Communist Party in Boston available to you?

Mr. PHILBRICK. So far as the rank and file Communist Party members, that is, open Communist Party members, were concerned, there would be card files and lists of names, lists of party names, usually at party headquarters, or sometimes at a secret headquarters of the Communist Party. Any names of any real importance, however, of Communist Party members connected with espionage or sabotage—those names would never appear at Communist Party headquarters.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Admiral Hillenkoetter, could you add anything to the point that was just developed by Mr. Philbrick in connection with your central intelligence experience?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. I think the effort would be to compartmentalize people as much as possible and to have them deal with as few as possible.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a question along that line?

Admiral, during the time that you were head of the CIA, would you have been able personally to identify all of your agents?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to an agent whom you did know, and did know to be an agent, would you have been able to prove that he was an agent, other than by your own testimony?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. By no means; no, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. In normal course, would you say it was possible for a CIA agent to take instructions over a period of months from a superior who was actually his superior and yet be unable to show or to testify that he ever saw any evidence that the man was, in fact, an employee and his superior?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. It would be very easy; yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, that would be the natural course, wouldn't it?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. The normal thing to do; yes, indeed.

Mr. SOURWINE. These people are introduced one to another, and they accept the authority or take the instructions or perform the duties on the basis of the oral introductions; do they not?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. That is right; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. They don't show credentials?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or wear stripes on their sleeves or badges pinned to their vests?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. No.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Philbrick, you mentioned a minute ago that in Boston, while there may have been some records in respect to the open members, there was no documentation with respect to those en-

gaged in espionage and sabotage. Might I ask whether those individuals who were so engaged, or were to engage if possible in sabotage and espionage, were known to the general membership of the party?

Mr. PHILBRICK. No; these members, who were mostly the professional group members, were not known to the general membership as Communist Party members.

In 1947, I myself was ordered to disassociate myself from the rank-and-file membership of the party.

Senator O'CONOR. For what purpose?

Mr. PHILBRICK. For the purpose of joining the Prof. 4 cell. And I was never to attend a cell meeting again of any of my former comrades, and I was not to associate in any way with them.

I remember that on the day that I got the instructions, it so happened that I had a cell meeting scheduled for that very evening, and in fact I was supposed to conduct the educational discussion in the cell meeting that evening.

So I told my friend, explained to him, that I should attend this final meeting, because it was too late to get a substitute to take over that night.

I remember I said, "Well, I will tell them tonight that I am dropping out." And my instructions were to not do anything like that at all, not to say anything to them but just to drop out.

That meant that so far as my former comrades were concerned, they had no idea as to what happened to Comrade Philbrick. He, for some reason which they were not at liberty to know, was simply not there any more.

And, of course, one thing a comrade learns very soon is not to ask questions. It is none of their business to know. Perhaps he has been found out to be a traitor or something. At any rate, it is just understood that he wasn't there, and that is all there was to it.

That meant that so far as the rank-and-file members, they had no idea as to the actual identity of the top-ranking members of the party.

Senator O'CONOR. So we are to understand that where there were extra precautions taken, the identity of the ones in that special group were not even known or to be known to those who even professed membership and were loyal members of the party?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Admiral Hillenkoetter, if you were the head of an intelligence organization, and you walked into the office of one of your principal assistants and found him in close conversation with a man whom you had never seen before, discussing a subject which was highly restricted, what assumptions would you feel at liberty to make about that stranger?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. That he was working for us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that what you would immediately conclude?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would any other possibility occur to you?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. You could not get any other possibility.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to develop from the witnesses here today the probative value of a communication between a

senior in an organization directed to a junior, whether the organization would be the Communist organization or an organization operated by the United States Government.

We have had testimony that General Berzin, for instance, communicated to one of his assistants in Soviet military intelligence, the assistant being himself a person with the rank of a general. He passed on to him evidence about the identity of several people who were, according to General Berzin, members of their organization.

I wonder if I could ask you, Mr. Chambers: What probative value can we give to such a communication as that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I would say, if General Berzin said so, it was true.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean if General Berzin told an assistant of his who himself was a general, you think we can attach great probative value to such a statement, if the statement was true, of course?

Mr. CHAMBERS. If I had been the assistant and General Berzin had made the statement to me, I would assume on the face of it that it was true.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, isn't that very statement on the part of a superior general to a lower general, the real essence of the agency that we are trying to establish?

Mr. CHAMBERS. You mean that method of communication?

Mr. MORRIS. Communication. Namely, if General Berzin considers somebody to be his agent, isn't that almost the essence of the agency that we are talking about?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am not quite sure I follow that.

Senator O'CONOR. Will you, Mr. Morris, rephrase the question?

Mr. MORRIS. The relationship that an individual bears to the Soviet organization is a state of mind that that person has toward the organization as exemplified by the superior in the organization, in this case, General Berzin. And if the individual is loyal to, in this case, General Berzin, and if General Berzin considers him loyal, isn't that really the essence of the relationship that exists between the individual and the Soviet organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. If I follow, all Communists are under party discipline, and that discipline has been accepted by the individual party member at the time he joined the Communist Party, and has been intensified and has become more experienced and more conscious as his experience has deepened. Insofar as that is true, I think your statement is probably true.

There is also the question of decentralization, or, to put it another way, the personal relationship, rather than organizational relationship, the system in the apparatuses. That is, the chain of command comes from one individual to a lower individual to a still lower individual, until you get to the end of the chain.

Is that along the lines of what you are asking?

Senator O'CONOR. Will you just suspend for one second? I want to ask Miss Bentley if in that same situation, or out of her experience, there is anything that she could add.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, I would say that was correct in the Soviet espionage, as I saw it. In other words, there were no credentials. There was nothing that you could actually put your hands on to prove it. But if a superior officer considered his inferior to be a member of the apparatus, and under discipline, and that person accepted the orders and carried them out, then very definitely that would be true.

Also, if, for example, Mr. A. has Mr. B. working under him, and Mr. B. should be shifted to another superior, it is done entirely on a personal basis, which is that either Mr. A. would introduce Mr. B. to the new contact or else would make arrangements whereby he would meet his new contact at a prearranged place.

Mr. MORRIS. Isn't it true that the only process by which anybody could arrive at the relationships vis-à-vis those three people would be admission on the part of the person who was supposed to be an agent, or testimony on the part of some of the others as to what they told him?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct, testimony either by the agent himself or testimony by the superior officer.

Mr. MORRIS. And who was your superior in the Soviet organization, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I had several of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was your immediate superior?

Miss BENTLEY. My immediate superior, the last one I had, was Anatol Gromov, who was first secretary of the Soviet Embassy at that point.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, if Anatol Gromov told you in the course of your official duties in a serious way about a subject that was important to the Communist organization, that a particular agent was a Communist agent, what probative value would you give to that statement?

Miss BENTLEY. I would accept his statement completely.

Mr. MORRIS. In fact, that would be the highest proof you could possibly arrive at that such a person was a Communist agent; isn't that so?

Miss BENTLEY. For example, with the previous man, whom I knew as "Jack," who was my superior before Mr. Gromov, the question of who Mr. Hiss was came up. And I had spoken to Jack about Mr. Hiss, "Who was he?" and Jack came back and said, "That is all right. He is one of ours. Forget about it." I accepted that statement completely. That meant exactly what it said.

Mr. MORRIS. And in your own mind you know as a matter of fact that Hiss was a Communist agent?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely. And I had been told by my superior office, "He is one of ours—lay off" or words to that effect, and I accepted that.

Mr. MORRIS. And at the same time you were not called to testify at the Hiss trial, were you?

Miss BENTLEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Why were you not called to testify at the Hiss trial?

Miss BENTLEY. I haven't the least idea.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it because the testimony at that time would have been technically considered hearsay evidence?

Miss BENTLEY. I am not a lawyer, Mr. Morris, but that might have been what you call second-hand or hearsay evidence. I don't know.

Senator O'CONOR. Miss Bentley, had you communicated to the FBI and other officers of this Government that information?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I had already told that to the FBI. I presume it was, as Mr. Morris says, hearsay evidence.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply would like to ask this question. Mr. Chambers, in your opinion, which would be the most convincing statement with respect to the espionage activities of "X": "X's" statement

that he was a Soviet agent, or the statement of the local head of the Soviet organization that "X" was one of his agents?

Mr. CHAMBERS. If those statements were made while both were Communists? It that your question?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. CHAMBERS. The statement of the superior would have greater probative force.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, suppose that you have the testimony of one, "B," known to have been a direct subordinate of the Communist chief, that his chief told him "X" was a Communist. Would that, in your mind, weight more than "X's" statement that he was in fact a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am afraid I will have to ask you to say that again. I am a little slow.

Mr. SOURWINE. I don't know what your answer is going to be. I am not driving to a preconceived conclusion here.

Assuming that you have "X" and "X" says he is a Communist; assume also that "B" whom you know to be a principal subordinate of the head of the Communist Party, says that the head of the Communist Party told him "X" was a Communist: Which is the most convincing statement, "X's" own statement, or the statement made by the head of the party to his subordinate, "B"?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I should say that I would be inclined to believe both of them if they both said so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Suppose they were in conflict on that point?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think I would have to give greater credence to the superior, the ranking superior in the case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, Miss Bentley, I would like to ask you the same question.

Miss BENTLEY. Could you repeat it again?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Assume we have, on the one hand, the testimony of a man, "X," that he is a Communist.

We have, on the other hand, the testimony of one, "B," who is a principal subordinate of the chief Communist, who says that his superior told him that "X" was a Communist.

Which is the more convincing testimony, if you would weigh them in your mind?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, in general, I agree with Mr. Chambers that the testimony of the superior would be the more believable, probably.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there was a conflict, you would believe what the chief said, even as against the man himself?

Miss BENTLEY. I would tend to, but I think you would have to go into the situation a great deal deeper than that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Philbrick, what would you say on that?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I would say in that instance the hearsay evidence would, in my mind, be stronger or nearer the fact than the direct statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Admiral Hillenkoetter, would you express an opinion on that, sir?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. I think the same thing. You would believe the superior, I think.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, what you people are all saying is this, is it not: That a man himself might for any number of reasons

lie about whether he was or was not a Communist, but the head of an espionage agency would not lie about such a matter to one of his principal subordinates? Is that what you have in mind? Is that the basis of your reasoning?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Philbrick?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Admiral?

Admiral HILLENKOETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with the maintenance and the formation of an espionage organization, is the question of making a contact or making an introduction an important thing? Could you answer that question, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes. Inevitably.

Mr. MORRIS. The mere contact, the mere introduction, of somebody to somebody else under the proper auspices: That is an important function?

Mr. CHAMBERS. It is bound to be.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you develop that for us, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, clearly, when you have an underground organization, that is to say, a secret organization, any new person put in touch with that apparatus raises a new problem. And they always constitute a danger. There is no reason to believe in most cases presumably that there is any danger. The fact that the introduction is being made implies that very careful consideration has been given to it in advance. In the nature of underground work, a good deal of secrecy usually surrounds such an introduction, for security reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. Hede Massing, who is one of our witnesses, has just arrived, and I would like, because of the testimony she has previously given this committee—she has been sworn—to ask the same question of her.

Based on your experience, that is. What was your experience in the Communist organization, Mrs. Massing?

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF MRS. HEDE MASSING

Mrs. MASSING. Well, I was an agent. I was an Apparatschik. I belonged to a Russian Apparatus. I was originally a German party member. In fact, I have spent most of my life, until 1937, in the Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. About how long was that? Fifteen or twenty years?

Mrs. MASSING. Oh, more than that. I joined it when I was 17, and I actually did not join by taking out party membership, but as you probably know I worked under Gerhart Eisler, and then belonged to the movement by being his wife.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, during this period of time, what period of time was spent actually in the open Communist Party?

Mrs. MASSING. You see, I spent my life in the Communist Party without ever having been a party member. By mere coincidence, I took out party membership when I came back the first time from Russia, where I had lived for 2 years, not knowing that I was not to

do that, not having been sort of briefed in time not to take out party membership.

Mr. MORRIS. So your party membership actually was a mistake.

Mrs. MASSING. Oh, completely. And I had to drop it right away, and it was very complicated.

Mr. MORRIS. So if anyone such as the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate had asked you if for any particular time except for the 2 weeks you were a member of the Communist Party, "Were you are have you ever been a Communist Party member," could you have given the answer that you were not?

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; I could. Of course I could.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, the point that we are developing at this particular juncture, Mrs. Massing, is the importance of a contact within the Communist Party organization. We have had extensive testimony about the nature of agency, a Communist agency or an agency for the United States Government.

We would like to know within the general framework of an agency the importance of a mere contact.

As I understood your testimony previously, you were essentially someone who made contacts for the Communist Party, were you not?

Mrs. MASSING. Exactly. Well, of course, there are various kinds of contacts one makes, and various intensities at which one works on such a contact. I do not quite know which one you want to elaborate.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, what did you do, for instance? What was your assignment?

Mrs. MASSING. Well, first of all I would come here and report on possible prospects to my Russian superior. I then would be ordered, advised, to work on such prospects. And then I would, after intensive working on such prospects, hand them over to a Russian, that I generally didn't know.

Senator O'CONOR. Mrs. Massing, may I ask you at that point: Were you under instruction to obtain any given number, or as many as possible, of prospects?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course, everything I did was under instruction. And I had no decision on the number. I would give a report, and I would be told, "There is the man to focus or concentrate on." It wasn't a question of getting a number. It was a question of getting important and useful people, even if they would not be of immediate use, if they would be of future use.

Senator O'CONOR. That is the very point I was coming to, whether or not you were given any specific instructions as to the kind of individuals or as to the position or their influential posts or anything of that nature.

Mrs. MASSING. Well, sir, you see, they had so many levels. Of course, first you go and sort of look it all over, and once when I explained to my superior that I could not possibly meet a stenographer in his office, I said, "Of course, that is not important," and he said: "Don't say that. It might be very important at a difficult time to have a stenographer at the right place." But, of course, my occupation was to concentrate on State Department officials, and in fact I concentrated on two State Department officials mostly.

Mr. MORRIS. How much time did you spend on those two people?

Mrs. MASSING. Many months.

Mr. MORRIS. On each one, or on both, combined?

Mrs. MASSING. Many months on Noel Field and a few months on Lawrence Duggan, who had been obviously previously very well prepared, not for working with me but in the Communist doctrine.

Senator O'CONOR. Mrs. Massing, so that we can keep clear the references, will you state who the two were on whom you were to concentrate?

Mrs. MASSING. Noel Field, who then was in the western section of the State Department, and who is now kidnaped with his whole family behind the iron curtain, and Lawrence Duggan.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. And was there anyone else? That is what I wanted to get at.

Mrs. MASSING. Yes; there were others I tried to get, but they were not liked by the Russians, or it didn't work out, and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing was not here, Mr. Chairman, when you asked the question about the significance of meeting with a Soviet official, particularly a Soviet official attached to a foreign office.

Would you attribute any significance to an American meeting with such an official, particularly if the Russian came to the individual's home, in connection with security scrutinies?

Mrs. MASSING. Well, in my personal experience, no Russian official would have ever gone to any American official's home. That would have been completely taboo. Such meetings were done in great secrecy and with great preparation.

As Whittaker Chambers has beautifully described, we all had misgivings, for example, to represent our Russians, all of whom we didn't like, to our American sources; and we all found, and I think Betty Bentley found the same thing, that we did not need to worry. The Americans had already been prepared. And they were very pleased to be faced with a representative of this great country, Russia, the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Philbrick, did you have any comment to make?

Senator O'CONOR. You indicated there was something.

Mr. PHILBRICK. Yes, on this very peculiar business of being in the Communist Party for many years and not being a party member, that is quite a gimmick.

And as Mrs. Massing told about it, I recall that when I was shifted from the subrosa section, semiunderground section, of the party, into the underground, the very words that were used were, "You are to drop out of the party."

And yet I was becoming more of a party member than I had ever been before.

But what it means is that the Russian bosses and the Communist Party realize that they have not only an underground organization but an illegal operation, and therefore they use this, it seems to me, to make it impossible or try to make it impossible to legally prove that any of these people are party members. They all carry no cards and they operate as though they are not legally party members, when actually of course, they are.

Senator O'CONOR. Miss Bentley, might I just, in order that we can understand the method of operation, ask this: Recalling as I do the testimony you gave us when you first came before the Senate committee in respect to William Remington, which I think was in 1947, you described the method of operation and the steps you took to obtain from Remington certain information and Government records.

Do you recall?

Miss BENTLEY. Not offhand, no.

Senator O'CONOR. You do recall some of the contacts you had with Remington?

Miss BENTLEY. Oh, yes.

Senator O'CONOR. And it was that information that you gave us then. My point was whether or not, at the time you were having the contacts with Remington, you were then a member of the underground, or whether you were in the open party.

Miss BENTLEY. No; I was definitely a member of the underground and had been since 1938. That was 4 years before that.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Hillenkoetter, I would like to ask you the question, If you continued now to be the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and you had agents within the Communist Party, would you be allowed to make them available to a Senate committee for testifying about the organization that they had infiltrated on your behalf?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. Normally, no. We wouldn't make them available, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You see, Mr. Chairman, the point here is that if a Senate committee addresses itself to this problem, there are really only two sources of evidence, if we have established the fact that there are no documents available.

Then we have to get the testimony of someone who was there in the conspiracy, namely, somebody who had been a participant in the conspiracy, either genuinely or acting, say, on behalf of the United States Government.

Now, I would like to ask a few questions of Admiral Hillenkoetter about the availability of such an agent.

The CIA, if it had a man well placed in the Communist organization—purely supposition—would not readily have that agent available for testimony before the committee?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. If they had such an agent, and he testified before the committee, he would be no good. He is gone then.

So certainly if he were doing good work and if there were an infiltration like that, you wouldn't want him to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Philbrick, can you give any testimony on that point? You did ultimately testify, did you not?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances surrounding your testimony?

Mr. PHILBRICK. Well, in 1949 the Justice Department or somebody—I don't know who—decided that I should be pulled out of my work for the Government inside the Communist Party to testify in the trial of the 11 comrades in 1949. And that, of course, meant that so far as the FBI was concerned my value was destroyed. I was no longer of any use to them. I could no longer get hold of any of the evidence that was available to me before.

Mr. MORRIS. So the fact of your exposure was something to offset the value of your testimony at the trial?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And as far as you know, some superior of yours made the decision, and you did not participate in it in any way?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to take a little testimony on the possibility of a Communist being an objective scholar.

I wonder if you could give us any testimony along those lines, Miss Bentley; the possibility of someone who is a Communist being an objective scholar within an organization such as the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Miss BENTLEY. I don't see how it is possible for a Communist to be objective anyway, whether he is a scholar or anything else.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by that?

Miss BENTLEY. I mean that a Communist or someone who is under Communist discipline does not do his own thinking. He must accept the party line. He does not make up his own mind. And therefore I fail to see how he could be objective even if he had the kind of mind which otherwise could do objective thinking.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you think a Communist could be an objective scholar, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any reason for that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. It is scarcely possible to accept a doctrine such as the Marxist theory and apply it and be objective in the ordinary acceptance of the word.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Hillenkoetter, can you give us any opinion on that score?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. Mine would be mostly hearsay, but if you are under strict discipline of a certain line of thinking, you can't be objective and follow that line of thinking.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Philbrick, could you answer that question?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I would say it would be impossible for a Communist Party member to be objective. I saw so many examples of it, such as—oh, I think it was in 1948, when in the party we were studying material concerning Tito. And we were studying booklets and pamphlets published by the Communist Party which built Tito up to a great hero. And then overnight, suddenly, Tito was a bum. Things had changed, according to Joe Stalin. And overnight here, in our own party cells, the peculiar minds of the comrades shifted immediately, and they all decided unanimously that Tito was no good any more.

There were many such instances which were amazing to watch, and it convinced me it was simply impossible for these people to be objective about almost anything.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing, can you contribute anything to that particular point?

Mrs. MASSING. Of course he cannot be objective if he is a party member. If he is a good actor, and these are his orders, he will certainly make every effort to appear objective and make the point of being objective, but he will not be.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, if you think it is advisable, I would like to put the following possibility to the witnesses here today and ask them to comment on the probative value of a situation such as the following:

If we have a man concerning whom several witnesses have given testimony that that particular person has been within the scope of their direct knowledge a member of the Communist Party, and we

call such a person in, a man who was stated to have been a member of the Communist Party, and we ask him if he is or has been in the past a member of the Communist Party or at least ask him if he hasn't been in the past a member of the Communist Party, and then he refuses to answer, and then he indicates that he is going to refuse to answer any question concerning his membership in the Communist Party on the grounds that any answer he would give would tend to incriminate him. At the same time there is considerable evidence that the general tenor of his writing remains the same. His general list of associations remains the same. That is, from the time that he was identified to have been active in the Communist Party, right down to date.

What probative value do you think we can give to that testimony concerning his present membership in the Communist Party, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should find it very difficult to suppose that he was not still in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I would think so, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Philbrick?

Mr. PHILBRICK. What was the question again, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Philbrick, the question is that we have a situation where a man has been identified by several witnesses to have been in the past sometime within the scope of their knowledge a member of the Communist Party. After that, we call the man in and ask him if he, in fact, had been, according to the testimony of the three people, a member of the Communist Party. And he refuses to answer whether or not he had been, on the grounds that his answer might incriminate him. By his subsequent course of deportment in response to questions, he refuses to answer any question that borders on his own association with the Communist Party.

At the same time there is considerable evidence that such a person keeps the same associations, the general tenor of his writing remains the same, and there is no interruption of his general line of thought.

To what extent do you think we can conclude that such a man is still a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. PHILBRICK. I think you could definitely conclude that he is still a member of the Communist Party. He might even go so far as to answer one question, and that would be to say that he is not now a member of the Communist Party.

And I base that statement upon instructions which we were given in 1948 in our cell by a courier by the name of "Pete," who was a security man inside of the party.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all you know about him, that he is "Pete"?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is all. And Pete instructed us at that time—now, the situation may have changed since—that we were to say, we were permitted to say and some party members were instructed to say, that we were not now members of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he could have resigned the day before he came down to testify, could he not?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Well, he wouldn't have to resign; no. But he was to testify to that effect.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, do you think that course of conduct would be prompted by the fact that perhaps the inquiring agency had evidence of past membership but they had no evidence of present membership?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And therefore advice of that nature would be considered to be good advice under the circumstances?

Mr. PHILBRICK. That is true, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Admiral Hillenkoetter?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. I think you must believe the man is still a member.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you give a reason for that other than the reasons that have been given, Admiral Hillenkoetter?

Admiral HILLENKOETTER. No; I think the reasons that have been given have been very adequate.

Mr. MORRIS. Mrs. Massing?

Mrs. MASSING. I agree with everything that has been said so far. You are instructed by a Communist Party member that if it is advisable to say that you are not now a member of the party you will say so, and if it is assumed that you don't know enough about the man you deny it completely.

You could never prove, for example, that I was a party member. And I was a party member. And if I had been asked when I was a Communist if I was a party member, I would have said "No; I wasn't."

Mr. MORRIS. You see, at that point, Mr. Chairman, we point out that there is no further source of evidence for all practical purposes about this man's present membership. It takes some period of time before an ex-Communist becomes an ex-Communist. He doesn't become one in a single day and then give testimony the same day about the agency of this particular person.

The only other possible source would be to have somebody in the intelligence agency acting on behalf of somebody in the Government who knows about his identity in the Communist organization.

So if those two things are unavailable, as I think the discussion showed today, we have to draw some kind of inferences as reasonable men about the continuation of a status once established, and we have to assume that such an agency is presumed to continue.

I have no more questions of these particular witnesses, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. Any further questions, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I wanted to put some exhibits into the record and wanted to make some comment about the difficulty of serving certain people in connection with our hearing. I dont' think the whole thing will take more than 10 minutes.

Senator O'CONOR. There was a matter that I had to communicate with the floor on, so I thought we would be in recess for about 10 minutes, and then we will resume with what we have, if that is agreeable to you.

The committee will now be in recess until a quarter of 12.

(Short recess.)

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please be in order.

Mr. Morris, you indicated a desire to offer for the record certain documents or other data, and also to make some explanatory statement.

Will you proceed?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There were quite a few witnesses that we have made an effort to have testify before this committtee, and I think, if it is your wish, that the effort made by the staff to bring these witnesses here should properly be made part of the record; the difficulties that we encountered, the inaccessibility of these witnesses, are factors that should be taken into consideration if this committee is going to make a report on the series of hearings.

Now, we tried several times to reach Solomon Adler.

We consulted Mr. William Holland in the Institute of Pacific Relations. We checked with the Department of Justice. And we in addition having tried to subpena him. The best information apparently is that Mr. Solomon Adler is in England; he is at Cambridge University, and that seems to be the best evidence I can produce at this time as to his availability.

Senator O'CONOR. Now, Mr. Morris, it occurs to me that we might be able to follow better, and the record might be a little more intelligible, if you were to announce the name of the individual about whom the explanatory statement will be made and then proceed to give any detailed information.

Mr. MORRIS. The next name is Ellen Atkinson. Now, Ellen Atkinson we had an address for in Arlington, Va., and we made an effort to reach her, and we discovered that she was working in the United Nations in Rome. That is the extent of the effort we have made to reach Ellen Atkinson.

Senator O'CONOR. The next individual?

Mr. MORRIS. Charles Bidien. He was a writer for the institute. We endeavored to subpena him, and we discovered that he had been deported by the United States authorities out of the country, and he is now somewhere outside the continental limits of the United States, and we have a letter which has been introduced into the record giving his immigration status, namely, one of somebody who has been barred from the country.

In connection with Abraham Chapman, who has been a writer for the Institute of Pacific Relations, we have made extensive efforts to reach him. We have asked the Justice Department to assist us in finding him. We have had four different addresses. We have had several subpenas out, and all of them have been unavailing, and nobody apparently knows where Abraham Chapman is now. It may be that a public announcement would turn him up, but the Department of Justice—and I presume they got in touch with the FBI—were not able to find where Chapman is at the present time.

Senator WATKINS. I understand the committee still wants him here to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. I don't think so, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. What good is it if it becomes public and we find out where he is now, then, if you do not want him to testify?

Mr. MORRIS. I am just saying that the best efforts on the part of all the staff to find Mr. Chapman have been unavailing, and I want to say that we have tried to reach him through the Department of Justice and several times through the United States marshal's office.

Senator WATKINS. Well, I wondered, if you could get him, whether you would not still want him to testify.

Mr. MORRIS. There comes a point, Senator, where you feel that you can give up trying to reach him.

Senator WATKINS. Suppose he gets the word and turns up immediately? Would you want him then?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't know. We would have to consult with the chairman.

Senator WATKINS. I would think the committee would want to hear him.

If you had this search out for him now, and had not been able to get him, and he should show up immediately, I think he ought to be heard.

Mr. MORRIS. The next is Mr. Ch'ao Ting Chi. We have discovered that he is an official in the Chinese Communist Government, and we last heard that he was actively associated in an important position in the Chinese Communist Government, and we assumed that he would not be available as a witness, from that fact. And that, I might say, is true of Mr. Y. Y. Hsu, who was on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and it is also true of Mr. Chen Han-seng.

These three are now in Communist China and therefore are unavailable so far as this committee is concerned.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, just so there can be no misunderstanding of the record and the colloquy between Mr. Morris and Senator Watkins, I would like to ask Mr. Morris:

The purpose of putting this list in the record is not to serve notice on these people that they can come out of hiding, if they are in hiding, that the committee is not to look for them any more; is it?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. It is not an effort to reach them. It is a report on the efforts we have made to reach them.

Mr. SOURWINE. But nothing said here is to be taken as an indication that the committee has lost interest in these folks. If we can find them, the committee will certainly consider bringing them in here for testimony. Isn't that true?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. That is all I had in mind. I thought from what you said about making this public that that might help to turn him up.

Mr. SOURWINE. It could.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is, by all our sources of information, including Mr. Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations, presently the wife of Israel Epstein. We had information 2 months ago that both Mr. Epstein and his wife were being feted in Red China. So the last information we had on these two people was that they were in Red China. Again, we have had subpenas out. The marshal tried to find them. Early in the proceedings we discovered that they left the United States while an investigation was under way, and the immigration inspector has stated that all immigration stations in the country are on the lookout to avoid their entry into the country again. So I think we therefore can discontinue our efforts to get Epstein and his wife, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley. The last reports were that they were in Communist China and were being feted for some of the efforts they had made toward the conquest of China by the Communists.

Talitha Gerlach was reported out of the country, as was Michael Greenberg, for whom the last address we have is Trinity College, Cambridge, England, and we also heard from Mr. Holland that he was now working in Switzerland.

Mr. Chew Hong, or Chew Tong—he is known by both names—was called for a corollary purpose, to establish the identity of the New China Daily News, which figured in the testimony of Mr. Lattimore and some of the other witnesses. Now, we tried to reach him, and apparently he has left the country. The marshal reported that he cannot be found anywhere.

And again, on all of these, we have asked the Department of Justice to help us.

Again, Chew Hong, from the best information we have, is also in Red China.

Now, Anthony Jenkinson we had an address for at 133 West Forty-fourth Street, New York. We got some information that he might be found through the Allied Labor News at 401 Broadway. A subpena was issued at both of those places, and the marshal reported that he could not be found. We do know that he is an Englishman, and then we have every reason to believe that he has left the United States and is now in England.

Hans Mueller, who was known as Asiaticus, to the best of our knowledge, has died. All of the Institute of Pacific Relations people, and Holland and Carter, have stated that their best information is that he was killed during the last war. We have made no other efforts to try to reach him. He is not an American citizen.

Fred Poland is a Canadian, and we made no effort to reach him, because he is a Canadian official.

Now, we tried to reach Hilda Austern Rae, and we subpenaed her on March 11, 1952, and we got a report from the marshal's office that she was in Geneva, Switzerland, at that time.

Ludwig Rajchman, whose name appeared in our testimony, is now associated with the Polish Communist delegation to the United Nations and presumably would not be a witness before this Committee.

Andrew Roth, according to our evidence, according to information received from Mr. Holland, was last discovered to be in London. We have further evidence that the French Government has banned Mr. Roth from turning up in Indochina, because of his hostility to the French Government, I suppose vis-à-vis their difficulty with the Communists in Indochina.

Agnes Smedley is deceased. According to all reports, she is dead.

Andrew Steiger, who has appeared in our hearings particularly in connection with having written a book for Mr. Wallace—we had an address for him at 49 Claremont Avenue, in New York City. William Holland gave us the same information. We had a subpena out quite some time trying to reach Mr. Steiger, and it was all unavailing.

The last we heard from Guenther Stein was that he was believed to be a correspondent for the Hindustani Times in Geneva. Mr. Holland confirmed this fact. Several times in the course of the hearings we had testimony to the effect that he had been deported from France for espionage activities, but he has not been found by the committee, and we are not going to call him.

Anna Louise Strong we tried to subpena. We had an address for her in Connecticut, and after we tried to subpena her we discovered

she was traveling somewhere in the State of Washington and could not be reached.

Mary Van Kleeck we sent a subpena out for on May 4, 1952. The subpena was not served. The marshal told us that she was reported to be somewhere in California.

Nym Wales was formerly Mrs. Edgar Snow, and was subpenaed by the committee on two or three occasions by telephone. She pleaded illness, and she was unavailable to come before the committee.

Rose Yardumian, who was the secretary of the Washington branch of the IPR for a long while, apparently is married to an Englishman, Peter Townsend, and is living in London. We did have a report that within the last year she was in Communist China, and our evidence in the record does show that she was on the staff of a publication put out in Communist China, and that there is some doubt as to whether actually she is in England or in Red China, but the fact is that she is unavailable to the committee.

We have one more, Ella Winter. We had a subpena out for Miss Winter on February 4, 1952. The marshal was not able to serve it. And the report was that she was vacationing somewhere in Europe.

I think that is properly a report on the people that we have not been able to reach. And I think that all should be part of the official record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'Conor. Yes. Now, is there anything further?

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1345" and was read in full by Mr. Morris.)

Mr. Morris. Yes, we have some more documents we would like to put into the record, Mr. Chairman. It will take only about 10 minutes.

Senator O'Conor. Proceed.

Mr. Mandel. First, there was correspondence in regard to Government contracts for IPR publications. We have here correspondence with the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Frank Pace, and the replies, correspondence with the Secretary of the Navy, the Comptroller General of the United States, the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Comptroller General again. All these deal with the question of contracts.

Mr. Morris. That is, contracts, Mr. Mandel, between the Institute of Pacific Relations and these various Government agencies for the publication and the acquisition of IPR pamphlets and material by the Government?

Mr. Mandel. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may these be received into the public record?

Senator O'Conor. They will be. And they will be marked as official exhibits.

(The correspondence referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1346 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, and O" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1346–A

SEPTEMBER 26, 1951.

Hon. FRANK PACE, Jr.,
Secretary of the Army, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations being conducted by the Internal Security Subcommittee, it is noted that Contract No. W28021 QM 14783 was made with Jersey City Quartermaster Depot for an indefinite number of pamphlets at a 20-percent discount.

Would you kindly give me the titles of the publications ordered in connection with the above contract with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346–B

OCTOBER 4, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: The Secretary has requested me to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated September 26, 1951, in which you ask for the titles of the publications ordered in connection with Contract No. W28021QM 14785, between the Jersey City Quartermaster Depot and the Institute of Public Relations.

I find that this contract is a 1-year "open end" contract dated June 30, 1944, and that all the records concerning this contract are located elsewhere than in Washington.

These old records are now being searched, and I will write you further concerning this matter, as soon as that search is completed.

Sincerely yours,

F. SHACKELFORD, *Department Counselor.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346–C

OCTOBER 13, 1951.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Further reference is made to your letter of 26 September 1951 in which you ask for the titles of the publications ordered in connection with Contract No. W28021 QM 14783 between the Jersey City Quartermaster Depot and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

We have made a search of the available Army records concerning this contract which, as I informed you in my letter of October 4, 1951, was a 1 year "open end" contract dated 30 June 1944. Examination of the accounts of the disbursing officer servicing the finance office at which vouchers under the contract were paid reveals that during the period July 1944 to June 1945 the following publications were ordered under this contract:

Month of purchase and name of publication:

	Quantity
January 1945:	
Japan Since 1931	1
Japan Emerges as a Modern State	1
Basis for Peace in the Far East	1
An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics	1
Our Far Eastern Record	1
Changing China	1
Wartime China	1
Modern Japan	1
Korea Looks Ahead	1
Our Job in the Pacific	1
March 1945: America's Far Eastern Policy	1
May 1945:	
Modern Japan	1
Alaska Comes of Age	1
Speaking of India	1
Pacific Islands in War and Peace	1
China in Peace and Freedom	1
Korea for the Koreans	1
Asia's Captive Colonies	1
Our Far Eastern Record	1

Month of purchase and name of publication—Continued

	Quantity
May 1945—Continued	
Knowing the Soviet Union	1
Filipinos and Their Country	1
Wartime China	1
Land of the Soviets	1
Changing China	1
Our Job in the Pacific	1
Gateway to Asia: SINKIANG	1
June 1945:	
Land of the Soviets	62
Modern Japan	62
Peoples of the China Seas	62
Lands Down Under	62
Our Far Eastern Record	62
Security in the Pacific	1

If you desire any further information in this connection, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

F. SHACKELFORD, *Department Counselor.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346–D

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, October 17, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I have your letter of September 26, 1951, wherein you requested certain information relative to purchase contracts placed by the Navy Department for publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The publications purchased from the Institute of Pacific Relations are listed below with the applicable contract numbers and titles:

N140 s—28522 A, dated 23 February 1944	Speaking of India.
N140 s—46000 A, dated 19 May 1944	Wartime China.
Requisition dated 25 April 1945:	
Purchase order 69197 A, dated 7 May 1945	Know your Enemy Japan.
	Wartime China.
	Our Job in the Pacific.
	Speaking of India.
	Asia's Captive Colonies.
	Pacific Islands in War and Peace.
N140 s—72028 A, dated 20 June 1945	Spotlight on the Far East War on Japan.
N140 s—99790, dated 24 Mar. 1942	Know Your Enemy Japan.

Sincerely yours,

H. R. ASKINS,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

EXHIBIT No. 1346–E

SEPTEMBER 26, 1951.

Hon. DAN A. KIMBALL,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations being conducted by the Internal Security Subcommittee, it is noted that the following contracts were made by the Navy with the Institute:

N140 s 28522 A: With Educational Services Section of Navy for 10,000 pamphlets at a total cost of $1,000. Feb. 23, 1944.

N140 s 46000 A: With Naval Training, 10,000 pamphlets at a total cost of $1,000. May 19, 1944.

Pur. Ord. 69197 A: With Naval Training for shipment all around the world, 180,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about $15,400. April 25, 1945.

N140 s 72028 A: With Naval Training, 30,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about $3,100. June 20, 1945.
N140 s 99790: With Navy for 100,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about $1,750. March 24, 1942.

Would you kindly give me the titles of the publications ordered in connection with the above contracts with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346–F

SEPTEMBER 27, 1951.

Hon. LINDSAY C. WARREN,
Comptroller General of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: In connection with an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations being conducted by the Internal Security Subcommittee, it is noted that the following government contracts were made with the Institute:

W28021 QM 14783: With Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, for indefinite number of pamphlets at a 20% discount.
N140 s 28522 A: With Educational Services Section of Navy for 10,000 pamphlets at a total cost of $1,000. Feb. 23, 1944.
N140 s 46000 A: With Naval Training, 10,000 pamphlets at a total cost of $1,000. May 19, 1944.
Pur. Ord. 69197 A: With Naval Training for shipment all around the world, 180,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about $15,400. April 25, 1945.
N140 s 72028 A: With Naval Training, 30,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about $3,100. June 20, 1945.
N140 s 99790: With Navy for 100,000 pamphlets at a total cost of about $1,750. March 24, 1942.

Would you kindly give me the titles of the publications ordered in connection with the above contracts with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346–G

SEPTEMBER 28, 1951.

Hon. LINDSAY C. WARREN,
Comptroller General of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: Would you kindly consult your files for any record between 1940 and 1945, inclusive, showing a contract for government purchase of copies of two magazines:

1. CHINA TODAY, published monthly at 168 W. 23rd St., New York, N. Y.
2. AMERASIA, a fortnightly of America and Asia, published fortnightly by AMERASIA, 225 Fifth Ave., New York 10, N. Y.

The contracts for the purchase of these publications by the government may have been made through the Liberal Press, 80 Fourth Ave., New York, N. Y.

We should like to have all data pertaining to these contracts.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346–H

SEPTEMBER 28, 1951.

Hon. LINDSAY C. WARREN,
Comptroller General of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: Further in connection with the investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations being conducted by the Internal

Security Subcommittee, it is noted that the following Government contracts were made with the Institute:

NOM–41776: 1/7/44, book
N–14055–15198A: 2/13/43, books on Alaska, Asia, Japan, China, etc.
W–1445 QM–2230: 7/29/43

Would you kindly give us the titles of the publications ordered in connection with the above contracts with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and also all data pertaining to these contracts?

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT NO. 1346–I

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, October 2, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your letter dated September 28, 1951, requesting all data pertaining to a contract for Government purchase of two magazines, China Today and Amerasia, between 1940 and 1945. The matter will be given prompt consideration and I shall be pleased to advise you relative thereto at a later date.

Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN,
Comptroller General of the United States.

EXHIBIT NO. 1346–J

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, October 2, 1951.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your communications dated September 27 and 28, 1951, requesting titles of publications ordered and all data pertaining to various contracts with the Institute of Pacifis Relations.

The matter will be given prompt consideration and I shall be pleased to advise you relative thereto at a later date.

Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN,
Comptroller General of the United States.

EXHIBIT NO. 1346–K

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, October 24, 1951.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Further reference is made to your letter dated September 28, 1951, acknowledged October 2, 1951, requesting all data pertaining to contracts of record in this office for the period 1940 to 1945, inclusive, for Government purchase of copies of two magazines, China Today and Amerasia, which you state may have been made through the Liberal Press, 80 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

In accordance with your request, you are informed that a careful check of the records of this office does not reveal any contracts entered into for the purchase of such magazines through the Liberal Press or from any other source, for the period 1940 to 1945, inclusive.

Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN,
Comptroller General of the United States.

EXHIBIT No. 1346–L

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, November 26, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Further reference is made to your letters dated September 27 and 28, 1951, acknowledged October 2, 1951, furnishing a list of Government contracts entered into with the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations and requesting the titles of the publications and the number thereof ordered under said contracts.

In accordance with your request there is submitted herewith a report compiled from the records of this Office showing the number of copies ordered under said contracts, with the exception of contract No. W–28–021–QM–14783, and the titles of the publications, which are identified with the specific contract involved. with respect to contract No. W–28–021–QM–14783, I have to advise that said contract covered not only the publications ordered by the Department of the Army, but, also, provided that the contract "may be utilized by any Government bureau, instrumentality or agency desiring to participate in same," and this Office has no centralized record of the titles of the publications and the number thereof ordered under the contract.

I trust that the otherwise available information contained in the enclosure will serve the purpose of your inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK H. WEITZEL,
Acting Comptroller General of the United States.

Enclosure.

Contract number	Number of copies	Title of publication
N140s–99790	100,000	KNOW YOUR ENEMY: JAPAN.
W–1445–QM–2230	118	FAR EASTERN RECORD.
	118	KNOW YOUR ENEMY.
	118	CHINA AMERICA'S ALLY.
	118	MEET THE ANZAS.
	118	ASIA'S CAPTIVE COLONIES.
N140s–15198A	1,000	ALASKA COMES OF AGE.
	500	CHANGING CHINA.
	500	LAND OF THE SOVIETS.
	500	PEOPLES OF THE CHINA SEAS.
	500	MODERN JAPAN.
NOm–41776	1	BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PACIFIC AREA MAPS.
N140s–28522A	10,000	SPEAKING OF INDIA.
N140s–46000A	10,000	WARTIME CHINA.
N140s–69197A	40,000	KNOW YOUR ENEMY: JAPAN.
	40,000	WARTIME CHINA.
	40,000	OUR JOB IN THE PACIFIC.
	20,000	SPEAKING OF INDIA.
	20,000	ASIA'S CAPTIVE COLONIES.
	19,955	PACIFIC ISLANDS IN WAR & PEACE.
N140s–72028A	30,000	WAR ON JAPAN.

EXHIBIT No. 1346–M

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, November 30, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Supplementing Office letter of November 26, 1951, furnishing, in response to your letters of September 27 and 28, 1951, the titles of publications and the number thereof ordered under certain Government contracts made with the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, there is submitted herewith another list showing the titles of the publications and the number of copies ordered and paid for by the Department of the Army only, under contract No. W–28–021–QM–14783, for the period July 1, 1944, through August 31, 1945.

Sincerely yours,

LINDSAY C. WARREN,
Comptroller General of the United States.

Enclosure.

Contract number	Number of copies	Title of publication
W–28–021–QM–14783	1	AMERICA'S FAR EASTERN POLICY.
	1	SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC.
	1	GATEWAY TO ASIA.
	63	LAND OF THE SOVIETS.
	65	MODERN JAPAN.
	62	PEOPLES OF THE CHINA SEAS.
	62	LANDS DOWN UNDER.
	64	OUR FAR EASTERN RECORD.
	1	ALASKA COMES OF AGE.
	1	SPEAKING OF INDIA.
	1	PACIFIC ISLANDS IN WAR & PEACE.
	1	CHINA IN PEACE & FREEDOM.
	1	KOREA FOR THE KOREANS.
	2	ASIA'S CAPTIVE COLONIES.
	1	KNOWING THE SOVIET UNION.
	1	FILIPINOS AND THEIR COUNTRY.
	2	WARTIME CHINA.
	3	CHANGING CHINA.
	2	OUR JOB IN THE PACIFIC.
	1	JAPAN SINCE 1931.
	1	JAPAN EMERGENCE AS A MODERN STATE.
	1	BASIS FOR PEACE IN THE FAR EAST.
	2	KOREA LOOKS AHEAD.
	1	AN ATLAS OF FAR EASTERN POLITICS.
	1	THE FAR EAST: A SYLLABUS.
	1	MEET THE ANZACS.
	1	KNOW YOUR ENEMY: JAPAN.
	1	TWENTIETH CENTURY INDIA.
	1	SMALL INDUSTRIES OF JAPAN.

EXHIBIT No. 1346–N

APRIL 8, 1952.

Hon. ROBERT A. LOVETT,
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I understand that some time about 1945 Andrew Roth, an American writer, was refused clearance for a visit to Japan by General MacArthur's intelligence officers. Would you please let me have the official record on this, with the reasons for lack of clearance?

Kindest personal regards and all best wishes,

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1346–O

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR,
Washington, 13 May 1952.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: As the Secretary of Defense advised you, your letter of April 8th concerning the denial of clearance for Andrew Roth to visit Japan was forwarded to the Army for reply.

I am pleased to be able to give you the information that actually Mr. Roth was denied clearance to Japan in 1949, rather than 1945 as reported in your letter. This denial was made by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who was responsible for the security of the area under his authority, and within whose jurisdiction the decision lay. You will understand, I am sure, that under established national policy it is not possible for the Department of the Army to release the sources or the nature of the information on which General MacArthur's decision was based.

I hope that if there is any further help I can give you, you will not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

F. SHACKELFORD, *Department Counselor.*

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, dated May 14, 1952, relative to money paid to Owen Lattimore for services.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Ferguson requested that information be made part of our record, and it is now available.

Senator O'CONOR. All right. It may be included.

(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1347," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1347

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 14, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Subcommittee for Department of State,
Committee on Appropriations,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Your letter of May 3, 1952, to the Secretary of the Treasury requesting to be advised of the amount of money that was paid to Owen Lattimore by the United States Government in 1945 has been referred to this Department for further reply, as stated in that Department's acknowledgment of May 7 to you.

The records available to this Department indicate that Owen Lattimore was paid the sum of $4,063.13 for services rendered to the United States Government during the calendar year 1945. This covers his service with the Office of War Information, and with the Japanese Reparations Mission, which was appointed by the President.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,
Deputy Under Secretary.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a letter from Senator Cain, submitting a translation of a review of Owen Lattimore's book, the Situation in Asia, the translation being taken from a Soviet publication, Novy Mir, for November 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that go into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes.

(The correspondence and enclosure referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1348," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1348

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
May 19, 1952.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: I am writing to you with reference to the hearings of the Internal Security Subcommittee on the Institute of Pacific Relations, with special reference to Owen Lattimore.

Because of the important role that Lattimore and his writings have played in the pro-Communist orientation of the Far Eastern policy of the State Department, and the official attitude of the Soviet government toward his utterances, I believe they represent an important criterion for evaluating his adherence to the Communist Party line.

In making a study of American Far Eastern policy, I discovered a significant article on Owen Lattimore in the Soviet publication Novy Mir (the New World) of November 1950. The article discusses Lattimore's book, the Situation in Asia, and shows very clearly how valuable to the Soviet Union was the published philosophy of Owen Lattimore.

I am sending you this article because I believe it to be an integral part of your hearings and reports on the Institute of Pacific Relations, and you may find it desirable to make it a part of your record.

With best personal regards, I am

Most cordially,

HARRY P. CAIN.

HPC/dmb.
Enclosure.

THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND THE PLANS OF THE IMPERIALISTS

REVIEW OF OWEN LATTIMORE'S BOOK, THE SITUATION IN ASIA

(By B. Leontiev)

As a result of World War II there has been a fundamental change in the relation of the forces of the camp of socialism and democracy, on the one hand, and the camp of imperialism and reaction, on the other. The decisive role of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army in the smashing of Hitlerite Germany and militaristic Japan, and in the liberation of mankind from the threat of fascist enslavement, ensured the victory of the progressive forces in a number of European countries and evoked a new great upsurge of the national liberation movement in Asia. The events of the postwar period and, above all, the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, and also the successes of the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, prove that the undivided domination of the imperialist powers in Asia has passed out of existence and never again will be revived.

The attitude towards this unalterable fact of historical development varies among different circles of the imperialist bourgeoisie. One group—and to it belong the more influential, the more aggressive elements in the ruling circles of the U. S. A.—has built and is building its policies on the desire to turn back the wheel of history at all costs. By adopting force, economic expansion, and direct armed intervention, the American imperialists, during the entire postwar period, have been trying to suppress the invincible movement of the peoples of Asia for freedom and national independence and to foist on them the old regime of colonial enslavement.

The other, less influential part of the bourgeoisie, is inclined to take into consideration more soberly and realistically the lessons of history and to draw practical conclusions from them. To it belong some persons from the ranks of the ruling classes of the U. S. A., who are cognisant of the harmfulness of a policy based upon an implacable, zoological hatred towards progressive movements.

True, these more sober-minded people from the ranks of the American bourgeoisie are not at all inclined to acknowledge the capitalism is doomed. It seems to them capitalism still may offer the peoples of Asia, who are liberating themselves, a means for raising the living level of the popular masses. They insist upon an "acknowledgement" of changes which have taken place and on the inevitability of the existence of self-governing states in Asia. In their opinion, the governments of the U. S. A. and other powers must "adapt themselves" to the new situation and attempt to come to an understanding with the people's regime in China and other countries.

To this , undoubtedly more sober but extremely small number of persons, belongs Owen Lattimore, who at one time occupied the post of political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, and who is considered an outstanding specialist on questions of the Far East by the U. S. State Department. In 1949 he published a book, Situation in Asia, in which are summed up his comments and his views on the past, present, and future policies of the imperialist powers in Asia. Both the factual material gathered in the book and the critique of the present policies of the ruling circles of the U. S. A. which are contained in it offer considerable interest.

"Asia is out of control," writes Lattimore. "From the Arab countries to China, the old forms of ascendancy, protectorate or rule cannot be reasserted by military action. * * * An attempt to stun the peoples of Asia by atomic warfare is out of the question, except for madmen. * * * We must negotiate; and we can only negotiate successfully if people in Asia are as well-satisfied with what they get out of negotiated agreements as we are with what we get out of them."

Lattimore refers to all the well-known facts of the forcible actions of the western powers in their former colonies. The attempts to suppress the national liberation movement are proving extremely costly but are not giving results. "Crack troops of the British army" are holding Malaya, notes the author. "The Dutch are keeping approximately a 125,000-man army in Indonesia, and the French more than a 100,000-man army in Indo-China." Having cost, in the words of Lattimore, from 2 to 4 billion dollars (and as a matter of fact considerably more) "the attempts of America to create a government in China satisfactory to it have suffered complete defeat."

Stating the hopelessness of reestablishing "an empire" as he expresses it, Lattimore tries to analyse those reasons which have led to the mighty upsurge of the national liberation movement in Asia, and to the failure of all attempts to suppress it. He gives its due to the growth of national self-awareness of the Asiatic peoples, to the increasing hatred of the popular masses towards the alliance of the imperialists and the feudal landlords in China, India, and other countries, and to the importance of the liberation struggle against the Japanese occupiers. However, the author puts in first place the great revolutionising influence of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia.

Lattimore's reasoning advantageously distinguishes itself from the wild, raving howls of American reactionaries concerning the "Bolshevist menace" and the "hand of Moscow." Not Bolshevist propaganda, he says, but Soviet reality itself, the attainments of the socialist revolution in Russia—this is what has roused and inspired the peoples of Asia to a fight against their imperialist aggressors. And "no kind of propaganda against Russia can prevent other peoples from envying Russia." The feeling of admiration is aroused among the Asiatic peoples by the fact that "they would wish to have for themselves, for example: the schools, universities, hospitals, industrial developments, modernised farming, and opportunities for skilled workers that Russia has in greater abundance than any of its neighbours in Asia."

"Among Russia's neighbours in Asia, the progress made in the Soviet Republics of Asia from about 1925 to 1941 inspired awe and wonder" notes the author. "It leads to daydreams when a poor peasant lad in Iranian Azerbaijan, or a poor Kazakh shepherd in Sinkiang, hears that in Soviet Azerbaijan or Soviet Kazakhstan a poor boy from a family exactly like his, speaking exactly the same language, can go to school with all expenses paid by the state, and on through school to the university, to become an engineer, or a doctor, or a high official, or anything that he is good enough to be. He thinks it wonderful that in those countries his position could be as good as that of a Russian * * *."

Lattimore acknowledges that in the eyes of all the Asiatic people, Soviet democracy is the only complete real democracy. "Colonial peoples," he writes, "attacked by their former rulers and shot down by American guns, increasingly feel that Russia is their only friend. * * * Not one of these countries would

agree to go to war against Russia." Moreover, Lattimore, although in hollow form, is compelled to admit that "when Russia aids the development of a neighbouring country," then this country "acquires a more modern economy," that is, industrialises and becomes economically independent.

The utterances of Lattimore concerning the policies of the imperialists sound especially acute and burning now, when the ruling circles of the U. S. A. have gone over to direct acts of aggression against the Chinese People's Republic by sending its fleet for the "defence" of the last refuge of the Kuomintangites on Taiwan (Formosa), and to armed intervention against Korea.

Lattimore thoroughly describes the history of American intervention in the civil war in China on the side of the reactionary Kuomintang. He speaks about the "complete domination of the landlords in the Kuomintang," about the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was the stooge and support of the most reactionary, exploiting elements noted by the popular masses, and that even the national bourgeoisie finally saw in the Kuomintang bureaucracy its enemy. He talks about the demands of the peasant masses of China, and about the struggle for land, and although his analysis of the growing influence of the Communist Party and the relation between the working class and the peasantry of China suffers from all the defects of a bourgeois commentator, he is compelled to acknowledge the erroneousness of the "wager on Chiang Kai-shek."

The warnings of Lattimore to the American ruling circles are significant and characteristic. "If the Americans proceed along the incorrect path," writes Lattimore, "and endeavor to defend the government which has fled from Central China to the island of Taiwan, this latter also cannot serve as a reliable base * * *. If America converts Taiwan, at the same time, into a base for the American Navy and into a refguge for the Kuomintang government which has been driven out of China, an anti-American frame of mind will develop very quickly there." Lattimore considers mad all such attempts, as also efforts not to permit China its lawful seat in the Security Council: "By the use of our own veto, we could delay China's acceptance in the U. N., but only by some such reductio ad absurdum as pretending that the island of Formosa is China."

As is well known, American imperialist policy in China has followed exactly this adventurist path. In wild hatred of the free people of China, who have thrown off the yoke of imperialism, in a frantic desire to "wipe out" the victory of the Chinese revolution, the ruling circles of the U. S. A. are committing excesses in their impotent rage. They are impeding the Chinese People's Republic, one of the five great powers of the world, from occupying the seat which belongs to it on the U. N. Security Council. A year after the warning of Lattimore, the ruling circles of the U. S. A. announced that an order was given to the American Fleet to "defend" Formosa, that is, to commence open armed intervention against the Chinese People's Republic.

This aggressive act of the U. S., as also the invasion of Korea, has revealed the real plans of American imperialism in Asia. Now, precisely that which Lattimore feared is taking place: the peoples of Asia have seen in American militarists their implacable foes. There cannot be any doubt of the fact that the "reinforcement" of the Kuomintang bands on Formosa by American naval and air units will bring about the final result of further weakening the entire camp of imperialism in the Far East.

Of even more interest are the comments and prognoses of Lattimore concerning Korea. In vivid colours, he paints the reaction and lack of perspective of the American policies in the regions of South Korea occupied by them. The American occupants, he writes, oriented themselves "with two kinds of people: returned political exiles, and Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese. * * * The collaborators were detested by the Koreans, but they were useful to the Americans: they possessed a reputation of a dubious character and they were supposed, through their affiliation with the Japanese, to know something about keeping the people under control."

"America, which has in China complained of the bad luck of having inherited the Kuomintang through no fault of its own", writes Lattimore, "has however in Korea manufactured its own Kuomintang. * * * We have in South Korea created a weak and unreliable police state of our own." The author describes how the Americans, not having "the faintest comprehension of the struggle which is taking place in Asia between the peasants and the landlords," established in Korea an order detestable to the people, under which the land fell into the hands of landlords and adventurists. Having spoken truthfully enough about the great transformations in Northern Korea, about the land reform and the transfer of industry into the hands of the peoples regime, Lattimore emphasized that the army of North Korea is a real people's army, at the same time as in South

Korea "the Americans created not a national army, but a constabulary," consisting of people "who are the most hated by the population." "If there is to be a civil war," he remarks, "South Korea would not be able to subdue North Korea without American aid," at the same time as "North Korea would be able to overrun South Korea without Russian help."

In the light of these admissions of a prominent figure of the U. S. State Department, one of the few collaborators of Acheson actually acquainted with the situation in the Far East, the hypocrisy and falsity of the present American attempts to justify its intervention in Korea by fabrications about North Korean "aggression" appear with all the more force. The opponents are not the northern and southern parts of Korea, but the Korean people, on the one hand, and the Americans and Japanese-American stooges on the other.

The statements of the bourgeois American writer are an act of indictment against the ruling circles of the U. S. A. and against the entire postwar policy of the imperialist camp. Proceeding from the interests of American capitalism, Lattimore sharply condemns and ridicules all the foreign policy acts of Truman's government pertaining to the countries of Asia, colonies and dependent countries. He exposes the conduct of the American occupants in Japan, considering it unwise and based upon incorrect calculations. "The basic reason for the stay of American forces in Japan," he writes, "is the demand of America to dispose of an advantageous position against Russia," * * * but "the control of America over Japan is precarious." The economic policy of the U. S. A. in Japan is absurd, being based on tearing away Japan from her normal, vitally necessary, economic relations with China and other Asiatic countries; this policy is costing the U. S. up to one billion dollars a year expended on the supplying of Japanese industry with raw materials essential for it, at the same time as markets for Japanese goods are artifically closed. Lattimore writes about the inevitability of reviving the old economic connections of Japan which in their turn will create a guarantee against the revival of Japanese militarism. The U. S. A. in relation to Japan, as Lattimore expressed it, "is a dog in the manger." He is certain of the failure of this position. "The possibility that as Japan goes along the road of militarisation and subordination to the U. S. A. so Asia can be made to go is in fact a decreasing possibility. The increasing probability is that as Asia goes so Japan will go."

The author discloses the essence of the enslaving agreements concluded by the U. S. A. with the Philippines which have received formal "independence," and have been given over to the power of the collaborationists who are hated by the people. "In less than two years," he writes, "the military installations of the U. S. A. in the Philippines will be transformed into besieged strongholds surrounded by a hostile population." It is proper to note that in this respect the predictions of Lattimore were not slow to come true since now already in 1950, the national liberation movement in the Philippines—in this, it would seem, most "reliable" colony of the U. S. A.—has acquired a most unprecedently broad scale.

Lattimore also writes about Iran, where "exists a feeble and venal government." The ironical remarks of the author of the hopeless wager of the imperialists on some kind of "strong man," sufficiently strong to carry out the policies demanded by foreign diplomats, but insufficiently strong to oppose foreign influence, bear directly upon recent events in Iran. Chiang Kai-shek seemed to be such a "strong man" to some people, but his fate is well known. Now, in many other countries of Asia, including Iran and Indo-China, the American diplomats are endeavouring to rely upon such similar figures. "So long as we do not rid our heads of some of our illusions," writes Lattimore, "we will again and again find ourselves in the same situation as in China in 1948."

The general conclusions to which Lattimore arrives attest to his realistic understanding of the situation. The analysis of the present situation in Asia and the imminent prospects ends in the following conclusions of the author: "Asia is approaching a status of complete independence"; "neither the subjugating of colonial Asia nor the suppression of China will succeed"; "even those representatives of the national movement in Asia who fear communism, do not wish to serve as cannon fodder in an American war against Russia." But, "the communist movement in Southeast Asia will become more and more powerful," since the tendency of the popular masses of Asia "to connect the concept of democracy with Russia, and not with Europe and America belongs to a number of stubborn facts with which it is now necessary to reckon," since "the communists have mastered the art of recognising the needs of the people."

What Lattimore fears chiefly, as a moderate American writer who realises all the madness of a "policy of force," is the inevitability of the intensification of the influence and authority of the U. S. S. R. in Asia. The continuation of the aggressive policy of Truman, in his opinion, will lead only to the fact that "the situation will gradually incline in favour of Russia." In addition, he expects "a very rapid increase in the strength of the Soviet economy." It is on these fears that all his proposals are based. He proposes not only "to lessen the pressure on Asia," and to give up the "ring of military bases" of the USA around Asia, but also to render, before it is too late, economic aid to the new regimes in Asia, without demanding, for the granting of this assistance, any "political guarantees," that is, the preservation of reactionary regimes. Only in this policy does he see the possibility of maintaining the American position in Asiatic countries, where the USA must "encourage a process of the attainment of independence by the colonial countries," and not suppress the national liberation movement.

The events of recent years prove that the new paths proposed by Lattimore have been rejected by the ruling classes of the USA. They not only are not refraining from efforts to enslave anew the peoples of Asia, but are intensifying these efforts, proceeding to open, outright, aggressive war against China, Korea, and Viet Nam, and, in alliance with their West European accomplices, also against the peoples of Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and the peoples of the Near East. Thus they are dooming themselves to new defeats. The national liberation movement in Asia is invincible. Each new crime of the Americans and other imperialists against the peoples who are fighting for their freedom will lead to the further weakening of imperialism. The future belongs to communism, and whatever "recipes" for saving the power of the imperialists or saving the system of capitalism which might be proposed by liberal figures of the bourgeoisie—these recipes cannot alter the course of historical development (pp. 280–285).

—The New World, No. 11, 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. Did we find out who made that translation, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Senator Cain guarantees the accuracy of the translation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Senator Cain know this language?

Mr. MANDEL. He does not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then how can he guarantee the accuracy of the translation?

Mr. MANDEL. I asked him for the name of the individual who translated it, and he said it was confidential.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the kind of information we want in this record. It makes sense.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, under the circumstances, and with the limitations that have been brought out, will this be received into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received. I do think, however, it ought to be qualified on the condition attached and ought to be open to correction by anyone qualified to pass on it.

Mr. MORRIS. Suppose that we send a copy of this to Mr. Lattimore. And, if anything is unfair to him from his point of view, I think we should take recognition of that.

Senator O'CONOR. Yes. I think it ought to be left open to any correction or any counterstatement.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have photostats taken from pages of the Tydings committee hearings dealing with John Stewart Service and documents that deal with individuals that have come up in our own hearings, and that are therefore pertinent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may we receive that into the record?

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1348A" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1348A

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, PURSUANT TO SENATE RESOLUTION 231, A RESOLUTION TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER THERE ARE EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT DISLOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES

PART I

March 8, 9, 13, 14, 20, 21, 27, 28; April 5, 6, 20, 25, 27, 28; May 1, 2, 3, 4, 26, 31; June 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 1950

[Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations]

MONDAY, JUNE 26, 1950

Mr. MORGAN. That is exactly correct, but at the same time, our record here in public session, as well as reports now in the press, have that particular portion of this information and that is all the public now has. It occurs to me that the only way we can proceed at all, if we are going to go into this situation and finally resolve it, is at least go into this matter right here at this time.

Senator TYDINGS. Let me see if we could do this for the time being. I suggest, first of all, that the letters which Mr. Morris read to the witness yesterday were not classified documents. The letters that were read to the witness yesterday were correspondence for the most part which Mr. Service carried on with certain acquaintances and perhaps friends. They were not classified documents, and they were a part of the so-called 1,700 documents seized in the case, and these particular documents were nothing more than letters for the most part.

I am wondering if part of those letters were put in the record yesterday, whether it would not have been fair to put the whole letter into the record rather than just the sentences that were picked out and read. I would like to hear what counsel for Mr. Service has to say on that particular point.

Mr. RHETTS. In that connection, Senator, I should like to point out, first, that those letters were not found in the possession of Amerasia. They were found in Mr. Service's desk at the Department of State, along with his other personal effects.

Senator TYDINGS. I understand.

Mr. RHETTS. I want to make that perfectly clear.

Senator TYDINGS. These were not seized in any connection with the Amerasia matter at all. They were taken out of Mr. Service's desk in the State Department.

Mr. RHETTS. Now, I certainly think that coming to your next point, if the letters are to be put in, they might as well be put in completely.

Senator TYDINGS. Now that we have covered that, my reason in bringing this up is we would not be breaking any rule of putting in classified documents, because these are not classified documents, but they are a part of the 1,700 papers that were seized or obtained in the case.

Now, I think we got a little too much latitude yesterday having parts of these letters and memoranda, whatever they were, that were in Mr. Service's desk read without putting the whole thing in. I am sure Mr. Morris would want them put in, and my reason for bringing it up now is to ask Mr. Service and his attorneys if they would object to having them put in.

Mr. REILLY. Emphatically not.

Senator TYDINGS. I will take that responsibility by trying to correct the error of yesterday by saying the whole document—it is not a document, we are abusing that word—all the memoranda, letters, or papers that were read yesterday now become a part of the stenographic record, and I will ask Mr. Morris if he will, at his convenience, sort those out, to which he referred yesterday, and give them to the stenographer, and I will ask the stenographer if he will not leave space right here at this point to put them into the record.

(The letters referred to follow:)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
STAFF, CINEPAC, ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS, BOX NO. 5,
FLEET POST OFFICE,
San Francisco, April 2, 1945.

DEAR JACK: Your returning boss gives me a chance to get this line off to you. I've been luxuriating here on Guam for almost 2 months. I'm in the Future Plans Section technically but mostly am getting an education in what goes on in the Pacific and trying to keep up on China—the former is fascinating, the latter difficult. If you could find a safe way to send me an occasional copy of your memos I'd be grateful—maybe you'll find it practical, maybe not. So far as I can find out this is the only opportunity I'll have to communicate with you until and unless Lud (?) and Emmerson (?) come through.

What goes on these days in the old country? I got a chuckle out of the news this morning that old Lung Pi-win (?) is going to be a delegate to the SF Conference.

Best to the boys—specially Sol, if he is about.

A (s) JIM.

WASHINGTON, *April 16, 1945.*

DEAR ANNALEE AND TEDDY: The optimistically pleasant speculations we allowed ourselves to indulge in on that last evening of mine at 879 were 180° off.

The paper tiger roared loudly enough around here to drown out the general but timid—opposition. And based on the Tiger's modest account of his achievements, the big boss said "Keep it up." After that, the table pounding in regard to yours truly was only a matter of course.

Especially disappointing was the "political sense," in the narrow meaning, by the man I had hoped would fight.

I am now assigned to a safe job here but have been urged to bide my time. The Tiger's support ended on the 12th, the day of my arrival. And there is a (now some) feeling that good jobs go to good party members.

WASHINGTON, *April 16, 1945.*

DEAR ANNALEE AND TEDDY: The optimisticaly pleasant speculations we allowed ourselves that last evening of mine at 879 were 180° off.

1350 EUCLID AVENUE,
Berkeley, Calif., March 7, 1945.

Mr. JACK SERVICE,
Care of Neil Brown, OWI, APO 627, Care of PM, New York, N. Y.

DEAR JACK SERVICE: I do hope you don't resent that I now trouble you long distance. But my conscience bothers me; I know how I would feel if I were in Dr. Schwarz's shoes (and I would be in his shoes save for some fortunate circumstances including J. S.).

I had hoped to have a chance to see you again before you left—you sure move fast, and it seems you get across the sea sooner than we get across the bay.

Actually, I have little to add to Kurt's story; I just may add his address: 173 Route Mayen (Hwa Ting Iu)—that's the place where the kindergarten is. Perhaps you may want to add his address to your other addresses, in case there is a chance to use it. Kurt's name is also known to Carlson, who used to work in Opintell, and to Fitch; and Lyman Hoover actually knows Kurt. I had a letter from Lyman a few weeks ago.

If you think it possible to write to Kurt, even just greetings so he sees he is not forgotten, I know it would be a great lift for him and Martha. He knows your name. I feel lousy to suggest this to you, and I would feel guilty if I didn't So here you have my dilemma.

Next month I will celebrate the fourth anniversary of my arrival—and last week my folks (father and mother) arrived in the United States from England on the quota; it took me all these 4 years to get them here, but now I am the happiest guy between the two coasts.

From time to time in the office we have a chance to see reports which include your name, so we are currently reminded of you. What an interesting job you have.

Well, once again, I hope you won't mind all this too much—but I feel if anyone can appreciate the circumstances it's you.

Very sincerely yours,

S. MAX.
MAX KNIGHT.

Mr. RHETTS. In that connection, might I make another suggestion? Along toward the close of the proceedings yesterday afternoon, Mr. Morris was relying on the interesting theory of guilt by association and referring to certain names and addresses found in an address book. I should like similarly to suggest that all the names and all the addresses in that address book be made available. If that type of imputation of guilt is to be indulged in, I think we should have that.

Senator TYDINGS. I think that is fair.

The data referred to are as follows:

27—Sunday:
6:30—Terrell
12:30—Jones
28—Monday: 2:30 Reichne—2177Q
29—Tuesday:
12:30—Weaver
7—Rose Ellen—3447
S
Wakefield
30—Wednesday: 6:30—Senator Pepper
1—Friday: 1:00—Rankin—2D855
2—Saturday—Andy
3—Sunday:
Lattimore
Supper for Rose
4—Monday: Paid
5—Tuesday:
12—Lineboyer
7:30—Burns—4902 S 28 R
Fairlington 12 & Penn.
End line
6—Wednesday:
10—Gebb OSS here
12:30—Duncan Lea

* * * * * * *

Sol Adler:
85/5172
85/2026
Ameson, Eliz. Yard: Glebe 2431
Adkinson, Brooks:
120 R Dr. 1
En. 2-5293
Arnold, Carl: Ex. 7700/280
Brown, Lt. Emil: Ent. 2D 869
Barnett: 86/4725
Carr: Mi. 4321
Colling, Capt. J.: 86/6001
Caldwell, John: OWI 71192
Cowan, Col. Jim:
Co. 0991
86/74107
Davis, Dan: Navy 2488
Marty: OSS/639
Dennison: RFC/614
Drumnight: s/2666
Emmerson, John K.:
903 N. Wahsatch St.
Colorado Springs, Colo
Engdahl, Lee:
1725 W. Hampshire
Apt. 403
s/2398. Du. 5351
Ficlan: Navy 63037. Ch. 1891.
John Fairbank: 80/5454
The Hon. Gauss:
17 Circle Drive
Balled Bay Sher.
Newport Beach, Calif.
Gayn Mail:
302 W 12
Ch. 3-2743
Griffiths:
Garrisonville 17
Fredericksburg, Pa.
Gentile: OSS/654
Garrisonville, Va. 17: Ask for Tom Waller
Hutchinson: OSS 2547
Hitch, Lt. S. H.: Navy 2488
Homan, Christine: Ad. 8514
Harris, Capt.: 86/72809

Hatem, Cpl. J. N.:
1385 Service Unit
McGuire General Hospital
Richmond 19, Va.
Isaacs, Harold:
33 C. P. W., N. Y.
122
Jaffe, Phil:
225 5th, N. Y., 13
MU 3–0245
Jones, Col. Paul: Ex. 7700/498
Little, Herbert:
3761 W, N. W.
OSS2646. WO 3091
Lyon, Freddy: State 459
Luden:
56 Woodard Rd.
West Roxbury 32
Boston
Lattimore:
Roland View Rd., Huxten, Baltimore
OWI, Re. 7500. 72228. Towson 846
Mr. W. W. Lockwood:
UN. 4–0200
119 and Morningside
Capt. Paul Lineberger: 86/5504
McHugh, Col.: OSS/2014. 2188
Mayer, Col. W.: War 72535
Mertsky (Coleman) Jeannette: Mamaroneck 2497
McNally, Col. E. J.: 86/2772
Penfield, J. K.:
U. S. For. Ser. Off.
Staff Cinepar, 5
Reichner, Phoebe: OSS/2472
Lt. Col. Rankin Roberts: 86/74107
Pent. 2D855
Lt. Andy Roth:
1614 N. Queen, Arlington
810/3892
Roger Smith Hotel: Na. 2740
Ray, Frank: FEA 3132
Snow:
Route 1, Madron, Conn.
Or c/o Mrs. Estelle Carlson
Int. House Berkeley
Stevens, Mrs. Harley:
3522 P St. NW.
Wash. OSS ext. 2831
Stein, Guenther: 102 W. 80. En. 2–2900
Sullivan, Phil. s/2633: Room 609. 17129
Schnulz, Gen. J. W.:
Fort Belvoir Engineer Bd.
Temple 6800/2201
Service, R. M.: APO 210
Taylor, George: 5530 Broadfrank NW.
Terrell, Gerald:
3828 Fulton NW.
Wisc. Car N at Fulton
1½ blocks to left
Tolstog: OSS/2488
Vinogradoff, Eugene:
Commissonat F. A.
Chinese Dept.
Moscow
Wilbur:
1625 Fitzgerald Lane
Park Fairfax, Arlington
Ai. 0023. OSS. 2050
Watts, Dick:
920 5th
Bu. 8–2109
Weaver, Capt.: OSS 2232
Wolfe, Thelma: Ed. 4–8634 NYC
Yarderman, Rose: Di. 8665

Mr. MORRIS. In connection with those letters, I believe there were three of them to which reference was made: A letter from CINCPAC headquarters, the letter from Mr. Service to Annalee and Teddy, and the third one we had just gotten to when we abandoned the project.

Mr. RHETTS. One from Max Knight.

Mr. MORRIS. From Max Knight, just three letters. I will see that the stenographer gets them in their entirety.

Mr. MORGAN. Is this applying merely to the letters or also to the reports, portions of which were read into the record?

Senator TYDINGS. The reports were Mr. Service's own personal reports and not classified documents, as I understand it. Is that correct, Mr. Service?

Mr. MORGAN. At yesterday's proceedings I believe portions of your reports were read, and you were asked as to whether or not they represented a fair cross section of your reports. I believe you commented that in your opinion that did not so represent a fair cross section.

I am wondering, Mr. Chairman, if you desire to extend your ruling with respect to these matters that have been read into the record to include the incorporation of the full text of those reports where portions of them have been read into the record.

* * * * * * *

Senator TYDINGS. I make a suggestion, then, that in order to get along we proceed with the paper, and if we can get the record then, later on, we play the record back and compare it with the paper, to see if there is any difference. If there is, we will make corrections at that time. In the mantime, with your consent, I see no reason why we should not proceed with the paper.

Mr. Morgan, without objection, you may continue with your interrogation on this record.

Mr. MORGAN. I do therefore have your consent, Mr. Service, and that of your attorney, to read this into the record?

Mr. RHETTS. Yes.

Mr. MORGAN. This conversation is prefaced by this statement:

"Jaffe and John A. Service entered Jaffe's room after having breakfast in coffee shop."

Senator GREEN. How do they know where he had breakfast?

Senator LODGE. Who said this? Who makes the statement?

Mr. MORGAN. Perhaps we ought to get that clear in our record.

Mr. McInerney, can you help us as to who is responsible for this statement preceding the verbatim transcript of the conversation?

Mr. MCINERNEY. I assume that statement is based upon a physical surveillance of the agents watching them in the coffee shop.

Mr. SERVICE. In any event, it is my recollection that we had breakfast in the coffee shop. I insisted on paying the bill, and we had quite an argument.

Mr. MORGAN (reading):

"They listened to radio addresses by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill."

Senator TYDINGS. So VE-day had been behind us.

Mr. MORGAN. As a prefatory statement, the parties to the conversation are identified by "S" and "J," "S" for Mr. Service and "J" for Mr. Jaffe.

Senator GREEN. Are you reading?

Mr. MORGAN. I am reading now, sir:

"S. If he did it, it will be translated. Have you been trying to keep track of what the Chinese are doing at San Francisco?

"J. I can keep track of them. I'll know later on.

"S. They apparently are avoiding any controversy with the Soviet Union. They are staying, hoping on the Argentina thing. And there seem to be some indications that they are trying to play up to the Russians, hoping for some sort of understanding with the Soviet Union.

"J. Well, they are not talking privately as if they are.

"S. Well, they certainly publicly are avoiding being placed in opposition.

"Indian representatives (anyhow) (.)

"J. I guess these are the only things.

"S. Did you get a chance to look them over?

"J. (Unintelligible.)

"S. The reason I—I had the same idea out in China before I came home, that the President might be playing that sort of a game and was playing a very deep game in not revealing his hand to the Chungking government but when I got home and found out the violence and bitterness of the argument going on here, I dropped it. I mean, if so, there wasn't any reason for the State Department to be smacked down, more or less. There wasn't any reason for Hurley to be kept in the dark.

"J. Well, I'll tell you what I think happened, Jack. I've been thinking about that very hard. I think that Roosevelt recognized after he appointed Hurley, that it was a mistake to appoint him, but once Hurley did his dirty work, there was nothing—would have to take time. I think that of the three big nations we are the only one in which an individual plays such a big role. It is inconceivable that a Soviet ambassador would operate as an individual but here it happens frequently. And I think Hurley put Roosevelt and the whole country on the spot and Roosevelt was trying to find a way of getting out—sending Hurley to some very important area where there was some difficulty. So I can't imagine that Roosevelt changed his ideas about China overnight, and he would have been delighted if he could have found some excuse for firing the guy, but of course Hurley put us in such a terrible spot, and has still got us on the spot where we can't move any longer without openly defying Chungking.

"S. Well, what I said about the military plans is, of course, very secret.

"J. Yes, well, that was talked around about——

"S. That plan was made up by Wedemeyer's staff in his absence, they got orders to make some recommendations as to what we should do if we landed in Communist territory. They had several——

"J. To cooperate with them?

"S. Well, yes, that's what we planned, and they showed me the plans they had drawn up and if we cooperated with Chungking troops if we in recovering territory, in other words, when we were in Chungking territory, we would have to go on cooperating with them. Those were the orders. But if we landed in territory where the Communists were, without any question they'd be the dominant force.

"J. Why would they have to cooperate with the Communists?

"S. Chungking, of course, has been putting pressure on us, trying to get us to agree to take in Kuomintang officials, government officials wherever we land. As far as we know we had not been given any power to do that. But if you get Hurley there, for Hurley to be consistent, why you'd get Hurley putting his influence probably behind—Hurley has all the way down the line only recognized Chiang Kai Shek, and our job is to strengthen Chiang Kai Shek, and to support him, and to bring all the forces in China under Chiang Kai Shek's control. If he says all this publicly, he's going to be just sitting there laughing. And he's going to have a hard time refusing to take in Chungking officials.

"J. Huley's fighting Chungking then?

"S. Oh, yes.—Well, on that line of the Chinese not—with the Russians, Petroff (ph) the new Soviet Ambassador stopped in (?) and stayed for about 9 days—and Award (ph) reports that this is the first time since he'd been there that there'd been any attempt to be frienly with the Russians. All Chungking papers have been carrying practically identically the same wording, and it is obvious that it was prepared stuff and Chungking is avoiding anything derogatory, etc."

Following the verbatim quotation from the record there follows statements apparently by whoever prepared this particular statement here, and I might ask you, Mr. McInerney, who prepared the latter part of it? Was it prepared by the FBI?

Mr. MCINERNEY. Yes.

Mr. MORGAN. I will proceed then, to read this:

"Jaffe tells service about T. V. Soong's visit to Washington, D. C., recently. Jaffe and Service continue their conversation along lines of whether or not Russia will declare war on Japan. Jaffe says Russia will not do so, as they know they are not wanted by the British and the United States. Service asked Jaffe what effect Russia's declaration of war on Japan would have, and Jaffe said Russia would declare war on Japan on one of two conditions:

"1. The San Francisco Conference breaks down, and Russia decides that it must settle matters of its defense in the old-fashioned way;

"2. A coalition government (democratic) is formed in Chungking which would ask Russia to enter the war, which invitation Russia would accept.

("End of record.)"

Mr. Service, after having read this statement, do you recall the conversation with Mr. Jaffe? Does this refresh your recollection in any way.?

Mr. SERVICE. No, sir; I have no specific recollection of the conversation or of making those statements. It is over 5 years, and it wasn't a conversation that would have been particularly noteworthy at the time.

Mr. MORGAN. I notice you apparently, referring to this conversation, have asked Mr. Jaffe as to what he is doing to keep in touch with what is going on in San Francisco. I presume that refers to the United Nations Conference there?

Mr. SERVICE. I would assume so—the general attitudes of the different delegations. "Following it" I suppose meant following it in the press.

Mr. MORGAN. As I gather from what you said, you don't recall ever having asked such question?

Mr. SERVICE. No.

Mr. MORGAN. Does that mean that any questions I might ask you concerning this conversation as reported here, on the basis of your having read it and having heard it read, would not call to mind any of the particulars or the details of the conversation?

Mr. SERVICE. I don't want to seem to be quibbling, but I am afraid that is so, that I do not have positive recollection of the conversation.

* * * * * * *

Senator MCMAHON. Let us put in Mr. Davies' statement.

Senator TYDINGS. Do you want Mr. Davies' statement in?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator TYDINGS. Without objection, it will be put in the record.

(The document referred to follows:)

DOCUMENT J 108 y, RF Q 306

1. Agency where prepared: OWI.
2. Agency where routed:
3. Where recovered: Amerasia.
4. Original or copy: Typed copy and carbons.

5. Copies found elsewhere:
6. Abstract of document:
(1) Yenan, November 7, 1944. Subject: How Red Are the Chinese Communists? by John Davies. Memo points out moderateness of Communists, their willingness to cooperate and to make concessions.
(2) Yenan, November 7, 1944. Subject: Will the Communists Take Over China? by John Davies. Memo reflects Davies' opinion that the Communists are in China to stay, China's destiny is in their hands, and they possess strength and vitality superior to that of Chiang and his followers. (Original typed copy with four copies.)
7. Comments of agency preparing document: An item, not an exact copy, but of the same substance, was located by Helen Groves in OWI files, July 5, 1945; filed in China Section, room 3036.
8. Comments of agency receiving document: None.
9. Laboratory examination; Latents (iodine), none; typewriting, ident K4–KB.
10. Comments:
11. Agent who can introduce document: George E. Allen.

HOW RED ARE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS?

The Chinese Communists are backsliders. They still acclaim the infallibility of Marxian dogma and call themselves Communists. But they have become indulgent of human frailty and confess that China's Communist salvation can be attained only through prolonged evolutionary rather than immediate revolutionary conversation. Like that other eminent backslider, Ramsay MacDonald, they have come to accept the inevitability of gradualness.

Yenan is no Marxist New Jerusalem. The saints and prophets of Chinese communism, living in the austere comfort of caves scooped out of loess cliffs, lust after the strange gods of class compromise and party coalition, rather shamefacedly worship the golden calf of foreign investments and yearn to be considered respectable by worldly standards.

All of this is more than scheming Communist opportunism. Whatever the orthodox Communist theory may be about reversion from expedient compromise to pristine revolutionary ardor, the Chinese Communist leaders are realistic enough to recognize that they have now deviated so far to the right that they will return to the revolution only if driven to it by overwhelming pressure from domestic and foreign forces of reaction.

There are several reasons for the moderation of the Communists.

1. They are Chinese. Being Chinese, they are, for all of their early excesses, temperamentally inclined to compromise and harmony in human relationships.

2. They are realists. They recognize that the Chinese masses is 90 percent peasantry; that the peasantry is semi-feudal—culturally, economically, and politically in the Middle Ages; that not until China has developed through several generations will it be ready for communism, that the immediate program must therefore be elementary agrarian reform and the introduction of political democracy.

3. They are nationalists. In more than 7 years of bitter fighting against a foreign enemy the primary emotional and intellectual emphasis has shifted from internal social revolution to nationalism.

4. They have begun to come into power. As has been the experience in virtually all successful revolutionary movements, accession to power is bringing a sobering realization of responsibility and a desire to move cautiously and moderately.

Chinese Communist moderation and willingness to make concessions must not be confused with softness or decay. The Communists are the toughest, best organized and disciplined group in China. They offer cooperation to Chiang out of strength, not out of weakness.

JOHN DAVIES.

YENAN, *November 7, 1944.*

WILL THE COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER CHINA?

The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great Wall and the Yangtze that they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least north China. They may also continue to hold not only those parts of the Yangtze Valley which they now dominate but also new areas in central and south China.

The Communists have fallen heir to these new areas by a process, which has been operating for 7 years, whereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines of communication to the Japanese and the countryside to the Communists.

The Communists have survived 10 years of civil war and 7 years of Japanese offensives. They have survived not only more sustained enemy pressure than the Chinese Central Government forces have been subjected to, but also a severe blockade imposed by Chiang.

They have survived and they have grown. Communist growth since 1937 has been almost geometric in progression. From control of some 100,000 square kilometers with a population of one million and a half they have expanded to about 850,000 square kilometers with a population of approximately ninety million. And they will continue to grow.

The reason for this phenomenal vitality and strength is simple and fundamental. It is mass support, mass participation. The Communist governments and armies are the first governments and armies in modern Chinese history to have positive and widespread popular support. They have this support because the governments and armies are genuinely of the people.

Only if he is able to enlist foreign intervention on a scale equal to the Japanese invasion of China will Chiang probably be able to crush the Communists. But foreign intervention on such a scale would seem to be unlikely. Relying upon his dispirited shambling legions, his decadent corrupt bureaucracy, his sterile political moralisms, and such nervous foreign support as he can muster, the generalissimo may nevertheless plunge China into civil war. He cannot succeed, however, where the Japanese in more than 7 years of determined striving have failed. The Communists are already too strong for him.

Civil war would probably end in a mutually exhausted stalemate. China would be divided into at least two camps with Chiang reduced to the position of a regional warlord. The possibility should not be overlooked of the Communists—certainly if they receive foreign aid—emerging from a civil war swiftly and decisively victorious, in control of all China.

Since 1937 the Communists have been trying to persuade Chiang to form a democractic coalition government in which they would participate. Should the generalissimo accept this compromise proposal and a coalition government be formed with Chiang at the head, the Communists may be expected to continue effective control over the areas which they now hold. They will also probably extend their political influence throughout the rest of the country, for they are the only group in China possessing a program with positive appeal to the people.

If the generalissimo neither precipitates a civil war nor reaches an understanding with the Comunists, he is still confronted with defeat. Chiang's feudal China cannot long exist alongside a modern dynamic popular government in north China.

The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs.

JOHN DAVIES.

YENAN, *November 7, 1944.*

* * * * * * *

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

DOCUMENT S–67, Q–404

THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,
May 14, 1945.

DEAR JACK: I met your wife the other evening, and your delightful children as well. Phil had arranged with Caroyln to bring Messrs. Tung and Chen to Berkeley, and we had dinner together, along with Martin Wilbur. During the course of conversation, Carolyn mentioned her need of a washing machine in Washington. I told her that if worse comes to worse you might be able to have my family's machine which is now up on Long Island. Carolyn got all excited about this suggestion, and she said that she would write you about it. If you have been looking for one in Washington, I suggest that you continue to do so. You should also inquire about the possibility of new machines coming on the market in the near future. If your efforts in Washington all lead up a blind alley, then it would be practical to consider shipping my family's machine—if you want it—from Long Island to Washington. I just thought that I should explain this to you in case Carolyn's letter discourages you from continuing your search for a machine.

The conference is rather dull, and I find it very depressing. I imagine that this conference may go down as one of the most reactionary international gatherings in history. The only consolation I can find is that the fantastic views on international organization—views which are in essence quite contrary to real and sound international organization—may contribute to breaking down such outmoded concepts as sovereign equality and nation-state system of international relations. But they offer nothing in place of these traditional elements of world affairs.

Phil is keeping the most disgraceful company these days. It is practically certain now that he'll return to Chungking as Minister Counselor and Hurley's houseboy. He is taking his job seriously, and even shows some compassion over the inconvenience which members of the Chinese delegation occasionally have to endure. He is first-rate on seeing that T. V.'s car turns up at the right place at the right time.

John Carter has been introducing me around as the labor attaché for Chungking. The local liberal and labor groups have had me out for a party to meet the right-minded people. Saturday I was introduced to Tarasov, Soviet trade-union representative on the World Trade Union Council. He told that he didn't know that north China was called Communist China. He asked whether they were "Communists" or not. He stated that the Soviet Government favored unity in China and that the United States and Soviet Union should cooperate in bringing about such unity. I am planning to bring John Carter together with Tarasov and another Soviet trade-union leader, Kuznetzov (who is the head of the Soviet trade-union movement and an important figure in Soviet high policy). We may not learn much, but we might get some better line on Soviet psychology on the Pacific, specifically, the China question.

Not much else to say. I won't go into detail about the conference. It isn't too difficult to read between the lines in the press to see what is happening here.

Best regards,

JULIAN.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will look at that letter and identify the writer and the addressee.

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I had forgotten all about this letter until it was shown to me by the Department of State loyalty board. I assume that the writer must be a man named Julian Friedman, who was an employee of the Department of State at that time, and was at San Francisco, I think, as a liaison officer of some sort.

Mr. MORRIS. And he was writing to you?

Mr. SERVICE. Yes.

Senator TYDINGS. Speak the least bit more loudly, please.

Mr. MORRIS. And the John Carter referred to in this letter was, I take it, John Carter Vincent?

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I think we should let Mr. Morris ask the questions.

Senator TYDINGS. Go ahead, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Service, just take them up one at a time and tell us who they are.

Mr. SERVICE. The first name is Terrell, a British diplomat who was stationed in Washington for some time. I had known him and had been a neighbor of his in Shanghai and saw him for supper.

The name Jones is Col. Paul Jones, who had previously been public relations officer, China-Burma, India theater.

The next name, I believe, is copied incorrectly. It should be Reichner. I believe she was a woman working on biographic information for OSS, with whom I had agreed to offer—to whom I had offered to make available my knowledge, particularly regarding Communist personalities. I spent several afternoons with her in OSS being interrogated regarding specific people.

The next man Weaver, I believe, is a captain working in Army Intelligence.

The next name Rose Ellen refers to a Yardoumian, and Ellen Atkinson.

Rose Yardoumian, as I testified, was the secretary of the Washington office of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Ellen Atkinson was employed in the War Department, MIS, as a researcher on the Far East.

This engagement refers to the party on the 29th of May which I attended which they gave in honor of Lieutenant and Mrs. Roth.

The next name, Senator Pepper, needs no explaining.

The next name is Rankin. He was a lieutenant colonel, had been in Chungking as assistant public-relations officer, and at this time was in Washington temporarily. I saw him for lunch.

The next three entries have to do with a week end at the Lattimores'. The entry for 12 noon on June 5 is a mistake in copying. It should be Linebearger, who had formerly been professor at Duke University. During the war was in Military Intelligence, and during the war was a member of the staff at G–2 in Chungking, and was back in Washington attached to the Psychological Warfare Branch.

The next one was Ray burns.

The next name is Gebb. I don't remember Mr. Gebb, but it is written right after his name "OSS" here, meaning that he was coming to my office.

There were a good many research specialists in the other agencies who were continually contacting me with respect to some particular line or field of work in which they were engaged where they thought that I might be able to give them some help, and this was undoubtedly such a man.

The next name is Duncan Lee, concerning whom I have already testified. He had arranged to lunch with me.

Now I come to the address book proper.

Mr. MORRIS. The name "Adler" begins the address book.

Mr. SERVICE. I am sorry. I come to the address book proper. This was a new address book, as I remember it, just concerning this particular period. The first name is Adler, whom I have already testified concerning.

The next name is Arneson, Elizabeth Yard. I did not know Mr. Arneson well. He was at that time employed with OWI, I believe. He was a native Icelander, naturalized American.

Elizabeth Yard, his wife, was my friend. She was the daughter of missionaries in west China, the same age as myself, and I had grown up with her and kept contact with her. I had seen them, they lived over in Arlington.

Brooks Atkinson, correspondent for the New York Times, and probably my closest friend in China.

Carl Arnold was General Stilwell's aide.

Lt. Emil Brown—that is a mistake, it should be Lt. Emily Brown—was an old friend of my wife's. She was at that time in the WAC. She had been a college friend of my wife's and myself, too, for that matter, but I had never known her very well. She is a newspaper woman, was a newspaper woman before the war, and is now with the United Press in the Far East.

Barnett is Robert Barnett. At that time he was in the Army, and presently with the State Department.

Carr. I don't remember what Carr that is.

Mr. MORRIS. Could that be Drew Pearson's assistant?

Mr. SERVICE. It might be. It might well be.

Colling was a young captain in the OSS, who had been a member of the observer group at Yenan. He was, what you would call, a sort of guerrilla-warfare man, a demolitions man, and he had just recently returned to Washington to make his report to OSS, and I brought back a lot of films, and they were trying to put together a picture of Chinese Communist guerrilla operations, and I went over to OSS and saw these films several times, consulted with them on it.

John Caldwell was a friend whom I had known since we were boys together in China. He was with OWI, was with me in China, and was back with me in China on the China desk of OWI.

Cowan was an officer in the headquarters at Chungking who happened to be back here temporarily in the War Department.

Dan Davis—that should be Don Davis, is a copying mistake—he was at that time an officer in Naval Intelligence. Marty refers to C. Martin Wilbur, who was head of the Political Branch of the Far Eastern Section of Research and Analysis, which is OSS, formerly a China boy; also a professor and curator in the Field Museum, and came into the OSS during the war.

Dennison refers to a man whom I had known out in China with the National City Bank. I think it was the National City Bank or possibly the Chase Bank, and he was back here with the RFC during the war. His wife had been a college friend of my wife and myself.

Drumright was Everett F. Drumright, an American Foreign Service officer, who was Assistant Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, State Department.

Emmerson is a fellow service officer. Japan expert, who had been one of the four Foreign Service officers attached to General Stilwell's staff.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the four, by the way?

Mr. SERVICE. John Davis, Raymond P. Ludden, John Emmerson, and myself.

Lee Engdahl was the widow of a Foreign Service officer who had served with me at Shanghai, and whom we had known very well.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his name?

Mr. SERVICE. His name was Russell Engdahl. He was killed during internment in Hong Kong during the early part of the war. She was employed by the State Department at this time on some sort of a visa review board. She is now vice consul in the Foreign Service and stationed at Tehran.

The next name I think is a mistake in copying. It should be Fickan. He was a man who was a house mate of mine at college. He was a mathematician, had been a professor and was employed during the war by the Navy.

John Fairbanks, now professor of oriental history at Harvard University, during the war was head of far eastern operations for OWI. At this time he was in Washington for employment with OWI.

Hon. C. E. Gauss, of course, was former Ambassador, and my former chief in China.

The next name is Mark Gayn.

Griffiths refers to Col. Samuel P. Griffiths, United States Marine Corps, who had been a Navy language officer in Peking, studying Chinese at the same time I was in Peking in 1936 and 1937. I had kept up my friendship with him.

Gentille is, so far as I can remember, one of those research specialists in OSS who came over to see me on some particular project that he was working on where he hoped that I could give him some advice.

Now, the next item, Garrisonville, Va., "Ask for Tom Waller," does not ring any bell right now. I don't know who Tom Waller is. That might be a mistake in copying. I mean there are so many mistakes in copying.

The next name is Hutchinson. He was a lieutenant colonel in OSS in one of their more secret branches, who had been out in the Far East, and with whom I had consulted on a number of projects which they had contemplated undertaking.

Hitch was an assistant naval attaché in Chungking during part of my period there. He had returned to Washington and was on duty here.

Christine Homan was the wife of an economist who was working for some Government bureau. I think he is employed at present with the President's Council of Economic Advisers. I had known the Homans first in Peking. They had visited there in 1936 or 1937. I had become acquainted with them there, and I was invited to their house for dinner or something here in Washington.

Captain Harris was a young man over in MIS, a researcher in the social branch of or a special branch of something of the sort there who had been present at some interrogation, and had come over to consult me further on some points he was interested in.

Hatem is Corp. J. W., who is a brother of an American doctor who had gone out to China about 1936 or 1937, and had stayed with the Chinese Communists. This doctor in Yenan had asked me to write a letter to his family back here and let them know he was well, and this man Hatem, his younger brother, had come up to see me.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Dr. Hatem a Communist?

Mr. SERVICE. I suppose he must have been to stay there all that time, but I don't know whether he was actually a party member or not.

Harold Isaacs, of course, was at that time correspondent in China of Newsweek, and he had recently returned to the States and was living in New York.

Phil Jaffe we have already discussed.

Col. Paul Jones, his name I already mentioned. His name appears on my date pad.

Herbert Little had formerly been with the Chinese Maritime Customs in China. Since the war he has been the senior foreigner with the Chinese Customs Service. During the war he was returned from internment, I think, and he was with the OSS, and I saw him here in Washington on OSS business.

Freddy Lyon, of course, was the security officer of the Department of State.

Ludden is Raymond P. Ludden, whom I have discussed.

Lattimore I have discussed.

Mrs. W. W. Lockwood is a widow of an old friend of my mother's and father's, who was associated with them, an associate of theirs, out in the YMCA in China.

Capt. Paul Linebearger I have already mentioned. I think that his branch was the Morale Branch of MIS.

Colonel McHugh had formerly been naval attaché in China for a good many years before and during the war. At this period he had been assigned to OSS and was here in Washington.

Colonel Mayer had formerly been military attaché in China and at that time was, I don't know what the term was, Far Eastern specialist in MIS, and he asked me to come over and talk to him and to General Bissell on one occasion.

Mr. RHETTS. Who is General Bissell?

Mr. SERVICE. He was Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, for the United States Army, in charge of intelligence.

Mertsky was a woman who had formerly been on our staff with the consul general in Changhai. After marriage to a man named Coleman, she left the Foreign Service and was living in New York.

She had been my stenographer for a while in the consulate general in Shanghai.

Colonel McNally was a man I had known in China as a language student, had known him during the war. He went out to China originally in 1934, as aide to General Hurley, returned to Washington thereafter, and was at that time stationed at MIS.

J. K. Penfield is Mr. James Penfield. I gave his address at this time as CINCPAC, commander in chief of the Pacific.

Phoebe Reichner is this woman in OSS who was writing a biographic series, biographic data, whom I was assisting.

Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, his name appears in my pad. He was assistant public relations officer in Chungking.

Lt. Andy Roth we had mentioned.

Ray is a man who has been working for lend-lease out in China, and I had seen him off and on. He had made numerous trips to China, and was here in Washington with FEA.

Snow is Edgar Snow.

Next is Mrs. Harley Stevens. I am trying to think of a Mrs. Harley Stevens. The name does not mean anything to me now, but is an address with OSS, so it must have been somebody working in OSS, somebody in the Research Branch, who had got in touch with me.

Guenther Stein was a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor and the Manchester Guardian.

Phil Sullivan was in Shanghai, and went to St. John's College. He was employed by the Department of State in the labor end.

Gen. J. W. Schulz is Brig. Gen. John Wesley Schulz, the brother of my wife's father. At that time he was a member of the engineering board. I think the head of the engineering board at Fort Belvoir.

R. M. Service is my younger brother.

George Taylor is a man I had known out in China, where he had taught at Yenan University, was in the University of Washington, and during the war was employed by OWI on Far Eastern operations, and I had had some contacts with him.

Terrell, I have already mentioned, was the British diplomat who was stationed in Washington, attached to the British Embassy, and I had known him out in China.

The next name is a mistake in copying and should be Tolstoi. He was at that time Major Tolstoi, an OSS officer I had met first in the extreme northwest of China in Lanchow. One of my reasons in going to Lanchow was to carry funds for him, and another officer, who had come from India through Lhassa, up to Lanchow. I saw a good deal of him subsequently in China, and at this time he was back in Washington.

Vino Gradoss, of course, I have already mentioned, was press attaché in Chungking at the Embassy.

Wilbur, I have mentioned as C. Martin Wilbur, at that time attaché to the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS.

Dick Watts is Richard Watts, who was for many years drama critic of New York Herald Tribune. During the war he was in China first for the New York Herald Tribune and later for OWI. I saw a good deal of him in Chungking, and at this time he had returned to the States.

Captain Weaver, as I mentioned, was a research analyst whom I had met.

Senator LODGE. Are you still in touch with Richard Watts?

Mr. SERVICE. No; I have not seen him since 1945.

Senator LODGE. How often had you seen him before that?

Mr. SERVICE. Well, I suppose in Chungking I saw him fairly frequently. I think I saw him once in the spring of 1945 very briefly. I have not seen him since.

Thelma Wolfe—the name does not mean anything to me now.

The last name is apparently a copying mistake. It should be Yardoumian, Rose, whose name I have already mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no other questions .

Senator LODGE. I have no questions of Mr. Service. There are some questions I would like to ask of Mr. Morgan, due to the fact that Senator Green and I were

away as a subcommittee of two, and the rest of the subcommittee very properly went ahead with the development of this case, and I have some points I would like to have cleared up.

I have had a chance to go through the transcript that was developed while Senator Green and I were away, and I have jotted down some questions I would like to ask you.

This first group can be answered "Yes" or "No" if you want to. You do not have to if you do not want to.

Senator TYDINGS. No; I don't think it is important, unless the committee wants them.

Mr. MORGAN. Pursuant to a request made of me by Mr. Morris relative to appearances of Lattimore before the Foreign Service Institute, I have a letter here, dated May 25, 1950, from the State Department, as follows:

"DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: I understand that your subcommittee is interested in learning of any occasions on which Mr. Owen Lattimore has lectured for the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Lattimore's only lecture at the Foreign Service Institute was one given on June 5, 1946, as part of the 'Meet the Public' program of the Department's Office of Public Affairs, as referred to in my letter to you of April 17, 1950.

"His only other connection with the Institute arose from the Department's contract with Johns Hopkins University in relation to the University's Mongol language project, which is also covered in the letter of April 17.

"Sincerely yours,

"JOHN E. PEURIFOY."

I might say, in passing, that I have the letter of April 17, which I will incorporate here in a few moments. This letter I would like to have incorporated, without objection.

(The letter, submitted by Mr. Morgan, is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, April 17, 1950.

The Honorable MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: Following Senator McCarthy's statement on March 21 that a top Russian espionage agent, whom he privately identified as Mr. Owen Lattimore, was an employee or consultant of the State Department, I submitted to your subcommittee a brief statement of Mr. Lattimore's connections with this Department, as revealed by a careful check of our personnel records. Since Mr. Lattimore has been publicly identified and since there has been considerable public discussion concerning his relationship with the Department, it is now appropriate to give in greater detail the instances of connections between Mr. Lattimore and the Department. Without any intention of reflecting on Mr. Lattimore, and for the purpose of setting the record straight, I believe I should state that Mr. Lattimore does not have a desk in the Department of State nor access to its files, and is neither an employee nor a top adviser of the Department. These are the facts

On October 15, 1945, Mr. Owen Lattimore was appointed as an economic adviser to the United States Reparations Mission to Japan. He served with the mission until February 12, 1946. While on this assignment he was paid out of the Department's International Conferences funds.

Mr. Lattimore was one of 28 persons to lecture on a program known as Meet the Public, which was given at the Department's Foreign Service Institute. He gave one lecture on June 5, 1946. This program was initiated by the Department's Office of Public Affairs and was designed to bring before departmental personnel the viewpoints of various persons who were working on, or interested in, foreign affairs. In this capacity, Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the Department and received no remuneration. The following were the speakers on this program:

Senator J. William Fulbright
Mr. Ernest K. Lindley, chief of the Washington bureau of Newsweek
Mr. Charles Bolte, chairman of the American Veterans' Committee
Congressman Jerry Voorhis
Prof. Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University
Prof. Frederick L. Schuman, Williams College
Mr. Herbert Elliston, editor of the Washington Post

Mr. Eugene Meyer, president of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
Dr. Jacob Viner, professor of economics, Princeton University
Dr. Harold Lasswell, professor of law, Yale University
Mr. Wallace Deuel, editor of the Chicago News
Senator Wayne Morse
Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, vice chairman of Americans United for World Government, Inc.
Mr. James M. Landis, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board
Senator Warren Austin
Dr. Arthur Compton, chancelor of Washington University, at St. Louis
Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean, editor and research director of the Foreign Policy Association
Mr. Kermit Eby, director of education and research, Congress of Industrial Organizations
Mr. Hamilton Owens, editor of the Baltimore Sun (and Sun papers)
Prof. Frank Tannenbaum, Columbia University
Mr. Gardner Murphy, American Psychological Association
Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, vice president of Georgetown University and regent of the School of Foreign Service
Mr. David Lawrence, editor of the United States News and of the World Report
Mr. Robert Watt, International representative of the American Federation of Labor
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt
Dr. Dexter Perkins, professor of Latin American affairs, University of Rochester
Congressman Mike Mansfield
Dr. James P. Baxter, president of Williams College

On October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, Mr. Lattimore, following preliminary correspondence with the Department of State, was one of a group of 25 private individuals participating in a round-table discussion arranged by the Office of Public Affairs for the purpose of exchanging views on United States foreign policy toward China. As a member of this group Mr. Lattimore was not an employee of the Department and received no compensation but was reimbursed for expenses. This round-table discussion followed a solicitation of written views on the same topic from a larger group in response to which the written views of 31 private individuals were received and analyzed. Some of the members, including Mr. Lattimore, were in both groups. Both the written views received and the transcript of the round-table discussions were made available as some of the background material for consideration by Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick, Mr. Everett Case, and Ambassador Jessup, who had been requested by the Secretary to review United States policy toward the Far East. The 31 who expressed views initially in writing were:

Former Consul General Joseph W. Ballantine, now at Brookings Institution
Prof. Hugh Borton, Columbia University
Former President Isaaih Bowman, John Hopkins University
Dr. A. J. Brumbaugh, American Council on Education, Washington
Former Ambassador William Bullitt
Former Under Secretary Castle
Former Consul John A. Embry
Prof. Rupert Emerson, Harvard University
Dr. Charles B. Fahs, New York City
Prof. John K. Fairbanks, Harvard University
Dr. Huntington Gilchrist, New York City
Prof. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University
Former Under Secretary Grew
Col. Robert A. Griffin, former Deputy Administrator, ECA, China
Former Ambassador Stanley K. Hornbeck
Roger Lapham, former Administrator, ECA, China
Prof. Kenneth S. Latourette, Yale University
Prof. Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins University
Oliver C. Lockhart, Export-Import Bank of Washington
Walter H. Mallory, Council on Foreign Relations
Prof. Wallace Moore, Occidental College Los Angeles
Prof. Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University
C. A. Richards, Economic Cooperation Administration
Former Minister Walter S. Robertson, Richmond, Va.
Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York City
Mr. James Rowe, Washington
Mrs. Virginia Thompson (Adoloff), New York City

Prof. Amry Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky
Prof. Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University
Prof. Mary Wright, Stanford University
Admiral Yarnell

The 25 who attended the round-table discussions were:

Joseph W. Ballantine, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
Bernard Brodie, department of international relations, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Claude A. Buss, Director of Studies, Army War College, Washington, D. C.
Kenneth Colegrove, department of political science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.
Arthur G. Coons, president, Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif.
John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, New York, N. Y.
John K. Fairbank, committee on international and regional studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
William R. Herod, president, International General Electric Co., New York, N. Y.
Arthur N. Holcombe, department of government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer & Graves, Spokane, Wash.
Owen Lattimore, director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Ernest B. MacNaughton, chairman of the board, First National Bank, Portland, Oreg.
George C. Marshall, president, American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.
J. Morden Murphy, assistant vice president, Bankers Trust Co., New York, N. Y.
Nathaniel Peffer, department of public law and government, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.
Harold S. Quigley, department of political science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
Edwin O. Reischauer, department of Far Eastern languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
William S. Robertson, president, American & Foreign Power Co., New York, N. Y.
John D. Rockefeller III, president, Rockefeller Brothers' Fund, New York, N. Y.
Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.
Eugene Staley, executive director, World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, Calif.
Harold Stassen, president, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
Harold M. Vinacke, department of political science, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio

The following were invited to the round-table October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, but did not attend:

W. Langbourne Bond, Pan American Airways, Washington, D. C.
Monroe E. Deutsch, provost, University of California.
Anne O'Hare McCormick, New York Times
Moris T. Moore, chairman of the board of Time, Inc.
Michael Ross, director, department of international affairs, CIO
J. E. Wallace Sterling, president, Stanford University

In order to ascertain whether any facts whatsoever might support Senator McCarthy's assertions that Mr. Lattimore has a desk in the Department, access to its files, and a position as a top adviser on far-eastern affairs, a check has been made with officers of the Department who have been concerned with the Far East, and many of whom have come to know Mr. Lattimore, who is widely regarded as one of the leading experts in this field. Beyond the normal contacts found among persons having a common specialized professional training and interest, this check developed only that Mr. Lattimore, as director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations of Johns Hopkins University, has participated in setting up at Johns Hopkins a Mongolian language project in which the Department is interested. The Department of State, in line with the policy of promoting and utilizing foreign language and other international studies in numerous American universities, has, under authority of Public Law 724 (79th Cong.), entered into a contract with the Johns Hopkins University, pursuant to which it has contributed $3,200 toward this language project. Very much larger sums have been made available for this project, it is understood, by

the American Council of Learned Societies and the Carnegie Foundation. In connection with this project, it was possible to arrange for three Mongol scholars, including Dilowa Hutuktu, or the "Living Buddha," to enter the United States and work in the Walter Hines Page School in Baltimore. Officers of the Department's Foreign Service Institute have visited the project from time to time to observe its progress, and a junior member of the Foreign Service staff, a specialist on the Far East, whose salary is $4,650 a year, is studying at the Walter Hines Page School as part of this project. The end results of the project will be a descriptive grammar of the Mongolian language and other teaching materials in spoken Mongolian.

Mr. Lattimore was recently sent by the Secretariat of the United Nations as a member of a preliminary economic survey mission to Afghanistan. In this capacity, Mr. Lattimore was hired by and responsible to the United Nations and not the Department of State.

Mr. Lattimore does not have a desk in the Department of State, nor does he have access to its files. Of course, in connection with his OWI employment (1942–45) and his 4-month assignment to the Pauley Reparations Mission which terminated February 12, 1946, Mr. Lattimore, like others in such positions, might have been required as part of his duties to consider some official papers from other agencies of the Government, including the Department of State.

These are the facts.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN E. PEURIFOY,
Deputy Under Secretary.

Senator TYDINGS. Are you numbering these so he can identify them? You want them all in the record here, don't you?

Mr. MORGAN. Without objection, I would like to ask to have incorporated in our record a letter to me of May 2, 1950, from the United States attorney in New York City, pursuant to a request of mine concerning the physical condition of Jacob Stachel, whom we had subpenaed. As I understand it, we have now determined that we should not seek to require Stachel's appearance, that is, the members of the committee here. I would like to have this in the record.

Senator TYDINGS. Put it in.

(The letter, submitted by Mr. Morgan, is as follows:)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
New York, N. Y., May 2, 1950.

Re United States v. *Foster et al.*

EDWARD P. MORGAN, Esq.,
Chief Counsel, Subcommittee Investigating the State Department,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

SIR: I am in receipt of your letter dated April 28, 1950, relating to the subpena issued by the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, directed to Jacob Stachel.

The records of the district court for the southern district of New York disclose that Stachel is represented on appeal from his conviction by George W. Crockett, Jr. I have received information that Stachel is confined to his home under the care of one Dr. Louis Finger, and has been a patient at Mt. Sinai Hospital for a coronary condition. Doctor Finger, of course, has also been physician for William Z. Foster, national chairman of the Communist Party, and has submitted affidavits in his behalf concerning a heart condition.

Stachel is presently under bond which restricts his movements to the southern district of New York. However, I have advised his attorney that I will consent to an order permitting his appearance before the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pursuant to the subpena issued by you.

In addition, there is presently pending before the district court a motion made by Stachel, as one of the 11 defendants seeking a general modification of the bail bonds of all of them, to permit travel throughout the entire United States for the purpose of making speeches and raising funds.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Respectfully,

IRVING H. SAYPOL, *United States Attorney.*

[Advance Section from Foreign Service Journal, January 1952]

THE DOCUMENTS IN THE SERVICE CASE

The Editors of the Journal are making available to all Journal readers the complete texts of the documents released by the State Department upon the announcement on December 13th of the dismissal of John Stewart Service from the Foreign Service of the United States

Letter From the Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board to the Secretary of State

United States Civil Service Commission,
Washington 25, D. C., December 13, 1951.

The Honorable the Secretary of State.

Sir: Reference is made to the case of John Stewart Service, Foreign Relations Officer of the Department of State.

This case came to the attention of the Loyalty Review Board on post-audit after a favorable finding by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State. A panel of the Loyalty Review Board was duly assigned to review the matter and, on March 3, 1950, the panel recommended that it be remanded to the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State for a hearing on charges. Thereafter, the employee was duly presented with a letter of charges and notice of proposed removal action, dated March 24, 1950, in accordance with Executive Order No. 9835. Subsequently, a hearing was held by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State and said Board reaffirmed its decision, favorable to the employee. Pending reconsideration of this decision on post-audit, supplementary information was received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the complete file was returned to the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State for such consideration as it deemed advisable. Executive Order No. 9835 was amended by Executive Order No. 10241 on April 28, 1951, and the case was considered by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State under the amendment to Executive Order No. 9835 and that Board thereafter reaffirmed its favorable action.

The case again came before the Loyalty Review Board on post-audit and, under date of October 9, 1951, the panel of the Loyalty Review Board determined that it was necessary to hold a hearing before the panel of the Loyalty Review Board under its Regulation 14.

A hearing was accordingly held by the panel at the offices of the Loyalty Review Board in Washington, D. C., on November 8, 1951, at which the employee was present and testified and was represented by his counsel, Charles Edward Rhetts, of Washington, D. C.

On December 4, 1951, a stipulation was entered into by and between Hiram Bingham, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, and C. E. Rhetts, Attorney for John Stewart Service, wherein it was stipulated "that the said panel of the Loyalty Review Board may consider the entire matter and make a determination thereon as if the original letter of charges served on John Stewart Service, dated March 24, 1950, contained the following specification within the meaning of section 392.2d of the regulations and procedures of the Department of State:

> "Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or nonpublic character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States."

A copy of said stipulation is attached hereto.

Thereafter, the said panel of the Loyalty Review Board, upon a consideration of all the evidence and the complete file in the matter, found that there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of said employee, John Stewart Service, to the Government of the United States. A copy of the decision of the panel is also attached hereto.

The Loyalty Review Board found no evidence of membership in the Communist Party or in any organization on the Attorney General's list on the part of John Stewart Service. The Loyalty Review Board did find that there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the employee, John Stewart Service, to the Government of the United States, based on the intentional and unauthorized disclosure of documents and information of a confidential and nonpublic character within the meaning of subparagraph d of paragraph 2 of Part V, "Standards," of Executive Order No. 9835, as amended.

The Loyalty Review Board hereby submits to the Secretary of State its opinion: The employee, John Stewart Service, should be forthwith removed from the rolls of the Department of State; the Secretary should approve and adopt the proceedings had, as heretofore recited herein; and such approval and adoption should appear on Standard Form 50, "Notification of Personnel Action."

Please advise the Loyalty Review Board of the effective date of the removal of said employee, John Stewart Service.

For the Loyalty Review Board:

Sincerely yours,

HIRAM BINGHAM,
Chairman, Loyalty Review Board.

OPINION OF THE LOYALTY SECURITY BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OCTOBER 6, 1950

The case of John Stewart Service, on which the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State had reported a favorable determination based on the information then available, was remanded on March 14, 1950, by the Loyalty Review Board, with the statement that the reviewing panel had concluded that the record had not been fully developed, and that a hearing should be held on charges. In accordance with this recommendation charges were preferred against Mr. Service and a hearing has been held. The hearing before the Loyalty Security Board has consumed 15 days and has resulted in the accumulation of a voluminous transcript and numerous exhibits.

Although the Regulations prescribed by the Loyalty Review Board provide that the determinations of the Loyalty Security Board "shall state merely the action taken," its is the feeling of the Loyaly Security Board that a full statement should be made of the reasons for its conclusions in this case, in view of the wide interest in the "Amerasia" case, in connection with which Mr. Service was arrested in 1945.

John S. Service was born in Chengtu, China, August 3, 1909, of American missionary parents. He was educated at Shanghai American School, Berkeley High School (Berkley, California) and Oberlin College, A. B., 1931. At Oberlin he was captain of two athletic teams and president of the Men's Honor Court. In 1933 he returned to China and became clerk in the American Consulate at Kunming in the Province of Yunnan. In 1935 he was admitted to the Foreign Service and was assigned as a language student at the Embassy in Peiping; in 1938 he was transferred to the Consulate at Shanghai; in 1941 he was assigned as Third Secretary of the Embassy at Chunking.

After a four-months' leave in the United States in 1942–43, he was sent to Lanchow, in May 1943, as an observer for the Embassy. In August 1943, at the request of the Secretary of War Stimson, he was detached from the Embassy and assigned to General Stilwell, Commander of the American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. During this service he was sent with an Army observer group to the Communist headquarters in Yenan. He was in Yenan from July to October of that year, and was then returned to the United States, at the time of General Stilwell's recall. After a brief period of consultation in Washington he went on leave.

In January 1945, he was again ordered to Chunking, for detail to the staff of General Wedemeyer, who succeeded General Stilwell. On March 9 he was again sent to Yenan under Army orders to report on an expected Communist Party Congress, but on March 30 was suddenly ordered to return to the United States, where he arrived on April 12. He was arrested on June 6, in connection with the so-called "Amerasia" affair, but on August 10 the Grand Jury returned "no true bill" against him. In September 1945 he was assigned to the staff of the United States Political Adviser in Tokyo, where he served until he was hospitalized, from April to August 1946.

After a leave in the United States he served as First Secretary and Consul at Wellington, New Zealand, from October 1946 to January 1949; for about two months in 1949 he served on the Foreign Service Selection Board in Washington; and for about a year as Special Assistant to the Chief, Foreign Service Personnel. He was en route to an assignment as Consul General at Calcutta when recalled for the present hearing.

CHARGES BASED ON REPORTS FROM CHINA

The Board considered first the charges against Mr. Service which have to do with his conduct in China, in particular from 1943 to 1945, while he was stationed in Chunking, Lanchow and Yenan.

First, it is alleged that Mr. Service was disloyal or insubordinate to General Hurley who was in China from August to November 1944 as personal representative of the President, and served as Ambassador to China from November 1944 until November 1945. In particular it is charged that Mr. Service's second trip to the Communist area in Yenan was in disobedience to Ambassador Hurley's instructions. His sudden recall to the United States in March 1945, was at the insistance of Ambassador Hurley, who was in the United States at the time on consultation.

The Board finds that at no time during General Hurley's service in China, either as the President's personal representative or as Ambassador, was Mr. Service attached to the Embassy, or subject to Ambassador Hurley's direction. In August 1943 Mr. Service had been detailed to General Stilwell, and in July, 1944, sent by General Stilwell with an Army observer mission to the Communist Headquarters in Yenan. He was still in Yenan when General Hurley arrived in Chunking in August, and returned from Yenan to the United States at the time of General Stilwell's recall in October.

On Mr. Service's return to China in January, 1945, he was still assigned to the Army, now under General Wedemeyer. As for his second trip to Yenan in March, General Gross, who was in command during General Wedemeyer's absence in Washington with Ambassador Hurley, accepted full responsibility, and stated that the trip had the concurrence of both Army Headquarters and the Embassy. Mr. Service cannot have been guilty of insubordination to Ambassador Hurley, for he was at no time his subordinate; he acted at all times strictly in accordance with the orders of his proper commanding officers, to whom his services were apparently satisfactory.

Second, it is charged that Mr. Service was disloyal to American policy with respect to China, as that policy was represented by Ambassador Hurley, in that Mr. Service was critical of the Chinese Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek and favorably disposed towards the Chinese Communists; that he favored arming and collaborating with the Communist forces; and that he favored stopping United States assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and extending it to the Communists, and believed that Communist participation in Government was the only hope for a stable democratic and independent Chinese Government.

Third, it is charged that Mr. Service was sympathetic with communism and working in the interest of the Communist Party. Since both the *second* and the *third* charges were based upon the reports and recommendations submitted by Mr. Service from China, and since the two charges are closely related in substance the Board considered them together.

There was nothing covert or furtive or secret, so far as American authorities in China or elsewhere were concerned, about Mr. Service's observations, conclusions and recommendations with regard to Chinese affairs from 1942 to 1945. The Board has had access to 127 reports written by Mr. Service between those dates. Only 4 of these precede his assignment as a political observer; about 10 are from Lanchow, where he was observer for the Embassy; about 50 were made at Chunking after he was detailed to the Army; about 35 were made during his first tour of duty in Yenan, where his function was to secure political intelligence for the Army, and for this purpose to become acquainted with the principal Communist leaders, and to report on the organization, policies, program, propaganda and popular support of the Communist Party; 3 were made in Washington; 11 on his return to Chunking; and 14 on his second trip to Yenan under General Gross's orders.

Mr. Service's reports while he was on detail with the Army were in the form of memoranda, prepared in quadruplicate—the orginal for Army Headquarters, one copy for his immediate superior, Mr. John P. Davies, one for the Embassy, and one for his own files. Mr. Service's views were, therefore, well known throughout both Army Headquarters and the Embassy in China, and in the War and State Departments in Washington, to which Department copies were forwarded by the Army Headquarters and Embassy respectively.

ALLIED WITH SOVIET IN 1945

It is necessary to assess these reports against the background of 1944–1945 rather than that of 1950. In 1944–1945 the war with Japan was reaching its climax. It was the duty of the United States Military Commander in the China Theater to do all in his power to contribute to the defeat of Japan, and to this end to bring about the maximum possible Chinese military effort. In 1944–1945 we were allies with the Soviet Union in the war in Europe, and were furnishing lend-lease arms to the Russian Communists on a large scale.

In 1945 it was Ambassador Hurley's mission in China, not only to prevent the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Government and to keep the Chinese Nationalist Armies in the field, but also to prevent civil war in China and to unify the Anti-Japanese forces in China, whether Nationalist or Communist. This double-headed objective could only be accomplished by an accommodation between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists. It was precisely such an accommodation which General Hurley was endeavoring, under instructions, to bring about.

The Board has examined Mr. Service's reports in the light of this background. It finds them objective, and extraordinarily accurate as political forecasts of what was to come. It finds no indications that they misstated any fact or reported anything other than his best judgment candidly stated. The sum and substance of Mr. Service's recommendations was contained in his report No. 40, dated October 10, 1944, which profoundly displeased Ambassador Hurley, and in a report drafted by him and R. P. Ludden, another American observer, dated February 14, 1945.

Copies of both reports which have been declassified are appended to this opinion. The essential difference between Ambassador Hurley on the one hand and Mr. Service, General Stilwell and the staff of the Embassy at Chungking on the other hand, concerned the terms on which the amalgamation of forces was to be effected, the conditions under which lend-lease aid would be extended to the Communist forces; the extent to which United States interests required acceptance of the views of Chiang Kai-shek as to the nature and policies of the Chinese Government, or change in the nature and policies of that Government.

Both Ambassador Hurley and Mr. Service advocated, and it was a major objective of Ambassador Hurley's mission to achieve, unification of all Chinese military forces for the purpose of defeating Japan. Ambassador Hurley considered that his primary duty was to sustain the Nationalist Government and that the Communists should be armed only through the Nationalist Government. Mr. Service and General Stilwell considered the Nationalist Government was not prosecuting the war as vigorously as required. They believed that the Chinese forces could be unified only by utilizing lend-lease aid as a bargaining weapon to force Chiang Kai-shek to form a coalition government, and that some lend-lease aid might, if required, be extended to the Chinese Communist forces directly. Mr. Service did not favor stopping lend-lease assistance to Chiang Kai-shek but did favor making its continuance conditional upon agreement by Chiang to broaden the base of the government and undertake substantial economic, political and social reform.

ISSUE DEFINED

The issue before the Board does not require a decision as to who was right. The issue is rather whether the views expressed by Mr. Service constitute disloyalty to American policy with respect to China. The Board finds no indication that Mr. Service was disloyal in this respect. Rather, the Board finds that he was properly stating to his superiors the conclusions at which he had honestly arrived as a result of his personal observations both in Chungking and in Yenan, and recommending a change in policy which he believed essential in the national interest.

In this connection the Board finds itself in hearty accord with a statement made by Secretary Byrnes to the Foreign Relations Committee concerning the reports of Mr. Service and of the other Foreign Service officers criticized by Ambassador Hurley: "What it amounts to is that within proper channels they expressed to those under whom they served certain views which differed to a greater or less degree from the policies of the Government as then defined. Of course, it is the duty of every officer of the United States to abide by and administer the declared policy of his Government. But conditions change, and often change quickly in the affairs of Governments. Whenever an official honestly believes that changed conditions require it, he should not hesitate to express his views to his superior officers.

"I should be profoundly unhappy to learn that an officer of the Department of State, within or without the Foreign Service, might feel bound to refrain from submitting through channels an honest report or recommendation for fear of offending some one in the Department." As Mr. George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department, said before this Board: "I would feel very alarmed for the future of Foreign Service reporting if we ever were to permit the implication to creep in that a policy recommendation contrary to the policy that was actually adopted by the Government was a sign of disloyalty to the Government purposes."

With respect to the *third* allegation that Mr. Service was sympathetic with Communism and working in the interest of the Communist Party, the Board finds no evidence that his reports acquired their character from any ulterior motive or association or from any impulse other than his desire to acquaint his superior officers with the facts as he saw and interpreted them. As early as January 1943, he reported that civil war in China would bring about a Communist government which would not be democratic in the American sense, and which would be more inclined to friendship with Russia than with the United States.

In April 1944, he recommended that in order to prevent Russian dominance over a part or all of China, the United States Government should show a sympathetic interest in the Communist and liberal groups in China, and use its influence with the Kuomintang to promote Chinese unity on the foundations of progressive reform. In June 1944, he analyzed the weaknesses of the Kuomintang which he said were precipitating a debacle of which the only parties to benefit would be Japan and Russia eventually. He recommended, not a flat refusal to aid the Kuomintang, but the use of that aid as leverage to induce the Kuomintang to broaden the base of the Government and to undertake political reform.

When he got to Yenan he reported that the Japanese there were being faced by a total mobilization based on an economic, political and social revolution, and that unless the Kuomintang went as far as the Communists in political and economic reform, the Communists would become the dominant force in China within a few years. The Board finds nowhere in his reports any sympathy for Russian or for world Communism, but only a clearly expressed fear that the policy of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and of the United States Government as a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek alone, was headed for a major disaster that would throw all of China into the hands of the Soviet Union.

KENNAN ASSAYED REPORTS

The Board had the benefit of expert testimony from Mr. George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department and for many years a leading American authority on the Soviet Union and Communist matters. At the request of the Board, Mr. Kennan examined 127 of Mr. Service's reports for the specific purpose of forming an opinion as to whether or not they reflected Communist or pro-Communist tendencies or propaganda themes.

After completing his examination, Mr. Kennan testified that Mr. Service's reports indicated no Communist inspiration or guidance, that they were free from the exaggerations and distortions characteristic of Communist propaganda, that in important instances the reports took issue with the Communist Party line, that some of Mr. Service's early reports indicated a certain naivete with respect to the Soviet Union but that this was substantially corrected in his later reports, that Mr. Service appeared to be reporting honestly and conscientiously the views at which he had arrived on the basis of an open-minded examination and analysis of the facts before him. Mr. Kennan concluded that the reports could not have been the work of a man with a closed mind or ideological preconceptions.

The Board finds that, on the basis of his reports from China, Mr. Service was neither a Communist nor pro-Communist.

Fourth, it has been charged that at least one of Mr. Service's reports was circulated among the Chinese Communists, and that the Communists were advised that Ambassador Hurley's efforts to prevent the collapse of the Nationalist Government did not represent United States policy. The charge was denied by Mr. Service and is entirely out of character with his function. His reports did not purport to state United States policy, but only his personal observations, conclusions, and recommendations. No evidence was presented to support this charge and the Board finds no basis for it.

THE AMERASIA AFFAIR

In the so-called Amerasia affair, Mr. Service was charged with furnishing classified information to one Philip Jaffe. In 1945 Philip Jacob Jaffe of New York City was coeditor with Kate L. Mitchell of a magazine called "Amerasia." Jaffe was born in Russia, came to the United States in 1905 and was naturalized in 1923. He was a member of the editorial board of China Today, the official publication of the American Friends of the Chinese People, which had been cited as a Communist front by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He is also reliably reported to have collaborated with other Communist front publications, to have been National Treasurer of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship, Inc., an organization on the Attorney General's list, and to have been in frequent contact with many prominent members of the Communist Party.

On March 10, 1945, a month before Mr. Service's arrival in the United States, OSS agents searched the offices of Amerasia, and there discovered a large number of classified government documents principally of State and Navy Department origin. Upon being advised by the OSS of this discovery the State and Navy Departments jointly requested the FBI to make a full investigation. On June 6, Mr. Jaffe was arrested by the FBI, along with Kate Mitchell, and four others, Emmanuel Sigurd Larsen, Lieutenant Andrew Roth, Mark Gayn and Mr. Service. Mr. Larsen was a State Department employee, Lieutenant Roth was a naval reserve officer on duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Mark Gayn was a free-lance writer interested in questions concerning the Far East.

Subsequently a Grand Jury returned indictments against Jaffe, Larsen and Roth, but found "no true bill" against Mitchell, Gayne and Service. Jaffe pleaded guilty, and was fined $2,500. Larsen, who had admitted procuring some of the documents for Jaffe, also pleaded guilty and was fined $500. The case against Roth was nol-prossed.

Among the large number of government documents found in Mr. Jaffe's office were copies of about 40 of Mr. Service's reports, and the primary question before this Board in connection with this aspect of the Service Case is his part in making any of these available to Mr. Jaffe. Eight of these 40 were ozalid copies from State Department files which were found in Mr. Jaffe's brief case and were identified by Mr. Larsen as papers which he procured for Mr. Jaffe. Included in the 40 were also typed or carbon copies of at least 10 Service reports produced from other sources than the State Department. None of these 40 reports were papers from Mr. Service's files.

It will be recalled that Mr. Service customarily kept a carbon copy for his personal files of the reports which he made while detailed to the Army in China. Most of these copies bore the typed classification "Secret" or "Confidential" which Mr. Service himself had placed on the original. Copies of about 70 of these reports were in Mr. Service's possession when he arrived in Washington on April 12, 1945, and were found in his possession at the time of his arrest. As stated above, none of Mr. Service's personal copies were found in Jaffe's possession.

FULL STATEMENT MADE

Mr. Service made a full statement of his connection with Mr. Jaffe to the FBI, to the Grand Jury, and to the Board. Although he had heard of Mr. Jaffe as editor of "Amerasia" he had never met him or communicated with him prior to his return to Washington on April 12, 1945. On April 19 Mr. Service was introduced to Jaffe by Lieutenant Roth, whom he had met the preceding November at a talk that he (Service) gave to the Institute of Pacific Relations, and who now invited him to dinner. Thinking that Jaffe as editor of a specialist magazine on the Far East would be interested in a conversation he had had with the Communist leader Mao Tse-tung in Yenan. Service took along with him to his meeting with Jaffe a copy of his report on that subject.

Mr. Jaffe was interested and asked if Service had other reports that he could see. He invited Mr. Service to lunch the next day, and Mr. Service brought to that meeting about 8 or 10 copies of reports which he carefully selected from his personal file as being descriptive and not discussing American policy. Mr. Jaffe at lunch stated that he wished to take the papers to New York with him. Mr. Service permitted Mr. Jaffe to do so, and afterwards, on April 25, he picked up the reports in New York.

This, according to Mr. Service, and so far as the evidence before the Board goes, was the entire extent of Mr. Service's transmission of classified documents to Mr. Jaffe. The exact number of documents loaned to Mr. Jaffe is uncertain.

It is established that Mr. Jaffe had other sources from which he obtained copies of Mr. Service's reports. The Board found no evidence to disprove Mr. Service's recollection that the number of reports which he loaned to Mr. Jaffe did not exceed ten.

The transmission of classified documents to a person outside the Government service, whether for examination or loan, was not only highly injudicious on Mr. Service's part, but was a violation of the security regulations and practices of the Department. Since the issues here are (1) loyalty, and (2) security risk, the Board has had to examine into the motives behind his act.

In this connection the nature of Mr. Service's function in China, from which he was freshly arrived, becomes of moment. One of Mr. Service's official duties under General Stilwell had been to serve as public relations officer for Army Headquarters, and as such to work closely with American correspondents and to furnish them "background information" regarding the political situation in China. Understanding of this situation was essential to intelligent and accurate press reporting. "Background information" was understood at Army Headquarters to include, at the discretion of the officer, classified information, which could not itself be published, but which would enable correspondents correctly to interpret and report events as they occurred.

On his return to the United States in October 1944, as the first American official to return after a visit to the Communist-held areas in China, Mr. Service was sought after, not only by government agencies whose work related to China, but also by newspaper people and other writers on Far Eastern affairs. He was invited, and with the authorization of his superiors accepted the invitation, to address an "off-the-record" meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations. For all of these conferences he used as working material the substance of his observations in China, the very matter which was contained in his classified reports.

It is apparent to the Board that Mr. Service, without inquiring into Mr. Jaffe's background or credentials, but solely on the basis of Mr. Jaffe's connection with "Amerasia," assumed to treat Mr. Jaffe as a reputable writer, and to give him the same sort of "background information" that he had been accustomed to give to newspaper men in China. It is also apparent that Mr. Service was eager to impart to persons interested in the Far East, his views of the Chinese situation.

Mr. Service clearly committed two serious indiscretions with reference to these reports. The first was to communicate any classified information at all to Mr. Jaffe without checking on his reputation. The second, which was both an indiscretion and a breach of regulations, was to allow Mr. Jaffe to take possession, for however short a time, of classified documents. The Board takes note, however, of the fact that the documents in question contained nothing that could be considered harmful to the national security; they were reports of Mr. Service's personal observations on the aims and situation of the Chinese Communists. The Board cannot find Mr. Service disloyal to the United States on the basis of his loan of these documents to Mr. Jaffe.

INFORMATION FROM FBI

The Board had before it certain confidential information from the FBI regarding conversations between Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Service in which Mr. Service referred to certain military plans in China as "very secret," and to certain information about the whereabouts of General Stilwell as "very confidential." It has been charged that Mr. Service in these conversations disclosed classified information to Mr. Jaffe. It appeared on hearing that Mr. Service on his return to the United States in April 1945, was not in possession, nor advised of the contents of, any classified documents regarding military plans or the whereabouts of General Stilwell.

As a matter of fact he was not advised of any secret information at all concerning the military plans of the United States or of General Stilwell. He was aware only of general discussions and speculations regarding the possibility of a landing in China, and of the desirability of cooperating with whatever Chinese forces might be met there. General Stilwell had told him that he was looking for a "fighting job" in the Pacific. He did not know the determination of any of these issues. He could therefore not have been guilty of disclosing secret information as alleged, for he had none. It is to be noted that oral information of the sort mentioned does not, like a document, bear on its face its classification, and that it is a mark of prudence, rather than

the opposite, for a government official in the discussion of military speculations with the press in wartime, to refer to the subject matter as secret or confidential, in order that no conclusions may be attributed by the press to government sources. The Board does not find any indiscretions on the part of Mr. Service in this issue.

So far as security risk is concerned, the record contains no evidence that Mr. Service has ever, subsequent to the Jaffe incident, been guilty of any indiscretion. The Board believes that the experience Mr. Service has been through as a result of his indiscretion in 1945 has served to make him far more than normally security conscious.

The several social affairs to which Mr. Service was invited between April 19 and May 29, 1945—lunch with Gayn, dinner with Lt. Roth, lunch with Mr. Jaffe, an evening party at Mr. Gayn's, a party at Kate Mitchell's, and an another at a Miss Yardouman's given for Lt. Roth, appear to have been initiated by those persons and to have been innocently accepted by Mr. Service as normal amenities. Mr. Service spent two nights at the apartment in New York of Mark Gayn, the free-lance writer, who shared with Mr. Service a China background and had been a college mate of Mr. Service's brother.

The association with Lieutenant Roth, a naval officer in uniform on duty with Naval Intelligence, does not appear subject to criticism; the association with Mark Gayn appears to have been a natural one of mutual interests; the Jaffe and Mitchell invitations were accepted on the assumption that these were reputable literary people interested in China. All of these associations on the part of Mr. Service terminated on June 6, 1945. The Board does not consider them evidence of disloyalty, or to be of present significance as to security risk.

Mr. Service's name has also been connected with that of Mr. Owen Lattimore. Mr. Service had known Mr. Lattimore since they were both in Peiping in 1936. After Mr. Service's return to the United States in 1945 he had several casual contacts with either Mr. or Mrs. Lattimore, and was finally invited to spend the first week-end in June at their home in Baltimore. Without his knowing it in advance, Lieutenant Roth and Rose Yardouman had also been invited, and Mrs. Lattimore suggested they come down together. Mr. Service took no documents with him on that occasion but did take with him a personal copy of a new edition of the writings of Mao Tze Tung which Mr. Lattimore had asked to see. The Board finds nothing exceptional in this association of Mr. Service with a noted writer on Chinese affairs. Mr. Service was never a pupil or protege of Mr. Lattimore.

SUBSEQUENT CAREER

The third and final aspect of this case has to do with Mr. Service's tour of duty in Tokyo from September 1945 to his hospitalization there in April 1946. It has been alleged that during that period Mr. Service was in touch with Japanese Communist leaders, and was in sympathy with Communism. It appears that Mr. Service served as administrative and executive officer in Tokyo, had no political functions, and took no part in policy decisions.

The political reporting at SCAP Headquarters was done by Mr. John K. Emmerson, one of whose duties was to keep in touch with Japanese political leaders. Nosaka, one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, who had spent most of the war at Yenan with the Chinese Communists, called on Mr. Emmerson at SCAP Headquarters and, having met Mr. Service in Yenan, inquired for him. Mr. Emmerson called in Mr. Service for a brief conversation. Mr. Service saw Nosaka on one or perhaps two other occasions, but at no time had any political conversations with him. No evidence was presented to the effect that he was ever in touch with any other Japanese Communists. The Board finds no evidence that Mr. Service was sympathetic with Communism.

CONCLUSION

The Loyalty Security Board has given extended, careful, and earnest attention to this case, and concludes, on the basis of all the evidence, that reasonable grounds do not exist for belief that John Stewart Service is disloyal to the Government of the United States. The Board further concludes that, notwithstanding a single serious indiscretion in the handling of classified information, he does not constitute a security risk to the Department of State.

On July 31, 1951, the Loyalty Security Board reconsidered the case of John Stewart Service under the provisions of the loyalty standard as amended by

Executive Order 10241 of April 28, 1951, and determined that no reasonable doubt exists as to his loyalty to the United States Government.

OPINION OF THE LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD

DECEMBER, 12, 1951.

CHAIRMAN, LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD:

Case of: John Stewart Service, Foreign Relations Officer, U. S. Department of State, Washington, D. C.

The undersigned panel of the Loyalty Review Board first took up this case on post-audit, and on March 3, 1950, recommended that it be remanded to the Loyalty Security Board of the State Department for a hearing on charges. Subsequently a hearing was held, and the State Department board reaffirmed its decision favorable to the employee. Pending consideration of this decision on post-audit, supplementary information was received from the F. B. I. and the file was returned to the State Department board for such consideration as it deemed advisable. And after the amendment to Executive Order 9835 by Executive Order 10241 the case was again referred to the State Department board, which in each instance reaffirmed its favorable action. The case then came once more before this panel on post-audit, and after review of the entire file it was recommended under date of October 9, 1951, that a hearing be held pursuant to Loyalty Review Board Regulation 14.

A hearing was accordingly held by the undersigned panel at the office of the Loyalty Review Board, Washington, D. C., on November 8, 1951, at which the employeee was present and testified and was represented by his counsel, Charles Edward Rhetts of Washington.

We are satisfied that during the employee's service in China, including his visits to Yenan while assigned to the Army and acting under Army orders, the reports which he made from Yenan raise no reasonable doubt concerning his loyalty. In this respect we reaffirm the opinion expressed in our memorandum of March 3, 1950, in which we said:

> "It is evident that as a result of his official visit to the Communist headquarters at Yenan and from other sources, Mr. Service believed that the Communists were putting up a more effective fight against the Japanese than the Nationalists, and that the Communists should be helped. This view was shared by other observers, and it appears to have been Service's honest opinion. That he held and reported such opinion is, in the judgment of this panel, no reflection upon his loyalty. Furthermore, it was a part of his duty to confer with the Communists and report upon what he found and his conclusions as to what should be done. It should also be noted that there are many reports from those familiar with Mr. Service's work which are highly commendatory."

Concerning the employee's conduct in other respects while on assignment in China, we have in the file no sufficient evidence to support a doubt on the question of loyalty. There is, however, testimony of Patrick J. Hurley before the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate at hearings held in June 1951, indicating that the employee may have given a Chinese Communist official a copy of his report of October 10, 1944, to General Stilwell, entitled "The Need for Greater Realism in Our Relations with Chiang Kai-shek." This is the report known as Service's Report No. 40. This testimony was not available to us at the time of our hearing, and the employee was not examined upon it. We therefore make no finding with respect to this question but make note of it as a subject worthy of inquiry should there be further proceedings in this case.

A review of the entire file, including the testimony at the hearing before the State Department board, also satisfies us that no reasonable doubt concerning the employee's loyalty arises from his activities while assigned to the staff of General MacArthur in Toyko.

There is no evidence in the file that the employee was ever a member of the Communist Party or of any other organization on the Attorney General's list.

DEALINGS WITH JAFFE

There remains for consideration the employee's dealings with Philip C. Jaffe, of New York, the editor of Amerasia, and with others after his return from China

on April 12, 1945, and up to the time of his arrest in connection with the Amerasia case on June 6, 1945. In this connection reference is made to the following provision of Executive Order 9835:

"Part V—Standards

"2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which may be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the following. * * *

"d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disoloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or nonpublic character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States."

There is no evidence that the employee stole or abstracted from the official files and transmitted to Jaffe or any other person any official files. Such files found in Jaffe's possession appear to have come from Emmanuel S. Larsen, Andrew Roth, or some other source. It was on this charge that the Grand Jury in the so-called Amerasia case found no bill against Service. It is not disputed, however, that Service did intentionally lend for a period of time to Jaffe from 8 to 19 copies which he had retained in his files of his reports made during his official visits to the Communist headquarters in Yenan during 1944 and 1945, and that he orally gave Jaffe considerable information concerning what he had learned while on Government service in China and that these reports and some of this information was of a confidential or nonpublic character.

The practice of giving out information appears to have been somewhat loose, but it is clear there was, at least to some extent, a breach of State Department regulations. The only question remaining is whether these disclosures were of such a character or were made under such circumstances as to lead to the conclusion that there is reasonable doubt concerning the employee's loyalty to the Government of the United States. We shall now address ourselves to that question.

The employee left Yenan on April 8 and arrived in Washington from China on April 12, 1945, bringing with him his file copies of his Yenan reports for 1944 and 1945 and also originals for the State Department of some of his 1945 reports. The others had been distributed by him through channels while in China. These State Department copies he says he delivered at the State Department shortly after his arrival, and there is no evidence to controvert this. He appears to have spent the first week after his arrival in Washington reporting to various officials in line of his duty.

On April 19, a week after his arrival from China, Service received a telephone call from Lieutenant Andrew Roth of the Navy Department, whom he had met in 1944 at a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, inviting him to dinner. Later, Roth called and said that he had also invited Philip Jaffe, who was staying at the Statler in Washington, and suggested that Service call and pick Jaffe up. Service accordingly called up Jaffe and arranged to meet him at Jaffe's room in the hotel. Service testified that he had never before met Jaffe, but knew of him as editor of Amerasia, and, believing that he would be interested, brought with him to Jaffe's room his file copy of a report of an interview he had had in Yenan in the spring of 1945 with Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader.

There is information in the file indicating that Service had met Jaffe in China some years previously, and had transmitted information to Jaffe from China. We find no corroboration of this. And it appears from FBI reports that Service and Jaffe in their telephone conversation arranged to meet in Jaffe's room because if they were to meet in the lobby they might not recognize each other.

SUPPLIED OTHER REPORTS

Service allowed Jaffe to retain the copy of the Mao interview and Jaffe expressed an interest in Service's other reports and it was arranged that they would meet again in Jaffe's room at the Statler on the morning of the 20th. Pursuant to this appointment Service the next morning brought a number of his reports (which in his testimony before the State Department board he claimed were specially selected as being of such nature that they might be divulged) and left them with Jaffe. Service then returned for lunch with Jaffe and Lieutenant Roth in Jaffe's room at the hotel, and Jaffe said that he wanted more time to read the reports and would like to take them to New York, to which Service assented. Service testified that he lent Jaffe 8 or 10 of his reports. The information in the file indicates that Jaffe may have received from Service as many as 19.

On April 25 Service called on Jaffe at the Amerasia office in New York, and picked up the reports. As he kept no record of what reports he had lent to Jaffe and made no check of those which were returned, we have no accurate information as to how many and what reports Service in fact lent to Jaffe. While in New York on the 24th and 25th of April, Service stayed at the apartment of Mark Gayn, a free-lance writer on Far Eastern subjects whom he had met for the first time on April 18th and who had been a college mate of his brother, and on the evening of the 24th he attended a party at Gayn's apartment at which Mr. and Mrs. Jaffe, Kate Mitchell, and others were present.

Service met Jaffe again in Washington at Jaffe's room in the Statler on May 8, and on May 29 picked up Jaffe at the Statler and attended with him and others a farewell party for Lieutenant Roth. He also met Jaffe in New York on a week-end party of Mr. and Mrs. T. A. Bisson on May 19 and 20. There is no evidence that Service passed any copies of reports to Jaffe at any meetings subsequent to those of April 19 and 20, but there is information in the file indicating that on May 8 and 29 at Jaffe's room in the Statler Service continued to talk freely with Jaffe, as he had on the 19th and 20th of April, and this notwithstanding the fact that at these first meetings Service felt that Jaffe was unpleasantly inquisitive and insistent, and that after leaving the meeting of April 20 with Lieutenant Roth, Service asked Roth if Jaffe was a Communist, to which Roth replied that he did not think he was a Communist, but that he was extremely sympathetic.

It was also notwithstanding the fact that on April 25th in New York one Harold Isaacs, known to Service to be a former Communist, in response to an inquiry made by Service told Service that Jaffe was "bad business" or "bad medicine," and that while on the week-end party with the Bissons on May 19th and 20th Jaffe in conversation with Service took what appeared to Service to be the "party line" by telling Service that "they had real freedom of the press in Russia, that they did not have real freedom of the press here."

Service concedes that he should not have lent copies of his reports to Jaffe, but in extenuation he says that so far as he then knew Jaffe was a reputable journalist, and that giving what he called "background" information to reputable journalists had been encouraged by his superiors. The testimony of others indicates, however, that background briefing seldom went to the extent of showing reports, much less lending them or giving them out. And Brooks Atkinson, in a letter submitted to the State Department board on behalf of Service, says, "My only complaint as a reporter was that Mr. Service was too punctilious about State Department security and declined to tell me everything he knew. He never permitted me to see classified material and was cautious and guarded about matters he considered confidentially." This contrasts strangely with the very different treatment accorded by Service to Jaffe. Indeed, Service frankly stated that he placed no restriction on the use which Jaffe might make of the reports which he lent to him.

Service conceded that in no event should reports which had passed through headquarters and to which were attached letters of transmittal or comments be handed out. A number of such reports were found among Jaffe's papers, but the evidence indicates that none of them came from Service.

SOME REPORTS COPIED

Copies of reports which Service did lend or may have lent Jaffe were also found among Jaffe's papers. It appears that one Anne H. C. Blumenthal copied a number of reports for Jaffe, and it seems probable that some or all of those lent by Service were among these.

We have examined the 18 reports copies of which Service concedes were or may have been lent by him to Jaffe. Some of these are not classified; others are classified "secret" or "confidential." Service testified, and the evidence indicates, that these were his own classifications and that, in many cases at least, before he showed them to Jaffe by reason of lapse of time or otherwise they were no longer secret or confidential.

From our examination of these reports, it appears to us that they were for the most part such as a newspaper reporter on the spot might transmit to his newspaper. Some of them, however, appear to us to be of a nature which no discreet person would disseminate without express authority, and some of them were dated within four to six weeks of the time they were lent to Jaffe, and the originals had not been in the hands of the State Department for more than a week. These recent reports therefore might be considered as "hot news."

We have no knowledge of what information Service may have imparted to Jaffe and others orally during these meetings in New York, or during the evening parties he went to with Jaffe and others in Washington on April 19 and May 29. We do, however, have some information concerning Service's conversations with Jaffe in Jaffe's room at the Statler in Washington on April 19th and 20th and May 8th and 29th. These indicate that there was some conviviality, and that Service talked very freely, discussing, among other things, troop dispositions and military plans which he said he had seen and which he said were "very secret."

This intimacy of talk appears to have continued unabated, though from the first Service felt that Jaffe was unduly inquisitive and evidently suspected that Jaffe might be a Communist, having after the meeting of April 20th asked Lieutenant Roth whether Jaffe was a Communist, to which Roth replied that he did not believe Jaffe was a Communist but that he was extremely sympathetic.

Superiors Not Consulted

It also continued after Isaacs had told Service on April 25th that Jaffe was "bad business" or "bad medicine," and after Jaffe had on May 19th or 20th taken the "party line" in conversation with Service. At no time did Service consult his superiors as to the extent to which he might properly give Jaffe information.

What have we that gives ground for reasonable doubt as to Service's loyalty? With some necessary repetition of what has preceded, the grounds, as we see them, are these:

He knew very early in his association with Jaffe that Jaffe was a very doubtful character, extremely left-wing, as Service said in his testimony before us. He was asked before us, "What made you think he might be a Communist?" The answer was, "I don't remember anything specific. It was fairly obvious from talking to him, and his general approach, that he was extremely left-wing. He was a much more uncritical booster of the Chinese Communists than I was. At some point fairly early, he mentioned his interest and participation in something like Russian Relief."

His counsel urged in his excellent brief that Service had mentioned Jaffe to several of his friends and colleagues, and that none of the persons of whom these inquiries were made—Vincent Friedman, Isaacs, or Salisbury—gave any indication that Jaffe was a Communist or an improper person to associate with. His statement is not entirely accurate, but it scarcely helps Service.

Service was a highly trusted official of his Department, of long and wide experience in his particular field. The statements made by him, quoted above, show that no such warning was necessary. He knew almost from the start of his relations with Jaffe of Jaffe's true character. To this man he gave, as we have stated, a large number of his reports. His story is that there were eight or ten of them which he gave to Jaffe. Jaffe, as reported by the F. B. I. said Service gave him 19. Giving these reports was against the State Department's regulations, as Service knew. It is true that, as we have said, these regulations were apparently not always strictly observed, and how many of these reports Service really furnished Jaffe is a matter of considerable doubt.

Step by step, as Service continued in his association with Jaffe, Service had a continuing line of warnings as to Jaffe's character. We begin on April 20, after Service had delivered his reports to Jaffe. He asked Roth if Jaffe were a Communist, and Roth said he was not a Communist, but a left-winger and very sympathetic. Later, when Service came to New York on April 24 and 25, two things which should have been a warning occurred.

He said he was very much annoyed at finding that Jaffe had turned over Service's reports to Gayne for use. It has been previously noted that Service had put no restriction on the use to which Jaffe might put these reports. He had, he says, simply assumed that Jaffe would treat them as reporters might use them for background information.

In New York, he saw his friend, Isaacs, who said Jaffe was "bad medicine." Isaacs had been a Communist himself, and "bad medicine," used by an ex-Communist, should, we think, have had some special significance to Service. Later, at Bisson's party on May 19, Jaffe, as quoted above, takes what Service himself called "the Communist line" in saying that there was more freedom of the press in Russia than in this country.

DISLIKED JAFFE AS PERSON

Service also says that he soon disliked Jaffe as a person—that he was aggressive and nosey. Yet, notwithstanding what Service knew about Jaffe as a Communist sympathizer, and notwithstanding this stated dislike of him as a person, we find in the conversations between Jaffe and Service at the former's hotel room in the Statler, as reported by the F. B. I., no indication of any caution by Service in the continuous line of answers he made to Jaffe's "nosey" inquiries on State Department matters. If Jaffe was nosey, he rarely failed to get from Service what he asked for, punctuated at one time, at least, by the statement, "This is very secret." Service undertook to get documents for Jaffe in the Department. Quite irrespective of whether these documents could properly be made available to Jaffe, the question we ask ourselves is, "Why should Service do it for a man he says he disliked and whom he knew to be very much of a left-winger and, as Service's own statements indicate, whom he suspected of being a Communist?"

The evidence of Jaffe's true character was, we think, built up with every contact Service had with him, and yet his last long conversation with Jaffe on May 29 shows Service telling Jaffe matters which we think a reasonably decent person in Service's position of trust should have hesitated to disclose even to a friend in whose character he had complete faith. The contrast between his treatment of Jaffe and his treatment of Brooks Atkinson, an accredited representative of the New York Times, as reported by the latter and previously quoted herein, requires no comment.

To say that his course of conduct does not raise a reasonable doubt as to Service's own loyalty would, we are forced to think, stretch the mantle of charity much too far.

We are not required to find Service guilty of disloyalty, and we do not do so, but for an experienced and trusted representative of our State Department to so far forget his duty to his trust as his conduct with Jaffe so clearly indicates, forces us with great regret to conclude that there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty. The favorable finding of the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State is accordingly reversed.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY SERVICE

John S. Service issued the following statement after being notified of his dismissal from the State Department:

"The Loyalty Review Board's decision is a surprise, a shock, and an injustice. I am not now and never have been disloyal to the United States. The board expressly states that it does not find me disloyal.

"What it has done is to base a 'reasonable doubt' on a single episode which occurred six and a half years ago, which has been freely admitted by me and known to all responsible quarters since that time and for which I have been tried and unanimously acquitted at least nine times.

"That episode involved discussing normal and proper background information with a journalist whom I believed, and had every reason to believe at the time, to be nothing more than the editor of a reputable specialist magazine dealing with the Far East. The selected background information which I gave him did not adversely affect, or even deal with, the national interests of the United States, nor did it come within the meaning of regulations defining the classification secret and confidential. The information involved was known, or at least available to all of the American correspondents in China. The only thing that kept these facts about China from an un-informed American public was a foreign censorship. The same information had been used repeatedly by me, with official approval, in discussing the situation in China with other writers and researchers in the United States.

"I am confident that my record of 18½ years' service to the American Government and the testimony of the many people who have worked with me during that period will support me in my conviction that there is no doubt of my loyalty."

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a study made by the staff of the committee relative to contributions by the Carnegie Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation to the Institute of Pacific Relations, the fig-

ures being taken from the annual reports of these two organizations.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1349," and is as follows:)

Contributions from the Carnegie Corp. of New York to the IPR as taken from the annual reports of the Carnegie Corp. of New York

	Donations during year	
	Authorized	Paid
1925–33: No donation.		
1934: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)	$20,000	$20,000
1935: No donation.		
1936: Institute of Pacific Relations American Council (support of program)	10,000	10,000
1937: No donation.		
1938: Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council (support of program)	10,000	10,000
1939: Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council (support of program)	10,000	10,000
1941: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)	15,000	15,000
1942: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)	15,000	15,000
1943: Report not available.		
1944: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)	34,000	34,000
1945:		
Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)	34,000	34,000
Expenses of 9th International Conference	8,000	8,000
1946: Institute of Pacific Relations (support of program)	55,000	55,000
1947: Report not available.		
1948: Institute of Pacific Relations (final grant for support)	60,000	40,000
1949: Institute of Pacific Relations	*20,000	20,000
Total	291,000	291,000

*Balance from Appropriations made before 1948–49.

Contributions from Rockefeller Foundation to Institute of Pacific Relations as taken from the annual reports of the Rockefeller Foundation

	Appropriation for year plus balance or prior-year appropriation	Payments for year
1929: Toward program of research in the social sciences	$125,000.00	$50,000.00
1930: Toward program of research in the social sciences	325,000.00	33,499.70
1931:		
General budget—American Council	60,000.00	30,000.00
General expenses—American Council	30,000.00	30,000.00
Program of research in the social sciences	291,500.00	91,500.30
1932:		
General program	30,000.00	20,000.00
Program of research in the social sciences	200,000.00	50,000.00
1933:		
General program	55,000.00	30,000.00
Program of research in the social sciences	150,000.00	50,000.00
1934:		
General budget, American Council	50,000.00	25,000.00
Support of Russian language instruction, American Council	7,500.00	2,500.00
Program of research in the social sciences	100,000.00	50,000.00
1935:		
American Council, experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language	17,500.00	
Support of Russian language instruction	5,000.00	5,000.00
General expenses, American Council	72,500.00	25,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program	135,000.00	
Research in the social sciences	50,000.00	50,000.00
1936:		
General expenses, American Council	47,500.00	17,500.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program	135,000.00	50,000.00
Experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language, American Council	17,500.00	4,500.00
1937:		
General expenses, American Council	30,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program	85,000.00	45,000.00
Experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language, American Council	13,000.00	6,305.00

Contributions from Rockefeller Foundation to Institute of Pacific Relations as taken from the annual reports of the Rockefeller Foundation—Continued

	Appropriation for year plus balance or prior-year appropriation	Payments for year
1938		
General expenses, American Council	$45,000.00	$15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in the Far East	90,000.00	12,791.27
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program	120,000.00	40,000.00
Experiments in intensive teaching of research program, American Council	6,695.00	6,500.00
1939:		
General expenses, American Council	30,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in the Far East	77,208.73	34,115.50
Pacific Council, general expenses and research program	80,000.00	40,000.00
English translations of source materials on Chinese history, American Council	31,700.00	5,950.00
Experiments in intensive teaching of Chinese language	195.00	
1940:		
General budget, American Council	45,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East	43,093.23	14,913.57
Pacific Council, general budget and research program	129,000.00	40,000.00
English translations of source materials on Chinese history, American Council	25,750.00	10,900.00
1941:		
General budget, American Council	30,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East	28,179.66	26,453.04
Pacific Council, general budget and research program	89,000.00	48,000.00
American Council, English translations of source materials on Chinese history	14,850.00	9,900.00
1942:		
General expenses, American Council	45,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East	1,726.62	
Pacific Council, general expenses, research program and emergency fund	148,000.00	41,000.00
American Council, English translations of source materials on Chinese history	61,050.00	14,674.09
1943:		
General expenses, American Council	45,000.00	15,000.00
International Secretariat, studies of issues involved in present situation in Far East	1,726.62	1,726.62
Pacific Council, general expenses, research program and emergency fund, American Council	148,000.00	47,250.00
English translations of source materials on Chinese history	46,325.00	17,959.79
1944:		
General expenses, American Council	30,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses, research program, and emergency fund	100,750.00	59,750.00
American Council, English translations of source materials on Chinese history	28,365.21	18,208.80
1945:		
General expenses, American Council	15,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses, research program, and emergency fund	41,000.00	41,000.00
American Council, English translations of source materials on Chinese history	35,156.41	24,123.86
1946:		
General expenses, American Council	60,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research	173,000.00	41,000.00
American Council, English translations of source materials of Chinese history	36,000.00	23,500.00
1947: Report not available.		
1948:		
General expenses, American Council	30,000.00	15,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research	91,000.00	41,000.00
1949:		
General expenses, American Council	15,000.00	10,000.00
Pacific Council, general expenses and research	50,000.00	30,000.00
Pacific Council, general budget	25,000.00	25,000.00
Total	4,144,771.48	1,576,521.54

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a postcard which is identified as being genuine by the John Day Co., Inc., publishers, issued by them, relative to an introduction written by Owen Lattimore to a book entitled "Failure in Japan."

Senator O'CONOR. That will be introduced and received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1350" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1350

RICHARD J. WALSH, *President*

THE JOHN DAY COMPANY, INC.

PUBLISHERS

62 West 45th Street

NEW YORK 19, N. Y., *April 18, 1952.*

Mr. BENJAMIN MANDEL,
Research Director, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MANDEL: The card about Robert Textor's book FAILURE IN JAPAN of which you enclosed copy was processed in a quantity of about 2,300 all of which were delivered to the office of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Institute had previously agreed to address and mail the cards to a list of its members, and I presume this was done. The time was about the middle of last June.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD WALSH, Jr., *Editor.*

[Postcard]

No one seriously concerned with current world affairs can afford to miss

FAILURE IN JAPAN

WITH KEYSTONES FOR A POSITIVE POLICY

By Robert B. Textor

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY OWEN LATTIMORE

This book analyzes our Occupation record and seeks to show how it has been spelling out failure for democratic values in Japan, and producing a situation of strategic weakness for the West. It makes recommendations for a positive policy.

$3.00 A COPY THROUGH YOUR BOOKSELLER OR DIRECT FROM—

THE JOHN DAY COMPANY

210 Madison Avenue, New York 16

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have the actual wrapper of a book by Catherine Porter, entitled "Crisis in the Philippines," which describes the use of her book in the Armed Forces.

Senator O' CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1351" and is as follows:)

CRISIS IN THE PHILIPPINES

(By Catherine Porter)

Here, in a compact, readable, not-too-technical book, is full information about the first American soil to feel the tread of the invader—the Philippines. Finished after the Japanese invasion, it analyzes the opening moves in that campaign and is completely up-to-the-minute.

Miss Porter first traces the history of the islands down through the latest developments in their program for eventual independence. She provides a fine section on the people—their racial make-up, their language, their education, and their loyalties. She describes the economy of the Philippines, and considers how they could sustain themselves under blockade. She covers their politics up to the most recent elections. She offers invaluable material on the strategic prob-

lems of defense, including the significance of the various Japanese moves both strategically and economically. There are maps in the volume showing roads, railways, important airfields, principal economic regions, etc.

Miss Porter wrote this book under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which distributed copies of the first edition in pamphlet form to its members. It was considered so valuable that the War Department took a very large edition for the use of army officers. The present edition, so drastically revised as to be virtually a new book, should be of the utmost service to anyone who wants to follow intelligently the war in the Pacific.

CATHERINE PORTER is a native of Holyoke, Mass., and a graduate of Cornell University. After three years of teaching, she joined the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1926. She was managing editor of *Pacific Affairs* from 1935 to 1939, and has been editor of the *Far Eastern Survey* for the past year. She is the author of numerous articles on Pacific affairs which have appeared in various journals in both this country and the Philippines.

Miss Porter has travelled much in Europe and East Asia: but she believes her most valuable experience was a year spent in the Philippines just before the present war broke out in Europe. This trip took her not only to such important cities as Manila and Davao, but to the great sugar plantations, to the outlying mountain districts of Luzon, to the Moro regions, to Cebu and Iloilo and Negros. Everywhere she lived as much as possible among the Filipino people, from the most important to the humblest. She came away from this experience with a firm knowledge of the islands, and a firm confidence in their people's devotion to the ideal of their own independence.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have an article from the New Masses of November 14, 1944, pages 19 and 26, dealing with the Stilwell matter.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1352" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1352

[Source: The New Masses, November 14, 1944, pp. 19 and 26]

BEHIND STILWELL'S RECALL

(By Frederick V. Field)

A major breakdown has occurred in the Far Eastern theater of war. One arm of our two-armed attack up on the Japanese enemy has been crippled. The military breakdown derives from the political deteriation of the Chinese government, which in turn is the result of the deep-rooted economic and social fallacies upon which Chungking has tried to maintain itself.

The recall of the valiant American general, Stilwell, and the resgination of our ambassador, who has had a record of notable service in his present post, are culminations of a process which has been apparent for a long time. Since before Pearl Harbor it has been evident to informed persons abroad, including officials of all branches of our own government and armed services, that the Chinese nation as a fighting unit was approaching disaster. During the last year the situation has been deemed so acute that the American government has taken unusual measures to cope with it.

Through our ambassador and military representatives the views of our government on the urgency of Chinese unity have been repeatedly and forcefully conveyed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There can be no question that at the Cairo Conference a year ago the President himself had the opportunity to put forward these views. These efforts, apparently unavailing, were then supplemented by our sending to China a whole series of officials representing various economic and military agencies of our government. Their work was bolstered and dramatized by the visits of Vice President Wallace, Donald Nelson, and Maj. Gen. Patrick Hurley.

There is every evidence that the United States has been exceedingly careful to put forward its point of view—and that, incidentally, of its other allies—in such a way as to promote unity in the coalition rather than the reverse. All possible care has been taken not to offend the Chinese people. Our government has maintained contact with and had news from a great variety of Chinese belonging to many political groups, and from not any single one—the feudal

bureaucracy excepted—has there been the slightest intimation that our interest was resented or that the false issue of foreign interference was being raised to defeat the very purposes for which we were employing our emissaries. On the contrary, Chinese of all democratic persuasions have used every opportunity to urge the American people to stand by them in pressing even more strongly for Chinese unity against the common enemy.

Press reports—and they are so consistent with our general picture of the situation as it has been known here that they ring true—indicate that we finally presented Chiang Kai-shek with three conditions which Washington regarded as prerequisites for effective coalition warfare against Japan. We asked, first, that General Stilwell be named commander in chief of all Allied forces in China; second, that the Chinese high command undertake a thorough reorganization of its armies in order to eliminate ineffective (to use a mild term) officers; and, third, that the military effort of the Kuomintang and Communist armies be unified.

There can be no doubt as to the wisdom of this position. It is conceivable that if the second and third conditions were accepted and carried out the first would become unnecessary. But under present circumstances, with the Japanese armies rapidly taking over the strategic hinterland to the China coast and destroying the advance airfields from which we have been bombing enemy shipping and outlying bases, military reforms brooked no delay.

The news of this tragedy in China and of her relations with her allies burst upon the American and British people with suddenness. A severe Chinese censorship controlled by the reactionaries in Chungking coupled with the hope for an improvement that Washington has never let go combined to hold back much of the information now being published by the yard. A natural tendency is therefore to adopt too pessimistic an attitude toward the Chinese scene, to throw up one's hands and relegate the Chinese people to a secondary position for the war's duration.

There is a further danger in the present circumstances. That is the danger that the momentary collapse of the China front will add fuel to the fire of the most reactionary circles in America. If it is assumed that the Chinese people are no longer a factor in the defeat of Japan, then to all intents and purposes the war against Japan loses its vital quality of being a war of coalition. Semi-fascists, isolationists, and imperialists, knowing that China cannot fight until an internal democracy has been initiated, welcome the avoidance of that semblance of a people's war. They say, let the Navy, the American Navy without even the British navy, complete the job alone! That won't require any deals with Communists or other democratic elements. It will mean, moreover, that we can avoid the embarrassment of arousing the Chinese people politically during the war; if we can squeak through without helping to create a real Chinese nation, they say, our imperialist ambitions after the war will have a far better chance of success.

Such thinking is fallacious and dangerous for more than the obvious reasons. Any situation which feeds reaction is fraught with peril. But I have in mind two other factors. While it is conceivable that we could defeat Japan single-handed, the war would thereby be interminably prolonged. It would cost more lives by far, it would be inefficient, it would be costly in every sense of the term. "Going it alone" would sow seeds which might well destroy the United Nations coalition completely, for it would inevitably be not only anti-Chinese but anti-British and anti-Soviet as well.

Furthermore it is impossible to conceive of postwar security in the Far East without a strong Chinese nation among the United Nations leadership. And if we do not have security in the Far East how can we expect it anywhere? A Chinese nation is not going to spring up immediately after the war out of a vacuum. Nationhood does not jump out of a Pandora's Box. The Chinese nation must be welded in the course of a coalition war against Japan. That is the only way we can be certain of its support in the postwar.

With these consideration in mind, President Roosevelt's position in trying to narrow the area of conflict to a difference of opinion between personalities is wise statesmanship. For it leaves our official position vis-à-vis China and Chiang Kai-shek intact, where it was before Stilwell's recall and Gauss' resignation. Our conditions, with the exception of General Stilwell's part in them, for the reconstitution of China's fighting power remain. The door is wide open for the democratic forces within and outside the Kuomintang to reform their government, to reorganize their armies, and to bring unity among all groups capable of or willing to fight the Japanese enemy.

Let us not, therefore, fall into the reactionary trap of writing off the Chinese people in this war. Let us instead redouble the efforts to support those forces in China, and they constitute the vast majority—who wish desperately to rid themselves of the Chungking clique which has brought them to the present disaster. By the same token let us encourage those in our own country who are committed to the policy of aiding in the establishment of a united Chinese nation.

NOVEMBER 14, 1944.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have three articles from the Daily Worker of August 28, 29, and 30, 1946, which are reprints from the Far Eastern Survey and reprinted by permission of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator O'CONOR. They will be received in evidence.

(The articles referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1353," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1353

[Daily Worker, August 28, 1946, p. 6]

ROXAS AND THE HUK IN THE PHILIPPINES

(Reprinted from the Far Eastern Survey, by permission of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations)

(By Barbara Entenberg)

(Barbara Entenberg was with Office of War Information from 1943 to 1945.)

Military operations to crush the Hukbalahap and the organized peasant movement in Central Luzon have been undertaken by the Philippine Army as a first major policy of the newly inaugurated Philippine Republic. Among the resources at the command of the Philippine Army for this offensive are $50,000,000 worth of military equipment presented as a gift to President Manuel Roxas by the Commanding General of United States Army Forces Western Pacific on the eve of the proclamation of the Republic.

To justify the offensive, stories of outlaw bands in Central Luzon have dominated the news from the Philippines. The propaganda quality of the stories is well exemplified by a Manila dispatch of the Associated Press of June 5 which reported that careful investigation of stories claiming Huk violence proved to be "entirely fabricated" and that "apparently deliberate efforts to stigmatize the Hukbalahaps are being made within the province (Nueva Ecija) by persons with access to official stationery, or who have forged it."

The Hukbalahap proposed a truce to the Roxas administration and according to Philippine newspaper reports the Huk leaders have conferred with President Roxas and members of his administration in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the pressing problems of the Filipino peasantry. The Philippine Army, however, and private armies of the landowners are on the offensive against the Hukbalahap and peasant organization with apparently full backing of Mr. Roxas.

The nature and objectives of the Hukbalahap, the "Peoples Army Against Japan" have been obscured through the preoccupation of United States and Filipino officials with the refusal of the Huk to surrender arms after liberation. The Hukbalahap has been described by its opponents as an "outlaw organization" of Communist terrorists which impose its rule on helpless landowners and peasants by force and which constitutes a "state within a state," threatening the stability of the Philippine Government.

Such reports overlook the legitimate fear of the Huks that, disarmed, they would be helpless against the reprisals of those elements of the Philippine Government which have announced that the "most extreme" measures would be taken to suppress them. Overlooked also for the most part has been the fact that announced Huk objectives include social reforms of a mild, unrevolutionary character, long needed for the improvement of the position of peasant tenant farmers.

The Hukbalahap was organized early in 1942 by Luis Taruc, the head of the General Union of Workers, and other labor and peasant leaders. Some of them were Communists. Their primary objective was to organize effective resistance to the Japanese.

Taruc immediately tried to establish liaison with General MacArthur and his forces. The General had left, but Taruc's emissaries received advice and a letter of authority from his representative Lt. Col. C. A. Thorpe. Peasants from Central Luzon joined the guerrilla bands in great numbers. Each community furnished a quota of fighters, who were indoctrinated by Huk leaders, formed into squadrons, and sent out to harass the Japanese in night raids. It is estimated that 100,000 people belong to the Huk.

The Christian Science Monitor reported that "by conservative estimate, the Huks accounted for 20,000 Japanese and puppets killed in more than 1,100 encounters with the enemy." The Huks rescued Allied aviators, and prevented large amounts of harvested rice and cotton from falling to the Japanese. Their efforts were so successful that the Japanese found it necessary to send a large force to Central Luzon in an unsuccessful attempt to wipe them out.

Colonel Thorpe wrote to the Hukbalahap in June 1942: "I desire to congratulate you on your past accomplishments and on your present enemy effort." The minutes of the cabinet meeting of the puppet republic on Jan. 25, 1944, noted that "Vice Minister Francisco declared that the [Filipino] constabulary needed the help of the Japanese Army against the guerrillas and stated that 'the most serious concern of the constabulary is the Hukbalahap.'" The constabulary that fought with the Japanese against the Huks during the war are in large measure the same constabulary fighting against the Huks today.

The Huk has been accused of hostility toward Americans as well as toward the Japanese. This conflicts with the opinion of American soldiers who later fought with the Huks on their return to the islands. In February 1945 the Free Philippines, a United States Army publication, cited the noteworthy part Huk guerrillas played with the 11th Airborne Division in liberating American internees at Los Banos. Many Philippine villages were liberated solely by the Huk. Evidence from the statements of Huk leaders, and from their behavior after the landing of American forces, indicated the desire of the Huk to cooperate with the returning U. S. Army.

In harmony with this main policy of resisting the Japanese, the Huks also attacked puppet government officials, landlords, and guerrilla and constabulary groups whom they believed to be aiding the Japanese.

In addition to these activities, the Huk established a civilian government. Elections were held and land reforms instituted. The Huk expropriated lands belonging to collaborators and divided them among peasant guerrillas. Crops of the collaborators and noncollaborators were taken over in order to coordinate the needs of the tenant farmers with the objectives of the guerrillas. That policy links the Huk's wartime activities and their current objectives.

[Daily Worker (N. Y.), August 29, 1946, p. 6]

The Problems of Philippine Tenant Farmers

(By Barbara Entenberg)

(The second of three instalments of an article reprinted from the "Far Eastern Survey," by permission of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations)

The position of the tenant farmer in the Philippines continued practically unchanged during the administration of the islands by the United States. In crowded Central Luzon, approximately one percent of the population held 99 percent of the land. Tenants received 50 percent of the total rice harvest, and were responsible for 50 percent of the expenses of farming, including the cost of hiring farm labor. In some cases as many as 30,000 tenants farmed the land of one owner.

On their small holdings, tenants were unable to harvest enough rice to feed themselves. They were forced to borrow and unable to meet their debts. Former High Commissioner Sayre points out that during the United States Administration "the bulk of the newly created income went to the Government, to landlords and to urban areas, and served but little to ameliorate living conditions among the almost feudal peasantry and tenantry." The relative numbers of tenants and landlords did not change materially.

It was not until after the Japanese occupation that peasants in Central Luzon were sufficiently well organized to effect a change in the system of tenantry. The Huk mobilized thousands of tenants who had formerly been passive, due to the

strength of those in authority (a wealthy clique of politicians, landlords, industrialists, and church elements). In a speech before the Manila Rotary Club, Luis Taruc said that as a result of the struggle against Japan, "The guerilla peasant in Central Luzon * * * is now politically and socially conscious * * * When Bataan fell and all hope seemed gone and 'superpatriot' leaders went to the enemy's side, he whetted his bolo and acquired a gun. * * * He was that, while at the same time most of the landlords, the buy-and-sell merchants of death, and puppets were licking the boots of the Japs. So now he feels that he will not be fettered any more by the landlords' will."

The fight of the Huks against Japan and collaborationists landowners became after the war a political battle to exclude former collaborators from the Philippine administration, to change the land tenantry system, and to win political representation for farmers and workers. The Huk became a member of a new political party, the Democratic Alliance, together with the National Peasants Union, the Committee on Labor Organization, the Blue Eagle Guerillas, and other organizations.

Together these groups have asked increase in the peasants' share of the harvest; a minimum daily wage of three pesos for workers; the purchase of large landed estates and their sale in small parcels and on easy installments to present occupants; and prompt unseating and prosecuting of known pro-Japanese persons in high official and commercial positions.

When the Philippines were liberated, the returning Commonwealth Government found that in some regions of Central Luzon a complete Huk government was functioning. Almost autonomously, it collected taxes, punished collaborationists, administered its own laws, and resisted the reinstatement of Commonwealth officials without regard to their own elected representatives.

The Huks retained weapons which they had seized from the Japanese during the war and, according to report, refused to surrender them to the Commonwealth Government until other former guerilla groups, notably members of the United States Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE), had been disarmed. President Truman, in October, 1945, asked for an investigation, charging that "agrarian unrest" constituted a special problem "which threatens the stability of the government."

During his election campaign, the pro-Roxas press asked the United States Army to destroy the Huk, and blamed the Osmena administration for its inability to maintain order in the face of constant strife in Central Luzon. Roxas warned that, if elected President, he would "restore peace and order in 30 days," if necessary asking the assistance of the United States Army.

Huk officials have said that after the return of the Commonwealth Government they recognized the impossibility of two governments in the islands and were willing to surrender arms. They insisted that this be done by negotiation. They feared reprisals by those they had fought as collaborators during the war, especially members of the Philippine Army Military Police Command and the guerrilla Filipino members of the USAFFE. They feared attacks of private guards of landlords who were unwilling to concede peasant farmers the newly won share of the harvest.

[Daily Worker (N. Y.), August 30, 1946, p. 6]

ROXAS SUPPRESSES FILIPINO DEMOCRATS

(By Barbara Entenberg)

(The last installment of an article reprinted from the Far Eastern Survey, by permission of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations)

Huk fears were apparently well founded. In February 1945, Huk Squadrons 77 and 97, which had fought with the Sixth Army, were ordered to surrender their arms. On their way back to Pampanga, unarmed, they were attacked by a band of armed USAFFE guerillas and thrown into the Malalos provisional prison. During the night, 109 of them were slain. An investigation was made by U. S. Army officers, and then the only action taken was the arrest of a USAFFE leader, who was released after two days and later was appointed, by P. S. Civil Affairs officers, mayor of the town where the massacre took place.

A committee appointed to investigate disorders in Central Luzon after visiting Nueva Ecija reported to Secretary of the Interior Montelibano that "Mayors Rigor of Cabanatuan and Jose Carlos of Jaen openly and notoriously connived

with civilian guards in arresting, shooting and, in a few cases, murdering of men suspected to be members of the Huk and PKM (Peasants Union)." Luis Taruc claims that it is officially admitted that from 70 to 80 percent of the Filipino Military Police are ex-collaborators, bitter enemies of the Huks.

The policy of the United States Army has apparently been hostile to the Huk. Immediately after landing, the U. S. Army Counter-Intelligence Corps rounded up and jailed Huk leaders, including Taruc and Castro Alejandrino, while many whom the Huks considered collaborators remained free. Taruc and Alejandrino were released for lack of evidence. As early as July 1945, the U. S. Army used tank destroyers to break up Huk meetings.

The Army loaned the Secretary of National Defense 10,000 submachine guns, and jeeps, planes and field hospitals for the control of "restive tenants under agitators." The Huk and other groups have charged that the action of the U. S. Army in putting the Sixth Division in readiness for "battle" in January 1946, long after any enemy forces remained in Luzon, was "designed to confront progressive groups who are now clamoring for the rights long denied them."

The Huk, as a member of the Democratic Alliance, supported the candidacy of Osmena, although disappointed in his conciliatory attitude toward collaborators, his mechanical reinstatement of former Commonwealth officials, his ignoring of leaders who had developed during the occupation, and his failure to solve the problems of food distribution and relief.

They viewed Roxas as the candidate of the landowners and big business interests who, while urging the political independence of the Philippines, is actually interested in maintaining close economic connection with the United States. This connection has in the past been profitable for the propertied class, but has brought few benefits to those tenant farmers who form the bulk of the Huk and the people as a whole.

The Roxas majority in the Congress, after a fight over rules, refused to seat three opposition senators and seven congressmen, most of them elected from Central Luzon. Among them was Taruc, elected representative of the first district of Pampanga. Roxas supporters have called the opposition congressmen Communists "who have no place in our scheme of government." The banning of the opposition congressmen seems to have been a move to secure for Roxas the necessary three-fourts majority for the ratification of the Bell Act, strongly opposed by the Democratic Alliance. The Bell Act prolongs free trade with the United States and grants United States businessmen equal rights with Filipinos in the islands, and in the opinion of the Democratic Alliance perpetuates the economic dependence of the Philippines and the advantages of the entrenched business interests.

At the same time, majority groups in both houses seated two representatives and three senators under indictment for treason. Jose de Leon, chief of the Huk in Nueva Ecija, offered on June 6 cooperation with the Government's pacification program provided the Government seat the seven Democratic Alliance congressmen, including Taruc, and recognize the Huk guerillas for veterans' benefits.

In answer to peasant requests for reform, the Roxas administration has made no serious effort to solve the problem either by legislation or by initiation of improvements in the working conditions of the peasants. On the contrary, political maneuvering is giving way to full-scale military action by the Government. It is improbable, however, that the problems which press for solution—namely, agrarian and democratic reform—can be dispelled by force of arms, even when those arms are backed by the material force and influence of the United States.

Mr. MANDEL. The name of Mme. Sun Yat-sen has come up in the hearings, and we have here a copy of page 90 from the book entitled "The People's War," by Israel Epstein, describing Mme. Sun Yat-sen.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1354

MADAME SUN YAT-SEN

[Source: The People's War, by I. Epstein, published by Victor Gollanez, Ltd., London, 1939]

Madame Sun Yat-sen writes:

"This book is different from any other foreign work on our war resistance, because it relates an analytic and factual account of the struggle to our past history and the future prospects of our national revolution. Every friend of China should read it" (wrapper).

Among the first to greet the reconciliation was Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Kuomintang, the father of China's national revolution. "Throughout his life," she wrote, "Dr. Sun advocated the principle of joint struggle for the existence of China. That is why he held that the Kuomintang and Communists should work together. The Communist Party is a party which stands for the interests of the working classes, both industrial and agricultural. Dr. Sun realized that, without the keen support and cooperation of these classes, the mission of completing the national revolution could not easily be carried out. If the cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party which Dr. Sun advocated had continued uninterruptedly until the present time, China would by now have been a free and independent power. Past events are a good lesson. During the present crisis, all former differences should be forgotten. The whole nation must join together in opposing Japanese aggression and fighting for the final victory" (p. 90).

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a tabulation made by the staff, showing the contributors associated with Amerasia and with the Institute of Pacific Relations, showing the volume number, the page, and the date in each case.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The tabulation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1355" and is is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1355

Amerasia—Contributors associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations

Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year	Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year
Allen, James S	I	2	73	Apr. 1937	Jaffe, Philip J	I	3	136	May 1937
Bisson, T. A	I	4	151	June 1937		I	8	349	Oct. 1937
	I	8	360	Oct. 1937		I	8	338	Oct. 1937
Carter, Edward C	I	11	489	Jan. 1938	Kizer, Benjamin H	I	5	207	July 1937
Chi Ch'ao-Ting	I	8	343	Oct. 1937	Lang, Olga	I	9	415	Nov. 1937
	I	6	247	Aug. 1937	Lasker, Bruno	I	8	366	Oct. 1937
	I	1	33	Mar. 1937	Lattimore, Owen	I	7	310	Sept. 1937
	I	10	443	Dec. 1937		I	1	26	Mar. 1937
	I	11	487	Jan. 1938	Lockwood, Wm. W	I	11	503	Jan. 1938
	I	5	195	July 1937		I	2	53	Apr. 1937
Coons, Arthur G	I	4	168	June 1937		I	3	98	May 1937
Earnshaw, Ruth	I	3	133	May 1937	Moore, Harriet	I	6	244	Aug. 1937
Emerson, Rupert	I	5	203	July 1937	Motylev, V	I	5	230	July 1937
Fairbank, John K	I	7	295	Sept. 1937	Norman, E. Herbert	I	2	84	Apr. 1937
Field, Frederick V	I	9	397	Nov. 1937		I	12	571	Feb. 1938
	I	1	9	Mar. 1937		I	1	2	Mar. 1937
	I	6	253	Aug. 1937		I	2	50	Apr. 1937
	I	3	122	May 1937	Peake, Cyrus H	I	9	387	Nov. 1937
	I	2	52	Apr. 1937		I	1	41	Mar. 1937
	I	2	147	June 1937		I	12	535	Feb. 1937
	I	6	242	Aug. 1937		I	8	340	Oct. 1937
	I	5	194	July 1937		I	11	486	Jan. 1938
	I	7	291	Sept. 1937		I	5	225	July 1937
Hanwell, Norman D	I	10	471	Dec. 1937		I	3	99	May 1937
	I	5	211	July 1937		I	2	50	Apr. 1937
Jaffe, Philip J	I	1	20	Mar. 1937		I	6	243	Aug. 1937
	I	9	389	Nov. 1937	Peffer, Nathaniel	I	9	391	Nov. 1937
	I	4	183	June 1937	Popper, David H	I	12	534	Feb. 1938
	I	10	434	Dec. 1937		I	10	435	Dec. 1937
	I	11	486	Jan. 1938		I	1	13	Mar. 1937

Amerasia—Contributors associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations—Con.

Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year
Popper, David H	I	11	510	Jan. 1938
	I	4	148	June 1937
Reischauer, Robert Karl	I	1	28	Mar. 1937
	I	3	99	May 1937
	I	1	4	Mar. 1937
Rosinger, Lawrence K	I	6	270	Aug. 1937
	I	10	463	Dec. 1937
Snow, Edgar	I	6	263	Aug. 1937
Stone, Wm. T	I	2	52	Apr. 1937
	I	7	292	Sep. 1937
	I	8	339	Oct. 1937
	I	4	175	June 1937
	I	1	3	Mar. 1937
	I	9	386	Nov. 1937
Voitinsky, G	I	3	116	May 1937
Wittfogel, Karl August	I	10	437	Dec. 1937
"Asiaticus"	II	11	545	Jan. 1939
Barnes, Kathleen, and Moore, Harriet	II	3	143	May 1938
Bisson, T. A	II	7	322	Sept. 1938
	II	4	178	June 1938
	II	1	3	Mar. 1938
	II	2	82	Apr. 1938
	II	7	323	Sept. 1938
	II	4	181	June 1938
	II	9	421	Nov. 1938
	II	7	324	Sept. 1938
	II	10	481	Dec. 1938
	II	12	581	Feb. 1939
	II	8	371	Oct. 1938
	II	6	274	Aug. 1938
	II	5	263	July 1938
	II	3	130	May 1938
	II	9	418	Nov. 1938
	II	7	347	Sep. 1938
	II	11	551	Jan. 1939
	II	9	452	Nov. 1938
Bloch, Kurt	II	11	519	Jan. 1939
Chen Han-Seng	II	8	390	Oct. 1938
Chi, Ch'ao-Ting	II	1–5	77, 123, 173, 220, 268	Mar.–July 1938
	II	3	157	May 1938
	II	2	84	Apr. 1938
	II	9	455	Nov. 1938
Colegrove, Kenneth W.	II	1	11	Mar. 1938
	II	12	571	Feb. 1939
Coons, Arthur G	II	11	535	Jan. 1939
Emerson, Rupert	II	5	236	July 1938
Field, Fred. V	II	8	370	Oct. 1938
	II	11	515	Jan. 1939
	II	8	373	Oct. 1938
	II	1	18	Mar. 1938
	II	4	191	June 1938
	II	11	524	Jan. 1939
Grajdanzev, A. J	II	6	316	Aug. 1938
Greene, Roger S	II	9	423	Nov. 1938
Holland, Wm. L	II	2	93	Apr. 1938
Jaffe, Philip J	II	9	419	Nov. 1938
	II	7	322	Sep. 1938
	II	10	466	Dec. 1938
	II	7	327	Sep. 1938
	II	7–11	364, 410, 458, 507, 554	Sep. 1938–Jan. 1939
	II	8	372	Oct. 1938
	II	3	131	May 1938
	II	5	227	July 1938
	II	4	180	June 1938
	II	1	24	Mar. 1938
	II	5	238	July 1938
	II	2	83	Apr. 1938
	II	10	471	Dec. 1938
Johnstone, Wm. C	II	3	137	May 1938
Kizer, Benjamin H	II	12	563	Feb. 1939
	II	2	86	Apr. 1938
Lattimore, Owen	II	10	475	Dec. 1938
	II	6	309	Aug. 1938
	II	8	380	Oct. 1938
	II	1	31	Mar. 1938
Leaf, Earl H	II	12	593	Feb. 1939
	II	4	203	June 1938
	II	10	496	Dec. 1938
Lockwood, Wm. W	II	11	517	Jan. 1939
	II	9	425	Nov. 1938
	II	1	44	Mar. 1938
	II	5	226	July 1938
	II	10	467	Dec. 1938
Moore, Harriet and Barnes, Kathleen	II	3	143	May 1938
Nagano, Y	II	11	549	Jan. 1939
Norins, Martin R	II	7	357	Sep. 1938
Peake, Cyrus H	II	1	50	Mar. 1938
	II	8	385	Oct. 1938
	II	9	456	Nov. 1938
Peffer, Lillian	II	1	68	Mar. 1938
	II	11	553	Jan. 1939
	II	7	324	Sep. 1938
Peffer, Nathaniel	II	6	279	Aug. 1938
	II	5	235	July 1938
Popper, David H	II	10	502	Dec. 1938
	II	4	179	June 1938
	II	9	420	Nov. 1938
	II	6	275	Aug. 1938
	II	1	56	Mar. 1938
Recht, Charles	II	6	277	Aug. 1938
	II	7	346	Sep. 1938
Rosinger, Lawrence K	II	2	119	Apr. 1938
	II	9	453	Nov. 1938
Smedley, Agnes	II	7	362	Sep. 1938
Stewart, Maxwell	II	5	527	July 1938
Stone, Wm. T	II	10	505	Dec. 1938
	II	6	275	Aug. 1938
	II	1	63	Mar. 1938
Strong, Anna Louise	II	6	304	Aug. 1938
Timperley, H. J	II	8	375	Oct. 1938
	II	11	553	Jan. 1939
Allen, James A	III	----	25	Mar. 1939
"Asiaticus"	III	----	184	June 1939
Barnes, Kathleen and Gregory, Homer E	III	----	427	Nov. 1939
Bisson, T. A	III	----	246	Aug. 1939
	III	----	198	July 1939
	III	----	294	Sep. 1939
	III	----	2	Mar. 1939
	III	----	438	Dec. 1939
	III	----	393	Nov. 1939
Bloch, Kurt	III	----	68	Apr. 1939
	III	----	534	Feb. 1940
	III	----	549	Feb. 1940
	III	----	471	Dec. 1939
Borg, Dorothy	III	----	580	Feb. 1940
Carlson, Evans Fordyce	III	----	555	Feb. 1940
	III	----	345	Oct. 1939
	III	----	12	Mar. 1939
	III	----	458	Dec. 1939
Chi, Ch'ao-Ting	III	----	50	Apr. 1939
	III	----	199	July 1939
Farley, Miriam	III	----	367	Oct. 1939
Field, Fred. V	III	----	215	July 1939
	III	----	53	Apr. 1939
	III	----	439	Dec. 1939
	III	----	51	Apr. 1939
	III	----	315	Sept. 1939
	III	----	449	Jan. 1940
Friedman, Irving	III	----	398	Nov. 1939
Grajdanze, A	III	----	303	Sept. 1939
Green, Roger S	III	----	225	July 1939
Hanson, Haldore	III	----	78	Apr. 1939
	III	----	158	June 1939
Jaffe, Philip J	III	----	99	May 1939
	III	----	146	June 1939
	III	----	3	Mar. 1939
	III	----	451	Dec. 1939

Amerasia—Contributors associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations—Con.

Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year
Jaffe, Philip J	III		342	Oct. 1939
	III		210	July 1939
	III		74	Apr. 1939
	III		534	Feb. 1940
Kizer, Benjamin H	III		132	May 1939
Lasker, Bruno	III		575	Feb. 1940
Lockwood, Wm. W	III		487	Jan. 1940
	III		201	July 1939
	III		390	Nov. 1939
Mitchell, Kate	III		350	Oct. 1939
	III		297	Sept. 1939
Moore, Harriet L	III		516	Jan. 1940
Norins, Martin R	III		477	Dec. 1939
Norton, Robert	III		263	Aug. 1939
	III		371	Oct. 1939
Peake, Cyrus H	III		360	Oct. 1939
Peffer, Nathaniel	III		16	Mar. 1939
Popper, David H	III		147	June 1939
Price, Harry B	III		355	Oct. 1939
Reischauer, Robert Karl	III		191	June 1939
Shepherd, Jack	III		218	July 1939
Stein, Guenther	III		234	July 1939
	III		282	Aug. 1939
Stone, Wm. T	III		98	May 1939
Timperley, H. J	III		510	Jan. 1940
Vinacke, Harold M	III		249	Aug. 1939
"Asiaticus"	IV		543	Feb. 1941
	IV		442	Dec. 1940
Barnes, Kathleen	IV		116	May 1940
Barnett, Robert W	[illegible]		518	Jan. 1941
	IV		38	Mar. 1940
	IV		225	July 1940
	IV		72	Apr. 1940
Bisson, T. A	IV		136	May 1940
	IV		421	Nov. 1940
	IV		469	Dec. 1940
Brandt, Wm	IV		315	Sep. 1940
	IV		10	Mar. 1940
	IV		401	Nov. 1940
Chi, Ch'ao-Ting	IV		4	Mar. 1940
Field, Fred. V	IV		349	Oct. 1940
Grajdanzev, A	IV		336	Sep. 1940
	IV		513	Jan. 1941
	IV		381	Oct. 1940
Graves, Mortimer	IV		7	Mar. 1940
Greene, Roger S	IV		452	Dec. 1940
Jaffe, Philip J	IV		397	Nov. 1940
	IV		547	Feb. 1941
Lattimore, Owen	IV		253	Aug. 1940
	IV		136	May 1940
Mitchell, Kate	IV			Mar. 1940–Feb. 1941
	IV		213	July 1940
	IV		538	Feb. 1941
Motylev, V. E	IV		417	Nov. 1940
	IV		21	Mar. 1940
Norton, Robert	IV		229	July 1940
Porter, Catherine	IV		25	Mar. 1940
Rosinger, Lawrence K	IV		368	Oct. 1940
	IV		42	Mar. 1940
	IV		271	Aug. 1940
Roth, Andrew	IV		276	Aug. 1940
	IV		411	Nov. 1940
Stone, Wm. T	IV		111	May 1940
Thompson, Virginia	IV		307	Sep. 1940
Vinacke, Harold	IV		289	Aug. 1940
"Asiaticus"	V		11	Mar. 1941
	V		355	Oct. 1941
	V		118	May 1941
	V		287	Sep. 1941
Austern, Hilda	V		546	Feb. 1942
Barnett, Robert	V		163	June 1941
	V		123	May 1941
Bisson, T. A	V		101	May 1941
	V		344	Oct. 1941
Brandt, Wm	V		377	Nov. 1941
	V		450	Dec. 1941
	V		530	Feb. 1942
Carlson, Evans Fordyce	V		5	Mar. 1941
Deane, Hugh	V		316	Sep. 1941
	V		202	July 1941
	V		250	Aug. 1941
Greenberg, Michael	V		144	June 1941
Jaffe, Philip J	V		191	July 1941
	V		109	May 1941
Johnstone, Wm. C	V		30	Mar. 1941
	V		335	Oct. 1941
Kizer, Benjamin H	V		425	Dec. 1941
Lattimore, Owen	V		296	Sep. 1941
Mitchell, Kate	V			Mar. 1941–Feb. 1942
	V		139	June 1941
	V		330	Oct. 1941
Popper, David H	V		536	Feb. 1942
Roth, Andrew	V		239	Aug. 1941
Steiger, G. Nye	V		542	Feb. 1942
Strong, Anna Louise			11	Mar. 1941
Vinacke, Harold M			473	Jan. 1942
Brandt, Wm	VI		187	June 1942
Goshal, Kumar	VI		36	Mar. 1942
Grajdanzer, Andrew	VI		174	June 1942
	VI		269	Aug. 1942
	VI		362	Oct. 1942
Greenberg, Michael	VI		42	Mar. 1942
Holland, Wm. L	VI		179	June 1942
Jaffe, Philip J	VI		161	June 1942
	VI		255	Aug. 1942
Kizer, Benjamin H	VI		233	July 1942
Mitchell, Kate L	VI		27	Mar. 1942
	VI		107	May 1942
	VI		275	Aug. 1942
	VI		382	Oct. 1942
Moore, Harriet	VI		15	Mar. 1942
Norton, Robert	VI		211	July 1942
Popper, David H	VI		225	July 1942
Rosinger, Lawrence K	VI		483	Jan. 25 '43
Steiger, G. Nye	VI		221	July 1942
Vinacke, Harold M	VI		495	Jan. 25 '43
Hsu Yung-Ying	VII		195–205	July 1943
Jaffe, Philip J	VII		195–205	July 1943
Kizer, Benjamin H	VII		323–327	Oct. 1943
Mitchell, Kate L	VII		216–227	July 1943
Bisson, T. A	VIII		62	Feb. 23 '45
Field, Fred. V	VIII		62	Feb. 23 '45
Rhee, Dr. Syngman	VIII		275–76	Oct. 1945
	VIII		324	Dec. 1945
Rosinger, Lawrence K	VIII		62	Dec. 1945
Tung, Pi-wu	IX		137–138	May 4 '45
Wallace, V-Pres	IX		116–117	Apr. 20 '45
Allen, James S	X		160	Nov. 1946
Benedict, Ruth	XI		91	Mar. 1947
Borg, Dorothy	XI		189	June 1947
Epstein, Israel	XI		188	June 1947
Isaacs, Harold R	XI		189	June 1947
Jaffe, Philip	XI		195–231	July 1947
McNair, Harley Farnsworth	XI		93	Mar. 1947

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have the United States Government employees who contributed to Amerasia, a study made by the staff of the committee.

Senator O'Conor. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1356" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 1356

United States Government employees who contributed to Amerasia

Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year	Government post
Barnett, Robert W	IV		38	Mar. 1940	Army 1943–45, maj., overseas ser., asst. adv. for econ. affairs (Japan), Office of Asst. Sec. of St. for Econ. Aff'rs; econ. adv. & chmn., Far Eastern Comm.; sp. ass't. for St., War, Navy Coord'ng Comm. aff'rs; adv. to Far Eastern Comm., Div of Jap. & Korean Aff'rs; Act. adv., div. of Occupied-Area Econ. Aff'rs; officer in chg. of econ. Aff'rs, Office of Chinese Affr's.
			225	July 1940	
			72	Apr. 1940	
			518	Jan. 1941	
	V		163	June 1941	
			123	May 1941	
Bisson, T. A	I	4	151	June 1937	Adviser, Govt. Section, Supr. Cmdr. for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Princ. Economist, Bd. of Econ. Warfare, 1942–43.
	I	8	360	Oct. 1937	
	II	7	322	Sept. 1938	
	II	4	178	June 1938	
	II	1	3	Mar. 1938	
	II	2	82	Apr. 1938	
	II	7	323	Sept. 1938	
	II	4	181	June 1938	
	II	9	421	Nov. 1938	
	II	7	324	Sept. 1938	
	II	10	481	Dec. 1938	
	II	12	581	Feb. 1939	
	II	8	371	Oct. 1938	
	II	6	274	Aug. 1938	
	II	5	263	July 1938	
	II	3	130	May 1938	
	II	9	418	Nov. 1938	
	II	7	347	Sept. 1938	
	II	11	551	Jan. 1939	
	II	9	452	Nov. 1938	
	III		246	Aug. 1939	
	III		198	July 1939	
	III		294	Sept. 1939	
	III		2	Mar. 1939	
	III		438	Dec. 1939	
	III		393	Nov. 1939	
	IV		136	May 1940	
	IV		421	Nov. 1940	
	IV		469	Dec. 1940	
	V		101	May 1941	
	V		344	Oct. 1941	
	VI		50	Mar. 1942	
	IX		62	Feb. 1945	
Carlson, Evans Fordyce	III		555	Feb. 1940	U. S. Army 1912–20; U. S. Marine Corps 1922–39, disch. Col.; Marine Corps 1941 to ——, Col. 1944.
			345	Oct. 1939	
			12	Mar. 1939	
			458	Dec. 1939	
	V		5	Mar. 1941	
Deane, Hugh	V		316	Sept. 1941	OWI, Infor. Coordinator, 1942.
			202	July 1941	
			250	Aug. 1941	
Fairbank, John K	I	7	295	Sept. 1937	Cultural-relations office, Chungking, 1945; same, Nanking, 1946.
Greenberg, Michael	V		144	June 1941	Bd. of Econ. Warfare; For. Econ. Adm.; (Specialist on China).
	VI		42	Mar. 1942	
Hanson, Haldore	III		78	Apr. 1939	Actg. Asst. to the Adm'r. for Projects of the Tech. Coop. Adm., St. Dept. (1951), St. Dept. 1942–45.
			158	June 1939	
Hornbeck, Stanley K	I	1	16	Mar. 1937	Far Eastern Div., Dept. of State, 1925–44.
Johnstone, Wm. C	II	3	137	May 1938	Pub. Aff'rs Off., Foreign Ser. Aux., New Delhi, 7/46; For. Ser. Res. off. 11/13/46; Act. Dir., Off. of Ed. Exch., 7/48; Dir. 8/48; GS–15 10/49.
	V		30	Mar. 1941	
			335	Oct. 1941	

United States Government employees who contributed to Amerasia—Continued

Name	Vol.	No.	Page	Month and year	Government post
Kizer, Benjamin H	I	5	207	July 1937	Dir. of UNRRA in China, 1944–46; Nat. War Labor Bd.; Spcl. Master, U. S. Cir. Ct. of Appls., 1942–44.
	II	12	563	Feb. 1939	
	II	2	86	Apr. 1938	
	III	----------	132	May 1939	
	V	----------	425	Dec. 1941	
	VI	----------	233	July 1942	
Latimore, Owen	I	7	310	Sept. 1937	State Dept. 1941, as F. D. R. pol. adv. to Kai-shek; Depy. Dir., Pac. Relations, OWI., 1944; St. Dept. del. to Ind.-Amer. Conf. at New Delhi, 1949.
		1	26	Mar. 1937	
	II	10	475	Dec. 1938	
		6	309	Aug. 1938	
		8	380	Oct. 1938	
		1	31	Mar. 1938	
	IV	----------	253	Aug. 1940	
			136	May 1940	
	V	----------	296	Sept. 1941	
Lockwood, Wm. W	I	11	503	Jan. 1938	Division of Japanese and Korean Econ. Affairs, State Dept.
		2	53	Apr. 1937	
		3	98	May 1937	
	II	11	517	Jan. 1939	
		9	425	Nov. 1938	
		1	44	Mar. 1938	
		5	226	July 1938	
		10	467	Dec. 1938	
	III	----------	487	Jan. 1940	
			201	July 1939	
			390	Nov. 1939	
Porter, Catherine	IV	----------	25	Mar 1940	With the St. Dept. since '45, Chf. of Philippines Br. Area Div. III since 1946.
			16	Mar. 1940	
Roth, Andrew	IV	----------	276	Aug. 1940	Lt. jg. US Navy 1941– ; Assigned to ONI, as Liaison officer betw. Navy & St. Dept.
	V	----------	239	Aug. 1941	
			173	June 1941	
			361	Oct. 1941	
Stone, Wm. T	I	2	52	Apr. 1937	Ed. of research publ. 1925–28, dir. of Wash. bu. 1928–33, v. pres. 1933–41, For. Policy Assn.; chief of Br. Empire Div. 1941, asst. dir. 1942–43 Bd. of Econ. Warfare; dir. of spec. areas br., For. Econ. Admin. 1943–44; dir. of Econ. Warfare Div., Am. emb., London, and sp. adv. to Am. Amb. at London 1944–45; app. dir., Office of Int. Infor. and Cult. Affairs, Dept. of St., P–8, Nov. 12, '45; V. Chm., Interdept. Comm. on Sci. & Cult. Co-op., 2/4/46; Spcl. asst. to asst. Sec. of St. for public affrs. 6/21/48; GS–15 10/30/49.
		7	292	Sept. 1937	
		8	339	Oct. 1937	
		4	175	June 1937	
		1	3	Mar. 1937	
		9	386	Nov. 1937	
	II	10	505	Dec. 1938	
		6	275	Aug. 1938	
		1	63	Mar. 1938	
	III	----------	98	May 1939	
	IV	----------	111	May 1940	

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a photostat from the hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, dated January 16, 1952, showing that Max Granich, whose name has appeared in our hearings, refused to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1357" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1357

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PRESS IN THE COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1952

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to adjournment at 10:45 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. Clyde Doyle, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Clyde Doyle, Harold H. Velde, Bernard W. Kearney, and Donald L. Jackson.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Thomas W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and Rosella Purdy, secretary to counsel.

Mr. DOYLE. For the purpose of the record, I will announce that the chairman of the committee has appointed for the purpose of this hearing as a subcommittee, committee members Velde, Jackson, and Doyle. Present also at this time is committee member Kearney. The subcommittee named is all present.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, the first witness this morning is Mr. Max Granich.

Will you come forward, please, Mr. Granich?

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Granich, will you please raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give this morning in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GRANICH. I do.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name, please, sir?

TESTIMONY OF MAX GRANICH, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, DAVID REIN

Mr. GRANICH. Max Granich.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you represented by counsel?

Mr. GRANICH. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will counsel please identify himself for the record?

Mr. REIN. David Rein, R-e-i-n, 711 Fourteenth Street NW.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present address, Mr. Granich?

Mr. GRANICH. Wilmington, Vt.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give us your full name, please?

Mr. GRANICK. Max Granich.

Mr. TAVENNER. When and where were you born?

Mr. GRANICK. New York City, March 19, 1896.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please outline for the committee, briefly, your educational background?

Mr. GRANICH. New York public schools; a graduate. Evening high schools; didn't graduate. And then self-education.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your profession or trade?

Mr. GRANICH. Well, I have had many jobs. I haven't limited myself to one thing.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please speak a little louder?

Mr. GRANICH. I have had many jobs, many trades.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you outline for the committee, briefly please, how you have been employed?

Mr. GRANICH. Well, going back a long way, I was office boy, cowpuncher, ranch hand, orange picker, railroad section hand, newspaper reporter.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you become a newspaper reporter?

Mr. GRANICH. Early 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, some period in there.

I worked as a sales engineer. I worked as a carpenter. I worked as a shipyard worker, a farmer.

Mr. TAVENNER. How are you employed now?

Mr. GRANICH. Self-employed.

Mr. TAVENNER. In what business?

Mr. GRANICH. Operating a children's camp, and a farm; a work camp, a farm camp.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where?

Mr. GRANICH. In Wilmington, Vt.

Mr. DOYLE. Will you speak up just a little louder, Mr. Granich, please?

Mr. GRANICH. I will try.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you for trying.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long have you been engaged in that work in Wilmington?

Mr. GRANICH. The last 6 years or 7 years. In fact, I believe we bought the farm in 1944.

Mr. TAVENNER. In 1944. How were you employed between 1944 and 1946?

Mr. GRANICH. Well, in-between there, I worked in the shipyards. That was at the time I went to the camp. I worked in the shipyards from 1941 to the end of the war.

Mr. TAVENNER. What shipyards?

Mr. GRANICH. Two or three of them around New York City.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give us the names of them?

Mr. GRANICH. Certainly. Todd's Shipyards, Hoboken, N. J.; Atlantic Basin in Brooklyn.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you speak a little louder, please? It is a little difficult to hear you.

Prior to 1941, how were you employed?

Mr. GRANICH. I was editing a magazine in New York City.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the name of the magazine?

Mr. GRANICH. China today.

Mr. TAVENNER. Whom did you succeed as editor?

Mr. GRANICH. I just don't remember his name. I just don't.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who were some of the editors of that magazine prior to the time that you became its editor?

Mr. GRANICH. Gentlemen, I am going to refuse to answer that question, and claim my constitutional privilege; self-incrimination.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was Philip Jaffe the first editor of that magazine?

Mr. GRANICH. On the same grounds, gentlemen, of self-incrimination, I refuse.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you acquainted with Philip Jaffe?

Mr. GRANICH. On the same grounds, gentlemen——

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you an employee of Philip Jaffe at one period of time?

Mr. GRANICH. On the same grounds; I claim the fifth amendment.

Mr. TAVENNER. Prior to the time that you—let me ask you this first. When did you first become employed as editor of that mafiazine?

Mr. GRANICH. When I came back from China.

Mr. TAVENNER. What date was that, approximately?

Mr. GRANICH. 1938.

Mr. TAVENNER. 1938. Well, prior to your going to China, how were you employed?

Mr. GRANICH. I am trying to get dates exactly. It is difficult thinking back. But I worked as a sales engineer there for a period of time. I had three or four jobs as sales engineer. I was unemployed some periods of that time. I can't say exactly what I did prior to that time, by date.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Granich, you were identified in testimony before this committee yesterday and last week as a member of the Communist Party. Do you desire to comment on that?

Mr. GRANICH. Not a bit.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. GRANICH. I will claim my constitutional privilege on that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you now a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. GRANICH. I still will refuse.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, when you state you refuse to answer on the ground of your constitutional privilege, what do you mean?

Mr. GRANICH. That it might be incriminating, self-incriminating.

Mr. TAVENNER. That to answer that question might tend to subject you to criminal prosecution?

Mr. GRANICH. Right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you acquainted with Mr. Louis F. Budenz?

Mr. GRANICH. I still will claim the privilege, gentlemen.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Granich, I hand you a photostatic copy of a passport application in the name of Max Granich, executed October 22, 1931.

I will first offer this passport in evidence and ask that it be marked "Granich Exhibit No. 1."

Mr. DOYLE. It will be accepted and so marked.

(The passport referred to, marked "Granich Exhibit No. 1," is filed herewith.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you examine the passport and look at page 2 and state whether or not that is your signature? It is at the top of page 2.

Mr. GRANICH. Yes, sir, I will identify this.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is that also your photograph appearing at the bottom of the same page?

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have the passport application of David Lattimore to the World Youth Festival in 1947.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The passport application referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1357A" and is as follows:)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PASSPORT APPLICATION
FORM FOR NATIVE CITIZEN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

I, DAVID LATTIMORE
do hereby apply to the Department of State, at Washington, for a passport. I solemnly swear that I was born at PEKING HOPEH CHINA on MARCH 25, 1931
I am domiciled in the United States, my permanent residence being at Roland View Road in Ruxton MD
I have resided outside the United States as follows:
China from 1931 to 1933

My father, Owen Lattimore, was born at Washington D.C. on or about July 29, 1900, and is now residing at Roland View Rd., Ruxton, Md.
My father emigrated to the United States on or about ... and resided ... years continuously in the United States from ... to ... and was naturalized as a citizen of the United States before the ... Court of ... on ...

My mother, Eleanor Holgate Lattimore, was born at Evanston Ill. on or about May 1, 1895, and is now residing at Roland View Rd., Ruxton, Md.
My mother emigrated to the United States on or about ... years continuously in the United States from ... to ... she retained citizenship in the United States

DESCRIPTION OF APPLICANT
Height 5 feet, 9¾ inches.
Hair Brown
Eyes Hazel
Distinguishing marks or features
Place of birth Peking, Hopeh, China
Date of birth March 25, 1931
Occupation Student

MAILING ADDRESS
MR. JOHN HOLDEN
THE PUTNEY SCHOOL
PUTNEY SCHOOL

194177

My last American passport was obtained from ... and is submitted herewith for cancellation.

I was { never married. / last married on ..... } to .....

who was born at ..... on ..... ; who { is / is not } an American citizen,

and who is now residing at .....

Our marriage { has not been terminated. / was terminated by (death) (divorce) on ..... } (Date of death or divorce)

A WOMAN APPLICANT WHO IS OR HAS BEEN MARRIED MUST FILL IN THIS PORTION

My maiden name was ..... (Name), and

I { was not previously married. / was previously married to ..... } (Full name of former husband)

on ..... (Date), at ..... (City and State), who was born

at ....., and the marriage was terminated by { death / divorce } on ..... (Date)

(If married more than twice, set forth facts in a supplemental statement)

My { husband / former husband } emigrated to the United States on .....

and { his father ..... (Name of father) / he } was naturalized as a citizen of the United States before the

..... Court of ..... at ..... (City and State)

on ..... (Month, day, and year) as shown by the Certificate of Naturalization { submitted herewith. / previously submitted.

MY TRAVEL PLANS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

Port of departure New York

Approximate date of departure June 21, 1947

Proposed length of stay abroad 4 months

Means of transportation Marine Tiger (Name of ship or air line)

Countries to be visited France, Czechoslovakia, England - for

Purpose of trip for study and reconstruction work & to attend the World Youth Festival in Prague

I solemnly swear that the statements on both sides of this application are true and that the photograph attached hereto is a likeness of me.

I { have / have not } been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted or performed the duties of any office, post or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; voted in a political election in a foreign state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; made a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted by court martial of deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of war; been convicted by court martial, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, of committing any act of treason against, or of attempting by force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

Further, I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation, or purpose of evasion: So help me God.

David Lathmore
(Signature of applicant)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of June, 1947

[SEAL OF COURT] H. R. Fairbanks

Clerk of the County *Court at* Brattleboro, Vt.

AFFIDAVIT OF IDENTIFYING WITNESS

I, the undersigned, solemnly swear that I am a citizen of the United States; that I reside at the address written below my signature hereto affixed; that I know the applicant who executed the affidavit hereinbefore set forth to be a citizen of the United States; that the statements made in the applicant's affidavit are true to the best of my knowledge and belief; further, I solemnly swear that I have known the applicant personally for 2 years.

If witness has been issued a passport, give number if known and date or approximate date of issue.

No. ..... Date of Issue .....

No lawyer or other person will be accepted as witness to a passport application if he has received or expects to receive a fee for his services in connection with the execution of the application or obtaining the passport.

Bertha Hinton
(Signature of witness)

Not related
(Relationship to applicant; if not related, so state)

Putney School, Putney, Vt.
(Residence address of witness)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of June, 1947

[SEAL OF COURT] H. R. Fairbanks

Clerk of the County *Court at* Brattleboro, Vt.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—26-93-4

THE PUTNEY SCHOOL,
ELM LEA FARM,
Putney, Vt., May 31, 1947.

Mr. LOUIS B. OWENS,
Passport Division, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. OWEN: This is to certify that David Lattimore is a bona fide member of the Putney School group going to France for construction work this summer and is getting a IB priority to sail on the S. S. *Marine Tiger* on June 21, 1947, and return on the *Marine Tiger* on September 12, 1947. Since June 21st is almost upon us, it is hoped that his passport will be returned to me without delay.

Sincerely yours,

John S. Holden,
JOHN S. HOLDEN,
Director, Summer Trips.

Mr. MANDEL. In connection with that it was disclosed that David Lattimore sailed on the steamship *Marine Tiger*, and we have a letter from the United States Department of Commerce showing that the steamship *Marine Tiger* was used for cultural missions abroad, and the authority under which it operated.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1358" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1358

MAY 4, 1952.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Some time during the middle 1940's the United States ship *Marine Tiger* was, according to my information, used under Government auspices for cultural missions abroad. Would you kindly let me know the exact period of such use and the exact authority under which that ship operated at that time?

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, D. C., May 23, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: Your letter of May 5, 1952, addressed to the Secretary of State, inquiring as to the period the S/S *Marine Tiger* was used for cultural missions abroad and under what authority the ship was operated at that time, has been referred to the Maritime Administration for reply.

The Department of State on April 24, 1947 requested the former Maritime Commission to assign suitable ships for the transportation of students and teachers between the United States and European countries, for the 1947 summer season only. The Commission on April 29, 1947 authorized the use of the ships *Marine Tiger* and *Marine Jumper* in this service from June to October 1947 for operation under General Agency Agreement by Agwilines and Moore-McCormack Lines, respectively.

The authority of the Maritime Commission to operate these vessels was contained in P. L. 521, 79th Congress (60 Stat. 614), which authorized the Maritime Commission to carry on until March 1, 1947 the operating functions transferred from the War Shipping Administration to the Commission by P. L. 492, 79th Congress (60 Stat. 481); and in P. L. 6, 80th Congress (61 Stat. 6) and P. L. 127, 80th Congress (61 Stat. 190) which successively extended the authority of the Maritime Commission until July 1, 1947 and March 1, 1948. The War Shipping Administration authority was based upon E. O. 9054, as amended, and P. L. 101 of the 78th Congress (55 Stat. 242), as amended.

Voyages made by the two ships under this program are shown on the attached pages.

Should you desire further information concerning this matter, I shall be glad to assist you.

Sincerely yours,

E. L. COCHRANE,
Maritime Administrator.

Attachment.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have documents taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one being a post card addressed to Mr. Frederick Field, announcing an open forum of the American Friends of the Chinese People.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1359" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1359





Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a circular of the New School for Social Research, as taken from the files of the institute, showing the course scheduled on the Far East, including a number of names included in our hearings.

Mr. MORRIS. The significance of that, Mr. Chairman, is that the chairman of this course is Mr. Edward C. Carter, and in almost every case there the people on his staff at the New School now are people who have come up in our hearings.

Seantor O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1360" and is follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1360

ASIA IN FERMENT

A COURSE PLANNED TO HELP AMERICANS UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT WORLD-SHAKING EVENTS IN ASIA

Tuesdays, 8:30–10:10 p. m. $23.50, incl. registration fee.[1] Beginning Sept. 25.

This course deals with current events in Asia and their effects, present and potential, on the rest of the world. The lectures offer a comprehensive analysis of the social forces at work in an attempt to give the student a perspective on the future.

Individual topics treated include: Asia in American and Russian policies; after Korea; Communism in China; reaction and progress in India; whither Pakistan; economic development—the case of Japan; Indonesian problems and progress; Viet Nam and Viet Minh (French Indo-China); Huks vs. Government in the Philippines; Asia's nationalisms; clash in Burma, Siam, Malaya; British, French, and Dutch interests; Asia and the Pacific "blocs"; requisites for viable settlements in Asia.

OPTIONAL SEMINAR HOUR

Ample opportunity is afforded at the end of each lecture period for questions from students and answers by the lecturer. The lecture course is complete in itself. Credit students, however, are required also to take an additional seminar hour in which subjects introduced in lectures can be developed in conversation. This seminar hour is open to a limited number of non-credit students who can satisfy the course chairman of serious purpose and ability to profit from the hour. Application for admittance to the seminar hour should be addressed, by letter, to Edward C. Carter at the New School. The provisional seminar hour is Tuesday, 5:10–6:00 p. m. Special fee, $14.00.

COURSE SCHEDULE

Chairman of the course is EDWARD C. CARTER. Mr. Carter was formerly Secretary-General of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Director of International Studies of the New School. He lived and worked in Asia for many years and has known many of that continent's leading figures of the last quarter-century.

Guest lecturers will participate as follows:

Sept. 25. OWEN LATTIMORE, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University
Oct. 2. RALPH E. TURNER, Professor of History, Yale University
Oct. 9. C. MARTIN WILBUR, Associate Professor of Chinese History, Columbia University
Oct. 16. LAWRENCE S. FINKELSTEIN, Institute of Pacific Relations, Fellow, recently returned from Indonesia
Oct. 23. DR. FINKELSTEIN

[1] You may register merely by sending this coupon and your check for $23.50 by mail:

REGISTRAR,
New School,
66 W. 12th St., New York 11, N. Y.

Please register me for Course 122, *Asia in Ferment.*

Please register me for Course 122, *Asia in Ferment.*
Name_____
Street_____
City_____

Oct. 30. LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER, Social Science Research Council Fellow, Columbia University
Nov. 6. DERK BODDE, Professor of Chinese, University of Pennsylvania
Nov. 13. HUGH BORTON, Associate Professor of Japanese; acting director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Nov. 20. W. W. LOCKWOOD, Assistant Director, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
Nov. 27. MR. LOCKWOOD
Dec. 4. NATHANIEL W. PEFFER, Professor of International Relations, Columbia University
Dec. 11. VERA M. DEAN, Director, Research Department, Foreign Policy Assn.
Dec. 18. W. L. HOLLAND, Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations
Jan. 8. HAROLD R. ISAACS, journalist; author, "New Cycle in Asia," "Two Thirds of the World"
Jan. 15. MR. ISAACS

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Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a document from Y. Y. Hsu, dated May 8, 1942, which is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dealing with the Chinese Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. There are two of those, are there not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. The unavailability of Mr. Hsu is noted in connection with this document.

Senator O'CONOR. They will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit Nos. 1360–A and 1360–B" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1360–A

STATEMENT OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, AUG. 19, 1941

Four copies:
1 to Mr. Carter
1 to Mr. Holland
1 to Miss Brenecke of YWCA, who lent the material
Notes #12

NOTES ON CHINESE LITERATURE, No. 12, MAY 7, 1942. BY Y. Y. H.

A copy of the full text of the Chinese Communist Party's position on the Roosevelt-Churchill joint declaration of August 14, 1941, reached this country belatedly. Arriving with this document there is an article by Mr. Mao Tse-tung throwing some interesting light on the Chinese Communist position on the "capitalist development of China's social economy"

On Roosevelt-Churchill joint declaration.—The Chinese Communist statement, dated August 19, 1941, characterized the Roosevelt-Churchill joint declaration of August 14 and the concurrent proposal for a tri-partite conference in Moscow as "an international foundation not only for the liberation of England, America, and the Soviet Union from the menace of Fascism, but also for the liberation of the peoples of the entire world as well as for the liberation of our Chinese people." The fact that "the declaration did not mention Japan by name," that Point IV of the declaration "hinted to Japan the possibility of trade and supply of raw materials," and that Point VII hinted "to permit Japanese immigration" was noted by the statement. These by themselves might indicate attempts "to conciliate Japan," but the Chinese Communists see a "positive Anti-Japanese" stand in the declaration, especially in Point VIII which "recognizes the necessity to disarm all aggressor nations."

The full text of the statement, issued in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, follows:

"The joint declaration issued on August 14 by President Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain and their proposal

for a tri-partite conference in Moscow is an important event of world historical significance which opens a new stage in world history.

"The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and the proposal for a Moscow conference indicates England and America's determination to overthrow Fascism. This determination is thoroughly beneficial to the Soviet Union, to England and America, to China, and to the world.

"The greatest danger has been and still is the attempt to accept a Fascist peace on the part of a section of the pro-Fascist reactionaries in England and America, in defiance of the will of the people, but the declaration has rejected this kind of peace. There are also others who would take the position of a spectator and let the Soviet Union shoulder alone the burden of wearing out the Fascists so that they would be able to take any advantage at an opportune time. But this passive attempt received a blow from the action of Roosevelt and Churchill, who proposed the Moscow conference in order to map out concrete measures for the assignments of war tasks and the distribution of war supplies.. It is especially in England and America's recognition of the necessity to disarm the aggressor nations and their insistence upon the ultimate collapse of Nazism, as well as their agreement to share the tasks and the supplies for the war that the victory for the Soviet union, England and America, as well as the victory for China and the entire world, is guaranteed.

"In his famous speech of July 3 Stalin referred to the fact that the Soviet Union had observed treaty obligations while Germany had violated them and attacked the Soviet Union as to have constituted a political factor in the long run, laying the basis for military victory. This is a truth which has found its complete vindication in the recent Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and the proposal for a Moscow conference. The declaration and the conference proposal has especially evidenced America's determination to participate in the sacred war against Fascist aggression and such a determination on the part of America indicates that the great worldwide fighting front against Fascist aggression has been completed politically, while its organizational completion will be effected in the Moscow conference. The Fascist front is now isolated and its doom predetermined.

"The situation as existing at present was impossible to obtain prior to the outbreak of the European war in the Autumn of 1939, for, despite the efforts on the part of the Soviet Union and the peoples of the entire world to organize an anti-Fascist front for international security, the Munich policy, damaging both to the advocates and the victims, was still in vogue in England and America at that time. This erroneous policy was rectified only after the cruel lessons of war. The change is directly effected by the heroic battles of the peoples of the Soviet Union; the Red Army has stopped the offensive of the German army, and thereby Roosevelt and Churchill were encouraged to confer and issue the recent joint declaration. The change has also been the result of the militant struggles of the peoples of England and America. Such struggles have dealt blows against a section of the pro-Fascist reactionaries in England and America and enabled both Roosevelt and Churchill to reject the temptations of a Fascist peace. Such a change for a politically farsighted policy is also the result of the heroic struggles of the Chinese people. The Chinese people has brought the invasion of the Japanese Fascist bandit army to a stop, thus enboldening England and America to issue the statement for the disarming of all aggressor nations.

"The joint declaration did not mention Japan by name; Point IV of the declaration hinted to Japan the possibility of trade and supply of war materials; and Point VII hinted to permit Japanese immigration; these are attempts to befriend Japan's advocates of the status quo and indicate a willingness to conciliate Japan. But Point II of the declaration opposed to arbitrary territorial changes; Point III insists upon the reestablishment of nations whose rights have been deprived; and especially Point VIII recognizes the necessity of disarming all aggressor nations: these all constitute a positive anti-Japanese stand.

"All in all, the entire people of China welcomes this Anglo-American declaration and the Anglo-American-Soviet tripartite conference to be held in Moscow. The Chinese people believes this to be an international foundation not only for the liberation of England, America and the Soviet Union from the menace of Fascism, but also for the liberation of the peoples of the entire world as well as for the liberating of our own Chinese people.

"The tasks of the Chinese people lie in the insistance upon unity and the war of resistance, the overcoming of reactionary attempts to sabotage unity and resistance within the Anti-Japanese front, and the active organization of the counter-offensive against the Japanese invaders.

"There exists within China Fifth-comunists of the enemy who are Japanophiles and Germanophiles. These people advocate against the Communists in the country, contrary to the national interest and the interest of the human race. What they are doing are nothing more than giving their support to Hitler's anti-Bolshevist crusade and clearing the way for the Japanese Fascists. If these Fifth-columnists remain unstirred and persist to perpetrate their antipeople, antination, and antihumanity crimes in the face of the actual establishment of the great world-wide anti-Fascist union, they would be condemned by the entire Chinese people and the entire world. We believe that if the people of the entire nation would only redouble its effort and clean out the Fifth columnists, then unity will be strengthened, the war of resistance will be energetically maintained, and the counter-offensive will be realized. China is well-qualified as a participant in the worldwide anti-Fascist front to become one of its powerful arms.

"The fate of entire China and the whole world is tied up with the present struggle with Fascism. All political parties and groupings in China ought to deal with this rare opportunity of a millenium with wisdom and propriety, by unifying the people of the entire country to strive as one man toward a good and progressive direction. This is the deeply seated desire of the Communists."

The Chinese Communists position on "Capitalist development" in China will be dealt with in the following number of the "Notes."

EXHIBIT No. 1360–B

Four copies:

1 to Carter
1 to Holland
1 to Miss Brenecke who supplied the original.

Part of the summaries are written especially to oblige the owner of the "Selections" who wants to know the general content.

NOTES ON CHINESE LITERATURE. No. 13, MAY 8, 1942. Y. Y. H.

Communist guidance of capitalist development.—The twofold historical task of the Chinese Communists, according to Mao Tse-tung, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, is to maintain their Communist integrity on one hand and "to give guidance to the capitalist development" of China's social economy on the other. This is the most categorical clarification of the economic policy of the Chinese Communists which has come to our attention.

Elsewhere in the article which contained the above statement Mr. Mao wrote: "The labor policy (of the Chinese Communist Party) is a twofold policy of proper improvement of the living conditions of the workers and noninterference with the development of capitalist production. The land policy is a twofold one which stands for the reduction of rent and interest on the part of the landlords and the payment of rent and interest on the part of the farmers. The policy on political right is a twofold one which grants human and property rights to all landlords and capitalists identical with those of the workers and farmers on the one hand and the prevention of their possible counterrevolutionary actions sabotage of the anti-Japanese movement and the people's (interests)."

Free and government enterprises and cooperatives.—The relative importance of free and government enterprises and cooperatives is contrasted by Mr. Mao, as he wrote: "State economic enterprises and cooperatives ought to be developed, but the main thing for the present is not state enterprises but private enterprises. It is to afford the opportunity of development for an economy based upon liberalism, to oppose Japanese Imperialism and semifeudalism. This is the most revolutionary policy for China at the present. It is wrong to oppose or sabotage this trend."

Communist integrity distinguished from correct national policy.—The general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party anticipates demoralization among some of his followers during the process of China's capitalist development, but even then he would insist upon what he regards as the correct policy. "It is our historical task during the period of the war of resistance against the Japanese and the building of the democratic republic", writes Mao, "both to maintain solemnly and determinedly our Communist integrity and to promote and guide the capitalist development of social economy." He continues: "During this period, it is inevitable, and it need not cause us worry, that a section of the membership of the Communist Party will be demoralized by capitalism and

the capitalist class. The intraparty struggle against political and ideological demoralization must not be mistakingly directed against the social economy."

Review of Soviet policy.—There is "difference in principle," according to Mao, between the present Communist policy and the policy during the Soviet period before the war. "Then it was opposition to the landlords and the Bourgeoisie; now, it is unity with all landlords and capitalists who are not opposed to the anti-Japanese War."

But the undifferentiated policy during the very last period of the Soviets toward the "reactionary government and the reactionary political party which were attacking" the Soviet regime on the one hand, and the capitalist elements "within the jurisdiction" of the Soviet regime on the other, was wrong, according to the Communist leader. This mistaken policy, as characterized by Mao, was "struggle-against-everything", which was compared with an equally mistaken policy in 1927—"Unity-with-everything-and-denial-of-any-struggle".

One concrete instance during the "last period" of the Soviet was mentioned by Mao. This was the repudiation of a policy adopted in the "first and middle periods." This original policy which distributed land equally to former landlords was now regarded as correct.

Rural Surveys.—The above definitive statements of the economic policy of the Chinese Communists appear in the postscript to Mao Tse-tung's "Rural Surveys," reprinted in *Selections from Emancipation Daily*, Yenan, No. 6, September 10, 1941. In the same issue of the *Selections* there is also a reprint of the second introduction to the survey. (Title of reprint: "Introduction to Rural Surveys, II." By Mao Tse-tung.) While the postscript explains the difference of the Communist policies between the Civil war period and the present, the introduction dwells upon the importance of fact-finding. These survey were personally conducted by Mao Tse-tung in Kiangsi and Hunan provinces between 1927 and 1934. A number of these, according to the Introduction, were lost. The main purpose for the publication of those which had been preserved was, according to the author, "not to expect the comrades to remember those concrete data and the conclusions derived therefrom, but to point out one of the ways to understand the conditions at the bottom (of the social structure)."

Fact-finding.—This entire issue of Selections from Emancipation Daily is, in fact, keynoted by the insistence upon facts as one of the main basis for Communist policy and action. A total of five articles are reprinted in this issue, including the two already mentioned. The other are: (1) Decisions on Survey and Research by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; (2) Intensify the Forging of Party Character; and (3) Against Doctrinarism in Learning. The second article is an editorial and the third is unsigned.

The Party Decisions and the editorial (dated September 6, 1941) are similar in content. The editorial is prefaced by a synopsis in a box which reads as follows:

"To correct tendencies contrary to party character, there must first be developed a struggle against subjectivistic and formalistic styles of work by promoting a style of work which is a striving for the real, burying the head in hard working, emphatically eliminating arrogance—superficiality, and closely linking up theory and practice; and second, there must be in intraparty life a further emphasis of the importance of the unitedness and centralization, of the entire party and obedience to the decisions and guidance of the Central Committee of the Party. There should be strict check-up of the carrying out of all decisions, timely discovery and correction of the mistakes of every party member, intensification of intra-party solidarity and mutual assistance reenforcement of party discipline, and development of intra-party self-criticism."

The entire "Decisions" article and nine-tenths of the editorial are, however, devoted to the importance and ways and means of fact finding despite the greater space devoted to intraparty discipline in the synopsis. Economic and social surveys are to be conducted by small conferences with elements intimately connected with the subject under study and the selection of "typical" samples, rather than by systematic and comprehensive census-taking and formal statistical compilations. Studies of leading individuals in all classes and walks of China's national life are urged, by writing up and collecting their biographs of from a few hundred to a few thousand words. "The biographical sketches must meticulously agree with the realities of the subjects, and there should be no distortions resulting from the compiler's own friendliness or enmity." Such impartial and factual studies of individuals are "an important link in the study of entire China," according to the "Decisions."

The slogan of "No factual study, no qualification for vaunting opinions" appeared in almost every article in this issue of the Selections from Emancipation

Daily. In his second introduction to the Rural Surveys, Mao Tse-tung wrote that this slogan had been characterized by some as "narrow Empiricism," but he still does not "regret it." "Not only that I have no regret," he continues, "but I still insist that there should be no qualification for vaunting opinions without fact-finding." The Chinese Communist Party, according to Mao, "has suffered greatly from wanton opinions without intimate factual knowledge."

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, how are these documents identified as being from Y. Y. Hsu? Are they signed by him?

Mr. MANDEL. The name is on the document.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they signed by him?

Mr. MANDEL. The name is typed on it. One is a manuscript with his initials, and on the other his name is up in the corner.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does his signature appear on either one?

Mr. MANDEL. We have no way of knowing that this is his signature. The name appears in handwritten characters.

Mr. MORRIS. A reading of it will indicate that it purports to be a summary.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is what I am trying to make the record show. This purports to be documents from Mr. Y. Y. Hsu, but we have not yet identified them positively, have we?

Senator O'CONOR. They will be received with that qualification.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a photostat from The Worker, Sunday, September 16, 1945, a photostat made under the direction of the staff of an article entitled "Many in Washington Furious Over Our Far East Kid Gloves," dealing with matters that have come up before this committee.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1361" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1361

[The Worker, New York, Sunday, September 16, 1945]

MANY IN WASHINGTON FURIOUS OVER OUR FAR EAST KID GLOVES

(By Virginia Gardner)

WASHINGTON.—Official Washington is seething over events in Japan.

"What we have is a negotiated peace." These are the words you hear from embittered government people who have no more desire to see the Japanese military and political regime maintained than do the mass of American people.

The State Department itself is divided. Even so, it is reported that an official protest was sent by the State Department to General MacArthur on the retention of a Japanese government in Korea, and that a huffy reply was received to the effect that it had to be retained now.

The two chief emperor lovers have departed—former Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew and Eugene Doomán, special assistant to Joseph W. Ballantine, director of the Far Eastern Division. Moreover, some lasting-peace advocates are being sent to Japan and it would greatly strengthen their hand if labor and progressives began raising hell publicly about the MacArthur policies.

Of course backing MacArthur is James Clement Dunn, who with Brig. Gen. Julius Holmes did so much to help bring the Vichyite Marcel Peyrouton back from Argentina to become Governor of Algiers where anti-Nazis continued to be kept in concentration camps for many months.

And he has his circle in the State Department.

"OLD CHINA HAND"

As it happens, the newly appointed political adviser has spent years in China and saw at close range the effects of Japanese aggression. Minister to Thailand George Atcheson was aboard the U. S. S. *Panay* when the Japanese bombed it Dec. 12, 1937.

Since Dooman's retirement, the key place he held in formulating occupation policy as chairman the board known as SWINK (State, War and Navy Departments) fortunately has been taken by John Carter Vincent, chief of the Chinese Affairs Division. Although he retains his position on the Chinese Division, Vincent will be devoting himself to Japanese affairs. The only thing unfortunate about this is that he is needed in formulating policy on China, and will not have the time to devote to it that he should. Vincent also spent years in China and is one of the better informed State Dept. people.

Heated debates and arguments are in progress within the agencies closest to the foreign field, but those who defend the policies of General MacArthur are definitely in the minority.

Some of the agency people who worked on the directives for the treatment of Japan, who fought for a tough peace policy who finally saw those directives passed by the Inter-Departmental Committee and packed up beautifully in boxes to be flown to MacArthur headquarters, are wild.

The directives were good. They provided for eliminating the stranglehold the Zaibatsu monopolists have on Japan's economy. They would have broken up the heavy steel and chemical industries and any others making war matériel or which might later be converted secretly to making it.

They would, like the directives on the treatment of Germany, call for preservation of light industry and would not involve any return to an archaic agrarian economy—but at the same time would eliminate Japan as a threat to the peace of the world. Primarily, this would be achieved in prosecution of war criminals and a strict control over the country's monopolies and was predicated on the assumption that the Emperor and the Imperial advisers were not kept in power.

THEORY AND FACT

In theory, with the sort of surrender that was accepted from Japan, it might be possible to wait until the armed forces had laid down their arms and then say, "Scram" to the powerful imperialist-militarist Japanese who run the show.

It is known that not only did the U. S. never plan to have the control over Japan shared by any ally, but that the Office of Strategic Services was actually drawing up plans preparing to land personnel in Port Arthur and elsewhere to govern Manchuria by the same unilateral methods.

Where the responsibility for the conditions of surrender can be fixed with exactness is not clear. But those who were acting in the best interests, with the desire only to save American lives, were doubtless influenced too by those who are dominated by their fear of the Soviet Union and democratic forces that might arise in Japan, and those which exist in very real fashion in China.

Just as there were forces in the State Department opposing with all their striped-pants subtlety and cleverness the fight for the so-called Morgenthau plan for Germany, in the hopes of leaving Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, there has been the same activity directed against the real destruction of Japan as a world militarist power.

To date those forces seem to have won in the Japanese situation—despite all the trimmings and the radio broadcasts and the super-duper-formality of the peace-signing ceremony aboard the Missouri.

CHANGE OF HEART DUE?

Maybe when labor begins saying aloud, publicly, and with delegations to the State Department, what the better people in government are saying covertly, Messrs. Atcheson and Vincent and other people who can do a job, will sigh with relief.

Maybe Pat Hurley, the oilman turned diplomat, whose main job in China has been to try to keep all lend-lease and all American sympathy turned away from the Yenan Communists in China, and General MacArthur, and our Secretary of State, James Byrnes, who is rather bearish on the Soviet Union, will soon suffer a so-called change of heart.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have an editorial in the Stilwell matter which appeared in the New Masses for December 19, 1944, page 21.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1362," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1362

[New Masses, December 19, 1944, p. 21]

NM SPOTLIGHT

THE CHANGES IN CHINA

A good deal has happened in China since the crisis which occurred over the recall of General Stilwell. The changes in the cabinet are evidently more important than certain skeptics in this country at first thought. If nothing else they brought into extremely influential positions two patriotic men, General Chen Cheng and T. V. Soong, both of whom are friendly to China's allies and advocates of military, political, and economic reform. Soong represents those elements among China's big bourgeoisie which believe in internal unity as the condition of victory.

The Kuomintang-Communist negotiations have been resumed. Major General—now Ambassador—Hurley deserves much of the credit for that. The negotiations, however, have not been completed and there is again evidence that Chiang Kai-shek is taking a position considerably short of what the situation demands. Nevertheless the unity discussions are proceeding in an atmosphere more favorable than at any period in the last few years. Major General Wedemeyer has had a series of conferences with the Generalissimo and with the new Minister of War. As a result China's forces have been regrouped in such a way that some of the troops previously wasted in the notorious blockade of the Northwest have been sent against the Japanese. This does not mean that the blockade has been broken, but it does indicate a new willingness to compromise.

All of these events are nothing more than preludes to the basic changes that must be made if China is to resume her place as a fighting ally. This is virtually Chungking's last chance to save itself. It has no time nor space for further delays. For Chungking and for Chiang Kai-shek the alternatives are immediate and drastic changes in policy, or suicide. China's people and her democratic leaders supported by the United States must prevail upon the Generalissimo to take the only realistic course—a coalition government.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a list of literature on the Chinese Soviet movement prepared by the staff of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, as it appeared in Pacific Affairs for September 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. The significance of that, Mr. Chairman, is that it bears on the knowledge that the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations had of the Chinese Communist organization.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1363" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1363

[Pacific Affairs, September 1936]

PACIFIC AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHIES

No. III: LITERATURE ON THE CHINESE SOVIET MOVEMENT

(Prepared by the Staff of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations)

The social root of the Soviet movement in China, according to orthodox Marxists, lies in the semi-feudal and semi-colonial character of Chinese society. The problem of semi-feudalism in China is highly controversial and involves the question of the interpretation of the whole course of China's economic development. So far no comprehensive economic history of China, based on most, if not all, available source material on the subject, exists. However, several notable works attempting to give a Marxist interpretation of Chinese history and society have been published during the last decade.

L. Madyar's *The Agricultural Economy of China* (original Russian version published in Moscow, 1928; Chinese translation, 1930) has exerted considerable influence on later writers in the field. The book was issued with a critical preface which represents the collective opinion of its editors in the Institute for Chinese Studies in Moscow. The preface rejects Madyar's attempt to

designate Chinese economy as a special "Asiatic mode of production," and characterizes Chinese economy as "semi-feudal," which is the viewpoint adopted by official documents of the Communist International and the Communist Party of China. Madyar also published a book on Chinese handicrafts and industry, a companion volume to his book on agrarian economy (Chinese translation, 1932). The scholarly volume, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig, 1931; Japanese translation, 1935) by Karl August Wittfogel, gives a clearer and much more consistent formulation of the theory of "Asiatic agrarian society" or "Asiatic mode of production" than Madyar. Far from being scholarly, though still influential among certain writers in China, are Karl Radek's *Theoretical Analysis of Chinese History* (a series of lectures delivered at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, 1926–27, Chinese translation 1933) and Safarov's *History of the Development of Chinese Society* (Chinese translation 1932). Safarov's work has been challenged and in part refuted by P. Grenivich in an excellent article, entitled "The Problem of the History of Chinese Feudalism" (*Problems of China*, No. 14).

Among numerous works on the subject by Chinese writers, Chen Han-seng's "The Agrarian Problem of China" (*Problems of the Pacific*, 1933, pp. 271–298, in English), *Landlords and Peasants in China* (New York, 1936, in English) and "The Good Earth of China's Model Province," (PACIFIC AFFAIRS, September 1936, pp. 370–381) are excellent analytical studies of the problem based upon factual data collected from field work. Chi Ch'ao-ting's *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History* (London and New York, 1936, in English) studies the historical development of irrigation, flood control and water transport, gives an original approach to the problems of regional relations, one of the basic problems in Chinese economic history. Kuo Mo-jo's *Study of Ancient Chinese Society* (Shanghai, 1931, in Chinese) and T'ao Hsi-sheng's *Chinese Society and the Chinese Revolution* (Shanghai, 1929, in Chinese) deserve special attention, although the importance of both lies in their influence on students, rather than the soundness of their interpretation, which is questioned by many competent critics. (See also "The Rise of Land Tax and the Fall of Dynasties in Chinese History," by Wang Yü-Ch'üan, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, June 1936, pp. 201–221.)

Between 1931 and 1933, a very lively controversy over the social history of China was waged among left intellectuals. During this discussion, various theories were represented. The results were published in four volumes under the title *Discussions of the Social History of China* (in Chinese). Most of the participants in the discussion, however, are non-Communist left intellectuals, the most prominent of whom are Wang Li-hsi and Hu Chiu-yuan, and others who are not connected with the actual work of the Soviet movement. Owing to the legal disabilities under which Communists work in China, practically none of the leaders of the official Marxist (Communist) Party took part in the controversy. The whole controversy is not only of academic interest. A correct interpretation of history underlies a proper understanding of such problems as the special character of agricultural and handicraft production, the influence of irrigation, flood-control and water transport on social organization and political activity, the land system, the role of commercial and usury capital, class relations in town and village, the position of the landlords, the nature of the agrarian crisis and the character of the state and the bureaucracy. All of these problems are of practical importance to the Soviet movement.

LITERATURE ON THE CHINESE SOVIET MOVEMENT

The term "semi-colonial" was used by Dr. Sun Yat-sen to characterize Chinese economy in the same sense that the Marxists use the term. Concretely speaking, semi-colonialism refers to the condition of economic and political subordination to imperialist control imposed upon China by the Unequal Treaties and the political and economic implications of a country divided between rival foreign spheres of influence. Created by the penetration of Western influence in the latter half of the nineteenth century, this situation profoundly modified the social, economic, and political structure of China. Hence, for two thousand years before the middle of the nineteenth century the Marxists regard Chinese society as semi-feudal. After the Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking, however, China became semi-feudal as well as semi-colonial. The book which exercised the greatest influence in bringing the facts of imperialist economic denomination to the Chinese people, is the huge volume, *China Under the Iron Heel of Imperialism* (in Chinese), by Chi Shu-feng, first published in Shanghai in 1925. The most authoritative Marxist analysis of the characteristics of

colonial economics was worked out in 1928 at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International and embodied in a long resolution on the colonial question. This resolution, published as a pamphlet, entitled *The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies* (obtainable in English, Chinese, Russian, French, German, Spanish, Japanese, etc.), constitutes the basis of all official Communist writings on the colonial question subsequent to its publication and must be regarded as one of the most important documents for the understanding of the Soviet movement in China.

The immediate historical antecedent of the Chinese Soviet movement was the revolution of 1925–1927. For a general history of China since the middle of the nineteenth century and for the social and cultural movements and political events leading to the revolution, the best short work seems to be Li Ting-sheng's *A Modern History of China* (in Chinese; Peiping, 1933). *Thirty Years of Recent Political History of China*, by Li Chien-nun (in Chinese; Shanghai, 1930) gives a more detailed account of the political history of the period. As for military history, which is important for a period in which hardly a year passes without civil wars, the best source is Wen Chih-kung's *Thirty Years of Recent Military History of China* (in Chinese; Shanghai, 1930). T. A. Bisson, of the Foreign Policy Association, New York, gives a very able summary of the period in his *Ten Years of the Kuomintang: Revolution and Reaction* (*Foreign Policy Reports*, February 15, 1933). The official Communist summary and estimate of the economic and political situation between 1925 and 1927 can be found in the Communist International publications, *Between the Fifth and the Sixth World Congresses, 1924–28: A Report on the Position of All Sections of the World Communist Party* (pp. 436–457, English edition; in English and Russian and many other languages) and the report of the Chinese delegate Strahov (Chu Chiu-po) and speeches of the delegates at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International. (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, No. 68ff.) The best popular history of the period from the official Communist viewpoint is given in Yolk's *The Chinese Revolution* (in Chinese; Moscow, 1932).

In addition to these materials of a general nature, there is much special material available dealing with specific topics of the period, usually of a documentary or semi-documentary character. As the revolution of 1925–27 was specifically directed at British imperialism, an article on "British Imperialism in China" written in 1923 by G. Voitinsky, a leading Soviet authority on the Far Eastern question, should be of more than usual interest. The fact that it appeared in *The Communist International* (No. 6, November 1924), the official organ of the Communist International, gives it a semi-documentary character. For a Marxist estimate of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's life and ideas and his role in the Chinese Revolution, the best short account available is Hansu Chan's article, "Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Revolution" (*China Today*, October 1935). This article traces the inspiring story of the life of Dr. Sun and points out its revolutionary tradition which is still a source of strength to the patriotic anti-Japanese movement today. In an article, "The Situation in China," written in April 1925 (*Communist International*, No. 21), G. Voitinsky gives an excellent summary of the complicated situation of civil war and diplomacy among the northern militarists and the development of the revolutionary movement in South China on the eve of the Northern Expedition.

The most important documents dealing with the period are the *Resolution on the Chinese Question* passed by the Sixth Plenum of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International in March 1926 (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 6, No. 40); the speech delivered by Stalin in the Chinese Commission of the Seventh Plenum in November 1926 (reprinted in the pamphlet *China in Revolt*, in English) and the *Resolution on the Chinese Question* passed by the Eighth Plenum in April 1927. In these resolutions, the general line of policy as well as the Comintern's views on leading events in the period are formulated. Of basic importance to an understanding of the critical months after the revolutionary government was moved from Canton to Wuhan, are the three documents on the workers and peasants policy of the Kuomintang, published in *Chinese Correspondence* (May 8, 1927, in English), namely, the *Political Platform of the Kuomintang Concerning Workers and Peasants* and the reports of the peasant movement from Kwangtung and Hunan. On the question of Chiang Kai-shek's change of front in April 1927, the text of the *Declaration of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang*, expelling Chiang K'ai-shek from membership in the party, and the declarations of the Communist Party of China and of the Communist International, can be found

in *Chinese Correspondence, Weekly Organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang* (Wuhan, China, May 1, 1927, in English). A long editorial in the *Communist International* of May 30, 1927, entitled "The Crisis in the Chinese Nationalist Movement," sums up the Communist view of the crisis, and its policy of dealing with it in considerable detail.

Chiang K'ai-shek openly broke with the left-wing Kuomintang and the Communists on April 12, and six days later, on April 18, 1927, he launched the Nanking Government as a rallying center against the government at Wuhan. The mass workers' and peasants' movement had grown to great dimensions and the rate of change was at its quickest during the Wuhan period. It was one of the most difficult and yet one of the most important periods for the historian of the Chinese revolution to grasp. *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, by T'ang Liang-li (London, 1930, in English), gives the story of the Wuhan period from the viewpoint of the Wang Ching-wei group. *Kuomintang and the Chinese Revolution*, by T. C. Wu (London, 1930) gives a left Kuomintang account of the revolution. The most important source materials for Communist policy in this period are: the *Chinese Revolution* (original in Russian; Chinese translation in 1933) by Mif, the leading Far Eastern authority in the Comintern, especially chapters II and III, in which he analyzes in detail the policy of the Chinese Communist Party in the critical months of 1927, and "An Abrupt Turn in the Chinese Revolution," by N. Bukharin (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 7, Nos. 41 and 42) in which he dealt with the collapse of the Wuhan Government and sharply criticized the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for rejecting the decisions of the Comintern (June 16, 1927), which instructed them to quicken the pace of revolution rather than allow it to slow down. A. V. Bakulin's *Notes on the Wuhan Period of the Chinese Revolution* (Moscow, 1930, in Russian) contains very interesting material that deserves attention. For a detailed account of the mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership see Tsai Ho-sen's "The History of Opportunism in the Chinese Communist Party." (*The Problems of China, Journal of the Institute of Research on China*, Moscow, No. 1, 1929, pp. 1–77, in Russian.) Also see G. Voitinsky's "The Errors of the Communist Party of China in the Revolution of 1925-1927" (*The Problems of China*, Nos. 4 and 5, 1930, in Russian). Earl Browder's *Civil War in Nationalist China* (in English) gives a vivid account of those critical days by a keen American eye-witness who is also a distinguished Marxist. Anna Louise Strong's *China's Millions* (New York 1928, New Edition 1936) tells the story of the Wuhan days and gives, so to speak, the human side of the picture more than most other accounts.

The curtains of the Revolution of 1925-27 were drawn with the defeat of the Canton uprising in December 1927 when the Canton workers, led by the Communist Party, seized power and established a Soviet Government for three days. The Canton Commune, as that short-lived regimé was called by Communist writers, was regarded by the Communist authorities as "the rearguard battle of the revolution." However, it not only closed an old epoch but also opened a new one. For the first time in the history of a colonial or semi-colonial country, the banner of the Soviets was unfurled. Thus the Canton Commune must be regarded as the beginning of the Soviet period of the Chinese Revolution. The best source material on the Canton Commune is *The First Anniversary Memorial Volume on the Canton Uprising* (in Chinese and Russian), a symposium of six chapters including contributions from leading participants in the uprising and a very able research article based upon current press reports of the uprising. The symposium was published by the Institute of Researches on China in Moscow, in 1929. Hansu Chan's short article on the Canton Commune, "The Canton Uprising and Soviet China" (*China Today*, Vol. I, No. 3, December 1934) is based on this material and is the best available factual summary of the history of the Commune in English.

While the Chinese Revolution of 1925–1927 was raging, the Trotskyists were actively engaged in their opposition activities against the majority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led by J. Stalin. One of the important subjects of controversy, perhaps second in importance only to the Russian question, was the Chinese Revolution. Trotsky's writings on the question are collected in a volume, entitled *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (New York, 1932, in English). Trotsky's main contention was that it was the Comintern's policy of working inside the Kuomintang that brought about the defeat of

the revolution. The most important writings explaining and defending the policy of the Comintern and sharply criticizing the position taken by Trotsky and his group is unquestionably Stalin's book *About the Opposition* (Moscow, in Russian; Chinese translation, 1931), over a hundred pages of which are devoted to the Chinese question. The English version of one of Stalin's most important writings on the Chinese question, *Extract from a Speech on "The International Situation and the Defense of the U. S. S. R.," Delivered at a Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the C. P. S. U., August 1, 1927*, is printed in Stalin's book *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (pp. 232–252; English translation, New York, 1936) and included in the *Handbook of Marxism*, edited by Emile Burns (pp. 894–909, New York, 1935).

In these writings, Stalin affirms that it was the difficult objective conditions of the revolution and the refusal of the Chinese Communist Party leadership to carry out the policy of the Comintern that caused the defeat. He particularly noted that although the revolution failed, Communism had become a mass movement. Had the Comintern adopted the policy of the Trotskyists, Stalin contends, Communism would still be just a sect. For polemics against Trotsky's writings on the situation after August 1927, especially on the issue of the Chinese Soviets, see R. Doonping's articles, "The Rising Revolutionary Wave and Trotskyist Liquidationism in China" (*The Communist*, monthly theoretical organ of the Communist Party of the United States, March 1930, in English), and "The Burgeois-Democratic Revolution and Soviet Power in China" (*The Communist*, November-December 1930, pp. 1016–1030). For the most recent echoes of the controversy, see Harold Isaacs' "Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution: A Marxist View" (PACIFIC AFFAIRS, September 1935, pp. 269-283), and Hansu Chan's answer, "The Nature and Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution—An Answer to the Trotskyist Views of Harold Isaacs" (*China Today*, September 1935, pp. 228–230. A summary of this article appeared in PACIFC AFFAIRS, December 1935, pp. 477–481). In these articles Doonping and Chan sharply took issue with the Trotskyist view that the Chinese Soviet movement is no more than a peasant war and is bound to degenerate into banditry and oblivion. In addition to the above materials, which are largely of a theoretical nature, it should be of interest to read the report of Trotskyist activities from the Central Soviet District in Kiangsi, entitled "The Secret Counterrevolutionary Machinations in the Central Soviet Districts of China and Their Liquidation" (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 12, No. 3, January 21, 1932, p. 46).

The four years from the Canton Commune to the establishment of the Provisional Central Soviet Government in November 1931, witnessed the utter failure of the Nanking Government to stabilize its power and the phenomenal rise of Soviet districts in many parts of south and central China. The much heralded unification of China by the Kuomintang Nanking Government in the middle of 1928 proved to be extremely short-lived. Soon the country was plunged into a series of civil wars. The Kwangsi-Nanking war was followed by the war of the Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yü-hsiang North China coalition against Chiang K'ai-shek. For a Marxist interpretation of these events, see R. Doonping's pamphlet, *Militarist Wars and Revolution in China* (New York, 1930, in English). The story of Kuomintang rule down to 1932 is eloquently told from the Communist viewpoint in the pamphlet *Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction* (in English, Shanghai, 1932).

As a result of dissatisfaction over the conditions described in the above pamphlets, which reveal the inability of the Kuomintang to stabilize its rule, its betrayal of its original workers and peasants policy, its failure to solve the people's problems of livelihood and its helplessness in the face of foreign invasion, peasant uprisings occurred in many parts of the country. Remnants of the Revolutionary Army, which refused to submit to the Nanking high command after the collapse of the Wuhan Government and the Canton Commune, retreated into the mountains of south China and helped the peasant rebels to arm and organize their struggles against the landlords and usurers. The result was widespread peasant guerrilla warfare in the Yangtze and Pearl River valleys. The detailed stories of this movement, especially in the provinces of Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Hunan, Kwangtung, Fukien and Shantung are told in a series of research reports, *Bulletins of the Institute of Research on China*, published in Moscow from 1928 to 1931 (all available in Russian only). The development of these guerrilla struggles resulted in the organization of many Soviet districts in various parts of south and central China.

The years from 1928 to 1931 are generally regarded as the first stage of the Soviet movement in China. As the development of the struggle approached a

culminating point in 1930, the leadership in the Communist Party of China, under the domination of Li Li-san, tended to exaggerate grossly the maturity of the revolutionary situation in China as well as in the world, and adopted the adventurist tactics of a headlong, reckless drive in an attempt to establish socialism (in the form of Soviet Farms and Collective Farms) in the Soviet districts and to capture such big cities as Changsha and Hankow. A new group, headed by Chü Chiu-po, which came to leadership after the Third Plenum of the Central Committee, in 1930, adopted a policy of reconciliation with Li Li-san, but failed to liquidate his influence. Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming) led the criticism of the weaknesses of the Third Plenum policies. The criticism led to a new plenum, the Fourth Plenum which finally liquidated Li Li-san's policies, corrected Chü Chiu-po's conciliatory attitude toward Li Li-san, and took the helm of the party. The writings of Chen Shao-yu in this connection are collected in a book, entitled *The Struggle for Increasing Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party* (1932, in Chinese). The period is also described in V. Kuchymov's article, "The Struggle for the Bolshevization of the Communist Party of China" (*Communist International*, Vol. VIII, No. 6, March 15, 1931, pp. 162–167, in English). Subsequent history indicates that the work of the Fourth Plenum represents a very important consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party, ideologically as well as in organization. It prepared the Chinese party for facing the difficult tasks of a new period of the Soviet movement.

With the organization of the Provisional Central Soviet Government in Juichin, Kiangsi, on November 7, 1931, the Soviet movement in China entered its second period of development. In regard to the First All-China Soviet Congress, which brought into existence the Central Soviet Government, there are two authoritative articles, one by Mif, entitled "The Revolutionary Fight in China" (*International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 11, No. 60, Nov. 26, 1931, pp. 1075–1076), and the "First Congress of Representatives of the Soviet Districts in China," by L. I. (*Communist International*, Vol. VII, No. 5, pp. 34–40). The socio-economic and political structure of Soviet China, as well as its main lines of policy in regard to the Red Army, agrarian labor, economic construction and other problems are formulated in a series of laws which, together with the *Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic*, are collected in a one-volume edition, *Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic* (Chinese edition, 1933, with an introduction by Wang Ming; English edition, 1934, with an introduction by Bela Kun). These laws constitute a concrete formulation of what the Marxists call a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." For a detailed discussion of economic policy, see Wang Ming's article, "The Economic Policy of the Soviets in China" (*Problems of China*, No. 12, 1933, pp. 3–21, in Russian).

As the agrarian revolution is the key problem of the present stage of the Chinese Soviet movement, land policy constitutes a factor of decisive importance. It is generally known that in the Soviet districts there has been much discussion of the problem in connection with the actual carrying out of the land policy as formulated in the land laws. Of great importance in this connection is Mao Tse-tung's pamphlet on *Land Investigation Movement* (Moscow 1934, in Chinese). Aside from this, very little of the documentary and other material, affording evidence on this accumulated experience, has been published outside the Soviet districts. The only available materials in this connection are included in a series of articles on "Land Policy in the Soviet Districts" (in Chinese), by Shen Sheng-chang, which appeared in the *Kuo-wen Weekly* in 1933. They include long quotations taken from Soviet documents seized by the Kuomintang troops when certain Soviet districts were taken by them. The quotations, carefully selected by one who is distinctly not sympathetic, are necessarily fragmentary. However, they are indispensable to a careful study of land policy in the Soviet districts. For a descriptive account of conditions in Soviet villages see "Life in Chinese Soviet Villages" (*China Today*, Vol. I, No. 3, Dec. 1934, pp. 48–49). In January 1934 the Second Soviet Congress met in Juichin, the Red capital. Mao Tse-tung, the president of Soviet China, delivered a long report which outlined the achievements of three years of Soviet power in China. These documents have been published in many languages. The English edition is entitled *Red China* (International Publishers, 1934).

There are two short summaries of the development of Soviet China available in English: *Soviet China* by M. James and R. Doonping (International Pamphlets, New York, 1932) and the summary by T. A. Bisson in *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 4, April 26, 1933. The best comprehensive source book on Soviet China is the big Russian volume, *Soviets in China*, which contains detailed docu-

ments and other material in regard to each separate Soviet district that was in existence up to 1933, and a good bibliography of books and articles dealing with the Chinese Soviet movement in the Russian language. (Moscow, 1933, in Russian. Translated from original German edition.) The only full-sized book on Soviet China in the English language is *The Chinese Soviets* by Victor A. Yakhontoff (New York, 1934), which discusses the Chinese Revolution from the Taip'ing Rebellion down to Soviet China. Agnes Smedley's *China's Red Army Marches* (New York, 1934) is a vivid account of the growth of Soviet China, based on very reliable historical facts but written in the author's characteristic vigorous prose which makes the book read like fiction.

In the latter half of 1930, almost immediately after crushing the Yen-Feng opposition to Nanking, Chiang K'ai-Shek opened his military campaign for the eradication of the Soviet Districts and Communist activities in China. From the fall of 1930 to that of 1931, three anti-Communist military campaigns were launched. Three more campaigns, much larger in scale and longer in duration, were undertaken after 1931. Some of these campaigns ended in the total failure of the anti-Communist expeditions, some of them gained substantial results and forced the Red armies to retreat to new positions; but none of them succeeded in achieving the result aimed at—the wiping out of Soviet power from Chinese soil. For the official Kuomintang view of the campaign, see T'ang Liang-li's *Suppression of Communist Banditry in China* (Shanghai, 1935, in English). The story of the first five campaigns is told by General Yakhontoff in his book, *The Chinese Soviets* (Chapter VIII, pp. 100–120). Analytical studies of the sixth and most protracted campaign were made by Frederick V. Field in "The Recent Anti-Communist Campaign in China" (*Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. IV, No. 16, August 14, New York, 1935) ; by Wang Ming in "The Sixth Anti-Communist War and the Tactics of the Red Army" (*The Communist International*, Chinese edition, Vol. V, No. 12, Dec. 31, 1934, pp. 62–101) ; and by G. Kara-Murza in "The End of the Sixth Campaign against the Chinese Soviets (*Tikhii Okean*, No. 1, 1935, in Russian).

It is common knowledge that the Red forces showed extraordinary vitality in resisting a force that was many times superior in numbers and equipment. The secret of this strength on the part of the Red troops can best be seen from two extraordinarily valuable accounts by two able Chinese journalists whose sympathies are by no means with the Reds. One is a book of 189 pages, *Notes Taken on an Investigation Tour of Kiangsi, Anhueti, Hunan and Hupei*, by Chen Keng-ya, special correspondent of the Shanghai *Shen Pao* (Shanghai, 1934, in Chinese). The other is a series of seven long articles, "Impressions of the Anti-Communist Campaign in Northeastern Szechwan," by Hsiung Shih (*Kuo-wen Weekly*, Vol. 12, Nos. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 1935, in Chinese). Both correspondents visited former Soviet districts and had close contact with the anti-Communist activities of the Nanking Government. Their contributions are of great value in helping one to understand the strength and weakness and the problems faced by both contending forces. The two accounts also contain much material on the conditions in the Soviet districts and the people's reactions toward Soviet innovations. They are social documents of first-rate importance. (See also "Reconstruction after Revolution: Kiangsi Province and the Chinese Nation," by G. E. Taylor, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Sept. 1935, pp. 302–312.) A detailed discussion of the Chinese Red Army from the Communist viewpoint is given by V. Siang in his very interesting and informative article, "The Red Army of China" (*The Problems of China*, Nos. 8 and 9, 1931, in Russian).

The strategy of the Sixth Anti-Communist campaign was to bottle up the main Soviet forces in Kiangsi by blockhouse construction, road-building and an immense concentration of the best forces under Chiang K'ai-shek's command. This policy of encirclement failed because the Reds finally succeeded in breaking through, but it did make it impossible for the Communist forces to maintain their base in Kiangsi. They thereupon selected a new base in Szechwan, where Red troops under the command of Hsü Hsiang-chien had already occupied an extensive territory in the northeastern part of the province. (See "The Dramatic Struggle for a Soviet Szechwan," *China Today*, Vol. I, No. 2, Nov. 1934, pp. 31–33. Also see "Struggle for Soviets in Szechwan," by B. Perlin, *China Today*, Vol II, Nos. 5 and 6, Feb. and March, 1936, pp. 93–96 and 114–117.) Breaking through the encirclement in November 1934, the main body of the Red Army commanded by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh marched westward and, crossing the boundaries of thirteen provinces and covering a distance of over 3,000 miles, it joined forces with Hsü Hsiang-chien in June, 1935. The story of this extraordinary march, one of the most unique in military history, is eloquently told by Shu Pin in "Heroic

Trek of the Chinese Red Army" (*Communist International*, Special Chinese Number, February 1936, pp. 124–144). Other materials on the westward march can be found in the pages of *China Today* ("Soviet March into Szechwan," by Crispian Corcoran, Vol. 1, No. 4; "New Tactics of the Chinese Red Army," by J. W. Phillips, No. 5; "Toward Szechwan," by Harry Gannes, No. 9).

A most detailed and authoritative account of the Soviet Army is given by Chow Ho-sin in his article "Military Power of Soviet China" (*China Today*, Vol. II, No. 4, January 1936, pp. 71–74), which includes a statistical table showing the territorial distribution of the Armed Forces of the Revolution in the summer of 1935. In August 1935, the main Red troops which were concentrated in western Szechwan after the joining of the forces of Mao Tse-tung with those of Hsü Hsiang-chien, began to move northeastward. This was the beginning of a chain of movements which resulted in the consolidation of a base on the border between Szechwan and Sikang, a great extension of Soviet territory in northern Shensi and the entry into Shansi in the spring of 1936. The only systematic and detailed account of these new developments is given by Hansu Chan in "Chinese Red Army in New Offensive" (*China Today*, Vol. II, No. 7, April 1936, pp. 128–130).

With the abandonment of the base in Kiangsi and the westward march of the main Red forces, the Soviet movement in China entered upon a third stage of its development. The most important new factor in the present period is the great stress placed upon the policy of organizing a united front especially directed against Japanese imperialism. As the main resolution of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International emphatically puts it, "The extension of the Soviet movement and the strengthening of the fighting power of the Red Army must be combined with the development of the people's anti-imperialist movement all over the country." (*Resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International*, New York, 1936, p. 35.) In order to understand this new emphasis on the anti-imperialist front, it is necessary to trace the development of the Communist policy on the united anti-imperialist front which had been the order of the day ever since 1931.

Immediately following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the Communist Party proposed the organization of a united effort of all Chinese people for revolutionary war of liberation. As early as the beginning of 1932, during the Shanghai campaign against the Japanese invaders in Shanghai, Chinese Communists volunteered assistance to the 19th Route Army. Later, in April, the Soviet Government of China issued a statement declaring war on Japan. In January 1933, in another public statement, Soviet China declared itself ready to enter into agreements to fight against the Japanese invaders with any army or military detachment, under three conditions: cessation of civil war against the Soviet districts; the granting of democratic rights to the Chinese people; and the arming of the people for the anti-Japanese war. This offer for an anti-Japanese united front was repeated on April 15, 1933. (See documents printed in *International Press Correspondence*.)

In October 1933, the Kuomintang 19th Route Army, of Shanghai fame, which was in control of Fukien province, concluded the first series of anti-Japanese united front agreements with Soviet China and the Red Army. (For English text of the agreements, see *China Today*, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 10–11. For Chinese text, see *Kuo-wen Weekly*, Vol. 12, No. 9, March 11, 1935.) In August 1934, a special detachment of the Chinese Red Army, under the command of Fang Chih-ming, was dispatched northward through Anhuei province to attack the Japanese invaders. However, before reaching its destination, it was cornered and wiped out by the forces of Chiang K'ai-shek. On August 2, 1134, a document entitled "The Basic Program of the Chinese People in a War against Japan" (*China Today*, Vol. I, No. 1) was issued. The document, which was signed by Madame Sun Yat-sen and over 3,000 prominent persons from all walks of life, called for the arming of the whole population and mobilization of all resources of the nation for a determined struggle against Japanese invasion. This document is an expression of the rising anti-Japanese movement as well as a powerful stimulus for its further development.

In one of the sessions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, the Chinese delegate, Wang Ming, made a new and most emphatic appeal to "all parties, groups, military units, mass organizations and prominent politicians" to join the anti-imperialist front against Japanese invasion. (See Wang Ming's speech on *The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries*, New York, 1935, pp. 6–33 and 53–64, in English. Also see *New Political Power and New*

Army, a collection of speeches by members of the Chinese delegation to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, Moscow, 1935, in Chinese.) Less than a month after the Seventh Congress, on August 1, 1935, the Chinese Soviet Government jointly with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a manifesto to the Chinese people in which it made a very broad appeal to "Chinese men and women of all walks of life" to resist Japanese invasion and fight for the recovery of lost territories. For the attainment of this objective, the manifesto proposed the formation of a Government of National Defense and a United Anti-Japanese Army. (See document reprinted in *China Today*, Vol. II, No. 3, December 1935, pp. 58–59.)

A series of very weighty articles recently published by Wang Ming, the leading authority in the Comintern on the Chinese question, clearly indicates that the Comintern regards the organization of the anti-imperialist front, centered against Japanese imperialism, as the central task of the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Government of China. (See Wang Ming's *Resist-Japan Save-China Policy*, a collection of two articles, Moscow, 1936. Also see the following three articles in *International Press Correspondence* by Wang Ming: "The Basis of the New Policy of the Communist Party of China," Vol. 15, No. 11, Dec. 28, 1935, pp. 1751–1754; "Replies to Chief Arguments against the Anti-Imperialist Front in China," Vol. 16, No. 2, January 11, 1936, pp. 39–40; and "The Relation between the Soviet Government and the People's Government of National Defense," Vol. 16, No. 6, Jan. 25, 1936, pp. 149–150.) In another article, entitled "The Struggle for the Anti-Imperialist United Front and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of China" (*The Communist International*, Special Chinese number, Feb. 1936, pp. 107–123), Wang Ming points out the essential changes in policy in the Soviet regions in regard to agrarian questions, trade, industry, labor, political administration and foreign affairs, in order to adjust the policy of the Communists to the immediate needs of the national emergency and to bring it into harmony with the Seventh Congress decisions and the general united front program. The changes outlined in this article, which in general greatly "liberalize" the policy in the Soviet regions toward non-proletarian elements and foreign interests other than the Japanese, open new perspectives for the Soviet movement in China and deserve the closest attention of all who are concerned with the Far Eastern situation.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of an article appearing in the Daily Worker of August 20, 1942, page 3, showing that Ordway Southard was a Communist candidate for Governor of Alabama in 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Southard was the man to whom Mr. Lattimore sold his property.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1364" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1364

[Daily Worker, August 20, 1942, p. 3]

3 COMMUNISTS QUALIFY FOR ALABAMA ELECTION

(Special to the Daily Worker)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA., Aug. 19—Three candidates nominated by the Communist Party of Alabama have qualified to run in the general election No. 3, it was announced in the state capitol today.

The candidates are Mary Boggs Southard, for state senator; Rob F. Hall for Congress from the 9th Congregressional District; and Ordway Southard for governor.

Mrs. Southard is District Secretary of the Young Communist League. She was born in South Carolina 27 years ago and was reared in Birmingham. She graduated with highest honors from Phillips High School and Agnes Scott College. Hall was born in Mississippi in 1906 and was reared in Mobile, Ala. Since 1935, he has been district secretary of the Communist Party.

Ordway Southard, 30, is a native of Cambridge, Mass., where his father, the late Dr. Ernest Southard held the chair of neuro-pathology in the Harvard School of Medicine. He is the grandson of former Governor Horace Austin of Minnesota one of the pioneer governors of that state. Southard has lived in Birmingham for the past five years and is District Daily Worker director.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat of an article appearing in the Seattle Post Intelligencer for August 5, 1937, page 1, dealing with the expulsion of Selden Menefee from the Central Labor Council of Seattle. The name of Menefee has come up in our testimony, and that is relevant.

Mr. MORRIS. It is a newspaper report of a dismissal, Mr. Chairman. That is the best evidence we have on it.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1365," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1365

[Seattle Post Intelligencer, August 5, 1937, p. 1]

CENTRAL LABOR BODY OUSTS FOUR DELEGATES

Four delegates to the Central Labor Council were unseated by action of the executive board and a vote of the membership last night for "actions subversive to the best interests of the American Federation of Labor."

The men unseated were Eugene Dennett of the Inland Boatmen's Union, Selden Menefee, and Victor Hicks of the Teachers' Union and E. E. Hendrickson of the Postoffice Clerks' Union.

Dennett was found guilty of abrogation of his oath of allegiance to the American Federation of Labor, because he refused to deny making remarks favorable to the Committee for Industrial Organization, according to Charles Hughes, who was one of the men who brought the charges.

VIOLATION CHARGED

The other three men in a previous session with the executive board of the Central Labor Council declared that they had attended meetings of the Seattle Unity Labor Council, recently formed for the expressed purpose of bringing about unity in the labor movement. Some of the unions in the new group are C. I. O. members.

Holding that this attendance was a violation of obligation to the A. F. of L., the executive board ruled that the local unions of Menefee, Hicks and Hendrickson should be instructed to repudiate their membership in the Unity Council.

On motion from the floor from Charles Hughes, the council voted to remove all four men as delegates to the Central Labor Council.

The four men denied the charges and said they would appeal their cases to the American Federation of Labor.

GUILD CRITICIZED

A resolution was introduced by Seattle Web Pressman's Union No. 26, criticizing the Seattle Newspaper Guild for its activities in the strike on the Seattle Star and "doing everything possible to tear down and disrupt legitimate organized labor." The resolution also commended the Seattle Star for its stand "for the best interests of labor," and urged all A. F. of L. members to support the newspaper in its controversy. The resolution was adopted.

Officers of the labor council were also elected at last night's session with Claude O'Reilley relected president; Harry Ames, vice president, and Charles Doyle, executive secretary. Doyle's reelection provided the only contest and he defeated Bert Nelson by a vote of 239 to 67.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a letter sent by Mr. Holland in answer to our request for anti-Communist material critical of the Soviet Union that has been published by the IPR, and this is Mr. Holland's reply dated August 27, 1951.

Senator O'CONOR. Signed by him?

Mr. MANDEL. Signed by him.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1366" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1366

JULY 16, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
1 East 54th St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: Will you kindly send us the following material which will be returned to you:

Copies of all articles published by the IPR critical of the Soviet Union covering the period 1931 to 1950.

Sincerely,

ROBERT MORRIS, *Special Counsel.*

"A Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union," by L. E. Hubbard. (Pacific Affairs, June 1938, pp. 171–185.)
Notes and Comment. "Soviet Russia and the Korean Communist Party," by John N. Washburn. (Pacific Affairs, March 1950, pp. 59–65.)
"Soviet Policy in China," by Max Beloff. (Pacific Affairs, June 1950, pp. 128–138.)
"The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia," by Milton Sacks. (Pacific Affairs, September 1950, pp. 227–247.)
"The Japanese Communist Party, the Soviet Union and Korea," by Paul Langer and Rodger Swearingen. (Pacific Affairs, December 1950, pp. 339–355.)
Notes and Comment. "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Government," by Wilbert B. Dubin. (Pacific Affairs, December 1950, pp. 381–392.)
"The Communist Party in India," by M. R. Masani. (Pacific Affairs, March 1951, pp. 18–38.)

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

ELdorado 5–1759

AUGUST 27, 1951.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In response to your request I send you herewith a collection of articles critical of the Soviet Union and communism, published in *Pacific Affairs*, quarterly journal of the international Institute of Pacific Relations, and in *Far Eastern Survey*, fortnightly magazine of the American I. P. R. In addition to these articles, I wish to direct your attention to the following correspondence published in *Pacific Affairs:* letter from William Henry Chamberlin on the Moscow trials (September 1938) and letter from W. J. Oudendyk on the Soviet position in the Far East (March 1937). These may be found in the bound copies of *Pacific Affairs* which you have in Washington. I also refer you to a pamphlet entitled *The Red Influence in China* by R. Otsuka, submitted by the Japanese I. P. R. to the 1936 conference of the Institute in Yosemite (a copy of which I have already sent you).

I wish to stress the fact that, since the I. P. R. concerns itself mainly with the Far East and the Pacific, its publications seldom deal with the Soviet Union as such, or with its internal problems or with its European areas. They almost all have to do with the Far Eastern regions of the U. S. S. R. or with Soviet relations with other Far Eastern or Pacific countries. I would also point out that the great majority of the I. P. R. articles which do deal with the Soviet Far East or with Soviet policies towards other Far Eastern countries are purely descriptive accounts in which the authors do not express political judgments or take either a pro- or anti-Soviet position. This is particularly true of the numerous factual, short articles in the *Far Eastern Survey*, dealing with the geography, resources, and economic development of Soviet Asia.

In *Pacific Affairs* from 1931 to 1951 approximately 525 articles were printed. Of these, 35 articles were largely concerned with the Soviet Union, 9 of them being critical, 10 being more or less favorable, and 16 taking no position. In the *Far Eastern Survey* from its inception in 1935 and up to 1951, there were 31 major articles and 54 short notes on the Soviet Union or its policies in the Far East. Of these all except 3 were descriptive, expressing neither praise nor criticism. Of the three exceptions, two were unfavorable and one was favorable.

Please note that from 1935 to 1940, the *Far Eastern Survey* was exclusively concerned with economic topics and only after 1940 did it carry articles on political questions.

It should be remembered also that through most of the period 1931 to 1945 the Soviet Union was not taking an aggressive position in the Far East as it has done since World War II. It was opposed to Japanese imperialism, supported collective security during most of the period, and maintained friendly relations with Nationalist China. Since 1945, the Soviets have intervened much more aggressively in Far Eastern affairs. Consequently, it is natural that I. P. R. publications in recent years should contain more criticism of Soviet and communist policies in Asia.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM M. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

WLH: abs.
Enclosure.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a statement from Mr. Holland dated May 23, 1952, sent in reply to our request as to the use of the name "American Institute of Pacific Relations" after a certain period.

Senator O'CONOR. And also signed by him?

Mr. MANDEL. Also signed by him.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1367" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1367

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

Eldorado 5-1759

MAY 23, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Special Counsel, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Room 424-C, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: This is in reply to your inquiry of May 22nd about the change in name of the American IPR, as listed on the masthead of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY.

At its meeting on November 26, 1946, the Board of Trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., voted to change the name of the organization to the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.

Several formalities were required, such as getting the written consent of two-thirds of the Trustees before such a change could be made, and so it was not until January 14, 1947, that the final certificate of amendment to the certificate of incorporation was recorded in the District of Columbia.

The firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, New York, handled this matter for us and we did not receive from them the certified copy of the certificate of amendment until the middle of February 1947.

The masthead box in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY is included in all issues, but it was not until after the February 26 issue had been printed that it was noted the necessary change had not been made in the masthead statement. As the March 12 issue had probably already gone to press, the change in the name of the organization was not published in the journal until the March 26 issue.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a copy from the Proceedings of the Third Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 23 to November 9, 1929, a statement made by J. Merle Davis, then general secretary, regarding his visit to Moscow and his dealings with the Third International leaders.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1368" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1368

One of the chief responsibilities of the Secretariat has been to maintain liaison between the Institute member groups. This has been carried on by travel, correspondence and publications. All of the National Councils have been visited by one or more staff members during the two-year period. In the autumn of 1927 and winter of 1928, the General Secretary visited Canada, the United States, England and the Continent of Europe. He spent a month at Geneva studying the organization and program of the League of Nations and the International Labor Office and making contacts with their Secretariats. *He then visited Moscow, met with Foreign Office officials and Third International leaders to whom he explained the Institute of Pacific Relations.* Through the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, he was able to hold a conference with a group of specialists representing the principal Russian scientific societies interested in Far Eastern and Pacific questions. Tentative plans were made with this group and a committee was formed for the purpose of cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations and participation in the 1929 Conference.

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC 1929 Proceedings, Third Conference Institute of Pacific Relations (p. 674), Nara and Kyoto, Japan, October 23 to November 9, 1929.
The University of Chicago Press, June 1930.
Biennial Report of the General Secretary.
J. Merle Davis, General Secretary (p. 630).

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have a statement of ownership of Pacific Affairs during the year 1945, as photostated from Pacific Affairs of that year.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1369" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1369

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC., REQUIRED BY THE ACTS OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AND MARCH 3, 1933

Of PACIFIC AFFAIRS, published quarterly at Orange, Connecticut, for March, June, September, December, 1945.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

Before me, a notary public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Hilda Austern, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the business manager of the PACIFIC AFFAIRS and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the owner-

ship, management (and if a daily paper, the circulation), etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:

Publisher, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Editor, Edward C. Carter, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Business Manager, Hilda Austern, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

2. That the owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding one percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a firm, company, or other unincorporated concern, its name and address, as well as those of each individual member, must be given.)

Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Editor: Edward C. Carter, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Hilda Austern, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None.

4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as so stated by him.

5. That the average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the twelve months preceding the date shown above is 3,500. (This information is required from daily publications only.)

HILDA AUSTERN.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 12th day of September 1945.

[SEAL] ROSAMOND L. TESCHNER,
Notary Public, Queens County, No. 3066.

(My commission expires March 31, 1946.
Certificate listed in N. Y. Co. No. 306. Reg. No. 174–T–6.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a newspaper account entitled, "Tokyo Reds Urge Trial of Emperor," taken from the New York Times of March 1, 1946, page 13, on the question of the Communist Party of Japan's attitude toward the Emperor, having been under discussion in our hearing.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1370" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1370

[New York Times, Friday, March 1, 1946, p. 63]

TOKYO REDS URGE TRIAL OF EMPEROR—COMMUNISTS DENOUNCE PUBLIC APPEARANCES OF HIROHITO AS "REACTIONARY" ELECTIONEERING

(By Lindsay Parrott)

[By wireless to the New York Times]

TOKYO, February 28.—The Japanese Communist Party came out into the open for the first time today in opposition to Emperor Hirohito's personal conduct, attacking his recent visits to repatriation centers and other public places as "designed to help the election campaigns of the reactionary parties and trying to frustrate the democratization of Japan."

The Communists' criticism was voiced in a party resolution handed to the Imperial Household Ministry today just as the Emperor completed his first inspection trip through bombed-out sections of Tokyo, during which he visited schools, emergency dwellings, and open-air markets and large stores selling the products of reconverted munitions factories.

The resolution charged that the Emperor was "largely responsible for the war, which brought misery to millions of his people," and remanded that the government take steps to prohibit "electioneering" by "the Emperor and all other war criminals," thus putting the monarch directly in the criminal class, in which the Allies have refrained so far from listing him.

The Communists, though they are on record for the eventual elimination of the "Tenno system," or imperial rule, recently have tended to soft-pedal the issue, which probably is the principal impediment to their chances in the general election scheduled for April. Today's attack, therefore, appeared to be a reversion to the Communists' earlier tactics of open demand for the immediate abolition of the monarchy and possibly the trial of the monarch.

The Emperor's trip today was his most extensive so far. He left the Palace at 9 a. m. and made a 6-hour automobile tour of the capital. As in his previous appearances, he was accompanied by only a small escort. He wore a European suit and a gray felt hat, which he raised occasionally to acknowledge applause.

The largest group of Japanese citizens who saw their ruler for the first time probably was in the Ginza department store, where the Emperor saw the products now on sale to the public and inquired about prices and the supplies available.

As he left the store several hundred persons gathered at the doors and set up a shout of "banzai"—greetings, which also was the battle cry of Japanese troops. The Emperor bowed and removed his hat and waved to the crowd as the imperial automobile drove off.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a Christian Science Monitor article dated August 18, 1947, page 3, dealing with the Pacific Institute's meeting on the Japanese Peace Treaty and showing their desire to mold public opinion on the treaty with Japan.

This is a newspaper article.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1371" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1371

[The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Monday, August 18, 1947]

PACIFIC INSTITUTE TO STUDY JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

(By Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor)

NEW YORK.—Controversial issues of the countries around the Pacific Basin, high lighted by discussions of the proposed Japanese peace treaty, mark the agenda of the 10th international conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which will be held at Stratford-on-Avon, England, Sept. 5–20.

The United States delegation, under its Chairman Huntington Gilchrist, expects this meeting of the Institute's history to provide valuable background material for molding public opinion on the treaty with Japan.

Prior to the Stratford-on-Avon meeting, all the national councils and the international secretariat of the Institute will have assembled documents which bear on the issues to be discussed.

All questions revolve around the one central matter of Japan.

The United States group filed material on this country's economic relationship with the new Philippine Republic, its business interests in Asia, and the political and economic problems involved in Micronesia.

Australia is concerned about dependencies and trusteeships in the Pacific and policies which provide for the social and economic reconstruction of the countries in the area.

China's economic problems, its social progress, and its international monetary position appear in the background material.

The future on Indo-China concerns the French.

New Zealanders, like the Australians, are concerned about their economic and defense positions in the Pacific.

The international secretariat submitted studies on China's agricultural problems and the problems of agricultural reconstruction throughout the Far East. Koreas' political and economic problems are scheduled for conference debate.

Members from Australia, Canada, China, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States will attend the Stratford-on-Avon meetings. Observers are expected from India, the Netherlands, Korea, and several international organizations. This will be the first conference the Institute has held in Euorpe.

American universities will be represented by Prof. Donald Tewksbury of Columbia University, Prof. Raymond Kennedy of Yale University, Prof. James H. Shoemaker of the University of Hawaii, and Prof. Owen Lattimore of Johns Hopkins University. Mortimer Graves, Director of the American Council of Learned Societies, also will attend.

Prominent members of the British delegation will be Viscount Astor, Chairman of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee, Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and author of the "Study of History"; Sir Andrew McFadyean, Director of the British North Borneo Chartered Company and Honorary Treasurer of the British Liberal Party; Lieut. Col. D. R. Rees-Williams, Labor Member of Parliament and an expert on Malaya and Burma; Sir John Masson, partner of John Swire and Sons and prominent in British Far East trade, and Lieut. Col. L. J. Barley of the Imperial Chemical Industries.

Leading members of the Canadian delegation will be R. M. Fowler, President of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association; Sidney Scott, Managing Editor of the Vancouver Daily Province; the Honorable Justice J. B. Coyne, Manitoba Court of Appeals, and E. Herbert Norman, Chief of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Tokyo.

The leader of the Chinese delegation will be Dr. Chiang Monlin, until recently Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan of the Chinese National Government.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a review by Owen Lattimore of Gunther Stein's book, The Challenge of Red China, as taken from the New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, October 14, 1945, page 3.

Mr. MORRIS. That has already been acknowledged as having been written, has it not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. It has.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1372" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1372

[Source: New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review, October 14, 1945]

THE VITAL COMMUNIST PROBLEM IN CHINA—AN AMICABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE AGREEMENT OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR NATIONAL POLICY

THE CHALLENGE OF RED CHINA. By Gunther Stein * * * 490 pp. * * * New York: Whittlesey House * * * $3.50.

(Reviewed by OWEN LATTIMORE)

At this time, when it seems clear that the Soviet policy in the Far East is to avoid a head-on collision with America, and when one report follows another that there is to be an amicable and constructive agreement between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists, understanding of the Communist problem in China is of the greatest importance to the formation of our national policy. We need to demand the widest possible presentation of facts, from both official and unofficial sources, and we need to encourage discussion and to clarify issues so that our long-term policy can be formed with the backing of public opinion.

The problem is important because it affects economic interests as much as it affects political attitudes. Can we invest safely and trade profitably in a China in which the Communists continue to be active? Will such a China provide an area in which we can meet the Russians and cooperate with them in the maintenance of security and world-wide organization of a higher standard of living, or will China's Great Wall be taken over by us as our Great Wall to exclude the Russians from the community of democratic peoples?

These problems will not be settled by one agreement in Chungking. The fact is that no one agreement, no matter how cordial or far reaching, will "settle" or "solve" or eliminate the Communist problem in China. That problem has come to stay. It is now part of the Chinese environment and habitat. It is one of the conditions which mold the domestic politics and international relations of China. As a problem, it will change and develop in the years to come, just as every other aspect of China will change and develop. That only means that it is now necessary for Americans to study Chinese Communism from the ground up, if they wish to equip themselves to understand the China of the future.

To the study of this problem, Mr. Stein has made two contributions which deserve the highest praise: he has assembled a great deal of new material, and he has offered his own analysis of the material. The two elements of the book are interwoven but distinct. The analysis is clear in statement and temperate in tone but it need not prevent the reader from making his own evaluation of the facts.

Mr. Stein's book does not have the colorful appeal of those parts of Harrison Forman's recent "Report From Red China" which describes guerrilla territory and guerrilla campaigning; for while Mr. Forman penetrated behind Japanese lines, Mr. Stein settled down to a five-month program of exhaustive interviews and investigation in Yenan.

He was remarkably well qualified for his work. His previous experience as a journalist included Germany, Russia, and Japan. He had already had several years in Hong Kong and free China. He had established a name for himself as an economic journalist; while other reporters handled economic news from time to time, Mr. Stein had made his way from the beginning as an economic journalist. The worth of his economic knowledge is attested again and again by his evaluation of the economic problems and economic methods of both Yenan and Chungking.

Mr. Stein clearly prepared himself for the trip with great care, taking it not as an adventure but as a major assignment. In particular, he thoroughly briefed himself on all of Chungking's complaints and suspicions regarding the Communists, and he really "bore down" to get the Communist answers. In addition he made a study of Japanese materials on the Chinese Communists which are of great value and are little known in this country. He must also have tried to think out in advance and to tabulate for the purpose of interviewing people in Yenan, all the most searching questions that would be asked by ordinary people in America. As a result, he has been able to provide us with the most up-to-date handbook, amazingly complete, of questions about the Chinese Reds, views held

about them by others, theories which they themselves expound, and their own expositions and interpretations of what they do, and why.

So detailed and thorough a book cannot be given a running review which touches on all the high lights. There is room here to discuss only one of the major topics: The absorbing problem of how Communist a body of Communists can remain when preaching and training others to follow, a program that is non-Communist.

Mr. Stein found Chinese Nationalism "a more characteristic trait of Yenan's ideology than Marxism." He says that the Chinese Communists "feel as grown-up after eighteen years of continuous responsibility for the conduct of armies and administrations, as the Soviet Union does after twenty-eight years. They regard the conditions under which Marxism has to be applied to China as utterly different from those prevailing in Russia. And they consider themselves as little in need of advice from any foreign communist party as Moscow does."

The social composition of their membership "has undergone a deep change, away from radicalism." Of their membership, 93 percent joined after 1937 (so that the Old Guard of the civil war period is heavily outnumbered). The great bulk of the membership "are 'middle peasants' with a pronounced petty-bourgeois, nationalistic background." They joined up "not after having read and agreed with the theories of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung, but in the course of liberating their homes from the Japanese and reforming the social life of their villages."

There would seem to be in this summary both a reassurance that the Communists have gone a long way toward making themselves a party of compromise instead of extremism, and a warning that a renewal of civil war in China would force on progressives and on conservatives a return to the extremism which characterized both sides in the last civil war phase, which in the ten years from 1927 to 1936 so nearly destroyed China and laid her open to foreign conquest.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a statement from the Library of Congress, giving the biography of V. E. Motylev, his name having been mentioned in the hearings.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1373" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1373

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,
Washington 25, D. C.

Motylev, Vol'f Evnovich, lecturer at the Urals-Siberian Communist University. [Field of Specialization]: political economy, Soviet economics. [Address]: Sverdlovsk, Communist University, Moscow, 5 Serpov Drive, Apt. No. 2. [Born]: 1898 at the locality of Dubrovno, District of Gomel', Mogilev Province. (Partial translation of page 267 of Nauchnye rabotniki SSSR bez Moskvy i Leningrada—Scientific workers in the USSR except for Moscow and Leningrad—edited by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Leningrad, 1928).

The following publications by the above author are available in Washington, D. C.:

1. Tsena i stoimost' v kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve i v khoziaistve SSSR. (Price and value in the capitalistic economy and in the economy of the USSR). Krasnodar, 1924.

2. Zarabotnaia plata v kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve i v SSSR. (Wages in the capitalistic economy and in the USSR). Second edition. Rostov n/D, 1925. This publication includes a "scheme for a course of political economy to be given at communist universities."

Motylev states in the preface to the first edition of Zarabotnaia plata v kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve which is reprinted in the second edition that both forementioned pamphlets represent "the transcripts of a portion of the lectures which I delivered in the courses established at the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party for the secretaries of the Party district committees." He further states that he found it impossible to make up-to-date additions to the publication "in view of my departure for England." The preface is dated March, 1924.

3. Problema tempa rasvitiia SSSR. (The problem of the tempo of the development of the USSR). Moscow, 1929.

4. Varianty piatiletki; vreditel'skie teorii i sovetskaia deistvitel'nost. (Versions of the 5 year plan; the wreckers theories and the Soviet reality). Moscow, 1931. This pamphlet was published in the series "Ekonomicheskaia biblioteka propagandista" (The Economic library for the propagandist).

5. Zarozhdenie i razvitie tikhookeanskogo uzla protivorechii. (Origins and development of contadictions in the Pacific Ocean). Moscow, 1939. A notice on the cover of the book indicates that this publication "is meant for teachers and students who are active members of the Party."

SERGIUS YAKOBSON, *Senior Specialist.*

NOVEMBER 21, 1951.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is the correction from the Library of Congress of a word which we have been told has been incorrectly translated from the French, and the Library of Congress experts make the correction in that connection.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in connection with Gunther Stein's leaving France, is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1374" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1374

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,
Washington 25, D. C.

Memorandum to: Mr. Benjamin Mandel, Internal Security Subcommittee.
From: Elizabeth Hanunian, translator.
Date: November 27, 1951.

In answer to the inquiry from Mr. Mandel as to the exact meaning of the word "arrêté," in the penultimate paragraph on p. 400 of the Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, the sentence in which the word appears is translated as follows:

"He was expelled from France for espionage, by virtue of an order of November 14, 1950, and headed for England."

The word "arrêté" does not mean "arrest"; the French use this for an administrative decision in a broad sense—administrative order. Arrest is translated either by "arrestation" or "arrêt."

Mr. MANDEL. Next is the page numbers in Pacific Affairs and Soviet Russia Today containing writings by Owen Lattimore, with excerpts therefrom.

Mr. MORRIS. He has acknowledged writing those?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And the excerpting was done by you?

Mr. MANDEL. By the staff; yes.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1375" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1375

OWEN LATTIMORE

GREAT SOVIET ATAS, MOSCOW, reviewed by Owen Lattimore * * * "a major geographical work infused with the spirit of Marxist historical materialism cannot fail to challenge the interest of geographers all over the world. The tone of the Atlas is set by a letter from Lenin; written in 1921, that is characteristic of Lenin's greatness of mind * * * it is evident that Marxist historical

materialism, as practiced by the scientists of the Soviet Union, is not a crude materialism. The historical method * * * is extended to demonstrate the superiority of Socialism, as practiced in the Soviet Union, with the deliberate purpose of arriving at a future Communism, over the Capitalism of the rest of the world. It is not vulgar 'propaganda,' but scientific argument on a plane that commands full intellectual respect" (pp. 383–389, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, June 1938).

THE MOSCOW TRIALS defended by Owen Lattimore. He wrote, "Why should Mr. Chamberlin be surprised that no letters, memoranda or minutes of meetings of the conspirators were adduced in evidence? The testimony makes it clear by inference that the work of all the conspirators interlocked so closely with that of loyal citizens that, if they had risked much in writing, they would have been caught much sooner * * * The verbatim records of the trials are entirely credible in the way they describe the descent from grandiose ideas to futile deeds." (pp. 370–372, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, September 1938).

CAN THE SOVIET UNION BE ISOLATED? reviewed by Owen Lattimore. "The only positive evidence on the record is clear: France and Great Britain have not been willing to fight. The Soviet Union has been willing to fight, and has actually fought, in self-defense, but has refused to take the aggressive, even when it looked profitable, as in Siberia * * * France and Great Britain may yet be driven to beg from the Soviet Union the assistance which they refused in the case of Czechoslovakia. For, arguing from the record, there is every probability that Germany, Italy, and Japan will go on grabbing what they can from Great Britain and France rather than rush headlong against the enigmatic menace of the Red Army." (pp. 492–493, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, December 1938).

THE AMERICAN QUARTERLY ON THE SOVIET UNION, Vol. 1, No. 1, reviewed by Owen Lattimore. "The first issue opens with an article by John N. Hazard * * * the article is one more indication that the series of Moscow Trials does not represent the climax of a process of repression, but on the contrary is part of a new advance in the struggle to set free the social and economic potentialities of a whole nation and its people. It is evident that the Quarterly will be indispensable for the formation of intelligent opinion about the Soviet Union." (pp. 404–406, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, September 1938).

COMMENT AND OPINION by Owen Lattimore. Tribute to Walter Duranty: "We need Western journalists who can * * * feel the creative, formative period of Russia as the peoples of the Soviet Union feel it—or as Duranty feels it." (p. 205, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, June 1934).

THIS SOVIET WORLD by Anna Louise Strong, reviewed by Owen Lattimore. "Her book as a whole is a good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individually and the foreign idea of 'regimentation'." (pp. 611–612, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, December 1936).

LA MONGOLIE by J. Levine, reviewed by Owen Yattimore. "The ruling party is Communist in the character of its thought, but not in its policy; it looks forward, rather, to a future transition to Communism, when the people are ready for it * * *" (p. 479, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, December 1937).

SOLUTION IN ASIA by Owen Lattimore, reviewed by Harriet Moore. "To the people of Asia, he (Lattimore) says: '* * * the Soviet Union stands for strategic security, economic prosperity, technological progress, miraculous medicine, free education, equality of opportunity, and democracy' * * * It is interesting to note that Trud, the Soviet Trade Union newspaper, has given SOLUTION IN ASIA a long review and has quoted extensively from it." (p. 27, SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY, July 1945).

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a typewritten copy of an article from the Communist dated November 1944, dealing with Wallace's trip to the Soviet Union.

It is entitled "The Soviet Union and the Small Nations," by Marcia T. Scott.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1376" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1376

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SMALL NATIONS

(By Marcia T. Scott)

(On the occasion of the Twenty-Seventh Anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution)

* * * * * * *

All recent American visitors to the Soviet Union have been especially impressed by the extraordinary progress of all the Soviet minority peoples. Eric Johnston, amazed to find the age of science flourishing in Uzbekistan, was moved to offer a toast in a Tashkent factory to "the tremendous progress made here in the last twenty years under the Soviet system." W. H. Lawrence, NEW YORK TIMES correspondent who traveled with him, wrote in his dispatch of the two Central Asiatic Republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbeistan that "more progress has been made in the years since Soviet rule was firmly established here than in all the other years since Alexander the Great first captured Samarkand in 329 B. C."

Vice President Wallace commented enthusiastically on the new industry and new life and above all the new free people he found in Siberia on his visit last spring. Owen Lattimore, who accompanied him, noted especially the flexibility of the Soviet national policy. In a recent article in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY, Mr. Lattimore made a penetrating analysis of the difference in the status between minority groups in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, where minority rights tend to be largely identified with the right to nonconformity. This, he said, sometimes, led Americans to ask: "What would happen if one of these Soviet minorities were to attempt to set up laws, institutions, and practices conflicting with Marxist doctrines and Soviet orthodoxy?" Mr. Lattimore answers thus:

"* * * This would be the last thing that would occur to their minds, not the first. All of them have a long history of oppression. Since, in all their long history, only the Soviet government ever freed them from discrimination and gave them the opportunity of progress, they identify their own interest with the Soviet interest, and in everything which they do to advance their own particular interest their instinct is also to advance the general Soviet interest, not to encroach upon it, because the general Soviet interest is the primary safeguard of their own particular interest."

FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH SMALL COUNTRIES

The principle that underlies the relations of the family of nations within the Soviet Union also determines her relations with the small countries outside her borders. The application of the principle is of necessity different, because the relations are different. Within, cooperation has assumed its most complete form, because the Soviet Republics have voluntarily subordinated themselves to a central federal government which in turn has assumed great responsibilities in relation to them. But the principle of the right of nations to self-determination—expressed more accurately as the right to independent political existence—is completely operative in Soviet relations to outside states. Thus, the Soviet Union has consistently sought peaceful and friendly relations with other states and a system of collective security, as the only guarantee that nations could be independent.

* * * * * * *

(Source: THE COMMUNIST, November 1944, pp. 968–969.)

Mr. MANDEL. Next is an excerpt which was typed by the committee staff from a book called The Orient Past and Present by Elizabeth Seeger, the book being published jointly by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co. in 1946.

It is a poem which has been copied from the book.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be received.

(The poem referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1377" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1377

CHAPTER ON: THE PEOPLE OF SOVIET ASIA

* * * * * * *

Here is one of their poems which has been translated into English.

"Jenghis Khan crossed the earth with his hordes,
And he knew one law only: to kill and rob.
He crossed sands and deserts,
Forests and steppes, cities and valleys.
Rivers of blood and tears flowed in his wake.
Hissing curses followed him.

"Tamerlane crossed the earth long long ago
And left a bloody trail
Buried under ashes of burned cities.
Behind him he left a desert strewn with corpses,
And before him,
Whenever he saw light and joy,
He sowed grief and darkness.

"There was Nicholas, the Czar over Russia,
Only a short time ago.
He destroyed and plundered,
Massacring and enslaving nations.
His generals were dressed in gold,
But the whip in their hands
Was heavy as in the hands of the executioner.

"Then Lenin came,
He, too, will live in the memory of men,
But men will remember him in a new way,
For he brought light to the land Nicholas cast into darkness,
He replanted orchards made fruitless by the Mongols,
Rebuilt cities destroyed by Jenghis Khan.

"Jenghis Khan, Tamerlane, and Nicholas were warriors:
Wherever they saw light they made darkness.
Wherever they saw orchards they made deserts.
Wherever they saw life they made death.

"Lenin! Out of the darkness he brought forth light.
Out of the deserts he made orchards:
Out of death, life!
He was mightier than all the warriors put together,
For he alone built in eight years
What they had destroyed in a thousand."

("The Orient Past and Present" by Elizabeth Seger, a Cooperative Project between the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and Webster Publishing Co. 1946, pp. 293–294.)

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a State Department release dated October 11, 1951, dealing with the discussion of October 6 to 8, 1949, on problems of United States policy in China.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be received in evidence.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1378" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1378

Department of State. For the Press. Caution—future release

OCTOBER 11, 1951 No. 922

For release at 7:00 p. m., E. S. T., Thursday, October 11, 1951. Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way

RELEASE OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION HELD IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON OCTOBER 6–8, 1949, ON PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN CHINA

At the request of the Senate Internal Security Committee and the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considering the nomination of Ambassador Philip C. Jessup to be a United States delegate to the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly, the Department on October 9 released to the Senate Internal Security Committee and the Subcommittee considering the nomination of Ambassador Philip C. Jessup to be United States delegate to the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations the transcript of the round table discussion held in the State Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, on American policy toward China. In view of the public discussion that has taken place concerning this meeting and the requests for its release, the transcript is being made public.

In the summer of 1949 Secretary Acheson invited Mr. Everett Case, President of Colgate University, and Mr. Raymond Fosdick, former President of the Rockefeller Foundation, to work with Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, in a study of problems confronting the United States throughout Asia.

On August 18 Ambassador Jessup wrote a letter to a considerable number of individuals who had either had extensive personal experience in the Far East or who had made a special study of the area. He invited a written summary of their views on the objectives of United States policy. The list was drawn up in order to elicit as many different points of view as possible. The list included among others former Ambassador William Bullitt, former Under Secretary Castle, former Ambassador Stanley Hornbeck, former Under Secretary Grew, Admiral Harry E. Yarnel, and former President Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins. In addition it was decided to bring together a similar group of people for an informal conference.

In order to make the views expressed at this meeting available to Department officers concerned but unable to attend, a stenographic record was made. A compilation of the principal sections of the discussion was distributed to interested officers of the Department.

The Department's verbatim transcript of Governor Stassen's statements at the conference was sent to him following the meetings and his principal statement in the report contains his editorial changes. Colonel McCann's statements have also been edited. The rest of the transcript is unedited.

The participants were informed at the outset of the meeting that there would be no effort to arrive at a consensus of views. They were also told that the transcript would not be made available to anyone outside the Department, so that there could be the freest possible exchange of ideas without the necessity of careful consideration of phraseology.

In view of the requests from the Senate Subcommittees the Department has recently inquired of the participants concerning their willingness to have the full transcript released to the public. All agreed to the release of the transcript.

In recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Mr. Stassen has declared that:

a. There was a prevailing group at the conference and that there were two leaders in this group, Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. Lawrence Rosinger.

b. This group recommended 10 points for American policy in China and in Asia.

c. There was a "prevailing agreement" on the 10 points.

A careful scrutiny of the transcript discloses that Mr. Stassen's statements are factually incorrect. The transcript fails to reveal a "prevailing group" led by Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger—or anyone else. The reading fails to disclose a 10 point policy recommendation upon which there was a "prevailing agreement."

One of the topics of discussion at the round table was the question of recognition or nonrecognition of Communist China. The transcript indicates that a

majority of the round table participants inclined toward eventual recognition—with due attention given to the question of timing—or believed that eventually recognition was inevitable in view of the probability that the Communists would gain complete control of Chinese territory. At no point, however, did the discussions take the shape of anything resembling a policy recommendation. Such was not the purpose of the round table, and nothing of that character resulted.

The record of the United States Government in its refusal to accord recognition to the Communist regime in Peiping from before the Round Table Conference to date is thoroughly documented from official records. These records have been made available to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. These show conclusively that the Department of State has never advocated the recognition of Communist China. Therefore it is beyond challenge that any statements made by Mr. Stassen to the effect that a recognition policy favored by a majority of persons at the Round Table Conference was either favored or followed by the Department of State are not correct.

It is apparent from the transcript that the discussion was arranged for the purpose first of obtaining a full expression of varying points of view and, secondly, of having those various points of view subjected to the scrutiny and comment of persons holding other views. It is apparent from the transcript that those who took part in the discussion were made fully aware of the fact that the group was not being asked to make any recommendations as a group nor even to attempt to arrive at a consensus. The purpose of the meeting was to give to those in the Department who were charged with the responsibility of recommending policy the assurance that they were being given the benefit of a full and free discussion of a given situation by an informed group of citizens who had no official responsibility.

* * * * * * *

Mr. MANDEL. The name of Joseph Weinberg has come up in connection with one of our exhibits as well as the name of Frank Oppenheimer.

And I offer a newspaper account of the present status of Joseph W. Weinberg and also the testimony of Frank Oppenheimer as photostated from the hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the relevancy of that is that a conference was held by the Institute of Pacific Relations on the general question of the atom bomb, and the two scientists who were asked to be present were Mr. Oppenheimer and Mr. Weinberg.

We have asked General Groves, who held a high position in respect to atomic energy at that time, to comment on the significance of the conference at the time. And Mr. Groves has answered and has presented a letter to the committee.

And I ask you, if you think it appropriate that his comment on that conference go into the record at this time, that that be done.

Senator O'CONOR. I personally doubt, Mr. Morris, whether it is in line with the others. It is not official. It has not been submitted to the Atomic Energy Energy Commission or anything of that kind.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, no. You see, he is no longer associated with it. But we asked him, in view of what he knew about atomic energy and the nature of the thing being discussed at the conference, and he is qualified in every way, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, except that instead of being here as a witness he is giving it to us as a letter.

Senator O'CONOR. It is the equivalent of a statement he would make if he were present here as a witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The inadequacy of it, Senator, is that he is not here as a witness; that he has written his opinion.

With that limitation, I wonder if you would allow that to go into the record, strictly for informational purposes.

Senator O'CONOR. I do feel, however, without digesting all of the paragraphs in the letter, that it had to be qualified to that extent, because it is not under oath.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Senator O'CONOR. And if it reflects upon anybody or anything of that kind, I think it has to be understood that it is not the same as if it were testimony from a witness.

But it is introduced purely for informational purposes, and it will be received with that restriction.

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1379" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1379

[From the Washington Star, May 23, 1952, p. 1]

PERJURY CHARGED TO ATOM EXPERT IN INDICTMENT—WEINBERG ACCUSED OF FALSELY DENYING COMMUNIST TIES

Joseph W. Weinberg, a scientist who helped develop the atomic bomb, was indicted here today on charges he lied when he denied under oath to a congressional committee that he had been a member of the Communist Party.

Weinberg was long described only as "Scientist X" by the House Un-American Activities Committee during an investigation of atomic spying. He figured prominently in the committee's investigation of spying at the University of California's wartime radiation laboratory at Berkeley.

Conviction would make him liable to 10 years imprisonment on each of three counts.

ARRESTED IN MINNEAPOLIS

Weinberg was arrested by the United States marshal in Minneapolis. He expressed surprise when told of the indictment.

He indicated he would seek legal advice immediately preparatory to his scheduled appearance to answer the indictment in Washington June 2. He refused to discuss the charges against him.

Weinberg went to the University of Minnesota in 1947 from the University of California to serve as assistant professor of physics.

He was suspended by President J. L. Morrill on May 16, 1951, on charges he refused to cooperate with the grand jury investigating his testimony before the Un-American Activities Committee.

A month later the Board of Regents voted to relieve him of all duties but to keep him on the payroll for one year to comply with university tenure regulations. That year will expire June 15.

Weinberg appeared before the House committee May 25, 1949.

The committee demanded that Weinberg be indicted for perjury and his case long has been before a grand jury here.

Weinberg appeared before the grand jury and refused to answer certain questions. This led to contempt of court proceedings, but he was acquitted on his plea that he had a constitutional right to refuse answers that might be incriminating.

District Court Judge James R. Kirkland, before whom the indictment was returned, fixed bond at $10,000.

The indictment charges Weinberg's statement under oath that he had not been a member of the Communist Party was "false."

A second count alleges that Weinberg falsely told the committee that other than one Communist Party meeting in Oakland, Calif., during the war, he did not believe he had attended any meeting which he believed to be Communist.

A third count alleges Weinberg lied when he testified he did not remember having known Steve Nelson prior to April 26, 1949.

PARTY ORGANIZER IN WAR

Nelson now is a Communist Party functionary in Western Pennsylvania, but during the war he was party organizer in Alameda County, Calif., where the university is located.

The House committee alleged that Nelson, in that capacity, infiltered the radiation laboratory with Reds and obtained atomic secrets to be passed along to Russia.

Several scientists of lesser stature who worked in the radiation laboratory also were called before the committee, but refused to answer questions about Communist connections on the ground of possible self-incrimination.

HEARINGS REGARDING COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF RADIATION LABORATORY AND ATOMIC BOMB PROJECT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CALIF.

TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 1949

EXECUTIVE SESSION [6]

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood, Burr P. Harrison, John McSweeney, Morgan M. Moulder, and Richard M. Nixon.

Staff members present: Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; William A. Wheeler, investigator; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will be in order.

Let the record disclose that Mr. Harrison, Mr. McSweeney, Mr. Moulder, Mr. Nixon, and Mr. Wood are present, a quorum.

Mr. RUSSELL. The first witness is Frank Oppenheimer.

(Thereupon, Dr. Frank Friedman Oppenheimer entered the hearing room, accompanied by his counsel, Mr. Clifford J. Durr.)

Mr. DURR. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would permit Mrs. Oppenheimer to come in with Dr. Oppenheimer at one and the same time? I assure you there will be no attempts at evasion. Some of the incidents you might want to talk about occurred a long time ago, and you might get more accurate information from both of them at the same time than separately.

Mr. WOOD. Will Mrs. Oppenheimer be a witness?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. We will proceed with one at the time.

Mr. DURR. What was your ruling?

Mr. WOOD. We will proceed with one at the time.

Dr. Oppenheimer, will you raise your right hand. You solemnly swear that the testimony you will give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I do.

Mr. WOOD. If it becomes necessary, in the course of the examination, for Dr. Oppenheimer to confer with Mrs. Oppenheimer, we will be very glad to give him that opportunity.

Mr. DURR. Thanks for the "very competent."

Mr. RUSSELL. Dr. Oppenheimer, did you ever meet Steve Nelson at more than one place, or was it the same place all the time?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Two different places.

Mr. RUSSELL. Two different places?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Yes. I met him only twice.

Mr. RUSSELL. Only twice?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. At two different places?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. A different place each time?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. Yes; both being social occasions.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did you ever meet him in the home of Dr. Joseph Weinberg?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. No; I did not meet him in the home of Dr. Weinberg.

Mr. RUSSELL. You stated this morninng that when you joined the Communist Party you used the name Frank Folsom.

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[6] Testimony taken in executive session and released during the public hearing in the afternoon of same day.

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. May I correct that? I did not use the name Frank Folsom. When I joined the Communist Party, for some reason which I did not understand at the time and have never understood since, they requested that my right name and another name be written down. This seemed to me ludicrous. I never used any name but my own, and at the time, because of the fact it seemed so ludicrous, I wrote down the name of a California jail.

Mr. RUSSELL. Who asked you to use the false name?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. A person I do not recall, whose identity I do not recall who took my application.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did you ever pay dues to the Communist Party of the United States?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I certainly did.

Mr. RUSSELL. To whom did you pay dues?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. To the treasurer of the particular branch to which I happened to belong.

Mr. RUSSELL. Do you recall the branch?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. No.

Mr. RUSSELL. Did you receive Communist Party membership cards during 1940 and 1941?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I do not remember whether I did or not.

Mr. RUSSELL. For purposes of the record, the committee's investigation reflects that in 1937, under the name of Frank Folsom, you were issued Communist Party book 56385. In 1938 you were issued Communist Party book 60493. And in 1939 you were the holder of Communist Party book No. 1001.

Mr. WOOD. Can you affirm or deny the correctness of the statement counsel has just made?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. I can't possibly identify the numbers, but the fact that I was issued a membership book at that time, I certainly affirm.

Mr. RUSSELL. At the time of your membership in the Communist Party, that is, when you first joined in 1937, were you residing at 1288 Cordova Street in Pasadena, Calif.?

Dr. OPPENHEIMER. No.

DELLWOOD ROAD,
Darien, Conn., May 26, 1952.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This is in reply to your letter of April 30 in which you enclosed a summary of the round table conference which was held under the joint auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the San Francisco International Center.

The most significant names on the list of participants shown in the photostats you sent me were those of Frank Oppenheimer and Joseph W. Weinberg, and Felix Bloch. Other names that might on investigation prove to be interesting from a scientific standpoint were those of Leo Brewer, Paul H. Kirkpatrick, David L. Webster, and Walton A. Wickett.

As to the Army and Navy officers who were present, I have been unable to determine just who Col. Isaacs was. Admiral Greenslade died several years ago. General Wilbur, who won the Congressional Medal of Honor in Africa, is now retired from the Army. I imagine that General Wilbur and possibly Col. Isaacs attended as representatives of the military command in San Francisco. General Wilbur has done a great deal of public speaking in the last few years and has consistently pointed out the dangers of the advance of creeping socialism in Europe.

As far as I know, Mr. Brewer, Mr. Webster and Mr. Wickett had no connection with the Manhattan District, although they may have participated in the work of the present Atomic Energy Commission. I do not know about Mr. Kirkpatrick.

Mr. Bloch was one of the more experienced physicists who was originally recruited for work at Los Alamos by Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer, the scientific head at that point. After his arrival there, a certain amount of friction developed between him and Dr. Oppenheimer. Just what the cause was I cannot remember without reference to records not now in my personal possession. It was not personal, but dealt with the work. I would guess either that it was the organizational set-up (Bloch did not, I believe, consider Oppenheimer to be his superior in experience or ability), or possibly it was because Bloch was not in complete sympathy with the goal which we hoped to achieve. I do not know whether he was influenced in his decision by Dr. E. U. Condon, who was at Los Alamos for

a short period as an associate director under Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer at about that time. At any rate, Mr. Bloch left after a very short stay at Los Alamos.

I rather assume that the files of the Manhattan Project, which were turned over to the Atomic Energy Commission, or perhaps those remaining at Los Alamos, would disclose the reason, although it may have been reported verbally by Dr. Oppenheimer to me. Dr. Oppenheimer should remember, because he was personally involved. I have the recollection that it in no way involved security.

The two significant names are, of course, those of Frank Oppenheimer and Joseph W. Weinberg. As has been brought out in the testimony before and the conclusions of the House Un-American Activities Committee, Weinberg's attitude towards security was not above suspicion. He never enjoyed my confidence or trust after his attitude towards Russia became known.

Frank Oppenheimer, as you know, is a younger brother of J. R. Oppenheimer. You are undoubtedly familiar with his record. I do not recall that we were able, during the war, to discover any proof that Frank Oppenheimer himself was not loyal to the United States. It is possible that the security files of the Manhattan Project, which are no longer under my control, would disclose otherwise. In that event, I would not dispute them. When I say this, it does not mean that we did not keep a rather close eye on Frank Oppenheimer.

The significance of his appearance at such a meeting is that he knew a great deal more about the project than did Weinberg. The latter's information was, as I recall, limited to that of the Berkeley Laboratory plus whatever he may have been told by people violating our security rules. Weinberg did not enjoy our confidence. He did not know everything that went on in Berkeley.

Frank Oppenheimer had been at Berkeley. He had also been at Oak Ridge on the Electro Magnetic plant. He undoubtedly learned through conversation with other scientists, although it was forbidden, a great deal about the gas diffusion plant. He also spent some time at Los Alamos where he would have learned about the actual bomb design and to some extent about the Hanford plutonium project.

As to the meeting itself, it is difficult to guess the difference between what was said and what was reported. The statements of the two scientists at the top of page two were definitely in line with the Communist line that the Soviet Union was superior to the United States and that it would be to our advantage to give away as much of our secret processes and secret knowledge as we could.

In general, the views expressed at the conference appear to follow the general party line. If one eliminated the views attributed to the military personnel, it would not be difficult to imagine that the meeting was being held in a regularly established cell.

The most interesting thing to me was the agenda used by the conference. This must have been prepared in advance. It was slanted in such a way that no other type of discussion could possibly have taken place with such a participating group. I noted that there were a number of subjects on the agenda that were not discussed in the meeting. The tone was undoubtedly set by the agenda and the moderator. I found no indication as to who prepared the agenda and who was the moderator, or who selected him. On the whole is seems to be part and parcel with the general aims of those who would surrender American aims to those of the Soviet.

Sincerely yours,

LESLIE R. GROVES, *Lt. Gen. USA (Ret.)*.

LRG/eru.

Senator O'CONOR. That concludes the list, and the hearing will now be adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., Thursday, May 29, 1952, the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

INDEX TO PART 13

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

Page

Abolin ---- 4490
Abramson, Mr ---- 4489, 4490, 4492, 4516, 4586, 4588–4590
Abshagen, Mr ---- 4439
Abt, John J ---- 4720, 4722, 4737
Academy of Science of the Soviet Union ---- 4483
Acheson, Dean ---- 4533, 4534, 4539, 4540, 4545, 4547, 4714, 4715, 4748, 4869, 4877, 4900
Adamovich ---- 4508
Adler, Larry ---- 4748
Adler, Solomon ---- 4531, 4649, 4663, 4737, 4748, 4805, 4823, 4830
Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute ---- 4555
Afghanistan ---- 4630–4633, 4739, 4836
AFL. (*See* American Federation of Labor.)
Africa ---- 4595–4598, 4606, 4607, 4626
Agrarian Institute ---- 4508
Agwilines ---- 4869
AKO. (*See* Kamchatka Co.)
Alaska ---- 4493, 4494, 4556
Albanian Government ---- 4789
Albricht, Mr ---- 4428
Alcock, Consul ---- 4699
Alderson Reporting Co ---- 4468
Aldo Cafe ---- 4358, 4370, 4373, 4376, 4382, 4456, 4464, 4466, 4470, 4471
Aldrich, Bailey ---- 4692
Alejandrino, Castro ---- 4858
Aleutian Islands ---- 4493, 4494
All Union Chamber of Commerce ---- 4508
Allen, James A ---- 4860
Allen, James S ---- 4859, 4861
Allen, George E ---- 4827
Alley, Rewi ---- 4616, 4619, 4620
Allied Labor News ---- 4807
Alper, Benedict Solomon ---- 4643, 4723
Alpi. (*See* Brown, Fred.)
Alexeief, Mr ---- 4589
Alsberg, Mr ---- 4568, 4587
Altenburg, Mr ---- 4439
Altman, Norman S ---- 4401
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America ---- 4638, 4639, 4725
Ambroz, A. J ---- 4509
Amerasia ---- 4544, 4545, 4570, 4620, 4621, 4692, 4698, 4811, 4812, 4821, 4826, 4838, 4842, 4843, 4845–4847, 4859–4862.
America. (*See* United States of America.)
Amarican & Foreign Power Co ---- 4835
American Chinese Policy Association ---- 4544
American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives ---- 4619
American Committee for Cultural Freedom ---- 4595
American Council of Learned Societies ---- 4836, 4893
American Council on Education ---- 4834

88348—52—pt. 13——36

Page
American Economic Association 4669
American Embassy (Chungking) 4541
American Embassy (Moscow) 4570
American Embassy (Rome) 4417
American Federation of Labor 4887
American Friends of the Chinese People 4609, 4613, 4615, 4616, 4842, 4870
American Geographical Society 4591
American League for Peace and Democracy 4608
American Magazine 4592
American Psychological Association 4834
American Red Cross 4835
American Student Union 4391
Americans United for World Government, Inc 4834
American Veterans Committee 4833
Ames, Harry 4887
Amindusco. (*See* American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.)
Amoy 4535, 4700
Amstal Bank 4569
Amsterdam 4500
Amtorg Trading Corp 4753
Amsterdam 4500
Andy 4823
Anglo-American Russian Summer School 4580
Anisimov, J. A 4506, 4508
Annalee 4822, 4824
Argentine 4651, 4728, 4825
Arneson, Mr 4823, 4830
Arneson, Elizabeth Yard 4823, 4830
Arnold, Carl 4823, 4830
Arnold, Fortas & Porter 4359, 4457, 4459, 4460, 4464, 4467, 4468, 4470, 4471
Arnold, Thurman 4743, 4744
Aroon, Sheh Bidien Ben. (*See* Bidien, Charles.)
Arosev, A. J 4497, 4504, 4508
Asakian, Ferri 4748
Asia 4447, 4454, 4516, 4525, 4534, 4536, 4537, 4539, 4544, 4691–4693, 4696, 4697, 4703, 4708, 4710–4712
Asia (magazine) 4592
Asiaticus 4575, 4807, 4860, 4861
Askins, H. R 4810
Associated Press 4855
Astor, Viscount 4893
Atcheson, George 4542, 4876
Atkinson, Allen 4724
Atkinson, Brooks 4691, 4823, 4830, 4847, 4849
Atkinson, Ellen Van Zyll de Jong 4622, 4805, 4829
Atlantic Monthly 4592
Atlantic Pact 4710
Auemoy 4535
Austern, Hilda (Ray) 4578, 4861, 4890, 4891
Austin, Horace 4618, 4886
Austin, Warren 4834
Austria 4637
Australia 4526, 4651, 4893
Avorin. (*See* Abolin.)
Award 4826

B

Bachrach, Marion 4614, 4757
Badger, Admiral 4534
Baker, Mr. 4569
Bakulin, A. V 4881
Baldwin, Raymond E 4428
Ballentine, Joseph W 4532, 4834, 4835, 4876
Baltimore Sun 4834

Page
Bank of Foreign Commerce ---- 4499, 4504, 4560, 4567
Bankers Trust Co ---- 4835
Baranov, T. E ---- 4509
Barcelona ---- 4519, 4520
Barkley, Alben ---- 4714, 4748
Barley, L. J ---- 4893
Barnes, Joseph ---- 4355, 4492
Barnes, Kathleen ---- 4500, 4503, 4561, 4562, 4567, 4569, 4860–4862
Barnett, Patricia Glover ---- 4616
Barnett, Robert ---- 4616, 4823, 4830
Barrows, Miss ---- 4714
Bassie, Veet ---- 4748, 4755
Bator, Ulan ---- 4525
Baxter, James P ---- 4834
Beale, Thomas W ---- 4863
Beer, Max ---- 4723
Beloff, Max ---- 4888
Benedict, Ruth ---- 4861
Bentley, Elizabeth Terrill ---- 4402, 4404, 4667, 4670–4673, 4677, 4720, 4737, 4755, 4759, 4775–4782, 4786–4792, 4796–4798, 4801, 4803
Bently group ---- 4759
Berkovich, J. M ---- 4508
Berle, Adolph ---- 4783
Berlin ---- 4487
Bertram, James ---- 4616
Berzin, General ---- 4795
BEW. (*See* Board of Economic Warfare.)
Bidien, Charles ---- 4609, 4610, 4716, 4805
Bigelow, Professor ---- 4556
Biggerstaff, Knight ---- 4422
Bingham, Hiram ---- 4827, 4838
Bingham, Woodbridge ---- 4422
Bissell, General ---- 4831
Bisson, Thomas Arthur ---- 4545, 4605, 4610, 4616, 4622, 4624, 4716, 4847, 4848, 4859–4862, 4880, 4883
Bisson, Mrs. T. A ---- 4847, 4848
Bloch Felix ---- 4904
Bloch, Kurt ---- 4860
Bloom ---- 4714
Blue Eagle Guerrillas ---- 4857
Blumenthal, Anne H. C ---- 4847
Board of Commissars ---- 4518
Board of Economic Warfare ---- 4395, 4622, 4623, 4625, 4629, 4736
Bodde, Derk ---- 4610, 4872
Bogolepov, Igor ---- 4479–4520, 4553–4590
Bogorov, B. G ---- 4509, 4555
Bolte, Charles ---- 4833
Bolton, Congresswoman ---- 4628, 4629
Bond, W. Langbourne ---- 4835
Bonnet, Henri ---- 4681, 4682
Boodberg, Professor ---- 4422
Borg, Dorothy ---- 4860, 4861
Borodin, Michael ---- 4583, 4584, 4586
Borton, Hugh ---- 4834, 4872
Bowman, Isaaih ---- 4834, 4900
Branch, Claude R ---- 4692
Brandt, William ---- 4861
Bremman, Mr ---- 4562, 4570
Brenecke, Miss ---- 4872, 4874
Brewer, Leo ---- 4904
Bridges, Harry ---- 4620
Bridges, Styles ---- 4540, 4541, 4543
British Embassy (Washington) ---- 4832
British India ---- 4526
British North Borneo Chartered Company ---- 4893
British United Aid to China Fund ---- 4619

Page
Brodie, Bernard 4835
Bromoff, Mr 4779
Brooke, Raymond D. (*See* Chen Han-seng.)
Brookings Institute 4568, 4834, 4835
Browder, Earl 4597, 4615, 4759, 4787, 4788, 4881
Brown, Emily 4823, 4830
Brown, Fred 4616
Brown, Neil 4822
Brumbaugh, A. J 4834
Brunauer, Esther Caulkin 4622, 4716
Buck, Mr 4590
Budenz, Louis 4358, 4359, 4363, 4364, 4369–4377, 4389, 4398, 4399, 4458, 4460, 4467–4471, 4866
Bukhara 4593, 4881
Bullitt, William C 4520–4552, 4834, 4900
Bundy, George 4532
Bundy, Harvey H 4692
Bunsch-Osmolovsky 4567
Bureau Ehrhardt 4431, 4432, 4440, 4442
Burley, Mr 4787
Burma 4533, 4534, 4536, 4687, 4689, 4691, 4772, 4871
Burns, Emile 4882
Burns, Ray 4823, 4830
Bursler, Norman 4675, 4737
Buss, Claude A 4835
Butler, Nicholas Murray 4474
Butterworth, W. Walton 4429, 4430, 4437, 4438
Byrnes, James F 4542–4546, 4548, 4840, 4877

C

Cain, Harry P 4816, 4820
Caldwell, John 4823, 4830
California Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities 4616
Canada 4561, 4653, 4659, 4890, 4893
Canadian Legation 4629
Canadian Pulp and Paper Association 4893
Canton 4442, 4443, 4699–4701
Cape, J 4591
Carlos, Jose 4857
Carlson, Evans Fordyce 4610, 4616, 4620, 4822, 4860–4862
Carnegie Corp 4850
Carnegie Endowment of International Peace 4474
Carnegie Foundation 4836, 4849
Carnegie Fund 4673
Carolyn 4828
Carr 4823, 4830
Carrington, John W 4863, 4903
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 4605
4359, 4370–4373, 4376, 4378–4380, 4456, 4462, 4463, 4492, 4497, 4505, 4506, 4522, 4526, 4553–4557, 4560–4563, 4567, 4569, 4571, 4573, 4574, 4576, 4584–4588, 4629, 4807, 4859, 4871, 4872, 4874, 4891.
Carter, Mrs. Edward C. 4605
Carter, John 4829
Case, Everett 4532–4534, 4834, 4900
Castle 4900
Caustin, Harold E 4900
CCNY. (*See* College, City of New York.)
Central Asiatic Republics of Kazakhstan 4398
Central Intelligence Agency 4775, 4790, 4793, 4801
Central Labor Council of Seattle 4887
Chait, Phillis 4650
Chamber of Commerce (Moscow) 4499
Chamberlain, Mrs 4612, 4613
Chamberlain, William Henry 4888

Page
Chambers, Jay David Whittaker---- 4648, 4673, 4720, 4743, 4752, 4756, 4757, 4775–4787, 4789, 4790, 4795, 4797, 4798, 4800, 4801, 4803.
Chan, Hansu---- 4885
Chapman, Abraham---- 4610, 4805
Chase Bank---- 4830
Chatham House---- 4500, 4577
Chen, Han-seng---- 4586, 4587, 4590, 4610, 4615, 4806, 4828, 4860, 4879
Chen, Keng-ya---- 4884
Chen, Shao-yu---- 4883
Cheng, Chen---- 4878
Chennault, Claire Lee---- 4534, 4687, 4688, 4703, 4706, 4710, 4763–4775
Cherniavsky---- 4497, 4504, 4509
Chesnokov, M. J---- 4509, 4555
Chi, Chao Ting---- 4355, 4616, 4806, 4859–4861, 4879
Chi, Shu-feng---- 4879
Chiang, Kai-shek---- 4535, 4537, 4543, 4545, 4581, 4582, 4586, 4634, 4685–4687, 4691, 4694, 4696, 4703–4714, 4771, 4827, 4839–4841, 4845, 4853, 4854, 4878, 4880–4882, 4884, 4885.
Chiang, Kai-shek, Madame---- 4707, 4765, 4767, 4772, 4826, 4827
Chicago News---- 4834
Chicago Star---- 4543
Chicherin---- 4523, 4524
Chile---- 4642
China---- 4356, 4416, 4417, 4423, 4428, 4432, 4441, 4447, 4489, 4492, 4494, 4505, 4526, 4528, 4535, 4542, 4544, 4547, 4552, 4568, 4581, 4586, 4587, 4590, 4633, 4634, 4682–4691, 4693–4700, 4702–4714, 4763–4765, 4768, 4769, 4771–4775, 4806, 4808, 4822, 4825–4832, 4834, 4839–4841, 4843–4846, 4849, 4854, 4855, 4859, 4865, 4871, 4874, 4876, 4878, 4880, 4882, 4883, 4885, 4888, 4894, 4899, 4900.
China-American Council of Commerce & Industry, Inc---- 4543, 4546
China, National Government of---- 4525, 4533, 4542, 4543, 4545, 4683, 4685, 4687, 4690, 4694, 4703, 4705, 4715, 4764, 4767, 4769–4771, 4839–4841, 4889, 4893, 4895.
China Today---- 4615, 4616, 4620, 4621, 4811, 4812, 4842, 4865, 4880, 4881, 4883–4886
Chinese American Citizens Alliance---- 4870
Chinese Air Force---- 4765
Chinese Atlas---- 4504
Chinese Central Government---- 4828
Chinese Communist Army---- 4542, 4884, 4885
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives---- 4619, 4620
Chinese Maritime Customs Service---- 4699, 4831
Chinese National Army---- 4552, 4840
Chinese Navy---- 4536
Chinese Provisional Central Soviet Government---- 4882
Chinese Republic---- 4691
Chinese Soviet Government---- 4886
Chinese Soviet Republic---- 4883
Chinese Stabilization Board---- 4625
Chinese War Production Board---- 4691
Choate, Charles F., Jr.---- 4692
Cholmely, Elsie. (*See* Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie.)
Chou, En-lai---- 4686, 4687
Chow, Ho-sin---- 4885
Christian Science Monitor---- 4832, 4856, 4892
Chu, Chia-hua---- 4423
Chu, Chiu-po---- 4880, 4883
Chu, Teh---- 4884
Chugunov, N. L.---- 4509, 4555
Chungking---- 4432, 4441, 4533, 4581, 4582, 4686, 4691, 4768, 4769, 4771, 4773, 4825, 4826, 4829–4831
Churchill, Prime Minister---- 4825, 4872, 4873
CIA. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency.)
CIO. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
Civil Aeronautics Board---- 4834

Page
Civil Air Transport---- 4763
Civil Rights Congress---- 4607
Clark---- 4590
Clark, Tom---- 4611
Clay, General---- 4427
Clayton, William L---- 4546
Cochrane, E. L---- 4870
Coe, V. Frank---- 4625, 4629, 4676, 4677, 4737, 4748, 4756
Cohen, Theodor---- 4545
Colegrove, Kenneth W---- 4835, 4860
Coleman---- 4832
College, Agnes Scott---- 4886
College, Army War---- 4545, 4835
College, Bryn Mawr---- 4478, 4582
College, Claremont---- 4591
College, City of New York---- 4626, 4638, 4639, 4741
College, Oberlin---- 4838
College, Occidental---- 4835
College, Radcliffe---- 4392
College, St. John's---- 4832
College, Trinity---- 4807
College, Williams---- 4834
Collier's Weekly---- 4592
Colling, J---- 4823, 4830
Collins, Henry H---- 4722, 4737
Collins, Henry Hill---- 4748–4750
Collins, Henry Hill, Jr---- 4748–4750
Collins, Tom---- 4750
Columbia University Library School---- 4392
Comintern---- 4485, 4489, 4508, 4516, 4518, 4561, 4587, 4881, 4882, 4886
Comintern, Executive Committee---- 4564
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy---- 4599, 4601, 4604, 4609–4612
Committee for Industrial Organization---- 4887
Committee on Armed Services---- 4548
Committee on Labor Organizations---- 4857
Communist, The---- 4616, 4882, 4898
Communist Academy---- 4488, 4492, 4493, 4499, 4560, 4567, 4577–4579, 4586, 4588, 4589
Communist International---- 4541, 4880, 4881, 4883–4885
Communist International, Seventh Congress---- 4885, 4886
Communist International, Sixth World Congress---- 4880
Communist Party---- 4359–4364, 4366–4369, 4374, 4388–4391, 4393–4395, 4398, 4404, 4483, 4484 4490, 4497, 4498, 4511, 4523, 4525, 4529, 4535, 4581–4583, 4585, 4586, 4634, 4645–4662, 4669, 4673, 4674, 4676–4679, 4720, 4722, 4723, 4726, 4727, 4733, 4741–4745, 4748, 4751, 4752, 4754, 4758–4760, 4766, 4776, 4777, 4780–4783, 4785–4804, 4816, 4841, 4842, 4847–4849, 4866, 4902.
Communist Party (Alabama)---- 4886
Communist Party (China)---- 4529, 4530, 4533–4535, 4538, 4539, 4542, 4543, 4551, 4685–4687, 4690, 4694–4697, 4702–4714, 4764–4768, 4771, 4772, 4806, 4827–4831, 4839, 4840, 4844, 4848, 4859, 4872, 4874–4879, 4881–4884, 4886, 4894, 4895.
Communist Party (India)---- 4888
Communist Party (Japan)---- 4844, 4888, 4892
Communist Party (Korea)---- 4888
Communist Party (Philippines; *see also* Hukbalahap)---- 4449, 4858
Communist Party (Poland)---- 4807
Communist Party (Russia)---- 4541, 4542, 4840, 4879
Communist Party (USA)---- 4403, 4485, 4836, 4886, 4903, 4904
Communist Party Central Committee (Russia)---- 4561, 4589, 4881
Communist Party Congress (China)---- 4838
Communists' Progressive Book Shop---- 4616
Compton, Arthur---- 4834
Condon, E. U---- 4904
Congress of Industrial Organizations---- 4398, 4834, 4835, 4887
Connally---- 4714
Connelly, Matt---- 4714

Page
Cooke, Admiral ---- 4534, 4538
Coons, Arthur G ---- 4839, 4859, 4860
Coordinating Committee for Postwar Rehabilitation ---- 4674
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs ---- 4736, 4737
Coplon, Judith ---- 4670
Corcoran, Crispian ---- 4885
Cordes, Mr ---- 4439
Cordt, Mr. ---- 4440
Corey, Lewis ---- 4725–4727
Corey, Mrs. Lewis (Esther) ---- 4726–4727
Corwin, Norman Lewis ---- 4724
Council for Pan-American Democracy ---- 4614
Council on African Affairs ---- 4599, 4605, 4606, 4626
Council on Foreign Relations ---- 4834
Cowan, Jim ---- 4823
Coyne, J. B ---- 4893
Cresset Press, The ---- 4591
Cripps, Lady ---- 4620
Crockett, George W., Jr ---- 4836
Cross, Mr ---- 4580
Crum, Bartley ---- 4620
Curran, Joseph ---- 4620
Currie, Lauchlin ---- 4667, 4676, 4677, 4737, 4745, 4751
Curtis, Charles P ---- 4692
Curtis, Richard C ---- 4692
Czechoslovakia ---- 4897

D

Daily Express ---- 4511
Daily Worker, The ---- 4374, 4543, 4855–4857, 4886
Daladier, Premier ---- 4530
Dane, John, Jr ---- 4692
Daniel, Howard ---- 4650
Davies ---- 4826
Davies, John ---- 4768, 4827, 4828
Davies, John P ---- 4839
Davies, Joseph P ---- 4512, 4513, 4515, 4516, 4557–4560
Davis, Benjamin J ---- 4597
Davis, Don ---- 4823, 4830
Davis, J. Merle ---- 4890
Davis, John ---- 4830
Daytona Beach News-Journal ---- 4388
Daytona Beach Sun-Record ---- 4388
Dean, Vera Micheles ---- 4834, 4872
Deane, Hugh ---- 4610, 4616, 4861, 4862
De Caux, Len ---- 4629
Decker, John W ---- 4835
De Gaulle Government of France ---- 4441
Dekezoniov ---- 4486
De Lacy, Hugh ---- 4620
De Leon, Jose ---- 4858
Democratic Alliance ---- 4857, 4858
Dennett, Eugene ---- 4887
Dennett, Raymond ---- 4680, 4681
Dennison ---- 4823, 4830
Despres, Emile ---- 4622, 4624, 4716
Deuel, Wallace ---- 4834
Deutsch, Monroe E ---- 4835
Dexter, Franklin ---- 4692
Digby, Winfield ---- 4497, 4504, 4506
Dillingham, Walter F ---- 4546
Diska, Sarah L ---- 4651
Doihara ---- 4699
Dolbin, Mr ---- 4779
Donaldson, J. M ---- 4621
Donaldson, Faith ---- 4476, 4478, 4526

Page
Dooman, Mr---- 4545, 4546, 4876, 4877
Doonping, R---- 4882, 4883
Dorfman, Adolfo---- 4651
Doubleday, Doran & Co---- 4591
Doyle, Charles---- 4887
Doyle, Clyde---- 4863, 4866
Drogunov, Mr---- 4589
Drumright---- 4545, 4546
Drumwright, Everett F---- 4823, 4830
Dubin, Wilbert B---- 4888
Duggan, Lawrence---- 4580, 4614, 4800
Dunn, James Clement---- 4876
Dupee, William Arthur, Jr---- 4692
Duran, Gustavo---- 4520
Duranty, Walter---- 4897
Durr, Clifford J---- 4903

E

Earnshaw, Ruth---- 4859
East Indies---- 4684
East India Co---- 4699
Eaton---- 4714
Eby, Kermit---- 4834
ECA. (*See* Economic Cooperation Administration.)
Ecija, Nueva---- 4858
Economic Cooperation Administration---- 4622, 4625, 4714, 4834
Ehrhardt, Mr---- 4440
Eisenhower---- 4537
Eisler, Gerhart---- 4402, 4798
Ellis, Raymond W---- 4692
Elliston, Herbert---- 4833
Elyssiev, Mr---- 4589
Embry, John A---- 4434
Emerson, Rupert---- 4834, 4860, 4859
Emerson, John K---- 4844
Endelman, Michael---- 4724
Engdahl, Russell---- 4831
Engdahl, Mrs. Russell (Lee)---- 4823, 4830
England. (*See* Great Britain.)
Entenberg, Barbara---- 4855, 4857
Epstein, Israel---- 4806, 4858, 4859, 4861
Epstein, Mrs. Israel. (*See* Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie.)
Erenburg, Mr---- 4589
Estonia---- 4486
Export-Import Bank (United States)---- 4544, 4834

F

Fabyan, Eleanor B---- 4616
Fahs, Charles B---- 4834
Fairbank, John K---- 4692, 4693, 4698, 4702, 4823, 4831, 4234, 4835, 4959, 4862
Fairbank, John P---- 4454
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie---- 4600, 4601, 4610, 4804
Fanelli, Joseph---- 4358, 4396
Fang, Chih-ming---- 4885
Far East American Council---- 4546
Far Eastern Survey---- 4445, 4454, 4680, 4692, 4693, 4855, 4856, 4884, 4888, 4889, 4898
Farley, Miriam---- 4473, 4545, 4860
Farmers' Bank of China---- 4619
FEA. (*See* Foreign Economic Administration.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation---- 4389, 4403, 4663, 4776, 4782, 4785, 4786, 4790, 4792, 4796, 4801, 4805, 4826, 4837, 4842, 4843, 4846, 4848, 4849.
Federal Emergency Relief Administration---- 4639, 4647, 4667, 4720, 4722, 4733
Federal Research Project---- 4756

Page
Federal Reserve System Board of Governors---- 4622
Federal Security Agency---- 4623
Federal Works Agency---- 4623, 4744
Feng, Yu-Hsiang---- 4582, 4583, 4882
FERA. (*See* Federal Emergency Relief Administration.)
Ferris, General---- 4771
Fickan---- 4823, 4831
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt---- 4357, 4358, 4374, 4462, 4500, 4502, 4560, 4562, 4567, 4569, 4587, 4663, 4787, 4789, 4853, 4859, 4861, 4870, 4884.
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt---- 4357,
Field, Noel---- 4800
Field, Philip Morton---- 4662, 4663
Fields, Lottie Adler---- 4653
Fifield, Russell H---- 4446, 4450, 4454
Finger, Louis---- 4836
Finkelstein, Lawrence S---- 4871
Finletter, Thomas K---- 4834
Fischer, Mrs. Louis (Markoosha)---- 4403, 4404
Fisher, H. H---- 4870
Fitch---- 4822
Fitzgerald, Barry---- 4752
Fitzgerald, Edward J---- 4677, 4678, 4737, 4752, 4755
Fitzpatrick, Henry Patrick---- 4754
Fitzpatrick, Patrick F---- 4752, 4754
Five-year plan---- 4578
Flato, Charles---- 4623
Fleischer, Colonel---- 4427
Fleischman, Manly---- 4758
Flick, Mr---- 4440
Folkoff, Isaac---- 4752
Fong, Mr---- 4590
Foote, Wilder---- 4723
Ford, James W---- 4596, 4597
Fordham Law School---- 4741
Foreign Affairs (magazine)---- 4592
Foreign Economic Administration---- 4622–4625, 4641, 4664, 4675, 4676, 4679, 4716, 4745, 4832
Foreign Office in Moscow---- 4563, 4564
Foreign Policy Association---- 4834, 4880
Foreign Relations Committee of the House---- 4540, 4628
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate---- 4540, 4542, 4548, 4836
Foreign Trade Bank---- 4508
Foreign Workers Publishing House---- 4508
Forman, Harrison---- 4894
Formosa---- 4534–4538, 4713, 4769
Fortas, Abe---- 4370-4372, 4359, 4363, 4364, 4375–4380
Fosdick, Raymond B---- 4532–4534, 4834, 4900
Foster, William C---- 4682
Foster, William Z---- 4597, 4836
Fowler, Henry---- 4758
Fowler, R. M---- 4893
Foye, Arthur---- 4547
France---- 4441, 4564, 4681, 4807, 4893, 4896, 4897
France, Government of---- 4807
Francisco, Vice Minister of Philippines---- 4856
Franco, General---- 4482
Frank, Waldo---- 4616
Freiman, Mr---- 4555
Freina, Louis C---- 4726
French Intelligence Service---- 4530
Friedland, Pauline---- 4751
Friedman, Irving---- 4860
Friedman, Jacob---- 4402
Friedman, Julian R---- 4716, 4829
Friedman, Milton---- 4738

Page

Friedman, Vincent 4848
Friefeld, Anna 4652
Fritchman, Stephen 4602
Fuchs, Walter 4420–4423
Fuellkrug, Mr 4439, 4440, 4442
Fukien 4700
Fulbright, J. William 4833

G

Galewicz, Jan 4724
Galkovitch 4589
G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd 4591
Gannes, Harry 4885
Gardner, C. S 4420, 4421
Gardner, Virginia 4876
Garfield, James 4692
Gates 4597
Gauss, Mr 4541
Gauss, C. E 4823, 4831
Gayn, Mark 4823, 4831, 4842, 4844, 4847
Gebb 4823, 4830
Geneva 4481, 4569, 4671, 4676, 4807
Gentill 4823, 4831
George, Walter F 4539, 4540
Gerlach, Talitha 4600, 4604, 4610, 4807
Germany 4421, 4425, 4426, 4435, 4441, 4487, 4488, 4745, 4873, 4877, 4894, 4897
German Army 4487, 4873
German consulate in Canton, China 4440
German consulate in Chifoo, China 4440
German consulate in Hankow, China 4440
German consulate in Shanghai, China 4440
German consulate in Tientsin, China 4440
German consulate in Tsingtao, China 4440
German consulate in Nanking, China 4440
German consulate in Peking, China 4440
German Foreign Office 4581
German Party Headquarters in China 4440
Gernett, Alice Ratcliffe 4392
Gilchrist, Huntington 4834, 4892
Ginsberg, Marie 4724
Glasser, Harold L 4623, 4678, 4737
Glassman, Sidney 4653
Goebels, Mr 4440
Gold, Bela 4677, 4737
Gold, Mrs. Bela 4737
Gold, Sonia 4677, 4737, 4756
Goldet, Mr 4671
Golos, Jacob 4402, 4404, 4752
Goodrich, L. Carrington 4420, 4610, 4834
Goodsteinsinger, Jeanne 4724
Goshal, Kumar 4604, 4610, 4616, 4861
Goss, Ambassador 4839
GPU. (*See* Soviet Secret Police.)
Grad, Andrew. (*See* Grajdanzev, Andrew.)
Gradoss, Vino 4832
Grady, Henry F 4546
Grajdanzev, A. J 4725, 4860, 4861
Granich, Max 4862–4366
Gran, Mr 4440
Graves, Kizer & Graves 4835
Graves, Mortimer 4861, 4893
Great Britain 4439, 4500, 4503, 4510, 4512, 4551, 4564, 4569, 4590, 4631, 4650, 4681, 4691, 4698, 4699, 4784, 4805, 4807, 4808, 4822, 4872, 4873, 4890, 4893, 4895–4897.

Page
Great Soviet World Atlas---- 4498, 4499, 4507
Green, Senator---- 4825, 4832
Greenberg, Michael---- 4622, 4629, 4716, 4736, 4807, 4861, 4862
Greene, Jerome---- 4569
Greene, Roger S---- 4860, 4861
Greenslade, Admiral---- 4904
Gregg, Joseph---- 4719, 4736
Gregory, Homer E---- 4860
Grew, Joseph C---- 4544–4546, 4834, 4876, 4900
Griffin, Robert A---- 4834
Griffiths, Samuel P---- 4823, 4831
Gromov, Anatoli Borisovitch---- 4669–4671, 4796
Gropper, William---- 4615
Groves, Helen---- 4827
Groves, Leslie R---- 4901, 4905
Guam---- 4764, 4822
Gubicher---- 4670
Gumperz, Julian---- 4402
Gutzeit, Miss---- 4439
Gwin, Samuel L---- 4692

H

Haas, Dr---- 4441
Hall, John L---- 4692
Hall, John M---- 4692
Hall, Rob F---- 4618, 4886
Halperin, Maurice---- 4719, 4736
Hansemann, Mr---- 4439
Hanson, Haldore---- 4860, 4862
Hanwell, Norman D---- 4859
Harondar, Eugene---- 4476, 4477, 4499, 4554, 4555, 4561, 4568, 4574
Harriman, W. Averell---- 4546
Harris, Captain---- 4823, 4831
Harrison, Burr P---- 4903
Haru, Matsui---- 4615
Harvard Russian Summer School---- 4580
Harvard University Press---- 4692, 4702
Harvard-Yenching Institute---- 4421
Hatem, Dr---- 4831
Hatem, J. W---- 4824, 4831
Hazard, John N---- 4440, 4443, 4509, 4510, 4513, 4622, 4716, 4897
Heise, Mr---- 4440, 4443
Heissig, Walther---- 4416–4426, 4428–4436, 4439, 4440
Henderson, Loy---- 4527
Hendrickson, E. E---- 4887
Henson, Ed---- 4636
Herod, William R---- 4835
Hersey, John---- 4610, 4612
Hicks, Victor---- 4887
Hidaka, Takashi---- 4442, 4443
Hidaka, Tomiaki---- 4432, 4433, 4439, 4440, 4442
Hillenkoetter, Admiral---- 4775–4782, 4790–4793, 4797, 4798, 4801, 4802, 4804
Hillman, Sidney---- 4638, 4664, 4676
Himmler, Mr---- 4440
Hindustan Times---- 4807
Hinton, Bertha---- 4868
Hirohito---- 4892
Hirschfelt, Mr---- 4569
Hiss, Alger---- 4473–4475, 4530, 4531, 4673, 4722, 4737, 4748, 4755, 4778, 4786, 4791, 4796
Hiss, Donald---- 4722, 4737
Hitch, S. H---- 4823, 4831
Hitler, Adolph---- 4340, 4487
Ho, Chi Minh---- 4536
Hoffman, Paul G---- 4546

Page
Holcombe, Arthur N---- 4835
Holden, John S---- 4867, 4869
Holland---- 4493
Holland, William L---- 4461, 4462, 4464, 4472, 4500, 4566, 4571, 4629, 4805–4807, 4860, 4861, 4872, 4874, 4887–4889
Holmes, Julius---- 4876
Homan, Christine---- 4823, 4831
Hong, Chew---- 4355, 4357, 4807
Hong Kong---- 4501, 4534, 4699, 4700, 4702, 4766, 4831
Hoover, Lyman---- 4822
Hopkins, Harry---- 4639
Hornbeck, Stanley K---- 4530, 4531, 4545, 4546, 4862, 4900
Hsu, Hsiang-chien---- 4884, 4885
Hsu, Yung-Ying---- 4806, 4861, 4872, 4876
Hu, Chiu-yuan---- 4879
Hubbard, L. E---- 4888
Huber, Franz---- 4440
Huks. (*See* Hukbalahap.)
Hukbalahap---- 4447–4452, 4454–4456, 4858, 4871
Hughes, Charles---- 4887
Hull, Secretary---- 4714, 4715
Humelsine, Carlisle H---- 4539, 4540, 4548, 4849, 4617, 4714–4716, 4815
Hummel, Professor---- 4420
Hung, William---- 4420, 4421
Hurley, Patrick J---- 4541, 4542, 4544, 4545, 4769, 4773, 4774, 4825, 4829, 4832, 4839–4841, 4845, 4853, 4877, 4878
Hutchins, Mr---- 4568
Hutchinson---- 4823, 4831

I

Ilyin, B. S---- 4509, 4555
India---- 4537, 4595, 4596, 4632, 4687–4689, 4694, 4700, 4701, 4708, 4711, 4829, 4832, 4871, 4893.
Indochina---- 4533, 4536, 4537, 4682, 4684, 4693, 4711, 4807
Indonesia---- 4537, 4693, 4711, 4716
Indusco. (*See* Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.)
Industrial Relations Counselors---- 4641
Infantry Journal, The---- 4591
Iniasevsky, A. N---- 4509
Inland Boatmen's Union---- 4887
Inner Mongolia---- 4418, 4419
Institute on China---- 4578, 4586, 4588
Institute of Oceanography---- 4499, 4508, 4509, 4553–4555, 4557, 4561, 4567, 4568, 4573
Institute of Orientology---- 4578
Institute of Pacific Relations---- 4373, 4374, 4382, 4420, 4445, 4452, 4462, 4463, 4472, 4476, 4477, 4488, 4490–4495, 4498, 4500, 4501–4505, 4514, 4516, 4517, 4522, 4525, 4530, 4532, 4545, 4546, 4553, 4554, 4557, 4561, 4562, 4568, 4572–4574, 4576, 4578–4580, 4586, 4590, 4627–4629, 4682, 4692, 4716, 4780, 4787, 4802, 4805–4812, 4816, 4829, 4843, 4846, 4849–4853, 4859–4861, 4870–4872, 4887, 4888, 4890–4892, 4896, 4901, 4904.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council)---- 4488, 4493, 4495, 4497, 4500–4502, 4554, 4556, 4568, 4571, 4576–4580, 4587, 4680, 4681, 4693, 4787, 4813, 4814, 4835, 4850, 4855, 4856, 4878, 4888, 4889, 4898, 4899.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Amsterdam)---- 4569
Institute of Pacific Relations (Canadian Council)---- 4554, 4556
Institute of Pacific Relations (Far Eastern Branch)---- 4556
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat)---- 4571, 4576, 4578
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council)---- 4501, 4568, 4570, 4576, 4577, 4850, 4851
Institute of Pacific Relations (Soviet Branch)---- 4476, 4477, 4491–4493, 4495, 4496, 4498, 4500–4508, 4554, 4557, 4566–4573, 4576, 4577.

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference (Banff) 4579, 4586, 4590
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference (Hot Springs) 4681
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference (Kyoto, Japan, Third International) 4890
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference (Ninth) 4850, 4610
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference (Seventh) 4610
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference (Statford-on-Avon, Tenth) 4892, 4893
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference (Yosemite) 4526, 4571, 4888
Institute of Royal Economics and Politics 4516
Institute of Scientific Publications 4499
Institute of Soviet Construction and Soviet Law 4506, 4509
Institute for World Economics and Politics 4488, 4494, 4508, 4578, 4579, 4588
Institute of Vostokvedenie 4508
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 4834
International Committee for Chinese Industrial Cooperatives Production Relief Fund 4619
International General Electric Co 4835
International Labor Office 4890
International Missionary Council 4835
International Monetary Fund 4676
International Press Correspondence 4880, 4886
International Refugee Organization 4724
International Research Committee 4499, 4503
Irwin, Don 4374
Isaacs, Colonel 4904
Isaacs, Harold 4824, 4831, 4847, 4848, 4861, 4872, 4882
Ishii, Mr 4587
Italy 4699
Ivanov, Mr 4649, 4735
Izvestia 4585

J

Jaffe, Philip J 445, 4560, 4561, 4567, 4824–4826, 4831, 4842–4849, 4859–4861, 4865
Jahnke, Mr 4440
James, M 4883
Janson, J. D 4499, 4505, 4308, 4562, 4567
Japan 4433, 4441, 4489, 4493, 4494, 4526, 4533, 4537, 4542, 4543, 4588–4590, 4683, 4684, 4686, 4690–4692, 4698–4711, 4715, 4722, 4814, 4815, 4826, 4830, 4840, 4852, 4854, 4855, 4871, 4877, 4892, 4894, 4897
Japanese Army 4432, 4442, 4529, 4530, 4856
Japanese Navy 4374
Jefferson School 4614
Jehol 4700
Jenckes, Marcien 4692
Jenkinson, Anthony 4807
Jessup, Philip C 4532, 4533, 4535, 4536, 4770, 4800, 4834
Jim 4822
Joffe, S. S 4499, 4508, 4560, 4561, 4567
John Day Co., Inc 4591, 4851, 4852
John, Helen. (*See* Bentley, Elizabeth.)
John Swire & Sons 4893
Johnson, Franklin R 4692
Johnston, Eric 4898
Johnstone, William C 4629, 4860–4862
Jones, Catesby 4456–4461, 4464–4468, 4470–4472
Jones, Paul 4823, 4824, 4829, 4831
Joseph, J. Julius 4719
Journal du Moscow 4482
Julian 4829
Jung, Mr 4439

K

Kafoid, Professor 4556
Kahn, Albert 4513
Kalestsky, Michael 4721

Page
Kalgan Press---- 4418
Kamchatka Co---- 4477, 4556, 4508
Kantorovich, Anatole---- 4489, 4490, 4499–4502, 4516, 4561, 4562, 4567–4569, 4575
Kaplan, Mrs. Irving (Dorothy)---- 4754, 4758
Kaplan, Irving (Isadore)---- 4629, 4636, 4647, 4648, 4652–4656, 4658, 4671, 4672, 4735, 4737, 4738–4761, 4756, 4781, 4782
Kaplan, Jenni---- 4740
Kaplan, Morris---- 4740
Karakhan, Mr---- 4522–4524, 4529, 4583
Kara-Murza, Mr---- 4516–4518, 4884
Karavaev, A. A---- 4506, 4508
Keany, Mary Jane---- 4643
Kearney, Bernard W---- 4863
Keeney, Mary Jane---- 4389, 4394, 4396, 4397
Keeney, Philip O---- 4388,4394, 4396, 4397, 4610
Kefauver, Estes---- 4428
Keitel, Mr---- 4440
Kennan, George F---- 4841
Kennedy, Raymond---- 4893
Khabarovsk---- 4589
Khmelnitskaya, Mr---- 4588, 4589
Kholokhoze---- 4556
Khorezm---- 4593
Kimball, Dan A---- 4810
Kimura, Shoji---- 4443
King, P. S---- 4587
Kingsley, J. Donald---- 4724
Kirkland, James R---- 4902
Kirkpatrick, Paul H---- 4904
Kizer, Benjamin H---- 4835, 4859, 4860–4862
Klecki, Michael---- 4649, 4650, 4653
Klemova, Mr---- 4555
Klueva, Mrs. V. N---- 4508, 4509
Knight, Max---- 4823, 4824
Koblehavn, Gyldenal---- 4591
Koketuy (Blue Banner) periodical---- 4418
Kolossen Asien---- 4591
Komsomol Pravda---- 4508
Korea---- 4519, 4536, 4538, 4574, 4711, 4767, 4871, 4876, 4893
Kornfetter, Mr---- 4785
Kramer, Charles---- 4678, 4722, 4737, 4752, 4755
Kransky, Ferdinand---- 4752
Krasavtsev, Mr---- 4562, 4570
Kreger, Dorothy---- 4463
Kremlin---- 4506, 4569
Krevitsky, Charles. (*See* Kramer, Charles.)
Krivitsky, General---- 4784
Krupskaya---- 4503
Kubanin---- 4506, 4508
Kuchymov, V---- 4883
Kuei, Po---- 4701
Kuliabko---- 4497, 4504, 4505, 4509
Kulik, Marshal---- 4481
Kullgren, John---- 4423
Kung, H. H---- 4687
Kunming---- 4768, 4771, 4773
Kuo, Mo-jo---- 4879
Kuomintang---- 4534, 4542, 4685, 4686, 4690, 4694–4698, 4706, 4708, 4766, 4768, 4826, 4841, 4854, 4859, 4878, 4882–4885
Kuo-wen Weekly---- 4885
Kurt---- 4822
Kuznetzov---- 4829
Kwong, Victor---- 4870

L

Page
LaGuardia, Fiorello ---- 4728–4732
Lampell, Millard ---- 4724
Lanchow ---- 4432, 4442
Landis, James M ---- 4834
Lang, Olga ---- 4611, 4612, 4623, 4624, 4859
Langer, Paul ---- 4888
Lapham, Roger ---- 4532
Larsen, Emmanuel Sigurd ---- 4842, 4846
Lasker, Bruno ---- 4859, 4861
Laswell, Harold ---- 4834
Latin America ---- 4737
Latourette, Kenneth S ---- 4834
Lattimer, Murray ---- 4630, 4641, 4642, 4674, 4675, 4735, 4736
Lattimore, David ---- 4422, 4866–4869
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor) ---- 4358, 4359, 4361, 4369–4371, 4375, 4376, 4378, 4379, 4382, 4389, 4392, 4395, 4396, 4399, 4422, 4455–4466, 4469–4472, 4477, 4526, 4681, 4682, 4692, 4840, 4844, 4867.
Lattimore, Owen ---- 4355, 4358–4365, 4369–4390, 4392, 4393, 4395, 4396, 4399, 4416, 4418, 4420–4431, 4435, 4436, 4456–4458, 4461, 4462, 4465–4472, 4475–4477, 4501, 4516–4519, 4522–4530, 4544–4546, 4554, 4555, 4562–4566, 4570–4575, 4582, 4590, 5691, 4630–4637, 4681, 4683, 4692, 4739, 4779, 4807, 4815, 4816, 4820, 4823, 4824, 4830, 4831, 4833–4836, 4844, 4851, 4852, 4859–4862, 4867, 4871, 4893, 4894, 4896–4898, 4900.
Latvia ---- 4486
Lawrence, David ---- 4834
Lawrence, W. H ---- 4898
Leaf, Earl H ---- 4860
League of Nations ---- 4481, 4484, 4485, 4518, 4526, 4563, 4880
League of Women Shoppers ---- 4395
Lee, Duncan Chaplin ---- 4719, 4823, 4830
Lee, John ---- 4771, 4772
Lee, Michael ---- 4623
Lehman, Herbert H ---- 4640, 4642, 4675
Lenin ---- 4493, 4895, 4896, 4899
Lenin Library of Leningrad ---- 4579
Leningrad ---- 4486
Leontiev, B ---- 4816
Leouzon, Lieutenant ---- 4434
Leshinsky, Solomon ---- 4678, 4679, 4737
Lessing, Ferdinand D ---- 4421, 4422
Levine, J ---- 4897
Levy, Jenny ---- 4404
Li, Chien-nun ---- 4880
Li, Li-san ---- 4883
Li, Ting-sheng ---- 4880
Library of Congress ---- 4393, 4394, 4591, 4593, 4895, 4896
Lichter, Mr ---- 4439
Lie, Mr ---- 4655
Lilienthal, Philip ---- 4612, 4613
Linde ---- 4497, 4504, 4509
Lindley, Ernest K ---- 4833
Linebearger, Paul ---- 4823, 4824, 4830, 4831
Lischinsky, Ferdinand ---- 4752
Litag ---- 4514
Little, Herbert ---- 4824, 4831
Little, Khiral ---- 4525
Litvinov ---- 4485, 4503, 4506, 4512, 4513, 4515, 4518, 4519, 4524, 4558–4560, 4564, 4565, 4569
Litwinowa ---- 4526
Lockhart, Oliver C ---- 4834
Lockwood, Mrs. W. W ---- 4824, 4831
Lockwood, Wm. W ---- 4859, 4861, 4862, 4872
Lodge, Senator ---- 4832

Page

London 4588, 4699, 4808, 4881
London School of Economics 4499, 4560, 4567
Lovett, Robert A 4682, 4814
Lowell Institute 4422
Lowenthal, Max 4426, 4663, 4675, 4679, 4735, 4736
Luce, Claire Boothe 4620
Luce, Henry 4545
Luchenhaus, Mr 4439
Lud 4822
Ludden, Paul 4768
Ludden, Raymond P 4531, 4532, 4824, 4830, 4831, 4840
Ludwig, William 4677
Lu, Kwang-mien 4619
Lung, Pi-win 4822
Lurie, D. G 4506, 4508
Luzon 4448, 4454
Lyon, Freddy 4824, 4831

Mc

McAllister, Parker 4675
McCann, Colonel 4900
McCarthy, Senator 4833, 4835
McConnell, Frederick J 4741, 4743
McCormick, Anne O'Hare 4835
McFadyean, Andrew 4893
McHugh, Colonel 4824, 4831
McInerney, Mr 4825, 4826
McKeever, Harold Porter 4724
McLean, Robert Leroy 4393
McMahon, Senator 4826
McNair, Harley Farnsworth 4861
McNally, E. J 4824, 4832
McSweeney, John 4903
McWilliams, Carey 4611

M

Ma, General 4534
Macao 4700
MacArthur, Douglas 4452, 4453, 4543, 4545, 4546, 4814, 4815, 4845, 4856, 4876, 4877
MacKenzie, Mr 4569, 4577
Mackey, Argyle R 4716, 4717
MacMillan Co., The 4587, 4591
McMahon, Senator 4660
McNaughton, Ernest B 4835
Madrid 4429
Maddocks, Ray T 4430
Madyar, L 4589, 4878, 4879
Magdoff, Harry Samuel 4645, 4646, 4669, 4671, 4672, 4679, 4725, 4737, 4743, 4752, 4755
Malania, Leo 4659
Malaya 4535, 4539, 4871
Mallan, Colonel 4436–4438
Mallory, Walter H 4834
Manchester Guardian 4832
Manchoukuo 4500, 4702
Manchuria 4425, 4490, 4516, 4517, 4530, 4544, 4551, 4552, 4589, 4684, 4690, 4699, 4700, 4708, 4766, 4877
Mansfield, Mike 4834
Mao, Tse-Tung 4687, 4704, 4707, 4708, 4710, 4711, 4713, 4842, 4844, 4846, 4872, 4874–4876, 4883–4885, 4895
Marcantonio, Vito 4620
Marine Jumper, steamship 4869
Marine Tiger, steamship 4868, 4869
Maritime Commission 4869

Page
Marsh, Mr 4439
Marshall, George C 4424, 4430, 4437, 4438, 4534, 4542–4544, 4547–4551, 4708, 4710, 4764–4767, 4835
Martha 4822
Marx 4895
Masani, M. R 4888
Massachusetts Co 4699
Massachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activities 4616
Massing, Hede 4402–4404, 4798–4804
Masson, John 4893
Mastin, Floyd E 4417, 4425
Matzkevich, S. P 4506, 4508
Mayer, W 4416, 4417, 4419, 4824, 4831
Medical Pharmaceutical Information Bureau 4401
Meisinger, Mr 4441
Mekhanoshin, K. A 4508, 4553–4555, 4557, 4573
Melish, William H 4611
Menefee, Selden 4611, 4887
Mertsky, (Coleman) Jeannette 4824, 4832
Methuen & Co., Ltd 4591
Meyer, Eugene 4834
Mexico 4584
Miaja, General 4481, 4482
Michael, Mr 4513
Midwest Record 4388
Mif, Mr 4589, 4883
Military Affairs Committee of the House 4543
Military Intelligence (Russia) 4561, 4562, 4566, 4581, 4584, 4590
Military Intelligence Service 4832
Miller, Robert T 4398, 4473–4475, 4719, 4737
Minerva, D. F. Ediciones 4591
Mirsky, Prince 4503, 4506, 4507
MIS. (*See* Military Intelligence Service.)
Missouri, U. S. S 4877
Misumi, Kikan 4443
Mitchell, Kate L 4497, 4504, 4584, 4586–4588, 4611, 4616, 4842, 4844, 4847, 4861
Molotov 4485, 4511
Mongolia 4418, 4419, 4422, 4425, 4429, 4433, 4504, 4516–4519, 4523, 4526, 4527, 4562–4566, 4570, 4571, 4590, 4631, 4632, 4836
Mongolian People's Republic 4523, 4525
Monlin, Chiang 4895
Montelibano 4857
Moore, Harriet L 4476–4478 4497, 4502–4506, 4526, 4554, 4555, 4568, 4569, 4571, 4574, 4859,–4861 4897.
Moore, Moris T 4835
Moore, Wallace 4834
Moore-McCormack Lines 4869
Morgan, Mr 4821, 4824–4826, 4829, 4832, 4833
Morgan, Edward P 4836
Morgenthau, Mr 4745
Morgenthau plan 4877
Morrill, J. L 4902
Morris, Susan 4659
Morse, Wayne 4834
Moscow 4404, 4442, 4475, 4476, 4482, 4486–4488, 4490, 4492, 4495, 4498–4500, 4502, 4510, 4514, 4516, 4520, 4522, 4525–4527, 4545, 4553, 4561, 4562, 4568, 4574, 4575, 4577–4583, 4586, 4712, 4713, 4771, 4789, 4872, 4873, 4878, 4880–4883, 4890, 4896.
Moscow Daily News 4403, 4404, 4508, 4583
Moscow Stock Exchange 4505, 4567
Moscow Trials 4559, 4584, 4585, 4587
Motylev, V. E 4476, 4477, 4495, 4498, 4500–4503, 4505, 4507, 4560–4563, 4556–4571, 4574, 4859, 4861, 4895.

Page
Moulder, Morgan M---- 4903
Moy, Eugene---- 4355
Mueller, Hans---- 4807
Mulin, V---- 4506, 4508
Mueller, Mrs---- 4439
Murmansk---- 4555, 4556
Murphy, Gardner---- 4834
Murphy, J. Morden---- 4835

N

Nagano, Y---- 4860
Nanking---- 4424, 4426, 4442, 4443, 4570, 4770
Narkomindel---- 4572, 4577
Nation, The---- 4592, 4615
National Bureau of Economic Research---- 4638, 4639, 4664
National Bureau of Standards---- 4727
National City Bank---- 4830
National Council of American Soviet Friendship, Inc---- 4842
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties---- 4754
National Foreign Trade Council---- 4544
National Labor Relations Board---- 4623
National Negro Congress---- 4596, 4598, 4607
National Peasants Union---- 4857
National People's Party. (*See* Kuomintang.)
National Production Authority---- 4758
National Recovery Administration---- 4638, 4733
National Research Project. (*See* Work Projects Administration, National Research Project.)
Natsuda, Mr---- 4439
Naval Intelligence of the Soviet Union---- 4553, 4554, 4561, 4573
Nazi Intelligence---- 4423, 4433
Nazi Party---- 4421
Needleman, Isadore Gibby---- 4753
Nelson, Bert---- 4887
Nelson, Donald M---- 4691, 4853
Nelson, Steve---- 4902, 4903
Netherlands---- 4569, 4893
Netherlands India---- 4492
New China Daily News---- 4355–4357, 4807
New Masses---- 4853, 4877, 4878
New Republic---- 4592
New School for Social Research---- 4871, 4872
Newsweek, Washington Bureau---- 4831, 4833
New World, The. (*See* Novy Mir.)
New York Herald Tribune---- 4373, 4374, 4543, 4544, 4713, 4832, 4893, 4894
New York Journal-American---- 4466, 4472
New York Journal of Commerce---- 4544
New York Public Library---- 4579
New York Times---- 4374, 4378, 4530, 4830, 4835, 4849, 4891, 4892, 4898
New York World-Telegram---- 4543
New Yorker, The---- 4610
New Zealand---- 4526, 4893
Neyhaus, David---- 4753
Niles, David---- 4753
Ningpo---- 4700
Nixon, Raphael I---- 4863
Nixon, Richard M---- 4903
NKVD. (*See* Soviet Secret Police.)
Norins, Martin R---- 4861
Norman, E. Herbert---- 4859, 4893
Norton, Robert---- 4616, 4861
Norwegian Government---- 4789
Nosaka---- 4844
Novy Mir---- 4815, 4816, 4820
NRA. (*See* National Recovery Administration.)
Nuremberg---- 4426

O

O'Connor, Colonel 4431, 4437, 4438
Oberg, Mr 4423
Oberg, Mrs 4423
Office for Emergency Management 4622, 4623
Office of Naval Procurement 4680
Office of Strategic Services 4395, 4416, 4417, 4429, 4693, 4716, 4737, 4829–4832, 4877, 4842
Office of War Information 4355, 4395, 4693, 4815, 4826, 4827, 4830–4832, 4836, 4855
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion 4623, 4746, 4747
OFRAR. (*See* United States Department of State, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation.)
Okinawa 4443, 4764, 4769
Oppenheimer, Mrs 4903
Oppenheimer, Frank Friedman 4901, 4903–4905
Oppenheimer, J. R 4905
Orchard, Mr 4590
O'Reilley, Claude 4887
Organized Workers International 4545
Osmena 4857
OSS. (*See* Office of Strategic Services.)
Ost-Europäisches Institute 4579
Ostiminesterium 4487
Otsuka, R 4888
Oudendyk, W. J 4888
Oumansky, Constantine 4584–4588, 4779
Outer Mongolia 4419, 4525, 4526, 4528, 4574
Owen, David 4630, 4632–4636, 4654–4656, 4671, 4672
Owens, Courtney E 4863
Owens, Hamilton 4834
Owens, Louis B 4869
OWI. (*See* Office of War Information.)
Oxford University Press 4591
Oyama, Richard Heroshi 4441, 4442

P

Paalov, General 4481
Pace, Frank 4808
Pacific Affairs ..... 4418, 4420, 4462, 4464, 4477, 4492, 4501, 4568, 4570, 4574, 4575, 4578, 4580, 4590, 4853, 4878, 4879, 4882, 4884, 4888, 4890, 4896, 4897.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co 4741
Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Communist Academy 4499, 4504, 4560, 4567
Pakistan 4871
Palmerston 4699
Pan American Airways 4835
Panay, U. S. S 4876
Paris 4531, 4724
Park, William Z 4719
Parkes, Harry 4699, 4701
Parnoch 4519
Parson, William W 4624, 4625
Patterson, John M 4544, 4545
Pauley Reparations Mission 4836
Pavolov, Mr. (*See* Ivanov, Mr.)
Peake, Cyrus H 4859–4861
Pearl Harbor 4687, 4688, 4853
Pearson Drew 4830
Pearson, L. B 4629
Peffer, Lillian 4860
Peffer, Nathaniel 4835, 4859, 4860, 4861, 4872
Peking (Peiping), China ..... 4416, 4418, 4421, 4422, 4425, 4426, 4433, 4434, 4436, 4439, 4442, 4570, 4701, 4702, 4831.
Penfield, James K 4824, 4832
Pengra, Charles O 4692

Page
People's Consultative Counsel 4542, 4543
People's Republic of Outer Mongolia 4524
Pepper, Senator 4823, 4829
Perazick, George N 4667–4672, 4753
Perkins, Dexter 4834
Perlin, B 4884
Perlo group 4673, 4737, 4755, 4759, 4778
Perlo, Victor 4674, 4677, 4722, 4737, 4753
Pete 4803
Peters, J 4756
Petroff 4826
Petropavlovsk 4442
Peurifoy, John E 4833, 4836
Peyrouton, Marcel 4876
Phil 4828, 4829
Philbrick, Herbert A 4782–4798,
4790, 4792, 4793, 4794, 4797, 4798, 4800, 4801, 4803, 4804
Philippine Army 4855, 4857
Philippines 4454, 4693, 4710, 4711, 4852, 4853, 4855–4857
Philippine Republic 4893
Phillips, J. W 4615, 4885
Picon, Jean 4643
Picthford, H 4426
Points, Julian Stewart 4784
Poland 4433, 4542, 4637, 4649, 4650, 4653, 4654, 4658, 4740
Poland, Fred 4807
Polish Government 4653, 4654
Politburo 4486, 4496, 4511, 4564
Poore, A. S 4903
Popov, Mr 4589
Popper, Davis H 4859–4861
Popper, Martin 4605
Popular Republic of Mongolia 4563
Porter, Catherine 4852, 4853, 4861, 4862
Postoffice Clerks Union 4887
Potsdam Conference 4541, 4544, 4545
Potsdam Declaration 4543, 4551
Potter, Brooks 4692
Pottinger, Henry 4699
Pravda 4503, 4585
Pressman, Lee 4722, 4737, 4753
Price, Harry Byard 4616, 4724, 4861
Proctor, Robert 4692
Purdy, Rosella 4863
Putney School, The 4867–4869
Puttkamer, B 4440
Puttkammer, Ernest W 4428

Q

Quezon, Mrs. 4451
Quigley, Mr. 4580, 4835

R

Rabbins 4497, 4504, 4509
Radek, Karl 4879
Radio Moscow 4485
Rae, Hilda Austern 4807
Railroad Retirement Board 4641, 4655
Rajchman, Ludwig 4807
Ramspeck, Robert 4621, 4624
Rand, Stuart C 4692
Randall Philleys Associates 4402
Rankin, Lieutenant Colonel 4823, 4829
Ray 4832
Ray, Frank 4824

Page
Ray, Jefferson Franklin 4623, 4624, 4716
Ray, Jefferson Franklin, Jr 4725
Recht, Charles 4860
Reconstruction Finance Corporation 4830
Red Army 4480, 4481, 4486, 4490, 4506, 4569
Redmont, Bernard 4719
Rees-Willimas, D. R 4893
Reichner, Phoebe 4823, 4824, 4829, 4832
Reid, Escott 4569
Reid, Helen 4713
Rein, David 4863
Reischauer, Edwin O 4835
Reischauer, Robert Karl 4860, 4861
Remer, Mr. 4590
Remington, William 4720, 4747, 4800, 4801
Republic of China 4523, 4542
Reviewing Board at Munich 4428
RFC. (See Reconstruction Finance Corporation.)
Rhee, Syngman 4861
Rhitts, Charles Edward 4821, 4823–4825, 4831, 4837, 4845
Rhodesia 4596
Ribbentrop, Mr 4434, 4440
Richards, C. A 4834
Rigor, Mayor 4857
Roberts, Rankin 4824, 4832
Robertson, Walter S 4834
Robertson, William S 4835
Robeson, Paul 4606, 4607, 4612, 4613, 4620
Robinson, G. T 4580
Rockefeller Brothers' Fund 4835
Rockefeller Foundation 4848, 4850, 4851, 4900
Rockefeller, John D., III 4835
Rodman, Bella 4757, 4758
Roever, Reel, & Donovan 4426–4428
Rogov, Mr 4584, 4585
Romm, Michael 4584, 4585, 4587, 4588
Rooks, General 4732
Roosevelt, Franklin D 4523, 4545, 4691, 4825, 4839, 4854, 4872, 4873
Roosevelt, Mrs. Eleanor 4834
Rose 4823
Rosenberg, Allan 4487, 4679, 4737
Rosenberg, Mr 4636
Rosenberg, Jacquelin 4659
Rosenthal, Morris 4641, 4674, 4675, 4735, 4736
Rosinger, Lawrence K 4834, 4835, 4860, 4861, 4872, 4900
Ross, Charles G 4551
Ross, John C 4724
Ross, Michael 4835
Roth, Mrs 4829
Roth, Andy 4824, 4829
Roth, Andrew 4616, 4681, 4682, 4807, 4814, 4815, 4832, 4842, 4844, 4846–4848, 4861, 4862
Rowe, David N 4446, 4447
Rowe, James 4834
Royal Institute of International Affairs 4893
Roxas, Manuel 4855, 4857, 4858
Rucker, Arthur 4724
Rukovina, Margaret 4659
Russell, Representative 4904
Russell & Co 4701
Russell, Louis J 4903
Russell, Maud 4602, 4604, 4620
Russell, Richard B 4428
Russia 4432, 4433 4442, 4479, 4487, 4515, 4517, 4528, 4554, 4556, 4583, 4589, 4657, 4691, 4703, 4710, 4711, 4715, 4725, 4728, 4729, 4740, 4788, 4798, 4800, 4826, 4841, 4848, 4894, 4897, 4902.

Page
Russian-American Society 4504
Russian Army 4873, 4897
Russian Foreign Office 4515

S

Sacher, Harry 4364, 4365
Sacks, Milton 4888
Safarov, Mr 4589, 4879
Sakhalin, Mr 4556
Salisbury, Lawrence E 4472, 4473, 4611, 4848
Santos, John 4364, 4366
Sayers 4513
Saypol, Irving H 4836
Sayre, Francis 4856
SCAP. (*See* Supreme Command Allied Powers.)
Schmidt, Mr 4433, 4434, 4499, 4560, 4567
Schnulz, J. W 4824
School of Slavonic Studies in London 4579
Schoyer, B. Preston 4616
Schulman, Marshall D 4724
Schulz, John Wesley 4832
Schuman, Frederick L 4512, 4513, 4833
Schwarz, Dr 4822
Scientific Publishing Institute 4507
Scotland 4699
Scott, Marcia T 4897, 4898
Scott, Sidney 4893
Scott, W. K 4616, 4617
Scripps-Howard Press 4544
Scripps Institute in California 4556
Sears, Judge 4426
Seattle Newspaper Guild 4887
Seattle Post-Intelligencer 4887
Seattle Star 4887
Seattle Unity Labor Council 4887
Seattle Web Pressman's Union No. 26 4887
Seeger, Elizabeth 4879, 4898
Seeman, Bernard 4611
Segrae-Ebro 4519
Service, Jack 4822
Service, John Stewart 4545, 4546, 4716
4768, 4773, 4820, 4821, 4824–4826, 4826, 4829, 4830–4832, 4837–4849
Service, R. M 4824, 4832
Shackelford, F 4809, 4810, 4815
Shanghai 4419, 4421, 4427, 4429, 4433, 4434,
4436, 4442, 4690, 4700, 4701, 4702, 4765, 4769, 4770, 4829, 4830, 4832
Shanghai Military Commission 4435
SHAPE. (*See* Supreme Headquarters of American Forces in Europe.)
Shen, Sheng-chang 4883
Shepherd, Jack 4861
Shih, Hsiung 4884
Shimura, Lt 4439
Shoemaker, James H 4893
Shu, Pin 4884
Shubin, Mr 4584
Siam 4533, 4536, 4711, 4871
Siang, V 4884
Siberia 4479, 4489, 4503, 4578, 4897, 4398
Siberian Cheka 4489
Silverman, Abraham George 4649,
4664–4667, 4670, 4673, 4677, 4733–4735, 4737, 4755, 4756, 4758–4760
Silvermaster group 4722, 4737, 4755, 4759, 4778
Silvermaster, Helen Witte 4753, 4754
Silvermaster, Nathan Gregory 4402, 4667, 4669, 4737, 4759
Singer, Marcia 4660
Sinkiang 4425, 4516

Page
Sino-Japanese War---- 4685, 4690
Skladyar, Mr---- 4589
Smedley, Agnes---- 4807, 4860, 4884
Smerling, Helen---- 4724
Smith, H. Bowen---- 4394
Snow, Edgar---- 4824, 4832, 4860
Snow, Mrs. Edgar---- 4808
Social Democrat Party---- 4766
Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries---- 4504, 4508, 4509, 4572, 4577, 4890
Sokolsky---- 4590
Sol---- 4822
Solution in Asia---- 4590
Somov, M. P---- 4509
Soong, T. V---- 4436, 4545, 4686, 4687, 4826, 4878
Sorge, Richard---- 4374, 4433
South America---- 4486
Southard, Ernest---- 4618
Southard, Mary Boggs---- 4618, 4886
Southard, Ordway---- 4618, 4886
Southern Conference for Human Welfare---- 4757, 4758
Soviet Army---- 4581
Soviet China---- 4492, 4504, 4517
Soviet Council for Foreign Relations---- 4561
Soviet Council of Pacific Affairs---- 4490
Soviet Embassy (Peiping)---- 4499, 4568
Soviet Embassy (Washington)---- 4670
Soviet Encyclopaedia---- 4507, 4568, 4589
Soviet Foreign Broadcast System---- 4485
Soviet Military Intelligence---- 4434, 4491–4493, 4497
Soviet Purchasing Mission---- 4670
Soviet Secret Police---- 4510, 4524, 4525, 4574
Soviet State Bank---- 4483, 4560, 4567
Soviet Union or Soviet Russia. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Soviet World Atlas---- 4504
Spain---- 4481, 4482, 4515, 4519, 4520
Spanish Civil War---- 4481
Special Committee on Un-American Activities---- 4616
Speshneff, Mr---- 4439
Sproul, Robert G---- 4546
Spykman---- 4587
St. Cyr---- 4536
Stachel, Jacob---- 4836
Stahmer, Mr---- 4441
Staley, Eugene---- 4835
Stalin, Joseph---- 4486, 4511, 4536, 4538, 4802, 4880–4882, 4895
Stankevich---- 4506, 4508,
Stary, Jeri---- 4724
Stassen, Harold---- 4835, 4900, 4901
State Farms Institute---- 4508
State Planning Commission (Russia)---- 4483
State, War, and Navy Cordinating Committee---- 4543, 4877,
Steger, Mr---- 4440
Steiger, Andrew---- 4724, 4807
Steiger, G. Nye---- 4861
Stein, Arthur---- 4733
Stein, Gunther---- 4807, 4824, 4832, 4861, 4893–4896
Sterling, J. E. Wallace---- 4835
Stettinius, Mr---- 4542
Stevens, Mrs. Harley---- 4824, 4832
Stewart, Ambassador---- 4770
Stewart, Maxwell---- 4542, 4860
Stewart, Ralph A---- 4692
Stilwell, General---- 4687, 4688, 4691, 4764, 4768, 4769, 4771, 4772, 4830, 4839–4840, 4843, 4845, 4853, 4854, 4878
Stimson, Secretary---- 4838, 4689
Stock, Mr---- 4439

Page
Stockholm, Sweden 4429
Stockton, Charles H 4692
Stomonyakov 4522
Stone, Edward 4394
Stone, Wm. T 4860, 4861, 4862
Strahov 4880
Straus, Donald 4611
Stripling, Mr 4403
Strong, Ann Louise 4583, 4807, 4860, 4861, 4881, 4897
Stuart, Leighton 4420, 4423, 4424, 4437, 4438, 4531, 4532
Sues, Ilona Ralf 4605, 4611
Sullivan and Cromwell 4889
Sullivan, Phil 4824, 4832
Sultan, Daniel I 4687
Sun, Yat-sen 4552, 4685, 4687, 4695, 4700, 4706–4709, 4859, 4879, 4880
Sun, Mme. Yat-sen 4858, 4859, 4885
Supreme Board of the Great Northern Sea Passage 4508
Supreme Command Allied Powers 4844
Supreme Headquarters of American Forces in Europe 4620
Swandize, A. S 4499, 4504, 4508, 4560, 4561, 4567
Swearingen, Rodger 4888
Sweden 4636
SWINK. (*See* State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Switzerland 4550, 4807

T

Talbot, Phillips 4835
T'ang, Liang-li 4881, 4884
Tangu 4421
Tannenbaum, Frank 4934
T'ao, Hsi-sheng 4879
Tarasov 4829
Taruc, Luis 4449, 4450, 4855–4858
TASS 4572, 4577, 4779
Tavenner, Frank S 4863–4866
Taylor, George E 4683, 4824, 4832, 4884
Taylor, William 4677, 4737
Teachers Union (Seattle, Wash.) 4887
Technical Assistance Administration. (*See* United Nations Technical Assistance Administration.)
Technikum of Foreign Language 4508
Teddy 4822, 4824
Teh, Chu 4687
Tehran 4831
Tennessee Valley Authority 4712
Tenney, Helen 4719
Terentiev, Mr 4589
Terlin, Rose 4600
Terrell, Gerald 4823, 4824, 4829, 4832
Teschner, Rosamond 4891
Tewksbury, Donald 4611, 4893
Textor, Robert 4852
Thailand 4876
Thomas, E. P 4546
Thompson, John T 4443
Thompson, Virginia 4616, 4834, 4861
Thorpe, C. A 4436, 4856
Tibet 4631, 4632
Tichy, Mr 4439
Tikhii Okean (Pacific Ocean) 4499, 4570, 4575, 4884
Time 4592, 4593
Time, Inc 4835
Time-Life-Fortune 4545
Timperley, H. J 4860, 4861
Ting, V. K 4504
Tirana, Rifat 4629

Page
Tito ---- 4802
Tojo ---- 4708
Tokyo, Japan ---- 4443, 4453, 4500, 4501, 4546, 4589, 4892
Tolstog ---- 4824
Tolstoi, Major ---- 4832
Tong, Chew. (*See* Hong, Chew.)
Torgny, Mr ---- 4423
Townsend, Peter ---- 4808
Townsend, Simon P ---- 4692
Toyin, Neyici ---- 4426, 4428
Toynbee, Arnold J ---- 4893
Trachtenberg, Alexander ---- 4614
Trainin, Mr ---- 4509
Transport Workers Union ---- 4364
Triano, Anne ---- 4723
Trinin, Mr ---- 4506
Trotsky ---- 4511, 4881, 4882
Troyanovsky, Mr ---- 4589
Trud ---- 4897
Truman, Harry S ---- 4535, 4542, 4545, 4551, 4605, 4606, 4714, 4825
Tsai, Ho-sen ---- 4881
Tseng, S. Y ---- 4504
Tukachevsky ---- 4482
Tung, Mr ---- 4828
Tung, Pi-wu ---- 4861
Turkmenia, Republic of ---- 4593
Turner, Ralph E ---- 4871
TVA. (*See* Tennessee Valley Authority.)
Tydings hearings ---- 4363, 4364, 4365, 4465, 4820–4849
Tydings, Senator ---- 4821, 4823, 4824, 4825, 4829, 4832, 4836
Tyler, Dolly ---- 4526

U

Ukraine ---- 4506, 4728–4730
Ullman, William Ludwig ---- 4737
Un-American Activities Committee, House of Representatives ---- 4374, 4672, 4733, 4734, 4755, 4757, 4842, 4862, 4863
Union of South Africa ---- 4596
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ---- 4389, 4403, 4404, 4450, 4481, 4484, 4486–4488, 4491, 4496, 4502–4507, 4509–4512, 4518, 4519, 4522, 4526–4528, 4530, 4534, 4537, 4543, 4545, 4551, 4553, 4554, 4557, 4558, 4563–4572, 4574–4583, 4586–4590, 4645, 4655, 4649, 4686, 4735, 4780, 4816, 4825, 4840, 4841, 4872, 4873, 4877–4880, 4883, 4887–4889, 4894, 4895–4898, 4905.
U. S. S. R. Foreign Office ---- 4480, 4481, 4484, 4491, 4492, 4494, 4496, 4510, 4522, 4524
U. S. S. R. Government ---- 4487, 4523–4526, 4529, 4534, 4559, 4571, 4574, 4583, 4670, 4779, 4789, 4829
U. N. (*See* United Nations.)
United American Spanish Aid Committee ---- 4757
United Federal Workers of America ---- 4396, 4398, 4733
United Kingdom. (*See* Great Britain.)
United Nations ---- 4397, 4441, 4551, 4552, 4592, 4627, 4628, 4630, 4631, 4634, 4639, 4643, 4647, 4649, 4651–4654, 4656, 4658, 4661–4663, 4666, 4670–4673, 4683, 4684, 4687, 4688, 4713, 4721, 4723, 4725, 4727, 4739, 4742, 4748, 4781, 4782, 4805, 4807, 4828, 4836, 4854
United Nations Conference, San Francisco ---- 4541, 4826
United Nations Department of Economic Affairs ---- 4627, 4642, 4738, 4747, 4748
United Nations Economic and Social Council ---- 4644
United Nations General Assembly ---- 4644, 4679, 4900
United Nations Personnel Bureau ---- 4659, 4661
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ---- 4639–4642, 4664, 4668, 4669, 4675, 4676, 4678, 4679, 4723, 4727–4732
United Nations Secretariat ---- 4635

Page
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration---- 4636, 4650, 4659, 4660, 4662
United Press---- 4830
United Public Workers---- 4398
United States, The. (*See* United States of America.)
United States Air Force---- 4429, 4441, 4666, 4667
United States Air Force, Fourteenth---- 4687, 4688
United States Air Transport Command---- 4687–4689
United States Armed Forces Institute---- 4682
United States Armed Forces Far East---- 4857
United States Army---- 4429, 4430, 4529, 4537, 4582, 4687, 4763, 4764, 4830, 4832, 4855, 4858
United States Army Counter-Intelligence Corps---- 4858
United States Army Intelligence (G–2)---- 4616, 4431, 4432, 4436, 4829
United States Army Ordnance---- 4691
United States Atomic Energy Commission---- 4624, 4901, 4904, 4905
United States Civil Service Commission---- 4621–4624, 4837
United States Civil Service, Loyalty Review Board---- 4611, 4837, 4838, 4845, 4849
United States Department of Agriculture---- 4623, 4731, 4732
United States Department of Commerce---- 4623, 4646, 4869
United States Department of Justice---- 4716, 4743, 4744, 4805, 4807, 4836
United States Department of State---- 4395, 4398, 4402, 4403, 4420–4423, 4430, 4436, 4512, 4515, 4527, 4530, 4532–4534, 4539, 4541, 4544, 4545, 4547–4551, 4558, 4559, 4627, 4633, 4641, 4673, 4694, 4703, 4715, 4716, 4721–4723, 4728–4730, 4737, 4746, 4747, 4774, 4799, 4815, 4816, 4821, 4825, 4830–4834, 4836–4839, 4841, 4842, 4844, 4869, 4876, 4877, 4899–4901.
United States Department of State, Loyalty Security Board---- 4837, 4838, 4844, 4845, 4849
United States Department of State, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation---- 4628, 4629, 4640–4642, 4664, 668, 4675, 4678
United States Department of War---- 4423, 4426, 4548, 4622, 4623, 4683, 4688, 4829, 4830, 4853
United States Department of the Army---- 4808, 4813–4815
United States Department of the Interior---- 4364
United States Department of the Navy---- 4716, 4810
United States Department to the Division of Central Services---- 4716
United States Embassy, Nanking---- 4531
United States Government---- 4394, 4479, 4485, 4486, 4488, 4536, 4537, 4629, 4630, 4638, 4639, 4644, 4645, 4648, 4649, 4664, 4665, 4678, 4691, 4714, 4717, 4734, 4745, 4747, 4760, 4766, 4769, 4770, 4774, 4776, 4782, 4786, 4795, 4799, 4801, 4805, 4815, 4901.
United States Group Control Council in Germany---- 4745
United States Immigration Service---- 4364, 4365
United States Marine Corps---- 4552, 4831
United States Military Commission in China---- 4427, 4436
United States Military Command in China---- 4840
United States Military Government---- 4680
United States Navy---- 4680, 4831, 4854
United States Navy Department---- 4842
United States Navy Office of Intelligence---- 4842, 4844
United States News---- 4592, 4834
United States of America---- 4356, 4417, 4429, 4439, 4441, 4450, 4497, 4500, 4503, 4505, 4506, 4516, 4522–4524, 4527, 4529, 4533, 4537, 4546, 4551, 4552, 4558–4561, 4564, 4568–4570, 4574, 4579, 4582, 4584, 4585, 4590, 4629, 4634, 4636, 4651–4653, 4655, 4657, 4659, 4660, 4683, 4684, 4686–4688, 4692, 4693, 4697, 4702, 4706, 4707, 4709–4713, 4720, 4721, 4728, 4740, 4744, 4764, 4772, 4773, 4779, 4784, 4786, 4806, 4807, 4822, 4826, 4829, 4834, 4836–4844, 4846, 4849, 4853, 4858, 4859, 4861, 4862, 4872, 4877, 4878, 4882, 4890, 4892, 4893, 4894, 4899, 4900, 4902, 4905.
United States Post Office Department---- 4621
United States Reparations Mission to Japan---- 4833
United States Senate---- 4540, 4816, 4821

Page
United States Senate, Armed Services Committee---- 4845
United States Supreme Court---- 4435
United States Treasury Department---- 4623, 4624, 4678, 4745, 4746
United States Women's Army Corps---- 4830
University, Cambridge---- 4805
University, Duke---- 4830
University, Colgate---- 4900
University, Columbia---- 4474, 4503, 4506, 4509, 4579, 4580, 4622, 4638, 4741, 4758, 4788, 4834, 4835, 4872, 4893
University, Cornell---- 4422, 4853
University, Fordham---- 4375
University, Fu-jen---- 4416, 4418, 4419
University, Georgetown---- 4834
University, Harvard---- 4420, 4503, 4579, 4618, 4693, 4831, 4834, 4835, 4886
University, Johns Hopkins---- 4358, 4360, 4384, 4416–4418, 4421, 4424–4426, 4428, 4468, 4633, 4833–4835, 4871, 4893, 4900
University, Lincoln---- 4595
University, Northwestern---- 4835
University of California---- 4421, 4422, 4556, 4579, 4835, 4902, 4903
University of Chicago---- 4387, 4428, 4835
University of Chicago Press---- 4890
University of Cincinnati---- 4835
University of Hawaii---- 4893
University of Kentucky---- 4835
University of Maryland---- 4387
University of Michigan---- 4446
University of Minnesota---- 4835, 4902
University of Moscow---- 4879
University of Nanking---- 4694
University of Pennsylvania---- 4835, 4872
University of Petrograd---- 4479
University of Rochester---- 4834
University of Vladivostok---- 4492
University of Washington---- 4832, 4835
University, Oxford---- 4588
University, Princeton---- 4834, 4872
University, Stanford---- 4588, 4835, 4870
University, Washington---- 4834
University, Yale---- 4834, 4835, 4871, 4893
University, Yenan---- 4832
University, Yenching---- 4420, 4423, 4424
UNRRA. (*See* United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.)
USAFFE. (*See* United States Armed Forces Far East.)
USSR. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Utley, Freda---- 4504, 4516

V

Vancouver Daily Province---- 4893
Vandenberg---- 4713
Vandenberg, Senator---- 4540, 4541
Vandenbosch, Amry---- 4835
Van Kleeck, Mary---- 4611, 4808
Van Tassel, Alfred James---- 4660
Varga, Eugene---- 4488, 4504, 4516, 4517, 4561, 4567, 4580, 4588, 4589
Varley, Mr---- 4661
Vaughan, Professor---- 4556
Veinberg---- 4510, 4514
Velde, Harold H---- 4863
Victor Gollanez, Ltd---- 4859
Viet Minh---- 4871
Viet Nam---- 4871
Vietnamese Army---- 4536
Vinacke, Harold M---- 4835, 4861
Vincent, John Carter---- 4421–4423, 4540–4550, 4877
Viner, Jacob---- 4834
Vinogradoff, Eugene---- 4824

Page
Virginia Co 4699
Virginia Quarterly Review 4592
Vishinsky 4486
Vladimar, Dimitry 4660
Vladivostok 4442, 4556, 4589
Vlassov, General 4486–4488, 4581, 4582
Voice of Moscow (radio) 4485
Voitinsky, Mr. G. N 4477, 4489, 4490, 4492–4494, 4499, 4501, 4508, 4560, 4561, 4567, 4570, 4574, 4575, 4588, 4589, 4860, 4880, 4881.
Voks. (*See* Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries.)
Von Briessen, Mr 4439
Von Reichenau, Ernst 4433, 4434
Von Reichenau, Walter 4433
Von Valree, Mr 4569
Voorhis, Jerry 4833
Vostokryba 4508
Vreeland, Harold 4463, 4464

W

WAC. (*See* United States Women's Army Corps.)
Wahl, David 4393, 4394
Wait, Richard 4692
Wakefield 4823
Wallace, Henry 4544, 4772, 4807, 4853, 4861, 4897, 4898
Waller, Tom 4823, 4831
Walsh, Edmund A 4834
Walsh, Richard J 4852
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations 4358, 4418–4421, 4424, 4426, 4459, 4463, 4833, 4835, 4836, 4871
Walton, Lieutenant 4417, 4419
Wang, Ching-wei 4708, 4881
Wang, Li-hsi 4879
Wang, Ming 4883–4886
Wang, Shi-hsueh 4545
Wang, Yu-Ch'uan 4879
War Production Board 4640, 4665, 4674, 4691, 4734, 4745, 4755
War Shipping Administration 4869
Ward, Angus 4527
Ware-Abt-Witt group 4722, 4737
Ware, Harold 4720, 4737, 4754
Warren, Lindsay C 4811–4814
Washburn, John N 4888
Washington Bookshop Association 4395, 4396
Washington Cooperative Book Shop 4395, 4396
Washington League of Women Shoppers 4757
Washington Post 4544, 4833
Washington Star 4902
Washington Square School 4638
Washington Times-Herald 4544
Wasserman, Ursula 4723
Watt, Robert 4834
Watts, Richard (Dick) 4605, 4611, 4824, 4832
Weaver, Captain 4823, 4824, 4829, 4832
Webb, Beatrice 4509
Webb, Sidney 4509
Webster, David L 4904
Webster Publishing Co 4898, 4899
Wedekind, Mr 4439
Wedemeyer Albert C 4419, 4430, 4431, 4534, 4547, 4548, 4687, 4702, 4771–4774, 4825, 4838, 4839, 4878.
Weinberg, Joseph W 4901–4905
Weitzel, Frank H 4813
Wehrmacht 4487
Weintraub, David 4627–4737, 4739, 4742
Weintraub, Sylvia 4674, 4727
Wells, Henry 4445–4447, 4449, 4451, 4454

Page
Weltfish, Gene 4611
Wen, Chih-kung 4880
Weng, W. W 4504
Wheeler, Donald Niven 4679, 4737
Wheeler, William A 4903
White, Harry Dexter 4575, 4625, 4667, 4677, 4679, 4745, 4754
White, Harry Victor 4756
White House 4531, 4542, 4550
White, Theodore 4545
Wickett, Walton A 4904
Wilbur, General 4904
Wilbur, C. Martin (Marty) 4823, 4824, 4828, 4830, 4832
Willoughby, General 4374
Windett, Mr 4587
Winter, Ella 4808
Winterfield, Mr 4440
Witt, Nathan 4722, 4737
Wittfogel, Karl A 4835, 4860, 4879
Wolf, Benedict 4356
Wolfe, Thelma 4824, 4832
Wolman, Leo 4638, 4639
Wood, John S 4903
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs 4872
Woosung, China 4690
Work Projects Administration 4623, 4640, 4741, 4742
Works Projects Administration, National Research Project 4645–4648, 4665, 4675, 4677, 4678, 4756
Worker, The 4876
Worker's Bookshop 4615
Workers Library Publishers 4541
World Affairs Council of Northern California 4835
World Atlas (Russian) 4567, 4568, 4570
World Report 4834
World Trade Union Council 4829
World War I 4528, 4637
World War II 4518, 4528, 4531, 4538, 4889
World Youth Festival 4866, 4868
Worvill 4395
WPB. (*See* War Production Board.)
Wright, Arthur F 4420–4423, 4426
Wright, Mary Clabaugh 4420, 4422, 4426, 4835
Wu, Mr 4569
Wu, T. C 4881
W. W. Norton & Co., Inc 4591

Y

Yakhontoff, Victor 4616, 4725, 4884
Yakobson, Sergius 4896
Yalta Agreement 4544, 4545
Yang, Mr 4427
Yardumian, Rose Ellen 4808, 4823, 4824, 4829, 4832, 4844
Yarnell, Harry E 4532, 4835, 4900
Yeaton, Ivan D 4431
Yen, Hsi-shan 4882
Yenan 4432, 4441, 4686, 4772, 4773, 4830
Yergan, Max 4595–4626
Yin, Ju-Keng 4702
Young Communist League 4391, 4618, 4639, 4886
Young, E. H 4430, 4437
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) 4596, 4597, 4626, 4713
Young Socialist League 4639
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) 4872
Youths Party 4766
Yugoslavia 4542, 4668

Z

	Page
Zablodowsky, David	4661, 4662
Zaibatsu	4877
Zap, Herman	4662
Zap, Mary	4662
Zhdanov	4486
Zhukov	4486

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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 14

MAY 2, JUNE 20, 1952

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

UNITED STATES
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BENJAMIN MANDEL, *Director of Research*

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
New York, N. Y.

The subcommitte met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., Hon Pat McCarran, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator McCarran.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Both Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland have been sworn previously.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; they have been sworn.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, yesterday afternoon I spent some time with Mr. Lockwood presenting to him copies of letters written to him and written by him. He was able to spend the afternoon on this, and he did make a statement authenticating the documents.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify these for the record, please?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have a list of those documents?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a list which was drawn up under my direction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a true list of that batch of documents?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you offer that list for the record?

Mr. MANDEL. I can.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, in connection with this list, did you notice there have been two amendments since it was originally compiled?

Mr. MANDEL. The list is authentic with the exclusion of those.

Mr. MORRIS. Those amendments are two letters, one a letter from W. W. Lockwood to Col. William Mayer dated December 26, 1942, which is file No. 131B. The other is a letter to Philo W. Parker and others from William W. Lockwood dated December 2, 1942, No. 131B.2. They were both added by Mr. Lockwood yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. The witness identifies everything except those two?

Mr. MORRIS. No, they have been added to Mr. Mandel's list.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he identify those?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I am going to introduce his statement on that.

The CHAIRMAN. He identifies them as what?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will testify that all of the documents on this list as amended were taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It that right, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that true?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Yesterday Mr. Lockwood stated that he could not be here today, and he gave a sworn statement to me which reads:

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

I have examined the documents described in the list attached hereto as exhibit A. While many of the documents so described are documents of which I have no present recollection, I am satisfied that all of the documents listed in exhibit A are letters or memoranda or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me or received by me.

[s] WILLIAM A. LOCKWOOD.

Dated: May 1, 1952.
Present:
[s] Robert Morris
ROBERT MORRIS
[s] Stuart Marks
STUART MARKS

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you there, and that was your client's list?

Mr. MARKS. Yes; that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the list and the affidavit together with the documents which are named in that list be offered for the record at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record at this time.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 765 to 771, inclusive; 773 to 782, inclusive, and 784 to 799 C" and appear on pp. 4958 through 4983.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is this gentleman?

Mr. MORRIS. This is Mr. Marks of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl. He is counsel for Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter.

May the documents be numbered consecutively?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be numbered consecutively in order of previous exhibits.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Lockwood appeared, Senator, he authorized me to make the statement that the list is accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I offer you a group of documents together with a list appended thereto. Will you tell us what are those documents and what is that list?

Mr. MANDEL. The documents I hold are taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations or submitted by officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations, of which documents I made an itemized list.

Mr. SOURWINE. The list is that list you made?

Mr. MANDEL. The list is the list I hold in my hand.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a true and correct list of the documents that you have in that batch?

Mr. MANDEL. It is.

The CHAIRMAN. The list is one thing. The documents are another. The list was made by you?

Mr. MANDEL. The list was made under my direction from the documents.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Are you offering the list, so-called, or are you offering the documents? I take it that you are offering the documents.

Mr. MORRIS. We are going to offer the documents.

Mr. SOURWINE. The list is in fact an inventory of those documents.

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, we are proffering the list also as evidence of what this batch of documents contains.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. That is merely a list that was made by Mr. Mandel or under his direction, but the documents are taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Are all of those documents taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. All except one, which was prepared by Mr. Holland at our request.

Mr. MORRIS. What is that?

Mr. MANDEL. That is a list of the staff members of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. As of what date?

Mr. MANDEL. Various dates. There is one list from 1936 to 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may we not consider this at this time? That does not belong in there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct. I think that is the best way to handle that.

Mr. MANDEL. The others are all documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, NEW YORK, N. Y., AND EDWARD C. CARTER, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED BY STUART MARKS, ATTORNEY AT LAW

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, have you had an opportunity to look at the documents that we have now offered for the record?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes, I have been through that whole list.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you in connection with that group of documents looked at the list that has been compiled by Mr. Mandel?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. The list seems to be complete with the exception of the document you have just removed. I found corresponding documents to each item in the list. I am prepared to identify all of the documents with the exceptions which I will name in a moment as letters or memoranda written by me or received by me in the course of my work with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. What are the exceptions?

Mr. HOLLAND. Three exceptions that I wish to note are: One, a letter which appears to be from me to a man called Harondar, an official of the Soviet council. He was an official of the Soviet council of the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Where does that appear on the list?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is item No. 4, I believe, and the point is that it only appears to be the last page of a letter and a copy. It is unsigned and is not a carbon. While it seems to me like a perfectly normal letter, I have no means of identifying what the beginning of the letter was nor do I happen to remember writing this particular paragraph.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, apparently by mistake we have only the second page of this letter, and I move that this be stricken from the list.

The CHAIRMAN. Just do not offer it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe since this is on the list and since Mr. Holland has testified about it, it should not be stricken from the list.

As the chairman suggested, it should be excluded from the offer.

The CHAIRMAN. Just remove it from the offer at this time. You may be able to identify it at a later time.

Mr. HOLLAND. The second exception, which is I think about item No. 15, your exhibit No. 819, is an unsigned memorandum with the initials "W. L. H. and K. M. from E. C. C.," giving background information on the Muslim League in India. This, too, is a letter which I have no recollection of and is unsigned. It appears to me to be a perfectly normal kind of memorandum and one which I might well have seen, but it just so happens that I cannot myself identify it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter's initials are on there; are they not?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he identify or recall it?

Mr. MORRIS. It has now been offered to Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER. It has every external appearance of being a photostat of an interoffice memorandum of mine to Mr. Holland and Miss Mitchell. I do not remember it, but it seems to be authentic, and I do not identify who the author is, what the source of the enclosure is.

The CHAIRMAN. How do your initials appear on it; from or to you?

Mr. CARTER. The initials "W. L. H. and K. M. from E. C. C." My signature is not on it. There is a mark here, "Carter," which is not in my handwriting, but I think it is one of the routine information memorandums and while I do not remember it specifically, I should see no reason why it should not be used in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you say you have a third exception?

Mr. HOLLAND. I have a third one. This is I think about five more items down the list, your file No. 823. This is the one item already mentioned, a free distribution list for a memorandum called Korean Industry and Transport by A. J. G., presumably A. J. Grajdanzev. I have no recollection of this list, and it would appear to be something prepared by someone on my staff, but I do recall the memorandum, and it is perfectly likely that it was distributed in fact to the list indicated there.

The CHAIRMAN. You make no objection to its being attached?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, sir. The remaining exception is the fifth from the last, your file No. 862. This is an original letter from a Chinese by the name of Tseng to S. B. Thomas, and I am prepared to say that this appears to me to be an authentic copy of a letter sent to a junior member of my staff who had apparently requested some documents from a Chinese book agency in Peking.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, you will notice that there is on the letter from Mr. Tseng a pencil notation, "rewrite for Bill to sign," and the Bill presumably is you.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes. The following is a letter from me which I acknowledge and identify.

Mr. MORRIS. So even though one-half of the correspondence is addressed to S. B. Thomas, the answer to that was prepared by you?

Mr. HOLLAND. That is true. Finally, Mr. Chairman, the list which you just excluded is one which I sent to the committee some weeks ago.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me finish this other thing first.

Mr. Chairman, in view of Mr. Mandel's testimony and Mr. Holland's testimony in connection with these documents, may they all be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may all be received into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 800, 802, 804 to 866," and appear on pp. 4984 through 5031.)

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to have to be very careful about identifying these documents because you are putting them in in clusters, and each one of them should have a serial number.

Mr. MORRIS. They do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is why I am asking that the list in each case go in. The documents themselves have been physically examined individually by the witnessses who are testifying with respect to the list, which is an accurate list of the documents, and the testimony of Mr. Mandel and of Mr. Holland, who said he had checked it, is simply to save the time of the committee and to shorten this hearing. If the list goes in and also the documents, I believe we will have a clear record on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the testimony, first, as to Mr. Mandel, saying that these are copies of instruments found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Secondly, Mr. Holland identifies each and every one of these as being instruments that were in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Am I correct in that?

Mr. HOLLAND. Subject to the qualifications which I have just indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. Subject to the qualifications that you made.

Mr. HOLLAND. Finally, Mr. Chairman, just so that there will be correspondence between the typed list and the documents, I notice two or three typographical, minor errors. On your file No. 807 it should read "to W. L. H. from E. C. C." At present you have it reversed. On your file No. 818 it should read "to W. L. Holland from William T. Stone" and not William T. Johnstone as you have it in your list.

On your item 837, apparently a slip in the carbon copy—it may not appear on the original—it should read "to William L. Holland from Schuyler Wallace." My copy has only S-c-h-u-y-l.

Finally on item 839, missing date figure, "to Schuyler Wallace from W. L. Holland," the correct date should be April 12, 1944. I think it is the carbon that reads March 12, 1944. Otherwise that list seems to be correct.

The CHAIRMAN. As to those corrections suggested by Mr. Holland, it might be well for you to make the corrections on the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In other words, evidently an error has crept in as to these small items. That should be corrected. It is not an exception taken by the witness. It is just a suggested check, and his suggestion should be followed up to see that he is correct and the instrument corrected accordingly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the list describing the documents which we have been discussing will be corrected in view of the recommendations made by Mr. Holland.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, I offer you four documents, and ask you what they are.

Mr. HOLLAND. These documents are lists of the staff members of both the Pacific Council and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for various periods, namely, 1936 to 1943; 1937 to 1943, 1944 to 1951, and 1944 to 1951.

Mr. Morris. I think I have a fifth one, Mr. Holland.

Mr. Holland. And a fifth entitled "IPR Staff Members," submitted by W. L. Holland, date October 10, 1951. All of these documents, Mr. Chairman, were prepared under my direction at the request of the subcommittee some weeks ago, the latest date here being October 10, 1951, and to the best of my belief and according to our personnel records, they present the true facts regarding the lists of employees and dates of employment of the persons who worked for the Institute of Pacific Relations, the staff members.

Mr. Sourwine. Did you have access to your personnel records in connection with the preparation of those lists?

Mr. Holland. I had access to them. I did not myself scrutinize every personnel card. The list was prepared under my direction by Miss Ruth Carter, and I have every reason to believe that it is a correct and complete list.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will we insert this in the running record, or should we put this in the appendix?

The Chairman. Where do you want it? What do you offer them for? Do you offer them for the record?

Mr. Morris. I offer them for the record.

The Chairman. I think so. They will be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked Exhibit No. 801 and appear on p. 4987.)

The Chairman. All that shows is who were the officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the respective years mentioned?

Mr. Morris. Yes.

The Chairman. Let the record show that the stenographer in the outer room closed the door so that the telephoning might go on in the outer room without disturbing the hearing and that the Chair announced that this was an open hearing and anyone who came into the outer room who wished to come in here might come in. This is an open hearing.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I am offering to Mr. Mandel two groups of documents.

Mr. Mandel, are those two groups of documents made up of letters and papers taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Mandel. These are documents from or to Mr. E. C. Carter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. They are either the original documents or photostats thereof.

The Chairman. The instruments are true and correct photostats of documents found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. And every one of the documents and papers in those two groups is so classified?

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Namely, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Mandel, what are those two lists?

Mr. Mandel. From these documents I have authorized a list to be prepared itemizing each document and describing them.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean you have there a list which constitutes an inventory of the documents which you have just identified and which you hold?

Mr. Mandel. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. There are two lists, Mr. Chairman; one with each group.

Mr. Carter, have you had an opportunity to look at the documents so identified by Mr. Mandel and described in the list accompanying those documents?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, I have had the opportunity of hurriedly going through them.

Mr. MORRIS. Do they appear to you to be authentic documents?

Mr. CARTER. I do not challenge the authenticity of any. There are some that I don't particularly recollect, but those I will point out when I go through the list.

Mr. MARKS. You do not mean "recollection." You mean you do not identify because you do not have personal knowledge of them.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MARKS. But you do not challenge the authenticity.

Mr. CARTER. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to make any particular comment as to any document on either of those two lists?

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand, those minutes were made of conferences. If Mr. Carter after having examined those minutes says that they appear to him to be true and correct, that is about as far as he can go unless he made them himself.

Mr. MARKS. That is perfectly true.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to make any comment on any of the documents in these two groups?

Mr. CARTER. One such case is item 978, a discussion on collective security.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the nature of that document, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. It was a discussion on collective security in 700 Jackson Place, Washington. I did not prepare the minutes. I don't know who they were prepared by, but I remember the meeting, and they look like a reasonably accurate job.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where is 700 Jackson Place? Is that the corner of Jackson Place and Pennsylvania Avenue alongside of the Blair House?

Mr. CARTER. That is where the Carnegie Endowment Library has been for many years.

This is to Edward C. Carter from MC, undated.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right under the exhibit No. 980?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. I cannot think who MC is. I don't identify the handwriting either, and it is in conection with a letter to Mr. Dollard. This is a mimeographed study of Attitudes of American Soldiers in the Berlin District Toward Our Allies. It is not mine, and it was originally marked as restricted, but the classification has been canceled, so it was an open document.

The CHAIRMAN. What point do you make in regard to it?

Mr. MARKS. Nothing at all, except I do not exactly know whether we are authenticating this document as put out by the research library of the information-education division. We acknowledge it was in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations if that is what you want.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said the classification is canceled. You mean it shows on its face by proper authority there has been an official cancellation of the security classification?

Mr. MARKS. Yes. Our only point is if you want us to say what it is, we will say it was taken from the files. We did not prepare it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it received by you as indicated?

Mr. MARKS. Oh, yes. We have no objection to that.

The CHAIRMAN. What is next?

Mr. CARTER. There is a handwritten note of mine here, and it is marked underneath "Dear Kate" in brackets "Enclosure, July 19 note." It should be July 17 notes. It is perfectly routine.

Mr. MARKS. One other point on that. We don't understand why it says "Enclosure." The list says "enclosure." We do not understand why, but it does not make much difference, I guess. The list says, Senator, "(Enc. July 19 notes)" and the list should be July 17. We do not understand what the enclosure reference is, but I do not think it is very significant.

Mr. CARTER. With your permission I will let Mr. Marks do this.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right.

Mr. MARKS. Item 984. This is a report of conference of March 9. Mr. Carter acknowledges that it is a fairly accurate statement of what went on, although he did not himself prepare the report.

Mr. SOURWINE. Just at that point, you say he acknowledges that it is fairly accurate. Does he take exception to it on any point with regard to accuracy?

Mr. MARKS. On those I do not think we ought to be bound because we had to read those at a terrible clip. If we have to stop now to examine this page by page, it will keep us here indefinitely. We would like to reserve comment and check on these things. Mr. Carter spent just a few minutes to go through this thing and to construe it to see whether each thing is a fair statement would require a lot more time, and I don't think he at this time can state more than I have already stated. I want to suit your purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is: Is the instrument found where it was found? It is admitted that it was found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What it sets out is not a matter for your construction nor for anyone else's just now. It is a matter for the committee's construction.

Mr. MARKS. Fine. That is perfectly acceptable to us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, if the Chair will permit, since I understand that Mr. Carter is adopting Mr. Marks' statements as his testimony, is that right, sir?

Mr. CARTER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to this particular document it might save time in the future if I ask Mr. Carter a question now.

Mr. Carter, you have had an opportunity to examine that briefly; is that correct?

Mr. CARTER. Very sketchily.

Mr. SOURWINE. From the examination which you have made of it, does it appear to you to be a report which was prepared under your direction or at your behest?

Mr. CARTER. I was present at the meeting. It does not show who recorded it. The handwritten bits of editorial alterations are not in my handwriting, and I could not swear who the author or editor

was. It may have been Mr. W. W. Lockwood. Let me see whether he was there. Yes; he was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am trying to get at is: Was that prepared by someone who did so as a part of his duties as an official or employee of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. Not necessarily, because in the list of attendees there is typed "W. W. Lockwood, Princeton," and then inserted in handwriting after Lockwood's name, "ACIS." That would be the American Committee for International Studies. That might indicate that he was there in his capacity as an executive of the American Committee of International Studies, which has no connection with the IPR.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to how this found its way into the files of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. I have no knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge as to whether this was prepared for the files of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. I have no knowledge one way or the other on that.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 988. This is a memorandum of the meeting of the Arctic Institute, April 9, which was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, but not prepared by Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, do you know by whom it was prepared?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember. With reference to this meeting of the Arctic Institute, I note that there were present FD and HM. FD is Faith Donaldson and HM is Harriet Moore. Either one of them might have prepared the record of the meeting. I don't know which. There is nothing written, straight typing, and I have no idea which one of them prepared it or whether they prepared it jointly and submitted it to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. One of those alternatives?

Mr. CARTER. One of those alternatives.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 993. This is a memorandum of an interview with Mortimer Graves, December 7, 1933, at which Mr. Carter and Mr. Joseph Barnes were present. I think Mr. Carter will state that either he or Mr. Barnes prepared this memorandum. He doesn't remember which.

Mr. CARTER. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask a question about that. Is Mr. Barnes' style so similar to your own that you cannot tell them apart when you look back over them?

Mr. CARTER. This is statistical. It was in 1933.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think in fairness to you that should be explained here. It is not a document that is likely enough to make it identifiable; is that the point?

Mr. CARTER. It is very short. It is statistical, and there are no flourishes of authorship or rhetoric in it.

Mr. SOURWINE. The point was if it had been prepared by you we know you would be prepared to say it was absolutely true and correct; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. It makes sense to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that basis since you cannot tell whether it is yours or Mr. Barnes, I assume you are still able to say that it is true and correct.

Mr. CARTER. It strikes me thoroughly as a correct compilation.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 1005, a meeting of the presidium of the Soviet branch of the IPR. Mr. Carter will state that the report was prepared either by Harriet Moore or Kate Mitchell. Do you know which?

Mr. CARTER. I have no idea.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Kate Mitchell take shorthand?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Harriet Moore did not?

Mr. CARTER. Not with the same precision. I don't remember whether Harriet Moore actually used shorthand or her own shorthand system.

Mr. SOURWINE. And Faith Donaldson had no shorthand system at all?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. She, if I remember correctly, had sort of a debutante shorthand.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought you had testified here once—it is an unimportant point—that Faith Donaldson did not write in shorthand.

Mr. CARTER. I remember describing her as a champion skier. I don't remember referring to her shorthand capacity.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she a typist?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 1008. This is a photostat of what purports to be a letter from E. V. Harondar to Kathleen Barnes, June 20, 1935, which Mr. Carter will say was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, but it was not a letter received by him nor written by him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any recollection as to whether you ever saw that letter before the committee presented it to you for identification?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember having seen it before. I may have or I may not. I don't recall it now.

Mr. MARKS. Item 1009 is a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Motylev. The list shows the date "3/4/35." It should be "5/4/35."

Mr. SOURWINE. Speaking of Mr. Motylev, we have a number of documents in the file including some of these summaries wherein his name is spelled M-o-t-i-l-e-v; is that not correct? It is the same person, is it not?

Mr. CARTER. That is correct.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is 1010. This is a carbon copy of a document entitled "Extracts From Letter From Harriet Moore to E. C. Carter" of March 20, 1935. Can you tell who prepared this?

Mr. CARTER. I cannot discover who typed or prepared this copy, who selected the extracts. There is no initial or other identifying mark. It would all depend on who made the extracts as to what its significance is, I should assume.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember having seen the document before or a copy of it?

Mr. CARTER. I can't at this moment say that I do recollect it.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is from the files of the IPR?

Mr. CARTER. So Mr. Mandel shows me.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean do you have any knowledge on that point?

Mr. CARTER. Not other than Mr. Mandel's certification.

Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, that is not a matter of your knowledge.

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MARKS. Item 1011 appears to be a duplicate of 1009.

Item 1013, "Moscow meeting in Motylev's," the date should be "3/31/36." That is the date shown by the document. It should be that instead of "3/21/36" shown by the list. The document itself purports to be a report of what happened at the meeting.

Mr. CARTER. This concerns the administrative problems of the institute and, among others, there were present Harriet Moore, Charlotte Tyler, and Faith Donaldson as secretaries, but which one of them, whether all three collaborated in writing out this one page, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Their assignments were such that any or all of them might have worked on it?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, may we go off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. On the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, with regard to the remainder of the documents on this list I believe an acceptable formula has been worked out which will cover the identification so far as Mr. Carter is able to make. Is that correct, Mr. Marks?

Mr. MARKS. That is correct, Mr. Sourwine. May I state the nature of this arrangement?

Mr. SOURWINE. Please.

Mr. MARKS. Mr. Carter states that all of the documents listed——

Mr. SOURWINE. From this point on.

Mr. MARKS. From this point on of the two lists referred to——

The CHAIRMAN. And "from this point on" means what? What is the point?

Mr. SOURWINE. From the point following the last document identified in this record and discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring to the numbers in the list that you prepared?

Mr. MARKS. Yes; that is right. There are two lists which I think Mr. Mandel has already referred to, the last two lists that Mr. Mandel referred to. These are lists setting forth documents which have just been presented to Mr. Carter for identification.

The CHAIRMAN. And were taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations according to the testimony of Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And have been numbered serially under the direction of Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MARKS. Up to the point of 1019, and after that there are no numbers, and we understand they will be numbered serially from there on.

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

Mr. MARKS. From this point on Mr. Carter states that the documents which purport to be letters or memoranda to him, or copies of such letters and memoranda, or letters or memoranda from him or copies of those, are genuine. On the list there are a number of other documents which are prepared by other persons and which do not in-

dicate whether or not they were sent to Mr. Carter or sent by him to anybody.

As to these, Mr. Carter has no personal recollection of whether or not they do come from the IPR files, but he has no reason to raise any question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MARKS. That is sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may they therefore be admitted into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under that agreement.

(The documents were marked "Exhibits Nos. 977 to 1007, 1009, inclusive; 1011 to 1031, 1032 to 1068, inclusive; 1070, 1071, 1073 to 1080, inclusive; 1082 to 1090, inclusive; 1092, to 1095, 1097 to 1112, 1114 to 1122, inclusive, and appear on pp. 5083 through 5197.)

Mr. SOURWINE. This order includes the two lists which have been referred to and the documents which have been included on those lists?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The lists are merely identification by serial numbers?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has Mr. Carter had an opportunity to examine the documents which we are now discussing?

Mr. MARKS. Mr. Carter has had a chance to examine the documents now under discussion and identifies them all with certain exceptions which I shall now enumerate.

Mr. SOURWINE. And applies them as either documents that were received by him or which he wrote?

Mr. MARKS. That is right.

This list does not bear exhibit numbers, and I am going to give the item number as I count down.

Mr. SOURWINE. Give the item number and the title.

Mr. MARKS. All right. This is the fourteenth item on the first page of this three-page list. It is to WLH from ECC. The date is given as March 20, 1940. I think it should be March 30, 1940. The file number is 191.87.

The next is to Philip C. Jessup from Edward C. Carter, with the file number of the committee 191.37. The date is given as December 19, 1943. I think it should be December 19, 1942, subject to your check.

The next one purports to be an original of part of a note to "Dear Dr. White." It does not bear any date or any signature. It is on the second page of this list under your No. 172.1. I don't know what Mr. Carter wants to say about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter, up to this point do you adopt Mr. Marks' statements as your testimony?

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to the document which has just been handed to you by Mr. Marks what do you want to say about it?

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. White is the name?

Mr. MARKS. It is addressed to "Dear Dr. White," no address.

Mr. CARTER. I have no recollection of either side of this page.

Mr. MORRIS. It is not your handwriting?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. I move it be stricken from the list of documents.

The CHAIRMAN. It will just not be inserted.

Mr. SOURWINE. It remains on the list, but you withdraw the offer of the document?

Mr. MORRIS. I do.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is a memo handwritten which appears on your list immediately below the item, the offer of which has been withdrawn. I hand it to Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know what that is, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. It's in pencil. I don't identify the handwriting. There is a note regarding treatment of a book written for the IPR at one time. There is nothing I object to. I simply don't know who the author was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any reason to believe it did not come from the IPR files?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MARKS. The next item is to W. L. Holland from C. F. Remer, dated March 17, 1942, your No. 119.121.

Mr. HOLLAND. I have read this letter and identify it as having been received by me. There is also the original of this same letter—this is a carbon copy—in the collection which I have previously identified.

Mr. MARKS. The final item is a mimeographed copy of what perhaps is a telegram from Edward C. Carter to Lauchlin Currie, bearing the date, mimeographed, September 17, 1941. This appears under your file No. 119.13. It is listed on the third page of the list.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a copy we made of the original. We should have the original rather than the stenciled copy. We will withdraw the offer.

Mr. MARKS. Those are all the remarks and exceptions that we have to make to that list.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which you previously generally identified?

Mr. MARKS. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you adopt as your testimony all the statements of Mr. Marks in connection with these lists?

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. May these be inserted in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record with the same numbers.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1136, 1145, 1203, and 1231," and appear on pp. 5204, 5210, 5245, 5259, respectively.)

Mr. SOURWINE. So that the record may be clear with regard to this document, this is the document which was previously mentioned as the "Dear Dr. White" letter or document, the offer of which was withdrawn. This is a document, which on the one side, which I shall designate as face, is marked with an F in ink and has a typed paragraph, "Dear Dr. White: I understand from Irving S. Friedman," and so forth, ending with the words "until the end of the current month."

On the other side in pencil, handwritten, is, "Dear Malik: I understand that Mr. Friedman," and so forth, closing with the words "at any time convenient to you. Sincerely yours," and it is unsigned. Mr. Carter, you state that you do not recognize that handwriting?

Mr. CARTER. I do not recognize the handwriting. I would like to comment for the record that Malik was the Indian official in New York. It is not the Soviet.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you do not recollect it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know which Malik is referred to?

Mr. CARTER. Isn't there some reference here to Friedman? Friedman was an employee of the Indian Government in New York working under Malik.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you spell it?

Mr. CARTER. M-a-l-i-k.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are saying really is because you know of Friedman's connection you assume that was Malik the Indian rather than the Russian?

Mr. CARTER. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you renewing your offer on that now?

Mr. MORRIS. I now offer it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; it will be inserted in its proper place in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1202," and appears on p. 5245.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a third envelope which Mr. Carter was not able to finish reading last night, and I wonder what we can do with respect to having those received.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have a suggestion, if the Chair please.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the Chair please, I propose to ask Mr. Mandel to identify these papers as coming from the files of the IPR and to identify the list.

The CHAIRMAN. Let Mr. Mandel identify them.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, I hand you a number of documents or what purports to be a list or inventory of documents. Will you please identify them?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an inventory of documents taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The sheet begins with a document to ECC and ends with one to A. Hiss. The documents all come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that list a correct inventory of those documents and prepared under your direction?

Mr. MANDEL. It is; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask the permission of the Chair to hand this list and the documents in question to Mr. Carter and to ask that at his early convenience he go through these and examine them and then furnish the committee with a statement in affidavit form with regard to them along the lines of the statemens he has previously made.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Do you want them inserted in the record now, to be followed by what you request?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would request, sir, that the documents be put in the record at this point, but that the affidavit which Mr. Carter furnishes also go in at this point in the record when he furnishes it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; is that satisfactory?

Mr. MARKS. Yes, it is, Senator

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1269 to 1291, inclusive; 1293 to 1312, inclusive; and 1314," and appear on pp. 5272 through 5303.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I hand you additional groups of documents and ask you if you will identify those.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an inventory of documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations beginning with one marked "Atomic Energy and U. S. Int. Policy," and ending with one addressed to "Secretary, Lithuanian Legation," which is an inventory of documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a second batch which is headed "A Second Batch," of which the inventory begins with a document to E. C. Carter and ends with one to E. C. Carter. This is an inventory of documents from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, in each case does the list represent an inventory of the actual documents to which it is attached?

Mr. MANDEL. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. The inventory was prepared under your supervision?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And the documents themselves are all from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. They are.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they, or are they photostatic copies?

Mr. MANDEL. They include originals, carbons, as taken from the files, and photostats.

The CHAIRMAN. Photostats of instruments in the files; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The photostats were made under your direction?

Mr. MANDEL. They were.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the reasons for the recurrence of the photostats are many. In most cases the reason for it is that we have gone through the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on Fifty-fourth Street and taken out certain documents there. We returned the original documents to the Institute of Pacific Relations, but had them photostated before returning them. That is the reason for the photostating.

The CHAIRMAN. The photostats were not themselves taken from the files? The instrument was taken from the files and photostated, and the photostats are here; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. In almost every case. I think in some cases there were photostats in the IPR files.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask in regard to these two groups of documents and the list attached thereto that Mr. Mandel has most recently identified they be offered to Mr. Carter with the same stipulation as the earlier one.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be inserted in the record and offered to Mr. Carter with the same stipulation as to his making an affidavit.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 889 to 903, inclusive; 905 to 954, inclusive; 956 to 964, inclusive, and appear on pp. 5031 through 5083.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I hold in my hand a file of material which was offered for the record during Mr. Bogolepov's testimony. The Chair

ruled that it would be accepted and inserted in the record, but there was the proviso that it be offered to Mr. Carter for identification. I would like to ask has this ever been offered to Mr. Carter and has Mr. Carter had an opportunity to examine it?

Mr. MARKS. No, he has not. He just got it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that these documents, which I shall briefly identify, the first headed "Confidential, not for distribution outside the office," under date of August 10, 1934——

The CHAIRMAN. Where do they come from?

Mr. MORRIS. They have been identified by Mr. Mandel at an open session of the hearing as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and they were admitted by you provisionally on their being recognized by Mr. Carter.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply thought, Mr. Chairman, that since the record at this point does not specifically identify what we are handing Mr. Carter there should be this identification: Under date of August 10, 1934, headed "Memorandum of Personnel on Soviet Studies." The next item is called "Confidential, not for distribution outside the office, Report on Soviet Relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations." The next is to Frederick V. Field from Edward C. Carter under date of January 16, 1935. The next is headed "Meeting, April 9, Institute of Oceanography; ECC; OL; HM, Harondar."

The next is headed "Report of the Visit of the Secretary General to Moscow, December 20–31, 1934." The next is a letter or what appears to be a letter, under date of April, 1934. It is headed "Communist Academy, Volkhonka, 14 Moscow, U. S. S. R." The next is a letter, and the date is Hotel Richemond, Geneva, September 12, 1934, and it begins "Dear Owen."

Then there is a letter to Senator McCarran under date of March 24 from Carlisle Humelsine and the attachment thereto.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carter would have nothing to do with that last.

Mr. SOURWINE. The attachment, sir, is the one which raises the question as to whether Mr. Carter can add anything by way of identification.

The CHAIRMAN. These are to be made available to Mr. Carter for his comment and his affidavit?

Mr. SOURWINE. Along the same lines with regard to any identity he should make, and he should have the privilege if he cares to include in that affidavit any voluntary statement or comment about it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The documents referred to were previously marked "Exhibit No. 58" and appear on p. 262, pt. I. For the other documents, see exhibits 749, 758, 759, 760, 761, 763, respectively.)

Mr. MARKS. With reference to comment, it is obvious from the record that we have not made any comments on the contents of these.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is correct. It is not completely correct because in the instance of Malik he had a comment to make.

Mr. MARKS. You are right there.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to any others he has not made a comment. He is not bound, but if he wants to make comment as to these submitted for study, he is to have the right to include in that affidavit any comment he desires to make.

Mr. MARKS. We would like to reserve whatever rights we have to comment on the others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland or Mr. Carter, are you going to offer any documents to be inserted into the record at this time?

Mr. CARTER. If I may have your permission, Mr. Chairman, on April 23 I mailed you in Washington, A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations, by Edward C. Carter, and in my letter to you I promised to send a second statement on clarification and correction. This I now hand you with a covering letter, and here is a copy of my letter to Senator McCarran for Mr. Morris.

Mr. SOURWINE. With regard to these documents, Mr. Carter, have they been prepared by you?

Mr. CARTER. They have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you offering them as part of your testimony, that is, that the material in here is true to the best of your knowledge and belief where it is stated to be on knowledge and belief, and if not so stated it is true?

Mr. CARTER. That is my position.

Mr. MARKS. Just one moment, Mr. Sourwine; I am not sure that Mr. Carter understood the import of that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to take advantage of him in any way.

Mr. MARKS. I understand that, but I think as to everything he states it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief. He is not using a pleading style and stating upon information and belief thus and so, but he is doing his best to represent the facts. Is that all right?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Carter has handed here a document of over 50 pages, nearly 60 pages, including the appendix, headed "Amplification, correction, and clarification of testimony." Obviously if Mr. Carter is going to amplify, correct, and clarify his testimony, he has to do it under oath.

Mr. MARKS. I am sure that Mr. Carter will say that this shall have the same status as if these things were read orally or stated orally at any committee hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Under oath?

Mr. MARKS. Under oath; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he make an affidavit to this?

Mr. SOURWINE. No, sir, that is another point. There is no jurat on this. Whatever the form is immaterial, but the record should show that Mr. Carter fully adopts this statement, the main text of 49 pages and the appendix of 7 pages, as a sworn statement presented before this committee.

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. The committee staff of course has had no opportunity to see this until this moment and has of course had no opportunity to cross examine Mr. Carter with regard to it. I cannot state what the staff might desire in that regard.

Mr. CARTER. Might I ask, Mr. Sourwine, Mr. Chairman, whether my first statement was received?

Mr. SOURWINE. The statement has been received, but has not been offered in the record. You are referring to "A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations." I think it should be under the same stipulation, that you were offering it as your sworn testimony.

Mr. CARTER. I would be agreeable to making the stipulation now so that it is all formally in your hands.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carter is stating, as I understand it, that he offers as his sworn testimony at this hearing his statement entitled "A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations," which he transmitted to the chairman in his letter of April 24.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think the regular way and most orderely way would be to have Mr. Carter present when the committee considers that and let him then swear to it. I think you are doing this by a long-distance operation here. I do not particularly like it, but we can determine that when we get to it. We can call Mr. Carter and have him go over his two statements, the one he sent before and this one, and make any comment on them and then be examined on them if you want to and let it go in the record. I think that is the clearer and more satisfactory way. I do not like to insert his first statement in the record now with a kind of an offhand saying that he swears to it.

I think it would be best to have him present and swear to it at the proper time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the Chair's ruling also with regard to this document which has just been handed in?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I amend Mr. Sourwine's list of documents included in the material introduced during Mr. Bogolepov's testimony. I have been informed by Mr. Mandel—it is a letter from Carlisle Humelsine and so described in Mr. Sourwine's testimony—that it should not have been included in that list.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that material submitted by Mr. Humelsine is not such that Mr. Carter would be able to shed any light on?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct, and it may be excluded from the documents.

Mr. Mandel, that got erroneously in this file [indicating] when it should be in this [indicating]?

Mr. MANDEL. That is right.

Mr. CARTER. I accept it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Morris has a few other documents to be offered for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have received an answer from Carlisle Humelsine dated April 11, 1952, in reply to your letter of April 2 to the Honorable Dean Acheson of that date. May that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. That may go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1315–A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1315–A

APRIL 2, 1952.

HON. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have examined carefully the letter of March 19, 1952, from Mr. Carlisle Humelsine in reference to a conference which took place at the State Department October 12, 1942, between Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, and Mr. Laughlin Currie. In this connection, we should like to have the full State Department records on this conference precisely as they appeared.

We should also like to know the steps by which this conference was arranged, who was responsible, and the correspondence that was exchanged in connection therewith.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1315–B

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, April 11, 1952.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I refer to your letter to the Secretary of April 2 in which you request Department of State records on the conference "which took place at the State Department, October 12, 1942, between Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, and Mr. Lauchlin Currie." You also request information regarding "the steps by which this conference was arranged, who was responsible, and the correspondence that was exchanged in connection therewith."

As I stated in my letter to you of March 10, the Department's investigation into the history of this meeting reveals little more than the fact that Mr. Welles did meet with Mr. Browder on October 12, 1942, at which time Mr. Welles handed Mr. Browder a memorandum concerning U. S. policy in the Far East. Although the Department cannot locate a verified copy of this memorandum, our files do contain several letters in response to request for copies of this memorandum in which was stated that "a verbatim text of the memorandum, as given by Mr. Browder to the press, appeared in the October 18 [16], 1942, issue of The Worker." I enclose two such replies.

A thorough search of the Department's files does not reveal whether either Robert Minor or Lauchlin Currie, or both, attended the Welles-Browder conference on October 12, 1942; any invitations to Mr. Browder or to anyone else to attend this meeting; any correspondence in regard to calling the meeting; any memorandum of conversation or record of the meeting; or any record of who drafted the memorandum handed by Mr. Welles to Mr. Browder.

Since these may be of interest to you, I am also enclosing copies of the following letters which bear on the Welles-Browder meeting: (1) letter from Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Mr. Sumner Welles, dated September 26, 1951; (2) reply from Mr. Welles, dated October 10, 1951; (3) letter from Mr. Rusk to Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, dated May 19, 1950; and (4) reply from Dr. Hornbeck, dated June 7, 1950.

I regret that the Department is unable to provide further information in regard to the conference to which this letter refers.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE,

EXHIBIT No. 1315–C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., November 13, 1942.

Mr. ARNOLD B. HARTLEY,
Radio Station WGES, Western at Madison, Chicago, Ill.

MY DEAR MR. HARTLEY: Mr. Welles has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 6, 1942, in which you request a copy of the text of a statement issued by him in regard to the questions of national unity in China and other United Nations.

It is thought that you may refer to a memorandum which Mr. Welles gave on October 12 to Mr. Earl Browder in regard to this Government's policy with respect to China. This memorandum, which was referred to in the press, including the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune of October 16, has not been published by the Department. However, a verbatim text of the memorandum, as given by Mr. Browder to the press, appeared in the October 18, 1942, issue of The Worker.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, Jr.,
Acting Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 1315–D

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., October 29, 1942.

Mr. MORRIS U. SCHAPPES,
School for Democracy, 13 Astor Place, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. SCHAPPES: Mr. Welles has asked me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 26, 1942, in which you request a copy of the text of a memorandum which he gave on October 12 to Mr. Earl Browder in regard to this Government's policy with respect to China.

The above-mentioned memorandum has not been published by the Department. However, a verbatim text of the memorandum, as given by Mr. Browder to the press, appeared in the October 18, 1942, issue of The Worker.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, Jr.,
Assistant Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 1315–E

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., September 26, 1951.

Hon. SUMNER WELLES,
Oxon Hill, Md.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES: The Department has under consideration a request from Senator McCarran of Nevada for information concerning a meeting which purportedly took place between Mr. Earl Browder, Mr. Robert Minor, Mr. Lauchlin Currie, and you at the State Department, October 12, 1942, to discuss American policy toward China. Mr. Browder testified before a Senate committee headed by Senator Tydings in May 1950 that you handed him a written statement of the United States Government's views on the Far East at the conclusion of this meeting.

Although a very careful search has been made of the Department's files, we have not been able to locate the statement described by Mr. Browder or any record of your conversation with him. The files do reveal, however, that Mr. Browder released to the press and the Daily Worker published October 16, 1942, the text of a memorandum allegedly handed to him by you.

It is realized that it is difficult to recall details of events which transpired many years ago, but it would be greatly appreciated if you could furnish the Department such details concerning this matter as you might have available. In this connection it might be helpful to you to read the enclosed statements by Mr. Browder taken from the Daily Worker.

I am most reluctant to bother you with this request, but the absence of sufficient information in the Department's files has led us to seek your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK,
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

Enclosures: Daily Worker, October 4, 1942, and October 16. 1942.

EXHIBIT No. 1315–F

OXON HILL MANOR,
Oxon Hill, Md., October 10, 1951.

Hon. DEAN RUSK,
Assistant Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. RUSK: I have been away from home for some time and your letter of September 26, 1951, has consequently only now been brought to my attention. I regret the delay in replying to your inquiry.

In view of the many years that have passed since the interview of which you refer in your letter, it is unfortunately very difficult for me to recollect in any detail what took place during the course of the interview. Of one thing, however, I am certain, and that is that any memorandum that may have been handed to Mr. Browder at that time was not prepared by myself, but by the Far Eastern Division under the supervision of either Dr. Hornbeck or Mr. Max Hamilton. There is no copy of any such memorandum in my own files.

I also think I am correct in my recollection that some official of the Far Eastern Division was present at the interview and subsequently prepared at my request a memorandum of the conversation that took place.

It occurs to me that it might be helpful to you to consult either Dr. Hornbeck or Mr. Hamilton since their recollection of what took place at the interview and of any documentation that might have been prepared with regard to the interview might be more accurate than mine.

I am very sorry not to be able to be more helpful to you, but neither my memory nor my own files throw much light on the matter.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) SUMNER WELLES.

EXHIBIT No. 1315–G

MAY 19, 1950.

The Honorable STANLEY K. HORNBECK,
2139 Wyoming Avenue NW., Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR DR. HORNBECK: During his recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator Tydings, Mr. Earl Browder stated that in October 1942 he called on Mr. Sumner Welles, then Under Secretary of State, to discuss American policy toward China and that Mr. Welles handed to him a written statement of the United States Government's views on this subject. He further stated that, while the Department considered that this statement did not represent any change in United States policy toward China, he did consider it a change in policy and thus an important document. In subsequent debate in the Senate, Senator Knowland referred to this portion of Mr. Browder's testimony and expressed the view that this was an extremely important document since it apparently marked "the turning point of American policy in China." Senator Knowland has not requested the Department to furnish him a copy of the statement, together with any other pertinent documents leading up to the issuance of the statement.

Alhough a very careful search has been made of the Department's files, we have not yet been able to locate the statement described by Mr. Browder or any record of Mr. Welles's conversation with him. The files do reveal, however, that Mr. Browder released to the press and *The Worker* published on October 18, 1942, the text of a memorandum said to have been handed to him by Mr. Welles. The files also contain memoranda indicating that the matter of Mr. Browder's call and the statement given him by Mr. Welles were brought to your attention.

It is realized that it is difficult to recall the details of events which transpired many years ago, but it would be greatly appreciated if you would furnish the Department such details regarding this matter as you can reconstruct from memory. In this connection, it might be helpful to you to read the enclosed copy of a dispatch from the *New York Herald Tribune* of October 16, 1942, which gives Mr. Browder's version of his call on Mr. Welles.

I am reluctant to bother you with this request, but the absence of sufficient information in the Department's files make it necessary for us to seek your assistance in this regard. Similar inquiries are being made of other officers of the Department then in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs who might have some knowledge of the matter.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK, *Assistant Secretary.*

Enclosures:

1. Excerpt from *The Worker*, October 18, 1942.
2. Excerpt from the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 16, 1942.

EXHIBIT No. 1315–H

2139 WYOMING AVENUE,
Washington 8, D. C., June 7, 1950.

The Honorable DEAN RUSK,
Assistant Secretary of State.

DEAR MR. RUSK. In reply to your letter of May 19 regarding statement recently made by Mr. Earl Browder and a memorandum released to the press

by Mr. Browder and published by The Worker on October 18, 1942, and with reference especially to your request that I furnish the Department such details regarding this matter as I can reconstruct from memory.

You will doubtless have been informed by Mr. Sprouse that, after the receipt of your letter under reference, I some days ago spoke with him on the telephone and informed him that, although I clearly recall having known at the time that Mr. Welles talked with Mr. Browder and that Mr. Browder thereafter issued a statement and released therewith the text of a memorandum which he said had been handed him by Mr. Welles, there was little that I could add from memory to what is set forth in your letter and the enclosure thereto. At the same time I offered to come to the Department at any time for he purpose of discussing the matter or seeing what the files disclose, or both.

That Mr. Welles gave Mr. Browder a memorandum there can be no doubt. The account given in that text of the matters to which it relates is, I believe, substantially accurate. How or by whom that text was drafted I am not able to say. There are passages in it which might have been drafted by me or by any one of several officers on duty and concerned with China and relations with China as of October 1942, and there are passages which might have been accepted or approved by me but which would not, I believe, have originated with me. I recall that Mr. Welles communicated with me regarding Mr. Browder's call, and I do not recall at what stage or stages. I believe that he asked in advance for a memorandum for his (Mr. Welles') information and guidance, and, although I do not recall the circumstances of the drafting, I believe such a memorandum was prepared with participation on my part and for *those* purposes. I recall being informed after the call that Mr. Welles had given Mr. Browder a memorandum: and I recall having felt that the text of the memorandum thus given was not entirely such as I would have drafted or recommended for *that* purpose.

More important, in my opinion, that the question of the origin of the memorandum under reference is the question whether there took place in 1942 a "change" in American policy regarding China and whether this memorandum or the facts of the situation to which it related marked a "turning point."

What Mr. Browder may have had in mind when he expressed himself in 1950 to the effect, as stated in your letter, that "he did consider it a change of policy," we need not for present purposes attempt to conjecture.

Looking at the text of the memorandum as copied from *The Worker* of October 18, 1942, I can say: In that memorandum, dealing with and refuting assertions and charges which had been made by Mr. Browder, there was given an objective account of developments in and regarding China and an honest review of what had been and was the official position of the United States with regard to the question of "civil strife" in China. A review of the whole history of American policy in relations to China will show that although the United States had consistently deprecated not only aggression by other countries against China but civil strife—with or without foment or support by other countries—within China, the United States had long been committed to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. It will show also that for many years before 1942, and in that year, and for some time thereafter the Government of the United States, in the formulating of official policy regarding China, both kept in mind and respected that commitment and that principle. There was official noting of civil strife in China; there was official giving of advice that civil strife be avoided; there was official collaboration with the Government of China toward strengthening China's effort in the war; but there was with regard to the civil conflict within China no official taking of a position either "against" or for any party or faction. There were on the part of some American nationals some manifestations in some contexts of a tendency to ignore or misinterpret or disregard official policy, but the thoughts and the acts of such nationals in those respects were their own, not those of their Government, and were, incidentally, in most cases favorable to, certainly not "against," the Communists. On the basis of what I then knew and of what I have from subsequent study learned, I find no warrant for an opinion or a conjecture that there took place in 1942 a change in the official attitude and policy of the United States regarding China.

Both "turning point" and "change of policy" came later.

A case could be made for a contention that the "turning point" came at the time of the Teheran Conference (November-December, 1943); a better case, that it came toward the end of the next year, 1944; but search for a clearly discernable and describably "change of policy" leads into and through the year 1945.

It will be recalled that there took place in 1944—and not until then—the first

of a series of reorganizations of the Department of State; that during that year there were substantial shiftings of personnel within and outward from the Department, including, in December, the retirement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull; and that there took place in 1945 the Yalta Conference, the death of President Roosevelt, the San Francisco Conference, the capitulation of Germany, the capitulation of Japan, the Potsdam Conference, the conclusion (with American encouragement) of an Agreement between the Soviet Union and China, the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and, in December, announcement by President Truman of a "United States Policy toward China" which was then and thereafter declared to be a "new" policy.

It was then, in the year 1945—and not before then—that the Government of the United States, first having taken action inconsistent with tradition and commitment in regard to China, embarked upon what became a course of intervention in regard to the civil conflict, the conflict between the National Government and the Communists, in China. It was then that words and action of the Government of the United States began to be expressive of an "against" and a "for" attitude; then and thereafter that the Government of the United States brought to bear pressures, pressures upon the National Government, pressures which were not "against" the Communists but were on their behalf, pressures not to the disadvantage of the Communists, but, in effect, to the disadvantage of the National Government.

To the circumstances of the "change," to the content and purport of the policy devised in 1945, proclaimed on December 15 of that year, and given expression in word and in deed since then, and to the gross and the net consequences thereof, there is no need for attention in the present context. There is however, in my opinion, great need that in the context of present American involvement as a leading participant, in a third global conflict, wherein "Communist" totalitarianism is making war both "cold" and "hot", on all States, Governments, peoples, institutions, organization and persons disinclined to accept domination by it, there is urgent need that the Government of the United States give solicitous attention to the question: Must the United States follow to the bitter, tragic and discrediting end the downward path, in relations with China, on which its feet were set in the fateful year of military victories and diplomatic vagaries and vitiations, 1945?

I should welcome an opportunity to talk with you on the implications of query.

Yours cordially and sincerely,

[s] Stanley K. Hornbeck
STANLEY K. HORNBECK.

Mr. MORRIS. This is a copy of a letter, Mr. Chairman, you sent to the Secretary of State dated May 1, 1952, wherein you renew your demand for the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta Conference in 1945. May that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Was there an answer to that?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That may go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1316" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1316

MAY 1, 1952.

The SECRETARY OF STATE,
The State Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 21, 1952, I wrote to you asking that the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta Conference in 1945 be made available to the Internal Security Subcommittee.

In my letter of February 21st it was pointed out that a witness before the Subcommittee, Dr. Edna Fluegel, an employee of the State Department from 1942 to 1948, testified that, in the course of her official duties in the Department, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Mr. Hiss.

This letter is written to determine what action has been taken on my request of February 21, 1952, to you.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. SOURWINE. The original request is already in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; and this is the renewal.

These will be made available, Mr. Holland, if you want to see them.

The next will be a copy of a letter by you, Senator McCarran, addressed to Rear Adm. Robert L. Dennison, dated May 1, 1952, in connection with a request that the Forrestal diaries and papers be made available to this committee. May that go into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. That may go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1317" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1317

May 1, 1952.

Rear Admiral ROBERT L. DENNISON,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR ADMIRAL DENNISON: My attention has been called to the story appearing in the New York Times today concerning the intention of the White House not to make available to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the diaries and papers of the late James Forrestal.

As you know, on December 3, 1951, a subpena was served on the New York Herald Tribune directing that it make available the papers and diaries of Mr. Forrestal. It is my understanding these are the property of the New York Herald Tribune. The Subcommittee has been assured by the New York Herald Tribune that as far as it is concerned it has done everything possible to comply with the demands of the subpena. The staff of the Subcommittee contacted you about this matter because it was understood you were holding these papers for the owners.

The New York Times story referred to above, which credits a White House source, treats this matter as though the documents in question were Executive papers and wholly subject to Presidential control.

If for any reason you have decided to refuse to make these subpenaed papers and diaries available to the Subcommittee, it is requested you directly inform me, as Subcommittee Chairman, of the position you choose to take.

Kindest personal regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. We have a letter from Mr. Edwin O. Reischauer dated September 26, 1951, which he requested to go into the record. This was discussed before. We held it up on the grounds that we had hoped possibly that we might have a sworn statement by Mr. Reischauer, but, in view of the fact that we are a little pressed, will you accept this letter?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, it is the opinion of counsel that this letter is distinguishable and should be distinguished from an offer of proof which is not made in affidavit form, since this letter is a recital which does not appear to be at variance with the facts; is that correct, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; it will go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1318" and is as follows):

EXHIBIT No. 1318

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
DEPARTMENT OF FAR EASTERN LANGUAGES,
Boylston Hall, Cambridge 38, Mass., September 26, 1951.

The Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
Senate Judiciary Committee, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: I understand that my name was cited before your committee yesterday as one of a group who had taken a pro-Chinese Communist stand at a three-day meeting called by the Department of State in October 1949. I am certain that any examination of the record of those meetings or of my various writings before or after that time will reveal nothing which could be called pro-Chinese Communist or in favor of communism in any form. As I recollect the meetings, my chief role was to present, at the request of the State Department, a statement on the situation in Japan. I took this opportunity to urge the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan as soon as feasible, in part on the grounds that this was an important step in our efforts to halt the spread of Communism there. This opinion subsequently became a generally accepted view in the U. S. Government, and the peace treaty which Mr. Dulles and Mr. Acheson so ably brought to successful completion was in part based on such a point of view.

I am sending you this statement so that the records of your committee will not contain false testimony uncorrected and so that the committee may be warned of the unreliability of some of its witnesses, such as Professor Kenneth W. Colgrove, who is quoted as being responsible for the statement in question.

Yours sincerely,

[s] Edwin O. Reischauer,
[t] EDWIN O. REISCHAUER,
Professor of Far Eastern Languages.

SEPTEMBER 28, 1951.

Prof. EDWIN O. REISCHAUER,
Harvard University, Department of Far Eastern Languages,
Boylston Hall, Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR PROFESSOR REISCHAUER: I have your letter of September 26, 1951, which will be inserted in the public record of our proceedings.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

Mr. MORRIS. This is a reply the staff has received in connection with a compilation. Perhaps this was done by Mr. Mandel. Will you identify that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a reply from the Library of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date?

Mr. MANDEL. It is dated March 12, 1952. We had asked for information regarding the activities and career of Madame Sun Yat-sen. The letter is signed by Ernest Griffith, director of the Legislative Reference Service. It is a reply to a request from me.

Mr. MORRIS. Will that go in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. That will go in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1319," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1319

Legislative Reference Service

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D. C., March 12, 1952.

SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: Miss Walker.)

GENTLEMEN: With respect to your request concerning Madame Sun Yat-sen's cooperation with the Communists, we submit the following information. It is

based largely on the articles on Madame Sun in *Current Biography*, 1944; the *New York Times Magazine*, August 11, 1946; *New York Herald Tribune*, March 7, 1950.

Madame Sun was active in the Chinese revolutionary movement during the period of the "first united front" in China (1924–27) when the Communists and Nationalists cooperated under the initial leadership of her husband, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Madame Sun left China in 1927 after the split in the revolutionary movement. Living abroad, first in Moscow and then in Berlin, Madame Sun was critical of the National Government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. She returned to China in May 1929, to attend to the removal and reinterment of the remains of her husband.

After the Japanese invasion of China in 1931, Madame Sun urged a united effort against the Japanese. In 1938, she accepted a seat on the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. She had been elected to the post *in absentia* in 1929, but refused until this time to lend her prestige to the party. However, she continued to criticize what she termed the "reactionary minority within the leadership" of the Kuomintang "which has forgotten the teachings of Sun Yat-sen."

When the Chinese Communists took Shanghai in May 1949, Madame Sun remained in the city. In the early fall of 1949 she became a "non-Communist" member and vice chairman of the "People's Political Consultative Council" in the newly formed "People's Republic of China."

Since that time Madame Sun's name has appeared as author of several articles attacking the motives and policies of the United States. Such attacks have contained references to the "peaceful" intentions of the "Great Soviet Union" led by the "mighty Stalin" and similar terminology.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Ernest S. Griffith
[t] Ernest S. Griffith, *Director.*

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, if I might revert to the offer of the letter by you to Admiral Dennison, through error for which counsel is responsible, the document is not here physically at this hearing. There is in the files of the committee in Washington a letter addressed to Mr. Morris from Charles Murphy, administrative assistant to the President, with regard to the Forrestal diaries. I ask the Chair to order that that letter may be inserted in the record.

The Chairman. Yes; I know of that letter, and it may be inserted in the record. It has to do with my request for the Forrestal diaries.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1320," and filed for the record.)

Exhibit No. 1320

The White House,
Washington, April 28, 1952.

Mr. Robert Morris,
Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Morris: It is understood that you have been in touch with Admiral Robert L. Dennison, the President's Naval Aide, concerning the possibility of having made available to the Subcommittee on Internal Security certain papers of the late James V. Forrestal, which are now in the custody of the White House.

I have been requested by the President to advise you that in his judgment the disclosure of these papers would not be in the public interest.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Charles S. Murphy
[t] Charles S. Murphy,
Special Counsel to the President.

The Chairman. It is a reply made by Mr. Charles Murphy of the President's staff.

Mr. Sourwine. If the Chairman please, it is in a sense not a reply because the committee had made no request of Mr. Murphy or of the President.

The Chairman. I understand, but he is making the reply, is he not?

Mr. Sourwine. It is a letter stating that the President has directed him to inform the committee the President does not feel the committee should have the Forrestal diaries.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, I offer you a group of letters and a list. I ask if you will identify the letters and the list.

The Chairman. Take the list first.

Mr. Mandel. This is a list prepared under my direction of letters, memoranda, and documents from or to Mr. E. C. Carter as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Sourwine. Is that list an inventory of the documents and papers which have also been handed to you at this time?

Mr. Mandel. It is in fact an inventory of these documents.

The Chairman. You better tie them into the record a little bit by some identification. There are so many that we are handling here rather loosely. I think you better identify them.

Mr. Mandel. This list begins with A. Von Trott and ends with E. C. Carter.

The Chairman. Are there numbers of serials?

Mr. Mandel. The documents are numbered and dated.

The Chairman. And the list sets forth the numbers and the dates?

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Were the documents themselves taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Mandel. They were.

Mr. Sourwine. Have these documents been shown to Mr. Carter?

Mr. Marks. Yes, they have, Mr. Sourwine.

The Chairman. They may be inserted in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits Nos. 1123 to 1139, inclusive; 1141 to 1182, inclusive; 1184 to 1223, inclusive; 1125 to 1229, inclusive; 1231 to 1240, inclusive; 1242 to 1254, inclusive; 1256 to 1260, inclusive, and appear on pp. 5198 through 5272.)

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg was the object of certain statements made by a witness before this committee, Mr. Owen Lattimore, and he has written in demanding the right to be heard. The committee has rejected a statement that he gave to the committee on the theory that it was not a sworn statement.

At the suggestion of the committee he has now made this a sworn statement. May that be received into the record at this time? He has presented it in the form of an affidavit.

The Chairman. Is it the same in substance that he made before he took an oath to it?

Mr. Morris. Previously he was introducing certain letters and certain material which the committee felt were self-serving and they were rejected. In lieu of that Mr. Kohlberg has submitted this affidavit.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I believe it would be clarifying if the Chair also ordered printed in the record at this point the correspondence in the committee file between Mr. Kohlberg and the committee on this subject. That would explain it.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be the order, and this will be inserted in the record together with the correspondence of the past.

(The documents referred to were marked exhibit No. 1321–A, B, C, and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1321–A

MARCH 28, 1952.

Senator PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: As proposed in your letter I enclose affidavit for inclusion in the record of your Hearings.

Briefly it states:

1. References to me by witnesses before you Committee as the China Lobby, etc.
2. My background and interest in the Far East.
3. Letters from Air Marshal Bishop and Assistant Secretary of Navy Gates attesting my interest in opposing totalitarianism.
4. Service in Civil Air Patrol.
5. Wartime trip to China and discovery of apparent treasonable activities.
6. Study of IPR and publication of findings November 9, 1944.
7. Answer by four trustees.
8. My answer of December 28, 1944.
9. Special meeting of IPR—my letter to members and defeat of my resolution for investigation.
10. Formation of American China Policy Association in 1946 and letter of Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce, October 11. 1945, revealing attitude of Directors.
11. My appearance before Senate Committees and acquaintance with members of Foreign Relations Committee of Senate.
12. My connection with Senator McCarthy.
13. Admiral Nimitz, General Marshall, and IPR.
14. Letter to IPR Trustees, March 13, 1952.
15. Letter to Dr. Roscoe Pound.
16. Closing statement.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] Alfred Kohlberg
[t] ALFRED KOHLBERG,
1 West 37th Street, New York, 18, N. Y.

EXHIBIT No. 1321–B

APRIL 9, 1952.

Mr. ALFRED KOHLBERG,
1 West 37th Street,
New York 18, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KOHLBERG: I have your affidavit of March 28, 1952, which contains extraneous clippings and supplementary letters.

For inclusion in the record of the Internal Security Subcommittee what you submit should be all in affidavit form.

Kindest regards,

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1321–C

(Mr. Alfred Kohlberg's affidavit of April 16, 1952:)

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

Alfred Kohlberg, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That I reside in New York, my office address being 1 West 37th Street, New York 18, N. Y.

That Professor Owen Lattimore referred to me three times in his statement read to the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate,

generally referred to as the McCarran Committee. That in addition Professor Lattimore referred to me several times in his verbal testimony; that I was likewise referred to numerous times by other witnesses before the McCarran Committee; alos by Professor Lattimore and other witnesses before the Tydings Committee in March, April, May and June 1950; also by Senators Morse and McMahon during the Joint Committee hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur; and on the floor of the Senate by Senators Lehman, Connally and others.

That beginning in April and May 1950, after Professor Lattimore's statements to the Tydings Committee, articles and editorials appeared in the Washington Post, St. Louis Dispatch, New York Post, New York Compass, New York Daily Worker, New York Times, The Nation (a weekly), the New Republic (a weekly). That I was mentioned 17 times in Owen Lattimore's book "Ordeal by Slander."

That the testimony and articles stated that I was the "China Lobby," that I was the "man behind McCarthy;" that "McCarthy's charges were nothing but a rehash of the irresponsible charges of Kohlberg;" that I was probably secretly in the pay of the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek; that I had connections with a so-called Christian-front, with fascists, with anti-semites; and an editorial in the Washington Post entitled "Kohlberg's Klan" suggested further disreputable connections.

That I have written evidence that in April 1950 one, Robert W. Barnett, formerly Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and in 1950 Chief of the Economic Section of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, advised certain reporters of the above alleged facts about me and further advised them that more details could be obtained from an organization in New York called The Friends of Democracy, headed by Rev. Leon Birkhead; and that Friends of Democracy had prepared a three page statement entitled "The Case Against Alfred Kohlberg."

That the facts concerning my interest and activities in opposing Communism, and opposing the Chinese Communists, are as follows:

I have been engaged in the import textile business for more than 35 years, having offices and agents at various times in China, Japan, Iran, France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. At no time have I ever done any business with or had any financial transactions of any character with the Government of the United States or any foreign Government, or any subsidiary thereof (with two exceptions), except for the payment of customs dues and taxes. When I refer to any business or financial transactions, I include myself personally and any and all corporations with which I have been actively connected. The exceptions referred to above were (1) a period of 2 or 3 years during which one of my corporations acted as agent for the Amtorg Trading Corp. for Russian linens in the late 20's or early 30's; and (2) the purchase of some surplus navy jackets, after V-J Day, from the United States Government.

During these more than 35 years in foreign trade, I came to understand the wisdom of the now-abandoned Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy. The Monroe Doctrine was designed to prevent the possibility of the building up of a European empire on this continent, with its resulting constant threat to our security. The Open Door Policy was designed to prevent any military empire from adding to its power the resources and manpower of the Chinese Empire, with a resulting threat to our security in the Pacific.

Therefore when Japan began her all-out war on China in 1937, I contributed to relief work and addressed some open letters to Congress on America's interest, as I saw it. At the beginning of that war I learned that the Soviet Union extended aid in military supplies and a Russian-manned airforce to the Republic of China. Being in China in the summer of 1938, I learned that the Soviets had ceased their aid and that Russia had reached agreement with Germany and Japan. This agreement, which was finally made public as the Hitler-Stalin Pact of Aug. 23, 1939, I reported in an interview in the New York Times of Nov. 25, 1938. During the course of said interview I stated, and the New York Times reported, that Russia, Germany, and Japan had arrived at an agreement by which Russia "either joined the German-Japanese alliance, or, if she did not go so far, made peace with Japan and Germany. The arrangement called for cooperation with Russia by Japan and Germany rather than antagonism, and provided for withdrawal of Russian support to Chinese forces."

After the war started in Europe the following year, and after the replacement of Neville Chamberlain by Winston Churchill convinced me that Britain would really fight the Hitler-Stalin-Japanese alliance, being a licensed airplane pilot, I went to Canada in May 1940 to volunteer, but was rejected because of age.

The following month, after the fall of France, I wrote to Wing Commander Homer Smith of the Royal Canadian Air Force, offering to volunteer, with my airplane, to fly a suicide mission into any German objective selected by them. On July 2, 1940, Air Marshal W. A. Bishop wrote me "Wing Commander Smith has shown me your letter and I wanted to take this opportunity of telling you how much we appreciate your offer of service, and the offer of your machine. At the moment, however, the age limit makes it impossible for us to accept your services, but should this at a later date change, I will get in touch with you."

Thereafter I volunteered to fly a similar suicide mission for the Australians, the British, and the Chinese; but was refused.

Finally, after Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941, I wrote Artemus Gates, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, stating in part:

"In May 1940 I volunteered for the R.C.A.F. at Ottawa but was turned down on account of age. In July 1940 I volunteered to fly any old trainer loaded with explosives into a troop transport, warship or any other objective. This offer was refused. In April 1941 I repeated this offer. This last offer is still being considered, but the Air Attaché of the British Embassy in Washington still has no final decision from London, but is not hopeful of a favorable answer, as the regulations provide for no such service."

"I now make this offer to you * * * Can you use me? Rank and pay are no object, but I would like two weeks to wind up my affairs. This letter, of course, is strictly confidential."

On Jan. 8, 1942, Mr. Gates wrote:

"I have your offer very much in mind, in fact, I have not been able to forget it since you wrote me early in December, but to date I just don't know where such 100 percent unselfish services can be used. Perhaps the opportunity will develop but I think our battle on the Pacific is going to be a long war.

"Incidentally, a number of officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics have been acquainted with your sacrifice."

Failing to obtain such a commission, I finally served with the Civil Air Patrol in the antisubmarine patrol in the Gulf of Mexico in the latter part of 1942, and hold Certificate of Honorable Service of the Department of the Air Force.

I refer to this service and attempted service as an answer to charges and implied charges, referred to above, that I was a Fascist or sympathetic to fascist-minded groups, with none of whom have I ever had any association whatsoever.

Meantime I had become a Director and in 1941 Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China. In the Spring of 1943 ABMAC and United China Relief, of which it had become a part, received unfavorable reports from their staff men in Chungking about graft and incompetency in the Chinese Army medical services, which we were aiding. Mr. E. C. Carter, of the IPR, had become head of the United China Relief Committee that allocated funds to the various agencies in China, and had recommended for appointment most of the employees of United China Relief.

I flew to China in June 1943 at my own expense to invetigate. Shortly before leaving for China, Mr. Lauchlin Currie phoned New York and asked me to see him before going, in his offices in the State Department. He told me at considerable length of reports being received from China, of incompetence, corruption and the inability and lack of will on the part of the Chinese to fight. He told me I could check with Americans in Chungking, and that he would be pleased to hear my impressions on returning. On arrival in China Dwight Edwards, head of UCR there, Dr. George Bachman, head of ABMAC, and various other Americans including some in our Embassy confirmed the reports of corruption and incompetence.

As none of them had been in the field, I asked their sources, which they protested were confidential. I therefore felt it necessary to check in the field, which I did against their advice. After traveling through five provinces by truck, ambulance, rail, air and horse-back, including 8 days in the 6th War Area, I found the itemized charges either completely untrue or greatly exaggerated.

On returning to America I complained to Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Political Adviser to the Secretary of State on the Far East, and Joseph Ballantine, Director Far Eastern Division of the State Department, in a lengthy interview. I protested that the untruths were making Chinese-American cooperation difficult, if not impossible, with resultant benefit to the Japanese enemy and unnecessary loss of both Chinese and American lives.

They professed to be unable to do anything about it; Dr. Hornbeck saying: "When I see the people that this Department is sending to China, I shake in my shoes."

It was not until early 1944 that I began to realize that the lies about the Chinese Government and Army were Communist propaganda; and that the main source for spreading them in this country was the Institute of Pacific Relations. Although I had previously been a member of the Finance Committee of the IPR and helped raise funds for them, and had previously recognized that some of the employees were pro-Communist, I had not suspected the scope of the infiltration. As I had foolishly thrown away all back copies of their publications, unread, I went to their offices to rebuy such back copies. They told me that they were out of print.

I therefore went to the public library and from about April to October 1944, read all articles they had published on the Chinese *military and/or political situation* from 1937 to that date. I then read the articles in the New Masses, an official Communist weekly, and The Communist, an official Communist monthly, on the same topics, for the same years.

From these I prepared an 88 page study (frequently referred to in the McCarran hearings) and sent it with a covering letter to Mr. E. C. Carter and to each of the Trustees of the IPR and such members and other persons interested in the Far East as were known to, or suggested to me. (Later the IPR in their so-called analysis which Mr. Dennett testified was prepared by Mrs. Maxwell S. Stewart, and not by the Trustees, and in other testimony, charged that my study contained extracts from only 2 percent of their articles published between 1937 and 1944. This may or may not be literally true, but is irrelevant as I studied and extracted only their articles on the military and/or political situation in China. To the best of my memory my extracts covered all or practically all of their articles in those two fields. I did not attempt to analyze their articles on other countries than China (even including the U. S. and Canada), nor on other topics such as economics, industry, transportation, finance, agriculture, folklore, family life, shipping, missionary activities, fisheries, etc., etc.)

In my covering letter to Mr. Carter, dated Nov. 9, 1944, I said in part:

"Last June I received from United China Relief a copy of a booklet issued by your IPR entitled 'War-Time China' (IPR Pamphet No. 10). In a recent advertisement, Rosamund Lee, your Publications Secretary, referring to this pamphlet states. 'What is the true situation between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang as explained by Maxwell S. Stewart in War-Time China.'

"Frankly, I was shocked at this pamphlet. From start to finish, it seemed to me a deliberate smear of China, the Chinese and the Chinese Government. I was especially shocked by the following: 'They (the American, British and Soviet Governments) have, however, limited their economic and military assistance because of fear that any supplies they send might be used in civil strife rather than against the Japanese.'

"The statement seems completely at variance with the many statements made by our President to the effect that all possible aid is being given to China and will continue to be given to China.

"Three or four years ago, you may recall, I resigned after a dozen years membership in IPR. You asked me the reason for my resignation and I told you frankly that I thought you had too many Communists on your staff. You asked me if I thought you were a Communist, to which I, of course, replied 'No.' You then told me that you did not question your staff as to their political beliefs: whether they were Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, Communists, or what not; that you investigated their qualifications and judged them by their work. This seemed to me at the time a very businesslike attitude and I withdrew my resignation.

"After reading the above referred-to booklet, I decided to look into the IPR publications further. As a result of this reading, I now attach hereto a lot of clippings from your publications, along with clippings from 'The Communist' (Official organ of the Communist Party in the U. S. A.) and 'New Masses' (another Communist organ), also a few other clippings that seem to bear on the same issues. If you will go through these, I think you will find that your employees have been putting over on you a not-too-well-camouflaged Communist line. Your staff publications follow the 'New Masses' line exactly but not quite so frankly and the 'New Masses' articles are much better documented. In selecting these, I have had to clip and clip to keep to reasonable length, but I believe that what is left of each article fairly represents the article as a whole, as far as same touches on the subjects covered

"This study poses the question: What are the Soviet Union's aims in the Far East? Is there a sinister purpose behind this Communist inspired campaign to discredit China? Only Marshall Stalin can answer this question.

"But another question has been bothering me as I made this study. This question is: Is it treason? Does the publication of untruthful statements give 'aid and comfort' to our enemy, Japan, in its attempt to break Chinese unity under Chiang Kai-shek? This question I propound to your Board of Trustees.

"Look over these clippings and see if you do not think it is time for a house-cleaning in the IPR. The economic articles (not quoted) sounded to me very much like undergraduate studies, compiled from studies of Chinese economists and lacking any practical business background.

"If you agree that a house cleaning in the IPR is long overdue, I will be happy to help. My suggestions would be:

"1. Fire all the Reds, because the truth is not in them.

"2. Adopt a policy of presenting facts rather than opinions. Identify the sources of your information.

"3. Name a responsible body to determine policy.

"This last point is suggested to me by what I missed in going through your last 7 years' publications. I found:

1. No criticism of Japan in those 7 years, except of her rural land system;
2. No single criticism of Communist China; and
3. No single criticism of the Soviet Union; whereas I found:
4. Severe criticism of the Chinese Government, alternating with praise, closely following the alternations of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and of the Communist press.

"A responsible committee controlling and vouching for your policy would be very reassuring to the members of, and contributors to your Institute."

This letter was answered, not by Mr. Carter, but by Messrs. Robert G. Sproul, Chairman; Robert D. Calkins, Dean, Columbia University; G. Ellsworth Huggins, Treasurer, and Philip C. Jessup. In their answer they said:

"At its December 11 meeting the Executive Committee of the American Council reviewed Mr. Kohlberg's charges and demands. It desires to report the following:

"The Executive Committee and the responsible officers of the American Council find no reason to consider seriously the charge of bias. The character of the personnel associated with the Institute, the long history of its research activities, and the demonstrated value of its research testify to the fact that it has properly fulfilled its function to conduct impartial research on important issues even though they are controversial. The Committee believes a full presentation and discussion of such issues is desirable, even in wartime.

"The Institute of Pacific Relations has, and always has had, a responsible body to determine policy. The Pacific Council, with which Mr. Carter is associated, is directed by representatives from the National Councils and that body, made up of these representatives, determines its policies.

"The general policy of the American Council, which is one of the ten constituent bodies in the Institute, is determined by the Board of Trustees. The Executive Committee acts on behalf of the Board of Trustees, when the Board is not in session.

"The research conducted by the American Council is under the direction of its Research Advisory Committee, to which research planning and policy have been delegated by the Executive Committee. This Committee formulates and approves research programs, and it approves the research personnel who are engaged for their competence to undertake the special assignments required in the research program. Having hired competent research workers, it is not the policy of the Committee or of the American Council to censor this findings, but to publish them as the research results of the authors themselves."

This answer of the 4 trustees, I answered Dec. 28, 1944. My answer follows (in part):

"*The issue presented to Mr. Carter* by my letter of Nov. 9 is:

"Have the publications of the I. P. R. (both American Council and Pacific Council) closely followed the Communist line in alternate praise and abuse of the Chinese Government? i. e.

Prior to the Hitler-Stalin past of Aug. 23, 1939	PRAISE.
Then until June 22, 1941 (Hitler invasion of Russia)	ABUSE.
Then until Summer of 1943	PRAISE.
Since Summer of 1943	ABUSE.

"*The issue presented to your Board* by my letter of Nov. 9 is: Are these publications treasonable, inasmuch as they are calculated to give 'aid and comfort' to

our enemy, Japan, in its attempts by propaganda to break the faith of the Chinese people in the Government of Chiang Kai-shek?

"Neither of these issues is touched on in your letter of Dec. 19. Whether they were discussed at your meeting of Dec. 11 is not stated.

"Your letter states that, having selected competent employees, you let them publish what they wish, without censorship. Do you consider yourselves responsible bodies and if so, do you, or do you not, assume responsibility for those publications by your staff?

"As a member, may I ask your Research Advisory Committee for the qualifications as 'experts' of the following staff members who write your articles on whether, including dates of their visits to China, cities and provinces visited, and whether you feel their impartiality is attested to, or questioned by, their acceptance as authorities by, and contributors to, the American Communist press:

Maxwell S. Stewart
T. A. Bisson
L. K. Rosinger
Y. Y. Hsu

"As a member, I would be interested to know who elected or appointed to your Board and to your Executive Committee, Mr. Frederick V. Field, Generalissimo of the White House pickets until their liquidation, Sunday, June 22, 1941, and now featured writer on China for the 'Daily Worker,' 'The Communist,' and 'New Masses', I would also be interested to know what makes him an 'expert' on China.

"In my letter of November 9, I called attention to the fact that in reading your publications for the past 7 years, I found no criticism of Japan, Communist China, or the Soviet Union, but alternating praise and abuse of the Chinese Government.

"Since that time I have received scores of letters, many from outstanding American authorities on the Far East. None was critical, some were noncommittal, the majority were commendatory of my study. A number were from ex-members of your Institute who resigned because they felt the Institute had become the not-too-well-camouflaged agent of a foreign power whose way of life and world-wide fifth column infiltration are antagonistic to the interest of these United States.

"From that correspondence I attach a letter written to you Oct. 8, 1942, by Mr. Miller Freeman, Seattle publisher. Mr. Freeman tells me his letter was neither answered nor acknowledged. Maybe he, too, should have cleared it privately with Mr. Carter.

"Before closing, one more quotation—this from signed statement of Upton Close:

"'A few days prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Mr. Trammell' (head of NBC) 'himself received a letter from E. C. Carter, head of the Institute of Pacific Relations, demanding that I be dropped from the air because I was "anti-Japanese".'

"One of the questions most commonly asked is: "What are IPR's motives for their current attacks on China.' Possibly your Boards would like to make a statement on this, explaining why all your articles on the current complicated situation are written by staff members, none of whom has been in China for years, while contrary statements by such liberals as Pearl Buck and Lin Yutang are ignored, and articles from your own Chinese Council are rejected. May I also ask Mr. Carter whether he personally presented your public criticisms to Chiang Kai-shek, Ho Ying-chin, Chen Li-fu and Sun-fo in Chungking last year and what were their answers?"

I then asked for permission to circulate my fellow members. This was granted by letter from Mr. Raymond Dennett. But when I sent a secretary by appointment to copy the names, they withdrew permission. I filed suit for the membership list, which after various court vicissitudes was settled by agreement by the IPR to address on their machine under my inspection any one mailing I might choose to send their members.

In said mailing, dated March 18, 1947, I included a printed resolution appointing an impartial committee of investigation and a proxy to vote for same. Also one article from the New Leader and one from Plain Talk, both about the IPR and wrote my fellow members of the IPR in part as follows:

"By order of the supreme court of the State of New York, this letter is being mailed to you by the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.

"Early in July 1943 I was told by several Americans in Chungking that 'the Chinese Government was hoarding tanks and guns given them under lend-lease

to use against the Japs.' Late in August, having spent six weeks traveling through Szechuen, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Hunan and Yunnan, I called on Brig. Gen. Arms, U. S. Army, Commander of the Infantry Training School in Kunming. Among other items I asked why we permitted such hoarding. He laughed and said he'd heard some good ones, but this took the cake. He said that up to that date all the arms and ammunition that had come in had gone to him and to the artillery training school; that they were not fully equipped as yet and, until they were, nothing would be flown in (the air route over the hump to Kunming being the only route in) for any other force except the air force whose minimum requirements were the first priority. He explained that nothing but air-force supplies had come in since May, due to the monsoons. After the monsoons ended, he expected the resumption of his equipping; and after that was completed, he explained, General Stilwell was to get full equipment for two of his divisions, and then, after that, 50% was to go to Stilwell and 50% to the Chinese Army—sometime in 1944. At that moment, he said, not one tank or gun or rifle or bazooka or cartridge had been turned over to the Chinese Army under lend-lease—hence none could be hoarded.

"On returning to the United States, I spoke of this and other reports with some heat and was told by friends that the IPR was the chief culprit in the spreading of lies about China, and that the motivation back of it was Communism. I had been a member of the IPR since 1928, but like most businessmen and (as I later learned) like most of their Board of Trustees, I seldom read the literature they sent me, and like most people knew nothing about Communism.

"To check on these charges, I read through the Far Eastern Survey and our quarterly Pacific Affairs from 1937 to that date (summer of 1944). In my reading I read every article on the political and military situation in China and skipped nearly everything else. Then, to learn the Communist line, I read all the articles on the political and military situation in China in the New Masses (weekly) and The Communist (monthly), both being Communist Party official publications.

"In the course of this reading I learned that the IPR and the Communist publications had switched their attitude or 'line' on the situation in China several times between 1937 and 1944; both IPR and Communists making the same switches at the same time. Further I noticed that to some extent they interchanged writers and both quoted the same authorities; that they were both lyrical in their reviews of the same books; but that, of the three, the New Masses (possibly because it was franker and more open in taking sides) had the best documented articles. In fact, if the IPR had disregarded whatever information sources it had (if any) and relied only on the New Masses, it would have omitted little that it published on the Chinese military and political scene.

"After completing my study, I published extracts from the IPR and the Communist press in an 88-page booklet and sent it with a letter to Mr. E. C. Carter and each of our Trustees and to personal acquaintances interested in China. (You may have a copy of this and later correspondence for the asking.)

"At that time I thought that Mr. Carter, who was then President of Russian War Relief, was so busy that he had let some Reds on the staff run off with the Institute. I called on him and the Trustees to fire these Reds and exercise a real control over their publications. (That was November 1944.) The answer of the Executive Committee was to issue a letter stating that they did not think my charges 'merited serious consideration.' (Two of them told me later that they had not read the study.) They then turned the charges and study over to the staff (against whom the charges were filed) to be studied and answered. By April 1945 the staff had prepared a 52-page answer of which I only learned in 1946 and of which even the Chairman of the Trustees couldn't get a copy to give me. I finally obtained a copy by court order in October 1946.

"Since 1944 I have learned much more about the IPR; its apparently completely Communist or pro-Communist staff; that all articles on Far Eastern politics are written by Communists or pro-Communists (some articles on economic, scientific, geographic questions are not); and that it has ties through interlocking directorates or staff with various Communist or pro-Communist organizations.

"Through its influence in the staffing of the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence, and Far Eastern Divisions; of UNRRA, of OWI, and even General MacArthur's staff, our Institute has put considerable numbers of Communists and pro-Communists where they could and have done the most possible harm

and spread the most confusion. How far they have succeeded is strikingly illustrated by comparing the present confusion in our attitude to China with the statement handed to Ambassador Nomura on November 26, 1941, which laid down the terms on which we would restore peaceful relations with Japan (ruptured by the blockade declared July 25, 1941). Hull's essential demand was:

" '4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any Government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.'

"To attempt to prove my statements is impossible in this letter. They are proven in part by the study and correspondence referred to above, which will be sent you on request.

"My attempts to arouse Mr. Carter and our Trustees to investigation and action have failed. Several Trustees, including several of the Executive Committee have resigned, claiming that they were worried by the charges of communism, but had no time to look into them so thought they'd better get out. Our Board of Trustees (47) scattered all over the country never meets. The Executive Committee (10) is chairmanned by a Californian who never attends. The connections of the others are as per attached sheet. Most of our Trustees are, of course, not Communists and furthermore don't take Communists very seriously. Their attitude is very similar to that of a witness before the Senate Atomic Committee, as reported in the New York Sun February 22, 1947, as follows:

" 'Cameron said that he roomed with Hart and knew that his roommate held Marxist views, was sympathetic to Russia, and read the Daily Worker, Communist paper, but did not know that he was a Communist.'

"If our Institute is to be saved for the useful work it can and should do in soundly and objectively posting American scholars, teachers, and writers on the Far East, we, the members, will have to do the job. The first step is to appoint a Board of Investigators to listen to my charges and dig out the facts. Some of the gentlemen named in the enclosed proxy are known to me, some are not, but all bear reputations as good Americans informed on the Far East. I have not asked them if they will serve and cannot do so until I hold sufficient proxies. I have no doubt that enough will accept to make up a satisfactory board.

"In order to keep this letter within reasonable length, I have omitted going into the following:

"1. Many of the staff and writers have no real claim to scholarship in the fields they cover.

"2. Much of the material published is plagiarized for the above reasons.

"3. Our staff and officers were instrumental in forming the violently pro-Communist 'Committee for a Far Eastern Democratic Policy.'

"4. Our staff and officers were instrumental in maintaining the pro-Communist 'Japanese American Committee for Democracy.'

"5. Our staff and officers conducted a pressure mail campaign to force NBC to continue the wartime 'Pacific Story'—a Communist-angled dramatic half hour.

"6. Our staff and officers have sponsored and published books and articles by such known Communists as Abraham Chapman, Jos. S. Allen, Harriet L. Moore, Philip Jaffe, Anna Louise Strong, Frederick V. Field.

"7. Members of our Board of Trustees and our staff managed to get control of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, UNRRA and OWI, where they loaded all three with pro-Communists. Two of them, Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, accompanied Henry Wallace to China in 1944 and talked that adolescent into reporting to Roosevelt that 'we were backing the wrong horse in China' and that 'Chiang Kai-shek's government would collapse within 90 days.' Just prior to that much heralded trip of that great friend of the common man, IPR published a booklet by Henry Wallace, Our Job in the Pacific, which they knew he had not written.

"8. Four of the six persons arrested in the Amerasia case were connected with the IPR.

"I no longer believe the officers and Executive Committee can clean up the Institute.

"After such an Investigating Committee has completed its investigation and reported, action will then be up to us. Our Trustees will not act and if we wait until Congressional investigation reaches us, it may be too late to save our institution and even our good reputation."

At the meeting, April 22, 1947, the tellers advised me that they had over 1,100 proxies against the resolution for an investigating committee. I presented 86 but they disqualified about 20, though they refused to show me their proxies. In the meeting I read my proposed resolution and then stated:

"It would be my intention to present first to this Investigating Committee witnesses, and by witnesses I mean more than one, who would testify that the Institute of Pacific Relations is considered by the National Committee of the Communist Party to be one of its organizations and that certain of the Executive Committee of the American Institute are members of the Communist Party.

"In addition to these witnesses who would testify to that effect, I would expect to show that committee that there have been certain misstatements of fact in the publications of the Institute, that these misstatements of fact follow a pattern, that the publications of the Institute have been free of criticism of Japan up to Pearl Harbor except for criticisms of the Japanese rural land system, and that they have been free of criticisms of Russia up to date, both Japan and Russia—that is, Siberia—falling within the area covered by the Pacific Institute.

"I would call attention to the fact that although the Institute has referred to many documents and in books and pamphlets issued by it has published many pertinent documents, four of the most pertinent documents referring to the Far East have always been omitted, and as far as I have been able to find by an examination of the publications, have never been either printed in full or referred to by the Institute.

"Those four documents are the Tanaka Memorial, the Resolutions of the Colonies and Semi-Colonies adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, the program of the Comintern adopted by the same Sixth Congress, and the note of Secretary Hull to Ambassador Nomura of November 21, 1941.

"I would also expect to show to that same committee that many of the writers are not qualified and that there are much better qualified people in certain of the fields on, for example, the Philippines, Hawaii, than the writers in the publications of the Institute. They are not qualified, and qualified writers are available, and, in fact, members of the Institute.

"I would also call to the attention of that committee that American policy for the Pacific has been a consistent policy and in a traditional policy. That policy is the policy of the Open Door, proclaimed in 1899 and further confirmed in the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, and that policy calls for the Open Door, for the independence and the territorial integrity of China, and that the publications of the Institute, although they have published vast amounts of material on China, seldom, if ever, have referred to this policy and its implications.

"I believe that if the opportunity is presented, I can prove each of those statements and also the charges with which you are familiar from the letter sent you March 20."

Mr. Arthur H. Dean, Vice Chairman of the IPR, presided in the absence of the Chairman, Robert G. Sproul. He answered my statement, saying that the IPR was lily-white (not red) and he could vouch for it. The vote cast by the nearly 100 present, was unanimous against the resolution. A few days later, by letter, I resigned from the IPR, since which time I have devoted little attention to it.

Just about a year previous to the above meeting, Mr. J. B. Powell, dean of the American correspondents in China, and Miss Helen Loomis, a former missionary teacher in China, had called a small meeting at Miss Loomis' apartment to form a committee to warn the country of the dangerous policy we were following in China. From this meeting came the American China Policy Association, Inc., of which Mr. Powell was President until his death in 1947, when he was succeeded for one year by former Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, and Miss Loomis was Secretary-Treasurer. I was elected Vice President and later Chairman of the Board. By resolution the American China Policy Association, Inc., limited its members to persons of American citizenship and provided that only Americans could be brought as guests to its Board meetings, so that America's interest, only, should be presented for consideration.

Meantime also, I had become publisher and sole financial backer of the magazine Plain Talk, published from October 1946 to May 1950, as a monthly, and now merged with The Freeman, a fortnightly.

During these years, and continuing to the present, I have written numerous open letters to various persons, including Government officials, numerous articles for magazines, and letters to newspapers, on the general topic of our struggle with World Communism. I have also made speeches on numerous occasions. In all cases I have refused to accept monies, from any source, either for

articles, speeches or traveling expenses, or as contributions. All expenses have been paid by me personally or by one of the corporations controlled by me and interested in these matters.

I have five times appeared at public hearings before Committees of the Congress—twice on behalf of the American China Policy Association, Inc., and three times as an individual. Three of the hearings were before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and two before the Appropriations Committee of the Senate.

Other than these appearances my visits to Washington have been mostly seeking information as to what was going on in the labyrinth of apparent absence of over-all policy which has led to such disastrous results for America and the Free World. The only members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee whom I have ever met are Senators Brien McMahon, H. Alexander Smith, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Owen Brewster. These were chance meetings. The only members of that Committee on whom I have ever called are Senators H. Alexander Smith and Owen Brewster. When Senator Smith returned from the Far East in 1949, I sent my card in to the Floor and he came to the Senate Lobby and told me of his impressions. I called on Senator Brewster in New York once when he was en route to Europe and presented him with copies of three important Comintern documents.

Sometime in March 1950 one of Senator McCarthy's assistants got in touch with me and I supplied published material on the Far East and on persons connected with American policy in the Far East. Subsequently, I met the Senator for the first time. Thereafter Drew Pearson broadcast the statement that I was backing Senator McCarthy financially. Up to that moment it had not occurred to me that Senator McCarthy had to pay his staff, as I presumed they were supplied by the Senate. So I wrote Drew Pearson as follows:

"Your broadcast suggested that Senator McCarthy has been put to heavy expense in his patriotic work of exposing the traitors who have controlled our policy in Asia. I think Americans should join in helping pay some of Senator McCarthy's expenses, so I am going to send him a small check today and hope others do likewise."

Some days, or a week later, I sent a check for $500 to Senator McCarthy. He returned it with a polite letter saying that charges that I was the China Lobby made it inadvisable for him to accept the contribution. Since then, Senator McCarthy has not suggested, nor have I offered or made a further contribution; nor had I ever previously offered or made any contribution to Senator McCarthy.

In the course of my studies (which were those of a businessman with some background, but not those of a trained student of international affairs), I learned from persons in a position to know, that at all times for more than 10 years the Communists have maintained control of the Executive Committee of the IPR and of the staff; and that the few changes made, under pressure of public exposure, have not altered this control. About 5 years ago an investigator for the State Department spent two days in my files, and after investigation elsewhere filed a report on the IPR which must have revealed to the State Department the true facts. In spite of which our Far Eastern destiny still lies in the hands of IPR-connected officials.

At about the same time an investigator for ONI called on me, said Admiral Nimitz had been invited to become Chairman of IPR; that he had asked ONI to report, and they were making a routine check. Admiral Nimitz did not become Chairman or a Trustee, but thereafter General Marshall became a Trustee, in spite of the previously filed report of the State Department investigator.

In a speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, February 29, 1952, I called on those Trustees of the IPR (of whom some were present) who were neither Communist nor pro-Communist to rehabilitate themselves with their fellow Americans by coming forward and publicly revealing who pulled the strings and who had induced them to lend their protection to the Communists. On March 13, 1952, I wrote to the Trustees in part as follows:

"To Messrs. Jos. P. Chamberlain, Arthur H. Dean, W. F. Dillingham, Brooks Emeny, Huntington Gilchrist, W. R. Herod, and Philip C. Jessup:

"In March 1947 I proposed a Resolution for investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to be voted at a special meeting on April 22, 1947.

"In seeking proxies to oppose my Resolution, a public letter (March 17, 1947) issued by all of you, denied that there was any need for investigation of the Institute. Among various inaccurate statements, you said:

" 'The Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees has investigated Mr. Kohlberg's charges and found them inaccurate and irresponsible.'

"Raymond Dennett, your then secretary, has now sworn before the McCarran Committee that the above statement was untruthful, and known to you to be so.

"To Messrs. Eugene Staley, Herbert Eloesser, Galen M. Fisher, Mrs. Frank A. Gerbode, O. C. Hansen, Mrs. E. H. Heller, Rene A. May, Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, Mrs. Harold L. Paige, Robert Gordon Sproul, Lynn White, Jr., and Ray Lyman Wilbur (all of California):

"On March 31, 1947, you issued a public letter of the same general tenor as the above, seeking proxies to oppose my Resolution for investigation.

"To Knight Biggerstaff of Cornell; John K. Fairbank, of Harvard; Harold H. Fisher of the Hoover Library; Kenneth Scott Latourette, of Yale; Raymond Kennedy, of Yale; Wm. W. Lockwood, of Princeton; Donald G. Tweksbury of Columbia:

"You signed statements in the same proxy fight, exonerating the I. P. R. of the slightest Communist bias.

"To Messrs. Edward W. Allen, Raymond B. Allen, Christian O. Arndt, J. Ballard Atherton, E. C. Auchter, George T. Cameron, Edward C. Carter, D. C. Clarke, Arthur G. Coons, George B. Cressey, Lauchlin Currie, John L. Curtis, Len de Caux, K. R. Duke, Clarence A. Dykstra, Rupert Emerson, Frederick V. Field, Charles K. Gamble, Carrington Goodrich, Henry F. Grady, Mortimer Graves, R. P. Heppner, John R. Hersey, Paul G. Hoffman, Benjamin H. Kizer, Daniel E. Koshland, Lewis L. Lapham, Owen Lattimore, Herbert S. Little, Boyd A. Martin, Charles E. Martin, Abbot Low Moffat, Donald M. Nelson, David N. Rowe, Gregg M. Sinclair, D. B. Straus, Donald B. Tresidder, Juan Trippe, Sumner Wells, Brayton Wilbur, Heaton L. Wrenn, Louise L. Wright and J. D. Zellerbach:

"You were the remaining members of the Board of Trustees of the IPR at the time my Resolution for investigation was voted on April 22, 1947. Not one of you voted for my Resolution to investigate.

"Since that time numerous qualified witnesses have testified under oath before the McCarran Committee that:

"1. Your organization constantly and deliberately followed the Communist line in its publications.

"2. Some espionage activities were carried on.

"3. More than forty of your staff, Trustees and writers were actual Communists, or espionage agents, or both, and others leaned that way.

"4. That activities in infiltrating our government by such people were carried on both officially and unofficially in your name.

"The balance of this letter is addressed only to those of you who are not Communists, or pro-Communist in your sympathies. I suggest that you explain to the McCarran Committee your defense of the conspiracy in your midst; stating names of persons who induced you to protect the guilty, and reasons given; and reasons for neglecting the duty incumbent on you as Trustees. For example, which of you inveigled General Marshall into joining your Board?

"Such confession is the atonement for past injury to our country made by Louis Budenz and the other ex-Communists who testified. I hesitate to think you have less regard for our country's welfare than they."

Thereafter I received a letter from Dr. Roscoe Pound, dean emeritus of the Harvard Law School, and at present, visiting professor at the School of Law, University of California at Los Angeles, dated March 18, 1952, in which he said:

"Many thanks for your statement of date March 14 which I am rejoiced to have. One of the worst offenders in my experience is Professor J. K. Fairbank of Harvard. He is beyond redemption, but I take pleasure in showing him up on every occasion. I ran into him first in Nanking where the State Department information office was a fountain of misinformation."

I further state that the testimony on page 1085 of the MacArthur hearings of last May by Senator Knowland and General Bradley to the effect that we have no objectives in Korea; and the statement near the bottom of page 1556 of Part 5 of the McCarran hearings by Ambassador George Kennan to the effect that we have no over-all foreign policy, not even the Open-Door Policy and the Monroe Doctrine any longer, is conclusive proof either of incompetence on the part of the State Department, or neglect of America's interests by that Department.

ALFRED KOHLBERG.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 16th day of April 1952.

[SEAL] PASQUALE J. FENICO,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Commission Expires March 30, 1954.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify those documents, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here nine groups of photostats that are stapled together, and they come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they photostats of instruments found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. These actual photostats as they are now were found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. They were found in photostatic form?

Mr. MANDEL. In photostatic form and stapled as they are now. For purposes of identification I will read one cover sheet. It reads: "Depart of State, Office of Research and Intelligence," marked "Restricted," No. 3024.3, Economy of Communist North China, 1937–45; Land Policy, Description, Analysis of the Chinese Communist Agrarian Policies and of the Results Obtained From These Policies in Communist-Controlled Areas, Washington, D. C., March 8, 1946," and then there is a rubber stamp in the photostat, "Department of State, Reference Division, Received January 14, 1947," and another rubber stamp, "Division of Geography and Cartography, May 13, 1946, Department of State."

Mr. SOURWINE. Don't you think that identifies it adequately?

Mr. MANDEL. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you made up copies of the first sheets of every one of those documents?

Mr. MANDEL. I have made up copies of nine cover sheets.

Mr. MORRIS. May we offer for the record Mr. Mandel's copies of the cover sheets of these documents rather than the documents themselves? In other words, the significance of this offering is the nature of the documents found rather than the contents of the documents. Because of their great bulk I do not recommend that they be put into the record, but that Mr. Mandel's copies of the cover sheet in each case be introduced into the record after Mr. Marks, Mr. Holland, and Mr. Carter have had an opportunity to make comment on them.

Will you accept that?

Mr. MARKS. We have not checked those cover sheets.

Mr. MORRIS. We will get a ruling first.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it now, the cover sheets were copied by Mr. Mandel; is that right?

Mr. MANDEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And you want to offer the cover sheets?

Mr. MORRIS. We are going to offer the cover sheets, thereby describing the nature of the documents found.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the cover sheet reflect the nature of the document?

Mr. MANDEL. It does.

Mr. SOURWINE. What you are offering is the cover sheet of the document; you are not offering Mr. Mandel's copy. The documents are here, and you are offering the cover sheet of the document of the record in each case; is that right?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. MARKS. Mr. Mandel has his own copy.

The CHAIRMAN. He has a copy of the photostats.

Mr. SOURWINE. The photostats themselves are physically in Mr. Mandel's hands, and I am simply suggesting that we disregard the question of any copies that he may have made and that the Chair's instruction be that the cover sheets of each of these groups of photostatic documents be put into the record.

Mr. MARKS. Fine.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is ordered into the record is the cover sheet itself if the Chair so rules.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, could you tell us precisely in what files they were found? Is that information possible?

Mr. MANDEL. I could not tell you what cabinet or class of cabinet it was found in.

Mr. MARKS. Do you think they came from Lee, Mass., or do you think they came from the files you examined here in New York?

Mr. MANDEL. I am positive they came from the files of Lee, Mass.

Mr. MARKS. I am just trying to locate these things. Did you notice these things before? I know you have had a lot of papers. Are these recent discoveries?

I am going to say frankly right now that Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter will state that they do not recall having seen those, and I am just trying to figure out just what did happen.

Mr. MANDEL. As I recall, they were in a drawer loosely, not in any particular folder, and due to the bulk they were withheld pending further examination and questions to the State Department. It is correspondence with the State Department regarding these, and that is why they have not come up until now.

Mr. MARKS. Do you recall any correspondence in those boxes about these boxes or any kind of covering letter?

Mr. MANDEL. No, I do not.

Mr. MARKS. And there is no staff memorandum or anything, just saying that we received these?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MARKS. Perhaps Mr. Morris would like to ask you whether you or Mr. Carter can identify these.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do these documents suggest anything at all to you?

Mr. HOLLAND. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had an opportunity to examine them?

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes; not every page, but I have examined the covers of each one, and I have a general idea of the nature of the documents. I have no knowledge of ever having seen this document before, and no knowledge of its being in the Institute of Pacific Relations' files. I wish, Mr. Chairman, to note that in the inventory listing of this document, it is given a committee serial number 500.28, and I wondered whether from that Mr. Mandel might be able to locate a little more precisely where in the files he found it.

Mr. MANDEL. The designation was made in the last few days and covers only the documents that we did not have in our ordinary file and had to classify roughly for purposes of this hearing.

Mr. SOURWINE. I might say to Mr. Holland if it is important for him to know how the committee operates in its classification numbers that that is more in the nature of a library classification. It does not have a reference back to the source of the document in the IPR files,

but refers only to the evaluation or the tentative evaluation by the committee staff.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Chairman, my purpose in asking for information about the location in the files is because the dates on these documents I think all relate to late 1945 up to I think either January or May 1947. To the best of our knowledge the files in Lee did not include material after 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. On that point, the files would of course speak for themselves.

Mr. HOLLAND. Sure. I explain this is the only reason for my asking for some clarification if it can be provided.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you recall whether there have been other documents in the IPR files of a date as late as 1947?

Mr. MANDEL. That point has not come up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, would it be proper for me to testify on this of my own recollection?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you want to make a statement or sworn testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MORRIS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MORRIS, SUBCOMMITTEE COUNSEL

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this question has come up, and I have a vivid and unmistakable recollection of this very question because it was my understanding when I first began to examine the files last February and March that the documents contained only letters up to and including 1945. The first or the second day that I began to examine the files I found letters in there subsequent to that date.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you called that to my attention at that time, did you not?

Mr. MORRIS. I did, Mr. Sourwine. They number, I would say, at least in the hundreds in that description. Some of them have been put in the record. I was pointing that out to Mr. Holland yesterday, and one I could think of offhand was a letter describing a conference between Mr. Carter and Mr. Robert T. Miller, which was introduced in the record the first or second day of our open hearings. There have been others, and my recollection is that it is at least in the hundreds. It came as a surprise to me, and I have an unmistakable recollection on that score.

Mr. MANDEL. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that there were two classes of documents, those taken from the files at Lee, Mass., and those taken from the New York office. If these had come from the New York office you would have had photostats of all of them because that was the arrangement.

Mr. HOLLAND. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. As far as that goes, the committee staff in its handling of these documents has kept the items which came from the New York office and those which came from the Lee barn in such a way that there has been no possibility to be confused.

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct. They are designated as coming from the New York office.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Holland, do these appear to you to be based on reports made by the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. HOLLAND. No; I have no indication of that. Yesterday when I was speaking to you informally I said it might, but on subsequent looking at them I don't find any sign that they are based except insofar as they contain footnote references to published materials by the institute. The other comment I wish to make is that in our New York office here and subsequent to 1945 after the end of the war, the institute like a number of other research organizations has received from the State Department a number of declassified documents, some of which resemble this, but so far as I am aware none of them have been in this photostat form. They have all been mimeographed or done on one of these ditto form things, and that is why I am extremely surprised to have this brought to my attention, because it is the kind of thing which I myself would be expected to know because of its subject matter, but, as I say, I have no knowledge or recollection of having seen it before or knowledge of its being in the institute's files.

Mr. MARKS. Do the declassification documents received always show on the document that they have been declassified?

Mr. SOURWINE. I cannot answer it. It should be obvious that it is possible to have in one's possession a document which does not show any declassification stamp and which has in fact been declassified, because if you had a document in your possession at a time when it was classified and retained it in your possession until after it was declassified, it would be a declassified document.

Mr. MARKS. I understand that, but I think the practice is sometimes to declassify by a covering letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps you are sufficiently familiar to testify on that point.

Mr. MARKS. From Mr. Holland's experience, and I would like him to testify on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider Mr. Holland is able to testify with regard to Government practices?

Mr. MARKS. Just his own experience in regard to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. HOLLAND. From our own experience, Mr. Chairman, in one or two cases we have received documents subsequent to 1945 from the State Department in sending along with a group of documents, most of which had the usual stamp "declassified by order of," and then the signature of the person—one or two documents did not have this stamp, but the document was identified in a covering letter transmitting it to us, saying, "We are herewith sending you the following document."

Nevertheless, this does not——

Mr. MARKS. You have not completed that sentence, I don't think. Is that all the letter said?

Mr. HOLLAND. Of course, I cannot remember the exact title, but indicating the title on the document, which on subsequent examination we have found did not include the usual stamp.

Mr. MARKS. But the letter talks about classification. What is it?

Mr. HOLLAND. I can't speak from direct recollection, but I do know we have one or more letters in our files with inventory documents being transmitted to us, and in that inventory are items which on subsequent examination we found referred to documents which did not include on the cover the usual declassification stamp.

Mr. MARKS. Did the letter refer to those documents as declassified, or was it completely silent?

Mr. HOLLAND. That I can't say.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have the testimony here of Mr. Mandel that these photostats were actually found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations in photostatic form as they are presented to the committee now; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your offer?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer the cover sheets of each one of these documents and ask that they be admitted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. After the Chair rules on that point and if Mr. Marks has finished his cross-examination of Mr. Holland, I have a question I want to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to cross-examine now?

Mr. SOURWINE. I would simply like to ask Mr. Holland this: Since you did remember such a letter, do you remember who wrote it?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, because it was not addressed to me. I ascertained this information by speaking to our publications secretary yesterday.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it an official State Department letter, or merely from someone in the State Department?

Mr. HOLLAND. No, it was an official State Department letter which I can produce. It does not refer to this document because when I asked for this information, I said, "Have we any record in our file of a document with this title and serial number?" And it is not there.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask that Mr. Holland be directed to furnish to the committee the letter he speaks of and any other letter he speaks of, to wit, letters which contain in terms transmittals of documents which at the time were on their classified list and also that he indicate which of the documents on that letter so transmitted were in fact on their classified list.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Your request is that these cover sheets be inserted?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(Mr. Mandel, after a subsequent examination of his files, testified at a hearing held on May 13, 1952, that he had been in error in testifying that the photostats were found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. See pp. 4616 and 4617, pt. 13.)

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 1322 to 1330, inclusive," and are as follows:)

181101 3

EXHIBIT No. 1322

(Handwritten:) 097.3
44 Z1092R
no. 3024.1

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTERIM RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

R & A No. 3024.1

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–1945: AREAS OF ECONOMIC CONTROL

DESCRIPTION

This study, the first of a series, outlines the territorial basis of the economy of Communist North China.

Date: 23 November 1945.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

COPY No. ———

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1323

Department of State, Intelligence Reference Division. Received, Aug. 12, 1946.

(Handwritten:) R
097.3
Z1092
no. 3024.5

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.5

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–1945: STANDARDS OF LIVING

DESCRIPTION

Analysis of wages, food, clothing, shelter, health care, and other aspects of standards of living in Communist North China.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 15, 1946.*

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1324

(Handwritten) R
29 097.3
Z1092
no. 3024.6

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.6

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–1945: LABOR

DESCRIPTION

A study of labor policies, labor force, wages and hours, and labor unions in Communist North China.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 25, 1946.*
Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1325

Handwritten: 097.3
22 Z1092
#3024.8
1946

RESTRICTED

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–1945: COOPERATIVES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH REPORT

OCL–3024.8

JUNE 30, 1946.

A study of the historical background, types, organization, and development of cooperatives in Communist areas of North China.

Distributed by OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND LIAISON (OCL).

Restricted.

EXHIBIT 1326

(Handwritten) 097.3
38 Z1092
#3024.2/45

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTERIM RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

R. & A. 3024.2

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–45: SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC POLICIES

DESCRIPTION

A summary of the economic policies of the Chinese Communists as analyzed in further detail in the forthcoming parts of the Economy of Communist North China, 1937–45.

11 DECEMBER 1945.

Restricted.
(80380)

EXHIBIT No. 1327

(Handwritten:) 097.3
47 Z1092
No. 30243

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.3

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–1945: LAND POLICY

DESCRIPTION

Analysis of the Chinese Communist agrarian policies and of the results obtained from these policies in Communist-controlled areas.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *8 March 1946.*

Restricted.

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EXHIBIT No. 1328

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Illegible initials
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.4

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–1945: LAND AND FOOD

DESCRIPTION

Analysis of the topographic and agricultural regions, land utilization, and crop production of Communist North China.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 12, 1946.*

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1329

RESTRICTED

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27 Z1092
#3024.7/46

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

No. 3024.7

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–1945: INDUSTRIES AND MINING

DESCRIPTION

A study of the nature and extent of industrial development, types of industrial activity, and geographic distribution of industries in Communist areas.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *August 20, 1946.*

Restricted.

EXHIBIT No. 1330

Handwritten: #3024.9/46. Other handwritten figures crossed out.
24

RESTRICTED

ECONOMY OF COMMUNIST NORTH CHINA, 1937–1945: FINANCE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH REPORT

OCL–3024.9

AUGUST 26, 1946.

A study of money and banking and the operation of taxation systems in Communist Areas.

Distributed by OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND LIAISON (OCL).
Restricted.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Mandel recently referred apropos of letters allegedly in the Lee files after 1945. There were two sources of the Senate subcommittee's IPR documents, one at Lee and one in the New York office. I think I might have pointed out before, Mr. Chairman, that in the barn at Lee was a three-drawer wooden cabinet of my personal papers. Those were taken to Washington at the same time, and it is conceivable that some of these 1945 and subsequent letters were in my personal file, not in the IPR files.

I do not think that is particularly material, but there is that possibility.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you say whether these photostats were in your personal files?

Mr. CARTER. My testimony on them is identical with that of Mr. Holland, that until I saw them in Davis Polk's office yesterday I didn't remember ever having seen them before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then, you cannot testify whether they were or were not in your personal files?

Mr. CARTER. No. It was not apropos of that, but to establishing the date of what the Lee files covered. I thought that in my personal files there might have been some IPR letters. The thing that recalled it to me was Mr. Mandel and Mr. Morris's comment with reference to the Miller letter which was of a date later than 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that Miller letter in your personal files, or do you know?

Mr. CARTER. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Mandel, can you say whether the so-called personal files of Mr. Carter were separately identified?

Mr. MANDEL. They were not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there has come up for attention part of the witness, Mr. Owen Lattimore's, testimony that he did not clearly understand the testimony of Mr. Barmine with respect to a certain conversation Mr. Barmine had with General Berzin. Mr. Chairman, I feel our public record is clear and unmistakable on this point, particularly if you read two or three pages, and it comes to the very point.

In reading through the executive session testimony of Mr. Barmine taken on May 5, 1951, several months prior, the thing is even more clear and more precise. For the sake of clarity I ask that pages 21

and 22 of Mr. Barmine's executive session testimony be introduced into our public record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, since that obviously requires a ruling by the committee to release executive session testimony, I would ask Mr. Morris if he would amend his request to be that the chair at an appropriate time lay before the full committee the question of inserting in the record such portions of the executive session testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is the correct attitude to take. I think it should be presented to the subcommittee. At that time let the subcommittee release it from its executive position.

Mr. SOURWINE. The chair could order included at this point in the record such portions of the executive testimony of Mr. Barmine as the subcommittee rules may be released from the executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be the order.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 1331 and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1331

* * * * * * *

Mr. BARMINE. * * *

In this connection with General Berzin and one of his assistants, we were discussing possible personnel.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was his assistant?

Mr. BARMINE. He was chief of the second section, Firin.

So there was discussion about the personnel at least and Firin was called to the discussion and there were exchanges about the possible people among the Military Intelligence personnel who were at that time in China or had knowledge of Chinese affairs, and would it be possible to use them.

Several names of Russians, Chinese, Americans, Czechoslovakians, French, were mentioned.

Now, I want to make the statement that that conversation was in 1935, sixteen years ago, and I only can tell these conversation were carried by hours and for weeks. There were so many other problems in our work in the export of arms, things that you are interested in, it was a very casual and incidental part of it.

I had my hands full of other things, so probably only I can tell to the best of my recollection whatever remains in my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. What did he say about the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BARMINE. Several names were named of men working for the apparatus of Military Intelligence there, and suggested, not even suggested, but discussed the posibility. Two of them were Americans, Lattimore and Joseph Barnes.

* * * * * * *

Executive Session, Volume 21, May 5, 1951.

Testimony of Alexander Gregory Barmine, pages 21–22 of transcript.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandell, will you identify these two letters, please?

Mr. MANDELL. I have here three photostats which I personally obtained from the files of Ray Lyman Wilbur at the Stanford University.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have those photostats made?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean from the files of Ray Lyman Wilbur, or from the files of the Ray Lyman Wilbur Library or some other library?

Mr. MANDEL. They were files of Ray Lyman Wilbur.

Mr. SOURWINE. Personal files?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. They were obtained from the Hoover Library at Stanford University.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the first of these purports to be a letter signed by Mr. Edward C. Carter, dated December 30, 1933, to the members of the American council:

It gives me great pleasure to announce that at the board of trustees meeting on December 20 Mr. Joseph Barnes was unanimously selected my successor as secretary to the American council.

I offer this to Mr. Carter and ask him if he can recall having written that letter. Does that look like a photostatic copy of a document sent by you, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Does he recall having sent the original of that?

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a photostatic copy of your signature?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here photostatic copies of correspondence between Mr. Eliot Wadsworth and Mr. Edward C. Carter dated November 25, 1941, and November 26, 1941. I offer you that, Mr. Carter, and ask you if those documents recall such an exchange of correspondence that you had?

Mr. CARTER. They appear to be one sent by me and the other received by me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is one of those in fact a letter which you sent and signed?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it a photostatic copy?

Mr. CARTER. Yes. The signature is not there on either letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is a photostatic copy of a letter dated November 26, 1941, typed and addressed "Dear Eliot" and is a letter which in fact you dictated and sent?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The next document is headed "American Red Cross" and is dated November 25, 1941, to Mr. Edward C. Carter and signed "Eliot Wadsworth." Is that a copy of a letter you received?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. May they be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They will be received in the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1332, 1333, 1333–A, and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1332

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

129 East 52nd St., New York City (top floor)

Telephone PLaza 3-4700. Cable, INPAREL, New York

DECEMBER 30, 1933.

TO the MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL:

It gives me great pleasure to announce that at the Board of Trustees meeting on December 20th Mr. Joseph Barnes was unanimously elected my successor as Secretary of the American Council. He will take office on January 1st, 1934.

For the past two years Mr. Barnes has been a member of the Research staff of the American Council. He was the editor of the series of studies in Conflict and Control which were presented as the American Council data papers at the Banff Conference. He wrote Government Promotion of Foreign Trade in the United States in that series. In 1932, in collaboration with Mr. Frederick V. Field, Mr. Barnes wrote two of the American Council's most widely circulated pamphlets, Conflict in the Far East, 1931–1932, and Behind the Far Eastern Conflict. He is the author of several of the American Council's Fortnightly Memoranda.

At the 1933 annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mr. Barnes read a paper on The Tactics of the Third International, and at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association he presented a paper on Military Communism. In March 1934, Doubleday, Doran are publishing a symposium which has been planned by Mr. Barnes and written by ten members of the American Council. The title of the forthcoming book is "Empire in the East."

After being graduated from Harvard and completing a period of study at the London School of Economics and in the Soviet Union, Mr. Barnes joined the staff of the Chase National Bank. From the Chase Bank he returned to Russia for a further period of study, at the end of which he went to the Far East as a member of the American Group at the Shanghai Conference in 1931. He joined the staff of the American Council at the end of that year. In addition to the highest research qualifications, Mr. Barnes has shown pronounced executive ability. He assumes office with the unqualified support of the officers of the Council.

In connection with my new work as Secretary General of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mrs. Carter and I leave San Francisco for Honolulu and the Far East on January 26th.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edward C. Carter,
[t] Edward C. Carter.

Exhibit No. 1333

American Red Cross,
Washington, D. C., November 25, 1941.

Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y.

Dear Ned: Thanks for your letter of the 21st with a most interesting report as to the varied activities of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

You certainly have been playing checkers and almost rival Felix Frankfurter in his reputing activities in recommending young men for positions.

I am certainly glad that you put aside the crown and stuck to your old job which must be more important all the time.

Enclosed is check for $50, which I am glad to send.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Eliot Wadsworth.

Exhibit No. 1333–A

November 26, 1941.

Eliot Wadsworth, Esq.,
American Red Cross, Washington, D. C.

Dear Eliot: It was great to get your prompt and generous response to our appeal. Enclosed is the Assistant Treasurer's receipt.

As you can well imagine, it is satisfying to find that we have been lucky in developing both a system and an appeal which draws exceedingly able young people to our staff, whose services subsequently appear invaluable to various governments.

Allen Wardwell has just spoken very appreciately of Andrew Grajdanzev's article on Russia's War Potential in the Far Eastern Survey of November 17, and four departments of the Government have indicated that his article on the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Problem of Soviet Supply in December *Pacific Affairs* is the most authoritative and useful treatment of this all-important railway which has been prepared in this country.

Again many, many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter.

Mr. Morris. With respect to these others, they do not require the presence of these gentlemen here, but they are perfectly willing to

stay on. I suggest that they do stay on because they may be of interest to them. The only thing is your time.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is coming up right now. I have an appointment. When would we go on again?

Mr. MORRIS. We can do it in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be better.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before we conclude this hearing, I would like to ask one question of Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland. Do each of you adopt as your testimony the statements here made in your behalf by Mr. Marks?

Mr. HOLLAND. I do.

Mr. CARTER. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. We have two statements from Mr. Carter which have been submitted to the committee today. I have not seen either one of those, but the question comes up, Suppose those statements are based on letters that are not now in our records; will they be able to be received in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. They are not admitted in the record of this committee yet. If you need those letters, you can call on Mr. Carter to produce them.

Mr. MORRIS. On several occasions I have invited Mr. Marks and Mr. Holland and Mr. Carter and others in the Institute to put into our record, if they feel it is necessary in the sake of justice and fairness, if we have, for instance, introduced a letter of a certain nature, the reply to that letter. I was hoping that today they might have some of those things that might go into our record at this time.

Mr. HOLLAND. The selection of those letters is one of the things why Mr. Carter is working in New York. We do have a few and, as I recall, Mr. Carter has one section, the appendix to one of his statements, and we will have others that we wish to submit fairly soon.

Mr. SOURWINE. With the knowledge of the shortage of time that the chairman has, it seems perfectly clear there is going to have to be one more session. Could we recess subject to the call of the chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p. m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

EXHIBIT No. 765

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
ECC and CP	WWL	1/ 5/37	Carbon	191.9	765A
FVF	WWL	1/ 5/37	"	131B.113	766
Fred V. Field	W. W. Lockwood, Jr.	11/15/37	"	119.40	767
Maxwell M. Hamilton	Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.	12/ 1/37	"	191.100	768
BL	WWL	1/ 4/38	Photostat	119.146	769
WLH	WWL	9/19/38	"	105.244	770
Owen Lattimore	Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.	10/10/38	Carbon	100.26	771
W. W. Lockwood	George V. Blue	1/ 5/40	Original	191.98	773
E. C. Carter	Wm. W. Lockwood	7/12/40	Photostat	191.2	774
W. W. Lockwood	Bob Lynd	3/21/41	"	100.385	775
ECC, MSF, WIW, HM, CP	WWL	4/15/43	"	"	775A
Prof. G. Nye Steiger	Wm. W. Lockwood	12/10/41	Carbon	131B.42	776
Wm. W. Lockwood	Lt. Col. B. B. McMahon	12/19/41	Original	131B.61	777
ECC	WWL	12/23/41	"	119.120	778
Wm. W. Lockwood	Roger S. Greene	1/16/42	Copy	105.202	779
Arthur H. Dean	Wm. W. Lockwood	2/12/42	Carbon	119.75	780
Wm. W. Lockwood	Joe (8-page memo attached)	3/ 3/42	Photostat	191.197	781
KB, GET, WLH, et al	WWL	3/27/42	Carbon	131B.110	782
W. L. Holland	C. F. Remer (COI)	3/17/42	Original	"	783
W. W. Lockwood	Maj. Hardy C. Dillard	4/21/42	"	131B.77	784
ECC	WWL	6/15/42	Photostat	105.322	785
Wm. W. Lockwood	Jesse I. Miller (War Dept.)	10/21/42	"	131B.117	786
Robert W. Barnett	W. W. Lockwood	10/21/42	"	500.1	787
ECC	WWL	11/16/42	Original	191.45	788
Dr. S. K. Hornbeck	W. W. Lockwood	11/ 6/42	Carbon	191.45	789
Benjamin H. Kizer	W. W. Lockwood	11/19/42	"	105.27	790
(Attached: Partial list of U. S. Delegation to Mont Tremblant conf.)					
W. A. M. Burden	Wm. W. Lockwood	11/19/42	"	131B.63	791
Lt. Col. John W. Coulter	Wm. W. Lockwood	11/27/42	"	131B.13	792
Wm. Lockwood	Robert N. Magill	12/ 3/42	Photostat	131B.44	793
Laughlin Currie	Wm. W. Lockwood	12/28/42	"	500.2	794
Anthony Jenkinson	Wm. W. Lockwood	4/17/43	"	131B.149	795
ECC, WLH, RWB	WWL	9/16/42	Carbon	131B.57	796
Wm. W. Lockwood	Wm. S. Culbertson, Lt. Col.	10/12/42	Original	"	797
"	"	10/ 1/42	"	"	798
Lt. Col. Wm. S. Culbertson	Wm. W. Lockwood	10/ 9/42	Carbon	"	799
Maxwell S. Stewart	Wm. W. Lockwood	12/29/47	"	500.18	799–A
W. W. Lockwood	Wm. Mayer, Col	12/26/42		131B.68	799–B
(Enc. letter to Col. W. W. Pettigrew from Wm. W. Lockwood dated 12/21/42)					
Philo W. Parker and others	Wm. W. Lockwood	12/ 2/42	Original	131B.2	799–C

EXHIBIT No. 765–A

WWL to ECC and CP:

Miss Grace Simons, 4122 42nd Street, Long Island City, Apt. 3K, came in to inquire about a job. She would like to do some kind of writing and research, but is equipped and willing to do secretarial work.

Miss Simons returned from the Far East a year ago. During her five years residence in China her experience was as follows:

One year as secretary to Leighton Stuart at Yen-ching; Two years as secretary to Messr. Hogg and MacKay at the National City Bank in Shanghai; and a year and a half with Havas in Shanghai doing rewrites and translations from French. During the past few months, she has been doing secretarial and library work in the New York office of Havas but is now without employment. I should judge that she is about 35 years old.

The most intriguing thing about Miss Simons is the fact that she is the sister of Rahna-Trone of Vincent Sheehan fame.

(Hand written)

REFERENCES

Grace Simons, 4122 42nd St., Long Is. City, Apt. 3–K.
American—Chi—sister of Rahna-Trone, Yenching, sec. to Stuart, Shanghai—1932–37.
Sec'y—Hogg & MacKay, Nat. City Bank.
Havas 1½.
Rewrite & translation French.
NYC—Havas—Editorial & Library work.
Secretarial work equipped writing & research.

EXHIBIT No. 766

JANUARY 5, 1937.

WWL to FVF:
Re: Study of the U. S. Navy.

While in Chicago I talked with several people, especially with Quincy Wright, concerning a research project on the Navy. Wright expressed himself as very much in favor of the proposal, and was unable to recall very much that has been done in this field. He thought that the subject would require some prolonged digging in Congressional hearings, navy reports, etc.

As to persons who know something about the subject, I learned of two. Wright mentioned Mr. Robert P. Lane, now director of the New York Welfare Council, 122 East 22d Street. He once did a good deal of work (at Chicago, I think) on the navy during the first phase of the modern era—1884–1898. This work might be made available to us. The second person is John Ross, of the Institute of International Studies at Yale. He is said to be working on various aspects of the navy in connection with the Yale studies in American foreign policy. Another person with an academic interest in the Navy is Joseph P. Baxter, of Harvard. Doubtless these people, and perhaps others, should be consulted.

At the present stage, my suggestion would be to proceed as follows:

(1) Secure for *Pacific Affairs* from some competent person an analysis of the naval building program since 1933, and especially of the construction and enlargement of naval and air bases in the Pacific. This could be primarily an analytical study of the economic and strategic factors. It might be confined to Pacific bases, which the navy people reckon as second only to ships as an element of sea power. (Some experts claim, I believe, that the building of bases in the Western Pacific would make the fleet something like 50% more effective, and that the money spent on one battleship might better go into the building of bases). This article we might secure from some young naval officer who knows what he is talking about. The editor of the *Proceedings of the Naval Institute* might be approached for suggestions. Incidentally, we should subscribe to this publication.

(2) Have Hall continue his present bibliographical work with a view to preparing for *Pacific Affairs* a bibliography on the U. S. Navy (appropriations, building programs, operations, strategy, etc.) and a more extensive bibliography for office reference.

(3) With the knowledge gained from this bibliographical work, we can discuss with Walter Millis, and also perhaps with Stone of the F. P. A. and the above-mentioned Ross, Lane and Baxter the possibility of an extended study of the Navy. If we could arouse the interest of Millis in doing the job, it would be relatively easy, would it not, to secure funds to finance the project.

Copy to WLH.

EXHIBIT No. 767

NOVEMBER 15, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: Probably by this time you have given up the American policy pamphlet in despair. Here is another draft. Will you please read it at once and return your comments by air mail? I am unwilling to have it go to press without your criticisms.

As a matter of fact as things have turned out it is unfortunate that we did not publish your original draft of this pamphlet weeks ago. I am afraid that the best opportunity has already passed, although it is still worth while to get out something. If we have missed the boat I am afraid that it is my responsibility. When I consented to undertake the job I had no idea of the number of things which would delay and interrupt its completion or of the difficulties I would encounter in this rather unfamiliar field. However, I have learned a good deal about the subject even though it has been a little expensive for the American Council and a little trying for Jinny, whose apartment has been littered up with mountains of clippings for weeks.

I hope that you are finding material to do a first-class job for the SURVEY on shipments of war supplies to China and Japan. We should have had a thorough discussion of this topic before this. So far as the China trade is concerned I have made a few casual inquiries around here but have been unable to learn

anything definite. San Francisco should be a good place to find out about whatever stuff is going from Pacific Coast ports. Some stuff, however, may be going via Europe. I notice that the nineteen planes were loaded on a train headed east several weeks ago. Another story told of DuPont shipments of TNT by way of Germany.

Eliot Janeway, with whom Chen and I have had several long talks recently, is convinced that an embargo on American shipments to Japan, even if undertaken without the cooperation of other powers, would be a very serious blow to the Japanese. He says, for example, that this high-test aviation fuel which the Japanese have recently bought in large quantities is a special kind of gas which cannot be procured elsewhere. Without it Japanese planes would be crippled both in respect to speed and efficiency. Janeway says, furthermore, that American machinery and machine tools now going to Japan cannot be easily replaced. In the case of industries equipped with American machinery constant replacements are required in the form of parts which are manufactured best in this country. Japanese steel production, he says, is deficient particularly in various kinds of alloy steels (manganese, nickel, etc.) and they rely heavily on American supplies. How much weight should be attached to this point I don't know. It is difficult to believe that the Japanese are as dependent as Janeway believes and that they could not carry on readily even though with some difficulties if they can no longer secure American stuff. This is a technical question on which we are not very well qualified to pass judgment. It would be interesting to get the opinion of businessmen who know the oil and machinery trades thoroughly.

I have agreed tentatively to tackle the subject of Japan's economic problem in North China for the SURVEY. Whether there is enough reliable information to make possible and satisfactory a job remains to be seen. Have you any suggestions as to how the thing should be tackled and where the best information is to be found? Peffer says that he went to great efforts to collect information on this subject and made little headway. Even the best informed people in North China did not know what was going on.

In response to a letter of mine, Joe Jones, who is now an economic specialist in the Far Eastern Division, writes that he is now contemplating a study of a similar nature. He thinks that the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Mines can be enlisted to help. He is willing to supply us with information for this study but is not yet sure how quickly it can be carried through. He offers to let me see the basic diplomatic and consular reports on the economic resources of North China. I shall go down to Washington one of these days and go over the matter with him.

That reminds me that I am sending a copy of this American policy manuscript to Maxwell Hamilton with the request that he or someone else in the Division go over it for us.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, JR.

EXHIBIT No. 768

DECEMBER 1, 1937.

MR. MAXWELL M. HAMILTON,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. HAMILTON: I am most grateful to you for the suggestions concerning the manuscript *America and the Far Eastern War* conveyed with your letter of November 30th. Some of the suggested corrections I am now unfortunately unable to make because the printing of the pamphlet is already far advanced, but I appreciate very much this help which you have very kindly given us.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, JR.

EXHIBIT No. 769

JANUARY 4, 1938.

BL from WWL:

IPR Representative in Washington

If, as your letter indicates, the proposal for an IPR Washington representative has come up for discussion, there are a few suggestions I might offer as to the functions which such a person might perform. Obviously it is important to have rather definitely in mind what our representative could most usefully do before laying any plans, even though it is true that a resourceful and energetic person would naturally create his own job to a large extent.

As for Washington "society," I never made much use of the black or white tie in Washington and I don't know what the possibilities really are. Doubtless there are potential contributors there, but I see little reason to suppose that we should set out to cultivate directly the elderly dowagers of Washington any more than the social set of any other city.

Nor is it likely that Washington is a particularly opportune place for a local educational program. Outside of the comparatively small circle of government people, Washington is a rather provincial town with a good deal of the lethargy of a huge bureaucracy hanging over it, and with so much "public affairs" as its daily business that it is bored with the whole thing and is rather unreceptive to lectures, dinners, discussion groups, etc.

The really important contacts in Washington are as follows:

(1) administrative officials and legislators
(2) news men
(3) private educational agencies (League of Women voters, National Council; FPA, WIL, etc.)
(4) Embassies, especially Chinese and Japanese, and Filipino delegation
(5) universities

It would be the job of our representative there to work with these groups, first, to extract from them the information, aid, and support which they can give to our national program, and, second, demonstrate the value of the IPR and of himself to them in a variety of ways.

Given our present program and set-up it should be recognized, I think, that the value of a Washington office would be somewhat limited. It would become invaluable, however, as our program develops along new lines, as it is likely to do. The present limitations in this regard are threefold. First, as long as our chief and almost sole current publication is the Survey, we have little practical use for the political information for which Washington is the preeminent source, both its officials and its newsmen. If we did get the hot dope from the State Department, what would we do with it?

Second, as long as our publications deal mainly with the general course of events in China and Japan rather than with the specific American angle of such events or with American affairs which have some relation to the Far East, Washington contacts are also of limited aid. Excepting for the Embassies—and this is a doubtful exception—I doubt if one can get in Washington a great deal of news *from the Far East* which is not available here. Its preeminence is as a source of information on what is going on in the United States, and the value of an IPR agency there would depend in part on how much we propose to concern ourselves with American shipping, investments, education, public opinion, etc.

Third, our value to the people in Washington and the welcome we would receive depend on what we can give them in the way of information as to events, publications, and what not in the Far East. It would hinge on whether our contacts through our international set-up enable us to offer anything of distinctive value. At present the IPR is so loosely knit and our contacts in the Far East so haphazard that we have little to offer in Washington through the continuous personal relationship which an IPR man might have there. The people there already have access to most of our sources of information and more besides. We can offer them a limited educational outlet and the support of our research program such as it is, it is true, and in this way we can enlist the interest and support of persons anxious to enlighten public opinion. On the whole, however, an IPR man starting out in Washington today would find himself in the position of going hat in hand for information and assistance rather than bringing something the people there are eager to get.

There are a good many things an IPR agency in Washington could do and it might be a swell job for someone to tackle. If there are limitations such as I have described and if they should be overcome, one way of contributing to this end would be for someone to start in down there. Some of the possibilities are as follows:

(1) The Washington bureaus—agriculture, commerce, tariff, maritime, etc., are stuffed full of information on all aspects of American economic life and of economic developments abroad. Moreover, for most subjects of this sort with which we deal there are men who have spent their lives cramming up on the data and they are usually quite willing to cooperate with outsiders. I should say that roughly a third of the Survey should be devoted to American-Far Eastern topics and that such studies can be done in Washington better than anywhere else. One obvious function of an IPR agency, then—although not the most important one—would be to serve as a branch of the New York research staff for the execution of certain projects. Moreover, the ideas and information picked up in Washington through this broadened contact might help to shape our whole program more realistically.

(2) Our Washington man would doubtless have to spend a great deal of time drifting around among officials, Congressmen and newsmen developing personal contacts and making himself a person to whom individuals might turn when an issue of Pacific relations and policy arose. (Bill Stone has done this rather successfully, especially as regards armaments and naval policy.) The importance of the Washington newspaper corps ought to be emphasized in this connection. The Washington correspondents are the most influential group of reporters in the country. Moreover, they have a wide editorial leeway in their despatches. Also, they are fairly close knit and accessible as a group since their offices are practically all in one building, and since Washington is a comparatively small place. An able IPR man could make himself useful feeding them stuff, prompting various stories, securing Washington releases on IPR studies, etc.

As regards Congressmen, we should have to be quite wary. Under no circumstances do we want to engage in lobbying. By slow personal contact, however, a relationship with the IPR which is now totally lacking might be built up informally. It is not difficult to imagine that under the circumstances of the last six month this contact might be valuable. The same, I think, can be said of relationships with administrative officials, and especially with the junior group who do most of the real brain work in Washington. This part of the job ought to be thoroughly enjoyable providing it was not aimless, and in the end it would be helpful all around.

The value of such contacts with Congress, the State Department, and the correspondents would depend in part, I should think, on whether we plan to go into the field of political journalism. If we do, an agency in Washington would be just as indispensable for us as for the FPA. I doubt that we want to go very far in this direction, but as matters now stand we lack channels for effectively using the political information to be had in Washington. If we should eventually take over Amerasia or if we should start a mimeographed news sheet for American Council members, or something like that, it would be different. In any case if we expand along the lines of regional educational activities, a Washington bureau might be helpful in a variety of ways.

(3) The universities in Washington are rather poor on the whole, and there is no use looking to them for a lot of good research in our field (Brookings stands in a somewhat different category). Nevertheless, there is a good deal of educational effort in the field of public affairs and a growth of specialized training for government work. Our man might be able to associate himself with these activities through doing some teaching, taking part in discussion groups, etc., but this sort of thing would not add up to a great deal in its value to the IPR.

(4) Another minor phase of the opportunity in Washington is a closer relationship with a handful of private agencies, including the ones named above, with the Embassies, and with such offices as the ILO, etc. This need not be rated very high in the scale, for such contacts can be maintained from New York, but it would be all to the good if we had a man on the spot.

(5) One more function of the IPR representative, and doubtless a fairly troublesome one, would be to trundle foreign visitors around.

Thus the job suggests a combination of research and of contact work, both to secure and supply current information and to pick up leads for our general national program. I dare say it would be something of a gamble at the start, but it seems to be a logical step in expansion. This step is especially impor-

tant—in fact, it is essential—if we are to move further and further away from a strict research program appealing only to the academic world. It goes without saying that the individual chosen for the job would have to know his onions and be able to make his way as a person; otherwise he can do us a lot of damage.

Incidentally, as a measure of economy it might be possible for the IPR representative to share the office and secretarial services of the FPA in Washington.

EXHIBIT No. 770

SEPTEMBER 19, 1938.

WLH fram WWL:

Several of us had lunch today with Mr. R. Kano, who is a friend of Tsuru of Harvard and who came in to inquire about the possibility of work in connection with the Secretariat Inquiry. I referred him to you, of course, and suggested that he telephone tomorrow or Wednesday to make an appointment. Kano left Japan three years ago, having involved himself in sufficient difficulty with the authorities to make it difficult or impossible for him to continue his university work at Shizuoka. He spent two years at Chicago, receiving his A. B. degree. Last year he studied economic history at the Sorbonne, and he has just come over from Paris, hoping to find some opportunity which will enable him to support himself in academic work. Tsuru had written him, he says, that he (Tsuru) might be doing some work on the Secretariat Inquiry, and suggesting that Kano might assist him. Meanwhile, Tsuru returned to Japan for a brief visit this summer, and Kano, hearing nothing further from him, has come over anyway.

Kano makes a good impression in terms of personality and intelligence. He is somewhat leftist—how far I don't know—and his particular interest is in the economic history of Japan in modern times. He and Tsuru are translating a Marxist interpretation of the rise of Japanese capitalism, and hoping to publish it, possibly under assumed names (this is confidential). He says that he can still go back to Japan, but that he might be denied any university connection, and for for this reason he prefers, if possible, to remain here for the time being. He is now awaiting the return of Tsuru, on September 26th, and can be reached at 73 Martin Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

EXHIBIT No. 771

NEW YORK, N. Y., *October 10, 1938.*

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
6 Middleton Court, Paddington Road,
Homeland, Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: This will introduce to you Arthur L. Pollard, of Knoxville, Tennessee. Mr. Pollard, a successful engineer and businessman who has had a lot to do with the fertilizer program in the Tennessee Valley, is arranging for a trip to the Soviet Union next May. He is anxious to talk with you about certain phases of his plans, and I am sure that you will be glad to make his acquaintance.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

EXHIBIT No. 773

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 5, 1940.

In reply refer to RP.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
Research Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.

MY DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of December 21, 1939, in which you request copies of certain documents.

There are enclosed copies of publications containing the texts of the documents to which you refer, with the exception of the document described as "Letter from Department of State to registered manufacturers and exporters

of aircraft, July 1, 1938." A summary and partial quotation of the letter of July 1, 1938, will be found in the enclosed copy of *The Department of State Bulletin*, August 12, 1939, page 121.

Sincerely yours,

George V. Blue,
GEORGE V. BLUE,
Acting Assistant Chief,
Division of Research and Publication.

Enclosures:

1. Senate Document No. 55, 72d Congress, 1st Session.
3. Publication No. 296.
3. Conference Series, No. 37.
4. Press release no. 706 of December 20, 1939.
5. The Department of State Bulletin (Publications Nos. 1359, 1363, and 1404).

EXHIBIT NO. 774

AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
Princeton, New Jersey, July 12 1940.

MR. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52 Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: In talking yesterday (Thursday) with Joe Jones in Washington, I found that he is very much interested in the whole conception of a Pacific bloc as we discussed the subject recently at Lee. If you are getting out a report on those discussions, he would like to see a copy and would also appreciate the chance to talk to Fred Alexander the next time the latter is in Washington. It's Joseph M. Jones, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department.

Jones, by the way, gives an optimistic impression as regards the possibilities of future American aid to China. He is very guarded in what he says, but I rather inferred that he was thinking of monetary cooperation through the Treasury and perhaps also a tightening embargo against Japan. Alger Hiss, on the other hand, fears that the appeasement move is gaining a good deal of ground south of Forty-second Street. Hiss, by the way, is probably one of the few genuinely liberal men in the State Department—that is to say, he sees the direct connection between effective national defense and a strong New Deal policy at home. A Republican victory in the Fall, he believes, will be the prelude to an appeasement program, a "back-to-normalcy" movement, and the danger of internal disintegration.

As you have learned from other sources, the State Department was anything but pleased with the O'Ryan mission and with the President's interview with the General. I gather that the official introductions given by the mission are not going to be very helpful to them, and that Mr. Grew will not be very cooperative.

I spent most of yesterday scouting around in the Latin-American field, trying to find out what the government proposes to do. When the President issued his public statement about a hemisphere cartel some weeks ago, they really had no plan, as a matter of fact, and a good deal of discussion since then has thus far failed to produce one. There is wide disagreement, with the Department of Agriculture taking the lead in favoring drastic efforts to reorient and control trade and currency relations, with the Treasury lukewarm, and with the State Department divided but inclined on the whole to be cautious and skeptical. If you would like to see an enthusiastic set of proposals along this line, write to the American Council on Public Affairs, 1721 Eye Street, for a pamphlet entitled, "Total Defense." This is the work on a committee headed by Clark Foreman. It has had such a response in Washington that Foreman and Joan Raushenbush are now producing a book on the subject. There is the same kind of feverish activity around Washington now that used to characterize it during the early days of the New Deal. By comparison, I must confess that the universities I have been visiting seem like medieval monasteries.

Although innocuous enough, this isn't quite the kind of letter I like to leave lying around, so will you kindly toss it in the waste basket?

Sincerely yours,

Bill, WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

WWL/mn.

EXHIBIT No. 775

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

MARCH 21, 1941.

DEAR BILL: I guess it's too late, but why the devil don't you have Joe Barnes do a book on the Soviet Union rather than Germany? I'd rather read him on the S. U. than any man I know of. Or he could compare certain aspects of both Germany and Russia, e. g.:

Relation of economic to political power in each country.

The social structuring of life of the common people at grass roots in each country.

The freedom allowed the individual in each.

Tolerance of diversity.

Citizenship literacy and devices (press, etc.) serving effective participation as citizen.

Etc.

Joe is unique in that he knows both Russia and Germany well. Other men can write on the economic structure of Germany (an important job) but Joe, better than anyone else, could bring us Americans a comparative sense of the social strengths and weaknesses of the two systems.

What we need on both countries is not books pro and con, but candid appraisals of strengths and weaknesses.

I don't know Hartshorne—only that he has been working on case studies of Nazis.

Yours,

BOB (LYND).

(Handwritten) To W. W. Lockwood.

EXHIBIT No. 775–A

APRIL 15, 1943.

To: ECC
MSF
WLH
MM
CF

From: WWL

Max Stewart called me on Tuesday to say that Peggy Snow had been in to express to him her concern over the prevailing and increasing lack of knowledge among even informed people concerning current developments in China. She felt this very strongly in Washington, and felt that something ought to be done about it. She wondered whether some new organization and/or journal should be started to circulate at least within a limited group the information brought back by people coming from Chungking.

Max doesn't like the idea either of a new organization or of a new journal, but agrees with her diagnosis of the situation and wonders whether the IPR can do something about it. He suggested to Peggy Snow, I believe, that she come in and see Harriet Moore and Mr. Carter.

Two possibilities suggest themselves:

(1) That we make an effort to include more current material on China in the *Survey* and in our pamphlets, and

(2) That we redouble our program of meetings in Washington and New York, taking steps to bring in more non-members from organizations, the press, etc.

EXHIBIT No. 776

DECEMBER 10, 1941.

Professor G. NYE STEIGER,
Simmons College, Boston, Massachusetts.

DEAR STEIGER: I am wondering whether I may call on you for assistance in meeting an emergency demand from the Public Relations Bureau of the War Department.

That Bureau, under Colonel Beukema, whom you probably know, is arranging for an educational program on the international position of the United States, to be carried forward in the army camps this winter. Colonel Beukema has asked the American Council to cooperate in the supply of materials, including one item which we would like very much to get you to do.

This is a series of three lectures which are to be prepared within the next month, printed or mimeographed, and distributed to a large number of officers in charge of camp programs. These officers in turn will themselves deliver the lectures in series, and use them as a basis for questions and discussion. It is proposed that the three lectures be divided chronologically as follows: (1) The period 1931 to 1934, with some preparatory background; (2) the internal situation in China and Japan during the period 1934 to 1937, the international setting of the two countries at this time and events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in the latter year; and (3) the last four years culminating in the present war.

Each of the lectures is to be about seventeen pages, double spaced. They should be simple, factual, as graphic as possible, and directed at an audience of a high-school level.

The War Department is in a position to pay the author an honorarium of $10 per day for time expended in their preparation.

There is no one I can think of who could do this job more admirably than you. You have a thorough command of the facts and a wide experience in writing for high-school and college readers. You could also give the papers the character which would be necessary for effective oral delivery.

Within a day or two I can give you further particulars. I have only just learned of this over the telephone, but a member of our staff is talking with Beukema this afternoon and will be back tomorrow with the details.

I hope very much that you will be able to join us in this cooperation with the government in an exceedingly important enterprise.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. W. Lockwood, *Secretary.*

(Handwritten:) WLH.

Exhibit No. 777

War Department,
War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, G–2,
Washington, D. C., December 19, 1941.

Mr. William W. Lockwood,
Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 129 East 52nd Street, New York City, New York.

Dear Bill: Colonel Bratton's office appreciated most highly the receipt of the three publications sent me by you.

Question: May we keep them, or are they to be returned to your office?

In addition, Bratton would especially like to have "British Rule in Eastern Asia" and "Malaya in War Time." And, to finish this skimpy letter, Colonel Bratton wishes that you would look in on him the next time you come to Washington. Come to my office, 3502 Munitions Building, and I will take you around to meet him.

Thanks again, Bill. Arrange to have at least a meal at the house when you hit Washington.

Sincerely,

B. B. McMahon,
Lieut. Col., General Staff Corps, Coordinating Section.

(Handwritten:) ED War Dept.

(Handwritten:) ED—Would you write Bratton. I think Bill saw him Friday. He intended to.

EXHIBIT No. 778

12/23/41.

To: ECC.
From: WWL.

In response to your inquiry, here is a little more dope on the organization of the Economic Defense Board (now the Board of Economic Warfare).

Charles Rayner, Assistant Executive Director, is heading the Far Eastern Division, at least for the time being. All I know of him is that he was once with the Standard Oil at Singapore, but left in 1917. Apparently he has had no more recent Far Eastern experience.

Ralph Turner, formerly of the University of Pittsburgh, is Assistant Chief of the Far Eastern Division. He was taken over from the old Office of Export Control research unit, where I worked with him last summer. Turner is also no Far Eastern specialist. However, he is a fellow of some ability, particularly in seeing the larger outlines of a problem. He also knows that he doesn't know much about the Far East and is eager for assistance.

Jim Shoemaker, the third person with Far Eastern responsibility, came to the Office of Export Control last summer from Brown University. He spent some years teaching in Japan, and has returned there in recent years for occasional visits.

Shoemaker told me two things in confidence last week:

1. There are a half dozen rather highly paid jobs still open in the Far Eastern Division. Shoemaker himself, however, and perhaps the others, too, are reluctant to raid the IPR. (It is interesting that several agencies seemingly take this view at present.) He raised the question of part-time or short-term consultative appointments for IPR staff members, and I assured him that of course we would do every thing we could to cooperate.

2. Rupert Emerson may undertake, on behalf of the Board, a sizeable study of America's economic stake in the Far East as affected by the war, and post-war prospects. Apparently Emerson is restless over the fact that he has been given little to do thus far in his present job as expert in the Office of Inter-American Affairs. This office—that is its economic section—is closely linked with the Board of Economic Warfare. It is possible that Emerson may now be shifted to the Far Eastern Division for this special job. If it is undertaken, our staff may be asked to make certain contributions.

Cc: WLH
RWB
KB, CP, MSF, MG

EXHIBIT No. 779

ROGER S. GREENE,
348 LINCOLN STREET,
Worcester, Massachusetts, January 16, 1942.

MR. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Before the next annual meeting, that is the 1943 meeting, will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to the Board of Trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of names than the number of vacancies to be filled? The present system gives the members no chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few if any members would care to undertake.

For example, while I have had a high opinion of Fred Field's personal character, his judgment during the past two years has been so strange that it seemed to me that he must be almost in a psychopathic state. If a man like that is to be nominated surely one ought to have a chance to pick an alternate instead of him. When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic and social subjects, on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line, and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with a party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging to intellectual freedom.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ROGER S. GREENE.

EXHIBIT No. 780

FEBRUARY 12, 1942.

Mr. ARTHUR H. DEAN,
48 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. DEAN: In February 1941, when you last contributed to the American Council, the United States was technically at peace with the world. Today we're fighting a world war, and initially suffering grave reverses on the vast and little-understood Pacific front.

I think you will agree that the war strikingly confirms a basic thesis of the Institute of Pacific Relations—that the Pacific is vital to America. As a member, you will be interested in a brief report on the services of the I. P. R. in the war crisis.

Since December 7 the I. P. R. has handled a growing stream of inquiries from business houses, publishers, newspapers, radio commentators and teachers. There have been urgent requests from the Army, Navy, and other government departments for special reports and for the loan of I. P. R. studies still in manuscript or proof. I. P. R. books will be found in constant use on scores of Washington desks today. Large special editions of our pamphlets are being provided at cost to meet the Army's urgent need for reliable educational materials in its camps. We are also supplying the War Department with basic lectures on the Far East for its educational program.

The importance of the Institute as a training center for Far Eastern experts in recent years is also shown by the number of former I. P. R. staff members promptly called into important government work. Owen Lattimore, as you know, is serving, on the nomination of President Roosevelt, as personal advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; Ch'ao-ting Chi is Secretary-General of the A. B. C. Currency Stabilization Board; others are in a dozen key agencies in Washington.

Government agencies have turned to our staff experts for special studies of the Japanese economy and of the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway. United China Relief has drawn extensively on I. P. R. personnel for planning its China relief program. The American Council on Eudcation has asked our help in extending and improving teaching on the Far East in the schools of America.

Few persons realize that it would have been impossible for the I. P. R. to respond to these national needs so quickly had the Institute not long been planning for such an emergency. In our research program, for example, that meant launching some years ago a wide-ranging set of long-term inquiries into the basic problems and conditions of the Far Eastern countries. Many of these studies (see our recent catalog) are just coming off the press as they are vitally needed for the war effort of the United Nations.

Recognizing the importance of Southeast Asia in world politics, the I. P. R. five years ago initiated a series of studies on the governments, resources and development of those areas. As a result we are now issuing the only up-to-date, authoritative books on Thailand, Malaya, Formosa, Burma, as well as new studies of Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies. Every one of these urgently needed studies would not have to be made under immense difficulties by defense agencies if the I. P. R. by its foresight had not done the job.

Other volumes, too, take on a new war significance. What is the industrial staying power of the Japanese Empire and the Japanese-controlled areas of China and Indo-China? This question, now so vital to the war effort, has been the subject of continuous I. P. R. study. The latest results are now being published in *The Industrialization of the Western Pacific*, in *Japan's Industrial Strength*, and in *Industry in Southeast Asia*, not to mention earlier studies of the Far Eastern economies.

What is the strategic and economic importance of the Soviet Far East for the war plans of the United States today? The best available information on this subject is contained in a forthcoming I. P. R. report on *Soviet Policy in the Far East*, begun in 1939.

What Russian, Japanese, Chinese, and Dutch maps of the Far East are easily available in American libraries? *Pacific Area Maps* gives the answer.

What about aviation in the Pacific area after the war with its vast expansion of aircraft production capacity? An indispensable preliminary for any such inquiry is the I. P. R. monograph just published as *Air Transport in the Pacific Area*, begun eighteen months ago.

Since Pearl Harbor the demands upon the I. P. R. have doubled and trebled. We see an even bigger opportunity ahead. Both nationally and in cooperation

with its sister Councils in the ABCDR war partnership, the American Council ought now to throw all its accumulated resources into the war and postwar effort of the United Nations in the Pacific.

To help meet this opportunity we are asking you to make your 1942 membership contribution at the present time. If possible, we would greatly appreciate your increasing it over the sum of $100 which you gave last February.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD.

WWL:JL.

EXHIBIT No. 781

(Handwritten:) Joe Jones. M. S. F. What would you think of a Werner pamphlet right away? Return to W W L file. Sent to Carnegie Endowment & returned.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 3, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum which I have prepared setting forth the most significant conclusions which I drew from the discussions at Princeton last week end.

I am not sure how many agree with me, but I was especially impressed with Mr. Werner and his contribution. I fear that many who have not read his books and who were not, therefore, predisposed in his favor may not have been able properly to understand and appreciate him. In my memorandum I have tried to place him in his proper setting and to give the essence of his views. So many people here have been instantaneously impressed by his views that I venture to send you a copy of my memorandum for whatever use you may wish to make of it.

Alger Hiss has suggested that it would be exceedingly useful if you could put out a pamphlet on the conference within the next few days or weeks, stressing Mr. Werner's contribution, as well as his background and writings. I think that might be a very good idea. Meanwhile, I am doing all that I can to popularize Mr. Werner's views in the Department, elsewhere in the Government, and with appropriate Chinese, including T. V. Soong. It doesn't seem to be a very difficult job either because they have seemed to appeal to everyone as extremely sensible. The surprising thing to me is that they are new. Werner is coming down to Washington this week and I hope to be able to take him around.

I want to say again that I found the conference not only enjoyable but exceedingly useful, and I think that additional conferences of that nature would be of considerable usefulness in the near future. All of our ideas are in a state of flux as they have never been before and for that reason now as never before a group discussion should help clarify our views. I would appreciate it if you would convey these views to Mr. Carter. Incidentally I think he did a magnificent job of running the conference.

I have used and am using Mr. Werner's name freely in connection with his views, while maintaining the rule of secrecy with respect to the views of other people at the conference. Mr. Werner being a publicist, and his private views being no different from his public views, I have not thought it necessary to follow the conference rule. If you do not agree with me please let me know.

Sincerely,

JOE.

Enclosure.

MARCH 2, 1942.

The week-end conference at Princeton on February 28 and March 1, held under the auspices of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, was well attended (a list of those participating is attached) and in my opinion the discussions were well conducted and arrived at significant conclusions. Without reference to the printed agenda I set forth below the most significant conclusions which I drew from the discussions.

I. STRATEGY

The principal contribution to the discussions of strategy was made by Mr. Max Werner, author of *Military Strength of the Powers* and *Battle for the World.* Mr. Werner was born in Russia and has lived a considerable part of his life in Germany and France and elsewhere on the European Continent. He is thoroughly familiar with the military literature of the world and writes with great logic and brilliance. His most recent book, *Battle for the World—The Strategy and Diplomacy of the Second World War,* was published in April 1941 prior to the German attack on Russia and, of course, to our entry into the war. This book is nevertheless exceedingly fresh when read now, even after the events of 1941. His judgments and evaluations both in regard to diplomacy and strategy have been proved in the year subsequent to the publication of his book nearly one hundred percent accurate. He has an understanding of strategy, facts, the mentalities of the general staffs and political leaders in the various countries in Europe and Asia which is most impressive. His knowledge and interpretation of Russian military strength, strategy, and diplomacy is particularly impressive, and his correctness has been demonstrated by events. His opinions, therefore, in my opinion, merit closest attention.

I summarize briefly below Mr. Werner's analysis of the current situation and his suggestions as to policy, with the addition of a few supplementary factors brought out by other persons at the Conference which fit into Mr. Werner's general plan:

War between the United States and Japan has traditionally been conceived as a naval war whereas in fact the Japanese have employed, in blitzkrieg tempo, land armies, using mechanical equipment as far as possible, and supported by airplanes. Japan's successes in Southeastern Asia have made it exceedingly difficult for us to deal with the situation without confronting the Japanese with equivalent or superior land forces using the proper equipment and supported by superior air power. The concentration of American industry for the most part in the eastern regions of the United States, the vast distances between our west coast and Southeast Asia, and the shortage of shipping space makes it an extremely difficult matter to accomplish that end. Japan must be defeated by a superior land army using modern equipment and air power. Who has in the Far East an army equipped with modern weapons and supported by air power? The Soviet Union. The Russian Army is strategically situated near vulnerable Japanese home bases, is large, well-equipped, and capable of the job of handling the Japanese. Moreover, war between Japan and the Soviet Union is inevitable within the next few weeks, months, or years and both the Japanese Government and the Soviet Government realize it. The conflict of interests between Japan and the Soviet Union is fundamental and the situation is explosive.

We must conceive of the present war as a global war and plan our strategy along global lines. The Soviet Union is fighting desperately in Europe and it must at an indefinite time in the future fight in the Far East. We are at war both with Germany and Japan. It would be an economical division of labor, which would have great potentialities of reducing the length and cost of the war, and if we could induce the Russians to employ their Far Eastern army against Japan while we aid Russia in Europe where transportation and supply problems are easier for us to solve. Indeed, this may be the *only* way in which we can win the war.

How can we induce Russia to employ its Far Eastern army in the common interest?

(1) By opening up a new front in the West (Mr. Werner did not elaborate on this point but indicated the front might be in Africa, Italy, or elsewhere, the main idea being to engage German troops and equipment. He suggested that thirty British Divisions and thirty American Divisions properly equipped could handle this matter, with another sixty Divisions in reserve);

(2) By furnishing Soviet armies on the European and Asiatic fronts with from two to three thousand planes monthly and from two to three thousand tanks monthly (this contribution would be a joint British and American contribution);

(3) By concentrating air and submarine power in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and coordinating an attack with the Russian attack;

(4) By equipping Chinese armies in North China as fully as possible for a coordinated attack in North China and Manchuria.

The foregoing program of course, implies cooperation between the Soviet Union and the British and American Governments on a full and frank basis.

The Conference generally stressed the necessity of such cooperation. It is possible to achieve such cooperation. The Russians tried desperately to achieve a system of collective security in Europe. After Munich they tried sincerely to obtain some binding alliance with France and Great Britain. The British and Franch would neither arm themselves adequately against the German danger (the strength of the Germans and the pitiful weakness of the British and Franch were well-known to the experts) nor would they ally themselves with the Soviet Union. Accurately judging German strength, and despairing of the British and French, the Russians decided to rely upon themselves alone, signed an agreement with the Germans in August 1939 and proceeded to increase their armaments as fast as possible and to improve their strategic situation by absorbing the small Baltic States and by attacking Finland. The Russians will now be impressed and moved not by words but by the strength which we are prepared to exert in the common cause.

II. EMPLOYMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR POTENTIALS OF COLONIAL PEOPLES

It is frequently said that this war is a war of four-fifths of the people of the world against one-fifth, that it is a peoples' war, a war for freedom. It is more accurate to say, however, that it is a war of one-fifth against one-fifth of the world with the remaining three-fifths of the world indifferent. This remaining three-fifths of the world consists of Colonial peoples who are insufficiently interested and prepared to defend their own territories against attack. We have seen that the people of Malaya aided the Japanese rather more than they aided Britain; that the Burmese are aiding the attacking enemy; that the peoples of the Netherlands Indies (the action of the people of Java remains to be seen) are insufficiently developed, both spiritually and materially, to defend their lands. Will the peoples of India aid the British in the defense of India, or will they be indifferent, will they aid the attackers?

How can the morale of China be improved further that resistance might be continued at the highest possible level? (It was recognized that China was not a colonial country and that China has, of course, been defending herself with great tenacity; nevertheless, it was recognized by the Conference that there are many things which the United States and Great Britain can do in order to strengthen the morale of the Chinese peoples and increase their fervor for a continuation of the peoples' war.)

With respect to *India* it was agreed that in the interest of common defense and of winning this desperate war the Indians must be given a considerable measure of independence, that their nationalism must be aroused and inspired to self-defense, and that India's economic war potentialities be fully developed with outside aid.

With respect to *China* it was suggested that steps be taken to accept China fully and frankly as a full-scale partner in this war and accord her a full voice in the conduct of the war. She is still being treated as somewhat of an outsider. It was suggested that steps should be taken at once, as a part of the war effort, to abolish extraterritoriality in China, to return Hong Kong to China legally, and to abolish the discrimination against China in our immigration law. The cause of the "peoples' war" might be greatly enhanced by taking these steps.

Australia and *New Zealand* should be admitted into a fuller participation in the conduct of the war. They are at present represented in the Pacific War Council in London but they feel that in some way they should be represented in the councils at Washington.

(It was commented upon widely how much greater had been the participation of the Philippine people in the war than in other areas where a less liberal colonial policy had been followed.)

It was the general feeling in the Conference that the old order in Asia was completely gone and would never be restored; that the peoples of Asia must be permitted and assisted to become masters in their own houses; that British and American superiority must give way to cooperation on a level; and that both in the conduct of the war and the organization of peace it is imperative that the peoples of Asia be given a greater voice.

III. ORGANIZATION FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR (AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE)

This subject was only partially discussed, and no conclusions were reached. It was, however, generally recognized as an important problem which merits careful consideration in the future. Considerable dissatisfaction was expressed with

the existing set-up with a British-American Chiefs of Staff Group functioning in Washington and a largely British, largely advisory Pacific War Council operating in London. It was felt that the smaller nations were too far removed from decisions taken in Washington, although it was recognized that a diversity of voices in the Central War Council may lead to confusion.

SR: Jones: MJK/HNS.

EXHIBIT No. 782

MARCH 27, 1942.

To: KB
KRCG
MSF
CP

From: WWL.

The newest government project calling for study of the Far East is a School of Military Government being organized under auspices of the War Department. This is to be located at the University of Virginia under the direction of Major H. C. Dillard and J. I. Miller. These two gentlemen called on me Tuesday to ask the cooperation of the I. P. R. in advice on materials, personnel and curriculum. The purpose of this school is to train officers in the techniques and problems of military government in areas taken over from the enemy.

As the war progresses, and as the military forces are successful large areas will be freed from Axis domination and will require provisional military administrations. In many respects the policies followed in this interim period may set the mold for long-term postwar economic and political readjustment.

It is proposed to provide a selected group of officers with general background and training for this job. The first course will begin in June and run for approximately three months. The curriculum will include elementary training in the organization of the Army and the War Department and legal procedural problems, and historical experience where it seems applicable. As men are ticketed for various areas they will be given intensive background courses in the history, geography, resources, economic and political organization of the area in question.

Dillard and Miller would like our assistance at several points. Immediately they would like suggestions on Far Eastern personnel available and competent to give instruction, at least for this first summer period. I would be glad to have suggestions as to historians, political scientists, geographers, etc. who might be considered in this connection.

In the second place they want help in building up a library of teaching materials. On looking over my shelf of recent I. P. R. books, they decided that they should have virtually all of our books, periodicals and reports. I am sending them a complete list, eliminating only those things that clearly are not useful, and in addition including suggestions regarding non-I. P. R. materials.

The headquarters of the School of Military Government at present are in the new Armory Building, 10th and B Streets, SE., Washington, D. C. (War Department Extension 71951).

(Handwritten:) ECC.

(Handwritten:) ECC: MG—return to ECC.

EXHIBIT No. 784

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT,
Washington, April 21, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Many thanks for your letter of April 17, which reached us prior to the interview with Mr. Holland.

Mr. Holland made a very favorable impression all around. We are, however, definitely troubled by the citizenship business. Indeed it is our understanding that present regulations forbid us to employ on our regular staff a noncitizen. The matter is one we are now investigating.

Even if our tie-up with the I. P. R. does not mature this time, there is of course the possibility that it will in the future. Hence I feel that Mr. Holland's trip was not by any means a fruitless one.

We deeply appreciate the interest you have shown.

Yours very sincerely,

[s] Hardy C. Dillard
HARDY C. DILLARD,
Major, AUS, Director of Instruction.

EXHIBIT No. 785

JUNE 15, 1942.

Copy
ECC from WWL:

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards non-government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

GOVERNMENT:

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska.
Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare.
Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
Riefler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare.
Shoemaker, James, H., Board of Economic Warfare.
Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare.
Wallace, H. A., Vice President, BEW.
Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget.
Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information.
Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information.
Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information.
Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information.
Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture.
Ropes, E. C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade.
Berle, A. A., State Department.
Davies, Joseph, State Department.
Grady, Henry, State Department.
Hiss, Alger, State Department.
Hornbeck, S. K., State Department.
Sayre, Francis B., State Department.
Stinebower, L. D., State Department.
Vince, Jacob, Treasury Department.
White, H. D., Treasury Department.
Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board.
Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
Currie, Lauchlin, White House.
Lubin, I., White House.

OTHERS:

Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross.
Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council.
Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point.
Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News.
Clapper, Raymond, Washington Columnist.
Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register & Tribune.
Dennett, Tyler, Historian.
Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corporation.
Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland.
Field, Frederick V., New York.
Herod, W. R., International General Electric.
Jessup, Prof. Philip C., Columbia University.
Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corporation.

Luce, Henry, Time, Inc.
Molyneaux, Peter, Texas Weekly.
Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute.
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., U. S. District Court, Spokane, Wash. (ex-Senator).
Sproul, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York.
Sweetland, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief.
Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives.
Wilkie, Wendell, Attorney.
Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation.
Wilson, C. E., General Electric.
Yarnell, Admiral H. E., U. S. N., retired.
(Handwritten:) conference.

EXHIBIT No. 786

WAR DEPARTMENT,
SERVICES OF SUPPLY,
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL,
Washington, October 21, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, New York.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: I appreciate very much your visit yesterday and the willingness to cooperate in the War Department's Program for Military Government to which it bore evidence.

Pursuant to our agreement that I would supplement the statement contained in the "Synopsis of War Department Program for Military Government", copies of which were furnished you yesterday, the following supplemental statement is made.

The reservoir of technical and advisory personnel referred to in the "Synopsis" is the group toward the recruitment of which you have volunteered the services of your organization. There is, of course, no immediate need for this personnel; on the other hand, it will not do to await the need before attempting to recurit them. *Consequently, it is the intention of the War Department to select this group at once and commission them in the Army Specialist Corps in a status of leave without pay. This will permit these persons to continue in their present useful civilian employment until such time as a need arises for them, when they will not only have been selected, but will be immediately available for service.*

It is planned, however, after some substantial numbers have been enrolled in this reserve to *ear-mark them for specific areas and then to send them, in groups, to certain colleges and universities for a brief training period*, not to exceed four weeks, in which they will be given some insight into the principles of military government, and some background instructions in the areas for which they have been ear-marked. No effort will, of course, be made during this training period to instruct anyone in the functional activities for which he has been selected since the selection of each will have been premised upon the fact that he is already specially qualified in his own profession. Inasmuch as the recruitment of this personnel must be accomplished with an eye to the Selective Service regulations, *no person can be enrolled in the Army Specialist Corps unless he is either over forty-five years of age, or if under forty-five, has been classified in Class 3A or in more deferred classifications* under the Selective Service administration.

Your efforts in assisting the War Department in compiling lists of available personnel for the foregoing purposes will be greatly appreciated, and some early activity in this direction on your part will be most helpful.

With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,

JESSE I. MILLER,
Acting Chief, Military Government Division.

EXHIBIT No. 787

OCTOBER 21, 1942.

ROBERT W. BARNETT,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
700 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR BOB: The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless O. S. S. policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservations; also he is not yet sure of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for two or three days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and these I'll take up with you later.

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his return.

I also invited *Lon De Caux*, C. I. O. publicity director and editor of the *C. I. O. News*. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a very favorable impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him.

De Caux suggested *Boris Shuskin*, of the A. F. of L., as another good labor person for the conference. He is the research director, I believe. If the Nominating Committee approves, I'd like you and Michael to see him at the Washington headquarters and extend an invitation. Before doing this, however, you had better wait for further word from me.

In the opinion of *Hiss*, Coe, and Despres, we ought to try to get *Berle* or *Dean Acheson*, or both. More about this later, too.

(Handwritten:)

One important gap in the present line-up is India. The Washington possibilities are Paul Alling, now political adviser and formerly chief of the State Department's Near Eastern Division; Wallace Murray, present chief; Eric Beecroft, and Norman Brown. From what I learned of the two State Department men, neither would be very useful to us. As between Beecroft and Brown, I'd like your opinion and Michael's. Despres says that the written work of Brown's section is first rate—imaginative and pointed. He doesn't know Brown's qualifications as a conference participant. Bremer thinks well of Brown as more than the conventional academician. In his favor are not only his position, but also his academic standing. Although we are paying little attention to this consideration in making up the American group, it would be desirable, other things being equal, to include at least one person with senior rank, among scholars in the Asiatic field. But this shouldn't decide the matter unless on other grounds as well Brown is the best nominee.

Another possibility we might consider is someone from Knox's office or Stimson's. Coe and Hiss mentioned *Adlai Stevens* (sic), one of Knox's special assistants. Hiss also suggested with some approval *Harvey Bundy*, former Assistant Secretary of State and now special assistant to Stimson. Then there is General Little, a Marine general formerly in China, now retired (?). Also General Magruder, whereabouts unknown. Despres suggested Admiral Hart, saying that it wouldn't be a bad idea to have someone who would give a pretty forthright and orthodox Navy view, as this view will greatly influence the postwar settlement.

Still other suggestions include Robert Sherwood, head of the O. W. I.'s Overseas Section, and Gardner Cowles.

Ben Kiser probably will write Congressman Coffee a personal letter, and leave it to us to follow up with an interview.

In a day or so I'll send a revised list indicating where we now stand on invitations and acceptances.

Reed Hager, by the way, would like very much to see you, and took down your telephone number. He has been with Rupert Emerson in the office of the O. P. A. Regional Administrator handling Territories and Possessions. Next week he probably will shift to the civilian staff of the Munitions Assignments Board. This will put him in a key position, as a member of the group working for Hopkins in this field. His home address is 2031 Huidekoper Place.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 788

NOVEMBER 16, 1942.

WWL to ECC

Barnett writes, apparently quoting Hiss, that Hornbeck warmly supports the invitation to Yarnell, but feels that it would be improper for him to take any initiative in approaching Secretary Knox, as I suggested he do. Hornbeck's opinion apparently is that the best procedure would be for you to write directly to Welles. Attached is a carbon of my letter to Hornbeck, in case you wish to use the same form with Welles.

You may want to tell Welles that the American Council has issued conference invitations to Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Pasvolsky.

Hiss added that Hornbeck and Hamilton would be very glad to have their expenses paid. I see no reason for us to do this, and I imagine you will agree.

EXHIBIT No. 789

NOVEMBER 6, 1942.

Dr. STANLEY K. HORNBECK,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HORNBECK: The American Council is eager to include Admiral Yarnell as a member of the American group at the Mont Tremblant Conference in December.

Admiral Yarnell has expressed a keen interest in attending, and suggested that we write the Secretary of the Navy requesting official approval.

If you think it advisable, we would very much appreciate your taking up the question with Secretary Knox, supporting our request and indicating the importance of the Conference.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. LOCKWOOD,
Executive Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 790

NOVEMBER 19, 1942.

Mr. BENJAMIN H. KIZER,
Old National Bank Building,
Spokane, Washington

DEAR BEN: Things have moved so fast that I haven't been able to keep you posted on every development in the assembling of the conference group. In any case, I know that you wanted us to go ahead on our own intiative.

Enclosed is the list as it stands. Everyone on it has given his final O. K. for at least part-time attendance. The exception is General Strong, who hopes and expects to be present, however.

We now run the risk of finding ourselves with a larger group than we wanted. There are still several people to be heard from—for example, Gideon Seymour, a Minneapolis journalist, John B. Cook, a Chicago businessman, John Coffee, and Max Hamilton of the State Department. This results from the fact that two weeks ago we became alarmed by the lack of response and stepped up the number of invitations. In the past few days a number of people have came through.

Considering the circumstances, I believe that we have a good group—good in the sense that it is diversified and includes a number of able people. The problem now will be to produce some degree of unity and coherence in the American presentation at Mont Tremblant. Don't you agree that the American group as such ought to have a number of meetings of its own?

Hastily yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary.

Copies to: Harriet L. Moore
Philip C. Jessup

NOVEMBER 19, 1942.

Confidential

PARTIAL LIST OF UNITED STATES DELEGATION

Mont Tremblant Conference, December 4–14, 1942

Institute of Pacific Relations

BROWN, W. Norman, British Empire Section, Office of Strategic Services.
BUNCHE, Ralph J., British Empire Section, Office of Strategic Services.
COE, Frank, Assistant to the Director, Board of Economic Warfare.
CURRIE, Lauchlin, Administrative Assistant to he President.
DE CAUX, Len, Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations.
DENNETT, Tyler, former President, Williams College.
DESPREES, Emile, Chief, Economic Section, Office of Strategic Services.
EARLE, Edward M., Institute for Advanced Study.
EMBREE, Edwin R., President, Julius Rosenwald Fund, Chicago.
EMENY, Brooks, Director, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland.
FIELD, Frederick V., Chairman, Editorial Board, *Amerasia*.
HORNBECK, Stanley K., Political Adviser, Department of State.
JOHNSON, Luther A., Congressman, Sixth District, Texas.
KIZER, Benjamin H., Chairman, Northwest Regional Planning Commission.
MCCOY, General Frank R., President, Foreign Policy Association.
MOORE, Harriet L., Secretary, American Russian Institute.
PASVOLSKY, Leo, Chief, Division of Special Research, Department of State.
REMER, C. T., Chief, Far Eastern Section, Office of Strategic Services.
SCHWELLENBACH, Lewis B., Judge, U. S. District Court of Appeals, Spokane.
SHISKIN, Boris, Research Director, American Federation of Labor.
STONE, William T., Assistant Director, Board of Economic Warfare.
STRAIGHT, Michael, Editor, The New Republic.
STRONG, Major General George V., Assistant Chief of Staff (G–2), Department of War.
THOMAS, Elbert H., Senator from Utah.
VINER, Jacob, University of Chicago.
WILBUR, Brayton, President, Wilbur-Ellis Company, importers, San Francisco.
YARNELL, Admiral Harry E., U. S. N., retired.

EXHIBIT No. 791

(Handwritten:) W. L. H.

NOVEMBER 19, 1942.

Mr. W. A. M. BURDEN,
Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURDEN: I note with interest the press report of your speech the other day on air transport in the Arctic. This prompts me to ask your advice and assistance on one or two aspects of our present I. P. R. program.

Early next month the Eighth International Conference of the Institute will convene at Mont Tremblant, Quebec. Delegates from Britain, the Dominions, India, China, the Netherlands, and other I. P. R. countries are coming together for a ten-day round-table session on *Wartime and Postwar Cooperation Among the United Nations in the Pacific*. A number of studies are being prepared for this conference, which in turn will set the stage for a large-scale I. P. R. inquiry during the next two or three years into the terms and conditions of postwar reconstruction in this vast area.

One of the key questions, of course, is the potential role of air transport, in relation both to military security and to economic development. Although this is bound to figure in the Mont Tremblant discussions, we have not yet documented the subject in any special I. P. R. paper.

I wonder whether by any chance you would be willing to prepare a brief article on the subject, with special reference to the North Pacific, for publication in the *Far Eastern Survey*. In order to make it available for the conference, we should have to have the manuscript not later than December 1. Even if this were out of the question, we should like very much to publish such an article in the *Survey*.

In the second place, I wonder whether, in your opinion, we ought to endeavor to arrange for a more extensive study in this field for later publication—say, in pamphlet form. One difficulty, of course, is that much of the new technical

information necessarily is secret for the time being. If this would not preclude our arranging for an interesting and useful report on the future of air transport in the Pacific, do you have anyone in mind who might be competent and available for the job?

As you may recall, last year the I. P. R. published a monograph by Sydney B. Smith, formerly of the State Department, on *Air Transport in the Pacific Area.* If you haven't a copy, I'd be glad to send you one. It was a pre-Pearl Harbor study, and therefore is now only of historical interest in its account of the prewar development of air lines. It might, however, be the basis of a further report which would take up the question as of the present date, and would deal somewhat more speculatively with the future. You may be interested in a conference paper on *The North Pacific International Planning Project,* just issued by the American Council. It is a memorandum on the future development of Alaska, the Yukon and the Pacific Northwest, by the chairman and staff of Region Nine, National Resources Planning Board.

Sincerely yours,

WM. F. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary.

WWL: wm

EXHIBIT No. 792

NOVEMBER 27, 1942.

Lieutenant Colonel JOHN W. COULTER,
Room 2C766, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL COULTER: In response to your letter of November 24 inquiring regarding the Eighth International Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, December 4–14, 1942, at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, may I suggest that you consult my letter to Major General George V. Strong, dated November 11? This letter with its enclosures gave full particulars.

Mr. Robert W. Barnett, the Institute's Washington representatives, can give you further information if you wish it. His office is at 700 Jackson Place (telephone National 3428).

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

WWL: MS.

EXHIBIT No. 793

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES,
Washington, D. C., December 3, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM LOCKWOOD,
American Council Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City

DEAR BILL: Mr. Remer thanks you for the copy of Mr. Barnett's interviews with Chinese leaders which you sent him on October 22nd. We have much of this material on file in the office, so I am returning this copy to you.

I trust that the Mont Tremblant Conference was highly successful.

Best regards,

Bob
ROBERT N. MAGILL.

EXHIBIT No. 794

Copies to ECC and WHL.

DECEMBER 28, 1942.

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Room 228, State Department Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR LAUCH: Enclosed herewith is a staff memorandum on the high points of the Mont Tremblant Conference. You may feel free to use the memorandum confidentially in any way you wish.

Brief summaries of this sort never succeed in conveying the color and vitality of the round table process, but I hope you may nevertheless find this of some value.

The IPR now has the job of building on the foundation of this post war discussion. In this connection we ought presumably to establish contracts with Governor Lehman's office—both to insure that full use is made of whatever value there may be in the Conference documentation and discussion, and also to see what further IPR work would be most useful for the purpose of Governor Lehman's program. After the first of the year we would like to discuss this with you.

In a few days I will send you under separate cover a new set of IPR school books on the countries of Asia. They are just out and are already getting an enthusiastic reception. One wishes that the State Department's Cultural Relations Division and the Office of Education could see their way to assisting substantially in developing work of this type. The Rockefeller Foundation has now decided not to go extensively into this field, thus leaving pretty flat for the moment the ambitious plans of the IPR and American Council on Education for capitalizing on the new interest in the Far East among school authorities.

One other matter—Wilma Fairbank has just written to say that she does not feel that she can accept our offer to her of the Washington IPR secretaryship. If you happen to think of anyone who might be a candidate, we would welcome nominations.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 795

APRIL 17, 1943.

MR. ANTHONY JENKINSON,
16 West 12th Street,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR TONY: Fred told me the other day that you saw the notice in the paper about the film, KNOW YOUR ENEMY. This announcement startled us, too, for we are still in the preliminary stages of negotiation.

We are probably going to cooperate with the Princeton Film Center, however, in producing this documentary film on Japan. The producer seized on this title as a good one though the film narrative itself will be somewhat more general in character than the contents of the pamphlet. The Navy has been sending us endless forms to sign in connection with the pamphlet order. Once the payment comes through we will immediately forward a check to you on the arrangement proposed some weeks ago.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary.

cc: TGS
ECD & MPF

EXHIBIT No. 796

SEPTEMBER 16, 1942.

WWL to : ECC WLH RWB

I understand that W. S. Culbertson, formerly a draft commissioner, is now creating an office and program in G–2 with the aim of developing certain general studies of a geopolitical character. He is particularly interested in making use of the scholarly resources of private research institutes and universities.

(Handwritten:) Please return to WWL.
(Handwritten:) WLH ECC RWB 10/19/42.

EXHIBIT No. 797

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G–2,
Washington, 2431 Munitions Building, October 12, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Thank you very much for your letter of the 9th instant. It will be entirely satisfactory to me to have the proposed Round Table Conference on India postponed until after the first of the year. I hardly think we could do an adequate job before that time anyway. In the meantime I hope to have an opportunity to talk the whole matter over with you and to explain the procedure and technique of Round Tables which I have in mind.

With personal regards, I am,
Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON,
Lt. Colonel, GSC., Chief, Geopolitical Section, MIS.

EXHIBIT No. 798

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G–2,
Washington, 2431 Munitions Building, October 1, 1942.

Mr. W. W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: In part as a result of our conversation a short time ago and in part as a result of a conversation which I had with Dr. Earle of Princeton, I desire to raise the question whether a Round Table group, in line with the procedure which I am developing under this Section, might be sponsored by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The suggestion which I have in mind is India. If you should think well of this idea, I shall be glad to confer with you or with Mr. Barnett.

I shall be in New York next Tuesday and continue on to Boston where I will be for two or three days. I will be back in Washington October 12.

With personal regards, I am,
Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON,
Lt. Colonel, GSC., Chief, Geopolitical Section, MIS.

EXHIBIT No. 799

c. c.: WLH–ECC, RWB, with copy Culbertson to WWL 10–1–42.
(Handwritten:) War Dept.

OCTOBER 9, 1942.

Lt. Col. WILLIAM S. CULBERTSON,
Chief, Geopolitical Section, Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
General Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
2431 Munitions Building.

DEAR COLONEL CULBERTSON: In reply to your letter of October 1, I wonder if you would explain in a little more detail what you have in mind in regard to the proposed conference on India.

Would you like to have the Institute take charge of arrangements for the meeting, selection of personnel, preparation of the agenda, etc.? Do you have in mind a week-end discussion in which both government officials and private individuals would take part?

If it involved a good deal of organizing work for us here, I doubt that we could take it on before the end of the year. Until that time, we happen to be pretty well occupied with plans and arrangements for a big IPR conference to be held in Canada in December.

It would be possible now, I believe, to assemble a group of experts, chiefly from Washington and the New York area, who together might be able to clarify the Indian picture in a very useful way. At the moment, however, our staff is so overloaded with work that we hardly see how we can take on the organizing responsibility at present.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 799–A

(Handwritten:) File Lockwood.

[Copy]

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY,
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
December 29, 1947.

MR. MAXWELL S. STEWART,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East 54th St., New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MAX: My reactions to Arthur Bisson's pamphlet manuscript on Japan are as follows:

It is a well-written and clear exposition of the outcome of the postwar elections, in terms of the success of the parties and some of the factors influencing their success. I learned a lot from it.

Nevertheless, I feel that its political assumptions and value judgments raise the whole issue of IPR pamphlet policy. A pamphlet carries institutional sponsorship of its point of view unless it is one of a number of divergent views presented—which would not be the case here. The question, therefore, is whether the American Council should sponsor strong political judgments on current controversial issues. In my own view it should avoid doing so unless in a nonpartisan round-table fashion. This limitation is implicit in its whole set-up, and failure to recognize this clearly is responsible for many present IPR difficulties. It is a real limitation, of course, but it still leaves room for a useful and important program.

Accordingly, I would question publication of the manuscript as it stands. Now I'll try to be a little more explicit.

The manuscript defines political progress strictly in terms of the triumph of the Communists and left-wing Socialists. The "new democratic forces" are equated with the Communist and Socialist parties on p. 26, but earlier the right-wing Socialists are excluded from the "true progressives" (p. 24) and are lumped with the old guard (p. 13). The latter are blamed for the lack of a united Communist-Socialist front (p. 12), and to this is ascribed the deplored Liberal-Progressive victory in 1946 (p. 14).

It happens that I also believe that democracy in Japan is linked with the fortunes of the Social Democrats (though I'm more skeptical about the united front with the Communists). But I'm in doubt whether the IPR should argue this doctrine on either point, especially when the pamphlet presents no factual evidence for this definition of democracy or for labelling the Liberals and Democrats as the useless and objectionable old guard. A reader is certainly entitled to ask what about totalitarianism on the left, what are these Japanese parties really after, what kind of political system can Japan with her traditions be expected to adopt, etc. Instead, he gets here a very specific standard of judgment, assumed *ex hypothesi.*

As for SCAP policy, MacArthur is sharply criticized for failure to conduct sweeping purges and to do a good many other things, especially in the first six months. With some of the criticisms I would certainly agree. But I would make more allowances for lack of preparation, shortage of staff, the inevitable confusion of the earlier period, failure to estimate the depth of the problem, etc. And, aside from that, it would seem to me that we have faced a basic dilemma in overall policy which is not recognized here. We were committed to indirect govern-

ment, probably for good reasons. We were also committed to encouraging self-government by democratic procedures, in a situation where defeat did not itself bring revolution. Arthur argues for a policy of sweeping intervention which would have run the danger (1) of our having to administer Japan from top to bottom and (2) of our installing a set of left-wing puppets lacking real strength in the Japan of 1945–47. He has much more confidence than I in the possibilities and the desirability of totalitarian (i. e. military) force operating from the outside and at the top to democratize Japan. He is therefore more disappointed in the outcome to date.

But again I don't object to the pamphlet because I disagree; Arthur has a much closer knowledge of the facts than I (though I question a few statements like the one on p. 17 ascribing Japanese support of the Emperor's retention to SCAP). Rather, I question whether the IPR should sponsor what is in a rather summary, *ex parte* judgment on an operation which has been exceedingly delicate in character and one where good democrats can honestly differ in evaluating the goals and the progress toward them. Most Americans will reject the tests of success which he applies and will feel correspondingly less dissatisfied with the MacArthur record.

Perhaps these objections could be overcome by some alterations in balance, emphasis, and phraseology. For example, the conclusions on democratization presented by Maki and Steele in recent IPR publications are not open to objection on the issue I have raised. For examples of other articles on Japan which are valuable and also entirely appropriate for IPR publication, see those by Sansom and Ladejinsky in Foreign Affairs for January 1948.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Bill,
WM. W. LOCKWOOD,
Assistant Director.

EXHIBIT No. 799–B

(Handwritten:) Note made HRH.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, December 26, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.

MY DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: Your letter to Colonel Pettigrew, dated December 21, has been referred to me during Pettigrew's absence on a rather prolonged trip.

Our office is very much interested in the proceedings of the IPR conference and would like to get at least two and preferably five complete sets. Our Far Eastern Group is divided into five branches, and I believe it would be advantageous for us to have one copy on file with each branch.

I expect to get in touch with Mr. Barnett today and ask him if he could spare us some time, with the object of giving us a first-hand picture of the proceedings. Your kind cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Sincerly yours,

WILLIAM MAYER,
Colonel, GSC, Acting Chief, Far Eastern Group.

(Handwritten:) original sent to ED.

DECEMBER 21, 1942.

Colonel M. W. PETTIGREW, G. S. C.,
Chief, Far Eastern Group,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL PETTIGREW: In answer to the request stated in your letter of the third, I believe we can arrange to provide your office with a full set of reports from the Mont Tremblant IPR Conference.

We were sorry that the pressure of affairs in Washington prevented the attendance of someone in Military Intelligence Service. The Conference proved to

be a remarkably interesting discussion of almost every phase of the War effort and postwar possibilities in the Far East. The British, Chinese, Australians, New Zealanders, Indians, Canadians and others were ably represented, and the discussion was quite frank and illuminating. If you would like a personal report on what went on, may I suggest that you get in touch with Robert W. Barnett, our Washington representative, who can be reached at 700 Jackson Place (National 3428). I believe he could give you a very interesting and informative account of the whole proceedings.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 799–C

DECEMBER 2, 1942.

Mr. PHILO W. PARKER,
Standard-Vacuum Oil Company,
26 Broadway, New York City.

DEAR MR. PARKER: The War Department has asked the American Council to assist in compiling a list of technical and advisory personnel who might be enlisted to take part in its program of military government in occupied areas.

This is to ask whether you could help us in meeting this important request by forwarding to me nominations of persons qualified in your opinion for the type of work specified.

The War Department's specifications and general plans in this field are outlined in the attached letter and memorandum. To facilitate you in scanning the material, I have underlined certain passages.

As you will see, the Department is looking for men experienced in such fields as industry, raw materials, banking and fiscal operations, public health and sanitation, public utilities and relief administration.

Candidates must be over 45 years of age or, if under 45, must be in one of the deferred classifications of the Selective Service.

According to the original plan, these men were to be commissioned in the Army Specialist Corps. With the abolition of that Corps, recently announced, they will probably be given commissions in the U. S. Army. They will be allowed to continue their present civilian employment until called up for service. A brief training period, not to exceed four weeks, is envisaged.

The Council is particularly interested in submitting nominations of persons of Far Eastern experience but would be glad to forward suggestions regarding other specially qualified personnel.

Any help you can give us will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

WM. W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary.*

Letters of identical text, as the one sent to Mr. Philo W. Parker, Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, 26 Broadway, New York City, were sent to the following:

Mr. Boies C. Hart, National City Bank, 55 Wall Street, New York City
Mr. Randall Gould, Starr, Park and Freeman, Inc., 101 Fifth Avenue, New York City
Dr. Henry Heleney, 60 Gramercy Park North, New York City
Mr. Joe Mickle, International Missionary Council, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City
Mr. W. S. Roberson, American and Foreign Power Company, Two Rector Street, New York City
Mr. Julian Arnold, 262 Arlington Avenue, Berkeley, California
Mr. William P. Hunt, Hunt Engineering Company, 150 Broadway, New York City
Dean Robert Calkins, School of Business, Columbia University, New York City
President Everett N. Case, Colgate University, Hamilton, New York
Mr. Lennig Sweet, United China Relief, 1790 Broadway, New York City
Dr. Eugene L. Opie, Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, York Avenue and 66th Street, New York City
Dr. Reginald Atwater, American Public Health Association, 1790 Broadway, New York City
Mr. G. Ellsworth Juggins, 79 Worth Street, New York City
Mr. George R. Coleman, 50 Church Street, New York City
Mr. E. E. Barnett, Y. M. C. A., 347 Madison Avenue, New York City

EXHIBIT No. 800

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
PROGRAMS FOR MR. W. L. HOLLAND'S STAY		Oct			
(office memo)		Nov	Original	131B. 11	800A
IPR Staff Members	1936–1943		Original	500. 3	801
	1937–1943		"		
	1944–1951		"		
	1944–1951		"		
	All years		Carbon		
E. C. Carter	Research Secretary	9/26/34	Carbon	105. 95	802
Harondar	W. L. Holland	10/1/35	Copy	100. 48	803
E. C. Carter	WLH	10/4/35	Carbon	100. 157	804
W. W. Lockwood	Research Secretary	3/28/39	Photostat	191. 258	805
ECC	WLH	5/10/40	Carbon	191. 89	806
WLH	ECC	7/5/40	Original	"	807
Phil	W. L. Holland	7/5/40	Carbon	104. 52	808
Carl F. Remer	W. L. Holland	12/1/41	Photostat	100. 384	809
W. L. Holland	James P. Baxter	3/18/42	Carbon	119. 123	810
Maj. G. A. Lincoln	W. L. Holland	4/2/42	Carbon	131B. 41	811
Geo. H. Kerr	W. L. Holland	4/3/42	Carbon	131B. 40	812
Wm. Holland	Geo. H. Kerr	4/2/42	Original	131B. 40	813
Wm. Holland	Chester R. Vail	7/25/42	Original	119. 24	814
Wm. Holland	Philip C. Jessup	7/31/42	Photostat	131B. 165	815
W. L. Holland	Wm. T. Stone	9/2/42	Original	119. 29	816
Wm. T. Stone	W. L. Holland	7/6/42	Carbon	"	817
W. L. Holland	Wm. T. Johnstone	7/11/42	Original	"	818
WLH KM	ECC	3/1/43	Photostat	131B. 160	819
(Attached: Background Information—The Strength of the Muslim League in India, Mr. Jinnah's position—164/No. 4/2/1/43.					
Hugh Borton	W. L. Holland	4/21/43	Carbon	119. 15	820
Mr. Holland	A. Grajdanzev	1/17/43	Original	"	821
W. L. Holland	" "	7/22/42	"	"	822
Free distribution list for "Korean industry and transport by AJG:					
			Carbon	"	823
Preface, Grajdanzev	W. L. Holland	4/19/43	Carbon	"	824
Hilda Austern	W. L. Holland	5/19/43	Photostat	500. 4	825
Owen Lattimore	W. L. Holland	7/20/43	Photostat	500. 5	826
Wilma Fairbank	W. L. Holland	2/21/44	Carbon	191. 59	827
W. T. Holland	Edward L. Barlow	12/7/43	Original	131B. 3	828
Dr. Wm. T. Holland	" " "	12/6/43	Original	"	829
Wm. T. Holland	" " "	12/1/43	"	"	830
Wm. Holland	" " "	12/3/43	"	"	831
Lauchlin Currie	W. L. Holland	3/2/44	Carbon	131B. 5	832
Wm. Holland	Mrs. Wilma Fairbank	3/11/44	Original	191. 57	833
T. A. Bisson	" " "	2/18/44	"	"	834
Wilma Fairbank	W. L. Holland	3/20/44	Carbon	"	835
Prof. Schuyler Wallace	" " "	3/22/44	Carbon	131B. 10	836
Wm. L. Holland	Schulyer	3/23/44	Original	131B. 9	837
Wm. Holland	Schuyler C. Wallace	4/14/44	"	"	838
Schuyler C. Wallace	W. L. Holland	4/12/44	Carbon	"	839
Wm. Holland	Schuyler C. Wallace	4/8/44	Original	"	840
W. L. Holland	Philip C. Jesup	3/27/44	Original	191. 13	841
W. L. Holland (note attach).	Irving S. Friedman	4/10/44	Original	131B. 23	842
Irving Friedman	W. L. Holland	5/1/44	Photostat	131B. 23	842A
Wm. L. Holland	Alice B. Foy	4/12/44	Original	131B. 22	843
Alice B. Foy	W. L. Holland	4/17/44	Carbon	"	844
W. L. Holland	Lt. L. H. Chamberlain	4/25/44	Original	131B. 21	845
Eleanor Lattimore	W. L. Holland	5/17/44	Carbon	107. 3	846
W. L. Holland	Louis Dolivet	6/19/44	Original	109. 2	847
W. L. Holland	Douglas A. MacLennan	3/23/46	Photostat	112. 57	848
Douglas MacLennan	Wm. L. Holland	3/25/46	"	112. 51	849
W. L. Holland	Philip J. Jaffe	4/29/48	"	109. 9	850
Edw. C. Carter	Wm. L. Holland	4/30/48	"	109. 10	851
E. Herbert Norman	Wm. L. Holland	1/25/50	"	500. 6	852
W. L. Holland	Herbert	1/ 5/50	"	"	853
W. L. Holland	E. H. Norman	2/13/50	"	500. 8	854
Charles Loomis	W. L. Holland	4/26/50	"	101. 55	855
Sir George Sansom	Wm. L. Holland	5/17/50	"	112. 50	856
Holland	Harondar	7/ 6/35	Cable	100. 46	857
Dean Rusk	Wm. L. Holland	9/12/50	Photostat	500. 10	859
" "	" " "	9/16/50	"	500. 11	858
Pacific Council Officers (attachment).		12/12/50	"	100. 354	860
Justice Wm. O. Douglas	Wm. L. Holland	2/ 1/50	Carbon	500. 12	861
S. B. Thomas	V. G. Tseng	3/22/51	Original	500. 14	862
V. G. Tseng	Wm. L. Holland	4/ 5/51	Carbon	"	863
Geo. J. Beal (2 attach.)	Wm. L. Holland	4/12/51	Photostat	500. 15	864
W. L. Holland	Geo. J. Beal	4/10/51	"	"	865
Edw. C. Carter	Wm. L. Holland	8/14/51	"	500. 16	866

EXHIBIT No. 800-A



EXHIBIT No. 800–A—Continued



EXHIBIT No. 801

Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1936–1943

NOTE.—This list includes paid personnel only. No regular record is available as to volunteer assistance. Personnel serving in clerical capacity for a few months only are not all listed. Years listed do not necessarily indicate that individual was a member of the staff during the entire year.

Began	Name	Years	Position
1933	Edward C. Carter	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary-General.
1933	Hilda Austern	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Assistant Treasurer.
	Joseph Barber, Jr.	1936	Publications.
1933	Annette Blumenthal	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942	Distribution Manager.
	Chen Han-seng	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939	Research Associate.
1935	Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939	Assistant to Secretary-General.
1929	William L. Holland	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Research Secretary.
1934	Owen Lattimore	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941	Editor, Pacific Affairs.
	Liu Yu-wan	1936	
1933	Kate L. Mitchell	1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940	Assistant to Secretary-General.
1934	Harriet L. Moore	1936, 1937	Research Associate.
1934	Catherine Porter	1936, 1937, 1938	Managing Editor, Pacific Affairs.
	Richard L. Pyke	1936, 1937, 1938	Publications Secy.
	Charlotte Tyler	1936, 1937	Research Associate.
	Elizabeth Downing	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942	Secretary and Publications.
	Eleanor Fabyan	1937	Secretary.
	F. Max	1937	Research Associate.
	Nagaharu Yasuo	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940	Research Associate.
	Hugh Borton	1938, 1939	Research Associate.
	Rilma Buckman	1938	Secretary
	Ruth D. Carter	1937, 1938 1938, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Ch'ao-ting Chi	1938, 1939, 1940	Research Associate.
	Irving S. Friedman	1938, 1939	Research Associate.
	Helen Kellogg	1938	Secretary.
	Philip E. Lilienthal	1938, 1939, 1940, 1942	Editorial and Research.
	Elodie Moerman	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942	Clerical.
	Elizabeth Raymond	1938, 1939	Secretary.
	Jack Shepherd	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941	Research Associate.
	Katrine Parsons	1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary.
	M. Young	1939, 1940, 1941	Secretary.
	F. Mangahas	1939	Research Associate.
	Barbara Messer	1939, 1940, 1941	Clerical.
	Patricia Glover	1939, 1940	Research.
	Marjorie Austern	1939	Clerical.
	John Leaning	1939, 1940, 1941	Editorial.
	Percy E. Corbett	1940	Research Associate.
	Vera Dodds	1940, 1941, 1942	Secretary.
	M. Matsuo	1940, 1941	Research Associate.
	Michael Minarovich	1940, 1941, 1942	Shipping clerk.
	Lillian Peffer	1940, 1941	Research Associate.
	Russell G. Shiman	1940, 1941	Research Associate.
	Ellen van Zyll de Jong	1940, 1941	Research Associate.
	Kurt Bloch	1941	Research Associate.
	John De Francis	1941	Research Associate.
	Andrew J. Grajdanzev	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Research Associate.
	Michael Greenberg	1941, 1942	Managing Editor, Pacific Affairs.
	C. Y. Hsiang	1941	Research Associate.
	Y. Y. Hsu	1941, 1942, 1943	Research Associate.
	Isabel Ward	1941, 1942	Secretary.
	Robert W. Barnett	1942	Research Associate.
	Winnifred Clark	1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Mary F. Healy	1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Bruno Lasker	1942, 1943	Research Associate.
	Renee Stern	1942, 1943	Clerical.
	T. A. Bisson	1943	Research Associate.
	Edith Bykofsky	1943	Clerical.
	Grace Caravello	1943	Clerical.
	Frances Friedman	1943	Secretary.
	Augusta Jay	1943	Receptionist.
	Harriet Levinthal	1943	Switchboard.
	Laura Mayer	1943	Secretary.
	Elizabeth Neal	1943	Stenographer.
	Betty Skrefstad	1943	Clerical.
	R. Winslow	1943	(?)
	Clara Spidell	1943	Secretary.

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1937–1943

[See note at end of table]

Began	Name	Years	Position
1929	Frederick V. Field	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940	Executive.
1929	Helen Wiss	1937, 1938, 1939	Secretary.
1930	Hilda Austern	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941	Assistant Treasurer.
1934	Kathleen Barnes	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940	Research associate.
1933	Annette Blumenthal	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942	Subscription manager, Far Eastern Survey.
	Elodie Shinkle	1937, 1938	Clerk-typist.
	Mary E. Harrell	1937	Secretary.
1926	Catherine Porter	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary, research associate editor, Far Eastern Survey.
	Ernest Hauser	1937, 1938	Research associate.
	Anita Archer	1937	?
	Ruth Earnshaw	1937	Librarian.
1929 on and off.	Bruno Lasker	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1943	Research associate.
1927	Jeanette Randolph	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Librarian.
	Joseph Barber, Jr	1937	Promotion.
	Inez Campbell	1937	
	Josephine Metcalf	1937	Secretary.
	J. Murphy	1938	
	B. P. Schoyer	1938, 1941, 1942	Membership and radio.
	Margaret Taylor	1938, 1939, 1940	Membership and finance.
	Isabel Ward	1938, 1939	Secretary.
1933	Russell G. Shiman	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941	Editor, Far Eastern Survey.
1935?	William W. Lockwood.	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Research secretary and Executive.
1934	Miriam S. Farley	1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Research associate and pamphlet Editor.
	Michael Minarovich	1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Shipping clerk.
	John Stewart	1938, 1939, 1940	Research associate.
	Emily Twaddell	1938, 1939, 1940	Secretary.
	Katrine R. C. Greene	1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Elizabeth Raymond	1939	Secretary.
	Kurt Bloch	1939, 1940, 1941, 1942	Research associate.
	E. Todd	1939	
	Frances Rifchin	1939, 1940	Secretary.
	Ann Warson	1940, 1941	Secretary.
	M. Taussig	1940, 1941	Secretary.
	Robert W. Barnett	1941, 1942	Research associate.
	Rose Landres	1941, 1942	Assistant treasurer.
	Tillie G. Shahn	1941, 1942, 1943	Assistant treasurer.
	Janet Leifert	1941, 1942	Secretary.
	Elizabeth Downing	1941, 1942, 1943	Membership and Publications.
	Nancy Wilder	1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary.
	A. Holtman	1941, 1942	
	Mary Rolfe	1941, 1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Dorothy Borg	1941, 1942	Education secretary.
	Vera Dodds	1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Rose Yardumian	1942, 1943	Secretary, library.
	Wilson Morris	1942	Secretary.
	Rita Zagon	1942, 1943	Clerk-typist.
	Harriet Holmes	1942, 1943	Secretary.
	Judith Daniel	1943	Secretary, Washington office.
	Theresa Gerathy	1943	Secretary, Special Project.
	Mildred Gilliam	1943	
	Harold J. Greenberg	1943	
	Josephine Owen	1943	
	Roberta Powell	1943	Secretary.
	J. O. M. Broek	1943	Special project.
	Homer H. Dubs	1943	
	Wilya G. Ilus	1943	Secretary.
	Dorothy Israel	1943	Secretary.
	Alice Jayson	1943	Public relations.
	William C. Johnstone	1943	Director, Washington office.
	Mildred Klein	1943	
	Rosamund Lee	1943	Promotion secretary.
	Harriet Levinthal	1943	Switchboard operator.
	Dorothy Mayo	1943	
	Frances Moldauer (until 1946, Sharpe).	1943	Superintendent public distribution (1 week December 1948 as typist).
	Harriet L. Moore	1943	Acting Executive Secretary.

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1937–1943—Con.

[See note at end of table]

Began	Name	Years	Position
1934	Frieda Neugebauer	1943	Stenographer.
	Sallie Ornitz	1943	Secretary.
	Maggie Smith	1943	Acting librarian.
	Marguerite Stewart	1943	School secretary; administrative secretary.
	Elnora Walker	1943	

NOTE.—The above list includes paid personnel only, and a few clerical workers who served for 1 or 2 months only may not be listed. A list of volunteers is not available. Years do not necessarily mean that individual worked for the Institute for the entire year. If 1 month only, year is enclosed in parentheses ( ). Personnel employed locally by regional offices are not listed.

American Institute of Pacific Relations

[Staff members, 1944–1951]

NOTE.—This list includes paid personnel only, and a few clerical workers who served for one or two months only may not be listed. A list of volunteers is not available. Years do not necessarily mean that individual worked for the Institute for the entire year. If one month only, year is enclosed in parentheses ( ).

Name	Years	Position
Nina Balfour	1944	(?) Clerical.
Edythe M. Banks	1944, 1945, 1946	Stenographer.
Beatrice Benjuya	1944	(?) Clerical.
Mary Jane Bowen	1944, 1945	Library consultant (pttime).
J. O. M. Broek	1944	Research project.
Esther Brown	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Jewerl Carroll	(1944, 1945)	(?) Clerical.
Miriam Chesman	1944, 1945, 1946	Subscription clerk.
Lillian Cunningham	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Raymond Dennett	1944, 1945, 1946	Executive Secretary.
Homer H. Dubs	1944	Research (?).
Miriam S. Farley	1944, 1945, 1946, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Research Assoc.; Pamphlet Editor; Ed., F. E. Survey.
Margaret Fischl	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947	Secretary.
Wilya Gallus	1944	Secretary.
Marie Godby	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Josephine Golembosti	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Rose Greenberg	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Dorothy Israel	1944	Secretary.
Alice Jayson	1944	Public Relations.
Louise Jenkins	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Shirley Jenkins	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948	Research Assoc.; Assoc. Editor, F. E. Survey.
William C. Johnstone	1944, 1945	Director, Wash. office.
Carolyn A. Kizer	1944, 1945	(?) Clerical.
Mildred Klein	1944	(?) Clerical.
Beatrice Krasnow	1944	(?) Clerical.
Bruno Lasker	1944, 1945, 1946	Research Associate.
Eleanor Lattimore	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947	Research Associate.
Ruth Lazarus Turbin	1944, 1945, 1946	Secretary.
Ilse Lederer	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Rosamund Lee	1944, 1945	Promotion Secretary.
Harriet Levinthal	1944, 1945, 1946	Switchboard operator.
Rhoda Lewis	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Dorothy S. Ludwig	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948	Asst. Bookkeeper.
Adrienne Maurer	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Jean May	1944	(?) Clerical.
Dorothy Mayo	1944	(?) Clerical.
Harriet Mills	1944, 1945	Administrative Asst.
Frances Sharpe Moldauer	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947	Publications Distribution.
Harriet L. Moore	1944	Acting Exec. Secretary.
Betty Morita	1944	(?) Clerical.
Marion Morris	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Hilton Morseley	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Frieda Neugebauer	1944, 1949	Stenographer.
Harry A. Nelson	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
David Soyer	1944, 1945	Clerical Asst.
Clara Nerenberg	1944, 1945	(?) Clerical.
Helen E. Nitka	(1944, 1945)	(?) Clerical.
Zelda Ormont	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Sallie Ornitz	1944	Secretary.
Harriet H. Parker	1944, 1945	Secretary.
Catherine Porter	1944	Editor, F. E. Survey.
Ruth Resnick	1944	(?) Clerical.
Rhoda Rothman	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947	Billing clerk.
Laurence E. Salisbury	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948	Editor, F. E. Survey.
Sophie Schneer	1944	(?) Clerical.
Tillie G. Shahn	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Assistant Treasurer.
Rita Shavelson	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Maggie Smith	1944, 1945, 1946	Acting Librarian.

American Institute of Pacific Relations—Continued

[Staff members, 1944–1951]

Name	Years	Position
Maxim Snyder	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Marguerite Stewart	1944, 1945, 1946, 1947	School Secy.; Admin. Secy.
Masha Switzer Wise	1944, 1945, 1946	Stenographer
Marie Talkington	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Frances Tendetnick	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Janet Taylor	(1944), (1946)	Stenographer.
Elnora Walker	1944	(?) Clerical.
Henrietta Wentholt	(1944)	(?) Clerical.
Nancy Wilder	1944	Secy; Editorial Asst.
Caroline Woods	1944	Librarian.
Rose Yardumian	1944, 1945	Secy; Librarian; Secy., Washington Office.
Marguerite E. Bear	(1945)	Stenographer.
Robert S. Bialos	(1945)	Shipping Clerk.
Jeanne Chalfin	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Mike Coffey	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Elizabeth A. Converse	1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Asst. Editor, F. E. Survey.
Salvatore De Leonardis	1945, 1946	Shipping Clerk.
Jean Elson	(1945)	Typist.
Ethel E. Ewing	1945, 1946, 1947	School Secretary.
Rita Frucht	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Lillie Gerber	1945, 1946	Stenographer.
Rita Kahane	(1945)	Stenographer.
Dorothea Keil	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Hiroyo Kiyaba	1945	Stenographer.
Bernice Kennedy	(1945)	Stenographer.
Ellen B. Levy	(1945)	Temporary Secretary.
Miyaho Matsuo	(1945)	Stenographer.
Michael E. Minarovitch	1945, 1946	Shipping Clerk.
Wilson Morris	1945, 1946	Asst. Editor-Pamphlets.
Eugene Newman	1945	Clerical.
Sylvia Rosenfeld	(1945)	(?) Clerical.
Rima S. Rogers	1945	Secretary.
Jerome Shishko	1945	Clerical.
Elizabeth Ussachevsky	1945, 1946	Secy-Washington Office.
Lola Brice	(1946)	Clerk-Typist.
Ruth D. Carter	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1951	Secy.; Admin. Asst.
Melvin A. Conant, Jr	1946	Research Assistant.
Lillian Covelle	(1946)	Washington Office.
Elizabeth Crawford	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950	Switchboard Operator.
Sonja Dahl	1946	Los Angeles Office.
Lionel C. Delgado	1946	Shipping Clerk.
Helen Dimitry	1946, 1947	Stenographer.
Elba Aileen Dodson	(1946)	Secretary (Wash. Office).
Florence Englander	1946	Stenographer.
Dorothy M. Freist	(1946)	Stenographer.
Bernice Fischman	1946, 1947	Acting Librarian.
Gloria Gordon	(1946)	Typist.
Rence J. Guthman	1946, 1947	Branch Secretary, Washington Office.
Sally R. Hawkins	1946, 1947	Secretary, Wash. Office.
Callie M. Hickey	1946, 1947	Secretary.
Sonia Kramer	1946, 1947	Secretary.
Betty Lee	(1946)	Stenographer.
Sony Lipton	(1946)	Stenographer.
Regina Marks	1946, 1947	Stenographer.
Abe J. Millman	1946	Stenographer.
Benjamin Millman	1946	Stenographer.
Angelina Morrison	(1946)	Stenographer.
Frank Pelan	1946, 1947	Shipping Clerk.
John A. Pollard	1946	Director, Wash. Office.
Jane Radom	(1946)	Stenographer.
Gwendolyn Robertson	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Subscription Clerk.
Constance Root	1946, 1947	Promotion Assistant.
Barbara B. Smith	1946	Clerk-Typist.
Louise B. Serot	(1946)	Secretary.
Rhoda Serot	(1946)	(?) Clerical.
Louise H. Schatz	1946, 1947	Promotion Secretary.
Maxwell S. Stewart	1946, 1947, 1948	Pamphlet Editor.
Esther Taylor	1946, 1947	Stenographer.
Yoshi Uchida	1946, 1947	Membership Clerk.
Dolores Van Buren	(1946)	Stenographer.
Ella S. Waller	(1946)	Stenographer.
Abraham Barnett	(1947)	Shipping Clerk.
Pearl C. Christian	1947, 1948, 1949, 1950	Clerk-Typist.
Daniel F. Doyle	(1947)	Shipping Clerk.
Margaret M. Dunn	1947, 1948	Secretary.
Rhoda Goldenberg	1947	Secretary.
Deborah Grigsby	(1947)	Secretary.
Marguerite F. Hill	(1947)	Secretary.
Gerard P. Kok	1947	Chinese Language Instr.
Pao-Ch'en Lee	1947	Asst. Chinese Lang. Instr.
Celestine G. Mott	1947, 1948	Secretary (Executive).

American Institute of Pacific Relations—Continued

[Staff members, 1944–1951]

Name	Years	Position
Belzy M. Parker	1947	Stenographer.
Anna Reinhold	(1947)	Secretary.
Marjorie Baum	(1948)	(?) Clerical.
Charles Cherubin	1948	Shipping Clerk.
Gladys Edwards	(1948)	(?) Clerical.
Katrine R. C. Greene	1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Asslstant Secretary.
Rosalind Greenwald	1948, 1949, 1950	Secretary.
Patricia Hochschild	1948, 1949	Acting Librarian.
Clayton Lane	1948, 1949, 1950	Executive Secretary.
Philip E. Lilienthal	1948	Acting Editor, F. E. Survey.
Hilda Mayer	(1948, 1949)	Clerk-typist.
Lawrence K. Rosinger	1948, 1949, 1950	Research Associate.
Francis Dick Wanderman	1948	Secretary.
Chia-ling Bumgardner	(1949, 1950)	Clerk-typist.
Elaine Douglas	(1949)	Clerk-typist.
Irene Conley Chang	1949	Acting Librarian.
Lolita W. Smith	(1949)	Typist.
Lucrecia Suguitan	1949	Typist.
Elizabeth Yates	1949, 1950	Acting Librarian.
Anita Ehrlich	1950	Clerk-typist
Wei-ta Pons	1950, 1951	Acting Librarian.
Ruth V. Stein	1950, 1951	Secretary.
Sadie Winston	1950	Secretary.
Betty E. Buchsbaum	1951	Secretary.
Robert Hasse	1951	Clerk-typist.
Ora Leak	(1951)	Typist.
Gladys Nusbaum	(1951)	Typist.
Leslie Morgan	1951	Editorial Assistant.
Ann Stopp	1951	Secretary.
Melvin Anderson	1951	Shipping clerk.
Robert Bruce	1951	Shipping clerk.
Edward A. Fujima	1951	Acting librarian.
Jack Gerson	1951	Bookkeeper.
George Kawata	1951	Asst. Librarian
Marjorie Montana	1951	Receptionist.
Edward C. Carter	1946, 1947, 1948	Executive Vice Chairman.
William L. Holland	1950, 1951	Executive Vice Chairman.

The above list includes only personnel paid by the national office. It does not include personnel employed locally by regional offices.

Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1944–1951

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Name	Years	Position
Hilda Austern	1944, 1945	Asst. Treasurer.
Horace Belshaw	1944, 1945, 1946	Research Secretary.
T. A. Bisson	1944, 1945	Research Associate.
Joan Bramley	1944, 1945, 1946	Clerical.
Grace Leah Butts	(1944)	Clerical, Wash. office.
Edith Bykofsky	1944, 1945, 1946	Subscription clerk.
Frances Pietrowski Capps	1944, 1945	Bookkeeping Asst.
Grace Caravello	1944, 1945, 1946	Clerical.
Edward C. Carter	1944, 1945, 1946	Secretary-General.
Ruth D. Carter	1944, 1945, 1946, 1949	Secretary.
Olga Field	1944, 1945	Research Associate.
Frances Friedman	1944	Secretary.
Andrew J. Grajdanzev	1944, 1945, 1946	Research Associate.
Augusta Jay	1944	Receptionist.
Virginia Mack	(1944)	Washington office.
William L. Holland	1944, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Secretary-General.
Yung Ying Hsu	1944, 1945	Research Associate.
Wilhelmina Masselman	1944	Res.
Elizabeth Neal	1944	Stenographer.
Ruth M. Parsons	1944, 1945, 1946	Secretary.
Rose Pietrowski	(1944)	Clerical.
Laura Rosenthal	1944, 1945, 1946	Secretary.
Florence E. Sanders	(1944)	Secretary.
Betty Skrefstad	1944, 1947	Clerical.
Clara Spidell	1944, 1945	Secretary.
Elizabeth Ussachevsky	1944, 1945	Secretary.
Robert Vernon, Jr	1944, 1945	Shipping clerk.
Nellie Wright	1944	Clerical.
Joyce Wagner	1944, 1945	Clerical.
Michi Yasumura	1944, 1945	Asst. Librarian.

Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations—Staff members, 1944–1951—Continued

Name	Years	Position
Elizabeth A. Bates	1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949	Distribution Mgr.
Helen E. Russell	1945, 1946, 1947	Secretary.
Rae Solomon	(1945)	Shipping clerk.
Elaine Annall	1946	Receptionist.
Elizabeth Bryant	1946, 1947	Clerk-Typist.
Donald Fine	1946	Shipping Clerk.
Mary F. Healy	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Publications Secy.
Anne O. Hooker	1946	Secretary.
Anita Issen	1946, 1947	Secretary.
Mary J. Kilpatrick	1946, 1947	Assistant Treasurer.
Philip E. Lilienthal	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Editor, Pacific Affairs.
Ruth Marcusson	(1946)	Secretary.
Gloria Mitchell	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Receptionist, Bookkeeper, Secy.
Helen Schneider	1946, 1947, 1948, 1949	Business Manager, Pacific Affairs.
Alice M. Togo	1946	Librarian.
Rose Alfino	(1947)	Secretary.
Marguerite Anderson	1947	Secretary.
Edward Bierman	(1947)	Shipping clerk.
Thelma Chargar	1947, 1948, 1949	Billing clerk.
Charles Cherubin	1947, 1948, 1949, 1950	Shipping Clerk.
Stanley Ferber	(1947)	Shipping Clerk.
Filmore Gluck	1947	(?).
Martin Gluck	(1947)	(?).
Ruth Gorgas	1947	Clerical.
James Green	(1947)	Shipping Clerk.
Raymond Greenberg	(1947)	Shipping Clerk.
Gertrude Greenidge	1947, 1948, 1949	Clerical.
Robert Haulsey	(1947)	Shipping Clerk.
Ayaka Murota	1947	Secretary.
Joan St. George	1947, 1948	Secretary.
Gladys H. Edward	(1948)	Secretary.
Rosaline Greenwald	(1948)	Secretary.
Deborah Grigsby	1948, 1949	Secretary.
Wei-ta Pous	1948	Librarian.
Tillie G. Shahn	1948, 1949, 1950, 1951	Asst. Treasurer.
Ruth A. Velleman	1948	Secretary.
Aminadau Aloric	(1949)	Shipping Clerk.
Kazuko Kay Fujii	1949, 1950	Secretary.
Barbara Harrison	1949, 1950	Secretary.
Kathryn Hayes	(1949)	Typist.
Martha T. Henderson	(1949)	Secretary.
Frances P. Landau	1949	Secretary.
Chiya Oshima	1949, 1950, 1951	Distribution Mgr.
Unsoon Park	1949	Typist.
Lillian Rosberg	1949, 1950, 1951	Subscription clerk.
Lolita Smith	(1949)	(?).
Evelyn M. Darrow	1950	Secretary.
Myra M. Jordan	1950	Secretary.
Mary A. McCrimmons	1950	Receptionist.
Kazu Oka	1950, 1951	Secretary.
Marjorie Ota	(1950)	Secretary.
Albert A. Weidon	1950, 1951	Shipping Clerk.
Melvin T. Anderson	1951	Shipping Clerk.
Robert Bruce	1951	Shipping Clerk.
Edward A. Fujima	1951	Asst. Librarian.
Jack Gerson	1951	Bookkeeper.
George Kawata	1951	Asst. Librarian.
Marjorie Montana	1951	Receptionist.
Mary C. Spillum	1951	Secretary.

IPR staff members

[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]

Name	Started	Resigned	Position	Salary
Alfino, Rose	2/47	3/47	Secretary	
Aloric, Aminadau	6/49	7/49	Shipping clerk	
Anderson, Marguerite	4/47	6/47	Secretary	
Anderson, Melvin T	5/51	Present	Sh. clk	
Armall, Elaine	4/46	9/46	Recep.-typist	
Austern, Hilda	1930?	11/45	Asst. Treasurer	
Balfour, Nina	3/44	6/44		$20/wk.
Banks, Edythe M	9/44	8/46	Stenographer	
Barnett, Abraham	7/47	8/47	Shipping clerk	
Bates, Elizabeth	6/45	6/49	Distribution mgr	
Baum, Marjorie	6/48	7/48		
Bear, Marguerite E	2/45	3/45	Stenographer	
Belshaw, Horace	9/44–12/44	11/45–7/46	Research Sec'y	
Belshaw, Michael	5/46	8/46	Shipping clerk	
Benjuya, Beatrice	5/44	9/44		
Bialos, Robert S	11/45	12/45	Shipping clerk	
Bierman, Edward	1/47	2/47	Shipping clerk	
Bisson, T. A	6/43	9/45	Research Associate	
Blumenthal			Clerk-typist	
Bowen, Mary Jane	8/44	9/45	Library consultant part time	
Bramley, Joan	6/44	7/46	Clk-typ	
Brice, Lola	5/46	6/46	Clerk-typist	
Broek, J. O. M	1/44	5/44	Special research project	
Brown, Esther		2/44		$30.20/wk.
Bruce, Robert	1/51	Present	Sh. clk	
Bryant, Elizabeth	9/46	6/47	Clerk-typ	
Buchsbaum, Betty E	9/51	Present	Secretary	
Bumgardner, Chia-Ling	12/49	1/50	Clerk-typist	
Burt, Virginia	11/43	11/43		
Butts, Grace Leah	7/44	8/44	Clk-typ	
Bykofsky, Edith		4/46	Subscrip. clerk	
Capps, Frances Pietrowski	9/44	8/45	Bookkeeping asst	
Caravello, Grace	1/44	2/46	Clerk-typist	
Carroll, Jewerl	12/44	1/45		
Carter, Edward C	1933	2/46	Sec'y General	
Carter, Ruth D	1937, 38–41	42–4/46	Secretary	
	5/49	10/49	Secretary	
	3/46	12/49	Secretary	
	2/51	Present	Administrative Ass't	
Chalfin, Jeanne	8/45	9/45		
Chang, Irene Conley	2/49	10/49	Librarian	
Chargar, Thelma	12/47	4/49	Billing clerk	
Cherubin, Charles	12/48	12/48	Shipping clerk	
	12/47	7/50	Shipping clerk	
Chesman, Miriam	4/44	4/46	Subscription clerk	
Christian, Pearl C	10/47	4/50	Clerk-typist	
Clark, Winifred H	(?)	1/43	Temp. secretary	
Coffey	1/45	2/45	Temporary clerk	
Conant, Melvin A., Jr	6/46	8/46	Research Assistant	
Converse, Elizabeth A	3/45	3/51	Assistant Editor FES	
Coville, Lilian	1/46	3/46	Washington Office	
Crawford, Elizabeth	8/46	3/50	Switchboard Operator	
Cunningham	12/44	12/44		$110/mo.
Curtis, Aileen	11/43	3/44	Clerical	
Dahl, Sonja	2/46	9/46	Los Angeles Office	
Darrow, Evelyn M	4/50	7/50	Secretary	
Day, Augusta	5/44	8/44	Receptionist	
De Leonardis, Salvatore	2/44	9/46	Shipping clerk	
Delgado, Lionel C	9/46	12/46	Shipping clerk	
	12/46	1/47	Shipping clerk	
Dennett, Raymond	2/44	2/46	Executive Secretary	
Dickinson, Edna C	(?)	1/43	(?)	
Dimitry, Helen	11/46	8/47	Stenogrpaher	
Dodson, Elba Aileen	5/46	6/46	Secretary (Wash. Office)	
Douglas, Elaine	5/49	6/49	Clerk-typist	
Doyle, Daniel F	8/47	9/47	Shipping clerk	
Dubs, Homer H		6/44		$400/mo.
Dunn, Margaret M	10/47	3/48	Secretary	
Edward, Gladys H	8/48	8/48	Secretary	
Ehrlich, Anita	1/50	3/50	Clerk-typist	
lson, Jean	4/45	4/45	Typist	
Englander, Florence	8/46	9/46	Stenographer	
Ewing, Ethel	9/45	6/47	School secretary	
Farley, Miriam S	11/34 to 1/46	12/48 to present.	Res. Assoc; Pamphlet Editor; Editor, Far Eastern Survey.	
Ferber, Stanley	7/47	8/47	Sh. clk	
Field, Olga	6/44–8/44	12/44–6/45	Research assoc	
Fine, Donald	2/46	5/46	Shipping clerk	
Fischl, Margaret	9/44	4/47	Secretary	
Fischman, Bernice	9/46	10/47	Acting librarian	
Freidman, Frances	10/43	6/44	Secretary	
Freist, Dorothy M	9/46	9/46	Stenographer	

IPR staff members—Continued

[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]

Name	Started	Resigned	Position	Salary
Frucht, Rita	1045	10/45		
Fujii, Kazuke Kay	8/49	1/50	Sec'y	
Fujiima, Edward A	9/51	Present	Librarian	
Gallus, Wilya		9/44	Secretary	
Gerber, Lillie	12/45	6/46	Stenographer	
Gerson, Jack	9/51	Present	Bookkeeper	
Gibson, Eulalie	6/46	7/46	Clerk-typist	
Gluck, Filmore	4/47	6/47	(?)	
Gluck	6/47	6/47	(?)	
Godby, Marie	12/44	12/44		
Goldenberg, Rhoda	1/47	10/47	Secretary	
Golembosti, Josephine	10/44	10/44		$30.20.
Gordon, Gloria	4/46	5/46	Typist	
Gorgas, Ruth	10/47	12/47	Clk-typ	
Grajdanzev, Andrew	1/43	12/43	Research Associate	
	7/44	12/44		
	1/45	1/46	Research Associate	
Green, James	8/47	8/47	Shipping clerk	
Greenberg, Raymond	2/47	3/47	Shipping clerk	
Greenberg, Rose	12/44	12/44		
Greene, Katrine R. C	1/48	1/51	Assistant Secretary	
Greenidge, Gertrude	6/47	4/49	Clerk	
Greenwald, Rosalin	5/48	6/48	Secretary	
Greenwald, Rosalind	8/48	6/50	Secretary	
Grigsby, Deborah	12/47		Temporary secretary	
	/148	7/49	Secretary	
Gutlman, Renee J	5/46	9/47	Branch secretary (Washington Office).	
Harrison, Barbara	1/49–1/50		Secretary	
Hasse, Robert	5/51	9/51	Shipping clerk	
Haulsey, Robert	9/47	10/47	Shipping clerk	
Hawkins, Sally R	10/46	7/47	Secretary (Washington Office)	
Hayes, Kathryn	1/49	1/49	Temp. typ	
Healy, Mary	2/43–10/43	4/46–present	Publications sec'y	
Henderson, Martha T	4/49	4/49	Temp. sec'y	
Hickey, Callie M	10/46	7/47	Secretary	
Hill, Marguerite F	4/47	4/47	Temporary secretary	
Hochschild, Patrick	10/48	5/49	Librarian	
Holland, W. L	1931–32, 1933		Research sec'y	
	1933–1944		Editor, Pacific affairs	
	1946	Present	Sec'y general	
Hooker, Anne O	1/46	5/46	Secretary	
Hsu, Ying Yung	(?)	9/45	Res Assoc	
Israel, Dorothy		3/44	Secretary	
Issen, Anita	6/46	4/47	Secretary	
Jayson, Alice		7/44	Public relations	
Jenkins, Louise	10/44	11/44		$30.20.
Johnstone, William C		12/45	Director, Washington office	
Jordan, Myra M	1/50	5/50	Secretary	
Kahane, Rita	1/45	1/45	Stenographer	
Kawata, George	3/51	9/51	Librarian	
Keil, Dorothea	10/45	10/45		
Kennedy, Bernice	8/45	4/45	Stenographer	
Kilpatrick, Mary J	1/46	8/47	Asst. treas	
Kiyaba, Hiroyo	5/45	8/45	Stenographer	
Kizer, Carolyn A	10/44	2/45		$40/wk.
Klein, Mildred		4/44		$30.20.
Kok, Gerard P	2/47	5/47	Chinese Language Instructor	
Kramer, Sonia	12/46	8/47	Secretary	
Krasnow, Beatrice	3/44	11/44		$30.20.
Landau, Frances P	1/49	3/49	Secretary	
Lane, Clayton	10/48	7/50	Executive Secretary	
Lasker, Bruno		9/43	Research Associate	
		1/46	Research Associate	
Lattimore, Eleanor	5/44	6/47	Research Associate (Washington Office).	
Lazarus, Ruth J	12/44	8/45	Secretary	
(As: Ruth Turbin)	1/46	8/46	Secretary	
Leak, Ora	2/51	2/51	Typist	
Lederer, Ilse	3/44	4/44		
Lee, Betty	9/46	10/46	Stenographer	
Lee, Pao-Ch'en	2/47	5/47	Ass't Chinese Language Instructor.	
Lee, Rosamund		11/45	Promotion secretary	
Levinthal, Harriet		8/46	Switchboard operator	
Levy, Ellen B	11/45	12/45	Temporary secretary	
Lewis, Rhoda	2/44	2/44		$22/wk
Lilienthal, Philip E	10/48		Editor, Far Eastern Survey	
	1/46	Present	Editor, Pacific Affairs	
Lipton, Sony	9/46	11/46	Stenographer	
Ludwig, Dorothy S	3/4	4/48	Asst. Bookkeeper	
Mack, Virginia	6/44	7/44	(?)	
Marks, Regina	10/46	8/47	Stenographer	
Masselman, Wilhelmina	2/44	4/44	Res	
Marcusson, Ruth	4/46	5/46	Secretary	

IPR staff members—Continued

[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]

Name	Started	Resigned	Position	Salary
Matsuo, Miyaho	5/45	4/45	Stenographer	
Maurer, Adrienne	3/44	3/44		
May, Jean	4/44	9/44		
Mayer, Hilda	12/48	1/49	Clerk-typist	
Mayer, Laura		9/43	Typist	
Mayo, Dorothy		6/44		
McCrimmons, Mary A	7/50		Temp. typ	
Millman, Abe J	3/46	5/46	Stenographer	
Millman, Benjamin	5/46	7/46	Stenographer	
Mills, Harriet	9/44	2/45	Administrative Asst	
Mitchell, Gloria	1'47	10/51	Secy-bkpr	
	7/46	9/51	Asst. bookkeeper; scty	
Minavonitch, Michael E	12/45	4/46	Shipping clerk	
Moldauer, Frances (until 1946—Sharpe).		10/47	Supur. pub. distrib. (1 wk. 12/48 as typist).	
Montana, Marjorie	3/51	present	Receptionist	
Moore, Harriet L		2/44	Acting Exec. Secretary	
Morgan, Leslie	6/51	present	Editorial assist	
Morita, Betty	8/44	12/44		
Morris, Marion		1/44		
Morris, Wilson	2/45	3/46	Assistant Editor—Pamphlets	
Morrison, Angelina	10/46	10/46	Stenographer	
Morseley, Hilton	11/44	12/44		
Mott, Celestine G	1/47	3/48	Executive secretary	
Murota, Ayaka	4/47	11/47	Secretary	
Neal, Elizabeth	4/43	12/44	Steno-type	
Nelson, Harry A	12/44	12/44		
Nerenberg, Clara	9/44	1/45		
Neugebauer, Frieda		6/49	Stenographer	
Newman, Eugene	2/45	6/45	Clerical assistant	
Nitka, Helen E	12/44	1/45		
Nusbaum, Gladys	3/51	5/51	Typist	
Oka, Kazu	8/50	3/51	Sec'y	
Ormont, Zelda	4/44	4/44		
Ornitz, Sallie		5/44	Secretary	
Oshima, Chiye	7/49	2/51	Distr. Mgr	
Ota, Marjorie	4/50	9/50	Sec'y	
Park, Unsoon	7/49	9/49	Temp. typ	
Parker, Belzy M	4/47	7/47	Stenographer	
Parker, Harriet H	2/44	1/45	Secretary	
Parsons, Katrine	(?)	11/43	Sec'y	
Parsons, Ruth M	9/44	2/46	Secretary	
Pelan, Frank	12/46	8/47	Shipping clerk	
Pietrowski, Rose	11/44	11/44	Clk-typ	
Pollard, John A	4/46	7/46	Director, Washington Office	
Pons, Wei-ta	1/48	11/48	Librarian	
	9/50	3/51	Assistant librarian	
Porter, Catherine		4/51	Res. Assoc.; Editor, Far Eastern Survey.	$400/mo.
Radom, Jane	1/46	10/46	Stenographer	
Reinhold, Anna	4/47	4/47	Temporary secretary	
Resnick, Ruth	2/44	4/44		
Robertson, Gwendolyn	6/46	present	Subscription clerk	
Rogers, Rima S	2/45	12/45	Secretary	
Root, Constance	12/46	7/47	Promotion Assistant	
Rosberg, Lilian	4/49	Present	Subscript. clerk	
Rosenfeld, Sylvia	1/45	1/45		
Rosenthal, Laura	11/44	5/46	Secretary	
Rosinger, Lawrence K	9/48	10/50	Research Associate	
Rothman, Rhoda	3/44	10/47	Billing clerk	
Russell, Helen E	2/45	2/47	Secretary	
St. George, Joan	7/47	3/48	Secretary	
Salisbury, Laurence E	10/44	5/48	Editor, FAR EASTERN SURVEY.	
Sanders, Florence E	8/44	9/44	Secretary	
Schneer, Sophie		10/44		
Schneider, Helen	4/46	4/49	Bus. Manager	
Sebatz, Louise, H	1/46	5/47	Promotion Secretary	
Serot, Louise B	9/46	10/46	Secretary	
Serot, Rhoda	10/46	12/46		
Shahn, Tillie G	(?)	9/51	Asst. Treas	
Shavelson, Rita	4/44	5/44		
Shishko, Jerome	3/45	5/45	Clerical assistant	
Skrefstad, Betty	11/43	11/44	Clerk-typist	
	5/47	6/47	Clerk-typist	
Smith, Barbara B	1/45	9/46	Clerk-typist	
Smith, Lolita W	7/49	7/49	(?)	
	6/49	7/49	Temporary typist	
Smith, Maggie	3/44	10/46	Acting librarian	
Snyder, Maxim	6/44	8/44		
Solomon, Rae	9/45	10/45	Shipping clerk	
Soyer, David	6/44	6/45	Clerical asst	
Spidell, Clara	11/43	12/45	Clerk	
Spillum, Mary C	10/51	Present	Sec's	
Stein, Ruth V	8/50	3/51	Secretary	
Stewart, Marguerite		5/47	School scty; admin. sec'y	

IPR staff members—Continued

[Submitted by W. L. Holland, 10/10/51]

Name	Started	Resigned	Position	Salary
Stewart, Maxwell S	2/46	2/48	Pamphlet Editor	
Stopp, Ann	2/51	Present	Secretary	
Suguitan, Lucrecia	6/49	12/49	Typist	
Talkington, Marie	1/44	2/44		
Tandetnick, Frances	2/44	2/44		
Taylor, Esther	12/46	3/47	Stenographer	
Taylor, Janet	10/44	10/44	Stenographer	
	2/46	3/46		
Togo, Alice M	1/46	8/46	Librarian	
Uchida, Yoshi	9/46	7/47	Membership clerk	
Ussachevsky, Elizabeth	8/44	9/45	Secretary	
	9/45	9/46	Secretary, Washington Office	
Van Buren, Dolores	3/46	4/46	Stenographer	
Velleman, Ruth A	4/48	12/48	Secretary	
Vernon, Robert Jr	10/44	4/45	Shipping clerk	
Wagner, Joyce	9/44	8/45	Clerk-typist	
Walker, Elnora		3/44		
Waller, Ella S	9/46	10/46	Stenographer	
Wanderman, Francis Dick	3/48	5/48	Secretary	
Weidom, Albert A	8/50	1/51	Sh. clk	
Wentholt, Henrietta		2/44		
Wilder, Nancy		12/44	Sec'y.; edit. assistant	
Winston, Sadei	6/50	9/50	Secretary	
Wise, Masha Switzer	12/44	7/46	Stenographer	
Woods, Caroline		7/44	Librarian	
Wright, Nellie	3/44	6/44	Clerical	
Yardumian, Rose	/42	10/45	Sec'y.; librarian; sec'y., Washington office.	
Yasumuva, Michi	10/44	9/45	Asst. librarian	
Yates, Elizabeth	10/49	2/50	Acting librarian	

EXHIBIT No. 802

SEPTEMBER 26, 1934.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I was greatly interested in reading a copy of your letter to Wellington Liu inquiring whether there was any posibility of securing the services of Chen Han-seng for permanent work in the I. P. R. It is an excellent suggestion and I hope you will keep pushing it. Chen is a first-class researcher with the good knowledge of Russian, French, German, and English as well as one or two Chinese dialects and reading knowledge of Japanese. He is a hard worker and one of the few Chinese researchers whose eyes are not blinded to the real conditions of rural China. While of course he could render great service to the China Council as a colleague working with Liu, I believe from many points of view it would be worth your while appointing him to the Secretariat as my colleague. I shall certainly be glad to make drastic economies in my own budget in order to secure Chen.

As you probably know by now, Chen is living here in Tokyo completing a study of rural conditions in South China and also working over some materials on Chinese economic history at the Oriental Library in Tokyo. He has taken a house here with his wife and will return here again in December after making a short trip back to China in order to get field work started on his I. P. R. study of standards of living in tobacco-producing regions in China.

One reason why I think it is worth your while to push the question still further is that Chen's relations with the Sun Yat-sen Institute and especially with Academia Sinica are not very happy. He is much too close to the radical elements in China to suit the Nanking authorities and I understand that for the time being it is better for Chen's political health to be out of China. I shall be seeing him in a day or two before he goes back to Shanghai and I shall endeavour to sound him out as discreetly as possible on his views about working for the I. P. R.

Sincerely yours,

———— ————, *Research Secretary.*

WLH: MI
Copy to Mr. Loomis.
Copy to Mr. Liu.

EXHIBIT No. 804

MEMORANDUM W. L. HOLLAND TO E. C. CARTER

OCTOBER 4, 1935.

With reference to Harriet Moore's list of discussion questions of Soviet national policy, I suggest that we write to all the other Councils immediately after the Lee Conference, making it clear that "national policy" is being used in a very different sense in the Round Table on Soviet Policy. I would strongly support Harriet's plea for changing the word from "national" to "nationality."

All this is assuming that we would want to limit the Soviet Round Table to the two questions of economic development and policy towards minor nationalities and dependent peoples. There ought to be rather careful discussion of this point to make sure first of all how much of a limitation this really is, and, second whether the Soviet Council would be unwilling to broaden the discussion program to include more general and political aspects of Soviet policy in the Far East.

As you know, I would like to have the broader interpretation so that the Round Table would be more in line with the other Round Tables on Japanese, American, and Chinese national policy. While the Soviet policy towards minor nationalities in its Far Eastern territories is certainly a major element in the total Soviet Far Eastern policy, it would be unfortunate if the discussion went too deeply into the details of cultural autonomy, the language question, et cetera, when there will be nothing comparable in the discussions on other questions, and when most of the other delegates will no tbe in a position to participate in the discussion for want of detailed knowledge. (Incidentally, I wonder if you have thought of suggesting to Crawford at the University of Hawaii that you and Keesing might invite a Soviet expert to the Conference on Government and Education in Dependent Territories. A Russian could make a real contribution, and would certainly throw a lot of monkey wrenches which ought to be thrown.)

W. L. H.

EXHIBIT No. 805

Copy to F.

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 28, 1939.

DEAR BILL: I apologize for not having sent you an earlier answer to your letter of March 13th. In the meantime, however, I have sent formal invitations to Miss Dietrich and Hayden for the Secretariat Inquiry monographs. After consultation with Carter I decided to offer Hayden $150 and to give him the opportunity to make the report 20,000 to 25,000 words. I have asked Fred to send on to you copies of both letters.

I also took up with Carter the question of having authors' names printed on the cover and title page of Inquiry reports and he has now agreed to make this a general practice.

I am glad to have the news about Riesenfeld and have told Fred that I certainly approve paying him the necessary $50. In fact, I should be prepared to pay $75 if necessary. To avoid complicating our bookkeeping I have suggested to Fred that this amount should be paid out of the available funds which the American Council now has and that any necessary additional payments from the International Research Fund should be made later this year.

In Washington I had quite a long talk with Saugstad who was extremely cooperative. The reason for the slightly mysterious tone in his letter to you was that the person he recommends for the shipping study is Mr. Henry L. Deimel, Jr., Assistant Chief in the Division of Trade Agreements (private address 4414 Macomb Street NW., Washington). Deimel, whom I met briefly, has apparently done a good deal of work on shipping and has at various times worked in association with Henry Grady who, incidentally, is his father-in-law. The reason for Saugstad's mysterious phraseology is that (confidentially) Sayre is probably being sent out soon to the Philippines as High Commissioner, and Deimel is being asked to go as his economic advisor. There would be a possibility, however, that Deimel would get leave of absence for about four or five months during the summer before going out to Manila, and during this period he would be willing and in a very good position to prepare a report for the I. P. R.

The State Department would raise no objections to such a procedure and Deimel would also be willing to collect additional information on the way out to Manila. In the meantime he would be able to get access to a great deal of more or less confidential information in Washington.

Deimel impressed me as a capable and well informed person, but I have too little evidence to judge whether he is the best possible person we could get. On the whole, however, I am inclined to offer him the job partly because it might be an extremely valuable way of making use of State Department and other governmental material, and incidentally of working in closely with the State Department. I emphasized to Deimel the fact that the report would have to be of an international character and not merely present American policy and point of view.

In the meantime I should be glad to have your comments on the scheme, and also any other information about Deimel or about the shipping project generally. I shall not make any move until I hear from you.

Meanwhile Hubbard has just sent you a copy of the Imperial Shipping Committee's report on British Shipping in the Orient which is being sent to you. It is better than I had expected and provides a good deal of the information we should want. It is obvious, however, that there is still room for a great deal of work along the lines of more systematic analysis of the problems from an international point of view and quite certain that we should go ahead with the I. P. R. study.

I did not call on Gates in the Civil Aeronautics Commission, chiefly because Saugstad had already warned me off him because Gates apparently, being a fighting young lawyer, has become identified with an anti-Pan-American group and is interested in nothing but ways of reducing the monopolistic power of Pan-American. It also appears that the State Department which has to handle most of the foreign negotiations has more or less unconsciously found itself lined up against Gates as an advocate of Pan-American. Saugstad also emphasized the fact that the State Department has all the information available to the Civil Aeronautics Commission, and in fact is better informed on the international aspects. His recommendation was, therefore, that if we wanted to get any profitable cooperation from people in Washington, it would be much better to do it through the State Department, and he said that he would be prepared to see that we did get the necessary cooperation. Apparently they already have one or two capable young men working on the problem. Obviously there is a little bureaucratic jealously here, but I think there is a good deal in what Saugstad says, and unless we find strong evidence to the contrary, I should be inclined to take his advice. Here, again, however, I should be glad to have a word from you before I write again to Saugstad.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

——— ———, *Research Secretary.*

W. W. Lockwood Esq.

Exhibit No. 806

Institute of Pacific Relations

Amsterdam—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Giannini Foundation,
University of California,
Berkeley, Calif., May 10, 1940.

ECC from WLH:

I was somewhat startled to receive your wire saying that Andrew Ross was waiting for me to write him about a supplementary chapter to Levy's report, but on looking through my files I find a slip of paper with the name Andrew Roth of 3150 Rochambeau Avenue, written on it. So I am afraid I have clearly been negligent in forgetting all about him. I enclose herewith a note which you might send on to him if it seems suitable. The amount of writing to be done cannot be very great and if Levy's manuscript is only just going to the press there need be no delay in its final appearance. If you or Kate or Jack have

any doubts about the present letter, don't hesitate to scrap it and write Roth directly. (Incidentally you had better find out whether his name is really Ross or Roth.) I apologize sincerely for having slipped up on this matter.

I should not think it was necessary to get Levy's formal permission for this supplementary chapter, but presumably you ought at least to notify him that we are getting it done.

I note that no Inquiry funds will be available for Lockwood's suggested study by Quigley on the Open Door. The study is not within the present field of the International Research Committee and I don't think it would interest Lockwood's committee, although a related study of the Open Door as a cardinal factor in American policy might. I would not regard the suggested Quigley study as of major importance, though it might come on the list of new studies to be undertaken if we get additional Inquiry funds. The subject might be better treated as one chapter of a larger study of new diplomatic machinery for the Far East. How would it be to consult two or three people like Blakeslee, Willoughby, Hornbeck and Quincy Wright, as well as Quigley, about the possible scope and importance of the study? It might also be possible to have the subject treated in a PACIFIC AFFAIRS article and expanded later if it seemed worthwhile.

I agree with so much of what you say in your letter of May 8 about Japanese Trojan Horses in the bosoms of various influential people (a vastly intriguing metaphor when you consider what would have to be done to let the soldiers escape from the Trojan Horse) that I don't propose to do anything further about a possible visit by Alsberg to Japan, particularly as Galen Fisher's visit will be a sufficient goodwill gesture.

If it is convenient I should like to look at "Contemporary International Politics" by Sharp and Kirk, the latter of whom is doing an American Council study on electrical communications in the Pacific. If it seems worthwhile, I shall write a brief review on the Far Eastern sections of the book. Among your suggested reviewers for Morgan Young's book, "The Rise of a Pagan State," I should be inclined to mention Colegrove, but we had probably better not bother him until he finishes his present assignment for us. Would you also send me Lowe's "Japan's Economic Offensive in China," as I may want to review this myself or, perhaps, ask George Taylor to do it.

I am very interested to hear that the Japan Council have translated "Agrarian China." I am delighted that they have done so but so far as I remember this is the first we have been told of it, although it is a Secretariat book. I should like to have two of the copies, if possible. The book should be listed under its Japanese title in the next issue of PACIFIC AFFAIRS, but I don't think it need be reviewed separately. To the best of my recollection we have not yet reviewed "Agrarian China" in PACIFIC AFFAIRS but you might check on this; and if I am right you might get Wittfogel or Cressey or Rossiter of the Department of Agriculture to write about 300 words.

WLH
W. L. H.

EXHIBIT No. 807

MAY 10, 1940.

WLH from ECC:

Jessup rang up just now and says that he fears it was you rather than he who slipped the cog with reference to the Levy supplement. He has just checked with Peffer and I have condensed his message into the following Day Letter:

"Regarding Levy supplement Jessup says he, Peffer, arranged for Andrew Ross see you, that Ross says you promised write him. He is eager and ready and according to Peffer anxious and qualified to go ahead and has been awaiting daily your letter."

I explained to Jessup how terribly rushed you were with a million things just before your departure. Under the circumstances, I assume that you will want to go ahead and have Ross go to work, though I suppose you are still free to cancel your tentative proposal to Ross.

Somehow or other both Jessup and Peffer have the idea that Ross saw you before you left New York. His address is: care the Chinese Department at Columbia.

In the view of Jessup and Peffer his knowledge of French and of France and of the Far East qualify him to do a good job.

EXHIBIT No. 808

BERKELEY, *July 5, 1940.*

DEAR PHIL GAFFE: The Hollands are duly touched and awed that our offspring should have made such an impact on 129 E. 52nd St. If you want to indicate that Amer and Asia are separated by an ever-renewed body of water, then Patricia is certainly an apt symbol. Photographs a priori and a posteriori will be forthcoming soon.

I should have no objections to putting Owen's article in Amerasia and in some ways I think it would be better to print it immediately rather than have it delayed. It's a difficult topic and I think Owen has made a gallant effort, but I have a slight feeling that he has tried to find too many historical roots for the current, and obviously important, connection between Germany and Japan. Moreover there is singularly little account of the role the U. S. has played and of the fears of the U. S. S. R. regarding the intentions of both Germany and Britain. I should like to see the article end with a more outright plea that only by direct pressure on Japan from the U. S. and by a rapprochement between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. can the Axis powers now be checked.

I hope Amerasia will have a blast against the latest wave of appeasement and Lippmannism favouring a deal with Japan.

My regards to Kate and the rest of the Amerasia bunch.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Copy to CEE, I mean ECC.

EXHIBIT No. 809

Copy for ECC

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., December 1, 1941.

Mr. CARL F. REMER,
Office of the Coordinator of Information,
Library of Congress Annex, Washington, D. C.

DEAR REMER; You have probably already heard of this matter through Fans or Fairbank, but I understand that the publishers of the Japanese magazine CHUO KORON wrote sometime ago that they had had to discontinue mailing the periodical to the United States as the United States atuhorities had been confiscating it as propagandist literature. The United States action may have been quite justified in some cases, but it seems very probable that the Customs authorities have acted as precipitately here as they did formerly with important Soviet magazines which were urgently needed by libraries and research institutions in this country.

If the matter has not already been attended to, it might be worth while for your group to communicate, perhaps through Archibald MacLeish or Mortimer Graves, with the Customs authorities to see that confiscations are handled intelligently and not to the detriment of legitimate research institutions and libraries.

I enclose a circular in Japanese from CHUO KORON.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND, *Research Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 810

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., March 18, 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: The research work of the Institute of Pacific Relations has been directly useful to the Office of the Coordinator of Information in its efforts to meet the urgent demands created by the war. Certain unpublished studies of the Institute have been made available to us during the preparation of reports and you have, yourself, found time to serve as consultant and adviser to our sections dealing with the British Empire and the Far East.

I am sending this brief acknowledgment in the hope that it may be useful to you in making plans and securing funds for the coming year. I think you will agree with me that full informal cooperation must be the basis of the effective use of the limited number of persons with adequate research training to deal with the Far East. The Office of the Coordinator of Information is looking forward to the continuance of such cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES P. BAXTER, 3RD,
Deputy Coordinator.

EXHIBIT No 811

(Pencilled initials) NLH

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.,
April 2nd, 1942.

Major G. A. LINCOLN,
Director of Orientation Course,
Bureau of Public Relations, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MAJOR LINCOLN: Since I have a certain general responsibility for the publication program of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I have had occasion to learn from Miss Downing your sudden decision to cancel the War Department's order for 10,000 copies of *An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics*. I want to reinforce Miss Downing's reply to you by saying that this Institute has acted in all good faith and has in fact gone to considerable trouble to meet the request originally made by Colonel Beukema, e. g., in getting paper especially manufactured and having the maps rephotographed, etc.

Your action in announcing your dissatisfaction with parts of the book and cancelling the order at this late date without giving us any previous warning comes as a considerable shock, particularly as nothing in our correspondence indicated that your office would require further revisions. Had you mentioned this problem some weeks ago when we were waiting for the paper to be manufactured we should, of course, have done our best to meet your wishes.

I therefore hope that you will carefully consider Miss Downing's suggestion of having a revised edition even now. If you cannot accept this suggestion I hope that you will at least indicate a procedure whereby we can be compensated for the losses we shall suffer through your failure to notify us soon. The direct losses will probably total about $1,600, and we have not included in this figure any charge for the considerable amount of time which the office staff here has devoted to the problem.

We are genuinely anxious to assist you in your important work. We would therefore like to be given an opportunity to provide the kind of material you want. The only thing we ask is that you give us reasonable notice in the sudden changes of your plans.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 812

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.,
April 3rd, 1942.

Mr. GEORGE H. KERR,
Military Intelligence Division, War Department,
Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. KERR: Thank you for your letter of April 2nd about Grajdanzev's report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments and if there are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that you let me know in the next day or two as we may want to insert an errata slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactory set of proofs.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 813

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G–2,
RM 2628, MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, April 2, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of further writing.

Some weeks ago there came to our M. I. D. files—and my Formosa section—a set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinary good work, which I first saw briefly in your office and now have read thoroughly. No covering letter came with it to me and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our files. If it is not a loan I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan I shall keep it intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We live very largely on loans these days.

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.

With every goood wish.

[s] George H. Kerr.
GEORGE H. KERR.

My residence address: 2700 Wisconsin Ave., NW.

EXHIBIT No. 814

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., July 25, 1942.

In reply refer to: OW–6–RHS.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: Thank you for sending us the article on the organization of the Chinese Government, which will be most useful to our Far Eastern Division.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] C. R. Vail,
CHESTER R. VAIL,
Acting Chief, Economic Intelligence Division.

EXHIBIT No. 815

Joseph P. Chamberlain, Chairman, Professor of Public Law; Lyman Bryson, Professor of Education; Carter Goodrich, Professor of Economics, Chairman, Governing Body, I. L. O.; Luther H. Gulick, Eaton Professor of Municipal Science and Administration; Carlton J. H. Hayes, Seth Low Professor of History: Charles Cheney Hyde, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy: Huger W. Jervey, Director, Institute of International Affairs, Professor of Comparative Law; Philip C. Jessup, Professor of International Law; Grayson Kirk, Associate professor of Government; Arthur W. Macmahon, Professor of Public Administration; Wesley C. Mitchell, Professor of Economics; Nathaniel Peffer, Associate Professor of International Relations; Lindsay Rogers, Burger Professor of Public Law, Assistant Director, I. L. O.; J. Russell Smith, Professor of Economic Geography; James T. Shotwell, Boyce Professor of the History of International Relations

Consultants: Dr. Frank G. Boudreau, Director, Mulbank Memorial Fund; Joseph Hyman, Executive Vice Chairman, Joint Distribution Committee; General Frank R. McCoy, President, Foreign Policy Association; Clarence E. Pickett, Executive Secretary, American Friends Service Committee; George L. Warren, Executive Secretary, President's Advisory Committee on Political Regugees

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

COMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PROGRAM OF TRAINING IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Professor Schuyler C. Wallace, *Director*
Room 513 Fayerweather Hall
UNiversity 4-3200, Ext. 188

JULY 31, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: Our arrangements for the course are coming along. Broek will arrive on the 20th of August for the six weeks period. I told him in my letter that you and Lockwood had waived the I. P. R. claims for those six weeks, and that arrangements with the Rockefeller people were feasible. Can you take the initiative with the Rockefeller people, or will he do that, or can I help?

Keesing will come up from the Office of Strategic Services in a consultative capacity one day a week for the first six weeks.

We want very much to have you come up for a few introductory lectures. What we thought you might be willing to do would be to come on August 18, 19, and 20 to give three one-hour lectures, which would do the following:

1. Provide a general introduction to the Pacific area, just touching the high spots as to the divisions of the region, the peoples, etc. Some of the men will be well informed, others may be quite blank about it.

2. A bibliography lecture on materials bearing on the Pacific and Far East, which would include a description of the inquiry series.

3. A talk on the available sources in the New York area, so that the men would know where to go after we assigned them research projects. This would include an indication of what you have at the I. P. R., and references to such other places as the American Museum, the Geographical Society, etc.

We can offer you the modest honorarium of $150.00 for this series of lectures.

In addition, we hope that you would be willing to contribute some of your time to sitting in with a committee which we are forming on the Pacific area, to plan out our whole curriculum. The committee will include Keesing, Broek, Clare Holt, and Arthur Schiller.

I hope that we can count on your help in these ways.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Phil.
PHILIP C. JESSUP.

PCJ: es.

EXHIBIT No. 816

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., Sep. 2, 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: I think you will be interested in seeing the enclosed copy of an article by the Vice President on "Economic Warfare—The War Behind the War," which appears in the current issue of the *Army and Navy Journal.* It is the first broad public statement about the work of the Board of Economic Warfare.

Sincerely yours,

[s] BILL
WILLIAM T. STONE, *Assistant Director.*

Attachment.

EXHIBIT No. 817

JULY 6, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM T. STONE,
Board of Economic Warfare,
Department of Economic Warfare,
Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BILL: You may be interested in these reports of Stein's.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 818

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., July 11, 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Many thanks for your note of July 6, enclosing the radio letter from Guenther Stein. This service is most interesting, and the Board will appreciate receiving the reports regularly as they come in.

Do look me up the next time you are in Washington.

Sincerely yours,

[s] BILL
WILLIAM T. STONE, *Assistant Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 819

MARCH 1, 1943.

KM from ECC

The private document prepared in Washington on the Strength of the Muslim League has come into my hands. It is not available for quotations, nor should any reference be made to it. I thought, however, that you might be interested in seeing it, so I have had copies made. I don't think that it covers the ground, but it does contain one or two interesting points.

164/No. 4/2/1/43

Background information

THE STRENGTH OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IN INDIA

MR. JINNAH'S POSITION

Mr. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League has recently been carrying on a vigorous political drive.

His visit to the Punjab showed the extent to which he has secured contact with the Muslim masses. It can no longer be argued that because at the General Elections it was not able to secure a majority of the Muslim votes in any Province, the Muslim League has no following among the masses. Since 1937, accession to the Muslim League's and Mr. Jinnah's strength has been tremendous. Almost every bye-election in Muslim constituencies has been won by the League and the number of Muslim League members in the various Provincial Legislatures has increased manifold.

The number of Muslim Ministers who now owe allegiance to the League is considerable. The latest accession has come from Sind. Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, who succeeded Mr. Allah Bux, has joined the League and his example has since been followed by all the Sind Muslim Ministers. Here is a survey of the Muslim League position in the Muslim majority Provinces:

PUNJAB

The total number of Muslim members in the Punjab Legislative Assembly is 89. Only one out of these was elected on Muslim League ticket in the General Elections of 1937. The number of Muslims elected on Unionist tickets was 77. All Muslim members of the Unionist Party are, however, now members of the Muslim League under what is known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact of 1938. The main terms of the Pact were that the Unionist Party's leader, the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, with all his Muslim followers in the Assembly should join the League and promise support to it in all Indian constitutional questions. Mr. Jinnah agreed on his part that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party would have freedom in Provincial matters and would be free to pursue the Unionist Party program.

The political complexion of the Punjab made it necessary for the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Prime Minister, not to form a Muslim League Government but a Unionist Government in coalition with Hindu and Sikh groups. In all Provincial matters he pursued a more or less independent line and, though professing allegiance to the League and Mr. Jinnah, his policy on all-Indian questions was at times embarrassingly independent of the League. On the other

hand, Sir Sikander never openly flouted any League mandate and he resigned from the National Defence Council when required by the League.

The *Civil and Military Gazette* of Lahore recently wrote: "What is consistently ignored is the fact that Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikander are mutually dependent; their common fundamental purpose must over-ride differences arising from the admitted diversity of their 'spheres of influence.' Whatever their personal predilections, circumstances must force the Muslim League President and the Premier of the Punjab (so long as he is a Muslim) to run in double harness until India's future is hammered out; and that Constitution may conceivably effect even closer cooperation between them."

Mr. Jinnah's recent Punjab tour monopolised public attention, not only because of his public utterances on topical questions, but also because of the object underlying his visit. Recent attempts made by the Punjab Premier to settle the communal problem in that part of the country on a Provincial basis irrespective of an all-Indian agreement, must doubtless have caused anxiety to Mr. Jinnah. The formula favored by Sir Sikander, according to most reports conceded self-determination to the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the event of a Muslim plebiscite deciding in favor of secession in a post war settlement. The minorities may form a separate State or join the main Indian Union. Negotiations went on for some time amongst the various parties but ultimately broke down or were adjourned because it was said that he Hindus wished to consult the Mahasabha.

Soon after, Mr. Jinnah arrived in the Punjab and in his first public utterance made a pointed reference to the main basis of the scheme without naming it and condemned the move to give the right of self-determination to "Sub-National" groups like the Hindus and the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Muslims in the United Provinces. He further tried to win over the Sikhs to his conception of Pakistan by reassuring them that their interests would be safe under a Muslim State. This failed, but Mr. Jinnah succeeded in scotching the "mischievious idea, as he described it, of a purely Provincial settlement of the communal problem and laid down that "no settlement is worth the paper on which it is written either in the Punjab or elsewhere, so far as Muslims are concerned, except with the Muslim League."

Later, Mr. Jinnah in another speech said that he had not referred to the Sikander formula, which he had not even studied in his earlier speech. This enabled Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to make a rapprochement with Mr. Jinnah and declare himself to be a loyal supporter of the Muslim League. If there were any differences between Sir Sikander and Mr. Jinnah, it was explained, they related more to the method than to the policy and program of the Muslim League and were intended soley to further its aims and ideals.

Attempts have lately been made to show that the Sikander formula is in accordance with the League's resolution on Pakistan which visualised territorial adjustments. The formula allowed this in accordance with the desires of the communities concerned and to that extent unintentionally conceded the right of self-determination to the Hindues and the Sikhs. However, the problem is no more a live issue. Mr. Jinnah has applied the damper and as a result of his visit to the Punjab he is back again in the position he occupied prior to Sir Sikander's attempt.

The death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan on December 26th was regarded by the New York Times correspondent (N. Y. T., Dec. 29) as considerably strengthening Mr. Jinnah's position by removing the only Muslim figure important enough to challenge him.

BENGAL

Out of a total of 123 Muslim members in the Bengal Assembly and 30 in the Legislative Council, 43 and 11 members, respectively, follow the Muslim League.

Mr. Fazlul Haq, the Premier of Bengal, who had been a member of the Muslim League since 1918, resigned in 1940 when disciplinary action was threatened against him for accepting membership of the National Defence Council, from which, however, he resigned. The Muslim League expelled him on Desember 11, 1941, for having formed a coalition Ministry in Bengal without its sanction.

Some unconfirmed reports have appeared in the press that Mr. Fazlul Haq had met Mr. Jinnah recently in Delhi. Another report said that Mr. Haq had rejoined the Muslim League. On this the Bengal Premier made the following statement: "The news published by *Independent India* (Mr. M. N. Roy's Delhi paper) about my rejoining the Muslim League raises an irrelevant issue. I maintain I was never out of the League, I am still in the League. Therefore,

the question of my rejoining does not arise. As regards Mr. Jinnah, I have never been at war with him, nor do I intend to be so. I am not at war with anybody. I am at war with untruths."

SIND

Out of 35 Muslim members in the Sind Assembly, only 13 were elected on Muslim League ticket. With the return of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah as Premier of the Province in October last, a number of M. L. A.'s have joined the League. Sir Ghulam and all his Muslim Ministers are now members of the League, and the strength of the League party is now 26 out of 35.

Sir Ghulam resigned from the Muslim League when Mr. Allah Bux took him into his Cabinet two years ago. His rejoining the League has been prompted by a desire to strengthen the Ministry that he formed on Mr. Allah Bux's dismissal.

ASSAM

Out of 34 Muslim members in the Assam Assembly, originally only 3 were elected on Muslim League ticket. But, a few months after the General Elections 30 members signed on as a Muslim League Party. The Premier, Sir Mohammad Saadullah Khan, has been strictly following Muslim League discipline. He resigned from the National Defence Council when required by the League to do so. On recently assuming office he claimed that his Cabinet was representative of Assam's people. No mention was made of the party affiliations of the Muslim members of his Cabinet. In all his public utterances since assuming office, he has refrained from mentioning the Muslim League.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Out of 38 members in the N.-W.F. Province Legislative Assembly, only 12 belong to the League Party. The only sign of a weakening of the Congress Party in the Province has been the resignation of Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan, M. L. A., ex-Parliamentary Secretary, from the Congress Party and the Red Shirts, but he did not join the Muslim League. He formed a new organisation called the Pashtoon Jirga. It aims at an independent Pathan State, run in accordance with the laws of the Shariat. In a statement, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan said that an alliance with the Congress was harmful as the Pathans were gradually losing their identity and drifting away from religion.

	Total Muslim Members of legislatures	Total Muslim League members
Punjab	89	78
Bengal	[1]123	[1]43
	[2]30	[2]11
Sind	35	26
Assam	34	30
North West Frontier Province	38	12
Totals	349	211
Percent		60.45

[1] Lower House.
[2] Upper House.

IMPORTANT NOTE.—It is important to remember in using the above figures that they show the strength of the Muslim League among the Muslim members of the Legislatures of Muslim majority provinces; they do *not* show Muslim League strength in Hindu majority provinces (these figures will be released later when available).

JH: MC.

EXHIBIT No. 820

(Pencilled note) Same letter to Bisson, Moser, Shoemaker, Bloch, Orchard, Remer, Fahs.

Dr. HUGH BORTON,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HUGH: Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of "Korean Industry and Transport" by Grajdanzev. We would appreciate having your comments on this.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 821

(Handwritten letter.)

GRAJDANZEV, *Sunday, Jan. 17, 1943.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: Since Tuesday I am working in the B. of E. W. on Japanese materials and will finish work on Tuesday, 5:30 p. m., so that I shall be back in the office Wednesday morning. I believe that my stay here is useful, because I think I shall be able to prepare 3 articles—

(1) Japan after December 7, political
(2) Japan after December 7, economic
(3) Japanese policy in the occupied areas.

Of course, the picture is far from complete, but I believe that those who do not have access to special sources of information will be glad to read my story. Whether you will approve all these three articles and whether to publish them in the F. E. S. or elsewhere—it will be, of course, up to you. I shall prepare the articles in the shortest possible time, let us say—the first one may be ready in one week after my return.

Yours sincerely,

[s] A. GRAJDANZEV.

P. S. But I may stay here even Wednesday, if not all will be finished.

(Handwritten letter)

EXHIBIT No. 822

A. GRAJDANZEV,
July 22, 1942.

To the SECRETARY OF RESEARCH,
I. P. R.,
W. L. HOLLAND

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I read the letter of Mr. Norman's and the outline of the research project on industrialization of the Soviet Asia, prepared by A. Yugon.

I have to make the following comments on this project.

(1) I do not know whether it is good for the Institute to finance the work of a person who is a noted political figure, so long as the Institute has the Soviet Union council as a member and so long as the Soviet Union government is not over thrown by German and Japanese arms.

As you may see from the curriculum Vital he was the editor and head of the ec. department of Sotsialistichemyi vestnik since 1923—a magazine of Russian Men'sheviki, published abroad, and his part, so far as I know, was larger than that. The Soviet representatives may not protest now, when they are hard pressed; but they may have a certain feeling about that.

If the Institute finds that such work is a necessity, why not entrust it to such a person as, say, Mandel of the A. R. I., who is able, acquainted with Russian literature and language, and, probably, would be acceptable for the Soviet and American circles?

(2) I have no honor of being acquainted with Mr. Yugon; but I read his books and I think that all of them are superficial, including his last one, Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace. Of course, this is my personal opinion and it is worth just so much.

(3) I was of the opinion that we have no materials and studies enough for a serious book on the Soviet Asiatic regions. I am of the same opinion now. But in so far as many stupid and empty books on this or other regions are

written (an example, "Russia and Japan," by Maurice Hindus), I think a fairly tolerable book of that type can be written and be reasonably informative.

(4) The sources presented by Mr. Yugon are not new to those who study Russia; it is clear that they do not go much beyond 1937 or even 1936, though the chief ec. development took place in Siberia after that date.

(5) Some of the points of the outline are bordering on nonsense.

"(a) Superindustrialization as the fundamental idea of the Five-year plan." Superindustrialization was not the fundamental idea of any of the Five-year plans.

B 4, c—"Forest industries of Buryat-Mongolia." That is the only place in outline on Western and Eastern Siberia where forest industries are mentioned, though it is not in Buryat-Mongolia primarily (which contains so much of the steppe) that forest industry is developed in Siberia.

B 5, f—"Hunting of fur-bearing animals" under the general title the industrialization of Soviet Asia!

(6) Distortion and mutilations of Russian words go beyond the permissible misprints. Could not Mr. Yugon spend a few minutes in going over these names and giving us something actual instead of mythical "Sahalimsk" and many other places like that?

(7) In the sources I see many books included presumably for the increase of the number of titles.

What relation can have "Stenographic Report of the Shakhtinskyi trial, 1935"? The trial was related to Don. Cas. production, and not to Siberia. Why then are omitted recent trials?

What is there useful for this book in Tugan-Bavanovsky, The Russian Factory, where there is nothing about Siberia,

The book of Kabo about Tannu-Tuva republic?

Miller's History of Siberia, which ends, as far as I remember, in the seventeenth or eighteenth century?

Shulpin—Sea hunting?

Sergeyer, The Soviet Pacific Islands?

Gapanovich, Russia in Northeast Asia?

Burthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, bibliography!!!

and other not less striking examples.

The decision is, of course, up to you. I only point out to certain things which deserve your attention.

Yours sincerely,

[s] A. Grajdanzev.

Exhibit No. 823

Free Distribution List for "Korean Industry and Transport" by AJG

For Comment (with the Compliments of WLH):

Hugh Borton, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
T. A. Bisson, 353 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland
Dr. C. K. Moser, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C. (Far Eastern Section)
James Shoemaker, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
Kurt Bloch, Fortune Magazine, Time and Life Bldg., Rockefeller Center, N. Y.
Mrs. Dorothy Orchard, Board of Economic Warfare, Walshington, D. C.
Carl Remer, Office of Strategic Services, Library of Congress Annex, Washington
Charles B. Fahs, Office of Strategic Services, Library of Congress Annex, Washington

With the Compliments of WLH:

G. Nye Steiger, Simmons College, Boston, Mass.
George Taylor, Room 3313, Social Security Bldg., 4th & Independence Ave., Washington
Owen Lattimore, Office of War Information, 111 Sutter Street, San Francisco, Calif.
American Council (3 copies)
Margaret Cleeve, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S. W. 1, England (2 copies)
W. D. Berrie, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 369 George Street, Sydney

F. L. W. Wood, Victoria University College, Wellington, W. 1, New Zealand
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 700 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.
Kilsoo Haan
Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California
Ben Dorfman, Tariff Commission, Washington, D. C.
Mrs. Vera M. Dean, Foreign Policy Association, 22 East 38th Street, New York
Col. M. W. Pettigrew, Chief, Far Eastern Unit, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington
J. B. Condliffe, Carnegie Endowment, 405 West 117th Street, New York
League of Nations Secretariat, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.
International Labor Office, 3480 University Street, Montreal, Canada
G. E. Voitinsky, Institute of World Economics & Politics, Academy of Science, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Sir George Sansom, British Embassy, Washington
Douglas MacLennan, Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 230 Bloor St., West Toronto, Canada
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Shannon McCune, BEW, 2501 Q Street NW., Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 824

PREFACE

This preliminary report is part of a larger study on Modern Korea to be published later by the International Secretariat of the IPR. Other sections of this book were submitted as documents for the Mont Tremblant Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in December 1942, one entitled "Memorandum on Korea's Agriculture and Resources" and the other "Memorandum on Politics and Government in Korea."

The author and the IPR Secretariat will welcome readers' comments and suggestions for improvements to be made in the final version of the book. The author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion expressed in this report.

For convenience in following the author's references herein to other chapters in the book, some of which are included in the above-mentioned memoranda and some are still only in manuscript, the following table of contents of the whole book may be useful.

I. Introduction (partly included in Agriculture and Resources)
II. General Information (partly included herein)
III. Historical Sketch
IV. Population (included in Agriculture and Resources)
V. Agriculture (included in Agriculture and Resources)
VI. Forestry and Fishing (included in Agriculture and Resources)
VII. Power and Mineral Resources (included in Agriculture and Resources)
VIII. Industry (included herein)
IX. Communications and Transport (included herein)
X. Money and Banking
XI. Public Finance
XII. External Trade
XIII. Government (included in Politics and Government)
XIV. Courts, Prisons, and Police
XV. Health, Education, and Religion
XVI. Problems of Korean Independence (included in Politics and Government)
Statistical Appendix Bibliography

W. L. HOLLAND,
Research Secretary.

NEW YORK, *April 1943*

EXHIBIT No. 825

MAY 19, 1943.

Miss HILDA AUSTERN,
Assistant Treasurer's Office.

DEAR HILDA: This will be your authority to remit the sum of $183 by cable through the bank of China to Mr. Guenther Stein in Chungking (c/o Press Hostel). This is an advance payment for reports he is to send by radio and mail on current developments in Free China. This should be charged under the above title to reserve fund in the current International Research Budget.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 826

JULY 20, 1943.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
Office of War Information,
111 Sutter Street, New York City.

DEAR OWEN: The enclosed extract from my letter to Norine about his book on Sinkiang is self-explanatory. I would greatly appreciate it if you would do what you can to interest the University of California Press in publishing it for us.

I was sorry that you could not find time to do the review of the Russian book, but I realize that it is a considerable chore. We will definitely count on it for our December issue, and I suggest that you make it into a review article in essay form. I hope you can complete the job by the middle of September at the latest.

What do you think about Bisson's article on China in the current Far Eastern Survey? As you can imagine, it has caused a considerable storm among some of the official Chinese here. While I disagree with some of Bisson's terminology I think the article is fundamentally sound and says a lot of things that many people feel ought to have been said before this. I suspect it would have been better tactics to emphasize the possibilities of reform within the Kuomintang and under the leadership of the Generalissimo and the younger members of the party rather than to play up the contrast with the Communist areas. C. L. Hsia is of course very angry and says it will seriously harm the IPR both here and in China. We have offered them an opportunity to reply or submit another article, but I am not sure whether they will accept.

Carter and I have been told to be ready to leave around the end of this month, although there is still no assurance that we will get our priorities. If you are going to be in Washington about that time, please be sure to let us know, as we would both very much like to get your advice on whom to see and how generally to behave in China.

All the best.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 827

FEBRUARY 21, 1944.

Mrs. WILMA FAIRBANK,
Division of Cultural Relations,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR WILMA: Under separate cover and at John's request, I am sending you a package of Chinese manuscripts which were erroneously sent here with some other material which John brought back from China. They seem to have been sent by Lowdermilk for somebody in the Library of Congress. I told John about them on Friday and he asked me to return them to you.

With reference to your note to Art Bisson with reference to Chien's article on local government in China, you have probably noticed that it was published in the December 1943 issue of Pacific Affairs. At Chien's instructions, I have paid the fee to Professor Pei in this country together with an additional $200 representing part payment for the larger study of China's Government and Politics which Chien is now doing for us. I am anxious to find some way of remitting another $400 to him during the next few months. I would greatly

appreciate it if you could suggest some way of doing this. I have already sent a message to Bob Barnett requesting his help, but I doubt if he can manage more than about $200 for the present. Incidentally, I should greatly appreciate if it you could let me know privately, perhaps through Rose Yardumian at our Washington office, when John Davies is likely to be going back. I have one or two personal messages which I should like him to take.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 828

KKA

DECEMBER 7, 1943.

Dr. WILLIAM T. HOLLAND,
Research Director of the International Council Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR DR. HOLLAND: The material which you were so kind as to loan to this office has been most helpful. Thank you for putting it at our disposal for the last week.

The address by Chou En Lai at Yenan, the disposition of Japanese and puppet troops in China, and the Report from Yenan on Communist and Kuomintang effort in the War are being returned at this time. The "Situation in China" and An Answer to Chinese Comments, by V. Rogev are being used at the present time. They will be returned to you this week if that is agreeable to you.

Thank you again for allowing this office to make use of the timely and valuable reports listed above.

[s] E L Barlow,
EDWARD L. BARLOW,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, NY Office, MID.

EXHIBIT No. 829

8th Floor

1270 Sixth Avenue

New York, N. Y.

Telephone: CIrcle 6–4250

DECEMBER 6, 1943.

In reply refer to: KKA:sms

Dr. WILLIAM T. HOLLAND,
Research Director, International Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, Fourth Floor, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: The enclosed report on "The Situation in China," by Mr. V. Rogev, has aided the work of this office. Thank you for your cooperation in making this report available.

"The Situation in China" and "An Answer to Chinese Criticisms", by Mr. V. Rogev, are being returned at this time.

[s] E. L. Barlow,
EDWARD L. BARLOW,
Lt. Col., G. S. C., Chief, N. Y. Office, MID.

Enclosures: 2 Reports

EXHIBIT No. 830

8th Floor

1270 Sixth Avenue

New York, N. Y.

Telephone: CIrcle 6–4250

In reply refer to: AAL: med

DECEMBER 1, 1943.

Dr. WILLIAM T. HOLLAND,
Research Director of the International Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54 Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: This is to acknowledge receipt of material, which you turned over to Miss Francis of this office, as follows:

1. "Situation in China." By V. Rogev. (Translation from the Russian journal War and the Working Class.)
2. Answer to Chinese Comments. By V. Rogev. (Translation from the Russian journal War and the Working Class, September 1943.)
3. Address by Chou En Lai at Yenan.
4. Disposition of Japanese and puppet troops in China. (Original with some Chinese characters and partial carbon copy without Chinese characters.)
5. Report from Yenan on Communist and Kuomintang effort in the war.

This material will be returned to you at the end of this week.

Thank you for your assistance in making these documents available to this office.

[s] E. L. Barlow,
EDWARD L. BARLOW,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, N. Y. Office, MID.

EXHIBIT No. 831

8th Floor

New York, N. Y.

1270 Sixth Avenue

In Reply
Refer To:

Telephone: CIrcle 6–4250

DECEMBER 3, 1943.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
1 East 54th Street, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: We are returning herewith the following material which you so kindly loaned to this office:

The Progress of Indian Industries during the War, by D. N. Ghose, No. 10295.
2 Issues of the People's War, newspaper of Indian Communist Party, No. 10295.
2 Issues of The Student, journal of the All India Students' Federation, No. 10295.
2 Pamphlets from Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs, series, No. 10295.
4 Pamphlets, publ. by Peoples Publishing House, Bombay, No. 10295.
5 Pamphlets, publ. by the New India Planning Groups, No. 10295.

Your kind cooperation and interest in making this available is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. L. Barlow,
EDWARD L. BARLOW,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.

By hand
16 items
edm

EXHIBIT No. 832

MARCH 2, 1944.

DR. LAUGHLIN CURRIE,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR DR. CURRIE: This is just to let you know that I have filed my application for final citizenship papers. The application is dated March 1 and the Serial Number of my first papers (Declaration of Intention) is D22–108175. The application has been filed at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 70 Columbus Avenue, New York 23.

Admiral Yarnell has written my draft board supporting Carter's application for my deferment on occupational grounds. Apparently President Wilbur, of Stanford, and President Sproul, of the University of California, have also written in similar vein. I have told Carter, however, that even if he gets deferment for me I shall want to take a Government job which is more directly connected with the war, and that I shall stay on only for three or four months until Carter can find a successor to me.

At the moment the most promising openings in Washington seem to be a Navy job in the Bureau of Occupied Areas, where there seems to be some hope of my getting a Commission, or a job in O. S. S. The latter would probably be more to my taste, as it would be concerned with the India-China-Burma theater. However, it is almost impossible to get a deferment for a civilian job in O. S. S., and it is therefore a question of whether O. S. S. can also get a Navy commission for me, since Army commissions are now practically unobtainable.

I should be most grateful if you can do anything to speed up my naturalization. I apologize for inflicting this chore on you when you are so busy, but I don't know anyone else who would be in a position to help me in this way.

Best wishes.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 833

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 11, 1944.

Informal

MR. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54 Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: With reference to your letter of February 21, 1944, I am glad to hear that Chien's article on Local Government in China was published in the December 1943 issue of Pacific Affairs. For my records, and because the manuscript was transmitted through the Department, would you let me know what the fee on this was and to whom it was paid [penciled: Yes $100.] (Chou, Pei-yuan?) Are there reprints of this article for Chien? We might be able to send two or three to him by pouch. In the case of other manuscripts placed here through our office we have also offered to distribute reprints to a list of persons in this country to be designated by the author.

I trust that Rose gave you my message regarding John Davies' departure and the transmission of funds.

Sincerely yours,

Wilma Fairbank.
(Mrs.) WILMA FAIRBANK.

EXHIBIT No. 834

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 18, 1944.

Informal

MR. T. A. BISSON,
American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR ART: On October 19, 1943 I wrote to you about T. S. Chien's article Wartime Local Government in China which Harriet had told me would probably appear in the December issue of Pacific Affairs.

Can you tell me whether the article has appeared, if there is any honorarium, and if there will be any reprints for him?

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Wilma F.
(Mrs.) Wilma Fairbank.

Exhibit No. 835

1 East 54 Street, *March 20, 1944.*

Mrs. Wilma Fairbank,
Division of Cultural Relations
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Dear Wilma: With reference to your letter of March 11, I confirm the fact that we paid Professor Chien $100 for his article on Local Government in China. This was in accordance with the arrangement I had made with him when I requested the article several months earlier. On Chien's request, the payment was made to Professor Chou in this country. We are not supplying reprints of articles, but I am sending you two copies of the magazine in the hope that you can either send these complete to Chien or tear out the pages containing his article.

Incidentally, if you ever have promising articles on China's social, political, or economic problems, please let me know as we may occasionally be able to use them in Pacific Affairs. As a general rule, we don't pay for articles and the payment to Chien was regarded as an advance payment on the larger book he is doing for us. However, we sometimes are able to make modest payments in special cases.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. Holland.

Exhibit No. 836

March 22, 1944.

Professor Schuyler Wallace
Columbia University,
431 West 117 Street, New York 27, N. Y.

Dear Schuyler: As you may know, Andrew J. Grajdanzev, one of our Research Associates and our principal expert in the Japanese language, is temporarily on leave getting some teaching experience at Oregon State College. We hope to get him back here in the summer, but Carter and I have promised to find a part-time academic post for him in or near New York. Because of your possible need for people who are pretty well-informed on Japanese language sources and on the economic and social problems of Japan, Korea and Formosa, I wonder whether there is any likelihood of your using him on a part-time basis at the Navy School.

As you may know from Phil Jessup and Nat Peffer, Grajdanzev is apt to be excessively polemical. Moreover, his spoken English, though fluent and pungent, is not always elegant or idiomatic. I am certain, however, that his experience in teaching will have greatly diminished these two faults. He would be particularly useful in lectures to seminars on rather specific and even technical problems relating to industry, trade, transport, shipping, banking and agriculture in the Japanese empire. He is perhaps more intimately acquainted than any other research worker outside Washington with the Japanese materials on these topics. We shall shortly be publishing his big book on Modern Korea and he is now working on a detailed study of Japanese Agriculture. As you probably know, he took his Ph. D. in Economics at Columbia and the Korea book was submitted as the dissertation. Peffer was rightly critical of the language and aggressive style of much of it, but we are editing it pretty severely for publication.

Grajdanzev will probably come back in June and I imagine he would be prepared to do some teaching during the summer if necessary. He is an Assistant Professor at the moment. Let me know if you see any prospect of using him.

As you may have heard, my draft board relented and gave me a six-month deferment, only till about the end of August. I may take a part-time Government job before that time but my main job will still be here.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. Holland.

EXHIBIT No. 837

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
March 23, 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: Could I hold off giving you a definite answer on Grajdanzev for another week or two insofar as summer work is concerned. I am quite sure that we will be very much interested in making use of him on a part-time basis in the fall.

I am delighted indeed that your draft board has given you a six months' deferment and definitely hope that they will renew it at a later period. It seems utterly ridiculous to force you into uniform when you are doing more effective work where you are.

Cordially yours,

SCHUYLER.

ECC (handwritten) Encouraging, ECC.

EXHIBIT No. 838

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
April 14, 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR BILL: We are scheduling your lectures for Tuesday mornings beginning with May 2nd as you suggest.

I am leaving in about an hour for a two weeks' holiday and have not yet begun to work on the summer schedule. The more I think about it, I doubt very much whether we will want to have Mr. Grajdanzev do any lecturing during the summer. We might conceivably use him as a consultant in connection with some of the projects *if* he can be cleared by the Office of Naval Intelligence. I will leave a note asking Jessup to start the machinery going to get such clearance if Mr. Grajdanzev is willing to have the investigation started on the basis of a possibility, not a certainty.

Cordially yours,

Schuyler.
SCHUYLER C. WALLACE.

EXHIBIT No. 839

APRIL 12, 1944.

Prof. SCHUYLER C. WALLACE,
Columbia University,
431 West 117 Street, New York 27, N. Y.

DEAR SCHUYLER: Thanks for your note of April 8. If it's not inconvenient, I should prefer Tuesday morning presumably beginning May 2.

Is there any likelihood of your being able to reach and decision in the near future about employing Andrew Grajdanzev? May we assume that you will certainly not require his services for the Summer Session? I ask simply because he has asked us to arrange some lectures before he returns from Oregon.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 840

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
New York 27, N. Y., April 8, 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: After looking over the schedule it appears that we can run your series of lectures on either Monday or Tuesday a. m. or Monday at 4:00 p. m. It does not make much difference to us which hour you prefer. If anything, I think Monday morning would be slightly preferable, but only slightly so.

Cordially yours,

Schuler,
SCHUYLER C. WALLACE.

EXHIBIT No. 841

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC LAW AND GOVERNMENT,
March 27, 1944.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Since you say so, I agree that I undertook to draft some outline for the Far East security organization but I am appalled at the thought. There are dozens of schemes running around and I have been participating in one or two groups that have been dealing with some of them. I think the one to which Bill Johnstone refers must be that which is being developed by a little committee under Phil Nash. I have a recent text of their draft. There is also a draft prepared by the former League of Nations group in London which I also have. I am not sure whether at this stage any particular draft should be selected for the kind of criticism you suggest unless it be the London draft which has a certain authority because of its signatories. I shall turn the matter over in my mind and we can talk about it a little later.

I shall keep in touch with you about the question of your taking another job.

Sincerely yours,

Phil.
PHILIP C. JESSUP.

EXHIBIT No. 842

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 10, 1944.*

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Pacific Affairs,
1 East 54 Street, New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: I am inclosing for the information of yourself and Mr. Carter excerpt from letter which I have just received from Adler.

I would appreciate, for obvious reasons, your not showing this around and your not disclosing your source of this information.

Sincerely,

Irving.
IRVING S. FRIEDMAN.

Enclosure.

Do you see the I. P. R crowd nowadays? If you do, you might inform them that they have completely baffled decent people here by appointing Wellington Liu to the Secretariat of the forthcoming I. P. R. Conference and by allotting him US$10,000 for research? For some reason or other they don't want to believe what is common knowledge here, namely that Liu is a pretty highly placed member of Tai Li's outfit. I had a talk with Holland on the subject last summer and he seemed to require written evidence to establish Liu's membership in the Secret Service. Since then I have received further evidence—not written but satisfactory to anyone but an ostrich—that such is the case. Of course he will be very well placed from his point of view in the I. P. R. Secretariat.

EXHIBIT No. 842–A

MAY 1, 1944.

Mr. IRVING FRIEDMAN,
United States Treasury, Washington, D. C.

DEAR IRVING: I have been meaning to call on you in Washington to acknowledge your note of April 10 with the excerpt from Adler's letter but I don't seem able to escape from O. S. S. where I am now working every Thursday.

I appreciate knowing about Adler's comment although it contains nothing new. Adler has got things a bit twisted about the I. P. R. research grant, most of which is to be kept here for publication purposes. Another grant of US$10,000 was made by a Chinese in New York partly for the relief of selected Chinese scholars.

Adler's account of my alleged blindness to Liu's connections with Tai is not very fair. I talked about the matter with him at some length in Calcutta. I would rather you did not pass the information on but the situation is that Liu has a number of personal friends in Tai's organization and he came to the attenton of Tai himself some years ago because of his friendship for a Shanghai engineer who unsuccessfully tried to assassinate Wang Ching-wei. Liu has talked to me really frankly about the whole business and gave a very convincing story though I have no means, of course, of proving it. Liu says he had been repeatedly asked by Tai Li to work for him but has always refused largely because his wife and friends have urged him not to accept. One of Liu's closest friends in this country says he is quite certain that Liu is not working for Tai.

Even if the allegation were true, there is not much that Carter or I could do about it as Liu is employed by the China I. P. R., not by us. He is probably coming to New York this summer to put a number of research reports through the press in preparation for our January conference.

One of the incidental advantages of the rumors of Liu's connection with Tai is that it has thus far saved the China I. P. R. from suffering the fate of all similar organizations in China, namely being swallowed up by Kung. To the best of my belief, the funds which the China I. P. R. has recently succeeded in raising have been obtained because of the personal interest expressed by the Generalissimo. What bank or agency actually turned over the funds I don't know but I am pretty sure it was not the usual handout from Kung.

Let's try to have lunch sometime soon. There are several things I want to discuss with you.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 843

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES,
Washington, D. C., 12 April 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: Will you be good enough to fill out the enclosed form and return it to me. We have put through a request for your appointment as a WOC Consultant. You will get $10 per diem in lieu of subsistence, and your railroad fare. I have told Personnel that you will be here on April 20.

Sincerely,

/s/ Alice B. Foy
ALICE B. FOY,
Administrative Office, Planning Staff.

EXHIBIT No. 844

APRIL 17, 1944.

Miss ALICE B. FOY,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MISS FOY: Thank you for your letter of April 12 enclosing the Federal Employment form which I return herewith. You will see that I have filled out only some of the questions. Having wasted a great deal of time already filling in a twelve page application form for O. S. S., I am not disposed to repeat the process. Your office is at liberty to answer the remaining questions on the basis of what I have already submitted. If this is done, I should be prepared to consider signing the application form,

If this procedure is likely to prevent your office from employing me on April 20, perhaps you would be good enough to let me and also Dr. Norman Brown know. I am sorry to appear uncooperative but there is a limit to the number of forms I can bring myself to fill in for the Government.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

enc.

EXHIBIT No. 845

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
New York 27, N. Y., April 25, 1944.

Mr. WM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: As you perhaps know, Mr. Wallace has been out of town for a few days. Before his departure, he indicated that you had requested that if possible, your class be scheduled on Tuesday mornings. Accordingly, we have made the following arrangements:

Your lecture series on South East Asia will come on May 2, 9, 16 and 23rd, from 9 to 11 in the morning, in Room 302, Fayerweather Hall.

I hope that this arrangement is satisfactory.

Very truly yours,

L. H. Chamberlain
L. H. CHAMBERLAIN,
Lieut. (jg) USNR, Academic Aide.

EXHIBIT No. 846

MAY 17, 1944.

Mrs. ELEANOR LATTIMORE,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
744 Jackson Place, N. W., Washington, D. C.

DEAR ELEANOR: I enclose three letters to people in Chungking which I should very much like to have delivered by Owen if it's not too inconvenient for him. I know it's a bit of an imposition as he will probably be asked to carry dozens of other messages, but if he can manage to take them I shall be extremely grateful. I certainly wish I were going along. It will be a most interesting and probably critical time in Chungking.

I am just starting to read the first draft of the Wallace pamphlet which looks like a very interesting job.

I am glad you can review the book on the Gobi desert.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

encs. 3.

EXHIBIT No. 847

FREE WORLD

FREE WORLD HOUSE, 144 BLEECKER ST., NEW YORK 12, N. Y.

Telephone: ALGONQUIN 4-0722. Cable Address: FREEWORLD NEWYORK

JUNE 19, 1944.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: It gives me great pleasure to send you under separate cover, a copy of the April 1944 issue of our Mexican edition, MUNDO LIBRE.

In this edition is a reprint of the Round Table Conference, "What to do with Japan," in which you participated and which was originally published in the March 1944 edition of FREE WORLD magazine.

Very sincerely yours,

LOUIS DOLIVET.
Louis Dolivet.

LD: NB.

EXHIBIT No. 848

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
NATIONAL SECRETARIAT,
230 Bloor Street West, Toronto 5, March 23, 1946.

W. L. HOLLAND, ESQ.,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: You may not have heard that Fred Poland has been held for weeks in connection with the spy round-up in Ottawa. I enclose a page from the local morning paper.

The C. I. I. A. is ignoring the publicity; our stand is that our membership includes all political parties for purposes of good discussion at meetings, and that the branches can enlist any persons they wish.

Poland has been held without benefit of counsel and his wife is seeking habeas corpus. We have no idea of whether Fred is guilty; I have known about his being held since the third day after the story broke, or thereabouts but I had no proof to substantiate my suspicions until the recent announcement (underline is pencilled).

Yours sincerely,

DOUGLAS A. MACLENNAN, *National Secretary.*

DAM: bm
Copy to Mr. E. C. Carter.

EXHIBIT No. 849

25TH MARCH 1946.

DOUGLAS MACLENNAN, ESQ.,
Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
230 Bloor Street, West, Toronto 5.

DEAR DOUGLAS: I am grateful to you for your note of March 23rd enclosing the clipping on Fred Poland. I had seen a brief reference to the matter in the *New York Times* and got the impression that the habeas corpus request would probably succeed. The whole procedure adopted by the government seems very curious and I should imagine there may be a considerable protest about it in Parliament. I should appreciate it if you would keep me informed of what develops and particularly of any further references to the Canadian Institute or the IPR.

You may be interested to know that Dr. Chen Nan-sang and his wife have just arrived here from India. Chen will be teaching for the next few months at the University of Washington and during the summer may be doing some work for the IPR. For the past three years he has been working in New Delhi at the British Ministry of Information and during the past four months has travelled

widely in India studying the agricultural situation. Although there will not be time for him to visit Canada before he goes to Seattle, it occurs to me that your Victoria and Vancouver branches might want to invite him to speak before them during the next few months.

J. P. Simon of your Victoria branch has asked Carter or me to participate in the annual joint conference of the IPR and the Canadian Institute in Victoria on May 10 to 12. I am inclined to accept this invitation as I may have to visit the Pacific coast about that time. If so I would probably plan to visit Vancouver as well.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary-General.

EXHIBIT No. 850

PHILIP J. JAFFE,
225 Fifth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y., April 29, 1948.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Acting Executive Vice Chairman, American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: For some time now, I have been one of those that believed that in the coming years the most important area in the Far East will be Japan. Up to the present, no detailed study of developments in postwar Japan has appeared in print. I feel strongly that such a study is needed, and that the Institute of Pacific Relations is the appropriate organization to direct it. If you feel that this is the right time to undertake such a study, and if you have a competent person available for this project, I would be very happy to make a financial contribution towards that end.

Would you be kind enough to let me know whether you feel that this project is worthwhile and whether you have the right person available for it; and, if so, approximately how large a contribution would be required from me to make it possible?

Cordially yours,

PHILIP J. JAFFE.
(signed) Philip J. Jaffe.

EXHIBIT No. 851

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington, D. C.,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y., 30th April, 1948.

ELdorado 5-1759

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Consultant, ECAFE Secretariat,
106 Whangpoo Road, Shanghai, China.

DEAR MR. CARTER: With reference to the attached letter from Jaffe of April 29, I might add that he has now decided it would be better for Bisson to continue working on his research project under IPR auspices and hopes that the American IPR will be willing to receive a donation of $3,000 which can be used to pay Bisson for a continuation of his current IPR research project on the impact of SCAP on Japanese life. We trust the Executive Committee will not object to receiving the money. It will ease Phil's tax problem.

Sincerely,

Bill,
WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Acting Executive Vice Chairman.

P. S.—C. D. Jackson of Time, Inc., phoned Emeny this morning to check on the IPR. Jackson is a member of the Board of Independent Aid, and apparently the Board is seriously considering the IPR's appeal. Emeny took the opportunity to inquire of Jackson what the possibilities of a renewal of Time's contribution would be, and apparently didn't get a negative response. So we shall wait and see.

(Penciled:) Rec'd, May 7, 1948.

(Penciled:) Brooks has now retracted his earlier strong criticism of Rossinger and now recommends him to me in the most glowing terms.

EXHIBIT No. 852

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York, January 25, 1950.

Dr. E. HERBERT NORMAN,
Canadian Liaison Mission, c/o Foreign Liaison Section G–2,
GHQ, AFPAC, APO 500, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

DEAR HERB: I was delighted to find your letter of January 5th awaiting me on my return to New York and even more pleased to see a copy of your book. It is an excellent production job despite the unattractive cover and title page. I took the liberty of sending it immediately to Sansom, who tells me that he is reading it with very great interest and admiration—so much so that he is going to write you directly about a number of specific points including probably some disagreements. He has also agreed to review it for PACIFIC AFFAIRS, commenting mainly on the broader social and economic implications of your analysis of Japanese feudalism. At a later date he is keen to write a more detailed and longer review for one of the professional journals, such as the FAR EASTERN QUARTERLY. I shall try to send you a copy of his PACIFIC AFFAIRS review as soon as we receive the manuscript, probably some time within the next three or four weeks.

If you have another copy to spare, I do hope you will send it to Miriam Farley for review in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I know she would appreciate seeing it. She has just written a rather long and interesting review article on Sansom's book, *The Western World and Japan*, which we may print in the next PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Mary Healy has sent you a copy of Sansom's book which I hope you will admire as much as I do. Won't you try to write a review of it for one of the English-language publications in Japan and let me have a copy of your manuscript.

I think there is a good chance that under the joint auspices of the Japan IPR and the Tokyo National University and with some Rockefeller Foundation help Sansom will be able to visit Japan next fall and give a series of eight or ten lectures, which will subsequently form the basis for a book to be published under IPR auspices. In many ways I think it is likely to be a kind of projection of the ideas in his present book into the problems of contemporary Japan. Sansom tells me that he is now planning to work on his "swan song", a rather general book on eighteenth century Japan with numerous incidental comparisons with eighteenth century Europe.

I do hope you are making some headway on your volume, "Essays on Japanese Politics and Society." Knowing how you are apt to be interrupted by the pressure of other work I hope you will try to finish each chapter one by one and send along the revised manuscript as soon as possible rather than keeping the whole book until all the revisions and additional chapters have been completed. Why not make a start with the principal chapters in the earlier mimeographed report? Incidentally let me know if it would facilitate things if I can send you an advance payment of say $200.00, which you can use to cover incidental clerical or research expenses.

You may be interested to know that Bob Fearey, who is still in the Northeast Asia Division of the State Department, has just completed a 50,000 word supplement to Ed Martin's earlier IPR book, *The Allied Occupation of Japan.* We hope to produce the revised and enlarged edition within the next four months or so.

I would be most grateful to have any news from you on research developments in the Japan IPR. Perhaps you can get Okubo to tell you what is happening and also to remind Matsuo to write me soon about the new projects which I discussed with the Japan IPR people.

All good wishes to Irene and yourself.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, *Secretary-General.*

cc: PEL.
MFH.

EXHIBIT No. 853

CANADIAN LIAISON MISSION,
Tokyo, 5th January, 1950.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
Sec'y, Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York 2, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: I presume you have returned to New York by now from your world jaunt. I would very much like to have an opportunity of seeing some of your observations on the countries you visited. I trust that you will write up some aspects of your trip in one of the I. P. R. publications.

I am sending you by the same mail a copy of my work on Ando Shoeki, which was finally published last month. I think Kenkyusha did a respectable job of printing, although I must say that the Asiatic Society format is not the most attractive in the world. On the first day after publication, I hastily picked up some of the misprints I noticed and the printer obligingly struck off a page of errata, which is enclosed with the copy. One or two which I missed I shall take the liberty of correcting marginally. The work, I fear, shows signs of composition at different periods of time but, since it is after all a rather enlarged essay, it may not affect the argument too seriously. I know I shall be open to the criticism that I have magnified the subject out of its proper proportion making Shoeki appear a more orginial or incisive figure than some might think he deserves. I should be happy to have your frank opinion on this subject and on any other feature of the work on which you feel like commenting. Although I am sending this book to you personally, I should be grateful if you would make use of it by reviewing it yourself or, if you are too busy, have someone else on your staff review it for an I. P .R. publication—preferable Pacific Affairs. I am asking the editor of the Asiatic Society, who is for the current year Don Brown, Civil Information and Education Section, General Headquarters, to mail a few copies to the institutions or publications on Far Eastern subjects.

As you may have noticed, our Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, is coming with a large delegation to Japan at the end of this month after the Colombo Conference and will stay for about four days. Naturally, things will be quite hectic for a while before and after the visit but, unless I am in the very near future given another assignment, which is always possible after the length of time I have been here, I intend to get down to some work on the series of essays which we discussed on Japanese political and biographical subjects.

With all good wishes for the coming year to both Doreen and you,
Yours sincerely,

HERBERT.

EXHIBIT No. 854

CANADIAN LIAISON MISSION,
Tokyo, February 13, 1950.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 E. 54th Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR BILL: Many thanks for your letter of January 25 in which you acknowledge receipt of my book. I am delighted, of course, to know that Sansom is reviewing it and he wrote me a very kind letter about it. I still have not received his book, "The Western World and Japan," but am naturally looking forward to it keenly. I would be honoured to review it, although I would like to take my time and do as thorough a job as possible.

I must confess that I haven't made much headway on my "Essays on Japanese politics and society," except to continue accumulating fresh material for other sections. It is very thoughtful of you to suggest making an advance of $200 to assist in clerical and research expenses. For the present, I think I had better decline this kind offer, but may I take a rain check on it so that, when I feel the work is making real progress, then I would have less scruples about taking it? At the present, that time is a little remote although my intention to go on is still as strong as ever.

I have remembered you to the IPR people here.

With kind regards from both Irene and myself.
Yours sincerely,

Herbert.
E. H. NORMAN.

EXHIBIT No. 853

APRIL 26, 1950.

Mr. CHARLES LOOMIS,
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Dillingham Building Annex, Halekauwila Street, Honolulu 16, T. H.

DEAR CHARLES: Thanks for your personal note of April 24 enclosing a copy of your note to Clayton Lane. Needless to say there are bound to be some adverse effects on the IPR from all the McCarthy and Budenz charges. On the other hand, it seems pretty clear from the categorical refutations of Budenz which Bella Dodd and Browder are making that the myth about the IPR as a communist organization will be pretty well exploded. While the next 2 months are going to be very difficult for the American IPR, I am confident that it will weather the storm and that the IPR's prospects will then be pretty bright. For your strictly confidential information, I may tell you that the Rockefeller Foundation officers are going to recommend that a special and very exceptional grant be made to both the American IPR and the Pacific Council at the June meeting of the Foundation. Again for your personal information alone, I can tell you that there is a good prospect that the Ford Foundation (which officially has not yet begun to operate) will make a special preliminary grant to the Pacific Council for research on Southeast Asia. I know that our appeal to the Ford Foundation has had the specific and enthusiastic backing of Arthur Bean, Sir George Sansom, Phil Jessup, Dean Rusk, and Huntington Gilchrist.

As you probably know we have had some excellent publicity, notably in the Washington Post, where Alfred Friendly ran a very long article exposing Kohlberg and enthusiastically supporting the IPR (Sunday issue of April 23).

There is always, of course, the chance that Foundation trustees may be panicked by some new spectacular development, but my own guess is that this will not happen and that there is a good chance that the IPR can even benefit in the long run from the present attacks upon it. So I certainly hope you will go ahead vigorously with your Pacific House scheme. I think it is wonderful that you have been able to put this over so well at a time like this, and I only wish the New York office could point to an achievement like yours.

All good wishes.

Yours sincerely,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary-General.

EXHIBIT No. 856

MAY 17, 1950

Sir GEORGE SANSON,
Chandos Lodge, Eye, Suffolk, England.

DEAR SIR GEORGE: As you know, the various charges by Senator McCarthy and Louis Budens against Owen Lattimore have included references to the I. P. R. as a pro-communist organization or as harboring a communist "cell" in past years. Despite the statements issued by Lane, President Raymond Allen, myself and others, these insinuations are likely to continue as long as the attack on the State Department's Far Eastern policy is kept up. They are being made continually by certain newspaper columnists, notably George Sokolsky in the Hearst press. The latest blast comes from a sheet called "Counterattack" which asserts that the IPR is still employing communists and publishing communist reports. Specifically they complain about the following items in our current international research program: "The Impact of SCAP on Japanese Life" by T. A. Bisson; "Documents on Soviet Far Eastern Policy Since Yalta" by William Mandel; "Philippine Nationalism" by Abraham Chapman; "Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China During the War" by Israel Epstein (this last having been published in mimeographed form last year).

These studies are all under the auspices of the International Secretariat, not the American IPR. Two of them, those by Epstein and by Chapman, were originally started (in 1943 and 1946) by the American IPR with funds given by the American People's Fund (Fred Field's money). After the American IPR Executive Committee, on my recommendation, had appointed Clayton Lane to be Executive Secretary, I explained the background of these two projects to him. Because the projects did not directly concern American policy, and because I wanted him to be free to operate as he wished without being hampered

by any past commitments involving such a controversial figure as Field, I suggested that the two studies be put under the auspices of the International Secretariat. This was done and the unspent portion of the funds was returned to Field.

After some delay Epstein completed his manuscript. After being read and criticized by Lattimore, Fairbank and me, it was edited and somewhat shortened by Lillienthal and then issued in mineographed form last year. It's a factual study of limited historical interest and has not aroused criticism from reviewers. Any way it's over the dam.

The Chapman study has also been delayed. He promised to submit the complete manuscript at the end of 1949. I phoned him the other day and he told me that the report is about 90 percent finished and that he will definitely submit the whole manuscript before the middle of June. It's quality is hard to predict but I expect it will contain (besides historical background) a great deal of accurate and hitherto not generally available information on Philippine politics and parties. He knows a lot about the Philippine political situation.

Chapman is under attack because, as he readily states, he was elected in 1945 as a member of the New York State Committee of the Communist Party. I think it is almost certain that he is still a communist. As far as I know this is the only case in the IPR research program involving a study by a communist party member. It thus constitutes a good test case of whether we should follow our traditional practice of judging a study on its merits, in the light of comments from qualified critics, or of deciding in advance whether to accept or reject it in the light of the author's communist party membership. My own past policy, and the one I would still recommend despite its unpopularity these days, is to decide on the basis of the manuscript. I've so informed Chapman and have also told him that the manuscript will undoubtedly be read with a very critical eye and that I can give him no assurance it will be accepted for publication. To me it would seem absurd and cowardly at this late date for us to disown the study in advance after it's been on our lists for several years.

My idea would be to have the manuscript read by such people as Claude Buss (Stanford University), Laurence Salisbury, one person on the Philippine desk in the Research Division of the State Department, one qualified Filipino, and one qualified businessman with knowledge of the contemporary Philippine scene. If the comments are generally adverse, and if on the basis of them I conclude that it would not be feasible to get the study satisfactorily revised, I presume we shall drop any idea of publication. If the comments are generally favorable, then I would like your advice on how to proceed. One possibility would be to go ahead with such editorial revision as seems justified in the light of the readers' comments but to postpone final publication arrangements until the matter of policy has been decided by the International Research Committee and the Pacific Council at the Lucknow Conference. Another possibility would be to issue the study in a mimeographed edition for restricted circulation to national councils and research institutions, with a preface mentioning the author's communist party membership, and perhaps including the comments of those who read the first draft.

Admittedly it will be easier to form an opinion on this after we see a few sample chapters, which I may receive in about two weeks. However, the question is complicated by the fact that last January, the American I. P. R. at Clayton Lane's strong insistence rejected (but paid for) an article by Chapman on Philippine politics today, which had previously been requested by the editor of the *Far Eastern Survey*, and which in quality and essential accuracy was judged by all who read it, including Mr. Lane, as acceptable. The ground given for rejection, was Chapman's membership on the executive committee of the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, New York, an organization which was listed as "subversive" last year by the Attorney General. The Survey editor was unaware of this fact when she originally requested the article. The American I. P. R. Executive Committee which was asked to rule on this point of policy was divided in its views, but left it to Mr. Lane to decide.

Mr. Lane still feels that no manuscript should be accepted by the I. P. R. (either American or International Secretariat) from a writer who is a Communist or a member of a policy committee of an organization listed as subversive by the Attorney General. (The list is a very extensive one, including the American-Russian Institute of which Mr. Carter and Harriet Moore Gelfan have been leading members, but not the American I. P. R.). Undoubtedly several other members of the American I. P. R. Board of Trustees share Mr. Lane's view,

though the matter has never been put to a vote. Mr. Lane and they would of course respect the views of the international officers and other members of the Pacific Council, but would probably point out that since Chapman is an American, and since the study began under American I. P. R. auspices with a grant from Field's American People's Fund, the publication of the report, even under International Secretariat auspices, would provide further ammunition to those who are already attacking the I. P. R. On the other hand it seems to me unlikely that cancellation of the project now and suppression of the report would do much to make our critics end their attacks, especially when the project has been included on our lists for the last five years, and when both *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey* have previously (in 1946) published articles by Chapman.

As for Bisson, he is now teaching at the University of California and carrying on his study of industrial deconcentration in Japan with the aid of a direct grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. He is not receiving any grant from the I. P. R. but we are committed to helping in the eventual publication of his book. To suggest that, after publishing several of his earlier books and making several grants to him over the past ten years, we should now become apologetic about him or try to dissociate ourselves from him would be ridiculous.

Mandel's project is simply a collection of official Soviet diplomatic documents and Soviet editorial comments. It is now almost finished and in order to make it more useful, I've written to Max Beloff at Oxford asking if he would write an introductory chapter analyzing Soviet Far Eastern policy since 1945, largely by expanding the excellent article he has written on this topic for the June issue of *Pacific Affairs*. Mandel, you will recall, is the author of the Inquiry Series volume on The Soviet Far East and Central Asia.

I'm sorry to inflict all this on you. If it were not for the fact that the American I. P. R., in the public mind, is almost indistinguishable from the International Secretariat, I would say that we should proceed in our traditional way, judging the research manuscrips on their merits, and pay no attention to the McCarthy and similar attacks. What do you advise? I shall await your reply before sending copies of the correspondence to Gilchrist and other Pacific Council officers.

All good wishes.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary-General.

EXHIBIT No. 857

[Cablegram]

3 Moskou 2720 28 5 17 10 CHO
Holland Inspacrel Tokyo

Motylev cabled Carter suggesting meet you Vladivostock July eighteenth Stop No reply Stop Cable whether coming; if yes, which Soviet consulate to issue visa.

HARONDAR

JUL. 6 AM 5 54.

EXHIBIT No. 858

W. L. HOLLAND,
1 East 54th St. (5th floor), New York 22, N. Y.,
September 12, 1950 [6.30 p. m.].

Night letter.

DEAN RUSK,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Urgent could you kindly cable Supreme Commander urging him favorably consider permitting Japanese delegation attend IPR conference Lucknow October third to fifteenth? I am advised that influential Washington recommendation is needed to assure clearances. Please phone or wire me collect if you wish. Is there anything more I can do regarding Kahins passport? Urgently need him at Lucknow. Can you now give me names of special American delegates you would like attend Lucknow?

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 859

SEPTEMBER 16, 1950.

Personal

The Hon. DEAN RUSK,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR DEAN: I was sorry not to reach you on the phone in New York as I wanted to ask whether you had found any well-qualified Americans whom you might especially wish to attend the Lucknow conference of the IPR as members of the American delegation. I do hope you'll let me know soon if you have any special candidates. I'm sorry that Sen. Graham couldn't accept our invitation, but I'm hoping now that W. W. Waymack will accept the offer of a grant from the Carnegie Endowment to enable him to go to Lucknow.

Ordinarily we don't include government officials in the American delegation to an IPR conference, but Lane previously wrote Loy Henderson asking him to consider sending someone not in a policy-making position and preferably not a regular foreign service officer. Henderson declined, saying that he disliked making any such distinctions in his staff. I've told him, however, that I'd like to discuss the matter further with him in New Delhi, as it might be possible for us to include one or two specialists, such as cultural or agricultural or information officers of the Embassy in the delegation if you thought it desirable. I'd like your advice on the matter, as it sometimes raises touchy questions with the other delegations. In spite of all we say, I suspect that the Indian delegation, and possibly some of the other groups too, may include people who are at least mainly if not wholly government officials.

May I make an urgent and probably irregular appeal to you to lend your weightiest support to the double IPR financial appeal which is to be considered by the Rockefeller Foundation on September 22. As a Foundation trustee, you probably know better than I that one or two members of the Foundation's Executive Committee have been worried about all the McCarthy and Budenz charges against the IPR. The officers of the Foundation have given us very solid support, but it has been suggested to me that in this abnormal situation their hand would be strengthened if an impressive body of outside testimony and recommendations were sent to President Barnard, including letters from former Foundations officers and trustees. I have accordingly asked such people as Raymond Fosdick, Robert G. Sproul, Stacy May and Sydnor Walker if they would submit letters, and have also asked General Marshall, as an IPR trustee, to do likewise if possible before he officially assumes his new job. Your own position in this question is peculiarly important and Mr. Swope and I would therefore appreciate it greatly if you could see your way to indicate your belief in the importance of the IPR at this time. Your words of support for us to the Ford Foundation were very influential, even though action on that grant has been postponed pending the forthcoming appointment of a director for the foundation

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 860

12-12-50—PACIFIC COUNCIL OFFICERS

Chairman—Arthur H. Dean, partner, Sullivan & Cromwell, attorneys, New York.
Vice-Chairmen—Edgar McInnis (Canada), Professor of History, University of Toronto.
Paul Emile Naggiar (France), former French Ambassador to the United States.
S. Kitadai (Japan), former President, Reconstruction Finance Bank.
A. B. A. Haleem (Pakistan), President, Sind University.
Manuel Elizalde (Philippines), Elizalde & Co., Manila.
Chairman, Research Committee—Sir George Sanson, Director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York.
Chairman, Finance Committee—Laurence Heyworth, Lever Brothers, London.
Chairman, Program Committee—D. R. Gadgil, Director, Gokhale Institute of Economics and Politics, Poona.
Secretary General—W. L. Holland.

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Nihon Taiheiyo Mondai Chosakai Room 602, Mitsui Sango Kan No. 1, 2-chome, Muromachi Nihombashi, Chuo-ku, Tokyo, Japan	
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Pakistan Institute of International Affairs Frere Hall, Karachi, Pakistan	
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Philippine Council, I. P. R. State Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila, P. I.	
Manuel Elizalde	Quirino Gregorio
U. S. S. R. Council of the I. P. R. Volhonka 14, Moscow, U. S. S. R.	
Eugene Zhukov	
Royal Institute of International Affairs 10, St. Jame's Square London, S. W. 1, England	
Arthur Creech Jones	Ivison S. Macadam
American Institute of Pacific Relations 1 East 54th Street New York 22, N. Y., U. S. A.	
Edward C. Carter	K. R. C. Greene Asst. Secretary

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1 EAST 54 ST., NEW YORK, N. Y.

EXHIBIT No. 861

1 FEBRUARY 1951.

Justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS,
Supreme Court,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR JUSTICE DOUGLAS: I am sending you an advance copy of a preliminary report on the Lucknow Conference, entitled: ASIAN NATIONALISM AND WESTERN POLICIES, containing the rapporteurs' summaries of the discussions and the opening speech by Prime Minister Nehru. I think you will be interested in many of the points brought out in the discussions.

In view of the widespread publicity which the Lucknow Conference evoked in the press of India, Pakistan, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, you will be interested to see the enclosed copy of some of the Soviet news dispatches and radio broadcasts on the Conference.

The IPR is now also distributing copies of the recently published volume *Indian-American Relations* which summarizes the discussions at the India-America Conference held in Delhi in December 1949 under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and the Indian Council of World

Affairs. Many passages in this volume have an important bearing on the present day relationships between India and the United States. The volume also provides a useful companion study to the American IPR's previously published book, *India and the United States* by L. K. Rosinger.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

EXHIBIT No. 862

Ref. FA132

(Penciled:) WLH

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS,
26, Kuo Hui Chich, Peking, China, Mar. 22, 1951.

Mr. S. B. THOMAS,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 E 54th St., New York 22, U. S. A.

DEAR SIR: Your letter addressed to the China Information Bureau has been forwarded to this Press. We noted that you asked for quite a voluminious set of documentary materials pertaining to the local administration of the Republic of China, and also its people's representative organs. As you probably know, this Press has published a lot of those documents in English and other foreign languages and your library has acquired a copy of more of each of these publications. Undoubtedly these cannot meet all your requirements; but we can hardly contribute anything more from our own sources. Of course we will be glad to help you in this connection, but we have to be furnished first with an official letter from your Institute signed by the Secretary-General with which we can more conveniently approach other organisations on your behalf.

Hoping to hear from you again,

Yours sincerely,

V. G. Tseng,
V. G. TSENG,
Circulation Department, Foreign Languages Press.

EXHIBIT No. 863

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y., April 5, 1951.

Mr. V. G. TSENG,
Circulation Department, Foreign Languages Press,
26, Kuo Hui Chich, Peking, China.

DEAR MR. TSENG: In reference to your letter of March 22 to Mr. S. B. Thomas, of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I would like to repeat his request for documentary material on local government in the People's Republic of China. I would be most grateful if you could arrange to send us the texts of important documents (other than those contained in the publications you have already sent us) on the organization, status, and function of organs of local government on the county, municipal, and provincial level.

If the relevant documents have been translated into English or one of the other western languages, we would of course be happy to secure the translated version, but, if not, would very much appreciate procuring the Chinese texts.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General.

WLH:abs

EXHIBIT No. 864

APRIL 12, 1951.

Mr. GEORGE J. BEAL,
Office of the Comptroller, The Rockefeller Foundation,
49 West 49th Street, New York 20, N. Y.

DEAR MR. BEAL: This is to acknowledge with cordial thanks your letter of April 10 enclosing a check for $10,000 for the budget of the Pacific Council of the I. P. R.

In accordance with your request I am enclosing a budget for the American I. P. R. for the period October 1, 1950, to September 30, 1951. Since the American I. P. R. budget is normally made up on a calendar year basis, you will understand that we have had to estimate the enclosed statement by taking the actual figures for the last three months of 1950 and combining them with pro rated budget figures for the first nine months of 1951.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General.

WLH:abs
Enc. 2

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

Budget—Calendar Year 1951

Cash Balance, January 1, 1951	$16,330.93
Receipts:	
Foundations	22,500.00
Membership Contributions	44,394.00
Other Income	400.00
Far Eastern Survey, subscriptions	7,000.00
Royalties	500.00
Total	$91,124.93
Expenditures:	
Administration	$26,202.00
Grant to Pacific Council	9,000.00
Far Eastern Survey	18,885.00
Library	1,650.00
Research	6,400.00
Publications	5,150.00
Conferences & Meetings	3,900.00
Services to Members	4,435.00
Promotion	2,000.00
Total	$77,622.00
Balance to be carried forward 12/31/51	13,502.93
	$91,124.93

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

*Budget—Receipts and Expenditures, October 1, 1950–September 30, 1951***

	Rec & Exp Oct–Dec 1950	Budget Jan–Sept 1951	Total receipts & Expenditures
Cash Balance, October 1, 1950	$5,946.51		$5,946.51
Receipts:			
Foundations	*15,000.00	$16,875.00	31,875.00
Membership contributions	10,635.00	33,295.50	43,930.50
Other Income	10.05	300.00	310.05
Far Eastern Survey, subscriptions	2,374.42	5,250.00	7,624.42
Royalties	164.38	375.00	539.38
Total	$34,130.36	$56,095.50	$90,225.86
Disbursements:			
Administration	$5,844.62	$19,651.50	$25,496.12
Grand to Pacific Council	4,000.00	6,750.00	10,750.00
Research	1,644.73	4,800.00	6,444.73
Conferences & Meetings	1,285.07	2,925.00	4,210.07
Library	325.02	1,237.50	1,562.52
Services to Members	739.56	3,326.25	4,065.81
Publications	155.00	3,862.50	4,017.50
Far Eastern Survey	3,751.76	14,163.75	17,915.51
Promotion	53.67	1,500.00	1,553.67
	$17,799.43	$58,216.50	$76,015.93
Cash Balance, December 31, 1950	*16,330.93		
September 30, 1951 (to be carried forward)			14,209.93
Total	$34,130.36	$58,216.50	$90,225.86

*$7,500 of this amount earmarked for 1951.
**Oct. 1, 1950–December 31, 1950, receipts and expenditures based on actual figures.
Jan. 1, 1951–Sept. 30, 1951 prorated on basis of budget for the year 1951.

EXHIBIT No. 865

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION,
49 West 49th Street, New York 20, April 10, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
One East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: We are enclosing herewith our check for $10,000, covering the balance available for the period ending December 31, 1951, under appropriation RF 50092 to the Pacific Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, toward the general budget.

We note that the budget for the year 1951 under our appropriation RF 50090 to the American Institute of Pacific Relations totals $77,622.00. Before making further payments under this grant, we would appreciate receiving a budget for the year beginning October 1, 1950. In connection with your requirements for this period, a check in the amount of $15,000 was forwarded to you in accordance with the request in your letter of October 3, 1950.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE J. BEAL.

fg
Enclosure—1 Check

EXHIBIT No. 866

AUGUST 14, 1951.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
The Dodge Hotel,
20 E Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CARTER: To refresh your memory for the hearing on Thursday, here is my recollection of the memo I wrote you on September 1940 from Berkeley about Phil's forthcoming trip to Shanghai. The Phil, of course, is Phil Lilienthal, at that time my research assistant working with me in Berkeley. We sent him out to Shanghai to supervise the publication of a large number of IPR

studies which we planned to have printed in Shanghai by Kelly & Walsh. In my memo, I was obviously telling you about the manuscripts he would be taking with him.

Morris possibly thinks Phil is either Jessup or Jaffe.

If you are asked why I said secret messages should be sent to Lilienthal in care of Herb Norman in Tokyo, I hope you will say it was a perfectly normal thing and meant only that there might be some question (e. g., relating to the China IPR or to the Inquiry Series) which we didn't want to come to the attention of the Japanese IPR office, which was Lilienthal's ordinary mailing address in Tokyo. At that time, the Japanese were opposing our plan to go ahead with the Inquiry Series and were also criticizing the Secretariat as being too pro-Chinese.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

WLH : abs

EXHIBIT No. 889

js.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as Exhibit Z. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am satisfied that these documents, subject to the comments noted below, are letters or memoranda received by me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me to others or photostatic copies of such copies:

Document	*Comment*
1. ATOMIC ENERGY AND U. S. INT. POLICY. Summary of a Round-table Conf. under joint auspices of IPR and S. F. International Center. JAN. 1946. File No. 122.41.	I was not present at the meeting described in this document, nor do I know by whom this document was prepared.
7. Harriet Moore, Edward C. Carter. March 2, 1943. File No. 500.38.	The second page of this document is a memorandum to me from HM. This memorandum appears to have no relation to the first page of this document.
9. W. L. Holland, Edward C. Carter. March 26, 1943. File No. 100.402.	The second memorandum set forth on this document appears to be incomplete.
16. Invitation list of May 8 meeting--	The date of the meeting referred to is May *6*.
46. Raymond Dennett (Return to). Report on Washington Office Dec. 1943–March 1945. File No. 122.37.	I do not know whether or not I have seen these documents before. Neither of them was prepared by me or addressed to me.
47. MAS RY (Report) April 16, 1945. File No. 122.37.	

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Sworn to before me this 9th day of May, 1952.

[SEAL]

IRENE R. DONOHUE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Qualified in Queens County No. 41–6061300. Certs. filed with Queens, Kings, New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs. Offices, Westchester & Nassau Co. Clerks Offices. Commission Expires March 30, 1954.

(The documents referred to by Mr. Carter are exhibits Nos. 901, 907, 909, 916, 946, and 947.)

EXHIBIT No. 900

To—	From—	Date	File Number	Exhibit Number
ATOMIC ENERGY AND U. S. INT. POLICY. Summary of a Roundtable Conf. under joint auspices of IPR and S. F. International Center.		Jan. 1946	122.41	901
Frederick V. Field	E. C. Carter	1/29/43	500.34	902
Edgar J. Tarr	E. C. Carter	2/ 3/43	500.35	903
W. L. Holland and Background information "The Strength of the Muslim League in India."	E. C. Carter	3/ 1/43	131B.43	905
Misses Carter	E. C. Carter	3/ 1/43	100.186	906
Harriet Moore	E. C. Carter	3/ 2/43	500.38	907
W. L. Holland	E. C. Carter	3/18/43	119.78	908
W. L. Holland	E. C. Carter	3/26/43	100.402	909
Mabel Carter	E. C. Carter	4/ 1/43	119.83	910
Richard J. Walsh	E. C. Carter	4/12/43	107.55	911
Henry C. Alexander	E. C. Carter	4/12/43	100.183	912
E. C. Carter	John L. Christian	4/13/43	131B.29	913
E. C. Carter	M. W. Pettigrew	4/ 1/43		914
Capt. John L. Christian	E. C. Carter	4/ 5/43		915
Invitation list of May 8 meeting				916
E. C. Carter	M. W. Pettigrew	4/29/43	131B.32	917
E. C. Carter	Alger Hiss	4/30/43	191.263	918
E. C. Carter	Truman M. Martin	5/ 1/43	131B.31	919
Col. Truman M. Martin	E. C. Carter	5/ 4/43	131B.30	920
W. W. Lockwood	E. C. Carter	5/10/43	119.151	921
E. C. Carter	Wm. C. Johnstone	5/21/43	191.25	922
Mortimer Graves	E. C. Carter	6/ 7/43	100.164	923
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/ 9/43	119.118	924
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/15/43	500.39	925
Invitation list of 3rd Collective Security Meeting in the Pacific and Far East and list of those invited with notations.		6/17/43	119.8	926
Milo Perkins	E. C. Carter	5/26/42		927
E. C. Carter	Milo Perkins	6/20/42		928
Milo Perkins—draft to				929
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/28/43	119.70	930
Constantine Oumansky	E. C. Carter	7/14/43	500.40	931
Constantine Oumansky	E. C. Carter	6/30/43	500.42	932
John A. Carter	E. C. Carter	7/18/43	100.187	933
Mr. & Mrs. Constantine Oumansky	E. C. Carter	7/20/43	500.43	934
Mrs. Maxim Litvinoff	E. C. Carter	7/20/43	500.44	935
Eugene D. Kisselev	E. C. Carter	7/20/43	500.45	936
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter's secretary	8/ 4/43	119.68	937
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	8/ 1/43		938
E. C. Carter	W. D. "Bill" Carter	8/23/43	119.30	939
William D. Carter	E. C. Carter	10/15/43	119.76	940
Dr. Robt. J. Kerner	E. C. Carter	11/ 4/43	105.174	941
Misses Carter	E. C. Carter	11/ 8/43	100.185	942
Andrew Grajdanzev	E. C. Carter	11/13/43	100 163	943
John Carter	E. C. Carter	11/15/43	100.188	944
Kate Mitchell	E. C. Carter	11/15/43	131B.161	945
Raymond Dennett (Return to Report on Washington Office, Dec. 1943–March 1945.)			122.37	946
MAS	RY (Report)	4/16/45	122.37	947
Andrews J. Grajdanzev	E. C. Carter	12/13/43	100.162	948
Secretary, Lithuanian Legation	E. C. Carter	12/22/43	100.202	949
E. C. Carter	K. C. Li	3/ 7/44	119.28	950
Selective Service Board #53	K. C. Li	3/ 7/44		951
Notes for Cleveland Speech	Carter	3/31/44	100.302	952
Speech "Soviet Russia's Contribution to Peace."	Carter	4/14/44	100.289	953
E. C. Carter	Ray Dennett	1/ 7/45	122.40	954
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	2/10/45	102.43	956
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	6/ 6/45	102.42	957
E. C. Carter	Ray Dennett	6/18/45	500.36	958
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	6/20/45	102.39	959
E. C. Carter	Owen Lattimore	6/25/45	500.41	960
Ray Dennett	E. C. Carter	9/13/45	122.38	961
Ray Dennett	RDC	9/26/45		962
Notes on Mr. Carter's finances of trip		10/19/45	100.283	963
E. C. Carter	Ray Dennett	11/19/45	119.135	964

EXHIBIT No. 901

ATOMIC ENERGY AND UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL POLICY

SUMMARY OF A ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE

Under joint auspices of Institute of Pacific Relations, 417 Market Street, San Francisco 5, YUkon 1570; and San Francisco International Center, 68 Post Street, San Francisco 4, DOuglas 2273. January 1946

(On December 29, 1945, the Institute of Pacific Relations and the San Francisco International Center held a round-table conference running through the day on atomic energy and its international implications. Attending the conference were physical scientists, some of whom had contributed to the development of the atomic bomb; social scientists, journalists; officers of the United States armed services; and persons active in women's groups, labor groups, and groups interested in international relations. The agenda and a list of participants appear at the end of this summary.)

THE FACTS ABOUT THE BOMB

The moderator opened the discussion by asking whether the scientists present were agreed on the following five points which seemed to him to emerge from what the public had heard about the atomic bomb: (1) that the bomb in its present state of development was capable of enormous destruction and that "improvements" in the future would almost certainly make it very much more destructive; (2) that secrecy at best was only a temporary protection for the United States because other countries would probably develop atomic bombs shortly; (3) that the raw materials necessary for atomic bomb production were readily available to all great powers and many smaller powers; (4) that the cost was not prohibitive; and (5) that no adequate defense against atomic bombs existed at present or was likely to be found soon.

Recently, however, the moderator had read statements attributed to a high military authority that cast doubt on some of these conclusions. The talk about a push-button war, according to these statements, was exaggerated. The people of this country had no need to fear being atomized by a hostile power. Washington, D. C., would not be bombed during the lifetime of most people now living because the United States had the production and engineering know-how to build the bomb, which other countries lacked. These factors were just as essential in the making of the bomb as the scientific contributions. The military authority was said to have declared that the scientists were not engineering experts and therefore were not qualified to judge the time required for other nations to produce the bomb.

A scientist who had contributed to the development of the bomb declared that he agreed with the five points put forward by the moderator. The bomb had tremendous destructive power at present and was susceptible of great development. He suggested the possibility that in the future atomic energy would have other wartime applications than its original use in blasting Japanese cities. Radioactive materials might be used, for example, against personnel and agriculture. To keep the scientific principles behind the bomb from being known in other nations was impossible. Moreover, these principles were the critical elements in its making. The scientists themselves had suggested much of the engineering that went into the making of the bomb. And, since the need for speed was paramount, practically all of the devices and techniques used were taken from other operating industries. Any advanced industrial nation could get the raw materials—uranium and thorium were well scattered over the world—and make a bomb in reasonable time. No effective defense exists now nor seems likely in future.

A second scientist who had contributed to the making of the bomb agreed. In his opinion, quite possibly the present state of the bomb was to its future development as the muzzle-loading cannon was to present-day artillery. A policy of secrecy would only spur on development of the bomb in other countries, now that the United States had proved its production feasible. For the fundamental secret was released when the bomb was dropped—namely, that atomic energy could be harnessed for destruction. Much additional information was contained in the official Smyth report. Several different methods were available at each stage of the bomb's manufacture, and foreign nations would probably not be

forced to make the same mistakes we did in its hurried development in wartime.

Another scientist suggested that in peacetime the development of the bomb might go on faster in the Soviet Union than in the United States. For the U. S. S. R. seems to support its scientists more wholeheartedly than this nation does. Money was no object on a state-supported project, the scientists being given everything they needed to produce the desired results. As for secrecy, that was a hope unjustified by the facts of scientific life.

THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION

What is the state of American public opinion about the bomb? the moderator questioned. Are the people fully and accurately informed about the matter, and are they reacting in a way that will eventuate in reaching rational solutions to the problems of the new atomic age?

One word describes the present public mind about atomic energy, a journalist replied, and that word is *fear*. The public may have a fuzzy hope that international peace can be obtained by international agreement, but that feeling is secondary to an almost universal fear—a fear that other powers will get the bomb and will use it. And out of that fear comes an instinctive reaction on the part of the public that we can and should keep the bomb a secret, and through its possession write the world ticket for the future. One of the greatest needs of the hour, he continued, is for a great amount of public education and information, and that as rapidly as possible.

Will public opinion support the cession of a part of our sovereignty in order to make international control of atomic power possible? a scientist asked. There is no indication, a journalist answered, that the public today has even the foggiest notion of what such regulation will do to our sovereignty. Without that understanding, how can the people answer the question of whether they would be willing to surrender a part of it? A physicist commented that, unfortunately, with such a state of public opinion, some of our better Senators, who are constantly asking how much of the wise and decent thing they can "get away with," will not feel constrained to fight very hard for intelligent action.

A social scientist observed that at a closed meeting of business men in New York recently a high official of the army argued for keeping the bomb as a power instrument and the audience had seemed to agree with his arguments. A labor educator queried whether the May-Johnson bill with its reactionary insistence on secrecy and tight national control was still the official policy of the military. Or are the armed forces willing to follow the Moscow agreement, which alters the May-Johnson concepts? There has not been and is not now an official military policy, an officer of the armed services replied. That is a matter for the people of the United States to decide. Another officer concurred. And to aid the people to decide intelligently, it was generally agreed by all present, an immediate national campaign of education on the facts of the bomb and its implications for the future was vitally needed.

THE STATE OF FOREIGN OPINION

The moderator read a newspaper dispatch from Moscow giving "man in the street" interviews on the atomic bomb. A 38-year-old woman, a dressmaker, had said she wished the bomb had never been invented. She was afraid that the attempt of the United States to monopolize it would not be in the interests of the people of the world. And, she added, she hoped the inventors of the bomb would find no peace on this earth! Was this typical of foreign opinion, asked the moderator?

An educator recently back from a United Nations meeting replied that he was afraid it was. All over the world there was a sweeping feeling that peoples and nations must cooperate culturally, politically, and in every way if civilization were to continue. People felt that it was impossible to keep the atomic bomb the secret possession of the United States, and that it would be undesirable if it were possible. For that would lead to suspicion and armed competition, which would be the final disaster. All during the war Europe has been socially as well as politically isolated. We should take immediate advantage of this emotional desire by removing all obstructions from the free interchange of technical, political, artistic and literary ideas. A scientist agreed that one of the most immediate needs was the launching of such a widespread intercultural program to encourage free interchange of all types of information, including information related to potential military weapons.

CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

A labor member stated that he understood we were continuing to make atomic bombs. Why are we still making them, and against whom are we planning to use them, he queried? Is this not a threat to all other nations and to the successful construction of a working international organization?

A scientist replied that it would be a fine thing if we stopped making them immediately. But a college official disagreed. As long as we maintain an army for future wars that army should be as efficient as possible and should have the best tools of destruction available. He remembered that he personally had been against the fortification of Guam before the recent war and had lived to regret deeply his stand. Only with effective international control and policemen would he be willing to see this nation disarm atomically.

An officer of the armed services observed that perhaps international control was not the only solution to the problem. He suggested that the United States could possibly stop future wars by maintaining its superiority in atomic research and by building up such an overwhelming stockpile of atomic bombs that it would be foolhardy for another nation to attack us. One of the principal reasons why gas was not used against us in the recent war, he observed, was that we had more of it than the Germans did.

Disagreeing, a scientist replied that we could not be at all sure that we could continue our superiority in either the research for, or the production of, atomic bombs. The development of science is one of the most unpredictable things on this earth. But even if we did remain superior, this policy would lead straight to an armaments race and catastrophe.

A second officer of the armed services added that if atomic bombs were still being manufactured it should be remembered that they were being made with the explicit approval of the President, who was in a much better position to know about our possible future military needs than anyone sitting in this room. Apparently, a journalist added, the President is supported by public opinion. For the public obviously believes that another war is not only possible but probable, and because of that conviction it demands that we have the best engines of destruction in the world.

Whether this nation should stop making atomic bombs immediately or only after international control has been evolved was a moot question as was the question of revealing or not revealing such "secrets" as we still possess. But there was little doubt in the majority of minds about the need for positive and immediate action in organizing some type of workable international control. As one social scientist put it, this is a time of tragic urgency. Unless we solve this problem now, we shall inevitably drift into an atomic arms race, the catastrophic effects of which are all too foreseeable. Agreed to also was the remark of a physicist that the war just ended was the "last victory" on this earth. In any future major war the great cities on both sides will be destroyed and millions of people will be annihilated. "Victory" will be a purely relative matter, of who has the most survivors and the greatest capacity and will to fight on.

INSPECTION

Granted some form of world organization, is international control of atomic energy, backed by an effective inspection system, technically possible, the moderator questioned?

A scientist replied that he had no doubt about it, if the participating countries honestly attempted to enforce it. Atomic bombs cannot be made in an abandoned cellar. Their manufacture requires elaborate machinery and laboratory equipment, which are readily detectable. But, a journalist added, inspection of atomic energy was not enough. The world is now in a feverish race, not alone in atomic weapons but in all types of new and deadly armaments. Jet planes, gas turbines, supersonic speeds and push-button rockets are all being developed. Consequently, there would have to be inspection of all types of armament. The fundamental problem was to stop the outbreak of war. For once hostilities started, and international control was abandoned, the atom bomb could be made by any major nation and would undoubtedly be used.

A social scientist, who had worked for a number of years with the League of Nations, was of the opinion that the technical problem of inspection would not be too difficult, judging from the experience with the control of opium. One possible safeguard, for example, was a free interchange of information. The refusal of any country to make evidence available could be construed as *prima*

facie evidence of something wrong. The problem was really political, not technical. But because it was political it was perhaps more difficult to solve. Certainly, a tremendous revolution in our ways of thought and action would have to precede or accompany the adoption of a genuine inspection system. For that would mean opening every industrial laboratory and every factory door in the world to the official inspectors. It was obvious that our concepts of secrecy by competitive industries and our theory of patents might offer obstacles to such a development.

A scientist interjected that efficient inspection would have to be in some instances by visit and search. We could no longer rely on the negative safeguard of a scientist's desire to publish. Most of the research done in this country today was done not in the university laboratory where publication always had been and is automatic, except where the government steepped in. But rather it was done in industrial laboratories where the emphasis was upon withholding information from possible competitors. In some instances that condition had greatly changed the traditional concept of freedom in science.

Would the various nations of the world, for example the U. S. S. R., accept international inspection, the moderator asked?

A member who had devoted particular study to the U. S. S. R. replied that in the first international meeting of scientists since the war the Russians held nothing back. The desire of the U. S. S. R. for secrecy is commensurate with their feeling of insecurity. Once the U. S. S. R. feels secure from military invasion, he thought, it will be completely willing to exchange any and all information.

But would not a system of thoroughgoing international inspection mean a drastic change in the Russian way of doing things and be harder for them to accept than for us, a scientist queried?

A military officer thought not. Once the Russian government accepted it, the whole nation would accept it . For the Russians are accustomed to such inspection from above. Private industry in the United States, on the contrary, is not. Even if our government did officially accept such a system, it would meet with great opposition in practice by private corporations throughout the country.

A journalist agreed. If the General Motors Corporation will not open its books to a government committee on prices and wages, it is probable that it will object strenuously to opening its laboratories and factories to foreign inspectors. International inspection clearly means a sweeping change in our ideas about private enterprise and private gain through the use of private information.

But, several members interposed, the information obtained could be held confidential by the international inspectors. After all, we have had inspection by income tax authorities and various government enforcement agencies for a long time. The Department of Commerce regularly gets statistical information from business firms which it agrees not to publish except as industry totals.

Should not the United Nations Organization run some atomic laboratories of its own, the moderator asked? It could invite all the world's leading scientists to work in these laboratories from time to time. In that way the UNO would know more about atomic energy than any single nation in the world, and full disclosure and interchange of new developments would be more assured.

There seems to be no intention to do that, replied an educator just returned from a UNO meeting. For one thing, it would cost too much, and the resulting huge budget would imperil the life of the entire organization. No, the answer lies in world control and inspection. And our willingness, or lack of it, to accept inspection will be a test of whether we are acting in entire good faith in our efforts to build a world dedicated to amity and security for all peoples.

We should be extremely careful about vetoing any proposition aiding control and inspection, even though it concerns what we believe to be our own business, a social scientist added, or it may set a precedent we might live to regret. New Zealand objected to a League committee investigating a local squabble with the natives in one of their mandated territories. On the basis of that precedent the League was barred from investigating the state of things in the Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific.

I am ready to accept whatever changes in our life effective control of atomic power necessitates, a journalist stated. I would much rather welcome a Russian inspector representing the United Nations, than a Russian atomic bomb.

THE PREVENTION OF WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

The next question the moderator posed was whether the present structure of the United Nations Organization was adequate to fulfill its mission in an atomic world. Should the veto power reserved by the five great nations be altered? Many people of world importance, including some statesmen, think that the veto power and the control of the atomic bomb are irreconcilable. Some, indeed, feel that we must have a world state now with plenary powers if we are to preserve our present civilization from disaster.

A social scientist answered that it was a proper procedure to place the responsibility for the control of the atomic bomb squarely on the backs of the great powers. The idea that all nations large and small should be given equal representation and power in an international body has come from all the nonsense that has been thought and written about sovereignty. To give a nation of five million inhabitants as much power as a nation with one hundred and seventy-five millions could not be considered democratic. Modern wars are started by conflict between the great powers. And it does not make any difference to an aggressor nation whether it is outvoted four to one or forty to one. The abolition of the veto power would at this time simply enlarge the sphere of possible disharmony among the major nations.

Accepting this as true, a scientist believed that the veto power was necessary under present circumstances. The public, he felt, is not ready to discuss the veto power, because it seemed to be beside the point. What is needed immediately is not new machinery but agreement among the great powers.

A college administrator added that the reason why no one at the meeting was willing to speak for the abolition of the veto was that everyone recognized that our present popular belief in national sovereignty would make it impossible for either the U. S. S. R. or our own Senate to agree to such a step. We have this fixation about sovereignty and we have to live with it at least a little while longer.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Throughout the meeting, the moderator had observed numerous references to the U. S. S. R. when the members had speculated on the possibility of keeping the peace. Apparently, in common with many other people in this country, the members of this group felt that the greatest potential danger to the peace of the future lies in the possibility of deteriorating relations between the United States and Russia. The moderator realized that many people in this nation are worried, for example, about the Russian policy toward the smaller states neighboring her. Occasionally there is also a fear expressed in this country that the Red army may take over the control of the Russian state. And these fears of ours are also undoubtedly reciprocated by Russian fears about the policy of the United States. What then can be done here and in Russia to encourage continuing good relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R.?

One of the best ways to quiet our fears, a labor educator suggested, is to study and inform ourselves about the structure and the present condition of the U. S. S. R. If we do, we will know that the Red army comes from the people, is part of the people, and therefore offers no threat of any such military domination of the government. We will also know that there are one million amputees in Russia today who have lost an arm or a leg, and that they together with all the Russian people have but one desire internationally—and that is lasting peace. We should also find out by study that there never have been and are not now any irreconcilable conflicts of interest between this nation and the U. S. S. R.

An officer of the armed forces suggested that perhaps we could use the atomic bomb as a bargaining counter with Russia to get the things we want internationally and to obtain a foolproof international organization. To this a scientist objected that the bomb gives no bargaining power, or very little. Within five years or so the Russians will probably be able to make atomic bombs. In the meantime, we are not going to make war upon them. The people of this country could not be persuaded to enter another war in the next five year by any government, unless we were attacked. They just would not support a war, and the Russian government knows that.

A modification of Russian restrictions on the press would help our relations, a journalist volunteered. There is as much need for international freedom of the press as there is for free world science.

What about looking at our own newspapers, a civic leader interjected, at our own schools, radio, and movies? Depending upon the definition, we may have a free press; but does it express national opinion? Judging from the campaigns of the last three presidential elections, she thought not. It may be free, but it certainly is not a responsible press. Many people want Russia to adopt a free press, but would they want Russia to adopt the policies of some of the newspapers in this country?

Obviously, a scientist added, the United States and the USSR in the future are going to compete for the moral leadership of the world in the name of democracy. They may mean different things by democracy, but neither of them is using anti-democratic propaganda as the Nazis were. That is important, for perhaps one system does not have to swallow the other. Perhaps both will be modified toward a common mean.

Why do they have to be modified to be accepted by each other, an educator asked? Is it not possible that cultural pluralism can exist in the world without war? If we cannot accept the fact of cultural pluralism, then we certainly are on the broad highway to another world war.

This argument was quickly supported by a college official. Reasoning by analogies is dangerous, he admitted, but four hundred years ago most of the civilized world was killing one another because of religious differences. When both sides were convinced they could not win they stopped the killing and accepted the fact of religious pluralism. And types of religion meant as much to the seventeenth-century European as types of economics to the man in the street today.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW

A few thousand scientists created this problem of atomic energy, the moderator stated, but millions of people all over the world have to participate in solving it. What can be done in the immediate future to dispel their suspicion of one another and to create both the will and the ability among them to answer these many difficult questions which we have been discussing?

For one thing, replied a scientist who had worked on the bomb, our own country can take the lead in allaying suspicion by abandoning production of atomic weapons. (There was no agreement on the timing of this move, some holding that international acceptance of an adequate control system should precede such a step.) Secondly, the scientist continued, we might supply atomic power plants to nations who do not now have the needed power to develop their raw materials. One operating uranium pile in China might be convincing testimony to the Chinese, as well as the rest of the world, that we do not intend to monopolize atomic power for our own selfish national interests.

The National Academy of Science might also further the interests of world peace, a social scientist suggested, by reciprocating Russia's recent gesture and inviting the scientists of the world to a conference in the United States to discuss recent scientific progress and research. Why only science, an officer of the armed forces asked? Why not call a world conference to talk over the whole field of human culture and endeavor?

A college official objected that as an educator, he was dubious about persuading people through intellectual means rapidly enough to solve the great problems confronting us. Through the use of symbols we might work faster and more effectively in the emotional realm. One of the most powerful of our symbols is the flag. Why not start a United Nations flag movement. A flag, together with other types of persuasion, might help to create what we really need—a new area of sovereignty, a world sovereignty.

An officer of the armed forces intervened. One of the most fundamental things we can do in creating an attitude receptive to world organization and enduring peace is to obtain an adequate standard of living for everyone. As we oppose legislation in this nation calculated to assist the rest of the world to increase its capacity to produce and to raise the world standard of living we are opposing world peace. And as we support it we are supporting world peace. An economist signified hearty agreement.

A most essential role in educating the public and in changing public attitudes, a journalist declared, will be played by the scientists. At no time in the past has the prestige of the scientists been higher with the American public. If they remain out of their laboratory shells and continue their activity on the

platform and in the press as they have recently done, the educational job will be far less difficult to perform. They should not confine their remarks to the technical aspects of these questions, but, as in this meeting, take the responsibility of discussing publicly at every opportunity all of the social implications of their discoveries.

A scientist replied that two organizations made up of scientists had already been formed in the state of California to work for the proper world control of atomic power. Other groups of scientists were active in other parts of the country and were federating nationally. An association for the international control of atomic energy, to include both scientists and nonscientists, had recently been launched in this vicinity.

The organization of such small groups all over the nation should be encouraged, a social scientist concluded. It gives the movement for international control a grass roots flavor and is in the great tradition of American democracy. But that is not enough. If these small groups are not organized into a coordinated national movement for education and action, their energies will be dissipated. What is needed today is a national campaign, and indeed a world campaign. There already exist in this nation several strong and active national organizations concerned with the maintenance of world peace. By federating with and supporting these organizations, local groups all over the country can best bring about their desire to harness atomic power for the constructive use of mankind.

GEORGE E. MOWRY,
Rapporteur.

THE AGENDA USED BY THE CONFERENCE

I. THE SITUATION

A. Testimony of scientists on destructiveness of atomic weapons; on probable time required for other powers to have them regardless of secrecy; on future development possibilities.
B. Official policy proposals and negotiations to date.
C. The present state of public opinion, as gauged by opinion polls, by pronouncements of various groups, and in other ways.
D. Official and unofficial reactions in other countries.
E. Conclusions: How urgent is the problem posed by the situation thus revealed?

In view of the fact that all participants have by now considerable background information, a relatively brief time will be spent on Topic I.

II. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

A. Control of atomic weapons.
   1. National control? Probable consequences of atomic armaments competition.
   2. International control?
      a. Methods and feasibility of inspection system.
      b. Political problems, including relation to United Nations Organization.
B. The prevention of war.
   1. The United Nations Organization. What changes, if any, in the Charter and in United States policy toward the Organization are needed in in the light of atomic weapons?
   2. Improvement of relations with other great powers, especially the U. S. S. R. What can be done about the distrust that exists?
   3. The issue of "world government." How and when?
C. Re-examination of United States military defense policies.
   1. Foreseeable effects of atomic weapons on military strategy and on comparative power positions.
   2. The relation of atomic weapons to such issues as:
      a. Universal peacetime military training.
      b. Naval policy and naval bases.
      c. Scientific research and mobilization of scientists.

III. HOW TO GET DONE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

A. The problem of public support for constructive policies in relation to atomic weapons.
B. What specific methods are available for education of the public, especially on the West Coast, to the real issues involved and to the needs for positive action?

List of Participants

Bloch, Felix, Physics Department, Stanford University
Boardman, T. D., International Center
Brewer, Leo, Chemistry Department, University of California
Clark, Mrs. Warner, International Center
Condliffe, John B., Economics Department, University of California
Cowell, Mrs. Olive Thompson, Social Science Department, San Francisco State College
Douglas, Mrs. W. W., League of Women Voters
Edwards, Paul C., Associate Editor, San Francisco News
Elkus, Mrs. Charles de Young, Jr., Columbia Foundation
Elliott, Robert C., San Francisco News
Greenslade, Admiral John W., USN (ret.)
Hacke, Mrs. Harold, League of Women Voters
Isaacs, Lt. Col. Irwin M., USA
Kirkpatrick, Paul H., School of Physical Sciences, Stanford University
Kefauver, Grayson N., Department of Education, Stanford University
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred, Institute of Pacific Relations
McWilliams, Mrs. Robert, International Center
Merner, Garfield D.
Mowry, George E. (Rapporteur) History Department, Mills College
Oppenheimer, Frank, Radiation Laboratory, University of California
Phillips, Miss Lillian M., Women's Action Committee
Roberts, Holland, California Labor School
Tilton, Mrs. L. Deming, League of Women Voters
Webster, David L., Physics Department, Stanford University
Weinberg, Joseph W., Physics Department, University of California
Wheeler, Oliver P., Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
White, Dr. Lynn, Jr., President, Mills College
Wickett, Fred A., Institute of Pacific Relations
Wickett, Walton A., California Laboratories
Wilbur, Brig. Gen. Wm. H., USA

Selected Reading List

(All items listed are available in the libraries of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 417 Market Street, or the International Center, 68 Post Street, San Francisco. Those marked with an asterisk were circulated to conference participants in advance.)

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*Smyth, Henry Dewolf. *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945.

EXHIBIT No. 902

129 EAST 52ND ST., NEW YORK CITY, *January 29, 1945.*

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
16 West 12th Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: This is to thank you most sincerely for your extraordinarily helpful letter of January 26th. I think I agree with practically every one of the criticisms that you have made. If we could have managed to shape the conference in advance along the lines which we now in retrospect see would have been desirable, the results would, I believe, have been even more substantial. The analysis that you have made means that we must now in the series of continuation conferences and discussion groups which we are now planning and which you suggested at Mont Tremblant endeavor to achieve some of those things which we failed to achieve at Mont Tremblant. In this we will be looking to you for constant suggestion and leadership.

Thanks to your excellent suggestion, yesterday we had Castro to lunch. Lockwood and Holland and I all found him most charming, stimulating and intelligent. We are giving him letters of introduction to friends in Delhi and Chungking and arranging for him to meet a number of Chinese in New York and Washington and in addition a circle of Americans who know China in both cities.

He has made excellent suggestions for multiplying our contacts in Mexico itself.

Be sure that I meet Tolefano when he comes to New York.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 903

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
February 3, 1943.

Mr. EDGAR J. TARR,
Chatean Laurier, Ottawa, Canada.

DEAR TARR: On Wednesday evening, February 10th, subject to your approval, I am planning to take you to a dinner to the great Mexican labor leader, Vincenta Lombard Toledano who is one of the most forceful, intelligent, and liberal leaders in Mexico and is President of the Confederation of Latin American Workers. The dinner is sponsored by the C. I. O. It will give you opportunity of meeting someone who would be essential in building an I. P. R. in Mexico. It will also give you an opportunity of seeing at first hand, progressive New York City workers en masse.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 905

MARCH 1, 1943.

WLH.
KM from ECC:

The private document prepared in Washington on the Strength of the Muslim League has come into my hands. It is not available for quotation, nor should any reference by made to it. I thought, however, that you might be interested in seeing it, so I have had copies made. I don't think that it covers the ground, but it does contain one or two interesting points.

164/No. 4/2/1/43

Background information

THE STRENGTH OF THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IN INDIA

MR. JINNAH'S POSITION

Mr. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League has recently been carrying on a vigorous political drive.

His visit to the Punjab showed the extent to which he has secured contact with the Muslim masses. It can no longer be argued that because at the General Elections it was not able to secure a majority of the Muslim votes in any Province, the Muslim League has no following among the masses. Since 1937, accession to the Muslim League's and Mr. Jinnah's strength has been tremendous. Almost every bye-election in Muslim constituencies has been won by the League and the number of Muslim League members in the various Provincial Legislatures has increased manifold.

The number of Muslim Ministers who now owe allegiance to the League is considerable. The latest accession has come from Sind. Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, who succeeded Mr. Allah Bux, has joined the League and his example has since been followed by all the Sind Muslim Ministers. Here is a survey of the Muslim League position in the Muslim majority Provinces:

PUNJAB

The total number of Muslim Members in the Punjab Legislative Assembly is 89. Only one out of these was elected on Muslim League ticket in the General Elections of 1937. The number of Muslims elected on Unionist tickets was 77. All Muslim members of the Unionist Party are, however, now members of the Muslim League under what is known as the Sikander-Jinnah Pact of 1938. The main terms of the Pact were that the Unionist Party's Leader, the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, with all his Muslim followers in the Assembly should join the League and promise support to it in all Indian constitutional questions. Mr. Jinnah agreed on his part that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party would have freedom in Provincial matters and would be free to pursue the Unionist Party program.

The political complexion of the Punjab made it necessary for the late Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Prime Minister, not to form a Muslim League Government but a Unionist Government in coalition with Hindu and Sikh groups. In all Provincial matters he pursued a more or less independent line and, though professing allegiance to the League and Mr. Jinnah, his policy on all-Indian questions was at times embarrassingly independent of the League. On the other hand, Sir Sikander never openly flouted any league mandate and he resigned from the National Defence Council when required by the League.

The *Civil and Military* Gazette of Lahore recently wrote: "What is consistently ignored is the fact that Mr. Jinnah and Sir Sikander are mutually dependent; their common fundamental purpose must override differences arising from the admitted diversity of their 'spheres of influence.' Whatever their personal predilections, circumstances must force the Muslim League President and the Premier of the Punjab (so long as he is a Muslim) to run in double harness until India's future is hammered out; and that Constitution may conceivably effect even closer cooperation between them."

Mr. Jinnah's recent Punjab tour monopolised public attention, not only because of his public utterances on topical questions, but also because of the object underlying his visit. Recent attempts made by the Punjab Premier to settle the communal problem in that part of the country on a Provincial basis irrespective of an all-Indian agreement, must doubtless have caused anxiety to Mr. Jinnah. The formula favored by Sir Sikander, according to most reports, conceded self-

determination to the Hindu and Sikh minorities in the event of a Muslim plebiscite deciding in favor of secession in a postwar settlement. The minorities may form a separate State or join the main Indian Union. Negotiations went on for some time amongst the various parties but ultimately broke down or were adjourned because it was said that the Hindus wished to consult the Mahasabha.

Soon after, Mr. Jinnah arrived in the Punjab and in his first public utterance made a pointed reference to the main basis of the scheme without naming it and condemned the move to give the right of self-determination to "Sub-National" groups like the Hindus and the Sikhs in the Punjab and the Muslims in the United Provinces.

He further tried to win over the Sikhs to his conception of Pakistan by reassuring them that their interests would be safe under a Muslim State. This failed, by Mr. Jinnah succeeded in scotching the "Mischievious idea," as he described it, of a purely Provincial settlement of the communal problem and laid down that "no settlement is worth the paper on which it is written either in the Punjab or elsewhere, so far as Muslims are concerned, except with the Muslim League."

Later, Mr. Jinnah in another speech said that he had not referred to the Sikander formula, which he had not even studied in his earlier speech. This enabled Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to make a rapprochement with Mr. Jinnah and declare himself to be a loyal supporter of the Muslim League. If there were any differences between Sir Sikander and Mr. Jinnah, it was explained, they related more to the method than to the policy and program of the Muslim League and were intended solely to further its aims and ideals.

Attempts have lately been made to show that the Sikander formula is in accordance with the League's resolution on Pakistan which visualised territorial adjustments. The formula allowed this in accordance with the desires of the communities concerned and to that extent unintentionally conceded the right of self-determination to the Hindues and the Sikhs. However, the problem is no more a live issue. Mr. Jinnah has applied the damper and as a result of his visit to the Punjab he is back again in the position he occupied prior to Sir Sikander's attempt.

The death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan on December 26th was regarded by the New York Times Correspondent (N. Y. T. Dec. 29) as considerably strengthening Mr. Jinnah's position by removing the only Muslim figure important enough to challenge him.

BENGAL

Out of a total of 123 Muslim members in the Bengal Assembly and 30 in the Legislative Council, 43 and 11 members, respectively, follow the Muslim League.

Mr. Fazlul Haq, the Premier of Bengal, who has been a member of the Muslim League since 1918, resigned in 1940 when disciplinary action was threatened against him for accepting membership of the National Defense Council, from which, however, he resigned. The Muslim League expelled him on December 11, 1941, for having formed a coalition Ministry in Bengal without its sanction.

Some unconfirmed reports have appeared in the press that Mr. Fazlul Haq had met Mr. Jinnah recently in Delhi. Another report said that Mr. Haq had rejoined the Muslim League. On this the Bengal Premier made the following statement: "The news published by *Independent India* (Mr. M. N. Roy's Delhi paper) about my rejoining the Muslim League raises an irrelevant issue. I maintain I was never out of the League, I am still in the League. Therefore, the question of my rejoining does not arise. As regards Mr. Jinnah, I have never been at war with him, nor do I intend to be so. I am not at war with anybody. I am at war with untruths."

SIND

Out of 35 Muslim members in the Sind Assembly, only 13 were elected on Muslim League ticket. With the return of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah as Premier of the Province in October last, a number of M. L. A.'s have joined the League. Sir Ghulam and all his Muslim Ministers are now members of the League, and the strength of the League party is now 26 out of 35.

Sir Ghulam resigned from the Muslim League when Mr. Allah Bux took him into his Cabinet two years ago. His rejoining the League has been prompted by a desire to strengthen the Ministry that he formed on Mr. Allah Bux's dismissal.

ASSAM

Out of 34 Muslim members in the Assam Assembly, originally only 3 were elected on Muslim League ticket. But, a few months after the General Elections 30 members signed on as a Muslim League Party. The Premier, Sir Mohammad Saadullah Khan, has been strictly following Muslim League discipline. He resigned from the National Defence Council when required by the League to do so. On recently assuming office he claimed that his Cabinet was representative of Assam's people. No mention was made of the party affiliations of the Muslim members of his Cabinet. In all his public utterances since assuming office, he has refrained from mentioning the Muslim League.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Out of 38 members in the N.-W. F. Province Legislative Assembly, only 12 belong to the League Party. The only sign of a weakening of the Congress Party in the Province has been the resignation of Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan, M. L. A. ex-Parliamentary Secretary, from the Congress Party and the Red Shirts, but he did not join the Muslim League. He formed a new organization called the Pashtoon Jirga. It aims at an independent Pathan State, run in accordance with the laws of the Shariat. In a statement, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan said that an alliance with the Congress was harmful as the Pathans were gradually losing their identity and drifting away from religion.

	Total Muslim Members of Legislatures	Total Muslim League Members
Punjab	89	78
Bengal:		
Lower House	123	43
Upper House	30	11
Sind	35	26
Assam	34	30
North West Frontier Province	38	12
Total	349	[1] 211

[1] Or 60.45 percent.

IMPORTANT NOTE.—It is important to remember in using the above figures that they show the strength of the Muslim League among the Muslim members of the Legislatures of Muslim majority provinces; they do *not* show Muslim League strength in Hindu majority provinces (these figures will be released later when available).

JH : MC.

EXHIBIT No. 906

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y. March 1, 1943.

The Misses CARTER,
31 Bartlet Street, Andover, Mass.

DEAR MABEL AND HARRIET: Thank you for all your kindness, thoughtfulness, and love, and for this delicious loaf of bread.

I looked everywhere in the station and on the train for Zita, but I guess she probably decided to take a later train.

Under separate cover I am sending you the four American Council booklets. They are all good, but I think you will find the one on the Soviet Union the most interesting and timely.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 907

MARCH 2, 1943.

Copies to WWL
WLH
HA
ED

HM from ECC:

Going up to New England last week I read "The Land of the Soviets" for the first time. I was immensely impressed with it and feel that it is a most skillful and timely job. It is going to have a very big sale in the secondary schools, but I would like to see a similar sale amongst the general reading public.

If you agree that this is desirable, I am wondering what you and your colleagues would think of cooperating with Webster in getting it out as a bound volume that would sell at $1.50 or $2.00, and go out in a big way for getting it reviewed and promoted. So long as it is in its present Binding it will probably fail to make the review columns of the more serious book review editors.

Could you also check with *Fred Myers* and *Rose Gandel* to see whether it has been taken up by the merchandising department of RWR and whether there are any large possibilities there either in the present edition or in a bound volume, where there could be a considerably larger national distribution.

At the right time I would like to see the present or the new edition go with personal letters from me to any of the following who have not received it:

Litvinoff
Gousev
Kolokoff
Gromyko
Davies
Standley
Faymonville
Hopkins
Hazard
the whole RWR Board
McLean and some of the leaders of the Canadian Aid to Russia Fund
Welles
Some of the more outstanding members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees in Congress
A select list of people in the Army headquarters
T. V. Soong
Some of the Indian Leaders
To Chiang Kai-Shek and some of his colleagues
Motylev

ECC from HM:

Here is a possible type of invitation that might work on the Russians.

It would be necessary to tell Litvinov what it was and urge him to send as many of his people as possible, if he can't come himself. Likewise it would be well to get from Jessup, Currie, Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau the names of their assistants who should be invited, if we don't already know. Also Lukashev should be urged to let some of his people come.

EXHIBIT No. 908

MARCH 18, 1943.

WLH from ECC.

The talk with Veatch revealed the following:

1. Governor Lehman and Mr. Sayre were very enthusiastic about our talk and very eager to have the IPR undertake the assignment.

2. The areas to be covered in approximately the following order are:

Burma
Malaysia
Netherlands Indies and, in fact all Southeastern Asia except that we need give little attention to the Philippines (I imagine Sayre will do that himself)
China
Korea, Japan, and Manchuria

Veatch will send us today or tomorrow such general outlines and directives as they have already worked out for other areas, but they do not want us

to be too much guided by these. They want us to make our own analysis and put forward our own project.

They would hope that we could send them an outline of our proposed plan within the next four or five days; that after a month we could present a first draft, and that some of us could take it to Washington for a full day's discussion with them and a few Far Eastern experts from various Government departments. Then the gaps could be filled and a redraft made and the whole thing submitted by the middle of May.

I asked Veatch whether they were thinking of a six- or ten-thousand-dollar job, and he said that they had been thinking in smaller terms, that he felt pretty sure that they could get an appropriation to cover the cost of one $6,500 man for two months and then the money could be used in whatever way we thought best. But if this is inadequate they would make every effort to get a larger appropriation. I should say that we could count definitely on about $1,100 with a fair chance of making a case for $2,200 or $2,500.

I told Veatch that professionally we couldn't afford to submit a poor piece of work.

EXHIBIT No. 909

Copy.
WLH from ECC. MARCH 26, 1943.

I was a bit sad when I discovered in *Pacific Affairs* page proof that you had secured a review from Norman Thomas, but I decided to say nothing to anyone.

Today however without having mentioned the matter to her I received the enclosed from Harriet Moore. Please return it at your convenience.

The case of Roy is different, I assume ILO submitted his paper and that we had to accept it.

Copy.
ECC from HM. Rec'd MARCH 26, 1943.

It is probably unnecessary for me to add this P. S. to the memo in re the talk with Litvinov, but I believe it should be born in mind. It does not help the standing of the International Secretariat with the Soviets to use people like Norman Thomas and Roy of India. Good capitalists are ok with them but Social democrats are poison—especially of the Thomas variety who remain the one group in the U. S. who oppose the war. This opposition even comes out in a piece like his review in the current Pacific Affairs though somewhat disguised—"It is the failure of most American liberals to understand and discuss openly these facts which warrants grave doubts concerning the success of our struggle now." It would be one thing for one of the national councils to select these people—but it is a little different when it is the international secretariat.

In the case of Roy their reaction is probably that the IPR is pretty ignorant about India if they pick Roy to write about the labor movement there. I know very little about it, but my impression is that Mr. Roy's labor movement is something minute and doesn't represent anything of real significance. Of course Mr. Roy is incidentally an ex-communist, expelled I believe for "rightist" tendencies. If we were to pick a minority party in India, it would be more to the point today to pick the Communists themselves who apparently are cooperating in the war effort and trying to push the Congress into a settlement. The British have even let most of them out of jail as their program is constructive for the general war effort. But best of all, the IPR should stock to major movements and to articles on large groupings first, before it goes in for the Roys.

I am sure that this position will not be accepted by either the secretariat or many of the individuals connected with the IPR, but as you know it is hard for the Soviets to cooperate with an organization whose policy it cannot identify * * *.

EXHIBIT No. 910

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 1st April 1943.

In pencil (Copy to P. K. C.).

MISS MABEL M. CARTER,
31 Bartlet Street, Andover, Massachusetts.

DEAR MABEL: Herewith my check for $225. I was in Washington on Monday and so got a little behind with my correspondence.

While in Washington, among others, I called on and had interesting talks with Dr. T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister of China; Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles; Secretary of the Interior Ickes; John Hazard, of Lend-Lease; and Michael Greenberg, of Lauchlin Currie's White House office. In the evening I participated in a United Nations discission at Constitution Hall. The other speakers were: W. L. Batt, of the War Production Board; Gardner Cowles, of the OWI, who went to Russia with Willkie; Maurice Hindus; and Sir Bernard Pares, of the London School of Slavonic Studies. We dined beforehand at the home of Mrs. Robert L. Bacon and then went back to her house at 10:30 for an hour and a half further discussion and a number of speakers, Senators, Congressmen, press, and others. It was a full and useful day.

Affectionately yours,

_____ _____.

EXHIBIT No. 911

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 12, 1943.

MR. RICHARD J. WALSH,
Asia Magazine, 40 East 49th Street, New York City.

DEAR DICK: The Dies Committee is after T. A. Bisson, who for the past year has been working for the BEW. Bisson desires a few of his friends to write letters testifying to his loyalty as an American citizen, adding anything that the writer feels free to say.

Enclosed is a copy of what I have written. Would you feel free to write directly to Honorable John H. Kerr, Chairman, Special Subcommittee on Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., sending a copy of your letter to T. A. Bisson at 383 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 912

129 EAST 52ND STREET, *New York, N. Y., 12th April 1943.*

HENRY C. ALEXANDER, Esq.,
23 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR ALEXANDER: From your reading of LAND OF THE SOVIETS I am afraid you may have got a wrong impression of the Institute of Pacific Relations. In the hope of correcting such an impression, I am venturing to send you for your personal library a few of our publications which may aid in rounding out the picture.

During the past year the Institute has published in North America more than fifty books and pamphlets. In this entire list the only one which has been criticized as soft and sentimental is LAND OF THE SOVIETS, which was written especially for high-school students and which now, happily, is being revised. Much more representative of the Institute's solid work are such studies as:

BANKING AND FINANCE IN CHINA.
JAPAN SINCE 1931.
THE MAKING OF MODERN NEW GUINEA.

I am therefore sending copies of these to you under separate cover.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 913

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, April 13, 1943.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
c/o Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter having reference to the Princeton Conference. I am glad to have the tentative agenda, which I think is well prepared. I have read Mr. Holland's article in the Far Eastern Survey of March 5th; it seems to be an excellent statement.

I am taking the liberty of inviting Colonel Boekel, who is shortly going to India in charge of civilian affairs on General Stilwell's Staff. I do this in the belief that he will find a great deal in the discussions which will be of value to him in his work. I have checked with Dr. Johnstone and he thinks it is an excellent proposal. I realize there isn't time for a reply from you, but unless you send me a wire to the contrary, I shall bring Colonel Boekel.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ JOHN L. CHRISTIAN,
Captain, A. U. S., Southern Asia Branch.

am

EXHIBIT No. 914

Penciled notations: KP

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.
Washington, April 1, 1943.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: You letter to Colonel Mayer with respect to the I. P. R. meeting on India, scheduled for Princeton, April 17–18, has been received. We shall be pleased to have Captain John L. Christian of the Southern Asia Branch, attend this private meeting.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ M. W. Pettigrew
M. W. PETTIGREW
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, Far Eastern Unit.

EXHIBIT No. 915

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 5, 1943.

CAPTAIN JOHN L. CHRISTIAN,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CHRISTIAN: We were delighted to hear from Colonel Pettigrew that you will be able to attend the Princeton Conference on "India in the United Nations' War Effort," April 17 and 18. As soon as it is ready we will send you the draft agenda.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 916

In pencil (ECC invited 4/28/43)

MAY 6 MEETING, WASHINGTON, REVISED INVITATION LIST

Sir Girja S. Bajapi, Indian Agency General, 2633 16th Street NW, Washington, D. C.
Hugh Borton, Department of State, Washington
H. B. Butler, British Embassy, Washington
(penciled in-Carter)

Frank Coe, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.
Geoffrey Cox, New Zealand Legation, Washington
J. M. Elizalde, Resident Commissioner of the Philippines, 1617 Mass. Ave., Washington
James W. Fulbright, House Office Building, Washington
Morris Greene, 2117 Woodland Drive NW, Washington
Dr. G. H. C. Hart, 1620 Belmont Street NW
Alger Hiss, Esq. Department of State
(penciled in-Holland)
Luther A. Johnson, House Office Building
(penciled in-Johnstone)
Dr. Walter Judd, House Office Building
Dr. Kan Lee, China Defense Supplies, 1601 V Street NW
(penciled in-Lockwood)
Howard J. MacMurray, House Office Bldg.
T. M. Martin, Col., G. S. C.-Chief, Japan Section, M. I. S. the Pentagon
William Mayer, Col., G. S. C.,-Chief, China Section, M. I. S., the Pentagon
John W. McCormack, House Office Building
Karl Mundt, House Office Building
M. W. Pettigrew, Col., G. S. C.,-Chief Far Eastern Section, M. I. S. the Pentagon
L. B. Pearson, Minister-Counsellor, Canadian Legation, Washington
MomSeni R. Pramoj, Royal Thai Legation, 2300 Kalorama Road NW, Washington
Mr. A. P. Tixier, Delegation du Comite National Francais, 729 15th Street, NW
Alan Watt, Australian Legation, Washington, D. C.

SUPPLEMENTARY LIST

Mahindra
Someone from Navy
Bruce Turner
Rotor

EXHIBIT No. 917

WWL

Penciled notations: (K. P. on Monday ask WWL & WLH whether it's okay to invite both of these?) ECC

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, April 29, 1943.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you very much for your invitation to attend the I. P. R. round-table discussions on the problems of collective security in the Pacific and Far East, commencing Thursday, May 6. I shall make every effort either to be there or to delegate someone to represent the Far Eastern Unit.

I think that the two agencies listed below might also be interested in the discussions:

Brig. General C. W. Wickersham, Commandant, School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia.

Colonel Dallas S. Townsend, Chief, Military Government Branch, Civil Affairs Division, Office, Chief of Staff, War Department.

Very truly yours,

[s] M. W. Pettigrew
M. W. PETTIGREW,
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, Far Eastern Unit.

(Penciled notation: How about shoemaker, too? Lt. Col. gaines H. Office of Provost Marshal Gen., Service of Supply, Room 2805, Munitions Bldg., War Dept., Wash., D. C.)

EXHIBIT No. 918

Penciled notation: Hiss, yes

3415 VOLTA PLACE,
Washington, D. C., April 30, 1943.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52 Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: This is to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 28 in which you were so good as to ask me to attend a small private discussion on May 6 to discuss the tentative outline which was enclosed with your letter.

I shall be very glad to attend this meeting, subject, of course, to some last-minute call of duty which frankly I do not now foresee.

Yours sincerely,

ALGER HISS.

EXHIBIT No. 919

Penciled notation: Martin, Yes.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, May 1, 1943.

Penciled notation: K. P. By all means come on this basis—ECC

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have received your letter of April 28, 1943, inviting me to join a small private IPR round table discussion on the problem of collective security in the Pacific and the Far East, to be held in Washington on May 6.

I am glad to have a copy of the tentative outline prepared by Mr. Johnstone, and I should like to have the privilege of attending the discussion if I am not expected to participate.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Truman M. Martin
TRUMAN M. MARTIN,
Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, Japan Branch.

EXHIBIT No. 920

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 4, 1943.

COLONEL TRUMAN M. MARTIN, G. S. C.,
Chief, Japan Branch, Military Intelligence Service,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL MARTIN: We will of course be glad to have you come to the Thursday evening meeting as an observer.

Sincerely Yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 921

MAY 10, 1943.

WWL from ECC:

I had a long talk with Jane Plimpton yesterday about becoming the IPR representative in Washington. I think she would take the job like a shot if she wasn't partially committed to going to work for Gulick in the Lehman office.

She has agreed to hold up until Wednesday morning taking any final action with Gulick. This is to give you time to see her on Tuesday and do the final job of salesmanship on behalf of the IPR.

Miss Plimpton was an honors graduate of Vassar, and throughout her term at Vassar has shown an unusual interest in the study both of American domestic problems and of foreign relations. She has been very active in the student move-

ment, was editor of the Vassar paper, and held several other high positions in student life.

She could do, I think, a remarkably good job for Bill Johnstone and for our other Washington study groups because she has already had a lot of experience in summarizing similar meetings. For several weeks, for example, at 700 Jackson Place, she has been rapporteur of the Washington study group of the Commission to Organize Peace.

Of incidental value is the fact that she has intimate friends in the White House and is a born promoter as well as a good scholar. Once she was given a definite assignment, I would have no hesitation in sending her to Welles Hornbeck, Harry White, or anyone in our government or any other government with whom we wanted to make an IPR contact.

I think you can render a great service to Amco and Pacco by persuading her to become our Washington representative. So far as Pacco is concerned I would be prepared to recommend an appointment for the rest of the year.

She knows her way around government offices, having been an interne in the Bureau of the Budget where she has made the necessary grade. She does not know shorthand, but she types rapidly and well.

You can reach her in Room 250 of the State Department building, though that particular room is a Bureau of the Budget room. She lives at 3913 Huntington Street, N. W.—Telephone: Ordway 6370.

You may want to send her a wire today as to when and where to meet you.

EXHIBIT No. 922

MAY 21, 1943.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: As regards the invitation list for May 27 I suggest adding Sir George Sansom, and Kan Lee. I presume that you have invited Hiss. I shall be glad to have a talk with Alger Hiss about the meeting. I still think if we go ahead on the agenda that it can be a good discussion. I will be on hand to have dinner with you before the meeting if that is possible or to see you ten or fifteen minutes before the meeting at 700 Jackson Place.

I will be perfectly willing to preside if you think it best, although you do a much better job than I can. Please let me know if there is anything further you would like done before the meeting.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM C. JOHNSTONE,
Dean of the Junior College.

EXHIBIT No. 923

Penciled in (copy to HM)

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., 7th June 1943.

MORTIMER GRAVES, ESQ.,
American Council of Learned Societies,
1219 Sixteenth Street N. W., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MORTIMER: On my return I received your little yellow inquiry about a center of information in Washington. Part of the problem, of course, is finance; and part is personnel. I think you ought to get Harriet Moore's advice. I wish we could see our way clearer and am wondering whether we ought to wait until we can have the Ickes-Litvinoff-Graves-Moore-Carter dinner that I spoke of.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 924

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., 9th June 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: Some time ago you asked me for a list of Chinese personnel. I am now able to send you a copy of a list prepared by Lenning Sweet of UCR together with a suplementary list which he has also prepared. This, I assume, will be used in its present form or revised in the report that Lockwood is making for Governor Lehman. If this is of any use to you, would you have a copy made for your files and return the enclosed to me in due season?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 925

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., 15th June 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: Sweet of UCR has compiled the enclosed list of foreign personnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and return this copy to me in due course.

Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new and characteristically valuable experience behind him. He leaves tonight for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next two days in case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 926

INVITATIONS FOR THIRD MEETING ON COLLECTIVE SECURITIVE IN THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST

In ink—June 17, 1943.
In pencil—6/10/43.
(Hand written:)

No—Sir Girja S. Bajpai: Indian Agency General, 2633 16th St. NW.
Dr. Hugh Borton: Special Division, Department of State.
Yes—Nicholas A. J. deVoogd: 1620 Belmont Street NW.
Yes—Morris Greene: Australian Legation.
Yes—Alger Hiss: Department of State.
Yes—M. R. Seni Pramoj: Royal Thai Legation, 2300 Kalorama Road NW.
Lt. Col. James W. Shoemaker: 1729 Q Street NW.
No—Captain Vaughn F. Meisling: Military Intelligence Service, War Department.
Yes—John Alexander: British Embassy.
No—Philippe Baudet: French National Committee, 1420 16th Street NW.
Yes—Frank Coe: Board of Economic Warfare.
(?)—L. B. Pearson: Canadian Legation.
Yes—The Honorable Frances P. Bolton: 2301 Wyoming Ave. NW.
Yes—The Honorable Howard J. McMurray: House Office Building.
No—The Honorable James W. Wadsworth: House Office Building.
G. S. Cox: New Zealand Legation.
No—The Honorable J. W. Fulbright: House Office Building.
Yes—The Honorable Walter Judd: House Office Building.
Yes—Kan Lee: China Defense Supplies, Inc., 2311 Mass. Ave., Washington 8.
Alan Watt: Australian Legation.
Harry B. Price: China Defense Supplies, Inc., 2311 Mass. Ave., Washington 8.
Yes—J. M. Elizalde: 1617 Massachusetts Avenue NW.
Col. William Mayer: Chief, China Section, MIS, War Dept., Pentagon Bldg
No—Sir George Sansom: British Embassy.
Y. R. C. James Yen: % Chinese Embassy.

No—Bruce Turner: New Zealand Legation (6/14/43) in pencil.
No—W. W. Lockwood.
Yes—W. L. Holland.
Yes—William C. Johnstons.
Yes—Edward C. Carter.
(In ink) Walter Laves: Organization Services Division, Office of Civilian Defense, Dupont Circle Bldg.
Yes—Grayson Kirk: Department of State.
*Eugene Dooman: Department of State.
*William Y. Elliott: War Shipping Administration.
*Read Hager: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munitions Assignment Board.

List of those invited to collective security in the Pacific and the Far East, 700 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

(in ink)

[I—Invited. Acc.=Accepted. Arr.=Attended. N=Did not attend or regretted]

	May 6, 1943	(In ink) May 27, 1943	June 17, 1943
John Alexander		I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att.
Sir Girja Bajpai	I., Acc., Att	I. (sorry). Hot Springs.	I. (sorry), away.
Philippe Baudet	I. (sorry), New York.	I., Acc., Att	I. (sorry), New York.
T. A. Bisson		I., Acc., Att	
Frances P. Bolton	I. (sorry), engaged	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att.
Hugh Borton	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att	I. (very sorry), busy.
H. B. Butler	I., England		
Evans F. Carlson			I., Acc., Att.
Edward C. Carter	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att.
Frank Coe	I., Acc	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att.
G. S. Cox	I. (try attend), Turner	I., Acc., Att	I. (no reply).
N. A. J. de Voogd	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att.
Eugene Dooman			I. (sorry).
J. M. Elizalde	I. (sorry) engaged	I. (sorry), Hot Springs	I. (hopes to come) N.
William Y. Elliott			I., no reply.
J. F. Engers			I., Acc., Att.
Miriam S. Farley	I., Acc., Att	I., N	
J. W. Fulbright	I. (sorry) engaged	I., Acc., Att	I. (sorry) engaged.
Andrew Grajdanzev			I., Acc., Att.
Morris Greene	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att.
Read Hager			I., Acc., Att.
G. H. C. Hart	I., West Coast		I. (sorry), New York.
Alger Hiss	I., Acc., Att	I., N	I., Acc., N.
W. L. Holland	I., Acc., Att	I., N	I., Acc., Att.
Luther Johnson	I. (sorry), engaged	I., N	
William C. Johnstone	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att.
Walter Judd	I. (sorry), engaged	I., N	I., Acc., Att.
Grayson Kirk			I., Acc., N.
Walter Laves			I. (very much interested).
Kan Lee	I	I. (sorry), Hot Springs	I., Acc., Att.
W. W. Lockwood	I., Acc., Att	I. (try)	I., N.
Col. T. M. Martin	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att	
Col. William Mayer	I. (sorry suggests Meisling).	I., N	I. (no reply).
John W. McCormack	I., N		
Howard J. McMurray	I. (sorry), engaged	I., Acc., N	I., Acc., Att.
Capt. Vaughn F. Meisling	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att	I., N.
Martha Mooney		I., Acc., Att	
Harriet Moore	I., N		I., N.
Karl Mundt	I. (sorry), engaged	I. (sorry), engaged	
L. B. Pearson	I (try), N	I. (sorry), Hot Springs	I. (try), N.
Col. M. W. Pettigrew	I. (try or send someone).	I., N	
Catherine Porter		I., Acc., Att	
M. R. Seni Pramoj	I., Acc. Att	I., Acc., Att	I., Acc., Att.
Harry B. Price		I., Acc., Att	I. Acc., Att.
Sir George Sansom		I., Acc., Att	I. (sorry) Baltimore.
James W. Shoemaker	I., Acc., Att	I., N	I. (no reply).
Capt. J. P. Taylor			I. Acc., Att.
A. P. Tixier	I., London		
Dallas Townsend	I. (sorry) engaged		
Bruce Turner	I		I., N., regrets.
James W. Wadsworth	I. (sorry) engaged	I. (sorry) engaged	I., N.
Alan S. Watt	I	I., N	I. (sorry).
Urbano Zafra	I., Acc., Att	Hot Springs	(?), N.

*Special letter.

EXHIBIT No. 927

WLH NWL HA (Pencilled initials)

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 26, 1942

MILO PERKINS, Esq.
Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PERKINS: In early September the Institute of Pacific Relations is planning a small private study conference to make an over-all appraisal of the factors to be considered in the waging of the war in Asia and the Pacific, and to stimulate creative thinking on immediate postwar problems.

We expect able representation from China, India, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Soviet Russia, and the Netherlands East Indies.

We regard it as most essential that you be present and participate in our discussions. I want very much to talk with you in the near future as to some of the personnel whom we should invite from other countries. I am wondering whether you would have a quarter of an hour free to discuss this matter with me on Tuesday, June 2nd. I could see you any time from early morning to late at night except between two and three-thirty.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 928

Penciled Note: ECC Ark July 3

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., June 20, 1942.

Office of the Executive Director
Penciled note: TARR
HOLLAND
LOCKWOOD
JESSUP

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I appreciate your invitation to attend the September meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations to discuss problems of war and reconstruction in the Far East. Your enterprise in promoting such discussion is useful. If circumstances permit, I shall be happy to participate; otherwise I shall ask James H. Shoemaker of the Far Eastern Division to attend.

I am sorry that I could not get in touch with you before June 2. Might I suggest that the next time you come to Washington you see Mr. William T. Stone and Dr. Shoemaker about the persons to be invited to attend the meeting. I have asked them to consider this matter now so that your discussion with them may be as helpful as possible.

Sincerely yours,

[s] MILO PERKINS, *Executive Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 929

DRAFT TO MILO PERKINS

DEAR MR. PERKINS: We deeply appreciated your letter of June 20 indicating that if circumstances permitted you would be happy to participate in the forthcoming Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In deference to the wishes of our Chinese colleagues we have decided to hold the Conference in December instead of September as originally proposed. The Chinese cabled that they could send a very much more representative group if the later date were chosen.

Enclosed is a copy of the draft agenda. Mr. Lockwood has already followed your suggestion and talked to Mr. Stone and Mr. Shoemaker about our plans.

EXHIBIT No. 930

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., June 28, 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, ESQ.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: For your private information I enclose a description of some of the Chinese who arrived in this country a few weeks ago. This was prepared for me by Harry Price. I am sure he would have no objection to my sharing it with you.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 931

JULY 14, 1943.

CONSTANTIN OUMANSKY,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.,
Merida 18, Mexico City, Mexico:

Planning see you early Thursday afternoon fifteenth.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 932

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., June 30, 1943.

His EXCELLENCY, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.,
Mexico City, Mexico.

DEAR OUMANSKY: If you are unlikely to visit the United States this coming month I am wondering whether you could spare a half a day to talk over many matters with me if I found it possible to visit Mexico in the third or fourth week of July?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 933

COPY OF UNFINISHED HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM EDWARD C. CARTER TO JOHN A. CARTER

ALOFT—MEXICO CITY TO FORT WORTH, TEX.,
Sunday, July 18, 1943.

DEAR JOHN: Mexico City is about the same altitude as your birthplace, Simla. Unlike Simla it is flat. Like Simla it is surrounded by mountains. But Mexico's mountains though impressive are not as high or extensive as the vast bulk of the Himalayas. The climate of Mexico City is unlike Simla. It has cool nights and warm days all the year round. Some people feel the altitude. I didn't. The city is a mixture of Rome, Paris, New York, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Mexican Indian and I suppose of Madrid and Lisbon (which I've never visited). It reminds one alternatively of Manila (the Spanish influence, palm trees, sunshine, a primitive hinterland and an emotional people who can act with great ability but who sometimes find great oratory a substitute for practical action. They both can exert themselves when music bids them dance.

I mentioned Detroit's influence. There is apparently no gas or rubber shortage. The city is jammed with American cars—mostly Mexican licenses but a scattering of Texas and Arizona licenses. The hotels are full of American tourists. I had wired ahead for a room but had to try six hotels after arrival before I could get located. Luckily Oumansky (who has just arrived from Moscow as the Soviet Ambassador) sent one of his staff in the Embassy car and she (Miss Alexandra Nicholsky) drove me around until she found a hotel that would take me in.

After a wash and shave at the Hotel Gillow, she drove me to Embassy for lunch. Oumansky greeted me most cordially but said quickly, "Don't say anything about it to Mrs. O." Luckily I knew what he meant. Five days before leaving Moscow for Mexico their only child, a 15-year-old daughter who was their greatest joy and interest in life, was killed in an accident in Moscow. She had been at school

in Washington, was developing great charm, brains, versatility, and they had all three been planning together their next great adventure—the flight to Mexico and life in a totally different civilization. They buried her and 2 days later got into the great plane that flew them, their files, and the Embassy staff (four or five people) across Siberia to Fairbanks, Alaska, where I am happy to say the U. S. Army received them most cordially (lots of generals helping) and on orders from Washington a big Army transport plane flew them from Fairbanks via Seattle to Los Angeles when they travelled by American Airlines to Mexico City.

Mr. and Mrs. O. and I had a very nice lunch preceded by a little vodka and caviar that they had brought. Mrs. O. was in black and you could see how overwhelmed she is with her sorrow. Several times when I was with O. alone he told of his anxiety for her and showed how terribly he, too, is suffering. But he has his work that absorbs so much of his time. She is reading and clipping American newspapers for him but the mails are awfully slow and that is hardly a full-time job. I am going to ask Ruthie if she will send Mrs. O. some clippings from time to time so that Mrs. O. will have more to do and also so that they can get stuff of value that they wouldn't otherwise get. Mrs. O. has sent Alice and Ruthie, by me, some little gifts of Mexican silver.

Oumansky and I spent many hours during my 3 days in Mexico discussing IPR and the world in general. Motylev has gone to the front and has been succeeded by G. N. Voitinsky as head of the USSR IPR. V. is a very good man—he was long in China and the Far East. The food situation in Russia for civilians is terribly bad but the Soviet press says little about it for fear of giving comfort to the enemy.

With O. I met some of the leaders of the Mexican RWR. Castro Leal, a great Mexican history and university professor.

(Penciled notation: If he has time ECC may finish this later—RDC.)

EXHIBIT No. 934

JULY 20TH, 1943.

Mr. and Mrs. CONSTANTIN OUMANSKY,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.,
Merida 18, Mexico, D. F.

DEAR MR. AND MRS. OUMANSKY, This is to thank you both for your very kind hospitality while I was in Mexico City. I enjoyed every minute of the 3 days and I cannot tell you how pleased I was to renew our old acquaintance.

The new secretary of the Mexican aid to Russia committee came to see me Sunday morning and we had a long and useful talk.

I arrived at La Guardia Field yesterday (Monday afternoon) about 1:30.

I have already given your greetings to several of your friends and will be seeing more in the course of the week. I tried several times to reach Mrs. Litvinoff on the phone yesterday afternoon, but there was no answer. So I went to her apartment at 6:00 and discovered she had been away for a few days. At the apartment house they did not know precisely when she would return, but I will see that she gets Mrs. Oumansky's letter just as soon as she returns.

Mrs. Carter and Ruth were delighted with Mrs. Oumansky's presents and with all the news I was able to bring them.

I will be writing you again in two or three days on several matters.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 935

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y. July 20th, 1943.

Mrs. MAXIM LITVINOFF,
301 East 38th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MRS. LITVINOFF: Yesterday I arrived by air from Mexico City where I had spent 3 days. I saw a great deal of Mr. and Mrs. Constantin Oumansky, who sent you their warmest greetings and the enclosed package. On my arrival yesterday afternoon I phoned your apartment several times but got no answer. So I went to the apartment about six in the evening and discovered that you were away for a few days. So I thought I better send this package by mail rather than leaving it with the elevator man.

The Oumansky's are settling in to life in Mexico City very well. They have made many friends already and are clearly very well liked. They are both terribly crushed by their daughter's death. He is most considerate of her and is doing everything in his power to help her to overcome her profound grief. His life is, of course, more filled with activity than hers so he does not have as much time for sadness. But he is terribly crushed by the calamity. He is naturally eager for her to have as many things to do as possible. I suggested to her a number of things that she can do for Russian war relief in Mexico.

If you could possibly manage to go there for a visit, you would be doing the Oumanskys a very friendly service. Incidentally, you would find much in Mexico to interest you. It is a fascinating mixture of Europe, the Orient, and of Mexican Indian life and culture. There are interesting people in Mexico from all over the world and the cultural and aesthetic life would interest you very, very greatly. The climate is salubrious and the vegetables and fruit, the clear air and the sunshine are to be had in great abundance. There is little external evidence of the war and no rationing of rubber, petrol or coffee. Do go if you possibly can.

There is a chance that I will be flying to Chungking about the first of August. I do hope that I can have a talk with you at least on the phone before I go, if I do go.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Copy care Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 936

Copy to: Oumansky.

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., July 20th, 1943.

EUGENE D. KISSELEV, Esq.,
Consul General of the U. S. S. R.,
7 East 61st Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KISSELEV: This is to inform you that I have recently received a cablegram from Moscow signed by Voitinsky reading as follows:

"Volumes Mont Tremblant Conference Papers Received Many Thanks."

May I thank you most sincerely for your kindness in dispatching the volumes so promptly.

I will have another consignment of books to send to Voitinsky in another week or two. May I enlist your help in sending this second instalment also?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 937

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
August 4th, 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,
Executive Office of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CURRIE: Dad was very grateful to you for sending him the letter of recommendation which he found awaiting him at the Mayflower on Monday night. He was sorry to miss having a last word with you. If there is anything which you would like to communicate with him you can send it to the Embassy in Chungking.

He is wondering whether you would feel free to cable John Fairbank that he is on the way?

Sincerely yours,

———— ————,
Secretary to Edward C. Carter.

EXHIBIT No. 938

AUGUST 1, 1943.

Sent from 331 East 71st Street, N. Y. C.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Executive Office of the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.:

If you think a general letter of recommendation would be helpful for me on my journey could I get it at your office nine-thirty Tuesday morning?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 939

THE UNITED STATES,
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION,
54 Queensway, New Delhi, India, August 23, 1943.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
% American Embassy, Chungking.

DEAR DAD: The following cable came from Bill Holland, which I am passing along through the pouch.

"Extension AMCO relief studies requested confidential basis hope you Carter can report briefly from Chungking, extensively following return; also secure several studies qualified Americans special aspects 500 dollars available stop Can you also arrange survey correspondents India Australia Hariet More."

I hope things are going well, and that the trip was not too adventurous.

Affectionately yours,

[s] BILL.

(Penciled note: W. D. Carter.)

EXHIBIT No. 940

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
15th October 1943.

Letter #25

WILLIAM D. CARTER, Esq.,
U. S. Office of War Information,
A. P. O. 885, Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: Here is another part of the September PACIFIC AFFAIRS which you requested. I hope it gets to you soon.

You may be interested to know that Kay Greene is now, as far as we know, somewhere in the northern part of the continent on which you landed before flying to your present post. She started out with a job with Lehman's organization, which I believe Phill Jessup got for her. I think Margaret is going to use some of her furniture for her new apartment. Kay had left it for Rose Yardumian and Mary Healy to use. But as Rose has now gone to Washington for the IPR and as Mary will soon be joining Beecroft, they gave up their plans for taking an apartment here so the furniture was going begging.

Love.

EXHIBIT No. 941

1 EAST 54TH STREET,
4th November, 1943.

Private & confidential.

Dr. ROBERT J. KERNER,
University of California, Berkley.

DEAR KERNER: As you know, W. L. Holland and I were in China in September. Holland saw your former student and great admirer, Chen Han-seng. Holland discovered that because of his honest, liberal views and progressive attitude, Chen Han-seng was in danger of being spirited away by some underground right-wing group. We all regard him as one of the soundest students of China's agrarian economy and a true Chinese patriot. We conferred with both Chinese and American friends in China as to how best to save Chen Han-seng for future

usefulness to his country. It is a matter that has to be handled with extreme delicacy.

All of our advisers say that the best insurance would be an invitation from one of the three or four leading American universities to Chen Han-seng to come to the United States either as a temporary research professor or associate or for a special course of lectures. This apparently would be a greater safeguard than an invitation from the IPR.

Knowing how familiar you are with Chen Han-seng's work, Holland and I are venturing to inquire whether you could act in the matter. If funds should prove the only difficulty, we would be prepared to find the necessary money for the journey and, say, a three-months appointment.

In confidence, today I have received through the State Department the following confidential message from Chungking:

"Confidential: Please tell Mr. Carter that latest from the Kweilin consul indicates that Chen Han-seng is in an increasingly precarious position, and that Sa Kung-liao, the liberal writer who was arrested there this summer, is now incommunicado; Chen may well be next, and IPR would be well advised to act suddenly and soon if they want to get him out."

Would you wire me whether you would be in a position to act swiftly and affirmatively in this matter?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 942

(Handwritten note:) Copies to JAC
PKS
WDC

1 EAST 54TH STREET,
New York 22, N. Y., 8th November 1943.

The Misses CARTER,
31 Bartlett Street, Andover, Massachusetts.

DEAR MABEL AND HARRIET: Letters from each of you have arrived. We are glad to hear from you both and to read the interesting clippings that you have sent.

I finished my work in Moscow just as Hull, Eden, Harriman, and their staffs arrived. I had an invitation to go to the airport to meet them, but at the same time I had an important engagement with a Russian expert on China whom I had been trying to see ever since I arrived, so I spent three hours with Rogoff instead of going to the airport to see the celebrities arrive. The reception for them was very impressive I was told. The American planes came in and landed their passengers fifteen minutes ahead of the British, so first Mr. Hull inspected the Guard of Honor and then Mr. Eden. The Guard of Honor were all in fancy uniforms and impressed everyone profoundly. I did not bother Hull or Eden after their arrival because I knew they were fully occupied with the preparations for what proves to have been one of the most historic meetings in our generation. A great many of the things that we have all worked for for years are beginning to be realized.

We are not going to Nashville to see Jill because John is staying on at Fort Sill as an artillery instructor for a month or two at least. His address is: Lt. John A. Carter O1184470, Battery E, 32nd Battalion, 8th Training Regiment, F. A. R. T. C., Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Alice and I are going to Lee this afternoon so I can get a little further sleep and relaxation before I plunge into active work next week.

Ruth and I have just spent two days in Washington. I had talks with Secretary Morgenthau, Ambassador Davies, Lauchlin Currie, Governor Lehman, Phil Jessup, Selskar Gunn, General Faymonville, Jane Plimpton, Stanley Hornbeck, Elizalde, Fox of the President's War Relief Control Board, and a few others.

I was very tired when I arrived owing to the strenuous character of the last week in Russia, but I am now back in my old form.

You will note we have moved into new offices which are going to be a little more commodious and convenient than our rabbit-warren at 129 East 52nd Street.

With much love, I am

Ever affectionately yours,

EXHIBIT No. 943

NOVEMBER 13, 1943.

AG from ECC:

When I asked you to translate Rogoff's article I did not know about the part of it which appeared in the September issue of Amerasia. I hope this will reach you in time so as to prevent your doing the entire translation if part of it has already been done in Amerasia.

I was sorry that I did not get as far to the east as Irkutsk.

EXHIBIT No. 944

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
15th November, 1943.

Lt. JOHN A. CARTER O1184470,
Battery E, 32nd Battalion, 8th Training Regiment,
Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

DEAR JOHN: It was wonderful to hear your voice on the phone at Lee Friday evening. Mother, Ruth and I were very excited.

I got your good letter of November 3rd a few days before. Your present temporary assignment of teaching men survey must, as you say, be both interesting and instructive to you. I am sure it is also interesting and instructive to your pupils.

You certainly have a wide variety of subjects to cover in the Field Artillery.

You would have been immensely interested to have visited with me the great "German War Trophies Exhibition" at the Park of Culture and Rest in Moscow. Here, spreading over many acres is a vast but systematically organized collection of armament and equipment captured from the Germans. There are special sections for each classification—tanks, planes, trucks, artillery, uniforms, mines, bombs, etc. The evolution, for example of tanks and artillery, are vividly shown. The Russian Major General who personally conducted me had special technicians elaborating details in each section; i. e., one for howitzers, another for heavy siege guns, another for light but terribly powerful antitank guns, another for various types of antiaircraft guns. The different technicians explained the differences in German and Soviet equipment and indicated how much more mobile a great deal of the Russian equipment is.

Yes, the Moscow conference was one of the most significant gatherings of our generation. As I was in Russia for the fortnight before the conference began, I was aware on every side of the determined efforts the Russians were making to ensure the success of the conference. The intellectual and documentary education had been very extensive. In addition the Russians thought up a thousand different acts of hospitality and friendship not only for Hull and Eden but for all of their staff including all of the members of the crews of every one of the British and American planes that flew the two staffs into Moscow.

It was, I suppose, necessary for Churchill and Roosevelt to have all of those two-some conferences of theirs, but it did begin to look to all the rest of the world as though a secret, closely knit Anglo-American hegemony was emerging to control the world.

The Moscow conferences dramatize to the world that the four countries—Britain, China, U. S., and U. S. S. R.—must and will work together. Of course, there are innumerable problems to be faced still, but the machinery for facing them is now at long last being set up.

I am sure that all of the public criticism of Hull as being anti-Soviet has been worth while. It probably needled him into bolder and more friendly action than he might otherwise have taken.

With you, I think that the reports of the travelling Senators were not as thoughtful as they should have been. A British Parliamentary Mission of the same sort would have compared notes and agreed on making a more unified impact on the public on their return.

With you I also question the wisdom of the line which TIME is taking regarding air bases abroad. There is bound to be an immense expansion of aviation after the war, but we will become one of the most hated nations if we try to scoop other nations in attempting monopoly of postwar commercial aviation.

It is too early to say whether Wavell will establish a new India or not. Thus far he has shown no sign of holding out the olive branch to those in prison. He

has, however, publicly acknowledged that there is famine in India by going personally to Bengal, which his predecessor failed to do.

I will try and send you copies of any letters or reports that might develop further my ideas resulting from the trip.

I enclose a hurriedly dictated report on certain aspects of my visit to the Soviet Union. This is just a first draft and will be revised later. Will you please send it on to Polly and the Andover Aunts and ask them to return it to me.

Affectionately yours,

———— ————.

EXHIBIT No. 945

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
15th November 1943.

Miss KATE MITCHELL,
Amerasia, 225 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR KATE: May I congratulate you on the September issue of AMERASIA. I do hope that you managed to send a number of copies into China itself. If you have not done so already, may I venture to suggest that you tear off the cover and send by air mail to their appropriate APO addresses one copy each to:

General Stilwell
General Chennault
General Stratemeyer (New Delhi)
John Davies and Jack Service (Both on Stilwell's staff)
George Merrell (American Mission, APO 885, Postmaster, NYC)
William D. Carter (U. S. O. W. I., APO 885, Postmaster, NYC)
Mac Fisher (Chungking)

You might also send one by ordinary air mail to Liu fu-wan, P. O. Box 98, Chungking.

It may help matters with the Indian and Chinese censorship if you refrain from mentioning that you are sending these at my request. It may also help if the envelope which carries them is simply marked with your new address without mentioning AMERASIA, 52nd Street, or the IPR.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 946

(Pencilled:) RD San Francisco, 417 Market St.
(Pencilled note:) Return to RD

REPORT ON WASHINGTON OFFICE, DECEMBER 1943–MARCH 1945

Under the joint auspices of the American Council and the International Secretariat the Washington offices of the Institution Of Pacific Relations were reopened at 744 Jackson Place NW., in November 1943 with Professor William C. Johnstone, Dean of the School of Government at The George Washington University, as Director of the Washington Study Program and Miss Rose Yardumian as Washington Representative. During the past year several research associates have been added on a part-time basis including Miss Virginia Thompson, Mrs. Eleanor Lattimore and Dr. Rockwood Chen. (Miss Thompson moved to San Francisco in October where she is now associated with the Office of War Information.) In August 1944 Mrs. Elizabeth Ussachevsky joined the staff of the Washington Office. A small library including a full set of IPR publications and a number of reference texts on the Far East has been set up and made available to members and people working in the field. The Washington Office sells the publications of both the American Council and the International Secretariat for the convenience of members in the local area.

The IPR in Washington has been in a favorable position through its international and private character to simulate informal discussion among Far Eastern experts temporarily stationed in Washington from the various countries for off-the-record meetings either at the IPR offices or at the Cosmos Club Assembly Hall. Informal meetings at the IPR office—of which there have been 17 in the course of the past year—have included such speakers as Mr. Edmund Clubb of

the Department of State; Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Minister of Information in Chungking; Col. Victor Purcell, a British colonial administrator with long experience in Malaya; Dr. J. S. Kennard, a missionary recently returned from China; the Hon. Walter Nash of New Zealand who discussed the ILO conference; several Chinese professors visiting this country under the program of cultural relations of the Department of State; Mr. John Service of the Department of State; Sir Frederick Eggleston, Minister to the United States from Australia; Mr. Kumarappa, Director of Social Sciences of the Tata Institute, India; Mr. George Yeh, China, Ambassador Naggiar, France, Mrs. Pandit, India, Mr. Siva Rao, India, delegates to the Hot Springs Conference of IPR; Senator Carloos Garcia, a Filipino guerrilla leader from Leyte; Gunther Stein, British correspondent from China; and Mr. John Emmerson of the Department of State who described plans of the Japanese Emancipation League in Yenan.

General meetings to which all members in the local area are invited have taken place about every two months usually in the Cosmos Club Assembly Hall. Attendance at these meetings ranges from 75 to 100 people. The first meeting of this kind was held in December 1943 to give the members of the IPR an opportunity to hear Mr. Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General of the IPR and Mr. William Holland, Research Secretary, discuss their trip to China. The response to this meeting was so enthusiastic that it was decided to include such meetings as part of the regular program. Eight such membership meetings have been held in the last 16 months. Other speakers have included H. Foster Bain, repatriated from the Philippines on the second *Gripsholm* trip, who described some of the effects of Japanese occupation on the Philippine economy; Dr. Tsiang Tingfu and Dr. Mackenzie Stevens who discussed the role of cooperatives in Asia; Dr. Henry De Young, Mr. Youngjeung Kim, and Mr. Ilhan New who discussed Korean affairs; Lt. Com. Nelson Spinks, Dr. William C. Johnstone and Mr. Wilfred Fleisher who participated in a panel discussion on What To Do With Japan under the chairmanship of Admiral Harry Yarnell; Mr. Obaidur Rahman and Mr. John Fischer on U. S.-Indian economic relations. In December 1944 a joint meeting was held at the home of Mrs. Gifford Pinchot with the local branches of Americans United and Indusco participating on recent developments in Chinese affairs—Mr. Lewis Smythe and Mr. Owen Lattimore were the speakers. Early in March, 1945, Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana reported on his mission to China to the IPR membership in a Cosmos Club meeting.

Special functions have included a luncheon for press members to hear Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland give an off-the-record account of their trip to the Far East, a dinner for members of Congress and administration officials for the same purpose. (Penciled note—An informal luncheon discussion led by Mr. Carter for Army and Navy officials responsible for educational work was held about a year ago to acquaint officers with IPR materials particularly our pamphlet program.) A luncheon was held for Owen Lattimore on his return from China in the summer of 1944 when he accompanied Vice-President Wallace on his trip to the Soviet Far East and China. At this meeting Mr. Lattimore discussed the treatment of minorities by the Chinese and Russians. In December 1944 a sherry party honoring Sir Frederick Eggleston, Minister from Australia to the U. S. was held at the Mayflower Hotel.

Following the ninth international conference of the IPR held at Hot Springs, many parties were held in Washington to honor the foreign delegates visiting in Washington. Highlighting these was a tea given by the Hon. Frances Bolton, Representative from Ohio, for conference delegates to meet members of Congress as well as Army, Navy, and Administration officials. A small cocktail party was given for the press by the IPR to meet the chairmen of the various delegations.

Under Dr. Johnstone's chairmanship a number of small study groups were formed on various topics sponsored by the American Council in some cases and by the International Secretariat in others. In one case the American Council of the IPR and the China Council sponsored jointly a number of meetings on Postwar U. S.-Chinese Economic Relations. Under the auspices of the American Council study groups met on Trade and Investment Policies in Southeast Asia, Treatment of Japan and Postwar U. S.-Chinese Economic Relations. The International Secretariat has sponsored two groups, one on Treatment of Japan, and the other on Economic Recovery in Pacific countries. A great part of the discussions on Japan have been included by Dr. Johnstone in his forthcoming book, *The Future of Japan*, soon to be published by the Oxford University Press under the sponsorship of the American Council of IPR. Plans are under way for another study group under the auspices of the American Council on the general topic of Dependent Territories in the Pacific area.

It is interesting to note that as a result of greatly increased interest in the Pacific area and therefore in the work of the IPR generally, membership in the Washington area has almost doubled in the last eighteen months since the reopening of the Washington offices. (Check with TGS on exact figures believe we have picked up 85 members in the past year bringing our membership up to 200 approximately. This does not include about 35 non-Americans interested in the work of the IPR whom we invite to general membership meetings.)

EXHIBIT No. 947

(Pencilled note:) Ray—Some rough notes for Peggy on my vague ideas on program. Thought you might like to see a copy. RY

(Pencilled note:) Return to R. D.

To: MAS.
From: RY.

APRIL 16, 1945.

During the present phase of the Pacific war and until its final successful conclusion and for several years thereafter the interest of the American people in Far Eastern affairs will increase tremendously. The job before the IPR will be to build this interest in a constructive way toward the education of an enlightened American people. The IPR is uniquely organized and favorably equipped to assume leadership in this task. Through a carefully planned program of activities integrating the school program, pamphlet and research programs, and through an expanded circulation of *Far Eastern Survey*, *Pacific Affairs* and the other research publications of the International Secretariat, the IPR should be able to go forward building and broadening the base of its membership. The greatest obstacle before the American Council at present is the lack of integration between work already done, current program and a future program. This can be overcome only with the appointment of a mature qualified and experienced Program Director with a background in Far Eastern affairs if possible.

In my work in Washington I have found that not all people interested in IPR are interested in all phases of its work. For example, press and radio people are far more interested in the *Far Eastern Survey* than in general meetings or study group activities. The good job already begun on getting the *Far Eastern Survey* before influential newspapermen and radio commentators with appropriate releases should be continued. We have found that government people are more interested in the program of study groups than in any other single activity. The international character of IPR bringing together experts for informal discussion on Far Eastern problems has interested many government people who after participating in one of these groups usually become members. It may be that this kind of activity can be expanded throughout the United States; in areas where non-Americans interested in Pacific affairs are present, the international character could be organized for people with Far Eastern background. It may be that this phase of our activity should be planned in cooperation with local FPA's, Carnegie Endowment groups, Americans United, etc. While I strongly favor cooperation with all groups to avoid duplication, outside of study group activity I would urge that the IPR set up an independent program wherever possible.

Organized groups and clubs (including women's groups, international and national organizations interested in international relations, church groups, labor groups, and other) are attracted by general membership meetings. An arbitrary figure of six such meetings a year might be planned for all active branches. While we have been able to plan only one meeting ahead in Washington we hope in the future to have plans made a little farther ahead. It is not always possible to do this, of course, because people come unexpectedly and sometimes stay only briefly. These groups mentioned above who will form the broader base which we hope to build are also very much interested in the popular pamphlet program. It may be that the general meetings and new pamphlets could be coordinated in some way. The Army and Navy can be included in the above group, generally speaking. We had one special luncheon in Washington for Army and Navy leaders in orientation work about a year ago to acquaint them with our work, particularly our pamphlet program. Perhaps another one should be planned soon.

There has been no demand in Washington for the business luncheons which have worked so successfully in New York. However, we have had a number of small informal sherry parties beginning at 5:30 and lasting about an hour for foreign officials, U. S. government officials, newspapermen, etc., just back from the Far East. To these meetings we invite approximately 35 people, mostly members and some nonmembers whom we wish to interest in membership. The talks are usually off-the-record and brief, with a long question period. We have had 17 such meetings in the course of the past 12 months. They are an excellent technique for building membership in Washington as well as for giving us the reputation for being closely in touch with the latest visitors from the Far East. People often call up to ask what's going on at IPR? (We don't tell them all, of course!) Slightly modified to fit the special branches these meetings could be more generally used throughout by our branches.

Not a small part of our office time is taken up with requests for information, not only on IPR publications and others but on substantive material. We have handled this business very spottily in Washington. When I have time, I work up bibliographies, investigate Mme. Chiang Kai-shek's life, etc., but often these requests must be answered very generally by reference to a pamphlet or article. This is one specific instance where coordination between a branch and the national office is bad. There are lots of special bibliographies in the file in New York (Bruno has worked up many), and somehow when this is done branches should get copies. It would be desirable to have copies of those already drawn up. Another criticism which I would like to make is that, unless I come to New York to find out specifically what each of you is working on, I am apt to be very loosely informed. (Don't stop the New York trips thought.) For instance, I had heard from someone down here that we were putting out a pamphlet by Pearl Buck but didn't know anything about it until I got to New York. Each department head or the Secretary should assume responsibility for keeping branches informed about all work in preparation. This would be a big help.

We have recently decided in Washington that we would try to build up our relations with the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees. In connection with these plans which have already been in operation, a few of us invited Congressman Mansfield to dinner, and plans are in process to invite Congresswoman Emily Taft Douglas for lunch. Getting the IPR better known on the Hill will be one of our chief aims for the next six months. (I might add, Peggy, that I am scared to death of this kind of work.) I have asked Ruth Lazurus to keep me informed about forthcoming issues of *FES* so that I can use special articles as a springboard for discussion on IPR.

Finally, on the question of big money raising, I have done nothing in this field whatsoever. The question is a complex one, I know, but the branches should be informed of what is being done in the various areas and how. The national office should assume leadership in this job but with some direction; perhaps the branches could help share the burden.

The fact that Washington has almost doubled membership figures since the reestablishment of our Washington office is a concrete indication of the interest of many kinds of people in our work. (Check with Tillie. I believe we've added over 85 members and have approximately 200 now.)

EXHIBIT No. 948

1 EAST 54th STREET,
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.,
13th December 1943

ANDREW J. GRAJDANZEV, ESQ.,
Office.

DEAR ANDREW: I am giving a small private dinner for several Soviet friends in Washington on Tuesday, December 14th, to report on my impressions of the Soviet Union.

I would be delighted if you would join us. The dinner will be held in Suite 237 at the Hotel Mayflower at 8:00 p. m. tomorrow night. Business suits will be worn.

Would you let me know whether, in spite of this short notice, you will be able to attend.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 949

22ND DECEMBER, 1943.

Private & Confidential.

The SECRETARY,
Lithuanian Legation,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Yesterday I received the enclosed unsigned letter, pamphlet, and news bulletin in the enclosed envelope.

I have scanned this material and am now returning it to you because I am not able to write to the anonymous sender, and furthermore I ought in all frankness to say that I am sure that this is not the moment for friends of Lithuania to attack the Soviet Union. From a realistic point of view it seems clear that Lithuanians in Europe will have a better opportunity of working out their own salvation by forgetting the grievances of the past centuries and seeking to understand and cooperate with the people of the Soviet Union. It would seem to me that along these lines there is a greater chance for peace in Europe and prosperity in Lithuania than along the lines of the enclosed documents.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 949–A

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as Exhibit I. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am satisfied that with the following exception they are letters or memoranda received by me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me to others or photostatic copies of such copies:

12. Ray Dennett RDC Sept. 26, 1945.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Sworn to before me this 9th day of May 1952.

[SEAL] IRENE R. DONOHUE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Qualified in Queens County, No. 41–6061300.
Certs. filed with Queens, Kings, New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs. Offices, Westchester & Nassau Co. Clerks Offices.
Commission Expires March 30, 1954.

(The document referred to by Mr. Carter is exhibit No. 962.)

EXHIBIT No. 950

K. C. LI, WOOLWORTH BUILDING, NEW YORK

EL RUNCHOKEE,
El Paso, Texas, March 7, 1944.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Your letter of March 1 has been forwarded to me and I am enclosing copy of a letter I have written to the Draft Board in Richmond, California.

I approve of your assuring Mr. Holland that the IPR for the next two years will make up the difference between any salary he may receive in government service and his present IPR salary. It is only fair in view of the reasons you give.

I hope Holland is deferred, as he is indeed indispensable in preparing for the important 1945 Meeting. I am leaving here but expect to be back in New York by the 15th.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) K. C. Li.
K. C. LI.

KCL: efm
(Enclosure)

EXHIBIT No. 951

K. C. LI, WOOLWORTH BUILDING, NEW YORK

MARCH 7, 1944.

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD #53,
Richmond, Calif.

GENTLEMEN: I have just learned that Mr. W. L. Holland, a registrant of your Board, has been classified as 1-A. May I respectfully suggest reconsideration of this classification for the following reasons:

1. Mr. Holland is International Research Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations which is the leading research organization devoted to Pacific problems.

2. Because the Institute has lost so many of its staff to Government service, Mr. Holland has literally become indispensable. Besides being research secretary, he is also editor of its magazine, "Pacific Affairs."

3. The 1945 Conference of the Institute is regarded as very important, and preparations for it are in the hands of Mr. Holland. The work of this Conference will be valuable to the State Department as well as to members of the United Nations.

4. Mr. Holland is frequently being consulted by representatives of the War, Navy, and Treasury Departments.

5. Should the registrant be inducted, he will no doubt, because of poor eyesight, be assigned to limited service. I believe he is of greater value to his country and the cause of the United Nations in his present position than he can be in uniform.

For the above reasons, I recommend that Mr. Holland be deferred for 1 year.

Sincerely yours,

K. C. LI,
Chairman, International Finance Committee, Institute of Pacific Relations.

EXHIBIT No. 952

3/27/44.

NOTES FOR CLEVELAND SPEECH, MARCH 31, 1944

The peoples and leaders of the United Nations generally believe that they will win the war. But many thoughtful people in the various nations are not so sure of the peace. This misgiving is on balance a healthy sign. It derives in part from a greater degree of political consciousness than that which existed amongst the Allies in the midst of the First World War. It is true that some hundreds of people in the United Kingdom, the British Dominions, the United States and other countries were studying problems of world organization during the last war. But where there were hundreds engaged in this task then, there are now thousands, probably tens of thousands. Indeed one of the most striking results of the last war and the Paris and other peace conferences was the creation of scores of important national and local organizations whose central purpose was: "It must never happen again." Among the many such non-governmental organizations that came into being at that period are the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, The Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangere in Paris, the Institute of History and Economics in Copenhagen, the Foreign Policy Association and the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States. In 1925 men and women from several of the Pacific countries, meeting in Honolulu, formed the Institute of Pacific Relations as a regional expression of this broad movement. For it was felt that most international organizations had their headquarters in Europe and were inadvertently tending to take the position that if European problems were solved the problems of the world as a whole would disappear. Many Europeans and Americans, if they looked to the Far East at all, seemed to be looking that way with a telescope in reverse. The founders of the IPR were acutely conscious of a whole world of dynamic forces in the Pacific area which had menacing possibilities and which cried out for immediate study. The Institute aimed to study the problems of the Pacific from a world point of view and the problems of the world from a Pacific point of view. National Councils of the Institute came into being in eleven countries bordering on the Pacific or having vital interests in that area. When Japan raised the curtain on the Second World War by occupying Manchuria in 1931, the foresight of the founders of the Institute was justified. In

1933 the Institute chose Mr. Newton D. Baker as Chairman of its international governing body, the Pacific Council and he gave rare insight to the leadership of the Institute until his death. Recently an eminent American, closely in touch with the efforts of the United Nations, following Hongkong and Pearl Harbor, to prepare themselves for the war in the Pacific, remarked: "I would hate to think of where we would have been if it had not been for the scholarly research of the Institute of Pacific Relations."

In addition to the national and international organizations which I have just mentioned there have grown up in this and other countries local and regional societies of similar purpose such as the Cleveland Council on World Affairs and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. These still further register the growing conviction that the study of foreign affairs was as urgent a concern of the masses as domestic issues. The contribution of such councils to public enlightenment has been great.

But the Second World War has come and by history's severest test the efforts of us all will have to be described with the one word: "failure."

The challenge today is how can we profit by this collective failure to help in solving now the overwhelming problems of world organization? Do we now accept Newton D. Baker's prophecy that if the nations did not organize after the first world struggle, the war would have to be fought over again on a vaster scale and that the United States would return to the ideal of world organization which it had rejected?

Although the governments of the world and the peoples through unofficial organizations like the Cleveland Council on World Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations have failed, they have increased substantially the possibility of avoiding the grievious mistakes of the past generation. Balked and frustrated as we are by the caution of our governments, the leaders of the United Nations and their respective publics are much further advanced in previsioning the future than they were at this stage in World War I.

Both governmental agencies and unofficial organizations have done and are doing quantitatively at least a vastly greater amount of study on the future organization of the world than they had done in preparation for the Paris Conference. In the United States alone every week sees the appearance of some new book, plan, or monograph on world organization. The Protestant Churches, under the leadership of John Foster Dulles, have advanced their views. The international lawyers, under the leadership of Manley O. Hudson of Harvard and the Permanent Court of International Justice, after a long period of careful study, have made six postulates and twenty-three proposals for the organization of the proposed community of nations and prescribing details for the operation of its machinery. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, under the leadership of James T. Shotwell, has published a flood of memoranda on almost every aspect of the postwar world. The United States Chamber of Commerce's Committee on Post War Problems has called for the immediate formation of an international commission to draft a world peace plan based on the Moscow 4-Power Declaration. This committee, headed by Harper Sibley of Rochester, has made six brief but pertinent proposals which, if adopted, might usher in a new era. The Committee of Economic Development under Paul G. Hoffman of the Studebaker Corporation has a nation-wide net of study groups working on the internal problems of American adjustment to the postwar situation. In this field many other organizations such as the Brookings Institute, the Twentieth Century Fund, the National Industrial Conference Board, the Chamber of Commerce, the A. F. of L., and C. I. O. through a joint committee are busily at work. Many of the great universities have created institutes of international affairs which are turning out thoughtful memoranda on the postwar world. The National League of Women Voters, the American Association of University Women, the National Federation of Women's Clubs are similarly engaged. In the periodical field, FORTUNE magazine is conspicuous for its continuing publication of articles on America and the future. This magazine has already published five major articles dealing with relations with Britain, with the Pacific, with Europe, and also with reference to the American domestic economy and the United States government. The Institute of Pacific Relations has the cooperation of its Councils in ten countries in carrying out a long-range and very fundamental series of studies on the war and postwar problems of the Pacific area. The interim volume "WAR AND PEACE IN THE PACIFIC," being a report of the Mont Tremblant Conference, sketches the main outlines of the problems and indicates the studies which still must be undertaken. The Inter-

national Labour Office in Montreal and the Secretariat of the League of Nations in Princeton are hard at work.

Within the State Departments and Foreign Offices of the United Nations work on these problems from the governmental angle is proceeding on a much greater scale in volume at least than during the first world war.

Both the public and governments of the principal United Nations will have an immense volume of material with which to face the future. But while recognizing the value of all this preparatory work, the publics are haunted by several misgivings.

First, they fear that statesmanship, though adequately documented, will fail because the statesmen are tired, overworked, overcautious, and so fearful of their internal political opponents that they are unequipped to give that creative leadership on which the world waits.

Second, they fear that isolationism with its reactionary and appeasing qualities will rise up to defeat creative statecraft if it emerges.

Third, the people of Britain, China, Russia, France, and Italy fear that if America's leaders move constructively to implement the Moscow declaration, the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms in cooperation with the other Powers that the American Congress will repeat history and defeat American statesmanship at the end of this war.

It is precisely at this point that the role of organizations like the Cleveland Council on World Affairs emerges as of transcendant importance.

At the first conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Honolulu in 1925 at the opening session the Chairman asked the members to list the problems of the Pacific. The very first spokesman rose and said, "The United States is *the* problem of the Pacific." There were many in other countries who asserted that the United States, because of its growing strength and its refusal to cooperate with the League of Nations, the International Labour Office and the World Court, was an anarchical influence in the Pacific and in the world in general.

Facing the new and vastly more complex world situation today there are many responsible Americans who hold that *the* problem of the postwar world is the United States. For if it does not use its sovereignty to implement a world collective system, the third world war will be infinitely more devastating than anything mankind has yet known.

There is a tendency among other Americans to fear that the application of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter will be defeated not by the United States but by the British and the Dutch in their colonial world and by the British in their acquiescence in an unjust settlement in eastern Europe. There is a further American belief that the forming and successful operation of a world organization will be thwarted by the age-old conflict of the European nations and the reemergence of Britain's ancient balance-of-power policy. There are other Americans who admit these dangers but who affirm that they will only be realized if the United States withdraws from the theatre of world cooperation. Certainly it is not the duty of the Cleveland Council on World Affairs or the Foreign Policy Association or the Council on Foreign Relations to dictate to our European or Asiatic allies. It is rather to concentrate on the colossal task of so informing the American electorate that its representatives in Congress will voice an overwhelming and intelligent American mass opinion on behalf of effective and daring cooperation in world machinery and affairs.

Although the various public opinion polls reveal a growing American approval of international cooperation, they do not yet ensure that when the generalities are brought down to the concrete issues of "vital interests", the American public is prepared to go the whole way. In this decade we have seen the great Republic of France collapse because for 150 years there have existed two Frances which hated each other. Within this country the lines do not appear to be as clearly drawn as in France. But there are menacing movements and attitudes which are growing in strength. In spite of much that is encouraging, attitudes toward the Negro, the Jew and even the North American Indian make it inappropriate for Americans to throw stones at the British for their treatment of colonial peoples. The attitude of certain American groups toward progressive movements in organized labor, among farmers, and the public generally hold the seeds of future devastating conflict. Usually those who take these antisocial attitudes are precisely those who still appear to regard the Nazis and the Japanese more tolerantly than they regard our British, Russian, and Chinese allies.

America today is in debt—deep debt—to China, Britain, and the USSR. To China because she was the first to see the nature of aggression and take up arms against Japan. To England because if she had lost the Battle of Britain the Nazis would have lunged into the Atlantic and been able to drive further into Russia before they were stopped. And to the Soviet Union for her early foresight in knowing that war was coming and for her brilliant and stupendous war effort.

I would hate to think of how much further Japan would have gone if the Chinese had not contained from three-quarters of a million to a million Japanese troops on the mainland of Asia for nearly seven years. Australia, India, Alaska, and parts of the United States Pacific coast would have been endangered.

If England had lost the Battle of Britain, Canada and the United States would have become a war theatre instead of arsenals of democracy. Latin America would undoubtedly have been used by the Nazis as a springboard for bombing Dallas, New Orleans, Atlanta, and Washington.

If the USSR had not accepted Hitler's challenge, Germany and Japan would have met in India and all southern Asia would have fallen to the enemy. China's position would have become well nigh hopeless and most of Africa would have been in the hands of the Nazis and Fascists.

China's losses have been vaster than those of Britain and America combined. They have been equalled only by those of Russia, for to date the Red Army has killed more Nazi troops than the armies of all the United Nations put together. The magnitude of the Soviet effort is indicated statistically when I remind you that the published totals of American Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel is still under forty thousand dead as compared with an estimate of three million in the Soviet Union.

The comradeship in arms of China, Britain, Russia, and the United States has naturally led to a measure of collaboration in staking out the broad outlines of the peace. The Moscow agreements commit these four Powers to participate in a new international order. This commitment implied that the four Powers would police our enemies and substituted four Power collaboration for the old formula of a balance of power among the strongest states.

Probably a majority of thinking Americans accept the Moscow thesis that a nuclear alliance of the four Powers is a precondition of an ordered world. They agree with the Moscow conference leaders that provision should be made for the cooperation of all peace-loving states with the Big Four. Public opinion in the United States broadly accepts the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms partially because of an incorrigible American habit to accept broad and idealistic generalities. But the re-educational job with which we are confronted is as follows:

First, to define what these mean when applies to the American scene; Second, to understand the degree to which they can be applied nationally and internationally by the other Powers; Third, to aid our government in stating the issues so concretely and constructively that they will be supported by the people and the Congress and provide a basis for mutual cooperation with the other Powers.

One of the many dangers in current American thought is the persistence of the idea that the United States is the most powerful country in the world. Even more sinister is the belief that we are the most moral people in the world. And finally, there is emerging from many platforms the assertion that the cultural and intellectual center of the world has moved from the European continent and the British Isles to North America. "Let him that thinkest he standeth, take heed lest he fall."

In industrial and agricultural production and social organization the Soviet Union may outstrip the United States in our lifetime. Out of the ruins of continental Europe there may emerge a daring intellectual vigor surpassing that in the United States. There are those who believe that the leaders in the realm of art and thought who will set the pace for the civilized world will emerge from the vast area that stretches from the Volga to the Yangtze.

Certainly our failure following the Paris conference and our failure to understand the implications of Japanese, Italian, Spanish, and German aggression sprang in part from the American feeling of overwhelming superiority in power, social organization, and intellectual leadership. The war has shown that we are members one of another, that we are strong only as we are united with other nations.

Recently Mr. Walter Lippmann in his "U. S. Foreign Policy" has convinced many Americans that we have never had a coherent world policy. More recently Mr. Joseph M. Jones in his "A Modern Foreign Policy for the United States" has made an on-the-whole useful critique of our own State Department and at two points has advanced ideas which call for widespread study on the part of the American public. He lists some of the main operating concepts of American foreign policy in the past and affirms that there is scarcely one that has not been either demolished by the impact of world events or riddled by the implications of modern warfare. This is what he says:

"(1) Isolation, avoidance of alliances, avoidance of commitments, diplomacy by 'parallel action' and 'cooperative effort'—demolished by our inevitable involvement in two devastating world wars in one generation.

"(2) Verbal championing of high principles of international law and conduct while continually declaring that our action in support of any and all principles would stop 'short of war,' thereby delivering our diplomacy over to any foreign nation that could trump our highest card—destroyed by Japanese bombs at Pearl Harbor.

"(3) Nonintervention in the affairs of sovereign states—a fraud that was exposed in all of its essential absurdity in Spain in 1937.

"(4) Rights of neutrals—two world wars have shown conclusively that they are respected *only* to the extent that it is convenient and expedient for warring powers to do so.

"(5) Freedom of the seas—to a large extent made irrelevant by the growth of civil and military air power.

"(6) National self-determination—proved inadequate as it fails to protect the rights of individuals and minorities.

"(7) Limitation and reduction of armaments—a policy proved dangerous to the nation's security in the absence of international organization for policing, inspection, enforcement, and for mitigating the economic causes of war.

"(8) Concept of international law as applying only to *states* and not to individuals, thus permitting atrocities *within* states that shock and offend the world's conscience and lead to war—direct bomb hit.

"(9) Nondiscrimination and equality of treatment in commercial relations—still valid, but inadequate in a world in which economic *expansion* and a rising standard of living are conditions of peace and democracy."

Mr. Jones proceeds to sketch the framework of a modern foreign policy as follows:

"I. The first major requirement of a modern American foreign policy is that it shall perpetuate after the war the close association of the four major United Nations—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—as a nucleus of world order, strong and above challenge.

"II. The second important requirement of American foreign policy is that it shall be based upon, protect, and extend the principle of freedom in the world.

"III. The third essential requirement of American foreign policy is that it shall make adequate provision for international control over civil and military air power everywhere in the world; and for placing at the disposal of a United Nations organization a sufficient margin of air power to deal efficiently and effectively with aggression or threat of aggression anywhere in the world.

"IV. The fourth major requirement of American foreign policy is that it shall promote, wherever in the world it is desired, steady expansion of economic activity, a rising standard of living for the masses, and expanding programs of public education, health, and nutrition as indispensable to democracy and peace."

In spite of certain limitations I would urge all of you who are here today carefully to study these two volumes. In addition I venture to suggest study of the volume "Post War Worlds" by Percy E. Corbett and "War and Peace in the Pacific" for those concerned for international relationships in that half of the world. To this latter group I recommend the volume "Winning the Peace in the Pacific" by S. R. Chow, an eminent Chinese scholar, and another volume "The Future of Southeast Asia" by an Indian leader, K. M. Panikkar.

The Institute of Pacific Relations in common with other organizations is engaged in an effort to fill up the vast gaps in the world's knowledge of the Pacific area. The American Council of that Institute has published recently a sheaf of pamphlets on several of the countries of the Pacific which are being used widely in the American Army and in American secondary schools. Everyone here who has a relative in the Armed Forces in the Pacific or a child in an Ohio school will wish to familiarize themselves with this invaluable series.

This vast Pacific world, almost unknown to Americans before Pearl Harbor, is now being visited by a rapidly increasing stream of American men and women in the Armed Forces. For a few it is a kind of Cook's tour. But for the majority it is the mud of a South Pacific fox-hole, the fever of the Burmese jungle, the heat of the Indian plains, and the frustration of life in wartime China. A "must" for all patriotic Americans is to see that their men and women in these areas are supplied with background material on racial and national cultures and economic interests so that they can adjust themselves intelligently to their role of comrades in arms and comrades in peace with their Pacific allies. There remains the common task of examining the military, political, and economic policy which the United States and other United Nations should adopt in this far flung Pacific area. Here more attention has been given to the treatment of Japan that to any other single topic. But if we think that the resolving of the problem of Japan means the solution of all the problems of international cooperation in the Pacific area, we will deceive ourselves. For all around that greatest of oceans new dynamic and divisive forces will emerge which must be faced on a regional and global basis.

Let us address ourselves first, however, to the treatment of Japan. I am not familiar with any more comprehensive analysis of this problem than that contained in an article in the current PACIFIC AFFAIRS by my colleague, T. A. Bisson. Recognizing that the treatment of Germany will give some pointers for the treatment of Japan, Mr. Bisson, from whom I will quote at length, writes as follows:

"In his Christmas Eve broadcast, President Roosevelt expressed the general principles underlying the political attack on Germany in most careful and exact terminology. The conferees at Teheran, said the President, 'were united in determination that Germany must be stripped of her military might and be given no opportunity within the foreseeable future to regain that might. The United Nations have no intention to enslave the German people. We wish them to have a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members of the European family. But we most certainly emphasze that word "respectable"—for we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the "master race.'"

"Against the background of the final military assault on the European fortress, three simple principles are laid before the Germany people: (1) Germany's military power will be crushed and not permitted to revive; (2) the old leadership must go; and (3) on these bases, the German people will again be accepted as normal members of the European community. The uncompromising nature of this program is perhaps its most striking feature. Even with respect to the second principle, there is no call to the Germans to throw out their old leaders. The words used—'we intend to rid them'—place the responsibility on the United Nations for this drastic action. They are an implied threat to those Germans who support the old leaders, and an implied promise to those Germans who would like to see them overthrown. Cooperation of the German people in this overthrow would obviously be welcomed, but it is neither urged nor suggested.

"In the same broadcast, President Roosevelt also made reference to two basic elements which must enter into the making of peace with Japan. These comprise first, 'the restoration of stolen property to its rightful owners'—a restatement of the Cairo pledge that Japan will be stripped of all territories gained by aggression since 1895; and secondly, the peace will ensure 'the permanent elimination of the Empire of Japan as a potential force of aggression.' It is noteworthy that these two pronouncements, taken together, do not go beyond the first principle as stated for Germany. They constitute a blunt affirmation of the intention of the United Nations to fight the war against Japan to a finish, somewhat analogous in this respect to the 'unconditional surrender' demand voiced at Casablanca. It might have been assumed that further statements on Japan, covering the scope of the last two principles set forth for Germany, would have to wait upon victory in Europe and the mounting of the final assault against Japan. At this point, however, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a New Year's message to the Chinese Army and people, went far to close the gap. Revealing a hitherto unreported passage at the Cairo conference, he made the following statements:

"'In intimate talks I had with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Cairo we considered steps for mutual cooperation and agreed upon certain plans for prosecution of the war.

"'We also agreed upon the question of the disposal of the enemy after the war. One important problem in this connection concerns Japan's form of government.

When President Roosevelt asked my views I frankly replied, "It is my opinion tbat all Japanese militarists must be wiped out and the Japanese political system must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements. As to what form of government Japan should adopt, that question can better be left to the awakened and repentant Japanese people to decide for themselves."

" 'I also said, "If the Japanese people should rise in revolution to punish their warmongers and overthrow their militarists' government we should respect their spontaneous will and allow them to choose their own form of government." Mr. Roosevelt fuly approved of my idea.'

"Assuming that these statements reflect a common approach to the peace settlements in Europe and the Far East, it is already possible to sketch the type of peace to be made with Japan. A few of the outlines are even now sharp and clear; others must be drawn on the basis of given suggestions in the light of objectives which seem desirable.

"The peace with Japan will be a harsh one in many of its aspects, notably those affecting territories, disarmament, and possible reparations. When the costs and sacrifices of defeating Japan's ruthless aggression are placed in the reckoning, nothing less should be expected or desired. These terms of the peace will, in some cases, be setting right old wrongs that have endured for a generation or longer. They are also required to limit Japan's power to engage in a second adventure in aggression.

"Obviously, these terms presuppose the existence and continued maintenance of unity between members of the United Nations and the emergence of a strong and effective international organization. Continued agreement and firm cooperation, at least among the United States, Great Britain, the U. S. S. R. and China, are indispensable in order to enforce the terms of peace against Japan initially and then to see that they are upheld. Given this degree of unity, the harsher aspects of the peace can be mitigated somewhat by measures which will indicate clearly to the Japanese people that the settlement is dictated not by a policy of revenge, nor with an intention to enslave. The line is not so difficult to draw as might appear. A vengeful peace can be defined as one aimed at keeping Japan in a state of lasting subjection, political or economic. Any such policy would be self-defeating. Sir George Sansom has rightly declared that the existence of 'a nation of over 70 million desperate and frustrated people would ruin any plan designed to bring prosperity and peace to Asia.' The principle enunciated by President Roosevelt for the German people must also be taken as applying to the Japanese people—they will be given 'a normal chance to develop, in peace, as useful and respectable members' of the world community.

"What is stated here really amounts to a process of postwar development. It looks toward the emergence of a healthy Japan, which can in time reenter the society of nations as a member in full standing. The process makes serious demands on the United Nations, as well as on Japan. They must assist her to develop along peaceful lines on both the political and economic levels; they must assume direct responsibility for the type of political and social structure established in Japan after her defeat. United Nations guidance will be required in greater or lesser degree, to make it certain that the old autocratic system is not reestablished, but that a new system is inaugurated in which the democratic aspirations of the Japanese people find real expression. Full opportunity must also be given Japan to raise the living standard of her people by the processes of normal international trade. The new world organization must have not only the strength to maintain collective security but also the economic statesmanship to eliminate trade barriers and develop the colonial areas of the world by measures for improving the social and economic welfare of the inhabitants on a basis of nondiscriminatory international cooperation. This process will provide the most dependable safeguard against renewed Japanese (or German) aggression. The enemy nations must be restored to health and then must be fitted into a constructive system of international collaboration."

Whatever the fate of the Royal Family, it is clear that whatever remains of the Japanese Navy must be surrendered. Munitions and aircraft must be destroyed or surrendered. Munitions plants must at least be converted into production of civilian goods. For a considerable period Japan will be prevented from maintaining military and naval forces. A civilian police force alone will be allowed. The punishment of the Japanese leaders of totalitarian aggression, whether naval, military, or industrial, must be complete. On the

matter of reparations the experts disagree. The Chinese are expected to inherit such parts of the large industrial plants in Manchuria and Formosa as are not destroyed by military action or a scorched earth policy. In these factories and in the coal and iron of Manchuria, China will add significantly to her heavy industry. If, as declared at Cairo, China regains all her lost territories there would seem to be but little need of insisting on a long drawn-out period of reparation payments which might promise more discord than they are worth. Confined to the slender area of her own islands, Japan will face a perplexing problem of self-support. With the security issue settled, intelligent people in other countries will assert that Japan's economic rehabilitation will be advantageous to other countries. Mr. Bisson rightly affirms:

"Extension of disarmament into the factory, a necessity under modern conditions, still treats the symptoms, not the disease itself. The key issue in the degree of success attending the United Nations' dealings with a defeated Japan is not how well the country is disarmed but how greatly its outlook and motivations are changed. In the last analysis, what is required is a thorough recasting of Japan's political and social leadership. Addressing himself to Germany, President Roosevelt declared in the statement already quoted: '* * * we intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the "master race."' In much the same terms, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated that 'all Japanese militarists must be wiped out and the Japanese political system must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements.'"

As to those who ask, "Can we expect to impose democracy on Japan?" one answer is that if the United Nations do not concern themselves we will find the militarists and secret societies back again in their old places of power. Others will answer that the Japanese people may do a good part of the job themselves. Without staking Japan's future on the so-called "liberals" we do know that there have been relatively able opposition movements in Japan. If the United Nations' political warfare and postwar policy is sound, it will appeal to the Japanese on the ground that there are stronger material, social, and emotional satisfactions than those deriving from the ideology of conquest and master race. Confidence must be created in the faith that construction can follow destruction. If the United States role in United Nations' policy is to be positive in revolutionizing the psychology of the Japanese, the American people must steer a courageous and realistic course toward cooperation with the masses of Japan by avoiding appeasement and collaboration with the militarists and the great cartels which have never refused to profit from the expansionist policy of the militarists.

As indicated above while the problem of Japan is central it is not the only one in the Pacific area. A few of those that must be faced are the foreign trade, investment, airlines, merchant marine, and immigration policies of the United States. Another is the problem of British relations with India, Burma, Malaysia, and China. Internally China has tensions and problems that are as baffling as those within the United States.

Though Soviet Russia was the first great power to aid China substantially in her war with Japan, the role of Russia in the Pacific is still obscure to many citizens of China, India, the Netherlands, the United States and the British Commonwealth. This results in large measure to two factors: First and principally because of the generation of mutual suspicion between these powers and the Soviet Union and the fact that but few citizens of these countries have ever taken the trouble to inform themselves on the rational character of Soviet policy in Asia and the Pacific. It results to a lesser degree from a failure to recognize the validity of the position of the combined Chiefs of Staffs that Russia's supreme contribution to the global war is to continue her devastating blows against the Nazis. No United Nations citizen in his right mind could ask that at this moment the Soviet Union take on a second front war which would incidentally cut off the great flow of lend-lease supplies for the defeat of Hitler that now safely cross the Pacific. But in the postwar period whether Russia enters the Pacific war or not, the other Pacific nations will have to recognize Russia as a major Pacific power. The future peace of the Pacific will depend in part on whether the powers that heretofore have regarded Russia with suspicion can so thoroughly inform themselves as to Russian policy as to be able to accept at its face value Russia's overwhelming commitment to the world collective system.

CLEVELAND LECTURE, MARCH 31, 1944

In Georgia, in the Atlanta Constitution, Mr. Henry Ford proclaimed that the war will end in two months. Mr. Ford was not in a position to reveal the inside information on which his prediction was based. The period in which we will have to wait in order to verify his accuracy is so brief that I shall not take your time today to speculate on its truth or falsity. I mention it merely to advance another speculation and that is that Mr. Ford in common with some other Americans may believe that the collapse of Germany automatically and simultaneously means the end of the war with Japan.

I do not hold this view. It seems to me to spring from several wrong assumptions (1) a throw-back to the pre-Pearl Harbor underestimation of Japanese power; (2) a belief that there is a Pacific war and a European war rather than a global conflict; (3) that once the Nazis are subdued the United Nations can quickly deal the mortal blow to Japan.

But for the moment let us have an end of speculation. Looking across the Pacific one sure factor emerges. The way in which the United Nations deal with Japan and all the areas which Japan has occupied will be one of the determinants of the issues of war and peace in the world for coming generations.

Undoubtedly the collapse of Germany will have profound repercussions in Japan. The Japanese will receive the news with mixed feelings. It will spell ultimate doom. At the same time many Japanese, angry with Hitler's failure at Moscow, Stalingrad and in the Caucasus and exasperated by the arrogant behavior of their German colleagues in Japan and China, will secretly rejoice that the German master race is eating the dust of defeat. The Japanese command will undoubtedly seek to minimize the meaning of Hitler's downfall. With his collapse will come two important opportunities—the first on the military; the second on the political and psychological front. If the latter is as inchoate as in the past United Nations political warefare in Africa and Europe has been we may yet win the war in the Pacific but lose the peace.

EXHIBIT NO. 953

APRIL 14, 1944.

SOVIET RUSSIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE

(By Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General of the Institute of Pacific Relations)

The Red Army has killed more Nazi soldiers than the armies of all the rest of the United Nations put together. Surely this is a primary contribution to the future, for until the Nazi army is destroyed there will be no peace.

If the USSR had not accepted Hitler's challenge, Germany and Japan would have met in India and all southern Asia would have fallen to the enemy. China's position would have beoome well nigh hopeless and most of Africa would have been in the hands of the Nazis and Fascists.

By what means did Russia emerge as the greatest effective military power in the world in the winter of 1943–44? By what alchemy did the Russia of 1914–17 transform herself in a short generation? Remember that Germany knocked Czarist Russia out of the First World War while Germany was still at war with the entire British Empire, the United States, France, Belgium, Italy, China and Japan. There is no single answer. The process represents a vast complex of historical and economic forces. Here we have the paradox of a great people who sought primarily the good life. That was the first aim. Supreme military power emerged as a by-product of that objective. In other words, Russia's second contribution to the peace is the unity of her people and her progress in social and economic organization, looking forward to a genuine democracy as the ultimate goal.

The Russians, the British, the Chinese, and indeed many Americans are still guessing as to the future international role of the United States. Under these circumstances it is inevitable that people in the other countries should be guessing about Russia's future role. This results in part from a generation of mingled suspicion and ignorance which has blinded many of us to the fact that through the years Russia has had a rather exceptionally consistent foreign policy.

No student of current affairs can be blind to the serious effects on present thinking in many countries on the future role of the Soviet Union as a result of nearly twenty years of mutual misunderstanding between Russia and other countries. There is not time tonight for me to list those trends—some real,

some imagined—in the early days of the revolution which caused misgivings abroad. Those early years provoked a profound and burning suspicion of things Russian.

To the Russians the behavior of the other nations seemed equally grim. Suspicion in Russia of the capitalist countries resulted from foreign intervention in Russia following the revolution. On the advice of Secretary of War Winston Churchill in 1918 London despatched materials and troops into northern Russia under Major General Poole and later under Major General Ironside. These forces at their maximum numbered more than eighteen thousand British and five thousand Americans. They disposed of the Soviet government at Archangel and set up a provisional white government. In eastern Siberia, British, French, American and Japanese forces marched in. The Czechs controlled western Siberia and Admiral Kolchak with British aid established a provisional regime at Omsk. You are familiar with the aid which the Allies gave to Generals Yudenich ———. You will remember that in 1921 the French General Weygand played a major role in Poland's war against Russia. For a long time it was not easy for Russia to forget the foreign intervention of 1918, the Allied blockade of Russia in 1919, or the credit blockade that extended into the 1920's.

From the moment of Litvinov's first arrival in Geneva, the Soviet government went on record as committed to a world collective security system. Neither the United States, France, nor Great Britain were really committed to that system. Englishmen and Frenchmen assure Americans that it was impossible for their governments to make this commitment because of American isolationism.

The Powers regarded Russia's commitment to the collective system cynically, and the temporary Moscow-Berlin agreement in 1939 was the direct result of the policies of Chamberlain and Daladier in the Munich period.

It behooves Americans to resurvey the whole history of 150 years of relations between Russia and the United States, both under the Czar and under the Bolsheviks. In this period of 150 years the United States has been at war at one time or another with Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Never throughout this period has the United States been at war with Russia. Misunderstanding have arisen from time to time between the United States and both Czarist and Bolshevik Russia, but they have never issued in war between the two countries. The economic and foreign policies of the two countries have been parallel. Their broad interests have been largely identic. Both have been more concerned with the maintenance of peace than advancing their fortunes by wars of aggression.

On both sides there is much to forget. Happily, there is a general, though not yet universal, desire to face forward and profit by the grave mistakes of the past. Since June 22nd, 1941, immense progress has been made in the task of liquidating distrust and forging new ties of genuine understanding.

The growing awareness of Russia's indispensability as a member of the family of nations derives from several causes:

First, a frank recognition of the fact that if the USSR had not resisted the Nazis the other United Nations would still be fighting a losing war;

Second, fresh and ever increasing knowledge of the military, industrial and social strength of the Soviet Union;

Third, a recognition that Soviet geography, natural resources, and commitment to a steady rise in the standard of living both demand and make possible Russia's announced and reiterated commitment to a strong world collective security system.

At the recent Moscow and Teheran conferences Russia gave unequivocal evidence of her commitment to a world collective security system. This is so clearly in Russia's self-interest that only a defection by London and Washington can again precipitate Russia's withdrawal.

Mr. Hull has indicated clearly that one of the foundations of United States war and peace policy is the complete destruction of the Nazi system which plunged us into war. There can now no longer be any question in any informed person's mind as to the complete commitment of the Soviet government and the Russian people to the destruction of the Nazi system. In view of the Soviet war effort the consistent prediction of certain writers of a separate deal between Stalin and Hitler appears ridiculous. Though the Moscow and Teheran declarations have been criticized as indefinite, few can ignore the significance of the declarations regarding complete agreement as to the scope and timing of military operations.

In the political field the Moscow declaration's fourth point recognized "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization—for the maintenance of peace and security." Cooperation of the

great Powers is such an indispensable precondition of substantial advance that this must be regarded as a step forward. Moscow and Teheran were also significant in that they were the occasion for the first meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the government heads of the three great Powers.

There is a cluster of declarations and agreements which throw a good deal of light on the interests, intentions, and broad ideals of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union: The Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Declaration, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942, and the mutual aid agreements concluded by the United States with other countries. The Moscow and Teheran statements to a large extent implied general approval of the foregoing declarations and agreements. In some cases they stood for concrete and binding commitments. In other cases they repreesnt ultimate goals toward which progress will be gradual. In other words, the Moscow and Teheran statements underlined in clear terms the Soviet Union's commitment to a broad program of cooperation for peace and security.

As might be expected, the Bolsheviks with their growing appreciation of the continuity of Russian history have long assumed that the recovery of Russia's lost territories was a legitimate aim.

The Russians have made it abundantly evident that they regard the reacquisition of the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and parts of Karelia as desirable and historically defensible. They have announced that at the right time they are prepared to negotiate with a responsible and representative government of Poland on the general basis of the Curzon line. They have not dogmatically insisted on the Curzon Line as unalterable, but they have stated frankly that it should form the basis for negotiation.

The Russians have affirmed their wholly friendly and cordial interest in the reestablishment of the Czechoslovak state. They have entered into a strong and binding twenty-year agreement with Great Britain. They have made clear their attitude to the French National Committee of Liberation. They have stated their attitude to the Badoglio government.

The Soviet authorities have declared that they do not intend to annex Rumanian territory or to alter the Rumanian social structure.

The Soviet government, together with Great Britain and the United States, has notified the Austrians, the rest of Europe, and the whole world of their intention that their goal is that Austria become independent and free. The Austrians are assured of support in their efforts to find economic and political advantage through understandings with "those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems." In other words, the world organization will not in theory stand in the way of regional arrangements in the Danube Valley.

A measure of regionalism was foreshadowed by the creation at Moscow of the Advisory Council for Italy and the European Advisory Commission.

The Soviets clearly wish to look forward to a hundred years of peace. I venture to guess that they would prefer to see western Europe emerge from the war quickly into a long era of peace and progress under liberal, democratic, capitalistic and friendly governments than to be torn in twain by long-drawn-out chaos resulting from inconclusive communist revolutions.

Vis-à-vis Japan, the USSR does not seek a two-front war. The strength of the Soviet Far Eastern armies is such as to immobilize a Japanese army of approximately three-quarters of a million in Korea, Manchuria, and North China. While not seeking war with Japan, one may surmise that the Russian Army does not fear Japan. Very recently the negotiations regarding Sakhalin and the fisheries question reveal that Moscow is fully aware of the fact that her strength is greater than that of Japan. In discussing the war in the Pacific, Soviet writers invariably refer to Japan as the aggressor and China, Britain, the United States, and other countries as the victims of aggression.

In her relations with China, Russia is reported to have taken a scrupulously correct position. The Chinese remember that before Pearl Harbor, when the United States and British countries were aiding Japan with abundant war materials, Russia was aiding China with substantial credits and supplies.

With reference to British India, a study of Soviet publications indicates that the Russians are failing to follow the practice of certain American liberals in lecturing Britain about her relations with India.

At Teheran the three leaders recognized the common responsibility of making "a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples." There was the promise to seek the cooperation of all peoples "dedicated to the elimination of tyranny." There was the welcome to such peoples to come "as they may choose into the world family of democratic nations." The

concert of three made clear their dedication to the cause of free lives to nations and individuals and their repudiation of the role of three-power dictatorship. There still awaits clarification of the fourth point of the Moscow declaration mentioned above regarding the necessity of establishing a general international organization. This was to be open to all peace-loving states for the maintenance of peace and security. Pending the completion of this organization the three Powers and China promised to consult with one another and, as occasion required, with other members of the United Nations.

The foregoing and other declarations point in general terms to the regulation of armaments and the inauguration of a system of general security.

Moscow and Teheran did not completely blueprint the future. They did, however, point the way to many forms of international cooperation which are of self-evident importance to all nations. Neither the British nor the Americans who participated in those conferences have provided their publics with any information to controvert the theory that Stalin and Molotov were any less sincere in their declarations than the leaders from the other nations.

The Soviet government has participated in the United Nations Food Conference and is also participating in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. A Soviet delegation recently came to the United States for preliminary bilateral talks on postwar international currency stabilization with U. S. Treasury officials. These discussions, which were paralleled with talks with the British delegation and similar negotiations with thirty other governments, are paving the way for a United Nations Monetary Conference toward the end of this year or in 1945. The press has hinted that the subject matter of the Beaverbrook-Berle conversations in London regarding international problems of postwar aviation have been communicated to the Soviet authorities.

The Soviet government's policy towards its own diverse nationalities contains lessons both for Europe and for the colonial areas alike of Europe, the Americas and Asia. These are lessons that can be learned and applied with necessarily adopting socialism as the exclusive government policy. Some of these lessons are:

1. In order to be independent and strong, substantial economic power is an essential. This is best achieved if there is an effective balance of industrial and agricultural development. This does not preclude high specialization in the internal economy.

2. When there is an integration between internal economic policy and foreign policy the risk of cultural or social domination of one nation by another is substantially reduced.

3. Nation-wide education and public health are indispensable to a rising standard of living and the development of self-government. These, however, cannot be achieved unless there is an intelligent and dynamic economic and social motivation on the part of the rank and file of the population.

4. Racial and national antagonisms and prejudices can be reduced by a combination of education, compulsion (i. e. punishment of all overt forms of discrimination and vilification) and economic practices which in fact provide equality of opportunity.

The Russians' self-confidence in their way of life and in their strength permit them to work for practical compromises with other nations and other systems. This is a new development in Soviet foreign policy beginning about 1933 at the time of the second Five-Year Plan. Before this, they relied more heavily on hortatory appeals to the rest of the world and other devices showing some lack of internal self-assurance. Those who have followed the progressive efforts of the Soviet government to give their many minorities and nationalities a more indigenous and richer culture of their own, while steadily according them greater and greater responsibility for political and economic matters, were not surprised with the Russian announcement recently that the 16 Soviet Republics were hereafter to have a say in Army and foreign policy. The minorities were to participate in the State's highest responsibilities—the issues of peace and war. This latest move was not in my view a hastily fabricated device for giving the Soviet Union more votes in a future world council than the British Empire or the Pan-American republics, or General Smuts' British countries plus Western Europe. It was rather a logical development of Stalin's policy of according to every major racial or nationality group within the Soviet Union the fullest share in the complex and abounding life of the Soviet Union and, concurrently, a new place in the affairs of the family of nations.

In October last I had the privilege of visiting one of the 16 Republics—Uzbekistan. Here, in half a generation, a medieval, predominantly Mohammedan

state has been inducted into full participation in the mass production techniques of the 20th Century. Accompanying the industrial and agricultural leap over five centuries there has been a corresponding lightning evolution from feudalism to a political and social structure that has made a backward people heir to the education, science, and the aesthetic satisfactions of the modern world. None of these rapidly developing 16 Republics have any urge to participate in wars of aggression. Their vital interest is in the maintenance of peace and the most friendly relations in trade and culture with all their neighbors. Their vested interest in peace is as great as that of every one of the forty-eight states of the American union.

EXHIBIT No. 953–A

215 EAST 72D STREET,
New York, N. Y., May 26, 1952.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS,
Room 424, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: When you brought to New York recently a large number of documents for identification, one was a mimeographed or photostated article entitled "Soviet Russia's Contribution to Peace." I remember that there was no clue as to where the article appeared.

I now find that it appeared in volume 234 of July 1944, in The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, edited by Dr. Ernest M. Patterson, professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania. The title of the volume was "Agenda for Peace."

In adition to my own, papers were contributed by Bruno Lasker, Francis B. Sayre, Percy E. Corbett, F. Cyril James, C. J. Hambro and Samuel S. Fels.

Reviews in the volume, among others, covered books by A. Whitney Griswold, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Count Sforza, Stuart Chase, H. M. Kallen, Albert Shaw.

I thought that if you are planning to print this article of mine in the records of the hearings, you would want to indicate under what auspices the article was published.

Sincerly yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC: ftw

EXHIBIT No. 954

(Penciled note:) "MAS scan & return to EC."

JANUARY 7, 1945.

ECC from RD:

Apart from Kohlberg, Hearst & Co. there has been [penciled note "No?"] direct criticism of the school material put out by Amco except as follows:

1. Julean Arnold has been carrying on a one-man crusade against the Syllabus prepared by George Harris for some years. This criticism is largely against the relative amount of attention paid in the material to the modern political aspects of China's development rather than to any misinterpretations or factual errors. Arnold feels that relatively more attention should have been devoted to Chinese history. (Penciled note "anti-Brit?")

2. Kenneth Colegrove took sharp exception to the use of Kate Mitchell (penciled note right of paragraph: "I'd never heard of this. I know we *slaved* with Kate & Komar to make it objective") and Komar Goshal as editors of the pamphlet texts on India. He wrote me a strong note asserting that Mitchell's bias had been so evident and so proved that we were doing a disservice in using her and Goshal. He stated that he felt that the pamphlet was biased. The correspondence is in the files. I have an impression that Lennox Mills joined with Colegrove's criticism, but I am not certain.

3. Leland Goodrich told me verbally that IPR pamphlet texts had been subject to attack in the Cambridge school system, and that some one had talked with him on the phone about them. My memory is vague on the subject, and at any rate no direct word reached the office while I was in charge. Again, I have the impression that the attack—if that is what it was—merely mentioned IPR material along with other stuff used in Cambridge.

(Penciled note:) "This was a question raised by a Catholic group. Later the pamphlets were adopted in Cambridge."

MAS may know of any comments directly to her from school superintendents as they did not normally come to my attention.

For your private information, Huggins has raised questions several times in Executive Committee meetings about the educational program. He has not been enthusiastic about Mrs. Stewart, and as a member of a school board has voiced some reluctance to go along with the program. McConaughy and Jessup have regularly risen to MAS's defense and to the defense of the whole educational program of Amco.

(Penciled note:) "This is very helpful to know. I'd be grateful to learn Mr. Huggins' criticisms of our school program, for we do want it to be the best ever. I can't help wondering, however, how he can judge the school program as no report of it has ever been made by me. It may be, however, that my departure from the staff will satisfy his criticism."

(Penciled note with line from next to last paragraph:) "I've had only one—from Great Neck, L. I., where *Land of the Soviets* was attacked by the Catholic Church on the grounds that the pamphlet attacked the R. C. church. When the high school teacher (who is an ardent admirer of the IPR & the pamphlet series) called on the priest & pointed out the only the Russian Orthodox Church was mentioned in the pamphlet, the opposition ceased and the series is still being used in Great Neck."

EXHIBIT No. 956

10TH FEBRUARY 1945.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
Roland View Road, Ruxton 4, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: With immense profit, delight, and admiration I have just finished reading SOLUTION IN ASIA.

It is a marvelous postscript to Hot Springs. I only wish that I had seen the manuscript or page proofs in advance and I would have made a special trip to Little, Brown & Co. to see whether they couldn't strike off a hundred advance copies to serve as the principal data paper for the Conference. If every member had had and read SOLUTION IN ASIA before the Conference began, the discussions would have been on a much higher creative and responsible level.

Personally, I feel deeply indebted to you for writing the book. I believe that the whole IPR and the leaders of the United Nations will profit immensely by its publication.

With all good wishes and my warmest congratulations, I am,

Gratefully yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 957

6TH JUNE 1945.

OWEN LATTIMORE. Esq.,
Roland View Road, Ruxton 4, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Ernest Simmons, of Cornell, at the meeting of the American-Russian Institute Board yesterday, told me he hoped you were not going to take Max Eastman's article in the Reader's Digest lying down. He asserted that Eastman could not have read the book and that all he had read was the publisher's blurb. I am eagerly looking forward to seeing you on the evening of June 13th.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 958

JUNE 18, 1945.

ECC from RD:

In answer to your memorandum of June 14, I certainly have no objection to your approaching William Morris, John Hersey, and Mrs. Maurice T. Moore for contributions to the American Council.

In view of the letter from DeWitt Wallace, of the Reader's Digest, a copy of which is attached, I am talking to I. F. Stone about the best approach to Marshall Field. Field is about to come east to talk to PM about the espionage

case, and there is a reasonable possibility that, with the Wallace letter as bait, I might be able to interest Field in seeing that the IPR did not suffer from this kind of an attack.

I have also learned that Harpers Magazine is embarrassed by its prophets and, through Jack Fisher, I am making arrangements to see Cass Caufield when he returns from Europe within the next two weeks to investigate the possibilities of a large contribution from them.

EXHIBIT No. 959

20TH JUNE, 1945.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
Roland View Road, Ruxton 4, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Enclosed is a review for PACIFIC AFFAIRS just received from Chen Han-seng. I would deeply appreciate it if you would read it and let me know whether it should go into PACIFIC AFFAIRS as it stands or whether you would recommend a few changes.

In the latter event could you in your own inimitable way take your pen in hand and do the kind of editing that will enable Chen Han-seng's review to represent his and your best thought? As he will be shortly coming to this country to join the Secretariat and to lecture at the University of Washington, I am particularly eager that in all of his published writings he puts his best foot forward.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 960

THE WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., June 25, 1945.

MR. E. C. CARTER,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I have several letters from you to acknowledge.

First, I am glad to have your authority for scrapping the old *Pacific Affairs* correspondence.

Second, I shall shortly send you all available back issues of *Pacific Affairs*, at the same time giving you details on the bound issues that I need.

Third, I am returning herewith the copy of the draft letter with Bisson's notes. You now have alternative wordings for dealing with the Manchuria-Russia aspect.

Fourth, I am returning herewith the Chen Han-seng review, with editorial suggestions. It so happens that I had been reading the Normano book myself for the purpose of writing a review for another journal. By and large I agree with Han-seng, as I usually do; but I think that as frequently happens, his talent for twisting the knife in the wound has run away with him a little. It would be a good thing to submit my proposed revisions to someone like Bisson, in order to be sure of being fair to Han-seng as well as to Normano.

Sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL:ec

EXHIBIT No. 961

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
Park Lane Hotel, London, 13th September, 1945.

RAYMOND DENNETT, ESQ.,
5th Floor, 1 East 54th Street,
New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR DENNETT: The pace has been such that any general report on my progress to date will have to wait my return. I have been sending rather inconsequential

scraps to Corbett and some of my colleagues in the office, but I have been so long out of personal touch with our colleagues on this side of the world, and I am trying to use every possible moment seeing people instead of writing reports.

I have, of course, had hours and hours with our various friends at Chatham House. They are deeply cast down by Amco's failure to accept their invitation for a visit to London in September. Most of their reasons for desiring the visit would be acceptable to all shades of Amco thought, but some of them would, as you suspected, be challenged by everyone.

Just before I left you made some cryptic remark to me about Willits. Airmail me a letter here at this address as to what it was all about.

Also do let me know how you have come on with your Labour troubles and above all please write me fully as to failures and successes on Finance.

I was both shocked and pleased to discover that under the auspices of Lady Cripps and with an introduction by the Master of Balliol, Max Stewart's pamphlet on China has been given a large circulation in the United Kingdom completely independent of Chatham House.

Austern will be glad to show you the list of the faithful who turned out for the luncheon which Lord Astor gave me at Chatham House a few days after my arrival. It was most sporting of many of them to come under the circumstances, especially as some of them had to interrupt the first vacation they had had for a long time, in order to be present.

When I return I will endeavor to give you and members of the Amco Board and Staff an oral off-the-record account of my impressions of the prospects of the Institute in France, Holland, Britain and the U. S. S. R.

By the way, I know your Executive Committee cannot have reached a decision as to the year and place of the next I. P. R. Conference. I would, however, like to have your own personal, though necessarily tentative answer, as you will have to handle the donkey work for Amco wherever and whenever the Conference is held. Specifically, what is your personal answer to the following questions:

1. Should the next Conference be held in 1946 or in 1947?
2. As to place, which would be your personal preference as between (*a*) Canada (*b*) United Kingdom (*c*) China (*d*) India (*e*) Philippines?

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 962

SEPTEMBER 26, 1945.

RD from RDC:

Mr. Carter sent me a letter addressed to you asking that I type it up and hand it on. This I have done.

He asked me to change the dateline from the letterhead on which he wrote it to the Park Lane Hotel. I note, however, that in one of his paragraphs he asks that you write him "at this address".

The address to which I think you should send your reply is:

% Mitrany, Unilever House, Blackfriars, London, E. C. 4, England.

I have no idea whether, on his return from France and the Netherlands, he will be staying at the Park Lane Hotel or not. Therefore, I think it would be safer to use the above address.

EXHIBIT No. 963

10/19/45

NOTES ON MR. CARTER'S FINANCES IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT TRIP

On July 27, 1945, Mr. Carter left New York in possession of $1,500 worth of express checks, $1,000 of this was provided by Pacco and $500 by ASRR. In addition he had $130 in cash. On his return October 16, 1945, he had $100 in express checks, $43.00 in dollars and £2. Mr. Carter also had a check on a New York bank for $50.00, an accommodation to a G. I. officer who wanted the equivalent in francs.

Mr. Carter's personal expenditures were principally as follows:

1 Hat £2–8–11	$9.93	
French perfumery 720 francs	14.40	
2 pair gloves £1–15–0	7.11	
Cigarettes	9.85	
Shaves, laundry, cocktails, theatre (1)	17.25	
		$58.54

Transportation from Great Falls, Montana, and throughout the Soviet Union and on to Berlin was provided free by the Soviet authorities. From Berlin to London, Mr. Carter paid ATC $84.94. From London to Paris he paid Air France (£7–10–0) $30.45.

At the request of the Dutch Embassy in Paris the RAF flew Mr. Carter from Paris to the Hague free. Mr. Carter questions whether we will ever be billed for this.

At the request of the American Embassy, KLM flew Mr. Carter from Amsterdam to London. A letter from the American Embassy to KLM indicated that Mr. Carter would be personally responsible for the payment of the passage but no bill has been received as yet. Pacco should keep in its reserve approximately £8 ($24.48) in case a bill for this passage should ultimately turn up.

In making out the expense account Mr. Carter will charge the IPR for nothing from New York to and in Russia and on to Berlin except for IPR cables and postage from Moscow. He will charge ASRR ⅓ of the air travel cost from Berlin to New York and will bill ASRR ⅓ of the London Hotel bill during his second stay in London.

Miss Nora Ford Smith incurred many pounds worth of expenses for air mail postage and cables. She will send Mr. Carter a total bill. Instead of paying that bill the amount of it is to be regarded as available for purchase here for the Professor of IPR books and food packages.

The American Export passage of $663.75 from Foynes to LaGuardia was paid by the New York office. In addition Mr. Carter paid £11–10–0 ($46.69) from Croydon to Foynes.

A gift package of cigarettes handed to Mr. Carter by Sverdin in Moscow was an expensive gift. To get it into England Mr. Carter had to pay duty amounting to and then because it weighed too much to bring home across the Atlantic, Mr. Carter had to pay the American Express Company 10s–6d ($2.14) to pack and send it over and presumably Mr. Carter will have to pay duty on it when it arrives.

Conversion rates:

England—£24–13–0 equals $100. (Approx. $4.06 per £.)
Belgium—$1.00 equals 2.66 cronen.
Holland—1 guilder equals approx. $.40.
France—approx. 2 cents per franc.

Summary of hotel bills:

Park Lane, London, 8/29–9/4/45, £28–14–4	$116.59	
Park Lane, London, 9/5–14/45, £37–8–6	151.94	
Park Lane, London, 9/26–10/2/45, £33–19–1	137.86	
Park Lane, London, 10/3–9/45, £28–11–3	115.96	
Park Lane, London, 10/10–13/45, £16–8–7	66.70	
		$589.05
Hotel Mitre, Oxford, 10/6–7/45, £1–5–0		5.08
Hotel Lancaster, Paris, 9/14–20/45, 8405 francs		168.10
Hotel Des Indes, Hague, 9/22–25/45, 44.60 guilders		17.84
		780.07
Cables and Postage, London, £2–12–9½		10.71
Books, £1–9–1		5.86
		796.64

EXHIBIT No. 964

NOVEMBER 19, 1945.

To: ECC.
From: RD.

Herewith is a draft of the Research section of the Annual Report. It needs considerable redrafting as to style, but I would appreciate your comments on contents.

Several questions occur to me at once:

1. On pages three and four, should there be more extended discussions of the Wittfogel and Broek projects, similar to that in *IPR in Wartime*, so that their significance would be immediately apparent to readers of the present report?

2. Page 7: Should this discussion on research plans be extended to include the Indian project and others? The difficulty is that it is hard to predict what the Research Committee will approve and hence there is some danger of running ahead of the Committeee in including this in a report.

3. Page 8: Are we at liberty to reveal our Army and Government contracts?

4. Should we not include the names of the individual staff people who were taken on by the Government?

5. Pages 9–10: Is quite frankly a pet of mine which I may be writing too heavily in this report, and perhaps it should be deleted entirely.

EXHIBIT No. 977

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
E. C. Carter. (Attached: Photostat Hand-drawn map, Photostat N. Y. Times Map).	Eppy	8/7	Photostat	107.33	977A
Discussion on Collective Security & Far East (Chairman, Carter).		5/6/43	Photostat	600.1	978
E. C. Carter	Oumansky	(Stamped 7/8/45).	Photostat	600.2	979
E. C. Carter	CD (Charles Dollard)	1/3/46	Original	131B.38	980
ECC. (Attached: ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN BERLIN DISTRICT TOWARD OUR ALLIES. Sept. 1945).	MC	Undated	Original	131B.38	
ECC. (Enc. letter to Edward Carter from AP of June 12, 1946, and LIST BUSINESS & NON-COMMERCIAL HOLDINGS IN JAPAN OF U. S. & AMERICAN COMPANIES HAVING PATENT LICENSE OR TRADEMARK AGREEMENTS WITH COMPANIES IN JAPAN PROPER).	RJG	Undated	Original	131B.67	981
ECC	CP	Undated	Original	105.123	982
Kate. (Enc. July 17 notes)	Edward	7/17	Copy	131B.4	983
Report of Conference of March 9th		?	Photostat	119.91	984
E. C. Carter	Felix Frankfurter	1/11	Original	119.63	985
?	Edward	8/6	Original	104.7	986
Pencilled list names on yellow paper.			Original	191.101	987
Memo: Meeting Arctic Institute, Apr. 9.		Undated		100.27	988
E. C. Carter. (Attached ECC to JP, April 17, 1933, and F. V. Field from E. C. Carter, March 27, 1933).	J. B	4/10/33		100.247	989
L. T. Chen. (Attached ltr. to L. T. Chen from E. C. Carter dated June 28, 1933).	E. C. Carter	6/28/33		100.195	990
Stanley Hornbeck	E. C. Carter	7/13/33		100.110	991
E. C. Carter	J. B	11/29/33		100.135	992
Memo of Interview with Mortimer L. Graves.		12/7/33		100.129	993
Individual Travel Expenditure for past few years. Finance 1936, Document 7.					994
Selskar M. Gunn	E. C. Carter	2/13/34		100.122	995
Conversation between Mr. Arosev, Pres. VOKS, Mr. Carter and J.B.		5/21/34		100.237	996
Barbara Wertheim	E. C. Carter	7/18/34		105.82	997
Fred V. Field	E. C. Carter	9/25/34		101.26	998
E. C. Carter (Memo)	KB	10/22/34		100.1	999
E. C. Carter	Harriet Moore	11/22/34		100.53	1000
Harriet Moore	E. C. Carter	12/15/34		100.375	1001
A. Kantorovitch	E. C. Carter	12/25/34		100.31	1002
F. V. Field	E. C. Carter	12/26/34		100.104	1003
Galen M. Fisher	E. C. Carter	1/4/35		100.168	1004
Meeting of the Presidium of the USSR IPR draft.		1/3/35		100.314	1005
M. E. Cieeve (Madge)	E. C. Carter	1/18/35		100.167	1006
William Holland	Ned	2/23/35		100.169	1007

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
Extracts from ltr. fr. Harriet Moore to E. C. Carter.		3/20/35		100.158	1010
V. E. Motylev	E. C. Carter	5/4/35		100.56	1011
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	9/10/35		100.287	1012
Moscow Meeting in Motylev's office.		3/31/36		100.64	1013
ECC	FVF	5/18/36		100.100	1014
E. C. Carter	V. E. Motylev	6/11/36		100.28	1015
E. C. Carter	Stanley K. Hornbeck	7/18/36		133.2	1016
F. V. Field	Edward C. Carter	10/19/36		131B.52	1017
Stanley K. Hornbeck (Attached letter from Stanley K. Hornbeck to Edward C. Carter dated 1/30/37.)	Edward C. Carter	1/5/37		131B.90	1018
Edward C. Carter	V. E. Motylev	1/15/37		100.332	1019
Extract from letter, San Francisco, to Catherine Porter from Owen Lattimore.		4/18/35		600.4	1020
E. C. Carter	Harriet	1/15/37		100.294	1021
Clipping from San Francisco Chronicle.		1/27/37		100.321	1022
E. C. Carter	W. L. Holland	2/10/37		100.118	1023
Harry Emerson Fosdick	Edw. C. Carter	3/1/37		100.303	1024
James G. McDonald	Edw. C. Carter	3/2/37		100.323	1025
H. B. Elliston	Edward C. Carter	3/2/37		100.363	1026
H. B. Elliston	Edward C. Carter	3/2/37		100.282	1027
Hall Borovoy	Edward C. Carter	3/3/37		100.395	1028
Edward C. Carter. (Enc. FVF fron ECC dated March 8, 1937, and letter to Edward Carter from J. P. Chamberlain.)	F. R. Scott	3/4/37		100.403	1029
William L. Holland	Edward C. Carter	3/5/37		100.387	1030
Joseph P. Chamberlain	E. C. Carter	3/2/37		100.291	1031
FVF	ECC	3/8/37		100.319	1032
Kate	Edward C. Carter	3/8/37		100.308	1033
Kate Mitchell	Edward C. Carter	3/11/37		100.309	1034
EVF (and others)	ECC	3/21/39		107.19	1035
Kate Mitchell	Edward C. Carter	4/20/37		100.310	1036
E. C. Carter	Y. P. Bremman	5/15/37		100.335	1037
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	5/27/37		100.330	1038
Joseph Barnes	Edward C. Carter	5/31/37		100.389	1039
Kate Mitchell	Edward C. Carter	6/18/37		100.311	1040
SUPPLEMENTARY AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN USSR, IPR & THE SEC. GEN., MOSCOW.		8/17/37		100.333	1041
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	8/20/37		100.126	1042
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	9/7/37		100.326	1043
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	10/18/37		100.278	1044
Edward C. Carter	R. S. Bratton, Lt. Col.	11/5/37		131B.156	1045
Edward C. Carter	Joe (Joseph Barnes)	11/10/37		100.374	1046
Fred V. Field	Edward C. Carter	12/23/37		119.129	1047
Virginia Burdick	Edward C. Carter	2/24/38		100.143	1048
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	2/25/38		100.368	1049
Names for membership, including Alger Hiss.	Edward C. Carter	2/25/38			1050
W. W. Lockwood	F. V. Field	3/17/38		112.61	1051
Mrs. Edward C. Carter	Philip J. Jaffe	3/31/38		105.328	1052
Edward C. Carter	C. Oumansky	3/29/38		100.59	1053
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	3/31/38		105.196	1054
Joseph P. Chamberlain	E. C. Carter	3/31/38		100.144	1055
Dr. John H. Finley	Edward C. Carter	4/2/38		100.149	1056
Russell Shiman	Edward C. Carter	4/16/38		191.145	1057
Copy of memo attached from Div. of FE Affairs, Dept. of State.		4/14/48			1058
Copy of letter to Joseph W. Ballentine.	ECC	4/15/38			1059
E. C. Carter	A. W. Dulles	4/22/38		100.151	1060
Virginia Burdick	Edward C. Carter	5/9/38		116.13	1061
I. F. Wizon	Edward C. Carter	5/23/38		119.60	1062
Edward C. Carter	I. F. Wizon	5/21/38			1063
Snydor Walker	Edward C. Carter	6/30/38		191.131	1064
Maxwell M. Hamilton	Edward C. Carter	6/16/38		191.247	1065
Carter	Robert S. Lynd	12/15/38		100.34	1066
Dr. Robert S. Lynd	Edward C. Carter	12/14/38			1067
E. C. Carter	Dr. Robert S. Lynd	6/20/38			1068
Lawrence R. Salisbury	Edward C. Carter	6/16/38		191.254	1070
Edward C. Carter	Maxwell M. Hamilton	6/27/38			1071
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	7/19/38		106.28	1073
Edward C. Carter	J. Leighton Stuart	7/20/38		191.148	1074
Frederick Field	Edward C. Carter	7/23/38		105.169	1075
W. L. Holland	E. C. Carter	8/23/38		105.326	1076
E. C. Carter	Jessica Smith	9/1/38		100.226	1077
E. C. Carter	Chen Han-seng	9/28/38		119.56	1078

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
Felix Frankfuter	Edward C. Carter	9/29/38		119.58	1079
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	10/11/38		100.189	1080
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	10/16/38		105.161	1082
Irving Friendman	Edward C. Carter	10/17/38		119.62	1083
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	10/20/38		100.153	1084
Edward C. Carter	M. G. Shippe (Asiaticus).	5/28/38		105.150	1085
N. Hanwell	ECC	11/1/38		131B.86	1086
Frederick P. Keppel	Edward C. Carter	11/4/38		116.16	1087
Chen Han-seng & Knight	Biggerstaff ECC	11/9/38		100.145	1088
Harriet Moore	Edward C. Carter	.1/9/38		100.409	1089
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	12/15/38	Carbon	100.414	1090
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	12/15/38		102.30	1092
Wm. L. Holland	Edward C. Carter	12/20/38		119.117	1093
C. Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	1/10/39	Telegram	100.18	1094
Grenville Clark	Edward C. Carter	1/10/39	Telegram	100.60	1095
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	1/18/39	Telegram	100.61	1097
Edward C. Carter	Herbert S. Little	1/23/39		100.411	1098
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	2/2/39		100.296	1099
N. H. Hanwell	Edward C. Carter	2/13/39		105.193	1100
Harriett Moore	Edward C. Carter	2/21/39		119.113	1101
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	3/14/39		100.295	1102
E. C. Carter	John H. Oakie	3/23/39		100.264	1103
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	3/28/39		131B.95	1104
Margaret R. Taylor	Edward C. Carter	4/19/39		191.195	1105
Dr. V. E. Motylev	Owen Lattimore	4/21/39		100.288	1106
Kate Mitchell	E. C. Carter	5/20/39			1107
Motylev	Edward C. Carter	6/29/39		100.299	1108
Sherwood Eddy	Edward C. Carter	7/3/39		100.271	1109
E. C. Carter	Sherwood Eddy	6/24/39			1110
Owen Lattimore	Edward C. Carter	7/11/39		100.268	1111
Philip J. Jaffe	Edward C. Carter	7/11/39		104.66	1112
E. C. Carter	Philip J. Jaffe	8/11/39		104.9	1114
Philip Jaffe	Edward C. Carter	8/24/39		105.7	1115
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	9/8/39		100.6	1116
V. E. Motylev	Edward C. Carter	9/11/39		100.299	1117
Philip C. Jessup	Edward C. Carter	9/15/39		191.270	1118
Edward C. Carter	Evans F. Carlson	9/21/39		106.49	1119
Frederick V. Field	Edward C. Carter	10/17/39		101.45	1120
Constantine Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	12/3/39		100.293	1121
Kenneth Durant	Edward C. Carter	12/11/39		100.211	1122

EXHIBIT No. 977–A

52 SMITH TERRACE,
Stapleton, S. I., August 7.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The enclosed rough sketch gives the situation today as it looks on a larger map on which I have been moving pins carefully since my arrival. There are no actual maps from China more recent than V–J day, and the boundaries of areas are therefore proximate and arrived at by linking together the respective known points (generally district towns) marking the limits of control of the two parties. The only accurate *boundary* is that of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia region (west of the Yellow River, with Yenan at the center) which has been a stable administrative entity for some years.

The tendency at present (and the situation is changing rather rapidly) is for the Central (KMT) troops to push through along the railway lines. However, there is also a tendency on the part of the Communist-led forces to filter back and take railway points *behind* the extreme points of KMT advance. Thus the Communists are back in several stations of the Tsingtao-Tsinan and Taiyuan-Tungkwan (South Tungpu) railways, with the result that what were once KMT salients are now KMT pockets. These situations change *daily* as both sides sometimes withdraw from points where they are threatened with encirclement and then come back, very soon afterwards, when they have been reinforced and feel that their communications are secure. The enclosed map, however, gives the *over-all* situations along the railways accurately, as it is quite obvious that, even though the Eighth Route may withdraw from the 15–20% of any given railway line that it holds to block KMT traffic, it will at once seek to reoccupy other places representing an equal fraction of the line, though in a different and currently more vulnerable place.

The actual area of Communist *influence* is greater than shown, because where regular forces have been withdrawn to avoid being pinned down, or to reinforce more important points, the local guerillas and their organization remain. An attempt has been made to show such an area in the cross-hatched red lines *south* of Shanghai and Nanking, where no regular New Fourth Army troops remain. Other such areas exist both north and south of Hankow along the Pinghan and Canton-Hankow lines, notably around Changsha. The long diagonal red pocket between Sian and Ichang represents the line of breakthrough of the formerly surrounded Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan border pocket, once closer to Hankow. This "floating kidney" will tend to move north, toward a junction with the Eighth Route Army in the region of Yenan, or perhaps that south of Taiyuan, depending upon where a KMT weak spot is found,

Sincerely,

EPPY.




HOW CHINA IS DIVIDED BETWEEN NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS
SOVIET UNION
MONGOLIAN PEOPLES REPUBLIC
MANCHURIA
Sea of Japan
KOREA
JAPAN
CHINA
Chungking
Canton
Hanoi
TAIWAN
FORMOSA
CONTROLLED BY NATIONALISTS
DOMINATED BY COMMUNISTS

CHINA, showing Kuomintang and Communist areas

WHERE ARE WE HEADING?

BY

SUMNER WELLES

EXHIBIT No. 978

DISCUSSION ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST

May 6, 1943, 8:15 p. m., 700 Jackson Place, Washington

Carter, Chairman.

Present: Mrs. Alexander, Sir Gurj Bajpai, Hugh Borton, de Voogd, Farley, Greene, Hiss, Johnstone, Lockwood, Martin, Meisling, Pramoj, Shoemaker, Zafra.

Mr. Carter stated that the purpose of these meetings was to stimulate thinking around the problems of collective security which appear to be different for the Pacific area and the Far East, compared with those that exist in Europe. These questions should be considered now because so much international political action has been Europe-centered or concerned with the American hemisphere that relatively little attention has been paid to the problems of collective security in the Far East. The Far East has tended to be ignored in most of the scholarly efforts on postwar organization. It is thought that the discussion might form a basis for an essay by one of the members.

It was decided that a few minutes should be spent on the statement on the first page of the agenda, to see whether there is general concensus that it is a reasonable forecast.

There was some discussion of paragraph 2 and the meaning of the word aggression as used in the last sentence. Mr. Carter suggested that for purposes of this discussion it should be limited to armed aggression or military occupation. Shoemaker suggested that one of the most likely dangers would be that trouble might arise between two sections of China, with Russia coming into the picture and making claims China would not want to recognize. Bajpai suggested that there ought to be someone at these meetings qualified to speak for Russia.

Shoemaker thought it was almost certain that Russia would desire a Pacific outlet and Dairen is a logical one. This would be a point of conflict with China, as would be Inner and Outer Mongolia and the Communist elements in China.

Pramoj suggested border difficulties between Thailand and French Indo-China.

Mr. Cordell Hull statement on restoring the French Empire was brought up at this point. Hiss said that the statement was made a long time ago and it was a statement of intention with reference to a particular action, not a promise having in mind action regarding Pacific colonies. As it was worded it had to do with the "integrity" of the French Empire.

Lockwood said that one general comment on the statement in the agenda is that if it is intended as an inclusive statement on security as a whole a little more attention should be given to general economic and social setting of postwar development. The problem of establishing the basis of security will be a matter of what machinery can be elaborated for dealing with these issues as well as what is going to be done about the economic future of Japan or economic rivalries in the Pacific or the future of the open door and access to the resources of Southeast Asia, or problems of economic and social reconstruction in China.

There was further discussion of the possibility of minor or major border disputes breaking out between Pacific countries, and the likelihood of American or Soviet forces interfering in these. It was more or less agreed that there would be no large-scale hostilities in the immediate years after the war.

There was some discussion of what kind of a settlement or security system would be set up—emergency or short-term—carefully planned and long-term.

Hiss said that we ought to distinguish between a perfect paper settlement and a more viable day to day arrangement that might grow out of developments during the war and the early stages of the peace. Good will will make possible the satisfactory handling of a good many problems that could not be met without it in spite of all careful preparations. In the Pan-American system this is a pertinent point. The Inter-American agreements mentioned in the agenda are important primarily because they stated something that had already largely been worked out and accepted as a basis of relationship.

Lockwood said the Pan-American agreements work because there is peace rather than there being peace because there are agreements.

There was inconclusive discussion of the applicability of the points on page two to the Far Eastern Situation.

Johnstone said that granted we want a collective security system in the Pacific, whether on a regional or world bases, what could be the basis for agreement among the nations interested in the Pacific for such a system? Is it just a

simple agreement that we are going to act to prevent aggression, or is something more necessary? One would assume that you can't have a system unless it is an agreement. It is quite possible that there will be a general agreement for the joint use of bases and employment of force in the Pacific, immediately after the war. When more normal conditions are restored and troops moved back within their own boundaries, many people will feel that it may not be necessary to continue joint use of bases. At that point when the period of large-scale use of occupation forces comes to an end more suitable arrangements will have to be made. Unless some machinery is set up fairly soon after hostilities end it may be very difficult to do so later.

Bajpai asked if there were any common interests among the Pacific countries.

Hiss said it was a question of various periods of time. He hoped there would be an effort to secure an increasing community of interest; that present and developing military collaboration would bring an increasing marking out and finding of common interests. Every effort should be made toward reaching an agreement today. This ought to be supplemented or incorporated in further agreements.

Bajpai said that of course everyone recognizes that it is impossible at this stage to envisage all those points either of agreement or clash of interest, making for association or separation hereafter. Would it be correct to say that the United Nations are all interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East to the extent that they would collaborate with one another to use force against aggression in the Far East?

Hiss said that you could not say at the present time that they are.

It was agreed that the United Nations would have to have a community of interest before they could maintain peace in the Far East and this question should be the first one explored at the next meeting.

EXHIBIT No. 979

MEXICO CITY, *July 8, 1945.*

DR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Russian War Relief, New York, N. Y.:

Will be delighted to see you here any day at your convenience. Am sure Russian War Relief leaders in Mexico would welcome opportunity discuss with you their problems and take advantage your great experience. Eye, too, will be glad to discuss same problems with you, since they come under my present jurisdiction, and to renew our personal contact. Warmest regards.

OUMANSKY.

EXHIBIT No. 980

CHARLES DOLLARD, *Executive Associate*

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK,
522 FIFTH AVENUE,
New York 18, N. Y., January 3, 1946.

(Handwritten:) M. C.: Do you know whether the Army did any testing later than the enclosed? EC, Jan. 24/46.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I think these are the reports referred to in your note of December 27. If not, please try me again. While both of them are technically in the clear, I think it would be well to clear with Buck Lanham before using any of the data in anything that you may prepare for public consumption.

You are welcome to keep these for your files.

Sincerely,

DOLLARD.

CD: RN
ENC.

ECC:

These "attitude" surveys appeared in a publication called "What the Soldier Thinks." I remember seeing that magazine in January 46 and I feel sure it

will be continued on a limited scale. Surveys were of considerable value. Shall I try and get a more recent copy dealing with the East?

M. C.

RESTRICTED

Classification cancelled by authority of Brig. Gen. Paul W. Thompson Theater Chief, Information and Education Theater Service Forces, European Theater, by _____

Lt Col C. D. LEATHERMAN,

(Name and Grade of officer cancelling classification and date of cancellation) : Oct 4, 1945.

ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN THE BERLIN DISTRICT TOWARD OUR ALLIES

(Based on a sample of 700 men surveyed 22–25 August 1945 in the Berlin District.)

Research Branch, Information and Education Division, Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, September 1945

Report No. E70–93
Copy No. 24

FOREWORD

1. The information upon which this report is based was collected in a survey of a sample of soldiers in the Berlin District during the period 22 to 25 August 1945.

2. The sample includes representative units from Headquarters troops in the Berlin District as well as a cross section of men in the 82d Airborne Division and attached troops. Within each unit selected, a random sample was drawn so that all types of men had a proportional chance of being included in the survey.

3. As in previous Research Branch studies, the men who filled out questionnaires were assured of anonymity. No names or serial numbers were placed on the questionnaires, and it was explained to the men that the purpose of the survey was simply to secure their frank and and honest opinion.

4. It is important to keep in mind that the findings presented here do not purport to be indicative of attitudes held by troops in other areas. As a matter of fact, the Berlin District is a unique situation for our troops in the European Theater.

5. Data have just been returned from the field and have been tallied from a sample that is representative of the entire theater. When these data are compared with attitudes of a cross section of men in the ETO in late April, it is found that attitudes toward the English and Russians have not changed appreciably; however, attitudes toward the French were much less favorable in August than in April. Troops in Berlin express somewhat more favorable attitudes toward the English, and also toward the Germans, but slightly less favorable attitudes toward the French than do troops in the entire theater. Also, the Berlin troops express considerably more skepticism about how we shall be able to get along with Russia in the future than do a cross section of American troops in the European Theater.

MAIN FINDINGS

1. A large majority of the American soldiers (85%) in the Berlin area say they have a favorable attitude toward the English. A smaller proportion, but still a substantial majority (61%), report favorable attitudes toward the Russians. Less than half of them (42%) say they have a favorable opinion of the French.

2. Most of our soldiers who have contacts with Allied soldiers say they get along very well or fairly well with them. Twenty-three percent said they had no contact with English soldiers, 28 percent said they had no contact with Russian soldiers, and 48 percent said they had no contact with French soldiers. Of those who have contact with Allied soldiers, 91 percent say they get along fairly well or very well with English soldiers; 75 percent say they get along fairly

well or very well with Russian soldiers; and 60 percent say they get along fairly well or very well with French soldiers.

3. Those who have known some English, Russian, and French soldiers personally are slightly more favorable in attitude toward the English, Russian, and French people and soldiers.

4. Educational status seems to be only slightly related to like and dislike for the various Allies.

5. Men who have had combat experience are somewhat more favorable toward the Russians and somewhat less favorable toward the French than are noncombat men. The two groups do not differ in their opinion of the English. Combat men are no more nor less favorable toward the Germans than are noncombat men.

6. There is a widespread feeling of confidence that we shall be able to get along well with England from now on, more than 90 percent of the men expressing this attitude. A substantial majority (65%) say that we will get along well with France in the years ahead. There is considerable skepticism as to how well we shall get along with Russia and only 30 percent of the men say they think that we shall get along well with her; a substantial minority anticipate war with her sometime in the next 25 years.

7. The overwhelming majority say they expect England (80%) and the United States (93%) to cooperate with other nations to settle disputes peaceably. Only half of them (51%) think Russia will cooperate.

8. The better educated men and those less well educated differ only slightly in their attitudes on international relations.

9. Men who have been in combat do not differ appreciably from the noncombat men in their attitudes on international relations.

10. As might be expected, those who have a generally favorable attitude toward the Russian people are also more likely to be more optimistic about the possibility of working out good international relations with Russia and to express more confidence in the Russian government's intentions.

Detailed Findings

Attitudes of Personal Likes and Dislikes

General Attitudes

A large majority of the American soldiers (85%) in the Berlin area say they have a favorable attitude toward the English. A smaller proportion, but still a substantial majority (61%), report favorable attitudes toward the Russians. Less than half of them (42%) say they have a favorable opinion of the French.

For comparison, the same question was aked about Germans. About three men in every five (59%) reported a favorable attitude toward the Germans.

Question: "What sort of opinion do you have of the English (Russian, French, German) people?" [1]



[1] In interpreting these replies it must be kept in mind that in general, the contacts with the English, French, and Germans have been of longer duration and have included civilian contacts while the Russian contacts have been shorter and limited to Russian soldiers and displaced personnel.

The replies of the men in the Berlin area are more favorable toward the English and less favorable toward the French than were those of a cross section of ETO troops surveyed in April 1945.[2]

	Cross section survey, April 1945	Berlin area survey, August 1945
Percentage saying they were very favorable or fairly favorable to—	*Percent*	*Percent*
English	72	85
French	68	42

Most of our soldiers who have contacts with the Allied soldiers say they get along very well or fairly well with them.

In answer to the question, "How well do you get along with the English (Russian, French) soldiers?": 23 percent said they had no contact with English soldiers, 28 percent said they had no contact with Russian soldiers, and 48 percent said they had no contact with French soldiers.

Of those who have contact with Allied soldiers, the following percentages say they get along:



Those who have known some English, Russian, and French soldiers personally are slightly more favorable in attitude toward the English, French, and Russian people than are those who have not.

In the case of the Russians, the relation between personal acquaintanceship and attitude is greater than it is in the case of the English or French.

	Among men who have known—	
	No soldiers personally	Some soldiers personally
Percentage of men who have very favorable or fairly favorable opinions of—	*Percent*	*Percent*
The English people	81	89
The Russian people	59	71
The French people	41	46

Similarly, those men who know some Allied soldiers personally are more likely to say they get along with English (Russian, French) *soldiers* very well or fairly well.

[2] Comparable data are not available on the Russians or the Germans.

	Men who have known—	
	No soldiers personally	Some soldiers personally
Percentage of men who say they get along with—		
English soldiers	89	92
Russian soldiers	72	84
French soldiers	51	69

This relationship does not necessarily mean that getting to know Allied soldiers personally *causes* a more favorable attitude though this is probably true in many instances. It is also likely that getting to know other soldiers is itself an indication of a previously existing favorable attitude.

It is important to recognize that while personal acquaintanceship is related to favorableness of attitude, mere length of time the soldier was stationed in England, France, and Berlin has no relation to what men say their attitudes are toward the English, French, and Russians. The only attitudes studied which seem to be related to time spent in the Berlin area are those toward the Germans. The men who have been in the area for a month or more are somewhat less favorable toward the Germans than are those who have been there less than a month.

It is also interesting to note that educational status seems to be only slightly related to the attitudes reported above. High school graduates are no more nor less favorable than are those with less education.

Men who have had combat experience are somewhat more favorable toward the Russians and somewhat less favorable toward the French than are noncombat men. The two groups do not differ in their opinions of the English. Combat men are no more nor less favorable toward the Germans than are noncombat men.

SPECIAL LIKES AND DISLIKES

In addition to rating the degree to which they were favorable or unfavorable in attitude toward the various Allies, the men were asked to state what special things they like or dislike about them.

The following is a summary of the most frequently mentioned things which they like or dislike.

Like About the English

About half of the men mentioned some characteristics that they dislaked about the English people. Most frequently mentioned were:

1. Friendly, hospitable, generous, kind, etc.
2. Courage, guts, self-confidence, see things through, etc.
3. They are a lot like we are.

Dislike About the English

About half of the men mentioned some characteristics that they disliked about the English. Most frequently mentioned were:

1. Superior, conceited, stuck-up, reserved, unfriendly, etc.
2. Traditionalism, unprogressiveness, etc.
3. Take too much credit and give us too little credit for winning the war.

Like About the Russians

About half the men mentioned one or more characteristics they liked about the Russians. The things most frequently mentioned were:

1. Friendly, good hearted, etc.
2. Jolly, care-free, happy-go-lucky, etc.
3. Good fighters, courage, fight for their country, guts, never-say-die spirit, etc.

4. Sturdy, vigorous, full of vitality, hard working, etc.
5. Treat the Germans rough like they said they would and as they should be treated.

Dislike About the Russians

About half the men listed something about the Russians which they disliked. Those most frequently mentioned were:

1. Dirty, sloppy, ill-kempt appearance, etc.
2. Ignorant, stupid, uneducated, etc.
3. Crude, uncultured, rude, ill-mannered, etc.
4. Arrogant, conceited, think they won the war alone, etc.
5. Brutal, excessively cruel to Germans, rape, etc.
6. Steal, loot.

Like About the French

About a fourth of the men listed something they liked about the French people. The most frequently mentioned are:

1. Friendly, hospitable, etc.
2. Cheerful, easy-going, know how to have a good time, etc.
3. Helped all they could, tried to do their share in winning war, etc.

Dislike About the French

About two-thirds of the men listed one or more characteristics they disliked about the French. Most frequently mentioned are:

1. Dirty, filthy, unsanitary, etc.
2. Mercenary, grasping, want to get something for nothing, etc.
3. Lazy, backward, no ambition, no spirit, etc.
4. Undependable, irresponsible, etc.
5. Loose morals.

Like About the Germans

About half of the men listed one or more things they liked about the Germans. Most frequent items were:

1. Clean, neat, orderly, etc.
2. Industrious, good workers, etc.
3. Intelligent, educated, resourceful, etc.
4. Friendly, good manners, treat you well, etc.
5. Look and act like Americans in many ways.

Dislike About the Germans

About two-thirds of the men mentioned something they disliked about Germans. The most frequent items were:

1. Dishonest, two-faced, treacherous, etc.
2. Fascistic, militaristic ideas, still believe Hitler had right idea, etc.
3. Easily led, can't think for themselves, etc.
4. Superiority complex, arrogant, etc.
5. They don't accept any responsibility or guilt for the war.
6. Self-pity, whining, complaining, fawning, all to get sympathy.

ATTITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The general picture which one gets from the men's replies is that many of them are in doubt and suspicious about Russia and a substantial minority anticipate war with her sometime in the next 25 years. In contrast there is a great deal of confidence that we shall be able to get along well with England and only slightly less confidence about our relations with France.

How Will We Get Along With Other Nations?

Four men in every ten say they are either in doubt as to how we will get along with Russia (26%) or that they expect we will fight Russia sooner or later (14%). Only about one man in ten expresses this opinion regarding England and France.

Question: "How do you think we will get along with England (France, Russia) from now on?"



When asked, "Do you think the United States will get into another big war within the next 25 years?" 23 percent said, "yes"; 38 percent said, "undecided"; and 37 percent said "no". Two percent did not answer.

In addition, the men were asked, "If you think the US will be in another big war, who do you think the US will be fighting against?" Twenty-nine percent of the men named one or more countries. Twenty-five percent of the men named Russia. The highest percent of mention any other nation received was Japan, mentioned by 3 percent of the men.

Cooperation in Settling Disputes

The overwhelming majority say they expect England (80%) and the United States (93%) to cooperate with other nations to settle disputes peaceably. Only half of them (51%) think Russia will cooperate.

Question: "Which do you think the US (England, Russia) is most likely to do about international problems in the future?"



Confidence in the English and Russian Governments

The men express much less confidence that the Russian government will be "on the up-and-up" in dealing with the US than will the English government.

Question: "How much confidence do you have that the English (Russian) government will be on the up-and-up in dealing with the US?"



The better educated man and those less well educated differ only slightly in their attitudes on international relations.

Men who have been in combat do not differ appreciably from the non-combat men in their attitudes on international relations.

As might be expected, those who have a generally favorable attitude toward the Russian people are also more likely to be more optimistic about the possibility of working out good international relations with Russia and to express more confidence in the Russian government's intentions. The following charts will illustrate this relationship.

Question: "How do you think we will get along with Russia from now on?"



Question: "Which do you think Russia is most likely to do about international relations in the future?"



Question: "How much confidence do you have that the Russian government will be on the up-and-up in dealing with the US?"



It cannot be assumed from these data that by changing soldiers' attitudes in the direction of greater personal favorableness toward Russian people that one will effect change in their international attitudes. However, it is very likely that such personal attitudes are likely to be accompanied by a greater willingness to view the problems of our relations with Russia in a less prejudiced, more pudicious frame of mind.

Soldiers Suggestions for Improving Allied Relations

The men were asked to write out any suggestions they had for improving relations among Allied soldiers in the Berlin area. About six men in every ten offered one or more suggestions.

By far the most frequent type of suggestion centered around the idea of increasing opportunities for friendly contact with individuals in other Allied forces. Typical of these suggestions were:

"More mixing of all Allied troops in sports, joint recreational activities."
"Have facilities like clubs, canteens, etc., where men can meet."
"Have dances and other social events of interest to all troops."
"Give men more freedom and facilities for transportation to visit soldiers in the other forces."
"Have joint classes, discussion groups, speakers at meetings open to all interested Allied soldiers."

Less frequently mentioned were:

"Decrease contacts with Allied soldiers, let each keep to his own area."
"Have a more uniform policy in Berlin and let all Allied forces follow it."
"More control of Russians."

CHANGES IN ATTITUDES OF SOLDIERS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER TOWARD OUR ALLIES FROM APRIL 1945 TO AUGUST 1945

(Based on a Comparison of 2 Cross-sectional Surveys: Survey 1: Among 3,795 Enlisted Men Queried 25 April to 5 May 1945. Survey 2: Among 2,981 Enlisted Men Queried 14 to 24 August 1945)

(Research Branch, Information and Education, Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, September 1945)

Report No. ETO–102
Copy No. 8

HOW THE STUDY WAS MADE

1. Information on men's attitudes and opinions was secured by means of anonymous questionnaires filled out by two representative cross sections. One

survey was conducted during the period from 25 April to 5 May 1945 among a cross-section sample of 3,795 white enlisted men. The other was conducted during the period from 14 to 24 August 1945 among a sample of 2,981.

2. Each sample was designed to give proper representation to all arms and services and types of outfits. Men in Air Forces, Field Forces, and Service Forces units were included in the proportions found in the Theater as a whole. Within each unit selected, a random sample was drawn so that all types of men had a proportional chance of being included in the survey.

3. As in previous Research Branch studies, the men who filled out questionnaires were assured of anonymity. No names or serial numbers were placed on the questionnaires, and it was explained to the men that the purpose of the survey was simply to secure their frank and honest opinions.

OVER-ALL OPINION GI'S HAVE OF ENGLISH AND FRENCH PEOPLE

In the four months following VE-day a considerable shift took place in soldiers' attitudes toward the French. During the same period no appreciable changes took place in attitudes toward the English.

QUESTION: "What sort of opinion do you have of the English people?"
"What sort of opinion do you have of the French people?"



Whereas just prior to VE-day as many soldiers said they thought as well of the French people as of the English (about 7 in every 10 said they felt "very" or "fairly" favorable toward them), in August, 75% of the soldiers thought favorably of the English but only 45% thought well of the French.

The fact that there was a smaller proportion of soldiers who indicated that they thought favorably of the French in August as compared to April is not the result of the changing composition of the Theater during the elapsed period of time but rather is a true reflection of differences in men's attitude between the two dates.[1]

[1] In this as well as in other comparisons of April and August findings appearing in this report, detailed analysis shows that differences are not the result of a changed composition of the Armed Forces in Europe in August as compared with April, except insofar as time in Army and time overseas is concerned where, of course, the 4-month lapse of time must be taken into account.

OVER-ALL OPINION OF FRENCH NO BETTER THAN OF GERMANS

The two charts below indicate that, in general, the expressed opinion is no more favorable toward the French people than toward the German and that attitudes expressed toward both French and German people is considerably less favorable than toward English people.

QUESTION: (August Survey) What sort of opinion do you have of the (English, French, German) people?



QUESTION: Leaving aside for the moment the fact that they are our enemies or our allies, which one of the following do you like best just as people--the French people, the German people, or the English people?

Answers ⇨



The types of reasons men gave for disliking the English or French were the same for both surveys (report of April findings—Research Report No. E-125—lists chief reason soldiers mention). Reasons men advance for liking or disliking the Germans, along with other data on attitudes toward Germans, are presented in Research Report No. E-134.

EFFECT ON ATTITUDES OF TIME SPENT IN COUNTRY

Men who have spent considerable time in all three countries have substantially the same attitudes toward the people of each of the three countries as do all soldiers surveyed. As was pointed out in the report of the April survey there is no evidence to support the theories that better-educated men have more favorable attitudes toward our Allies or that the longer men are overseas, the worse their attitudes toward our Allies become. On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that the longer men remain in a particular country the more favorable their attitude becomes to the people of that country. This holds for Germany as well as for France and England.

For example:

ATTITUDE TOWARD ENGLISH PEOPLE ...



ATTITUDE TOWARD FRENCH PEOPLE ...



*Includes a very few men surveyed who reported spending no time in France.

Attitude toward German people seems to be even more closely related to time spent in the country than patterns shown above for Britain and France.

Among men who spent *no time in Germany* 34 percent say they have a favorable opinion of German people.

Among men who spent *less than 4 weeks* in Germany 42 percent say they have a favorable opinion of German people.

Among men who spent between *4 and 8 weeks* in Germany 54 percent say they have a favorable opinion of German people.

Among men who spent over *8 weeks* in Germany 59 percent say they have a favorable opinion of German people.

Although time spent in country and attitude toward people of the country are related, analysis reveals no appreciable relationship between time in one country and attitude toward people of *other* countries. For example, time spent in Germany (for men who have also spent some time in England and France) does not appear to appreciably affect attitudes men have toward the English or the French.

DECREASE IN FEELING THAT WE SHOULD HELP ALLIES GET BACK ON THEIR FEET

In the August as well as in the April survey, more soldiers were favorable to the idea of helping to feed our Allies after the war than the proportion who felt we should help our Allies by sending them money and materials. However, a slightly *smaller proportion* of men in August as compared to April thought we should send help along these lines.

These two questions were asked the men:

1. "After the war, *some of our Allies* will need help in feeding their people. Do you think the United States should send *food* to these countries even if it meant that we would have to keep on rationing food in our own country for a while to do it?"
2. "After the war, *some of our Allies* will need *money and materials* to help them get back on their feet.

Do you think we should let them have money and materials to help them get back on their feet, even if it meant that we should have to pay higher taxes to do it?"



Consistent with findings shown above is the small decline in proportion of men who feel we should do everything we can to help France get back on her feet. Men were asked to tell whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement:

"We should do everything we can to help France get back on her feet as soon as possible."

In April: 60% of men surveyed AGREED with statement.

In August: 51% of men surveyed AGREED with statement.

OTHER SHIFTS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD FRENCH

Some Change in Belief That France Will Again Be A Strong Nation. More men in August than in April felt that French nation is too weak and split up to ever amount to anything again.

Men were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "The French nation is so weak and split up that it will never amount to anything again."

In April: 73% of men surveyed DISAGREED with statement.

In August: 62% of men surveyed DISAGREED with statement.

Fairly Large Change In Belief That French People Sincerely Like Americans. Men were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Most French people sincerely like Americans."

In April: 73% of men surveyed AGREED with statement.

In August: 52% of men surveyed AGREED with statement.

APPRAISAL OF ALLIES' WAR EFFORT UNCHANGED

About the same proportions of men feel that our major Allies—Britain and Russia—have done as good a job as possible of fighting this war. Even as regards France, who suffers in other respects a decline in favorable attitudes, there is no appreciable decrease since April in soldiers' respect for her contribution in war effort.

Statement: "Considering everything, the (specified people) have done as good a job as possible of fighting this war."

Specified People—

Russians—More than *19 men in every 20* surveyed AGREED with statement in both April and August surveys.

British—More than *16 in every 20* surveyed AGREED with statement in both April and August surveys.

French—About *10 men in every 20* surveyed AGREED with statement in both April and August surveys. (In April, slightly more than half the men agreed. In August just slightly less than half—but the difference is too small to be significant.)

AIMS OF OUR ALLIES REMAIN UNCHANGED IN EYES OF SOLDIERS

In August just as in April most men had faith in the war aims and the future course of action that England and Russia are likely to take. In each survey about as many men expressed faith in Russia as faith in England and no change in the level of these attitudes took place between the two dates.

Statement: "(Specified country) is more interested in dominating or controlling the world than she is in building a truly democratic world."

In April and in August about *7 in every 10* men surveyed DISAGREED with this statement as it applies to both Russia and to Britain.

Statement: "The (specified country) will try as much as possible to work out a just and lasting peace."

In April and in August about *8 in every 10 men* surveyed AGREED with this statement as it applies to both Russia and to Britain.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND ENGLAND AFTER THE WAR

No changes have taken place in the 4-month period between surveys, in soldiers' attitude toward our postwar relations with Russia and England.

Question: "How do you think we will get along with (specified country) after the war?"



In the April survey comparable questions were also asked about France and China, but these were not repeated in August. (See Research Branch Report # E-125.)

*Includes a few men who did not answer the question.

EXHIBIT No. 981

ECC from RJG:

I am at present having a card file made of all corporation prospects. By now I have accumulated eight or ten lists, many of which have duplications. Each card will give the name of the corporation, source, and individual to contact. When it is completed I thought you and I could go over it to decide what method of approach to use on each one. Some few you will probably want to contact personally. Others should get a letter and others we probably won't bother with at all for awhile. But it seemed a simpler approach to have all the information in one place.

If you would like to give this list back to me I will include the names on it with the rest of the names I have. I know there are some on this list which I already have on other lists.

(Pencilled note:) Have carded all of these along with our other corp. prospects 6/21/46.

R. J. G.

(Pencilled note:) RJG: Note & Return to ECC who hasn't seen it yet.

AMERICAN COUNCIL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,
June 12, 1946.

Washington Office, 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington 6, D. C. Telephone District 8665

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
IPR, 1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Attached are two lists which I spoke of yesterday when you were here and which should be useful in campaigning among big corporations interested in the Far East.

You will be interested, I think, in the opinion of Mr. Blair Bolles, of the Foreign Policy Association, on the outlook for the IPR here. He thinks it will take six or seven months' hard work to lay the base for a sound job of membership expansion and enlargement of program. He does not believe that the IPR should hope or expect to get all its financial support in Washington for the local office. The FPA here gets about $2,500 a year from its membership and the rest from the New York office, which the Washington unit exists to serve. I judge that the total budget of the Washington-FPA is above $15,000 a year. Bolles said that a staff of four people is the minimum he thinks either FPA or IPR needs in order to do a first class job. He says you have to plug very hard to get the information you need in order to serve outside offices; no automatic flow system from government sources will work. He adds that he thinks IPR can and should do more community service here than FPA can do.

Sincerely,

[s] I. A. P.

Business and noncommercial holdings in Japan of United States organizations (total value of interest is as of December 1, 1941)

Name	Address	Value
All America Radio, Inc	67 Broad St., New York	$8,494
American Foreign Insurance Association	80 Maiden Lane, New York	38,801
American Magnesium Metals Corp	800 Ohio St., Pittsburgh	327,600
Associated Merchandising Corp	1440 Broadway, New York	11,231
American President Lines	311 California St., San Francisco	4,036
American Trading Co., Inc	96 Wall St., New York	460,526
Anderson, Clayton & Co	Cotton Exchange Bldg., Houston	33,554
Associated Press	50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York	5,721
Baker & Co., Inc. (precious metals)	113 Astor St., Newark 5, N. J	118,266
Carrier Corp	900 S. Geddes St., Syracuse	67,308
Commercial Pacific Cable Co	67 Broad St., New York	8,129
Dorr Co., The (engineers)	570 Lexington Ave., New York	114,149
Eastman Kodak Co	343 State St., Rochester	213,424
Ford Motor Co. (2 units in Japan)	Dearborn, Mich	5,403,873
General Motors Corp	3044 West Grand Blvd., Detroit	2,614,973

Business and noncommercial holdings in Japan of United States organizations (total value of interest is as of December 1, 1941)—Continued

Name	Address	Value
Goodrich, B. F., Co	500 S. Main St., Akron, Ohio	$334,080
Gosho Co., Inc. (Cotton agents)	c/o Alien Property Custodian, 1577 Mercantile Bank Bldg., Dallas, Texas.	138,555
Hanovia Chemical & Mfg. Co. (2 units)	233 New Jersey Railroad Ave., Newark 5, N. J.	84,414
Hanson-Van Winkle-Munning Co. (electroplating & polishing).	Matawan, N. J	37,008
International Automatic Electric Corp	1033 W. Van Buren St., Chicago	6,111
International Business Machines Corp	Madison at 57th, New York	318,375
International Nickel Co	67 Wall St., New York	3,896
International Standard Electric Corp. (7 units)	67 Broad St., New York	2,645,245
Irwin-Harrisons-Whitney, Inc. (tea)	50 S. Front St., Philadelphia	405,887
Loew's, Inc	1540 Broadway, New York	513,493
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Co	1540 Broadway, New York	65,296
National Cash Register Co. (2 units)	Main & K Sts., Dayton, Ohio	928,597
National City Bank	55 Wall St., New York	12,636
Nichibei Securities Co., Ltd	c/o Office of Alien Property Custodian, 417 Montgomery St., San Francisco.	
Otis Elevator Co	260 Eleventh Ave., New York	349,164
Paraffine Co., Inc	475 Brannan St., San Francisco	154,101
Paramount Pictures, Inc. (2 units)	New York	571,619
RCA Communications, Inc	66 Broad St., New York	5,342
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc	1270 Sixth Ave., New York	246,274
Sales Affiliates, Inc. (beauticians' stuff)	730 Fifth Ave., New York	5,733
Singer Sewing Machine Co	149 Fifth Ave., New York	2,323,195
Standard Brands of Asia, Inc	595 Madison Ave., New York	18,877
Standard Oil Co. (N. J.)	30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York	2,181
Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. (3 units)	26 Broadway, New York	5,580,812
Tide Water Associated Oil Co	17 Battery Place, New York	1,549,613
Titan Co. (titanium products) 2 units	111 Broadway, New York	249,852
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp	444 W. 56th St., New York	284,899
United Artists Corp	729 Seventh Ave., New York	37,520
United Engineering & Foundry Co	First National Bank Bldg., Pittsburg	1,571,177
United Press Associations	220 E. 42nd St., New York	14,823
Universal Pictures Co., Inc	1250 Sixth Ave., New York	150,942
Warner Brothers-First National Pictures	321 W. 44th St., New York	270,932
Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society	124 Columbia Heights, Brooklyn	43,023
Western Electric Export Co	195 Broadway, New York	87,172
William Wrigley, Jr., Co	410 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago	23,400

AMERICAN COMPANIES HAVING PATENT LICENSE OR TRADE-MARK AGREEMENTS WITH COMPANIES IN JAPAN PROPER

Ajax Electrothermic Corp., Ajax Park, Trenton 5, N. J.
Ajax Electric Furnace Corp., 1108 Frankford Ave., Philadelphia, Pa.
American Cyanamid Co., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
American Magnesium Metals Corp., 800 Ohio St., Pittsburgh, Pa.
Baker & Co., 113 Astor St., Newark 5, N. J.
Bendix Aviation Corp., 11th floor, Fisher Bldg., Detroit, Mich.
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corp., 1400 Lafayette Bldg., Detroit 26, Mich.
California Institute of Technology, 1201 E. California St., Pasadena 4.
Carrier Corp., 900 S. Geddes St., Syracuse, N. Y.
Chemical Construction Corp., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
China Electric Co., Ltd., 67 Broad St., New York, N. Y.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Santa Monica, Calif.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Wilmington 98, Del.
Gasoline Products Co., 26 Journal Square, Jersey City, N. J.
General Cable Corp., 420 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y.
General Railway Signal Co., 801 West Ave., Rochester, N. Y.
B. F. Goodrich Co., Akron, Ohio.
Gray Processes Corp., 26 Journal Sq., Jersey City, N. J.
Hanovia Chemical & Mfg. Co., 233 New Jersey Railroad Ave., Newark 5, N. J.
Hooker Electrochemical Co., Buffalo Ave. & 47th St., Niagara Falls, N. Y.
International General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y.
International Standard Electric Corp., 67 Broad St., New York, N. Y.
Kidde, Walter & Co., Inc., 675 Main St., Belleville, N. J.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., Nicholas Bldg., Toledo, Ohio.
Eli Lilly & Co., Indianapolis, Ind.
Merco Nordstrom Valve Co., 400 N. Lexington Ave., Pittsburgh, Pa.
Merrill Co., 582 Market St., San Francisco, Calif.

Northern Equipment Co., 1945 Grove Drive, Erie, Pa.
Radio Corporation of America, Rockefeller Center, New York, N. Y.
Saint Regis Paper Co., 230 Park Ave., New York, N. Y.
Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc., 40 Flatbush Avenue Extension, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Stanco, Inc., 216 W. 14th St., New York, N. Y.
Standard Oil Co. (N. J.), 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.
Standard Oil Development Co., 26 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Stewart-Warner Corp., 1826 Diversey Parkway, Chicago, Ill.
Texaco Development Corp., 26 Journal Square, Jersey City, N. J.
Titan Co., 111 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Universal Oil Products Co., 310 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.
Western Electric Co., Inc., 195 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
Western Electric Export Co., Ditto.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., Wilmerding, Pa.
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.
Weston Electric Instrument Corp., 614 Frelinghuysen Ave., Newark 5, N. J.

EXHIBIT No. 982

(Pencilled note:) URGENT.

MR. CARTER: The attached article on the CIC is to appear in the September 22nd Survey. Its history is as follows: Hugh Deane submitted a short, which KB and Bob Barnett wanted Hugh to rewrite a little more objectively, giving a little more on the other side of the question. Hugh's second piece also fell short of what was required, so I secured Hugh's OK on KB's rewriting the article, the final piece to be signed by both KB and Hugh. Hugh has seen the article in its present form and has just wired that he is returning it special delivery with his comments, and he added the phrase "en garde" which may suggest that he is unwilling to sign it in its present form. We shall presumably have his comments tomorrow morning.

In case Hugh is unwilling to sign the piece, KB is also unwilling to sign it. I therefore suggested some such device as this: indicating that the article had been written by the staff of the American Council, on the basis of sources given in the text and of first-hand material supplied by Hugh Deane. I will suggest this formula to Hugh after I have heard from you.

Do you approve the piece as it stands? If we cannot have the the double signature, do you approve my suggestion about authorship? (Pencilled note:) Please let me have your answer Friday morning.

CP.

The piece has gone to the printer and galleys should be here tomorrow afternoon (*Friday*). I am sorry to have to bother you with the matter at this late date, but the possibility of a hitch about authorship makes it necessary.

CP.

Thursday p. m.

EXHIBIT No. 983

(Handwritten:)

SEISLIN, *July 17.*

DEAR DEAR KET: Well I have been to Manchukuo and got in & out alive. I place our invitation to the Emperors Garden Party on the top of my (your) office bag at every frontier & where every Japanese gendarme can see it & though the questions continue they are in a mellow atmosphere. In one Manchurian city in an important Govt. office—the Japanese chief was called out of the office to the phone. His Chinese assistant quick as a flash took a piece of paper out of his pocket & wrote "Don't believe a word they tell you." Then a moment later on another piece he wrote "I can't talk." When I looked straight into his eyes as you have seen me some time "intense sympathy" he wrote again "Meet in front of Station at 6.30. He appeared at 7—driving along a side street in a half-covered Russian Troika—I walked alone for two blocks down a side street and then stepped into the Troika & we zigzagged first to a Russian Restaurant where I dropped him & drove on. Then I joined him at a Chinese Restaurant across the street—we talked & talked & talked. I'll tell you all when

we meet. When we started back to my Hotel—Air raid drill was on sirens blew—the streets filled with amateur patriots with arm bands who began wildly putting out shop lights, bicycle light, & fairly leaped on our driver & blew out his coach lights—later gendarmes insisted that we alight & we walked on until a block from my hotel he said goodbye. I wonder whether he was agent provocateur or Chinese patriot—I think the latter. Don't mention this I beg of you until we meet. I don't want to get the lad shot. (You can tell this to John.) After leaving him—I had a devil of a time in the hotel—the lights were out because of the air raid drill & I had to pack in the dark, paying bill in the dark, drive to the station in a lightless taxi & catch my train in a station that was dim & where you first bumped into luggage coolies, next excited passengers, next the muskets of hurrying soldiers & got into a train with an armed & armoured engine & an armed & armoured caboose. It was one more hectic and amusing get away as I had only about 20 minutes and had to get two bags out of the handgepack.

Much love,

EDWARD.

JULY 19.

Well, here I am in Vladivostok harbor—what a contrast with Korea! It is cool & there is a little mist hanging over the lovely hills that are much like the Korean Hills & not unlike the Japanese sea—I am guessing which is Bremman of those on the dock. The *Siberia Maru* is a very comfortable ship. It does a regular triangle or quadrant every ten days, Tsuruga, Seislin, Raslin, Vladivostok. I am the first foreign passenger in a long time to board the ship at Seislin. There are many who board it at Tsuruga. There were two Soviet women attached to the Embassy in Tokyo and two Japanese F. O. men on board, one going to Berlin the other to be consul general in Vladivostok.

Later: I am now on shore in the same hotel with Bremman.

EXHIBIT No. 984

REPORT OF CONFERENCE OF MARCH 9TH

A conference of leaders in the academic field was held at the Institute of Pacific Relations on March 9th to devise a scheme for meeting the emergency demand for people with unusual qualifications, primarily in the language field, without unduly dislocating the academic system or disrupting future sources of supply.

WHAT ARE THE MAIN GOVERNMENT NEEDS IN THIS RESPECT

1. *Intelligence officers for all forces.*—Requirements: all-round knowledge of the language in question, especially reading script and printed matter, and military knowledge.

2. *Economic analysis.*—Requirements: ability to read the language, and knowledge of the economic situation of the country in question.

3. *Interpreters with troops.*—Requirement: ability to speak the language.

4. *Diplomatic advisers.*—Requirements: ability to read the language, and knowledge of the political situation.

5. *Communications Intelligence.*—Requirements: ability to read script and printed matter and speak the language, and a thorough general knowledge of the country.

6. *Propaganda.*—Requirement: ability to read, speak, and write the language, and a thorough knowledge of the country and the people.

7. *Censorship.*—Requirement: ability to read all forms of writing of the language.

8. *Reserve category*, including those engaged in basic or special studies, and those working on long-term government projects or on research related to government needs.

NOTE.—Since it will be impossible for some time to find sufficient personnel in the above categories who combine all the necessary qualifications, the functions of each category could be divided. (For example, the work of economic analysis could be shared between economics and linguists.)

HOW IS THE GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT RECRUITING SUCH PERSONNEL?

The government is already taking some people with a knowledge of Russian, Chinese, and Japanese from academic sources, but so far chiefly from the periphery. There is a danger, however, that its demands will soon involve dislocation of the academic system.

The present method of recruiting varies with the different departments. Thus the Army may encounter difficulties in recruiting specialists under existing regulations. On the other hand, the F. B. I., the Marines, and the Navy are freely enrolling them as the need arises

The supply of those with a knowledge of Russian and Chinese is still sufficient to meet the present demand without seriously affecting academic organizations. But in the case of Japanese, the supply is already practically exhausted.

WHAT ARE THE NONACADEMIC SOURCES FROM WHICH THE GOVERNMENT'S NEEDS MIGHT BE MET?

1. *Japanese language.*—(a) Second-generation Japanese. The government is still reluctant for political reasons to use this group. Moreover, few of them can read Japanese; and even those who speak the language frequently speak only patois. Those who can read and speak well have usually received their training in Japan and are therefore under suspicion. However, the latter are one of the few groups who could read script.

(b) *Businessmen.*—Very few are able to read and write Japanese. Those with speaking knowledge would be valuable if they could be used on active service, but most of them are above the age limit for such work. However, their speaking knowledge could be made use of in the fields of Communications Intelligence and Propaganda.

(c) Missionaries: Some have reading and writing, as well as speaking, knowledge of the language; and although the majority would be over-age for active service, this group might be an important source of supply. However, it is doubtful how many would be willing to work against Japan in view of their connections with that country and of the fact that by so doing they would probably be unable to continue their activities in Japan after the war was over.

Missionaries with knowledge of Chinese, on the other hand, could learn to read Japanese fairly quickly and would not be subject to the same scruples as the missionaries from Japan.

(d) White-Russian émigrés from Manchuria and Koreans knowing Japanese. It is probable that few would be able to read or write the language; and the political allegiance of both groups would be suspect.

(e) Chinese could possibly be used to read and write Japanese.

2. *Chinese language.*—The supply is still adequate to meet the present demands of the government. If the demand grows, Chinese could be used.

3. *Russian language.*—The supply is plentiful; and, if necessary, new personnel can be trained comparatively quickly.

4. *Siamese and Malay languages.*—Missionaries are at present the chief source of supply, but there are not enough of them to meet possible demands. However, since the reading and writing problem is not great in the case of these languages, the training of new personnel would not be difficult. Another possible source of supply would be British Malaya.

5. *Dutch language.*—No problem.

6. *Political and economic analysts.*—The chief problem here is to utilize the present supply with a minimum of wastage, and to conserve the present facilities, and develop new ones, for training additional personnel. Newspapermen, State Department officials, and students and research workers abroad would be a valuable source of supply in this category. Steps should be taken to ensure that such people will be available in the case of emergency and not interned abroad.

Conclusion.—As regards languages, the situation is already acute only in the case of Japanese. However, there is no machinery for making the best use of available personnel in all the above categories; and there is no adequate organization for the training of new personnel. For two reasons, therefore, it is essential that the academic world, in cooperation with the government, should devise some scheme to meet these deficiencies. First because its cooperation is essential to the efficient working out of such a scheme, which is of vital importance to the whole national defense organization; and secondly because, in the absence of such a plan, the whole academic system would be dislocated by the haphazard extraction of teachers and students for government service.

PROPOSALS FOR THE MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE ABOVE FIELDS

A committee representing the various academic institutions, learned societies, etc. should be set up to offer its services to the government in the task of working out a well integrated plan on a national scale. The first step in the drawing up of such a plan must be to compile a list of available personnel in the above fields and to classify them according to their special ability. The questionnaire already issued by the government with a view to creating a national roster in this connection is just beginning to get under way. This roster will do the mechanical work satisfactorily; but it cannot show initiative in selection, and it cannot sell its services to the departments.

Thus, when the preliminary listing and classifying have been completed, a scheme must be devised by which the personnel can be utilized with the maximum efficiency. Both as a means of conserving the limited supply of specialists and as an aid in coordinating the work of the various government departments, it would be desirable, in the case of the kind of work that lends itself to such treatment, to set up a central information bureau, possibly through the agency of the National Resources Planning Board. Without such centralization the available supply of specialists would soon be exhausted, and the present practice of duplication of work in the various departments would be perpetuated. A possible nucleus for such a central information bureau in the Far Eastern field already exists in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In coordination with the above scheme for the most efficient utilization of existing personnel, machinery should be devised for the training of new personnel in languages and the social sciences. The establishment of some kind of National Training School would preserve intact and even extend the existing teaching facilities and would guarantee a continued supply of new personnel. It would also enable those doing important research work to continue their studies or to undertake special studies in accordance with government needs.

Such a school could either be centralized or decentralized. If it were centralized at Washington, where members of government departments could attend after office hours, the government might be more inclined to provide the necessary funds. On the other hand, centralization would disorganize the training centers already established; and the value of part-time study in the present emergency situation, particularly in the case of the Japanese language, is doubtful. (In the latter connection, the question of organizing evening classes wherever the necessary facilities exist was also discussed, and it was agreed that the matter should be further investigated.)

The teaching facilities for such a National Training School are adequate, except in the case of the Japanese language, which presents a special difficulty. (Similar problems will arise if the government should require specialists in such langauges as Malay, Turkish, and Arabic.) Limited facilities exist for the teaching of the reading and writing of Japanese print and script in this country. And in the case of spoken Japanese, students could be sent to Hawaii; or missionaries and second-generation Japanese might be used for training purposes, though few are trained teachers. It was agreed that a conference of all teachers of Japanese should be held to discuss the problem.

THE PROBLEM OF DOCUMENTS, DICTIONARIES, ETC.

Steps should be taken to lay in a stock and to ensure the future supply of documents, newspapers, periodicals, etc. from potential enemy countries and from countries with which communications are likely to be blocked. The chief deficiency at present is in Russian and Japanese materials. In the former case, inquiry needs to be made as to what agencies or governments are holding up such materials. In the latter case, the deficiency should be made up by increased purchases from Japan. The Institute of Pacific Relations has already increased its purchases of such materials slightly and is attempting to organize delivery through neutral countries in the event of war. It was suggested that the Japanese section of the American Council of Learned Societies, and some of the universities, should take similar steps on as large a scale as possible; and that the Library of Congress should be encouraged to increase its activities along these lines.

A special problem arises in the case of Japanese dictionaries, textbooks, etc., the supply of which in this country is already practically exhausted. Since they would be extremely costly to reproduce, an adequate number should be

ordered from Japan immediately. Such purchases could best be made through the State Department. It was agreed that the problem would be taken up immediately by the Japanese teachers at the conference.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

It was agreed that Mr. Mortimer Graves should be entrusted with the task of taking all necessary steps, with the assistance of anyone he thought fit, for the implementation of the above proposals. It was suggested that the aid of Mr. Philip Moseley should be enlisted in connection with the drawing up of a new national roster; and that, as the essential first step, all the proposals put forward at the conference should be taken up with Washington as soon as possible.

NOTE ON FAR EASTERN INSTITUTE AT CORNELL

A two months intensive course in Chinese and Japanese is being given at Cornell this summer. This course, for which scholarships are available, will be the equivalent of a normal one-year course. In view of the emergency need for Japanese linguists, students should be encouraged to attend this summer school.

The conference was attended by:

Knight Biggerstaff, Cornell
Kurt Bloch, I. P. R.
Hugh Borton, Columbia
E. C. Carter, I. P. R.
Samuel N. Cross, Harvard
Carrington Goodrich, Columbia
Mortimer Graves, A. C. L. S., Washington
W. L. Holland, I. P. R., Berkeley
Elizabeth Jorgensen, I. P. R.
George O. Kennedy, Yale
Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins
John Leaning, I. P. R.
W. W. Lockwood, A. C. I. S., Princeton
John Marshall, Rockefeller Foundation
Harriet Moore, A. R. I.
E. O. Reischauer, Harvard
G. T. Robinson, Columbia
David N. Rowe, Princeton

EXHIBIT No. 985

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *Jan. 11 1129A.*

EDWARD C. CARTER:

Delighted to see your son Tuesday 11:30 at the Court.

FELIX FRANKFURTER. 1130.1151A.

EXHIBIT No. 986

(Handwritten:)

AUG. 6.

It is difficult to answer your very thoughtful letter re office space because I don't know yet whether Chen Han N-seng will have returned to China as Holland desires or whether he will still be in N. Y. The problem is simplified through Bill Holland's not coming. The Amerasia space, i. e., beyond Amerasia seems a solution.

(Inserted here is a sketch of the office layout, with the following initials and names: EFC
Orrick
McDonald
KM ECC)

If Chen returns before I do I guess we can manage to squeeze into our present space. I don't think card tables will do. I think you should continue in my office—I would rather like to work in yours.

We are having a peaceful crossing. Bremman is a store house of information. I am also lucky in that your friend & Tommy White's is in the next compartment—Col. Faymonville. He has been out in Vladivostok for the visit of the U. S. Asiatic Squadron. If every American had his wise and comprehensive outlook on the U. S. S. R. there would be great possibilities of cooperation between U. S. and U. S. S. R.

This carriage is very wobbly. I have run out of stationery as you see—so I am afraid my letters will bother and bore you because of their sloppiness. I envy you your clear distinguished handwriting & your lovely blue writing paper.

AUG. 7.

It has been hot but today is lovely and cool. I hope when I get to Moscow to be able to reach you by cable or phone. Bremman and I got up at 4 a. m. to get your cable at Irkutsk but every one there swore there was no cable from you anywhere in the city. I saw a lovely sunrise over Baikal but that hardly made up for the lack of a cable from you.

This is our longest and I hope our last separation.

Love,

EDWARD.

CARTER,
Tourist Bureau, Harbin.

Cable care Stationmaster, Birobidjan, whether leaving as planned.
No answer.

EXHIBIT No. 987

Arthur Paul, Daisy Paul, reserved
Hrepilad Fall
N. Y.
Crm.
Wash.
Harriman
pro court Liberty
Thurman Arnold
Abe Fortas, 50,000 income
RS: Albert Friendly, Post
William Cochrane, Balt., wife
Mary Gresham, Govt. Folk good.
Robert Lamb
C. I. O. now Williams
AI.
Miss Nathausen
Pub. Rel.
Lincoln Bld.

Don't mention Vluz
Camincho
Bus Ma for Roosevelt
Smith Boat

Clifford Durr
Able friend
FCC South Conf
Little money
Raymond Swing
Cli
I. P. R.
Anne Wheeler
F. E. State
Balting daylete
2 children
Balt.

EXHIBIT No. 988

MEETING; ARCTIC INSTITUTE; APRIL 9; ECC; OL; FD; HM; SCHMIDT; MOTILIEV HARONDAR

Schmidt is head of all the work north of the 62nd parallel, it is about one-third of the U. S. S. R.

The first thing that had to be developed in the Arctic was science. This began in 1917, but since 1929 the development has been very rapid. Every region of the north has its permanent arctic station, where work is carried on during the whole year.

The second thing to be developed was transportation. This is the key to the arctic. The aim is to get a route across the north sea. In 1932 the *Sibiryakov* made the first complete trip in one season. In 1933 was the Cheliuskin expedition in 1934 the *Litka* got through and in 1935 they opened a regular route for commercial vessels, four ships made the trip. In 1936 six will go from West to

East; two from East to West; 6 as far as the Kolyma; 8 to the Lena and 40 to the Yennisea. More than 300,000 tons of cargo will be carried.

River transportation is very important. The basin of the Lena is larger than Western Europe and this has to be developed. Since 1933 ships have gone to the mouth of the Lena. Now they have their own shipbuilding wharf on the Lena.

The next thing is the geological survey in order to begin the production of minerals. There is zinc and lead and nickel. There is rock salt near the Taimir penninsula. This is very important because there is no salt in the Soviet Far East. They have had to get salt for the fishing industry from Odessa and from Western Siberia. In 1938 there will be 5,000 workers there and they will produce 150 tons per year.

The Yennisea is navigable for ocean ships as far as Igarka, 450 km. from the mouth. Last year many foreign steamers came there for timber, which is shipped down the river from Western and Eastern Siberia. One even took timber to South Africa. River transport on the lower Yennisea has existed since before the Revolution.

There is no need to colonize the north, because there is better land to be settled elsewhere in the U. S. S. R. There they plan to have more machines than men. There is one labor camp on the Yennisea, but there is not much use for criminal labor there, everyone wants to work in the Arctic. The population in the asiatic part of the north, north of 62nd parallel is 900,000 of which 150,000 are the native tribes.

Aviation has been widely developed. There is regularly daily, all-year service down the great rivers, the Ob, the Yennisea, the Lena, etc. There are occasional services East and West between the rivers to the fur centers or to the mines. They find it cheaper to transport the men and equipment for the mines by air. The airplanes also help with the navigation, to locate the ice flows, etc.

At present they have a general rough geological survey of the whole region and on a basis of this they are doing more specialized surveys. In 1936 there will be 12 geological expeditions to different parts of the North.

In 1935 the most important product of the region was timber. This is shipped from the interior. In 1936 they expect that minerals will be the most important. The Lena and the Yennisea are open about 4 or 4½ months for shipping.

The native peoples are helped by the Institute of Northern Peoples. Every tribe has its schools and at present they are concentrating on training teachers from the native peoples. There are already native technical experts, ship captains, wireless operators, etc.

When Schmidt was in the U. S. he found everyone very friendly to him. Roosevelt was interested in his work and questioned him very carefully on all the details.

Conditions in Alaska are better than in the North here. The climate is not as severe. But in the north of Canada they are worse.

The Soviet weather forecasts, based on their observations in the North, are very good and far ahead of other countries. The U. S. should establish similar stations for this purpose in the north of Canada.

Reindeer are to be increased for meat production, but they will not be used more widely in transportation. At present there is agriculture in the north, in Igarka and Franz Joseph Land. It is just for raising vegetables. In the next few years they plan to have agriculture for fresh vegetables in all the places where there are people. There is no grain grown there.

The work in the mines goes on all the year.

At present there is a 50–60 percent increase in transportation facilities every year. The growth of transportation over the next twenty years will depend on the development of mining.

EXHIBIT No. 989

APRIL 19, 1933.

ECC from JB:

OWEN LATTIMORE

You will remember that when Lattimore was first suggested as a member of the American Council I was inclined to support the proposal. It is true that he is not an economist, but the following reasons would weigh very heavily in my mind in favor of inviting him: (1) as far as I know, he is not reputed to be in

the pay of any government; (2) he has a remarkable background of personal experience in Manchuria and China; (3) he has written what is perhaps the best book in existence on Manchuria; (4) although he is not an economist, he is thoroughly familiar with what the economists are interested in. In other words, he understands the nature of the pressures which impinge on the Far East, and although I myself think that he overweights the cultural or Spenglerian analysis, he never loses sight of reality; (5) he has a very understanding and sympathetic attitude toward the Soviet Union, and (6) our job at the Banff Conference is not only to break political issues down into their economic units, but also to put them together again. In this second job, Lattimore would have a very great deal to contribute.

APRIL 17, 1933.

ECC to JB:

I wrote Fred saying that Lattimore had offered to be a member of the American Group at Banff but that we had misgivings as to whether it was more important to have him than some of the others who we felt would help more on our economic program.

Now I have the following cable from Fred dated Honolulu, April 14:

"MATSUKATA: I STRONGLY RECOMMEND LATTIMORE."

This would mean more if you also joined in the recommendation. What is your reaction? Attached is a copy of the letter I sent Fred.

MARCH 27, 1933.

Mr. F. V. FIELD,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

DEAR FRED: Owen Lattimore is coming home from Mongolia and Manchuria across Canada just at the time of the Banff Conference, and he is very eager to attend. This news came to us after the Selection Committee had met, and it looks as though we were going to have the very greatest difficulty in keeping down the American group to 25. So it will be hard to find a place for Lattimore. But before the Selection Committee finally passes on his name, we should like to know whether you feel strongly that he should be secured, even though that might mean increasing the size of the American group. Please send a full statement of your views as to the importance or otherwise of having him, at the earliest possible moment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT NO. 990

JUNE 28, 1933.

Mr. L. T. CHEN,
China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.

DEAR MR. CHEN: Here is a copy of a letter of introduction which I have given at his request to General Yakhontoff. The General is very eager to get the backing of the Institute of Pacific Relations in making a study of Communism in China. He felt that his wide contacts in Russia and in the Far East fitted him uniquely to make such a study and that he might be employed jointly by the China Institute, the American Council and the Pacific Committee of the I. P. R. in the U. S. S. R.

We have told him that the I. P. R. was not in a position to sponsor his study. We do not know where the funds would come from.

A further difficulty is that we do not think that General Yakhontoff stands in the first rank as a scholar. He is more in the class of a popular lecturer than a research worker of high qualifications.

I think it would be a friendly act for you to see him when he calls and talk with him about his plans, but I do not think there is any reason for you to go out of your way to render him special favors or give a great deal of time to him.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC: W

JUNE 28, 1933.

Mr. L. T. CHEN,
China Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.

DEAR MR. CHEN: This is to introduce General Victor Yakhontoff, who hopes to visit China in September and October to get material for lectures and for a book on Communism in China. He was formerly a General in the Russian Imperial army; later he was an attaché in the Russian embassy in Tokyo; after the Revolution he was an emigre and settled in America. More recently he has re-established friendly relations with people in Moscow interested in the study of foreign affairs. He is the author of "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East." He recently became an American citizen.

Inasmuch as General Yakhontoff lectures quite widely before men's women's clubs in America and is making a serious effort to continue as an objective student of Far Eastern affairs, any help that you can give him will be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC:W

EXHIBIT No. 991

JULY 13, 1933.

PERSONAL.

Dr. STANLEY K. HORNBECK,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HORNBECK: As you know, a group of scientific workers in the U. S. S. R. who have specialized on a study of the economic, ethnic, cultural, and political problems of the Far East has been definitely organized as the Soviet Group of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The head of this group was elected unanimously at the Shanghai Conference as the Soviet member of the Pacific Council, the international governing body of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Sir Robert Borden, the Honorable Newton W. Rowell and Vincent Massey, the outstanding leaders of the I. P. R. in Canada, are exceedingly anxious to have a Soviet representative at the Banff Conference. Unfortunately the official attitude of the Canadian Government is such that it is illegal for members of the Communist Party to visit and live in the Dominion of Canada. Prime Minister Bennett, however, is so interested in the success of the Banff Conference that he has privately informed the Honorable Newton W. Rowell that the Canadian immigration officers at all points of entry in the Dominion will be instructed to facilitate the arrival and departure for Banff of all accredited members of the Institute of Pacific Relations en route for the Banff Conference. Some months ago he gave a personal assurance of this to Mr. Rowell after Mr. Rowell raised the question of the legal and administrative obstacles that might arise in the case of a Soviet representative.

To make doubly certain that there is no embarrassment and unfortunate incident accompanying the arrival of a Soviet representative, Mr. Rowell has again reopened the matter with Prime Minister Bennett. As a result, I am able to send to you herewith a copy of a letter just received from Escott Reid, the Secretary of the Canadian Institute, conveying to me formally a copy of a recent letter from Prime Minister Bennett to the Honorable Newton W. Rowell.

It so happens that it would be of the greatest value to the American Council in developing its program of studies of Russian practice and policy in the Far East if it were possible for us to get permission from the State Department to ensure that the Soviet member of the Banff Conference was able to visit New York for conference with the officers and staff of the American Council both before and after the Banff Conference.

If the Institute of Pacific Relations group in Moscow is finally able to send a representative to Banff, the chances are three to one that they will send as the sole member or as Chairman of a group of two or three, Karl Radek whose article in Foreign Affairs a few months ago you must have read. He is a member of the Communist Party and, as you know, he has been specializing for some time on Soviet policy in the Far East.

I would like to inquire from you what steps the American Council should take in order that we might be able to cable Karl Radek that if it is possible for him

to visit New York on his way to and from Banff, the State Department will attend to the necessary formalities.

I do not know sufficiently the present policy and division of responsibility in the State Department in such a matter but have wondered whether it will be possible for you to discuss the question with Mr. Phillips and enlist his interest in finding a solution to the problem which confronts the American Council. There is no one in Washington better qualified than you to explain to Mr. Phillips the purpose and importance of the scientific studies of the Institute of Pacific Relation. If any personal reference would help, you might remind Mr. Phillips that I was a classmate of his at Harvard and that our fellow classmate, Charles Dana Draper, whom he knows, is my brother-in-law.

If some formal communication from the American Council addressed to the Secretary of State is called for, will you kindly let me know what sort of letter I should send in place of this purely personal inquiry.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC/NH

EXHIBIT No. 992

NOVEMBER 29, 1933.

JB to ECC:

The following men at Harvard should be interested in the Russian field:

Cross, Samuel A.—Professor of Russian, working in the medieval period. An expert on the Chronicles. Former commercial attaché, with, I think, chemical training. Pretty anti-Soviet personally, but a good American citizen. Said to be really good at the language. You will remember that Elisieff spoke very highly of him, and of the six or eight young men, including one of the Coudert boys, who are working for him.

Fainsod, Merle—Young, married a classmate of Betty Field's, took his Ph. D. in Government two years ago. Spent last year in Russia, working on the Third International, and is preparing a monograph for publication on this. Thoroughly intelligent, a protégé of Holcombe's personally, at present a tutor in government.

Langer, William—Modern European history. One of the best men in this field in America. Teaches History 30, Archie Coolidge's old course, and therefor partly inheritor of Coolidge's Russian tradition. Has no special competence in Russian, but an interest in it. Works for Foreign Affairs, and is the special friend of Mosely's. On the board of the Fletcher School.

Holcombe—You know.

Elliott, W. Y.—Government, at present titular head of the department. A special colleague of Lowell's, expert on the British empire, on which he has written a big book.

Emerson, Rupert—Government, relatively young. Has married a Russian, his own Russian background uncertain. Said to have spent the past year in the Far East. Recommended by Cross. Spoken well of by Moseley.

Blake, Robert—Head of the library. A very important fellow in Harvard politics. Knows only a little Russian, but knows Georgian, Armenian and about twenty other peripheral languages. Dug up Mount Athos with Kirsopp Lake. Very much interested in the Russian field.

Pope—Fine Arts. The greatest master of Persian art alive, and personnally said to be an advance Bolshevik. Went through Russia two years ago with Eddie Warburg, who has told me that he knows no Russian but is sold on the Soviet Union. Knows quite a lot about icons, and might be interested from the point of view of Russian art.

Hopper, Bruce—You know. Away on a sabbatical in Russia.

EXHIBIT No. 993

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH MORTIMER L. GRAVES

Thursday, December 7, 1933

Present: Edward C. Carter and Joseph Barnes.

Speaking from memory Mr. Graves said that the expenditure budget for the Harvard Summer School of Chinese Studies was as follows:

24 assistances @ 125 and 62.50	$2,500
3 inst. P $800	2,400
2 sub. @ $400	800
22 spec. lect. @ $50	1,100
Adm. 40 @ $5	200
	$7,000

Income budget was as follows:

Tuitions 40 and 45	$1,800
Harvard Yenching	1,850
Society of Japanese Studies	850
Carnegie Corporation and American Council Learned Societies	2,500
	$7,000

There were forty students registered; sixteen paid their way entirely, twenty-four were assisted, eight at $62.50 per person and sixteen at $125 per person. The charge for board and room for six weeks ranged from $70 upward according to accommodation. The tuition fee was $45 for the six weeks.

Graves expressed delightful desire that the American Council of Learned Societies was not to have the credit for taking the initiative for the proposed Russian Language School but expressed a deep and sincere desire to cooperate to the full with the I. P. R. in putting the school across.

EXHIBIT No. 994

Finance 1936
Document 7

INDIVIDUAL TRAVEL EXPENDITURE FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS

I—ADMINISTRATION

1934

Edward C. Carter

Left New York January 1934, visited Toronto, Winipeg and San Francisco prior to sailing for Honolulu. Left Honolulu, after a two weeks' visit, for Japan. After a four weeks' stay in Japan, he sailed from Kobe to Manila for a short visit. He returned to China early in April and visited the following cities: Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Peiping, and Ting Hsien. He left for Moscow early in May, visiting Hsinking en route. He left Moscow the end of May and visited Amsterdam, The Hague, Leyden, Paris, Geneva and London and returned to New York the end of June.

He remained in the United States until the fall with the expection of visits to Toronto and Montreal in July and October.

Early in November he purchased a round-the-world trip ticket via London, Marseilles, Bombay, Hongkong, Shanghai and San Francisco in order to take advantage of the saving possible on purchasing a round-the-world ticket. Re-

mained in London from the middle of November until early in December. He then visited Paris, Amsterdam, The Hague and Moscow, returning to London January 2, 1935.

Total Expenditure, $4,777.48.

1935

After a week's stay in London and a brief visit in Paris he sailed from Marseilles to Bombay. Remained in India from January 24 to February 7 visiting Bombay, Delhi, Nagpur and Wardha. Traveled to Shanghai via Hongkong. He remained in China until April 2 visiting Hankow, Nanking, Tientsin and Peiping. Left for Japan to attend the interim research conference in Tokyo. On May 14, he sailed from Japan to Honolulu where he remained until June 3rd. He sailed from Honolulu to Australia, arriving in Sydney on June 18. In Australia he visited Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. Left Australia on July 5 for New Zealand where he remained until July 27, visiting Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin, Invercargill, Oamaru, Hastings, and Napier. He left New Zealand for Los Angeles spending August 5th in Honolulu. He visited Los Angeles, San Francisco and Yosemite. He reached New York late in August.

During the autumn he visited Washington, D. C., Seattle, Portland, Vancouver, Edmonton, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal.

Total Expenditure, $5,077.30.

1936

He visited Washington, D. C., Cleveland, Chicago, San Francisco, and returned to New York to sail for London on March 11. He visited Amsterdam, The Hague and Leyden, Moscow, Geneva, Paris, and returned to London. Sailed for New York on May 7th.

At the end of May he visited Ottawa to attend the meetings of the Canadian Institute Studies Conference. June and July spent on work in connection with preparing for the Yosemite Conference at Lee, Mass.

In July he received a $500 advance toward his Yosemite travelling expenses.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $1,996.35.

Kate Mitchell

Miss Mitchell accompanied Mr. Carter on all of the above mentioned visits with the exception of his visits to the west coast and Canada in 1935 and his visits to Chicago, San Francisco, Amsterdam, The Hague, Leyden, and Moscow, and Ottawa in 1936.

No expense to the Institute was involved in Miss Mitchell's travel.

Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley

Miss Cholmeley joined the Secretariat staff on January 9, 1935, and accompanied Mr. Carter on his visits to India, China, Japan, Honolulu, Australia, New Zealand, and returned to the United States, visiting Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Yosemite. She did not accompany Mr. Carter on his trips to the west coast and Canada during 1935.

No expense to the Institute was involved in Miss Cholmeley's travel during 1935.

The details of Miss Cholmeley's travel during 1936 will be found under item VI—Staff and Staff Exchange.

II—PACIFIC AFFAIRS

1934

Owen Lattimore

Mr. Lattimore left New York in September 1934 for Peiping, visiting Honolulu en route.

Total Expenditure, $1,200.00.

1935

Mr. Lattimore's travel in China during 1935 was paid for by a grant from the International Research Fund.

1936

Left Peiping in March, visited Moscow, Amsterdam, London, and returned to New York in May.

Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore were given travelling grants to enable them to attend the Yosemite Conference.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $2,034.39.

III—RESEARCH

1934

W. L. Holland

Early in 1934 he visited Toronto and Winnipeg en route to Japan where he established his headquarters in Tokyo. He also visited China during 1934.

Total Expenditure, $568.98.

1935

In March 1935 he travelled to Shanghai to meet Mr. Carter and participate in staff conferences with Mr. Carter, Mr. Lasker, Mr. Lattimore, Miss Tylor and Miss Mitchell in Shanghai, Nanking and Peiping as well as to confer with members of the China Council. In June 1935, he visited Manila, Hongkong, Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, Tientsin, and Dairen. He left Japan in July and spent some time in Honolulu, returning to New York the end of August; since which time his headquarters have been in New York and Stockbridge.

In December he paid a short visit to Toronto.

Total Expenditure, $892.98.

1936

Mr. Holland visited Ottawa in May 1936 to attend the Canadian Institute Studies Conference. He has also been given a travelling grant in connection with attending the Yosemite Conference.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $280.25.

1935

Carl L. Alsberg

Dr. Alsberg was given a grant towards his travelling expenses in connection with attending the interim research conference in Tokyo in April.

Total Expenditure, $300.00.

1936

Pardoo Lowe

Incidental travel and travelling grant in connection with attending Yosemite Conference.

Total Expenditure, $191.06.

VI—STAFF AND STAFF EXCHANGE

1935

Richard Pyke

Mr. Pyke was given a grant of $150 toward his expenses in connection with coming to the United States. He visited Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa in December.

He was given a grant of $1,000 to purchase a round-trip ticket from New York to Shanghai.

Total Expenditure, $1,226.58.

1936

Mr. Pyke visited Toronto early in 1936 in connection with arranging for his readmission to the United States.

He left for the Far East in February visiting Seattle, Vancouver, and Honolulu en route. He spent 3 weeks in Japan visiting Tokyo, Nagaya, Kobe, Kyoto, and Mara. He spent about 8 weeks in China visiting Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, and Tientsin. He spent a week in Manchuria visiting Hsinking, Mukden, and Dairen. The advance of $1,000 given Mr. Pyke during 1935 practically covered all his travel to and in the Far East and return.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $63.54.

1935

Charlotte Tyler

Miss Tyler left the United States in the fall of 1934 and visited London. Left London for the Far East via Singapore, Siam, and Indo China. She spent some time in Shanghai and accompanied the Secretary General to Nanking and Peiping where she maintained her headquarters until March 1936.

Total Expenditure, $1,000.00.

1936

She returned from Peiping via Moscow, and London to attend the Yosemite Conference.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $306.25.

NOTE.—Miss Tyler's salary and travel is paid from a special earmarked grant from the Payne Fund.

1936

Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley

Miss Cholmeley visited Canada in January 1936 for purposes of readmission to the United States.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $97.02.

1936

Harriet Moore

Miss Moore left New York on March 11 and paid short visits to London and Amsterdam, and accompanied Mr. Carter to Moscow where she remained until the latter part of May. She then returned to the United States to assist in conference preparation.

Total Expenditure, first 7 months, $600.00.

EXHIBIT No. 995

FEBRUARY 13, 1934.

SELSKER M. GUNN, Esq.,
Rockfeller Foundation,
49 West 49th Street, New York City.

DEAR GUNN: It is impossible to tell you how highly we all appreciated the information and the insights which you and Mrs. Gunn gave us here. We only wish we could have pumped you for 10 weeks instead of 10 hours.

I am hoping that you will have a long talk with Barnes and Holland almost immediately after you arrive in New York, for Barnes is leaving for Russia and Siberia a few days after your arrival, and similarly Holland about the first of March is leaving New York for the Pacific Coast, Honolulu, and Japan.

First of all I hope you can in confidence sketch to Barnes and Holland your general plan for China. It is of the utmost importance that they get as full a picture of your analysis of China's needs as you so vividly gave to me. To understand what is in your mind will be invaluable to Holland when he goes to the Far East, and to Barnes when he goes to Russia. I know you want to discuss with them the Standard of Living study, particularly with reference to China.

I hope you and Mrs. Gunn can go over to the Fifty-second Street office and more generally give the background of your studies, not only to Barnes and Holland but also to Lattimore, Miss Tyler, and Lasker.

Any help that any of them can give you in return will be gladly given.

I don't think I told you that, when we saw Kerakhan in Moscow in 1931, he told us that the Institute's researches in China and Japan would be equally valuable whether the Far East remained capitalist or became communist. He affirmed that these basic researches on food and population, trade, tariffs, industrialization, and farm management must form the basis for any socially valid public policy. Similarly I have the feeling that your program of education and research for rural reconstruction in China will prove equally indispensable whether China goes communist or not. I think this is an important point for you to bear in mind, for it may be that some of your trustees will want to veto your proposals because they think that China is going communist.

Holland and Barnes you must see soon after your arrival, as they will be leaving the city very soon. A little later, when your initial rush is over, I hope

you can give a little time to Miss Tyler to tell her what you know of the Basic English situation in the Far East.

If there are any memoranda that would be of use to me in China, I hope that you will send them to me in care of the China Institute of Pacific Relations, 123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai. I wish now that I had been forehanded enough to get from you a list of the twenty or thirty Chinese whom you found the wisest and most promising. If you could possibly spare the time to send me the names and cities and a brief "Who's Who" regarding the people I ought to see without fail. You would be rendering the I. P. R. a great service.

With deepest appreciation for all that you did for us here, and with kindest regards from us all to you both, I am

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC/H

EXHIBIT No. 996

CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. AROSEV, PRESIDENT OF VOKS, MR. CARTER, AND J. B., INTERPRETER

MAY 21, 1934.

Mr. Carter began by explaining that this was his third trip to the Soviet Union. On each of his previous trips, he had made every effort possible to work out arrangements for cooperation between the I. P. R. and Soviet social scientists interested in the Pacific area. The results of these efforts were by no means insignificant. The degree of cooperation actually achieved today was far higher than when he first came here in 1929. On the other hand, he was equally convinced that it did not yet begin to correspond to the volume and importance of the work being done here or of that with which the Institute is familiar outside the Soviet Union. The main purpose of his present trip was to try to improve these arrangements, if possible, through a better organization of Soviet representation in the I. P. R.

Mr. Arosev began by saying that he wished to be entirely frank and open with us. As he had told JB previously, the question was unfortunately not one simply of scientific cooperation. From what he had been able to learn of the Institute, it was obvious that it was at least in large part a political institution.

Mr. Carter explained that this was only partly true. The subject matter of the Institute's research is political, but its own organization and activity is entirely nonpolitical. The Institute is a research organization which works through the scientific bodies and workers of different countries, and must consequently take into account the political situation of those bodies and scholars, but it is not itself a political body.

Mr. Arosev replied that in the Soviet Union there were no private bodies or individuals. The nearest exception to this rule is VOKS, which is organized on the same lines as TASS, the Soviet News Agency. But even with these, we must understand, it is inevitable that any activity carried on by anyone in the Soviet Union in cooperation with other nationals has a political significance. It was for this reason that he himself was eager to straighten out the question. The inclusion of Dr. Petrov's name on the Pacific Council, whatever the misunderstanding as to his action in accepting election three years ago, was today merely an empty formality, and both sides would profit by clearing the question up. The very misunderstanding, by which Dr. Petrov feels that he accepted the position as President of VOKS while the record shows that he did so as an individual, is representative of the situation here and indicates the need for a clear understanding of the Soviet position *in principle*, an understanding which could be worked out only in responsible quarters when the question had the wide political significance which is inevitable in joining officially the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Carter agreed completely with the desirability of arriving at such an understanding, and stated that it was the principal reason for his visit to Moscow. He pointed out that in reality it was the substance of cooperation which interested him, and that the form or formula, although it was important to straighten out, was after all of secondary importance. The increase of

direct contacts between other research institutions and those of the Soviet Union, and a wider exchange of documents and materials are the real desiderata which the Institute had in mind.

Mr. Arosev expressed his gratitude for this statement, which left him in a better position to understand the motives of the Institute. For these purposes, VOKS was the ideal organization in the Soviet Union. It is independent, it is responsible to no one and it unites in its contacts with foreign countries all the organizations of the Soviet Union in the arts and sciences.

The main question at the moment, he felt, was to secure the understanding in principle about which he had spoken. If that decision, which under the circumstances could be made only by very responsible people, should be favorable, he would find no difficulty at all in the Soviet Union. He had been in his new post only 25 days, but he was convinced that VOKS could be made a significant link between the Soviet Union and foreign scientists. In regard to the Institute, he and other officials had lacked hitherto any concrete idea of what the Institute wanted.

Mr. Carter stated that we are now in a position to supply such a statement in written form, if desirable, as a formal outline of the aims and objectives of the Institute and the part which the Soviet Union would be desired to play in their attainment. He wondered if Mr. Arosev would care to advise him as to the form and method of presenting such a statement.

Mr. Arosev said that he would try as quickly as possible to secure, on the basis of the large amount of information which they now had as a result of our visit, a definite ruling on the question in principle. He hoped to be able to secure this by May 26th, when he wished we would telephone him. Then we could submit such a concrete statement as we had mentioned, and he could guarantee that if the decision in principle should be favorable, we would find every aid and cooperation in carrying out our plans.

Mr. Carter then described in some detail the history of the Institute's relations with the Soviet Union. In 1929, through the warm interest of Commissar Litvinov, Mr. Alexandre Romm of TASS was sent to the Kyoto Conference as an observer. In 1931, Vice Commissar Karakhan spoke with cordiality of the research work of the Institute, and of the keen interest in it which was felt by Soviet scientists, and assured a responsible group of Institute representatives that individual cooperation on the part of Soviet scientists was entirely acceptable to the government authorities. At that time he recommended that VOKS be used as the agency, and in the same year Dr. Petrov who was then President of VOKS accepted his election to the Pacific Council of the Institute. This formal representation of the Soviet Union in the Institute had not developed as might have been hoped. In other ways, however (Mr. Carter referred to JB's presence in Moscow for the past two months, the survey he had made of research societies in the Soviet Union, and to the last number of *Problemii Kitapa*, which contains the translation of an I. P. R. data paper) we have been successful in working out larger and more fruitful cooperation than we have ever had before.

He concluded by repeating his assurances that he was only too eager to conform to any suggestion which might be forthcoming as to the formula of cooperation. He would wait until the 26th for the decision which Mr. Arosev had promised, particularly since he planned to be in Moscow again in the fall.

JB added personally, since he knew Mr. Arosev from a previous meeting, that he wished to assure him that the invitation was by no means a political gesture. The persistence and zeal of Institute representatives in Moscow in attempting to work out some answer to this problem reflected no desire on the part of any nation or group to use the Soviet Union for political purposes. It reflected rather our increasing conviction of the importance of Soviet studies, as witnessed by the fact that some of us have learned the Russian language and spent considerable periods here, and also to some extent the impossibility of securing any sort of really definite answer from Soviet authorities. If Mr. Arosev could secure a definite answer, even if it should be negative, it would probably be an assistance to the substance of what we want to secure.

Mr. Arosev, concluding, assured Mr. Carter that he had no desire to continue "feeding us with empty promises." While we were here, we should feel free to commend VOKS in any way possible. If the answer is in the affirmatve, VOKS will officially bend every effort to advance our projects here. If it is in the negative, however, VOKS will still be only too happy to help us in any way possible that does not commit it to our policies. He reminded us that it would be hard to convince anyone in the Soviet Union that the Institute is not political. Any organization in which England, Japan, China and the United States are working,

because of the delicate relations between those countries, is of necessity political. In this case, political significance is like the fat in which a cutlet is fried. It may be butter fat, or sunflower seed oil, but you can't fry a cutlet without fat.

Mr. Arosev took a list of Banff Conference members, and asked a few additional questions concerning the central headquarters of the Institute and the role of Pacific Council members. He had already been given a pretty complete sheaf of documents, including Pacific Affairs, a list of A. C. members, Empire in the East, a check list of publications, the Harvard Summer School circular, etc.

EXHIBIT No. 997

JULY 18, 1934.

Miss BARBARA WERTHEIM,
129 East 52nd Street, New York

DEAR MISS WERTHEIM: This is to formalize the invitation that I have already given you orally to go to Tokyo this autumn for one year to act as Research Assistant to W. L. Holland, the Institute's International Research Secretary and S. Uramatsu, Secretary of the Japanese Council of the I. P. R.

You would thus be serving both the Pacific Council and the Japanese Council and the division of your work would be made by a three-cornered understanding between Mr. Holland, Mr. Uramatsu and yourself. At the time of your arrival Mr. Holland and Mr. Uramatsu will be occupying offices in the same building. As they are working together in the closest collaboration there will be no difficulties whatsoever in working out your program so that your work for Mr. Uramatsu and Mr. Holland will be complementary.

In order that you may know just what has transpired since first I talked with you I now wish to quote my cable to Holland. It reads as follows:

"Cable could you Uramatsu use Barbara Wertheim one year from November volunteer research worker. Shiman Barnes endorse."

It was sent on July 12. On July 14, Mr. Holland cabled me from Tokyo in reply, as follows:

"Wertheim valuable and welcome."

At your convenience would you please let me know whether you would prefer to sail some time in October, or whether you would prefer to wait until early November?

Mr. Barnes informs me that the American Council will be willing to give you leave of absence for the period of your sojourn in Japan and also six to eight weeks' leave this summer as soon as you have completed your current assignments.

In the autumn before you go I would be glad to make suggestions for a short period of reading and work, preparing to assuming responsibilities in the Tokyo office.

With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 998

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, September 25, 1934.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Office.

DEAR FRED: Would you let me know whom of the following you would like to meet before I sail? Sooner or later, under the most easy and natural auspices, I assume that you will want to establish personal contacts with all whom you don't know already.

Arthur W. Packard	David H. Stevens	Stanley K. Hornbeck
Robert M. Lester	Henry S. Haskell	Henry R. Luce
Frederick P. Keppel	Miss Ella Crandell	Maurice Wertheim
Raymond B. Fosdick	Edwin R. Embree	Martin Egan
Henry Allen Moe	Richard Walsh	James D. Mooney

If there are other people not listed above whom you would like me to establish contact with for you, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 999

KB to ECC:

This memorandum, which contains my ideas of what may be accomplished by the Institute in the Soviet Field, falls into two parts:

I. Long-term objectives.

II. The immediate steps necessary in order to accomplish I.

I. The long-term objectives embody an ideal state of things which is admittedly impossible of accomplishment for many years. I would like to see all activities which have been proved of value by one national council incorporated in the work of the other councils with such modification as the peculiar needs and situation of each may necessitate. Keen interest by all national councils in the work carried on in the other countries, with active cooperation in such work would be an integral part of this Utopian picture. A description of this picture from the Soviet angle falls into the following three divisions:

A. The Soviet Council in relation to the other member countries.

B. The Pacific and National Councils in relation to the Soviet Union.

C. Activities impossible without the active support of the Soviet and other national councils.

A. 1. The Soviet Council must ultimately be as active on the International committees, in the preparation for the conferences and in the conferences themselves as any other council. This will take a long time to bring about, due to financial, political and geographic reasons. But there seems to be no reason why these difficulties should be insurmountable once the Soviets are convinced of the advantages accruing to their own research and scholarship from such active cooperation. This conviction can only be given by actual requests for information and studies and by the reciprocal rendering of concrete assistance to the Soviet workers in the Pacific field.

2. Under the auspices of the Soviet Council, a survey should be made in the Soviet Union of the facilities afforded research workers to acquire the languages of the other members of the Institute. Should the survey show that facilities are provided, adequate to the building of a body of research workers equipped to function in the various fields, no further action would be necessary. Should the opposite be the case, action should be taken to remedy the situation.

3. Coordination of the studies carried on in the Soviet Union of the problems of the other member countries should be one of the functions of an active Soviet Council.

4. The Soviet Council should possess an up-to-date record of organisations and personnel interested in the problems of the Pacific area.

5. The Soviet Council should investigate whether a need exists in the Soviet Union for the issue of periodical, timely information on the problems of the Pacific Area. It is possible that the magazines already published absorb all demand for such information. On the other hand, some such service as the American Council is giving in its biweekly memoranda might fill a real lack in providing a section of the population of the USSR, which would not otherwise be reached, with authoritative accounts of Pacific incidents and situations.

B. Before going into detail on B and C, I would like to recapitulate the situation of the various national councils as I know it re the Soviet Union.

Australia—Lack of interest coupled with suspicion. Lack of research workers in the Soviet field and even of people acquainted with the Russian language.

New Zealand—Ditto but even stronger.

Canada—Ditto. Feeling towards the Soviets reminiscent of 1920.

Netherlands—Admittance of possible value of Soviet material in their work, but unable to use it through lack of people acquainted with the language and unwilling to through general fear of communism.

Great Britain—Luke-warm attitude towards Soviet Affairs. However, something is being done in the Soviet field, e. g., in Birmingham, and people can be found in Great Britain who handle the language.

China—Language facilities exist, but people found in possession of Soviet literature are in extreme danger during the periodic anti-communist drives.

Japan—Keen interest on the part of some members of the Council exists but there is a lack of language facilities and it is practically impossible to import Soviet literature.

U. S. A.—Interest is present. Language can be handled. Soviet literature is importable and causes no embarrassment to possessor.

Such being the case, a considerable period of time will have to be spent in arousing interest and waiting for political obstacles to disappear. Granted such a period of time, it would be desirable to have in each member country the following:

1. Facilities for acquiring the Russian language, so that a body of research workers could develop, capable of handling Soviet and Russian materials.
2. A coordinating center for all Soviet Studies and the institutions and personnel concerned.

The Pacific Council of course would act as originator of such plans, with due regard for national autonomy, and would receive reports as to progress in their achievement. It would seem logical, moreover, that the compiled lists of Soviet studies, interested institutions, and research personnel should be sent to the Pacific Council which would then be in a position to keep all national councils informed as to the state of Soviet studies in the membership as a whole. Care would have to be taken in setting up the machinery that it did not become so cumbersome and the process so lengthy that the information would be out of date before distributed.

C. Under activities requiring active support of the Soviet and other councils we can list:

1. Exchange of books and publications. The American Council has for some time been exchanging books and periodicals with various institutions in the Soviet Union. This can be continued in the same fashion as before or through some central agency set up by the Soviet Council. This central agency would of course carry on exchange arrangements with the other National Councils. The extent to which this exchange would develop would depend on how B. was carried out. It is obviously useless for a library to be collected if it is unused through lack of interest or ability.
2. Exchange of research workers such as has existed between the American Council and the Japanese and Chinese should be extended. It would be of great value if ultimately such exchange could function between the Soviet and all the other national councils.
3. A bibliographical service such as is now being contemplated, inevitably will demand the cooperation of all countries concerned. In the far future a similar service covering Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the English and Dutch speaking countries should be set up in each of the member countries of the Institute.
4. The Soviet and other councils could be of valuable mutual assistance if they kept each other informed of the progress of their various activities without waiting for the inevitably longer procedure of communicating through the Pacific Council.

II. Immediate steps necessary in order to accomplish I. divide into two parts:

A. In the Soviet Union.
B. In other member countries.

A. In the Soviet Union.

1. From the point of view of terminology, it might be as well to suggest that the Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R. should be known as the Soviet Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.
2. Membership on International Committees. The necessary documents should be presented to the Soviet Council which will acquaint them with the activities of the various committees: Program; Research; Publications; Education. They should be urged to appoint a representative on each committee. Perhaps, to begin with, one person might do for all, preferably the person who might conceivably come to the next conference so as to increase the chance of the Soviet representative actually meeting the other members of the committees.
3. An associate editor for Pacific Affairs should be appointed and asked as his first job to check up on the articles promised by Voitinsky, Abramson, and Radek.
4. Data Papers. The Soviet Council has already announced five studies that they intend to publish before the next conference as well as two collections of articles. As these all deal with subjects pertinent to the general subject matter for data papers for the next conference as determined at Banff, these publications may very well be counted enough.
5. Standard of Living Studies. All relevant material such as the International Research Program 1933–35, FVF's report on the progress of the American Council in the Standard of Living Studies and any other reports the Secretary General may get from other council visits, should be shown

to the Soviet Council. They should be asked to draw up a report on what has been published and on what projects are now under way or being contemplated on the subject of Standard of Living in the Soviet Union, HM can be offered as assistant or collaborator. They should be informed that all countries are making such a report to the International Research Committee early next year and be asked to send their report in at the same time. Suggestions how the studies in each country might further progress, or what new ones might be originated, in order best to coordinate all the work, will then be sent out. As for the cultural side of the research program. I understand that that is still under discussion. Concrete suggestions as to just what "cultural relations" signifies will be sent to the Soviet Council later.

6. The question of translation of Soviet studies should be discussed as it affects both the data papers and the projects connected with the Research program of the Institute.

7. The report of JB made last spring on Soviet Institutions concerned with the problems of the Far East is so confidential in character that no reference should be made of it to the Soviet Council or to any of the Institutions concerned. (N. B. to HM.) The Soviet Council should be told that in the American Council we are attempting the coordination of Soviet and Far Eastern Studies. They should be urged to compile a report of all Soviet organisations interested in Pacific Relations with a description of the type of work each carries on. Such a report, they would realize would be of value not only to themselves but to all Soviet-minded research workers. If they demur owing to lack of time or personnel, HM could be offered as the person to undertake it, in so far as her other activities permit, with the Soviet Council as sponsor and guide.

8. Exchange of books and periodicals. Some machinery should be set up within the Soviet Council which could arrange for exchange of books and periodicals. Obviously this would be feasible as far as the publications of the nine institutions embodied in the Soviet Council are concerned. Would it be equally feasible for the Soviet Council to act as the clearing house for arrangements with other Soviet Institutions?

9. The possibility of exchange of research workers should be broached. The preliminary trial of such an arrangement would seem logically to take place between the American or the Pacific Council and Moscow. An ideal arrangement would be for Kantorovich to come over here in 1936, after he has got the data papers published, and stay through the Conference. He could be attached to the staff of either the Pacific or the American Council and paid a salary in dollars while in exchange some member of the Pacific or American Council staff could be sent to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Council made responsible for his or her room, cooperative cards, supply of rubles etc. Whether a foreigner would be willing to live in Moscow without an additional valuta income, of course, is doubtful, but something could be worked out.

10. What cooperation is asked from the Soviet Council in connection with the bibliographical service depends on what decision is reached about the service itself. This matter has already been broached to several people in Moscow, I believe. I feel that they would be keenly interested in the prospect of a similar service in English and Dutch books being set up some time.

11. Attendance at the next conference should be put forward as being desirable in order to convince the national councils of the Soviet Council's real desire to cooperate. It should be stressed, however, even more highly for the value it would have in facilitating research work and cooperation. If the suggestion in point 9 should be feasible, the aim would be to some extent accomplished. Any large representation of the Soviet Union at the next conference can hardly be expected.

12. In order to give the Soviet Council a picture of what other councils are doing, national council reports such as the present one of FVF to the American Council should be shown along with any other documentation possible, such as Cross's report on the Harvard Russian Language School. Out of the latter could develop a discussion of what are the facilities for language study in the Soviet Union.

13. In connection with points 7, 10, and 12, a suggestion might be made to the Soviet Council that they publish a periodic memorandum on work in Pacific problems in the Soviet Union for dissemination among the member councils of the Institute. This might appeal to them strongly.

14. Finance. On the question of the Soviet Council contribution to the Institute, I feel that some contribution should be made if only nominal. In all financial matters, it must be remembered that the Soviets are intensely proud. Direct subsidy from abroad, I believe, would not be acceptable, nor would they wish to be in the position of the only national council not contributing financially. Exchange relations, both for research workers and materials, will have to be arranged with the minimum of international money payments.

In taking up the above points with the Soviet Council, the Secretary General will have to be constantly on the alert to see how much load they seem willing to carry and will have to stress the points correspondingly. If necessary, emphasis could be merely laid on Data papers and Studies of Standards of Living. After all, such research work as would be represented in them and the making of it available to the other countries by means of translation is the main objective of the Institute. Also the Secretary General must observe to what extent the Soviet Council is liable to be an integrated unit with functions of its own, and to what extent it tends to leave everything to the initiative and activity of the institutions out of which it is made. All discussion of plans with the Soviet Council will have to be tempered by whichever of the above cases is true.

B. 1. The Secretary General in his forthcoming tour should endeavour to discover the exact status of Soviet Studies in each country visited, both as regards interest and actual accomplishment. My own impressions of what exists I have stated earlier. If they are correct, the only thing to be done seems to be to discuss with the few persons interested ways and means of utilizing the existence of the Soviet Council.

2. The Secretary General could present to Moscow requests for help in Mackenzie's Status of Aliens coordination, his Communications project and the navalism project of the American Council. There also could be presented with a request for suggestions as to broadening or otherwise improving, a statement of the exchange relations between the American Council and various Soviet Institutions. Any other concrete requests for assistance should be gathered from the countries visited for presentation to Moscow.

3. It should be stressed to the national councils that the Soviet Council is now in existence and eager to cooperate.

NOTE.—The activities of the Pacific and the American Councils re the Soviet Union have become intermingled in the past. The library that is being built up in the office of the American Council, for example, obtains many of its periodicals in exchange for Pacific Affairs. The fact that J. Barnes when Secretary of the American Council acted likewise as representative of the Secretary General before the latter's arrival in Moscow, also added to the confusion in Soviet minds. It has been unavoidable owing to personnel reasons, and for the immediate future the distinction of activities will be hard to make at least to the Soviet Council. In the ideal future, of course, each council will have its staff worker able to handle Soviet materials, and the intermingling of activities will cease. Until then, it may be as well not to confuse the Soviets by attempting too much to disentangle the Pacific and American Councils.

OCTOBER 22, 1934.

EXHIBIT NO. 1000

Moscow, *November 22, 1934.*

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Chatham House, St. James Sq., London, S. W. 1.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have now been in Moscow twelve days and am more or less settled. I am sorry that I have not been able to write to you sooner but I have been separated from my typewriter for some days.

As soon as I arrived I went to VOKS and they arranged for me to see Voitinsky. He was very nice to me and offered to help me in every way possible, but of course, he referred all Institute matters to Kantorovitch. Unfortunately it took me almost a week to make arrangements to see him. Immediately after my interview with him I sent you the following cable:

"Send complete list Institute publications. Have asked me for specific answers to questions sent to you. Especially interested in exchange of publications and afraid you uninterested. General answer desirable now and details when you arrive."

As soon as I met Kantorovitch, he got down to the business of the Institute. He first wanted to know if I was empowered to give him specific answers to the ques-

tions which the Russian group addressed to you this summer. I, of course was not able to give him these answers. The question that interested him most was that of the exchange of publications. He asked if the Institute had its own publication establishment and I told him that we had books printed through commercial firms. He asked if books prepared by the separate National Councils appeared under the imprint of the Central Office. I said that apart from the conference papers this generally was not the policy. He inferred from the fact that you had not answered him specifically on the possibility of exchanging publications that you were not interested in doing so. I told him that, as I understood the situation, you were very interested in making some such arrangement and were waiting to make the definite arrangements after you arrived here.

In the course of the interview he asked many questions about the organization and functions of the National Groups. I am keeping a full record of these conversations for you to see on your arrival. He asked to see the Memoranda. I have given him a few of my copies which I had with me. If it is possible, I think it might be wise to send copies here for a certain period. If you do not wish to do that officially, I will continue to give him mine.

Both Kantorovitch and Voitinsky are very anxious to hear about new books published in America on this general field. Voitinsky asked specifically for one. He was not sure of the exact title but thought it was some Annals on the United States Policy in the Pacific. Perhaps you know what book he is referring to. I shall try to discover the exact title and if it is convenient for you, you might bring it when you come. I shall also write Kathleen Barnes and ask her to keep me posted on all new books and to send me any that she considers particularly important.

The Institute Office is in the office of the Soviet World Atlas. Kantorovitch is usually there and his secretary speaks perfect English, having lived in England for several years. She is taking care of the arrangements for me. There is a small library for the Atlas and they are able to get books for me from other libraries. They have also given me letters to two other places which may have more of the books which I need. Kantorovitch has offered to let me have a desk in the Institute Office and in a few more days I think that I will work there most of the time.

As you undoubtedly know, the Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Communist Academy is publishing a new magazine of the Pacific Ocean. It is a quarterly. At the moment I am in the process of reading it and hope to be able to tell you all about it when you arrive. Among other things, it has a long review of Empire in the East and a short statement about the IPR in Russia.

At present I am giving a great deal of time to studying Russian, which you, of course realise is very important for me. I am starting working on the National Minorities, because I have no idea where to begin on the Standards of Living. I hope that you will be able to bring with you an outline of Gregory's book on Standards of Living and of any others that have been started. I am also very eager to hear from Bill Holland in answer to your questions about the National Minorities.

Just before I left London I heard that in November a new book was to be Published on the National Minority policy in the U. S. S. R. This is number 7 of the New Soviet Library, published by Gollanz, Ltd. 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden. The title of the book is "the Soviet State and the Solution of the Problems of Nationalities," By Victor Dimanstein. He is a Russian Authority on the subject and it is very important for me to have this book. Could you bring it when you come or have it sent?

In London I received from you two files of material in relation to Russian participation. One was supposed to contain the Preliminary Survey of Soviet Research Institutions Specializing in the Siberian and Far Eastern Field, prepared by Joe this Spring. On the folder it is marked that I already have this. Although I saw the first draft of it here in Moscow, I have never had a copy. If you think it is advisable, you might bring me a copy.

In your letter of October 31st, you asked me to advise you where it would be most convenient for you to stay when you are here. At present, I would certainly advise the National again or the Metropole. Both are in a central position and near the Institutions in which we are interested. As soon as you know definitely when you are arriving and how many are coming with you, I will make the arrangements here for you.

In my opinion the Soviet group of the Institute is a very serious and business-like group. We will get cooperation from them in proportion to the cooperation we are willing to give to them. For this reason it is most important that I be kept

informed on all the latest Institute news and any changes in policy, etc. As you know, I have been away from the office for over a year and there are probably many things which you take for granted but which are news to me. I will continue to cable you for specific information, but if you have any general information on the work being done by the various National Councils, I would be very grateful to be kept informed about it.

I think it will be best if you continue to send my mail to Intourist, as it is less likely to go astray. However in cases it is necessary to reach me some other way, my address is

Moscow
Savelevski Pereulok
Dom 2, Kv. 4
Sincerely

HARRIET MOORE.

EXHIBIT No. 1001

AMSTEL HOTEL,
Amsterdam, December 15, 1934.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,
Hotel Metropole, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR HARRIET: There are no special instructions for our visit. It was thoughtful of you to ask me for further suggestions.

The principal purpose of the visit is twofold—First, to be of every possible assistance to the new Soviet IPR as it develops its program. The second is to have the maximum time with you is conferring about your work and in loading you with IPR ammunition so that you can be of the greatest consultative value to Kamtorovich is the weeks following our departure. I want, of course, to talk fully with you regarding your work when you have finished your present Moscow assignment.

Subordinate to those two purposes is the desire to give my three colleagues a favorable opportunity of seeing something of important influences in the U. S. S. R. as revealed in Moscow. For five hours each day all of them will be engaged on immediate IPR duties, but all of the rest of the time can be given to studying and observing the various aspects of Moscow life. All of this can be easily arranged after we have arrived. These purposes can be in part realized in connection with the main object of the visit, for example a couple of hours spent by us at the Institute of Minor Nationalities would serve many purposes.

One incidental matter which I will want to discuss with you, and if you and Kamtorovich advise it, is this. How can scholars from abroad who obey the Soviet law fare nearly as well as those who violate it?

As a result of your letter to Kate we got the coffee and can opener that you requested in Paris.

We will drive straight from the flying field to the Metropole on our arrival on the night of the 20th. Did I tell you that Simon Wingfield-Digby will, because of his luggage come by train, arriving in Moscow a little before noon on the 21st? I have just received two friendly letters from Kantorovich in one of which he indicates that advancing my visit by a few days is equally convenient for him. I hope that on the 21st we can have a long conference with him and then on the 22nd or 23rd a meeting of the Soviet group, if that is regarded by Kantorovich and yourself as a possible and desirable thing to do.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

We want first of all a long talk with you.

EXHIBIT No. 1002

W. L. H from ECC

HOTEL METROPOLE, MOSCOW,
December 25th, 1934.

A. KANTOROVITCH,
20, Razin Street, Moscow.

DEAR KANTOROVITCH: In my conversation with you on December 24th, I mentioned two projects which have formed part of the International Research program of the Institute of Pacific Relations since the 1931 conference. These are, (1) an international survey of *Communications in the Pacific Area*, and (2) an international survey of the *Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries.*

This letter constitutes a formal request from the Pacific Council and the International Research Committee to the U. S. S. R. Council of the I. P. R. to contribute a section to each of these two studies.

On December 24th I handed you the British paper on Communications, the Australian paper on the Status of Aliens, and four pamphlets dealing with the Status of Aliens in Canada, from which the final Canadian paper will be compiled. These papers will serve to show you the general form which the Research Committee would like you to follow, but, of course, the details as to the method of treatment and the scope of the study would be left entirely to your discretion.

If the U. S. S. R. Council agrees to contribute a chapter to each of these studies, these should be in manuscript form and mailed to the International Research Secretary, W. L. Holland, 306 Osaka Building, Tokyo, by April 1st, 1935. A copy of the manuscript should be sent to Professor Norman Mackenzie, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada. Professor Mackenzie has been selected by the International Research Committee to act as final editor and complete the report on both these studies for publication.

As you will note from the sample sections which I have given you, the material is almost entirely factual. Each study will be published as a small reference handbook, in which statistics and terminology will have been made as nearly uniform and comparable as possible. Professor Mackenzie has not decided as yet whether he will write an interpretive analysis of the material presented. If he does so, he will circulate it to all the National Councils before the final publications of the two reports.

At present Professor Mackenzie has on hand papers on the *Status of Aliens* from the following countries:

Japan	China	Australia
United States	Canada	France
Philippines	Holland	
New Zealand	Great Britain	

He is not planning to edit more than is absolutely necessary. His introduction will emphasize the similarities and the differences in treatment of aliens in the countries of the Pacific.

With regard to the study of Communications, Professor Mackenzie has received papers from every member country of the Institute with the exception of Australia and the Philippines. He hopes to receive these papers in the near future.

The details as to the publication of these two studies have not been decided, pending the completion of the final manuscript.

Both the Pacific Council and the International Research Committee feel that it is of the utmost importance that information from the U. S. S. R. on both these questions be secured if possible. I hope, therefore, that the U. S. S. R. Council of the I. P. R. will be able to respond favorably to this request for a Soviet contribution to each study.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1003

Copies to Holland, Moore

MOSCOW, *December 26, 1934.*

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: As Leonard Wu is coming to Moscow I would strongly recommend that you urge him seriously to consider reaching here before Harriet Moore leaves. The reception that we have had from Motylev and Kantorovich and the other members of the Soviet Council could not have been more cordial or useful. In no country has any group made more precise and more adequate arrangements for the fulfillment of the purposes of our visit than the offices here.

For the sake of continuity there would be very great advantages in Wu's arriving before Miss Moore leaves. She could be of the greatest assistance to him, and he could perpetuate the wonderful tradition that she is establishing here.

Could you and Kathleen talk this over with Wu to discover what his plans are, what he particularly wants to study when he gets here, what his dates are,

and then write Harriet very fully. It would be better if he got here when Harriet was in Moscow, rather than when she was in the Buriyat Mongolian Republic.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1004

Mr. W. L. Holland: For your information.

CHATHAM HOUSE, 10, ST. JAMES'S SQUARE,
London, S. W. 1, 4th January 1935.

GALEN M. FISHER, ESQ.,
347 Madison Avenue,
New York City.

DEAR GALEN: The enclosed from Lasker would seem to indicate that he has got a garbled idea of the proposed Bibliographical Service. I wonder whether he has received one of your American or international letters on the subject?

I will be writing you more fully about the attitude of the four countries recently visited. Briefly it is as follows:

In England, those who know Russian, Chinese, or Japanese think the proposal important. Those who do not know any one of these three languages seem to question its value.

In France, Boyer, Bonnet, Dennery, and Lavey all thought the service would be of very great value.

In Holland, the entire I. P. R. Council thought that the Service would be very important, but it would have to be started and an exhibition given of its value before any large number of people would recognize its importance and subscribe to it.

In the U. S. S. R. several very important items came out, regarding which I will write you more fully later.

1. The I. P. R. Group wants immediately from America and, if possible, from London, a description of what the I. P. R. people, for example in New York, feel are the really important books and articles on the Pacific in the English language. The listing of such books supported by good reviews that may appear in other journals not necessarily prepared for the I. P. R. would serve their purpose.

2. Our friends in Moscow at the moment are not terribly impressed by the scientific quality or the indispensability of much of the literature that is being published in China and Japan.

3. Although they do not say so, it is quite apparent that we will have to be careful not to lump Russia, China, and Japan together as in a similar category when we are dealing with our Russian colleagues. At that moment when the Bibliographical Service includes English language publications, then the danger of Soviet leaders thinking that the Service is lumping Soviet Russia with China and Japan as Asiatic countries will disappear.

It is difficult for our Soviet colleagues to envisage a Service conducted from London or Washington by a staff that will be predominantly capitalistic, describing either Soviet or other books in a manner that would be regarded as objective by Communist and capitalist readers.

Here is one of the central difficulties facing us, not only in the Bibliographical proposal, but from now on in "Pacific Affairs" and any other I. P. R. publications. We have worshipped at the shrine of objectivity, but nearly all of the worshippers heretofore have been non-Communist. The coming of the Soviet I. P. R. into not only formal but active, wholehearted, and generous co-operation with the I. P. R. involves a complete rethinking of our entire programme of research, conference, and publication. Each one of us who is working for the Pacific Council is now a servant of an organisation in which the Communist outlook on politics and economics must organisationally be regarded as deserving the same consideration as the capitalists.

Translating this into terms of the Bibliographical problems facing us, suggests among others three possible plans: (1) a note of each book and articles in the Bibliographical Service from both a Communist and non-Communist; (2) an attempt at a description that would be regarded as equally objective by Communists and capitalists; (3) capitalist reviews of Communist books and articles and Communist reviews of capitalist books and articles.

As I say, I hope to write you a little more fully on this matter later, but I wanted to send you immediately this advance report on my discussions in four European countries.

You have doubtless already appraised the value of the International Bibliography of Historical Sciences. I would like to have you write me fully as to what extent you feel that this meets the need that we have all had in mind. The fact that it does not come out until about 18 or 20 months after the year under review militates against it slightly, though I suppose we might find ourselves from six to nine months behind the wishes of our constituency. Do you know whether the fact that a book or article is listed in this Bibliography persuades people that books and articles in their field are indispensable to them? The intrinsic importance of each book and article seems to be the principal criterion of selection. How widely does the scientific world accept the judgment of those who make the selection as final?

The letter from Hughes, the Chinese expert at Oxford, is significant as an example of the reaction of one who knows Chinese. The letter from Webster is significant as coming from one who does not know any of the three languages, so also is the formal letter from Arnold here at Chatham House.

Duyvendak, the great sinologist at Leiden, is very keen on the Bibliographical Service, and believes that both he and several of the Netherland institutions can cooperate. Rade, the Japanologist at Leiden, is also ready and eager to help. Duyvendak goes to Columbia very shortly. It is of the utmost importance that you see him on arrival. You should talk with him as to the desirability of considering once a year the review of the very important Dutch publications on the Pacific.

I am sending copies of this letter to Lattimore, Lasker, and Holland, with the request that they should not distribute it to others, as it is only a hurried interim report. I would ask that you share it immediately with Field and Kathleen Barnes, and that you three send me individually or collectively your best reaction to the problem raised by Soviet cooperation with the I. P. R.

At this point I perhaps ought to add that I believe that the Soviet Group is going to make a very substantial contribution both to scholarship and realism in the I. P. R.

I am enclosing a copy of Miss Harriet Moore's private memorandum on the Bibliographical Service. This was written after she had listened in on the preliminary discussions which Miss Mitchell and I had with the Praesidium of the Soviet I. P. R.

Appended is a list of those who were present at the Luncheon discussion and the Afternoon Conference at Oxford. At both of these meetings the Bibiliography was discussed. The attitude of those who knew Chinese and Russian was such as to convince nearly all those present as to the importance of the I. P. R. proposal. Zimmern, for example, does not know Russian, Chinese or Japanese, yet he felt that the project was of the utmost importance.

I ought to add that our colleagues in the Soviet Union will cooperate superbly in whatever plan we finally decide to inaugurate. The resources of the Soviet I. P. R. Group are very great indeed. They will be able to command the active collaboration of the principal Russian scholars throughout the Soviet Union on any plan which we finally work out which thoroughly commends itself to us and to them.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1005

Draft

20, RAZIN STREET,
Moscow, 3rd January, 1935.

MEETING OF THE PRIAESIDIUM OF THE U. S. S. R. I. P. R.

Present.—V. E. Motylev
A. Kantorovitch
G. Voitinsky
Edward C. Carter
Harriet Moore
Kate Mitchell

Mr. Carter had prepared an Agenda for the Meeting, a copy of which is attached to this Report. It was agreed that the points listed should be taken up in order.

1. *Organisation of I. P. R. Conferences.*—Mr. Carter explained that the various international committees of the I. P. C. listed under item 7 on the Agenda, held their Meetings for two or three days before and after the Conference. The Conference itself is devoted entirely to education and research work. Mr. Carter then described the "Round Table" technique. He explained that at I. P. R. Conferences, papers are read by the members in advance of the Confrence and that the discussion begins as soon as the Conference opens. The Conference is divided into four or five Round Table groups, with from 35 to 40 members at each. Discussions begin at 9 o'clock in the morning and ordinarily last until 12 p. m. The afternoons are given up to informal discussion amongst small groups of Conference members. The Conference meets as a whole, every two or three days, and at this time Reports are read by either the Chairman or the Secretary of each Round Table, thus enabling the Members to follow the course of discussions at Round Tables other than their own.

Mr. Motylev asked whether discussion at the Round Tables was organised.

Mr. Carter explained that each Round Table had a Chairman and a Secretary who were responsible for guiding a discussion in such a way that all points of view were presented. The object of the Round Table technique is to ensure both a free and informal discussion and at the same time to make sure that each member of a Round Table is given an opportunity to make his special contribution. In dividing the Members of the Conference among the Round Tables, the Programme Committee consults with the National Secretaries and attempts:—

(a) To see that national groups are divided equally amongst the Round Tables, and

(b) To see that the division brings together men and women of similar interests or fields of knowledge.

Every effort is made to avoid the formation of national blocs on any question under discussion. Mr. Carter explained that this description was, of course, a "Council of perfection," but that he hoped that in the next Conference the Round Tables would be organised better than they had ever been before, and that this standard of perfection would be more nearly attained than in former years.

Mr. Motylev asked how the Round Table topics were divided amongst the different groups.

Mr. Carter explained that all the Round Tables discussed the same topics at the same time. The equal division of time amongst the five Round Tables topics had not yet been decided. Presumably the first two days would be spent on topic (a) "Japanese Economic Expansion in World Markets." The next two days on "The United States Recovery Programme;" three days on the "Soviet Union"; two days on "China"; and three days on the final topic, "The Changing Balance of Political Forces in the Pacific."

Mr. Motylev expressed satisfaction with this plan of organisation. He explained that it would be something new in Russian experience but that he felt that it had a distinct advantage in that it created a chance for every member of the Conference to express his opinion on the subjects under discussion.

Mr. Motylev then discussed the points raised in the letter sent by the Secretary General to the members of the Institute from Amsterdam, December 18th, 1934. In general he was in full agreement with the provisions contained therein. With regard to the specific points, he felt that the American Consul's proposal for changing topic (e) was not sound. The Soviet Union has no special interest in Manchuria and, therefore he did not see that the question of Manchuria's status could properly be discussed in connection with the topic concerning the Soviet policy in the Far East. It might, of course, be considered in connection with the topic dealing with China, but he felt that it would be better to leave it under topic (e).

Mr. Carter said that he was very glad to have this expression of Soviet opinion.

Mr. Voitinsky said that he felt topic (e) was very well formulated and should prove valuable in summarising the problems brought out during the discussion of the first four topics.

With regard to the daily papers which the Union intends to contribute to the Conference, Mr. Motylev explained that the Council had decided to combine Nos. 4 and 5.

This paper will deal not only with the economies, but also with the political struggle in the Pacific and will therefore furnish the Soviet data for the final Round Table. Mr. Motylev raised the question as to whether the National Councils were still to be allowed to prepare an official paper as stated in the Secretary General's Memorandum of June 21st. Mr. Carter said that this provision still held good and that his December 18th Memorandum in no way superceded the

provisions of the former Memorandum. Mr. Motylev explained that the Soviet group had not decided on any additional paper, but wished to be free to contribute one if international conditions should make it necessary.

Mr. Kantorovitch added that the Soviet Council would see that a definitive list of papers were sent to the Secretariat by April 1st, 1935, and a partial list of probable Soviet members by December 1st, 1935.

2. *Interim Research Conferences.*—Mr. Motylev explained that before he could give Mr. Carter a definite answer with regard to Soviet attendance at the proposed Conference in Tokyo in April, the Soviet Council would have to discuss the question of standards of living studies with various specialists in that field. This would be done during the next few weeks and he would then send to Mr. Carter and to Mr. Holland, the Soviet Council's views on the question of possible research projects in this field within the Soviet Union. With regard to Mr. Carter's invitation to him to attend the Conference in person, Mr. Motylev explained that his teaching duties would ordinarily occupy him until June and that it might be difficult for him to leave Moscow by April 1st. He asked whether the Conference was to be a general one confined to Members from the Far Eastern countries.

Mr. Carter explained that the original plan had been for a Regional Conference, but that information which he had received while in America and Moscow had led him to feel that it was of the utmost importance that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States should be represented there. The principal task of the Conference will be to try and work out a common methodology for all future work in the field of standards of living and for this reason it is desirable that it should be as international in character as is possible at this short notice.

Mr. Motylev said that although Soviet representation might not be possible, the Council would send a Memorandum setting forth their views on this question.

The Meeting then took up items 3 and 4 on the Agenda.

With regard to the exchange of staff, Mr. Motylev said that he was thoroughly in agreement with the principle involved. In this connection he might say that the financial aspect need not prove the handicap which Mr. Carter evidently feared. The Soviet Council could, if it desired, send students at its own expense as it had been given a certain endowment in valuta. The working out of principle might, however, take time as the Soviet Council would first have to attract research workers and students interested in the idea of such an exchange.

Mr. Kantorovitch expressed his gratitude at the invitation of the American Council for him to spend a period of months in the New York Office. It was, of course, impossible for him to accept at present, but it might be arranged at a later date.

Mr. Carter said that he understood that Mr. Kantorovitch would be very occupied in Moscow for the next few months, but that the invitation was a standing one which he hoped could be accepted later on.

Mr. Motylev expressed regret that Miss Moore had not asked for more help from the Soviet Council. He explained that his Institute had a special department for securing all necessities in the way of materials for his staff, and he hoped that Miss Moore will make full use of it. He also hoped to arrange any special consultations with experts in various fields which would be useful for Miss Moore in carrying out her proposed study. With regard to the possibility of Miss Moore visiting Buriat, Mongolia, he was a little doubtful, but promised to do everything he could to help her in arranging this, should she wish to do so. Miss Moore expressed her appreciation of this offer and explained that the reason she had not hitherto asked for more assistance was because she had been concentrating upon her study of the language and had not as yet begun much actual work on her research project.

5. *An English Edition of the Great Soviet World Atlas.*—Mr. Carter felt that it would be a very valuable contribution to the work of the I. P. R. if such an edition could be arranged, as English was the first or second language for the majority of the member countries.

Mr. Motylev promised to inform the Editorial Council of Mr. Carter's proposal and expressed the hope that a favourable decision would be possible.

6. *Language Problem.*—Mr. Carter explained that one of the most difficult problems now facing the I. P. R. was that of the language barrier amongst its different members. As one step in attacking this problem the American Council of the I. P. R., in collaboration with Harvard University, had put on a Summer School during 1934, for an intensive study of the Russian language.

This experiment had proved so successful that it is to be repeated at Columbia University in the summer of 1935. Mr. Carter also mentioned that Mrs. Barnes had consulted with Tolokonoky, the Soviet Consul-General in New York, concerning the possibility of securing a Russian instructor for the school. Tolokonoky had suggested writing direct to Arosev for his suggestions. Prince Mirsky's name had been mentioned as a possibility and Mr. Carter wished to find out from the Praesidium their reaction to this proposal. Mr. Motylev asked what the terms would be. Mr. Carter explained that Professor Patrick at the University of California had been secured for the first part of the school and that Mirsky would be requested to take the second half, from approximately July 22d to August 30th. His travelling expenses would be paid and he would receive $800 in addition. The Praesidium appeared to feel that there was no reason why Mirsky should not be approached if it seemed advisable.

Mr. Carter next mentioned the question of Basic English, explaining that the I. P. R.'s interest in Basic was entirely as a method of learning English in a much shorter length of time. He told of his conversations with Litvinova and showed Mr. Motilev the clippings from Pravda which dealt with the matter of language teaching in the U. S. S. R. Mr. Motilev expressed great interest and promised to get into touch with Litvinova at once. He agreed that the present teaching of English in the Soviet Union was far from satisfactory and was eager to learn more about Basic as a simpler and more effective method.

7. *International Committees.*—Mr. Carter explained that the Soviet group was entitled to representation upon all the International Committees of the I. P. R. The Praesidium agreed to take up this question with the Council and to inform Mr. Carter as to their nominations for the various positions.

8. *Studies in Standards of Living and Culture.*—Under this topic the hope was merely left that, if possible, Mr. Motilov himself should attend the Research Conference in Tokyo, at which time he could convey the views of the Soviet group with regard to possible studies in this field, and that if his attendance was impossible, a memorandum embodying these views should be sent.

9. *Exchange of Books.*—This had already been worked out with Kantorovich and no further discussion appeared necessary at this time.

10. *Catalogue in Russian of all books on the Far East.*—Mr. Carter asked whether the catalogue of all books in Russian dealing with Far Eastern questions which the Soviet Council was planning was to be made available in England as well. Mr. Kantorovich explained that this would be a very expensive proposition but that the catalogue would be available in the Soviet Council office and that Miss Moore could select such items from it as she considered important for translation into English.

11. *Finance.*—Mr. Carter stated that contributions to the Pacific Council were not obligatory, but there were two factors to be considered. First, that the Pacific Council always needed money, and second, that if the Soviet Union made no financial contribution, some countries might feel that the Soviet Union was not fully taking part in the Institute's work. Mr. Carter himself, of course, did not share this feeling, but he knew that the Soviet Council would understand that such an attitude might be held.

At Mr. Motilov's request, Mr. Carter quoted the contributions which each of the National groups had given over the last few years. He also explained the financial situation of the International Research Committee and the method by which grants from the International Research field were used to stimulate local financial support for research work.

Mr. Motilev said that so far the I. P. R. had not proved itself in the Soviet Union sufficiently for him to be able to guarantee a definite financial contribution. He said, however, that it was only a question of time and not of principle; that the Soviet Council wants and can participate fully in the work of the I. P. R. and that the question of financial contribution will be discussed with all the institutions represented in the U. S. S. R. Council.

12. *Publicity.*—As an example of the type of publicity which the I. P. R. sought for its publications, Mr Carter displayed a copy of a review of the economic handbook of the Pacific area which had appeared in the New York Times. He explained that the Institute preferred to have its work speak for itself rather than go in for more direct methods of publicity and propaganda.

13 & 14. *Chatham House Report and Report of Federation of British Industries Mission to Manchuria.*—At the request of Mr. Carter six copies of the Chatham House Annual Report had already been received by Mr. Kantorovich. A copy of the report of the F. B. I. Mission to Manchuria will be sent at once.

15. *Publication of Soviet I. P. R. studies in English.*—Mr. Kantorovich explained that the first instalment prepared by the Soviet Council should be ready for publication by June 1935, and Mr. Carter promised to take up the question of its publication with a publisher either in London or New York.

16 & 17. *Soviet Report, etc., and contribution to Pacific Affairs.*—Mr. Kantorovich promised to send a regular contribution for I. P. R. Notes, and also to get into touch directly with Mr. Lattimore on the matter of Soviet articles and reviews for Pacific Affairs. He also requested Mr. Carter to supply the Soviet office with a full set of all back numbers of Pacific Affairs.

18. *A possible bibliographical service.*—With regard to the possible bibliographical service already described by Mr. Carter, Mr. Kantorovich again expressed the opinion that what the Soviet Council would value most would be a list sent at regular intervals from America, and, if possible, from London, of what the I. P. R. groups in both countries feel are the really important books and articles on the Pacific appearing in the English language. A list of such books together with a brief descriptive comment as to which might be the most important and also such reviews as might appear in other journals, would serve their purpose adequately. It was obvious that the Praesidium felt that in a bibliographical service conducted from London or Washington by a staff that would presumably be predominantly capitalistic, it would be difficult to describe either Soviet or other books in a manner which could be regarded as objective by both communistic and capitalistic readers. It was also obvious that the Soviet Council did not welcome the idea of being grouped with China and Japan as Asiatic countries. Unless the bibliographical service included English language publications, it would not be greeted with any very enthusiastic support. It also appeared that they are not particularly impressed with the scientific quality or the indispensability of much of the literature now being published in China and Japan.

19. *Status of Aliens and Communications.*—Mr. Kantorovich reported that the Soviet Council would undertake to prepare a section for the International studies on the status of aliens and on communications in the Pacific, as requested by Mr. Carter and by the International Research Committee.

DECEMBER 30, 1934.

AGENDA

1. Organisation of I. P. R. Conferences.
2. Attendance at Tokyo Research Conference.
3. Exchange of staff and research workers.
   (a) Invitation to Kantorovich to visit New York.
   (b) Exchange of research workers (e. g., Miss Moore).
4. Miss Moore's research plans.
5. A request that an English edition of the new great Soviet World Atlas be considered.
6. Language problems in the I. P. R.
   (a) Advisability of securing D. S. Mirsky for the I. P. R.-Columbia Russian Language School.
   (b) Experiments with Basic English.
7. International Appointments:
   (a) Pacific Council.
   (b) National Secretary.
   (c) Research Committee.
   (d) Publications Committee.
   (e) Finance Committee.
   (f) Pacific Affairs Correspondent.
   (g) Program Committee.
8. Studies in Standards of Living and Culture.
9. Exchange of books.
10. Catalogue in Russian of all books on the Far East.
11. Finance.
12. Publicity.
13. Chatham House Report.
14. Report of Federation of British Industries Mission to Manchuria.
15. Publication in English, in England or America, of Soviet I. P. R. studies.
16. Soviet report, quarterly, to I. P. R. Notes.
17. Regular Soviet contribution to PACIFIC AFFAIRS.
18. A possible bibliographical service.
19. Status of aliens and Communications.

EXHIBIT 1006

ON BOARD SS. "CHITRAL," *January 18, 1935.*

Miss M. E. CLEVE,
10 St. James Square, London, England.

DEAR MADGE: In looking over our notes on the Moscow visit, I have discovered that I have failed to pass on one question raised by Kantorovich. I do not know whether you have heard from him at all and, if so, whether he mentioned to you this matter.

It is this. He would like to have the Chatham House publications on the Far East and on the Pacific on an exchange basis. In addition he wanted me to inquire whether you could consider an exchange arrangement by which you would send him the more important English books on the Far East in the economic and political field in return for Soviet publications on the Soviet Far East and Pacific.

Mr. Field has arranged to send to Moscow not only everyone of the I. P. R. publications from the very beginning but in addition a substantial number of American and Canadian publications on the Far East and the Pacific. In return for these Kantorovich has already dispatched to New York a big shipment of Soviet publications. Enclosed is the list of those that have already gone.

I fully appreciate the nature of the difficulties which Sir Hageburg Wright has raised in connection with exchanges of English and Soviet publications. While I have not met him personally, I am acquainted with friends of his in London and Paris. I am told that he feels that English books of high quality are sent to Moscow and Soviet books of inferior quality are sent to London in return. Part of the difficulty is due to two different sets of values. One in Moscow, another in London. It would not be surprising to discover that some Russian scholars do not regard as final some English writing.

If you and your colleagues share Sir Hageburg's skepticism with reference to the importance of contemporary Soviet Publication, I would not advise your attempting at this stage any substantial exchange arrangement.

If, however, there is at Chatham House any considerable group of people like E. H. Carr and Miss Makower who feel that it is of the highest importance that English students acquaint themselves fully with what Soviet leaders themselves regard as important, I should advise you to explore the possibilities of a substantial measure of interchange. It may be that you will find that it will not be worth while to do this until you have on the Chatham House staff some member who not only has a mastery of the Russian language but also a mastery, through living and studying in the Soviet Union, of some one aspect of contemporary Soviet life.

I would be grateful if you would share this letter with Arnold.

Very sincerely yours,

E. C. CARTER.

Enclosure.
Copies to W. Holland, Miss Moore, and Mrs. Barnes.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

EXHIBIT No. 1007

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

SS. "CARTHAGE," *Feb. 23, 1935.*

WILLIAM HOLLAND,
123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai.

DEAR BILL: You have very kindly sent me a copy of your letter of Feb. 5th to Kantorovich in which you rebuked the Soviet Group for proposing the Paper by Dimantshtein.

In view of the fact that we were to meet within a fortnight, I wish to record my regret that you did not see fit to delay your rebuke until we could meet. With my colleagues of the Soviet Group I went over the proposed list of Papers for the next Conference. Without consulting me and within precisely five weeks of the Secretary General's Moscow visit you take a line that in Moscow might be

regarded as evidence of a breach between the Secretary General and his Research Secretary. No such breach exists. It is a pity to give Moscow such a false impression.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Ned.

(Handwritten:) Please don't take this letter too seriously. Please hand me as soon as possible a copy of Kantorovich letter to you of Jan. 13.

Exhibit No. 1010

Extracts From Letter From Harriet Moore to E. C. Carter of March 20, 1935

I was glad to receive a copy of your letter to Bill Holland about the Dimanshtien paper. I understand unofficially from Harondar that the group here was rather taken aback by the letter. This matter, of course, arose over a misunderstanding in terminology, a thing for which we are really to blame, since correspondence has to be carried on in English, due to our ignorance of other languages. Here "National Policy" always means policy in regard to (minor) nationalities.

As a matter of fact, I don't understand why there is any objection to this paper, since the original list of proposed papers for the USSR group, as it appeared in the IPR Notes of October, listed a. *Economic and Social development in Siberia and the Soviet Far East.* The list that the USSR group proposed divided this group into two papers: *The first and second Five-Year plans in the Soviet Far East*, for the economic development; *The National Policy in the Soviet Far East* for the social development. It is true that they do not provide a paper on their foreign relations in the Far East, as was proposed in the original outline. That, however, could be an additional paper and need not exclude Dimanshtien's.

You did not ask me for any comments on this matter, but I am giving them for two reasons; first, because Dimanshtien, as you know, is *the* authority on this subject and his paper ought to be good; and, secondly, because I feel that this question has a bearing on the agenda and even more on the research problem of cultural relations (Incidently, if it has no bearing, my Buriats also are a bit extraneous).

The next question is the "Suggestions for Round Table Agenda." As I understand it, the six points listed here would all be taken up in each of the first four major round tables, as announced in your letter of December 18th. For the fifth round table on "Changing balance of political forces in the Pacific" a different agenda would be worked out later.

I would suggest adding one or two topics under several of the headings. Under 3, *Social Policy*, I would add Social Insurance, in general. Under 4, *Foreign Trade and Tariff Policy*, I would add "Manipulation of value of currency." Perhaps this is covered by "Foreign Exchange Policy," but it should be clearly stated. Under 6, *National Defence Policy*, it would be interesting to get an idea of the meaning of "Defense," as the term is used in each country: e. g., how far U. S. defense extends to defending the Monroe Doctrine; offense as defence; etc.

Another question I would raise is in regard to the inclusion of "Class consciousness" under *Social Policy*. I think it is fair to say the USSR is the only country that has the development of class consciousness as part of its social policy. Other countries tend to foster patriotism, nationalism, or racial consciousness. I think this question is very interesting, but that some other term should be found to cover class consciousness and all the others, something that would mean "THE policy in regard to fostering some type of social psychology or mass attitude." Perhaps "Mass attitudes" would serve though it would need a certain amount of explanation.

The first three points in the agenda could be considered matters of primarily domestic importance, while the last three are directly international in their effects. In view of the fact that the topics for the round tables in your letter of December 18 emphasises the international effects of the respective national policies. I think it might be advisable to stress this in the agenda by putting under each of the last three points. 4, 5, 6, a definite topic on "International repercussions of, or reactions to, "The Foreign trade policy, Monetary policy, and Defence Policy, * * *.

EXHIBIT No. 1011

Copy for W. L. Holland.

IMPERIAL HOTEL,
Tokyo, May 4, 1935.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
20 Razin Street, Moscow.

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV: This is to confirm our recent interchange of cables as follows:

"TOKYO, *April 22nd.*

"Cable whether coming Orient if so dates arriving China, Japan."

"Moscow, *April 23rd.*

"Trip Soviet Far East definitely scheduled June. Possibility visiting China, Japan, Korea decided late May. In case positive decision arriving July."

The object of this letter is to inquire whether, in the event of your visiting China, Japan, and Korea, you would like me to arrange for Mr. W. L. Holland to meet you on or about the 1st of July, either in Peiping, Dairen, or Changchun (Hsinking). Mr. Holland is writing to Kanterovitch at this time very fully with reference to the recommendations which we are passing on to the National Councils in the light of the discussions at the Tokyo conference. They involve a substantial change in the program as adopted at Banff. In addition to the correspondence between Holland and Kantorovitch it would facilitate cooperation between the Pacific Council and the Soviet Council if it were possible for Mr. Holland to meet you personally. Among others there would be three advantages in such a meeting; 1) mutual acquaintance between yourself and Holland, and discussion of the I. P. R. research program, 2) you could tell Mr. Holland of the latest developments in the U. S. S. R. I. P. R., 3) Mr. Holland could assist in putting you in touch with I. P. R. and other leaders in China and Japan so as to make your visits as fruitful as possible from the point of view both of the I. P. R. and of the other purposes you have in mind in coming to the Far East.

If you are not able to visit China and Japan but would like to have Mr. Holland spend a couple of days with you, he could meet you either at Manchouli or Vladivostok on or about the fifth of July.

If you desire it Mr. Holland would be glad to spend a week with you in the first half of July either in China, Manchuria, the Soviet Far East, or Japan. It would be a tremendous education for Holland to have the privilege of meeting you. I realize, however, that your engagements in the Soviet Far East may make such a meeting impossible.

As you know, I shall be in Honolulu from May 22nd to June 3rd. Would you please cable me, CARTER, INPAREL, HONOLULU, as soon as possible after my arrival in Honolulu as to whether you would like to have Holland meet you, and, if so, when and where.

Holland himself has to leave Yokohama for Honolulu on either July 9th or July 19th. He can easily stay in the Far East until July 19th if this permits of meeting you. He is transferring his Far Eastern headquarters from Tokyo to Shanghai at the end of this month. His forwarding address throughout June will be % The China Institute of Pacific Relations, 123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai; *cables;* HOLLAND, INPAREL, SHANGHAI.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1012

Copy for Miss Austern.

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., 10th September, 1935.

Dr. V. E. MOTILEV,
20, Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR DR. MOTILEV: You will be receiving a formal acknowledgment from Mr. F. C. Atherton, the Treasurer in Honolulu, of the Soviet Council's very generous contribution of $2,000 (American) to the budget of the Pacific Council. I want,

however, to add my own personal and official thanks, through you, to the Soviet Council, for this substantial aid in financing the international work of the I. P. R. It means a great deal, that the newest of the national member groups should make so generous a contribution within a year of its formation.

With kindest personal regards,

I am, sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1013

MOSCOW—MEETING IN MOTYLEV'S OFFICE, 12–2:30

MARCH 31, 1936.

Present: Motylev, Harondar, Carter, Lattimore, Moore, Tyler, Donaldson.

To be discussed at a future conference: The Administrative problems of the I. P. R., and the problems of the Pacific Area.

Motylev said that he would arrange conversations with individuals who were primarily interested in Mongolia, for Mr. Lattimore in particular; and the Far East in general, for Mr. Carter.

Lattimore wanted to see all the reports and books on Mongolia available. Motylev stated that these were almost entirely in Russian, but if some could be found in Mongolian these would be produced for Lattimore, otherwise Moore could help L. with the Russian texts.

Motylev said that his report was ready for the Yosemite conference, and that he had collected immense wealth of material. All reports Harondar would translate.

Exchange of Literature.—Carter requested that more literature be sent to New York dealing with the internal development of the Soviet Union.

Pacific Affairs to be discussed at a future conference.

Organisational questions.—Questions were to be formulated to be answered at a future conference, in conversation not in writing.

Motylev said that he was ready to discuss contradictions and interrelations in the Pacific, Britain's role in the Pacific, etc.

Carter desired that his staff should have the Atlas shown and explained to them.

German-Japanese alliance.—Motylev stated that a German-Japanese alliance was only feasible from a military point of view. Japan could not possibly hope to wage a war against the Soviet Union single-handed. Germany is strong in the air, Japan is not. From an economic standpoint the alliance is ridiculous. Neither party can expect to gain anything. Both are deficient in raw materials, both export finished goods. In fact, they are economic rivals.

Soviet Far East industrialization was predetermined and inevitable without Japanese aggression. Naturally since 1931 it has been influenced by military considerations. The direction remains the same, but the tempo has changed. Japanese action has necessitated acceleration.

EXHIBIT No. 1014

MAY 18, 1936.

ECC from FVF:

In reply to your letter of May 12th regarding the allocation of Harriet Moore's services to the Pacific Council for the next year or two, the matter rests of course almost entirely with her. The work which the American Council would like her to do would, I think, fit easily into your own plan for using her. Specifically, she is now at work on the translation of Kantorovich's book on American policy in China, in collaboration with Kathleen Barnes. We would like to have this job finished as soon as possible. She is also engaged in the preparation of an article for the FAR EASTERN SURVEY scheduled for publication at the end of June or early in July. We would of course also like to have this job completed. We would further like to have her contribute occasionally to the FAR EASTERN SURVEY during the next year or two, and we would like to feel somewhat free in asking her cooperation on the various things in which she is a specialist.

But all these projects, as I have mentioned, fit as well into your scheme of things as into ours, so that I cannot see that it makes a great deal of difference to us whether she carries on under your banner or under ours. One additional fact

should be mentioned, namely that the American Council probably cannot afford the luxury of two Russian experts, and we would welcome having the Pacific Council take over the services of one of them.

EXHIBIT No. 1015

COUNCIL OF THE USSR,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
20, Razin Street, Moscow, June 11, 1936.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York.

DEAR CARTER: I take this opportunity to express once more my regret that I was not able, as promised, to send you our recommendations for the modification of the Yosemite agenda to London. This delay was caused by the absence from Moscow of several members of our Council which prevented us from arranging a general meeting of the Council for the discussion and approval of these amendments.

Bearing in mind that because of the short time left at your disposal you would not be able to communicate our comments to other member countries, we decided to confine them exclusively to Round Table programme No. 3 (Economic Development and Nationality Policy of the Soviet Union).

We would offer the following suggestions:

(1) We proposed to omit entirely from Round Table No. 3 agenda item 29; or, at least, to reformulate it radically. The original wording ("privations suffered by the entire population under the First 5 Year Plan") reminds one of the unfair anti-soviet statements one can still find in some foreign papers. We are confident that you would prefer to avoid the unfavourable impression which would inevitably be produced here should such a statement appear in a questionnaire published by a serious scientific organization.

(2) Item 30 should read: "the peasants as compared to the proletariat; collective farmers as compared to individual farmers" instead of "opposed." The use of the word "opposed" could result in an absolutely wrong conception of the situation which in no way corresponds to the actual relations between the peasantry and the proletariat in the U. S. S. R.

(3) In item 40 (page 21 IPR NOTES) the question "If so, would she be willing to and would the other powers allow her to?" should be omitted. Reply to such a question could naturally not be given by the Soviet delegation and it is up to the delegates of corresponding countries to answer it.

(4) We consider unnecessary the inclusion of item 44 as all questions treated therein are covered fully by the two preceding items.

(5) In items 40 and 45 the relations between the USSR and Sinkiang are presented as a special separate problem. These relations should really be discussed simultaneously with Sino-Soviet relations as a whole.

(6) Referring to item 46, we were surprized to see that the Soviet nationality policy could be characterized as "offensive." The application of this term seems so irrelevant that we would prefer not to see it in the agenda.

(7) It would seem more feasible to transfer discussion of item 47 to Round Table No. 1 (USA). The same refers to item 49. The problems covered should be discussed in Round Table No. 5.

These are the essential minimum changes which, we believe, should be introduced into the agenda.

At the same time I would like to point out that in our estimation the programme of discussion in Round Table No. 5 does not give adequate consideration to the problem of determining the aggressor in the Pacific. On the contrary, some of the questions are evidently intended to present this problem in a form as vague and indefinite as possible. As an example, question No. 4 could be indicated.

Once more I repeat that to my regret I am not in the position to offer our criticism of other Round Table topics as I perfectly realize that before introducing any change you would have to communicate with the respective countries which is impossible in view of the short time left.

Sincerely yours,

Motylev,
V. E. MOTYLEV.

EH

EXHIBIT No. 1016

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 18, 1936.

Unofficial and Confidential.

DEAR CARTER: Referring to your letter of July 8.

It was a pleasure to me to see you and to make the appointments which you requested in connection with your recent visit to Washington.

With regard to the question which you ask in relation to the text of a mimeographed memorandum on Far Eastern policy a copy of which you enclose:

First of all a bit of narrative. Early in April I attended, by invitation, a luncheon where foreign policy was to be under discussion. I was seated beside a very intelligent woman whom I met for the first time who is active in the work of women's clubs. In the course of our conversation this woman asked whether I had seen a memorandum which was being circulated by the "Cause and Cure of War", on American Far Eastern policy. I said that I had not. She produced from her pocketbook a copy of the memorandum to which she referred, with which the copy you give me now is identical. I glanced through that copy and remarked on the fact and that she considered it outrageous that such materials were circulated thus anonymously; she went on to say that she had received this paper along with a number of other papers in an envelope of materials sent her from the office of the Cause and Cure of War in New York, and that she thought that all the other papers had some indication of source or authorship or both. She inquired whether I considered the presentation given in this memorandum of our Far Eastern policy in its actuality a fair presentation; also whether I would care to express myself (to her) with regard to the suggestions offered in the latter part of the text.

In the light of the above, you will realize that it is very interesting to me to have the account which you give of the origin of this document. You do not ask the same questions which were asked of me on the occasion to which I refer; and I shall not now make the same comments that I made (to her) at that time. You state, however, that now you and Mr. Field would like to have from me "a full personal criticism of this statement"; and you expressly ask, "To what extent does the'. . . . statement represent various schools of thought now current in the United States?

Before addressing myself to this request and enquiry, may I take the liberty of making the observation that any attempt which I might make to respond to the request of criticism of the statement under reference would in my opinion be of far greater value to all concerned had the enquiry and the response been made before the memorandum was circulated—in January 1936. I believe that it is regarded as axiomatic that when statements have been made and there are later made statements in criticism or correction thereof, the latter never catch up with the former.

I am sure that both you and Mr. Field must realize that it is not possible for me to discuss Far Eastern policy or statements made with regard thereto on a purely "personal" basis. I am in an official position; I am an official; I have as an official some knowledge of and constant connection with the question of American Far Eastern policy; and I cannot separate what I learn, what I know and what I think as an official (and in relation to public matters) from what I know and what I think as a private person. It does not seem to me that any very useful purpose would be served by my attempting—especially at this time—to set down in writing something purporting to be a "personal" criticism of the statement of policy under reference. Moreover, I have reached that point (age?) where the exercise of criticism gives no pleasure and little if any gratification; and, in addition, "life is short" and there is paucity of time, I shall, nevertheless, take time and make an effort to make some comments—because you ask it and because I hope that it may be helpful.

To begin with, let's forget the authorship and the circumstances of origin of the memorandum. Let me treat the matter wholly impersonally and on the basis solely of what appears in the memorandum.

To the express question asked in the last sentence of your letter, quoted above, I can answer readily that the statement seems to me clearly to set forth what are the concepts and views of *some* "schools" of thought now current in the United States. Going further, I may say that it does *not*, in my opinion, accurately portray or adequately take account of the reasoning, the conclusions and the courses of action of the American *Government* (whether in the past or now).

The author sets out to state, "First, what our Far Eastern policy actually is."

In that connection, in the first paragraph he makes it appear that the building up of our Navy is intended "to make enforcement" of our policy "possible in the future." He makes it appear that it is a part of our policy to "maintain" equal trading opportunities for all foreigners in China and to "maintain" China's territorial and administrative integrity. I am not aware that it is the thought or intent of the American Government to "enforce" its views or to "maintain" a particular situation in the Far East. It has been, it is, and I think it will continue to be the policy of the *United States* to pursue in and with regard to the Far East *objectives* similar to or identical with those which it pursues in other parts of the world. Important among these objectives are enjoyment by American nationals, American ships, and American trade of equal opportunities and fair and nondiscriminatory treatment; and, enjoyment by free peoples of rights of sovereignty and independence within the territories which are theirs. But—to *seek* and to *advocate* constantly the acceptance and application of certain principles is one thing; to *insist* (up to and by threat or use of force) upon the application of those principles is quite another thing.

The *primary* purpose of the present building up of the American Navy is, as I understand it, not to enforce upon others the views of this country or of the existing Administration but to diminish the likelihood of resort by others to methods and instruments of force in such assaults upon American nationals or interests as, if made, would tend to lead to war; and, if war should come, to ensure as far as possible against hostilities being brought to our own shores or onto our own soil and against a final victory over us by the armed forces of the assaulting nation. In other words, the naval program is designed for the purpose of *keeping this country out of war*. (There are, of course, and there can be differences of opinion with regard to the efficacy of armament as an instrument or agency for keeping its possessor out of war. There is less room for difference with regard to the soundness, in the event of war, of the view cited by Voltaire that "God is always on the side of the heaviest battalions.")

The author's treatment of the subject of our Far Eastern policy makes it appear that he considers that the activities of the American Government in and with regard to the Far East have been and are directed almost entirely and almost exclusively to the protection and promotion of American *business interests*. This is, in my opinion, altogether too narrow a concept. American policy and American action in and with regard to the Far East have for more than a century revolved around and been concerned with at least three things: protection and promotion of American trade*; protection and promotion of American cultural efforts and influences (especially in the field of missionary activities—evangelistic, educational, philanthropic, etc.); and advancement of certain political concepts which prevail among the American people, especially the concept that independent nations have the right to remain independent and that international relations should be regulated by processes of discussion and agreement rather than processes of war.

It is by no means certain that "China remains one of the greatest, if not the greatest, future market of American commodities and capital."

It is absolutely erroneous, in my opinion, to say that, "Traditional American Far Eastern policy is based strictly on commercial interests. The present Far Eastern policy of the Government is ultimately based on nothing more nor less than commercial interests." American Far Eastern policy, in line with American foreign policy in general, has rested and still rests on a far broader basis than merely that of "commercial interest", trade, or investments.

Not accepting, as you can see very clearly that I do not, the author's account of what the policy of the United States "actually is," I feel that it would be futile for me to discuss the suggestions which he makes for change of policy. I may say, however, that I do not regard the building up of the Navy or the maintenance in Far Eastern waters of American ships (and at some points in China of small contingents of American landed forces) or the development of American aviation in the Pacific Ocean as intended "to defend American imperialistic interests in the Far East" or for "the military protection of American investments and business abroad."

The subject under discussion is too big for compression into any satisfactory discussion within the limits of the seven pages of the memorandum under reference or the limtis of a letter such as I am now taking time to write. No one can, in my opinion, say in a *few* words and categorically what American policy *is*,

*And, of course, protection of the lives and various rights (general) of American nationals.

than to avoid disseminating statements which, purporting to be statements of what it *is*, declare it to be that which it *is not*.

It is the policy and the effort of the American Government in any administration to safeguard and promote the interests of the United States. In different administrations and at different moments there will be differences in methods resorted to and instrumentalities employed; but by and large each administration reflects the fundamental thought and attitude of the American people. Are the American people solicitously interested in the idea of protection by their Government to the *n*th degree of American "business interests" in the Far East? Do they desire, would they support resort by this country to arms to "*enforce*" the principle of the "open door" in China or to "maintain" China's administrative or territorial integrity? Our Far Eastern policy is a part of our foreign policy in general. We use certain *methods* and certain instruments in connection with certain problems and certain situations in the Far East because those problems and situations are peculiar. But the *objectives* of our action in that connection are neither peculiar nor unique. And a changing of the methods and the instrumentalities would by no means signify or effect an alteration of the objectives.

I am going to give you for your and Mr. Field's confidential information a copy (herewith enclosed) of a memorandum which I wrote sometime ago which relates to one part of our many problems in connection with the general question of operations or course of action in connection with the Far East. When you have perused this, *please be so good as to return the copy to me.* You may make of the thoughts expressed in it any use which you may see fit short of quoting it with any attribution as to source. If you really care to make a careful study of what I believe to be the essential principles of our foreign policy, I shall be glad to send you upon request therefor, for your confidential consideration, a copy of the talk which I gave at the Army War College last December on that subject.

With cordial regards and all best wishes—always, I am,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) STANLEY K. HORNBECK.

Enclosure: Memorandum.

EXHIBIT No. 1017

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 19th October 1936.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
New York City.

DEAR FRED: This morning I received your round-robin with the copy of Alsberg's important letter of October 8th to Holland and Holland's letter of comment to you of October 13th. I agree heartily with Alsberg that it would be a grand thing for the IPR if it got into the position not of asking the S. S. R. C. for funds but of telling it where it ought to head in in research.

Of the various proposals before me I would personally be inclined to put in the first category Holland's proposal with reference to the economic and political status of the Philippines and your own with reference to the American Navy in the Pacific. How the other questions were rated and broken up you and your colleagues, Alsberg and Holland, should determine better than I. One problem is to get questions into manageable proportions. If the continuation of Remer's work could be done without too great an expenditure it would clear up several important questions. The study of American shipping and shipping policies is of considerable importance and if the study of this problem went ahead concurrently with the study of the American Navy each might throw a little light on the other.

Of course a full length study of the American Stake in the Far East is a major item on the agenda of the American Council. If a very able far-reaching scholar could be put to work on this problem by the S.S.R.C. he would profit enormously by the work that you have already done and might add substantially by way of verification and supplement.

I am all for going ahead at the full steam with Alsberg's excellent suggestion and I am glad that you and Alsberg and Holland have the framing of the project in hand.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,

Copies: Alsberg
Holland

EXHIBIT No. 1018

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 5th January, 1937.

DR. STANLEY K. HORNBECK,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HORNBECK: A temporary member of the Institute's International Secretariat is making for us at this time a study of Germany's position in the Far East. In connection with his studies he has run across the question of the German-Japanese Alliance, news of which was published in Moscow, Paris, Shanghai and Budapest in the first part of 1919 as having been concluded in Stockholm in 1918. Most of the news items trace back to a message in cipher which it was stated was sent by Major Slaughter of the United States Army from Siberia to Washington. According to these dispatches Major Slaughter was an observer with the Allied Intervention Forces in Siberia and got the Treaty and a note on the occasion of the occupation of Perm by Admiral Kolchak.

I do not know whether you are in a position to answer any of the questions which my colleague wishes me to put, but, if you can answer any or all of them, I shall be grateful. Here they are:—

a. General Graves mentions Major Slaughter but does not describe his duties, particularly while at Perm. Do you know what these were.

b. Did Major Slaughter really send a message in cipher regarding the alleged German-Japanese Treaty? If so, from what place and by what cable service?

c. Did Major Slaughter ever report as to how he got the document? Were there any middlemen involved. for example, Chinese or White Russians, or did he find the document himself?

d. Was the original document sent subsequently to Washington? If so, in what form was it and in what language?

e. Reports in Paris, perhaps circulated by the Chinese Delegation to the Peace Conference, state that the document was a part of a correspondence between the Soviet Government and the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin. Is there any explanation of why the document was left in Perm by the Soviets? Did Major Slaughter give any evidence to the effect that the Bolsheviks left the document in Perm by design?

f. When Senator Lodge on July 15, 1919, inserted the dispatches regarding the Treaty in the United States Senate Documents was there any formal protest made by the Japanese Embassy in Washington? Did the State Department have any answer sent to Senator Lodge or to the Senate regarding the authenticity of the Treaty?

g. Is it known whether Senator Lodge was in possession of any other information besides these dispatches of which the United States Government also had knowledge? For example, was Major Slaughter back from Siberia and was he permitted to give information to Senator Lodge or to other private persons?

Do the files on the matter give any evidence as to whether Senator Lodge discussed the matter formally and directly either with the United States Army or with the Department of State?

h. If there are any clippings or references in your files relating to the matter, would it be possible for you to have someone in your office send us the titles and dates to aid in our study of this question?

I do not know whether any of these questions are out of order, but I know you will not hesitate to let me know which, if any, of the questions you are in a position to answer.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Handwritten:) Unofficial.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 30, 1937.

E. C. CARTER, Esquire,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, New York.

DEAR CARTER: Referring to your letter of January 5 laying before me, on behalf of an unnamed temporary member of the Institute's International Secretariat, certain questions,—

I am able to give informally answers to some of the questions as follows:

(a) Major Slaughter, formerly Assistant Military Attaché in Russia, was assigned to duty with the Siberian Expeditionary Force in September 1918. General Graves immediately directed Major Slaughter to proceed wherever necessary in Siberia to maintain contact with both Czech and Russian Headquarters, and to keep the American Commanding Officer informed in regard to developments. Major Slaughter was in effect Liaison Officer and Military Observer with both Czech and Russian Armies as General Graves' representative for the United States Army from September 1918 until January 1920.

(b) In November 1918, probably about November 20, a Bolshevik Commissar, well known to Major Slaughter, informed him that such a treaty was known to exist and that the treaty and all pertinent facts had been published in the "Rote Fahn," communist publication of Hamburg, on or about November 8, 1918, and that it would also be published in the Moscow *Izvestiya* immediately. A few weeks later, probably about December 20, the same Commissar informed Major Slaughter that he had been to Moscow and showed Major Slaughter a copy of the *Izvestiya* containing the alleged treaty but declined to surrender the paper. On the capture of Perm, Major Slaughter proceeded at once to that place to go over the copies of the *Izvestiya* required by law to be kept in court and public offices. Copies were made under court direction and given to Major Slaughter. Because Major Slaughter declared this news dispatch to have little or no value, the Commissar stated that he would secure photostat copies of the treaty. Early in February 1919, the Commissar showed what purported to be a photostat copy of the treaty in German and in Japanese. There was also said to be an unofficial initialed copy in French. The Commissar declined to surrender the copy without substantial payment, and in view of lack of authentication Major Slaughter declined to purchase the copy.

An interpreter, who translated the alleged treaty as published in *Izvestiya*, later, on arrival in Peking, gave a copy to a North China newspaper, and this was published with many apparent factual details intended to give weight to the story of the existence of the alleged treaty.

(c) No.

(d) Answered above.

(e) Answered above.

(f) Question.

(g) No. No. Question.

(h) Question.

You will note that I have not attempted to answer those portions of questions (f), (g) and (h) which relate to the Department's files. A preliminary examination of the files indicates that we have not a great amount of material on the subject of this alleged treaty; also, that publicity of one kind or another was given at many points in Europe, at the time, to stories with regard to the alleged treaty. In view of the fact that the whole matter seems to have rested on foundations of mere affirmation and allegation, I am reluctant to ask that anyone in the Department give much time to a study of it. It is clear that the Department did not give credence to the stories that such a treaty had been concluded.

Could you give me an exact reference to the U. S. Senate document or documents in which "Senator Lodge on July 15, 1919, inserted the dispatches regarding the Treaty"?

It should be understood, of course, that, in any use which may be made of the information given above, there should be made neither reference to nor attribution to the Department of State or the undersigned.

With all best wishes, I am,

Yours sincerely,

STANLEY K. HORNBECK.

EXHIBIT No. 1019

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MOSCOW, *January 15, 1937.*

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York.

DEAR CARTER: First of all I want to thank you for sending us the manuscript of the Soviet chapter of "PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC 1936." Having carefully studied its contents I note with satisfaction that in general it renders a correct summary of the discussion at the Conference. In view of that I was quite surprised to read the first preliminary paragraph. This literary introduction to the subject is so queer, not to say offensive, that I simply cannot make up my mind to see how a statement of that kind could be incorporated in the report. I sincerely believe that the author intended to say something different. I would request you to omit it altogether and begin the chapter from the second paragraph as the first one is entirely inadmissible from the viewpoint of the Soviet Council.

Passing to our comments on the report as such, I would like to offer the following suggestions:

For the purpose of permitting the readers a more objective and comprehensive study of the problems involved we believe it would be desirable to introduce some corrections and additions:

(1) To begin with, I would request you, insofar as possible, to quote my statements instead of rendering their summary. This does in no way mean that we are discontented with the summary as given in the report, but we would rather prefer to see those statements printed in full as we believe them to be of significance as a matter of principle.

(2) Every time mention is made of separate statements made in Round Tables, the manuscript invariably refers to "an English member," "an American member" and so forth. We fully realize that the disclosure of the names of those who participated in Round Table discussion might unfavourably affect the frankness of their statements at future Conferences. However, we believe it is possible and would well serve our common purposes if some discrimination was introduced here for stressing the importance of the statements made by the heads of the delegations. This could easily and conveniently be done by saying "a leading member of the British delegation," or "a distinguished American member," etc. In particular we believe it would be necessary to resort to such a method of stressing the importance of some statements on pages 20–22 of the manuscript covering the German-Japanese alliance.

(3) Two further remarks are of utmost importance from our viewpoint. The first concerns the German-Japanese agreement. On page 21 of the manuscript it is stated that "the French members were only partially satisfied with the Japanese denial of the existence of such a treaty, since it did not extend to the future possibilities." As you probably remember, Mr. Sarraut's second statement was followed by Mr. Yoshizawa taking the word for the second time and saying that he did not admit such an agreement could be concluded even in future. We believe this second statement should be included in the report for the purpose of adequate presentation of such an important problem. This would also throw light on the existence of difference of opinion on the same question between members of the delegation of one and the same country; while in Moscow, you mentioned this was one of the main objectives of I.P.R. Conferences. In this particular case this would be of primary importance as it would reveal the fact that there are influential circles in Japan, which are not agreeing with the aggressive attitude in Japan's foreign policy.

(4) The second remark concerns Mr. Takayanagi's statements. We believe it would be essential to include Mr. Takayanagi's outburst and our full reply (my statement at Round Table "B" session on Aug. 19), of course excluding

those parts of the latter which were presented on the preceding pages of the report. As a result the two different trends in Japanese public opinion—a manifestation of which could also be found, as you know it, in the statements of the Japanese delegates—would be embodied, at least superficially, in the report. On the other hand this would be an explanation of the firm reply given by the Soviet delegation to Mr. Takayanagi, and would at the same time supply an answer to the question as to the reasons justifying the location of considerable Soviet forces in the Far East. Otherwise the report is offering no answer to this question.

(5) On page 24, where my words are extensively quoted, a sentence concerning Germany has been omitted. I would request you to include it.

(6) I would further like to direct your attention to two more items. On page 2 of the manuscript we read about "the absence of expansionist tendencies in the Soviet Union in the immediate future." Insofar as I can remember the words "near future" have been mentioned at the Conference in connection with Soviet exports and not with eventual war. A mention of these words in a different connection might be misleading.

The second remark concerns our understanding of classless society as presented on page 3 of the manuscript. The report failed to convey a correct interpretation of our idea. Instead it would be much better to quote paragraphs 4, 11, and 12 of the new Soviet Constitution.

(7) Moreover, I have a number of suggestions to offer purely concerning the matter of wording.

On page 7 instead of the words "socialists maintain" we should have: "Soviet delegates maintain."

On page 10 the sentence: "One should call the U. S. S. R. a directed rather than a planned economy" is of no real importance from the viewpoint of the report as such. However, it is absolutely inadmissible to Soviet representatives. The Soviet economy is a socialist economy and the above sentence, as we understand it, confuses a socialist economy with fascist methods of directing national economy. As you perhaps remember, this has been specially emphasized by Comr. Stalin in his interview given to Roy Howard. I think that the report would in no way suffer if that sentence were simply eliminated.

On page 11 we find reference to the "so-called dumping" "disturbing certain markets." It seems to me that the use of such misleading words is hardly feasible.

On page 18, when speaking about commodities the U. S. S. R. would have to secure abroad, I would like you to add that we had in mind such commodities "as for example bananas."

On page 26 (second line from the bottom) it seems to me that my own words are attributed to the Japanese delegate.

On page 36 I found traces of considerable hesitation on the part of the editor as to the manner in which Mr. Lattimore should be presented to the reader. We would find no objection to his being called "an outstanding expert on Mongolian problems."

On page 32 (last lines) my statement to the effect that China should be allowed to work out its own destiny without foreign interference is badly located. An impression could be thereby created that my statement was directed against collective security, which of course is absurd. Please have this statement of mine transferred to some other place or omit it entirely.

On page 43 it is stated that "the U. S. S. R. thought it possible to accept this offer and agreed to create a *demarcation commission*." This is probably a bad misprint, as in the statement I issued on this problem, which has been handed to the Secretariat in writing, I used the word "*redemarcation*." As you know, we consider this difference to be politically of essential importance. I would like the editor of the book to bear this in mind.

On page 45 terrorist activities of certain Japanese fascist officers are referred to as related to Marxian ideology. This is such an unbelievable libel, that nothing more absurd could be invented. You will greatly oblige me by eliminating this passage. I believe this could be done easily as the corresponding words are not quoted but rendered in the form of a summary.

Finally, I would suggest to supplement the report by an appendix, in which be printed the main statements of the Chairman of delegations presented at plenary sessions; it would be worth while to include the most interesting pronouncements of other leading delegates (for example Mr. Bisson's) at the same sessions. I believe that such a supplement would be of real value to serious students of the problems of the Pacific.

I have to stress here that under no circumstances would I want to create any kind of inconvenience to you in connection with adopting my suggestions outlined in items (2), (3) and (4). Will you kindly accept them in that case only if that can be done without any difficulties or complications. *However, I would insist on eliminating altogether the introductory paragraph on page 1, as I believe this is quite necessary.*

As a whole I note with considerable satisfaction that the present report is *very favorably differing from that published in I. P. R. NOTES.* From the political viewpoint, the standard of presentation of all questions is *high and they are objectively interpreted.*

I am awaiting with great interest the publication of this volume.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) V. E. Motylev
V. E. Motylev.

EH

P. S. (handwritten) Manuscript herewith returned. G. H.

Exhibit No. 1020

ECC

Extract From Letter Dated San Francisco, April 18, 1935, Owen Lattimore to Catherine Porter

I find around here that the knowing Mr. John Thompson of the San Francisco Daily News has an explanation of the Moscow trials which is widely accepted. It is simply that Stalin is getting rid of all the people "who knew him when" so as to monopolize control of the political machine. To me this simply does not make sense because even from the little I know of the personalities of 1917, 1918, it is clear that a number of the people who have since come to be classified as Old Bolsheviks did not properly belong to the famous closely welded core of the Communist Party. On the contrary, many of them were radicals who belonged to the fringe of the Party and many of them had already been known for years of obstinate partisans of one or another variant theory.

As a reader, I should like to find a good article on the Who's Who of the Old Bolsheviks, sorting out who was really a close follower of Lenin and who was a more or less loosely harnessed sidekick whom only Lenin's genius could keep pulling in the traces. As an editor, I don't know whether I should prompt anyone to write such an article at the present time.

Exhibit No. 1021

January 15, 1937.

Dear Mr. Carter: In re the Hazard article, I would say that he has done a fine job. In answer to your questions specifically, I think:

a. His account is very thorough and well documented.

b. His article in no way reveals his point of view. He is presenting the Soviet analysis, with no apologies or comments. His article, however, does reveal a thorough understanding of the theory of Marxism. This means nothing in particular, since no student in a Soviet field is permitted to escape without this.

c. I likewise do not think it possible to judge much about his imaginative qualities from this article, as it is a straight-forward factual account. I think the article is quite well arranged, and, except for unavoidable condensation of large fields of law, it is written in a comprehensible and easy-reading style. I may be a poor judge of this, however, as at the moment I am extremely interested in the subject.

Thank you for sending me the reprint, as I might not have taken the time to read it, just from its title. I will appreciate your sending me any other articles on the Soviet Union that you happen to see in out-of-the-way places.

In re Richard's letter to Motylev: I wonder if it might not also be suggested that Richard find out how a decision is reached in the U. S. S. R. to translate foreign books and whether there is some one institution where we should send our books immediately with this purpose in mind.

Motylev is likely to raise the whole question of getting Soviet material published abroad. Insofar as we have anything to say on this point, I hope we

will remind him that the question of editing Soviet translations is of paramount importance to us, if we are to sponsor any such publications. If we should make any arrangements with them about this, I expect we will run into difficulty on this point. Perhaps Motylev's experience in regard to the Data Papers has shown him what we mean. He is not unaware of the work we had to put in on them, and he also probably knows that it did improve them.

I would not be surprised if Motylev wanted to know more about how and why the proceedings were written as they were. This is just a matter of information but I think Richard had better be prepared for it.

In that letter I sent you from Harondar you will see some indication of the type of question he may ask. It might be a good idea for Bill to write him about the general principles on which it is done, to save Richard the explanation.

Incidentally, I don't think that Motylev will be particularly helpful in regard to increasing the circulation of our books in the USSR. It might be a good idea if Richard asked to be put in touch with the institution which handles the import of foreign books. He might be more successful in dealing directly with them, as they are the ones who publish lists, etc. and keep in touch with all the libraries. Moreover, I think that it is through them that all purchases must be made and it might be possible to establish some sort of an agency with them, as they are the ones who publish lists, etc., and keep in touch with sort of thing. He might also try to see the main libraries, such as the Communist Academy Library, which have special funds for the purchase of foreign books.

You probably have heard that in the last Tikhii Okean there is an article by Voitinsky on the conference and on Whyte's article. If you don't know the contents I could make you an outline, or a translation, as you prefer. There is also an article by Motylev in Pravda on the position of Japanese workers and peasants as revealed in the big Mitsubishi book.

I will be in the ARI office Saturday morning, if you want to talk to me about any of these things. At the moment I can't think of anything else which Motylev might ask Richard.

HARRIET.

EXHIBIT No. 1022

"ROMM WIDELY KNOWN IN U. S. FOR PEACE EFFORTS

"Vladimir Romm, who has 'confessed' that he was the contact man between the Trotzkyite conspirators in Russia and Trotzsky himself, is widely known to the press fraternity in the United States and was an active participant at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference at Yosemite last summer.

" 'Mr. Romm's confession of personal participation in something which never happened and in which it would have been physically imposible for him to have played the part to which he has confessed,' said Chester H. Rowell, editor of The Chronicle, who was a delegate to the Yosemite meeting, 'is only one more chapter in the unsolved mystery of these Russian conspiracy trials.'

"Romm, with his colleague, Dr. V. E. Motylev, famous geographer and director of the Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas, had an important part in the conference at Yosemite, said Rowell.

" 'These two,' he said, 'were probably the hardest-working members of the institute, laboring with documents far into the night and frequently all night.

" 'On account of his better knowledge of English, the brunt of the running discussions in the round tables fell on Romm, though the major written statements were usually made by Motylev.

" 'Romm collaborated in their preparation. He made brilliant analyses of the Soviet economic and governmental structure, and defended with the orthdox arguments even the ambiguous provisions for the freedom of the press in the new Soviet constitution. He was an accomplished linguist, speaking Russian, German, French, English, and Japanese, and an extremely capable newspaper man.

" 'I first worked with Mr. Romm in Japan, where I learned to know him as a newspaperman who I lived up to the highest standards of his profession

" 'Personally, from many contacts with him, some of them close and continued, all over the world, I became very fond of Romm.'

"Rowell described Romm as one of the most important Soviet foreign correspondents and much the best known in America. He formerly represented 'Tass', the Russian Associated Press, first in Europe and later in Japan. He was then transferred to America as the Washington correspondent of the Moscow 'Izvestia,' of which Karl Radek, another of the 'confessed' conspirators, has long been editor.

"Romm was the first Russian observer accredited to the Institute of Pacific Relations at its conference in Kyoto, Japan, in 1929, and was one of the two regular delegates at the institute conference at Yosemite. He also reported the national conventions of the two parties last summer and commented to friends that the procedure in Russia was far more democratic and less steam-rollered than these American conventions."

(Source: San Francisco Chronicle, January 1, 1937, p. 2.)

EXHIBIT No. 1023

STANFORD, *Feb. 10, 1937.*

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd St., New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have gone over all Motilev's revisions and find I am in full agreement with all the changes you and Harriet suggest. I'm sorry about the misunderstanding over the opening para. I did not realize that Harriet desired and expected it to be left out. I certainly have no objection to omitting it.

I agree entirely to having Motilev's reply to Takayanagi quoted directly and fully in Harriet's chapter, and footnoted to the Takayanagi statement in Chapter II. I am reluctant to give the Takayanagi statement in direct quotation as I had to reconstruct his words from two not completely identical records, and I feel that the present form is fuller and more accurate in substance than if I tried to quote disjointed parts of the recorder's notes.

In the footnote on page 39 of my chapter I now suggest adding the following words at the end of the note:

", where the Soviet member's reply to the Japanese statement is directly quoted."

In the paragraph beginning near the foot of Page 39 of my chapter I see no reason to make any changes, but I am quite ready to accept any amendments from Harriet or you.

I have generally adopted Motilev's idea of using suitable adjectives to indicate the importance of speakers and will make further changes of this sort where it seems advisable.

I accept your suggestion of quoting from the Constitution in a footnote.

My only other comment is on Motilev's wish to cut out the passage about Japanese officers being actuated by Marxian ideology. I agree it seems an absurd libel, but it was said in all seriousness by a responsible Japanese, and if some Japanese think that, I suppose it is not without significance. My own inclination would have been to leave Harriet's text as it is but add a sentence saying that to the Soviet and many other members such a statement seemed incredible. However, I don't really mind if the passage is omitted and will gladly accept Harriet's and your judgment.

You are right in thinking that wherever possible we are including in the text the relevant and important parts of the national chairmen's statements. I don't think it practicable or advisable to reproduce them all in an appendix, even if we could afford the space. Many of them, you recall, are already printed in IPR Notes.

All in all, Motilev's comments are sound and very reasonable. It's a nice letter, and I'm glad you decided to send him the MS. I'm keeping the copy of his letter and returning the MS by air mail herewith. Do you think I should send him a note personally thanking him for having read and revised the chapter so carefully? If you don't think it necessary, please be sure to add my thanks to those of Harriet and yourself when you write.

I have had your wire in answer to my travel inquiry. I shall await further definite word from you as to whether you are booked for the Empress of Japan on March 26, before I decide anything. Will you please wire or air mail me as soon as you know. I had the idea you preferred Dollar accommodations to C. P. R., and in fact I have the impression that in tourist class Dollar ships are better, even in the older ships like the Taft. However, either line will suit us perfectly well. My slight preference for staying here till March 20 was mainly because we are liking it so well here, not because of any important IPR reasons.

Sincerely,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—Alsberg and I talked briefly to Wilbur about the Lapham scheme. He thought it an excellent scheme and said he would be glad to speak in support

of the plan to Lapham senior, who is one of his trustees I gather. The Bay Region is to hold an Executive Committee meeting on the 16th. I am invited and will relay to you any news you want. Wilbur leaves today for Chicago where he can be reached on the 13th and 14th c/o Palmer House. If Alsberg goes to Europe next June, Wilbur will grant him leave of absence with pay.

EXHIBIT No. 1024

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 1, 1937.

DR. HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK,
The Riverside Church,
Riverside Drive, New York City.

DEAR HARRY: One of the functions of the Institute of Pacific Relations is to confront thoughtful people with points of view that are radically different from their own. It has recently occurred to me that it might be useful if you were to invite Bishop McConnell and eight or ten equally intelligent and open-minded clergymen to meet for a long discussion Constantin Oumansky, the present Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. An immediate reason for such a meeting would be the perplexity in the minds of a considerable section of the American public with reference to the recent Moscow trials. Some Americans seem to be delighting in the Trotskyist attack on the U. S. S. R., in ignorance of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are probably supporting a war maker. I am convinced that for our generation at least Stalin is an asset for peace.

Oumansky has long been a colleague of Radek and others who figured in the recent trials, and, now that the verbatim record of the court proceedings is available, could clear up certain points which have been a matter of concern to American liberals.

Recently I took the initiative in asking Oumansky whether he would be willing to meet you and a few other liberal clergymen. He said that he would be glad to do so. He normally comes to New York about once a fortnight so a date convenient to you and him could be easily arranged. I may add that Oumansky said that if desired he would be glad to answer questions with reference to the status of the Christian Churches in the U. S. S. R.

We are leaving New York for the Far East on Friday, so it might be better if you communicated with me by letter or phone before I go but if this is not feasible my colleague Miss Mitchell could communicate with Mr. Oumansky in case you wished to act on my proposal. Or you could write him direct at the Soviet Embassy, 1119 16th Street, Washington.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1025

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 2nd March 1937.

MR. JAMES G. MCDONALD,
New York Times, Times Square,
New York City.

DEAR MCDONALD: Knowing Romm as you did in Kyoto, Washington, Yosemite and Geneva, you must have been particularly interested in the recent Moscow Trials. You doubtless knew Radek also.

The Trotskyists in America are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that I thought you would want to have the text of the public trial. I have at last succeeded in securing a few copies of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23–January 30, 1937. I am sending you a copy under separate cover because I know you will want to read it. It is barely possible that you will want to comment on it editorially.

It is certainly a most amazing record and seems to be very definite evidence of a widespread counter-revolutionary movement organized by Trotsky, Trotsky's denials not withstanding.

If you already have a copy I would be grateful if you would return the one I have just sent you as they are difficult to get.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1026

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 2nd March 1937.

Mr. H. B. ELLISTON,
Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Massachusetts.

DEAR ELLISTON: So many journalists as well as others have been perplexed by the recent Moscow Trials that I have thought that possibly you would like to have a fuller background than has thus far come through on the wires from Europe.

I have recently managed to secure a few copies of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23–January 30, 1937, and I have just sent a copy to you thinking that it was the kind of thing that you would want to read. At least you will want to read all that Radek and Romm said. Knowing them both personally their testimony in Moscow came to me at the time of the Trial as a complete surprise. Now, as I think over my relationships with them, I realize something of the struggle they have had and the depth of their convictions at certain periods that Trotsky, not Stalin, had the right way for the world.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.

May I now turn to another matter? Are you likely to become an American citizen? The reason for my question is this: Your name is repeatedly proposed for membership in the American Council of the I. P. R. Unfortunately, the Constitution limits the membership to American citizens. The American Council is losing a great deal through your not being a member. How do things stand?

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Copies of the verbatim report of the 1937 Moscow Trial sent to:

Hon. Newton D. Baker, Cleveland
Mr. Carroll Binder, Chicago
Mr. Edward C. Carter, New York
Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain, Columbia University, New York
Dr. J. . Defoe, Winnipeg, Canada
Mr. H. B. Elliston, Boston
Frederick C. Field, New York
Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, New York
Mr. James G. McDonald, New York
Miss Kate L. Mitchell, New York
Mr. Chester H. Rowell, San Francisco
The Hon. Newton Howell, Chief Justice of Ontario, Toronto, Canada
Professor Frank R. Scott, Montreal, Canada

EXHIBIT No. 1027

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 2nd March, 1937.

Mr. H. B. ELLISTON,
Christian Science Monitor,
Boston, Massachusetts.

DEAR ELLISTON: So many journalists as well as others have been perplexed by the recent Moscow Trials that I have thought that possibly you would like to have a fuller background than has thus far come through on the wires from Europe.

I have recently managed to secure a few copies of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23–January 30, 1937 and I have just sent a copy to you thinking that it was the kind of thing that you would want to read. At least you will want to read all that Radek and Romm said. Knowing them both personally their testimony in Moscow came to me at the time of the Trial as a complete surprise. Now, as I think over my relationships with them, I realize something of the struggle they have had and the depth of their convictions at certain periods that Trotsky, not Stalin, had the right way for the world.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though those Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials notwithstanding.

May I now turn to another matter? Are you likely to become an American citizen? The reason for my question is this: Your name is repeatedly proposed for membership in the American Council of the I. P. R. Unfortunately, the Constitution limits the membership to American citizens. The American Council is losing a great deal through your not being a member. How do things stand?

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1028

[Telegram]

MARCH 3, 1937.

HALL BOROVOY,
Soviet Consulate General,
7 East 61st Street, New York City:

Can you lunch with me Hotel Ambassador room four eleven one o'clock today.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1029

McGILL UNIVERSITY,
FACULTY OF LAW,
Montreal, March 4th, 1937.

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esq.
c/o Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y., U. S. A.

DEAR CARTER: I am much obliged to you for taking the trouble to send me the report of the Moscow Trials. I shall read it carefully when it comes, and will let you know how the trial appears to me. I shall also see that others in Montreal have a chance to look at it.

There is no doubt that the effect of the trials is very serious for those who wish to see our society develop a form of economic planning based upon social ownership.

Yours sincerely,

[*s*] F. R. Scott
F. R. SCOTT.

MARCH 8, 1937.

FVF from ECC:

Enclosed for your information and that of Mrs. Barnes are copies of letters from Joseph P. Chamberlain of Columbia and Professor Scott of McGill.

I wish to reiterate the seriousness of the effect in this country of the most recent Moscow Trial. Your suggestions that steps be taken now with reference to the next trial are most fudamental. I hope you can act on this matter. I am incined to think that the American Council of the I. P. R. is in a much better position to do this than the American Russian Institute.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
510 Kent Hall, March 4, 1937.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER
Institute Of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: Thank you for sending me the proceedings of the Soviet court in the recent Moscow trials. I have not had time to read it carefully, but I hope to get a chance to do so shortly.

I have personally been anti-Trotsky, because, if for no other reason, I read his book and became convinced that Stalin was right and he was wrong in regard to the organization of the Soviet Union. Trotsky, according to his own book, was a very brilliant person who did not believe in the organization of the state but opposed the bureaucracy and was for world revolution, while Stalin recognized that a great job of construction had to be done, that it had to be done by a bureaucratic organization and that Russia could stand on its own feet, if organization and internal discipline were provided.

Furthermore, I have always felt that it would be quite improper for me to join a society for the defense of Leon Trotsky, for the reason that I do not like to join committtees whose object would appear to be to attack the government of a state at peace and amity with the United States, especially where I knew as little as I did about the truth of the situation.

I hope you have a very good trip. I am sorry that I have not had a chance to see you and Mrs. Carter.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] J. P. Chamberlain
J. P. CHAMBERLAIN,

C:S

EXHIBIT No. 1030

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 5th March, 1937.

MR. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND
Food Research Institute,
Stanford University, California.

DEAR BILL: You will, I think, be able to help people who have been perplexed by the recent Moscow Trials to realize that they make sense by loaning them a copy of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23–January 30, 1937. I have just managed to secure a few copies and I am sending one to you under separate cover, as I know you will find it fascinating and will want to read it all the way through.

I think also that the very able law professor whom Alsberg so greatly admires will want to read it also.

The Trotskyists in this country are doing so much to play into the hands of Americans who are anti-Soviet that the appearance of this book is most timely. It looks to me as though these Americans who are delighting in the Trotskyists attack on the U. S. S. R. are ignorant of the fact that in supporting Trotsky they are supporting a war-maker, Trotsky's denials not withstanding.

When the volume has been read by those whom you and Alsberg think would most appreciate it, it should be put in the library of the I. P. R. in San Francisco.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1031

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, 2nd March, 1937.

Professor JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR JOSEPH: As a friend of Kurovia and as a student of the Soviet Union you must have followed with some interest the newspaper accounts of the recent Moscow Trials. In view of the fantastic interpretations appearing in many newspapers I have been eager to see whether I could get a copy of the record

of the public trial. At last I have been able to secure a few copies of the verbatim report of the Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, January 23–January 30, 1937, and I am sending you one of these under separate cover. I am rather anxious to have your opinion as a lawyer on what appears here. The first 150 pages would furnish a pretty fair sample though you may be intrigued by the whole record as it unfolds from section to section.

As the number of copies available in this country seems limited, it may be that you will want to share this with one or two of your friends who may be especially interested and who would not ordinarily have easy access to this report. It is most interesting to see how the Trotskyists in America are using this Trial to fool anti-Soviet Americans into believing that Trotsky is a peace-maker.

Alice and I are off on Friday for a long absence in the Far East, I only wish you were going along too.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1033

EN ROUTE NEW YORK-SAN FRANCISCO,
March 8th, 1937.

DEAR KATE: If it meets with your approval, I wish you would order from "SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY," 824 Broadway, N. Y., the requisite number of copies of the 5-cent pamphlet—"At the Moscow Trial" by D. N. Pritt, so that you can send it with individual letters to each of those whose names appear at the bottom of this letter. Your letter to them might read somewhat as follows:

"Just before sailing from San Francisco, Mr. Carter asked me to order and send you a small pamphlet by D. N. Pritt, K. C., M. P. This is his comment on the Moscow trials of last August. Mr. Pritt was in Moscow at the time and attended the public trial. He seeks, in the light of his own knowledge of English court procedure to explain the differences between the English and the Soviet Courts.

Though Pritt's pamphlet describes the August trial, the procedure was presumably the same at the trial in January, the report of which Mr. Carter recently sent to you. That report and this pamphlet may serve as a useful background for the impending trial of Bukharin and Rykoff and others."

When you are ordering the Pritt pamphlet, please order six extra for me; 3 can be sent to Tokyo and 3 to Shanghai. It will be interesting to see whether they all arrive.

Gratefully yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,
BEN CHERRINGTON,
HERBERT LITTLE,

We miss you Kate—A. C.

Hon. Newton D. Baker
Mr. Carroll Binder
Professor Joseph P. Chamberlain
Dr. J. W. Dafoe
Mr. H. B. Elliston
Mr. Chester H. Rowell
The Hon. Newton Rowell
Professor Frank R. Scott

EXHIBIT No. 1034

HOTEL SIR FRANCIS DRAKE,
San Francisco, 11th March 1937.

Miss KATE MITCHELL,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR KATE: It was good of you to send me Baker's letter about the Verbatim Report, and the extra copies. I am privately sending a copy to Oumanski and wish that you would show copies of Baker's letter to me, to Fred, Kathleen, and Harriet.

I expect to see Bill and Alsberg this afternoon and will try and raise all of your questions with them. Now I am just starting out to make a round of financial calls with Esberg.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1035

MARCH 21, 1939.

Confidential.

FVF WLH KM CTC IF EFC,
From ECC:

For your private information I enclose a copy of a letter from a friend in Peiping dated February 21st. Under no circumstances must this letter be circulated or the identity of its author disclosed. Please return it to me when you have read it.

EXHIBIT No. 1036

IMPERIAL HOTEL,
Tokyo, 20th April, 1937.

Miss KATE MITCHELL,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR KATE: Purely for your private information I enclose this purely personal letter from Holland. I had insisted that he and Doreen move from second to first class from Honolulu to Yokohama, that is the point of the last part of the letter.

Bill and Doreen are in grand form and have received a very warm welcome back to Tokyo. The Japanese Council would now appreciate it enormously if they would spend a year instead of only a week in Tokyo.

This is to acknowledge with thanks your letter of March 29th congratulating the staff on the output between San Francisco and Honolulu.

The point about living on a high intellectual level in my review of the Moscow trial was simply this: The substance of the dialogue in the Verbatim Report revealed not only high intellectual development on the part of many of the participants, but seemed to reveal also that they were living as members of social groups where discussion was carried on at a level of mental development not easily duplicated elsewhere. I cannot remember the record of any court proceedings in the United States for many years in which the level of examination and reply averaged as high as that in the January Moscow Trial.

Thank you for forwarding me this copy of Tarr's letter to me of March 23. I will write him direct to London in a few days and send him a copy.

You will be interested to know that Elisabeth Downing made a highly favorable impression during her brief working visit. Both the Japanese I. P. R. and the Grews and the Andrews spoke of her with enthusiasm. You might pass this on to her mother.

Affectionately yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1037

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, May 15, 1937.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
c/o China Institute of Pacific Relations,
123, Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai, China.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Upon receipt of your letter of April 11, we cabled you as follows:

"Regret delay answering re trip myself or Bremman Far East. Stop. Expect decide within few days will immediately advise by cable.

MOTYLEV."

We very deeply regret that such a considerable delay occurred in finally settling our plans for arranging a visit with you to the Soviet Far East. This

was caused by the fact that Mr. Motylev wanted to accompany you personally and was endeavouring to schedule correspondingly his obligations connected with the work on the Great Soviet World Atlas. However, recent developments of his work are such that it does not seem likely he would be able to leave Moscow at the time of your proposed visit. As we did not want to further delay this matter, it was finally decided that I would spend a fortnight in July and August with you in the Soviet Far East. Consequently, we immediately cabled to you:

> "Deeply regret unable personally go Far East looking forward see you Moscow. Stop. Bremman will spend fortnight with you Soviet Far East assisting your studying region. Stop. Your visa providing stay Far East granted Soviet Consulate General Shanghai instructed correspondingly. Stop. Please cable exact date arrival Vladivostok."

The necessary formalities for arranging such a trip also required some time because, as you probably know, Intourist does not take care of rendering accommodations for trips in this region.

I am greatly looking forward to meeting you in the District. As I did not have an opportunity of visiting the Soviet Far East in recent years, I am sure this trip will prove most interesting to both of us. We will try to avoid spending too much time on conferences and instead will endeavour to see the maximum of what it is possible to see on a visit of short duration.

I sincerely hope that this delay did not put you to too much inconvenience and did not interfere with the elaboration of your further plans.

Would you kindly advise us in advance of the exact date of your arrival so as to enable me to be in Vladivostok a few days ahead of you. That would give me the possibility of making all necessary arrangements beforehand and no time would be wasted on trying to find people whom we want to meet and making appointments.

Sincerely yours,

Y. P. Bremman,
Y. P. Bremman,

YB/eh

Exhibit No. 1038

Copy to KM.

123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai,
May 27, 1937.

Dr. V. E. Motylev,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow.

Dear Dr. Motylev: This is to acknowledge with thanks your cablegram of May fifteenth reading as follows: Deeply regret unable personally go Far East. Looking forward see you Moscow. Stop. Bremman will spend fortnight with you Soviet Far East assisting your studying region. Stop. Your visa providing stay Far East granted. Soviet Consulate General Shanghai instructed correspondingly. Stop. Please cable exact date arrival Vladivostok.

I was in Nanking at the time and so was delayed in replying. On my return here on May twenty-first, I cabled you as follows: Many thanks will arrive Vladivostok July nineteenth or twenty first. Will cable exact date May thirtieth. Stop. Barely possible Holland could accompany me Soviet Far East only cable frankly whether easy arrange or whether better not ask for permission now.

The reason for uncertainty as to the date of my arrival in Vladivostok is due to the fact that the Sovtorgflot S. S. *Saver* is now under repair in Shanghai and it is not known whether she will be repaired in time to resume her regular schedule.

In view of this uncertainty, it will probably seem best for me to take the Japanese steamer *Siberia Maru*, leaving Seishin (Korea) July eighteenth and arriving in Vladivostok at 8:00 a. m. on July nineteenth.

I am exceedingly glad that Bremman can meet me and that we will find you in Moscow on our arrival.

My present plan is to depart for Moscow on the train which leaves Vladivostok on Thursday, July twenty-ninth. (I suppose we would join the train at Khabarosk or west of Khabarosk.) My plan is to have the train at Karymskaya on Sunday, August first, and stop over there for two days until the train from Manchouli arrives, on which Mrs. Carter, my daughter Ruth, and Miss Nan Smith will be traveling from Manchouli to Moscow. By joining the train at

Karymskaya, I could take the long journey across with them. I would hope that Mr. Bremman could travel with us, as this would give us such a splendid opportunity of conversation day by day, discussing the significance of our visit to the Far East and preparing for our visit to Moscow.

This means that we would all arive in Moscow at 15:30 on Sunday, August eighth.

Miss Smith has to go on from Moscow after a week or ten days, but I am planning to remain, if you think it desirable, from August eighth until August twenty-sixth, when I shall probably have to leave for western Europe.

The time between August eighth and August twenty-sixth I will be prepared to spend under your direction, staying all the time in Moscow or going to one, two or three other places, as you think best. There is one short trip that I would like to make if it is convenient, and that is to go to the industrial city of Kolumna. I visited Kolumna in 1931. I would tremendously appreciate the privilege of going there again so as to compare Kolumna then and now.

With reference to the clause in my cable about Mr. Holland, the situation is this. Long-postponed work on his book, "The Effect of the Depression on the Far East," and the fact that the Pacific Council is not to meet in Europe this year, have decided him to remain in the Far East until he goes to Australia and New Zealand next November. He would, however, like to accompany me to the Soviet Far East in July, provided it is perfectly easy for you to get the necessary permission and also provided transportation arrangements are such that Mr. Bremman can arrange for two of us to travel about from place to place with him instead of one.

Neither Mr. Holland nor I wishes to inconvenience you or Mr. Bremman with this proposal, so we hope that you will feel perfectly free to cable vetoing Mr. Holland's accompanying me. He will visit the Soviet Union next year after the meeting of the Pacific Council in China next April, and could go to Moscow then by way of the Soviet Far East if it is not possible for him to go there this year.

Owing to the fact that Mr. Holland cannot go to Moscow this year, we will probably arrange for Miss Kate Mitchell to be in Moscow when we are there, in order to confer with you, Voitinsky and me regarding the research program. She is handling the supervision of a good deal of the research work in collaboration with Mr. Holland and is particularly anxious to have a long talk with you about the Economic Handbook, a large responsibility for which has been delegated to her.

Will you continue to address me here, care of the China Institute of Pacific Relations, 123 Boulevard de Montigny, Shanghai. I am going to Manila on June fifth, but Shanghai continues to be my best forwarding address for mail and cables.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1039

123 BOULEVARD DE MONTIGNY,
SHANGHAI, CHINA,
May 31st, 1937.

JOSEPH BARNES, ESQ.,
New York Herald Tribune Bureau,
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR JOE: Our present plan is to reach Moscow on August 8th. I spent about a fortnight before in the Soviet Far East with Bremman.

I wonder whether you would be willing to give me a little travel tip. Is the Hotel Metropole still presumably the most logical place for us to stay or has some new Hotel arisen which has all the advantages of the Metropole and is a little less gloomy?

I wish the newspapers of China and Japan would buy your Moscow despatches. Misinformation in these two countries regarding the Soviet Union is pretty discouraging.

Ever sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1040

BAY VIEW HOTEL,
Manila, 18th June, 1937.

Miss KATE MITCHELL,
New York City.

DEAR KATE: Yesterday evening the delayed clipper arrived with your very welcome airmail letters of June 7. I cannot tell you how grateful I am to you for arranging to send me Mrs. Barnes's latest article on the Soviet Union in the Far East. This should give me just the kind of pointers that I want. I hope that you and she and Harriet will include any questions for which you wish me to seek the answers. Thank you also for sending me the clipping from the Times about the "Spy Scare."

Yes, I got your May 11th letter but it was delayed in reaching me owing to my absence for a week in Szechwan. By now you have received the copy of my letter to Motylev of May 27, in the next-to-last paragraph of which you will find Bill Holland's reasons for deciding that you visit Moscow in order to represent him in going over with Voitinsky and Motylev the entire research program. You have also by now, I hope, received by letter of the 30th of May in which, in addition to giving Bill Holland's reasons, I mentioned the necessity of starting work on the semifinal draft of the Budget toward the end of August or early in September.

In accordance with your request for a cable, which I am sending for fear my earlier letters may have been delayed in reaching you, I am cabling you today as follows:

> "MITCHELL, *Inparel, New York:*
> "Staying Metropole, Moscow, until August twenty-sixth. Satisfactory if you arrive ninth. Stop. Holland self think your visit important. Stop. If, however, very difficult arrange meet me Berlin August Twenty-eighth cable. Stop. Ask Dorothea, Ruth, or Martha cable family news this week end.
>
> "CARTER."

Your tentative schedule calling for leaving on the "Washington" on July 28, reaching Paris on the 4th, Berlin on the 7th and Moscow on the 9th, is satisfactory to me, except that I wish that you might have a day or two longer in Paris to relax after your arduous schedule throughout July in New York.

I am told that Catherine Porter's Survey article was widely quoted in the Philippine papers. Tell her that yesterday we met Mrs. Traynor, who was Gladys Plunkett of the Inquiry staff. She is now a most sedate matron. We were delighted to find that Annette's very vivid and attractive sister, Miss Mayer, is living here at the Bay View.

I have decided to return to Shanghai by steamer from Hongkong so all the letters that you have sent to Shanghai will reach us automatically, and anyhow, in Wellington's absence, Elizabeth Downing is attending to the forwarding of all our mail.

The future of the Philippine Council hangs in the balance. I wonder whether if you go to Washington before you sail, you could have a really frank talk with Conrado Benitez, who may have left or may stay on in Paredes' place.

Affectionately yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1041

SUPPLEMENTARY AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN U. S. S. R., IPR, AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, MOSCOW, AUG. 17, 1937

1. Memorandum from Chatham House dated August 3rd, 1937.
2. What steps will be taken to insure intelligent and significant reviews of Great Soviet World Atlas in principal countries. How secure a few advance copies with memorandum on principal points of significance.
3. Recommendation as to duration Miss Harriet Moore's visit to Buryat Mongolia.
4. Could Bremman spend at least 3 months as a member of the International Secretariat in 1938 or 1939.

5. Procedure with reference to members of the International Secretariat and the Secretariats of the National Councils visiting the Soviet Union in the future.
6. The internal situation in the Soviet Union.
7. Suggestions from Soviet Council to the Secretary-General regarding making the work of the International Secretariat more efficient.
8. How secure promptly several copies of the following publications of the Institute of World Politics and Economics. Provisional titles only:
   a. Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria.
   b. Guerrila Warfare in Manchuria.
   c. Symposium on China.
   d. Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in Japan.
   e. Financial Situation in Japan.
   f. Position of the Working Class in Japan.
   g. Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gourivitch.
   h. Dissertation by Levina (?) developing Lenin's idea that Capitalism is acceptable to the United States peasant because of the absence of feudal factors.
9. Other business as proposed by the officers of the U. S. S. R. IPR.
10. Shiman.
11. Lattimore.

EXHIBIT No. 1042

Please pass on the word of Shiman's arrival in the Far East to Liu Yu-wan, Saionji, Pyke and Downing.

HOTEL METROPOLE,
Moscow, 20th August, 1937.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR FRED: In order to keep the records complete, this is a record of the Shiman incident.

On the 12th August I received your cable of the 11th reading as follows:

"Shiman stuck London no word Soviet visa applied 8 weeks ago. Can you push Moscow end cable Shiman Amexco London today."

In order to discover whether he wanted merely to visit Moscow or to go to the Far East via Manchuria or via Vladivostok I wired him as follows:

"Wire Metropole kind of visa desired".

He replied as follows:

"Tourist visa preferred leaving London new address American Express Vienna."

As I could only act if I had precise information I wired you as follows on August 13th.

"Shiman gone Austria wire me duration stay itinerary desired".

To this Hilda replied as follows.

"Shiman care Markus Sevensix Weidner Hauptstrasse Vienna communicate directly no knowledge present itinerary."

I then wired Shiman in Vienna as follows:

"Wire duration stay itinerary desired."

Shiman then wired me on the 16th, as follows:

"Desire enter Negoreloye 3 days Moscow transit Manchouli".

This I received late on the evening of the 16th. On the morning of the 17th I delivered, personally, letters of recommendation, information, and appeal to, Belsky, the head of Intourist, Ward, the passport man at the American Embassy, and to Dr. Motylev. Belsky rang up the Government immediately and discovered that Shiman's visa had not been refused. This meant that the situation was

still hopeful. As Belsky told me to pull all possible wires in order to get speedy action, I wired you on the 17th as follows:

"Suggest you ask Umansky burn wires behalf Shiman."

On the 19th I had to leave for Kalinin for two days. On my return on the 21st I received a telegram from Shiman in Vienna reading as follows:

"Boat tickets too scarce to wait longer. Stop. Sailing Naples Singapore August 28 Japanese Terukuni signing off with thanks."

A few moments later Belsky informed me that the visa had been granted and that the telegram to the Soviet Consul in Vienna had gone forward late on the evening of the 19th or early on the morning of the 20th. I immediately wired Shiman at his home address in Vienna, as follows:

"Your telegram received visa telegraphed Vienna nineteenth."

Shiman presumably left Vienna before the final telegram arrived or felt already committed to sail via Singapore.

Now for the future. Whenever fully accredited and important members of the Pacific Council or the American Council staff desire to visit or pass through the Soviet Union, full details as to the person and the purpose of the trip should be sent by you or me to Dr. Motylev with a copy to Secretary-General Y. P. Bremman. If possible this information should be sent a full fortnight in advance of making the application for the visa at the local office of Intourist and the Soviet Consulate.

Simultaneously similar letters giving all details should be sent to the Chief of the Consular Section of the American Embassy in Moscow. I would recommend that, even though no one in Moscow proposed it, a similar letter be sent to any personal friends you may have in the Soviet Embassy in Washington or Shanghai or wherever the application is made.

Both Motylev and the officials of the American Embassy are always embarrassed if the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs address communications to them regarding the visits of I. P. R. personalities of whose visits they have not already heard.

One other suggestion I gather that with reference to members of the American Council who are not members of the staff you should be very discriminating in giving letters of introduction to the Soviet I. P. R. Any member of the American Council who is a really serious student can be introduced but any who want to go purely as trippers had better stick closely to the Intourist program. I deeply regret that the hours that I spent on Shiman's behalf did not secure action two hours earlier.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—You might show this letter to CHS, HA, CP, HM, KB, and EFC.

EXHIBIT No. 1043

HOTEL RICHEMOND,
Geneva, Switzerland, 7th September, 1937.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
% Soviet Union Institute of Pacific Relations,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: From London I cabled Mr. Field to send you a copy of each issue of Amerasia from the beginning mailing each copy separately. I hope that all will reach you in due course.

In the meantime my copy of the July issue has arrived. I am, therefore, posting it to you. On page 230 you will find the translation of your Pravda article.

Here in Geneva I have had the great privilege of meeting Mr. Sokoline, the Soviet Under Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1044

ON BOARD M. V. "GEORGIC,"
EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK,
18th October, 1937.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
33 Ta Yuan Fu Hutung,
Peiping, China.

DEAR OWEN: One of the cables that I sent to you which was apparently garbled was that in which I inquired whether I could give Motylev a copy of your two articles on your visit to the Chinese Communists. The first was "The Stronghold of Chinese Communism." The second was "The Present and Future of Chinese Communism." Motylev was naturally exceedingly eager to have the benefit of your impressions. Perhaps more eager than any other member of the Pacific Council.

I did not tell him that I had copies of these two articles because I was not quite sure whether you would wish me to show them to him. But I would like to hear from you as to whether I may send them or whether you would prefer to send him copies or to write him direct a long letter giving him the benefit of your impressions.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1045

G–2
RSB

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIENCE DIVISION G–2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1937.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: In reply to your request of November 5, I am listing below the officers who attended the meeting in Colonel Strong's office this morning.

With much appreciation for your kindness in giving us so much of your time, I am

Sincerely yours,

R. S. Bratton
R. S. BRATTON,
Lieut. Col., Inf., DOL.

td

List of Officers:

Captain W. L. Lind, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence
Commander S. M. Creighton, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence
Captain W. L. Bales, U. S. M. C., Office of Naval Intelligence.
Colonel Geo. V. Strong, U. S. A., War Department, G–2
Lieut. Col. P. E. Van Nostrand, U. S. A., War Department, G–2
Lieut. Col. R. S. Bratton, U. S. A., War Department, G–2
Major William Mayer, U. S. A., War Department, G–2

EXHIBIT No. 1046

JOSEPH BARNES, *Moscow Correspondent*

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE,
HOTEL METROPOLE,
Moscow, November 10, 1937.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Your reference to Nyon, however pessimistic, hardly needed toning down. All that has happened since then has only strengthened the case of those, and they are legion here, who feel that there is nothing more to do but wait, and arm, and fight. The blackmail policy of aggression—taking endless half-loaves of bread by threatening each time to take the whole loaf—seems to pay such dividends that it is not likely to be discarded voluntarily,

and the chances of checking it by any sort of collective action certainly grow slimmer and slimmer. I have reason to believe that even some of the more bitter-minded Soviet people score the steady losses up to bad diplomacy in western Europe, and to the failure of otherwise-sensible people to see just what the policy of endless forbearance and compromise leads to. For myself, this is steadily a less satisfactory explanation. It makes me appear to out-Bolshevik the Bolsheviks, which is not a fair conclusion, but it is hard for me to dodge the suspicion that increasing groups of owning people, in Japan, in eastern Europe, and now in England, have beaten the workers to class-consciousness, and that they have in spirit if not in the letter of treaties decided to get down off their post-Versailles fence on the Facist side, God knows it's not an unreasonable conclusion for a Yugoslav banker, say or *Montague Norman*, or the b'Iwasakis to come to, but it's a depressing one for those who watch it. Without some such explanation, it is hard to understand the endless patience of the English, or their old-maid's fright at the thought of a Soviet under the bed. Brussels appears to have gone the way of Nyon. If I were a Czechoslovak today, or a citizen of Danzig, or a young Englishman of draft age, I would feel that my very life depended on the slim chance that some of my rulers would wake up to the fact that cooperation with the Soviet Union, a united front of democracies committed to collective security and the indivisibility of peace, is the only thing that could now stop what's going on.

God knows the Russians don't seem to be working very hard on convincing them, but they've had twenty years of trying, and maybe they're justified in being discouraged. If the Bolsheviks decide, after their Spanish experience, to give the Chinese their blessing and their sympathy—which I am increasingly convinced is what is happening, and no more—and watch the Japanese slowly founder in the snow of North China, it will be pretty hard for us Friends of the Soviet Union, or for our first-cousins, the self-righteous liberals stranded between *realpolitik* and pacifism, to keep up the present chorus about the world's having been let down by the Soviet Union.

This started out to be a simple note, telling you that I was glad to see you in Moscow, but the indignation which gets choked on a cable line seems to have overflowed.

I assume you have heard all the recent news about Moscow which would interest you from those of your staff who read Pravda attentively. The issue of October 3 was full of news.

News continues for us too, with no sign of a let-up. The elections are now ahead, as soon as the celebration is decently over. When the dull routine days will come, when I have been planning to settle down and do some of the real work that I have got to do, is still uncertain.

Give my best regards to Mrs. Carter, Ruth, and John [Handwritten.] Carter.

Very sincerely yours,

JOE

EXHIBIT No. 1047

[Copy]

OVERLAND LIMITED, EAST-BOUND,
December 23, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD
San Francisco

DEAR FRED: May I recommend that the Membership Committee of the American Council undertake to make a serious study of the desirability of securing for membership in the Council several, if not all, of the members of the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Relations.

The Committee might at the same time consider whether there are not other members of the two Houses who should be invited to become members of the American Council. The Nominating Committee or the Executive Committee may wish to consider having the SURVEY and some of the pamphlets go to key members of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees even though they decide against asking them to become members of the Council.

As one means of capitalizing on my recent expensive visit to Kansas, I would like to propose that the Nominating Committee consider Governor Landon for membership in the American Council.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1048

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 24, 1938.

Miss VIRGINIA BURDICK,
American Russian Institute,
56 West 45th Street, New York City.

DEAR MISS BURDICK: 1. Because the Bulletin of the American Russian Institute aims at objectivity, covers contemporary life in the Soviet Union and is written by a highly competent staff, its importance both to scholars and to the more thoughtful section of the general public cannot be overemphasized.

2. I was attacked the other day, not by a Soviet citizen but by an American capitalist, for being on the Board of the American Russian Institute in which, it was alleged, there are still a number of Trotskyists. To what extent is this true? I do not believe in persecuting American Trotskyists in general, but I do not see any point in including them on the Governing Board of an Institute that is trying to promote intelligent understanding between the United States and the U. S. S. R.

3. Of what committee of the American Russian Institute am I a member, the Board or the Executive Committee?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1049

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 25, 1938.

Purely personal
CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY, ESQ.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: When I saw you last Wednesday, I meant to show you a copy of the letter that I sent to Motylev last November. At that time I sent a similar letter to several consultants, the majority of which favored the proposal.

In the light of these letters from several parts of the world we have now drafted a short statement as to the inquiry to be organized. This I enclose also. You will note that it is marked confidential.

I would enormously appreciate your personal criticism of these two enclosures.

I was very glad that the Ambassador invited me to lunch, and was particularly pleased that I was able to meet Mrs. Oumansky. It was delightful sitting beside her.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1050

ADDITIONAL NAMES RECOMMENDED FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN COUNCIL

(By EDWARD C. CARTER)

Oscar Littleton Chapman, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C.
Ernest L. Gruening, Director, Division of Territories and Insular Possessions, Department of the Interior, Washington, D. C.
Alger Hiss, attached to the staff of Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Sayre
Daniel A. de Menocal, Vice President, First National Bank of Boston, New York
Mr. and Mrs. Philip Moore, Hubbard Woods, Illinois
Recommended by himself:
Dr. Frank Bohn, 2219 California Street, Washington, D. C., formerly a contributor to the New York Times; lecturer at the University of Southern California; now son-in-law to the Secretary of Commerce

EXHIBIT No. 1051

1795 CALIFORNIA STREET,
March 17, 1938.

MR. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, JR.
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR BILL: You will find enclosed a copy of a letter to Dr. Davis which follows a long discussion which wasted a good deal of the time available to the local advisory research committee at its meeting last week. I hope that the relationships I have outlined will be accepted without comment. In any case, I never could make out why research people were interested in these legalistic questions.

The remarks in my letter to Davis pertain also to the formation of a research committee in the East as discussed in your letter of March 14th. Since talking with you in New York I have somewhat changed my views as I have tried to figure out an organizational procedure which would be consistent through the country. It is quite definitely recommended in the report of the nominating committee to the Annual Meeting of December 17, 1937, that the national research committee shall remain a skeleton committee composed only of the chairman, now Dr. Alsberg, and a secretary from the staff, yourself, and that a series of regional advisory research committees on the model of the one already established in San Francisco should be organized. Therefore, to make the committee which you are getting together in and near New York the national research committee instead of a New York or Eastern research advisory committee would be contrary to the recommendation made and accepted at the Annual Meeting.

A procedure more consistent with our development elsewhere and with the needs of the organization would be to make the committee on which you are now at work another in the series of advisory research committees to which Dr. Alsberg and yourself will make definite requests from time to time. At the moment the principal responsibility which is being put on this new committee is to take charge of the studies which the International Secretariat has requested the American Council to undertake on behalf of the large war settlement inquiry. I shall seek the advice of our research groups here and in Southern California and of research individuals in other parts of the country but responsibility for the work will be placed in the hands of this new group.

Do you agree that this will be a sounder way to go about our work?

In any case the composition of your committee is hardly affected as we are not likely to develop more than one research advisory between Chicago and New York for some time to come. There would be, therefore, no difficulty in including a Chicago member on the regional committee established from New York.

I think the names you suggest are excellent with the possible exception of Erich W. Zimmerman of North Carolina. His book on raw material resources was my bible for a couple of years and I have the highest regard for him as a scholar. For committee work, however, he is not particularly useful, largely because of very conspicuous deafness which makes it difficult for him to participate in a discussion. He served on one of the American Coordinating Committee groups of which I was a member and I recall that the general impression was that he was very seriously handicapped. There is the further point in connection with him that the University of North Carolina represents a good deal of travel expenses to New York. The only other possible question as to the members you have suggested is Shotwell whose name in some quarters has become synonymous with monkey wrench. There is no question that he is inclined to run away with a committee if he becomes interested nor is there any question that he has more than once started research work off on a tangent and an expensive one at that. Confidentially, Miss Walker of the Rockefeller Foundation expressed the frank opinion at lunch three weeks ago that valuable as Shotwell had been in the past that time had come when he should be no longer appointed to research committees of any sort.

I feel very self-conscious about Shotwell because of having gone to considerable trouble to organize a stop-Shotwell movement among the younger people in New York six or seven years ago. The movement was so successful that I have often wondered since whether we were justified in taking such an unfriendly attitude towards him in our IPR work. At his request Barnes and I got together a group of about eighteen or twenty people who met at Shotwell's house and ate his food one evening a week for about four months

in order to engage in an open discussion of the original motivations of international relations. Barnes and I carefully stacked the cards so that out of a meeting of twenty there were nineteen Marxists or pseudo-Marxists and one violent anti-Marxist, Shotwell himself. Each meeting was more embarrassing than the last for, all being young, we were rather unmerciful in tearing to pieces every clause issued by this renowned scholar.

With regard to a representative from the business community, I am quite certain that Whitney Shepardson will not accept a position on one of our committees. Some years ago he decided that he would undertake outside work with only one organization, namely the Council on Foreign Relations, and as far as I know he has stuck religiously by this self-imposed rule. He is always available for personal consultation but not, I think, for committee work. I do know your alternative candidate, Howard Houston of the American Cyanamid Company. I do not think that he is a vice president but rather assistant to the president. He is an old friend of Carter's, was at one time on the staff of the League of Nations, and very likely was one of the important YMCA boys during the War, though of this I am not certain. My acquaintance with him is slight, being limited to two or three fairly long talks in connection with a possible gift to the IPR from the company with which he works. We did not receive the gift but our relations with Houston, and with the company for that matter, were extremely satisfactory. They actually read a very elaborate report I prepared for them and gave me the impression of understanding rather accurately what we were driving at. In other words, I would very much support the suggestion that Houston be included in the committee.

I am also glad to see that you have included Edward M. Earle of Princeton. I have never met him personally but for a long time I have heard only the highest praise of his work. He was a great friend of the Barnes family who used to tell me about him while I was still an undergraduate at Harvard. More recently I have often heard Professor Chamberlain speak about him.

In going over your list again as I dictate I notice that you have included Alsberg on this committee. If we adopt the organizational procedure which I recommend in the first fifteen paragraphs of this letter, he should not, of course, be made a member of a regional advisory committee in view of his position as chairman of our national research committee.

Finally, on the question of the procedure which should be adopted for appointing this committee, I am today taking the first step which is to secure Alsberg's approval. After you have replied to this letter, giving me the final list of the committee, I shall communicate with members of our Executive Committee by correspondence and I have no doubt that our recommendations will be speedily accepted.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

EXHIBIT No. 1052

[Copy]

225 FIFTH AVE., N. Y. C.,
March 31, 1938.

MRS. EDWARD C. CARTER,
American Council, I. P. R.,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

MY DEAR MRS. CARTER: It is a pleasure to accept your invitation to participate in the week-end conference at Princeton, on April 23rd and 24th.

The agenda for the conference is certainly complete. My only criticism would be that it is too minutely detailed, and in some instances duplicated. It may be that a somewhat broader and shorter agenda might be easier to handle at a conference which is to last only two days.

In addition, I would like to suggest one more topic, and that is, concerning the German-Japanese Pact and its implications. How much truth is there in the Japanese warning that China is on the verge of going Communist, and what is meant by Communism in China? A clarification of these issues would go a long way toward creating a better understanding of what American business may or may not expect in China, whether victorious or defeated.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) PHILIP J. JAFFE.

EXHIBIT No. 1053

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
Washington, D. C., March 29, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of March 26. As before I am at your disposal for the dinner.

I understand that the verbatim report in English of the recent proceedings will arrive in this country shortly. At that time I shall not fail to send you a copy immediately.

Sincerely yours,

[S] C. OUMANSKY.

P. S.—I have sent you under separate cover two issues of the Moscow News dealing with the trial.

CO: P

EXHIBIT No. 1054

129 EAST 52nd ST.,
New York City, March 31, 1938.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
1795 California St., San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR OWEN: Here is a copy of my second letter to Scherer. I think I have already sent you Yasuo's comment.

Tsuro is supposed to have Leftist sources of information. Shiman and Jaffe regard him very highly.

Now it may be that Scherer is right and Tsuro and Yasuo wrong, but I need to be shown.

Scherer wrote as if he were writing for Pacific Affairs. I hope this is not the case. He doubtless is a swell guy, but I cannot quite see the point of Pacific Affairs suddenly taking up with him when our best friends in the Japanese I. P. R. would have been pained if we had featured him even when he was doing his pro-Japanese writing.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1055

129 EAST 52nd STREET,
New York City, March 31, 1938.

Professor JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN
8 Sutton Square, New York City

DEAR JOSEPH: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20th, to listen to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put.

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Handwritten note:)

Mr. Chamberlain's secretary called to tell Mr. Carter that a previous engagement prevents Mr. Chamberlain from accepting the dinner invitation for April 20.

12:40
APRIL 6, 1938.

EXHIBIT No. 1056

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 2, 1938.

DR. JOHN H. FINLEY,
Editor in Chief, New York Times.

DEAR DR. FINLEY: Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20th, to listen to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put.

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1057

APRIL 16, 1938.

E. C. C. to Russell Shiman:

When I was seeing Ballantine, Thursday, in the State Department on another matter, he said he wished to talk to me about Virginia Thompson's notes on Siam. It apears that she has been most industrious in making voluminous notes from the private consular reports. The Department has been carefully scrutinizing these and hopes that, in the terms of my original application, she will use this material only as background. Ballantine and Spencer read me an "aide memoir," a copy of which I attach for your private information. Ballantine was clearly in a dilemma. He did not wish to have the Department appear rigid and restrictive with reference to Miss Thompson's work. At the same time, he felt that there was some material in Miss Thompson's notes which would be embarassing if published, especially if the State Department was given as the source.

I think the Department has confidence in the I. P. R. and in Miss Thompson. At the same time, they were worried about a good deal of what they felt was irrelevant, marginal, and indiscreet in her notes.

I assured Ballantine and Spencer that Miss Thompson could be trusted to play the game 100 percent and that I would make a point of seeing her personally and assuring myself on this score before she sailed for Europe.

This I did yesterday afternoon with entirely satisfactory results as you can see from the attached letter to Mr. Ballantine.

It seemed to me that all the Department's points were well-taken, but I am sure that Miss Thompson's promise will dispel their fears.

For the purpose of their confidential information, I wish you would share this memorandum and the attached correspondence with Miss Porter, Mr. Lockwood, and Mr. Field.

EXHIBIT No. 1058

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS,
April 14, 1938.

In your letter of February 24, 1938, addressed to the Secretary, requesting permission for Miss Thompson to examine the political reports from Siam, it was stated that her desire was "solely to get background for her study, not in any case for direct quotation." It is on the basis of that understanding that it is, therefore, requested that the materials and information contained in the notes taken by Miss Thompson in no case be quoted from or be cited as obtained from official sources. In this connection, attention is invited in particular to the passages in the notes which have been marked on the margin with red pencil.

In addition, throughout the notes there will be found certain passages which have been marked with red brackets. It is desired that the information and statements contained in those bracketed passages in no wise be used, cited, or quoted from.

It is with the understanding that the above-mentioned conditions are acceptable to you and to Miss Thompson that there are being returned to you for delivery to Miss Thompson the notes under reference.

EXHIBIT No. 1059

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, April 15, 1938.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE, Esq.,
Department of State,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BALLANTINE: In accordance with my promise to you yesterday I have just handed Miss Thompson her notes and told her of my conversation with you and Mr. Spencer yesterday. I also gave her a copy of the memorandum which was the basis of our discussion.

As I expected Miss Thompson understood that her notes were solely to serve as background for her study and not in any case for direct quotation.

As I assumed was the case, she has just assured me that she was planning to make no reference whatsoever in her book to the privilege which you have accorded her; and, in addition, was planning to send you the whole manuscript informally before publication in the hope that you would feel free to read it to make doubly certain that at no point had she violated the understanding which was the basis of her work while in Washington.

Very sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1060

(Handwritten:) Copy. FVF return to ECC. A. W. Dulles.
Oumansky

Cable address: "Ladycourt," New York—Paris

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL

48 Wall Street, New York. 39 rue Cambon, Paris

NEW YORK, *April 22, 1938.*

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd St.,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I want to tell you how much I enjoyed our dinner the other evening with Mr. Oumansky. It was one of the most interesting affairs of this character that I have attended for a long time.

Faithfully yours,

[s] A. W. Dulles
(A. W. DULLES.)

EXHIBIT No. 1061

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 8, 1938.

Miss VIRGINIA BURDICK,
American Russian Institute, 56 West 45th Street, New York City.

DEAR MISS BURDICK: The International Secretariat has arranged for the translation of the titles of every one of the maps in the "Great Soviet Atlas of the World." It has also arranged for the translation of detailed items on—

Map 27—Mineral resources of the world
" 53—World map of oil and coal industries
" 68—Map of the financial dependence of countries in the capitalist world
" 69—Map of the financial dependence of capitalist countries. Spheres of capital investment

Map 83—Economic rivalry of imperialistic powers in the Pacific
" 99—Map of mineral resources of the U. S. S. R.
" 133–34—Fuel, mining metalurgical, and chemical industries in the European part of the U. S. S. R.
" 135–36—Machine-building and machine-working industries of the European part of U. S. S. R.
" 137—Machine-building and metal-working industries in the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.
" 138—Forests, timber and paper industry of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.
" 141–42—Light industry in the European part of the U. S. S. R.
" 143—Light industry in the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.
" 144—Food industry in the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R.
" 151—Industry within the limits of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R. in 1913
" 152—Industrial map of the Asiatic part of the U. S. S. R. in 1935
" 166—Map of the foreign trade of the U. S. S. R. (imports)
" 167—Map of the foreign trade of the U. S. S. R. (exports)

The translation takes about 28 pages of double-spaced typing. If this abbreviated translation is of any value to you it can be supplied by the International Secretariat at $2.00 per copy.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1062

WASHINGTON, D. C., *23rd May, 1938.*

Ref: 55886/749

Mr. I. F. WIZON,
U. S. Department of Labor, Immigration and Naturalization Service,

DEAR SIR: Very many thanks for your letter dated May 21st, advising me that you have directed that the visas of Mr. Chen Chu and Mrs. Susie Ku Chen be extended to May 18, 1939.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1063

Address Reply to Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and Refer to File Number 55886/749

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington, May 21, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR SIR: Referring to your letter of the 11th instant and your telegram of the 18th instant, you are advised that the Department has directed that the temporary admission of Mr. Chen Chu (Geoffrey C. Chen) and Mrs. Susie Ku Chen be extended to May 18, 1939.

Respectfully,

I. F. Wixon
I. F. WIXON, *Deputy Commissioner.*

EXHIBIT No. 1064

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, June 30, 1938.

Miss SYDNOR WALKER,
The Rockefeller Foundation,
49 West 49th Street, New York.

DEAR MISS WALKER: Have you any convictions as to whether the I. P. R. ought to seek to create in any of the Latin American countries unofficial societies for the scientific study of international affairs?

Both Sumner Welles and Lawrence Duggan in the State Department would give a good deal if the I. P. R. could catch on in Latin America.

Their difficulty and that of the I. P. R. is that in none of the states as yet is the nonofficial study of international affairs encouraged.

Have you, through any of your contacts or reports, any advice to give?

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1065

129 EAST 52ND STREET
New York, June 16, 1938.

MAXWELL M. HAMILTON, Esq.,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR HAMILTON: Would it be possible for you to arrange to have the enclosed letter sent to Salisbury in the diplomatic pouch? I am particularly anxious to avoid any risk of having it read by the censors of the present Peking regime.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1066

(Handwritten:) HM
KB
CHS
KM
MT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
In the City of New York
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for your note. I'm not talking in public in re USSR. It's too durned complex, & we were there only 3 wks.

I did see Motylev, who is a corker. Got from him a glowing sense of a scientist at work in U. S. S. R.—as well, of course, as much inf'n.

We will "plan another visit," of course, but it isn't in sight as yet.

Cordially,

LYND.

EXHIBIT No. 1067

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, December 14, 1938.

Dr. ROBERT S. LYND,
Physics Building, Columbia University,
New York City

DEAR LYND: It was delightful to see you across the room at the Town Hall Club last week. I would like to hear your impressions of the U. S. S. R. and if you're giving them to any little group at Columbia, I hope I will be included in the invitation.

When your hurry-up letter came asking for letters of introduction to Moscow last summer, I was away. I got back to the office and received your letter a few hours before you sailed. Someone assured me that Oumansky had given you the necessary introductions so I did not send any. I do hope that Oumansky's letters gave you the necessary entree. If they didn't and you are planning another visit, give me a month's notice and I think I may be able to interest Dr. Motylev, the head of the U. S. S. R. IPR, in your visit. He has thus far been unfailing in the apportunities he has made available for all who have gone with our credentials.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1068

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

In the City of New York

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

JUNE 20, 1938.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 120 East 52nd Street,
New York City

DEAR CARTER: Mrs. Lynd and I are going into Russia this summer. We hope to settle down in a Middletown-sized community of 40–50,000 growing up around a new industrial site and try to get some sense of how social and community organization is taking place in Russia.

Geroid Robinson says we should certainly have a letter of introduction to the editor of the great Soviet Atlas. Robinson believes he would understand our problem and be helpful. If you know the editor and are in a position to give us a letter to him we would appreciate it a lot.

As we sail tomorrow (Tuesday) will you answer this in care of the Open Road, S W. 40th Street, New York City, attention of Miss Messenger?

Truly yours,

[s] ROBERT D. LYND.

EXHIBIT No. 1070

120 EAST 52nd STREET,
New York, June 18, 1938.

LAWRENCE E. SALISBURY, ESQ.,
American Embassy, Peiping, China

DEAR SALISBURY: Would you be kind enough to see that the enclosed letter is delivered privately to Professor George Taylor at Yenching University? It so happens that I want to avoid any risk of its being read en route.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1071

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 27, 1938.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York

DEAR MR. CARTER: As requested in your letter of June 16, 1938, there is being sent in the diplomatic pouch to the American Embassy at Peiping your letter addressed to Mr. Laurence E. Salisbury, together with its enclosure addressed to Professor George E. Taylor, Yenching University. As you of course know the Department transmits private communications in the pouch only in exceptional cases.

Sincerely yours,

MAXWELL M. HAMILTON,
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

EXHIBIT No. 1073

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, 19th July, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
c/o Allie Robinson's Camp,
Independence, California.

DEAR OWEN: Thank you for your long and delightful letter of July 10 from Independence. What an intriguing name for editorial work in this particular age.

In the strictest confidence I am sending you a copy of Paul Scheffer's comment on Bloch's original outline (I did not tell Scheffer who wrote the outline).

With reference to Hu Shih, we had him here at Lee for a week-end conference just before he sailed. Chen and Chi were also here. Though both these men differ with Hu Shih very strongly, the both believe in his integrity of character. We are all trying to get him to write a major monograph to document the "temporizing policy" of Nanking in the last few years. He is convinced that the Generalissimo was preparing as fervently for ultimate resistance to Japan as were the Communists. We have asked him to go the whole way in making available documents that would prove his thesis. Whether we agree with his thesis or not it is important to have the job well done. This a a round about way of answering your question as to the weight which Hu Shih exerts in American circles and the extent in which he molds or leads the opinions of the Chinese in America. With Americans who have never heard of Chu Teh, Hu Shih stands out as a really great Chinese patriot—a man of dignity and a mind with a spacious point of view. To those Americans who feel that the Chinese Communists are making an epic contribution to Chinese unification Hu Shih seems to be living in the Victorian Age, albeit in rather a distinguished fashion. The reaction of Chinese in America to Hu Shih is similar to that of Americans according to their own line up on the question of Chinese Communists.

Thank you for the tip about Sereno. I will write to Lasswell today.

With reference to the question which you raise as to the role that you should play in view of Japanese attacks on the impartiality of members of American Council staff and the Pacific Council staff I am inclined to take the position that the American Council staff are in one category, the Chinese and Japanese members of the International Secretariat are in a second, and you, Bill Holland, and I in a third, though all three categories blur into each other. The American Council staff are responsible only to the American people. They thus should be among the freest people on earth. The Chinese and Japanese members of our own staff are chosen among other reasons because they are Chinese or Japanese and we want from them the fullest possible reflection of all that is most fundamental in the attitudes of their countries. You and Holland and the other non-Oriental members of the International Secretariat and myself are the servants of all eleven Councils. Our role is an almost impossible one. It might be likened to the role of the Speaker in the House of Commons, namely to ensure that every responsible point of view in the Institute is given a full hearing. This means that we ought to convince all the National Councils that whatever are our own private views, the Secretariat, the research program, the conferences, and Pacific Affairs are administered with complete detachment so that every responsible point of view is represented in the most favorable possible light.

If in our private capacities we take a line that is so conspicuous that any large element in our constituency feels that we cannot administer our international responsibilities with impartiality then I think that our non-Secretariat activities should be reconsidered. Some weeks ago I came to the tentative conclusion that so far as I myself am concerned I should seriously consider declining all public invitations to speak on the Far Eastern situation. By public invitations I mean those which are reported by the press. In the past month I have declined to write for Amerasia. I did this because in Japan Amerasia is regarded as having been founded with a definite anti-Japanese bias.

However unjust this feeling may be we have got to make some allowance for the exigencies of war psychology as it affects our Japanese friends.

Saionji is one of the straightest thinking of young Japanese. He has stood apart and above the muddled-headed war philosophy during the past year in a most striking manner. The other day I learned privately that he had single-handed raised the money that was needed to carry on the Japanese I. P. R. this year, but that now the donors were hammering him because of the line taken both by members of the International Secretariat and the American Council Staff. I understand that he feels that the American Council staff are free. In other words to his friends he defends the right of the American Council staff to take any line they want. But he finds it difficult to explain what appears to be partisanship on the part of members of the Secretariat. I personally wish that it was possible for you to withdraw from the Amerasia board in the interests of the major task of integration which we have ahead of us for the next two years. I do not think any hasty action is called for but it is a matter I have long wanted to discuss with you and have never had the opportunity.

I am exceedingly glad that you approve of the way Yasuo is functioning. If ever a man was in a hot spot he is it.

Motylev is going to the Soviet Far East instead of coming here. I am urging him to send Voitinsky in his place.

Dennery, Takayanagi, and Dafoe are all coming to Sunset Farm for ten days on August 10 to meet with the International Secretariat. Is there any chance of your coming east in time for this meeting or at least arriving by the 16th or 17th?

Would you let us know just how we should describe your Johns Hopkins appointment so that it can be announced in the next issue of I. P. R. NOTES.

If you are able to come on while Dennery is here you will be able to find out who the French counterparts of Archie Rose and Barbara Wooton are.

It is grand to hear that the family is all well and that you are making good progress on your book. If anything takes you to Seattle you may wish to look up John Alden Carter who is acting as an assistant to the president of McDougall Southwick Co. He is at present staying with Herb Little. Mrs. Carter and Ruth send their greetings to your whole household.

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

FVF (Pencilled:)

EXHIBIT No. 1074

YENCHING UNIVERSITY

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

PEKING, CHINA

Telegraph Address: "Yenta"

JULY 20, 1938,

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR NED: The last American mail brought your note and the clipping from the New York Times about happenings here. This was quite accurately reported, and I am impressed with the promptness with which the news reached America. It happens that thus far yours is the only word that had come to me about this, so that I am the more grateful.

There has been during the past few days a recrudescence of pressure on another matter, the yielding of which would seem to me to violate the principle of academic freedom. The matter is being dealt with at present on a basis of friendly negotiation, but if driven to it, we shall stand for our principles and take any consequences. I think the odds are, however, that those concerned will not carry it to any such extreme.

I hear indirectly that the IPR is considering the organizing of American opinion with a view to somewhat more definite action. If this is true, I feel very much pleased, and should like to be kept informed of developments.

With all good wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

[s] J. LEIGHTON STUART.

Jls/c

EXHIBIT No. 1075

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, July 25, 1938.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: For a variety of reasons, both scholarly and politically, both the Chinese and Japanese outlines have been drastically revised. Enclosed for your advance information are copies of the latest edition of the two outlines.

The process and reason for these changes I will explain to you on my arrival.

I need hardly add that the following approve of the outlines as they now stand: Holland, Mitchell, Chen, Borton, Chi, Cholmeley, and myself.

None of the assignments to individual research workers, e. g., Borton, Chen, or Chi have in any way to be altered by reason of the reformulation of the outline of these two studies.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC:K

EXHIBIT No. 1076

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, August 23, 1938.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.
Office.

DEAR HOLLAND: Yesterday, at the suggestion of W. W. Lockwood, Han-seng and I had a call from Theodore H. White who has this year graduated with high honors from Harvard University. Lockwood met him at the Institute of Far Eastern studies at the University of Michigan. White has been awarded a Frederick Sheldon fellowship by Harvard University. This fellowship is an unconditional grant and allows the holder to travel and observe in any part of the world he chooses. He plans to use this fellowship in order to go to the Far East to enter Chinese China and see and learn what he can. Ultimately, he would like to write and publish what he learns. Before coming he wrote me as follows:

> "Although my broad general purpose is as I have set it forth, my specific objectives are, at present, somewhat hazy. There are a great many contemporary phenomena in Chinese life that I would like to study; for example: the economic reorganization within China since the outbreak of the war; the changing relationship of the provincial warlords to the Central Government; the shifting of the political base of the Kuomintang; and other problems."

I showed him a list of some of the questions on which we wish to get information and asked him which would be most interesting to him. I quote those that he checked:

> What degree of political coalition exists among parties and groups since the Kuomintang National Conference of party delegates on March 29th? Particularly, what is the situation between the Kuomintang and his Communists?
>
> There are many people in the government who have never liked the Communists. Why are these people now adopting a conciliatory attitude towards them?
>
> How close does the Kwangsi faction stand with Chiang Kai-shek's group?
>
> In China at present, both patriots and traitors are revealing themselves almost every day. Is it possible to have a general analysis of these two groups?
>
> What recent improvements in communication have been made in China's northwest and southwest? What new factories have been set up in these sections?
>
> To what extent and how has the Chinese army been transformed from its mercenary nature to a modern national force? What is the general composition of the present high strata of military officers? What is the general living condition and the discipline among the Chinese soldiers? Are there ideological differences among the different troops?
>
> To what extent is the present personnel in the Chinese air force different from the prewar set-up? Has this new development any political significance in China?
>
> It is generally recognized that the Partisan movement in Hopeh, Shansi, and western Shantung has attained a certain degree of success. To what extent may we say that the ex-students and ex-teachers of the Peiping-Tientsin area have organised and led this movement?
>
> What are the most influential and most representative newspapers and magazines and to what degree do they enjoy freedom of speech?
>
> In Hopeh the Japanese have recently reorganized the puppet political organization called The North-China Youth Party into an organization called Hsin Min-wei, which now directs the activities of at least four societies. These are, Hsin-min Academy, a training school for civil servants; The

Dawn of Asia Society; Federated Association for East Asia Culture; and Association for Promoting East Asian Peace. Is it possible to have a general analysis of the personnel and procedure of these Japanese-protected organizations?

Is it true that the Japanese authorities in China entertain different attitudes towards Great Britain and America? If so, what are they and what motivates them?

What can be inferred as the Soviet policy in China?

Do the German advisers in China take the same stand as the German Government and as the German merchants in China?

I wired to Fairbank, who was his principal tutor in Harvard, last night as follows:

"Please wire collect regarding T. H. White. Is his scholarship exceptional? How do you rate him on tact, social presentability, capacity to adjust to new situations, discretion, reliability?"

Today I have had his reply as follows:

"Decidedly exceptional. First history summa in three years supported himself through college stop Short stature Jewish features keen and sensitive reaction to people feeling for situations and motives mature experience of practical life in Dorchester environment inexperienced elsewhere but apparently adjusted will at Michigan this summer discreet and reliable without question first appearance probably unimpressive but markedly attractive personality immediately effective stop No hesitation recommending for anything requiring intelligence initiative selfreliance providing given forty-eight hours to learn the ropes."

He is coming in this afternoon to talk a little further with us and then returns to Boston where his home is 60 Greenwood Street, Dorchester, Mass. He is scheduled to sail for Europe on September 28. He will return here on the 27th in the hope of seeing Dick Walsh with a thought of making a tentative arrangement for a few articles after he has been in China a year. He has had three years of Chinese at Harvard and describes himself as "reading Chinese with difficulty, but, nevertheless, reading it." He hopes to get his spoken Chinese on reaching China. After leaving here he pays short visits to England, France, and possibly to Palestine, and hopes to reach one of the frontiers of China—either the Burmese or French—either December 15th or 31st. I gave him a copy of Mrs. I. A. Richards' letter to me describing briefly her journey from China to Burma. I also let him read Peter Fleming's London Times articles on the Burma road to China.

I would like to have a suggestion as to what specific requests we should make to him in response to his offer to act as a Secretariat fellow in China without any financial obligation on our part.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1077

SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY

"The truth about the Soviet Union"

114 EAST 32ND STREET
MUrray Hill 3-3855-6

SEPTEMBER 1, 1938.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

MY DEAR DR. CARTER: We are planning to publish a special anniversary issue of our magazine for November, centered largely around with subject of the Soviet struggle for peace, and with special emphasis on the Far Eastern situation. We should very much like to have an article from you for this issue dealing with the development of the Soviet Far East. If you feel that you can do this for us, I should appreciate an opportunity to come and discuss it with you, so that I may also get your advice on other angles of the problem that should be dealt with, and suggestions of others who might help us. Will you let me know

whether you would consider writing the article for us, and whether it would be convenient for you to have me come and see you sometime during the week following Labor Day?

Your radio speech, which you were good enough to let us publish in our May issue, was extremely popular with our readers, and many of them wrote to us commenting on it as one of the best articles we have ever published. So naturally we are anxious to have another article from you.

Sincerely yours,

JESSICA SMITH, *Editor.*

EXHIBIT No. 1078

28TH SEPTEMBER, 1938.

ECC from CH-s:

Last week when Fred came in and discussed with me the matter of getting Soong to a small dinner, I told him that so far as I was informed, Soong was in this country, having arrived with K. P. Chen, but that to get him to the public perhaps is difficult. As I was told by some Chinese in private, Soong is to deal with the loan matter while Chen's delegation is negotiating on the matter of silver purchase. I suggested to Fred that it would be safe and desirable to sound out somebody in the Treasury Department to reach Young first, and then through Young to get a private interview with Soong. I added that the idea of a small dinner would not probably be feasible. Now, according to Hornbeck, even Chen may not respond to such an invitation at this time. I have just telephoned to the Chinese Consulate asking the Consul whether Soong is here. His answer was that Soong has not come but that even if he were here it would be better to deny it.

EXHIBIT No. 1079

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, September 29, 1938.

Professor FELIX FRANKFURTER.

DEAR FRANKFURTER: H. J. Timperley, the Manchester Guardian's China correspondent, has recently arrived in this country, having flown from China after nearly a year there after the war started. While in London he had occasion to inform himself intimately with regard to the attitudes of different sections of London life toward the developing Far Eastern struggle. I think you will enjoy meeting him. He has had more than ten years in the Far East and has had the friendship of many of the best Chinese and Japanese.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1080

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—Honolulu—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

11TH OCTOBER, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
300 Gilman Hall,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Neither Harriet Moore nor I have seen Kantorovich's name or nom de plume in any Soviet magazines or newspapers recently. In view of the request that Bremman made to me regarding Kantorovich, I would be inclined to suggest that you should not write direct to Kantorovich but write to Motylev saying that your first choice would be Kantorovich, if he is once more able to write, if he is not, would Motylev ask whatever Soviet scholar is best qualified.

Maybe you don't want to give Motylev as much leeway as this. I am inclined to think that if you write to Motylev as though you thought Kantorovich was still certain to be in his orbit, he will feel that the staff work in the International Secretariat is bad.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1082

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, 16th October, 1938.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1795 California Street,
San Francisco, California.

DEAR FRED: In accordance with Miss Wiss's suggestion I invited Meharally to a meeting in the Pacific Council Library attended by Farley, Lockwood, Chen Han-seng, Yasuo, Fairfax-Cholmeley, Downing, Friedman, and Ruth Carter. Meharally gave an illuminating account of his experience at the Labor Congress in Mexico and then swung into a vivid description both of the open and underground political movement in India. He is a brilliant student and a very shrewd political organizer. He has been in prison often and is clearly connected with a movement that is steadily increasing its power with English domination clearly on the wane but by no means finished. Yasuo must have been distinctly interested in his remark that, though after the Russo-Japanese war the Indians regarded the Japanese as Gods, he doubted there was any other country in the world now that was as completely anti-Japanese as was India. He had been informed that the boycott against Japan in India was more complete than in any other country.

Another matter may be of interest to you. Harold Laski is lecturing at Teachers College. He spoke at a Council House dinner last week on British Labor Movement and British Foreign Policy. It was an amazingly clear analysis by the most studied understatement. He left in my view no shred of justification for the Chamberlain policy. The audience was predominantly tory and while all were not convinced of Laski's thesis, I think everyone must have felt that as sheer tour de force in political analysis Council House had never witnessed such a performance.

I have no idea yet of Laski's plans, but I would love to see Pacific Center arrange at the Pacific Union Club a dinner of the sixty "most powerful figures in San Francisco business" and turn Laski loose on them.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1083

OCTOBER 17, 1938.

E. C. C. to I. F.:

Here is the State Department's reply to my letter of October 6 regarding registration of the Pacific Council. Would you immediately read the rules and regulations as well as the registration form, and advise me as to what action I should take?

EXHIBIT No. 1084

(Penciled initials:) CP
MRT

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, 20th October 1938.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1795 California Street, San Francisco, California.

DEAR FRED: Night before last Herbert S. Little arrived full of the European situation. He seems to have managed to check in at each European capital at just the right moment—in Prague just after Runciman wrote his ghastly letter to Chamberlain, in the House of Commons when Churchill made his scathing arraignment, in Berlin when Hitler made his Nuremburg speech, in Moscow

when the Bolsheviks were seething of Lindbergh's reported luncheon conversations in London, and in Vienna, Paris, Munich, etc. at crucial moments.

Motylev and Harrondar were hospitality personified during his five days in Moscow. That visit made a profound impression on him, and of course was indispensable in rounding out his European experience.

As I assume you will be seeing him in the near future, I hope you can help him in sorting out his experiences so that he grasps the deeper meaning of all that he witnessed. Do not let his audiences encourage him to dwell on personalities so that he fails to pass on a picture that will reinforce the realistic study of the world situation to which you are summoning members of the American Council.

I think with a little coaching you could get him to give at a private meeting limited to members of the American Council at Pacific Center an account of his observations which would be valuable to them and of exceptional value to him if you are able to get him to base his statement on a fundamental political and economic philosophy.

If you can help him to measure up to your standard in a performance in San Francisco, it may be that you will want to use him at an early date for the members in Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle.

Unfortunately his time in New York was so crowded that I was not able to reach any conclusion as to the stage he himself has reached in making a fundamental analysis. He has, however, the raw material for something that may be important. You can help him greatly in ensuring successful accomplishment.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1085

(Hand written:) WLH
KM

NEW ASIA HOTEL, LTD.,
Canton, May 28, 1938.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
General Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
57 Post Street, San Francisco.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have just concluded my journey through the Chinese interior and the front, which I thought to restrict to a period of two months but it lasted twice as much due to the delays in communication. I have collected all the material needed for my study, and I return to Shanghai to write the final manuscript. Now, you wanted to have the final manuscript in New York end of July, and I agreed to it, but it becomes now quite impossible. However, I can deliver at that time a considerable part of it, and then the rest in parts during August. It means that the whole manuscript will be in New York no later than one month after the date we have agreed upon, which is due to the exceptional difficulties I had to overcome a comparatively very short delay. I am sure you will understand the situation and excuse me for the unavoidable delay. Please address all correspondence for me through your office at Shanghai.

Yours very truly,

[s] M. G. SHIPPE.
(Handwritten:) (Asiaticus).

EXHIBIT No. 1086

Copies to CP
MRT
1ST NOVEMBER 1938.

N. Hanwell from ECC:

H. B. Elliston of the Christian Science Monitor was in the office yesterday and inquired whether someone on the staff of the American Council would be willing to send him such information as the American Council has on the present routes into China and a rough estimate of the munition-carrying capacity of each. Specifically he mentioned: the motor roads from Indo-China into Yunnan, the railway from Indo-China into Yunnan, the road or roads across the desert which bring in Russian supplies, and the road from the Burman frontier which is under construction. I told him that there was not a great deal of reliable

information about, but he thought that someone in the American Council must have a lot.

If you are interested, what can you get together? Have you been in correspondence with Owen Lattimore to see whether he has been over to Washington to see his friend Major Mayer in G–2? He admires Lattimore so much that he probably would give Lattimore all the information that G–2 has.

Elliston is about to write an article for the Atlantic Monthly and wants to use anything the American Council has on the different munitions routes into China. I don't know whether you will care to supply Elliston with this information or whether you want to use it yourself. In general it is a good thing to cooperate with Elliston. You probably saw recently the fine blurb which he or someone contributed to the Christian Science Monitor on October 25th reviewing Miss Farley's pamphlet on American Far Eastern Policy.

EXHIBIT No. 1087

(Copy of this letter sent to Virginia Burdick)

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, November 4, 1938.

FREDERICK P. KEPPEL, Esq.,
Carnegie Corporation of New York,
522 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

DEAR KEPPEL: The work of the American Russian Institute is both well done and important. The very fact that the Bolsheviks are so generally unpopular in the United States makes the maintenance of the clear-headed, able, fact-finding work of the A. R. I. all the more important to the American people. I know of few organizations which are as greatly needed at the present time, nor do I know any which do as big a work on as small a budget. I wanted you to know that I hope the appeal now before you will merit favorable action.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1088

CC.OL

ECC TO CHS
KB

NOVEMBER 9, 1938.

Owen Lattimore has just written me as follows:

> "Enclosed I am sending you a review of the 'Trotsky Vindication' by Kingsley Martin, who is editor of the NEW STATESMAN. I shall be perticularly interested in your comments. Do you think we should print the review as it stands, or drop it, or get some other comment to put with it? I shall cagily reserve my own comments until I have yours."

Attached is the article by Kingsley Martin on Trotsky. It seems to me that this article adds nothing to the subject except Kingsley Martin's opinion. It is an interesting opinion but is seems a little like flogging a dead horse.

I don't know whether the article has come in solicited by Lattimore or not. Lattimore's own writing on this subject is so much more meaty than Kingsley Martin's that I would mildly vote for returning the manuscript to the author.

Would each of you, however, without reference to my bias against the article, write your own views to Lattimore.

EXHIBIT No. 1089

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, November 9, 1938.

Miss HARRIET MOORE.
American Russian Institute,
56 West 45 Street, New York City.

DEAR HARRIET: I assume that you have already seen in the October–December 1938 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST the article on archeology in the U. S. S. R. by

Henry Field and Eugene Prostov. Henry Field is a new member of the American Council of the I. P. R. and is authority for the statement that the U. S. S. R. has at the present moment more archeological expeditions in the field than all the rest of the world put together.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1090

(Handwritten:) Copy sent to B. L. 1/10/39, re *S. F.* Exposition.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Amsterdam—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

129 East 52nd Street, New York

DECEMBER 15, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
Office.

DEAR FRED: In continuation of my note forwarding a copy of Lasker's letter of December 8 about Soviet participation in the San Francisco Exposition, I had a few moments with Oumansky in Washington and he said that the Soviet Government was not in a position to participate adequately in two simultaneous expositions. There is a Russian proverb that one cannot dance at two wedding ceremonies at the same time. The dance in the New York Fair will be in the grand manner and very expensive.

If Californians on their own initiative wish to do something in San Francisco in the field of art, literature or music, the Soviet Government would probably assist, but any exhibit on the Fair grounds, signalized by flying the Soviet flag, etc., would probably not be welcomed by the Soviet Government which would, I am sure, be unalterably opposed to anything of an amateurish nature in the Fair grounds which might be mistaken by visitors as the best the great Soviet Government could do, and thus subject to highly invidious comparison.

I gather that the San Francisco American Russian Institute has raised the question and that probably you may wish to suggest to Lasker that he discover how far that organization has gone in a library, or an art exhibit or what not, on the old mainland of San Francisco within the city limits.

I assume that you will want to suggest to Lasker that he decide whether the Fair or the American Council, whichever Lasker is, want to go ahead independently or in cooperation with the A. R. I. I gather that there is now in New York an excellent Soviet art exhibit and a book exhibit which might be sent to San Francisco at the time of the Fair under the sponsorship of some American organization. Harriet Moore would know all about these items.

I read between the lines that a great deal of musical talent is likely to come from the U. S. S. R. to the New York Fair. I can envisage nothing more musically thrilling and socially contradictory than to create a music lovers corporation—Wallace M. Alexander & Bruno Lasker, Inc.—which might sponsor in the Municipal Opera House under the auspices of Presidents Wilbur and Sproul a really first-class series of performances of Soviet pianists, violinists, ballet and national folk music, interspersed with cantatas by, say, the Red Army chorus, if this exciting musical society could be persuaded to visit the capitalist shores of San Francisco and Long Island.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1092

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, December 15, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.
300 Gilman Hall,
The Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: I have just been reading your letter of the 12th to Miss Van Kleeck. I do not know that you need to be too afraid of Archibald MacLeish

because I think he still feels under a considerable debt of obligation to the I. P. R. on account of letters which I gave him to Ushiba. On his return he told me that these gave him more insight than he got from any other source. Ushiba apparently let him into the inner shrine and I think MacLeish attributes a good deal of what success the FORTUNE on Japan had to the time and trouble that Ushiba took.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1093

DECEMBER 20, 1938.

WLH from ECC:

Could you or Lilienthal edit this report of Calder's so as to take out all traces of its being the work either of Calder or of an official of the United States Government? All names should be eliminated or hints of names indirectly. For example, on page 5 the identity of the high official Chinese mentioned at the beginning of the last paragraph, should be still further obscured. You or Lilienthal should go through the whole thing with a fine-tooth comb to see that all traces of sources or authorship are completely obliterated. Then I can see no reason why this should not be circulated to the people you mention.

Before, however, mimeographing this and sending it to a dozen people in different countries, I think you and I should talk over the whole problem with Field in the light of the desirability of carrying out your suggestion of getting these materials coming into the office in a steady stream from Washington.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I am sending to Roger Greene.

If we decide to send this information outside the office, it should be with a personal letter asking that none of the material be quoted.

You will note that Greene in his covering letter said: "If you do not allow them to be *quoted* I see no reason why you should not use them *in* your organization."

We have got to be very careful in making certain that the use of this material with non-Americans does not prove to be a boomerang.

EXHIBIT No. 1094

[Day letter]

JANUARY 10, 1939.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY

Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.:

Expecting Plopkin and you lunch tomorrow Wednesday Century Club at one. Among acceptances are: Roger Levy, Paris; Liu Yuwan, Chen Hanseng, China; W. L. Holland, New Zealand; Professors Philip Jessup and Joseph Chamberlain, Columbia; also Frederick Field, W. W. Lancaster, T. A. Bisson.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1095

[Telegram]

JANUARY 10, 1939.

GRENVILLE CLARK,

31 Nassau Street, New York City:

Could you lunch Century tomorrow or on Wednesday; meet Plopkin, legal advisor, Soviet Foreign Office.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1097

[Day letter]

JANUARY 18, 1939.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.;

I desire Liu Yuwan very able secretary China Institute Pacific Relations see you for half hour at your convenience. Please wire have you any time free on the twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, or twenty-third.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1098

JANUARY 23, 1939.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,
c/o American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR NED: I am awfully happy to learn that you are coming out this February in connection with preparations for the International Conference in October. Ben Kizer and I have both written to Fred Field to utilize you for a talk, and doubtless Fred has already talked with you about it. I do hope that you can lengthen your visit in Seattle so that the date will be a little more convenient for getting out a good crowd. This would really be a "kick-off" dinner.

John and I would both like to have you stay at the house. There will be plenty of room for you there, as we have two unused bedrooms, one of which could be used by Ruth, or anyone else in your company, and the other by yourself. John has a portable typewriter, and if this would not be sufficient we could borrow a regular typewriter for you. You would have more room in which to operate, and I would be happy to loan you my car so that the distance from the business center would not be a pressing problem.

By the way, was Motylev at the Pacific Council meeting? I have often wondered, especially in view of his remarks to me concerning the feasibility of future Soviet participation. I do hope he came and that the Soviet group will remain in.

Please pardon me for having inadvertently mislaid your letter sending me the article written by Maxwell S. Stewart in the Bulletin on the Soviet Union of October 15th.

On the whole I would agree with Stewart's position except I doubt that there was much stiffening in the French attitude after Litvinov's speech, although I do think there was a stiffening of the Czechoslovakia attitude, I think the pattern of French foreign policy has not really changed very much since the Austrian Anschluss any more than Chamberlain's policy. There is not much doubt in my mind that Chamberlain, Halifax, Bonnet and probably Daladier have thought all year of eventually arriving at a four-power pact. As far as future Soviet foreign policy is concerned I must say that I was greatly impressed with Joe Barnes' thoughtful analysis. He prefaced his remarks by saying that the new generation Bolsheviki "who have never been abroad" is at the helm now. The men behind Stalin are men whose whole mind set has been directed by a score of years of operation within the framework of the Soviet social order. Those who are now in charge of shaping government policy are not the old diplomats, but younger men taken from industry and trade organizations instead of from the humanistic professions.

One of Joe's principal points was that in the immediate future the policy of the government will be to neutralize the forces of war. He spoke of a possible, although not necessarily likely alternative of rapprochement with Germany to make the gentlemen in Paris and London feel uncomfortable, and perhaps force them to change their policy. He spoke also of a continued desire for good will and closer relations with the United States. He also mentioned the likelihood of a determined effort to win back the Oslo Bloc to a policy of "objective neutrality." He believes that the Soviet Union will now concentrate in preparing to defend itself singlehanded. The Soviet Union will, of course, endeavor to build up more friendly relations with Poland and Rumania. This would be justified on the short-term basis of self defense in order to give the Union that modicum of time which it undoubtedly needs to put its own house in order, especially in view of the loss of leadership following the purge.

The intensive Bolshevization of Soviet life, particularly in the army, is most significant. For example, Leo Mekhlis, a forty-eight-year-old Jew recently editor of Pravda is now in charge of the Bolshevization of the army. He ranks in authority above the Marshals. While this would be criticized by army strategists, nevertheless it is felt necessary as a policy measure. I got the very definite impression after talking with many people, that the rank and file of the soldiers are genuinely loyal and also that they are pretty well treated. I also got the impression that cruel as the purge was, probably partly necessary and partly unnecessary, nevertheless in the main it was jusitfied on the ground that it has temporarily at least brushed aside the danger of counter revolution.

If the Soviet Union can delay for two or three years longer any attack from the west or the east its position will become nearly invulnerable. From many estimates which I received in Moscow I am inclined to think that at this moment there are at least 3,500 first-line planes attached to the two western armies, to-wit, the White Russian and the Kiev armies, which aggregate pretty close to 400,000 men, and that there are between 2,000 and 2,500 first-line planes in the Far East with a force of approximately 350,000 men. Furthermore, during all of this crisis the Red Army of 1,300,000 men, excluding the border troops of NKVD approximating probably 300,000, have been fully mobilized. Furthermore, I suppose that the Russians have more fully trained reserves than any other nation in Europe, not excepting France.

I do not believe the Soviet Union would yield a single inch of territory. I think a compromise with Germany involving a cession of the Ukraine would be out of the question. The Soviet Union, like England and France, might be willing to sacrifice another Czechoslovakia, but not its own territory. It might be willing to agree to the partition of Poland, by no means an unnatural alternative, but I think they would fight to the end to defend themselves. Many times they mentioned to me "Remember Napoleon", and they do not believe that either Japan or Germany could defeat them.

I am sorry that I have written at such length, but having once started I became too interested in the problem to make the letter as short as I had intended.

With best wishes to you, and hoping to see you soon, I remain

Sincerely,

HERBERT S. LITTLE.

HSL: C

EXHIBIT No. 1099

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 2nd February, 1939.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: Thank you most sincerely for sending me the text of the theses to be delivered by Mr. Molotov on March 10.

Looking forward to seeing you on Sunday, I am,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT 1100

FEBRUARY 13, 1939.

NH from ECC:

Here is what Lattimore has written Utley regarding Haldore Hanson. Do you think that you ought to put Lattimore wise?

ECC from NDH:

I had an all afternoon discussion yesterday with Hal Hanson on every type of topic possible and must say that I'm at a loss to understand how the impression got abroad that he was particularly anti-Soviet. Despite his unpleasant experiences in Yenan, due to undiplomatic question he asked, he seems all for the guerillas even though he may discount some of the publicity about them. It may be that he was careful because he knows of my particular bias, but I feel his background is quite solid. For factual material, he is full to overflowing with good stuff—critical and commendable. He has lost his worship of Chiang K'ai-shek and seems sounder and more mature than when I last knew him in China. If someone praises too much he might point to the black side that we all know exists, but otherwise he seems to maintain a proper balance.

EXHIBIT No. 1101

c/o JOHN A. CARTER, Esq., MACDOUGALL SOUTHWICK CO.,
Seattle, Wash., 21st February 1939.

Miss HARRIET MOORE,
American Russian Institute,
56 West 45th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HARRIET: Here is a letter from George Marshall and a copy of my reply. I wish you would wire me collect as to whether I am right in having a hunch that it is a little bit better for me not to accept this invitation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1102

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York, N. Y., 14th March, 1939.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: I was on the point of writing you asking if you could give me a copy of the full text of Stalin's March 10th speech, when the postman brought it to me. This is yet one more evidence of your unfailing thoughtfullness.

I am almost certain to be in Washington on Friday and Saturday. If I am I will telephone you in the hope that you may have a few minutes to spare.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1103

Executive Committee, San Francisco, Bay Region Division: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chairman; Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin, Vice Chairman; Robert Gordon Sproul, Vice Chairman; Jesse Steinhart, Treasurer; Wallace M. Alexander; Carl L. Alsberg; Allan E. Charles; Harry Deans; Mrs. Edward H. Heller; Ira S. Lillick; Mrs. Duncan McDuffie; William F. Morrish; Mrs. William H. Orrick; Charles Page, Jr.; Chester Rowell; Paul Scharrenberg; Richard S. Turner; John H. Oakie, Secretary

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AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
1795 California Street, San Francisco
Telephone TUxedo 3114—Cable Address: Inparel

MARCH 23, 1939.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I took Chen Han-seng to Palo Alto yesterday where he had what I hope was a fruitful half hour or so with Dr. Wilbur and what I am sure was a fruitful lunch with Hobart Young, H. H. Fisher, Merrill Bennett, Masland and a few others. I was not at the luncheon as I had other business with Radius and a graduate student by the name of Bloch whom I hope to draft for IPR work. Han-seng informed me, however, that he was delighted to have discovered H. H. Fisher as a man who knows far more about the USSR than the more widely known Kerner of the University of California.

I will give you a complete report on Chen's local activities within a few days.

Bill Lockwood has just arrived and is this moment in conference with Hall, a doctoral student from the University of Michigan, who is en route to Baja, California to renew his studies of the Japanese in Mexico.

Very sincerely,

[s] Jack JOHN H. OAKIE.

O:r

EXHIBIT No. 1104

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
March 28, 1939.

Purely personal

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esquire,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: If you have a chance to write Carlson saying that there are certain advantages in his remaining in the Navy, I hope you will not hesitate to do so, for it may be, I suppose, that the Navy will ask him to reconsider. Your view as expressed in your letter of March 27 to me might be helpful.

I think it would be a good scheme to write McWilliams asking whether he would like to have you publish a protest on the New Zealand article. I think the more people see that their protests are recognized, the more they will have faith in the desire of the editor to include an expression of varying points of view. It also will encourage people who have not yet dared to criticize this or that article to come forward.

I am glad that the Fairbanks are staying with you. You will doubtless be able to help Fairbanks realize what his generally good knowledge of contemporary China really means.

Are you in touch with anyone in Baltimore or Washington who is able to bring illumination to the committees of the Senate and the House on Foreign Affairs with reference to the terrible deficiencies of Pittman's bill, to be known as "The Peace Act of 1939," in so far as it applies to the Far Eastern situation?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1105

19TH APRIL, 1939.

MRT from ECC:

As a follow up on our lunch with Mr. Plant you may wish to ring him up and say that on Monday I was informed by two members of the Far Eastern division of the State Department that Ambassador Johnson was returning to China on the next sailing of the *President Coolidge*. For particulars please note the enclosed copy of my letter to Field.

EXHIBIT No. 1106

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Maryland, April 21, 1939.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR DR. MOTYLEV: Your book on "Origin and Development of the Pacific Ocean Nexus of Contradiction" has just arrived. It is too late to be reviewed in our June issue, but I am listing it among the important books recommended to readers of PACIFIC AFFAIRS, and I shall review it myself in the September issue. I have already started reading it and want to tell you how much I admire the clarity of your analysis and the precision of your statements.

A review of such an important book helps to make up for the lack of articles in PACIFIC AFFAIRS by Soviet authors, but it all the more stimulates my ambition to get direct contributions from you and some of your colleagues. Take the case of such a book as this. It would have been an editorial triumph if we could have published in translation one of the chapters, either before the appearance of the book or simultaneously. To translate from it now would not be quite the same thing. It would look as though, in spite of the fact that there is a Soviet Council of the I. P. R., we were unable to secure original contributions by Soviet authors.

I am now working myself on the conclusion of my book on Inner Asian Frontiers of China. It ought to be finished next month. Then there will still

be the planning of a number of maps, and a good deal of work in connection with completing footnotes and bibliography. However, the book is now definitely planned for publication in January by the American Geographical Society.

When that is over, I hope to be able to take up some new work on contemporary aspects of Mongolia and Western China. One thing on which I should especially like to do some studying is the Moslems of China—both those who speak Chinese and those who speak Turkish.

With cordial personal regards,

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 1107

CC to Mrs. Carter and RDC.

ON BOARD: S. S. "PRESIDENT DOUMER",
Tokyo to Hongkong, 20th May, 1939.

Private and confidential

Miss KATE MITCHELL,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, U. S. A.

DEAR KATE: For the most part this will be an off-the-record letter, not for official circulation round the office or for insertion in the official Secretariat files. Its contents, however, may be communicated orally by preference to Holland, Field, and Lattimore. It should not go into either the Amco or the Paco files.

With reference to Boku (Pakh) you may all regard him as a turncoat, a crook, a spy, a patriot or statesman, but whatever your classification of him, I think you will conclude, if you get him to talk frankly, that he is able and courageous. Publicly and privately he is able to make sense out of the positive side of the organisation of Manchuria. Of more interest to you will be his private opinion of the muddle and futility of the Japanese invasion of North China. A professor of agricultural economics in Tokyo told us of the beneficence of Japan in Peiping with the reorganisation of all the universities into a single great joint Sino-Japanese university; of the settlement established by a dozen charming recent girl graduates of Miss Hani's school in Tokyo for the girls of the Peking slums. That effort can be described with the same enthusiasm that characterised Mrs. Humphrey Ward's account of Passmore Edward's settlement in London forty years ago, or the brave deeds of Junior Leaguers in the Isle of Manhattan. The professor told us that there were now 70,000 Japanese in Peking and that if Chiang Kai-shek did not come back soon, Peking would be a Japanese city. Boku gave a different picture, the point being that 70 Japanese gangsters arrive in Peking daily from Japan and go on with their work of spoilation, adding indescribable exploitation to the chaos and disorganisation of the invading army. Boku is unreservedly contemptuous of the complete lack of psychology that has characterised Japanese effort in China, nor is there in his view any improvement in Japanese psychology in Korea. Although publicly he describes the positive achievements in Manchuria, I suspect that privately he has more admiration for the Korean bandits who are still a far from negligible thorn in the flesh of the Manchukuo Government. These Korean bandits he describes with an enthusiasm similar to the paragraphs of Snow and Bertram in their eulogy of the Eighth Route leaders. I hope you, Fred, Bill, Owen, and Bisson may be able to get him to talk as candidly to you as he did to me. Hypothesis number 7 would be that he is agent provocateur extraordinaire. If this is his real role, then he deserves the highest pay for the quality of his acting in my conversation with him two years ago in Hsinking and last week in Tokyo. As I think I have already written you, he is leaving Chicago about the 8th June. He is then going to have a few days in Washington before coming to New York. He will then sail on the "Queen Mary" on the 21st June for Warsaw where as Consul-General of Manchukuo he is expected to bring about closer relationship between his own and the Polish Government.

For the purposes of confirmation I wish now to quote copies of cables and radio letters which I hope were ultimately clear and that you were able to separate the paragraphs which may go into the files from those which were purely personal and unofficial. They are as follows:

Cable from Kobe on the evening of the 19th:

"Fred Owen: If you discover George inclined to stronger policy than writing notes urge you arrange he see Stanley Cordell without fail. Stop. Very important you win Joseph to Harry's viewpoint ask Hilda tell Philip approve Purvis if she does."

Radio letter sent from the "Doumer" on the evening of the 20th:

"George Means Sansom, Joseph Grew, Harry Price Treat, Fred Owen message strictly confidential George may prove more progressive than Joseph send Craigie affairs my request stop what would Jessup, Field, Holland you think Victoria consist national councils staffs international secretariat Paco officers inquiry contributors Ushiba Saionji privately suggested this believing Victoria more possible and better results if composed younger generation."

Soon after my arrival in Tokyo I had a private talk with Ambassador Grew whom you know is one of the ablest, straightest and finest ambassadors the United States has anywhere in the world. His prestige with the people of Japan is rightly greater than that of any other Ambassador. His conversations with the Japanese authorities have never lacked in candour. It is quite clear that he has put tremendous pressure on highly placed Japanese in order to get the government and the army to take the view which apparently the navy takes, that a military alliance between Tokyo and Berlin would be certain to lead to a long and terrible war between Japan and the United States in the event of a European war into which he and the Japanese navy believe the United States would inevitably be drawn. No one is more aware of the barbarity of the Japanese army's behaviour in China than Grew. No one is more aware of the fact that there is a vast gulf between the charming, gentle and sophisticated Japanese who surround the Embassy and the Japanese army and Japanese gangsters who are overrunning the Mainland. Nevertheless Grew has the same hope that many of us cherish, namely, that the Japan of the future shall not become a slave of Hitler with Gestapo agents adding subtlety and strength to the barbaric impertinence of the Japanese militarists. Rather he envisages the ultimate triumph in Japan of the school of thought which now characterizes the throne. This school maintains that Japan's natural political and intellectual friends are the Americans and to a certain extent the English and that the American rather than the German way of life will best serve the people of the Japanese Empire. With the double aim of wooing Japan away from Hitler and strengthening the position of those whose deepest desire is that Japan be worthy of American friendship, Grew believes that American sanctions against Japan would be decisive in deflecting the course of history and throw all Japan into Hitler's arms. This Grew conceives as a calamity alike to Japan and to the United States. I surmise that he thinks that sanctions would not only lead to a military alliance between Tokyo and Berlin (I wonder whether perhaps it has not already been made), but would lead to war between Japan and the United States. If I were to disagree with Grew, and this I should hesitate to do because of my superficial knowledge of the Far East, it would be only at this last point, namely, that United States sanctions would lead to war between Japan and the United States. Every day in Japan revealed how critically Japan is dependent on the United States for her campaign in China and for economic survival at home. A 100% economic embargo might, I think, quickly lead to war because Japan's position would soon become so desperate that war itself with the United States would hardly be a more ghastly alternative. But the desire for friendship with America combined with the fear of America are influences which I think would prevent war if the sanctions were gradual and explained on the very rational grounds which already exist for such action. Let the United States begin with machinery, machine tools, trucks, scrap and oil. Gradualism would give the extremists less of a case than a complete severance of all economic relations.

Grew's stature and courage never impressed me more. He is certainly right in his view that the American public does not want war with Japan. He is certainly right that Japan has more to gain in the long run in freedom and progress by cultivating America rather than Nazi friendship, but whether he is right that no means exist stronger than words but short of war, I question. Unfortunately my visit synchronised with his last days in Tokyo. He was under terrific pressure and the landing at Kulangsu came only twenty-four hours before his boat left. Otherwise I would have tried to lead him to my view or endeavour to accept his, for he as much as I desire to see Japan saved from the almost certain ruin towards which the extremists are rushing her today.

As this was impossible for lack of time, I am hoping that you can persuade Field or Lattimore or Holland or any two of them to have long talks with Grew soon after his return, for several reasons: first, you all ought to get to know his views more thoroughly than I was able in our short talk; second, if his analysis is different from yours, he would enormously appreciate getting the benefit of the views of those whose central purpose is so close to his own. He was full of enthusiasm for Mr. Roosevelt's letter to Hitler and for Roosevelt's whole foreign policy. He was tremendously pleased to learn that in answer to questions from Japanese Cabinet Ministers I had replied that even though Roosevelt had the support of but, say, 55% of the American public, his letter to Hitler probably had the support of 80% of Americans.

As you know, Sansom sailed a few days before we arrived. Missing him was a great disappointment. I wirelessed his steamer to ask whom I had best see in his Embassy in his absence. He radioed back recommending that I see the Ambassador himself. This I did. I had never met him before and must confess that my former picture of his views was incorrect, or it may be that his views have undergone a radical change. In any event he seemed to me to have views that more nearly approximated those of Harry Price than any Englishman I have met for a long time. He assured me that the entire Embassy staff was united. He very definitely feels that there are measures stronger than words, short of war, that both his government and the American government can take in the present situation. He was obviously pleased that the British Navy with or without Cabinet instruction had landed at Kulangsu. He quite obviously believes that the time for appeasement in the Far East has ended though he clearly hopes that Japan can be persuaded to extricate herself from a Military Alliance with Berlin and Rome. I suspect that if he were pressed he would repudiate the Japanese propaganda that he and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr hold antithetical views. I told him of the Imperial Hotel lobby gossip about peace terms which were, according to a terribly well-informed* English hireling of the Japanese, to be British recognition of Manchukuo; a British loan of 50 million sterling for reconstruction in North China, Japanese withdrawal from Canton, and British opportunity in the Yangtse provided Britain recognised that Japan had succeeded her as a dominant power in the area. The British would demand also the Japanese withdrawal from Hainan, but this the Japanese could not concede. Sir Robert dismissed all this as utterly fantastic and obviously could not see the slightest possibility of a London loan to Japan for North China reconstruction.

From the foregoing, I hope that you and your colleagues will be able to make sense out of my cable and radio letter.

Please send Sir Robert Craigie, "Pacific Affairs" beginning with the June issue for one year, telling him that you are sending it at my request. The latter part of my message about Victoria is the only one which you need to trouble Jessup with. If it is not completely intelligible, it will be when you receive by, I hope, this same mail, a copy of my long letter to Jessup reporting on my negotiations with the Japanese Council in Tokyo.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1108

Unofficial

CARLTON COURT, PALL MALL PLACE,
London. S. W. 1 June 29, 1939.

Mr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: This is to thank you most sincerely for your help while I was in Moscow. My main object was to have long talks with you and Voitinsky and the conditions for these could not have been more satisfactory. It was most encouraging to find you both in such excellent health. I am greatly pleased with the outline of your bigger book and feel that it will be of the greatest value.

Now with reference to your criticism of Miss Moore's monograph, both she and we are very eager to have your best and earliest criticisms. As you pointed out every member of the Secretariat must have the liberty to write fully, and

*Well-informed in the view of the hireling.

freely provided he writes objectively. At the same time no member of the Secretariat writing for an international audience can be sure that he has attained the maximum degree of objectivity unless he and she have the frankest criticism and suggestions from scholarly friends like yourself.

All of my colleagues will enormously appreciate the reiteration of the position which you took in your Princeton cablegram that members of the International Secretariat must be given full academic freedom but this very freedom makes everyone of us all the more eager to have the most searching kind of criticism of all our work.

Please do not wait therefore until you can send your criticism of Miss Moore's manuscript by word of mouth. You can write a purely private letter marking it private either to Miss Moore or to me and it will be regarded not as a formal communication but simply as a private letter from one scholar to another.

In Amsterdam among many others I talked with Van Walree who was exceedingly sorry that pressure of engagements had prevented his calling on you on his most recent visit. He had gone in connection with the U. S. S. R.-Netherlands trade treaty and every minute was taken. Apparently he felt that the trade treaty was of substantial advantage to the Netherlands and he hoped also of substantial advantage to the U. S. S. R. He enormously appreciated the opportunity of meeting you on his former visit.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1109

CARLTON COURT, PALL MALL PLACE,
London, S. W. 1, July 3, 1939.

Mr. SHERWOOD EDDY,
Toynbee Hall, 28 Commercial Street,
London, E. 1, England

DEAR SHERWOOD: I have just sent Oumansky a night cable letter reading as follows:

> "Sherwood Eddy, a consistent critic but genuinely sincere friend of Soviet Union, informs me his visa canceled. Personally believe net result of his seminars is of equal value to both countries in interest of mutual cultural relations. Urge get matter reconsidered. Eddy's address Toynbee Hall, London, until July twelfth."

I suggest that you go direct to Maisky and explain the whole situation to him. I wish I were in a position to do more. My cable address in Paris on Thursday and Friday will be care of Poletran Paris.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(PENCILLED:) ECC

EXHIBIT No. 1110

SHERWOOD EDDY

52 Vanderbilt Avenue

NEW YORK CITY

Telephone: MUrray Hill 9-3668

JUNE 24, 1939.

Mr. E. C. CARTER
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York City

MY DEAR NED: I need your help and you can certainly give me help. At the last moment, twenty-four hours before sailing, Intourist informs the Open Road that my Soviet visa, which was granted weeks ago, has been suddenly cancelled. Someone has blundered. This must be reversed. It means the end of the Seminars and that would damage Russia. I have taken a thousand people to Russia in the last twenty years. For a dozen years our parties have been the largest and most influential that have entered Russia and nine-tenths of our people have rendered favorable reports. For twenty years I have been a friend of Russia's. I am on Mrs. Dilling's red network, supposed to be "supported by Moscow gold". I have always been a Stalinist, never for Trotsky.

I would appreciate it very much if you would do anything you could to have this cancellation reversed. It will certainly make a bad impression on our party of nearly forty and end the Seminars forever.

I am at Toynbee Hall, 28 Commercial Street, London E. 1 (cable Toynbee Hall), July 1–15.

Thanking you in advance for your help,

Very sincerely yours,

[s] SHERWOOD EDDY.

EXHIBIT No. 1111

ON BOARD S. S. "AQUITANIA",
July 11, 1939.

Mr. OWEN LATTIMORE,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: The Chinese are more unanimously enthusiastic about Pacific Affairs than the members of any other group. Franklin Ho was immensely impressed by Guenther Stein's "The Yen and the Sword." Ushiba assured me that the office of the Japanese Council was taking seriously your request for additional Japanese articles. Motylev was eager for much more intimate factual details giving both very recent economic information and also personal observations as to what is going on in China and Japan.

As you will see from the enclosed copy of my letter to Jaffe, he likes the militancy of Amerasia. He recognizes that Pacific Affairs cannot quite take this line but he still insists that no one can legitimately critize you if you do decide to adopt his request to you of three years ago that Pacific Affairs come out strong consistently and repeatedly for the collective system. Both he and Voitinsky regret that there is no evidence of our having taken seriously their request for this three years ago. They feel the necessity for this was never greater than today. Their insistence was of great interest to me for two reasons. First, because it is evidence that they treat the IPR seriously and have orderly memories of their suggestion. Second, because it controverts the assertions of the reactionaries in Paris, London, and Washington that the retirement of Litvinoff meant that the Kremlin was throwing over its commitment to the collective system.

Could you use the present appearance of Sir Arthur Salter's "Security—Can It Be Retrieved" as the occasion for an early full length treatment that will be so fundamental as to appeal to the more thoughtful members of the Institute in every member country and so militant as to convince Motylev and Voitinsky that we are responding to their suggestion.

One of Motylev's most urgent requests was for information regarding Chinese internal economic and financial position. Happily this will be supplied by Chi's study for the Inquiry. (You have doubtless seen his Virginia Quarterly article.) I am going to reopen with Jessup and Angus the question of publication of some inquiry material in Pacific Affairs when it is of such a nature as to fit in with your own policy as editor and when it is of a kind which will make important and authentic information of which scholars and statesmen are in need available to a wide Pacific Affairs audience.

Your many friends all along the line inquired for you and sent you their warmest greetings. All are asking when your book will be published.

I learned in one or two quarters that Miss Virginia Thompson's book on Indo-China is not being taken seriously because there is a criticism of Pelliot or an implied criticism of Pelliot's position. Do you happen to know what would be the basis of this and whether scholars in other countries regard Pelliot with the same degree of infallibility as he regards himself.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1112

ON BOARD S. S. "AQUITANIA."
July 11, 1930.

Mr. PHILIP J. JAFFE,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR JAFFE: All around the coast of Asia and Europe I picked up highly complimentary remarks with reference to Amerasia. Someday I would like to sit

down with you and some of your colleagues and run over the whole question of promotion overseas. Copies ought to be in the reading rooms of the Chinese, British, American and French Embassies and Legations in Tokyo, Chungking, Shanghai, Bangkok, Paris, London, Moscow, The Hague, Ottawa, Canberra, Rome, Berlin and Brussels. Ways and means should be discovered for substantially increasing the circulation in Japan, China and Great Britain. Motylev wishes that Pacific Affairs carried as essential information as that which he discovers invariably appears in your section "Economic Notes." Motylev also likes the consistently militant quality that characterises almost every issue of Amerasia and which appears so clearly, according to Motylev, in everything that Fred Field writes whether in Amerasia or elsewhere. If Amerasia and AMCO merge the prestige of both will be enhanced in several countries.

Do you suppose the Amerasia free list could stand sending a complimentary copy for a year to Murray G. Brooks, Y. M. C. A., Rangoon, Burma. He is working for the reeducation of certain Burmese members of Parliament who are obstructing the Burmese government's efforts to facilitate cultural and material communications between Burma and China. He is facilitating a Burmese vernacular translation of Vesper's "Secret Agent of Japan."

Hoping you can come to Sunset Farm for a long talk sometime before September, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1114

Editorial Board: Frederick V. Field, *chairman;* Philip J. Jaffe, managing editor; Lillian Peffer, *assistant editor*; T. A. Bisson; Ch'ao-ting Chi; Kenneth W. Colegrove; Owen Lattimore; William W. Lockwood; Cyrus H. Peake; David H. Popper; William T. Stone; Harriet Levine, *secretary*

AMERASIA

A review of America and the Far East

125 East 52nd St., New York

Telephone: PLaza 3-4700

AUGUST THE 11TH, 1939.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I appreciate the opportunity to make what I hope are constructive comments on Captain Carlson's report on China's Military Strength and Efficiency. I am very sorry to be some days late with my comments.

Carlson's report is, in my opinion, a very excellent one and a very much needed one. The latter half especially is excellent. As I was reading the first half, without knowing what would follow, I kept thinking that too much was elementary knowledge easily obtainable elsewhere, but upon completion of the whole study I am not sure that his way is not the best. Some of the elementary material might be converted into explanatory phrases throughout the whole manuscript, while some might be converted into notes. In addition the introduction can perhaps be strengthened by inclusion in it in summary form some of the strong points in the latter half.

There are a few sections which, in my opinion, are treated too incompletely. For example, the aviation section could have more precise material on training centers, particularly those in Kansu and Yunnan. Our own Curtis Wright Company is apparently very active in building and supplying the Yunnan bases with planes and instructors. In addition, some estimate should be made of the probable future effectiveness as well as size of China's growing air forces.

The section on China's Industrial Cooperatives is too incomplete. They have not been moving ahead rapidly enough and the five million dollars promised by Dr. Kung has not been advanced. The reasons for this should be written and analyzed. Understandably enough, there are many conflicting and contradictory elements in the building up process going on in China.

The section on the Italian Aviation Mission should be enlarged slightly and it should be brought out that the chief reason at the time for the ability of the Italians to outbid American companies was due to superior credit terms. At that time the United States demanded practically cash in advance for plane orders. The fact that we have regained that market and have, even in the

past year or two, extended sizeable credits to China, contains within it the obvious political conclusions that China has proved itself worthy of commercial confidence, etc., etc.

In the section where the German Military Mission is discussed, there should be some study made of the contradictions involved in Germany's selling large quantities of munitions to China. Germany's continuance to do so in the face of its pact with Japan may play an important role in the future of the Sino-Japanese war.

There have been reliable reports about ten million troops being trained in the province of Sikong. Some study of that should be included in an appropriate place. Additional material might be added on Mohammedans and Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and their probable military strength and effectiveness.

In the section on present facilities for arms manufacture, the building of roads and railways, as well as that on war financing, I feel it would be important to express an opinion as to how much the continued success of these depend upon foreign help. On page 79, which contains the six conditions which will bring China victory, Section 5 states that "China must continue to receive credits from abroad until such time as she can manufacture her own raw materials," which idea is repeated again on page 81. It is not improbable that some time in the future Great Britain, supported by France and possibly the United States, will make an effort to effect peace and in its effort to do so will put pressure on China by threatening to shut down both the Burma and Indo-China ports of entry. In the face of such an eventuality, will China be able to continue to carry on a protracted war even if limited to guerrilla warfare? Will China then be able to manufacture sufficient small arms and munitions, grow sufficient food, develop new transportation facilities, and find means of financing her economic set-up? Therein, it seems to me, lies the biggest question mark in China's war of resistance.

I hope that the above remarks have sense and are constructive, and I would be only too delighted at any time to expand these remarks with whatever facts are at my disposal.

Sincerely,

PHILIP J. JAFFE.

PJJ : g

EXHIBIT No. 1115

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., August 24, 1939.

PHILIP JAFFE, Esquire,
Sunset Farm.

DEAR PHIL: Here are letters from Edgar Snow, Rewi Alley, and John Hersey which are self-explanatory.

Perhaps this evening or this afternoon you can give me the benefit of your advice on all these matters.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,

EXHIBIT No. 1116

129 EAST 52nd STREET,
New York City, September 8, 1939.

Dr. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute,
20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: You will be getting a copy of AMERASIA in due course, but I thought you would be particularly interested in two of the articles, so I am enclosing them in this letter. One is by my colleague on the International Secretariat, Miss Kate L. Mitchell. The other is by Mr. Frederick V. Field. The entire magazine will be reaching you shortly.

I understand that it is likely that the American Council will shortly assume full responsibility for AMERASIA as its own journal.

I am writing you in another letter regarding the decision to go ahead with the Victoria Meeting. All of us feel that the war in Europe makes Victoria more important than ever.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1117

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., 11th September 1939.

DR. V. E. MOTYLEV,
Pacific Institute, 20, Razin Street.
Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR MOTYLEV: I have just cabled you as follows:

"Proceeding with victoria as planned. War situation makes contribution your institute more important than ever. Hope nothing will prevent your attendance. Suggest arriving New York ten days early for preliminary private discussion."

There is little need to amplify what I have said. All that is necessary is to emphasize and underline it. You will have learned from my circular letter of September 5th to the National Secretaries of the decision of Jessup and Tarr to go ahead with the Study Meeting.

What I consider a very biased interpretation of the significance of the Moscow-Berlin non-aggression pact in editorial and political circles in several of the I. P. R. member countries gives added importance to your presence and that of your colleagues at the forthcoming Study Meeting.

Earnestly hoping that we will receive an early word that you are planning to come, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1118

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Mass., 15th September 1939.

(Penciled initials:) KM

DR. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Norfolk, Conn.

DEAR JESSUP: You will remember my telling you that I cabled Dr. Adam von Trott zu Solz in Berlin urging that he get permission to have his national service consist of exploring with us the possibilities of extending the I. P. R. Inquiry to the wider field. You will remember that I secured approval for this proposal from both Lord Lothian and Mr. Sumner Welles.

I have today received a cable from him in Berlin stating that he will be glad to come over on the *Vulcania* if I can facilitate his passage and landing, otherwise he will have to come via Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. I wired to Sumner Welles today to see if he can facilitate the passage on the *Vulcania* as he promised me last week in Washington that he would do everything in his power to facilitate von Trott's coming to this country.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1119

68 WEST 91ST STREET,
New York, N. Y., September 21, 1939.

DEAR MR. CARTER: With regard to your note of the 16th, I have read with genuine admiration Rosinger's article in the September issue of Pacific Affairs entitled "Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile War." It is the most penetrating and most accurate survey of the situation I have seen. I don't know whether Rosinger has been in China or not, but it is evident that he has followed developments there very closely, and he has caught the spirit of the new order.

Now, with respect to Colonel Burckhardt's comments. I have known Burckhardt in a casual way for a number of years—since he was British military attaché at Peiping, as a matter of fact. I saw him at Hongkong last autumn. He was intelligence officer for the General Officer Commanding the China Forces.

Burckhardt has, like so many orthodox military men of the old school, missed the point in China's guerrilla warfare. Probably the only politics he knows is the residue of what he was exposed to at Harrow or Sandhurst. At any rate, he has failed to comprehend the importance of the political (ethical, if you will) development which parallels the military strategy of the Chinese guerrilla units. He points to isolated incidents of guerrilla activities, some of which

admittedly have been amateurish, as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the whole movement. He apparently overlooks the magnitude of the guerrilla movement, and he has no sense of the social and economic reforms that have made possible the continuation of Chinese control in those areas which were penetrated by the Japanese. He even overlooks the fact that in Shansi province the guerrilla pattern of resistance developed and executed by the 8th Route Army, supplemented by provincial troops inspired by the 8th Routers, has for over two years prevented the Japanese from conquering that province and moving on Sian.

On the other hand, there is a good deal of truth in many of Colonel Burckhardt's comments. There are still many young men in China with the attitude of the youth who remarked: "Why can't the foreigners fight our wars for us?" This attitude is prevalent among many of the youth who have not been reached by the 8th Route Army doctrines. I saw a good deal of it at Hankow, and it thoroughly disgusted me. But that attitude is diminishing rather than increasing. Both the Generalissmo and Madame Chiang are striving to make the youth of China more unselfish and more self-reliant.

Staff work has been poor in the past, but intensive training in staff schools, plus practical experience in the field, is improving this condition.

Strong leadership, especially in the higher ranks, has been lacking. But this was largely due to the semifeudal military system with which the Generalissimo had to deal. Political considerations made it imperative for him to proceed with caution in removing high ranking military officers from office. Even this obstacle is being overcome. However, as the younger officers move into positions of high command it takes time for them to adjust themselves to their new responsibilities. Here again, the important point is that the trend is in the direction of progress and greater efficiency, rather than the reverse.

The Colonel's remarks regarding the prospect of a revolution in Japan and about foreign intervention are not new. I have encountered no large scale sentiment in China in favor of intervention by the Western powers. They want our material assistance—in the way of loans, war supplies, etc. But that is all.

The point about the China situation which worries me right now is Russia's attitude. The United Front has been dropped, apparently, as a policy of the Comintern. Does that mean a possible break in the United Front in China? Is there any connection between the visit of Chow En-lai to Moscow and the Russo-Japanese negotiations concerning a possible nonaggression agreement? Is there a possibility that a Chinese Soviet may be set up in the northwest in return for freedom being granted the Japanese to move against the British, French, American and Chinese interests in the balance of China?

Many thanks for letting me see Colonel Burckhardt's comments.

With best regards, I am,

Sincerely,

EVANS F. CARLSON.

EXHIBIT No. 1120

OCTOBER 11, 1939.

FVF from ECC:

The other night at dinner I met Mrs. James Warburg, who purports to have a flaming interest in China. She struck me as extremely intelligent and more articulate than her husband. Should she be approached as a recorder for Virginia Beach, in case I get another opening, or better still through you? Is there any other moneyed person of brains whom we might rope in with an eye to long term financial future of the American and Pacific Councils? How about Ellie Auchincloss?

EXHIBIT No. 1121

CAVALIER HOTEL,
Virginia Beach, Va., December 3, 1949.

Mr. CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: This is to introduce my colleague from Berlin, Dr. Adam von Trott. I hope you and he can have a long talk together.

Would you ask one of your consular officials to advise him with reference to procedure in getting his visa for his Moscow visit?

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1122

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 11th December 1939.

KENNETH DURANT, Esq.,
Tass Agency, 50 Rockefeller Plaza,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR DURANT: Having returned from the I. P. R. Study Meeting at Virginia Beach today, I take pleasure in sending you herewith by special messenger copies of the following statements at Virginia Beach:

1. Dr. Jessup's Opening statement. (Document 9)
2. Statement by L. W. Holland at Opening Plenary Session. (Doc. 10)
3. Rapporteur's Summary of Round Table Topic I. (Document 12)
4. Mr. Lattimore's Statement at Plenary Session Opening Round Table II. (Document 15)
5. Rapporteur's summary of Round Table Topic II. (Document 16)
6. Mr. Angus' Statement at Plenary Session Opening Round Table III. (Doc. 18)
7. Rapporteur's Summary of Round Table Topic III. (Document 19)
8. Mr. Staley's Statement Opening Topic IV. (Document 21)
9. Dr. Jessup's Summary of Round Table Topic IV. (Document 23)

Any of these may now be quoted. Ultimately a summary of these will be published in the proceedings. For your purposes, perhaps the most interesting summary is that made by Dr. Jessup on December 2. It is marked Document 23.

I don't know whether you will wish to share these with Mr. Todd in Washington but if you so desire you are at liberty to do so.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1123

To—	From—	Date	File No.	Exhibit No.
A. von Trott	E. C. Carter	1/ 8/40	100.111	1123A
A. Van Scheltema (Mrs.)	E. C. Carter	12/15/39	100.111	1124
Adam	E. C. Carter	3/13/40	100.111	1125
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	1 /8/40	100.249	1126
E. C. Carter	Calvin B. Hoover	1/22/40	100.274	1127
Ida Pruitt	E. C. Carter	2/16/40	119.36	1128
Ingrid Warburg	E. C. Carter	3/ 8/40	112.33	1129
E. Fairfax Cholmeley	E. C. Carter	3/ 9/40	119.5	1130
Ingrid Warburg (Miss)	E. C. Carter	3/13/40	100.239	1131
W. L. H	E. C. C	3/14/40	104.22	1132
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	3/19/40	100.386	1133
Mr. Carter	Ingrid Warburg	3/20/40	107.22	1134
Oumansky	Edward C. Carter	3/22/40	100.209	1135
W. L. H	E. C. C	3/30/40	191.87	1136
W. L. Holland	Edward C. Carter	4/24/40	191.90	1137
Edward C. Carter	C. K. Moser	4/29/40	191.188	1138
C. K. Moser	Edward C. Carter	4/24/40	191.188	1139
C. K. Moser	Edward C. Carter	4/24/40	100.360	1140
H. A	E. C. C	5/ 2/40	105.133	1141
Edward C. Carter	Charles F. Loomis	5/ 2/40	131B.99	1142
Edward C. Carter	Charles F. Loomis	5/ 3/40	131B.98	1143
Wm. W. Lockwood	Edward C. Carter	5/ 8/40	105.293	1144
Philip C. Jessup	Edward C. Carter	12/19/42	191.37	1145
E. C. Carter	Edgar Snow	5/10/40	126.4	1146
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	6/ 6/40	102.3	1147
E. C. Carter	John M. Gaus	6/ 3/40	102.3	1148
KM	E. C. C	6/10/40	105.21	1149
Motylev	Edward Carter	6/12/40	100.114	1150
ECC	RWB	7/ 3/40	106.9	1151
FVF	ECC	7/ 2/40	500.26	1152
F. V. Field	E. C. Carter	7/11/40	191.162	1153
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	7/15/40	191.12	1154
E. C. Carter	G. M. Fisher	8/10/40	105B.4	1155
E. C. Carter	V. E. Motylev	8/21/40	100.94	1156
Mortimer Graves	E. C. Carter	9/20/40	125.1	1157
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	9/24/40	105.175	1158
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	9/26/40	151.65	1159
E. C. Carter	Mortimer Graves	10/10/40	119.3	1160
F. V. Field	E. C. Carter	10/14/40	105B.3	1161
E. C. Carter	A. Grajdanzev	10/15/40	100.87	1162
E. C. Carter	Joseph P. Chamberlain	10/18/40	191.257	1163
E. C. Carter	Phil	10/29/40	128.49	1164
Owen Lattimore	E. C. Carter	10/29/40	100.206	1165
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	11/ 6/40	100.208	1166
E. C. Carter	Oumansky	11/ 7/40	100.218	1167
Invitation	AMCO	11/19/40	116.18	1168
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	11/28/40	105.13	1169
CP	ECC	12/ 2/40	105.321	1170
E. C. Carter	Grajdanzev	12/13/40	100.37	1171
E. C. Carter	Edwin O. Reischauer	12/17/40	131B.45	1172
E. C. Carter	Harriet L. Moore	12/17/40	500.30	1173
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	12/18/40	100.220	1174
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	12/13/40	100.220	1175
E. C. Carter	Bob	12/30/40	191.72	1176
E. C. Carter	Geoffrey	1/21/41	106.47	1177
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	1/21/41	500.29	1178
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	1/22/41	119.143	1179
Chen Han-seng (Geoffrey)	E. C. Carter	1/24/41	106.54	1180
E. C. Carter	C. K. Moser	2/11/41	500.31	1181
Ch'ao-ting Chi	E. C. Carter	2/18/41	106.51	1182
E. C. Carter	Chen Han-seng	3/12/41	119.31	1184
E. C. Carter	Frederick D. Sharp	6/ 4/41	131B.28	1185
KM	E. C. C	3/24/41	105.297	1186
E. C. Carter	Harriet L. Moore	3/25/41	131B.81	1187
ECC	MG	4/ 3/41	500.32	1188
Members of 9th Conf	E. C. Carter	4/11/41	119.98	1189
Wm. R. Herod	E. C. Carter	4/18/41	119.105	1190
E. C. Carter	Owen Lattimore	5/ 2/41	500.33	1191
Lt. Col. Sharp	E. C. Carter	6/ 6/41	131B.27	1192
Lt. Col. Sharp	E. C. Carter	7/ 3/41	131B.27	1193
HA	ECC	6/19/41	100.226	1194
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	6/23/41	100.248	1195
Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton	E. C. Carter	6/25/41	131B.60	1196
I. P. R	Lt. Col. G. S. C	6/23/41	131.60	1197
E. C. Carter	James J. Maloney	7/ 1/41	172.1	1198
Irving Friedman	E. C. Carter	8/ 7/41	172.1	1199
E. C. Carter	Irving S. Friedman	9/ 9/41	172.1	1200
Irving	E. C. Carter	2/17/41	172.1	1201
Dr. White			172.1	1202
Memo (handwritten)			172.1	12.3
E. C. Carter	Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley	7/ 3/41	100.2	1204
WLH	ECC	7/ 8/41	131B.97	1205

To—	From—	Date	File No.	Exhibit No.
Henry J. Wadleigh	E. C. Carter	7/14/41	191.184	1206
Capt. R. Stuart Murray	E. C. Carter	7/15/41	131B.96	1207
Wm. D. Carter	E. C. Carter	7/15/41	131B.152	1208
Wm. A. M. Burden	E. C. Carter	7/16/41	119.97	1209
Lt. Col. Frederick S. Sharp	E. C. Carter	7/23/41	131B.26	1210
E. C. Carter	Frederick D. Sharp	7/25/41	131B.26	1211
E. C. Carter	Jessica Smith	8/ 4/41	100.179	1212
E. C. Carter	Jessica Smith	8/14/41	100.179	1213
Jessica Smith	E. C. Carter	8/10/41	100.404	1214
Sumner Welles	E. C. Carter	8/13/41	100.410	1215
E. C. Carter	Quincy Wright	8/20/41	106.50	1216
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	9/ 2/41	105.304	1217
State Department	E. C. Carter	10/ 2/41	191.83	1218
Nathaniel Bretholtz (Mrs.)	E. C. Carter	7/15/41	191.83	1219
Nathaniel Bretholtz (Mrs.)	E. C. Carter	7/16/41	191.83	1220
HA	E. C. Carter	11/14/41	199.38	1221
WWL	ECC	11/22/41	131B.69	1222
E. C. Carter	Herman Beukema	11/24/41	131B.153	1223
Tass	E. C. Carter	1/ 1/42	100.21	1225
Joseph E. Davies	E. C. Carter	2/27/42	191.147	1226
E. C. Carter	Catherine Porter	6/ 2/42	119.144	1227
John A. Pollard	E. C. Carter	3/12/42	119.92	1228
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie	3/13/42	119.122	1229
W. L. Holland	C. F. Remer	3/17/42	119.121	1231
ECC	WLH	4/ 6/42	191.111	1232
Wm. W. Lockwood	Roy Veatch	3/30/42	191.111	1233
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie	4/25/42	119.13	1234
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	5/ 5/42	119.13	1235
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/23/42	119.13	1236
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	6/26/42	119.13	1237
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie	10/ 7/42	119.13	1238
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	10/ 7/42	119.13	1239
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie		119.13	1240
Lauchlin Currie	E. C. Carter	9/17/41	119.13	1241
Oumansky	E. C. Carter	3/29/38	100.119	1242
I. P. R	Oumansky	4/20	100.119	1243
V. M. Molotov	E. C. Carter	11/14/42	100.119	1244
E. C. Carter	Phil	3/24/42	105.31	1245
Mrs. Johnstone	E. C. Carter	4/ 6/42	100.81	1246
E. C. Carter	Mrs. A. H. Johnstone	4/ 8/42	100.81	1247
E. C. Carter	Charles A. Thomson	5/12/42	191.74	1249
Charles A. Thomson	E. C. Carter	5/13/42	191.74	1250
E. C. Carter	Truman M. Martin	5/30/42	131B.92	1251
Edgar J. Tarr	E. C. Carter	6/11/42	119.96	1252
E. C. Carter	Anthony N. Fedotov	6/26/42	100.115	1253
E. C. Dayason	E. C. Carter	7/11/42	119.109	1254
Philip C. Jessup	E. C. Carter	8/ 3/42	105.246	1256
Ned (E. C. C.)	Brooks Emeny	9/ 7/42	191.139	1257
G. E. Voitinsky	E. C. Carter	9/28/42	100.20	1258
W. W. Lancaster	E. C. Carter	10/ 1/42	100.210	1259
E. C. Carter	W. W. Lancaster	10/14/42	100.210	1260
W. W. L	E. C. C	10/21/42	106.3	1261
E. C. Carter	Yung-ying Hsu	10/23/42	105.59	1262
John W. Holmes	E. C. Carter	10/23/42	100.251	1263
Jerome D. Greene	E. C. Carter	11/17/42	105.42	1264
J. W. Dafoe	E. C. Carter	11/25/42	112.22	1265
Michael Greenberg	E. C. Carter	3/27/43	100.193	1266
E. C. Carter	Lauchlin Currie	10/ 1/42	500.48	1267
E. C. Carter	Robert W. Barnett	9/12/42	500.47	1268

EXHIBIT No. 1123–A

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 8th January 1940.

DR. ADAM VON TROTT,
c/o John H. Oakie, Esq.

DEAR ADAM: Enclosed is a copy of a letter to Motylev which is self-explanatory. I shall try and send a copy of it by way of Oumansky's diplomatic pouch so that it will get to Motylev in advance of your arrival.

Motylev's office, the Pacific Institute, is at 20, Razin Street, Moscow. It is less than seven minutes' walk from the Kremlin and equally near to whatever hotel you may be staying at. It is an oldish building in which there are several other organizations. Motylev, as you know, is an economic geographer and a very able intellectual. He has been a very active member of the Party and is a Lecturer at the University of Red Professors.

Voitinsky you can get in the Far Eastern Section of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of which Varga is the head. Varga is of German origin and is of very great intellectual ability.

Eugene Harondar is Office Secretary of the Soviet I. P. R. He does not always give full-time to the work of the Institute. His Russian, German, Frtnch, and English are all exceptionally good. Motylev and Voitinsky, if I remember rightly, speak English, German, and French equally well.

I think you will enjoy greatly meeting all of the friends and members of the I. P. R. in Moscow. I suggest for the most part that you concentrate your attention on them while in the city. I vaguely remember that you were only planning to spend three days in Moscow. If you can possibly extend this, I would strongly urge it. You ought to try to spend from five to seven days, unless there are some overriding reasons for hurrying on to Berlin.

J. arrived back from a visit to Edgar on Saturday. On Sunday afternoon he met K.

We miss you greatly and hope you are getting a little rest in the sunshine and warmth of California.

If you want to have Loomis arrange to drive you around to see the beauty spots of Honolulu, please wire me and I will cable him that you are passing through. Maybe you would perfer to arrive unannounced. His new office address is 501 Dillingham Building. This is only two minutes' walk from where your steamer lands.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1124

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK CITY, *December 15, 1939.*

MRS. ADAMA VAN SCHELTEMA,
International Institute for Social History,
264 Keizersgracht, Amsterdam C, Holland.

DEAR MADAM: This letter is to introduce Dr. Adam von Trott, a German scholar who has been engaged, on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in the preparation of a study on the relation of the Chinese guild system to modern Chinese nationalism and labor organization. I am sure you will find him an able research student and I hope that you and your Institute may be able to give him the information and help he desires for the completion of his work. I shall be most grateful for anything you can do for him.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1125

NEW YORK CITY, *March 13, 1940.*

DEAR ADAM: Your very interesting letter from Tokyo dated February 6 reached me on the morning of March 11, as did your cable from Moscow, dated March 9. It was most interesting that the two messages, one from Tokyo and one from Moscow, arrived at the same moment. Your Tokyo letter was posted at Kobe and came through promptly.

I gather that after you wrote you did get the visa to permit you to stop over in Moscow. I do hope that you saw Motylev. I am sure he would appreciate your up-to-date impressions of Virginia Beach and Japan.

I understand that there are considerable delays in the mails to Holland, so I have not written to His Excellency there. It has seemed better to write to our good friend Strong. He, I gather, may be able to see you in person before very long.

It now looks as though I could not start for Chungking until the middle of July.

Corbett has been hard at work, and he and his group are making real progress. There is much to be done. He and his colleagues are doing it very well. I have shown your letter to him, to Jessup, to Bill and to one or two others here.

I have sent a copy to Edgar. Though he was offered the job in the Far East, he declined. He is likely to spend Good Friday with us in New York.

We are all very eager to get your impressions of Moscow and Berlin.

With warmest regards from Mrs. Carter, Ruth, and myself, I am

Ever sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1126

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., January 8, 1940.

His EXCELLENCY, the SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: Here is a letter which I would like to have reach Motylev in advance of von Trott's arrival in Moscow which encloses a letter of introduction that I have given to von Trott. Is it possible for you to send these to Motylev via the Diplomatic pouch? If not, can you advise me how to mark it so as to ensure its reaching Moscow without interference or delay?

With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1127

DUKE UNIVERSITY,
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, OFFICE OF THE DEAN,
Durham, N. C., January 22, 1940.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR Dr. CARTER: I regret that an extraordinary press of work has prevented my being able to read at all carefully the manuscript by Miss Harriet Moore on "Soviet Relations in the Far East, 1931–1939." I had hoped I would be able to do it but I simply have not been able to do so.

In looking the work over hastily, I do have the impression of a sort of pro-Soviet bias which would prevent the work being accepted as wholly objective. To quote several isolated sentences on page 76:

> "During the second Czech crisis in September, the Soviet Union indicated, in the first days of September, its readiness to aid France and Czechoslovakia, only to have this cooperation rejected not only in the final Munich settlement but in all the negotiations leading up to it."

This is quite possibly true but so far as I know the facts are very much in dispute. Take another sentence as an illustration on the same page:

> "Following the annexation of Austria by Germany, and the increasing threat to Czechoslovakia, Litvinov issued an appeal to convoke a world conference of peaceful nations to take positive action to prevent further aggression. But he was answered with silence."

Now it is quite possible to describe what happened in these words; that is what Litvinov said he did, but these "peaceful" nations are the very ones now which Soviet Russia declares are those conducting an imperialistic war. I could go on with scores of other illustrations. I do not know whether the nuances which I am attempting to explain are clear to you or not but I feel quite sure that scholars reading the work would get the impression which I have mentioned.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

CALVIN B. HOOVER, *Dean.*

CBH: RK

EXHIBIT No. 1128

(Handwritten Notation) Copies to:
JRH
Roy Veatch
EFC
R. P. Chin

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 16th February 1940.

Miss IDA PRUITT,
c/o American Bureau for Medical Aid to China,
67 William Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS PRUITT: Would you please prepare for me on two pages a statement which will reach me not later than Tuesday morning giving an authoritative statement of the method of handling any United States Government money that might conceivably be available for C. I. C. You have written of this several times. Roy Veatch has asked me to meet next week a number of his friends to discuss the matter.

I can give a general description of the way the local cooperatives work, but I have no material that would show the mechanism for handling government loans nor have I any details on the two types of financial administration and control in China. Type I being cooperatives financed by the National Government. Type II being cooperatives financed by the Hongkong Committee.

It is going to be relatively easy to arouse people's enthusiasm for the program of the cooperatives. It is going to be more difficult to describe the entire financial administration and control in such a way as to show people how it works, what controls there are, and who audits the accounts.

Don't think for a minute that because Veatch has asked me to meet his friends that this means that a grant from the Washington government is likely. It is a long and uncertain journey from a junior official in the State Department to a vote in Congress, and there are many adversaries.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1129

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 8, 1940.

Miss INGRID WARBURG,
25 West 54th Street, New York City.

DEAR MISS WARBURG: I have recently been asked to write a letter to Johannes Schroeder, whose address is care of Senora Maria E. Villasenor, Humboldt Av 39, Dept. 4, Mexico City, saying that we would like his counsel in anti-Fascist work in the United States. He has a Mexican passport and was in this country on a visitor's visa from September 1939 to December 1939. He requires a letter from some American organization so as to get a visa for a return to the United States.

This request has come to me from S. A. Trone, 390 Riverside Drive, whose telephone is Monument 2–8335.

I have only known Mr. Trone slightly. Do you know anything about Schroeder? I think I will also write Dr. Niebuhr.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Pencilled notation:)
Sent to 227 Eden Road, Palm Beach, Fla.

EXHIBIT No. 1130

129 EAST 52ND STREET.
New York, N. Y., 9th March, 1940.

Miss ELSIE FAIRFAX-CHOLMELEY,
c/o China Institute of Pacific Relations,
10, Peking Road, Kowloon, Hongkong.

DEAR ELSIE: This is to acknowledge your cablegram reading as follows:

"Hanseng fieldworking sun honorary chairman fully confident committee due Hanseng's effort Hongkong Chungking cooperating Cripps enthusiastic committee wishes you urge Kung finance Snow."

I have the approval of John Hersey and Ch'ao-ting Chi of wiring Kung to send Snow but I am waiting now to hear from Ida Pruitt for I do not want to act without her full approval.

There is another matter on which I want your help. About a year ago we managed to get through Miss Madge Cleeve from His Majesty's Stationer's Office a few copies of the pamphlets in the series of Peace Handbooks that Sir George Brothero of the British Foreign Office prepared for the Paris Peace Conference. If I remember rightly I handed them over to you to get bound for the Pacific Council Library.

Phil Lilienthal has searched the Library several times but has failed to find them.

You may remember that we borrowed one or two of the bound volumes of the Peace Handbooks from the Council on Foreign Relations but we would invariably return them to them.

Can you rack your memory and give us some clue as to what happened to the half dozen little pamphlets in this series that we got from London a little while before you and I sailed for the Far East?

P. C. Chang is leaving today or tomorrow to attend the meeting of the People's Political Council. You will doubtless see him as he passes through Hongkong.

I note that about a fortnight ago Miss Pruitt reported to you that I was about to go to Washington in connection with a Government loan for the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. I hope this did not raise false hopes on your part or that of any of your friends. Very informally I met representatives of the Treasury, the S. E. C., the State Department, and the Department of Agriculture. These were all for the most part junior officials with whom Miss Pruitt had already been in contact. They are all deeply interested in the Cooperatives. At the same time they seem to be of the unanimous opinion that there was no chance whatsoever at the present session of Congress for any Governmental aid to C. I. C.

If I had seen higher ups I do not think I would have received a different report. The $20 million credit through the Export-Import Bank is all I am afraid that can be expected from Governmental sources this year. And I do not imagine that the Chinese Government has any intention of deflecting any of the 20 million to the C. I. C. I ought to add that Miss Pruitt's work among officials in Washington has been of a very high order. She has aroused genuine interest. It is a pity it can't be canalized into a substantial government grant.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—As you will have gathered from the copy of my letter to John Hersey of February 8, I do not feel that Hubert Liang should be sent to this country on behalf of the Industrial Cooperatives. He is a man of the highest character and patriotic spirit, but what is needed is someone who will carry greater weight and greater conviction.

EXHIBIT No. 1131

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 13, 1940.

Miss INGRID WARBURG,
25 West 54th Street, New York City

DEAR Miss WARBURG: You will, I think, be glad to hear that Adam sent me a cable from Moscow on March 9, saying that he was leaving for Berlin on that day. I have also had a letter from him from Tokyo indicating that he had a very useful and illuminating visit there.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1132

MARCH 14, 1940.

WLH From ECC:

Here is Fred Field's proposed letter to Tsurumi. The letter is to my mind adequate except for one point: at the top of the second page Fred says that the American Council strictly avoids political statements. Fred in this letter is using AMERASIA to differentiate between IPR and non-IPR activities. If this letter goes to the Japanese Council, will they feel that it puts Fred over his own signature as frankly playing the role of Mr. Box and Mr. Cox?

Intrinsically I can find no fault with Fred's excellent letter. Should I have any misgivings about it?

(Pencilled: "No".)

EXHIBIT No. 1133

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 19, 1940.

His Excellency the Ambassador of the U. S. S. R.
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: It has occurred to me that possibly you would be interested in reading this article of Lattimore's that has just appeared in the VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW.

With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1134

MARCH 20, 1940.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you very much for your two letters. They did not reach me before as I am traveling until about April 6.

I am very glad to know that Adam got as far as he did.

Regarding Johannes Schroeder I want to assure you that I don't know anything about him, only that he was a member of the C. P. in Germany.

I hope to see you soon.

With kind regards,
Sincerely yours,

/S/ INGRID WARBURG.

EXHIBIT No. 1135

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 22nd March 1940.

HIS EXCELLENCY, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: Doubtless you saw Miss Dorothy Thompson's confession in her column this morning. Do you happen to know who her misinformants were?

With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1136

WLH
IIA From ECC:

Please note the attached from Cabot Coville. Under the circumstances I am inclined to send Coville a full set of the Inquiry documents, but do not wish to go to this expense if either of you think it is unwise. If the State Department were not so financially starved by Congress I would send the whole set to him with a bill for the same. For promotion purposes, I am proposing to send him the five books already issued in printed form and tell him I will write him later whether we are in a position to send him all of the mimeographed and forthcoming printed volumes.

Please note the people whom he suggests as in a position to comment on Colegrove.

EXHIBIT No. 1137

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 24th April 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
Care, Giannini Foundation, University of California,
Berkeley, California.

DEAR BILL: Our copy of the Tamagna manuscript has arrived minus the material that he says he will send us later. After you have glanced through it will you immediately air mail me answers to the following questions:

(1) Is this good enough in its present form to justify our making copies to go immediately to the Advisers and to the following commentators:

Frederick Schuman	von Beckwrath
Kurt Bloch	proper person in
Dragoni	State Department

(2) In view of the arrival of this manuscript a little more promptly than we anticipated, what are your recommendations with reference to the editing? Do you or Phil desire to undertake it, or do you wish us to secure someone here?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1138

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE,
Washington, April 29, 1940.

In reply refer to 35

(Penciled notation:). WLH. Scan & return ECC

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: In reply to your letter of April 24, I am informed by my colleague, Mr. Ernest C. Ropes, who handles information on Russian commercial matters for this Bureau, that the whole matter of Soviet purchases from the United States is one of considerable complication. The Soviets have bought considerable copper from us during the past year because they were unable to obtain it elsewhere. The figures over recent months, as far as we have them, are as follows:

Copper to U. S. S. R.

Exports:	*Lbs.*
Sept.–Dec. 1939	46,782,000
January 1940	53,205,784
February 1940	12,816,549
Lbs.	112,804,333

Reexports:	*Dollars*
Sept.–Dec. 1939	1,149
January 1940	337,476
February 1940	410,077
	748,702

Unable to get by the regulations of our Maritime Commission with shipments of copper to Vladivostok, Amtorg, it appears, shipped the goods to Mexico where they were reloaded on Soviet boats that had come over from Vladivostok. En route to port, the vessels were stopped by the British and taken to Hong Kong where they were turned over to the French who still have them, according to reports. The last cargo stopped is reported to have been returned to the United States, and a few days ago the Amtorg in New York offered a lot of copper for sale but because of unsatisfactory prices offered the copper was withdrawn.

Oil shipments to Soviet Russia in 1939 and 1940 were actually less than in the two previous years, although it has been reported in the press that they amounted to 2,500,000 barrels. Last year only ordinary gasoline was involved, while in previous years the bulk of shipments were of aviation grade. Mr. Ropes expresses the opinion that in all years these shipments were purely for the supply

of Soviet Russia in the Far Eastern area and that none was likely to get to Germany.

Tin shipments appear large because the Soviets have not previously bought tin in the United States at all, and actually the purchases from us are small compared to the Soviet's annual imports over a number of years.

Relative to your inquiry regarding shipments of copper from Spain to Germany, our Metals and Minerals Division does not have any definite information. It is known, however, that during the period of the Spanish Civil War considerable quantities of copper or copper-bearing materials, produced at Rio Tinto, were shipped from Spain to Germany. The Division is inclined to doubt that much, if any, copper has gone from Spain to Germany since the outbreak of the war in Europe.

The newspaper reports which you mentioned in your letter as emanating from Japan are given little credence here, because reports of a similar nature are almost a daily occurrence in the course of political disturbances in the Far Eastern area.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

[S] C. K. Moser,
C. K. Moser.
Chief, Far Eastern Section, Division of Regional Information.

Exhibit No. 1139

129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, April 24, 1940.

Dr. C. K. Moser
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Moser: Around the middle of April the British were making a fuss over American shipments to Vladivostok. At that time, Mr. Butler gave out figures calculated to give the public the idea that the total of American shipments to the U.S.S.R. had increased greatly since the beginning of the European war.

An AP dispatch from Tokyo, dated April 23, which appeared in last evening's and this morning's papers contained among others, the following paragraphs:

"Reports reaching Japan said Vladivostok was choked with incoming cargoes consigned to Germany, that warehouses were overflowing and docks piled high. It was said that an average of 1,500 metric tons (1,653 American tons) of carbon was being licensed daily for transshipment.

"American copper imports arriving at the Russian port from the outbreak of the war until March 31 totaled 70,000 metric tons (71,140 tons) according to Japanese statistics, whereas formerly Vladivostok received an average of only 6,000 metric tons yearly. Imports of oil and tin had increased similarly, it was said."

It begins to look as though it was the beginning of an Anglo-Japanese alliance to scare people abroad about American shipments to the U. S. S. R. I assume that you would be able to answer for me the following double question: Have British and American exports to all U.S.S.R. ports increased or decreased since the war began?

By the way, what information have you regarding shipments of copper derivatives to Germany from a British-controled company in Spain to the amount of 30,000 or 35,000 tons per month?

May I explain to you privately my own personal position and that is that it will be a political and strategical mistake of the first order for the Allies to go to war with the U. S. S. R. Contrary to the popular opinion, I am convinced that the U.S.S.R. wants to stay out of the war in Europe, but that if the British and French continue their hostile attitude they may still succeed in effecting an alliance between Moscow and Berlin as a substitute for the present Berlin-Moscow non-aggression pact.

Your reply will of course be treated confidentially. With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter.

EXHIBIT No. 1141

Copies to: WLH
ED
OL
CTC
AB

129 EAST 52ND STREET, *New York, N. Y.,*
2nd May 1940.

HA from ECC:

I note in a letter from Field to Shotwell about sending Carnegie publications to China the following p. s.:

"Miss Hume also informs me that, as it is the only port which is definitely open for shipments to China, packages should be marked '*Via Rangoon.*'"

Will you please investigate and see whether book packages that we are sending to "free China" as differentiated from Hong Kong and Shanghai are and should be marked "*Via Rangoon.*" When you have cleared up this point, would you notify all whose initials appear at the bottom of this letter.

WLH
OL
AB
ED
CTC
ECC

EXHIBIT No. 1142

MAY 2, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary-General, Pacific Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR NED: This will introduce Lt. Colonel George E. Arneman, who for the past three years has been one of the most useful and active members of the Hawaii Group, I. P. R.

He is the one who engineered the two Schofield conferences for us and has been a member of several of our study groups. He was the G–2 intelligence officer at Schofield Barracks and has had two different tours as military attaché in Baltic countries.

I want him to see the library and general workings of the Top Floor and hope it will be possible for him to participate in one of your regional conferences. His immediate assignment is to the state of Maine.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES F. LOOMIS, *Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 1143

TELEPHONE 5325 Cable: INPAREL, Honolulu

Hawaii Group, Executive Committee: Riley H. Allen, Chairman; A. L. Dean, Vice Chairman; Frank C. Atherton, Treasurer; Charles F. Loomis, Secretary; Robbins B. Anderson; Paul S. Bachman; Peter H. Buck; David L. Crawford; W. F. Dillingham; Gerald W. Fisher; Peyton Harrison; Shao-chang Lee; Frank E. Midkiff; Iga Mori; Philip S. Platt; Oscar F. Shepard; Yasutaro Soga; Hugh C. Tennet; Heaton L. Wrenn

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTION OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

501 Dillingham Building

HONOLULU, HAWAII

MAY 3, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR NED: Colonel Arneman is an enthusiastic I. P. R. booster and is responsible for getting several army officers in our Group. At least three of

them have written saying that their contacts with our study groups while here were the most stimulating ones they had.

He sails today on the U. S. T. *Hunter Liggett* to his new assignment in Maine and will call on you and Field en route.

Sincerely yours,

Chas.,
CHAS. F. LOOMIS.

Encl.

(Penciled notation:) P. S.—And what are your travel plans for the summer and fall? Any new developments with our friends in Japan?—CHAS.

EXHIBIT No. 1144

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, May 8, 1940.

Mr. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD,
American Committee for International Studies,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR BILL: I have given your letter of May 2 considerable thought. Rather than limit myself to one or two suggestions, I think it is better for me to make quite a number which I regard as of great importance, or of being worthy of further investigation.

In order that you may understand my reaction to your letter, and to this highly interesting and significant statement which Earle and you have just issued on the American Committee for International Studies, I am venturing quite informally to send you quite a number of names.

Your Committee's statement, as well as the quality of its leadership and its membership are most encouraging. As would be expected of the kind of leadership that you and Earle are giving, it is encouraging to note that you are not disinterested in relating scientific research to questions of policy and that your main objective is to make new and constructive approaches to the study of international affairs.

You are, I think, familiar with Dr. Percy E. Corbett's general plan of work. He has the approval of McGill for a continuation of major work on this project after his return to McGill in 1941. In the meantime, he and I are looking for an appropriate colleague with a Far Eastern background comparable to Corbett's background in Europe, the Americas and the British Commonwealth, in the hope that the two of them with appropriate assistance can make a synthesis and interpretation of all that is most fundamental in the I. P. R.'s Far Eastern Inquiry with what is basic in the studies of Chatham House, of P. E. P., of Shotwell's Committee, the New School, Buell's book and the many European Studies and those that are appearing in Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere. Corbett is thinking not simply of a review of reviews or a synthesis of existing plans. He aims to carry them further, more fundamentally and contageously.

The basic work that he has in mind and much of the work of many of the groups and individuals just mentioned would in my view be aided enormously if arrangements could be made for some such international exchange fellowships as the following:

(1) Bring over R. H. Tawney so that he may appraise, critisize and interpret the Corbett project, contribute to it and at the same time make a critique of the plans of the other serious groups on this continent.

(2) Bring Ushiba, Saionji or Yokota in order that we may have someone from the very inside of Japan closely in touch with current thought in the Japanese army, and bureaucracies and the universities.

(3) Send Harriet Moore to the U. S. S. R. to go through all government and party writing on postwar problems and supplement this by interviewing party and politburo chiefs.

(4) Bring von Trott from Berlin to be associated with Corbett, Sansom, Tawney and others, and hold him here until a week before America enters the war.

(5) Discover who is the most valuable man in the P. E. P. group, namely the one principally responsible for the now really first-class P. E. P. Memorandum (7th Edition), and bring him to the United States after a visit with Kittredge and his French colleagues in Paris.

(6) If Tamagna turns out to be as promising as he looks on paper, send him to Rome to undertake a study there on lines similar to Miss Moore's study in Moscow, returning at the end of six months to give six months to collaboration with the group under the direction of Corbett, Sansom, Holland, Alexander, and also with the A. C. I. S., Earle and yourself.

(7) Discover whether there is one wise and great man in Manila—(Would Apostol qualify?)—and have him spend three months on the project in Manila, a month each in Chungking and Tokyo and then bring him, preferably by way of the trans-Siberan railway, to collaborate with the groups here.

(8) Send Phil Jessup or Jack Sheppard for three months each to Batavia, Chungking, Manila, Tokyo.

(9) Discover whether Myrdal would be free three months after his return to Sweden to contribute an analysis of above-ground and under-ground concepts in Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania on postwar organization.

(10) After he has served six months in the French Army, if he is still alive, dig up Dennery by the roots and bring him over to collaborate with Corbett, Earle, and yourself. Failing Dennery, consider Joxe.

(11) Discover whether there is some European, African or British scholar who knows the greater part of Africa from the political and economic angle, and arrange for him to make a fresh visit to the principal African states and colonies. After a ten-month survey of war repercussions and the establishment of contact with that handful of people in each area who are thinking of postwar organization, bring him to New York for collaboration with the groups here.

(12) Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan and others who are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America from a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization.

(13) Bring both Searle Bates and Chen Han-seng from China to collaborate both with Corbett, Tawney, Sansom and Holland on the one hand and with such groups as the American Committee may recommend on the other.

(14) Bring either Motylev, Troyanovsky or Voitinski, to contribute alike to the I. P. R. Inquiry, Corbett's special synthesis and to such studies by other American groups as may be recommended by the American Committee for International Studies.

(15) Discover from S. K. Datta and Jawaharlal Nehru what Indian scholar is qualified or could take time under a Rockefeller fellowship to qualify himself to come to New York to contribute to the work of the various international and national groups here.

The parochialism of even the greatest thinkers is such that unless international organization is studied in an atmosphere that is made realistic by the physical presence of people from every continent, grave errors are inevitable. You will remember that in his A Study of History, Arnold J. Toynbee asserts that, as a historian, he disapproves of the use to which historical information has been put. He maintains that historical scholarship has substituted the nation for mankind and thwarted the impulse to comprehend life as a whole. To support this he examines one case and discovers that English history is unintelligible when taken by itself. The "intelligible field of study" must be in some larger unit than the nation. "Historical thought takes a deep impression from the dominant institutions and the transient social environment in which it happens to live."

You will note that the people I envisage as fellowship holders and collaborators represent everyone of the disciplines in the social sciences.

It seems to Holland and me that either your Committee or your Committee acting jointly with the I. P. R. or the Rockefeller Foundation itself should set up a temporary research bureau in New York for the next three or four years, devoted solely to studying the question of wartime and postwar problems.

Many of these suggestions, or perhaps the multiplicity of them, may cause you to feel that I have gone beyond your request. This I have clearly done, but I have been moved to do so by my fairly deep convictions. The I. S. C. has done valuable work, but one of its principal limitations has been that it has been too much conditioned by its European environment. The I. P. R. has done valuable work, but it has been too much conditioned by its Pacific environment. It seems to me that the war situation makes it more imperative than ever that a nucleus of scholars be established somewhere in the world, probably of neces-

sity in New York, which can look at present problems of mankind from an even more inclusive point of view than that of either the I. S. C. or the I. P. R.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1145

129 EAST 52ND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.,
19th December, 1942.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

DEAR PHIL: Here are the rapporteurs' reports for the last group of Round Tables. I think you will be particularly interested in the reports of Harriet Moore, Fred Field, and Ralph Bunche. You will want to read, of course, ultimately, Condliffe's report, though it was not regarded as measuring up as well to the requirements as the three others.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1146

(Handwritten:) RWB, HP, FVF, KM, WLH.

BAGUIO, *May 10, 1940.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have read Robert Barnett's article, China's Industrial Cooperatives on Trial, and the comments of Rewi Alley and Miss Cholmeley on this presentation. I am amazed that Barnett could have drawn such a clear picture of both the strength and weakness of Indusco, from such a distance. He is to be congratulated for his understanding of both the potential significance of the movement (with which he is obviously in sympathy) and the dangers which confront it with possible failure.

What comment I have to offer is not meant as criticism either of his point of view, which is good, or his objective analysis of the material available to him, which is sound enough and as competent as anyone could have done without a more intimate experience with complex problems that face Indusco workers in the field. I offer these remarks merely to fill in a little of the background of those problems. Most of it is probably already familiar to you. Fundamentally I agree with Miss Cholmeley that the weakness of Barnett's article—if it is a weakness—is failure properly to estimate the degree to which the political mileu conditions the development of Indusco. This is fully implied also in Alley's comment.

I will just enumerate a few things which might have been handled differently if Barnett had possessed all the facts.

1. First of all, a word about the objectives of C. I. C. It is not correct, as far as I know, that "conflicts developed among those who supported the movement" over the points Barnett mentions. The charge of "communism" came from C. I. C.'s enemies, not its supporters. Leaders in the organization all fear the degeneration of the movement into a chi-kuan; nobody advocates it. And without exception they welcome foreign help and participation that offers any practicable advantage.

But a certain disagreement between some leaders over fundamental objectives sometimes causes confusion of purpose. I should say the majority, in practice, and almost everybody, in theory, admits that the first objective of C. I. C. is *not* to set up a model cooperative movement in the midst of present chaos, but to *win the war*. Therefore, C. I. C. is no place for the Rochdale orthodox to come on pilgrimage, for their principles must be sacrified wherever they handicap the primary purpose. Starting cooperatives with destitute workers possessing no assets whatever is in itself a mortal sin in Rochdale eyes, yet this is Indusco's essential method.

To win the war, Indusco recognized its task to be (1) to maintain independent Chinese industrial production of some kind over the widest possible areas, both in the rear and behind the Japanese lines, so as to offer a market for the greatest possible number of Chinese, (2) to mobilize Chinese skilled labor, in order to prevent Japan from exploiting it in war aims, and for other obvious reasons, (3) to furnish war bases for the guerrilla troops, (4) to achieve this mobilization in a form which would strengthen the will and the sense of responsibility of the

working class. Indusco people accepted these aims and the fundamental win-the-war objective because everybody saw clearly that if China lost the war no cooperative organization, however model or ideal it might be, could survive. Dozens of examples of the fate of small-scale, carefully-charted pre-war institutions (consider Ting Hsien, for one) in the occupied areas proved this beyond any argument. The thing was to make this a practical mass organization on the biggest scale possible, and quickly enough to affect the outcome of the war. Indusco is above all a mass movement, as Alley keeps repeating, and as such it must acquire much of its character from below. It is a war-time improvisation, a method of mobilization, a section of national defense, an instrument of struggle, a training ground for democracy, a social and political hope, and a focus for the help of all those who believe it is desirable to have an independent democratic China. It is all that and a lot of other things simultaneously with its organic form as a cooperative movement. So you see how very radically it differs from any cooperative attempt of the past. Because of its unique character, Indusco can fail in some respects as an efficient cooperative organization, but still be a triumph if it attains its other objectives.

While I think few inside the movement would dispute the priority of these hopes, in theory, nevertheless there are some who in practice feel depressed whenever the cooperative ideal comes into conflict with the practical need. Thus you find schisms occasionally where opposition develops to extending co-ops into dangerous regions, to expansion to new areas or into new industries while existing units are still in the formation stage, or to the sacrifice of cooperative principles in order to meet emergency needs. E. g., the army order for 400,000 blankets was filled partly by employing thousands of women on a piece-work basis. E. g., some rear-line co-op workers object to C. I. C. extension into the guerrilla areas, where the danger of loss through war greatly increases. Maybe, as Alley says, C. I. C. is attempting too much. But if that is true it is because everywhere the need and the opportunity are so urgent and the alternatives to C. I. C. are so weak, that the latter cannot restrict itself as a peacetime organization might be able to do.

2. Now, in view of all this, one might think the various elements which make up the Government would unanimously extend all possible aid to C. I. C. Such is not the case, though I am afraid Barnett assumes it to be. Certain individuals, originally lukewarm, are now stanch backers: Mme. Chiang, the Generalissimo, Mme. Kung, Dr. Kung—in general the "palace satellite group". All liberal and left-wing elements are behind it, but they have little to say in the Government. The groups which dominate the bureaucracy, on the other hand, are opposed to C. I. C. and will continue to be as long as it is not a chi-kuan under their control. And these (chiefly the C. C. and the Cheng Hsüeh Hsi) are powerful enough to keep the organization from getting necessary financial backing, often interfere with it locally, raise the baseless cry of "communism" to the embarrassment of its friends, and have had to be placated by compromises in certain regions—which are consequently now the most backward of all.

3. C. I. C. has thus never been given its proper status as a national defense institution, and the Soong family, while behind it, have never understood the full implications of the objectives set forth above. Thus the Government help (which up till now amounts to only about $3,000,000, as contrasted with about an equal amount raised from bank loans and gifts) has been limited mostly to third-line areas. It was not available for extraordinary expenses which really should have come from defense expenditure: i. e., salvaging of tools and machinery, transportation of essential workers, and the setting up on guerrilla industry. Consequently, countless opportunities to save valuable means of production were lost, especially in front line areas. The delay in recognizing C. I. C.'s defense function cost China millions of dollars in lost plant and labor power. What results it has accomplished in this respect have been financed largely by (1) gifts from special funds raised by outside supporters, (2) borrowing "special funds" from capital funds and charging them against loans made to the co-ops eventually set up. The latter is highly irregular, as Barnett rightly points out. But what would you do, let the machines fall into enemy hands in order to be regular? I note, for example, Barnett's praise for the removal of some of the Kingtehchen kilns and workers to southeast Kiangsi. They would not be there today had it not been for just the kind of irregularity which he—again quite rightly—deplores. Alley and other C. I. C. leaders have repeatedly plowed back their own salaries into the organization, when the Government would not advance special funds. Alley in fact put his life savings into this work; and so did others. Often, due to bureaucratic manipulation, salaries (provided for the staff personnel by Government allowance from relief funds) were withheld for months.

At one time Alley's own salary was seven months in abeyance. When I was in Paochi staff salaries had not been paid for three months and organizers were digging into their own pockets to meet daily needs. Show me another organization, outside of the guerrilla districts, of which this is true. These men were even facing the prospect of permanent withdrawal of Government aid and had already brought the problem before the cooperative guild, and considered ways and means of financing staff work from co-op contributions.

4. "The word cooperative is not mentioned." I know of no cases where co-ops have been organized without a discussion of the co-op constitution, the pledge of all to observe it, and in no case has money been loaned to start private factories or workshops. Unquestionably the basic principles are often but hazily understood by new groups. But there is never any attempt to entice them into this method of work by deception.

5. "In one co-op more than 200 light machine guns are made daily." This is incorrect. The output of China's best arsenal at present is only 200 machine guns a month. Co-ops have made guns and grenades; one in southern Shensi turned out 70,000 hand grenades in one month, on Government order, but on Government order stopped making them also. The Government does not want co-ops to make munitions, and extends no aid to C. I. C. to build badly needed war industries in the guerrilla districts.

6. Most of C. I. C.'s machinery has been salvaged from war areas, purchased from inoperative plants, or made in its own machine shops. A little has been imported. In few instances has any functioning plant been bought and turned over to cooperative ownership. In many cases of handicraft industry one or more members of a co-op possessed tools or light machines, but lacked operating capital and technical direction. In other cases odd bits of machinery were lying unused in scattered villages, but there was no one to bring them together to create a workable industry. C. I. C. performed that function. Sometimes Government-owned industry had been abandoned or partly dismantled, until C. I. C. with great difficulty managed to buy it up and put it back into production. This was true of C. I. C.'s alcohol plant in Shensi, and of the testing laboratory there. It is true of a sulphuric acid plant in Sian, which C. I. C. has been trying to buy. But—though the plant remains idle—the political opposition succeeds in frustrating the purchase.

7. Barnett praises co-op hospitals, schools, creches, and clubhouses. In most cases these have had to be financed by non-Government funds, or by methods he would consider "irregular." When they have proved their value it is hoped the Government will give them some support. The schools are opposed by the C. C., who will probably succeed in preventing that support for some time.

8. The Shensi laboratory was not "placed at the disposal" of C. I. C. Though it was idle, C. I. C. could not secure it from the Government except by payment of an annual rental of $10,000. This latter will have to be supplied, probably, from capital funds, until the Co-op Guilds become strong enough to maintain it themselves—which should be the case in a year or so. Another irregularity—but an imperative need.

9. "The Government may abandon its support" not because of inefficient accounting methods—C. I. C. has an infinitely better record in this respect than the machine-bossed Credit co-ops—but because it is making a determined fight to keep its organization out of the hands of the bureaucratic apparatus, and it may lose. C. I. C. is the only war organization now training accountants from the masses, from its own workers, and the only one whose accountants are not machine appointees. Exceptions are found in Szechuan, where some C.C. men have had to be given posts, under pressure from the party, and where the worst co-ops in the organization are found. Government money "earmarked for use by cooperatives has been withheld" not because of any proven case of corruption but because of bureaucratic opposition.

10. Barnett is quite right in emphasizing the need for improvement in accountancy, for a greater degree of discipline, and for greater coordination of field workers with general headquarters. Due to various conditions, the growth of the movement in the field has been far more rapid than the general section could follow or direct. One of these conditions is political. Another is communications. It takes a week to reach Paochi from Chungking, and two weeks to reach Kanchow. Telegrams take almost as long. Money travels about four times as slowly as that. People in Chungking have no conception of the daily problems facing headquarters' chiefs, and the latter more and more assume responsibility for decision. The tendency now is definitely away from too much centralized power, which has in the past handicapped the growth

of field work. Only when the working units become numerous and powerful enough to be an important factor in national economic life can the central section find its real place. The aim of most co-op leaders is eventually to bring that section under the control of the many field units, through a National Indusco Guild, instead of the other way round. C. I. C. people are definitely democrats, all their workers are being trained in democratic principles, and that is just why "it is not always plain who the single individual is through whom" all authority is exercised. The aim of C. I. C. is to make that "single individual" the united will of the co-op members, not the whim of a politician.

11. Barnett cites a case where "shares carried a fantastic multiple liability of 250 times their face value" and believes "reform is essential if the cooperatives are to merit continued financial support from government or non-political sources." The case cited is unusual but all through the co-ops liability probably exceeds share investment by from 10 to 50 times. Should we wait until the destitute refugees turn bandit, steal enough cash to buy a shop, and then come back and get a loan to start a cooperative? Barnett probably does not realize the extraordinary rate of capital turnover in light industries in Free China. In the whole C. I. C. chain it is now averaging 16.8 times per year, and it is quite possible for workers in some industries to pay back an unsecured loan in six months. In certain areas the value of C. I. C. production appears to be as much as 25 times that of capital. This is quite "normal," and occurs in all countries during infant industrialism. Even in Shanghai now an annual 10/1 ratio of production to capital is common. There are many reasons for this, which I won't go into here. In any case, Barnett's fears in this respect are exaggerated—though that is the line of attack used by the C. C. and other enemies of the movement. What they object to, however, is really the fact that C. I. C. loans are not under their control, and go to poor people instead of to the gentry, as in the case of the so-called "agricultural cooperatives." The C. C., through the co-op control commission, pumped 50 millions into the villages last year, through the magistrates, who in many cases simply called in the gentry and formed a "co-op" with them, distributing the manna without further ado.

12. The "hired labor" problem is quite serious and C. I. C. must fight against this abuse. No hard and fast rule can be laid down without more experience. Clearly a machine shop co-op, for example, cannot take in 10 carpenters as members when it needs their labor only for a special order to make wheels for carts, or frames for looms, for which there may not be another demand for weeks or months. Spinners, for whose products C. I. C. textile co-ops may have a temporary need, also present a problem. Clearly the case cited by Barnett, where in a co-op with 32 members only 16 were at work, together with 13 hired laborers and 33 apprentices, was an outrage unless it was a temporary phenomenon. I know that such cases exist in Szechuan, and that when discovered by inspectors these co-ops are either reorganized or dissolved. Outside that province (where C. I. C. faces an especially acute political struggle, as I have pointed out) such instances are rare, though the problem definitely exists. Here is just the place, in fact, where C. I. C. would go to pieces if it fell in the hands of Chinese Tammany methods. It would simply degenerate into another loan bureau, through which the party machine would dump money into the pockets of the t'u-hao and the lieh-sheng, to enable them to hire slave labor under the name of "cooperation."

I would not like any part of this to be quoted under my name but I think it is worth discussing at this length, so that American friends can better appreciate the complexity of the tasks that face C. I. C. It is a great movement, with great aims, and some fine men and women in it. Maybe it is attempting the impossible, but so far it has achieved enough to keep hope alive. The real danger is that it is moving much faster than the country as a whole, particularly its political life. Only the war moves ahead of it, and in that emergency lies the explanation of its existence at all. It is not "China's Industrial Cooperatives on Trial" really—they have already proved that they are inherently sound—it is "China on Trial Through Industrial Cooperatives."

I wish you would express my profound appreciation to Robert Barnett for his brilliant statement on C. I. C. Despite the points of disagreement made above, I think it is the best objective summary I have seen.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

[s] Edgar Snow

Edgar Snow.

EXHIBIT No. 1147

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
129 East 52nd Street.
New York City, June 6, 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esquire,
300 Gilman Hall, John Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Here is Gaus' reply and my acknowledgement. Is Vincent competent? Is he now in Washington? What do you suggest as the next move?

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter
EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—Please return these letters at your convenience.

EXHIBIT No. 1148

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
South Hall
MADISON, WISCONSIN

JUNE 3, 1940.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of May 29 with its invitation to review the new book by Owen Lattimore. I am just reading the book with very great pleasure and profit. I must say in all honesty, however, that I simply lack the knowledge that a person should possess to review this book adequately for *Pacific Affairs*. It is far too distinguished and important a work to be left to one who is an amateur in these questions. And while I have read all of Mr. Lattimore's books and some others on Asia, I have not visited that region or made a special study of its history and problems.

I wonder if you know Mr. John Carter Vincent of our Foreign Service, formerly a member of the staff of the Embassy in Peiping and during the past year State Department representative at the International Labor Office in Geneva. He knows Lattimore and his work, and he knows the Far East very well indeed, as does his wife. I think that he may have been ordered back to this country in view of the developments abroad, but I am not sure. I mention him, because I know how much I would turn with eagerness to a review of this book by him. Doubtless, however, you have many other experts on your list who are available.

Thank you again for your kindness in inviting me to review the book.

Faithfully yours,

John M. Gaus
JOHN M. GAUS.

JMG: EMB.
(Handwritten:) I find *Pacific Affairs* excellent.

EXHIBIT No. 1149

JUNE 10, 1940.

KM from ECC:

Here is a copy of Corbett's proposal for the Summer, also a copy of his project for the year, entitled, "I. P. R., European War, and International Organization." From the latter you may wish to make an appropriate note for the forthcoming issue of I. P. R. NOTES.

Miss Virginia Thompson has just completed the manuscript of her book on Siam. She is at present a member of the International Secretariat in New York cooperating in the study of the effect of the war in Europe on the policies of those countries which are chiefly interested in the Far East. In this connection her special field of study is the war and peace aims of France in relationship to the Far East and the general problem of international organization.

Ch'ao-ting Chi has been given six months leave of absence to assist in an independent survey of the Chinese transportation systems and war economy. He sailed from San Francisco on May 15, 1940. It is expected that he will travel widely in free China in connection with his present assignment.

Nagaharu Yasuo, who joined the International Secretariat on January 11, 1938, for a period of two years, was able to get permission from Domei news agency to continue as a member of the Secretariat longer than was originally proposed, namely, until April 1st, when he resumed work for Domei, being posted in the first instance in its New York office. He has, however, been able to continue part time work as a member of the Secretariat. It is hoped that he will be able to continue to do so until his successor arrives in New York from Tokyo.

EXHIBIT 1150

JUNE 12, 1940.

[Night letter]

MOTYLEV, *Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow (U. S. S. R.)*:

In view his recent Asia visit recommend you talk with Cripps.

EDWARD CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1151

(Handwritten notation:) OL scan & return to ECC.

JULY 3, 1940.

ECC from RWB:

Thank you for letting me see Lattimore's "Empire in the East." I agree with you that it represents an important point of view. His argument is, I believe, that as China goes, so goes Asia; that China may go under the yoke of colonial domination and other Asiatic peoples follow, or China may wrest her independence and freedom from the existing stalemate in the Far Eastern hostilities. The future of half the peoples of the world lies largely, therefore, with the fate of China. The argument is well taken. However, without exaggeration, the argument may be carried even further for with the fate of China lies the future of the other half of the peoples of the world as well. China loses and, whatever happens in Europe, the United States and the British Empire (or its remnants) must maintain a military and naval alert in the waters of the Pacific. China wins and democratic processes acquire a practical verification which they have not yet gained in Europe. Either of these developments will have far-reaching repercussions upon democracy here. Thus, one might say that "as China goes, so goes Asia—so goes democracy—so goes the United States."

On pp. 3–4 Lattimore refers to the lessons of Changkufeng and Namonhan. I believe his implicit point is that the United States should take a bold stand, in which I concur. But his depreciation of the argument that boldness unifies Japan behind counteraction is contradicted by his admission that Japan did attack the USSR. This argument cuts no ice with American readers who in general, desire only to avoid war; not to win small ones.

EXHIBIT No. 1152

(Penciled notation:) Copies to WLH
OL
HP
LKR
RWB

JULY 2, 1940.

FVF from ECC:

Recently I wrote to a Chinese friend in Hongkong asking about Kuomintang-Communist relations. He is not a member of the Secretariat of either the China I. P. R. or the Pacific Council. Under date of May 31st he wrote me as follows:

> "Since last March I have been worried about the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists. You may be aware that the Communists have been conducting publicity against the Central Government for the last

12 months. They have printed lots of pamphlets under the name of a certain Mr. Robert, at first at Hongkong and then at Manila. Their criticisms seem reasonable enough, but it is strange that they should print them in English instead of Chinese. Moreover, quite a number of Kuomintang magistrates and officials have been done to death by the Communists in certain areas. All this has been going on for the last ten months or so. The Central Government has done nothing to retaliate. But since last January, certain Party members apparently couldn't stand any more Communist propaganda and anti-Government actions. It was then decided that some measures should be taken to counteract Communist propaganda. So a good many pamphlets *in Chinese* have been circulated abroad detailing the anti-Government activities of the Communists. The whole affair was deplorable. I did what I could to impress upon our authorities the unfortunate effect which any semi-official propaganda against the Chinese Communists would have on foreign friends of China, and how welcome it would be to China's enemies. I suggested that no more pamphlets should be circulated against the Communists, and that the Central authorities should tell the Communists that they must stop all anti-Government propaganda and subversive activities in future. I am glad to tell you that this has been done. So, for the present at any rate, there is peace between the Central Government and the Communists. But I would deceive you if I do not tell you that there has been no final settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist misunderstanding. However, there is no reason for undue pessimism. I still think that a satisfactory and lasting solution is not impossible, if there is good faith on both sides.

"I have written rather frankly to you, because I owe it to you as a real friend of China. The truth is oftentimes most unpleasant, but I know you like to hear it. Please keep what I have here written confidential."

EXHIBIT No. 1153

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 11th July, 1940.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQ.,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR FRED: Lawrence Duggan says that it will make it easier for Deborah Hubbard to get into the press conferences at Havana if she goes as a correspondent of a daily rather than of such august periodicals as the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs.

Could you manage to have her accredited by PM or by any of the other newspapers in which you are interested?

Deborah wouldn't object if PM had two representatives there: one to do the work and herself to do the listening?

Deborah might go down for the illustrative section, as you will remember she is both an artist and a researcher.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1154

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, July 15, 1940.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University,
New York City.

DEAR PHIL: Recently Holland wrote me as follows:

"The other day I had a visit from Dr. H. W. Baerensprung who was introduced by Carlson. He is a very interesting German social democrat, formerly chief of policy in Saxony and brought out to China by Rajchman as one of the various experts in Rajchman's entourage. After Rajchman left he taught international law in Soochow University for some time and then was employed by the national government as a lecturer in the Central Police Training School at Nanking, and later in Hankow and Chungking. He is still employed in this capacity and has been sent to this country by Chiang Kai-shek to learn something of American police methods, and is, accordingly, spending a good deal of time with the police

in Berkeley and Alameda where they apparently have a number of outstanding authorities on various aspects of police and finger-printing work.

Baerensprung is hoping to return to Chungking but feels that what with the Japanese blockade and the fact of his German nationality, he may find it impossible to get back, especially if he has to go through Singapore and Burma. He is an anti-Nazi and was imprisoned in Germany before he came to China but this is no guarantee that he would not be interned in British Territory today, although they let him come through Hongkong without difficulty a few months ago. He apparently has enough to live on here for nine months or so but is anxious to obtain one or two lecturing or research assignments that would enable him to qualify with the immigration authorities as a teacher or research worker, i. e. as a non-quota immigrant."

I do not know whether any department at Columbia would be interested in getting Dr. Baerensprung for a lecture or two. If so, you may wish to pass this letter on to the appropriate person.

He does not quite fit into the I. P. R. research program.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1155

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Incorporated

260 California Street, San Francisco

NITTA MARU, *August 10, 1940.*

DEAR CARTER: Enclosed is my original letter of July 2 to you, which in a cautious moment I decided it would not be well to entrust to the Japanese post. I repeated the gist of it in the letter that I did then send.

After my return from our five days in Peking I had leisurely talks with Takayanagi at his home, and with Ushiba, Takagi, and Matsumoto in Tokyo; also with Yamakawa. The talk with Matsumoto was unfortunately cut short by the sudden death of Mr. Cox, of Reuters who was one of his close friends.

It is not easy to summarize the long talks with Ushiba and Takayanagi, but I will try. In trying to reflect the trend of attitude of the Japan Council toward the IPR as a whole, and toward the Pacific Council and the Secretariat in particular, they of course did not always express their own attitudes.

1. There is a conviction that the Secretariat is biased in two unforunate directions: in favor of China and of USSR. The former they think has been fostered by Field, Jaffe (whose attendance at the Pac. Council staff meeting last Dec, they resent), and Lattimore, and has been shared at times by you. The latter they probably resent now more than they did a few years ago, since the China war is so largely motivated by an anti-USSR objective, and its success has been greatly hindered by the Red Army in China and by USSR. They doubt that you and your white associates can overcome this bias sufficiently, or in time, to reorient and redeem the whole IPR. They do not all distrust you, but I judge that a majority of the leading minds do, even though they may like and admire you, in great measure.

2. They mean to send at least one representatve to the next meeting of the Council, but Matsumoto told me he could not possibly get away for it. Ushiba is reluctant to go himself, but I believe will do so, especially if a worth-while agenda is proposed and submitted to the Japan Council as early as practicable.

3. Ushiba seems to hold some doubts as to the practical efficiency of the present heterogeneous composition of the Pac. Council, and raised the question of some possible regional groupings, with a federation of them all, which would be in effect, an Inst. of World Relations. The trend of the European war lends weight to this query.

4. A reorganization of the International Association of Japan is likely to occur before long, according to Ushiba, and if it does, greater importance and leeway will accrue to the Japan Council of IPR. I judge that it would, however, be premature to count too surely on this.

5. I heard no criticism of the volumes of the INQUIRY thus far published, except that some of them were inevitably inconclusive, because the Sino-Japan conflict is still in progress, and many trends will depend on its outcome; not to mention

the effects of the European war on the Far East. They feel that the Japan Council has lived up to its assurances respecting the parallel series of studies made by them, and Ushiba says he has nearly completed the English translations. They say that the authors are a group of younger men, competent and ambitious, likely to be heard from as time goes on. I have only glanced at a few passages in two of the eight volumes now out, but they seem to me promising. They will apparently give an impressive array of data, with emphasis on those which justify the positions taken by the Japanese Government. That, at least, is the tendency in one passage that I read.

6. Pacific Affairs sticks in their throats. They think that Lattimore's China bias makes him anxious always to counteract the influence of any article that seems to support Japan's case. But they admit that he has tried hard to secure articles from Japan, and that they have not given him adequate aid to that end. They seem to absolve Holland and Alsberg of bias in the administration of research, in so far as they control it. None of the men I interviewed had yet read Lattimore's new book on China's Inner Frontiers.

7. As to their attitudes toward the China war, I found some differences. All but one of them showed an awareness of the moral weakness of Japan's position, and of the extreme difficulty of achieving a decisive military or political victory in China. They are disposed, however, to place heavy responsibility on the United States for her negative and obstinately obstructive tactics toward Japan, and they think that if continued, this will drive Japan into the arms of Berlin and Rome. Even Matsumoto seemed to believe that China needed Japan's tutelage, and that Japan can not now turn back, although she should strive to make her benevolent intentions convincingly clear. When I talked with Prof. Nasu in Peking he paid no attention to military or political matters, but stressed the backwardness of the Chinese farmer and villages, and the great need of the science and administrative efficiency that Japan was beginning to contribute. I am now trying to organize my voluminous notes of other interviews, and to write a couple of articles. The day before we sailed I made a short-wave broadcast to the Western U. S. from Tokyo, and in it I incorporated briefly a point or two. Am sending a copy of it to Fred Field.

Very inadequate and spotty though this letter will seem, I send it for what it may be worth.

Faithfully,

(Signed) G. M. Fisher.

Exhibit No. 1156

(Handwritten notation:) Copies to

PCG	HM
JWW	BKB
CA	AG
WLH	MSF
EJT	CO

(Handwritten notation:)
HA
FVF
WWL
JS
PEC

Council of the USSR,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
20, Razin Street, Moscow, August 21, 1940.

Mr. E. C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.

Dear Carter: Under separate cover I am sending you a complimentary copy of my latest book entitled "The Pacific Nexus of the Second Imperialist War," which has just been published in a cheap edition in 20,000 copies as a part of our Institute's work.

This study, which represents the continuation of my first small book, will be included, in a much enlarged form, of course, as Part II in the monograph on which I am working at present.

The book was finished last spring and I made the last additions to it by the end of May. However, unfortunately, the publication was somewhat delayed in print.

Simultaneously, I am sending you a reprint of my article "Anglo-German Contradictions in the Epoch of Imperialism" which appeared in the sixth issue of the publication "Pod Znamenem Marxizma." I hope that this article containing my interpretation of the reasons which led to the present war, will be of some use in the Institute's library.

Yours sincerely,

V. Motylev.,
V. E. Motylev.

(Handwritten notation:) Return ECC to send cable.

(Handwritten notation:) Many thanks for yours Aug. 21 eagerly awaiting arrival your book. Please send 20 additional copies each Pacific Nexus and 12 copies Anglo G Contra.

Exhibit No. 1157

129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, September 20, 1940.

Mortimer Graves, Esquire.
American Council of Learned Societies,
West Newbury, Massachusetts.

Dear Graves: Ben Dorfman and Knight Biggerstaff have recently written me with reference to a grant-in-aid for Mr. Jay Robinson, who apparently has an unusual knowledge of the Chinese language. He is within a year of getting his Ph. D., has supported himself throughout his scholarly career, and according to Dorfman and Biggerstaff, is a man of promise.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter that I have written to Ben Dorfman on the subject.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter.

Exhibit No. 1158

Institute of Pacific Relations

Amsterdam—London—Manila—Moscow—New York—Paris—Shanghai—Sydney—Tokyo—Toronto—Wellington

Office of the Secretary-General

Sunset Farm,
Lee, Massachusetts, 24th September 1940.

Owen Lattimore, Esq.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland.

Dear Owen: On September 20 Holland wrote me as follows regarding Shore's article:

"I agree with you that the article on 'Sun Yat-sen, Lenin and China,' by Maurice Shore, is too long for PACIFIC AFFAIRS. I also have the feeling that this kind of doctrinal discussion is no longer so useful as it might have been before the present Sino-Japanese war started. Moreover, I suspect that you would get violent differences of opinioin on almost all the issues raised by Shore if you were to submit the article to such people as Holcombe, McNair, Browder, Anna Louise Strong, Ed Snow, Harold Isaacs, and Chen Han-seng, not to mention Borodin, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. That does not necessarily damn the article, but it suggests that it might better appear in one of the learned journals or else in pamphlet form. Could Owen, perhaps, raise with the author the question of submitting the article to some of the people I have mentioned with a view to getting it published, together with their comments, in pamphlet form? I personally feel that the value of the study would be immensely increased if the author could attempt to apply his arguments to, or to

consider how Lenin and Sun Yat-sen might have reacted in the face of, the present situation in China. Admittedly it would take a pretty colossal intellect to do such a thing."

I have no idea what your reaction will be to this.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1159

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, September 26, 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esquire,
300 Gilman Hall, John Hopkins University,
Baltimore, Maryland

DEAR OWEN: Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important monograph for the I. P. R. Inquiry, is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese post-war history and also on Indian history. He will be delighted to contribute to PACIFIC AFFAIRS if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for PACIFIC AFFAIRS during the next two years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Peffer.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1160

TELEPHONE: DISTRICT 3395 CABLE ADDRESS: ACOLS

American Philosophical Society, 1727; American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1780; American Antiquarian Society, 1812; American Oriental Society, 1842; American Numismatic Society, 1858; American Philological Association, 1869; Archaeological Institute of America, 1879; Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, 1880; Modern Language Association of America, 1883; American Historical Association, 1884; American Economic Association, 1885; American Philosophical Association; 1900; American Anthropological Association, 1902; American Political Science Association, 1903; Bibliographical Society of America, 1904; American Sociological Society, 1905; American Society of International Law, 1906; History of Science Society, 1924; Linguistic Society of America, 1924; Mediaeval Academy of America, 1925

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

Member of the International Union of Academies

Executive Offices: 907 Fifteenth Street

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OCTOBER 10, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52d St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I am happy to send you two more copies of Notes on Far Eastern Studies in America, No. 7.

Sidney Glazer is on my list in Arabic and Russian. His name will go into the Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel as soon as the people on H Street get it working.

Last week-end, we discussed Mr. Jay Robinson as one of our problems in Far Eastern personnel. Most of the members of the two Committees knew him, and all were exceedingly favorably disposed toward him. There is, however, a very general feeling that he is not in our field. His interest in social and economic phases of Far Eastern studies are primary, and he has his linguistic competences. We have been able earlier to rationalize help to social scientists on the theory that we were giving them language training, and that after all language is a "humanity." This rationalization does not seem possible in Robinson's case. There was general agreement that he would be an excellent man for you; in fact that his whole career to date has been training for the kind of thing which we assume you are doing.

The consensus of opinion was that Mr. Robinson ought to be set down to doing a job within his competences, and made to stick to the job until he had cleaned it up. I should think that he might be urged to apply to the Social Science Re-

search Council. Why not give him a card to Phil Mosely, who is with the SSRC this year, or to somebody else in that organization? I would be quite willing to convey the opinion of our Committees, individually and collectively, that he is an excellent prospect, but he just simply is not up our alley. If you know of any argument against this view, I should be pleased to see what can be done with it.

Most sincerely yours,

[s] M. G.
MORTIMER GRAVES,
Administrative Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 1161

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York City, October 14, 1940.

URGENT

FREDERICK V. FIELD, ESQUIRE,
16 West 12th Street, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Here is the galley proof of Peffer's manuscript. Don't bother with typographical errors. I am most worried over the manuscript because of a good many very sweeping and unsupported assertions in the manuscript. I am also a little uncomfortable because he assumes that the behavior of all the Western Powers, including the U. S. S. R., in the Far East is similar. Finally, he assumes and declares that the U. S. S. R. is an imperialist power.

I hasten to say that so far as brilliance of style is concerned Peffer's book is tops in the I. P. R. series.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1162

A. GRAJDANZEV,
October 15, 1940.

To E. C. CARTER,
Secretary of the IPR:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Herewith I enclose a short summary of the contents of Dr. Motylev's book and the full translation of its conclusions. I do not think that there is something new for the members of the Institute in this book except the interpretation of the known facts, but this interpretation is quite clear from the Conclusions which I translated in full.

By the way, out of 60 quotations in the book 13 are taken from the IPR books, Far Eastern Survey and Amerasia (others are chiefly the works of S Stalin, the Oriental Economist and Foreign Trade Statistics). Evidently the works published by the Institute and its affiliations are studied in Moscow.

May I report you also that the cataloging of the books in Japanese language in the Library of the IPR is finished and that we have with the recent additions 1,494 volumes for each of which we have two cards (by the author and contents), an entry in the list of the books; each book has its number on the title page, on the first and last pages, so that one may easily find in the list the name of the author, the translation of the title, the name of the publisher, place, year, and month of the publication, edition, number of pages, and the price.

Herewith I enclose also a list of 20 books just received from Japan, so that you can see whether there is something what you consider good for translation.

Yours respectfully,

A. GRAJDANZEV.

(Penciled notation:) Copies to WLH
OL

V. MOTYLEV

The Pacific Knot of the Second Imperialist War, Moscow, 1940, 200 pp., 20,000 copies.

Introduction—the meaning and the importance of the Sino-Japanese War.

Ch. I. China at the end of the third year of her war for national liberation. The Creation of the United Front. Three stages of the War. Now—the stage of the equilibrium. The military-economic construction in China. The

economic ties of China with capitalist powers. A hope is expressed that the development of the economic base in the West will finally make China independent from foreign supplies.

Chapter II. Japan at the end of the third year of her military adventure in China. Stimuli and direction of the Japanes aggression. It is shown that Japan is richly endowed for peaceful development. The National Income and the problem of the financing of war. The problem of the raw materials in the third year of war. Symptoms of the coming economic crises in Japan. Political situation in Japan.

Chapter III. Pacific interests and Pacific policy of the USA. USA as a Pacific power. Economic interests of the USA in the Pacific. Japano-American antagonism and the Far Eastern policy of the USA. The author shows that the American policy is based first on the commercial principle of getting profits from the Chinese as well as from the Japanese; second, on the principle of the open doors, i. e., the USA as an industrially developed country is sure of her success in case of the open door competition in China. Thirdly, on the readiness of certain groups in the USA to support Japan as a bulwark against the USSR. These groups pray also for the Russo-Japanese war.

Naval construction of the USA in the Pacific. The author presents the bases under construction as the bases not only for defense, but also for an offense. The problem of the Philippines' independence. The author explains some steps made in the direction of the independence (1) by the desire of the USA to bring Great Britain, France, and Netherlands face to face with Japan (because before these powers felt that they are sheltered by the Philippines against Japan and could safely play Japan against the USA) and (2) by the economic competition of the Philippine sugar with Cuban sugar. But he believes that this policy is undergoing a change.

Chapter IV. The Economic Interests and the policy of Great Britain, France, and Netherlands.

Chapter V. The Economic interests and the policy of Germany and Italy.

Conclusions—translated fully.

Conclusions

EUROPEAN AND PACIFIC "KNOTS" OF THE SECOND IMPERIALIST WAR

In the preceding chapters the inner logic of the development of the Pacific knots leading to the Second World War was examined. The influence of the Imperialist War in Europe on the War in China and on the Pacific knot of contradictions connected with it was taken into consideration as much as was necessary in each particular case. This does not preclude, however, the necessity of considering the interconnection of the European and Pacific knots as a whole. Insofar as the probable interaction of these two knots of the Second Imperialist War is only beginning to take definite forms, we shall limit our task to the mere formulation of the problems. The turning of the Pacific knot of Imperialist contradictions into the Pacific knot of the Second Imperialist War was proceeding in direct connection with the development of the Second Imperialist War in Europe. The struggle of Japan for the subjugation of China is only a part of the struggle for the redivision of the capitalistic world which brought on the Second Imperialist War. The outbreak and development of the Imperialist War in Europe has changed the situation in the Pacific and is of tremendous importance in connection with the development of the Sino-Japanese War and Imperialist rivalry on the Pacific. There is a real danger that the Pacific War will fuse with the European War. *First*, the war in Europe caused such a weakening of British and French military positions in the Pacific that the Anglo-French imperialists become very interested in safeguarding their rear through an agreement with Japan. At the same time the development and intensification of the Second Imperialist World War and the growth of the national-revolutionary movement in India, Burma, etc., as well as the successful progress of the Chinese War of national liberation present a growing danger to the Anglo-French Imperialists as factors in the revolutionization of the colonial peoples. All this makes these imperialists interested in a speedy end to the Sino-Japanese war, even at a price of recognition of Japanese demands on China, at least of a substantial part.

These Imperialists undoubtedly cherish a "clever" plan to bring Japan over on their side, to induce her to sever her trade connections with Germany, to provoke the deterioration of the Soviet-Japanese relations, etc. In this respect the information reaching the world press that Great Britain and France are ready

to supply Japan with necessary raw materials, if she severs her trade connections with Germany, is symptomatic. If this is true, it means that the British-French imperialists are trying to use the acute shortage of raw materials and foreign exchange in Japan to draw Japan in on their side with promises of help.

However, the British-French imperialists are interested in such a policy only insofar as they can buy Japanese "friendship" in a time of European War. The fate of this policy depends upon the problem of whether with these concessions to the Japanese demands they will be able to draw Japan into their orbit. If Japan, with the further development of the European war follows a German orientation, the British-French imperialists may become interested in a more intensive use of China against Japan. In spite of all their anti-Chinese actions and maneuvering, they are interested in China as a tool of their plans.

But even in case a rapprochement with Japan, is realized the growing threat of Japan to the British and French possessions in the Pacific and Indian oceans cannot be removed.

Secondly, with the growth of demand for American arms on the part of the European countries the American Imperialists become less and less interested in selling arms and raw materials to China and Japan. At the same time continuation of war in the Far East threatens with social and political consequences in China and Japan which are contrary to the interests of American Capitalists. The hope of the American imperialists that at a certain stage of exhaustion of the belligerents the USA will be able to dictate a peace which will be profitable for the American Capitalism becomes more and more uncertain. This is the reason why the American Imperialists want a speedy end to the war in China, even at a price of certain concessions to Japan. But though the USA are evidently ready to recognize temporarily certain Japanese demands in China, they, unlike to British and French imperialists, are unwilling to sacrifice their own present and future chances in China. This circumstance makes difficult an agreement between American and Japanese imperialists. In any case the first attempt of the USA to compel Japan to agree to a compromise which would be acceptable to the USA was not successful and brought on a new deterioration of Japano-American relations.

In general, whatever maneuvers the American imperialists may carry out for the speedy end of the Sino-Japanese war, this cannot remove or even mitigate the intensity of Japano-American contradictions, especially because the development of the European war may bring a new burst of Japano-American rivalry in connection with the struggle for redivision of the Asiatic territories.

Thirdly, the British-French imperialists (and to some degree, the American imperialists) interested in the speedy end of the Sino-Japanese war have brought pressure on the Chinese national government with the purpose of getting its consent to the concessions, i. e., capitulation to the Japanese. Insofar as certain groups of Chinese bourgeoisie are closely connected economically with the foreign capitalists, this new attitude adopted by the British, French, and Americans strengthens the psychology of capitulation among these groups. This creates an atmosphere favorable to the intensification of Japanese intrigue inside of the Kuomintang and for the provocative work of the Japanese agents in China. This results in the activity of the right wing of the Kuomintang, which wants to liquidate the united anti-Japanese national front, which was and is the only real base of the war of national liberation.

But this defeatist attitude is in sharpest contradiction with the development of the Sino-Japanese war, with the relative strength of Japan and China, with the present phase of the war of national liberation, with the interests and mood of the Chinese masses, with the aims of all progressive elements in the Kuomintang. For almost three years now the heroic Chinese people have been fighting for their independence. This war has proved beyond doubt that militarily China is able to resist successfully the Japanese plans of enslavement. Since the end of 1938 the line of fronts in China has been almost stable and a period of balance of forces has begun. Now it is clear to the whole Chinese people and even to the whole world that the Japanese imperialists will not be able to enslave China with bayonets alone. Meanwhile, the political maturity of the Chinese masses, their activity and their organization has reached such a level that they will not be reconciled to a defeatist position, whoever may be behind it. Wrote Chou-eng-lai: "Even if we admit that the Japanese imperialists may succeed in their plot—to strike a blow at the anti-Japanese forces and to their unity with the help of the defeatists and appeasers, just the same, the masses of China, the armed forces of the country and all anti-Japanese parties and groups in China will steadfastly continue their anti-Japanese war till the victorious end."

Thus, under all conditions the anti-Japanese war of national liberation will continue. Meanwhile, Japan is so weakened by this war, the political state and the morale of her army in China is so impaired that the continuation of war will become more and more dangerous for the Japanese imperialists and pregnant with disasters inside Japan.

Fourth—and this especially important,—each change in the balance of European war will find its reflection in the Pacific and may cause the spread of war in the Pacific. The essence of the problem of the Pacific is the struggle between the Imperialist powers for hegemony in Asia and the Pacific approaches to Asia. If one keeps this in mind, then it becomes clear that the new intensification of the imperialist struggle in the Pacific is possible not only with regard to China, but also, for example, with regard to the Dutch Indies and for any territory which may become a definite object of war. Above it was shown that neither the Japanese nor the American imperialists are ready to give up the Dutch Indies to the rival in case of violation of Netherlands' neutrality.

But the development of the European war may create a situation in which the British and French possessions in the Pacific and Indian oceans will become more defenseless than now; and though Japan is exhausted by her war with China and needs peace, the spirit of adventure of her ruling groups may throw them into the struggle for the redivision of the British and French colonial Empires. But it is clear that this will bring nearer the moment of Japanese-American armed conflict in the Pacific. Though this variant of the development of events is not the only possible one, yet it is clear that the American imperialists are not ready to permit the Japanese imperialists to use the war in Western Europe to thoroughly strengthen the Japanese positions in the Western Pacific and in Asia. Quite the contrary; the American imperialists want to use the weakening of Great Britain and France in the Pacific in order to strengthen the American positions at the expense of the former. At the same time the British imperialists, even under stress of war in Europe, are ready to use Japano-American contradictions to their own advantage. All this shows that the development of war in Western Europe intensifies the Japanese-American antagonism. There are, of course, other problems of interdependence and interaction of the Pacific knots of the Second Imperialist War. But even these which were mentioned show how close is the connection between further development of the Pacific knot of the second imperialist war and the development of this war as a whole.

EXHIBIT No. 1163

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
In the City of New York

OCTOBER 18, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52d Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: I have read Miss Farley's memorandum. I hope to see Phil Jessup and talk it over with him. I think that he is right in believing that it is better to wait until after the election. No such letter is likely to get much attention now, but it might be more useful after the election.

I am in doubt as to whether an open letter like this would do much good. I think that the general idea is well expressed, and it is of course an idea in the minds of a few people, but I do not think that in this form it would have much effect as a letter to the Times. Possibly, if we could have a dinner of some sort, particularly with a group of men like the American Council, with some of the really strong names on the Council ready to endorse the statement, we might get general press publicity.

I understand that there is a committee in the State Department working on plans after the war, of which Wilson, former American Ambassador to Berlin, is the chief, and with which Mr. Welles is concerned. So far as the State Department is concerned, it seems to me that there would have to be work done with this committee or with Feis and Livesay, or Pasvosky, who appear to be the economic advisors to the Secretary. You might get started in the Department through someone in the Far Eastern Division who could urge on the powers-that-be in the Department the value of working with the Institute. That I think would be the most effective procedure, and I doubt whether newspaper publicity would be of value in pushing such a program.

To take away the impression that this is simply a group of professors, it might be a useful thing if you could get some businessman to go down with you

and Jessup to talk with the State Department, and then you could perhaps lay out more definitely the general terms of a study which could be worked in with consideration of the European situation and its consequences as part of a world settlement. Even taking Eastern Asia by itself, it would be an advantage to make some such study. I suppose you are already working with the committee of which Ed Earle appears to be the head. I have not had a chance to see how far they are going or what they are doing, but I am a great believer in cooperating with any important organization which seems likely to produce some effect. You will know better than I if Ed Earle's group fills this prescription.

I trust that Mrs. Carter is much improved. Again give her my best regards and my best hopes for her getting back to normalcy more successfully than the United States was able to do after the shock of the last war or, perhaps more notably, after the shock of the depression.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN.

EXHIBIT No. 1164

PACIFIC COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

COLUMBIA UNVERSITY,
October 29, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 E. 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: I don't really think we can use Fred's statement as is, much as I would be glad to help him with his cause. How about a combination of the two, something like this:

> "Frederick V. Field, who has been on the staff of the American Council since 1928, has resigned in order to become Executive Secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. 'The American Peace Mobilization is a mass organization of progressive trade unions, farm, church, youth, Negro and fraternal groups dedicated to preserving the interests of the United States through the strengthening of American democracy and through non-participation in the war between England and the fascist powers.' Mr. Field had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility and felt that in view of the acceptance of his new position, it was not possible for him to continue his official connection with the I. P. R. The Executive Committee, being forced to the conclusion that Mr. Field's decision was final, felt compelled to accept Mr. Field's resignation with great regret. It expressed its appreciation of the distinguished service that Mr. Field had rendered during his eleven years of service to the American Council and expressed the hope that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the I. P. R."

Perhaps we could add to that the expression of appreciation which came from the staff.

How does that strike you?

The paragraphs in regard to Lasker seem to me excellent.

Sincerely yours,

CHIL.

EXHIBIT No. 1165

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 29th October 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: If the page proof of PACIFIC AFFAIRS is still on your desk, may I suggest two minor changes?

First, in your admirable and very important summary of Motylev's book, I think you might add on the bibliographical side that Motylev refers to a considerable number of I. P. R. publications. I note, for example, in addition to the sources that you mention, references to the Far Eastern Survey, to Miriam Far-

ley's book in the Inquiry Series, to Bisson's book in the Inquiry Series, to Remer's book done at the instance of the I. P. R. on Foreign Investments in China, and to Kurt Bloch's I. P. R. Inquiry book on German Interests.

In view of the considerable number of references to I. P. R. sources I think we might allow ourselves a little backscratching, at least to the extent of one I. P. R. reference.

Second, Adam von Trott has found that the best way of advancing the interests of the I. P. R. in these difficult days in Germany has been to join the staff of the Foreign Office to promote Far Eastern studies. As a member of the Foreign Office, therefore, he is ineligible to be a member of the International Secretariat and his name should be deleted from the last page of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

I may add privately that he will continue to cooperate with us in every possible way, though naturally his area of operations is considerably circumscribed.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1166

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, November 6, 1940.

His Excellency the SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: It is a matter of the greatest personal regret to both Mrs. Carter and myself that we are unable to accept the very kind invitation which you and Mrs. Oumansky have sent us for the Twenty-Third Anniversary.

A long time before your invitation arrived I had promised to preside at a gathering from five to six-thirty on November 7 here in New York, and I have not been able to get relieved of this responsibility. Though airplanes are fast, they can't get me from New York to the Embassy between 6:30 and 7:00.

Mrs. Carter is making good progress, but she is not yet quite at the place where a journey to Washington is feasible.

You know that neither of us has ever wanted to "snub" the U. S. S. R. Embassy—least of all at the present time.

With very kindest regards to you and Mrs. Oumansky from us both, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1167

In Celebration of the Twenty-third Anniversary
of the Great October Socialist Revolution
The Ambassador
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Oumansky
request the honor of the company of
MR. AND MRS. EDWARD CARTER
at a reception
on Thursday, November the seventh
from five until seven o'clock
at the Embassy

R. S. V. P. Please present this card at the door

EXHIBIT No. 1168

The American Council
of
The Institute of Pacific Relations
and
The American Russian Institute
cordially invite you to a dinner conference
on
THE PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
Tuesday, November 19, 1940
8:30 O'clock
at the
Twentieth Century Association
3 Joy Street
Boston, Massachusetts

Speakers

Edward C. Carter, Chairman
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations
Bruce C. Hopper
Professor of Government, Harvard University
Joseph Barnes
Foreign Editor, New York Herald Tribune

(Discussion and question period will follow speeches.)

R. S. V. P., Harriet L. Moore., 64 Griggs Road, Brookline, Mass.

$1.25 per plate

(Please make checks payable to Miss Moore)

EXHIBIT No. 1169

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, November 28, 1940.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR PHIL: In view of the probable importance of the Princeton discussions I am inclined to think that we should invite two or three younger men to come in the role of recorders or rapporteurs. What would you think of our creating a panel for this purpose consisting of William W. Lockwood, Charles Dollard, and William D. Carter?

Bruce Hopper has just written that he cannot come, though he regrets greatly that he is not free. What would you think of our asking Joseph Barnes? He has as good, perhaps a better, idea of the potentialities of Soviet policy as it may affect or be affected by American or British policy in the Pacific.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,

EXHIBIT No. 1170

DECEMBER 2, 1940.

CP from ECC:

You found the essence of Miriam's letter to Jessup. Here is the whole letter and there is nothing of importance in the resolution except what you had already spotted.

I have taken the liberty of slightly elaborating your first draft. I enclose a copy of what I have written. I hope it will meet with your approval.

(Handwritten:) This is exactly what should have been written. Sorry the job fell to you.

CP
F

Frederick V. Field.—It was voted unanimously to record the American Council's appreciation of the work of Frederick V. Field as follows:

It was with the deepest regret that the Board of Trustees learned that the Executive Committee had found it necessary to accept the resignation at its meeting of September 18 of Mr. Frederick V. Field from the Secretaryship of the American Council. As the minutes of that meeting showed, the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Parker, had asked the Chairman of the American Council whether he felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the Secretaryship. Dr. Jessup had replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final.

Mr. Field joined the staff of the American Council in 1929. During his eleven years of service he has demonstrated an unusually high quality of leadership. The program of the American Council has expanded notably under his direction, partly because of his own untiring efforts, and partly because of his imaginative leadership in developing the cooperation of the entire staff. Mr. Field was one of the Founders of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. He was the author of "American Participation in the China Consortiums," published by the University of Chicago Press, and presented as a research study at the Hangchow-Shanghai Conference of the Institute in 1931. In 1932 and 1933 he acted as Editor-in-chief of the "Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area," which was published by Doubleday-Doran and Company in 1934 with a foreword by the late Mr. Newton D. Baker. In this monumental work his own research abilities, together with his rare capacity for stimulating research on the part of his colleagues, were strikingly exhibited. It was largely through his initiative that the series of regional conferences on American foreign policy were developed in various parts of the United States in 1938, 1939 and 1940.

While he was executive secretary the membership of the American Council more than doubled, but it is impossible to make a full record of his services to the American Council, because in innumerable unknown and anonymous ways he has contributed to the maintenance and expansion of the IPR program. His capacity to surround himself with young and able scholars has served as a compelling example in other National Councils. His services likewise to the International Secretariat and the Pacific Council have been a major contribution to the development of the Institute's international work.

Throughout his connection with the Institute he has been most scrupulous and exacting in maintaining the highest objective standards for his own IPR writing and that of his colleagues. He has combined personal modesty with the capacity to inspire high achievement on the part of others. He has been noted for his practical wisdom in counsel and amazing energy in action.

The Board of Trustees desire that the officers assure Mr. Field that his job on the American Council staff will be awaiting him when he completes his present work.

EXHIBIT No. 1171

(Handwritten letter:) To Mr. E. C. Carter.

DEC. 13, 1940.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I think that there is no necessity to translate the whole book of Mr. Motylev because the basic ideas were well presented in Owen's review. However if you find it necessary it may take 10 days of work.

Yours respectfully,

GRAJDANZEV.

EXHIBIT No. 1172

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF FAR EASTERN LANGUAGES

HARVARD-YENCHING INSTITUTE
Boylston Hall

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

DECEMBER 17, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd St., New York City.

DEAR SIR: As you may already know, there is an urgent need for Japanese interpreters and translators for service with our armed forces. There is a project to create here a special training centre to give additional instruction to those who know some Japanese. These men will probably be given commissions in the navy or in the marine corps and will have their full expenses paid while studying here.

Before a final decision can be made in Washington, we shall have to submit to the proper authorities a list of possible candidates for this training. Will you be so kind as to send us a list of all the young men whom you know have some knowledge of Japanese and who might possibly be interested in receiving commissions during this emergency or permanently in the navy or the marine corps.

This request is, of course, strictly confidential and perhaps should not be mentioned as yet to the possible candidates. We expect to meet with the authorities in Washington on December 26th, and therefore we shall need to receive your reply at least by December 24th. We are very sorry that we must ask you for such speed on your part, but the training centre, if organized, will probably begin to function early in February, so there is need for very quick action. The persons to whom this request is being sent are:

Knight Biggerstaff
Derk Bodde
Peter A. Boodberg
Hugh Borton
E. C. Carter
Homer H. Dubs
Robert B. Hall
George Kennedy
Owen Lattimore
G. MacAfee McCune
H. F. MacNair
Harold S. Quigley
David Rowe
Earl Swisher
George Taylor.

Yours sincerely,

SERGE ELISSEEFF,
EDWIN O. REISCHAUER.

EXHIBIT No. 1173

Telephone: MURRAY HILL 2–0312 *Cable Address:* AMRUSCUL

THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE
For Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union, Inc.
Fifty Six West Forty-Fifth Street
NEW YORK

Editor and Executive Secretary: HARRIET L. MOORE

DECEMBER 17, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am returning herewith Miss Anderson's notes from the round table in Boston. Have you ever received Joe Barnes' outline for his talk? He has never mentioned to me whether or not he would give them to us. I am afraid he has probably thrown them away.

I am also returning Mr. Slesinger's letter regarding Vassiliev. I do not know anything in particular about Vassiliev. I believe he has been in our library using our materials, but I have never had an opportunity to talk with him. If he comes in again I shall try to find out what he is now doing. If you are further interested in him, it may be that Dr. Stefansson knows something about him.

I hope that after Christmas we will have the opportunity to discuss the question of further conferences. We continue to get favorable comment from Boston and I cannot help but think that such discussions have a very real value, particularly outside of New York City. I may take the opportunity to talk over the general idea with people in Chicago when I am there on Christmas.

Very sincerely,

[S] Harriet
HARRIET L. MOORE.

HLM : ss

EXHIBIT No. 1174

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 18th December, 1940 (may be 17 December).

His Excellency, the SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.
Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: You doubtless saw this editorial in the NEW YORK TIMES of December 11, referring to Lattimore's reference to Motylev's book in the December issue of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Under separate cover I am sending you marked copies of PACIFIC AFFAIRS for December and AMERASIA for November, for I think you will be interested in glancing at Lattimore's comment on Motylev's book on page 446 of the former and Crajdanzev's translation of the last chapter of the book on page 417 of the latter.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1175

129 EAST 52nd STREET,
New York, N. Y., December 13, 1940.

His EXCELLENCY, the SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
Embassay of the U. S. S. R.,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY, Under separate cover I am sending you marked copies of PACIFIC AFFAIRS for December and AMERASIA for November which I think you will be interested in glancing at. In PACIFIC AFFAIRS beginning on page 446 Lattimore has commented on Motylev's book. In AMERASIA on page 417 Grajdanzev has translated the last chapter of Motylev's book.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Penciled notation:) This is for possible use without reference to the Embassy. Thank you very much.

CONSTANTINE A. OUMANSKY,
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

EXHIBIT No. 1176

(Penciled notation:) WLH Scan & return to ECC at Nassau.

AMERICAN COUNCIL

INSTITUTION OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

INCORPORATED

131 MUSEUM RD.,
Shanghai, December 30, 1949.

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esq.,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City,
New York, U. S. A.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Except for your letter of October 3rd and a copy of a letter from Maxwell Hamilton regarding the Shiratori interview we have received no communication from you by mail since reaching Shanghai. I state

this as a matter of fact to be incorporated in the record rather than as a complaint. If complaints were in order I should direct mine to the Chinese Post Office which is now completely under the control of Japanese supervisors and censors. We are hoping that on the next boat a letter or two from our headquarters may elude the authorities. I have referred to letters. We received a cable, through Phil, from you on December 19th. To this cable we replied:

> "Crisis foreseen developing slowly here Patricia's sailing deferred Shanghai study finished January cabling then for approval cooperatives if Chekiang impossible. Signed: Bob."

At the present time Patricia has tentative reservations on the *Taft*, sailing January 20th, and on the *Asia*, sailing in the second week in February. Other than putting her name in the lists we have made no preparations for her to go.

"Crisis foreseen developing slowly" may require a word of explanation. Ian Morrison, special writer for the London Times and resident agent for the British and Chinese Corporation which handles Chinese railway securities, wrote in his November report to London as follows: "The Shanghai problem has become overshadowed by much graver events. It is now one out of many issues involving those fundamental questions of the relations between Japan, China, Soviet Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and America. Let us put it like this. A year ago the Shanghai issue lay primarily between the governments of Great Britain and America and the government of Japan. Today it lies primarily between the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Japanese army in Central China." He implies here that Shanghai is not likely to become a casus belli between Japan and the Anglo-American bloc. With this opinion I am in agreement. With his view that the Shanghai issue lies between the SMC and the Central China Japanese military, I am not. Since the outbreak of the European war the Shanghai issue has become progressively more closely identified with total world issues. Since the signing of the Tri-Partite Pact the confict at Shanghai has been transformed from the underlying triangular conflict involving China, Japan, and the Western Powers which Vinacke analysed in his preface to Shanghai and Tientsin, to a bilateral truce involving on the one hand Japan, Germany, and Italy, and on the other a developing Anglo-American-Chinese bloc. The USSR is suspended in the balance. Shanghai is, relatively speaking, a piccolo stake in this developing antagonism. It is, indeed, to the advantage of the Central China military authorities to preserve the peculiar status of Shanghai for as a haven for their loot and as a luxuriant orange to be squeezed, Shanghai serves well the greed of the Japanese military. It does so, however, only so long as it is a going concern, enjoying relative freedom for industry, finance, and commerce. The private gains now accruing to the local military and to a few of their favorites, Japanese and Chinese, count for nothing, however, in the light of the larger designs of Japanese leaders in Tokyo. There is no indication that today they are less infatuated than in September by visions of their Greater East Asian autarchy. In that autarchy there will be no place for Shanghai, as it now exists, nor for American and British interests, as they have existed. The fate of Shanghai, therefore, lies with Japan's fortunes in realizing her aims in Southeast Asia; and, probably, will not be sealed until that program of realization is under way. I talked to Sugita yesterday. Sugita is the secretary of the headquarters of the China Seas Fleet of the Japanese Naval Bureau in Shanghai. When I learned he was a Cambridge man, I mentioned that I was from Oxford and flashed quickly the range of my Tokyo connections. In consequence, perhaps, he talked more freely than any Japanese of my acquaintance in Shanghai. Several times he said with quiet intensity that Japanese-American naval hostilities would be a supreme tragedy. Nevertheless, Sugita informed me, unprecedented naval preparations are under way in Japan and in the China Seas. Tomorrow he flies to Formosa, Amoy, Canton, Hainan, Haiphong, and back to Japan. This is an index of activity in one quarter. This morning's newspapers reveal that Japan is planning a coup d'etat in Thailand aiming to install a sympathetic war government there. Here is more activity. In Japanese ports, in Dairen, in Tsingtao and elsewhere German boats are being equipped with arms and in south Pacific waters German vessels flying Japanese flags have engaged in naval harassing activity. More activity. Activity, moreover, Axis as much as Japanese in flavour. Meanwhile, on the other plate of the scales, lies the increasing effectiveness of the RAF in Britain, Greece, and North Africa, the Italian losses at Taranto, the advances of British mechanized forces towards Bardia, the fulfillment of the American cruiser unit at Manila and the arrival of more heavy bombers, reports of accelerating American rearmament, the failure of Germany

and Italy to recognize Wang, the British and American loans to Chungking, and the continued existence of large Japanese forces on the Manchukuon border—defense against attack from that enigmatic quarter. These are some of the basic factors influencing the Shanghai issue. SMC-Army (or Puppet) flurries are window-dressing. We cabled that the crisis was developing slowly because from this vantage point it looks as though war in Europe has taken a turn advantageous to Britain (despite the shipping losses and the movement of German troops across Rumania where they confront large Russian concentrations) and because, as many people have maintained before this, it looks as though the Japanese threat may prove to be bluff if it runs into determined Anglo-American opposition. There are some indications, including Grew's latest bucket of cold water on Axis exuberance, that America means business out here. If Japan throws caution to the winds, goes south risking war, and has an easy time of it, then Shanghai falls in her lap. If Japan does not go south and in exasperation takes over Shanghai she may find herself experiencing the economic counter-attack, embargoes and tariffs, which even now she fears almost as much as American and British warships. Hence, we foresee the situation developing slowly here—unless, Germany unexpectedly upsets the applecart completely in Europe.

As to the remainder of our cable. My Shanghai study has not proceeded quite as quickly as might have been the case had I not undertaken, soon after our arrival here, to do spadework, simultaneously on the Chekiang study. I hope, and I believe I have good reason to expect that the Shanghai brochure will be finished by February 1. I already have in hand a large quantity of background material on Chekiang; the notes upon which my address on occupied Hangchow was based; extensive notes on the wartime Chekiang coastal blockade; and several translations of recent articles appearing in the Chinese press and in Chinese economic journals on economic and political developments in free Chekiang. I dislike abandoning a project upon which I have made some extremely interesting preliminary observations. Tentatively, therefore, I have arranged that Leonard Hsu, son of an old Hangchow friend of my father, join me for a six weeks' tour of Chekiang in February and March. He knows the patois a great deal better, naturally, than I do. His contacts in free Chekiang are excellent. He has had experience with the KMT in its prewar Nanking days. He kept the accounts of the "refugee center" which formed the basis of some of my remarks about economic Hangchow. We have in mind slipping across into guerrilla territory near Hangchow or taking a boat from Shai to Ningpo. At best, both trips are dangerous. At worst, they might be fatal. Japanese mopping up in the Hangchow environs is continuous. The Japanese navy has shelled Chinghai, the port of Ningpo, periodically since 1937; intensively since September 1940. I hope, however, that advised by various shipping magnates here not averse to shady dealing with naval authorities we may be given what we can consider safe conduct. I mention these details hoping that they may reflect my determination to complete a really satisfactory survey of Chekiang. Without field observations, the study would be bloodless, if not mere guesswork. If, however, the Chekiang study proves quite impossible, I shall cable you for approval to go to Chungking. Pat is reading the second proof of Mrs. Ed Snow's book of the cooperatives as a favor to the family. With that background, which undoubtedly will be highly romanticized, it should be possible to conduct a systematic survey and a critical analysis of the movement on the basis of uncollated materials known to exist at Chungking and on the basis of some travelling.

In recent days there has been much talk of aggravated KMT-Communist friction. Reports to this effect appearing in the local press come from Domei. Some of our government people, however, have heard corroborating reports from Chinese coming out of the interior. Anna Louise Strong, in Hongkong, expressed alarm over friction several days ago. One indication of the seriousness of the conflict is seen to be the transfer, on Chungking order, of the New Fourth Army from East Central China to the northwest. I have not shared alarm felt in some quarters. Domei's reports of friction have been legion. I seem to recall Agnes Jaffe's black picture of the United Front last summer and now find it easy to understand Miss Strong's pessimism. Both of them should be excused, perhaps, for not seeing the whole China picture because through preference they associated only with those who made it their business to see the seamy side of KMT corruption and tryanny. As to the withdrawal of the New Fourth Army: They are guerrillas and mobile troops unequipped for or unpractised in positional warfare while in this war area there are indications that

the Chinese may be contemplating an offensive which will require a unified command and the best equipment of the most highly trained regular troops. Takung Pao sums up the matter thus: The crux of todays problems, therefore, does not lie in the question of political unity, but in the question of unified command of the Chinese armed forces. If any army today should refuse to obey the orders of the High Command, or even resort to irregular activities, such action should be regarded as detrimental to the efforts of resistance, or even as threatening the safety of the state. Unity applies to political questions, but in the army there can only be discipline and order. Powell thinks the people of Central China are congenitally anti-Communist. On this point I am in total disagreement. From the most selfish banker to the wildest little student here in Shanghai I have heard nothing but admiration for the courage and fighting effectiveness of the 8th and 4th Armies. While in Hangchow, I was told that hostility to communists had evaporated, for reasons I have explained to you before. There may be a recurrence of KMT-Communist friction in Chungking; partly for political reasons, partly over military issues. The consensus here is that Chiang has it in his power to annihilate the Communist military threat. Were he to try, nothing would please the Japanese more. Were he to try without Soviet approval, few things could so jeopardize one important source of his power to conduct continued resistance. To answer those who assert that Chiang, more than ever, is in tow of the petticoat government, Madame etc., and the corrupt Kung coterie it is relevant to ask if the execution and dismissal of corrupt mayors and magistrates indicates complete satisfaction with the administrative and political status quo.

I am tempted to share with you my estimates of personalities I have reason to meet here. I am thinking, especially, of Keswick, Hunt, Itoh, Lockhart, Br. Consul-Genl. George, Smith of BAT, etc. Perhaps these estimates will color portions of the book when it reaches you. The rest sounds better in a gossip session, than in print on a page.

I cannot, however, resist the temptation to record a few highlights of my relations with the South Manchuria Railway people. I have not yet received from them a long-promised reply to a lengthy questionnaire placed in their hands early in November. Ushiba had told me that Itoh could place at my disposal more information than any other Japanese in Shanghai. Another Japanese friend told me that the SMR employs rather more than 300 researchers. I called on Itoh and told him my objective in coming to Shanghai. He served tea, offered cigarettes, and called in an interpreter. All went well and Itoh promised full and prompt replies to any questions I might wish to ask. That night I prepared an extensive questionnaire on trade, industry, shipping, etc. In many cases I presented data which I had got from Japanese english-language sources and merely asked for confirmation. I sent along the questionnaire. Two days later Itoh left for Japan, Dairen, Tsingtao, returning to Shanghai early in December. Meanwhile, his translator told me he had the questionnaire and was working on it. Three times each week I telephoned for developments. Finally, his translator rang me up. Expectantly I waited, only to be informed that he wished to dine me at the French Club. Cigars topped an excellent meal. There were, however, only vague promises regarding my questionnaire. The next day I put in writing what I had explained by word of mouth the night before: namely, that I did not wish to have the responsibility of knowing facts which had not already appeared in print, either in English or Japanese. I said that I knew the Shanghai Japanese press gave reports bearing upon my questions, but unfortunately I did not know Japanese. Could they refer to their clippings? The translator sympathized with my modest request and promised early action. In the first week in December Itoh returned. I called upon him and learned that he had talked about my work with Konoye's private secretary (Ushiba) and others whom I had met. The next day his translator called me up and said that the research staff was working on my questionnaire, but that their report would be in Japanese. Itoh had, apparently, found a way to shift the buck while in Tokyo. Several days later I called again and learned that the typists had finished writing the report, that revisions were being made by the translator and Itoh, and that the document would be in my hands the next day. The next day I received a telephone call. The document, apparently, had been sent over to the press division of the local army headquarters. They, however, could not pass it, though all the materials there contained had previously been published in Japanese papers. They ordered the SMR to send the document to Nanking where it will be read by the press division of General Nishio's military headquarters. With apologies to me the SMR has done this and together we await its return.

I have found similar difficulties in dealing with British, Chinese, and Americans here, but none of them have been on this super-Japanese scale.

Cordially,

Bob.

(Pencilled notation:)

P. S. over.

P. S.—Under no circumstances will I expose Pat to the rigors of interior travel. If I go to Chekiang, she stays here or goes back to U. S. A. If we go to Chungking, we fly—or, at least she does so.

When you write please include some news of developments in the office. We are starved for it.

Exhibit No. 1177

Box 222, Post Office,
Hongkong, January 21, 1941.

Dear Mr. Carter, This is a note to you in great hurry, as I am so busy with all sorts of things at the present moment. Enough for me to report that these are grave days in China. By war regulations in Hongkong we cannot send out any clippings of any sort; hence I am enclosing herewith a copy of the British editorial which is published in today's South China Morning Post. Also enclosed in this envelope is our little Bulletin, under the date of January 15th. I hope that the second article therein on the Japanese international and internal situation will be of interest to the friends in New York. I hear that Joe Barnes is now the Foreign Editor of the H-Tribune and please give my best regards to him when you see him.

There was a battle between the Kuomintang troops and the New Fourth Army from Jan. 9th to Jan. 12th. About four thousand NFA people crossed the Yangtze, as they were carrying out the order of the Government to go to the northern part of the River. All of a sudden, the Kuomintang troops attacked them. Someday the true story of how the four thousand were killed and wounded, and even children and nurses had to take up rifles in self-defense, will be told in detail. The deputy commander, Han Ying, was murdered after being wounded. The commander Yeh Ting was taken after seriously wounded. Ever since Sian, China's leaders have pledged that their guns would never again turn direct against their own nationals. Now such a promise is violated. If such break-up of agreements goes on, how can the leaders expect their overseas patriots contribute their support in the financial and material contributions? How can they guarantee that their leaders' repeated declarations that they would not make peace with their enemy unless the enemy withdraws, would be kept? Certainly the democratic way is not through bullets, but should be through ballots.

Madame Sun and other Members of the Kuomintang OEC have sent a written appeal to the Generalissimo to maintain unity at any price. We are all trying our best to ask our "leaders" to stoy fighting themselves while the enemy remains in China. Please do not hesitate to call on me for any work for the Secretariat that I can do while out here.

Most sincerely, and pardon my great hurry,

Yours,

[s] Geoffrey.

Exhibit No. 1178

(Penciled notation:) Sent Jan. 21—Allen, Bisson, Carlson, Farley, Peffer, Taylor.

January 21, 1941.

Sent from 33 East 71.

DL.

Lauchlin Currie
3132 P Street N. W., Washington, D. C.

Delighted you are going Chungking. Regret illness prevents my going Washinton see you before departure. Strongly recommend you wire my colleague Dr. Chaoting Chi suggesting he see you Washington before you leave. He is an economist of distinction and has just returned from Free China. You could wire him direct care Universal Trading Corporation 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City. He could go Washington almost anytime before you leave.

Edward C. Carter.

EXHIBIT No. 1179

120 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, January 22, 1941.

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
3132 P Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CURRIE: Last evening I wired you as follows:

"Delighted you are going Chungking. Regret illness prevents my going Washington. See you before departure. Strongly recommend you wire my colleague, Dr. Chaoting Chi, suggesting he see you Washington before you leave. He is an economist of distinction and has just returned from Free China. You could wire him direct, care Universal Trading Corporation, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York City. He could go Washington almost any time before you leave."

Herewith I am sending you a rather important galley proof of Dr. Chi's forthcoming study "Wartime Economic Development in China." If you are able to take on the clipper only one item of all I am sending you, I should recommend that you take this.

Yesterday, however, I did mail you the following books:

Japanese Industry: Its Recent Development and Present Condition, by G. C. Allen
American Policy in the Far East: 1931–1940, by T. A. Bisson
The Chinese Army, by Major Evans F. Carlson
The Problem of Japanese Trade Expansion in the Post-War Situation, by Miriam S. Farley
Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East, by Nathaniel Peffer
The Japanese-Sponsored Regime in North China, by George E. Taylor

The above volumes are all part of the IPR Inquiry Series.

After you have scanned Dr. Chi's galleys you will, I think, realize what a valuable piece of work he has done. He gathered this material on a trip he made to China for the IPR a year and a half ago. About six months ago he made another trip to free China, accompanying Mr. K. P. Chen, the well-known Chinese banker, as his research secretary. With Mr. Chen he travelled all over free China.

It has suddenly occurred to me that if you should want the services of a highly competent Chinese who is intimate alike with Chinese problems and the American point of view you would be well advised to consider asking Dr. Chi to accompany you on this trip. His research and personal qualifications are of the highest.

The Universal Trading Corporation has recently borrowed him from the IPR staff, but I cannot think of any more important work for him than to go along as your interpreter and Chinese secretary, unless you have already made provision for such a person.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1180

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 24th January, 1941.

Dr. CHEN HAN-SENG,
P. O. Box 1688K. Kowloon, Hong Kong.

DEAR GEOFFREY; You were doubly generous and thoughtful this year in first sending me the FAR EAST BULLETIN of December 15 as a substitute for a Christmas card and then following it up with this charming card from you and Susie.

There is one good thing about the serious difficulties within the United Front in China in recent weeks.

At long last our friend Joe Barnes persuaded the Ogden Reids to appoint Edgar Snow as a Herald Tribune correspondent in China. Edgar Snow is, therefore, giving the American people a more accurate picture of the serious state of affairs in China than any correspondent has given in cabled stories since the war began.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1181

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE,
February 11, 1941.

EDWARD C. CARTER, ESQUIRE,
Board of Editors, Far Eastern Survey,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR CARTER: Knowing your interest in our economic relationships with the Far East, when in need I turn to you with my cry for help. Recently I have been placed in charge of a committee for making certain economic studies in re our relationships with Far Eastern countries in connection with our Defense Program. Within the next few weeks we are trying to complete a preliminary report comprehending the basic material required, to be subsequently expanded into a much more complete study. For this immediate study we are lacking in trained research workers.

I am wondering if your American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations—or, more specifically, the Board of Editors and Research Associates of Far Eastern Survey—could loan us the services of two or three or more of your research experts over the next two or three weeks. Of course we might like to have them longer, if their services were still available. I had in mind, because of their special fields, a list from which any number whose services you could spare might be detailed to help us: Miss Miriam Farley, Kurt Bloch, Miss Kathleen Barnes, Miss Virginia Thompson, John R. Stewart, Jack Shepherd, Dorothy Borg, William N. Lockwood and Ellen de Jong, or others whose names might occur to you as available.

Our work is under the general direction of the Export Control Administrator, with whom, I believe, arrangements can be made without difficulty for paying the present salaries of any who might be available for temporary loan from your staff, together with such additional expenditures as would be necessarily incurred. I am not, however, undertaking to initiate such arrangements until hearing from you that the desired personnel may be available.

If you find no one willing or available among those connected with the Far Eastern Survey, I would be glad to have any other suggestions as to research assistants that might occur to you. Please let me have a reply at your early convenience, as the matter is of some urgency.

With sincere personal regards.

Very truly yours,

C. K. MOSER,
Chairman, Far Eastern Research Unit.

EXHIBIT No. 1182

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 18, 1941.

DR. CH'AO-TING CHI,
541 West 113th Street,
New York City.

DEAR CHI: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable as the following:

> LAUGHLIN CURRIE,
> *American Embassy, Chungking:*
>
> If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's unified resistance.

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific for China to start a two-front war.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1184

CHINA INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
P. O. Box 1688, Kowloon, Hongkong (Received March 12, 1941).

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: With this mail will arrive also Mr. Currie on his way back to America. He was twenty days in Chungking but as a trained observer and not like a trained bureaucrat he has certainly learned and understood many things. I am sure he has already appreciated the fact that Chungking is not China because of the exclusive depressive deteriorating atmosphere over there. He certainly made a splendid speech of half an hour before the highest and selective audience in Chungking sponsored by the Sino-American Cultural Society on February 23rd. All the way through his speech he emphasized the importance of democracy for the sake of both national resistance and the upbuilding of a modern state.

I saw him both on his way to Chungking and upon his return despite the attempts to encircle him. While in Chungking he asked Hollington Tong to arrange an interview with Professor Ma Yin-tsu. Holly replied after a day or so that Ma was not to be found. Currie enquired if Ma was confined somewhere, but Holly said that cannot be true. Factually, of course, Ma is now confined somewhere near Chungking because of his criticism of the government finance. He advocated a tax levy on those who became rich during the war.

By ordinary mail I sent you a few days ago a copy of February 15th Newsletter of the China Defense League. The article on the United Front in that issue is worth reading and if I may say so it may be regarded as a brief supplement to my unprinted MS on that same topic. Kindly pass this on to Rosinger if you see fit.

(A. W. Circulate)

The American Council is to be congratulated for the improved style and new policy of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I for one have always been opposed to the narrow and dry statistical articles that the Survey used to carry. I am enclosing a clipping herewith for the Survey's reference. I wish somebody would find it feasible to use Dr. Lim's speech and write a short piece for the Survey.

Dr. Lim pointed out three problems in his work: nutrition, training, and transport. His work is really connected with everybody's work because these problems are both national and urgent. I wish I could find time to write a short article to explain how the economic policy has now affected the Central troops very seriously, because these troops are in the rear where prices are high and no fighting is being carried out. The guerrillas and other troops are mostly on the fronts, where prices are much cheaper, being unaffected by the government policy. Their morale is much higher. If there is really a wide-scale civil war, I estimate that only one-tenth of the Central troops are fit to fight. Have you received the 28th issue of the FAR EAST BULLETIN, dated February 15th?

With kindest regards and best wishes,
Sincerely yours,

Chen Han-seng.
CHEN HAN-SENG.

EXHIBIT No. 1185

FDS/wc
ROOM 811, 1270 SIXTH AVENUE,
New York, N. Y., June 4, 1941.

TELEPHONE: CIRCLE 6-1484-85

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Acting Sec'ty., American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd St., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for calling our attention to Mr. John R. Stewart as a specialist familiar with Manchurian affairs.

Your valuable and continued cooperation with this office is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick D. Sharp.
FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Lieut. Col. G. S. C.

EXHIBIT No. 1186

MARCH 24, 1941.

KM from ECC:

I am awfully glad you are reprinting Anna Louise Strong's article. Would you send me up three copies of it? It is certainly one of the most important articles that you have carried for a long time.

EXHIBIT No. 1187

Telephone: MURRAY HILL 2-0312 *Cable Address:* AMRUSCAL

Mrs. Kathleen Barnes, Basil Bass, Edward C. Carter, Wm. O. Field, Jr., Mortimer Graves, Harriet L. Moore, Henry E. Sigerist, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Maxwell S. Stewart

THE AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

For Cultural Relations With the Soviet Union, Inc.

Fifty-six West Forty--Fifth Street

NEW YORK

Editor and Executive Secretary: HARRIET L. MOORE

MARCH 25, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City

DEAR MR. CARTER: I shall attempt to answer your bevy of letters which I received this morning.

I shall be able to attend the meeting of the Board of Trustees of the American Council on Tuesday, April 8.

As I understand it Dr. Stefansson's handbook for the War Department is a tremendously long and detailed study of the development of the Soviet Arctic. In preparing this he has undoubtedly amassed a wealth of new information on the Northern Sea Route. I do not know just what he means by suggesting that the IPR undertake research on the subject inasmuch as I believe he has already exhausted all the material available in this country. I am sure however that Dr. Stefansson or his staff could write a very interesting article for PACIFIC AFFAIRS or perhaps a pamphlet.

The vice president of the PRESS is the famous Eddie Moore and no relation of mine.

Florinsky's article in our opinion is about 70% accurate as to fact but very extremist as to interpretation. A few examples are as follows:

1. In the middle of page 43 he says, "The directors are allowed to grant an application for dismissal or transfer only in the following instances * * *." The decree provides that directors must grant the application in those instances and may grant applications on other grounds as well.

2. On page 47 he says, "volunteers were also admitted * * *." The fact of the matter is that volunteers filled the entire quota and it was unnecessary to recruit any youths.

3. An example of his interpretation is on page 45 where he says, "* * * the Soviet Constitution whose high-sounding promises the new legislation so flagrantly violates." I think it would be impossible for the strictest lawyer to find any constitutional violation no matter how much they may dislike the new laws.

There are other examples of this sort but this is probably enough for you to understand on what basis we choose 70% as the degree of factual accuracy.

Sincerely yours,

Harriet
[s] HARRIET L. MOORE.

HLM/kw

EXHIBIT No. 1188

APRIL 3, 1941.

ECC from MG:

1. I have added a section and altered the conclusion in order to deemphasize the ten points. I think we have now so hedged the points around that they can no longer be taken as a program for action climaxing the discussion.

2. Miss Farley thinks that Jessup's name should not be mentioned. I am inclined to agree.

3. I agree with WWL that the title should be "Showdown at Singapore" and that the title page should say by way of explanation "A report of a private international conference held at Princeton to discuss Anglo-American cooperation in the Pacific."

4. I think the authorship should be anonymous, unless the authors be described merely as rapporteurs.

5. Above all, if the pamphlet is to sell it should be published in a big hurry.

EXHIBIT No. 1189

(Penciled notation:) To the members of the March 9th conference. Return KP.

APRIL 11, 1941.

It is now almost ancient history but I am sending you herewith a report of the informal conference held in this office on March 9 with a view to investigating the possibility of a sort of planned economy in the use of scholars with a knowledge of Japanese, Chinese, and Russian during the present crisis.

You will note that we asked Mr. Mortimer Graves to establish contact with various agencies in Washington. As a result Mr. Graves must have given an enormous amount of time to the matter since March 9. Confidentially I may say that he has induced the Civil Service Commission to call together a number of interested agencies of the United States Government to talk the matter over with the Civil Service Commission and Mr. Graves in the near future. It looks as though some progress would be made.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Penciled notation:) cc: all members and KG–DB
MSF–CP
AG

EXHIBIT No. 1190

(Handwritten:) ECC
KRCG

APRIL 18, 1941.

Mr. WILLIAM R. HEROD,
570 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

DEAR HEROD: Are the following paragraphs of any use apropos Monday's discussion?

> In connection with the war emergency several United States government agencies have asked for the loan of members of the Institute's research staff. In one instance a government department which must remain nameless asked for the privelege of employing the whole research staff on a particularly urgent and important task involving many weeks of work. These requests are striking evidence of the government's high appreciation of the work of the Institute and its research staff. Interestingly enough, it so happens that it has been possible to prove to the government agencies concerned that the I. P. R.'s staff members can render the government a greater service by continuing as members of the Institute's highly competent research group.
>
> In this way the research staff is kept intact for essential group collaboration and is thus in a position to serve all government agencies concerned with the Pacific through special reports and through articles in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY.

Maybe you will want to ring me up to let me know whether you would like the foregoing redrafted in any way to put a little more punch in it. Unfortunately, it is not possible for us to put into a letter the names of the government agencies concerned.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER, *Acting Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 1191

(Handwritten:) WLH
ED

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Maryland, May 2, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: There seems to be a number of minor items on my desk to clear up. The first is the question of my proposed pamphlet for the Oxford University Press. They tell me that they want about 8,000 words. My idea is a survey of the war that covers the time span of four years and the changes in the character of the war and the internal problems of Japan and China that run from the Marco Polo Bridge to the Russo-Japanese neutrality declaration, and include the relation of the Far Eastern war to the European war. Sounds like quite a large order, but it will be interesting to try. My original idea was to approach the job by elaborating more completely and linking up with each other a number of the ideas very briefly brought forward in my recent articles in Foreign Affairs, Asia, and the "After Four Years" article that is to appear in PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

I am quite sure that Oxford will be only too glad to cooperate with the Institute of Pacific Relations not only in planning the format of the pamphlet but in its distribution. I have not said anything to them yet. It seems to me slightly immodest, when I have not yet written the pamphlet! I can either bring it up with them when I send them the MS or you may feel perfectly free to use your own discretion in sounding them out in advance.

Another thing I want to mention is the list of translations from the Chinese that you have sent me—translations totalling about 151 pages, made by Mr. Hsu, and covering the wide range of subjects. Would it entail much additional work to have an extra copy of future translations made? I have been thinking that if I were able to keep track of them, I might be able to use extracts in almost every issue of PACIFIC AFFAIRS, thus matching the very interesting translations from the Japanese with which Grajdanzev is supplying me regularly.

That was a vitriolic memorandum on Barndt's article by Bloch that you sent me. Bloch must be quite a tempermental guy to have around the office. I have already sent the memorandum on to Bill Holland as you requested, and so can only refer to it by memory.

Perhaps I am an ineffable innocent, but I can see nothing particularly "Marxist" about the article. It seemed to me to be a perfectly legitimate discussion of a broad problem which undoubtedly is shaping up as a turning point in the history of empires and their colonies and spheres of interest—whether you call the change evolutionary or revolutionary. As far as Brandt has presented his ideas, I should say that the implications are more New Dealish than Marxist. It seems to me that a major contention of his is that the future of profitable private enterprise in Asia requires a system of loans on such a large scale that they can only be handled by governments. This is undoubtedly a paradox, but I can see the force of the argument: the loans should be planned in terms of speeding up industrialization in Asia. The loans themselves should not be made with a view of political control or even a large margin of profit, though the capital outlay may be recoverable. By bringing the Asiatic and European-American levels closer together, this will open a new horizon for profitable private trade. All of this would be, to my mind, compatible with political democracy, and I fail to see anything sinister in it.

Some of Bloch's criticisms ought to be addressed to me rather than to the author of the article, whom I asked to present his theory in broad terms, without using too much statistical documentation or too much space. In at least one case what Bloch calls "Marxist arithmetic" is purely the result of a slip that occurred in editing: I tried to untangle a rather Germanic sentence that looked the wrong way round in English, and in so doing the words got straightened out but the figures got mixed up. This has already been caught in proof.

I remember one place where Bloch makes a great to-do about whether the average Chinese acreage is half an acre or two acres. I looked up the source quoted by Brandt, and found that he had simply quoted word for word what was said by his authority. In this connection, I think you will agree with me that it is absurd to stickle for statistical exactness in figures that apply to China, where statistics are so chaotic. For the purposes of an article like this it is quite sufficient if the fact emerges that the average Chinese acreage is of the order

of half an acre to 2 acres—not of the order of 20 acres or 40 acres. It is simply unprofitable to try to determine whether the exact statistical average should be 1.2 acres, or whatever.

Generally speaking, while Bloch seems to consider that Brandt is obsessed, it is fairly clear that Bloch has some obsessions of his own. For instance, he seems to make it an article of faith that an increasing population means a rising standard of living. This gets right in the teeth of what is evident to any general observer: that for a couple of decades the rural standard of living in both Japan and China has fallen. As far as Japan is concerned, I should think it not impossible that there has been simultaneously a rise in the urban standards and a fall in rural standards; but to hold dogmatically that because the Japanese population as a whole has been growing, the Japanese standard of living has been rising, in the face of the fact that it is widely admitted by Japanese that they are burdened with a chronic rural depression which has been getting worse and worse, is absurd.

I am keeping by me your quoted note from Bob Barnett on Miss Strong's "Eighth Route Regions in North China" and shall see what can be done when the article comes back in proof.

I'm down today with a very heavy cold, and as I have to go out tonight to be initiated into Phi Beta Kappa, to the greater confusion of American scholarship, I am dictating this at home and Mrs. Young will sign the letter when she has typed it.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 1192

(Penciled notation:) Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton, Chief of F. E. Section, Mil. Intell. Div., G2 War Dept., General Staff.

JUNE 6, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

Lieut. Col. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,
New York City.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: Thank you for yours of June 4. May I in confidence bring to your attention Dr. Russell G. Shiman of the IPR staff who for the past seven years has edited our fortnightly research service THE FAR EASTERN SURVEY. Under separate cover I am sending a few sample copies of the SURVEY under his editorship.

Dr. Shiman's economic knowledge of the whole Far Eastern region is exceptional. He has visited Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, and has long studied China, Japan, and Manchuria. He has a very unusual knowledge of the source and production cost of the principal commodities of the Pacific Area, such as rubber, tungsten, antimony, oil, rice, copra, coal, iron, etc.

He has unusual skill in gathering material from a great many different sources and coordinating the researches and investigations of others as well as doing his own research work.

At the beginning of this year the International Secretariat of the IPR borrowed Mr. Shiman to make a special study of certain of the Far Eastern commodities for the Economic Handbook of the Pacific. He is now bringing this work to a successful conclusion.

It has occurred to me that in view of the inquiries which various members of your staff have made in this office, you might like to consider borrowing Dr. Shiman for several months or for the duration, as he has a wide and encyclopedic knowledge of the whole Pacific Area, writes well, edits well and knows how to eliminate irrelevant material.

I have not told Dr. Shiman that I am writing you this letter, for I did not want to mention it if there were no chance of your wishing to consider him. If you would like to size him up you could get him over to the office some day to talk not about a job but about some of the problems that your staff are facing.

I have to leave for the Pacific Coast tonight but will be back here on June 16 in case you wish to talk the matter over with me before talking to Dr. Shiman.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1193

CONFIDENTIAL

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., July 3rd, 1941.

LIEUT. COL. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York City.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: In continuation of my confidential letter to you of June 6th regarding Dr. Russell G. Shiman. I am now writing to say what I would have passed on to you orally had I had the good luck to find you in when I called at your office a few days ago.

Shiman has a firm offer from me to continue his work as a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations staff, but he like other patriotic Americans wants to spend the coming year where his life experience will best serve our Government during the emergency. Knowing something of the great scope of your work, and of other studies which the War Department is planning, I wish very strongly and enthusiastically to call him to your attention.

To aid you in forming an opinion of his experience I am enclosing his Curriculum Vitae. Everything I said in my letter of June 6th holds true. He is not only an indefatigable research worker himself, but has shown marvelous ability in taking promising but people untrained in the Far Eastern field and guiding their studies so that after a short time they have shown great competence.

This combination of qualities might be of very great value to the War Department. I do hope that you can arrange in due course to meet him or fix a time when one of your staff can have a talk with him.

As you will note from my earlier letter, he has first class editorial ability which you will have noted from the samples of *The Far Eastern Survey* that I have already sent, and from perusing his chapters in *The Economic Handbook of the Pacific*, published by Doubleday Doran for the IPR in 1934.

I am sending this letter and the Curriculum Vitae in duplicate in case you wish to send on copies to Lieutenant Colonel Bratton.

With kindest personal regards, I am,
Sincerely yours.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1194

HA from ECC: JUNE 19, 1941.

Will you please prepare a memorandum showing the dates and amounts of all USSR Council contributions to the Pacific Council since they began to contribute.

Pencilled in:

August 26, 1935		$2,000.00
June 5, 1935		2,000.00
Feb. 7, 1937	$500.00	
Apr. 29, 1937	2,500.00	
		3,000.00
June 1, 1938		2,500.00
May 23, 1939		2,500.00

EXHIBIT No. 1195

JUNE 23, 1941.

DR. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
c/o American Express,
Santiago, Chile.

DEAR JESSUP: Immediately following your excellent suggestion regarding General Barrows I wrote Wilbur and asked whether he would be willing to make a presentation of a series of IPR publications to the General for the ultimate purpose which you and I discussed.

Wilbur responded in the affirmative, and I sent him a handsome assortment. These reached Barrows on the morning of June 10. Just by a pure fluke this was the day on which Wilbur and the Bay Region IPR gave a luncheon at the

Palace Hotel at which Wilbur asked me to speak of some of the latest developments in the IPR. I sat between Wilbur and General Barrows.

This morning Wilbur sent me a letter from General Barrows, copy of which I enclose. So far, so good.

I ought to add that at the luncheon I was able to emphasize to General Barrows the role that W. L. Holland and Galen Fisher are playing in the total program of the IPR. The Bay Region group has a scheme for an emergency study of the Japanese in California and have made some progress in getting Barrows interested in seeking to secure part of the funds from the Carnegie Endowment.

The Canadian Institute—Northwest-American IPR two-day meeting at Victoria was realistic and worth while. The discussions were at a very high level. After Victoria I met members of the Institute in San Francisco, Stanford, Berkeley, and Los Angeles. Holland is a great asset on the Pacific Coast, though we miss him sorely here. Sproul's Executive Assistant James E. Lash is gradually wiping out the difficult situation that existed under Warren Scott.

I wonder whether you happened to hear Churchill's speech yesterday. Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill managed quite a spectacular week end. It so happened that last week I had lunch with Oumansky in Washington on Wednesday. We talked for a couple of hours. I was fortunate in getting Lattimore over from Baltimore, as I thought it was pretty important for him to have a long talk with Oumansky, in view of his job and the evolving world situation. It was a most illuminating two hours.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1196

(Handwritten:) GL
CC—Oakie

NEW YORK CITY, *June 25, 1941.*

Lt. Col. R. S. BRATTON,
Chief, Far Eastern Section, War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL BRATTON: Your letter of June 23rd reached us this morning. We shall, of course, be glad to cooperate with you to the fullest extent but, before writing in detail, I am wondering to what extent you have already made use of the material in the National Roster of Scientific Personnel. We have already provided somewhat similar information to the National Roster and would like to save your time and ours by avoiding any duplication of effort.

Needless to say, however, we are very much interested indeed in assisting you in every way and hope that you will let us know just how we can be of most assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1197

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Intelligence Division G–2

WASHINGTON

FAR EASTERN SECTION, G–2,
June 23, 1941.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
429 East 57th Street, New York City.

GENTLEMEN: This office is interested in obtaining the services of personnel who have the necessary linguistic qualifications as well as a knowledge of the social, geographic, political and economic aspects of the Far East, including Thailand, Indo China, Burma, Malay Peninsula and the Philippine Islands.

The salary will vary between $2,000 and $3,200 per year, depending upon the Civil Service rating.

I shall appreciate the names of individuals who may be desirous of such employment.

Yours,

R. S. Bratton,
Lt. Col. G. S. C., Chief, Far Eastern Section.

Exhibit No. 1198

Treasury Department,
Secret Service Division,
New York, N. Y., July 1, 1941.

Office of Supervising Agent, District No. 2, State of New York and Territory of Puerto Rico.
Rm. 804, 90 Church St., New York, N. Y.

Please refer to file CO 5002.

Mr. Edward C. Carter,
129 E. 52d Street, New York, N. Y.

Sir: This office has under investigation Irving S. Friedman relative to his position with the Treasury Department. He has given your name as a personal reference.

Will you kindly advise us the length of time you have known the subject and furnish any information which you may possess regarding his character and ability, and employment record with you.

There is enclosed for your reply a self-addressed envelope which requires no postage.

Very truly yours,

James J. Maloney, *Supervising Agent.*

Exhibit No. 1199

129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., August 7th, 1941.

Irving S. Friedman, Esq.,
Research Division, Washington, D. C.

Dear Irving: This is just to let you know how glad I am that you are so well established in Washington. Bob Barnett spoke very enthusiastically about the way you are taking hold. You certainly have a big job. You have my very best wishes.

I hope you will forget my harshness the last time we met. I happened to be very fatigued that week and hope you did not carry away a permanent picture of me as always loaded with vinegar.

With very kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

[t] Edward C. Carter.

Exhibit No. 1200

(Penciled notation:) R. W. B. any suggestion? ECC.

Treasury Department,
Division of Monetary Research,
Washington, D. C., September 9, 1941.

Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Secretary General, International Secretariat,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Carter: Would you be kind enough to suggest the names of a few people who might be interested in working down here in the Division of Monetary Research. From what I have been able to gather from my own brief experience here, it would be best if any person suggested had some training in economics, but of more importance, however, is some acquaintance with the Far Eastern area.

I do hope that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you again the next time I come up to New York.

With best regards to the IPR.

Sincerely,

IRVING S. FRIEDMAN.

EXHIBIT No. 1201

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 17, 1941.

IRVING S. FRIEDMAN, Esquire

DEAR IRVING: Would you glance through this Act, H. R. 10094 and let me know whether you think either the American Council or the Pacific Council should consider registration under it.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1202

DEAR DR. WHITE: I understand from Mr. Irving S. Friedman who holds the appointment of Head Clerk in this office, that he has been appointed to the post of research economist in your Department.

Under the terms of his appointment here, Mr. Friedman has to give me one months notice in advance before relinquishing his post, and on account of certain circumstances it would be extremely inconvenient for me and detrimental to the interests of the work of this office if I were to allow Mr. Friedman to leave at any shorter notice than the month referred to above. At the same time I do not wish to do anything that might in any way affect his prospective position in your Department, as I am delighted to hear of his new appointment though I shall be very sorry to lose him. I would be most grateful, therefore, if you could kindly let me know whether there would be any objection from your point of view in Mr. Friedman continuing his appointment here until the end of the current month.

(Handwritten notation on back of letter)

DEAR MALTH: I understand that Mr. Friedman is joining the United States Treasury and as my nominee I hope that he has lived up to my recommendation. If you have not already secured another man for Mr. Friedman's post, may I suggest a man whom I believe has any of the qualifications which you seek. If you are at all interested I shall be glad to have him call on you at any time convenient to you.

Sincerely yours,

EXHIBIT No. 1203

(Hand written note:)

NOTE.

Irving S. Friedman started June 9, 1938, on regular payroll at $35.00 a week until May 15, 1939.

Around the office until January or February 1940.

EXHIBIT No. 1204

CHINESE INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATIVES

SOUTHEAST HEADQUARTERS, KANHSIEN, KIANGSI

108 SITKIN ROAD, KANHSIEN, KIANGSI, *3rd July, 1941.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Your letter of May 1st was sent to me up here and I was very glad to hear from you and to know that you have such a good understanding of our problems and the reasons for our failings out here.

I came up to Kiangsi at the beginning of May, flying to Namyung which is just one hour from Hongkong. I first went to Kukong, Kwangtung's Provincial war-time capital for a few days and then came straight here in one day by postal truck. I am now collecting material for the C. I. C. people in Hongkong to use for publicity and I send them down a five-page report every two weeks. The situation has become rather difficult and the C. I. C. is now going through a period of consolidation rather than of expansion. The two great needs are for capital and education. I find that I learn mostly about poverty and the only surprise is that organisations like CIC can do anything at all—not that they don't do more. The only equipment is the land and the people. Here in Kanhsien the land is rich and bamboo and wood plentiful. We should be able to make large quantities of good paper, but improvements in the technique of manufacture are a first necessity. At present it is all done handicraft way and no one knows how to tap rosin from the pine trees so that the paper could be sized to take ink.

When I came here I, of course, relinquished my work with the China Council, about which I have already written you. I heard that it was possible that you would be coming out here to talk things over and to discuss the program. I hope you may be able to make a somewhat extended stay so as to get it really stabilised because it looks as though the I. P. R. will have, in the great storms to come, an even more important task to fulfill than it has ever had in the past. It looks as though it were a historical necessity that the importance of events will gradually shift from Europe to the Pacific once the path is set.

Connected with this is another matter which I would like to discuss with you. It seems that now the World War has really begun the relations and inter-relations of European, Asian and American countries will inevitably become more complex and inter-dependent. In the present situation it looks as though, if the IPR succeeded in bringing about a closer collaboration of the Councils of the Pacific, including the Soviet Union, it might contribute to the important task of avoiding an extension of the war within the Pacific area. Of course the position of the Soviet Council in this affair gains in importance for it seems that this would coincide with the present interests of the Russians and therefore we can hope to get the most active collaboration of the Soviet Council and could count on its willingness to cooperate with all the Councils of the other countries in question. It looks to me, therefore, as though it would be of great advantage if somebody from the Secretariat could at present get information on the spot about Russia's position and the position of the Council, and keep in personal touch with the people concerned. If you share in this opinion, then I woud like to ask you to consider letting me proceed to Moscow where I feel I could do far more effective work than I shall be able to do here in the immediate future.

It seems to me that if the International Secretariat were to have a liaison officer in Moscow, closer ties could be established not only between the Secretariat and the Soviet Union but between the Soviet Union and the other national Councils. In general such a liaison officer would have to keep the Secretariat and other Councils informed of the Soviet Council's work and viewpoint, and to keep the Soviet Council informed of the work of the other Councils and of their viewpoint. Second, to give a provisional report of the view of the Soviet authorities on Pacific problems in view of the present political situation along the Pacific coasts and as influenced by the present German-Russian war. Third, to get a special publication for the IPR prepared on a special Russian-Japanese-Pacific issue. Fourth, to make known and get the widest distribution possible for the IPR publications, especially those which have lately been published in Shanghai.

I realize that if you were to consider doing this that my identity would have to be established before I could get a visa. As you know, when I first came out here I started sending—on your suggestion—the "Internos" to the Soviet Council—two copies of each issue. Harondar wrote me asking for information about it and expressing their appreciation, but at that time owing to the situation in Hongkong which was very difficult, I was only able to answer him in a very general way. When the "Far East Bulletin" was issued I asked Alec Crosby of the "Federated Press" in New York to continue sending the Bulletin to Motylev, and I think that he did this until communications made it impossible. The Embassy in Washington, however, is a regular subscriber.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bill Holland as the percentage of mail that gets lost these days seems to be extremely high, but I hope one or the other gets through. I haven't had any mail from England for three months and I feel that that part of the world is marooned.

Please give my best greetings to Mrs. Carter and remember me to all the people I know in 129, and with best greetings to you,

Yours ever,

Elsie
ELSIE FAIRFAX-CHOLMELEY.

EXHIBIT No. 1205

JULY 8, 1941.

WLH from ECC:

I have been working hard with Colonel Sharp in New York and Colonel Bratton in Washington to get Shiman a job in the Army Intelligence either in New York or Washington. Temporarily Washington has turned him down on the ground that he does not feel free to go to Washington for full time.

I have also been in correspondence with Loveday, but Loveday doesn't want to take anyone on until the autumn. I am beginning to think that Field and other members of the American Council staff were much more responsible for the success of *The Far Eastern Survey* than Shiman himself was. Confidentially, I may say he is rather a pathetic figure at the moment. He is his own worst enemy as he spent several years slaving on the *Survey* but at the same time opposing every move of his colleagues that would introduce him to a wider world and richer personal contacts and a steadily growing personality. The quality of his work is now so poor and the necessity for his facing the realities of life so great that I am wondering what you would think of our computing what severance pay should be given him in line with the traditions in this matter, with the American Council and the Pacific Council splitting the amount, and thus endow him for a period of months to paddle his own canoe.

I hate to write you in this way, but his performance since we took him on the International Secretariat has really been shocking. Not the least is the quality of the work he has done on Phillip's manuscript and the sort of last straw was his billing you for employing outside people to do the work that he should have done during the two months that he was sulking and nursing his grievances, none of which were caused by either the American Council or the Pacific Council.

In spite of all his limitations, he is so vastly better than many of the captains, majors and colonels who are studying the Far East that I can recommend him in the highest terms to service in the Army. He needs a complete change of environment, a start in a fresh setting. He has got a chance of rehabilitating himself in a way which he sorely needs. We are rendering him no service by trying to build up his ego by continued odd jobs.

It may be that I am unduly pessimistic, and I want you to come back at me with your sternest criticism and your fairest judgment. If you think we should assign him the five months' job I will defer entirely to your judgment. I am showing no one a copy of this letter except Bill Lockwood who recognizes that Shiman is very much more competent than a lot of the people that Washington is using in important jobs. He is in a position to help Shiman a lot in finding a new opening.

EXHIBIT No. 1206

(Penciled notation:) cc. Robinson
WWL
WLH

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, July 14, 1941.

Mr. HENRY J. WADLEIGH,
c/o Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, State Department.

DEAR MR. WADLEIGH: In accordance with my promise to you on Friday afternoon I write to say that I have just had a talk with Mr. Jay Robinson. Before he came to see me at my request, I took the opportunity of going over our files regarding him.

As I indicated to you over the phone I think that the recommendations which Ben Dorfman and Mortimer Graves have sent you regarding Robinson are fully justified.

Robinson has an unusual experience. I know but few men who have worked so thoroughly on many of the economic and political problems of the Far East. His studies have included work on Korea and on the railways of Manchuria for

Dr. Walter Young of the Lytton Commission, for Mr. Ben Dorfman on currency, and in connection with his work at Yenching University, on cooperative banking, the cotton crop of certain Chinese provinces and oil production in China.

For the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Robinson worked for over a year to our great satisfaction on a cooperative study which we were making of the effect on China of the overseas Chinese communities.

In addition to a good knowledge of French, German and Spanish, he has an altogether unusual knowledge of Chinese. Here Graves, Peake and others are better qualified to speak, for I myself do not know Chinese.

Of course I only have a general idea of the nature of the work that you have in mind from what you said on the telephone, but from your brief description I should have no hesitation in recommending Mr. Robinson because the imaginative character of his mind and the initiative and independence that he has shown throughout his career. As Dr. Pasvolsky suggested a general area for study, I would be inclined to think that Mr. Pasvolsky would not have to give Mr. Robinson detailed supervision but could count on his doing the job independently and thoroughly.

In the study of post-war adjustments in the Far East, Mr. Robinson could, I know, count on informal collaboration from time to time on the part of W. W. Lockwood of Princeton and W. L. Holland of Berkeley, for both of these men are familiar with Mr. Robinson's qualifications and are deeply interested in the problems that you have in mind to put up to Mr. Robinson to investigate.

As to character qualifications I am satisfied that they are of the highest. If I can be of any further assistance to you in this matter please do not hesitate to command me.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1207

JULY 15, 1941

CAPT. R. STUART MURRAY
Room 811, 1270 6th Avenue, New York City.

DEAR CAPTAIN MURRAY: This is to confirm in writing my remarks to you when you telephoned yesterday to the effect that we would not only raise no objection to your appointing Miss Virginia Thompson but would welcome it in the national interest provided it would be possible for the War Department to employ her for four days a week, thus giving her two days a week for a continuance of her work on the staff of the IPR.

The following work requires her further effort: (1) a study of British Malaya, (2) occasional contributions to the FAR EASTERN SURVEY (3) IPR staff consultation (4) the study of nationalism in Southeastern Asia.

Her appointment by the War Department would of course delay completion of her work on some of these tasks, but the arrangement proposed above would meet our requirements and would enable us and the public to cash in on the very large investment already made.

As you know we have the highest regard for Miss Thompson's character and you are already informed as to the high quality of her work. For purposes of information you may want to know that her present salary rating is $3,000 annually.

If you wish further information please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Acting Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 1208

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, July 15, 1941.

MR. WILLIAM D. CARTER,
Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service,
316 F Street NE, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BILL: It was swell to see you in Washington and at Princeton.

Enclosed is a sheet of your notes which you left in my room at the Mayflower.

Andy Roth has recently seen Colonel Black of the Military Intelligence in Washington. Black is looking for four economic analysts beginning at $2,600

a year. Roth is very hopeful that Colonel Black will appoint him as soon as the formal appropriation comes through from the budget office.

Sincerely yours.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1209

JULY 16, 1941.

WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN, Esq.
Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
Lafayette Building, Room 312, Washington, D. C.

DEAR BILL: Aside from the heat, how do you like your new job in Washington? I am most eager to hear.

I am wondering whether we may count on your making a contribution of $250 to the I. P. R. some time between now and October 15th.

Since I last saw you, four governments have recognized the I. P. R.'s achievements and the high quality of the I. P. R. personnel by the following appointments.

You doubtless know that on President Roosevelt's nomination, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has invited Owen Lattimore to go to Chungking as his personal political adviser. Lattimore flew from San Francisco on July 8th and is due in Chungking this week. Another member of the International Secretariat, Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi, has gone with our best wishes on the same plane to become General Secretary of the American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund of U. S. $95,000,000. Here we have a case of outstanding services of the I. P. R.—in the case of Lattimore, an American to the Chinese Government, and in that of Chi, a Chinese to the American, British and Chinese Governments. A former member of the Secretariat, Irving Friedman, for whom I secured an appointment and an opportunity to study India as an employee of the Indian Government Trade Commissioner in New York, has now been given an important research position in the Treasury in Washington, one for which he is highly qualified.

Officers in the Army, Navy, Federal Reserve Bank, Department of Commerce and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies are asking for and getting substantial help from our research staff. The Office of the Export Control Administrator recently asked for the full time service of all the American Council research staff for a long period. We had to persuade that office that our staff could render a greater service by continuing its work as a well-balanced, experienced research group, rather than by moving en bloc to Washington, where its services would be available only to a single Government department.

Another demand of a different kind has been made upon us. Mr. Henry R. Luce, Mr. Wendell L. Willkie, and Mr. James G. Blaine have asked me to serve as chairman of the Disbursements Committee which is making a very thoroughgoing survey of China's needs and how the $5,000,000 fund, if raised, can best be spent for maximum relief and at the same time to contribute to long-range reconstruction.

All of the foregoing is for your private information, for part of it is obviously not for general circulation.

This service to governments has not, happily, thus far lessened our service to business groups, the press and our university and secondary school constituency. The demands for Institute services from all these groups is greater than ever before, and I think we are furnishing more help in all these directions than ever before.

Nor has the international work of the I. P. R. throughout the world been reduced by the war excepting in the case of France and Holland. In the case of Holland nearly all of the activities have been transferred to Batavia, where van Mook, who has been the principal negotiator with Yoshizawa, is the I. P. R. leader. (Interestingly enough, van Mook and Yoshizawa were members of the same round table for a fortnight during the I. P. R. Conference at Yosemite in 1936.)

While Prince Konoye has been Premier, Ushiba, the chief I. P. R. Secretary in Japan, has acted as his private secretary. It is expected that he will return to the Tokyo office of the I. P. R. if Konoye refuses to form a new Cabinet. While Ushiba has been helping the Premier, Saionji, the grandson of the Genro, has acted as chief Secretary of the I. P. R. in Tokyo, save for the period of Matsuoka's visit to Europe. Saionji accompanied the Foreign Minister on his fantastic round of visits to Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin.

Bruce Turner, for many years Secretary of the I. P. R. in New Zealand, has just come to Washington with a member of the New Zealand Cabinet and will

shortly be going to London to help get another New Zealand Cabinet officer there.

The Royal Institute in London has recently very greatly augmented its studies of the Far East. The Far Eastern program of the Canadian and Australian Institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any period in the past.

As to adjustments in the International Secretariat, we have been fortunate in getting Y. Y. Hsu in place of Chi. It so happens that he was a classmate of Chi's both in China and during their undergraduate days in the United States. While I am taking over the editorship of PACIFIC AFFAIRS temporarily, I am going to have the help as managing editor of Michael Greenberg, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who has an unusually clear head, a good knowledge of the Far East and an exceptional pen. The Rockefeller Foundation has just awarded a fellowship to Dr. George E. Taylor, formerly of Nanking and Yenching Universities, who is now head of the Oriental Department at the University of Washington, to spend a year in this office as a member of our staff beginning October 1st.

Our Shanghai office is still in charge of our very able associate international research secretary, Philip E. Lilienthal, who for the past two years has handled the production and distribution of a very large list of research studies which he has been putting through the press in Shanghai for prompt distribution to our whole Far Eastern constituency as well as for the British and North American market. Dr. Chen Han-Seng is carrying out his studies with Hong Kong and Chungking as his two bases. Jack Shepherd, who has been the Australian member of the International Secretariat, has just been awarded a Carnegie Corporation fellowship for a study—pilgrimage through Japan, China, Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies.

In view of the foregoing, I hope that you can come to our financial assistance again this year.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER, *Acting Secretary.*

enc.

EXHIBIT No. 1210

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., July 23rd, 1941.

Lt. Col. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: Some time ago Mr. W. L. Holland, the International Research Secretary of the IPR, sent me a copy of a letter he had received from Martin R. Norins applying for a research appointment in the Institute of Pacific Relations. His offer was declined because the budget of the Institute did not permit of additional appointments.

Thus, I have personally made no inquiry regarding Mr. Norins. It occurred to me, however, that you might like to see his letter of May 20th to which is attached his autobiographical record.

In other words, I am passing on this with the suggestion that if he has qualifications that you need you make your own investigation about him.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1211

ROOM 811, 1270 SIXTH AVENUE,
New York, N. Y., July 25, 1941.
FDS/eh

TELEPHONE: CIRCLE 6-1484-85.

(Penciled notation:) WLH for your private information. ECC.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd St., New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Yours of July 23rd with reference to Mr. Martin R. Norins was received, for which I thank you.

I am forwarding this information to the War Department for such use as they may care to make of it.

Thank you for your kindness in keeping me in mind.

Very sincerely,

Frederick D. Sharp,
FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Lieut. Col., G. S. C.

EXHIBIT No. 1212

Telephone: MU. 3-3855-6.

SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY,
114 EAST THIRTY SECOND STREET, NEW YORK,
August 4, 1941.

Dr. EDWARD CARTER,
66 East 79th Street, New York City.

DEAR DR. CARTER: In our August issue we published a preliminary group of statements from noted figures in the field of culture and public affairs, expressing support of the U. S. S. R. in its common struggle with Great Britain against Nazism. Similar statements from others have appeared elsewhere and some who would be glad to make such statements have been traveling and have not yet been reached. We would like to publish in our September issue a complete a list as can be gathered. Will you be good enough therefore to send us a copy of any public statement you may have made, or wish to make, for this purpose. We go to press on the 12th of August for the September issue. May we therefore have your answer before then?

Yours sincerely,

JESSICA SMITH, *Editor.*
Jessica Smith.

JS:FMU
UOPWA #18

THE AUTHORITATIVE AMERICAN MAGAZINE ON THE SOVIET UNION

EXHIBIT No. 1213

Telephone: MU. 3-3855-6.

SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY,
114 EAST THIRTY SECOND STREET, NEW YORK,
August 14, 1941.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR DR. CARTER. Many thanks for sending us the copy of your cable to Moscow for publication. I shall be glad to indicate that it was cabled to the U. S. S. R. on June 26th, and will send you the proof as soon as it comes back from the printer.

Sincerely yours,

JESSICA SMITH, *Editor.*
Jessica Smith.

THE AUTHORITATIVE AMERICAN MAGAZINE ON THE SOVIET UNION

EXHIBIT No. 1214

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, 10th August, 1941.

Miss JESSICA SMITH,
Soviet Russia Today,
114 East 32nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS SMITH: On June 26th I cabled to friends in Moscow the following message:

"American opinion, while holding varying political views, agrees with Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in condemning Hitler's 'treacherous attack' on the Soviet Union and in declaring that 'any rallying of forces opposing Hitler

would redound to the benefit of American security.' It is highly significant that the vast majority of commentators recognize that this is a clear-cut case of indefensible Nazi aggression.

"Though American writers on strategy are divided in their judgment of the military outcome, I personally believe that the attitude of the Soviet citizens and the character of the Soviet Army are such that a Hitler victory is as unlikely as it is undesirable. The Soviet Army has already proved its competence in the Far East, and demonstrated its power in the West. Many Americans expected that Japan would quickly conquer China. After four years of fighting the army of Free China and the spirit of the Free Chinese are stronger than ever before. Neither the Chinese people nor the peoples of the U. S. S. R. with their infinitely more integrated military organization and political structure, would expect the Soviet Union to be less determined or less certain of final victory. I believe that the American people, too, will rise above internal differences and support every Soviet effort to resist the Nazi aggression."

You may use this in the next issue of Soviet Russia Today provided that you indicate that it was sent to my friends in the U.S.S.R. on June 26th.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter.

Exhibit No. 1215

129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N. Y., August 13, 1941.

The Hon. Sumner Welles,
State Department, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Welles: At the suggestion of Charles C. Burlingham, Judge Thomas D. Thacher, Joseph Barnes, Allen Wardwell, Dr. Henry E. Sigerist and others, I have accepted the chairmanship of a preparatory and temporary committee to organize an American Committee for Medical Aid to Russia.

We have consulted the Hon. Joseph E. Davies in his capacity as a member of the President's Committee on War Relief Agencies, and Mr. Davies has asked that I go ahead with the organization of the proposed committee. We have consulted the Soviet Ambassador who has assured us of the full cooperation of his Government. A representative of a New York law firm has undertaken to aid in drafting articles of incorporation. He will also aid in preparing the papers necessary for the approach to the Treasury in connection with the necessary authority for gifts being deductible in income tax returns.

The firm of Barrow, Wade, Guthrie and Co. has accepted our invitation to serve as honorary auditor and to aid in setting up the books and supervising the accounts.

Mr. Charles C. Burlingham and I have been in correspondence with the Hon. Norman H. Davis as to relationships with the American Red Cross. I expect to talk the matter over further with Mr. Davis in Stockbridge this week end. Similar consultations are taking place with the American Friends Service, and the Joint Distribution Committee of the Jews.

In order to have as much coordination as possible we are asking James G. Blaine to act as consultant for United China Relief and Mr. Winthrop W. Aldrich to act as consultant for British War Relief. We are asking Mr. Aldrich to arrange for Mr. F. V. Gehle, one of the vice presidents of the Chase Bank, to cooperate with us in setting up a sound organization which can profit by the very extensive experience of British War Relief.

Colonel Philip R. Faymonville of the War Department is being kept informed as to the developments of this plan.

When the preliminary appeal is made we will emphasize that the immediate need in Russia is for medicines, drugs and surgical instruments, rather than for ambulances or personnel.

The preparatory committee will make a decision very shortly as to the precise title of the permanent committee. Some recommend American Committee for Medical Aid to Russia. Others propose United Russian Relief.

All with whom we have consulted favor the idea of a central organization in order to avoid duplication of effort, as local groups all over the country have already started raising funds for medical aid.

I would appreciate it if you would pass this letter on to the appropriate officer of the State Department with the request that he inform me as to any further steps which I should take on behalf of the preparatory committee at this stage.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1216

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
August 20, 1941.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: I have just received a letter from Tuan-Sheng Chien from Kunming, China. He is distinctly more optimistic than he was in my last letter from him, although he says the economic situation, especially around Chungking is getting pretty bad. He emphasized the importance of the Burma Road and the great loss to China by the Japanese occupation of Indo-China and the stoppage of access by that route to the outer world. He hopes the United States may do more to improve the administration of the Burma Road.

He is a good deal concerned about the Russian entry into the war, thinking it may complicate China's position, although of course he realizes the possibilities of great military advantage. As a Left, but not Communist Chinese, he is afraid China will be squeezed by the Communists on the one hand and the "Shanghai minds" on the other.

Perhaps you have got this same letter, but if not I am sure you would be interested in the following paragraph: "The attitude of the left intelligentsia of America towards the Chinese Communists and the latter's quarrel with the Central Government is most unintelligible to me. I know very few of that left. But I do know that the Amerasia group, which is almost identical with the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, is the moving spirit of that pro-Communist and shall I say anti-Chungking propaganda. How far that propaganda poisons the American mind and how far that group gets a sympathetic hearing from the New Deal I am in no position to judge. But I do think that that propaganda is very harmful in the sense that it interferes with our liberty of action in regard to the disloyal troops of Communism and prevents American public opinion from otherwise exerting a great and healthy influence on Chungking which needs to be criticized and also to go very much further to the left (again not Communist).

He adds a word of surprise at Owen Lattimore's appointment as adviser to Chiang Kai-shek on the grounds that he is not very close to the Roosevelt administration, nor a man of the technical ability sorely in need in Chungking.

"There was rumor that the choice was made by that left intelligentsia referred to above, through Laughlin Currie. If this could be true, one naturally looks to a more virulent anti-Chungking (but of course pro-Chiang) pinkish propaganda in America, and the task of true reformers of the liberal left of China, will be made only more difficult."

I have just written Mr. Chien assuring him that the Amersia group now has no connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations and that the latter does not sympathize with the attitude of the former. I also said a word for Owen Lattimore and assured Chien that he is not closely associated with the Amerasia group.

I would be glad to have your comment on this situation.

Sincerely yours,

QUINCY WRIGHT.

QW: hmp

EXHIBIT No. 1217

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, September 2, 1941.

DR. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR PHIL: * * *.

Professor Tuan-sheng Chien who was one of the members of the Chinese group at Virginia Beach has written to several Americans criticising Owen Lattimore, Lauchlin Currie, and by indirection the IPR.

We need not be worried about the letter, because by now Lattimore has apparently made good with the Generalissimo as is evidenced by the wide publicity which the Chinese Government propaganda ministry has given Lattimore's address on August 12 at Chungking, but I would be interested to know whether Chien has written you; and if he has, I thought you would want to see my comment on his letter to one of his several correspondents in this country.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1218

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 2nd October 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Visa Division, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIRS: This is to certify that I am well acquainted with Mrs. Hilda A. Bretholtz. I have known her for the last twelve years and she is a very responsible character.

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1219

[Telegram]

JULY 15, 1941.

MRS. NATHANIEL BRETHOLTZ,
Care of Philip J. Jaffe,
Box 66, Roxbury, Connecticut (Telephone Woodberry 323):

Do you know any good unemployed cartographers in addition to Winslow and Watkins?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1220

[Telegram]

JULY 16, 1941.

MRS. NATHANIEL BRETHOLTZ,
c/o Philip Jaffe,
Box 66, Roxbury, Connecticut (Telephone Woodberry 323):

Earnestly hope you Nat can come Lee lunch one Saturday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1221

NOVEMBER 14, 1941.

HA from ECC:

Here is my letter to Remer and his reply about Chi's monograph. I suppose we have to send him a copy if we have one to spare. I do not remember saying that we put Remer on the mailing list in the sense of his getting free copies. Would you handle the whole matter on my behalf, both with reference to Chi and the Economic handbook. The Coordinator of Information has barrels of money and they ought to pay for all of the books we send them. If you send Chi's manuscript, be sure to put a time limit of say eight days when it should be returned.

EXHIBIT No. 1222

NOVEMBER 22, 1941.

WWL from ECC:

Schoyer has just been in to ask my advice with reference to Colonel Sharp's proposal. It is quite clear that he is very loath to leave the IPR, but realizes that if he went to Colonel Sharp it might result in a budget saving.

Considering his age and single blessedness I suppose government service is indicated.

What I would like to urge very strongly on you is that you tell him you will release him in the hope that Colonel Sharp will permit his doing two things;

First, complete the present radio program; and second, put through a second AMCO–CBS program after the first of the year. I think it is likely that CBS will give us another series and at an even better hour.

I think we ought to do this second series for three reasons:

(1) Its intrinsic value in our total program of public education.

(2) It will in the long run help us with AMCO finances (e. g. Grover's very complimentary remarks).

(3) If we don't go ahead with a second program we let the Far Eastern radio field go by default to Dick Walsh and Pearl Buck, and to Upton Close.

I think Schoyer could manage the second program without its taking too much of his time from Colonel Sharp's office. The more often he does it the more skillfully and speedily he can do the job. It would hardly be fair to also ask him to carry the task of answering any questions that come in in the fan mail.

If you agree, I suggest that you get Schoyer to drive a bargain along the foregoing lines.

EXHIBIT No. 1223

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, GOVERNMENT, AND HISTORY,
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY,
West Point, New York, November 24, 1941.

(WWL dealing with this)

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
The Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Early in 1942 the War Department will launch an educational campaign which aims to inform all military personnel as to:

1. The train of events beginning with the outbreak of World War II which compelled the United States to launch the current defense program.
2. The hazards facing the United States today.
3. The day-to-day interpretation of further events as they occur, with emphasis on their relationship to our national defense.

We will look to selected officers in the various posts, camps, and stations to give the lectures which are intended to bring the soldiers abreast of the situation. At the same time we hope to build up a "pool" of not less than a hundred civilian specialists whose lectures will highlight the campaign. In many cases their intimate knowledge of specific problems will not otherwise be available to the Army.

The job of organizing this project was turned over to me a few days ago. We have been fortunate at the outset in securing the full support of the Foreign Policy Association in our work. I am hoping that the Institute of Pacific Relations will do likewise, in view of the fact that no other research group can provide comparable information in the Far Eastern field.

Our immediate wants are:

1. A list of your publications which will serve as background material for the research work of the Army officers who will give the lectures. They should go back at least to early 1931. I have in mind particularly the pamphlets and magazines which you publish—issued volumes of the "Far Eastern Survey," etc. As for your books, although I am reasonably sure I can find them in the War College Library, it will still be advisable to have our own supply. Please quote your prices on all items.
2. A list, with quotations, of current publications.
3. A list of suggested speakers in the Far Eastern field. We are looking for the realist who will stick to an objective presentation, avoiding the direct emotional appeal. Also, he should be able to put his ideas across in a relatively simple style, inasmuch as his audience will in many, prehaps most, cases be a mixed group—officers and enlisted men. I have in mind James R. Young as a typical example.

We plan to call on the speakers for not more than six lectures each during the period Jan. 2–April 15. Their assignments will be at camps and posts as near as possible to their normal places of business. The standard Government consultant fee of $10.00 per day, plus expenses, will be paid. As you see, we look to them for a contribution to defense.

I will be in my Washington office, Chief of Public Relations, War Department, during the periods November the 26–28 and December 2–6. Thereafter I will be in

Washington regularly (for an indefinite period) from Tuesday to Saturday of each week. Please write to that address.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) HERMAN BOUKEMA.

NB: ht.

EXHIBIT No. 1225

[Telegram]

JAN. 1, 1942.

(Handwritten:)

TASS,

A. P. Building N. Y. C.

Message just received. If not too late you may send following. The spontaneous thundering and long sustained applause by the United States Senate and House of Representatives following Winston Churchill's remarks regarding the Soviet Union's great role in the World War reflects the feeling of gratitude of the American people to the people of the Soviet Union as we now are joined together in the War against Hitler.

EDWARD CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1226

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, February 27, 1942.

The HONORABLE JOSEPH E. DAVIES,
South Ocean Boulevard, Palm Beach, Florida

DEAR MR. DAVIES: Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the March PACIFIC AFFAIRS, the quarterly journal of the IPR. Ultimately I think you may want to familiarize yourself with this magazine. The reason I am writing you today is to call your attention to the review of "Mission to Moscow" which begins on page 124.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1227

JUNE 2, 1942.

Memo to E. C. C. from C. P.:

My four days in Washington last week were fruitful in ideas if nothing else. Several things came up which Bill Lockwood has suggested that I pass on to you.

1. *W. Norman Brown* (British Empire section of the C.O.I., Library of Congress Annex) whose specialty is India was full of good intentions and would very much like to see some arrangement made whereby an organization like the IPR would have access to material and personnel in the various Washington departments. He is going to suggest to someone in the Office of Facts and Figures that they consider making the IPR a semi-official channel for releasing certain information to the public. This was his own idea, and coming from him it might carry some weight.

I spent quite a while with Bill Carter in the hope that some way could be found of securing for the IPR such releases as the Monitoring Department can distribute. Bill felt that the only way that such an arrangement could be made would be by an important IPR person making an appeal directly to MacLeish or someone of equal importance. Bill realizes that the IPR would make far better use of the releases than some of the newspapers which evidently do get the benefit of this service. It does seem ridiculous that an office like ours has to depend upon newspaper stuff at second or third hand.

Would you be willing to write to MacLeish presenting the problem which the IPR is facing now that it is cut off from most Far Eastern news, and ask whether it would be possible for certain information secured through the Monitoring service to be released to us for use in the Survey, Pacific Affairs etc.

2. The people who are working on India seemed to show more interest in IPR and its potentialities than anyone else I met in Washington. Eric Beecroft (Board of Economic Warfare) talked to me at length about his

desire to see the Far Eastern Survey and other Institute publications give adequate attention to India. He thinks it important that we add a scholar on Indian to our staff and raised the question of making such an appointment Having in mind the possibility of a Rockefeller fellowship for such a person, I asked Beecroft whether he could suggest any candidates. He mentioned (I suppose this should be treated confidentially) Daniel Thorner who is in the C. O. I. working under Brown's direction. Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know Thorner's background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in Indian than any other person in this country. It is Beecroft's notion that a fairly attractive offer here could wean Thorner away from his present government job. (Beecroft is not sure what Thorner's present salary is. He thinks it is probably $2,600 or $3,200.) I have discussed this somewhat briefly with Bill Lockwood. He is a little uncertain about the second fellowship for the American Council staff. If this fellowship could be made available, or if you could find it possible to give Thorner a secretariat appointment, it would certainly mean a great deal to the IPR program for the next year.

3. I was very much interested to find a large number of our friends in Washington bemoaning the fact that the whole IPR was not located in Washington, or at least that a branch office was not in full operation there. Several people mentioned to me the dinner meeting which was called by Graves on May 13 to discuss the whole problem of India and the presentation of information about India in this country. Every person who attended that dinner was delighted that the opportunity had been given him, and said quite honestly that if it had not been for Graves' action, they would probably not have sought the opportunity to discover what other departments of the government were doing in their field of particular interest. It was pointed out that an active IPR office in Washington could do a great service by calling together frequent meetings of this kind. I wish it were possible for our staffs to have someone in Washington full time. We are certainly missing opportunities of service to ourselves and of usefulness to others.

All in all, it is very heartening for a member of the IPR staff to discover how highly the organization and its publications are regarded everywhere in the capitol city.

CP: RY

EXHIBIT No. 1228

(Penciled notation: not sent?)

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 12, 1942.

MR. JOHN A. POLLARD,
Special Reports Division, Coordinator of Information,
270 Madison Avenue, New York City.

DEAR MR. POLLARD: Thank you for your letter of the 28th regarding Mr. Field.

I have no hesitation in testifying to Mr. Field's political integrity and freedom from activities which might place his loyalty in question.

I was associated with him intimately from 1929 until September 1940. During this period his Americanism was of the most rugged and valuable character. He was an indefatigable and exceptionally able student of domestic and foreign policy and became one of our foremost authorities on the Far East. He saw the menace of Japan, and I do not know of anyone who more unerringly envisaged the inevitable movement of Japan into Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. He again and again called attention to the costly appeasement policy of London and Washington, and as I remember, indicated that if the United States was not willing to fight to prevent the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China all of Southeast Asia would fall to the Japanese.

In the autumn of 1940 Mr. Field broke with me in the sense that he resigned from the staff of the Institute because he recognized that it was impossible for him to continues on the Institute staff and engage in political activities as planned by the American Peace Mobilization. He felt that the war as defined by the

London and Paris Governments in 1939 was in danger of involving the United States in Chamberlainism, in the underwriting of British Imperialism and in the ultimate appeasement of Germany and Japan as advocated at various times by the Cliveden set. He therefore resigned from the IPR, threw himself into the APM, carried on a nation-wide educational campaign and to gain publicity for this campaign organized the picketing of the White House.

Though I had a great deal of sympathy for many of his ideas I had tried to dissuade him from joining the APM because I thought it might endanger both his research and political usefulness, and also because I felt that the sooner the United States got into the war the sooner it could be transformed from an imperialist war into a people's war against the new and terrible imperialisms of Germany and Japan.

The Congress of the United States, many employees of our government, and a great many trusted officers of our armed forces were in 1940 in my view as inadequate in their political analysis as Mr. Field. A very high percentage of loyal Americans were working, as Mr. Field was working, to keep us out of the war. They did this for all kinds of motives and all kinds of reasons.

[Mr. John A. Pollard —2— March 12, 1942]

Yet the vast majority of these are accepted today as citizens of integrity, completely free from activities which might place their loyalty in question.

Mr. Field was, of course, politically ill-advised to picket the White House, but a great many of our most reliable and responsible citizens have made political mistakes.

That Mr. Field could be guilty of any disloyalty to the United States is inconceivable. The great advantage that he has over many is that his political analysis of the Far East has been far in advance of most of our best informed citizens. His knowledge of the Far East is very extensive. His capacity for work is great. His usefulness to the Government would, in my view, be beyond question.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

[Mr. John A. Pollard —2— March 12, 1942]

Yet the vast majority of these are accepted today as citizens of integrity, completely free from activities which might place their loyalty in question. I would trust Mr. Field's integrity more than I would certain well known isolationists, because I think he possesses more than most a keen awareness of the essence of our American democracy.

There will, of course, be wide difference of opinion as to the wisdom of APM's picketing the White House. Personally, I think it was an ill-advised move. It was defended by its protagonists on the ground that APM felt obligated to expose the nature of what they regarded as the phony war which was being waged at the beginning. The difference between APM and certain genuinely subversive movements was that APM was attempting to do everything in the open, and its picketing of the White House was an attempt to bring out into the open before the American people and the American government the important issues which it believed must be faced by the American people.

That Mr. Field could be guilty of any disloyalty to the United States is inconceivable. The great advantage he has over many is that his political analysis of the Far East has been far in advance of most of our best informed citizens. His knowledge of the Far East is very extensive. His capacity for work is great. His usefulness to the Government would, in my view, be beyond question.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. JOHN A. POLLARD,
Special Reports Division, Coordinator of Information,
270 Madison Avenue, New York City.

EXHIBIT No. 1229

(Pencilled initials:)

WWL	EJT
WLH	PCG
HA	JWB
ED	Lomis
KG	RLW

Holmes
Keenleyside
ISM
L. Curtis
Parkin
Claston
Skelton

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 13, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I am happy to express my interest in the continuation of the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I believe is more necessary now than ever before. Several of the volumes of the Inquiry Series have been of distinct use to this office, and there have been a number of articles in *Pacific Affairs* and in the *Far Eastern Survey* which have helped us in the analysis of problems upon which we have been working.

It would be a distinct loss if these publications had to be shut down or even curtailed. I hope that in the interest of our war effort in the Pacific they may be actually expanded. I do not know of any agency inside the government or out of it which is in a position to do the work which the Institute has been doing.

Sincerely yours.

Lauchlin Currie,
LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President.

EXHIBIT No. 1231

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., March 17th 1942.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,
Research Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR Mr. HOLLAND: The Far Eastern Section of the Office of the Coordinator of Information wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has received from the Institute of Pacific Relations and particularly from those in charge of its research activities. . . . The outstanding example is the receipt of a number of manuscripts in advance of their publication by the Institute. These include the translation of a work by Charles Robequain on the economic development of French Indo-China, a manuscript by H. G. Callis on foreign investments in Southeast Asia, one by Virginia Thompson on Burma, and one by Chao Ting-chi on China.

This acknowledgment may be useful to you in any appeal you may make for support during the coming year.

May I express the hope that your plans for the year will include provision for further cooperation with this Section. The immediate importance of this is emphasized by the fact that our own work has become more closely integrated with that of the Army and Navy.

We look forward to the continuance of the cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations with confidence that such cooperation will make for effectiveness in research and economy in the use of personnel.

Sincerely yours,

C. F. REMER, *Chief, Far Eastern Section.*

EXHIBIT No. 1232

APRIL 6, 1942.

To: ECC
WLH
From: WWL

I'd like your advice on a reply to the attached letter from Roy Veatch. It proposes a conference this spring on the essentials of a postwar settlement, attended by persons in and out of the government.

There isn't any doubt but that this would be a very useful undertaking if properly set up. It might in fact be the Prout's Neck follow-up which we have been unable to arrange thus far.

The chief problem I should think would not be organizational sponsorship but finding someone with the standing, time, and resources to pull it off. Given this it would be easy to get the necessary informal cooperation.

As for our taking the lead, shouldn't positive I.P.R. efforts in this field be devoted primarily to our own area of concern? I should think any conferencing that we do ought to be directed first of all at several preparatory meetings for the September show. This would not preclude our chipping in but would mean that someone else would really have to carry the ball.

Ed Earle is out west for a month investigating different aspects of the Japanese evacuation.

I am sending a copy of Roy's letter to Phil Jessup. He might like to consider the proposal in relation to his Carnegie Endowment program.

Veatch's personnel proposals are entirely American, but surely this meeting should be international in character.

EXHIBIT No. 1233

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
Washington, D. C., March 30, 1942.

MR. WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, JR.,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: I have had an opportunity to talk with a good many people both inside and outside the Government since I came down here, particularly regarding the present state of thought and action on plans and advance preparations for the postwar world. It seems perfectly clear to me, and to others who are trying to observe the situation closely, that some new impetus is needed to bring scattered thinking into focus. We do not yet have in Government or outside of Government any agreement, or any general understanding, as to the essential points in a postwar set-up that will make impossible another war within a generation or two, and there is no adequate plan for such public discussion of this problem as will lead to general support of the action that Governments must take.

I, and a few others here, have been casting about for the proper agency or medium to bring together the people who should think through this problem and advise upon lines of action. This might be done by Edward Meade Earle's Committee, as a follow-up of the Prout's Neck Conference last summer. On the other hand, I believe it would be desirable for the auspices to be a little broader and I wondered therefore whether the I. P. R. and the F. P. A., and perhaps also Shotwell's Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, might join with Earle's Committee in sponsoring such a conference, entirely without publicity.

It would be my idea that a group ought to meet near Washington during the Spring, at least before the end of May, and that it should spend two to four days together. If the meeting is limited to two days, say Saturday and Sunday, I believe you would have a better chance to hold the entire group together since each member might be able to commit himself to that much time.

As a starter I would suggest the following people outside the Government: Shotwell, Buell, Pittman Potter, Eugene Staley, Jacob Viner, Clarence Pickett, Quincy Wright, J. B. Condliffe, Isaiah Bowman, Dr. Boudreau, A. Loveday, A. Hansen, Edward Meade Earle, Walter Van Kirk, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Vera Micheles Dean, and of course you and Ned Carter. You might want to include also George Warren, Secretary of the President's Advisory Committee

on Political Refugees; Patrick M. Malin, American Director, International Migration Service; Michael Straight, Maxwell S. Stewart, Carter Goodrich, Esther Brunauer, Bill and Anne Johnstone, and John Coyl of the National Planning Association.

From within the Government you might include Mrs. Roosevelt, Vice President Wallace, Milo Perkins, Berle, Acheson, Pasvolsky (and Julian Wadleigh, Charles Yost, and Harley Notter, from Pasvolsky's Division in the State Department); Harry White of the Treasury; Leslie Wheeler, Paul Appleby, and Mordecai Ezekiel of Agriculture; Wayne Taylor, Amos Taylor and A. R. Upgren of the Department of Commerce; Lubin and Hinrichs from the Labor field; Stacy May from WPB; Stephen Raushenbush from the Power Commission; Ringland and Fox, on the staff of the President's Committee on War Relief Appeals (and perhaps Joseph E. Davies and Keppel of the Committee); and from the staff of our Board, Lewis Lorwin, Winfield Riefler, William T. Stone, and Louis Bean.

Let me know what you think about this plan. If you are not in a position to take the initiative we should like to take it up with someone else.

Sincerely yours,

ROY VEATCH.

P. S.—Of course other names will occur to me as soon as this has gone—for instance. I certainly wouldn't leave out Phil Jessup. Presumably a group of four or five would want to do a careful job of drawing up the list.

EXHIBIT No. 1234

[Telegram]

APRIL 25, 1942.

From: The WHITE HOUSE, *Washington, D. C.* 25. 1240P.
EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East 52nd Street:

Planning to attend conference Tuesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1235

[Telegram]

MAY 5, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.:

Wire collect can you spare five minutes anytime Wednesday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1236

[Telegram]

JUNE 23, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.:

Washington visit postponed until next week.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1237

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, June 26, 1942.

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2nd, and hope you can see me in the forenoon of the day.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1238

[Telegram]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., October 7, 1942.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Eighth only time would be better if convenient.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1239

[Telegram]

OCTOBER 7, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Executive Offices of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.:

Visiting Washington tomorrow, Thursday. Will telephone you in morning for appointment.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1240

[Telegram]

7 GOVERNMENT,
Washington, D. C. 5 5:32 P.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Glad to see you at 12:30 Wednesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1242

[Day letter]

MARCH 29, 1938.

Mr. CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R., Washington, D. C.:

Could you dine with a dozen of my friends at the Century Club on the evening of Wednesday April twentieth?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1243

[Telegram]

Washington, D. C., April 20 1035A.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Will be Century Club tonight 7:15. Arriving consulate about five. Regards.

C. OUMANSKY.

EXHIBIT No. 1244

NOVEMBER 14, 1942.

NLT
93

V. M. MOLOTOV,
Narkomindal, Moscow (U. S. S. R.):

Respectfully and urgently invite you to authorize some members of Soviet Embassy Washington and Soviet Legation Ottawa to attend eighth conference Institute Pacific Relations, Montremblant Province, Quebec, December four to fourteen Stop Influential leaders coming from England, China, Fighting France, Philippines, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States Stop E. Varga, G. Voitinsky, Constantine Oumonsky, V. Motylev, famil-

iar with Institute purposes Stop Conference agenda includes better prosecution of war in racial political economic matters. Conference discussion will be private.

EDWARD CARTER,
Secretary-General, Institute Pacific Relations,
129 East 52 Street, New York.

EXHIBIT No. 1245

PACIFIC COUNCIL

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
New York City, March 24, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 E. 52nd Street, New York City.

DEAR NED: I hope you have sent copies of Lauchlin Currie's letter to such key people as Dr. Shotwell, Dr. Butler, Roland Morris, and the people at the corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Sincerely yours,

[s] PHIL.

EXHIBIT No. 1246

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., April 6th, 1942.

Mrs. ANNE HARTWELL JOHNSTONE,
Foreign Policy Association,
National Press Building, Washington D. C.

DEAR Mrs. JOHNSTONE: Thank you for sending me *Russia at War.* I am sorry the War Department took such a timid attitude. I imagine General McCoy has by this time decided to reopen the question with the War Department. If the army can't stand as mild a dose of the Soviet Union as this, how can American soldiers be expected to be effective comrades in arms with our gallant allies of the Soviet Union? And how can our soldier civilians consider intelligently the issues which will confront all Americans when the representatives of the Soviet Union are sitting with our representatives at some future peace conference table?

As for other channels of distribution, neither I nor my colleagues in the IPR can think of any avenues of promotion with which you are not already familiar.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1247

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
22 EAST 38TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

VICE PRESIDENT AND WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM T. STONE

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC.

Washington Bureau: National Press Building, Washington, D. C.

TELEPHONE: DISTRICT 3780

APRIL 8, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52d Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter about our Headline Book, "Russia at War." I sympathize entirely with your questions on the subject and I am really alarmed at the amount of distrust or, to put it more mildly, questioning of Russia that I find here.

I think we have done a good job of promoting Mrs. Dean's pamphlet through the regular channels. I had in mind that your work with Russian Relief might have sugggested certain new areas of interest which the pamphlet might help consolidate.

Sincerely yours,

Anne H Johnstone
Mrs. Anne Hartwell Johnstone,
Education Secretary.

AHJ : MH

Exhibit No. 1249

WLH file
WWL

Department of State,
Washington, May 12, 1942.

In reply refer to RC

My Dear Mr. Carter: In connection with its program of cultural and technical assistance to China, the Department plans to send to universities and other research centers in that country scientific and technical textbooks, reference works, and learned journals.

Because of the difficulties of transportation, it is for the moment impossible to send to China the actual books and journals needed in any appreciable quantity. The Department is, therefore, making arrangements for the microfilming of certain urgently needed books and journals with the permission of their publishers which has been generously extended in each case thus far taken up.

As a war measure and for the duration of the present transportation stringency the Department would appreciate receiving your permission to make microfilm copies of pamphlets, books, and articles from the periodicals published both by the International Secretariat and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for transmission to China in connection with the program referred to above.

Sincerely yours,

[s] Charles A. Thomson,
Chief, Division of Cultural Relations.

Exhibit No. 1250

129 East 52nd Street,
New York City, May 13, 1942.

Mr. Charles A. Thomson,
Chief, Division of Cultural Relations,
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Thompson: Thank you for your letter of May 12. We are very glad to cooperate with you in your admirable program for sending microfilms to China and are glad to give you permission to make microfilm copies of our publications.

We should be interested to hear from time to time what particular articles or books you select for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

[t] Edward C. Carter.

Exhibit No. 1251

(Pencilled notes:) Don't these people ever consult other govt. departments?
? Schumpeter? John Steward?

WLH
WWL
Please deal with this ECC
KG: No, except for the attached stuff, if that counts. WLH
WM 1. Has this been answered?
MR 2. Martin & Pettigrew for our Washington list KG
WWL: What's to be done about this? WLH OK HS

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Military Intelligence Division G–2

WASHINGTON

MAY 30, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York City, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The Japan-Manchuria section of the Far Eastern Branch of the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, is interested in obtaining the services of some additional research analysts primarily to prepare economic and geographic surveys, studies, and reference material on Japan and Manchuria. In fairness to the analysts now on hand, it is necessary that additional personnel employed under the new authorizations have outstanding records of accomplishment in the field of scholarship or in the business world. While a knowledge of Japanese or other Far Eastern languages is not essential, some personal experience in the Far East is practically indispensable. The work consists of the preparation of research material and, in some cases, the direction and supervision of other research analysts of superior qualifications and accomplishments.

Salaries range from $2,000 to $3,800, and if someone with the necessary qualifications and experience is available, it is probable that arrangements could be made to employ one research analyst at $4,600.

Because of your wide acquaintance among research workers interested in the Far East and your accomplishments in directing research and the serious study of Far Eastern questions, it may be that you know of some American that you would consider suitable for the kind of work roughly described above. In any case, I shall be under obligations to you if you will send to me or to Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS, any information you think might be helpful in obtaining the services of two or three research workers who can be depended upon for at least a year to turn out a considerable amount of research work of high quality on economic and other subjects relating to the Japanese Empire and Manchuria.

Yours sincerely,

[s] Truman M. Martin,
[t] TRUMAN M. MARTIN,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C., Chief, Japan-Manchuria Section.

hl

JUNE 26, 1942.

WWL from ECC:

If John Stewart isn't already in government service isn't he just the person to recommend to Truman Martin? I certainly would not want to recommend Mrs. Schumpeter.

(Pencilled note:) ECC I talked with Pettigrew and proposed Stewart, among others.

WWL

EXHIBIT No. 1252

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, June 11, 1942.

EDGAR J. TARR, Esq.,
Monarch Life Assurance Company,
Winnipeg, Canada.

DEAR EDGAR: Your letter of the 9th raises two points: first, the welcome possibility of an invitation from Canada; second, the question of postponement until December.

Regarding the latter, I think an overriding consideration will be the point you raise as to the psychological time for getting the best results. I know that our chances of getting people from the Soviet Union would be better in December

than in September. I raised the matter of Soviet representation with Litvinoff last week. He is deeply interested in the Institute and very appreciative of its work, but he says that this summer it is going to be terribly difficult to get anyone to leave the Soviet Union. Everyone wants to stay and participate in the winning of the war. To the Russians, as you know, this summer is the crisis period. Litvinoff has the greatest difficulty in getting over adequate staff for this reason. On the cultural side he has been under tremendous pressure from government and private agencies here to get over Shostakovich, the composer, the Red Army Chorus, etc., and though he has put tremendous pressure on these people to come over and help in the task of speeding up America's war effort for Russia he has had absolutely no success. No one wants to leave the Soviet Union now. In spite of this I do not exclude the possibility of Motylev or Voitinsky coming, but all the indications point to December being much better than September.

As to the possibility of our getting a really significant group of people in as short a time as three months, I believe that we can certainly get as good a personnel from the Pacific Area for a September Conference as we got for the Atlantic Area at Prout's Neck last year, but I think we all want to attempt an even higher level for the IPR than we had for the Atlantic Conference. (I except, of course, Canada, because we could not think of a better group for the IPR than that you mobilized for Prout's Neck.)

Last week in Washington, Holland and I made some soundings with reference to Wallace and Milo Perkins. Right now both of them have to watch their step because of the very delicate relations between the Board of Economic Warfare and the State Department. The Department is known by the public to be a little exercised about the activities of the BEW, and I read between the lines that neither Wallace nor Perkins wants in the next few weeks to do anything that would aggravate this situation.

And here is one of the critical problems faced by the American Council. Many thoughtful Americans believe that there is more constructive thinking on postwar reconstruction in the BEW than in the State Department. Many would hope that the lead in the proposed Conference, from the American point of view, could be taken by Wallace and Perkins and some of their very able staff members. Certain foreign office people from other countries might be more eager to meet Wallace and Perkins than some of the more routine people in the State Department. We can undoubtedly secure the presence of some State Department people if that seems wise to the officers of the Pacific Council, but it would be difficult to manage at the moment.

Wallace is known to be grieved at the rivalry that the public talks about and is leaning over backwards to liquidate it. It may be that the whole matter will be cleared up in another two months, but until it is Wallace may be very reluctant to commit himself, Mr. Perkins, or any of the other members of his staff to attendance. If we can get Wallace's consent to attend within the next fortnight I think we can get good personnel from other countries. If it is impossible this month to get a decision from Wallace, then I am inclined to think that for the reasons you give December might be very much more preferable.

The actual mechanical work I feel sure Holland, Austern, Parsons, Lilienthal, and I can handle.

Jessup, Holland, Lockwood and I will meet you in Montreal or N. Y. for the 19th and 20th, or receive you here, as you prefer. Please wire your preference in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1253

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
Washington, D. C., June 26, 1942.

Dr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your kind invitation to attend the next international study conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

It would be possible for me to attend the conference only on permission and instructions of the Soviet Government. I regret to have to decline your invitation, which I am doing. because I do not have the above instructions.

It is also impossible for me to separate myself from the official diplomatic rank, which I am holding at the Embassy, and come as a private person.

Sincerely yours,

Anth. Fedotov,
ANTHONY N. FEDOTOV, *Third Secretary.*

EXHIBIT No. 1254

120 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, July 11, 1942.

EDWARD C. DYASON, Esq.
Arroyo 845, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

DEAR DYASON: It was delightful to get your letter of May 11 and your extraordinarily interesting letter to Spalding which I am forwarding to him at this time.

Though truncated by the war, activity of the IPR is in many areas greater, more important and more publicly recognized than ever before. For fifteen years the IPR has been trying to advance the thesis that the Pacific must be considered as well as the Atlantic. Pearl Harbor in a single day did perhaps more to substantiate the IPR's thesis than we have been able to do in the past decade and a half of careful scholarly and educational work. For example, here in the United States, departments of the government which reluctantly ordered but a single copy of our publications, are now ordering them by the dozen and in the case of the pamphlet series by the tens of thousands. Under separate cover I am sending you a copy of the latest catalog and supplement.

Some months ago there was a suggestion that PACIFIC AFFAIRS, the FAR EASTERN SURVEY, and AMERASIA consolidated into a single publication. This proposal broke down in part because the editors of AMERASIA wish to continue the magazine on an entirely independent basis, free of all institutional impediments. The negotiations were most friendly but were not successful.

The Canadian Institute and the American Council are broadening out very substantially in the field of popular or semipopular education. The pamphlet series of both organizations have reached very large circulation figures. The American Council is on the air regularly once a week over the Columbia Broadcasting System. Under separate cover I am sending you a pamphlet. "Spotlight on Asia" which though out of date, shows you the type of popular presentation which the American Council has adopted in cooperation with the CBS.

A considerable number of the staffs of the various Institutes have been drafted into governmental service. Enclosed is an extract (brought up to date) of a letter I wrote some time ago reporting on some of these. In spite of these wartime changes in personnel it has been possible to maintain the secretariats of the American and Pacific Councils intact, as many of the governments, though eager to employ every member of the staff have recognized that it is in the interests of all the United Nations governments and the various departments within the governments to have the IPR retain a balanced, competent, expert staff that could look at the whole Pacific as a unit and be freer for writing and publication than if all were in government service.

I was very interested in the December-January issue of the *Austral-Asiatic Bulletin.*

On the financial side there have been some losses and some gains. Support from Japan, France and Holland has faded; that from the Philippines has deceased. The China IPR has, however, increased its allocation to the Pacific Council from $1,000 to 03,000, which is exceptionally generous and inspiring at this particular moment in China's struggle against the invaders.

I think the best plan with reference to Spalding's book is for you to keep it and return it to me when you next come to New York, which I hope will not be any one of your dollar accounts.

I am a little discouraged by what you say of the cultural efforts in your neighborhood. International intercultural efforts has many pluses and minuses.

In the light of your letter and your letter to Spalding I am of course intrigued as always with the development of your own thought. As you will have guessed

from our last conversation the world into which you are moving is one which I myself have not traversed. That does not mean that I shall not be profoundly interested in the results of your study. My hope is that I may be sufficiently intelligent to profit by your unique pioneering.

Mrs. Carter joins me in sending you our warmest greetings.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER REPORTING ON IPR PERSONNEL NOW IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (REVISED JULY 11, 1942)

Owen Lattimore, on the nomination of President Roosevelt is acting as Chiang Kai-shek's personal political adviser. He is at present back in Washington temporarily, but may soon be returning to Chungking.

Ch'ao-ting Chi is serving in Chungking as Secretary General of the Currency Stabilization Board.

Irving S. Friedman is serving in the Division of Monetary Research in the U. S. Treasury.

Dr. Russell G. Shiman has gone to the Tariff Commission in Washington.

Ellen van Zyll de Jong is working on the Netherlands East Indies problems in the Intelligence Section of the War Department.

Virginia Thompson is with the Tariff Commission in Washington.

Information supplied by Miss Harriet Moore of the American Russian Institute and Edward C. Carter to the British authorities in Washington was said to have been useful in clearing the way for a coordination of British and Russian appeals for American material.

Jack Shepherd was attached to the Ministry of Information in Singapore and is now with the Ministry of Information in India.

W. L. Holland and W. W. Lockwood have served in a consultative capacity to several Washington agencies but have not entered government service.

Andrew Grajdanzev has compiled urgently needed information for the Library of Congress, the War Department, and the Coordinator of Information.

Percy E. Corbett, while serving on the International Secretariat of the IPR has advised the Ottawa government on Latin American problems as a result of his observation at the Havana Conference and his subsequent studies of hemispheric problems.

John Leaning is in charge of the British Press Service for the American Pacific Coast.

Frank M. Tamagna is dividing his time between the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington.

EXHIBIT NO. 1256

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, August 3, 1942.

Dr. PHILIP C. JESSUP,
Columbia University, New York City.

DEAR PHIL: I was glad to see your circular on International Administration. It is most interesting.

As for the people in the YMCA and YWCA who might be interested, here are a few names to start on:

YMCA, 347 Madison Avenue, New York
- E. E. Barnett
- S. M. Keeny
- Jay Urice
- F. V. Slack

YWCA, 600 Lexington Avenue, New York
- Miss Talitha Gerlach
- Miss Sarah Lyon
- Miss Rhoda McCulloch

Sincerely yours,

[t] EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1257

(Handwritten:)

PIERSON COLLEGE—YALE UNIVERSITY,
Master's House, 231 Park Street, September 7, 1942.

DEAR NED: I had better send this to you while I have it, but with the reservation that $50 is to be credited to the account of the Foreign Affairs Council for purchase of IPR publications. Would you have the Treasurer write a letter to me in Cleveland to this effect?

The Ted White letter is most interesting. Have a few extra copies which I might send to members of the Cleveland delegation who participated in the Conference.

As soon as Winifred can get a line on her own complicated tax situation she will send a contribution to IPR. We are both up against it!

She sends warmest regards with the hope of seeing you very soon. You might be interested to know that I am now appointed to the Department of State for the duration "on a part time basis." My function is still considered "secret and confidential", but between you and me I am very grateful over the whole affair. There is much I want to talk to you about.

Warmest regards.

Ever yours,

BROOKS EMENY.

P. S.—I am here until Thursday of this week then on to Washington for two days and then to New Hampshire for a week before returning to Cleveland the 21st. Am in Washington at least every Friday and can always be reached at the Metropolitan Club or the Department of State. The former is probably better given the confusion of government departments.

EXHIBIT No. 1258

SEPTEMBER 28, 1942.

G. E. VOITINSKY, Esq.,
Pacific Institute, 20 Razin Street, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

DEAR VOITINSKY: This is to acknowledge with thanks your cable informing us that Soviet participation in the IPR December Conference is doubtful.

During these months of titanic struggle between your heroic army and people and the Nazi hordes we realize how tremendous the pressure is on you and all Soviet citizens. The whole world is inspired by the epic character of the gigantic war that the U. S. S. R. is waging. Your countrymen are bearing the brunt of Hitler's onslaught. All of the rest of the world is in debt to the Soviet Union.

Many of us in the Institute of Pacific Relations believe that we must do all in our power to make certain that the war develop not as a series of national wars but in fact as well as theory as a real United Nations effort. We believe that the December Conference of the IPR can aid at least in a small way in facing the problems of a United Nations war. If it were not for this we would not dream of asking a single Soviet citizen to leave the Soviet Union at this critical moment.

Enclosed is a copy of the revised Conference announcement, agenda and provisional document list. We do hope that you will be able to reconsider the matter and come if possible yourself, or at least arrange for one or two equally competent scholars to come to the meeting.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1259

129 EAST 52D STREET,
New York City, October 1, 1942.

Mr. W. W. LANCASTER,
55 Wall Street, New York City.

DEAR LANCASTER: I would be glad to give your friend letters of introduction to any or all of the following:

Edgar J. Tarr, President of the Monarch Life Assurance Company, Director of the Bank of Canada, Chairman of the Finance Committee of the IPR.

H. L. Keenleyside, Department of External Affairs, for several years in Tokyo.
L. B. Pierson, Minister-Counsellor, Canadian Legation, Washington.
Brooke Claxton, Member of Parliament from Montreal.
W. A. Mackintosh, Special Economic Adviser, Department of Finance, Ottawa.
M. J. Coldwell, Member of Parliament from Ottawa, Member of the CCF.
J. B. Coyne, K. C., Chairman of the Winnipeg Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
Howard Greene, Member of Parliament from British Columbia.
Louis Rasminsky, Member of the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board, formerly in the Economic Section of the League Secretariat.
Captain R. G. Cavell, Businessman, Toronto, former army officer in India. (He has a very different attitude from that which might be expected from a former Indian army officer.)
James M. Macdonnell, National Trust Company, Toronto.
John W. Holmes, Secretary of the Canadian Institute, Toronto.
Norman A. M. MacKenzie, President, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N. B.

Is this the kind of list that you think would be helpful?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1260

WM. W. LANCASTER

55 WALL STREET,
New York, October 14, 1942

Personal

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Referring to your letter of October first, I would like very much letters of introduction to the following:

Mr. Edgar J. Tarr
Mr. H. L. Keenleyside
Mr. Brooke Claxton
Mr. W. A. Mackintosh
Mr. M. J. Coldwell
Mr. J. B. Coyne
Mr. Louis Rasminsky
Mr. James M. Macdonnell
Mr. John W. Holmes
Mr. Norman A. M. MacKenzie.

The person in whose favor the letters are to be written is Ivan Krotov, Commercial Attaché to the Legation of the U. S. S. R., at Ottawa. The letters can be sent to me, and I will endeavor to get them into the hands of Mr. Krotov, who has already left for Ottawa where he is living in a hotel.

Very sincerely yours,

WM. W. LANCASTER.

WWL/rp.

EXHIBIT No. 1261

OCTOBER 21, 1942.

WWL to ECC:

Despres suggests that we consider bringing Rajchmann to the conference in some capacity. Despres has a high respect of Rajchmann's insight into fundamental issues and for his finesse in conference discussion—this particularly on matters which don't directly concern China, and on which he therefore has fewer official inhibitions.

EXHIBIT No. 1262

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, Oct. 23, 1942.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thanks for the increase in my pay check and the extension of my appointment, as informed by Miss Hilda Austern.

I have been working under Mr. Holland's direction. I am sure he has kept you informed. I just like to mention that the work has been interesting, and as I have just finished translating Mao Tsetung's two books on war the coming weeks will be devoted to clippings sent by Dr. Chi. Two summaries on these have been written and a copy of each has been presented to you through Miss Ruth.

Best wishes to you and Mrs. Carter.

Sincerely yours

[s] Yung-ying Hsu
[t] YUNG-YING HSU.

EXHIBIT No. 1263

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 23rd October, 1942.

JOHN F. HOLMES, Esq.
Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
3 Willcocks Street, Toronto, Canada.

DEAR JOHN: It gives me the greatest pleasure to introduce to you Mr. Ivan Krotov, Commercial Attaché to the Legation of the U. S. S. R. at Ottawa. Mr. Krotov has long been connected with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade and has visited the United States several times on special missions.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1264

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 17th November 1942.

JEROME D. GREENE, Esq.,
54 A Garden Street,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

DEAR JEROME: As you know, Tarr and Jessup have been asked to revise the IPR constitution to bring it in line with present realities and necessities. In this connection, Jessup has recently written Tarr and I enclose a copy. The object of my sending this to you is to inquire whether you think Jessup is right that the quorum provision in the original constitution was inserted to give the United States a control over the expenditure of funds.

I never sat in on the work of drafting, but this is the first time I have ever heard of the point which Jessup raises.

Can you enlighten me?

I question a little whether Jessup's proposal would ever be necessary. Won't you write me frankly?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1265

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York, N. Y., 25th November 1942.

Dr. J. W. DAFOE,
Winnepeg Free Press, Winnipeg, Canada.

DEAR DAFOE: Thank you for your letter of the 6th. Lattimore is due any moment. We are hoping to persuade him to go to Mont Tremblant. That gathering, as Tarr will have told you, seems to loom very large in the thoughts of people in many parts of the world. They are coming in larger numbers than any of us had anticipated. Apparently the more complicated the world gets, the more people look to the Institute for light. I only wish our record as a light-house had been better.

There is great depression among many of my friends regarding Darlanism and over Otto von Hapsburg. The arrest of Valtin is one bright speck, however, on the political horizon. We certainly are a nation of suckers.

Have you by any chance heard of the scheme for world order worked out by Ely Culbertson, the Bridge expert! I have not mastered it yet, but it has

been endorsed by a number of fairly thoughtful Americans as "THE ANSWER" to world order. We will see what we will see.

I am glad there is a prospect of your coming to New York, but don't come until after we return from Mont Tremblant.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1266

129 EAST 52ND STREET,
New York City, March 27, 1943.

MICHAEL GREENBERG, Esq.,
814 17 St. NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MICHAEL: In a rash moment I agreed to participate in the Constitution Hall discussion on Monday, March 29th, on Russia and the United Nations. The topic I was assigned was Russia's Role in Asia. Here is the first draft of my proposed remarks. I would be immensely grateful to you if you would do me the great service of reading this critically and letting me know whether you can detect any inaccuracies or politically unwise assertions or emphasis.

I will telephone you Monday forenoon in the hope of getting your suggestions.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1267

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 1, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,
Institute of Public Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, New York.

DEAR CARTER: Would you drop in and see me the next time you are in Washington? There are one or two things I would like to discuss with you.

Yours,

Lauchlin Currie.
LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

EXHIBIT No. 1268

NAtional 3428

PACIFIC COUNCIL,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
700 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. C.,
September 12, 1942.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I hope that you will be able to attend all four of our round table discussions on *Chinese Post War Reconstruction.* Alger Hiss congratulated me on securing you as the wind-up chairman calling you a "whiz-bang" at that fine art.

Enclosed is an outline containing a statement of our procedure, our guest list (acceptances to date checked), and a draft agenda. Should you wish to offer it, I would welcome your comment.

Thus far the quality of our participants is quite unusual even by Washington standards—and reflects, I believe, a confidence in IPR achieved in the last two decades.

Sincerely yours,

R. W. B.
ROBERT W. BARNETT.

EXHIBIT No. 1269

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

I have examined the documents described in the list annexed hereto as Exhibit A. While I have a present recollection of only a few of them, I am

satisfied that these documents, subject to the comments noted below, are letters or memoranda received by me or photostatic copies thereof, or copies of letters or memoranda sent by me to others or photostatic copies of such copies:

Document	*Comment*
2. M. Gerbode ECC File No. 100.382	Date is illegible.
5. S. Welles ECC File No. 191.272	Date should be 11/7/*46*
22. Mrs. McLaughlin ECC 3/11/47, File No 133.6	These items are respectively an original copy of a letter to Mrs. McLaughlin and a photostat of such original copy; I do not know whether the letter or any copy thereof was ever sent to Mrs. McLaughlin.
23. Mrs. McLaughlin ECC 3/11/47, File No. 105.194	
31. Progress Report Wash. office, File No. 119.42	The date should be 5/1–6/12.
42. ECC, C. Lane, WLH 11/4/48, File No. 191.67	The source of this document is KRCG.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Dated: May 9th, 1952.
Sworn to before me this 9th day of May 1952.

[SEAL]

IRENE. R. DONOHUE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Qualified in Queens County. No. 41-6061300. Certs. filed with Queens, Kings, New York, and Bronx County Clerks and Regs. Offices, Westchester & Nassau Co. Clerks Offices.

Commission expires March 30, 1954.

EXHIBIT No. 1270

To—	From—	Date	Type of Document	File Number	Exhibit Number
ECC	OL	4/11/46		100.349	1270A
M. Gerbode	ECC	4/16/46		100.382	1271
V. Kazaniev	ECC	4/4/46		100.383	1272
R. Guthman	ECC	9/20/46		100.345	1273
S. Welles	ECC	11/7.46		191.272	1274
B. Emeny	ECC	12/27/46		191.251	1275
WLH & MAS	ECC	4/18/46		191.271	1276
O. P. Swift	ECC	4/11/46		104.70	1277
B. Emeny	ECC	12/27/46		112.45	1278
M. A. Stewart	ECC	11/4/46		131B.33	1279
ECC	R. A. Millikan	3/22/46		122.43	1280
C. Lamont	ECC	5/15/46		100.353	1281
ECC: R. A. Millikan	R. A. Millikan; ECC	3/22/46; 3/27/46		133.5	1282
ECC	J. Barnes	5/30/46		100.352	1283
F. Myers	ECC	9/26/46		107.34	1284
R. Guthman	ECC	10/22/46		105.252	1285
M. Graves	ECC	11/1/46		105.250	1286
ECC	S. Welles	11/9/46		191.273	1287
R. Guthman	ECC	12/24/46		100.346	1288
WLH	ECC	1/10/47		119.19	1289
MAS	ECC	3/3/47		131B.34	1290
Mrs. McLaughlin	ECC	3/11/47		133.6	1291
Mrs. McLaughlin	ECC	3/11/47		105.194	1292
ECC	T. Gerlach	6/11/47		105.295	1293
ECC	G. G. Davidson	6/9/47		119.49	1294
G. G. Davidson	ECC	6/12/47		119.49	1295
ECC	R. D. Carter	1/9/47		119.20	1296
Ask Beecroft		1/9/47		"	1297
Memo for: J. F. Byrnes		2/20/46		"	1298
R. P. Patterson					
J. Forrestal					
C. L. Chapman					
ECC	R. Guthman	6/12/47		119.52	1299
Progress Report	Wash. Office	5/1–6/12/47		"	1300
Luncheon		5/28/47		"	1301
Memo of ECC's talk with Lauchlin Currie.		7/18/47		191.103	1302
C. Porter; interview with Report to ECC from W. Fairbank.		3/18/48		119.43	1303
U. S. Industrial Training for Personnel Survey by Wilma Fairbank for ECC.		3/48		"	1304
J. K. Penfield	ECC	3/25/48		191.250	1305
ECC	J. B. Powell	5/4/45		100.351	1306
A. H. Dean	ECC	8/7/48		100.400	1307
Finance Agenda	ECC	9/15/48		101.32	1308
C. Oumansky	ECC	9/29/38		100.227	1309
WLH	ECC	11/4/48		191.67	1310
ECC, C. Lane, WLH		11/4/48		"	1311
ECC, refers to Hiss quoting Conant.		12/7/48		191.102	1312
A. Hiss	ECC	5/8/51		500.27	1314

EXHIBIT No. 1270–A

THE WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Maryland, April 11, 1946.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th St., New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Replying to your letter of April 8 on the subject of William Henry Chamberlain's allegation that I received a letter from the Soviet Council stating that it would withdraw from membership in the IPR if Chamberlain wrote on any subject whatever in *Pacific Affairs*, it is difficult to rely on memory after the lapse of so many years. I am almost sure that there was a letter, though whether I showed it to Chamberlain or merely quoted it to him I cannot remem-

ber. I doubt—but not having the letter cannot state positively—that Motylev threatened to withdraw. My recollection is that the wording was negative rather than positive; i. e., that instead of saying "would withdraw" he said "could not be expected to participate," or "could not be expected to contribute," or something like that.

You will remember perhaps that when you and I talked with Motylev, it developed that there had been gaps in the correspondence. At least one and perhaps two letters which I had written had never been received by Motylev. These gaps had of course given him the impression that I had not written, and therefore instead of discussing problems was presenting to the Soviet Council a blank and stony face. It is worth adding that I wrote the unreceived letter or letters not from Peiping but from the inland Province of Shansi, which was under the rule of Yen Hsi-shan, who had a tendency to manifest autonomy in the matters of politics and censorship as in other matters. The letter or letters might therefore have disappeared into a censor's pigeonhole either in Shansi Province, in the process of clearing through the Chinese National Post Office, or in Russia.

Sincerely,

Owen,
OWEN LATTIMORE.

ol : ec

EXHIBIT No. 1271

APRIL 194.

MRS. FRANK CARBODE,
2560 Divisedero Street,
San Francisco 15, California.

DEAR MARTHA: Thank you for yours of the 14th. By this time Ray will have arrived.

If I go out at all I do not expect it will be before the 10th or 15th of May. Enclosed are letters to the new Soviet Consul-General and to one of his colleagues. Both men were attached to the Soviet Consulate in New York for some months and were most friendly and cooperative while here. They did a lot for Russian War Relief.

If I go to San Francisco Mrs. Carter will not be accompanying me. Thank you for your concern about accommodations. A relative has offered me a cot for a few nights but if collapses I may ask you to be on the look-out. But don't bother to do anything about it now as I do not yet know whether I can go out at all.

If the Soviet authorities have thus far, presumably for strategic reasons, been reluctant to show their head regarding war with Japan it may be that they will be reluctant at the moment to identify themselves with I. P. R. activities. This, of course, will not be a permanent phenomena.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1272

4TH APRIL, 1946.

The Honorable V. KAZANIEV,
Consul-General of the U. S. S. R.,
7 East 61st Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KAZANIEV: At last I seem to have so caught up with out of town engagements that I am free to have our long-postponed talk.

This is to inquire whether you could do me the honor of coming to this office for a light lunch at, say, one o'clock on either Monday, April 8, or Tuesday, April 9.

I do hope that you will be free on one of these dates as I am very eager to have a long talk with you regarding the Institute of Pacific Relations and other common interests.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1273

SEPTEMBER 20, 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,
1710 G Street, NW., Washington 5, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: For a fair sized lunch or a meeting in the small hall of the Chamber of Commerce of the Cosmos Club, you may wish to consider inviting L. L. Lorwin and E. C. Ropes, who recently went to Moscow for the Department of Commerce to discuss trade possibilities. It may be that you will find that they are not allowed to talk or it may be that they were and now the muzzle on Wallace will be applied to them but as Russia, whether good or bad, is very much in the people's minds at the present time I am sure a talk would draw a good crowd and both men are tempered, informed and know Russia. Both of them are familiar with the work of IPR. Lorwin attended either the Kyoto Conference in 1929 or the Shanghai Conference in 1931. He was also at Banff.

Yesterday, Charles Gamble came in to see me on another matter and as he was leaving asked for you. I told him you had been promoted to a new and bigger job and he was very pleased. He has a high regard for you and was glad to be reassured that you had done a swell job while here in New York.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Cc to Mrs. Stewart

EXHIBIT No. 1274

7TH NOVEMBER, 1946.

SUMNER WELLES, ESQ.,
P. O. Box 4669, Anacostia Station, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. WELLES: It was most encouraging to get your favorable reaction last week to the problems and plans of the IPR.

After my talk with you I wrote immediately to Mortimer Graves to be sure to telephone you for an appointment on his return from the west so that he and you and Miss Guthman can carry on from where I left off. I told him of your early departure for the South and the desirability of his getting as much help from you as possible before you leave.

Ever since I belatedly realized that Benjamin Welles was your son, I have been reading his New York Times dispatches with renewed interest. He certainly observes competently and writes well.

It has occurred to me that he might find useful for background reading a monograph prepared by Michael Lindsay on "The Military Prospects in a Chinese Civil War." Lindsay, as you may remember is Oxford of Oxford, his father being the Master of Balliol. Lindsay served for a time in the British Embassy in China, taught for a period at Yenching University, and then when the Japanese approached, started for Chungking and Oxford. He had to pass through the Communist area and was so intrigued by what he found that he cancelled his passage to England and stayed in Communist China for several years. Then the British Government asked him to return to share his observations with the Foreign Office.

The Master of Balliol then wrote me suggesting that his son might visit Canada and the United States and we arranged with the Canadian Institute to have him visit a number of the Canadian cities and then we brought him back across the United States. He is now teaching at Harvard in the Department of Government. Last summer, just before returning to this country, the London Times published a series of his articles. He subsequently put part of them into a memorandum, a copy of which I am sending to you thinking that your son might like to read it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1275

27TH DECEMBER, 1946.

BROOKS EMENY, ESQ.,
Council on World Affairs,
922 Society of Savings Building,
Cleveland 14, Ohio.

DEAR BROOKS: Thank you most sincerely for sending me this quotation from your anonymous friend's letter.

Rightly or wrongly, our Government during the war tried to woo Petain away from Hitler. Many Americans felt that this partially successful tactic saved great numbers of American and British lives.

Personally, I see no reason why our Government and people should not seek by the same formula to woo the Chinese Commnists. I am not particularly anxious to have my sons, Bill and John, go through another war fighting the Russians on the plains of Manchuria.

Perhaps Uncle Sam could have wooed the Chinese Communists nine months ago with a considerable degree of success. Informed Americans and Chinese who have recently come from China, tell me that this would be much more difficult today. But I still think nothing would be lost by such an effort.

Of course Owen Lattimore is not always right. But I am not certain that his critics are any more accurate. They read extracts from his "Solution in Asia." If they would only read without emotion the book from cover to cover I think they would take a little different attitude. It seems to me that what Lattimore is trying to say is this: If America and Britain go all out for democracy here and in Asia, we can still attract Asia's restless millions into the democratic orbit. But if we go on backing up people like Chiang Kai-shek, then Moscow and not the British-American concept of democracy will win out.

Thanking you for your thoughtfulness in sending me this quotation, and with best New Year's greeting, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Hand written:) Amco Correspondence, 1947 A-E.
Brooks Emeny, 1947.

EXHIBIT No. 1276

APRIL 18, 1946.

WLM
MAS from ECC:

Have you any suggestions that I could send in reply to the following letter from Sumner Welles which arrived this morning?

> "When I had the pleasure of seeing you here the other day, I forgot to ask your advice with regard to a matter which is of much interest to me.
>
> "You may know that I am the editor-in-chief of the Harvard University Press Series which is now bringing out a considerable number of volumes written by individual authors and dealing with the relations between the United States and other countries and regions of the World. One of the projected volumes is to deal with Southeastern Asia. My associates and I have been unable as yet to find a suitable author for this volume, although we have tried to secure several competent authorities. I shall be deeply indebted to you if you will let me have your suggestions as to possible authors for this volume who in your judgment possess the personal experience and ability required. I should add that we are agreed that the authors of all of the prospective volumes must be United States citizens."

EXHIBIT No. 1277

11TH APRIL 1946.

OTIS PEABODY SWIFT, ESQ.,
2600 Woodley Road, N. W.,
Washington 8, D. C.

DEAR OTIS: Your intriguing and handsome Sea-Air brochure arrived a few days ago. Many, many thanks, and all success to this venture.

The lanes across and over the seas and continents give one a renewed zest for travel.

Today I received a call from a young Lieutenant who is about to be demobilized from the U. S. Navy who hopes to make a leisurely trip around the world, beginning in Europe, proceeding through the Middle East, India, Southeastern Asia, China and Japan, and back across the Pacific. The following papers and magazines have expressed an interest in his articles and most of them have already published his writings. They are: The Star Weekly (biggest circulation in Canada); the Australian Consolidated Press; Mademoiselle; Colliers; Holiday; the National Herald in India; the New Statesman in London; and the Nation in New York.

His name is Andrew Roth and his address is 266 Washington Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y. Color is added to his writing by reason of the fact that he was one of the government servants who was rounded up at the time of the "Arrest of the Six." As you know, the case against him was completely thrown out and discredited with due apologies to him.

Now it has occurred to me that there is a possibility that you might like to retain him in some capacity to publicize the facilities of your principals. The fact that he already has the above-mentioned outlets would probably be more advantageous to you than if you had to market his material yourself. If you could not arrange compensation, you might help meet his financial needs by getting some of your principals to provide free passages.

Turn it over in your mind, and if there is anything worth exploring, drop him a note and I know he will be glad to see you.

The other day in the train you asked me to bring you up to date regarding the IPR. Perhaps one of the best ways of doing this briefly is for you to read this little folder "21 Years of IPR" and scan this list of our popular pamphlets. Possibly after reading these you may wish yourself to become a $50 member of the American Council or recommend that the National Federation of American Shipping become a corporate and supporting member.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1278

27TH DECEMBER 1946.

BROOKS EMENY, ESQ.,
Council on World Affairs,
922 Society for Savings Building,
Cleveland 14, Ohio.

DEAR BROOKS: Here is a letter which, if you wish, you can pass on to your out-of-town friend. Naturally, I am glad that you have not lost faith in me. This means a lot.

I am afraid dear Admiral Greenslade was very much worried by some of my remarks. And I am told that there was a story in last night's New York Post by Edgar Mowrer in which, referring to the Cleveland Conference, he criticizes Lattimore, Teddy White, John Carter Vincent, and myself. Perhaps it was a mistake to invite him in to a single session without his having heard what went on before. He is very likeable, but he's not nearly as objective as he was when he was stationed in Geneva.

Reverting to my remarks in my formal letter of today's date with reference to American wooing the Chinese Communists, I might add that the fact that General Marshall and Ambassador Leighton Stuart had some sympathy with my point of view is substantiated indirectly by a letter written from Shanghai on December 2nd (just before the Country Club meeting) by an American doctor reporting to the American Friends Service Committee in Philadelphia on the cooperation of Marshall and Stuart in flying in to Yenan a medical team of six together with medical supplies.

Because of the cordiality which many of the members of the Country Club Conference expressed to me personally, I sent letters to several immediately after the Conference inviting them to membership in the IPR. Two or three have accepted. This morning I received a letter from Cass of White Motors. I thought you would be interested in seeing a copy. Here it is.

From the purely selfish, personal point of view, as well as from the point of view of the public interest, I hope history will prove that I was as right in my remarks at the recent Cleveland Conference as I was five years ago when one

of your Cleveland papers on the Saturday preceding the Pearl Harbor Sunday quoted me as saying that war between the U. S. and Japan was inevitable.

If you can spare the time, would you write me as to your guess as to how Harry Luce got on the trail of my "misbehavior" at the Country Club?

I don't think Hurst, the Cleveland manager of TIME, was in the round table I attended. But at the plenary session, when by accident I was in the chair and you asked me to present the Iglauer resolution, he may have concluded that I had initiated it.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

(Hand written:) Amco Correspondence, 1947 A–E.
Brooks Emeny, 1947.

EXHIBIT No. 1279

(Handwritten:) RDC & MAS: Has this contribution come in yet?

NOVEMBER 4, 1946.

MAS from ECC:

On October 24, I wrote Edith Field asking her to contribute $500 to the American Council. This afternoon she rang up and said that she had just got the letter on her return from California and would be glad to send a check; only she will be broke throughout this calendar year but plans to send her donation in January. While she didn't say so specifically, I think she plans to send $500.

On the train coming east, she met a Captain Leslie Anderson whose designation on his uniform was United States War Artist. He is going to be around New York for six months. He is an ex-businessman who has made art his hobby. He has been attached to the engineers in the war, is about 43, and has a distinctly liberal outlook. I told her we would be delighted to meet him and maybe we could persuade him to give us some of his sketches.

EXHIBIT No. 1280

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
Pasadena, March 22, 1946.

Mr. E. C. CARTER.
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The present Russian situation poses a very bothersome question for the Institute of Pacific Relations which I have felt keenly for some time and started once or twice to write you frankly about. Perhaps the following incident will bring to the fore the matter that has been disturbing me lately.

You will agree that the Institute loses completely its usefulness if it gives the readers of the Far Eastern Survey the impression that the articles which it publishes therein are, wittingly or unwittingly, Russian Communist propaganda. Some time ago I read an article in the Far Eastern Survey entitled "Political Problems in Indonesia—Independence the Issue" by Charles Bidien, and I mailed this article to one of the most prominent and informed supporters of the I. P. R. with this request—"Take a look at this article of Bidien's and then let me know whether the Institute of Pacific Relations is wise in promoting the interests of that type of man, as it is certainly doing herein." I received the reply, "I have been disappointed in the general attitude of the Far Eastern Survey during the last year or two. Presumably under the influence of a small group of men it has become biased, I think, in some of these Far Eastern matters, and I expect to withdraw my support." From articles by Bisson, which have often appeared in the Survey, I myself have lost all confidence in his scientific quality or objectivity.

Again, in a copy of the Far Eastern Survey just received I find the advertisement of the book called "The Challenge of Red China" by Gunther Stein, with the statement at the bottom that "orders may be sent to the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1 East 54th Street, New York City." I know

nothing about the content of this book, but in the mind of the public it would, I fear, tie the Institute of Pacific Relations in with Red China. That would certainly tend strongly to destroy its usefulness. From my own point of view, and I suspect from the point of view of all thoughtful people, this is about the worst time in the world for any American organization that wants to do a constructive job to get the reputation that the present Russian propaganda influences are capturing it.

Having here at the California Institute some fifteen to twenty very fine Chinese advanced men, I have had some opportunity through them and the Chinese who come here through them to get an impression of what Red China is. I have asked at least a dozen men who know China well this question, "Are the Chinese Communists merely social reformers, as their friends say they are, or are they Marxian Communists?" The difference is the difference between day and night. If they are the last, then they are necessarily a world menace, for Marx was the most potent war monger that this world has yet seen. I have generally received the reply from men in whose knowledge and objectivity I had come to have confidence, such as T. Z. Koo, Secretary of the World Student Christian Federation, "I think it is correct to call them essentially Marxian Communists."

That answer is highly significant, for the organization that Lenin set up, following the Marx pattern, was specially designed to infiltrate other governments the world over and stir up disturbances, unrest, and bring about by fair means or foul violent revolutions. This is the way it actually functioned and is still functioning in Mexico and in many other parts of the world. Marx-Lenin policy is, I think, reliably reported to have caused the starvation of many millions in Russia until up to the time of the fight between Stalin and Trotsky. Then Stalin at least had the intelligence to see that in order to prevent complete starvation of the Russian people he had to desert Marx to an extent and to borrow the incentive wage principle from capitalism, and he thus began to improve a little the physical condition of the Russian people, although an American expert on Russia with whom I talked yesterday told me that the standard of living of the Russian people as a whole *outside "the party"* was not now a particle better than it was under the Czars. Churchill and Roosevelt both felt that at Yalta they had got Stalin to join with them in finding a modus vivendi by which Russian Communism and the free system of the Western world which has been successful in raising the standard of living of the common man to historically unparalleled heights, might exist side by side and a basis of real cooperation for the prevention of war established. Recent events have shown to the world that Roosevelt and Churchill failed completely at Yalta. The Lippmann editorials, the Byrnes and Churchill speeches, and official and private reports on the policies of the State Department leave no doubt whatever but that the forces of cooperation and enlightenment have been thrown out of the window in Russia by the small group of men who now hold Russia in their power, and so far as international relations are concerned *are Russia.* The evidence is unmistakable, as Lippmann says, that Russia is now going to use all its energies, not to raise the standard of living of the Russian people, but to try to build the greatest system of military imperialism that the world has ever seen, and to keep its own people in complete ignorance by their secret police system and by the building up of military force of a system of buffer states all around Russia so as to hermetically seal Russia against the infiltration of all knowledge of the ideas and of the standard of living of Western peoples, while it indoctrinates them with the group of ideas which they must have to keep them submissive to the dictatorship of the central controlling group.

Further, so as to weaken all the states of the world outside the Bolshevist core we find that they are continuing now their old methods of stirring up dissatisfaction, strikes, riotings, rebellions, and the overthrow of orderly government all over the world in order to weaken countries so as to make them as impotent as possible to resist Russian attack. While you and I are doing what we can to raise funds for Russian relief for the staving off of Russian famine, the Russian autocracy while accepting our wheat is sending hundreds of thousands of bushels into France as the first and weakest country in which they can destroy what is left of a once free system.

Informed men in this country now know that the UNO, under the leadership primarily of the United States and Britain, has got to quit its appeasement attitude and say "No" to the Russian attack. Manchuria and Northwest Communist China are merely two of these buffer states which in violation of all their agreements they are preposing to control.

With that kind of a world outlook, when I see the Institute of Pacific Relations joining with Anna Louise Strong, Bidian, Bisson, Edgar Snow, and other befuddled writers in casting aspersions upon the patriotism of the only leader in China through whom there can be any hope for the building of a united and prosperous China, namely, the Chiang Kai-shek government, I begin to be greatly concerned.

I took dinner just a little while ago with Dr. Mei, the Acting Chancellor of Yenching University, and said to him, "There is a group of American writers, some of them connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, whom I find continually pouring out poison with respect to the patriotism and motives of the Chiang Kai-shek government. Would you be good enough to tell me, first, whether that distrust as to the patriotism of Chiang Kai-shek is generally prevalent in North China where you live, namely in Peiping? His reply was, "*We Chinese as a group realize that the only hope for the unification and the building up of China is in Chiang Kai-shek.* I can assure you that in Peiping if you took a poll, eighty percent would be behind Chiang Kai-shek as a great patriot and the hope of China." I then put precisely the same question to Leighton Stuart whom you must know, a wise and objective man, telling him that I was disturbed by the writings of some of the men who have become hipped by the Chinese Communist movement—a movement which I thought gave itself away as to its motives *by its insistence upon maintaining an army, that this thing alone indicating that what it was after was military conquest corresponding to all Communist teachings* but something which at the very start makes *constitutional* government impossible. I knew that the Chiang Kai-shek government had promised to China constitutional government which would give the Communist party the same right in elections to get across its ideas by nonviolence that they have in this country. Mr. *Leighton Stuart's* reply was, "I think I can assure you that you need not be worried about the attitude of the Chinese people. I would say that President Mei understated it in saying that eighty percent regard him as a patriot and were behind him. I should estimate that fraction at eighty-five or ninety percent."

I myself have been on Mr. Leighton Stuart's Advisory Board for years, and I know him well. I regard him as a very able and an exceedingly fine man. I would trust one word of his farther than I would trust one hundred words of writers of the sort I have mentioned above, or even of Owen Lattimore's who is better than the rest but who I heard speaking at Banff in a way which I thought tended to undermine the influence of Chiang Kai-shek. Everybody recognizes the terrible difficulties that confront him in a country in which the whole atmosphere is permeated with graft, and if Mr. Lattimore was wise enough I thought he would have stated something of that sort instead of in effect by his words to begin to undermine the effectiveness and smear the character of the man whom I suppose is the only hope of China.

Finally, in your own speech which you made here at the Biltmore before the Town Hall you first showed a complete misunderstanding of the fission problem and the kind of world benefits than can come from it. For this you were not to blame; you can lay this to the type of foolish reports which some scientists have made. But when you stated that the London conference broke down because of the attitude of Mr. Truman with respect to the bomb, I thought you exhibited a most uninformed mind with respect to the real significance of what Russia is doing and is likely to do at this stage of world history. In my own judgment, if the United Nations cannot say a powerful and emphatic "no" to Russia in her present machinations in playing every possible game to build a Russian imperialism at the expense of the well-being of the Russian people and of the world, we shall be in World War III with certainty inside of thirty years. The situation is identical with that existing at the time of the invasion of the Ruhr by Hitler. If all the powers had said "No" to Hitler at that time there probably would not have been World War II. If we have not the strength and the intelligence to say "No" to Russia now, when she is not prepared for war and is afraid of atomic bombs, too, then World War III is inevitable some time.

I am writing this letter because the Institute of Pacific Relations is now trying to build a strong branch in Southern California, and I told the organizing persons, at their request, that I would write to you my doubts about the wisdom of trying to do too much right now, and that primarily because the recent record of the Institute of Pacific Relations has been such as to raise doubts about the kind of management which is behind it.

Very cordially yours,

(Signed) ROBERT A. MILLIKAN.

RAM: IH

EXHIBIT No. 1281

15TH MAY, 1946.

CORLISS LAMONT, *Esq.*,
450 Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y.

DEAR CORLISS: As you know, the IPR has done a modest task in interpreting the U. S. S. R. to this and other countries. The pamphlet "Land of the Soviets" was distributed to many thousand men and women in the armed forces. It is being used in over a thousand public school systems.

In another of our pamphlet series we hope to publish before the year is over a pamphlet on American-Soviet Relations by Foster Rhee Dulles and a pamphlet on Soviet Asia by Marguerite Stewart of our staff.

In our various publications we endeavor to make people realize that the U. S. S. R. is a Pacific as well as a European power and that her destiny and our own are intertwined in Asia.

You are already familiar with Harriet Moore's admirable book published jointly by the Princeton University Press and the IPR on Soviet Far Eastern Policy.

Enclosed is a formal invitation to you to become a member of the American Council of the IPR. We hope that you will accept. You can, as you will see, become a member for $10. In that event the IPR financially would profit to the extent of about $1 a year.

If, however, you should be so venturesome as to think of the IPR as a public institution like a university, art museum, or library, to which you would like to contribute so that the public rather than you personally could benefit, then you might wish to become a Supporting Member at, say, $500 or $1,000 a year.

Some of my friends have felt that I have neglected the IPR by giving so much of my attention in recent years to Russian Relief and the American Russian Institute. Most of my intimate colleagues feel that I have been justified in doing this. But there is one thing that I have neglected, and that is to bring home to those who think as you do the important role of the IPR in the total picture.

As you know, the international IPR is one of the very few private bodies that has an affiliate in Russia, namely, the U. S. S. R. Council of the IPR. This is a present and a long-range asset in our common cause.

If you would like further information before reaching a decision, I would be delighted to talk the matter over with you.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1282

27TH MARCH, 1946.

DR. ROBERT A. MILLIKAN,
California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, Calif.

DEAR DR. MILLIKAN: Thank you most sincerely for your letter of March 22nd. If only all our members wrote as frankly, the IPR would have even greater vitality, though happily I think it has reached a new high not only in number of members but in membership interest and participation and also in its inclusiveness of people of many different points of view and background.

This very diversity means an enrichment of the essential texture of the IPR. For example, you imply that readers of the *Far Eastern Survey* may be getting the idea that its articles are wittingly or unwittingly Russian-communist propaganda. You or others are entitled to that opinion, though personally I do not think it would be easy to substantiate that thesis.

In contrast to your apparent view, for example, is that of Chancellor Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stanford University who recently wrote an unsolicited letter to Mr. Salisbury, the Editor of the *Far Eastern Survey*, as follows:

STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
Stanford University, California, March 18, 1946.

OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

DEAR MR. SALISBURY: This is just a line to tell you that I have noted a steady improvement in the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. I am particularly

struck with the March 13th issue. I trust that you will be able to keep the same kind of material constantly before as many people in the country as possible.

Congratulations and all good wishes.

Faithfully,

Ray Lyman Wilbur.

With regard to the article in the *Survey* by Charles Bidien, I am convinced that the editors were attempting to follow an unbiased policy. They asked a Dutch official and an Indonesian each to write an article on the situation in the Netherlands Indies. Each was shown the article written by the other prior to publication. The Bidien article preceded the Dutch article in the issue for the reason that in the issue of the *Survey* of October 18, 1944, when *pro* and *contra* views had been published regarding Dutch policy in the Netherlands, the article expressing the *pro* views preceded the article expressing the *contra* views. The editors would have preferred to obtain an objective article by an American writer instead of publishing the Bidien and Vlekke articles. None was, however, available. And, believing that the Indonesian situation should be dealt with, the editors followed what they believed to be an unbiased course, namely, that of permitting each side, the official Dutch side and the Indonesian side, to present their views side by side. Bidien was recommended to the editors by a competent American scholar as a suitable man to present the Indonesian view.

A comparable recent instance of this policy of the editors was the publishing of two articles on the situation in North China, one by Michael Lindsay (the son of the Master of Balliol) who was in the area from 1941 to 1945, and the second by Lin Yu-tang, outstanding protagonist of the Kuomintang.

Concerning the attitude expressed in articles published in the *Survey* dealing with Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communists, articles which have dealt with those subjects during the past year and one-half have been written by the present Editor, Laurence Salisbury, except for the Michael Lindsay and Lin Yu-tang letters already referred to. Mr. Salisbury was a senior State Department officer in China for several years and, from Pearl Harbor until June 1944, served in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State. In none of his articles has he advocated the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, nor has he advocated rule by the Chinese Communists. He has expressed the view, held by many interested officials in our Government and in the Kuomintang, that the government of Chiang Kai-shek should be liberalized. A number of Chinese and American officials have privately assured Mr. Salisbury that his articles have been accurate and sound. Because of their official position, I cannot quote them. I am taking the liberty, however, of quoting in confidence a sentence or two from an unsolicited letter received by Mr. Salisbury from General Stilwell after the publication of Mr. Salisbury's article in the Survey of April 25, 1945, perhaps his most significant article. General Stilwell, who certainly knew the situation existing then as thoroughly as any one, wrote in his letter of May 4, 1945: "Congratulations on your article, 'Our China Policy' in the Far Eastern Survey. We all read it with great interest and I believe you should print it in large gobs and give it widespread distribution. At least send a copy to every Member of Congress as a matter of education. I marveled at the restraint you showed and the completeness of the picture." Mr. Salisbury also received an unsolicited and favorable letter from former Ambassador Gauss at the same time, but I have not secured Ambassador Gauss' permission to quote it. However I can assure you it was most favorable. Neither General Stilwell nor Ambassador Gauss could be regarded as having Communist tendencies, but both have first hand knowledge of the situation in China.

With reference to Mr. Bisson, he has had no article on China in the *Survey* since the issue of July 14, 1943. He had no article in the *Survey* in 1944, and his three articles published in 1945 all dealt with Japan. In 1945 Mr. Bisson was invited by the United States Government to accompany Mr. Ed Pauley as a member of the American Reparations Commission to Japan. His work was so acceptable that he was recently invited by General MacArthur to return to Tokyo as a member of MacArthur's staff and he has already started for Japan for a second visit for the United States Government.

Contrary to your impression of bias on the part of Mr. Bisson, his volume "America's Far Eastern Policy," published by the IPR in 1945 and distributed by

the Macmillan Company, has received universally high commendations, for its scholarly objectivity.

In sending out advertisements of Gunther Stein's "The Challenge of Red China," the American Council was following its policy of bringing to the attention of its readers important books dealing with the Far East. Stein's book had received almost without exception favorable reviews in leading newspapers and periodicals. As a competent reporter with long Far Eastern experience, Stein's book contains material not available elsewhere in regard to Kuomintang-Chinese Communist relations. To those who have read the volume, it seems to be as impartial a presentation as one can expect in dealing with so controversial a situation. I have looked through the file of advertisements sent out in the *Survey* since last July and find that only one other book on China was advertised during that period, Lawrence K. Rosinger's "China's Crisis," an advertisement of which was sent out in July. Since then the publications advertised have been William C. Johnstone's "The Future of Japan," William Herbert Hobbs' "The Fortress Islands of the Pacific," John Embree's "The Japanese Nation," Harriet L. Moore's "Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931–45," and a pamphlet issued by Chatham House entitled "The Publications of the Royal Institute of International Affairs." To my mind this seems to be a varied group of advertisements which are not pressing a "line."

In addition to reviews and an occasional advertisement in the *Far Eastern Survey*, the American Council from time to time sends out bibliographies and reading lists. These are selective, but comprehensive and authoritative. For example, a great many of them have been distributed by the office of United China Relief because UCR is as eager as is the IPR to develop an informed public.

It is quite true that many Chinese, as well as many Americans, dislike and distrust Red China. But Red China is a political fact, whether we like it or not, and it is important for informed Americans to understand it. This does not imply that they necessarily approve of it. It is so important that the United States Government sent no one less than General George C. Marshall to bring about a *modus operandi* between Red China, the Kuomintang, and the Democratic League. Certainly the IPR, which is obligated to face real situations, could hardly fulfill its task by ignoring the existence of Red China. I hold no personal brief for Gunther Stein, but I think you would be on safer ground if you read the book before passing judgment on it.

For many years I have been a friend of both T. Z. Koo and Leighton Stuart. I would agree with Koo that the leaders of Red China are essentially Marxian Communists, though their present program is in no sense Communist. Nevertheless, classifying them as Marxian Communists does not obliterate the fact that they are the leaders of millions of Chinese citizens.

Your splendid group of nearly a score of fine Chinese advance scientists at Cal Tech are from all accounts men of great integrity and competence. I imagine that they have all come from Kuomintang China. It may be that many of them have been nominated by the Kuomintang Government for study with you. I imagine that at least a half a dozen mature men might come to Pasadena from Yenan with as strong anti-Kuomintang feelings as your present group possesses pro-Kuomintang views.

As to my remarks on the bomb at the Town Hall luncheon in Los Angeles to which you refer, I must confess that on the scientific aspects of the fission problem I must bow to you as a scientist, for I am a layman. What I did say at that meeting was that I believed Truman's early handling of the problem did result in a sharp change in Molotov's behavior at the London conference of Foreign Ministers. Warm supporters and appointees of Mr. Truman's government have assured me that his early pronouncements were most unfortunate, not only in our relations with Russia, but with other countries as well. Mr. Byrnes' later visit to Moscow, which was apparently prompted by Mr. Truman's earlier treatment of the matter, was further evidence of Washington's recognition that the first statements by Mr. Truman were not ideal. And Mr. Acheson has only this week helped clarify the situation.

My observations at the Town Hall luncheon are, I think, substantiated by the writings of Alexander Worth, for many years an accredited English correspondent in Russia for the Sunday Times (London) and other English newspapers. As you will remember, International Affairs is the journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Patron of which is His Majesty the King. In the January 1946 issue of International Affairs Mr. Worth wrote as follows:

"* * * When I was recently in Sweden, my friend Paul Winterton had the enviable publicity of being splashed over the front page of at least half the newspapers for saying that the atomic bomb had reduced Russia to a second-class Power overnight. Such things do not make for good relations with Russia, do they? And day after day the Swedish Press was featuring on its front pages new details about the atomic bomb, with always this implication: 'That'll teach the Russians.'

"My own private view is that the atomic bomb has a great deal to do with the breakdown of the recent Foreign Ministers' Conference in London. The Russians were in a very bad mood; sticky and obstructive, and reluctant to compromise. I do not think there was any fear that Great Britain and the United States would attack them with atomic bombs in a foreseeable future. I think the chief reason for their obstructiveness was to show the world that they were not a 'second-class Power,' and that they were not frightened, and that they could be a nuisance, despite the atomic bomb.

"Against this idea that Russia can some day be threatened and bullied by the atomic bomb, there is a wave of popular, one might say, national resentment in Russia. As one Russian put it, with a touch of bitterness: 'I suppose one day they will want to atomise the heroes of Stalingrad.' There is a tricky question of national pride involved in all this, and a feeling of 'How can we trust anyone?' It is a deplorable state of affairs, and it is my profound conviction that unless something is done to place the atomic bomb at the disposal of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization (without even necessarily giving away the technical secrets to anyone) the Russians will remain acutely distrustful and difficult. But I do not believe that they want to go into isolation."

But correspondence is, of course, a poor substitute for face-to-face discussion. I wonder whether there is any chance of your being in New York in the near future because I do want a long talk with you, for I know how deeply interested you have been in the IPR ever since your attendance at the Banff Conference in 1933. I remember, too, how pleased Allen Wardwell and I were when you were one of the very first Californians to affirm that you would be glad to be a sponsor of Russian Relief way back in the autumn of 1941.

Few Americans have had more recent experience as to the perplexities of dealing with the Russians than our late Ambassador W. Averell Harriman. And yet with all his background, he recently affirmed at a great dinner at the Hotel Commodore that he did not think there was anything so important at the present time than for private American citizens to intensify their humanitarian gifts to the people of the Soviet Union through Russian Relief.

The present effort to develop a branch of the IPR in Southern California derives principally from the luncheon at the University Club convened by Mr. Rosecrans in December which you attended when all seemed to agree that Southern California should be given an opportunity for a larger participation and when all further agreed that the appointment of a full-time executive officer was necessary in order to carry out the wishes of Southern California IPR members.

I do hope that my letter has aided you a little in clarifying your mind, and that you will be able to give to Mr. Rosecrans, Mr. McKelvey, Professor Coons, Miss Dahl, Mrs. Heineman, and all the others that fine cooperation that you have given in the past.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1283

European Edition: *Published Daily and Sunday in Paris*

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE,
230 WEST 41ST STREET,
New York 18, May 30, 1946.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: I think you would be well within your rights in declining to sign the final report of the Russian study group. At the last meeting, it was decided to submit the report to the Committee on Studies of the Council together

with a very strong minority report, so I doubt if any signatures will be included without express authorization.

The final meeting was interesting. Of 20 men present, only four dissented sharply from the report, which is on the friendly side although not very dangerously so. These four were led by Frank Altschul. Four more were prepared to sign with some reservations. Twelve of us were ready to swallow our objections and sign it as it was (they were very different objections)—we included Duggan, Gerry Robinson, John Hazard, and Bidwell himself, but I still think the vote is an interesting commentary on the increasingly common assumption that nearly all business and banking leaders are openly hostile to Russia.

Sincerely yours,

Joe
JOSEPH BARNES, *Foreign Editor.*

EXHIBIT No. 1284

CC: MAS

SEPTEMBER 26, 1946.

FRED MYERS, ESQ.,
American Russian Institute,
58 Park Avenue, New York City.

DEAR FRED: Eleanor Lattimore, you know, is terribly keen on our Washington IPR program and recognized that our Pollard experiment did not work out presumably because his campaign would have been keyed on Sumner Welles and Welles didn't come across.

Mrs. Lattimore has just written Peggy Stewart as follows:

> "Here is some information about the public relations outfit I spoke to you about. My friend Carl Green understood, and I am sure made clear to Mr. Flato, that I was not inquiring about it in any official capacity or representing Mr. Carter in any way, but was asking only because of my personal concern about IPR finances. There is no point in my talking with Mr. Flato, but if you or ECC would like to talk with him when you come down, I'd be glad to arrange it."

Enclosed is a letter from someone named Carl Green, whom I do not identify. Will you return it with your comments?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Enclosure.

MRS. OWEN LATTIMORE
ROLAND VIEW ROAD

RUXTON 4, MD., *September 24, 1946.*

DEAR PEGGY: Here is some information about the public relations outfit I spoke to you about. My friend Carl Green understood, and I am sure made clear to Mr. Flato, that I was not inquiring about it in any official capacity or representing Mr. Carter in any way, but was asking only because of my personal concern about IPR finances. There is no point in my talking with Mr. Flato, but if you or ECC would like to talk with him when you come down I'd be glad to arrange it.

Mr. Carter's wire to Owen about the Kohlberg case being settled has just come. What a relief! We are longing to know the details.

Was my pamphlet ever found? [Handwritten:] What pam.?

Yours,

ELEANOR.

EXHIBIT No. 1285

OCTOBER 22, 1946.

MISS RENEE GUTHMAN,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G. Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: Here is a copy of a letter I have just sent to Mortimer Graves. I don't know whether you would consider J. Franklin Ray for some kind of a meeting. He is only two weeks back from China where he was acting head of UNRRA after Kizer's resignation. He knows Japan—has long been connected with our Government's enterprises in China, first I think for Lauchlin Currie

and Lend-Lease, then FEA and, more recently, UNRRA. Mrs. Ray, as you know, was Miss Hilda Austern, for a long time a valued member of the IPR staff.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Encl.

EXHIBIT No. 1286

NOVEMBER 1, 1946.

Mr. MORTIMER GRAVES,
1219 16th Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR MORTIMER: Yesterday I had an hour and a quarter with Welles at Oxon Hill Manor. He was in excellent form. First I told him of the fine reports I had had of his recent visit to Canada where he was immensely impressed with our Edgar Tarr. Then we discussed his earlier and his most recent book. He expressed great gratitude to the IPR for furnishing the map for his latest book showing the division between Kuomintang and Communist China.

We then wandered around the world a bit and then came down to the IPR. I presented him with a copy of Olga Lang's "Chinese Family and Society" and an advance copy of Dulles' pamphlet on "Russia and America—Pacific Neighbors" as samples of our work at two levels, long-term research and competitive popularization. He professed eagerness to read both. He clearly is aware of the existence of the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs. He had already seen "Treatment of Asia in American Textbooks" so that was a good preliminary to presenting Miss Guthman's report of the current program in Washington, and I told him of the way both a teachers' institute and a regional conference would fit into the national and international picture. I showed him the list of present members prepared very carefully in the Washington office. He agreed that it was a mixed grill and that there were a great many obvious gaps. He noted particularly that there were not enough people from Baltimore and the "rich counties or Maryland." He is going to see Isaiah Bowman next week and will try to get suggestions for additional Marylanders. I told him that most of the Washington members gave $10 a year but some gave $25, $50 and more, and that Mrs. Bolton had given $1,000 a year for several years and promised a larger gift in 1947. He has a very high regard for her. Somewhere in the conversation he mentioned that taxes had about broken him this year but would send a "generous check" in 1947. We will all have to guess as to his interpretation of the word "generous." If he has a good memory, he will recall that several months ago I asked him for a gift of $1,500.

Later I showed him the long list that Pollard and others compiled last summer and asked him to check the names of those whom he thought were membership prospects. He took that rather seriously and said that rather than do it hurriedly yesterday he would like to take more time and would mail the list back to me. I think it contains the names of a number of people in his exclusive world. I certainly hope so.

At an appropriate time in the conversation I described adequately the real gifts of his two principal colleagues, yourself and Miss Guthman. I emphasized your travels, your broad knowledge of the Far East, your linguistic services to the United States Government, not only in the matter of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian but also the innumerable "funny" languages. Then I spoke of your statesmanship in facilitating the building up of area faculties in some of the larger universities. As Miss Guthman is in the room, I will not set down in this letter my description of her.

He asked me to be sure and request you to phone him immediately on your return to Washington next week from your present trip and make an appointment to go out and see him to discuss ways in which you and he can cooperate in activating the program.

He has a copy of Miss Guthman's one page report on the Washington office activities. He has seen the present membership list and by that time will have checked the long prospect list. There is one joker and that is that he goes to Florida, I presume for the rest of the winter, around the tenth of December so you will want to line him up for the maximum activity before he goes.

I am convinced that he is deeply interested in the IPR. He likes bouquets about his books. Benjamin Welles, the New York Times correspondent in Peiping, is his much admired son and this gives him an added interest in the Far Eastern scene.

He had read enough of our circular letters to the Board of Trustees to have formed the impression that we had eliminated Kohlberg from the scene which he thought was a great blessing. I had to amplify that this was, alas, not the case but the amplification gave me a good opportunity to reinforce his own conviction that Kohlberg was a crackpot.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

cc Mrs. Steward, N. Y.
cc Miss Guthman, Washington.
ECC: sh

EXHIBIT No. 1287

(Handwritten:) Mortimer Graves: Note and return to ECC.

SUMNER WELLES
OXON HILL MANOR

OXON HILL, MARYLAND, *November 9, 1946.*

EDWARD C. CARTER, Esquire,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, New York.

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: I am very glad to have your letter of November 7 and I am indebted to you for your kindness in sending me with it a copy of the monograph prepared by Michael Lindsay. I am sending this on to my son and I know he will be much interested in it.

I have not yet heard from Mr. Graves, but I shall be glad to talk with him as soon as he notifies me that he is back from his trip to the west.

With my kind regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES.

(Handwritten:) Seeing him at Oxon Hill Nov. 22 at 5 p. m.—MG.

EXHIBIT No. 1288

DECEMBER 24, 1946.

MISS RENEE GUTHMAN,
American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: Professor Dorothy Douglas of Smith College will be sending, in a few days, to me in care of the Washington Office a small bundle of books. These, she wants me to present to the Soviet Ambassador on the occasion of my next visit to Washington. Would you guard the package when it arrives and keep it until I call for it? I am hoping to have a few hours for Washington some time within the next two or three weeks. Is there in this period any particular date on which you would like to have me in Washington if I can manage it?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1289

10TH JANUARY 1947.

WLH from ECC:

Toward the end of my recent talk with Secretary Krug of the Department of the Interior, he asked whether we couldn't make a comparison of social, economic, and political results of civil government in the Virgin Islands and Naval government in American Samoa. He had in mind a comparison of such services as police, fire, roads, water, health, education, economic advance, costs to Uncle Sam, etc.

Beecroft is going to help us in assembling material.

Doubtless Emerson at Harvard, Kennedy at Yale, Keesing at Stanford, would be among those who can comment helpfully on how to go at the study, including an outline for the study itself. Also Ralph Bunche at U. N.

But before approaching others, I would like your general comment.

(Handwritten:) Good idea, but include Guam also.—W. L. H.

(The name Kennedy is circled and a line is drawn to the handwritten name L. Thompson.)

EXHIBIT No. 1290

FEBRUARY 3, 1947.

(Cross off with pencil:) CGM

MAS from ECC:

Here is a copy of Brooks Emeny's letter and my acknowledgment. Have you any comments?

(The following is handwritten in pencil:)

FEB. 3, 1947.

ECC fr. MAS:

It is an advantage in many ways to have Brooks as a national officer. I wonder, however, whether it might not be preferable to have him serve as a Vice Chairman, rather than Treasurer.

In these days of rising costs, and expanding budget and unusual difficulties in fund-raising, it seems to me there would be important advantages in having a Treasurer here in New York to advise and help you possible. As it is now, with Brooks in Cleveland, you've had to bear the brunt alone.

EXHIBIT No. 1291

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

Honolulu—Los Angeles—Milwaukee—New York—San Francisco—Seattle—Washington, D. C.

1 East 54th Street,

New York 22, N. Y.

ELdorado 5-1759

MARCH 11, 1947.

Mrs. ALFRED MCLAUGHLIN

3575 Clay Street, San Francisco 18, California.

DEAR MRS. MCLAUGHLIN: Thank you for your frank and helpful letter of February 25. I can well appreciate how the connection of Frederick Field and myself with the IPR have added to your difficulties in the Bay Region.

Without doubt an easy, though merely temporary, gain would result from a decision on his part and mine to withdraw from all official connection with the IPR.

But, alas, we are up against a vastly complicated, abundantly financed movement which is employing the classical Nazi methods in attacking liberals, leftists, and middle-of-the-road conservatives.

Mr. Kohlberg is one of the spearheads of this nation-wide intrigue. He has carefully planned his time table and is moving with great skill from objective to objective. To the IPR he has added the FPA, and to that he has recently added an attack on Alger Hiss, the very able but by no means leftist successor to President Nicholas Murray Butler as the new President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Reverting to the IPR, Kohlberg's time table is roughly something like this: (1) the expulsion of Field, (2) the expulsion of Carter, (3) of Lattimore, (4) of Salisbury, (5) of Staley, (6) Mrs. Stewart, and so on. Now you may personally feel that Field, Carter, Lattimore and Salisbury should leave but I am sure you would regret as much as I would the loss of Staley. It is because of the end result rather than the fortunes of Field and myself that I am inclined to stand my ground in adhering to the invitation extended me by Sproul, Jessup, Calkins, and others late in 1945: that I accept a three-year appointment as Executive Officer of the American IPR beginning in the early part of 1946.

You will remember the Bay Region Committee, when apprised of this invitation, suggested the appointment be for one year but its attitude changed to approval of the three-year appointment at a meeting of the Bay Region Committee presided over by Admiral Greenslade and attended by Mrs. Rogers, Mrs. Gerbode, Julean Arnold and others. I think you will remember that Admiral Greenslade made himself the spokesman for the entire committee in saying that now that the whole picture was clear he fully supported the three-year appointment.

I am fully aware that at one stage some of the members of your committee felt that all would be well if we could eliminate Field but, subsequently, some felt that both Field and I should go. The reason why I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that I should stand my ground personally is because, as I have sketched above, I know the Nazi technique of killing off its opponents progressively one by one. I am aware also that you and a few others have had your fingers crossed on me for many years, long before my alleged redness entered the picture. I am pretty confident that these criticisms have aided the redbaiters in recommending my elimination. On all of these issues, I am quite willing to admit that I have made mistakes but I would also ask from your side that degree of live and let live that I have consistently granted to you personally. Furthermore, I hope that some day you and I can sit down alone for a couple of hours, if you have the time to review all these matters which have worried you over the years such as: Mrs. Grady, the librarian, the Bell-Nugent textbook, our national secondary school program, etc. I do not want to defend myself or my colleagues in these matters, but I think you owe it to me to let me explain the reasons for the actions I took and, then, when you have given me your side of the picture, I know I will profit by your description of the ways in which you think I have been in error.

With reference to our invitation to you to go to Coronado, I should inform you that invitations were automatically sent to all of the 1946 National Board of Trustees and all of the candidates for the 1947 Board. You were in the first category and thus the invitation went to you with no thought that it would jeopardize the freedom of the Bay Region committee in its choice of the Bay Region group at Coronado. We do hope that the Bay Region quota will be fully utilized and that the Bay Region committee will not feel that it must limit its selection to the quota because the 1946 and 1947 Trustees have been invited and we sincerely hope they will accept.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1293

Tel. 15212.213.214 Cable Address: "EMISSARIUS SHANGHAI"

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF CHINA

133 YUEN MING YUEN ROAD

SHANGHAI, *June 11, 1947.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you kindly for your acknowledgment of the cabled proxy which IPR members in Shanghai sent for the fateful April 22nd meeting.

We rejoice that the IPR was given the overwhelming vote of confidence which the quality of its work unquestionably merits.

May I take this opportunity to recommend a coworker of mine who I hope will be invited to become a member of the IPR? This person is Miss Edith Lerrigo who has served on the national staff of the YWCA in China for the past five years. Miss Lerrigo is returning to the States for furlough the end of June. She wishes to be in constant touch with up-to-date sources of dependable information about the Far East. She should be addressed as follows:

Miss Edith M. Lerrigo,
Foreign Division,
National Board YWCA,
600 Lexington Avenue,
New York 22, N. Y.

You will find her to be a staunch supporter of the democratic movement in China and the Far East.

We are happy to see Dorothy Berg from time to time.

Sincerely,

TALITHA A. GERLACH.

TAG/s

EXHIBIT No. 1294

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, June 9, 1947.

Mr. EDWARD CARTER,
President, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: There has been quite a number of developments relating to the Pacific since our last conversation, which was prior to the trip that several of us took to the Pacific. I should like to discuss some of these developments with you at your convenience.

If you expect to be down in Washington, I hope you will give me a ring. It may be that I will be in New York the latter part of this week, and if so I will try to get in touch with you at that time.

With all kind regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

C. GIRARD DAVIDSON,
Assistant Secretary.

EXHIBIT No. 1295

Take to Washington.

JUNE 12, 1947.

Mr. C. GIRARD DAVIDSON,
Assistant Secretary, United States Department of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. DAVIDSON: Thank you for yours of June 9. I certainly will be delighted to see you in the near future. If you come to New York, let me know a little in advance so I may be sure to be here.

If you don't turn up here first, I will certainly make every effort to see you in Washington the next time I am there.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

ECC: sk.

EXHIBIT No. 1296

JANUARY 9, 1947.

ECC from RDC:

In response to the various points I gave Beecroft over the phone, he remarked the following:

1. He wondered whether we had anyone in mind for the Virgin Islands Study. He said he might send someone in to see you on this, i. e., Nelson Nichols, who was in the Virgin Islands representing the OPA, who is interested in making the kind of study you have in mind.

2. He didn't have time to mention it when he saw you, but he thought the IPR should approach the dependent areas division of the Department of State with any plans it has for research on the South Pacific and Pacific Islands. Some other organizations are very active on this and a good deal of planning is going on for research activities in the Pacific. A good deal of pressure is being put on the State Department by the National Academy of Sciences, Douglas Oliver, Harold Coolidge, etc. He would like to talk with you about this some time soon.

EXHIBIT No. 1297

JANUARY 9, 1947.

(Shorthand notes unreadable across top.)

ASK BEECROFT:

1. Spelling, initials, title & address of Davidson (penned) C. Garard.
2. That Davidson was the only additional person at the Krug-Carter interview

3. Davidson had never seen the Thompson study on Guam, so ECC is sending him a copy even though he knows there is a copy in Beecroft's office.
4. In talking to Krug, ECC didn't mention Beecroft, but in talking with Davidson afterwards, ECC did mention Beecroft in his capacity as an expert on Hawaii apropos of the possibility of Krug visiting Hawaii and Davidson wanted ECC's help in nominating people of different points of view to talk to Krug while in Hawaii. Davidson wants ECC to send him a list of people Krug should see in Hawaii. Would Beecroft send ECC such a list for him to pass on to Krug? (Penciled notation:) ECC will add few names.
5. Krug suggested that the IPR make a small comparative study of the Virgin Islands and American Samoa. Would Beecroft be able to send ECC some material on this? (Penciled notation:) & a brief outline of how the comparison could best be made in the proposed monograph.

(Penciled notation:) With comments on them (not legible) and specialties e. g., pro Statehood anti-Statehood pro Civil Gov't for most of the Pacific islands or pro Navy gov't. also whether (Bus?) men formalists, etc.
(Shorthand notes unreadable.)

EXHIBIT No. 1298

FEBRUARY 20, 1946.

Memorandum for Hon. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State.
Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War.
Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy.
Hon. Oscar L. Chapman, Acting Secretary of Interior.

The following proposal of the Department of the Interior for administration of the Pacific islands is submitted in accordance with the resolution adopted on January 30 by the subcommittee of the committee of four Secretaries which was appointed by the President on October 20, 1945.

1. It is proposed that military government should be replaced by civil government in all Pacific islands under the control of the armed services of the United States, with the exception of islands or parts of islands which may be designated as military reservations, subject to any future international agreement as to the status of these islands. The proposal will apply to Guam and American Samoa and to the other islands which are already under United States sovereignty; to all of the Micronesian islands which were formerly under Japanese mandate, including the Marianas, the Palaus, the Carolines and the Marshalls; and to the Ryukyus, the Volcanos, the Izus and the Bonins. It will also apply to any additional Pacific islands which may from time to time be brought under United States administration.

2. The administrative agency for the islands will be the Department of the Interior. Through its Division of Territories and Island Possessions, the Department of the Interior is already responsible for administration in nearly all overseas territories of the United States. For over 100 years, the Department has dealt with the problems of indigenous peoples, both on the mainland and overseas. Under its jurisdiction, the Philippine Commonwealth is preparing for independence; Hawaii and Alaska for statehood; Puerto Rico (under the bill supported by the President and the Department) for such status as its voters may choose; and the Virgin Islands for a rapidly increasing measure of self-government. By maintaining Navy rule in Guam and American Samoa for the past 45 years, the United States has had the distinction of being the only power in the Pacific which treats an inhabited area as a mere appurtenance of a military base. This is not a distinction which the American people will justify at a time when enlightened opinion, at home and abroad, demands expert attention to the progress of dependent peoples.

3. The Department of the Interior recommends that, even if some delay in transferring jurisdiction is anticipate, the decision to employ civil administration in islands under United States control should be made and announced at once. Such a decision would correct a belief which is prevalent, both at home and abroad, that our military interest in this area tends to ignore the civil rights and the economic welfare of the island inhabitants. The announced intention of this Government to employ civil administration in areas under its supervision will strengthen, not prejudice, our claims for military or administrative responsibility in the Pacific, and it will place this Government in a sound position to insist upon the adoption and maintenance of proper standards of civil administration in areas under the control of other powers.

4. The decision and announcement concerning civil administration will permit immediate steps to be taken by the Department of the Interior to prepare the necessary plans. The transfer from military to civil administration should be made, as an interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can be completed. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject to subsequent international agreements. Nothing done under an interim civil administration would stand in the way of sound decisions concerning military use or concerning the future disposition of the Pacific Islands or concerning trusteeship or other terms under which the islands are to be governed.

5. An immediate decision to replace military by civil government at an early date and to begin planning to that end will have the further advantage of easing the necessary final adjustment which will have to be made by the Departments and the personnel concerned. It would help to remove the impression that exists among civil affairs personnel and island peoples alike that the present island program is a temporary one. It would also help to give a sense of continuing responsibility to those concerned with carrying out the administration of island affairs.

6. American experience in the Micronesian area already strongly suggests that any division of the islands for administrative purposes would multiply the difficulties in the way of economical and efficient government. If the taxpayers of the United States (or those of some other administering power) are to be relieved largely of cost in connection with island affairs and if the islanders are to have the benefit of an adequate control of conditions affecting their welfare, it would be essential to regard Micronesia, including Guam, as a single administrative unit, subdivided only for the purposes of local administration. Some of the islands have agricultural, mineral and fish resources which may be used for the maintenance of the population and as a source of taxable revenues. Other islands may be deficit areas which, if left to their own resources, might become a charge upon the budget of the administering power. To treat the whole region as a single unit for the purpose of dealing with the practical and difficult problems of transportation, communication, food distribution, public health, and public finance will provide a sound basis for economical administration.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Military government should be replaced by civil government, with the Department of the Interior as administering agency, in all Pacific islands under the control of the armed services, with the exception of islands or parts of islands which may be designated as military reservations.
2. The decision to adopt civil government should be made and announced at once. The Department of the Interior should then proceed accordingly, with the assistance of other departments concerned, to prepare plans of administration.
3. The transfer from military to civil administration should be made, as an interim arrangement, as soon as the necessary preparations can be completed. Such an arrangement would, of course, be subject to subsequent international agreements.
4. In the interest of economical and effective administration, the Micronesian area, including Guam, should be regarded as a single unit, subdivided only for purposes of local administration.

EXHIBIT No. 1299

SUMNER WELLES, *Chairman*
MORTIMER GRAVES, *Vice Chairman*

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York—San Francisco—Los Angeles—Honolulu—Milwaukee—Seattle
Telephone District 8665

WASHINGTON OFFICE: 1710 G STREET N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 12, 1947.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: There seems to an accumulation of items for this letter. General Marshall's home address is simply Leesburg, Virginia.

Mac Fisher still will not give a yes or no answer on being a trustee. When I asked him last night he said he wanted to wait till Abbot Low Moffat returned

to talk it over with him. Moffat will not be back till next Monday. I explained that the trustees met on Tuesday and you would like to know before then. He said he would let me know Monday. I have a suspicion his answer will be no. However, I'm amazed and so is Shirley at the list Bill Holland suggested and which I am enclosing. Unless it were simply for prestige reasons Ropes and Hummel are too old. Ropes has taken no interest in this office at all—Hummel only a mild interest. Ed Martin and Stelle aren't even members and never attended anything even when asked personally. Gauss is a terribly busy person. Hoskins and Linebarger share opinions and Linebarger considers the IPR Communist. Beecroft is out of Interior and will be looking around for a job elsewhere. On the positive side what about Harry White or Bob Berkov or Nelson Johnson. Mortimer Graves will be at the meeting Tuesday of the trustees. He might have some other suggestions for a replacement then if Mac Fisher says no on Monday.

Mortimer Graves will also be telling you about the meeting last night which I have reported on briefly in the enclosed report. As I mentioned to Celestine, Mr. Graves would like to make a report on the Washington office at the meeting. On the basis of the talk with Welles and the meeting last night various ideas and suggestions were put forth. Everyone is enthusiastic about having the program here continue. But there does seem to be some differences on what the aims of this office should be. Graves is planning to leave in September if OIC gets its budget. So we have until then to think of a possible successor. Perhaps you can get him to express some ideas on that too.

I'm afraid the results of my financial efforts today were two very cold shoulders. But perhaps it was the heat! Anyway, I'll continue to try.

Sincerely,

RENÉE GUTHMAN.

P. S.—Had lunch with Eric Beecroft yesterday and Catherine Porter today. Catherine will be in New York next Wednesday as I guess you know. Eric Beecroft is out of a job and very anxious to talk to you and Bill Holland about various ideas and job possibilities.

EXHIBIT No. 1300

PROGRESS REPORT, WASHINGTON OFFICE, MAY 1–JUNE 12

During the month of May two meetings were held—an office meeting for Mr. U Myat Tun, the Secretary of the Commerce Department of the Government of Burma on May 1st, and a luncheon meeting for Mr. John Caldwell on May 28 (list attached). Mr. Caldwell was head of the U. S. Information Program in China until recently. The luncheon was held in the YWCA dining room and was one of the most successful meetings of the year.

The present Washington membership totals 265. As of the first of November the membership was 205. This is an increase of 60 members in seven months even disregarding those who have moved away, resigned or allowed their memberships to lapse.

Much of the time covered by this report has been spent attempting to raise some money in the Washington area. Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, Mrs. Lillian Coville and the Hon. Sumner Welles have all made suggestions of people to approach. To date the results of those approached have not been too encouraging, but there are still many contacts to pursue and the main efforts of the office during June are being devoted to this end.

A final meeting of the season of the advisory committee and other interested and active Washington members was held Wednesday evening, June 11th. Present were: Mortimer Graves, William Carter, Isobel Ward, F. MacCracken Fisher, Cora DuBois, Robert Berkov, Robert Fearey, Frank Lorimer, John Barrow, Karl Pelzer, Shirley Jenkins and Renee Guthman. The program for the past year was reviewed and suggestions and comments made on the program for the coming year. The general feeling of the group was that the Washington office should

concentrate its effort on a program to aid and abet the national program rather than attempting to have a typical regional office program. For example, more effort should be made to "win friends and influence" Congressmen and Senators; the Far Eastern experts which are concentrated in Washington should be utilized more than they are perhaps by a weekly broadcast over a local station from which records could be made and sent around the country; efforts should be made to keep track of various national and international conferences eminating from Washington to see that the Far East is given as much attention as possible; close contact should be established and maintained with the information officers of all embassies; international relations secretaries of all national organizations with offices in Washington should be contacted and all help and information available through the IPR should be offered to them. There seemed to be some question in the minds of the Washington group as to just what course the National Office wanted the Washington Office to pursue, and it was hoped that perhaps a more clearly defined directive could be worked out through the mutual efforts of the Washington group and the National Office.

A somewhat curtailed program is being planned for the summer months—two luncheon meetings a month to suffice—with the full program to be resumed in September.

EXHIBIT No. 1301

LUNCHEON MAY 28, 1947—12:30 P. M.—Y. W. C. A

Speaker: John Caldwell, O. I. C., State Department; Introduced by Robert Berkov, O. I. C., State Department

Drury Anderson, State Dept.
Russell Andrus, State Dept.
Pat Barnett, State
John Barrow, U. S. Office of Educ.
Dr. M. Bernardo, State
Effie Browne, State
Mr. Busuego, State
Mrs. Busuego
Stanley Caidin, formerly with Foreign Broadcast Intell., FE
Wallace Cohen, attorney
Mrs. Cohen
Lillian Coville, member
John DeFrances, Social Sci. Res Fellow
Henry Douglas, Library of Congress
Jim Elliot, State
Katherine Erwin, Librarian, Wilson State Teachers College
Mrs. Fairbank
F. M. Fisher, State
George Ford, guest of Mr. Andrus
Mr. Friedberg, Int. Monet. Fund
Henry Galant, guest of Agnes Roman
Mrs. Galant
Jean Gates, Central Intell. Group
Carl Green, WQQW
Engracio Guerzon, State
Renee Guthman
Sally Hawkins
John Heideman, State
Arthur Hummel, Library of Congress
Mrs. Hummel
Clarence Hendershot, State
Robert Hummel, State
Mr. Isikoff, UNRRA
Shirley Jenkins
Eugene Karst, State
Bessie Kibbey, member and guest
Elleanor Lattimore
Mildred Lau, State
Mr. Liang, Int. Monet. Fund
Wm McAfee, State
General McCoy, FE Commiss.
Lloyd Millegan, State
Frances F. Miller, guest of Miss Roman
Lorna Morley, State
Raymond Moyer, Agric.
Mrs. Moyer
Carl Nelson, State
Mrs. Nicholas, Miss Simester's mother
John Oldham, Australian Embassy
Mrs. James Penfield and mother
Hilda Ray (Mrs. Frank) and sister
Charlotte Riznik, guest of E. Lattimore
Agnes Roman
Rodolfo Severino, State
Edith Simester, former teacher in China
Joseph Smith, Office Educ.
Ted Tannenwald, attorney
Mr. Ubaldo, State
Freda Utley
Henry F. Vicinus, State
Mr. Villareal, State
Isabel Ward, State

EXHIBIT No. 1302

JULY 18, 1947.

MEMORANDUM OF CARTER'S TALK WITH LAUCHLIN CURRIE

1. Can you be sure of saving Salisbury and the rest of the IPR if you let one member of the Executive Committee resign?
2. Currie will contribute $25 now and another $25 at the end of the year if he can possibly do so.
3. Harry Beyster of the Beyster Corporation in Detroit is an advisor to the Philippine Government with a 16-million-dollar project in the wind.
4. Joe Swan of Haydon Stone handles the accounts of a great many Chinese.
5. Bill Pauley (of Pauleyville) has the State of Travancore pretty well sewed up.
6. A number of American corporations are angling in a big way for Japanese business. The IPR might begin by lining up the group mentioned in the attached New York Times column of July 18.

EXHIBIT No. 1303

PHILIPPINE RECONSTRUCTION ACT

(Ecafe Training Study Report to ECC from W. Fairbank)

Interview with Miss Catherine Porter, in charge of Philippine desk, Area Division, Far East, Office of Information and Educational Exchange, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

MARCH 18, 1948.

Miss Porter reported that under the Philippine Reconstruction Act it is planned to bring to the U. S. on American Government funds about 800 Filipinos for in-service training in U. S. Government department's or bureaus between 1947 and 1950. Some of the trainees will be studying purely military subjects at West Point or with the Signal Corps, etc. but that others will get civilian training analogous to that now received by Latin Americans in U. S. Government Bureaus under the U. S. Government program supervised by the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation.

I was not able in my brief talk with her to get details of this program or of State Department information regarding any trainees from the Philippines in the U. S. under other auspices but will look into this further if ECC desires.

Miss Porter suggested that if ECC should go to the Philippines in the course of his survey he might find it useful to discuss possible training programs or to get information on current programs from Bienvenido Gonzalez, President of the University of the Philippines.

EXHIBIT No. 1304

U. S. INDUSTRIAL TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL FROM ECAFE COUNTRIES

Survey by Mrs. Wilma Fairbank for Mr. Edward C. Carter, ECAFE Consultant, March 1948

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents Numbers (Black Ink)		Index Numbers (Red Ink)
	I. Introduction:	
1-	A. *Draft questionnaire followed in interviews*	1-
	II. Government Programs Financing Study and Training in the U. S. for Foreign Students:	
	A. U. S. Government:	
2-3-4-	1. *The Fulbright Act*	8-11-16-
5-6-7-	2. *The Smith-Mundt Act*	6-17-31-
8-	3. *The Philippine Reconstruction Act*	15-
	B. ECAFE Governments:	
9-	1. *Indian Government Program*	19-
11-	2. *Chinese Government Programs—Placement of Chinese in U. S. Industries by E. S. Taub*	2-
10-	a. *The National Resources Commission*	29-
12-	b. *Plans (Extract from the A. Taub plan)*	3-
13-	3. *Other ECAFE Countries*	9-
	III. Agencies Placing and Supervising Foreign Trainees in the U. S.:	
	A. Government:	
14-	1. *U. S. Government In-Service Training for Foreign Nationals*	12-
15-	2. *International Trade Division of the Department of Commerce*	14-
	3. State Department:	
16-17-18-	a. *Administration*	21-18-
	b. *Hospitality*	30-
	B. Private:	
19-	1. *International Training Administration* (now defunct)	20-
20-	2. *China Institute In America*	27-
21-22-23-24-	3. *Institute of International Education*	28-5-7-10-
	IV. Agencies in the U. S. Providing Training for Foreign Trainees:	
	A. Technical Institutions:	
25-26-	1. Example: *Mass. Institute of Technology*	23-24-
	B. Industrial Firms:	
27-28-	1. Example: *International General Electric*	25-26-
29-	2. Example: *Studebaker Export Corporation*	34-
	C. Government Bureaus:	
30-	1. Example: *Tennessee Valley Authority*	22-
	V. Conclusions—Assessment of Value of Training, and Suggested Improvements:	
31-	A. *Development of Skilled Laborers and Foremen*	32-
32-	B. *Extract from "The Development and Operation of Programs to Train Foreign Technicians in U. S." by E. S. Taub*	4-
33-	C. *Comments on the Training of Chinese Trainees by Officials of the Bureau of Reclamation, 1946*	33-
34-	*APPENDIX: Training Films*	13-

NOTE.—Italicized phrases in the index refer to individual memoranda which constitute the body of the report.

EXHIBIT No. 1305

Straight Message. MARCH 25, 1948.

JAMES K. PENFIELD,
Far Eastern Division, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.:

Hope see you nine fifteen Friday morning two minutes urgent matter. Returning for longer talk at ten.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1306

JOHN B. POWELL

PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, HARKNESS PAVILION

180 Ft. Washington Avenue

NEW YORK 32, N. Y., *May 4, 1945.*

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Editor, Pacific Affairs,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR M. CARTER: After reading T. A. Bisson's letter to the New York Herald Tribune, dealing with political changes in China, I am prompted to ask you

whether Bisson is the official spokesman of the Institute of Pacific Relations. You may have noticed that he indicated such at the end of his article.

I make the inquiry because his article more or less confirms charges which I have recently heard regarding the Red leanings of a considerable number of officials and employees of the Institute. Mr. Bisson's charge against the Kuomintang may be quite correct, but why not say something about the totalitarian pro-Russian inclinations and connections of the Chinese Communist Party?

It is quite true that the Kuomintang has not had an election, but what country, aside from the United States, has had one? Also, how would China go about having a general election with the Japs and Reds holding about half of the country?

Also, incidentally, why confine all the attacks to China when Russia seems to be the main disrupting force at the San Francisco meeting? I have read a great many publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations but I have never seen one single criticism of the dictatorial Communist Party in Russia. According to Sun Fo, who has always been friendly toward the U. S. S. R., there isn't the slightest chance of a democratic development in Russia within fifty years, and possibly it will take a hundred. Why do you ignore the situation in Russia while concentrating all of the Institute's criticism on China and the Kuomintang?

Since practically all of the attacks on the Kuomintang and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek can be traced back to Chinese Communist and Russian sources, it seems to me that the whole thing is a build-up for a further grab of Chinese territory, this time by the U. S. S. R. All through World War I we appeased Japan; now we seem to be following a similar policy with respect to the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) J. B. Powell
J. B. Powell.

EXHIBIT No. 1307

CATHAY HOTEL, *Shanghai, China, 7 August 1948.*

ARTHUR H. DEAN, Esquire,
48 Wall Street, New York City.

DEAR ARTHUR: The enclosed was delayed. Since writing it I have received a clipping from the New York Herald Tribune reporting on Mr. Cromwell's bequests. I was particularly interested in his gift of $450,000 to the Russian War Relief and his $300,000 gift to United China Relief. As you can well imagine, as an IPR person, I wish it could be established that Mr. Cromwell made this gift to the Russian War Relief because I was its president: In such an event you might persuade the executives that the money should be paid over to the American IPR because it was the IPR that enabled me to serve as president of the Russian War Relief!!

Doubtless my colleagues Bill Lancaster and Peter Grimm are in touch with the executers as to the pros and cons of asking that the $450,000 be made available for relief to war sufferers in the Soviet Union. I am wondering whether the Un-American Committee will wish to have Mr. Cromwell's remains examined in order to discover whether he was a Moscow agent.

I hope to see you the end of August or early September.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1308

9/15/48

Jerome Cohen
Ellen Hammer

AGENDA FOR E. C. C.

I. FINANCE

1. Follow up September 13 memo—KRCG from ECC
2. Contact: Devereux Josephs
   Dollard
   Shepardson
   Joseph E. Davies
   $100 and over
   Mrs. Emmons Blaine

3. Check all $50 and up for 1947 and 1948, starring any who have not paid yet in 1948.

Detroit

4. Arrange to see Ford Foundation at the same time as Economic Club engagement. If this does not take place, see Craig anyhow. (Handwritten:) See or write with Compton before seeing Craig.
5. Make sure that as many as possible of the following are invited to one or more of the appropriate small dinners:

Willits
Fahs
Shepardson
Dollard
Josephs
Mrs. James
Mrs. Schoellkopf
Mrs. Lilienthal
The Rossbachs
Joe Barnes
Louis Weiss
Marshall Field
Dr. and Mrs. David M. Levy
Mr. and Mrs. Stein
Wilbur Forrest
Beatrice Auerbach
Mr. and Mrs. Michael Straight
Henry Allen Moe
W. A. M. Burden
Nelson Rockefeller
William S. Paley
John Hay Whitney
Mr. & Mrs. Maurice T. Moore
David H. McAlpin
John Cranes

6. Consider a meeting for such people as:

Mr. and Mrs. Max Stewart
Henry Collins
Fred Myers
The Gelfans
The Lauterbachs
Mrs. Jaffe
Mrs. Hale
Rose Rubin
The Jenkins
The Conants
Mr. and Mrs. John Hazard
Mrs. Brownell
E. C. Roper
F. P. A. Barber
Mrs. W. W. L. Tuckman
The Coffs
W. W. Lancasters
Andrew Grad
Mr. and Mrs. Cune
Rosamond Lee
Tiedemann
Weems
John Stewart
Mrs. P. E. L. Norees
Larule Davis

II. ASIA: REPORT AND FOLLOW UP

1. Read, edit and revise all ECC'S letters from Asia.
2. Decide to what use they can best be put.
3. Place in chronological or other order all miscellaneous memos, clippings, bibliographical material, etc., collected during or since the Asia visit.
4. Revise speech for Pakistan Institute or write fresh article.
5. Consider revising the three instalments of material on Ooty for Lilienthal.
6. Prepare outlines for two or three talks in case FPA or others ask for formal engagements.
7. Write appropriate letters to those in each country who facilitated visits and asked for some action here.
8. Review with Holland, Healy, Lilienthal, Greene, Rosinger, Ruth Carter various suggestions, e. g.
   A. A follow up of key Asians in this country, particularly Siamese, Burmese, Filipinos, Javanese.
   B. Consider possibility of Southeast Asia graduate student conference.
   C. Consider ways and means for more effective cultivation of Chinese in the United States.
9. Go to bottom of reasons for failure to get visa for Japan and decide whether to make an issue of it.

III. OFFICE ARRANGEMENTS

In advance of Lane's arrival, about September 26, evacuate all personal material from present office, allocating some to the new office, here, some to 72nd Street, and some to Lee.

IV. EXPENSE ACCOUNT

1. Clear with Holland, Shahn, Greene adjustment of Asia expense account.
2. Finish and submit AIPR expense account for period prior to March 30. (Handwritten:) (done) (out $70)

V. WHAT TO DO AFTER JANUARY FIRST

1. Get advice from Holland, Greene, Lilienthal, Willits, Dollard, Dean, Chamberlain, Vera Dean, Mitrany, Bolton, Davies, Lattimore, Fairbank.
2. Review from time to time the 14 alternatives outlined at Lee.
3. Consider seriously taking three months for study and writing before fulfilling any engagements either in North America or Asia. One object of this might be to supplement present sketchy knowledge of Eastern situations by thorough study, possibly at Andover-cum-Cambridge so as to be able to deal more authoritatively on Eastern topics, whether in America or Asia. A last trip to Asia could be far more productive if it was preceded by such a period of study.

VI. PACIFIC COUNCIL

Review with Holland and Shahn Pacific Council financial situation and consider what letters Carter or others should write to India, Pakistan, etc.

VII. WASHINGTON VISIT

See among others: Joe Davies
Keiser (middle east)
Johnstone
Bolles
Sumner Welles
Margaret Carter
Whoever in State Dept. is in charge of ECAFE both with reference to Ooty and the November meeting in Austrialia
Catherine Porter
Oneal—U. S. Ambassador to the Phil.
Burmese Ambassador
Siamese Ambassador
Indian Ambassador
Pakistan Ambassador
Philippine Ambassador

Ask Holland and Greene whether one of them could persuade Arthur Dean to write separately to Davies and Welles suggesting that each arrange a small dinner at which ECC could report. (It might be better to ask Dean to write but one of the men and get someone else to write the other.) (Handwritten:)

? *Canadian Visit* (See ECC to WLH of 15 Sept. & his reply.)
? Cleveland Visit (See ECC's corresp. with Mrs. Bolton & Cleveland Council.)
? F. P. A. Visits (See ECC's corresp. with Frances Pratt.) If Pittsburgh is visited see that Paul Mellon & his Foundation are invited to small luncheon or dinner.

EXHIBIT No. 1309

129 EAST 52ND STREET, *New York City,*
September 29, 1938.

CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY, Esq.,
Embassy of the U. S. S. R.
Washington, D. C.

DEAR OUMANSKY: My colleague, Owen Lattimore—Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS—has just written his interpretation of the meaning of recent events in Japanese-Soviet relations. He has done this in an article entitled "Siberia Seals Japan's Fate."

It will probably be published in an early issue of AMERASIA, but I thought that you would like to see it immediately. If you have any personal comments to make on this analysis, I would be very glad to have them.

You may be interested to know that Owen Lattimore has now come to the Atlantic seaboard and, while continuing on the I. P. R. staff as editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS, he will be on the faculty of Johns Hopkins University in charge of what is called the Walter Hines Page School of International Affairs.

When are you coming to New York next? Are you visiting Moscow in the near future?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 1310

NOVEMBER 4, 1948.

WLH (cc. to KRCG
CL from ECC: PEI
LKR)

(KRCG)

Holland will remember that I wrote to New York from Southeastern Asia last summer of the desire of the Burmese, Siamese and Filipinos that either the American IPR or the International Secretariat undertake the task of educating their abler graduate students and engineers in North America in the lore of the IPR. I suggested that one way of doing this might be for one or other of the IPRs to organize a Southeast Asia student conference.

Last week in the State Department in Washington I asked Miss Cora DuBois what she thought of the proposal of a student conference. She reacted highly favorably and said that she thought the time was ripe for it and that much could be accomplished. Her section of Research and Analysis covers all of Southeast Asia with the exception, I think, of Pakistan and India, but she feels that the inclusion of Pakistanis and Indians in such a conference would be of great value. Her tentative recommendation was that it be a southern Asia affair and that greater reality would be achieved if we didn't bother to include Chinese students.

On the basis of her reaction I tried the idea out on Bill Johnstone and found him wholly favorable.

Of course both of them recognize that the best results would accrue if it was entirely non-official and that the State Department did not appeal—though each of them would be glad to help with names and in any other way that the IPR desired. They both were under the impression that the majority of the students from southern Asia are in the East and thus that a conference on the eastern seaboard would be indicated—though Miss DuBois wished that funds could be secured so that it could be a national conference, bringing a few of the best from the Pacific Coast. But she added that a successful eastern seaboard gathering might pave the way for a similar conference later on the West Coast.

If you and your colleagues think that the matter should be further explored, I think we should talk it over with Miss Nuvart Parseghian, the head of the Asiatic and African Division of the Institute of International Education. She, according to Wilma Fairbank, is a most unusual person, as we all discovered when we got her views on the ECAFE study of technical training. Perhaps it would be advantageous to have the conference under the joint auspices of the IPR and the IIE. Until we have all discussed the matter further, I am not certain whether it would be best to have the American IPR or the International Secretariat take the lead.

I should assume that the more student participation in the affair, the better. To this end a consultative meeting of some of the best leaders among the students in the east might be desirable so that they could feel a stake in the show from the start.

As to possible topics, several ideas were mentioned, including the following:

THE ROLE OF SOUTHERN ASIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS
INTELLECTUAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN ASIA
THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE NEEDS AND POSSIBILITIES OF SOUTHERN ASIA
WHAT HAS AMERICA TO LEARN FROM SOUTHERN ASIA AND VICE VERSA?

At the moment I cannot think of any special source to which we might appeal for the necessary financing. In the case of Government students, we would probably discover that they mi ht draw on their expense accounts for travel and hotel bills, but probably some of the best students would have no funds on which to draw. Further, there would be expense of organization and for paying the expenses of the few adult leaders—IPR and non-IPR—whose presence would be important.

From one angle it could be said that the project falls within the scope of the Secretariat because one of the aims would be to develop IPR leadership in Asia. On the other hand, it could be affirmed that it is equally in the interests of the American IPR and the American people to have such leadership developed.

Perhaps you can all be thinking of the pros and cons and ways and means and then in a few days we could get together and try and reach a consensus.

EXHIBIT No. 1311

4 Nov. 48.

Memorandum to: E. C. Carter.
C. Lane.
W. L. Holland.

Subject: Conference of Students from Southeast Asia.

Isn't this a project in which we could get excellent cooperation from Alger Hiss and the Carnegie Endowment? As you know, the Endowment is reworking its whole student program, and particularly the organization and work of the International Relations Clubs in colleges throughout the States. Last April, these Clubs held their first national conference (at Endowment expense) in St. Louis. They planned, at that meeting, to hold annual, nation-wide meetings, with, I gather, the lively expectation that the Endowment would pay the costs. One of the theme songs of the student conference in St. Louis was that almost every college intl. rel. club was "using" the foreign students.

It seems to me that, rather than a conference exclusively of Southeast Asian students (with, of course, a few experts from US faculties, etc.) it might be more interesting and more valuable for the students (most of whom, I assume, are graduate students (?)), to have an opportunity to meet with leading Americans in fields outside of their actual college and university contacts—social work leaders; heads of hospitals; heads of city and small town libraries; school teachers; public health officers; country agricultural agents, and so on and so forth, including business; newspapers; radio; etc.

The danger of a conference exclusively, or very largely of Asian students would be (I should imagine) the danger of continuing "international house" relations—seeing too much of one's fellow Asians and fellow foreigners generally, and not enough of the plain, unvarnished U. S. picture.

These are very random thoughts; the only one with any value (I hope) being that the Endowment might be called in for financial and organizing help. I confess to being slightly appalled at the thought of organizing any more conferences, when the AIPR's own program is not yet started.

KROG.

EXHIBIT No. 1312

8 A. M. 8:58 A. M. TUES. DEC. 7 48 HARVARD CLUB OF N. Y., PRESIDENT CONANT & ECC

Conant—knows Hiss lawyer—says nothing in it—JBC Do you know him—ECC Yes as inconceivable as the late Henry James. J. B. C. The press can break an innocent man without recourse in the present Am scene. ECC Brooks House—Harvard Mission to India intercoll. pride not brick & mortar—strange alliance between Harvard and YMCA play grounds coop. cred. Student Hostels not bricks & mortar Yale in China Hence ECC a Bias on India since 1902. Self Govt. 400 yrs. Vast change today British prestige. Lord Louis—Rajagopalachari Marion Dix—Strongest & most dem. Govt. in Asia Middle East Africa—(So. Africa exception) Within framework Truman Doct India immense asset to US. What increases confidence & coop. between UK & India is an asset to US. Now India no longer British Preserve. US & India getting together can aid UK Univ—Trade—Libraries (reminded JBC Harvard IPR Russia State War Navy) India Am. Conf. Dec. 1949 4½ weeks De Kiewist—Allen (JBC knows him) ECC asks Conant should see—JBC likes traveling but never does his home work—Appalled at idea that being an expert in 5 weeks. If JBC asked ECC to become an atom scientist in 5 weeks. ECC said if he was head of a great Univ. without a nuclear faculty 5 weeks might result in his establishing one. JBC would like to go would be difficult because Annual Report to Bd. Overseers Jan. 6. However, that

could be managed. But it might be better for his Provost Buck went. He has established a precedent of taking December off. So if ECC asked JBC to designate an alternate in case he could go JBC would suggest Buck—ECC mentioned Don Ingalls came in Gen'l Ed on India (half course undergrad) JBC thot Clark had impossible task Sanskrit to present day—Maybe Harvard should get some other Univ. to take on India—two Universities should do India not more. Why not get revolutionized AAU to form a Committee of the best six and make it a joint project—Tressider started revolution now Pres. Wriston of Brown is present president (one yr. rotation) He is always looking for new things—Let the Univ. part of this be Wriston baby. JBC said tried interest Carnegie in a master catalog of all Univ. courses in Int. affairs there should be far more coord. & coop. among ding univs. Harvard for eg. should loan or send Clark to whatever Univ. was doing a thorough job on India. Worried about financing when Carnegie 700,000 to Harvard Russia Institute ends. Rather appealed to by Eisenhower & Stassen. Delighted to hear of new India strength & attitude to British. Really something new & surprising like the election every one delighted at the fall of the Polsters?? Spoke proudly of Harvard—Yenching (ECC mentioned Fairbank JBC "please write me & I will give matter my best consideration"—Prestige of Harvard should not mean Harvard should do everything—Again delighted to hear of new forces in India & pleased to be asked."

12.40 phoned Fairbank re above says Buck young first class liberal the key men at Harvard under JBC. He might not want to leave for 5 yrs. Warm support of Fairbanks program. Fairbanks thinks Wriston's committee well worth exploring.

Paul Herman Buck 1899, A B OSU MA Phd Harvard Sheldon Fellow London, Paris, 25-26, Pulitzer Prize History, 9 Kirkland Place, 5 University Hall, Cambridge.

Henry M. Wriston, 1889, 180 Hope St., Providence.

James Bryant Conant, 1893, 1 Quincy St.

3.10 PM ECC phoned Whitney Shepardson reporting on JBC—Shepardson was interested—also though Wriston good action man sometime second thots better than first. ECC mentioned Buck—WHS thot new AAU idea worth exploring—WHS also said ECC should talk John Gardiner of Carnegie Corp. full of ideas—WHS says avoid Leslie Ames—owns Minneapolis & has largest library on India in U. S. Talks your head off & other peoples also has some good ideas but.

EXHIBIT No. 1314

MAY 8, 1941.

ALGER HISS, Esq,
3415 Volta Place NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR HISS: Your private comments have so supported my own views that they have been most gratefully received! I think our final production will be better as a result of our accidental conversation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

FRIDAY, JUNE 20, 1952

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins presiding.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in session.

You may present such matters as you have.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there are certain documents and affidavits which have come to the attention of the committee since the last hearing and I would like all of these to go into the public record today.

Senator WATKINS. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. The first one is the sworn statement of Karl August Wittfogel, dated May 29, 1952, to Senator McCarran, with attached documents.

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit 1380, A, B, C, D, E," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1380

Tel. UNiversity 4-3200, Ext. 2657

CHINESE HISTORY PROJECT

LOW MEMORIAL LIBRARY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Sponsored by UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE, in cooperation with COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

MAY 29, 1952.

Senator PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Internal Security Subcommittee, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: Mr. Lattimore devotes a section of the statement that he read before your Committee on February 26–28, 1952, to my testimony of August 7, 1951. I beg permission to correct, insofar as they concern me, the most serious of his distortions and misrepresentations.

(1) Mr. Lattimore claims that, in my testimony, I tried to create the impression that "in the early years of our acquaintance we were friendly with each other on the basis of mutual Communist sympathies." This is just not so. The basis of our relations was primarily scholarly interest. As I said in my testimony, I considered him a leading expert in the field of Inner Asiatic and Chinese relations (Hearings of the Committee on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part I: p. 328); and he on his part was very receptive to my ideas on

88348—52—pt. 14——26

Chinese history and society. Although our relations became "less and less cordial" (p. 327), they were maintained in the academic field until 1947 (p. 331).

(2) This leads up to Lattimore's second misrepresentation. Allegedly I tried to create the impression that after I "finally stopped being a Communist in 1939" I broke off relations with him. I neither made such a claim, nor is it justified by my testimony, which documents in considerable detail the continuation of our relations until 1947.

(3) Lattimore calls "the flimsy statements by which Wittfogel attempted to show that I knew he was a Communist * * * complete nonsense." And to prove his point he invokes the very method which he so eagerly ascribes to his critics. First he disregards my many relevant remarks, and then he tries to create the impression that all I did to indicate that I was a Communist was to smile at him. As my testimony states, I had indicated my political past in different ways to Lattimore. For instance, "all our talks about Chi the son and Chi the father made sense only in connection with the background of the Chis' story when it was perfectly clear that we were dealing with a man who had this Communist background, and my relations were in the same set" (p. 301). How well Lattimore understood my position is shown by a letter that he wrote to Frederick V. Field immediately after a trip we had made together in the first week of September 1935. In this letter, dated September 27 and identified as Exhibit No. 492 in the Hearings of your Committee, Lattimore wrote: "I have just been traveling with Wittfogel who, as you probably know and I dimly suspect, is a bit of a heretic from either the Stalinist or Trotskyist point of view, when it comes to the bourgeois feudal controversy over the nature of Chinese society." Thus, Lattimore related my position not to any conservative, liberal, or social-democratic views, but to the views of the two most prominent protagonists in the Communist movement of that day, Stalin and Trotsky; and he felt that my interpretation of Chinese society differed, but only "a bit," from theirs. Lattimore's description shows him not only "dimly," but very clearly aware both of my ideological and political orientation.

(4) Throughout his attack on me, Lattimore tries to prove that, contrary to my alleged claims, he was no Communist. To quote him directly: "He [Wittfogel] has attempted to show that at that time [in 1935 and 1936] I knew he was a Communist and must therefore have been one myself." Lattimore's assertion that I called him a Communist again misrepresents the facts. In my testimony I carefully distinguished between party membership and a pro-Soviet attitude. Senator Smith asked me, "Do you know whether or not he [Lattimore] was a full-fledged member of the party?", and I answered: "No, I do not know." But in commenting on his political development, I did say that he showed "a consistent pro-Soviet pattern," which in the earlier days was accompanied by a somewhat "easy-going" ideological attitude (p. 309 ff.).

(5) As a scholar I am especially concerned with the analysis and interpretation of Asiatic society in general and of Chinese society in particular; and it was just in these matters that Lattimore's views for years lagged behind pertinent Soviet tenets. In his statement before the Committee and also in other recent writings, Lattimore has sought to obscure the political meaning of the very important political issue underlying this seemingly academic argument. In his statement, Lattimore wrote: "Wittfogel also made the ridiculous assertion that the fact that I used the terms 'feudal' and 'feudal survival' in describing Asiatic societies showed that I was a Communist. His claim that these terms are nothing but litmus papers for telling Communists from non-Communists is ridiculous." In his attempt to confuse the issue completely, Lattimore notes that Esther S. Goldfrank (Mrs. K. A. Wittfogel) speaks of the survival of "feudal elements" in Japan. But if Lattimore thought that the mention of feudalism in Japan would make my position absurd, why did he bother with my wife's passing remark? Why didn't he cite from my writings directly on this subject? Wasn't he familiar with these writings of mine, which distinguish sharply between the great managerially bureaucratic Oriental societies of the Asiatic mainland and feudal Japan? On the contrary. Lattimore knew these writings so well that he quoted from them at length and approvingly in his *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, published in 1940 (pp. 572, 39, 395 passim). And more, in this same publication, while speaking of Japan's "feudal" aristocracy (p. 147), Lattimore was at great pains to explain why, as the result of "the prime factors of evolution and growth, which have been authoritatively classified by Wittfogel" (p. 370), China's early and not quite European type of feudalism (pp. 369 ff.) was superseded by a "bureaucratically administered empire" (p. 375; cf. also pp. 368, 369, 373, 376 ff.).

In March 1944, a few months before he went on his widely discussed trip to the USSR with our then vice president, Henry A. Wallace, Lattimore in a review of certain recent Russian writings on China still noted that Stalin's concept of "feudal survivals" was among the "paramount Communist theses" that "a Communist writer has * * * to maintain" when dealing with China (*Pacific Affairs*, March 1944, p. 83). And in this same article, which otherwise highly praised the Soviet studies under review, he objected to the "emphasis on 'feudal' thought later than the Christian era" for China; and he noted that "the social data are somewhat obscured by loosely used terms like 'semi-feudal' and 'feudal survivals'" (p. 86).

I cannot enter into a full explanation here as to why the concept of "feudal survivals" is among the "paramount Communist theses" that "a Communist writer has * * * to maintain." Suffice it to say that it obscures the true nature of Oriental despotism with its managerial functions and its bureaucracy as a ruling and exploiting class. The masters of the USSR were quick to see the devastating implications of such a historic precedent for their own despotic class rule and the appropriateness of a "feudal" *ersatz* formula that one-sidedly stresses the property issue and conveniently hides the dangers of a totalitarian apparatus state. But they were also extremely careful not to propagandize so explosive an argument. Thus it was that in 1935, when I began to familiarize Lattimore with the concept of Asiatic society, I myself was not yet fully aware of all its political implications. And Lattimore, despite his pro-Soviet leanings, upheld until 1944 a theory, which seemed only "a bit" heretic and which was scientifically so productive.

(6) In the late 1940's Lattimore shifted to the "feudal" position, which was being upheld with increasing rigidity by the Communist world outside the borders of the USSR. In his statement before your Committee, he defended his later use of the form "semifeudal" as accurate; and this he has every right to do; but he failed to explain his changed position—and this poses a serious problem.

Lattimore's assertion that in my testimony I had described the terms "feudal" and "feudal survivals" as litmus papers for telling Communists from non-Communists is a complete distortion of what I said; and his quip: "I am sorry that I did not know the Communists had a patent on the term 'semifeudal'" confuses the issue further. In a democracy, any student is free to employ whatever interpretation or terminology he chooses; and a number of writers have used "feudal" designations naively and in good faith. In my testimony I warned expressly and strongly against "narrow word catching," and against accusing those who applied the term "feudal" naively to agrarian Asia of having Communist leanings (Hearings I: p. 338 ff.). But Lattimore, who knew in the fall of 1935 that the "feudal" issue was part of the Communist controversy over the character of Chinese society, who upheld in his main scientific work (1940) the bureaucratic and not the feudal interpretation of imperial China, and who recognized up to the time of his 1944 trip to the USSR that the "feudal" interpretation of traditional China was Communist-promoted and scientifically harmful, did not live in what I, in my testimony, called "the innocence of paradise" (p. 339). Lattimore must justify his new position with convincing scientific arguments. If he fails to do so, it will certainly be viewed, as he himself formerly viewed this position, as an acceptance of one of the "paramount Communist theses" in the field of Oriental studies.

(7) Lattimore has placed with your Committee several of my letters, which were written in 1940, 1941, and 1945, and which give evidence of our friendly personal relations and my high regard for his major scientific work, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. By referring to his book as the "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (economics and society) of the oases," I was playing on the title of my own book, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (China's Economics and Society). This is quite understandable, for Lattimore had used my key concepts in his analysis of the oases of Inner Asia, and he had also discussed the development of Chinese society in terms of factors which, to quote him again, "have been authoritatively classified by Wittfogel." Indeed, I had every reason to be satisfied with a book, which in its historical and institutional analysis so faithfully followed my ideas.

To be sure, the fact that Lattimore, in the late 30's and early 40's and under my influence, was upholding the "bureaucratic" interpretation of Asiatic society against the Soviet-promoted "feudal" view does not mean that he was opposed politically to a crucial Communist position. When a prominent English Communist told Mr. Carter in 1934 that my disagreement with the Soviet interpreta-

tion of Asiatic society was purely "academic" (Hearings I: p. 340), be expressed what many prominent Communists outside the Soviet Union thought, not only then but for years afterwards. Dr. Chi Ch'ao-ting in his *Key Economic Areas* occasionally applied the term "semifeudal" to China, but essentially he upheld the classical "Asiatic" view. The leading theoretician of the English Communist Party, R. P. Dutt, in his introduction to a pamphlet entitled, *Karl Marx: Articles on India*, and published by the Indian Communist Party in Bombay in 1943, consistently upheld Marx' version of the classicial non-feudal interpretation of Asiatic society. Thus it may be said that Lattimore's later adjustment to the "feudal" and Soviet-promoted concept is politically significant, whereas his early adherence to the "Asiatic" interpretation, when viewed in the context of international Communist usage of the time, merely expressed preference for a less favored, but permissible ideological variant.

(8) The intricacies of Lattimore's ideological development explain in large degree, but not completely, my attitude toward him over the years. As a former Communist, I had decided to rebuild my life on an essentially scholarly basis; and while my evaluation of the ideas of Marx and Lenin underwent great and continuous change, I was happy in the middle 30's to establish relations with such persons as Lattimore, who not only shared my professional interest in Chinese society, but who also accepted the key tenets of my interpretation.

The letters of mine which Lattimore put in the record were undoubtedly chosen to demonstrate my esteem for his writings; and in this respect they are extreme rather than typical. However, they indicate the essentially scientific and personal quality of our conversations and correspondence. In our exchange of opinions, political argument played no great part. But there were times when it did. I attach herewith photostatic copies of four letters written me by Lattimore in 1942, 1944, 1946, and 1947, respectively, as well as photostatic copies of two letters that I wrote him in 1944 and 1947, respectively, all of which have a direct bearing on the statement he made before your Committee.

(*a*) Lattimore's letter of April 20, 1942, shows that our relations were by no means free of open political disagreement. (Some of our earlier arguments I have indicated in my testimony.) In this letter Lattimore answers my criticism of his stand on certain Communist problems. His argument is typical of the attitude he has maintained toward me throughout these years, the attitude of a man who knows little about Communism and who considers himself neither an anti-Communist nor a pro-Communist. Like his letter of September 27, 1935, this letter refutes his claim that he was unaware of my background: Lattimore distinguishes me from both Browder and Freda Utley; but these two (a then top-ranking Communist and a former Communist) are his only points of reference.

(*b*) Lattimore has sought to characterize our relations in 1944 and 1945 on the basis of the letter I wrote him on March 4, 1945, while carefully omitting to mention the sharp political argument we had in the fall of 1944 concerning Joseph Barnes and the future of Korea (cf. Hearings: p. 327 ff.). Lattimore's letter of October 3, 1944, mentions my "violent personal attack" on his "old friend"; and it also supplies evidence that this initial clash was followed by such a "forceful presentation of political opinions" on my part that he was "completely dazed." In my letter of November 5, 1944, I criticized him for failing to answer questions raised in my previous letter (written, as he says, on September 24, but of which I have no copy at hand); and I felt there was no point in continuing the political argument since I encountered a "psychological situation, which it is probably wise to accept as definite, at least for the time being."

(*c*) However, since I still considered Lattimore the leading American authority in the Inner Asian field and since, in his book *Solution in Asia*, he, despite some compromise formulations, did not embrace the feudal interpretation of Chinese society, I endeavored to keep our political differences in the background. So on March 4, 1945, I wrote him the "nice" letter, which I referred to in my testimony (p. 328) and which Lattimore put into the record.

I am not proud of this letter. However, such a phrase as "an expert to end all experts" was, if Lattimore cared to remember our previous conversations hardly the flattering epithet he wants others to believe it was. But aside from this, anyone who reads this letter of mine carefully, will see that I praised Lattimore essentially, if fulsomely, for the problems he raised and not for the solutions he offered. And while I did not elaborate on our political differences, I expressly indicated, in the last sentence, that such differences did exist. Significantly, Lattimore's statement neither quotes nor paraphrases this critical last sentence.

(*d*) The three letters written in 1946 and 1947 clearly refute the description that Lattimore gave your Committee of our final break in the latter year. Says Lattimore in his statement: "During 1947 we had a disagreement over his invitation to me, at the end of 1946, to write an introduction to his History of Chinese Society: Liao. I asked him to be allowed to read the book before writing the introduction, and I am afraid that I indicated that I would not write an introduction without being given a chance to form my own opinion about the work I was supposed to sponsor in this way" (Galley 78).

Lattimore's story is as specific as it is false. In the first place, and as our correspondence shows, I invited him to write the introduction not "at the end of 1946" but in 1944. In the second place, it was Lattimore who, in his letter of December 18, 1946, reopened the subject by asking whether I still wanted his introduction; and in doing so, he did not mention the manuscript. Thus his statement that his entirely reasonable request for the manuscript "didn't seem to suit Wittfogel" is a fairy tale behind which he has hidden the real reason for our break.

In my letter of January 24, 1947, I said politely, but firmly, that we needed no introduction by him. Under these circumstances, I naturally made no reference to the manuscript; and Lattimore's letter of January 29, 1947, which once more reasserts his eagerness to write the introduction (" * * * I should feel very much honored by such an association with such an important piece of work"), correctly states the reason for my not sending him the manuscript: "To be quite frank with you, I thought that since you had never sent me a copy of the manuscript, or of proofs, * * * that you were hinting that you no longer needed an introduction by me."

In my letter of January 24, 1947, which cancelled our previous arrangement about the introduction, I expressed the wish that our scientific relations be maintained. But at the same time I clearly emphasized the differences in our political attitudes. In his recent statement Lattimore falsely lays our break to my unwillingness to let him see the Liao manuscript. But in his letter of January 29, 1947, he showed that he was thoroughly aware of our political differences, which were indeed the sole basis for my decision.

Lattimore's account of our break as given in his statement concludes as it began—with misrepresentation: "* * * after several letters I heard no more from him." The fact of the matter is that in my letter of March 19, 1947, I had refuted his mendacious political assertion with his own writings (pp. 330 ff.); and this letter Lattimore failed to answer—on paper. And when he remarked to me subsequently at a meeting in Princeton: "You were probably pleased that you caught me with the one about the Mikado" (p. 333), he terminated in a cheap and ugly way what had been originally, at least on my part, a genuine and productive friendship.

(9) At least on my part. In making this qualification, I do not mean to say that in the middle 30's Lattimore did not have a genuinely friendly attitude toward me. I have every reason to believe that he did. But the documents that have come to light recently show Lattimore, from the middle 30's on, intensifying his relations with Soviet representatives and pro-Communist Americans; and although Lattimore's interest in—and sympathy for—the USSR was clear enough, he was careful not to express in conversations with me the blunt pro-Soviet attitude that emerges from letters such as the one he wrote to E. C. Carter on July 10, 1938. Lattimore's way of handling political disagreements as evidenced by our correspondence permitted him to hide ideas even from so close a scientific friend as I was. Usually he listened attentively to all arguments; and when they were critical of the USSR, as indeed they were from the early days of our friendship on, he nodded thoughtfully, claimed lack of competence, and let it go at that.

(10) These facts may make more understandable not only my own relations to Lattimore, but also the relations to him of many others, who, since they were probably less experienced politically than I, were even more easily misled as to his real political acts and intentions. If I had known the full extent of Lattimore's relations with the representatives of the USSR and with their many foreign friends, I would surely have been more critical of him even before 1939; and our relations would certainly have deteriorated much faster after that date.

I make this statement in order to explain rather than to excuse my own development. And I make it about facts that were dynamic and changing rather than static and set. Today I am not the political person I was in the 30's, although it was during that decade that I gradually disassociated myself from the Com-

munist orbit. And as far as I can judge, the Lattimore of 1952 is not the Lattimore of the 30's either, although his behavior during that decade, as recent investigations have disclosed, show him already willing in the 30's to take the course that he has followed ruthlessly since. Realizing how Lattimore's special and unusual talents were increasingly furthering the aims of total power, we should examine more than this single man, who without doubt did great harm to the free world. We should study the entire political nexus that encourages the Lattimores, for the world that admires the Lattimores is disastrously related to the world that breeds them.

KARL A. WITTFOGEL.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of May 1952.

[SEAL] MADELINE F. SCULLY,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Commission expires March 30, 1953.

EXHIBIT 1380–A

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

RUXTON, MD., *April 20, 1952.*

DEAR KARL AUGUST: First, a piece of news which I know you will be glad to hear, if you have not heard of it already. T'ao Hsi-sheng escaped from Hongkong and is now in Chungking. This news from Liu Yu-Wan, via Hu Shih.

Second, a belated word of thanks to you and Esther for the visit with you, which refreshed me more than I can say. I am only disappointed that Eleanor was again unable to meet Esther.

I have just sent back the General Introduction. As I said when I saw you, many of the marginalia are not to be taken too seriously. They are just things that occurred to me while reading your introductory remarks, without having the opportunity to see the main text.

In reading your remarks, in your letter, about "watchmaker" problems—the delicate, specialized approach in contrast with the crude or amateur approach, I think I can fairly say that I appreciate many of your criticisms, without being able to share them. Like anybody who tries to study and understand China, I have in recent years heard a lot about Communism. And when you learn about Communism and China, it naturally overlaps to include, at least to a certain extent, Communism & Russia.

Now the main point about Communism, so far as I am concerned, is that I am no Marxist. I have never read Das Kapital, much less studied it. I have never read Lenin. Therefore when I hear Communists presenting Communistic arguments, based on specialized "watchmaker" interpretations of Marx & Lenin, I cannot judge them as if I were a watchmaker myself. I can only form my own judgments on political problems and methods according to my own non-specialized, non-Marxist qualifications.

But for the same reason, when I hear specialized anti-Communist arguments which are also based on a specialized knowledge of Marx and Lenin, I am equally compelled to continue following my own crude, general, non-specialized judgments.

Thus, if I were to have an argument with Earl Browder, and disagree with him, I should not necessarily consider myself an anti-Communist. But in the same way, if I were to disagree with Freda Utley, I should not necessarily consider myself a pro-Communist.

But, human nature being what it is, in the one case Browder would probably call me an anti-Communist, while in the other, Utley would probably call me a pro-Communist.

You are in a different classification. You should, therefore, respect those intellectual responsibilities which are yours, because of their qualifications. But I must equally respect my own classification.

These are very hurried thoughts while waiting to catch a train to Philadelphia.

As ever,

OWEN.

EXHIBIT No. 1380–B

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION,
Washington, October 3, 1944.

Dr. K. A. WITTFOGEL,
Chinese History Project, Low Memorial Library,
Columbia University, New York, New York.

DEAR KARL AUGUST: Forgive my having taken so long to answer your letter of September 24. I have been working mostly at home without a secretary, so my correspondence has fallen behind.

I am really eager to see your Liao manuscript as a whole, and the additional pages on Qara-Khitay will be especially interesting. I shall read it with envy as well as admiration. It seems an endless time since I have been able to do any new work or fresh thinking on these problems which once so engrossed me. I sometimes get very despondent because in these years I have accumulated a certain number of books; but most of these I have not even been able to read. The Liao manuscript was so promising in its early stages that I am sure the finished work is going to be really important.

About my confining myself to conventional phrases during your brief visit here, the fact is that I was completely dazed. I thought we were meeting as old friends for the first time in a long period and was at a loss as to what to say when you opened with a violent personal attack on another old friend for whom I have as much respect as I do for you. You followed that up by a very forceful presentation of political opinions on which I, myself, have either no opinion or only an unformed or half-formed opinion. In such cases I find it very difficult to be expected to endorse somebody else's strongly held opinions, even if I know that his opinion is based on experience and knowledge. I still cling to the privilege of what I believe is known legally as the "Scotch Verdict"—that is, the right to say that I don't know.

With the best regards and hoping to see you when I come up to New York.

Very sincerely,

Owen
OWEN LATTIMORE.

NOVEMBER 5, 44.

DEAR OWEN: Your last letter did not answer the questions raised in my letter. Please, permit me therefore not to answer your letter either. The pattern of our correspondence evidently reflects a psychological situation, which it is probably wise to accept as definite, at least for the time being.

Of course, I am glad to notice your continued interest in my work. Yes, the Liao manuscript is completed: half of it went to Philadelphia the other day. Although work on the Ch'ing, T'ang, Chin, and Ch'in and Han periods may still require much effort and time, Liao ought to be out in the spring or summer of 1945.

You remember my dream of having Professor Tawney and you write forewords. Tawney, who twice agreed to do so, came finally to the conclusion that he ought to spend a couple of weeks studying the manuscript before formulating a preface or foreword. He will not be able to devote himself so long to this job, so we shall have to do without him—for Liao.

I think that there is something in his attitude which is right, but I am equally sure that your case is different. You are much closer to our problems; you will get an over-all picture much faster. It would be fine if you could come to New York, as you once suggested, to look the matter over. I am aware how busy you are, but having just reread your Inner Asian Frontiers (which are required reading in my Columbia class), I feel most vividly how close Liao is to your life work. It would be fine if we could discuss the question soon, here, or wherever you wish.

Yours cordially,

———— ————.

EXHIBIT 1380–C

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND

WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

DECEMBER 18, 1946.

Dr. KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL,
Chinese History Project, Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR KARL AUGUST: This is just an interim note to tell you both how much I am impressed with your Liao Introduction and how warmly I appreciate your very generous remarks about me personally. I look forward to a careful and detailed study of the Introduction, and still more to the eventual publication of the entire work.

In view of your own very careful and complete introduction, and in view of the fact that the work of printing and publication is now so far advanced, I assume that you do not wish me to write a special introduction. It would look very thin and unsubstantial in comparison with your terrific assemblage of documentation!

With warm regards for the Christmas season.

Sincerely,

Owen
OWEN LATTIMORE.

OL/m

EXHIBIT No. 1380–D

JANUARY 24, 1947.

Professor OWEN LATTIMORE,
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations,
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 18, Maryland.

DEAR OWEN: Please forgive me for not answering your good letter of December 18th before this. George was here between the two holidays and I was busy with conferences. Immediately afterwards I went to Seattle with him to contribute whatever small experience I have to the crystallization and development of his research group. He is building a very fine Far Eastern Institute.

I am glad that you like the General Introduction to our *Liao volume.* The question of whether, in view of my "very careful and complete introduction," a special introduction by you is still needed took me by surprise. Indeed your feeling that another introduction would suffer by comparison certainly seems a Chinese way of being polite. However, it is true that I tried to incorporate as many of your relevant ideas as possible, and it is good to know that you are so well satisfied with the results. If it weren't for this, I should be even more reluctant to accept your implied suggestion not to insist upon another introduction to the General Introduction.

As you well know, you have had little time for scientific contacts with me since your trip to the U. S. S. R. with Henry Wallace. This I regret, for I feel that different political attitudes should not interfere with scholarly relations. In fact, I have a great many scientific friends whose political opinions differ strongly from mine. Surely it should be possible for us also to meet on these terms.

Good wishes to you and Eleanor for the New Year,

Sincerely Yours,

KARL A. WITTFOGEL.

EXHIBIT No. 1380–E

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND

WALTER HINES PAGE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

JANUARY 29, 1947.

Dr. KARL A. WITTFOGEL,
Chinese History Project, Low Memorial Library,
Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

DEAR KARL AUGUST: Many thanks for your letter of January 24.

I should not only be very glad to write an introduction for your Liao volume; I should feel very much honored by such an association with such an important piece of work. To be quite frank with you, I thought that since you had never sent me a copy of the manuscript, or of the proofs, from which I could draw the material for framing the ideas which would need to be expressed in an introduction, that you were hinting that you no longer needed an introduction by me. So I thought the graceful thing to do would be to offer, with as much Chinese politeness as possible, not to write an introduction.

As far as concerns any difference between us in political attitudes, the adjustment of the relations between us depends more on you than it does on me. Your political opinions are much stronger than mine, and much more vehemently expressed. I am not conscious of any awkwardness except on occasions when you devote a great deal of energy, and some very vivid language, to trying to convert me from opinions which I do not hold.

With all good wishes to you and Esther for 1947,

Sincerely as ever,

Owen
OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is the sworn statement of Eugene Staley dated May 27, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit 1381" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1381

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

EUGENE STALEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

My name is Alvah Eugene Staley, but my customary practice is to call myself simply "Eugene Staley."

I am an economist. I am referred to in "Who's Who in America", Vol. 27 (1952–1953), as follows:

> "STALEY (Alvah), Eugene, economist; b. Friend, Neb., July 3, 1906; s. Alvah H. and Helen Teresa (Browne) S.; A. B., magna cum laude, Hastings Coll., Hastings, Neb., 1925; Ph. D., U. of Chicago, 1928; study and research (fellowship of Social Science Research Council) in Geneva, Paris, Berlin, Kiel, London and the Balkans, 1929–31; m. Phyllis Eugenia Parker, Dec. 19, 1936; children—Pamela Myrick, Thomas Eugene, Asst. prof. economics, U. of Chicago, 1931–37; asst. prof. (on leave from U. of Chicago), Grad. Inst. Internat. Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 1934–35; asso. prof., later prof. internat. economic relations, Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, 1937–44, on leave for govt. service, 1943–44; prof. internat. economic relations Sch. of Advanced Internat. Studies and Foreign Service Training Center, Washington, D. C., 1944–45; director Bay Region Div. of Am. Council, Inst. Pacific Relations, 1945; teaching Grad. Sch. of Business, Stanford U., 1945–46; executive dir. World Affairs Council of Northern Calif., 1947–49; research associate, Hoover Inst. and Library on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford U., also cons. Stanford Research Institute, 1948–50; economist Stanford Research Institute since 1950. Government work as economist with Administrator of Export Control, Bur. of Budget, Dept. of State, UNRRA; mem. UNRRA mission to China, 1944; mem. Secretariat U. N. charter conf., 1945; cons. econ. affair United Nations;

senior economist Cuban Mission of International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 1950. Mem. Am. Economic Assn., American Political Science Association, Council on Foreign Relations, American Institute of Pacific Relations, Foreign Policy Assn. Author or coauthor books relating to field since 1930. Home: 455 Seale Av., Palo Alto, Calif. Office: Stanford Research Inst., Stanford, Calif."

At the hearing on September 25, 1951, conducted by the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate To Investigate The Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Mr. Kenneth Colegrove mentioned my name in the following extract from the testimony (p. 920, Printed Record of the Hearings of the Subcommittee Investigating The Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3):

"THE CHAIRMAN. You have named certain people who were present at that meeting as belonging to that particular group that favored Communist China and the Kremlin. Have you named all of them that you can recall who belonged to that group?

"Mr. COLEGROVE. I see one other name I should have thought of, Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, who is very decidedly of that group; sometimes Eugene Staley, Professor Staley."

I have never belonged to any such group and the imputation that at any time I was actuated by anything except a strong concern for the national interest of the American people, and in a manner to defeat the aims of the Kremlin and its Communist leadership, is completely false. I have never been a Communist, or a member of the Communist Party, or a fellow-traveler, and any implication or suggestion that I have been is completely untrue and does me irreparable damage.

Mr. Colegrove testified that in an advisory conference of Far Eastern specialists held by the State Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, "one group was very obviously pro-American in its thinking, put America first, that is, foreign policy must serve the national interest of the American people," while another group "tended to be sympathetic to Communistic China and very, very considerate of the Kremlin." In answer to a question by Senator Ferguson whether this latter group "were favoring, in your opinion, the Communist line rather than the good interests of the United States of America?" Mr. Colegrove replied, "That was my impression." The testimony continued:

"Senator FERGUSON. From what was said?

"Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes.

"Senator EASTLAND. Did they advocate economic aid to Communist China?

"Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes, very, very strongly.

"Senator FERGUSON. And recognition of Communist China?

"Mr. COLEGROVE. Immediate recognition of Communist China, and were very much opposed to a Pacific pact."

Mr. Colegrove named a number of participants who, in his opinion, comprised this group and, in answer to the Chairman's question, "Have you named all of them that you can recall who belonged to that group?" he added:

"Mr. COLEGROVE. * * * sometimes Eugene Staley, Professor Staley." (Printed record of the Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 3, pp. 919, 920, 921.)

I desire to make two points, the first with reference to my part in the conference itself, the second on my general attitude toward Communism.

First, my remarks in the conference were based on a very strong concern for the national interest of the American people and were distinctly directed toward finding ways to defeat the aims of the Kremlin and its Communist leadership in China and all over the world. This is plainly shown by the stenographic transcript published subsequent to Mr. Colegrove's testimony. Mr. Colegrove himself apparently recognized this fact when he had an opportunity to read the transcript, for he testified again on October 12, 1951, and this time omitted to mention my name, though he claimed that his original testimony with respect to various other people was supported by the transcript.

Permit me to cite the following pages of the transcript, which report my main statements in the conference. References are to the subcommittee's printed Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 5, Appendix.

(P. 1562.) I asked a question of Mr. George Kennan, prefacing it with a statement that Marxist doctrine had predicted proletarian revolutions in the most advanced capitalist countries and that this had been "a great failure as a forecast," but that now apparently the Russians had shifted the emphasis in their

strategic thinking and planning to the so-called backward countries like China and the rest of Asia.

(P. 1576.) I proposed that we analyze "what are the interests of the United States in relation to China?" After stating a number of possible formulations, I said, "expressing my own view" our "dominant concern" should be the interest which I had described as "whether or not China's regime is tied to the apron strings of Russia," and I added that "what we are mainly interested in is (that) the power of the Soviet Union should not be augmented by having subservient regimes in China and all through Asia. * * *"

(P. 1595.) I referred to Mr. Stassen's proposal for a greatly stepped-up positive program of American economic aid to strengthen non-Communist Asia against Communism as "a broad and constructive concept." (The rest of the first sentence or two is mixed up in the reporting, but this much is clear, and this was my meaning.) Then I asked him whether "maybe we haven't more to gain from the standpoint of American interests" by using United Nations agencies whenever we can for this sort of effort, thus lessening the charges of "imperialism" against us and "setting up as against a Marxist internationalism the United Nations type of more voluntary internationalism and doing everything we can to boost that * * *?"

(Pp. 1620–21.) I suggested measures to improve the preparation of the personnel we send to Asia on Point Four operations, urging that in this way we could "derive very great political values for the United States." Specifically, I recommended that Point Four personnel should be briefed on political matters, "the kind of attitudes they will find towards the United States as they get to talking with people, the kind of attitudes they will find toward Russia, what the Russian propaganda has been in the area * * * At least so they will be informed so that in a cafe one day if it is thrown up to them that the United States has consistently tried to dominate the country and a lot of misinformation is involved in it at least they know some of the elementary answers to it."

(P. 1641.) I opposed economic aid to Communist China, recommending instead a policy of "judicious disinterestedness." I concluded: "In other words, help the countries more that are more friendly to us."

(Pp. 1666–7). On the question of recognition of the Communist regime in China, my statement was: "In general, the view that Mr. Herod first expressed, and expressed very ably, seems right to me, so I am not going to discuss that any more." Mr. William R. Herod, President of the International General Electric Company, had not favored immediate recognition, but had advised recognizing if and when the Communists attained the positions of having complete control of the machinery of state, "unless in the meantime there has been some other factor" (p. 1659). I went on to consider public opinion in relation to possible recognition and quoted in that connection four points made by Mr. Roger Lapham on his return to San Francisco from his ECA mission in China. I quoted these points from a resolution that had just been formally adopted by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce. The fourth of these points advised "acceptance of the fact that we may soon have to recognize, in such areas as they control, the Communist government as the de facto government, and be prepared to recognize it whether we like it or not," just as we had found it expedient to recognize the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and other countries whose regimes we do not particularly admire.

My own view at the time on the recognition problem was based principally on two thoughts: (1) that nonrecognition is not a very effective weapon, and at the same time has the effect of cutting us off from possibly useful sources of information and means of action on behalf of American citizens, and (2) that recognition might have some value in holding open the possibility of an eventual defection of the Chinese Communist regime from the Kremlin, as had happened with Tito in Yugoslavia. The merits of these tactical views are, of course, debatable; but to suggest, as Mr. Colegrove seemed to do, that persons willing to contemplate recognition of Communist China under the conditions of the autumn of 1949 (before the Communist aggression in Korea) were therefore "sympathetic" to Communist China and the Kremlin and not "pro-American" is quite unwarranted. Imputations of this kind definitely weaken our side, because they tend to prevent full consideration of any tactics except those dictated by the most simple emotional responses.

Second, as to my general attitude, I believe deeply and honestly in the principles of freedom on which the American government and the American economic and social system are founded, and I am decidedly opposed to the philosophy, aims, and practices of Communism and Communist regimes. The Com-

munist world movement is in my view the greatest menace in the world today, both to America and to the broad interests of humanity. It seems superfluous to add, though I am glad to do so for the record, that I have never been a member of the Communist Party and have never sought to advance the Communist cause of propaganda through "front" activities or in other ways. Far from looking to the Communist "line" for guidance in my conclusions as a social scientist or in my efforts to assist in public education on world affairs, I have consistently opposed key Communist doctrines and have on numerous crucial issues advocated policies such as no one "considerate of the Kremlin" could possibly advocate. This is true not only lately but over the years. Specifically:

a. My book *War and the Private Investor: A Study in the Interrelations of Diplomacy and International Private Investment*, published in 1935, reaches conclusions directly contrary to the Marxist-Leninist dogma on issues very important to Communists.

b. In 1940–41, before Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, the Communist line was that the war in Europe was an "imperialist war," and American Communists and fellow-travelers were urging America to stay neutral. I was publicly urging that American interests would be gravely jeopardized by a Hitler victory and that we should intervene to any extent necessary to prevent it. (See my article, "The Myth of the Continents," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1941.)

c. I have strongly supported, by public speeches or writings, the Truman Doctrine for containment of Communist aggression, the Marshall Plan, the United States proposals for international control of atomic energy, the North Atlantic Treaty and the military organization based on it, the United Nations resistance to Communist aggression in Korea, and the present rearmament program of the United States and its allies. All of these things are anathema to Communists and those who follow the Communist line.

EUGENE STALEY.

Sworn to before me this 27th day of May, 1952.

[SEAL] THOMAS P. DUNN,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Commission Expires March 30, 1954.

Mr. MORRIS. I would now like to introduce a sworn statement by Edward C. Carter, dated June 10, 1952, entitled "A personal view of the IPR 1925–1952 by E. C. Carter."

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1382" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1382

A PERSONAL VIEW OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, 1925–1952

(By Edward C. Carter)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
1.	Foreword	5316
2.	The Institute of Pacific Relations—What It Is?	5317
3.	How the Organization Started	5317
4.	What Countries Have Had Members Councils in the IPR	5318
5.	The Role of the International Conferences	5319
6.	Chairmen of National Groups at International Conferences	5319
7.	Observers at Conferences	5322
8.	Binational Conferences	5322
9.	Research—a Primary Function	5326
10.	The Inquiry Series	5327
11.	The Institute Publishes Magazines	5328
12.	A Variety of Educational Projects	5330
13.	The Role of Edward C. Carter	5330
14.	Training Personnel	5331
15.	How the Institute Is Financed	5332
16.	Eminent People Were Active in the IPR	5333
17.	A Tribute	5334
18.	Conclusion	5335

FOREWORD

Here recorded are some personal impressions of the important events in the story of the Institute of Pacific Relations over the past twenty-seven years.

The IPR record is one of which thousands of citizens in this and other coun-

tries are proud. It is indeed the record of an unusual organization. It is a society which, by committing itself to painstaking and objective scholarship, has enlisted the enthusiasm of a great company of men and women from business, banking, academic, and professional life in an unfolding process of research, discussion, and publication.

It is an organization that has attracted mature minds from many countries that were united in a common belief. They held that the process and power of adding painstakingly to the world store of knowledge about the Pacific area would gradually remove the misunderstanding and ignorance that has curtained off from the Western world that half of mankind which dwells in Asia.

Although the record which follows contains many pages, it is actually a severely condensed account. I believe it to be an accurate one, however. If it were extended many times, it would be found to be rich in detail and grounded in fact. Nevertheless it would differ sharply from the muddled story unfolded in the proceedings of Senator McCarran's Subcommittee. So replete have the hearings been with half truths and innuendo that those familiar with the actual work of the Institute are convinced that the Subcommittee's lawyer has attempted to prove the IPR subversive, rather than objectively to provide Senator McCarran and his associates with the true facts concerning the organization and its real record and achievements.

This may or may not have been deliberate. There is no doubt, however, that the attorney has concentrated on the Institute's correspondence files rather than its publications—on letters and informal inter-staff memoranda which were a necessary and legitimate part of its efforts to present all sides of a given study, rather than the study itself. In short, he has put the spotlight on the machinery of the organization, while virtually ignoring the finished product.

Here I shall endeavor to tell the story of the Institute—the story of the final product as well as the machinery. This is the record of events as I saw them as an IPR officer for many years. But it does not tell the whole story. It should be read in connection with the Institute's periodical reports, its published output and the letters and statements presented to the Subcommittee by William L. Holland, John K. Fairbank, Gerard Swope, Owen Lattimore, Jerome D. Greene, William W. Lockwood, and the many letters from Americans of eminent scholarship and integrity who have a first-hand knowledge of Asia and a long-time acquaintance with the IPR and its publications.

215 East 72nd Street, New York, N. Y., *April 23, 1952.*

The Institute of Pacific Relations

What It Is

The Institute of Pacific Relations is a non-partisan, non-governmental organization with member councils at present in ten countries which have an interest in Asia. Its purpose is to carry on research and educational activities designed to create an informed public opinion in all countries on the problems of development of the Far East and the Pacific area.

How The Organization Started

The Institute grew out of a dawning awareness after World War I of the need of an intelligent understanding of Far Eastern affairs. There were few non-governmental agencies dedicated to this subject. Two—the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and the Council of Foreign Relations in New York—had grown out of private discussions by members of the British and American delegations at the Paris Peace Conference. A third—the Foreign Policy Association—had begun to hold meetings in New York.

It was already apparent, however, that these groups were going to concentrate primarily on European issues. The League of Nations and the other official international bodies (all of which had their headquarters in Europe) likewise were focussing major attention on European problems. Even when situations in other parts of the world were considered, there was an almost inevitable tendency to look at them through European eyes.

Naturally this was viewed with concern in Far Eastern countries. It was not long before a group of prominent business men, educators and YMCA leaders in Hawaii began to protest that the Pacific area was being overlooked. Keenly aware of the vast new forces upsurging in Asia, these men expressed a need for an organization which would concentrate on the needs and developments of the far-flung region washed by the Pacific Ocean.

By 1924 this group in Hawaii had associated with itself Chinese, Japanese, Canadians, mainland Americans and others. Out of their efforts, the IPR was

born. It was organized formally at an international conference held in Honolulu, in 1925. The Hawaiian group had been inspired by YMCA leaders and the conference had been originally organized by YMCA people from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines and the United States. But before it convened, there had been a demand for a more representative membership, and the YMCA leaders had farseeingly relinquished their sponsorship and agreed to cooperate in the development of the Institute on a broad and wholly secular basis.

What Countries Were Invited To Join The Institute?

The founders of the IPR in Honolulu and their later associates in the countries around the Pacific not only insisted from the first on the Institute's being nongovernmental; they also insisted that it should be completely non-partisan, providing a platform for the expression of the widest possible variety of viewpoints. For example, the Honolulu leaders urged that trade unionists be included among the conference members so that labor's opinions might be heard during the deliberations. At the same time, efforts were made to get the attendance of bankers, journalists and scholars in China, Japan, the Philippines, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

By 1927, leaders from these seven countries had joined with Americans in deciding to enlist scholars, business men and others from additional countries with interests in the Pacific, in the work of the Institute. At first, a few of the Americans had hesitated about inviting Europeans to join the Institute, on the ground that membership should be limited to groups in those countries whose shores were washed by the Pacific Ocean. Those who took a broader view maintained that the problems of the Pacific could not be studied scientifically unless help were received from all countries which exercised sovereignty in the Pacific area. The latter concept prevailed and it was agreed to establish contacts with people and institutions in the United Kingdom, Holland, France and the U. S. S. R. Although Portugal exercised sovereignty in Macao and Timur, no effort was made to enlist any of its citizens in the Institute's effort.

The Institute's leaders, recognizing that Soviet Russia's shores were also washed by the Pacific and that its influence in Asia and the Pacific area might have great potentiality, considered it desirable to seek collaboration of Oriental research scholars in Russia. Thus it was that the first General Secretary, Mr. J. Merle Davis (formerly a YMCA secretary in Japan), in connection with visits to England, France, and Holland was sent to Moscow in the winter of 1927–1928, in the hope of securing scholarly cooperation in Russia, and the formation of a Soviet IPR. This visit was followed by sending the Institute's Conference Secretary, Charles F. Loomis, to Moscow in the summer of 1928, and a little later, Dr. J. B. Condliffe, the International Research Secretary (at that time a New Zealand citizen).

The leaders of the IPR, not only those in Hawaii, but eminent Americans on the mainland, like Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene, Roland W. Boyden, Chester H. Rowell, Joseph P. Chamberlain, Carl L. Alsberg, and Norman F. Coleman, maintained that it was of the utmost importance to have the fullest possible Soviet collaboration. This was generally the position held by the representatives of all of the other countries participating in the IPR. It was because of this that, following the visits to Russia by Mr. Davis, Mr. Loomis, and Dr. Condliffe, I made my visits to Russia and stimulated others in the IPR to do so. My first visit to Moscow was to accompany Mr. Jerome D. Greene (then a partner of Lee, Higginson & Co.) who was then chairman of the American IPR. We were seeking Soviet scholarly cooperation in the IPR while en route to the Kyoto Conference in 1929. Among those who accompanied us were Mr. Boyden, formerly United States Observer with the Reparations Commission, and Joseph P. Chamberlain of Columbia University.

In 1948, IPR Councils were formed in India and Pakistan.

A month before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese IPR ceased contact with the Institute and ordered the immediate return of the Japanese member of the International Secretariat. After the war, the Japanese IPR was reorganized and in 1949 permitted to renew its membership.

Although contacts were established in 1927–1928 with Soviet Oriental scholars, an active Soviet IPR was not formed until the winter of 1934–1935. This Council contributed to the support of the Pacific Council in the years 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939. Its leadership suffered greatly during World War II and the Secretariat's last contact with the Soviet IPR was in 1945.

The Role of the IPR's International Conferences

Between 1925 and 1950, the IPR sponsored ten international conferences, usually of a fortnight's duration, as follows: Honolulu, 1927: Kyoto, Japan, 1929; Hangchow and Shanghai, 1931; Banff, Canada, 1933; Yosemite National Park, 1936; Virginia Beach, Va., 1939; Mt. Tremblant, Canada, 1942; Hot Springs, Va., 1945; Stratford-at-Avon, England, 1947; Lucknow, India, 1950.

Here outstanding Far Eastern authorities and men and women of different professions from many countries gathered to discuss the problems of the Pacific area, freely and informally. To insure a frank give-and-take and the widest possible expression of views, newspaper reporters acting as reporters were excluded from the discussions. No delegate need hesitate to speak lest his remarks conflict with some official policy of his native land. Not the least among the values of IPR conferences was the fact that they were nonofficial private meetings where experts could exchange opinions without any fear of press misinterpretation.

Months of preparation preceded each conference. Research monographs were prepared on each question on the agenda. The conference discussions were carefully recorded and a final report published.

The position of the national groups at the conferences was unusual, as it was also in the membership of the national councils in each country. The public had become accustomed to conferences of bankers, Chambers of Commerce conferences, newspaper gatherings, trade-union conventions and a great number of assemblies of college and university professors. The IPR, in its membership and in the groups attending its conferences, attempted to cross these lines. Its goal was unique. It aimed to draw in to distinctive academic discussions and research the practical experience of members of all the foregoing groups. The conference personnel consisted of academic leaders, businessmen, bankers, editors, trade-unionists, women's organizations. Here was something new, stimulating and highly productive. Concrete evidence of this important innovation will be found in the following lists of those who served as chairmen of the national council groups at the international conferences and in a sample list of the personnel of a single binational conference at Delhi in India.

Conference Chairmen of National Member Groups

It should be emphasized that the lists that immediately follow are simply the *chairmen* of the national groups. The total attendance at these conferences from all the national councils ranged from 150 to 250 members.

HONOLULU, HAWAII—1927

Hon. F. W. Eggleston, Australia. Formerly Attorney General and Minister of Railways, State of Victoria, and subsequently Australian Ambassador in China and the United States. (Australian group)

General Sir Arthur Currie, G. C. M. G., K. C. B., principal and vice chancellor, McGill University, Montreal. Formerly general officer commanding the Canadian Corps in France during the First World War. (Canadian group)

David Z. T. Yui, general secretary of the National Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association of China, Shanghai. (Chinese group)

Sir Frederick Whyte, K. C., S. I., formerly president of the National Indian Legislative Assembly. (British group)

Frank C. Atherton, vice president and manager, Castle & Cooke Ltd., chairman Central Advisory Committee, Honolulu. (Hawaii group)

Hon. Masataro Sawayanagi, member of the House of Peers; president of the Imperial Educational Association, Tokyo. (Japanese group)

Uck Kym Yu, dean and professor of Law, Chosen Christian College, Seoul. (Korean group)

Walter Nash, secretary of the New Zealand Labor Party, Wellington. (New Zealand group)

Francisco Benitez, dean of the College of Education, University of the Philippines, Manila. (Philippine group)

Ray Lyman Wilbur, President of Stanford University, California. (U. S. group)

KYOTO, JAPAN—1929

Hon. F. W. Eggleston, Australia. (See above.) (Australian group)

Rt. Hon. Viscount Hailsham, formerly Lord Chancellor. (British group)

Hon. Newton W. Rowell, K. C., President of the Privy Council of the Government of Canada and subsequently Chief Justice of Canada. (Canadian group)

Dr. David Z. T. Yui. (See above.) (Chinese group)
Inazo Nitobe, Member of House of Peers, formerly Under Secretary General of League of Nations. (Japanese group)
W. B. Matheson, Government Representative at International Agricultural Conference at Rome. (New Zealand group)
Conrado Benitez, Dean, School of Business Administration, University of the Philippines. (Philippine group)
Jerome D. Greene, Lee, Higginson & Co., New York. Subsequently, Secretary of the Harvard University Corporation. (U. S. group)

HANGCHOW AND SHANGHAI, CHINA—1931

Tristan Buesst, Writer, Melbourne. (Australian group)
J. Mackintosh Bell, Mining Engineer, Almonte, Ontario. (Canadian group)
Chang Poling, President, Nankai University, Tientsin. (Chinese group)
W. G. S. Adams, Professor of Politics, Oxford. (British group)
Jerome D. Greene, Lee, Higginson & Co., New York. (U. S. group)
Inazo Nitobe, Member, House of Peers, Tokyo. (Japanese group)
J. E. Strachan, Headmaster, Rangiora High School. (New Zealand group)
Rafael Palma, President, University of the Philippines, Manila. (Philippines group)

BANFF, CANADA—1933

Ernest Scott, Professor of History, University of Melbourne. (Australian group)
Edgar J. Tarr, K. C., Attorney, Winnepeg. Later, President of Monarch Life Assurance Company, and Director of the Bank of Canada. (Canadian group)
Hu Shih, Professor of Philosophy, National Peking University. Later, President of Peking University, and Chinese Ambassador in Washington. (Chinese group)
Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, G. C. B., G. B. E., M. P., later Lord Samuel. (British group)
Inazo Nitobe, Member, House of Peers, Tokyo. (Japanese group)
J. H. Boeke, Professor of Eastern Economics, University of Leyden. The Netherlands and Netherlands Indies group)
Hon. Walter Nash, M. P. Later, Finance Minister of the Government of New Zealand. (New Zealand group)
Judge Manuel Camus, Member, Philippine Senate. (Philippine group)
Hon. Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of War. (U. S. group)

YOSEMITE NATIONAL PARK, U. S.—1936

Hon. W. F. Eggleston. (See above.) Australian group
Hon. Newton W. Rowell, K. C., Member, Imperial War Cabinet, 1918. (See above.) Canadian group
Hu Shih. (See above.) Chinese group
Albert Sarraut. Former Governor-General of Indo-China; Former Prime Minister of France. (French group)
Tadao Yamakawa, Member of House of Peers. (Japanese group)
G. A. Dunlop, Managing Director, Netherlandsch Indische Handelsbank. (Netherlands-Netherlands-Indies group)
Horace Belshaw, Professor of Economics, Auckland University College. (New Zealand group)
Conrado Benitez. (See above.) Philippine group
The Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander, M. P. Formerly and subsequently First Lord of the Admiralty. (British group)
Carl L. Alsberg. Director, Food Research Institute, Stanford University. (U. S. group)
V. E. Motylev. Director, Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas; Professor, Institute of National Economy, Moscow. (U. S. S. R. group)

VIRGINIA BEACH, U. S.—1939

Jack Shepard. Formerly, Hon. Secretary, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1936–38. (Australian group)
J. W. Dafoe, Editor in Chief, Winnipeg Free Press; Chancellor of University of Manitoba. (Canadian group)

W. W. Yen. Formerly Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to the United States, 1931; Ambassador to the U. S. S. R., 1933–36. (Chinese group)
J. B. Condliffe. Formerly Professor of Commerce, London School of Economics, and a member of the Economic staff of the League of Nations. (New Zealand group)
Camilo Osias. Former Resident Commissioner of the Philippines in Washington; Chairman of the Philippine Educational Commission Abroad. (Philippine group)
George H. Blakeslee. Formerly special assistant to the American Legation, Peiping, and Counselor to American Member of Lytton Commission; Professor of History and International Relations at Clark University and at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. (U. S. group)

MONT TREMBLANT, CANADA—1942

R. J. F. Boyer. Member of the Australian Broadcasting Commission since January, 1940. President, Graziers' Federal Council of Australia. (Australian group)
Edgar J. Tarr. (See above.) Canadian group
Sao-Ke Alfred Sze. Acting Chairman, China Defense Supplies, Inc., Washington. Former Ambassador to London and Washington. Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Washington Conference, 1921–22. Chief Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations, 1931. (Chinese group)
Paul Rivet. Formerly Professor at the Paris Museum and Head of the Musee de l'Homme, Paris, 1928–40. (Fighting France group)
Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, K. C. S. I. Indian Delegate, Nine Power Conference, Brussels, 1937. Member, Imperial Economic Committee, London, 1936–39. Commerce Member, Government of India, 1932–42. Member, British War Cabinet and Pacific War Council, London, 1942. (Indian group)
Younghill Kang. Economic Analyst, Board of Economic Warfare. (Korean group)
Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat. Director of the Department of Education and Public Worship. (Netherlands-Netherlands Indies group)
Walter Nash. New Zealand Minister to the United States and New Zealand Member of the Pacific War Council, Washington. New Zealand Minister of Finance since December, 1935. Deput Prime Minister since 1940. (New Zealand group)
Joaquin M. Elizalde. Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the U. S. Member, Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs, 1937. Philippine Delegate to the International Sugar Conference, London, 1938–42. (Philippine group)
M. R. Seni Pramoj. Free Thai Minister of the United States. (Thailand).
The Lord Hailey, G. C. S. I.,G. C. M. G. C. I. E. Member of the Indian Council Service, 1895–1935. Governor of the Punjab, 1924–28, and of the United Provinces, 1928–30 and 1931–34. Director of the African Research Survey. (British group)
Philip C. Jessup. Chairman, Pacific Council, IPR; Professor of International Law, Columbia University. Assistant Solicitor, U. S. Department of State, 1924–25. Leval Adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Later, U. S. Ambassador-at-Large. (U. S. group)

HOT SPRINGS, VA., U. S. A.—1945

Boyer, R. J. F. (See above.) Australian group
Wallace, Malcolm. Principal Emeritus of University College, University of Toronto. (Canadian group)
Chiang, Mon-Lin. Formerly Minister of Education, Chancellor, National Peking University. Now, Member, Executive Council, National Southwest Associated University; President, Chinese Red Cross. (Chinese group)
Naggiar, Paul Emile. Ambassadeur de France. Formerly Ambassador in Moscow and previously Ambassador in Nanking and Hankow. (French group)
Pandit, Mrs. V. L. Ex-Minister for Public Health, Local Self-Government, United Provinces. Later, Indian Ambassador to the U. S. (Indian group)
DeYoung, Henry C. Member, Korean Delegation to Disarmament Conference, 1921. Member, Korean Commission, Washington, D. C. (Korean group)

Visman, Frans H. Member of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao in New York since 1943. Netherlands Indies Civil Service, 1910–32; Governor of Menado (Celebes), Netherlands Indies, 1932–35; Commissioner for Reforms in the internal administration of the Netherlands Indies, Batavia, 1935; Member of the Council for the Netherlands Indies, Batavia, 1936–41. (Netherlands-Netherlands Indies group)

Belshaw, Horace. (See above.) New Zealand group.

Zafra, Urbano A. Economic Adviser to the President of the Philippines; Member, War Cabinet; Member, Filipino Rehabilitation Commission; Chairman, Technical Committee of the President of the Philippines; Alternate Member, Council of UNRRA; United Nations Food and Agriculture Interim Commission. (Philippine group)

Pramoj, M. R. Seni. (See above.) Thailand group

McFadyean, Sir Andrew. His Majesty's Treasury, 1910–19. Director of the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company. Secretary of the British Delegation, Reparation Commission, 1920–22. General Secretary to the Reparation Commission, 1922–24 and to the Dawes Committee 1923–24. Commissioner of Controlled Revenue, Berlin, 1924–30. (British group)

Jessup, Philip C. (See above.) U. S. group

STRATFORD-ON-AVON, ENGLAND—1947

Ross, Ian Clunies. Executive Officer, Australian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. (Australian group)

McInnis, Edgar. Associate Professor of History, University of Toronto. (Canadian group)

Chiang, Monlin. (See above.) Chinese group

Gourou, Pierre. Professor of Geography, College de France, Paris. (French group)

Belshaw, Cyril. Formerly Administrative Officer, British Solomon Islands. (New Zealand group)

McFadyean, Sir Andrew. (See above.) British group

Gilchrist, Huntington. Executive, American Cynamid Co., New York; consultant on Trusteeship to United Nations; League of Nations Secretariat, 1919–28. (U. S. group)

LUCKNOW, INDIA—1950

Edgar McInnis. (See above.) Canadian group

Hriday Nath Kunzru. President, Indian Council of World Affairs; President, Servants of India Society; Member of Parliament. (Indian group)

Komakichi Matsuoka. Member, Nippon House of Representatives; President, Japanese Federation of Trade Unions. (Japanese group)

A. B. A. Haleem. Vice Chancellor, Sind University, Karachi; Chairman of Council of Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. (Pakistani group)

Quirino G. Gregorio. Executive Secretary, Philippine IPR. (Philippine group)

Sir George Sansom. Professor of Japanese Studies and Director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Chairman, International Research Committee, IPR. (British group)

Harold H. Fisher. Chairman, Hoover Institute and Library; Professor of History, Stanford University, California; Representative of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York. (U. S. group)

Hadji Agoes Salim. Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta; former Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Indonesian group)

Observers at Conferences

In addition to members from the national councils, a number of people from other organizations were invited as observers. Frequently these included people from the International Labor Organization, the League of Nations, the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation. Later, observers attended from the United Nations Secretariat and the following United Nations agencies: United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Children's Emergency Fund.

Binational Conferences

Binational conferences attended by businessmen, journalists and scholars, from British Columbia, Washington and Oregon, have been held almost every year, alternating between Canada and the U. S. A significant binational conference

(India-America) was held in Delhi in December 1949. Among the 37 members of the Indian group were:

Kunzru, H. N. President of the Savants of India Society, and member of the Constituent Assembly since 1947

Aiyer, Sir C. P. Ramaswami. Former Dewan (Prime Minister) Travancore State

Durga Das. Joint Editor, *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi

Gadgil, D. R. Economist; Director, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona

Kabir, Huamyun. Educationist; Joint Educational Adviser to the Government of India. Educated at Calcutta and Oxford. Secretary, Oxford Union Society and Indian representative on the International Students Union

Lokanathan, P. S. Economist, Member, Executive Committee, Indian Council of World Affairs. Professor of Economics, University of Madras and Editor, Eastern Economist. At present, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Bangkok

Pattani, A. P. Formerly Dewan (Prime Minister) of Bhavnagar State

Prasad, P. S. N. Economist. Director, Balance of Payments Division, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay

Ranga, N. G. Principal, Indian Peasants Institute, Nidubrolu

Rao, V. K. R. V. Economist. Director, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University

Setalvad, M. C. Lawyer. Former Advocate-General to the Government of India. Leader, Indian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, 1949

Shri Ram, Sir. Industrialist

Srinivasan, C. R. Journalist. President, All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference, 1949–1950

Tara Chand. Educationist

Trivedi, H. M. Deputy Manager, Scindia Steam Navigation Company Limited, Bombay

Vakil, C. N. Director, University School of Economics and Sociology, Bombay and University Professor of Economics, Bombay University

Yodh Raj. Banker

The members of the American group were:

Atherton, J. B. Vice President, Mutual Telephone Company, Honolulu

Ames, C. L. Ames Library of South Asia, St. Paul, Minnesota

Baker, I. F. Director, Vice President and Treasurer, Westinghouse Electric International Company, New York

Carter, E. C. Provost, New School for Social Research, New York. Member, Executive Committee, American Institute of Pacific Relations

Compton, A. H. Chancellor, Washington University, St. Louis

Darden, C. W. Jr. President, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.

Elliston, H. Editor, the *Washington Post*

Fisher, H. H. Chairman, Hoover Institute and Library

Fosque, J. D. Caltex (India) Limited

Hancher, V. M. President State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

James, F. C. Principal and Vice Chancellor, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Johnson, C. S. President, Fisk University, Nashville, Tennessee

Kizer, B. H. Lawyer. Graves, Kiser & Graves, Spokane and Seattle, Washington

Lamb, Beatrice P. Editor, The *United Nations News*

Lattimore, O. Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, The Johns Hopkins University

Lewis, Vinita V. Child Welfare Officer, International Refuge Organization, U. S. Zone, Germany, since 1948

Lindeman, E. C. Professor of Social Philosophy, New York School of Social Work, Columbia University, New York

Malcott, D. W. Chancellor, University of Kansas, Lawrence

Mandelbaum, D. G. Professor of Anthopology, University of California

Murphy, J. M. Assistant Vice President and Chief, Far Eastern Section, Foreign Division, Bankers Trust Company, New York

Opler, M. E. Professor of Anthropology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York

Parton, Margaret. Correspondent for India and Pakistan, *New York Herald Tribune*

Potter, P. B. Dean, Graduate Division, School of Social Sciences and Public Affairs, The American University, Washington, D. C.

Rivers, W. F. Manager, New Delhi branch of the Standard Vaccum Oil Company
Shaw, G E. Manager, Overseas Industrial Relations Department, Standard Oil Company
Straus, D. B. Vice President, Management-Employee Relations, Inc.
Talbot, P. Senior Associate, Institute of Current World Affairs
Trone, S. Adviser to the Government of India on Industrial Planning
Turner, R. E. Professor of History, Yale University
Valentine, A. President, University of Rochester

The reports of these conferences were submitted many months ago to the Senate Subcommittee for its study. In the Senators' questions and remarks, there was little evidence that they had noted the significance of these conferences, however, either from the point of view of the high quality of the discussion, the monograph submitted, or the importance of the personnel and the long-term results.

Instead of noting these, the Subcommittee and its counsel have put their fingers on minor matters of trivial import. Instead of appraising the high significance of the participation of scholars, businessmen and journalists from many countries interested in the Pacific, attention has been called to the presence at two or three of these conferences of men and women who served in minor secretarial positions.

Senator McCarran's insinuation in his opening statement at the first hearing that, though there were many "eminent people of great respectability and of preeminence in capitalistic achievement," the real work of the IPR was done by Communists, operating shrewdly behind the scenes, is completely false. The men and women of respectability and those who had attained preeminence in capitalistic achievement did not travel thousands of miles to attend these conferences as a "joy ride" or to be "taken for a ride"; instead they took the work of the conferences most seriously. They did not absent themselves from the discussions.

Summaries or reports of the discussions of each conference were published and distributed widely. The volumes contain the gist of the discussions, they list all of the data papers submitted, they provide a brief "who's who" of all who attended from national groups, and the observers. They list those who attended in clerical and administrative positions. The volumes are on the shelves of many of the principal libraries of the world. They speak for themselves. I cannot remember a single case when a member of a conference called in question the accuracy of these books of standard reference.

If the Senators could even now take the time merely to scan the names of those who attended the conferences, they might revise their estimate of the paramount importance of these gatherings. Members spent a full twelve to fourteen days living, usually, in a small compact area or under the same roof, eating together in the same dining room, conferring together on the conference agenda between the sessions, and observing the work of the recorders, rapporteurs, and the conference staff.

Toward the end of nearly every conference, one or two full sessions were given to appraising the work of the conference, its staff, and its permanent secretariat. The chairmen urged the members for criticisms, rather than bouquets; there was great frankness. There was, too, the fact that groups from the various countries were always asked to contribute financially to the Institute's support. Thus, they had a very direct stake in the IPR, because they had to make up their minds whether it was worth their continued support. If any of the national groups had seen signs of Communistic control, the Senators may be assured that capitalistic financial support of the Institute would have been withdrawn.

Among the hundreds of delegates who participated in IPR international conferences, and aside from the four Soviet citizens (two at Kyoto, 1929, and two at Yosemite, 1936) whom we assumed, of course, were Communists, the McCarran Committee has cited and given major attention to the name of a member of the Japanese delegation at Yosemite in 1936, Hotsumi Ozaki. It is quite clear that the group of eminent Japanese attending that conference would not have included him in their group if they had suspected that he was a Communist.*

No member of the Senate Subcommittee, or its staff, has ever accused any of the following of being Communists: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene, Newton D. Baker, J. W. Dafoe, Edgar J. Tarr, Philip C. Jessup, Percy E. Corbett,

*There is certainly no evidence that he was one at that time.

and Huntington Gilchrist. Yet all of these men, as chairmen of the Institute's international governing body—the Pacific Council—were very active rather than figurehead chairmen. They attended, participated in, and guided the international conferences. Between conferences, they gave an enormous amount of time to the work of the Institute. As is well known, they were all anti-Communist.

The members of the international conferences were not only men and women of stature in their own countries, many of them were of international eminence. I cannot remember a single instance where an IPR member in any of the national groups declined to attend an international conference, because he suspected that the Institute was infiltrated by Communists.

One of the fundamental principles of the IPR was its nonofficial and nongovernmental character. It not only did not seek governmental officials for membership in its international conferences, it definitely and strongly discouraged such proposals. There were notable exceptions during the second World War when, in every country, business men, bankers, journalists and university personnel were drafted into government service in large numbers. This wartime situation robbed the national councils of a high proportion of nongovernmental personnel interested in Pacific problems. The officers of the Pacific Council, therefore, made an exception in the case of the conference membership at Mt. Tremblant, in 1942, and at Hot Springs, in 1945. In most delegations there was a minority of wartime government officials, but even here every effort was made to insure that the number of permanent officials of foreign offices and state departments was kept at a minimum. The officials who did attend came principally as observers, not as active participants in the round-table discussions.

In a few instances exceptions were made at other times. At one or two of the earliest conferences the American delegation, which would have stoutly opposed the membership in its group of a state, war or navy official, did include an agriculture economist from the Department of Agriculture. He was an expert on Asia's agricultural and rural problems.

The atmosphere at all the conferences was that of a group of private citizens. The importance of this was emphasized repeatedly by Pacific Council Chairman, Ray Lyman Wilbur, who said that at an official international conference free discussion could not be carried beyond the point where the official's instructions from his home government began and ended. He asserted that the great advantage of the IPR conferences was that *thinking* was sought in areas that were difficult for government representatives to discuss. Every effort was made to provide a setting in which the members of the conferences could examine the most controversial questions—questions which, in the days before the United Nations was organized, government officials rarely discussed on a broad basis with representatives from other governments.

The IPR conferences progressively worked out what might be described as a cooperative technique for dealing with conflict. The "hottest" and most highly controversial questions were, by design, placed on the agenda. There was a consistent invitation for the utmost frankness, because a premium was put on the most candid expression of the most diverse points of view. An atmosphere of cooperation and a respect for the views of others developed. After a fortnight of intense discussions, members were not expected to depart to their countries and homes with precisely the same point of view with which they arrived. The discussions were aimed at widening the members' points of view in the light of fresh data and the deeper knowledge of the psychology and interests of those with whom they disagreed.

It was because of the importance of the foregoing that the IPR developed its public relations policy as it concerned members of the press. Round-table discussions were closed to reporters. Many eminent newspaper men attended the conferences, but their role was not that of reporters, but that of informed citizens who could make a contribution to the discussions. The presence of reporters would have prevented most of the members from giving any appearance of having learned anything in the discussions. If, for example, an American, a Japanese, a Chinese, or an Englishman, said on a Monday: "This is my point of view" or "This is the point of view of my country," his position might be cabled to the country from which he came. Then, if by Friday his point of view had widened and changed, he would still have to adhere to what he had said on Monday, even though by Friday he realized that he had spoken earlier without full knowledge. The conferences were not "secret" in the sense that its members were conspirators. It was rather a private gathering where the members sought to widen their outlook and to grow.

Because the Institute recognized the enormous importance of the press, at most conferences a member of the Institute from one of the national delegations was appointed as press officer. He would report to the newspaper men each day on the general trend of the discussion, the subject matter of the round-tables, the different points of view expressed, but withheld the individual names of those who made this or that statement. This did not, of course, of course, completely satisfy all the reporters but, in the main, their cooperation was invaluable in bringing the Institute's discussion to a wider public. Among those who served as conference press officers were Chester H. Rowell of the San Francisco Chronicle, Victor Sifton of the Winnipeg Free Press, and W. W. Waymack of the Des Moines Register and Tribune.*

The results of the international conferences are difficult to describe. They may be listed as follows:

1. From 150 to 250 people, during the fortnight's discussions, met many people from other countries, whom they would not have met otherwise. They must have learned much at the discussions because, for the most part, these were intensely interesting and exciting. A high proportion of the members read the substantial data papers either before, during, or soon after the conference and they kept them for reference in future years.
2. Most of the members took to their own constituencies on their return not only the publications of the Institute, but oral reports of its proceedings. Some of them spoke to small and large audiences in their countries on the results.
3. Copies of the data papers and the proceedings were distributed widely to the press of many countries.
4. Full documentation of each conference was filed in the national libraries of each member country and also with the foreign offices. Many libraries have standing orders, not only for all the publications of the Institute, but for the proceedings of each conference.
5. In spite of the limitations imposed on newspaper reporters, the press of several countries was aided in making the problems of the Pacific vivid to their great audiences.
6. Although the aim of the conferences was to add to the body of knowledge on the part of the members, the members of the delegations in their individual capacities were so influential that, on their return, in many instances, they discussed the conference topics with members of their own governments.

Research, a Primary Function of the IPR From The Beginning

In addition to its conferences, research is a major function of the IPR in all the countries where the organization has member councils. This has been true from the beginning. At the first conference at Honolulu in 1925, the various roundtables discovered that while there was a great measure of good will, and a deep eagerness to solve the problems of the Pacific, the conferees, coming as they did from many professions and many countries, were without a broad and deep factual basis for their discussions. It was then and there that the IPR's most momentous step was taken, namely, its commitment to long-term fundamental research. Idealistic speeches, pleasant social intercourse, lofty generalities were to be set aside in favor of fact finding.

At the start, to be sure, there was a minority who were irked by this commitment to research, who wanted to "get things done", to pass resolutions, to memorialize governments, to use the Institute as a crusading organization. But the majority ruled otherwise. The Institute was never to become an action organization. It would continue its efforts to conferences, research, publications, and education, on a factual, non-partisan basis.

This research program has done much to raise the level of public information on Far Eastern questions. It has given people in all parts of the world a factual base on which to judge developments in Asia. It has provided material for journalists and commentators. It has been of practical value to economists, importers, exporters, scholars, and others with interest in the Pacific area.

The Institute of Pacific Relations has recently made a quantitative compilation of the materials published by the Institute and its national councils during the past quarter century, as follows:

*Also Christopher Chancellor of Reuters.

Books	249 titles	72,411 pages
Conference documents	696 "	26,171 "
Monographs	61 "	5,183 "
Pamphlets	136 "	6,919 "
Educational materials	46 "	3,782 "
Totals	1,190 "	114,466 "

The Institute's chief executive, Mr. W. L. Holland, has, I believe, presented a list of the titles of these publications. As of today neither the members of the Subcommittee nor its counsel have given any substantial evidence that they have appraised the value of this considerable and carefully prepared material.

In the early days, the founders of the IPR were particularly mindful in planning the research program of the necessity of a deeper understanding of the emerging nationalisms in Asia and the uncertain implications of the Bolshevik Revolution. Although a measure of attention was given to Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Korea, and the Far Eastern interests of Canada, Great Britain, Holland and France, the IPR leaders, especially those in the U. S., regarded Japan, China and Russia as presenting the most baffling problems. During the early period there was but little concern with the Asian areas under the sovereignty of Britain, Holland and France. These were to emerge as "hot spots" later. In the 1920's, many considered Japan as a danger only in the event of the U. S. failing to adjust some of her discriminative policies which irked the Japanese—the Oriental-exclusion policy, and the discrimination—legal and social—against resident Orientals, particularly in the Pacific Coast states. Toward the study of these, the American IPR undertook several major studies such as The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries, Oriental Exclusion, The Status of Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast.

Meanwhile, studies to which the National Councils and the International Secretariat devoted themselves were, among others: Land Utilization in Japan, Land Utilization in China, Trade and Tariff Barriers, Problems of Japanese Shipping, Mandated Territories, The Position of Japan and China in Manchuria, Foreign Merchant Ships in Chinese Rivers, Commodity Control, Land and Labor in China, The State of Asia, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution 1925–1928, Economic Survey of The Pacific Area, The Government and Politics of China, Manchuria Since 1931, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office, China: The Land and the People, Symposium on Chinese Culture, The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase, Korea Today, The Western World and Japan, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, Malay Fishermen, The Economic Development of French Indochina, The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy, Thailand: The New Siam, Land Utilization in Australia, Guam and Its People, The South Seas in The Modern World, Americans of Japanese Ancestry, China Enters the Machine Age, China's Post-War Markets, The Chinese Family and Society, Earthbound China, The Economic Development of French Indo China, Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, The Governing of Men, Industrial Development of The Netherlands Indies, Japan's Prospect, Japan's War Economy, Life and Labour in Shanghai, Modern Korea, Pioneer Settlement in The Asiatic Tropics.

The Inquiry Series

Shortly after the Japanese occupation of North China, in 1937, the officers of the Pacific Council decided to undertake an inquiry into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East. This was called the IPR INQUIRY. During 1938 the *Inquiry* was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe, Chairman of the Pacific Council, and in 1939, under his successor, Dr. Philip C. Jessup. Dr. Dafoe, up to the time of his death, was Editor of the Winnipeg Free Press. Dr. Jessup was Professor of International Law at Columbia University. The officers of the Council had the benefit of the counsel of the following advisors:

Professor H. F. Angust of the University of British Columbia
Dr. J. B. Condliffe of the London School of Economics
Mr. Etienne Dennery of the Ecole des Sciences Politiques in Paris

In addition to the foregoing, the Secretariat secured the expert help of several dozen authorities in the U. S. and abroad, to whom, according to their specialized fields, copies of early drafts of *Inquiry* manuscripts were sent for comment and criticism.

The Inquiry was financed by a grant of $90,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation. The purpose of the project was to provide members of the Institute and the public with an account of the economic and political conditions which had produced the

situation existing in July 1937, with respect to China, Japan and other foreign powers concerned, and a constructive analysis of the major issues which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in the Pacific area.

The project comprised twenty-seven published volumes. It turned out to be one of the most important Far Eastern research enterprises undertaken by a private agency. Manuscripts were sent to experts in various fields and in various countries for criticism. Their comments were then sent to the authors, with the request that they be seriously considered in the final draft.

The Japanese Council of the IPR feared that the *Inquiry* would prove to be an anti-Japanese project. On two occasions, it sent emissaries to the United States to discuss the project with officers of the Pacific Council. Several changes were made in the plans for the study in an effort to meet the Japanese objections without interfering with the integrity of the research. But despite these concessions, the Japanese IPR refused to participate. The foreword of each volume in the series carried the following:

> "The statements of fact or of opinion appearing herein do not represent the views of the Institute of Pacific Relations or of the Pacific Council or of any of the National Councils. Such statements are made on the sole responsibility of the author. The Japanese Council has not found it possible to participate in the *Inquiry*, and assumes, therefore, no responsibility either for its results or for its organization."
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> "Attention may also be drawn to a series of studies on topics bearing on the Far Eastern situation which is being prepared by the Japanese Council. That series is being undertaken entirely independently of this *Inquiry*, and for its organization and publication the Japanese Council alone is responsible."

Scholars from Australia, Canada, England, France, New Zealand and the United States contributed volumes to the *Inquiry* series. Several Chinese advised the Institute in the development of the project. A notable example was Dr. H. D. Fong. As indicated elsewhere, Dr. Chi was invited to write one of the volumes but his duties in the American-British-Chinese Government Currency Stabilization Board prevented this. He did contribute a partial study which was printed in a small edition of merely 100 copies in mimeographed form for limited circulation. Presumably for lack of time, it did not measure up to the standards of the regular printed volumes in the *Inquiry* series. China's most modern and most able banker, and Minister of Finance, the Honorable T. V. Soong, wrote an important and laudatory preface for the book by Frank M. Tamagna on Banking and Finance in China. His closing paragraph reads as follows:

> "Until now there has been no single book to which a Western reader could turn for an account of this development. Dr. Tamagna's comprehensive and up-to-date survey is therefore especially timely. It is the result of careful work, extending over several years. This volume may stand for a number of years, therefore, as the standard work in its field."

Soviet scholars did not cooperate in the project because they said that the Soviet Union wished them to concentrate all their efforts on defeating Hitler. (It was generally believed that both Churchill and Roosevelt believed that Russia should direct all its efforts to crushing the Nazis before taking on any other enemy.) In this situation the Soviet leaders did not wish to give the Japanese imperialists any occasion, however slight, for thinking that Russia was planning war with Japan.

The Institute Publishes Magazines in Several Countries

The Pacific Council (the Institute's international governing body) and several of the National Councils have, at various times, published nine different magazines. The Pacific Council's quarterly magazine, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, holds a unique position amongst the most thoughtful persons, academic and government leaders in many countries. Its International Secretariat publishes monthly in mimeograph form the FAR EAST DIGEST. This consists of summaries on current periodical material on the Far East, India, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand.

The American IPR's research fortnightly, the FAR EASTERN SURVEY which, like PACIFIC AFFAIRS, concentrates on Asia and the Pacific and circulates principally in the United States.

Periodicals have been also put out by several of the other National Councils. These have included the AUSTRAL-ASIATIC BULLETIN; the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; TAIHEIYO MONDAI

SHIRYO, published prior to the war by the Japanese Institute of Pacific Relations; MEDEDEELINGEN (Bulletin of the Royal Colonial Institute in cooperation with the Pacific Institute) published before the war by the Netherlands-Netherlands Indies IPR (no longer in circulation); POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, published by the French Council; PAKISTAN HORIZON published by the Pakistan Council of International Affairs; the INDIA QUARTERLY published by the Indian Council of World Affairs; and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. Some of these magazines covered more than the Pacific.

At first, PACIFIC AFFAIRS was edited and published in Honolulu as a monthly. Later, when it was edited on the mainland, it became a quarterly. It enlisted the cooperation of as wide a circle of writers from different countries as could be secured.

The IPR, as is well known, has sought consistently the expression of diverse points of view on controversial questions, both in its books and its magazines. If at this time, in retrospect, an attempt should be made to classify the place in the political spectrum of the Institute's scores of writers, I think it would be an almost impossible task for the following reasons:

(1) It would involve subjective judgments. In any group of competent scholars unanimity of appraisal is difficult to achieve.

(2) What in one decade is regarded as right, center, or left, is often quite different from that of a later decade.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS' first editor was Miss Elizabeth Green in Honolulu. Her successors were Owen Lattimore, 1934 to June 1941; Edward C. Carter, 1942; W. L. Holland, 1943; Edward C. Carter, 1944–1945; P. E. Lilienthal, 1946–1952.

The first of the fortnightly research bulletins of the American IPR was published on March 3, 1932. It was first called the IPR MEMORANDA, and was issued in mimeographed form. It was for the most part staff written. It gradually became so highly regarded because of its coverage and objectivity that after, I believe, a couple of years, it was published in printed form, and called the FAR EASTERN SURVEY. It has had a succession of able editors, including Russell Shiman, 1935–1941; Catherine Porter, 1941–1944; Laurence Salisbury, 1944–1948; Miriam Farley, 1948–1952.

The Soviet IPR leaders criticized a few articles in the quarterly PACIFIC AFFAIRS, but so far as I can remember in twenty years, with about 500 issues of the FAR EASTERN SURVEY and about twice as many major articles, only a single article stirred up a measure of public controversy. This article appeared in July 1943, and was entitled *China's Role in a Coalition War* by T. A. Bisson. It caused more criticism on the part of a self-appointed American critic than it did among the Chinese in China. The author spoke in high terms of the accomplishments of the Generalissimo and the Chinese people in the war, passed on to some of the prevailing Chinese criticisms of the Nationalist regime, and then moved on to a description of Chinese Communist contributions to the war against Japan. The article probably would have avoided controversy if the author had not used one or two debatable phrases. He described the Kuomintang regime as "feudal" and the Chinese Communists as "democratic." This was perhaps a tactical error rather than a factual one. It is true that subsequently the Generalissimo himself and many non-Communist writers described China as feudal or semifeudal. It is also true that *at that period* China's communism was developing a peasant base that was more democratic than the Kuomintang. However, "feudal" and "democratic" were fighting words among pro-Kuomintang Americans and some of the Chinese in the United States.

The flurry that followed the publication of that article was accentuated because just previously two other articles had appeared in New York which were very critical of China, one by Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times, and the other by Pearl Buck in LIFE magazine. When the editor of FAR EASTERN SURVEY learned that the article was challenged by Chinese Nationalists in New York, she asked Dr. C. L. Hsia to write a rebuttal which was printed in full in a subsequent issue of the magazine.

It so happened that, at the invitation of the Generalissimo, Mr. W. L. Holland and I arrived in Chungking just about the time that incomplete quotations from these three articles were cabled to China. The Chungking newspaper printed in English published an editorial under the title of "The Three Busy Bees." These were identified as Baldwin, Buck, and Bisson. On the basis of these inadequate and misleading cables from America, the editor felt himself justified in writing as he did.

The matter ended in an amicable fashion. One morning, Dr. Chiang Monlin, Chancellor of the National University and Chairman of the China IPR, came to

see us at our hotel and told us that at a dinner the previous evening, attended by several of the top people in the Government, criticism of the IPR had been made. However, General Wu Teh-chen, the Secretary General of the Kuomintang, had remarked that the Chinese in the long view should be grateful to the IPR instead of being critical. He asked them to remember the twenty years in which the IPR had served China, that it had called attention to China's needs when hardly any other research group in the U. S. had done so. It had made China favorably known throughout the world. The IPR, he declared, had been one of the staunchest and most influential friends that China had ever possessed, and even this one critical article was the work of a long-time friend of China.

A Variety of Educational Projects Developed

In addition to its program of research and conferences at the expert level, the IPR saw the need for educational activities designed to inform the public at large on developments in various countries of Asia.

As time went on, some of the National Councils of the IPR—particularly the Royal Institute of International Affairs (United Kingdom) and the AIPR—published popular pamphlets, bibliographies and other materials designed for the nonspecialist in Far Eastern affairs. In addition, the AIPR undertook a number of special projects which were designed to improve teaching, library and museum services in the Far Eastern field, and increase the number of specialists and trained personnel.

(1) It was noted, for example, that the Far East was generally neglected in universities so a study was made by the IPR and published in a volume entitled China and Japan In Our University Curricula with the results that scores of colleges added Far Eastern courses to their curricula.

(2) It soon became apparent that almost all of the fellowships for post-graduate study abroad were being awarded to American students for research in *Europe*. An examination of this situation resulted in a volume which called attention to the need of more opportunities for graduate study in the Far East.

(3) It was observed that the language requirement for American college entrance was such as to discourage the children of American businessmen, educators and missionaries in China and Japan, from capitalizing on their early knowledge of these difficult languages. A study of this resulted in the alteration of the language requirements in over 500 American colleges and universities.* This was achieved just in time to provide for the United States Government, both civil and military, a larger company of American linguists in the Second World War than would otherwise have been available.

(4) A book was published on Careers for Americans in China and Japan.

(5) Considerable attention was paid to the problem of providing secondary and elementary school teachers with factual information on the geography, history and way of life of Far Eastern peoples. As one educator wrote, "the fact is that the average American school child learns more about the tiny country of Holland than about the whole continent of Asia, which includes more than one-third of the land surface and is inhabited by nearly one-half of the population of the earth."

So the AIPR initiated a series of discussions with high-school authorities, city Boards of Education, and State Superintendents of Schools, on the preparation of study outlines, bibliographies, and finally of a series of textbooks for high-school use.

In 1945, the AIPR in cooperation with the American Council of Education appointed a committee of educators to appraise the treatment of Asia in 108 widely used junior and senior high school textbooks for history, geography, civics and modern problems.

The results of this study were published by AIPR and the American Council on Education in a pamphlet entitled *Treatment of Asia in American Textbooks*. This report showed the lamentable neglect of all the countries of the Far East in books used in American schools. It was widely read by educators and textbook publishers, and several of the latter sent their authors to the IPR to get advice as to how to include adequate material on Asia in new editions.

The Role of Edward C. Carter in the IPR

My principal initial contact with the organization was attendance at an all-day meeting held at the Yale Club in New York, in 1925, where some forty Americans

*This, in turn, had enabled many American students with an early knowledge of Chinese or Japanese to continue their language study in American institutions.

met to consider the pros and cons of holding the conference at Honolulu at which the IPR was born.

Although I was consulted both before and after the Yale Club meeting, I did not attend the 1925 conference, but I did attend those held in 1927 (Honolulu), 1929 (Kyoto), 1931 (Shanghai), 1933 (Banff), 1936 (Yosemite), 1939 (Virginia Beach), 1942 (Mont Tremblant), 1945 (Hot Springs), and 1947 (Stratford on Avon). I became honorary Secretary of the American IPR in, I think, 1926, and a year or two later, became the salaried Secretary of the American IPR, which I served until 1933 when I became Secretary General of the Pacific Council, serving through 1946, when I reverted to the American IPR as Executive Vice Chairman, continuing in that position until the end of 1948.

When I became Secretary General of the Pacific Council in 1933, among my special responsibilities was the strengthening of the National Councils; helping them to secure their income; bringing about general liaison between the National Councils, the Pacific Council and the International Secretariat; encouraging liaison between the IPR and scholars, publicists and businessmen in countries having a stake in the Pacific, who were not members of the Institute; stepping up the preparation of each National Council for and participation in the international conferences; and, above all, extending their research and publication programs.

Training Personnel

Along with the organization of international conferences and cooperation with my colleagues in the research and publication program, I was expected, in most of the countries, to be a sort of talent-scout to find young people of promise who might join the staffs of the National Councils or the Pacific Council, for periods of training and service. Most of those who were recruited, whether for the National Councils or the International Secretariat, were paid modest salaries. But over the years quite a number of highly competent young men and women were trained, thus adding to the intellectual output of the Institute in a way that was not recorded in the annual financial statements. The number of volunteers from various countries who participated with little or no salary in the administration of the International Conferences was considerable and established a tradition of high-level voluntary participation which had permanent value. The spirit of spontaneous service was a great asset.

As Secretary General I was charged with the responsibility not only of helping to strengthen all of the National Councils, but also of increasing their number. A continuous effort was made to strengthen the existing Councils and to form new ones. This activity was undertaken through the following methods: (a) correspondence; (b) inviting leaders from organized and unorganized countries to attend the periodic international conferences; (c) getting scholars, in their regular travels, to talk with leaders in other countries with reference to possible organization; (d) personal visits to other countries by my staff colleagues and myself.

In view of statements made before the McCarran Committee and in the press, casting suspicion on my relations with a few Russians, I cannot emphasize too strongly the far greater volume of correspondence, personal interviews, and conferences that I also had with important Chinese leaders in Kuomintang China; with people in many professions in Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Great Britain, France, Holland, and with similar people in India, Pakistan, Burma, and Siam. The correspondence and personal contacts with people interested in the Pacific in the U. S. S. R. were only a small fraction of those which I had with people in the countries just named.

In fact, the proper fulfillment of my obligation to the IPR as a whole called for many more contacts with Russians than I am able to make either in the U. S. S. R. or in other countries. Apart from diplomats and a few newspapermen, there were scarcely any Russians abroad whom one could see except during the War, When Lend-Lease brought scores to the United States. But few of these knew Asia.

Formality or red tape or something else, meant that I could see fewer Russians in a day in Moscow than interested people in any other capital. Russians, whether officials or scholars, were or purported to be busier than those in other countries. Further, only in prewar Japan was it necessary to spend as much time in "sightseeing" and in being "entertained" as in the U. S. S. R. The social hospitality in both countries was lavish and warm. In a fortnight in Moscow I would be taken gratis to more plays and performances at the Opera than I could afford in New York in a whole season. In Tokyo that "No" plays were a "must" and deeply impressive. Russia and Japan were still in the

propaganda stage. In all other countries it was assumed that I knew and enjoyed their cultures. I need not be "educated."

My efforts to stimulate the formation of IPR Councils in the Pacific Ocean countries of Latin American—Mexico and Chile—were a complete failure. I did not visit Chile, but a Chinese and a Canadian diplomat, serving in Chile and knowing the value of the Institute to their own countries, sought in vain to persuade thoughtful Chileans to organize. I made two visits to Mexico without result. Private citizens there as in Chile maintained that the authorities would not favor the formation of a private society for the study of international problems independent of government control. Further, they affirmed that their people were not interested in the lands across the Pacific. They concentrated their foreign concern on Europe and the Americas.

My visits to the principal National Councils were frequent (eleven or twelve times to each). They were always personally rewarding. The warmth and volume of the hospitality that was extended to me in every country and especially in China, Japan, the Philippines, and later in India and Pakistan was informative and inspiring. All of this added greatly to the value of the Institute's work. In all countries my visits seemed to be cordially welcomed. *Every facility was accorded to me. *Engagements were made to acquaint me with every possible person and institution that might assist in the work of the Institute. Invitations to speak before various groups were received in volume. Great candor and mutual "give and take" in academic circles were characteristic during the few years of active Soviet IPR membership. A very small company of Soviet scholars appeared to be nearly as eager for cooperation as the much larger number in all the other countries, but after 1945, personal contacts with the Soviet IPR leaders ceased. I felt that I had failed signally in achieving what the leaders of the IPR in all countries expected of me.

In the other member countries the IPR was welcome because it was unofficial, scholarly, and provided a platform for the expression of widely differing and conflicting points of view. This, of course, was one of the many reasons for the Institute's great strength in the earlier years, as it is still today.

How The Institute Is Financed

Much of my time was spent in obtaining financial support for the Institute—not only for the Pacific Council, but for the American IPR and some of the other Councils as well.

For the American IPR the principal sources of income are:

(1) regular annual dues from members;

(2) individual donations from $100 a year and upward;

(3) industrial and business corporations, and banks (from $200 to $2,500 annually).

(4) Foundations.

The Pacific Council is financed by annual contributions from the National Councils and by Foundation grants. Of all the National Councils, the American IPR was able to raise larger funds for Pacific area study than any of the others. The AIPR and certain American Foundations were therefore the largest contributors to the Pacific Council budget. Neither the American nor the Pacific Council has a penny of endowment. Grants from the Foundations were rarely for more than a three-year period. Contributions from banks and industrial corporations, as well as from individual members, were on an annual basis.

All of the national Councils of the IPR incurred large expenditures over and above their money contributions to the Pacific Council budget. The Pacific Council did not pay the very heavy expenses of the National Council representatives attending the international conferences and the meetings of the Pacific Council that were held between the international conferences. The National Councils met the bill for the hundreds of data papers presented at the conferences. They also met the travelling and living expenses of some of their members who attended the international conferences. Many members paid their own expenses, thus, in effect, the National Councils' total financial contribution to the work of the Institute was very much higher than the grand total that would be shown by combining the budgets of all the National Councils and the Pacific Council. Between and during the conferences the amount of highly intelligent volunteer work of hundreds of people in the different countries was substantial.

The same phenomena characterized my own secretariat. Except during the war, Mrs. Carter accompanied me on most trips aiding greatly in my staff

*Except in the U. S. S. R. There social hospitality was bountiful, but intellectual contacts severely limited.

work. The staff included at various times young people from Great Britain, China, Japan, and the United States. Seventeen young men and women served as volunteer members of my travelling staff without cost to the Pacific Council for either salary or traveling expenses.

Of even greater significance have been the travels of the unpaid and senior officers of the Institute. Most of them frequently gave as much as two or three months in a single year in advancing the Institute's program. They travelled thousands of miles at their own expense to distant countries for conference, and for the international conferences. The large cost, both in time and money, to the Institute's officers cannot be estimated. Among others who travelled extensively in the interest of the IPR were: Ray Lyman Wilbur, Jerome D. Greene, Newton D. Baker, J. W. Dafoe, Edgar J. Tarr, Sir George Sansom, Philip C. Jessup, Percy E. Corbett, Huntington Gilchrist, Carl L. Alsberg.

The foregoing list includes only men from the United Kingdom and North America. It would be greatly increased by adding to the record many eminent leaders from China, Japan, the Philippines, and later from India and Pakistan.

Many eminent people were active in the IPR

As already noted, a significant feature of the IPR was the opportunity it afforded people of various countries to know each other. Notable were the personal contacts established during the international conferences when anywhere from 150 to 250 people from several Pacific countries met for periods of twelve to fourteen days. As I indicated earlier, they were usually housed under the same roof or in the same small area. They discussed and ate their meals and took such limited recreation as the program permitted together. Many of these contacts were kept up for years and persist today. After each conference, a good many of the members remained in the country where the conference was held and visited quite widely under the auspices of the host Council.

Further personal contacts came in the intervals between conferences when members of the Institute and its staff travelled widely in countries other than their own. Members, when travelling, were invited by the National Councils to address meetings at their headquarters or at their branches. The International Secretariat took the initiative in facilitating such contacts so that the conference discussions might continue informally and not be limited to the arbitrary times of the conferences themselves.

Many scores of visits and discussions have taken place over the years. Without access to the files but simply from memory, I could give many dozen illustrations of this sort. Often when former members of the Institute became government officials stationed in countries other than their own, these contacts were informally continued. For example, one of the founders of the IPR was F. W. Eggleston of Australia, who many years later became Australian ambassador to China in Chungking. He was allowed by the Chinese government a limited, but fairly substantial luggage allowance "over the hump." This he used in large measure to have flown in his entire library of IPR books. As a result, his embassy provided for scholars and government servants in Chungking the largest library of books on the Pacific that existed in that part of war-torn China. Later, Mr. Eggleston became Australian ambassador in Washington where he continued his interests and contacts with the Institute.

The Hon. Vincent Massey, who has just become Governor-General of Canada, attended the Shanghai conference in 1931 and made a real contribution through the Canadian Institute in which he was a leader.

There were many Chinese IPR leaders whose lectures and discussions in other countries added much to the development of knowledge of the Far East. These included W. W. Yen, Hu Shih, Chiang Mon-lin, Y. C. James Yen, P. C. Chang, Liu Yu-wan, Franklin Ho, K. P. Chen and Chang Po-ling.

Similarly, Japanese IPR leaders who advanced the Institute's program while abroad were Dr. I. Nitobe, Professor Y. Takaki, K. Yozizawa, M. Matsuo, Ino Dan, S. Saito, Y. Iwanaga, M. Anesaki, T. Mayeda, S. Matsukata, S. Urumatsu and S. Matsumoto.

Canadians other than Vincent Massey were Newton W. Rowell, Edgar J. Tarr, J. W. Dafoe, Edgar McInnis, Norman MacKenzie, F. H. Soward, Escott Reid, G. R. Parkin and R. G. Cavell.

From France there were Paul Pelliott (now deceased), the greatest French Sinologist; Emile Naggiar, formerly French Minister in China; E. Dennery, now in the French diplomatic service; H. Bonnet, now French Ambassador in Washington; Roger Levy, author and Secretary of the French IPR; Father Robert (Society of Jesus); Pierre Gourou; Charles Robequain.

From Holland there were H. J. van Mook, formerly Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies; G. A. Dunlop, Amsterdam banker; Baron F. M. van Asbeck; J. J. L. Duyvendak; T. Moll.

From England there were Lord Hailsham, Lord Hailey, Lord Samuel, Arnold J. Toynbee, Sir Frederick Whyte, Miss Eileen Power, Sir Andrew McFadyean, Ivison S. Macadam, Captain L. D. Gammans, Sir John Pratt, Lord Snell, G. F. Hudson, A. V. Alexander, Sir Charles Webster, Margaret Cleeve, Malcolm MacDonald, W. W. Astor, Miss Barbara Ward, Archibald Rose and A. Creech Jones.

I remember, for example, that on Miss Ward's first visit to the United States (she was then foreign editor of the London *Economist*), the American IPR arranged for her to meet influential audiences in Seattle, Los Angeles, Washington and New York. A large luncheon was given for her at the Mayflower in Washington and a large dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria here. The IPR had the honor of introducing to influential Americans on their first visits to North America Mrs. Pandit, lately Indian ambassador in Washington; Zafrulla Khan, foreign minister of Pakistan; and many other Indians and Pakistanis. The same can be said of Herbert Gepp of Australia, Walter Nash of New Zealand, Francisco Benitez and Rafael Palma of the Philippines.

Reference should also be made at this time to the names of many others mentioned in the statement for the McCarran Subcommittee prepared by William L. Holland, the Institute's present Secretary General. In the Institute's published proceedings of the international conferences and in the printed and mimeographed periodical reports of the American IPR, the names of a very large number of participants in IPR activities have been regularly made available to a wide public. I cannot remember a case in the entire history of the Institute when an effort was made to suppress the name of any person. In fact, it would have been completely contrary to the whole philosophy of the IPR so to do. Nevertheless, at the very first session of the McCarran Subcommittee (July 25, 1951) counsel Robert Morris said he was going to read to me a list of names—"which names turn up with great frequency in the files. This list has been compiled by the staff here as a condensation of many people, of many names who are interested in the Institute." Reading the list of some 80 names Mr. Morris did not find time to mention a single one of the foregoing who had been really active in IPR affairs in one capacity or another. Nor did Mr. Morris call attention to many of the names which Mr. Holland has submitted.

The following afternoon Mr. Morris went to great pains to blow up out of all proportion the role that I played in introducing to Washington peple interested in Asia, a Tass representative, Vladimir Rogov, whom I had met several times in my IPR travels. The number of Soviet citizens with a knowledge of the Far East who visited the United States, was much more limited than those from China, Japan, Great Britain or France, and I took the opportunity of letting a number of people in Washington know of his presence in this country. If more Soviet citizens of his background had come to my attention in this country, I would have sought as the Secretary General of the Pacific Council to give them the opportunity of meeting thoughtful Americans. I considered it a part of my job as an officer of the international IPR. I did not think and still do not think for a moment that hardheaded Congressmen like Judd and Fulbright would be poisoned by such contact. Nor did I have any misgivings as to any deleterious effect from talks between a convinced Russian Communist like Rogov, and such competent, democratic-minded Americans as Stanley Hornbeck and John Carter Vincent. According to State Department protocol, my inquiry to Hornbeck was through his right-hand man, Alger Hiss, of whose loyalty at that time there was no question whatever in the American mind. Rogov had a wide circle of acquaintances in several countries. The list included representatives of Reuters, Havas, A. P., U. P., correspondents of metropolitan newspapers and American business men in Shanghai. I feel sure that all of these knew him as a convinced Communist. Rogov was, of course, not the only foreigner whom I introduced to people in Washington. There were a great many and they were non-Communists.

The foregoing instance is but one illustration of Anne O'Hare McCormick's charge in the New York Times (October 3, 1951) that the Senate Subcommittee is "carrying on its investigation in the context of today instead of in the state of mind of yesterday when such events occurred."

A Tribute

To the late Frank C. Atherton (one of Hawaii's "Big Five") and Charles F. Loomis (Secretary of the Honolulu YMCA) should go a major tribute as the

two most decisive initiators of the IPR. With Atherton's backing, Loomis travelled abroad studying official and unofficial international organizations. He consulted leaders from the Orient and the Occident.

Atherton and Loomis enlisted the interest in these formative years of David Z. T. Yui and S. Saito, the National Secretaries of the YMCA in China and Japan; secured the commanding interest of the late Ray Lyman Wilbur of Stanford University, the late Wallace M. Alexander (Alexander and Baldwin Ltd., San Francisco), Carl L. Alsberg, of the Food Research Institute (aided much by Herbert Hoover), Chester H. Rowell of the San Francisco Chronicle; John Nelson (Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Montreal). This group, of course, were all volunteers. The administrative work in Honolulu and exp'oratory work abroad was undertaken by Charles F. Loomis, who was loaned for the purpose by the Hawaiian YMCA. But a little later, the steadily growing group from several countries required a larger staff and a nucleus international secretariat was appointed consisting of J. Merle Davis as General Secretary, Dr. J. B. Condliffe as International Research Secretary, and Miss Elizabeth Green, a very competent newspaper woman with Far Eastern experience, as Editor. Loomis himself became Associate and Conference Secretary. Under the inspiring Dr. Ray Lman Wilbur, these four staff members made a remarkable team. They envisaged the potentialities of the developing organization, they overcame great obstacles, they enlisted the active participation of many others, including Dr. Nitobe of Japan; Dr. Hu Shih of China; Newton W. Rowell and General Sir Arthur Currie of Canada; Jerome D. Greene, Stanley K. Hornbeck (then at Harvard) and George H. Blakeslee of Clark University. All of these whom they secured were active in building up national councils in their own countries.

The imagination and competence of Davis, Loomis, Condliffe and Miss Green contributed in a distinct way to building the Institute on sound foundations. A few years after the founding of the Institute, Dr. Condliffe secured as his research colleague a fellow-New Zealander, William L. Holland, whose unique abilities led to his succeeding Condliffe when the latter joined the Economic Staff of the League of Nations in Geneva; and, in 1946, he succeeded me as the Secretary General of the Pacific Council. Under his creative leadership, the Institute has advanced to a position of world recognition which was only barely envisaged by the first founders. His capacity for discovering, training and leading researchers, and in skillfully editing the first drafts of their manuscripts has been outstanding. No Secretary General of any international organization, official or unofficial, has approached Holland in a rare combination of intellectual fertility combined with administrative skill. The Pacific, the American, and all the other National Councils are counting on him for eminent leadership for many years to come. Such talented and self-effacing leaders are indispensable.

Without the financial contributions of business men, bankers, industrialists and the officers of steamship companies, both in California and Hawaii, the early efforts of IPR leaders would have been limited. Later, bankers and industrialists on the eastern seaboard and in other countries followed the example of those far-sighted men in San Francisco and Honolulu.

At an early stage also substantial support came first from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial; later from the Rockefeller Foundation itself; and later still from the Carnegie Corporation. The smaller gifts from high school teachers, college professors, journalists, librarians and government servants were greater in number, and not less generous proportionate to their income. These donors were invaluable, too, in the Institute's discussions, and in their criticism of and use of IPR publications.

The contributions to the international budget from the National Councils, large and small, were significant in the Institute's support. They were creative in building a living, working solidarity of scholars, journalists and business men. By their own standards, national councils' contributions were all generous. When compared in terms of national income, the contributions from the councils in Nationalist China and in Canada were the most substantial.

CONCLUSION

Let the Record Testify

In my personal view the foregoing are characteristic of the activities that have occupied the IPR over the past quarter century. These have been the muscle and sinew of its tireless effort to realize the aim—its only aim—of acquiring and making available an accurate fund of knowledge regarding conditions in Asia.

That this has been a sole objective of the organization over the years is plain

to any fair-minded observer who will take the trouble to look into the record of the Institute's work as it was actually carried on, not as the counsel of the Senate subcommittee has endeavored to portray it to Senator McCarran and his associates, so as to conform with a preconceived bias.

In addition to this personal statement (A Personal View of the Institute of Pacific Relations), I shall soon submit to the Senate Subcommittee another memorandum. This will be entitled "Amplification, Correction and Clarification of Edward C. Carter's Testimony Before the McCarran Subcommittee." Those who read the present statement will, I believe, find it useful to read also this Amplification. In it I will attempt to correct errors I made in answering some of the questions at the hearings. I will try to amplify and clarify my testimony, too, in order that Senator McCarran and his associates may have a clearer picture of my personal views of the Institute, and my considered reactions to several of the questions put to me by members of the Subcommittee and its counsel.

I cannot close this statement without affirming that something far more important than the institutional fortunes of the IPR is at stake in the attacks during the hearings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on scholars concerned with teaching and studying the Far East. A whole generation of American scholars in the Far Eastern field is being threatened. Even more important than this is the menace to the American people of a movement which might rob them of the services of those who, through long study of and great experience in Asia, are highly qualified in aiding the citizens of this country to reach their own conclusions regarding American Far Eastern policy. This situation has been emphasized in a short letter published April 23, 1952, on the editorial page of the New York Times, and signed by the following from universities which specialize on Far Eastern issues. They are as follows:

Derk Bodde	University of Pennsylvania.
Delmer Brown	University of California.
George B. Cressey	Syracuse University.
Rupert Emerson	Harvard University.
L. C. Goodrich	Columbia University.
K. S. Latourette	Yale University.
Shannon McCune	Colgate University.
Lauriston Sharp	Cornell University.
C. Martin Wilbur	Columbia University.

The letter says that the attacks "do violence to the principle of academic freedom inherent in our democratic heritage, and tend to deprive the Nation of the views of trained specialists regarding an area which is today of critical national concern."

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

Edward C. Carter, being duly sworn, says: That he has read the foregoing document and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true to his own knowledge, except as to the matters therein indicated to have been communicated to him by other persons and except as to the matters therein which are matters of opinion, and that as to the matters indicated to have been communicated to him by others, he believes it to be true and as to matters of opinion, that the opinion expressed is his own and that is his true opinion.

Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.

[SEAL] IRENE R. DONOHUE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a sworn statement again by Mr. Edward C. Carter, dated June 10, 1952, entitled "Amplification, Correction, and Clarification of Testimony Before the Committee by E. C. Carter."

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1383" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 1383

Amplification, Correction, and Clarification of Testimony Before the Senate Subcommittee

(By Edward C. Carter)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Relationship of Frederick V. Field to the Institute of Pacific Relations.
2. The letter of July 10, 1938, from Owen Lattimore.
3. Asiaticus, Chen Han-seng and Chao-ting Chi.
4. Did the IPR ever place people in government departments?
5. The illegal seizure of the Institute's files by an agent of Senator McCarran's Subcommittee.
6. Has the Board of the IPR ever conducted an inquiry into the operations of the IPR to determine whether it is under Communist influence or domination?
7. People who were and were not actively associated with the IPR.
8. The role of the IPR in making it possible for persons in various countries to meet people of opposing Far Eastern backgrounds and unpalatable viewpoints.
9. How did I happen to suggest that a pro-Communist book be sent to certain American officials and Senators?
10. The Institute explored many controversial issues.
11. Facts about IPR methods and purposes of which the McCarran Subcommittee has shown little understanding.
12. Further amplifications, correction, addition, and clarification:
    (a) The Subcommittee's procedures contrasted with those proposed by Senators Kefauver and O'Conor.
    (b) Senator Ferguson's irritation at my implication that the IPR files had been tampered with.
    (c) Correction of my testimony regarding Alger Hiss.
    (d) The Committee on Militarism in Education.
    (e) "Death does not rob a man of his place in history."
    (f) James S. Allen's appeal for a financial subsidy was not granted.
    (g) Miss Smedley asked the IPR's help in getting two Chinese (prisoners of the Japanese in Hong Kong) placed on an exchange list.
    (h) Challenge to Mrs. Massing's testimony by Miss Harriet Moore.
    (i) Invitation list to a conference at Sunset Farm—Oct ber 18–21, 1935.
    (j) Mrs. Massing's attack on Corliss Lamont.
    (k) William S. White's significant article in the *New York Times.*

Appendix A. Copy of a letter from Carter to Lattimore, dated July 19, 1938.
Appendix B. Letter to members of the American IPR from seven prominent members of the IPR Board, dated March 17, 1947.
Appendix C. Copy of letter from Dr. James L. McConaughy, President of United China Relief, to Alfred Kohlberg, dated August 13, 1946.

ERRATA

Hearings, page 11, line 42: For Rolañd *Boyd* read Roland *Boyden.*
Hearings, page 12, line 23: *Dr. Chao-ting Chi, a Chinese Communist,* should read *Dr. Chao-ting Chi, a Chinese economist.*
Hearings, page 16, line 14: For UNESCO read ECOSOC (The Economic and Social Council of the U. N.).
Hearings, page 29, line 46: *Stone was in the AIPR* should read *Stone was in the FPA* (Foreign Policy Association).
Hearings, page 38, line 17: *Comintern* should be corrected to read *Kuomintang.*
Hearings, page 141, line 32: For Mr. *Lewis* read Mr. *Luce.*

I would like to clarify and amend my testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security on the following points:

1. RELATIONSHIP OF FREDERICK V. FIELD TO THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

At the Senate Subcommittee's first public hearing on July 25, 1951, questions were asked of me regarding Mr. Field's relationship to the *New Masses* and the *Daily Worker.* Senator Eastland and the Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Robert Morris, appeared to be endeavoring to prove that while Field was Secretary of the American IPR, he was also connected with the *New Masses* and the *Daily Worker.* I realized that the question of dates was important. I endeavored, therefore, at four different times to get the Subcommittee's assistance, but completely in vain. I spoke as follows:

> "I would like to, if I may, ask counsel, Mr. Morris, who must have all these dates at his fingertips, whether Mr. Field was an executive officer of the IPR concurrently with being on the editorial board (New Masses or Daily Worker)." [1]

Unable to get a precise answer the first time, I asked Senator McCarran's permission again to help clarify the question of dates. My query was as follows:

[1] Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee, page 10.

"The point I wanted to clear up was whether the committee's records show that Mr. Field wrote for the New Masses or the Daily Worker before 1940 and the date he went on the board of New Masses and the relationship of the date of his withdrawal from the secretaryship of the institute." [2]

Again, the matter of dates came up as follows:

"Senator EASTLAND. And you knew at that time that Mr. Field was on the editorial board of either New Masses or the Daily Worker, did you not?

"Mr. CARTER. One reason that I wanted to get these dates straightened out——

"The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question, if you can. There was a direct question put to you, Mr. Carter." [3]

Still again, I beseeched and begged Mr. Morris for the dates:

"Senator EASTLAND. He was on the board of editors (New Masses or Daily Worker) before 1940, was he not?

"Mr. CARTER. That was the question that I challenge and beseech and beg Mr. Morris to produce for me." [4]

That Mr. Morris did have the dates at his command at that time when I was pressing for them is clear from Exhibit No. 15, Hearings, pages 125–126. These Exhibits were not shown to me, although Mr. Morris had them filed in the record at the end of Mr. Field's testimony the following day, July 26, 1951. I had no opportunity of seeing them until many weeks later when they were printed in Part I of the Subcommittee's hearings.

From the foregoing, it is clear to me that Senator Eastland and Mr. Morris were evading questions that I put on four separate occasions. It seemed as though they were trying to prove that Field was identified with the *New Masses* and the *Daily Worker* while he was still Secretary of the American IPR.

It would be noted that after the first of my four consecutive attempts to clarify the question of dates, the Institute's lawyer, Mr. Crossman, saw immediately that this matter of dates was crucial. As Mr. Crossman was sitting at my side at the Subcommittee's table, he attempted to help me, but Chairman McCarran rules against this. A little later, Senator McCarran threatened to remove Mr. Crossman from the table to the audience and to "do it very fast." [5] Senator McCarran thus identified himself with the efforts of Senator Eastland and Mr. Morris to frustrate the sincere efforts of Mr. Crossman and myself to get the facts. These facts, as it now appears from the printed record, were in total disagreement with the false thesis that two members of the Committee and its counsel were seeking to establish.

Now, the facts are these: Mr. Field, the then Secretary of the American IPR, asked in June, 1940, to be relieved of the administrative and financial routine of his office.[6] With regret the IPR deferred to his wishes. He was appointed staff advisor, to be on leave without salary for the ensuing six months. Furthermore, three months later, namely, on September 1, 1940, he resigned as Secretary of the IPR and his resignation was accepted by the IPR on September 18, 1940.

Turning now to the Subcommittee's Exhibit No. 15, it appears that the earliest date on which Field had any connection with either the *New Masses* or the *Daily Worker* was on December 16, 1941, when the *New Masses* published an article by him entitled "How Strong is Japan?" [7] (This immediately followed Pearl Harbor and I have been informed, was cleared by Military Intelligence.) Thus, eighteen months elapsed between the time Field first asked to be relieved of administrative responsibility and the appearance of his first article in either of these periodicals. According to Exhibit No. 15, Field was not listed as an editor of the *New Masses* until December 15, 1943.

According to the same Exhibit, Field's first article in the *Daily Worker* was not until April 25, 1944—three years and seven months after he had resigned as Secretary of the American IPR. Exhibit No. 15 further shows that Field's first article in the *Communist*, later known as *Political Affairs*, did not appear until September 1944—four years after he had resigned as Secretary of the American IPR.

During the six years Field served as Executive Secretary of the American IPR (1934–1940), he maintained a very high standard of objectivity, factual

[2] Ibid., page 17.
[3] Ibid., page 21.
[4] Ibid., page 22.
[5] Ibid., page 18.
[6] Ibid., page 122, Exhibit No. 13.
[7] Ibid., page 125.

accuracy and nonpartisanship. The same is true of his attitude on the Executive Committee of the Board (1940–1947). In 1946, as a matter of fact, when he offered his resignation to the Board of Trustees, it was decided at a largely attended meeting, with but one dissenting vote, that he be urged to withdraw it so obvious was it to those who had oversved him in action that he had followed only the most exemplary, nonpartisan standards in his work for the IPR and had always been scrupulous in keeping his political views out of IPR affairs.

The Committee's counsel appeared to take exception to my having written a letter recommending Mr. Field for a commission in Army Intelligence.[8] I testified that I had done so on the basis of his record of objective, nonpartisan scholarship and factual accuracy while at the IPR, and his background on Japan. I was certain that Mr. Field would perform an outstanding service for his country if granted a commission. For this reason I was glad to recommend him.

The Committee made much of my letter to the War Department. *I have never been shown a copy of that letter*, although it was made the basis of extensive questioning. At the hearing on July 25th I did not remember fully the details of this incident but, on the following day, when Mr. Field himself appeared as a witness, the Subcommittee asked him many questions about his negotiations in the matter of a commission in Army Intelligence. Here Field, under oath, brought out that he did not initiate the proposal. On page 106 and following of Part 1, Mr. Field stated clearly that the origin was the other way around. His words were: "I was asked if I could accept a commission."[9] Field subsequently was asked to visit officers in Washington, where the matter was fully discussed.

Mr. Field in his testimony[10] made it clear that, in his discussions in Washington, the question of his political views was discussed frankly and that finally he was definitely offered a commission. In response to further questioning on this same point by Senators Ferguson and O'Conor, Field testified again that he revealed his views fully to Army Intelligence. Senator O'Conor asked what was the problem on which Army Intelligence wanted Mr. Field's help. He replied that it was the strategic bombing of Japan.

From a perusal of all of Field's testimony, it is apparent that Field was first approached by an officer of United States Army Intelligence proposing that Field accept a commission in that unit to work on the problem of the strategic bombing of Japan. Subsequently, Army Intelligence asked Field to do what he could to eliminate objections which had been made to his appointment by someone outside of the United States Army. Without the IPR files I cannot remember at what stage I wrote my letter commending Field. Field, I remember, approached me and I volunteered to write a letter to the Army recommending him.

This I did in good faith, for the following reasons: (a) I knew that from Japan's illegal occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and onward, Field had been a constant and intense opponent of Japanese aggression; (b) I knew that Field had a good knowledge of the Japanese economy, its industrial centers, railway assembly yards, ship building facilities, communication centers, which, if damaged, could deprive Japan of much of her economic power; (c) I knew that Field had extensive knowledge and facilities for bringing to the attention of highest Army authorities those locations and installations overseas which, if the Army planned a large bombing program, would substantially weaken Japan's strength and her war potential; (d) I was convinced that Field would throw himself with complete abandon into the United States Government's attempt to weaken and ultimately destroy Japanese aggression; (e) I was aware, too, that Field had an excellent general knowledge not only of Japan, but of the Philippines and China; (f) as I stated in my testimony, I was confident that if the security agencies had derogatory data regarding Field that I did not possess, his appointment would not be approved. Under no circumstances could I conceive of a letter from me taking precedence over the recommendations of a security service objection.

So far as I could see Army Intelligence wanted Field and wished that he could overcome the objections to his serving. In view of the foregoing, I not only had no hesitation about recommending him, I felt it was my patriotic duty because, like him, I had seen on the spot, step by step, Japan's massive attempt to become master of as much of China as possible. With Professor Chamber-

[8] Ibid., page 11.
[9] Ibid., page 106.
[10] Ibid., page 107.

lain and others I had traveled across Europe and Siberia, arriving in Manchuria on the eve of the Mukden "incident." Our party traveled from the border to Harbin and through no man's land to Changchung and Mukden where we were joined by Field, who had traveled through Japan and Korea, arriving in Mukden the night of the "incident." We saw concrete instances of the ever-expanding plans of the Japanese militarists. As Japan's aggression increased, I had noted that Field became more deeply concerned. Many of his studies were calculated to aid our people and our Government in recognizing the danger of Japan's march both to the vital interests of China and those of the United States. His early isolationism toward Europe did not apply to the Far East.

Now I will revert to a part of the testimony which I will quote as follows from pages 21 and 22 of Part I:

> "Senator EASTLAND. You do not remember, then, whether or not you attempted to get a commission in Army Air Force Intelligence for a member of the Editorial Board of either the Daily Worker or the New Masses?
>
> "Mr. CARTER. I don't remember."

I did not remember because, at this time, Field had no editorial connection with either of these publications (as shown above, Hearings, Exhibit No. 15, pages 125–126).

Mr. Morris asked whether I recalled that Field took a position with the American Peace Mobilization and had I known that that organization was Communist controlled.[11] I replied that I knew that it was cited as that and that I had come to the conclusion that the Communists took it over.

A the time of Pearl Harbor, Field's position (which had been isolationist with reference to Europe up to June 1941) changed radically. Here his position seemed similar to that of a great company of other Americans including many notable conservatives. The war had now developed away from the Chamberlain-Daladier concept of appeasement. The attack on Pearl Harbor compelled the United States to fight aggression. Here was a campaign to which all patriotic Americans could be expected to respond with complete devotion. I was convinced that to the war against Japan for which Field was so well fitted, he would commit his remarkable gifts and knowledge with utter devotion. I could not conceive then, nor can I conceive now, of his not having given everything he had.

I wish to extend my remarks with reference to the autumn of 1940 when the American Peace Mobilization was forming at a time when Quakers, pacifists, Reds, and conservatives were trying to keep us out of the Chamberlain-Daladier war. I understood that the Chairman of the Peace Mobilization was a non-Communist clergyman—the Chaplain of the University of Chicago. He had associated with him not only Quakers, but other non-Communist American citizens who wanted to keep our country out of war if possible. (This movement synchronized and in many respects was parallel to the powerful America First movement.)

Under what I understood to be pressure from the Chaplain of the University of Chicago and others, Field responded to the invitation to become Executive Secretary. At what point in the American Peace Mobilization the Communists came to dominate, I never learned; but, by the time of the picketing of the White House, I surmised that they had attained large influence. When I said to the Subcommittee that at this time (i. e., the picketing of the White House) Field was behaving like a Communist, I did not mean to suggest that I knew him to be a Communist or that I considered him as even a fellow traveler.

A little later, Senator O'Conor implied that I had been doing something detrimental to the interests of my country.[12] I certainly did not and do not now think I was doing anything detrimental. Please remember that at that time all the Allies were concerned in stopping Japan and Germany. Field's special competence was such that I firmly believed his talents could be used in aiding in the stopping of Japan.

Senator O'Conor then introduced a letter on the stationery of the periodical *Amerasia*. This I identified and noted that the editorial board included Professor Kenneth Colegrove of Northwestern University. I would now like to remark that *Amerasia* was never connected with the IPR. Its Board and its authors were a mixture of persons familiar with developments in Asia, but of widely differing political points of view. Professor Colegrove of Northwestern, Dr. Cyrus Peake of Columbia, and several others on its Board, could by no stretch of the imagination be labeled as pro-Communist.

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[11] Ibid., page 22.
[12] Ibid., page 30.

2. THE LETTER FROM OWEN LATTIMORE OF JULY 10, 1938

Mr. Morris read two paragraphs from a long letter from Owen Lattimore to me dated July 10, 1938.[13] This letter became the subject of extensive questioning by members of the Subcommittee and its counsel. I was asked what was the inquiry referred to in that letter. I replied that it was an inquiry into the issues of the Sino-Japanese War. I was in Peking in 1937 when the Japanese came in and took over Tientsin and Peking. The Japanese were clearly on the march. It seemed to me that here we had an opportunity while a major conflict was starting to get people of different points of view to analyze it.

It is now clear that at one of the preliminary planning stages of the Inquiry, it had been proposed that Chi, Chen Han-seng and Asiaticus be asked to write books for the Inquiry. These proposals along with many others were contained in a letter of mine to Dr. Carl Alsberg who had served for so many years as head of the Food Research Institute aided by Mr. Herbert Hoover at Stanford University.

But later it was decided not to employ either Asiaticus or Chen Han-seng. For particulars with reference to the limited and non-Inquiry series assignment to Chi, please see page 23 of "A Personal View of the IPR", recently submitted to the Subcommittee. The best evidence of the integrity of the IPR was not in inter-staff letters, but in what was actually published in the Inquiry series, in its many other published volumes and in its periodicals.

However, Lattimore's letter was attacked over and over again. When, at long last, he was allowed to testify on February 26, 1952, he explained in detail what he meant in the passages quoted from his letter.

In the early autumn of 1951 and continuing to December, I wrote several times to Senator McCarran and Mr. Morris requesting copies of my correspondence with Lattimore just prior to and following the letter to me of July 10, 1938. Although, last year, Mr. Morris told a Herald Tribune representative that he was sending me the material, and although Mr. Mandel confirmed last year that there was such material in the files, nothing was sent to me until March 1952, when I received from Morris a copy of my letter to Lattimore of July 19, 1938. This letter reveals so clearly the impartial position which the IPR has endeavored to maintain throughout its history that I respectfully request that it be published in the Subcommittee's printed record. It is submitted herewith and marked "Appendix A" to this statement.

3. DID I REGARD ASIATICUS, CHEN HAN-SENG AND CHAO-TING CHI AS COMMUNISTS?

The purpose of the introduction of the Lattimore letter was apparently intended to prove that Asiaticus, Chi and Chen Han-seng were known to be Communists.

My testimony regarding the three men was and is that I did not regard either Chen Han-seng or Dr. Chi as Communists when they were writing for the Institute. Today I do not know whether Chen Han-seng is a Party member or not; he left the United States last year, I believe. I do not know whether Chi is a Party member or not. I was not aware of the fact that he wrote for *China Today* under a pseudonym. I do know that for a long time he was an official in the Kuomintang government of China, assisting Dr. H. H. Kung. The presumption now is that he is a Communist Party member because he is employed in a high position by the Chinese Communist Government. Regarding Asiaticus, who never wrote a book in the IPR Inquiry series, I do know that he did some writing for the IPR, but at the time I was not informed that he was a Communist.

4. DID THE IPR EVER ATTEMPT TO PLACE PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS?

In response to Mr. Morris' question as to whether I was instrumental in having Dr. Philip C. Jessup go into the State Department, I replied that I was not, although we regarded him as a competent man. Senator Eastland apparently ignored my denial of putting Jessup into the State Department when he asked that I tell "who else they placed in the State Department."[14]

The implication of Senator Eastland's questions I believe to be completely without foundation. The Senator here revealed a basic lack of knowledge, both

[13] Ibid., page 36.
[14] Ibid., page 32.

of the Institute's policy and its history. From its beginning, the Institute has maintained itself as a private and non-governmental society. It has refused as strongly to bow before government pressure as it has refrained from putting pressure on the government. Its raison d'etre from 1925 to the present time has been the important and distinctive role which it could play in public understanding by remaining private and unofficial. There is ample justification for this in terms of the American way of life. This was the accepted view of the national units of the IPR in Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, China, France, Holland, and in Japan. During the few years of activity on the part of the Soviet Russian IPR, even its leaders made the best attempts they could to disassociate their organization from foreign office control. Just before Pearl Harbor the Japanese IPR was compelled to bow before government pressure. The Chinese IPR throughout its history courageously resisted government pressure.

To revert to the American IPR, I want to make it clear that what actually happened was precisely the reverse of Senator Eastland's implication. Both the American Institute and the International Secretariat had one major concern—how could the IPR resources in research and personnel make the maximum contribution to the war effort. The case of each individual was studied carefully with this objective in view. When some of the civilian agencies of the government made inquiries regarding this or that person, I discussed the case with the government representative in the light of the foregoing principle and usually succeeded in establishing the fact that the person concerned could help the Allies most by continuing his or her study of a problem which bore directly on Allied success. My attitude toward those of my associates who were of military age was, of course, different.

I remember that at one time, late in the war, when the IPR personnel consisted only of older people, I had been invited to the Pentagon for conference with Major General Frederick Osborn and some of his colleagues. A Colonel on the staff of General Osborn proposed that practically the entire American staff of the IPR should enter the service of General Osborn's program. Flattering though this was, I took the position that my associates and I could render the United States a greater service by remaining at our posts. The deal was never consummated.

To the best of my knowledge, the IPR or its officers made no move whatsoever in the matter of Jessup's entering the State Department. Over the years he had acquired experience, stature and contacts which were even more imposing than his invaluable service to the IPR. So far as I am informed, the initiative came from the State Department, based on Jessup's long record as a scholar, international lawyer and public servant.

Senator Eastland asked whether the Institute or whether I, as an official of the Institute, recommended people to the State Department for employment. To this I replied that several times we had had requests from several agencies of the government for a man for this or that job. Senator Eastland reminded me that he had asked about the State Department. I replied that a number of our people, more of our junior staff, were employed in the State Department during the war. Senator Eastland then asked who they were. I said that I thought more of the people went into the Army, that Robert W. Barnett is in the State Department at present. My testimony regarding Barnett was incomplete. He did not go from the IPR into the State Department. He went from the IPR to, I think, an OSS training course and thence to General Chennault's staff in Kunming. Later, he was attached to the staff of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington under General Frank R. McCoy. Whether that was a State Department or an independent appointment, I do not remember. It was made several years after he had resigned from the IPR staff. However, he has now for some years been a State Department employee.

5. THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE INSTITUTE'S FILES BY AN AGENT OF SENATOR M'CARRAN'S SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Sourwine asked if I thought the seizure of the files was illegal, why wasn't there a contention to that effect made in February or March rather than in July in connection with the hearings. I replied that that question should be addressed to a responsible officer of the Institute.[15]

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[15] Ibid., page 43.

At the close of the hearing, Mr. Holland reminded me that Mr. Sourwine was completely wrong in his intimation that the Institute had made no previous challenges to the legality of the Subcommittee's taking possession of the files. He handed me a press release, dated February 16, 1951, which had been issued by Mr. Gerard Swope, the Chairman of the AIPR, and which included a telegram that the IPR had sent to Senator McCarran and other members of the Subcommittee, calling to their attention the fact that the Insitute's files had been seized illegally.

Here is the text of the telegram sent to Senator McCarran and other members of the Subcommittee:

> "We respectfully call your attention to the recent publication in several newspapers of materials obviously taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations which your Subcommittee has seized without any subpoena being served either on Mr. Carter or on any officer of the Institute. As previously stated, we have no objection to these files being examined in an orderly manner by any properly accredited U. S. agency or to their being made public through appropriate procedures.
>
> "But we again appeal to you, in common decency and for the protection of hundreds of persons named in the files, to see that such unauthorized and partial leakages of private correspondence are stopped and that the materials are used fairly and not taken out of context. May we have your public assurance on this?"

So far as I have been informed, Mr. Gerard Swope never received a reply from Senator McCarran, or from any of the other members of the subcommittee, or its staff.

6. HAS THE BOARD OF THE IPR EVER CONDUCTED AN INQUIRY INTO THE OPERATIONS OF THE IPR TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS UNDER COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OR DOMINATION?

Senator Ferguson asked a question about investigations within the IPR itself.[16] He said that I had indicated that prior to the Amerasia exposure there had been an investigation on the so-called Kohlberg charges. A little later, Ferguson read [17] what he described as a line or two of testimony, *not giving the name of the person who testified to it.* The anonymous writer asserted that the IPR investigation of the Kohlberg charges was prepared by a staff member and then accepted by the Executive Committee.

That description is not quite adequate. The Kohlberg charges were studied by the Executive Committee, and very carefully analyzed by a subcommittee of three Board members. The two committees were aided in this by a staff committee designated for the purpose. A member of the staff, Mrs. Stewart, was asked to edit the written reports of all those who worked on the Kohlberg charges. This she did. Her summary was then approved by the Executive Committee and issued in mimeographed form.

There was a good and compelling reason why the officers and trustees of the IPR had never been impressed by charges that the organization was serving as a Communist front, or even influenced by Communists or any other partisan group. The IRP trustees and especially the Executive Committee knew from first-hand observation that such charges were completely groundless because they kept in close personal touch with the organization and its publications. It would have been impossible to pull the wool over the eyes of this group of representative business, academic, and professional leaders. They were genuinely interested in the IPR and felt a keen sense of responsibility regarding its successful operation. They were all kept fully advised on the nature of Mr. Kohlberg's charges.

The Executive Committee met frequently, giving scrupulous attention to all aspects of its program and functioning. They were familiar with its publications so they were not taken in by a few paragraphs taken out of context by an irresponsible or dishonest critic. They were present at its conferences and observed for themselves the high degree of nonpartisanship that characterized those meetings. In short, they did not require an independent outside investigation to prove that the Institute was not a front for Communism. They knew it was not.

Senator Ferguson wanted to know whether or not it would be reasonable when charges were made against an organization as large as the Institute that it was acting as a front for Communism that someone would not have ordered another

[16] Ibid., page 45.
[17] Ibid., page 74.

detailed investigation after the papers were seized, and whether or not they did, and whether or not they made a report.[18]

I replied that the charges made in recent months were in large part the same baseless and irresponsible charges that had been made by Mr. Kohlberg in 1944, that these had been investigated by the IPR and were not substantiated. The recent charges were so similar, in some cases so identical, that the Institute trustees felt that there was no use in going through them again. Senator Ferguson asked whether any officer, or group of officers, of the IPR had made an independent check to ascertain whether there were any reasonable grounds for the charges that the IPR was serving as a Communist front.

I replied that from the time of the Senate Subcommittee's illegal seizure of the IPR files in early 1951, the officers and Executive Committee of the American IPR have followed the proceedings in Washington. It has kept its members throughout the United States informed regarding the procedures of the Senate Subcommittee. Further, it employed the firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl to watch its interests. Inasmuch as the charges have so faithfully followed the lines established and developed by Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, the officers and the Executive Committee have felt that the investigation which the IPR made of those charges in the 1945–1947 period was still valid. Mr. Holland, the Institute's present chief executive, has, I believe, already submitted a copy of a circular letter which was sent to all the members on March 17, 1947. This I regard as valid today as it was then. It was signed by: Joseph P. Chamberlain, Professor of Public Law, Columbia University;[19] Arthur H. Dean, attorney, Sullivan & Cromwell, New York; Walter F. Dillingham, Oahu Railway & Land Company, Honolulu; Brooks Emeny, formerly President of Cleveland Council of World Affairs, now President of Foreign Policy Association, New York; Huntington Gilchrist, American Cyanimid Company (now in Europe with MSA); W. R. Herod, President, International General Electric; Philip C. Jessup, then Professor of International Law, Columbia University.

For purposes of emphasis, I enclose a copy of the letter of March 17, 1947. I request that it be reproduced in the published record of the Subcommittee in photostat form as "Appendix B" to this statement.

Reference has already been made to my service to the Chinese Mass Education Movement and to Nankai University. As mentioned elsewhere, during the war I was Chairman of the Program and Disbursements Committee of United China Relief at the request of Henry R. Luce, W. R. Herod and B. A. Garside. (At the same time, I was President of Russian War Relief.)

My services in United China Relief were impaired by an attack on me and on UCR's Field Director in China, Mr. Dwight Edwards, by an importer of Chinese textiles, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg. Mr. Kohlberg had been splendidly active in one of UCR's constituent societies, the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China. Although UCR contributed more to ABMAC than to any of the other societies, Mr. Kohlberg came to the conclusion that we should give more to his society, and thus less to the others. He launched an attack on Mr. Edwards and myself in a long document which he submitted to the officers of the UCR. Charles A. Edison, ex-Governor of New Jersey, was then President of UCR. He appointed a special committee to listen to Mr. Kohlberg's charges. The committee consisted of Paul G. Hoffman, Henry R. Luce and James G. Blaine, President of the Marine-Midland Trust Company. These three men listened for some hours to Mr. Kohlberg. Subsequently, they submitted to the UCR Board a report dismissing Mr. Kohlberg's charges. In addition, they recommended that Mr. Edwards' salary be increased and that he be promoted to a vice presidency of UCR.

They exonerated me and, sometime later, a group of eminent Chinese in China sent me an elaborate and handsomely illuminated Chinese scroll testifying to what they regarded as my distinguished service to the Chinese people.

The signers of this scroll included Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Director General of CNRRA (Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation Administration); Dr. Chiang Mon-lin, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan; Dr. Han Lih-wu, Vice Minister of Education; Bishop Paul Yu Pin, Catholic Bishop of Nanking; Dr. Robert K. S. Lim, Surgeon General of the Chinese Army; Dr. Y. T. Tsur, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. King Chu, Vice Minister of Education; Dr. P. Z. King, Director of the National Health Administration; Dr. C. K. Chu, Director of the National Health Institute; Mrs. William C. Wang, Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee of the New Life Movement; Mrs. Nora T. H. Chu,

[18] Ibid., page 46.
[19] Since deceased.

Director of the National Association for Refugee Children; Dr. Chang Fu-liang, General Secretary of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives; Dr. Y. S. Djang, Treasurer of the International Relief Committee; Dr. H. C. Chang, Chief of the Welfare Division of the Ministry of Social Affairs; and Dr. A. Pan-tung Sah, of the Academica Sinica.

A translation of part of the text in typically flowery Chinese was sent to me by Dr. James L. McConaughy, at that time President of the UCR. Subsequently, Dr. McConaughy became Governor of Connecticut. The translation was also conveyed by Dr. McConaughy to Mr. Alfred Kohlberg in a letter dated August 13, 1946. A copy of this letter is attached as "Appendix C" to this statement.

Mr. Kohlberg, having been refuted, resigned from ABMAC and all connection with United China Relief. Some months later, however, he came up with a violent attack on the Institute of Pacific Relations and on me personally. The IPR made a thorough investigation of Mr. Kohlberg's charges and then, after an effort to take his case to the courts, he was allowed to send his massive attack to all of the members of the Institute throughout the United States, appealing for proxies which would enable him to have the IPR investigated and presumably re-organized to his liking.

Mr. Kohlberg's immense propaganda against the IPR did not pay off. He lost his proxy battle decisively—66 members voted in his favor; 1,163 members voted against him, thus affirming their confidence in the Institute and its administration.

7. PEOPLE WHO WERE AND WERE NOT ACTIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE IPR

Counsel Morris announced that he was going to read a list of names that had turned up with *great frequency* in the files.[20] The list purported to be a condensation of names of many people who were active in the Institute. I was admonished to give a quick yes or no answer.

Mr. Morris' definition of "connection" was confusing because he described it in three different ways. First, he said "people who were interested in the Institute"; second, he said "names that were connected with the Institute in any way"; third and finally, he established his criteria as follows: "The standard is this, Mr. Carter: They are either members of the staff, they were contributors to IPR publications, they were members of the executive board of trustees, or they performed substantial services in addition to their membership in the IPR."

Further, Mr. Morris' method of query precluded advance notice so I could have investigated to see what, if any, connection these individuals had had with the IPR during the past 27 years. This, it seems to me, should have been done if the Subcommittee had really desired to fulfill its announced purpose of getting the facts. Mr. Morris' list was, of course, what some people might call a "loaded" list. It was unfair because of the implication that the Subcommittee's staff had assembled these names *as though they were principal personalities in the Institute's program and policies.*

I should like to remind the Subcommittee that my entire life has not been devoted to the Institute of Pacific Relations. That has been for a span of nearly a quarter of a century. I've had a great many other contacts before and during my IPR relationship: Y. M. C. A., Columbia University, RWR, UCR, ARI, China Institute, Japan Society, the United Nations, and many others. After having had connections with so many people, I do not see how, when a very long list of names was suddenly presented to me, I could possibly have been expected to give completely adequate answers, as well as accurate ones.

I now wish fully and frankly to declare that several of my answers were inaccurate or inadequate. Here I will set down the correction and amplification of my answers in the light of Mr. Morris' final criteria. For ease of reference, I will put the names of those I refer to in capital letters. My replies to Mr. Morris at the hearing will be in italics. These will be followed by my current comments.[21]

SOLOMON ADLER. *I can't answer.*

My answer is that Adler met *none* of Morris' criteria.

JAMES S. ALLEN. *I think he wrote one article.*

As a matter of fact, he wrote two articles for *Pacific Affairs.*

BETTY BARNES. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my reply is *no.*

[20] Ibid., pages 69 through 73.

[21] These comments are based in part on data furnished to me by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

ESTHER BRUNAUER. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no.*

EVANS CARLSON. *Leeturer. Yes.*

My reply is that he wrote a book in the Inquiry Series on the Chinese Nationalist Army, and a few articles. He was a Brigadier General in the Marines and commanded "Carlson's Raiders."

O. EDMUND CLUBB. *Yes.*

He wrote a single article for the *Far Eastern Survey* which was published in 1950.

FRANK V. COE. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no.*

JOHN DAVIES. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no.*

HUGH DEANE. *I don't remember.*

It seems he wrote on article for the *Far Eastern Survey.*

EMILE DESPRES. *I don't remember.*

The answer is *no.*

LAWRENCE DUGGAN. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no.*

THEODORE DRAPER. *Dromedary Dates, was he, or Federal Reserve? Yes, I had lunch with him one day.*

Mr. Morris then asked, "Was he connected with the IPR, Mr. Carter?" I replied: *I don't think so.*

My answer is *no.* The Draper with the Federal Reserve System was another person (Ernest G. Draper).

JULIAN FRIEDMAN. *We had a Friedman whose name was Irving. I don't place Julian.*

Julian Friedman wrote a supplement to a monograph by Epstein entitled "Notes on Labor in Nationalist China."

MARK J. GAYN. *Yes, slight.*

The answer is *no.*

HALDORE HANSON. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no.*

PHILIP J. JAFFE. *Yes.*

My answer is *no.* He met none of Mr. Morris' criteria. He was a contributing member as were hundreds of others.

SERGEI KOURNAKOFF. *Don't remember.*

My answer is *no.* To this day I have failed to identify him.

CORLISS LAMONT. *Contributor. Yes.*

Actually, Mr. Lamont met *none* of Mr. Morris' criteria. Mr. Morris avoided mentioning Mr. Thomas W. Lamont who contributed many times as much money as his son, and a great deal more of his time.

DUNCAN C. LEE. *Yes, sir.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no.*

MICHAEL LEE. *Attended a conference, yes.*

My answer is *no.*

HOZUMI OZAKI. *Ex-mayor of Tokyo. Maybe, I don't know.*

Mr. Morris then asked "Was he not a delegate to your Yosemite Conference in 1936?" To which I replied: *Yes.*

There were two Ozakis. One had been the greatly venerated mayor of Tokyo. The one who attended the Yosemite Conference way back in 1936 was, at that time, attached to one of Japan's greatest newspapers, *The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun.* He contributed a data paper for Yosemite on recent development in Sino-Japanese relations.

FRED POLAND. *Yes.*

This is incorrect—my answer is *no.*

MILDRED PRICE. *I don't know.*

The answer is that she met none of Morris' criteria.

LUDWIG RAJCHMAN. *I don't remember. I remember him. I don't remember his IPR connections.* * * *

The answer is *no.* Dr. Rajchman, a Polish citizen, was long a member of the International Health staff of the League of Nations. For many years, he was a close associate and assistant to the Honorable T. V. Soong, both in China and in Washington. Because of his knowledge of China he was proposed, I think,

by some influential Kuomintang person for membership in the international IPR conference at Mt. Tremblant in Canada in 1942. As a Pole, he could not be admitted as a regular conference member because no Polish organization was affiliated with the IPR. I remember that he was invited to attend as an observer, but for some reason he did not accept.

HELEN SCHNEIDER. *Don't remember.*

Mr. Morris asked "Was she not a staff worker?" To which I replied: *I don't remember.*

Subsequent inquiry reveals that she was employed as Business Manager of *Pacific Affairs* for about two years in the late 1940's.

JOHN S. SERVICE. *Yes.*

The answer is *no.* Mr. Service met none of Morris' criteria.

AGNES SMEDLEY. *Yes; she was a member for two years.*

The answer is *no.* Dues-paying members did not meet the criteria set up by Morris.

MARY VAN KLEEK. *I don't know. I know her, but I don't remember her in an IPR connection.*

Mr. Morris asked "Did she not write for your publication?" I replied: *I don't remember.*

My answer is that Miss Van Kleek contributed one article to *Pacific Affairs in* June 1938.

HARRY DEXTER WHITE. *Very limited; yes.*

The answer is *no.* Mr. White was not even a member of the IPR. He did not meet any of the Morris criteria.

ELLA WINTER. *I don't remember.*

Miss Winter contributed one article to *Pacific Affairs* in 1935.

Following the foregoing colloquy I endeavored to point out that the Morris list was not at all representative. It could not be regarded as a balanced sample of people who influenced IPR publications and policies. I reminded the Chairman that, at the outset, he wanted me to give the whole picture. If I had done this, I would have been able to mention the names of a far longer list than that of Morris'. These would have been people who rendered a much greater service than the majority of those that Morris mentioned.

8. THE ROLE OF THE IPR IN MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND OFFICIALS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES TO MEET PEOPLE OF OPPOSING FAR EASTERN BACKGROUNDS AND UNPALATABLE VIEWPOINTS

Mr. Morris introduced an article by Rogov printed in the Soviet trade union periodical, "The War and the Working Class." [22]

I asked that I be supplied with an extra copy of that article. Morris replied than an extra copy would be made for me.[23] (This he failed to do, but many weeks later it appeared in the published edition of the Hearings.)

Morris asked whether I took Rogov to introduce him to important Government officials in Washington. I said yes, but this should be qualified. I did not take him personally. From New York I wrote letters suggesting that several Washington people might wish to meet him. This was a routine procedure at the IPR. I regarded it as part of my job to acquaint Americans and others—both officials and laymen—with visiting Europeans and Asians who were well informed on the Far East.

Mr. Morris made a great deal of the fact that I wrote to Mr. Alger Hiss to inquire whether his chief, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, would wish to see Rogov. I replied stating that Hiss was Hornbeck's secretary or assistant and a natural channel. I should add that I was following correct State Department protocol. In the matter of high officials seeing a citizen of a foreign country whom they might not wish to see, the proper procedure was to approach them through a subordinate, so that the higher official might not have to be placed in the position of himself refusing to see a foreigner.

It so happens that Rogov, in my view, had special credentials. These came from Kuomintang Chinese, American and British friends of mine who knew full well that he was a hundred percent Russian Communist. For example, Dr. Hollington Tong, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's principal public relations adviser, told me that there was hardly one foreign correspondent in China who knew China as widely as Rogov. He mentioned Rogov's mastery of the

[22] Ibid., page 128.
[23] Ibid., pages 130–131.

Chinese language and added that he had travelled more widely in China than almost any correspondent.

This was also the view of Christopher Chancellor, of Reuters; Liu Yu-wan, then secretary of the China IPR; and several of the American correspondents.

I conceived it as one of my duties to use every opportunity to promote occasions when people of different backgrounds and diverse points of view could meet informally to discuss problems of public importance.

In 1940, for example, the then British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, whom I had known intimately for years, invited me to lunch at the British Embassy in Washington to meet the late Sir Stafford Cripps, who had just returned from a visit to Asia. Lord Lothian believed that I would want to hear of Cripps' impressions. His remarks at lunch were so illuminating that I arranged for him to meet a dozen or more people later at a private dinner in New York.

Earlier, in the mid-1930's, when Prince Konoye was visiting this country, I gave a lunch in his honor in private rooms at the Century Club, so that a number of Americans might meet him.

Later, in 1939, when I was visiting in Japan and China, I received word from Dr. S. K. Datta, principal of the Forman College in Lahore, urging that I visit India to discuss with him and with Pandit Nehru the organization of an IPR affiliate in India. I cabled that on my flight from China to Europe I would be glad to stop over for a few days, in order to meet Nehru and himself. The three of us spent twelve hours in intimate conversation about the problems of India, and about the ways and means for forming the India section of the IPR. Naturally, Nehru and Datta asked me my impressions of Japan and China. Toward the end of the day, I told Nehru that I thought it was of the utmost importance that he should visit China himself. He retorted that he had never had an invitation. I replied that I was sure that the China IPR would invite him, if it thought that there was any chance of his accepting.

So I cabled to Mr. Liu Yu-wan, the secretary of the China IPR, suggesting that he cable an inviation to Nehru to visit China. I then took the plane for Amsterdam. On arriving there, I received a cable from Nehru, saying that the China IPR, a number of other Chinese organizations, and the Generalissimo had all cabled him, inviting him to visit Chungking, and what should he do. I simply replied "accept."

This he did. He flew to Chungking as the guest of the Generalissimo and received an overwhelming reception. He had an exceptional opportunity for a long, intimate talk with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang for, in the middle of a big state dinner in Nehru's honor, there was a Japanese air raid on Chungking. The Chiangs took Nehru alone to one of those deep shelters in the cliffs of wartime Chungking, where, for several hours, under rather dramatic circumstances, the three of them were able quietly to discuss the common problems of the two most populated countries in the world—China and India.

Upon my return to the United States, I called on the then Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, and reported on what I thought were the significant features of the experiences on my journey. He was so impressed that he asked if he could turn me over to interested officers in the office of Naval Intelligence and G–2 in the War Department. As a result, I was invited to spend a long morning at one of the War Department's offices. Both the Army and Navy officers were interested in my impressions, especially with reference to Japan, China, Korea, and the Soviet Far East. I had been in Peiping and Tientsin when the Japanese took over at the time of Marco Polo Bridge in 1937. I had passed through the Japanese lines to Manchuria where, in the capital (Changchung), I was received by Lieutenant General Hoshino and members of his staff. Hoshino was the commanding General of the Japanese Army in Manchuria and had authority over all Japanese, whether civilian or military.

Those who were present at the conference at the War Department mentioned above were:

Captain W. L. Lind, U. S. N	Office of Naval Intelligence.
Commander S. M. Creighton, U. S. N	Do.
Captain W. L. Bales, U. S. M. C	Do.
Colonel Geo. V. Strong, U. S. A	War Department, G–2.
Lieut Col. P. E. Van Nostrand, U. S. A	Do.
Lieut. Col. R. S. Bratton, U. S. A	Do.
Major William Mayer, U. S. A	Do.

In the summer of 1942, Mr. Henry R. Luce (publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune) told me that he was eager to have Mr. Wendell Willkie familiarize himself with the Far Eastern situation by visiting China. Because of Mr. Willkie's relationship to President Roosevelt, Mr. Luce told me that he assumed that if Mr. Willkie could be persuaded to go to China, he would want to avoid a presidential veto. As Mr. Lauchlin Currie was the one of the President's six executive assistants who was dealing with Chinese affairs on behalf of Mr. Roosevelt, it was suggested that I might arrange for Mr. Willkie to meet with Mr. Luce, Mr. Currie and myself informally to talk the matter over.

I then gave a small private dinner in New York at which my guests were Mr. Willkie, Mr. Luce, and Mr. Currie. During most of the dinner, the conversation stemmed from Mr. Willkie's request that the three of us should tell him as much as we could about China. He did his best to get us to explain the Chinese situation and to get Mr. Luce and me to indicate why we thought a visit to China by him would be in the public interest.

Toward the end of the evening the delicate question of Mr. Willkie's relationship to the President in the matter of a possible visit to China was discussed. If I remember rightly, Mr. Currie had not discussed the matter with Mr. Roosevelt prior to the dinner. He indicated, however, that in his personal opinion such a visit by Mr. Willkie would be useful. Mr. Currie clearly thought that the more intelligent Americans made a first-hand study of China, the better. The dinner ended without any firm commitment on either side. It was, however, a valuable and highly interesting affair.

I have forgotten precisely what happened subsequently but, as is well known, Mr. Willkie with Mr. Roosevelt's blessing on his around-the-world journey did visit China and, on his return, gave the American public the benefit of his impressions of China and of the Chinese leaders. I was personally glad that Mr. Willkie had visited China because of what he brought back to the public, and also because I was at that time Chairman of the Disbursements and Program Committee of United China Relief. Mr. Willkie's service to that organization in securing greater interest in China's needs was of great value to UCR.

In the winter of 1934–35, when Mrs. Carter and I were in England prior to proceeding to India, China, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, we were invited by an old friend, Mr. Philip Kerr, for a week end at Blickling Hall in Norfolk. Mr. Kerr was then head of the Cecil Rhodes Trust in Oxford. Later he became Lord Lothian and British Ambassador in Washington.

Among the other guests were Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Admiral Standley, the Honorable Norman H. Davis and Sir Archibald Sinclair, M. P., who later became Secretary for Air in Mr. Churchill's War Cabinet.

Because of my knowledge of Asia and Mr. Davis' concern with the continuing repercussions of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, our host led the discussions again and again to the Far East, both during the meals and before and after. Mr. Chamberlain seemed to be so impressed with my general knowledge of the Far East that he subsequently invited me to lunch in London. Toward the end of our talk, the conversation swung around to India with which I had had considerable contact since 1902 when I first went to live and travel in that subcontinent. After inquiring as to the purposes of my Indian visit (which were to inquire as to the possibilities of establishing an Indian affiliate of the IPR and to see Mr. Gandhi, in whom my friends in the Far East were immensely interested), Mr. Chamberlain expressed his desire to have me talk with Lord Willingdon, then Viceroy of India.

This he arranged presumably by cable for, on our arrival in Bombay, a messenger from the Viceroy met our steamer with an invitation from Lord Willingdon to proceed immediately to New Delhi as his guests. There we stayed for a few days at Viceroy's House, where we had long talks with him and Lady Willingdon. We met members of his government and staff and attended the festivities in honor of the visiting Maharajah of Nepal. Lord Willingdon expressed the hope that after his term as Viceroy was over, he himself could visit the Far East. He questioned me extensively about conditions in that area and wished me well on my impending visit to Gandhi in Central India. He added that I was fortunate to have this opportunity and added that he had made a mistake in affirming that while he was Viceroy he would never meet Gandhi.

His official interest in the possibility of the eventual establishment of an Indian affiliate of the IPR luckily did not obstruct but aided indirectly in the eventual establishment of the Indian Council of World Affairs. This today is one of the strongest members of the Institute.

This catalogue could continue to excessive length. It is included here only to point out that I made it my business as Secretary-General to inform both private citizens and government representatives of the developing work of the IPR and the IPR's desire to secure authentic information from as many sources as possible.

9. HOW DID I HAPPEN TO SUGGEST THAT A PRO-COMMUNIST BOOK BE SENT CERTAIN AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND SENATORS?

I was asked several questions regarding a book published by Little Brown & Co., entitled *The Unfinished Revolution in China* by Israel Epstein.[24] In response to an inquiry by the publisher's publicity director, Miss Anne Ford, for suggestions as to whom she might send the book, I wrote Miss Ford making a number of suggestions. It was a frequent procedure for publishers to consult the IPR on such occasions. But I want to point that *this was not an IPR book.* It was published quite independently of the IPR by Little Brown & Co., a reputable publishing firm.

In reply to Miss Ford's inquiry for a list of names to whom she might mail copies, I indicated that I had read two-thirds of it and I thought it important for Little Brown to send copies of the Secretary of State, to Senators Vandenberg, Morse and Ives, and also to John Foster Dulles, John Carter Vincent, United States Ambassador Leighton Stuart and others in China. Knowing the competence of all of the foregoing, I did not think that the reading of a single book would sway them. This appeared to me to be the first major postwar book that had appeared on the Chinese Communist program in North China. The first part of the book contained a great amount of material that had not been available to the public.

In suggesting that it be sent to American officials and Senators, however, I did not expect any one of them to accept the book as anything more than the outlook of one person. To think that such wise Americans as those I mentioned would be swayed by the book strikes me as ridiculous and childish. Those who are familiar with the ability and integrity of the late Senator Vandenberg, for example, could hardly picture him as being thrown off balance by one book from a little known author.

Whether Miss Ford did actually send copies to any or all on the list, or whether any of them read the book, I have never learned. Today I am convinced that if a large number of thoughtful Americans and Chinese had more seriously studied the sort of problems which Epstein outlined, we would have been better prepared to meet the challenge of Chinese communism in subsequent years.

10. THE INSTITUTE EXPLORED MANY CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

In its research studies and at its conferences, the Institute unhesitatingly focussed attention on the "hot spots" of Far Eastern conditions. Listed below are a few examples of published studies of issues that were highly controversial at the time they were undertaken:

Extra-territoriality in China, by James T. Shotwell (1929)
Tariff Autonomy of China, by Mingchien Bau (1929)
The Manchurian Dilemma-Force or Pacific Settlement? by Shuhsi Hsu (1931)
Land and Labor in China, by R. H. Tawney (1932)
Trade and Trade Rivalry Between the United States and Japan, by W. W. Lockwood (1936)
The Struggle for North China, by George E. Taylor (1940)
Social and Industrial Problems of Shanghai, by Eleanor Hinder (1940)
Japan and the Opium Menace, by Frederick T. Merill (1942)
British Economic Interests in the Far East, by E. M. Gull (1943)
Industrial Development of the Netherlands-Indies, by Peter Sitsen (1944)
American Policy and the Chinese Revolution (1925-1928), by Dorothy Borg (1947)
The Chinese in Malaya, by Victor Purcell (1948)
Manchuria Since 1931, by F. C. Jones (1949)
Korea Today, by George McCune (1950)

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[24] Ibid., pages 452–466.

11. FACTS ABOUT IPR METHODS AND PURPOSES OF WHICH THE M'CARRAN SUBCOMMITTEE HAS SHOWN LITTLE UNDERSTANDING

From the line of the questions put by members and counsel of the McCarran Subcommittee, it would appear that they are so obsessed by the fairy tale which had been fabricated of the IPR as a Communist front and espionage agency that they could not examine the true purpose and achievements of the Institute throughout its history.

They seem to have refused to acknowledge the plain fact that here is an organization that has adopted the most nonpartisan, democratic of methods in an effort to add to the fund of human knowledge on the Pacific. Closing their eyes to the preponderance of reliable evidence in the IPR record, the Subcommittee has become a prisoner of its own unethical procedure of taking isolated letters, documents and sentences from published volumes completely out of context, both as to date and substance. Ignoring the full pattern of the organization's work, they have built their case on the flimsy basis of minor and unrelated threads.

Particularly startling is the fact that these Senators of the United States show so little understanding of the abysmal ignorance of the Far East on the part of the American people, and fail so utterly to appreciate the need for the very type of program the Institute has carried on this past quarter century. (I have found as yet no evidence that more than one of the Subcommittee has ever set foot in Asia.)

Yet the founders of the IPR faced the problem of public inertia from the first. In 1925, they saw clearly that if anything was to be done to increase American knowledge of the Pacific, many sectors of American life had to be aroused to a sense of the need of more information on the subject. This meant that fresh factual material had to be prepared. New research personnel must be recruited and trained, and linguistic skills had to be developed. Funds for the new venture had to be raised. Media for testing and diffusing the new knowledge had to be devised, and a long-range plan developed for mobilizing scholars, teachers, librarians, businessmen, publicists and others to our work.

The founders realized, too, that the underlying approach of the new organization would be all-important. Committed to the task of studying the problems of many peoples whose outlook was different and whose viewpoint might frequently conflict, they saw that it would necessarily have to adopt a coldly scientific attitude in all its activities, and would have to be completely nonpartisan. It would have to assemble data from all countries concerned with each issue studied. It would have to show the same hospitality to the "unpalatable" as to the "palatable" point of view on controversial issues.

Thus the standard was set up for the organization—a strict standard of accuracy, objectivity and nonpartisanship. For twenty-seven years this philosophy has shaped the work of the IPR. It has been respected throughout the world. The McCarran Subcommittee seems to have missed its significance.

They have failed utterly to understand that here is an organization which has refused to be limited to safe issues and the viewpoints of a chosen few.

This is an organization whose standards of scientific inquiry have been so strict and so generally respected, that for the past quarter century it has been able to focus the spotlight of study and discussion on the "hot spots" of Asia and East-West relations—on the most controversial issues of our time. It is obvious to anyone of unbiased mind that this has been an outstanding achievement. It has made a unique contribution to the record of human knowledge. Only men of small minds would wish to see it changed either in approach or content. Bankers, industrialists, scholars and journalists in several countries, including the United States, do however desire one change. They urge that its program be enlarged.

One eminent American who holds this view is Mr. Gerard Swope, the honorary president of the General Electric Company, and the active chairman of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to close this page by quoting a paragraph from a statement which Mr. Swope made at a press conference in New York on October 9, 1951, as follows:

> "If the day ever comes when it will not be possible for a private nonpartisan society like the American Institute of Pacific Relations to seek and publish facts without fear of political reprisal, and to present to the public differing opinions on controversial issues, something essential to the American way of life will have been lost."

12. FURTHER AMPLIFICATION, CORRECTION AND CLARIFICATION

(*a*) *The Subcommittee's procedures contrasted with those proposed by Senators Kefauver and O'Conor*

The officers of the Institute of Pacific Relations are only a few of many Americans who believe that the time has come to establish a sound set of procedures for Senate investigatory committees. For example, Senator Estes Kefauver has shown his concern by introducing S. Con. Res. 44. This has not yet been referred out of the Committee on Rules and Administration. I understand that Senator Kefauver does not expect that there will be a revision of Senate committee procedures until this resolution is adopted by the Senate. It should be noted that he is a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, although he is not a member of that body's subcommittee on the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I would like respectfully to call attention also to the admirable suggestions for Senate committees' procedures which were put forward last year by Senator O'Conor, an eminent member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and also a member of the Subcommittee on the IPR. A few weeks after Senator McCarran's Subcommittee began its public sessions, Senator O'Conor made a widely publicized statement in the course of an address before Chief Justices of the State Supreme Courts, New York, September 13, 1951. In this statement, like Senator Kefauver's, he summarized the principles that should guide the procedures of Senate investigating committees. Nevertheless, in not one of the several sessions of the McCarran Committee which I had the privilege of attending in 1951, did I note evidence that the Subcommittee was following the admirable courses which two members of the Judiciary Committee had already advanced and advocated.

Under these circumstances it was inevitable that many of our citizens, including officers of the IPR and its attorneys, were inclined to believe that the Senate Committee was not keeping up-to-date with reference to the march of American thought. The Subcommittee's sessions which I attended took on the atmosphere of an inquisition rather than that of a scientific inquiry.

Perhaps this was not so much the fault of the Senators as that of the Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Robert Morris. Illustrations of procedures and tactics which I personally challenge are as follows:

(1) The Subcommittee's counsel, Mr. Morris, made an effort to put words into my mouth by summarizing remarks which I had just made, but in a quite different sense.

(2) From September 1951 to March 1952, Mr. Morris failed to keep his promises to provide me with copies of material from the IPR files which I requested in order that I might answer questions intelligently.

(3) I was asked to comment on Mr. Owen Lattimore's long letter to me of July 1938, before I had time to read it. In another case I was to read a part of a letter but ordered not to look at the rest of the contents.

(4) Mr. Morris avoided answering my questions as to the dates when Mr. Field wrote for leftist publications, i. e., *The New Masses* and *The Daily Worker*. It now appears from the Subcommittee's printed record, which was not published for several weeks after the session in which I interrogated Mr. Morris, that Field did not write for either of these two publications until a considerable time after he had ceased to be an executive officer of the Institute.

(5) I am free to admit that even if a truly American procedure had been folfowed, I would still have been handicapped. The Institute's Secretary General and also the Institute's attorneys, Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl, requested that the Senate Subcommittee return to the IPR files which an agent of the Subcommittee had seized illegally from my barn at Lee, Massachusetts. The Subcommittee failed to reply to these requests, nor did they offer even limited access to those IPR files which were stored in the Senate Office Building until some thirteen months after the robbery took place. Without access to these records during the hearings, I could not answer many of Mr. Morris' questions with satisfaction either to the Committee or to myself.

(*b*) *Senator Ferguson's irritation at my implication that the IPR files had been tampered with*

(Pp. 44–45) Here Senator Ferguson was apparently annoyed at a remark of mine that had implied that I suspected that the old files stored by the IPR in my barn at Lee, Massachusetts, might have been tampered with. That my suspicion was justified, but in a quite different context, was clear from the following.

At the time of the Subcommittee's illegal seizure of the files, it became apparent that the files had been tampered with prior to the Subcommittee's raid. It

is now a matter of public record that an agent of Senator McCarthy was party to robbing the barn on two occasions prior to the Subcommittee's seizure. Senator Mundt has been bold enough to make this sorry spectacle available to the public. The occasion of this was the appearance in The New York Post, on September 18, 1951, of one of a series of articles by Oliver Pilat and William V. Shannon. The pertinent excerpt is as follows:

"Early in 1951, McCarthy was again poaching on Hoover's (J. Edgar) preserves. Surine, his investigator, broke into a barn in Lee, Mass., and carried off some of the documents that had been stored there by the Institute of Pacific Relations. The IPR had already offered to let any authorized government agency go through the papers. In the summer of 1950, several FBI agents spent weeks poring over the material. Surine was unauthorized but eager to score a beat for McCarthy.

" 'Surine got the papers through one of the methods used by investigators generally, without the knowledge of the IPR,' boasted Sen. Mundt (R—S. D.), a friend of McCarthy's who found the adventure a diversion from the weightier problems of his office. 'I don't think I'd better say just how he got them. It might get somebody into a lot of trouble,' Mundt told this newspaper.

" 'Surine brought some of the documents to McCarthy. McCarthy brought the samples to me. I went through part of them and Joe went through the others. Surine said the FBI was watching the barn and he was afraid the IPR might find that out and move the papers. We decided something had to be done quickly.

" 'We finally decided that Joe should talk it over with Senator McCarran (D—Nev.), chairman of the new judicial subcommittee investigating Communism. He did and the subcommittee decided to issue a subpena for the documents. I suggested that instead of serving the subpena on officials of the IPR it be served on the caretaker of the farm so there would be no possibility of the records being destroyed. That's the way it was done.'

"That isn't quite the whole story. Surine took thousands of letters from the farm in the course of two different trips. He brought them to the office of Matthews (J. B.) in Hearst headquarters at 8th Avenue and 57th Street, where some of the more interesting ones were photostated. The samples examined by Mundt came from his cache. The real purpose of the McCarran seizure was to cover up the earlier escapade.

"The Mundt statement carried an implication that the FBI was not quite bright enough to protect the papers. The FBI may have noticed that, too.

"The FBI does not discuss grievances against a Senator or a former FBI man for the public record. It issued no statement on the Surine-McCarthy-Matthews-Mundt melodrama. It did, however, summon Surine and Matthews privately for extended questioning about the documents and the way they were acquired."

(c) Correction of my testimony regarding Alger Hiss

(Pp. 135–136) Here either I, myself, or the stenotypist, was responsible for totally misleading statements. Senator McCarran asked whether Mr. Hiss was not an assistant to Dr. Hornbeck, although I had designated him as a secretary. The printed hearings record me as having stated twice that Mr. Hiss was not much more than a stenographer. I was then asked whether it was not true that Mr. Hiss had an office of his own, separate and apart from Dr. Hornbeck. My reply was:

"You went in and there were two or three lady secretaries, and receptionists, and so on, and to the right was one of those old State Department lattice doors, and you went in to Hornbeck; and at the left you went in to Hiss, and it was a much smaller office, and as I remember it there was not a lattice door; and that was the geography of it."

I am sure I meant to say that Mr. Hiss clearly was much more than a stenographer. Of course, I knew at the time of my visits to Dr. Hornbeck's office that Mr. Hiss was Dr. Hornbeck's principal and highly valued assistant.

(d) The Committee on Militarism in Education

In the early summer of 1940, Mr. Field asked me for my opinion regarding invitations which both he and I had received from what was called the Committee on Militarism in Education to sign the Declaration Against Conscription. I did not accept the invitation. I learned later that Mr. Field did not do so either. I now wish to quote for insertion in the Subcommittee's printed record the following copy of my letter of July 2, 1940, to Field on this matter:

"DEAR FRED: I did not respond to the invitation of the Committee on Militarism in Education to sign the Declaration Against Conscription because I couldn't agree to sign it and I didn't have the time to write an adequate letter explaining why I couldn't sign it.

"Some of my reasons for dissent are as follows:

"1. The main body of the declaration seeks to prove that we are not in danger. I believe that American interests including American ways of life are greatly endangered by both Germany and Japan.

"2. This declaration appears to make the point that because a thing has never been necessary in the past it will never be necessary in the future.

"3. I think mass conscription of whatever forces are necessary whether it is five per cent or fifty per cent of our citizens is much healthier and democratic than the building up of an aristocratic professional army.

"If, for example, Versailles had permitted Germany a democratic army the post-war history of Germany might have been different. By limiting Germany to 100 thousand, Versailles created an aristocratic army which was predominantly Prussian. In other words, it perpetuated the Prussian military caste, the destruction of which was one of the announced aims of the Allies in going to war with Germany. This Prussian military caste was even more influential in bringing Hitler to power than German big business.

"With you, I would like to see a public authoritative study of our defense needs. I think such a study would prove the one sound point which I find in this declaration, namely, the last sentence—'that comparatively small forces of highly trained soldier-mechanics, properly equipped, can defeat many times their number of partially trained civilian conscripts regardless of how courageous the latter may be.' I want to see the government have the power to conscript highly trained soldier-mechanics to whatever extent necessary, but on a mass and democratic basis, not on the basis of aristocracy or poverty.

"Most of the declaration makes me sick at its emotional ardor for the American tradition and its total blindness to the dangers that confront us. I know that Hitler didn't pay for the drafting of this declaration, but he would get his money's worth out of its publication if he had contributed a large sum to its drafting. Until we as a people are willing to back up our beliefs with force, I see nothing but the total eclipse of civilization ahead.

"Sincerely yours,

"EDWARD C. CARTER."

(e) *"Death does not rob a man of his place in history."*

In opening the session of August 2, 1951, Senator McCarran spoke in part as follows:

(P. 223) "Let me say before commencing the hearing of today I would like to mention that the names of people now dead will figure in today's testimony. I would like to say that the introduction of such names into the record is done with reluctance because we are aware that it is not for us to pass judgment on those who have passed beyond. But a congressional committee, charged with a heavy duty, must present every possible fact to shed light on present-day conspiracy. Thus an association of 5 or 10 years back involving a man or woman now dead can well illuminate a relationship of today or aid in characterizing a living conspirator. Death does not rob a man of his place in history. It is in this spirit then that reference will be made to the dead today."

Here Senator McCarran was preparing the way for the next witness, Mrs. Hede Massing, to pass judgment on Mr. Laurence Duggan when he was no longer alive to answer Mrs. Massing's charges. Senator McCarran's outlook could hardly have had a better illustration, for with the voice of one who was so deeply pained at the thought of mentioning the name of a deceased person, he said: "It is not for us to pass judgment on those who have passed beyond."

Mrs. Massing was given the opportunity of explaining her role as a Communist agent and then told of her success in recruiting Laurence Duggan into the Communist apparatus.

Against Mrs. Massing's boast regarding Duggan must be set the flatly contrary statements of Whittaker Chambers, Isaac Don Levine, Attorney General Tom Clark and Richard M. Nixon. These are to be found in the memorial volume published by the Overbrook Press of Stamford, Conn., entitled "Laurence Duggan, 1905–1948." For Whittaker Chambers, see page 11; for Attorney General Clark,

see page 60; for Isaac Don Levine, see pages 61–63; and for Richard M. Nixon, see pages 51–52. The text of the Attorney General's statement is as follows:

"DECEMBER 24, 1948.

"The FBI investigation has produced no evidence of Mr. Duggan's connection with the Communist Party or with any other espionage activity. On the contrary, the evidence discloses that Mr. Duggan was a loyal employe of the United States Government.

"In answer to many inquiries concerning Laurence Duggan, the Attorney General stated that while it is the policy of the Department of Justice not to comment upon the evidence in the files or upon interviews made by its agents, he was deviating from this rule in order to prevent an injustice being done to the family of a former employe of the Government."

A few hours after Mr. Duggan's death, Karl Mundt, then Acting Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, called a meeting of the subcommittee of the General Committee which was attended by a minority of two members—Mundt himself and Richard M. Nixon. According to the press, these two members proceeded to inform a press gathering that the files of the Committee showed that Duggan has passed on to Whittaker Chambers confidential information. The following day, Chambers denied this. The public reaction to Mundt's action was shown immediately in condemnatory newspaper editorials. These appeared in such reliable organs of public opinion as the New York Herald Tribune, The New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and by broadcasters such as Edward R. Murrow, Elmer Davis, Martin Agronsky and Drew Pearson.

The testimony thus far presented to the McCarran Committee shows that Duggan's contact with the Institute of Pacific Relations was of a most insignificant character due to the fact that his field was Latin America, and not the Far East.

It is to be hoped that the McCarran Subcommittee will include in its printed record a copy of the memorial volume described above. This little book gives the record of Duggan's life and, as previously mentioned, contains the statements by Whittaker Chambers, Isaac Don Levine and Attorney General Clark. It also contains Senator Mundt's inexcusable attack and the text of the dissent from that attack by certain other members of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Here Mr. Morris introduced letters from the IPR files concerning Laurence Duggan. The first was from me to W. W. Lockwood, dated May 8, 1940.[25] Mr. Morris asserted that in this letter I was discussing plans of the Institute of Pacific Relations. *This was not true.* My letter to Lockwood was addressed to him, care of the American Committee for International Studies. This was not an IPR body; it was an entirely separate Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Edward M. Earle, of Princeton University. It was made up of prominent American scholars and men of affairs. It was aided by the Social Science Research Council. It included in its purview, not only the Pacific, but the whole world. My letter was written in response to a letter that I received from Mr. Lockwood in his capacity as secretary of that Committee. He had asked for suggestions in reference to the Committee's programs. I made some fifteen suggestions for that Committee's study. The only reference to Laurence Duggan was in Suggestion 12, as follows:

(P. 239) "(12) Ask Henry Allen Moe, Laurence Duggan and others who are the one or two Latin Americans of great intellectual ability who look at Latin America for a continental and international point of view, who might establish contact with the appropriate groups in the leading countries and then come to New York to give the groups here the benefit of his study of such thinking as there is in Latin America on war aims and postwar organization."

Mr. Moe was at that time, and still is, the head of the Guggenheim Foundation and a man who, like Laurence Duggan, was exceptionally well-informed on Latin America.

It should be pointed out that the purpose of the letter was to urge the American Committee for International Studies to adopt a broad and comprehensive plan for studying the problems of post-war organization in relationship to war aims.

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[25] The full text of my letter to W. W. Lockwood of May 8, 1940, is printed on pages 237–239 as Exhibit No. 41. Following this letter is a favorable comment on it by Dr. Percy E. Corbett (pages 239–240). Dr. Corbett has been Dean of the Faculty of Law, McGill University, a Guggenheim Fellow, Professor of Government and Jurisprudence at Yale, and is now a Professor at Princeton.

In the United States and other countries, unofficial organizations were beginning to study these questions. My suggestion was that Dr. Earle's Committee could aid in giving these studies a global character in the hope that when the war was over, the peace could be won and not lost.

(P. 241) Mr. Morris' irresponsible method of establishing guilt by association without any fidelity to dates was illustrated by his introducing correspondence between Duggan and Frederick V. Field of November and December, 1935—long before Mr. Field had resigned as Secretary of the American IPR and an even longer period before Field had begun to write for *The Daily Worker* and *The New Masses* and when he was highly regarded by eminent scholars and bankers, who were familiar with his work. Duggan's letter to Field was simply an invitation to Field to spend an evening in Washington with an informal group that was carrying on a series of discussions of international matters of interest.

The attempt by Senator McCarran and Mr. Morris to discredit the IPR by bringing in the name of Laurence Duggan was in bad taste and irrelevant. Duggan was dead and could not comment. Duggan in fact did not meet any of the criteria of association with the IPR which Mr. Morris laid down.

(f) James S. Allen's appeal for a financial subsidy was not granted

(Pp. 251–252) These pages give the correspondence I had with James S. Allen about his desire to get financial assistance from the IPR in furthering his studies of the Filipino economy. American knowledge of agrarian problems in the Philippines was severely limited. It seemed as though it was both in the American and in the Filipino interest to get several scholars to work on the problem. Because of the Institute's limited financial resources, Mr. Allen's request for monetary assistance for his project was never granted.

(g) Miss Smedley asked the IPR's help in getting two Chinese (prisoners of the Japanese in Hong Kong) placed on an exchange list

(P. 259) The reference here is to the letter which the IPR received from Miss Agnes Smedley, asking the Institute's good offices in getting two Chinese, who were prisoners of the Japanese in Hong Kong, placed on an exchange list. This couple was Dr. and Mrs. Chen Han-seng. Mrs. Chen was reported as seriously ill. This was a request for a humanitarian effort on the part of the IPR.

(h) Challenge to Mrs. Massing's testimony by Miss Harriet Moore

(P. 260) The reference made is to Miss Harriet Moore by Mrs. Massing. She asserts that she met Miss Moore socially in Moscow and that Miss Moore stayed either at the International Hotel or the Hotel Lux. Miss Moore, now Mrs. Gelfan, wrote to William L. Holland on September 8, 1951, regarding Mrs. Massing's testimony, that she had never been inside the Lux Hotel and doesn't even recall the existence of the Hotel International. On her visits to Russia, Miss Moore traveled Intourist and the hotels at which she stayed in Moscow were the Metropole and the New Moscow. She adds that she never met Mrs. Massing or Mr. Gerhard Eisler. In fact, she never heard of them until their names came into prominence in the past year or two. She never met Agnes Smedley and never heard of Grace Maul. Mrs. Gelfan closed with a paragraph saying that Mrs. Massing's testimony is false.

(i) Invitation list to a conference at Sunset Farm—October 18–21, 1935

(P. 263) Mr. Robert Morris introduced to the Committee a letter of mine dated Lee, Mass., August 31, 1935, to Frederick V. Field, inviting him to participate in a staff conference at Sunset Farm, October 18–21. The letter stated that I was hoping that the following could be present: Escott Reid, Richard Pyke, Kate Mitchell, Leonard Wu, Kathleen Barnes, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, Harriet Moore, W. L. Holland. May I comment on these as follows:

Mr. Reid was at that time Secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and, later, for many years, has held high positions in the Canadian diplomatic service. Richard Pyke (British) was, for several years, on the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London, and had just accepted a position on the IPR's Secretariat to handle the publication of IPR books in Shanghai. Miss Mitchell, at that time, was serving as my secretary. Mr. Wu was a scholar from Kuomintang China, highly regarded by his Chinese colleagues. Kathleen Barnes (American) was then aiding in the IPR's studies of the Soviet Union.

Miss Fairfax-Cholmeley had accompanied Mrs. Carter and me on our visits to India, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand in 1935. She came from a

well-known family in Yorkshire. Many years later she married Israel Epstein who, in the past years, has been accused by the Subcommittee as a supporter of the Chinese Communist cause. At the time of the Lee meeting in 1935, Miss Fairfax-Cholmeley showed no interest in Chinese Communists. I think she did not meet Mr. Epstein until they were fellow-prisoners of the Japanese in the Stanley Prison in Hong Kong in 1941. They and one or two Englishmen escaped from that prison and, together, traveled by sampan and on foot to Chungking.

Mr. William L. Holland is well known to the Committee.

Miss Moore, in her letter to Mr. Holland of September 8, 1951, pointed out that during the brief period when she was Acting Secretary of the American IPR in 1943–44, many of the staff members were called into military and other war service. Her appointment was simply to carry out existing projects until the staff returned and a new secretary could be found. As far as she was aware, there was not, at any time, any group in the IPR seeking to use it for propaganda espionage purposes. She believes that the record of that period, in regard to publications, research, and meetings, will confirm her view as to the variety of subjects dealt with and the diversity of views of the authors and subjects. Subsequent documents introduced by Mr. Robert Morris indicate some of Miss Moore's routine duties in connection with the Mt. Tremblant Conference and the favorable comment which the American IPR made on Miss Moore's services during the year that she served as Acting Secretary, following Mr. William Lockwood's departure for the China war theatre. (Mr. Lockwood was a Major on General Chennault's staff in Kunming. He is now a professor at Princeton.)

(j) Mrs. Massing's attack on Corliss Lamont

(P. 267) Mrs. Massing asserted that everybody knew Corliss Lamont was a Communist. This Mr. Lamont has denied in a communication to the Senate Subcommittee. He has recently published a pamphlet entitled "Why I Am Not a Communist."

(k) William S. White's significant article in the New York Times

Toward the end of the Subcommittee's first public hearing (July 25, 1951), Senator McCarran called attention to the length of the period during which I had been on the witness stand and added, "You have been a ready witness, and the Committee is grateful for the information you have given us." This was naturally reassuring to me personally, for this Subcommittee was the first Congressional Committee of which I had had personal knowledge.

I knew, of course, that the procedures of some Communists had been increasingly challenged in recent years. Indeed there were those who were saying that the procedures were such that a person being investigated could not hope to convince the general public, but he could at least reassure his friends. To this end and because it was my duty as an American citizen, I resolved that I would do my best to answer all questions as fully and frankly as possible. I do not consciously evade any question.

But, as the hearings continued, my skepticism of the current methods of the Subcommittee increased. It has grown as the months have rolled by. It was confirmed still further on March 23, 1952, when I read a significant article by William S. White in the Sunday Magazine Section of the *New York Times*. As is well known, Mr. White of the *Times* Washington staff, has covered many of the Congressional investigations since the end of the war. In this article, he has departed from straight reporting and expresses a personal opinion of what he considers a dangerous trend. He did not refer in his article to the Subcommittee's investigation of the IPR, but he did emphasize the evolution of Congressional investigation into what he thought, in all disinterest, must be called, all too often, a kind of pitiless inquisition in which, he put it plainly, the accused is licked before he starts. He added that such inquiries have now become, however, punitive rather than fact-finding. It is my personal opinion that what Mr. White said applied, for the most part, to the proceedings of the Subcommittee on the IPR. In fact, I am reminded that perhaps the best description of the Subcommittee's procedure is what they call in France The Communist Technique of Retroactive Defamation. The methods adopted by the Subcommittee's counsel, presumably with the approval of the Subcommittee, are sadly reminiscent of previous and current attempts by Communist authorities in several governments to defame retroactively or posthumously destroy the reputations of those who block their evil purposes.

215 East 72nd Street, New York, N. Y., *May 1 1952.*

APPENDIX A

SUNSET FARM,
Lee, Massachusetts, 19th July, 1938.

OWEN LATTIMORE, ESQ.,
C/o Allie Robinson's Camp, Independence, California.

DEAR OWEN: Thank you for your long and delightful letter of July 10 from Independence. What an intriguing name for editorial work in this particular age.

In the strictest confidence I am sending you a copy of Paul Scheffer's comment on Bloch's original outline (I did not tell Scheffer who wrote the outline).

With reference to Hu Shih, we had him here at Lee for a weekend conference just before he sailed. Chen and Chi were also here. Though both these men differ with Hu Shih very strongly, they both believe in his integrity of character. We are all trying to get him to write a major monograph to document the "temporizing policy" of Nanking in the last few years. He is convinced that the Generalissimo was preparing as fervently for ultimate resistance to Japan as were the Communists. We have asked him to go the whole way in making available documents that would prove his thesis. Whether we agree with his thesis or not it is important to have the job well done. This is a round about way of answering your question as to the weight which Hu Shih exerts in American circles and the extent in which he molds or leads the opinions of the Chinese in America. With Americans who have never heard of Chu Teh, Hu Shih stands out as a really great Chinese patriot—a man of dignity and a mind with a spacious point of view. To those Americans who feel that the Chinese Communists are making an epic contribution to Chinese unification Hu Shih seems to be living in the Victorian Age, albeit in rather a distinguished fashion. The reaction of Chinese in America to Hu Shih is similar to that of Americans according to their own line up on the question of Chinese Communists.

Thank you for the tip about Serene. I will write to Lasswell today.

With reference to the question which you raise as to the role that you should play in view of Japanese attacks on the impartiality of members of the American Council staff and the Pacific Council staff I am inclined to take the position that the American Council staff are in one category, the Chinese and Japanese members of the International Secretariat are in a second, and you, Bill Holland, and I in a third, though all three categories blur into each other. The American Council staff are responsible only to the American people. They thus should be among the freest people on earth. The Chinese and Japanese members of our own staff are chosen among other reasons because they are Chinese or Japanese and we want from them the fullest possible reflection of all that is most fundamental in the attitudes of their countries. You and Hollard and the other non-Oriental members of the International Secretariat and myself are the servants of all eleven Councils. Our role is an almost impossible one. It might be likened to the role of the Speaker in the House of Commons, namely to ensure that every responsible point of view in the Institute is given a full hearing. This means that we ought to convince all the National Councils that whatever are our own private views, the Secretariat, the research program, the conferences, and Pacific Affairs are administered with complete detachment so that every responsible point of view is represented in the most favorable possible light.

If in our private capacities we take a line that is so conspicuous that any large element in our constituency feels that we cannot administer our international responsibilities with impartiality then I think that our non-Secretariat activities should be reconsidered. Some weeks ago I came to the tentative conclusion that so far as I myself am concerned I should seriously consider declining all public invitations to speak on the Far Eastern situation. By public invitations I mean those which are reported by the press. In the past month I have declined to write for Amerasia. I did this because in Japan Amerasia is regarded as having been founded with a definite anti-Japanese bias.

However unjust this feeling may be we have got to make some allowance for the exigencies of war psychology as it affects our Japanese friends.

Saionji is one of the straightest thinking of young Japanese. He has stood apart and above the muddled-headed war philosophy during the past year in a most striking manner. The other day I learned privately that he had single-handed raised the money that was needed to carry on the Japanese I. P. R. this year, but that now the donors were hammering him because of the line taken both by members of the International Secretariat and the American Council staff. I understand that he feels that the American Council staff are

free. In other words to his friends he defends the right of the American Council staff to take any line they want. But he finds it difficult to explain what appears to be partisanship on the part of members of the Secretariat. I personally wish that it was possible for you to withdraw from the Amerasia board in the interests of the major task of integration which we have ahead of us for the next two years. I do not think any hasty action is called for but it is a matter I have long wanted to discuss with you and have never had the opportunity.

I am exceedingly glad that you approve of the way Yasuo is functioning. If ever a man was in a hot spot he is it.

Motylev is going to the Soviet Far East instead of coming here. I am urging him to send Voitinsky in his place.

Dennery, Takayanagi, and Dafoe are all coming to Sunset Farm for ten days on August 10 to meet with the International Secretariat. Is there any chance of your coming east in time for this meeting or at least arriving by the 16th or 17th?

Would you let us know just how we should describe your Johns Hopkins appointment so that it can be announced in the next issue of IPR NOTES.

If you are able to come on while Dennery is here you will be able to find out who the French counterparts of Archie Rose and Barbara Wooton are.

It is grand to hear that the family is all well and that you are making good progress on your book. If anything takes you to Seattle you may wish to look up John Alden Carter who is acting as an assistant to the president of McDougall Southwick Co. He is at present staying with Herb Little. Mrs. Carter and Ruth send their greetings to your whole household.

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

APPENDIX B

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

HONOLULU—LOS ANGELES—NEW YORK—SAN FRANCISCO—SEATTLE—WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

ELdorado 5-1759

MARCH 17, 1947.

DEAR FELLOW MEMBER: For over two years, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, a former member of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and an importer with substantial business interests in China, has been carrying on a campaign charging the Institute with bias in its treatment of the contemporary situation in the Far East, especially in China.

In any country as wartorn as China, there may well develop honest differences as to the factors which underlie the current difficulties and, consequently, as to the course which will lead to a solution. Feelings naturally run high. But no reader can draw as severe criticisms of the Kuomintang Government from the publications of the IPR as those set forth in General Marshall's report to President Truman.

You will note in the enclosure entitled "An Attempt to Stifle IPR Scrutiny of the Chinese Situation" that as one of the many efforts to meet Mr. Kohlberg's demands, he has been offered the privilege of mailing his accusations on March 20th to the entire membership of the American IPR. In this mailing, we understand, he will ask the members for proxies to be posted direct to him, authorizing him at a members' meeting on April 22nd to introduce a resolution appointing a committee to investigate his charges.

The Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees has investigated Mr. Kohlberg's charges and found them inaccurate and irresponsible.

We, the undersigned, have been connected with the IPR over a period of years. We have observed its research and educational program closely and have no hesitation in stating that the charges are false. We believe that you will agree with us that the IPR has an enviable record for unbiased and scholarly research. The enclosed excerpts of letters from recognized experts on the Far East are only some of the many that have been received emphasizing the high regard in which IPR publications are held by scholars. Some of the very publications criticized by Mr. Kohlberg have been highly praised by Army, Navy, and State Department officials in a position to know the facts and were exten-

sively used by the armed services during the war. Indeed, so useful were IPR materials to the war effort that the American IPR was awarded the Navy "E" in 1945.

Please sign the enclosed proxy and return it by quickest mail if you wish to support the present administration of the American IPR under the direction of the recently elected Board of Trustees whose names you will find enclosed. We hope that you will be present to vote in person. But in any case we urge that you send in your proxy. If you attend in person, your proxy will not be used.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN.
ARTHUR H. DEAN.
WALTER F. DILLINGHAM.
BROOKS EMENY.
HUNTINGTON GILCHRIST.
W. R. HEROD.
PHILIP C. JESSUP.

NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF MEMBERS OF AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC., TO BE HELD AT ITS OFFICES, 1 EAST 54TH STREET, NEW YORK CITY AT 4:30 P. M. ON TUESDAY, APRIL 22, 1947

PURPOSE OF THE MEETING

Considering a resolution to be proposed by Alfred Kohlberg appointing a committee to investigate certain charges of Alfred Kohlberg, and such other business as may properly come before the meeting

MARGUERITE ANN STEWART,
Secretary.

Please cut along this line and sign and return the proxy to the offices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1 East 54th Street, New York 22

PROXY

The undersigned member of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., does hereby constitute and appoint ARTHUR H. DEAN and JOSEPH P. CHAMBERLAIN, or either of them, with full power of substitution, as my duly constituted proxies and attorneys to vote in my behalf against any and all proposals made by Alfred Kohlberg at a meeting of the members on Tuesday, April 22nd, 1947, or any adjournment thereof, and to vote in favor of sustaining the policies of the Board of Trustees, with all the power I would possess if personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming all my proxies and attorneys may do in my behalf.

(Sign here)_____
Member

APPENDIX C

UNITED CHINA RELIEF, INC.
1790 BROADWAY
New York 19, N. Y.

AUGUST 13, 1946.

MR. ALFRED KOHLBERG,
1 West 37th Street, New York 1, N. Y.

DEAR MR. KOHLBERG: Because of your interest in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I believe the following may prove of interest to you. (I served on the Executive Committee of the Council for nearly three years.)

When United China Relief was organized one of the most difficult problems was the division of funds collected. A Program Committee was organized, an office

established in China, and an Advisory Committee of Chinese and Americans there was formed.

Mr. Carter was elected Chairman of the Program Committee from its start. At great personal sacrifice, he so served, with remarkable tact and diplomacy, until late last year.

The strongest test of the effectiveness of this Committee was in China itself. Accordingly, we were deeply impressed to receive, last month, for presentation to Mr. Carter a Chinese scroll expressing, from outstanding Chinese leaders, their gratitude for his leadership, devotion to China, and fairness.

Phrased in typically flowery Chinese, it reads, in translation, in part as follows:

America the glorious,
Our friend and neighbor,
Kindness in birth,
Righteousness in spirit,
Bright as the sun and stars,
That recognizes no national boundary.
Prominent among her people,
Is Mr. E. C. Carter.

We, the unworthy ones,
Through close contacts
And advisory capacity,
Have come to know his work more intimately.

So great is he
That none can emulate him.
His virtue is Christian
And his fame is historic.
Stronger he cemented national relations;
Closer he promoted spirit of friendship.

One person but two responsibilities,
He undertook to shoulder,
To bridge the Pacific.
East and West, standing on either side
Link hands through the clouds,
United our spirit in the sky.
With distance exceeding thousands of miles,
Age lasting hundred of years
This is to commemorate our everlasting gratitude.

The signers include Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Director General of CNRRA, Dr. Chiang Mou-lin, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan, Dr. Han Lih-wu, Vice Minister of Education, Bishop Paul Yu Pin, Catholic Bishop of Nanking, Dr. Robert K. S. Lin, Surgeon General of the Chinese Army, Dr. Y. T. Tsur, Minister of Agriculture, Dr. King Chu, Vice Minister of Education, Dr. P. Z. King, Director of the National Health Administration, Dr. C. K. Chu, Director of the National Health Institute, Mrs. William C. Wang, Chairman of the Women's Advisory Committee of the New Life Movement, Mrs. Nora T. H. Chu, Director of the National Association for Refugee Children, Dr. Chang Fu-liang, General Secretary of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, Dr. Y. S. Djang, Treasurer of the International Relief Committee, Dr. H. C. Chang, Chief of the Welfare Division of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and Dr. A. Pan-tung Sah, of the Academica Sinica.

I have always felt deep resentment at those who have criticized Mr. Carter as being "anti-Chinese"; I think, accordingly, this statement deserves special consideration.

Sincerely,

[s] JAMES L. MCCONAUGHY,
President.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York ss:

EDWARD C. CARTER, being duly sworn, says: That he has read the foregoing document and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true to his own knowledge, except as to the matters therein indicated to have been communicated

to him by other persons and except as to the matters therein which are matters of opinion, and that as to the matters indicated to have been communicated to him by others, he believes it to be true and as to matters of opinion, that the opinion expressed is his own and that it is his true opinion.

Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.

[SEAL] IRENE R. DONOHUE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is the affidavit of Hilda Austern, dated May 5, 1952, which I would like to introduce at this time.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1384" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1384

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND,
May 5, 1952.

CONFEDERATION OF SWITZERLAND,
City and Canton of Geneva,
Consulate General of the United States of America, ss:

AFFIDAVIT

I, HILDA AUSTERN (RAY), being duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

(1) I have just learned for the first time of the following testimony of Louis Francis Budenz before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security in August 1951:

"Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Hilda Austern was a member of the Communist Party?

"Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports."

(2) It is my intent and purpose by this affidavit to deny, under oath, the charges against me which seem to be intended by this vague and more or less unresponsive reply of which, I understand, there is no further elaboration of any kind in the rest of his testimony.

(3) I am not now and never have been a member of the Communist Party nor of any other organization cited as subversive by the Attorney General of the United States. I do not hold and never have held any beliefs contrary to American democracy or the principles for which the United States stands. I am and have always been completely loyal to my country, its government, and its form of government.

Hilda Austern Ray,
HILDA AUSTERN (RAY).

Subscribed and sworn to before me, Charles W. Thomas, Consul of the United States of America in and for the consular district of Geneva, Switzerland, duly commissioned and qualified, this 5th day of May 1952, A. D.

[SEAL] CHARLES W. THOMAS, *American Consul.*

Service No.: 2861. Fee: $2.00 equals SW Frs. 8.80. Tariff No. 24.
American Foreign Service $2.00 Fee Stamp [affixed].

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL.

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, *May 5, 1952.*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would next like to introduce excerpts from the executive-session testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck of May 21, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. They will be received into the record.

(The excerpts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1385" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1385

[EXECUTIVE SESSION]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, May 21, 1952.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in Room 424–C Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur Watkins, presiding.

President: Senator Watkins.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator WATKINS. The committee will be in session.

Mr. Morris, you have a witness here this morning?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Senator, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

Senator WATKINS. Will you stand and be sworn, Doctor?

Mr. HORNBECK. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. Do you solemnly swear that this testimony you shall give before this subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HORNBECK. I do.

* * * * * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Hornbeck, this committee has obtained from the Department of State an exchange of letters between Dean Rusk and yourself dated May 19 and June 7, 1950. In your answer to Dean Rusk you state that:

"* * * It was in the year 1945—and not before then—that the Government of the United States, first having taken action inconsistent with tradition and commitment in regard to China, embarked upon what became a course of intervention in regard to the civil conflict, the conflict between the National Government and the Communists, in China. It was then that words and action of the Government of the United States began to be expressive of an 'against' and a 'for' attitude; then and thereafter that the Government of the United States brought to bear pressures, pressures upon the National Government, pressures which were not 'against' the Communists but were on their behalf, pressures not to the disadvantage of the Communists, but, in effect, to the disadvantage of the National Government."

Dr. Hornbeck, I offer you the full text of both of these letters which have become part of our record, and I ask, did you in fact write the reply of June 7, 1950, to Dean Rusk?

Mr. HORNBECK. The letter which appears as having been addressed by me to Dean Rusk under date of June 7, 1950, in reply to a letter addressed by Mr. Rusk to me under date of May 19, 1950, is a copy, exact except for a few inconsequential typographical errors, of a letter written by me at the time and under the circumstances indicated.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the statements in that letter true statements?

Mr. HORNBECK. Everything that is said in that letter is to the best of my knowledge true.

Mr. MORRIS. On what facts and what experience did you base the conclusions that appear therein?

Mr. HORNBECK. I have been studying the subjects of international relations, American foreign policy and Far Eastern affairs for nearly 50 years. I was closely associated with matters involving conduct of United States Far Eastern policy for more than 25 years. In the Department of State, I was especially concerned with Far Eastern affairs from 1928 to 1944. Since my retirement in 1947, I have given and am giving most of my time to study of these subjects.

The conclusions to which I gave expression in the paragraph which you have quoted were—and are—based in part on consideration of the facts set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the letter, in part on consideration of other facts known to me from study and from experience, and in part on consideration of still other facts, knowledge of which I had gained from study of contemporary evidence and from conversations and discussions with participants in the acts or events to which they relate.

The paragraph in which I state that change of policy took place in the year 1945 is expressive in terms of interpretation of a conclusion or group of conclusions drawn from facts and stating what I believe to be absolutely true.

Mr. Morris. Next is an affidavit by Henry A. Wallace, dated June 6, 1952.

Senator Watkins. It may be received and made a part of the record.

(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1386" and s as follows:)

Exhibit No. 1386

Farvue, South Salem, N. Y., *June 6, 1952.*

Hon. Pat McCarran,
Senate Office Building, Washington D. C.

Dear Senator McCarran: Thanks for the courtesy of your wire of June 6 in reply to my letter of June 3. In conformity therewith I am hereby formally swearing before a notary public that the following statement is the truth:

I am testifying with regard to the bottom 14 lines of page 1792, the top 16 lines of page 1793, the bottom 14 lines of page 1993, the top 19 lines of page 1994, the bottom 9 lines of page 2046, and the top 18 lines of page 2047—all from parts 6 and 7 of the hearings of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Senate with regard to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The first 4 pages referred to in the foregoing have to do with Counsel Sourwine's apparent belief that I had in my Mission to China recommended that the Communist armies receive a proportionate share of American supplies sent to China. On pages 1793 and 1994 Vincent makes clear his belief that I made no such recommendations. I am sure that I was not directly or indirectly responsible for initiating the July 7 telegram from Roosevelt referred to on page 2073.

With regard to pages 2046 and 2047 commenting on the statement made by Vincent in the white paper, "Wallace referred to the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States—" I wish to call attention to my wire of June 5, 1951, to Senator Knowland which he kindly inserted in the June 6, 1951, hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. This wire was printed in its entirety on page 17 of the June 6, 1951, and again on page 14 of the June 7, 1951, issue of the New York Times. I hope therefore that your committee may extend me the same courtesy as the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees by at least publishing the reference to my letter to Senator Knowland as reproduced in the hearings of June 6, 1951, of the Senate committee. Exactly the same matter is up for discussion as on pages 2046 and 2047 of your committee's hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The prime purpose of this sworn statement is to say that I am in complete accord with Vincent and that I say independently that I made no recommendation to Roosevelt that the Communist armies be sent a proportionate share of American arms. (Communist in the foregoing means Chinese Communist.)

Respectfully submitted.

H. A. Wallace.

Sworn to this 5th day of June 1952, before notary public.

Cyrus W. Russell,
Notary Public in the State of New York.

Mr. Morris. I have here a sworn statement of W. L. Holland, dated June 10, 1952, which I would like to put in the record at this time.

Senator Watkins. It may be received and made a part of the record.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1387" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 1387

MEMORANDUM ON RAYMOND DENNETT'S TESTIMONY

I, William L. Holland, being duly sworn, depose and say as follows:

In his testimony before the McCarran Subcommittee, September 26, 1951, (Hearings, part 4, pp. 937–1005), Raymond Dennett, who had been Secretary of the American IPR from March 1944 to December 1945, made a number of misleading and unsubstantiated allegations concerning the American IPR and members of its staff. Among other things he said that he did not think the Institute "was an objective research organization"; that he had "grave doubts"

of the staff's objectivity; that he "came not to trust" the staff (although he explained that he had no reason to think any of them were Communists); that members of the staff tended to "favorably interpret" the Soviet Union (he explained that this was because the staff felt at that time that "if we had to live with the Soviet Union during the postwar period we had to explain why the Soviet Union acted this way"); that he thought certain members of the staff were biased against the Chinese Nationalist government and "probably" sympathetic to the Chinese Communists; that the staff tried to "control" the organization; and that when he took steps to reduce the staff's influence the staff attempted to use the union contract as an instrument for "getting rid of" him. He also said: "I was responsible for objective research. I do not feel there was objectivity and I resigned and got out."

It is incumbent on me as the present executive officer of the American IPR to point out how, in several important respects, Mr. Dennett's testimony was (perhaps inadvertently) inaccurate or incomplete. I do this with reluctance and regret, since my own relations with Mr. Dennett during and after his period of work for the American IPR were always cordial. Moreover, I admired his insistence in his testimony that he was convinced that Dr. Philip C. Jessup was not a Communist sympathizer. However, for the sake of correcting the record, I feel it necessary to submit the following remarks, which are based on my own knowledge, on a careful study of the relevant documents, and on corroboration by other persons directly acquainted with the period of Mr. Dennett's employment by the American IPR.

Much of Mr. Dennett's testimony must be judged in the light of the circumstances attending his departure from the IPR. His testimony creates the impression that he resigned his position with the IPR because he was dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the office. The fact is that the Executive Committee of the American IPR decided and made clear to Mr. Dennett that it would not be in the best interests of the organization for him to continue as Executive Secretary. This decision did not reflect unfavorably in any way upon Mr. Dennett's character.

When he became the administrative head of the American IPR, Mr. Dennett was a young man of limited experience. The job in which he found himself was one that required a high order of tact, judgment, and administrative and fund-raising skill. After a considerable period of observation, the Executive Committee regretfully concluded that Mr. Dennett did not fully measure up to all these requirements, especially the first and the last. Eventually the Committee decided that in the interests of the organization a change in the administrative direction was imperative, and made this known to Mr. Dennett. The matter was handled in such a way as to cause Mr. Dennett as little embarrassment as possible. For this reason, the full details of the story were never put in the official record. Nevertheless, its main outlines are sufficiently clear from a careful reading of the minutes of the Executive Committee at this period. These show:

(1) That the Executive Committee, at its meeting on June 18, 1945, adopted a resolution instructing the Secretary (Mr. Dennett) to devote the major portion of his time to fund raising.

(2) That the Executive Committee held two meetings, on October 11 and November 13, 1945, at Midston House, at which Mr. Dennett was not present. Customarily, the Executive Committee met in the IPR office, and the Secretary, a member of the Committee, attended its meetings.

(3) That at its meeting on October 11 the Executive Committee engaged in "general consideration of the purposes and program of the American Council and of the problems confronting it." There were present the following members of the Executive Committee: Robert D. Calkins, Chairman; Eugene E. Barnett, Frederick V. Field, Huntington Gilchrist, G. Ellsworth Huggins, James L. McConaughy, Lawrence Morris, and Mrs. Ada Comstock Notestein; also the following guests: Joseph P. Chamberlain, Philip C. Jessup, Grayson Kirk, and Owen Lattimore. At this meeting the Executive Committee appointed a special committee consisting of Messrs. Calkins, Jessup, and McConaughy "to carry on discussions and negotiations with any officers or branches of the American Council and with any outside organizations with a view to making proposals concerning the solution of the problems facing the Council, including recommendations concerning the location of the various activities of the Council." (This referred in part to certain proposals which had been made by Mr. Dennett.)

(4) That at the Executive Committee meeting on November 13, the same persons being present with the exception of Messrs. Gilchrist and Lattimore, the

special committee presented its recommendations. The Executive Committee thereupon voted to accept Mr. Dennett's resignation as Secretary, and to appoint Edward C. Carter as Executive Vice Chairman of the American IPR. The resolution accepting Mr. Dennett's resignation referred to the difficulties confronting the American IPR at the time when he became Secretary, and to subsequent unforeseen problems of great magnitude; it expressed appreciation of Mr. Dennett's services, mentioning his energy and devotion, but omitting any reference to his ability or accomplishments. It requested Mr. Dennett, if he found it possible, to continue on the staff until March 1946, performing such duties as might be assigned to him by the Executive Vice Chairman. The resolution appointing Mr. Carter as Executive Vice Chairman stated that "efficient management of the affairs of the American Council of the IPR requires an expansion of its executive direction at the top levels and the services of a man of great public prestige and broad experience in the work of the IPR." Mr. Carter was therefore "charged with the general management and control of the general activities and business affairs of the American Council."

It is worth noting that Philip C. Jessup, who had originally recommended Mr. Dennett for the position of Secretary, was a member of the special committee mentioned above.

In the light of this history it was perhaps natural for Mr. Dennett to feel that he had a grievance against the IPR. Unfortunately this feeling seems to have influenced his recollections to the point where parts of his testimony cannot be regarded as fully reliable, although it is certainly not suggested that he deliberately falsified.

Many of Mr. Dennett's administrative weaknesses at this period were those of inexperience. In fairness to him, it should be noted that he had the difficult task of dealing with an experienced senior staff, most of whom were older than he and had more knowledge than he of the Far East and of the IPR, and some of whom possessed strong personalities. Toward the end of his tenure in office, considerable friction developed between Mr. Dennett and some members of his staff. Hence he undoubtedly took away with him some personal grudges. His testimony concerning staff members must be interpreted in this light.

It should be added that the differences between Mr. Dennett and members of the senior staff arose partly from factors of temperament, partly from differences of opinion on administrative questions, and partly from the fact that the senior staff eventually lost confidence in his ability to administer the affairs of the American IPR in an effective manner. These differences were in no sense political.

As Executive Secretary, Mr. Dennett had full authority to protest or block any actions or publications of the staff if he felt they were not in keeping with the purposes and policies of the Institute and he could depend on full support from the Executive Committee. In fact, there is no evidence that he did make any such protests while he was Executive Secretary on any matters concerning the politics of staff members or the objectivity of the work and publications of the Institute.

A few specific points in Mr. Dennett's testimony are worth comment:

(1) His statement that the staff "began to rely on the union contract as a method for, shall we say, getting rid of me." Mr. Dennett may have believed this to be true, but it was not true. Neither the Book and Magazine Union, UOPWA, with which the American IPR had a contract, nor the shop unit (i. e., the group of union members in the office) made any attempt whatever to "get rid of" Mr. Dennett. (A fuller notarized statement on the Union has been submitted by Miss Miriam S. Farley to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security.)

(2) His statement that there was no "thorough investigation" of Alfred Kohlberg's charges against the IPR, but only an "answer" prepared by Mrs. Marguerite A. Stewart. Mrs. Stewart has stated that this "answer" was not prepared by her but by a committee of the American IPR staff under her editorship. Mr. Kohlberg's principal charges were contained in a lengthy document which alleged, with what purported to be supporting documentation, that IPR publications during a certain period had followed the Communist Party line. The staff, at the request of the Executive Committee, prepared a detailed analysis of Mr. Kohlberg's document, concluding that the evidence did not support his allegations. This was the analysis edited by Mrs. Stewart. Certain other inquiries were conducted, and some members of the Executive Committee, notably Mr. Arthur H. Dean (then a vice chairman) did a considerable amount of research on their own. In general, however, Mr. Kohlberg's charges were regarded as

so irresponsible, and so obviously motivated by political partisanship, that they commanded little credence among officers and members of the Executive Committee, who concluded that there was no necessity for the additional full-dress investigation demanded by Mr. Kohlberg. It will be recalled that in 1947 Mr. Kohlberg's demand for an investigation by an outside committee was rejected by a vote of the American IPR membership, 1,163 to 66, after the members had received through the mails materials from Mr. Kohlberg and from officers of the organization. In other words, the investigation conducted at that time was sufficient, in the judgment of the organization's officers and Executive Committee, to establish that there was no valid foundation for Mr. Kohlberg's charges, and this decision was upheld by an overwhelming vote of the membership.

W. L. HOLLAND.

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

William L. Holland, being duly sworn, declares that every statement in the above letter is true to the best of his knowledge.

Sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.

DAVID ADLER,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Next is the sworn statement of Michael Lindsay, dated June 3, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1388," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 1388

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES, CITY OF SYDNEY,
Consulate General of the United States of America, ss:

I, Lord Lindsay of Birker hereby declare under oath:

It has been brought to my attention that, in the hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations before the Senate Committee on Internal Security, my name has been mentioned as a Communist or fellow traveller connected with the I. P. R. I would, therefore, like to make the following statement, firstly about my political standpoint and, secondly about my connections with the I. P. R.

Since I began to take a serious interest in politics I have consistently supported democratic government—definiug democracy in the same general sense as expounded in my father's writings.[1] That is, I have believed that democracy implied free discussion, human fellowship, and a preference for the use of persuasion rather than force. As a corollary I have consistently opposed militarism and authoritarian and police state regimes.

On more general issues my thinking was greatly influenced by such books as J. M. Keynes' Treatise on Probability and Felix Kaufmann's Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften. I have believed that the truth or falsehold of any statement about the real world could only be tested by comparison of its implications with the evidence of observation and experiment and that, in consequence, any generalisation was subject to possible modification as new evidence became available; that, while economic or racial factors might influence the questions in which men were interested or incline them to illogical thinking on some subjects, the truth or falsity of the answer to any question was normally objective or interpersonally invariant. As a corollary I have opposed the claims of all groups who have believed that the absolute certainty of their knowledge entitled them to impose their views by force or deception and I have opposed all theories which claimed that truth or falsehood should not be judged by interpersonally invariant standards but according to expediency for the interests of some particular group.

The application of these principles has implied agreement at various times with parts of the orthodox Communist position and cooperation for a considerable period with the Chinese Communist Party, but it has also implied a consistently critical attitude towards the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership and disagreement with parts of the Communist position even during the period when I was working in the Chinese Communist organization. I would accept

[1] Such as The Essentials of Democracy, O. U. P., 1929.

the standard suggested in the following quotation from Freda Utley, "If one appreciates the fundamental difference between fortuitous similarity of views at a given moment, and consistent changes of attitude paralleling those of the Communists, there can be no danger of 'guilt by association' trapping the innocent." [2] Judged by this standard I have never been either a Communist or a fellow traveller.

Before leaving England for China at the end of 1937 I was engaged in adult education and economic research work in South Wales. I was extremely critical of the failure of the British Government to take any effective action on the problems of unemployment and the depressed areas and this implied a certain amount of sympathy for Communist criticisms of the existing economic system. I was also extremely critical of the failure of the British Government to support collective security and resist the development of aggressive militarism and this implied approval of the Soviet policies associated with Mr. Litvinov. On the other hand, a study of the history of the Weimar Republic, on which I gave a course of lectures, convinced me that Hitler's rise to power had been greatly assisted by the policies which the German Communist Party had followed under Comintern leadership. The evidence available about the Soviet Union seemed to show that, while it might have overcome some of the evils of the capitalist system, such as unemployment, it had even more serious though different defects of its own. In arguments with Communist friends I consistently criticized what I called their "fairy story" attitude—the belief that once they had the revolution "everyone would live happily ever after" so that meanwhile they could indulge in completely irresponsible criticism and sabotage with a clear conscience.

I arrived at Peiping in January 1938 to take up the position of Tutor in Economics at Yenching University. The evidence I saw of Japanese behaviour in North China soon convinced me that Japanese militarism was an evil which it was a duty to resist.

My first contacts with the Chinese Communist organisation came largely by chance. In April 1938 I was invited by some American friends at Yenching to go on a trip in the Easter vacation to have a look at the guerilla organisation that was starting in Central Hopei. I made a more extended trip in the summer vacation of 1938 with Mr. George Taylor to Central Hopei and the Wut'ai area and, in the summer vacation of 1939, I made a journey with Mr. Ralph Lapwood and Chinese friends from Peiping to Sian, mainly through Eighth Route Army territory, returning via Chungking and Hongkong. On these trips I met generals Lu Cheng-ts'ao, Nieh Jung-chen, Chu Te and P'eng Te-huai and both in 1938 and 1939 I stayed some days with Dr. Norman Bethune whom I had first met on the boad from Vancouver to Yokohama.

Assistance to these guerilla organisations was an obvious way of taking part in opposition to Japanese militarism and, owing to the existence of extraterritoriality, a foreigner could give considerable assistance. By the summer of 1938 I had become fairly active in groups that were engaged in purchasing medical supplies in Peiping and later became involved in the purchase of radio and communications equipment, technical books, etc., and in delivering supplies to Chinese units outside the city.

I knew that the main Chinese resistance groups that I was working with were under Communist leadership but the Chinese communists whom I met on my trips into the countryside seemed to me a very different type of person from the Communists I had known in England. Instead of irresponsible destructive activity the Chinese Communists were engaged in responsible constructive work and seemed to be doing a very effective job both in organising resisting to Japanese militarism and in mass education and social and economic reform. Instead of the unreasoning dogmatism that had characterized most of the Communists I had known in England, the Chinese Communists mostly seemed to be reasonable sensible people who could argue without losing their tempers, who seemed ready to modify their theories to fit the facts and who were capable of cooperating with people who did not share their beliefs.

I contributed a number of articles to the London Times based in my observations during my trips into the Eighth Route Army areas. The account given of the Chinese Communist organisation was strongly favourable and I would still maintain that the facts of the situation at that time entirely justified such favourable reports. But even then I was critical of some of the Stalinist aspects of the organisation. A report I wrote after my trip in 1939 is strongly critical of the tendency of education to concentrate on indoctrination and discourage

[2] The China Story. By Freda Utley, Chicago; Henry Regnery Co., 1951, page 196.

critical thought. I argue, "For the development of democratic government it is essential to have people who are able to think scientifically and who can see through any attempts to deceive and exploit them through plausible propaganda. There is little point in fighting Japanese militarism by means which make the Chinese people equally liable to fall a prey to militarism. So long as the people believe whatever the government tells them democracy rests on a very insecure foundation and the people can be exploited by any group which can gain temporary control of the government."

I never felt any incompatibility between cooperation with the Chinese Communist organisation and loyalty to my own country or cooperation with other governments working for democratic objectives. The information obtained on my trips in the Chinese countryside was made available not only to the British but also to the American authorities in Peiping. While Kuomintang resistance groups were operating near Peiping I was equally ready to assist them. I helped in the collection of money to buy winter clothing for Chao T'ung's troops in the winter of 1938 and tried to establish radio communication with Chungking on behalf of another Kuomintang organisation. (The attempt failed because the frequency fixed was, as I afterwards found, unsuitable.) Towards the end of 1941 I had managed to obtain permission from General Nieh Jung-chen for a British intelligence unit to operate in his area and maintain radio contacts with Hongkong or Singapore though unfortunately the scheme fell through because of delays in London.

Also my cooperation with the Chinese Communist organisation did not imply any agreement with the international Communist line. In the winter of 1938–9, Yenching University tried the experiment of a formal debate in the British or American college debating society style and in this I proposed the motion that "There is nothing to choose between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia." (The experiment was not repeated as we found that the Japanese Gendarmerie had taken the greatest interest in the proceedings.) In my course on Logic and Scientific Method I introduced my students to a certain amount of Marxian writing but used a good deal of it as illustration of logical and scientific fallacies.

I was entirely opposed to the official Communist line on international affairs between 1939 and 1941. Though I was strongly critical of the Chamberlain government I had no doubts that it was right to go to war over the German invasion of Poland and that, whatever the defects of the British and French governments, the war was basically a war of democracy against totalitarianism. I criticised the Communist arguments about an imperialist war in which the Germans were slightly less to blame than the British as being dishonest nonsense. I argued that the Soviet Union was clearly playing a game of completely cynical power politics and that the invasion of Finland and annexation of the Baltic States were clear acts of aggression.

In March 1950 I accepted an appointment as British Press Attaché at Chungking and in this capacity I made a number of protests to the Chinese authorities over the material appearing in the Communist New China Daily News which made frequent and violently abusive attacks on the Allies and only occasionally expressed mild disapproval of the Germans. I returned to Yenching University in September 1940 at the request of Dr. J. Leighton Stuart with the approval of the British Ambassador.

In June 1941 I married Li Hsiao-li who had been one of my students at Yenching. Since many allegations have been made, and fairly widely believed, that my wife was connected with the Chinese Communist organisation I will set out briefly the facts about her. My father-in-law came from the leading landlord family of Lishih hsien in Shansi, studied at the Paoting Military Academy and served in the Shansi Provincial Army under Yen Hsi-shan. He held some moderately important positions but was too honest to be very successful in Yen Hsi-shan's organisation and had retired some years before 1937 to live on his private income. When I first knew the family he was living in retirement near Peiping as he was afraid that he might be forced to serve in the Japanese puppet organisation if he returned to Lishih and the family was supported by my brother-in-law, a graduate of Harvard Business School, who was working in the Bank of China at Chungking. Lady Lindsay went to Bridgeman Academy, an American missionary school in Peiping, and then to Yenching University. She had very little interest in politics apart from a natural patriotic dislike of the Japanese. She had refused invitations from her friends to join the Kuomintang Blue Shirt organisation and had no connections with the underground Communist organisation at Yenching. Until December 1941 her knowledge of the

Chinese Communist Party and the Liberated Areas came almost entirely from what I had told her.

On the morning of the attack on Pearl Harbour my wife and I escaped from Yenching to the Western Hills and made contact with local 18th Group Army units. Our original idea had been to go on to Chungking and India but, on finding that I knew a fair amount about radio, General Nieh Jung-chen invited me to stay and work for his organisation and this seemed likely to be quite as useful a piece of war service as I could do anywhere else. I therefore remained in the Shansi-Chahor-Hopei area for nearly two and a half years during which I gave classes in radio engineering to 18th Group Army technicians and travelled round rebuilding the army radio equipment. In 1943 I was officially appointed Technical Adviser to the Communications Department of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military District.

During this period I was in a good position to confirm that the 18th group Army was doing an extremely good job in fighting the Japanese within the limitations imposed by the complete absence of outside supplies. I could also confirm that the government, under Communist leadership, was doing an extremely good job in economic and social reform and had succeeded in winning strong support from the great majority of the population. In this respect Lady Lindsay's observations were of great asistance. She had lived in the country as a child and found it easier to establish friendly relations with the peasants than many of the Communist Party organisers. She could also make the direct comparison with the prewar countryside in North China.

But while I was working in the Chinese Communist organisation and strongly approving of the greater part of their actual policies I still expressed disagreement with parts of the Communist position. I remember arguments in which I maintained that large parts of Marxian economics were fallacious; that the Chinese Communist Party was only successful because of its differences with other Communist parties; that the stupidities of Comintern policy were largely responsible for Hitler's rise to power. On the basis of information from British and American broadcasts I publicly criticized the official Communist views about the second front in Europe. I still have the draft in Chinese romanisation of a reply to a questionnaire about my political views from a friend in the Communist Secret Service Organisation. I was writing to minimize rather than to emphasize our points of difference but even so I argue that Hitler would certainly have won the war if the British workers had been silly enough to follow the leadership of the British Communist Party under Comintern direction. I admit that the Soviet Union might be very democratic in some respects but I argue that in other respects it was definitely inferior to British or American democracy, in particular I criticize the absence of free and informed discussion and the insecurity of the ordinary citizen against oppression by officials.

The fact that people in the Chinese Communist organisation were prepared to work in full and friendly cooperation for common objectives with someone who disagreed with them to this extent is strong evidence that, at this period, the Chinese Communist Party was considerably different from orthodox Stalinist parties.

By the beginning of 1944 I was becoming increasingly concerned at the complete lack of contact between the 18th Group Army and the British and American organisations in China as I believed that cooperation between them could make a very valuable contribution to the Allied war effort against Japan. Attempts to establish contacts from Shansi-Chahar-Hopei had failed and it seems that the best chances of making contacts were from Yenan. My main work in Shansi-Chahar-Hopei was also coming to an end as I had done almost all the rebuilding of apparatus possible with the material available and nearly all the technicians with sufficient mathematical background to profit by my courses on radio engineering had been through them. We therefore moved to Yenan in the spring of 1944.

In fact contacts with the outside world were established very soon after our arrival at Yenan through the visit of foreign correspondents and the arrival of the U. S. Army Observers Section.

I designed the radio transmitter and directional antenna which enabled the New China News Agency to transmit its service to America and India but I gradually withdrew from technical communications work largely because the head of the Yenan Communications Department was uncooperative and resentful of outside advice. I concentrated on helping the New China News Agency with their English language service and on trying to promote cooperation with the U. S. Army Observers Section. (Colonel David Barrett and Colonel Ivan

Yeaton could give evidence of my work in this connection.) Unfortunately relations between the U. S. Army and the 18th Group Army gradually deteriorated, largely owing to bad faith on the American side. The American personnel at Yenan saw the advantages of cooperation for the Allied War effort and tried to work for it but their efforts were often sabotaged by the higher U. S. Army authorities at Chungking.

These American authorities in Chungking appeared to be opposed to cooperation with the British as well as to cooperate with the Communists. I heard that the head of British Military Intelligence at Chungking had wanted to visit Yenan but had been compelled to postpone his visit and I wrote to him to say that, in case he was not getting all the information he wanted from Yenan through the Americans, I had arranged with General Yeh Chien-ying for copies of all the 18th Group Army reports given to the U. S. A. O. S. to be made available for the British and that if he wanted any additional information I would ask General Yeh if it could be procured. On reaching Chungking in November 1945 I found that my letter had been suppressed by the anti-British American authorities in Chungking and that none of the information obtained by the U. S. A. O. S. at Yenan had been shared with the British. I later learnt that General Hurley had issued orders that no British representatives was to be allowed to visit Yenan and had been grossly insulting to Colonel Harmon in the presence of the British Ambassador because he had heard a rumor that Colonel Harmon had managed to visit Yenan without his permission.

The result of the policies of the American authorities was that in a number of projects the 18th Group Army authorities were led by assurances of American cooperation into considerable expenditures of labour and scarce materials only to find that the Americans had backed out of their share of the proposed undertaking. For example, I worked with the U. S. A. O. S. on plans for a communications network. An appreciable part of the very limited communications equipment of the 18th Group Army became tied up in providing intelligence and weather reports for American use. Repeated assurances were given that this was only a temporary expedient and that American material would be provided for all radio stations working for the U. S. forces. But it was only after very long delays that any apparatus was delivered and then it was of types that the 18th Group Army had clearly and repeatedly stated to be useless for the front line areas so that it could only be used to scrap for the components.

This is not the place to discuss other instances but I would like to place it on record that the 18th Group Army was one of the few Allied forces that could almost certainly claim a balance due from the United States under any sort of Lend Lease arrangement. I would also like to record my opinion that the reluctance of the higher American military authorities in Chungking to cooperate in good faith for the common objective of defeating Japan played an appreciable part in stimulating the growth of anti-American feeling in China.

In this situation I tried to advise the 18th Group Army authorities that the best policy was to make a frank statement of their grievances to Americans and to make it clear that they were ready to carry out fully their part of any scheme for cooperation provided the Americans did the same. Unfortunately this advice had only slight effect in preventing the 18th Group Army authorities from reacting to American bad faith and lack of cooperation by becoming discourteous and obstructive on their side, even towards those Americans who were working for cooperation.

I was not directly concerned in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations but I was in fairly close touch with developments and I would also like to place on record that General Hurley provided the Chinese Communist Party with a glaring instance of American bad faith. According to both Chinese and American eyewitnesses, General Hurley signed the Five Point Draft Agreement of 10th November 1944 saying that, though he could not commit his government, he was signing to show that he personally fully approved the draft terms and pledged himself to support them. Within a few weeks he had repudiated his signature. (It is an indication of the cowardice of the State Department against its critics that the White Paper tries to cover up for General Hurley by saying that he only signed the Draft Agreement as a witness (page 74) instead of revealing that, at one time, General Hurley had pledged himself to support the full Communist claims for a settlement with the Kuomintang with some additions proposed by himself, going even further than the original Communist draft). The point at issue is not General Hurley's judgment in first supporting the Communist terms or in later opposing them, it is

the simple issue of elementary honesty. When people of any political view take the Stalinist position that any undertaking can be repudiated as soon as it is considered expedient to do so, any agreement based on mutual trust becomes impossible. If every promise is liable to arbitrary repudiation, the only remaining guarantee of security is superior force.

It is strong evidence of the desire of the Chinese Communist leaders for a peaceful settlement in China that they should again have accepted American mediation after this experience of the behaviour of a United States Ambassador. Their rather quixotic honesty in some respects was also shown by their refusal to publish the evidence of General Hurley's bad faith because, during his visit to Yenan, they had agreed that the terms to which he had pledged his support should not be made public without his consent.

In Yenan, as in Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, I was working with the Chinese Communist organisation because in most matters of practical policy they seemed to be in the right and to be doing a good job. A large part of the criticism of the Chinese Communist Party and 18th Group Army that appeared in the Kuomintang or right-wing American press was based on statements that had almost no relation to the facts. But here again, my attitude was not one of uncritical support. Members of the U. S. A. O. S. could probably remember arguments I had with the 18th Group Army Liaison officers in which I maintained that some things that happened at Yenan would arouse violent public protests in democratic societies such as Britain or America. I also wrote a long report of 30,000 words entitled "What's wrong with Yenan," which I circulated among friends in the higher ranks of the Communist organisation. In this I pointed out the instances of bureaucracy and incompetence in the Yenan organisation and that the general standards of work at Yenan were lower than in the front-line areas. I related these defects to the fact that organisations at Yenan were more purely Communist and less genuinely united front and suggested that the Communist theories about "democratic centralism" and about the nature of scientific judgments almost inevitably led to maladministration in any organisation that was predominantly controlled by Communist Party members. Although these criticisms attacked some of the basic principles of Communist organisation they were accepted by the people to whom I showed them as worthy of serious consideration and discussion. This again indicated an absence of dogmatism which was abnormal among Communists outside China.

In November 1945 I left Yenan for England with my family. I had already been away from home for eight years and it seemed that if we did not return then the spread of a general civil war might prevent us leaving North China for a very long period. After a short time in England I went on a lecture tour in Canada and the United States at the invitation of the Canadian Insitute of International Affairs, the Institute of International Education and the Institute of Pacific Relations. I was then invited to Harvard as a visiting lecturer and returned to the United States in September 1946 and worked at Harvard, mainly in the Far Eastern Area Programme, until June 1947. I was the only Westener who combined a knowledge of the Chinese Communist areas outside Yenan, some inside knowledge of the Chinese Communist organisation through having worked in it and academic qualifications in social science, and these invitations were a natural result of this.

I took part in the general controversy about China and U. S. policy in China, mostly in defence of the general position of the Chinese Communist Party, though I always based my support for the Chinese Communist Party on the fact that their policies were considerably different from those of normal Stalinist parties and on the hope that these differences might increase and become permanent.

In an article which appeared in the London Times of 17th January 1946 I wrote, "To sum up, the Chinese Communist Party is definitely Communist in its basic principles and its party organisation, but its practical programme and its traditions differ considerably from those of other Communist parties." And, by September 1946, I was writing to friends in the Chinese Communist organisation to the effect that the Russian form of Communism was showing itself to be similar in many ways to Japanese militarism and that it was only if Communism followed some of the special features of the Chinese organisation that it could become democratic. (The relevant passages of one such letter are reproduced in Appendix I.)

Looking back on the controversy about China it seems that there was a real problem about which people who accepted the assmuptions of scientific thinking could honestly hold differing opinions on the evidence available at the time.

This problem was whether or not the Chinese Communist leadership was sincere in its proclaimed objective of serving the interests of the common people of China and whether or not it was capable of acting rationally in pursuit of this objective. If the answer on both these points was affirmative the policies of the Chinese Communist Party were bound to diverge increasingly from those of orthodox Stalinist Communist Parties and a unification of theory with practice was bound to involve the Chinese Communist Party in condemnation of the monolithic police-state systems of the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellites. But there was evidence of conflicting tendencies within the Chinese Communist Party.

On the one hand the success of the Chinese Communist Party and their ability to win very general popular support in the areas they controlled had depended on their readiness to adjust their policies to fit the facts and to give the ordinary peasant what he actually wanted and not just what Marx-Leninist theory said he ought to want. This had involved important departures from Stalinist orthodoxy. For example, the distinction between "good" and "bad" landlords corresponded to the obvious facts of experience but implied a rejection of the rigid Marxian view of determination of thought by class position. The agrarian policy in force from 1937 to 1946 was a "reformist" one. It produced strong economic pressures towards equalization of land holdings and transfer of capital from land or usury to productive industry or trade but it did not put any group in the community in a position where they either had to fight the regime or else passively accept "liquidation." The result of this unorthodoxy was to make possible a government in which the reality of popular support was proved by the absence of secret police terrorism. In spite of wartime conditions which made it impossible to prevent the infiltration of enemy agents the respect for due process of law was, by Chinese standards, remarkably high. Though rejecting the name the Communist Party had in practice accepted Sun Yat-sen's theory of "political tutelage" and it is hard to see how, in the Chinese situation, anything else could have functioned effectively at the higher levels of government. But the element of tutelage was more real than with the Kuomintang. At the village level, where the ordinary citizen could understand the issues involved in spite of illiteracy and lack of political experience, the system was genuinely democratic and, in the more advanced areas, there was a considerable degree of effective discussion and popular participation at higher levels. (The whole subject is discussed at greater length in Chapter II, Political and Social Background, of my Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China, New York IPR 1950.)

Besides this there were indications that the Chinese Communist leadership had begun to think about the question, "How can we know that the policies of the Communist Party do in fact represent the masses?" and were beginning to arrive at the obvious answer that this was only possible if the power of the Communist Party dependent on persuasion and if non-Communists had effective powers of criticism and discussion. An editorial in the official Yenan paper went so far as to say, "Only when a party is functionally separate from the government can it be fitted into a system of democracy; * * *." Authoritarianism was a defect that was strongly condemned by the Chinese Communists in the early 1940's and the whole atmosphere of Yenan was felt to be very different from that of Russia by people who had experience of both. And the atmosphere of the front-line areas was freer than Yenan. In pure theory, Mao's lectures on Dialectical Materialism gave an interpretation that was almost certainly unorthodox. (By 1949 this book had, apparently, been completely suppressed.) If one considered these aspects of the Chinese Communist Party it seemed that it was likely to act reasonably in the interests of the Chinese people and to develop in an increasingly democratic and anti-Stalinist direction.

On the other hand, while many Chinese Communists were sensible, reasonable people, the Party also contained many doctrinaire fanatics who were not likely to modify their Marx-Leninist dogmas or their blind faith in the Soviet Union. Although the leaders paid lip service to the importance of discussion and critical thought, the training of Party cadres always suffered from the tendency to inculcate a blind uncritical respect for the authority of the Party. Even in the thinking of the sensible leaders there were elements of contradiction. For example, in an article entitled "The Reconstruction of our Studies" Mao Tse-tung makes a strong argument for genuinely scientific thinking—"seek the truth by referring to fact"—but ends by uncritical praise of the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," "* * * in the whole world, this is still the one perfect model." Judged by everything that Mao has said before the

last two paragraphs he should have condemned his illustration as the perfect model of what to avoid, the distortion of the facts to fit a preconceived view. Finally, in all its official statements on the international situation and nearly all its high-level public statements on theory and policy the Chinese Communist Party had followed the Stalinist line. This is not conclusive evidence that no anti-Stalinist tendencies existed as such public statements would be among the last things likely to change. The Yugolsav Communist Party continued official theoretical support of Stalin and the Soviet Union for a considerable period after the actual breach and it was not until 1950 that theoretical criticism of the Soviet Union appeared. The pre-Hitler German Social Democratic Party retained a revolutionary Marxian theoretical position for decades after it had become a predominantly Trade Union party working in an accepted capitalist system. But the failure of the Chinese Communist Party openly to dissociate itself from the Stalinist position indicated that the reasonable and democratic policies practiced after 1937 might be only a tactical move and that the Party might swing over to the orthodox doctrinaire, authoritarian and terrorist line as soon as it became strong enough to do so with impunity.

There was a similar real problem about whether or not the Kuomintang was capable of developing toward democracy and the evidence also indicated conflicting tendencies.

But these real problems were largely obscured in the public controversy that raged in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom. Anyone who defended the respect for objective standards, which has been a basic part of both the Christian and the scientific traditions in Western civilization, found themselves in conflict over Chinese questions with the extreme anti-Communist groups in America and Britain. The Kuomintang publicity organisation and many Kuomintang supporters had, in practice, accepted the standards common to Stalinism and Hitlerism about what was legitimate in political controversy. Anyone who maintained that it was wrong to invent or suppress historical evidence to serve the interests of any cause inevitably became involved in defence of the Chinese Communist position, because such a large proportion of the attacks on the Chinese Communists were based on statements or assumptions which were completely untrue. One continually met arguments based on the assumption that Communist land policy and methods of government were the same after 1937 as in the Chinese Soviet Republic before 1935. Other arguments assumed that the area round Yenan had remained the only important Communist area throughout the war. It was alleged that Communist-Japanese hostilities had practically ceased after 1939. The evidence of Kuomintang-Japanese collaboration and continuing Kuomintang secret-police terrorism was denied; and so on. Many of these completely false arguments, which only discredit genuine criticism of Chinese Communism, have remained in circulation until the present. (See Appendix II.)

Totalitarians of both sides have been united in denouncing people and institutions who have tried to retain standards of objectivity. Left-wing totalitarian views have been less in evidence in America but it should be pointed out that institutions such as the Institute of Pacific Relations and individual experts such as Professor J. K. Fairbank have been denounced by the genuine Communists and fellow travellers as well as by the anti-Communists (e. g., article by I. Epstein in China Monthly Review of January 1952). For my part, I have attacked those who have tried to falsify the historical record whether from the Communist or the anti-Communist point of view. Appendix III gives the text of an article written in October 1951 for the Manchester Guardian, criticising an official history of the Chinese Communist Party.

Looking back on events, I was too optimistic to begin with and underestimated the strength of the doctrinaire, extremist tendencies in the Chinese Communist Party. But as signs of extremism became more apparent, I more and more stressed that support for the Chinese Communist Party must be dependent on its differences from orthodox Stalinism and that the crucial test for popular support was the absence of secret police terrorism. I also argued that the only sensible policy for the West was to fight on the real issue between democracy and totalitarianism by challenging the good faith of the Chinese Communist Party over its proclaimed objectives of freedom and friendly relations with non-Communist countries. In a memorandum written in 1948 and circulated to Members of Parliament and others interested in Far Eastern policy I urge that Britain should establish contacts with the Communiss and that British representatives in the CP areas should publish strictly factual material about Russian actions in Europe, from which everyone in North China or Man-

churia would draw the obvious conclusions about the similarities of the Soviet and Japanese systems, and that they should offer Chinese Communist representatives facilities for investigation in Germany if these reports were challenged. In a letter to Liu Ning-I in May 1948, I say, "The point which I hope you can make clear to people in the Liberated Areas is that the great majority even of socialist opinion in this country is Anti-Russian simply because they hate secret policy terrorism." I say that if the Chinese Communists really wished for popular support in England or America they should issue a statement "denouncing the Kuomintang secret police, pointing out that the Liberated Areas do not need an organisation like the Kuomintang secret police organisation because the governments really have popular support and then saying that *no government could be called democratic which had to use an organisation like the Kuomintang secret police or the old Japanese Kempetai to keep itself in power.*" I made the same general points in a number of letters published in the British press and in the articles written after a visit to China in 1949. (The relevant passages are reproduced in Appendix IV.)

On the outbreak of the Korean war I supported the U. N. action as being a defence of collective security and argued that if the U. N. had failed to act in Korea it would almost certainly have led to further acts of Stalinist aggression which would have produced a general war. I have been strongly critical of the handling of the Korean situation and of American intervention in Formosa and have maintained that Chinese intervention in Korea could probably have been avoided if earlier action had been taken to control General MacArthur's disloyalty and insubordination as U. N. commander but I have consistently attacked those who have tried to deny that the war was started by North Korean aggression and those who have tried to maintain that Chinese intervention was justified. (The persecution mania about the United States among the Chinese leaders was a fact of which U. N. policy should have taken account; but while this persecution mania explains Chinese intervention it does not justify it.) Appendix V reproduces some of my letters on these points which have appeared in the British press.

Since the degeneration of the Chinese regime towards terrorism and police-state methods after the middle of 1950 I have become steadily more critical of the Chinese Communist Party. In a broadcast (published in the Listener of 31st May 1951), I said, "If the Chinese take Russia as a model China may well develop something like the old Confucian system with the Communist Party in place of the scholar officials and Marxism instead of Confucianism as the official ideology * * *. One can even see the beginnings of a movement in this direction," and, "If the enforcement of a new uniform ideology prevents people from thinking scientifically they will be unable to prevent the degeneration of Chinese society into what Milovan Djilas calls 'bureaucratic centralism,' because they will not be able to understand what is happening. A static China will again face a progressing West." In a letter to the New Statesman on 27th May 1951 I reply to Chinese critics of British policy and argue that the main obstacle to better Sino-British relations was the intransigence of the Chinese government. (See appendix VI.) In a controversy in the Manchester Guardian I criticise Mr. Zilliacus's defence of Chinese terrorism and say, "It is quite true that American action over Formosa and the advance to the Manchurian border played a large part in producing political hysteria in China, but this does not alter the fact that political hysteria is a mental disease with disgusting symptoms. * * * Mr. Zilliacus * * * is here asserting a principle that would equally well excuse Maidenek or Buchenwald because of the part which French intervention in the Ruhr and Rhineland played in the growth of Nazism. As against this Lord Vansittart is entirely right in asserting the principle that all terrorism and massacre should be condemned. One only regrets that he did not apply this principle some years ago by condemning the Kuomintang with the same vigour that he now condemns the Communists." (Letter written 11th May 1951.) In more recent lectures I have argued that the resort of the Chinese regime to terrorism is evidence that it can no longer command popular support.

I have been strongly critical of United States policy in China, not because it opposed Stalinism and Soviet imperialism but because its actual result has been to assist the acceptance of Stalinist views in China, to discredit democracy, and to force China into reliance on the Soviet Union. After my return from a visit to China in 1949 I wrote, "The complete discrediting of America in Chinese eyes has been the work of the group who might be called the Kuomintang fellow travellers, whose attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek has been that of Com-

munist fellow-travellers towards Stalin. * * * This powerful group has made America appear in China as the consistent supporter of the most corrupt and reactionary forces in Chinese society," and, "If China ever becomes a Russian dependency, the best assistants of Russian imperialism will, as usual, have been the doctrinaire anti-Communists." [3] In many public speeches I have said that if General Hurley had accepted a commission from the Soviet government to discredit American influence in China there was scarcely one of his actions he would have needed to change.[4]

I have maintained that, during the period from 1945–49, the State Department was very much better informed about China than the British Foreign Office and that the basic weakness of American policy was the failure of the State Department to stick to its principles against its right-wing critics. A summary of my views is given in an article on The Cold War in the East which appeared in the Political Quarterly for January-March 1951. (Appendix VII.) I have argued that if General Marshall and the State Department had had a free hand over China policy they could have very probably prevented the civil war in China and that a skilful handling of American policy could have put the Chinese Communists in a position in which they either had to break with the Soviet Union and repudiate the doctrinaire Stalinist elements in their position or else break with America and the democratic forces in China over issues on which they would have been violently opposed by all nationalist and democratic Chinese public opinion. I have argued that, in such circumstances, it is very probable that most of the Chinese Communist leaders would have broken with the Soviet Union. If they had not, their chances of success in the civil war would have been very much reduced if they had fought with the active opposition of the great majority of educated Chinese public opinion.

The points on which I disagree with the right-wing critics of the State Department involve the fundamental issues of democracy versus totalitarianism. I have argued that these right-wing groups have in fact accepted the Stalinist assumptions about the nature of the world conflict and the correct forms of political strategy. (See letter reproduced in Appendix V (b) and letters reproduced in Appendix VIII.) As against this I have argued that the most serious danger in the present world conflict is the practical cooperation between extremists of both sides in strengthening each other's influence and in working for a situation in which no disputes can be settled except by war. A short statement of my views was given in a series of broadcasts which I gave last year for the B. B. C. Far Eastern Service which are reproduced in Appendix IX.

I have argued that, in psychological warfare, it is vital to fight on the right issues and that American policy in China failed because, under pressure from the groups in America who supported Stalinist strategy, it always fought on the wrong issues. It has seemed to me the height of folly for a democratic country to try to compete with Stalinism by using Stalinist strategies. In such competition the highly organized and completely unscrupulous professionals are certain to defeat the disunited and slightly half-hearted amateurs. On the other hand I have maintained that Stalinism could be defeated in psychological warfare if democratic countries insisted in fighting on democratic principles.

In writing on American policy in China I have always criticized the failure to stand for democratic principles and the failure to carry out the declared objectives of American policy. As early as January 1946 I wrote that a settlement was only possible if the Americans insisted on the conditions set out in President Truman's statement of 15th December 1945. (See appendix X (a).) In an analysis of American policy written in May 1947 I wrote, "Judged in terms of American objectives the basic mistake in American policy was failure to support the groups that would have been America's natural allies." (The full analysis is given in Appendix X (b).) The Chinese Communists were never challenged on the real issues of their conflicting loyalties to China and to the Soviet Union or on their readiness to repudiate policies of secret-police terrorism and to allow freedom of information and discussion. On the contrary the United

[3] The New China: three views. London. Turnstile Press. 1950, pages 141 and 145.

[4] In view of the controversy about military aid to the Kuomintang, it is worth pointing out that, in 1945, Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer and Commodore Miles told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, "They were all of the opinion that the rebellion in China could be put down by comparatively small assistance to Chiang's Central Government." (Admiral Leahy, I Was There. London Gollancz, 1950, page 395.) An important part of General Hurley's assistance to the Soviet Union was his provision to the U. S. government of completely inaccurate information about both the political and the military situation and his efforts to prevent the transmission of more accurate reports.

States became involved in the support of a corrupt and incompetent police-state regime against a regime which was strikingly more honest and efficient and which, until 1950, could make out a strong case for claiming to be more democratic. Most non-Communist foreign observers in contact with Chinese opinion agree that these policies completely discredited America and made educated Chinese opinion inclined to accept Communism. (Derk Bodde's "Peking Diary" is one example of such reporting.) The Formosan problem is, perhaps, the clearest illustration of the troubles caused by American failure to stand on the principles of American democracy. By every principle of American democracy, going back to the Declaration of Independence, the United States should have supported the efforts of the Formosans to free themselves from intolerable misgovernment, especially since there was no question of Communism involved in the rising of February 1947. If America had then supported Formosan home rule there would now be a Formosan government, either independent or under U. N. trusteeship, which would have represented the great majority of Formosan opinion in asking for support against attack from any totalitarian government on the mainland. Defence of Formosa would be an issue on which the United States could obtain support from democratic opinion throughout the world. Instead, the United States allowed the Kuomintang to suppress the rising by terrorism, including the regular Stalinist technique of killing off the educated natives who were likely to lead any opposition.[5] As a result the defence of Formosa is defensible only in terms of military strategy and has become an issue on which democratic opinion in the free countries is strongly and justifiably critical of American action, and which, therefore, causes disagreements between America and her allies.

It is extremely improbable that the American advocates of totalitarian strategy could have prevented a Kuomintang defeat even if they had had a free hand in determining American policy in China, because they had lost the contact with objective reality which, as George Orwell showed in his brilliant analysis of totalitarianism, is an essential constituent of successful "doublethink." All the arguments that the outcome of the civil war could have been changed by a limited extension of military aid to the Kuomintang depend on completely unrealistic estimates of the relative military strength and general competence of the Kuomintang and the Communists. My estimates of the military prospects in 1946 and 1947 proved to be much more nearly correct than those which were generally accepted at the time. In an analysis written at the end of 1946, based on the experience of the Communist-Japanese fighting, I argued that, even with full-scale American assistance and the use of American troops, it would take the Kuomintang a minimum of four or five years to win the war; that with only limited American assistance the Kuomintang might win positional battles to begin with but would probably end by being completely defeated by the Communists, also in four or five years (Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol. 23, No. 2). By the middle of 1947 I was pointing out that the Kuomintang seemed to have weakened to the point where it could not even win positional battles and suggested that while this might be altered by increased American intervention there was the possibility that full-scale American intervention on one side might produce Russian intervention on the other (Fabian Quarterly, June 1947).

This is not the place for a full discussion of American policy but I would maintain that there is strong evidence to support my general contention that the influence on U. S. policy of such bodies as the China Policy Association and such personalities as Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer, Senators Knowland and McCarthy, Congressman Judd and Mr. Henry Luce has been a major factor in bringing about the victory of Stalinism in China. I would also maintain that there is strong evidence to support my view that the present situation would be much better if U. S. policy had followed the views of those experienced China Service officers who have been denounced and in some cases dismissed for alleged disloyalty. There was, at the least, a reasonable possibility that the policies they advocated might have produced a Chinese government committed to democratic values and opposed to police-state methods and, therefore, aligned with the democracies against Stalinism, even though some of the leading fig-

[5] By an irony of arrangement, Annexe 169 of the American White Paper, which describes the suppression of the Formosan rising by troops with American equipment and which reads rather like the accounts of the establishment of Soviet rule in the Baltic States, is followed immediately by an Annexe in which President Truman declares, ". . . it should be clearly understood that military assistance furnished by the United States would not be diverted for use in fratricidal warfare or to support undemocratic administration."

ures in such a government would have been members of the Chinese Communist Party. Even if such policies had failed to prevent the complete dominance of the Chinese Communist Party by the doctrinaire Stalinist and blindly pro-Russian elements in it and the complete victory in China of such a Communist Party, the American position in the Far East would still be far stronger than it is now. Stalinist dominance in China would have depended far more directly on force and terrorism against a Chinese public opinion which would have been naturally pro-American; and American moral influence and trust in American good faith would be far stronger in other Asian countries.

In conclusion, I would claim that the above account shows that my actions have always been based on a viewpoint completely different both from that of Stalinist Communists or fellow travellers and from that of the right-wing groups in America and Britain who accept the basic Stalinist assumptions on philosophy and political strategy.

Appendix XI gives a short account of my membership of political associations.

SECTION II

I first became acquainted with the publications of the I. P. R. after reaching China in 1938 and, at Yenching University, I was a close friend of the late Mr. Norman Hanwell, an I. P. R. research scholar who was doing very interesting work (unfortunately uncompleted because of his illness and death).

When in the United States in 1946 and 1947 I got to know a number of the staff of the American I. P. R. and gave a number of lectures under their auspices.

After returning to England, I was one of the British delegates, chosen by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, to the World I. P. R. conference at Stratford-on-Avon. After the conference I was invited to become a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

I have been working on a book on the growth of the Chinese Communist areas and the history of Communist-Kuomintang relations between 1937 and 1947. The book is sponsored by the I. P. R. and by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and, in 1949, the I. P. R. financed a visit to China on which I hoped to obtain more material for the book.

I have done some writing for Pacific Affairs, and Far Eastern Survey, largely book reviews, and in 1950 the I. P. R. published a mimeographed edition of my "Notes on Educational Problems in Communist China" which was originally written as a report for an international organisation.

In all my work on Chinese problems I have found publications by the I. P. R. to be among the most useful English-language sources. In the sample of I. P. R. publications, whose accuracy I have been in a position to check, the standards of objectivity and respect for the facts has been extremely high and, judging from the reports of other workers in the Far Eastern field, the work of the I. P. R. is very generally respected among serious scholars.

In the political, social, and economic problems with which the I. P. R. has been concerned, the evidence available is normally insufficient to give a definite decision between a range of alternative hypotheses. This means that there is a range within which scholars genuinely trying to be objective can honestly and legitimately differ, and the material published by the I. P. R. has seemed to me to represent a variety of views within this range. But the standards of scholarship and objectivity which the I. P. R. has tried to preserve imply the rejection of views outside the range which can be supported by an honest examination of the evidence. This has meant that the I. P. R. has been committed to a stand for one side in certain political controversies. To give an example that has now become comparatively uncontroversial, during the years before 1941 the I. P. R. was definitely pro-Chinese in the Sino-Japanese conflict and highly critical of the viewpoint which supported Japan's alleged "civilizing mission" and which advocated that the Western powers should accept the Japanese claims for a special position in China. But the pro-Japanese case was not one which could be supported by any honest examination of the record of Japanese behaviour in Manchuria or China. The argument, used by some influential Americans, that Japan should be conciliated as being the best customer for American cotton ignored the frequent statements in Japanese publications that control of North China was vital to Japan because it would make Japan independent of American cotton supplies. Thus, a refusal to accept views which depended on deliberate distortion or falsification of evidence inevitably put the I. P. R. in a position strongly critical of Japanese policy.

In the present controversies, a good deal of the criticism of the I. P. R. from both the extreme right and the extreme left has been caused by the policy of the I. P. R. in publishing factual material. If the I. P. R. were compelled to change its present standards for standards which reject scholarship and objectivity it would be an important victory for totalitarianism over the traditions of Western civilization.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this third day of June, 1952.

[SEAL] NORTH BURN,
Vice Consul of the United States of America.

Service No. 7671, Item No. 24, Fee $2.00—18s 4d.

APPENDIX I

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO YU KUANG-SHENG (OF NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY IN YENAN), SEPTEMBER 13, 1946

However, Hsin Hua Shih publicity is far better than the publicity of the British or American Communist parties and especially the Soviet Union. Soviet publicity is almost incredibly incompetent. My impression in England was that Soviet publicity was a big factor in producing anti-Soviet feeling, and some of the Labour Party people who want to get Bevin out as Foreign Secretary feel that the attacks made on him by the Communists are one of the main factors keeping him in power. You could see the same sort of result very clearly in the Labour Party conference rejection of Communist affiliation. Even the South Wales Miners Federation, which had elected a Communist as their chairman, voted against affiliation by a large majority apparently because Communist publicity had been so subjective and so dogmatic that even very left-wing workers' organisations distrusted it.

The weaknesses seem to be dogmatism and an extreme subjectivism, which might be called Marxian idealism. They seem to have turned Marx upside down again and got back to a position like Hegel in "Naturphilosophie" of supposing that truth and falsehood can be determined entirely from ideas without reference to the material world.

As far as I could judge, Hsin Hua Shih was often guilty of serious omissions and was sometimes inaccurate through carelessness but it did not go in for deliberate invention or false statements. Soviet and Western Communist publicity, on the other hand, seems to have extremely little respect for facts. I'm carrying on a correspondence with "Soviet News" about an article they had on American intervention in China which was typical of the sort of stuff they put out. Among other things the author tries to make out that American policy was very good before the death of Roosevelt and very bad ever since, which of course means that he has to distort the whole history of the recall of Stilwell and Hurley's press conference on April 5th. Even when the facts support his general case he does not bother to get them right. He argues that it would have been cheaper (sic) both for China and America for the "People's Armies of Liberation" to receive the Japanese surrender rather than to send American and Kuomintang troops to disarm the Japanese. As he writes it, the reader would understand that the Japanese had been disarmed as soon as American and Kuomintang troops got to North China. In general, Soviet publicity makes so many statements that are clearly untrue that people often disbelieve even the true statements.

People who have had to do with the Russians find their subjectivism quite fantastic. My brother had one story about a committee he was on in Berlin. The British had one set of proposals and the Russians quite a different set, and as they could not agree on a compromise the meeting was adjourned for three weeks. At the next meeting the Russians said, "We have a new set of proposals," and produced almost word for word what had been the British proposals at the last meeting. They then said, "These are the Russian proposals and they always have been the Russian proposals." Someone who had been at San Francisco told me a very similar story about the conference. The Russians wanted to change some resolution, which may have been quite a sensible thing to do, but instead of proposing that the original resolution should be changed they proposed that there should be a new resolution and that all mention of the original resolution should be removed from the records of the conference. The man who told me said that

the Russians just did not seem able to understand it when other people said, "But the conference did pass the original resolution and that is a fact which you cannot alter by falsifying the records."

All the stories you hear from people who have been in Europe give you a fairly poor opinion of the Russians. In many ways the Russian army seems to be much more like the Japanese army than the Eighth Route army. All the British army people in Germany are struck by the fact that the difference in treatment between officers and men is much greater in the Russian army than it is in the British (and of course it is much greater in the British than in the Eighth Route). Also, for a long time there was a breakdown in discipline in many units with very widespread looting and raping. This was not just in enemy territory. A friend of mine was over in Denmark recently and he said that people had heard from friends or relations in Bornholm that the Russians had behaved very much worse than the Germans. (The people he was meeting were Danish workers or farmers.) Russian discipline was tightened up several months ago, apparently on orders from Moscow, though by rather brutal methods in which a lot of people were shot, and is now said to be rather better than American discipline.

Another point where the Russians seem to be much more like the Japanese or Kuomintang than they are like the Eighth Route is in secret-police activities. My brother had a lot of stories about it. This is a typical case. A German Communist was arrested in the British zone of Berlin for black-market activities. A day or two later two Russians came to the house of the German policeman who had arrested him and when they found the policeman was not in they carried off his wife. The Russian HQ said they knew nothing about it, but British intelligence got news of where she was and a British patrol went into the Russian zone and found her shut up in a cellar after having been raped and beaten. This is just the sort of thing which might have happened in Peiping if a Chinese policeman had arrested a criminal with Japanese connections.

A lot of the Russian defects seem to have come from the development of an authoritarian tradition. At the moment that seems to be very strong. People who have to do with the Russians say that people on the spot are very much tied down by detailed orders from Moscow and have very little freedom of initiative and also there seems to be a general authoritarian outlook. For example, my bother said he had a long argument with one of the Russians when the Russians wanted to probihit private schools in Germany. The Russian attitude was that there was a correct education and that it was the business of the government to see that all children received this correct education and so all children should go to official government schools. My brother said to him, "Surely what you want is exactly the same as the Nazi policy of Gleichschaltung." The Russian thought about this for a bit and finally said, "Well perhaps our methods are the same as the Nazis', but we are using them for different ends."

I think that is the real point at issue between the Russians and British Socialists—how far the methods the Russians use can produce a democratic Socialist society. For example, in the part of Europe under Russian influence there have been very important reforms. On the other hand, they have usually been put through by rather authoritarian methods and a considerable amount of terrorism by secret police. Once a government starts using secret-police terrorism it automatically produces an irreconcilable opposition and has to go on using secret-police methods against them, and unless it manages to wipe out the opposition without creating other opposition groups in the process it may be extremely difficult ever to get away from authoritarian methods. It seems to me that secret police and terrorism in government are like morphine in medicine. It may be necessary to use them occasionally, but if they are used too long it may be very difficult to stop and they will have a disastrous effect on the whole society.

I think that one of the causes of misunderstanding between Russia and the West is that the Russians don't seem to understand this objection to authoritarian methods and assume that everyone who disagrees with them must do so because they are reactionaries who disagree with their aims. This comes from different theories about democracy. My father wrote a very good article, pointing out that to a very large extent the Russians and the West were talking at cross-purposes when they talked about democracy. The Russians asked, "Whose interest does the government represent?" The Russians would define a democracy as a country in which the government represents the interests of the masses while people in the West would define a democracy as a country in which government was carried on by free discussion and compromise. On the Russian definition America and, until recently, England are not very democratic, while on the Western definition Russia and other eastern European countries are not very democratic.

It seems to me that democracy should really include both definitions. The weakness of a lot of Western argument about democracy, especially in America, is that it ignores the class struggle. It refuses to face the difficulty that free speech and free elections are not in fact sufficient to prevent control of the government by groups representing interests opposed to the mass of the people. You would probably agree with criticisms of Western democracy on these lines; so I need not expand the point.

On the other hand the weakness of Communist theory is that it ignores the dangers of authoritarian organisation. It does not face the difficulty that unless there is effective free criticism and unless people can turn out a government they do not like there is no guarantee that the government will remain responsive to popular opinion. It seems to me that the Chinese party is the only one which has begun to face the question and that the Russian and European parties are still about at the stage of the Chinese party in 1935 or earlier. If you once start to ask, "How can we guarantee that the party will remain in touch with the masses and responsive to popular opinion?" it seems to me that you must be led to something like Mao Tse-tung's views about the 3–3 system. That is, the party must be separate from the government and be in a position where it only has power in the government by providing leadership which can gain the support of freely elected non-Communists. Where the system is working properly that automatically means that the Party has to adjust its program in response to popular opinion, has to know how to discuss its policy and to get along with non-Communists and has to face continual informed criticism and suggestions. My main criticism was that the Chinese Party had not fully worked out the theoretical implications of experiences for organisation within the party. I don't know if Po Ku ever showed you the long manuscript I wrote called What's Wrong with Yenan. The point I tried to show was that general standards of efficiency in most Yenan organisations were very much lower than in similar organisations at the front largely because they were much more one-party organisation which, because of Communist theories on party organisation, meant that they did not face continuous and effective criticism. I think there is little doubt about the low standards at Yenan. Almost everyone I knew who came to Yenan from the front noticed it, but you may not agree with my diagnosis. My theory was that at the front most organisations were subject to continual criticism. In the government there were able non-Communists who were free to criticize and in army organisation there was the continual test of the military struggle which amounted to very effective criticism from the Japanese. When an organisation was not engaged in a competitive struggle and did not have important non-Communist participation it was not subject to any effective criticism because of the Communist rule about not criticising party decisions. It seemed to me that the results of this rule were that in a Communist organisation mistakes were never corrected until their bad effects had become obvious to the party leaders. In What's Wrong with Yenan I gave examples of cases where most people recognised that things were wrong but no one did anything because the defects were connected with some party decision. Actually Yenan was never very bad because there was the general anti-authoritarian tradition and non-Communist participation, though not very effective, in the government. Also the organisation was so small that the leaders became aware of mistakes before they became really serious.

It seems to me that the big drop in administrative efficiency between 3–3 organisations and party organisations has important implications for party organisation. It implies that the best form of party organisation is relative to the situation. Lenin's views about the necessity for a centralised organisation which was authoritarian in the sense of not allowing discussion in the carrying out of policies which had been decided by the party are quite correct for a party carrying out a revolution. For dealing with this sort of situation an organisation must be largely authoritarian because quickness and decisiveness in action are so important. On the other hand as soon as you get a situation in which quickness and decisiveness in action are less important, then the loss in efficiency caused by the limitation of discussion and criticism becomes serious. As a result I don't think you can generalize about the best form of organisation and the fact that all Communist parties have adopted the same form of organisation has had important consequences. Communist parties operating in the type of situation for which the organisation was designed have been relatively successful while parties operating in Western democracies where the organisation is not suitable have been relatively unsuccessful.

To come back to Russia, my impression is that the Russian party has never even asked the question, "how can we guarantee that the party will remain in touch with the masses and responsive to popular opinion?" and that the same is true of most Western Parties. They seem to assume it as self-evident that the Party is the representative of the masses and that decisions of the Party are the only correct policy representing the interests of the masses. This has naturally made them authoritarian. If you believe that you certainly represent the people and that you know with certainty what should be done in the interests of the people you are naturally impatient of criticism and discussion and think that the best form of organisation is one which enables you to put your policies into practice as quickly as possible. Of course there is a lot of disagreement about what the Russian organisation is like but it seems to me that there is fairly strong evidence that it is authoritarian in the sense that there is not general freedom of criticism of government policies and that the government puts through the policies it thinks correct without very much concern for popular opinion, or perhaps you might say that the actions of the government are limited not by what the people would want if they knew and could discuss possible alternatives but by what the government can persuade them to want with a monopoly of publicity. I think you could confirm that judgement entirely from Communist sources. There are several good examples in the official Short History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.

I feel that a lot of the trouble in Europe has come from this Communist authoritarianism. If the Russian army had maintained proper discipline and the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe tried to set up united-front governments which were democratic in the Western sense as well as in the Russian sense there might have been quite a rapid political settlement which would have left the really reactionary opposition as a group too small to be dangerous. In fact the bad discipline of the Russian army produced a lot of anti-Communist feeling so that where there were fairly free elections in Hungary and Austria the biggest vote went to Catholic parties with strong reactionary elements. In countries like Poland or Yugoslavia there seems to be a vicious circle of Communist authoritarianism producing so much opposition that the government dare not allow free elections; this in turn makes more of the opposition side with the extreme reactionaries who want violent resistance to the government which in turn makes it necessary for the government to be still more authoritarian. The only country which seems to be progressing is Czechoslovakia where there was a real tradition of democracy in the Western sense.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX II

SOME POPULAR FALLACIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM

The importance of continued publication of factually accurate accounts of recent Chinese history is shown by the recurrence in comparatively reputable publications of arguments based on simple and definite errors of fact. This appendix gives only a few of the simpler examples.

A whole series of arguments have been based on the assumption that the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area around Yenan was the most important Communist base area throughout the war. E. g., "undoubtedly, the organization of the Communists was good, but their forces were concentrated into a specific area [sic] which made matters easy for them. The Central Government suffered from the drawbacks of geography, with their forces sprawling awkwardly over vast areas both unmanaged and unmanageable with transport problems that were insoluble. (General Carton de Wiart, "Happy Odessey," London 1950, page 268.) "Americans on conducted tours also failed to take into account that 'land reform' was comparatively easy in the sparsely populated Northwest left practically unmolested by Japan [sic]. Only a few perspicacious correspondents realized that the National Government, whose armies had to bear the main brunt of the Japanese attack, could not, even if it had wished, have instituted 'agrarian reform' in the midst of war and blockade." (Freda Utley, The China Story, Chicago, 1951, page 140.) G. F. Winfield uses a slightly similar argument about Communist land reform being easy because the Northwest was one of the few areas in China where there was some good uncultivated land. (China: The Land and the People, New York, 1948.)

In fact, the population of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area was never over two million and, even by the summer of 1938, some of the Communist base areas in Shansi and Hopei had much larger populations. By 1940 Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia had become one of the smallest of the Communist areas which extended to Shantung in the East and the Yangtze valley in the South and by the end of the war the total population under Communist control had risen to about one hundred million. (The first map in Appendix B of the Bolton Report shows the position at VJ-Day.)

Thus the arguments that the Kuomintang suffered from greater transport difficulties than the Communists and that Communist agrarian reform depended on the specially favourable conditions of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area are based on assumptions which are the exact reverse of the truth. Kuomintang communications may have been poor but they were almost all through territory under continuous Kuomintang control; while the Communist areas were cut up by strips of Japanese-held territory, in some cases 20 or 30 miles wide and strongly fortified, which could only be crossed by fairly dangerous night marches. Large parts of the Kuomintang area, including the whole of Szechuan, saw no fighting throughout the war, except for air raids on the cities, while all the Communist areas except Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia were overrun repeatedly in the course of Japanese mopping-up campaigns; but this did not prevent agrarian reforms being carried out in the front-line Communist areas. The reorganisation of taxation and public finance was actually further advanced in the front-line Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base area than in Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia.

It is also frequently alleged that Communist-Japanese hostilities practically ceased after 1939 (the allegation is made, for example, in the Bolton Report and in Freda Utley's China Story). But the biggest Communist offensive which put some Japanese-held railways out of action for a period was in the summer of 1940 and was reported by the National Government spokesman at news conferences in Chungking. The largest Japanese offensives against the Communist areas came in the period from 1941 to 1943 and evidence of widespread hostilities was seen by the various foreign observers who were in the front-line areas from 1941 on.

Another fallacy which occurs in the Bolton Report is the argument that Communist land policy was always simply redistribution of land (pp. 19–20) while, in fact, the agrarian reform policy between 1938 and 1946 was based on the reform measures which had been passed but never enforced by the National Government at Nanking.

These examples have been chosen because the errors of fact involved are simple and obvious, but the list could be greatly extended.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX III

1921 AND ALL THAT

Review, written for Manchester Guardian, of an official history of the Chinese Communist Party that appeared in 1951 in "People's Cihna"

The official Chinese-English language magazine People's China has been commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party with a series of articles on the history of the Party by Hu Chiao-mu, Vice Director of the Party's Propaganda Department. These articles give very little information that has not already been published in English but they do give a very revealing picture of the mental climate of present day China.

It is interesting to compare these articles with the history of the Party that was given to Anna Louise Strong at Yenan in 1946–7. The description of Communist relations with the leaders of the Fukien revolt in 1933 provides a good illustration of the difference. The 1947 version is short enough to quote in full. "The leadership of the dogmatists cost us heavily," said Lu Ting-yi, giving the present Communist view. "When we were in Kiangsi we were offered an alliance with the Fukien general Ts'ai Ting-kai, the hero of Shanghai's 1932 resistance to Japan. The opposed Chiang's appeasement of Japan and was willing to cooperate with us. Our dogmatists were too orthodox to have a united front with 'that bourgeoise' and thus we lost the chance of victory." (Dawn Out of China, by Anna Louise Strong, People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1948, page 18). In the 1951 version given by Hu Chiao-mu we are told that the Fukien

leaders "sought to unite with the Communists"; that the Communists had made a declaration in favour of an anti-Japanese united front; and that "the leadership of the Party, between 1931 and 1934 committed new, serious 'left' mistakes" (People's China, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 15–16). But we are left to guess that one of these mistakes was a failure to reach an agreement for cooperation with the Fukien leaders. The readiness to face facts and to exercise critical judgment that still characterized Chinese Communist thinking in 1947 has been replaced by an apparent fear of making any definite statement that might prove unorthodox.

The result is to produce a highly formalized version of history in which a decisive role is played by the ideological struggle between the invariably correct views of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin and the erroneous views of various deviationists. If this emphasis on the importance of the ideas of individual leaders represented a reaction from a rigidly determinist Marxism it would be a sign of progress. Unfortunately the assumption that ideas play an independent, and often decisive role in history is nowhere integrated or even reconciled with the rather doctrinaire Marxism which characterizes other parts of the narrative. The orthodox scheme in which the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin must be not only correct but also obviously correct makes it impossible to give any rational explanation of the views of their opponents. We are back in the old fashioned history where men just say to themselves, "I am determined to prove a villain."

Events which do not fit into this highly conventionalized version of history are usually simply ignored and the gaps are especially noticeable in the period up to 1928 when a serious Communist set-back has to be explained away. For example, most authorities on this period attach considerable importance to the various Comintern advisers who were active in China. The Soviet sources who provided the information for Louis Fischer's The Soviets in World Affairs describe Borodin as exercising an important influence on both Communist and Kuomintang policy and place a large part of the blame for the Communist defeat on the rival Comintern adviser who opposed his policy. Roy, in his Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China, claims that a number of important Communist decisions were the result of instructions which he gave as representative of the Comintern. Even short histories of the period usually connect the reorganisation of the Canton government under a Kuomintang-Communist united front with the Sun Yat-sen-Joffe declaration of January 1923. But in Hu Chiao-mu's narrative all the Comintern representatives have vanished without trace. The only Russian influence which is admitted is wise advice from Stalin and responsibility for all Communist decisions is placed entirely on the Chinese leaders of the time.

It is interesting that the other important authority who agrees with Hu Chiao-mu is Chiang Kai-shek. The chapters of China's Destiny which describe the period from 1923–27 also make no mention of the Comintern advisers in the Kuomintang and Communist organizations. Unfortunately neither Hu Chiao-mu nor Chiang Kai-shek give any reasons to justify their assumption that the Comintern advisers were too unimportant to be worth mentioning.

Again, Hu Chiao-mu describes Chiang Kai-shek as "the Right-wing KMT commander in chief of the National Revolutionary Army of the time who "had already organized an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet conspiracy on March 20th, 1926 * * *" and who "at the end of 1926 * * * turned his headquarters at Nanchang into a centre of opposition to the Left-wing of the KMT at Hankow" (People's China. Vol. IV. No. 2. page 12). All this is quite correct but nothing is said about the line of the international Communist press which continued to praise Chiang Kai-shek as the loyal revolutionary leader right up to the Shanghai *coup* of April 1927 and denounced all prophecies of an impending split as counter-revolutionary attempts to weaken the revolutionary forces. After the Communist defeat Stalin defended his policy by pointing out various passages in his speeches in which he had advised the Chinese CP to build up their organisation in the Chinese armed forces in preparation for a split with the KMT. If the Chinese CP had consisted of highly disciplined revolutionaries it might have been possible to make effective preparations to fight Chiang Kai-shek while publicly proclaiming completed trust in him as a loyal revolutionary leader. But the majority of the Chinese Communists were comparatively untrained enthusiasts who tended to believe what they read in the Communist press so that effective preparations to resist Chiang Kai-shek were incompatible with acceptance of the Comintern line on publicity. When the Chinese Communists faced a similar problem during the second united front period they acted quite differently. In 1943, when the Communist leadership thought that there was a real

danger of a general Kuomintang offensive against the Communist areas, the Communist press at once started to attack Chiang Kai-shek and to expose his cooperation with the Japanese against the Communists. And his policy was defended as a lesson learnt from the mistakes of 1926–7. Thus, even if one accepts the explanations which Stalin gave after the event, it would seem that his propaganda policy in 1926–7 was mistaken and weakened his allies more effectively than it deceived his enemies. If, on the contrary, the Comintern press line up to April 1927 represented the real beliefs of the CPSU leaders than it is clear that their estimates of the Chinese situation were seriously mistaken.

If history must teach the lesson that Stalin and the CPSU are always right, then the record of events must be distorted in the sort of way in which Hu Chiao-mu distorts it. If this orthodox version of history is to be secure against overthrow by anyone with a sufficiently critical and scientific attitude to investigate the original sources, then these original sources must be suppressed. So far the process may only have got to the stage where it would be unhealthy for any Chinese historian to point out the obvious gaps in this official version of history; but Hu Chiao-mu has committed the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party to a policy whose logical conclusion is the activities of George Orwell's Ministry of Truth.

In dealing with later periods when the Chinese Communist Party was generally successful there are not such striking gaps in the record of events though a great deal of the narrative is still very controversial. One of the more interesting sections is that which deals with the negotiations in 1945–6. Here Hu Chiao-mu seems to be undecided between two objectives. On the one hand he wishes to show that the Chinese CP really wanted peace and, therefore, did its best to reach an agreement with the KMT which would have prevented the civil war. On the other hand he wishes to show that the Chinese CP knew from the start that both the KMT and the Americans were determined on war and, therefore, did not allow itself to be tricked into making any concessions that would weaken its military position. On the whole, it seems to be the latter objective which predominates, and as a result, Hu Chiao-mu leaves out some of the evidence which shows that the Chinese CP acted with more good faith than either the KMT or the Americans. The Chinese CP did, in fact, carry its effort to reach a peaceful settlement to the point of making concessions which quite seriously weakened its military position. Under the agreement of 10th October 1945, the Communists evacuated quite large areas south of the Yangtse in which they could almost certainly have maintained guerrilla bases and which they did not in fact recover until 1949. Again, while the demobilisation agreements were almost completely evaded by the Kuomintang, in some important Communist areas a third of the regular army had been demobilised by the end of March 1946.

Hu Chiao-mu spoils his case against America by exaggeration. The American attempts at mediation are represented as nothing but devices to gain time for Chiang Kai-shek's military preparations and the whole of the American government organisation is represented as being united in a policy of supporting the Kuomintang in a civil war. By taking this line Hu Chiao-mu precludes himself from making the criticism of American policy for which there really is strong evidence; that, while defeating Japan, America had become infected with the disease that proved fatal to the Japanese political system. The more responsible and better informed Americans who really wished to mediate a peaceful settlement in China were unable to control the military leaders who followed their own line in Chinese politics and the equally ignorant and irresponsible extremists who supported them at home, just as the more responsible Japanese statesmen could never control the military hotheads or the ultrapatriotic political gangster organisations.

Here again Hu Chiao-mu finds himself in strange company. He is revising the record of events in exactly the same way as it is being revised in America. Under pressure from Senator McCarthy and the Kuomintang lobby, the American statesmen whose words and actions in 1945–6 indicated a genuine desire to act as honest mediators in the Chinese dispute now try to show that they were always really in favour of supporting the Kuomintang in a civil war.

No doubt Hu Chiao-mu has managed to persuade himself that his revision of history serves the cause of peace and the interests of the Chinese people. But if he could discard the blinkers of Stalinist orthodoxy, he would see that he is actually fighting side by side with such men as Senator Knowland and Henry Luce. The version of history for whose acceptance they are all fighting is one in which no Communist can hope for peaceful agreement with an non-Communist American and in which no American can hope for peaceful agreement with any

Communist; in short, a version of history in which war is inevitable. The only Chinese interests which are served by such a revision of history are those of the Kuomintang regime in Formosa whose only hope of return to power in China lies in a new world war.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX IV (A)

LETTER PUBLISHED IN NEW STATESMAN

BALLIOL COLLEGE,
Oxford, 27/3/48.

SIR: The following analysis may explain why Communism under Russian influence has led to results which democratic socialists are compelled to repudiate.

Firstly, Communists tend to believe that Marx-Leninism is an exact science from which they can deduce with absolute certainty the policies required by the interests of the masses. (The official "Short History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union" suggests that Marx-Leninism is as exact a science as biology). This inevitably produces a tendency to treat the ordinary workers who are not Marx-Leninist scholars like children who do not know what is good for them and whose wishes must be overruled in their own interests.

Secondly, Communists tend to be influenced by the Hegelian element in Marxism and to believe that abstract concepts such as classes or the socialist state are realities superior to the individuals who compose them. This leads to a readiness to sacrifice human beings to ideas (cf. Gorki's remark that Lenin treated the Russian people as a scientist treats his experimental material). It leads to a belief that the Communist Party representing the masses is an *a priori* truth which does not need to be validated by regular testing against actual mass opinion. The theoretical simplicity of "liquidating a class" has made Communists ignore the vicious circle inherent in police-state methods—the people who form an opposition class cannot, in practice, be "liquidated" without making other people into a new opposition.

The striking thing about East European Communist Parties is their contempt for the intelligence of the masses. Communists claim that the Communist-led governments of Eastern Europe enjoy general popular support. (If this were so then scrupulously fair elections could give irrefutable proof of popular support for Communism.) But they also claim that it has been necessary to dissolve or purge opposition parties and prevent the free expression of opposition views before holding elections. The two claims are only consistent on the assumption that the average worker or peasant in Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., is so stupid that, if he is allowed to hear arguments against Communism as well as arguments for it, he will vote for parties which wish to enslave and exploit him instead of for a party that offers him freedom and prosperity.

The Russians act on the assumption that nearly all Soviet citizens are so weak-minded that their belief in Communism and loyalty to their country would be corrupted by any first-hand contact with the non-Communist West. The size and powers of the Russian secret police would seem to show that a generation of Communist government and liquidating the opposition has left cleavages in Russian society more bitter than those in capitalist democracies.

It is only in China that a Communist Party has shown a genuine respect for popular opinion and has tried to secure an objective correspondence between Communist policies and the desires of the masses. The wartime experience of the Chinese Liberated Areas is conclusive proof that New Democratic governments which really have wholehearted mass support can deal with enemy and fascist agents supported by a small opposition class without resorting to Russian style secret police terrorism.

It is possible to agree with much of the Communist criticism of Social Democracy, but the striking practical defects of the alternative offered by Communism have been a major factor in making progressive opinion in the West tolerant of reaction as the lesser evil. Communist doctrinaires and the Russian secret police have been the most effective assistants of world reaction.

Yours, etc.,

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

APPENDIX IV (B)

[From the Times of 25th January 1949]

COMMUNISM IN CHINA

SIR: Mr. Samson's conclusion that the Chinese Communist leaders are in favour of Communism is hardly new or surprising. Over three years ago (The Times of January 17, 1946) your own Special Correspondent lately in China wrote that "* * * the Chinese Communist Party is definitely Communist in its basic principles and its party organisation." The real question is whether one objects to Communism even if it is based on popular support or whether one objects only to the use of terrorism and deceit by a minority to force through Communist policies regardless of human suffering or the wishes of the masses. Strong elements in the Chinese Communist Party have taken the line that Communist power should be based on popular support. In Mao Tse-tung's report to the 1945 Party Congress one finds such statements as "Our starting point is to serve the Chinese people earnestly and wholeheartedly * * *" and "Authoritarianism is wrong in all kinds of work * * *" The economic policies of New Democracy fit into this pattern by providing a possible transition to Socialism without a drastic reduction in the general standard of living. For a period in 1946 and 1947 the more extremist doctrinaire elements in the Chinese Communist Party seemed to be in the ascendant. But recent developments seem to show that the party has returned to the policy of basing its power on popular support through providing honest administration and respecting public opinion in the policies which are applied.

It is unfortunate that British policy towards China, insofar as it has existed at all, has usually played the role assigned to it by Cominform propaganda. British, and still more American, policy towards China has given left-wing Chinese opinion quite reasonable grounds for accepting the Cominform analysis of world affairs. Cominform attacks on the Marshall plan must appear reasonable if it is judged by analogy with the workings of UNRRA in China. (See your own special correspondent's comments in The Times of September 20, 1947.) The British reaction to elections with no opposition candidates and to secret police terrorism in Kuomintang China has been very different from the reaction to similar events in Eastern Europe. In spite of statements by the Chinese Communist leaders that they would welcome friendly relations with foreign countries besides Russia, no attempts have been made to penetrate the "iron curtain" in China imposed from the anti-Communist side. If present British policy continues, the leaders of the new regime in China will have had every reason to suppose that they face irreconcilable hostility from non-Communist countries, regardless of whether or not they represent majority opinion in China and whether or not they allow greater freedom than the old regime. This would make dependence on Russia unavoidable.

The only way in which this country can maintain British prestige in China and assist the new Chinese regime to genuine independence is by proving that the British people dislike government based on terrorism, either Communist or non-Communist, but that they would welcome friendly relations with any regime enjoying popular support, also either Communist or non-Communist. British policy should, therefore, make the experiment of assuming that the Chinese Communists are acting in good faith when they say that they would like friendly cooperation with other powers besides Russia and that they intend to maintain democratic liberties. British cultural and commercial contacts should at once be extended to the Communist areas and the possibilities of cooperation explored on the merits of the case in China.

If cooperation on these lines proved possible it would greatly raise British prestige in China, would greatly help in securing Chinese independence, and might even have an important influence on the world situation. Even if the experiment failed through Communist bad faith it would still be better than present policy. If this country made a sincere attempt to establish friendly relations with the new regime and was rebuffed by Communist prejudice it would then be more difficult for the Communists to obtain popular support for a policy aligned solely towards Russia against the interests of the Chinese people.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

84, Sunny Bank, Hull.

Appendix IV (c)

Extracts From New Statesman, Articles 1949, From New China: Three Views, pp. 147–150

(P. 147) * * * While the official British attitude toward Communism is one of unqualified opposition, every Communist is bound to treat the British authorities as declared enemies and accept the doctrinaire thesis of two irreconcilable factions in the world. But the position would be altered if the British authorities formulated the grounds of their opposition to Communism in a way which would command general support in England. Most people in England dislike Stalin's Communism because of its similarities to Hitler's National Socialism and would have very different feelings about any form of Communism which did not share these similarities. The principles involved are simple: The techniques by which the Nazis seized and held power are those which enable an organized minority to control and exploit the rest of the population. If any Communist regime uses the Nazi techniques of government—secret-police terrorism against all organized opposition or criticism and isolation of the masses from all information except highly distorted propaganda—this shows that the claim of the Communist Party to represent the masses is no better than that of the Nazis to represent the German people. And, in such regimes, the dominant secret-police organizations have a strong vested interest in a continuing threat of war.

Such a formulation of policy would involve an internal struggle against the extreme anti-Communists who have no objection to the Nazi techniques of government when used by anti-Communist regimes, by Chiang Kai-shek or Franco, and who would not accept a difference in principle between Communism based on terrorism and Communism based on mass support. But such a distinction would provide a rational basis for British foreign policy, with applications extending far beyond China. It would be possible to give both recognition and approval to the Chinese regime, insofar as it applied Mao Tse-tung's "scientific" interpretation of Communist principles, and quite consistently to oppose Communism in Malaya and Europe.

Such principles would not, at present, command agreement within the Chinese Communist Party, though they might well do so among the non-Communist elements in the regime. They would, however, reduce the basic disgreement between Britain and China from a fundamental conflict of principle to a dispute about facts, the truth or falsity of the claims of various Communist parties to represent the masses. (Such a development would destroy the whole mental world of the real doctrinaires both in China and England and would, therefore, produce violent emotional reactions.) Furthermore, if this diagnosis of the Russian regime is correct, it is likely that increased contact with Russia would lead the members of the Chinese Communist Party who really wished to serve the masses into agreement with the British position. * * *

(P. 150) With much smaller responsibilities in China, the British authorities have avoided the spectacular blunders of the Americans, but British policy has been extremely ineffective. China faces a choice between two roads of development; the one, based on the "scientific" interpretation of Marxism, toward a form of Communism which would really serve the people and could become fully democratic; the other, based on the "doctrinaire" interpretation, along the Russian road of degeneration toward "oligarchical collectivism" which could produce something like the traditional Chinese social structure but with Marxian instead of Confucian orthodoxy as the ideology of the ruling bureaucracy. Both tendencies exist and the British people have every reason for wishing the former to prevail. In fact, however, through lack of principles, lack of imagination, and lack of courage, perhaps all traceable to class prejudice, the British authorities have done almost nothing to encourage the democratic forces in China but, by both action and inaction, have done a good deal to strengthen the worst "doctrinaire" tendencies in Chinese Communism. Great opportunities have already been lost but it is still true that the essentials for an effective British policy are the repudiation of the anti-Communist doctrinaires and the formulation of rational principles of democratic policy.

Lindsay of Birker.

Appendix V (a)

Letters to the Manchester Guardian

29th September 1950.

Sir: The North Korean peace proposals reported in your issue of September 28th are likely to be repeated and developed and may form the basis of plausible arguments that any continuation of the fighting is proof that the U. N. forces are acting for American interests and not for collective security. It is, therefore, very important that the U. N. should announce conditions under which it would cease military action and should make absolutely clear the relation of such conditions to the basic principle of collective security, that rulers who resort to armed aggression as an instrument of policy cannot be allowed to benefit by it.

A condition which would meet these requirements, and whose inclusion might render something like the North Korean proposals acceptable, is this: that the responsible leaders of the North Korean regime should put themselves and their archives at the disposal of a tribunal investigating the responsibility for the war. If the North Korean leaders could substantiate the claims of their own propaganda, they would have nothing to fear from such a tribunal. If, on the contrary, it could be substantiated beyond reasonable doubt that it was the unscrupulous ambition or fanaticism of the North Korean leaders, or their subservience to foreign advice, which has led to the devastation of their country and the sacrifice of thousands of lives, then it is important that they should not be allowed to retire unpunished and free to repeat their behaviour at the next opportunity.

Yours, etc.

Michael Lindsay.

Appendix V (b)

Letter to Listener

21/1/51.

Sir: While accusing the British press of failing to report the full story of the origins of the Korean war, Sir John Pratt states a case that depends on the omission of important evidence, in particular, the report of the U. N. Commission dated June 24th on their tour of the frontier. This stated that "South Korea army is organised entirely for defence and is in no condition to carry out attack on large scale against forces of North" (Annexe J. of British White Paper, Cmd. 8078 of 1950). Apart from this Sir John Pratt's case depends on equating South Korean words with North Korean deeds. The South Koreans made threats which their forces were completely incapable of carrying out. Whatever happened on June 25th, the North Koreans had an army vastly superior in offensive weapons and proceeded to use it in an attempt to conquer the whole of Korea, in which they nearly succeeded.

There is strong evidence to support the charges that General MacArthur and his political associates would like to embroil the United States and, if possible, the United Nations in a war with China. But the ability of this group to influence policy has depended at every crucial point on Communist assistance. Suppose the North Korean army had remained on the 38th parallel where it could have repulsed with ease any South Korean attack. And it is almost certain that the North Korean government, set up by the Russians and dependent on Russian military supplies, would have accepted Russian advice against taking the offensive. There would then have been nothing to justify U. N. military support for South Korea and no foreign forces would have supported any South Korean attack. Suppose that the Chinese government, instead of actively applauding the North Korean attempt to settle the Korean problem by war, had exerted its influence in favour of a peaceful settlement. There would then have been no pretext for U. S. intervention in Formosa and it is practically certain that China would by now have obtained both Formosa and the seat on the U. N. Suppose that, even now, the Communists were to indicate their desire for a peaceful settlement, as opposed to a settlement which would give them the fruits of victory without fighting. It is certain that the attempt to brand China as an aggressor would fail.

Sir John Pratt discredits his largely sound case against General MacArthur by his refusal to criticize the more fanatical, but equally unscrupulous and irresponsible men on the Communist side who combine professions of violent hostility against the extreme anti-Communists with practical collaboration in opposing every attempt to settle international disputes without resort to war.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

APPENDIX V (C)

LETTER TO LISTENER

84, SUNNY BANK, HULL, *4/2/51.*

SIR: Sir John Pratt still says nothing about the most obvious fact of the Korean war—that the North Koreans had an army vastly superior to the South Koreans in equipment and preparation and used it in an attempt to conquer all Korea. In the ordinary use of words such an attempt at conquest is aggression. Even if he could substantiate his allegations that the South Koreans were crazy enough to attack a far better armed opponent and that the members of the U. N. Commission faked their evidence to cover up this attack, Sir John Pratt would still not have proved his case. He would only have shown that the North Koreans could plead provocation as an extenuation for their aggression. He would not have shown that the U. N. decision to support South Korea against aggression was wrong but only that it was taken before the evidence had become conclusive. His arguments are irrelevant to the main contention of my previous letter—that, whatever actually happened on or before June 25th, the involvement of U. N. forces in a Korean war and all that has followed from this could have been prevented by a North Korean decision to remain on the defensive along the 38th parallel.

The question of principle involved is whether there is such a thing as a right of self-defence against anticipated attack? When the government of country A is convinced that some other country has aggressive intentions and that military intervention in country B is essential for defence against this anticipated aggression, has country A the right to resort to such military intervention without being condemned as an aggressor? Sir John Pratt seems to consider that North Korea and China had such a right; the Americans invoked the principle to justify their intervention in Formosa. In all these cases the evidence of aggressive intentions was by no means conclusive, but, quite apart from this, the principle itself is indefensible. In the present state of mutual suspicion in the world the assertion of a right of anticipatory self-defence is almost certain to produce a chain reaction in which the extremists of both sides cooperate in extending the scale of any conflict. The original North Korean offensive, the American intervention in Formosa and General MacArthur's advance to the Manchurian border, and the Chinese intervention in Korea are stages in such a chain reaction. If the principle of anticipatory self-defence is rejected as incompatible with world peace, then all these stages should be condemned.

I would suggest that a good definition of a warmonger is a man who claims the right of anticipatory self-defence for his own side but rejects it for the other.

Yours etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.
LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX VI

LETTER TO NEW STATESMAN AND NATION

84 SUNNY BANK, HULL, *27/5/51.*

SIR: Some of the points raised by Mr. Tsou confirm Critic's contentions rather than his own. The issue of the British consulate at T'aipei is one of the points which have led the British authorities to suspect that the Chinese Government does not want normal diplomatic relations. It has been the estabished precedent for a consulate to deal with the de facto authorities in its area without prejudice to relations with the recognised government. Foreign consulates

continued to operate in Manchukuo and foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, retained consulates in the Japanese occupied areas under the Wang K'e-min or Wang Ching-wei puppet governments. So far as I know, neither Chungking nor Yenan ever protested that this showed unfriendliness towards China. The Chinese Government is now trying to establish a completely new precedent in international relations and is demanding British acceptance of its decision as a condition for accepting normal diplomatic relations.

Again, Mr. Tsou deduces British unfriendliness from an incident in which a visa was refused to one member of a Chinese delegation against whom the British authorities alleged personal objections although the other members were given visas at a few days notice. What, then, should we deduce from the Chinese response to British applications for visas or exit permits? Over 90 percent of official British requests for visas have been refused and the normal delay in granting a visa has been a matter of months.

One might also ask Mr. Tsou to imagine the Chinese reaction to British "friendship" delegation which modelled its conduct on that of the Chinese delegation which did visit this country. Suppose that a British "friendship" delegation were to allow its contacts with representatives of the Chinese Government or the party controlling that Government to be restricted to a single meeting which was made the occasion for reading a speech denouncing the Chinese leaders as puppets of Moscow. It is fairly certain that such behaviour would be taken as clear evidence of British ill will, and that no visas would be granted to any persons who wished to visit China under the same auspices.

Mr. Dean Rusk's recent assertions that the Chinese Government was a Russian colonial regime and that the Kuomintang really represented the Chinese people have been widely criticised as completely contrary to the evidence and as ruling out any possibility of any peaceful agreement with China. But numerous Chinese official statements have denounced the British Government as an American colonial regime and claimed that the British Communist Party really represents the British people. Such statements are quite as contrary to the evidence as Mr. Rusk's and create the same obstacles to any improvement in relations.

Many people in this country would agree with Mr. Tsou in regretting the rather half hearted stand which the British Government has taken in supporting Chinese claims which they believed to be just—the U. N. seat, Formosa and representation in settling the Japanese peace treaty. But the British authorities could take a much stronger stand in supporting Chinese claims if they had some reason to believe that a response from the Chinese side would enable them to refute their critics at home and abroad by reaching a fair negotiated settlement of Sino-British differences. In fact, Chinese statements have led the British authorities to suspect that nothing short of the subordination of British policy to Communist control would produce a response from the Chinese side. Given this complete lack of encouragement from China even the rather half hearted British actions indicate a very genuine desire for better relations.

The real issue between Britain and China is that the British Government believes that Russian imperialism is a far more serious danger than American imperialism while the Chinese Government holds the opposite opinion. Both could produce some valid evidence in support of their views and in both countries actions motivated by fear are taken by the other country as evidence of aggressive intentions. In this sort of situation the most urgent necessity is the development of mutual understanding based on a determination to find out the real facts and a desire to understand the position of the other side. What is alarming in the present Chinese position is the rejection of the frank discussion of differences which is the essential basis for any such understanding. A few years ago the obstacles to Sino-British understanding came preponderantly from the British side. But more recently an increasing British reasonableness has coincided with a growing Chinese intransigence. The best assistance which Mr. Tsou or your correspondents from Tsinghua could give to those in the West who are opposing MacArthurism would be to denounce the Chinese exponents of the Communist equivalent of MacArthurism.

Yours etc.

Michael Lindsay.
Lindsay of Birker.

Appendix VII

[Political Quarterly, vol. XXII, No. 1, January–March 1951]

The Cold War in the East

By Michael Lindsay

The most obvious feature of the cold war in the East is that it has been anything but *cold*. In Europe actual fighting has been confined to guerrilla warfare in Greece, but in the east there has been fighting of varying intensity and duration between communist and anticommunist forces in most countries, in some cases large-scale regular warfare.

The character of the opposing forces is also different from Europe. The anti-communist governments are not democracies of the west European or American type. (The countries nearest to western democratic government tend to have the weakest communist movements.) Communism in the east is opposed by colonial regimes or by independent governments run by comparatively small ruling cliques with low standards of administration. On the other side, communism in the east has been greatly influenced by developments in China and tends to base its power on the peasants rather than on the city workers and to use the methods of guerrilla warfare rather than insurrection or political action.

Finally, the dependence of communism on direct Russian assistance has been much smaller in the east than in Europe. In the east it is only the Government of North Korea which was established under Russian military occupation and which contains former Soviet citizens in important positions. Elsewhere in the east, the successes of communism have owed little or nothing to direct Russian assistance.[1]

By far the most spectacular development of the cold war in the east has been the loss of China to the American sphere of influence. The Americans started with everything in their favour. American reputation in China stood very high, even among the communists. The predominant foreign influence in Chinese universities was American, and American returned students held many important positions. This moral influence was backed by very great material power through the almost complete dependence of the Chinese Government on American military and economic assistance. The American Government attached enough importance to China to send General Marshall on a special mission. Several thousand million dollars were spent on military and economic assistance after VJ-Day. But within less than four years the forces supported by America had been driven from the Chinese mainland and Chinese public opinion had become strongly anti-American.

Many Americans realized that this might happen. In October 1944, one of the best-informed State Department officials wrote: "Unless the Kuomintang goes as far as the communists in political and economic reform, and otherwise proves itself able to contest this leadership of the people (none of which it yet shows signs of being willing or able to do), the communists will be the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years." And earlier: "If we come to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own terms . . . both China and ourselves would only be its gaining a brief respite from the ultimate day of reckoning" (*U. S. White Paper on China*, pp. 572–3). The deductions from this analysis, which subsequent events very fully substantiated, were that the alternatives for American policy, not necessarily exclusive, were democratization of the Kuomintang or coming to terms with the communists, who, it was hoped, might be led to take an independent position friendly to America.

This sort of view seems to have prevailed in the State Department and formed the official basis of American policy during the Marshall mission. It has been widely criticized on the grounds that no communist party can ever be trusted to cooperate with noncommunists, and that the Chinese communists, once admitted to a coalition government, would have eliminated their associates like

[1] This statement has been disputed in the case of China. Both right-wing propaganda, interested in justifying American assistance to the Kuomintang, and Chinese communist propaganda, interested in justifying the extreme pro-Russian policy adopted in 1949, have played up the importance of Russian action in Manchuria from August 1945 to April 1946. The subject is too large to discuss here, but there is very strong evidence for asserting that any Russian assistance to the communists in Manchuria was not on a scale whose absence would have altered the outcome of the civil war.

the communist parties of Eastern Europe. In fact, however, it is probable that if this policy had ever been effectively implemented it would have completely altered the course of events, especially as the Americans could have benefited from serious Russian mistakes.

The Chinese communists have been exceptionally successful because they have combined the normal discipline and enthusiasm of communism with a leadership sufficiently skilful and sufficiently independent to adjust policy to meet the demands of the Chinese people and the needs of the Chinese situation. On several important occasions Mao Tse-tung showed his readiness to reject bad advice from Moscow. This independence seems to have led the Russians to start with a serious underestimate of Chinese communism. According to General Hurley, Molotov told him that he did not consider the Chinese communists to be communists at all (*U. S. White Paper*, p. 93). While General Hurley is a very unreliable witness, articles in *Izvestia* and Mr. Byrnes's account of Molotov's remarks at the Moscow Conference indicate that the Russians were very badly informed about China, and Russian actions in Manchuria can very plausibly be explained on the hypothesis that they hoped to weaken a hostile Kuomintang Government rather than to help a communist rise to power.

Suppose that General Marshall had been able to implement official American policy; that a coalition government had been established; that the military reorganization agreements were in process of realization; that American influence had been used to strengthen the natural supporters of American democratic ideas and to eliminate from power those whom General Marshall called the "irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their feudal control of China." Suppose, then, that America had expressed her readiness to support China in protests against the Russian removal of Manchurian industrial equipment and the behaviour of Russian troops in Manchuria. The communists would have faced a clear choice between loyalty to China and loyalty to Russia. If they had gone into opposition on this issue and resumed the civil war against a government rendered more democratic and efficient by the previous removal of the extreme right, their chances of success would have been very small. It is much more likely that the majority of the communists would have come out against Russia and that the break with Russia would have been followed as in the case of Yugoslavia, by increasing rejection of the Byzantine and Mongolian influences in Russian communism in favour of the liberal and scientific elements in the Marxian tradition. Such tendencies were already strong; "objective" was a term of abuse for Zhdanov, but a term of praise for Mao Tse-tung.

In fact, the issue of Russian action in Manchuria was largely discredited through its use by the right-wing Kuomintang in their campaign against the implementation of the agreements reached in January and February 1946.

But what might be called the "State Department" policy was always in conflict with a rival policy of unqualified support for the Kuomintang. Very influential sections of American opinion were ready to back any opponent of communism, and managed to persuade themselves that Chiang Kai-shek was a great democratic leader, aided by publicity, which was the only thing the Kuomintang did efficiently. General Marshall's efforts at mediation were nullified by General Wedemeyer, who saw the Chinese problem simply as a question of how to help the Kuomintang defeat the communists. The official account of American policy leaves out the episodes in General Wedemeyer's command hardest to reconcile with official American policy, such as his long delays in disarming the Japanese. But even so, it shows that the communists were given very good reasons to suspect the honesty of American mediation long before negotiations finally broke down.

The dominant impression is of the helplessness of those Americans who understood the situation. Chiang Kai-shek, confident of American support so long as he fights communism and refusing to the end to admit the dangers of the situation, drags both his party and American influence in Chmina towards disaster. The Americans who see where they are going can only plead with him with steadily diminishing hopes that their advice will be taken.

If the American reactionaries had been anything like as intelligent and as unscrupulous as communist propaganda represents them, they would have organized a coup d'état to replace the right-wing Kuomintang by a government capable of reaching an essential minimum of efficiency. In fact, the dominant mental quality of reactionaries appears to be a vast power of self-deception. Chiang Kai-shek remained confident of victory till the summer of 1948. In face of overwhelming evidence from American advisers and officials in China that the Kuo-

mintang defeat was caused by hopeless incompetence and corruption in both Army and Government, Senator Taft continues to maintain that "the proper kind of sincere aid to the Nationalist Government a few years ago could have stopped communism in China."

The case of China is an excellent illustration of the basic dilemma involved in the decision to support an inefficient and reactionary government because it is anti-communist. What is needed is immediate assistance combined with reforms and democratization which can produce a government which can remain stable without outside assistance. But reforms touch on the vested interests of the ruling groups, and once the government has outside assistance the incentive to make reforms disappears. The strength of the communist forces depends on their ability to offer leadership in securing essential reforms which their opponents are unwilling or unable to make. The assisting power, therefore, finds itself committed to the support of a degenerating government against a growing communist movement. A simple policy of anti-communism, while it may seem effective in the short run, inevitably leads to this type of vicious circle. Positive support for democracy is much harder in the short run and involves fighting both the extreme right and the extreme left, but it is the only policy which can lead to permanent success.

In Korea the element of pure confusion in American policy was much larger than in China. Occupation started with no definite policy at all, and the normal prejudice of regular soldiers that "maintenance of order" is the supreme objective led to incidents in which Japanese police under American orders fired on Korean demonstrations to welcome the Americans. Subsequent policy was crippled by false economies. The occupation authorities never had the personnel to replace, or to train Koreans to replace, the Japanese who had held all responsible positions in all branches of administration. The limitation of salaries to regular civil service scales produced a rapid turn-over of American officials, who were forced to rely on the small minority of English-speaking Koreans whose politics and social background were usually conservative. Improvements were made after a very slow start, and fairly effective measures of land reform were started before the American withdrawal. The level of competence in South Korean administration fell even lower after the American withdrawal, but the elections, despite many abuses, were free enough to allow many opposition candidates to be elected.

The rival administration set up by the Russians in North Korea had the advantage of being able to draw on trained personnel from the Korean population of Eastern Siberia, and was much more drastic in land reform and in elimination of the Japanese. But it is not at all certain that it has an better claims to represent the Korean people. All the negotiations for the unification of Korea broke down because the Russians refused to accept any solution which would have forced the communists to compete with non-communist parties for popular support in free elections. The North Korean Government has always refused to allow its claims to enjoy popular support to be examined by the U. N. Commission or by other observers likely to diverge from the communist line. Even stronger evidence is provided by refugee movements. One quarter of the entire population of North Korea ran away to the South, while the reverse movement from the South was on a much smaller scale. Such movements indicate very strong preferences for one régime rather than the other. The unfortunate Koreans may quite possibly feel that they have only had the choice between King Log in the South and King Stork in the North. The resort of the North to long-prepared military action may well be an admission that the Soviet satellite type of communism cannot stand peaceful competition even with a government like that of South Korea.

Indo-China is the other area of large-scale conflict. There are obvious similarities with the Chinese situation. Viet Minh has an administration functioning over large parts of the countryside, while their opponents hold the cities. Like the Chinese communists, Viet Minh has managed to win very general popular support. Negotiations which might have settled the conflict in 1946 broke down, with Admiral d'Argenlieu playing the rôle of Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer. The additional complication is the colonial relationship with France. French concessions to nationalist feeling have nearly always been made too late. On the one hand, there was a reluctance to admit how bad colonial rule in Indo-China had been and how unpopular it had become, and on the other there has been a desire for precise definition of the future status of Indo-China which has prevented such gestures as the British withdrawal from India. An agreement with Ho Chi Minh would have been perfectly possible for less than has now been

conceded to Bao Dai. The French now seem to have reached a settlement in Laos and Cambodia, where the local population are afraid of Annamite domination, but there seems little prospect of a settlement elsewhere. The establishment of the Bao Dai Government was based on the sound principle that it is more effective to compete with a revolutionary movement than simply to fight it. But it is very doubtful whether such French-sponsored competition can prove effective after feelings have been embittered by several years of very brutal fighting. So long as Viet Minh can only draw on internal resources, the French army may be able to maintain their present holdings. But the position will remain unstable, and at any time Chinese assistance to Viet Minh could cause a rapid collapse of the French position.

The Malayan communists seem to have tried to repeat the strategy of the Chinese communist party without having the basis of mass support which would have made this possible. The continued resort to terrorist tactics has been made possible partly by the geography of Malaya and still more by the failure of the Government to conciliate the Chinese population, who, while not particularly pro-communist, have disliked the Government too much to assist it against the terrorists. The basic problem of the Government is how to implement policies which could win popular support while handicapped by an administration whose traditions include an authoritarian outlook, an anti-Chinese bias, and ideas of racial superiority.

Communist forces have also been fighting in the Philippines and Burma, but the Huk movement does not seem to be strong enough to be a serious threat even to the weak Government at Manila, while Burmese communism seems to be part of the general struggle between armed factions rather than a normal communist movement.

In India and Japan the cold war has been cold except for a few small guerrilla areas in Hyderabad. In both countries communism might easily become strong if government by other parties became too incompetent or too oppressive. The recent Russian criticism of the Japanese communist leadership seems to be another instance of the tendency to sacrifice local communist strength in the interests of Russian international strategy. It is not likely that either the Japanese or the Indian communist parties will be able to win general mass support under present conditions until they are able to assert the right to independent judgment on the policies demanded by the Japanese and Indian people.

To sum up: communism in the east has been successful where, and in so far as, it could take the leadership in popular demands which its opponents were unwilling or unable to meet. The west has been defeated and Russia has won at no cost where, and in so far as, the forces of the west have been committed, not to the support of democracy, but to a blind opposition to communism.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX VII (A)

84 SUNNY BANK, HULL, *17/3/50.*

The EDITOR, THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN,
3 Cross St., Manchester 2.

SIR: Your report, on March 14, of Senator McCarthy's activities in Washington provides a good illustration of the natural affinity between right- and left-wing extremists.

Mr. Haldore Hanson of the State Department, who has been denounced by Senator McCarthy, was AP correspondent in Peking and made two visits to the new Communist areas in 1938. The factual basis of the charges against him is that he gave sympathy and assistance to the Chinese resistance against Japan, in which the Communists played an important part, at a time when many Americans of Senator McCarthy's views were advocating a policy of appeasement. But he did so as a believer in the American tradition of democracy. I visited the Communist headquarters at Wutai in 1938 soon after Mr. Hanson had passed through and was told that relations had become rather strained because of several heated arguments in which Mr. Hanson had maintained that the American type of democracy was greatly superior to the Communist type.

There is here a very obvious similarity with the distrust of the Czech Communists for their comrades who joined in resistance to Hitler before June 1941. Senator McCarthy apparently agrees with the Czech Communist leaders that consistent opposition to imperialist military aggression is a proof of political unreliability.

On a wider view, the right-wing extremist group to which Senator McCarthy belongs is a more serious threat to British and American security than any group under definite Communist control. Their campaign to eliminate from public life all people having any understanding or direct knowledge of Communism is, in effect, a campaign for the disarmament of America in the fields of psychological warfare and political intelligence. The Communists among the French dock workers are trying to deprive their country of the means to resist military aggression. Senator McCarthy and his supporters are trying to deprive their country of the means to prevent the outbreak of war, to leave their country powerless to counteract the deliberately produced ignorance and hysterical fear which may lead the masses under Communist rule to support the extremists of the Russian Communist Party in a policy of military aggression.

There has been considerable comment in America on the laxity of the British authorities in the case of Dr. Fuchs. This would seem to give the British public some right to comment on the extraordinary laxity of the American authorities toward the equally dangerous activities of Senator McCarthy and his associates.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL LINDSAY.

APPENDIX VIII (B)

LETTER TO MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

84 SUNNY BANK, HULL, *21st April 1951.*

SIR: Your American correspondents who defend General MacArthur, and indeed the General himself, appear to accept the basic assumptions of Communist propaganda. They assume that there is a clear-cut struggle between the forces of good and the forces of evil in which all right-thinking persons must subordinate every other standard to securing a victory for the right side, and that this simple partisan motivation enables self-appointed leaders to provide infallible guidance on every question of policy. The case both against Russian Stalinism and this inverted American Stalinism can be stated in terms of the more realistic assumptions implicit in the practice of democracy and in scientific method; that any human cause is seldom wholely right or wholely wrong, that justice is not simply that which serves some particular interest but is something which makes cooperation between free men possible, and that our judgments can seldom be based on anything but the weight of more or less circumstantial evidence.

There is strong evidence to indicate that the continued loss of American, and allied, lives in Korea is a direct consequence of General MacArthur's refusal to take account of the well-founded warnings that an advance to the Manchurian border was almost certain to produce Chinese intervention. It is not unreasonable to suppose that General MacArthur is equally mistaken in believing that further hostile measures against China could be taken without producing Russian intervention and a general world war.

Going further back, there is evidence that the extremist and blindly pro-Russian forces in China owe their dominance very largely to the continued and active assistance they have received from the forces in America who now support General MacArthur. By their blind support of the corrupt and incompetent Kuomintang police state, these groups in America discredited democracy in Chinese opinion and appeared to substantiate extremist Communist propaganda. Even conservative Chinese opinion was rendered anti-American through the bombing of Chinese cities by an air force based on Formosa with American planes and, as most people believed, with American or Japanese pilots. Furthermore, it was these same groups in America who provided the Chinese armies now fighting the U. N. forces with a considerable part of their equipment. The shipment of American arms to China was continued in the face of expert warnings that a high proportion of these supplies was likely to end in Communist hands. It is likely that the same would happen to any fresh supplies given to the Kuomintang army.

The term "appeasement" was originally applied to policies which abandoned principles in the hope of appeasing aggressors. But in this case, British policy is upholding the principles of civilized justice against the totalitarian concept of justice. If the U. N. is maintaining any principle in condemning China on an issue where China is in the wrong it must also be ready to support China on issues

where China is in the right. And, on the merits of the case, the claims of the Chinese government both for recognition and the U. N. seat and for a free hand in Formosa are extremely strong. Those who argue that Chinese claims should not be judged according to the merits of the case but according to the political views of the Chinese government are rejecting civilized standards of justice in favour of the standards propounded by Himmler and Vyshinsky. Quite apart from any questions of principle, a policy which rejects even reasonable Chinese claims must destroy any hope of reaching a peaceful settlement in the Far East.

British policy has often been confused and has been greatly weakened by a reluctance to think about principles. But the general trend of British opinion has been consistent in disliking totalitarian philosophy and methods in whatever country they appear. One might have hoped that Americans who value their own democratic traditions would have approved these sentiments instead of denouncing them.

Yours, etc.

MICHAEL, LINDSAY.
LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX IX

[Broadcasts for B. B. C. Far Eastern Service, 1951, P. S. 12]

POLITICAL EXTREMISM

I

In a broadcast I gave some months ago I referred to political extremism as probably the most serious problem in the modern world, and in these talks I would like to develop the view that the risk of war is directly related to the influence of extremism on governments.

Perhaps the argument will be clearer if I begin by summarizing my main contention. Disputes between reasonable people should not lead to war. Resort to war in the modern world involves such great losses even for the victors that, even when there is a real conflict of interests, both sides can gain by compromising rather than by fighting it out. But compromise demands a certain degree of objectivity. Compromise is impossible when either party insists on terms quite disproportionate to its actual bargaining strength or refuses to give reasonable assurances that a bargain once made will be observed. When lack of objectivity rules out compromise, a conflict of interest can only be settled by force. Objectivity is even more important in the large class of disputes which can be settled by agreement and not merely by compromise. If people accept the basic assumption of rational thought, that there is some sort of objective real world about which human minds can obtain some sort of true knowledge by thinking, observation, and experiment, then it follows that those who are genuinely trying to get at the truth will ultimately agree on the answer to any question, because they will all reach the right answer. The parties to any controversy who accept this assumption of objectivity can agree to differ and to respect each others opinions in the expectation that continued discussion and the accumulation of evidence will ultimately lead to agreement. Even when possible agreement lies in the indefinite future reasonable people will realise that a controversy about facts or principles cannot be settled by fighting.

The trouble with extremists is that they maintain opinions which cannot be modified either by evidence or logic and may be determined to impose these opinions regardless of the cost. The extremist is always really making a demand for submission. He demands that others should accept his opinions even though he cannot give conclusive evidence to support them or, more simply, he demands that others should submit to his arbitrary personal will. When faced with a demand for submission one must either surrender or fight. To give an obvious example, what can one do when faced by people with an unshakable conviction that they have a right to rule the world and are justified in using any means to conquer it? This was roughly the challenge from the Nazi leaders and Japanese militarists. Given that these people had effective control of Germany and Japan the only alternative to the last war was submission to slavery. War could only have been avoided by policies which might have prevented these extremists from obtaining full control of their countries. The problem of preventing another

world war is the same problem of reducing extremist influence and there is not much to choose between the different varieties of extremism. And to reduce extremist influence one must understand extremism.

One of the best concise descriptions of extremism was given nearly 200 years ago by Hume. He describes two types of persons with whom reasonable discussion is impossible, "men pertinaciously obstinate in their principles" and, "persons . . . who really do not believe the opinions they defend . . .". Hume then goes on, "The same blind adherence to their own arguments is to be expected in both; the same contempt of their antagonists; and the same passionate vehemence in enforcing sophistry and falsehood. And, as reasoning is not the source whence either disputant derives his tenets, it is vain to expect that any logic, which speaks not to the affections, will ever engage him to embrace sounder principles." The appositeness of Hume's description can be illustrated today from almost any extremist statement, either of the right or of the left, and anyone who argues with extremists can confirm Hume's diagnosis that their tenents are based on emotion and not on reason.

The case of "persons . . . who really do not believe the opinion they defend . . ." had been very widely discussed, especially by the Marxists. Most people are familiar with the argument that certain views are maintained only from motives of class interest. And this Marxian analysis does explain a great deal. When one finds people refusing to admit certain evidence into their thinking or refusing to accept conclusions which follow logically from their own arguments one can very often relate these emotionally charged irrationalities to class interest. If you have read some of the better Marxian writings you will easily be able to supply examples. What is not so often realised is that this Marxian analysis can be applied to Communist organisations just as much as to Capitalist ones. One need only ask the question, "How would the interests of the secret-police organisations in Communist countries be affected if the risk of war became small or the internal class struggle really diminished?" Here are closely organised groups of men enjoying great powers and a considerable degree of economic privilege. The only justification for society giving them these powers is the existence of violent international tension and bitter internal class struggle. Their special skills, such as the interrogation of suspects, would be socially valueless in a peaceful and stable society. It follows that powerful elements in most Communist parties have a strong interest in maintaining the internal class conflict, for example, by economic policies which will antagonise large sections of the population, and an equally strong interest in preventing any international reconciliation or understanding. The vested interest of Communist secret-police agents in a continuing risk of war is at least as strong as that of capitalistic armament manufacturers. One can extend this line of argument and explain a good deal of Stalinist doctrine as a rationalisation by which Communist ruling groups try to maintain their power.

But this simple Marxian analysis does not give anything like a complete explanation of extremism, largely because its psychology is so inadequate. One can find many examples of people who use "passionate vehemence in enforcing sophistry and falsehood" as a means to gain power or privilege for themselves or their group. But very few people can convincingly defend an opinion of whose falsity they are fully conscious. The really dangerous political extremists are dangerous because they manage to combine sincerity with dishonesty. A brilliant analysis of this type of extremist was given by George Orwell in his "1984". Orwell defines a concept he calls *doublethink* which makes it possible "to use conscious deception while retaining the firmness of purpose that goes with complete honesty. * * *" Though Orwell is obviously describing the unchecked development of tendencies in left-wing extremism, most of his analysis applies equally well to the extreme right. The Japanese militarists in China often combined completely criminal behaviour with an apparently sincere belief in the superiority of their moral values over what they called the materialism of the West. One of the best examples of present-day *doublethink* is a combination one finds among some Western politicians who combine an apparently sincere belief in freedom and democracy with support for some of the most corrupt and oppressive regimes in Asia and Europe.

Luckily for the world, very few extremists manage to preserve the delicate balance of successful *doublethink*. What usually seems to happen is that people gradually come to believe in their own propaganda and lose the ability to take account of the objective reality which they deny in public. There is no sharp dividing line between the pure political gangster type that Orwell describes, who is to some extent conscious that he is defending false opinions from ulterior

motives and the genuine fanatic "pertinaciously obstinate in his principles", who may be completely altruistic but who operates in a world of fantasy and myth. The typical fanatic starts with the conviction that some policy or some doctrine is of such supreme importance that he is justified in using any means to impose his convictions on his fellow men. There is always an element of fantasy about the future in the fanatic's thinking. His certainty about the results which would follow from the acceptance of his doctrine is quite disproportionate to anything justified by the evidence. In most cases the element of fantasy goes much further and covers a wide field within which the fanatic refuses to admit any posibility of difference between the world as it is and the world as it should be according to his theories. Again, there is no sharp dividing line between political fanaticism and thinking which is definitely psychopathic. A very high proportion of political extremists have tendencies to persecution mania and some extremist behaviour is hard to explain except in terms of compulsive obsessions.

There has been much less public discussion of the fanatical type of extremist, "pertinaciously obstinate in his principles", probably because comparatively little is known about this field of abnormal psychology. But it is not reasonable to ignore something which is obviously important simply because we do not understand it. An investigation into the problems of what might be called psychopathic extremism might well prove to be one of the biggest contributions towards the prevention of war.

II

In my first talk I gave a general description of political extremism and today I want to develop some generalizations and to show their relevance to present problems.

One cannot describe the very important distinctions between different types of extremist by a simple division into classes. It doesn't make sense to divide mankind into reasonable people and extremists and then to subdivide extremists into gangsters and fanatics. For one thing, there are no reasonable people. Everyone has some extremism in his make-up and the completely reasonable man is a theoretical limiting case, in the same category as frictionless mechanisms or reversible heat engines in natural science. There is a continuous range from people of low extremism to people of high extremism. Similarly, the different varieties of extremist shade off into one another. To describe extremism one must talk in terms of variables, not in terms of classes, and one can give a fairly accurate description of any type in terms of three variables. Firstly, there is the degree of extremism. Secondly, there is the range between the pure gangster type, intent only on personal power, and the pure fanatic type, intent only on promoting some cause. Finally, there is the degree of realism, the extent to which irrationality about ends is combined with irrationality about means. Some extremists are only irrational in their objectives but remain very realistic in the way they set about attaining these objectives. Others operate in terms of a mental picture of the world so unlike objective reality that their actions may often produce results completely different from their intentions.

The whole controversy about appeasement can be clarified by discussing it in terms of degrees of extremism. The real issue is whether or not the people one is dealing with are so extremist that no agreement or compromise with them is possible. Such extremists do exist and may control governments. The completely ruthless and unscrupulous fanatic and the megalomaniac conqueror are types that appear again and again in history. Take an account written two thousand years ago: "* * * there was talk in the house of Nabuchodonosor, King of the Assyrians, that he should, as he said, avenge himself on all the earth. So he called unto him his officers, and all his nobles, and communicated with them his secret counsel, and concluded the afflicting of the earth out of his mouth. Then they decreed to destroy all flesh, that did not obey the commandment of his mouth." This isn't very different from Hitler and his officers as revealed in the Nuremberg trials. People at this level of extremism are absolutely determined to obtain complete submission to their will and the fallacy of appeasement lies in a refusal to recognize this fact. In spite of all evidence to the contrary, the British Government refused to believe that Hitler would not be satisfied with a compromise which gave him satisfaction on almost every issue where he could produce any sort of reasonable claim. They became disillusioned when Hitler occupied completely non-German territory. But the Russian Government then tried appeasement in the equally mistaken belief that Hitler would leave a modest share of the world to his allies if he were allowed to conquer the

rest. In the event it became clear that nothing could deflect Hitler from his fundamental aim of subjecting the whole world to the rule of the so-called "master race".

The appeaser just refuses to admit that there can be men like Hitler or Attila or Chiang Hsien-tsung. He is like a man in tiger-infested country who talks about the perfectly real advantages that would follow from a nonaggression pact between human beings and tigers and refuses to admit the impossibility of making an agreement with tigers.

It is worth while pointing out the fallacy in the simple appeasement theory because there are still people who argue on the assumption that it must somehow be possible to reach a peaceful compromise with anyone. This still leaves the problem of how to decide whether or not some organisation is so extremist that no agreement or peaceful compromise is possible. The complication is that one is normally dealing with a ruling or controlling group which is not homogenous. Some individuals in the group may be hopelessly extremist; others may be comparatively reasonable. The possibility of peaceful compromise depends on the balance of power within the group, and attempts to reach a compromise may shift this balance of power or even alter the degree of extremism in individuals.

The present situation is much more complicated than in the 1930's but in some ways it is more hopeful. Nazism, fascism, or the philosophy of the Japanese militarists were almost purely extremist theories. They were fairly transparent rationalisations of extremist demands for submission. This shows very clearly in the concept of the "master race" which was fundamental to German and Japanese theory. Present-day extremism is mostly based on exaggerations and distortions of theories which are very largely reasonable, and the sham controversies which only rationalize extremist demands are mixed up with genuine controversies about the best form of social organisation or the nature of human knowledge. The nearest equivalent to the "master race" concept is the Communist belief in the infallibility of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This is like the "master race" idea because it implies a clear demand for submission to the will of one particular group but it is not a belief which Communists formulate explicity as an essential part of their theory. The difference with the 1930's is this: a nazi or fascist could only be reasonable and ready to accept a peaceful solution of world problems if he rejected the greater part of nazi or fascist theory, which meant that peace was impossible without the elimination of nazism and fascism. At present there are extremists of the type with whom no agreement or compromise is possible on both sides of the world conflict, but their power could be eliminated by comparatively small changes. A Christian, or a Communist, or a believer in free competition can all work for agreement and peaceful compromise without rejecting anything but exaggerations and distortions of their fundamental beliefs. There is no inherent reason why the present world tension should not be transformed into peaceful rivalry between different hypotheses about the best form of social organisation. The main requirement is to find a stabilizer which will stop the chain reaction in which rival forms of extremism help and intensify one another.

A major obstacle to the lessening of world tension comes from the implicit assumptions on which both sides base their policy. The constant theme of communist publicity is that the danger to world peace comes entirely from the plotting of the imperialists to extend their power and that peace can only be defended by demonstrating the military strength and preparedness of Russia and her allies. Very similar arguments are used in the West to justify the rearmament programme. In both cases the implicit assumption is that the other side is controlled by a fairly homogeneous group of high extremism and fairly high realism. It is only on these assumptions that the policy is sensible. High extremism and homogeneity imply that no genuine agreement or compromise is possible with any sections of the controlling group. Hibh realism implies that the determination of the extremist controlling group to extend their power will not lead them to start a war unless they are reasonably certain of winning it. In this special case, rearmament is the only possible policy and is likely to secure peace. But extremists who are not realistic are quite capable of starting wars which they have no chance of winning. Francisco Lopez, the dictator of Paraguay, went to war with all the neighbouring states and went on fighting until five-sixths of the entire population of his country had been killed. When one is dealing with unrealistic extremists, rearmament is very unreliable as a security against war. The most that can be said for it is that it gives security against defeat.

In fact, it is extremely doubtful whether either side is justified in the implicit assumption on which it bases its policy. This can be seen most clearly in the West where politics operate with a fairly high degree of publicity. The individuals who control or influence Western policy obviously vary enormously in degree of extremism and the individuals who are violently extremist are very far from realistic, in many cases their extremism is clearly psychopathic. Under these circumstances, communist policy does not make sense as a means to promote peace. Its actual effect is to produce a widespread fear of communist aggression among reasonable people and to intensify and strengthen Western extremism. It is much harder to say whether the West is justified in its implicit assumption about communist controlling groups because the whole communist system operates behind the facade of the uniform party line. But one can say that the West has decided its policy without taking nearly enough trouble to find out whether its assumptions are correct. It is possible that Western policy for peace may be as mistaken as the communist. The difficulty is that for either side to pursue a policy that might really reduce the risk of war it would first have to be ready to oppose its own extremists. Next week I will try to discuss this general problem of how to reduce extremist influence.

III

In the last talk I tried to make two main points. Firstly, that one must face the unpleasant fact that there are people so extremist—so determined to enforce submission to their arbitrary will—that no agreement or peaceful compromise with them is possible. Secondly, that the rival views in the present world conflict are not inherently extremist as nazism or fascism were, which means that the danger to world peace could be eliminated simply by a lessening of extremist influence on both sides. The problem is to find out what produces extremism and what can be done to reduce it. What one has to explain is the process by which people who would be considered rather comic lunatics in stable times rise to positions of leadership and seem to infect large parts of society with their extremism. An obvious major factor in this process is frustration. People lose their ability to act rationally when faced with insoluble problems. This is very well established by psychological experiments. In wartime officer selection tests candidates were deliberately given insoluble problems to test their mental stability and a fair proportion broke down, often with the typical extremist reaction of disruptive aggression. There are also some very suggestive experiments on animals. Rats which were forced to face insoluble problems would develop compulsive obsessions. In some experiments a rat which could see and smell food in one direction would be driven by its obsession to go in another direction which always led to plainful results. Maier, who made these experiments, pointed out the analogy with types of human extremist behaviour. Actual political examples are not as clear as controlled experiments but there are important cases which support the view that extremism is the product of frustration. The pre-Hitler elections in Germany showed a rise in the extremist vote whenever economic problems seemed insoluble, during the inflation and in the depression, and a rapid fall in extremism when conditions became stable. The growth of extremism in the Chinese Communist Party can be very directly related to frustration, over the failure to avoid the civil war in 1946 and over international problems in 1950. The growth of extremism in the West can also be very directly related to the frustration by Russian suspicion and obstruction of every attempt to improve international relations.

Frustration also explains the mechanism of the chain reaction between different forms of extremism. Because it is impossible to reach any agreement or peaceful compromise with people above a certain degree of extremism; extremism in one group presents an apparently insoluble problem to people in other groups who wish for a peaceful settlement of disputes. This frustration produces extremism which reacts back to produce further frustration and further extremism.

I've been talking about frustration produced by insoluble problems and I should make the point that it is just as frustrating to face a problem that one doesn't know how to solve as it is to face a problem that is really insoluble. One could make out quite a strong case for the theory that a lot of the difficulties of the modern world come from the long-time lag with which new ideas get into ordinary thought. Many people feel that problems are insoluble because they still think in terms of pre-Newtonian science and pre-Freudian psychology when they would not feel frustrated if they could use the tools of modern psychology

and logical analysis. What is relevant here is that many people get frustrated because they do not see the fallacies in extremist arguments. Extremists are always trying to present disputes in forms that allow no peaceful solution. It is only when differences can be made to appear irreconcilable that extremists can say, "This dispute can only be settled by everyone submitting to my opinion." And submission is what the extremist always wants. The typical extremist conclusion is that the only important political decision is choosing which side to support. And to reach this conclusion extremist arguments have to exaggerate some distinctions and explain away others. The fallacy in these arguments is nearly always an assumption that the world can be completely described in terms of simple pairs of alternatives; that if something is not black it must therefore be white. A great many fairly reasonable people get the worst of arguments with extremists because they don't realise that the extremist introduces his fallacy by the way in which he puts the question. An example can make the point clear. Consider the people who say, "In the West there is a free press while in communist countries there is not." They are easily made to look silly by a defender of communist extremism who can point out all the obvious limitations of press freedom in the West and then draw the conclusion that there is nothing to choose between the press on either side of the Iron Curtain. The fallacy is the assumption that the press must be either free or not free. "Free or not free" is a disjunction like "hot or not hot" which is meaningless without a definition of standards. If one states the question rightly, one must say that no country has a perfectly free press but there is more freedom in some countries than in others. One can also say that great social dangers appear when press freedom falls so low that no one outside a small privileged group can obtain the information necessary to form a correct political judgment. In this form the criticism of the totalitarian press is not easily refuted. As soon as one realises that most extremist arguments are based on this sort of fallacy one ceases to be worried by them.

Finally, what can one do about it all? The general lines of a sensible policy for reasonable people on either side become clear when one states the elements of the problem. (*a*) There can be no compromise with violent extremists, one must either fight them or submit to them. (*b*) The disputes between people of low extremism on either side in the world conflict could be settled by agreement or peaceful compromise. (*c*) Extremism is always strengthened by frustration and extremists are always trying to present disputes in forms that have no peaceful solution and so produce frustration. A policy to avoid war under these conditions must meet two requirements. On the one hand it must show complete firmness in resisting extremist demands for submission. On the other hand it must avoid producing the frustration which would strengthen extremism on the other side which means that it must offer a solution or possibility of peaceful compromise which would be accepted by the less extremist elements on the other side. A policy of appeasement, which fails to meet the first condition, cannot do more than postpone a war, at the expense of increasing the risk of defeat when war does come. A policy of intransigence, which fails to meet the second condition, makes war inevitable by increasing extremism to the point where no disputes can be settled except by fighting.

The difficulties in meeting these conditions for a policy likely to secure peace come from the fact that neither side could follow this sort of policy without repudiating its own extremists. At present these conditions are clearly not fulfilled by either Russian or Western policy. Communist policy claims to be trying to win over the less extremist elements in the West, but the attempt is made practically futile by an unrealistic analysis of the West and by a complete failure to repudiate or even to criticize the most extremist elements in Communism. There are some grounds for suspecting that the most violent extremists hold dominating positions in the Russian communist party. The West criticizes its extremists and sometimes even repudiates them, but its policies are confused. Those who see the dangers of appeasement are inclined to intransigence and those who see the dangers of intransigence are inclined to appeasement. One cannot say for certain that either side will prove able to follow an effective peace policy. But this only means that one cannot say for certain that war will be avoided.

The basic problem remains the repudiation of extremism, and I think extremists could be fought more effectively if they were attacked where they are weakest. The obvious case for repudiating one's own extremists is that they are a liability and not an asset in the cold war. They are like very bellicose generals who are always committing their forces to the defence of untenable positions.

I remember reading an article by American supporters of Chiang Kai-shek which measured his services in the war against Japan by the number of *Chinese* soldiers who had been killed under his command. Those who support their own extremists judge their services by the same perverse standards. There is very strong evidence that the complete discrediting of America in Chinese opinion was primarily the work of the anti-communist "China Lobby" in America, with only minor assistance from the communists. There is even stronger evidence that the Russian secret police have done more effective anti-communist propaganda than any nominally anti-communist organization. This means that peace-loving communists and anti-communists should be able to agree in fighting extremism. It is not at all clear which side either set of extremists is actually helping by their actions. It is quite clear that both sets of extremists are working for war.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX X (A)

[Times, January 2, 1946]

THE CHINESE TUG-OF-WAR—PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT AT CHUNGKING—KUOMINTANG AND COMMUNIST SUSPICIONS

From a special correspondent lately in China

President Truman's statement on United States policy towards China and the reopening of negotiations in Chungking encourage hopes of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the central Government and the Chinese Communists, but there are still big differences to be overcome. All previous negotiations between Chungking and Yenan had broken down because of the completely different views of the Kuomintang and the Communists, and the deep suspicions between them.

The Kuomintang has always insisted on its legal position as the National Government. It suspects that the Communists are determined to keep their independence and so insists that it must restore its full authority over all armies and all areas. The Communists base their claims on their achievements and actual position. They suspect that the Kuomintang is determined to maintain one-party rule, and so they refuse to give up their separate armies and areas until the central Government is completely reorganized. Since both parties claim that they stand for a democratic and united China the real issue is which party has more justification for its suspicions of the other. Here the Communists have the stronger case.

ONE-PARTY RULE

A great deal of the Kuomintang suspicion is the product of its own propaganda and censorship. At times the Sian authorities even stopped copies of the Yenan papers addressed to Chiang Kai-shek, and the Kuomintang leaders have had no means of checking the stories put out by the violently anti-Communist secret police or by military commanders, who found reports of Communist attacks a convenient excuse for their failure to resist the Japanese. Actually the Communists refused to take their best opportunity for claiming independence at the time when there would have been a chance of the allies applying the Tito-Mikhailovich precedent.

On the other side the Kuomintang has a long record of promised reforms which have never materialized. For example, the secret police still make arrests, political prisoners have not been released, and the taking over of the Japanese occupied cities has produced graft and speculation on a larger scale than ever. The only real reform has been a relaxation of censorship. Also the Kuomintang has always resisted any real modification of one-party rule. In the recent negotiations it refused new elections for the National Assembly though the old delegates, chosen in 1936, are completely unrepresentative, as the government was then suppressing anyone who advocated resistance to Japan. These old delegates, many of whom have served under the puppet Wang Ching-wei, plus the Kuomintang Central Committee as *ex officio* members, would produce an assembly completely dominated by the right-wing Kuomintang, which would probably pass the 1936 draft constitution that has been described as "nothing but a legalistic device for the continuation of the Kuomintang dictatorship."

THE REAL ISSUE

The Communists have also had reasons for saying that the Kuomintang has considered them as worse enemies than the Japanese. Chungking always blocked any allied cooperation with the Communists, which could have greatly helped in the war against Japan, and even demanded the disbandment of most of the Communist armies regardless of the help this would have given the Japanese. Many Kuomintang commanders deserted to the Japanese and their prompt reinstatement after the surrender seemed to show that these deserters had been condoned in order to keep a Kuomintang army in North China ready for civil war.

After the Japanese surrender the Kuomintang relied largely on the puppets and Japanese. The puppets were made responsible for maintaining order till the arrival of Kuomintang forces. The Communists refused to recognize a surrender in which they had no share and advanced rapidly against the puppets until the Japanese started a general counteroffensive at the end of August. The Chinese surrender terms of September 11 ordered the Japanese to cooperate with Kuomintang forces, and Japanese, puppets, and Kuomintang forces have since fought together against the Communists. Even after the joint declaration on October 11, when Government and Communist leaders pledged themselves to avoid civil war by all possible means, Kuomintang forces continued to attack positions which the Communists held and had declared they would defend. The real issue has been the Communist right to hold positions taken from the Japanese and puppets since the surrender. As in previous disputes, the Kuomintang have a strong legal case and the Communists a strong moral one.

The Kuomintang had good reasons for sending troops into Manchuria, where the Communists had only small guerrilla forces in the southwest, but the argument that Kuomintang and American forces had to go into North China to receive the surrender depends on the unstated assumption that the Communist armies could not be used. In fact, if the Japanese and their puppets in North China had been ordered to surrender to the Communist 18th Group Army they could have been disarmed and normal conditions restored within a few weeks, as the Communists could quickly have sent large forces to every centre in North China. This would have strengthened the Communist position, but equally the Kuomintang movements strengthened their position against the Communists.

American policy after the surrender was contradictory. Their declared policies of eliminating the Japanese and of neutrality in Chinese internal conflicts were incompatible with their effective policy of cooperating only with the Kuomintang. Their assistance to Kuomintang troop movements greatly influenced civil friction and they have done nothing to eliminate the Japanese influence which the Kuomintang has been willing to preserve. In Peking the Americans neither disarmed the Japanese nor insisted that the Kuomintang should do so. They everywhere cooperated with the puppet commanders and collaborationist officials whom the Kuomintang had recognized, and actually had clashes with the Communists while protecting puppet troop movements. They made no protest about the arrangements by which Yen Hsi Shan protected Japanese interests in Shansi in return for their military support. In fact the United States cannot avoid interference in Chinese affairs because the present central Government depends on American support. Without this support its chances in a civil war are doubtful and it faces strong internal opposition which the withdrawal of American support would crystallize.

AMERICAN PROPOSALS

President Truman's statement advocates "modification of the one-party 'political tutelage'" and the "institution of a broadly representative Government" and repeatedly emphasizes the "elimination of Japanese influence from China." These are the essential conditions for a settlement but they are opposed by strong vested interests. The "elimination of Japanese influence" should include the removal of puppet commanders and of officials who have been closely associated with the Japanese and puppets, but many of them have powerful connexions in Chungking. A "broadly representative Government" should mean one in which the balance of power is held by the Democratic League. The Democratic League is still a fairly small organization but in any free election it would almost certainly get a big vote from the very large group which dislikes the present Government but distrusts the Communists. Also the balance of power in the hands of a party which stands for the policies which both Kuomintang and Communists accept in principle would be a guarantee to both sides. Such a Government

would, however, mean the end of one-party rule and the elimination of some leading figures in the present Government.

If the Americans insist on such conditions Chiang Kai-shek would be compelled to throw over his more reactionary associates and return to the more progressive position of 1937 and 1938. The Communists, who have always said they would merge their armies and areas under a coalition Government, could not now refuse to cooperate without losing popular support, and their military power depends entirely on popular support. Such a Government would face difficult problems, but there would no longer be irreconcilable conflicts which the Chinese genius for compromise would not solve.

The danger is that the United States may not insist on the conditions for a settlement but support proposals like the suggestions in Chiang Kai-shek's speech of March 1, 1945, which both Communists and Democratic League rejected as not really ending one-party rule. In refusing such proposals the Communists would have the support of the population of North China, who would fight rather than come under Kuomintang one-party rule. The result would be a very long civil war. The Communists could not easily defeat Kuomintang armies which continued to get American supplies, but it is equally unlikely that the Kuomintang would be more successful than the Japanese in eliminating the Communists from their bases, and the development of a strong and prosperous China would be indefinitely delayed.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

APPENDIX X (B)

POST-MORTEM ON AMERICAN MEDIATION IN CHINA

Michael Lindsay

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A post mortem is useful if it reveals something about the disease from which the patient died, which can help in avoiding similar deaths in the future. In this case the disease is not a unique one. There were very obvious analogies between the American position in China and the British position in Greece. Also the results seem to indicate the necessity for the rethinking of some basic principles in foreign policy if similar frustrations are to be avoided in the future.

General Marshall's mission to China started with an excellent formulation of United States policy in the President's statement of December 15, 1945. The basic aim was a "strong, united and democratic China" and the major obstacles to this were correctly diagnosed as the existence of an independent Communist party army which made political unity impossible and the form of the National Government as a "one-party government" operating under a theory of "Political Tutelage."

There is no reason to suppose that this aim was unattainable. General Marshall found that there were moderates in both the main parties who agreed in wanting a strong, united, and democratic China and who were prepared to compromise to avoid civil war. They had the support of most of the minor parties and the main body of unorganized public opinion.

However, in fact the United States completely failed to attain its objectives and the situation when General Marshall left was very much worse than in December 1945. The reasons for this failure are obviously complex but there is one major factor which has been very little discussed. This is the legal and diplomatic traditions within which the United States has operated.

The United States has usually operated in terms of the legal forms of the situation and has seldom been willing to take official notice of the divergence between legal forms and reality. As a result American action has often been diverted so that its actual results have been directly contrary to the declared objectives of American policy. American policy has been planned in terms of American traditions but it has operated in a situation where most people judge it in terms of Chinese traditions, which make it look very different.

The same failure to recogize the difference in political traditions made the United States miss its opportunities in the period when American mediation was accepted by both sides. American influence was dissipated in securing a legal structure of agreements which looked excellent on paper and might have

been effective in a country with the tradition of the rule of law, but which was largely unrealistic in terms of Chinese politics.

The most obvious example of the frustration of American policy through adherence to legal forms, was in the disarmament of the Japanese and the elimination of Japanese influence. The effectiveness of American mediation was always greatly weakened by the false position into which the United States had allowed itself to be manoeuvered. The President's statement of December 15, 1945, laid great stress on these objectives.[1]

The fatal ambiguity in the statement was the implicit assumption that American objectives were shared by the Chinese National Government and could be attained by assisting it. But at the end of 1945 the military position of the Kuomintang in North China depended very largely on assistance from Japanese and puppet troops so that the implementation of American policy would have greatly weakened the Kuomintang position in the civil war.

The justification for arranging the transportation of Kuomintang armies to North China was the possibility that strong forces might be needed to disarm and evacuate the local Japanese army units. However, by the end of August, 1945, it was clear that the Japanese army in China remained an organized force under the control of its commanders who were willing to obey Allied instructions. It also soon became clear that the Chinese National Government was more interested in using the Japanese in the civil war than in securing their evacuation.[2] Japanese officers from North China Headquarters stated to the American Headquarters in Peiping that they could deliver all their troops at the ports within six weeks to await evacuation if only the Chinese government would allow them to do so.

The President's statement of December 18, 1946, points out the real physical difficulties of repatriating all the Japanese forces but it was purely legal and diplomatic inhibitions that prevented the United States from securing their removal from the Chinese political and military scene within a few weeks of VJ-Day. All that was required for this was the issue of appropriate orders to the Japanese and, if the Chinese government had refused to cooperate, the United States was in a position to issue orders directly through General MacArthur and the Japanese government.

The American government has always defended its military activities in North China with the argument that these actions were only assistance to the Chinese National Government in disarming and repatriating the Japanese. This argument is perfectly sound on the assumption that the American government had no obligation to go behind the forms of legal and diplomatic correctness; that it would have been an unfriendly act towards an allied government to have inquired whether the large Kuomintang armies transported to North China were necessary to disarm and repatriate the Japanese or whether they were in fact used for that purpose; that for the American forces to disarm the Japanese except at the request of the Chinese government would have been illegal interference in Chinese internal affairs.

Although American actions were correct from this formal legal standpoint they were, in reality, completely contrary to the declared objectives of American policy. Though most of the Japanese troops were finally repatriated when they were no longer essential to the Kuomintang military position, the American forces in North China made no attempts to secure the rapid elimination of the Japanese.[3] The Kuomintang armies transported to North China were used

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[1] It stated that, "to remove the possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops," and that, "The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed." For these purposes the United States would "assist the National Government of China in effecting the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas," and would "cooperate with it * * * in eliminating Japanese influences from China." It was also stated that, "United States support (to the National Government) will not extend to military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife."

[2] Immediately after VJ-day, the Japanese in North China started retiring to a few main concentration points, fighting only defensive actions. But at the end of August they started a general counteroffensive against the Communists in cooperation with the puppet armies and later with regular Kuomintang troops. The Communists claim that this counteroffensive was the result of orders from General Ho Ying-chin to General Okamura that the Japanese should assist the puppet armies and must recover positions they had abandoned to "illegal armed forces and bandits." Such an order would explain the Japanese action and the Chinese surrender terms of September 11 ordering the Japanese forces to assist the National Government armies but making no mention of cessation of hostilities.

[3] According to Dr. Abrams, the Regional Medical Officer of UNRRA, at the end of February 1946 Japanese troops were holding sections of the Kuomintang front within a few miles of the main American base at Tsingtao. Other American sources reported 40,000 Japanese still fighting in Shansi in April 1946 and some still remaining in December.

entirely in "Chinese internal strife" and American action was diverted into very definite intervention in the civil war.[4]

The position with regard to the puppets was similarly confused. The United States was not prepared to challenge the good faith of the Chinese government in making official appointments. As a result any puppet who received a new appointment from the Kuomintang became, for the Americans, an official of the Chinese National Government and as such he automatically received American support and assistance.

Here again the position was legally correct. It would have been interference in the internal affairs of China to query appointments made by the recognized national government. In practice the American forces which had come to "eliminate Japanese influence" were working with men who, a few months before, had been serving under the Japanese and proclaiming their determination to defend Greater East Asia against American imperialism.[5]

In terms of the Western tradition of law this does not necessarily imply bad faith on the part of the American government. The Kuomintang were trying to divert American action to their own ends; and the Kuomintang has the services of almost all the Western-trained legal talent in China. Also important sections of the American armed forces were, to say the least, not unwilling to allow American action to be diverted into intervention against the Communists.[6] It is quite possible to argue that the American government meant well but was manoeuvered into a false position. But this would be hard to understand in terms of Chinese traditions. The whole Confucian tradition has been hostile to the idea of law as a set of invarient rules and has emphasized the subordination of legal rules to the special circumstances of each particular case.

This Chinese tradition of law is only part of the whole Chinese social and political tradition which has been very different from that of America. At its best the traditional Confucian imperial system was a benevolent, paternalistic authoritarianism. In times of decline it became a struggle for office and wealth between individuals or small groups in the ruling class. In modern history the decline of the Manchu dynasty began between 1800 and 1850 and Chinese politics since the revolution have been an open and ruthless struggle for power only slightly modified by some conventional rules. There were accepted fictions which no one openly challenged. For example, even the most independent war lords always officially claimed to be within the political and military organization of a united China under a central government. There were conventional forms of words whose real meaning was quite well understood.

Within the limits of these conventions everyone operating in Chinese politics, including the Japanese before 1937, used their actual power as far as possible to get their friends into office and their enemies out and to protect the groups they wished to support. It was the spoils system in an extreme form except that office depended on guns rather than on votes. The development of the forms of a modern state in recent years had only begun to modify the system. The Chinese liberals are trying to build up something very different but so far they have been more successful on paper than in real life.

Though some of the traditions of Chinese politics may be unique, there are many countries where the general pattern of political struggle is nearer to China than to America.

The United States has, for the past few years, been playing a leading part in Chinese politics, but has been playing it according to rules completely different from those which have been used by any other players.

There has been no doubt about the actual power of the United States during the last few years. It is widely believed, with some reason, that the continued existence of the National Government has depended on American support. If America had wished to change the composition of the National Government it is highly probable that it could have done so. Thrice-repeated invitations

[4] On one occasion American forces were nearly manoeuvred into a full-scale battle with the Communist army when they accepted without question a Kuomintang request to take over Cheefoo to receive the Japanese surrender more than a month after its capture by the Communists.

[5] To give only two out of many possible examples: Li Hsien-liang, who was Mayor of Tsingtao until the autumn of 1946, was known to the American army to have been an officer in the Japanese sponsored "Imperial Collaboration Army" but received full American support; the first troops transported to Changchun with American assistance included units organized by the Japanese, under Chiang P'eng-fei, who had entered Japanese service in the East Hopei Autonomous Government before 1937.

[6] From conversations with officers who served in China it is clear that General Wedemeyer did not consider himself bound by the official American policy of nonintervention in the civil war but planned American action to assist the Kuomintang military position.

to the leading reactionaries in the government to visit the United States on missions with high-sounding titles but no real functions, could hardly have been refused.

In the cities where American troops were stationed there was no doubt at all about the ability of America to secure the removal of anyone it disliked and to protect any groups that it wished to support. Local Kuomintang forces were obviously not going to oppose the Americans unless American action were so crudely managed as to leave no possible way of saving face.[7] In any city with American troops the liberals could have been given complete security and freedom of action.

In fact the United States allowed the extreme reactionaries to play a leading part in the National Government. In the cities with American troops, power and office have been in the hands of the extreme reactionaries or semigangster elements in the Kuomintang, sometimes of leading collaborationists. In Peiping the presence of American Marines did not prevent the appointment of the former head of the Nazi Gestapo organization to a position in the Kuomintang secret police.

Liberals received much less protection from the Americans than they had from Lung Yun, the Yunnan warlord, before his removal by Chiang Kai-shek in October 1945. Even in the cities with American troops liberal meetings have been broken up, liberal newspapers suppressed, and liberal leaders beaten up, arrested, or kidnapped.

In spite of the declared intentions of America to avoid intervention in the civil war American assistance to the Kuomintang was continued in forms which directly strengthened its military position in the civil war.

If it were assumed that the United States were acting in the same sort of way as any other power in modern Chinese politics, and this is the natural assumption for a Chinese without foreign training to make, the deduction from the situation was obvious. Namely that the United States was firmly supporting the ultrareactionary, irreconcilably anti-Communist group in the Kuomintang; that the statements of American policy praising the liberals and calling for democracy and settlement by compromise were merely a foreign form of the conventional euphemisms like calling a government opium monopoly an opium suppression bureau. Of course it was a good thing to suppress opium; but what could the government do when it needed money? Of course the Americans liked democracy, civil liberties, and so on; but what could they do when they needed reliable allies against Communism?

This is, most probably, the sort of picture that American policy has presented to the majority of Chinese. It fully explains the fact that, "The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions" (to quote General Marshall). The Western-trained group in the Kuomintang have realized that America does not too much like the extreme reactionaries but they have considered that the bad relations between America and Russia would always secure them American support against the Communists.

A very slight relaxation of the strict forms of diplomatic correctness would have made a very big difference to the chances of success of American mediation. The most obvious example is the failure to make any protest in March 1946 when there was growing evidence of Kuomintang failure to carry out its part of the agreements and when the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee repudiated some of the key points in the settlements reached through American mediation. This was most probably responsible for the change in the Communist party line from conciliation and readiness to accept American mediation to its present uncompromising anti-American attitude.

By the end of General Hurley's ambassadorship the Communists were extremely suspicious of America. "General Marshall undoubtedly impressed the Communist leaders with his personal integrity but their willingness to accept American mediation must have met with considerable skepticism from the more doctrinaire members of the party. It could be argued, on doctrinaire Marxian theory, that American policy was inevitably determined by the position of America as a capitalist, imperialist power; that whatever General Marshall's personal intentions he could not in fact change the policy dictated by the interests of the groups that controlled the American government.

[7] After the assassination of Li Kung-pu and Wen I-to last summer the American Consulate in Kunming protected a number of other liberals against the secret police without any local American troops to back them.

To the Communist Central Committee, the attempt to reach agreement through American mediation must have seemed a policy that was worth trying as a last hope of avoiding civil war but which, on theoretical grounds, was not very likely to succeed. American silence in March and the beginning of April must have seemed convincing proof of the correctness of the doctrinaire position. The Kuomintang was repudiating the agreements which General Marshall had mediated and America did nothing about it. When it came to the point General Marshall appeared to be powerless against the forces that linked America to the right-wing Kuomintang, exactly as Marxian theory predicted. The Communist party could no longer afford to trust in American mediation but must strengthen its military position. If the Communist leaders still felt confidence in General Marshall's personal good faith they may have felt that to appeal to him to safeguard the agreements would only cause him an embarrassing loss of face.

If this analysis of Communist policy is anywhere near correct then a statement by General Marshall, at the beginning of April 1946 denouncing the right-wing Kuomintang in the sort of terms he was finally prepared to use in January 1947 would probably have prevented the Communist offensive in Manchuria and the change in party line which it indicated.

In many other cases simple plain speaking on the part of America could have greatly weakened the extremists on both sides by making it clear that America was not irrevocably committed to support of the right-wing Kuomintang.

In January and February 1946 when American mediation was accepted by both sides it produced a system of agreements which seemed to be more designed to impress the Americans than to solve the practical problems of Chinese politics. There is an interesting contrast between the 1946 agreements with their essentially western legal structure and the reports of the direct Kuomintang-Communist negotiations in September 1945 with their emphasis on practical problems.

The only part of the agreements which applied immediately to the practical situation was the truce agreement. This was very definitely only a truce and not in any way a settlement. It put military conflict into a state of suspended animation but it stabilized a completely impossible siuation in which the two armies were so mixed up in the disputed territory that neither side could settle down to the badly needed economic and social reconstruction. Friction was almost inevitable and became quite certain when the truce was extended to include puppet troops. The Communist leaders could not really restrain their local units from continuing attacks on the puppets, who in many cases had a record for atrocities little better than the Japanese. Equally the Kuomintang could not really control many of the puppet units it had recognized as part of its army.

Almost everything except the truce agreement was a theoretical legal structure which started at the top with the constitution. On paper it looked very nice and if it had been possible to bring the whole system into effect simultaneously it might have worked. But all the bits were interconnected. Neither side could afford to make the concessions it had agreed to without some guarantee that the other side would do the same. The whole structure depended on the Western view of law, that the signing of a contract implied an unconditional obligation to observe it and that the enforcement of law in one case was an effective precedent for its enforcement in others. But in modern Chinese politics the observance of agreements has been the exception rather than the rule and the system could only have worked if America had been willing to guarantee the agreements with sanctions against either party which broke them.

In fact America seems to have taken the diplomatically correct but completely unrealistic position of operating entirely in terms of the legal forms of the agreements and refusing to take official notice of any actual failure to implement them. Months after the Military Reorganization Agreement had decided that all war-lord armies and all troops that had served under the Japanese should be disarmed and disbanded as quickly as possible the Truce Teams continued to treat former puppet units as legitimate parts of the Kuomintang army. Even more striking was the attitude to secret police activities in Chungking.[8] These were undermining the whole basis of the agreements which were aimed at setting up a system in which parties could compete by legitimate political activities without needing private armies to protect them. If Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling or unable to secure obedience to the law from his own party organizations

[8] On paper the National Government had implemented the civil liberties clauses of the agreements by issuing a set of decrees through the Supreme National Defence Council. Within two weeks, a meeting held by left-wing Kuomintang and other liberal groups in Chungking was broken up by the Kuomintang secret police and similar incidents continued.

or enforcement of the law by the local police even in his own capital the agreements were meaningless. But it was not until his statement in January 1947 that General Marshall made any official reference to the "quite obviously inspired mob actions."

It is probable that American mediation would have had a much greater chance of success if it had started from the bottom instead of from the top, if it had worked in the Chinese tradition of practical problems and personalities instead of in the American tradition of general legal principles.

A practical solution had to reconcile two claims both of which have had the support of moderate opinion in China. The basic Kuomintang case, which the Communists accepted in principle, can be put in President Truman's words: "The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China." The Kuomintang has had a legitimate case against allowing the Communists military as well as civil power in what would be in practice an independent North China.

The basic Communist case, which the Kuomintang have accepted in principle, is that there should be democratization, civil liberties, and local self-government. In North China the local government organizations set up under the Communists have been far ahead of the Kuomintang areas in honesty, efficiency, and degree of popular control. The Communists have had a legitimate case in claiming that these existing elected local governments should not be replaced by appointed Kuomintang officials who were proving scandalously corrupt and inefficient in all the areas they had taken over.

At the beginning of 1946 it should have been possible to secure a provisional settlement of outstanding practical issues in terms of the concessions which both parties were prepared to make in the agreements.[9]

This sort of provisional settlement would have enabled both sides to get down to the real job of reconstruction while discussing the more theoretical points of the constitution and army reorganization. It would have greatly increased the chances of further agreements as both sides would have made practical gestures of good faith which involved the repudiation of their extremists.

Of course there would have been difficulties in getting this kind of provisional settlement of actual problems, but even if it has always been true that one or both sides have only been willing to promise concessions but not to make them in practice, it would have been better to find this out at the beginning of 1946 rather than after a year of confusion and disillusionment. America could have started to face the realities of the situation a year sooner.

It would have been almost impossible to work for a settlement of practical problems within the limits of normal diplomatic traditions. At every step it would have been necessary to consider questions of fact and of personalities, to be prepared to challenge the good faith of the parties in any agreement and the correspondence of legal forms and official statements with reality.[10]

In fact American policy continued to operate in terms of legal forms even when the legal forms of early 1946 had obviously failed to be effective in the real situation. American influence on the Chinese government was concentrated on securing the passage of a comparatively democratic constitution though there was no reason to suppose that legal forms would gain a new effectiveness simply from being in a constitution.

Judged in terms of American objectives the basic mistake in American policy was failure to support the groups that would have been America's natural allies. The Democratic League and the left wing of the Kuomintang had a large pro-

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[9] In the Military Reorganization Agreement of February 1945, the Communists accepted a preponderance of Kuomintang troops even in the main Communist areas of North China. In a provisional settlement they might have been asked to concede control of the railways and strategic points at least to Kuomintang armies untainted by collaboration under commanders who might reasonably be expected to observe agreements.

In the agreements the Kuomintang accepted provisions for elected county and provincial governments. They also agreed to the quickest possible elimination of war lord and puppet troops. In return for military preponderance in North China they might have been asked to agree that existing elected local governments should take over the whole of areas of which they already controlled the larger part, at least till arrangements were made for new elections.

[10] For example, it would have been necessary to take official notice of the fact that Yen Hsi-shan was a local war lord who had had close relations with the Japanese so that settlement was impossible while he remained the official governor and military commander in Shansi; or to investigate how far the Communists had actually set up elected local governments in Manchuria. The task would not have been impossible, but it was certainly not compatible with an official policy of nonintervention in Chinese affairs and correct diplomatic relations with the recognized Chinese government.

portion of leaders with American education and were the groups in China that really wanted a democratic system of the American type. Under any system which secured genuine free elections these groups might become a major force in Chinese politics. The right wing Kuomintang has little popular support and many people are afraid of the Communists in spite of their moderate programme.

The liberal groups received a lot of verbal praise from America but nothing more. The major weakness of the liberals in modern Chinese politics is that they do not control an army. They could only assume leadership with American support against the secret police and militarists but no support was ever given. Because America acted only through the recognized government, American assistance to China automatically meant American support for the groups that controlled the government by their command of the army and secret police organizations. On the one hand General Marshall tried to negotiate agreements, on the other American assistance strengthened the "irreconciliable groups within the Kuomintang party, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, (who) evidently had no real intention of implementing them." [11]

Secret police terrorism has greatly weakened the liberals and American assistance to the right-wing Kuomintang has made the naturally pro-American Democratic League almost as anti-American as the Communists whose anti-American and more extremist line dates from the failure of America to protest against the repudiation of the agreements reached through American mediation.

By failing to support its natural allies American policy has placed itself in a dilemma. Without continued American support the Kuomintang will probably lose the civil war and the Communists will play a leading part in a new Chinese government. On the other hand a resumption of large-scale military assistance to the Kuomintang might easily produce Russian support for the Communists, of which there has been no evidence up till now; and the Communists with a very large mass organization behind them would need very much less foreign assistance than the present Kuomintang government. Only very large-scale American intervention could then prevent a Kuomintang defeat.

The moral of all this obvious. Assistance to a country where there is a violent political struggle must be, in effect, assistance to the group that controls the recognized government so long as the forms of nonintervention and diplomatic correctness are preserved. There is no choice between supporting this group and discontinuing all assistance.

So long as the group that controls the government is confident of continued foreign assistance it will have no motive for compromising with its rivals or for introducing reforms that conflict with the vested interests of its members.

If it is desired to give support but at the same time to secure reforms or perhaps to secure a compromise between the government and opposition groups, then it is necessary to abandon the forms of diplomatic correctness and to intervene on behalf of the groups it is desired to support or in favour of the reforms which are desired.

Harvard University, May 1947.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial, nonpolitical, nonprofit-making organization founded in 1928 to promote an understanding of international questions and problems, and of Canada's position both as a member of the international community of nations and as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Institute, as such, is precluded by its Constitution from expressing an opinion on any aspect of public affairs. The views expressed in this journal, therefore, are those of the writers.

APPENDIX XI

MEMBERSHIP OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. GENERAL

As an undergraduate at Oxford I was a member of the Oxford University Labour Club, supporting, and I think affiliated with, the British Labour Party.

In 1948 I joined the British Fabian Society, of which I am still a member, and between 1949 and 1951, I was a member of the Hull Fabian Society.

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[11] From General Marshall's statement of January 7, 1947.

2. CONNECTED WITH CHINA

While in the United States in 1946 I became a "consultant" to the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. This Committee has been largely under communist influence but it was, at one period, publishing some quite interesting material on China and I was in agreement with its criticism of the totalitarian influences in U. S. Far Eastern policy. The only advice I have given to the Committee as "consultant" has been that it would completely discredit its ability to work for its ostensible objective if it allowed itself to become associated with support for the Soviet Union. In 1946 I sent a strong letter of protest when the Committee sent out a pro-Soviet pamphlet with its material on the Far East. In, I think, 1950 I wrote a letter to the Committee strongly criticizing an editorial in Far East Spotlight and saying that I could not remain associated with the Committee if it continued to support the Soviet Union, which, in my opinion, was a fascist power opposed to democracy. This produced a very conciliatory reply.

In 1946 I became Chairman of the China Campaign Committee in England. This committee had been formed at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict to organise support for China. Its membership was fairly wide and included some Communists but control was in the hands of British Labour Party supporters. The joint secretaries, Miss Dorothy Woodman and Lady Selwyn Clarke, were both members of Labour Party organisations.

At the end of 1948 or beginning of 1949 the Committee was asked by Mr. Jack Ch'en of the New China News Agency in London whether, in view of the developments in the Chinese situation, we were ready to commit ourselves to full support of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Liberated Areas. We replied that while our general attitude had been favourable to the Chinese Communist Party because we felt that it had usually been in the right as against the Kuomintang, we could not commit ourselves to unconditional support and felt that we served a more useful purpose for Sino-British friendship by remaining independent.

Most probably as a result of this reply from the China Campaign Committee Mr. Jack Ch'en and members of the British Communist Party organised the Britain-China Friendship Association in 1949, and this organization received the support of the Chinese government. Members of the China Campaign Committee were invited to join the BCFA. We refused to accept suggestions for merging the two organisations but, with considerable misgivings, joined the BCFA as a means of keeping contacts with China after receiving the most explicit assurances that the BCFA would be run as a nonparty and not as a Communist-front organisation. These assurances were broken over the handling of a Chinese "friendship" delegation which visited England in October 1950. I published an article in the Manchester Guardian of 2nd January 1951, strongly attacking the BCFA management and, after some correspondence and controversy, resigned from the BCFA. Other non-Communist members of the China Campaign Committee also resigned.

As a matter of strategy, I would maintain that this temporary association with the Communist-controlled BCFA was justified. If cooperation had been refused before the bad faith of the management had been made clear, the Communists could have argued, with considerable effect, that they wanted to work honestly for Sino-British friendship but had found that non-Communists would not cooperate. As it is, there is clear evidence to show that the Britan-China Friendship Association was given every opportunity of working for its ostensible objective but instead chose to act in ways that worsened Sino-British relations.

I have spoken at meetings for the Peace with China Association which was organised by members of the China Campaign Committee with the wording of its objectives framed to exclude Communists and Communist supporters by accepting the correctness of the original UN action in Korea but I do not remember if I ever actually joined the association.

I have also belonged to a number of associations connected with politics though nonpolitical. For example, I was active in the Hull branch of the United Nations Association and I now belong to the Canberra Branch. I am a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

I cannot remember all the organisations, and societies with which I have been connected at various times, but, to the best of my recollection, the above list gives all the political associations in which I have played any sort of active part. I can state definitely that I have never belonged to any branch of any Communist Party in any country.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

Mr. Morris. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a sworn statement by Miriam S. Farley on the UOPWA Union in the American IPR, dated June 10, 1952, which I would like to have received at this time.

Senator Watkins. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1389" and is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 1389

State of New York,
County of New York, ss:

Memorandum on the UOPWA Union in the American IPR

By Miriam S. Farley, who, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

The following is intended to correct and supplement certain inaccurate, incomplete or misleading statements concerning the relations between the American Institute of Pacific Relations (formerly American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations) and the United Office and Professional Workers of American (later merged in the Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America) made before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security by Raymond Dennett (Hearings, Part 4, pp. 939–50) and Harvey Matusow (stenographic transcript, Vol. 55, pp. 6211–29).

On this subject I can speak from personal knowledge as I have been a member of the American IPR staff since 1934 and was a member of the union from 1939 to 1951, except for a period in 1946–48 when I was not employed by the American IPR. I was the first shop chairman in the American IPR and was an active member of the union for a number of years. My union activities were largely confined to maintaining and operating the machinery of collective bargaining in the American IPR office. Later, my feeling toward the union having changed, I became inactive, and remained a member only because it was required by the contract.

In 1939 the American IPR signed a contract with the Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18, UOPWA, CIO. The initiative in forming a union in the American IPR did not come from Frederick V. Field, as stated by Mr. Dennett. Mr. Dennett was not connected with the IPR at that time and, as he said himself, could not speak from personal knowledge. The initiative came from the American IPR employees. Their motive was nonpolitical; they simply wished to conduct their relations with their employer on a basis of collective bargaining. Mr. Field was executive secretary of the American IPR at this time, but he made no attempt to influence the employees either for or against joining the union.

At that time, so far as I know, the UOPWA was not under Communist control. The UOPWA had contracts at this period with a number of reputable organizations, including Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Phi Beta Kappa, and the Foreign Policy Association. Ten years later, in 1949, charges were made in the CIO that the UOPWA was under Communist control. These charges were investigated by the CIO and as a result the UOPWA was expelled from the CIO in 1950. Subsequently the American IPR officers gave notice that they would not renew the contract with the union after it expired in May 1951, and it was not renewed. The decision not to renew was taken by the American IPR officers with the approval of the American IPR employees.

At no time, to my knowledge, did the union ever make any attempt whatever to influence, directly or indirectly, the policies, program, or publications of the American IPR. And I was in a good position to know of such attempts had they been made. Any attempt of this kind would have been resented and rejected both by the American IPR employees and by the Institute officers and Executive Committee members. In its relations with the American IPR the union confined itself strictly to normal union functions, i. e., negotiations with management on wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.

The implication in Mr. Dennett's testimony that the union attempted to "get rid of" him has no basis in fact. In saying this I do not mean to charge Mr. Dennett with a deliberate untruth. He may have believed this to be true, but it was not true.

From 1943 on the American IPR contract contained a standard union-shop clause, common in union contracts, requiring all new employees to join the

union. Mr. Dennett stated that he feared this clause might make it impossible for the American IPR to obtain the services of research persons whom it might wish to employ. It should be noted that the the contract contained a number of loopholes. Certain categorie of employees were excluded from its operation, including "research persons engaged for special research projects" (quotation is from contract as revised on January 6, 1945; earlier wording was "persons engaged temporarily for special projects"), "workers on a retainer basis," and "holders of fellowships working under the supervision of the Council but receiving no compensation from it." Other exceptions might be made by vote of the union members in the office. To the best of my knowledge and recollection the American IPR never in fact experienced any difficulty in engaging research persons because of the union shop clause in the contract.

Mr. Matusow testified that it was the policy of the Communist Party to attempt to get Party members into the IPR and similar organizations through the operation of the preferential hiring clause. It should be noted that he did not cite any concrete examples.

From the beginning the union contract contained a preferential hiring clause, another standard clause common in union contracts, requring the American IPR to hire through the union provided the union could supply a "qualified" candidate for the job in question. Under the contract the American IPR could and did reject candidates recommended by the union if in its judgment they were not "qualified." (Any difference of opinion between the American IPR and the union as to whether or not a candidate was qualified would have been subject to arbitration under the terms of the contract; to the best of my knowledge no such case ever arose.) In addition, as mentioned above, various categories of employees were excluded from the operation of the contract. The American IPR was thus protected against having to hire only persons recommended by the union, which could rarely, if ever, furnish qualified candidates for senior, specialized or research jobs.

In practice, clerical employees were usually, though not always, hired through the union, but senior research, editorial and administrative employees seldom if ever came through the union. As regards the clerical employees who were hired through the union—who, of course, had no concern with IPR policy—it should not be assumed that any of them were Communists because of the fact that they were rank-and-file members of this union.

It should be added that the Pacific Council (i. e., the International Secretariat of the IPR) never had a contract with any union.

[SEAL] MIRIAM S. FARLEY.

New York, N. Y.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of June 1952.

ELSIE JENRICHE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. I also have another statement sworn to by Miriam S. Farley, this one dated also June 10, 1952, supplementing previously sworn statement.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1389A," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1389A

STATE OF NEW YORK,
County of New York, ss:

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT BY MIRIAM S. FARLEY

Miriam S. Farley, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

With reference to the mention of my name during testimony by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security (Hearings, pt. 2, pp. 387, 395, 396), the following information is submitted for the record:

General Willoughby referred to me and two other people as persons who were "hired in the States and unloaded on Tokyo"; i. e., on General MacArthur's headquarters (GHQ, SCAP). He also, in answer to questioning, made a point of the fact that Army regulations prevented him from testifying regarding the contents of personnel files on present or former Government employees.

I am not acquainted with General Willoughby and never was employed by him. All of the three persons whom he mentioned, including myself, were employed by Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, headed by Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney.

I was employed by the War Department as a civilian employee in Tokyo from February 1946 to February 1947. From February to August 1946 I served in Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, as an editorial analyst, and from August 1946 to February 1947 in the Civil Information and Education Section (C. I. & E.) as an information officer. Both jobs were purely operational; neither was at the policy-making level. I was recruited through War Department channels, and understood that I had undergone a security check and received clearance before I was put on the Government payroll.

At no time, to my knowledge, was the quality of my work for SCAP criticized. On the contrary, it was frequently commended by my superior officers in both Government Section and C. I. & E. I had originally agreed to remain in Japan for a period of 9 months. At the end of that time I was requested to remain longer, and did remain for an additional 3 months, during which I was repeatedly and strongly urged to continue in my job. I do not mean to suggest that I was indispensable, but it seems improbable that I should have been urged to remain in GHQ if my work had been considered unsatisfactory or if any doubts had been entertained as to my loyalty to the United States.

Confirmation of the above statements may be obtained from the following persons under whom I worked in Tokyo: In Government Section, Lt. O. I. Hauge, U. S. N., and Col. Charles L. Kades; in C. I. & E., Lt. Col. J. W. Gaddis and Mr. Don Brown.

As regards my letter to Hugh Deane, which is quoted in the record, this hardly requires explanation. In it I merely congratulated an acquaintance on a new job and offered assistance to the Government in time of war. My acquaintance with Mr. Deane is slight. At the time the letter was written (1942) I knew him chiefly as a former China correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor and, as the letter indicates, as an employee of the Coordinator of Information. I had no reason to believe that he was a Communist.

[SEAL] MIRIAM S. FARLEY.

NEW YORK, N. Y.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of June, 1952.

ELSIE JENRICHE,
Notary Public, State of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, next is report No. 22 by John S. Service, dated September 4, 1944.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The report referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1390," and is as follows:)

[Report No. 22]

UNITED STATES ARMY OBSERVER SECTION
APO 879, September 4, 1944

Subject: The Growth of the New Fourth Army: An Example of the Popular Democratic Appeal of the Chinese Communists.
To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF-CBI, APO 879.

1. The growth of the Chinese Communists armies during the present war has proved them to be an extremely powerful political instrument because this spectacular development would not have been possible without the support of the people of the areas in which they have operated. This widespread popular support must, under the circumstances in which it has occurred, be considered a practical indication that the policies and methods of the Chinese Communists have a democratic character.

2. This may seem to be jumping to an ipso facto conclusion.

(a) It might be assumed, for instance, that a patriotic desire to fight the foreign invader was responsible for this popular support. This is partially true.

But to the Chinese peasant (who is the only important class involved, both because of his overwhelming numerical superiority in China and because the Communists have had to operate entirely away from the cities) the idea of active personal resistance was entirely new. In the past the peasant has regarded all governments merely as something to be endured; there was little, as far as he was concerned, to choose from between them; and even if one was

slightly better or worse than another, it was no concern of his and there was nothing he could do about it.

So the peasant needed a great deal of education and indoctrination—and some tangible evidence that it would benefit his own interest—before he was willing to take up arms. The fact that the Communists were able to accomplish this while the Kuomintang was not, indicates a closeness to and an ability to appeal to the common people in terms which they understand. This is something akin, at least, to democracy.

(b) Furthermore, the people, if they were willing to fight, almost always—certainly in the early years of the war had two choices: They could fight with either Kuomintang or the Communists. It would have been more natural for them to have turned to the Kuomintang because it was the Government. Instead they turned to the Communists, who have come more and more to be regarded and treated by the Government as rebels. It would seem therefore that the peasants received better understanding and treatment from the Communists. This, again, is a prima facie indication of democracy. At least it can be said, on this basis, that the people must regard the Communists as more democratic than the Kuomintang.

(c) It might be argued that the Communists have the advantage of a "cause," that they use such direct appeals as distributing the land of the landlords to the peasants, that they spread a rabble-rousing communism, or that they have found an equivalent of the fervor which gave such impetus to the Taipings or the Boxers. But, in fact, this argument is never heard. Even the Kuomintang does not bother to advance it. If they did, it would be refuted by the evidence of every foreign observer who has traveled through the Communist guerrilla areas. The Communists are not even actively preaching communism—though it cannot be denied that they are, sometimes by not too subtle means, trying to create support for the Communist Party.

(d) It can also be claimed this popular support is chiefly due to the Communist skill in propaganda. The Communists are masters of this art, and it does have a part, but only a relatively small one. The war has lasted more than 7 years, longer than mere propaganda without positive results could hope to hold the stolid and practical Chinese peasant. Furthermore, the guerrilla warfare into which the Communists have drawn their supporters is the type which is hardest of all military forms on the peasant because the whole area is continually a battleground.

(e) Another argument, little heard because it is so obviously untenable, is that the Communists have forced the people to support them and join their armies. But the Communist armies were small when the war began; they did not have the military power necessary to have forced the people. Their armies, relatively speaking are still small. They are, for instance, much smaller than the Kuomintang uses to garrison areas of equivalent size far in the rear away from any enemy. It is obvious therefore that the Communist army does not need large forces to maintain its own rear—as it would if it carried out Kuomintang policies of conscription and taxation and was plagued by the same resultant problems of banditry and internal unrest. It is also true that these relatively small regular forces could not successfully fight off the Japanese and hold these areas unless they had the active assistance and participation of the people in large irregular auxiliary forces, which can only, by their nature, be voluntary. The Communists claim over 2,000,000 local volunteers, the Peoples Militia, who are an active force in resisting and harassing the enemy. This figure may be exaggerated—though the evidence we have so far been able to gather indicates that Communist statistics of this nature are not inflated. But an organization of this type cannot be created and made effective by the threat of military force. And the Kuomintang does not even claim to have such an organization.

3. The conclusion therefore seems justified that the peasants support, join, and fight with the Communist armies because they have been convinced that, the Communists are fighting for their interests, and because the Communists have created this conviction by producing some tangible benefits for the peasants.

These benefits must be improvement of the social, political or economic condition of the peasants. Whatever the exact nature of this improvement, it must be—in the broader sense of the term as the serving of the interests of the majority of the people—toward democracy.

3. I believe that this success of the Communist forces in winning the support of the people is particularly well shown in the history of the new Fourth Army (hereinafter referred to as N4A). This force has not received the publicity

given to the development of the Eighth Route Army, which was visited by a number of foreign journalists and other observers early in the war. In many ways, however, its growth has been even more remarkable.

4. The N4A was not organized until 1938. It was formed out of remnants of the old Red Army who had been scattered among numerous isolated areas in South and Central China since the withdrawal of the main Communist forces from Kiangai at the end of 1934. (See my Report No. 19, August 31, 1944, par. 2). This was therefore an entirely new force with no background of unified organization: it could hardly compare with the Eighth Route Army, which at the outbreak of the war was already a well-organized army in being.

When organized the N4A had a strength of only 12,000 officers and men: This is small compared with the 80,000 of the Eighty Route Army in 1937. Weapons and equipment were insufficient and mostly old; many of them were dug up from the ground where they had remain buried during the years of Kuomintang suppression. The new arms promised them by the Central Government were never forthcoming; all they ever received was a small amount of ammunition. Likewise the recruits that had been promised by the Central Government to fill their ranks were never turned over to them.

This new army was immediately thrown into action and was assigned the lower Yangtze Valley, where it was to attack already important and heavily garrisoned Japanese areas. In these areas, or close to them, there were also Kuomintang troops. The N4A army thus had much less favorable opportunities for expansion than the Eighth Route Army, which had first occupied large almost empty areas behind the Japanese lines, from which the Central Government forces had withdrawn and which the Japanese had left very lightly guarded as they moved south.

Having this greater freedom, the Eighth Route Army was able, as early as 1938, to establish stable bases to support its operations. When the Kuomintang, in the years 1939–42, made an attempt to recover this territory, the physical difficulties of distance and interposing Japanese lines made it impossible for the Kuomintang to bring great strength against them. But the N4A, operating partly in Kuomintang territory much more easily accessible to the Central Government, was subjected to much stronger Kuomintang pressure and was forced to change its bases of operations several times. The result has been that most of the present N4A bases date from only 1940 or 1941. This is a serious handicap to the Communist method of growth by the mobilization of local support through a comprehensive political and economic program.

The N4A not only had to move; it also suffered heavy losses in conflicts with the Central Government troops. There have been sporadic small engagements and several of considerable size. In the largest of these, the "incident" of January 1941, the N4A suffered about 7,000 casualties. Furthermore, since that time the N4A has been "illegal" by official mandate of the Central Government. Recruits joining it, therefore, know that they will be regarded by the Kuomintang as rebels and that this official vengeance will extend to their families. The Eighth Route Army has also suffered under this opprobrium, but to a much less extent.

What was the actual development of the N4A under these apparently unfavorable conditions?

At the end of its first year (spring 1939) the original strength of 12,000 *nad* grown to 35,000. Operations extended from Shanghai to Hangchow, from Nanking to Hsuchow, and from Hsuchow west along the Lunghai Railway to the vicinity of Kaifeng. Equipment had been brought in by recruits and captured from the Japanese.

By the spring of 1942 strength had risen to 100,000 regulars. Operations in the area between the Yangtze and the Lunghai Railway had been extended to the Kisngsu coast; it had also moved forces into the Japanese-occupied areas around Hankow.

By the spring of 1944 the regular strength of the N4A had increased to 152,000 men, armed with 93,000 rifles, and supported by an organized Peoples Militia of 550,000. Operations had been extended into East Chekiang and into South and West Hupeh. Stable base areas had been created with a total population, paying taxes only to Communist-controlled governments, of about 30 000,000. All of these bases had withstood large-scale Japanese attacks and some areas had not been penetrated by the Japanese for over 2 years.

In this development the N4A has increased its size by more than 12 times. In a slightly longer period the Eighth Route Army has increased sixfold.

5. These results have been achieved by a force which started from almost nothing. It has grown as it went along, out of the people. It has been an

orphan, without any powerful, well-established government with large resources behind it. It has had to supply itself entirely.

During much of its history it has shared areas with or been in close proximity to Kuomintang troops. Despite the advantages of supply, reenforcements and government support, those Kuomintang forces did not have any such increase. To the contrary, they grew steadily weaker and most of them have by now disintegrated, turned puppet, or withdrawn. They have never carried out an offensive against the Japanese; and they have shown repeatedly that they cannot successfully withstand Japanese attack.

6. General Chen Yi, acting commander of the N4A (General Yeh Ting is still regarded as commander although he has been a prisoner of the Kuomintang since 1941) insists that the success and growth of the N4A is wholly due to its policy toward the people. The most important of these were the following:

(a) First it was necessary to win the people's confidence, in a military sense. Fortunately the original cadres were old and experienced guerrilla fighters. In their first engagements, the Japanese were not used to their tactics and were unprepared and overconfident because of their easy defeats of other Chinese troops. During the first year they had uniform success: after that they had newly trained and capable forces. The Communists always follow the policy of using their best troops in important engagements, holding their newer troops as reserve or to throw in after the enemy is retreating to give them experience.

(b) The first step after coming into an area is intensive propaganda to explain the war and secure popular support.

(c) This followed by the creation of mass organizations of the people. These include farmers, youth, women, militia, and so on. All of these are for the purpose of carrying out some function in resisting the enemy. But they are also encouraged to interest themselves in their own problems. For instance, the farmers are told that in the well-established guerrilla bases rents and interest have been reduced.

(d) Through and from these mass organizations, democratically elected governments are set up. At first these are on the village level. As the area becomes stabilized the system is extended until the hsien governments, and finally the base governments are elected by the people. Nominations and elections are carried out in general village meetings.

(e) As soon as some sort of government control is established, rents and interest are reduced. This is done moderately. The minimum standard is 37½ percent for rent. But in the first stage rents are not usually reduced by more than one-quarter. This is to avoid driving the landlords away and into Japanese camp. In many areas into which the N4A has gone, the power of the landlords has been very great and they have been able to hang on to their control and even in some areas to dominate the local governments. In such areas the Communists move slowly by strengthening the organization of the people until they gain control by democratic methods.

(f) Taxes are reduced because of the moderate requirements of the N4A and the elimination of corruption through popular election of officials.

(g) Taxation is made moderately progressive. At present the poorest approximately 20 percent of the farmers pay no tax. The highest rate on the rich landlords usually does not exceed 35 percent.

(h) Banditry is vigorously attacked and the welfare of the people is improved by the maintenance of peace and order. In addition to direct attack, the other policie sof the Communists are effective in removing this old burden of banditry.

(i) As important as any of these is the practical demonstration of the unity of the army and the people. The army takes as one of its major tasks the protection of the people (to the degree that this often determines its military operations). It takes positive measures to prevent enemy interference with the sowing and harvest. It actually assists when possible in farm work. When and where able its troops produce a part of their own needs. It avoids any sort of arbitrary demands on the people, pays for what it takes, and replaces breakage or damage. It helps the people cope with disasters such as breaks in dikes. In times of poor crops it reduces its own rations to the level of subsistence of the people. It continually harps on the idea that the army and people are "one family."

(j) There is never any forced conscription. Except for the encouragement of the formation, on a volunteer basis, of such organizations as the militia, it avoids in the early stages of its control of an area, any attempt at recruiting.

(k) Within the army, it takes special measures to care for families of soldiers; emphasis is given to care of wounded; such practices as beating of soldiers are prohibited; and there is a democratic relationship—outside of purely military matters—between officers and men.

(l) Various other phases of the program include women's rights, intensive advancement of popular education, promotion of all types of cooperative societies, and so on.

7. General Chen, with whom I have had several long talks on these general subjects, can be excused if he paints an exaggeratedly pretty picture.

The fact remains that the Communists have been successful in winning the support of the people in the areas in which they operate, while the Kuomintang has not. General Chen laughingly says that the Communists should thank the Kuomintang for coming into the same areas, because they have provided the people with a basis for comparison.

We cannot yet say with certainty that the Communists claims of democratic policies are true. But that they are at least partially true is the only reasonable explanation of the popular appeal which the Communist armies have shown.

8. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF–CBI for the information of Mr. Davies.

JOHN S. SERVICE.

Mr. MORRIS. Also, Mr. Chairman, I have report No. 34 by John S. Service, this one dated September 28, 1944, which I would like to introduce at this time.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The report referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1391," and is as follows:)

[Report No. 34]

UNITED STATES ARMY OBSERVER SECTION,
APO 879, September 28, 1944.

Subject:

The orientation of the Chinese Communists toward the Soviet Union and the United States.

To: Commanding general, Fwd, Ech. USAF–CBI, APO 879.

1. There is attached a memorandum on present policies of the Chinese Communists as they affect and are indications of present Chinese Communist orientation toward the Soviet Union and the United States.

2. This memorandum may be summarized as follows:

Summary: Politically, any orientation which the Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems to be a thing of the past. The Communists have worked to make their thinking and program realistically Chinese, and they are carrying out democratic policies which they expect the United States to approve and sympathetically support.

Economically, the Chinese Communists seek the rapid development and industrialization of China for the primary objective of raising the economic level of the people. They recognize that under present conditions in China this must be accomplished through capitalism with large-scale foreign assistance. They believe that the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, will be the only country able to give this economic assistance and realize that for reasons of efficiency, as well as to attract American investment, it will be wise to give this American participation great freedom. (End of summary.)

3. The conclusion, which is the continual statement of the Communist leaders themselves, is that American friendship and support is more important to China than Russia. The Communists also believe, of course, in the necessity of close and friendly relations of China with the Soviet Union, but they insist that this should involve no conflict in interests between the United States and the Soviet Union.

4. This apparent strong orientation of the Chinese Communists toward the United States may be somewhat contrary to general expectation—which may be too ready to emphasize the Communist name of the party. Apart from what may be called the practical considerations that the United States will be the strongest power in the Pacific area and America the country best able to give economic assistance to China, it is also based on the strong Communist conviction that China cannot remain divided. I believe that the Chinese Commu-

nists are at present sincere in seeking Chinese unity on the basis of American support. This does not preclude their turning back toward Soviet Russia if they are forced to in order to survive American-supported Kuomintang attack.

5. It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the American Ambassador at Chungking and Headquarters, USAF–CBI, for the information of Mr. Davies.

JOHN S. SERVICE.

POLICIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AFFECTING THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

A. POLITICAL

1. The attempt to make Chinese Communist thinking more Chinese.—There is apparent in the major statements of theory by Communist leaders during the past several years an effort to get away from slavish attempts to apply Russian communism to China. The emphasis is laid on realistic study of China itself.

The strongest intellectual movement within the Communist Party has been against the "three great faults" of subjectivism, sectarianism, and pedantic formalism. The most important of these, judging from the attention given to it, is subjectivism, which is interpreted to include the dogmatic application of foreign theories unsuited to existing conditions in China. The attitude set forth as correct is "objectivism"—the application of theory on the basis of exhaustive study of actual facts and true conditions. The general effect of this movement has been to take the communism out of Chinese Communist thinking, at least in regard to the immediate future of China.

Examples of such Communist statements are numerous. Perhaps one of the best is a lecture entitled, "How To Change the Way We Study," given by Mao Tse-tung to high party workers at Yenan in May 1941. This lecture is now included in a volume of selected papers which is required textbook for all Communist Party cadres. The following is a partial quotation:[1]

"No one has begun in a really serious manner the study of the political, economic, military, and cultural history of China during the past century, the period of real significance. * * * Many of our comrades regard this ignorance or partial knowledge of our own history not as a shame, but on the contrary as something to be proud of. * * * Since they know nothing about their own country, they turn to foreign lands. * * * During recent decades many foreign returned students have made this mistake. They have merely been phonographs, forgetting that their duty is to make something useful to China out of the imported stuff they have learned. The Communist Party has not escaped this infection.

"We study the teachings of Marx and his followers. But the way that many of us learn those teachings is in direct opposition to their spirit. * * * Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin teach us to study seriously the existing conditions, starting from the actual objective circumstances, not from our subjective wishes. But many of our comrades are acting directly contrary to this guiding principle.

"* * * Many comrades learn the truths of Marx-Leninism merely for the sake of Marx-Leninism. * * * Although they can quote at length from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, yet they cannot apply their learnings to the concrete study of Chinese history and the present conditions in China: They cannot analyze and solve problems that arise from the Chinese revolution.

"These people, who are unscientific in attitude, who only know how to recite dogmas, who have degrees but no real knowledge * * * are a practical joke on real Marx-Leninism."

2. The application of Marxism to China.—I attempted to in my report No. 5 of August 3, 1944, to describe the Chinese Communist application of Marxist ideology to China. The gist was that the Chinese Communist Party in its present program has abandoned everything except the doctrine of historical materialism and the belief in the eventual socialistic society.

That exposition was based on very incomplete study and fragmentary statements by various Communist leaders. It was confirmed, however, in a striking way by Po Ku (generally referred to by the Kuomintang by his original name, Ch'ing Pao-hsien) in a conversation on September 3, 1944. Po Ku's comments

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[1] This translation has been made by Communist sources in Yenan. I have, however, checked it roughly by reading the Chinese original.

are of interest, not only because of his position as a member of the Political Bureau and former chairman of the Communist Party's Central Committee, but also because he is a Russian-returned and usually described in Kuomintang "analyses" of the Communists as the leader of a "pro-Russian clique." My notes or Po Ku's remarks are as follows:

"We regard Marxism not as a dogma but as a guide. We accept its historical materialism and its ideological method. It furnishes us with the conclusions and the objectives toward which we strive. This objective is the classless society built on socialism—in other words, the good of the individual and the interests of all the people.

"But to try to transplant to China all of Marx's description of the society in which he found himself (the industrial revolution of Europe in the nineteenth century) and the steps (class struggle and violent revolution) which he saw would be necessary for the people to escape from those conditions, would not only be ridiculous, it would also be a violation of our basic principles of realistic objectivism and the avoidance of doctrinaire dogmatism.

"China at present is not even capitalistic. Its economy is still that of semifeudalism. We cannot advance at one jump to socialism. In fact, because we are at least 200 years behind most of the rest of the world, we probably cannot hope to reach socialism until after most of the rest of the world has reached that state.

"First we must rid ourselves of this semifeudalism. Then we must raise our economic level by a long stage of democracy and free enterprise.

"What we Communists hope to do is to keep China moving smoothly and steadily toward this goal. By orderly, gradual, and progressive development we will avoid the conditions which forced Marx to draw his conclusions of the necessity (in his society) for class struggle; we will prevent the need for a violent revolution by a peaceful planned revolution.

"It is impossible to predict how long this process will take. But we can be sure that it will be more than 30 or 40 years, and probably more than 100 years."

3. The Communist political program is democracy.—Advancing from the field of theory to that of practice, the Communist political program is simple democracy. This is much more American than Soviet in form and spirit.

Communists now are apt to argue that they were not really communistic even in the days of their power in Kiangsi. I am not competent to discuss this. But even though they may have distributed the land to the peasants as private property and have left the landlord enough for his own needs, still the fact remains that their governments were organized as Soviets during that period.

Starting in August 1935 the Communists based their policy on a democratic united front. Since that time—now over 9 years—they have adopted the San Min Chu I (as set forth by Sun Yat-sen in the manifesto of the first Kuomintang congress) have abandoned the Soviet form of government, have sought the cooperation of all groups based on the democratic rights of the whole people.

This Communist program is well known and there is hence no need for detailed description here. Basic documents are the above-mentioned manifesto of the first Kuomintang congress and Mao Tse-tung's book, New Democracy (a translation of which was submitted to the headquarters and Embassy under cover of one of my reports dated early in 1944).

First we must rid ourselves of this semifeudalism. Then we must raise our economic level by a long stage of democracy and free enterprise.

"What we communists hope to do is to keep the country moving smoothly toward this goal. By orderly, gradual, and progressive development we will avoid the conditions which forced Marx to draw his conclusions of the necessity (in his society) for class struggle; we will prevent a revolution in the violent sense of the term.

"It is impossible to predict how long this process will take. But we can be sure that it will be more than 30 or 40 years, probably more nearly 100."

3. The Communist political program is democracy.—Changing from theory to practice, the Communist political program is simple democracy. This is much more American than Russian in form and spirit.

Communists now are prone to deny that they were communistic even in the early days of their rule in Kiangsi. I am not competent to discuss this. But the fact was their governments were organized as Soviets during that period.

Starting in August 1935 the Communists reversed their basic policy on the basis of the united front line. Since that time—for over 9 years—they have adopted the San Min Chu I as set forth by Sun Yat-sen in the manifesto of the first Kuomintang congress, and Mao Tse-tung's book, New Democracy (a translation of which was submitted to the headquarters and the Embassy early in 1944).

Generally speaking, the Communists are faithfully carrying out this democratic program. There is no question but that in the areas under their influence they have given democratic rights to the people, and that the party is supported by the majority of the population.

Will stick to first manifesto, even if KMT fails.

The question of whether the Communists are willing to share their power with other parties in a democratic way is a question more difficult to answer. They are working in backward rural districts with a population without previous political experience. This has required them to assume a role in organization and leadership which gives them power and influence greater than normal for a political party as the Americans think it. Furthermore the only other real political party, the Kuomintang, has generally refused cooperation. Through their institution of such policies as the three-three system (not more than one-third of elective officials to be Communist), through their close cooperation with such liberal groups as the intellectuals, and through their inclusions of such groups as the landlords and merchant classes in their governments and efforts to give them reasonable treatment, the Communists seem to have demonstrated this broad-minded, democratic spirit.

Of course, it can be argued that the Communists are advancing their own interests and moving toward a goal of control of the country by the use of these methods. This is true. But it must be acknowledged that the Communists have not tried to eliminate such groups as the landlords and native capitalists, and that they realize that their own advancement and the interest of the country are best served by the cooperation of all groups based on reasonable protection of the interests of all those groups.

4. There is little aping of Soviet Russia and little evidence of strong ties to Russia.—Not only in theory and policy, also in the atmosphere and daily scene in Yenan there is little direct evidence of Soviet influence. Except in speeches within the party there is little reference to Communism or to Marx and the other patriarchs of communism. In party institutions there are pictures of Marx and occasionally of Engles and Lenin: but these are rare. Stalin's picture is common but usually placed alongside those of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt, and Churchill.

The Communist newspaper gives considerable prominence to Russian war news but not more than it does news of American victories and much less than it does to the operations of the Communist armies.

Soviet influence is obvious in the organization of the Communist Party: but the same can be said of the Kuomintang.

Soviet examples also seem apparent in the measures used to promote the production campaign such as the selection and honoring of labor heroes, the assigning of planned quotas, and the stress on competition. But these measures seem to be effective and are hardly in themselves characteristically Soviet.

Since we have been in Yenan one foreign play has been produced (in translation). This was Russian. But its choice was particularly appropriate because it was a war play, involving guerrillas and old Communist leaders whose main claim to position was that they had fought through the civil war and now had to be removed because they were out of date (Budenny?).

The Soviet symbols of the hammer and sickle are almost never seen. In fact the casual observer sees little to remind him of Russia or to make him think that the Chinese Communists are particularly attached to Soviet Russia or, as suggested by the extreme faction of the Kuomintang, in any way a front for the Russian Communists.

It cannot be said, on the other hand, that the Chinese Communists are trying to ape American models (except in the surprising ways of social dancing and a mild interest in bridge and poker). In fact they are imitating nobody. Their emphasis is on being Chinese. And in this they seek to come down to the level of the common people. There is no hocus-pocus such as the Kuomintang insists on of weekly Sun Yat-sen Memorial Meetings, no formal posting of Sun Yat-sen's (or anyone else's) picture to be bowed to before every meeting, no ceremonial of repeating Sun Yat-sen's will, no standing every time someone's name is mentioned. The Russian-inspired romanization of the Chinese language has been dropped. Except for limited audiences of the party cadres, the western drama has been abandoned for a popularization and development of the native northern Chinese folk plays and dances. Music has been made native. In every sphere the Communists have made the most strenuous efforts to go native and to approach the mass of the people in terms that they will understand.

B. ECONOMIC

Following views chiefly Po Ku, supplemented by talks with Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i:

1. The Communists agree that China must industrialize.—The Communists are just as convinced as the Kuomintang (and everyone else) that China must industrialize.

Where the Communists differ from the Kuomintang is in their motivation and emphasis. One gains the impression from China's Destiny and much of the present thinking in Chungking that the primary objective of China's industrialization is defense—in other words, national power. The Communists place this second. First in their minds (at least in their talk) is welfare. Unless the living standards of the people are raised, there can be no real foundation for either economic or political progress. The first great expansion, the Communists claim, should therefore, be in light, consumer industry and communications. More gradually and slowly there can be built up a heavy industry (or as China's Destiny calls it, a national defense) base.

The Communists also place greater emphasis on the idea that China will probably be predominantly an agricultural country, that China's agricultural resources and problems must therefore not be neglected, that China does not have the material resources to be a first-rank heavy-industry country.

2. China can industrialize at present only on a capitalistic basis.—China's basic condition at present is still semifeudalism. To get rid of this is the first important step. From this it is impossible to step at once to socialism because there is neither the political nor economic foundation. The Chinese people are not yet ready for socialism and will not be for a long time to come. To talk of socialism now is impractical. The next stage in China's advance must be capitalism. In this capitalism must be given the freest possible opportunity to develop the country economically. China's weakness now is the under-development of capitalism.

3. Foreign assistance will be necessary to bring about this industrialization.—China not only lacks enough native capital to finance large-scale industrialization, it also lacks an adequate industry to serve as a starting point for this industrialization, it lacks experience and technical personnel. The end of the war will see these conditions accentuated. China will be suffering from ruinous inflation, from the disorganization and destruction brought by the war. It is probable that the Japanese will complete the destruction of the rudimentary Chinese industry before they withdraw or are defeated.

These conditions make it impossible for China to follow Russia's example of building herself. Backward as Russia was after the Revolution, she had far more of a modern industrial base than China will have. Low as were the living standards of the Russian people, they were not as low as the irreducible minimum of the great majority of the Chinese people, and it was therefore possible for the Soviets to depress those living standards even further to raise the capital for their industrialization. But even Russia accomplished what she did only with terrific sacrifices. She did not do it on her own resources because she wanted to; but because she had to. China, even if she were able to accomplish such a Herculean feat, will be under no such compulsion to do so. The attempt would be foolish.

4. Soviet Russia will be unable to give this needed large-scale economic assistance to China. After the war, Russia will have a great part of her country to rebuild. Her own reconstruction and the continuation of her own internal development which was interrupted by the war will continue for a long time. Published reports indicate that the reopening of the mines in the Donbas Basin may take as long as 2 or 3 years of work. The report of Mr. Johnson, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce, of his talks in Moscow indicate that Russia herself will seek large-scale assistance from the United States after the war in imports of materials and machinery. These will have to be financed by loans.

It is therefore obvious that Russia will have neither surplus capital nor technical personnel available to assist us in the industrialization of China.

5. The United States is the only country which will be able to help China. Even if Russia were able (which she will not be) to assist China, the United States will be the logical country to play the greatest share. American resources will be tremendous. They have been geared to huge exports during the war. America will have industrial plants which will not be needed and can be exported whole. She will have capital to invest and the necessary technical per-

sonnel. In addition, her sea communications with China are better than those from European Russia. America faces on the Pacific. Siberia is still under development.

American ties with China are strong. America has all of China's good will. For reasons of China's internal unity it will be better for America to play the major role in this economic development.

The other European countries will be engaged in reconstruction of their own countries. They will not have capital to invest. The same will be true to some extent of Great Britain, whose large-scale participation in China will, in any case, be less welcome than American.

6. Great freedom must be given to foreign capital in this economic development of China.—Since our goal is the most rapid possible development of Chinese resources, communications, and industry, we must make investment attractive to foreign capital. We cannot reasonably expect China to reap all the profit.

The logic of our moderate treatment of landlords and merchants and limited reduction of rent and interest in order to obtain the support of these groups in a united front which can strengthen our bases economically will hold good. If we carried out drastic reduction of rents or confiscation of land and restriction of private business, we would cut off our own noses and weaken our bases by driving out these necessary capitalistic groups.

We must therefore give foreign capital very wide freedom of opportunity.

Experience has shown us that Government enterprises in our own areas cannot yet be operated efficiently. Our Army factories are not as efficient as privately run factories.

We believe that Chungking's efforts to create a bureaucratic industry (for instance, the enterprises of the National Resources Commission and the monopolies of H. H. Kung) are proving the same thing. They may enrich Kung and a few others. But they are rotten with favoritism, graft, and inefficiency. They are not the best means to bring about this economic development."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here a document entitled "IPR Notes on Chinese Clippings." It is No. 15, dated July 28, 1943. It bears the initials TAB, CP, and P. Jaffe. It also has a notation "Return to W. H. H. File."

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be received in the record?

Senator WATKINS. You say this is a photostat of a document you found in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received and made part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1392" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1392

IPR NOTES ON CHINESE CLIPPINGS, NUMBER FIFTEEN, JULY 28, 1943

(By Yung Ying Hsu)

CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT ON COMINTERN DISSOLUTION

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement on May 26 approving the dissolution of the Communist International. The full text of the statement was published in the Hsin Hua Jih Pae (May 28, 1943) with a total of sixty-three characters deleted by the censor. This censored version reads as follows:

1. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party fully endorses the proposal of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to dissolve the Communist International. The Chinese Communist Party considers itself free, beginning this very day, from all the obligations provided in the Constitution, and in resolutions adopted by its congresses of the Communist International.

2. The Communist International has accomplished its historical mission. It has not only safeguarded revolutionary Marxism in Europe, America and Japan from distortions by the opportunists, aided the advanced workers [in these lands] to consolidate themselves into genuine workers' parties, supported the Socialist Soviet Union, and repeatedly opposed Fascism and Fascist wars, but has also offered its best aid to the advanced workers of the oppressed nations of the East in organizing into their own parties and becoming the people's vanguard standing in the foremost ranks of all movements for liberation. What is especially unforgettable for the Chinese people was the strong effort exerted by the Communist International in helping to bring about the united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1924, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was still alive. Following that it helped the Northern Expedition to achieve its victory. During 1927 to 1937, the most trying period for the Chinese revolution, the Communist International again supported the people of China. Finally, during the six years of anti-Japanese war since 1937, it rallied its affiliated section and the toiling people of the nations in assisting the Chinese people against the Japanese imperialists' war of aggression. In a word, throughout its entire existence, the Communist International put forth its best effort to aid the suffering Chinese people.

As rightly stated in the proposal of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, conditions within nations and on an international scale have become so complex today that the existing organizational form has become unadaptable to the continuously growing labor movement in the different countries. In the present allied anti-Fascist war of liberation there is a much greater necessity for the national Communist Parties to solve their respective problems independently on the basis of the specific circumstances and historical conditions of their own people, thus broadening and hastening the national upsurge and mass mobilization in order to achieve a thorough-going and complete victory. [Meanwhile] the National Communist Parties and their leading cadres have grown up and reached their political maturity. In view of these facts the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International proposed to the national Communist Parties the dissolution of the Communist International. [It was held that] under present conditions the dissolution of the Communist International has become more advantageous than its continuance.

Since the present war situation does not permit the convening of an international congress, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International lays this proposal before the national Communist Parties. In view of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party fully agrees with the reasons given in the proposal and endorses the dissolution of the Communist International. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party further points out that after dissolution of the First International by Karl Marx the labor movement in the different countries recorded a greater development. Dissolution of the Third International now will undoubtedly hasten the victory of the Anti-Fascist Global War as well as the liberation of all mankind.

3. The founding of the Chinese Communist Party was a sequence of a developing labor movement in China as well as of the unfolding of modern Chinese history since the "May Fourth" movement in 1919. It also meant that where there is a proletarian and labor movement, there will emerge a party of the proletariat. Even if there were no Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party would emerge according to the law of historical necessity.

After its founding in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointed out the anti-imperialist and antifeudal road to the Chinese people for the first time in the modern history of China. Moreover, the entire membership of the Party set a practical example of undeviating loyalty, in defiance of torture and death, to struggle for the liberation of its nation along all lines. The Chinese Communist Party has received a great deal of help from the Communist International; but for a long time the Chinese Communists have been able to determine their own political path, policy and action with complete independence on the basis of the concrete circumstances and specific conditions in their own nation. Since the decision of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, held in August 1935, not to interfere in organizational matters of the national Communist Parties, the Executive Committee of the Communist International and its Presidium have lived up to this decision and have not interfered with the organizational matters of the Chinese Communist Party. (29 characters deleted here). Since the War of Resistance, the Chinese Communist Party has

been carrying on a hard struggle unprecedented in history. These are the independent achievements of the Chinese Communist Party with its bare hands, unaided by any outside power. This may be said to be historically unparallelled in China's revolutionary movement during the last several decades.

Revolution can neither be exported nor imported. It can only arise through the internal development of each nation. This is the truth repeatedly dwelled upon by the Marxists. The practice of the Chinese Communist Party has completely vindicated this truth. In view of this fact, dissolution of the Communist International will strengthen the self-confidence and the initiative of the Chinese Communists, it will reinforce the link between the Party and the people of the entire nation, and it will increase further the fighting power of the Party. The Chinese Communists (13 characters deleted here) will remain militantly in the foremost ranks of the anti-Japanese war (21 characters deleted here) and to support the war effort of the national government, until our victory over the Japanese aggressors and their German and Italian allies, until the completion of the great task for an independent, democratic new China.

4. The Chinese Communists are Marxist-Leninists, because Marxism-Leninism is a science transcending national limits. The Chinese Communists will continue to base themselves on the conditions of their nation in applying and developing skillfully the principles of Marxism-Leninism, in order to serve our nation in war and in reconstruction. The Chinese Communists are also the inheritor of the best traditions in all of our national culture, thought, and ethics; they consider such tradition as their own blood and flesh and will continue to develop and glorify them. The campaign carried on by the Chinese Communist Party in recent years against subjectivism, against sectarianism, and against doctrinaire sterotypes is aimed at the further integration of the revolutionary science of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese revolutionary practice, Chinese history, and Chinese culture. This campaign has demonstrated a power of initiative in thought and in revolutionary practice on the part of the Chinese Communists. It also demonstrates that the Chinese Communists are surely able to accomplish the historical tasks of the Chinese people together with them. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is deeply convinced that our Party comrades will unite as one man to overcome our shortcomings and to develop our initiative and positiveness. If this is the case, we will surely accomplish our tasks despite the fact that our enemy the Japanese imperialists is still strong and that there are still innumerable difficulties lying ahead of us.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.

MAY 26, 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. I would next like to introduce, Mr. Chairman, the sworn statement of T. A. Bisson, dated April 16, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1393" and is as follows:)

97 KINGSTON ROAD,
Berkeley 7, Calif., April 16, 1952.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: With reference to my testimony before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary, I wish to point out that I made an important denial in executive session but did not have an opportunity to repeat it in public session. I denied that my article (China's Role in a Coalition War) in the Far Eastern Survey of July 14, 1943, was written at the instruction or request of the Community Party and emphasized that it was written entirely independently and expressed only my own personal views at the time.

This denial is very important to me because it refuted a serious charge made against me by Mr. Louis Budenz before the subcommittee. Accordingly, I respectfully request that my executive session testimony on this point be made part of the printed record of the hearings. I feel that it is only fair to me and my reputation that this should be done immediately. Otherwise, the public record will give the impression that this serious charge against me has not been denied by me in sworn testimony.

May I also request that the full text of the Survey article in question, together with the reply to it by Dr. C. L. Hsia and my final comment printed in the Survey issue of August 16, 1943, be inserted in the printed record of the public hearing.

Reference was made in the public hearing of March 31, 1952, to my membership in the American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression. This committee was long headed by Mr. Henry L. Stimson as honorary secretary, a testimony to the character of the committee, which was exclusively concerned with stopping the sale of American war materials to Japan while it was engaged in its aggressive attack on China. Since this point was not made clear at the hearing, where I did not have my data available, I respectfully request that the statement here made concerning the committee be made part of the printed record of the hearing.

Would you kindly acknowledge this letter and give me assurance that my requests will be granted.

Sincerely yours,

[SEAL] T. A. BISSON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me by T. A. Bisson this 18th day of April 1952.

EDITH LAWRENCE SMITH,
Notary Public in and for the County of Alameda, State of California.

My commission expires June 2, 1955.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce at this point the sworn statement of William L. Holland, dated April 12, 1952.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received and made a part of the record.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1394" and is as follows:)

NEW YORK, *April 12, 1952.*

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM BY W. L. HOLLAND ON ISRAEL EPSTEIN

Mr. Israel Epstein has been mentioned in testimony before the subcommittee as the author of an IPR research report entitled "Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China." Since it has recently been alleged that Mr. Epstein is or was a Communist, I wish to explain how it came about that he prepared this study for the IPR.

My acquaintance with Mr. Epstein began in 1943 in Chungking when he was working as a correspondent for several newspapers and magazines, including, at one period, the New York Times. He was well known at that time as a writer on Chinese affairs and the author of a substantial book on China as well as many articles. In 1943 he had started work on an investigation of labor problems in Nationalist China. He had already collected a valuable amount of hitherto unavailable first-hand information on labor conditions in formerly backward parts of western China which were now being rapidly transformed by migration of industry from the coastal areas. He had had the close cooperation of well-qualified Chinese labor experts and had clearly acquired a unique knowledge of this problem, about which no serious research report had been written.

In my capacity as international research secretary of the IPR, I therefore commissioned Mr. Epstein (in 1943) to prepare a full report on this subject for the international research program of the IPR and authorized him to make arrangements with a number of Chinese colleagues, including the well-known sociologist, Professor Ta Chen, to work on this project during the ensuing year or two. Mr. Epstein did so and eventually returned to New York with a great collection of data which, after a long delay, he wrote up in a rather poorly organized first draft.

In accordance with the standard IPR procedure, this draft was submitted for comment to a number of people, including Prof. W. W. Lockwood at Princeton University, Prof. Owen Lattimore, and Prof. John K. Fairbank. It was also read by several persons on the IPR staff. All readers felt that the study contained valuable new information which ought to be made available, but some thought that there were also certain passages which expressed criticism of the Nationalist authorities in a tone not suitable for an IPR research volume. I therefore told Mr. Epstein that the study would be accepted for publication for the IPR only if he agreed to have the manuscript undergo considerable editing,

including the removal of the above excessively critical passages. Mr. Epstein agreed and finally approved the drastically revised version, which was subsequently issued in 1949 by the IPR in mimeographed form under the above-mentioned title.

The report contains a preface by me, clearly indicating that the study does not claim to be a definitive work but was simply intended as an interim compilation providing a useful body of reference materials pending the time when a more comprehensive book might be written.

I also arranged for an appendix (briefly sketching some outstanding postwar labor developments) to be added. This was written by Mr. Julian Friedman, then lecturer in colonial economics at the University of London and formerly labor attaché at the United States consulate general in Shanghai in 1946.

A glance at the volume will show that it is essentially factual and accurate in the general picture it gives of China's wartime and immediate postwar labor relations. It has been favorably reviewed in many journals.

W. L. Holland.

State of New York,
County of New York, ss:

William L. Holland, being duly sworn, declares that every statement in the above memorandum is true to the best of his knowledge.

Russell S. Golde,
Notary Public, State of New York.

April 12, 1952.

Mr. Morris. I have here a statement entitled "United States Economic, Financial, and Military Aid to China Since 1 April 1941," prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is secret security information only when statement 7 is attached, and statement 7 is not attached to this report, therefore relieving it of its secret classification.

Senator Watkins. It may be received.

(The statement referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1395" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1395

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND MILITARY AID TO CHINA SINCE 1 APRIL 1941

Prepared by Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Progress Reports and Statistics

United States economic, financial, and military aid to China since Apr. 1, 1941

[In millions of United States dollars]

	Transfers Apr. 1, 1941, to Sept. 2, 1945	Transfers Sept. 2, 1945, to Dec. 31, 1951
Aid to China furnished in whole or in part by the Army, Navy, and Air Force		
1. Lend-lease program:		
May 6, 1941, to Sept. 2, 1945	$845.3	
Sept. 2, 1945, to June 30, 1946		$714.1
Subsequent to June 30, 1946		17.9
Pipeline credit agreement		50.3
2. Military aid under Sino-American Cooperative Organization agreement (SACO).		17.7
3. Transfer of United States naval vessels under Public Law 512, 79th Cong.		74.6
4. Transfers under the China aid program authorized by sec. 404 (b) China Aid Act of 1948.		123.1
5. Ammunition transferred by the United States First Marine Division in the Peiping-Tientsin Area.		3.0
6. Ammunition transferred by Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific at Tsingtao, China.		1.3
7. Mutual Defense Assistance Program. (See attached secret statement 7.)		24.7
8. U. S. Army sale of excess stocks in West China		20.0
Aid to China furnished by agencies other than Army, Navy, and Air Force		
9. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and War Asset Administration: Sale of surplus military equipment.		3.9
10. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner sale of civilian surplus property. (bulk-sales agreement).		55.0
11. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner dockyard-facilities sales		4.1
12. Maritime Commission ship sales		16.4
13. Assistance by American Red Cross:		
Prior to VJ-day	4.6	
Subsequent to VJ-day		1.9
14. Export-Import Bank credits:		
Prior to VJ-day	20.3	
Subsequent to VJ-day		83.5
15. Economic Cooperation Administration program		213.5
16. United States foreign relief program (Department of State)		43.9
17. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—United States contribution		474.0
18. Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs		3.6
19. Stabilization fund agreement, 1941 (Department of Treasury)	10.0	
20. 1942 Treasury credit (Public Law 442, 77th Cong.)	485.0	15.0
21. Chinese Student Assistance (Department of State)		5.2
Total	1,365.2	1,966.7
Grand total	3,331.9	

DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL CATEGORIES OF UNITED STATES AID

(Paragraph numbers correspond with numbers of items listed in table above)

1. Lend-lease program

As of December 31, 1951, Treasury Department records on fiscal operations show aid, both material and services, furnished to the Chinese Government under the lend-lease program amounted to $1,627.6 million of which $845.3 million had been delivered prior to VJ-day and the remainder of $782.3 million had been delivered subsequent to VJ-day.

Of the total aid, $1,627.6 million, the War Department, which included the Army Air Corps effected transfers amounting to $1,420.7 million, according

to records of the Department of the Army. This amount includes: (1) Overseas transfers out of United States theater stocks and services rendered amounting to $1,073 million. Approximately 97 percent of all overseas transfers of materials and services are supported by receipted transfer documents listing in detail the nature and extent of the aid furnished. (Photostat copies of receipted transfer documents attached as exhibit I). Lend-lease shipments to United States commanding generals earmarked for China amounting to $385.9 million against which credits for diversions to non-Chinese recipients and returns amounting to $308.6 million were applied, leaving for these shipments a net of $77.3 million as the value of actual transfers to the Chinese. (3) All other War Department transfers, amounting to $270.4 million, took place in the continental United States and are supported by transfer documents of which approximately 98 percent are receipted by either Chinese Government representatives or their authorized agents.

The bulk of the lend-lease transfers made by the Department of the Navy were accomplished in China and in most instances are supported by receipts signed by representatives of the Chinese Government. The total lend-lease aid furnished by the Novy, according to Navy Department records, was $71 million of which $66.8 million represents the value of the 96 vessels charged to lend-lease and transferred under Public Law 512 (79th Cong.).

In addition to the War and Navy Department transfers, there were lend-lease transfers by Treasury Department, Maritime Commission, and other agencies totaling $135.9 million, according to Treasury Department records.

Included in the above totals are amounts resulting from transfers under the pipeline credit agreement which authorized the delivery under credit arrangements of lend-lease civilian-type equipment and supplies contracted for but undelivered on VJ-day. The agreement provided for the shipment of $51.7 million of such supplies to be paid for over a period of 30 years beginning July 1, 1947, with interest at 2⅜ percent per year. Goods with a value of $50.3 million were actually delivered and charged to the Chinese under the terms of this agreement. Also included in the above totals are charges in the amount of $25.9 million covering certain transfers made under lend-lease for which the Chinese Government agreed to pay. No other credit arrangements under lend-lease are indicated by the December 31, 1951, lend-lease reports of the Treasury Department.

The pricing policy for aid furnished under the Lend-Lease Act was United States procurement cost for new items and value based on condition for used items, plus an amount to cover packing, handling, and inland transportation. Charges for transfers out of excess military stocks overseas were United States procurement cost for new items, the value based on condition for used items, plus an amount to cover packing, handling, and inland and ocean transportation. (Statement 1.)

2. Sino-American cooperative agreement

The military transfers under the Sino-American Cooperative agreement (SACO) consisted primarily of ordnance supplies furnished the Chinese between September 2, 1945, and March 2, 1946, by the United States Navy. These transfers were accomplished in fulfillment of a wartime agreement calling for the exchange of services and supplies for certain specified services provided by the Chinese Government. (Statement 2.)

3. Transfer of United States Naval Vessels

A total of 131 vessels were transferred to the Chinese Nationalist Government as grant aid under Public Law 512 (79th Cong.). The procurement cost of these vessels was $141.4 million of which $74.6 million is reflected in this report as value of aid rendered under Public Law 512, and $66.8 million is reflected in the lend-lease accounts with $27.3 million prior to VJ-day and $39.5 million subsequent to VJ-day. (Statement 3.)

4. China-aid program

Through December 31, 1951, shipments to the Chinese Government made by United States Government agencies under the China-aid program, for which $125 million was appropriated, amounted to $94.2 million. In addition, there was a cash advance of $28.9 million made to the Nationalist Government of China to be utilized in direct procurement of military equipment by the Chinese on the open market. A portion of the cash advance was pai dto the War Assets Administration and the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner for certain surplus material obtained from them.

Pricing of aid furnished by the Departments of the Army and the Aid Force which amounted to $71.8 million, was in accordance with the pricing policy established by the Department of the Army covering all military-aid programs. In accordance with this policy actual procurement cost was charged for items procured for foreign aid programs, plus packing, handling, transportation, and administrative costs. Full current replacement cost was charged for transfers out of stock, plus packing, handling, transportation, and administrative costs. Transfers out of excess stocks were priced at 10 percent of prices in effect in 1945, plus rehabilitation costs, packing, handling, transportation, and administrative costs. (Statements 4 and 4A.)

5 and 6. Ammunition transferred by United States marines

Between April and September 1947 the United States marines in the Peiping-Tientsin area and the Tsingtao area transferred at no cost to the Chinese Government approximately 6,500 tons of ammunition. Complete listings of the items and quantities transferred, together with dollar values, based on estimated 1947 procurement costs are attached. (Statements 5 and 6.)

7. Mutual Defense Assistance Program

As of December 31, 1951, certain military material with a value of $24.7 million had been shipped under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. All detailed information concerning this program is classified for security reasons.

Pricing of aid furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program is in accordance with the provision set forth in section 403 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. (See attached secret statement 7.)

8. Sale of excess stocks of the United States Army in West China

In 1946 the United States Army contracted to transfer to the Chinese Government a broad assortment of United States Army supplies, with a depreciated landed cost value of U. S. $67.24 million, plus CN $5.16 billion and located in West China. In return the Chinese Government agreed to pay $25 million (US) and $5.16 billion (CN) for the property transferred.

Certain terms of the agreement follow:

"ARTICLE 4. In consideration of the immediate transfer of said property, China hereby agrees to purchase and to pay for the property thus transferred, and further agrees t hold the United States harmless for all claims for rents, damages, breach of contract or otherwise which may arise from any sourse whatever. . . .

"ARTICLE 7. China agrees to pay US $25,000,000 and CN $5,160,000,000 for the property thus transferred in accordance with the following terms and conditions:

"a. CN $5,160,000,000 will be deducted from the total of the CN dollar advance made by China to the United States.

"b. US $5,000,000 will be paid in cash.

"c. US $20,000,000 will be payable in accordance with the terms of a contract to be negotiated between China and the United States Treasury Department, which contract will provide for:

(1) Principal to be paid in 30 equal installments.

(2) Interest at 2⅜ percent.

(3) Any surplus of settlement of US indebtedness to China for military expenditures in excess of China's cash down payments for surplus property of the US will thereupon be used by China for the purchase of property in the United States or will be applied to the liquidation of the unpaid balance of this contract.

"d. If at the completion of the transfer the actual net depreciated value computed as above is greater or less than the estimated net depreciated value stated herein, China's purchase price will be increased or decreased by the same percentage by which the actual net depreciated value varies from the contract referred to in c, above."

The cash down payment in United States dollars was later incorporated into the Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner bulk-sale agreement as part of the considerations received by the United States. The Chinese obligation of $20 million was later included as one of the items presented as a United States claim in negotiations with the Chinese Government on settlement of war accounts.

9. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and War Assets Administration sale of surplus military equipment

The Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner and the War Assets Administration sold material and equipment to the Chinese Nationalist Govern-

ment with an estimated procurement cost of $102 million for $6.7 million, according to the records of the Department of State. The Chinese Government paid the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner $2.78 million out of the $125 million grant authorized by the China Aid Act of 1948. (See item 4.) The remaining $3.93 million was paid to the United States Government; however, the source of these funds is not known.

10. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner sale of civilian surplus property (bulk-sales agreement)

Under an agreement dated August 30, 1946, the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner sold to the Chinese Nationalist Government surplus property located in China and on various islands in the Pacific. Total acquisition cost of the property covered by this agreement was $842 million, according to the records of the Department of State. The total sales price was $175 million. Of this amount $120 million was offset against obligations of the United States Armed Forces to the Chinese Government, and $55 million represents a Chinese obligation to be paid in local currency for real property to be acquired in the future for United States diplomatic and consular establishments and for the expenses of educational programs under the Fulbright Act (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.).

11. Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner dockyard-facilities sales

The procurement cost of the property transferred under this sale was $11.5 million and the sale price was $4.1 million, according to the records of the Department of State.

12. Maritime Commission ship sales

The Maritime Commission sold the Chinese Government 43 vessels for a total sales price of $26.2 million under the Merchant Ships Sales Act of 1946. Of this amount $16.4 million was on Maritime Commission credit terms. The balance of $9.8 million was paid in cash, obtained in part through an Export-Import Bank credit. (See item 14.) The total wartime procurement cost of the 43 vessels was $77.3 million. This information was taken from page 1049 of the Department of State's United States Relations With China.

13. Assistance by American Red Cross; 15. Economic Cooperation Administration program; 16. United States foreign-relief program (Department of State)

The amounts indicated above regarding the aid furnished under these programs were obtained from Foreign Transactions of the United States Government, released in January 1952 by the Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, Clearing Office for Foreign Transactions.

14. Export-Import Bank credits

Amounts reflected in this report were obtained from the Export-Import Bank.

17. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—United States contribution; 18. Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs

The values cited are from United States Relations With China (Department of State), page 1043.

19. Stabilization fund agreement, 1941 (Department of Treasury); 20. 1942 Treasury credit (Public Law 442, 77th Cong.)

The amounts of aid reported under these agreements are in accordance with the records of the Department of the Treasury.

21. Chinese student assistance (Department of State)

The amount of aid reported under this program is in accordance with records of the Department of State.

STATEMENT 1.—*Statement of lend-lease aid provided to the Government of China, as of Dec. 31, 1951*

	Total	Ordnance and ordnance stores	Aircraft and aeronautical material	Tanks and other vehicles	Vessels and other watercraft	Miscellaneous military equipment	Facilities and equipment	Agricultural, industrial, and other commodities	Testing reconditioning, etc., of defense articles	Services and expenses
Transfers period May 1941 to Sept. 2, 1945:										
Army (includes Air Force):										
Direct transfers [1]	$329,900,252.11	$96,461,382.32	$126,419,340.76	$42,356,153.71		$23,331,376.70	$1,522,313.18	$3,521,147.60	$78.25	$36,288,459.59
Oversea transfers	403,993,368.00	56,600,438.36	60,861,960.09	19,110,792.98		19,871,732.38	8,388,808.60	5,499,505.33		233,660,130.26
Navy	29,162,470.15	78,326.31	42,699.09		$27,737,895.98	207,425.26		503,705.70	204,315.38	388,102.43
Treasury	73,943,806.37	47,417.41		32,770,074.99		3,402,602.19	17,681.55	36,980,756.00		725,274.23
Maritime	8,242,348.39				7,823,368.14					418,980.25
All other	93,283.68									93,283.68
Total	845,335,528.70	153,187,564.40	187,323,999.94	94,237,021.68	35,561,264.12	46,813,136.53	9,928,803.33	46,505,114.63	204,393.63	271,574,230.44
Transfers period Sept. 2, 1945, to June 30, 1946:										
Army (includes Air Force):										
Direct transfers [1]	11,300,515.83		5,810,136.11			1,040.82	20,343.70	177,011.72	1,882.93	5,290,100.55
Oversea transfers	658,051,284.99	111,738,607.83	32,616,712.03	67,456,851.08		93,102,219.37	15,855.04	22,866,212.14		330,254,827.50
Navy	41,346,909.53	250,342.32			39,526,481.04	1,481,655.94			455.95	87,974.28
Treasury	43,155,250.54			28,278,974.01		572.18		14,875,704.35		
Maritime	10,397,133.33				10,397,133.33					
All other	55,207.53									55,207.53
Total	764,306,301.75	111,988,950.15	38,426,848.14	95,735,825.09	49,923,614.37	94,585,488.31	36,198.74	37,918,928.21	2,338.88	335,688,109.86
Transfers subsequent to June 30, 1946:										
Army (includes Air Force):										
Direct transfers [1]	6,449,713.56		5,256,756.49							1,192,957.07
Oversea transfers	11,001,568.82	5,842,892.19		273,784.99		4,801,852.68				83,038.96
Navy	479,330.00	37,234.60			17,028.20	375,305.46				49,761.74
Total	17,930,612.38	5,880,126.79	5,256,756.49	273,784.99	17,028.20	5,177,158.14				1,325,757.77
Transfers all periods:										
Army (includes Air Force):										
Direct transfers [1]	347,650,481.50	96,461,382.32	137,486,233.36	42,356,153.71		23,332,417.52	1,542,656.88	3,698,159.32	1,961.18	42,771,517.21
Oversea transfers	1,073,046,221.81	174,181,938.38	93,478,672.12	86,841,429.05		117,775,804.43	8,404,663.64	28,365,717.47		563,997,996.72
Total, Army	1,420,696,703.31	270,643,320.70	230,964,905.48	129,197,582.76		141,108,221.95	9,947,320.52	32,063,876.79	1,961.18	606,769,513.93
Navy	70,988,709.68	365,903.23	42,699.09		67,281,405.22	2,064,386.66		503,705.70	204,771.33	525,838.45
Treasury	117,099,056.91	47,417.41		61,049,049.00		3,403,174.37	17,681.55	51,856,460.35		725,274.23
Maritime	18,639,481.72				18,220,501.47					418,980.25
All other	148,491.21									148,491.21
Total	1,627,572,442.83	271,056,641.34	231,007,604.57	190,246,631.76	85,501,906.69	146,575,782.98	9,965,002.07	84,424,042.84	206,732.51	608,588,098.07

[1] Includes net "Commanding general" shipments.

STATEMENT 2.—*Materials and services provided under Sino-American Cooperative Organization Agreement*

Ordnance supplies and equipment	$14,284,068
Radio equipment and supplies	1,320,664
Fiscal codes, aerology	957,782
Equipage, shore bases	585,045
Training of Chinese students	200,000
Medical equipment	159,494
Public-works construction and maintenance	79,304
Furniture and fixtures	63,449
Communications	14,747
Clothing	2,310
Aviation supplies and materials	67
Total	17,666,930

STATEMENT 3.—*Transfer of United States naval vessels under Public Law 512 Seventy-ninth Cong.*.

	Number of vessels transferred at a procurement cost of $141.4 million	Number of vessels transferred at a procurement cost of $27.3 million included in lend-lease transfers prior to Sept. 2, 1945	Number of vessels transferred at a procurement cost of $39.5 million included in lend-lease transfers after Sept. 2, 1945	Number of vessels transferred at a procurement cost of $74.6 million reported under Public Law 512
Total	131	9	87	35
River gunboat	1	1		
Destroyer escort	6	2		4
Patrol-craft escort	2	2		
Large mine sweepers	12	4		8
Landing ships, tank	10		10	
Landing ships, mechanized	8		8	
Landing craft, Infantry (large)	8		8	
Destroyer escort tender	1		1	
Landing craft, tank	8		8	
Auxiliary ocean tug tanker	2		1	1
Auxiliary floating drydock	2		1	1
Landing craft, mechanized	25		25	
Landing craft, vehicle and personnel	25		25	
Motor mine sweeper	1			1
Submarine chaser	13			13
Motor gunboat	6			6
Repair ship, landing craft	1			1

STATEMENT 4.—*Transfers under the China-aid program, authorized by sec. 404 (b), China Aid Act of 1948, through Dec. 31, 1951*

[In thousands of dollars]

	Army		Navy	General Services Administration	Department of State Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner	Government of China	Total
	Ground program	Air program					
Medical supplies and equipment	$5,582.0	$6.0	$2.1				$5,590.1
Fuel, lubricants, and petroleum products			144.4	$7,675.0			7,819.4
Communication and transportation equipment (except military aircraft and watercraft)	3,384.0	345.0					3,729.0
Industrial equipment	452.0						452.0
Other equipment (except agricultural and military aircraft and watercraft	14.0						14.0
Clothing, textiles and footwear	3.0		15.0				18.0
Miscellaneous manufacturing end products (except ordnance, ordnance stores, and aeronautical material)	299.0			6,030.6			6,329.6
Ordnance and ordnance stores	51,355.0	3,999.0	4,481.3		$19.1		59,854.4
Military aircraft and aeronautical material	63.0	3,726.0			1,892.6		5,681.6
Military vessels and watercraft			1,592.6				1,592.6
Services	180.0	266.0					446.0
Technical aid			559.7				559.7
Ocean transportation	1,800.0	310.0					2,110.0
Cash (Riggs National Bank)						28,880.8	28,880.8
Total	63,132.0	8,652.0	6,795.1	13,705.6	1,911.7	28,880.8	123,077.2

STATEMENT 4A.—*Selected items shipped to China under the China-aid program*

	Number delivered
United States rifles, caliber .30	132,851
Browning automatic rifles, caliber .30	8,793
Heavy machine guns, caliber .30	1,707
Submachine guns, caliber .45	12,975
Rocket launchers	1,196
Grenade launchers	5,758
.30-caliber ammunition—units	231,221,082
.45-caliber ammunition—do	26,577,498
Rocket ammunition—do	66,380
Grenades	280,560

STATEMENT 5.—*Ammunition transferred to Chinese Nationalists by the United States Marines in north China, April–September 1947*

Type	Number of units transferred	1947 estimated unit cost	Total estimated cost
Rockets:			
High explosive, antitank 2.36 inch	3,646	$6.88	$25,084
High explosive, antitank 4.50 inch	300	64.00	19,200
20-millimeter	9,493	1.84	17,467
37-millimeter	4,993	2.77	13,831
60-millimeter mortar	47,678	2.97	141,604
80-millimeter mortar	20,916	9.00	188,244
75-millimeter gun	5,577	10.51	58,614
105-millimeter howitzer	64,538	18.59	1,199,761
155-millimeter howitzer	18,726	23.00	430,698
155-millimeter prop, charge	10,725	4.93	52,874
Grenades:			
Hand	55,529	1.20	66,635
Rifle	23,038	3.48	80,172
Demolition blocks	47,438	.38	18,026
TNT (pounds)	29,787	.25	7,447
Charges, M–12 prop	2,420	1.00	2,420
Bangalore torpedoes	3,020	6.02	18,180
Mines, antipersonnel	1,014	8.00	8,112
Mines, antitank	2,636	14.00	36,904
Small arms:			
.30-caliber	2,195,370	[1] 110.00	241,450
.45-caliber	94,100	[1] 60.00	5,640
.50-caliber	225,515	[1] 285.00	64,410
Grenade adapters	8,592	.26	2,234
Flame throwers:			
Portable	35	313.00	10,955
Cylinders	302	27.00	8,154
Bombs, 500 pounds GP	62	198.00	12,276
Demolition charges	3,248	4.40	14,291
Artillery fuzes	16,975	6.80	115,430
Pyrotechnics	13,174	9.30	122,518
Blasting caps	32,913	.17	5,595
Blasting fuze, feet	100,500	.04	4,020
Firing device	2,575	.80	2,060
Detonators	460	.04	18
Shaped charges	288	43.00	12,384
Detonating cord, feet	366,200	.04	14,648
Firecrackers, M–11	1,200	.03	36
Ignition cylinder, M–1	3,000	1.00	3,000
Napalm, gallons	12,751	.78	9,946
Bomb fuzes, AN, M–230	48	9.50	456
Shells, shotgun, 12-gage	9,000	54.00	486
Lighter fuze	72,581	.04	2,903
Total			3,038,183

[1] Cost per thousand units.

STATEMENT 6.—*Ammunition transferred by the Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, at Tsangkou airfield, Tsingtao, China, April–September 1947*

Type	Number of units transferred	1947 estimated unit cost	Total estimated cost
105-millimeter howitzer	24,665	$18.56	$457,782
81-millimeter mortar	30,903	9.60	278,127
60-millimeter mortar	28,042	2.97	83,285
75-millimeter howitzer	9,337	10.51	98,132
155-millimeter prop charge	7,414	4.93	36,551
Grenades:			
Hand, fragmentation	27,575	1.20	33,090
Hand, all others	13,640	1.65	22,506
Rifle, all types	9,650	3.48	33,582
Bangalore torpedoes	1,810	6.02	10,896
Small arms, caliber .30, carbine and rifle	1,488,490	[1] 110.00	163,680
Mines:			
Antitank	732	14.00	10,248
Antipersonnel	686	8.00	5,488
Shaped charges:			
40-pound	634	43.66	27,680
10-pound	200	14.66	2,932
Grenade adapters, all types	4,272	.26	1,111
Shell, 37-millimeter, all types and shot	1,035	2.77	2,867
Rocket, high explosive, antitank	321	64.00	20,544
Flares, trip, all types	911	8.00	7,288
Device:			
Firing, pressure-type	980	.85	833
Firing, pull-type	1,410	.74	1,043
Firing, push-type	340	.85	289
Firing, release-type	1,040	.85	884
Lighter:			
Fuze, waterproof	102,000	.04	4,080
Fuze, friction-type	55,000	.06	3,300
Pyrotechnic signals, ground	1,010	9.30	9,393
Fuze, igniting, hand grenade	7,725	.42	3,244
Shells, shotgun No. 00B	720	[1] 54.00	38
Cord, detonating (Prima) 500-foot spools	280	.04	11
Total			1,318,904

[1] Cost per thousand units.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have here the correspondence between the Attorney General of the United States and Senator McCarran on the question of the transmission to the Justice Department of the transcript of Mr. Lyle Munson and Mr. John P. Davies. There has been a contradiction in the testimony of Mr. Davies and Mr. Munson, and it is one of the things sent down to the Department of Justice asking them to look into it and look into the possibility that perjury may have been committed. I would like the files on this issue to go into the record at this point.

Senator WATKINS. Those may be received.

(The correspondence referred to was marked "Exhibit 1396, A, B, C, D, E, F. G." and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1396

MEMORANDUM

FEBRUARY 19, 1952.

To: Mr. Sourwine
From: Mr. Green
Re testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., and Lyle H. Munson—items contained in testimony appearing to be contradictory.

Below you will find some samples of apparently contradictory statements in testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., and Lyle H. Munson. All of the excerpts come from the confidential testimony of John P. Davies, Jr., of August 10, 1951, and the confidential testimony of Lyle H. Munson of February 15, 1952, except the last item which comes from the confidential testimony of Mr. Davies on August 8, 1951, and the open testimony of Mr. Munson dated February 15, 1952. The last

item referred to is peculiar in that Mr. Davies tends to mislead the committee in believing the situation existed which, in fact, was contradicted as not existing by the witness Munson.

There are other statements throughout the records which are contradictory by inference as well as misleading in fact, and if it is desired that all of these statements be cataloged, I shall be very happy to do so. I do believe that in the main most of the material differences in testimony appear in this Memorandum.

Item No. 1

(P. 38, Davies testimony, August 10, 1951:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by another Government agency for policy guidance?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir—categorically.

(P. 4, Munson testimony, February 15, 1952:)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that Mr. Davies recommended that the six people whose names I have mentioned work for the Central Intelligence Agency in a position where they would give guidance to a certain program of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MUNSON. It was Mr. Davies' recommendation in our conference with him that we, as officials of CIA, should avail ourselves of the knowledge and guidance and counsel that these six persons could provide us and that they should be used for consultation and guidance and for the preparation of materials that would be useful to us in our activities or responsibilities.

Mr. MORRIS. It was your understanding that they were to give the guidance rather than to be guided?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. The persons you are talking about are those named in the memorandum, that is, John K. Fairbank, and wife, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Benjamin K. Schwartz; is that correct?

Mr. MUNSON. That is correct.

(P. 16, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did the recommendations Mr. Davies made with regard to these persons or any of them involve the use of those persons as a part of the CIA operation or any CIA operation?

Mr. MUNSON. Mr. Davies recommended that we at OPC should consult with and procure guidance and materials from Professor Fairbank, and his wife, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and Benjamin K. Schwartz, and that these materials and guidance should be used by us and that they would represent a proper approach to effecting our responsibilities.

Senator FERGUSON. And proper guidance?

Mr. MUNSON. And proper guidance.

Item No. 2

(P. 73, Davies testimony.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state she [Smedley] was not a Communist, but only "very sophisticated," or "very politically sophisticated?"

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest that another agency of Government set her up in an office?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

(P. 18, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies have any plans to have any contacts with these listed persons or they with the Government in any capacity?

Mr. MUNSON. It was Mr. Davies' suggestion that these persons be situated physically outside Washington in some other geographical location and that they should be contacted and made use of only through what he called cut-outs or a cut out. This would seem to imply that these persons would not have been knowledgeable that they were furnishing guidance, counsel, and materials to the Central Intelligence Agency but that they were actually furnishing it to some intermediary who himself would have been knowledgeable of where it was going, but that the six persons would not have been.

(P. 25, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Agnes Smedley one of those recommended by Mr. Davies to be set up in this workshop or office somewhere away by themselves?

Mr. MUNSON. She was.

Item No. 3

(P. 38, Davies testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have a categorical answer, if we can get it, and let me recall to you in that connection that you have already testified on this record that Dr. Schwartz did not serve as a consultant to you at any time.

Mr. DAVIES. He did not, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. That being the case, sir, does that help you to answer the question as to whether at any time you told any person, a representative of another Government agency, that he had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I could not have said that, because he was not my consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever say it?

Mr. DAVIES. No: I never did.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. That is all I was trying to get at.

(P. 31, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies, at the conference which is the subject of the questioning today, that is, which took place on November 16, 1949, discuss Dr. Schwartz's possible Communist or Communist-front affiliations other than as a part of the group?

Mr. MUNSON. No. Mr. Davies did urge that Dr. Schwartz should be used by us in certain fields of our responsibilities, again as a source of guidance and counsel.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was recommending that Dr. Schwartz be retained by you for policy guidance; is that right?

Mr. MUNSON. In broad and general terms, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies state that Schwartz had been helpful to him as a consultant?

Mr. MUNSON. He did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are quite sure about that?

Mr. MUNSON. I am quite sure about that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it make any difference to you that Mr. Davies has denied ever making such a statement? Would that change your testimony in any way?

Mr. MUNSON. It would not change my testimony in any way.

Item No. 4

(P. 79, Davies testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than in connection with top-secret matters, did you ever state that materials prepared by her (Anna Louise Strong) would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

(P. 24, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you understand Mr. Davies' recommendations to be, his statement to be that the materials prepared by them would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes, I did so understand.

Item No. 5

(P. 89, Davies testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by an agency of the United States?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

(P. 37, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. But he did recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by CIA or OPC?

Mr. MUNSON. In the manner we have indicated, yes.

(P. 23, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Davies ever state that materials prepared by Edgar Snow would represent the proper approach?

Mr. MUNSON. Yes, he did. Let me interrupt to say that it is not my recollection that he singled out Edgar Snow individually, but that he did recommend that these persons collectively would be supplying information and guidance which would represent a proper approach.

Item No. 6

(P. 91, Davies testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Professor Fairbank be set up in an office by some agency of Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that Professor Fairbank was a person ideally suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

(P. 24, Munson testimony:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Davies recommend that Snow be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?

Mr. MUNSON. No, that Snow, along with the other afore-mentioned persons should be provided quarters and space in which to function. This was not designated as an office. Again such limiting terms or refined terms were not used. It was simply suggested that these persons be situated physically in an office or suite of offices at some distant point from which they would function.

Item No. 7

(P. 11, Davies testimony August 8, 1951:)

Senator SMITH. You can say "Yes" or "No," "I did," or "I didn't."

Then, if you wish to enlarge or explain, if you say "I did," then I can see how you might wish to go further and say, "Here is the reason I did," or "Here is what they do."

We are not asking you that at the moment. We are asking you now for the yes or no answer.

Did you recommend them for anybody?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, hypothetically, let us put it this way: Supposing—and this completely hypothetical—I were to have recommended the employment of somebody as a double agent, and then I was charged with having recommended somebody who was known to have belonged in the other camp from us.

The fact that I recommended the employment of a person as a double agent would be perfectly legitimate, and would be in the national interest of this country.

But if I can only reply to questions on this, "Yes, I suggested the utilization, not the employment, but the employment of so and so as a double agent"——

(P. 4224, Munson open testimony, February 15, 1952:)

Mr. SOURWINE. Let me ask this question: Was there anything in his recommendation which could have been construed or which, in your opinion, was intended as a recommendation that these people, or any of them, be used as double agents?

Mr. MUNSON. At no time did I understand that Mr. Davies was suggesting the use of any one or all of these persons as double agents.

Senator FERGUSON. They were to be used, were they not, according to this memorandum, as a unit?

Mr. MUNSON. They were to be used as a workshop team, or unit: yes, sir.

EXHIBIT No. 1396A

SEPTEMBER 21, 1951.

Hon. J. HOWARD MCGRATH,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice,
Washington 25, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I am submitting to you herewith the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in executive session, on August 10, 1951. It is requested that you examine this testimony and check it against information available to you, with a view to determining, and advising the committee, what if any action by the Department of Justice is indicated.

Please return the transcript when you have concluded your examination of it.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

———— ————, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1396B

SEPTEMBER 27, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: This will acknowledge your letter of September 21, 1951, forwarding the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the

Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in executive session on August 10, 1951.

In accordance with your request I am having an examination made of this testimony and will communicate with you again in the matter in the near future.

Your sincerely,

WILLIAM AMORY UNDERHILL,
Acting Deputy Attorney General.

EXHIBIT No. 1396C

OCTOBER 29, 1951.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Further reference is made to your letter of September 21, 1951, with which you transmitted the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in executive session on August 10, 1951.

The testimony of Davies has now been examined in light of the information available to the Department. As a result it appears that there is insufficient evidence of perjury or any Federal violation on Davies' part to sustain prosecution.

In accordance with your request I am returning the official transcript of Davies' testimony to you.

Sincerely,

JAMES M. MCINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General.

EXHIBIT No. 1396D

FEBRUARY 21, 1952.

Hon. J. HOWARD MCGRATH,
Attorney General of the United States,
Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: On or about September 21, 1951, and under that date, I transmitted to you the official transcript of the testimony of John P. Davies before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in executive session on August 10, 1951.

In that letter I requested that you examine this testimony and check it against information available to you with a view to determining and advising the committee what if any action by the Department of Justice was indicated.

Under date of October 29, 1951, Mr. James M. McInerney, Assistant Attorney General, advised me that:

"The testimony of Davies has now been examined in light of the information available to the Department. As a result it appears that there is insufficient evidence of perjury or any Federal violation on Davies' part to sustain prosecution."

Enclosed herewith are official transcripts of testimony before this committee by Mr. Lyle H. Munson, in executive session on February 15, 1952, and in public session later the same day. It is requested that this testimony also be examined by you, in connection with the information previously made available to you, with a view to determining, and advising the committee, what action, if any, by the Department of Justice, now appears indicated.

With the thought that it may possibly be of some slight assistance to you, I am enclosing also a memorandum prepared by a member of the staff of the Committee on the Judiciary, indicating some (but by no means all) of the conflicts between testimony of Mr. Davies, previously referred to, and that of Mr. Munson, transmitted herewith.

Kindest personal regards and all good wishes.

Sincerely,

——— ———, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1396F

FEBRUARY 27, 1952.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Your letter of February 21, 1952, to the Attorney General, enclosing official transcripts of Lyle H. Munson's testimony before your committee in executive session on February 15, 1952, and in a public session on the same date, together with a memorandum on some conflicts between Mr. Munson's testimony and the previous testimony of John P. Davies, has been referred to me. I will be pleased to review this matter again in the light of the testimony adduced from Mr. Munson.

I have noted that in the memorandum to Mr. Sourwine, your staff representative, Mr. Green states:

"There are other statements throughout the record which are contradictory by inference as well as misleading in fact, and if it is desired that all of these statements be cataloged, I shall be very happy to do so. I do believe that in the main most of the material differences in testimony appear in this memorandum."

It would be very helpful to the Department's review of this matter if Mr. Green prepared a catalog of the additional material conflicts of evidence which he has encountered.

Sincerely,

JAMES M. MCINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General.

EXHIBIT No. 1396 E

FEBRUARY 28, 1952.

Mr. JAMES M. MCINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. MCINERNEY: This will acknowledge your letter of February 27, in which you suggest that Mr. Green of the Judiciary Committee professional staff be asked to prepare a catalog of the additional material conflicts of evidence which he has encountered in comparing the testimony of Mr. Lyle H. Munson with the prior testimony of Mr. John P. Davies, before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

It is my hope that the Department of Justice will make its own careful examination of the matters called to the Department's attention by my letter of February 21, 1952; and I would not wish either to suggest or imply that the Department rely entirely upon a memorandum prepared by a member of the Judiciary Committee staff, or that the Judiciary Committee is attempting to establish proof of the commission of an actionable offense.

The question is: What is the opinion of the Department of Justice, on the basis of an examination of the testimony to which attention has been directed, in connection with all information otherwise available to the Department?

Thanks for your prompt acknowldegement of my letter of February 21, and kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

EXHIBIT No. 1396G

MARCH 12, 1952.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have received your letter of February 28, 1952, concerning the testimony of Mr. Lyle H. Munson and the prior testimony of Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., given before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

As you will recall, I stated in my letter of February 27, 1952, that I would review the matter again in the light of Mr. Munson's testimony based on the information presently available to the Department. A preliminary review has now been completed, in consequence of which it has been deemed appropriate to conduct further investigation predicated upon certain statements contained in Mr. Munson's testimony.

When this investigation has been completed you may rest assured that I shall advise you concerning any further action which the Department feels is warranted.

Sincerely,

JAMES M. MCINERNEY,
Assistant Attorney General.

Mr. MORRIS. May I also put into the record at this time two transcripts taken before this committee in executive session, of John P. Davies, both of those have been transmitted to the Department of Justice, but I would like those introduced at this time as an exhibit, and may that bear the next consecutive exhibit number?

Senator WATKINS. You want it actually printed in the record at this point? It has been printed once.

Mr. MORRIS. No; it has not, Mr. Chairman. This is executive session testimony.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like it introduced as an exhibit rather than made part of the public testimony, because we have no public testimony here today other than this session. This is the executive sessions of August 8 and 10, 1951.

Senator WATKINS. They may be received as an exhibit and will be marked the next consecutive number.

(The transcripts referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 1397, 1397A," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1397

[EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL]

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, August 8, 1951.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. Arthur V. Watkins, presiding.

Present: Senators Watkins and Smith.

Also present: Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator WATKINS. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Davies, do you solemnly swear that the testimony given in the matter now pending before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DAVIES. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN PATON DAVIES, JR., POLICY PLANNING STAFF, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. DAVIES. John Paton Davies, Jr., care of Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present position, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. My present position is a member of the policy planning staff, State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you specialize in any one division of that planning staff?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not specialize in Far Eastern affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. No; because the planning staff operates as a unit and we deal with all areas.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Davies, have you recommended for employment with CIA John K. Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. This is a question, if it is what you are leading to, which is of a top secret classification, and it is one which very few people in the Government are clear to know about.

It touches on an operation which is only slightly less sensitive than that of atomic energy.

I, therefore, am not at liberty to talk about this subject without clearance from my superiors.

Mr. MORRIS. We will make the record clear on it, Mr. Davies.

Concerning John K. Fairbank, and you have answered as far as that is concerned, you are not at liberty to discuss it?

Mr. DAVIES. The discussions regarding any recommendations I have made regarding the employment of persons in CIA.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I was going to ask you about John K. Fairbank, Wilma Fairbank, Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley, Benjamin Schwartz, and Edgar Snow.

It is your statement, Mr. Davies, that we will have to take this up with higher authorities in the State Department.

Now, could you recommend who, particularly, we can take this up with?

Mr. DAVIES. I would make a formal request to the Department.

Mr. MORRIS. You cannot recommend any one particular person?

Mr. DAVIES. I can't, because this goes into the type of the operation.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right, Mr. Davies. We wanted to find out, and we figured you would be the best one to find out from.

Senator WATKINS. Does your same objection pertain to answering any questions about any of these persons named, the same as with respect to the individual John Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir; no objection to my answering any questions regarding them as persons.

Senator WATKINS. I understand he can answer with respect to the rest of them, except Fairbank.

Mr. DAVIES. No, all of them. I can answer questions regarding them in general, but I can't answer any questions regarding any alleged charges that I recommended the employment of any one.

Mr. MORRIS. It is not a charge, Mr. Davies. I have seen a sworn statement to that effect. It is our job here to look into things like that, and we decided the first person to ask would be you.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know these people; do you not?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I know all of those that you mentioned.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean, the fact that you know them——

Mr. DAVIES. That, of course, is no question.

Mr. MORRIS. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator WATKINS. I fail to see that the fact of whether you did or did not recommend them is such a question that you could not answer it.

Mr. DAVIES. I can't answer without going into the nature of the operation.

Senator WATKINS. Certainly, all he is asking you is whether you recommended them.

Mr. DAVIES. This statement I can make: I did not recommend the employment of these people to be placed on the CIA rolls as a regular part of the American Government, to be taken into the operation as such.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not recommend them?

Mr. DAVIES. I did not recommend them.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, will you make that clearer? You are making a qualification, are you not?

Mr. DAVIES. To go into it any further would be to intrude into the nature of the operation, which is a highly secret operation.

Senator SMITH. Have they been recommended by anybody?

Mr. DAVIES. That I can't answer, because I do not know.

Senator SMITH. Do you know these people yourself?

Mr. DAVIES. I know these people, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you know whether they are about to be employed in the State Department?

Mr. MORRIS. It is in the CIA.

Senator SMITH. That is not under the State Department?

Mr. MORRIS. No. Mr. Davies is in the Planning Division of the State Department, and the statement is that he recommended the employment of these six people for a certain classified project with CIA.

Senator SMITH. That is the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Now, without asking anything about the nature of the project, we would like to know if the statement, and there are two statements that I have seen, are true, that you have recommended them as personnel for this project.

Mr. DAVIES. I have not recommended them for employment by the CIA as a part of the CIA operation.

Senator WATKINS. Have you recommended them for the CIA for any type of operation?

Mr. DAVIES. To go into an explanation, sir——

Senator WATKINS. I do not ask you to explain.

You understand what I mean. I am referring to any other operation of any kind.

Mr. DAVIES. Not for employment by the CIA in any operation. You see, we are in the very complicated business of a highly classified type of operation.

Senator SMITH. I know that, but it is just as important to us as it is to you, and it is just as important to the American people as it is to your Department, the way I see it.

Now, are these people recommended for any position of that kind? I do not know whether you use just technical words, or not.

Mr. DAVIES. I am trying to be helpful, you see, and give you as much as I can without transgressing security.

Senator SMITH. Now, are those people in the employment now of any department of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. Not so far as I know.

Senator SMITH. Do you know each of these parties whose names have been mentioned?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. You know all of them?

Mr. DAVIES. I know all of them.

Senator SMITH. Have you had contacts with them?

Mr. DAVIES. I have had intermittent contacts with them; yes.

Senator SMITH. Are you having any contacts with them now of any kind of a governmental nature?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Do you have any plans to have any contacts with them, or they with the Government, in any capacity?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I have seen two official reports which relate the story that I have expressed.

Now, tell me this: Do you consider those people Communists, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, they are people of a variety of points of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider John K. Fairbank a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you consider Wilma Fairbank a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Edgar Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MORRIS. Agnes Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. She is dead.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, did you consider her a Communist when you made the recommendations?

Mr. DAVIES. I made no recommendation of this type.

Agnes Smedley I have always regarded as at least a fellow traveler and probably part of the agitation apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you consider her such in 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you make that clear at the time?

Mr. DAVIES. Make what clear?

Mr. MORRIS. That you considered her as you just described her?

Mr. DAVIES. There has never been any question in my discussions with Agnes Smedley as to what I regarded her as, which is, as I say, probably a part of the apparatus, but probably of the agitation side of it.

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Davies, is it your testimony that, in 1949, you did not make the statement that these people were not Communists?

Mr. Davies. And I did not make the statement they were not Communist?

Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that you did not make the statement that they were not Communists?

Mr. Davies. I never said that Mrs. Smedley was a Communist, or never denied, or never stated, that I did not regard Miss Smedley as not a Communist.

Mr. Morris. Do you remember considering these people as a unit of six?

Mr. Davies. No.

Mr. Morris. I mean, six people.

Mr. Davies. Six people?

Mr. Morris. Do you remember commenting and characterizing these six people, politically characterizing the six of them, and saying, "Whereas some people think they are Communists, they actually are not"? Do you remember making that statement?

Mr. Davies. No.

Senator Watkins. Or anything like it?

Mr. Davies. No.

Senator Watkins. I would like to ask you, you said you never recommended for employment of this type. Now, what did you mean by that?

Senator Smith. I noticed that, too.

Senator Watkins. What is the qualification for? That indicates that you may have recommended for something, but not of this type?

Mr. Davies. I did not recommend them for employment.

Senator Watkins. Of any kind?

Mr. Davies. Any kind.

Senator Watkins. At any time or place?

Mr. Davies. At any time or place.

Senator Watkins. Or to anybody?

Mr. Davies. Or to anybody.

Mr. Morris. Did you recommend for any purpose?

Mr. Davies. We go then into the nature of this operation.

Senator Watkins. You could say whether you recommended them or did not recommend them. That is all we want to ask about.

Mr. Davies. I think that pursuit on this, which can be clarified for you completely, should be conducted to my superiors, because I am not at liberty to go into any discussion which would help you out in any further examination of this type of operation.

Senator Smith. What we have asked here was just a simple question, whether or not you recommended these people for positions, and you said "of this type."

That excited my curiosity, as it did Senator Watkins'; what did you mean by limiting yourself to "this type"?

Apparently you did recommend them for some type of work. We are not asking you at the moment what kind of work that was. We are asking you whether or not that was a fact that you did recommend them for some type of work.

That is not giving away any secrets, except the secret that you may have recommended them.

Mr. Davies. That, from my superiors, would be no secret, because they can discuss that.

Senator Smith. I know, but we are trying to find out about these things. That is what we are constituted for. We are not going to get this from your superiors, if they already know it, but we just asked you a very simple question:

Now, did you recommend them?

Mr. Davies. But to answer intelligently, so that you would understand the answer completely, would be to have to go into the nature of this.

Senator Smith. You can say yes or no, "I did," or "I didn't."

Then, if you wish to enlarge or explain, if you say "I did," then I can see how you might wish to go further and say, "Here is the reason I did," or "Here is what they do."

We are not asking you that at the moment. We are asking you now for the yes or no answer.

Did you recommend them for anybody?

Mr. Davies. Well, hypothetically, let us put it this way: Supposing—and this is completely hypothetical—I were to have recommended the employment of

somebody as a double agent, and then I was charged with having recommended somebody who was known to have belonged in the other camp from us.

The fact that I recommended the employment of a person as a double agent would be perfectly legitimate, and would be in the national interest of this country.

But if I can only reply to questions on this, "yes, I suggested the utilization, not the employment, but the employment of so and so as a double agent"——

Senator SMITH. Well, there is no suggestion here that we are going to require you to stop at answering "yes" or "no." We have asked you a simple question. The answer is either "Yes" or "No." You did or you did not. That is simple.

If you did, there is no reason, so far as I know, from our standpoint, why we would not give you full opportunity as to why you did, because it might completely exonerate you even if there had been anything wrong in the first instance.

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I can't answer it.

Senator WATKINS. You can answer the first question; but, if you cannot answer the next one—if there should be a next one—that would be one of the matters that we can consider as to whether we ought to require you to answer it or not.

If it should be highly classified, and somebody else ought to answer it, all right. We can bring somebody else in. But I think you ought to answer the question whether you did or did not recommend those people.

Mr. DAVIES. It can't be answered without leading right into this other question.

Senator WATKINS. I know; but, if it goes that far, that is one of those things. I do not think it is revealing any secrets or not, whether you did or did not. Not only that, but this is an executive session, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. I realize that. But this is more than top secret. I mean, it is highly classified, this whole business.

Senator WATKINS. Personally, I do not want to press you to revealing any top-classified secrets that you are under obligation not to reveal.

Mr. DAVIES. I am under strict obligations not to.

Senator WATKINS. But I cannot understand how on earth the question that has been propounded to you, about the recommendation of these people, could possibly be that kind of secret.

Senator SMITH. Apparently what Mr. Davies is worried about is if he says "Yes," which is a manifested answer to my mind—if you say "Yes" to that—then you feel that that standing alone might be prejudicial to you without an explanation, and you do not feel that you can give an explanation.

Mr. DAVIES. I can't give the explanation.

Senator SMITH. The point about this, to my mind, there is no reason why; but, if he answers "Yes" and then wishes to consult his superiors and get either permission or the reason why he cannot answer the rest of the questions, that would be perfectly all right. I do not wish to press him.

Mr. DAVIES. It leaves the story half told, and me completely on the spot.

Mr. MORRIS. I was just asking your individual opinion of these people. You considered John Fairbank not to be a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. So far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. Wilma Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. Not so far as I know.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Benjamin Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. So far as I know, not a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. And Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. DAVIES. At least a fellow traveler, and maybe a part of the apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Edgar Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know well enough to really have a definite opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. And, finally, Agnes Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. I answered that as certainly a part of the apparatus.

Senator SMITH. She is dead.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

You see, there are people of very different types; at least, they seem to me so.

Senator WATKINS. How about Mrs. Agnes Smedley? When did you first come to the conclusion that she was a member of the apparatus, or at least connected with it?

Mr. DAVIES. From the very beginning of the time I knew her.

Senator WATKINS. How long ago was that?

Mr. DAVIES. In 1938, when she was working with, and intimately identified with, the Chinese Communist delegation in Hangkow, which at that time was part of the United Front government in Hangkow.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Davies, the statements that I alluded to as having been read contained a report that, when the objection was raised, some of these people were Communists. You made the assertion that they certainly were not; they were just people who were extremely politically sophisticated.

Mr. DAVIES. That is untrue.

Mr. MORRIS. You never interposed an objection to a statement that any one of these people was a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Interposing an objection on your part would have been a defense of them.

Mr. DAVIES. The statement that you gave me is, of course, as given to you, a fabrication.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not holding the statement. I am telling you what it was.

Mr. DAVIES. But, had they asked me did I think that Fairbank was a Communist, I would have given them the answer that I gave you. If they asked me about any of the others, I would have given the answers I gave you, because that was my feeling.

Senator SMITH. You would have given the answer at that time and you still would have given the answer, to your own knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all, Senator.

I told Mr. Davies that we were just going to ask him about one thing. It was just that one thing that had come under our scrutiny, and we wanted to ask him about it.

Senator SMITH. You are talking about here, if you answered the question and then explained why, gave the reasons why you answered that way, that you would be disclosing top-secret information as to present conditions?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Senator SMITH. As to current conditions?

Mr. DAVIES. As an operation as a whole.

Senator SMITH. You mean an operation that started in 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I shouldn't say when it started, either.

Senator SMITH. Back at the time that this question was raised, and continuing on up to now?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I have no more questions.

Senator SMITH. I think, Mr. Morris, that certainly none of us want to ask Mr. Davies to do something that he should not do. I think we might have the record made and have the chairman and members look it over and see if they want to pursue the matter further.

Senator WATKINS. I feel the same way about it, but I still feel that he could have answered "Yes" or "No."

Senator SMITH. He would have answered "Yes" to my satisfaction, because if he answered "No" that would have been a complete answer to the whole thing.

Mr. MORRIS. And you made a distinction between utilization and employment.

Mr. DAVIES. Exactly, a very important distinction.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

Senator WATKINS. He said "employment of this type."

When you said you had not, as I understood it, recommended for employment of this type, you did not mean to say that you did not recommend them to be employed?

Mr. DAVIES. I will say that I made no recommendation that they be employed and put on the CIA rolls and become part of the CIA operation.

Senator SMITH. He is apparently drawing a distinction between "employment" in the general acceptation of the word and using somebody in a particular endeavor, maybe for compensation and maybe not. I think that is what he has in mind.

You have not said that, but that is what I believe you have in mind.

Senator WATKINS. That is a play on words, but it indicated something to me that there has been, apparently, a recommendation of employment at some time.

Senator SMITH. I think it indicates mysteriousness, myself.

Mr. DAVIES. It is a mysterious operation.

I am sorry I could not be of more help in this thing, but you understand.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you for coming down, Mr. Davies.

(Thereupon, at 10:25 a. m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

EXHIBIT No. 1397A

[EXECUTIVE SESSION—CONFIDENTIAL]

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C., Friday, August 10, 1951.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a. m., Hon. Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senator Smith.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; and Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator SMITH. Come to order, please.

I understand that this morning we have present to testify Mr. John P. Davies.

Mr. Davies, will you stand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give in this proceeding before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. DAVIES. I do, sir.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. DAVIES, POLICY PLANNING DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SOURWINE. In order that this record may be full and complete, I respectfully suggest that we insert at this point a copy of Senate Resolution 336, Eighty-first Congress, second session, which is the basic authority for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. Very well, that will be inserted.

(S. Res. 366 follows:)

[S. Res. 366, 81st Cong., 2d sess.]

RESOLUTION

Whereas the Congress from time to time has enacted laws designed to protect the internal security of the United States from acts of espionage and sabotage and from infiltration by persons who seek to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence; and

Whereas those who seek to evade such laws or to violate them with impunity constantly seek to devise and do devise clever and evasive means and tactics for such purposes; and

Whereas agents and dupes of the world Communist conspiracy have been and are engaged in activities (including the origination and dissemination of propaganda) designed and intended to bring such protective laws into disrepute or disfavor and to hamper or prevent effective administration and enforcement thereof; and

Whereas it is vital to the internal security of the United States that the Congress maintain a continuous surveillance over the problems presented by such activity and threatened activity and over the administration and enforcement of such laws: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed to make a complete and continuing study and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950; (2) the administration, operation, and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and (3) the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States, its Territories and possessions, including, but not limited to, espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the Government of the United States by force and violence.

SEC. 2. The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to hold such hearings, to require by subpenas or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and, within the amount appropriated therefor, to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report hearings of the committee or subcommittee shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. Subpenas shall be issued by the chairman of the committee or the subcommittee, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman.

A majority of the members of the committee, or duly authorized subcommittee thereof, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that a lesser number to be fixed by the committee, or by such subcommittee, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of administering oaths and taking sworn testimony.

SEC. 3. The committee, or duly authorized subcommittee, shall have power to employ and fix the compensation of such officers, experts, and employees as it deems necessary in the performance of its duties, and is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the various departments and agencies of the Government to the extent that such services, information, facilities, and personnel, in the opinion of the heads of such departments and agencies, can be furnished without undue interference with the performance of the work and duties of such departments and agencies.

SEC. 4. The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $10,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee on or before January 31, 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe it would also be well to insert Senate Resolution 7, Eighty-second Congress, first session, which is the resolution continuing the authority of the subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. Very well; it is so ordered.

(S. Res. 7 is as follows:)

[S. Res. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess.]

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the limitation of expenditures under S. Res. 366, Eighty-first Congress, relating to the internal security of the United States, agreed to December 21, 1950, is hereby increased by $75,000, and such sum together with any unexpended balance of the sum previously authorized to be expended under such resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee and covering obligations incurred under such resolution on or before January 31, 1952.

Mr. SOURWINE. I should like also to insert at this point the minutes of the Internal Security Subcommittee for Thursday, January 18, 1951, being that portion of the minutes which show the subcommittee approval of a resolution with regard to the quorum of the subcommittee.

Senator SMITH. Very well, it is so ordered.

(The minutes referred to follow:)

"The chairman laid before the subcommittee the following resolution:

"*Resolved by the special subcommittee appointed to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other internal security laws under Senate Resolution 366 (81st Cong.) of the Committee on the Judiciary*, That pursuant to subsection (3) of rule XXV, as amended, of the Standing Rules of the Senate (S. Res. 180, 81st Cong., 2d sess., agreed to February 1, 1950) a quorum of the subcommittee for the purpose of taking sworn testimony shall consist of one Senator of said subcommittee.

"On motion of Senator Ferguson, there being no objection, the above resolution was adopted."

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies, you have testified before this committee in executive session on August 8, have you not?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. At that time, Mr. Davies, certain questions were asked you which you felt you could not answer, before, because they referred to a matter which, in your opinion, was of a higher classification than top secret; is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. It is at least top secret. It is one of the higher categories of top secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you explain for the record, Mr. Davies, what the classifications are which are higher than top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. There are some categories, I believe, which I think it would be a violation of security to name, which affect certain operations.

Mr. SOURWINE. You understand that this is an executive session of a committee of the Senate?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And is it your understanding that it is a violation of security to discuss with this committee in executive session and in response to inquiries classified material?

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly, of top-secret classification.

Mr. SOURWINE. You feel, then, that it would be a violation of security to state to this committee on this record what classifications may exist higher than top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that information is available to the committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do too, Mr. Davies.

Mr. DAVIES. And I do not know whether those classifications are, themselves, classified material, and therefore——

Mr. SOURWINE. Not knowing that they are classified material, sir, on what basis did you previously refuse to discuss it with the committee?

Mr. DAVIES. The matter simply of identification of classifications?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. Because I can only identify them by relating them to the operation which they cover.

Mr. SOURWINE. I respectfully submit, sir, that you may not mean that answer to stand just the way you gave it.

Would you read that answer back, Mr. Reporter?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean to say, Mr. Davies, that the only way you can identify the various levels of classified material is by relating to the material itself?

Mr. DAVIES. I misunderstood you.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure you have.

Mr. DAVIES. I was talking only about the top level of top secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am at the present time dealing only with the question of the method and degree of classification. I am seeking to establish for the record your familiarity with classified material, the way in which it is classified, and the relative importance of it. I think that question has become germane because of the problem that has arisen.

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry; I misunderstood.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sure you did.

To rephrase the question: Would you tell the committee what the degrees of classification of classified material are?

Mr. DAVIES. Restricted is the lowest, confidential, secret, and top secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. And what comes above top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. There are classifications within top secret of certain material which has its own identification in the top-secret category.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the existence of such classifications within the top-secret classification itself a top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. I think so, because the identification of it uses a code name which is associated only with that particular operation.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever hear of the classification of "Top secret ultra"?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; that is one.

Mr. MORRIS. That does not involve a code name, does it?

Mr. DAVIES. No: that doesn't involve a code name.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the classification: "Top secret, eyes only"?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that involve a code name?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is one of the subclassifications of top secret, isn't it?

Mr. DAVIES. Eyes only, as I understand it, is not a security classification, but a distribution classification.

Senator SMITH. A what?

Mr. DAVIES. A distribution, as to whom it goes to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Top secret ultra is a security classification?

Mr. DAVIES. I should say so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, what authority do you have to classify material in the State Department, sir?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't have any authority in myself to classify material; I am not in a top-secret office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any authority to classify any material at any of the levels of classification?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe that I have authority to classify up to top secret.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you exercised that authority on occasions in the past?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever attempted to exercise the authority to classify some material or matter as top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; but subject, of course, to the approval of that classification, which is the procedure.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean you have only made recommendations for that classification?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. I mark it top secret and it carries on.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that material which you had originated?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, some of it—entirely what I had originated, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever classify anyone else's material as top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Or any higher classification than top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any authority with regard to classification of material outside the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not attempt to classify or pass on the classification of material at the Department of Justice or the CIA or Military Intelligence?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is it true, then, that material which is not originated by you, in order to be top secret, in your understanding, must have come to you from one of your superiors in the Department with the top-secret classification?

Mr. DAVIES. That is, written material; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir.

Now, for the moment I would like to take a slightly different line of inquiry, and I would like to ask you some questions with regard to your knowledge of an acquaintanceship with certain persons.

Some of this will be repetitive of testimony which you gave day before yesterday.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Speaking now of Mr. Benjamin K. Schwartz, do you know Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long have you known him?

Mr. DAVIES. Since 1948 or 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall how you met him?

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry; I don't recall the precise circumstances under which I met him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you seen him on subsequent occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. I have seen him, roughly, I should say, three or four times.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any of those occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. I recall two of the occasions. I cannot give you the date beyond saying that the most recent one, I believe, was either late last year or early this year, and the previous one, I think, was some time in 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us something about the nature of those occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. A most recent occasion was when I had lunch with him and an American businessman by the name of Hartmann, I believe it is, who is a representative of Cornell Bros., in San Francisco.

Others present were Mr. C. B. Marshall, of the policy planning staff, and Mr. Kenneth Krentz, policy planning staff.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us what the purpose of the meeting was, sir? Was it social?

Mr. DAVIES. It was a casual get-together. He happened to be in town. He joined a luncheon that we had arranged with Hartmann.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Hartmann bring him in to the luncheon?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I invited him in to the luncheon.
Mr. SOURWINE. How did you invite him?
Mr. DAVIES. Pardon?
Mr. SOURWINE. How did you invite him? By telephone?
Mr. DAVIES. I don't recall whether I invited him by telephone or whether—we had made a previous arrangement for lunch.
Mr. SOURWINE. You had made a previous arrangement?
Mr. DAVIES. I mean, as a matter of an hour or so. I had seen him in the halls, or some such thing, and had then said, "Come to lunch with us, because we are having lunch."
Mr. SOURWINE. Does he work within the Department?
Mr. DAVIES. Not that I know of. He was down from Harvard, where he was a research fellow, or maybe now on the faculty.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does he come to Washington frequently?
Mr. DAVIES. I do not believe that he does.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you see him when he does come to Washington?
Mr. DAVIES. He may have come on occasions that I have not seen him. As I say——
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you usually know when he comes to Washington? Does he look you up, or call you?
Mr. DAVIES. No—well, I don't know. As I say, all I know is that on two occasions, either 1950 or 1951 I saw him.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did I understand you to say on the occasion of this luncheon which was in 1951 with Mr. Hartman and the others, you were not sure whether you had invited him by telephone or whether you had met him in the hall?
Mr. DAVIES. That is right.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, if you had wanted to invite him by telephone, where would you have called?
Mr. DAVIES. He may have called me. I would not have known where to have called him.
Mr. SOURWINE. You don't recall whether he called you or not?
Mr. DAVIES. Or whether I met him in the hall and said "Come to lunch."
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what was discussed at the luncheon?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes; in general terms.
Mr. SOURWINE. Could you tell the committee?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes; with pleasure.
I asked Schwartz what he had dug up in his studies of the Chinese Communists.
I might say parenthetically here that Schwartz is one of the most—has made one of the most extensive studies of Chinese Communists' documents, history, and so forth, from original sources—which is very unusual—because he works in Chinese, Japanese, and the Russian languages, which is quite——
Mr. MORRIS. Is that at Harvard University?
Mr. DAVIES. It is Harvard. He is one of the really serious students of the subject. That is the end of my parenthetical comment, and now back to the subject.
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. DAVIES. I was very interested in the strategy and the tactics which were being used by the Chinese Communists in Korea at that time.
Mr. SOURWINE. This was in what month?
Mr. DAVIES. This must have been at the time of the Chinese offensive, after the big Chinese offensive in North Korea.
Mr. SOURWINE. Can you recall the month, with that refreshment?
Mr. DAVIES. Let's see. That must have been in the winter or early spring that this luncheon took place.
Mr. SOURWINE. That is some time between January and the end of April of this year?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. You cannot place it any closer than that?
Mr. DAVIES. I couldn't place it, because it was some time after the offensive, and I have been wondering about the strategy that was used, particularly the question of the human sea tactics which the Chinese Communists have talked a great deal about.
I queried Schwartz as to what he had discovered in his readings and research on the subject and he said there was, of course, a great deal of material on it. This was of considerable interest to us, because I had not had much success with our research people in getting translated material on the strategic thinking of the Chinese Communists.

It is strongly influenced by Clausewitz and is also influenced by Lenin, who, as you know, is influenced by Clausewitz in his military thinking, and therefore, Schwartz was a very interesting check point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you find that the other members of the State Department staff who were with you at the luncheon were also interested in what he had to say?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, certainly, and so was Hartmann, of course, who is an American businessman, who knows the Far East very well. He is a very experienced man. He thought it was very interesting.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Schwartz interested with John K. Fairbank at Harvard?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know whether he is formally connected with him or not. I don't know whether he is now. He was connected with Fairbank when doing his Chinese study.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you mean in Hawaii?

Mr. DAVIES. No, at Harvard, when he was doing his graduate work, and taking his doctorates.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know whether Schwartz worked with Fairbank during the war?

Mr. DAVIES. He was in Military Intelligence during the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Schwartz was?

Mr. DAVIES. Schwartz was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall, now that you have been thinking about the subject of Mr. Schwartz for some few minutes, perchance who it was that introduced you, or how you happened to meet him?

Mr. DAVIES. It was probably Fairbank, because Fairbank considered him one of the bright boys on the subject——

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he bring him in to see you, perhaps?

Mr. DAVIES. Who had these extraordinary qualifications.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he perhaps bring him in to see you?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know whether he sent him down with a note or told him to call me when he came to Washington, or whether I may have seen him on a trip that I made up to Harvard in, let's see, I think that was 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you will pardon us; I want to be sure the record is straight. I realize we are going backward and forward over your recollection.

I understood that you had testified earlier that you had only known Schwartz since 1949. Are you saying now that there is a possibility that you might have met him in 1947? It is possible I misunderstood you, of course.

Mr. DAVIES. Now that I think back to my trip to Harvard, I may have known him since 1947. I would like to make that correction.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. It is possible.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Schwartz doing at Harvard at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. He was working, must have been working on his doctorate, or maybe his M. A., I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Mr. Fairbank present at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. At the time he was at Harvard, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. So they were together in 1947?

Mr. DAVIES. If I met Schwartz then, Fairbank was at Harvard in 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think the witness has testified, Mr. Morris, that he either was introduced to Schwartz by Fairbank at Harvard in 1947 or that Fairbank sent Schwartz to him in Washington, either with a note or telling him to call him.

It is in one of those two alternatives, is that right, sir?

Mr. DAVIES. I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have already partially answered this question, sir, but will you expand as much as necessary to complete the answer to the question, to wit: What do you know of Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. I know him through some of his writings, which I have seen in the mimeographic form, sent down by the Cluckhorn Russian Institute, at Harvard. They mimeographed some of his papers. I know him from his writings, which are considered very scholarly—rather dry—but a thorough study of the early period of the Chinese Communists, which is the period he is interested in.

As a person, he struck me as a shy, rather professorial, very dispassionate individual. That is about all.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have referred to one of the instances on which you met him, that is in 1951.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You said you could recall at least one other of the three or four. Would you tell us about that other one?

Mr. DAVIES. It was an instance in, I should say it was 1950 or 1949. This was at a period when he was trying to make up his mind whether to go on with teaching or to go into some Government job, research, or something like that; and we discussed the pros and cons of it in informal terms. It was, I believe, a visit to my office.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say he had come to you for advice?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; he had come to consult me as to what he should do.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him fairly well then, at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. Not particularly well, but I was one of the few people in Government that he knew, you see?

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. DAVIES. And I must say that I could have recommended Government service to him very highly.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew him well enough to know what his circle of acquaintanceship was in Government at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. I knew some of the people that he knew, amongst the research people.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you apparently knew him well enough to know he didn't know very many people in Government?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That connotes a very good acquaintanceship with his circle of acquaintances, doesn't it?

Mr. DAVIES. No; because he told me he knew only so and so and so and so, a few people in our research shop who were doing research parallel to his, but in Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. What did you advise him to do?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't like to give people advice about going into the Government or staying out of the Government. I think they have to make that bitter choice themselves.

Mr. SOURWINE. You then refused to advise him?

Mr. DAVIES. I certainly did. Thereby the Government loses many good people, too.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had thought perhaps because of your earlier answer that you could not advise him very strongly to come into the Government, or words to that effect, that you had expressed that view to him?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't recall whether I expressed it explictly. I said I thought his considerable talents could be used in the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me. May we suspend for a moment?

Senator SMITH. Yes. We will take a short recess.

(At this point a short recess was taken, after which the hearing was resumed.)

Senator SMITH. We will reconvene. You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe you have now told us in substance what you know of that earlier meeting. Do you recall any other meeting that you had with Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. Not in definite terms. I think that I saw him on another trip that he made to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before or after the occasion on which he had asked your advice?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I am not sure whether it was before or after. It was on one side or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. You must have seen him before that occasion on which he asked your advice or he would not have come to you for that purpose.

Mr. DAVIES. That is right; so it was presumably before.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you place the time of the occasion when he came to see you at your office and asked your advice with regard to his career?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe that I recollected it was some time in 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, you had already stated, I think, that it was in 1947 that you first met him.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I may have met him in 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much later might it have been?

Mr. DAVIES. It might have been 1948 or 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your statement that you cannot recall whether you met him in 1947 or 1948 or 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. When I first met him, I cannot recall whether it was 1947 or 1948 or 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it also your statement, however, that on the occasion when you did meet him it was either through introduction by Mr. Fairbank at Harvard; or through a contact arranged by Mr. Fairbank here in Washington?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, is it your statement that at this time you do not recall any other occasions on which you met Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. Any other than——

Mr. SOURWINE. Than the two with regard to which you have testified, and the original meeting, concerning which you have not testified, except that there was such a meeting?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not recall any others. There may have been others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your statement that you did not make a practice of meeting with him, that there were no frequent associations with him, or frequent meetings?

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that your statement?

Mr. DAVIES. That is my statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any occasions when you originated a communication with him?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not recall any such instance, but I may well have written to him and asked him if he was coming to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it possible you might have written to him more than once?

Mr. DAVIES. I might have written to him more than once. I might have written to him twice. If I wrote at all, I don't think it was more than perhaps twice.

Mr. SOURWINE. You did not then carry on a correspondence with him; is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. I did not carry on anything that might be generally termed a correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could you say how many letters you might have received from him?

Mr. DAVIES. I doubt that I received more than one or two letters from him, perhaps informing me that he was coming to Washington.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember receiving any particular letters from him?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that you did receive certain letters from him?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't remember that, but I may well have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you remember that you did write letters to him on one or more occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. That, I can't be sure of, but I would not exclude that I had.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether you ever telephoned him?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think I have ever telephoned him. I don't remember.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether he ever telephoned you?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, yes; I am sure he must have telephoned to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would that be on several occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; that would probably be on one or two occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were those occasions when he had come to Washington, and wanted to let you know that he was here?

Mr. DAVIES. I should say that there would be such occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. When he made those calls, was it in the nature of putting himself at your disposal or in the nature of asking for an opportunity to see you?

Mr. DAVIES. Asking for an opportunity to see me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what he wanted, on any of those occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. Not otherwise than as I have previously testified.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you ever sent him any telegrams or cables?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I do not recall any telegrams to him.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that you did not send him any telegrams?

Mr. DAVIES. I did not, so far as I recall, send him any telegrams.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever send you any telegrams or cables?

Mr. DAVIES. Not so far as I recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have a question, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. No; I do not think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than the occasion on which you all had luncheon, with regard to which you have testified, in the early months of 1951, is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I would say early in 1951.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than that occasion, do you recall ever breaking bread with Mr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than the occasion concerning which you have testified, in 1950, that is, the occasion in 1950 concerning which you have testified, on which occasion he asked your advice with regard to his course of action——

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever discussed with him his employment or possible employment in the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. I may have discussed it with him on the first occasion that I met him, or if there was still another occasion, I might have discussed it at that time. We have established a total of three meetings, I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; that is right.

Mr. DAVIES. And I said, I do not exclude that there may have been a fourth.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; it is your memory that when he first met you his possible employment in the Government was discussed?

Mr. DAVIES. That may well have been discussed at that time, because he was looking forward to what he would do after the conclusion of his studies.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in 1947?

Mr. DAVIES. Either 1947 or 1948 or 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; some time prior to the end of 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You discussed with him the question of employment in the Federal Government?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he at that time ask you to assist him in any way?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think so, because he had not, you see, made up his mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Fairbank ask you to assist him in any way?

Mr. DAVIES. Fairbank initially, of course, was very anxious for him to stay in academic life and to go on and continue his studies and then teach.

Later—This must have been the end of 1950 or early 1951, when there was a question of Schwartz' being called back into military service again—Fairbank felt that his considerable talents should not be overlooked, and that if he were going back into military service he should be in some capacity where his experience and his training would be of use, or that, as an alternative, he might be placed in some other Government service; for example, the State Department, in the research field.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fairbank told you that that is the way he felt about it?

Mr. DAVIES. That was his thought.

Mr. SOURWINE. He told you that that was his thought?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. And a third alternative was that Schwartz continue at Harvard in the Russian Institute, but do work which could be considered as contributing to the national interest, and thereby his draft be deferred?

Mr. SOURWINE. This was in what year?

Mr. DAVIES. This was last year. I remember that conversation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Incidentally, is it Dr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. He is a doctor now; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doctor of what—philosophy?

Mr. DAVIES. I suppose Ph. D.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when he got that degree?

Mr. DAVIES. I think in 1949 or 1950.

Mr. SOURWINE. 1949 or 1950. Over what period was Dr. Schwartz connected with the Russian Institute at Harvard?

Mr. DAVIES. I can't answer that definitely, but I would say that the Russian Institute began to use his services as a consultant, or take his papers and publish his papers, shortly after they were established, which I think was in 1947 or 1948.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did you learn that, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I know Cluckhorn, and I see the Russian Institute stuff. It is sent down to me by Cluckhorn.

Mr. SOURWINE. They used his papers, then, as early as that, and identified them as his?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I see.

Mr. DAVIES. They were mimeographed; I don't think they were printed. Monographs, with his name, and the heading at the top "Russian Institute".

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he still associated with the Russian Institute?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know what he is doing now.

Mr. SOURWINE. When is the last that you heard of him or from him?

Mr. DAVIES. The last I heard of him was this luncheon that we had, and I have heard, so far as I can recall, nothing since that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever serve in any consultant capacity with the Department of State, or any agency of the Department of State?

Mr. DAVIES. That I cannot answer definitely. I think he came down on consultation at one time, whether formally or informally, I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever serve you in a consultant capacity?

Mr. DAVIES. No; certainly not formally. I was interested in what he was writing, to see it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever tell him that you had recommended him or were going to recommend him for any position in which he could serve his Government?

Mr. DAVIES. In one of the earlier contacts—that is, perhaps the first one; or, if there was a fourth, in the early period—I told him, as I have indicated here, that I thought his considerable talents should be turned to use by this Government, and I said that I would want to explore on my own the possibilities of where he might be utilized, but gave him no indication.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you tell him that you had made any specific recommendations, or that you would?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you subsequently explore the possibilities of his utilization in Government?

Mr. DAVIES. I did, in the Department, I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. In research, and in connection with the question, which raises this whole situation.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not sure that I know just what you mean by that. Would you expand on that answer a little, if you please?

Mr. DAVIES. On the question of whether or not he might be utilized in a clandestine operation.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever discuss with him the possibility of his utilization in a clandestine operation?

Mr. DAVIES. No; certainly not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not ever, at any time?

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make a recommendation that he be used in a clandestine operation?

Mr. DAVIES. This is where I came in.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Davies, the term "clandestine operation" is sufficiently broad that it does not connote anything particularly classified.

Mr. DAVIES. I considered and suggested his utilization.

Mr. SOURWINE. You considered and suggested his utilization?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In a clandestine operation?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone else in the State Department ever suggest to you the utilization of Dr. Schwartz in a clandestine operation?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did any of your superiors in the State Department ever direct you to make a recommendation to any other agency with regard to the employment of Dr. Schwartz?

Mr. DAVIES. Insofar as I made any suggestions of this character, they were made under standing orders from my superiors.

Mr. SOURWINE. I can understand that, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. But not specifically with respect to Dr. Schwartz.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes; I can understand that statement. But I would appreciate it, if you would, if you feel that you can, give us a direct "Yes" or "No" answer to the previous question. Do you recall it?

Mr. DAVIES. The answer is "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. The answer is "No."

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; it is "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry I confused the record a little bit by saying "Yes" after you said "No." I wanted to make it perfectly clear your answer was a direct negative.

Did you on your own initiative make a recommendation for the utilization of Dr. Schwartz by another agency, and, if so, did you make that recommendation without Dr. Schwartz' knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; without Dr. Schwartz' knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you are unable, for security reasons, to answer any further questions with regard to the nature of the recommendations that you made respecting the utilization of Dr. Schwartz by another agency?

Mr. DAVIES. I do, sir; because of the reasons which I have previously stated, and because it is, strictly speaking, the operation of another agency, which it would be most inappropriate in any event for me to comment upon.

Mr. SOURWINE. Until you are asked to comment upon what some other agency did, I do not think we need to cross that bridge. We are concerned at the moment, and up to this point, with what you did.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I want the record to be perfectly clear on this point because, frankly, there may be some question with regard to what privilege you may have under the circumstances.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And I want to be sure the record shows your basis for claiming the privilege.

Now, on the basis of the testimony that is in the record, is this a fair statement:

You did make a recommendation to another agency for the utilization of Mr. Schwartz by that agency, in a clandestine manner; you made that recommendation on your own initiative, and not having been instructed or directed by any superior to make it. In spite of which situation, you now state that the making of it constituted a top secret or higher matter, concerning which you cannot testify.

Is that correct?

Mr. DAVIES. Would you read that back to me?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. DAVIES. That is not entirely accurate.

Mr. SOURWINE. By all means correct it.

Mr. DAVIES. Because, when I took an action, as you say, on my own initiative, it was not a private action, a personal action; it was an action in the line of duty, within the framework of standing orders that I had from my superiors. All of my actions within that framework were, because of the nature of this operation, properly not divulgable to anyone outside of the executive charged with knowing about and conducting this operation. That is my position. It is a very awkward one, in the circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. I wanted the record to show clearly what your position was. I think, in fairness to you, it must be. I trust you will appreciate that I was attempting only to summarize how the record appeared at that time.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that you might have a chance to correct it if it was giving a false impression of your true position.

Senator SMITH. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator SMITH. Back on the record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this, then, Mr. Davies, a case in which you had exercised your prerogative to initiate a top-secret classification since, as you have stated, this was with respect to a subject which, under your general orders, you considered to require such a classification?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. It was impossible for me to act with respect to this particular question, outside of the top-secret category.

Mr. SOURWINE. I want to leave that for the moment, at least, and I want to ask what may appear to be an unrelated question, but we will bring it in later, Mr. Chairman, in connection with another line of inquiry.

Please don't let your natural modesty hold you down in answering this question, sir:

Is it not true that you are recognized as an authority on Far East affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that is hotly disputed in certain quarters.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have tried over the years to make yourself an authority, or at least to keep yourself currently well informed on Far East affairs; is that not true?

Mr. DAVIES. I have endeavored to keep myself currently well informed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you believe that you are well informed on Far East affairs at the present time?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe that I am fairly well informed on Far East affairs. But, during the past 6 years, I have not kept very close contact with Far East affairs, ever since I proceeded to the Embassy of Moscow and the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I am sure you appreciate these questions are not being asked for the purpose of embarrassing you; they are a necessary line of questions, necessary to establish that you are an expert in the field.

Are you familiar with the Communist Party line as it applies to affairs in the Far East?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I believe that I am, generally.

Mr. SOURWINE. You necessarily have tried to keep yourself apprised of that line as it changed?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel that you know what the Communist ideology is with regard to the Far East?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you attempt to keep yourself currently informed with regard to that ideology?

Mr. DAVIES. I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you give us your own general conclusion as to the extent to which you may have sympathized with that Communist ideology?

Mr. DAVIES. I have at no time sympathized with the Communist ideology. My basic motivation, since I was a small American missionary boy in China, was almost Xenophonically American.

Mr. SOURWINE. If the witness will permit me to render an apology, which appears to be called for, I think we have a slight semantic difference. I did not use the word or intend to use the word "sympathized" in the connotation in which the witness accepted it. However, Mr. Davies, you had a perfect right to accept it that way.

May I rephrase my question?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What I am really after is your own general conclusion as to the extent to which your own conclusions and feelings with regard to Far East matters coincided with the current Communist Party ideology on those same things.

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot say that my opinions coincide with Communist ideologies in any respect.

Mr. SOURWINE. Very good.

Now, if we may go back to Dr. Schwartz: Have you had a sufficient acquaintance with him to be able to have formed an opinion as to the extent to which his opinions agreed with Communist ideologies and the Communist Party line?

Mr. DAVIES. We went, in my relations with Dr. Schwartz, very little into the opinions. What I was after was what information he had dug up, and I would evaluate that myself.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is your answer to the question "No," then?

Mr. DAVIES. My answer to the question is that so far as I knew Dr. Schwartz, I saw no indication of his associating himself in any way with Communist ideology; to the contrary.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiries concerning Dr. Schwartz' record, his possible affiliation with Communists or Communist-front organizations, or his loyalty?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I did not, because, I might go on and say a little further that when I considered him as potential material for Government use, I was interested in his knowledge, and not his attitudes, at that time. So far as the check on his attitudes, that was not my job. That was the job of the Security people. If they came up with a negative check on his attitudes, then I had no further interest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean, sir, or by that do you mean that you never discussed the question of his possible Communist affiliations, with anyone in Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No; that did not arise with the people with whom I discussed this matter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, let me rephrase the question. Did you ever discuss Dr. Schwartz's possible Communist or Communist-front affiliations with any other person in Government?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot recall any instance of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend him against the suggestion that he might have Communist or Communist-front connections?

Mr. DAVIES. I may have said that I saw no indications of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state with reference to him, that he was not Communist, but only very sophisticated, or very politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a categorical answer? You never did make that statement?

Mr. DAVIES. That is a categorical answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever——

Mr. DAVIES. One doesn't make that statement about anybody, these days.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be retained by another Government agency for policy guidance?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir—categorically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to a representative of another Government agency that Dr. Schwartz had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot recall ever having made any such statement. However, it is true that I was interested in what Schwartz had produced. And in that sense, that any material coming in, information, is of help. In that sense, he was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you might have told a representative of another agency of Government that Dr. Schwartz had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of ever having said anything of that sort.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say categorically that you did or that you did not?

Mr. DAVIES. I would not have said it to——

Mr. SOURWINE. I have not asked any question about whom you said it to, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. I simply have no recollection of ever having made such a statement.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have a categorical answer, if we can get it, and let me recall to you in that connection that you have already testified on this record that Dr. Schwartz did not serve as a consultant to you at any time.

Mr. DAVIES. He did not, certainly.

Mr. SOURWINE. That being the case, sir, does that help you to answer the question as to whether at any time you told any person, a representative of another Government agency, that he had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I could not have said that, because he was not my consultant.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever say it?

Mr. DAVIES. No, I never did.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right, sir. That is all I was trying to get at.

Now, I would like to discuss Edgar Snow. Do you know Mr. Edgar Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did you meet Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. I first met Mr. Snow, so far as I can remember, in probably 1933 or 1934.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall the occasion, or in what manner you met him?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I recall a cocktail party at his house, to which I was invited, amongst many other people.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in 1934?

Mr. DAVIES. 1933 or 1934, or maybe 1935.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did he live at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. This was in Pekin. At that time he was a language officer at the Embassy, or then Legation, in Pekin.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how you came to be invited? Was it because of your diplomatic connections?

Mr. DAVIES. Very likely, and because it was a small community there, that entertained one another.

Mr SOURWINE. Now, did you see him on frequent occasions thereafter?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were the occasions of your meetings thereafter so infrequent that you can recall them?

Mr. DAVIES. They were so infrequent that I do not recall any.

Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you met him in 1933 or 1934 and you have never met him again?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, during that period of 1933, 1934, 1935, I cannot recall but one meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps it would be helpful if at this point, instead of asking precise questions, I simply requested that the witness give for the record his recollection of his acquaintanceship with Mr. Snow.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. Mr. Snow was a journalist who traveled extensively throughout the Far East.

Senator SMITH. Is he the man who wrote the book People on Our Side?

Mr. DAVIES. I think he did write that book. I haven't read it. I think he has written it.

Senator SMITH. In which, as I recall, he attempted to show that not all righteousness was on our side, or something of that sort?

Mr. DAVIES. I have not read the book. He was a journalist who traveled extensively throughout the Far East, throughout Asia and Europe. Our paths crossed at various times because I, too, traveled on the same continents, and being Americans, we would meet each other on social occasions, or he would come into an office where I was stationed.

I cannot recall any instance of meeting him in the period following the first meeting, until 1942 or 1943, when I was detailed to the commanding general of the China-Burma-India theater.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who was the general?

Mr. DAVIES. General Stilwell.

At that time Snow made several trips to the theater, and we met on those occasions, briefly, and then he would move on. He would come to the G–2, and to me, as one of the political advisers. He was around as a newspaperman, and my contacts with him were of that nature.

We made one trip together in the company of the American Ambassador to China, Mr. Gauss, in India, where Mr. Gauss was visiting. It was a trip from New Dehli to Allahabad. I stopped off there to see if I could get an interview with Nehru and Snow stopped off at the same time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that in your official capacity, which was——

Mr. DAVIES. That was in my official capacity as investigator, political officer, exploring for General Stilwell, the internal political situation in India, which was then very explosive and dangerous. He helped to arrange for a meeting with Nehru, and also got me into a meeting of the Indian Congress Executive Committee, and I think probably I was the first and only American official who had ever attended one of these meetings.

I then saw him some time during the war, at Cairo, for a day, as we passed, I remember meeting him at Shepards' Hotel.

Then my next recollection is a visit that he made to Moscow when I was stationed at the Embassy there, and we saw him then socially. And since then I do not recollect of any instance of having seen him.

Oh, I have seen him at the Metropolitan Club, but not to talk with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell the committee about Mr. Snow, in addition to what you have already said?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Snow is a man whom I never became well acquainted with, and therefore I have no very strong impressions of his personality or his outlook, beyond that he is a very active newspaperman who had leftist tendencies in the war years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean in 1941–45?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, and before it—in the thirties, when he wrote Red Star Over China.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had leftist tendencies when you first met him in Pekin?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he still has those tendencies today?

Mr. DAVIES. Not having seen him, I cannot speak from personal experience, although one of his recent articles on Tito and Russia seemed to indicate a considerable disillusionment with the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to discuss political affairs with him?

Mr. DAVIES. Only as I would with any newspaperman trying to explore what information he had that would be of use to us.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any business relationships with him?

Mr. DAVIES. Commercial? Financial?

Mr. SOURWINE. Commercial or financial affairs conducted with the hope of mutual profit?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That does not necessarily imply that you were both on the same side, because all business affairs are conducted with the hope of profit or loss.

Mr. DAVIES. No; only from an information profit on my side.

Mr. SOURWINE. I mean commercial or financial. You never had any commercial or financial business with him?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know him to have any connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. I didn't know that he had any connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations. If, indeed he did, I didn't know it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you now know whether he ever did?

Mr. DAVIES. No, I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you know what the Institute of Pacific Relations is?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know any persons who are connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. I could not give you a complete list, because I do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you do know some?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I do.

Mr. SOURWINE. That lays the foundation for this question:

Did you ever see Mr. Snow in the company of any person whom you knew to be connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. Inasmuch as many Americans in the Far East belonged to the Institute of Pacific Relations, or subscribed to their journal, I assume that I must have, but I can't identify any such relationships.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have any occasion to comunicate or confer with Mr. Snow in connection with or through the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you recall whether you ever wrote any letters to Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I think I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. How extensive was that correspondence?

Mr. DAVIES. Very limited. He had a girl friend in Moscow. I remember his inquiring about her, and my writing back and saying that the NKVD had not gotten her and she was all right.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was at the time you were in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. When I was in Moscow.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was that?

Mr. DAVIES. That was in, I should say, 1945 or 1946.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the only ocasion you can recall when you corresponded with Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. That is the only occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you name this girl, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't remember what her name was. She was a girl who had contacts with people in the British Embassy. She was a—we all recognized her as somebody that the NKVD was trying to use on us. She was a cute dish.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say someone in the NKVD was trying to use her?

Mr. DAVIES. We assumed that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you all recognized her?

Mr. DAVIES. "Recognized" is the wrong word. We assumed that.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you say she was Mr. Snow's girl friend?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't—I think that——

Mr. SOURWINE. I wasn't asking you what you meant by it. You did use that word, didn't you—his "girl friend"?

Mr. DAVIES. I think it was an "A" political relationship.

Mr. SOURWINE. A what?

Mr. DAVIES. An "A" political relationship.

Mr. SOURWINE. What does an "A" political relationship mean?

Mr. DAVIES. A relationship without any political connotation.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. I think perhaps the committee might be interested if you might recall the young lady's name. I would like to ask you, if the name does come to your mind, or if you can in any way refresh your memory in the future and can furnish the committee with her name, would you try to do that?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I may be able to.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. If the name is subsequently furnished, may it be inserted in the record at this point, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Snow wrote to you for information with regard to the young lady in question?

Mr. DAVIES. Because he had known me at various times, and I suppose that I was the member of the American Embassy staff that he had had the acquaintanceship with the longest.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was he keeping close track on your movements at that time, do you know?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did he know you were in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. Where a foreign officer is is pretty well known to the correspondents corps. They know where we are, because they tell one another that so-and-so is in such-and-such a place.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought perhaps there might have been something in his letter that would give you a clue to that and that you would bring it out on response to the question. That is why I asked you that.

Mr. DAVIES. I don't recall the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Something, that he might have wanted to find someone in Moscow he knew, and looked in the register to find if someone he knew was in Moscow, and said so in his letter?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; this was after his visit to Moscow, so he knew I was there.

Mr. SOURWINE. He had visited Moscow earlier?

Mr. DAVIES. That is my recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. How much earlier was it?

Mr. DAVIES. A matter of months.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you see him in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I said I had seen him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. We had, I recall, one meeting with him, a dinner which he gave, at which the British Ambassador was present.

Mr. SOURWINE. I thought it might be possible that the young lady in question was a mutual acquaintance, that is, an acquaintance of both you and Mr. Snow, and that is why he wrote you about it.

Mr. DAVIES. I knew who she was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met her?

Mr. DAVIES. I had just met her socially.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had you met her in Mr. Snow's company?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Senator SMITH. Was she at the dinner?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since you presumed the young lady to be an NKVD agent, why was it that you told Mr. Snow that the NKVD did not have her yet, or had not gotten her yet?

Mr. DAVIES. A totalitarian state devours its own, you know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think he knew that she had the indicia of an NKVD agent?

Mr. DAVIES. I think so. Any American or Englishman who went into the Soviet Union and was there more than a day or two realized that all——

Mr. SOURWINE. You think he was sophisticated enough politically, so that he knew what the score was?

Mr. DAVIES. Something as elementary as that, I think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any other occasions on which Mr. Snow wrote to you?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not recall any other circumstances.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say there was no other occasion?

Mr. DAVIES. I can't categorically say that, but I can—again it is a question that I cannot recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. I believe the record should show, Mr. Chairman, by this questioning, I do not imply there was or was not another occasion. I am simply trying to get as accurately as possible just what the situation was.

Do you recall any other occasion on which you wrote to him?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any other occasion——

Mr. DAVIES. I can recall another occasion when he wrote to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. It was after he wrote the Saturday Evening Post article on Tito and he sent me a copy of it, and asked for my reactions. I did not reply.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was fairly recently?

Mr. DAVIES. That was while I was in Washington, within the past 3 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was that the only time you can recall that he ever asked for your reaction on something he had written?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why he wanted your reaction on this particular article at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. I think maybe he wanted me to say that I felt he had swung his views more toward center.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he indicate that in his letter to you?

Mr. DAVIES. No; that is an assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. You don't know why that might have been important to him?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, his sense of esteem, I suppose.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you don't know?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any occasion when you got a telegram from him?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I do not recall any occasion when I got a telegram.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send him a telegram or cable?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I can answer that "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever telephone him?

Mr. DAVIES. I must have telephoned him, for instance, when he was in India.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean when you both were in India?

Mr. DAVIES. When we were both in India.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was there any other occasion or occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. I can recall no other occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever telephone him when you were both in the United States?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I can recall.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever telephone you other than the occasion when you were both in India?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I have no recollection of his ever having telephoned me.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send a message to him by word of mouth through another person?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of having done that.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever receive a message from him by word of mouth through another person?

Mr. DAVIES. I may well have, during the war years, when he may have told another correspondent that he was coming to Delhi or Chungking.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you received a message from him by word of mouth through another person since you have returned to the United States?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of ever having received such.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had, you would remember it?

Mr. DAVIES. I am quite sure that I would.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiry with regard to Mr. Snow's possible affiliation with the Communist Party or Communist front?

Mr. DAVIES. I remember in Moscow that we—in the Embassy, I discussed his orientation, and we had our doubts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anything ever happen to dissipate those doubts in your mind?

Mr. DAVIES. Nothing happened to confirm the doubts that we entertained.

Mr. SOURWINE. My question was: Did anything ever happen to dissipate them?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that probably this Tito article tended to dissipate those views.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was in what year?

Mr. DAVIES. The date I can't recall. It was in the last 2 or 3 years—his article in the Saturday Evening Post.

Mr. SOURWINE. Prior to that time, nothing had happened to dissipate the doubts previously entertained?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it not true—psychologically—that the doubts that you maintain with regard to a person need dissipation by some outside impact? Your faith in a person may die of ennui but doubts don't die that way?

Mr. DAVIES. I think that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is why I asked the question in that way.

Mr. DAVIES. However, I reserve judgment on this man because I think it is a terrible thing to go on the record about it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you do reserve judgment or you did reserve judgment?

Mr. DAVIES. I said that the indications in his Saturday Evening Post article tended to dissipate the doubts.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a result of which, you now reserve judgment?

Mr. DAVIES. I have always reserved judgment with regard to whether a person is a Communist or not, until the full evidence is in.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hadn't asked that question.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir—your question was the doubts.

Mr. SOURWINE. I had initiated the line of inquiry by asking you if you had had occasion to check with or consult security officers with regard to the question of his loyalty.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a rephrasing of it, and now I will put the question in just those terms. Did you have such occasion?

Mr. DAVIES. Not with security officers, because we in the Embassy of Moscow were political officers.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then I take it from that answer that subsequent to the occasion in the Embassy in Moscow when his—what was the word you used?—orientation was discussed there——

Mr. DAVIES. Orientation.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have no subsequent occasion to inquire as to any loyalty question vis-a-vis Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I have had no occasion to.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have made no such inquiries of security officers or others?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I haven't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you ever recommend Mr. Snow for employment by an agency of the United States Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend to another agency of the Government or a representative of another agency of the Government that Mr. Snow be utilized by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. The answer is the same as I gave on Schwartz.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you just give the answer? I respectfully suggest to you that perhaps what you really want here is just a "Yes" or "No" answer, but I would be happy to have you expand, if you wish to do so.

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry; I have lost the trend of the question.

Mr. SOURWINE. So as to save time. I would be glad to repeat the question.

Did you ever recommend to another agency of Government, or representative of another agency of Government, that Mr. Snow be utilized by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything about the circumstances under which that recommendation was made?

Mr. DAVIES. I do not feel that I can, for the reasons that I gave with regard to Schwartz.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do all of the other answers that you gave in connection with my inquiries concerning your recommendation of Dr. Schwartz hold true with respect to your recommendation of Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. To wit?

Mr. SOURWINE. To wit: That the recommendation was not initiated at a higher level, was your own suggestion, which you implemented in accordance with what you assumed to be a general directive under which you were operating?

Mr. DAVIES. Which was explicitly a general directive, not which I assumed, but which——

Mr. SOURWINE. I accept the correction.

Mr. DAVIES. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Under your construction of an explicit general directive under which you were operating?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is all I meant by saying "all."

Mr. DAVIES. The answer is "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend Mr. Snow against the charge or suggestion that he was a Communist or associated with communism?

Mr. DAVIES. That he was a Communist or associated with? No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever, in response to the suggestion that Mr. Snow was considered as a Communist or Communist sympathizer, say that he was not a Communist, but only very sophisticated, or very politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest or urge that Mr. Snow be used for guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that he be used for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to a representative of another agency of the Government that materials prepared by Mr. Snow would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. The proper approach for what and for whom?

Mr. SOURWINE. If you would answer the question, then I would be glad to have you expand upon it with whatever qualifying information is necessary to make your answer perfectly responsive.

Mr. DAVIES. I will answer it this way: That to reply to this question takes us right into the heart of this operation, which is a top-secret operation, and in another agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would your answer then be that you never did so, except in connection with a top-secret operation, concerning which you feel you cannot testify?

Mr. DAVIES. My answer would be "Yes."

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, that you never did so, except in connection with a top-secret operation concerning which you feel you cannot testify?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Snow ever serve the State Department in a consulting or consultant capacity, to your knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it that includes possible service to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to anyone that Mr. Snow had been helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. I neglected a question, and I must apologize for putting it out of context, Mr. Chairman, with regard to Dr. Schwartz.

Do you know anything of his possible connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall ever meeting him in company with or in connection with persons you knew to be members of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. Here again, I am in the same disability of not knowing who are members of the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. I realize that I might get exactly the same answers as when I asked that question with regard to Mr. Snow.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever communicate or confer with Dr. Schwartz at or through the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. We are back on Mr. Snow now.

Did you ever recommend that Mr. Snow be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never did?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Dr. Schwartz be set up in an office by an agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, with regard to Agnes Smedley: Did you know Agnes Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us of your acquaintance with her, when you met her, and follow through along the same lines we have already had with the other two persons that we have discussed?

Mr. DAVIES. I first knew Agnes Smedley in 1938 in Hanchow, when she was living there and working with the Chinese Communists. She had presented to the consulate general there a letter of introduction, which I might read here. It is a letter from the Department of State, Washington, May 4, 1934, to the American diplomatic consular officers.

"SIRS: At the instance of the Honorable Robert F. Wagner, Senator of the United States from the State of New York, I take pleasure in introducing to you Miss Agnes Smedley of New York City, who is about to proceed abroad.

"I cordially bespeak for Miss Smedley such courtesies and assistance as you may be able to render, consistently with your official duties.

"Very truly yours,

"CORDELL HULL."

Mr. SOURWINE. Was this presented to you?

Mr. DAVIES. This was a standard letter of introduction Miss Smedley carried, and which she presented to the American officials in Hanchow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it presented to you?

Mr. DAVIES. I saw it, or knew of it. I do not recall whether I physically saw the document, but I knew of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you saw it or you knew of it at the time you met her?

Mr. DAVIES. At the time I met her.

Mr. SOURWINE. Where did you get this photostat?

Mr. DAVIES. This is a photostat which I received from Mr. Clubb.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Clubb?

Mr. DAVIES. A colleague of mine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean a colleague in the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did he give it to you?

Mr. DAVIES. He gave it to me about 2 or 3 weeks ago.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ask him for it or did he bring it to you and suggest it might be well if you had it?

Mr. DAVIES. He brought it to me. He thought it might be of interest to me.

Mr. SOURWINE. We just thought it might be of interest?

Mr. DAVIES. No—it might be of use to me.

Mr. MORRIS. How long were you in Hanchow, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I was in Hanchow from 1938 until 1940.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to interrupt that, but I wanted to go back for just a moment, because I would like to have this put in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Very well, it is so ordered.

(The letter above referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U. S. A.

To the Diplomatic and Consular Officers of the United States of America.
Introducing: Miss Agnes Smedley.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 4, 1934.

TO THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS.

SIRS: At the instance of the Honorable Robert F. Wagner, Senator of the United States from the State of New York, I take pleasure in introducing to you Miss Agnes Smedley of New York City, who is about to proceed abroad.

I cordially bespeak for Miss Smedley such courtesies and assistance as you may be able to render, consistently with your official duties.

Very truly yours,

_____.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask Mr. Davies for Mr. Clubb's full name.

Mr. DAVIES. Edmund Clubb.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that E-d-m-u-n-d?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. C-l-u-b-b?

Mr. DAVIES. Double b.

Mr. SOURWINE. What position does he hold with the State Department now?

Mr. DAVIES. He is Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know why Mr. Clubb felt that this might be of service to you?

Mr. DAVIES. Miss Smedley has been mentioned in connection with me, publicly, in Miss Smedley's book and elsewhere.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am trying to get the tie. As I understand it, you say Mr. Clubb gave you this letter 2 or 3 weeks ago. Wasn't that too late to have been of service to you in connection with any proceeding in the Department, and without knowledge that there would be or might be any proceedings before this committee?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, it was without reference to any proceedings in this committee, about which, of course, I had no forewarning.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. Is it your testimony that you do not know just how he intended it to be of service to you?

Mr. DAVIES. It might be of some use to me in case there were questions on the subject.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a friendly gesture by Mr. Clubb?

Mr. DAVIES. A friendly gesture.

Mr. SOURWINE. He was a friend of yours and he made a friendly gesture?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry, Mr. Morris—I interrupted you.

Mr. MORRIS. I just wanted to know what was his service in China before he went to Hanchow?

Mr. DAVIES. My official service in China began in 1933 in Yunnanfu. In 1933 I was transferred for my language study in Peking. I completed that after 2 years' study and then went to Mukden. I left Mukden in 1938 and went to Hanchow, and there we are.

Mr. SOURWINE. Before you go further, I want to clear up the question of your meeting. Is it your testimony that your initial meeting with Miss Smedley was in line of duty—that she came to the offices of the State Department which you were occupying, in which you were working in Peking, and——

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. In Hanchow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. In Hanchow. And that she either there presented, or had previously presented, and you knew about, this letter of introduction, and therefore you met her in connection with your official duties?

Mr. DAVIES. That is so. I was——

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, proceed.

Mr. DAVIES. I was a political officer reporting on the local scene. I was an investigator. My job was to know everybody that I could know on the local scene. I knew everyone from von Faulkenhausen, who was the German military adviser to the Generalissimo, to Agnes Smedley. As a political officer, it was my duty to know everybody I could know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why do you say from von Faulkenhausen to Agnes Smedley. Are they at opposite poles?

Mr. DAVIES. They are not, because one was a Nazi and the other was a member of the Communist apparatus.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was at what time?

Mr. DAVIES. This was in 1938.

Mr. SOURWINE. They were not at opposite poles?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, it depends on your reading of the meaning of whether the Nazis and Communists are at opposite poles or the same poles.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean to be argumentative. I was trying to find out whether you intentionally used them in that way.

Mr. DAVIS. I think they are contrasting personalities.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes. Please go ahead.

Mr. DAVIES. Miss Smedley was at that time, as I have previously testified, intimately identified with the Communist headquarters.

She was a channel through whom foreign correspondents and members of the diplomatic and consular corps obtained information, established contacts with the Chinese Communist delegation in Hanchow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was her position in that regard known to the State Department—the American State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. To the Embassy and the consulate.

Mr. SOURWINE. You certainly had reported it to Washington?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, yes. Insofar as we sought to get information from the Communists, in addition to the other elements, we would use Miss Smedley as an intermediary, to see what we could get. That was during the period of the Japanese advance on Hanchow. The city was filled with correspondents and the official staffs of the various consulates and embassies there were very large. There was a constant coming and going and contact-seeking information, and in that way I had contacts with Miss Smedley, endeavored to get what information I could from her, the hand-outs that they produced at the Communist headquarters, asking her questions, officially had these various associations with her.

She then left Hanchow at the time the Embassy pulled out; the Chinese Government pulled out, and most of the correspondents left, which was just as the

Japanese came in. I stayed behind with the consul general's staff. We underwent the Japanese occupation.

Smedley told us that she was going out into the guerrilla territory in the outlying areas. This was of great interest to us for two reasons: One was that we were following the military campaign very closely, and were also interested in how the Japanese occupied, and observed their control, through the area, and were very interested in what the guerrilla resistance would be in the surrounding areas.

Secondly, Japanese-American relations were rather tense. The *Panay* had been sunk a short time before, and we never knew when, while under Japanese occupation, the balloon might not go up. We were therefore interested in the guerrilla movement from the view of getting out in the event of war between Japan and the United States. Therefore, I asked Smedley to keep us informed. She wrote to the British and wrote to us little notes that would be sent back in through the Japanese lines to us.

Her information on the guerrilla operations out there was of considerable interest to us. We always had to make very large corrections in her bias, but nevertheless, it was a first-hand account of guerrilla operations.

Mr. SOURWINE. With a deflection for windage, it showed reasonable accuracy?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. It was of great use to us in our appraisals of the guerrilla operations. Her estimates, of course, were checked against what estimates we got from the Chinese agents who remained behind, and from what the Japanese carried in their communiqués, and what we got from missionaries who came from the area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did her reports, after correction for bias, show sufficient accuracy to indicate that she had a pretty good knowledge or sources of information with regard to the matters she was reporting on?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, yes; because she had lived with the guerrilla units in these little villages and marched with them, not in the heart of battle, but on the periphery of battles.

Mr. SOURWINE. After that period, during which her services were utilized, and you had some contacts in your official capacity, what further acquaintanceship have you had?

Mr. DAVIES. I have had none.

Mr. SOURWINE. When did that period end?

Mr. DAVIES. It ended before my departure from Hanchow, which was late in 1940—or the summer of 1940, I think, so I would say it ended at probably about 1939.

Mr. SOURWINE. Since that time, have you sent her any letters?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she sent you any?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you sent her any telegrams or cables?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she sent you any?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you telephoned her or has she telephoned you?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any communication with her by word of mouth or through another person?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, at the time that you initially met her, did she present to you any letter of introduction from any person other than the letter that has gone into the record here?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anyone write you about her, or give her a good-character rating, or suggest that you get together, or anything of that sort?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't recall any such. She was a public figure, well known in the area.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything of her connections—still speaking of Miss Smedley? Do you know anything of her connections, if any, with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall meeting her in connection with or in the company of persons known to you to be members of the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. No; with the same caveat I gave on the other two.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if I might ask: Would you tell us at this point what generally have been your connections with the institute? May I have a response to that question?

Mr. DAVIES. Very slight. I have known, of necessity, many people who have been connected with the institute. I have seen their journal.

Mr. MORRIS. You are a member, are you not?

Mr. DAVIES. That, I don't know. I do not recall ever having been a member. I ask a question for information—whether subscription to the journal makes one a member? I don't recall having been a member, nor do I recall having subscribed to the magazine. I may have subscribed to the magazine, but I have no recollection.

Mr. MORRIS. You make payments to the institute, do you not?

Mr. DAVIES. I make payments?

Mr. MORRIS. Don't you make payments to the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't make any payments.

Mr. SOURWINE. Didn't you ever pay dues to the institute, as such?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never applied for membership in the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. That I am not sure of. I have, as I said, no recollection of having been a member.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever get a bill for dues from the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection.

Mr. SOURWINE. A bill, or other requests for dues?

Mr. DAVIES. I may have had solicitation from it. I do not exclude the possibility that I may have been a member, but I haven't checked back—I have no record of it.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say definitely that you have not, over a period of succeeding years, two or more, paid annual dues to the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. In the past 2 years?

Mr. SOURWINE. No—I said over a period of two or more years consecutively.

Mr. DAVIES. I have no recollection of paying any dues to the institute.

Mr. SOURWINE. If you had you would have recalled it?

Mr. DAVIES. No, sir; not necessarily.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you pay dues in organizations you don't know you belong to?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I know I pay dues to the American Automobile Association.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you know you pay the dues?

Mr. DAVIES. I know I pay those dues. I have no recollection of ever having paid any dues to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever pay dues to the Amalgamated Sons and Daughters of I Will Rise?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You can say "No" to that?

Mr. DAVIES. I can say "No" to that because, of course, it was an organization in which I—it is utterly improbable that I would ever have had anything to do with it, whereas, the Institute of Pacific Relations, to my knowledge, was a very respectable, and rather stuffy, organization. It was one which I naturally really should have belonged to. I am afraid I didn't.

Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me for interrupting.

Mr. SOURWINE. It was a very good interruption, Mr. Morris.

With regard to Agnes Smedley, did you ever communicate with her through or in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiry with respect to Agnes Smedley's possible Communist connections?

Mr. DAVIES. Certainly. That was something we were all very interested in. Just what her relationships were—she denied, of course, that she was a party member.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever make inquiry in that regard subsequent to leaving the Orient?

Mr. DAVIES. No; because I lost interest in Smedley.

Mr. SOURWINE. You knew her at that time to be a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. In the Orient?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. I assumed that she was a Communist. As I have testified, I regarded her as a part of the Communist apparatus there.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did anything ever occur to change your mind with regard to her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend Agnes Smedley for employment with another agency of the Government, that is, an agency other than the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recommend her employment with the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend to a representative of another agency of the Government that Agnes Smedley be utilized by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything further about that occasion?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. For the same reasons that apply to the case of Dr. Schwartz and Edgar Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend Agnes Smedley against the charge or the suggestion that she was a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend her against the suggestion or charge that she had Communist sympathies, or was a member of a Communist-front organization?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state she was not a Communist, but only very sophisticated or very politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest that another agency of Government set her up in an office?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that she had been useful to you or helpful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever suggest that she be assigned to produce materials for utilization by another department of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. Assigned? I beg your pardon, will you repeat that?

Mr. SOURWINE. That she be assigned to produce materials for utilization by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to a representative of another agency of the Government that materials prepared by her would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. The same answer that I gave on Snow.

Mr. SOURWINE. What was that answer?

Mr. DAVIES. That this goes into the nature of the operation a top-secret operation, which I do not feel at liberty to discuss.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not sure that that is the precise answer you gave with regard to Mr. Snow, but it is the answer you intend to give here with regard to Miss Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. It is.

Mr. SOURWINE. But you cannot answer that question, because to answer it goes into a top-secret operation about which you feel you cannot testify?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Except with regard to the said top-secret operations, did you ever represent to a representative of any other agency of the Government—that is, other than the State Department, that materials prepared by Agnes Smedley would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever represent to a representative of an agency of the Government, other than the State Department, that Agnes Smedley could be used by that agency for consultation and guidance?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a categorical "No"?

Mr. DAVIES. A categorical "No."

Mr. SOURWINE. Moving now to Anna Louise Strong, are you acquainted, or were you acquainted with Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us about when you met her, and follow along the same lines we have had with the other persons concerning whom we have asked you?

Mr. DAVIES. I first met Anna Louise Strong in 1945 or 1946 at a reception in the Embassy. I do not remember the precise occasion, but my only contacts with Miss Strong were at the Embassy.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the Embassy where?

Mr. DAVIES. In Moscow. She was a member of the press corps.

Mr. SOURWINE. For what organization or publication?

Mr. DAVIES. I beg your pardon?

Mr. SOURWINE. What organization or publication did she represent?

Mr. DAVIES. My recollection was that she was a free lance. She may have corresponded for various Communist magazines or newspapers, but I don't think that she had a——

Mr. SOURWINE. Were free-lance correspondents permitted to roam around Moscow at that time?

Mr. DAVIES. Communists, or those who were a part of the apparatus, were permitted to roam around.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she a part of the apparatus?

Mr. DAVIES. I assumed that she was at least a fellow traveler, completely acceptable to the regime and under its control.

Mr. SOURWINE. Go ahead.

Mr. DAVIES. Aside from the social contacts, for example, the Fourth of July, when she would appear at the Ambassador's reception, or contacts during the council of foreign ministers, in 1947, when Mr. Harriman asked me to help out with handling the press. In that situation I would see her, with a group of newspapermen, when the releases were made, and in similar circumstances. That was my only contact with her, and I have had no contact with her since.

Mr. SOURWINE. What do you know of her besides the fact that she had this Communist connection or presumed Communist connection in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. I know little about her personal history.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she still alive?

Mr. DAVIES. I believe she is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where she is?

Mr. DAVIES. She is in this country, so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where?

Mr. DAVIES. But I do not know where.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was it that you knew her in Moscow?

Mr. DAVIES. In Moscow, 1945 through April of 1947.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, since April of 1947, have you had any communication with her of any nature?

Mr. DAVIES. None whatsoever.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have not written her a letter, nor sent her a telegram or cable or telephoned her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And she has not written a letter to you or sent you a telegram or a cable or telephone to you?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had any communications by word of mouth through any other individual?

Mr. DAVIES. None.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about her connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No, I do not.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you ever recall meeting her in connection with or in company with persons whom you knew to be members of the institute?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever consult with her or communicate with her or confer with her in connection with or through the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend Anna Louise Strong for employment by the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend her for employment by any other department or agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend to a representative of another agency of the Government, that is, other than the State Department, that Anna Louise Strong be utilized by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything more about the occasion on which you made that recommendation?

Mr. DAVIES. No; for the reasons which I have cited in the other cases.

Mr. SOURWINE. The same reasons as cited in the cases of Dr. Schwartz and Mr. Snow and Agnes Smedley?

Mr. DAVIES. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, did you ever recommend that Anna Louise Strong be set up in an office by some agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that she be used for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state to the representative of another agency of the Government that materials prepared by her would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. The same answer that I gave on the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is, you cannot answer that question, you are stating you cannot answer that question without discussing matters which are, in your opinion, top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Other than in connection with top-secret matters, did you ever state that materials prepared by her would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that she had been useful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Had she ever been useful to you as a consultant?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was she ever employed by the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever receive instructions from any superior to make a recommendation to another agency of Government with respect to Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. DAVIES. I received no specific instructions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it correct, then, that the situation is the same with regard to Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley, Edgar Snow and Benjamin Schwartz in that regard, to wit, that the recommendations which you made were your own implementation, of your own suggestion, acting under your construction of an explicit directive which was then in existence, and which you were attempting to follow out?

Mr. DAVIES. And which was of a top-secret category, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I accept the amendment.

All right, sir. Now, I have one more name to move on to, but I would like to go back for just a minute and pick up a loose end.

When we were talking about Mr. Edgar Snow, I did not ask you if you knew Mrs. Snow—did you?

Mr. DAVIES. Which Mrs. Snow?

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know a Mrs. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. I knew a Mrs. Snow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Which one did you know?

Mr. DAVIES. Who wrote under the nom de plume of Nym Wales.

Mr. SOURWINE. N-y-m W-a-l-e-s?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. She was the Mrs.—that is, she was Edgar Snow's wife at the time you knew him?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know where she is now?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you maintained contact with her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have an acquaintanceship with her other than your contact with Mr. Snow?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. You never had any social connections?

Mr. DAVIES. Any what?

Mr. SOURWINE. Any social connections with her.

Mr. DAVIES. She was a hostess at the cocktail party where I first met Snow.

Mr. SOURWINE. Aside from that?

Mr. DAVIES. Aside from that, no.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know Professor John Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you tell us when you met him and under what circumstances, and what your acquaintance has been?

Mr. DAVIES. I met Mr. Fairbank in 1933 or 1934 when he was a student, doing a thesis on the Chinese maritime customs. This was in Peking. I was a language officer at that time.

I knew him fairly well, because we had many interesting comments. I was at that time, as I said, a student, and we were covering much the same ground.

I have maintained this acquaintanceship with Fairbank over these subsequent years. I cannot say when I next saw him after I left Peking in 1935.

In 1937, I think, was the next time I met him, and that was when I was home on leave, and then only briefly.

During the war he was a Government official employed in General Donovan's office.

Mr. SOURWINE. The Office of Strategic Services?

Mr. DAVIES. It preceded the OSS. I have forgotten the name of it. OIC, or something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. COI—Coordinated Information.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; it may have been Coordinated Information. But it was the office which preceded the OSS.

Mr. SOURWINE. These letters are a little confusing. What is the CIA?

Mr. DAVIES. Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the OIC?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, that is one I am not sure of the letters. It is the organization set up before they set up the OSS.

Mr. SOURWINE. What is the OPC?

Mr. DAVIES. That is the Office of Policy Coordination, within the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. Whether this was OIC or OCI that Mr. Snow was in we don't know?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. DAVIES. I don't remember the initials. It was the organization which ultimately was replaced by the OSS.

Mr. MORRIS. I think it was called the COI, Coordinated Information.

Mr. SOURWINE. Office of Coordinator of Information.

Go ahead, sir, please.

Mr. DAVIES. He was in the book and periodicals acquisition organization. I do not recall under what office that was. It may have been under OSS or it may have been part of the State Department. But at any rate he was, during the war, in China as an official, carrying out official duties.

At that period I saw a good deal of him when I went to China and I saw him also, I think, in the United States when he came back and he was OWI.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the Office of War Information?

Mr. DAVIES. Officer of War Information. After the war years I did not see him again until I returned to the United States in 1947. My first meeting with him then, I believe, was in the fall of 1947. I have since seen him occasionally as he comes to Washington. Sometimes I discover he has been in Washington and I have not seen him. Sometimes we meet and have lunch together, or I go to his house for a drink, and that has been our relationship.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are then more than mere acquaintances?

Mr. DAVIES. Oh, yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are friends of long standing?

Mr. DAVIES. We are friends of long standing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall when was the most recent occasion that you saw him?

Mr. DAVIES. It was sometime this spring I saw him. I don't recall the date.

Mr. SOURWINE. Besides Dr. Schwartz, has he ever introduced to you or brought you into contact with other persons in connection with their possible future course of employment, or their employment by the Government or some agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think so. No; I have no recollection of it.
Mr. SOURWINE. He never sent you any other bright young man?
Mr. DAVIES. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever had any commercial relations, business relations, commercial or monetary, with Mr. Fairbank?
Mr. DAVIES. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you maintain a correspondence with him?
Mr. DAVIES. Irregularly.
Mr. SOURWINE. Have you maintained this irregular correspondence over a period of years?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send him telegrams?
Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't recall sending him a telegram.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did he ever send you one?
Mr. DAVIES. No; not that I recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does he ever telephone you long distance?
Mr. DAVIES. He has; yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Frequently or infrequently?
Mr. DAVIES. Infrequently.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what it was about?
Mr. DAVIES. Oh, that he was coming to Washington and would like to see me; have lunch with me.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever telephone him long distance?
Mr. DAVIES. I think I may have; I don't recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall what it would have been about, if you did?
Mr. DAVIES. No. It wouldn't have been of any importance.
Mr. SOURWINE. Which means, of course, you don't recall what it was about?
Mr. DAVIES. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever send to him or receive from him oral messages through some third person?
Mr. DAVIES. Not that I recall.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether he is a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations or has any connections with the institute?
Mr. DAVIES. I do not know.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever meet him in connection with or in the company of persons whom you knew to be members of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. DAVIES. Again, not that I know of.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever communicate with him or confer with him at or in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, or through the institute?
Mr. DAVIES. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever have occasion to make inquiries with regard to his possible loyalty or his possible connection with communism or the Communist Party or Communist-front organizations?
Mr. DAVIES. It had not occurred to me that it would be necessary to do so.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever do so?
Mr. DAVIES. No.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have an opinion with regard to the question of whether he had any connection with communism or Communist-front organizations?
Mr. DAVIES. In my long acquaintance with him I have seen not the slightest evidence of any connections which might be considered disloyal to the United States.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does that mean that you do have an opinion, and that your opinion is that he has no such connection?
Mr. DAVIES. Yes.
Mr. SOURWINE. Have you ever heard of the charge that he is or has been a member of the Communist Party?
Mr. DAVIES. Not until recently.
Mr. SOURWINE. How recently?
Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry. Was he a member of the Communist Party or associated with it?
Mr. SOURWINE. I said member.
Mr. DAVIES. Oh, member. No; I have never heard that.
Mr. SOURWINE. Have you heard the charge that he was associated with the Communist Party?
Mr. DAVIES. In the sense that I have heard the charge that he was sympathetic to the Communists.
Mr. SOURWINE. How recently did you hear that charge?

Mr. DAVIES. I should say it was in the last few months.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall where and how you heard it?

Mr. DAVIES. I think probably I read it in the Congressional Record.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether you saw anything about it in the public press?

Mr. DAVIES. I have seen his name mentioned in the publications.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you a careful reader of the Congressional Record, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. Spasmodically.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall whether the mention of Mr. Fairbank in the Congressional Record was called to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might it have been called to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. It might have been; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you would have found it yourself if it had not been called to your attention?

Mr. DAVIS. I might have found his name, and connected it with other names that I knew.

Mr. SOURWINE. You know there is no index in the Congressional Record?

Mr. DAVIES. I know there isn't?

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you say that it wasn't called to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I can't say that. It may have been called to my attention.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility that Mr. Fairbank himself called it to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I can't think he did.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there any possibility Mr. Clubb might have called it to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, do you recall having heard any other charge bearing any relation to communism, against Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever hear of the allegation that he had carried messages for the Communists?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I hadn't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the employment of Mr. Fairbank by the State Department?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend Mr. Fairbank's employment by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used for consultation and guidance by an agency of the United States?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Mr. Fairbank be used to prepare materials for another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. My answer to that is that I cannot reply to it because to do so would be to go into a top-secret operation, which I don't feel ready to do.

Mr. SOURWINE. I did not mean to cross you up by changing the order of my questions, although I did change them. The question that I ask earlier in the series with respect to these other persons I will ask now with respect to Mr. Fairbank.

Did you ever recommend to a representative of an agency of Government other than the State Department the utilization of Mr. Fairbank by that agency?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us any further details with regard to that recommendation?

Mr. DAVIES. No; for the reasons which I have given with respect to the others.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was Mr. Fairbank's wife included in that recommendation?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that Mr. Fairbank could be trusted to prepare materials which would represent the proper approach?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot answer that because to do so would be to reveal the nature of a top-secret operation.

Mr. SOURWINE. I take it you noted that that question is slightly different from the question I asked in that regard with respect to these other people. I do not want to trap you, Mr. Davies.

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry.

Mr. SOURWINE. The question I asked was: "Did you ever state that Mr. Fairbank could be trusted to prepare materials that would represent the proper approach?" I am not urging you to change your answer nor am I attempting to coerce your answer. I call your attention to the fact that the question is slightly different in form from the similar questions that have been asked earlier.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I did recommend that, but I can't go further into the reasons.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right.

Did you ever state that you had perfect confidence in both Professor and Mrs. Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us anything further about any occasion on which you may have stated that?

Mr. DAVIES. I probably have stated that on a number of occasions, because that is what I believe.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend that Professor Fairbank be set up in an office by some agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that Professor Fairbank was a person ideally suited to provide consultation and guidance for another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend his use for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the use of Mrs. Fairbank for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever recommend the use of Professor and Mrs. Fairbank for consultation and guidance by another agency of the Government?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever defend Professor Fairbank or his wife, or he and his wife, from any allègation of communism or Communist connections?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I think I have, on a number of occasions.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, does that imply that you had heard charges made against them on a number of occasions?

Mr. DAVIES. It implies that, as I said, in the past few months I have heard that he is a Communist.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you have defended them against such allegations only during the past few months?

Mr. DAVIES. No; there may have been earlier allegations. There may have been earlier allegations against which I have defended them.

Mr. SOURWINE. How early? Do you know?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot recall. That would be going back at least months and maybe a year or two.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you a year ago defending Professor and Mrs. Fairbank, or either of them, against allegations of Communist connections or Communist sympathies?

Mr. DAVIES. I may have—it may have been a year ago; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you, as early as 2 years ago, defending Professor and Mrs. Fairbank, or either of them, against allegations of Communist connections or Communist sympathies?

Mr. DAVIES. It may have been that early.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you defending them against such allegations as early as 1949?

Mr. DAVIES. It may have been 1949.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you defending them as early as 1948?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, if there were such allegations in 1948——

Mr. SOURWINE. I am asking you, sir.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. For you to defend a person against an allegation, you would have had to have heard it. Allegations might have been heard elsewhere, but they would have no meaning in that connection. All I can do is ask you whether you were defending them against such allegations as early as 1948.

Mr. DAVIES. I do not recall any allegations as early as 1948. There may have been allegations in 1949. If there were, I certainly defended them.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have been since, presumably 1949, and subsequently, been defending Professor and Mrs. Fairbank, or either of them, against such Com-

munist allegations as may have been made against them and have come to your attention?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you recall any specific allegations that have been made against them and on which you have defended them?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever state that they were not Communists, but only very sophisticated or very politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think I ever used those words. No; I did not.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a categorical answer?

Mr. DAVIES. That is a categorical answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is Professor Fairbank a very politically sophisticated man?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; I would say that he is.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is he so politically sophisticated that he could be confused with a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. A Communist is politically naive, for my money.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not feel that political sophistication is an earmark of communism?

Mr. DAVIES. I think it is the reverse.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would not, under any circumstances, refer to a Communist as being politically sophisticated?

Mr. DAVIES. Never.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would never refer to a person in terms of so being politically sophisticated as an explanation of why they might be mistaken for a Communist?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you never did so refer to any of these people in any other way?

Mr. DAVIES. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have just a few more questions and we will be through, Mr. Chairman.

Is your acquaintanceship with Professor Fairbank's wife the outgrowth of your acquaintance and friendship with him?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had any independent acquaintance with her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know her as well as you know Mr. Fairbank?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does she have any professional attainments?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes. She is a very talented woman in a number of ways. She is an artist. She is something of a student of history. For a while she was in the Department of State and in the field in China as a cultural relations officer, dealing with students.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long ago was that?

Mr. DAVIES. That was, I believe, in the last days of the war, or right after the war.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who employed her for that job?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who recommended her?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. How long was she there?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know. My impression is it was perhaps a year or perhaps 2 years.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has she been employed by the Government or any Government agency since then, to your knowledge?

Mr. DAVIES. No; not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she is working at all?

Mr. DAVIES. Pardon?

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know whether she is working at all?

Mr. DAVIES. Now?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does she write for publication?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did she ever?

Mr. DAVIES. She may have. I do not know of any of her writings.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she a stenographer or typist?

Mr. DAVIES. Not so far as I know.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she an expert on foreign affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is she a specialist in Pacific Affairs?

Mr. DAVIES. No; not technically so.

Mr. SOURWINE. She doesn't work with and collaborate with her husband?

Mr. DAVIES. No. She is independently a very intelligent and well-educated woman.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the picture?

Mr. DAVIES. That is the picture.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, sir, if I may hop around a little bit, I think I have left some loose ends.

Did you know Edgar Snow's second wife?

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. And do you know who she was?

Mr. DAVIES. That is, the current one, is it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I am asking you.

Mr. DAVIES. The only wife that I knew was named Wales.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you speak the Chinese language, sir?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You are, as a matter of fact, one of a relatively small number of persons employed by the State Department today who do speak the Chinese language fluently, are you not?

Mr. DAVIES. That may be so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know how many others there are in the Department who do?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't, but I could make a rough estimate of 10 or 15.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many do you know that do? Do you think you know all of the 10 or 15?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't know the younger ones.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you name those employees or officials of the State Department who, to your knowledge, speak Chinese fluently?

Mr. DAVIES. Who speak Chinese fluently?

Everett Drumwright, John S. Service, Philip D. Sprouse, Fulton Freeman, Edmund Clubb.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is the same Mr. Clubb referred to earlier in this hearing?

Mr. DAVIES. Right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you finished your answer?

Mr. DAVIES. That is roughly, yes. That is the list that comes to mind.

Mr. SOURWINE. I do not mean to burden this record with conclusions nor to try to testify, but isn't it perhaps an unfortunate thing that we do not have more experts in that language in the State Department than we have?

Mr. DAVIES. It is a very serious matter, and it is also a serious matter that very few of them now are dealing with Far Eastern affairs.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why is that? Do you know what that is?

Mr. DAVIES. I have my guesses, but they aren't——

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you know?

Mr. DAVIES. They are personal guesses.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think you know why that is?

Mr. DAVIES. I think it is because they have been persecuted out of the Far East. You have two China language officers in London.

Mr. SOURWINE. Who are they?

Mr. DAVIES. James K. Penfield and Arthur Ringwalt. Both of them are senior officers. Penfield is No. 3 in the London Embassy. He went there from Czechoslovakia.

In Paris there is Philip Sprouse, who was Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say he was?

Mr. DAVIES. He was, prior to Clubb's arrival.

In Brussels is Raymond P. Ludden. In Rome is Joseph E. Jacobs, who is a career Minister, China Service. And there is assigned to Rome, Fulton Freeman, who was one of the best younger officers in China Service.

In Tangiers is John Carter Vincent, who is of China Service.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say all——

Mr. DAVIES. At the present time, in the two posts which deal most intimately in the field with China, that is, Hong Kong and Formosa, there is no senior

China language officer. They are all junior officers that have come in since the war. They are young men with very little background and experience in the problems they have to deal with.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Dr. Schwartz speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Edgar Snow speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Poorly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Agnes Smedley speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. I think poorly.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Anna Louise Strong speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I know of.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Professor Fairbank speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does he speak it well?

Mr. DAVIES. He speaks, reads and writes it well.

Mr. SOURWINE. He is a Chinese scholar?

Mr. DAVIES. He is a scholar.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does Mrs. Fairbank speak Chinese?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does she also read and write?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; not as well as her husband.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does she read well enough to translate?

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think so. That is very difficult.

Mr. SOURWINE. I apologize for that diversion. I thought it would be well to have that situation in the record.

Now, I want to get back to the question of the top secret, because I think we have to tie this record up.

Mr. DAVIES. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to ask: Can you, without violation of top secret, identify for us the specific general directive under which you were operating?

Mr. DAVIES. It is an NC document, national-security document, establishing the operation, organization, regarding whom I made the personnel recommendations.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, I assume, since you have not identified it with more particularity, you feel you cannot, without violating the classification itself?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; that classification is a top-secret document.

Mr. SOURWINE. That being the case, will you undertake to make the proper approach through the proper channels to the persons who might be able to make a determination as to whether this committee can have that document under the classification, and subject to the classification, and to inform the committee of the determination which is made in that regard?

Mr. DAVIES. That I make the approach?

Mr. SOURWINE. I know of no other way, since you cannot tell us whom to approach.

Mr. DAVIES. I can say that the most appropriate person to go to in the situation is the Director of Central Intelligence, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will General Smith know what we are referring to when we refer to it in the terms which are referred to here, which are at best very vague?

Mr. DAVIES. I think he will.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think we will have no question as to what to ask him for? Do you see any impropriety, sir, in the committee requesting that you make the approach, since you obviously know specifically what it is, and attempt to get us an answer from General Smith? Would it be improper for you to do so?

Mr. DAVIES. I should be glad to do so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Could we make that a request of the committee, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. Very well.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you will get us an official refusal, or if it can be submitted to the committee, or to the chairman thereof, under whatever restrictions may be necessary?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. I can envisage the possibility that it might be something that would not be for the eyes or knowledge of the staff, perhaps, but I find it hard to envision the possibility that anything can be so top secret that, for instance, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee may not be permitted to see it under proper classification.

Mr. DAVIES. I shall transmit this request to my superiors, who in turn will——

Mr. SOURWINE. Through what channels or what manner you deem appropriate under the circumstances, but with the end of getting the committee a definitive answer on it.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The chairman asks me to say that I should make it clear on the record that I meant Senator McCarran, but I would like to state also for the record that I have just as great difficulty in imagining a refusal for the present chairman of this hearing as in the case of the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator McCarran.

Senator SMITH. There might be some difference there.

Mr. SOURWINE. The record shows that the request is first on behalf of the committee, with a request that if they want to narrow that, they narrow it as far as they think necessary down to the point of an absolute refusal, which we hope will not result.

Now, sir, do you know whether any of these six people, that is, Prof. Benjamin Schwartz, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Prof. John Fairbank and his wife, Mrs. Fairbank, were ever hired as a result of this recommendation which you made?

Mr. DAVIES. Insofar as I know, none of them were hired.

Mr. SOURWINE. As a matter of fact, you know that they were not hired, don't you, Mr. Davies?

Mr. DAVIES. I cannot answer categorically on this, because if they were hired, it would have been by another agency, but so far as I know, they certainly were not hired.

Mr. SOURWINE. You have seen and talked with Professor Fairbank since the date of this recommendation, have you not?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you know that he wasn't hired?

Mr. DAVIES. I know that he wasn't—within my knowledge he was not hired.

Senator SMITH. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SOURWINE. When you were using the word "hire," were you using it solely in the connotation of employment as an employee for compensation?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, now, let me repeat the question:

Do you know whether any of these six persons were ever utilized by the agency to which you made the recommendations, along the lines of the recommendations you made?

Mr. DAVIES. I have no knowledge, but my belief and all of the information that I have points to the fact that none of them were used for this purpose.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, as a matter of fact, you have seen, as you testified, Mr. Fairbank, since the recommendation was made?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do know, do you not, that Mr. Fairbank was not and has not been utilized in accordance with your recommendation?

Mr. DAVIES. So far as my information goes, he was not.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you have never discussed the matter with him at all?

Mr. DAVIES. I could not discuss a clandestine operation with him.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not necessarily as such; but I mean, as between good friends, you know pretty well what he is doing?

Mr. DAVIES. I know what he is doing. His time is taken up. In fact, he is now in Japan or on his way to Japan.

Mr. SOURWINE. If he had been utilized in the way which you recommended, you would have had opportunity to have learned of it, in his case, at least?

Mr. DAVIES. I probably would have.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you tell us, sir, since the project did not go forward and the people were not utilized in accordance with the recommendations, why it still remains a top secret?

Mr. DAVIES. Because the authorities who are in charge of this operation consider it in that category.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, in order to secure permission to testify with regard to this subject, testify beyond the point where you have felt you must stop, would you have to go outside of your own agency?

Mr. DAVIES. I think I would, because this operation is not under the State Department. This operation is under CIA, which is another agency.

Mr. SOURWINE. You would then have to get permission from General Smith?

Mr. DAVIES. Precisely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would it be improper for you, at the committee's request, to seek permission from General Smith to give the committee testimony with regard to that recommendation in executive session, and subject to such classification as might be imposed?

Mr. DAVIES. I certainly can make that request.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would you be willing to do so?

Mr. DAVIES. I would be glad to.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the record show that as a request of the committee?

Senator SMITH. Yes. The record will so show.

Mr. SOURWINE. And you will report back to the committee what the answer is or the ruling is?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

The two things you want are—let me summarize: One is the authorization under which I decline to reveal this information; and secondly, a request for authorization for me to reveal the further details?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. DAVIES. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am almost through, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask whether, in connection with your recommendation of these six people, Mr. Davies, you thought it necessary to make any spot check or then current check with regard to security?

Mr. DAVIES. On all operations involving personnel, I consider it necessary to have a security check.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say you do feel it necessary?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you make such a check with regard to any of these six people?

Mr. DAVIES. No, because that was not in my purview to make the check.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean you recommended them, subject to security check?

Mr. DAVIES. This again goes into the nature of the operation.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is a question you cannot answer?

Mr. DAVIES. That is a question I cannot answer.

Mr. SOURWINE. I think on that point we have reached an impasse, an amicable impasse, Mr. Chairman, and I have no further questions of this witness at this time.

Senator SMITH. Very well. Thank you very much, for your testimony, Mr. Davies.

The committee is recessed subject to call.

(Whereupon, at 2:45 p. m., the committee was recessed subject to call.)

Mr. MORRIS. I also have here, Mr. Chairman, a memorandum dated June 19, prepared by me for the chairman of this committee, explaining that I have been to the office of Carlyle Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and examined the penciled notes which Alger Hiss made during the Yalta Conference. As I indicate in this memorandum, the notes do indicate that Hiss was active at the Conference and had an active role in the Conference, but that there is no direct IPR association in the notes. There is one reference, however, to the fact that a memorandum was handled by or prepared by Hiss urging President Roosevelt to take up with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin the question of unity between the Kuomintang and the Communists. We have not been able to verify whether the note was prepared by the Secretary of State himself or by Mr. Hiss. It is among the Hiss notes. It has a notation by Charles E. Bohlen which indicated that the point had been taken up with Premier Stalin. I think it describes it "with satisfactory results."

Senator WATKINS. That memo may be received as part of the record.

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1398" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1398

MEMORANDUM

JUNE 19, 1952.

To: Senator McCarran.
From: J. G. Sourwine and R. Morris.

Mr. Morris spent three afternoons in the office of Carlisle Humelsine, Undersecretary of State, examining pencil notes of Alger Hiss made at Yalta. On the third occasion, he was accompanied by Mr. Sourwine, and together we reviewed the folder containing the Hiss notes. After Mr. Morris left on this third occasion, Mr. Sourwine stayed on with the expectation of conversing with Mr. C. E. Bohlen, but spoke instead with Mr. Humelsine.

The Hiss notes do not directly concern the Institute of Pacific Relations, but they are very interesting and significant in a collateral way.

On the very first page, Hiss made a diagram of the seating arrangement at Yalta. The seating was around a round table, at which was seated 19 persons. On Mr. Roosevelt's left was C. E. B. (obviously standing for Bohlen). On his right was E. R. S. (obviously standing for Stettinius). On Stettinius' right was Leahy, and on his left was Byrnes and Harriman. Behind the President were Hopkins, Matthews, and Hiss. Maisky was on Stalin's left, and on his right were Molotov and Vyshinsky, and Gromyko, in that order. On the upper right-hand page there was a notation headed "tonight, Harriman, Page, and A. H. with Gromkyo and who else." Hiss' handwritten notes indicated that E. R. S. had suggested the words "and the dismemberment" (referring to Germany) be added to article XII of the Articles of Surrender. Molotov apparently had a proposal of his own which he withdrew after Stettinius' suggestion. On this same page, in what was apparently the first day of the session, Hiss made the following note: "Intermission—Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L. P. (Pasvolsky?) the change in the third paragraph of our proposal. I straightened him out on the text but he was still not satisfied that the effect of the reference to Roman numeral VIII was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great difficulty explaining its effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier for the R's if we could drop the whole reference and ask if Pres. would agree to that. I said I thought so." Later in the notes after the Roman numeral VIII there is the following notation, "Prisoners of War." ST (obviously Stalin) suggests mention of prisoners of war should be deleted. It was explained that this should be among the conferees and that they could take a decision and it would not be necessary to publish it. Molotov is reported as having said that it would come up in meeting of the Foreign Ministers. There was nothing else on the notes that would link up a reference made in the intermission note above and this last note other than the identity of Roman numerals.

On February 8th Hiss made a notation that after meeting of Foreign Secretaries, Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss met as a committee to discuss U. N. conference procedures. A. H. (Alger Hiss) explains State Department views, but said Pres. had not approved. After lunch before plenary session E. R. S. cleared all with Pres. and A. H. told Gromyko and sent word to Jebb.

There was one document dated February 10, 1945, on the stationery of the Secretary of State. Subject: Recommendation that the three powers encourage Kuomintang Communists unity in the war effort against Japan. As this is likely to be the final plenary session, I suggest that some time during today's meeting you find occasion to urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full encouragement is given by the governments to Kuomintang Communists unity in the war effort against Japan. The importance of encouraging united Chinese efforts at the moment must be apparent to all three governments.

Alger Hiss had pencilled a note in the corner of the page: "Bohlen says the Pres. has already taken this up with Stalin."

It was in connection with this memorandum that Mr. Sourwine had hoped to see Mr. Bohlen. He wanted to find out whether Hiss had dictated the memo on the letterhead of the Secretary of State. We also wanted to find out from Bohlen what were the circumstances described in Hiss' handwritten note. This could possibly be a corollary factor in the IPR hearings. Mr. Bohlen subsequently told Mr. Sourwine he did not remember seeing this memorandum, but did remember telling either Secretary Stettinius or Mr. Hiss that the President had taken this matter up with Stalin. There is another activity of Hiss' indi-

cated in the remainder of the notes. Six pages of notes taken by Mr. Morris are in the subcommittee file.

Appended with this memorandum are copies of all the correspondence between the Chairman and the State Department on this matter.

FEBRUARY 21, 1952.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: A witness before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, testified yesterday that, in the course of her official duties at the Department of State, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Alger Hiss taken at Yalta which were available to her in her work of postwar planning.

Dr. Fluegel was an employee of the Department from 1942 to 1948.

On the basis of this testimony, the Internal Security Subcommittee agreed that these handwritten notes of Alger Hiss should be made available in the original, or photostatic duplicate, to the committee.

Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

MAY 1, 1952.

The SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On February 21, 1952, I wrote to you asking that the handwritten notes of Alger Hiss taken at the Yalta Conference in 1945 be made available to the Internal Security Subcommittee.

In my letter of February 21, it was pointed out that a witness before the subcommittee, Dr. Edna Fluegel, an employee of the State Department from 1942 to 1948, testified that, in the course of her official duties in the Department, she dealt with and handled the penciled notes of Mr. Hiss.

This letter is written to determine what action has been taken on my request of February 21, 1952, to you.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

May 22, 1952.

Hon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Under date of May 14, 1952, over the signature of Mr. David Bruce, the Under Secretary of State, your Department made reply to my letter of February 21, 1952. In view of the length of time (nearly 3 months) that my letter was apparently under study in the Department, I must conclude the Department's reply was carefully considered, and represents firm policy; and, therefore, I must assume that you participated in the decision which this letter reflects, and concur therewith.

The Department's letter of May 14, 1952, was as follows:

"This is in reply to your letter of February 21, 1952, in which you request the penciled notes which Alger Hiss made at the Crimea Conference. These papers contain informal notes of the internal discussions of the members of the American delegation to that conference. They also contain informal notes of the discussions at the international meetings held during the conference at which Mr. Hiss was present.

"It has been the consistent policy of the Department not to permit the release of papers of this type. If release were to be permitted, each person participating in the discussion of an American delegation in the future would feel called upon to take similar notes. The discussion would tend to be for the record rather than the full and frank exchange of views which is essential if a considered position is to be developed. By the same token, if the informal notes of the international meetings were released, persons now active in public life in friendly governments would have just cause to feel aggrieved. The position of the United States in future diplomatic discussions might well be prejudiced.

"For the above reasons, the request to make these notes available must be respectfully declined."

That letter is a rather remarkable document. It will bear some discussion.

At the outset, let me say frankly it had not been expected the Department would refuse to make the Hiss notes available to the Internal Security Subcommittee; though consideration had been given to the possibility that the Department might report that no such notes were in its possession. I am therefore grateful for the confirmation, contained in the first paragraph of the Department's letter, of the fact that these papers are in the possession of the State Department.

The State Department's answer that "it has been the consistent policy of the Department not to permit the release of papers of this type" is not an honest statement of fact. Informal notes, and in fact full transcripts of conferences, have been released in the past. The Wake Island Conference is only one example in a long series. Furthermore, Sherwood's book, the Forrestal diaries, Byrnes' book Speaking Frankly, and Stettinius' book, all gave what purported to be intimate conversations and descriptions of informal statements made at the Yalta Conference. There should be nothing about Alger Hiss' notes which would make them sacrosanct; nor should there be anything about the conversations of the persons mentioned in his notes, even "persons now active in public life in friendly governments," which would entitle those conversations to protection in a situation where no protection was given to the conversations of such persons as General MacArthur at Wake Island, and all those at Yalta who are mentioned in the Byrnes, Sherwood, and Stettinius books and the Forrestal diaries.

Incidentally, speaking of "persons now active in public life in friendly governments", Mr. Churchill has written extensively on his meetings with many Americans, and on many occasions has been quite candid. To mention a case more in point, the "inside" story of Klaus Fuchs is now being syndicated. Would your Department object to disclosure of any notes Fuchs may have made?

Alger Hiss was not just another State Department functionary. He is a man who has been found by a jury to have been guilty of acts which brand him as a traitor of his country. What he did in the State Department were not the acts of an ordinary man. The notes he took and the influence he bore on the shaping of our policy at the Yalta Conference should be known and exposed at this time. Certainly, the contents of the Hiss notes are a proper subject of inquiry by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

There is an implication in the Department's letter that to release those notes would give notice to all persons in the State Department that any notes they might take would be subject to release in the future. Perhaps there may have been such an implication in the release of other notes and recollections of various meetings; but in the particular case of the Hiss notes there is only implied notice that *if* the taker of notes subsequently is proven to be a traitor to his country his notes may be subject to examination by a Senate committee.

Alger Hiss was in a position where he could have placed many persons in key positions in our Government. We should know what his notes show about those with whom he dealt, those upon whom he relied, and those who assisted him; and we should check up on what they are doing now. By nature, training, and doctrine, Communists attract other Communists and put them in positions of influence.

The position of the United States in future diplomatic discussions, about which the Department's letter expresses concern, would be much more hampered by the continued presence of persons Alger Hiss may have put into important positions than it would be by any revelation of what Hiss wrote in his notes. It is an ironical standard that every single secret that the United States Government possessed, according to testimony before our subcommittee, was available to Alger Hiss in his position as Director of Postwar Planning; yet the notes which Hiss wrote at Yalta are being withheld not only from the people of the United States but even from the United States Senate.

I noted particularly that the Department's letter made no mention whatever of security in connection with the Hiss notes. I assume this was not because the Department thought the matter of security unworthy of consideration, or failed to consider it, but rather because no valid question of security, under the circumstances, could exist.

Though this letter has been written, as I have indicated, in the light of the assumption that the Department's answer under date of May 14 and over the signature of Mr. David Bruce, the Under Secretary of State, represented a considered decision in which you had participated and with which you concur,

yet I want to ask if there is any possibility that you wish to modify or amend that reply in any way. It is hard and painful to believe that your attitude with regard to Alger Hiss extends so far as to embrace a determination to protect his notes not only against public exposure but even against examination by a duly constituted committee of the United States Senate. I earnestly hope you will tell me there is still further word to come from the Department on this matter. I await your reply.

Sincerely,

PAT MCCARRAN, *Chairman.*

June 3, 1952.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In accordance with your request, I have reviewed the correspondence between you and Mr. Bruce regarding the notes which Mr. Alger Hiss took at the Yalta Conference. The concern of the Department which Mr. Bruce was stressing was that reports made by an employee of the Department stating views expressed or positions taken by representatives of other governments should not be made public by the Department. The Department has, of course, no power to control writings by former officers or employees or former representatives of other governments.

Neither the Department nor I have any concern in withholding the notes for any other reason. Since you believe that these notes may have information bearing on Mr. Hiss or his activities, I would be perfectly willing to have a representative of the committee examine the notes in the Department. If, as a result of this examination, the committee feels that it requires any portion of these notes for its work, the Department will be prepared to discuss the question further.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have some specimens of the "pumpkin papers," and some of them concern a handwritten memorandum of Harry Dexter White which was turned up in our hearings. These come from Senator Richard Nixon, a Senator from California, and they were turned over to the committee with a covering letter from Senator Nixon dated June 7, 1952. May they, with the covering letter, go into the record at this time?

Senator WATKINS. They may be received and made a part of the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1399" and are as follow:)

EXHIBIT No. 1399

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
June 7, 1952.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: At the request of Mr. Robert Morris, counsel for the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I have forwarded to you under separate cover the following documents:

1. Documents identified as K–1, K–2, K–3, and copy of a memo from Harold J. E. Gessell regarding the handwriting of Harry D. White. These documents came from my files.

2. Documents identified as Q–1, Q–2, Q–3, and Q–4. These documents were obtained by me from the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

March 2, 1949.
EI/HJEG : ml.
#1829.

Director, Inspection-Investigation Service.
Chief, Identification & Detection Division.
Examination of handwriting of Harry D. White (Committee on Un-American Activities).

1. On February 21, 1949, Investigator Owens, of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the U. S. House of Representatives, personally and informally submitted three photostatic copies of documents purporting to bear the known writings of one Harry D. White, which are identified as follows:

K–1 Photostatic copy of letter dated June 11, 1934, addressed to "Dr. Jacob Viner, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C." and signed "Harry D. White".

K–2 Photostatic copy of Personal History Statement (Standard Form No. 6), which purports to be the Personal History Statement of Harry Dexter White, understood to bear certain writings made by Harry Dexter White.

K–3 Photostatic copy of final portion of Personal History Statement (Standard Form No. 6), purporting to bear the known writings of Harry D. White.

Investigator Owens also submitted eight pages (photostatic copies) of questioned writing herein identified as Q–1 through Q–8.

2. It was requested that an examination and comparison be conducted of the purported known writings of Harry D. White (identified as K–1, K–2, and K–3) with the questioned writings (identified as Q–1 through Q–8), to determine whether Harry D. White is the author of the questioned writing. It was also requested that the documents as submitted be photographed, and that several copies of each document be attached to the report.

3. A careful examination and comparison was conducted regarding the aforementioned writings and as a result of such a study, it is concluded that the person responsible for the writings appearing on K–1, K–2, and K–3, purporting to be the known writings of Harry D. White, also is responsible for all of the writing appearing on Q–1 through Q–8. In other words, Harry D. White is the author of the questioned writings purporting to be notes involving State Department activities.

4. The above conclusion is subject to verification upon examination of the original documents.

5. Photostatic copies of the documents as submitted, together with three photographic copies of each document, are attached.

Harold J. E. Gesell.

Atts.



LAWRENCE COLLEGE
APPLETON, WISCONSIN

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

June 14, 1934.

Dr. Jacob Viner,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Professor Viner:

The nomination stated in your letter is quite satisfactory and I shall report at Washington on June 20th. I am looking forward with interest to the summer's work.

Sincerely yours
Harry D. White



PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Department or Establishment Treasury Date Nov 2, 1944

1. Name (in full) (Mr., Miss, or Mrs.) White Harry Dexter

2. Present address [illegible]

3. Legal residence (home address) [illegible]

4. Place and date of birth [illegible] Boston, Mass. Oct 9, 1892

5. If foreign born, when and where did you become a citizen of the United States?

6. Husband's name (if married woman, give maiden name also) [illegible]

7. Number of wife's dependents (exclusive of wife) [illegible]

8. Name and address of your nearest relative [illegible]

9. Name and address of your next nearest relative [illegible]

10. Education

Name of School	Place (City and State)	Course	Graduate?	Date Attended			Date Degree Received
				From	To		
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

11. Employment

Name and Address of Employer	Position	Salary	Date Appointed			Date Resigned		
			Month	Day	Year	Month	Day	Year
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

12. Relatives employed by the United States Government or the District of Columbia Government

Name	Relationship	Department or Office	Position
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

13. Do you now hold any State, political or other office? If so, state which.

14. Are you a citizen of a foreign country? If so, name country.

15. Are you the son or daughter of a person who died in the military or naval service?

16. Military and naval service. If any, state (a) which branch and other information, and give dates of call, induction and discharge

Enlisted Appt. as 2nd Lt. F.A.R.C. Commd. Dec. 1917

Rank 2nd Lt. Rank [illegible]

Organization 2nd Lt. F.A.R.C. Organization [illegible]

Drafted [illegible] Discharged [illegible]

Rank [illegible] Rank [illegible]

Organization [illegible] Organization [illegible]

No

K 2













becoming Premier.

Reynaud believed the solution of French ~~[illegible]~~ economic situation is ~~[illegible]~~ to permit a ~~[illegible]~~ strong dive in the franc. Abort [illegible] trend against that would include [illegible] Blum claims he doesn't want to [illegible] [illegible] has heard that Reynaud is trying to get Eng. & U.S. to support the franc. (not the slightest chance) The prospects of national depreciation of [illegible] very strong.

I have heard nothing as to Capt. Ingersoll's [illegible] and my earlier explanation. As to the Germany concerned he is supposed to [illegible] in case of another incident with Japan. In that event he would serve as secret liaison man between Eng. & U.S. entrusted only as to the nature of our mission. Mr. Chamberlain turned us down at the time of the Munich incident when we wished him to [illegible] with us in placing exchange restrictions against Japanese operations in case we decided to do so, but another Munich incident may bring them around.

Q 3 State Dept was eager to accept Hungarian debt offer & told idea to Sec. M. & President. But Congress doesn't want to begin debt negotiations with Germany


The Van Zeeland report was not
taken seriously here.
Q 3

(via Cochran)

Re Japan of the issue. Nat'l. Bank [illegible] that the Japanese have recently put out a feeler to some of his banks for a low loan for industrial development in Manchukuo. However, his bankers had not sufficient interest in such a proposition even to submit it to the National Bank for consideration and presumably approval.

Schacht impressed me [illegible] as finding some hope in the New Zealand report on a Council for a period of years between Germany and U.K. British and the U.S. trade.

Schacht said he positively did not know what had taken place at the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg.


65 big ships
4 little ships

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have one other affidavit here, and that is an affidavit by Igor Bogolepov, who has been a witness before this committee. I would like this added to the list of affidavits previously introduced.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The affidavit referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1400" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT 1400

THE AIMS AND METHODS OF SOVIET POLICIES IN THE FAR EAST IN 1937–44

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

The theory which guided the Soviet Far East policy more than actual balance of powers was Lenin's theory of colonial Asia as a reserve of the world proletarian revolution. In Stalin's time this theory was completed by recognition of the fact of the failure of the worker movement in the west to become a vehicle for Communist domination; now the poor and bewildered masses of the Orient had to play the role of cannon fodder for communism, and, contrary to Marx, the pace of the world revolution had to take an east-west direction, instead of a west-east direction. Out of this came the change in the Communist tactics and slogans from the internationalistic proletarian line to nationalistic popular line.

I have to repeat once more and with full responsibility that although strange to the western mind, this theoretical set-up, and not merely political realities, commanded the mind of Soviet leaders and their actions.

II. POLICIES TOWARD JAPAN

One can say that in case of Japan the Soviet policies were less internationalistic in form—that is, communistic—and more customary than anywhere in the relations of the Soviet Union with other foreign countries; it must be emphasized, however, that generally speaking the mentality of the members of the Politburo and their actions were motivated by interest of the international Communist movement and Communist world revolution rather than by any Russian national interest, the latter always being sacrificed for the first.

Since the rise of nazism and the beginning of Japanese aggression on the Asiatic mainland Stalin's main preoccupation consisted in avoiding a war on two fronts; as we know here he succeeded fully and wholly. This line of policy required a lot of appeasement in the case of Japan. Therefore, the Comintern was actually "put on ice" in the case of Soviet relations with Japan. The Soviet policy toward that country was channeled through the Foreign Office (NKID) and not through the Comintern, as it was in the case of China. Being frightened by Japanese menace, the Soviet leaders required always from the Foreign Office staff to carry out such kind of policy which will not induce the Japanese to believe we are carrying out Communist subversive tactics. We were ordered to be extremely careful and polite to the Japanese. The idea was to make the Japanese believe that the U. S. S. R. intended to entertain with them relations as usually existing between nations, that Comintern and Communist tactics were not to be applied by the U. S. S. R. in its relations with Japan. Previously to my own participation in the negotiations with the Japanese on the oil concessions on Sakhalin and fisheries around Kamchatka, I had to read the directives and then had to sign them as proof I had read them. Of course, all this does not preclude the efforts of Soviet military and naval intelligence to penetrate Japan (mostly with the assistance of Koreans and Chinese as well as the White Russian emigrants). Yet more important in China proper the Soviet Union met military aggression of Japan with methods of propaganda, Communist subversive activities, and so forth, that's along the usual Communist lines of conducting the struggle.

The second aim of the Soviet policy toward Japan besides the tactics of appeasement, of avoiding much friction directly between the U. S. S. R. and Japan, was indeed the aim of diverting the Japanese aggression from the northwest to the southwest (from the Soviet angle of view). In this respect the Soviet Foreign Office was instructed to let the Japanese think that the U. S. S. R. would not

oppose any Japanese move against (*a*) British, Dutch, and other European colonies in China and Indonesia, (*b*) China proper.

I remember having read in the secret files of Litvinov's office the same instructions to the newly appointed Ambassador Malik in 1938. At the same time the Japanese were told that every attempt to move in the general direction of the Soviet sphere, including Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, would "create serious consequences."

In accordance with this double line of ideas, the Chinese Communist forces were transferred in 1931 from the south China to Yenan and adjoining areas. It was tantamount to an invitation for the Japanese to attack China proper as well as a warning against any aggressive steps toward the Siberian border. We had in our files the text of declaration to that effect made by Karakhan to the Japanese Government.

Only after long hesitation and arguing inside the Politburo the Soviet Union decided to take a risk of an open clash with the Japanese on the Siberian border in order to show that Soviet leaders meant business. Everything was at stake to defeat the Japanese military reconnoissance in strength directly on the Siberian border (1938) and in the steppes of Mongolia (1938–39). In the Khalkin-Gol operation Marshal Zhukov first proved his military talent, and the invading force was circled and annihilated with the help of then secret task force of the famous tanks T–34. The risk was worth while to undertake. The strength of the Soviet Far East defense impressed the Japanese greatly. The reports of the Soviet ambassadors in Great Britain and Japan, as I remember, told that this was the turning point in the Japanese policy. Then they decided positively to take the Pacific and Indonesia direction instead of Siberia-Mongolia. As Litvinov told me in 1939 that here was the great success of Soviet policy and one of the main premises of the failure of the coming German onslaught.

It is quite obvious that the Soviets were vehemently opposed to any attempt by the Japanese to approach the United States or vice versa. They were interested only in an open clash in the Pacific, for this would be the surest guaranty for them on their Far East frontier. I can only wonder myself at the thinking of some people—that is why the Soviet Union did not release to the United States Government information of the coming attack on Pearl Harbor. As General Vlassov, one of the defenders of Moscow, told me later that Pearl Harbor rescued Moscow in December 1941.

WASHINGTON,
District of Columbia, ss:

I have prepared the within statement, and I represent that the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and are predicated on the basis of my experience within the Soviet organization.

IGOR BOGOLEPOV.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June 1952.

[SEAL] CHAS. E. ALDEN.
Notary Public, District of Columbia.

My commission expires August 18, 1952.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have something here?

Mr. MANDEL. I have two quotations from a volume entitled "The United Front" by George Dimitrov, pages 52 and 193, which I would like to introduce into the record.

Senator WATKINS. They may be received.

(The quotations referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1401" and are as follows:)

"Comrades, you remember the ancient tale of the capture of Troy. Troy was inaccessible to the armies attacking her, thanks to her impregnable walls. And the attacking army, after suffering many sacrifices, was unable to achieve victory until, with the aid of the famous Trojan horse, it managed to penetrate to the very heart of the enemy's camp."

(The United Front, by Georgi Dimitrov, general secretary, Communist International, International Publishers, 1938, p. 52).

"The efforts of the Communist Party, directed toward ending the civil war in the country and establishing collaboration with the Kuomintang and all other political groupings and armed forces of China in the organization of resistance to the Japanese marauders, have the sympathy, endorsement, and support of the friends of the Chinese people throughout the world." (ibid, p. 193).

Mr. MANDEL. I have here excerpts from the testimony of Lee Pressman before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on August 28, 1950, which I would like to introduce in the record, including several pages.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The excerpts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1402" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1402

HEARINGS REGARDING COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT—PART 2

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C., Monday, August 28, 1950.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:50 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood, Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison, John McSweeney, Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case, and Harold H. Velde.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell, and Courtney Owens, investigators; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will be in order.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call at this time Mr. Lee Pressman.

Mr. WOOD. Let us have order, please.

Mr. Pressman, will you hold up your right hand, please. You swear that the evidence you will give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. PRESSMAN. I do.

Mr. WOOD. Have a seat, please.

TESTIMONY OF LEE PRESSMAN

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name?

Mr. PRESSMAN. My name is Lee Pressman.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Pressman, the record of proceedings of this committee shows that you appeared before it on August 20, 1948, and at that time you refused, on constitutional grounds, to answer certain questions relating to your alleged affiliation with the Communist Party.

The Committee on Un-American Activities has learned through the public press that when you recently resigned from the American Labor Party you issued a statement to the effect that you were doing so because of the Communist control of that organization. The committee has consistently endeavored to give an opportunity to witnesses who have appeared before it to repudiate their Communist affiliations or associations. A full disclosure of your knowledge of Communist Party activities would perform a great public service, especially at this time, when acts of military aggression are being committed by the forces of international communism. It would also be evidence that the break with your alleged Communist association has been full and complete, and that your action was taken in good faith.

The committee will not be satisfied with a mere perfunctory repudiation of the Communist Party, nor, it is suggested, will the American public. The committee desires to know if you are willing to cooperate with it in its effort

to expose Communist activities by answering such questions as will be propounded to you with regard to Communist activities during the course of this hearing?

Mr. PRESSMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask at this time for the opportunity of making a brief statement to the committee.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Pressman, you will be accorded the privilege of making whatever statement you desire, but you have just been asked a direct question, and we would like to have a direct answer to that question.

Mr. PRESSMAN. May I suggest the question was rather lengthy.

Mr. WOOD. The latter part was direct.

Mr. PRESSMAN. I believe my statement, which will be very brief, will answer the question, as well as indicate precisely what my position will be before the committee today.

Mr. WOOD. Then will you be prepared to answer questions asked you?

Mr. PRESSMAN. That is correct.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

Mr. PRESSMAN. I understand, Mr. Chairman, there is a desire that I further clarify the position which I took in my recent letter resigning from the American Labor Party. This I desire to do, as well as take this opportunity to expose many distortions which have been circulated regarding my past activities. There has been considerable speculation regarding my past activities. I propose at this moment to set forth a few very simple facts.

In the early 1930's, Mr. Chairman, as you may well recall, as well as other members of this committee, there was a very severe depression in our country. The future looked black for my generation just emerging from school. At the same time, the growing specter of nazism in Germany presented to my mind an equally grave threat.

In my desire to see the destruction of Hitlerism and an improvement in economic conditions here at home, I joined a Communist group in Washington, D. C., about 1934. My participation in such group extended for about a year, to the best of my recollection. I recall that about the latter part of 1935—the precise date I cannot recall, but it is a matter of public record—I left the Government service and left Washington to reenter the private practice of law in New York City. And at that time I discontinued any further participation in the group from that date until the present.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I state the following at this time:

There were three other persons in that group in addition to myself. They were all at the time with me in the Department of Agriculture. They have all been named before this committee by others.

I state to you that I am prepared, as I will indicate, to answer any and all questions regarding my activities in the past up to the present, and possibly project my viewpoint into the future. It would be offensive to me, as it would be to practically all people, to have to name individuals with whom I have associated in the past.

What I have stated to you would indicate that I offer no additional information that this committee does not already have. However, that is a decision which this committee will have to make in propounding its questions to me and the directives you issue to me.

Bear in mind, sir, there may be others like myself who, out of deep convictions, will change their beliefs. If this committee assumes the position that those who do change their convictions and beliefs, as I have, must also be compelled to take what I submit would be an offensive—offensive to one's own personal self—position, that might well be discouraging to other people to do what I have done. But, I repeat, that is a decision which this committee will have to make.

Now, I believe it is of interest to comment that I have no knowledge regarding the political beliefs or affiliations of Alger Hiss. And when I say I have no knowledge, I am not endeavoring to quibble with this committee. I appear here, as I necessarily must, as a lawyer. I am a lawyer. When one asks me for knowledge, knowledge to my mind is based on fact, and I have no facts. And bear in mind, sir, that as an attorney, to be asked to comment on a case now pending in court is a very unusual experience for an attorney, because anything I say undoubtedly may have an impact one way or another on that case, and for that reason I am trying to be very, very precise. I do know, I can state as a matter of knowledge, that for the period of my participation in that group,

which is the only basis on which I can say I have knowledge, Alger Hiss was not a member of the group.

Now, those two statements of mine are based on knowledge, which embraces facts within my possession. I do not believe that this committee would want me to hazard conjectural surmise. That is not my function. You want from me, I assume, facts and nothing but facts.

Now, there has been a great deal of wild speculation, a great deal of unfortunate distortion, regarding my name as it arose in the course of previous testimony before this committee by a man named Chambers.

When I left the city of Washington I advised the group—and I believe on that occasion Mr. Peters may have been present—that I was leaving the city of Washington, leaving the Federal Government, and I was disassociating myself from the group, or the Communist Party, or any group of the Communist Party.

Mr. Wood. Were all members of the group present when you made that assertion?

Mr. Pressman. That is correct.

Mr. Tavenner. Did you assign any reason for doing so?

Mr. Pressman. I think the most precise way I can put it is to say, as I have stated before, that I wanted to leave the Federal Government, that I was going back to the city of New York and that I preferred from that moment on, at least, in my private practice, not to have organizational relationship with the Communist Party, such as being a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Tavenner. That did not mean that you had severed all connection with the Communist Party, did it?

Mr. Pressman. At that time?

Mr. Tavenner. Yes.

Mr. Pressman. At that time it did not.

Mr. Tavenner. Tell the committee about your subsequent connection with the Communist Party.

Mr. Pressman. Over the past number of years I have had contacts and dealings with known leaders of the Communist Party whom I have met from time to time.

Mr. Tavenner. And what was the nature of those contacts which you have mentioned?

Mr. Pressman. They would discuss with me their viewpoints, their recommendations, and suggestions, with respect to organizational activities of the CIO while I was counsel for the CIO. I discussed those problems with these people. When they made recommendations or suggestions which I deemed to be of assistance or helpful to the CIO, I accepted them.

I state here now, as categorically as I can, that at no time from 1936 until 1948 did I take instructions or directives from anyone, including these leaders of the Communist Party, which were contrary to the established policy of the CIO. The only persons who gave me instructions or directives while I was with the CIO were the official officers of the CIO. And here now I challenge anyone to point to a single act or utterance of mine while I was with the CIO, Mr. Chairman, which was contrary to the established policy of the CIO.

Mr. Case. But you did receive instructions during the period you were a member of the Communist Party and in the Department of Agriculture?

Mr. Pressman. I would say I do not recall instructions as such, Mr. Congressman, because in the kind of work I was then doing there was nothing I could be instructed about.

Mr. Nixon. Mr. Pressman, can I go back a moment to your break with the party. You said you wanted no organizational relationship with the party?

Mr. Pressman. In the sense of considering myself a member completely committed to all the policies and doctrines of the Communist Party.

Mr. Nixon. Was your break in 1935 an ideological break with the party?

Mr. Mandel. The next is a letter of transmittal from the Library of Congress with the material sent to us on June 16, 1952, covering the contributors to the Far Eastern Survey of Pacific Affairs.

Senator Watkins. It may be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1403" and are as follows:)

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington 25, D. C., June 16, 1952.

Hon. PAT MCCARRAN,
Chairman, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: We are transmitting to you the study on the contributors to the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, which we have compiled for the subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

W. C. GILBERT, *Acting Director.*

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1	Hallet Abend	FES																								
		PA																								
2	Herbert K. Abrahms	FES																								
		PA																								
3	Edward Ackerman	FES																								
		PA																								
4	Romanzo Adams	FES																								
		PA															2	1							2	1
5	B. P. Adarkar	FES																								
		PA																								
6	Richard Adloff	FES																								
		PA																								
7	Mohammed Afzal	FES																								
		PA																								
8	John Ahlers	FES																								
		PA																								
9	Willis T. G. Airey	FES																								
		PA																								
10	Roy Akagi	FES																								
		PA	23	1									23	1												
11	Takdir Alisjahbana	FES																								
		PA																								
12	Fred Alexander	FES																								
		PA																								
13	Dorothy W. Allan	FES																								
		PA																								
14	Edward Weber Allen	FES																								
		PA																	16	1					16	1
15	G. C. Allen	FES																								
		PA																								
16	James S. Allen	FES																								
		PA																	26	2	4	2			30	4
17	John M. Allison	FES																								
		PA																								
18	Carl Alsberg	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1					1½	1					1½	1
19	Karl L. Anderson	FES									5	1	5	1												
		PA																								
20	J. R. Andrus	FES																								
		PA																								
21	Masahara Anesaki	FES																								
		PA									3	1	3	1												
22	Sir Norman Angell	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1	Hallet Abend	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA																												
2	Herbert K. Abrahms	FES													3½	1											3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
3	Edward Aekerman	FES													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
4	Romanzo Adams	FES																											2	1
		PA																												
5	B. P. Adarkar	FES																					2	1			2	1	2	1
		PA																												
6	Richard Adloff	FES															1½	1	2	1	4½	2					8	4	8	4
		PA																												
7	Mohammed Afzal	FES																							1	1	1	1	1	1
		PA																												
8	John Ahlers	FES									5	1	5	1															5	1
		PA													10	1											10	1	10	1
9	Willis T. G. Airey	FES															5	1									5	1	5	1
		PA									10½	1	10½	1			4½	1					2½	1			7	2	17½	3
10	Roy Akagi	FES																											23	1
		PA																												
11	Takdir Alisjahbana	FES																			4	1					4	1	4	1
		PA																					2½	1			2½	1	2½	1
12	Fred Alexander	FES															2½	1									2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
13	Dorothy W. Allan	FES																							1	1	1	1	1	1
		PA																												
14	Edward Weber Allen	FES																											16	1
		PA																												
15	G. C. Allen	FES															4	2	1½	1							5½	3	5½	3
		PA																												
16	James S. Allen	FES																											30	4
		PA																												
17	John M. Allison	FES																							1	1	1	1	1	1
		PA																												
18	Carl Alsberg	FES																											3	2
		PA																											5	1
19	Karl L. Anderson	FES																												
		PA																												
20	J. R. Andrus	FES																							2	1	2	1	2	1
		PA							3	1			3	1	12	1									1½	1	13½	2	16½	3
21	Masahara Anesaki	FES																											3	1
		PA																												
22	Sir Norman Angell	FES							3	1			3	1															3	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
23	H. F. Angus	FES																								
		PA	3	1			1½	1			9	1	12½	3	9	2					2	1			11	3
24	William N. Angus	FES																								
		PA																								
25	"Anonymous"	FES																								
		PA																								
26	Vera Anstey	FES																								
		PA																								
27	E. H. Anstice	FES																								
		PA	5	1	6	1	7	1					18	3												
28	John Apostol	FES																								
		PA																								
29	Salvador Araneta	FES																								
		PA																								
30	Capt. Jack Arbolino	FES																								
		PA																								
31	Gilbert Archey	FES																								
		PA																								
32	Elizabeth H. Armstrong	FES																								
		PA																								
33	Julean Arnold	FES																								
		PA																								
34	F. V. Asbeck	FES																								
		PA																	5	1					5	1
35	Frank Ashton-Gwatkin	FES																								
		PA																								
36	"Asiaticus"	FES																								
		PA													12	1	13	1	16½	2					41½	4
37	Ungku A. Aziz	FES																								
		PA																								
38	Carl Bache	FES																								
		PA																								
39	Paul S. Bachman	FES																								
		PA	1½	2	6	3	7½	5			1	1	16	11												
40	H. W. Baernsprung	FES																								
		PA																								
41	K. H. Bailey	FES																								
		PA	2	1									2	1												
42	Sydney Bailey	FES																								
		PA																								
43	H. F Bain	FES																								
		PA																								
44	John Earl Baker	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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23	H. F. Angus	FES																												
		PA									2	1	2	1	9½	3											9½	3	26	10
24	William N. Augus	FES													2	1											2	1	2	1
		PA																												
25	"Anonymous"	FES			3½	1							3½	1													3½	1	3½	1
		PA							10	1	9	1	19	2															19	2
26	Vera Anstey	FES																												
		PA															1½	1			2½	1	4	1			8	3	8	3
27	E. H. Anstice	FES																												
		PA																											18	3
28	John Apostol	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
29	Salvador Araneta	FES																												
		PA																	5	1							5	1	5	1
30	Capt. Jack Arbolino	FES															½	1									½	1	½	1
		PA																												
31	Gilbert Archey	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
32	Elizabeth H. Armstrong	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
33	Julean Arnold	FES									2½	1	2½	1															2½	1
		PA																												
34	F. V. Asbeck	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
35	Frank Ashton-Gwatkin	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
36	"Asiaticus"	FES																												
		PA	15	1									15	1															56½	5
37	Ungku A. Aziz	FES																							1½	1	1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
38	Carl Bache	FES									½	1	½	1	½	1											½	1	1	2
		PA																												
39	Paul S. Bachman	FES																												
		PA																											16	11
40	H. W. Baernsprung	FES																												
		PA	1	1									1	1															1	1
41	K. H. Bailey	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
42	Sydney Bailey	FES									1½	1	1½	1	4	2			4½	1							8½	3	10	4
		PA																												
43	H. F. Bain	FES													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
		PA															2	1									2	1	2	1
44	John Earl Baker	FES			2	1							2	1															2	1
		PA																												

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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45	Nathan M. Baker	FES																			6½	1			6½	1
		PA																								
46	Etienne Balazs	FES																								
		PA																								
47	W. MacMahon Ball	FES																								
		PA																								
48	Joseph Ballantine	FES																								
		PA																								
49	William Ballis	FES																								
		PA																								
50	Alvin Barber	FES									4½	1	4½	1							30	11	4½	1	34½	12
		PA																								
51	Joseph Barber	FES																								
		PA																								
52	George W. Barclay	FES																								
		PA																								
52	Carleton P. Barnes	FES									1	1	1	1												
		PA									1½	1	1½	1												
54	Joseph Barnes	FES													11½	2									11½	2
		PA					5	2	11	7	½	1	16½	10			2½	1							2½	1
55	Kathleen Barnes	FES									19	8	19	8	32½	20	24½	13	21½	14	20½	12	13½	7	112½	66
		PA							12	2	2½	1	14½	3			2	1	½	1			1	1	3½	3
56	Patricia Barnett	FES																								
		PA																								
57	Eugene Barnett	FES																								
		PA															2	1							2	1
58	Robert W. Barnett	FES																			2½	2	17½	6	20	8
		PA																								
59	Sir William Barton	FES																								
		PA																								
60	M. S. Bates	FES																								
		PA			15	1							15	1												
61	P. T. Bauer	FES																								
		PA																								
62	J. G. Beaglehole	FES																								
		PA													2	1									2	1
63	Ernest Beaglehole	FES																								
		PA																								
64	Edwin G. Beal, Jr.	FES																								
		PA																								
65	Richard K. Beardsley	FES																								
		PA																								
66	I. de Beauclair	FES																								
		PA																					3	1	3	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
45	Nathan M. Baker	FES																											6½	1
		PA																												
46	Etienne Balazs	FES																												
		PA															1½	1					5	1			6½	2	6½	2
47	W. MacMahon Ball	FES							4	1			4	1															4	1
		PA																	18	2	1½	1			19½	3	39	6	39	6
48	Joseph Ballantine	FES																	2	1			1	1	3	1	6	3	6	3
		PA																												
49	William Ballis	FES																												
		PA	6	1									6	1															6	1
50	Alvin Barber	FES																											40	12
		PA																												
51	Joseph Barber	FES																			½	1							½	1
		PA																			1½	1					1½	1	1½	1
52	Geroge W. Barclay	FES																												
		PA																					9	1			9	1	9	1
53	Carleton P. Barnes	FES																											1	1
		PA																											1	1
54	Joseph Barnes	FES	3	1									3	1	½	1											½	1	15	4
		PA	4½	1					½	1			5	2															24	13
55	Kathleen Barnes	FES	½	1									½	1															132	75
		PA																											18	6
56	Patricia Barnett	FES			1½	1							1½	1															1½	1
		PA																												
57	Eugene Barnett	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
58	Robert W. Barnett	FES	10½	5	7	2							17½	7							1½	1					1½	1	39	16
		PA	2	1	2	1							4	2															4	2
59	Sir William Barton	FES																												
		PA							9	1			9	1															9	1
60	M. S. Bates	FES			3½	1							3½	1																
		PA					2	1	2½	2			4½	3	15	1											15	1	34½	5
61	P. T. Bauer	FES																												
		PA															10	1			2	1					12	2	12	2
62	J. G. Beaglehole	FES																												
		PA													12½	3	1	1			1½	1					15	5	17	6
63	Ernest Beaglehole	FES																												
		PA															2	1	15	1	½	1					17½	3	17½	3
64	Edwin G. Beal, Jr.	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
65	Richard K. Beardsley	FES																												
		PA																							2½	1	2½	1	2½	1
66	I. de Beauclair	FES																												
		PA																											3	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
67	K. M. Beaumont	FES																								
		PA																								
68	L. Beck	FES																								
		PA																								
69	Eric Beecroft	FES																								
		PA																								
70	Konrad Bekker	FES																								
		PA																								
71	Sir Charles Bell	FES																								
		PA															13	1							13	1
72	Reginald Bell	FES																								
		PA															½	1							½	1
73	Minnie Belle	FES																								
		PA																								
74	Cyril Belshaw	FES																								
		PA																								
75	Horace Belshaw	FES																								
		PA									5				9	4			2½	1					13	5
76	James P. Belshaw	FES																								
		PA																								
77	Conrado Benitez	FES																								
		PA										1	5	1												
78	Marjorie Bennett	FES																								
		PA																								
79	M. K. Bennett	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1			1½	1
80	Martin T. Bennett	FES																								
		PA																								
81	Wilfred Benson	FES																								
		PA																								
82	Robert H. Berkhov	FES																								
		PA																								
83	Harro Bernardelli	FES																								
		PA																								
84	Harry Bernstein	FES																								
		PA																								
85	Joel V. Berreman	FES																								
		PA																								
86	James Bertram	FES																								
		PA																			2	1			2	1
87	J. van Beusekom	FES																								
		PA																								
88	Windham H. Bewes	FES																								
		PA													1½	1									1½	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
67	K. M. Beaumont	FES									½	1	14½	2																
		PA					14	1																					14½	2
68	L. Beck	FES													1	1											1	1	1	1
		PA																												
69	Eric Beecroft	FES																												
		PA			2	1							2	1															2	1
70	Konrad Bekker	FES																					1	1			1	1	1	1
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
71	Sir Charles Bell	FES																												
		PA																											13	1
72	Reginald Bell	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
73	Minnie Belle	FES					3½	2	1½	1			5	3															5	3
		PA																												
74	Cyril Belshaw	FES																	3	1							3	1	3	1
		PA															6	1	½	1							6½	2	6½	2
75	Horace Belshaw	FES							1½	1	4	1	5½	2	4½	1	3½	1									8	2	13½	4
		PA							23½	2	4	2	27½	4	3	2	10	1	3	1							16	4	55	8
76	James P. Belshaw	FES									4	1	4	1															4	1
		PA																												
77	Conrado Benitez	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
78	Marjorie Bennett	FES																					3	1			3	1	3	1
		PA																												
79	M. K. Bennett	FES			2½	1							2½	1															2½	1
		PA																											1½	1
80	Martin T. Bennett	FES													5	1											5	1	5	1
		PA																	10	1							10	1	10	1
81	Wilfred Benson	FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
		PA					8	1	9	1			17	2															17	2
82	Robert H. Berkhov	FES															4	1									4	1	4	1
		PA																												
83	Harro Bernardelli	FES																												
		PA																							1	1	1	1	1	1
84	Harry Bernstein	FES			4	1	1	1					5	2															5	2
		PA																												
85	Joel V. Berreman	FES																												
		PA							13	1			13	1															13	1
86	James Bertram	FES																												
		PA																	2	1							2	1	4	2
87	J. van Beusekom	FES					½	1					½	1															½	1
		PA			4	2							4	2															4	2
88	Windham H. Bewes	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
89	V. M. Bhott	FES																								
		PA																								
90	Charles Bidien	FES																								
		PA																								
91	Knight Biggerstaff	FES																								
		PA																								
92	Woodbridge Bingham	FES																								
		PA																								
93	Carl Whiting Bishop	FES																								
		PA							31	2			31	2	2	1					2½	1	3	1	5	2
94	T. A. Bisson	FES																								
		PA			28	3							28	3							9	1	2½	2	11½	3
95	Charles S. Blaekton	FES																								
		PA																								
96	R. J. Blakeley	FES																								
		PA																								
97	George H. Blakeslee	FES																								
		PA																								
98	Kurt Bloch	FES																	50	17	32	18	38	17	120	52
		PA																			15½	5	24	1	39½	6
99	F. Beelaerts Van Blokland	FES																								
		PA															2	1							2	1
100	Derk Bodde	FES																								
		PA																								
101	J. H. Boeke	FES																								
		PA							15	3	1½	3	16½	6	14	1									14	1
102	William F. Boericke	FES																								
		PA																								
103	Blair Bolles	FES																								
		PA																								
104	Elizabeth Boody	FES															5½	1							5½	1
		PA																								
105	H. Th. deBooy	FES																								
		PA									16	1	16	1			7	1							7	1
106	Dorothy Borg	FES																	1	1	3½	4	7	6	11½	11
		PA																								
107	Victorino Borja	FES																								
		PA																	½	1					½	1
108	W. D. Borrie	FES																								
		PA																								
109	Hugh Borton	FES																								
		PA													3	1			1½	1	1½	1			6	3
110	G. H. Bousquet	FES																								
		PA																			5	1			5	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
89	V. M. Bhott	FES															4	1									4	1	4	1
		PA																												
90	Charles Bidien	FES									3½	1	3½	1															3½	1
		PA																												
91	Knight Biggerstaff	FES																					4	1			4	1	4	1
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
92	Woodbridge Bingham	FES																			3½	1					3½	1	3½	1
		PA	1	1									1	1															1	1
93	Carl Whiting Bishop	FES																												
		PA																											38½	5
94	T. A. Bisson	FES					9½	3	5	3	8	3	22½	9			6½	1									6½	1	29	10
		PA					12	2	34	5	24½	4	70½	11					2	2	2	1					4	3	114	20
95	Charles S. Blakton	FES																							4½	2	4½	2	4½	2
		PA																												
96	R. J. Blakeley	FES													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
97	George H. Blakeslee	FES																												
		PA	5½	1									5½	1															5½	1
98	Kurt Bloch	FES	43½	24	18½	9							62	33															182	85
		PA	14	1									14	1															53½	7
99	F. Beelaerts Van Blokland.	FES																											2	1
		PA																												
100	Derk Bodde	FES													11	3			1	1	4½	1	2	1			18½	6	18½	6
		PA													1½	1	7	1									8½	2	8½	2
101	J. H. Boeke	FES																												
		PA													8	1	1	1									9	2	39½	9
102	William F. Boericke	FES									4	1	4	1	2½	1	2½	1	3	1							8	3	11	4
		PA																												
103	Blair Bolles	FES																					3½	1			3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
104	Elizabeth Boody	FES																											5½	1
		PA																												
105	H. Th. deBooy	FES																												
		PA																											23	2
106	Dorothy Borg	FES	5	5	2½	1	3	2					10½	8			3½	1	3½	1	11½	2	½	1	½	1	19½	6	41½	25
		PA							1	1			1	1											1	1	1	1	2	2
107	Victorino Borja	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
108	W. D. Borrie	FES																												
		PA															13	2	2	1					1	1	16	4	16	4
109	Hugh Borton	FES																					½	1			½	1	½	1
		PA																											6	3
110	G. H. Pousquet	FES																												
		PA																											5	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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111	Isaiah Bowman	FES																								
		PA																								
112	Robert G. Bowman	FES																								
		PA																								
113	R. J. F. Boyer	FES																								
		PA																								
114	Alex L. Ter Braake	FES																								
		PA																								
115	Anita Bradley	FES																								
		PA																					2½	1	2½	1
116	Alexander Brady	FES																								
		PA																								
117	Robert A. Brady	FES																								
		PA																								
118	Ralph J. D. Braibanti	FES																								
		PA																								
119	Jean-Yves Le Branchu	FES																								
		PA															11	1	1½	1					12½	2
120	Willem Brand	FES																								
		PA																								
121	William Brandt	FES																								
		PA																					41	1	41	1
122	Herbert Bratter	FES																								
		PA	17	1	35	2							52	3												
123	J. B. Brebner	FES									3	1	3	1												
		PA																								
124	John Brent	FES																								
		PA													3½	2									3½	2
125	Hilda A. Bretholtz-Austern	FES																					1	1	1	1
		PA																								
126	A British Observer	FES																								
		PA																	23	2					23	2
127	Roswell S. Britton	FES																								
		PA							12	1			12	1												
128	J. B. Brigden	FES																								
		PA																								
129	Alan Houghton Brodrick	FES																								
		PA																								
130	Bernard Brodie	FES																								
		PA																								
131	Fawn M. Brodie	FES																								
		PA																								
132	Jan O. M. Broek	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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111	Isaiah Bowman	FES																												
		PA	½	1									½	1															½	1
112	Robert G. Bowman	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
113	R. J. F. Boyer	FES																												
		PA							9	1			9	1															9	1
114	Alex L. Ter Braake	FES																												
		PA									½	1	½	1															½	1
115	Anita Bradley	FES																												
		PA	10	1									10	1															12½	2
116	Alexander Brady	FES					½	1					½	1															½	1
		PA									1½	1	1½	1					1	1							1	1	2½	2
117	Robert A. Brady	FES																												
		PA	13½	1									13½	1															13½	1
118	Ralph J. D. Braibanti	FES															3	1	4	1	5½	1					12½	3	12½	3
		PA																												
119	Jean-Yves Le Branchu	FES																												
		PA																											12½	2
120	Willem Brand	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA															1	1	1½	2	1	2			1½	1	4½	6	4½	6
121	William Brandt	FES																												
		PA	19	1	17½	2							36½	3															77½	4
122	Herbert Bratter	FES																												
		PA																											52	3
123	J. B. Brebner	FES																											3	1
		PA													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
124	John Brent	FES																												
		PA																												
125	Hilda A. Bretholtz-Austern.	FES																											3½	2
		PA																											1	1
126	A British Observer	FES																												
		PA																											23	2
127	Roswell S. Britton	FES																												
		PA																											12	1
128	J. B. Brigden	FES																												
		PA							5½	2			5½	2															5½	2
129	Alan Houghton Brodrick	FES																												
		PA																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
130	Bernard Brodie	FES																												
		PA			4½	2	1	1			1½	1	7	4															7	4
131	Fawn M. Brodie	FES					2	1					2	1															2	1
		PA																												
132	Jan O. M. Broek	FES	½	1			9	4	3½	1			13	6											2½	1	2½	1	15½	7
		PA	1½	1	½	1	10	1	2	2			14	5	1	1	2	1					½	1			3½	3	17½	8

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
133	D. W. Brogan	FES																								
		PA													3	3									3	3
134	C. Broudgeest	FES																								
		PA																								
135	Delmer M. Brown	FES																								
		PA																								
136	Harrison Brown	FES																								
		PA																			½	1			½	1
137	W. Norman Brown	FES																								
		PA																								
138	Esther Caukin Brunauer	FES									2	1	2	1												
		PA																								
139	Edmund DeS. Brunner	FES																								
		PA																								
140	E. H. Bryan, Jr	FES																								
		PA																								
141	Pearl S. Buck	FES																								
		PA	5	1									5	1												
142	Raymond Leslie Buell	FES																								
		PA																	1½	1					1½	1
143	Triston Buesst	FES																								
		PA			13	1							13	1												
144	Arthur C. Bunce	FES																								
		PA																								
145	H. B	FES																								
		PA																								
146	J. Stewart Burgess	FES																								
		PA																								
147	James Burke	FES																								
		PA																								
148	Ardath Walter Burks	FES																								
		PA																								
149	Patricia G. Burnett	FES																					2	1	2	1
		PA																								
150	Lawrence J. Burpee	FES																								
		PA																			4½	2			4½	2
151	William Burton	FES																								
		PA																								
152	John O. Burtt	FES																								
		PA																								
153	Herbert Burton	FES																								
		PA	2	1									2	1												
154	Chilton Bush	FES																								
		PA																	2	1					2	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
133	D. W. Brogan	FES																												
		PA																												
134	C. Brondgeest	FES					½	1					½	1															3	3
		PA																											½	1
135	Delmer M. Brown	FES																			3½	2					3½	2	3½	2
		PA																												
136	Harrison Brown	FES																												
		PA																												
137	W. Norman Brown	FES													4	1											4	1	½	1
		PA															1	1									1	1	4	1
138	Esther Caukin Brunauer	FES																											1	1
		PA																											2	1
139	Edmund DeS. Brunner	FES																												
		PA									½	1	½	1															½	1
140	E. H. Bryan, Jr	FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
		PA																												
141	Pearl S. Buck	FES					½	1					½	1															½	1
		PA																												
142	Raymond Leslie Buell	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
143	Triston Buesst	FES																											13	1
		PA							7	2			7	2															7	2
144	Arthur C. Bunce	FES																												
		PA																												
145	H. B.	FES	1	1									1	1															1	1
		PA																												
146	J. Stewart Burgess	FES									2	1	2	1					½	1							½	1	2½	2
		PA																												
147	James Burke	FES																	2	1							2	1	2	1
		PA																												
148	Ardath Walter Burks	FES													2½	1			½	1					½	1	3½	3	3½	3
		PA																												
149	Patricia G. Burnett	FES																											2	1
		PA																												
150	Lawrence J. Burpee	FES																												
		PA																											4½	2
151	William Burton	FES																												
		PA																							1½	1	1½	1	1½	1
152	John O. Burtt	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA																												
153	Herbert Burton	FES																											2	1
		PA																												
154	Chilton Bush	FES																											2	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
155	Claude A. Buss	FES																								
		PA																								
156	Paul Butter	FES																								
		PA																								
157	Charles Buttrose	FES																								
		PA																								
158	Hugh Byas	FES																								
		PA																								
159	Hector C. Bywater	FES																								
		PA									8	1	8	1												
160	W. R. E. B	FES																								
		PA	1	1									1	1												
161	C	FES																								
		PA																								
162	John F. Cady	FES																								
		PA																								
163	George Caiger	FES																								
		PA																								
164	Oliver Caldwell	FES																								
		PA																								
165	Merton Cameron	FES																								
		PA			2	1							2	1												
166	Schuyler Camman	FES																								
		PA																								
167	Persia Campbell	FES																								
		PA							13	1			13	1							2	1			2	1
168	Andrew Canniff-Grajdanzev	FES																								
		PA																	20½	3					20½	3
169	Marian Cannon	FES													5	4									5	4
		PA																								
170	A. Capell	FES																								
		PA																								
171	Evans F. Carlson	FES																								
		PA																			8	2			8	2
172	W. A. Carrothers	FES																								
		PA																								
173	Edward C. Carter	FES																								
		PA																	4	1	1	1			5	2
174	Gwendolen M. Carter	FES																								
		PA																								
175	William D. Carter	FES																								
		PA													1	1									1	1
176	Frank T. Cartwright	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
155	Claude A. Buss	FES													½	1			½	1					6½	1	7½	3	7½	3
		PA													½	1			1½	1							2	2	2	2
156	Paul Butter	FES																												
		PA													1½	1			2	2	1	1					4½	4	4½	4
157	Charles Buttrose	FES							3	1			3½	1															3	1
		PA																												
158	Hugh Byas	FES			½	1							½	1															½	1
		PA																												
159	Hector C. Bywater	FES																												
		PA																											8	1
160	W. R. E. B	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
161	C	FES																												
		PA																					½	1			½	1	½	1
162	John F. Cady	FES													9½	3							6	1	½	1	16	5	16	5
		PA													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
163	George Caiger	FES																												
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
164	Oliver Caldwell	FES			1	1							1	1															1	1
		PA																												
165	Merton Cameron	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
166	Schuyler Camman	FES															½	1									½	1	½	1
		PA																												
167	Persia Campbell	FES							½	1			½	1															½	1
		PA					1½	1					1½	1															16½	3
168	Andrew Canniff-Grajdanzev.	FES																											20½	3
		PA																											5	4
169	Marian Cannon	FES																												
		PA																												
170	A. Capell	FES																												
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
171	Evans F. Carlson	FES	6	1									6	1															6	1
		PA																											8	2
172	W. A. Carrothers	FES																												
		PA					1	1					1	1															1	1
173	Edward C. Carter	FES																												
		PA					4	3	2½	2	3	1	9½	6	½	1											½	1	15	9
174	Gwendolen M. Carter	FES																												
		PA							10½	2			10½	2			1½	1			10	2					11½	3	22	5
175	William D. Carter	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
176	Frank T. Cartwright	FES																			4½	1					4½	1	4½	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
177	Steven Cartwright	FES																								
		PA							5	1			5	1												
178	W. G. Cassers	FES																								
		PA													1	1									1	1
179	Andres V. Castillo	FES																								
		PA																								
180	R. G. Cavell	FES																								
		PA																								
181	Len De Caux	FES																								
		PA																								
182	Joseph P. Chamberlain	FES																								
		PA			½	1							½	1												
183	William H. Chamberlain	FES																								
		PA									4	1	4	1					3	1					3	1
184	Shaw Wing Chan	FES																								
		PA																								
185	T. W. Chan	FES																								
		PA																					4	1	4	1
186	Kiron Chandra	FES																								
		PA																								
187	Chang Chih-chung	FES																								
		PA																								
188	C. M. Chang	FES																								
		PA																								
189	S. T. Chang	FES																								
		PA							8	4			8	4												
190	Chang Chih-Yi	FES																								
		PA																								
191	S. Chandrasekhar	FES																								
		PA																								
192	C. F. Chang	FES																								
		PA															7	1							7	1
193	N. K. Chang	FES																								
		PA																								
194	P. C. Chang	FES																								
		PA					10	1					10	1												
195	Su-Lee Chang	FES																								
		PA			7	1							7	1												
196	Abraham Chapman	FES																								
		PA																								
197	Royal N. Chapman	FES																								
		PA							1	1			1	1												
198	Wilbert McLeod Chapman	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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177	Steven Cartwright	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
178	W. G. Cassers	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
179	Andres V. Castillo	FES																												
		PA																	12	1							12	1	12	1
180	R. G. Cavell	FES																												
		PA					1	1	2	1			3	2	1	1											1	1	4	3
181	Len De Caux	FES					3	1					3	1															3	1
		PA																												
182	Joseph P. Chamberlain	FES															6	1									6	1	6	1
		PA																											½	1
183	William H. Chamberlain	FES																												
		PA																											7	2
184	Shaw Wing Chan	FES																												
		PA													1	1											1	1	1	1
185	T. W. Chan	FES																												
		PA																	2	1							2	1	6	2
186	Kiron Chandra	FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
		PA																												
187	Chang Chih-chung	FES																												
		PA															7	1									7	1	7	1
188	C. M. Chang	FES																												
		PA																					1	1			1½	1	1½	1
189	S. T. Chang	FES																												
		PA																											8	4
190	Chang Chih-Yi	FES																												
		PA																			18	1					18	1	18	1
191	S. Chandrasekhar	FES							5	1	1½	1	6½	2	2½	1											2½	1	9	3
		PA					10	2					10	2															10	2
192	C. F. Chang	FES																												
		PA																											7	1
193	N. K. Chang	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
194	P. C. Chang	FES																												
		PA																											10	1
195	Su-Lee Chang	FES																												
		PA																											7	1
196	Abraham Chapman	FES													11	3											11	3	11	3
		PA													6	1											6	1	6	1
197	Royal N. Chapman	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
198	Wilbert McLeod Chapman.	FES													2½	1											2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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199	Chatham House Paper (Eng.)	FES																								
		PA																								
200	Su-ching Ch'en	FES																								
		PA																								
201	Han-seng Chen	FES													12½	7	13½	6							26	13
		PA	3	1	10	5	12	5	2½	1			27½	12	16	2	9½	3	3	1	2	1	1½	1	32	8
202	Shou-Yi Chen	FES																								
		PA													4	1									4	1
203	Ch'ao-Ting Chi	FES															11½	5							11½	5
		PA							9	1			9	1												
204	Tuan-sheng Ch'ien	FES																								
		PA																								
205	Ai-Li S. Chin	FES																								
		PA																								
206	Rockwood Q. P. Chin	FES															6½	1							6½	1
		PA																								
207	Small Political Parties of China	FES																								
		PA																								
208	A. Kaiming Chiu	FES																								
		PA					1	1					1	1												
209	S. R. Chow	FES																								
		PA																								
210	John L. Christian	FES																								
		PA																					19	1	19	1
211	Coching Chu	FES																								
		PA									11	1	11	1												
212	Ching-Lai Chu	FES																								
		PA	15	1									15	1												
213	Arthur C. Churchill	FES																								
		PA																								
214	Andrew H. Clark	FES																								
		PA																								
215	Colin Clarke	FES																								
		PA																			2	1			2	1
216	Elizabeth Allerton Clark	FES																								
		PA																								
217	Walter Clark	FES																								
		PA																								
218	J. R. Clementin	FES																								
		PA																								
219	Harlan Cleveland	FES																								
		PA																								
220	Edwin Clough	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1			1½	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number o. items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
199	Chatham House Paper (Eng.).	FES																												
		PA																												
200	Su-ching Ch'en	FES													15	1											15	1	15	1
		PA																	4	1							4	1	4	1
201	Han-seng Chen	FES													6	1	½	1	3	1							9½	3	35½	16
		PA									4	1	4	1	2	2	2	2			2	2	2	1			8	7	71½	28
202	Shou-Yi Chen	FES																											4	1
		PA																											11½	5
203	Ch'ao-Ting Chi	FES																											9	1
		PA																												
204	Tuan-sheng Ch'ien	FES																												
		PA					20	1					20	1					13	1							13	1	33	2
205	Ai-Li S. Chin	FES									2	1	2	1							½	1					½	1	2½	2
		PA																											6½	1
206	Rockwood Q. P. Chin	FES					14	1					14	1															14	1
		PA							6	1			6	1															6	1
207	Small Political Parties of China.	FES																											1	1
		PA					1	1					1	1															1	1
208	A. Kaiming Chiu	FES																											8	3
		PA					4½	1	3½	2			8	3															7½	2
209	S. R. Chow	FES											7½	2															49	6
		PA											30	5																
210	John L. Christian	FES	2	1	5½	1																							11	1
		PA	16½	4	13½	1																								
211	Coching Chu	FES																											15	1
		PA																											3	1
212	Ching-Lai Chu	FES																												
		PA																												
213	Arthur C. Churchill	FES																												
		PA									3	1	3	1															3	2
214	Andrew H. Clark	FES																											2	1
		PA									1½	1	1½	1											1½	1	1½	1		
215	Colin Clarke	FES																											2	1
		PA																												
216	Elizabeth Allerton Clark	FES																											2	1
		PA			2	1							2	1																
217	Walter Clark	FES					½	1					½	1															½	1
		PA																												
218	J. R. Clementin	FES																												
		PA																												
219	Harlan Cleveland	FES																					17	1			17	1	17	1
		PA																			5½	1					5½	1	5½	1
220	Edwin Clough	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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221	Paul H. Clyde	FES																								
		PA																								
222	Tui Co, M. D	FES																								
		PA																								
223	N. E. Coad	FES																								
		PA			8	1							8	1												
224	John Coast	FES																								
		PA																								
225	J. Coatman	FES																								
		PA									8	1	8	1												
226	Jerome B. Cohen	FES																								
		PA																								
227	Nathaniel Cohen	FES																								
		PA																								
228	Theodore Cohen	FES																					1	1	1	1
		PA																								
229	Allan B. Cole	FES																								
		PA																								
230	Kenneth Colegrove	FES																					3½	1	3½	1
		PA																								
231	Maurice Collis	FES																								
		PA																								
232	C. J. Colombos	FES																								
		PA									½	1	½	1												
233	A. S. Comyus-Carr	FES																								
		PA																								
234	Alzada Comstock	FES																	½	1					½	1
		PA																								
235	Melvin A. Conant, Jr	FES																								
		PA																								
236	David Conde	FES																								
		PA																								
237	J. B. Condliffe	FES													1½	1					1½	2			3	3
		PA																								
238	George Condominas	FES																								
		PA																								
239	Violet Conolly	FES																								
		PA																								
240	Elizabeth Converse	FES																								
		PA																								
241	Harry Conover	FES													1½	1					2	1			3½	2
		PA																								
242	Renato Constantino	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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221	Paul H. Clyde	FES																			3½	1	1½	1			4	1	4	1
		PA																					2	1			2	1	2	1
222	Tui Co, M. D.	FES			½	1	½	1					1	2															1	2
		PA																												
223	N. E. Coad	FES																												
		PA																											8	1
224	John Coast	FES																												
		PA																							8	1	8	1	8	1
225	J. Coatman	FES																												
		PA																											8	1
226	Jerome B. Cohen	FES													9½	1			5½	1	9½	2					24½	4	24½	4
		PA																	16	1							16	1	16	1
227	Nathaniel Cohen	FES													2½	1											2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
228	Theodore Cohen	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
229	Allan B. Cole	FES													2	1											2	1	2	1
		PA					21	1					21	1															21	1
230	Kenneth Colegrove	FES																												
		PA																											3½	1
231	Maurice Collis	FES																												
		PA															1	1			½	1					1½	2	1½	2
232	C. J. Colombos	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
233	A. S. Comyns-Carr	FES																			5½	1					5½	1	5½	1
		PA																												
234	Alzada Comstock	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
235	Melvin A. Conant, Jr.	FES																			1	1			5	1	6	2	6	2
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
236	David Conde	FES															4½	1									4½	1	4½	1
		PA																												
237	J. B. Condliffe	FES																			2½	1					2½	1	2½	1
		PA	3½	2			3½	2	1	1	1	1	9	6	3½	1					2½	2					6	3	9	6
238	George Condominas	FES																												
		PA																							8	2	8	2	8	2
239	Violet Conolly	FES																												
		PA																			1½	1			½	1	2	2	2	2
240	Elizabeth Converse	FES																			14	5	½	1	6½	1	21	6	21	6
		PA																												
241	Harry Conover	FES																												
		PA																											3½	2
242	Renato Constantino	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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243	Harold J. Coolidge	FES																								
		PA																								
244	Elizabeth W. Cope	FES																								
		PA																								
245	D. B. Copland	FES																								
		PA																								
246	Charles H. Corbett	FES																								
		PA																								
247	Percy Corbett	FES																								
		PA																								
248	Duvon C. Corbitt	FES																								
		PA																								
249	Richard J. Coughlin	FES																								
		PA																								
250	John W. Coulter	FES																								
		PA	1	1	8	2							9	3												
251	Reginald Coupland	FES																								
		PA																								
252	Donald Cowie	FES																								
		PA																	7	1	6	1			13	2
253	Spencer Coxe	FES																								
		PA																								
254	John G. Crowford	FES																								
		PA																			2	1	1½	1	3½	2
255	A. Creech Jones	FES																								
		PA																								
256	Herrlee Glessner Creel	FES																								
		PA									8	1	8	1												
257	George B. Cresey	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1			1½	1
258	W. R. Crocker	FES																								
		PA																								
259	E. H. G. Crosby	FES																								
		PA																								
260	Sir Josiah Crosby	FES																								
		PA																								
262	Robert M. Cullum	FES																								
		PA																								
263	Margaret S. Culver	FES																								
		PA																								
264	Kenneth B. Cumberland	FES																								
		PA																								
265	George Cunningham	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
243	Harold J. Coolidge	FES													4	1			1	1							5	2	5	2
		PA																												
244	Elizabeth W. Cope	FES																	2½	1							2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
245	D. B. Copland	FES																												
		PA																	9	1							9	1	9	1
246	Charles H. Corbett	FES					4½	1	3½	1			8	2															8	2
		PA																												
247	Percy Corbett	FES													1	1											1	1	1	1
		PA	1	1	4½	2	1½	1	½	1			7½	5															7½	5
248	Duvon C. Corbitt	FES							2½	1			2½	1															2½	1
		PA																												
249	Richard J. Coughlin	FES																					4½	1			4½	1	4½	1
		PA																												
250	John W. Coulter	FES																												
		PA																											9	3
251	Reginald Coupland	FES																												
		PA							12	1			12	1															12	1
252	Donald Cowie	FES																												
		PA																											13	2
253	Spencer Coxe	FES																			4	1					4	1	4	1
		PA																												
254	John G. Crowford	FES																												
		PA																											3½	2
255	A. Creech Jones	FES							1	1			1	1															1	1
		PA							5	1			5	1															5	1
256	Herrlee Glessner Creel	FES																												
		PA																											8	1
257	George B. Cresey	FES																												
		PA			1½	1			1	1			2½	2											2	1	2	1	2	1
258	W. R. Crocker	FES																											4	3
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
259	E. H. G. Crosby	FES																												
		PA																							½	1	½	1	½	1
260	Sir Josiah Crosby	FES																												
		PA													7	1											7	1	7	1
262	Robert M. Cullum	FES																	4	1							4	1	4	1
		PA																												
263	Margaret S. Culver	FES									4	1	4	1															4	1
		PA																												
264	Kenneth B. Cumberland	FES																												
		PA													1	1							1	1			2	2	2	2
265	George Cunningham	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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266	Jean A. Curran, Jr	FES																								
		PA																								
267	S. J. C	FES																								
		PA									1	1	1	1					2	1					2	1
268	"J. B. C."	FES																								
		PA	2	1					2½	1			4½	2												
269	F. W. Dalley	FES																								
		PA																								
270	Howard Daniel	FES																								
		PA																								
271	M. L. Dantwala	FES																								
		PA																								
272	Edward M. David	FES																								
		PA																								
273	Madeline David	FES																								
		PA																								
274	J. W. Davidson	FES																								
		PA																								
275	C. Collins Davies	FES																								
		PA																								
276	C. H. Davies	FES																								
		PA																			5	1			5	1
277	Harold C. Davis	FES																								
		PA																								
278	Joseph S. Davis	FES																								
		PA																								
279	Kingsley Davis	FES																								
		PA																								
280	C. C. Dawson	FES																								
		PA																								
281	Edgar Packard Dean	FES																								
		PA																					6	1	6	1
282	Vera Micheles Dean	FES																								
		PA																								
283	J. W. Decker	FES																								
		PA																								
284	John De Francis	FES																								
		PA																								
285	Jane Degras	FES																								
		PA																								
286	John C. De Korne	FES																								
		PA							9	1			9	1												
287	Paschal M. D'Elia, S. J	FES																								
		PA													2½	1									2½	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
266	Jean A. Curran, Jr.	FES																					10	2			10	2	10	2
		PA																												
267	S. J. C.	FES																												
		PA																											3	2
268	"J. B. C."	FES																												
		PA																											4½	2
269	F. W. Dalley	FES																												
		PA																							10	1	10	1	10	1
270	Howard Daniel	FES					4	3	1½	1			5½	4															5½	4
		PA	1	1	4½	3	3	2					8½	6			½	1									½	1	9	7
271	M. L. Dantwala	FES																					4½	1			4½	1	4½	1
		PA																												
272	Edward M. David	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
273	Madeline David	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
274	J. W. Davidson	FES																												
		PA													1½	1			17	2					1½	1	20	4	20	4
275	C. Collins Davies	FES																												
		PA													1	1											1	1	1	1
276	C. H. Davies	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
277	Harold C. Davis	FES																												
		PA			6	1							6	1															6	1
278	Joseph S. Davis	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
279	Kingsley Davis	FES					3	1					3	1							1	1					1	1	4	2
		PA																			11	1							11	1
280	C. C. Dawson	FES					1	1					1	1															1	1
		PA																												
281	Edgar Packard Dean	FES																												
		PA	½	1									½	1															6½	2
282	Vere Micheles Dean	FES																					4½	1			4½	1	4½	1
		PA																					1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
283	J. W. Decker	FES													7	2											7	2	7	2
		PA																												
284	John De Francis	FES																												
		PA															3½	1	½	1							4	2	4	2
285	Jane Degras	FES																												
		PA															2	1							2	2	4	3	4	3
286	John C. De Korne	FES																												
		PA																											9	1
287	Paschal M. D'Elia, S. J.	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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288	P. Demieville	FES																								
		PA																								
289	Raymond Dennett	FES																								
		PA																								
290	Tyler Dennett	FES																								
		PA																								
291	Eleanor Dennison	FES																								
		PA																	5½	1					5½	1
292	R. A. Derrick	FES																								
		PA																								
293	Ki Hadjar Dewantara	FES																								
		PA																								
294	Margaret Dewar	FES																								
		PA																								
295	A. Gordon Dewey	FES																								
		PA																								
296	R. Van Dijk	FES													2	1									2	1
		PA																								
297	Subhas K. Dhar	FES																								
		PA																								
298	Ethel B. Dietrich	FES																								
		PA																	12	2					12	2
299	Maurice Dobb	FES																								
		PA																								
300	E. H. G. Dobby	FES																								
		PA																								
301	Vera Dodds	FES																								
		PA																								
302	Dudley B. Donald	FES																								
		PA																					7	1	7	1
303	Anthony Do Yangly	FES																								
		PA																								
304	J. G. Drabbe	FES																								
		PA																			2	1			2	1
305	C. Dragoni	FES																								
		PA															1	1	½	1					1½	2
306	W. M. Drummond	FES																								
		PA							1½	1			1½	1												
307	Wilbert B. Dubin	FES																								
		PA																								
308	Homer H. Dubs	FES																								
		PA																								
309	Paul S. Dull	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
288	P. Demieville	FES																												
		PA																			3½	1					3½	1	3½	1
289	Raymond Dennett	FES							7½	3	10	3	17½	6	4	1											4	1	21½	7
		PA																												
290	Tyler Dennett	FES									3½	1	3½	1															3½	1
		PA					5	2	12	3	2½	1	19½	6															19½	6
291	Eleanor Dennison	FES																											5½	1
		PA																												
292	R. A. Derrick	FES																			1½	1							1½	1
		PA																												
293	Ki Hadjar Dewantara	FES																												
		PA																					½	1					½	1
294	Margaret Dewar	FES																												
		PA																	½	1									½	1
295	A. Gordon Dewey	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
296	R. Van Dijk	FES																												
		PA													2½	1													2½	1
297	Subhas K. Dhar	FES															½	1											½	1
		PA																												
298	Ethel B. Dietrich	FES																												
		PA																											12	2
299	Mauriee Dobb	FES																												
		PA													2	1	2½	1									4½	2	4½	2
300	E. H. G. Dobby	FES																												
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
301	Vera Dodds	FES																												
		PA	1½	1									1½	1															1½	1
302	Dudley B. Donald	FES																											7	1
		PA																												
303	Anthony Do Yangly	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
304	J. G. Drabbe	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
305	C. Dragoni	FES																												
		PA																											1½	2
306	W. M. Drummond	FES																												
		PA																											1½	2
307	Wilbert B. Dubin	FES																												
		PA																					11	1			11	1	11	1
308	Homer H. Dubs	FES																												
		PA							1½	1			1½	1			2	2											3½	3
309	Paul S. Dull	FES																	2	1							2	1	2	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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310	Foster Rhea Dulles	FES																								
		PA																								
311	J. Kyuang Dunn	FES																								
		PA																								
312	J. Leslie Dunston	FES																								
		PA																								
313	R. Ernest Dupuy	FES																								
		PA																			11	1			11	1
314	Walter A. Durham, Jr.	FES																								
		PA			5	1							5	1												
315	J. J. L. Duyvendak	FES																								
		PA							3½	1	1	1	4½	2			2	1							2	1
316	"E"	FES																								
		PA															½	1							½	1
317	Frances M. Earle	FES																								
		PA																								
318	Ruth Earnshaw	FES																								
		PA															1	1							1	1
319	Paul E. Eaton	FES																								
		PA																								
320	W. Eberhard	FES																								
		PA																								
321	Kermit Eby	FES																								
		PA																								
322	H. Edelman	FES																								
		PA																	1	1					1	1
323	Editors	FES																								
		PA							2½	1			2½	1					3½	1	3½	1			7	2
324	Corwin D. Edwards	FES																								
		PA																								
325	Geertrui Van Eeghen	FES																	1½	1					1½	1
		PA																								
326	Fred Eggan	FES																								
		PA																								
327	F. W. Eggleston	FES																								
		PA									7	1	7	1	6	2									6	2
328	Polly Eggleston	FES																								
		PA																			½	1			½	1
329	Emily L. Ehle	FES																								
		PA																	6½	1	2	1			8½	2
330	Ivan Elchibegoff	FES																								
		PA																								
331	Barnard Ellinger	FES															1	1							1	1
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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310	Foster Rhea Dulles	FES																												
		PA																	½	1			1½	1			2	2	2	2
311	J. Kyuang Dunn	FES							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
		PA																												
312	J. Leslie Dunston	FES															3	1									3	1	3	1
		PA																												
313	R. Ernest Dupuy	FES																											11	1
		PA																												
314	Walter A. Durham, Jr	FES																											5	1
		PA																												
315	J. J. L. Duyvendak	FES																											7½	4
		PA													1	1											1	1		
316	"F"	FES																											1½	1
		PA																												
317	Frances M. Earle	FES																	2	1							2	1	2	1
		PA																												
318	Ruth Earnshaw	FES																											1	1
		PA																												
319	Paul E. Eaton	FES							2½	1			2½	1															2½	1
		PA																												
320	W. Eberhard	FES																												
		PA																							6	2	6	2	6	2
321	Kermit Eby	FES													2	1											2	1	2	1
		PA																												
322	H. Edelman	FES																											1	1
		PA																												
323	Editors	FES					1	1					1	1			1½	1			1	1	2	1			4½	3	5½	4
		PA					2	1					2	1															11½	4
324	Corwin D. Edwards	FES																												
		PA													14	1											14	1	14	1
325	Geertrui Van Eeghen	FES																											1½	1
		PA																												
326	Fred Eggan	FES															½	1									½	1	½	1
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
327	F. W. Eggleston	FES																												
		PA													2½	1			12	1							14½	2	27½	5
328	Polly Eggleston	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
329	Emily L. Enle	FES							2	1			2	1															2	1
		PA																												
330	Ivan Elchibegoff	FES																											8½	2
		PA																												
331	Barnard Ellinger	FES																												
		PA							½	1			½	1															1½	2

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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332	George Fielding Elliot	FES																								
		PA																								
333	Edwin R. Embree	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1												
331	John F. Embree	FES																								
		PA																								
335	Brooks Emeny	FES																								
		PA																	1½	1					1½	1
336	Rupert Emerson	FES															½	1							½	1
		PA							11	1			11	1			2	1							2	1
337	Edgar B. Emery, Lt. Col	FES																								
		PA																								
338	Leonard Engel	FES																								
		PA																								
339	J. F. Engers	FES																								
		PA																								
340	R. C. K. Ensor	FES																								
		PA																	1½	1					1½	1
341	Barbara Entenberg	FES																								
		PA																								
342	I. Epstein	FES																								
		PA																								
343	Jean Escarra	FES																								
		PA																								
344	Willard R. Espy	FES																								
		PA																								
345	Ethel Ewing	FES																								
		PA																								
346	Charles B. Fahs	FES																								
		PA															2	1							2	1
347	John K. Fairbank	FES																								
		PA																					1½	1	1½	1
348	Wilma Fairbank	FES																								
		PA																								
349	Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley	FES																								
		PA																								
350	Fobert A. Falconer	FES																								
		PA					6½	1			3	1	9½	2												
351	Chac ing Fang	FES																								
		PA							2½	2			2½	2												
352	Miriam S. Farley	FES									22½	11	22½	11	48	27	40½	25	22½	18	33½	17	13½	9	158	96
		PA															1½	1							1½	1
353	Victor Farmer	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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332	George Fielding Elliot	FES																												
		PA			2	1							2	1															2	1
333	Edwin R. Embree	FES					1½	1					1½	1															1½	1
		PA					1	1					1	1															2½	2
334	John F. Embree	FES							4	1			4	1	3½	1	½	1	3	2							7	4	11	5
		PA																	2½	2	1½	2					4	4	4	4
335	Brooks Emeny	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
336	Rupert Emerson	FES							1½	1																			2	2
		PA	3	1	1	1	8½	2	1	1			13½	5	2	1	18	2	2	1	1	1	2	2			25	7	51½	14
337	Edgar B. Emery, Lt. Col.	FES													2½	1											2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
338	Leonard Engel	FES			3½	2	1	1					4½	3															4½	3
		PA																												
339	J. F. Engers	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
340	R. C. K. Ensor	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
341	Barbara Entenberg	FES													3½	1											3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
342	I. Epstein	FES													2½	1											2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
343	Jean Escarra	FES																												
		PA													1	1											1	1	1	1
344	Willard R. Espy	FES																							4½	1	4½	1	4½	1
		PA																												
345	Ethel Ewing	FES									2	1	2	1	2	1											2	1	4	2
		PA																												
346	Charles B. Fahs	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
347	John K. Fairbank	FES															6½	2	6	2	3½	1					16	5	16	5
		PA	3	1									3	1							4	1			2½	1	6½	2	11	4
348	Wilma Fairbank	FES																												
		PA																			1½	1					1½	1	1½	1
349	Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley	FES									2½	2	2½	2															2½	2
		PA																												
350	Fobert A. Falconer	FES																												
		PA																											9½	2
351	Chaoying Fang	FES																												
		PA																											2½	2
352	Miriam S. Farley	FES	40½	21	53½	19	13½	14	3	3	5	1	15½	58	1½	1					½	1	13½	2	3½	2	19	6	315	171
		PA					1½	1			2½	1	4	2			10	1					6	1			16	2	21½	5
353	Victor Farmer	FES																												
		PA									1½	1	1½	1															1½	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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354	Theodore S. Farrelly	FES																								
		PA							5	1			5	1												
355	James M. Faulkner	FES																								
		PA																								
356	Federal Council of Churches Executive Committee.	FES																								
		PA																								
357	Hsiao-Tung Fei	FES																								
		PA																								
358	Henry C. Fenn	FES																								
		PA																								
359	Arthur Feraru	FES																								
		PA																								
360	G. V. Ferguson	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
361	H. S. Ferns	FES																								
		PA																								
362	Lewis S. Fever	FES																								
		PA																								
363	Frederick V. Field	FES									16½	3	16½	3	20½	4	1	1							21½	5
		PA					2½	2	1	1	2½	1	6	4	22	1	16	1	3	1	2	1			43	4
364	Olga V. Field	FES																								
		PA																								
365	John E. Fields	FES																								
		PA																								
366	Russell H. Fifield	FES																								
		PA																								
367	Chia-sheng Fing (Feng)	FES																								
		PA																								
368	Lawrence S. Finklestein	FES																								
		PA																								
369	Dallas Finn	FES																								
		PA																								
370	Raymond Firth	FES																								
		PA																								
371	Allan G. B. Fisher	FES																								
		PA																								
372	Galen M. Fisher	FES															5½	1							5½	1
		PA																	15	2	2	1	22	2	39	5
373	George Fisher	FES																								
		PA																								
374	Harold H. Fisher	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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354	Theodore S. Farrelly	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
355	James M. Faulkner	FES															2	1									2	1	2	1
		PA																												
356	Federal Council of Churches Executive Committee.	FES																			1	1					1	1	1	1
		PA																												
357	Hsiao-Tung Fei	FES																												
		PA									2	1	2	1															2	1
358	Henry C. Fenn	FES													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
359	Arthur Feraru	FES																			2	1	3½	2			5½	3	5½	3
		PA																												
360	G. V. Ferguson	FES																												
		PA					2½	1	1	1			3½	2															5½	3
361	H. S. Ferns	FES																												
		PA																							1½	1	1½	1	1½	1
362	Lewis S. Fever	FES													7½	2											7½	2	7½	2
		PA																												
363	Frederick V. Field	FES					7½	1					7½	1															45½	9
		PA			4	2							4	2															53	10
364	Olga V. Field	FES																												
		PA							1	1	1	1	2	2															2	2
365	John E. Fields	FES																	6½	1							6½	1	6½	1
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
366	Russell G. Fifield	FES																					3½	2	11½	2	15	4	15	4
		PA																												
367	Chia-sheng Fing (Feng)	FES																												
		PA			2	2							2	2																
368	Lawrence S. Finklestein	FES																					8	1	10	3	18	4	18	4
		PA																							12	1	12	1	12	1
369	Dallas Finn	FES																							10½	2	10½	2	10½	2
		PA																												
370	Raymond Firth	FES																												
		PA					1	1					1	1	2½	1	2½	1			2	1					7	3	8	4
371	Allan G. B. Fisher	FES																												
		PA							12	3			12	3					1	1	1½	1					2½	2	14½	7
372	Galen M. Fisher	FES			6	1	½	1			4	1	10½	3			2½	1			½	1					3	2	19	5
		PA													1	1	½	1							1	1	2½	3	41½	8
373	George Fisher	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
374	Harold H. Fisher	FES																					7½	1			7½	1	7½	1
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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375	C. P. Fitzgerald	FES																								
		PA																								
376	Peter Fleming	FES																								
		PA																								
377	Robert E. Flersheim	FES																								
		PA																								
378	Richard Flournoy	FES																								
		PA																								
379	Lida Flower	FES																								
		PA			4	1							4	1												
380	Sun Fo	FES																								
		PA																								
381	H. D. Fong	FES																								
		PA																								
382	C. S. Forester	FES																								
		PA																								
383	R. A. D. Forrest	FES																								
		PA																								
384	W. D. Forsyth	FES																								
		PA																								
385	Clarence J. Fox	FES																								
		PA																								
386	F. W. Foxworthy	FES																								
		PA																								
387	Herbert Franke	FES																								
		PA																								
388	Maurice Freedman	FES																								
		PA																								
389	Frances Freedman	FES																								
		PA																								
390	Irving S. Friedman	FES																			11½	5	4½	3	16	8
		PA																			1½	1	13	1	14½	2
391	Carl J. Friedrich	FES																								
		PA																								
392	Gerald M. Friters	FES																								
		PA															24	2							24	2
393	Richard A. Frost	FES																								
		PA																								
394	Grzegorz Frumkin	FES																								
		PA																			2	1			2	1
395	Thomas Penberthy Fry	FES																								
		PA																								
396	Walter Fuchs	FES																								
		PA													8	1									8	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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375	C. F. Fitzgerald	FES																												
		PA																			1½	1	16	2	13	1	30½	4	30½	4
376	Peter Fleming	FES																												
		PA																					1½	1			1½	1	1½	1
377	Robert E. Flersheim	FES													1	1											1	1	1	1
		PA																												
378	Richard Flournoy	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA																												
379	Lida Flower	FES																												
		PA																											4	1
380	Sun Fo	FES							1	1			1	1															1	1
		PA																												
381	H. D. Fong	FES																												
		PA			22	2							22	2															22	2
382	C. S. Forester	FES																												
		PA									2½	1	2½	1															2½	1
383	R. A. D. Forrest	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
384	W. D. Forsyth	FES																			2	1					2	1	2	1
		PA					14	1					14	1					2	1							2	1	16	2
385	Clarence J. Fox	FES															7	2									7	2	7	2
		PA																												
386	F. W. Foxworthy	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
387	Herbert Franke	FES																												
		PA																							1	1	1	1	1	1
388	Maurice Freedman	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
389	Frances Freedman	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
390	Irving S. Friedman	FES																											16	8
		PA			1½	1	2½	1	1	1			5	3															19½	5
391	Carl J. Friedrich	FES									1½	1	1½	1															1½	1
		PA																												
392	Gerald M. Friters	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	25	3
393	Richard A. Frost	FES																												
		PA									24	2	24	2															24	2
394	Grzegorz Frumkin	FES																												
		FA																											2	1
395	Thomas Penberthy Fry	FES																												
		PA													19	1											19	1	19	1
396	Walter Fuchs	FES																												
		PA																											8	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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397	Phillip Fugh	FES																								
		PA					½	1					½	1												
398	Shuji Fujii	FES																								
		PA																								
399	Holden Furber	FES																								
		PA																								
400	J. C. Furnass	FES																								
		PA																								
401	T. J. Furnival	FES																								
		PA																			2½	1			2½	1
402	B. G	FES																								
		PA			5	1							5	1												
403	L. G	FES																								
		PA	22	14									22	14												
404	D. R. Gadgil	FES																								
		PA																								
405	Eugenia Gage	FES																								
		PA																								
406	R. Galletti	FES																								
		PA																			1	1			1	1
407	Charles Gamba	FES																								
		PA																								
408	Sydney Gamble	FES																								
		PA																								
409	Siegfried Garbuny	FES																								
		PA																								
410	Howard C. Gary	FES																								
		PA																								
411	Gussie Esther Gaskill	FES																								
		PA																								
412	Lionel Gelber	FES																								
		PA																								
413	Stuart Gelder	FES																								
		PA																								
414	George Gelman	FES																								
		PA																								
415	W. H. George	FES																								
		PA	2½	1	2	1	1½	1					6	3												
416	Alexander Gerschenkron	FES																								
		PA																								
417	Sudhin H. Ghose	FES																								
		PA																								
418	D. Ghosh	FES																								
		PA																								

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397	Phillip Fugh	FES																												
		PA																												
398	Shuji Fujii	FES																											½	1
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
399	Holden Furber	FES																			4	1					4	1	4	1
		PA																	1	1			1	1	20	1	22	3	22	3
400	J. C. Furnass	FES																			½	1					½	1	½	1
		PA																												
401	T. J. Furnival	FES																			4½	1					4½	1	4½	1
		PA			15	2			1	1	13	1	29	4	2	1	5	2			38	4					45	7	76½	12
402	B. G	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
403	L. G	FES																											22	14
		PA																			3½	1					3½	1	3½	1
404	D. R. Gadgil	FES																			15	1			7	1	22	2	22	2
		PA																												
405	Eugenia Gage	FES																							1	1	1	1	1	1
		PA																												
406	R. Galletti	FES																											1	1
		PA																							2	1	2	1	2	1
407	Charles Gamba	FES																												
		PA													½	1											½	1	½	1
408	Sydney Gamble	FES																												
		PA																	3½	1							3½	1	3½	1
409	Siegfried Garbuny	FES																							3½	1	3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
410	Howard C. Gary	FES																												
		PA																			2	1					2	1	2	1
411	Gussie Esther Gaskill	FES																												
		PA																												
412	Lionel Gelber	FES																												
		PA					½	1					½	1	1	1											1	1	1½	2
413	Stuart Gelder	FES																												
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
414	George Gelman	FES																												
		PA							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
415	W. H. George	FES																												
		PA																											6	3
416	Alexander Gerschenkron	FES																												
		PA	1	1									1	1			2	1									2	1	3	2
417	Sudhin H. Ghose	FES																												
		PA					1½	1					1½	1															1½	1
418	D. Ghosh	FES																												
		PA																	3½	2							3½	2	3½	2

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419	Kathleen Gilbert	FES																								
		PA														2½	1								2½	1
420	Rodney Gilbert	FES																								
		PA									2	1	2	1												
421	Huntington Gilchrist	FES																								
		PA																								
422	Conrade Gini	FES																								
		PA																3½	1						3½	1
423	Leslie Glass	FES																								
		PA																								
424	G. de T. Glazebrook	FES																								
		PA							3	1	2½	2	5½	3	3	1					½	1			3½	2
425	Sidney Glazer	FES																								
		PA																								
426	Patricia Glover	FES																			3½	4	2½	2	6	6
		PA																					1½	1	1½	1
427	Harry G. Glowes	FES																								
		PA																								
428	Toshi Go	FES																								
		PA																			6	1			6	1
429	H. Carl Goldenberg	FES																								
		PA													9	1									9	1
430	Ira Gollodin	FES																								
		PA																								
431	Carter Goodrich	FES																								
		PA																								
432	L. Carrington Goodrich	FES																								
		PA							14	4			14	4	4	2					2	1	1½	1	7½	4
433	Leland M. Goodrich	FES																								
		PA																								
434	J. King Gordon	FES																								
		PA															6½	1							6½	1
435	Margaret S. Gordon	FES																								
		PA																								
436	P. H. Gore-Booth	FES																								
		PA																								
437	B. J. Gould	FES																								
		PA																								
438	Randall Gould	FES																								
		PA																								
439	Pierre Gouron	FES																								
		PA																								
440	Andrew J. Grad	FES																								
		PA																								

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419	Kathleen Gilbert	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
420	Rodney Gilbert	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
421	Huntington Gilchrist	FES																												
		PA	2	1									2	1															2	1
422	Comrade Gini	FES																											3½	1
		PA																												
423	Leslie Glass	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
424	G. de T. Glazebrook	FES																												
		PA																	1½	1							1½	1	10½	5
425	Sidney Glazer	FES																											13	1
		PA	13	1									13	1															6	6
426	Patricia Glover	FES																											1½	1
		PA																			2½	1					2½	1	2½	1
427	Harry G. Glowes	FES																												
		PA																												
428	Tashi Go	FES																											6	1
		PA																											9	1
429	H. Carl Goldenberg	FES																											2	1
		PA													2	1											2	1	2	1
430	Ira Gollodin	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
431	Carter Goodrich	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
432	L. Carrington Goodrich	FES																												
		PA															4	1									4	1	25½	9
433	Leland M. Goodrich	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
434	J. King Gordon	FES																												
		PA																	3	2							3	2	3	2
435	Margaret S. Gordon	FES																											6½	1
		PA																												
436	P. H. Gore-Booth	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
437	B. J. Gould	FES																												
		PA																							½	1	½	1	½	1
438	Randall Gould	FES			4	1							4	1					3½	1	2½	1					6	2	10	3
		PA			1½	1			½	1	1½	1	3½	3											1½	1	1½	1	5	4
439	Pierre Gouron	FES																												
		PA															12	1	12	1			3	1			27	3	27	3
440	Andrew J. Grad	FES																												
		PA																	21	1	½	1					21½	2	21½	2

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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441	Henry F. Grady	FES																								
		PA			2	1	3½	2					5½	3												
442	Gerald S. Graham	FES																								
		PA																								
443	Andrew J. Grajdanzev	FES																			6½	1			6½	1
		PA									18½	2	18½	2									36	6	36	6
444	Lester B. Granger	FES																								
		PA																								
445	John B. Grant	FES																								
		PA																								
446	C. Hartley Grattan	FES																								
		PA																					1½	1	1½	1
447	Mortimer Graves	FES																								
		PA																								
448	F. W. Gray	FES																								
		PA																								
449	Elizabeth Green	FES																								
		PA	182	25	169½	42	160½	45	8	1			520	113												
450	O. M. Green	FES																								
		PA							1½	1	4½	3	6	4	2	2			9	1					11	3
451	Michael Greenberg	FES																								
		PA																								
452	Jerome Greene	FES																								
		PA					3½	1	4	2	1	1	8½	4	3	1									3	1
453	Roger S. Greene	FES																								
		PA																					2½	1	2½	1
454	Gordon Greenwood	FES																								
		PA																								
455	Herbert Gregory	FES																								
		PA	2	2									2	2												
456	Homer E. Gregory	FES																	3½	1					3½	1
		PA																								
457	Austin Grey	FES																								
		PA																								
458	G. E. Grimsdale	FES																								
		PA																								
459	A. Whitney Griswald	FES																								
		PA													2	1									2	1
460	Walter Grunge	FES																			2½	2			2½	2
		PA																								
461	Leon Ma. Guerrero	FES																								
		PA																								
462	S. Haden Guest	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
441	Henry F. Grady	FES																												
		PA																											5½	3
442	Gerald S. Graham	FES																												
		PA																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
443	Andrew J. Grajdanzev	FES	11½	3	10½	2	16	4	9½	3	7½	2	55	14															61½	15
		PA	58	5	38	5	46½	5	19	2	23½	5	185	22	15	1											15	1	254½	31
444	Lester B. Granger	FES									2½	1	2½	1															2½	1
		PA																												
445	John B. Grant	FES																			½	1					½	1	½	1
		PA																												
446	C. Hartley Grattan	FES					1	1	3½	1			4½	2					2½	1							2½	1	7	3
		PA					8½	2					8½	2	1½	1	½	1							4½	2	6½	4	16½	7
447	Mortimer Graves	FES					1	1					1	1	2	1											2	1	3	2
		PA																												
448	F. W. Gray	FES																												
		PA													4	1											4	1	4	1
449	Elizabeth Green	FES																												
		PA																											520	113
450	O. M. Green	FES																												
		PA													1½	1													18½	8
451	Michael Greenberg	FES	3	2									3	2					4	1					2½	1	6½	2	9½	4
		PA	14	3	20½	4	1	1					35½	8	2	1					1½	1					3½	2	39	10
452	Jerome Greene	FES																												
		PA																											11½	5
453	Roger S. Greene	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
454	Gordon Greenwood	FES																												
		PA													1½	1	14	1					16	1			31½	3	31½	3
455	Herbert Gregory	FES																												
		PA																											2	2
456	Homer E. Gregory	FES																											3½	1
		PA																												
457	Austin Grey	FES							4½	2			4½	2															4½	2
		PA																												
458	G. E. Grimsdale	FES																												
		PA																			2	1					2	1	2	1
459	A. Whitney Griswald	FES							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
		PA																											2	1
460	Walter Grunge	FES																											2½	2
		PA																												
461	Leon Ma. Guerrero	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
462	S. Haden Guest	FES															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
463	E. M. Gull	FES																								
		PA															1	1							1	1
464	G. E. H.	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
465	G. L. H.	FES																								
		PA					1½	1					1½	1												
466	H. I. H.	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1												
467	Eleanor M. Hadley	FES																								
		PA																								
468	Red Hager	FES																								
		PA									½	1	½	1												
469	Lord Hailey	FES																								
		PA																								
470	Monroe Hall	FES																								
		PA																								
471	Russell E. Hall	FES															17½	13	13½	6					31	19
		PA															6	1	2	1					8	2
472	T. D. H. Hall	FES																								
		PA	12	2									12	2												
473	James J. Halsema	FES																								
		PA																								
474	Ellen Hammer	FES																								
		PA																								
475	Elizabeth G. Handy	FES																								
		PA																								
476	E. S. C. Handy	FES																								
		PA			39½	13	23½	4			9	1	72	26	1½	1									1½	1
477	Willowdean C. Handy	FES																								
		PA	1	1									1	1												
478	Ellen J. Hammer	FES																								
		PA																								
479	Haldore Hanson	FES																								
		PA													13	1			14	1	1½	1			28½	3
480	Norman D. Hanwell	FES																	34½	14	26	12	6	1	66½	27
		PA															11	1			1½	1			12½	2
481	Tasuku Harada	FES																								
		PA			3	1							3	1												
482	Sheila Harden	FES																								
		PA																								
483	C. H. Haring	FES																								
		PA																								
484	Douglas G. Haring	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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463	E. M. Gull	FES																												
		PA							1	1	½	1	1½	2															2½	3
464	G. E. H	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
465	G. L. H	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
466	H. I. H	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
467	Eleanor M. Hadley	FES																			6	1					6	1	6	1
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
468	Red Hager	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
469	Lord Hailey	FES																												
		PA					1	1					1	1															1	1
470	Monroe Hall	FES													2	1											2	1	2	1
		PA																												
471	Russell E. Hall	FES																											31	19
		PA																											8	2
472	T. D. H. Hall	FEE																												
		PA																											12	2
473	James J. Halsema	FES																			12	2					12	2	12	2
		PA																												
474	Ellen Hammer	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
475	Elizabeth G. Handy	FES					½	1					½	1															½	1
		PA																												
476	E. S. C. Handy	FES																												
		PA																											73½	27
477	Willowdean C. Handy	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
478	Ellen J. Hammer	FES																												
		PA																	12½	2			13	1			25½	3	25½	3
479	Haldore Hanson	FES																												
		PA																											28½	3
480	Norman D. Hanwell	FES																											66½	27
		PA																											12½	
481	Tasuku Harada	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
482	Sheila Harden	FES																												
		PA															½	1			1	1			1	1	2½	3	2½	2
483	C. H. Haring	FES																												
		PA			2	1							2	1															2	1
484	Douglas G. Haring	FES									1½	1	1½	1							½	1					½	1	2	2
		PA																												

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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485	Norman D. Harper	FES																								
		PA																								
486	George H. C. Hart	FES																								
		PA																								
487	L. V. Hart	FES																								
		PA																								
488	Evelyn Harvey	FES																								
		PA																								
489	J. M. D. Haste	FES																								
		PA																								
490	Ernest O. Hauser	FES															15½	11	6	6					21½	17
		PA													4	1	2½	2	1	1	2	1			9½	5
491	Edwin Haward	FES																								
		PA																								
492	Everett D. Hawkins	FES																								
		PA																								
493	H. B. Hawthorn	FES																								
		PA																								
494	R. G. Hawtrey	FES																								
		PA																								
495	John G. Hazam	FES																								
		PA																								
496	John Hazard	FES																								
		PA																	3	1					3	1
497	Stephen Heald	FES																								
		PA	46	2	28	1							74	3												
498	S. Heaslett	FES																								
		PA																								
499	John Heath	FES																								
		PA									½	1	½	1	½	1									½	1
500	Robert Heine-Geldern	FES																								
		PA																								
501	W. H. Van Helsdingen	FES																								
		PA																								
502	Milton Helmick	FES																								
		PA																								
503	Clarence Hendershot	FES																								
		PA																								
504	Harold Henderson	FES																								
		PA															1	1							1	1
505	Albert W. C. T. Herre	FES																								
		PA																								
506	Lawrence I Heives, Jr	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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485	Norman D. Harper	FES																							6	1	6	1	6	1
		PA																							11	3	11	3	11	3
486	George H. C. Hart	FES																												
		PA					12	1					12	1															12	1
487	L. V. Hart	FES																			½	1					½	1	½	1
		PA																												
488	Evelyn Harvey	FES																	1	2							1	2	1	2
		PA																												
489	J. M. D. Haste	FES																												
		PA													½	1											½	1	½	1
490	Ernest O. Hauser	FES																											21½	17
		PA																											9½	5
491	Edwin Haward	FES																												
		PA									½	1	½	1	½	1							½	1			1	2	1½	3
492	Everett D. Hawkins	FES															7½	3									7½	3	7½	3
		PA																												
493	H. B. Hawthorn	FES									4	1	4	1	4½	1											4½	1	8½	2
		PA					1	1	½	1			1½	2			1	1			½	1					1½	2	3	4
494	R. G. Hawtrey	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
495	John G. Hazam	FES					6	1					6	1															6	1
		PA																												
496	John Hazard	FES																												
		PA																	8	1			2	1			10	2	13	3
497	Stephen Heald	FES																												
		PA																											74	3
498	S. Heaslett	FES																												
		PA													1	1											1	1	1	1
499	John Heath	FES																												
		PA																											1	2
500	Robert Heine-Geldern	FES																												
		PA																			1½	1					1½	1	1½	1
501	W. H. Van Helsdingen	FES																												
		PA															3	1									3	1	3	1
502	Milton Helmick	FES									7	2	7	2															7	2
		PA																												
503	Clarence Hendershot	FES			3	1							3	1			5½	1									5½	1	8½	2
		PA																												
504	Harold Henderson	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
505	Albert W. C. T. Herre	FES			½	1	2	1					2½	2					2	1							2	1	4½	3
		PA																												
506	Lawrence I. Heives, Jr.	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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507	Walter Hill	FES																								
		PA																								
508	Rita Hinden	FES																								
		PA																								
509	Eleanor M. Hinder	FES																								
		PA																								
510	W. J. Hinton	FES																								
		PA			2	1							2	1												
511	Alice Tisdale Hobart	FES																								
		PA							1½	1																
512	William Ernest Hocking	FES																								
		PA																								
513	H. V. Hodson	FES																								
		PA													7	1									7	1
514	E. Adamson Hoebel	FES																								
		PA																								
515	H. Ian Hogbin	FES																								
		PA																			½	1			½	1
516	Arthur Holcombe	FES																								
		PA			4	1			½	1			4½	2	1	1									1	1
517	W. L. Holland	FES													11½	3									11½	3
		PA			58	7	10½	2	6	1	2	1	76½	11	2½	1									2½	1
518	Leon Hollerman	FES																								
		PA																								
519	D. S. Holman	FES																								
		PA																								
520	Claire Holt	FES																								
		PA																								
521	D. C. Holtom	FES																								
		PA																								
522	Pieter Honig	FES																								
		PA																								
523	Carl E. Hopkins	FES																								
		PA																								
524	Bernard L. Hormann	FES																								
		PA																								
525	Hot Spring Conference (Extracts)	FES																								
		PA																								
526	Hou Wei-long	FES																								
		PA																								
527	Gunji Hosono	FES																								
		PA									2½	1	2½	1												
528	Ernest Hotson	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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507	Walter Hill	FES																												
		PA									9	1	9	1															9	1
508	Rita Hinden	FES																												
		PA															2	1									2	1	2	1
509	Eleanor M. Hinder	FES					2	1			½	1	2½	2															2½	2
		PA																												
510	W. J. Hinton	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
511	Alice Tisdale Hobart	FES																												
		PA													½	1													1½	1
512	William Ernest Hocking	FES					1½	1					1½	1													½	1	½	1
		PA																											1½	1
513	H. V. Hodson	FES							1	1			1	1			1	1									1	1	9	3
		PA													½	1											½	1	½	1
514	E. Adamson Hoebel	FES																	2	1							2	1	2	1
		PA							11½	1			11½	1													12	2		
515	H. Ian Hogbin	FES																											5½	3
		PA			1½	1	2	1					3½	2	½	1											½	1	15½	6
516	Arthur Holcombe	FES																												
		PA	1½	3	21½	2	2	3	4	2			29	10							4	2			½	1	4½	3	112½	25
517	W. L. Holland	FES																							26	1	26	1	26	1
		PA																												
518	Leon Hollerman	FES															10	1									10	1	10	1
		PA													1	1											1	1	1	1
519	D. S. Holman	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA																												
520	Claire Holt	FES																												
		PA																												
521	D. C. Holtom	FES									5	1	5	1	6½	2	3½	1									10	3	15	4
		PA																			1½	1					1½	1	1½	1
522	Pieter Honig	FES					6	1					6	1			1	1									1	1	7	2
		PA																												
523	Carl E. Hopkins	FES																			2½	1					2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
524	Bernard L. Hormann	FES													3½	1											3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
525	Hot Spring Conference (Extracts)	FES																												
		PA									10	1	10	1															10	1
526	Hou Wai-long	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
527	Gunji Hosono	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
528	Ernest Hotson	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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529	Harry Paxton Howard	FES																								
		PA																								
530	Janet K. Howie	FES																								
		PA																								
531	Charles P. Howland	FES																								
		PA			3	1	2	1					5	2												
532	C. L. Hsia	FES																								
		PA	20	1	11	1							31	2												
533	Hsia, Pin fang	FES																								
		PA			7	1							7	1												
534	C. Y. Hsiang	FES																								
		PA																								
535	C. Y. Hsu	FES																								
		PA																								
536	Frances L. K. Hsu	FES																								
		PA																								
537	Leonard S. Hsu	FES																								
		PA	25	1									25	1			17	1							17	1
538	Shuhsi Hsu	FES																								
		PA															3	1							3	1
539	Y. Y. Hsu	FES																								
		PA																								
540	Charles Y. Hu	FES																								
		PA																								
541	Hsien-Chin Hu	FES																								
		PA																								
542	Hu, Shih	FES																								
		PA					2½	1					2½	1												
543	G. E. Hubbard	FES																								
		PA													7	3									7	3
544	Deborah Hubbard	FES																								
		PA																								
545	L. E. Hubbard	FES																								
		PA																	19	2					19	2
546	G. F. Hudson	FES																								
		PA													1½	1									1½	1
547	E. R. Hughes	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1			1½	1
548	John Hughes	FES																								
		PA																								
549	A. F. D. Hulsewe	FES																								
		PA																								
550	Joy Hume	FES																			2	1			2	1
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
529	Harry Paxton Howard	FES																												
		PA	24	1			4	1					28	2															32	3
530	Janet K. Howie	FES	2½	2									2½	2															10	4
		PA																												
531	Charles P. Howland	FES																											5	2
		PA																											1	1
532	C. L. Hsia	FES					1	1			1	1																	33	3
		PA							2	1			2	1																
533	Hsia, Pin fang	FES																											7	1
		PA																												
534	C. Y. Hsiang	FES																												
		PA	15	1									15	1															15	1
535	C. Y. Hsu	FES																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
536	Frances L. K. Hsu	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
537	Leonard S. Hsu	FES																												
		PA																											42	2
538	Shuhsi Hsu	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
539	Y. Y. Hsu	FES			3½	2	2½	2					6	4															6	4
		PA	6	1	44	3	25	3	1½	1			76½	8															76½	8
540	Charles Y. Hu	FES																												
		PA																	2	1							2	1	2	1
541	Hsien-Chin Hu	FES			4	1							4	1															4	1
		PA																												
542	Hu, Shih	FES																												
		PA					3	1	1	1			4	2															6½	3
543	G. E. Hubbard	FES																												
		PA							3½	2			3½	2	4	1											4	1	14½	6
544	Deborah Hubbard	FES	1	1									1	1															10	4
		PA																												
545	L. E. Hubbard	FES																												
		PA																											19	2
546	G. F. Hudson	FES																												
		PA															2½	1	2	1							4½	2	6	3
547	E. R. Hughes	FES																												
		PA															2½	2			1½	1	1½	1			5½	4	7	5
548	John Hughes	FES					3	1					3	1															3	1
		PA																												
549	A. F. D. Hulsewe	FES																												
		PA																	1½	1					1½	1	3	2	3	2
550	Joy Hume	FES																											2	1
		PA																												

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
551	Arthur Hummell	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
552	John P. Humphery	FES																								
		PA																								
553	Warren S. Hunsberger	FES																	14½	2					14½	2
		PA																								
554	Charles Hunter	FES																								
		PA															1½	1							1½	1
555	Ellsworth Huntington	FES																								
		PA																								
556	Bruce Hutchison	FES																								
		PA																								
557	D. Graham Hutton	FES																								
		PA																	10	1					10	1
558	Albert Hyma	FES																								
		DA																								
559	Yamato Ichihoshi	FES																								
		PA	2	1	2	1							4	2												
560	Nobutaka Ike	FES																								
		PA																								
561	Arthur D. Ince	FES																								
		PA																								
562	Glen Ingles	FES																								
		PA																								
563	E. Burke Inlow	FES																								
		PA																								
564	H. A. Innis	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
565	P. F. Irvine	FES																								
		PA																								
566	Jeter A. Isley	FES																								
		PA																								
567	H. R. Issacs	FES																								
		PA									15	1	15	1												
568	Germaine Krull Ivens	FES																								
		PA																								
569	N. J.	FES																								
		PA	7	7	2	1							9	8												
570	W. T. Jackman	FES																								
		PA													1½	1									1½	1
571	Grace James	FES																								
		PA																	1	1					1	1
572	Jack James	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
551	Arthur Hummell	FES					½	1					½	1			½	1									½	1	1	2
		PA																											2	1
552	John P. Humphery	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
553	Warren S. Hunsberger	FES																											14½	2
		PA					11	1					11	1															11	1
554	Charles Hunter	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
555	Ellsworth Huntington	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA																												
556	Bruce Hutchison	FES																												
		PA									1½	1	1½	1															1½	1
557	D. Graham Hutton	FES																												
		PA																											10	1
558	Albert Hyma	FES																												
		PA													½	1											½	1	½	1
559	Yamato Ichihoshi	FES																												
		PA																											4	2
560	Nobutaka Ike	FES																	3	1							3	1	3	1
		PA			13½	1							13½	1					½	1	5	1	3	1	5	1	13½	4	27	5
561	Arthur D. Ince	FES																												
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
562	Glen Ingles	FES							4	1			4	1															4	1
		PA																												
563	E. Burke Inlow	FES																	2½	1	2	1					4½	2	4½	2
		PA																												
564	H. A. Innis	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
565	P. F. Irvine	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
566	Jeter A. Isley	FES															½	1									½	1	½	1
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
567	H. R. Issacs	FES																												
		PA																											15	1
568	Germaine Krull Ivens	FES															3½	1									3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
569	N. J.	FES																												
		PA																											9	8
570	W. T. Jackman	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
571	Grace James	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
572	Jack James	FES																	3½	1							3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
573	Roy E. James	FES																								
		PA																								
574	R. W. James	FES																								
		PA																								
575	Eliot Janeway	FES																	13	5					13	5
		PA																	4	1					4	1
576	R. J. Jardine	FES																								
		PA	7	1									7	1												
577	David R. Jenkins	FES																								
		PA																			13	1			13	1
578	Shirley Jenkins	FES																								
		PA																								
579	W. Ivor Jennings	FES																								
		PA																								
580	Phillip Jessup	FES																								
		PA							1½	2	2½	2	4	4	4½	3							12	1	16½	4
581	Eugene I. Johnson	FES																								
		PA																								
582	Guy B. Johnson	FES																								
		PA															2	1							2	1
583	Nelson T. Johnson	FES																								
		PA																								
584	Bruce Johnston	FES																								
		PA																								
585	Eric Johnston	FES																								
		PA																								
586	Reginald F. Johnston	FES																								
		PA									½	1	½	1			3½	1							3½	1
587	William C. Johnstone	FES																								
		PA																					3	2	3	2
588	F. C. Jones	FES																								
		PA																			2½	2			2½	2
589	George E. Jones	FES																								
		PA																								
590	Joseph Jones	FES																								
		PA																								
591	Stella Jones	FES																								
		PA	18	1									18	1												
592	Ellen Van Zyll de Jong	FES																					23	7	23	7
		PA																								
593	Arthur Jorgensen	FES																								
		PA																								
594	Elizabeth Jorgensen	FES																					3	2	3	2
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
573	Roy E. James	FES													4½	1											4½	1	4½	1
		PA													5	1	6	1									11	2	11	2
574	R. W. James	FES																												
		PA					1	1					1	1															1	1
575	Eliot Janeway	FES																											13	5
		PA																											4	1
576	R. J. Jardine	FES																												
		PA																											7	1
577	David R. Jenkins	FES									1½	1	1½	1			½	1									½	1	2	2
		PA																			2	1					2	1	15	2
578	Shirley Jenkins	FES							6	4	11½	5	17½	9	2½	2	10	2							5½	1	18	5	35½	14
		PA															2	1	13	1							15	2	15	2
579	W. Ivor Jennings	FES																												
		PA																			13	1			1½	1	14½	2	14½	2
580	Phillip Jessup	FES																												
		PA																											20½	8
581	Eugene I. Johnson	FES													2	1											2	1	2	1
		PA																												
582	Guy B. Johnson	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
583	Nelson T. Johnson	FES													½	1	½	1									1	2	1	2
		PA																												
584	Bruce Johnston	FES																			4	1					4	1	4	1
		PA																												
585	Eric Johnston	FES									1½	1	1½	1															1½	1
		PA																												
586	Reginald F. Johnston	FES																												
		PA																											4	2
587	William C. Johnstone	FES	½	1	4½	2	7	1	4½	1	13	3	29½	8															29½	8
		PA			1	1	7	1	2½	1	16	1	26½	4															29½	6
588	F. C. Jones	FES																												
		PA																	2½	2			½	1			3	3	5½	5
589	George E. Jones	FES															3½	1									3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
590	Joseph Jones	FES													½	1			½	1							1	2	1	2
		PA																												
591	Stella Jones	FES																												
		PA																											18	1
592	Ellen Van Zyll de Jong	FES	8	5									8	5															31	12
		PA																												
593	Arthur Jorgensen	FES									3½	1	3½	1			1	1									1	1	4½	2
		PA																												
594	Elizabeth Jorgensen	FES	6½	3									6½	3															9½	5
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
595	George Mc. T. Kahin	FES																								
		PA																								
596	J. R. Kaim	FES																								
		PA																								
597	Ryuichi Kaji	FES																								
		PA													3½	1									3½	1
598	H. M. Kallen	FES																								
		PA																								
599	Maximo M. Kalaw	FES																								
		PA					5	1					5	1												
600	Shina Kan	FES																								
		PA																								
601	K. A. Nila Kanta	FES																								
		PA																								
602	A. J. Kantorovich	FES																								
		PA									12	1	12	1												
603	K. P. Karunakaran	FES																								
		PA																								
604	Paul M. Kattenburg	FES																								
		PA																								
605	Kazuo Kawai	FES																								
		PA																								
606	K. K. Kawakami	FES																								
		PA	17	1	20	1							37	2												
607	H. L. Keenleyside	FES																								
		PA																								
608	Arthur S. Keller	FES																					7½	1	7½	1
		PA																								
609	Hon. Hugh Keenleyside	FES																								
		PA																								
610	Phillip O. Keeney	FES																								
		PA																								
611	F. M. Keesing	FES																								
		PA	3	2	16	2	½	1			16½	3	36	8	1	1							2	2	3	3
612	Marie Keesing	FES																								
		PA					1½	1					1½	1												
613	Helen G. Kelly	FES																								
		PA																								
614	George Ken	FES																								
		PA																								
615	George Kennedy	FES																								
		PA																	4½	1					4½	1
616	Raymond Kennedy	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
595	George Mc. T. Kahin	FES													4	1	4½	1	3½	1	5½	3	5	1	5½	1	28	8	28	8
		PA																			11½	1					11½	1	11½	1
596	J. R. Kaim	FES																	3	1	4	1					7	2	7	2
		PA																												
597	Ryuichi Kaji	FES																												
		PA																											3½	2
598	H. M. Kallen	FES													3	1											3	1	3	1
		PA																												
599	Maximo M. Kalaw	FES																												
		PA									6	1	6	1															11	2
600	Shina Kan	FES																					2½	1			2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
601	K. A. Nila Kanta	FES																												
		PA															2½	1									2½	1	2½	1
602	A. J. Kantorovich	FES																												
		PA																											12	1
603	K. P. Karunakaran	FES																												
		PA																					½	1			½	1	½	1
604	Paul M. Kattenburg	FES													6	1			½	1							6½	2	6½	2
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
605	Kazuo Kawai	FES																												
		PA																					13	1	2	1	15	2	15	2
606	K. K. Kawakami	FES																												
		PA																											37	2
607	H. L. Keenleyside	FES																												
		PA													1	1											1	1	1	1
608	Arthur S. Keller	FES																											7½	1
		PA																												
609	Hon. Hugh Keenleyside	FES													1	1											1	1	1	1
		PA																												
610	Phillip O. Keeney	FES																	7	2							7	2	7	2
		PA																												
611	F. M. Keesing	FES	5½	1							7	2	12½	3			5	1									5	1	17½	4
		PA			2	2			1½	2	½	1	4	5															43	16
612	Marie Keesing	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
613	Helen G. Kelly	FES													2½	1											2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
614	George Ken	FES															4	1									4	1	4	1
		PA																												
615	George Kennedy	FES																												
		PA																											4½	1
616	Raymond Kennedy	FES							3	1	9	3	12	4	9½	2			3½	1							13	3	25	7
		PA					7	1	1	1			8	2	2½	1											2½	1	10½	3

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
617	W. P. M. Kennedy	FES																								
		PA	1	1									1	1												
618	P. H. B. Kent	FES																								
		PA																								
619	R. J. Kerner	FES																								
		PA																	4	1					4	1
620	George H. Kerr	FES																								
		PA																								
621	Yougjeung Kim	FES																								
		PA																								
622	R. Kingsland	FES																								
		PA																								
623	Alexander Kiralfy	FES																								
		PA															4	1	17	2					21	3
624	Stuart Kirby	FES																								
		PA																								
625	Grayson Kirk	FES																								
		PA																								
626	Benjamin Kizer	FES																								
		PA																					3	1	3	1
627	Otto Klinebery	FES																								
		PA									2	1	2	1												
628	M. M. Knight	FES																								
		PA															2	1							2	1
629	F. B. J. Kniper	FES																								
		PA																								
630	K. E. Knorr	FES																								
		PA																								
631	Ko Siang-Feng	FES																								
		PA																								
632	Albert Kolb	FES																								
		PA																								
633	G. H. Van der Kolff	FES																								
		PA																								
634	E. Kondapi	FES																								
		PA																								
635	Johanna Felhoen Kraal	FES																								
		PA																								
636	Lawrence Krader	FES																								
		PA																								
637	H. Kraemer	FES																								
		PA																								
638	T. J. Kreps	FES																								
		PA															2	1							2	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
617	W. P. M. Kennedy	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
618	P. H. B. Kent	FES																												
		PA							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
619	R. J. Kerner	FES																			3½	1					3½	1	3½	1
		PA																											4	1
620	George H. Kerr	FES	4	1							20½	4	24½	5			3	1									3	1	27½	6
		PA																												
621	Yougjeung Kim	FES																	2	1							2	1	2	1
		PA																												
622	R. Kingsland	FES																												
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
623	Alexander Kiralfy	FES	6	1			1	1					7	2															7	2
		PA																											21	3
624	Stuart Kirby	FES																			2½	1			1½	1	4	2	4	2
		PA																	1	1	5	1					6	2	6	2
625	Grayson Kirk	FES																												
		PA	2½	2					1	1			3½	3															3½	3
626	Benjamin Kizer	FES			½	1	2½	2	3	2			6	5															6	5
		PA					1	1					1	1															4	2
627	Otto Klinebery	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
628	M. M. Knight	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
629	F. B. J. Kniper	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
630	K. E. Knorr	FES																												
		PA									1	1	1	1															1	1
631	Ko Siang-Feng	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
632	Albert Kolb	FES																												
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
633	G. H. Van der Kolff	FES																												
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
634	E. Kondapi	FES																												
		PA																							1½	1	1½	1	1½	1
635	Johanna Felhoen Kraal	FES																												
		PA																					1½	1			1½	1	1½	1
636	Lawrence Krader	FES																	4	1							4	1	4	1
		PA																												
637	H. Kraemer	FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
		PA																												
638	T. J. Kreps	FES																											2	1
		PA																							½	1	½	1	½	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
639	A. L. Kroeber	FES																								
		PA																								
640	Hyman Kublin	FES																								
		PA																								
641	Kuo Yen-ti	FES																								
		PA																								
642	Kuo Ping-chia	FES																								
		PA																								
643	Kenneth K. Kurihara	FES																								
		PA																								
644	Andrew Y. Kuroda	FES																								
		PA																								
645	Lawrence Lader	FES																								
		PA																								
646	Frederica de Laguna	FES																								
		PA																								
647	Harry Laidler	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
648	Corliss Lamont	FES																								
		PA									3	1	3	1												
649	Bartholomew Landhier	FES																								
		PA																								
650	Kenneth Perry Landon	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1	14	2	15½	3
651	Lan Francus	FES																								
		PA																								
652	Olga Lang	FES																								
		PA																			16½	2	19	2	35½	4
653	Pierre Olivier Lapie	FES																								
		PA																								
654	Richard T. La Pierre	FES																								
		PA															2	1							2	1
655	Baron de Lapomarede	FES																								
		PA							9	1			9	1												
656	Bruno Lasker	FES													1	1	2½	1							3½	2
		PA	1	1			11½	8	5	3	4½	2	22	14	10½	5	15	4	½	1	3	3	3	3	32	16
657	Gabriel Lasker	FES																								
		PA																								
658	K. S. Latourette	FES																								
		PA									1	1	1	1			1½	1	2	1					3½	2
659	David Lattimore	FES																								
		PA							1	1			1	1												
660	Eleanor Lattimore	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1												

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
639	A. L. Kroeber	FES																												
		PA																							½	1	½	1	½	1
640	Hyman Kublin	FES																												
		PA																												
641	Kuo Yen-ti	FES															5	1									5	1	5	1
		PA																												
642	Kuo Ping-chia	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA							3½	2			3½	2	4½	2											4½	2	8	4
643	Kenneth K. Kurihara	FES																												
		PA																												
644	Andrew Y. Kuroda	FES																			10	1					10	1	10	1
		PA									2½	1	2½	1															2½	1
645	Lawreuce Lader	FES																												
		PA																												
646	Frederica de Laguna	FES													3	1											3	1	3	1
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
647	Harry Laidler	FES																											2	1
		PA																												
648	Corliss Lamont	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
649	Bartholomew Landhier	FES	6	1									6	1															6	1
		PA																												
650	Kenneth Perry Landon	FES							2	1			2	1															2	1
		PA																											15½	3
651	Lan Francus	FES																												
		PA			3	1							3	1															3	1
652	Olga Lang	FES																												
		PA																											35½	4
653	Pierre Olivier Lapie	FES																												
		PA							5	1			5	1															5	1
654	Richard T. La Pierre	FES									2	1	2	1															2	1
		PA													½	1											½	1	2½	2
655	Baron de Lapomarede	FES																												
		PA																											9	1
656	Bruno Lasker	FES			1	1	3½	5	22	8	24½	18	51	32	4	5			½	1	1	2	½	1	½	1	6½	10	61	44
		PA			1½	1	4	3	5½	3	5	3	16	10			2	1	2	3			½	1	27	1	31½	6	101½	46
657	Gabriel Lasker	FES									2	1	2	1															2	1
		PA																												
658	K. S. Latourette	FES													½	1	1	1							½	1	2	3	2	3
		PA							2½	2			2½	2			1½	1	10	2			1	1			12½	4	19	9
659	David Lattimore	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
660	Eleanor Lattimore	FES							3½	1	9	3	12½	4	4	1			1	1							5	2	17½	6
		PA																	1	1							1	1	2½	2

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
661	Margaret Lattimore	FES																								
		PA																								
662	Owen Lattimore	FES																								
		PA							44½	12	31	8	75½	20	30	6	44½	10	20	8	17½	9	53½	12	164	45
663	Oliver Lawrence	FES																								
		PA							12	1			12	1												
664	Richard E. Lanterbach	FES																								
		PA																								
665	Forrest Laviolette	FES																								
		PA																								
666	Robert E. Laviolette	FES																								
		PA																								
667	David J. Leacock	FES																								
		PA																								
668	W. J. Leaning	FES																								
		PA																					3½	1	3½	1
669	Emil Lederer	FES																								
		PA							13	1			13	1			3	2	2	1					5	3
670	L. H. Lamb	FES																								
		PA																								
671	Paul Langer	FES																								
		PA																								
672	E. T. Larken	FES																								
		PA																								
673	Harold W. Larsen	FES																								
		PA																								
674	Forrest E. La Violette	FES																								
		PA																								
675	E. R. Leach	FES																								
		PA																								
676	S. Leathem	FES																								
		PA																								
677	Nguyen Van Le	FES																								
		PA																								
678	Alwyn Lee	FES																								
		PA																								
679	Franklin C. H. Lee	FES																								
		PA																								
680	Kar Lee	FES																								
		PA																								
681	S. C. Lee	FES																								
		PA					1	1					1	1												
682	Stephen Lee	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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661	Margaret Lattimore	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
662	Owen Lattimore	FES							2	1			2	1	½	1													2½	2
		PA	16	3					9	1	½	1	25½	5			10	1	2	1			12	1			24	3	289	73
663	Oliver Lawrence	FES																												
		PA																											12	1
664	Richard E. Lanterbach	FES																			½	1					½	1	½	1
		PA																												
665	Forrest Laviolette	FES							8	2			8	2			1	1	3	1							4	2	12	4
		PA																												
666	Robert E. Laviolette	FES			4	1							4	1															4	1
		PA																												
667	David J. Leacock	FES					1	1					1	1															1	1
		PA																												
668	W. J. Leaning	FES	2	1									1	1															2	1
		PA	1½	1									1½	1															5	2
669	Emil Lederer	FES																												
		PA																											18	4
670	L. H. Lamb	FES																												
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
671	Paul Langer	FES																												
		PA																					8½	1			8½	1	8½	1
672	E. T. Larken	FES																												
		PA																	2	1							2	1	2	1
673	Harold W. Larsen	FES																												
		PA													5	1	3	2									8	3	8	3
674	Forrest E. La Violette	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
675	E. R. Leach	FES																												
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
676	S. Leathem	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
677	Nguyen Van Le	FES																												
		PA															2	1									2	1	2	1
678	Alwyn Lee	FES			3	1							3	1															3	1
		PA																												
679	Franklin C. H. Lee	FES																												
		PA													1½	1			13	1							14½	2	14½	2
680	Kan Lee	FES																												
		PA									1	1	1	1															1	1
681	S. C. Lee	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
682	Stephen Lee	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1

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683	J. D. Legge	FES																								
		PA																								
684	T. P. Leggett	FES																								
		PA																								
685	Kit-king Lei	FES																								
		PA																								
686	Alexander H. Leighton	FES																								
		PA																								
687	George Kin Leung	FES																								
		PA	14	1							6	1	20	2												
688	Joseph R. Levenson	FES																								
		PA																								
689	Werner Levi	FES																								
		PA																								
690	Bernard W. Levmore	FES																			1	1			1	1
		PA																								
691	Marion J. Levy, Jr.	FES																								
		PA																								
692	Roger Levy	FES																								
		PA			13	1			2	1			15	2	7	1			18	2	2	2			26	4
693	Daniel H. Lew	FES																								
		PA																								
694	A. B. Lewis	FES																								
		PA									8	1	8	1	7	1									7	1
695	An-che LI	FES																								
		PA																								
696	Choh-Ming Li	FES																								
		PA																								
697	T'ai-chu Liao	FES																								
		PA																								
698	Henry R. Leiberman	FES																								
		PA																								
699	Channing Liem	FES																								
		PA																								
700	D. K. Lieu	FES																								
		PA							4	2			4	2							14	1			14	1
701	Dang-chan Lieu	FES																								
		PA																								
702	Phillip Lilienthal	FES																								
		PA																			1½	2	20	4	21½	6
703	Yu Lin	FES																								
		PA													12½	2									12½	2
704	Yutang Lin	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
683	J. D. Legge	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
684	T. P. Leggett	FES																												
		PA																					1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
685	Kit-king Lei	FES																												
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
686	Alexander H. Leighton	FES																												
		PA									2½	1	2½	1															2½	1
687	George Kin Leung	FES																												
		PA																											20	2
688	Joseph R. Levenson	FES																												
		PA																			1	1							1	1
689	Werner Levi	FES													6	2	9½	3					10½	2	7½	2	33½	9	33½	9
		PA																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
690	Bernard W. Levmore	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
691	Marion J. Levy, Jr	FES																		½	1						½	1	½	1
		PA																				1	1				1	1	1	1
692	Roger Levy	FES																												
		PA													½	1			½	1					½	1	1½	3	43½	10
693	Daniel H. Lew	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
694	A. B. Lewis	FES																												
		PA																											15	2
695	An-che LI	FES																												
		PA																	6	1	2½	1					8½	2	8½	2
696	Choh-Ming Li	FES																												
		PA							8	1			8	1															1	1
697	T'ai-chu Liao	FES																												
		PA															13	1									13	1	13	1
698	Henry R. Leiberman	FES																												
		PA																					2½	1			2½	1	2½	1
699	Channing Liem	FES																			3½	1					3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
700	D. K. Lieu	FES																												
		PA																											18	3
701	Dang-chan Lieu	FES																												
		PA															5	1									5	1	5	1
702	Phillip Lilienthal	FES																												
		PA					1	1					1	1	1½	1							15	1			16½	2	39½	9
703	Yu Lin	FES																												
		PA							16	1			16	1															28½	1
704	Yutang Lin	FES									5	1	5	1															5	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
705	Andrew Lind	FES																								
		PA					1½	1					1½	1												
706	J. M. H. Lindbeck	FES																								
		PA																								
707	Michael Lindsay	FES																								
		PA																								
708	Paul M. A. Linebarger	FES																								
		PA																								
709	C. Cecil Lingard	FES																								
		PA																								
710	Leslie Lipson	FES																								
		PA																								
711	Ivy Litvinoff	FES																								
		PA																								
712	James T. C. Liu	FES																								
		PA																								
713	N. C. Liu	FES																								
		PA																								
714	Trevor Lloyd	FES																								
		PA																								
715	C. Sumner Lobinger	FES																								
		PA																								
716	Edward T. Lockwood	FES									5	1	5	1												
		PA																								
717	William W. Lockwood	FES									11½	8	11½	8	24	11	20½	8	18	9					62½	28
		PA															5	2			½	1			5½	3
718	Edwin M. Loeb	FES																								
		PA																								
719	Richard F. Logan	FES																								
		PA																								
720	J. H. A. Logemann	FES																								
		PA																								
721	Rammanohar Lohia	FES																								
		PA																	3	1					3	1
722	W. Allen Longshore, Jr	FES																								
		PA																								
723	Doris Lorden	FES																								
		PA	1	1									1	1												
724	Frank Lorimer	FES																								
		PA																								
725	Lewis Lorwin	FES																								
		PA					8	1					8	1												
726	W. C. Lowdermilk	FES																								
		PA									11	1	11	1												

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
705	Andrew Lind	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
706	J. M. H. Lindbeck	FES																							4½	1	4½	1	4½	1
		PA																												
707	Michael Lindsay	FES									5	1	5	1			2	1									2	1	7	2
		PA													1	1					5	2			2½	1	8½	4	8½	4
708	Paul M. A. Linebarger	FES																	2	1	2½	1					4½	2	4½	2
		PA																	3	2							3	2	3	2
709	C. Ceeil Lingard	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA							12	1			12	1															12	1
710	Leslie Lipson	FES																												
		PA																												
711	Ivy Litvinoff	FES																					1	1			1	1	1	1
		PA					½	1					½	1															½	1
712	James T. C. Liu	FES																	5½	2							5½	2	5½	2
		PA																					½	1			½	1	½	1
713	N. C. Liu	FES					3½	1					3½	1															3½	1
		PA																												
714	Trevor Lloyd	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1			1½	1									1½	1	2½	2
715	C. Sumner Lobinger	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA																												
716	Edward T. Lockwood	FES																											5	1
		PA																												
717	William W. Lockwood	FES					4	1					4	1			2½	1							7	1	9½	2	87½	39
		PA	3½	1									3½	1	1½	1					2½	1					4	2	13	6
718	Edwin M. Loeb	FES																			½	1					½	1	½	1
		PA																					½	1			½	1	½	1
719	Richard F. Logan	FES									7	2	7	2			½	1									½	1	7½	3
		PA																												
720	J. H. A. Logemann	FES																												
		PA															12	1									12	1	12	1
721	Rammanohar Lohia	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
722	W. Allen Longshore, Jr	FES									½	1	½	1															½	1
		PA																												
723	Doris Lorden	FES																												
		PA																												
724	Frank Lorimer	FES																											1	1
		PA																												
725	Lewis Lorwin	FES																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
726	W. C. Lowdermilk	FES																											8	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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727	Pardee Lowe	FES																								
		PA													2	1	1	1							3	2
728	W. S. Lowe	FES																								
		PA																								
729	Rudolf Lowenthal	FES																								
		PA																								
730	A. R. M. Lower	FES																								
		PA																			2½	1			2½	1
731	Albert P. Ludwig	FES																								
		PA															4	1							4	1
732	Mr. Van Lummell	FES																								
		PA																								
733	Thomasine Lutkin	FES																								
		PA					2	1					2	1												
734	L. A. Lyell	FES																								
		PA							1½	1			1½	1												
735	T. R. S. Lyell	FES																								
		PA																								
736	Bayard Lyon	FES																								
		PA																								
737	B. M	FES																								
		PA	1	1									1	1												
738	J. C. M	FES													2½	2									2½	2
		PA																								
739	D. A. MacGibbon	FES																								
		PA							16	2			16	2												
740	W. H. MacDonnell	FES																								
		PA													2	1									2	1
741	Sir Eric Macfalyen	FES																								
		PA																								
742	Norman Mackenzie	FES																								
		PA	4	1									4	1					2½	2					2½	2
743	Robert A. Mackay	FES																								
		PA			13	1							13	1												
744	John M. MacLachlan	FES																								
		PA															1½	1							1½	1
745	Douglas T. Mac Lennan	FES																								
		PA																								
746	Tamon Maeda	FES																								
		PA	8	1									8	1												
747	William Magistretti	FES																								
		PA																								
748	N. Wing Mah	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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727	Pardee Lowe	FES																											11	1
		PA																												
728	W. S. Lowe	FES																											3	2
		PA																												
729	Rudolf Lowenthal	FES									10½	1	10½	1															10½	1
		PA																												
730	A. R. M. Lower	FES																	1	2	1½	2	1	1			3½	5	3½	5
		PA	2	1									2	1																
731	Albert P. Ludwig	FES																											4½	2
		PA																												
732	Mr. Van Lummell	FES																											4	1
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
733	Thomasine Lutkin	FES																												
		PA																												
734	L. A. Lyell	FES																											2	1
		PA																												
735	T. R. S. Lyell	FES																											1½	1
		PA																												
736	Bayard Lyon	FES																			½	1					½	1	½	1
		PA																												
737	B. M	FES																					½	1			½	1	½	1
		PA																												
738	J. C. M	FES																											1	1
		PA																											2½	2
739	D. A. MacGibbon	FES																												
		PA																												
740	W. H. MacDonnell	FES																											16	2
		PA																												
741	Sir Eric Macfalyen	FES																											2	1
		PA							7	1			7	1															7	1
742	Norman Mackenzie	FES																												
		PA													½	1	1	1									1½	2	8	5
743	Robert A. Mackay	FES																												
		PA																											13	1
744	John M. MacLachlan	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
745	Douglas T. MacLennan	FES																												
		PA									1	1	1	1															1	1
746	Tamon Maeda	FES																												
		PA																											8	1
747	William Magistretti	FES																												
		PA	19	1									19	1															19	1
748	N. Wing Mah	FES																												
		PA																							1	1	1	1	1	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
749	John McGilvery Maki	FES																								
		PA																								
750	William M. Mandel	FES																								
		PA																								
751	David G. Mandelbaum	FES																								
		PA																								
752	L. A. Mander	FES																								
		PA	22½	9	18	12							40½	21	2½	1									2½	1
753	C. A. W. Manning	FES																								
		PA																								
754	Nicholas Mansergh	FES																								
		PA																								
755	Charles E. Martin	FES																								
		PA			3	1							3	1	2	1									2	1
756	Kingsley Martin	FES																								
		PA																								
757	Daniel Marx	FES																			6	1			6	1
		PA																								
758	M. R. Masani	FES																								
		PA																								
759	Leonard Mason	FES																								
		PA																								
760	John W. Masland	FES																								
		PA																								
761	Leonard Mason	FES																								
		PA																								
762	George Massellman	FES																								
		PA																								
763	Shichiri Matsui	FES																								
		PA																								
764	Saburo Matsukata	FES																								
		PA							6	1			6	1												
765	Shigeharu Matsumoto	FES																								
		PA			7	1							7	1												
766	M. Matsuo	FES									7½	2	7½	2	5½	1									5½	1
		PA									2	1	2	1	2½	1									2½	1
767	Phillip Matthews	FES																								
		PA																								
768	Illarion Matveev	FES																								
		PA																								
769	Isabel Avila Maurer	FES																								
		PA																								
770	Herrymon Maurer	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
749	John McGilvery Maki	FES													5	2	8½	2			½	1					14	5	14	5
		PA									1	1	1	1			16	1	1	1	2	1					19	3	20	4
750	William M. Mandel	FES																	3	1	4	1					7	2	7	2
		PA			21	1			½	1			21	2															21½	2
751	David G. Mandelbaum	FES																			4½	1	2½	1			7	2	7	2
		PA																												
752	L. A. Mander	FES																												
		PA	2	1									2	1			1	1			1	1					2	2	47	25
753	C. A. W. Manning	FES																												
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
754	Nicholas Mansergh	FES																												
		PA																			½	1	18	1			18½	2	18½	2
755	Charles E. Martin	FES																												
		PA																											5	2
756	Kingsley Martin	FES																												
		PA									2	1	9	2	1½	1	2	1			2½	1					2½	1	2½	1
757	Daniel Marx	FES	7	1																	2½	1					6	3	21	6
		PA																												
758	M. R. Masani	FES																												
		PA																							2	1	2	1	2	1
759	Leonard Mason	FES																							21	1	21	1	21	1
		PA																												
760	John W. Masland	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA													2½	1											2½	1	2½	1
761	Leonard Mason	FES																												
		PA																	3	1							3	1	3	1
762	George Massellman	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
763	Shichiri Matsui	FES							1½	1			1½	1																
		PA																											1½	1
764	Saburo Matsukata	FES																												
		PA																							1	1	1	1	1	1
765	Shigeharu Matsumoto	FES																												
		PA																											6	1
766	M. Matsuo	FES																												
		PA																											7	1
767	Phillip Matthews	FES																											13	3
		PA																							2	1	2	1	6½	3
768	Illarion Matveev	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA							2	1			2	1															2	1
769	Isabel Avila Maurer	FES																												
		PA																			3	1					3	1	3	1
770	Herrymon Maurer	FES			6	1							6	1																
		PA											1	1															6	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
771	Alfred Max	FES																								
		PA																			9	1			9	1
772	Miyeko Mayeda	FES																								
		PA																					1½	1	1½	1
773	Adrian Mayer	FES																								
		PA																								
774	Margaret Mead	FES																								
		PA																								
775	Elliot G. Mears	FES																								
		PA																								
776	Helen Mears	FES																								
		PA																								
777	H. de Meel	FES																								
		PA																								
778	Ju-ao Mei	FES																								
		PA			10	1							10	1												
779	D. H. Mehta	FES																								
		PA																								
780	H. Scudder Mekeel	FES																								
		PA													2	1									2	1
781	William Melish	FES																								
		PA																								
782	William E. Nelson	FES																								
		PA																								
783	Audrey G. Menefee	FES																								
		PA																								
784	Chih Meng	FES																								
		PA	16	1					3½	1			19½	2												
785	A. R. Menjies	FES																								
		PA																								
786	James M. Menzies	FES																								
		PA																								
787	Lord Meston	FES																								
		PA							3	2			3	2												
788	L. Metzemaekers	FES																								
		PA																								
789	Colette Meuvret	FES																								
		PA																								
790	John Richard Mez	FES																								
		PA			2	1							2	1												
791	Margaret Portia Mickey	FES																								
		PA																								
792	Franz Michael	FES																								
		PA															5	1			13	1	6½	4	24½	6

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
771	Alfred Max	FES																												
		PA																												
772	Miyeko Mayeda	FES																												
		PA																											9	1
773	Adrian Mayer	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
774	Margaret Mead	FES																	1½	1			1	1			2½	2	2½	2
		PA					2	1					2	1							1	1					1	1	3	2
775	Elliot G. Mears	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
776	Helen Mears	FES																	2	1	½	1					2½	2	2½	2
		PA																												
777	H. de Meel	FES																												
		PA																							31	2	31	2	31	2
778	Ju-ao Mei	FES																												
		PA																											10	1
779	D. H. Mehta	FES																												
		PA																					½	1			½	1	½	1
780	H. Scudder Mekeel	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
781	William Melish	FES					½	1					½	1															½	1
		PA																												
782	William E. Nelson	FES																	3½	1							3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
783	Audrey G. Menefee	FES									3½	1	3½	1															3½	1
		PA																												
784	Chih Meng	FES					7	1					7	1															7	1
		PA																											19½	2
785	A. R. Menjies	FES																												
		PA							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
786	James M. Menzies	FES																												
		PA															1	1			½	1					1½	2	1½	2
787	Lord Meston	FES																												
		PA																											3	2
788	L. Metzemaekers	FES																												
		PA																							12	1	12	1	12	1
789	Colette Meuvret	FES																												
		PA																			2½	2					2½	2	2½	2
790	John Richard Mez	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
791	Margaret Portia Mickey	FES													3	1											3	1	3	1
		PA																												
792	Franz Michael						2	1	3	1			5	2	8	2			3½	1							11½	3	16½	5
		PA	2	1	15	1			3½	1			20½	3															44½	9

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
793	Joe Mickle	FES																								
		PA																								
794	Frank Midkiff	FES																								
		PA							1½	1			1½	1												
795	Edward W. Mill	FES																								
		PA																								
796	Agnes R. Miller	FES																								
		PA																								
797	Clayton Miller	FES																								
		PA															1½	1	13	1					14½	2
798	Margaret Miller	FES													1½	1									1½	1
		PA																								
799	Walter Millis	FES																								
		PA							3½	1			3½	1												
800	Lennox A. Mills	FES																								
		PA																								
801	Ian F. G. Milner	FES																								
		PA																			9½	4			9½	4
802	Jeanne S. Mintz	FES																								
		PA																								
803	Nicholas Mirkowich	FES																								
		PA																					5½	3	5½	3
804	C. Clyde Mitchell	FES																								
		PA																								
805	Kate Mitchell	FES													7½	1	12	5							19½	6
		PA															3	1							3	1
806	D. Mitrany	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1			1½	1
807	Kilmer Moe	FES																								
		PA	1½	1									1½	1												
808	Azizah F. Mohanimed	FES																								
		PA																								
809	P. K. Mok	FES																								
		PA							2½	2			2½	2												
810	J. T. Moll	FES																								
		PA													2½	1									2½	1
811	V. M. Molotoff	FES																								
		PA	4	1									4	1												
812	Chang Monlin	FES																								
		PA																								
813	R. Montagne	FES																								
		PA																								
814	H. J. Van Mook	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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793	Joe Mickle	FES									1	1	1	1															1	1
		PA																												
794	Frank Midkiff	FES																												
		PA																												
795	Edward W. Mill	FES													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
796	Agnes R. Miller	FES																					8	1			8	1	8	1
		PA																												
797	Clayton Miller	FES																												
		PA																											14½	2
798	Margaret Miller	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
799	Walter Millis	FES																												
		PA																											3½	1
800	Lennox A. Mills	FES			3½	1	4	1					7½	2			1	1									1	1	8½	3
		PA									1	1	1	1	3	2			1½	2			½	1			5	5	6	6
801	Ian F. G. Milner	FES																											9½	4
		PA																												
802	Jeanne S. Mintz	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
803	Nicholas Mirkowich	FES																											7	5
		PA	1½	2									1½	2																
804	C. Clyde Mitchell	FES																												
		PA																			11	1					11	1	11	1
805	Kate Mitchell	FES			3½	1	½	1			4	1	8	3															27½	9
		PA			20	1	4	1	1	1			25	3															28	4
806	D. Mitrany	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
807	Kilmer Moe	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
808	Azizah F. Mohammed	FES																							1	1	1	1	1	1
		PA																												
809	P. K. Mok	FES																												
		PA																											2½	2
810	J. T. Moll	FES																											2½	1
		PA																												
811	V. M. Molotoff	FES																											4	1
		PA									½	1	½	1															½	1
812	Chang Monlin	FES																												
		PA																												
813	R. Montagne	FES																												
		PA															3	1									3	1	3	1
814	H. J. Van Mook	FES																												
		PA																							5	2	5	2	5	2

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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815	Girija MooKerjee	FES																								
		PA																								
816	Penderel Moon	FES																								
		PA																								
817	E. S. Moore	FES																								
		PA							1½	1			1½	1												
818	Harriet Moore	FES									10	5	10	5	6	5									6	5
		PA									3	1	3	1	15	3	2	1	8	1					25	5
819	T. Inglis Moore	FES																								
		PA																								
820	Helen Howell Moorehead	FES																								
		PA																								
821	Alfredo T. Morales	FES																								
		PA																								
822	William T. Moran	FES																								
		PA																								
823	P. C. Morantie	FES																								
		PA																								
824	Leslie Morgan	FES																								
		PA																								
825	John Morris	FES																								
		PA																								
826	Ian Morrison	FES																								
		PA																								
827	Richard Morse	FES																								
		PA																								
828	Robert S. Morton	FES																								
		PA																								
829	W. L. Morton	FES																								
		PA															10	1							10	1
830	Phillip Moseley	FES																					2	1	2	1
		PA																								
831	Raymond Moyer	FES																								
		PA																								
832	Shikamatsu Mukai (by: Grajdanzev)	FES																								
		PA																								
833	Roads Murphey	FES																								
		PA																								
834	Paul Mus	FES																								
		PA																								
835	James McAuley	FES																								
		PA																								
836	J. A. McCallum	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
815	Girija MooKerjee	FES																												
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
816	Penderel Moon	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
817	E. S. Moore	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
818	Harriet Moore	FES	10½	4			4	5	1½	1	1½	1	17½	11															23½	21
		PA							17½	2			17½	2	1	1											1	1	46½	9
819	T. Inglis Moore	FES																												
		PA																	2	1					1½	1	3½	2	3½	2
820	Helen Howell Moorehead	FES															3½	1									3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
821	Alfredo T. Morales	FES																												
		PA							½	1			½	1															½	1
822	William T. Moran	FES																			8	1					8	1	8	1
		PA																												
823	P. C. Morantie	FES																												
		PA							½	1			½	1															½	1
824	Leslie Morgan	FES																							1	1	1	1	1	1
		PA																												
825	John Morris	FES																												
		PA															4	3			1	1					5	4	5	4
826	Ian Morrison	FES																	5½	1							5½	1	5½	1
		PA															1	1			12	2					13	3	13	3
827	Richard Morse	FES																					6½	1			6½	1	6½	1
		PA																												
828	Robert S. Morton	FES																												
		PA																											10	1
829	W. L. Morton	FES							4½	1			4½	1															4½	1
		PA													9	1			1½	1							10½	2	10½	2
830	Phillip Moseley	FES																												
		PA	1	1	1½	1							2½	2															4½	3
831	Raymond Moyer	FES													2½	1											2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
832	Shikamatsu Mukai (by: Grajdanzev).	FES																												
		PA													6	1											6	1	6	1
833	Roads Murphey	FES																	2½	1							2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
834	Paul Mus	FES																												
		PA																			7	1					7	1	7	1
835	James McAuley	FES																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
		PA															½	1					13	2			13½	3	13½	3
836	J. A. McCallum	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
837	Robert M. Cullum	FES																								
		PA																								
838	Evelyn McCune	FES																								
		PA																								
839	George McCune	FES																								
		PA																								
840	Shannon McCure	FES																								
		PA																								
841	Orville J. McDiarmid	FES																								
		PA																								
842	A. H. McDonald	FES																								
		PA																								
843	C. M. McDonald	FES																								
		PA													2	1									2	1
844	Edgar McInnis	FES																								
		PA																	1	1	1	1			2	2
845	A. D. McIntosh	FES																								
		PA			2	1							2	1												
846	Vernon McKay	FES																								
		PA																								
847	A. D. McKinlay	FES																								
		PA					17	1					17	1												
848	Harley Farnsworth McNair	FES																								
		PA																								
849	Theodore McNelly	FES																								
		PA																								
850	Carey McWilliams	FES																								
		PA																								
851	"E. N."	FES																								
		PA					4	7					4	7												
852	"J. E. N."	FES																								
		PA																								
853	C. Nagtegoal	FES																								
		PA																								
854	Vernon Nash	FES																								
		PA													12	1									12	1
855	Walter Nash	FES																								
		PA																								
856	Vishwambhar Nath	FES																								
		PA																								
857	R. S. Nathan	FES																								
		PA																								
858	Arthur L. Neal	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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837	Robert M. Cullum	FES																												
		PA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
838	Evelyn McCune	FES									1	1	1	1															1	1
		PA																												
839	George McCune	FES									3	1	3	1	4½	1			5½	1							10	2	13	3
		PA									1½	1	1½	1			15	1									15	1	16½	2
840	Shannon McCune	FES									1	1	1	1	1½	1			6½	2							8	3	9	4
		PA																												
841	Orville J. McDiarmid	FES																			3	1					3	1	3	1
		PA																												
842	A. H. McDonald	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
843	C. M. McDonald	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
844	Edgar McInnis	FES																												
		PA																											2	2
845	A. D. McIntosh	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
846	Vernon McKay	FES															½	1									½	1	½	1
		PA																												
847	A. D. McKinlay	FES																												
		PA																											17	1
848	Harley Farnsworth McNair.	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA																												
849	Theodore McNelly	FES																					3½	1			3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
850	Carey McWilliams	FES			2	1			2	1			4	2															4	2
		PA																												
851	"E. N."	FES																												
		PA																											4	7
852	"J. E. N."	FES																					5½	1			5½	1	5½	1
		PA																												
853	C. Nagtegoal	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
854	Vernon Nash	FES																												
		PA																											12	1
855	Walter Nash	FES			4	1							4	1															4	1
		PA			7	1							7	1															7	1
856	Vishwambhar Nath	FES																					2	1			2	1	2	1
		PA																												
857	R. S. Nathan	FES																												
		PA			10	1							10	1															10	1
858	Arthur L. Neal	FES																												
		PA													20	1													20	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
859	W. R. Nater	FES																								
		PA																								
860	Joseph Needham	FES																								
		PA																								
861	Stanley Nehmer	FES																								
		PA																								
862	Carl Neprud	FES																								
		PA																								
863	Ilhan New	FES																								
		PA																								
864	Robinson Newcombe	FES																			7½	2	7	1	14½	3
		PA																								
865	C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze	FES																								
		PA																								
866	Inazo Nitobe	FES																								
		PA					3	1					3	1												
867	John J. Nolde	FES																								
		PA																								
868	Martin Norins	FES																								
		PA																			28	3	10	1	38	4
869	E. H. Norman	FES																								
		PA																	2½	1			1	1	3½	2
870	J. F. Normano	FES																								
		PA							20	1	2½	1	22½	2												
871	Robert C. North	FES																								
		PA																								
872	Henry K. Norton	FES																								
		PA							½	1			½	1												
873	C. Noteboom	FES																								
		PA																								
874	John H. Oakie	FES																								
		PA																								
875	Tsutomu Obana	FES																								
		PA			13	1							13	1							7½	7	9	7	16½	14
876	Lawrence H. Odell	FES																								
		PA																								
877	Saburo Okita	FES																								
		PA																								
878	Robert T. Oliver	FES																								
		PA																								
879	George G. Olshausen	FES																								
		PA																								
880	A. S. B. Olver	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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859	W. R. Nater	FES																												
		PA																					3	1			3	1	3	1
860	Joseph Needham	FES																												
		PA																			8	1					8	1	8	1
861	Stanley Nehmer	FES													3½	1											3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
862	Carl Neprud	FES																												
		PA					1	1					1	1															1	1
863	Ilhan New	FES									½	1	½	1															½	1
		PA																												
864	Robinson Newcombe	FES																											14½	3
		PA																												
865	C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze.	FES																												
		PA																					15	1			15	1	15	1
866	Inazo Nitobe	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
867	John J. Nolde	FES																					5	1			5	1	5	1
		PA																												
868	Martin Norins	FES																												
		PA			14	1							14	1															52	5
869	E. H. Norman	FES					2	1			5½	1	7½	2													7½	2		
		PA					33½	4	24	1			57½	5			1½	1									1½	1	62½	8
870	J. F. Normano	FES																												
		PA			1½	1	1	1					2½	2															25	4
871	Robert C. North	FES																			2½	1	5½	1			8	2	8	2
		PA																					3	1			3	1	3	1
872	Henry K. Norton	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
873	C. Noteboom	FES																												
		PA													2	1											2	1	2	1
874	John H. Oakie	FES			3	1							3	1															3	1
		PA																												
875	Tsutomu Obana	FES																												
		PA																											13	1
876	Lawrence H. Odell	FES																											16½	14
		PA																												
877	Saburo Okita	FES																							3½	1	3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
878	Robert T. Oliver	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA																												
879	George G. Olshausen	FES															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
880	A. S. B. Olver	FES																												
		PA																	6	1							6	1	6	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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881	Dorothy J. Orchard	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
882	John E. Orchard	FES															2	1							2	1
		PA							1	1			1	1			1½	1					2	1	4½	2
883	H. T. Oshima	FES																								
		PA																								
884	Lillian Ota	FES																					½	1	½	1
		PA																								
885	Pao-San Ou	FES																								
		PA																								
886	W. J. Oudendyk	FES																								
		PA															4	1							4	1
887	B. W. P	FES																								
		PA																			2	1			2	1
888	John H. Paasche	FES																								
		PA																								
889	Gerald Packer	FES																								
		PA																								
890	Pedro Padilla	FES																								
		PA																								
891	W. H. Page School	FES																								
		PA																								
892	A. F. E. Palliser	FES																								
		PA																								
893	Kung Chan Pan	FES																								
		PA																								
894	K. M. Panikkar	FES																								
		PA																								
895	Ruth E. Pardee	FES																								
		PA																								
896	Bernard Pares	FES																								
		PA																								
897	Richard L. Park	FES																								
		PA																								
898	Robert E. Park	FES																								
		PA			15	2							15	2												
899	Harrison Parker	FES																								
		PA																								
900	Harold Parlett	FES																								
		PA							1	1			1	1												
901	Albert Parry	FES																								
		PA															4	1							4	1
902	Ruth Parsons	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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881	Dorothy J. Orchard	FES																												
		PA																	2	1							2	1	4	2
882	John E. Orchard	FES																											2	1
		PA	7	1									7	1	1½	1			1½	1							3	2	14½	6
883	H. T. Oshima	FES																												
		PA			19	1							19	1															19	2
884	Lillian Ota	FES																												½ 1
		PA																												
885	Pao-San Ou	FES																												
		PA			17	1							17	1															17	1
886	W. J. Oudendyk	FES																												
		PA																											4	1
887	B. W. P	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
888	John H. Paasche	FES																			2½	1					2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
889	Gerald Packer	FES																												
		PA																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
890	Pedro Padilla	FES																												
		PA															2	2									2	2	2	2
891	W. H. Page School	FES																	11	1							11	1	11	1
		PA																												
892	A. F. E. Palliser	FES																												
		FA																			1	1					1	1	1	1
893	Kung Chan Pan	FES																												
		PA																											12	1
894	K. M. Panikkar	FES																												
		PA									6	1	6	1					1½	1							1½	1	7½	2
895	Ruth E. Pardee	FES																												
		PA													3½	2											3½	2	3½	2
896	Bernard Pares	FES																												
		PA													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
897	Richard L. Park	FES																			10	3					10	3	10	3
		PA																			2	1	1	1			3	2	3	2
898	Robert E. Park	FES																												
		PA																											15	2
899	Harrison Parker	FES																												
		PA																	12	1							12	1	12	1
900	Harold Parlett	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
901	Albert Parry	FES																												
		PA																											4	1
902	Ruth Parsons	FES									2½	1	2½	1	2½	1											2½	1	5	2
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

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903	P. H. Partridge	FES																								
		PA																								
904	Surendra J. Patel	FES																								
		PA																								
905	George F. Patrick	FES																								
		PA									½	1	½	1												
906	J. A. Patterson	FES																								
		PA																								
907	H. S. Patton	FES																								
		PA													3½	1									3½	1
908	Prasert Patumanon	FES																								
		PA																								
909	Robert Payne	FES																								
		PA																								
910	Melvin Tun Pe	FES																								
		PA																								
911	Cyrus H. Peake	FES																								
		PA							9	1	½	1	9½	2			3	1					1	1	4	2
912	Thomas P. Peardon	FES																								
		PA																								
913	B. R. Pearn	FES																								
		PA																								
914	F. A. Pearson	FES																								
		PA	3	1									3	1												
915	Graham Peck	FES																								
		PA																								
916	Nathaniel Peffer	FES																								
		PA									11½	2	11½	2			9	1							9	1
917	N. A. Pelcovits	FES																								
		PA																								
918	Karl J. Pelzer	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1	2½	1	4	2
919	Robert L. Pendleton	FES																								
		PA																								
920	E. F. Penrose	FES																								
		PA													3	1									3	1
921	B. Ward Perkins	FES																								
		PA																			11	1			11	1
922	W. B. Pettus	FES																								
		PA																								
923	G. Pfeifer	FES																								
		PA																								
924	Ward Phelps	FES																								
		PA																								

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903	P. H. Partridge	FES																							4½	1	4½	1	4½	1
		PA																												
904	Surendra J. Patel	FES																												
		PA																					1½	1			1½	1	1½	1
905	George F. Patrick	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
906	J. A. Patterson	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
907	H. S. Patton	FES																												
		PA																											3½	1
908	Prasert Patumanon	FES																												
		PA																							½	1	½	1	½	1
909	Robert Payne	FES																												
		PA																	8	2							8	2	8	2
910	Melvin Tun Pe	FES																												
		FA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
911	Cyrus H. Peake	FES																												
		PA																											13½	4
912	Thomas P. Peardon	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
913	B. R. Pearn	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
914	F. A. Pearson	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
915	Graham Peck	FES																												
		PA																			2	1					2	1	2	1
916	Nathaniel Peffer	FES													3	1	3½	1	1	1	½	1					8	4	8	4
		PA																											20½	3
917	N. A. Pelcovits	FES													5	1											5	1	5	1
		PA																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
918	Karl J. Pelzer	FES			2½	1	2	1			½	1	5	3					2½	1	1½	2					4	3	9	6
		PA			2½	1			2	2			4½	3			3½	2	½	1	3½	2					7½	5	16	10
919	Robert L. Pendleton	FES															5	1									5	1	5	1
		PA													8	1			½	1							8½	2	8½	2
920	E. F. Penrose	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
921	B. Ward Perkins	FES																												
		PA																											11	1
922	W. B. Pettus	FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
		PA																												
923	G. Pfeifer	FES																												
		PA																					2	1			2	1	2	1
924	Ward Phelps	FES													1	1											1	1	1	1
		PA																												

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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925	P. D. Phillips	FES																								
		PA																								
926	Archie Phinney	FES																								
		PA									7	1	7	1												
927	J. W. Pickersgill	FES																								
		PA													6	1									6	1
928	E. Pigulevskaya	FES																								
		PA																								
929	Malcolm Pitt	FES																								
		PA																								
930	A. F. W. Plumptre	FES																								
		PA															1½	1							1½	1
931	Jenny F. Poleman	FES																								
		PA																								
932	Robert Pollard	FES																								
		PA					1	1					1	1	2	1	3½	1							5½	2
933	D. Pone	FES																								
		PA													2	1									2	1
934	Dale Pontius	FES																								
		PA																								
935	Maj. Everett P. Pope	FES																								
		PA																								
936	Frederick Pope	FES																								
		PA																								
937	Catherine Porter	FES									11	8	11	8	28½	23	31½	24	28½	18	10½	5	39½	19	149½	97
		PA																					11	1	11	1
938	S. D. Porteus	FES																								
		PA			6	1							6	1	1½	1									1½	1
939	G. V. Portus	FES																								
		PA	5	1									5	1												
940	Eileen Powell	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
941	Ifor Powell	FES																								
		PA													11	1									11	1
942	J. B. Powell	FES																								
		PA																								
943	Joseph E. Power	FES																								
		PA																								
944	G. R. Powles	FES																								
		PA																								
945	Hon. M. R. Seni Pramoj	FES																								
		PA																								
946	Frederick Pratt	FES																								
		PA			17	1							17	1												

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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925	P. D. Phillips	FES																												
		PA									18	1	18	1															18	1
926	Archie Phinney	FES																												
		PA																											7	1
927	J. W. Pickersgill	FES																												
		PA																											6	1
928	E. Pigulevskaya	FES																												
		PA					3	1					3	1															3	1
929	Malcolm Pitt	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1			1	1									1	1	2	2
930	A. F. W. Plumptre	FES																												
		PA	5	1									5	1					1½	1							1½	1	8	3
931	Jenny F. Poleman	FES			6	1							6	1															6	1
		PA																												
932	Robert Pollard	FES																												
		PA																											6½	3
933	D. Pone	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
934	Dale Pontius	FES																												
		PA													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
935	Maj. Everett P. Pope	FES													1	1											1	1	1	1
		PA																												
936	Frederick Pope	FES																			3½	1					3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
937	Catherine Porter	FES	9½	5	22½	6	8	6	6	2			46	19															206	124
		PA					2½	3	2	1			2½	4	½	1											½	1	40	6
938	S. D. Porteus	FES																												
		PA																											7½	2
939	G. V. Portus	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
940	Eileen Powell	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
941	Ifor Powell	FES																												
		PA									4½	3	4½	3											½	1	½	1	16	5
942	J. B. Powell	FES																												
		PA							2	1			2	1															2	1
943	Joseph E. Power	FES																												
		PA			7	1							7	1															7	1
944	G. R. Powles	FES																												
		PA													2	1											2	1	2	1
945	Hon. M. R. Seni Pramoj	FES					4	1					4	1															4	1
		PA																												
946	Frederick Pratt	FES																												
		PA																											17	1

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
947	Helen Pratt	FES																								
		PA					6	1					6	1												
948	Sir John Pratt	FES																								
		PA																								
949	Lawrence Preuss	FES																								
		PA													3½	1									3½	1
950	Ernest Price	FES																								
		PA									9	1	9	1												
951	Harry B. Price	FES																								
		PA															1½	1							1½	1
952	Maurice T. Price	FES																								
		PA			9	1							9	1												
953	M. Phillips Price	FES																								
		PA																								
954	Charles H. Prien	FES																								
		PA																								
955	Alan Priest	FES																								
		PA																								
956	Ida Pruitt	FES																								
		PA																								
957	Wei-meng Pu	FES																								
		PA																					15	1	15	1
958	Victor Purcell	FES																								
		PA																								
959	Richard Pyke	FES																								
		PA													1½	1									1½	1
960	Harold S. Quigley	FES																								
		PA					5	1			6½	1	11½	2	8½	2			3	1					11½	3
961	I. H. Qureshi	FES																								
		PA																								
962	"G. R."	FES													1	2									1	2
		PA																								
963	"G. F. R."	FES																								
		PA																								
964	Walter A. Radius	FES																	15	3	2	1			17	4
		PA																			2	1			2	1
965	F. A. Rager	FES																								
		PA																								
966	J. Rahder	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1												
967	T. A. Raman	FES																								
		PA																								
968	Jeanette Randolph	FES									2½	5	2½	5	12	8	½	1							12½	9
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
947	Helen Pratt	FES																												
		PA																											6	1
948	Sir John Pratt	FES																												
		PA					17½	2			4	1	21½	3											2	1	2	1	23½	4
949	Lawrence Preuss	FES																												
		PA																											3½	1
950	Ernest Price	FES																												
		PA																											9	1
951	Harry B. Price	FES			1	1							1	1															1	1
		PA																											1½	1
952	Maurice T. Price	FES																												
		PA																											9	1
953	M. Phillips Price	FES																												
		PA							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
954	Charles H. Prien	FES																												
		PA																					6	1			6	1	6	1
955	Alan Priest	FES																	1	1							1	1	1	1
		PA																												
956	Ida Pruitt	FES									4	1	4	1															4	1
		PA																												
957	Wei-meng Pu	FES																												
		PA																											15	1
958	Victor Purcell	FES																					2	1			2	1	2	1
		PA															2	2					2½	1			4½	3	4½	3
959	Richard Pyke	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
960	Harold S. Quigley	FES													½	1					½	1			2	1	3	3	3	3
		PA											1½	1	2	1	10	1									12	2	36½	8
961	I. H. Qureshi	FES																												
		PA																					½	1			½	1	½	1
962	"G. R."	FES																											1	2
		PA																												
963	"G. F. R."	FES																												
		PA													11	1											11	1	11	1
964	Walter A. Radius	FES																											17	4
		PA																											2	1
965	F. A. Rager	FES																												
		PA	13	1									13	1															13	1
966	J. Rahder	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
967	T. A. Raman	FES			7	1	½	1					7½	2															7½	2
		PA																												
968	Jeanette Randolph	FES																											15	14
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
969	B. Shiva Rao	FES																								
		PA																								
970	A. H. Rasmussen	FES																								
		PA													9	1									9	1
971	P. Ratnam	FES																								
		PA																								
972	Bernard Rawlings	FES																								
		PA																								
973	Geoffrey Rawson	FES																								
		PA																			3	1			3	1
974	J. Franklin Ray	FES																								
		PA																								
975	T. T. Read	FES															2	1							2	1
		PA																	1	1					1	1
976	Joseph Z. Reday	FES																								
		PA																								
977	A. H. Redfield	FES																			1½	1			1½	1
		PA																								
978	H. Vere Redman	FES																								
		PA																								
979	Frederick Rees	FES																								
		PA																								
980	D. R. Rees-Williams	FES																								
		PA																								
981	Edwin O. Reichshaver	FES																								
		PA																								
982	Escott Reid	FES																								
		PA							4½	1			4½	1												
983	John Gilbert Reid	FES																								
		PA													1	1									1	1
984	A. K. Reischauer	FES																								
		PA																								
985	C. F. Remer	FES																								
		PA									4	1	4	1	4	1									4	1
986	Edwin P. Reubens	FES																								
		PA																								
987	Lloyd P. Rice	FES									5½	1	5½	1												
		PA																								
988	I. A. Richards	FES																								
		PA							2½	1			2½	1												
989	E. J. Riches	FES																								
		PA															1½	1							1½	1
990	R. G. Riddell	FES																								
		PA							2½	1			2½	1												

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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969	B. Shiva Rao	FES									12½	2	12½	2															12½	2
		PA																												
970	A. H. Rasmussen	FES																											9	1
		PA																												
971	P. Ratnam	FES																							1	1	1	1	1	1
		PA																												
972	Bernard Rawlings	FES																					½	1			½	1	½	1
		PA																												
973	Geoffrey Rawson	FES																											3	1
		PA																							½	1	½	1	4	2
974	J. Franklin Ray	FES					3½	1					3½	1															2	1
		PA																												
975	T. T. Read	FES													8½	1											8½	1	9½	2
		PA																			7	1					7	1	7	1
976	Joseph Z. Reday	FES																											1½	1
		PA																												
977	A. H. Redfield	FES																												
		PA																												
978	H. Vere Redman	FES																											2	1
		PA					2	1					2	1																
979	Frederick Rees	FES																			1½	1					1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
980	D. R. Rees-Williams	FES															4	1									4	1	4	1
		PA																	1	1					1	1	2	2	2	2
981	Edwin O. Reichshaver	FES															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
982	Escott Reid	FES																											4½	1
		PA																												
983	John Gilbert Reid	FES																											1	1
		PA																												
984	A. K. Reischauer	FES																					1	1			1	1	1	1
		PA																												
985	C. F. Remer	FES																											8	2
		PA																			14	3			6	1	20	4	20	4
986	Edwin P. Reubens	FES																											5½	1
		PA																												
987	Lloyd P. Rice	FES																												
		PA																												
988	I. A. Richards	FES																											2½	1
		PA																											1½	1
989	E. J. Riches	FES	1½	1									1½	1															1½	1
		PA																												
990	R. G. Riddell	FES																											2½	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
991	John Ridley	FES																								
		PA																								
992	Victor Rienaecker	FES																								
		PA																								
993	Fred W. Riggs	FES																								
		PA																								
994	W. F. Rivers	FES																								
		PA																								
995	James R. Roach	FES																								
		PA																								
996	Charles Robequain	FES																								
		PA									2	1	2	1												
997	Stephen H. Roberts	FES																								
		PA			14	1							14	1												
998	C. J. Robertson	FES																								
		PA													11	1									11	1
999	Jean de La Roche	FES																								
		PA																								
1000	Glen Roekley	FES																								
		PA																								
1001	Charles P. Roekwood	FES																								
		PA																								
1002	H. R. Rodwell	FES																								
		PA																								
1003	Earl Rolph	FES																								
		PA																								
1004	Agnes Roman	FES																								
		PA																								
1005	V. Romm	FES																								
		PA									3	2	3	2												
1006	Carlos P. Romulo	FES																								
		PA																								
1007	William Ronan	FES																								
		PA													10	1									10	1
1008	Ernest C. Ropes	FES																								
		PA																								
1009	Nicholas Roosevelt	FES																								
		PA																	7	1					7	1
1010	S. Rose	FES																								
		PA																								
1011	Alma Rosenthal	FES																								
		PA			8	9	9	14					17	23												
1012	Lawrence K. Rosinger	FES																					2	1	2	1
		PA													1	1	1	1	8	1	30½	3	19	3	59½	9

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
991	John Ridley	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
992	Victor Rienaecker	FES																												
		PA															2	1									2	1	2	1
993	Fred W. Riggs	FES									1½	1	1½	1			5½	2					12½	2			18	4	19½	5
		PA																												
994	W. F. Rivers	FES																							3	1	3	1	3	1
		PA																												
995	James R. Roach	FES																					4	1	8	2	12	3	12	3
		PA																												
996	Charles Robequain	FES																												
		PA															2	1									2	1	4	2
997	Stephen H. Roberts	FES																												
		PA																											14	1
998	C. J. Robertson	FES																												
		PA																											11	1
999	Jean de La Roche	FES																												
		PA							1	1	14	1	15	2															15	2
1000	Glen Rockley	FES					4½	1					4½	1															4½	1
		PA																												
1001	Charles P. Rockwood	FES																			1	1	1	1			2	2	2	2
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
1002	H. R. Rodwell	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
1003	Earl Rolph	FES																												
		PA	1½	1									1½	1															1½	1
1004	Agnes Roman	FES									4½	1	4½	1															4½	1
		PA													14	1											14	1	14	1
1005	V. Romm	FES																												
		PA																											3	2
1006	Carlos P. Romulo	FES							5	1			5	1															5	1
		PA																												
1007	William Ronan	FES																												
		PA																											10	1
1008	Ernest C. Ropes	FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
		PA															5½	2									5½	2	5½	2
1009	Nicholas Roosevelt	FES																												
		PA																											7	1
1010	S. Rose	FES																												
		PA																					½	1			½	1	½	1
1011	Alma Rosenthal	FES																												
		PA																											17	23
1012	Lawrence K. Rosinger	FES			4½	1							4½	1					5½	1	6½	2	2	1			14	4	20½	6
		PA	2½	1	2½	2							5	3							1	1	1½	1			2½	2	67	14

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1013	Herbert Rosinski	FES																								
		PA																	10½	2					10½	2
1014	G. A. Johnston Ross	FES																								
		PA					2	1					2	1												
1015	Lloyd Ross	FES																								
		PA																								
1016	Fred J. Rossiter	FES																								
		PA																								
1017	Andrew Roth	FES																					1	1	1	1
		PA																								
1018	Cecile Rothe	FES																								
		PA									31½	3	31½	3												
1019	David Nelson Rowe	FES																								
		PA																								
1020	Newton Rowell	FES																								
		PA					2½	2					2½	2												
1021	D. W. Rowland	FES																								
		PA	3	2									3	2												
1022	Manuel Roxas	FES																								
		PA																								
1023	P. M. Roxby	FES																								
		PA							3	1			3	1					3	1					3	1
1024	M. N. Roy	FES																								
		PA																								
1025	Masamichi Royama	FES																								
		PA					4	1					4	1												
1026	Barnard Rubin	FES																								
		PA																								
1027	Beatrice G. Ruebens	FES																								
		PA																								
1028	Gaston Rueff	FES																								
		PA																								
1029	W. Carl Rufus	FES																								
		PA																								
1030	Shintaro Ryu	FES																								
		PA																								
1031	G. H. S.	FES																								
		PA			1	1							1	1												
1032	K. R. Sabarwal	FES																								
		PA																								
1033	Milton Sacks	FES																								
		PA																								
1034	A. L. Sadler	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1013	Herbert Rosinski	FES																											10½	2
		PA																												
1014	G. A. Johnston Ross	FES																											2	1
		PA																											10	3
1015	Lloyd Ross	FES					5	2					5	2											5	1	5	1		
		PA																											2	1
1016	Fred J. Rossiter	FES			2	1							2	1																
		PA																											2	2
1017	Andrew Roth	FES	1	1					3	2			1	1															3	2
		PA											3	2															31½	3
1018	Cecile Rotho	FES							6½	2	5	2	11½	4			9½	2	1½	1							11	3	22½	7
		PA									17½	2	17½	2															17½	2
1019	David Nelson Rowe	FES																												
		PA																											2½	2
1020	Newton Rowell	FES																												
		PA																											3	2
1021	D. W. Rowland	FES																											1	1
		PA													1	1														
1022	Manuel Roxas	FES																											6	2
		PA																											6	1
1023	P. M. Roxby	FES																											14	1
		PA																												
1021	M. N. Roy	FES					6	1					6	1															4	1
		PA																												
1025	Masamichi Royama	FES																											½	1
		PA													½	1													½	1
1026	Barnard Rubin	FES																											3½	1
		PA													3½	1													3½	1
1027	Beatrice G. Ruebens	FES																												
		PA																												
1028	Gaston Rueff	FES																											38½	5
		PA							1	2	37½	3	38½	5															1	1
1029	W. Carl Rufus	FES									1	1	1	1																
		PA																											4	1
1030	Shintaro Ryu	FES																							4	1	4	1		
		PA																											1	1
1031	G. H. S	FES																												
		PA																												
1032	K. R. Sabarwal	FES																							½	1	½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1033	Milton Sacks	FES																					21	1			21	1	21	1
		PA																												
1034	A. L. Sadler	FES																	1½	1	1	1					2½	2	2½	2
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1035	T. H. Sagar	FES																								
		PA																								
1036	Soichi Saito	FES																								
		PA			4	1							4	1												
1037	K. G. Saiyidain	FES																								
		PA																								
1038	Shio Sakanishi	FES																								
		PA																								
1039	Alfred Salmony	FES																								
		PA																					1	1	1	1
1040	Lawrence Salisbury	FES																								
		PA																								
1041	Arthur Salter	FES																								
		PA															2½	1							2½	1
1042	Sir Herbert Samuel	FES																								
		PA					3	1					3	1												
1043	H. K. Sang	FES																								
		PA																								
1044	George B. Sansom	FES																								
		PA							34	1			34	1					3½	1					3½	1
1045	Gerald Samson	FES																								
		PA																								
1046	Sao-Ke Alfred Sze	FES																								
		PA																								
1047	Pura Santillan-Castrence	FES																								
		PA																								
1048	Bienvenido N. Santos	FES																								
		PA																								
1049	Bertram D. Sarafam	FES																								
		PA																								
1050	Albert Sarraut	FES																								
		PA													6	1									6	1
1051	Kenneth Saunders	FES																								
		PA	38½	5	10	2	3	1					51½	8												
1052	Alfred Sauvy	FES																								
		PA																								
1053	Ruth Savord	FES																								
		PA									1	1	1	1												
1054	Beatrice Sawer	FES																								
		PA																								
1055	Robert A. Scalapino	FES																								
		PA																								
1056	Joseph B. Schechtman	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1035	T. H. Sagar	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
1036	Soichi Saito	FES																												
		PA																											4	1
1037	K. G. Saiyidain	FES																					1½	1			1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
1038	Shio Sakanishi	FES																												
		PA	1½	1									1½	1															1½	1
1039	Alfred Salmony	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
1040	Lawrence Salisbury	FES							5½	2	18	6	23½	8	9½	5			4	2							13½	7	37	15
		PA									½	1	½	1															½	1
1041	Arthur Salter	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
1042	Sir Herbert Samuel	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
1043	H. K. Sang	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
1044	George B. Sansom	FES													½	1					2	1					2½	2	2½	2
		PA			2½	1	5½	3	2	1			10	5	3	1					4	2	1½	1	7	1	15½	5	63	12
1045	Gerald Samson	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
1046	Sao-Ke Alfred Sze	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
1047	Pura Santillan-Castrence	FES																												
		PA															½	1									½	1	½	1
1048	Bienvenido N. Santos	FES			2	1							2	1															2	1
		PA																												
1049	Bertram D. Sarafian	FES													3½	1											3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
1050	Albert Sarraut	FES																												
		PA																											6	1
1051	Kenneth Saunders	FES																												
		PA																											51½	8
1052	Alfred Sauvy	FES																												
		PA															1½	1									1½	1	1½	1
1053	Ruth Savord	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
1054	Beatrice Sawer	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
1055	Robert A. Scalapino	FES																					½	1	4½	1	5	2	5	2
		PA																												
1056	Joseph B. Schechtman	FES																												
		PA																							8	1	8	1	8	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1057	A. Arthur Schiller	FES																								
		PA											2	1	10	1									10	1
1058	Preston Schoyer	FES																								
		PA																								
1059	B. Schrieke	FES																								
		PA															16	1							16	1
1060	Frederic D. Schulthers	FES																								
		PA													1½	1									1½	1
1061	Frederick L. Schuman	FES																								
		PA									2½	1	2½	1												
1062	Elizabeth B. Schumpeter	FES																	7	1					7	1
		PA																			18	1			18	1
1063	Benjamin Schwartz	FES																								
		PA																								
1064	Leonard J. Schweitzer	FES																								
		PA															2½	1							2½	1
1065	E. K. Scott	FES																								
		PA																								
1066	F. R. Scott	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1			1½	
1067	William O. Scroggs	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
1068	P. J. Searles	FES																								
		PA																								
1069	Edward G. Seidensticker	FES																								
		PA																								
1070	Max Seitelman	FES																								
		PA																								
1071	Yasushi Sekiguchi	FES																								
		PA																	16	1					16	1
1072	Hilda Selwyn-Clarke	FES																								
		PA																								
1073	Gertrude Emerson Sen	FES																								
		PA																								
1074	Carlo Sforza	FES																								
		PA																								
1075	Judy Shahn	FES																								
		PA																								
1076	Eileen Shanahan	FES																								
		PA																								
1077	R. Lauriston Sharp	FES																								
		PA													2½	2									2½	2
1078	Glenn Shaw	FES																								
		PA									10	1	10	1												

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1057	A. Arthur Schiller	FES															1	1							½	1	1½	2	1½	2
		PA							11	1			11	1															23	3
1058	Preston Schoyer	FES																												
		PA			1½	1							1½	1	1	1											1	1	2½	2
1059	B. Schrieke	FES																												
		PA																											16	1
1060	Frederic D. Schulthers	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1061	Frederick L. Schuman	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
1062	Elizabeth B. Schumpeter	FES																											7	1
		PA																											18	1
1063	Benjamin Schwartz	FES																			4½	1					4½	1	4½	1
		PA																												
1064	Leonard J. Schweitzer	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
1065	E. K. Scott	FES																												
		PA																	1½	1							1½	1	1½	1
1066	F. R. Scott	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1067	William O. Scroggs	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1068	P. J. Searles	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
1069	Edward G. Seidensticker	FES																							3½	1	3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
1070	Max Seitelman	FES															5	2	3½	2							8½	4	8½	4
		PA																												
1071	Yasushi Sekignchi	FES																												
		PA																											16	1
1072	Hilda Selwyn-Clarke	FES															3½	1									3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
1073	Gertrude Emerson Sen	FES															½	1									½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1074	Carlo Sforza	FES																												
		PA			1	1							1	1															1	1
1075	Judy Shahn	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1076	Eileen Shanahan	FES					1	1					1	1															1	1
		PA																												
1077	R. Lauriston Sharp	FES													9½	2							4½	1			14	2	14	2
		PA															3	1									3	1	5½	3
1078	Glenn Shaw	FES																												
		PA																											10	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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1079	Lt. Robert B. Sheeks, U. S. M. C.	FES																								
		PA																								
1080	George F. Sheldon	FES																								
		PA																								
1081	Jack Shepherd	FES																	3½	1	30	18	17	8	50½	27
		PA																					12½	2	12½	2
1082	Wm. R. Sheppard	FES																								
		PA									8	1	8	1												
1083	Latif Ahmad Sherwani	FES																								
		PA																								
1084	Tetsujiri Shidachi	FES																								
		PA	2	1									2	1												
1085	Chao-Ying Shih	FES																								
		PA													1	1									1	1
1086	Heng-Kuo Shih	FES																								
		PA																								
1087	Russell G. Shimau	FES									12½	2	12½	2	½	1	3½	3	4	4	5½	1			13½	9
		PA							3	1			3	1												
1088	James H. Shoemaker	FES																								
		PA																								
1089	James T. Shotwell	FES																								
		PA			9	1	1½	1					10½	2												
1090	Krishnalal Shridharani	FES																								
		PA																								
1091	Hsi-Hsu Shu	FES																								
		PA			20	1							20	1												
1092	George M. Sinclair	FES																								
		PA																								
1093	Anup Singh	FES																								
		PA																								
1094	B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya	FES																								
		PA																								
1095	P. H. W. Sitsen	FES																								
		PA																								
1096	G. William Skinner	FES																								
		PA																								
1097	Frank W. Slack	FES																								
		PA																								
1098	J. Slaski	FES																								
		PA																								
1099	Edward G. Swidensticker	FES																								
		PA																								
1100	Bradford Smith	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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1079	Lt. Robert B. Sheeks, U. S. M. C.	FES									5	1	5	1															5	1
		PA																												
1080	George F. Sheldon	FES													5	1			3½	1							8½	2	8½	2
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
1081	Jack Shepherd	FES																											50½	27
		PA																											12½	2
1082	Wm. R. Sheppard	FES																											8	1
		PA																												
1083	Latif Ahmad Sherwani	FES																											7	1
		PA																			7	1					7	1		
1084	Tetsujiri Shidachi	FES																											2	1
		PA																												
1085	Chao-Ying Shih	FES																											1	1
		PA																												
1086	Heng-Kuo Shih	FES																											9½	2
		PA															8	1	1½	1							9½	2		
1087	Russell G. Shiman	FES																											26	11
		PA																											3	1
1088	James H. Shoemaker	FES																												
		PA													11	1											11	1	11	1
1089	James T. Shotwell	FES																												
		PA																											10½	2
1090	Krishnalal Shridharani	FES																												
		PA	16	1									16	1															16	1
1091	Hsi-Hsu Shu	FES																												
		PA																											20	1
1092	George M. Sinclair	FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1093	Anup Singh	FES					6½	2					6½	2															6½	2
		PA							½	1			½	1															½	1
1094	B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya	FES																												
		PA																					½	1			½	1	½	1
1095	P. H. W. Sitsen	FES							4	1			4	1															4	1
		PA																												
1096	G. William Skinner	FES																												
		PA																							16	1	16	1	16	1
1097	Frank W. Slack	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1098	J. Slaski	FES																												
		PA																			1½	1					1½	1	1½	1
1099	Edward G. Seidensticker	FES																							5	1	5	1	5	1
		PA																												
1100	Bradford Smith	FES													4½	1											4½	1	4½	1
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1101	C. P. Smith	FES																								
		PA																								
1102	Edwin K. Smith	FES																								
		PA																								
1103	Elmer R. Smith	FES																								
		PA																								
1104	Fayette Smith	FES																			2½	2	1½	1	4	3
		PA																								
1105	Guy Harold Smith	FES																								
		PA																								
1106	M. Paske Smith	FES																								
		PA			2	1							2	1												
1107	N. Skeene Smith	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1							½	1			½	1
1108	Rennie Smith	FES																								
		PA					5	1					5	1												
1109	Warren D. Smith	FES																								
		PA																					2	1	2	1
1110	Wilfred Smith	FES																								
		PA																	1½	1					1½	1
1111	Helen Smyth	FES																								
		PA																								
1112	Marion W. Smith	FES																								
		PA																								
1113	Wilfred Cantwell Smith	FES																								
		PA																								
1114	Lewis C. Smythe	FES																								
		PA																								
1115	Lord Snell	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
1116	Edgar Snow	FES																								
		PA															10	1	2½	1					12½	2
1117	Dr. Soebandrio	FES																								
		PA																								
1118	Shigeo Soga	FES																								
		PA			1	1							1	1												
1119	Phillip L. Soljak	FES																								
		PA																								
1120	Jane Sommerich	FES																					3	3	3	3
		PA																								
1121	N. V. Sovani	FES																								
		PA																								
1122	F. H. Soward	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1101	C. P. Smith	FES																												
		PA					1	1					1	1															1	1
1102	Edwin K. Smith	FES									1	1	1	1															1	1
		PA																												
1103	Elmer R. Smith	FES																			2	1					2	1	2	1
		PA																												
1104	Fayette Smith	FES																											4	3
		PA																												
1105	Guy Harold Smith	FES																												
		PA									½	1	½	1															½	1
1106	M. Paske Smith	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1107	N. Skeene Smith	FES																												
		PA																											2	2
1108	Rennie Smith	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
1109	Warren D. Smith	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1110	Wilfred Smith	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1111	Helen Smyth	FES													3½	1											3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
1112	Marion W. Smith	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
1113	Wilfred Cantwell Smith	FES																												
		PA																							1	1	1	1	1	1
1114	Lewis C. Smythe	FES									1	1	1	1															1	1
		PA																												
1115	Lord Snell	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1116	Edgar Snow	FES																												
		PA																											12½	2
1117	Dr. Soebandrio	FES																	3	1							3	1	3	1
		PA																												
1118	Shigeo Soga	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
1119	Phillip L. Soljak	FES													2	1											2	1	2	1
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
1120	Jane Sommerich	FES																											3	3
		PA																												
1121	N. V. Sovani	FES																												
		PA																							1½	1	1½	1	1½	1
1122	F. H. Soward	FES																							½	1	½	1	½	1
		PA																												

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1123	F. H. Soward	FES																								
		PA					3½	2					3½	2			9	1					1	1	10	2
1124	W. F. Spalding	FES																								
		PA																			2	1			2	1
1125	James P. Speer	FES																								
		PA																								
1126	Hans Speier	FES																								
		PA																	1	1					1	1
1127	J. E. Spencer	FES																								
		PA																					11	1	11	1
1128	Charles Nelson Spinks	FES																								
		PA																			2	1			2	1
1129	H. M. Spitzer	FES																								
		PA																					1	1	1	1
1130	Harold Sprout	FES																								
		PA																								
1131	Odo B. Stade	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1												
1132	C. P. Stacey	FES																								
		PA																					1½	1	1½	1
1133	Staff Members	FES															12	1							12	1
		PA																								
1134	Eugene Staley	FES																								
		PA																								
1135	L. Dudley Stamp	FES																								
		PA													1½	1									1½	1
1136	W. E. H. Stanner	FES																								
		PA																								
1137	Geoffrey Stead	FES																								
		PA																			½	1			½	1
1138	Andrew J. Steiger	FES																								
		PA																								
1139	G. Nye Steiger	FES																								
		PA																								
1140	Gunther Stein	FES																								
		PA													14	1	14	1			15	1			43	3
1141	H. Arthur Steiner	FES																								
		PA																								
1142	Jesse F. Steiner	FES																								
		PA																								
1143	Joseph E. Stepanek	FES																								
		PA																								
1144	Robert P. Stephens	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1123	F. H. Soward	FES																												
		PA	1	1							½	1	1½	2					½	1					16	1	16½	2	31½	8
1124	W. F. Spalding	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1125	James P. Speer	FES															2	1									2	1	2	1
		PA																												
1126	Hans Speier	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
1127	J. E. Spencer	FES																			4	1					4	1	4	1
		PA																			1	1					1	1	12	2
1128	Charles Nelson Spinks	FES	5½	1									5½	1															5½	1
		PA			7	1			5½	2	1½	1	14	4	10	1											10	1	26	6
1129	H. M. Spitzer	FES													7	2											7	2	7	2
		PA																											1	1
1130	Harold Sprout	FES																												
		PA	2	1									2	1															2	1
1131	Odo B. Stade	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1132	C. P. Stacey	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1133	Staff Members	FES	5½	1	3½	1							9	2															21	3
		PA					8	1					8	1															8	1
1134	Eugene Staley	FES							2½	1			2½	1															2½	1
		PA			1	1							1	1															1	1
1135	L. Dudley Stamp	FES																												
		PA									1	1	1	1					1	1							1	1	3½	3
1136	W. E. H. Stanner	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
1137	Geoffrey Stead	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
1138	Andrew J. Steiger	FES													7	2											7	2	7	2
		PA	8	1									8	1															8	1
1139	G. Nye Steiger	FES																												
		PA	3½	2			6	2	1	1			10½	5					1½	1							1½	1	12	6
1140	Gunther Stein	FES			14½	6	13½	6					28	12			3½	1									3½	1	31½	13
		PA	12	1			5	1					17	2															60	5
1141	H. Arthur Steiner	FES																					4	1	½	1	4½	2	4½	2
		PA																												
1142	Jesse F. Steiner	FES																												
		PA					½	1					½	1															½	1
1143	Joseph E. Stepanek	FES																			2½	1					2½	1	2½	1
		PA																					6	1			6	1	6	1
1144	Robert P. Stephens	FES																												
		PA																					14	1			14	1	14	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1145	Harley Stevens	FES																								
		PA																								
1146	Alexander Stevenson	FES																								
		PA																								
1147	J. A. Stevenson	FES																								
		PA							10	1			10	1												
1148	Downie Stewart	FES																								
		PA	25	1									25	1												
1149	Kermit G. Stewart	FES																								
		PA																								
1150	John R. Stewart	FES									11	4	11	4	23½	15	27½	18	28	16	32	16	21	14	143	83
		PA																								
1151	Marguerite Stewart	FES																								
		PA																								
1152	Maxwell Stewart	FES																								
		PA																								
1153	Oliver Stewart	FES																								
		PA									8	1	8	1												
1154	J. Leighton Stuart	FES																								
		PA																								
1155	John Stigall	FES																								
		PA																								
1156	Leo C. Stine	FES																								
		PA																								
1157	Edward Stone	FES																								
		PA									7	2	7	2												
1158	Julius Stone	FES																								
		PA																								
1159	Wm. T. Stone	FES																								
		PA									2½	1	2½	1												
1160	Russell M. Storey	FES																								
		PA			4	1							4	1												
1161	G. R. Storry	FES																								
		PA																								
1162	Samuel S. Stratton	FES																								
		PA																								
1163	Anna Louise Strong	FES																								
		PA																								
1164	Graham Stuart	FES																								
		PA	1	1			1½	1					2½	2												
1165	Frank Kai-Wing Su	FES													4	1									4	1
		PA																								
1166	A. D. Suehsdorf	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1145	Harley Stevens	FES													4	1											4	1	4	1
		PA																												
1146	Alexander Stevenson	FES																												
		PA													1	1											1	1	1	1
1147	J. A Stevenson	FES																												
		PA																											10	1
1148	Downie Stewart	FES																												
		PA																											25	1
1149	Kermit G. Stewart	FES																	3½	1							3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
1150	John R. Stewart	FES	8	3	8	2							16	5															159	88
		PA																	6	1							6	1	6	1
1151	Marguerite Stewart	FES					½	1			4	1	4½	2															4½	2
		PA																												
1152	Maxwell Stewart	FES					1½	1					1½	1															1½	1
		PA																												
1153	Oliver Stewart	FES																												
		PA																											8	1
1154	J. Leighton Stuart	FES															½	1									½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1155	John Stigall	FES					1	1					1	1															1	1
1156	Leo C. Stine	PA					2	2	1½	3			3½	5															3½	5
		FES																			5½	1					5½	1	5½	1
1157	Edward Stone	PA																												
		FES							2½	1			2½	1															8	2
1158	Julius Stone	PA																											1½	1
		FES																												
1159	Wm. T. Stone	PA															3½	1			1	1					4½	2	4½	2
		FES																												
1160	Russell W. Storey	PA																											2½	1
		FES																												
1161	G. R. Storry	PA																											4	1
		FES																												
1162	Samuel S. Stratton	PA																							1½	1	1½	1	1½	1
		FES																	3½	1							3½	1	3½	1
1163	Anna Louise Strong	PA																												
		FES																												
1164	Graham Stuart	PA	12	1									12	1															12	1
		FES																												
1165	Frank Kai-Ming Su	PA																											2½	2
		FES																											4	1
1166	A. D. Suehsdorf	PA																												
		FES																	½	1							½	1	½	1
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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1167	Walter Sullivan	FES																								
		PA																								
1168	B. H. Sumner	FES																								
		PA																								
1169	E-Tu Zen Sun	FES																								
		PA																								
1170	J. S. Sun	FES																								
		PA							3	1	10	1	13	2												
1171	T. R. Sunde	FES																								
		PA															1	1	1	1					2	2
1172	Hagwon Sunoo	FES																								
		PA																								
1173	R. Supomo	FES																								
		PA																								
1174	W. B. Sutch	FES																								
		PA																								
1175	K. G. Swaswamy	FES																								
		PA																								
1176	Roger Swearingen	FES																								
		PA																								
1177	Lennig Sweet	FES																								
		PA																								
1178	Raymond G. Swing	FES																								
		PA																								
1179	Gerard Swope	FES																								
		PA																								
1180	Richard Symonds	FES																								
		PA																								
1181	"L. Y. T."	FES																								
		PA									½	1	½	1												
1182	Irene B. Taeuber	FES																								
		PA																								
1183	Masao Takahashi	FES																								
		PA																								
1184	Yasaka Takaki	FES																								
		PA			13	1	1½	1			2	1	16½	3												
1185	Kenzo Takayanagi	FES																								
		PA			8	1							8	1					3½	1					3½	1
1186	Phillip Talbot	FES																								
		PA																								
1187	Frank M. Tamagna	FES																								
		PA																								
1188	L. K. Tao	FES																					7	1	7	1
		PA	13	1									13	1												

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1167	Walter Sullivan	FES																					5½	1			5½	1	5½	1
		PA																												
1168	B. H. Sumner	FES																												
		PA													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
1169	E-Tu Zen Sun	FES																	3	1							3	1	3	1
		PA																												
1170	J. S. Sun	FES																												
		PA																											13	2
1171	T. R. Sunde	FES																												
		PA																											2	2
1172	Hagwon Sunoo	FES													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
1173	R. Supomo	FES																												
		PA																			1½	1					1½	1	1½	1
1174	W. B. Sutch	FES																												
		PA	16	1									16	1															16	1
1175	K. G. Swaswamy	FES																												
		PA																					15	1			15	1	15	1
1176	Roger Swearingen	FES																					3	1			3	1	3	1
		PA																					8½	1			8½	1	8½	1
1177	Lennig Sweet	FES					1	1					1	1															1	1
		PA																												
1178	Raymond G. Swing	FES							½	1			½	1															½	1
		PA																												
1179	Gerard Swope	FES																					1	1	3½	1	4½	2	4½	2
		PA																												
1180	Richard Symonds	FES																					6	2			6	2	6	2
		PA																					½	1	1	1	1½	2	1½	2
1181	"L. Y. T."	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
1182	Irene B. Taeuber	FES																												
		PA																			6	1	23	1			29	2	29	2
1183	Masao Takahashi	FES																												
		PA																	6	1							6	1	6	1
1184	Yasaka Takaki	FES																												
		PA																											16½	3
1185	Kenzo Takayanagi	FES																												
		PA																											11½	2
1186	Phillip Talbot	FES																					1½	1			1½	1	1½	1
		PA																												
1187	Frank M. Tamagna	FES			2½	1			1	1			3½	2															10½	3
		PA			22	2	3	1			20	1	45	4			2½	1									2½	1	47½	5
1188	L. K. Tao	FES																												
		PA																											13	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1189	E. J. Tarr	FES																								
		PA																								
1190	Luis Taruc	FES																								
		PA																								
1191	Y. Tateyania	FES																								
		PA																								
1192	Mary Taussig	FES																								
		PA																								
1193	R. H. Tawney	FES																								
		PA															2½	1							2½	1
1194	A. H. Taylor	FES																								
		PA																								
1195	George E. Taylor	FES																								
		PA									10	1	10	1	14½	2	5½	2	1½	1					21½	5
1196	Griffith Taylor	FES																								
		PA													2	1									2	1
1197	K. W. Taylor	FES																								
		PA									2	1	2	1												
1198	Paul S. Taylor	FES																								
		PA							8	1			8	1			½	1							½	1
1199	William H. Taylor	FES																								
		PA			7	4	3	3					10	6												
1200	Frederick J. Teggart	FES																								
		PA									3½	1	3½	1												
1201	S. Y. Teng	FES																								
		PA																								
1202	Donald G. Tewksbury	FES																								
		PA																								
1203	Robert B. Texton	FES																								
		PA																								
1201	B. T. Thakur	FES																								
		PA																								
1205	Mendell Thomas	FES																								
		PA			3	1							3	1												
1206	Norman Thomas	FES																								
		PA																								
1207	S. B. Thomas	FES																								
		PA																								
1208	Laura Thompson	FES																								
		PA																			½	1	2	1	2½	2
1209	Virginia Thompson	FES															10	2	9½	4			25	4	41½	10
		PA																			1	1	2	1	3	2
1210	Warren S. Thompson	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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1189	E. J. Tarr	FES																												
		PA									1½	1	1½	1															1½	1
1190	Luis Taruc	FES													2½	2											2½	2	2½	2
		PA																												
1191	Y. Tateyania	FES																												
		PA	5	1									5	1																
1192	Mary Taussig	FES	2	1									2	1															5	1
		PA																											2	1
1193	R. H. Tawney	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
1194	A. H. Taylor	FES																												
		PA	6	1	1	1							7	2					½	1							½	1	½	1
1195	George E. Taylor	FES	18	1									18	1															7	2
		PA																											49½	7
1196	Griffith Taylor	FES																												
		PA															2	1									2	1	4	2
1197	K. W. Taylor	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1198	Paul S. Taylor	FES																												
		PA																											8½	2
1199	William H. Taylor	FES																												
		PA	13½	1									13½	1															23½	7
1200	Frederick J. Teggart	FES																												
		PA																											3½	1
1201	S. Y. Teng	FES																												
		PA																					1½	1			1½	1	1½	1
1202	Donald G. Tewksbury	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
1203	Robert B. Texton	FES																							½	1	½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1204	D. T. Thakur	FES																							½	1	½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1205	Mendell Thomas	FES																												
		PA																											3	1
1206	Norman Thomas	FES																												
		PA					4	1					4	1															4	1
1207	S. B. Thomas	FES																											½	1
		PA															1½	2							½	1	½	1	½	1
1208	Laura Thompson	FES							5½	1			5½	1			3½	1					37½	3	½	1	39½	6	39½	6
		PA																									3½	1	9	2
1209	Virginia Thompson	FES	24½	7	14	4			1½	1	5½	2	45½	14			7½	4	16	5	4½	2			6½	1	34½	12	124½	36
		PA	15½	2	1¼	1	1	1	1	2			19	6			6	1	6½	2			½	1			13	4	35	12
1210	Warren S. Thompson	FES									1	1	1	1			2	1									2	1	3	2
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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1211	M. Thong	FES																								
		PA																								
1212	Alice Thorner	FES																								
		PA																								
1213	Daniel Thorner	FES																								
		PA																								
1214	James Thorpe	FES																								
		PA									7	1	7	1												
1215	M. B. Thresher	FES																								
		PA																								
1216	Richard C. Thurnwall	FES																								
		PA													11	1					2	1			13	2
1217	J. Tideman	FES																								
		PA																	1½	1					1½	1
1218	Sa Ting	FES																								
		PA																								
1219	Alice M. Togo	FES																								
		PA																								
1220	W. Stark Toller	FES																								
		PA																								
1221	Pauline Tompkins	FES																								
		PA																								
1222	Chakkratong Tongyai	FES																								
		PA																								
1223	James G. Torrens	FES																								
		PA																								
1224	Peter Townsend	FES																								
		PA																								
1225	Arnold J. Toynbee	FES																								
		PA	26	1					12	1			38	2												
1226	H. J. Timperley	FES																								
		PA													13	2									13	2
1227	Glenn T. Trewartha	FES																								
		PA																								
1228	H. M. Trivedi	FES																								
		PA																								
1229	Reginald Trotter	FES																								
		PA																			1	1			1	1
1230	Tseng Chao-lun	FES																								
		PA																								
1231	Tingfu F. Tsiang	FES																								
		PA																								
1232	Shigeto Tsuru	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1211	M. Thong	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
1212	Alice Thorner	FES									3½	2	3½	2	3	1			5½	1							8½	2	12	4
		PA																												
1213	Daniel Thorner	FES															2½	2	4	1							6½	3	6½	3
		PA													1½	1					1	1					2½	2	2½	2
1214	James Thorpe	FES																												
		PA																												
1215	M. B. Thresher	FES																											7	1
		PA															4½	2			1	1	2	1			7½	4	7½	4
1216	Richard C. Thurnwall	FES																												
		PA																											13	2
1217	J. Tideman	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1218	Sa Ting	FES																												
		PA																							½	1	½	1	½	1
1219	Alice M. Togo	FES																												
		PA															½	1									½	1	½	1
1220	W. Stark Toller	FES																												
		PA															4	1									4	1	4	1
1221	Pauline Tompkins	FES																												
		PA																							1	1	1	1	1	1
1222	Chakkratong Tongyai	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
1223	James G. Torrens	FES															3½	1									3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
1224	Peter Townsend	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
1225	Arnold J. Toynbee	FES																												
		PA																											38	2
1226	H. J. Timperley	FES																												
		PA																											13	2
1227	Glenn T. Trewartha	FES																												
		PA							1½	1			1½	1											3	1	3	1	4½	2
1228	H. M. Trivedi	FES																			4	1	2	1			6	2	6	2
		PA																			3½	2					3½	2	3½	2
1229	Reginald Trotter	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
1230	Tseng Chao-lun	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
1231	Tiugfu F. Tsiang	FES																												
		PA							2	1			2	1															2	1
1232	Shigeto Tsuru	FES																												
		PA																			10	1					10	1	10	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1233	Charlotte Tyler	FES																								
		PA													5	2									5	2
1234	Edith Tyrell	FES																								
		PA									2½	1	2½	1												
1235	Lt. George Uhlman	FES																								
		PA																								
1236	A. J. Ultee	FES																								
		PA							½	1			½	1												
1237	Puey Ungphakorn	FES																								
		PA																								
1238	Unidentified	FES									42	60	42	60												
		PA	46½	8	3	1	7	1					56½	10			2	1							2	1
1239	Sanutaro Uramatsu	FES																								
		PA							2	1			2	1												
1240	John Useem	FES																								
		PA																								
1241	Freda Utley	FES																								
		PA															15	1							15	1
1242	Teijiro Uyeda	FES																								
		PA					8	1			2½	1	10½	2							1	1			1	1
1243	F. Van Asbeck	FES																								
		PA									2½	1	2½	1												
1244	Amry Vandenboseh	FES													4	1									4	1
		PA	26	2	5	1			1	1			32	4							2	1	10	1	12	2
1245	Justus M. Van Der Kroef	FES																								
		PA																								
1246	M. H. Van der Valk	FES																								
		PA									2	1	2	1	10½	2					15	1			25½	3
1247	Geertrin M. Van Eeghen	FES															5½	1							5½	1
		PA																								
1248	Authony Vangley	FES																								
		PA																								
1249	Mary Van Kleeck	FES																								
		PA													3	1			4	1					7	2
1250	Louise Merrick Van Patten	FES																								
		PA																								
1251	H. Venkatasubbiah	FES																								
		PA																								
1252	Ilza Veith	FES																								
		PA																								
1253	A. Ventaryman	FES																								
		PA																								
1254	J. A. Verdoorn	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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1233	Charlotte Tyler	FES																												
		PA																											5	2
1234	Edith Tyrell	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
1235	Lt. George Uhlman	FES					3½	1					3½	1															3½	1
		PA																												
1236	A. J. Ultee	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
1237	Puey Ungphakorn	FES																												
		PA																	24	2							24	2	24	2
1238	Unidentified	FES					2	2			1½	1	3½	3															45½	63
		PA																											58½	11
1239	Sanutaro Uramatsu	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1240	John Useem	FES													4	1	½	1	6½	2							11	4	11	4
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
1241	Freda Utley	FES																												
		PA																											15	1
1242	Teijiro Uyeda	FES																												
		PA																											11½	3
1243	F. Van Asbeck	FES																												
		PA							2½	1			2½	1							½	1					8½	3	2½	1
1244	Amry Vandenbosch	FES													2	1					1	1	8	2			3	2	15	5
		PA																					5	1	8½	2	13½	3	46	8
1245	Justus M. Van Der Kroef	FES																											13½	3
		PA																												
1246	M. H. Van der Valk	FES																												
		PA																											27½	4
1247	Geertrin M. Van Eeghen	FES																											5½	1
		PA																												
1248	Authony Vangley	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
1249	Mary Van Kleeck	FES																												
		PA																											7	2
1250	Louise Merrick Van Patten.	FES									5½	2	5½	2															5½	2
		PA																												
1251	H. Venkatasubbiah	FES																												
		PA																	4	1			2	1			6	2	6	2
1252	Ilza Veith	FES									3	1	3	1															3	1
		PA																												
1253	A. Ventaryman	FES																												
		PA													2	1											2	1	2	1
1254	J. A. Verdoorn	FES																												
		PA													12	1											12	1	12	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items
1255	Lt. Col. Jesus A. Villamor	FES																								
		PA																								
1256	Harold M. Vinacke	FES																								
		PA																								
1257	Leonides S. Virata	FES																								
		PA																								
1258	Frans H. Visman	FES																								
		PA																								
1259	V. Vize	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1												
1260	Bernard H. M. Vlekke	FES																								
		PA																								
1261	C. A. Vlieland	FES																								
		PA																								
1262	Werner Vogel	FES																								
		PA	5	5									5	5												
1263	H. F. Von Haast	FES																								
		PA	11	1									11	1												
1264	E. de Vries	FES																								
		PA																								
1265	"B. W."	FES													1½	1									1½	1
		PA																								
1266	Harold Wakefield	FES																								
		PA																								
1267	Selyer Wakukawa	FES																								
		PA																								
1268	Harold Van Waldheim	FES																								
		PA													5	1	6½	1							11½	2
1269	Nym Wales	FES																								
		PA																	12	1	11	1			23	2
1270	E. Roland Walker	FES																								
		PA																								
1271	R. C. Wallace	FES																								
		PA													1	1									1	1
1272	Richard J. Walsh	FES																								
		PA																								
1273	Robert M. Walsh	FES																								
		PA																								
1274	Lin Yu Wan	FES																								
		PA																								
1275	Chiu-An Wang	FES																								
		PA																								
1276	Chi-Chen Wang	FES																								
		PA							12	1			12	1	5	1									5	1

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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1255	Lt. Col. Jesus A. Villamor	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1256	Harold M. Vinacke	FES													1	2											1	2	1	2
		PA			1	1			1½	1			2½	2	14	2					2½	1					16½	3	19	5
1257	Leonides S. Virata	FES									1	1	1	1															1	1
		PA																												
1258	Frans H. Visman	FES																												
		PA									8	1	8	1															8	1
1259	V. Vize	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1260	Bernard H. M. Vlekke	FES									2½	1	2½	1															2½	1
		PA																	1	1	5	1	1	1			7	3	7	3
1261	C. A. Vlieland	FES																												
		PA																			4	1					4	1	4	1
1262	Werner Vogel	FES																											5	1
		PA																												
1263	H. F. Von Haast	FES																											11	1
		PA																												
1264	E. de Vries	FES																												
		PA															4	1			18	2					22	3	22	3
1265	"B. W."	FES																											1½	1
		PA																												
1266	Harold Wakefield	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
1267	Seiyer Wakukawa	FES									6	1	6	1	8	2											8	2	14	3
		PA																												
1268	Harold Van Waldheim	FES																											11½	2
		PA																												
1269	Nym Wales	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA			19	1							19	1															42	3
1270	E. Roland Walker	FES																												
		PA													2	1											2	1	2	1
1271	R. C. Wallace	FES																											1	1
		PA																												
1272	Richard J. Walsh	FES																												
		PA							1	1			1	1															1	1
1273	Robert M. Walsh	FES			1½	1							1½	1															1½	1
		PA																												
1274	Lin Yu Wan	FES																												
		PA																											2½	1
1275	Chih-An Wang	FES																												
		PA													½	1											½	1	½	1
1276	Chi-Chen Wang	FES																												
		PA																											17	2

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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1277	Yu-Chuan Wang	FES																								
		PA													20	1			18	1					38	2
1278	H. C. Wang	FES																								
		PA					9	1					9	1												
1279	Kung-Ping Wang	FES																								
		PA																								
1280	Samuel Hsuan Wang	FES																								
		PA																								
1281	Yun-Sheng Wang	FES																								
		PA																								
1282	Tich-Yai Wang	FES																								
		PA																								
1283	E. E. Ward	FES																								
		PA																								
1284	John M. Ward	FES																								
		PA																								
1285	G. W. Warnecke	FES																								
		PA																								
1286	F. W. Warner	FES																								
		PA																								
1287	Kenneth Warner	FES																								
		PA	22	1									22	1												
1288	L. Warner	FES																								
		PA									1½	1	1½	1												
1289	James Paul Warburg	FES																								
		PA																								
1290	E. E. Ward	FES																								
		PA																								
1291	Isabel Avila Ward	FES																								
		PA																								
1292	John N. Washburn	FES																								
		PA																								
1293	J. H. Watson	FES																								
		PA							1	1			1	1												
1294	Richard Watts, Jr.	FES																								
		PA																								
1295	G. R. Weaver	FES																								
		PA					3	1					3	1												
1296	Capt. Leon H. Weaver, U. S. Marine Corps	FES																								
		PA																								
1297	Beatrice Webb	FES																								
		PA													3½	1									3½	1
1298	Richard E. Webb	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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1277	Yu-Chuan Wang	FES																												
		PA																											38	2
1278	H. C. Wang	FES																												
		PA																											9	1
1279	Kung-Ping Wang	FES																												
		PA													8½	1											8½	1	8½	1
1280	Samuel Hsuan Wang	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
1281	Yun-Sheng Wang	FES																												
		PA																	5	1							5	1	5	1
1282	Tieh-Yai Wang	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
1283	E. E. Ward	FES																												
		PA																							2½	1	2½	1	2½	1
1284	John M. Ward	FES																												
		PA																	½	1			½	1			1	2	1	2
1285	G. W. Warnecke	FES																												
		PA			41	2							41	2															41	2
1286	F. W. Warner	FES																												
		PA																			4	1					4	1	4	1
1287	Kenneth Warner	FES																												
		PA																											22	1
1288	L. Warner	FES																												
		PA															2	1									2	1	1½	1
1289	James Paul Warburg	FES																											2	1
		PA																			4½	1					4½	1	4½	1
1290	E. E. Ward	FES																												
		PA															2½	1									2½	1	2½	1
1291	Isabel Avila Ward	FES																												
		PA																												
1292	John N. Washburn	FES																												
		PA															9	1	1	1	7	3	6	1			23	6	23	6
1293	J. H. Watson	FES																												
		PA									1	1	1	1	½	1											½	1	1	1
1294	Richard Watts, Jr.	FES																											1½	2
		PA																												
1295	G. R. Weaver	FES																												
		PA							4	1			4	1															3	1
1296	Capt. Leon H. Weaver, U. S. Marine Corps.	FES																											4	1
		PA																												
1297	Beatrice Webb	FES																												
		PA			6	1							6	1															3½	1
1298	Richard E. Webb	FES																											6	1
		PA																												

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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1299	Charles Webster	FES																								
		PA																								
1300	Camilla Wedgwood	FES																								
		PA																								
1301	Francis Cho-Min Wei	FES																								
		PA																								
1302	Albert K. Weinberg	FES																								
		PA																			14½	2			14½	2
1303	Leonard Weiss	FES																								
		PA																								
1304	Katharine A. Wells	FES																								
		PA																								
1305	Gene Weltfish	FES																								
		PA																								
1306	Edna C. Wentworth	FES																								
		PA																			1½	1			1½	1
1307	Barbara Wertham	FES																								
		PA									21	3	21	3												
1308	W. F. Wertheim	FES																								
		PA																								
1309	Albert C. F. Westphal	FES																								
		PA															4	2					1	1	5	3
1310	Lora S. Weston	FES																								
		PA																								
1311	H. Westra	FES																								
		PA																			1	1			1	1
1312	K. C. Wheare	FES																								
		PA																								
1313	L. Richmond Wheeler	FES																								
		PA																								
1314	W. E. Wheeler	FES																								
		PA																	3	1					3	1
1315	Urban G. Whitaker	FES																								
		PA																								
1316	Gerald T. White	FES																								
		PA																								
1317	J. Patrick White	FES																								
		PA																								
1318	Theodore White	FES																								
		PA																								
1319	Sir Frederick White	FES																								
		PA							6	1			6	1	8	1			2	1					10	2
1320	A. F. Whyte	FES																								
		PA																								

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
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1299	Charles Webster	FES																	2	1							2	1	2	1
		PA																												
1300	Camilla Wedgwood	FES																												
		PA							11½	1			11½	1															11½	1
1301	Francis Cho-Min Wei	FES													½	1											½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1302	Albert K. Weinberg	FES																												
		PA																											14½	2
1303	Leonard Weiss	FES													5	1											5	1	5	1
		PA																												
1304	Katharine A. Wells	FES																							½	1	½	1	½	1
		PA																												
1305	Gene Weltfish	FES									4½	1	4½	1															4½	1
		PA																												
1306	Edna C. Wentworth	FES																											1½	1
		PA																												
1307	Barbara Wertham	FES																											21	3
		PA																												
1308	W. F. Wertheim	FES															9	1	3	1	1	1			3	1	16	4	16	4
		PA																												
1309	Albert C. F. Westphal	FES																											5	3
		PA																											4	1
1310	Lora S. Weston	FES									4	1	4	1																
		PA																												
1311	H. Westra	FES																											1	1
		PA																												
1312	K. C. Wheare	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
1313	L. Richmond Wheeler	FES																											1	1
		PA							1	1			1	1																
1314	W. E. Wheeler	FES																											3	1
		PA																												
1315	Urban G. Whitaker	FES																					1	1			1	1	1	1
		PA																												
1316	Gerald T. White	FES																					3	1			3	1	3	1
		PA																												
1317	J. Patrick White	FES																					7½	1			7½	1	7½	1
		PA																												
1318	Theodore White	FES													2	1											2	1	2	1
		PA																												
1319	Sir Frederick White	FES													3	1											3	1	19	4
		PA																												
1320	A. F. Whyte	FES																											4	2
		PA							1½	1	2½	1	4	2																

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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1321	George A. Wickes	FES																								
		PA																								
1322	Benjamin Weems	FES																								
		PA																								
1323	Herold J. Wiens	FES																								
		PA																								
1324	C. Martin Wilbur	FES																								
		PA																					3	1	3	1
1325	Nancy Wilder	FES																								
		PA																								
1326	A. Curtis Wilgus	FES																								
		PA																								
1327	Hellmut Wilhelm	FES																								
		PA																								
1328	Emilio Willlams	FES																								
		PA																								
1329	E. K. Williams	FES																								
		PA																								
1330	J. W. Williams	FES																								
		PA																								
1331	L. F. Rushbrook Williams	FES																								
		PA																								
1332	W. Wynne Williams	FES																								
		PA																								
1333	Wendell Willkie	FES																								
		PA																								
1334	Francis Wilson	FES																								
		PA			15	1							15	1												
1335	C. E. A. Winslow	FES																								
		PA							1½	1			1½	1												
1336	R. O. Winstedt	FES																								
		PA																	2	1					2	1
1337	Guy Wint	FES																								
		PA																								
1338	Ella Winter	FES																								
		PA							1½	1	4	1	5½	2												
1339	F. S. Winterbottom	FES																								
		PA																								
1340	Clark Wissler	FES																								
		PA																					1½	1	1½	1
1341	K. A. Wittfogel	FES																								
		PA													1½	1	5½	1	16	2	7	2			30	7
1342	Carl Wittke	FES																								
		PA							3	1			3	1												

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1321	George A. Wickes	FES																												
		PA																	½	1							½	1	½	1
1322	Benjamin Weems	FES																	5	1							5	1	5	1
		PA																												
1323	Herold J. Wiens	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
1324	C. Martin Wilbur	FES																			½	1	1	1			1½	2	1½	2
		PA																											3	1
1325	Nancy Wilder	FES							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
		PA																												
1324	A. Curtis Wilgus	FES																												
		PA					½	1					½	1															½	1
1327	Hellmut Wilhelm	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
1328	Emilio Williams	FES																			2½	1					2½	1	2½	1
		PA																												
1329	E. K. Williams	FES																												
		PA							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
1330	J. W. Williams	FES																												
		PA															11	1									11	1	11	1
1331	L. F. Rushbrook Williams	FES																												
		PA													1½	1											1½	1	1½	1
1332	W. Wynne Williams	FES																												
		PA																											12	1
1333	Wendell Willkie	FES			2	1							2	1															2	1
		PA																												
1334	Francis Wilson	FES																												
		PA																											15	1
1335	C. E. A. Winslow	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1336	R. O. Winstedt	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1337	Guy Wint	FES																												
		PA																			9	2			7	2	16	4	16	4
1338	Ella Winter	FES																												
		PA																											5½	2
1339	F. S. Winterbottom	FES																												
		PA																			1½	1					1½	1	1½	1
1340	Clark Wissler	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1341	K. A. Wittfogel	FES																												
		PA	3	1			1	1					4	2															34	9
1342	Carl Wittke	FES																												
		PA																											3	1

Bibliography of contributors to Institute of Pacific Relations publications; Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs for years 1931–51—Continued

No.	Name	Publication	1931		1932		1933		1934		1935		Subtotal		1936		1937		1938		1939		1940		Subtotal	
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1343	Charles Wolf, Jr	FES																								
		PA																								
1344	Emma Wold	FES																								
		PA	5	1									5	1												
1345	Arnold Wolfers	FES																								
		PA							14	1			14	1												
1346	Bryce Wood	FES																								
		PA																								
1347	F. L. W. Wood	FES																								
		PA																								
1348	G. L. Wood	FES																								
		PA	7	1									7	1												
1349	H. G. Woodhead	FES																								
		PA																								
1350	Dorothy Woodman	FES																								
		PA																								
1351	Charles J. Woodworth	FES																								
		PA																								
1352	Barbara Wootton	FES																								
		PA													8	1									8	1
1353	Arthur F. Wright	FES																								
		PA																								
1354	George Wright	FES																								
		PA			2	1							2	1												
1355	Mary C. Wright	FES																								
		PA																								
1356	Quincy Wright	FES																								
		PA							5	1	8	1	13	2	3½	1	2	1							5½	2
1357	Ruth C. Wright	FES																								
		PA																								
1358	Ching-Chao Wu	FES																								
		PA																								
1359	Chi-Yuen Wu	FES																								
		PA																								
1360	Leonard T. K. Wu	FES									17½	4	17½	4	14	2									14	2
		PA									5	1	5	1												
1361	Arthur Wubnig	FES																								
		PA									2	1	2	1												
1362	Woodrow Wyatt	FES																								
		PA																								
1363	C. Kay Wye	FES																								
		PA									2	1	2	1												
1364	C. K. Y.	FES																								
		PA						3	1			3	1													

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1343	Charles Wolf, Jr.	FES															4	1					1	1	7	1	12	3	12	3
		PA																					4	1			4	1	4	1
1344	Emma Wold	FES																												
		PA																											5	1
1345	Arnold Wolfers	FES																												
		PA																											14	1
1346	Bryce Wood	FES			1	1							1	1															1	1
		PA																												
1347	F. L. W. Wood	FES	5½	1									5½	1															5½	1
		PA							11	1			11	1							9	1					9	1	20	2
1348	G. L. Wood	FES																												
		PA									9	1	9	1															16	2
1349	H. G. Woodhead	FES																												
		PA							3	2	1½	1	4½	3															4½	3
1350	Dorothy Woodman	FES																												
		PA																			½	1					½	1	½	1
1351	Charles J. Woodworth	FES	5	1									5	1															5	1
		PA																												
1352	Barbara Wootton	FES																												
		PA																											8	1
1353	Arthur F. Wright	FES																												
		PA																					½	1	2½	1	3	2	3	2
1354	George Wright	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1355	Mary C. Wright	FES																												
		PA																					1½	1	12	2	13½	3	13½	3
1356	Quincy Wright	FES									3	1	3	1															3	1
		PA																											18½	4
1357	Ruth C. Wright	FES																					3	1			3	1	3	1
		PA																												
1358	Ching-Chao Wu	FES																												
		PA																	1	1							1	1	1	1
1359	Chi-Yuen Wu	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
1360	Leonard T. K. Wu	FES																											31½	6
		PA																											5	1
1361	Arthur Wubnig	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1362	Woodrow Wyatt	FES																												
		PA																							1	1	1	1	1	1
1363	C. Kay Wye	FES																												
		PA																											2	1
1384	C. K. Y.	FES																												
		PA																											3	1

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1365	Victor H. Yakhontoff	FES																								
		PA									3	1	3	1	11	1									11	1
1366	Tadao Yamakawa	FES																								
		PA													9	1									9	1
1367	Keichi Yamasaki	FES																								
		PA	18	1									18	1												
1368	Chitoshi Yanaga	FES																					3	1	3	1
		PA																					13	1	13	1
1369	Tadao Yanaihara	FES																								
		PA																	10	1					10	1
1370	Ching-Chih Yang	FES																								
		PA																								
1371	C. K. Yang	FES																								
		PA																								
1372	Hsin-Pao Yang	FES																								
		PA																								
1373	L. S. Yang	FES																								
		PA																								
1374	Rose Yardumian	FES																								
		PA																								
1375	H. E. Yarnell	FES																								
		PA																					2	2	2	2
1376	N. Yasuo	FES																								
		PA																	22	4	7	2			29	6
1377	P. Lamartine Yates	FES																								
		PA																								
1378	Jen Keng Yen	FES																								
		PA																								
1379	Chao-Ying Shih	FES																								
		PA													½	1									½	1
1380	Seishi Yokose	FES																								
		PA																								
1381	Kisaburo Yokota	FES																								
		PA									11	1	11	1												
1382	Edward M. Law Yone	FES																								
		PA																								
1383	Sakuzo Yoshino	FES																								
		PA	12	1									12	1												
1384	A. Morgan Young	FES																								
		PA																								
1385	John P. Young	FES															8	1	3	2	½	1			11½	4
		PA																								
1386	W. Y. Yu	FES																			1½	1			1½	1
		PA																								

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1365	Victor H. Yakhontoff	FES																												
		PA																											14	2
1366	Tadao Yamakawa	FES																												
		PA																											9	1
1367	Keichi Yamasaki	FES																												
		PA																											18	1
1368	Chitoshi Yanaga	FES																											3	1
		PA																											13	1
1369	Tadao Yanaihara	FES																												
		PA																							1½	1	1½	1	11½	2
1370	Ching-Chih Yang	FES																												
		PA			11	1							11	1															11	1
1371	C. K. Yang	FES																												
		PA							2	1			2	1	3½	1					2	1					5½	2	7½	3
1372	Hsin-Pao Yang	FES									4	1	4	1															4	1
		PA																												
1373	L. S. Yang	FES																												
		PA															1	1									1	1	1	1
1374	Rose Yardumian	FES							2½	1	4	1	6½	2															6½	2
		PA																												
1375	H. E. Yarnell	FES			1	1							1	1			3½	1									½	1	1½	2
		PA					1	1	2	2			3	3															5	5
1376	N. Yasuo	FES																											2½	1
		PA																											26½	5
1377	P. Lamartine Yates	FES													3½	1											3½	1	3½	1
		PA																												
1378	Jen Keng Yen	FES																												
		PA							1½	1			1½	1															1½	1
1379	Chao-Ying Shih	FES																												
		PA																											½	1
1380	Seishi Yokose	FES																												
		PA																					1	1			1	1	1	1
1381	Kisaburo Yokota	FES																												
		PA																											11	1
1382	Edward M. Law Yone	FES																					2	1			2	1	2	1
		PA																												
1383	Sakuzo Yoshino	FES																												
		PA																											12	1
1384	A. Morgan Young	FES																												
		PA																											11½	4
1385	John P. Young	FES																												
		PA																											1½	1
1386	W. Y. Yu	FES																												
		PA																											2	1

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1387	C. Yun	FES									2	1	2	1												
		PA																								
1388	H. C. Zen	FES																								
		PA	9	1									9	1												
1389	"X Y Z"	FES																								
		PA																								
1390	Sophia Chen Zen	FES																								
		PA	14	2									14	2												
1391	Carle C. Zimmerman	FES																								
		PA																					1½	1	1½	1
1392	Erich W. Zimmerman	FES																								
		PA																			1	1			1	1
1393	Maurice Zinkin	FES																								
		PA																								
1394	Reference matter	FES			86	23	86	25	98	25			270	73												
		PA	276	1	373	1	88	1	1½	1	25	1	763½	5	42	1	26	1	22	1	21	1	22	1	133	5

No.	Name	Publication	1941		1942		1943		1944		1945		Subtotal		1946		1947		1948		1949		1950		1951		Subtotal		Grand total	
			Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Number of pages	Number of items	Pages	Items	Pages	Items
1387	C. Yun	FES															1	1									1	1	1	1
		PA																												
1388	H. C. Zen	FES																												
		PA																											9	1
1389	"X Y Z"	FES																												
		PA					24	1					24	1															24	1
1390	Sophia Chen Zen	FES																												
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1391	Carle C. Zimmerman	FES																												
		PA	3	2									3	2							1	1					1	1	5½	4
1392	Erich W. Zimmerman	FES																												
		PA																											1	1
1393	Maurice Zinkin	FES																												
		PA																			5	1	½	1	1	1	6½	3	6½	3
1394	Reference matter	FES	128	12	41	16	7	1	33	1			209	30	17	1	19	1	25	1	25	1	14	1	8½	1	108½	6	587½	109
		PA	21	1	23	1	16	1	24	1	20	1	104	5	22	1	33	1	33	1	35	1	26	1	21	1	170	6	1,170½	21

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Services, dated December 12, 1951, dealing with the case of Charles Bidien.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1404" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1404

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Please address reply to
and refer to this file no: A–2987117—Inv.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington 25, D. C., December 12, 1951.

Honorable PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This is in response to your letter of December 1, 1951, requesting full information regarding the deportation proceedings of Charles Bidien.

Your inquiry appears to relate to the Charles Bidien who is the subject of immigration file A–2987117. He was born at Acheh, Sumatra, Indonesia, on July 18, 1904, and is an Indonesian citizen of the Malayan race. His name in his native land was Sheh Bidien Ben Aroon.

A warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings was issued against him on September 16, 1948, charging him with: (1) membership in an organization advocating the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States; (2) membership in an organization that circulates or distributes printed matter advocating such overthrow; (3) being an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigration visa at time of entry; and (4) being an alien ineligible to citizenship and not entitled to enter the United States under any exception.

He was accorded a hearing under this warrant of arrest on November 1, 1949, at the New York Office of this Service. Charges (3) and (4), above, were found sustained by the evidence. Charges (1) and (2), above, were not sustained as no evidence was adduced bearing upon these charges. Admissible evidence to sustain these latter two charges was not available for production at the hearing.

According to the record, Bidien last arrived in the United States February 8, 1930, at Boston, Massachusetts, as a seaman aboard the S. S. *City of Rangoon*, and deserted the vessel at the port of Philadelphia. He was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

On December 21, 1949, an order of deportation was entered. The warrant of deportation was issued on the same date. His deportation was effected on the SS "Batory" which sailed foreign from the port of New York January 20, 1950.

I hope that the foregoing satisfactorily answers your inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

ARGYLE R. MACKEY,
Commissioner.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat which I had made of an article from Political Affairs, of September 1947, a Communist Magazine, the article being by Charles Bidien.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1405" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1405

[Political Affairs, September 1947]

INDONESIA: ASIAN NEW DEMOCRACY

(By Charles Bidien)

The struggle for Indonesian independence is at a turning point. Either the Dutch war against the Indonesian Republic will be stopped by United Nations action, or the Dutch will continue their present imperialist offensive. This

offensive will be along the following lines: (1) Occupation of all deep-water ports and major cities; (2) capture of transportation, communications, irrigation, and industrial facilities; (3) military operations to divide the island of Java into three distinct units, and to effect the division of Sumatra into small areas.

The Netherlands Government is rapidly consolidating its position in Republican territory. The fate of the Indonesian Republic has wide political ramifications for the entire colonial world, since Indonesia alone of all the prewar colonies to set up independent governments since the end of the war, has set a pace in political democracy and economic change comparable to the European new peoples' democracies. Furthermore, as a nation of 70 million people, 90 per cent of whom are Moslems, Indonesia exerts a progressive influence on the Mohammedan countries. Indonesia is of major significance to world trade, having in prewar years produced 90 percent of the world's quinine, one-third of the world's rubber, one-fourth of its tin, as well as great amounts of sugar, copra, tapioca, spices, tea, coffee, tobacco and petroleum. Its need for industralization and expanded commerce make Indonesia important to the United States and Great Britain.

All of these constructive potentialities are in danger of being lost at this time. The undeclared Dutch war, started on July 19, against the Indonesian Republic, focused world attention on Dutch policy for the first time since the Ukrainian request that the Security Council investigate the Indonesian crisis in February, 1946.

During the period from August 17, 1945, when the Indonesian Republic was set up, until the present, the Netherlands has vacillated between a policy of negotiating with the Indonesian Republic, and one of conducting outright warfare to destroy it. Discussions with the Indonesian Republic reflected mass pressure within the Netherlands; gradual withdrawal of British forces which had borne the initial military efforts against Indonesian independence; limited aid to Dutch imperialism from the United States acquired at great sacrifice of Dutch interests in the Indies; and the unparalleled unity and resistance of the Indonesians. However, the Dutch imperialists never abandoned their desire to crush the Republic and regain dominance in Indonesian financial affairs.

The policy of "limited" war has been championed by Lieutenant-General S. H. Spoor, Commander of Dutch forces in Indonesia, with the support in the Netherlands of the Right Wing of the major party, the Labor Party (Social-Democrat); as well as the Catholic Party, the Anti-Revolutionary Party, and other imperialistic-minded groups. In an appeal for additional American credits and war material on February 13, 1947, General Spoor outlined the plan of operations:

> The policy I will follow is that of the late President Theodore Roosevelt: namely, soft words backed up with a big stick. . . . Our intention is to undertake a series of limited objectives. In this way we hope to eliminate resistance without stirring up trouble over a wide area.

Within the Netherlands, only the Communist Party is calling for an end to the imperialistic war; the other, parties are backing the Beel government in its grandiose plans of conquest. The following are the objectives of the Dutch imperialist war.

* * *

1. *The Dutch imperialists aim to weaken the Republic in order to wrest major political and economic concessions in a "legal" manner.*

The Dutch have utilized the past six months of negotiations and relative quiet to mobilize a full fighting force of at least 100,000 trained men, and adequate equipment purchased with the 1946 loans from the United States. They have stabilized their positions in the major cities that were captured by the British. They have extended and entrenched their perimeters. From October 1946, when a truce was signed between the Republic and the Netherlands, Dutch forces, by agreement, took over many strategic oil areas, plantations, and other prewar Dutch properties. After the signing of the Linggadjati Settlement—by which the Dutch granted *de facto* recognition to the Republica in Java, Madocra, and Sumatra, and the Republic gave up its claim to the other islands until 1949—the Dutch set up puppet governments in East Indonesia (Bali, Celebes, and lesser islands) and Borneo.

Having limited the Republican areas, the Dutch now consider themselves strong enough to make demands upon the Indonesian Republic so as to weaken its internal structure. Most significant of these, and the one on which negotia-

tions were deadlocked, was Dutch insistence on joint Dutch-Indonesian gendarmerie to "police" the Republic. The Republic, having made major concessions, refused this obvious attempt to dominate the functioning of its administration; supervise political, trade-union, and cultural organization; gain access to the entire industrial and agricultural development of the Republic; and acquire legitimate power to create "incidents" and disturb peace and order as an excuse for Dutch military intervention. The refusal of the Netherlands to arbitrate this and other disputed points under the provisions of Linggadjati, and Dutch resistance to U. N. consideration of the issues, fully confirm the Republic's fears that the Dutch will negotiate only when they can impose all conditions upon a prostrate Republic.

* * *

2. *The Dutch strive to command absolute control of all ports, thus assuring final decision on imports and exports, and all inter-insular, coastal, and ocean-going traffic.*

Before the war, the Netherlands had absolute control of inter-insular and coastal shipping through the government-ownet fleet, K. P. M. This Dutch monopoly not only prevented the growth of Indonesian or other shipping, but was one of the Netherlands East Indies government's instruments to enforce its economic cartel system. It was virtually impossible to transport commodities even from island to island, without the approval of the shipping monopoly. Thus, in cases of rebellion, an island or an area could be starved into submission by halting the shipping of exports and imports.

In the present Dutch war, this has been a major tactic in cutting the Republic off from the rest of the world. The Dutch economic blockade has been over 90 per cent effective. Thus the huge stockpiles of sugar, rubber, rice, quinine, and other commodities within Republican areas have been kept off the world market, and imports of textiles, machinery, shoes, rolling stock, and other items desperately needed by the Republic have been kept from reaching it. This war of economic attrition has not only cost the world millions in trade, but has retarded the reconstruction and development of Indonesia by many years beyond the blockade.

This use of the blockade received wide publicity in relation to the efforts of the American Isbrandtsen shipping line in March, 1947, to purchase exports from the Republic. The Dutch seized the ship, confiscated the cargo, and attempted to hold the master and crew for court-martial. Similar actions were taken against British and Chinese shipping. In each case the Dutch tried to buy off the shipping interests and make them deal with the Netherlands.

However, the rapid interest taken by Australian, American, and British business in the great market offered them by the Republic and in the tremendous stockpiles it could produce, threatened to place the Dutch in a weak bargaining position. Therefore, one of the first objectives in the current Dutch drive has been the deep-water port of Cheribon, in Republican lands since 1945. The fall of this port on July 25 called a halt to Republican trade with Singapore and India. This will have a particularly great impact on India, since the Republic had pledged half a million tons of rice to relieve Indian famine, in exchange for imports of Indian textiles. Up to the fall of Cheribon, the Dutch had waged an unsuccessful war against this trade.

* * *

3. *The Dutch imperialists want to establish political control through puppets in partitioned islands.*

The Indonesian nationalist movement grew rapidly after World War I. The Dutch made every effort to suppress the political parties and trade unions, and imprisoned or drove into exile their leaders. Efforts were also made to buy out leadership or act as a front for Dutch rule. This was practiced particularly in relation to the feudal remnants in the islands, where hereditary village chiefs, nobility, and co-administrators with the Dutch retained their positions and titles through government patronage, Japanese occupation perpetuated this hierarchy, with the former Dutch puppets serving in the same capacity for the Japanese.

Dutch propaganda regarding "Japanese influence" has never been leveled against these elements. The Dutch have made every effort to utilize them again. The leaders of East Indonesia and West Borneo, which are Dutch satellites in the Indonesian archipelago, are prewar Dutch agents. A notable example of this tactic to divide and destroy the Republic was the recent Soedanese

"revolt" in West Java. Openly precipitated by the Dutch immediately after the signing of Linggadjati, this "revolt" was the first major effort in military operations to destroy the Republic. The so-called leader of the Soedanese separatist movement was a notorious Dutch puppet before the war, a rabid racist who practiced atrocities on Dutch prisoners of war during Japanese occupation, and now a loyal adherent to Dutch rule "for at least 100 years" over Indonesia. The recent Dutch all-out attack on the Republic was supported by the head of the state of East Indonesia who declared the war was "police action" in "internal affairs."

While the Indonesian Republic has abolished the bulk of these Dutch-preserved offices, the Dutch have by no means given up their intention to place Indonesian puppets in office so as to mask the bloody military dictatorship which is characteristic of Dutch administration over Republican areas. The Dutch thus hope to beguile international opinion by presenting Indonesians mouthing Dutch policy, and to divide resentment and opposition within the governed areas. The Dutch captured Ratulangi, Republican Governor of Celebes, and six of his associates, and without trial have kept them imprisoned since then. These men were outstanding resistance fighters against the Japanese. Their crime today is their support of the Republic and their refusal to repudiate their positions of leadership. Perhaps the fact that Celebes, now within the Dutch puppet-state of East Indonesia, is rich in rubber, sugar, and manganese has had some influence in this Dutch action.

* * *

4. *The Dutch aim to regulate all industrial changes through domination of urban areas.*

The major cities in Indonesia are seaports (Batavia, Soerabaja), railroad and transportation centers (Medan), or close to the exploitation of major exports (Palembang, near the major Sumatra petroleum and tea centers). Thus, control of urban areas actually means control over production areas, transportation terminals and routes, shipping centers, and the industrial plants processing the raw material. These actually were the first line of attack and conquest by the Dutch.

While control of these areas cannot starve the Indonesians into submission (since rice production centered in the interior is the basis of the Indonesian diet), it can make the Republic incapable of offering the people more than a bare subsistence diet. The resulting shortages of clothing, curtailment of industrial productivity, and deterioration of transportation would lessen internal support, keep it at the lowest economic level, block its political and economic influence on Asia, and keep the riches of the islands out of the world market. No government, operating under such handicaps, could long withstand concerted military or political pressure to make major concessions.

* * *

5. *The Dutch imperialists want to supervise and allocate agricultural production and the removal of natural resources.*

Exports from Indonesia before the war fell into two major categories: agricultural products and petroleum; manganese, and tin. The last three items were exploited by European and American firms exclusively; and in the case of tin from the island of Billiton, it was owned by the Dutch royal family outright. Other than spices, most agricultural export produce came from European-owned plantations. Rubber, tin, petroleum and sugar production were all regulated by international cartels. The Indonesians were primarily laborers. The wealth of the country flowed out in a steady stream. Dutch capital investment in Indonesia of one billion dollars yielded an annual profit of $160,000,000.

The economic policy of the Republic would make drastic changes in the economic position of the Indonesians, since it is based on the principle that profit from the exploitation of the riches of Indonesia must be reflected in the national income. But the essential fact is that the Dutch imperialists, despite any agreement entered into between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands, have no intention of losing their stranglehold on Indonesia's economy. In their eyes, the only fashion in which the devastation of the Netherlands, its acute dollar-shortage, its steadily increasing indebtedness to the United States, can be overcome, is to regain and strengthen Dutch control over Indonesian production and development.

* * *

6. *The Dutch imperialists strive to halt growth of Indonesian bourgeoisie and economic expansion.*

The existence of the Indonesian Republic as an economic force presents a major threat to Dutch investment, not through limitation of the latter, but as a developing industrial center. In the prewar period, Indonesian capital was invested primarily in land. In Indonesian business, such as kapok and cigarette factories, Chinese competition proved keen; in other industries Europeans held virtual monopoly. But above all, the pauperization of the Indonesian masses was so extensive that for all practical purposes there was no Indonesian capital. A survey for the N.E.I. government, by Huender, of Indonesian income during the 1920's estimated the Indonesian's normal annual income at $57 in produce and money, in cash only $19. Such standards applied to over 80 per cent of the population. There did not emerge, therefore, an Indonesian bourgeoisie; the population was an almost inexhaustible cheap labor reservoir.

However, the Indonesian Republic immediately took steps to develop Indonesian enterprise and industry. Communications, transportation, and irrigation were nationalized. Those industries essential to the welfare of the people as a whole were placed under government ownership, supervision, or control. To encourage the development of industry, the National State Bank now gives financial backing to enterprises if capital is not available. Plans to spread ownership among the people by the issuance of shares of stock at a small face value have been projected. Cooperatives are also being encouraged. Plans have been made to diversify agriculture; large European estates, which were usually centered on the most fertile areas, are being broken up to permit the Indonesian farmers to move off marginal lands, and to facilitate crop diversifications by bringing more land under cultivation.

These rapid transformations in the Republic's economic life threaten Dutch, British, and American imperialist monopoly control over Indonesia. The growth of an Indonesian bourgeoisie, not like the development of that class during the rise of English capitalism, but within the framework of a planned economy such as Czechoslovakia or Poland, is part of an intensive economic program to raise the Indonesian standard of living and industrialize the country under five, ten, and fifteen year plans.

* * *

7. *The Dutch objective is to weaken the influence of other capitalist nations in Indonesia, particularly Great Britain and the United States.*

During the first two decades of this century, British and American investments in Indonesia grew rapidly. The Dutch,. whose final conquest of Indonesia was completed only in 1908, tried to combat the severe depression that hit the Netherlands in 1900 by intensified super-exploitation of Indonesia.

By 1913, of 206 million guilders invested in East Sumatra, only about 109 million constituted Dutch capital. By 1929, foreign capital (other than Dutch) accounted for 40 per cent of the investment in crops, aside from sugar, throughout Indonesia. However, it was in petroleum, due to the lack of Dutch capital, that American and British interests grew most rapidly; Standard Oil of N. J., Standard Vacuum, Socony, and Royal Dutch Shell (British) were the leaders in the field. British American Tobacco, Lever Soap, and other concerns expanded in the 1930's at the expense of older and weaker Dutch interests.

With the crisis of 1929, the bottom fell out of this intensively exploited area. Exports declined by 50 per cent, but the *value* of exports fell 75 per cent. In 1928 the Netherlands East Indies government showed a profit of 54 million guilders in agricultural enterprises; by 1932, these enterprises showed a deficit of 9 million guilders. Through the Crisis Acts of the '30's, the Dutch tried to bolster up their position; they tried to stabilize world markets through participation in rubber, tea, sugar, tin and petroleum cartels; preferential tariffs were introduced. Nothing brought an upward trend. British and American capital, particularly the latter, made concerted efforts to squeeze out Dutch interests by great purchases of rubber, tin, petroleum, and quinine as the Second World War drew near.

The jockeying for top position in Indonesian economy was halted by the Japanese invasion; but the postwar rivalry continues. But for the advent of the Indonesian Republic, which presents a threat to all imperialism, the Dutch would have fallen before the American financial drive. However, to enable the Dutch to continue in at least the position of watchdog and policeman in Indonesia, over 300 million dollars has been loaned by the U. S. to the Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies governments, and great amounts of American lend-lease and war surplus material, American-trained Dutch marines, and a major force of

British Indian troops were put at the disposal of the Dutch imperialists. The positions taken by the British and American governments toward the Republic through their diplomatic statements, and their actions in the Security Council are designed to prevent the Indonesians from achieving full political and economic independence.

With the upsurge of democratic and independence movements in colonial and semicolonial countries throughout the world, imperialism is losing ground every day. The United States, as the backbone and moving force of imperialism is taking the leading role in United Nations discussions to preserve Dutch imperial rule of Indonesia, with American imperialism as the guiding force. Thus, the United States is leading the bloc to prevent United Nations consideration of the substance of the Indonesian question, namely, independence.

However, the imperialist rivalries for hegemony over Indonesian economic affairs continue. The deeper the Netherlands falls under American control through loans, the more desperate the Dutch efforts to force economic concessions from the Indonesians. Because the Dutch have spent two years in fruitless efforts to wear down Indonesian resistance, British and American business interests have been trying direct negotiations for contracts with the Indonesians. In its July attacks on the Republic, the Dutch hoped for a rapid conquest, approved by Great Britain and the United States, because prolonged hostilities would hamper the economic plans of all three imperialist governments. At the same time, by its token show of military power, the Dutch hoped to limit vigorous American and British economic expansion in Indonesia.

The Dutch have won their round so far because the United States carried the Security Council along over Soviet objections by having the Council instruct both Dutch and Indonesians to cease fighting without calling on both sides to withdraw to pre-attack positions or set up machinery to settle the over-all dispute. But the Dutch will pay heavily to American imperialism for this maneuver. Furthermore, in view of the magnificent struggle of the Indonesian Republic, and the support it has won from Asiatic, Middle Eastern, and South American countries, as well as from the Soviet Union, the Dutch may before long discover they have won no more than a Pyrrhic victory.

* * *

8. *The Dutch imperialists want to restrict the growth of Asian unity for industrialization, commerce, and cultural exchange.*

Since the end of the war, a tremendous independence movement has swept over Asia. A general Asian confidence has developed in its ability to throw off the yoke of European domination. The movements in various Asian countries have drawn active sympathy and support to each other. This has been particularly true with regard to the Indonesian Republic. Support has come from Viet Nam, the Malayan independence movement and anti-imperialist forces in Japan and the Philippines. Mass protests and demonstrations in India, by British acknowledgment, have led to unrest among Indian troops in Indonesia. Moreover, consistent efforts have been made to establish the closest economic and political relations between these two countries. Dutch opposition has not stopped this intercourse, but has instead strengthened international support for the Republic. Singapore, the trading center of the Malay peninsula, has exerted great pressure against the Dutch economic blockade; Chinese importers and exporters, through the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, threatened to boycott Dutch goods throughout Asia. The entire Far Eastern world has assisted the Indonesian Republic because of its political and economic advancement and above all because its united resistance to colonial rule has created a major, immediate threat to imperialism.

This was clearly demonstrated at the Inter-Asian Conference called this year under the auspices of India. Although a non-governmental, non-partisan meeting, the Conference had the highest political significance as the first meeting of the Asian people—including Soviet delegations—to discuss the questions of ending imperialist domination, and substituting therefor cooperation of all Asian countries for the joint utilization of their resources to effect rapid industrializaton and to raise the health, educational, social and cultural levels of the Asian people.

Reports of the Conference indicated that the speeches of the Indonesian delegates, particularly Soetan Sjahrir, then Premier, were given the most serious attention. Indonesians, forming the largest delegation, were elected to the Central Committee of the Asian Conference, and will continue to exert great influence in its affairs.

The moral and material aid rendered the Indonesian Republic by Asian peoples has not gone unnoticed by the imperialists. One of the important considerations for Great Britain and France in Security Council discussions of Indonesia has been the prospect of a fully independent Idonesia acting as a catalyst for the French and English colonies throughout Asia and Africa. Thus, despite the cost, despite the greatly strengthened position of the working class in England and France, despite imperialist antagonisms—the United States, England, the Netherlands, and France have operated as a U. N. bloc, with only minor differences to resolve, regarding the Indonesian Republic.

These, in short, represent major objectives of Dutch imperialism in its war on the Indonesian Republic. Let us now turn to the Indonesian people's forces themselves.

* * *

An understanding of the present internal relation of social forces in Indonesia requires a brief background survey of the subjugation of the Indonesian people, and the development of their struggles for national liberation.

In discussing the history of the Indonesian people one might go back to the 7th Century Sumatran Kingdom of Sriwidjaja or the 13th century Empire of Madjapahit. These feudal governments, which extended Indonesian rule from Ceylon to Formosa, were the "Golden Age" of Indonesia's history, periods of the development of the arts, education, culture, and the skills of trading, navigation, and manufacture. During the decline and dissolution of the Empire of Madjapahit in the 15th and 16th centuries, Portuguese, Spanish, English, and Dutch traders began their search for the fabulous Indies, the Spice Islands. From 1602, when the first Dutch traders established a foothold in Indonesia, the islands became the scene of constant revolts, which were suppressed with bloody terror, and expansion of European imperialist control.

As has been noted, it was in the 20th century that the Dutch made the most concerted efforts to link up Indonesian economic life with the demands of the Western, industrialized nations, and the economic vicissitudes which resulted brought about the mass pauperization of the people. While the bulk of the Indonesians were peasants (with average holdings of 2½ acres), oppressive taxation and substandard incomes compelled most of them to seek at least occasional or seasonal work on European capitalist agricultural export enterprises like sugar and rubber.

Indonesia came under the political influences of the day. The Russo-Japanese War, and the First World War, began to show the vulnerability of European power and prestige. The Chinese Revolution under Dr. Sun Yat Sen opened new vistas of a free Asia; the impact of the Socialist revolution in czarist Russia gave tremendous impetus to the colonial liberation movement.

Political parties and trade unions—all with a nationalist approach—grew rapidly. The railway, pawnshop, and tram workers struck in 1921, 1923, and 1925. A small organization of Moslem merchants, formed in 1912 to combat the Chinese bourgeois group, became a mass political instrument of two million members by the 1920's. The Netherlands East Indies Government Penal Code was revised to make punishable by fine and imprisonment "indirect" criticism of the Government. Oppression became so great that in 1926–27 revolts broke out in Java and Sumatra, which were vigorously suppressed by the Dutch. Political movements and parties were abolished, trade unions broken up; over 1,300 Indonesians were exiled or thrown into the Dutch concentration camp of Boven Digoel in New Guinea. The Communist Party, which led the revolts, was illegal from 1927 on (and until the autumn of 1945 after the establishment of the Republic). The present leaders of the Republic, Soekarno (Nationalist), Hatta (Moslem), Sjahir and Sjahrifoeddin (Socialist) were all imprisoned by the Dutch for political and trade union activity.

Despite all Dutch efforts, the nationalist movement continued to grow, constantly changing its organizational names and form, but acting consistently in its efforts to bring democracy and independence to Indonesia. Just before the start of the Japanese War, the Indonesians petitioned the Netherlands Government for adequate representation in the Indies Government and military training to enable them to withstand expected Japanese aggression. The request was denied as not being "practical."

The brief limited defense of Indonesia by the Dutch was followed by 3½ years of Japanese occupation and exploitation. In order to achieve maximum rice production for Japanese consumption, many of the plantations set aside for European export crops were broken up into individual holdings; because of the

shortage of rolling stock and shipping, areas were made economically self-sufficient. All these changes, made for military expediency and under conditions of virtual slavery and starvation of the Indonesian people, nevertheless gave the people the opportunity to acquire skills that they were later able to utilize in building the Republic. The Indonesians did not passively accept Japanese rule any more than they had Dutch control. A disciplined resistance movement, under Communist and Socialist leadership, organized sabotage against Japanese communications and transportation, and five major revolts in Java, Sumatra, and Borneo.

Dutch propaganda that the Indonesian Republic is Japanese-inspired has as much logic or truth as the assertion that the new postwar peoples' democracies are German-inspired.

* * *

At the time of Japan's unconditional surrender, the Indonesians had the strength, the issues and the lack of effective opposition enabling them to seize power. Under the leadership of President Soekarno, a Constitution was drawn up for a democratic Republic which provides for freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, and organization; and the right to work and to strike. Starting on a narrow Nationalist-Moslem base, the Republic has been broadened. Today, the goverment is a coalition of the Nationalist, Moslem, Socialist, Labor, Peasant and Communist Parties. In the Central Working Committee (Parliament), the Left Wing (Sajap Kiri), consisting of the Labor, Socialist, Communist, Peasant, and People's Parties, commands a voting block of two-thirds and represents the advanced political and economic position of the people. The representation accorded Chinese and other national minorities, areas not yet under Republican authority, the Christian Party and the Catholic Party, as well as to the women and youth movements, testifies to the inclusive national character of the Republic.

The Labor Party is structurally similar to the British Labor Party, although radically different in political character. Based on the All-Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions (S. O. B. S. I.), the national organ of craft and industrial unions, the Labor Party reflects the military and class-consciousness of the workers. Labor-management committees have been set up to insure maximum production: during the early crisis days of the Republic, the unions pledged to work without pay, if necessary, to sustain the Republic. Furthermore, S. O. B. S. I. is affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions. The recent appeal by S. O. B. S. I. for international working-class solidarity with the Indonesians to prevent Dutch agression shows the high level of responsibility and vanguard position taken by Indonesian labor.

Action has already been taken by the Australian Waterfront Federation in renewing its boycott of all shipping for use by the Dutch in Indonesia. The Executive Board of the National Maritime Union in the United States has called on its members to vote affirmatively that the entire membership "boycott all vessels designed to aid the Dutch in their war of aggression." There are sporadic strikes of Dutch dockers that are hindering Dutch shipping to a considerable extent. A rank-and-file motion passed at the recent British Labour Party convention called for a halt to training of Dutch troops in Great Britain. Both India and Pakistan have condemned the Dutch colonial war, and have revoked, for the time being, Dutch rights to land any aircraft on their soil.

The Socialist Party of Indonesia, basing its political position on Mao Tse-tung's writings, has worked in harmony with the Indonesian Communist Party for the past two years. This is an Asian example of the new Socialist-Communist coalitions that have developed in Eastern Europe, and contrasts sharply with the Netherlands, where the Socialist Party supports imperialist war against Indonesia.

The economic policies of the Republic, projected by A. K. Gani (Chairman of the Nationalist Party), Minister of Economics and Deputy Premier, are perhaps the most comprehensive in all Asia. Projecting public, private, and mixed property and funds for the industrialization of the country, Indonesian, foreign and mixed capital to increase Indonesian production, the Five-, Ten-, and Fifteen-year plans will change Indonesia from a backward, poverty-stricken, agricultural and raw-material exporter, into a technologically advanced state.

Any consideration of the basic changes in Indonesia has little value without a keen awareness of the imminent danger of their destruction. China and India, because of great populations, huge land mass, and strategic locations, continue as the major countries of the Far East. But Indonesia at this moment is the focal

point of attention in the Far East and the United Nations because of its decisive significance to the entire colonial and imperialist world. Unlike the Philippines or Viet Nam, where the independence forces have not yet achieved sufficient unity and a wide enough mass base, or China, where the struggle is being resolved internally, or yet India, where the imperialists succeeded in affecting a three-way split among the Hindu, Moslem and Princely interests—the Indonesian Republic has forged the support of all sections of its people in consistent revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Indonesia is the only colonial country that has proved capable of forcing consideration of colonial independence at the highest international level, the Security Council.

At this juncture, the demands of the Republic are clear: international supervision of the cease-fire order of the Security Council, withdrawal of Dutch troops from Indonesia, international settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian crisis, full diplomatic recognition internationally, and membership in the United Nations.

Support of these completely just conditions must be developed in the United States. The recent Republican proposal that the U. S. use its offer of "good offices" to settle the Indonesian question by urging United Nations action clearly indicates that American prestige in Asia has reached a low point because of the actions of American imperialism in giving full support to the Dutch. Sharply fixing responsibility for the Indonesian situation on the imperialist powers, the note of the Indonesian Republic to the United States (August 7, 1947) stated:

The Republic feels sure that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands will all agree, in view of the fact that two years of negotiation and mediation failed to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, that in arbitration by a United Nations commission lies the only and final hope of settling the dispute by peaceful means.

The American people bear the major responsibility for the establishment of such a commmission and lasting peace in Indonesia. In addition to demanding that such a fully representative international commission be established to arbitrate the issues in Indonesia, the American people must demand that there be no bypassing of the U. N. by the United States. They must demand that the U. S. recognize the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic. They must insist that no American supplies be sent to the Dutch for war on Indonesia; and a boycott should be declared here on Dutch goods, and an embargo on Dutch and other shipping of materials for the Dutch imperialist war. The action of the Executive Board of the N. M. U. deserves the applause of all labor, all anti-imperialists. It calls for support by all unions.

Imperialist forces in the United States have brought war to the Indonesian people in the past two years; it rests with the American people to change United States policy to one of friendship with the Indonesian Republic.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is an excerpt from the testimony of Ambassador Philip Jessup from hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the excerpt dealing with the Soviet IPR Council.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The excerpt referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1406" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1406

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR PHILIP JESSUP REGARDING THE SOVIET COUNCIL OF IPR

"A national council was established in the U. S. S. R., the Soviet Union, in 1934, but did not participate at all in the activities of the Pacific Council after 1939."

(Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, first session, on Nomination of Philip C. Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations, October 4, 1951, p. 444.)

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a statement from the diary of Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey from a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. We are just putting the diary itself in. We are not extracting testimony from the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The diary referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1407" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1407

STATEMENT FROM THE DIARY OF SENATOR H. ALEXANDER SMITH OF NEW JERSEY

This is an entry of November 23, 1949, Wednesday:

"We are in New York. Yesterday I went to the meeting of the United States delegation to the United Nations. Met old friends Austin, John Cooper. Also Mrs. Roosevelt and Ruth Bryan Rohde.

"Talked with Francis Wilcox re China situation.

"Went up to Assembly at Flushing. Lunch with Philip Jessup and Ray Fosdick. They are leaning toward the British who want to recognize Communist China. Also they do not seem to see the dangers in the Formosa situation."

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a study made by the staff of the research director on the number of communications to and from the IPR and Philip Jessup.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of this, Mr. Chairman, is to show activity on the part of Mr. Jessup within the Institute of Pacific Relations. I mean, the number of letters sent by him or received by him in connection with our investigation.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The study referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1408" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1408

MEMORANDUM

A study of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations for 1939 shows 262 communications to Philip C. Jessup and 128 from Jessup.

A similar study of communications for 1940 shows 91 communications to Mr. Jessup and 50 from Mr. Jessup.

A similar study for 1941 shows 10 communications to Jessup and 8 from Jessup.

A similar study made for 1942 shows 3 to Jessup and 2 from Jessup.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is the incorporation papers of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. May that go into the record?

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The papers referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1409" and are as follows:)

No. 25407

EXHIBIT No. 1409

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

We, the undersigned, being all of full age and citizens of the United States and a majority of whom are citizens and residents of the District of Columbia, desiring to form a corporation pursuant to and in conformity with Subchapter Three of Chapter Eighteen of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia, DO HEREBY CERTIFY:

FIRST: The name of the Corporation shall be THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

SECOND: The Corporation shall have perpetual existence.

THREE: The particular business and objects of the Corporation shall be:

Amended and recorded Jan. 14, 1947.

To promote the study of the problems of the peoples and nations of the Pacific area by means of cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations by stimulating attention to these problems on the part of others and by means of such research and educational methods as discussion conferences, language and other schools, Far Eastern seminars, international conferences, study groups, publications and other lawful and appropriate methods.

In pursuance of and not in liimtation of the general powers conferred by law and the objects and purposes herein set forth, it is expressly provided that this Corporation shall also have the following powers:

To do all such acts as are necessary or convenient to attain the objects and purposes herein set forth, to the same extent and as fully as any natural person could or might do, and as are not forbidden by law or by this certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws of this Corporation.

As a nonprofit Corporation, none of the income of which shall accrue to any member, to purchase, lease, sell, mortgage, hold, receive by gift, devise or bequest, or otherwise acquire or dispose of such real or personal property as may be necessary to the purposes of this Corporation.

To have offices and promote and carry on its objects and purposes, within or without the District of Columbia, and in the states or territories of the United States and in foreign countries.

To have all powers that may be conferred upon corporations formed under Sub-Chapter Eighteen of the Code of Laws of the District of Columbia.

FOURTH: The property of the officers, trustees and members of this Corporation shall not be subject to or chargeable with the payment of corporate debts or obligations.

FIFTH: The Board of Trustees shall have power to make by-laws for the government of the Corporation and to alter, change or amend the same.

SIXTH: The principal office of this Corporation in the District of Columbia shall be located at No. 3417 Quebec Street NW., in the City of Washington.

SEVENTH: The meetings of the members and of the trustees of this Corporation may be held in the District of Columbia, or elsewhere within the confines of the United States or its possessions.

EIGHTH: The number of Trustees of this Corporation for the first year of its existence shall be fifty.

Witness our hands and seals this 20th day of February One thousand nine hundred and thirty-nine.

ESTHER CAUKIN BRUNAUER [Seal]
WILLIAM T. STONE [Seal]
ROY VEATCH [Seal]

ERNEST O. PALAND,
Witness.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, *ss:*

I, Ernest O. Paland a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that ESTHER CAUKIN BRUNAUER, WILLIAM T. STONE, and ROY VEATCH, parties to a certificate of incorporation bearing date of February 20th, 1939, and hereto annexed, personally appeared before me in said District, the said Esther Caukin Brunauer, William T. Stone, and Roy Veatch being personally known to me as the persons who executed the said certificate of incorporation and acknowledged the same to be their act and deed.

Given under my hand and seal this 20th day of February, 1939.

[NOTARIAL SEAL]

ERNEST O. PALAND,
Notary Public, D. C.

My commission expires April 15, 1943.

OFFICE OF THE RECORDER OF DEEDS

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and verified copy of the Certificate of Incorporation of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., and of the whole of said Certificate of Incorporation, as filed in this Office the 20th day of February A. D. 1939.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affived the seal of this Office this 21st day of February A. D. 1939.

[SEAL]

(Signature) ——— ———,
Recorder of Deeds, D. C.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a clipping from the Daily Worker showing the candidacy of Corliss Lamont on the American Labor Party ticket for the United States Senate.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The clipping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1410" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1410

[Daily Worker, June 10, 1952]

ALP LEADERS RECOMMEND CORLISS LAMONT FOR SENATE

Former Representative Vito Marcantonio, State Chairman of the American Labor Party, announced today that at a meeting of the American Labor Party State Executive Committee, held on June 3, the nomination of Corliss Lamont as the ALP candidate for United States Senator from the State of New York was unanimously recommended to all ALP clubs and to the ALP State Convention, which will take place on Aug. 28, 1952.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a compilation of the Government posts held by Philip C. Jessup as taken from the hearings of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and also from Who's Who and also from the Biographical Register of the Department of State.

Mr. MORRIS. It is background material, Senator.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The compilation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1411" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1411

GOVERNMENT POSTS OF PHILIP C. JESSUP

App. drafting officer in the Dept. of St., Oct. 15, 1924.
Asst. solicitor, Dept. of State, 1924–25.
Asst. to Elihu Root, Conf, of Jurists on Permanent Ct. Internat. Justice.
Legal adviser to Am. amb. to Cuba 1930.
App. Chief of Div. of Personnel & Training, Office of For. Relief & Rehibilitation Operations, Dept. of St., February 1, 1943.
Transferred to Office of For. Econ. Admin., Sept. 30, 1943.
Asst. Sec. gen. U. N. R. R. A. and Bretton Woods Confs., 1943–44.
Consultant, Bd. of Econ. Warfare & Navy Dept.
Asst. Dir Naval Sch. Mil. Govt and Administration, 1942–44.
Asst. on judicial orgn., U. S. del. San Francisco Conf., 1945.
App. Consultant, Div. of Int. Org. Affairs, Dept. of State, Sept. 5, 1945.
Rep. of U. S., United Nations Comm., on Progressive Development of Int. Law & Codification, Apr. 25, 1947–Dec. 5, 1947.
January 5, 1948.—Appointed deputy United States representative in the Interim Committee of the U. N. General Assembly (That is sometimes referred to in our record as the Little Assembly).
January–March 1948.—Representative of United States in Interim Committee, dealing with—
(a) Korea: Consultation by U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea with Interim Committee.
(b) Pacific settlement: Study of methods for improving international cooperation in the political field.
(c) Veto: Recommendations on the problem of voting in the Security Council.
April 14, 1948.—Appointed United States representative to the second special session of the U. N. General Assembly.
April–May, 1948.—Representative of United States in General Assembly, dealing with—
(a) Palestine: Problem of disposition of Palestine following termination of the mandate.
(b) Jerusalem: Provisions for protection of the holy places and measures to carry on municipal administration in Jerusalem.

June 7, 1948.—Appointed United States deputy representative in U. N. Security Council.

June 25, 1948.—Appointed Deputy Chief, United States mission to the U. N.

June 1948.—Representative of United States in U. N. Security Council.

February 1949.—dealing with—

(a) Palestine (June–November): Preservation of cease-fire between Israel and Arab States.

(b) Atomic energy (June): Forwarding to General Assembly of U. N. Atomic Energy Commission's report.

(c) Trieste (August): Consideration of Yugoslav charges concerning administration of zone A in Trieste.

(d) Hyderabad (September): Consideration of complaint made to Security Council following Indian "invasion" of Hyderabad.

(e) Berlin (October to February): Security Council consideration of Berlin blockade by U. S. S. R.

(f) Israel (December): Security Council consideration of Israeli application for admission to U. N. membership.

(g) Indonesia (December–January 1949): Security Council consideration of second Dutch police action and recommendations designed to bring about a political solution.

September–December, 1948.—United States representative to third regular session of the U. N. General Assembly in Paris, dealing with—

(a) Consideration of the problem of the future of Palestine but chiefly occupied with Security Council problems noted above.

December 2, 1948.—Appointed Acting Chief, United States mission to U. N., with personal rank of Ambassador.

December 2, 1948.—Appointed acting United States representative, U. N. Security Council.

March 2, 1949.—Appointed United States Ambassador at Large. (Present position.)

March–April, 1949.—Negotiations in New York with Soviet U. N. Delegate Malik which resulted in lifting of Berlin blockade.

April–May, 1949.—Delegate at second part of third regular session of U. N. General Assembly, New York, but not actively in charge of any item on agenda.

May–June, 1949.—Adviser to Secretary of State at sixth session of Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris:

(a) Austrian Treaty: Further negotiations and limited agreements among Big Four to move toward conclusion of Austrian Treaty.

(b) Berlin: Agreement concerning access by Western Powers to air sectors of Berlin.

(c) Germany: Further discussions on restoration of economic and political unity of Germany.

July–September, 1949.—Assignment in Department of State to work on far eastern problems:

(a) Editorial supervision of final states of preparation of China white paper.

(b) Preparation for anticipated debate in General Assembly on Soviet violations of Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.

(c) Discussion with consultants on far eastern problems.

September 1949.—Adviser to Secretary of State at meeting of three Foreign Ministers, New York, including especially—

(a) North Atlantaic Treaty.

(b) Western Germany.

September 1949.—Adviser to Secretary of State at meeting of four Foreign Ministers, New York, Austrian Treaty.

September–December, 1949.—United States representative at fourth regular session of U. N. General Assembly, dealing with—

(a) Italian colonies: Negotiation and adoption of Assembly resolution on disposition of former Italian colonies.

(b) Consideration of the question of "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 14, 1945, and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations."

December 20–March 15, 1950.—Trip through the Far East and Middle East, visiting Hawaii, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, Hong Kong, Philippines, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Ceylon, India, Pakistan,

Afghanistan, including Bangkok Conference of United States representatives in area, February 13–15.

May 1950—Fourth session, North Atlantic Council meeting and three Foreign Ministers meeting, London.

May 29–August, 1950.—General and varied assignments in State Department including far eastern questions especially as a result of the aggression on Korea, June 25, 1950.

April 5, 1950.—Designated Department of State consultant to the National Security Council.

August 3, 1950–February, 1951.—Designated Department of State representative on the senior staff of the National Security Council.

September, 1950.—Fifth session, North Atlantic Council meeting and three Foreign Ministers meeting, New York.

October 1950–February 1951.—General and varied assignments in State Department including preparations for and participation in meetings with Prime Minister Attlee, December 4–8, 1950, and preparations for and participation in meetings with Prime Minister Plevin January 29–30, 1951.

March 5–June 20, 1951.—Four Power deputies meeting, Paris, discussion of agenda for possible meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

July 1951 to present.—Assignment to western European subjects, including NATO, preparation for Foreign Ministers' Conference in Washington and Ottawa NAC Meeting.

Sources:

Who's Who In America, Vol. 26, 1950–51, page 1390.

Biographic Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1951, page 226.

Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, First Session, on Nomination of Philip C. Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations, October 15, 1951, pages 842, 843.

Mr. MORRIS. It gives Mr. Jessup's connection with the Government. He has been one who has figured in the hearings of the IPR.

Mr. MANDELL. Next is a compilation made by the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service of Reviewers of Books on the Far East which pertains to our report.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The compilation referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1412" and is as follows:)

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LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

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SELECTED REVIEWERS, BOOK REVIEW DIGEST 1945

P. 5: Richard Watts
A. Woollcott; his life and his world, by Samuel H. Adams, New Repub. 112: 795, Je. '45; 800 words.

P. 26: Richard Watts
Old Leatherface of the Flying Tigers, by Keith Ayling, New Repub. 113: 293, S. 3, '45; 950 words.

P. 89: Richard Watts
Artie Greengroin, Pfc., by Harry Peter M'Nab Brown, N. Y. Times, p. 6, Jl. 15, '45; 1,100 words.

P. 96: Eleanor Lattimore
China in black and white, by Pearl Buck, Weekly Book Review, p. 4, D. 23, '455; 310 words.

P. 97: Owen Lattimore
Tell the people, by Pearl Buck. Weekly Book Review, p. 5, Ap. 8, '45; 950 words.

P. 132: Eleanor Lattimore
The Asian legacy and American life, by Arthur Christy, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, Jl. 29, '45; 1,000 words.

P. 212: T. A. Bisson
Japanese nation, by John Fee Embree, Nation 161:262, S. 15, '45, 360 words.

P. 212: T. A. Bisson
Japanese nation, by John Fee Embree, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:17, S. 1, '45; 900 words.

P. 212: Gunther Stein
Japanese nation, by John Fee Embree, Yale, R. n. s. 35:342, winter '46; 40 words.

P. 223: Eleanor Lattimore
Earthbound China, Fei Hsiao-T'ung, and Chang Tse-I, Weekly Book Review, p. 26, N. 25, '45; 400 words.

P. 237: T. A. Bisson
What to do with Japan, by Wilfrid Fleisher, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:21, Mr. 17, '45; 650 words.

P. 237: Gunther Stein
What to do with Japan, by Wilfrid Fleisher, Yale R. n. s. 35:342, winter, '46; 40 words.

P. 242: Owen Lattimore
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, Atlantic 175:133, Ap. '45; 650 words.

P. 242: Edgar Snow
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Times, p. 3, Mr. 11, '45; 2,100 words.

P. 243: Richard Watts
Report from red China, by Harrison Forman, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:9, Mr. 10, '45; 2,250 words.

P. 344: Eleanor Lattimore
Challenge at Changsha, by Paul Hughes, Weekly Book Review, p. 7, D. 23, '45; 380 words.

P. 367: L. K. Rosinger
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, Nation, 161:17, Jl. 7, '45; 360 words.

P. 367: Richard Watts
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, New Repub. 112:876, Je. 25, '45; 1,150 words.

P. 367: T. A. Bisson
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, N. Y. Times, p. 4, S. 2, '45; 700 words.

P. 367: T. A. Bisson
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, Pacific Affairs 18:384, D. '45; 1,220 words.

P. 367: Gunther Stein
The future of Japan, by William Crane Johnstone, Yale R. n. s. 35:342, winter '46; 40 words.

P. 371: Richard Watts
Stephen Hero, by James Joyce, New Repub. 112:518, Ap. 16, '45; 1,150 words.

P. 409: T. A. Bisson
Asia on the move, by Bruno Lasker, Sat. R. of Lit. 28: 14, Mr. 3, '45; 800 words

P. 411: Richard Watts, Jr.
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, New Repub. 112:302, F. 26, '45, 1550 words

P. 411: Edgar Snow
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Times, p. 3, F. 25, '45; 1750 words

P. 411: T. A. Bisson
Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:9, Mr. 10, '45; 750 words

P. 414: Richard Watts
A star danced, by Gertrude Lawrence, Sat. R. of Lit. 28:17, Ag. 18, '45; 650 words

P. 419: Richard Watts
The ballad and the source, by Rosamond Lehmann, New Repub. 112:481, Ap. 9, '45; 1350 words

P. 433: Richard Watts, Jr.
Vigil of a nation, by Lin Yu-T'Ang, New Repub. 112: 180, F. 5, '45; 1550 words

P. 461: T. A. Bisson
Japanese militarism, by John McGilvrey Maki, Nation 160: 627, Je. 2, '45; 300 words

P. 465: Richard Watts
Little superman, by Heinrich Mann, N. Y. Times, p. 11, D. 16, '45; 600 words

P. 504: Nym Wales
Strangers in India, by Penderel Moon, Weekly Book Review, p. 4, Ap. 8, '45; 650 words.

P. 516: Richard Watts
Theatre book of the year, by George Jean Nathan, N. Y. Times, p. 8, N. 25, '45; 600 words.

P. 518: Owen Lattimore
Korea and the old orders in eastern Asia, by Melvin Frederick Nelson, Ann. Am. Acad. 242: 171, N. '45; 400 words.

P. 552: L. K. Rosinger
Forever China, by Pierre Stephen Robert Payne, Survey G. 34: 450, N. '45; 450 words.

P. 570: Annalee Jacoby
My twenty-five years in China, by John Benjamin Powell, N. Y. Times, p. 7, D. 16, '45; 1350 words.

P. 570: Owen Lattimore
My twenty-five years in China, by John Benjamin Powell, Weekly Book Review, p. 2, N. 11, '45; 1350 words.

P. 573: Owen Lattimore
Japan and the Son of Heaven, by Willard DeMille Price, N. Y. Times, p. 3, O. 14, '45; 700 words.

P. 607: Richard Watts
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, New Repub. 113: 138, Jl. 30, '45; 1950 words.

P. 607: T. A. Bisson
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, N. Y. Times, p. 4, Jl. 29, '45; 600 words.

P. 608: Owen Lattimore
China's crisis, by Lawrence Kaelter Rosinger, Weekly Book Review, p. 4, Jl. 15, '45; 1,350 words.

P. 608: T. A. Bisson
Dilemma in Japan, by Andrew Roth, New Repub. 113: 473, O. 8, '45; 1450 words.

P. 608: Gunther Stein
Dilemma in Japan, by Andrew Roth, Yale R. n. s. 35: 340, winter '46; 1,000 words.

P. 610: T. A. Bisson
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, Nation 160: 255, Mr. 3, '45; 350 words.

P. 610: Edgar Snow
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, N. Y. Times, p. 8, My. 20, '45; 700 words.

P. 610: L. K. Rosinger
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, Pol. Sci. Q. 60: 300, Je. '45; 650 words.

P. 610: Eleanor Lattimore
China among the powers, by David Nelson Rowe, Weekly Book Review, p. 16, F. 18, '45; 850 words.

P. 647: Richard Watts
Rickshaw boy, by Shu Ch'ing-Ch'un, New Repub. 113: 163, Ag. 6, '45; 1,050 words.

P. 660: Eleanor Lattimore
Chinese labor movement, by Helen Snow (Nym Wales, pseud), Weekly Book Review, p. 12, Ap. 8, '45; 800 words.

P. 667: Richard Watts
Small general, by Robert Standish, N. Y. Times. p. 7. O. 14, '45; 900 words.

P. 673: Richard Watts
Challenge of Red China, by Guenther Stein, New Repub., 113: 873, D. 24, '45; 750 words.
P. 673: Nathaniel Peffer
Challenge of Red China, by Guenther Stein, N. Y. Times, p. 4, O. 28, '45; 1,400 words.
P. 673: Owen Lattimore
Challenge of Red China, by Guenther Stein, Weekly Book Review, p. 3, O. 14, '45; 1,250 words.
P. 678: Edgar Snow
Russia is no riddle, by Edmund Stevens, Weekly Book Review, p. 3, Mr. 25, '45; 1,000 words.
P. 697: Richard Watts
Building of the Burma road, by T'an Pei-Ying, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, O. 14, '45; 900 words.
P. 712: T. A. Bisson
Through Japanese eyes, by Otto David Tolischus, Nation, 160: 522, My. 5, '45; 280 words.
P. 712: T. A. Bisson
Through Japanese eyes, by Otto David Tolischus, N. Y. Times, p. 6, Ap. 15, '45; 900 words.
P. 713: Richard Watts
China after seven years of war, by Hollington Kong Tong, Sat. R. of Lit., 28: 13, Mr. 3, '45; 1,100 words.
P. 713: Guenther Stein
China after seven years of war, by Hollington Kong Tong, Weekly Book Review, p. 2, Mr. 4, '45; 800 words.
P. 746: T. A. Bisson
Asia for the Asiatics, by Robert Spencer Ward, Sat. R. of Lit., 28: 11, Jl. 21, '45; 1,000 words.
P. 746: Eleanor Lattimore
Asia for the Asiatics, by Robert Spencer Ward, Weekly Book Review, p. 18, Ag. 26, '45; 450 words.
P. 746: Guenther Stein
Asia for the Asiatics, by Robert Spencer Ward, Yale R. n. s., 35: 342, winter '46; 300 words.
P. 782: Eleanor Lattimore
I saw the Russian people, by Ella Winter, Weekly Book Review, p. 4, Ja. 20, '46; 2,000 words.
P. 787: Richard Watts
American guerrilla in the Philippines, by Ira Wolfert, New Repub., 112: 713, My. 21, '45; 1,250 words.

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Betrayal in the Philippines, by Hernando Abaya, New Republic 115; 771, D, 9, '46; 650 words.
P. 137: Richard Watts
Innocents in Paris, by Gilbert Cesbron, N. Y. T., p. 5, Je. 23, '46; 900 words.
P. 144: Guenther Stein
Sun Yat-sen, by Stephen Chen and Pierre S. R. Payne, p. 16, Jl. 11, '46; Christian Science Monitor; 450 words.
P. 144: Richard Watts
Sun Yat-sen, by Stephen-Chen and Pierre S. R. Payne, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, Jl. 14, '46; 1,650 words.
P. 145: Owen Lattimore
Collected wartime messages, by Chiang Kai-shek, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, O. 20, '46; 1,350 words.
P. 219: Richard Watts
China Cycle, by R. P. Dobson, Sat. R. of Lit. 29; 9, S. 28, '46; 750 words.
P. 224: Richard Watts
Tour of Duty, by John Dos Passos, New Repub. 115: 267, S. 2, '46; 900 words.

P. 231: Owen Lattimore
China and America, by Foster Rhea Dulles, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, Je. 2, '46; 900 words.
P. 244: Richard Watts
Wrath in Burma, by Fred Eldridge, Weekly Book Review, p. 5, My. 12, '46; 1,500 words.
P. 231: Richard Watts
China and America, by Foster Rhea Dulles, New Repub. 115: 52, Jl. 15, '46; 850 words.
P. 312: Richard Watts
The B. O. W.'s, by Gillmore, Margalo, and Patricia Collinge, Sat. Rev. of Lit. 29: 11, F. 2, '46; 1,200 words.
P. 329: Richard Watts
China in the Sun, by Randall C. Gould, Weekly Book Rev., p. 5, Ja. 27, '46; 1,500 words.
P. 376: Richard Watts
Krazy Kat, by George Harriman, New Repub. 115: 487, O. 14, '46; 550 words.
P. 404: Eleanor Lattimore
Doctors East, Doctors West, by Edward H. Hume, New York Times, p. 7, My. 5, '46; 1,250 words.
P. 458: Richard Watts
Thieves in the Night, by Arthur Koestler, N. Y. Times, p. 1, N. 3, '46; 1,550 words.
P. 473: Eleanor Lattimore
Chinese Family and Society, by Olga Lang, N. Y. Times, p. 42, S. 15, '46; 1,150 words.
P. 478: J. K. Fairbank
The United States Moves Across the Pacific, by Kenneth S. Latourette, Pol. Sci. Q. 61: 602, D. '46; 1,250 words.
P. 478: Owen Lattimore
The United States Moves Across the Pacific, by Kenneth S. Latourette, Weekly Book Review, p. 16, Je. 2, '46; 950 words.
P. 508: Richard Watts
It is Dark Underground, by Pin fei Loo, Weekly Book Review, p. 2, My. 19, '46; 1,000 words.
P. 530: Richard Watts
Eamon de Valera, by M. J. MacManus, N. Y. Times, p. 6, O. 27, '46; 1,100 words.
P. 634: L. K. Rosinger
Chinese Constitution, a study of forty years of constitution making in China, by Wei-Tung, Pan, Am. Hist. R. 51: 718, Jl. '46; 400 words.
P. 640: Richard Watts
Torrents of Spring, by Pierre S. R. Payne, N. Y. Times, p. 5, My. 12, '46; 850 words.
P. 644: Richard Watts
Oscar Wilde, his life and wit, by Hesketh Pearson, Weekly Book Review, p. 3, Jl. 21, '46; 1,150 words.
P. 654: Richard Watts
Wind in the Olive Tree by Abel Plenn, New Repub. 114: 738, My. 20, '46; 1,000 words.
P. 695: Richard Watts
South of Heaven by Lettie Rogers, N. Y. Times, p. 7, O. 20; '46; 950 words.
P. 733: Richard Watts
Burma Surgeon Returns by Gordon S. Seagrave, Weekly Book Review, p. 1, Mr. 10, '46; 1,300 words.
P. 852: Richard Watts
Soviet Asia Mission by Andrew J. Steiger and Henry A. Wallace, New Repub. 115: 83, Jl. 22, '46; 1,100 words.
P. 855: Richard Watts, Jr.
Black Ships off Japan by Arthur C. Walworth, New Repub. 115: 52, Jl. 15, '46; 450 words.
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Black Ships off Japan by Arthur C. Walworth, Sat. R. of Lit. 24: 23, Ap. 20, '46; 800 words.

P. 856: Eleanor Lattimore
Chinese Mind by Gung-hsing Wang, N. Y. Times, p. 21, Jl. 14, '46; 650 words.

P. 856: Richard Watts
Chinese Mind by Gung-hsing Wang, New Repub. 115:52; Jul. 15, '46; 80 words.

P. 866: Richard Watts
Homecoming by Joseph Wechsberg, N. Y. Times, p. 4, Jl. 14, '46; 1,200 words.

P. 886: L. K. Rosinger
Thunder Out of China, Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, New Repub. 115:666; N. 18, '46; 1,000 words.

P. 886: J. K. Fairbank
Thunder Out of China by Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, N. Y. Times, p. 1, O. 27, '46; 1,850 words.

P. 886: Edgar Snow
Thunder Out of China by Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Sat. Rev. of Lit. 29:12, O. 26, '46; 1,600 words.

P. 886: Richard Watts:
Thunder Out of China by Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Weekly Book Rev., p. 1, O. 27, '46; 1,450 words.

P. 886: Richard Watts, Jr.
Our Neighbors, the Chinese by Vaughan White, New Repub. 115:52; Jl. 15, '46; 220 words.

P. 886: Eleanor Lattimore
Our Neighbors, the Chinese by Vaughan White, Weekly Book Rev., p. 18, My. 5, '46; 1,300 words.

P. 901: Richard Watts
Victorian Doctor by Thomas George Wilson, Weekly Book Rev., p. 2, Je. 16, '46; 1,300 words.

P. 912: Eleanor Lattimore
A Chinese Village by Mou-Ch-un Yang, Weekly Book Rev., p. 19, Mr. 3, '46; 400 words.

P. 918: Richard Watts
Mirror of the Past by Kodne Zilliacus, New Repub., 115:826, D. 16, '46; 1,650 words.

(Source: 1945 Book Review Digest.)

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P. 60: Richard Watts
Cervantes, by Aubrey F. Bell, New Republic 117:28, S. 15 '47; 1,550 words.

P. 74: Richard Watts
Slick but not streamlined, by John Betjeman, New Republic 117:28, Ag. 4, '47; 1,900 words.

P. 84: Richard Watts
Big Yankee, the life of Carlson of the Raiders, by Michael Blankfort, N. Y. Herald Tribune Weekly Book Report, p. 7, Mr. 2, '47; 1,200 words.

P. 110: Edgar Snow
War or peace with Russia? by Earl Russell Browder, N. Y. Times, p. 7, April 6, '47; 1,150 words.

P. 132: Richard Watts
Speaking frankly, by James Francis Byrnes, New Republic 117:28, O. 27, '47; 1,550 words.

P. 135: Annalee Jacoby
Look south to the polar star, by Holger Cahill, N. Y. Times, p. 5, Feb. 9, '47; 650 words.

P. 135: Richard Watts
Look south to the polar star, by Holger Cahill, Sat. Review of Lit. 30:23, Feb. 15, '47; 800 words.

P. 157: Annalee Jacoby
Autobiography of a Chinese woman, by Bu-Wei (Yang) Chao, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 14, Mr. 16, '47; 550 words.

P. 160: Richard Watts
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), New Repub. 116:37, F. 10, '47; 850 words.

P. 160: Owen Lattimore
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 5, F. 16, '47; 600 words.

P. 160: J. K. Fairbank
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), N. Y. Times, p. 3, F. 9, '47; 800 words.

P. 160: Nathaniel Peffer
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Macmillan), Pol. Sci. Q. 62: 598, D. '47; 330 words.

P. 161: Richard Watts
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), New Repub. 116: 37, F. 10, '47; 850 words.

P. 161: Owen Lattimore
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 5, F. 16, '47; 600 words.

P. 161: J. K. Fairbank
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), N. Y. Times, p. 3, F. 9, '47; 800 words.

P. 161: Nathaniel Peffer
China's destiny, by Chiang Kai-shek (Roy pubs.), Pol. Sci. Q. 62: 598, D, '47; 330 words.

P. 161: J. K. Fairbank
Tides from the West, by Chiang Monlin, Ann. Am. Acad. 253: 224, S. '47; 420 words.

P. 161: Annalee Jacoby
Tides from the West, by Chiang Monlin, Sat. R. of Lit. 30: 19, Je. 7, '47; 750 words.

P. 178: Richard Watts
Foreign mud, by Maurice Collis, New Repub. 117: 29, O. 6, '47; 140 words.

P. 186: Richard Watts
Future of freedom in the Orient, by Ralph A. Coniston, New Repub. 116: 27, My. 19, '47; 110 words.

P. 186: Nathaniel Peffer
Future of freedom in the Orient, by Ralph A. Coniston, New York Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 11, Ag. 24. '47; 550 words.

P. 201: Richard Watts
Roosevelt era, by Milton Crane, New Repub. 117: 25, D. 1, '47; 1,600 words.

P. 208: Richard Watts
Behind the silken curtain, by Bartley Cavanaugh Crum, New Repub. 116: 31, Ap. 14, '47; 900 words.

P. 229: Edgar Snow
Russia, menace or promise, by Mrs. Vera (Micheles) Dean, N. Y. Times, p. 7, Ap. 6, '47; 800 words.

P. 278: Richard Watts
Unfinished revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, New Repub, 116: 27, Je. 23, '47; 750 words.

P. 279: Owen Lattimore
Unfinished revolution in China, by Israel Epstein, N. Y. Times, p. 5, Je. 22, '47; 700 words.

P. 304: Richard Watts
Why they behave like Russians, by John Fischer, New Repub. 116: 31, Ap. 28, '47; 1,200 words.

P. 311: Richard Watts
You're the boss, by Edward Joseph Flynn, New Repub. 117: 26, S. 8, '47; 1,800 words.

P. 315: Richard Watts
Collected tales, by Edward Morgan Forster, New Repub, 117: 27, Jl. 14, '47; 1,400 words.

P. 338: Richard Watts
American Agent, by Mark J. Gayn, and John Cope Caldwell, New Repub. 116: 27, Je. 23, '47; 140 words.

P. 338: L. K. Rosinger
American Agent, by Mark J. Gayn, and John Cope Caldwell, Sat. R. of Lit. 30: 12, Je. 14, '47; 600 words.

P. 366: Richard Watts
Journals, by Isabella Augusta Gregory, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 4, Ap. 6, '47; 1,300 words.
P. 441: Richard Watts
Report from Spain, by Emmet John Hughes, New Repub. 116:27, Je. 23, '47; 1,250 words.
P. 454: Richard Watts
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, New Repub. 116:25, My. 19, '47; 2,000 words.
P. 454: Owen Lattimore
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 10, Je. 22, '47; 600 words.
P. 454: Annalee Jacoby
No peace for Asia, by Harold Robert Isaacs, N. Y. Times, p. 6, My. 18, '47; 800 words.
P. 477: Richard Watts
Portable James Joyce, by James Joyce, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Mr. 2, '47; 1,400 words.
P. 479: Richard Watts
Fabulous voyager, by Richard Morgan Kain, N. Y. Times, p. 42, Mr. 2, '47; 700 words.
P. 481: Richard Watts
Zotz!, by Walter Patrick Karig, New Repub, 117:31, O. 20, '47; 850 words.
P. 486: Annalee Jacoby
Three came home, by Mrs. Agnes Keith, N. Y. Times, p. 5, Ap. 6, '47; 650 words.
P. 523: T. A. Bisson
History of Japan, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, Am. Hist. R. 53:178, O. '47; 280 words.
P. 523: Richard Watts
China: a short history (rev.), by Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore, Saturday R. of Lit. 30:16, My. 10, '47; 800 words.
P. 636: Owen Lattimore
This is Pearl!, by Walter Millis, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 1, O. 12, '47; 1,650 words.
P. 663: Richard Watts
Bend sinister, by Vladimir Vladimirovich Nebokov, New Republic 117:26, Jl. 7, '47; 1,650 words.
P. 668: Richard Watts
There is a tyrant in every country, by Gilbert Neiman, New Repub. 116:26, Je. 16, '47; 1,350 words.
P. 703: Richard Watts
The bear coughs at the North Pole, by Pierre Stephen Payne, New Repub. 117:29, O. 6, '47; 230 words.
P. 703: Owen Lattimore
China awake, by Pierre S. R. Payne, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 18, N. 2, '47; 650 words.
P. 703: J. K. Fairbank
China awake, by Pierre S. R. Payne, N. Y. Times, p. 6, O. 19, '47; 1,000 words.
P. 704: J. K. Fairbank
Revolt of Asia, by Pierre S. R. Payne, Nation 165: 422, O. 18, '47; 1,650 words.
P. 704: Richard Watts
Revolt of Asia, by Pierre S. R. Payne, New Repub. 117: 27, O. 6, '47; 1,300 words.
P. 716: Owen Lattimore
Breaking New Ground, by Gifford Pinchot, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 5, D. 21, '47; 1,200 words.
P. 724: Richard Watts
Russia, a short history, by Helen Gay Pratt and Harriet Lucy Moore, New Repub. 116: 29, My. 26, '47; 60 words.
P. 737: Richard Watts
When the mountain fell, by Charles Ferdinand Ramuz, New Repub. 117: 31, O. 20, '47; 850 words.

P. 745: Owen Lattimore
Japan, past and present, by Edwin Oldfather Reischauer, N. Y. Times, p. 10, Ja. 26, '47; 700 words.
P. 764: Richard Watts
Juardez and his Mexico, by Ralph Roeder, New Repub. 117: 27, N. 10, '47; 1,700 words.
P. 765: Richard Watts
I remember distinctly, by Agnes Rogers, New Repub. 117: 26, S. 1, '47; 1,800 words.
P. 767: Richard Watts
F. D. R., letters, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, New Repub. 117: 26, D. 1, '47; 140 words.
P. 776: Richard Watts
Bread and rice, by Doris Rubens, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 4, Ap. 27, '47; 1,350 words.
P. 795: Richard Watts
Judas time, by Isidor Schneider, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 10, Mr. 30, '47; 1,100 words.
P. 798: Richard Watts
Harder they fall, by Budd Wilson Schulberg, New Repub. 117: 27, Ag. 11, '47; 1,700 words.
P. 802: Richard Watts
Story of Mrs. Murphy, by Natalie Anderson Scott, New Repub. 116: 24, Je. 30, '47; 1,250 words.
P. 818: Richard Watts
End of a Berlin diary, by William Lawrence Shirer, New Repub. 117: 28, S. 22, '47; 1,650 words.
P. 837: Richard Watts
Stalin must have peace, by Edgar Snow, New Repub. 116: 31, Ap. 28, '47; 1,200 words.
P. 854: Richard Watts
Four in America, by Gertrude Stein, New Repub. 117: 28, N. 17, '47; 470 words.
P. 855: Richard Watts
Wayward bus, by John Steinbeck, New Repub. 116: 37, Mr. 10, '47; 1,250 words.
P. 870: Richard Watts
Just tell the truth, by John Louis Strohm, New Repub. 116: 29, My. 26, '47; 140 words.
P. 874: Richard Watts
Your newspaper, by Leon Svirsky, New Repub. 117: 27, D. 15, '47; 1,150 words.
P. 884: T. H. White
Richer by Asia, by Edmond Taylor, New Repub. 117: 28, S. 8, '47; 1,100 words.
P. 884: Owen Lattimore
Richer by Asia, by Edmond Taylor, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly., Bk. R., p. 1, Jl. 13, '47; 1,350 words.
P. 890: Richard Watts
Complacent dictator, by Samuel John Gurney Hoare Templewood, New Repub. 116: 39, F. 3, '47; 1,200 words.
P. 924: Fairbank, J. K.
Last Chance in China, by Freda Utley, Nation 166: 78, Ja. 17, '48; 1,050 words.
P. 924: Owen Lattimore
Last Chance in China, by Freda Utley, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 20, N. 30, '47; 1,200 words.
P. 935: Richard Watts
Saxon charm, by Frederic Wakeman, New Repub. 117: 28, O. 13, '47; 1,300 words.
P. 940: T. H. White
Stories of China at War, by Chi-chem Wang, N. Y. Times, p. 4, Ja. 12, '47; 700 words.
P. 946: Richard Watts
When the going was good, by Evelyn Waugh, N. Y. Times, p. 7, Ja. 12, '47; 900 words.

P. 946: Richard Watts
Comics, by Coulton Waugh, New Repub. 117: 28, D. 15, '47; 180 words.
P. 958: Richard Watts
Year of Stalingrad, by Alexander Werth, New Repub. 116: 27, My. 26, '47; 1,500 words.
P. 959: Richard Watts
Meaning of treason, by Rebecca West, New Repub. 117: 24; D. 8, '47; 1,500 words.
P. 964: Richard Watts
Report on the Germans, by William Lindsay White, New Repub. 117: 25, July 21, '47; 2,300 words.

SELECTED REVIEWERS, BOOK REVIEW DIGEST, 1948

P. 7: Richard Watts, Jr.
Turning stream, by Duncan Aikman, New Repub. 118: 25, Je. 7, '48; 380 words.
P. 22: Richard Watts, Jr.
What the people want, by Ellis Gibbs Arnall, New Repub. 118: 24, Je. 21, '48; 1,150 words.
P. 40: J. K. Fairbank
Two years with the Chinese Communists, by Claire Band and William Band, Nation 166: 581, My. 22, '48; 750 words.
P. 40: Owen Lattimore
Two years with the Chinese communists, by Claire Band and William Band, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 6, Jl. 11, '48; 1,150 words.
P. 98: Nathaniel Peffer
MacArthur's Japan, by Russell Brines, Nation 167: 500, O. 30, '48; 400 words.
P. 134: Richard Watts
Persuade or perish, by Wallace Carroll, New Repub. 119: 26, S. 6, '48; 1,300 words.
P. 157: J. K. Fairbank
The Far East, by Paul Hibbert Clyde, Am. Hist. R. 53: 889, Jl. '48; 240 words.
P. 205: Richard Watts
United States and Russia, by Mrs. Vera Dean, New Repub. 117: 29, D. 29, '47; 850 words.
P. 234: Richard Watts
Enjoyment of living, by Max Eastman, New Repub. 118: 17; Ap. 12, '48; 750 words.
P. 238: Richard Watts
Freedom and order, by Anthony Eden, New Repub. 119: 23, Ag. 2, '48; 1,300 words.
P. 242: Richard Watts
Eisenhower speaks, by Dwight David Eisenhower, New Repub. 118: 31, My. 17, '48; 1,300 words.
P. 243: Richard Watts
Hate, hope and high explosives, by George Fielding Eliot, New Repub. 119: 22, S. 20, '48; 1,250 words.
P. 249: J. K. Fairbank
Eastern Asia, by Thomas Edson Ennis, Ann. Am. Acad. 258: 137, Jl. '48; 550 words.
P. 255: L. K. Rosinger
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, Am. Hist. R. 54: 364, Ja. '49; 550 words.
P. 255: Owen Lattimore
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, Nation 167: 104, Jl. 24, '48; 1,000 words.
P. 255: Richard Watts
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, New Repub. 119: 24, Jl. 12, '48; 1,550 words.
P. 255: Annalee Jacoby
The United States and China, by John King Fairbank, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Jl. 11, '48; 140 words.

P. 257: Richard Watts
Jim Farley's story, by James Aloysius Farley, New Repub. 118: 21, Mr. 15, '48; 1,550 words.

P. 268: Richard Watts
America's destiny, by Herman Finer, New Repub. 117: 27, D. 22, '47; 750 words.

P. 280: J. K. Fairbank
Changing China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 8, Ja. 2, '49; 750 words.

P. 302: Richard Watts
Japan diary, by Mark J. Gayn, New Repub. 119: 25, N. 29, '48; 1,200 words.

P. 280: Annalee Jacoby
Changing China, by Harrison Forman, N. Y. Times, p. 32, N. 14, '48; 700 words.

P. 318: Richard Watts
Goebbels diaries, by Joseph Goebbels, New Repub. 118:21, Ap. 26, '48; 1,350 words.

P. 435: Richard Watts
Latin America, by Ray Josephs, New Repub. 119: 23, Ag. 23, '48; 1,300 words.

P. 471: Richard Watts
Making of an insurgent, by Fiorella Henry La Guardia, New Repub. 118: 22, My. 24, '48; 1,450 words.

P. 474: Richard Watts
Pursuit of Robert Emmet, by Helen Landreth, New Repub. 118:25, F. 16, '48; 1,450 words.

P. 505: Richard Watts
Of flight and life, by Charles Augustus Lindbergh, New Repub. 119: 24, Ag. 30, '48; 1,200 words.

P. 506: Eleanor Lattimore
Carola, by Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R. p. 6, F. 1, '48; 450 words.

P. 571: Nathaniel Peffer
Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Mears, Nation 167: 499, O. 30, '48; 600 words.

P. 571: Richard Watts
Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Mears, New Repub. 119: 34, S. 27, '48; 1,250 words.

P. 571: L. K. Rosinger
Mirror for Americans: Japan, by Helen Mears, Survey G. 37: 475, N. '48; 700 words.

P. 603: Richard Watts, Jr.
Politics in the Empire, by Warren Moscow, New Repub. 119: 24, Ag. 16, '48; 1,150 words.

P. 666: Richard Watts
The southern Americas, by Abel Plenn, New Repub. 118: 25, Mr. 29, '48; 600 words.

P. 709: Richard Watts
When this you see remember me, by William Garland Rogers, New Repub. 119: 24, Ag. 9, '48; 1,450 words.

P. 728: Richard Watts
The silent people speak, by Robert St. John, New Repub. 118: 28, F. 2, '48; 1,250 words.

P. 747: Richard Watts
This was normalcy, by Karl Schriftgiesser, New Repub. 118: 24, Je. 7, '48; 1,100 words.

P. 755: Richard Watts
One thousand Americans, by George Seldes, New Repub. 118: 26, Ja. 5, '48; 1,200 words.

P. 757: Richard Watts
Donald of China, by Earl Albert Selle, New Repub. 118: 22, F. 23, '48; 1,250 words.

P. 757: Owen Lattimore
Donald of China, by Earl Albert Selle, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 4, F. 8, '48; 1,600 words.

P. 768: Richard Watts
Quest for love of Lao Lee, by Shu Ch'ing-Ch'un, New Repub. 119: 26, D. 27, '48; 950 words.
P. 772: Richard Watts
The South, old and new, by Francis Butler Simkins, New Repub. 118: 26, Ja. 19, '48; 1,300 words.
P. 784: T. A. Bisson
Americans from Japan, by Bradford Smith, Sat. R. of Lit. 31: 12, S. 4, '48; 900 words.
P. 794: Richard Watts, Jr.
Busy, busy people, by Samuel Spewack, New Repub. 119: 25, N. 22, '48: 800 words.
P. 798: Richard Watts, Jr.
The invisible island, by Irwin Stark, New Repub. 119: 26, Jl. 26, '48; 1,250 words.
P. 801: Richard Watts
Russian journal, by John Steinbeck, New Repub. 118: 22, Apr. 19, '48; 1,300 words.
P. 807: J. K. Fairbank
Stilwell papers, by Joseph Warren Stilwell, Nation 166: 608, My. 29, '48; 1,900 words.
P. 807: Richard Watts
Stilwell papers, by Joseph Warren Stilwell, New Repub. 118: 30, My. 31, '48; 1,500 words.
P. 811: Richard Watts
Earl Warren, a great American story, by Irving Stone, New Repub. 119: 22, S. 13, '48; 1,250 words.
P. 824: Richard Watts
Silent children, by Sze Mai-mai, New Repub. 118: 29, Mar. 22, '48; 1,100 words.
P. 864: Richard Watts
Great rehearsal, by Carl Clinton Van Doren, New Repub. 118: 27, Ja. 26, '48; 1,000 words.
P. 878: Nathaniel Peffer
New Paths for Japan, by Harold Wakefield, Nation 167: 500, O. 30, '48; 110 words.
P. 904: Richard Watts
We need not fail, by Sumner Welles, New Repub. 118: 23, Je. 14, '48; 1,400 words.
P. 912: Richard Watts
United States and South America, by Arthur Preston Whitaker, New Repub. 118: 24, My. 3, '48; 1,100 words.
P. 922: Richard Watts, Jr.
Ides of March, by Thornton Niven Wilder, New Repub. 118: 22, Mr. 1, '48; 1,150 words.
P. 932: Richard Watts, Jr.
China; the land and the people, by Gerald Freeman Winfield, issued in cooperation with the American Institute of Pacific Relations, New Repub. 120: 26, Ja. 17, '49; 900 words.
P. 932: J. K. Fairbank
China; the land and the people, by Gerald Freeman Winfield, N. Y. Times, p. 1, D. 12, '48; 1,650 words.
P. 936: Richard Watts
Indonesian story, by Charles Wolf, New Repub. 118: 24, Je. 28, '48; 800 words.

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P. 58: Edgar Snow
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden, New Repub. 121: 18, N. 7, '49; 2,200 words.
P. 58: Owen Lattimore
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 3, O. 23, '49; 1,500 words.
P. 58: Nathaniel Peffer
China shakes the world, by Jack Belden, N. Y. Times, p. 47, O. 23, '49; 600 words.

P. 77: Nathaniel Peffer
Prospects for democracy in Japan, by Thomas Arthur Bisson, Nation 168: 337, Mr. 19, '49; 800 words.

P. 159: J. K. Fairbank
Way of a fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, Nation 168: 244, F. 26, '49; 1,400 words.

P. 159: Richard Watts
Way of a fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, New Repub. 120: 23, Mr. 7, '49; 1,000 words.

P. 159: Annalee Jacoby
Way of a fighter, by Claire Lee Chennault, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Ja. 30, '49; 1,550 words.

P. 201: Nathaniel Peffer
Russia's race for Asia, by George Creel, N. Y. Times, p. 10, Mr. 13, '49; 450 words.

P. 201: Edgar Snow
Russia's race for Asia, by George Creel, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 11, Ap. 9, '49; 1,150 words.

P. 201: Owen Lattimore
Confucius, the man and the myth, by H. G. Creel, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 15, S. 11, '49; 900 words.

P. 201: J. K. Fairbank
Confucius, the man and the myth, by H. G. Creel, N. Y. Times, p. 7, My. 8, '49; 900 words.

P. 252: Edgar Snow
Social forces in southwest Asia, by Cora Alice DuBois, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 21, My. 14; '49.

P. 259: Edgar Snow
Stalin and Co., by Walter Duranty, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly, Bk. R., p. 4, Mr. 13, '49; 750 words; p. 14, Mr. 20, '49; 180 words.

P. 286: Edgar Snow
Next step in Asia, by John King Fairbank (and others), New Repub. 121: 28, D. 12, '49; 360 words.

P. 448: J. K. Fairbank
Venerable ancestor, by Harry Hussey, N. Y. Times, p. 6, N. 20, '49; 650 words.

P. 533: Edgar Snow
Situation in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., pl., Ap. 10, '49; 1,650 words.

P. 534: T. A. Bisson
Situation in Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Survey 85: 455 Ag. '49; 700 words.

P. 612: Nathaniel Peffer
Allied occupation of Japan, by Edwin M. Martin (pub. under auspices of Am. Inst. of Pacific Relations).

P. 661: Owen Lattimore
China changed my mind, by David Elwyn Morris, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 8, My. 1, '49; 750 words.

P. 661: Annalee Jacoby
China changed my mind, by David Elwyn Morris, N. Y. Times, p. 12, Jl. 17, '49; 550 words.

P. 672: Richard Watts
World must be governed, by Vernon Nash, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 11, D. 31, '49; 750 words.

P. 846: Owen Lattimore
Out of exile, by Soetan Sjahrir, N. Y. Herald Tribune Wkly. Bk. R., p. 3, Mr. 13, '49; 950 words.

P. 846: Richard Watts
Out of exile, by Soetan Sjahrir, New Repub. 120: 24, My. 9, '49; 900 words.

P. 890: J. K. Fairbank
Chinese conquer China, by Anna Louise Strong, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 3, N. 13, '49; 1,100 words.

P. 890: Edgar Snow
Chinese conquer China, by Anna Louise Strong, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 18, N. 19, '49; 1,250 words.

P. 906: Richard Watts
W. C. Fields; his follies and fortunes, by Robert Lewis Taylor, Sat. R. of Lit. 32: 26, O. 22, '49; 800 words.
P. 920: Nathaniel Peffer
American-Russian relations in the Far East, by Pauline Tomkins, N. Y. Times, p. 22, N. 20, '49; 550 words.
P. 984: Richard Watts
Land of milk and honey, by William Lindsay White, New Repub. 120: 23, F. 21, '49; 1,200 words.

SELECTED REVIEWERS, BOOK REVIEW DIGEST 1950

P. 91: Nathaniel Peffer
Peking diary, by Derk Bodde, N. Y. Times, p. 3, O. 29, '50; 1,000 words.
P. 330: J. K. Fairbank
Outer Mongolia and its international position; ed. by Eleanor Lattimore; with an introd. by Owen Lattimore [issued under the auspices of the Int. secretariat. Inst. of Pacific relations]. N. Y. Times, p. 11, Ja. 1, '50; 320 words.
P. 398: T. A. Bisson
Education for a new Japan, by Robert King Hall, Survey 86: 92, F. '50; 320 words.
P. 476. T. A. Bisson
Kokutai no hongi (Cardinal principles of the national entity of Japan), by Japan, Ministry of education, Survey 86: 92, F. '50; 320 words.
P. 537: T. H. White
Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore, New Repub. 123: 20, Jl. 10, '50; 1,250 words.
P. 537: J. K. Fairbank
Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 1, Mr. 19, '50: 1,600 words.
P. 537: T. A. Bisson
Pivot of Asia, by Owen Lattimore, Survey 86: 467, O. '50; 650 words.
P. 589: J. K. Fairbank
Korea today, by George McAfee McCune, and Arthur L. Grey, N. Y. Herald Tribune Bk. R., p. 1, Jl. 23, '50; 1,750 words.
P. 648: Richard Watts
Companion in exile, by Ferenc Molnar, Sat. R. of Lit. 33: 52, Ap. 15, '50; 750 words.
P. 650: Edgar Snow
Stakes of democracy in southeast Asia, by Hubertus Johannes Van Mook, Sat. R. of Lit. 33: 12, Jl. 22, '50; 800 words.
P. 718: Nathaniel Peffer
Two kinds of time, by Graham Peck, N. Y. Times, p. 4, N. 5, '50; 800 words.
P. 757: Nathaniel Peffer
United States and Japan, by Edwin Oldfather Reischauer, N. Y. Times, p. 1, Jl. 16, '50; 1,700 words.
P. 763: Nathaniel Peffer
Roof of the world, by Amaury de Riencourt, N. Y. Times, p. 29, Ap. 16, '50; 450 words.
P. 790: Nathaniel Peffer
Western world and Japan, by Sir George Bailey Sanson, Nation 170: 183, F. 25, '50; 1,050 words.
P. 899: Edgar Snow
Left wing in southeast Asia, by Virginia McLean Thompson, Sat. R. of Lit. 33: 12, Jl. 22, '50; 800 words.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat of a round-table conference in which Owen Lattimore participated, dealing with the terms of unconditional surrender for Japan.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1413" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1413

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE

A Radio Discussion by LEEDS GULICK, PAUL HUTCHINSON *and* OWEN LATTIMORE

592d Broadcast in Cooperation With the National Broadcasting Company

NUMBER 381 JULY 8, 1945

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More on This Topic

BECKER, CARL, *The Declaration of Independence*, New York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945. *The classic work on the eighteenth-century background, the various texts, and the place of the Declaration in American political philosophy.*

———. *Modern Democracy.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

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Around the Round Table . . .

LEEDS GULICK, visiting professor of Japanese at the University of Chicago, was born in Osaka, Japan, and has lived in the Orient for a number of years. He is, at the University of Chicago, at the present time the director of the A.S.T.P. Japanese Area and Language instruction. Professor Gulick received his B.A. and M. A. degrees at George Williams College and has studied at the University of Chicago. From 1924 until 1937 he served as a superintendent of schools. He has written numerous magazine articles and is the author of *Christian Camp Conference Leaders' Manual* (1934); *Nihonga* (1945); and *Selected Japanese Vocabulary* (1945).

PAUL HUTCHINSON, managing editor of the *Christian Century* magazine, was editor of the *China Christian Advocate* in Shanghai China, from 1916 to 1921.

He also was, for a time, executive secretary of the China Centenary Movement for the Methodist Episcopal church in China and was the secretary of the Epworth League in China. He studied at Lafayette College, where he received his Ph.B. degree, and Garrett Bible Institute, where he received his B.D. degree. Mr. Hutchinson has been managing editor of the *Christian Century* since 1924. He is a regular magazine contributor and the author of *Guide to Mission Stations in Eastern China* (1919); *The Next Step* (1921); *The Spread of Christianity* (1922; *China's Real Revolution* (1924); *What and Why in China* (1927); *The United States of Europe* (1929); *Men Who Made the Churches* (1930); *World Revolution and Religion* (1931); *Storm over Asia* (1932); *The Ordeal of Western Religion* (1933); *From Victory to Peace* (1943); and joint author of *The Story of Methodism* (with H. E. Luccock) (1926).

Owen Lattimore, director of the Page School of International Relations of John Hopkins University, studied at St. Bees School in England and at Harvard University. From 1920 to 1926 he was engaged in business in China, and since that time he has traveled widely, working on various research projects in China for the Social Science Research Council, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and Harvard-Yenching Institute. He was editor of *Pacific Affairs* from 1934 to 1941. Professor Lattimore served as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (1941–42), and he has been associated with the Office of War Information on Pacific operations. He has been a regular contributor to many magazines and is the author of *The Desert Road to Turkestan* (1929); *High Tartary* (1930) *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict* (1932); *The Mongols of Manchuria* (1934); *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (1940); *Mongol Journeys* (1941); *The Making of Modern China* (with Eleanor Lattimore) (1944); and *Solution in Asia* (1945).



Source: Hugh Borton, *The Administration and Structure of Japanese Government* (Department of State Publication No. 2244 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945]).

TERMS OR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER FOR JAPAN?

Mr. GULICK. The policies which we adopt in the next few months are crucial. They may determine the early termination or long duration of the war. Hutchinson, as managing editor of the *Christian Century*, in a recent issue in your magazine you reprinted a recent petition to the President.[1]

[1] See "A Petition to the President," *Christian Century*, June 27, 1945, and the text of the petition on page 762 of the same issue of *Christian Century*.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That petition was an attempt to give expression to the feeling that there are many Americans who believe that the term "unconditional surrender" is still not understood by the Japanese and that it needs to be cleared up in their minds as well as in the minds of most Americans.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Unconditional surrender, I believe, is the only stand which we can take against the Japanese at the present time. Unconditional surrender is something which has to be determined on the spot by the theater commanders; and, short of unconditional surrender, we should only get into a situation in which the Japanese were trying to play off one of the Allies against the other.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I can see that there is that grave difficulty, but is it not true that, while we have unconditional surrender as, you might say, a given element in this situation, something has to happen after unconditional surrender. It is time now that we were given an idea as to what that something is going to be.

Mr. LATTIMORE. There are two things which before unconditional surrender we must make clear to the Japanese. First, we must make it clear that nothing will be satisfactory except their complete defeat. The second stage is something else again and concerns how we behave after victory. If the Japanese can get it into their heads that after our victory we are a people who will behave in a decent and humane manner and will not exterminate them like some inferior breed, why, so much the better.

Mr. GULICK. But these points should be specifically stated. I believe, in something like Wilson's Fourteen Points, which seemed to hasten the end of the first World War. I do not know that we ought to issue generalities, because they will say, "There, again, they are jut putting something over on us."

Mr. LATTIMORE. There is an incomplete parallel there. I do not think that the situation is the same as it was in Wilson's time. If we—specifically the United States—were to make a declaration of that kind at the present time, we should simply be acting on our own without the other United Nations. One essential condition of unconditional surrender is that the nations which demand it should be completely unified.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And that means, does it not, that the time is here when we should be seeking some clear-cut understanding among the United Nations which would really unite us on what we are after in Japan?

Mr. GULICK. You see, the Japanese idea of unconditional surrender may be most anything, and, probably because of their propagandists, it has meant enslavement. They have watched the way that we have acted in Italy and said, "Well, that is fine. That is not enslavement." And then in Germany it seemed more harsh, so they do not know just what we might mean. Of course, our original idea of unconditional surrender was in order that we might have something to state before the world to prove that we are united.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Japanese, I believe, know very well what unconditional surrender would mean. It would mean complete military defeat, and they are trying to avoid that. Their propaganda on the radio right now is trying to balance America and Russia against each other, and they hope that the other United Nations will also be split from China. In other words, they want to squeeze out of the war without a complete military defeat. If we are to counteract that, we have to have complete understanding among all the United Nations about unconditional surrender and about the administration of the victory which is to follow it.

Mr. GULICK. I think that you have misunderstood what I meant about that. I do not think that the United States should, just on its own authority, issue what the terms should be; but I believe that the United Nations should work that out.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, but, as I understand Lattimore, what he means is that we have come to the point now at which in the coming Big Three conversations—and perhaps following them, bringing China into the conversations—we should reach a clear understanding among ourselves as to how we are going to handle Japan after the military victory is complete. I agree with that. We are very far from an understanding on that point as yet.

Mr. LATTIMORE. We have to expect the development in the Far East to follow somewhat the course that it did in Europe. You will remember that at the time that Roosevelt launched the phrase "unconditional surrender," it was at a period when cooperation among America, Russia, and Britain in the war against Germany was only beginning to develop its full potentiality.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is true.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And the phrase "unconditional surrender" was a signal that the United Nations were really getting together and that Germany would have to deal with all of them alike. We are getting to the same stage against Japan, and I think that it is reasonable to expect that the coming Big Three meeting will be followed up by other meetings which will really align the United Nations as a whole against Japan. Until that is done, any talk of modified terms for the Japanese is likely only to give them the hope that they can succeed in splitting us, and, therefore, such talk is more likely to prolong their resistance than to reduce it.

Mr. GULICK. How about the terms which were drawn up after we had taken Germany, for instance, or Italy? Did they have any effect upon the surrender?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. There was in that case complete collapse, and it was not a case of negotiating at all, except that there may have been some sort of secret negotiations which went on for the preservation of the House of Savoy in Italy, about which we know nothing; but we are dealing now with a nation which still has an army of four million men on its front lines. What we are feeling after, I take it, is whether or not it is possible to introduce psychological elements which will put those four million men out of action more quickly than simply by blasting them out of action.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The biggest psychological element is the feeling that the united lineup against them is something which is much greater than their four million men and that they cannot possibly split us.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is true, and I, therefore, say that I feel that we need to understand each other quite as much as we need to have the Japanese understand us.

Mr. GULICK. I see that the three of us do not agree exactly upon what terms should be stated or how much, so that we cannot argue this out. Let us go on to the matter of what might be done, however, in administration following the collapse of Japan—whether it is early or late. We might divide the discussion into three parts: the military, the political, and the economic.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. There is no great question as to what has to be done on the military question. Japan has to be demilitarized. That is what it amounts to. We have to wipe out the whole setup—the Japanese army and the navy, the shipbuilding and the airplane-building industries. Everything which has contributed to make Japan a military state headed toward aggression in the Pacific has to be wiped out.

Mr. LATTIMORE. That includes a lot of economic and political action as well, because we cannot forget that the civilian warmakers—that is, the big industrialists and financiers of Japan—are really primarily even more responsible for Japan's going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and the navy are only the striking instruments and the tools.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I quite gree with that, but that is the economic side which Gulick was saying that we would lead to after we talked about the military. That really goes to show that we cannot divide the categories in any such clear-cut way as he was suggesting, because they are all mixed up together. Behind the army clique which we are forever talking about in Tokyo there does stand this oligarchy of big business.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And they are not in opposition to each other; they are in partnership with each other.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Exactly

Mr. GULICK. You are quite right, but what I was saying was that our listeners would like to know what specific points we are making on this issue. Then we can let it go at that, I believe, without further discussion. They would include; (1) the evacuation of whole territories outside the home islands of Japan; (2) the complete demobilization of the army and the navy and the air force; (3) the dismantling of the factories which manufacture armaments and the dismantling of the navy yards; and (4) the delivery to the United Nations for trial and punishment of all the war criminals.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And at that point, including, as Lattimore was saying, the people who have been responsible for the policy which has produced this aggressive Japan. They are the big-business elements.

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Zaibatsu people—the same people who a lot of Americans unfortunately think are the crowd with whom we should deal in Japan after the war, because they stand for law and order. So far as we stand for any Japanese, we have to stand, not for that bunch, but for the Japanese people. Only when the power of that bunch is crushed, can the Japanese people rise up, and only then can we find anyone else to deal with. And we will not find that until we have imposed unconditional surrender.



Source: Philip E. Lilienthal and John H. Oakie, *Asia's Captive Colonies* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), and Elizabeth Allerton Clark, *Peoples of the China Seas* (Los Angeles: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942).

Mr. GULICK. By Zaibatsu, you mean the fifteen wealthiest families that control the economic life of Japan.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. The Mitsui, the Mitsubishi, the Yasuda. . .

Mr. LATTIMORE. The whole crowd, and I would include the Emperor and the Imperial Clan with them, because the Imperial Clan, with its economic and financial holdings, is built into the whole structure.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, of course, for they have stock in everything. There is a further point which I would like to get at for a minute. It seems to me that what we really should be trying to do in Japan at this moment is to get the idea

across to the Japanese masses that we come as liberators. They have been slaves of this old oligarchy and the hangover of the feudal order and the rest of it. The Japanese, whether he is a common soldier in the army or whether he is a farmer on his little plot, is a virtual slave. Now we should be coming in to say to them, "After we have wiped out this crowd who has been running things, we mean to give you a chance to have the kind of a government and the kind of a nation which you deserve."

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am thoroughly in favor of that, and I think that we may reasonably count on a certain element of cooperation in Japan.

Mr. GULICK. Of course, that will take a lot of reeducation of the people, will it not?

Mr. LATTIMORE. First, it will take a little bit of that good old "chaos" of which so many people are afraid. I cannot think of any country in the world in which a little period of chaos would be more healthy, because the respectable people in Japan and the decent people in Japan will not be able to get their heads up before they have had some chaos. I mean specifically the people who tried to vote against military aggression in the last election which they had.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That was very significant—that final vote or election that they had before the military crowd simply ran away with things in Manchuria.

Mr. LATTIMORE. You will find that that crowd will not be able to get in touch with the people in the State Department who stand for a Japanese equivalent of a Darlan policy, a Badoglio policy, and all that kind of thing.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, it seems to me that if there is any one thing clear about that Far Eastern situation at the present time, it is that to attempt to work through a puppet system out there will simply produce in the long run a worse tragedy than we have had.

Mr. GULICK. Then you believe that we should not have the Emperor or an Imperial family of any kind on the throne or in any relationship to the government?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I am not saying that. What I am saying is that, in the long run, that is something which has to be settled by the Japanese themselves, and I am saying that to attempt to use the Imperial family as puppets, as, for instance, the Japanese have attempted to use Wang Ching-wei as a puppet in China, will simply land us in unutterable confusion and a blind alley.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I agree with you there, and I am afraid that it is a very dangerous notion that a lot of Americans have that we could use the Emperor to do our job for us. It seems to me that the only way out of that is to put the Emperor and Imperial Clan, the whole gang of them, out of circulation the moment we get to Japan—simply sequester them, do not kill them or anythnig like that, but put them out of circulation.

Mr. GULICK. I will agree with you on that if, however, we use the Emperor in the first place to declare the war over, because he is the only man to be followed or obeyed by the military forces.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I am not so sure of that. I think that the Japanese can surrender without a top command to surrender, just as the Germans surrendered without a top command to surrender. When the time comes, they will surrender.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. You mean that generals in the field will surrender?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Generals in the field will surrender, or at least troops in the field will surrender. We have the beginnings of that already. Do not forget that, when we come to the home islands of Japan, we are dealing with bigger areas in terms of square miles. People are not going to be crowded into little caves where they can put up last stands. There is going to be room to run away, and when you get room to run away is when you get the time that people surrender.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And you do not believe that we are going to need anything like this Flensburg business which we had in Germany?

Mr. LATTIMORE. Not unless we create in the Japanese mind the idea that we are fighting a race war, that all Japanese are yellow-bellied so-and-so's, and that Americans are not going to deal with them as human people. If you give them an idea that when they have surrendered, they will get a reasonable break, then they will surrender.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I am glad to hear you say that, because your experience out there has been so extensive that it carries great weight, and that is what I have been trying to believe myself. It seems to me, then, that what we really should be trying to get across to the Japanese people as a whole these days is that surrender does not mean that they are going to have to exchange one despotism for another but that surrender will mean that, in place of the despotism which they have known, they are going to have a wholly new opportunity to build a democratic order of their own.

THE FAR EAST IN THE WORLD

Mr. Gulick. I agree with you in that we ought to let them know beforehand that we are going to allow them to form the kind of government which they want. If they want the Emperor back, all right—after a number of years, of course.

Mr. Lattimore. But if they get the Emperor back, it should be done by a Japanese plebiscite in which they are allowed to vote for having the Emperor back or having a constitutional monarchy or a republic. If it is done in that way, then the Japanese Emperor would come back not as a divine ruler but as a ruler by permission of the people. However, I am perfectly convinced that, in the disillusionment following defeat, the Japanese will all turn to the common idea prevailing in the world today—that progressive government is government under republican forms by democratic methods—and that very soon there will be a Japanese demand for doing away with the Emperor and that at that point we should not have a conservative American policy of preserving the Emperor.

Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, exactly, and therefore our responsibility is simply to see that there is a period after surrender in which the Japanese democratic forces

SOUTHEAST ASIA

get a chance to develop while we have the Emperor and his crowd, as you say, "on ice" somewhere. When the people have really had a chance, then let there be the plebiscite. Then the decision will be up to the Japanese, and let us let them go to it.

Mr. LATTIMORE. But there is an all-important point of timing there, and that is the one point on which I should criticize your *Christian Century* petition, Hutchinson, for it might mislead people as to timing, both in this country and in Japan. It would mislead them in the sense that they might think that if there were a little bargaining about the terms, it might end earlier. I am convinced that the more bargaining there is, the longer the Japanese will go on fighting, because they hope that they will be able to split the United Nations; and, therefore, we have to show an absolutely firm and unshakable front on the idea of military unconditional surrender.

Mr. GULICK. While we do not agree on the terms that should be stated, I believe that they should be specifically stated, however. Then there would not be the bargaining going on.

Mr. LATTIMORE. They have been, I think, specifically enough stated.

Mr. GULICK. By Truman's statement?

Mr. LATTIMORE. By Truman's statement that this is military unconditional surrender and that it does not mean the extermination of the Japanese people.

SOVIET UNION
BERING SEA
ALASKA
KAMCHATKA
KODIAK
ATTU
ALEUTIANS
DUTCH HARBOR
PETROPAVLOVSK
SAKHALIN
KURILES
VLADIVOSTOK
MONGOLIA
1931
MAN-CHURIA
SINKIANG
1937-43
KOREA 1905
JAPAN
PACIFIC OCEAN
LANCHOW
CHINA
CHENGTU
CHUNGKING
KUNMING
CANTON
KWANTUNG 1898
BONIN IS.
MIDWAY
INDIA
CALCUTTA
BOMBAY
BURMA 1942
FORMOSA 1895
MARCUS 1899.
MARIANA
HONOLULU
PEARL HARBOR
WAKE
1941
HAINAN
PESCADORES
THAI 1941
1940
PHILIPPINES 1942
JOHNSTON
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
YAP
CEYLON
CAROLINE
MARSHALL ISLANDS 1914
PALAU
MALAYA 1942
SINGAPORE
GILBERT ISLANDS
PALMYRA
INDIAN OCEAN
SUMATRA
BORNEO
NEW GUINEA
JARVIS
SOLOMON IS.
CELEBES
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES 1942
JAVA
TIMOR
DARWIN
FIJI
SAMOA
AUSTRALIA
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE MAP BY W. Hayden

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And there is the Cairo Declaration, also. That has to be taken into account.[2]

Mr. LATTIMORE. The Cairo Declaration is one element of consideration. One unspoken thing is also all-important. While we have promised not to exterminate the Japanese people, we should not promise not to exterminate the Japanese financial and industrial oligarchy which is back of the whole nasty business.

Mr. GULICK. That brings up the statement, then, in the *Christian Century* about the administration of the merchant marine, finance, and industry by commissions of the United Nations.[3]

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That means simply this: That by defeating the army we do not really defeat the Japanese threat to peace. As I have said before, behind the army lies this economic oligarchy. If we do not break that up and administer the whole economic situation long enough to be sure that it is broken up and that a new group has moved in to whatever Japanese economy comes on, why, then the war was practically fought in vain.

Mr. LATTIMORE. Is your point not that we have not only to administer the industries through the United Nations commissions, but that the United Nations commissions should not work through the nominees of the old Zaibatsu oligarchy. We have to allow new people to come up in Japan who will constitute a vested interest against the return of the oligarchs and against the return of the financial agents of the Imperial household and so on.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Yes, and who will not be interested in a type of economy that is the old-fashioned imperialism—getting foreign territory in order to get raw materials.

Mr. LATTIMORE. And should you not go on beyond that and say that the restoration of Japan's economy is not our primary concern, but, on the contrary, the Japanese should in all Asia have the last priority on restoration of their standard of living.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. China has first priority.

Mr. LATTIMORE. China, the Philippines, and all other territories overrun and damaged by the Japanese. Japanese industry can contribute to that rehabilitation. After it has done so, the Japanese should have no more basic war-making heavy industry but may be allowed to have consumer industries and other light industry, obtaining their materials at market prices on a free world market and not obtaining them by political control of dependent territories.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Exactly, and thus we give the Japanese people the chance for a very decent, probably improved, standard of living, because of their not having to carry the tax burden of this tremendous military establishment.

Mr. LATTIMORE. I dislike comparing a nice people like the Swedes with the Japanese, but I have said before that there is no reason why Japan should not become a Sweden of Asia. Sweden at one time was an aggressive country, yet now, for many years, it has been one of the most progressive countries in the world. It has no major war-making industry. It is a peace-trading system.

Mr. GULICK. Of course, what you have left out of your calculations is the slave position that the Japanese laborer will feel. If they are to produce for other countries first in reparations and particularly not under their accustomed rulers

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[2] President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill met at Cairo in November 1943. From that conference the following general statement was issued:

"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan.

"The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and the air. This pressure is already rising.

"The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.

"They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

"It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

"Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

"With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."

[3] Point 4 of the petition to the President says that the signers request: "Administration by commissions of the United Nations of the Japanese merchant marine, finance and industry with a view to the complete demilitarization of Japanese life and the restoration of Japan to membership in the world community. * * *" (*Christian Century*, June 27, 1945).

of the wealthy class, I think that they will tend, at first anyway, to lie down on the job.

Mr. Hutchinson. Why should they feel in a slave position if they are getting more food than they have been under the old order? I think that it is perfectly possible, under the kind of set-up that Lattimore and I have been suggesting, that actually the Japanese farmer on his little plot will be better off, in terms of the standard of living, than he ever was before.

Mr. Lattimore. Not only the farmer but also the industrial worker. If we dispossess the monopolists who are gouging the ordinary people of Japan to pay fantastic profits on their war-making industry, we will have a margin there which we can use for raising the level of the peasant and the industrial worker. Then, far from feeling enslaved to work for other Asiatic countries, he will feel liberated from his own oppressors and feel that he has something in common with other peoples in Asia who also want progress and economic development and republican self-government.

Mr Hutchinson. In other words, he has to come into this freedom bloc that is growing up in Asia, that you have talked about in your book.[4]

Mr. Lattimore. I think that that this is quite possible, yes.

Mr. Gulick. He may look to that later on, but certainly in the immediate future he will not be any better off than he has been. The farmer has always been able to hide out enough food that he has needed to support life. Of course, when you point out that agrarian reform will give him more land that is another thing. When the factories will pay more to labor, again that will help the population as a whole; but I do not believe he will be willing to trade those for the direction under the heel of a commission from a foreign power.

Mr. Lattimore. Neither were the Germans willing to trade it, but that is not the point. Neither the Germans nor the Japanese can expect that the reward of surrender will be immediate prosperity, and enough Japanese, like enough Germans, have been abroad to see the work done by their own conquerors to show that the nation is guilty. The nation has a certain expiation to work out, and there is no reason why they should not work it out.

Mr. Hutchinson. Of course, we are taking for granted that there is going to be common sense in the administration of this thing, that it is not going to be a matter of United Nations commissars' going in.

Mr. Lattimore. How far can you take common sense for granted? Common sense is something for which we have to work hard, and we have to put pressure on our own government to get it sometimes.

Mr. Hutchinson. I admit that that is true, but at least it should be a program that is aimed toward developing this new industrial group in Japan just as rapidly as possible.

Mr. Gulick. In other words, a new "Yalta Conference" perhaps should be in the making for that very purpose.

Mr. Lattimore. Politically, we certainly need a "Yalta Conference" in Asia as one step toward the final military victory over Japan. Otherwise, the military victory will lead us up into a position that is politically unclear.

Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, but do not forget that a Yalta Conference for Japan has to have China in it.

Mr. Lattimore. It has to have China in it, and in my opinion it has to have Russia in it, because Russia will be important in the future of Japan whether they fight or not. In fact, they have already made a military contribution simply by tying down Japanese troops.

Mr. Hutchinson. I was taking that for granted, because Russia was in the Yalta Conference originally, that conference that you are using in your parallel..

Mr. Lattimore. I see, yes, I think, though, that in the Yalta Conference for Asia there should not be first-class participation and second-class participation. The full equality of the United Nations should be essential to that concept.

Mr. Hutchinson. One of the things that needs to be pinned down right away on this whole Far Eastern situation is that China is in this thing just as much as we are and should have not merely formal but actual equality.

Mr. Lattimore. It is somewhat difficult to summarize a discussion that has moved as rapidly as this one has over so much ground in this Round Table discussion, but I think that I can say this: We are agreed that there must be unlimited victory over Japan—a clear-cut military victory. There is some disagreement among the three of us about whether the prosecution of the demand for unconditional surrender should be accompanied by some sort of declaration

[4] Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1945.)

to Japan comparable to Wilson's Fourteen Points in the last war. However, all of us are in agreement again that, after victory over Japan, the utmost should be done to make the Japanese feel that, while they have a great deal to expiate, they are not going to be treated as a pariah or outcast people and that they will have a chance to build a better Japan than the one which has brought so much misery in Asia and the world.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company. The supplementary information in this transcript has been developed by staff research and is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE speakers.

WHAT DO YOU THINK

1. How do you define "unconditional surrender"? What did it mean in the case of Italy and Germany? Do you favor similar action and policy for Japan? Or do you favor the acceptance of victory upon the basis of certain terms? Which course, in your opinion, will hasten the end of the war? Do you favor a "Yalta" agreement for Japan?
2. What should be the objectives of American policy in the Far East? Toward Japan? Upon what basis can cooperation with the other great powers be effected for the Pacific? What is the relation between the political and economic problems of the Far East? How can Japanese aggression be eliminated?
3. What are the inherent dangers in the peace settlement for the Pacific? What should be the role of China? Upon what basis can Japan be reconstructed to take her place among the nations of the Orient? What policies must be adopted by the Western powers if a future race war is to be avoided?
4. Why is it important that the United Nations cooperate in future policies for Japan? Do you believe that they should occupy Japan after the war? Or do you think that an overwhelming military defeat will be enough? How can Japan be demilitarized? What should be done with Japanese industry and its present economic system? Would you agree with the suggestion that Japan become the "Sweden of Asia"?
5. What does Mr. Lattimore mean when he says that, after the defeat of Japan, a "little period of chaos" would be "healthy"? If Japan is occupied, should the United Nations try to establish order, or should they encourage a revolution in the effort to build a new Japan? What are the "democratic forces" in Japan upon which a new regime might be built? How can they be encouraged? What would be your attitude toward a communist revolution in Japan?
6. Discuss the role of the Emperor in Japan today and the system of State Shintoism. Can there be peace in the Far East without the uprooting of emperor-worship and Shintoism? How can these be effectively eliminated from Japanese life?
7. What are the prospects for a United Nations' policy toward the Far East which will put an end to the traditional policy of Western imperialism? How will the end of imperialism in the Orient affect and condition the people of the Western world? What are the probable political consequences of the coming industrialization of Asia?

More on This Topic

"AMG Plans for Japan," *Nation*, June 16, 1945. *Excerpts from a letter by a member of the training program for Japanese military government which criticizes the policies which are being advocated.*

BALLING, FRANCIS C. "Unconditional Surrender and a Unilateral Declaration of Peace," *Political Science Review*, June, 1945.

BISSON, T. A. *America's Far Eastern Policy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1945.

"The Far East—from War to Peace," *New Republic*, May 28, 1945. *A special issue which is devoted to discussions of the Far East by prominent authorities.*

FLEISHER, WILFRID. "What to Do with Japan," *Life*, April 16, 1945.

———. *What to Do with Japan*. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1945.

HAILEY, FOSTER. "The War Converges on Japan," *Yale Review*, summer, 1945.

HALSEY, ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. "A Plan for Japan," *Collier's*, April 28, 1945. *Says that he does not believe in "halfway" measures and suggests how he would deal with Japan to prevent another war.*

HUTCHINS, ROBERT M. "The New Realism," *Commonweal*, July 6, 1945.
"Japan," *Fortune*, April, 1944. *The entire issue is devoted to discussions of various phases of Japanese life.*
LAMOTT, WILLIS CHURCH. "What *Not* To Do with Japan." *Harper's*, June, 1945. *Argues that military and economic restrictions should be enforced but otherwise we should adopt a policy of "hands off" and allow Japan to become a "good third-rate power."*
LATTIMORE, OWEN. "Freedom Bloc in Asia," Common Sense, March, 1945. *Says that our basic attitude toward the Orient must be a recognition that the age of imperialism is over and that a policy toward Asia involves the imposition of terms on Japan and the creation of a democratic bloc of nations on the continent.*
———. *Solution in Asia.* Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1945.
MACNAIR, HARLEY F. *The Real Conflict between China and Japan: An Analysis of Opposing Ideologies.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. *Says that the "nonphysical factors involved in the present struggle in eastern Asia are at least as important as the physical."*

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Anna H. Rubio appeared in our hearings. There was testimony from the Ohio State Un-American Activities Commission bearing on her behavior before that committee. I would like this put into the record. This is the reply of the Ohio committee; it is dated June 13, 1950.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1414" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1414

OHIO UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMISSION

STATE HOUSE

Columbus 15, Ohio

ADAMS 5751

Senator Roscoe R. Walcutt, Pres. Pro Tem
Senator Leo Blackburn
Senator Charles J. Carney
Senator James G. Headley
Senator C. I. Powell
Representative John V. Corrigan
Representative Robert W. Reider
Representative Kenneth A. Robinson
Representative Louis J. Schneider, Jr.

House Speaker Gordon Renner, Chairman
Senator Joseph W. Bartunek, Vice Chairman
Representative Samuel L. Devine, Secretary
Sidney Isaacs, Legal Director and Counsel
James F. Worster, Chief Investigator
Margaret H. Moorhons, Office Secretary

JUNE 13, 1952.

MR. ROBERT MORRIS,
Special Counsel, Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: This is in reply to your inquiry of May 10, 1952, concerning Anna H. Rubio whose signed letter in behalf of the China Aid Council was introduced into the official records regarding the investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mrs. Anna H. Morgan, in answer to a subpoena, appeared before this Commission on April 1, 1952. Although she was not questioned as to her affiliations with the China Aid Council, nor whether she was the Anna H. Rubio whose letter was introduced on page 1514, Vol. V. of your hearings, it appears that Mrs. Anna H. Morgan and Anna H. Rubio are one and the same person. The enclosed newspaper item from the Columbus (Ohio) Citizen for March 27, 1948, shows that Anna H. Morgan was formerly known as Rubio, and also that Alfred (Al) Rubio is a son by a former marriage.

Anna Hass Morgan, upon her appearance before this Commission on April 1, 1952, being first duly sworn, gave her name as Anna H. Morgan. Thereupon she refused to answer the following questions invoking the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as her protection.

Where she resided.

Was she a citizen of the United States.

How long she had been a resident of Franklin County, Ohio.

Where she was employed.

If she was, or had ever been a member of the Communist Party.

That it was not a fact that she was, during the entire time of her residence in Franklin County, Ohio, a member and an active member of the Communist Party of Franklin County.

That it was not a fact that as of January 9, 1949, she was not the finance director of the Communist Party of Franklin County.

If, on that date, she didn't take full responsibility as cochairman of the Franklin County Communist Party, directing registration and securing new recruits.

If, in February 1949, in her capacity as executive secretary of the Communist Party of Franklin County, she didn't report that she had recently attended the Ruthenberg dinner in Cleveland, Ohio.

Did she report to the Franklin County section of the Communist Party at the time that Martin Chancey (Ohio State Communist Party secretary) had emphasized that the fund drive in Franklin County being conducted at that time must go over the top with the point that if members had to borrow money to meet the quota, they must do so, and the quota would not be reduced but might be increased ten percent. And did she recall making that report for the Franklin County Communist Party section.

If, during the time she was not the paid Communist Party organizer for the Communist Party in Franklin County, having been promised $35 a week for that duty.

If it was not a fact that on April 24, 1949, she attended a Marxist class held by the Franklin County Communist Party at the home of Manny Shore at 454 South Wayne Avenue, at which time she reported that she had received no pay for eight weeks at $35 a week from the Communist Party.

If it was not a fact that on May 9, 1949, at a regular meeting of the Communist Party of Franklin County, she announced that she and her husband might have to leave Columbus because her salary had not been paid and her husband at that time had no job.

If it was not a fact that she was a delegate to the Franklin County Communist Party convention held in Columbus, Ohio, from June 6 to 13, 1949.

If it was not a fact that on the fifth day of June, immediately prior to that convention, she was elected executive secretary of the Franklin County Communist Party.

If it was not a fact that on the 26th day of June a Communist Party meeting was held in her home.

If it was not a fact that at that meeting held in her home, Robert Campbell, a State Communist Party functionary, spoke on the subject of white chauvinism, a white Communist Party in the north-end of Columbus and a Negro Communist Party in the south-end.

If it was not a fact that on August 12, 1949, the executive committee of the Franklin County Communist Party met in her home.

If it was not a fact that at that meeting Robert Gunkle was introduced as the new Communist Party organizer for Franklin County.

If it was not a fact that a Communist Party meeting was held in her home on September 16, 1949.

If the principal item of discussion at that meeting held in her home was not the fact that Robert Gunkle had left Columbus, Ohio, without notifying the State committee of the Communist Party.

And that there was discussion as to who would take his place as his successor.

If it was not true that in February 1950 Arthur Rappaport was appointed to succeed Robert Gunkle, and that he and his wife resided in her home.

If it was not a fact that during that period of time her home was not actually the Communist Party headquarters for Franklin County.

If it was not a fact that on the 2nd of May, 1950, a Communist May Day meeting was held in her home.

If it was not a fact that at that meeting Arnold Johnson was scheduled to speak, had to return to New York when it appeared that Eugene Dennis might have to go to jail and Frank Hashmall was a substitute speaker.

Had she ever been employed by the American Zinx Oxide Company.

If it wasn't a fact that she was arrested under the name of Katherine O'Rourke for illegal picketing during a strike at the AZO strike.

If it wasn't a fact that of today she was in charge of activities of the Communist Party of Franklin County.

Was she not one of the four Ohio sponsors of the petition, "We Charge Genocide."

If it was not a petition presented to the United Nations alleging that as the official and studied policy of the United States Government to exterminate the Negro race in the United States.

If it was not a publication of the Civil Rights Congress.

If she was not a member of the Civil Rights Congress.

If she was not aware that the Civil Rights Congress had been cited as both a subversive and Communist organization by the Attorney General of the United States.

If it was not a fact that she was an active member of the Communist Party in Franklin County at the present time.

Where she resided before she came to Franklin County.

If it was not a fact that she was active in Communist Party affairs in Champaign, Illinois, prior to coming to Franklin County.

Enclosed are copies of letters addressed by Mrs. Morgan to the chairman of this Commission, and the statement she presented to the Commission at the time she appeared as a witness, together with photostat copies of her signature.

Kindest regards.

Yours very truly,

Sidney Isaacs,
SIDNEY ISAACS,
Legal Director and Counsel.

Encls.: 8.

[Columbus Citizen, Saturday, March 27, 1948]

WINDOW SHATTERED AT HASHMALL HOME—EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE COMMUNISTS AT LOW EBB

Glass in Communist Frank Hashmall's front door was smashed with a brick Friday night.

Hashmall, his wife and year-old son were not at their home at 1403 S. Fourth St., when the incident occurred. Neighbors said they didn't even hear a noise during the night.

But Saturday morning, shattered glass, a large paving brick, stones and hard lumps of clay gave mute testimony to the bombardment. The house of the Franklin County Communist organizer was still deserted at noon Saturday.

Presumably Hashmall was AWOL from his duties as Columbus' No 1 Communist who receives his pay check from party coffers. Neighbors said the family left the house early Friday morning.

But Ohio Communist headquarters in Cleveland insisted he was still at his job in Columbus Saturday.

"If Frank isn't in Columbus, he's supposed to be," said Martin Chauncey, Communist leader at the Cleveland headquarters. "He hasn't checked in here, and we haven't heard from him for several days."

Frank Hashmall's efforts to organize a Communist Party in Franklin County had reached a dismal stage Saturday.

Two attempts to pass out handbills to Timken plant workers had met with failure. His statements bitterly complaining about his party activities had ceased arriving at The Citizen.

The low point in Hashmall's activities in Columbus came seven days after he first identified himself as executive secretary of the Franklin County Communist Party. He complained at that time, in a signed statement, about the reception of his handbill-passing efforts and the publicity about it.

Developments came fast:

Last Sunday Hashmall's connection with the Cleveland Communists was disclosed in The Citizen.

Last Wednesday a second attempt was made to give Timken workers handbills. This effort was led by Arthur Vincent Rappeport, 45 E. 11th Ave., who protested "treatment" received when at attempted to distribute communistic handbills with Hashmall on March 19.

Workers again destroyed the handbills and police broke up the gathering at plant gates on Cleveland Ave.

Then came the disclosure that Hashmall's home is owned by Mrs. Anna Morgan's son, Alfred M. Rubio, a Communist. Rubio lives in Chicago and is a tool grinder. Mrs. Morgan said she had turned the home over to her son.

HUSBAND FIRED

Mrs. Morgan's husband, Richard C. Morgan, 154 E. Kelso Rd., was fired from his position of curator of the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Museum the next day. Museum officials said they didn't like the "damning publicity."

Mrs. Morgan complained that she is an innocent bystander in the Communist activities led by Hashmall. She said she is not a Communist Party member.

She said she had closed her book shop at 38 E. Goodale St., because the business was losing money.

"All this Communist publicity," she added, "has made people afraid to come into the store.

"Just because I sold the house to my son, and a man they say is a Communist lives in it now, my business is ruined and my husband loses his job.

"INTERRACIAL UNITY

"My husband is an anthropologist. What we believe in is based on sound anthropological theory. We believe in interracial unity. We think everybody should have a chance."

She said her husband never had received official notice of his dismissal at the museum. Yet, officials there told reporters an official letter had been sent to Mr. Morgan Wednesday.

Mrs. Morgan, then Mrs. Rubio, was known to be interested in Communist activities when she lived in Indianapolis, a source there revealed Saturday. She later was divorced, and married Mr. Morgan.

"I have received threatening telephone calls," she said. "After the way they're treating that girl (Mrs. Hashmall) on Fourth St., I don't know what will happen next." She said she hadn't told police of her fears because she didn't think they would give her protection.

HELPED STRIKERS

Mrs. Morgan said she had tried to help Timken workers when they were on strike.

"We tried to help them in every way we could."

She was asked whom she meant by "we."

"Why, the decent people in Columbus," she replied.

DOESN'T LIKE IT HERE

Her son, Alfred, the avowed Communist, expressed strong dislike for Columbus.

"From what my mother wrote me and what I learned the day I went down (to accept the Hashmall house deed) I decided I didn't want to rear my two little girls there," he said.

"The Communist Party," he went on, "is fighting for the best traditions of America. It is slanderous to say we are members of any foreign power. Any member would quit if that were so."

He explained that a person trying to join the Communist Party must have two character references from party members.

IS EXCITABLE

Mrs. Morgan, an attractive middle-aged woman of olive complexion, becomes excited in her conversation. She rarely directly answers a reporter's question, but counters with one of her own.

Her white Goodale St. book shop is the most prominent structure in the area. The public part of the shop is backed up by several rooms used for routine store purposes.

Mrs. Morgan denied the store was a meeting place of Communists. She said she doesn't know where party members meet.

HITS TRUMAN PROGRAM

She stated political beliefs, several of which followed Communist Party lines. Among these was her dislike of President Truman's belligerent actions toward Russian aggression, Universal Military Training, and the draft.

She said she doesn't handle the Communist paper, "Daily Worker," and added that she had been criticized by some patrons because she carried literature of interest to Negroes.

Mrs. Morgan said her son, Alfred, and a second son, Carlos, are veterans of World War II. She said neither she nor Mr. Morgan plans to leave Columbus.

STATEMENT OF BELIEF BY ANNA H. MORGAN

On Sunday afternoon on returning home I found a subpoena dated March 25 stuck under the kitchen door. It was signed by one Gordon Renner, chairman of the Ohio Un-American Committee. On Monday evening again there was introduced a subpoena, this one dated March 24, signed by the same person but not bearing the stamp of the sheriff's office nor spelling my name correctly. This highly irregular service and slaphappy juggling of subpoena's (usually considered a serious and important document) is typical of the tactics of this unconstitutional committee which breaks laws to suit themselves and harasses, intimidates and smears citizens who dare protest corrupt political practices and the drive towards fascism. This committee was paid to investigate so-called Un-American and subversive activities but in all these months is has failed to state what it considers Un-American or subversive. This bipartisan witch-hunting committee feeds anti-red propaganda to the press without admitting that the Communist Party has never even been outlawed in the U. S. A. This committee persecutes all those who seek to establish a third party with a peace program in the 1952 elections. Its so-called "friendly" witnesses are the worse characters dragged from the labor movement; one witness was convicted of attempted rape; another mismanaged union funds; another urged youths to join an organization that he represented, then he sold out to the FBI and betrayed his young friends who followed him. Some FBI witnesses concentrate their attacks on peace workers, thereby seeking to boost the government's horrible war plans. Paid informers feed there lies to committees as long as committees feed money to them. Decent Americans traditionally reject all informers.

Who am I, you may ask. I am just an average American housewife. Daughter of a deacon I early was baptized in a Congregational Church. I accept its teachings of the brotherhood of man for every day in the year, not just for Sunday. I now present my sincere beliefs and let this committee and all interested citizens who pay this committee judge me.

I believe in the complete economic and social equality of all races and I ask this committee how come Ohio has never enacted FEPC legislation to guarantee those rights to its minority citizens? I feel that the American pattern of lynching Negroes, of murder and genocide in general is bringing down the hatred of the world upon us. I believe in freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. I demand that traditional American soap-box right to say what I think and let the man in the street decide for himself if I am a sage or a crackpot. I believe in clean newspaper reporting and I denounce those who use dirty journalism to build hate between nations with lies and half truths. Since the working man gives his strength, his life, his blood and his sweat to build up the big business machine I believe in his right to organize unions to protect himself from those who exploit him. I protest 76 percent of our national income being spent on war preparations while millions of our citizens lack decent housing, jobs, medical care, clothing, nourishment, education and our old age pensioners starve. I protest American planes dropping napalin bombs on Korean villages, making human torches of the living bodies of women, children and old men. I, who recall with horror the World War II pictures of naked bodies stacked like corded wood in the German concentration camps, I protest Atty. Gen. McGrath's boast that he is rushing to completion American concentration camps. Gen. Grow of the U. S. Army in his recently exposed diary boasts "we need not play fair * * * hit below the belt if necessary."

I protest that this policy of hitting below the belt has passed unjust judgment on these young Jewish parents, the Rosenbergs, who are now kept in solitary confinement of death cells on framed-up charges which have never been proved. I protest a cowardly Supreme Court riding on the political coat-tails of a corrupt administration instead of defending the Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights against the Smith, McCarran, Taft-Hartley Acts and all other pro-fascist legislation. I protest certain veterans organizations hounding simple citizens while they condone films like DESERT FOX, glorifying the

Nazi general Rommel. These veterans have already forgotten our heroes who died to defeat fascism. As the mother of veterans I hate war—I know the anxiety of long nights while sons serve in foreign lands.

I believe that peace can be achieved only through negotiation. It is futile for Americans to believe we can conquer the entire world just because we sit on the largest heap of atom bombs. As poisoned gas was outlawed after World War I, so should the atom bomb and cowardly bacteriological warfare be outlawed now.

I believe we cannot export freedom if we do not possess it. All the world watches cynically as Truman boasts of American freedom while his courts throw progressive leaders into jails as political prisoners on the framed-up testimony of discredited informers.

I challenge this committee to examine those who are dishonest in politics; to examine those who discriminate against and hurt minority groups; to examine those heads of educational institutions who stifle freedom of speech on the campus. I call upon Gov. Lausche to witness the tactics of this committee which sneaks about to the homes, offices of factories and institutions, calling on their victims for questioning while endangering those victims' reputations and livelihoods. I charge that this bi-partisan committee operates in an un-American and subversive manner in order to silence the independent voters during the 1952 election campaign.

Because this committee conducts its hearings like an inquisition, with no rules of evidence, its victims are denied the rights which they would have in a duly constituted court. Therefore I must claim the protection of the 5th amendment of the Constitution of the United States and remain silent before this committee.

(Signed) Anna H. Morgan.
ANNA H. MORGAN.

APRIL 1, 1952.
Room 8, House of Representatives.
State House, Columbus, Ohio.

5800 CLEVELAND AVE.,
Worthington No. 1, Ohio, April 2, 1952.

MR. GORDON RENNER,
Chairman, Ohio Un-American Committee,
State House, Columbus, Ohio.

DEAR SIR: Yesterday when you had me on the stand before your committee your man Issacs badgered me because I would not give my address. Last evening's edition of the Green Stripe, OHIO STATE JOURNAL, dated Wednesday morning, April 2, stated that I refused to give you my address, then it continued: "Mrs. Morgan, whose address, according to the commission records, is 5800 Cleveland Ave. * * *" After this came out we have received repeated calls threatening our lives and our property and warning us to get off Cleveland Ave. Furthermore, you allowed the press to take my photograph while in the hearing room which further identified me for attack. I thought I went before an investigating committee for questioning, not before a court charged with some crime. I would like to point out that when your "friendly" witness was on the stand and refused to give his address you did not release it to the press but you protected it. Apparently it is within the power of your committee to withold from the press information that may hurt people and it is also in the power of your committee to feed to the press information that you know from long experience in Ohio will open your victims to violent attack. I went before you with the pride of a clear conscience—I have broken no laws. I have all my life stood for what was just and honest, but your committee, being what it is, has given me the publicity of a criminal. I now find it necessary to have my phone disconnected in order to gain a little rest. I send you this letter to inform you that if any harm comes to me, my family, or my property as a result of your inspired publicity I shall hold you responsible.

Yours truly,

[S] ANNA H. MORGAN.

5800 Cleveland Ave.,
Worthington 1, Ohio, April 11, 1952.

Mr. G. Renner,
Chairman, Ohio Un-American Commission,
State House No. 8, Columbus, Ohio.

Dear Sir: Last week following your performance on March 31 and April 1, I wrote to inform you that as a result of the publicity you fed the press we received so many threats and harassing phone calls it was necessary to order our phone disconnected.

This week on April 9 as a further result of your undesirable publicity with the publication of addresses the National Union Fire Insurance Company notified me that it was lifting within five (5) days all insurance protection from my property which it has covered for years. I report this to you as proof of the result of your dirty work. Your committee is supposed to be a fact-finding committee but from the beginning it has operated as a bragging smear committee seeking headlines for political ends. You seem to think that you can ride to popularity (like the dixiecrat politicians who specialize in lynching) by availing yourself of the present red hysteria created by a corrupt bipartisan policy and aided and abetted by equally corrupt local newspapers. While the citizens of our state expected your committee to conduct yourselves like mature representatives of the voters you instead throw yourselves about and swagger around with the irresponsibility of school-yard bullies until regardless of one's party affiliation no decent citizen in the state respects you and cheap comedians constantly joke about you.

Your man Issacs badgered me to tell my address in an open hearing in a city which has become known all over the world (French papers reported this) for smashing the home and attempting to kill the family of persons with whom local Republicans happen to disagree. Your man Issacs sought to tell where I was employed when my own husband lost his state job through the Johnson-Hatcher frame-up and the corrupt Ohio Supreme Court shocked decent lawyers across the country by refusing to review the case, claiming he was not state employed (even though he had for 12 years been paid by state checks and had for 12 years had his salary deducted for the state retirement fund) and even though the greatest part of the money financing the Museum is appropriated by the state. Your man Issacs raised the question of my citizenship when any one of his paid stooges, either Worster or Prebbles using the skill of a half-wit could have (and no doubt did know) that I was born in Providence, R. I., and furthermore it is not yet subversive to be born—or have you already decreed that it is?

While you had your victim trapped at the hearing, denying us even the right of representation by attorney which is allowed common criminals in any cheap little politically controlled police court (and we were not charged with any crime even by the FBI) we who were under threat of heavy fines, jail sentences, etc., not for crimes committed but for perchance slipping into your technical "contempt" trap, we sat and saw you permit one of your committeemen ask us what day of the week it was (it being April fool's day) and when both Mr. Terrell and myself scorning this cheap humor at a hearing that was supposed to be a State Commission hearing, when we scorned to reply you as chairman did not have the decency to cut out such wise cracks and your committee laughed as if it were, oh, so funny. I have seen such "hearings" in Nazi movies but I never expected to have to stomach it even from your Ohio Gang.

Since your publicity has so affected certain unstable minds of the public to the point that a hysterical insurance agent removes insurance protection what guarantee have we that such unstable persons will not take one more step and stoop to arson? Since only that agent and you know of the lifting of this insurance I consider you responsible for any destruction that my property may suffer until such time that I may find an honest and courageous American who will insure it for me again.

Knowing you and your committee and understanding the mind of the sadist at work (your investigators behind closed doors threatened the livelihood of several persons they visited, knowing such persons had no one to whom they could appeal for justice or mercy) knowing your method of work I do not expect any reply from you except the same coarse laughter I heard when I sat before you and heard your man ask what day it was.

I am a housewife. I have a simple understanding of and a belief in the Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights but when you injected into the questioning by Isaacs your own question asking me if I knew what the 5th amendment said I smelled the rat that you were nosing out—that legal techni-

cality of "contempt." But I knew that we had reached a period in the history of Ohio if not in the nation when justice had broken down completely and judges are so corrupt. Your man Issacs asked did I not get arrested for illegally walking the picket line at the AZO strike. You were so corrupt you let that question go into the record but the record of our trial showed that the injunction against picketing was to have been signed at 9 AM but the bosses and the press got the corrupt Judge Reynolds out of bed very early to sign it so we could be trapped on the line. This is Ohio history in the making.

These hearings are your sounding board. With your questions so stacked you are able to inject anything you wish into the record and the press comes to you and sucks it up like pigeons milk. Only an aroused movement of the voters can clean up the condition which now exists. Atty. Gen. McGrath whose office prosecuted so many and filled our jails with political prisoners like the prisons of Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini, that high officer of justice proved to be the number one grafter of the nation. One would laugh cynically if so many good citizens were not in jail while he enjoys his ill-got millions. And this pattern extends all down the line from McGrath to you and your committee checking the "loyalty" of your fellow citizens. Loyalty to what? Truman? Dulles? McGrath? Costello? Morris? Or your man Issacs?

Very truly,

[s] ANNA H. MORGAN.

5800 CLEVELAND AVE.,
Worthington 1, Ohio, April 18, 1952.

Mr. G. RENNER,
Chairman, Ohio Un-American Commission,
Columbus, Ohio.

DEAR SIR: It is now brought to our attention that several persons who have been "investigated" by your committee have lost their jobs or been forced by bosses to resign, on the spot, the threat being that if they did not resign they would receive more undesirable publicity. This has led to several persons already moving out of the state. Whatever your committee touches it seems to contaminate with something fearful, repulsive, and un-American which panics the inexperienced and the weak.

I myself was dismissed this past week by my survey supervisor who stated that while he sympathized with my defense of the people's rights and while he recognized that your hearing was nothing more than a kangaroo court nevertheless since big advertising companies sent my checks through his hands it was necessary for him to disassociate himself from me until a more democratic government came to Ohio, perhaps in the fall of 1952. This dismissal I expected after your tactics of allowing photographers in the hearing room with your victims on the stand. (But the press did not publish photographs of your Columbus man DeLong nor did they emphasize his address.)

Because of the photographs which you allowed another member of my family has suffered extreme nervous strain when fellow associates circulating the pictures in the building where they reside impressed upon others that this person's relative was some sort of criminal. (In the United States a man was considered innocent until proved guilty of some crime but not in Ohio where you smear and slander first, then try to trap your victim through some technicality of the law into some sort of guilt with heavy punishment.) I recall that you insinuated you could "embarrass" me if I refused to answer your man Issacs. You were already trying to "embarrass" me but I have a clear conscience and know I have never broken a law outside of a U turn in a public highway—which I believe is a cleaner record than any of the politicians serving on the crucifixion committee.

Perhaps the most pathetic case of all those who lost their livelihood because of your legal blackmail was that of Mr. Robert Terrill. Do you recall how your man Issacs pompously referred to Mr. Terrill's "employment at University Hospital" and then read, not a copy of the loyalty oath of the university but read the oath from the very card that Mr. Terrill had signed thus proving to Mr. Terrill and the world at large that Mr. Terrill's bosses had been contacted and through the insinuation and innuendo Issacs, doubt was cast upon Mr. Terrill's loyalty and forces were already at work on Mr. Terrill's dismissal or compulsion to resign. (As a matter of fact there seemed to be nothing in the oath as read that Mr. Terrill could have violated and Issacs failed to show any subversive or disloyal conduct or to charge Mr. Terrill with any such act.)

And so because of sharp snooping of Issacs the aged and half-starved dishwasher at Ohio State University was told to resign? Now Ohio I suppose has cleaner dishes, if not cleaner politics under Chairman Renner? The cruel part is that in playing your political game Mr. Terrill's poor bed-ridden wife is the real victim. Mr. Terrill's income has been so limited that there have been many days when he had to decide whether to buy medicine for his wife or food. I recall your man Issacs, a tall, heavy-flushed man, red hair, red face, well-fed, hounding a poor aged Negro dishwasher whom Issacs sought to prove had some doubts that the capitalist system was the best in the world and maybe wanted to find out. You got $50,000 to persecute such citizens—Mr. Jackson was already unemployed but it seemed to worry one Bartunek about the source of Mr. Jackson's livelihood.

I do not know how much of the taxpayer's money you paid to your friend DeLong to finger Terrill with his vague memoirs but to any honest and decent citizen it seems that if you base your work on the testimony of such already discredited characters we can accurately judge you and Issacs and the rest of your un-American Ohio Gang. For it stands to reason that a man who will make such statements in an effort to betray those who he himself claims were his former associates and those who he admitted gave him a job and a home for his wife and children (not to mention loans for medicine, furniture, his wife's false teeth, etc.) such a character who sells himself to you for I don't know how many pieces of silver will have no integrity even under oath on the witness stand and for more silver will name as many names as desired from any lists Issacs may feed him. Don't forget that Mrs. Roosevelt and Shirley Temple have also been suspected by the witch hunters but they had money and were not "investigated" like a poor dishwasher.

We are now reliably informed that of some 60 Columbus attorneys listed in the telephone book not one can be found who will go into your hearing room or into a Columbus court with a victim marked by you for crucifixion. Did you have to buy off these attorneys with your taxpayers' appropriation or was it your legalized blackmail that frightened them?

Mr. Renner—I have lived and traveled in fascist countries and I know fascism when I see it. This is fascism. You as chairman of this committee which functions as it does have accepted the role of chief fascist in Ohio and you and your machinations must be exposed to all voters, especially to those in decent organizations which can move against you.

As the Bible says, "As ye sow, so shall ye reap." You are riding high today on the crest of fascist hysteria sweeping the U. S. A. under the protection of McGrath's order to rush to completion his four concentration camps but I warn you that the American people will not stomach it for long and those fascist friends who support you now will flee like the rats they are when the tide turns.

Very truly,

[s] Anna H. Morgan
ANNA H. MORGAN.







Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated June 10, 1952, transmitted to us by William L. Holland which he requests be inserted into the record.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to is marked "Exhibit No. 1415" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1415

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.
Eldorado 5-1759

JUNE 10, 1952.

MR. ROBERT MORRIS,
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: In connection with Professor David N. Rowe's testimony before the Subcommittee on Internal Security, I wish to point out that Professor Rowe on a number of points made inaccurate or misleading statements. Some of these have already been corrected by Miss Farley in her testimony.

In addition, however, Professor Rowe submitted a statistical analysis of some IPR publications by his colleague Professor Richard Walker, and I understand that the Subcommittee accepted this for inclusion in the record. These statistics were subsequently published in the *New Leader* of March 31, 1952, in an article by Professor Walker entitled, "Lattimore and the IPR," to which I have written a reply to Professor Walker. In the course of my reply I pointed out the inadequacy of his statistical analysis. Since the Subcommittee accepted Walker's statistics at second hand from Professor Rowe, it seems to me only fair that you should insert my own comments on these statistics into the printed record. I therefore enclose a copy of the relevant portions of my statement and request that you put it into the record.

In order to correct a number of other misleading impressions which Professor Rowe gave in his testimony, I am enclosing herewith copies of correspondence from the IPR files which in my opinion will help to give a more accurate picture of some of the incidents he mentioned. I request that you insert these documents into the record also. Please return the originals to us in the near future after you have made copies of them for your files.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Executive Vice Chairman.

MR. WALKER'S STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Mr. Walker's basis for selecting his so-called "anti-Communist" writers is quite unreliable. He uses my list (which I clearly described as only a partial

list) from my October 10 statement, whereas he could easily have ascertained that the IPR published contributions from scores of anti-Communist writers besides those whom I happened to mention in my list of 47. Following is a supplementary list (still incomplete) of other IPR writers whom I know to have been anti-Communist when they wrote for the IPR (and I am not aware that any of them later become pro-Communist). In addition, one could of course easily present an even longer list of reputable writers who may not have been *known* as "anti-Communist" but were certainly non-Communist and in most cases anti-Communist.

ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF ANTI-COMMUNIST IPR WRITERS

(1) American

A. Vandenbosch	Franz Michael	A. A. Schiller
C. Hartley Grattan	M. S. Bates	Charles N. Spinks
K. P. Landon	Donald Nugent	James H. Shoemaker
J. W. Masland	H. S. Quigley	J. R. Andrus
Galen Fisher	Andrew Lind	Warren S. Hunsberger
Percy E. Corbett	R. L. Pendleton	R. E. Dupuy
C. Walter Young	H. Foster Bain	J. E. Spencer
William C. Johnstone	F. M. Keesing	C. Yanaga
E. F. Penrose	Tyler Dennett	N. Pelcovits
K. Pelzer	Julius Edelstein	K. Kurihara
F. Tamagna	Joseph R. Hayden	Glenn T. Trewartha
Philip Wright	K. S. Latourette	Carl L. Alsberg
Quincy Wright	John E. Orchard	Grover Clark
Charles Wolf, Jr.	Stephen W. Reed	Arthur L. Dean
Jerome Cohen	John R. Stewart	Royal Chapman
J. M. Maki	Joseph S. Davis	Theodore J. Kreps
William Ballis	Harold M. Vinacke	Arthur D. Gayer

(2) Non-American

F. C. Jones	E. M. Gull	W. J. Hinton
Sir Charles Collins	F. L. Ho	T. L. Hsia
A. R. M. Lower	H. D. Fong	K. Kanai
F. W. Soward	C. H. Lowe	G. W. Keeton
Edgar McInnis	H. K. Lee	G. Lacam
Victor Purcell	K. Takayanagi	H. Lauterpacht
Eleanor Hinder	N. MacKenzie	J. Th. Moll
Lord Hailey	H. Angus	I. Nitobe
T. Uyeda	P. Gourou	G. R. Parkin
T. E. Gregory	C. Robequain	Sir Harold Parlett
Li Choh-ming	D. Lew	P. D. Philipps
Gaston Rueff	W. M. Borrie	G. L. Wood
Toshi Go	D. Copland	I. Clunies Ross
Sir James Allen	W. J. Cator	G. W. Swire
A. D. A. de Kat Angelino	Sir Paul Butler	K. Yokota
J. L. Christian	E. Dennery	P. H. W. Sitsen
G. H. C. Hart	W. D. Forsyth	Sir William Barton
H. Visman	T. P. Fry	P. T. Bauer
J. H. Boeke	C. Y. Wu	Sir J. Crosby
M. Royama	O. M. Greene	

Turning now to Mr. Walker's list of 40 so-called "pro-Communist" IPR writers, we find that it is compiled from the McCarran Subcommittee's misleading list of 37 "IPR Personnel" plus Mr. Walker's additions of Kate Mitchell, Philip Jaffe, and Nym Wales. It should be noted first that many on the list of 37 were never, in any meaningful sense, IPR "personnel" (e. g. Solomon Adler, Lawrence Duggan, Alger Hiss, Hotsumi Ozaki, Mildred Price, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Andrew Steiger, and Harry White). Many of them never wrote at all for the IPR (e. g. Adler, Currie, De Caux, Duggan, Hiss, Price, Smedley, Vincent, and White); and in fairness to Mr. Walker, I must note that he did not claim that these people did write.

Second, this was a list of people only *alleged* to be Communist or pro-Communist. There is no proof that many of them were or are. Indeed, many have given sworn testimony denying that they are or ever were Communists (e. g.,

T. A. Bisson, Owen Lattimore, Kate Mitchell, Maxwell Stewart, Benjamin Kizer, Joseph Barnes, John Fairbanks, and John Carter Vincent). Jaffe, whose name is added by Mr. Walker, does not belong on the list at all, as he wrote for the IPR.

But let us consider the much more important question of *what* these alleged "pro-Communists" actually wrote for the IPR. Here we cannot check exactly with Mr. Walker because he does not specify the titles which he included in his statistics. But in the arbitrary period, 1934–1947, which he selected, he must have included, for instance, some or all of the following studies:

Bisson: American Policy in the Far East
Mitchell: Industrialization of the Western Pacific
Norman: Japan's Emergence as a Modern State

Not everyone will agree with the views expressed in these publications, but they are very competent studies which certainly cannot be considered as pro-Communist. (Here again, in fairness to Mr. Walker, let me note that he did not say these *publications* were pro-Communist. He avoided listing the titles, probably because that would have exposed the misleading nature of his statistics). In the same way, most of the articles written for *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey* by the alleged "pro-Communist" writers turn out, on examination, to reveal little or no trace of "pro-Communist bias, partly because they were often purely factual and descriptive in character.

A much graver omission in Mr. Walker's table is his exclusion of a large number of the regular IPR research volumes, conference papers, and booklets for high schools. Why he omitted them is hard to imagine for they comprise a major part of the IPR output, but it certainly makes his statistics very questionable. For instance, he has omitted such important studies by "anti-Communists" as the following:

Taylor: America and the New Pacific
Mills: British Rule in Eastern Asia
Lieu: Industrialization of Shanghai
Buck: Land Utilization in China
Nasu: Aspects of Japanese Agriculture
Levy: French Policies in the Far East
Christian: Modern Burma
Chamberlin: Modern Japan
Boeke: Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy
Johnstone: The U. S. and Japan's New Order
Robequain: Enonomic Development of French Indochina
Keesing: The South Seas in the Modern World
Gull: British Economic Interests in the Far East
Lee: Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea
Wright: Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific
Royama: Foreign Policy of Japan
Pelzer: Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics
Grattan: Lands Down Under
Jones: Shanghai and Tientsin
Lin Yu-tang: Press and Public Opinion in China
Nitobe: Lectures on Japan
Shepherd: Industry in Southeast Asia
Porter: Crisis in the Philippines
Belshaw: Agricultural Organization in New Zealand
Wadham and Wood: Land Utilization in Australia
Thompson: Thailand, the New Siam
Uyeda: Small Industries in Japan

Besides the above, Mr. Walker has also omitted numerous other major research volumes and conference papers by writers who are certainly non-Communist, even if they may not be well known as anti-Communists. It is hardly necessary to present a list here. Examples can readily be found from a glance at the back catalogues of the IPR or its volumes of conference proceedings.

Now glance, however, at some of the studies by alleged "pro-Communist" writers, which Mr. Walker has also omitted from his list. Here are a few:

Lang: Chinese Family and Society
Field: Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area
Lattimore: Inner Asian Frontiers of China
Chi: Key Economic Areas in Chinese History

Here again, opinions may differ as to the importance of these studies, but it would be quite ridiculous to consider these valuable studies as pro-Communist.

W. L. Holland.

The following paragraph, referring to Professor Walker's statistical analysis, was contained in my letter to the *New Leader* of April 5, 1952, and published by the *New Leader* on April 21, 1952:

"Professor Walker's statistics are highly misleading. For reasons of his own he takes an arbitrary period of 1934–1947 instead of the full period, 1925–1952, of the Institute's history. Even in that shorter period he considers only a portion of the total IPR publication, omitting the very important regular research volumes, the numerous conference papers and the pamphlets prepared for high-school use. Worse still, he makes his comparison on the basis of (*a*) my random and partial list of 47 IPR writers well known for their opposition to communism and (*b*) 40 persons who have been *alleged* (not proved) to be Communist sympathizers, in the hearings. The absurdity of this procedure is obvious. There are of course many other IPR writers besides those named in my list who are strongly opposed to communism. By excluding them, Professor Walker quietly omits a very large proportion of all IPR authors. On the other hand, by accepting mere allegations as his criterion of 'pro-Communists' he includes in his list of 'pro-Communist' publications a number of scholarly, objective and widely acclaimed studies which have no trace of pro-Communist bias."

W. L. Holland,
WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations.

DECEMBER 26, 1946.

Professor DAVID M. ROWE,
Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: To my great distress I find that I shall not be able to return from China in time to attend the Princeton Conference. I had counted on going out to China by ship and coming back quickly by plane, as our budget won't permit of plane travel both ways. I have now had to postpone my departure until around January 17 in order to await Corbett's return, and will probably fly out by an UNRRA plane. I had hoped that there might still be a chance of my getting a ship back in time to attend the Princeton meeting, but it now seems quite clear that I won't be able to reach California until about April 7, and I will then have to attend the IPR National Conference in Southern California on April 9.

Under the circumstances, I must ask you to find someone else to take my place at the Princeton session. This is a real disappointment to me as I had been looking forward to this meeting. I would have told you about this the other day, but at that time there was still a chance that I might be able to get back here in time. In fact there is still a very faint possibility, but not enough to count on. If by any chance you can persuade the Army or Navy people to include me among the distinguished visitors that you are bringing over from China about the end of March, and if I would not need to pay more than the $350 boat fare, I could probably make it, but I don't honestly believe you would be justified in spending money on me when you might use it for Chinese or other foreign guests. However if you think of any other angles that might be worked, please let me know.

I enclose a copy of my letter to Fei Hsiao-tung. He had written me that he was at last accepting your invitation on condition that Tsing Hua would give him three weeks absence and the government would allow him to go. He seemed doubtful whether permission would be granted and I wondered therefore whether you and Fairbank could enter into a conspiracy with me to get him over here for several months. Let's talk it over on Saturday.

Sincer. yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary-General.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,
New Haven, Connecticut, December 30, 1946.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: I was very sorry indeed to hear that there is a strong possibility that you will not be able to get back from China in time for the Princeton conference, April 1, 2 and 3.

I am very reluctant to substitute anyone else for you in that meeting. I do not need to say how important I feel it would be that you should be there for these sessions. I have taken the responsibility of referring your letter to the Princeton Bicentennial, with the request that if it is at all possible they should secure your passage back to this country by Naval Air Transport with our other delegates from China to the Princeton conference. I do not know whether they can expand the number for whom they have requested these accomodations from the Navy Department. If there is any chance of our getting you back in this way in time for the conference, I am sure the Bicentennial authorities will do everything in their power to make use of it.

I do not know whether we can get a ruling from the Navy Department before you must leave this country for China in January. I wonder, therefore, if you can provide me with a very reliable address at which we could be sure to reach you in China by cable later on. This would make it possible for us to notify you in case we secure Naval Air Transport facilities for bringing you back to this country and to provide you with all necessary instructions in this connection. If we succeed in working this out with the Navy Department, I should be of the opinion that it would not cost the IPR anything. I do not believe there is any way in which we can pay the Navy Department for this service, but I should say that I don't know the facts on this point. I have sent to the Bicentennial authorities a copy of your letter to Fei Hsiao-tung. Naturally, I should be glad to see him remain in this country for a longer time than required by the Princeton meetings.

If any subsequent angles on the matter of your travel schedule develop, please inform me as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours.

[s] Rowe
DAVID N. ROWE,
Director of Far Eastern Studies.

dr/bm.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1949.

Dr. DAVID N. ROWE,
Foreign Area Studies, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: I have your letter of September 14 enclosing the comments on Grad's manuscript on Japanese Agriculture. Naturally, I attach considerable weight to the views of such a qualified group of scholars. Your letter raises some difficult problems, however, because within the last few weeks I have received enthusiastic reports about the manuscript from other well-qualified persons in the State Department and other Washington agencies. There have, of course, been criticisms on specific points, some of which I had previously made myself. In the meantime, Grad, with the assistance of T. A. Bisson, has been making a very thorough revision of the manuscript and has recently written me that he expects to work for another two or three months on further revision and reorganization of the manuscript. For this reason, I am a little disturbed at your implied remark that Grad is unlikely to be willing or able to make the necessary revisions, and I therefore wonder if there are not some other factors in the whole matter. If so, I do hope you will let me know in all frankness. I will treat your remarks as strictly confidential.

While I am, of course, grateful to you for having taken the time and the trouble to obtain these detailed criticisms from your colleagues, I want to assure you, in case there has been any misunderstanding, that I have never expected the Yale Foreign Area Studies Division to take any responsibility for Grad's study on Japanese agriculture. It is his other Japanese Urban Community study for which I had requested the professional assistance and guidance of Embree and any other interested faculty people at Yale.

I would like to discuss this whole matter further with you after I return from a visit to Toronto next week. In the meantime, if there is any more "low down," please let me have it.

With all good wishes.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,
New Haven, Connecticut, September 20, 1949.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR BILL: Thank you for your letter of the 17th. In reply to it I would like to say that the work we have done on the Grad manuscript on Japanese agriculture has been without knowledge of the "very thorough revision of the manuscript" which you report that he is making with the help of T. A. Bisson.

I do not know exactly how to interpret the last three sentences in your first paragraph. I have shown, or read your letter over the phone, to Embree, Kaplan, Pelzer, and Yanaga, and have had it suggested to me that perhaps what you mean by "other factors in the whole matter" may be a possible lack of thoroughly friendly relations and working arrangements between Grad and those of us that have been concerned with his work here. If so, I assure you most sincerely that all of us are and have been on the best of terms with Grad. There is, as far as I know, absolutely no friction with him. This, I believe, is all I can contribute on the matter of further "low down" as you put it. The letter to you, and the memo to Grad of which a copy was sent you, were both worked out carefully by me in consultation with each of the persons named above, and at times in conference of as many as three of us at one time. These documents represent, I regret to say, our deliberately reasoned evaluations of the present work under consideration.

Naturally, you are at liberty to do what you will with our comments. In this connection, however, I do believe that the matter of our relation to his project on Japanese Agriculure is not as simple as indicated in your next to last paragraph. It is clear that the Rockefeller grant, your sponsorship, and our appointment of Grad as Visiting Fellow in Far Eastern Studies in the Graduate School for 1948–49, were all based upon his project for the Fukaya study. In regard to it he stated in his memo to the Foundation with your letter to Roger Evans of March 22, 1948, that "My work on the project will be supervised by Professor D. N. Rowe and John Embree of Yale University." (See also my letter to you of March 13, 1948.)

On the other hand, it seems that Grad has given *most*, if *not* all [pencilled note: (Not true)] of his time to the Agriculture study during the term of his appointment as Visiting Fellow. As he finished the chapters of this book, he gave them one by one to Embree, whose comments on were made at the time and have been generally summarized in the memorandum from myself to Grad. Grad also submitted the entire draft to me on completion. I suppose both Embree and myself could have fallen back on the fact that we were only responsible for the Fukaya study, in which case we should certainly have spared ourselves and the other three of our faculty much work. This, however, could well have seemed rather uncooperative. In addition, since Grad *was* Visiting Fellow here in Far Eastern Studies, I believe our responsibility runs at least as far as doing what we could to improve the work, even if only in order to protect ourselves and our organization. Now, I believe, that latter objective has been secured, and as to the former, the statement in my letter about its likelihood still represents I believe, the opinion of all of us. This does not mean that we will not make every effort to continue to help him, that is, if he wishes us to. We are all most friendly to Grad. Please keep in mind that I certainly, and I believe this applies to Embree also, did not ask to see Grad's materials on Agriculture. He submitteed them to us on his own initiative. What would you have done if you had been in our position?

Now Grad is submitting to both of us the chapters, one by one, of his Fukaya study. Embree states and I agree, that we must now get Grad to submit to us a rather complete plan, so as to try to avoid much of the poor organization of material and duplication of treatment that characterized the work on Agriculture. Of course, we were hardly in a position to get this done at the beginning of the Agriculture project. Embree also has decided ideas about substantive revision of the first (and only submitted) section of the Fukaya work.

Incidentally, I find that we, as usual in such cases, gave Grad a one-year Visiting Fellowship. Your letter confirms our connection with the Fukaya project, and I will take steps to have the fellowship relationship extended for the academic year 1949–50. This should have been done before July 1, but the

administrative affairs of Foreign Area Studies have been in a state of readjustment recently. This is the only reason I can think of to explain this lapse.

Sincerely yours,

[s] David Rowe
DAVID N. ROWE.

DNR:dl

Pencilled note: (ack 11/3/49 MFH).

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,
New Haven, Conn., November 1, 1949.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR BILL: I have referred your letter of Oct. 19 to Provost E.S. Furniss who is now Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Area Studies, and he has authorized me to reply to it.

We note your statement regarding the new plan for the completion of the study on Fukaya by Dr. Grad, connected with his acceptance of a position with the United Nations Secretariat as a translator. I am glad to hear of this new arrangement, under which support the Rockefeller Foundation will be continued to allow Dr. Grad to engage the help of two assistants.

Under these circumstances the arrangement for Dr. Grad to call upon the services of members of the Columbia faculty to advise him from time to time on his study, seems a logical one. On our part, since any reappointment of Dr. Grad as Visiting Fellow at Yale had been deferred pending our discussion with you of the project, we will not find it necessary to take action of any kind on the reappointment, but will allow the whole matter to lapse.

I note your hope that some members of our staff will be available to read and criticise parts of the manuscript on an individual and informal basis. Arrangements for this would of course be made between your organization and the individuals of our faculty. These channels are always open to you at any time.

With all assurances of our cooperation in future matters of our mutual interest,

Sincerely yours,

[s] David N. Rowe
DAVID N. ROWE.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,
New Haven, Connecticut, February 6, 1950.

Mr. CLAYTON LANE,
American Institute of Pacific Relations,
One East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR MR. LANE: I wanted to write you in full approval of the point of view stated by you in the executive committee meeting last January 11, regarding editorial policy for the Far Eastern Survey. While I am in the fullest theoretical agreement with the position expressed by Mr. Lockwood as summarized at the bottom of Page four of the Minutes, I believe that from a practical point of view your position is the only tenable one.

I want to write you regarding a decision which I recently reached regarding my membership in the American Institute of Pacific Relations. I have decided to let this membership lapse and what I wanted to say is that I hope you will not read into this action any reflection on the recent administration of the IPR under your secretaryship. I have simply reached a stage where I must reduce my membership in organizations. I cannot afford as many memberships as I now support. Furthermore I cannot keep up with, not to mention participate in, the activities of so many organizations. I have recently decided that I will in the future maintain membership only in the American Political Science Association for professional reasons, and in the Far Eastern Association as an expression of my particular regional interest. It must be clear to you that I have not been able to participate in the activities of the IPR, either as a Trustee or

an ordinary member. I simply do not have the time or energy to keep up many organizational affiliations in the way in which they should be maintained.

My purpose in making the above statement is merely to indicate that my decision to let my membership in the IPR lapse is based upon nothing substantially more positive than the considerations mentioned above.

Sincerely yours,

[s] David N. Rowe
DAVID N. ROWE,
Chairman, Executive Committee of Foreign Area Studies.

DNR : cs

FEBRUARY 27, 1950.

Professor DAVID N. ROWE,
Chairman, Executive Committee of Forcing Area Studies,
Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

DEAR PROFESSOR ROWE: Thanks for your letter of February 6, expressing agreement with my position on the Philippines article.

Your decision not to renew your membership in the American IPR is bad news, particularly because having you as a Trustee assisted in a balance of views on the Board. In any case, I shall always welcome any expression of your views on American IPR matters you may wish to send me. Our close relations with the Far Eastern Association will be conserved.

Sincerely yours,

CLAYTON LANE, *Executive Secretary.*

CL : ae

MARCH 15, 1951.

Dr. DAVID N. ROWE,
Graduate School, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn.

DEAR DAVE: Because of your interest in the subject, I am sending you herewith a manuscript on Security Problems in Southern and Eastern Asia, by V. P. Dutt, of the Indian Council of World Affairs. I would greatly appreciate your comments and detailed criticisms of this study, which seems to me a rather immature and diffuse job with relatively little analysis of actual security problems.

I propose to write the Secretary of the Indian Council that I regard this report as quite unsuitable for publication as an IPR research report and that it is quite unsatisfactory as a substitute for the study the Indian Council was expected to do for us, namely, an analysis of security problems in India and the Indian Ocean area. However, it occurs to me that with a good deal of rewriting the Indian Council might find it possible to use Dutt's report as a more or less popular pamphlet for publication and distribution in India. I would, therefore, like your advice on this possibility, as well as your specific suggestions for revising the manuscript.

I apologize for inflicting this job on you. My only hope is here and there in the manuscript you may find a few points of interest, or at least some indication of Indian attitudes on some of the problems under discussion.

How is your own study going? Have you a tentative outline or table of contents which you could send me for my personal information?

All the best.

Yours,

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Secretary General.

WLH : abs.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
FOREIGN AREA STUDIES,
New Haven, Conn., May 28, 1951.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York.

DEAR BILL: I return herewith the manuscript by Mr. V. P. Dutt which you sent me some time ago.

I have looked this manuscript over, but have not had a chance to scrutinize it as carefully as I would have liked to. It seems to me to be worth publication, although, on the other hand, it is hardly what I consider a study of security

problems as I would define them. There is a lot of information in this publication. Providing the IPR understands what it is doing in publishing this manuscript, I would see no objection to its being put out for information.

Please accept my apologies for the slowness of this reaction. I am completely swamped these days with many concerns.

Sincerely yours,

[s] David Rowe.
DAVID N. ROWE,
Professor of Political Science.

DNR: me.
enc. 1.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat made by the Library of Congress at our request, of the Soviet personnel of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1928.

It shows the name of Mr. Bogolepov. That is the reason for it.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The photostat referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1416" and is as follows:)

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,
June 10, 1952.

SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY,
S. O. B. 424 C.

(Attn.: Miss Walker.)

The attached information is forwarded in response to the inquiry from your office noted below.

Respectfully,

W. C. GILBERT,
Acting Director, Legislative Reference Service.

Material re: Geneva Disarmament Conference: list of delegates.

EXHIBIT No. 1416

SOCIETE DES NATIONS,
C. P. D. 112,
Genève, le 15 mars 1928.

COMMISSION PREPARATOIRE DE LA CONFERENCE DU DESARMEMENT

PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

LISTE DES DÉLÉGATIONS À LA COMMISSION PRÉPARATOIRE

LIST OF DELEGATIONS TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

5ÉME. SESSION, GENÈVE, 15 MARS 1928

	Adresses à Genève
Allemagne:	
S. E. le Comte de BERNSTORFF, Ambassadeur en disponibilité, Membre du Reichstag, Starenberg bei Munchen.	H. des Bergues.
Le Baron E. de WEIZSACHER, Conseiller intime, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Berlin.	H. Métropole.
Contre-Amiral Baron von FREYBERG-EISENBERG, Reichstwehrministerium, Völkerbundstabteilung, Heer, Berlin W. 10.	Do.
Colonel F. von BOETTICHER, Reichswehrministerium, Völkerbundsabteilung, Marine, Berlin W. 10.	Do.
Colonel STRECCIUS, Reichswehrministerium, Völkerbundsabteilung, Heer, Berlin W. 10.	Do.

Argentine:	
S. E. M. Perez, Ministre d'Argentine à Rome, Piazza Esquilino, Rome.	H. des Bergues.
M. José María Cantillo, Ministre de l'Argentine à Berne, Légation de l'Argentine, Berne.	Do.
Capitaine de Vaisseau Julian Fablet, Légation de l'Argentine, Piazza Esquilino, 2, Rome.	Do.
Colonel Fasola Castano.	H. des Famillies.
Union des Republiques Socialistes Sovietistes:	
M. Maxime Litvinoff, Membre du Comité central exécutif U. R. S. S., Commissaire du peuple adjoint aux Affaires Etrangères, Narkomindiel, Moscou.	H. Bellevue.
M. Anatole Lounatcharsky, Membre du Comité central exécutif U. R. S. S., Commissaire du peuple à l'Instruction Publique—Narkomindiel, Moscou.	Do.
M. Simeon Pougatchef, Chef-Adjoint à l'Etat-Major général, Narkomvoien, Moscou.	Do.
M Boris Stein, Directeur du Département au Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Etrangères, Narkomindiel, Moscou.	Do.
M. Vs. Egoriew, Professeur à l'Académie Navale de Leningrade.	Do.
M. Vladimir Egoriew, Sous-Directeur au Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Etrangères, 3, Troilzki 18 log. 3, Moscou X 4, Trajdanskaia.	Do.
M. Vladimir Socoline-Schapiro, Chef adjoint du Protocole au Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Etrangères, Narkomindiel, Moscou.	Do.
M. I. Bogolaepoff, Attaché au Commissariat du Peuple pour les Affaires Etrangères, Narkomindiel, Moscou.	Do.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel has some other letters that he would like to enter in the record at this time.

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter from the Coordinator of Information, dated March 17, 1942, to Mr. Holland, dealing with the relations between the Institute and the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

Senator Watkins. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1417" and is as follows:)

(Pencil note: W L H)
(Pencil note: ECC, should we include one of these in the letter to Willits?)

Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C., March 17, 1942.

Mr. W. L. Holland,
Research Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street, New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Holland: The Far Eastern Section of the Office of the Coordinator of Information wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has received from the Institute of Pacific Relations and particularly from those in charge of its research activities. The outstanding example is the receipt of a number of manuscripts in advance of their publication by the Institute. These inc ude the translation of a work by Charles Robequain on the economic development of French Indo-China, a manuscript by H. G. Callis on foreign investments in Southeast Asia, one by Virginia Thompson on Burma, and one by Chao Ting-chi on China.

This acknowledgement may be useful to you in any appeal you may make for support during the coming year. May I express the hope that your plans for the year will include provision for further cooperation with this Section. The immediate importance of this is emphasized by the fact that our own work has become more closely integrated with that of the Army and Navy.

We look forward to the continuance of the cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations with confidence that such cooperation will make for effectiveness in research and economy in the use of personnel.

Sincerely yours,

[s] C. F. Remer
C. F. Remer,
Chief, Far Eastern Section.

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter to "Dear Mary," dated September 12, 1946, signed "Renee" who, according to our file is Renee Guthman, which I would like to incorporate into the record.

Mr. Morris. Did you take this letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. Mandel. All the letters are from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Those two are from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator Watkins. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1418" and is as follows:)

(Pencil note: file. Guthman ~~file W-L-H.~~ We seem to have hit a gold mine)

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.

New York—Washington, D. C.—Chicago—San Francisco—Honolulu

Washington Office, 1710 G Street, NW., Washington 6, D. C.

Telephone District 8665

Washington 6, D. C., *September 12, 1946.*

Dear Mary: No; I'll be in New York Monday and Tuesday. Only I find I can't keep both Washington and New York on my mind at once so I'm writing letters about Washington just as though I were here full time.

My accomplishments for the afternoon for Pacco were securing twelve copies of the Navy Insular Report to the United Nations, twelve copies of the Senate hearings on the Philippine Trade Act, twelve copies of the House hearings on the Philippine Trade Act and twelve copies of the House hearings of the resolution on Statehood for Hawaii. The latter three are being sent directly to you, the first one is being sent here and I will send them on up to you. Am I right in assuming that one copy of each is intended for the Amco library? I haven't done anything about getting them one for I figured one of the twelve would be for them.

I've gotten as far as locating the strategic Colonel from whom all copies of the Strategic Bombing Survey seem to emanate. I'll get as many copies of that as possible. I located a sergeant who said he could give me two copies but for any more I had to talk to the Colonel. So if the Colonel says no I know that I can at least get two copies.

What else may I do for you, m'am? Let me know, won't you.

See you Monday.

[s] Renee.

Mr. Mandel. This is a letter dated May 5, 1947, also addressed to "Dear Mary" from "Renee." Presumably Mary is Mary Healy and Renee is Renee Guthman. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We had the photostat made.

Senator Watkins. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1419" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1419

SUMNER WELLES, *Chairman*
MORTIMER GRAVES, *Vice Chairman*

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York—San Francisco—Los Angeles—Honolulu—Milwaukee—Seattle

Washington Office, 1710 G Street NW.

Telephone District 8665

WASHINGTON 6, D. C., *May 5, 1947.*

DEAR MARY: Thanks so much for sending me the news that Molly and Joan have passage from New Zealand. I wonder when that will bring them to this country?

On the Library of Congress list of declassified documents—in my own devious method I have discovered that such a list is in preparation but that they have no idea when it will be completed, if ever. A list of what they have received to date reclines in a little card file on the desk of one Mr. Greenwood in the documents section. He will be very glad to let anyone look at the list any time. But he says they have no way of telling how complete a list it is. They are trying to get all the agencies to let them know whenever any material is declassified but he seems to feel it is a losing struggle and that there is no way of checking up on just what proportion they do know about. However, what they do have they will be glad to let us in on. Will you be down soon or would you like one of us to take a look?

When will you be down? Soon, I hope.

Let me hear.

RENEE.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Renee Guthman from Mary F. Healy, dated April 30, 1947. I would like to offer it for the record.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1420" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1420

30TH APRIL 1947.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,
American IPR, 1710 G Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: Bill Holland has received a cable from Miss St. George as follows:

"Now sailing by *Rangitata* May 7th via Panama advise Guthman." St. George.

I suppose it will be a long trip but at last we know they are actually on their way.

Pat Barnett has written me that she thinks the Library of Congress is preparing or has prepared a list of various Government documents that have been declassified and that a good way of keeping informed would be through the Library of Congress, for a copy of every declassified document is sent to them. Have you heard of such a list or do you know someone who would keep us informed of such documents.

All the best.

Yours,

MARY F. HEALY.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman from Marguerite Ann Stewart, dated December 6, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1421" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1421

DECEMBER 6, 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washington 5, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: I am about to flit to San Francisco, but I do want to take a minute to give you my reaction to your suggestion of a rebate to the Far Eastern Commission for twelve subscriptions to the *Survey.*

I talked this over with Larry, and he said there was no sense in our giving a rebate to any government agency whatever. It seems that any publications they really want can be requisitioned in their budgets. In any case, a rebate on the *Survey* is highly impractical. The $5 subscription price does not nearly cover the cost of the *Survey* as it is. I find that the past year it cost us $6.80 per *Survey* subscription. So, the only thing I can suggest is that you tell the Commission that we are awfully sorry, but we cannot give them any reduction, and recommend that they take the number of subscriptions (at $5 each!) that they can afford.

I am so happy to hear that you are planning to really push *Survey* promotion among government agencies. That will be simply swell!

Affectionately,

(Mrs.) MARGUERITE ANN STEWART,
Secretary.

MAS: rs.

P. S.—Congratulations on your interesting meetings and on your luncheon for Teddy White. I hear wonderful things about them.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman, from Marguerite Ann Stewart, dated December 3, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1422," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1422

DECEMBER 3, 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washington 5, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: Thanks for the membership records. Yoshi is going to check them against our plates as soon as she gets time, probably next week when I am in California and she can have a bit more help than is the case when we are all working full tilt. One thing I notice from your list. You have included all the State Department men who are serving in various parts of Asia and whose mail is forwarded by the State Department. Strictly speaking, these are not Washington members. They merely use Washington as a forwarding address and are "members at large." Your list should not be cluttered up with them, for it is to your advantage to have an active list of people who are actually serviced by your office.

These, however, do not account fully for the discrepancies. Yoshi will endeavor to find other reasons for these in checking your list against hers.

Thanks for your list of nominees. I am afraid, however, that Wallace will have to be run for New York rather than Washington, as he tells us that his residence is now here. ECC strongly urges that Mrs. Frances Bolton be included in the Washington list of nominees. Will you please let me know at once if this is agreeable to you?

Affectionately,

(Mrs.) MARRUERITE ANN STEWART,
Secretary.

MAS:rs.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman from Marguerite Ann Stewart, dated November 19, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1423" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No 1423

NOVEMBER 19, 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,
American Council, Institution of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washington 5, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: I am trying desperately to weed out the "free copy" list for the FAR EASTERN SURVEY.

I note that at the moment only three government agencies receive free copies (Library of Congress; two copies, Social Record Division, Library of Congress; one copy, Head of the Far Eastern Desk; one copy, and Division of Regional Information, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, one copy).

It seems to me that if we are going to give free copies to strategic government agencies, we should be systematic about it. In general, I believe that most government agencies should take out paid subscriptions, and I wish you would undertake this little piece of business for us. In the meantime, will you, Shirley, and Eleanor please go into a huddle and make out for me a "must" list of bureaus which should receive free copies? I suggest that these be addressed in the name of the bureau or division, not in the name of a particular person. Will you please give this your very earliest attention.

I had a talk yesterday with Mr. Halstead of the International Film Foundation, 1600 Broadway. He is the man who is to speak on the "Use of Visual Aides in Teaching International Understanding at your teachers' conference, and he is responsible for loaning us *Peoples of the Soviet Union.* I told him about the change of date, and he will be glad to save January 11th. I suggest that you write him confirming the date, place, and time, and that in the future he receive all his information from you directly. This will avoid any chance of slip-up.

Affectionately,

(Mrs.) MARGUERITE ANN STEWART,
Secretary.

MAS: rs.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Renee Guthman from Marguerite Ann Stewart dated November 4, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1424" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1424

NOVEMBER 4, 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
1710 G Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: As Shirley has no doubt told you, I am simply thrilled about plans for the Teachers Conference on December 7th.

Enclosed is a draft of the program as I would suggest it. It has the advantage of having three speakers—approximately twenty minutes each—in the morning, rather than two long speeches such as Miss Summy suggested. I prefer the former, as an audience reacts better to several shorter speeches than to fewer longish ones. It has the disadvantage that the speakers are all women. This frequently happens at Teachers Conferences, and while I do not consider it ideal, I can think of worse elements in a conference.

I had a long talk with Miss Jean Gates, whom I believe you sent to me. I think she can give exactly the kind of talk teachers would like on Chinese cultural achievements and their contribution to the West. This is always useful to the classroom teacher. As Miss Gates is in G–2, she cannot speak on anything political but will, I believe, be willing to talk on a cultural topic.

Mrs. Dickinson has the advantage of bringing a recent first hand picture of Russia and of living in Washington, so that you will have no railroad fare to pay. She spoke the other night at the Herald Tribune Forum, where I understand she was very well received.

I have already arranged for the loan of the film (without charge) by Julien Bryan, *Peoples of the Soviet Union*. As it has been made by a new educational outfit working toward international understanding through visual aids, I took the liberty of asking their public relations man, who formerly lived in India, and has a Far Eastern slant, to go down (without any cost to us) and give a seven-minute talk after this film on the use of films in teaching international relations.

I will get you one or two other films, but have not as yet had time to do so. These will have to be rented.

As Shirley may have told you, I hope you will include a registration fee of approximately $.75, in addition to the cost of the luncheon. This is the only way you can cover the cost of mailing, film rental, and honoraria for speakers.

I do not know whether you and Miss Summy had any conversation about this. I always feel that if it is at all possible, speakers should receive some honoraria, no matter how small. I would suggest ten or fifteen dollars for Mrs. Dickinson, Miss Gates, and Eleanor. Ethel, of course, will be glad to speak without charge.

Another $.25 should be added to the total cost to cover the free kits. This is a swell idea and also important in a teachers' conference. I would suggest that we include Eleanor's new pamphlet, *Russia and America, Pacific Neighbors*, my article (enclosed) on Asia and the school curriculum, a school leaflet, and two bibliographies, *What to Read on China* and *Books on the Soviet Union*. We will be glad to make this available at cost or $.25 per kit.

Do let me hear of your and Miss Summy's reaction to all of these ideas and to the enclosed program.

You certainly are a whirlbeater the way you are getting things lined up down there. Teddy White and all! I am so proud of you I could pop.

Affectionately,

MARGUERITE ANN STEWART.
Secretary.

P. S.—You will note that the titles on this tentative program are too long. I have designed them primarily to convey the content I have in mind for each speech.

TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS OF TEACHERS' CONFERENCE ON THE FAR EAST

Wilson Teachers College, Washington, D. C., Saturday, December 7, 1946, 10:30 A. M.—3:00 P. M.

MORNING SESSION (10:30—11:45)

1. China's Cultural Heritage and Her Gifts to the West—Jean Gates
2. The Soviets and Their Problems Today—Mrs. LaFell Dickenson
3. *American Problems and Policies in China and Korea—Eleanor Lattimore

LUNCHEON SESSION (12:00—1:30)

Asia and the School Curriculum—Ethel Ewing

AFTERNOON SESSION (1:45—3:00)

Films:
A Film on China—(30 minutes)
Peoples of the Soviet Union (33 minutes)
Films in the Teaching of International Relations (7 minutes)

*This would of course include among other things an analysis of Soviet-American relations in the Far East.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated October 14, 1946, addressed to "Dear Mary" from Renee J. Guthman.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1425" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1425

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

New York—Washington, D. C.—Chicago—San Francisco—Honolulu

Washington Office, 744 Jackson Place NW., Washington 6, D. C.

Telephone District 8665

OCTOBER 14, 1946.

DEAR MARY: I'm afraid I haven't done so well this time on the documents you asked me to track down, but here's the report on your October 8th letter.

The reports on the textile and education missions to Japan will be out next week or the week after. Mrs. Florence Thomason, who is in charge of the distribution of documents in the public liaison office, says that you will automatically get one copy but that if you want 12 copies they will be glad to send them to you on a written request. If you request them now they'll keep the request and mail them to you as soon as they are out.

Pawley's report on Japanese reparations hasn't yet gone to the President and they don't know whether it ever will be released generally. What I think you must be referring to is the report on the press conference he had when he returned. I am getting 12 copies of this sent to me and will forward them on to you as soon as they arrive. Pawley's report on German reparations is available as such through the State Department. If that's what you want you can request that at the same time as the above material from Mrs. Thomason.

I called the Gov. Printing Office and they said they had not filled your order because you had not sent the money along with it. How you would have known the prices I'm sure I don't know. But here is the dope:

U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey reports:

1. Japan's Struggle to End the War ---------- 20¢ each
2. Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ---------- 45¢ each
3. Summary Report (Pacific War) ---------- 25¢ each

[Handwritten: BAB—would you follow up your previous order with a check?]

I have tried and tried to get you twelve copies for free. But the Strategic Bombing Survey has been dissolved and the only distribution point for the material seems to be the GPO. Do you want to try sending in an order accompanied with a check or would you like one of us to go around there and buy the stuff and send it from this office to you? Whichever you say—it's no trouble for one of us to go over and pick things up. How you managed to get the first copies I can't imagine. They were so firm about "no tickee, no laundry" except for Gov. agencies.

Now, on the last two I'm afraid I haven't done well at all. Would you look at your one copy of the Industrial Disarmament of Japan and see if they give any Washington clues at all. No one in State or War seems to have ever heard of them at all and I can find no trace of a National Engineers Committee here in Washington. Sorry to be stupid but I imagine there must be some reference or name or address that would shed some light on the subject.

The same goes for Corwin Edward's report on the Japanese combines. No one in State seems to have ever heard of them. Do you have any further clues such as who Edwards is or for whom the report was made or anything like that? Guess I'm no rival for Scotland Yards yet.

Now there is one favor you can do for us, please m'am. The recent catalogue (I suppose it's too much to hope that the additional order has arrived yet, isn't it?) lists pamphlets from the Australian Council and from the Royal Institute. We have none of them here in the office either in the library or on our "for sale" shelf. Do you suppose your office could send me one copy of each of these? Somehow I have the feeling that you could do it without any effort where it would be a struggle for the AMCO shipping room if I asked them for a set.

When can I expect you down? Your bed is waiting for you and any day or any hour is convenient. So let me hear, won't you.

Best,

RENEE J. GUTHMAN.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 8, 1946, addressed to Renee Guthman from Mary F. Healy.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1426" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1426

STH OCTOBER 1946.

Miss RENEE GUTHMAN;
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
1706 G. Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR RENEE: We have just received twelve copies of Hearings on Statehood for Hawaii from Representative Peterson's office. I believe these probably came through your good efforts. Thank you very much.

We have heard through Bill Lockwood that reports on textiles and education in Japan are now available in the State Department. At first I thought I would write to Margaret Carter to find out from who we should get these, but you seem to have such remarkable success I decided to ask you. We would like twelve copies of each report, if possible (I shall pass one on to the Amco library).

Also, we should like to obtain copies of Pawley's report on reparations from the State Department which was released some time back.

We have received one copy of each of the first reports of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (one on Japan, one on Germany) and have an order in for some time with the government printing office for an additional ten copies. I wondered if you would have a chance to get in touch with Colonel McMurrin about our getting copies directly from the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Gravelly Point, Virginia as indicated in the attached correspondence, rather than ordering them through the government printing office. It took us a good month to get the first copies and we have not yet received any additional ones. I should tell you that the government printing office did not bill us for the first copies, so perhaps if Gravely Point fails to comply you might try calling the GPO directly.

You see we are making full use of your generosity. It is wonderful to have someone to write to with these rather vague requests.

While I think of it, perhaps while you are on the trail of these reports you might see if we can obtain copies of the report on Industrial Disarmament of Japan made by the National Engineers Committee which was submitted to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. We have received one copy from the Engineers Joint Council here, but would like ten to twelve more.

Sincerely yours,

MARY F. HEALY.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat from the list of the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "List of Washington, Virginia, and Maryland members," dated October, 1946.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The list referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1427" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1427

OCTOBER 1946.

LIST OF WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA, AND MARYLAND MEMBERS

Capt. A. Alcan, 3130 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
Mrs. Jane M. Alden, 4607 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
R. P. Alexander, 4507 Van Ness St., D. C.
John M. Allison, Division of Japanese Affairs, State Dept.
J. Russell Andrus, 602 Woodside Parkway, Silver Spring, Md.
C. O. Arndt, U. S. Office of Education, D. C.
Edwin G. Arnold, Box 234, R. F. D. No. 2, Fairfax, Va.
Mrs. Ellen Atkinson, 3447 S. Wakefield St., Arlington, Va.
Australian Legation, 3117 Woodland Drive, D. C.
Dr. O. E. Baker, University of Maryland, College Park, Md.
Mr. and Mrs. Robert Barnett, 4225 49th St., D. C.
John Barrow, 5034 41st Street, D. C.
Margaret Beard, 2110 Florida Ave., D. C.
Eric A. Beecroft, 2017—37th Street, D. C.
Konrad Bekkar, 1323 Naw Hampshire Ave., D. C.

Harold R. Benjamin, 3915 Calverton Drive, Hyattsville, Md.
Charles R. Bennett, Hotel Fairfax, D. C.
Prof. George H. Blakeslee, Division of Political Studies, State Dept.
The Hon. Frances P. Bolton, House of Representatives
Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Johns Hopkins University
Mr. William Braisted, 3104 Cleveland Ave., D. C.
Senator Ralph O. Brewster, Senate Office Bldg.
Stephen C. Brown, State Dept.
William O. Brown, Lanham, Md.
Ralph J. Bunche, 1510 Jackson St., D. C.
W. A. M. Burden, Commerce Dept. Bldg.
Dorothy Burgeson, 4905 Potomac Ave., D. C.
Ardath W. Burks, The John Paul Jones, 1717 "G" Street, D. C.
Ralph H. Busick, 220 North Thomas St., Arlington
Halleck A. Butts, 4701 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
John F. Cady, 2824 S. Abingdon Drive, Arlington
John C. Caldwell, 8408 Queen Anne's Drive, Silver Spring, Md.
Schuyler Van R. Cammann, 4103 W Street, D. C.
Ellsworth C. Carlson, 3207 Commonwealth Ave., Alexandria
Mrs. Margaret R. Taylor Carter, Division of Public Liaison, State Dept.
William D. Carter, 1215 16th St., D. C.
Catholic Assn. for Int'l Peace, 1312 Mssachusetts Ave., D. C.
Len De Caux, C. I. O., 718 Jackson Place, D. C.
Alfred D. Charles, 29 College Ave., Annapolis
Chester Chartrand, 700 N. Wayne St. Arlington
Jean-Felix Charvet, French Embassy, 2129 Wyoming, D. C.
Office of Commercial Counselor, Chinese Embassy, 2001 19 St., D. C.
The Hon. O. Edmund Clubb, Foreign Service Mail Desk, State Dept.
Wallace M. Cohen, 6302 Oakridge Ave., Chevy Chase
Mrs. Evelyn S. Colbert, 1858 Mintwood Place, D. C.
Nickolas Cottrell, 1815 N. Randolph St., Arlington
Cabot Coville, Mail Room, Dept. of State
Mrs. Lillian Coville, 3114 Dumbarton Ave., D. C.
David Daiches, British Embassy, 3100 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
The Hon. F. M. Davenport, 8000 Parkside Drive, D. C.
Capt. R. A. Dawes, USN (Ret.)., Hunting Ter. Apts., 1200 South Washington St., Alexandria
Eleanor E. Dennison, 3900 39th St., D. C.
Ellery Denison, Export Import Bank of Washington, D. C.
Ludwell Denny, Scripps-Howard Newspapers, 1013 13th St., D. C.
LaFell Dickinson, Pres., General Federation of Women's Clubs, 1734 N St., D. C.
Ben Dorfman, U. S. Tariff Commission, D. C.
Dr. H. V. Dreyhausen, Dir., Evans Products Co., 1608 20th St., D. C.
Cora DuBois, 1639 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
James Terry Duce, Arabian-American Oil Co., Shoreham Bldg., D. C.
Col. R. Ernest Dupuy, 2719 Dumbarton Ave., D. C.
Clara Eastlake, 1411 No. Hartford St.. Arlington
Charleen Egan, 4905 Potomac Ave., D. C.
Capt. E. M. Eller, USN, Office of Public Information, Navy Dept., D. C.
Charles B. Fahs, 8411 Piney Branch Court, Silver Spring
Elizabeth Fautz, FAO, 2841 McGill Terrace, D. C.
Prof. Alfred P. Fernbach, Lyndhall Apts., Univ. of Virginia
Dr. Henry Field, Library of Congress
Gwendolyn R. Fillman, 2019 Eye St., D. C.
Ruth Finney, 1525 28th St., D. C.
Sam Fishback, 202 Wilmington Pl., S. E., D. C.
Mr. and Mrs. F. M. Fisher, 2313 South June St., Arlington
Ralph Fisher, 2005 North Madison St., Arlington
Wilfred Fleisher, 2320 Tracy Place, D. C.
Dr. Guy Stanton Ford, 3133 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
John De Francis, 1706 Prest Road, Alexandria
M. Jean Gates (Miss) 3100 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
C. E. Gauss, Export-Import Bank, D. C.
Mortimer Graves, 1219 16th St., D. C.
James Frederick Green, 21 East Bradley Lane, Chevy Chase
The Honorable J. C. Grew, 2840 Woodland Drive, D. C.
Gordon Griffiths, 1811 N. Oak St., Arlington

H. Lawrence Groves, Dept. of State, Mail Room, D. C.
Eleanor M. Hadley, Govt. Sect. (in Japan with military government)
Jane E. Hallenbeck, London Hall, 1133 13th St., D. C.
Dr. and Mrs. E. S. C. Handy, P. O. Box 57, Oakton
George L. Harris, 2102 South Knoll St., Arlington
Joseph C. Harsch, CBS, Earle Bldg., D. C.
Lowell H. Hattery, 945 Pennsylvania Ave., D. C.
Senator Harry B. Hawes, Transportation Bldg., D. C.
Mrs. Carrol Healy, Netherlands Information Bureau, 1470 Euclid St., D. C.
Sister Helen, Library, Trinity College
Dr. Clarence Hendershot, 8454 Piney Branch Court, Silver Spring
Arthur B. Hersey, 807 Chalfonte Drive, Alexandria
James J. Hitchcock, 1821 M St., D. C.
Claire Holt, 3260 Prospect Ave., D. C.
Halford L. Hoskins, 1906 Florida Ave., D. C.
Robert B. Holtz, 1188 National Press Bldg., D. C.
James L. Houghteling, 2431 Kalorama Road, D. C.
A. W. Hummel, 4615 Hunt Ave., Chevy Chase
Robert Stuart Hummel, 1201 Clifton St., D. C.
Lt. Com. W. S. Hunsberger, 16 West Woodbine St., Chevy Chase
Lt. Walter G. Inman, USNR, 2310 9th St. North, Arlington
Roy James, 1210 South Barton St., Arlington
Dr. David Jenkins, 3500 39th St., D. C.
Odette L. Jenzen, 1079 31st St., D. C.
Joan Johnson, Cardinal Point, Norfolk
Dr. William C. Johnstone, New Delhi, India
S. Shepard Jones, 4404 Maple Ave., Bethesda
Allen L. Jonns, 1320 Olds St., Norfolk
Walter B. Kahn, 2231 Q St., D. C.
Mrs. Mary Jane Keeney, 215 B Street, D. C.
Arthr S. Keller, 1436 N. Inglewood St., Arlington
John W. Kendall, 1313 Southview Road, Northwood, Baltimore
Bessie J. Kibbey, 2025 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
H. S. Konijn, 1823 North Monroe St., Arlington
Philip E. Krichbaum, 821 Maryland Ave., D. C.
John F. Kullgren, 2800 Woodley Rd., D. C.
Mrs. Helen B. Lamb, 2931 Morrison St., D. C.
Margaret Lambie, 1661 Crescent Place, D. C.
Emmanuel S. Larsen, 1650 Harvard St., D. C.
Owen Lattimore, Roland View Rd., Ruxton, Md.
Rev. Edmund J. Lee, Chatham Hall, Chatham, Va.
Waldo G. Leland, Amer. Council of Learned Societies
Morris R. Lewis, China
Sir Willmott Lewis, 1202 National Press Bldg., Washington
Ernest K. Lindley, 1227 National Press Bldg., D. C.
Paul M. A. Linebarger, 2831 29th St., D. C.
Walter S. Lippman, 3525 Woodley Rd., D. C.
Frank Lorimer, 2930 Chesapeake St., D. C.
Lewis L. Lorwin, 39th & Cathedral Ave., D. C.
Dr. W. C. Lowdermilk, 3127 Patterson Pl., D. C.
J. V. A. MacMurray, Lutherville, Md.
Robert N. Magill, 231 First St., D. C.
John McGilvrey Maki, Harvard University
Kendric N. Marshall, 122 Aspen St., Chevy Chase
Edwin M. Martin, 9 Brookdale Road, D. C.
Col. Truman M. Martin, 4801 Connecticut Ave., D. C.
George H. A. Masselman, 24 Woodhaven Blvd., Bethesda.
Major Gen. Frank R. McCoy, 2516 Massachusetts Ave., D. C.
Lt. Harry L. McMasters, USNR, 3720 9th St., D. C.
Selden & Audrey Menefee, 2729 Daniel Road, Chevy Chase
Eugene Meyer, World Bank
E. W. Mill, 4100 Russell Ave., Mt. Rainier, Md.
Mr. & Mrs. A. L. Moffat, 3705 Thirty-Third Place, D. C.
Mrs. Boswell Moorhead, 2220 R Street, D. C.
George W. Morris, 10 Shenandoah Road, R. F. D. 1, Alexandria
Phoebe Morrison, 7320 Piney Branch Road, Takoma Park, D. C.
William D. F. Morrisson, State Dept.

Warner Moss, 704 Powell St., Williamsburg, Va.
Edgar A. Mowrer, 3301 Garfield St., D. C.
Raymond T. Meyer, 400 High St., Chevy Chase
Rev. James Murdock, 23–1840 Biltmore St., D. C.
Prof. G. Bernard Noble, 909 N. Wayne St., Arlington, Va.
Frank B. Noyes, Evening Star, Washington, D. C.
Earl L. Packer, State Dept.
Ruth E. Pardee, 227 N. Pitt St., Alexandria
Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, Brookings Institute, D. C.
Cyrus H. Peake, 4616 Hunt Ave., Chevy Chase
Dr. Karl J. Pelzer, 5530 Broad Branch Road, D. C.
James K. Penfield, State Dept.
Marshall N. Peterson, 4107 Conn. Ave., D. C.
Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, 1615 Rhode Island Ave., D. C.
Abe Pivowitz, 3143 P Street, D. C.
Jane F. Plimpton, 2139 R St., D. C.
Major James Plimsoll, Australian Embassy
Mrs. Hilda C. Pontius, 4020 Arkansas Ave., D. C.
Catherine Porter, 2102 So. Knoll St., Arlington
Mr. & Mrs. G. R. Powles, New Zealand Legation
Olive I. Reddick, Hood College, Frederick, Maryland
Helen Dwight Reid, AAUW, 1634 I St., D. C.
Arthur R. Ringwalt, State Dept.
Jay Robinson, 1631 S Street, D. C.
Mrs. Eryl Rudlin, 3213 Volta Place, D. C.
Robert Rutherford, State Dept.
Corp. of St. Timothy's School, Catonsville, Baltimore
Mr. & Mrs. F. B. Sayre, 4853 Rockwood Pky., D. C.
W. A. Scharffenberg, 804 Houston Ave., Takoma Park, Md.
E. E. Schefer, 119 South Oak St., Falls Church, Va.
Karl de Scheinitz, 2505 P St., D. C.
Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Wardman Park Hotel
Katherine Sherman, 2808 8th St., Arlington, Va.
William Phillip Simms, 1013 13th St., D. C.
Lt. Bennet Skewes-Cox, 1635 Wisconsin Ave., D. C.
Florence M. Smith, 2558 Mass. Ave., D. C.
Henri Sokolove, 2010 N. Taft St., Arlington, Va.
H. M. Spitzer, 901 16th St., D. C.
Hon. Edwin F. Stanton, Bangkok
John Stenhouse, 4808 Park Ave., D. C.
Arthur Sweetser, 3060 Garrison St., D. C.
Carlton B. Swift, 1318 29th St., D. C.
Raymond Swing, 1613 19th St., D. C.
Wayne C. Taylor, 1743 22nd St., D. C.
William Lonsdale Tayler, Galesville, Md.
Sen. Elbert D. Thomas, Senate Office Bldg., D. C.
Laura Thompson (Mrs. John Collier), Vienna, Va.
Daniel Thorner, 4522 49th St., D. C.
M. B. Thresher, British Embassy, 3100 Mass. Ave., D. C.
Mrs. W. H. Turner, Jr., 513 South Fairfax St., Alexandria, Va.
TWA Library, 1740 G Street, D. C.
Mr. & Mrs. J. Parker Van Zandt, 712–A Westchester Apts., D. C.
Mrs. Ilza Veith, 4507 Prospect Circle, Baltimore
Comm. K. L. Veth, Claridge Hotel, D. C.
John Carter Vincent, State Dept.
Elliot Wadsworth, 2416 Tracy Pl., D. C.
Benjamin B. Wallace, U. S. Tariff Commission, D. C.
Mrs. Isabel A. Ward, 1449 Chapin St., D. C.
Lt. James T. Watkins IV, 2943 N. Charles St., Baltimore
Capt. Leon H. Weaver, 2901 Erie St., D. C.
Guy P. Webb, 5232 4th St., D. C.
The Hon. Sumner Welles
Alfred E. Wellon, 3517 Valley Drive, Alexandria
Mrs. Stafford M. Wheeler, 7811 Stratford Road, Bethesda
C. Martin Wilbur, Parkfairfax, Alexandria, Va.
Mrs. Daniel Willard, Jr., 4204 Somerset Place, Baltimore
Charles W. Yost, Department of State, D. C.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a tentative list of American delegates to the Ninth International Conference of the IPR. It is dated December 5, 1944, and was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The list referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1428" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1428

MASTER FILE COPY

12/5/44.

TENTATIVE LIST OF AMERICAN DELEGATES TO NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, HOT SPRINGS, VA., JANUARY 5 TO 19, 1945

1*Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, War Department
Ralph Bunche, Department of State
William A. M. Burden, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Robert D. Calkins, Dean, School of Business, Columbia University
Frank Coe, Assistant Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration
Arthur G. Coons, Dean of Faculty, Occidental College, Los Angeles
Len De Caux, Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations
Rupert Emerson, Deputy Director, Liberated Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration
Frederick V. Field, Executive Vice Chairman, Council for Pan-American Democracy; formerly Secretary, American Council, IPR
Mrs. Frank A. Gerbode, Executive Committee, San Francisco Office, IPR
Admiral T. C. Hart, Navy General Board, Navy Department
Philip C. Jessup, Professor of International Law, Columbia University
Eric Johnston, Chairman, United States Chamber of Commerce
Grayson Kirk, Institute of International Studies, Yale Univ.
Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins Univ.
Walter Lippmann, Columnist and author
J. A. MacKay, Vice President, National City Bank, New York
George Abbot Morison, Vice Chairman, Bucyrus-Erie Co., Milwaukee
Laurence Salisbury, Editor, *Far Eastern Survey*, American Council, IPR
Robert G. Sproul, President, University of California
Eugene Staley, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C.
Ralph Turner, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
John Carter Vincent, Chief, China Section, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
W. W. Waymack, Editor, The Des Moines Register and Tribune, Des Moines, Iowa

ALTERNATES

1*Colonel William Mayer, Chief Japanese Specialist, Military Intelligence Division, War Department
Boris Shishkin, Research Economist, American Federatio nof Labor

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Yosemite conference staff as taken by me from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1429" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1429

[Secretariat 1936, Document 1 (subject to revision)]

Pacific Council—Yosemite Conference Staff

General Administration	Edward C. Carter.
Chief Liaison Officer	Hobart N. Young.
Pacific Council:	
Secretary	Edward C. Carter.
Minute Secretary	Kate Mitchell.

Research Committee:	
Secretary	W. L. Holland.
Minute Secretary	Ruth Lee Young.
Program Committee:	
Secretary	Charles F. Loomis.
Minute Secretary	Pardee Lowe.
Finance Committee:	
Secretary	Edward C. Carter.
Minute Secretary	Hilda Austern.
Publications Committee:	
Secretary	Richard Pyke.
Asst. Secretary	Hilda Austern.
Minute Secretary	Bruce Turner.
Education Committee:	
Secretary	Harriet Moore.
Minute Secretary	Sir Anthony Jenkinson.
Joint Meeting, Pacific Council and Finance Committee:	
Secretary	Edward C. Carter.
Minute Secretaries	Hilda Austern & Kate Mitchell.
Pacific Affairs:	
Editor	Owen Lattimore.
Managing Editor	Catherine Porter.
Secretary to the Editor	Harriet Chi.
The Press:	
Conference Press Officer	Chester H. Rowell.
Deputy Press Officer	Charles F. Loomis.
Secretary to the Press Officer	Sadie Rogers.
Conference Proceedings and Supervision of Recorders.	W. L. Holland and Richard Pyke.
I. P. R. Notes—special Conference issue	Bruno Lasker, Richard Pyke, W. L. Holland.
Conference Broadcasts	Charles F. Loomis.
Conference Bulletin Board	Pardee Lowe.
Language Problems	Charlotte Tyler.
Conference Library, Bookstore, Bibliographical Exhibit.	Chen Han-seng, Harriet Moore, Charlotte Tyler, Van Waldheim, John Stevens, Gertrude Van Eeghen, M. Matsuo, C. B. Fahs, Neel A. Unger.
Conference Maps	Marian Cannon.
Data Papers: Distribution	Richard Pyke.
Ten Year History	Galen M. Fisher.
National Council Libraries	Galen M. Fisher. Richard Pyke.
Office Management and Financial Records	Hilda Austern and Kate Mitchell.
Stenographic Bureau:	
General Supervision and Supplies	Annette Blumenthal.
Assistants to Edward C. Carter	Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley, M. Matsuo, Kate Mitchell, S. V. C. Morris, Pardee Lowe, Nan Lincoln Smith.
Assistants to Hobart N. Young	Sue Curtis (Secretary & Reservations), Rita Ayers (Office Areas), Benjamin De Roy, Rawson Holmes (Meetings) George Alsberg.
Assistants to Richard Pyke	Eleanor Breed.

Recreation.—Edith Hunter.

AUGUST 9, 1936.

MR. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the minutes dated August 25, 1936, headed "Record of group D." It is a photostat of a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The minutes referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1430" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1430

RECORD OF GROUP D

AUGUST 25TH, 1936—FIRST SESSION

(See Lattimore, pp. 5, 7)

Chairman—Dr. R. C. Wallace.
Rapporteur—Field.
Secretary—Miss Moore.
Recorder—Trevor Lloyd.

The Rapporteur presented a brief summary of the proceedings of previous day.

Chairman.—Suggested that the Group try to discover what are the announced aims of Communism in China and how do they oppose the aims of Reconstruction. He invited the Chinese delegation to explain its attitude to be followed by anything the Japanese might wish to add.

T. Z. Koo.—China. Offered an estimate of the influence and extent of Communism in China based on two aspects of the subject:

i. Regarding it as an organized political movement.
ii. As an ideal of economic organization.

i. As an organized political movement, it was not serious before 1918, when it was an intellectual movement with very little political force. In 1919 a Russian element was added providing a technique of organization and popular propaganda to the already existing idealism. Between 1922 and 1927 there followed a period when Communism and Nationalism joined forces, the former agreeing to give up its own organization and to cooperate. During this period of cooperation, the Communist groups were enabled to penetrate throughout China. During the years 1925–26–27, Communism as an organization reached its peak. Then came the separation of it from Nationalists groups, and since that time it has shown a steady decline in strength. Today the movement is weak and broken, with fragments continuing to exist in Shansi and Sechuan.

As an organized political force it has no immediate future, although in the distant future it may revive. It is not a matter of immediate concern.

ii. As an idea of economic organisation it is very widespread indeed in view of the acute economic distress of the country. All who think of the future of China must think in Economic terms and Communism cannot be lightly brushed aside. Communism as an idea is still of interest and importance.

A new angle has been injected into the discussion with the pressure from without. Especially among younger people Communism is being seen as the only alternative to Imperialism (since the Manchurian conquest, etc.) and in the event of a choice being made the former will receive the most support. So, the speaker went on to say, internally there is acute distress and outside there is pressure. Together these may convert many to Communism. Those fully familiar with the conditions within China do not discuss the matter in terms of the failure or success of Communism. It has not yet been tried seriously. The Communists have had no chance of showing their real skill. All recognise that the Communism of 1936 is a very different matter from that of 1926. The earlier brand was based more on a class attitude, involving the confiscation of land and its redivision, etc. But nowadays by their own pronouncements they are no longer stressing class consciousness. They are fighting Imperialism as represented by Japan. Further they are abandoning many of their economic theories in view of the need for practical application, e. g., the confiscation of property. They are working on a more reasonable programme with a wider appeal.

In summary, as a political factor it is a spent force. As an idea it is still worthy of consideration and there is a change in its method of approach at present.

Dr. Nasu, Japan, translating for General Banzai.—Communism in China is just changing its front, the speaker said and although it had lost power in Central China it is becoming more powerful in the north. Although Communism may not be readily exportable, Japan is worried about its possible influence in Japan. This is especially true when the C. P. makes so much of its slogan the fighting of Japan. That slogan is put on the banners of the Communists and causes the gravest dismay.

The Chairman.—Wondered whether there should be some discussion of the United Front.

——— *U. S. delegate.*—Is this modification of aim by the Communists a foreshadowing of a cooperation between the Communists and Nanking in some future emergency.

Mr. Liu, China.—There have been rumours within the past year—it is very difficult to judge the sincerity of the Communists—that there have been discussions about a United Front between the Communists and Nanking, also for an agreement to allow the Communists to extend into Northern China in order to fight the Japanese. In northern Shansi a Government oil well was captured by the Communists and but minor changes in its personnel—a few years ago there would have been many beheadings. This shows, said the speaker, a disposition to work with the Government. On March 24th, 1936, there was a secret meeting of the Communist Party in Shanghai and the speaker understood that a United Front was discussed.

Dr. Nasu.—What connections exist between the Communist Party and the Third International or the U. S. S. R.?

Mr. Liu said that the Comintern had expressed its lack of desire to interfere in China—probably there existed very little contact.

Dr. Nasu wondered whether there was financial help or assistance with organisation as in the case of Borodin.

Mr. Liu believed there had been no contact since December 1935.

Dr. Quincey Wright was interested in what Dr. Koo had said about the Communists changing their attitude. Mr. Bisson had already stated that Communists and the Nanking Government were in effect offering alternative methods for protecting the territorial integrity of China. What are the essential differences between the two groups and in what way do they offer alternative solutions of the problems of Japanese Imperialism.

Mr. Loong, Chinese delegate.—The Communists have given up the idea of confiscating property. They are not hostile to *all* Imperialist nations, merely Japan.

Dr. Mah, China.—A very great deal of attention is being paid to Communism in China in the outside world, particularly in Japan. People have a bogey of it. The speaker agreed with Dr. Koo in mentioning that Communism is a factor in the life of China, but it is probably a spent force as an organised political movement. Some years ago in the south Shangsi (?) Province there was considerable fear that the movement might develop but on being driven from there and scattered very thoroughly by the Government, the danger passed.

The speaker went on to add that the sole difficulty was that small scattered groups are able to offer opposition to the Government's programme for reconstruction. The Government has had difficulty in completing its programme in Communist regions. From an ideological point of view he added, Communism need not disturb people. It is simply a manifestation of discontent and in view of the condition of the country would continue. If the National Government could alleviate the living conditions then Communism would have made a very great contribution to the progress of the country.

Further the speaker wondered whether the Communism of China was similar to that of Russia. The latter had developed a great deal since the early years. If Communism was to be regarded as a challenge to the evils of existing Society then it need not disturb one.

Certain principles were laid down by the Premier of Japan—Hiroto as a basis for Japanese-Chinese agreement. One of these was that the two countries should join together to remove the menace of Communism in China. The Chinese, the speaker added, are gravely suspicious. It would be difficult to discover just what are Communists. The Japanese might begin to describe as Communists those they had previously termed bandits, i. e., those in opposition to Japanese aggression. Under such an agreement it is possible, that, in view of what has already happened in the Northeast that the Japanese might send their troops to remote parts of China on the pretext of driving out Communists.

The failure of Japan to agree with China on the basis mentioned was largely due to such suspicions.

Dr. Nasu, Japan.—The speaker indicated that he could not pretend to represent the *Hiroto* Government—but if a definition of Communists was needed, it was those against whom Chang Kai Shek was fighting at the moment. Those occupying very large tracts of China at the present time. He did not think that Chang Kai Shek was a friend of the Communists—especially as the latter have been highly critical of him.

Any comparison between China and the USSR is misleading. The latter has changed a great deal and its attitude is partly due to its being firmly established and desirous of combining with foreign countries. Chinese Communism is not so firmly established and has not the experience of the USSR. The speaker doubted whether they had modified their attitude at all seriously. The change of front may have been due to their receiving a severe blow from Chiang Kai Shek.

Dr. Koo pointed out that when delegates asked for an opinion on the possibility of a United Front, it was impossible to give an answer. There are many in the present Government who believe that although the attitude of the Communists has changed, its fundamental policy does not change. It merely changes its outer appearance. At the moment they are capitalising on the anti-Japanese feeling that exists. Yet most observers think that as a whole the Communists are a group whose principles do not change. Such knowledge makes a United Front difficult. Fundamentally Communism is an *internal* problem for China and although it may be serious it will probably disappear before external threats. Thus, the speaker concluded under pressure from outside a United front might be formed. It was impossible to give a direct answer.

Dr. Wright, U. S. A.—In discussing the difference in Foreign Policy between the two factions suggested that the sole real difference between the Communists and the National Government lay in the speed with which they would demand the return of Chinese rights abrogated by treaty. The Nanking method he suggested was the capitalistic democracy way—that of gradualism. The Communists would denounce all foreign rights abruptly. Whichever way was followed there was a universal feeling that the matter must be solved.

Mr. Loong, China.—A great deal of attention is being directed, he indicated, to the Constitution and in a few months time it might be possible to answer the question. There was the possibility of the Communists being permitted to exist as a legal party.

Mr. Nimmo, Australia.—Pointed out that if the question of Communism was an internal one then nations were entitled to expect China to take the responsibility for what they did. Did the 1925–1927 efforts of the Communists effect the rights and lives of foreigners and did it provide grounds for foreign intervention?

Dr. Koo.—In the period mentioned in the question, so far as he knew there were no such problems. He was not aware of the Communists providing any grounds for foreign intervention.

The Communists were all driven inland, away from the Treaty Ports.

Owen Lattimore.—There had been a certain moral tone about the discussion of Communism, speakers had talked of it as being good or evil. The speaker wanted to discuss whether Chinese Communism was on the upgrade or going downward. He wondered what the governing factors were. The historical approach is the only possible one. The speaker congratulated Dr. Koo on his quite remarkable speech—the best short exposition of the topic he had ever heard—but doubted whether Communism was a spent force. It had merely changed its manifestations—it was not a spent force.

The matter could be discussed from two points of view.

i. As far as its strength went, in 1925–26 there was very powerful Russian influence. Since the movement retreated to the interior it had become separated and it was impossible for them to have obtained much financial assistance or ammunition. Thus for ten years it had been a completely Chinese movement. It had shifted its territorial position but its strength was undiminished.

The Party possessed a nucleus of highly trained men and around each of the nucleii there was a loosely organized group of discontented peasants—followers for negative reasons. The group was driven out of the old strongholds in Shanshi (?) and had done tremendous forced marches in taking up the new ground. They had moved and changed slogans but the principles remained unchanged.

The Communists believed that Communism would normally follow Capitalism as a stage in the evolution of Society and that the Revolution was merely a means of hastening the process. Thus it was possible for them to change the means in the face of Japanese aggression without modifying their principles.

ii. It has often been said that Japan is the only solid bulwark against the spread of Communism in Asia. The speaker suggested that the opposite point of view might well be put that Communism in China was the only bulwark against the spread of Japanese imperialism.

When Manchuria was being taken there was some resistance offered, probably comparable with that of Haile Selassie in Ethopia. The Governor of Manchuria represented one of the progressive movements in China—he saw that railways and factories were built and a new group of vested interests arose founded on the westernisation of the country. The ineffective resistance showed that there existed a division of interest—the official policy was to make as great a nuisance as possible for Japan so that they might be prepared to come to a deal. The Governor was successful and at the moment lived in China still a rich man.

The Communists pointed out that aggression from Japan divided the people of China into two groups. The wealthy were leaders up to a point and were then prepared to compromise to save themselves. Then they deserted the masses. Further the speaker pointed out that they suggest that under the leadership of Nanking Chinese Reconstruction is only possible with foreign aid against Japan. Thus Nanking prepared for an opposition to Japan at some future date but if foreign aid was not forthcoming in time to stop Japan it will have to be bargained for. Thus a weak country—China—will be bound in the end to lose by playing with other nations for help. So that the Communists had a fundamental appeal to the people of China. "Here are a backward people, who must learn western techniques. Will this come through the agency of profit-making groups with the workers all lowered to a coolie class or is the people going to take it on its own." Such an appeal, he pointed out, was an appeal to temporary conditions—a front towards Japan that would not compromise—but there was also a separate long-term appeal offering Communism as the best possible means of freeing China to make her master of Western ways rather than to allow them to master her.

Communism needed to be thought of not only as a threat to Japan but also as a protection against her.

Mr. Kerr, U. K.—Was the Pau Cha system being used as an opposition to Communism or was it a half-way compromise, or was it a simple revival of an old system.

Mr. Liu, China.—Suggested that it was probably a survival of an earlier custom. It amounted to the collective responsibility of a small community for the behaviour of its members. Thus if a murder was committed in a village, the Government held the whole group responsible for detecting the murderer. It was also used to discover troublesome people like Communists. There was a further use as a channel for propaganda.

Dr. Koo suggested the main reason that of an antidote for crime—a village of ten families would report any newcomers. The Government used it as one of the agencies for clearing up bandits.

Dr. Wright, USA.—Had been trying to think of Communism as an international problem. As Dr. Koo had said it was an internal problem but the acceptance of Communist leadership by the country would have important international consequences. He had been thinking of Germany since the war. The inequities of the Treaty of Versailles were too much for the moderate Government of Stresemann to remove. A later and more violent government was able to bring about their rapid dissolution. There might be a parallel in China. There existed at the moment moderate parties using moderate methods. In the background there existed a more violent party. In ten years this picture might be well worth bearing in mind.

The future depends on the success of the moderates in handling the dominant problem. The Radicals will fade away if the moderates succeed. Otherwise if the moderates fail in their international policies then the Communists will come to the fore once again.

Owen Lattimore suggested that Communism is an internal question and that it was up to the Chinese to choose democratic Capitalism or Communism. But its effects are NOT internal since the intervention of Japan. The people of China may well say, "How can WE settle this problem when we are continually being interfered with from Manchuria—wave after wave flowing down until they reach the Yellow River?" After all he went on, far from being unable to build railways parallel with the South Manchuria it is now forbidden even to keep Provinces which are parallel with Manchuria. Japan keeps pumping propaganda—Japanese propaganda into Japan. In effect "cooperation" is the injection of the Japanese view of Chinese affairs into China.

Wright, USA suggested that the difference between internal and external affairs in International Law breaks down when as the Germans pointed out in their case—the occupation of the Ruhr complicated the internal matters of the country as a whole. Every State has the right to insist on complete sovereignty.

If foreign influences enter it may be impossible for China to control her own internal affairs. Then all other parties will fall before that which offers determined leadership against the common foe.

The Chairman wondered whether the few remaining minutes would be best spent in considering the attitude of the Japanese delegation to these points or in some consideration of question B 3 which read: "What are the specific objections of the Japanese Govt. to foreign help in schemes for Chinese reconstruction? * * * etc., etc." He suggested that at the beginning of the next session of the Round Table, the Japanese delegation be prepared to make a statement. He then invited short questions on the Chinese question in general.

Mr. Gull, U. K. asked Dr. Koo whether there was a parallel between the nationalists attitude being adopted by the Communists and the agreement of 1927. Was the separation of the two groups at that time due to a fear of Borodin getting too great an influence.

Dr. Koo.—Most of those present will see nationalism as a dominant note for years to come. When the Communist-Nationalist break up came it was not alone because of Borodin but because the Communists contrary to the agreement kept their own cell organisations intact.

Mr. Loong, China, felt that the matter was receiving too great attention, yet he believed that if the alternative was the loss of property rights or the loss of sovereign rights, he would not only raise his son to be a soldier but his two daughters also.

The Chairman thanked the Chinese for their most impressive and objective contributions.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of a document taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "Minutes" as taken by M. Price, which I offer for the record.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The minutes referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1431" and are as follows:)

(Pencil note: China Aid Council.)
Pencil note: As taken by M. Price.)

MINUTES

The following people from Indusco and China Aid Council met together on March 27, 1944, at the Jaffe home, 49 East 9th Street: Norman Applezweig, Melvin Fox, David Leacock, Agnes Jaffe, Ida Pruitt from Indusco; William Holland, Phillip Jaffe, Talitha Gerlach and Miss Price from China Aid Council. Rose Terlin could not come.

Talitha Gerlach was asked to preside.

It was decided to discuss: (1) Ways of working harmoniously with UCR, i. e., a modus vivendi; (2) The sending of funds to China by UCR.

Mr. Jaffe outlined what he thinks are the differences between China Aid Council and Indusco. In addition to its children's work, China Aid Council sends funds to Mme. Sun and these funds therefore cannot fall into any other hands than Mme. Sun's. Indusco, on the other hand, sends funds through the International Committee and Indusco must be assured that its funds go in a way satisfactory to Indusco. In this case therefore Indusco may have a problem.

The question was asked whether or not the International Committee is controlled by the K. M. T. Spokesmen from Indusco considered that this was not the case.

It was asked whether the fight should not be to try to democratize UCR. After discussion over what this process of democratization would consist of, it was decided that the first step would be to try to democratize the Program Committee.

One of those present felt that UCR should be strengthened but expressed the fear that this strength might be turned against the agencies' programs. He agreed that the first point that should be made is the democratization of UCR. Mr. Jaffe thought that we should talk in terms our immediate rather than our future problems.

Mr. Holland said that in his opinion the U. S. Treasury would most probably permit UCR to enter into the procedure of exchange of American money on the open market in China if a single, solid organization is used, such as UCR.

The point was brought up that apparently it is Dr. H. H. Kung who wants the money to be sent by one group such as UCR. This fact indicates that funds sent from the U. S. probably support other groups than those controlled by Dr. Kung. The sending of funds through one group is extremely dangerous in that it might mean complete control of all foreign funds by that group and in time preventing any other groups from carrying on relief and rehabilitation work in China.

Mr. Applezweig suggested that some machinery was necessary and expressed the opinion that the agencies receive the worst deal when each agency is dealt with separately. He proposed that an Inter-Agency Council be set up in which matters can be thrashed out before they are taken up with UCR.

Mrs. Jaffe felt that all agencies within UCR can work together but should be content to limit themlseves to a few simple points to begin with.

Mr. Applezweig said there should be no tendency to keep the knowledge of such discussions from UCR, that the group should discuss frankly and openly with the view of improving relations with UCR.

Mrs. Jaffe pointed out that the meeting should be for the betterment of UCR and not against UCR.

Mr. Fox then said that CAC and Indusco both agree on the necessity for a strong UCR. UCR can only be strengthened, however, if there are strong agencies. The following resolution was suggested and adopted:

> "In the interests of effective functioning of the agencies with United China Relief, it is suggested that an Inter-Agency Council to discuss matters of mutual concern be formed. During the past period there have been difficulties due to certain causes. One of these causes has been that agencies have felt that they have had neither direct representation nor representation elected by themselves on the Program Committee. When this matter has been worked out, it is to be hoped that there will be a discussion of other questions of mutual concern to the agencies and United China Relief."

The group decided, if Mrs. Carter would give her consent for China Aid Council's representatives to do so, to meet with ABMAC representatives on the following Tuesday at 6:30 at the Jaffe's.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a telegram dated November 29, 1944, addressed to Raymond Bennett, from Rose Yardumian. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The telegram referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1432" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1432

WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 29, 1944.*

RAYMOND BENNETT,
Institute Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York:

Ellen Van Zyll DeJong Atkinson, formerly IPR research staff, now Far East Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, eager attend Hot Springs conference as recorder, has discussed matter Bissell's aid Colonel McCormick, but because wording in your letter to Bissell requesting three junior officers cannot be assigned Mrs. Atkinson. Competent and good worker, helpful to IPR in Washington; recommend her highly. Would you be willing write Bissell immediately suggesting her name either in place of one of three officers or in addition to three Atkinson consulted on whether MIS should send representatives.

ROSE YARDUMIAN.

Zyll, IPR, IPR, MIS.

[Handwritten: HHP—Will you take this up with HA and see what she thinks? I have no objection but don't want to get wires crossed in MIS, and HA has talked with them since I have. D.]

Mr. MANDEL. This is a "Draft of suggestions for the Washington office," a photostat from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 23, 1943.

Senator WATKINS. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1433" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 1433

JUNE 23, 1948.

ROUGH DRAFT OF SUGGESTIONS FOR WASHINGTON OFFICE

I. PRELIMINARY PREPARATION (TO BE COMPLETED DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST)

1. An effort should be made to find more accessible offices and a minimum of furniture secured.
2. All IPR publications should be sent down, as well as maps, any duplicate materials in either library, a duplicate file of the American Council bibliography file, copies of bibliographical material prepared by American council, a list of periodicals in Amco and Pacco libraries. Such organizations as FPA, NPA, WPA might be asked to send their publications to the Washington office as well as the New York office.
3. The Secretary should talk with members of Amco and Pacco staffs to secure their ideas on development of Washington office and information on work each is doing.
4. The secretary should have a talk with Bob Barnett at the first opportunity.
5. The secretary should contact key people in government offices concerned with the Far East to inform them of existence of office and to discover how it can be most useful to their work, and to discover what information is available in their offices.
6. An informal advisory committee should be set up. Possible members: Harry Price, Michael Greenberg, Irving Friedman, Alvin Barber, Alger Hiss, Jim Shoemaker, Bill Johnstone, Wilma Fairbank, Mrs. Boulton.

II. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON OFFICE AND DUTIES OF SECRETARY

1. Arrangements and secretarial work in connection with two study groups already running under Johnstone's direction.
2. Possible organization of new groups, such as (a) small "clearing house" groups of specialists working on the same field in different government departments; (b) popular meetings and luncheons on appropriate occasions.
3. Secretary should keep in touch with activities of French, Dutch, and Philippine Councils.
4. Secretary should be prepared to perform any special tasks asked of her by New York staff.
5. Secretary should keep in touch with the activities of such organizations as the FPA, League of Women Voters, NPA, etc.
6. Secretary should keep informed as much as possible on developments in Congress.
7. Secretary should make and maintain contact with the press.
8. Secretary should be prepared to arrange for book reviews and contributions of articles and keep an eye open for likely speakers and authors.
9. Development of AmCo membership.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I incorporate by reference the State Department biographical registers into the record at this time?

Senator WATKINS. Yes; you may have that permission.

(The incorporation by reference is noted and marked as "Exhibit No. 1434.")

Mr. MANDEL. I wish to enter into the record by way of reference the following document appearing as exhibit No. 18 in the appendix, part I, of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives on pages 245 to 292, entitled "Excerpts from speeches and resolutions adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist International (June 22 to July 12, 1921), published by the Contemporary Publishing Association, New York City, 1921, pages 34–70, 75–114, 115–117, 131–149, 150–153, 190–199.

Senator WATKINS. The matter will be received as offered.

(The incorporation by reference is noted and marked as "Exhibit No. 1435.")

Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all, Senator. Thank you very much.

Senator WATKINS. We will be in recess.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m. the committee recessed, subject to the call of the chairman.)

INDEX TO PART 14

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.)

A

Page

AAUW. (*See* American Association of University Women.)
Abaya, Hernando ---- 5650
Abdul, Arbab, Ghafoor Khan ---- 5006, 5044
Abend, Hallet ---- 5506, 5507
ABMAC. (*See* American Bureau for Medical Aid to China.)
Abrams, Dr ---- 5406
Abrahms, Herbert K ---- 5506, 5507
Abramson ---- 5125
Academica Sinica ---- 4996, 5345
Academy of Science (Moscow) ---- 5009
Acheson, Dean ---- 4924, 4931, 4975, 5261, 5485, 5487
ACIS. (*See* American Committee for International Studies.)
Ackerman, Edward ---- 5506, 5507
Adams, Romanzo ---- 5506, 5507
Adams, Samuel H ---- 5647
Adams, W. G. S ---- 5320
Adarkar, B. P ---- 5506
Adler ---- 5017
Adler, David ---- 5367
Adler, Solomon ---- 5345, 5684
Adloff, Richard ---- 5506, 5507
Afzal, Mohammed ---- 5506, 5507
Agronsky, Martin ---- 5355
Ahlers, John ---- 5506, 5507
Aikman, Duncan ---- 5656
AIPR. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, American.)
Airey, Willis T. G ---- 5506, 5507
Aiyer, C. P. Ramaswami ---- 5323
Akagi, Roy ---- 5506, 5507
Alcan, A ---- 5699
Alden, Charles E ---- 5501
Alden, Mrs. Jane M ---- 5699
Aldrich, Winthrop W ---- 5252
Alexander ---- 5209
Alexander, Mrs ---- 5089
Alexander, A. V ---- 5320, 5334
Alexander, Fred ---- 4964, 5506, 5507
Alexander, Henry C ---- 5047
Alexander, John ---- 5052, 5053
Alexander, R. P ---- 5699
Alexander, Wallace M ---- 5182, 5186, 5335
Alfino, Rose ---- 4992, 4993
Alisjahbana, Takdir ---- 5506, 5507
All-Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions ---- 5641
Allan, Dorothy W ---- 5506, 5507
Allemagne. (*See* Germany.)
Allen ---- 5234
Allen, Edward Weber ---- 4944, 5506, 5507
Allen, G. C ---- 5253, 5506, 5507
Allen, James S ---- 5337, 5345, 5356, 5506, 5507, 5684

Page
Allison, John M. 5506, 5507, 5699
Allen, Joseph S. 4941
Allen, Raymond B. 4944, 5023
Allen, Riley H. 5207
Alley, Rewi 5194, 5210, 5211, 5212
Alling, Paul 4975
Aloric, Aminadau 4992, 4993
ALP. (*See* American Labor Party.)
Alsberg, Carl L. 4999, 5119, 5144, 5151, 5152, 5155, 5157, 5167, 5186, 5218, 5318, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5341, 5506, 5507, 5684.
Alsberg, George 5704
Altschul, Frank 5286
AMCO. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, American.)
Amerasia 4941, 4977, 5000, 5060, 5061, 5111, 5162, 5174, 5192–5194, 5204, 5221, 5230, 5267, 5300, 5340, 5343, 5358
America. (*See* United States of America.)
American Association of University Women 5067, 5702
American-British-Chinese Government Currency Board 5249, 5268, 5328
American Bureau for Medical Aid to China 4936, 5202, 5344, 5345, 5710
American Chamber of Commerce 5423
American Committee for International Studies 4915, 5111, 5208, 5209, 5355
American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression 5427
American Council of Learned Societies 5051, 5110, 5117, 5219, 5220
American Economic Association 5220, 5314
American Embassy (Amsterdam) 5082
American Embassy (Bangkok) 5193
American Embassy (Berlin) 5193
American Embassy (Brussels) 5193
American Embassy (Canberra) 5193
American Embassy (Chungking) 5057, 5058, 5193, 5236
American Embassy (Hague) 5193
American Embassy (London) 5193
American Embassy (Moscow) 5161, 5162, 5193
American Embassy (Ottawa) 5193
American Embassy (Paris) 5193
American Embassy (Peiping) 5173, 5214
American Embassy (Rome) 5193
American Embassy (Shanghai) 5193
American Embassy (Tokyo) 5193
American Federation of Labor 4975, 4977, 5067, 5703
American History Review 5651, 5656
American Labor Party 5502, 5503, 5645
American Peace Mobilization 5225, 5257, 5258, 5340
American Political Science Association 5220, 5689
American Red Cross 4956, 4973, 5252, 5429, 5432
American Reparations Commission to Japan 5283
American Russian Institute 4974, 4977, 5007, 5079, 5111, 5150, 5154, 5165, 5170, 5181, 5182, 5186, 5227, 5229, 5238, 5268, 5282, 5286, 5345
American Russian Institute, San Francisco 5182
Ames, C. L. 5323
Amsterdam 5348
Amtorg Trading Corporation 4935, 5205
Anderson, Miss 5229
Anderson, Drury 5295
Anderson, Karl L. 5506, 5507
Anderson, Leslie 5279
Anderson, Marguerite 4992, 4993
Anderson, Melvin 4991–4993
Anderson, Robbins B. 5207
Andrews 5157
Andrews, Mrs. 5157
Andrus, J. Russell 5295, 5506, 5507, 5684, 5699
Anesaki, Masahara 5333, 5506, 5507
Angelino, A. D. A. deKat 5684
Angell, Norman 5040, 5506, 5507

Page
Anglo-Soviet Treaty (1942) 5076
Angus, H. F 5508, 5509, 5684
Angus, William N 5508, 5509
Annall, Elaine 4992
Annals of American Academy 5469, 5653, 5656
Anstey, Vera 5508, 5509
Anstice, E. H 5508, 5509
Apostol, John 5209, 5508, 5509
Appadorai, A 5027
Appleby, Paul 5261
Appell, Donald T 5502
Applezweig, Norman 5709, 5710
Araneta, Salvador 5508, 5509
Arbolino, Jack 5508, 5509
Archer, Anita 4988
Archy, Gilbert 5508, 5509
Argentina 5692
Arctic Institute 4915, 5083, 5112
ARI. (*See* American Russian Institute.)
Armall, Elaine 4993
Arms, Brig. Gen 4940
Armstrong, Elizabeth H 5508, 5509
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish 5260
Army War College 5144
Arnall, Ellis Gibbs 5656
Arndt, Christian O 4944, 5699
Arneman, George E 5207
Arnold 5132, 5137
Arnold, Edwin G 5699
Arnold, Julian 4983, 5078, 5090, 5508, 5509
Arnold, Thurman 5112
Aroon, Sheh Bidien Ben Aroon. (*See* Bidien, Charles.)
Arosev 5083, 5121, 5123, 5135
Asbeck, F. V 5508, 5509
Ashton-Gwatkin, Frank 5508, 5509
Asia Magazine 5047, 5240
Asiaticus 5085, 5180, 5337, 5341, 5508, 5509
Associated Press (AP) 5105, 5256, 5334, 5395
Astor, W. W 5334
Atcheson, George, Jr 4925, 4926
Atherton, Frank C 5139, 5207, 5319, 5334, 5335
Atherton, J. Ballard 4944, 5323
Atkinson, Ellen Van Zyll DeJong 5710
Atlantic Charter 5068, 5069, 5076
Atlantic Monthly 5040, 5181
Atwater, Reginald 4983
Auchter, E. C 4944
Auckland University College 5320
Auerbach, Beatrice 5299
August, H. F 5327
Austern, Hilda. (*See* Ray, Hilda Austern.)
Austern, Marjorie 4987
Austin 5643
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin 5328
Australia 5318–5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5334, 5349, 5356, 5367, 5668, 5670, 5707
Australia, Government of 4936, 4971, 5130
Australian Embassy (Washington) 5295
Australian Legation (Washington) 5049, 5052
Australian Institute of International Affairs 5320
Austria 5382
Austria, Government of 5076, 5201
Axis Powers 4972, 5000, 5231, 5232
Ayers, Rita 5704
Ayling, Keith 5647
Aziz, Ungku A 5508, 5509

B

Page

Bache, Carl ---- 5508, 5509
Bachman, George ---- 4936
Bachman, Paul S ---- 5207, 5508, 5509
Bacon, Mrs. Robert L ---- 5047
Baernsprung, H. W ---- 5216, 5508, 5509
Bailey, K. H ---- 5508, 5509
Bain, H. Foster ---- 5062, 5508, 5509, 5684
Bajpai, Girja S ---- 5048, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5090
Baker, I. E ---- 5323
Baker, John Earl ---- 5508, 5509
Baker, Nathan M ---- 5510, 5511
Baker, Newton D ---- 5067, 5153, 5156, 5228, 5320, 5324, 5333
Baker, O. E ---- 5699
Balazs, Etienne ---- 5510, 5511
Baldwin, Hanson W ---- 5040, 5041, 5329
Bales, W. L ---- 5163, 5348
Balfour, Nina ---- 4989, 4993
Ball, W. MacMahon ---- 5510, 5511
Ballantine, Joseph ---- 4936, 5084, 5169, 5170, 5510, 5511
Balling, Francis C ---- 5673
Balliol, Master of ---- 5081, 5276, 5283
Ballis, William ---- 5510, 5511, 5684
Band, Claire ---- 5656
Band, William ---- 5656
Banff ---- 5319, 5320, 5331
Bangkok ---- 5702
Banks, Edythe M ---- 5989, 4992
Banzai, General ---- 5705
Barber, Alvin ---- 5510, 5511, 5711
Barber, F. P. A ---- 5299
Barber, Joseph ---- 5510, 5511
Barber, Joseph, Jr ---- 4987, 4988
Barclay, George W ---- 5510, 5511
Barlow, dward L ---- 5984, 5011, 5012
Barmine, Alexander ---- 4953, 4954, 5207
Barnard, President ---- 5026
Barnes, Betty ---- 5345
Barnes, Carleton P ---- 5510, 5511
Barnes, Joseph ---- 4915
4955, 4956, 4965, 4973, 5083, 5084, 5113, 5114, 5116, 5117, 5120–5122, 5126, 5127, 5159, 5163, 5164, 5167, 5168, 5185, 5227, 5229, 5234, 5235, 5252, 5259, 5274, 5286, 5299, 5308, 5510, 5511, 5685.
Barnes, Kathleen ---- 4916, 4958, 4967, 4972, 4988, 5107, 5124, 5128, 5130, 5132, 5135, 5137, 5140, 5154, 5156, 5160, 5162, 5172, 5181, 5236, 5238, 5356, 5510, 5511.
Barnes, Shiman ---- 5123
Barnett, Abraham ---- 4990, 4993
Barnett, Eugene E ---- 4983, 5268, 5365, 5510, 5511
Barnett, Robert W ---- 4935, 4958, 4967, 4975, 5976, 4978–4980, 4983, 4987, 4988, 5011, 5107, 5198, 5199, 5210–5212, 5215, 5231, 5234, 5241, 5244, 5272, 5342, 5510, 5511, 5699, 5710.
Barnett, Mrs. Robert W. (Patricia) ---- 5000, 5231, 5234, 5295, 5510, 5511, 5694, 5699
Barrett, David ---- 5370
Barrow, John ---- 5294, 5295, 5699
Barrows, General ---- 5242, 5243
Barton, William ---- 5510, 5511, 5684
Bartunek, Joseph W ---- 5674, 5682
Bass, Basil ---- 5238
Bassett, Arthur ---- 4973
Bates, Elizabeth A ---- 4992, 4993
Bates, M. S ---- 5510, 5511, 5684
Bates, Searle ---- 4973, 5209
Batt, W. L ---- 5047
Bau, Mingchien ---- 5350

Page
Baudette, Philippe ---- 5042, 5053
Bauer, P. T ---- 5510, 5511, 5684
Baum, Marjorie ---- 4991, 4993
Baxter, James P., 3d ---- 5001
Baxter, Joseph P ---- 4959, 4984
B. C. F. A. (*See* Britain-China Friendship Association.)
Beaglehole, Ernest ---- 5510, 5511
Beaglehole, J. G ---- 5510, 5511
Beal, Edwin G., Jr ---- 5510, 5511
Beal, George J ---- 4984, 5028, 5030
Bean, Arthur ---- 5023
Bean, Louis ---- 4973, 5261
Bear, Marguerite E ---- 4990, 4992
Beard, Margaret ---- 5699
Beardsley, Richard K ---- 5510, 5511
Beaumont, K. M ---- 5512, 5513
Beck, L ---- 5512, 5513
Becker, Carl ---- 5661
Beecroft, Eric ---- 4975, 5058, 5256, 5257, 5274, 5288, 5291, 5292, 5294, 5512, 5513, 5699
Bekker, Konrad ---- 5512, 5513, 5699
Belden, Jack ---- 5658
Belgium, Government of ---- 5074
Bell, Aubrey F ---- 5652
Bell, Charles ---- 5512, 5513
Bell, J. Mackintosh ---- 5320
Bell, Reginald ---- 5512, 5513
Belle, Minnie ---- 5512, 5513
Beloff, Max ---- 5025
Belshaw ---- 5685
Belshaw, Cyril ---- 5322, 5512, 5513
Belshaw, Horace ---- 4991, 4993, 5320, 5322, 5512, 5513
Belshaw, James P ---- 5512, 5513
Belshaw, Michael ---- 4993
Belsky ---- 5161, 5162
Bengal Assembly (India) ---- 5005, 5043, 5044
Benitez, Conrado ---- 5160, 5320, 5512, 5513
Benitez, Francisco ---- 5319, 5334
Benjamin, Harold R ---- 5700
Benjuya, Beatrice ---- 4989, 4993
Bennett, Prime Minister ---- 5115
Bennett, Charles R ---- 5700
Bennett, M. K ---- 5512, 5513
Bennett, Marjorie ---- 5512, 5513
Bennett, Martin T ---- 5512, 5513
Bennett, Merrill ---- 5186
Bennett, Raymond ---- 5710
Benson, Wilfred ---- 5512, 5513
Berg, Dorothy ---- 5291
Berkhov, Robert H ---- 5294, 5295, 5512, 5513
Berle, A. A ---- 4973, 4975, 5261
Bernardelli, Harro ---- 5512, 5513
Bernardo, Dr. M ---- 5295
Bernstein, Harry ---- 5512, 5513
Berreman, Joel V ---- 5512, 5513
Berrie, W. D ---- 5008
Bertram ---- 5188
Bertram, James ---- 5512, 5513
Berzin, General ---- 4953, 4954
Bethune, Norman ---- 5368
Betjeman, John ---- 5652
Beukema, Herman ---- 4966, 4973, 5001, 5199
Bevin ---- 5379
Bewes, Windham H ---- 5512, 5513
Beyster, Harry ---- 5296
Bhott, V. M ---- 5514, 5515

Page
Bialos, Robert S---- 4990, 4993
Bidien, Charles---- 5279, 5281, 5283, 5514, 5515, 5634
Bidwell---- 5286
Bierman, Edward---- 4992, 4993
Biggerstaff, Knight---- 4944, 5111, 5219, 5229, 5514, 5515
Binder Carroll---- 4973, 5153, 5156
Bingham, Woodbridge---- 5514, 5515
Birker, Lindsay of. (*See* Lindsay, Michael.)
Birkhead, Leon---- 4935
Bishop, Carl Whiting---- 5514, 5515
Bishop, W. A---- 4934, 4936
Bissell, Clayton---- 5703, 5710
Bisson, T. A---- 4939, 4981, 4984, 4987, 4991, 4993, 5007, 5008, 5010, 5013, 5023, 5025, 5047, 5053, 5071, 5080, 5148, 5183, 5188, 5193, 5226, 5234, 5235, 5281, 5283, 5297, 5298, 5329, 5424, 5426, 5427, 5514, 5515, 5648–5650, 5654, 5658–5660, 5673, 5685, 5687, 5688, 5706.
Black, Colonel---- 5248, 5249
Blackburn, Leo---- 5674
Blackton, Charles S---- 5514, 5515
Blaine, Mrs. Emmons---- 5298
Blaine, James G---- 5249, 5252, 5344
Blake, Robert---- 5116
Blakeley, R. J---- 5514, 5515
Blakeslee, George H---- 4999, 5321, 5335, 5514, 5515, 5700
Blankfort, Michael---- 5652
Bloch---- 5358, 5514, 5515
Bloch, Felix---- 5040
Bloch, Kurt---- 4987, 4988, 5007, 5008, 5111, 5174, 5186, 5205, 5226, 5236, 5241
Blue, George V---- 4958, 4964
Blumenthal, Annette---- 4987, 4988, 4993, 5704
Board of Economic Warfare (BEW)---- 4967, 4973, 4977, 5001–5004, 5008, 5009, 5047, 5049, 5052, 5054, 5256, 5260, 5266, 5268
Boardman, T. D---- 5040
Bodde, Derk---- 5229, 5336, 5377, 5514, 5515, 5660
Boeke, J. H---- 5320, 5514, 5515, 5684
Boekel, Colonel---- 5048
Boericke, William F---- 5514, 5515
Bogolepov, Igor---- 4921, 4924, 5500, 5501, 5692
Bohlen, Charles E---- 5483, 5484
Bohn, Frank---- 5165
Bolles, Blair---- 5105, 5514, 5515
Bolton, Frances P---- 5052, 5053, 5062, 5287, 5300, 5695, 5700
Bolton Report---- 5383
Bonnet---- 5131, 5184
Bonnet, H---- 5333
Boodberg, Peter A---- 5229
Boody, Elizabeth---- 5514, 5515
Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18---- 5413
Book and Magazine Union---- 5366
Borden, Robert---- 5115
Borg, Dorothy---- 4988, 5236, 5350, 5514, 5515
Borja, Victorino---- 5514, 5515
Borodin---- 5219, 5384, 5706, 5709
Borovoy, Hall---- 5084, 5154
Borrie, W. D---- 5514, 5515
Borrie, W. M---- 5684
Borton, Hugh---- 4984, 4987, 5007, 5008, 5048, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5111, 5175, 5176, 5229, 5514, 5515, 5663
Boudreau, Frank C---- 5002, 5260
Boukema, Herman---- 5256
Boulton, Mrs---- 5711
Bousquet, G. H---- 5514, 5515
Bowen, Mary Jane---- 4989, 4993
Bowers, Claude G---- 5661
Bowman, Isaiah---- 5260, 5287, 5516, 5517, 5700

Page
Bowman, Robert G ---- 5516, 5517
Box, Mr ---- 5204
Boyden, Roland W. (Boyd, Roland) ---- 5318, 5337
Boyer, R. J. F ---- 5131, 5321, 5516, 5517
Braake, Alex L. Ter ---- 5516, 5517
Bradley, Anita ---- 5516, 5517
Bradley, Omar ---- 4944
Brady, Alexander ---- 5516, 5517
Brady, Robert A ---- 5516, 5517
Braibanti, Ralph J. D ---- 5516, 5517
Braisted, William ---- 5700
Bramley, Joan ---- 4991, 4993
Brand, Willem ---- 5516, 5517
Brandt, William ---- 5240, 5241, 5516, 5517
Bratter, Herbert ---- 5516, 5517
Bratton, R. S ---- 4966, 5084, 5163, 5198, 5242–5244, 5247, 5348
Brebner, J. B ---- 5516, 5517
Breed, Eleanor ---- 5704
Bremer ---- 4975
Bremman, Y. P ---- 5084, 5108, 5112, 5157–5159, 5162, 5178
Brent, John ---- 5516, 5517
Bretholtz-Austern, Hilda A. (*See* Ray, Hilda Austern.)
Brewer, Leo ---- 5040
Brewster, Owen ---- 4943
Brewster, Ralph O ---- 5700
Brice, Lola ---- 4990, 4993
Brigden, J. B ---- 5516, 5517
Brines, Russell ---- 5656
Britain-China Friendship Association ---- 5412
Britain. (*See* Great Britain.)
British Army ---- 5093, 5094
British Embassy (Bangkok) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Berlin) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Brussels) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Canberra) ---- 5193
British Embassy (China) ---- 5276
British Embassy (Chungking) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Hague) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Hong Kong) ---- 5190
British Embassy (Moscow) ---- 5193, 5463
British Embassy (Paris) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Rome) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Shanghai) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Tokyo) ---- 5193
British Embassy (Washington) ---- 4936, 5009, 5048, 5052, 5348, 5700, 5702
British Foreign Office ---- 5376
British Labour Party ---- 5412
British Military Intelligence ---- 5371
British Ministry of Information ---- 5019
British Navy ---- 5190
Britton, Roswell S ---- 5516, 5517
Brodie, Bernard ---- 5040, 5516, 5517
Brodie, Fawn M ---- 5516, 5517
Brodrick, Alan Houghton ---- 5516, 5517
Broek, Jan O. M ---- 4988, 4989, 4993, 5003, 5083, 5516, 5517
Brogan, D. W ---- 5518, 5519, 5661
Brondgeest, C ---- 5518, 5519
Brookings Institute ---- 5067, 5702
Brooks, Murray G ---- 5193, 5289
Brothero, George ---- 5203
Browder, Earl Russell ---- 4924–4928, 5023, 5219, 5308, 5310, 5622
Brown, Delmer M ---- 5336, 5518, 5519
Brown, Don ---- 5022, 5415
Brown, Esther ---- 4989, 4993
Brown, Harrison ---- 5518, 5519

Page
Brown, Harry Peter M'Nab 5647
Brown, Norman 4975, 4977, 5018, 5256, 5257
Brown, Stuart Gerry 5661
Brown, W. Norman 5518, 5519
Brown, William O 5700
Browne, Effie 5295
Brownell, Mrs 5299
Bruce, David 5485–5487
Bruce, Robert 4991–4993
Brunauer, Esther Caukin 5261, 5346, 5518, 5519, 5644
Brunner, Edmund DeS 5518, 5519
Bryan, E. H., Jr 5518, 5519
Bryan, Julien 5697
Bryant, Elizabeth 4992, 4993
Bryson, Lyman 5002
Buchsbaum, Betty E 4991, 4993
Buck 5685
Buck, Paul Herman 5303
Buck, Pearl 5064, 5255, 5329, 5518, 5519, 5647
Buck, Peter H 5207
Buckman, Rilma 4987
Budenz, Louis 4944, 5023, 5426
Buell 5208, 5260
Buell, Raymond Leslie 5518, 5519
Buesst, Tristan 5320, 5518, 5519
Bulick 5050
Bumgardner, Chia-ling 4991, 4993
Bunce, Arthur C 5518, 5519
Bunche, Ralph 4973, 4975, 4977, 5210, 5289, 5700, 5703
Bundy, Harvey 4975
Burckhardt, Colonel 5195, 5196
Burden, William A. M 4956, 4977, 5199, 5249, 5299, 5700, 5703
Burdick, Virginia 5084, 5165, 5170, 5181
Burgeson, Dorothy 5700
Burgess, J. Stewart 5518, 5519
Burke, James 5518, 5519
Burks, Ardath Walter 5518, 5519, 5700
Burlingham, Charles C 5252
Burma 5331, 5395, 5692
Burma, Government of 5193, 5294
Burn, North 5379
Burnett, Patricia G 5518, 5519
Burpee, Lawrence J 5518, 5519
Burt, Virginia 4993
Burthold 5008
Burton, Herbert 5518, 5519
Burton, William 5518, 5519
Burtt, John O 5518, 5519
Bush, Chilton 5518, 5519
Bush, Vannevar 5040
Busick, Ralph H 5700
Buss, Claude A 5024, 5520, 5521
Busuego, Mr 5295
Busuego, Mrs 5295
Butler, Mr 5206, 5263
Butler, H. B 5048, 5053
Butler, Nicholas Murray 5289
Butler, Paul 5520, 5521, 5684
Buttrose, Charles 5520, 5521
Butts, Grace Leah 4991, 4993
Butts, Halleck A 5700
Bux, Allah 5004, 5006, 5042, 5043
Byas, Hugh 5520, 5521
Bykofsky, Edith 4987, 4991, 4993
Byrnes, Mr 5393, 5484, 5486
Byrnes, James Francis 5274, 5292, 5652
Bywater, Hector C 5520, 5521

C

CAC. (*See* China Aid Council.) Page
Cady, John F 5520, 5521, 5700
Cahill, Holger 5652
Caidin, Stanley 5295
Caiger, George 5027, 5520, 5521
Cairo Declaration 5073, 5671
Calder 5183
Caldwell, John Cope 5294, 5295, 5653, 5700
Caldwell, Oliver 5520, 5521
California Institute of Technology 5106, 5279, 5280, 5282, 5284
California Labor School 5040
Calkins, Robert D 4938, 4983, 5289, 5365, 5703
Callis, H. G 5259, 5692
Cameron, George T 4941, 4944
Cameron, Merton 5520, 5521
Camincho 5112
Camman, Schuyler Van R 5520, 5521, 5700
Campbell, Inez 4988
Campbell, Persia 5520, 5521
Campbell, Robert 5675
Camus, Manuel 5320
Canada 5318–5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5335, 5372, 5411, 5705
Canada, Government of 4936, 4937, 5115, 5130
Canadian Institute of International Affairs 5328, 5356
Canadian Legation (Washington) 5049, 5052, 5270
Caniff 5520, 5521
Cannon, Marian 5520, 5521, 5704
Cantillo, M. Jose Maria 5692
Capell, A 5520, 5521
Capps, Frances Petrowski 4991, 4993
Caravello, Grace 4987, 4991, 4993
Carbode, Frank 5275
Carlson, Ellsworth C 5700
Carlson, Evans F 5052, 5053, 5085, 5111, 5193, 5196, 5216, 5234, 5235, 5346, 5521
Carnegie Corporation 4973, 5090, 5117, 5181, 5207, 5250, 5303, 5322, 5335
Carnegie Endowment 4969, 5009, 5026, 5063, 5207, 5243, 5289, 5302
Carney, Charles J 5674
Carr, E. H 5137
Carroll, Jewerl 4989, 4993
Carroll, Wallace 5656
Carrothers, W. A 5520, 5521
Carter, Mrs 5710
Carter, Edward C 4907–4924, 4937–4941, 4944–4947, 4953–4958, 4964, 4965, 4967, 4969, 4972, 4973, 4976, 4978, 4980, 4984, 4991, 4993, 4996–5000, 5004, 5010, 5013–5017, 5019, 5020, 5024, 5025, 5027, 5030, 5031, 5041, 5042, 5045–5062, 5065, 5074, 5078–5085, 5089, 5090, 5105, 5107, 5108, 5111–5124, 5127, 5129-5145, 5147, 5149, 5151–5157, 5307, 5309, 5316-5362, 5366, 5520, 5521, 5695, 5703, 5704.
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 5056, 5155, 5158, 5164, 5175, 5188, 5201, 5225, 5226, 5275, 5332, 5349, 5356, 5359
Carter, Gwendolyn M 5520, 5521
Carter, Harriet 5032, 5044, 5059, 5060
Carter, John A 5032, 5055, 5059, 5060, 5108, 5164, 5175, 5184, 5186, 5277, 5359
Carter, Mabel 5032, 5044, 5047, 5059, 5060, 5083, 5090, 5091
Carter, Mrs. Margaret R. Taylor 5699, 5700
Carter, Ruth D 4987, 4990, 4991, 4993, 5056, 5059, 5060, 5065, 5081, 5158, 5160, 5164, 5175, 5179, 5184, 5188, 5201, 5271, 5274, 5279, 5291, 5299
Carter, William D 5032, 5058, 5059, 5061, 5199, 5227, 5256, 5277, 5294, 5520, 5521, 5700
Carthage, S. S 5137
Cartwright, Frank T 5520, 5521
Cartwright, Steven 5522, 5523
Case, Everett N 4983, 5090
Case, Francis 5502, 5504

Page
Cassers, W. G---------- 5522, 5523
Castillo, Andres V---------- 5522, 5523
Castro---------- 5041
Catholic Association for International Peace---------- 5700
Cator, W. J---------- 5684
Cavell, R. G---------- 5027, 5270, 5333, 5522, 5523
Central Intelligence Agency---5438, 5439, 5443–5445, 5448, 5452, 5475, 5481, 5482
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Policy Coordination---------- 5438, 5439, 5475
Cesbron, Gilbert---------- 5650
Chalfin, Jeanne---------- 4990, 4993
Chamberlain---------- 5340, 5369
Chamberlain, Austen---------- 5349
Chamberlain, Joseph P---------- 4943, 5002, 5084, 5153–5158, 5183, 5198, 5225, 5300, 5318, 5339, 5344, 5360, 5365, 5522, 5523
Chamberlain, L. H---------- 4984, 5018
Chamberlain, Neville---------- 4935, 5075, 5179, 5184, 5258
Chamberlain, William Henry---------- 5274, 5522, 5523
Chamberlin---------- 5685
Chambers, Whittaker---------- 5354, 5355, 5504
Chan, Shaw Wing---------- 5522, 5523
Chan, T. W---------- 5522, 5523
Chancellor, Christopher---------- 5326
Chancey, Martin---------- 5675
Chandra, Kiron---------- 5522, 5523
Chandrasekhar, S---------- 5522, 5523
Chang, C. F---------- 5522, 5523
Chang, C. M---------- 5522, 5523
Chang, Chih-chung---------- 5522, 5523
Chang, Chih-Yi---------- 5522, 5523
Chang, Fu-liang---------- 5345, 5361
Chang, H. C---------- 5345, 5361
Chang, Irene Conley---------- 4991, 4993
Chang, Mon-lin. (*See* Chiang, Mon-lin.)
Chang, N. K---------- 5522, 5523
Chang, P. C---------- 5203, 5333, 5522, 5523
Chang, Po-ling---------- 5333
Chang, S. T---------- 5522, 5523
Chang, Su-Lee---------- 5522, 5523
Chang, Tse-I---------- 5648
Chao, Bu-wei (Yang)---------- 5652
Chao, Ting-chi---------- 5692
Chapman, Abraham---------- 4941, 5023, 5024, 5025, 5522, 5523
Chapman, C. L---------- 5274
Chapman, Oscar Littleton---------- 5165, 5292
Chapman, Royal N---------- 5522, 5523, 5684
Chapman, Seville---------- 5040
Chapman, Wilbert McLeod---------- 5522, 5523
Chargar, Thelma---------- 4992, 4993
Charles, Alfred D---------- 5700
Charles, Allan E---------- 5186
Chartrand, Chester---------- 5700
Charvet, Jean-Felix---------- 5700
Chase, Stuart---------- 5040, 5078
Chatham House---------- 5008, 5081, 5127, 5131, 5132, 5135–37, 5160, 5208, 5284
Chauncey, Martin---------- 5676
Chen---------- 5358
Chen, General---------- 5419
Chen, Chu---------- 5171, 5174–5176
Chen, Han-seng (Geoffrey C.)---------- 4987, 4996, 5058–5080, 5084, 5085, 5112, 5114, 5115, 5162, 5171, 5178, 5181, 5183, 5186, 5203, 5209, 5219, 5234, 5235, 5237, 5250, 5337, 5341, 5356, 5524, 5525, 5704.
Chen, Mrs. Han-seng (Susie)---------- 5235
Chen, Jack---------- 5412
Chen, K. P---------- 5178, 5235, 5333
Chen, Li-fu---------- 4939, 4960

Page

Chen, L. T. 5083
Chen, Nan-sang 5019
Chen, Rockwood 5061
Chen, Shou-Yi 5524, 5525
Chen, Stephen 5650
Chen, Su-ching 5524, 5525
Chen, Mrs. Susie Ku 5171
Chen, Ta 5427
Cheng, Hsueh-Hsi 5211
Chennault, Claire Lee 5061, 5342, 5357, 5659
Cherrington, Ben 5156
Cherubin, Charles 4991–4993
Chesman, Miriam 4989, 4993
Chi 5306
Chi, Chao-ting 4968, 4987, 5174–5176, 5192, 5193, 5198, 5203, 5234–5236, 5249, 5250, 5254, 5259, 5268, 5271, 5308, 5328, 5337, 5341, 5358, 5524, 5525.
Chi, Harriet 5704
Chiang, Hsien-tsung 5400
Chiang, Kai-shek (Generalissimo) 4932, 4935, 4938, 4939, 4941, 4968, 5010, 5017, 5045, 5071, 5073, 5174, 5176, 5185, 5188, 5196, 5211, 5216, 5219, 5233, 5249, 5253, 5254, 5268, 5277, 5281, 5283, 5298, 5329, 5347, 5348, 5358, 5375, 5384, 5388, 5403, 5405, 5408, 5409, 5422, 5469, 5650, 5653, 5662, 5671, 5706.
Chiang, Madame Kai-shek 5064, 5196, 5211, 5348, 5385, 5393
Chiang, Mon-Lin 5321, 5322, 5329, 5333, 5344, 5361, 5578, 5579, 5653
Chiang, Peng-fei 5407
Chicago Daily News 4973
Chien, Tuan-sheng 5010, 5013, 5014, 5054, 5253, 5524, 5525
Chile 5332
Chin, Ai-Li S 5524, 5525
Chin, Rockwood Q. P 5524, 5525
Chin, R. P 5202
China 5306, 5307, 5313–5315, 5318–5321, 5327–5330, 5332–5335, 5339, 5346, 5348–5350, 5356, 5357, 5359, 5361, 5363, 5364, 5368, 5371, 5372, 5375–5378, 5382–5384, 5386–5389, 5391–5394, 5396, 5397, 5403–5407, 5410–5412, 5415, 5419–5421, 5423, 5424, 5426, 5427–5432, 5435, 5460, 5462, 5469, 5475, 5479, 5480, 5481, 5500–5502, 5641–5642, 5664, 5666, 5639–5672, 5674, 5686, 5687, 5692, 5701, 5705–5710.
China Aid Council 5674, 5710
China Campaign Committee 5412
China, Central Government of 5176, 5215, 5216, 5253, 5382, 5417
China Christian Advocate 5661
China, Government of 5391, 5392, 5397, 5431, 5432, 5433, 5469
China Institute 5345
China Monthly Review 5374
China, Republic of 5671
China, Small Political Parties of 5524, 5525
China Today 5341
Chinese Chamber of Commerce 5639
Chinese Communist Government 5341
Chinese Consulate (Washington) 5178
Chinese Embassy (Bangkok) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Berlin) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Brussels) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Canberra) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Hague) 5193
Chinese Embassy (London) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Moscow) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Ottawa) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Paris) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Rome) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Tokyo) 5193
Chinese Embassy (Washington) 4961, 5042, 5700
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 5062, 5193, 5210, 5245, 5345, 5709, 5710

Page
Chinese Nationalist Government 4929, 4932, 4935–4939, 4941, 4959, 5002, 5023, 5060, 5062, 5069, 5070, 5072, 5087, 5088, 5104, 5120, 5130, 5133, 5176, 5196, 5202, 5203, 5211, 5223, 5231, 5249, 5254, 5329, 5335, 5359, 5363, 5365, 5383, 5393, 5394, 5403, 5406–5409, 5427, 5430, 5436, 5709.
Chinese National Party 4932, 4937, 5010–5012, 5085, 5086, 5088, 5176, 5215, 5216, 5223, 5232–5234, 5283, 5284, 5287, 5329–5331, 5337, 5347, 5356, 5369, 5372, 5374, 5375, 5377, 5383–5387, 5391, 5392, 5396, 5403, 5404, 5406–5412, 5416–5423, 5425, 5483, 5484, 5502.
Chinese Nationalist Army 4936, 4937, 4940, 4970, 5071, 5252
Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation 5344, 5361
Chinese Red Army 5085, 5217
Chinese Soviet Republic 5374
Chitral, S. S 5137
Chiu, A. Kaiming 5524, 5525
Chosen Christian College 5319
Chou, En-lai 5011, 5012, 5196, 5223, 5236
Chou, Pei-yuan 5013, 5014
Chow, S. R 5070, 5524, 5525
Christian 5685
Christian Century, The 5661, 5663, 5669, 5671
Christian, John L 5032, 5048, 5524, 5525, 5684
Christian, Pearl C 4990, 4993
Christian Science Monitor 5153, 5180, 5181, 5355, 5415, 5650
Christy, Arthur 5647
Chu, C. K 5344, 5361
Chu, Ching-Lai 5524, 5525
Chu, Coching 5524, 5525
Chu, King 5344, 5361
Chu, Mrs. Nora T. H 5344, 5361
Chu, Teh 5358, 5368, 5422
Chungking 5310, 5333, 5348, 5368, 5369, 5371, 5383, 5391, 5403, 5404, 5409, 5420, 5424, 5427, 5465
Churchill, Arthur C 5524, 5525
Churchill, Winston 4935, 5041, 5060, 5071, 5075, 5179, 5243, 5280, 5328, 5349, 5422, 5483, 5486, 5671
CIA. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency.)
CIO. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
CIO News 4975
Civil Rights Congress 5676
Clapper, Raymond 4973
Clark, Andrew H 5524, 5525
Clark, Elizabeth Allerton 5524, 5525, 5666
Clark, Glover 5684
Clark, Grenville 5085, 5183
Clark, Tom 5354, 5355
Clark, Walter 5524, 5525
Clark, Mrs. Warner 5040
Clark, Winnifred 4987, 4993
Clarke, Colin 5524, 5525
Clarke, D. C 4944
Clarke, Lady, Selwyn 5412
Claston 5259
Clausewitz 5454
Claxton, Brooke 5270
Cleeve, Margaret E. (Madge) 5008, 5083, 5137, 5203, 5334
Clementin, J. R 5524, 5525
Cleveland, Harlan 5524, 5525
Close, Upton 5255
Clough, Edwin 5524, 5525
Clubb, O. Edmund 5061, 5346, 5468, 5469, 5477, 5489, 5700
Cluckhorn Russian Institute 5454, 5457
Clyde, Paul Hibbert 5526, 5527, 5656
CNRRA. (*See* Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation.)
Co, Tui 5526, 5527

Page
Coad, N. E---- 5526, 5527
Coast, John---- 5526, 5527
Coatman, J---- 5526, 5527
Cochrane, William---- 5112
Cochrane, Mrs. William---- 5112
Coe, Frank V---- 4975, 4977, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5346, 5703
Coff, Mr---- 5299
Coff, Mrs---- 5299
Coffee, Congressman---- 4975
Coffee, John---- 4976
Coffey, Mike---- 4990, 4993
Cohen, Jerome B---- 5298, 5526, 5527, 5684
Cohen, Nathaniel---- 5526, 5527
Cohen, Theodore---- 5526, 5527
Cohen, Wallace M---- 5295, 5700
Cohen, Mrs. Wallace---- 5295
COI. (*See* Office of Coordinator of Information.)
Colbert, Mrs. Evelyn S---- 5700
Coldwell, M. J---- 5270
Cole, Allan B---- 5526, 5527
Colegrove, Kenneth---- 4931, 5078, 5193, 5204, 5314, 5315, 5340, 5526, 5527
Coleman, George R---- 4983
Coleman, Norman F---- 5318
College de France---- 5322
Collier, Mrs. John---- 5702
Colliers Magazine---- 5278, 5673
Collinge, Patricia---- 5651
Collins, Charles---- 5684
Collins, Henry---- 5299
Collis, Maurice---- 5526, 5527, 5653
Colombos, C. J---- 5526, 5527
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)---- 5255, 5267, 5701
Columbus (Ohio) Citizen---- 5674, 5676
Cominform---- 5387
Comintern---- 4942, 5196, 5337, 5368, 5370, 5384, 5385, 5500, 5706
Commager, H. S---- 5661
Commerce International-China---- 5107, 5202, 5203, 5210–5213, 5246
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy---- 4941, 5024, 5412
Committee on Militarism in Education---- 5353, 5354
Common Sense magazine---- 5040, 5041, 5674
Communist (*see also* Political Affairs)---- 5338
Communist Academy (Moscow)---- 4922, 5128, 5150
Communist International---- 5424, 5425, 5426, 5501
Communist International, Executive Committee---- 5424, 5425
Communist International, Third World Conference---- 4956, 5711
Communist International, Seventh World Congress---- 5425
Communist Parties, National---- 4942, 5425
Communist Party---- 4928, 4929, 4931, 4932, 4935, 4937–4945, 4950–4953, 4981, 5011, 5012, 5085–5089, 5115, 5120, 5128, 5131, 5149, 5163, 5167, 5174, 5176, 5204, 5213, 5215, 5216, 5232, 5233, 5253, 5276–5283, 5284, 5287, 5298, 5306, 5310, 5314, 5316, 5324, 5334, 5337, 5340, 5341, 5343–5355, 5357, 5358, 5365, 5367, 5368, 5381, 5386, 5396, 5400, 5403, 5404, 5412, 5414, 5418, 5420, 5421, 5422, 5426, 5427, 5438, 5439, 5445–5447, 5460, 5465, 5466, 5469, 5471–5473, 5476, 5477–5479, 5486, 5500, 5502–5504, 5675, 5677, 5678, 5684–5686, 5705–5709.
Communist Party (American)---- 4937, 4939, 4941, 5024, 5364, 5379, 5412, 5413
Communist Party (American, Ohio)---- 5675
Communist Party (American, Ohio, Cleveland)---- 5676
Communist Party (American, Ohio, Franklin County)---- 5675, 5676
Communist Party (British)---- 5307, 5308, 5370, 5412
Communist Party (Chinese)---- 4928, 4929, 4931, 4932, 4935, 4937–4941, 4945, 4950–4953, 5011, 5012, 5085–5089, 5115, 5120, 5163, 5176, 5213, 5215, 5216, 5232, 5233, 5253, 5276–5281, 5283, 5284, 5287, 5298, 5314, 5315, 5329, 5350, 5357, 5358, 5364, 5365, 5367–5378, 5382–5385, 5387, 5388, 5392–5395, 5405, 5407, 5409–5412, 5415–5417, 5419, 5420, 5422–5426, 5448, 5453, 5454, 5467, 5483, 5484, 5501, 5707.

Page
Communist Party (Czechoslovakian) 5395
Communist Party (German) 5204, 5368
Communist Party (Indian) 5308
Communist Party (Indonesian) 5641
Communist Party (Malayan) 5395
Communist Party (Netherland) 5635
Communist Party (New York State Committee) 5024
Communist Party (Russian) 5279, 5282, 5382, 5385, 5386, 5396, 5422
Communist Party (Yugoslavian) 5374
Communist Party Central Committee 5409, 5421
Compton, Arthur H 5040, 5299, 5323
Comstock, Ada L 5186
Comstock, Alzada 5526, 5527
Comyus-Carr, A. S 5526, 5527
Conant, Mrs 5299
Conant, James Bryant 5299, 5302, 5303
Conant, Melvin A., Jr 4990, 4993, 5526, 5527
Conde, David 5526, 5527
Condliffe, J. B 5009, 5040, 5260, 5318, 5321, 5327, 5335, 5526, 5527
Condominas, George 5526, 5527
Confederation of Latin American Workers 5041
Congress of Industrial Organizations 4974, 4975, 4977, 5041, 5067, 5413, 5504, 5700, 5703
Coniston, Ralph A 5653
Connally, Senator 4935
Conolly, Violet 5526, 5527
Conover, Harry 5526, 5527
Constantino, Renato 5526, 5527
Converse, Elizabeth A 4990, 4993, 5526, 5527
Cook, John B 4976
Coolidge, Archie 5116
Coolidge, Harold J 5291, 5528, 5529
Coons, Arthur G 4944, 5285, 5703
Cooper, John 5643
Coordinator of Information 4958, 4973, 5000, 5001, 5254, 5256–5259, 5268, 5415, 5692
Cope, Elizabeth W 5528, 5529
Copland, D. B 5528, 5529, 5684
Corbett 5686
Corbett, Charles H 5528, 5529
Corbett, Percy E 4987, 5070, 5078, 5081, 5208, 5209, 5214, 5268, 5324, 5333, 5355, 5528, 5529, 5684
Corbitt, Duvon C 5528, 5529
Cordell, Stanley 5189
Corrigan, John V 5674
Costello 5681
Cottrell, Nickolas 5700
Coughlin, Richard J 5528, 5529
Coulter, John W 5528, 5529
Coulter, John W 4958, 4978
Council for Pan-American Democracy 5703
Council on Foreign Relations 5066, 5068, 5167, 5203, 5260, 5314, 5317
Coupland, Reginald 5528, 5529
Coville, Cabot 5204, 5700
Coville, Mrs. Lillian 4990, 4993, 5294, 5295, 5700
Cowell, Mrs. Olive Thompson 5040
Cowles, Gardner 4973, 4975, 5047
Cowper, Norman 5027
Cowie, Donald 5528, 5529
Cox, Mr 5204, 5217
Cox, Geoffrey 5049, 5052, 5053
Coxe, Spencer 5528, 5529
Coyne, J. B 5270
Coyl, John 5261
CPSU. (*See* Communist Party, Russian.)

Page

Craig 5299
Craigie, Robert 5189, 5190
Crandell, Miss Ella 5123
Crane, Milton 5653
Cranes, John 5299
Crawford, David L 5207
Crawford, Elizabeth 4990, 4993, 4997
Creel, George 5659
Creel, Herrlee, Glessner 5528, 5529
Creighton, S. M 5163, 5348
Cressey, George B 4944, 4999, 5336, 5528, 5529
Crimea Conference 5485
Cripps 5203, 5215
Cripps, Lady 5081
Cripps, Stafford 5348
Crocker, W. R 5528, 5529
Crosby, Alec 5246
Crosby, E. H. G 5528, 5529
Crosby, Josiah 5528, 5529, 5684
Cross, Samuel N 5111, 5116
Cromwell, Mr 5298
Crossman, Mr 5338
Crowford, John G 5528, 5529
Crum, Bartley Cavannaugh 5653
Culbertson, Ely 5271
Culbertson, William S 4958, 4979, 4980
Cullum, Robert M 5528, 5529, 5582, 5583
Culver, Margaret S 5528, 5529
Cumberland, Kenneth B 5528, 5529
Cune, Mr 5299
Cune, Mrs 5299
Cunningham, George 5528, 5529
Cunningham, Kenneth B 5528, 5529
Cunningham, Lillian 4989, 4993
Curran, Jean A., Jr 5530, 5531
Currie, Arthur 5319, 5335, 5349, 5684
Currie, Lauchlin 4919, 4924–4926, 4936, 4944, 4958, 4973, 4977, 4978, 4984, 5013, 5082, 5045, 5047, 5052, 5055, 5057–5059, 5198, 5199, 5234–5237, 5253, 5259, 5261, 5262, 5272, 5274, 5286, 5296.
Curti, Merle 5661
Curtis, Aileen 4985, 4993
Curtis, John L 4944, 5259
Curtis, Sue 5704
Czechoslovakia 5076, 5185, 5382, 5386, 5480, 5638
Czechoslovakia, Government of 5075, 5201

D

Dafoe, J. W 5153, 5156, 5175, 5199, 5271, 5320, 5324, 5327, 5333, 5359
Dahl, Sonja 4990, 4993, 5285
Dai, Bao 5395
Daiches, David 5700
Daily Worker, The 4926, 4935, 4939, 4941, 5337, 5338, 5340, 5352, 5356, 5645, 5678
Daladier 5184, 5340
Dalley, F. W 5530, 5531
Dan, Ino 5333
Daniel, Howard 5530, 5531
Daniel, Judith 4988
Dantwala, M. L 5530, 5531
d'Argenlieu, Admiral 5394
Darden, C. W., Jr 5323
Darrow, Evelyn M 4992, 4993
Das Kapital 5310
Datta, S. K 5209, 5348

Page
Davenport, F. M---- 5700
David, Edward M---- 5530, 5531
David, Madeline---- 5530, 5531
Davidson, C. G---- 5274, 5291, 5292
Davidson, J. W---- 5530, 5531
Davies, Ambassador---- 5059
Davies, Mr---- 5045, 5300, 5420
Davies, C. Collins---- 5530, 5531
Davies, C. H---- 5530, 5531
Davies, John---- 5011, 5013, 5061, 5346
Davies, John P., Jr---- 5437–5483
Davies, Joseph---- 4973, 5199, 5252, 5256, 5261, 5298
Davis, Mr---- 5166
Davis, Elmer---- 5355
Davis, Harold C---- 5530, 5531
Davis, J. Merle---- 5318, 5335
Davis, Joseph S---- 5530, 5531, 5684
Davis, Kingsley---- 5530, 5531
Davis, Larule---- 5299
Davis, Norman H---- 5252, 5349
Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl---- 4908, 5344, 5352
Dawes, R. A---- 5700
Dawson, C. C---- 5530, 5531
Day, Augusta---- 4993
Dayason, E. C---- 5199
Dean, A. L---- 5207
Dean, Arthur H---- 4942, 4943, 4958, 4968, 5026, 5274, 5298, 5300, 5344, 5360, 5366, 5684
Dean, Edgar Packard---- 5530, 5531
Dean, Vera Micheles---- 5009, 5260, 5264, 5300, 5530, 5531, 5653, 5656
Deane, Hugh---- 5107, 5346, 5415
Deans, Harry---- 5186
de Beauclair, I---- 5510, 5511
de Bernstorff, S. E. le Comte---- 5691
de Booy, H. Th---- 5514, 5515
De Caux, Len---- 4944, 4975, 4977, 5522, 5523, 5684, 5700, 5703
Decker, J. W---- 5530, 5531
De Francis---- 4987, 5295, 5530, 5531, 5700
Degras, Jane---- 5530, 5531
Deimel, Henry L., Jr---- 4997, 5998
de Jong, Ellen Van Zyll---- 4987, 5236, 5268, 5558, 5559
DeKiewist---- 5302
De Korne, John C---- 5530, 5531
de Laguna, Frederica---- 5564, 5565
de Lapomarded, Baron---- 5564, 5565
DeLeonardis, Salvatore---- 4990, 4993
Delgado, Lionel C---- 4990, 4993
Delhi---- 5465
Delhi School of Economics---- 5323
D'Elia, Paschal M---- 5530, 5531
De Long---- 5681, 5682
de Meel, H---- 5576, 5577
DeMenocal, Daniel A---- 5165
Demieville, P---- 5532, 5533
Democratic League---- 5404, 5410, 5411
Denison, Ellery---- 5700
Denmark---- 5380
Dennery, E---- 5131, 5175, 5209, 5333, 5359, 5684
Dennett, Raymond---- 4937, 4939, 4944, 4989, 4993, 5032, 5063, 5065, 5078–5082, 5031, 5061, 5364–5367, 5413, 5414, 5532, 5533
Dennett, Tyler---- 4973, 4977, 5532, 5533, 5684
Dennison, Eleanor---- 5532, 5533, 5700
Dennison, Robert L---- 4930, 4932
Denny, Ludwell---- 5700
de Riencourt, Amaury---- 5660
De Roy, Benjamin---- 5704

Page
Derrick, R. A---- 5532, 5533
de Scheinitz, Karl---- 5702
Des Moines Register and Tribune---- 4973, 5326, 5703
Despres, Emile---- 4975, 4977, 5270, 5346
Devine, Samuel L---- 5674
DeVoogd, Nicholas A. J---- 5052, 5053, 5089
de Vries, E---- 5620, 5621
Dewantara, Ki Hadjar---- 5532, 5533
Dewar, Margaret---- 5532, 5533
de Weizsacher, Le Baron E---- 5691
Dewey, A. Gordon---- 5532, 5533
de Wiart, Carton---- 5382
De Young, Henry C---- 5062, 5321
Dhar, Subhas K---- 5532, 5533
Dickinson, Edna C---- 4993
Dickinson, La Fell---- 5700
Dickinson, Mrs. La Fell---- 5696, 5697
Dies Committee---- 5047
Dietrich, Miss---- 4997
Dietrich, Ethel B---- 5532, 5533
Dillard, Hardy C---- 4958, 4972, 4973
Dillingham, Walter F---- 4943, 5207, 5344, 5360
Dillings, Mrs---- 5191
Dimantshtein, Victor---- 5128, 5137, 5138
Dimitrov, George---- 5501
Dimitry, Helen---- 4990, 4993
Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America---- 5413
Dix, Marion---- 5302
Djajadiningrat, Raden Lockman---- 5321
Djang, Y. S---- 5345, 5361
Dobb, Maurice---- 5532, 5533
Dobby, E. H. G---- 5532, 5533
Dobson, R. P---- 5650
Dodd, Bella---- 5023
Dodds, Vera---- 4987, 4988, 5532, 5533
Dodson, Elba Aileen---- 4990, 4993
Dolivet, Louis---- 4984, 5019
Dollard, Charles---- 4913, 4973, 5083, 5090, 5227, 5298, 5299, 5300
Domei---- 5215, 5232
Donald, Dudley B---- 5532, 5533
Donaldson, Faith---- 4915–4917, 5140
Donohue, Irene R---- 5031, 5065, 5273, 5336, 5362
Donovan, General---- 5475
Dooman, Eugene---- 5053
Dorfman, Ben---- 5009, 5219, 5247, 5248, 5700
Door Co---- 5105
Douglas, Dorothy---- 5288
Douglas, Elaine---- 4991, 4993
Douglas, Emily Taft---- 5064
Douglas, Henry---- 5295
Douglas, Mrs. W. W---- 5040
Douglas, William O---- 4984, 5027
Downing, Elizabeth---- 4987, 4988, 5001, 5045, 5157, 5160, 5161, 5179
Do Yandly, Anthony---- 5532, 5533
Doyle, Daniel F---- 4990, 4993
Drabble, J. G---- 5532, 5533
Dragoni, C---- 5205, 5532, 5533
Draper, Charles Dana---- 5116
Draper, Ernest G---- 5346
Draper, Theodore---- 5346
Dreyhausen, H. V---- 5700
Drummond, W. M---- 5532, 5533
Drumwright, Everett---- 5480
Dubin, Wilbert B---- 5532, 5533
DuBois, Cora Alice---- 5294, 5301, 5659, 5700

Page

Dubs, Homer H---- 4988, 4989, 4993, 5229, 5532, 5533
Duce, James Terry---- 5700
Duggan, Lawrence---- 5172, 5209, 5216, 5286, 5346, 5354–5356, 5684
Duke, K. R---- 4944
Dull, Paul S---- 5532, 5533
Dulles, A. W---- 5084, 5170
Dulles, Foster Rhea---- 5282, 5287, 5651
Dulles, John Foster---- 4931, 5067, 5350, 5534, 5535, 5681
Dunlop, G. A---- 5320, 5334
Dunn, J. Kynang---- 5534, 5535
Dunn, Margaret M---- 4990, 4993
Dunn, Thomas P---- 5316
Dunsont, J. Leslie---- 5534, 5535
Dupuy, R. Ernest---- 5534, 5535, 5684, 5700
Durant, Kenneth---- 5085, 5197
Duranty, Walter---- 5659
Durga, Das---- 5323
Durham, Walter A., Jr---- 5534, 5535
Durr, Clifford---- 5112
Dutt, R. P---- 5308
Dutt, V. P---- 5690
Duyvendak, J. J. L---- 5334
Dyason, Edward C---- 5267
Dykstra, Clarence A---- 4944
Dutch Embassy (Paris)---- 5082

E

Earle, Edward M---- 4977, 5167, 5208, 5209, 5225, 5260, 5355, 5356
Earle, Frances M---- 5534, 5535
Earnshaw, Ruth---- 4988, 5534, 5535
Eastlake, Clara---- 5700
Eastman, Max---- 5079, 5656
Eaton College---- 5002
Eaton, Paul E---- 5534, 5535
Eberhard, W---- 5534, 5535
Eby, Kermit---- 5534, 5535
ECA. (*See* Economic Cooperation Administration.)
ECAFE. (*See* Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.)
Ecole des Science Politiques---- 5327
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East---- 5296, 5297, 5300, 5301
Economic Cooperation Administration---- 5315, 5432
Eddy, Sherwood---- 5085, 5191, 5192
Edelman, H---- 5534, 5535
Edelstein, Julius---- 5684
Eden, Anthony---- 5059, 5060, 5656
Edison, Charles A---- 5344
Edward, Gladys H---- 4991, 4992, 4993
Edwards, Corwin D---- 5534, 5535, 5698
Edwards, Dwight---- 4936, 5344
Edwards, Passmore---- 5188
Edwards, Paul C---- 5040
Egan, Charleen---- 5700
Egan, Martin---- 5123
Eggan, Fred---- 5534, 5535
Eggleston, Frederick---- 5062
Eggleston, F. W---- 5319, 5320, 5333, 5534, 5535
Eggleston, Polly---- 5534, 5535
Egoriew, Vladimir---- 5692
Ehle, Emily L---- 5534, 5535
Ehrlich, Anita---- 4991, 4993
Eighth Route Army---- 5085, 5086, 5188, 5196, 5233, 5241, 5368, 5380, 5417
Eighteenth Group Army---- 5370, 5371, 5372, 5404
Einstein, Albert---- 5040
Eisenhower, Dwight David---- 5656
Eisler, Gerhard---- 5356

Page
Elchibegoff, Ivan ---- 5534, 5535
Eldridge, Fred ---- 5651
Eliot, George Fielding ---- 5536, 5537, 5656
Elisieff, Serge ---- 5116, 5229
Elizalde, Joaquin M ---- 5321
Elizalde, Manuel ---- 5026, 5027, 5052, 5053, 5059
Elkus, Mrs. Charles De Young ---- 5040
Eller, E. M ---- 5700
Ellinger, Barnard ---- 5534, 5535
Elliott, Jim ---- 5295
Elliott, Robert C ---- 5040
Elliott, William Y ---- 5053, 5116
Elliston, H ---- 5323
Elliston, H. B ---- 5084, 5153, 5156, 5180, 5181
Eloesser, Herbert ---- 4944
Elson, Jean ---- 4990, 4993
Embree ---- 5688
Embree, Edwin R ---- 4977, 5123, 5536, 5537
Embree, John Fee ---- 5536, 5537, 5648, 5688
Emeny, Brooks ---- 4943, 4973, 4977, 5020, 5199, 5269, 5274, 5277, 5279, 5344, 5360, 5536, 5537
Emerson, Rubert ---- 4944, 4967, 4973, 4975, 5116, 5289, 5336, 5536, 5537, 5703
Emery, Edgar B ---- 5536, 5537
Emmerson, John ---- 5062
Engel, Leonard ---- 5536, 5537
Engels ---- 5420, 5422
Engers, J. F ---- 5053, 5536, 5537
England. (*See* Great Britain.)
Englander, Florence ---- 4990, 4993
Ennis, Thomas Edson ---- 5656
Ensor, R. C. K ---- 5536, 5537
Entenberg, Barbara ---- 5536, 5537
Epstein, Israel ---- 5023, 5024, 5083, 5346, 5350, 5357, 5374, 5427, 5428, 5536, 5537, 5653
Erwin, Katherine ---- 5295
Escara, Jean ---- 5536, 5537
Espy, Willard R ---- 5536, 5537
Ethiopia ---- 5708
Evans, Roger ---- 5688
Evening Star Newspaper ---- 5702
Ewing, Ethel E ---- 4990, 4993, 5536, 5537, 5697
Export-Import Bank ---- 5429, 5432, 5700
Ezekiel, Mordecai ---- 5261

F

Fabian, quarterly ---- 5377
Fablet, Capitaine de Vaisseau Julian ---- 5692
Fabyan, Eleanor ---- 4987
Fahs, C. B ---- 4973, 5000, 5007, 5008, 5299, 5536, 5537, 5700, 5704
Fainsod, Merle ---- 5116
Fair Employment Practices Commission ---- 5678
Fairbank ---- 5686
Fairbank, John K ---- 4944, 5000, 5024, 5057, 5177, 5187, 5296, 5300, 5303, 5317, 5374, 5427, 5438, 5439, 5440, 5443, 5445, 5447, 5448, 5454, 5456, 5457, 5475, 5479, 5481, 5482, 5536, 5537, 5651, 5652, 5654–5660, 5685
Fairbank, Mrs. John K. (Wilma) ---- 4979, 4984, 5010, 5013, 5014, 5274, 5295, 5297, 5301, 5438, 5444, 5445, 5447, 5478, 5479, 5481, 5482, 5536, 5537, 5711
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie ---- 4987, 5118, 5120, 5175, 5179, 5198, 5203, 5210, 5247, 5356, 5357, 5536, 5537, 5704
Falconer, Fobert A ---- 5536, 5537
Fall, Hrepilad ---- 5112
Fang, Chaoying ---- 5536, 5537
FAO ---- 5700
Far East Digest ---- 5328
Far East Spotlight ---- 5412
Far Eastern Commission ---- 5342

Page
Far Eastern Institute 5312
Far Eastern Survey 4940, 4956, 4977, 4988, 4989, 4991, 5007, 5010, 5021, 5024, 5025, 5029, 5030, 5048, 5063, 5064, 5140, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5236, 5237, 5239, 5241, 5242, 5247, 5248, 5255, 5257, 5259, 5267, 5279, 5282, 5283, 5284, 5287, 5328, 5329, 5378, 5426, 5504–5633, 5689, 5696, 5703
Farley, James Aloysius 5657
Farley, Miriam S 4965, 5967, 4969, 4972, 4988, 4989, 4993, 5021, 5053, 5089, 5179, 5181, 5218, 5224, 5225, 5228, 5234, 5236, 5239, 5329, 5366, 5413–5415, 5536, 5537, 5683
Farmer, Victor 5536, 5537
Farrelly, Theodore S 5538, 5539
Faulkner, James M 5538, 5539
Fautz, Elizabeth 5700
Faymonville, Philip R 5045, 5059, 5112, 5252
FBI. (*See* Federal Bureau of Investigation.)
FEA. (*See* Foreign Economic Administration.)
Feary, Bob 5021, 5294
Federal Bureau of Investigation 5109, 5353, 5355, 5678, 5680
Federal Council of Churches Executive Committee 5538, 5539
Federal Reserve Bank 4974, 5040, 5249, 5268
Federal Reserve System 5346
Fedotov, Anthony N 5199, 5267
Fei, Hsiao-Tung 5538, 5539, 5648, 5685, 5687
Feis 5224
Fels, Samuel S 5078
Feng (Fing), Chia-Sheng 5538, 5539
Fenico, Pasquale J 4944
Fenn, Henry C 5538, 5539
FEPC. (*See* Fair Employment Practices Commission.)
Feraru, Arthur 5538, 5539
Ferber, Stanley 4992, 4993
Ferguson, G. V 5538, 5539
Fernbach, Alfred P 5700
Ferns, H. S 5538, 5539
Fever, Lewis S 5538, 5539
Field 5685, 5705
Field, Betty 5116
Field, Edith 5279
Field, Frederick V 4922, 4939, 4941, 4944, 4955, 4958, 4959, 4967, 4973, 4977, 4979, 4988, 4997, 5023, 5024, 5032, 5041, 5083–5085, 5114, 5123, 5125, 5126, 5137, 5140, 5142, 5144, 5153, 5154, 5156, 5161, 5162, 5164, 5167, 5169, 5170, 5175, 5178, 5179, 5182–5184, 5186–5190, 5193, 5196, 5198, 5204, 5207, 5210, 5215–5218, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5257, 5258, 5289, 5290, 5306, 5337, 5338, 5339, 5352, 5353, 5354, 5356, 5365, 5413, 5538, 5539, 5703.
Field, Henry 5182, 5700
Field, Marshall 5079, 5080, 5299
Field, Olga V 4991, 4993, 5538, 5539
Field, William O. Jr 5238
Fields, John E 5538, 5539
Fifield, Russell H 5538, 5539
Fillman, Gwendolyn R 5700
Fine, Donald 4992, 4993
Finer, Herman 5657
Finklestein, Lawrence S 5538, 5539
Finland 5369
Finley, John H 5084, 5169
Finn, Dallas 5538, 5539
Finney, Ruth 5700
Firth, Raymond 5538, 5539
Fischer, John 5062, 5653
Fischer, Louis 5384
Fischl, Margaret 4989, 4993
Firshman, Bernice 4990, 4993
Fish, Hamilton 5002
Fishback, Sam 5700

Page
Fisher, Allan G. B---- 5538, 5539
Fisher, F. MacCracken---- 5294, 5295, 5700
Fisher, Mrs. F. M---- 5700
Fisher, Galen M---- 4944, 4999, 5083, 5131, 5186, 5198, 5218, 5243, 5538, 5539, 5684, 5704
Fisher, George---- 5538, 5539
Fisher, Gerald W---- 5207
Fisher, Harold H---- 4944, 5186, 5322, 5323, 5538, 5539
Fisher, Jack---- 5080
Fisher, Mac---- 5061
Fisher, Ralph---- 5700
Fitzgerald, C. P---- 5540, 5541
Flato---- 5286
Fleisher, Wilfred---- 5062, 5648, 5673, 5700
Fleming, Peter---- 5177, 5540, 5541
Flersheim, Robert E---- 5540, 5541
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy---- 5313, 5321
Fleugal, Edna R---- 4929, 5485
Florinsky---- 5238
Flournoy, Richard---- 5540, 5541
Flower, Lida---- 5540, 5541
Flynn, Edward Joseph---- 5653
Fo, Sun---- 5540, 5541
Fong, H. D---- 5328, 5540, 5541, 5684
Food Research Institute---- 5335, 5341
Ford, Anne---- 5350
Ford Foundation---- 5023, 5026
Ford, George---- 5295
Ford, Guy Stanton---- 5700
Ford, Henry---- 5074
Foreign Affairs---- 4982, 5115, 5116, 5240, 5316
Foreign Economic Administration---- 5287, 5703
Foreign Policy Association---- 4959, 4961, 4962, 4963, 4971, 5009, 5063, 5066, 5068, 5105, 5263, 5289, 5299, 5314, 5317, 5337, 5344, 5413, 5711.
Foreman, Clark---- 4964
Forrester, C. S---- 5440, 5441
Forman College---- 5348
Forman, Harrison---- 5648, 5657
Formosa---- 5375, 5386, 5396, 5397, 5480, 5643, 5671
Forrest, R. A. D---- 5540, 5541
Forrest, Wilbur---- 5299
Forrestal, James---- 4930, 4932, 4933, 5274, 5292, 5486
Forster, Edward Morgan---- 5653
Fortas, Abe---- 5112
Forsyth, W. D---- 5540, 5541, 5684
Fortune Magazine---- 5008, 5041, 5067, 5183, 5349, 5674
Fosdick, Harry Emerson---- 5084, 5152, 5153
Fosdick, Raymond---- 5026, 5123, 5643
Fosque, J. D---- 5323
Fox---- 5059, 5261
Fox, Mr---- 5710
Foy, Alice B---- 4985, 5017, 5018
Fox, Clarence J---- 5540, 5541
Fox, Melvin---- 5709
Foxworthy, F. W---- 5540, 5541
Foynes---- 5082
FPA. (*See* Foreign Policy Association.)
France---- 5318, 5321, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5334, 5357, 5369, 5640
France, Government of---- 4936, 4971, 5062, 5068, 5074, 5081, 5089, 5091, 5096, 5100–5104, 5130, 5185, 5196, 5201, 5206, 5222, 5224, 5258.
Franco---- 5388, 5681
Francus, Lan---- 5564, 5565
Franke, Herbert---- 5540, 5541

Page
Frankfurter, Felix ---- 5083, 5085, 5111, 5178
Franz, Joseph Land ---- 5113
Freedman, Frances ---- 5540, 5541
Freedman, Maurice ---- 5540, 5541
Freeman ---- 4942
Freeman, Fulton ---- 5480
Freeman, Miller ---- 4939
Free World Magazine ---- 5019, 5040, 5041
Freist, Dorothy M ---- 4990, 4993
French Army ---- 5092, 5095, 5209
French Embassy (Bangkok) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Berlin) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Brussels) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Canberra) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Chungking) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Hague) ---- 5193
French Embassy (London) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Moscow) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Ottawa) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Rome) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Shanghai) ---- 5193
French Embassy (Tokyo) ---- 5193
French Indochina ---- 5089, 5259
Friedberg, Mr ---- 5295
Friedman, Frances ---- 4987, 4991, 4993
Friedman, Irving S ---- 4919, 4920, 4983, 4987, 5016, 5017, 5085, 5179, 5198, 5244, 5245, 5249, 5268, 5540, 5541, 5711
Friedman, Julian ---- 5346, 5428
Friedrich, Carl J ---- 5540, 5541
Friendly, Alfred ---- 5023, 5112
Friends of the Soviet Union ---- 5164
Friters, Gerald M ---- 5540, 5541
Frost, Richard A ---- 5540, 5541
Frumkin, Grzegorz ---- 5540, 5541
Frucht, Rita ---- 4990, 4993
Fry, Thomas Pentherthy ---- 5540, 5541, 5684
Fuchs, Dr ---- 5396
Fuchs, Klaus ---- 5486
Fuchs, Walter ---- 5540, 5541
Fugh, Phillip ---- 5542, 5543
Fujii, Kazuko Kay ---- 4992, 4993
Fujii, Shuji ---- 5542, 5543
Fujima, Edward A ---- 4991, 4992, 4993
Fulbright, James W ---- 5049, 5052, 5053
Furber, Holden ---- 5542, 5543
Furnass, J. C ---- 5542, 5543
Furniss, E. S ---- 5689
Furnival, T. J ---- 5542, 5543

G

G–2. (*See* United States War Department, Military Intelligence.)
Gabriel, Ralph H ---- 5661
Gaddis, J. W ---- 5415
Gadgil, D. R ---- 5323, 5542, 5543
Gadgri, D. R ---- 5026
Gaffe, Phil ---- 5000
Gage, Eugenia ---- 5542, 5543
Gaines, Lt. Col ---- 5049
Galant, Henry ---- 5295
Galant, Mrs. Henry ---- 5295
Galletti, R ---- 5542, 5543
Gallus, Wilya ---- 4988, 4989, 4994
Gamba, Charles ---- 5542, 5543
Gamble, Charles K ---- 4944, 5276
Gamble, Sydney ---- 5542, 5543

Page
Gammas, L. D---- 5334
Gandel, Rose---- 5045
Gandhi, Mr---- 5349
Gani, A. K---- 5641
Gapanovich---- 5008
Garard, C---- 5291
Garbuny, Siegfried---- 5542, 5543
Garcia, Carlos---- 5062
Gardiner, John---- 5303
Garside, B. A---- 5344
Gary, Howard C---- 5542, 5543
Gaskill, Gussie Esther---- 5542, 5543
Gates, Artemus---- 4934, 4936, 4998
Gates, M. Jean---- 5295, 5696, 5697
Gauss, Ambassador---- 5283
Gauss, Mr---- 5462
Gauss, C. E---- 5700
Gaus, John M---- 5198, 5214
Gayer, Arthur D---- 5684
Gayn, Mark J---- 5346, 5653
Geddes, D. P---- 5041
Gehle, F. V---- 5252
Gilber, Lionel---- 5542, 5543
Gelder, Stuart---- 5542, 5543
Gelfan, Mr---- 5299
Gelfan, Mrs. (*See* Moore, Harriet.)
Gelman, George---- 5542, 5543
General Federation of Women's Clubs---- 5700
Geneva---- 5335, 5362
Geneva Disarmament Conference---- 5691
George, W. H---- 5542, 5543
George Williams College---- 5661
Gepp, Herbert---- 5334
Gerathy, Theresa---- 4988
Gerber, Lillie---- 4990, 4994
Gerbode, Mrs. Frank A---- 4944, 5290, 5703
Gerbode, M---- 5273, 5274
Gerlach, Miss Talitha---- 5268, 5274, 5291, 5709
German Army---- 4970, 5232
German-Japanese Alliance---- 4935, 5140, 5145, 5147, 5167, 5189, 5194
German-Russian War---- 5246
German Social Democratic Party---- 5374
Germany---- 5354, 5369, 5375, 5380, 5397, 5401, 5426, 5484, 5503, 5664, 5665, 5667, 5673, 5691, 5699.
Germany, Government of---- 4929, 4935, 4970, 4971, 5000, 5035, 5071, 5073, 5074, 5092–5102, 5145, 5177, 5184, 5185, 5194, 5201, 5206, 5222, 5223, 5226, 5231, 5258.
Germany, National Socialist Party of---- 4965, 5038, 5069, 5071, 5073, 5075, 5189, 5217, 5251, 5269, 5289, 5290, 5369, 5469, 5679, 5680.
Gerschenkron, Alexander---- 5542, 5543
Gerson, Jack---- 4991, 4992, 4994
Gessell, Harold, J. E---- 5487, 5488
Ghose, D. N---- 5012
Ghose, Sudhin H---- 5542, 5543
Ghosh, D---- 5542, 5543
Gibson, Eulalie---- 4994
Gideonse, Harry D---- 5041
Gilbert, Kathleen---- 5544, 5545
Gilbert, Rodney---- 5544, 5545
Gilbert, W. C---- 5505
Gilchrist, Huntington---- 4943, 5023, 5025, 5322, 5325, 5333, 5344, 5360, 5365, 5544, 5545
Gilfillan, S. Colum---- 5041
Gilliam, Mildred---- 4988

Page
Gillmore ---- 5651
Gini, Conrade ---- 5544, 5545
Glass, Leslie ---- 5544, 5545
Glazebrook, G. de T ---- 5544, 5545
Glazer, Sidney ---- 5220, 5544, 5545
Glover, Patricia ---- 4987, 5544, 5545
Glowes, Harry G ---- 5544, 5545
Gluck, Filmore ---- 4992, 4994
Gluck, Martin ---- 4992, 4994
Go, Toshi ---- 5544, 5545, 5684
Godby, Marie ---- 4989, 4994
Goebbels, Joseph ---- 5657
Golde, Russell S ---- 5428
Goldenberg, H. Carl ---- 5544, 5545
Goldenberg, Rhoda ---- 4990, 4994
Goldfrank, Esther S. (*See* Wittfogel, Mrs. K. A.)
Golembosti, Josephine ---- 4989, 4994
Gollodin, Ira ---- 5544, 5545
Gonzalez, Bienvenido ---- 5296
Goodrich, Carrington ---- 4944, 5111
Goodrich, Carter ---- 5002, 5261, 5544, 5545
Goodrich, L. C ---- 5336, 5544, 5545
Goodrich, Leland M ---- 5078, 5544, 5545
Gordon, Gloria ---- 4990, 4994
Gordon, J. King ---- 5544, 5545
Gordon, Margaret S ---- 5544, 5545
Gore-Booth, P. H ---- 5544, 5545
Gorgas, Ruth ---- 4992, 4994
Gorki ---- 5386
Goshal, Komar ---- 5078
Gould, B. J ---- 5544, 5545
Gould, Randall C ---- 4983, 5544, 5545, 5651
Gourivitch ---- 5161
Gouron, Pierre ---- 5544, 5545
Gourou, Pierre ---- 5322, 5333, 5684
Gousev ---- 5045
Government Printing Office ---- 5698, 5699
Grad, Andrew J ---- 4910, 4984, 4987, 4991, 4994, 5001, 5002, 5007, 5008, 5014, 5015, 5032, 5053, 5060, 6064, 5083, 5198, 5218, 5221, 5228, 5230, 5240, 5268, 5299, 5520, 5521, 5544, 5545, 5546, 5547, 5580, 5581, 5687, 5688, 5689.
Grady, Mrs ---- 5290
Grady, Henry F ---- 4944, 4973, 4997, 5546, 5547
Graham, Senator ---- 5026
Graham, Gerald S ---- 5546, 5547
Grajdanzev, Andrew. (*See* Grad, Andrew J.)
Granger, Lester B ---- 5546, 5547
Grant, John B ---- 5546, 5547
Grattan, C. Hartley ---- 5546, 5547, 5684, 5685
Graves, General ---- 5145, 5146
Graves, Mortimer ---- 4915, 4944, 4967, 4972, 5000, 5032, 5051, 5083, 5111, 5117, 5198, 5219, 5221, 5238, 5239, 5247, 5248, 5257, 5276, 5286, 5287, 5288, 5293, 5294, 5546, 5547, 5693, 5700.
Gray, F. W ---- 5546, 5547
Great Britain ---- 5318, 5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5334, 5368, 5374, 5412, 5424, 5501, 5635, 5638, 5642, 5664, 5708, 5709
Great Britain, Government of ---- 4935–4937, 4966, 4970–4972, 5000, 5009, 5042, 5046, 5048, 5060, 5062, 5066, 5067, 5069, 5070, 5072–5074, 5076, 5077, 5081, 5091, 5092, 5096, 5097, 5100, 5103, 5104, 5116, 5130, 5134, 5140, 5177, 5194, 5196, 5206, 5208, 5215, 5222, 5224, 5231, 5249, 5251, 5256, 5258, 5276, 5280, 5285, 5369, 5369, 5399.
Great Soviet World Atlas ---- 5128, 5134, 5136, 5140, 5150, 5158, 5160, 5170, 5173, 5320
Greece ---- 5405

Page
Green, Carl 5286, 5295
Green, Elizabeth 5329, 5335, 5546, 5547
Green, James 4992, 4994, 5105
Green, James Frederick 5700
Green, O. M 5546, 5547
Greenberg, Harold J 4988
Greenberg, Michael 4987, 5047, 5199, 5250, 5272, 5546, 5547, 5711
Greenberg, Raymond 4992, 4994
Greenberg, Rose 4989, 4994
Greene 5089, 5299, 5300
Greene, Howard 5270
Greene, Jerome D 5199, 5271, 5317, 5318, 5320, 5324, 5333, 5335, 5546, 5547
Greene, Katrine R. C 4972, 4988, 4991, 4994, 5027, 5058, 5259, 5273, 5298, 5301
Greene, Morris 5049, 5052, 5053
Greene, O. M 5684
Greene, Roger S 4958, 4967, 5183, 5546, 5547
Greenidge, Gertrude 4992, 4994
Greenslade, John W 5040, 5278, 5290
Greenwald, Rosalind 4991, 4992, 4994
Greenwood, Mr 5694
Greenwood, Gordon 5546, 5547
Gregorio, Quirino G 5027, 5322
Gregory 5128
Gregory, Herbert 5546, 5547
Gregory, Isabella Augusta 5654
Gregory, T. E 5684
Gresham, Mary 5112
Grew, Joseph C 5157, 5189, 5232, 5700
Grew, Mrs. Joseph C 5157
Grey, Arthur L 5660
Grey, Austin 5546, 5547
Griffith, Ernest 4931, 4932
Griffiths, Gordon 5700
Grigsby, Deborah 4990, 4992, 4994
Grimm, Peter 5298
Grimsdale, A. Whitney 5546, 5547
Gripsholm, S. S 5062
Griswold, A. Whitney 5078, 5546, 5547
Gromyko 5045, 5484
Grover 5255
Groves, H. Lawrence 5701
Grow, General 5678
Gruening, Ernest H 4973, 5165
Grunge, Walter 5546, 5547
Guerrero, Leon Ma 5546, 5547
Guerzon, Engracio 5295
Guest, S. Haden 5546, 5547
Guggenheim Foundation 5355, 5662
Gulick, Leeds 5661–5674
Gulick, Luther H 4973, 5002, 5050
Gull, Mr 4985, 5709
Gull, E. M 5350, 5548, 5549, 5684
Gunkle, Robert 5675
Gunn, Selskar M 5059, 5083, 5120
Gunn, Mrs. Selskar M 5120
Gustavson, R. G 5041
Guthman, Renee J 4990, 4994, 5274, 5276, 5286–5288, 5294, 5295, 5693–5699

H

Haan, Kilsoo 5009
Hacke, Mrs. Harold 5040
Hadley, Eleanor M 5548, 5549, 5701
Hager, Reed 4975, 5053, 5548, 5549
Hailey, Lord 5321, 5334, 5548, 5549, 5684

Page
Hailey, Foster 5673
Hailsham, Viscount 5319, 5334
Hale, Mrs 5299
Haleem, A. B. A 5026, 5027, 5322
Halifax, Lord 5184
Hall 4959
Hall, Monroe 5548, 5549
Hall, Robert B 5229
Hall, Robert King 5660
Hall, Russell E 5548, 5549
Hall, T. D. H 5548, 5549
Hallenbeck, Jane E 5701
Halsema, James J 5548, 5549
Halsey, William F 5673
Halstead, Mr 5696
Hambro, C. J 5078
Hamilton, Maxwell M 4926, 4927, 4958, 4960, 4976, 5084, 5172, 5173, 5230
Hammer, Ellen J 5298, 5548, 5549
Han, Lih-wu 5344, 5361
Hancher, V. M 5323
Handy, E. S. C 5548, 5549, 5701
Handy, Mrs. E. S. C 5701
Handy, Elizabeth G 5548, 5549
Handy, Willowdean C 5548, 5549
Hangchow 5319, 5320, 5417
Hansen, A 5260
Hansen, O. C 4944
Hanson, Haldore 5185, 5346, 5395, 5548, 5549
Hanwell, Norman D 5085, 5180, 5378, 5548, 5549
Haq, Fazlul 5005, 5043
Harada, Tasuku 5548, 5549
Harbin 5340
Harden, Sheila 5548, 5549
Haring, C. H 5548, 5549
Haring, Douglas G 5548, 5549
Harmon, Colonel 5371
Harondar, E. V 4909, 4916, 4922, 4984, 5025, 5112, 5138, 5140, 5150, 5180, 5200
Harper, Norman D 5550, 5551
Harpers Magazine 5041, 5080, 5674
Harrell, Mary E 4988
Harriman, Mr 5473, 5484
Harriman, George 5651
Harriman, W. Averell 5059, 5112, 5285
Harris, George 5078
Harris, George L 5701
Harrison, Barbara 4992, 4994
Harrison, Burr P 5502
Harrison, Peyton 5207
Harsch, Joseph C 5701
Hart 4941
Hart, George H. C 5049, 5053, 5550, 5551, 5684
Hart, L. V 5550, 5551
Hart, Roies C 4983
Hart, T. C 5703
Hartley, Arnold B 4925
Hartmann, Mr 5452, 5453, 5454
Hartshorne 4965
Harvard Business School 5369
Harvard-Yenching Institute 5662
Harvard University Press 5277
Harvey, Evelyn 5550, 5551
Hasan, K. Sarwar 5027
Hashmall, Mrs 5677

Page
Hashmall, Frank 5675, 5676
Haskell, Henry S 5123
Hasse, Robert 4991, 4994
Haste, J. M. D 5550, 5551
Hastings College 5313
Hatcher 5680
Hatta 5640
Hattery, Lowell H 5701
Hauge, O. I 5415
Haulsey, Robert 4992, 4994
Hauser, Ernest O 4988, 5550, 5551
Havas 5334
Hawaii 5317, 5319, 5454, 5699
Haward, Edwin 5550, 5551
Hawes, Harry B 5701
Hawkins, Everett D 5550, 5551
Hawkins, Sally R 4990, 4994, 5295
Hawthorn, H. B 5550, 5551
Hawtrey, R. G 5550, 5551
Hayden, Joseph R 4973, 4997, 5684
Haydon, H 5668
Hayes, Carlton, J. H 5002
Hayes, Kathryn 4992, 4994
Hazm, John G 5550, 5551
Hazard, John 5006, 5045, 5047, 5049, 5286, 5299, 5550, 5551
Hazard, Mrs. John 5299
Headley, James G 5674
Heald, Stephen 5550, 5551
Healy, Mrs. Carrol 5701
Healy, Mary F 4987, 4992, 4994, 5021, 5058, 5299, 5693, 5694, 5697, 5698, 5699
Heaslett, S 5550, 5551
Heath, John 5550, 5551
Heideman, John 5295
Heine-Gelden, Robert 5550, 5551
Heineman, Mrs 5285
Heives, Lawrence I., Jr 5550, 5551
Helen, Sister 5701
Heleney, Henry 4983
Heller, Mrs. E. H 4944, 5186
Helmick, Milton 5550, 5551
Hendershot, Clarence 5295, 5550, 5551, 5701
Henderson, Harold 5550, 5551
Henderson, Loy 5026
Henderson, Martha T 4992, 4994
Heppner, R. P 4944
Herald Tribune 5341
Herod, William R 4943, 4973, 5198, 5239, 5315, 5344, 5360
Herre, Albert W. C. T 5550, 5551
Hersey, Arthur B 5701
Hersey, John R 4944, 5079, 5194, 5203
Heyworth, Laurence 5026
Hickey, Callie M 4990, 4994
Hidayatullah, Ghulam Hussain 5006, 5043
Hill, Marguerite F 4990, 4994
Hill, Walter 5552, 5553
Himmler 5397
Hinden, Rita 5552, 5553
Hinder, Eleanor M 5350, 5552, 5553, 5684
Hindus, Maurice 5008, 5047
Hindustan Times 5323
Hinrichs 5261
Hinton, W. J 5552, 5553, 5684
Hirohito, Emperor 4982, 5107
Hiroto, Premier 5706

Page

Hiss, Alger---- 4920, 4929, 4964, 4969, 4973, 4975, 4976, 5032, 5049–5053, 5084, 5089, 5090, 5165, 5272, 5274, 5289, 5302, 5303, 5334, 5337, 5347, 5353, 5483–5487, 5503, 5504, 5684, 5711.
Hitchock, James J---- 5701
Ho, Franklin L---- 5333, 5684
Hitler, Adolph---- 4935, 4938, 5069, 5073, 5074, 5075, 5095, 5179, 5189, 5190, 5243, 5249, 5251, 5252, 5256, 5269, 5277, 5281, 5328, 5354, 5368, 5370, 5388, 5395, 5399, 5400, 5401.
Ho, Ying-chin---- 4939, 5406
Hobart, Alice Tisdale---- 5552, 5553
Hobbs, William Herbert---- 5284
Hochschild, Patricia---- 4991
Hochschild, Patrick---- 4994
Hocking, William Ernest---- 5552, 5553
Hodson, H. V---- 5552, 5553
Hoebel, E. Adamson---- 5552, 5553
Hoffman, Paul G---- 4944, 5067, 5344
Hogbin, H. Ian---- 5552, 5553
Hogg, Mr---- 4958
Holcombe---- 5116, 5219
Holcombe, Arthur---- 5552, 5553
Holiday Magazine---- 5278
Holland---- 5318, 5327, 5331, 5334
Holland, William L---- 4907–4912, 4918, 4919, 4923, 4930, 4945–4949, 4957, 4958, 4963, 4965, 4967, 4972, 4973, 4977–4980, 4984, 4985, 4987, 4991, 4994, 4996–5004, 5007–5032, 5042, 5045, 5046, 5048, 5049, 5053, 5054, 5058, 5059, 5062, 5065, 5066, 5083, 5084, 5085, 5111, 5119, 5123, 5128–5123, 5134, 5137–5139, 5144, 5150, 5151, 5155. 5157–5160, 5174–5176, 5180, 5183, 5188–5190, 5197–5200, 5204, 5205, 5207, 5209, 5210, 5215, 5216, 5218, 5221, 5230, 5240, 5243, 5246–5248, 5250, 5259, 5260, 5264, 5266, 5268, 5271, 5273, 5274, 5288, 5289, 5294, 5299, 5300, 5301, 5302, 5317, 5327, 5329, 5330, 5334, 5335, 5343. 5344, 5356, 5357, 5358, 5364–5367, 5424, 5427–5428, 5552, 5553, 5683–5691, 5692, 5694, 5704, 5709.
Holland, Mrs. William L. (Doreen)---- 5000, 5051, 5022
Hollerman, Leon---- 5552, 5553
Holman, D. S---- 5552, 5553
Holmes---- 5259
Holmes, Harriet---- 4988
Holmes, John W---- 5199, 5270, 5271
Holmes, Rawson---- 5704
Holt, Claire---- 5003, 5552, 5553, 5701
Holtman, A---- 4988
Holtom, D. C---- 5552, 5553
Holtz, Robert B---- 5701
Hongkong---- 5310, 5337, 5356, 5357, 5368, 5369
Honig, Pieter---- 5552, 5553
Honolulu---- 5318, 5319, 5326, 5329, 5331, 5334, 5335
Hood College---- 5702
Hooker, Annie O---- 4992, 4994
Hoover, Calvin B---- 5198, 5201
Hoover, Herbert---- 5334, 5341
Hoover Institute---- 5313, 5323
Hoover, J. Edgar---- 5353
Hoover Library on War, Revolution and Peace---- 4944, 4954, 5313, 5323
Hopkins---- 4975, 5045
Hopkins, Mr---- 5484
Hopkins, Carl E---- 5552, 5553
Hopper, Bruce---- 5116, 5227
Hormann, Bernard L---- 5552, 5553
Hornbeck, Stanley K---- 4925–4927, 4929, 4936, 4937, 4958, 4973, 4976, 4977, 4999, 5009, 5059, 5083, 5084, 5115, 5123, 5144, 5145, 5146, 5178, 5334, 5335, 5347, 5348, 5353, 5363.
Hoshino, Lt. Gen---- 5348

Page
Hoskins 5294
Hoskins, Halford L 5701
Hosono, Gunji 5552, 5553
Hotson, Ernest 5552, 5553
Hou, Wai-long 5552, 5553
Houghteling, James L 5701
Houston, Howard 5167
Howard, Harry Paxton 5554, 5555
Howard, Roy 5148
Howell, Newton 5153
Howie, Janet K 5554, 5555
Howland, Charles 5554, 5555
Hsia, C. L 5010, 5329, 5427, 5554, 5555, 5684
Hsia, Pin Fang 5554, 5555
Hsiang, C. Y 4987, 5554, 5555
Hsien, Ting 5211
Hsin Hua Jin Pae, The 5424
Hsu, Mr 5240
Hsu, C. Y 5554, 5555
Hsu, Frances L. K 5554, 5555
Hsu, Leonard S 5232, 5554, 5555
Hsu, Shushi 5350, 5554, 5555
Hsu, Y. Y 4939, 4987, 4991, 4994, 5199, 5250, 5271, 5554, 5555
Hu, Charles Y 5554, 5555
Hu, Chiao-mu 5383, 5384, 5385
Hu, Hsien-Chin 5554, 5555
Hu, Shih 5554, 5555
Hua, Tsing 5686
Hubbard, Mr 4985, 4998
Hubbard, Deborah 5216, 5554, 5555
Hubbard, G. E 5554, 5555
Hubbard, L. E 5554, 5555
Hudson, G. F 5334, 5554, 5555
Hudson, Manly O 5067
Huggins, G. Ellsworth 4938, 5365
Hughes 5132
Hughes, E. R 5554, 5555
Hughes, Emmet John 5654
Hughes, John 5554, 5555
Hughes, Paul 5648
Hukbalahap (Huk) 5395
Hull, Cordell 4929, 4941, 4942, 5059, 5060, 5075, 5089, 5412, 5468
Hulsewe, A. F. D 5554, 5555
Hume, Edward H 5651
Hume, Joy 5554, 5555
Humelsine, Carlisle 4922, 4924, 4925, 5483, 5484
Hummel, Arthur 5294, 5295
Hummel, Mrs. Arthur 5295
Hummel, Robert 5295
Hummel, A. W 5701
Hummel, Robert Stuart 5701
Hummell, Arthur 5556, 5557
Humphrey, John P 5556, 5557
Hungary 5382
Hunsberger, Warren S 5556, 5557, 5684, 5701
Hunt 5233
Hunt, William P 4983
Hunter, Charles 5556, 5557
Hunter, Edith 5704
Huntington, Ellsworth 5556, 5557
Hurley, General 5371, 5372, 5376, 5377, 5379, 5393, 5394, 5408
Hurst 5279
Hussey, Harry 5659
Hutchins, Robert M 5041, 5674
Hutchinson, Paul 5661
Hutchison, Bruce 5556, 5557

Page
Hutchison, Paul 5661–5674
Hutton, D. Graham 5556, 5557
Hyde, Charles Cheney 5002
Hyma, Albert 5556, 5557
Hyman, Joseph 5002

I

Ichihoshi, Yamato 5556, 5557
Ickes, Harold 5045, 5047, 5051
Ike, Nobutaka 5556, 5557
Ince, Arthur D 5556, 5557
India 4920, 4971, 5062, 5074, 5249, 5318, 5321–5324, 5328, 5331, 5332, 5349, 5356, 5370, 5374, 5395, 5462, 5465, 5656, 5641, 5668, 5670, 5701
India Quarterly 5329
Indian Council of World Affairs 5329, 5349
Indiochina 5320, 5394, 5692
Indonesia 5501, 5634, 5636, 5637, 5641, 5642
Indonesian Republic 5635, 5637, 5638, 5640–5642
Indusco. (*See* Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.)
Ingalls, Don 5303
Ingeles, Glen 5556, 5557
Inlow, E. Burke 5556, 5557
Inman, Walter G 5701
Inner Mongolia 5089
Innis, H. A 5556, 5557
Institute of Current World Affairs 5324
Institute of History and Economics (Copenhagen) 5066
Institute of International Studies 5313
Institute of Minor Nationalities 5129
Institute of National Economy (Moscow) 5320
Institute of Oceanography 4922
Institute of Pacific Relations ..... 4907–4924, 4933–4949, 4953–4956, 4959, 5961, 4962–5091, 5105, 5108, 5118, 5119, 5133–5136, 5195–5197, 5200, 5253, 5268, 5302, 5305, 5314, 5316–5336, 5337–5339, 5341, 5342, 5344–5348, 5350–5356, 5360, 5364, 5366, 5367, 5373, 5374, 5378, 5379, 5414, 5424, 5427, 5463, 5467, 5470, 5471, 5473, 5476, 5483, 5484, 5506–5633, 5643, 5647, 5666, 5674, 5683–5689, 5662, 5691–5693, 5695, 5699–5711.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American) ..... 4911, 4934, 4938, 4942 4955, 4956, 4959, 4962, 4967–4972, 4974–4978, 4980–4983, 4997, 4999, 5008, 5013, 5020, 5023–5030, 5051, 5061–5063, 5070, 5078, 5081, 5105, 5107, 5113–5116, 5123, 5125, 5126, 5134, 5140, 5141, 5144, 5153, 5154, 5162, 5164 5167, 5174, 5180–5182, 5184, 5186, 5193, 5194, 5196, 5198, 5204, 5207, 5217, 5225, 5227, 5228, 5230, 5236, 5237, 5247, 5255, 5257, 5260, 5264, 5267, 5278, 5279, 5282, 5284, 5285, 5288, 5289, 5293, 5298, 5301, 5302, 5314, 5323, 5327, 5328–5332, 5334, 5337, 5338, 5342–5344, 5351, 5356–5360, 5364–5367, 5378, 5413, 5414, 5643, 5644, 5658, 5659, 5683, 5689, 5690, 5693, 5694, 5696, 5698, 5699, 5703, 5711.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Australia) 5008, 5027, 5250, 5342
Institute of Pacific Relations (Bay Region Division of American Council) 5152, 5186, 5242, 5243, 5289, 5290, 5313
Institute of Pacific Relations (British) 4985, 5002, 5027, 5066, 5147, 5250, 5284, 5342
Institute of Pacific Relations (Canada) ..... 5009, 5019, 5020, 5027, 5115, 5243, 5250, 5267, 5270, 5271, 5276, 5333, 5342, 5405, 5411.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese) ..... 4939, 4996, 5017, 5031, 5062, 5114, 5115, 5119, 5121, 5125, 5157, 5159, 5184, 5203, 5237, 5246, 5329, 5333, 5342.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Dutch) 5329, 5342, 5711
Institute of Pacific Relations (French) 4985, 5329, 5333, 5342, 5711
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hawaii) 5207
Institute of Pacific Relations (Indian) 5027, 5028, 5348
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Council) 5011, 5012

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Research Secretary) 5024, 5066, 5126, 5130, 5135, 5136
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat) 4999, 5009, 5016, 5023, 5024, 5027, 5046, 5061, 5062, 5063, 5118, 5134, 5145, 5148, 5160, 5161, 5166, 5170, 5171, 5174, 5175, 5188, 5191, 5194, 5215, 5217, 5226, 5228, 5234, 5244, 5246, 5247, 5249, 5250, 5257, 5268, 5301, 5302, 5327, 5331, 5342, 5356, 5358, 5359, 5414, 5660.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japan) 4999, 5021, 5025, 5131, 5123, 5125, 5157, 5190, 5192, 5204, 5217, 5318, 5328, 5329, 5333, 5342.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Los Angeles Office) 4990
Institute of Pacific Relations (Netherlands Indies) 5329
Institute of Pacific Relations (New Zealand) 5027, 5342
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 4911, 4938, 4987, 5021, 5023–5027, 5030, 5067, 5081, 5114, 5115, 5121–5127, 5130, 5131, 5136, 5139, 5140, 5158, 5159, 5162, 5163, 5174, 5179, 5184, 5194–5196, 5199, 5203, 5207, 5215, 5217, 5228, 5242, 5247, 5267, 5269, 5272, 5300, 5318, 5321, 5325, 5327, 5328, 5329, 5331–5335, 5358, 5703.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pakistan) 5027, 5299
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippines) 5027, 5160, 5322, 5342, 5711
Institute of Pacific Relations (Russia) 4909, 4997, 5007, 5027, 5083, 5084, 5115, 5124–5128, 5130, 5134–5139, 5141, 5147, 5148, 5157, 5160–5162, 5187, 5200, 5218, 5242, 5246, 5274, 5282, 5318, 5329, 5332, 5342, 5642.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Board of Trustees) 4941, 4943, 4944, 4967, 5228, 5238, 5288, 5290, 5339
Institute of Pacific Relations (Executive Committee) 4941, 4943, 5164, 5167, 5225, 5228, 5296, 5343, 5366, 5367
Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, Binational 5322–5326
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, First, Honolulu, 1925 5318, 5326, 5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Second, International, Honolulu, 1927 5319–5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Third, International, Kyoto, Japan, 1929 5122, 5151, 5152, 5276, 5319, 5320, 5324, 5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Fourth, International, Hangchow and Shanghai, China, 1931 4956, 5115, 5228, 5279, 5319, 5320, 5331, 5333
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Fifth, International, Banff, Canada, 1933 4955, 5114–5116, 5123, 5276, 5281, 5285, 5319, 5320, 5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Sixth, International, Yosemite National Park, 1936 5118–5120, 5140, 5141, 5150, 5151, 5152, 5249, 5319, 5320, 5324, 5331, 5346, 5703
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Seventh, International, Virginia Beach, Virginia, 1939 5319–5321, 5331
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Eighth, International, Mont Tremblant, Canada, 1942 4958, 4976–4978, 4981, 4982, 5009, 5057, 5067, 5262, 5271, 5272, 5319, 5321, 5325, 5331, 5347, 5357
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Ninth, International, Hot Springs, Virginia, 1945 5062, 5079, 5198, 5319, 5321, 5322, 5325, 5331, 5552, 5553, 5703, 5710
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Tenth, International, Stratford-on-Avon, England, 1947 5319, 5322, 5331, 5378
Institute of Pacific Relations, Conference, Eleventh, International, Lucknow, India, 1950 5024–5027, 5319, 5322
Institute of Pacific Relations, Round Table on Atomic Energy 4921, 5031–5033
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington Office) 4961–4963, 4975, 4978, 4988–4990, 4995, 5011, 5032, 5061, 5286, 5287, 5294, 5295
Institute of World Economics and Politics (Moscow) 5009, 5161, 5200
International Bibliography of Historical Science 5132
International Film Foundation 5696
International Institute for Social History 5200
International Journal 5328, 5405
International Labor Office (Geneva) 5214
International Labour Office (Montreal) 5067, 5068
International Labor Organization 5322
International Missionary Council 4973, 4983
International Relief Committee 5345

Page
International Union of Academies ---- 5220
Intourist ---- 5161, 5162, 5191
Ironside, Major General ---- 5075
Irvine, P. F ---- 5556, 5557
Isaacs ---- 5679, 5680, 5681, 5682
Isaacs, Harold Robert ---- 5219, 5556, 5557, 5654
Isaacs, Lt. Col. Irwin ---- 5040
Isaacs, Sidney ---- 5674, 5676
Isikoff, Mr ---- 5295
Isley, Jeter A ---- 5556, 5557
Israel, Dorothy ---- 4988, 4989, 4994
Issen, Anita ---- 4992, 4994
Italy ---- 5074, 5222, 5231, 5426, 5665, 5673
Itoh ---- 5233
Ivens, Germaine Krull ---- 5556, 5557
Ives, Senator ---- 5350
Iwanaga, Y ---- 5333
Izvestia ---- 5146, 5393

J

Jackman, W. T ---- 5556, 5557
Jackson, Mr ---- 5682
Jackson, C. D ---- 5020
Jacobs, Joseph E ---- 5480
Jacoby, Annalee ---- 5649, 5652–5654, 5656, 5657, 5659
Jaffe, Mrs ---- 5710
Jaffe, Agnes ---- 5232, 5299, 5709
Jaffe, Bernard ---- 5041
Jaffe, Philip ---- 4941, 4984, 5020, 5031, 5084, 5085, 5167, 5168, 5192, 5193, 5194, 5217, 5254, 5346, 5424, 5684, 5685, 5709
James, Mrs ---- 5299
James, F. Cyril ---- 5078, 5323
James, Grace ---- 5556, 5557
James, Henry ---- 5302
James, Jack ---- 5556, 5557
James, Roy ---- 5701
James, Roy E ---- 5558, 5559
James, R. W ---- 5558, 5559
Janeway, Eliot ---- 4960, 5558, 5559
Japan ---- 5306, 5318, 5319, 5320, 5327, 5328, 5330–5335, 5339, 5340, 5348, 5349, 5354, 5356, 5358, 5370, 5378, 5382, 5383, 5385, 5395, 5397, 5403, 5404, 5425, 5426, 5427, 5470, 5500, 5501, 5641, 5663–5667, 5669–5674, 5698, 5699, 5705, 5706, 5708.
Japan, Government of ---- 4929, 4931, 4935–4937, 4940–4942, 4959, 4964, 4968, 4970, 4971, 4979, 4981, 4982, 4999, 5000, 5007, 5009, 5014, 5021, 5025, 5026, 5062, 5066, 5069, 5071–5074, 5087–5089, 5108, 5130, 5164, 5174, 5176, 5177, 5185, 5189, 5190, 5215, 5218, 5222, 5223, 5231, 5233, 5240, 5258, 5275, 5298, 5663, 5709.
Japanese American Committee for Democracy ---- 4941
Japanese Army ---- 4932, 4936, 4959, 5011, 5012, 5062, 5070, 5074, 5151, 5189, 5208, 5231, 5232.
Japanese Emancipation League (Yenan) ---- 5062
Japanese Embassy (Washington) ---- 4961, 5145
Japanese Navy ---- 5072, 5189, 5231, 5232
Jardine, R. J ---- 5558, 5559
Jay, Augusta ---- 4987, 4991
Jayson, Alice ---- 4988, 4989, 4994
Jebb ---- 5484
Jenkins, Mr ---- 5299
Jenkins, David R ---- 5558, 5559, 5701
Jenkins, Louise ---- 4989, 4999, 5299
Jenkins, Shirley ---- 4989, 5294, 5295, 5299, 5558, 5559
Jenkinson, Anthony ---- 4958, 4979

Page
Jennings, W. Ivor 5558, 5559
Jenriche, Elsie 5414, 5415
Jenzen, David 5701
Jervey, Huger W 5002
Jessup, Philip C 4918, 4938, 4943, 4973, 4976, 4984, 4999, 5002, 5003, 5014, 5016, 5023, 5031, 5045, 5054, 5058, 5059, 5079, 5085, 5183, 5186, 5189, 5195, 5197–5200, 5209, 5210, 5216, 5220, 5224, 5225, 5227, 5228, 5231, 5239, 5247, 5253, 5261, 5263, 5266, 5268, 5271, 5289, 5321, 5322, 5324, 5327, 5333, 5341, 5342, 5344, 5360, 5365, 5366, 5558, 5559, 5642, 5643, 5645–5647, 5703
Jinnah, Mr 4984, 5004, 5006, 5042, 5043
Joffe 5384
Johnson 5680
Johnson, Mr 5423
Johnson, Ambassador 5187
Johnson, Arnold 5675
Johnson, C. S 5323
Johnson, Eugene I 5558, 5559
Johnson, Guy B 5558, 5559
Johnson, Joan 5701
Johnson, Luther A 4977, 5049, 5053
Johnson, Nelson T 5294, 5558, 5559
Johnston, Bruce 5558, 5559
Johnston, Eric 5558, 5559, 5703
Johnston, Reginald F 5558, 5559
Johnstone 5685
Johnstone, Mrs. A. H 5199, 5261, 5263, 5264
Johnstone, William Crane 4988, 4989, 4994, 5048, 5049, 5051, 5053, 5061, 5062, 5089, 5261, 5284, 5301, 5558, 5559, 5648, 5684, 5701, 5711.
Johnstone, William T 4911, 4984, 5016
Jones 5685
Jones, Arthur Creech 5027, 5334, 5528, 5529
Jones, F. C 5350, 5558, 5559, 5684
Jones, George E 5558, 5559
Jones, Joe 4960, 4964, 4969, 4972, 5070
Jones, Joseph 5558, 5559
Jones, Stella 5558, 5559
Jones, S. Shepard 5701
Jonkinson, Anthony 5404
Jonns, Allen L 5701
Jordan, Myra M 4992, 4994
Jorgensen, Arthur 5558, 5559
Jorgensen, Elizabeth 5111, 5558, 5559
Joseph, Devereux 5298, 5299
Josephs, Ray 5657
Joyce, James 5648, 5654
Joxe 5209
Judd, Walter 5049, 5052, 5053, 5377
Juggins, E. Ellsworth 4983
Julius Rosenwald Fund (Chicago) 4977

K

Kabir, Huamyan 5323
Kades, Charles L 5415
Kahane, Rita 4990, 4994
Kahin, George McT 5560, 5561
Kahn, Walter B 5701
Kaim, J. R 5560, 5561
Kain, Richard Morgan 5654
Kaji, Ryucchi 5560, 5561
Kalaw, Maximo M 5560, 5561
Kallen, H. M 5078, 5560, 5561
Kan, Shina 5560, 5561
Kanai, K 5684

Page
Kang, Younghill 5321
Kano, R 4963
Kanta, K. A. Nila 5560, 5561
Kantorovich, A. J 5083, 5126, 5127–5129, 5132, 5134, 5136–5140, 5178, 5560, 5561
Kaplan 5688
Karakhan, Comissar 5122, 5501
Karig, Walter Patrick 5654
Karst, Eugene 5295
Karunakaran, K. P 5560, 5561
Kattenburg, Paul M 5560, 5561
Kaufmann, Felix 5367
Kawai, Kazuo 5560, 5561
Kawakami, K. K 5560, 5561
Wawata, George 4991, 4992, 4994
Kazaniev, V 5274, 5275
Keeney, Mrs. Mary Jane 5701
Keeney, Phillip O 5560, 5561
Keenleyside, Hugh L 5259, 5270, 5560, 5561
Keeny, S. M 5268
Keesing 4997, 5003, 5289, 5685
Keesing, F. M 5560, 5561, 5684
Keesing, Marie 5560, 5561
Keeton, G. W 5684
Kefauver, Senator 5337, 5352
Kefauver, Grayson N 5040
Keil, Dorothea 4990, 4994
Keith, Mrs. Agnes 5654
Keller, Arthur S 5560, 5561, 5701
Kellogg, Helen 4987
Kelly, Helen G 5560, 5561
Ken, George 5560, 5561
Kendall, John W 5701
Kenkyusha 5022
Kennan, George 4944, 5314
Kennard, J. S 5062
Kennedy, Bernice 4990, 4994
Kennedy, George 5560, 5561
Kennedy, George O 5111, 5229
Kennedy, Raymond 4944, 5560, 5561
Kennedy, W. P. M 5562, 5563
Kent, P. H. B 5562, 5563
Keppel, Frederick P 5085, 5123, 5181, 5261
Kerner, Robert J 5032, 5058, 5186, 5562, 5563
Kerr, Mr 5708
Kerr, Archibald Clark 5190
Kerr, George H 4984, 5001, 5002, 5562, 5563
Kerr, John H 5047
Kerr, Philip 5349
Keswick 5233
Keynes, J. M 5367
Khan, Zafrulla 5334
Kibbey, Bessie J 5295, 5701
Kiendl. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Kilpatrick, Mary J 4992, 4994
Kim, Yougjeung 5062, 5562, 5563
King, P. Z 5344, 5361
Kingsland, R 5562, 5563
Kiralfy, Alexander 5562, 5563
Kirby, Stuart 5562, 5563
Kirk, Grayson 4999, 5002, 5053, 5365, 5562, 5563, 5703
Kirkpatrick, Paul H 5040
Kisselev, Eugene D 5032, 5057
Kitadai, S 5026, 5027
Kittridge 5208
Kiyaba, Hiroyo 4990, 4994

Page
Kizer, Benjamin H ---- 4944, 4958, 4973, 4975–4977, 5184, 5186, 5286, 5314, 5323, 5562, 5563, 5685
Kizer, Carolyn A ---- 4989, 4994
Klein, Mildred ---- 4988, 4989, 4994
Klinebery, Otto ---- 5562, 5563
KMT (Kuomintang). (*See* Chinese National Party.)
Knight ---- 5085
Knight, M. M ---- 5562, 5563
Kniper, F. B. J ---- 5562, 5563
Knopf, Alfred A ---- 5661
Knorr, K. E ---- 5562, 5563
Knowland, Senator ---- 4927, 4944, 5364, 5377
Knox, Secretary ---- 4975, 4976
Ko, Siang-Feng ---- 5562, 5563
Koestler, Arthur ---- 5651
Kohlberg, Alfred ---- 4933–4935, 4938, 4944 5023, 5078, 5286, 5287, 5289, 5337, 5343–5345, 5359, 5360, 5366, 5367
Kok, Gerard P ---- 4990, 4994
Kolb, Albert ---- 5562, 5563
Kolchak, Admiral ---- 5075, 5145
Kolokoff ---- 5045
Kondapi, E ---- 5562, 5563
Konijn, H. S ---- 5701
Konoye, Prince ---- 5233, 5249, 5348
Koo, T. Z ---- 5280, 5284, 5705–5709
Korea ---- 5308, 5315, 5316, 5318, 5321, 5327, 5340, 5348, 5375, 5394, 5396, 5412, 5453
Korea, North ---- 5389, 5390, 5392, 5394
Korea, South ---- 5389, 5390, 5394
Koron, Chuo ---- 5000
Koshland, Daniel E ---- 4944
Kournakoff, Sergei ---- 5346
Kraal, Johanna Felhoen ---- 5562, 5563
Krader, Lawrence ---- 5562, 5563
Kramer, Sonia ---- 4990, 4994
Kreamer, H ---- 5562, 5563
Krasnow, Beatrice ---- 4989, 4994
Kremlin ---- 5314
Krentz, Kenneth ---- 5452
Kreps, Theodore J ---- 5562, 5563, 5684
Krichbaum, Philip E ---- 5701
Kroeber, A. L ---- 5564, 5565
Krog ---- 5302
Krotov, Ivan ---- 5270
Krug, Secretary ---- 5288, 5291, 5292
Ku, Po ---- 5381, 5420, 5421, 5423
Kublin, Hyman ---- 5564, 5565
Kullgren, John F ---- 5701
Kung, Dr ---- 5017, 5193, 5203, 5211, 5233
Kung, H. H ---- 5341, 5424, 5710
Kung, Madam ---- 5211
Kunming ---- 5342, 5357, 5408
Kunzru, Hriday Nath ---- 5027, 5322, 5323
Kuo, Ping-chia ---- 5564, 5565
Kuo, Yen-ti ---- 5564, 5565
Kuomintang, (*See* Chinese National Party.)
Kurihara, Kenneth K ---- 5564, 5565, 5684
Kuroda, Andrew Y ---- 5564, 5565
Kurovia ---- 5155

L

Labor Congress (Mexico) ---- 5179
Lacam, G ---- 5684
Ladejinsky ---- 4982
Lader, Lawrence ---- 5564, 5565

Page
Lafayette College---- 5662
LaGuardia, Fiorello Henry---- 5657
Laidler, Harry---- 5564, 5565
Lamb, Beatrice P---- 5323
Lamb, Helen B---- 5701
Lamb, L. H---- 5566, 5567
Lamb, Robert---- 5112
Lambie, Margaret---- 5701
Lamont, Corliss---- 5274, 5282, 5337, 5346, 5564, 5565, 5645
Lamont, Thomas W---- 5346, 5357
Lamott, Willis Church---- 5674
Lancaster, W. W---- 5183, 5199, 5269, 5270, 5298, 5299
Landau, Frances P---- 4992, 4994
Landhier, Bartholomew---- 5564, 5565
Landon, Governor---- 5165
Landon, Kenneth Perry---- 5564, 5565, 5684
Landres, Rose---- 4988
Landreth, Helen---- 5657
Lane, Clayton---- 4991, 4994, 5023–5025, 5273, 5274, 5299, 5302, 5689
Lane, Robert P---- 4959
Lang---- 5685
Lang, Olga---- 5287, 5564, 5565, 5651
Langer, Paul---- 5566, 5567
Langer, William---- 5116
Lanham, Buck---- 5090
Lanterbach, Richard E---- 5566, 5567
Lapham---- 5152
Lapham, Lew L---- 4944
Lapham, Roger---- 5315
Lapie, M---- 4985
Lapie, Pierre Olivier---- 5564, 5565
La Pierre, Richard T---- 5564, 5565
Lapwood, Ralph---- 5368
Larken, E. T---- 5566, 5567
La Roche, Jean de---- 5596, 5597
Larsen, Emmanuel S---- 5701
Larsen, Harold W---- 5566, 5567
Lash, James E---- 5243
Lasker, Bruno---- 4958, 4987, 4988, 4989, 4994, 5064, 5078, 5119, 5120, 5131, 5132, 5182, 5225, 5564, 5565, 5648, 5704
Lasker, Gabriel---- 5564, 5565
Laski, Harold---- 5179
Lasswell---- 5174, 5358
Latourette, Kenneth S---- 4944, 5336, 5564, 5565, 5661, 5664, 5684
Lattimore, David---- 5564, 5565
Lattimore, Margaret---- 5566, 5567
Lattimore, Owen---- 4933–4935, 4941, 4944, 4958, 4963, 4968, 4987, 5000, 5008, 5010, 5018, 5023, 5024, 5032, 5062, 5079, 5080, 5084, 5085, 5111–5114, 5118–5120, 5132, 5136, 5148, 5149, 5163, 5168, 5173, 5178, 5181, 5182, 5185, 5187, 5188, 5190, 5192, 5193, 5197, 5198, 5204, 5207, 5214, 5215, 5218–5221, 5225, 5228–5230, 5241, 5243, 5249, 5253, 5254, 5268, 5271, 5274, 5275, 5277, 5278, 5281, 5289, 5300, 5301, 5305–5313, 5317, 5323, 5329, 5337, 5341, 5352, 5358, 5365, 5427, 5566, 5567, 5647–5651, 5653–5674, 5683, 5685, 5701, 5703, 5704, 5707, 5708.
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor)---- 4984, 4989, 4994, 5018, 5061, 5119, 5286, 5295, 5310, 5312, 5564, 5565, 5647–5652, 5657, 5660, 5662, 5697
Lau, Mildred---- 5295
Lauren College---- 5491
Lausche, Governor---- 5679
Lauterbach, Mr---- 5299
Lauterbach, Mrs---- 5299
Lauterpacht, H---- 5684
Laves, Walter---- 5053
Lavey---- 5131
Laviolette Forrest---- 5566, 5567

Page
Laviolette, Robert E---------- 5566, 5567
Lawrence College---------- 5489
Lawrence, Gertrude---------- 5648
Lawrence, Oliver---------- 5566, 5567
Lazarus, Ruth J. (Ruth Turbin)---------- 4989, 4494, 5064
Leach, E. R---------- 5566, 5567
Leacock ,David J---------- 5566, 5567, 5709
League of Nations---------- 5016 5035, 5162, 5167, 5317, 5320–5322, 5335, 5346
League of Nations Secretariat---------- 5009, 5068, 5270
League of Women Voters---------- 4961, 5040, 5711
Leahy, Admiral---------- 5376, 5484
Leaing, John---------- 5268
Leaning, W. J---------- 5566, 5567
Leak, Ora---------- 4991, 4994
Leal, Castro---------- 5056
Leaning, John---------- 4987, 5111
Leathem, S---------- 5566, 5567
Leatherman, C. D---------- 5091
Le Branchu, Jean-Yves---------- 5516, 5517
Lederer, Emil---------- 5566, 5567
Lederer, Ilse---------- 4989, 4994
Lee---------- 5685
Lee, Alwyn---------- 5566, 5567
Lee, Betty---------- 4990, 4994
Lee, Duncan C---------- 5346
Lee, Edmund J---------- 5701
Lee, Franklin C. H---------- 5566, 5567
Lee, H. K---------- 5684
Lee, Kan---------- 5049, 5051, 5052, 5053, 5566, 5567
Lee, Michael---------- 5346
Lee, Pao-Chen---------- 4990, 4994
Lee, Rosamund---------- 4937, 4988, 4989, 4994, 5299
Lee, S. C---------- 5566, 5567
Lee, Shao-chang---------- 5207
Lee, Stephen---------- 5566, 5567
Legge, J. D---------- 5568, 5569
Leggett, T. P---------- 5568, 5569
Lehman, Herbert---------- 4935, 4979, 5050, 5052, 5058, 5059
Lehmann, Rosamond---------- 5648
Lei, Kit-King---------- 5568, 5569
Leiberman, Henry R---------- 5568, 5569
Leifert, Janet---------- 4988
Leighton, Alexander H---------- 5568, 5569
Leland, Waldo G---------- 5701
Lenin---------- 5149, 5161, 5219, 5220, 5280, 5308, 5310, 5381, 5386, 5420, 5422, 5426, 5454, 5500
Lerrigo, Miss Edith---------- 5290
Lester, Robert M---------- 5123
Leung, George Kin---------- 5568, 5569
Levenson, Joseph R---------- 5568, 5569
Levi, Werner---------- 5568, 5569
Levina---------- 5161
Levine, Harriet---------- 5193
Levine, Isaac Don---------- 5354, 5355
Levinthal, Harriet---------- 4987, 4988, 4989, 4994
Levmore, Bernard W---------- 5568, 5569
Levy---------- 4999, 5299
Levy, David M---------- 5299
Levy, Mrs. David M---------- 5299
Levy, Ellen B---------- 4990, 4994
Levy, Marion J., Jr---------- 5568, 5569
Levy, Roger---------- 5027, 5183, 5333, 5568, 5569
Lew, Daniel H---------- 5568, 5569, 5684
Lewis---------- 5337
Lewis, A. B---------- 5568, 5569
Lewis, Morris R---------- 5701

Page
MacDonnell, W. H---- 5572, 5573
Macfalyen, Eric---- 5572, 5573
MacFisher---- 5293
Mac Gibbon, D. A---- 5572, 5573
Mack, Virginia---- 4991, 4994
MacKay, Mr---- 4958
MacKay, J. A---- 5703
Mackay, Robert A---- 5572, 5573
Mac Kenzie, Norman A. M---- 5130, 5270, 5333, 5572, 5573, 5684
Mackintosh, W. A---- 5270
Mac Lachlan, John M---- 5572, 5573
MacLeish, Archibald---- 5000, 5182, 5183, 5256, 5661
MacLennan, Douglas---- 4984, 5009, 5019, 5027, 5572, 5573
MacMahon, Arthur W---- 5002
MacManus, M. J---- 5651
MacMurray, Howard J---- 5049
MacMurray, J. V. A---- 5701
MacNair, Harley F---- 5219, 5229, 5674
Maeda, Tamon---- 5572, 5573
Magill, Robert N---- 4958, 4978, 5701
Magistretti, William---- 5572, 5573
Magruder, General---- 4975
Mah, Dr---- 5706
Mah, N. Wing---- 5572, 5573
Mahasabha---- 5043
Mahindra---- 5049
Maisky---- 5191, 5484
Maki, John McGilvery---- 4982, 5574, 5575, 5649, 5684, 5701
Makower, Miss---- 5137
Malaya---- 5388
Malcott, D. W---- 5323
Malik, Ambassador---- 4919, 5501
Malin, Patrick M---- 5261
Maloney, James J---- 5198, 5244
Manchester Guardian---- 5178, 5374, 5375, 5383, 5389, 5395, 5396, 5412
Manchuria---- 5339, 5340, 5348, 5349, 5378, 5392, 5393, 5396, 5404, 5409, 5410, 5667, 5671, 5708
Mandel, William M---- 5023, 5574, 5575
Mander, L. A---- 5574, 5575
Mandlbaum, David G---- 5323, 5574, 5575
Mangahas, F---- 4987
Mann, Heinrich---- 5649
Manning, C. A. W---- 5574, 5575
Mansergh, Nicholas---- 5574, 5575
Mansfield, Mike---- 5062, 5064
Mao, Tse-tung---- 5219, 5373, 5381, 5384, 5387, 5388, 5393, 5420, 5421, 5422, 5423, 5641
Marcantino, Vito---- 5645
Marcusson, Ruth---- 4992, 4994
Margalo---- 5651
Marks, Regina---- 4990, 4994
Marks, Stuart---- 4908, 4909, 4913–4920, 4922, 4923, 4933, 4945, 4946, 4948, 4949, 4957
Marshall, George C---- 4934, 4943, 4944, 5278, 5284, 5293, 5359, 5376, 5392, 5393, 5405, 5408, 5409, 5410, 5411
Marshall, C. B---- 5452
Marshall, John---- 5411
Marshall, Kendric N---- 5701
Marshall Mission---- 5392
Marshall Plan---- 5387
Martin, Boyd A---- 4944
Martin, Charles E---- 4944, 5289, 5574, 5575
Martin, Edwin M---- 5021, 5294, 5659, 5701
Martin, Kingsley---- 5181, 5574, 5575
Martin, Truman M---- 5032, 5049, 5050, 5053, 5089, 5199, 5265, 5701

Page
Marx, Daniel ---- 5574, 5575
Marx, Karl ---- 4941, 4963, 5148, 5149, 5151, 5167, 5240, 5280, 5284, 5308, 5310, 5379, 5420, 5421, 5422, 5425, 5426, 5500
Masani, M. R ---- 5574, 5575
Masland ---- 5186
Masland, John W ---- 5574, 5575, 5684
Mason, Leonard ---- 5574, 5575
Massachusetts Institute of Technology ---- 5207
Masselman, George H. A ---- 5574, 5575, 5701
Masselman, Wilhelmina ---- 4991, 4994
Massey, Vincent ---- 5115, 5233
Massing, Mrs. Hede ---- 5337, 5354, 5356, 5357
Matheson, W. B ---- 5320
Mathews, J. B ---- 5353
Matsumoto ---- 5217
Matsuo, M ---- 4987, 4990, 4994, 5021, 5027, 5333, 5574, 5575, 5704
Matsuoka ---- 5249
Mathews, Mr ---- 5484
Matsui, Shichiri ---- 5574, 5575
Matsukata, Saburo ---- 5333, 5574, 5575
Matsumoto, Shigeharu ---- 5333, 5574, 5575
Matsuoka, Komakichi ---- 5322
Matthews, Phillip ---- 5574, 5575
Matusow, Harvey ---- 5413, 5414
Matveev, Illarion ---- 5574, 5575
Maul, Grace ---- 5356
Maurer, Adrienne ---- 4989, 4995
Maurer, Herrymon ---- 5574, 5575
Maurer, Isabel Avila ---- 5574, 5575
Max, Alfred ---- 5576, 5577
Max, F ---- 4987
May, Jean ---- 4989, 4995
May, Rene A ---- 4944
May, Stacy ---- 5026, 5261
Mayeda, Miyeko ---- 5576, 5577
Mayeda, T ---- 5333
Mayer, Miss ---- 5160
Mayer, Adrian ---- 5576, 5577
Mayer, Hilda ---- 4991, 4995
Mayer, Laura ---- 4987, 4995
Mayer, William ---- 4907, 4958, 4982, 5048, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5163, 5348, 5703
Mayo, Dorothy ---- 4988, 4989, 4995
McAfee, William ---- 5295
McAlpin, David H ---- 5299
McAuley, James ---- 5580, 5581
McCallum, J. A ---- 5580, 5581
McCarthy, Senator ---- 4934, 4935, 4943, 5023, 5026, 5353, 5377, 5385, 5395, 5396
McConaughy, James L ---- 5079, 5337, 5345, 5361, 5365
McConnell, Bishop ---- 5152
McCormick, Col ---- 5710
McCormick, Anne O'Hare ---- 5334
McCormack, John W ---- 5049, 5053
McCoy, Frank R ---- 4977, 5002, 5263, 5295, 5342, 5701
McCrimmons, Mary A ---- 4992, 4995
McCulloch ---- 5268
McCune, Evelyn ---- 5582, 5583
McCune, George McAfee ---- 5229, 5350, 5582, 5583, 5660
McCune, Shannon ---- 5009, 5336
McCure, Shannon ---- 5582, 5583
McDiarmid, Orville J ---- 5582, 5583
McDonald, A. H ---- 5582, 5583
McDonald, C. M ---- 5582, 5583
McDonald, James G ---- 5084, 5111, 5152, 5153
McDuffie, Mrs. Duncan ---- 5186
McFadyean, Andrew ---- 5322, 5334

Page
McGechan, R. O---- 5027
McGill---- 5208
McGrath, J. Howard---- 5440, 5441, 5678, 5681, 5682
McInerney, James M---- 5441, 5442, 5443
McInnis, Edgar---- 5026, 5322, 5333, 5582, 5583, 5684
McIntosh, A. D---- 5582, 5583
McKay, Vernon---- 5582, 5583
McKivey---- 6285
McKinlay, A. D---- 5582, 5583
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred---- 4944, 5040, 5186, 5273, 5274, 5289
McLean---- 5045
McMahon, Senator---- 4935, 4943
McMahon, B. B---- 4958, 4966
McMasters, Harry L---- 5701
McMurray, Howard J---- 5052, 5053
McNair, Harley Farnsworth---- 5582, 5583
McNelly, Theodore---- 5582, 5583
McSweeney, John---- 5502
McWilliams, Carey---- 5582, 5583
McWilliams---- 5187
McWilliams, Mrs. Robert---- 5040
Mead, Margaret---- 5576, 5577
Mears, Elliot G---- 5576, 5577
Mears, Helen---- 5576, 5577, 5657
Mededeelingen---- 5329
Meharally---- 5179
Mehta, D. H---- 5576, 5577
Mei, Dr---- 5281
Mei, Ju-ao---- 5576, 5577
Meiklejohn, Alexander---- 5661
Meisling, Vaughn F---- 5052, 5053, 5089
Mekeel, H. Scudder---- 5576, 5577
Mekhlis, Leo---- 5185
Melish, William---- 5576, 5577
Mellon, Paul---- 5300
Menefee, Selden---- 5701
Menefee, Mrs. Selden (Audrey)---- 5576, 5577, 5701
Meng, Chih---- 5576, 5577
Menjies, A. R---- 5576, 5577
Menzies, James M---- 5576, 5577
Merill, Frederick T---- 5350
Merner, Garfield D---- 5040
Merrell, George---- 5061
Merriam, Charles E---- 5661
Messer, Barbara---- 4987
Messenger, Miss---- 5173
Meston, Lord---- 5576, 5577
Metcalf, Josephine---- 4988
Metzmaekers, L---- 5576, 5577
Meuvret, Colette---- 5576, 5577
Mexico---- 5332
Meyer, Major---- 5181
Meyer, Eugene---- 5701
Meyer, Raymond T---- 5702
Mez, John Richard---- 5576, 5577
Michael, Franz---- 5576, 5577, 5684
Mickey, Margaret Portia---- 5576, 5577
Mickle, Joe---- 4983, 5578, 5579
Midkiff, Frank E---- 5207, 5578, 5579
Miles, Commodore---- 5376
Military Collegium of the Supreme Court (U.S.S.R.)---- 5152–5156
Mill, Edward W---- 5578, 5579, 5701
Millegan, Lloyd---- 5295
Miller, Agnes R---- 5578, 5579
Miller, Clayton---- 5578, 5579
Miller, Frances F---- 5295

Page
Miller, Jesse I---- 4958, 4972, 4974
Miller, John C---- 5661
Miller, Margaret---- 5578, 5579
Miller, Robert T---- 4947
Millikan, R. A---- 5274, 5281, 5282
Millis, Walter---- 4959, 5578, 5579, 5654
Millman, Abe J---- 4990, 4995
Millman, Benjamin---- 4990, 4995
Mills---- 5685
Mills College---- 5040
Mills, Harriet---- 4989, 4995
Mills, Lennox A---- 5078, 5578, 5579
Milner, Ian F. G---- 5578, 5579
Minarovich, Michael---- 4987, 4988, 4990, 4995
Minh, Ho Chi---- 5394
Minor, Robert---- 4924–4926
Mintz, Jeanne S---- 5578, 5579
Mirkowich, Nicholas---- 5578, 5579
Mirsky, D. S---- 5135, 5136
Mitchell, C. Clyde---- 5578, 5579
Mitchell, Gloria---- 4992, 4995
Mitchell, Kate---- 4910, 4914, 4916, 4987, 4998, 5003, 5032, 5042, 5061, 5078, 5083–5085, 5111, 5118, 5119, 5129, 5132, 5152, 5153, 5156–5160, 5172, 5175, 5180, 5188, 5194, 5195, 5198, 5210, 5214, 5238, 5356, 5578, 5579, 5684, 5685, 5703, 5704.
Mitchell, Wesley C---- 5002
Mitrany, D---- 5081, 5300, 5578, 5579
Mitsubishi---- 5150, 5666
Mitsui---- 5666
Moe, Henry Allen---- 5123, 5209, 5299, 5355
Moe, Kilmer---- 5578, 5579
Moeller, Hans. (*See* Asiaticus.)
Moerman, Elodie---- 4987
Moffat, Abbot Low---- 4944, 5293, 5294, 5701
Moffat, Mrs. A. L---- 5701
Mohammad, Saadullah Khan---- 5006, 5044
Mohanimed, Azizah F---- 5578, 5579
Moldauer, Frances (Sharpe)---- 4988, 4989, 4995
Mok, P. K---- 5578, 5579
Moll, J. T---- 5334, 5578, 5579, 5684
Molnar, Ferenc---- 5660
Molotov, V. M---- 5077, 5185, 5199, 5262, 5284, 5393, 5484, 5578, 5579
Molyneaux, Peter---- 4974
Mongolian Peoples Republic---- 5087, 5088
Montagne, R---- 5578, 5579
Montana, Marjorie---- 4991, 4992, 4995
MooKerjee, Girija---- 5580, 5581
Moon, Penderel---- 5580, 5581, 5649
Mooney, James D---- 5123
Mooney, Martha---- 5053
Moore, Miss---- 5705
Moore, E. S---- 5580, 5581
Moore, Eddie---- 5238
Moore, Harriet Lucy (Gelfan)---- 4915, 4917, 4941, 4958, 4965, 4974, 4977, 4987–4989, 4995, 4997, 5013, 5024, 5031, 5032, 5045, 5046, 5051, 5053, 5083–5085, 5111, 5112, 5120, 5126, 5129–5132, 5134, 5136–5138, 5140, 5150, 5151, 5156, 5160, 5162, 5172, 5178, 5181, 5190, 5198, 5201, 5208–5210, 5218, 5227, 5230, 5238, 5268, 5282, 5284, 5299, 5337, 5356, 5357, 5580, 5581, 5654, 5704.
Moore, Maurice T---- 5299
Moore, Mrs. Maurice T---- 5079, 5299
Moore, Philip---- 5165
Moore, Mrs. Philip---- 5165
Moore, T. Inglis---- 5580, 5581
Moorehead, Helen Howell---- 5580, 5581

Page
Moorhead, Mrs. Boswell 5701
Moorhous, Margaret H 5674
Morales, Alfredo T 5580, 5581
Moran, William T 5580, 5581
Morantie, P. C 5580, 5581
Morgan, Leslie 4991, 4995, 5580, 5581
Morgan, Richard C 5677
Morgan, Mrs. Richard C. (Anna Haas) 5674–5683
Morgenthau, Henry 5045, 5059
Mori, Iga 5207
Morison, George Abbot 5703
Morita, Betty 4989, 4995
Morley, Lorna 5295
Morris 5681
Morris, David Elwyn 5659
Morris, George W 5701
Morris, John 5580, 5581
Morris, Lawrence 5365
Morris, Marion 4989, 4995
Morris, Roland 5263
Morris, S. V. C 5704
Morris, William 5079
Morris, Wilson 4988, 4990, 4995
Morrish, William F 5186
Morrison, Angelina 4990, 4995
Morrison, Ian 5231, 5580, 5581
Morrison, Phoebe 5701
Morrison, William D. F 5701
Morse, Senator 4935, 5350
Morse, Richard 5580, 5581
Morseley, Hilton 4989, 4995
Morton, Robert S 5580, 5581
Morton, W. L 5580, 5581
Moscow 5318, 5331, 5356, 5380, 5391, 5393, 5463, 5464, 5465, 5473
Moscow-Berlin Nonaggression Pact 5075, 5195
Moscow Trials 5149, 5152–5155, 5157, 5168, 5169
Moscow, Warren 5657
Moseley, Phillip 5116, 5221, 5580, 5581
Moser, C. K 5007, 5008, 5198, 5206, 5236
Moss, Warner 5702
Mott, Celestine G 4990, 4995
Motylev, V. E 4916, 5025, 5045, 5056, 5084, 5085, 5112, 5132–5135, 5139, 5140, 5149–5151, 5157, 5158, 5160–5163, 5165, 5172, 5175, 5178–5180, 5184, 5187, 5190, 5192–5195, 5198–5201, 5209, 5215, 5219, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5230, 5246, 5262, 5266, 5275, 5320, 5359.
Moulder, Morgan M 5502
Mowrer, Edgar A 5701, 5278
Mowry, George E 5039, 5040
Moyer, Raymond 5295, 5580, 5581
Moyer, Mrs. Raymond 5295
Mudaliar, A. Ramaswami 5321
Mundt, Karl 5049, 5053, 5353, 5355
Munson, Lyle 5437–5442
Murdock, James 5702
Murota, Ayaka 4992, 4995
Murphy, Charles 4932, 4933
Murphy, J 4988
Murphy J. M 5323
Murphy, Roads 5580, 5581
Murray, R. Stuart 5199, 5248
Murray, Wallace 4975
Murrow, Edward R 5355
Mus, Paul 5580, 5581
Mussolini 5249, 5681
Myers, Fred 5045, 5274, 5286, 5299
Myrdal 5209

N

Page
Naggiar, Paul Emile ---- 5026, 5027, 5062, 5321, 5333
Nagtegoal, C ---- 5582, 5583
Nash, Phil ---- 5016
Nash, Vernon ---- 5582, 5583, 5659
Nash, Walter ---- 5062, 5319, 5320, 5321, 5334, 5582, 5583
Nasu, Dr ---- 5218, 5705, 5706
Nater, W. R ---- 5584, 5585
Nath, Vishwambhar ---- 5582, 5583
Nathan, George Jean ---- 5649
Nathan, R. S ---- 5582, 5583
Nathan, Robert ---- 4973
Nathausen, Miss ---- 5112
Nation, The ---- 4935, 5040, 5278, 5648–5650, 5654–5660, 5673
National Academy of Sciences ---- 5038, 5291
National Defence Council (India) ---- 5005, 5006, 5042, 5043
National Federation of Women's Clubs ---- 5067
National Government of China. (*See* Chinese National Government.)
National Herald (India) ---- 5278
National Indusco Guild ---- 5213
National League of Women Voters ---- 5067
National Party of China. (*See* Chinese Nationalist Party.)
National Production Authority ---- 5711
Nazi. (*See* Germany, National Socialist Party of.)
Neal, Arthur L ---- 5582, 5583
Neal, Elizabeth ---- 4987, 4991, 4995
Nebokov, Vladimir Vladimirovich ---- 5654
Needham, Joseph ---- 5584, 5585
Nehmer, Stanley ---- 5584, 5585
Nehru, Pandit ---- 5027, 5209, 5348, 5462
Neiman, Gilbert ---- 5654
Nelson, Carl ---- 5295
Nelson, Donald M ---- 4944
Nelson, Harry A ---- 4989, 4995
Nelson, John ---- 5335
Nelson, Melvin Frederick ---- 5649
Nelson, William E ---- 5576, 5577
Neprud, Carl ---- 5584, 5585
Nerenberg, Clara ---- 4989, 4995
Netherlands ---- 5130, 5191, 5222, 5224, 5320, 5321, 5322, 5329, 5635, 5636, 5639, 5640, 5641, 5642
Netherlands Indies ---- 5322, 5329, 5334
Neugebauer, Frieda ---- 4989, 4995
Nevins, Allan ---- 5661
New China Daily News ---- 5369, 5370
New China News Agency ---- 5379, 5412
New Delhi ---- 5349
New Fourth Army ---- 5086, 5232, 5415, 5416, 5418
New, Ilhan ---- 5062, 5584, 5585
New Leader ---- 4939, 5041, 5683, 5686
New Masses ---- 4937, 4939, 5337, 5338, 5340, 5352, 5356
New Republic ---- 4935, 4977, 5041, 5647–5660, 5673
New School for Social Research ---- 5208, 5323
New Statesman ---- 5181, 5278, 5386, 5388
New York Compass ---- 4935
New York Post ---- 4935, 5278, 5353
New York Herald Tribune ---- 4925, 4927, 4930, 4932, 5159, 5163, 5227, 5234, 5235, 5285, 5297, 5298, 5323, 5355, 5652–5660.
New York Times ---- 4930, 4932, 4935, 5005, 5019, 5043, 5083, 5135, 5152, 5160, 5165, 5169, 5175, 5224, 5230, 5276, 5287, 5296, 5329, 5334, 5336, 5337, 5355, 5357, 5364, 5427.
New Zealand ---- 4971, 5130, 5318, 5319, 5320, 5321, 5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5334, 5349, 5356, 5694
New Zealand Legation (Washington) ---- 5049, 5052, 5053

Page

Newcombe, Robinson 5584, 5585
Newman, Eugene 4990, 4995
Nicholas, Mrs 5295
Nicholsky, Miss Alexandra 5055
Niebuhr, Reinhold 5202, 5661
Nieh, Jung-chen 5368, 5369
Nihon Taiheiyo Mondai Chosakai 5027
Nimitz, Chester 4934, 4943
Nimmo, Mr 5707
Nishio 5233
Nitka, Helen E 4989, 4995
Nitobe, Inazo 5320, 5333, 5335, 5583, 5584, 5684, 5685
Nixon, Richard N 5354, 5355, 5487, 5502
NKVD. (*See* Soviet Secret Police.)
Noble, G. Bernard 5702
Nolde, John J 5584, 5585
Nomura, Ambassador 4941, 4942
Norees, Mrs. P. E. L 5299
Norins, Martin R 5250, 5584, 5585
Norman, E. H 4984, 5007, 5021, 5022, 5031, 5584, 5585, 5685
Norman, Irene 5022
Norman, Montague 5164
Normano, J. F 5584, 5585
North Atlantic Treaty 5316
North China Youth Party 5176
North, Robert C 5584, 5585
Northey, J. F 5027
Norton, Henry K 5584, 5585
Noteboom, C 5584, 5585
Notestein, Ada Comstock 5365
Notter, Harley 5261
Noyes, Frank B 5702
NPA. (*See* National Production Authority.)
Nugent, Donald 5684
Nusbaum, Gladys 4991, 4995
Nyon 5163

O

Oakie, John H 5085, 5186, 5199, 5243, 5584, 5585, 5666
Obana, Tsutomu 5584, 5585
Occidental College 5703
Odell, Lawrence H 5584, 5585
Office of Coordinator of Information (OCI) 4958, 4973, 5000, 5001, 5254, 5256–5259, 5268, 5415, 5475, 5692
Office of Price Administration (OPA) 4973, 4975, 5249, 5291
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 4975, 4977, 4978, 5003, 5008, 5013, 5017, 5018, 5342, 5475
Office of War Information (OWI) 4940, 4941, 4975, 5008, 5010, 5047, 5058, 5061, 5311, 5475, 5662
Ohio State Journal 5679
Ohio Supreme Court 5680
Ohio Un-American Activities Committee 5674, 5678, 5679, 5680, 5681
Oka, Kazu 4992, 4995
Okamura, General 5406
Okita, Saburo 5584, 5585
Oldham, John 5295
Oliver, Douglas 5291
Oliver, Robert T 5584, 5585
Olshausen, George G 5584, 5585
Olver, A. S. B 5584, 5585
Ooty 5300
OPC. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency Office of Policy Coordination.)
Opie, Eugene L 4983
Opler, M. E 5323
Oppenheimer, Frank 5040

Page
Orchard, Dorothy J 5007, 5586, 5587
Orchard, John E 5586, 5587, 5684
Oregon State College 5014
Ormont, Zelda 4989, 4995
Ornitz, Sallie 4989, 4995
O'Rourke, Katherine 5675
Orrick 5111
Orrick, William H 5186
Orwell, George 5385, 5398
Osborn, Frederick 5342
Oshima, Chiya 4992, 4995
Oshima, H. T 5586, 5587
Osias, Camilo 5321
OSS. (*See* Office of Strategic Services.)
Ota, Lillian 5586, 5587
Ota, Marjorie 4992, 4995
Ou, Pao-San 5586, 5587
Oudendyk, W. J 5586, 5587
Oumansky, Constantine 5032, 5055, 5056, 5057, 5083, 5084, 5085, 5094, 5152, 5162, 5165, 5168, 5170, 5183–5185, 5186, 5198, 5199, 5201, 5204, 5226, 5230, 5243, 5262, 5274, 5300.
Oumansky, Mrs. Constantine 5032, 5056, 5057, 5169, 5191, 5196, 5226
Outer Mongolia 5089, 5501
Owen, Fred 5189
Owen, Josephine 4988
Owens 5488
Owens, Courtney 5502
OWI. (*See* Office of War Information.)
Oxford University Press 5062, 5240, 5661
Ozaki, Hotsumi 5324, 5346, 5684

P

Paasche, John H 5586, 5587
Pacific Affairs 4940, 4956, 4959, 4987, 4999, 5010, 5013, 5014, 5016, 5021, 5022, 5025, 5046, 5058, 5063, 5066, 5071, 5080, 5123, 5125, 5127, 5131, 5136, 5168, 5187, 5190, 5192, 5195, 5214, 5216, 5218–5220, 5225, 5226, 5230, 5238, 5240, 5250, 5256, 5259, 5267, 5274, 5287, 5297, 5300, 5301, 5307, 5328, 5329, 5345, 5347, 5358, 5378, 5504, 5505–5633, 5648, 5662
Packard, Arthur W 5123
Packer, Earl L 5702
Packer, Gerald 5586, 5587
Padilla, Pedro 5586, 5587
Page 5484
Page, Charles Jr 5186
Paige, Mrs. Harold L 4944
Pakistan 5318, 5322, 5328, 5331, 5332, 5333, 5334
Pakistan Council of International Affairs 5329
Poland, Ernest O 5644
Paley, William S 5299
Palliser, A. F. E 5586, 5587
Palma, Rafael 5320, 5334
Pan, Kung Chan 5586, 5587
Pandit, Mrs. V. L 5062, 5321, 5334
Panikkar, K. M 5070, 5586, 5587
Pao, Ta-kung 5233
Pardee, Ruth E 5586, 5587, 5702
Pares, Bernard 5047, 5586, 5587
Paris Peace Conference 5317
Park, Richard L 5586, 5587
Park, Robert E 5586, 5587
Park, Unsoon 4992, 4995
Parker, Mr 5228
Parker, Belzy M 4991, 4995
Parker, Harriet H 4989, 4995

Page
Parker, Harrison 5586, 5587
Parker, Philo W 4907, 4958, 4983
Parker, Phyllis Eugenia 5313
Parkin 5259
Parkin, G. R 5333, 5684
Parlett, Harold 5586, 5587, 5684
Parrington, Vernon L 5661
Parry, Albert 5586, 5587
Parseghian, Miss Nuvart 5301
Parsons, Katrine 4987, 4995, 5048, 5049, 5050, 5239, 5266
Parsons, Ruth 4991, 4995, 5586, 5587
Parton, Margaret 5323
Partridge, P. H 5588, 5589
Pashtoon, Jirga 5006, 5044
Passos, John Dos 5650
Pasvolsky, Leo 4976, 4977, 5224, 5247, 5248, 5261, 5284, 5702
Patel, Surendra J 5588, 5589
Patrick, Professor 5135
Patrick, George F 5588, 5589
Patani, P. S 5323
Patterson, Ernest M 5078
Patterson, J. A 5588, 5589
Patterson, R. P 5274, 5292
Patton, H. S 5588, 5589
Patumanon, Prasert 5588, 5589
Paul, Arthur 5112
Paul, Daisy 5112
Pauley 5698, 5699
Pauley, Bill 5296
Pauley, Ed 5283
Payne, Pierre Stephen Robert 5588, 5589, 5649, 5650, 5651, 5654
Pe, Melvin Tun 5588, 5589
Peace with China Association 5412
Peake, Cyrus H 5193, 5248, 5340, 5588, 5589, 5702
Peardon, Thomas P 5588, 5589
Pearl Harbor 4936, 4939, 4942, 4968, 4978, 5062, 5070, 5071, 5076, 5267, 5279, 5283, 5318, 5340, 5342, 5370, 5501
Pearn, B. R 5588, 5589
Pearson, Mr 5022
Pearson, Drew 4943, 5355
Pearson, F. A 5588, 5589
Pearson, Hesketh 5651
Pearson, L. B 5049, 5052, 5053
Peck, Graham 5588, 5589, 5660
Peffer, Lillian 4987, 4999, 5193
Peffer, Nathaniel 5002, 5014, 5220, 5221, 5234, 5235, 5588, 5589, 5650, 5653, 5656–5660
Pei, Professor 5010
Peiping (Peking) 5341, 5348, 5368, 5369, 5380, 5395, 5404, 5406, 5461
Pelan, Frank L 4990, 4995
Pelcovits, N. A 5588, 5589, 5684
Pelliot 5192
Pelliott, Paul 5333
Pelzer, Karl J 5294, 5588, 5589, 5684, 5685, 5688, 5702
Pendleton, Robert L 5588, 5589, 5684
Penfield, James K 5274, 5297, 5480, 5702
P'eng, Te-huai 5368
Penrose, E. F 5588, 5589, 5684
Perez, S. E. M 5692
Perkins, B. Ward 5588, 5589
Perkins, Milo 4973, 4975, 5032, 5054, 5261, 5266
Perm 5145
Pescadore 5671
Petain, Marshal 5277
Peters, Mr 5504
Peterson, Representative 5699

Page
Peterson, Marshall N---- 5702
Petrov, Dr---- 5121
Pettigrew, M. W---- 4958, 4982, 5009, 5032, 5048, 5049, 5053, 5264, 5265
Pettus, W. B---- 5588, 5589
Pfeifer, G---- 5588, 5589
Phelps, Ward---- 5588, 5589
Philippines---- 4971, 5130, 5292, 5296, 5318, 5319, 5320, 5321, 5322, 5327, 5331–5334, 5339, 5349, 5395, 5639, 5642, 5666, 5671, 5690
Phillips, Mr---- 5116
Phillips, Miss Lillian M---- 5040
Phillips, P. D---- 5590, 5591, 5684
Phinney, Archie---- 5590, 5591
Pickersgill, J. W---- 5590, 5591
Pickett, Clarence E---- 5002, 5260
Pierson College---- 5269
Pierson, L. B---- 5270
Pietrowski, Rose---- 4991, 4995
Pigulevskaya, E---- 5590, 5591
Pilat, Oliver---- 5353
Pin, Paul Yu---- 5344, 5361
Pinchot, Gifford---- 5654
Pinchot, Mrs. Gifford---- 5062, 5294, 5702
Pitt, Malcom---- 5590, 5591
Pittman, Bill---- 5187
Pivowitz, Abe---- 5702
Plain Talk---- 4939, 4942
Platt, Philip S---- 5207
Plenn, Abel---- 5651, 5657
Plimpton, Jane F---- 5050, 5059, 5702
Plimsoll, James---- 5702
Plopkin---- 5183
Plumptre, A. F. W---- 5590, 5591
PM---- 5216
Pod Znamenem Marxizma---- 5219
Poland---- 5382, 5386, 5638
Poland, Fred---- 5019, 5346
Poland, Government of---- 5188
Poleman, Jenny F---- 5590, 5591
Poling, Chang---- 5320
Politburo---- 5500, 5501
Political Affairs---- 5338, 5634
Political Quarterly---- 5392
Political Science Review---- 5673
Polk. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Pollard, Arthur L---- 4963
Pollard, John A---- 4990, 4995, 5199, 5257, 5258, 5287
Pollard, Robert---- 5590, 5591
Pone, D---- 5590, 5591
Pons, Wei-ta---- 4991, 4992, 4995
Pontius, Dale---- 5590, 55591
Pontius, Hilda C---- 5702
Poole, Major General---- 5075
Poore, A. S---- 5502
Pope---- 5116
Pope, Everett P---- 5590, 5591
Pope, Frederick---- 5590, 5591
Popper, David H---- 5193
Porter, Catherine---- 4958, 4967, 4972, 4987, 4988, 4989, 4995, 5053, 5084, 5149, 5160, 5162, 5169, 5179, 5198, 5199, 5228, 5239, 5246, 5256, 5257, 5274, 5300, 5329, 5424, 5590, 5591, 5685, 5702, 5704.
Porteus, S. D---- 5590, 5591
Portugal---- 5318
Portus, G. V---- 5590, 5591
Potter, Pittman---- 5260
Poter, P. B---- 5323

Page
Potsdam Conference 4929
Pougatchef, Simeon 5692
Pound, Roscoe 4934, 4949
Poweles, G. R 5590, 5591
Powell, C. I 5674
Powell, Ifor 5590, 5591
Powell, John Benjamin 4942, 5274, 5297, 5298, 5590, 5591, 5649
Powell, Roberta 4988
Power, Eileen 5334, 5590, 5591
Power, Joseph E 5590, 5591
Powles, G. R 5702
Powles, Mrs. G. R 5702
Pramoj, M. R. Seni 5049, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5321, 5322, 5590, 5591
Prasad, P. S. N 5323
Pratt, Frances 5330
Pratt, Frederick 5590, 5591
Pratt, Helen Gay 5592, 5593, 5654
Pratt, John 5334, 5389, 5390, 5592, 5593
Pravda 5150, 5162, 5164, 5185
Prebbles 5680
Present, Richard D 5041
Pressman, Lee 5501–5504
Preuss, Lawrence 5592, 5593
Price, Ernest 5592, 5593
Price, Harry B 5052, 5053, 5189, 5190, 5210, 5215, 5592, 5593, 5711
Price, Maurice T 5592, 5593
Price, M. Phillips 5592, 5593
Price, Mildred 5346, 5684, 5700
Price, Willard DeMille 5649
Princeton University Press 5041, 5282
Prien, Charles H 5592, 5593
Priest, Alan 5592, 5593
Pritt, D. N 5156
Prostov, Eugene 5182
Pruitt, Ida 5198, 5202, 5203, 5592, 5593, 5709
Pu, Wei-meng 5592, 5593
Purcell, Victor 5062, 5350, 5592, 5593, 5684
Purvis 5189
Pyke, Richard 4987, 5119, 5161, 5356, 5592, 5593, 5704

Q

Quigley, Harold S 4999, 5229, 5592, 5593, 5684
Qureshi, I. H 5592, 5593

R

Rade 5132
Radek, Karl 5115, 5125, 5151–5154
Radius, Walter A 5186, 5592, 5593
Radom, Jane 4990, 4995
Rager, F. A 5592, 5593
Rahder, J 5592, 5593
Rahman, Obaidur 5062
Rahna-Trone 4958
Rajchman, Ludwig 5216, 5270, 5346
Raman, T. A 5592, 5593
Ramuz, Charles Ferdinand 5654
Randolph, Jeanette 4988, 5592, 5593
Ranga, N. G 5323
Rao, B. Shiva 5062, 5594, 5595
Rao, V. K. R. V 5323
Rappaport, Arthur Vincent 5675, 5676
Rasminsky, Louis 5270
Rasmussen, A. H 5594, 5595
Ratnam, P 5594, 5595

Page
Raushenbush, Joan 4964
Raushenbush, Stephen 5261
Rawlings, Bernard 5594, 5595
Rawson, Geoffrey 5594, 5595
Ray, Hilda Austern 4984, 4987, 4988, 4991, 4993, 5010, 5045, 5054, 5139, 5161, 5189, 5198, 5199, 5204, 5207, 5218, 5242, 5254, 5287, 5295, 5362, 5516, 5517, 5704
Ray, J. Franklin 5286, 5594, 5595
Raymond, Elizabeth 4987, 4988
Rayner, Charles 4967
Read, T. T 5594, 5595
Reday, Joseph Z 5594, 5595
Reddick, Olive I 5702
Redfield, A. H 5594, 5595
Redman, H. Vere 5594, 5595
Reed, Stephen W 5684
Rees, Frederick 5594, 5595
Rees, Williams, D. R 5594, 5595
Reichshaver, Edwin O 5594, 5595
Reid, Escott 5115, 5333, 5356, 5594, 5595
Reid, Helen Dwight 5702
Reid, John Gilbert 5594, 5595
Reid, Ogden 5235
Reider, Robert W 5674
Reinhold, Anna 4991, 4995
Reischauer, A. K 5594, 5595
Reischauer, Edwin Oldfather 4930, 4931, 5111, 5198, 5229, 5655, 5660
Remer, C. F 4919, 4958, 4975, 4977, 4984, 5001, 5007, 5008, 5199, 5226, 5254, 5259, 5594, 5595
Renner, Gordon 5674, 5678, 5679, 5680, 5681, 5682
Resnick, Ruth 4989, 4995
Reubens, Edwin P 5594, 5595
Reuters 5217, 5326, 5334, 5348
Reynolds, Judge 5681
Rhoads, Charles J 5186
Rhodes Trust, Cecil 5349
Rice, Lloyd P 5594, 5595
Richards, Mrs. I. A 5177
Richards, I. A 5594, 5595
Riches, E. J 5594, 5595
Riddell, R. G 5594, 5595
Ridley, John 5596, 5597
Riefler, Winfield 4973, 5261
Rienaecker, Victor 5596, 5597
Rifchin, Frances 4988
Riggs, Fred W 5596, 5597
Ringwalt, Arthur R 5261, 5480, 5702
Risenfeld 4997
Rivers, W. F 5324, 5596, 5597
Rivet, Paul 5321
Riznik, Charlotte 5295
Roach, James R 5596, 5597
Robequain, Charles 5259, 5333, 5596, 5597, 5684, 5685, 5692
Roberson, W. S 4983
Robert, Father 5333
Robert, Mr 5216
Roberts, Holland 5040
Roberts, Stephen H 5596, 5597
Robertson, C. J 5596, 5597
Robertson, Gwendolyn 4990, 4995
Robinson, Geroid 5173
Robinson, Gerry 5286
Robinson, G. T 5111
Robinson, Jay 5219, 5220, 5247, 5248, 5702
Robinson, Kenneth A 5674
Rochdale 5210

Page
Rockefeller Foundation 4974, 4979, 5003, 5021, 5023, 5025, 5026, 5029, 5030, 5111, 5120, 5166, 5171, 5209, 5250, 5263, 5322, 5327, 5335, 5688, 5689.
Rockefeller Memorial, Laura Spelman 5335
Rockefeller, Nelson 5299
Rockley, Glen 5596, 5597
Rockwood, Charles P 5596, 5597
Rodwell, H. R 5596, 5597
Roeder, Ralph 5655
Rogers, Agnes 5655
Rogers, Lettie 5651
Rogers, Lindsay 5002
Rogers, Rima S 4990, 4995, 5290
Rogers, Sadie 5704
Rogers, William Garland 5657
Rogov, Vladimir 5011, 5012, 5059, 5060, 5334, 5347
Rohde, Ruth Bryan 5643
Rolfe, Mary 4988
Rolph, Earl 5596, 5597
Roman, Agnes 5295, 5596, 5597
Romm, Alexandre 5122
Romm, V 5150–5154, 5596, 5597
Rommel 5679
Romulo, Carlos P 5596, 5597
Roman, William 5596, 5597
Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin 5261, 5643, 5682
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 4929, 4937, 4941, 4964, 4968, 4977, 5035, 5040, 5052, 5055, 5057–5060, 5071, 5072, 5073, 5112, 5190, 5249, 5253, 5268, 5280, 5328, 5349, 5364, 5379, 5422, 5483, 5484, 5655, 5664, 5671.
Roosevelt, Nicholas 5596, 5597
Roosevelt, Theodore 5635
Root, Constance 4990, 4995
Roper, E. C 5299
Ropes, E. C 4973, 5205, 5276, 5294, 5596, 5597
Rosberg, Lillian 4992, 4995
Rose, Archibald 5175, 5334, 5359
Rose, S 5596, 5597
Rosenberg 5678
Rosenfeld, Sylvia 4990, 4995
Rosenthal, Alma 5596, 5597
Rosenthal, Laura 4991, 4995
Rosinger, Lawrence K 4939, 4991, 4995, 5021, 5027, 5195, 5214, 5237, 5284, 5299, 5301, 5596, 5597, 5648–5653
Rosinski, Herbert 5598, 5599
Ross, Andrew 4999
Ross, G. A. Johnston 5598, 5599
Ross, Ian Clunies 5322, 5684
Ross, John 4959
Ross, Lloyd 5598, 5599
Rossbach, Mr 5299
Rossbach, Mrs 5299
Rossiter, Fred J 4999, 5598, 5599
Roth, Andrew 5220, 5248, 5249, 5278, 5598, 5599, 5649
Rothe, Cecile 5598, 5599
Rothman, Rhoda 4989, 4995
Rotor 5049
Rowe, David Nelson 4944, 5111, 5229, 5598, 5599, 5649, 5683, 5686–5691
Rowell, Chester H 5150, 5153, 5156, 5186, 5318, 5326, 5334, 5704
Rowell, Newton R 5115, 5156
Rowell, Newton W 5319, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5598, 5599
Rowland, D. W 5598, 5599
Roxas, Manuel 5598, 5599
Roxby, P. M 5598, 5599
Roy, M. N 5005, 5043, 5046, 5598, 5599
Royal Institute of International Affairs 5317, 5329, 5330, 5356, 5378, 5412

Page
Royama ---- 5685
Royama, Masamichi ---- 5598, 5599, 5684, 5685
Rubens, Doris ---- 5655
Rubin, Barnard ---- 5598, 5599
Rubin, Rose ---- 5299
Rubio, Alfred ---- 5674, 5677, 5678
Rubio, Carlos ---- 5678
Rubio, Anna H. (*See* Morgan, Mrs. Richard.)
Rudlin, Mrs. Eryl ---- 5702
Ruebens, Beatrice G ---- 5598, 5599
Rueff, Gaston ---- 5598, 5599, 5684
Rufus, W. Carl ---- 5598, 5599
Ruml, Beardsley ---- 5041
Rusk, Dean ---- 4925, 4926, 4984, 5023, 5025, 5026, 5363, 5391
Russell, Bertrand ---- 5041
Russell, Cyrus W ---- 5364
Russell, Helen E ---- 4992, 4995
Russell, Louis J ---- 5502
Russia. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Russian Consulate (Moscow) ---- 5025
Russian Consulate (NYC) ---- 5154, 5275
Russian Consulate (Shanghai) ---- 5158
Russian Consulate (Vienna) ---- 5162
Russian Legation (Ottawa) ---- 5262
Russian Embassy (Toronto) ---- 5270, 5271
Russian Embassy (Mexico City) ---- 5055, 5056
Russian Embassy (Tokyo) ---- 5108, 5115
Russian Embassy (Washington) ---- 5057, 5152, 5162, 5165, 5168, 5169
5183–5186, 5196, 5201, 5204, 5226, 5230, 5246, 5262, 5266, 5267, 5300
Russian-German Pact, 1939 ---- 4971, 5206
Russian Imperial Army ---- 5115, 5146
Russian War Relief ---- 4940, 5090, 5275, 5282, 5285, 5298, 5344
Russo-Japanese Neutrality Declaration ---- 5240
Rutherford, Robert ---- 5702
Rykoff ---- 5156
Ryu, Shintaro ---- 5598, 5599

S

Sa, Kung-Liao ---- 5059
Sabarwal, K. R ---- 5598, 5599
Sacks, Milton ---- 5598, 5599
Sadler, A. L ---- 5598, 5599
Sagar, T. H ---- 5600, 5601
Sah, Pan-tung ---- 5345, 5361
Sahalimsk ---- 5008
St. Bees School (England) ---- 5662
St. George, Joan ---- 4992, 4995, 5694
St. John, Robert ---- 5657
St. Louis Despatch ---- 4935
St. Timothy's School ---- 5702
Saionji ---- 5156, 5174, 5189, 5208, 5249, 5358
Saito, Soichi ---- 5333, 5335, 5600, 5601
Saiyidain, K. G ---- 5600, 5601
Sakanishi, Shio ---- 5600, 5601
Salim, Hadji Agoes ---- 5322
Salisbury, Laurence E ---- 4989
4995, 5024, 5084, 5173, 5282, 5283, 5289, 5296, 5329, 5600, 5601, 5703
Salmon, Alfred ---- 5600, 5601
Salter, Arthur ---- 5192, 5600, 5601
Samson, Mr ---- 5387
Samson, Gerald ---- 5600, 5601
Samuel, Herbert ---- 5320, 5334, 5600, 5601
Sanders, Florence E ---- 4991, 4995
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce ---- 5315
San Francisco Chronicle ---- 5084, 5151, 5326, 5335

Page
San Francisco Daily News 5149
San Francisco News 5040
San Francisco State College 5040
Sank, H. K 5600, 5601
Sansom, Sir George 4982, 4984, 5009, 5021–5023, 5026, 5051, 5053, 5072, 5189, 5190, 5208, 5209, 5322, 5333
Sansom, George Bailey 5600, 5601, 5660
Santillan-Castrence, Pura 5600, 5601
Santos, Bienveniod N 5600, 5601
Sarafam, Bertram D 5600, 5601
Sarraut, Mr 5147
Sarraut, Albert 5320, 5600, 5601
Saturday Evening Post 5465, 5466
Saturday Review of Literature 5648, 5650, 5651, 5653, 5654, 5659, 5660
Saugstad 4997, 4998
Saunders, Kenneth 5600, 5601
Sauvy, Alfred 5600, 5601
Savord, Ruth 5600, 5601
Sawayanagi, Masataro 4319
Sawer, Beatrice 5600, 5601
Sayre, Francis B 4973, 4997, 5045, 5078, 5165, 5702
Sayre, Mrs. Francis B 5702
Scalapino, Robert A 5600, 5601
SCAP. (*See* Supreme Command Allied Powers.)
Schappes, Morris U 4926
Scharffenberg, W. A 5702
Scharrenberg, Paul 5186
Schatz, Louise H 4990
Schefer, E. E 5702
Scheffer, Paul 5174, 5358
Schechtman, Joseph B 5600, 5601
Scherer 5168
Schiller, A. Arthur 5003, 5602, 5603, 5684
Schmidt 5112, 5113
Schneer, Sophie 4989, 4995
Schneider, Helen 4992, 4995, 5347
Schneider, Isidor 5655
Schneider, Louis J., Jr 5674
Schoellkopf, Mrs 5299
School for Democracy (NYC) 4926
School of Advanced International Studies and Foreign Service Training Center 5313, 5703
Schoyer, B. P 4988
Schoyer, Preston 5602, 5603
Schrieke, B 5602, 5603
Schriftgiesser, Karl 5657
Schroeder, Johannes 5202, 5204
Schulberg, Budd Wilson 5655
Schulthers, Frederic D 5602, 5603
Schuman, Frederick L 5205, 5602, 5603
Schuman, Frederick 5205
Schumpeter, Elizabeth B 5264, 5265, 5602, 5603
Schwartz, Benjamin K 5438, 5439, 5444, 5447, 5452, 5455, 5457–5461, 5466, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5481, 5482, 5602, 5603
Schweitzer, Leonard J 5602, 5603
Schwellenbach, Lewis B 4974, 4977, 5702
Scott, Ernest 5320, 5602, 5603
Scott, F. R 5084, 5153, 5154, 5156, 5602, 5603
Scott, Natalie Anderson 5655
Scott, Warren 5243
Scroggs, William O 5602, 5603
Scully, Madeline F 5210
Seagrave, Gordon S 5651
Searles, P. J 5602, 5603
Sebatz, Louise H 4995
Seidensticker, Edward G 5602, 5603

Page
Seitelman, Max ---- 5602, 5603
Sekiguchi, Yasushi ---- 5602, 5603
Seldes, George ---- 5657
Selassie, Haile ---- 5708
Selle, Earl Albert ---- 5657
Selwyn-Clarke, Hilda ---- 5602, 5603
Sen, Gertrude Emerson ---- 5602, 5603
Serene ---- 5358
Sereno ---- 5174
Sergeyer ---- 5008
Serot, Louise B ---- 4990, 4995
Serot, Rhoda ---- 4990, 4995
Service, John S ---- 5061, 5062, 5347, 5415–5424, 5480
Setalvad, M. C ---- 5323
Sevensix, Markus ---- 5161
Severino, Rodolfo ---- 5295
Seymour, Gideon ---- 4976
Sforza, Carlo ---- 5078, 5602, 5603
Shahn, Judy ---- 5602, 5603
Shahn, Tillie G ---- 4988, 4989, 4992, 4995, 4300, 5064, 5300
Shan, Yen Hsi ---- 5404
Shanahan, Eileen ---- 5602, 5603
Shanghai ---- 5319, 5320, 5331, 5333, 5334,5356, 5383, 5417
Shannon, William V ---- 5353
Shapley, Harlow ---- 5041
Shariat ---- 5044
Sharp ---- 4999
Sharp, Frederick D ---- 5198, 5199, 5237, 5242, 5247, 5250, 5251, 5254, 5255
Sharp, Frederick S ---- 5198, 5199, 5237, 5242
Sharpe, Frances (Moldauer) ---- 4988, 4989, 4995
Sharp, R. Lauriston ---- 5336, 5602, 5603
Shavelson, Rita ---- 4989, 4995
Shaw, Albert ---- 5078
Shaw, Glen E ---- 5323, 5602, 5603
Sheeks, Robert B ---- 5604, 5605
Sheehan, Vincent ---- 4958
Sheldon, Frederick ---- 5176
Sheldon, George F ---- 5604, 5605
Sheperd ---- 5685
Shepard, Jack ---- 5320, 5604, 5605
Shepard, Oscar F ---- 5207
Shepardson, Whitney ---- 5167, 5298, 5299, 5303
Shepherd, Jack ---- 4987, 5209, 5236, 5268
Sheppard, William R ---- 5604, 5605
Sherman, Katherine ---- 5702
Sherwani, Latif Ahmad ---- 5604, 5605
Sherwood ---- 5486
Shidachi, Tetsujiri ---- 5604, 5605
Shih, Chao-Ying ---- 5630, 5631
Shih, Heng-Kuo ---- 5604, 5605
Shih, Hsin Hua ---- 5379
Shih, Hu ---- 5174, 5310, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5358
Shiman, Russell G ---- 4987, 4988
5084, 5161, 5162, 5168, 5169, 5241, 5242, 5247, 5268, 5329, 5604, 5605
Shinkle, Elodie ---- 4988
Shippe, M. G. (*See* Asiaticus.)
Shirer, William Lawrence ---- 5655
Shiskin, Boris ---- 4975, 4977, 5703
Shishko, Jerome ---- 4990, 4995
Shoeki ---- 5022
Shoemaker, James H ---- 4967,
4967, 4973, 5007, 5008, 5052–5054, 5089, 5604, 5605, 5684, 5711
Shore, Manny ---- 5675
Shore, Maurice ---- 5219
Shostokovich ---- 5266

Page
San Francisco Daily News 5149
San Francisco News 5040
San Francisco State College 5040
Sank, H. K 5600, 5601
Sansom, Sir George 4982, 4984, 5009, 5021–5023, 5026, 5051, 5053, 5072, 5189, 5190, 5208, 5209, 5322, 5333
Sansom, George Bailey 5600, 5601, 5660
Santillan-Castrence, Pura 5600, 5601
Santos, Bienveniod N 5600, 5601
Sarafam, Bertram D 5600, 5601
Sarraut, Mr 5147
Sarraut, Albert 5320, 5600, 5601
Saturday Evening Post 5465, 5466
Saturday Review of Literature 5648, 5650, 5651, 5653, 5654, 5659, 5660
Saugstad 4997, 4998
Saunders, Kenneth 5600, 5601
Sauvy, Alfred 5600, 5601
Savord, Ruth 5600, 5601
Sawayanagi, Masataro 4319
Sawer, Beatrice 5600, 5601
Sayre, Francis B 4973, 4997, 5045, 5078, 5165, 5702
Sayre, Mrs. Francis B 5702
Scalapino, Robert A 5600, 5601
SCAP. (*See* Supreme Command Allied Powers.)
Schappes, Morris U 4926
Scharffenberg, W. A 5702
Scharrenberg, Paul 5186
Schatz, Louise H 4990
Schefer, E. E 5702
Scheffer, Paul 5174, 5358
Schechtman, Joseph B 5600, 5601
Scherer 5168
Schiller, A. Arthur 5003, 5602, 5603, 5684
Schmidt 5112, 5113
Schneer, Sophie 4989, 4995
Schneider, Helen 4992, 4995, 5347
Schneider, Isidor 5655
Schneider, Louis J., Jr 5674
Schoellkopf, Mrs 5299
School for Democracy (NYC) 4926
School of Advanced International Studies and Foreign Service Training Center 5313, 5703
Schoyer, B. P 4988
Schoyer, Preston 5602, 5603
Schrieke, B 5602, 5603
Schriftgiesser, Karl 5657
Schroeder, Johannes 5202, 5204
Schulberg, Budd Wilson 5655
Schulthers, Frederic D 5602, 5603
Schuman, Frederick L 5205, 5602, 5603
Schuman, Frederick 5205
Schumpeter, Elizabeth B 5264, 5265, 5602, 5603
Schwartz, Benjamin K 5438, 5439, 5444, 5447, 5452, 5455, 5457–5461, 5466, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5481, 5482, 5602, 5603
Schweitzer, Leonard J 5602, 5603
Schwellenbach, Lewis B 4974, 4977, 5702
Scott, Ernest 5320, 5602, 5603
Scott, F. R 5084, 5153, 5154, 5156, 5602, 5603
Scott, Natalie Anderson 5655
Scott, Warren 5243
Scroggs, William O 5602, 5603
Scully, Madeline F 5310
Seagrave, Gordon S 5651
Searles, P. J 5602, 5603
Sebatz, Louise H 4995
Seidensticker, Edward G 5602, 5603

Page
Seitelman, Max ---- 5602, 5603
Sekiguchi, Yasushi ---- 5602, 5603
Seldes, George ---- 5657
Selassie, Haile ---- 5708
Selle, Earl Albert ---- 5657
Selwyn-Clarke, Hilda ---- 5602, 5603
Sen, Gertrude Emerson ---- 5602, 5603
Serene ---- 5358
Sereno ---- 5174
Sergeyer ---- 5008
Serot, Louise B ---- 4990, 4995
Serot, Rhoda ---- 4990, 4995
Service, John S ---- 5061, 5062, 5347, 5415–5424, 5480
Setalvad, M. C ---- 5323
Sevensix, Markus ---- 5161
Severino, Rodolfo ---- 5295
Seymour, Gideon ---- 4976
Sforza, Carlo ---- 5078, 5602, 5603
Shahn, Judy ---- 5602, 5603
Shahn, Tillie G ---- 4988, 4989, 4992, 4995, 4300, 5064, 5300
Shan, Yen Hsi ---- 5404
Shanahan, Eileen ---- 5602, 5603
Shanghai ---- 5319, 5320, 5331, 5333, 5334,5356, 5383, 5417
Shannon, William V ---- 5353
Shapley, Harlow ---- 5041
Shariat ---- 5044
Sharp ---- 4999
Sharp, Frederick D ---- 5198, 5199, 5237, 5242, 5247, 5250, 5251, 5254, 5255
Sharp, Frederick S ---- 5198, 5199, 5237, 5242
Sharpe, Frances (Moldauer) ---- 4988, 4989, 4995
Sharp, R. Lauriston ---- 5336, 5602, 5603
Shavelson, Rita ---- 4989, 4995
Shaw, Albert ---- 5078
Shaw, Glen E ---- 5323, 5602, 5603
Sheeks, Robert B ---- 5604, 5605
Sheehan, Vincent ---- 4958
Sheldon, Frederick ---- 5176
Sheldon, George F ---- 5604, 5605
Sheperd ---- 5685
Shepard, Jack ---- 5320, 5604, 5605
Shepard, Oscar F ---- 5207
Shepardson, Whitney ---- 5167, 5298, 5299, 5303
Shepherd, Jack ---- 4987, 5209, 5236, 5268
Sheppard, William R ---- 5604, 5605
Sherman, Katherine ---- 5702
Sherwani, Latif Ahmad ---- 5604, 5605
Sherwood ---- 5486
Shidachi, Tetsujiri ---- 5604, 5605
Shih, Chao-Ying ---- 5630, 5631
Shih, Heng-Kuo ---- 5604, 5605
Shih, Hsin Hua ---- 5379
Shih, Hu ---- 5174, 5310, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5358
Shiman, Russell G ---- 4987, 4988
5084, 5161, 5162, 5168, 5169, 5241, 5242, 5247, 5268, 5329, 5604, 5605
Shinkle, Elodie ---- 4988
Shippe, M. G. (*See* Asiaticus.)
Shirer, William Lawrence ---- 5655
Shiskin, Boris ---- 4975, 4977, 5703
Shishko, Jerome ---- 4990, 4995
Shoeki ---- 5022
Shoemaker, James H ---- 4967,
4967, 4973, 5007, 5008, 5052–5054, 5089, 5604, 5605, 5684, 5711
Shore, Manny ---- 5675
Shore, Maurice ---- 5219
Shostokovich ---- 5266

Page
Shotwell, James T---- 5002
5041, 5067, 5166, 5207, 5208, 5260, 5263, 5350, 5604, 5605, 5661
Shri, Ram---- 5323
Shridharani, Krishnalal---- 5604, 5605
Shu, Ch'ing-Ch'un---- 5649, 5658
Shu, Hsi-Hsu---- 5604, 5605
Shulpin---- 5008
Siam---- 5331
Sian---- 5368, 5403
Siberia---- 5340, 5424
Sibley, Harper---- 5067
Sifton, Victor---- 5326
Sigerist, Henry E---- 5238, 5252
Sikander, Hyat Khan---- 5004, 5042, 5043
Simester, Miss---- 5295
Simkins, Francis Butler---- 5658
Simmons College (Boston)---- 4965, 5008
Simmons, Ernest---- 5079
Simms, William Phillip---- 5702
Simon, J. P---- 5020
Simons, Grace---- 4958
Sinclair, Archibald---- 5349
Sinclair, George M---- 5604, 5605
Sinclair, Gregg M---- 4944
Singh, Anup---- 5604, 5605
Sino-American Cultural Society---- 5237
Sino-Japanese War---- 5194, 5217, 5219, 5221, 5223, 5341
Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi---- 5604, 5605
Sitsen, Peter H. W---- 5350, 5604, 5605, 5684
Sjahir---- 5640
Sjahrir, Soetan---- 5639, 5659
Skelton---- 5259
Skinner, G. William---- 5604, 5605
Skrefstad, Betty---- 4987, 4991, 4994, 4995
Slack, Frank V---- 5268, 5604, 5605
Slaski, J---- 5604, 5605
Slaughter, Major---- 5145, 5146
Slesinger, Mr---- 5229
Smedley, Agnes---- 5337,
5347, 5356, 5438, 5444, 5447, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5481, 5482, 5684
Smith---- 5112
Smith, Barbara B---- 4990, 4995
Smith, Bradford---- 5604, 5605, 5658
Smith, C. P---- 5606, 5607
Smith College---- 5288
Smith, Edith Lawrence---- 5427
Smith, Edwin K---- 5606, 5607
Smith, Elmer R---- 5606, 5607
Smith, Fayette---- 5606, 5607
Smith, Florence M---- 5702
Smith, Guy Harold---- 5606, 5607
Smith, H. Alexander---- 4943, 5642, 5643
Smith, Homer---- 4936
Smith, Jessica---- 5084, 5178, 5199, 5251
Smith, Joseph---- 5295
Smith, Lolita W---- 4991, 4992, 4995
Smith, M. Paske---- 5606, 5607
Smith, Maggie---- 4989, 4995
Smith, Marion W---- 5606, 5607
Smith, N. Skeene---- 5606, 5607
Smith, Miss Nan Lincoln---- 5158, 5159, 5704
Smith, Miss Nora Ford---- 5082
Smith, Rennie---- 5606, 5607
Smith, Russell---- 5002
Smith, Sydney B---- 4978
Smith, T. V---- 5661

Page
Smith, Walter Bedell---- 5481, 5483
Smith, Warren D---- 5606, 5607
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell---- 5606, 5607
Smuts, General---- 5077
Smyth, Helen---- 5606, 5607
Smyth, Henry Dewolf---- 5041
Smythe, Lewis C---- 5062, 5606, 5607
Snell, Lord---- 5334, 5606, 5607
Snow, Edgar---- 5188, 5194, 5198, 5200, 5201, 5203, 5213, 5219, 5235, 5281, 5438, 5440, 5444, 5445, 5447, 5461–5464, 5466, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5481, 5482, 5606, 5607, 5648–5650, 5652, 5653, 5658–5660, 5684.
Snow, Mrs. Edgar---- 4965, 5232, 5474, 5480, 5620, 5621, 5649
Snyder, Maxim---- 4990, 4995
SOBSI. (*See* All-Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions.)
Social Science Research Council---- 5220, 5295, 5355, 5662
Socoline-Schapiro, Valdimir---- 5692
Socony---- 5638
Soebandrio, Dr---- 5606, 5607
Soekarno, President---- 5640, 5641
Soga, Shigeo---- 5606, 5607
Soga, Yasutaro---- 5207
Sokolove, Henri---- 5702
Sokolsky, George---- 5023
Soljak, Phillip L---- 5606, 5607
Solomon, Rae---- 4992, 4995
Sommerich, Jane---- 5606, 5607
Soong, T. V---- 4969, 5945, 5047, 5178, 5211, 5328, 5346
South Wales Miners Federation---- 5379
Sovani, N. V---- 5606, 5607
Soviet Russia Today---- 5156, 5177, 5251, 5252
Soviet Secret Police (NKVD)---- 5185, 5463, 5464
Soviet Union or Soviet Russia. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Soward, F. H---- 5333, 5606–5609
Soward, F. W---- 5684
Soyer, David---- 4989, 4995
Spalding---- 5267
Spalding, W. F---- 5608, 5609
Spanish Civil War---- 5206
Speer, James P---- 5608, 5609
Speier, Hans---- 5608, 5609
Spencer---- 5169, 5170
Spencer, J. E---- 5608, 5609, 5684
Spewack, Samuel---- 5658
Spidell, Clara---- 4987, 4991, 4995
Spillum, Mary C---- 4992, 4995
Spinks, Charles Nelson---- 5062, 5608, 5609, 5684
Spitzer, H. M---- 5608, 5609, 5702
Spoor, S. H---- 5635
Sproul, Allan---- 4974
Sproul, Robert G---- 4938, 4942, 4944, 5013, 5026, 5186, 5243, 5289, 5703
Sprouse, Philip D---- 5480
Sprout, Harold---- 5608, 5609
Srinivasan, C. R---- 5323
Stacey, C. P---- 5608, 5609
Stade, Ido B---- 5608, 5609
Staley, Alvah Eugene---- 5313, 5314, 5316
Staley, Alvah H---- 5313
Staley, Eugene---- 4944, 4973, 5197, 5200, 5289, 5603, 5608, 5609
Staley, Helen Teresa Browne---- 5313
Staley, Pamela Myrick---- 5313
Staley, Phyllis Eugenia Parker (Mrs. Alvah Eugene)---- 5313
Staley, Thomas Eugene---- 5313
Stalin, Joseph---- 4935, 4938, 5075, 5077, 5149, 5154, 5184, 5186, 5191, 5243, 5249, 5280, 5374, 5376, 5384, 5385, 5388, 5420, 5483, 5484, 5500
Stalin, S---- 5221

Page
Tannenwald, Ted 5295
Tao, Hsi-sheng 5310
Tao, L. K 5612, 5613
Tara, Chand 5323
Tarr, Edgar J 5032, 5041, 5054, 5157, 5195, 5199, 5265, 5269, 5270, 5271, 5287, 5320, 5321, 5324, 5333, 5614, 5615
Taruc, Luis 5614, 5615
Tass (Soviet News Agency) 5121, 5122, 5150, 5197, 5199, 5256
Tata Institute (India) 5062
Tateyania, Y 5614, 5615
Taub, A 5297
Taub, E. S 5297
Taussig, Mary 4988, 5614, 5615
Tawney, R. H 5208, 5209, 5311, 5350, 5614, 5615
Tavenner, Frank S., Jr 5502, 5504
Tayler, William Lonsdale 5702
Taylor 5685
Taylor, A. H 5261, 5614, 5615
Taylor, Edmond 5655
Taylor, Esther 4990, 4995
Taylor, George E 4999, 5008, 5173, 5229, 5234, 5250, 5312, 5350, 5368, 5614, 5615
Taylor, Griffith 5614, 5615
Taylor, J. P 5053
Taylor, Janet 4990, 4995
Taylor, K. W 5614, 5615
Taylor, Margaret R 4988, 5085, 5179, 5180, 5187
Taylor, Paul S 5614, 5615
Taylor, Robert Lewis 5660
Taylor, Wayne C 5261, 5702
Taylor, William H 5614, 5615
Teggart, Frederick J 5614, 5615
Teheran Conference 4928, 5071, 5075, 5076, 5 77
Temple, Shirley 5682
Templewood, Samuel John Gurney Hoare 5655
Tendetnick, Frances 4990, 4995
Teng, S. Y 5614, 5615
Tennet, Hugh C 5207
Terlin, Rose 5709
Terrell, Robert 5680, 5682
Tewksbury, Donald G 5614, 5615
Texton, Robert B 5614, 5615
Thacher, Judge Thomas D 5252
Thailand 5089, 5321, 5322
Thakur, B. T 5614, 5615
Thomas, Charles W 5362
Thomas, Elbert D 5702
Thomas, Elbert H 4977
Thomas, Mendell 5614, 5615
Thomas, Norman 5046, 5614, 5615
Thomas, S. B 4910, 4984, 5028, 5614, 5615
Thomason, Mrs. Florence 5698
Thompson 5292, 5685
Thompson, Miss Dorothy 5204
Thompson, John 5149
Thompson, L. (Kennedy) 5289
Thompson, Laura 5614, 5615, 5702
Thompson, Paul W 5091
Thompson, Virginia McLean 5061, 5169, 5170, 5192, 5214, 5236, 5248, 5259, 5268, 5614, 5615, 5660, 5692
Thompson, Warren S 5614, 5615
Thomson, Charles A 5199, 5264
Thong, M 5616, 5617
Thorner, Alice 5616, 5617
Thorner, Daniel 5257, 5616, 5617, 5702
Thorpe, James 5616, 5617
Tiedemann 5299

Page
Thresher, M. B---- 5616, 5617, 5702
Thurnwall, Richard C---- 5616, 5617
Tideman, J---- 5616, 5617
Tikhii Okean (Pacific Ocean)---- 5150
Tilton, Mrs. L. Deming---- 5040
Time, Inc---- 4974, 5008, 5020, 5060, 5279, 5349
Timperley, H. J---- 5178, 5616, 5617
Ting, Sa---- 5616, 5617
Ting, Yeh---- 5234, 5418
Tingfu, Tsiang---- 5062
Timur---- 5318
Titan Company---- 5106, 5107
Tito, Marshal---- 5315, 5462, 5465
Tixier, A. P---- 5049, 5053
Todd, E---- 4988, 5197
Togo, Alice M---- 4992, 4995, 5616, 5617
Tokyo---- 5346, 5414, 5665
Tokyo Asahi, Shimbun, The---- 5346
Toledano, Vincenta Lombard---- 5041
Tolokonoky---- 5135
Tolischus, Otto David---- 5650
Toller, W. Stark---- 5616, 5617
Tompkins, Pauline---- 5616, 5617, 5660
Tong, Hollington Kong---- 5237, 5347, 5650
Tongyai, Chakkratong---- 5616, 5617
Torrens, James G---- 5616, 5617
Townsend, Dallas S---- 5049, 5053
Townsend, Peter---- 5616, 5617
Toynbee, Arnold J---- 5209, 5334, 5616, 5617
Trammell, Mr---- 4939
Trans-Siberian Railway---- 4956, 4968, 5209
Treat, Harry Price---- 5189
Tressider, Donald B---- 4944, 5303
Trewartha, Glenn T---- 5616, 5617, 5684
Trinity College---- 5250, 5701
Trippe, Juan---- 4944
Trivedi, H. M---- 5323, 5616, 5617
Trone, S---- 5202, 5324
Trotter, Reginald---- 5616, 5617
Trotsky---- 5150, 5152–5156, 5165, 5181, 5191, 5280
Troyanovsky---- 5209
Truman, Harry S---- 4929, 4932, 4933, 5281, 5284, 5292, 5302, 5359, 5376, 5377, 5403–5406, 5410, 5669, 5677, 5679, 5681
Ts'ai, Ting-Kai---- 5383
Tseng, Chao-lun---- 5616, 5617
Tseng, V. G---- 4910, 4984, 5028
Tsiang, Tingfu F---- 5344, 5361, 5616, 5617
Tsingtao---- 5406, 5429
Tsou, Mr---- 5390, 5391
Tsur, Y. T---- 5344, 5361
Tsuru, Shigeto---- 4963, 5168, 5616, 5617
Tuckman, Mrs. W. W. L---- 5299
Tugan-Bavanovsky---- 5008
Tun, U Myat---- 5294
T'ung, Chao---- 5369
Turbin, Ruth (Ruth J. Lazarus)---- 4989, 4994
Turner, Bruce---- 5049, 5053, 5249, 5704
Turner, Ralph E---- 4967, 5324, 5703
Turner, Richard S---- 5186
Turner, Mrs. W. H., Jr---- 5702
Tusurumi---- 5204
Twaddell, Emily---- 4988
Tweksbury, Donald G---- 4944
Tydings, Millard---- 4926, 4935
Tyler, Charlotte---- 4917, 4987, 5119, 5121, 5140, 5618, 5619, 5704
Tyrell, Edith---- 5618, 5619

U

Page
Ubaldo, Mr. 5295
Uchida, Yoshi 4990, 4995
UCR. (*See* United China Relief.)
Uhlman, Lt. George 5618, 5619
Ultee, A. J. 5618, 5619
Underhill, William Amory 5441
UNESCO. (*See* United Nations Economic and Social Council.)
Unger, Neel A. 5704
Ungphakorn, Puey 5618, 5619
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA) 5251, 5366, 5413
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U. S. S. R.) 4920–4922, 4929, 4932, 4937–4942, 4954, 4956, 4963–4971, 4997, 5000, 5007–5009, 5025, 5032–5039, 5045–5047, 5055, 5056, 5060–5064, 5069–5082, 5086–5095, 5103, 5112–5117, 5120–5128, 5132–5135, 5138–5140, 5145, 5148–5150, 5154–5156, 5159–5161, 5164, 5165, 5172, 5173, 5177, 5181–5187, 5191, 5195, 5196, 5201, 5205–5208, 5215–5221, 5226, 5230–5233, 5238, 5240, 5246, 5251–5253, 5256, 5263, 5265–5267, 5272, 5275, 5279, 5280–5282, 5284–5287, 5298, 5302, 5306, 5307, 5309, 5312, 5315, 5316, 5318, 5320, 5321, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5332, 5356, 5365, 5367–5370, 5373, 5374, 5376, 5379, 5380, 5382, 5387, 5391, 5393, 5395, 5400, 5412, 5419, 5420, 5422–5425, 5460, 5462, 5500, 5501, 5639, 5640, 5642, 5664, 5668–5670, 5672, 5692, 5696, 5706, 5707.
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic Army 5074, 5077, 5092, 5094, 5182, 5185, 5232, 5252
United China Relief 4936, 4937, 4968, 4983, 5252, 5284, 5298, 5337, 5344, 5345, 5349, 5360, 5709, 5710
United Kingdom. (*See* Great Britain.)
United Nations (UN) 4925, 4968, 4969, 4977, 5034, 5036–5039, 5047, 5066–5077, 5079, 5090, 5267, 5269, 5272, 5280, 5281, 5285, 5289, 5316, 5322, 5323, 5325, 5345, 5375, 5389, 5390, 5394, 5396, 5397, 5412, 5484, 5634, 5636, 5639, 5642, 5643, 5664, 5665, 5669, 5671, 5672, 5673, 5676, 5693.
United Nations Economic and Social Council (Unesco) 5337
United Nations News, The 5323
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 4940, 4941, 5286, 5287, 5295, 5313, 5322, 5387, 5406, 5432, 5686
United Nations Secretariat 5313, 5323, 5689
United Press (UP) 5106, 5334
United Russian Relief 5252
United States Air Force 4936, 5340, 5429
United States Armed Forces 4936, 4940, 4958, 4959, 4965, 4966, 4968, 4972, 4974–4977, 4979–4983, 5001, 5002, 5009, 5013, 5033, 5040, 5045, 5048–5050, 5052, 5053, 5056, 5062, 5063, 5066, 5070, 5071, 5083, 5090, 5092, 5100, 5109, 5112, 5143–5146, 5163, 5187, 5144–5146, 5229, 5231, 5238, 5241–5243, 5247–5249, 5251, 5252, 5255, 5259, 5263, 5265, 5268, 5278, 5288, 5292.
United States Army 4940, 4958, 4968, 4972, 4974, 4983, 5040, 5045, 5056, 5062, 5063, 5070, 5083, 5090, 5145, 5146, 5249, 5254, 5259, 5339, 5371, 5414, 5415, 5419, 5429, 5678
United States Army Intelligence 5339
United States Bureau of Mines 4960
United States Chamber of Commerce 5703
United States Civil Service Commission 5239, 5243
United States Department of Agriculture 4960, 4964, 4973, 4999, 5203, 5261, 5295, 5325, 5503, 5504
United States Department of Commerce 4973, 4977, 5003, 5008, 5036, 5205, 5206, 5236, 5249, 5261, 5297, 5432, 5703
United States Department of Defense 5428, 5429
United States Department of Justice 5165, 5288, 5291–5294, 5437, 5440, 5443, 5452, 5634
United States Department of Labor 5171

Page
United States Department of State---- 4924–4927, 4929, 4931, 4935–4946, 4948–4953, 4960, 4964, 4967, 4973, 4975–4979, 4998, 5007–5010, 5013, 5014, 5021, 5023–5026, 5040, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5062, 5066, 5068, 5070, 5084, 5111, 5112, 5115, 5116, 5142, 5145, 5146, 5169, 5170, 5172, 5173, 5179, 5187, 5199, 5202–5206, 5214, 5224, 5225, 5247, 5252, 5254, 5261, 5264, 5266, 5269, 5280, 5283, 5291, 5292, 5295, 5296, 5297, 5300, 5301, 5313, 5314, 5321, 5334, 5341, 5342, 5347–5359, 5363, 5371, 5376, 5392, 5393, 5395, 5429–5432, 5435, 5443, 5444, 5445, 5449, 5453, 5454, 5457, 5458, 5467, 5468, 5469, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5477, 5479, 5480, 5482, 5484, 5485, 5486, 5645, 5663, 5667, 5687, 5695, 5698, 5703, 5711.
United States Department of the Army---- 5359, 5430, 5431, 5433
United States Department of the Navy---- 5359, 5430, 5433, 5435, 5687, 5703
United States Department of the Treasury---- 4964, 4973, 5017, 5066, 5077, 5178, 5203, 5244, 5245, 5249, 5252, 5261, 5268, 5430, 5432, 5488, 5489, 5490, 5709.
United States Embassy (London)---- 5480
United States Embassy (Moscow)---- 5460, 5466, 5473
United States Embassy (Pekin)---- 5461
United States Government---- 5330, 5339, 5355, 5363, 5399, 5432, 5449, 5466, 5486, 5634, 5663, 5676
United States House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities---- 5355, 5487, 5488, 5502, 5711
United States Marine Corp---- 5109, 5408, 5431, 5436
United States Maritime Commission---- 5429, 5430, 5432, 5433
United States Naval Intelligence---- 5348
United States Navy---- 4959, 4968, 4974, 4975–4977, 4979, 5013, 5040, 5062, 5063, 5066, 5109, 5112, 5143, 5144, 5163, 5187, 5231, 5249, 5259, 5278, 5288, 5292, 5415, 5429, 5430
United States News---- 5040
United States of America---- 4927, 4929, 4932, 4935, 4937, 4939, 4941, 4968, 4970–4972, 5000, 5033–5037, 5039, 5046, 5060, 5062, 5066, 5067, 5070–5074, 5076, 5077, 5083, 5092, 5096, 5097, 5102–5104, 5109, 5113, 5130, 5134, 5143–5145, 5165, 5177, 5183, 5184, 5189, 5190, 5193, 5194, 5196, 5202, 5215, 5218, 5222, 5231, 5239, 5249, 5255, 5258, 5260, 5277, 5280, 5283, 5285–5287, 5292, 5296, 5297, 5314, 5315, 5318–5323, 5327–5334, 5340–5342, 5345, 5348, 5350, 5351, 5356, 5362, 5363, 5367, 5370–5372, 5374, 5377–5379, 5385, 5389, 5392, 5403, 5405–5408, 5410, 5412, 5415, 5419, 5420, 5423, 5424, 5428–5431, 5434, 5439, 5449, 5465, 5470, 5475, 5477, 5501, 5635, 5637–5640, 5642, 5643, 5644, 5675, 5677, 5678, 5680–5682, 5707, 5708, 5710
United States Senate, Armed Services Committee---- 5364
United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee---- 5364, 5642, 5645
United States Senate, Labor and Public Welfare Committee---- 5487
United States Securities and Exchange Commission---- 5203
United States Supreme Court---- 5027, 5678
United States Tariff Commission---- 5009, 5268, 5700, 5702
United States War Assets Administration---- 5429, 5430, 5431
United States War Department---- 4958, 4965, 4966, 4968, 4972, 4974, 4983, 5001, 5002, 5009, 5048, 5049, 5050, 5052, 5163, 5238, 5241–5243, 5247–5249, 5251, 5252, 5255, 5263, 5265, 5268, 5292, 5339, 5348, 5415.
United States War Department (Military Intelligence Division)---- 4966, 4980, 4982, 5001, 5002, 5009, 5011, 5012, 5048, 5049, 5050, 5052, 5163, 5241, 5243, 5247, 5248, 5265, 5268, 5348, 5703, 5710.
United States White Paper on China---- 5392, 5393
Universal Trading Corporation---- 4973, 5234, 5235
University, American---- 5323
University, Bombay---- 5323
University of British Columbia---- 5327

Page
University, Brown---- 4967, 5303
University, Calcutta---- 5321
University of California---- 4944, 4998, 5010, 5013, 5025, 5040, 5058, 5135, 5186, 5205, 5323, 5336, 5703
University, Cambridge---- 5231
University of Chicago---- 4977, 5228, 5313, 5340, 5661, 5668, 5673, 5674
University, Clark---- 5321, 5335
University, Colgate---- 4983, 5336
University, Columbia---- 4938, 4944, 4965, 4973, 4983, 4999, 5003, 5014–5016, 5018, 5026, 5111, 5135, 5153–5155, 5172, 5173, 5179, 5183, 5210, 5216, 5217, 5224, 5225, 5227, 5253, 5257, 5263, 5268, 5305, 5311, 5312, 5313, 5318, 5321, 5322, 5323, 5327, 5336, 5340, 5344, 5345, 5703.
University, Cornell---- 4944, 5079, 5111, 5323, 5336
University, Delhi---- 5323
University, Fisk---- 5323
University, George Washington---- 5061
University, Harvard---- 4931, 4944, 4956, 4959, 4963, 5067, 5111, 5116, 5117, 5126, 5134, 5167, 5176, 5177, 5227, 5229, 5276, 5289, 5303, 5320, 5335, 5336, 5372, 5411, 5453, 5454, 5456, 5457, 5491, 5662, 5701.
University of Hawaii---- 4997
University of Iowa, State---- 5323
University, Johns Hopkins---- 5080, 5111, 5175, 5178, 5182, 5187, 5192, 5214, 5219, 5220, 5225, 5240, 5301, 5310, 5312, 5313, 5323, 5359, 5700, 5703.
University of Kansas---- 5323
University of Leyden---- 5320
University of London---- 5428
University of Madras---- 5323
University of Manitoba---- 5320
University of Maryland---- 5699
University of McGill---- 5154, 5319, 5323, 5355
University of Melbourne---- 5320
University of Michigan---- 5176, 5186
University of Nankai---- 5320
University, Nanking---- 5250
University, National---- 5329
University, National Peking---- 5320, 5321
University of New Brunswick---- 5270
University of North Carolina---- 5166
University, Northwestern---- 5340
University, Ohio State---- 5682
University, Oxford ---- 5025, 5131, 5232, 5276, 5320, 5323, 5349, 5386, 5411
University, Peking---- 5320
University of Pennsylvania---- 5078, 5336
University of the Philippines---- 5296, 5319, 5320
University of Pittsburgh---- 4967
University, Princeton---- 4915, 4969, 4981, 5009, 5048, 5068, 5111, 5167, 5191, 5239, 5248, 5355, 5357, 5427.
University of Shizuoka---- 4963
University, Sind---- 5026, 5322
University, Sino-Japanese---- 5188
University of Southern California---- 5165
University, Stanford---- 4954, 5009, 5013, 5024, 5040, 5282, 5155, 5289, 5313, 5319, 5320, 5322, 5335, 5341.
University, Syracuse---- 5336
University, Tokyo National---- 5021
University of Toronto---- 5026, 5130, 5321, 5322
University of Virginia---- 4972, 5049
University of Washington---- 5019, 5250, 5305, 5323
University of Wisconsin---- 5214
University, Yale---- 4944, 4959, 5040, 5269, 5289, 5324, 5336, 5686, 5688, 5689, 5690, 5703

Page
University of Yenching ---- 5173
5175, 5229, 5248, 5250, 5276, 5281, 5368, 5369
UOPWA. (*See* Union of Office and Professional Workers of America.)
Upgren, A. P ---- 5261
Uramatsu, Sanutaro ---- 5333, 5618, 5619, 5123
Urice, Jay ---- 5268
Useem, John ---- 5618, 5619
Ushiba ---- 5183, 5189, 5208, 5217, 5218, 5233, 5249
Ussachevsky, Elizabeth ---- 4990, 4991, 4995, 5061
U. S. S. R.-Netherlands Trade Treaty ---- 5191
Utley, Freda ---- 5185, 5295, 5308, 5310, 5368, 5382, 5383, 5618, 5619
Uyeda, Teijiro ---- 5618, 5619, 5684, 5685
Uzbekistan Republic ---- 5077

V

Vail, Chester R ---- 4984, 5002
Vakil, C. N ---- 5323
Valentine, A ---- 5324
Valtin ---- 5271
Van Asbeck, F ---- 5334, 5618, 5619
van Beusekom, J ---- 5512, 5513
Van Bloklan, F. Beelaerts ---- 5514, 5515
Van Buren, Dolores ---- 4990, 4995
Vancouver ---- 5368
Vandenbosch, Amry ---- 5618, 5619, 5684
Vandenberg, Senator ---- 5350
Van der Kolff, G. H ---- 5562, 5563
Van Der Kroef, Justus M ---- 5618, 5619
Van der Valk, M. H ---- 5618, 5619
Van Dijk, R ---- 5532, 5533
Van Doren, Carl Clinton ---- 5658
Van Eeghen, Geertrui M. (Gertrude) ---- 5534, 5535, 5618, 5619, 5704
Vangley, Anthony ---- 5618, 5619
Van Helsdingen, W. H ---- 5550, 5551
Van Kirk, Walter ---- 5260
van Kleeck, Mary ---- 5182, 5347, 5618, 5619
Van Le, Nguyen ---- 5566, 5567
Van Lummell, Mr ---- 5572, 5573
Van Mook, Hubertus Johannes ---- 5249, 5333, 5660, 5578, 5579
Van Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O ---- 5584, 5585
Van Nostrand, P. E ---- 5163, 5348
Van Patten, Louise Merrick ---- 5618, 5619
Van Scheltema, Mrs. A ---- 5198, 5200
Vansittart, Lord ---- 5375
Van Waldheim, Harold ---- 5620, 5621
Van Zandt, J. Parker ---- 5702
Van Zandt, Mrs. J. Parker ---- 5702
Varga, E ---- 5200, 5262
Vassar College ---- 5050, 5051
Vassiliev ---- 5229
Veatch, Roy ---- 5045, 5046, 5199, 5202, 5260, 5261, 5644
VE-Day ---- 5100
Velde, Harold H ---- 5502
Velleman, Ruth A ---- 4992, 4995
Venkatasubbiah, H ---- 5618, 5619
Veith, Ilza ---- 5618, 5619
Veith, Mrs. Ilza ---- 5702
Ventaryman, A ---- 5618, 5619
Verdoorn, J. A ---- 5618, 5619
Vernon, Robert, Jr ---- 4991, 4995
Versailles ---- 5164
Versailles, Treaty of ---- 5708
Vesper ---- 5193
Veth, K. L ---- 5702
Vicinus, Henry F ---- 5295

Page
Victoria University College 5009
Viet Minh 5394, 5395
Viet Nam 5639, 5642
Villamor, Jesus A 5620, 5621
Villareal, Mr 5295
Villasenor, Marie E 5202
Vinacke, Harold M 5231, 5620, 5621, 5684
Vince, Jacob 4973
Vincent, John Carter 4941, 5214, 5278, 5334, 5350, 5480, 5684, 5685, 5702, 5703
Viner, Jacob 4977, 5260, 5488, 5489
Virata, Leonides S 5620, 5621
Virgin Islands Civil Government 5288
Virginia Quarterly Review 5204, 5377
Visman, Frans H 5322, 5620, 5621, 5684
Vize, V 5620, 5621
VJ-Day 4935, 5392, 5406, 5429, 5430
Vlassov, General 5501
Vlekke, Bernard H. M 5283, 5620, 5621
Vlieland, C. A 5620, 5621
Vluz 5112
Vogel, Werner 5620, 5621
Voitinsky, G. E 5009, 5056, 5057, 5125, 5127, 5128, 5132, 5133, 5150, 5159, 5160, 5175, 5192, 5199, 5200, 5209, 5262, 5266, 5269, 5359.
VOKS 5083, 5121, 5122, 5127
Von Beckwrath 5205
von Boeticher, F 5691
von Faulkenhausen 5469
von Freyberg-Eisenberg, Contre-Amiral Baron 5691
Von Haast, H. F 5620, 5621
Von Hapsburg, Otto 5271
Von Trott, A 4933, 5195, 5196, 5198–5201, 5204, 5208, 5226
Voorhis, Jerry 4974
Vyshinsky 5397, 5484

W

Wadham 5685
Wadleigh, Henry J 5199, 5247, 5261
Wadsworth, Elliot 4955, 4956
Wadsworth, James W 5052, 5053
Wagner, Joyce 4991, 4995
Wagner, Robert F 5468
Wake Island Conference 5486
Wakeman, Frederic 5655
Wakefield, Harold 5620, 5621, 5658
Wakukawa, Seiyer 5620, 5621
Walcutt, Roscoe R 5674
Waldheim, Van 5704
Wales, Nym. (*See* Snow, Mrs. Edgar.)
Walker, Miss 4931, 5166
Walker, Elnora 4989, 4990, 4995
Walker, E. Roland 5620, 5621
Walker, Richard 5683–5686
Walker, Sydnor 5026, 5084, 5171
Wallace, Mr 5695
Wallace, Benjamin B 5702
Wallace, DeWitt 5079, 5080
Wallace, Henry A 4941, 4973, 5003, 5018, 5261, 5266, 5276, 5307, 5312, 5364, 5651
Wallace, Malcolm 5321
Wallace M. Alexander & Bruno Lasker, Inc 5182
Wallace, R. C 5620, 5621, 5705
Wallace, Schuyler 4911, 4984, 5003, 5014, 5015, 5016
Waller, Ella S 4990, 4995
Walree, Van 5191
Walsh. (*See* Kelly & Walsh.)

Page
Walsh, Richard J---- 5032, 5047, 5123, 5177, 5255, 5620, 5621
Walsh, Robert M---- 5620, 5621
Walter, Francis E---- 5502
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations---- 5080, 5301, 5312, 5313, 5323, 5586, 5587, 5662
Walworth, Arthur C---- 5651
Wan, Lin Yu---- 5620, 5621
Wanderman, Francis Dick---- 4991, 4995
Wang---- 5232
Wang, Chi-Chen---- 5620, 5621, 5655
Wang, Ching-wei---- 5391, 5403, 5667
Wang, Chiu-An---- 5620, 5621
Wang, Gung-hsing---- 5652
Wang, H. C---- 5622, 5623
Wang, K'e-min---- 5391
Wang, Kung-Ping---- 5622, 5623
Wang, Samuel Hsuan---- 5622, 5623
Wang, Shih-chieh---- 5062
Wang, Tieh-Yai---- 5622, 5623
Wang, Mrs. William C---- 5344, 5361
Wang, Yu-Chuan---- 5622, 5623
Wang, Yun-Sheng---- 5622, 5623
Warburg, Eddie---- 5116
Warburg, Ingrid---- 5198, 5202, 5204
Warburg, James Paul---- 5622, 5623
Warburg, Mrs. James---- 5196
Ward---- 5161
Ward, Barbara---- 5334
Ward, E. E---- 5622, 5623
Ward, Mrs. Humphrey---- 5188
Ward, Isabel---- 4987, 4988, 5294, 5295, 5622, 5623, 5702
Ward, John M---- 5622, 5623
Ward, Robert Spencer---- 5650
Wardwell, Allen---- 4956, 5252, 5285
Wardell. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Warnecke, G. W---- 5622, 5623
Warner, F. W---- 5622, 5623
Warner, Kenneth---- 5622, 5623
Warner, L---- 5622, 5623
Warren, George L---- 5002, 5260
Warson, Ann---- 4988
Washburn, John N---- 5622, 5623
Washington Post---- 4935, 5023, 5112, 5323
Watkins---- 5255
Watkins, James T., IV---- 5702
Watson, J. H---- 5622, 5623
Watt, Alan---- 5049, 5052, 5053
Watts, Richard---- 5647–5660
Watts, Richard, Jr---- 5622, 5623
Waugh, Coulton---- 5656
Waugh, Evelyn---- 5655
Wavell---- 5060
Waymack, W. W---- 5026, 5326, 5703
Weaver, G. R---- 5622, 5623
Weaver, James T---- 5702
Weaver, Leon H---- 5622, 5623
Webb, Beatrice---- 5622, 5623
Webb, Guy P---- 5702
Webb, Richard E---- 5622, 5623
Webster, Charles---- 5334, 5624, 5625
Webster, David L---- 5040
Wechsberg, Joseph---- 5652
Wedemeyer, General---- 5376, 5377, 5393, 5394, 5407
Wedgwood, Camilla---- 5624, 5625
Weekly Book Review---- 5649–5652
Weems---- 5299

Page
Weems, Benjamin 5626, 5627
Wei, Francis Cho-Min 5624, 5625
Weidon, Albert A 4992, 4996
Weinberg, Albert K 5624, 5625
Weinberg, Joseph W 5040
Weiss, Leonard 5624, 5625
Weiss, Louis 5299
Welles, Benjamin 5276, 5287
Welles, Sumner 4924–4928, 4944, 4976, 5045, 5047, 5088, 5172, 5195, 5199, 5224, 5251, 5252, 5273, 5274, 5276, 5277, 5286, 5288, 5293, 5300, 5658, 5693, 5702.
Wellon, Alfred E 5702
Wells, Katharine A 5624, 5625
Weltfish, Gene 5624, 5625
Wen, I-to 5408
Wentholt, Henrietta 4990, 4995
Wentworth, Edna C 5624, 5625
Werner, Max 4969, 4970
Werth, Alexander 5656
Wertham Barbara 5083, 5123, 5624, 5625
Wertheim, Maurice 5123
Wertheim, W. F 5624, 5625
West Point Military Academy 4973, 5255
West, Rebecca 5656
Westphal, Albert C. F 5624, 5625
Weston, Lora S 5624, 5625
Westra, H 5624, 5625
Weygand, General 5075
Wheare, K. C 5624, 5625
Wheeler, Anne 5112
Wheeler, L. Richmond 5624, 5625
Wheeler, Leslie 4973, 5261
Wheeler, Oliver P 5040
Wheeler, Mrs. Stafford M 5702
Wheeler, W. E 5624, 5625
Whitaker, Arthur Preston 5658
Whitaker, Urban G 5624, 5625
White, Dr 4918, 4919, 5198, 5245
White, Frederick 5624, 5625
White, Gerald T 5624, 5625
White, Harry Dexter 4973, 4975, 5051, 5294, 5347, 5487–5499, 5684
White House 4930, 4932, 4939, 4973, 5013, 5047, 5051, 5052, 5055, 5057, 5058, 5258, 5259, 5261, 5262, 5272
White, J. Patrick 5624, 5625
White, Lynn, Jr 4944, 5040
White Russian Government 5075, 5109, 5145, 5185
White, Theodore H 5176, 5177, 5261, 5269, 5278, 5624, 5625, 5652, 5655, 5695, 5697
White, Tommy 5112
White, Vaughan 5652
White, William Lindsay 5656, 5660
White, William S 5337, 5357
White Paper 5371
Whitney, Courtney 5415
Whitney, John Hay 5299
Whyte 5150
Whyte, Frederick F 5319, 5334, 5624, 5625
Wickersham, C. W 5049
Wickes, George A 5626, 5627
Wickett, Fred A 5040
Wickett, Walton A 5040
Wiens, Herold J 5626, 5627
Wilbur 5151, 5152, 5242, 5243
Wilbur, Brayton 4944, 4977
Wilbur, C. Martin 5336, 5626, 5627, 5702
Wilbur, Ray Lyman 4944, 4954, 5013, 5182, 5186, 5282, 5283, 5318, 5319, 5324, 5325, 5333, 5335

Page
Wilbur, Wm. H---- 5040
Wilcox, Francis---- 5643
Wilder, Nancy---- 4988, 4990, 4995, 5626, 5627
Wilder, Thorton Niven---- 5658
Wilgus, A. Curtis---- 5626, 5627
Wilhelm, Hellmut---- 5626, 5627
Willard, Mrs. Daniel, Jr---- 5702
Williams---- 5112
Williams College---- 4977
Williams, E. K---- 5626, 5627
Williams, Emilio---- 5626, 5627
Williams, J. W---- 5626, 5627
Williams, L. F. Rushbrook---- 5626, 5627
Williams, W. Wynne---- 5626, 5627
Willingdon, Lord---- 5349
Willits, Joseph H---- 4974, 5081, 5300
Willkie, Wendell---- 4974, 5047, 5249, 5349, 5626, 5627
Willoughby, Charles A---- 4999, 5414, 5415
Wilson---- 4985
Wilson, C. E---- 4974
Wilson, Francis---- 5626, 5627
Wilson State Teachers College---- 5295
Wilson Teachers College---- 5697
Wilson, Thomas George---- 5652
Wilson's Fourteen Points---- 5664, 5673
Winfield, Gerald Freeman---- 5382, 5658
Wingfield-Digby, Simon---- 5129
Winnipeg Free Press---- 5271, 5320
Winslow, C. E. A---- 5626, 5627
Winslow, R---- 4987, 5254
Winstedt, R. O---- 5626, 5627
Winston, Sadie---- 4991, 4995
Wint, Guy---- 5626, 5627
Winter, Ella---- 5347, 5626, 5627, 5650
Winterbottom, F. S---- 5626, 5627
Winterton, Paul---- 5285
Wise, Masha Switzer---- 4990, 4995
Wiss, Helen---- 4988, 5179
Wissler, Clark---- 5626, 5627
Wittfogel, Karl August---- 4999, 5083, 5305, 5306, 5309, 5310, 5311, 5312, 5313, 5626, 5627
Wittfogel, Mrs. K. A. (Esther S.)---- 5306, 5310, 5313
Wittke, Carl---- 5626, 5627
Wizon, I. F---- 5084, 5171
Wold, Emma---- 5628, 5629
Wolf, Charles---- 5658
Wolf, Charles, Jr---- 5628, 5629, 5684
Wolfers, Arnold---- 5628, 5629
Wolfert, Ira---- 5650
Womens Action Committee---- 5040
Wood, ---- 5685
Wood, Bryce---- 5628, 5629
Woods, Caroline---- 4990, 4995
Wood, F. L. W---- 5009, 5628, 5629
Wood, G. L---- 5628, 5629, 5634
Woods, Hubbard---- 5165
Wood, John S---- 5502, 5503, 5504
Woodhead, H. G---- 5628, 5629
Woodman, Dorthy---- 5412, 5628, 5629
Woodworth, Charles J---- 5628, 5629
Wooton, Barbara---- 5175, 5359, 5628, 5629
Work Projects Administration---- 5710
Worker, The---- 4925–4928
World Affairs, Council of---- 5277, 5278
World Affairs Council (Cleveland)---- 5067, 5068, 5300, 5344
World Affairs Council of Northern California---- 5313

Page

World Bank 5701
World Federation of Trade Unions 5641
World Student Christian Federation 5280
World War I 5066, 5067, 5074, 5298, 5317, 5319, 5636, 5640, 5664, 5679
World War II 4970, 5066, 5067, 5222, 5255, 5256, 5246, 5281, 5318, 5330, 5678
World War III 5068, 5281
Worster 5680
Worster, James F 5674
Worth, Alexander 5284
WPA. (See Work Projects Administration.)
Wrenn, Heaton L 4944, 5207
Wright 5685
Wright, Dr 5707, 5708
Wright, Arthur F 5628, 5629
Wright, Curtis 5193
Wright, George 5628, 5629
Wright, Sir Hageburg 5137
Wright, Louise L 4944
Wright, Mary C 5628, 5629
Wright, Nellie 4991, 4995
Wright, Philip 5684
Wright, Quincy 4959, 4,999, 5199, 5253, 5260, 5628, 5629, 5684, 5606
Wright, Ruth C 5628, 5629
Wriston, Henry M 5303
Wu, Chi-Yuen 5628, 5629, 5684
Wu, Ching-Chao 5628, 5629
Wu, Leonard K 5356, 5628, 5629
Wu, Teh-chen 5330
Wubnig, Arthur 5628, 5629
Wyatt, Woodrow 5628, 5629
Wye, C. Kay 5629, 5629

Y

Yakhontoff, Victor H 5114, 5115, 5630, 5631
Yale Review 5648–5650, 5673
Yale University Press 5661
Yalta 5673
Yalta Conference 4929, 5280, 5483–5487, 5672
Yamakawa, Tadao 5320, 5630, 5631
Yamasaki, Keichi 5630, 5631
Yanaga, Chitoshi 5630, 5631, 5684, 5688
Yanaihara, Tadao 5630, 5631
Yang, C. K 5630, 5631
Yank, Ching-Shih 5630, 5631
Yang, Hsin-Pao 5630, 5631
Yang, L. S 5630, 5631
Yang, Mou-Ch-un 5652
Yardumian, Rose 4988, 4995, 5011, 5058, 5061, 5063, 5630, 5631, 5710
Yarnell, H. E 4974, 4976, 4977, 5013, 5062, 5630, 5631
Yasker, Bruno. (*See* Lasker, Bruno.)
Yasuda 5666
Yasumura, Michi 4991, 4995
Yasuo, Nagaharu 4987, 5168, 5175, 5179, 5630, 5631
Yates, Elizabeth 4991, 4995
Yates, P. Lamartine 5630, 5631
Yawakama 5217
Yeaton, Ivan 5370
Yeh, Chien-ying 5371
Yeh, George 5062
Yen, Hsi-shan 5275, 5369, 5410
Yen, Jen Keng 5630, 5631
Yen, W. M 5321, 5333

Page
Yen, Y. C. James 5052
Yenan 5370–5374, 5379, 5381–5383, 5391, 5403, 5420, 5422
Yenching 5368, 5370
Yi, Chin 5418
Ying, Han 5234
Yodh, Raj 5323
Yokose, Seishi 5630, 5631
Yokota, Kisaburo 5208, 5630, 5631, 5684
Yone, Edward M. Law 5630, 5631
Yosemite National Park 5319, 5320, 5324, 5331, 5346, 5703
Yoshi 5695
Yoshino, Sakuzo 5630, 5631
Yoshizawa, Mr 5147, 5249
Yost, Charles W 5261, 5702
Young 5178
Young, Mrs 5241
Young, Hobart 5186
Young, A Morgan 4987, 4999, 5630, 5631
Young, C. Walter 5684
Young, Hobart N 5703, 5704
Young, John P 5630, 5631
Young Men's Christian Association 5317–5319, 5334, 5335, 5345
Young, Ruth Lee 5704
Young, Walter 5248
Young Women's Christian Association of China (National Committee) 5290
Yozizawa, K 5333
Yu, Kuang-sheng 5379
Yu, Uck Kym 5319
Yu, W. Y 5630, 5631
Yudenich, General 5075
Yugon, A 5007, 5008
Yugoslavia 5315, 5382, 5393
Yui, David Z. T 5319, 5320, 5335
Yun, C 5632, 5633
Yun, Lung 5408
Yu-wan, Liu 5333

Z

Zafara, Urbano A 5053, 5089, 5322
Zagon, Rita 4988
Zaibatsu 5665, 5666, 5671
Zellerbach, J. D 4944
Zen, H. C 5632, 5633
Zen, Sophia Chen 5632, 5633
Zhdanov 5393
Zhukov, Eugene 5027
Zhukov, Marshal 5501
Zilliacus, Kodne 5375, 5652
Zimmerman, Carle C 5632, 5633
Zimmerman, Erich W 5166, 5632, 5633
Zimmern 5132
Zinkin, Maurice 5632, 5633

○

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KEY TO VOLUMES

	Pages
1	1–352
2	353–701
3	703–935
4	937–1250
5	1251–1682
6	1683–1995
7	1997–2303
7A	2305–2474
8	2475–2896
9	2897–3275
10	3277–3714
11	3715–4031
12	4033–4354
13	4355–4905
14	4907–5712
Senate Report 2050	1–243

The index to the report appears at the end of the combined index beginning on page 5948.

TABLE OF WITNESSES AND TESTIMONY

	Page
Alsop, Joseph	1403–1489
Auerbach, Sol (James S. Allen)	2876–2896
Barmine, Alexander Gregory	181–222
Barnes, Kathleen	2599–2617
Bentley, Elizabeth Terrill	103–447, 4775–4804
Bisson, Thomas Arthur	4159–4288
Blenman, Commander William	2180–2182
Bogolepov, Igor	4479–4520, 4553–4593
Budenz, Louis Francis	513–701, 1077–1110
Bullitt, William C	4521–4552
Canning, William Martin	466–487
Carter, Edward C	5–74, 127–180, 449–466, 896–905, 4466–4478, 4909–4957
Chambers, Jay David Wittaker	487–511, 4775–4804
Chennault, Claire Lee	4763–4775
Chi, Harriet Lavine	3949–3953
Church, Col. Gerald L	4072–4074
Colegrove, Kenneth	905–935, 1277–1296
Cooke, Charles Maynard	1491–1550
Coy, Mildred Price	2644–2650
Davies, John Paton, Jr	5443–5483
Deane, Hugh Gordon, Jr	2780–2791
DeCaux, Leonard	2619–2643
Dennett, Raymond	937–1005
Dooman, Eugene H	703–754
Fairbank, John K	3715–3822
Farley, Miriam S	4445, 4455
Farrell, Frank	4407–4443
Field, Frederick V	75–127, 4033–4071
Finley, Moses	4152–4158
Fluegel, Dr. Edna R	2825–2870
Fortier, L. Joseph	843–864
Friedman, Julian R	4289–4354
Gelfan, Harriet Moore	2559–2598
Greene, Jerome D	3849–3862
Hillenkoetter, Roscoe H	4775–4804
Holland, William L	1139–1250, 3889–3948, 4909–4957
Hornbeck, Stanley K	5363
Jones, Catesby	4358–4391
Jones, Mrs. Catesby	4392–4399
Kaplan, Irving	4738–4761
Kenney, Mrs. Philip Olin (Mary Jane)	2773–2780
Keeney, Philip Olin	2791–2794
Kornfeder, Joseph Zack	864–896
Lattimore, Mrs. Owen (Eleanor)	4455–4466
Lattimore, Owen	2898–3674
Lockwood, William W	3862–3889
Mandel, William Marx	2733–2749
Massing, Mrs. Hede	223–271, 4798–4804
Matusow, Harvey M	3823–3847
McGovern, William Montgomery	1007–1034
Miller, Robert T	4401–4407
Moy, Eugene	4355–4358
Munson, Lyle H	2751–2771
Philbrick, Herbert A	4782–4804
Poppe, Nicholas N	2691–2731
Renwanz, Lt. Col. Rowland H	4072

Page
Rosinger, Lawrence K. 2475–2557
Rowe, David N. 3967–4031
Stassen, Harold E. 1035–1077, 1112–1138, 1252–1277
Stewart, Maxwell S. 2650–2690
Stuffiebeam, Robert E. 2121–2122
Taylor, George Edward 342–352
Thorner, Daniel 3955–3966
Vincent, John Carter 1683–2286
Wallace, Henry A. 1297–1402
Wedemeyer, Albert C. 775–841
Weintraub, David 4627–4680, 4719–4737
Weyl, Nathaniel 2795–2823, 2871–2876
Widener, Mrs. William Harry (Alice) 755–773
Willoughby, Charles A. 353–401
Wittfogel, Karl August 273–342
Yergan, Max 4595–4626
Yoskikawa, Mitsusada 499–511

INDEX

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

Page

AAA. (*See* Agriculture Adjustment Administration.)
AAF. (*See* United States, Army Air Force.)
Aronson, Norma 3061
AAUW. (*See* American Association of University Women.)
Abaya, Hernando 5650
ABC Stabilization Fund 481
Abdul, Arbab, Ghafoor Khan 5006, 5044
Abe Cabinet (Japanese) 4202
Abe, General Nobuyuki 4202, 4267, 4269
Abend, Hallett 3108, 3685, 3705, 3923, 5506, 5507
Aberle, Dr. David F 327, 3961
Aberyswyst University (British) 4037
ABMAC. (*See* American Bureau for Medical Aid to China.)
Abo, Baron (Admiral) 4148
Abolin 4490
Aborin. (*See* Abolin.)
Abraham Lincoln Brigade 2597, 2657
Abrahamson, Jim 2643
Abrahms, Herbert K 5506, 5507
Abrams, Dr 5406
Abramson 2770, 2771, 2773, 5125
Abramson, Mr 4489, 4490, 4492, 4516, 4586, 4588, 4589, 4590
Abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement 2891
Abshagen, Mr 4439
Abt, John J 2891, 4720, 4722, 4737
Abyssinia 3583, 3584
Academica Sinica 50, 3637, 4996, 5345
Academy of Science (Moscow) 171, 178, 2590, 2692, 2699, 2723, 2728, 2729, 2730, 3235, 3485, 3604, 3615, 5009
Academy of Science of the Soviet Union 4483
Acheson, Dean ..... 428, 444, 445,494, 639, 716–719, 722–724, 729, 730, 858, 859, 899, 902–904, 917, 918, 920, 928, 982, 1038, 1040–1042, 1049, 1065, 1067, 1068, 1075, 1112, 1113, 1115, 1117, 1118, 1123, 1125, 1126, 1131–1133, 1145, 1149, 1251, 1269, 1274–1276, 1294, 1336, 1337, 1425, 1457, 1458, 1534, 1555, 1556, 1566, 1587, 1702, 1715, 1717, 1720–1722, 1773, 1880, 1888, 1899, 1894, 1895, 1901, 1915, 1916, 1963, 2002, 2124, 2127, 2158, 2188, 2218, 2250, 2272, 2288, 2501, 2539, 2555, 2626, 2711, 2810, 2831, 2835, 2868, 2943, 3026, 3031, 3110, 3389, 3400, 3401, 3405, 3406, 3407, 3408, 3409, 3410, 3416, 3542, 3644, 3662, 3667, 3813, 3955–3956, 3986, 3993, 4533, 4534, 4539, 4540, 4545, 4547, 4714, 4715, 4748, 4869, 4877, 4900, 4924, 4931, 4975, 5261, 5485, 5487.
ACIS. (*See* American Committee for International Studies.)
Ackerman, Edward 5506, 5507
Ackerman, Dr. Phyllis 410, 620, 622
Acta Orientalia 342
Action Conference on China Policy 55, 56, 2789
Adamovich, I. A 189, 4508
Adams, Charlotte 1513
Adams, Eva B 903, 904, 2664, 3669

Page
Adams, Romanzo 5506, 5507
Adams, Samuel H 548, 5647
Adams, W. G. S 5320
Adarkar, B. P 5506
Addis, Dr. Thomas 4258
Adenauer, Chancellor 2188
Adler 5017
Adler, David 5367
Adler, Larry 4748
Adler, Solomon (Schloma) 69, 420, 434, 493, 1027, 1218, 1691–1695, 1753, 1778, 1916, 2214, 2215, 2250, 2811, 3504, 3530, 3594, 3903, 3983, 4322, 4531, 4649, 4663, 4737, 4748, 4805, 4823, 4830, 5345, 5684.
Adloff, Richard 1222, 2482, 5506, 5507
AEC. (*See* United States Atomic Energy Commission.)
Aero-Hydro-dynamics Institute (Russia) 4555
Afghanistan 3220, 3282, 3464, 3465, 3603, 3632, 3909, 4028, 4630–4633, 4739, 4836
AFL. (*See* American Federation of Labor.)
Africa 4595–4598, 4606, 4607, 4626
Afzal, Mohammed 5506, 5507
Agabekov 3705
Agrarian Institute 3934, 4508
Agricultural Adjustment Act 2798, 4071
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) 2797, 2798, 2802, 2803, 2821, 2875
Agricultural Cooperative Society (South Shantung) 2422
Agriculture Department. (*See* United States Department of Agriculture.)
Agriculture Economy of China, The 4352
Agricultural Organization of New Zealand 3168
Agricultural Workers (CCP) 2461
Agronsky, Martin 5355
Agwilines 4869
Ah Q 2351
Ahlers, John 5506, 5507
AI Ssu-ch'i 2405, 2451
Aid to Britain Bill 2577, 2688, 2689
Aid to Britain Today, War Tomorrow 2680
Aikman, Duncan 5656
AIPR. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, American.)
Air Force. (*See* United States Air Force.)
Air Force in China 4134
Air Transport Command 3713
Airey, Willis T. G 5506, 5507
Aiyer, C. P. Ramaswami 5323
Airport Hotel (Seimchan, Soviet China) 1106
Akagi, Roy H 2891, 5506, 5507
Akita, Kiyoshi 4148
Akiyama 369
AKO. (*See* Kamchatka Co.)
Alaska 3224, 3326, 3632, 4493, 4494, 4556
Alba, Nuova 2665
Albanian Government 4789
Albertson, William 3336
Albricht, Mr 4428
Albright, W. F 342
Alcan A 5699
Alcan Highway 1326
Alcatraz 3919
Alcock, Consul 4699
Alden, Chas. E 5501
Alden, Mrs. Jane M 5699
Aldenov 125
Aldo Cafe (Washington, D. C.) 3067, 3641, 4358, 4370, 4373, 4376, 4382, 4456, 4464, 4466, 4470, 4471
Aldrich, Bailey 4692

Page
Aldrich, Winthrop W ---- 5252
Alejandrino, Castro ---- 4858
Aleutian Islands ---- 3324, 3326, 4109, 4493, 4494
Alexander ---- 40, 238, 3922, 5209
Alexander, Mrs ---- 5089
Alexander, Rt. Hon. A. V ---- 1216, 5320, 5334
Alexander and Baldwin ---- 1217, 1219
Alexander, Fred ---- 4964, 5506, 5507
Alexander, Henry C ---- 5047
Alexander, J. W ---- 4089, 5052, 5053
Alexander Kaun Exchange Fellowship ---- 3621
Alexander, R. P ---- 5699
Alexander, Wallace M ---- 1217, 1219, 2511, 2610, 3612, 4044, 4092, 4093, 4105, 4106, 4108, 4109, 4134, 5182, 5186, 5335
Alexandroff, Mr ---- 3224
Alfino, Rose ---- 4992, 4993
Alfred, Helen ---- 4258
Ali Khan, Liaquat ---- 1679
Alisjahbana, Takdir ---- 5506, 5507
All American Trade Union Conference ---- 119
All-China Peasants Union ---- 2467
All-China Soviet Congress (First) ---- 2325, 2326
All-China Trade Union Conference ---- 119
All-China United Anti-Japanese National Defense Army ---- 2329
All-China United Central Government ---- 2331
All-China United People's Government of National Defense ---- 2329
All India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Union) ---- 2638
All India National Congress ---- 656, 2638
All-Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions ---- 5641
All Souls College (Oxford) ---- 1216
All-Union Central Committee (Soviet Second Congress) ---- 3107
All Union Chamber of Commerce ---- 4508
All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries ---- 3934
Allan, Dorothy W ---- 5506, 5507
Allemagne. (*See* Germany.)
Allen, Mr ---- 2986, 5234
Allen, B. C ---- 2622
Allen, Captain ---- 713
Allen, Carolyn E ---- 4119
Allen, Commodore ---- 2811
Allen, Edward W ---- 568, 995, 1219, 1313, 2819, 4944, 5506, 5507
Allen, G. C ---- 1221, 3867, 4270, 5253, 5506, 5507
Allen, George E ---- 3640, 3997, 3998, 4827
Allen, Hilen, Frouds and DeGarmo ---- 995
Allen, James A ---- 4860
Allen, James S. (*See* Sol Auererbach.)
Allen, Mrs. James S ---- 3348, 3349
Allen, Joseph S ---- 4941
Allen, Raymond B ---- 568, 1219, 1313, 1392, 4944, 5023
Allen, Riley H ---- 302, 712, 713, 4125, 4126, 4146, 5207
Alexeief, Mr ---- 4589

Alley, Rewi ---- 3791, 3793, 4002, 4616, 4619, 4620, 5194, 5210, 5211, 5212
Allied Commission on Reparations (German Economic Group) ---- 2777
Allied High Commission ---- 2184, 2188
Allied Labor News ---- 658, 659, 662, 2642, 2789, 2790, 3543, 3903, 4078, 4308, 4336, 4807
Allied Powers ---- 302, 354, 379, 419, 560, 561, 562, 617, 622, 728, 732–734, 738–741, 745, 784, 793, 812, 828, 901, 912, 1027, 1030, 1239, 1358, 1362, 1395, 1453, 1530, 1613, 1770, 1864, 1868, 1869, 1871, 2089–2091, 2164, 2167, 2170, 2184, 2186, 2187, 2236, 2237, 2281, 2282, 2284, 2285, 2298, 2299, 2313, 2314, 2362, 2378, 2381, 2386, 2447, 2672, 2763, 2675.
Allied Supreme Command ---- 611, 615

Page
Allin, B. W---- 3167
Alling, Paul---- 445, 4975
Allison, John M---- 723, 3894, 3900, 5506, 5507, 5699
Allport, Gordon W---- 2658, 4119
Aloric, Aminadau---- 4992, 4993
ALP. (*See* American Labor Party.)
Alper, Benedict Solomon---- 4643, 4723
Alper, Michael (Rabbi)---- 4115
Alpi. (*See* Brown, Fred.)
Alsberg, Dr. Carl L---- 365, 366, 694, 1216, 1219, 2610, 2720, 3482, 3857, 3932, 4044, 4092, 4093, 4105, 4106, 4108, 4119, 4130, 4134, 4568, 4587, 4999, 5119, 5144, 5151, 5152, 5155, 5157, 5167, 5186, 5218, 5318, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5341, 5506, 5507, 5684.
Alsberg, George---- 5704
Alson, Joseph---- 603
Alsop, Joseph---- 1296, 1305, 1344, 1346, 1347, 1363–1366, 1367, 1370, 1373–1376, 1379–1382, 1387, 1388, 1391, 1392, 1401, 1402, 1809, 1814, 1815, 2031, 2076, 2084, 2280, 2955, 2957, 3053, 3113.
Altai Mountains---- 2384
Altenburg, Mr---- 4439
Alteration Painters Union---- 3336
Altman, Norman S---- 4401
Altschul, Frank---- 5286
Alvin---- 2624
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America---- 4638, 4639, 4725
Amalgamated Engineers---- 40
Ambro, A. J---- 4509
AMCO. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council.)
Amerasia---- 14, 30, 34, 35, 46, 74, 114, 115, 140, 165, 220, 225, 265, 298, 305, 326, 350, 439, 474, 518, 555, 569, 572, 609, 618, 619, 625, 661, 665, 714, 788, 907–912, 915, 918, 955, 1155, 1203, 1228, 1229, 1392, 1393, 1733, 1737, 1746, 1748, 1750, 1752–1754, 1780, 1781, 1827, 1841, 1843, 1903, 1921, 1924, 1927, 1929, 2088–2092, 2110, 2111, 2114, 2120, 2121, 2148, 2178–2183, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2191, 2213, 2241, 2542, 2543, 2574, 2575, 2713, 2725, 2865, 2887, 2978, 3002, 3144, 3331–3333, 3482, 3579, 3580, 3587–3592, 3650, 3887, 4046, 4047, 4058, 4069, 4076, 4093, 4097, 4103, 4106, 4107, 4120, 4121, 4124, 4136, 4141, 4147, 4149, 4177, 4188, 4200, 4212, 4213, 4254, 4270, 4282–4284, 4286, 4312, 4314, 4316, 4333, 4334, 4544, 4545, 4570, 4620, 4621, 4692, 4698, 4811, 4812, 4821, 4826, 4838, 4842, 4843, 4845–4847, 4859–4862, 4941, 4977, 5000, 5060, 5061, 5111, 5162, 5174, 5192, 5193, 5194, 5204, 5221, 5230, 5267, 5300, 5340, 5343, 5358.
America. (*See* United States of America.)
America and the Soviet Union---- 2583, 2587
American Academy of Political Science---- 99
American Anthropological Association---- 4119
American Arbritation Association---- 4327
American Army. (*See* Army, United States.)
American Artist Union---- 4275
American Association for the United Nations---- 2139
American Association of University Women---- 4138, 5067, 5702
American Bank Note Co---- 1219
American Bar Association---- 1454, 1706, 2270
American-British-Chinese Government Currency Board---- 5249, 5268, 5328
American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund---- 390
American-British-Chinese Stabilization Committee---- 16, 277, 278
American-British Military Operation Zones (Europe)---- 2305, 2310
American Broadcasting Co. (ABC)---- 1534
American Broadcasting System---- 574
American Bureau for Medical Aid to China---- 4936, 5202, 5344, 5345, 5710
American Can Co---- 101
American-Canadian League for Peace and Democracy---- 2445

Page
American Chamber of Commerce 5423
American Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai 1579
American-China Policy Association 1855
American-Chinese Export Corp 86, 98, 101, 4081
American Chinese Policy Association 4544
American Civil Liberties Union 2160, 2668, 2683, 2684, 4116
American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives. (*See* INDUSCO.)
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans. (*See* China Aid Council.)
American Committee for Cultural Freedom 4595
American Committee for International Studies 79, 237, 239, 390, 910, 2585, 4915, 5111, 5208, 5209, 5355
American Committee for Nonparticipation in Japanese Aggression 3474, 3478, 4252, 4253, 5427
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born 2654
American Communications Association 4116
American Communist Party. (*See* Communist Party, United States.)
American Congress for Peace and Democracy 4114, 4115, 4118
American Consul (Lanchow) 2374
American Consulate:
Harbin 507, 508
Shanghai 507
American Consulate General in Shanghai 4329
American Cooperating Committee for Chinese Mass Education Movement 4046
American Council. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council.)
American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) 1220, 2480, 2567, 2602, 4026, 4259, 4836, 4893, 5051, 5110, 5117, 5219, 5220
American Council on Education 445, 2584, 2585, 2587, 2588, 3880, 3887, 3888, 4834
American Council on Soviet Relations 300, 2654, 2656
American Council Paper No. 2 572, 573
American Cyanamid Co 996, 1216, 1219
American Economic Association 99, 4199, 4259, 4669, 5220, 5314
American Embassy:
Amsterdam 5082
Bangkok 5193
Berlin 5193
Brussels 5193
Canberra 5193
Chungking 638, 1304, 1435, 3518, 4541, 5057, 5058, 5193, 5236
Hague 5193
Hong Kong 1120
London 1037, 5193
Moscow 1525, 1531, 1536, 2295, 2711, 2712, 2729, 3327, 3329, 3484, 3615, 3616, 3700, 4570, 5161, 5162, 5193
Mukden 2554
Nanking 493, 1026, 1027, 2536, 2551
Ottawa 5193
Paris 5193
Peking 3472, 3508, 5173, 5214
Rome 4417, 5193
Shanghai 5193
Tokyo 451, 3702, 5193
Warsaw 139
Yenan 2394
American Expeditionary Force 296
American Express (Santiago, Chile) 3264
American Express Co 150, 254, 319, 660, 661
American Far East Policy 2476, 4056, 4057, 4095, 4278
American Federation of Labor (AFL) 444, 445, 607, 663, 640, 658, 669, 884, 1075, 1100, 1102, 1104, 1137, 1292, 2161, 2624, 2628, 2633, 2639, 2642, 2643, 2664–2668, 2810, 2834, 3046, 4274, 4834, 4887, 4975, 4977, 5067, 5703.
American Federation of Labor (Convention, 1923) 2665, 2666

Page
American Federation of Teachers National Convention 2161, 2162, 4116
American Fisheries Publications 648
American and Foreign Power Co 901, 1217, 1551, 3079, 3704, 4835
American Foreign Service Journal 3005
American Friends of the Chinese People 285, 411, 439, 1154, 1155, 1160–1164, 1166, 1973, 2597, 2662, 3144, 3169, 3470, 3471, 4064, 4065, 4139, 4166, 4167, 4169, 4187, 4252, 4253, 4272, 4276, 4277, 4609, 4613, 4615, 4616, 4842, 4870.
American Friends Service Committee (China) 3502, 3704
American Geographical Society 6, 99, 2814, 2818, 4591
American Government. (*See* United States Government.)
American Hawaiian Steamship Co 1219
American Historical Association 3969, 4011, 4119
American History Review 5651, 5656
American Institute of African Relations 2819
American Institute of European Relations 2819
American Institute of International Relations 2814, 2819
American Institute of Latin American Relations 2819
American Institute of Middle East Relations 2819
American Institute of Pacific Relations. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, American Council.)
American Institute of World Affairs 2814, 2816, 2819
American Journal of International Law 906
American Ku Klux Klan 2340
American Labor Party 3841, 5502, 5503, 5645
American League Against War and Fascism 2596, 2654, 3551, 4118
American League for Peace and Democracy (*See also* China Aid) 1078, 1241, 1242, 2654, 4086, 4114, 4115, 4118, 4138, 4187, 4253, 4259, 4272, 4273, 4608
American League for Peace and Democracy (Women's Division) 4275
American Legation (Bern) 2294
American Legion 377, 399
American Lend-Lease 826
American Magazine 4592
American Mercury 2981
American Military Adviser Group in China. (*See* MAGIC.)
American Military Observer Section (Yenan) 2343, 2378
American Museum of Natural History 4119
American Navy. (*See* United States Navy.)
American Neutrality Act 4151
American Occupation Authorities (Japan) 367
American Oriental Society 3969, 3971
American Participation in the China Consortiums 4047, 4135
American Peace Crusade 3556
American Peace Mobilization 25, 22,33, 116, 124, 173, 174, 180, 295, 527, 861–863, 2654, 3145, 3197, 3458, 4045, 4046, 4051, 4052, 4053, 4075, 4098, 4140, 5225, 5257, 5258, 5340.
American People's Fund 2652, 3879, 3880, 3888, 3889, 4011
American-Philippine Conference 2593
American Philosophical Society 342
American Political Science Association 3767, 3969, 4027, 4119, 5220, 5689
American Political Science Review 906
American Populist 565
American President Lines 444, 1217, 1220, 3879
American Psychological Association 4119, 4834
American Psychology Society 2162
American Publication Service of the American Embassy 3803
American Quarterly 296, 3506
American Quarterly on the Soviet Union 2605, 2707
American Radio Association 946
American Red Cross 258, 259, 293, 294, 432, 857, 901, 1551, 1846, 2624, 2834, 4147, 4835, 4956, 4973, 5252, 5429, 5432
American Red Cross (Russia) 4260
American Reparations Commission to Japan 5283

Page
American-Russian Institute (ARI) 177, 265, 267, 295, 296, 297, 299, 300, 433, 444, 488, 645, 663, 664, 686, 768, 769, 857, 988, 1220, 2567–2571, 2574, 2577, 2604, 2629, 2655, 2707, 2742, 2817, 2882, 2883, 3242, 3273, 3274, 3449, 3450, 3452, 3479, 3484, 3486, 3487, 3506, 3517, 3617, 3619, 3620, 3621, 4091, 4144, 4145, 4258, 4974, 4977, 5007, 5079, 5111, 5150, 5154, 5165, 5170, 5181, 5182, 5186, 5227, 5229, 5238, 5268, 5282, 5286, 5345
American Russian Institute, San Francisco 5182
American School in Shanghai 132, 577
American Smelting & Refining Co 100
American Society for Russian Relief 539, 2669
American Sociological Association 4119
American Sociological Society 99
American Statistical Association 4119
American Students Union (ASU) 301, 3513, 4116, 4277, 4391
American Telephone & Telegraph Co 4119
American Trust Co 1216
American United for World Government, Inc 4834
American University (Peiping) 1624
American Veterans' Committee 4833
American Volunteer Aviation Corps (China) 2343
American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers) 1125, 1126, 1149
American War of Independence 3188
American White Paper. (*See* White Paper.)
American Y. M. C. A 138
American Youth Congress 300, 2655, 2658, 4138
American Youth for Democracy (AYD) 3055, 3056, 3059, 3477–3479, 3823, 3824, 3843
American Youth for a Free World 3057
Americans for Democratic Action 1539
Americans United 633
Amerling, Saram 2774, 2791
Ames, C. L 5323
Ames, Harry 4887
Amoy 4535, 4700
Amstal Bank (Netherlands) 4569
Amsterdam 3604, 3633, 3934, 4500, 5348
Amsterdam News 3845, 3846
Amter, Israel 3335, 3336, 4117
Amtorg Trading Corp 3928, 3929, 4038, 4039, 3042, 4077, 4753, 4935, 5205
An Te Hai 2385
An Wen-hsiang 2451
Anaconda Copper 100
Anderson, Miss 2646, 5229
Anderson, Mr 904
Anderson, Drury 5295
Anderson, Howard W 2585, 2590
Anderson, James 4277
Anderson, Karl L 5506, 5507
Anderson, Leslie 5279
Anderson, Marguerite 4992, 4993
Anderson, Marian 1528
Anderson, Melvin 4991, 4992, 4993
Anderson-Pritchard Refining Corp 101
Anderson, Robbins B 4125, 4126, 4146, 5207
Anderson, Sherwood 411, 1514, 4115
Anderson, William 4119
Anderson, Wrenn and Jenks (Honolulu) 1220
Andreau, Caesar 3057
Andreau, Jane Speed 3057
Andreof 2451
Andrews 5157
Andrews, Mrs 5157
Andrews, Clark 757–759, 761–763, 1513, 4309, 4310, 4328

Page
Andrews, Mrs. Clark 4309, 4310
Andrews, Roy Chapman 2710
Andrews, Seymour L 4119
Andrus, J. Russell 54, 5295, 5506, 5507, 5684, 5699
Andy 4823
Anesaki, Masahara 5333, 5506, 5507
Angelino, A. D. A. de Kat 5684
Angell, Norman 5040, 5506, 5507
Anglo-American Alliance 2632, 2634
Anglo-American Coalition 4203
Anglo-American Russian Summer School 4580
Anglo-Soviet Treaty (1942) 5076
Anglo-Chinese College (Foochow) 996
Anglo-French-Soviet Alliance 4201
Anglo-French Negotiations 3931
Anglo-German-American Cartel System 608
Anglo-Japanese Alliance 49, 3324, 3691
Angus, Mr 173, 321, 471, 472
Angus, Prof. H. F 768, 770, 3333, 5508, 5509, 5684
Angus, William N 5508, 5509
Anisimov, J. A 4506, 4508
Ankara, Turkey 3757
Annall, Elaine 4992
Annals 571, 572
Annals of American Academy 5649, 5653, 5656
Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science 3981, 3986
Annual Foreign Trade Convention (Waldorf-Astoria Hotel) 2256
ANSCOL (Army and Navy Staff College) 2310
Anstey, Vera 5508, 5509
Anstice, E. H 5508, 5509
Ant Society 2344
Antarctic 4147
Anti-Comintern Pact (November 1936) 4201, 4202
Anti-Imperialist League 3336, 3337
Anti-Japanese Action (Shantung) 2460
Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance (People's Committee) 2437
Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps 2349, 2471
Anti-Japanese Military Academy (Kang-jih Chun-cheng Ta-hsuch) 2433, 2438, 2463
Anti-Japanese Military and Political University 2406
Anti-Japanese National Front (China) 2377
Anti-Japanese University (Yenan) 2465
Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army (Of the New 4th Army) 2463
Anti-Japanese War (China) 2332
Anti-Nazi Literature Committee 4258
Anti-War League North China Association 2467
AP. (*See* Associated Press.)
APO (Army Post Office) 395, 396, 426, 427, 652, 3939
Apostol, John 238, 5209, 5508, 5509
Appadorai, A 5027
Appelman, Morris L 3470, 3471
Appell, Donald T 5502
Appleby, Paul H 2837, 5261
Applezweig, Norman 5709, 5710
Appropriations Committee of the Senate 1532, 3412
Aquitania (steamship) 3331
Araki, General 4148
Araneta, Salvador 5508, 5509
Arbolino, Jack 5508, 5509
Archbold, Mrs. Anne 3794
Archer, Anita 4988
Archey, Gilbert 5508, 5509
Architectual Forum 1647
Area Committee (SWNCC) 1732, 1733
Arens 3241

Page
Arens, Mrs 4041, 4042
Argall, Phyllis 668
Argentina 4651, 4728, 4825, 5692
ARI. (*See* American-Russian Institute.)
Arima, Count 4149
Arita 3931
Ariyoshi, Koji 2789
Armall, Elaine 4993
Armaments Year Book, 1936 (League of Nations) 2891
Armed Forces. (*See* United States Armed Forces.)
Armed Forces Radio Service 736, 757, 759, 2162, 2296
Armed Services. (*See also* United States Army.)
Armed Services Committee (House) 1026, 1041, 1049, 1064, 3114
Armed Services Committee of the Senate 1532
Arms, Brigadier General 4940
Armstrong 3167
Armstrong, Elizabeth H 5508, 5509
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish 2831, 2832, 2834, 5260
Armstrong Junior College 2585
Army. (*See* United States Army.)
Army Air Force. (*See* United States Army Air Force.)
Army Air Intelligence. (*See* United States Army Intelligence.)
Army Ground Forces (United States) 2310, 2361, 2367, 2419–2421
Army Military Mission (China) 1026, 1069
Army and Navy Club (Washington, D. C.) 586
Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) 2310
Army Public Information Service 2771
Army Service Forces (United States) 2310
Army War College 900, 1132, 1551, 2310
Arnall, Ellis Gibbs 5656
Arndt, Dr. Christian O 2521, 2776, 3964, 4944, 5699
Arneman, Lt. Col. George E 4125, 5207
Arneson, Mr 4823, 4830
Arneson, Elizabeth Yard 4823, 4830
Arnold 5132, 5137
Arnold, Carl 4823, 4830
Arnold & Co., Ltd 1967, 3151
Arnold, Edwin G 5699
Arnold, Fortas & Porter 2898, 4028, 4359, 4457, 4459, 4460, 4464, 4467, 4468, 4470, 4471
Arnold, John (*see* Abraham Chapman) 643
Arnold, Julean 576, 577, 4983, 5078, 5090, 5508, 5509
Arnold, Thurman 3206, 3207, 3259, 3277, 3353, 3533, 3573, 3605, 3606, 4743, 4744, 5112
Aronson, Jack 3840
Aroon, Sheh Bidien Bin Aroon. (*See* Bidien, Charles.)
Arosev 5083, 5121–5123, 5135
Arosev, A. Ia 188, 189
Arosev, A. J 4497, 4504, 4508
Arosev, I. S 2706
Arctic 4147
Arctic Institute of America 3557, 3558, 4915, 5083, 5112
Arctic Periodical 2707
Arctic Research Institute 3557
Artist, Rev. Edgar R 4115
Arvin, Newton 4258
Asahi Institute of the Far East 362, 363, 3168
Asahi Shimbun 367, 370
Asakian, Ferri 4748
Asanuma 2451
Asbeck, F. V 5508, 5509
Ascher, Charles S 2684
ASF. (*See* Army Service Forces.)
Ashton-Gwatkin (C. M. G.) F. (P. J. pen name) 4122, 5508, 5509

Page
Asia 1136, 3580, 3628, 3654, 3661, 3667, 3703, 3767, 3768, 3771, 3811, 3812, 3815, 3816, 3863, 3866, 3881, 3882, 3885, 3887, 3893, 3908, 3909, 3926, 3943, 3946, 3947, 3955, 3959, 3970, 3971, 3986, 3991, 3994, 4028, 4029, 4047, 4165, 4267, 4273, 4286, 4447, 4454, 4516, 4525, 4534, 4536, 4537, 4539, 4544, 4691–4693, 4696, 4697, 4703, 4708, 4710–4712.
Asia Institute 3903
Asia Magazine 396, 4592, 5047, 5240
Asia and the State Department 3666, 3668
Asian Congresses 1271, 1626, 1627
Asia's Captive Colonies 3880
Asiatic Fleet (United States) 995
Asiatic Russia 1328
Asiaticus. (*See* Hans Moeller.)
Askew, J. Thomas 2585
Askins, H. R 4810
Associated Farmers in California 4113
Associated Press (AP) 386, 1094, 1132, 1142, 1172, 2188, 2255, 2273, 3032, 3220, 3536, 1855, 5105, 5256, 5334, 5395.
Associated Telephone Services 712
Associated University (Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region) 2454
Association of Atomic Scientists 3538
Astor, Lord 3483
Astor, Viscount 4893
Astor, W. W 5334
ASTP (Army Services Training Program) 2590
Atcheson, George, Jr 618, 1435, 1701, 1702, 1788, 1817, 1818, 2076, 2102, 4542, 4876, 4925, 4926
Atherton, Frank C 261, 713, 1217, 1227, 4125, 4126, 4146, 5139, 5207, 5319, 5334, 5335
Atherton, J. Ballard 578, 4944, 5323
Atherton, Ray 2835
Atkinson, Allen 4724
Atkinson, Brooks 213, 217, 638, 1229, 1376, 1392, 1394, 1422, 1424, 1443, 1469, 2315, 3757, 4330, 4331, 4691, 4823, 4830, 4847, 4849
Atkinson, Ellen Van Zyll de Jong 1004, 1033, 1034, 1149, 1150, 2116, 3516, 3909, 3964, 4622, 4805, 4829, 5710
Atkinson, Henry A 409, 410, 1513
Atlanta Prison 543
Atlanta University 2658
Atlantic Charter 215, 218, 613, 633, 815, 2839, 4164, 5009, 5068, 5076
Atlantic City Jamboree (The Socialist) 2643
Atlantic City UNRRA Conference 1733, 2868
Atlantic Monthly 544, 1136, 1230, 2981, 3580, 3666, 4592, 5040, 5181
Atlantic Monthly Press 1136
Atlantic Pact 1065, 1268, 1287, 1337, 1485, 1532, 1536, 1555, 1584, 1586, 1606, 1610, 1625, 1626, 4710
Atlas of Far Eastern Politics 3937
Atlas of World Maps (ASTP) 2590
Atlee, Prime Minister 732, 733
Atwater, Reginald 4983
Atwood, Stanley 2161
Auchter, E. C 2819, 4944
Auckland University College 3168, 5320
Auemoy 4535
Auerbach, Beatrice 5299
Auerbach, Sol (James S. Allen) 70, 245–251, 253, 254, 439, 471, 640, 1439, 1440, 1470, 1642, 2876–2896, 2987, 3061, 3125, 3128, 3190, 3343–3346, 3348–3351, 3842, 4208, 4209, 4859, 4861, 5337, 5345, 5356, 5506, 5507, 5684.
August, H. F 5327
August, Karl. (*See* Karl Wittfogel.)
Auriea, Juan Mariveilli Vid 4081

Page
Austern, Hilda (Mrs. Nat Bretholtz, also Hilda Ray) 70, 122, 266, 281, 414, 418, 471, 476, 641, 642, 660, 663, 664, 695, 768, 769, 863, 945, 956, 957, 998, 1763, 2115, 2511, 2589, 2593, 2610, 2624, 3167, 3505, 3592, 3593, 3612, 3859, 4044, 4053, 4054, 4076, 4086, 4092–4094, 4097, 4105, 4106, 4108, 4109, 4131, 4143, 4241, 4578, 4861, 4890, 4891, 4984, 4987, 4988, 4991, 4993, 5010, 5045, 5054, 5139, 5161, 5189, 5198, 5199, 5204, 5207, 5218, 5242, 5254, 5287, 5295, 5362, 5516, 5517, 5704.
Austern, Marjorie 4987
Austin 5643
Austin, Gov. Horace 4618, 4886
Austin, Senator Warren R 2809, 2810, 2835, 2867, 4834
Austin, Dr. William M 327, 3961
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin 385, 386, 5328
Australia 2013–2016, 2170, 2556, 2636, 2679, 3318, 3566, 3592, 3593, 3632, 3851, 3881, 3936, 4070, 4080, 4112, 4526, 4551, 4893, 4936, 4971, 5130, 5318, 5319, 5320–5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5334, 5349, 5356, 5367, 5668, 5670, 5707.
Australia and the Far East 3167
Australian Embassy (Washington) 5295
Australian Broadcasting Commission 1216
Australian Cabinet 2636
Australian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 3168
Australian Institute of International Affairs 1215, 1236, 5320
Australian Labor Party 2636
Australian Legation (Washington, D. C.) 440, 2125, 5049, 5052
Australian Railways 3936
Austria 3592, 3702, 4204, 4637, 5076, 5201, 5382
Austrian Embassy (Moscow) 5070
Auto-Motor Export Corp 192–194, 197
Autumn Crop Uprising (Hunan, 1927) 2322, 2323, 2467
Avorin. (*See* Abolin.)
AVCO 775
AVCO International Corp 4079
Avco Manufacturing Co 2534, 2536, 2537
Aversa, Ray 4117
Avery, Sewell 3450
Awaken Society 2455, 2470
Award 4826
Axis 351, 495, 597, 598, 600, 607, 638, 1015, 1104, 1532, 2604
Axis-Japan Alliance 4203
Axis Powers 2377, 2381, 4972, 5000, 5231, 5232
AYD. (*See* American Youth for Democracy.)
Ayers, Rita 5704
Ayling, Keith 5647
Ayscough, Florence 270
Aziz, Ungku A 5508, 5509

B

B. of L. E. Journal 2665
Babcock, Mrs. W. R 1513
Bache, Carl 5508, 5509
Bachman, George 4936
Bachman, Paul S 1313, 4125, 4126, 5207, 5508, 5509
Bachrach, Marian 581, 4136, 4614, 4757
Bacon, Dr. Charles S 4258
Bacon, Mrs. Robert L 2567, 5047
Bacon, Miss Ruth 2036
Badeau, Dr. John 2582
Badger, Admiral 1503, 3838, 4534
Badoglio 552
Baernsprung, H. W 3505, 5216, 5508, 5509
Bagwell, May 2789
Baidukov, George 645
Baie de Cam Ranh 3936

Page
Baikal-Amur Railway 675, 2592
Bailey, K. H 2124, 2125, 5508, 5509
Bailie Memorial Technical Training School 3792, 3793
Baillargeon, Mr 712
Bain, H. Foster 2582, 2811, 5062, 5508, 5509, 5684
Bajpai, Girja S 5048, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5090
Baker, Mr 4569
Baker, Frank E 1514, 2658
Baker, I. E 5323
Baker, John Earl 1631, 5508, 5509
Baker, Nathan M 5510, 5511
Baker, Newton D 9, 73, 177, 684, 890, 1216, 1219, 2891, 2985, 3177, 3851, 3857, 3881, 4054, 4070, 4071, 4086, 4087, 4100, 4108, 4130, 4135, 5067, 5153, 5156, 5228, 5320, 5324, 5333.
Baker, O. E 5699
Baku Congress of Nations 2318
Bakulin, A. V 4881
Balamuth, Louis 485, 486, 487, 1218
Balazs, Etienne 5510, 5511
Baldwin. (*See* Alexander and Baldwin.)
Baldwin, Beanie 4174
Baldwin, Hanson W 1229, 3070, 3154, 3700, 3801, 5040, 5041, 5329
Baldwin, Raymond E 4428
Baldwin, Roger 268, 2667, 4115, 4142, 4170, 4171, 4174
Bales, W. L 2809, 2810, 5163, 5348
Balfour, Nina 4989, 4993
Ball. (*See* Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, and Ball.)
Ball, George W 1392, 1483
Ball, W. McMahon 52, 385, 3566, 3591, 5510, 5511
Ball, Maj. William 4046
Ballantine, Joseph W 568, 618, 704, 708, 900, 921, 932–934, 1122, 1123, 1147, 1551, 1576, 1577, 1590, 1592, 1607, 1627, 1636, 1649, 1650, 1662, 1667, 1676, 1739, 1765, 1772, 1773, 1779, 1794, 1823, 1827, 1841, 1851, 1853, 1935, 1936, 2106, 2120, 2123, 2124, 2127, 2130–2132, 2141, 3371, 3377, 3400, 3409, 3894, 3900, 4324, 4532, 4834, 4835, 4876, 4936, 5084, 5169, 5170, 5510, 5511.
Ballard (Little) 1764
Balling, Francis C 5673
Ballinger, Sid 3058
Balliol, Master of 178, 5081, 5276, 5283
Ballis, William 5510, 5511, 5684
Baltic Countries 3944
Baltimore Sun 3035, 3040, 3231, 3268, 4834
Bancroft, Frank C 300, 4285
Band, Claire 5656
Band, William 5656
Bandit Suppression Commission (Nationalist China) 2330
Banff Conference. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Fifth International Conference, Banff, Canada, 1933.)
Bangkok 1505, 3815, 3936, 5702
Bank of America 1217
Bank of California 1217
Bank of Canada 155
Bank of China 17, 82–85, 90–93, 99, 100, 104, 1161, 1471, 2544, 3950
Bank of England 2981, 3435, 3436
Bank of Foreign Commerce (Moscow) 4499, 4504, 4560, 4567
Bank of Hawaii 1217
Bank of Indochina 669, 1623, 2527, 2632
Bank of Japan 2231, 4148
Bankers Club 1148
Bankers Trust Co. (New York City) 901, 1217, 1220, 3080, 3704, 4835
Banks, Edythe M 4989, 4992
Banzai, General 5705
Bao Dai 1286, 1604, 1609, 1611

Page
Barach, Mrs. Edmond ---- 4136
Baranov, T. E ---- 4509
Barber, Alvin ---- 5510, 5511, 5711
Barber, F. P. A ---- 5299
Barber, Joseph ---- 4108, 4987, 4988, 5510, 5511
Barcelona, Spain ---- 4519, 4520, 4235
Barclay, George W ---- 5510, 5511
Baring, Danzil ---- 3167
Barkley, Vice President Alben ---- 4714, 4748
Barkoff, Mr ---- 3224
Barley, L. J ---- 4893
Barlow, Edward L ---- 4984, 5011, 5012
Barlow, Samuel L. M ---- 410, 1513
Barmine, Alexander Gregory ---- 181–222, 1225, 3097–3103, 3108, 3234, 3235, 3326, 3365, 3499, 3577, 3611, 3704, 4953, 4954, 5207
Barnard, President ---- 5026
Barnes, Betty ---- 70, 5345
Barnes, Carleton P ---- 5510, 5511
Barnes, Harry Elmer ---- 4091, 4145
Barnes, Joseph Fels ---- 70, 78, 82, 178, 200–203, 208–211, 243, 244, 246, 287, 288, 301, 323, 325, 327, 424, 425, 431, 432, 444, 490, 491, 494, 541–544, 648, 683, 687, 689, 856–860, 980, 1108, 1193, 1197, 1210, 1314, 1320, 1322, 1326, 1694, 1695, 1916, 2518, 2583, 2584, 2587, 2600, 2613, 2701, 2702, 2720, 2784, 2785, 2811, 2976, 2977, 2986, 3099, 3102, 3103, 3125, 3138, 3201, 3202, 3337, 3338, 3339, 3484, 3505, 3512, 3513, 3514, 3592–3595, 3854, 3883, 3896, 3907, 3941, 4035, 4126, 4130, 4355, 4492, 4915, 4955, 4956, 4965, 4973, 5083, 5084, 5113–5117, 5120–5122, 5126, 5127, 5159, 5163, 5164, 5167, 5168, 5185, 5227, 5229, 5234, 5235, 5252, 5259, 5274, 5286, 5299, 5308, 5510, 5511, 5685.
Barnes, Kathleen (Mrs. Joseph Fels Barnes) ---- 8, 70, 253, 254, 262, 263, 644–649, 687, 945, 2518, 2599–2617, 2700, 2880, 2986, 3126, 3128, 3137, 3167, 3168, 3241, 3321, 3343, 3429, 3480, 3481, 3484, 3775, 3929, 4043, 4086, 4087, 4090, 4091, 4094, 4096, 4097, 4108, 4135, 4144, 4145, 4208, 4209, 4500, 4503, 4561, 4562, 4567, 4569, 4860–4862, 4916, 4958, 4967, 4972, 4988, 5107, 5124, 5128, 5130, 5132, 5135, 5137, 5140, 5154, 5156, 5160, 5162, 5172, 5181, 5236, 5238, 5356, 5510, 5511.
Barnes, Shiman ---- 5123
Barnett, Mr ---- 268, 1634, 1635, 1636
Barnett, Abraham ---- 4990, 4993
Barnett, Eugene E ---- 138, 712, 713, 723, 970, 971, 1219, 2622, 2881, 4107, 4983, 5268, 5365, 5510, 5511
Barnett, Patricia Glover ---- 4616
Barnett, Robert W. (Bob) ---- 32, 33, 70, 137–140, 389, 391, 397, 445, 474, 481, 575–577, 651, 660, 670, 671, 680, 681, 687, 1152, 1236, 1693, 1694, 1695, 1758, 1764, 1912, 2248, 2486, 2511, 2512, 2518, 2625, 2776, 2832, 3964, 3983, 4075, 4226–4228, 4616, 4823, 4830, 4935, 4958, 4967, 4975, 4976, 4978, 4979, 4980, 4983, 4987, 4988, 5011, 5107, 5198, 5199, 5210–5212, 5215, 5231, 5234, 5241, 5244, 5272, 5342, 5510, 5511, 5699, 5710.
Barnett, Mrs. Robert W. (Pat) ---- 2248, 2521, 2776, 3964, 4075, 5000, 5231, 5234, 5295, 5510, 5511, 5694, 5999
Barr, Gen. David ---- 1122, 1597, 3114, 3994, 4046
Barrett, Col. David ---- 636, 638, 785, 1442, 2425, 4220, 5370
Barrett, Edward ---- 3998
Barrett, Mary ---- 143, 4328, 4329
Barrow, John ---- 2521, 2676, 5294, 5295, 5699
Barrows, General ---- 3264, 5242, 5243
Barrows, Miss ---- 4714
Barry, John D ---- 3548, 3549
Barton, Edward ---- 722
Barton, William ---- 5510, 5511, 5684
Bartunek, Joseph W ---- 5674, 5682

Page
Bass, Basil 5238
Bassett, Arthur 432, 857, 4973
Bassett, Ted 3057, 3826
Bassie, Veet 4748, 4755
Batangas Province 3815
Batavia 4111
Bates, Elizabeth A 4992, 4993
Bates, M. S 3169, 5510, 5511, 5684
Bates, Searle 239, 259, 306, 432, 444, 857, 4973, 5209
Bator, Ulan 4525
Batory (steamship) 590, 591
Batt, W. L 2809, 5047
Bau, Mingchien 5350
Baudette, Philippe 5042, 5053
Baudoin, Paul 669, 2632
Bauer, P. T 5510, 5511, 5684
Baum, Marjorie 4991, 4993
Baumgartner, Dr. Leona 410, 1513
Bavarian Republic 2693
Baxter, Dr. James Phinney 428, 444, 3805, 4834, 5001
Baxter, Joseph P 4959, 4984
Bay Region Committee (*See also* IPR) 2138, 2139
Bazorof, Boris 233, 261
BCFA. (*See* Britain-China Friendship Association.)
B. C. Federationist 2665
Beach, Ethel 3061, 3841
Beach, Joseph Warren 2658
Beaglehole, Ernest 5510, 5511
Beaglehole, J. G 5510, 5511
Beal, Edwin G., Jr 5510, 5511
Beal, George J 4984, 5028, 5030
Beale, Thomas W 4863
Bean, Arthur 5023
Bean, Louis 432, 857, 2831, 2836, 4973, 5261
Bean, Miss Ruth F 327
Bear, Marguerite E 4990, 4992
Beard, Charles A 1309, 3689, 4110
Beard, Margaret 5699
Beardsley, Richard K 5510, 5511
Beatty, Bessie 4258
Beaumont, K. M 5512, 5513
Bechover, M. R 2844, 2853, 2854
Beck, L 5512, 5513
Becker, Carl 5661
Becker, Maurice 4258
Bedacht, Max 3335, 3337
Beecroft, Eric 337, 338, 445, 483, 2521, 4975, 5058, 5256, 5257, 5274, 5288, 5291, 5292, 5294, 5512, 5513, 5699
Beer, Max 4723
Behind the Open Door 2579, 2581, 3943
Behrstock, Arthur 2254
Bekker, Konrad 5512, 5513, 5699
Belden, Jack 5658
Belgion Labour College 2468
Belgium, Government of 4113, 4349, 5074
Bell Act 1285, 1604, 1607
Bell, Aubrey, F 5652
Bell, Sir Charles 2981, 3241, 5512, 5513
Bell, J. Mackintosh 5320
Bell, Reginald 5512, 5513
Belle, Minnie 5512, 5513
Beloff, Max 1222, 2747, 3585, 4888, 5025
Belshaw 177, 577, 5685
Belshaw, Cyril 5322, 5512, 5513
Belshaw, Horace 957, 1216, 1222, 2124, 2126, 2141, 2488, 2590, 3167, 3168, 4991, 4993, 5320, 5322, 5512, 5513

Page
Belshaw, James P 5512, 5513
Belshaw, Michael 4993
Belsky 5161, 5162
Beltz, Edward W 1219
Benedict, Ruth 4861
Beneš, President 1057, 1669, 1670, 3421
Bengal Assembly (India) 5005, 5043, 5044
Benitez, Conrado 3167, 5160, 5320, 5512, 5513
Benitez, Francisco 5319, 5334
Benjamin Franklin Library (Mexico City) 1647
Benjamin, Harold R 3335, 5700
Benjuya, Beatrice 4989, 4993
Bennett, Charles R 5700
Bennett, M. K 5512, 5513
Bennett, Marjorie 5512, 5513
Bennett, Martin T 2791, 5512, 5513
Bennett, Merrill 5186
Bennett, Prime Minister 5115
Bennett, Raymond 5710
Bennington College 3538
Benson, Wilfred 5512, 5513
Bentley, Elizabeth Terrill (Helen Johns) 136, 138, 403, 447, 452, 652, 660, 677, 678, 1202, 1218, 1242, 1246, 2215, 2559, 2644, 2649, 2650, 2717, 2718, 2869, 2870, 3201, 3730, 3731, 3733, 3755, 3756, 3758, 3774, 3781, 3875, 4322, 4402, 4404, 4667, 4670–4673, 4677, 4720, 4737, 4755, 4759, 4775–4782, 4786–4792, 4796–4798, 4801, 4803.
Bentley Group 4759
Benton, Senator William 1756, 2158
Benzon, Wilfred 441
Berendsen, Sir Carl 2248
Berezhovsky, Mrs. Alice. (*See* Mrs. Alice Widener.)
Berg, Dorothy 390, 5291
Berg, Michael. (*See* Borodin, Michael.)
Berger, Milton 3964
Berger, Mrs. Victor L. (Berger, Meta) 4116, 4142, 4258
Berges, William 143
Beria 869
Berkeley Public Library 4090
Berkhov, Robert H 5294, 5295, 5512, 5513
Berkovich, Ia M 190
Berkovich, J. M 4598
Berland, Sam 3336
Berle, Adolph A., Jr 432, 444, 445, 602, 603, 857, 893, 1901, 2626, 2809, 2831, 2835, 3004, 4783, 4973, 4975, 5261
Berlin 4487
Berlin, Agis Verlag 143
Berlin Diary 2103
Berlin, Germany 4136, 4200, 4203, 4234
Berlin-Rome Axis 4202
Berliner Tageblatt 371, 3168
Berman, Isaac 3336
Bernal, J. D 4089
Bernard, John T 2684
Bernardelli, Harro 5512, 5513
Bernardo, Dr. M 5295
Berne, Lewis Alan 4115
Berstein, Harry 5512, 5513
Bernstein, Joseph M 3505, 3943
Berreman, Joel V 5512, 5513
Berridge, William A 4119
Berrie, W. D 5008
Bertram 5188
Bertram, James M 2891, 3169, 4616, 5512, 5513
Beryllium Corp 100
Berzin, Gen. Ian Antonovich 192, 193, 195–206, 208, 212, 216, 217, 222, 1218, 3099, 3102, 3107, 4795, 4953, 4954

Page
Bess, Demaree 3466, 4135
Bessarabia 3944
Best, Emery 3488
Bethune, Dr. Norman 560, 1696, 2445, 2451, 3508, 5368
Bethune Hospital 2405, 2445, 2457, 2466, 2469
Bethune Medical College 2405, 2451
Betjeman, John 5652
Better Economic Order 3167
Betts, Col. Thomas J 386, 2836
Beukema, Col. Herman 432, 444, 857, 2590, 4966, 4973, 5001, 5199
Bevin, Ernest 1061, 1132, 1566, 2169, 2170, 2637, 2680, 3665, 5379
BEW. (*See* Board of Economic Warfare.)
Bewes, Windham H 5512, 5513
Beyster, Harry 5296
Bhott, V. M 5514, 5515
Biales, Robert S 4990, 4993
Bibby, Dr. Henry L 409, 410, 1513, 1514
Biddle, Attorney General Francis 409, 861, 863, 1101, 2883, 3299
Biddle, George 4115
Bidien, Charles 1338, 2789, 3505, 4609, 4610, 4716, 4805, 5279, 5281, 5283, 5514, 5515, 5634
Bidwell, Peroy W 2586, 2834, 5286
Bieberman, Herbert 4038, 4050, 4051, 4063, 4066
Biedenkapp, Fred 3336
Bierman, Edward 4992, 4993
Big Five 2843, 2990
Big Four 611, 786, 825, 993, 2318
Big Three 178, 606, 607, 2529, 2859, 3355, 3357, 3390, 3479
Big Yankee 3059
Bigelow, Professor 4556
Biggerstaff, Knight 568, 998, 2811, 3980, 3982, 3993, 4011, 4012, 4422, 4944, 5111, 5219, 5229, 5514, 5515
Bill. (*See* Walter Grinkied.)
Bill of Rights 2657, 2683, 3365, 3499
Binder, Carroll 264, 432, 444, 857, 1220, 4140, 4973, 5153, 5156
Bingham, Hiram 4837, 4838
Bingham, Robert C 2609, 2615, 2616, 3962
Bingham, Woodbridge 288–290, 341, 3103, 3141, 4226, 4422, 5514, 5515
Biographical Register. (*See* U. S. Department of State Biographical Register.)
Birch, Francis 4089
Birk, Louis P 4258
Birker, Lindsay. (*See* Lindsay Michael.)
Birkhead, Leon 4935
Birmingham University 171, 178, 240
Birobidjan 3173, 3318
Bishop, Carl Whiting 5514, 5515
Bishop, George H 2658
Bishop, Shelton Hale 1514, 1982
Bishop, W. A 4934, 4936
Bissell, Gen. Clayton 495, 859, 1004, 2811, 3019, 4831, 5703, 5710
Bisson, Thomas Arthur 35, 70, 115, 163, 164, 168–170, 172, 173, 177, 253, 254, 284, 285, 288, 289, 302–307, 386, 387, 389, 474, 477, 479, 529, 533–539, 620, 657, 658, 687, 838, 890, 891, 901, 957, 994, 995, 1017–1019, 1025, 1153, 1204, 1229, 1235, 1239, 1511, 1512, 1696, 1697, 1760, 1801, 1902, 1916, 1998, 2005, 2222, 2488, 2492, 2493, 2518, 2524, 2587, 2662, 2717, 2718, 2789, 2880–2882, 3019, 3125, 3128, 3165, 3169, 3284–3287, 3290, 3291, 3297–3304, 3308, 3343, 3364, 3417, 3505, 3581, 3644, 3677, 3793, 3800–3804, 3883, 3895, 3896, 3904, 3941, 3983, 4022, 4085, 4086, 4089, 4092, 4158, 4159, 4288, 4339, 4545, 4605, 4610, 4616, 4622, 4624, 4716, 4847, 4848, 4859–4862, 4880, 4883, 4939, 4981, 4984, 4987, 4991, 4993, 5007, 5008, 5010, 5013, 5023, 5025, 5047, 5053, 5071, 5080, 5148, 5183, 5188, 5193, 5226, 5234, 5235, 5281, 5283, 5297, 5298, 5329, 5424, 5426, 5427, 5514, 5515, 5648–5650, 5654, 5658–5660, 5673, 5685, 5687, 5688, 5706.

Page
Bisson, Mrs. Thomas Arthur 306, 1696, 4847, 4848
Bittelman, Alexander 555, 556, 2961
Black, Colonel 5248, 5249
Black, Justice Hugo 3645
Black, Mrs. Hugo 379
Black, Helen 229, 23
Blackburn, Leo 5674
Blackton, Charles S 5514, 5515
Blackwell, Alice Stone 300, 4258
Blaine, Mrs. Emmons 5298
Blaine, James G 278, 5249, 5252. 5344
Blair Lee House 1842, 1843, 2122, 2124, 2129, 2143, 4291, 4293
Blaisdell, Thomas C 2797, 2798
Blake, Katherine Devereaux 4258
Blake, Robert 5116
Blakeley, R. J 5514, 5515
Blakeslee, Dr. George H 708, 1219, 2017, 2124, 3310, 4127, 4999, 5321, 5335, 5514, 5515, 5700
Blanchard, Paul 3830
Blankfort, Michael 582, 5652
Blenman, Commander William 2180–2182
Bliss, Robert 2567
Blitzstein, Marcy 300, 2658, 4258
Bliven 3923
Bloch 5358, 5514, 5515
Bloch, Felix 4904, 5040
Bloch, Kurt 8, 40, 320, 321, 390, 474, 475, 1222, 2517, 3522, 3523, 3921, 4860, 4987, 4988, 5007, 5008, 5111, 5174, 5186, 5205, 5226, 5236, 5241
Block, Anita 4258
Bloody Ku (Ku Cheng-lun) 2291
Bloom 4714
Bloom, Sol 2124, 2127, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2676, 2835, 3406–3408
Bloor, Mother Ella Reeve 2656
Blos, Dr. Peter 410
Blossom, Mrs. Dudley Stuart 277, 278
Blue Eagle Guerillas 4857
Blue, George V 4958, 4964
Bluecher, Vassily (General Galen) 2319, 2451, 2457
Blumenthal, Anne H. C 4847
Bluementhal, Annette 938, 4086, 4108, 4118, 4987, 4988, 4993, 5704
Blueshirts (Chinese Nationalist Secret Police) 2330, 2331, 2340, 2344
Blum, Leon 3305
Blumberg, Albert 3505
B'nai B'rith 2683
Bo Gu. (*See* Ch'in Pang-hsien.)
Board of Commissars (Russia) 4518
Board of Economic Welfare (BEW) 34, 282, 302, 337, 345, 384, 385, 393, 419, 432, 440, 443, 444, 857, 1298–1301, 1358, 1786, 1796, 1801, 2774, 2775, 2830, 2836, 2869, 3200, 4161, 4226–4228, 4236, 4238–4241, 4245, 4246, 4252, 4279, 4281, 4395, 4622, 4625, 4629, 4736, 4967, 4973, 4977, 5001–5004, 5008, 5009, 5047, 5049, 5052, 5054, 5256, 5260, 5266, 5268.
Boardman, T. D 5040
Boas, Franz 2657, 2658, 2684, 4115, 4136
Bodansky, Aaron 4091, 4145
Bodde, Derk 4610, 4872, 5229, 5336, 5377, 5514, 5515, 5660
Boddy, Manchester 4136, 4137
Bodian, Clara 3337, 4142
Boeke, J. H 254, 1222, 3167, 3173, 5320, 5514, 5515, 5684
Boekel, Colonel 5048
Boericke, William F 5514, 5515
Bogdanoff, Gen. Peter A 2697, 4042
Bogartz, Herman 3336
Bogolepov, Igor 4479–4520, 4553–4590, 4921, 4924, 5500, 5501, 5692
Bororov, B. G 4509, 4555

Page
Bohlen ---- 2729, 2859
Bohlen, Charles E ---- 1851, 5483, 5484
Bohn, Frank ---- 5165
Bole tungsten mine equipment ---- 2384
Bolles, Blair ---- 5105, 5514, 5515
Bolshevik Magazine ---- 2331
Bolshevik Revolution ---- 2343, 2516
Bolsheviks ---- 69, 171, 188, 189, 262, 476, 647, 880, 887, 889, 894, 1316, 1317, 1530, 1613, 2270, 2315, 2331, 2343, 2451, 2454, 2462, 3107.
Bolté, Charles ---- 4833
Bolton, Frances P ---- 440, 995, 1217, 1218, 2124, 2127, 2133, 2248, 2566, 2567, 2809, 4628, 4629, 5052, 5053, 5062, 5287, 5300, 5695, 5700.
Bolton Report ---- 5383
Bond, W. Langbourne ---- 4835
Boni & Gaer, Inc ---- 101
Bonnet ---- 5131, 5184
Bonnet, George ---- 603
Bonnet, Henri ---- 4681, 4682, 5333
Boodberg, Prof. Peter A ---- 4422, 5229
Boody, Elizabeth ---- 5514, 5515
Book and Magazine Guild ---- 941, 942, 945, 3840, 3841, 4111
Book and Magazine Guild, Local 18 ---- 5413
Book and Magazine Union ---- 5366
Boone, Daniel ---- 547, 549
Borchard, Edwin M ---- 1222
Borcic, Dr. B ---- 1514
Borden, Robert ---- 5115
Border Government Council (China) ---- 2334, 2335, 2401, 2402
Border Region Banks (China ---- 2415, 2421, 2427–2429
Border Region Congress (China) ---- 2334, 2335, 2338, 2339, 2402
Border Region Council (China) ---- 2335, 2401, 2402, 2448
Border Region Currency (China) ---- 2421, 2424, 2426, 2427
Border Region General Labor Union (China) ---- 2416
Border Region Government Committee (China) ---- 2401
Border Region Governments (China) ---- 2332, 2334–2339, 2347, 2391, 2400–2403, 2405, 2412, 2413, 2415–2423, 2426, 2427, 2433, 2435, 2440, 2443, 2446
Border Region Peoples Congress (China) ---- 2335, 2431, 2448
Bordofsky, Ben ---- 3060, 3061, 3828
Borg, Dorothy ---- 266, 474, 996, 1227, 2523, 2585, 2627, 2634, 2639, 2689, 4102, 4860, 4861, 4988, 5236, 5350, 5514, 5515
Boris. (*See* Boris Bazorof.)
Borja, Voctorino ---- 5514, 5515
Borkenau, Dr. Franz ---- 1464–1466
Borodin, Michael (Michael Berg) (Grusenberg) ---- 1306, 2319–2321, 2451, 2457, 2465, 2469, 2592, 2699, 2719, 2720, 3235, 3505, 3506, 3530, 3907, 4583, 4584, 4586, 5219, 5384, 5706, 5709.
Borovoy, Hall ---- 5084, 5154
Borovoy, Mrs ---- 4042
Borrie, W. D ---- 5514, 5515
Borrie, W. M ---- 5684
Borton, Hugh ---- 471, 472, 568, 708, 1219, 1839, 2238–2245, 2867–2869, 3167, 3168, 3587, 4834, 4872, 4984, 4987, 5007, 5008, 5048, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5111, 5175, 5176, 5229, 5514, 5515, 5663.
Boruchowitz, Joseph ---- 3335, 3336
Bosch, John H ---- 4115
Bostoko-begenie Institute ---- 2721
Boston Edison Co ---- 100
Boston Globe ---- 4299
Boston Post ---- 3763
Boston University ---- 4116
Boudin, Glickstein & Cohen ---- 4300
Boudin, Leonard B ---- 2475, 2479, 2484, 2495, 2658, 2780
Boudin, Louis B ---- 4089, 4304–4306
Boudreau, Dr. Frank C ---- 2831, 5002, 5260

Page
Boukema, Herman (Beukema) 5256
Boulter, V. M 3167
Boulton, Mrs 5711
Bourgman, Vassily 684, 685
Bourke-White, Margaret 52
Bousquet, G. H 5514, 5515
Bowen, Mary Jane 4989, 4993
Bowen, Sterling 4258
Bowers, Claude G 5661
Bowie, Mrs. W. Russell 4115
Bowman, Dr. Isiah 707, 1220, 1359, 2831, 2834, 2891, 3198, 3219, 3368, 3554, 4119, 4834, 4900, 5260, 5287, 5516, 5517, 5700
Bowman, LeRoy 4142
Bowman, Robert G 5516, 5517
Bowra, Maurice 177
Box, Mr 5204
Boxer Rebellion 2555
Boyd, Mrs. T. Kenneth 3450
Boyd, Roland 11
Boyden, Mrs 3964
Boyer, Raymond 77, 78, 1000, 1001, 5318, 5337
Boyer, Richard 4258
Boyer, R. J. F 1216, 5131, 5321, 5516, 5517
Braake, Alex L. Ter 5516, 5517
Braden, Spruille 743, 2260, 2303
Bradley, Anita 5516, 5517
Bradley, Rev. Dwight J 3793
Bradley, Lyman R 409, 410, 659, 660, 2558
Bradley, Omar 1065, 3114, 4944
Bradley, Philip 2585
Bradley, Lt. Robert J 998
Brady, Alexander 5516, 5517
Brady, Robert A 4258, 5516, 5517
Braibanti, Ralph J. D 5516, 5517
Braisted, William 5700
Brameld, Theodore B 4089
Bramley, Joan 4991, 4993
Branch, Claude R 4692
Brand, Millen 2658, 4258
Brand, Willem 5516, 5517
Brandes, Mr 4234
Brando de Boukelitz 501
Brandt, William 473, 2517, 3249, 3250, 3254, 3259, 3680, 4861, 5240, 5241, 5516, 5517
Brannan, Eleanor D 4142
Bransten, Louise R 3505, 3506, 3621
Brant, Miss Phoebe 4275
Branting, Hajalmar 4234
Branting, Sonya 4234, 4235
Bratislava (Czechoslovakia) 3664
Bratter, Herbert 5516, 5517
Bratton, R. S 4966, 5084, 5163, 5198, 5242–5244, 5247, 5348
Braunich, Arthur 487
Brazil 3592
Brebner, J. B 5516, 5517
Breed, Eleanor 5704
Breines, Simon 685, 4258
Breman Affair 4235
Bremer 4975
Bremman, Mr 2711, 2713, 3481, 3484, 3485, 3586, 4562, 4570
Bremman, Y. P 5084, 5108, 5112, 5157–5159, 5162, 5178
Brenecke, Miss 4872, 4874
Brent, John 5516, 5517
Brest-Litovsk (Central Powers) 2461, 2462
Bretholtz-Austern, Hilda A. (*See* Austern, Hilda.)
Bretholz Family 695

Page

Bretholz, Mrs. (*See* Austern, Hilda.)
Bretholtz, Nat ... 4053
Bretton Woods ... 607
Bretton Woods Conference ... 1758
Bretton Woods and World Security ... 2887
Brewer, Leo ... 4904, 5040
Brewster, Dorothy ... 4089, 4258
Brewster, Owen ... 4943
Brewster, Ralph O ... 5700
Brice, Lola ... 4990, 4993
Bricker, Governor ... 1098
Bridges, Harry ... 4121, 4620
Bridges, Styles ... 639, 1531–1536, 1551, 1538, 3721, 4540, 4541, 4543
Briffault, Robert ... 4258
Brigade Cooperative Management Committee (China) ... 2471
Brigade Field Hospital (China) ... 2444
Brigden, J. B ... 5516, 5517
Briggs, Ellis O ... 743, 2169, 2303
Briggs, Marion ... 4053, 4140
Bright, John ... 4136
Brill, Frank M ... 2636
Brines, Russell ... 5656
Bristol, Admiral Mark ... 3475
Britain. (*See* Great Britain.)
Britain-China Friendship Association ... 5412
British ... 3788, 3813, 3837, 3922, 3923, 3958, 3959, 3973, 3974, 3975, 3988, 3989
British-American Military Operation Zones (Europe) ... 2305, 2310
British-American Tobacco Co ... 17, 1159, 1216, 1701–1703, 1788, 1789, 1988
British and American policy in the Far East ... 4203, 4211
British Army ... 5093, 5094
British Army (China) ... 2310
British Army Field Service Regulations ... 2674
British Army Intelligence Service ... 4087, 4131
British Commonwealth ... 1635, 1679
British Communist Party ... 4316, 4317, 4353
British Conservative Party ... 1651
British Embassy:
  Bangkok ... 5193
  Berlin ... 5193
  Brussels ... 5193
  Canberra ... 5193
  China ... 5276
  Chungking ... 5193
  Hague ... 5193
  Hong Kong ... 5190
  Moscow ... 2711, 2712, 2729, 5463
  Paris ... 5193
  Rome ... 5193
  Shanghai ... 5193
  Stockholm ... 3931
  Tokyo ... 372–374, 5193
  Washington, D. C ... 440, 4832, 4936, 5009, 5048, 5052, 5348, 5700, 5702
British Espionage Act ... 1033
British Foreign Office ... 51, 66, 170, 1033, 1771, 2250, 3701, 5376
British-French negotiations ... 3226
British Gibraltar of the East ... 2632
British Government ... 390, 1118, 2013–2017, 2090, 2091, 2125, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2187, 2207–2212, 2265, 2297, 2309, 2310, 2314, 2315, 2317–2320, 2324, 2340, 2342, 2343, 2355, 2358, 2363, 2373–2377, 2379–2383, 2386, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2398, 2400, 2461, 2502, 2503, 2520, 2526, 2528–2531, 2538, 2548, 2553–2556, 2580, 2589, 2628, 2629, 2634, 2637, 2638, 2671–2681, 2684–2689, 2709, 2838, 2841, 2849–2851, 2856–2863, 2869, 2990, 2991, 2997, 3011, 3021, 3024, 3076, 3078, 3079, 3109, 3119, 3137, 3140, 3172, 3175, 3178–3180, 3196, 3223, 3224, 3226, 3248, 3249, 3269, 3270, 4128.

Page
British India Command 1424
British Institute of Pacific Relations. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, British.)
British Joint Chiefs of Staff 1033
British Labor Government 617, 1267, 1651, 3665, 4317
British Labour Party 5412
British Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1771, 1772
British Liberal Party 1216
British Loan (Chinese Nationalist Government) 3148
British Military Intelligence 5371
British Ministry of Information 5019
British Navy 578, 5190
British Navy (China) 2324
British North Borneo Chartered Co 4893
British Parliament 2628
British Quakers 2736
British railway loans 3131
British Tories 1013
British Troops (Hong Kong) 2017
British United Aid to China Fund 4619
British YMCA. (*See* Young Men's Christian Association.)
Britton, Roswell S 5516, 5517
Broad Street Club (New York City) 1233
Brodie, Bernard 1144, 1147, 1148, 1551, 1575, 1576, 1583, 1600, 1601, 1613, 1614, 1619, 1622, 1635, 1636, 1658, 3992, 4835, 5040, 5516, 5517.
Brodie, Fawn M 5516, 5517
Brodrick, Alan Houghton 5516, 5517
Broek, Jan. O. M 266, 660, 1222, 1236, 2581, 4988, 4989, 4993, 5003, 5083, 5516, 5517
Brogan, D. W 3167, 3168, 5518, 5519, 5661
Bromberg, J. E 4258
Bromfield, Louis 300
Bromoff, Mr 4779
Brondgeest, C 5518, 5519
Bronk 3557
Bronson, George 4271
Bronx warehouse 1174
Brooke, Raymond D. (*See* Chen, Han-seng.)
Brookings Institute 6, 900, 996, 1224, 1551, 1628, 3886, 4568, 4834, 4835, 5067, 5702
Brookline (Mass.) High School 2585
Brooklyn College 2659, 3168
Brooklyn Interracial Assembly 1105
Brooklyn, New York 3903
Brooks, Murray G 5193, 5289
Brooks, Overton 597
Brooks, Van Wyck 300
Brookwood Labor College 2620
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees 1104
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paperhangers of America, District Council No. 9 4116
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen 1104
Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks 1104
Brotherhood of Teamsters (AFL) 1104
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen 4116
Brothero, Sir George 5203
Brothman, Abraham 404
Browder, Earl Russell 89, 106, 175, 176, 180, 268, 293, 297, 333, 405, 415, 435, 438, 520, 521, 528, 535, 541–546, 548, 550, 551, 559, 560, 562–564, 593–595, 598–601, 605, 626, 643, 644, 657, 679, 700, 826, 883, 902, 903, 1012, 1088, 1090, 1099, 1106, 1108, 1224, 1294, 1295, 1308, 1392, 1438, 1470, 1687, 1697, 1764, 2661, 2976, 2977, 3072, 3283, 3305, 3414, 3415, 3507, 3530, 3532, 3560, 3843, 3956, 3966, 4084, 4110, 4142, 4170, 4172–4175, 4177, 4179, 4180, 4182, 4237, 4238, 4597, 4615 4759, 4787, 4788, 4881, 4924–4928, 5023, 5219, 5308, 5310, 5622.

Page
Brown Bros. & Co. (Philadelphia) 1220
Brown, Delmer M 4160, 5336, 5518, 5519
Brown, Don 5022, 5415
Brown, Elizabeth 78
Brown, Emily 4823, 4830
Brown, Esther 4989, 4993
Brown, Francis J 2585
Brown, Fred 520, 521, 4616
Brown, H. Clifford 568
Brown, Harold Chapman 2658
Brown, Harrison 5518, 5519
Brown, Harry Peter M'nab 5647
Brown, Harvey 1104
Brown, Irving 640
Brown, John 548
Brown, Neil 4822
Brown, Norman 444–446, 483, 4975, 4977, 5018, 5256, 5257
Brown, Percy S 3794
Brown, S. C 1271, 1627, 1628, 1629, 1631, 1634, 1636, 1641, 1679
Brown, Stuart Gerry 5661
Brown W. Norman 336–338, 1071, 5518, 5519
Brown, William O 3964, 5700
Browne, Effie 5295
Brownell, Herbert 839
Brownell, Lincoln C 568, 1219
Brownell, Mrs 5299
Bruce, David 3923, 5485–5487
Bruce, Robert 4991, 4992, 4993
Bruening (former German Chancellor) 3917
Brumbaugh, A. J 4834
Brunauer, Esther Caukin 70, 2595, 2831, 2867, 2868, 2869, 4622, 4716, 5261, 5346, 5518, 5519, 5644.
Brunner, Edmund De S 5518, 5519
Bruno, John 3337
Bryan, E. H. Jr 5518, 5519
Bryan, Helen R 4117
Bryan, Julien 5697
Bryant, Elizabeth 4992, 4993
Bryn Mawr College 149, 2561, 3518, 3862, 4258, 5260, 4478, 4582
Bryson, Hugh 1338, 2789
Bryson, Lyman 5002
Buchanan, Norman S 2523
Bucharin 3173
Bucholt, Joe 3846
Buchsbaum, Betty E 4991, 4993
Buck, Mr 4590, 5685
Buck, J. Lossing 1221, 1222, 3867, 3989
Buck, Paul Herman 5303
Buck, Pearl 52, 163, 713, 1229, 1313, 2622, 3801, 3802, 3803, 4245, 4301, 5064, 5255, 5329, 5518, 5519, 5647
Buck, Peter H 4125, 4126, 5207
Buckman, Rilma 4987
Bucyrus-Erie Co 996, 2810
Budenz, Louis Francis 513, 701, 839, 1077–1110, 1112, 1165, 1170, 1218, 1224, 1297, 1308, 1333, 1350, 1354, 1357, 1358, 1361, 1366, 1367, 1380, 1403–1410, 1418–1424, 1426, 1428, 1429, 1436, 1438, 1439, 1443, 1444, 1448, 1449, 1451–1455, 1457–1462, 1467–1469, 1471–1480, 1486–1489, 1687–1689, 1699, 1700, 1778, 1903–1908, 1914, 2092, 2274, 2276, 2279, 2280, 2475, 2559, 2621, 2624, 2650, 2661, 2690, 2744, 2745, 2747, 2894, 2958–2962, 2964, 2966, 2969–2977, 2979, 2981, 2984, 3053, 3054, 3093, 3103, 3283, 3760–3763, 3769–3770, 3773, 3778–3781, 3905, 3941, 3942, 3944, 3947, 4078, 4167, 4195, 4358, 4359, 4363, 4364, 4369–4377, 4389, 4398, 4399, 4458, 4460, 4467–4471, 4866, 4944, 5023, 5426.

Page
Budzeslawski, Herman 3507
Buell 5208, 5260
Buell, Dr. Raymond Leslie 175, 180, 1982, 2831, 4130, 4239, 4245, 5518, 5519
Buesst, Tristan 5320, 5518, 5519
Building and Construction Workers League 3336
Building Maintenance Workers Industrial Union 3336
Buitenkaut, Jacques 3337
Bukhara 4593, 4881
Bulgarian Government 1780, 2629, 3942
Bulick 5050
Bulkley, Dunton Paper Co. (New York City) 1528
Bulletin of American Schools of Oriental Research 342
Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the Academy of Science of the U. S. S. R. 3582
Bulletin on the Soviet Union 297, 298, 2707
Bullit, Ambassador William C 1393, 2690, 3327, 3328, 3616, 3702, 4520–4552, 4834, 4900
Bulwinkle, Alfred L 2835
Bumgardner, Chia-ling 4991, 4993
Bunce, Arthur C 1887, 1888, 2249, 2250, 5518, 5519
Bunche, Ralph J 432–444, 445, 857, 990, 993–995, 1036, 1215, 1220, 2124, 4089, 4973, 4975, 4977, 5210, 5289, 5700, 5703
Bundy, George 4532
Bundy, Harvey H 446, 4692, 4975
Bundy, Mrs 3564
Bundy, Mrs. Robert E 3562, 3607
Bunsch-Osmolovsky 4567
Burckhardt, Colonel 5195, 5196
Burden, Shirley 4063, 4066, 4067
Burden, William A. M 494, 858, 859, 2810, 4063, 4066, 4067, 4956, 4977, 5199, 5249, 5299, 5700, 5703
Burdick, Usher L 4115
Burdick, Virginia 4091, 4144, 4145, 5084, 5165, 5170, 5181
Bureau of Budget 432, 857, 2921
Bureau Ehrhardt 4431, 4432, 4440, 4442
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce 432, 477
Burgeson, Dorothy 5700
Burgess, J. Stewart 5518, 5519
Burgum, Edwin Berry 2658, 4089, 4117, 4258
Buriat Mongols 2562, 3317, 3318
Burke, Fielding 4258
Burke, James 5518, 5519
Burke, Kenneth 4089
Burke-Wadsworth conscription bill 2674
Burks, Ardath Walter 3964, 5518, 5519, 5700
Burleigh 2855
Burley, Mr 4787
Burlingham, Charles C 5252
Burma 1604, 2482, 3342, 3623, 3632, 3713, 3837, 3936, 3946, 4533, 4534, 4536, 4687, 4689, 4691, 4772, 4871, 5193, 5294, 5331, 5395, 5692
Burma Campaign 3501
Burma Road 382, 1383, 1440, 1621, 1639, 2584, 2634
Burn, North 5379
Burnett, Patricia G. (Barnett) 5518, 5519
Burnham, James 674
Burns, Rev. Clarence 3630
Burns, Elizabeth 3964
Burns, Emile 4882
Burns, Ray 4823, 4830
Burpee, Lawrence J 5518, 5519
Bursler, Norman 4675, 4737
Burt, Virginia 4993
Burt, Samuel 3336
Burthold 5008
Burton, Esther 99
Burton, Herbert 5518, 5519

Page
Burton, William 5518, 5519
Burtt, John O 5518, 5519
Buryat-Mongolia 3463, 3464, 3483, 3485
Bush, Chilton 5518, 5519
Bush, Vannevar 5040
Busick, Ralph H 5700
Buss, Claude A 900, 921, 1147, 1551, 1579, 1619, 1626, 1627, 1648, 1649, 4225, 4226, 4835, 5024, 5520, 5521.
Bussard, Father 1325, 3109
Busuego, Mr 5295
Busuego, Mrs 5295
Butkovich, John D 4115
Butler, Mr 5206, 5263
Butler, H. B 5048, 5053
Butler, Dr. Nicholas Murray 134, 2814, 2818, 3883, 4474, 5289
Butler, Paul 5520, 5521, 5684
Butler, R. A 3589
Butler, Maj. Gen. Smedley D 4169
Butterworth, W. Walter 1062, 1128, 1260, 1266, 1273, 1289, 1351, 1500, 1554, 1565, 1568–1573, 1578, 1630, 1638, 1639, 1658, 3078, 3894, 3900, 3992, 3993, 3995, 3998, 4429, 4430, 4437, 4438.
Butrose, Charles 5520, 5521
Butts, Grace Leah 4991, 4993
Butts, Halleck A 5700
Bux, Allah 5004, 5006, 5042, 5043
Byas, Hugh 2809, 5520, 5521
Byington, Homer M 2186
Bykofsky, Edith 4987, 4991, 4993
Bykov, Col. Boris 488-490
Byrnes, Mr 5393, 5484, 5486
Byrnes, James Francis 617–619, 633, 637, 639, 691, 692, 722–727, 731, 738, 745, 746, 928, 1101, 1709 1710, 1713-1715, 1717–1720, 1851, 1852, 1859, 1860, 1872, 1888–1891, 1901, 1903, 1907, 1916, 1963, 2120, 2124, 2164, 2169, 2170, 2197–2204, 2217–2219, 2251, 2295, 2298, 2592, 2848, 2852, 2861, 2862, 3109, 3112, 3398, 3667, 4542–4546, 4548, 4840, 4877, 5274, 5292, 5652.
Bywater, Hector C 3139, 3154, 3155, 3157, 5520, 5521

C

C. and G. S. S. (Command and General Staff School) 2310
Caballero, Mr 4234
Cabinet Advisory Council (Japanese) 4147
CAC. *(See* China Aid Council.)
Cadbury, Mr 2734
Cadbury Chocolate Interests 2736
Cadden, Joseph 4115
Cadogan, Sir Alexander 2857
Cady, John F 5520, 5521, 5700
Cahill, Holger 5652
Caidin, Stanley 5295
Caiger, George 5027, 5520, 5521
Cain, Harry P 4816, 4820
Cairo 3503
Cairo Conference 816, 1485, 2382, 2502, 2555
Cairo Declaration 734, 1868, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2310, 5073, 5671
Calder 5183
Caldwell, John Cope 4823, 4830, 5294, 5295, 5653, 5700
Caldwell, Oliver 4143, 5520, 5521
California Committee on Un-American Activities 1162, 1229, 2652, 4011, 4616
California Committee on Un-American Activities, report 1948, 3073
California Communist Political Association 118
California Institute of Technology 5106, 5279, 5280, 5282, 5284
California Japanese. *(See* Nisei.)

Page
California Labor School 3621, 3703, 5040
California Labor School Bookshop 3830
California College in China Foundation 995
California Legislature 4010
California Oil Worker 2665
Calkins, Robert D 712, 713, 970, 971, 995, 1219, 2593, 2622, 4938, 4983, 5289, 5365, 5703
Call to Students 2789
Callahan, James Morton 2891
Callis, H. G 5259, 5692
Callott, M. S 4091
Camden Post Office, New Jersey 3167
Cameron, Angus 70, 649, 650, 3508
Cameron, George T 1313, 4941, 4944
Cameron, Merton 5520, 5521
Camincho 5112
Camman, Schuyler Van R 327, 2248, 3961, 5520, 5521, 5700
Camp Sherwood (Monticello, N. Y.) 3825
Camp Unity 3058, 3061
Camp Unity Bookshop 3825
Campbell, Dorothy 4328, 4329
Campbell, Inez 4988
Campbell, Persia 5520, 5521
Campbell, Robert 5675
Camus, Manuel 5320
Can the Soviet Union Be Isolated 3269
Can We Be Neutral 3167
Canada 3471, 3472, 3575, 3582, 3592, 3632, 3851, 3881, 3919, 3946, 3973, 4064, 4070, 4099, 4118, 4561, 4653, 4659, 4890, 4893, 4936, 4937, 5115, 5130, 5318–5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5335, 5372, 5411, 5705
Canada: An American Nation 3167
Canadian Club 175, 176, 180
Canadian Embassy (Tokyo) 374, 375, 450, 451
Canadian External Affairs Ministry 451
Canadian Foreign Service 378, 749
Canadian Forum 3195
Canadian Friends of the Chinese People 1164, 1166, 3470–3472, 4065, 4273
Canadian Government 749, 2170, 2556, 2676, 2685
Canadian Historical Review 4150
Canadian Institute of International Affairs 5328, 5356
Canadian League Against War and Facism 3470, 3471
Canadian Legation 319–321, 4629, 5049, 5052, 5270
Canadian Legation (Tokyo) 3469
Canadian Legation (Washington, D. C.) 440, 3965
Canadian Prime Ministers 155
Canadian Pulp and Paper Association 4893
Canadian Royal Commission 999, 1001
Canadian Royal Commission Report 2517
Canberra 3880
Canfield, Cass 697
Canham 1648
Caniff, Andrew 3451, 3453, 3581, 5520, 5521
Canning, William Martin 466, 487, 1168, 1169, 2475, 3958, 3962, 3963
Cannon, Mr 3511
Cannon, Marian 5520, 5521, 5704
Cannon, Cavendish 2835
Cannon, Walter B 300
Canokia Valley News 2665
Cantillo, M. Jose Maria 5692
Canton, China 3586, 3709, 4046, 4111, 4442, 4443, 4699, 4700, 4701
Canton Chung-shan University 2471
Canton Commune 2322, 2473
Canton Dissension Movement 2340
Canton-Hankow Railroad 2434, 3810
Canton-Hong Kong Area 2471, 2472

Page
Canton-Kowloon Railway 2090, 2091
Canton University 2454
Canton Uprising 2460
Cape, J 4591
Capell, A 5520, 5521
Capital Preparatory Committee 3950, 3951
Capitalism and Agriculture in the United States 2890
Capitalist Appraisal of the Soviet Union 3443
Capitman, William 1338
Capps, Frances Petrowski 4991, 4993
Carovello, Grace 4987, 4991, 4993
Carbode, Frank 5275
Carey 1075, 1292, 1293
Carlin, Beatrice 447
Carlisle Lumber Co 2638
Carlos, Jose 4857
Carlson 793
Carlson, Captain 4125
Carlson Court (London) 2727
Carlson, Ellsworth C 5700
Carlson, Evans Fordyce (Brig. Gen., USMCR–RT.) ..... 70, 125, 580–588, 1697, 1764, 2546, 2547, 2582, 2979, 3059, 3060, 3472, 3475, 3477, 3478, 3508, 3835, 3836, 3983, 4610, 4616, 4620, 4822, 4860, 4861, 4862, 5052, 5053, 5085, 5111, 5193, 5196, 5216, 5234, 5235, 5346, 5520, 5521.
Carlson Marine Raiders 2547
Carlton House 1481
Carmode, Mr 2250
Carmon, Walt 496
Carnegie Corp ..... 8, 433, 857, 916, 928, 1151, 1167, 1215, 1217, 1219, 1227, 4023, 4160, 4850, 4973, 5090, 5117, 5181, 5207, 5250, 5303, 5322, 5335.
Carnegie Endowment 3637, 3638, 3704, 4969, 5009, 5026, 5063, 5207, 5243, 5289, 5302
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1220, 2586, 2587, 2814, 2817–2819, 2831, 2834, 4107, 4326, 4331, 4474
Carnegie Foundation 8, 31, 134, 135, 1152, 1217, 4836, 4849
Carnegie Fund 4673
Carnegie Institute 1736
Carney, Charles J 5674
Carolyn 4828
Carpenter, J. Henry 3794
Carpenter Lumber Co 2638
Car, E. H. (John Keith) 177, 178, 3585, 4122, 4823, 4830, 5137
Car-Saunders, A. M 4349
Carr, Sam 999
Carrington, John W 4863, 4903
Carroll, Elizabeth H 3562, 3563
Carroll, Esther 3169, 3471, 4272, 4273, 4277
Carroll, Jewerl 4989, 4993
Carroll, Marie J 2585
Carroll, Wallace 5656
Carroll, William A 2896
Carrothers, W. A 5520, 5521
Carter, Mrs 5710
Carter, General 1721
Carter, Bill 2880, 3343, 4208, 4210
Carter, Edward C 4–74, 80, 81, 107–109, 111, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127–180, 191, 237, 239–241, 243, 245, 247, 248, 251, 253, 254, 259–261, 263–266, 268, 270, 277, 279–281, 283, 285, 291, 293, 294, 296, 297, 299, 300, 308, 309, 319, 320, 330, 336–338, 340, 355, 364, 366, 373–375, 378, 382, 383, 385, 390–392, 399, 408, 424–426, 428–434, 438, 440, 449–466, 470, 471, 473, 474, 476, 477, 481, 483, 526, 528, 535–537, 539, 568, 573, 574, 583–591, 620, 630, 631, 642, 643, 648, 660, 661, 664, 669–673, 680, 681, 683–687, 691, 692, 694–698, 711

Carter, Edward C.—Continued Page
769, 837–840, 856, 857, 862, 863, 888, 890–892, 896–905, 915, 924, 925, 937, 957, 964–967, 982, 983, 985, 988, 994, 997, 998, 1002, 1012, 1013, 1153, 1154, 1173–1175, 1182, 1185, 1187, 1189 1190, 1195, 1197, 1199, 1207, 1208, 1210, 1213, 1219, 1231, 1240, 1243–1245, 1312–1314, 1320, 1327, 1513, 1760, 1763, 1799, 1803, 1832, 1887, 1916, 1934, 1982, 1998, 2020, 2087, 2115, 2116, 2124, 2126, 2127, 2146, 2246, 2248, 2512, 2517–2519, 2521, 2523, 2562, 2565–2568, 2582, 2588–2590, 2592–2594, 2601–2604, 2609, 2610, 2614–2616, 2621, 2622, 2626, 2645, 2646, 2700–2703, 2705, 2708–2711, 2713–2718, 2720, 2721, 2727, 2730, 2784, 2785, 2794, 2814, 2819, 2820, 2831, 2832, 2877–2884, 2887–2889, 2891, 2921, 2979, 2989, 2990, 2992, 2994, 2995, 2997, 3014, 3064–3068, 3131, 3135–3138, 3145, 3167, 3171–3173, 3176, 3193, 3199–3201, 3220–3222, 3227, 3228, 3230, 3234, 3236–3238, 3242–3244, 3250, 3260, 3263–3267, 3269, 3274, 3277–3280, 3287, 3309, 3313, 3315–3326, 3328, 3329, 3331, 3332, 3338, 3343, 3344, 3346, 3347, 3354, 3359, 3360, 3362, 3365–3367, 3376, 3380–3382, 3391, 3396, 3415, 3417, 3419, 3422–3431, 3434, 3445, 3447, 3448, 3451, 3453, 3455, 3460, 3462, 3466, 3469, 3473, 3474, 3480, 3483, 3484, 3486, 3487, 3497, 3506, 3522, 3523, 3546, 3552, 3554, 3569, 3579, 3581, 3582, 3585, 3587–3594, 3600, 3603, 3615–3617, 3633, 3634, 3638, 3641–3643, 3649, 3724, 3738–3753, 3755, 3778, 3806, 3807, 3854, 3858, 3859, 3868, 3882, 3909, 3910, 3913–3918, 3920–3932, 3934, 3937, 3938, 3940, 3966, 3976, 3982, 3989, 3990, 4043–4046, 4050, 4052, 4053, 4065, 4067–4069, 4074–4076, 4086, 4087, 4092–4100, 4104–4106, 4108, 4109, 4111, 4121, 4122, 4125, 4126, 4129–4131, 4136, 4140, 4145, 4146, 4161, 4188, 4208, 4209, 4239, 4241, 4242, 4244–4246, 4255, 4263, 4264, 4314, 4358, 4359, 4370–4373, 4376, 4378–4380, 4456, 4462, 4463, 4492, 4497, 4505, 4506, 4522, 4526, 4553–4557, 4560–4563, 4567, 4569, 4571, 4573, 4574, 4576, 4584–4588, 4629, 4807, 4859, 4871, 4872, 4874, 4891, 4907–4924, 4937–4941, 4944–4947, 4953–4958, 4964, 4965, 4967, 4969, 4972, 4973, 4976, 4978, 4980, 4984, 4991, 4993, 4996–5000, 5004, 5010, 5013–5017, 5019, 5020, 5024, 5025, 5027, 5030, 5031, 5041, 5042, 5045–5062, 5065, 5074, 5078–5085, 5089, 5090, 5105, 5107, 5108, 5111–5124, 5127, 5129–5145, 5147, 5149, 5151–5157, 5307, 5309, 5316–5362, 5366, 5520, 5521, 5695, 5703, 5704.
Carter, Mrs. Edward C 409, 410, 620, 622, 1190, 1803, 1804, 1934, 1983, 2020, 2021, 3484, 3555, 3737, 4605, 5056, 5155, 5158, 5164, 5175, 5188, 5201, 5225, 5226, 5275, 5332, 5349, 5356, 5359.
Carter, Elmer 4142
Carter, Gwendolyn M 5520, 5521
Carter, Harriet 5032, 5044, 5059, 5060
Carter, John A 4829, 5032, 5055, 5059, 5060, 5108, 5164, 5175, 5184, 5186, 5277, 5359
Carter, Mabel 5032, 5044, 5047, 5059, 5060, 5083, 5090, 5091
Carter, Mrs. Margaret R. Taylor 2521, 2714, 2718, 5699, 5700
Carter, Ruth 687, 2518, 2521, 2590, 2778, 3860, 3886, 4987, 4990, 4991, 4993, 5056, 5059, 5060, 5065, 5081, 5158, 5160, 5164, 5175, 5179, 5184, 5188, 5201, 5271, 5274, 5279, 5291, 5299.
Carter, William D 414, 415, 2248, 2518, 2521, 2590, 2776, 5032, 5058, 5059, 5061, 5199, 5227, 5256, 5277, 5294, 5520, 5521, 5700
Carter's Barn 2992, 2994, 2995
Carthage S. S 5137
Carusi, J. S 358
Cartwright, Frank T 5520, 5521
Cartwright, Steven 5522, 5523
Case, Mr 3643
Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center 4145
Case, Everett N 264, 917, 1038, 1145, 1146, 1219, 1269, 1553, 1575, 4097, 4127, 4532–4534, 4834, 4900, 4983, 5090.
Case, Francis 5502, 5504
Cashione, P 3337

Page
Caspary, Vera 4258
Cassel, Professor 3695
Cassers, W. G 5522, 5523
Castillo, Andres V 5522, 5523
Castle 4900
Castle & Cooke 1217, 1227
Castro 5041
Catholic Association for International Peace 5700
Catholic missionaries (China) 3629–3631
Catholic Quarterly 2997
Catholic Weekly 2495
Catholic World 3094
Catholic Digest 1322, 1325
Catholic Journal 1171
Catlin, Farrish & Co 1219
Cator, W. J 5684
Cavell, R. G 5027, 5270, 5333, 5522, 5523
Cavert, Mrs. Samuel McCrea 4138
Caustin, Harold E 4635, 4636, 4650
Caxton Printers 2283
CBS. (*See* Columbia Broadcasting System.)
C. C. Clique 1398, 1417, 1441
CCNY. (*See* College, City of New York.)
CDFEP. (*See* Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.)
CDS. (*See* China Defense Supplies.)
Central Accounting Office (Chinese Communist Party) 2410
Central Administrative Bureaus (CCP) 2408
Central Anhwei 2400, 2413, 2434, 2435, 2448, 2463
Central Anhwei Military Region 2434, 2435, 2448, 2452
Central Army Troops (CCP) 2330, 2332, 2333
Central Asian Society 3584, 3604
Central Asiatic Republics of Kazakhstan 4898
Central Bank of China 12, 1159, 3903, 4320
Central China 4131–4133, 4226, 4228
Central Chinese Troops 2524, 2547
Central Committee (Chinese Communist Party) 2318, 2335, 2377, 2399, 2403, 2408, 2410, 2411, 2448, 2451–2466, 2470–2473
Central Committee (China) 2550
Central Committee (Communist Party) 1690, 1973, 4336
Central Committee (CPSU) 2270
Central Daily News 3786
Central Executive Committee (CEC) 3802, 3804
Central Executive Committee (Chinese) 809
Central Executive Committee (Communist Party Headquarters) 2324, 2334, 2335, 2340, 2355, 2434, 2441, 2448, 2454, 2464, 2468, 2471
Central Government (China) 1791, 1993, 2306–2355, 2358–2360, 2363, 2372, 2380, 2381, 2392–2402, 2415, 2418, 2420–2422, 2426, 2433, 2436, 2442, 2443, 2454, 2455, 2459, 2462, 2465, 2473, 2474, 3187.
Central Government Troops 2397, 2463, 2465
Central Headquarters (Chinese Communist Party) 2407, 2408, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2434, 2441
Central Hopeh (Province) 2337, 2338, 2367, 2435, 2466
Central Hopeh Military Region 2466, 2468
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 136, 140, 840, 1289, 1449, 1580, 1780, 2752–2759, 2761–2763, 2767, 2769–2771, 2854, 3007, 3763, 3764, 4775, 4790, 4793, 4801, 5438–5439, 5443, 5444, 5445, 5448, 5452, 5475, 5481, 5482
Central Intelligence Agency, Office Policy Coordination 5438, 5439, 5475
Central Kiangsu 2400, 2413, 2434, 2435, 2448, 2457
Central Kiangsu Base 2457
Central Kiangsu Military Region 2434, 2435, 2448, 2457, 2465, 2469
Central Labor Council, AFL (Seattle Teachers' Union) 2161
Central Labor Council of Seattle 4887
Central News 2344, 2398
Central Officers School (Canton Branch) 2472

Page
Central Party Committee (CCP) 2318, 2339
Central Political Council (CCP) 2326, 2341, 2342, 2345, 2350, 2351
Central Political Protection Bureau (Chinese Communist Party) 2365
Central Powers (Brest Litovsk) 2461, 2642
Central Protection Bureau (Chinese Communist Party) 2459
Central Research Institute (Chinese Communist Party) 2404, 2457
Central Revolutionary Army (Chinese Communist Party) 2465
Central Revolutionary Military Council (Chinese Communist Party) 2404, 2454, 2456, 2466, 2471
Central Shantung Area (Chinese Communist Party) 2472
Central Social Department (Chinese Communist Party) 2365
Central Soviet District (Chinese Communist Party) 2325
Central Soviet Government (Kiangsi) 2467
Central Technical School (Toronto) 3470, 3472
Central Training Institute (Kuomintang) 2395
Century Association 99, 4047
Century Club 4044
Cesbron, Gilbert 5650
Chahar Province (China) 2334, 4151
Chahar-Hopeh Border Region 2347
Chait, Phillis 4650
Chakalsky 2723
Chalfin, Jeanne 4990, 4993
Challenge To The Americas 2586
Chamber of Commerce of Florida 1894
Chamber of Commerce (Moscow) 189, 3934, 4499
Chamber of Commerce (San Francisco) 1666
Chamber of Deputies (Italy) 1268
Chamberlain 3247, 3248, 5340, 5369
Chamberlain, Austin 5349
Chamberlain, John 4117
Chamberlain, Dr. Joseph P 45, 78, 123, 264, 713, 970, 1202, 1217, 1219, 1313, 2622, 2652, 2985, 4037, 4054, 4243, 4943, 5002, 5084, 5153–5158, 5183, 5198, 5225, 5300, 5318, 5339, 5344 5360, 5365, 5522, 5523.
Chamberlain, L. H 4984, 5018
Chamberlain, Mrs 4612, 4613
Chamberlain, Neville 22, 33, 40, 174, 1375, 3196, 3223, 4204, 4264, 4935, 5075, 5179, 5184, 5258
Chamberlain, Mrs. Sellah 4080
Chamberlain, William Henry 676, 2916, 2981, 3457, 3466, 3467, 3585, 3586, 4888, 5274, 5522, 5523
Chamberlin 5685
Chamberlin, Edith 78
Chamberlin, William Henry 1222, 1231, 3943
Chambers, Maria Cristina 4258
Chambers, Robert 4258
Chambers, Whittaker (Jay David) 233, 420, 421, 487–497, 1406, 2215, 2621, 2803, 2821, 2855, 2870, 2875, 3213, 3214, 3216, 3246, 3247, 3828, 4322, 4648, 4673, 4720, 4743, 4752, 4756, 4757, 4775–4787, 4789, 4790, 4795, 4797, 4798, 4800, 4801, 4803, 5354, 5355, 5504
Champlin Refining Co 101
Chan, Hansu. (*See* Chi, Dr. Chao-ting.)
Chan, Shaw Wing 5522, 5523
Chan, T. W 5522, 5523
Chancellor, Sir John Christopher 51, 839, 840, 5326
Chancey, Martin 5675
Chandra, Kiron 5522, 5523
Chandrasekhar, S 5522, 5523
Chang, Ai-ping 2451
Chang, Betty C 143
Chang, C. F 5522, 5523
Chang, C. M 1222, 5522, 5523
Chang, Chih-chung 2549, 5522, 5523
Chang, Chih-yi 327, 3961, 5522, 5523
Chang, Chin-chiu 2405, 2451

Page
Chang, Ching-wu 2404, 2451
Chang, Chun 2342, 2344, 2350, 2351
Chang, Chunnganu 1417
Chang, Fa-k'uei 2322, 2460, 2463, 2473, 2474
Chang, Fa-Kwei 1368, 2289, 2291
Chang, Fu-liang 5345, 5361
Chang, Go-tao (Chang, Te-li–Chang, Kuo-tao) 2451, 2452
Chang, H. C 5345, 5361
Chang, Han-fu 2451
Chang, Hao (Lin Yu-ying) 2403, 2451, 2464
Chang, Hsueh-ling 2329, 2330, 2331, 3306, 3584, 4272
Chang, Ichen 2405, 2451
Chang, Irene Conley 4991, 4993
Chang, Kuo-tao (Chang Te-li, Chang Go-tao) 2329, 2451, 2452, 2458, 2460,
Chang, Lo-fu (Chang, Wen-tien) 2403, 2404, 2452
Chang, Marshal 2330
Chang, Mon-lin. (*See* Chiang, Mon-lin.)
Chang, N. K 5522, 5523
Chang, Nai-chi 3951
Chang, P. C 5203, 5333, 5522, 5523
Chang, P. H 1094
Chang, Po-ling 2342, 5333
Chang, S. T 5522, 5523
Chang, Su 2405, 2452
Chang, Su-Lee 5522, 5523
Chang, Te-i 2452
Chang, Te-li-(Chang, Go-tao; Chang, Kuo-tao) 2451, 2452
Chang, Ting-cheng 2452
Chang, Tse-I 5648
Chang, Wen-ping 2452
Chang, Wen-t'ien (Chang Lo-fu) 2403, 2404, 2452
Chang, Yinwu 2346, 2347
Chang, Yun-i 2404, 2452
Chang, Yun-yi 2448
Changchun Railway 2295
Changing China 3943
Changing Status of the Cabinet in Japan 2890
Changkufeng Incident (July to August 1938) 4132
Chang-lan-fang, General 2357
Changsha College 2460
Changsha Consulate 1966, 1967
Changsik, L 3337
Chao, Bu-wei (Yang) 5652
Chao, General 2380
Chao, F. K 143
Chao, Jung (Hsieh Kang-chih) 2365, 2404, 2452, 2459
Chao, Ting-chi 5692
Chao Yung (Hsieh Kang-chih) 2452, 2459
Chapin, Selden 1755
Chapman, Abraham (John Arnold) 70, 640, 643, 644, 1338, 1764, 2789, 3061, 3500, 3531, 3903, 4078, 4610, 4805, 4941, 5023–5025, 5522, 5523.
Chapman, Agatha 1000, 1001
Chapman, C. L 5274
Chapman, Mrs. Ralph 713
Chapman, Oscar Littleton 5165, 5292
Chapman, Royal N 4126, 5522, 5523, 5684
Chapman, Seville 5040
Chapman, Wilbert McLeod 5522, 5523
Chappel, Winifred 4170, 4171, 4175
Chargar, Thelma 4992, 4993
Charles, Mrs. Alfred D 3964, 5700
Charles, Allen E 264, 1313, 2622, 5186
Charne, George Blake 3059
Chartrand, Chester 5700
Charvet, Jean-Felix 5700

Page
Chase, Mr. 990, 2088, 4335
Chase Bank 4830
Chase National Bank 93, 100, 101, 1151, 1217
Chase, Stuart 5040, 5078
Chatham House (London) 178, 179, 238, 240, 279, 2709, 2710, 3172, 3178, 3316, 3318, 3435, 3436, 3441, 3453, 3483, 3484, 3589, 3593, 3633, 3634, 3922, 3927, 3928, 4108, 4122, 4500, 4577, 5008, 5081, 5127, 5131, 5132, 5135–5137, 5160, 5208, 5284.
Chauncey, Martin 5676
Chavez, Senator Dennis 2963–2965
Chelyuskin 4042
Chemical Bank & Trust Co 101
Chen 5358
Chen, Chang-hao 2403, 2452
Chen, Chen-hsia 2452
Chen, Cheng 2325, 2326, 2334, 2474
Chen, Miss Chi Yi 1514
Chen, Chia-kang 2452
Chen, Chu 5171, 5174–5176
Chen, Chung-fu (Chen Tu-hsiu) 2318, 2321, 2339, 2452
Chen, Eugene 2340
Chen, General 5419
Chen, Geoffrey C. (*See* Chen, Han-seng.)
Chen Group 1629
Chen, Han-seng 50, 53, 70, 160, 259, 786, 809, 817, 1012, 1697, 1762, 1763, 2523, 2524, 2627, 2661, 2705, 2884, 2885, 2889, 2891, 2892, 2989, 3126, 3128, 3241, 3480, 3481, 3483, 3509, 3510, 3521, 3582, 3585, 3587, 3636, 3637, 3790, 3791, 3859, 3860, 3874, 3903, 3910, 3911, 3916–3918, 3938, 3939, 3951, 3952, 3961, 3983, 4002, 4003, 4057, 4059, 4060, 4069, 4095, 4096, 4141, 4146, 4149, 4150, 4231, 4339, 4586, 4587, 4590, 4610, 4615, 4806, 4828, 4860, 4879, 4987, 4996, 5058, 5059, 5080, 5084, 5085, 5112, 5114, 5115, 5162, 5171, 5178, 5179, 5181, 5183, 5186, 5203, 5209, 5219, 5234, 5235, 5237, 5250 5337, 5341, 5356, 5524, 5525, 5704.
Chen, Mrs. Han-seng (Susie) 5235
Chen I (Chen Yi) 2319, 2354, 2372, 2404, 2434, 2448, 2452, 2454
Chen, Jack 4274, 4276–4278, 5412
Chen, Dr. K. P. 15, 18, 786, 809, 817, 1216, 1368, 1384, 2290, 2292, 3313, 3314, 5178, 5235, 5333
Chen, Kang-pai 2405, 2453
Chen, Keng 2403, 2453
Chen, Keng-ya 4884
Chen, Kuang 2433, 2453
Chen, Kung-po 2318, 2360
Chen, Li-fu 1094, 1398, 1441, 2253, 2254, 2290, 4939, 4960
Chen, L. T. 5083
Chen, Ming-shu 2325
Chen, Mrs. 537
Chen, Nan-sang 5019
Chen, Pai-ta (Chen Po-ta) 2453
Chen, Pang-cheng 143
Chen, Peng 812
Chen, P. T. 3916
Chen, Po-ta (Chen Pai-ta) 2453
Chen, Rockwood 5061
Chen, Shao-yu (Wang Ming) 2322, 2329, 2403, 2404, 2453, 2454, 2459, 2470, 2472, 4883
Chen, Shao-yu Clique 2459, 2471
Chen, Shou-Yi 5524, 5525
Chen, Si-lan 1514
Chen, Stephen 5650
Chen, Su-ching 5524, 5525
Chen, Mrs. Susie Ku 5171
Chen, Dr. Ta 3791, 3938, 5424
Chen, Tai 2453, 2463

Page
Chen, Ti-hsiu ... 2466
Chen, Tu-hsiu (Chen Chung-fu) ... 2318, 2321, 2339, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2470
Chen, Wei-chi ... 3951
Chen, Y. G ... 3794, 3914, 3916
Chen, Yi (Chen I) ... 812, 2319, 2354, 2372, 2404, 2434, 2448, 2452, 2454
Chen, Yun ... 812, 2404, 2454
Cheng, General Chen ... 166, 167, 1087, 1094, 1368, 1417, 1441, 2288, 2291, 4878
Cheng, Chien ... 2347, 2467
Cheng, Chih-yi ... 3637
Cheng Chung Bookshop ... 4283
Cheng, Chung-fu (Chen Tu-hsiu) ... 2318, 2321, 2339, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2470
Cheng, Fang-wu ... 2405, 2454
Cheng, Hsueh-Hsi ... 5211
Cheng-Tai Railroad ... 2366
Chennault, Claire Lee ... 32, 33, 138, 1024, 1025, 1031, 1086, 1087, 1126, 1289, 1305, 1345, 1349, 1362–1367, 1371–1376, 1382, 1395, 1411, 1416, 1430, 1434, 1444–1450, 1456, 1460, 1462, 1463, 1467, 1472, 1482, 1577, 1812–1815, 2031, 2076, 2287, 2291, 2293, 2343, 2535, 3029, 3069, 3342, 3358, 3359, 3389, 3395, 3411, 3412, 3622, 3624–3626, 3658, 3706, 3714, 3805, 4534, 4687, 4688, 4703, 4706, 4710, 4763–4775, 5061, 5342, 5357, 5659.
Cheravin ... 3139
Cherniavsky ... 4497, 4504, 4509
Cherrington, Ben ... 5156
Cherubin, Charles ... 4991, 4992, 4993
Chesman, Miriam ... 4989, 4993
Chesnokov, M. J ... 4509, 4555
Che-tung Base ... 2401
Chevalier, Haakon ... 4258
Chew Sih Hong ... 3159–3161, 3163
Chew, Tong. (*See* Hong, Chew shi.)
Chi, Dr. Chao-ting (Hansu Chan) ... 12–18, 35, 36, 38–40, 47, 57–60, 64, 65, 70, 84–86, 90, 91, 93, 104, 139, 160–162, 276–278, 284–286, 288, 301, 302, 309, 352, 409–411, 426, 431, 435, 474, 475, 481, 525, 687, 1012, 1157–1163, 1514, 1698–1700, 1761–1763, 1850, 2518, 2605–2607, 2661, 2805–2808, 2812, 2891, 2892, 2989, 3126, 3128, 3136, 3140–3143, 3158–3166, 3194, 3205, 3333, 3341, 3342, 3509, 3511, 3582, 3588, 3591, 3594, 3678, 3737–3739, 3860, 3874, 3899, 3903, 3913–3918, 3949–3952, 4065, 4067–4069, 4092, 4095–4097, 4104, 4141, 4143, 4179, 4180, 4182, 4238, 4261, 4278, 4319, 4320, 4352, 4355, 4616, 4806, 4859, 4860, 4861, 4879, 4885, 4968, 4987, 5174–5176, 5192, 5193, 5198, 5203, 5234–5236, 5249, 5250, 5254, 5259, 5268, 5271, 5306, 5308, 5328, 5337, 5341, 5358, 5524, 5525.
Chi, Mrs. Chao-ting. (*See* Chi, Harriet Levine.)
Chi, Harriet Levine ... 2808, 2812, 3340, 3341, 3509, 3949–3953, 5704
Chi Hang-chang's Army ... 4213
Chi, K. P ... 3161
Chi, Kung Chuan ... 3159, 3161, 3162, 3164, 3511–3514, 3597
Chi, Li Shao ... 1743
Chi, Ming-hui ... 2403, 2454
Chi, Papa (Father Chao-ting, Chi) ... 288, 301, 3140, 3161, 3165, 3166, 3340
Chi, Shu-feng ... 4879
Chi, Dr. Tao-Heng ... 4318
Chiahua, Dr. Chu ... 1441
Chi-Lu Yu Pien Chu ... 2400
Chiang, Fa-kuei ... 2322, 2324
Chiang, Fa-Kwei ... 1087
Chiang Family ... 1359
Chiang, Hsien-tsung ... 5400
Chiang, John ... 1893
Chiang, Kai-shek ... 1698, 1699, 1701, 1703, 1707–1709, 1711–1714, 1716–1718, 1724, 1725, 1727, 1738, 1757, 1762, 1779, 1787, 1788, 1791, 1806, 1809, 1811, 1812, 1816, 1821, 1825, 1831, 1892, 1907, 1917, 1955, 1960–1963, 1986–1988, 1993, 1994, 2010, 2013, 2028, 2030, 2031, 2034, 2035,

Chiang, Kai-shek—Continued Page
2037, 2039–2043, 2045–2049, 2051, 2052, 2055–2061, 2063–2069, 2071–2074, 2081, 2086, 2087, 2095, 2103, 2104, 2186, 2201, 2206, 2207, 2216–2218, 2220, 2243, 2254, 2255, 2287–2294, 2306–2308, 2311, 2312, 2316, 2318–2320, 2324–2326, 2329–2332, 2334, 2339–2346, 2348, 2349, 2351–2355, 2358, 2366, 2374, 2375, 2379, 2382, 2383, 2385, 2386, 2388, 2391–2398, 2451, 2453–2455, 2457–2460, 2463, 2464, 2469, 2473, 2502, 2513, 2514, 2526, 2531, 2532, 2535, 2542, 2545, 2548, 2551, 2552, 2555, 2556, 2584, 2631, 2681, 2716, 2719, 2921, 2978, 2979, 2989, 2990, 3007, 3008, 3011, 3012, 3018, 3019, 3022, 3026, 3027, 3033, 3046, 3052, 3053, 3078, 3087, 3088, 3108, 3110–3114, 3124, 3144, 3184, 3187, 3198, 3209, 3210, 3212, 3262, 3265, 3266, 3284, 3289, 3293, 3304, 3307, 3309, 3311, 3329, 3341, 3342, 3355, 3357, 3374, 3377, 3388, 3391–3395, 3397, 3398, 3402–3405, 3408, 3411, 3414, 3416, 3475, 3476, 3498, 3501–3503, 3505, 3509, 3518, 3519, 3524, 3525, 3535–3537, 3541, 3549, 3583, 3586, 3595, 3600, 3608, 3610, 3623–3627, 3632, 3638, 3639, 3650, 3651, 3656, 3657, 3665, 3677, 3705, 3706, 3708–3710, 3713, 3791, 3800–3802, 3804, 3811, 3814, 3815, 3826, 3836, 3876, 3880, 3931, 3938, 3945, 3977, 3993, 4004, 4059, 4060, 4103, 4147, 4149, 4151, 4169, 4215, 4271, 4272, 4278, 4283, 4284, 4287, 4288, 4298, 4302, 4340, 4535, 4537, 4543, 4545, 4581, 4582, 4586, 4634, 4685–4687, 4691, 4694, 4696, 4703, 4704–4714, 4771, 4827, 4839–4841, 4845, 4853, 4854, 4878, 4880–4882, 4884, 4885, 4932, 4935, 4938, 4939, 4941, 4968, 5019, 5017, 5045, 5071, 5073, 5174, 5176, 5185, 5188, 5196, 5211, 5216, 5219, 5233, 5249, 5253, 5254, 5268, 5277, 5281, 5283, 5298, 5329, 5347, 5348, 5358, 5375, 5384, 5388, 5403, 5405, 5408, 5409, 5422, 5469, 5650, 5653, 5662, 5671, 5706.
Chiang, Madam Kai-shek 1816, 1818, 1963, 1985, 2045, 2061, 2062, 2065, 2078, 2081, 2091, 3009, 3069, 3144, 3356, 3477, 3551, 3632, 3650, 4707, 4765, 4767, 4772, 4826, 4827, 5064, 5196, 5211, 5348, 5385, 5393.
Chiang, Kai-shek Headquarters 2473
Chiang, K. P 1893
Chiang, Mon-lin 1216, 1222, 2124, 2125, 5321, 5322, 5329, 5333, 5344, 5361, 5578, 5579, 5653
Chiang, Ping-chih (Ting Ling) 2454, 2470
Chiang, P'eng-fei 5407
Chiang, General Tso-pin 4150
Chiang-nan Anti Japanese Volunteer Army 2463
Chiang-pei Headquarters (New Fourth Army) 2460, 2462
Chiao, Pet Shin 18
Chiasheng 3613
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1220
Chicago Daily News 432, 444, 857, 2574, 4834, 4973
Chicago Star 4543
Chicago Tribune 1105, 2998, 3043
Chicherin, Commissar 188, 4523, 4524
Chieh Fang Jih Pao (Emancipation Daily) 2381, 2406, 2454, 2460, 2472
Chieh-Fang Press 2454
Chien, Ho 2324
Chien-kuo Army (2d Division) 2458
Chien, Tuan-sheng Prof 18, 307, 651, 2508, 3939, 4188, 5010, 5013, 5014, 5253, 5054, 5524, 5525
Chien-tu, Shen 143
Chiho Sheng-p'ng 2454
Childs, Marquis 2248
Childs, Morris 605
Childs, Richard Storrs 300
Chile 4642, 5332
Chin, Ai-Li S 5524, 5525
Chin-Chá-Chi Border Region 2334, 2335
Chin-Cha-Chi Pien Chu 2334, 2335, 2339, 2400
Chin-Chi-Yu Pien Chu 2400
Chin, Chi-yung 2346
Chin-Doihara Agreement 4151
Chin, Han 3614

Page
Chin, Pang-hsien (Bo Gu, Po Ku) 2329, 2403, 2404, 2451, 2453, 2454, 2469, 2473, 3307
Chin, Mrs. Pang-hsien (Liu Chun-hsien) 2454, 2464
Chin, Rockwood Q. P 5524, 5525
Chin, R. P 5202
Chin-Sui Pien Chu 2400
China 2482, 2580, 3284, 3287, 3294, 3305–3307, 3318, 3322, 3323, 3325, 3326, 3330, 3333, 3334, 3341, 3349, 3353, 3355–3357, 3360–3362, 3364, 3366, 3370, 3371, 3373, 3375–3378, 3382–3384, 3387, 3388, 3390–3409, 3411, 3413–3415, 3437, 3439, 3442, 3460, 3464, 3472–3477, 3480, 3483, 3490, 3495–3504, 3507, 3509, 3511, 3514, 3537–3542, 3545, 3567, 3568, 3581, 3592–3594, 3596, 3597, 3599, 3600, 3608–3610, 3621, 3623–3627, 3630, 3632–3636, 3638, 3639, 3645, 3647, 3651, 3652, 3655, 3657–3659, 3661, 3663, 3664–3670, 3676, 3679–3694, 3696, 3699, 3700–3702, 3705–3714, 3725, 3726, 3728, 3730, 3731, 3735, 3738, 3740, 3741, 3746, 3747, 3752, 3757, 3758, 3767, 3782, 3783, 3785–3788, 3791, 3796–3801, 3803, 3804, 3807–3814, 3817, 3821, 3829–3831, 3837–3840, 3851, 3855, 3865, 3867, 3870–3872, 3874, 3876, 3880, 3881, 3885, 3892, 3897, 3903, 3906, 3909–3911, 3914–3917, 3920, 3923, 3929, 3936, 3945–3947, 3949–3952, 3958, 3962, 3966, 3968, 3969, 3976, 3977, 3979, 3980, 3987, 3990–4009, 4024, 4025, 4027, 4029, 4035, 4047, 4053, 4068, 4069, 4071, 4076, 4077, 4090, 4092, 4195, 4102, 4103, 4106, 4110, 4111, 4115, 4118, 4121, 4123, 4133, 4134, 4139–4141, 4147, 4149, 4169, 4178, 4184, 4202, 4215–4217, 4219, 4220, 4222, 4223, 4228, 4232, 4269, 4271–4273, 4276, 4278, 4282, 4285, 4286, 4298, 4300, 4301, 4303, 4312, 4321, 4329, 4330, 4333, 4335, 4352, 5353, 4356, 4416, 4417, 4423, 4428, 4432, 4441, 4447, 4489, 4492, 4494, 4505, 4526, 4528, 4535, 4542, 4544, 4547, 4552, 4568, 4581, 4586, 4587, 4590, 4633, 4634, 4682–4690, 4691, 4693–4700, 4702–4714, 4763–4765, 4768, 4769, 4771–4775, 4806, 4808, 4822, 4825–4832, 4834, 4839–4841, 4843–4846, 4849, 4854, 4855, 4859, 4865, 4871, 4874, 4876, 4878, 4880, 4882, 4883, 4885, 4888, 4894, 4899, 4900, 5306, 5307, 5313–5315, 5318–5321, 5327–5330, 5332–5335, 5339, 5346, 5348–5350, 5356, 5357, 5359, 5361, 5363, 5364, 5368, 5371, 5372, 5375–5378, 5382–5384, 5386–5389, 5391–5394, 5396, 5397, 5403–5407,, 5410–5412, 5415, 5419–5421, 5423, 5424, 5426, 5427–5432, 5435, 5460, 5462, 5469, 5475, 5479, 5480, 5481, 5500–5502, 5641–5643, 5664, 5666, 5669–5672, 5674, 5686, 5687, 5692, 5701, 5705–5710.
China Aid Act 1631
China Aid Council 406–411, 416, 436, 437, 677, 888, 1214, 1218, 1240–1249, 1513, 1514, 1747, 1803, 2020, 2059, 2446, 2524, 2544, 2646, 2656, 3550, 3551, 3560, 3730, 3732–3738, 3757–3759, 3790, 4079, 4138, 4300, 4318, 4328, 4337, 5674, 5710.
China Aid Relief 2656
China-American Council of Commerce and Industry Inc 4543, 4546
China—America's Ally 3880
China Among the Powers 1783, 1800, 3312, 4004, 4006, 4007
China-Burma Theater 1813
China Campaign Committee 5412
China, Central Government of 5176, 5215, 5216, 5253, 5382, 5417
China Christian Advocate 5661
China Commercial Treaty (1903) 2388
China Crisis 2541, 2544
China Critic 3168
China Daily News 166, 265, 3160, 3163, 3164, 3168, 3511–3514, 3788, 3833, 3834, 3950, 3951
China in Danger 2681
China Defense Commission 3266
China Defense League 1249, 2446, 2524, 2544
China Defense Supplies 1449, 1784, 2832, 3639
China Desk. (*See* State Department, Division of Chinese Affairs.)
China Digest 3826
China Export and Import Co 3951

Page
China Foundation 995
China Greets the New Year 3169
China Handbook 536
China-India-Burma Command 2392
China Institute 5345
China International Treaties 2990
China Lantern 835
China League for Civil Rights 3766
China Lobby 2945, 3002, 3018, 3020, 3036–3039, 3041–3044, 3049, 3050, 3096, 3106, 3108, 3109, 3114, 3143, 3144, 3277
China Mission 1359
China Mission (Henry Wallace summary report) 2037, 2038, 2080, 2081
China Monthly 4307
China Monthly Review 142, 143, 2790, 5374
China National Aviation Corp. (CNAC) 82–86, 90, 92–97, 99, 100, 105
China National Constitutional Convention 1518
China, National Government of 4525, 4533, 4542, 4543, 4545, 4683, 4685, 4687, 4690, 4694, 4703, 4705, 4714, 4764, 4769, 4770, 4771, 4839–4841, 4889, 4893, 4895, 5391, 5392, 5397, 5431, 5432, 5433, 5469.
China Plans for the Future 3800
China Press 3498
China and Silver 3681
China, Small Political Parties of 5524, 5525
China Story, The 3668, 3669
China Today 12, 13, 15, 115–117, 163, 168, 255, 285, 652, 653, 1155, 1157, 1162–1164, 1166, 1973, 2605–2607, 2660, 2661, 2669, 2670, 3135, 3138, 3143, 3144, 3169, 3470–3472, 3522, 3832, 3836, 3839, 3843, 3874, 3906, 4085, 4104, 4166, 4169, 4171, 4174, 4179–4182, 4187, 4189, 4203, 4237, 4269–4271, 4273, 4274, 4276, 4307, 4352, 4615, 4616, 4620, 4621, 4811, 4812, 4842, 4865, 4880, 4881, 4383–4886, 5341.
China At War 3705
China Weekly Review 141–143, 2790, 3498, 3669
China Welfare Appeal and China Welfare Fund 3736, 3757, 3758
China Welfare Fund 1247, 1249
China Womens College 2453
China At Work 2890
China Yesterday and Today 2692, 3943
Chinar, Vasyf 197
China's Chappiev (Ho Lung) 2458
China's Communist Told Me 3304
China's Destiny 2316, 2453
China's Interest In Korea 2557
China's New Democracy 106, 3500, 3895, 3896, 3904
China's Part in a Coalition War 3895, 3896, 3904
China's Wartime Activities 3799, 3800
China's Wartime Politics 2492, 2508–2510, 2512, 2533, 3795, 3796, 3939
Chinese Air Force 1516
Chinese-American Citizens Alliance 4870
Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 2555
Chinese Air Force 4765
Chinese Armies (Pre-Pearl Harbor) 1125
Chinese Armies 128, 129, 779, 812–814, 820, 824, 826, 1125, 1702, 1703, 1708, 1711, 1725, 1791, 1792, 1928, 1962, 1992, 1993
Chinese Army Guerrilla Training School (South Hunan) 2473
Chinese Association of Labor 4302, 4303
Chinese Atlas 4504
Chinese Benevolent Association 4138
Chinese Black Marketeers 719
Chinese Cabinet 1441
Chinese Central Government 49, 165, 315, 623, 635, 785, 795, 805, 806, 808, 809, 812, 816, 817, 828, 1791, 1993, 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187, 2201, 2218, 2543–2545, 2551, 2552, 3187, 4828
Chinese Chamber of Commerce 5639
Chinese Changchun Railway 2295

Page
Chinese Christians ... 3292, 3629
Chinese Civil War ... 1709, 1713, 1717, 1722, 1960, 2306, 2311, 2321, 2388
Chinese Commission of the Central Government ... 195
Chinese Communist Air Force ... 3711
Chinese Communist Army ... 384, 531, 532, 582, 612, 1057, 1058, 1087, 1268, 1360, 1371, 1377, 1394–1396, 1398, 1407, 1408, 1430, 1460, 1485, 1494, 1497, 1562, 1580, 1582, 1608, 1670, 1702, 1703, 1741, 1792, 1793, 1907, 1911, 1955, 2306, 2307, 2311–2313, 2315, 2317, 2319, 2322, 2324–2339, 2341, 2347–2367, 2371, 2372, 2376–2383, 2386, 2387, 2392–2395, 2399–2401, 2403–2406, 2413, 2416, 2418, 2420–2422, 2427, 2430–2441, 2445–2448, 2453, 2455–2474, 2535, 2536, 2541, 2544–2548, 2550, 2556, 2557, 2631, 2634, 2681, 2695, 2788, 2789, 3289, 3304, 3307, 3503, 3524, 3559, 3584, 3623, 3625, 3708–3710, 4059–4061, 4103, 4215, 4218, 4222, 4282, 4286, 4542, 4884, 4885.
Chinese Communist Army:
- Central Anhwei ... 2448
- Central Kiangsu ... 2448
- East Chekiang ... 2448
- East River ... 2448
- Eighth Route ... 130, 165, 370, 407, 434, 532, 596, 599, 607, 615, 622, 688, 812, 814, 1394, 1441, 1562, 1582, 1608, 1670, 1702, 1703, 1792, 1928, 1992, 1993, 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187, 2315, 2332, 2333, 2336–2338, 2341, 2346–2349, 2351–2354, 2358, 2359, 2363–2367, 2371, 2372, 2383, 2386, 2400, 2413, 2430, 2445, 2448, 2453, 2454, 2456, 2457, 2461, 2468, 2473, 2535, 2536, 2541, 2544–2550, 2556, 2557, 2631, 2634, 2681, 2695, 2738, 2739, 3060, 3112, 3184, 3204, 3304, 3306, 3476, 3523–3525, 3586, 3836, 4058, 4060, 4061, 4122, 4149, 4169, 4285, 4286, 4288, 5085, 5086, 5188, 5196, 5233, 5241, 5368, 5380, 5417
- First Red Army ... 2455
- Fourth Route ... 1441, 1927, 2311, 2335, 2339, 2347–2355, 2358–2367, 2371, 2372, 2376, 2377, 2383, 2386, 2400, 2401, 2404, 2413, 2418, 2420–2422, 2430–2439, 2448, 2451–2453, 2457–2463, 2465, 2467, 2469–2771, 2473, 2474, 2541, 2544–2550, 2631, 2734, 2681, 3476, 3523–3525, 3559, 3624, 4284–4286, 4333, 5086, 5232, 5415, 5416, 5418.
- Hainan Island ... 2448
- Hopei-Shantung-Honan ... 2448
- Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei ... 2448
- North Huai ... 2448
- North Kiangsu ... 2448
- Shansi-Hopei-Honan ... 2448
- Shansi-Chahar-Hopei ... 2448
- Shansi-Suiyuan ... 2448
- Shantung ... 2448
- Shen-Kan-Ning ... 2448
- South Huai ... 2448
- South Kiangsu ... 2448

Chinese Communist Capital (Yenan) ... 2314
Chinese Communist Central Revolutionary Military Council ... 2404, 2454, 2456, 2466, 2471
Chinese Communist Delegation to Moscow ... 2453
Chinese Communist Fifth Regiment ... 2461
Chinese Communist Government ... 5341
Chinese Communist Guerrilla Troops ... 2090, 2143, 2186, 2206, 2209, 2211
Chinese Communist Guerrillas ... 2332, 2349, 2352, 2362, 2363, 2370, 2432, 2437, 2443, 2448, 2452, 2457, 2459, 2464, 2466, 2471–2473
Chinese Communist Labor Movement ... 2539
Chinese Communist Medical Service ... 2466, 2467
Chinese Communist Military Affairs Commission ... 2472
Chinese Communist Military Council ... 2459
Chinese Communist Newspapers ... 2464

Page

Chinese Communist Party (*see also* Communist Party, China):
Chief of Publicity 2472
Department of Organization 2454, 2462
French Branch 2455
Front Committee 2455
Germany 2456
Hupeh Branch 2471
Intelligence Department 2459
Moscow Branch 2456
Overseas Members 2463
Seventh Congress 2373, 2456
Social Affairs Department 2459
United Front Department 2470
Chinese Communist Party Democratic League 2548
Chinese Communist Party National Congress 2411, 2407
Chinese Communist Party School 2465, 2466, 2471
Chinese Communist Premier 1700
Chinese Communist Provincial Government of Kiangsi 2452
Chinese Communist Regular Forces 2313, 2446
Chinese Communist Representative's Office (Chungking) 2462
Chinese Communist Secret Police 2470
Chinese Communist Secret Service 2459
Chinese Communist Trade Unions (Women's Department) 2464
Chinese Communist Underground (Hong Kong) 2465
Chinese Consulate (Washington) 5178
Chinese Currency Stabilization Loan 1691
Chinese Democratic League 2393, 2396, 2397, 2399, 2552
Chinese Eastern Railway 1225, 2389, 2462
Chinese Economic Society 3951
Chinese Embassy:
Bangkok 5193
Berlin 5193
Brussels 5193
Canberra 5193
Hague 5193
Hong Kong 2125
London 5193
Moscow 2729, 5193
Ottawa 5193
Paris 5193
Rome 5193
Tokyo 5193
Washington 1716, 3037, 3042, 3639, 4961, 5042, 5700
Chinese Empire 1446
Chinese Federation 351
Chinese Fourth Army 130, 532, 596, 599, 607, 615, 622, 1441, 1562, 1582, 1608, 1670
Chinese Government:
Coalition 804, 806, 813
Old 2388, 2389
Peking 2318, 2319
Chinese Government Research Institute 3637
Chinese Guerrilla Troops 1069, 2524, 2541, 2544, 2545, 2547, 2553
Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance 411, 3160, 3511–3513
Chinese Hand Laundryman's Association 3834, 4079
Chinese High Command 2307
Chinese History Project, Columbia University 330, 3578, 3613
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives 2290, 2669, 4329, 4619, 4620, 5062, 5193, 5210, 5245, 5345, 5709, 5710
Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (American Committee) 2669, 2791
Chinese Land Tax 3173
Chinese Language Summer School 2506
Chinese Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1771
Chinese Lobby 57
Chinese Main Highways 2420

Page
Chinese Maritime Customs Service 3148, 4699, 4831
Chinese Military Affairs Commission (National Military Council) 2331
Chinese Military Attaché (Washington) 2384
Chinese Ministry of Finance 3883
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2384
Chinese Mobilization Committee (Singapore) 2390
Chinese Mohammedans 3631
Chinese Mongols 3300
Chinese Moslems 3300
Chinese Navy 1492, 1494, 1500, 1510, 3838, 4536
Chinese National Army 4552, 4840
Chinese National Assembly 2259, 2307, 2308, 2312, 2342, 2394, 2396, 2398
Chinese National Cooperative Association 3951
Chinese National Currency 2421, 2431
Chinese National Government Currency Stabilization Board 1158
Chinese National Industrial and Commercial Association 3950, 3951
Chinese National Military Council (Chinese Military Affairs Commission) 2331, 2545, 2631
Chinese National Party 1257, 1574, 1664, 4932, 4937, 5010–5012, 5085, 5086, 5088, 5176, 5215, 5216, 5223, 5232–5234, 5283, 5284, 5287, 5329–5331, 5337, 5347, 5356, 5369, 5372, 5374, 5375, 5377, 5383–5387, 5391, 5392, 5396, 5403, 5404, 5406–5412, 5416–5423, 5425, 5483, 5484, 5502.
Chinese Nationalist Air Force 3709
Chinese Nationalist Army 214, 1257, 1360, 1371, 1377, 1393–1396, 1398, 1412, 1430, 1494, 1495, 1497, 1499, 1502, 1516, 1525, 1536, 1543, 1582, 1659, 1711, 1725, 1962, 2012, 2073, 2090, 2143, 2202, 2204–2207, 2209–2212, 2307, 2310, 2311, 2313, 2319, 2320, 2322–2327, 2330–2333, 2337, 2341, 2343, 2345–2353, 2356–2362, 2371–2374, 2383, 2386, 2387, 2392–2397, 2418, 2438, 2441–2447, 2453, 2454, 2459, 2460, 2463, 2473, 2524, 2535, 2536, 2538, 2546–2549, 3012, 3112, 3114, 3392, 3406, 3407, 3501, 3502, 3559, 3608, 3665, 3804, 4103, 4170, 4205, 4222, 4936, 4937, 4940, 4970, 5071, 5252.
Chinese Nationalist Blockade of Communist China 1068, 1119, 1133, 1274, 1275, 1279, 3078
Chinese Nationalist Delegation At The United Nations 3939
Chinese Nationalist Government 15, 39, 45, 67, 90, 151, 153, 160, 164, 193, 196, 197, 287, 303, 340, 350, 390, 435, 450, 456, 457, 461–463, 475, 531, 533, 535–538, 551, 563, 581, 599, 600, 612, 696, 697, 709, 711, 732, 733, 771, 772, 777–783, 790, 792, 794, 798, 801, 803, 807, 820, 827–829, 833, 851, 886, 917, 922, 925, 927–929, 932–934, 950, 991, 992, 994, 1022, 1023, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1043, 1045, 1047, 1049, 1051–1058, 1064, 1067–1070, 1083, 1087, 1094, 1111–1126, 1132–1136, 1149, 1158, 1163, 1167, 1195, 1203, 1204, 1228, 1229, 1231, 1249, 1254–1262, 1267, 1269, 1274–1295, 1359–1362, 1371, 1377, 1394–1401, 1406, 1407, 1412–1417, 1422, 1443–1452, 1460, 1462, 1484, 1485, 1492–1511, 1518–1535, 1540–1552, 1565, 1567, 1569, 1570, 1573, 1577, 1579–1585, 1588, 1592, 1594, 1598, 1605, 1612, 1614, 1629, 1631–1633, 1641, 1654, 1657, 1659, 1660, 1662, 1665, 1667, 1669, 1670, 1688, 1711–1714, 1717, 1722–1725, 1727, 1735, 1770–1772, 1790–1792, 1812, 1823, 1858–1861, 1881, 1886, 1891–1893, 1905, 1916, 1954, 1955, 1960, 1961, 1975, 1984, 1988, 1990–1992, 2001, 2010, 2013, 2044, 2046, 2056–2059, 2070, 2071, 2077, 2078, 2082, 2090, 2091, 2094, 2102–2126, 2170, 2173, 2186, 2187, 2194, 2196, 2202, 2204–2217, 2219, 2250, 2253–2256, 2288, 2289, 2293, 2295, 2306–2360, 2362–2365, 2367–2369, 2371–2388, 2392, 2393–2402, 2415, 2418, 2420–2422, 2426, 2433, 2436, 2442, 2443, 2451, 2473, 2502, 2503, 2525, 2528, 2532, 2535, 2538, 2541, 2543, 2548, 2551, 2552, 2554–2556, 2693, 2784, 2838, 2841, 2978, 2979, 3008, 3010, 3011, 3023, 3024, 3033, 3046, 3058, 3070, 3078, 3087, 3108–3118, 3120, 3142, 3143, 3148, 3184, 3198, 3265, 3266, 3285, 3286, 3289, 3291, 3295, 3303, 3304, 3309, 3353, 3357, 3358, 3361, 3364, 3367, 3373–3375, 3388, 3392, 3398–3402, 3404, 3407, 3411, 3412, 3498, 3502, 3513, 3520, 3535–3537, 3582, 3592, 3596, 3608–3610, 3623, 3624, 3631,

Chinese Nationalist Government—Continued Page
3637, 3669, 3690, 3703–3705, 3710, 3712, 3737, 3767, 3787, 3788, 3794, 3797, 3800, 3801, 3804, 3805, 3895, 3897, 3904, 3930, 3945, 3947, 3977, 3981, 3985, 3986, 3991–3995, 3997, 4001, 4002, 4004, 4007, 4009, 4010, 4022, 4058, 4069, 4071, 4150–4152, 4207, 4214, 4222, 4285–4287, 4298, 4302, 4323, 4929, 4932, 4935–4939, 4931, 4959, 5002, 5023, 5060, 5062, 5069, 5070, 5072, 5087, 5088, 5104, 5120, 5130, 5133, 5176, 5196, 5202, 5203, 5211, 5223, 5231, 5249, 5254, 5329, 5335, 5359, 5363, 5365, 5383, 5393, 5394, 5403, 5406, 5407, 5408, 5409, 5427, 5430, 5436, 5709.
Chinese Nationalist Minister in Korea 3939
Chinese Nationalist Mission (Bern, Switzerland) 1771
Chinese Nationalist Navy 1068
Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation 5344, 5361
Chinese Nationalist Revolution 2470, 3907, 3981
Chinese Nationalist Secret Police (Blueshirts) 2330, 2331, 2340, 2344
Chinese Nationalist Treaty With Russia 3010
Chinese News Service 535–537
Chinese People's Bank 3951
Chinese Postal Administration 2326
Chinese Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Hong Kong 82, 99, 100
Chinese Provisional Central Soviet Government 4882
Chinese Red Radio 258
Chinese Republic 801, 2209, 2210, 2212, 2215, 2316, 4691
Chinese Revolution 876, 1954, 2316, 2330, 2343, 2377, 2456, 2460, 2464, 2469, 2473, 2719, 2720, 3135, 3138, 3184, 3185, 3187, 3188, 4136, 4169, 4216, 4352
Chinese-Russian Negotiations 1859, 1861
Chinese Secret Societies 2458
Chinese Semi-Feudal Society 2305
Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee 2452
Chinese Soviet Government 2455, 2458, 2464, 2465, 3300, 3304, 4886
Kiangsi 2464
Labor Department 2458
Chinese Soviet Military Affairs Commission 2471, 2472
Chinese Soviet Peasant Movement 2322
Chinese Soviet Republic 2311, 2325, 2331, 2332, 4883, 5374
Chinese-Soviet Treaty (1950) 2555, 2557
Chinese Soviets 4103, 4120, 4169, 4352
Chinese Stabilization Board 4625
Chinese Stabilization Fund 2214
Chinese Stabilization Loan 1758
Chinese Student Movement, 1919 2318
Chinese Tag Day 3337
Chinese Trade Union Association 3951
Chinese Turkestan 3464
Chinese United National Revolutionary Army 2331
Chinese War Production Board 1397, 1441, 4691
Chinese Women's College 2406
Chinese Workers and Peasant Revolutionary Committee 2467
Chinese Workers School (Khabarovsk) 2464
Chinese Year Book 2541
Chinese Youth Delegation 4137–4139
Ching-hsing Coal Mine 2366
Ching-kan Shan 2322
Ching-kan Shan Mountain 2467
Ching-ping, Chien-cheng (picked army, simplified government principle) 2463
Chingyang 3308
Chiperfield, Mr 3407
Chitral (steamship) 648, 2614, 5137
Chiu, A. Kaiming 5524, 5525
Chiung-yai Base 2401, 2436
Chiung-yai Military Region 2436
Choate, Charles F., Jr 4692
Cholmeley, Elsie. (*See* Fairfax-Cholmeley, Miss Elsie.)
Chosen Christian College 5319
Chou, Professor 651

Page
Chou, Enlai 426, 792, 800, 812, 913, 1010, 1094, 1214, 1435, 1442, 1460, 1653, 1654, 1656, 1660, 1700–1703, 1725, 1762, 1787–1791, 1907, 1916, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 2000–2002, 2186, 2294, 2318, 2321, 2322, 2326, 2327, 2329, 2331, 2341, 2349, 2353, 2392–2395, 2398, 2399, 2403, 2404, 2413, 2414, 2453, 2455, 2456, 2470, 2473, 2553, 2556, 2557, 2695, 3288, 3293, 3304, 3306, 3307, 3549, 4686, 4687, 5011, 5012, 5196, 5223, 5236.
Chou, Enlai, Mrs. (Miss Teng Ying-chao) 2403, 2455, 2456, 2470
Chou, Fu-hai 2318, 2360
Chou, Ho-sin (Chou Ho-sheng) 2456
Chou, Ho-sheng (Chou, Ho-sin) 2456
Chou, Hsing 2403, 2456
Chou, Lu 2340
Chou Ping Fort 2326
Chou, Pei-yuan 5013, 5014
Chou, Shih-ti (Chou Tzu-ti) 2456
Chou, Tzi-ti (Chou Shih-ti) 2456
Chou, Yang 2405, 2456
Chow, Ho-sin 4885
Chow, S. R 5070, 5524, 5525
Christian 5685
Christian Century, The 5663, 5669, 5671, 5681
Christian Church (China) 3792
Christian Front 2683
Christian, John L 5032, 5048, 5524, 5525, 5684
Christian Medical Council 3144
Christian, Pearl C 4990, 4993
Christian Science Monitor 634, 635, 2185, 2186, 2542, 3466, 3488, 3515, 4832, 4856, 4892, 5153, 5180
Christian Student Movement House 4124
Christy, Arthur 306, 4107, 5647
Chu, C. K 5344, 5361
Chu, Chia-hua 4423
Chu, Ching-lai 5524, 5525
Chu, Ch'iu-pai (Chu Ch'iu-po) 2456, 2460, 4883
Chu, Coching 5524, 5525
Chu, Hsueh-fen 825
Chu, King 5344, 5361
Chu, Min-liang 2456
Chu, Mrs. Nora T. H 5344, 5361
Chu, Shao-liang 2325
Chu, Shi-ming 2350, 2351
Chu, Suah-fan 4302
Chu, General Teh (Chu Te, Chou Teh) 258, 377, 384, 614, 615, 657, 812, 1432, 1530, 1537, 1703, 1928, 2315, 2317, 2318, 2324, 2327, 2332, 2341, 2349, 2353, 2392, 2395, 2403, 2404, 2433, 2435, 2452, 2455–2458, 2461, 2462, 2464, 2467, 2469, 2473, 2542, 2689, 3288, 3292, 3293, 3301, 3302, 3304–3306, 3308, 3559, 3767, 3836, 4022, 4218, 4338, 4687, 4884, 5358, 5368, 5422.
Chu Te, Mrs. (Kang Ko-ching) 2457, 2461
Chu Te Clique 2464
Chu, Tong 4036, 4037, 4297
Chuan, Mrs 680, 681
Chuang-Tsao She (Creative Society) 2454
Chuchow (China) 3936
Chugunov, N. L 4509, 4555
Chun-Cha-Chi Border System 2402
Chun, Chang 1632, 2291, 4150, 4151, 4213, 4214
Chun-chung Pao (People's Newspaper) 2472
Chun, Tien 4301, 4302
Chun-cho, Tong 143
Chung, Dr. Arthur W 1513
Chung, Chi-hsien 2457
Chung, Hai 1579
Chung-Ming Island (Central Kiangsu Military Region) 2434

Page
Chung, General Pai 1580
Chungking, China 3311, 3329, 3341, 3342, 3356, 3388, 3405, 3518, 3537, 3533, 3549, 3566, 3567, 3594, 3595, 3600, 3624, 3626, 3650, 3652, 3685, 3737, 3758, 3759, 3790, 3801–3803, 3806, 3874, 3880, 3916, 3931, 3938, 3939, 3968, 3986, 3998, 4001, 4007, 4008, 4009, 4022, 4205, 4283, 4285, 4432, 4441, 4533, 4581, 4582, 4686, 4691, 4768, 4769, 4771, 4773, 4825, 4826, 4829, 4830, 4831, 5310, 5333, 5348, 5368, 5369, 5371, 5383, 5391, 5403, 5404, 5409, 5420, 5424, 5427, 5465.
Chungking Area 2416, 2424, 2425, 2426
Chungking Blockade 2416, 2547
Chungking Cabinet 1440
Chungking Embassy 1691, 1701, 1702, 1704, 1729, 1738, 1786, 1787, 1817, 1856, 1915, 1921, 1922, 1985, 1987, 1999, 2000, 2076, 2089, 2102, 2182, 2185, 2187, 2188, 3212, 3213
Chungking Government 990, 992, 1367, 1368, 1394–1396, 1398, 1424, 1430, 1431, 1440, 1907, 2306, 2308, 2311, 2313, 2339, 2362, 2364, 2365, 2367–2369, 2371–2388, 2390–2402, 2415, 2418, 2420–2422, 2424, 2426, 2433, 2436, 2442, 2443, 2447, 2457, 2463.
Chungking Government Troops 2313, 2371, 2372, 2382, 2386, 2387, 2447
Chungking Press 2387
Chungking Press Party (Yenan, 1944) 2452, 2456, 2459, 2471
Chungking Supreme National Defense Council 2464
Chung-kuo Ke-Ming (Chinese Revolution) 2473
Chungshan University 2349, 2453, 2456, 2464
Chunnganu, Chang 1417
Church, Dr. Alfred 2581
Church, Col. Gerald L 4047, 4072, 4073
Church League for Industrial Democracy 411, 4115, 4116
Church of the Master (New York City) 1106
Churchill 4825, 4872, 4873
Churchill, Arthur C 5524, 5525
Churchill, Winston 150, 174, 616, 617, 731, 811, 828, 1014, 1024, 1031, 1037, 1087, 1349, 1413, 1463, 1852, 2009, 2293, 2379, 2380, 2737, 2861, 2862, 2990, 3115, 3264, 3355, 3373, 3387, 3389, 3390, 3413, 3942, 4935, 5041, 5060, 5071, 5075, 5179, 5243, 5280, 5328, 5349, 5422, 5483, 5486, 5671.
Churchill, Mrs. Winston 179
Churchman, The 4116, 4118
Chuvakhin, D. S 1328
CIA. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency.)
CIAA. (*See* Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.)
CIC. (*See* Commerce International-China.)
CIIC, Inc 101
CIO. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
CIO News 445, 995, 2620, 2625, 2634, 2641, 4975
Citizens General Assembly (Peoples Congress) 2334, 2335
City of Flint (Steamship) 891–896
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 2810, 4834
Civil Affairs Commissioner (Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government) 2464
Civil Affairs Department 359
Civil Affairs Division (United States War Department) 995, 2162, 2169, 2296, 2303
Civil Air Transport 4763
Civil Information and Education (Tokyo) 2255
Civil Liberties Union 2663, 2668, 2683, 2684
Civil Rights Congress 3834, 3841, 4607, 5676
Civil Service Act 2801
Civil Service Commission. (*See* United States Civil Service Commission.)
Civil War (China) 1709, 1713, 1717, 1722, 1960
Civil War (United States) 545, 1551, 2887, 2890
Civil Works Administration 3907

Page
Civilian Personnel Division 4073
Clapper, Raymond 433, 444, 857, 1302, 4973
Clare, Mr 2267
Claridge Hotel 478
Clarion (Publication) 1000, 1001
Clark, Mr 4590
Clark, Andrew H 5524, 5525
Clark, Dwight L 1219
Clark, Elizabeth Allerton 3943, 5524, 5525, 5666
Clark, Evans 3795
Clark, Glover 5684
Clark, Grenville 5085, 5183
Clark, Marjorie R 3167
Clark, Tom 581, 4163, 4164, 4297, 4611, 5354, 5355
Clark, Walter 5524, 5525
Clark, Mrs. Warner 5040
Clark, Winnifred 4987, 4993
Clarke, Colin 5524, 5525
Clarke, D. C 4944
Clarke, Lady Selwyn 4337, 5412
Class B Regiment (Chinese Communist Party, chart) 2449
Claston 5259
Claus, Mr 4234, 4236
Clausewitz 5454
Claxton, Brooke 175, 176 180 5270
Clay, Gen. Lucius 1539, 2809, 4427
Clayton, William (Will) L 494, 858, 859, 980, 981, 1884, 1918, 2124, 2127, 2128, 2259, 2268, 2837, 4546
Cleaners and Dyers Union 3336
Cleaners, Dyers, and Truck Drivers Union 4116
Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Ball 1391
Cleeve, Margaret E. (Madge) 472, 4122, 5008, 5083, 5137, 5203, 5334
Clement, Harry G 3794
Clementin, J. R 5524, 5525
Cleveland, Harlan 1591, 1631, 1682, 5524, 5525
Clise, Charles F 568
Clivenden Set 4098
Close, Upton 5255
Club Valhalla 4182
Clubb, Oliver Edmund ..... 70, 495, 496, 974, 1703–1706, 1764, 1998, 2912, 2943–2946, 3000, 3002, 3004, 3048 3066 3068 3389 3410, 3983, 5061, 5346, 5468, 5469, 5477, 5480, 5700.
Clurman, Harold 4091, 4145, 4258
Clough, Edwin 5524, 5525
Kluckhorn Russian Institute. (*See* Kluckhohn Russian Institute.)
Clyde, Mrs. Ethel 4091, 4145
Clyde, Paul Hibbert 2891, 5526, 5527, 5656
CNRRA. (*See* Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation.)
Co, Tui 5526, 5527
Coad, N. E 5526, 5527
Coast, John 5526, 5527
Coates, Robert M 4258
Coatman, J 5526, 5527
Cobean, George C 1527–1530, 1532, 1534–1538
Cochran 1611
Cochran, William E 4145
Cochran, William T 2684
Cochrane, E. L 4870
Cochrane, William 5112
Cochrane Mrs. William 5112
Coe. Frank V ..... 70, 266, 425, 426, 440, 443, 445, 446, 495, 855, 859, 860, 1706, 1727, 2626, 2832, 2867–2869, 3514, 4625, 4629, 4676, 4677, 4737, 4748, 4756, 4975, 4977, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5346, 5703.
Coff, Mr 5299

Page
Coff, Mrs. 5299
Coffee, Congressman John M. 444, 446, 633, 2243, 4115, 4975, 4976
Coffey, Mike 4990, 4993
Cohen, Ben 1880, 2218
Cohen, Mrs. J. K. 4117
Cohen, Jerome B. 5298, 5526, 5527, 5684
Cohen, Jerome S. 1221
Cohen, Lester 2658, 4258,
Cohen, Nathaniel 5526, 5527
Cohen, Rabbi Samuel M. 4115
Cohen, Theodore 4545, 5526, 5527
Cohen, Wallace M. 5295, 5700
Cohen, Mrs. Wallace 5295
Cohn, Dr. Alfred E. 3794
COI. (*See* Office of Coordinator of Information.)
Coil, E. J. 2832
Colbert, Mrs. Evelyn S. 5700
Colclough, Capt., O. S. 2181
Coldwell, M. J. 5270
Cole, Allan B. 5526, 5527
Colegrove, Prof. Kenneth W. 30, 35, 712, 900, 905–935, 963, 1007, 1008, 1075, 1076, 1129, 1130, 1143, 1144, 1146–1148, 1251, 1253, 1277–1296, 1551, 1555, 1561, 1568, 1570, 1574, 1575, 1577–1579, 1581, 1596, 1602, 1606–1609, 1617, 1622, 1623, 1625, 1635, 1639, 1641, 1646, 1647, 1657, 1658, 1662, 1667, 1674, 1680–1682, 2515, 2809, 2928, 3054, 3069, 3070, 3097, 3576, 3577, 3883, 4124, 4835, 4860, 4931, 5078, 5193, 5204, 5314, 5315, 5340, 5526, 5527.
Coleman 4832
Coleman, George R. 4983
Coleman, Norman F. 5318
Collective Security Book Review 2662
College, Agnes Scott 4886
College, Army, War 4545, 4835
College, Claremont 4591
College, City of New York 4626, 4638, 4639, 4741
College, Commonwealth (Mena, Ark.) 2643
College, Corpus Christi (Oxford) 3168
College de France, Paris 4089, 5322
College of Chinese Studies (Peking) 3604
College of Natural Science (Chinese Communist Party) 2406
College, Oberlin 4838
College, Occidental 4835
College of Pacific 3536
College of the City of New York 466, 467, 469, 485–487, 1169, 2658, 2740, 2747, 3963, 4156, 4259
College, St. John's 4832
College, Trinity 4807
College, Williams 4834
Collier, John 495
Collier, Mrs. John 5702
Collier's Magazine 2956–2958, 2974–2976, 4258, 5278, 5673
Collier's Weekly 4592
Colling, J. 4823, 4830
Collinge, Patricia 5651
Collins, Charles A. 1005, 5684
Collins, Henry Hill 488, 489, 2595, 2596, 2799, 3515, 4748–4750, 5299
Collins, Henry Hill, Jr. 4748, 4750
Collins, Gen. J. Lawton 2537
Collins, Ralph E. 3965
Collins, Tom 4750
Collis, Maurice 5526, 5527, 5653
Colman, Louis 4136
Colombos, C. J. 5526, 5527
Colonial and American Workers, Washington Executive Council 3335
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) 390, 3040, 3041, 3882, 5255, 5267, 5701

Page
Columbia Press 51
Columbia University Library School 4392
Columbia University Press 3594
Columbus Citizens (Ohio) 5674, 5676
Combat Intelligence (U. S. Navy Department) 2181
Cominform 1613–1615, 1619, 1620, 1624, 3828, 5387
Comintern (Communist International) 188, 189, 191, 227, 234, 246, 254, 256, 260, 276, 277, 284, 291, 324, 325, 350, 383, 805, 865, 867, 868, 881, 888, 1465, 1690, 1957, 1974, 2311, 2318, 2321–2324, 2327–2329, 2331, 2332, 2344, 2375–2378, 2380, 2381, 2386, 2398, 2399, 2406, 2407, 2410, 2455, 2465–2469, 2695, 2699, 2719, 2721, 2723, 3107, 3165, 3185, 3188, 3319, 3494, 3498, 3500, 3610, 4287, 4485, 4489, 4508, 4516, 4518, 4561, 4587, 4881, 4882, 4886, 4942, 5196, 5337, 5368, 5370, 5384, 5385, 5500, 5706.
Comintern (Seventh World Congress) 2327–2329, 2377, 2381, 2386, 2398, 2399, 2410, 2455, 2456, 2467
Comintern, Executive Committee of the 4564
Comintern Headquarters (Moscow) 2322
Commager, H. S 5661
Command and General Staff School (C. & G. S. S.) 2310
Commerce Department. (*See* U. S. Department of Commerce.)
Commerce International-China (CIC) 388, 591, 1491, 1492, 3014, 5107, 5202, 5203, 5210–5213, 5246
Commercial Press 3593
Commercial Treaty (China, 1903) 2388
Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Social Insurance (Soviet Government) 2461, 2462
Commissar of Soviet Inspection in the Ukraine 2461
Commission for Investigation of War Crimes (United Nations) 2857
Commission on Publications 514
Committee Against American Intervention in China 3839
Committee Against Tom Clark 4163, 4164
Committee to Aid the Chinese Trade-Union 3335, 3337
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives 162, 177
Committee on Appropriations, Senate 3081
Committee on Armed Services 3114, 4548
Committee for Constitutional Government in New York 2283
Committee for Cultural Freedom 4257
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (Lamont) 2677
Committee for Democratic Action 2625
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy (CDFEP) 54–56, 771, 772, 1017, 1334, 1338, 2058, 2650, 2655, 2661, 2690, 2788, 2789, 2792, 3058, 3060, 3061, 3473, 3738, 3804, 3825–3827, 3832, 3834–3836, 3838, 3839, 3841, 3911, 4080, 4083, 4162–4164, 4183, 4282, 4296–4300, 4308, 4317–4319, 4323, 4337, 4339, 4599, 4601, 4604, 4609, 4610, 4611, 4612, 4941, 5024, 5412.
Committee for the Establishment of Constitutional Government (Chungking) 2471
Committee for Financing Foreign Trade 2260
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 2129, 2131, 3026, 3110
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate 896, 898, 1265, 1275, 1913, 1997, 2948, 2949, 2961, 2968, 2976, 2977, 3114
Committee of Industrial Organizations. (*See* Congress of Industrial Organizations.)
Committee on Labor Organization 4857
Committee on Materials for Teachers in International Relations 2585, 2588
Committee on Militarism in Education 5353, 5354
Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives 1686, 1915–1917
Committee for National Morale 300
Committee on One Thousand 3551
Committee on Un-American Activities 2999, 3013, 3071, 3073, 3080, 3102, 3246
Commodity Control in the Pacific Area 3167
Common Sense Magazine 5040, 5041, 5674
Commonweal (Catholic Journal) 1171, 2495

Page
Commonwealth Club (San Francisco) 1666, 2237
Commonwealth Edison Co 100
Communism in China 3683
Communism in China and the New American Approach to Asia 3758
Communism in Indochina 3972
Communism in the State Department Committee (Senate) 1474
Communism-Marxism-Leninism 2270
Communist Magazine. (Name changed to Political Affairs; *see* Political Affairs.)
Communist Academy 2699–2703, 2709, 2723, 4488, 4492, 4493, 4499, 4560, 4567, 4577–4579, 4586, 4588, 4589, 4922, 5128, 5150
Communist Academy Library (Moscow) 3593
Communist Anti-Japanese Military Academy 2463
Communist Army, China. (*See* Chinese Communist Army.)
Communist Case in California 3718
Communist Central Military Council (CCP) 3306
Communist Central Revolutionary Army 2465
Communist Central Revolutionary Military Council 2456
Communist China 3295, 3296, 3310, 3509, 3637, 3703, 3704
Communist Chinese Army. (*See* Chinese Communist Army.)
Communist Coup (Canton, 1927) 2465
Communist-Democrats (China) 698
Communist Government, Chinese (*see also* Communist People's Republic Government of China) 1708, 1722, 1771, 1787, 1791, 1793, 1907, 1911, 1955, 2989, 2999, 3017, 3019, 3020, 3334, 3381, 3382, 3509, 3518, 3535, 3731, 3800, 3803, 3804, 3860, 3876, 3911, 3913, 3945, 3950, 3961, 4002, 4005, 4010, 4207, 4313, 4314, 4323, 4333
Communist Group at Yenan (Chinese) 4231
Communist Guerrillas (Chinese) 3766
Communist Headquarters (Yenan) 2334, 2441
Communist International (Cominterm) 47, 48, 191, 312, 350, 352, 405, 514, 520, 521, 541, 545, 565, 640, 659, 864–867, 869, 871, 873, 874, 876, 883, 886, 1010, 1100, 1464, 1477, 1690, 1957, 1959, 2066, 2067, 2311, 2318, 2321–2324, 2327–2329, 2331, 2332, 2344, 2375–2378, 2380, 2381, 2386, 2398, 2399, 2406, 2407, 2410, 2411, 2451–2456, 2461, 2465–2468, 2499, 2805, 2808, 2876, 2893–2895, 2899, 3132, 3183, 3284, 3316, 3319, 4234, 4341, 4352, 4541, 4880, 4881, 4883–4885, 5424–5426, 5501.
  Executive Committee of the 5424, 5425
  Seventh World Congress 4885, 4886, 5425
  Sixth World Congress 4880
  Third World Conference 4956, 5711
Communist Labor Herald 3529
Communist Labor Youth League 3058, 3061
Communist Left-wingers 1734
Communist Line 2669
Communist Manifesto 1689, 2270, 4335
Communist Military Council (General Staff) 2469
Communist Military Council (Military Affairs Commission) 2435, 2462
Communist Militia Dietum 2440
Communist Movement (Chinese) 4103, 4104
Communist Parties, National 4942, 5425
Communist Party 2–4, 9–12, 15, 16, 23, 32, 34, 36, 38 46, 50, 79, 111, 115, 117, 127, 130, 162, 171, 175, 185, 188, 191, 200, 209, 210, 224–226, 236, 245, 246, 254, 256, 269, 274, 275, 277, 283, 286, 287, 289, 290, 295, 299, 301, 308, 333, 339, 343, 344, 373, 374, 381, 386, 397, 399, 403–407, 412, 415–417, 421–423, 426, 431, 438, 439, 441–443, 446, 447, 450, 452, 453, 456, 460, 466, 467, 469, 472, 476, 482–488, 490–493, 496, 510, 513, 525, 527–530, 532–535, 540–547, 550–552, 554–563, 565–567, 572, 580, 581, 583, 584, 588, 593, 599, 601, 602, 604, 605, 619, 621, 623–626, 630–632, 634–641, 643, 644, 646–650, 652, 654, 657–659, 662, 665, 667–680, 682, 686, 688, 689, 698–700, 706, 707, 711, 716, 718, 744, 746–752, 754, 758, 760, 763, 764, 766, 770, 778, 779, 781–784, 786–788, 790–792, 794–809, 811–819, 821, 822, 825–828, 833, 835, 839, 844–847, 852, 854, 856, 859–861, 864–872, 874,

Communist Party—Continued Page
876–882, 884–888, 913–915, 919, 920, 922–926, 928–934, 945–950, 954, 957, 962–968, 974, 977, 985–991, 1000–1034, 1037–1048, 1065–1110, 1114, 1116, 1118–1121, 1127–1129, 1131–1135, 1154, 1155, 1158, 1161, 1163, 1164, 1168–1170, 1191–1202, 1206, 1212, 1215, 1218, 1222, 1226–1231, 1234, 1235, 1239–1242, 1247, 1252–1263, 1266–1279, 1308, 1316–1324, 1328, 1329, 1335–1337, 1348, 1352, 1357–1362, 1366–1372, 1376–1383, 1390–1398, 1404–1470, 1476–1487, 1494–1497, 1503–1512, 1518–1545, 1551, 1552, 1563–1616, 1620, 1628–1647, 1653–1674, 1677, 1680, 1687–1690, 1692–1697, 1714, 1717–1725, 1728–1740, 1743–1748, 1788–1795, 1840, 1814–1818, 1823, 1833, 1837, 1838, 1846–1850, 1861–1866, 1878–1880, 1885, 1886, 1893, 1895, 1900–1911, 1916, 1927–1934, 1938, 1944–1949, 1952–1962, 1964, 1965, 1972–1979, 1988, 1990–1994, 2000, 2001, 2010, 2013, 2022, 2023, 2025, 2026–2028, 2039–2041, 2044–2055, 2057–2059, 2061–2064, 2066–2073, 2075–2078, 2082, 2083, 2085, 2089, 2091–2095, 2100–2103, 2112, 2121, 2126, 2146, 2156, 2157, 2160, 2161, 2172–2180, 2185–2187, 2190–2195, 2206–2209, 2211, 2212, 2214–2220, 2243, 2253, 2270, 2273, 2279, 2288, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2305–2474, 2475–2478, 2482, 2483, 2494–2500, 2504, 2516, 2519, 2525–2544, 2548–2565, 2571–2573, 2584, 2600, 2601, 2606, 2621, 2631–2650, 2656, 2657, 2660–2698, 2702, 2706, 2708, 2717–2723, 2733–2736, 2744, 2747, 2763–2769, 2774, 2775, 2786–2813, 2820–2822, 2832, 2855, 2869–2883, 2885, 2888, 2889, 2892–2895, 2897, 2902–2909, 2914–2919, 2923–2926, 2932, 2933, 2942, 2947, 2951–2956, 2958, 2961, 2965, 2967, 2969–2971, 2976–2991, 2995–3007, 3017–3021, 3027–3032, 3036–3039, 3045–3047, 3052–3063, 3069–3078, 3092–3120, 3125–3149, 3152–3167, 3170, 3179–3191, 3197, 3205, 3208, 3214, 3218, 3219, 3226, 3232–3236, 3245, 3247, 3252, 3253, 3259, 3283, 3284, 3286, 3311, 3336, 3346, 3362, 3363, 3365, 3457, 3466, 3470, 3471, 3477, 3478, 3494, 3499, 3500, 3502, 3504–3506, 3508–3511, 3515–3518, 3521–3527, 3530, 3532, 3534, 3543–3548, 3550, 3557, 3560, 3566, 3568, 3570, 3582, 3597, 3601, 3628, 3637, 3645, 3647, 3668, 3669, 3675, 3701, 3721, 3723–3726, 3731–3733, 3737–3739, 3741, 3748, 3749, 3767, 3768, 3798, 3800, 3808, 3813, 3824, 3825, 3827, 3829, 3831, 3836, 3873–3877, 3891, 3892, 3894, 3899, 3904, 3905, 3912, 3924, 3931, 3944, 3953, 3958–3962, 3989–3991, 3994, 3995, 3999, 4000, 4004, 4006, 4008, 4015, 4019–4021, 4028, 4029, 4061, 4069, 4073, 4103, 4104, 4153–4158, 4162, 4166, 4167, 4170, 4172, 4174, 4175, 4177–4185, 4187, 4207, 4209, 4211–4218, 4220–4222, 4232–4234, 4238, 4293, 4294, 4296, 4297, 4299–4304, 4306, 4307, 4313, 4317–4322, 4327, 4329, 4335, 4336, 4338, 4350–4354, 4359–4364, 4366–4369, 4374, 4388–4391, 4393–4395, 4398, 4404, 4483, 4484, 4490, 4497, 4498, 4511, 4523, 4525, 4529, 4535, 4581–4583, 4585, 4586, 4634, 4645–4662, 4669, 4673, 4674, 4676–4679, 4720, 4722, 4723, 4726, 4727, 4733, 4741–4745, 4748, 4751, 4752, 4754, 4758–4760, 4766, 4776, 4777, 4780–4783, 4785–4804, 4816, 4841, 4842, 4847–4849, 4866, 4902, 4928, 4929, 4931, 4932, 4935, 4937–4945, 4950–4953, 4981, 5011, 5012, 5085–5089, 5115, 5120, 5128, 5131, 5149, 5163, 5167, 5174, 5176, 5204, 5213, 5215, 5216, 5232, 5233, 5253, 5276–5283, 5284, 5287, 5298, 5306, 5310, 5314, 5316, 5324, 5334, 5337, 5340, 5341, 5343, 5344, 5355, 5357, 5358, 5365, 5367, 5368, 5381, 5386, 5396, 5400, 5403, 5404, 5412, 5414, 5418, 5420, 5421, 5422, 5426, 5427, 5438, 5439, 5445–5447, 5460, 5465, 5466, 5469, 5471–5473, 5476–5479, 5486, 5000, 5502–5504, 5675, 5677, 5678, 5684–5686, 5705–5709.

Alabama 4886
American 4937, 4939, 4941, 5024, 5364, 5379, 5412, 5413
Ohio 5675, 5676
Argentina 2889
Belgium 1465
Branch 1, Fifth Assembly District, New York 2650
British 5307, 5308, 5370, 5412
California 118, 3548
Canada 1000, 1001
Central Committee 1690, 1973

Communist Party—Continued Page
China 16, 36, 37, 40, 60, 61, 65, 66, 82–84, 87, 89, 106, 119, 138, 141, 151, 163, 165, 166, 171, 191, 198, 213, 214, 216, 258, 276, 277, 280, 287, 303, 304, 316, 350, 351, 377, 397, 398, 407, 434–437, 456–459, 461, 464, 465, 473, 521, 525, 529, 532–534, 538, 560, 563–565, 581–583, 594, 599, 600, 634, 635, 637, 638, 654, 656–658, 677, 682, 696, 697, 700, 701, 747, 759, 763, 765, 778, 779, 781–784, 786–788, 790–792, 794–809, 811–819, 821, 822, 825–828, 833, 835, 844–847, 852, 854, 856, 864–871, 874, 880, 881, 886–888 913, 916, 919–921, 924, 926, 928, 929, 931–934, 950, 991, 1009–1011, 1013, 1016, 1021–1024, 1026, 1029, 1030, 1041, 1048–1050, 1052, 1054–1058, 1060–1062, 1064–1067, 1069, 1070, 1082–1084, 1086, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1094, 1096, 1097, 1107, 1116, 1118, 1119, 1121, 1127–1135, 1158, 1161, 1163, 1164, 1198, 1200, 1218, 1222, 1229, 1235, 1239, 1252–1263, 1266–1279, 1308, 1337, 1359, 1362, 1371, 1372, 1377–1383, 1390–1398, 1405–1422, 1424–1453, 1460, 1464, 1467–1470, 1476, 1477, 1478, 1484, 1485, 1494, 1497, 1503, 1512, 1518–1545, 1551, 1563–1616, 1620, 1628–1647, 1653–1674, 1700–1729, 1746, 1757, 1771, 1772, 1782, 1783, 1788–1795, 1804, 1814–1818, 1823, 1850, 1885, 1886, 1893, 1895, 1907, 1911, 1916, 1927, 1928, 1948, 1954–1962, 1977, 1979, 1988, 1991–1994, 2001, 2010–2013, 2022–2026, 2039–2047, 2049, 2051–2058, 2061–2073, 2075–2078, 2082, 2083, 2094, 2102, 2103, 2146, 2177, 2185, 2186, 2195, 2206, 2212, 2216–2219, 2243, 2254, 2288, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2305–2474, 2498–2500, 2504, 2516, 2525, 2527, 2532, 2535, 2536, 2539, 2541, 2543, 2548–2556, 2606, 2631, 2634, 2639, 2647, 2649, 2681, 2692, 2693–2695, 1805, 2915–2919, 2955, 2956, 2971, 2976–2981, 2989, 2990, 2996, 2999, 3007, 3017, 3020, 3027–3030, 3076, 3078, 3103, 3108–3110, 3118, 3124, 3127–3136, 3140–3149, 3152, 3154, 3157–3166, 3179, 3245, 3284–3286, 3289, 3291–3293, 3299, 3302–3307, 3353, 3355–3359, 3361, 3364, 3366, 3367, 3373, 3374, 3376, 3380, 3383, 3388, 3391–3398, 3400–3403, 3405–3409, 3411, 3412, 3415, 3475, 3498, 3500–3502, 3516, 3527, 3528, 3530–3532, 3537, 3541, 3558, 3559, 3569, 3577, 3582–3584, 3595, 3596, 3608–3610, 3622–3624, 3626, 3628–3630, 3645, 3663–3665, 3669, 3678, 3682, 3684, 3701–3707, 3709–3714, 3730, 3739, 3746, 3782, 3783, 3790, 3792, 3797–3800, 3811–3816, 3829, 3837, 3860, 3875, 3895, 3911, 3945, 3980–3987, 3990, 3994, 3996, 3997, 3999, 4000, 4002–4004, 4103, 4120, 4150, 4180, 4216–4218, 4220, 4231, 4282, 4283, 4285–4287, 4334, 4529, 4530, 4533–4535, 4538, 4539, 4542, 4543, 4551, 4685–4687, 4690, 4694–4697, 4702–4714, 4764–4768, 4771, 4772, 4806, 4827–4831, 4839, 4840, 4844, 4848, 4859, 4872, 4874–4879, 4881–4884, 4886, 4894, 4895, 4928, 4929, 4931, 4932, 4935, 4937–4941, 4945, 4950–4953, 5011, 5012, 5085–5089, 5115, 5120, 5163, 5176, 5213, 5215, 5216, 5232, 5233, 5353, 5276–5281, 5283, 5284, 5287, 5298, 5314, 5315, 5329, 5350, 5357, 5358, 5364–5378, 5382–5385, 5387, 5388, 5392–5395, 5405, 5407, 5409–5412, 5415–5417, 5419, 5420, 5422–5426, 5448, 5453, 5454, 5467, 5483, 5484, 5501, 5707.
Chuman 4081
Comintern 1690, 1974
Czechoslavakian 5395
France 257, 501, 1106, 1108, 1465, 1466, 1714, 1961, 2910
Germany 225, 280, 283, 285, 308, 312, 322–324, 2328, 2386, 2467, 2805, 3134 3679, 4243, 4253, 5204, 5368.
India 1252, 2390, 3109, 4888, 5308
Indonesia 877, 5641
Italy 1714, 1961, 2011
Japan 368, 398, 504, 505, 510, 511, 667, 746–750, 752, 904, 914, 1072, 1635, 1861, 1866, 1879, 1895, 2089, 2091, 2121, 2160, 2172–2180, 2185, 2187, 2190, 2191–2193, 2382, 2468, 3069, 4183, 4272, 4280, 4844, 4888, 4892.
Korea 1027, 1769, 1770, 2717, 3028–3032, 3117, 4888
Malayan 5395

Communist Party—Continued Page
Massachusetts 649
Netherlands 5635
New York 55, 251, 252, 865, 881, 2243, 2880, 3055, 3057, 3335, 3557
New York County 3057
New York State 3057, 3058, 3060, 4297, 5024
Oklahoma 116
Philippines (*see also* Hukbalahap) 641, 4449, 4858
Poland 1003, 4807
Puerto Rico 3057
Republic of Viet-Nam 1285
Russia 52, 152, 315, 297, 361, 781, 794, 892, 930, 1031, 1044, 1045, 1049, 1050, 1058–1060, 1067, 1120, 1212, 1270, 1272, 1329, 1531, 1552, 1578, 1654, 1677, 1708, 1748, 1895, 2047, 2066, 2067, 2085, 2179, 2923, 2981, 2995, 2997, 3073, 3113, 3180, 3189, 3197, 3235, 3236, 3365, 3405, 3446, 3449, 3500, 3528, 3531, 3558, 3627, 3635, 4541, 4542, 4840, 4879, 5279, 5282, 5382, 5385, 5386, 5396, 5422.
South America 865, 866
Sunnyside 4081
Underground 488
United States 403–405, 413, 435, 490, 510, 511, 517, 518, 544, 560, 581, 605, 608, 609, 649, 700, 705, 865, 866, 867, 883, 902, 945–948, 954, 957, 963, 965–968, 974, 985–988, 1007, 1025, 1078, 1101, 1103, 1108, 1168, 1170, 1192–1197, 1199, 1206, 1215, 1227–1229, 1234, 1242, 1357, 1378, 1404, 1428, 1471, 1475–1477, 1486, 1687–1689, 1694, 1706, 1730–1737, 1740, 1744, 1745, 1755–1762, 1778, 1837, 1846, 1880, 1900, 1903–1907, 1910, 1911, 1938, 1973, 2046, 2047, 2049, 2053, 2054, 2112, 2160, 2214, 2215, 2243, 2279, 2294, 2475–2478, 2483, 2494–2500, 2540, 2559, 2564, 2565, 2572, 2573, 2584, 2600, 2601, 2621, 2637–2650, 2657, 2660–2669, 2690, 2733–2736, 2744, 2745, 2763–2769, 2774, 2775, 2786, 2787, 2792–2813, 2820–2822, 2832, 2855, 2869–2872, 2874, 2880, 2883, 2886, 2888, 2897, 2909, 2947, 2980, 2984–2988, 2991, 3004, 3020, 3046, 3049, 3052–3062, 3071–3074, 3092, 3094, 3106, 3123–3133, 3146, 3191, 3197, 3208, 3214, 3218, 3247, 3305, 3335, 3357, 3362, 3415, 3507, 3531, 3555, 4403, 4485, 4836, 4886, 4903, 4904.
Washington, D. C 2806
Yugoslavian 5374
Communist Party Book Club 3836
Communist Party Bookshop 3362, 4302
Communist Party, Central Committee of (Russia) 4561, 4881, 4589, 5409, 5421
Communist Party, China Congress 4838
Communist Party Headquarters (Central Executive Committee) 2324, 2334, 2335, 2340, 2355, 2398, 2411, 2441, 2448, 2454, 2464, 2468, 2471
Communist Party Organizations (chart) 2448
Communist Party Policy (Chinese) 4110
Communist Party School (Yenan) 2406
Communist Political Association 118, 604, 605, 607, 706, 707, 2261, 3414, 3415
Communist Political Association of California 118
Communist Political Association of San Francisco 118
Communist Political Bureau 2321
Communist Southern Hopeh Military Area 2470
Communist-sponsored Government organizations (chart) 2448
Communist Suppression Army 2353
Communist Youth Corps (Young Communist League) 2412
Communist Youth Movement in New York State 3846
Communists' Progressive Book Shop 4616
Compania 3349
Comphanhia de Importacoes Industrial e Construtora, S. A 101
Compass (New York) 1914
Compass. (*See* Sunday Compass.)
Compton, Arthur H 4834, 5040, 5299, 5323
Compton, Karl T 3794

Page
Comstock, Miss Ada L 122, 123, 264, 494, 713, 858, 859, 940, 970, 977, 1219, 1227, 2511, 2610, 2622, 2811, 3612, 3859, 3868, 4044, 4092, 4093, 4105, 4106, 4108–4209, 4134, 4143, 5186, 5365.
Comstock, Alzada 5526, 5527
Comyus-Carr, A. S 5526, 5527
Conant, James Bryant 3751, 3812, 5299, 5302, 5303
Conant, Mrs 5299
Conant, Melvin A., Jr 4990, 4993, 5526, 5527
Conde, David 5526, 5527
Condliffe, Dr. J. B 11, 321, 471, 660, 768, 770, 1213, 1216, 1222, 2582, 2831, 3167, 3168, 5009, 5040, 5260, 5318, 5321, 5327, 5335, 5526, 5527.
Condominas, George 5526, 5527
Condon, E. U 1436, 4904
Confederation of Latin American Workers 5041
Conference of Foreign Ministers (Paris, 1951) 1761
Conference on World Organization 2851, 2860, 2861
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 414, 433, 441, 444, 445, 559, 607, 622, 633, 635, 674, 884, 938–942, 945–947, 995, 1075, 1100–1102, 1104, 1137, 1292, 1293, 2242, 2620, 2621, 2624–2626, 2628, 2630, 2634, 2639, 2641, 2646, 2809, 2811, 2834, 3046, 4274, 4398, 4834, 4835, 4887, 4974, 4975, 4977, 5041, 5067, 5413, 5504, 5700, 5703.
Congress for Peace and Democracy 4274
Congress of Nations (Baku) 2318
Congress Party of India 1252
Congress Socialist Party (All-India National Congress) 2638
Congressional Library 1302, 1465, 1466
Congressional Record 492, 1905, 2237, 2294, 2887, 3029, 3030, 3721–3723
Coniston, Ralph A 5653
Connally, Senator Tom 606, 706, 707, 1071, 1072, 1265, 1275, 2124, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2134, 2835, 4714, 4935
Connelly, Matthew A 3363, 3366, 3386–3388, 3640, 4714
Connelly, Mathew J 1474
Conolly, Violet 178, 5526, 5527
Connor, E. C 4064
Connor, King Ramsey 2161
Conover, Harry 3167, 3168, 5526, 5527
Consadine, Mr 4275
Conservative Party (Great Britain) 3373
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York 100, 101
Constantino, Renato 5526, 5527
Constantinovitch, Vassily. (*See* Bluecher, Galen.)
Constitution. (*See* United States Constitution.)
Constitution (steamship) 2273
Constitution of Japan 4185
Consulate (Darien) 1696
Consumers Council 2798
Continental Oil Co 101
Continuation of Discussion on Comrade Dimitron's Report (manuscript) 2066
Control Commission (Communist International) 2456
Converse, Elizabeth A 4990, 4993, 5526, 5527
Cook, John B 4976
Cooke. (*See* Castle and Cooke.)
Cooke, Charles Maynard (Admiral) 1491–1550, 1688, 1700, 1905, 2013, 3012–3014, 3668, 3813, 4534
Cooke, Morris L 3794
Coolidge, Archie 5116
Coolidge, Harold J 5291, 5528, 5529
Coolidge, Mrs. John G 3794
Coons, Arthur G 568, 712, 859, 900, 994, 995, 1132, 1147, 1271, 1551, 1561, 1573, 1577, 1596, 1618, 1627, 1634, 1642, 1661, 1662, 1667, 1676, 2819, 4839, 4859, 4860, 4944, 5285, 5703

Page
Cooper, John C 19, 20, 26, 111, 264, 2810, 4064, 5643
Cooper, Merion (Marion) 19, 20, 26, 111, 4064, 4067
Cooperative Societies Law (Japan) 2234
Cooperative Unity Alliance 4116
Coordinating Committee. (*See* State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Coordinating Committee for Postwar Rehabilitation 4674
Coordinator of Information (COI) 336, 337, 338, 390, 393, 396, 432, 483, 857, 2781, 2787, 2793, 3337–3339, 3805, 3817, 3958, 3963, 3967, 3968, 4009, 4958, 4973, 5000, 5001, 5254, 5256–5259, 5268, 5415, 5692.
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) 140, 439, 4736, 4737
Cope, Elizabeth W 5528, 5529
Copland, D. B 5528, 5529, 5684
Coplon, Judith 558, 2854, 2855, 4670
Corales, Juan Sias 3057
Corbett, Charles 4206, 4208, 4210, 5528, 5529, 5686
Corbett, Percy E 177, 178, 238, 239, 253, 254, 473, 474, 687, 994, 1216, 1222, 1314, 2518, 3751, 3860, 3869, 3886, 3973, 4208, 4987, 5070, 5078, 5081, 5208, 5209, 5214, 5268, 5324, 5333, 5355, 5528, 5529, 5684
Corbett, Professor 3343
Corbett's Group 2880, 3343
Corbitt, Duvon C 5528, 5529
Corcoran, Crispian 4885
Cordell, Stanley 5189
Cordes, Mr 4439
Cordt, Mr 4440
Corey, Esther (Mrs. Lewis) 4726, 4727
Corey, Lewis 4725, 4726, 4727
Coronado Conference 2815–2819
Cornell University 1167
Corrigan, John V 5674
Corttneff, Irene 3964
Corwin, Norman Lewis 4724
Cosmopolitan Club 685
Cosmos Club 147, 161, 1695, 1747, 1761, 1762, 1802, 1906, 2294, 2832, 3274, 3280, 3311
Costello 2667, 2668, 5681
Costigan, Howard 2684, 4115
Cotten, Mrs. Elizabeth B 409, 410, 1513
Cottrell, Nicholas 3964, 5700
Coudert Committee. (*See* New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools.)
Coughlin, Father 4110
Coughlin, Edward J., Jr 3812
Coughlin, Richard J 5528, 5529
Coulter, John W 4958, 4978, 5528, 5529
Council on African Affairs 622 1106, 3834, 3841, 4327, 4328, 4599, 4605, 4606, 4626
Council on Arts of the Ukrainian Republic 3621
Council of American-Soviet Friendship 630, 631, 2086, 2087, 3061
Council on Books in Wartime 1136
Council on Foreign Affairs (Cleveland) 2834
Council on Foreign Relations 135, 2814, 2815, 2817–2819, 2831, 2834, 2982, 2988, 4047, 4093, 4097, 4104, 4834, 5066, 5068, 5167, 5203, 5260, 5314, 5317.
Council on Foreign Relations (New York City) 1214, 1224
Council of International Affairs 18, 451
Council for Pan-American Democracy 105, 106, 540, 995, 2655, 4125, 4136, 4614, 5703
Council of People's Commissars of U.S.S.R 2324, 2727
Council of Religious Education 1275
Council for War Crimes at Nuremberg 1539
Council on World Affairs 2819, 3701
Councils of Working Women 3336, 3337
Counter-Intelligence (SCAP) 749
Counter-Intelligence Service. (*See* Army Intelligence.)

Page
Country Life Commission 1309
Counts, George S 1219, 4091, 4145, 4170, 4171, 4175
County Court of Ottawa 1005
County Peoples Council 2431
Coupland, Reginald 5528, 5529
Court of Claims. (*See* United States Court of Claims.)
Coville, Cabot 440, 5204, 5700
Coville, Mrs. Cabot 3964
Coville, Lillian 2116, 2248, 2521, 2776, 4990, 4993, 5294, 5295, 5700
Cowan, Jim 4823
Cowell, Mrs. Olive Thompson 5040
Cowie, Donald 5528, 5529
Cowles Brothers 1104
Cowles, Gardner 443, 446, 857, 4973, 4975, 5047
Cowles, Mike 1322
Cowley, Malcolm 4117, 4170, 4171, 4175, 4179, 4182
Cowper, Norman 5027
Cox, Mr 5204, 5217
Cox, Geoffrey 5049, 5052, 5053
Cox, Hugh 2837
Cox, Oscar 2004
Coxe, Spencer 5528, 5529
Coy, Mrs. Harold (Mrs. Mildred Price) 2524, 2529, 2643–2650
Coy, Wayne 3794
Coy, Mrs. Wayne 3794
Coyl, John 2831, 5261
Coyne, J. B 4893, 5270
CPA. (*See* Communist Political Association.)
CPSU. (*See* Communist Party, Russia.)
Cradle of Conflict 4029
Craig 5299
Craigie 3931
Craigie-Arita Formula of July 24 4201
Craigie, Robert 5189, 5190
Crandell, Miss Ella 5123
Crane 1617, 1619
Crane, Esther 3964
Crane Foundation 1738
Crane, Milton 5653
Crane, Dr. Robert T 4086, 4119, 4120
Cranes, John 5299
Crawford, Bruce 2658
Crawford, David L 264, 4125, 4126, 5207
Crawford, D. G 1227
Crawford, Elizabeth 4990, 4993, 4997
Crawford, Kenneth 2624, 2625
Creative Society (Chuang-tsao She) 2454
Creeck-Jones, Arthur 1216
Creel 1982
Creel, George 5659
Creel, Herrlee Glessner 475, 5528, 5529
Creighi (Mrs.) 201, 202
Crighton, S. M 5163, 5348
Cresset Press, The 4591
Cressey, George B 568, 1222, 1982, 2707, 2819, 3323, 3483, 4258, 4944, 4999, 5336, 5528, 5529
Crichton, Kyle 4258
Crillon Hotel (Paris) 2718
Crimean Conference 2382, 2857, 2869, 5485
Criminal Law of the U. S. S. R 4145
Cripps, Lady 4620, 5081
Cripps Mission 909, 916
Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford 686, 687, 909, 910, 2518, 2616, 2882, 2883, 3931, 3932, 5203, 5215, 5348
Cristanzi, Mr 4155
Croatian Fraternal Union of America 4115

Page
Crocker, W. R. 5528, 5529
Crockett, George W., Jr. 4836
Crockett National Bank 3879
Croly, Herbert 548
Cromwell. (*See* Sullivan and Cromwell.)
Cromwell, Mr 5298
Cromwell, Doris Duke 4092
Cromwell, Edith 50
Cronin, Kathleen 1338
Crosbie, Paul 4142
Crosby, Alexander L. 415, 5246
Crosby, E. H. G. 5528, 5529
Crosby, Josiah 5528, 5529, 5684
Cross, Judge Anna 4234
Cross, Professor 2613, 4580
Cross, Samuel 171, 178, 5111, 5116
Crossman, Mr 10, 14, 5338
Crouter, Errol Edgerton 3794
Crow, Carl 2781
Crowdy, Dame Rachel 3584
Crowford, John G. 5528, 5529
Crowley, George T. 2004
Crowley, Mr. 1706, 1796, 1936
Crown Colony of Hong Kong 2553
Crum, Bartley 4620, 5653
Cubues, Eugene 3057, 3058
Culbertson, Mr 1972
Culbertson, Ely 5271
Culbertson, Lt. J. S. 573
Culbertson, Paul 2835
Culbertson, William S. 4958, 4979, 4980
Cullum, Robert M. 5528, 5529, 5582, 5583
Cultural Association, Chinese Communist Party 2405
Culver, Margaret S. 5528, 5529
Cumberland, Kenneth B. 5528, 5529
Cunard White Star Co. 4049
Cune, Mr 5299
Cune, Mrs. 5299
Cunningham, George 5528, 5529
Cunningham, Kenneth B. 5528, 5529
Cunningham, Lilliam 4989, 4993
Curran, Jean A., Jr. 5530, 5531
Curran, Joseph 1104, 4136, 4620
Currency Stabilization Board. (*See* Chinese National Government, Currency Stabilization Board.)
Currie, Arthur 5319, 5335, 5349, 5684
Currie, Lauchlin 19–21, 26, 29, 34, 67–70, 108, 109, 112, 114, 120, 132, 133, 136, 140, 144, 145, 154–158, 161, 174, 175, 182, 270, 281, 345, 347, 348, 382, 413, 414, 417–419, 423–431, 433, 434, 443, 444, 479, 480, 494, 585, 586, 594, 595, 598–600, 652, 856–861, 902, 979–985, 987, 988, 1313, 1727, 1728, 1734, 1735, 1786, 1787, 1796, 1805, 1806, 1811, 1816, 1936, 1985, 1986, 2002–2004, 2031–2033, 2079, 2081, 2082, 2086, 2087, 2506, 2523, 2534, 2775, 2809, 2810, 2832, 2833, 2867, 2868, 2870, 2921, 3052, 3053, 3197–3202, 3208–3212, 3310, 3342, 3515, 3649, 3650, 3652, 3655, 3678, 3805, 3806, 3887, 3956, 3983, 4048, 4073, 4074, 4330, 4667, 4676, 4677, 4737, 4745, 4751, 4919, 4924–4926, 4936, 4944, 4958, 4973, 4977, 4978, 4984, 5013, 5032, 5045, 5047, 5052, 5055, 5057, 5058, 5059, 5198, 5199, 5234–5237, 5253, 5259, 5261, 5262, 5272, 5274, 5286, 5296.
Currie, Mrs. Lauchlin 1728, 1778, 3794
Currie Report 2082
Curti, Merle 5661
Curtin, John 2636
Curtis, Aileen 4985, 4993
Curtis, Charles P. 4692

Page
Curtis, Lt. Col. E. P 4073
Curtis, Frances 3793
Curtis, John L 1219, 1313, 4944, 5259
Curtis, Lionel 1216
Curtis, Richard C 4692
Curtis, Sue 5704
Curtis, Wright A 100
Cushing, Caleb 2389
Custa Republic 1562
Cutler, Addison T 4089
Czarist Army 2451
Czarist Regime 4060, 4120
Czarist Russia 2388, 2451, 3457, 3464
Czarists Government 2693
Czarowska, Mrs. Marta 3936
Czechoslovakia 3420, 3421, 3430, 3585, 3586, 3601, 3631, 3632, 3664, 3665, 3710, 3942, 4134, 4204, 4897, 5076, 5185, 5382, 5386, 5480, 5638.
Czechoslovakia Department of Industries 1670
Czechoslovakia, Government of 5075, 5201

D

Dabney, Virginius 494, 858, 859, 2809, 2811
Dafoe, Dr. John W 73, 365, 576, 577, 580, 663, 664, 768, 769, 1216, 3167, 3483, 3580, 3587–3589, 3592, 3751, 3881, 5153, 5156, 5175, 5199, 5271, 5320, 5324, 5327, 5333, 5359.
Dagbladet 4236
Dahl, Sonja 4990, 4993, 5285
Dahlberg, Edward 4170, 4171, 4176
Dai, Bao 1286, 1604, 1609, 1610, 1611, 5395
Daiches, David 5700
Daily Express 4511
Daily News 3450
Daily News (Chicago) 2574
Daily News. (*See* North China Daily News.)
Daily Peoples World 3045, 3071–3073, 3330
Daily Worker, The 9, 10, 15, 17, 21, 22, 116–118, 125, 126, 128, 131, 162, 245, 299, 460, 466, 514–517, 529–531, 535, 539, 553–557, 560, 561, 594, 595, 598, 600–604, 609–614, 616–623, 626, 631; 632, 634, 635, 637, 639–641, 643, 652, 654, 655, 657–659, 662, 665, 666, 674, 677–690, 699, 700, 754, 902, 915, 954, 955, 1012, 1017, 1024, 1077, 1084, 1088–1090, 1092, 1094, 1095, 1097, 1099–1103, 1106, 1184, 1235, 1239, 1295, 1307, 1308, 1316, 1376, 1377, 1391, 1392, 1419–1422, 1425, 1426, 1438–1440, 1453, 1463–1470, 1914, 1972, 2161, 2654, 2661, 2662, 2747, 2790, 2802, 2873, 2897, 3040, 3060, 3284, 3334, 3335, 3337–39, 3345, 3475, 3556, 3828, 3835, 3843, 3846, 3847, 3956, 3957, 4116, 4147, 4173, 4180, 4280, 4281, 4316, 4331, 4374, 4543, 4855–4857, 4886, 4926, 4935, 4939, 4941, 5337, 5338, 5340, 5352, 5356, 5645, 5678.
Daily Worker Book Shop (New York) 3500
Dairy Farmers Union 2636
Daladier 22, 33, 174, 2375, 3196, 3457, 4204, 4530, 5075, 5184, 5340
Dalley, F. W 5530, 5531
Daman, Anna 3335
Dan, Ino 5333
Dana, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow 2658
Dane, John, Jr 4692
Daniel, Howard 2589, 4650, 5530, 5531
Daniel, Mrs. Judith 440, 4988
Daniele 2809
Danilin, Sergei 4040, 4042
Dantwala, M. L 5530, 5531
Danubian Conference 2637
DAR. (*See* Daughters of the American Revolution.)

Page
Darcy, Sam 3335
Darden (President of University of Virginia) 1167
Darden, C. W., Jr 5323
Dare to Die Detachments (Eighteenth Group Army) 2459
Darien Embassy 1696, 1969, 1970
d'Argenlieu, Admiral 5394
Darr, John, Jr 2789
Darrow, Clarence 3600
Darrow, Evelyn M 4992, 4993
Das Kapital (Publication) 5310
Datta, S. K 239, 5209, 5348
Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) 2659
Davenport, F. M 5700
David, Edward M 5530, 5531
David, Madeline 5530, 5531
Davidson, Captain 735
Davidson, C. G 5274, 5291
Davidson, J. W 5530, 5531
Davidson, John F 3472
Davidson, Louis R 1514
Davidson, Maurice P 620, 622
Davies, Ambassador 5059
Davies, C. Collins 5530, 5531
Davies, C. H 5530, 5531
Davies, John Paton, Jr 70, 307, 314, 426, 427, 439, 652, 776, 778, 785, 794, 795, 797, 804, 806, 828, 1021, 1022, 1025, 1079, 1218, 1435, 1436, 1446, 1483, 1504, 1514, 1728, 1729, 1744, 1758, 1759, 1912, 1916, 1928, 1967, 1969–1971, 1980, 1984, 1987, 2003, 2486, 2489, 2535, 2753–2763, 2765–2771, 2840, 2854, 2913, 3006, 3007, 3068, 3113, 3484, 3625, 2763–2766, 3771, 3772, 3983, 3986, 3993, 4116, 4768, 4827, 4828, 4839, 5011, 5013, 5061, 5346, 5437–5483.
Davies, Joseph E 432, 857, 903, 1217, 2567, 2741, 2755, 2831, 3702, 4512, 4513, 4515, 4516, 4557–4560, 4973, 5199, 5252, 5256, 5261, 5298
Davies, Mrs. Joseph E 300
Davies, Lieutenant Colonel 748, 753
Davies, Mr 5045, 5300, 5420
Davies, R. A 663, 664
Davis, Benjamin J 4597
Davis, Benjamin, Jr 605, 1903
Davis, Chester C 2836
Davis, Don 4823, 4830
Davis, Elmer 613, 729, 730, 839, 1325, 1360, 1738, 3041, 3159, 3512, 3659, 5355
Davis, Harold C 5530, 5531
Davis, J. Merle 11, 4890, 5318, 5335
Davis, Jerome 4115
Davis, John 4830
Davis, Joseph S 264, 713, 1313, 5330, 5331, 5684
Davis, Kingsley 5530, 5531
Davis, Larule 5299
Davis, Lord 3850
Davis, Michael W 3794
Davis, Morris 2789
Davis, Mr 5166
Davis, Norman H 2834, 5252, 5349
Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland, and Kiendl 10, 42, 4908, 5344, 5352
Dawes, Ambassador Clarence E 1318, 2912
Dawes Plan 4037
Dawes, R. A 5700
Dawson, C. C 5530, 5531
Day, Augusta 4993
Day, John Co., Inc 4591, 4851, 4852
Dayason, E. C 5199
Dayton News 3847
Daytona Beach News-Journal 4388

Page
Daytona Beach Sun-Record ---- 4388
Deacon, William Arthur ---- 3472
Deadlock in China ---- 2511, 2512
Dean, A. L ---- 1313, 4125, 4126, 5207
Dean, Arthur H ---- 977, 1216, 1217, 1219, 2518, 2519, 2828, 3920, 4942, 4943, 4958, 4968, 5026, 5274, 5298, 5300, 5344, 5360, 5366, 5684
Dean, Edgar Packard ---- 5530, 5531
Dean, Mrs. Vera Micheles ---- 976, 2831, 4091, 4145, 4834, 4872, 5009, 5260, 5264, 5300, 5530, 5531, 5653, 5656
Deane, Arthur ---- 45
Deane, Hugh ---- 70, 142, 143, 396, 397, 1338, 2773, 2780–2791, 2793, 2986, 3515, 3775, 4610, 4616, 4861, 4862, 5107, 5346, 5415
Deans, Harry ---- 5186
Deaver, Judge Bascom ---- 2638
De Baum, Capt. George H ---- 2836
de Beauclair, I ---- 5510, 5511
De Becker, E. V. A ---- 358
de Bernstorff, S. E. le Comte ---- 5691
de Booy, H. Th ---- 5514, 5515
De Boukelitz, Brando ---- 501
De Caux, Leonard (Len) ---- 70, 425, 426, 441, 444, 445, 493, 494, 674, 713, 858–860, 979, 990, 993, 995, 1194, 1313, 2619–2643, 2809, 2817, 2986, 3515, 3775, 3964, 4629, 4944, 4975, 4977, 5522, 5523, 5684, 5700, 5703.
De Ford, Miriam Allen ---- 4258
De Francis, Dr. John ---- 327, 335, 3636, 3961, 4987, 5295, 5530, 5531, 5700
De Garmo. (*See* Edward W. Allen.)
De Gaulle Government of France ---- 4441
de Goispechea ---- 4235
de Jong, Miss Ellen Van Zyll ---- 390, 475, 476, 481, 3515, 4987, 5236, 5268, 5558, 5559
De Korne, John C ---- 5530, 5531
de Kruif, Paul ---- 4115, 4258
De Lacy, Hugh ---- 633, 1916, 2160, 2161, 2789, 3794, 4620
de Laguna, Frederica ---- 5564, 5565
de Lapomarede, Baron ---- 5564, 5565
De Leon, Jose ---- 4858
De Long, Mr ---- 5681, 5682
de Meel, H ---- 5576, 5577
de Naucrede, Edith ---- 4170, 4171, 4176
de Riencourt, Amaury ---- 5660
De Roy, Benjamin ---- 5704
de Scheinitz, Karl ---- 3964, 5702
der Tag ---- 3878
De Vinney, Leland D ---- 2523
de Vries, E ---- 5620, 5621
de Weizsacher, Le Baron E ---- 5691
de Wiart, Carton ---- 1349, 5382
De Witt, Dale ---- 1514
De Young, Henry C ---- 5062, 5321
Decker, John W ---- 900, 1147, 1267, 1551, 1568–1570, 1573, 1578, 1579, 1582, 1592, 1593, 1607–1609, 1613, 1616, 1626, 1627, 1634, 1641, 1657, 1658, 1660, 1674, 1681, 1682, 3704, 3794, 4835, 5530, 5531.
Declaration of Independence (United States) ---- 369, 1287, 1606
Deep Rock Oil Corp ---- 102
Defense Advisory Commission ---- 3454, 3455, 3459, 3677, 3678
Degras, Jane ---- 5530, 5531
Deimel, Henry L., Jr ---- 477, 4997, 4998
Dekezoniov ---- 4486
De Kiewit ---- 5302
Delafield & Wood ---- 1220
Delafield, Edward C., Jr ---- 2658
Delany ---- 1075, 1292, 1293
DeLeonardis, Salvatore ---- 4990, 4993
Delegation to Moscow (Chinese Communist Party) ---- 2453

Page
Delgado, Lionel C. 4990, 4993
Delhi 5465
Delhi School of Economics 5323
D'Elia, Paschal M 3167, 3168, 5330, 5331
DeMenocal, Daniel A 5165
Demieville, P 5532, 5533
Democratic Alliance 4857, 4858
Democratic Convention (1944) 1097, 1099, 1100
Democratic League 5404, 5410, 5411
Democratic League (China) 698, 2393, 2396, 2397, 2399, 2552, 3113
Democratic National Committee 1220, 1657
Democratic Party 797, 833, 836, 837, 1097–1100, 1220, 1328, 1657, 1906, 2294, 2628, 2683, 2835, 3046
Democracy and Independence in the Philippines 2887
Demorest, Dana J 3794
Denison, Ellery 3964, 5700
Denmark 3592, 5380
Dennery, M. Etienne 173, 238, 321, 471, 768, 770, 2714, 4021, 5131, 5175, 5209, 5333, 5359, 5684
Dennett, Eugene 4887
Dennett, Raymond 267, 494, 628, 858, 859, 925, 935, 937–1005, 1166, 1219, 1399, 1400, 1832, 1844, 2006–2009, 2013–2015, 2079, 2080, 2093, 2094, 2100, 2124, 2127, 2129, 2131, 2132, 2134–2136, 2139–2141, 2150, 2522, 2523, 2548, 2560–2623, 2689, 2810, 3793, 3942, 3945, 3978, 4122, 4124, 4255, 4680, 4681, 4937, 4939, 4944, 4989, 4993, 5032, 5063, 5065, 5078–5082, 5031, 5061, 5364–5367, 5413, 5414, 5532, 5533.
Dennett, Tyler 425, 426, 433, 857, 925, 2809, 2811, 3798, 3945, 4973, 4977, 5532, 5533, 5684
Dennis, Eugene. (*See also* Paul Walsh) 605, 1729, 3415, 4080
Dennison 4823, 4830
Dennison, Miss Eleanor 249, 444, 2885, 3964, 5532, 5533, 5700
Dennison, Capt. R. L 736–743, 2157, 2162–2170, 2296–2303, 4930, 4932
Denny, George V., Jr 1530–1532, 1534–1538, 2729, 3212
Denny, Ludwell 5700
Department of Peasantry (Nung-min Pu) 2464
Derba, Charles. (*See* Clarence Dirba.)
Derby Oil Co 102
Derevyanko, Maj. Gen. Kuzma 746
Derrick, R. A 5532, 5533
Des Moines Register and Tribune 433, 857, 996, 1104, 1221, 4973, 5326, 5703
Desert Road to Turkestan (book) 3266, 4029
Despres, Emile 71, 443, 446, 2626, 2832, 4622, 4624, 4716, 4975, 4977, 5270, 5346
Detroit American Federation of Teachers Convention 2162
Detroit Labor News 2665
Deuel, Wallace 4834
Deutsch, Monroe E 2817, 4835
Devine, Samuel L 5674
DeVoogd, Nicholas A. J 5052, 5053, 5089
Dewantara, Ki Hadjar 5532, 5533
Dewar, Margaret 5532, 5533
Dewey, A. Gordon 3167, 3168, 5532, 5533
Dewey, Ethel L 4170, 4171, 4176
Dewey, John 1624, 4091, 4145, 4171
Dewey, Gov. Thomas E 1097, 1102, 1105, 1438, 1443, 1470, 1531
Dexter, Franklin 4692
DFU. (*See* Dairy Farmers Union.)
Dhar, Subhas K 5532, 5533
DiDonato, Pietro 4258
Dial Press, Inc 664, 674–676
Diamond Workers Protective Union (AFL) 2633
Dickey, Colonel 1436
Dickey, Mr 2124
Dickinson, Edna C 4993
Dickinson, John 4119

Page
Dickinson, La Fell 5700
Dickinson, Mrs. La Fell 5696, 5697
Dickover, Erle R 618, 708, 2124
Die Weltbuhne 229, 3166
Dies Committee 2657, 2658, 2683, 2684, 4239–4242, 4244, 4246, 5047
Dies, Martin 597, 1299, 2872–2874, 4244
Diet (Japan) 2231, 2234, 2628, 4092, 4166, 4263
Dietrich, Miss 4997
Dietrich, Mr 229
Dietrich, Ethel B 5532, 5533
Digby, Simon Wingfield 3934, 4497, 4504, 4506
Dilemma in Japan 1748, 2243, 3555, 3556, 4311
Dillard, Hardy C 2603, 2604, 4958, 4972, 4973
Dillingham Building (Honolulu) 3176
Dillingham, Walter F 264, 568, 713, 1219, 4125, 4126, 4546, 4943, 5207, 5344, 5360
Dillings, Mrs 5191
Dimantshtein, S. M 2721, 2722, 3173, 3318, 3935
Dimantshtein, Victor 5128, 5137, 5138
Dimitrov, Georgi 1957, 4341, 5501
Dimitrov Report 2066
Dimitry, Helen 4990, 4993
Dirba, Clarence (Charles Derba) 678
Dirkson, Ambassador 373
Diskin, Lou 3058
Disosway, General 3968
Dissertation by Levina 3485
Dissertation on the Decay of American Imperialism by Gowwitch 3485
Distributive, Processing, and Office Workers of America 5413
District Intelligence Office (Third Naval District) 1474
Dix, Marion 5302
Djajadiningrat, Raden Loekman 5321
Djang, Y. S 5345, 5361
Do Yangly, Anthony 5532, 5533
Dobb 179
Dobbs, Maurice 340, 4089, 5532, 5533
Dobbs, Mrs 481
Dobby, E. H. G 5532, 5533
Dobrer, Ruth 4117
Dobson, R. P 5650
Dodd, Mr 4243, 4244
Dodd, Bella 1224, 5023
Dodd, William E 1514
Dodd, William F., Jr 4258
Dodd, William E., Sr 411
Dodds, Professor 179
Dodds, Vera 4987, 4988, 5532, 5533
Dodge & Seymour 1220
Dodge, Stanley D 4258
Dodson, Elba Aileen 4990, 4993
Dogras, Mrs. J 179
Doihara 4699
Dolbin, G. G 1328, 3646, 3647, 3649, 4779
Dolivet, Louis 701, 4984, 5019
Dollard, Charles 433, 857, 2566, 4913, 4973, 5083, 5090, 5227, 5298, 5299, 5300
Dolsen, James 3516
Domei News Agency 373, 395, 4022, 4121, 5215, 5232
Domke, Captain 3964
Donald, Dudley B 5532, 5533
Donald, W. H 2331
Donaldson, Faith 3322, 3323, 4476, 4478, 4526, 4915–4917, 5140
Donaldson, J. M 4621
Donohue, Irene R 5031, 5065, 5273, 5336, 5362
Donovan, General 390, 413, 1002, 3801, 3958, 5475
Doolittle, Lt. Gen. J. H 2368, 4169

Page
Dooman, Eugene H 604, 616–619, 623, 626, 639, 703–754, 980, 981, 1016, 1291, 1688, 1732, 1739, 1772–1774, 1779, 1829, 1830, 1842, 1863, 1864, 1866, 1867, 1872, 1873, 1905, 2124, 2127, 2153, 2155, 2193, 2250, 3003, 3005, 3053, 3054, 3069, 3097, 3377, 3400, 3409, 3489, 3894, 3900, 4310, 4323–4326, 4348, 4545, 4556, 4876, 4877, 5053.
Doonping, R 4882, 4883
Doorman, Eugene 2810
Doreen 660
Dorfman, Adolfo 4651
Dorfman, Ben 5009, 5219, 5247, 5248, 5700
Doriot 597
Dorn, General 1436
Doroshkin, Sadie 3337
Dorr Company 5105
Dorsey, Lieutenant 4169
Doubleday Doran & Co 81, 3903, 4047, 4070, 4135, 4591
Douglas DC–3's 2730
Douglas, Prof. Dorothy 1313, 4258, 5288
Douglas, Elaine 4991, 4993
Douglas, Emily Taft 5064
Douglas, Helen Gahagan 633, 2248
Douglas, Henry 5295
Douglas, Mrs. W. W 5040
Douglas, Justice William O 1100, 3645, 4984, 5027
Douglas, Melvyn 4062, 4066, 4116
Doull, Lieutenant 998
Downie, W 1216
Downing, Miss Elizabeth 266, 476, 3480, 3481, 3523, 3581, 3937
Doyle, Charles 4887
Doyle, Clyde 4863, 4866
Doyle, Daniel F 4990, 4993
Drabbe, J. G 5532, 5533
Dragoni, C 5205, 5532, 5533
Dragunov, Mr 4589
Drama in China's Anti-Japanese Propaganda (Publication) 2546
Draper, Charles Dana 5116
Draper, Ernest G 5346
Draper, Muriel 4258
Draper, Theodore 71, 2662, 3169, 3516, 4086, 4093–4096, 4261, 5346
Dream We Lost, The 3668, 3669
Dreiser, Theodore 2657, 2658, 2684, 4116, 4170, 4171, 4176
Dreyhausen, H. V 5700
Drucker, David 4076
Drucker, Mrs. Esther 4076
Drum, Gen. Hugh 1432
Drummond, W. M 5532, 5533
Drumright, Mr. Everett Francis 1721, 4545, 4546, 4823, 4830, 5480
Drygoods Workers Union 3336
Du Bois, Cora Alice 922, 926, 1129, 1130, 1146, 1271, 1282, 1283, 1602, 1606–1611, 1613, 1614, 1623, 1628, 1758, 1912, 2248, 2527, 5294, 5301, 5659, 5700
Du Bois, Mr. Josiah (Joe) 2222, 3964
Du Bois, W. E. B 2658, 2745, 2746
Du Peld 3337
Du Pont 666
Du Pont, Mr 4127
Dubin, Wilbert B 4888, 5532, 5533
Dubinsky, David 149, 293–295, 300, 2564, 2565
Dubs, Homer H 342, 3611, 4988, 4989, 4993, 5229, 5532, 5533
Duce, James Terry 5700
Duclos, Jacques 1106, 1108, 1109, 3415
Duffield, E. S 1124
Duggan, Laurence (Lawrence) 71, 234–237, 239, 240–242, 488–491, 694, 1218, 1729, 2835, 2868, 2870, 3516, 4036, 4086, 4108, 4580, 4614, 4800, 5172, 5209, 5216, 5286, 5346, 5354–5356, 5684.

Page
Duggan, Dr. Stephen P---- 1219, 4107
Duke of Devonshire---- 909
Duke, K. R---- 4944
Duke University---- 3611
Dull, Paul S---- 5532, 5533
Dulles---- 3167
Dulles, A. W---- 5084, 5170
Dulles, Allan---- 45
Dulles, Foster Thea---- 2579, 2581, 3943, 5282, 5287, 5651
Dulles, John Foster---- 45, 452, 464, 1197, 1959, 2737, 2864, 3738, 4931, 5067, 5350, 5534, 5535, 5681.
Dumbarton Oaks---- 607, 993, 995, 996, 1032, 1132, 2135
Dumbarton Oaks Conference---- 1736, 2837, 2838, 2841–2843, 2849, 2857, 2858, 2860, 2868, 2869
Dummon, Mr---- 2912
Dunbar, Barrington---- 4115
Dunlop, G. A---- 5320, 5334
Dunn, Prof. Frederick Sherwood---- 4005, 4007
Dunn, J. Kynang---- 5534, 5535
Dunn, James Clement---- 639, 704, 717, 737, 1852, 1862, 2124, 2127, 2163, 2193, 2297, 2809, 2835, 2859, 2862, 4876.
Dunn, L. C---- 4258
Dunn, Margaret M---- 4990, 4993
Dunn, Thomas P---- 5316
Dunne, Bill---- 3335
Dunne, George H---- 2997
Dunston, J. Leslie---- 5534, 5535
Dupee, Wm. Arthur, Jr---- 4692
Dupuy, R. Ernest---- 5534, 5535, 5684, 5700
Duran, Gustavo---- 4520
Durant, Kenneth---- 5085, 5197
Duranty, Mr---- 4090, 4091
Duranty, Walter---- 4897, 5659
Durbrow, Eldridge---- 706, 710, 760, 4341, 4342, 4348
Durdin, Tillman---- 2652, 3757
Durga, Das---- 5323
Durham, Walter A., Jr---- 5534, 5535
Durkin, James---- 2789
Durr, Clifford J---- 4903, 5112
Duskis, Miss Nettie---- 4086, 4089
Dutch East Indies---- 4205
Dutch Embassy (Paris)---- 5082
Dutch Government---- 924, 2367, 2526, 2529, 2555
Dutch Navy---- 3325
Dutch Treat Club---- 217
Dutt, R. P---- 3970, 4270, 5308, 5690
Dubal Gasoline Co---- 101
Duyvendak, J. J. L---- 1314, 5334
Dyason, Edward C---- 5267
Dyke, Gen. Ken R---- 2248
Dykstra, Clarence A---- 4944

E

Eam---- 214
Earle Committee---- 4075
Earle, Edward M---- 238, 444, 911, 2585, 2831, 4977, 5167, 5208, 5209, 5225, 5260, 5355, 5356
Earle, Frances M---- 5534, 5535
Early, Steve---- 3640
Earnshaw, Ruth---- 2480, 4859, 4988, 5534, 5535
East Asia---- 4202
East Asia Turki Republic---- 2385
East Asian Institute (Columbia University)---- 1216, 1219
East Asiatic Studies (University of California)---- 4160

Page
East Chekiang Column 2434
East Chekiang Military Region 2434, 2436, 2448
East China Financial and Economic Council 3951
East Fish Trust 189
East German Government 2839
East India Co 4699
East Indies 4684
East River Base 2401, 2413, 2432, 2434, 2448
East River Detachment (chart) 2448
East River Military Region 2401, 2413, 2432, 2434, 2436, 2448
Eastern Air Lines 100
Eastern Baptist Association of New York 4116
Eastern Bureau (Federated Press) 2627–2639
Eastern Chekiang 2401, 2413, 2434, 2448
Eastern Germany 2184, 3942
Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the West (book) 3167
Eastern Publishing Co 1975
Eastlake, Clara 5700
Eastland, James O 1862
Eastman, Max 159, 169, 838, 3353, 3361, 3497, 3498, 5079, 5656
Eastman, Nicholson J 3794
Eaton College 4714, 5002
Eaton, Dr 3406
Eaton, Mr 2124
Eaton, Paul E 5534, 5535
Eaton, Representative Charles A 2835, 3711
Eberhard, W 5534, 5535
Eby, Harold 2161
Eby, Kermit 4834, 5534, 5535
ECA. (*See* Economic Cooperation Administration.)
ECAFE. (*See* Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.)
Eccles, Marriner 2837
Ecija, Nueva 4858
Eckhardt, Tibor 603
Eckhart, Joseph 446, 447
Ecole des Sciences Politiques 768, 770, 5327
Economic China 4108
Economic Club of Detroit 1521, 1522
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 5, 1595, 1628, 1679, 5296, 5297, 5300, 5301
Economic Commission for Japan 1895
Economic Committee, Eighteenth Group Army (Chart) 2448
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 485, 1072, 1201, 1269, 1279, 1505, 1546, 1591, 1610, 1611, 1630, 1631, 1633, 1634, 1645, 1665, 1682, 1706, 2528, 2555, 3947, 4622, 4625, 4714, 4834, 5315, 5432.
Economic Defense Board 30
Economic Defense of Latin America 2586
Economic Geography of Southeast Asia 2581
Economic Handbook 3455, 3456, 3581, 3582
Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area 9, 81, 4047, 4068, 4070, 4122, 4135
Economic and Living Standards, American and Asiatic 3254
Economic Policy Committee 996
Economic Review of Foreign Countries 3685
Economic and Social Council of the United States 1161, 1162
Economic, Social, and Political Development of the Soviet Far East 3935
Economic Struggle on the Pacific Ocean (Book) 3935
Economic Survey of the Pacific Area (Book) 4046, 4047
Ecuador Government 2556
Eddy, Harold 3336
Eddy, Harriett G 4258
Eddy, Nelson 1528
Eddy, Sherwood 411, 1514, 5085, 5191, 5192
Edelman, H 5534, 5535
Edelstein, Julius 5684
Eden, Anthony 2850, 2860, 2861, 2863, 5059, 5060, 5656

Page
Edison, Charles A 5344
Edith 695
Editorial Committee of the Atlas 4146
Edminister, Lynn R 2837
Educational Exchange Service 1642
Edward (King of England) 3140, 3248
Edward, Gladys H 4991, 4992, 4993
Edwards, Clyde S 3154
Edwards, Corwin D 2222, 2225, 5534, 5535, 5698
Edwards, Dwight 4936, 5344
Edwards, Mr 1881, 1882
Edwards, Passmore 5188
Edwards, Paul C 5040
Edwards' Report 1882, 2222, 2225
Efron, David 4136
Egan, Charleen 5700
Egan, Martin 5123
Eggan, Fred 342, 5534, 5535
Eggleston, Sir Frederic W 1216, 1222, 2124, 2125, 2981, 5062, 5319, 5320, 5333, 5534, 5535
Eggeston, Polly 5534, 5535
Egoriew, Vladimir 5692
Egyptian Government 2556, 3536, 3613
Ehle, Emily L 5534, 5535
Ehrhardt, Mr 4440
Ehrlich, Anita 4991, 4993
Eight and Ten West Thirty-seventh Street Corp 98, 101
Eighteenth Group Army (Chinese Communist Army) 1791, 1992, 1993, 2317, 2332, 2346, 2349, 2350, 2353, 2354, 2392, 2400 2401, 2404, 2432–2437, 2447, 2448, 2453, 2456–2466, 2468, 2470, 2473, 2541, 2544–2548, 2550, 5370, 5371, 5372, 5404.
Eighteenth Group Army (Mohammedan Column) 2466
Eighteenth Group Army Battalion (Chart) 2448
Eighteenth Group Army Brigade (Chart) 2448
Eighteenth Group Army Company (Chart) 2448
Eighteenth Group Army Division (Chart) 2448
Eighteenth Group Army Office (Yenan) 2461, 2472
Eighteenth Group Army Regiment (Chart) 2448
Eighteenth Party Congress 646
Eighth Air Force 138
Eighth International Conference of American States 2586
Eighth Route Army. (*See* Chinese Communist Army, Eighth Route.)
Eighth Route Army Medical Department 2445
Eighth Route Army Military Hospital 2445
Eighth War Zone 2374
Einstein, Albert 5040
Einzig, Paul 4271
Eisenhower, Dwight David 4537, 5656
Eisler, Gerhardt 224, 225, 256, 308, 324, 514, 555, 580, 866, 3134, 4402, 4798, 5356
Elchibegoff, Ivan 5534, 5535
Eldrige, Fred 5651
Eleanor 4641
Electric Bond & Share Co 1217
Elections Mark Japan Change (Article) 2789
Eleventh Red Army (Chinese Communist Army) 2324
Eliot, Charles W 568, 570
Eliot, Thomas H 444, 3794
Elisieff, Serge 5116, 5229
Elizalde, Joaquin M 5321
Elizalde, Manuel 5026, 5027, 5052, 5053, 5059
Elizayev 1154
Elkus, Mrs. Charles De Young 5040
Eller, E. M 5700
Ellin, Nathan 3336
Ellinger, Barnard 5534, 5535

Page
Elliott, A. Randle ---- 2586
Elliott, Bill ---- 3887
Elliott, Major T. George Fielding ---- 1302, 2673, 4125, 5536, 5537, 5656
Elliott, Jim ---- 5295
Elliott, Robert C ---- 5040
Elliott, William Y ---- 2517, 3167, 5053, 5116
Ellis, Raymond W ---- 4692
Elliston, Herbert ---- 2248, 4833, 5323
Elliston, H. B ---- 5084, 5153, 5156, 5180
Ellsworth ---- 862
Elmhirst, Mr ---- 155, 157, 158
Elmhirst Fund ---- 4142
Eloesser, Herbert ---- 4944
Elsie ---- 436, 652, 661
Elson, Jean ---- 4990, 4993
Eltenton, Mrs .Dolly ---- 71, 266, 3516, 3517, 3918, 3919, 3920, 4078, 4339
Eltenton, Mr. George Charles ---- 3516, 3517, 3920, 4078
Ely, Gertrude ---- 3794
Elyssiev, Mr ---- 4589
Emancipation Daily (Chich Fang Jih Pao) ---- 2381, 2404
Emancipation Press (Chieh-fang Press) ---- 2404
Embargo Battle Begins (Article) ---- 2673
Embick, Gen. Stanley D ---- 1022, 1023, 1032, 1033, 2836
Embree, Edwin R ---- 712, 713, 2622, 4092, 4977, 5123, 5536, 5537
Embree, John Fee ---- 2248, 4021, 5536, 5537, 5648, 5688
Embry, John A ---- 4834
Emeny, Brooks ---- 45, 158, 264, 266, 425, 426, 433, 444, 568, 713, 857, 1220, 1330, 2622, 2814, 2816, 2819, 2834, 4943, 4973, 4977, 5020, 5199, 5269, 5274, 5277, 5278, 5279, 5344, 5360, 5536, 5537.
Emeny, Mrs. Brooks ---- 713
Emerson, Ruppert ---- 54, 432, 444–446, 475, 494, 547, 568, 857, 858, 859, 980, 981, 994, 995, 1007, 1008, 1222, 1288, 2809, 2810, 3883, 4834, 4859, 4860, 4944, 4967, 4973, 4975, 5116, 5289, 5336, 5536, 5537, 5703.
Emery, Edgar B ---- 5536, 5537
Emmerson, John Kenneth ---- 746, 748, 749, 753, 776, 778, 830, 903, 904, 1729, 1758, 1912, 1972, 1980, 1987, 2003, 2063, 2156, 2248, 2489, 2535, 3005, 3547, 4844, 5062.
Empire Club (Toronto) ---- 3604
Empire in the East ---- 3323, 3324
Employee Loyalty Investigation. (*See* United States Department of State, Employee Loyalty Investigations.)
Empress of China (SS) ---- 2256
Emspak, Julius ---- 2634
Endelman, Michael ---- 4724
Engdahl, J. L ---- 3335
Engdahl, Lee (Mrs. Russell) ---- 4823, 4830
Engdahl, Russell ---- 4831
Engel, Leonard ---- 5536, 5537
Engels, Morris ---- 517, 548, 1689, 2270, 2887, 2890, 3182, 3184, 3501, 4117, 4335, 5420, 5422
Engers, J. F ---- 5053, 5536, 5537
England. (*See* Great Britain.)
Englander, Florence ---- 4990, 4993
English Baptist Mission ---- 3293, 3307
English Communist Party ---- 280, 281
English Missionaries ---- 3629
English Workers Clubs ---- 3337
English Workers Press ---- 3481
En-lai Chou. (*See* Chou, En-lai.)
Enlightened American Imperialism in the Philippines (Article) ---- 2887
Ennis, Thomas Edson ---- 5656
Ensr, R. C. K ---- 2891, 5536, 5537
Entenberg, Barbara ---- 4855, 4857, 5536, 5537

Page
Entente Cordiale 2306, 2311, 2318, 2319, 2382, 2388, 2454, 2461
Eppeisheimer, Daniel S 3794
Epstein, Henry 2658
Epstein, Israel 71, 435, 436, 452, 453, 455, 456, 458, 460, 463–466, 545, 589–591, 620, 622, 634–638, 651, 662, 709, 711, 1194, 1195, 1197, 1198, 1201, 1202, 1513, 1783, 2063, 2243, 2266, 2581, 2789, 3059, 3516, 3530–3532, 3737, 3738, 3740, 3741, 3746–3748, 3754, 3785, 3790, 3791, 3829–3831, 3834, 3840, 3899, 3903, 3938, 3939, 4082, 4306 4308, 4317, 4318, 4353, 4354, 4806, 4858, 4859, 4861, 5023, 5024, 5083, 5346, 5350, 5357, 5374, 5427, 5428, 5536, 5537, 5653.
Epstein, Mary. (*See* Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley.)
Erenburg, Mr 4589
Ernst, Mr 4234
Erwin, Katherine 5295
Escara, Jean 5536, 5537
Espil, Ambassador 603
Espionage Act 1033, 1042
Espy, Willard R 5536, 5537
Esso Standard Oil Co 102
Establishment of the Autonomous Jewish District in Birobidjan 3935
Esther 329, 331
Estonia 4486
Eteenpain (publication) 2665
Ethel, Dr. Garland 2161
Ethiopia 3693, 5708
Ethiopian Fiasco 4204
Ethiopian War 2671
Ethridge, Mark 1648
Etter, Willis R 4329
Eurasian 4204
Europe 3904, 3943, 3948, 3987, 4002, 4103, 4105, 4135, 4200, 4201, 4216, 4267
European Commission 722
European Theater of the War of 1914–18 4147
European War 2517, 2520, 2637, 2671, 2672, 2846, 4104, 4105, 4204
Evangelical Church 1315
Evans Building (Washington) 2595
Evans, Dr. Roger F 2523, 4245, 5688
Evatt, Dr 1566
Evening Star (newspaper) 5702
Ewing, Dr 2819
Ewing, Ethel E 4990, 4993, 5536, 5537, 5697
Exchange Stabilization Board 15
Executive Committee (Communist International) 2327, 2329, 2410, 2453
Executive Offices of the President 429, 430, 433, 568, 570, 586, 2921
Executive Yuan 2309, 2334, 2398
Exeter 1729
Export Control Administration 278, 390
Export-Import Bank (U. S. A.) 839, 2263, 2264, 2288, 2552, 4544, 4834, 5429, 5432, 5700
Extermination Campaign 2382
Extraordinary National Congress (Kuomintang) 2342
Eyes on Japan 4120
Eyester, Col. S 2770
Ezekiel, Mordecai 5261

F

Faber and Faber 3937
Fabian Quarterly 5377
Fablet, Capitaine de Vaisseau Julian 5692
Fabyan, Eleanor B 4616, 4987
Fact Finding Commission on China 1516
Fadeev 1317
Fahey, Col. Daniel D., Jr 995
Fahs, Charles B 321, 432, 471, 577, 857, 1222, 4011, 4834, 4973, 5000, 5007, 5008, 5299, 5536, 5537, 5700, 5704.

Page
Fainsod, Merle 262, 5116
Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) 608, 5678
Fairbank, John K ..... 71, 378, 383, 399, 426, 427, 436, 437, 474, 479, 480–482, 568, 628–630, 650, 651, 900, 920, 921, 933, 1025, 1147, 1245, 1273, 1275, 1280, 1513, 1527, 1531, 1532, 1534–1538, 1551, 1573–1576, 1587–1593, 1607, 1615–1620, 1626, 1646, 1650, 1651, 1664, 1682, 1729, 1760, 1761, 1783, 1916, 1938, 1968, 1978, 2018, 2506–2511, 2622, 2753, 2755, 2759, 2760–2765, 2768, 2769, 2809, 2810, 3207, 3208, 3212, 3213, 3516, 3517, 3547, 3671–3674, 3715–3822, 3902, 3903, 3938, 3980–3984, 3993, 4011, 4012, 4027–4029, 4107, 4206, 4330, 4692, 4693, 4698, 4702, 4823, 4831, 4834, 4835, 4859, 4862, 4944, 5000, 5024, 5057, 5177, 5187, 5296, 5300, 5303, 5317, 5374, 5427, 5438, 5439, 5440, 5443, 5444, 5445, 5447, 5448, 5454, 5456, 5457, 5475, 5476, 5478, 5479, 5481, 5482, 5536, 5537, 5651, 5652, 5654–5660, 5685, 5686.
Fairbank, Mrs. John K. (Wilma) ..... 266, 306, 307, 389, 427, 479, 1025, 1729, 1758, 1760, 1912, 2508–2511, 2753, 2755, 2759–2765, 2769, 2811, 3766, 3771, 3794, 3887, 4012, 4188, 4206, 4330, 4979, 4984, 5010, 5013, 5014, 5274, 5295, 5297, 5301, 5438, 5444, 5445, 5447, 5478, 5479, 5481, 5482, 5536, 5537, 5711.
Fairbank, John P 4454
Fairbanks, Alaska 3575
Fairbanks, Douglas, Jr 731, 732, 734, 998, 4063, 4066
Fairchild, General 1022
Fairchild, Henry Pratt 2684, 4116, 4258
Fairchild, Muir S 2836
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Miss Elsie (Mrs. Israel Epstein) ..... 50, 51, 263, 589–591, 839, 840, 2789, 3142, 3480, 3481, 3516, 3518, 3737, 3738, 3790, 3791, 3874, 3903, 3917, 3918, 3938, 3939, 4002, 4308, 4317, 4318, 4600, 4601, 4610, 4804, 4987, 5118, 5120, 5175, 5179, 5198, 5203, 5210, 5247, 5356, 5357, 5536, 5537, 5704.
Fairmont Hotel (San Francisco) 2843
Fa-Kwei, Gen. Chiang 1087, 1368
Falconer, Robert Alun 143, 5536, 5537
Falk, Dr. Leslie 3964
Falk, Mrs. Leslie 3964
Fall, Hrepilad 5112
Fan Chin 2457
Fan Tzu-chia 2457
Fan Wen-lan 2404, 2457
Fanelli, Joseph A 2650, 2967, 4152, 4159, 4187, 4189, 4195, 4358, 4396
Fang, Chaoying 5536, 5537
Fang, Gen. Chen-wu 3470, 3472
Fang, Chih-min 2457
Fang, Chih-ming 4855
Fang Fu-an 143
Fang Pu-chou 2457
FAO 5700
Far Custa Republic 1562
Far East ..... 2121, 2488, 3742, 3745, 3746, 3758, 3765, 3782, 3805, 3811, 3812, 3826, 3838, 3850, 3863, 3864, 3876, 3878, 3880, 3881–3887, 3892, 3894–3897, 3909, 3924, 3930, 3932, 3943, 3945, 3956–3958, 3964, 3969, 3970, 3972, 3974, 3982, 3985, 3986, 3987, 3989, 3992, 3994–3996, 3998, 4010, 4011, 4013, 4046, 4047, 4055, 4070, 4092–4099, 4103, 4106, 4114, 4120, 4122–4125, 4128, 4139, 4140, 4201, 4202, 4204–4207, 4216–4218, 4225, 4255, 4261, 4273, 4276, 4312, 4323, 4325, 4331, 4351.
Far East Advisory Commission 738, 1881
Far East Area Committee 714
Far East Briefs 2789
Far East Bulletin 2524, 2627
Far East Command 353, 358, 447–849, 851, 454, 456, 841, 843–845, 859, 860
Far East Commission 721, 722, 746, 922, 2125, 2164, 2169, 2170, 2222, 2224, 2236, 2237, 2258, 2281, 2298

Page
Far East Digest 5328
Far East Police (Russian) 2719
Far East Reading—Japan Diary 2789
Far East Spotlight. (*See* Far Eastern Spotlight.)
Far East State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (FESWNCC). (*See* State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Far East Subcommittee of State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee FESWNCC. (*See* State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Far East United Nations Conference at Ootacamund 13
Far Eastern Affairs 753, 1499, 4021, 4202
Far Eastern Association 1214, 3891, 3957, 3969, 3971, 4010–4012, 4026, 4027
Far Eastern Bulletin 2351
Far Eastern Commission. (*See* United States Department of State, FEC 230.)
Far Eastern Commission Policy (Economic Power in Japan.) 2224
Far Eastern Division. (*See* State Department.)
Far Eastern Front in the War Against the Axis 2887
Far Eastern Institute 342, 5312
Far Eastern Quarterly 341, 3969, 4012
Far Eastern Republics 3702
Far Eastern Review 2781
Far Eastern Series 800, 804, 808
Far Eastern Spotlight 51–53, 55, 56, 259, 1334, 1336, 1338, 2690, 2789, 2792, 3827, 4163–4166, 5412
Far Eastern Survey 6, 8, 9, 80, 81, 163, 167, 270, 299, 335, 337, 376, 377, 384, 385, 390, 394, 397, 435, 436, 468, 469, 481, 533, 534, 536, 538, 539, 574, 582, 621, 622, 643–645, 667, 668, 712, 754, 788, 911, 938, 949, 970, 971, 996, 1147, 1148, 1204, 1216, 1229, 2524, 2567, 2580, 2615, 2782, 2783, 2791, 2792, 2865, 2870, 3284, 3285, 3460–3462, 3506, 3523, 3617, 3618, 3682, 3698, 3797, 3800–3803, 3865, 3880, 3885, 3895, 3896, 3904, 3970–3972, 4014, 4016, 4017, 4047, 4096, 4098, 4103, 4107, 4114, 4128, 4135, 4140, 4144–4146, 4265, 4279, 4282, 4283, 4445, 4454, 4680, 4692, 4693, 4853, 4855, 4856, 4884, 4888, 4889, 4898, 4956, 4977, 4988, 4989, 4991, 5007, 5010, 5021, 5024, 5025, 5029, 5030, 5048, 5063, 5064, 5140, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5236, 5237, 5239, 5241, 5242, 5247, 5248, 5255, 5257, 5259, 5267, 5279, 5282, 5283, 5284, 5287, 5328, 5329, 5378, 5426, 5504–5633, 5689, 5696, 5703.
Far Eastern University 867, 868
Far Eastern War 2520
Farley, Hugh D 998
Farley, James Aloysius 5657
Farley, Miriam S 122, 266, 387, 389, 390, 394–397, 472, 474–476, 564, 628, 629, 901, 938, 940, 945, 950, 952, 990, 992, 993, 996, 1192, 1202, 1203, 1209, 1400, 1729, 1730, 1901, 1902, 1916, 1938, 2017, 2018, 2022, 2482, 2523, 2580, 2587, 2604, 2610, 2627, 2628, 2689, 2781, 2782, 2783, 2748, 3455, 3460, 3462, 3644, 3796, 3797, 3799, 3937, 4019, 4021, 4086, 4097, 4108, 4124, 4225–4229, 4263, 4264, 4473, 4545, 4860, 4965, 4967, 4969, 4972, 4988, 4989, 4993, 5021, 5053, 5089, 5179, 5181, 5218, 5224, 5225, 5228, 5234–5236, 5239, 5329, 5366, 5413–5415, 5536, 5537, 5683.
Farm Information 489
Farm Production for Defense 2887
Farm Research 489, 2798
Farm Security Administration (FSA) 419
Farmer, Miss Frances 4275
Farmer, Victor 2124, 2125, 5536, 5537
Farmers' Bank of China 4619
Farmer's Mass Organization (Chinese Communist Party) 2427
Farmers' National Salvation Association 2335
Farmers and the Struggle Against the War Program 2887
Farquhar, Sammy 660
Farquharson 2160
Farrar, Mr 4020

Page
Farrelly, Theodore S---------- 5538, 5539
Farrish. (*See* Catlin, Farrish & Co.)
Fascist Party---------- 404, 560, 570, 603, 606–608, 612, 613, 638, 707, 713, 723, 731, 740, 772, 815, 946, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1993, 2160, 2166, 2174.
Fascists---------- 1304, 1319, 1358, 1377, 1484, 2328, 2329, 2375, 2377, 2382, 2386, 2596, 2654, 2676, 2680, 2683, 3586, 4069, 4070, 4115, 4118, 4203, 4204, 4214–4216, 4256, 4257.
Fate of the World is at Stake in China, The---------- 3355, 3390, 3498
Fatt, Ngiam Tong---------- 143
Faulkner, James M---------- 5538, 5539
Fautz, Elizabeth---------- 5700
Faymonville, Col. Carl (sic)---------- 494, 858, 859
Faymonville, Col. Philip R---------- 144, 145, 147–151, 153, 161, 176, 587, 687, 980, 985, 988, 2518, 2811, 3265, 3310, 3327–3330, 3616, 3700–3703, 4078, 5045, 5059, 5112, 5252.
FBI. (*See* Federal Bureau of Investigation.)
FEA. (*See* Foreign Economic Administration.)
Fearey, Robert A---------- 1222, 2124, 2811, 5021, 5294
Fearing, Kenneth---------- 4258
FCC. (*See* Federal Communications Commission.)
FEC. (*See* Far East Commission.)
FEC–230. (*See* United States Department of State, FEC–230.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)---------- 27, 43, 63, 211, 221, 230, 270, 343, 353, 412, 484, 492, 514, 761, 763–765, 840, 956, 1044, 1079, 1080, 1172, 1173, 1175–1180, 1183, 1186–1188, 1470, 1471, 1486, 1759, 1778, 1973, 2112, 2117, 2148, 2242, 2752, 2753, 2754, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2769, 2803, 2821, 2822, 2864, 2875, 2945, 2954, 2955, 2982, 2983, 3054, 3055, 3063, 3064, 3071, 3103, 3106, 3163, 3339, 3724, 3824, 3896, 4045, 4137, 4261, 4316, 4333, 4389, 4403, 4663, 4776, 4783, 4785, 4786, 4790, 4792, 4796, 4801, 4805, 4826, 4837, 4842, 4843, 4846, 4848, 4849, 5109, 5353, 5355, 5678, 5680.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)---------- 758, 2787, 2788, 4244, 4327
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America---------- 4116
Federal Council of Churches Executive Committee---------- 5538, 5539
Federal Court of New York---------- 2970
Federal Emergency Relief Administration---------- 4639, 4647, 4667, 4720, 4722, 4733
Federal German Government---------- 2185
Federal Government. (*See* United States Government.)
Federal Power Commission---------- 2831, 2837
Federal Research Project---------- 4756
Federal Reserve---------- 71, 278
Federal Reserve Bank---------- 390, 433, 444, 858, 4974, 5040, 5249, 5268
Federal Reserve Bank of North China---------- 3685
Federal Reserve Board---------- 444, 1727
Federal Reserve System---------- 2687, 2837, 5346
Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors---------- 4622
Federal Security Agency---------- 4623
Federal Service. (*See* United States Government.)
Federal Works Agency---------- 4623, 4744
Federal Writers Project---------- 4275
Federated Press---------- 493, 668, 669, 2627–2639, 2640, 2642, 2664–2667, 4152
Federation of American Scientists---------- 3539
Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians---------- 4116
Federation of Farmers, Workers, Soldiers, and Students to Promote the Revolutionary Movement---------- 2319
Federation of Women's Clubs---------- 4276
Fedotov, Anthony N---------- 5199, 5267
Fei, Hsiao-Tung---------- 5538, 5539, 5648, 5686, 5687
Fei, Koh Tsung---------- 103
Feigin, Abner---------- 3336
Feingold, Abraham---------- 4117
Feis, Herbert---------- 2832, 2835, 4108, 5224

Page
Fellow-traveler 3732, 3738, 3747, 3877, 3898, 3984, 4019
Fels, Samuel S 5078
Fen-yang Arsenal 2428
Feng, Chia-seng 342, 1982
Feng (Fing), Chia-sheng 1982, 5538, 5539
Feng, Dora 3536
Feng, General 3612, 4151
Feng, Hung-chi 3536
Feng, Mildred 3536
Feng, Paul 3536
Feng, Wen-pin 24–3.24–4.2457
Feng, General Yu-hsiang 2320, 2359, 2329, 3518–3520, 3535–3537, 4582, 4583, 4882
Fenico, Pasquale J 4944
Fenn, Henry C 5538, 5539
FEPC. (*See* Fair Employment Practices Commission.)
FERA. (*See* Federal Emergency Relief Administration.)
Feraru, Arthur 5538, 5539
Ferber, Stanley 4992, 4993
Ferguson, G. V 5538, 5539
Fernbach, Alfred P 5700
Ferns, H. S 5538, 5539
Ferris, General 1030, 1435, 1447, 2074, 2075, 2292, 3657, 3658, 4771
FESWNCC. (*See* State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee.)
Fetter 3883
Feval, Mr 4091
Fever, Lewis S 5538, 5539
Fickan 4823, 4831
Field 5685, 5705
Field, Alice Withrow 4258
Field, Anita Boyer 77
Field, Betty 5116
Field, Edith (Mrs. Frederick V.) 71, 266, 862, 3570, 4136, 4149, 5279
Field, Mrs. Elizabeth 286, 4108
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt (Frederick Spencer, Lawrence Hearn) ..... 4, 7–9, 11, 12, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24–31, 33–35, 45, 71, 74–127, 173–175, 179, 180, 182, 232, 241, 242, 246, 247, 249, 251, 253, 254, 260, 263–265, 268, 277, 283, 286, 292, 295, 298, 305, 310, 311, 344, 345, 347, 364, 365, 388, 414–418, 425, 426, 433, 438, 444, 460, 461, 465, 475, 477, 488, 490, 491, 494, 517, 518, 520, 521, 523, 526–529, 539–541, 550, 551, 571, 572, 581, 584, 585, 588, 620, 622, 648, 653, 659, 661, 662, 680–683, 686, 687, 694, 713, 850, 857–860, 862, 863, 896–898, 907, 925, 928, 934, 940, 947, 953–955, 970, 971, 980, 986, 990, 992–995, 1088, 1089, 1091–1094, 1151, 1155–1157, 1160, 1162, 1164, 1177, 1179–1188, 1190, 1192, 1193, 1199, 1203, 1208, 1209, 1217–1219, 1224, 1227–1229, 1307, 1308, 1313, 1377, 1392, 1419, 1421, 1422, 1438, 1443, 1469, 1470, 1730, 1778, 1779, 1849, 1916, 1926, 1933, 1934, 1982, 2219–2221, 2491, 2511, 2512, 2515–2519, 2573–2576, 2605, 2606, 2610, 2615, 2616, 2622, 2643, 2652, 2662, 2709, 2713, 2720, 2730, 2789, 2804, 2809, 2811, 2813, 2877, 2878–2883, 2888, 2926, 2953, 2954, 2984–2986, 2994, 3059, 3125–3128, 3145, 3167, 3190, 3191, 3195, 3196, 3203–3206, 3208, 3249, 3250–3258, 3271–3274, 3283, 3284, 3288, 3343, 3346–3348, 3422, 3424–3429, 3437, 3438, 3444, 3445, 3454–3459, 3465, 3481, 3482, 3485, 3580, 3582, 3587, 3591, 3612, 3677, 3834, 3844, 3854, 3856, 3858, 3859, 3862, 3864, 3868, 3870–3875, 3877, 3878, 3882, 3883, 3887, 3888, 3895, 3898, 3918, 3920–3922, 3928, 3929, 3976, 3983, 3988, 3989, 4012, 4015, 4017, 4033–4152, 4158, 4167, 4173, 4179, 4180, 4182, 4208, 4209, 4211, 4234, 4236–4238, 4261, 4316, 4317, 4337, 4358, 4374, 4462, 4500, 4502, 4560, 4562, 4567, 4569, 4587, 4663, 4787–4789, 4853, 4859–4861, 4870, 4884, 4922, 4939, 4941, 4944, 4955, 4958, 4959, 4967, 4973, 4977, 4979, 4988, 4997, 5024, 5025, 5032, 5041, 5083–5085, 5114, 5123, 5125, 5126, 5137, 5140, 5142, 5144, 5153, 5154, 5156, 5161, 5162, 5164, 5167, 5169, 5170, 5175, 5178, 5179, 5182–5184, 5186–5190, 5193, 5196, 5198, 5204, 5207, 5210, 5215–5218, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5257, 5258, 5289, 5290, 5306, 5337, 5338, 5339, 5352, 5353, 5354, 5356, 5365, 5413, 5538, 5539, 5703.

Page
Field, Frederick U., Library 3834, 3835
Field, Mrs. Frederick V 4599, 4613
Field, Henry 1313, 5182, 5700
Field, Herta 260
Field, Lila V 102
Field, Marshall 3793, 5079, 5080, 5299
Field, Noel H 231–236, 260, 270, 271, 489, 4800
Field, Olga V 2576, 4991, 4993, 5538, 5539
Field, Osgoode 3484, 3487
Field, Philip Morton 4662, 4663
Field, Sara Bard 4258
Field, William O., Jr 4091, 4145, 4258, 5238
Field, W. B. Osgood, Jr 687, 2518
Fields, John E 5538, 5539
Fierstein, Chester 3336
Fifield, Russell H 4446, 4450, 4454, 5538, 5539
Fifteenth Infantry (United States Army, Tientsin) 3661, 3667
Fifteenth Red Army Corps 2460
Fifth Army Corps (Chinese Communist Party) 2325
Fifth Campaign in Kiangsi 2327, 2330
Fifth Division (New Fourth Army) 2461, 2462
Fifth IPR Conference. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Fifth International Conference, Banff, Canada 1933.)
Fifth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812, 4115
Fifth Nationalist Extermination Campaign 2325–2327, 2330, 2382
Fifth Red Army 2324, 2469
Fifth Regiment (Chinese Communist Party) 2461
Fifty-third Army (China) 2337, 2338, 2347, 2466
Fight, The (Publication) 4118
Fighting French Delegation 440
Fiji 3592
Filipino 3814
Fillman, Gwendolyn R 5700
Financial Cutting Edge in Partition of China 3167
Financial Situation in Japan 3485
Fine, Donald 4992, 4993
Fineman, Irving 4258
Finer, Herman 5657
Finestone 668
Finger, Louis 4836
Finkelstein, Lawrence 2867, 2868, 2870, 4871, 5538, 5539
Finkelstein, Moses 312, 313, 318, 321–323, 482, 483, 485, 1171, 1191, 3962, 3963, 4125–4158
Finland 3420, 3428, 3430, 3432, 3932, 3944, 4261, 5369
Finley, John H 5084, 5169
Finley, Mrs. John H 3794
Finley, Moses. (*See* Finkelstein, Moses.)
Finletter, Thomas K 4834
Finn, Dallas 5538, 5539
Finney, Ruth 5700
Finnish Campaign. (*See* Soviet Invasion of Finland) 3430
Finnish Workers Federation 3337
Finnish-Russian War 3931
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co 1217
First Act in China 3891
First All-China Soviet Congress 2325, 2457
First All-Soviet Congress in Juikin, Kiangsi 3306
First Army (Chinese Nationalists) 2330, 2345, 2346
First Bandit Extermination Campaign 2324
First Congress (Chin-Cha-Chi Border Region) 2335
First Division (New Fourth Communist Army) 2469
First Division (Peasants and Workers Army) 2467
First Five-Year Plan (Russian) 2328, 3443
First Front Army (Chinese Communist Party) 2324, 2327, 2453, 2457, 2467, 2469
First Guerrilla Division (Fourth Army) 2452

Page
First Kuomintang Congress (1924) 2316, 2414
First National Bank (Portland, Oreg.) 901, 1551
First National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
First Negro Workers Congress 286
First Peasants and Workers Army 2467
First Peoples Political Council (Central Government) 2454, 2467, 2470, 2472
First Red Army Corps 2453, 2457, 2463, 2465, 2467, 2469
First War Zone 2357
First Workers Republic 2682
First World War 2629, 2658, 2666, 2682, 2834
Firth, Raymond 5538, 5539
Fischer, John 5062, 5653
Fischer, Louis 243, 645, 649, 2663, 4091, 5384
Fischer, Mrs. Louis (Markoosha) 2431, 4403, 4404
Fischer, Marjorie 4259
Fischer, Markoosha. (*See* Mrs. Louis Fischer.)
Fischl, Margaret 996, 2523, 4989, 4993
Fischman, Bernice 4990, 4993
Fish, Mr 2278, 4244
Fish, Hamilton 5002
Fishback, Sam 5700
Fisher, Mr 3244, 3264
Fisher, Mr. Adrian 1776, 1777
Fisher, Allan G. B 5538, 5539
Fisher, Dorothy Canfield 4116
Fisher, Francis MacCracken 427, 652, 5294, 5295, 5700
Fisher, Mrs. F. M 5700
Fisher, Mrs. Frederick B 3793, 4002
Fisher, Galen M 274, 712, 713, 1219, 1313, 2622, 4105, 4106, 4944, 4999, 5083, 5131, 5186, 5198, 5218, 5243, 5538, 5539, 5604, 5684.
Fisher, G. W 568, 1313
Fisher, George 5538, 5539
Fisher, Gerald W 4125, 5207
Fisher, Harold H 1220, 2748, 4225, 4255, 4870, 4944, 5186, 5322, 5323, 5538, 5539
Fisher, Jack 5080
Fisher, Mac 5061
Fisher, Ralph 5700
Fisher, Ruth 339
Fisher, Sterling 736–744, 2162–2169, 2171, 2175, 2296, 2303
Fisher, Welthy Honsinger 2789
Fitch 4822
Fitch, George 1163, 3144
Fitch, Mrs. Geraldine 1163, 3144
Fitzgerald, Barry 4752
Fitzgerald, C. P 5540, 5541
Fitzgerald, Edward J 4677, 4678, 4737, 4755
Fitzgerald, William 3336
Fitzpatrick, Henry Patrick 4754
Fitzpatrick, Patrick F. X 4652, 4754
Five Year Plan (Russia) 2328, 4578
Fivefold Aid to Britain 2689
Flanders, Ralph E 1218
Flashes from China 3169
Flato, Charles 4623, 5286
Flaxer, Abram 4116
Fleischer, Colonel 4427
Fleischman, Manly 4758
Fleisher, Wilfred 5062, 5648, 5673, 5700
Fleming, Daniel J 1514
Fleming, Peter 3193, 5177, 5540, 5541
Flemming, Commissioner 3512
Flersheim, Robert E 5540, 5541
Fletcher, School of Law and Diplomacy 577, 996, 2105, 4291, 4326, 4349, 5313, 5321

Page
Flexner, Abraham ... 2658
Flick, Mr ... 4440
Folkoff, Isaac ... 4752
Flood, Daniel J ... 2534
Flores, Angel ... 4259
Florida Chamber of Commerce ... 1894
Florinsky ... 5238
Flournoy, Richard ... 5540, 5541
Flower, Lida ... 5540, 5541
Fleugel, Edna R ... 2823, 2825–2870, 2917, 3956, 4229, 5485
Fly, James Lawrence ... 758, 764, 4304, 4327, 4328
Flying Cloud (steamship) ... 1067, 1132, 1275
Flying Tigers (American Volunteer Group) ... 1125, 1126, 1149, 3805
Flynn, Edward Joseph ... 5653
Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley ... 605
Flynn, Mr ... 2852
Fo, Sun (*see also* Sun, Fo) ... 455–457, 465, 821, 1021, 5540, 5541
Focke-Wulf Condor Planes ... 3224
Foley, Mr ... 3488
Foley, Martha ... 4117
Foley Square ... 1352
Folsom, Franklin ... 2658
Fong, H. D ... 2832, 4590, 5328, 5540, 5541, 5684
Food Production and Distribution Administration ... 2836
Food Research Institute (Stanford University) ... 1219, 3168, 4099, 5335, 5341
Food Workers Industrial Union ... 3336
Foote, Wilder ... 4723
Forbes, W. Cameron ... 2583, 4046
Forced Labor in the United States ... 2890
Ford, Miss Ann ... 452, 463, 464, 590
Ford, Anne ... 1764, 5450
Ford Co ... 194
Ford Co. of Alexandria, Egypt ... 194
Ford Foundation ... 484, 3963, 4153, 5023, 5026
Ford, George ... 5295
Ford, Guy Stanton ... 4119, 5700
Ford, Henry ... 178, 194, 305, 306, 5074
Ford, James W ... 605, 2887, 4596, 4597
Fordham Law School ... 4741
Fordham University ... 2585, 2690
Foreign Affairs ... 973, 2834, 2917, 3470, 3580, 3744, 3852, 4029, 4592, 4982, 5115, 5116, 5240, 5316
Foreign Affairs Commissar (Soviet Government) ... 2461, 2462
Foreign Affairs Committee (House) ... 1009, 1010, 1019, 1026, 1029, 1631, 3405, 3406, 3711
Foreign Affairs Council (Cleveland) ... 433, 857
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) ... 2565, 2788
Foreign Commerce Year Book ... 3699
Foreign Correspondents Club ... 536, 538
Foreign and Domestic Commerce Committee (House) ... 1026
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) ... 132, 282, 417, 478, 479, 495, 858, 859, 980, 981, 994, 995, 1221, 1301, 1706, 1728, 1743, 1779, 1796, 1936, 1937, 1985, 2002–2004, 2006, 2086, 2624, 2775, 2777, 2793, 2810, 2868, 4622–4625, 4641, 4664, 4675, 4676, 4679, 4716, 4745, 4832, 5287, 5703.
Foreign Economic Administration (Intelligence) ... 2624
Foreign Investments in China ... 3168, 3690
Foreign Language Library ... 2592
Foreign Ministers Conference (Paris, 1951) ... 1761
Foreign Office:
  Britain ... 1771
  Moscow ... 188, 4563, 4564
  Switzerland ... 1771

Page
Foreign Policy Association (FPA) 28, 45, 99, 108, 120, 135, 175, 177, 180, 249, 349, 384, 468, 474, 481, 482, 890, 891, 976, 986, 1148, 1166, 1167, 1214, 1220, 1221, 1239, 1695, 1886, 1293, 2480, 2487, 2488, 2504, 2507, 2522, 2582, 2584–2588, 2814–2819, 2830, 2885, 2906, 2917, 3253, 3299, 3300, 3304, 3415, 3551, 3796, 3885, 3886, 3895, 3939, 4093, 4102, 4111, 4130, 4161, 4167, 4223, 4226, 4236, 4237, 4258, 4267, 4271, 4280, 4834, 4880, 4959, 4961, 4963, 4971, 5009, 5063, 5066, 5068, 5105, 5263, 5289, 5299, 5314, 5317, 5337, 5344, 5413, 5711.
Foreign Policy Association Forum 1886
Foreign Policy Committee 926
Foreign Relations (Chicago Council) 1220
Foreign Relations Committee of the House 4540, 4628
Foreign Relations Committee, Senate 211, 1027, 1041, 1049, 1065, 1071, 1072, 1079, 1144, 1265, 1275, 1473, 1997, 3398, 3594, 3678, 4540, 4542, 4548, 4836.
Foreign Service. (*See* United States Foreign Service.)
Foreign Service Act of 1946 709, 710, 760
Foreign Service Journal 2240, 2242
Foreign Trade (Committee for Financing) 2260
Foreign Trade Bank 4508
Foreign Trade Corp. (*see also* Stanko-Import, Machine Tool Import) 193
Foreign Trade Council 1579
Foreign Workers Publishing House 4508
Forer, Joseph 2599, 2644, 2733, 3949
Forer & Rein 2595
Forester, C. S 5540, 5541
Forkner, Dr. Claude E 409
Forkner, Mrs. Lucy 409, 410
Forman, Dr. Clark 655, 4964
Forman College 5348
Forman, Harrison 213, 217, 460, 466, 556, 557, 636–638, 654, 1235, 1239, 2185, 2186, 2789, 3225, 3226, 3229, 3230, 3355, 3380, 3381, 3391, 3500, 3501, 3829, 3831, 4301, 4894, 5648, 5657.
Formosa 3404, 3604, 3811, 3931, 4053, 4112, 4113, 4281, 4534, 4536–4538, 4713, 4769, 5375, 5386, 5396, 5397, 5480, 5643, 5671.
Fornwall, H. C 4127
Forrest, Parrott 102
Forrest, R. A. D 5540, 5541
Forrest, Wilbur 5299
Forrestal Diaries 1122–1125, 1276, 1338
Forrestal, James 729, 1122–1125, 1149, 1276, 1338, 1500, 4930, 4932, 4933, 5274, 5292, 5486
Forster, Edward Morgan 5653
Forsyth, Margaret 409, 410, 1514, 3794, 4116, 4142, 4259
Forsyth, W. D 5540, 5541, 5684
Fortas, Abe 2243, 2898, 2939, 3017, 3123, 3419, 3493, 3607, 3611, 4028, 4195, 4359, 4363, 4364, 4370, 4371, 4372, 4375–4376, 4377, 4378, 4379–4380, 5112.
Fortier, Brig. Gen. L. Joseph (retired) 843–864, 1062, 1133, 1137
Fortune 390, 1221, 1846, 1847
Fortune Magazine 2488, 2981, 5008, 5041, 5067, 5183, 5349, 5674
Fortune Round Table 474
Forty-fourth Street Book Fair 2243
Forward Bloc (All-India National Congress) 2638
Fosdick, Dorothy 2864
Fosdick, Harry Emerson 5084, 5152, 5153
Fosdick, Dr. Raymond B 917, 918, 1038, 1039, 1050, 1054, 1056, 1063, 1129, 1145, 1146, 1269, 1289–1291, 1552, 1553, 1555, 1560, 1565, 1568, 1570, 1575, 1577, 1580, 1589, 1593, 1595, 1601, 1638, 1639, 4532–4534, 4834, 4900, 5026, 5123, 5643.

Page
Fosque, J. D. 5323
Foss, Charles Burton 912
Foster, John 2789
Foster, W. A. 2666
Foster, William C. 4682
Foster, William Z. 548, 556, 559, 605, 2667, 3071–3073, 3092, 4597, 4836
Fou-ping (Fuping) Arsenal 2429
Fou-ping (Fuping) Chemical Plant 2429
Foundations of Leninism 1690, 2270, 4335
Four Power Declaration 2841
Fourteenth Air Force (United States) 1395, 1411, 1430, 1442, 1444, 1447, 1460, 1462, 1463, 3713
Fourth Annual Women's Congress (Chicago) 684
Fourth Army Headquarters (Presidio) 988
Fourth Army Incident (January 1941) 2350, 2351, 2354, 2355, 2452, 2453, 2458, 2473
Fourth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Fourth Route Army. (*See* Chinese Communist Army, Fourth Route and New Fourth.)
Fowler, Henry 4758
Fowler, R. M. 691, 4893
Fox 5059, 5261
Fox, Clarence J. 5540, 5541
Fox, Mr. 5710
Fox, Manuel 1691, 1692, 1698, 2214, 2831
Fox, Mrs. Manuel 3794
Fox, Melvin J. 620, 622, 5709
Foxworthy, F. W. 5540, 5541
Foy, Alice B. 4985, 5018
Foye, Arthur 4547
Foynes 5082
FPA. (*See* Foreign Policy Association.)
Fraina, Louis C. 4726
France 596, 602, 603, 607, 2010, 2170, 3134, 3136, 3202, 3216, 3264, 3420, 3421, 3423, 3430, 3432, 3457, 3500, 3584–3586, 3592, 3599, 3627, 3632, 3691, 3697, 3698, 3701, 3703, 4069, 4103, 4133, 4319, 4441, 4564, 4681, 4807, 4893, 4896, 4897, 5318, 5321, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5334, 5357, 5369, 5640.
France, Government of 206, 1714, 2010, 2170, 2317, 2319, 2375, 2382, 2388, 2503, 2520, 2526, 2527, 2529, 2538, 2555, 2629, 2672, 2673, 2676, 2683, 2684, 2689, 2716, 2991, 2997, 3109, 3110, 3119, 3186, 3196, 3226, 3270, 4807, 4936, 4971, 5062, 5068, 5074, 5081, 5089, 5091, 5096, 5100–5104, 5130, 5185, 5198, 5201, 5206, 5222, 5224, 5258.
Francisco, Vice Minister of Philippines 4856
Franco 781, 4216, 4482, 5388, 5681
Franco-Prussian War 3224
Franco-Russian Alliance 2388
Franco Spanish Government 2945, 3120
Francus, Lan 5564, 5565
Frank, Jerome 2802
Frank, Mark 1000, 1001
Frank, Nelson 4327
Frank, Waldo 4170, 4171, 4176, 4259, 4616
Franke, Herbert 5540, 5541
Frankfurter, Felix 5083, 5085, 5111, 5178
Frankfurter Zeitung 256, 360, 504
Franklin, William E. 998
Franz, Joseph Land 5113
Frazer, H. W. 1104
Frazier, E. Franklin 4089
Free China 1395, 1440, 1441, 2418–2420, 2427, 2471
Free China Labor League 766
Free French 3109

Page
Free German Committee 339, 2829
Free Synagogue Women 4275
Free Voice 2665
Free World 562
Free World Magazine 5019, 5040, 5041
Freedman, Frances 5540, 5541
Freedman, Maurice 5540, 5541
Freeman 1455, 1457, 4942
Freeman, David 4117
Freeman, Fulton 5480
Freeman, Harry 245
Freeman, Joseph 4170, 4171, 4176
Freeman, Kemper 2811
Freeman Magazine 2966
Freeman, Mansfield 494, 858, 859, 2810
Freeman, Miller 568, 570, 2811, 3482, 4939
Freeman, R. E 494, 858, 859, 2811
Freiheit 643
Freiman, Mr 4555
Freist, Dorothy M 4990, 4993
French Army 238, 5092, 5093, 5094, 5095, 5209
French, Beals E. L 4170, 4171, 4176
French Cabinet 2716
French Communists. (*See* Communist Party, France.)
French Embassy:
Bangkok 5193
Berlin 5193
Brussels 5193
Canberra 5193
Chungking 5193
Hague 5193
London 5193
Moscow 5193
Ottawa 5193
Rome 5193
Shanghai 5193
Tokyo 400, 5193
French Friends of the Chinese People 4273
French Indochina 3349, 4098, 5089, 5259
French Intelligence Service 4530
French, Myrtle M 4170, 4171, 4176
French Police 384, 2319
French Revolution 3188
French Socialist Party 1613
French Special Mission (Moscow) 2386
Friedberg, Mr 5295
Friedland, Pauline 4751
Friedman B 3337
Friedman, Frances 3987, 4991, 4993
Friedman, Irving S 71, 278, 390, 481, 1002, 2832, 4860, 4919, 4920, 4983, 4987, 5016, 5017, 5085, 5179, 5198, 5244, 5245, 5249, 5268, 5540, 5541, 5711.
Friedman, Jacob 4402
Friedman, Julian R 71, 708, 709–711, 714, 755, 757–765, 771, 772, 1245, 1513, 1730–1732, 1734, 1758, 1761, 1797, 1833, 1834, 1838, 1839, 1841, 1844, 1912, 1916, 2105–2107, 2109, 2113, 2114, 2120, 2124, 2241, 2266, 2487, 2489, 2538–2540, 3520, 3983, 4716, 4829, 5346, 5428.
Friedman, Mrs. Julian 4334
Friedman, Milton 4738
Friedman, Vincent 4848
Friedon, Jesse 4304, 4305
Friedrich, Carl J 5540, 5541
Friefeld, Anna 4653
Friendly. (*See* Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, and Ball.)
Friendly, Alfred 5023, 5112

Page
Friends of Chinese Democracy 621, 622, 2681
Friends International Centre 179
Friends of Soviet Russia 631, 674, 2655
Friends of the Soviet Union 3336, 3337, 5164
Frink, Mrs. Angelika W 410, 1513
Fritchman, Stephen H 1513, 4299, 4602
Friters, Gerard M 1222, 5540, 5541
From Canton to Shanghai 3132, 3134, 3170
Frost, Richard A 5540, 5541
Froude. (*See* Edward W. Allen.)
Frucht, Rita 4990, 4993
Frumkin, Grzegorz 5540, 5541
Fry, Thomas Pentherthy 5540, 5541, 5684
Fry, Varian 2586
FSA. (*See* Farm Security Administration.)
Fu, Tso-Yi 1504
Fu-chen, Li. (*See* Li, Fu-chen.)
Fu Chiu-tou 2457
Fu, Chung 2403, 2457
Fu, Lien-chiang 2404, 2457
Fu, Tso-i 2345
Fuchs, Dr. Klaus 290, 5396, 5486
Fuchs, Walter 4420, 4421, 4422, 4423, 5540, 5541
Fuchu Prison 748, 749, 753
Fuehrer. (*See* Adolph Hitler.)
Fuellkrug, Mr 4439, 4440, 4442
Fugh, Phillip 5542, 5543
Fujihara, Ginjiro 4267, 4268
Fujii, Kazuko Kay 4992, 4993
Fujii, Shuji 1338, 2789, 5542, 5543
Fujima, Edward A 4991, 4992, 4993
Fukien 4700
Fukien Christian University 2457
Fukien Province 2452, 3511
Fulbright Act 1285, 1604, 3989
Fulbright Agreements 1619, 1980
Fulbright, Congressman 145
Fulbright, James William 1285, 1604, 1680, 2809, 2810, 3069, 4833, 5049, 5052, 5053
Fulfillment of the Rio Pledges 2887
Fuller 712
Fuller, Miss Helen 4315
Fuller, Richard E 568
Fulton, J. J 2658
Fung Pak-yu 2457
Fung, Yu 1637
Fu-ping Conference 2333, 2334, 2337
Fur Worker 2665
Furber, Holden 2482, 5542, 5543
Furfey, Msgr. Paul Hanly 3794
Furnass, J. C 5542, 5543
Furniss, E. S 5689
Furniture Workers Industrial Union 3336
Furnival, T. J 5542, 5543
Furnivall, L. S 54, 1222, 1285, 1604, 1608, 3867

G

G–2. (*See* United States War Department, Military Intelligence.)
G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd 4591
Gabriel, Ralph H 5661
Gaddis, J. W 5415
Gadgil, D. R 5026, 5323, 5542, 5543
Gag, Wanda 4259
Gage, Eugenia 5542, 5543
Gail 695

Page
Gainard, Capt. Joseph A 892–894
Gaines, Lieutenant Colonel 5049
Galant, Henry 5295
Galant, Mrs. Henry 5295
Gale, Esson M 341
Galen, General (Vassily Bluecher) 2319, 2455, 2457, 3919
Galesburg Labor News 2665
Galewicz, Jan 4724
Galletti, R 5542, 5543
Gallup Poll 569, 570, 4202
Gallus, Wilya 4988, 4989, 4994
Galkovitch 4589
Galton, Miss Dorothy 177
Gamba, Charles 5542, 5543
Gamble, Charles K 1313, 4944, 5276
Gamble, Sidney D 568, 5542, 5543
Gammas, L. D 5334
Gandel, Rose 5045
Gandhi, Mahatma 1678, 1679, 2530, 2638, 3931, 5349
Gani, A. K 5641
Gannes, Harry 520, 521, 526, 3521, 4058, 4079, 4147, 4885
Gannett, Lewis 2658, 4091, 4145
Gapanovich 5008
Garard, C 5291
Garbuny, Siegfried 5542, 5543
Garcia, Carlos 5062
Gardner, Charles S 3793, 4420, 4421
Gardner, John 3637, 5303
Gardner, Virginia 639, 4876
Garfield, James 4692
Garfield, John 3794
Garland Fund 2667, 4143
Garramone, Michael 4136
Garriga, Miguel 4116
Garside, B. A 1247, 1248, 4141, 5344
Gary, Howard C 5542, 5543
Gaskill, Gussie Esther 5542, 5543
Gates, Artemus 737, 2163, 2297, 4597, 4934, 4936, 4998
Gates, M. Jean 5295, 5696, 5697
Gaus, John M 5198, 5214
Gauss, Ambassador 5283
Gauss, Clarence E 66, 638, 829, 839, 1305, 1339, 1359, 1360, 1366–1368, 1389, 1392, 1396, 1397, 1698, 1701, 1703, 1734, 1745, 1750, 1788, 1789, 1825–1830, 1921, 1922, 1928, 1973–1979, 1982, 1983, 1986–1988, 1990, 1993, 2029, 2045, 2063, 2075, 2088, 2178, 2185, 2187, 2188, 2238, 2288, 2290, 2392, 3651, 4823, 4831, 5700.
Gauss, Mr 4541, 5462
Gayer 3430
Gayer, Arthur D 5684
Gayn, Mark J 71, 1733, 2144, 2789, 3521, 4332, 4823, 4831, 4842, 4844, 4847, 5346, 5653
Gebb 4823, 4830
Geddes, D. P 5041
Gedye, G. E. R 3224
Gehle, F. V 5252
Geiger, Theodore 484, 1218, 3963, 4155
Gelber, Lionel 5542, 5543
Gelder, Stuart 5542, 5543
Gelfan, Mr 5299
Gelfan, Harriet Moore. (*See* Harriet Moore.)
Gellert, Hugo 4136, 4259
Gellhorn, Mrs. Kitty 4078, 4139
Gellhorn, Walter 4078
Gelman, George 5542, 5543
General Chennault's Staff 32, 138

Page
General Communications Administration (Chinese Communist Party) 2420
General Electric Co 433, 445, 858, 1220, 3079, 3704
General Federation of Women's Clubs 5700
General Gordon (steamship) 1572
General Looks at the Soviet Union, A 3700
General Motors Export Corp 1219
General Purposes Budget for 1938 3177
General Service Administration (GSA) 2967
General Staff. (*See* United States War Department, General Staff.)
General Staff (Japanese) 1869
General Staff Congress (Nationalist) 2330
Geneva 3652, 3903, 4481, 4569, 4671, 4676, 4807, 5335, 5362
Geneva Conference (United Nations) 2267
Geneva Disarmament Conference 5691
Genoa Conference (1922) 2461
Gentile 4823, 4831
Geoffrey. (*See* Chen, Han-seng.) 660
Geology of China 1982, 2518
George III 636
George, Daisy 1105
George, Harrison 883, 1218, 4084
George, Lloyd 4264
George, W. H 5542, 5543
George, Walter F 2835, 4539, 4540
George Washington University 440, 976, 996, 1747, 1761, 2127, 3889
George Williams College 5661
Georgetown University 1971, 1972
Gepp, Herbert 5334
Gerathy, Theresa 4988
Gerber, Lillie 4990, 4994
Gerbode, Martha A. (Mrs. Frank A.) 568, 965, 996, 1217, 1313, 4944, 5273, 5290, 5703
Gerig, O. Benjamin 1036, 2248, 2867, 2868, 2870
Gerlach, Talitha 409, 410, 588–591, 620, 622, 1245, 1513, 2646, 2789, 3636, 3793, 4002, 4319, 4600, 4604, 4610, 4807, 5268, 5274, 5291, 5709
German Army 116, 508, 2325, 2387, 2829, 3223, 4487, 4874, 4970, 5232
German Bourgeois Revolution of 1848 3184
German Communists. (*See* Communist Party, Germany.)
German Consulate in Canton, China 4440
German Consulate in Chefoo, China 4440
German Consulate in Hankow, China 4440
German Consulate in Shanghai, China 4440
German Consulate in Tientsin, China 4440
German Consulate in Tsingtao, China 4440
German Economics Group (Allied Commission on Reparations) 2777
German Embassy:
  Moscow 3224, 3225
  Nagoya 503, 504
  Nanking, China 4440
  Peking, China 4440
  Shanghai, China 4440
  Tokyo 379, 508
German Federal Government 2185
German Foreign Office 2848, 3917, 4581
German Government 2317, 2318, 2342, 2375, 2377, 2386–2388, 2398, 2461, 2982, 2986, 2996, 3223, 3224, 3226, 3227, 3269
German Government (Western) 2184
German-Japanese Alliance 3323, 4151, 4935, 5140, 5145, 5147, 5167, 5189, 5197
German Officers Corp 2839
German Party Headquarters in China 4440
German Police 2184, 2185, 2188, 2456
German Policy of the Marshall Plan 2887
German Politburo 1464
German-Russian Nonaggression Pact 3220, 3222–3224, 3226, 3227, 3241
German-Russian War 5246
German Social Democratic Party 5374

Page
German-Soviet Trade Treaty 2574
German Statistical Yearbook 500
German Trusts 2166, 2300
German War College 835
Germany 3356, 3387, 3414, 3457, 3500, 3584, 3592, 3593, 3633, 3640, 3668, 3669, 3670, 3701, 3702, 3703, 3707, 3785, 3810, 3917, 3932, 3944, 4024, 4037, 4058, 4084, 4098, 4106, 4113, 4129, 4134, 4137, 4140, 4201, 4203, 4205, 4214, 4216, 4234, 4235, 4240, 4261, 4266, 4269, 4271, 4421, 4425, 4426, 4435, 4441, 4487, 4488, 4745, 4873, 4877, 4894, 4897, 5354, 5369, 5375, 5380, 5397, 5401, 5426, 5484, 5503, 5664, 5665, 5667, 5673, 5691, 5699.
Germany (Eastern) 2184
Germany (Soviet Zone) 2184
Germany, Government of 4929, 4935, 4970, 4971, 5000, 5035, 5071, 5073, 5074, 5092–5102, 5145, 5177, 5184, 5185, 5194, 5201, 5206, 5222, 5223, 5226, 5231, 5258
Germany, National Socialist Party of 733, 742, 835, 3721, 3774, 3862, 3917, 3944, 4205, 4235–4257, 4965, 5038, 5069, 5071, 5073–5075, 5189, 5217, 5251, 5269, 5289, 5290, 5369, 5469, 5679, 5680.
Germany's Far Eastern Policy Under Hitler 2533
Gernett, Alice Ratcliffe 4392
Gerschenkron, Alexander 5542, 5543
Gerson, Jack 4991, 4992, 4994
Gesell, Dr. Arnold 1513
Gessell, Harold J. E 5487, 5488
Gessner, Robert 4259
Gestapo 818, 825
Gerson, Simon 542, 543
Ghose, D. N 5012
Ghose, Sudhin H 5542, 5543
Ghosh, D 5542, 5543
Ghidons, Albert 4116
GI Bill of Rights 4026
Giannini Foundation (University of California) 8, 254, 319, 320, 375, 450, 474, 476, 670, 3913, 3916, 3921, 3924, 3931, 3936
Gibarti, Louis 1733, 2005, 2006, 3521
Gibb 179
Gibbs, Mr 4053, 4054
Gibson, Eulalie 4994
Gibson, Hugh 444
Gideonse, Harry D 5041
Gilbert, Kathleen 5544, 5545
Gilbert, Frank B 3812
Gilbert, Rodney 5544, 5545
Gilbert and Sullivan 3963
Gilbert, W. C 3266, 5505
Gilchrist, Huntington 713, 970, 971, 996, 1003, 1216, 1219, 1313, 2622, 3160, 3920, 4834, 4892, 4943, 5023, 5025, 5322, 5325, 5333, 5344, 5360, 5365, 5544, 5545.
Gilfillan, S. Colum 5041
Gilland. (*See* M. Giran.)
Gillett, Capt. R. M 928
Gilliam, Mildred 4988
Gillmore 5651
Gilman Hall (John Hopkins University) 1982, 1983
Gilmore, Mr 27
Gilmore, Eddie 2592
Ginsberg, Marie 4724
Ginsbourg, Mak. (*See* Mark J. Gayn.)
Gini, Conrade 5544, 5545
Gipson, J. H 2283
Giran, M 748, 753
Girdler's Republic Steel 2684

Page
Girni Kamgar Textile Union 2638
Gladstone Hotel 2518
Glasgow University 178
Glass, Leslie 5544, 5545
Glasser, Harold 441, 1733, 2867, 2868, 2870, 3521, 4623, 4678, 4737
Glassman, Sidney 4653
Glazebrook, G. deT 3167, 5544, 5545
Glazebrook, George 3920
Glazer, Sidney 5220, 5544, 5545
Gleason, Mary H 4170, 4171, 4176
Globe Petroleum Corp 102
Glover, Clive E 327, 3961
Glover, Pat 321
Glover, Patricia 4987, 5544, 5545
Glowes, Harry G 5544, 5545
Gluck, Filmore 4992, 4994
Gluck, Martin 4992, 4994
GMAC 660
Go, Toshi 5544, 5545, 5684
Godby, Marie 4989, 4994
Godere 3793
Godon, Admiral 4275
Goebbels, Joseph 4136, 4440, 5657
Goetz, Delia 2568
Goglidze, Sergie Arsenvich 626, 627, 1107, 1327–1332, 1823, 1824, 1911, 2083–2085
Gogov 2457
Goh, Baron 4148
Gohol, Mr 908
Gokhman, Gregory I 3270, 3273
Gold, Mr 3034, 3035
Gold, Mrs. Bela 4677, 4737
Gold, Ben 555, 3336, 4136
Gold, Mike 254, 652, 1972, 4170, 4171, 4173, 4176
Gold, Sonia 4677, 4737, 4756
Golde, Russell S 5428
Golden Book of American Friendship for Soviet Union 300
Golden Gate International Exposition 3272, 3274
Golden Gate International Exposition 3272, 3274
Goldenberg, H. Carl 5544, 5545
Goldenberg, Rhoda 4990, 4994
Goldet, Mr 4671
Goldfrank, Esther S. (*see also* Mrs. Karl Wittfogel) 3104
Goldman, Mrs. Olive Remington 4351
Goldstein, M 645
Goldstein, Dr. Sidney 4275
Goldwater, A. L 2658
Goldway, David 3059–3061
Golembosti, Josephine 4989, 4994
Gollanz 3317, 3322
Gollobin, Ira 2879, 5544, 5545
Golos, Jacob 404, 405, 407, 412, 421, 437, 438, 439, 441, 447, 677, 678, 1218, 4402, 4404, 4752
Gompers, Samuel 2665, 2668
Gonzalez, Bienvenido 5296
Good Neighbors, The 2586
Goodrich, Carter 3167, 5002, 5261, 5544, 5545
Goodrich, L. Carrington 475, 568, 1219, 1313, 2819, 2831, 3611, 3612, 3794, 3923, 4245, 4420, 4610, 4834, 4944, 5111, 5336, 5544, 5545
Goodrich, Leland M 5078, 5544, 5545
Goodsell, Willystine 4116, 4259
Goodsteinsinger, Jeanne 4724
Goodwin, William 3037
GOP. (*See* Republican Party.)
Gordon, Eugene 1105
Gordon, Gloria 4990, 4994

Page
Gordon, J. King 5544, 5545
Gordon, Mack 3337
Gordon, Margaret S 5544, 5545
Gordon, Representative 3407
Gore-Booth, P. H 5544, 5545
Gorelik, Mordecai 2658
Gorgas, Ruth 4992, 4994
Gorki 5386
Gorki Factory (*see also* Ford Co.) 171, 178, 194
Gorman, Francis J 296
Goshal, Kumar 654, 655, 712, 2579, 2581, 2789, 3943, 4610, 4616, 4861, 5078
Goslin, Alexander Ryllis 4271
Gosnell, Charles 2585
Goss, Ambassador 4839
Gottlieb. (*See* Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, and Ball.)
Gould, B. J 5544, 5545
Gould, Randall 71, 977, 1222, 3983, 4983, 5544, 5545, 5651
Gourivitch 3485, 5161
Gourou, Pierre (Gouron) 54, 1216, 5322, 5333, 5544, 5545, 5684
Gousev 5045
Gouzenko 999
Government House (Hong Kong) 1536
Government pouch 2103
Government Printing Office 5698, 5699
Government Section in Tokyo 4185, 4224, 4230
GPU. (*See* Soviet Secret Police.)
Grad, Andrew. (*See* Andrew Grajdanzev.)
Gradoss, Vino 4832
Graduate History Society (Columbia University) 4153
Grady, Mrs 5290
Grady, Henry F 264, 432, 444, 713, 857, 1220, 1313, 1845, 1846, 2622, 2809, 2817, 3880, 4546, 4944, 4973, 4997, 5546, 5547
Grady, Mrs. Henry F 3794
Graham, Prof. Frank 411, 1514
Graham, Gerald S 5546, 5547
Graham, Katherine 4170, 4171, 4176
Graham, Senator 5026
Grajdanzev, Andrew (Andrew Grad) 71, 253, 254, 375, 376, 387, 389–392, 394, 399, 687, 901, 957, 994, 995, 1153, 1236, 2518, 2575, 2580, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2880, 3343, 3450–3452, 3454–3457, 3460, 3462, 3585, 3875, 3937, 3983, 4021, 4208, 4210, 4255, 4281, 4725, 4860, 4861, 4910, 4984, 4987, 4994, 5001, 5002, 5007, 5008, 5014, 5015, 5032, 5053, 5060, 5064, 5083, 5198, 5218, 5221, 5228, 5230, 5240, 5268, 5299, 5520, 5521, 5544, 5545, 5546, 5547, 5580, 5581, 5687, 5688, 5689.
Grand Canal (China) 2434
Grand Hotel (Auckland) 2715
Granger, Lester B 5546, 5547
Granich, Grace Maul 529, 652, 1734, 1972, 1973, 3169, 3284, 4080
Granich, Max 254, 255, 652, 1734, 1735, 1972–1976, 1978, 2074, 2660, 2609, 2670, 3144, 3169, 3521, 4158, 4173, 4174, 4862–4866
Granich, Mrs. Max. (*See* Grace Maul, Granich.)
Granna, Eleanor 4117
Grant, John B 5546, 5547
Grattan, C. Hartley 3943, 5546, 5547, 5684, 5685
Grau, Mr 4440
Graves 337, 338
Graves, General 4090, 5145, 5146
Graves, Kizer & Graves 571, 900, 4835
Graves, Mortimer 571, 630, 631, 693, 712, 713, 900, 1220, 1313, 1750, 1751, 1918, 2087, 2214, 2248, 2480, 2521, 2567–2569, 2602, 2604, 2622, 2776, 2886, 3806, 4026, 4091, 4107, 4145, 4259, 4861, 4893, 4915, 4944, 4967, 4972, 5000, 5032, 5051, 5083, 5111, 5117, 5198, 5219, 5221, 5238, 5239, 5247, 5248, 5257, 5276, 5286, 5287, 5288, 5293, 5294, 5546, 5547, 5693, 5700.

Page
Graves, Mrs. Mortimer 2248, 2521, 2776
Graves, William S 3701, 3703, 4091, 4145
Gray, F. W. 5546, 5547
Gray, Dr. John H 4259
Great Britain 4439, 4500, 4503, 4510, 4512, 4551, 4564, 4569, 4590, 4631, 4650, 4681, 4691, 4698, 4699, 4784, 4805, 4807, 4808, 4822, 4872, 4873, 4890, 4893, 4895–4897, 5318–5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5333, 5334, 5368, 5374, 5412, 5424, 5501, 5635, 5638, 5639, 5640–5642, 5664, 5708–5709.
Great Britain, Government of 2013–2017, 2090, 2091, 2125, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2187, 2207, 2208–2212, 2265, 2297, 2309, 2310, 2314, 2315, 2317–2320, 2324, 2340, 2342, 2343, 2355, 2358, 2363, 2373–2377, 2379–2383, 2386, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2398, 2400, 2461, 3292, 3305, 3356, 3357, 3373, 3404, 3405, 3413, 3415, 3420, 3421, 3423, 3430, 3432, 3435–3437, 3457, 3467, 3476, 3483, 3500, 3581, 3583–3586, 3589, 3592, 3599, 3600, 3627, 3632, 3633, 3665, 3667, 3681–3683, 3691, 3694, 3696–3700, 3702, 3712, 3851, 3865, 4103, 4140, 4202, 4264, 4269, 4276–4278, 4284, 4316, 4334, 4835–4937, 4966, 4970–4972, 5000, 5009, 5042, 5046, 5048, 5060, 5062, 5066, 5067, 5069, 5070, 5072–5074, 5076, 5077, 5081, 5091, 5092, 5096, 5097, 5100, 5103, 5104, 5116, 5130, 5134, 5140, 5177, 5194, 5196, 5206, 5208, 5215, 5222, 5224, 5231, 5249, 5251, 5256, 5258, 5276, 5280, 5285, 5368, 5369, 5399.
Great Dipper (Pei Tou Magazine) 2470
Great Falls (USA) 3575
Great Northern Ry. Co 100
Great Northern Sea Route 189
Great Soviet Encyclopedia 3107
Great Soviet World Atlas 2703, 2705, 3483, 3485, 4498, 4499, 4507, 5128, 5134, 5136, 5140, 5150, 5158, 5160, 5170, 5173, 5320
Great Victory in China, and the New Dangers of American Imperialist Intervention, The 3826, 3839
Great Wall of China 2206, 2327, 2347, 2433, 3994
Greater New York Industrial Union Council 300, 414, 2646
Greece 3838, 5405
Greek Communists 184
Greek Regular Army 214
Green, Abner 2242
Green, Carl 5286, 5295
Green, Elizabeth 5329, 5335, 5546, 5547
Green, G 3335
Green, Gilbert 605
Green, Gretchen 2115
Green, H. L. Co 4275
Green, James 4992, 4994, 5105
Green, James Frederick 5700
Green, Jerome 712, 713
Green, Joseph C 2836
Green, Kay 477
Green, Miss 2720
Green, O. M 3167, 3168, 5546, 5547
Green, Senator Theodore Francis 2956, 3668, 4825, 4832
Green, William 2664, 2665
Greenberg, Harold J 4988
Greenberg, Michael 71, 280–282, 325, 326, 339, 345, 413–417, 440, 444, 445, 476, 481, 665, 1002, 1734, 1735, 2587, 2625, 2626, 2749, 3126, 3128, 3208, 3522, 3523, 3530, 3794, 3860, 3875, 3903, 3923–3925, 3937, 3983, 4161, 4188, 4338, 4622, 4629, 4716, 4736, 4807, 4861, 4862, 4987, 5047, 5199, 5250, 5272, 5546, 5547, 5711.
Greenberg, Raymond 4992, 4994
Greenberg, Rose 4989, 4994
Greene 5089, 5299, 5300
Greene, Howard 5270

Page
Greene, Jerome D 11, 263, 264, 292, 712, 713, 1216, 1217, 1219, 2613, 2614, 2622, 2985, 3167, 3168, 3849–3862, 3872, 3902, 3903, 4037, 4137, 4569, 5199, 5271, 5317, 5318, 5320, 5324, 5333, 5335, 5546, 5547.
Greene, J. Woodall 358, 368
Greene, Miss Katrine R. C 264, 266, 862, 945, 3859, 3868, 3937, 4972, 4988, 4991, 4994, 5027, 5058, 5259, 5273, 5298, 5301
Greene, Morris 5049, 5052, 5053
Greene, O. M 5684
Greene, Roger S 3869, 3870–3872, 4147, 4860, 4861, 4958, 4967, 5183, 5546, 5547
Greenidge, Gertrude 4992, 4994
Greenslade, Admiral John W 712, 713, 975, 1313, 2136, 2138, 2139, 2140, 4904, 5040, 5278, 5290
Greenspan, Jack 3061, 3841
Greenstein, Joseph 2220
Greenwald, Rosalind 4991, 4992, 4994
Greenwood, Mr 5694
Greenwood, Gordon 712, 5546, 5547
Greetings to the Liberation Fighters of China 3839
Gregg, Joseph 136, 1735, 1880, 2220, 4719, 4736
Gregorio, Quirino G 5027, 5322
Gregory 2612, 5128
Gregory, Herbert 5546, 5547
Gregory, Isabella Augusta 5654
Gregory, Homer E 4860
Gregory, T. E 5684
Gresham, Mary 5112
Grew, Joseph C 604, 609–611, 613–620, 623, 665, 666, 704, 705, 715–718, 727–731, 733, 914, 928, 980–985, 1457, 1728, 1739, 1768, 1772, 1779, 1793, 1795, 1823, 1827, 1832, 1841, 1845, 1853, 1859, 1860, 1935, 1985, 2068, 2079–2081, 2106, 2123, 2124, 2127, 2129, 2143, 2193, 2393, 2566, 2809–2811, 2912, 3003–3006, 3369–3371, 3377, 3409, 3556, 3676, 3880, 3894, 3931, 4056, 4057, 4292, 4324, 4544–4546, 4834, 4876, 4900, 5157, 5189, 5232, 5700.
Grew, Mrs. Joseph C 5157
Grey, Arthur L 5660
Grey, Austin 5546, 5547
Griffin 1505
Griffin, James 2896
Griffin Philippines Mission 1120
Griffin, Robert A 4834
Griffith, Ernest S 674, 677, 4931, 4932
Griffiths, Gordon 5700
Griffiths, Samuel P 4823, 4831
Grigsby, Deborah 4990, 4992, 4994
Grimm, Peter 5298
Grimsdale, A. Whitney 5546, 5547
Grinkie, Walter 231, 261
Grinnell College 3591
Gripsholm S. S 5062
Griswold, A. Whitney 3167, 3168, 5078, 5546, 5547
Gromov, Anatoli Borisovitch 4669, 4670, 4671, 4796
Gromov, Michael 1540, 4040, 4042
Gromyko, Mr 178, 2849, 2850, 2857–2860, 2862, 3311–3314, 5045, 5484
Gronboch, K 342
Grondahl 1648, 1649
Gropper, William 2658, 4259, 4615
Grover 5255
Groves, Helen 4827
Groves, H. Lawrence 5701
Groves, Leslie R 4901, 4905
Grow, General 5678
Growth of the New Fourth Army (A Report) 1927
Gruening, Ernest H 432, 857, 4973, 5165
Grummon 2729

Page
Grunge, Walter 5546, 5547
Grusenberg, Michael. (*See* Borodin, Michael.)
GSA. (*See* General Service Administration.)
Guadalcanal 3502, 3702, 4426
Guam 4764, 4822
Guam (United States Naval Government) 996, 4053
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York 102
Guards Regiment, Second Battalion (Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters) ... 2473
Gubichev 4670
Guerrero, Leon Ma 5546, 5547
Guerrilla Army (Chinese Communist Party) ..... 2332, 2346, 2349, 2352, 2362–2370, 2403, 2432, 2437, 2443, 2448, 2452, 2457, 2459, 2464, 2466, 2471–2473.
Guerrilla Chinese Troops 2524, 2541, 2544, 2545, 2547, 2553
Guerrilla Training School, Chinese Army (South Hunan) 2473
Guerrilla troops (Chinese Communists) 2090, 2143, 2186, 2206, 2209, 2211
Guerrila Warfare in Manchuria 3485
Guerzon, Engracio 5295
Guest, S. Haden 5546, 5547
Guffey, Joseph 1100
Guggemoss, Brother Philotheus 3631
Guggenheim Fellowship 4086, 4095, 4096
Guggenheim Foundation 1136, 4095, 4261, 5355, 5662
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation 1969, 3266
Guggenheimer, Mrs. J. C 411, 1514, 4277
Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications (House on U. N.-American Activities) 3073, 3080
Guild Book Center 2243
Guiford, Elizabeth 1513
Guiliano 1178
Gulick, Leeds 5661–5674
Gulick, Luther H 432, 857, 4973, 5002, 5050
Gulick, Sidney L 4271
Gull, Mr 4985, 5709
Gull, E. M 1221, 5350, 5548, 5549, 5684
Gulf Oil Corp 102
Gulf Refining Co 102
Gumperz, Hede. (*See* Hede Massing.)
Gumperz, Juliam 255, 280, 283, 4402
Gundlach, Ralph H 2161, 2162
Gung. (*See* Kung.)
Gunkle, Robert 5675
Gunn, Selskar M 5059, 5083, 5120
Gunn, Mrs. Selsker M 5120
Gunther, John 259
Gurney, Ronald W 3794
Gussev 1881
Gustavson, R. G 5041
Guthman, Renee J 4990, 4994, 5274, 5276, 5286–5288, 5294, 5295, 5693, 5694, 5695, 5696, 5697, 5698, 5699
Guthrie, Anne 3794
Gutzeit, Miss 4439
Gwin, Samuel L 4692
Gyaw, Sir Htoon Aung 2124, 2125
Gyles, R. M 4170, 4171, 5176

H

Haan, Kilsoo 5009
Haas, Dr 4441
Haaser, Stephen G 4088, 4197
Habberton, B. John 590, 591
Hacke, Mrs. Harold 5040
Hackwith, George 2124, 2127
Hackworth, Green H 893, 3835
Hadley, Eleanor M 4263, 5548, 5549, 5701
Haessler, Carl 2665, 2668, 4152

Page
Haganower, Professor 2706
Hagelberg, Gerhard 1338, 2789
Hagen, Beulah 697, 698
Hager, Reed 446, 4975, 5053, 5548, 5549
Hague, The 69, 240, 1780
Hague Conference 1611
Hague, Frank 1680
Hague Rules of War, The 4228
Hai, Chung 1579
Haideo, Ohashi 369, 371
Hailey, Lord 2582, 5321, 5334, 5548, 5549, 5648
Hailey, Foster 5673
Hailsham, Lord 73
Hailsham, Viscount 5319, 5334
Hain-hua Jihpao Newspaper (Chinese Communist Party) 2451
Hainan 4112, 4113
Hainan Detachment (Chart) 2448
Hainan Island Military Region 2401, 2413, 2434, 2448
Haiti 3335
Hale, Mrs 5299
Hale, William B 3794
Haleem, A. B. A 5026, 5027, 5322
Haley, Mr 2124
Halifax, Lord 2635, 2637, 2730, 3931, 5184
Halinan, Vincent 2619, 2640, 2641
Hall 4959
Hall, Bryant 3335
Hall, Duncan 3964
Hall, John L 4692
Hall, John M 4692
Hall, Monroe 5548, 5549
Hall, Otto 3335
Hall, Robert B 5229
Hall, Rob F 4618, 4886
Hall, Robert King 5660
Hall, Russell 2610, 2891, 5548, 5549
Hall, T. D. H 5548, 5549
Hallenbeck, Jane E 5701
Halperin, Maurice 4259, 4719, 4736
Halsema, James J 5548, 5549
Halsey, Admiral William F 1036, 1064, 1072, 3070, 5673
Halstead, Mr 5696
Hamada, Kenju 2891
Hamaguchi 729
Hamano 578
Hambro, C. J 5078
Hamden, Conn 3967
Hamilton Hotel 2532
Hamilton House (Shanghai) 4328
Hamilton, Maxwell M 147, 428, 444, 1071, 1978, 2832, 3883, 3884, 3894, 3900, 4926, 4927, 4958, 4960, 4976, 5084, 5172, 5173, 5230
Hamish 178
Hammer, Desiderio (Alias John Santos) 2955, 2962, 2967–2969
Hammer, Ellen J 2482, 5298, 5548, 5549
Hammet, Dashiell 2657, 2658, 4259
Hammond, Mrs. John H 3794
Hammy's Consumers Division 2643
Han Fu, Chang 4080
Han, Lih-wu 5344, 5361
Han, Lu 1580
Han, Te-chin 2358
Han, Ying. (*See* also Hsiang Ying.) 2351, 2352, 2457, 2631
Hancher, V. M 1167, 5233
Hancock, W. K 240, 3313, 3314
Handbook to the Soviet Union or Russia 3835
Handy, Elizabeth Grenn 2819

Page
Handy, E. S. C 3964, 5548, 5549, 5701
Handy, Mrs. E. S. C 3964, 5701
Handy, Elizabeth G 5548, 5549
Handy, Willowdean C 5548, 5549
Hangchow, China 3936, 4047, 4133, 4169, 5319, 5320, 5417
Hangchow-Ningpo RR 2434
Hangin, John Gombojab 325
Hankins, Frank H 2658
Hankow, China 3586, 3709, 4059, 4060, 4131, 4132, 4284
Hankow-Canton Ry 827
Hankow Government 2320, 2321
Hankow Period (1938) 2340
Hankow-Wuchang Defense General Headquarters 2344
Hannegan 1657
Hanoi 3999
Hansemann, Mr 4439
Hansen, A 2831, 2832, 5260
Hansen, Alvin H 444, 4119
Hansen, Haldore 71, 2652, 2811, 3983, 4020, 4860, 4862, 5185, 5346, 5395, 5548, 5549
Hansen, O. C 2814, 2815, 4944
Hanson, Earl P 4259
Han-seng, General Chen. (*See* Chen, General Han-seng.)
Hansu Chan. (*See* Chao-ting Chi.)
Hanwell, Norman D 3921, 4093, 4859, 5085, 5180, 5378, 5548, 5549
Haq, Fazlul 5005, 5043
Hara, Yoshimichi 4267
Harada, Tasuku 5548, 5549
Harap, Louis 4089
Harbin 5340
Harcourt, Brace & Co 4004, 4007
Hardeians, Keir 2315
Harden, Sheila 5548, 5549
Haring, C. H 5548, 5549
Haring, Douglas G 668, 5548, 5549
Harju, Rudolph 4116
Harlem Peace League 4275
Harmon, Colonel 5371
Harmon, Francis S 122–124, 264, 528, 1219, 2511, 3612, 3859, 3868, 4109, 4143
Harondar, E. V 645–647, 2607–2609, 2721, 3135, 3136, 3149, 3171, 3172, 3174, 3244, 3315–3317, 3322, 3323, 3484, 3582, 4476, 4477, 4554, 4555, 4561, 4568, 4574, 4909, 4916, 4922, 4984, 5025, 5112, 5138, 5140, 5150, 5180, 5200.
Harper & Bros 696–698, 2961
Harper, Norman D 5550, 5551
Harper, Samuel N 687, 2518, 3450, 4091, 4259
Harper's Magazine 1230, 4287, 5041, 5080, 5674
Harrell, Mary E 4988
Harriman, George 5651
Harriman, Mrs. J. Borden 2567
Harriman, Mr 5473, 5484
Harriman, Mr. W. Averell 154, 2041–2044, 2682, 3009, 4546, 5059, 5112, 5285
Harris, Captain 4823, 4831
Harris, George 2248, 5078
Harris, George L 5701
Harris, Helen M 1513, 3793
Harris, Lem 541
Harris Memorial Foundation (Chicago) 1607
Harris-Seybold-Potter Co 2628
Harris, Rev. Thomas L 296, 300, 2817, 4259
Harrison, Mrs 3964
Harrison, Barbara 4992, 4994
Harrison, Burr P 4903, 5502
Harrison, George M 1104
Harrison, Peyton 4125, 5207

Page
Harrison, Shelby M---- 4119
Harrow, Benjamin---- 2658
Harrow School---- 2620
Harsch, Joseph C---- 5701
Hart---- 4941
Hart, George H. C---- 440, 5049, 5053, 5550, 5551, 5684
Hart, L. V---- 5550, 5551
Hart, Roies C---- 4983
Hart, Admiral T. C. (and Senator)---- 446, 839, 994, 995, 1218, 2124, 2127, 2248, 5703
Hartley, Arnold B---- 4925
Hartman, L. O---- 4116
Hartmann, Mr---- 5452, 5453, 5454
Hartshorne---- 4965
Harvard Business School---- 5369
Harvard Club---- 4047
Harvard Club of New York---- 99
Harvard Clubs Associated in Chicago---- 3809
Harvard Corp---- 3168
Harvard Crimson---- 3809, 3810, 3812
Harvard-Radcliffe Bureau of International Research---- 3883, 3887
Harvard Russian Summer School---- 4580
Harvard University---- 171, 178, 262, 286, 300, 301, 342, 343, 445, 451, 474, 475, 603, 671, 714, 758, 760, 764, 900, 901, 905, 920, 995, 1007, 1008, 1025, 1054, 1076, 1136, 1154, 1237, 1260, 1261, 1271, 1281, 1288, 1528, 1531, 1532, 1535–1537, 1551, 1589, 1591, 1760, 2581, 2609, 2613, 2614–2616, 2659, 2753, 3212, 3266, 3611, 3704, 3727, 3728–3730, 3751, 3758, 3771, 3812, 3821, 3850, 3883, 3903, 3917, 3923–3926, 3939, 3980, 3981, 3993, 4028, 4029, 4046, 4096, 4107, 4119, 4259, 4260, 4263, 4294, 4328, 4337.
Harvard University Press---- 18, 1591, 3939, 4692, 4702, 5277
Harvard-Yenching Institute---- 1136, 1969, 3266, 4421, 5662
Harvey, Evelyn---- 5550, 5551
Haru Matsui---- 4615
Hasan, K. Sarwar---- 5027
Hashmall, Mrs---- 5677
Hashmall, Frank---- 5675, 5676
Haskell, Oliver---- 179, 1514
Haskell, Henry S---- 5123
Hasse, Robert---- 4991, 4994
Haste, J. M. D---- 5550, 5551
Hastings College---- 5313
Hastwood, H. E---- 2538
Hata, Gen. Shunroku---- 2363, 3758, 4202
Hatcher---- 5680
Hatem, Dr. H---- 3525, 3530, 3531, 4831
Hatem, Cpl. J. W---- 4824, 4831
Hathaway, Comrade---- 555, 674
Hathway, Clarence---- 4116, 4142
Hatta---- 5640
Hattery, Lowell H---- 2248, 3964, 5701
Hauge, O. I---- 5415
Haulsey, Robert---- 4992, 4994
Hauser, Ernest---- 4093, 4094, 4988, 5550, 5551
Havana Conference---- 2584
Havas---- 131, 501, 5334
Hawaii---- 3592, 3745, 3851, 3882, 3907, 3927, 5317, 5319, 5454, 5699
Hawaii University---- 996, 1227
Haward, Edwin---- 5550, 5551
Hawes, Harry B---- 5701
Hawkins---- 2835
Hawkins, Everett D---- 5550, 5551
Hawks, Capt. Frank---- 4169
Hawkins, Sally R---- 4990, 4994, 5295
Hawthorn, H. B---- 5550, 5551

Page
Hawtrey, R. G 5550, 5551
Hay, John 1667
Hayang Arsenal 496
Hayashi Group (Japan) 4092
Hayden, Albert C., Jr 2753, 3884, 2885, 3883
Hayden, Joseph R 248, 249, 264, 432, 476, 857, 4973, 4997, 5684
Haydon, H 5668
Hayes, Carlton J. H 3958, 3962, 5002
Hayes, Kathryn 4992, 4994
Hayes, Marion 3167
Hayes, Max S 4142, 4234
Hazam, John G 5550, 5551
Hazard, John N ..... 154, 627, 687, 1108, 1305, 1314, 1325, 1331, 1342, 1345, 1457, 1805, 1811, 1828, 1837, 1916, 2518, 3450, 3467, 3575–3657, 3660, 3958, 3962, 4005, 4155, 4440, 4443, 4509, 4510, 4513, 4622, 4716, 4897, 5006, 5045, 4047, 4049, 5286, 5299, 5550, 5551.
Hazard, Mrs. John 5299
Headgear Worker 2665
Headline Book Series 2587
Headley, James G 5674
Headquarters (Japanese Imperial General) 1869
Heald, Brian 4117
Heald, Stephen 5550, 5551
Healey, Ned R 633
Healy, Mrs. Carrol 5701
Healy, Mary F 4987, 4992, 4994, 5021, 5058, 5299, 5693, 5694, 5697, 5698, 5699
Hearn, General 1435, 1436
Hearn, Lawrence. (*See* Frederick Vanderbilt Field.)
Hearst 545, 596, 597
Hearst Newspapers 3700, 3701
Hearst Press 1189
Heaslett, S 5550, 5551
Heath, John 5550, 5551
Heaton, Dr. Claude E 409, 410, 1240, 1513
Heaton, Mrs. Claude E 1513
Hedges, Marion H 3794
Heideman, John 5295
Heine-Geldern, Robert 5550, 5551
Heineman, Mrs 5285
Heise, Mr 4440, 4443
Heissig, Walther 3629, 3670, 4416–4428, 4429-4436, 4439, 4440
Heives, Lawrence I., Jr 5550, 5551
Helen. (*See* Elezabeth Zubelin.)
Helen, Sister 5701
Heleney, Henry 4983
Heller, Mrs. Edward H 264, 1220, 4944, 5186
Helmerich & Payne, Inc 102
Helmick, Milton 5550, 5551
Helping Mussolini Win His War 2671
Hemingway, Ernest 4141, 4259
Hendershot, Clarence 2522, 5295, 5550, 5551, 5701
Henderson 1286, 1605
Henderson, Donald 4116, 4142
Henderson, Harold 5550, 5551
Henderson, Loy 3616, 4527, 5026
Henderson, Martha T 4992, 4994
Henderson, Sir Nevile 3223
Hendley, Charles J 4259
Hendrickson, E. E 4887
Henson, Ed 4636
Hepburn, Admiral Arthur J 2836
Heppner, R. P 4944
Herald Tribune, New York ..... 744, 745, 891, 892, 1141, 1148, 1193, 1276, 1887, 1916, 2185, 2186, 2550, 2552, 2557, 2658, 2737, 3430, 5341.

Page
Hern, General 779
Hernandez, Amado V 1338
Herod, William R 264, 433, 444, 857, 900, 1147, 1219, 1258, 1313, 1551, 1553, 1564, 1569, 1571, 1581, 1597, 1607, 1611, 1617, 1618, 1625, 1627, 1637–1641, 1647, 1653, 1656, 1659, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1666, 1680, 1681, 3079, 3704, 3859, 3868, 4835, 4943, 4973, 5198, 5239, 5315, 5344, 5360.
Herre, Albert W. C. T. 5550, 5551
Hersey, Arthur B 5701
Hersey, John R. 71, 1313, 2521, 2522, 3794, 4610, 4612, 4944, 5079, 5194, 5203
Herskovitz, Melville J 2658
Heung Shan 4700
Heyworth, Laurence 5026
Hickenlooper, Senator Bourke B 1079, 2904
Hickerson, Harold 3337
Hickey, Callie M 4990, 4994
Hickman, Dr. Emily 1514
Hicks, Granville 4089, 4170, 4171, 4176, 4259
Hicks, Philip M 2658
Hicks, Victor 2161, 4887
Hidaka, Takashi 4442, 4443
Hidaka, Tomiaki 4432, 4433, 4439, 4440, 4442
Hidayatullah, Ghulam Hussain 5006, 5043
Hidemi. (*See* Hotsumi Ozaki.)
Higashi-Kuni Cabinet 739, 2166, 2299
Higgins, Mrs. Isabell 3964
Higginson & Co., Lee (*See also* Lee, Higginson & Co.) 7
High Cost of Vengeance 3094, 3095, 3669
High Tartary 3266, 4029
Hilen. (*See* Edward W. Allen.)
Hill, Marguerite F 4990, 4994
Hill, Walter 5552, 5553
Hilldring, Gen. John H 735–743, 1744, 1745, 2157–2159, 2162–2169, 2171, 2222, 2223, 2296–2303, 2809
Hillenkoetter, Admiral 4775–4782, 4790–4793, 4797, 4798, 4801, 4802, 4804
Hillman, Sidney 1101, 4638, 4664, 4676
Himes, Prof. Norman E 4259
Himmler, Mr 4440, 5397
Hinden, Rita 5552, 5553
Hinder, Eleanor M 5350, 5552, 5553, 5684
Hinder, Mr 3919
Hindus, Maurice 296, 4091, 5008, 5047
Hindustani News 360
Hindustani Times 400, 401, 3903, 4807, 5323
Hinckley, William W 1514, 2658
Hinrichs 5261
Hinricks 2831
Hinton, Bertha 3601, 4868
Hinton, Mrs. Carmelita 3534
Hinton, Joan Chase 3534, 3535, 3538, 3542, 3601
Hinton, William 3534
Hinton, W. J 5552, 5553, 5684
Hippodrome (New York) 687
Hiranuma, Baron Kijchiro 4267
Hiranuma Cabinet (Japanese 1939) 4202, 4267, 4268
Hirohito, Emperor 609, 611, 616, 617, 666, 705, 706, 713, 716, 725, 727, 728, 731, 736, 738, 739, 751, 914, 994, 1016, 1019–1021, 1135, 1830, 1869, 1964, 1965, 2094, 2159, 2162, 2165, 2170, 2174, 2176, 2296, 2298, 2299, 2592, 2846, 3054, 3064, 3069, 3070, 3071, 3140, 3556, 3577, 3598, 3660, 3661, 4892, 4982, 5107.
Hirose, Hisatada 4268
Hiroshima 3539
Hirota, Koki 4151, 4272, 4267, 5706
Hirota Principles 4151

Page
Hirschfelt, Mr 4569
Hirsh, Alcan 4091, 4145
Hiss, Alger 71–118, 131–137, 139, 140, 144–146, 161, 175, 232–235, 243, 270, 428, 432, 441, 445, 446, 481 482, 489, 492, 494, 497, 857–860, 980, 1032, 1194, 1735–1737, 1750, 1758, 1901, 1912, 1916, 1979, 2135–2138, 2140–2142, 2241, 2486, 2507, 2508, 2596, 2626, 2799, 2800, 2802–2804, 2808, 2813, 2814, 2818, 2820–2823, 2832, 2837, 2838, 2841, 2843–2846, 2848–2856, 2859–2861, 2864, 2867, 2868, 2870, 3011, 3013, 3049, 3213–3219, 3245–3247, 3310, 3543, 3544, 3638, 3646, 3795, 3796, 3887, 3888, 3939, 3955, 3956, 3983, 4323, 4326, 4331, 4473–4475, 4530, 4531, 4673, 4722, 4737, 4748, 4755, 4778, 4786, 4791, 4796, 4920, 4929, 4964, 4969, 4973, 4975, 4976, 5032, 5049–5053, 5084, 5089, 5090, 5165, 5272, 5274, 5289, 5302, 5303, 5334, 5337, 5347, 5353, 5483, 5484, 5485, 5486, 5487, 5503, 5504, 5684, 5711.
Hiss-Chambers Case 2855
Hiss, Donald 1079, 2508, 2803, 4722, 4737
Hiss Trials 2802, 2821
History of Chinese Society: LIAO 3106
History of the Colonial World Under Imperialism 2694
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1690, 2270, 4336
History of the Development of Chinese Society 4352
History of Imperialism 2694
History of Medical Psychology 3621
History of the Modern and Contemporary Far East 2891
History of the Peace Conference 2709
History of the Russian Revolution 2608, 2609
Hitch, S. H 4823, 4831
Hitchcock, James J 5701
Hitler, Adolph 150–152, 178, 188, 196, 198, 214, 274, 279, 289, 296–300, 302, 308, 315–318, 323–325, 334, 339, 343, 380, 464, 522, 527, 528, 567, 596–598, 602, 603, 606, 664, 675, 835, 891, 1045, 1049, 1051, 1057, 1060, 1083, 1135, 1272, 1530, 1532, 1557, 1577, 1583, 1669, 2328, 2351, 2377, 2386, 2467, 2533, 2577, 2629, 2635, 2637, 2671, 2672, 2675, 2676, 2704, 2737, 2804, 2822, 3076, 3119, 3196, 3220, 3222, 3228, 3230, 3241, 3260, 3262–3265, 3268, 3270, 3421, 3457, 3502, 3503, 3585, 3586, 3702, 3917, 4024, 4106, 4200, 4203, 4232, 4233, 4235, 4236, 4264, 4265, 4340, 4487, 4935, 4938, 5069, 5073, 5074, 5075, 5095, 5179, 5189, 5190, 5243, 5249, 5251, 5252, 5256, 5269, 5277, 5281, 5328, 5354, 5368, 5370, 5388, 5395, 5399, 5400, 5401.
Hitler Germany 3414, 3703
Hitler-Stalin Pact 52, 53, 68, 151, 323, 522, 527, 2577, 2671, 2675, 2676, 2804, 3220, 3222-3224, 3226, 3227, 3241, 3268, 3498, 3677, 4188, 4261.
Ho, Chang-chiang (Ho Chang-kung) 2457
Ho, Chang-li 2458
Ho, Chi Minh 930, 1031, 1282, 1610, 1612, 1613, 1620, 1622, 1623, 1737, 4536
Ho, Chien 2324
Ho, Franklin L 1222, 3306, 5333, 5684
Ho, Ko-chuan (Kai Feng) 2403, 2404, 2457, 2459, 2461
Ho, Li Fu Tan 2336
Ho, Lien-cheng 2458
Ho, Lung 812, 2324, 2327, 2332, 2347, 2348, 2403, 2404, 2433, 2451, 2458–2460, 2462, 2463, 2465, 2473, 3306
Ho, P. H 2832
Ho, Tze-Ch'uan 327
Ho, Tzu—chien 2467
Ho, Tzu-lo 2405, 2458
Ho-Umetsu Compromise Agreement 4213
Ho, Wei 2458
Ho, Wei-te 2458
Ho, Yin-ching 1094, 1416, 1417, 1441
Ho, Ying-chin 1416, 1417, 1441, 2074, 2290, 2325, 2342, 2349, 2397, 2455, 3636, 3627, 4939, 5406

Page
Hoard, Lord 2396
Hoare 3172
Hobart, Alice Tisdale 5552, 5553
Hobbs, William Herbert 5284
Hobson 823
Hobson, Dr., Rt. Rev. H. W 3794
Hochschild, Harold K 2566
Hochschild, Patricia 4991
Hochschild, Patrick 4994
Hocking, William Ernest 5552, 5553
Hodge, Gen. John S 1769, 1770, 1879
Hodge Report 1879
Hodgekinson, Sarah 763–765, 4299
Hodson, H. V 5552, 5553
Hoebel, E. Adamson 5552, 5553
Hoey, Senator Clyde 407
Hoffman, Alexander 4116
Hoffman, Paul G 141, 444, 713, 753, 1054, 1060, 1269, 1313, 1586, 4546, 4944, 5067, 5344
Hoffman, Ross 2585
Hogben, Lancelot 4089
Hogbin, H. Ian 5552, 5553
Hogg, Mr 4958
Holbrook, William S., III 3812
Holcombe, Arthur N 900, 1144, 1147, 1148, 3704, 3794, 4835, 5116, 5219, 5552, 5553
Holden, John S 4867, 4869
Holding Company Liquidating Commission (Japan) 2225, 2229
Holiday Magazine 5278
Holland (Europe) 3600, 3633, 4113, 4493, 5318, 5327, 5331, 5334
Holland, William L. (pseudonym—Sinicus) 7, 12–14, 16–19, 33, 41, 43, 64, 80, 155, 158, 173, 176, 238, 239, 253, 254, 260, 263, 268, 269, 277, 310, 319, 320, 375, 378, 383–385, 393–395, 399, 408, 414, 415, 418, 427, 436, 440, 450, 451, 470, 471, 473–477, 479–482, 535–537, 539, 568, 571, 574, 628, 629, 651, 652, 659–661, 663, 664, 670, 768, 769, 862, 863, 898, 903, 918, 957, 1036, 1134–1250, 1314, 1399, 1513, 1802, 1938, 2018, 2245, 2482, 2494, 2506–2510, 2518, 2523, 2524, 2566, 2582, 2589, 2593–2595, 2604, 2646, 2705, 2713, 2715, 2717, 2719, 2721, 2730, 2743, 2794, 2831, 2880, 2888, 2891, 2952, 2953, 2984, 3014, 3064–3066, 3145, 3167, 3173, 3176, 3199, 3208, 3242, 3263, 3264, 3278, 3286, 3287, 3328, 3339, 3340, 3343, 3430, 3469, 3480–3482, 3585, 3587, 3588, 3593, 3594, 3627, 3632, 3634, 3742, 3750, 3775, 3794–3796, 3798, 3854, 3864, 3867, 3889–34948, 3970, 3972, 4010–4012, 4015–4017, 4021, 4023, 4026, 4034, 4052, 4103, 4109, 4119, 4122, 4160, 4161, 4188, 4193–4196, 4198–4200, 4208, 4224–4231, 4262, 4263, 4307, 4349, 4461, 4462, 4464, 4472, 4500, 4566, 4571, 4629, 4805, 4807, 4860, 4861, 4872, 4874, 4887–4889, 4907–4912, 4918, 4919, 4923, 4930, 4945–4949, 4957, 4958, 4963, 4965, 4967, 4972, 4973, 4977–4980, 4984, 4985, 4987, 4991, 4994, 4996–5004, 5007–5032, 5042, 5045, 5046, 5048, 5049, 5053, 5054, 5058, 5059, 5062, 5065, 5066, 5083–5085, 5111, 5119, 5123, 5128–5132, 5134, 5137–5139, 5144, 5150, 5151, 5155, 5157–5160, 5174–5176, 5180, 5183, 5188–5190, 5197–5200, 5204, 5205, 5207, 5209, 5210, 5215, 5216, 5218, 5221, 5230, 5240, 5243, 5246–5248, 5250, 5259, 5260, 5264, 5266, 5268, 5271, 5273, 5274, 5288, 5289, 5294, 5299–5302, 5317, 5327, 5329, 5330, 5334, 5335, 5343, 5344, 5356–5358, 5364–5367, 5424, 5427, 5428, 5552, 5553, 5683–5694, 5704, 5709.
Holland, Mrs. William L. (Doreen) 3340, 5000, 5051, 5022
Hollerman, Leon 5552, 5553
Hollywood Anti-Nazi League 4062, 4066
Hollywood Group (Left-wing) 4063, 4064, 4066
Holman, D. S 5552, 5553
Holman, Helen 4274, 4277
Holmes 5259
Holmes, Eugene C 4089

Page
Holmes, Harriet 4988
Holmes, John W 5199, 5270, 5271
Holmes, Judge 571, 572
Holmes, Julius 1037, 1042, 2124, 2127, 4876
Holmes, Rawson 5704
Holt, Miss Clare 2248
Holt, Claire 5003, 5552, 5553, 5701
Holtman, A 4988
Holtom 306
Holton, D. C 5552, 5553
Holtz, Robert B 5701
Hom, Q. Pan 4037
Homan, Christine 4823, 4831
Hommel, Rudolph P 2891
Homer, Mrs. Dorothy Robinson 1106
Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu Frontier Bank 2422
Honan Campaign 2090, 2091, 3624
Honan-Hupen Flying Column (New Fourth Army) 2463
Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei Border Area 2325, 2326, 2460
Honan-Hupeh-Anhui Soviet District 2326
Honan-Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi-Border Region 2431
Honan Province 2370
Honan Provincial Kuomintang 2460
Hong, Chew 4355, 4357, 4807
Hong, Chew Sih 3159, 3161, 3163, 3509–3512, 3514, 3597
Hong Kong-Canton Railway 2349
Hong Kong, China 3314, 3342, 3535, 3586, 3600, 3637, 3757, 3791, 3826, 3903, 3910, 3912, 4002, 4046, 4054, 4060, 4069, 4129, 4149, 4150, 4201, 4202, 4307, 4337, 4501, 4534, 4699, 4700, 4702, 4766, 4831, 5310, 5337, 5356, 5357, 5368, 5369.
Kongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 3148
Kong Kong Shipping Strike (1924) 2470
Hong Ying (Hsiang Ying) 2458
Honig, Charlotte 2789, 4078, 4080, 4081, 4083, 4084
Honig, Pieter 5552, 5553
Honjo, Eijiro 3167
Honolulu, Hawaii 3851, 3906, 3907, 3927, 3929, 4047, 4124–4126, 4129, 5318, 5319, 5326, 5329, 5331, 5334, 5335
Hood College 5702
Hooker, Annie O 4992, 4994
Hooper, Bruce 262, 578–580
Hoover, Calvin B 5198, 5201
Hoover, Herbert 606, 607, 617, 633, 638, 706, 707, 1102, 1220, 2555, 3479, 5334, 5341
Hoover Institute (Stanford University) 2740, 2748, 5313, 5323
Hoover, J. Edgar 42, 43, 369, 1173, 1176, 1486, 5353
Hoover, Kenneth E 2658
Hoover Library 2250, 3546, 3961
Hoover Library on War, Revolution and Peace 1220, 4944, 4954, 5313, 5323
Hoover, Lyman 4822
Hoover Research Library 4225–4255
Hopeh-Chahar War Zone 2357
Hopeh-Jehel-Liaoning Area 2435
Hopeh People's Armies (Chungking Guerrillas) 2347
Hopeh Province 2334, 2337, 2467
Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region 2400, 2413, 2430, 2433, 2435, 2448
Hopei 4103
Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Region 2448
Hopkins 4975, 5045
Hopkins, Mr 5484
Hopkins, Carl E 5552, 5553
Hopkins, Harry 446, 788, 1393, 1414, 1450, 1453, 1664, 1665, 2528, 2862, 4639
Hopkins, Johns (Institute) 4091
Hopkins Papers 1450
Hopkirk, Howard W 1513

Page
Hopper, Bruce 5116, 5227
Horiuuchi 153, 1627, 1628
Hormann, Bernard L 5552, 5553
Hornbeck, Stanley K 113,
131–133, 135, 136, 139, 141, 145–147, 161, 428, 432, 443, 444, 754,
857, 980–983, 1032, 1178, 1291, 1359, 1735, 1736, 1738, 1779, 1780,
1846, 1978, 1979, 2017, 2097, 2099, 2135, 2809, 2810, 2832, 2835,
3003–3005, 3209, 3210, 3215, 3217, 3218, 3310, 3645, 3894, 3900,
4129, 4280, 4530, 4531, 4545, 4546, 4862, 4900, 4925–4927, 4929,
4936, 4937, 4958, 4973, 4976, 4977, 4999, 5009, 5059, 5083, 5084,
5115, 5123, 5144–5146, 5178, 5334, 5335, 5347, 5348, 5353, 5363
Horne, Admiral F. J 997, 998, 2139
Horner, John 4334, 4353, 4354
Hortz, Robert 3624, 3626, 3706
Hoshino, Lieutenant General 5348
Hoskins, Halford L 2820, 5294, 5701
Hosono, Gunji 5552, 5553
Hot Springs Conference. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs Conference.)
Hotel Claridge 478
Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance 4116
Hotel and Club Employees Union (AFL), Local 6, New York City 1105
Hotel Lux 256, 260
Hotel Richmond, Geneva, Switzerland 4120
Hotson, Ernest 5552, 5553
Hou, Wai-long 5552, 5553
Houghteling, James L 5701
Houghton, Mifflin Publishing Co 1117, 1148, 4107
Houk, John L 969
House Appropriations Committee 890, 4239, 4244, 4245
House Armed Services Committee 1026, 1041, 1049, 1064
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 1009, 1010, 1019, 1026, 1029, 1631, 2835
House Committee on Foreign and Domestic Commerce 1026
House Committee on Un-American Activities 1406, 1705, 1901, 2117,
2160, 2215, 2777, 2802, 2822, 2871, 2872, 2874, 2878, 3517, 4238
House of Commons 1061, 1132, 1267, 1465
House of Commons (Ottawa) 3470, 3472
House of Lords 909
House Military Affairs Committee 1686, 1915, 1917
House of Peers (Japan) 1216, 4184
House of Representatives:
Japan 4184
United States of America 433,
1299, 1365, 1406, 1915, 1916, 2127, 2132, 2540, 2810
Houston Foreign Policy Association 2810
Houston, Gen. Sam 548
Houston, Howard 5167
Hoving Corp 100
How Aid China 3610
Howard, Harry Paxton 5554, 5555
Howard, Roy 596, 597, 2809, 3228, 5148
Howard University 2659
Howe, Fred 249, 2885
Howell, Newton 5153
Howie, Janet K 2627, 2635, 4075, 5554, 5555
Howland, Charles P 1216, 1219, 1648, 5554, 5555
Hoy, Lee Chin (Gen.) 2253
Hrdlicka, Ales 300, 2729
Hsi-en-sui, General 2357
Hai, Pai Chung 1368, 1578
Hsia, C. L 535–539, 1229, 3896, 4283, 5010, 5329, 5427, 5554, 5555, 5684
Hsia Hsi 2558
Hsia, Pin Fang 5554, 5555
Hsiang 427
Hsiang, C. Y 4987, 5554, 5555
Hsiang-chien, Hsu (*see also* Hsu. Hsiang-chien) 812

Page
Hsiang Han-ping 2472
Hsiang Shan's Children's Home (Peiping) 1249
Hsiang Te-lung (Hsiang Ying) 2458
Hsiang Ying (Shang Ying, Ham Ying, Heng Ying) 2351, 2352, 2457, 2458, 2469, 2473
Hsiao Ching-hsien (Hsiao Ching-kuang) 2458, 2459
Hsiao Ching-kuan (Hsiao Ching-hsien) 2458, 2459
Hsiao, Ching-kuang 2404, 2405
Hsiao Chun 2459
Hsiao Hua 2459
Hsiao Keh (Hsiao K'o, Hsia Ko-cheng) 2459
Hsiao K'o (Hsiao Keh, Hsiao KO-cheng) 2459
Hsiao Ko-cheng (Hsiao Keh, Hsiao Ko) 2459
Hsiao Shuo 2470
Hsiao-tung, Fei 18
Hsiao Wang-tung 2459
Hsieh, Chueh-tsai 2405, 2459
Hsieh Fu-chih (Hsieh Kung-chih) 2459
Hsieh Hao-ju 2459
Hsieh, Kang-chih (Chao Jung, Kang Sang) (Chao Yung) 2365, 2404, 2452, 2459, 2461
Hsieh Kung-chih (Hsieh Fu-chih) 2459
Hsien Affairs Congress 2402, 2409, 2411, 2448
Hsien Committee (Chinese Communist Party) 2409, 2448
Hsien (Municipal Congress) 2403
Hsien, Kang-chih 2403
Hsien People's Congress 2402, 2448
Hsien, Ting 5211
Hsin Hua Jih Pao (New China Daily) 2341, 2342, 2344, 2377, 2453, 2469
Hsin Hua Jin Pac, The 5424
Hsinhua (New China) News Agency 3950, 3951
Hsin-hua News Service (Chinese Communist Party) 2404, 2454
Hsing-hsien Arsenal 2428
Hsing Jen—fu 2459
Hsipei Army (Northwestern) 2330, 2331
Hsiung Po-chen 2459
Hsiung, Shih-hui 2374
Hso Ti-hsin 3951
Hsu, C. Y 5554, 5555
Hau Cho-jan 2459
Hsu Elder (Lao Hau, Telieh Hsu) 2460
Hsu Fan-ting 2459, 2460
Hsu, Francis L. K 5554, 5555
Hsu, Hai-tung 2403, 2460
Hsu, Hsiang-chien 812, 2326, 2327, 2348, 2349, 2404, 2452, 2460, 4884, 4885
Hsu Hung 2460
Hsu Lao (Elder Hsu, Te-lieh Hsu) 2460
Hsu, Leonard S 5232, 5554, 5555
Hsu, Mr 5240
Hsu, Shuhsi 1221, 1222, 4150, 4151, 5350, 5554, 5555
Hsu Te-lieh (Elder Hsu, Lao Hsu) 2460
Hsu, Y. Y 71, 3126–3129, 3860, 3876, 3899, 3903, 3913–3915, 3952, 4080, 4081, 4083, 4312, 4313, 4334, 4335, 4939, 4987, 4991, 4994, 5199, 5250, 5271, 5554, 5555.
Hsu Yen-Kang 2460
Hsu, Yung-ying 415, 2645–2647, 2649, 2891, 3333–3335, 3337–3341, 3594, 4806, 4861, 4872, 4876.
Hsuchow, China 4060, 4061
Hsueh-fen, Chu 825
Hsueh, Yueh 2322, 2355
Hu, Charles Y 5554, 5555
Hu, Chiao-mu 5383, 5384, 5385
Hu, Chiu-yuan 4879
Hu, Chung-nan 596, 2186, 3804

Page
Hu Fu (Shao-chi Liu) 2403, 2404, 2460, 2465
Hu, Han-min 3596
Hu, Hsien-Chin 5554, 5555
Hu, Jen-kuei 2405, 2460
Hu, Shih, Dr 427, 1216, 1222, 1401, 3638, 3639, 3766, 3881, 3923, 3946, 4022, 4147, 4242
Hu, T. P 3335
Hu, T. Y 3335
Hu, Tsangnan 3608
Hu, Tsung-nan 165, 610, 2330, 2345, 2346
Hu Yeh-ping 2470
Hua, Tsing 5686
Huai Nan Bank 2422
Huai-nan Hsing-Cheng Wei-yuan-hui 2400
Huai-Nan Railroad 2434
Huai-pei Hsing-Cheng Wei-yuan-hui 2400
Huai River 2434
Huang Chen-tang 2461
Huang Hsin-lueh 2461
Huang, Hua 2404, 2461
Huang Ko-cheng 2461
Huang Ya-Kuang 2461
Huang Yung-sheng 2461
Huangpu Clique 4216
Hubbard, Mr 3176, 3177, 3580, 3581, 3592, 4985, 4998
Hubbard Article 3450, 3451
Hubbard, Deborah 5216, 5554, 5555
Hubbard, G. E 480, 481, 1222, 2981, 3167, 3436, 3452, 3453, 3456, 3457, 5554, 5555
Hubbard, L. E 4888, 5554, 5555
Hubbard, L. H 2981, 3448, 3450–3452
Hubbard, L. M 3433–3436, 3441, 3443
Huber 3096, 3097
Huber, Franz 4440
Huberman, Leo 4089, 4259
Hudine, Sven 3226
Hudson, G. F 5334, 5554, 5555
Hudson, Manly O 5067
Hudson, Roy 605, 3336, 3937
Huff, Henry 567, 3905
Huggins, G. Ellsworth 712, 713, 970, 971, 976, 1003, 1219, 2622, 4938, 5365
Hughes 5132
Hughes, Charles Evans 462, 4887
Hughes, E. R 5554, 5555
Hughes, Emmet John 5654
Hughes, John 5554, 5555
Hughes, Langston 4259
Hughes, Nancy C 4108
Hughes, Paul 5648
Hui-yang Pao-an Anti-Japanese Guerilla Corps 2349
Huks. (*See* Hukbalahap.)
Hukbalahap 4019, 4020, 4447–4452, 4454, 4855, 4856, 4858, 4871, 5395
Hulen, Bertram D 893
Hull, Cordell 20, 67, 140, 153–155, 175, 396, 580, 893, 980–982, 985, 1359, 1360, 1388, 1389, 1481, 1667, 1715, 1795, 1799, 1811, 1812, 1821, 1823, 1825, 1826, 1829, 1830, 1907, 1987, 2033–2035, 2045, 2079, 2081, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2181, 2187, 2188, 2287, 2295, 2783, 2828, 2830, 2834, 2835, 2841, 2842, 2858, 2865, 3218, 3651, 3884, 4201, 4204, 4714, 4715, 4929, 4941, 4942, 5059, 5060, 5075, 5089, 5412, 5468.
Hull, General 831
Hulsewe, A. F. D 5554, 5555
Human Exploitation in the United States 2890
Human Factors in Cotton Culture 2890
Human Geography of the South 2890
Humane Endeavour 4120

Page
Humble Oil & Refining Co 102
Hume, Edward H 264, 1219, 3144, 5651
Hume, Joy 71, 2593, 4137, 4143, 5554, 5555
Humelsine, Carlisle H 282, 903, 1293, 1917, 1949, 2202, 2203, 2267, 2268, 2271, 2272, 2278, 2534, 2539, 2944, 3410, 3956, 3966, 4539, 4540, 4548, 4549, 4617, 4714–4716, 4815, 4922, 4924, 4925, 5483, 5484.
Hummel, Arthur W 3794, 3965, 5294, 5295, 5701
Hummel, Mrs. Arthur 5295
Hummel, Professor 4420
Hummel, Robert S. 3965, 5295, 5701
Hummell, Arthur 5556, 5557
Humphrey, John P 5556, 5557
Hung, Wm 4420, 4421
Hungarian Republic 2693
Hungary 3592, 3702, 5382
Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Border Region Guerilla 5th Column, New Fourth Army 2457
Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area 2322, 2325
Hunan Military School 2469
Hunan Province 2453, 2454, 2466, 2469–2471
Hunan Provincial First Normal School 2466
Hunanese Student Delegation to France 2460
Hung-tze Lake Area 2434
Hunsberger, Warren S 5556, 5557, 5684, 5701
Hunt 5233
Hunt, Erling M 2585
Hunt, Henry T 2684
Hunt, William P 4983
Hunter 494
Hunter, Charles 5556, 5557
Hunter College 4089, 4259
Hunter, Croyle 2810
Hunter, Edith 5704
Huntington, Ellsworth 2658, 5556, 5557
Huntington Library 712
Hunton, Alpheus 1106
Hupeh (Sixth War Zone) 2341
Hupeh-Anhwei-Honan Soviet 2460
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei 2400, 2413, 2431, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2448, 2452
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Base 2462
Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Military Region 2434, 2435, 2436, 2448, 2452
Hupeh-Hunan Border Area 2325, 2458
Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area 2325
Hupeh Military School 2475
Hupeh Province 2460
Hurley, Gen. Patrick J 604, 610–615, 620, 622–624, 626, 631, 639, 654–656, 678, 700, 798, 828–830, 839, 933, 1022, 1214, 1229, 1393, 1397, 1431, 1443, 1453, 1457, 1524, 1525, 1710, 1712, 1713, 1745, 1791, 1853, 1856, 1858, 1860, 1916, 2000, 2063, 2094, 2107, 2117, 2143, 2144, 2379, 2381, 2387, 2392, 2396, 2488, 2548, 3004, 3005, 3009, 3108, 3109, 3356, 3367, 3374, 3502, 3610, 3626, 3705, 3788, 3839, 4007, 4008, 4323, 4331, 4541, 4542, 4544, 4545, 4769, 4773, 4774, 4825, 4829, 4832, 4839–4841, 4845, 4853, 4877, 4878, 5371, 5372, 5376, 5377, 5379, 5393, 5394, 5408.
Hurst 5279
Hussey, Harry 5659
Hutchins, Grace 496
Hutchins, Mr 4568
Hutchins, Robert M 5041, 5674
Hutchinson 4823, 4831
Hutchinson, Paul 5661
Hutchison, Bruce 5556, 5557
Hutchison, Paul 5661–5674
Hutton, D. Graham 5556, 5557

Page
Hutukhtu, Dilowa 325, 3961
Hutung, Ta Yuan Fu 305
Hwai-Nan Railroad 2434
Hweimin (Semifeudal Organizations) 2415
Hyde, Charles Cheney 5002
Hyman, Albert 4117, 5556, 5557
Hyman, Joseph 5002
Hyman, Louis 3336

I

Ianson, Ia. D 189
Ickes, Mr. Harold 384, 1104, 5045, 5047, 5051
Ideological War Preparation in Japan 3935
Ike, Nobutka 327, 5556, 5557
Ikeda, Seihin 4148
Illes, Agatja 4259
Illinois Industrial Review 2665
Illinois Miner 2665
Illinois University 2659
Ilyin, B. S 4509, 4555
Imes, William Lloyd 1514, 2659, 4116, 4117
Immigration and Naturalization Service (*see also* United States Immigration Service) 590, 591
Imperial College of Science, London 4089
Imperial General Headquarters (Japan) 1869
Imperial Household (Japan) 1872
Imperial Office of the Governor (Yu-lin District, Shensi) 2463
Imperialist Division of the World 2705
Imprecorr (International Press Correspondence) 47, 48, 54, 3132, 3170
In North Korea 2789
Ince, Arthur D 5556, 5557
Ichihoshi, Yamato 5556, 5557
Independent Carpenters Union 3336
Independent Motion-Picture Producers 1221
Independent Partisan Army (Central China) 2459
India ..... 2482, 3504, 3512, 3592, 3599, 3605, 3622, 3632, 3681, 3694, 3696, 3699, 3758, 3882, 3931, 3946, 3955, 3957–3959, 3963, 4123, 4270, 4537, 4595, 4596, 4632, 4687, 4688, 4689, 4694, 4700, 4701, 4708, 4711, 4829, 4832, 4871, 4893, 4920, 4971, 5062, 5074, 5249, 5318, 5321, 5322, 5323, 5324, 5328, 5331, 5332, 5349, 5356, 5370, 5394- 5395, 5462, 5465, 5636, 5641, 5668, 5670, 5701.
India Congress Party 1252
India Government Trade Commissioners Office 480, 481, 2480
India Quarterly 5329
India, Special Economic Mission to 3880
India and the United States 2529, 2534
Indian Civil Service 3110
Indian Council of World Affairs 18, 469, 1215, 2493, 2494, 5329, 5349
Indian Government 1566, 1678, 1680, 2531, 2556, 2679, 3076, 3078
Indian Legislative Assembly 1216
Indian National Congress 910
Indian Railways 483
Indian Service 495
Indian Trade-Union Congress 2638
Indochina ..... 2482, 3586, 3699, 3936, 3946, 3999, 4000, 4098, 4205, 4533, 4536, 4537, 4682, 4684, 4693, 4711, 4807, 5320, 5394, 5692.
Indochina Bank 2527, 2632
Indonesia ..... 2482, 3623, 3814, 3816, 3838, 3957, 3974, 4537, 4693, 4711, 4716, 5501, 5634, 5636, 5637, 5641, 5642.
Indonesian Government 3109
Indonesian Republic 5635, 5637, 5638, 5640, 5641, 5642
Indusco. (*See* Chinese Industrial Cooperatives and United China Relief.)
Industrial Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) 3335

Page
Industrial Relations Counselors 4641
Industrial Solidarity 2665
Industrial Worker 2665
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 2667
Industrialisti 2665
Infantry Journal, The 4591
Informational Conference, Relief and Rehabilitation Program (United Nations) 2595
Ingalls, Don 5303
Ingles, Glen 5556, 5557
Ingraham, Mrs. Henry A 3794
Iniasevsky, A. N 4509
Ining Valley 2385
Inland Boatmen's Union 4887
Inlow, E. Burke 5556, 5557
Inman, Walter G 5701
Inner Asia 4304
Inner Asian Frontiers of China 1739, 1785, 1786, 1930, 1941, 1943, 1951, 1952, 1982, 1983, 1984, 2724, 3105, 3266, 3271, 3614, 4006, 4029.
Inner Mongolia 2368, 2385, 3328, 3538, 3539, 3542, 3638, 4150, 4226, 4228, 4418, 4419, 5089.
Inner Temple of London 358
Innis, H. A 5556, 5557
Inouye, Junnosuke 1216
Inparel 4087, 4105, 4106, 4108, 4111, 4113, 4121
Inquiry 684, 2981, 2982
INS. (*See* International News Service.)
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 444, 474, 911
Institute on China 4578, 4586, 4588
Institute of Current World Affairs 1617, 1618, 5324
Institute of Economics (Moscow) 2723, 2728, 2730
Institute of Genetics (Moscow) 4089
Institute of History and Economics (Copenhagen) 5066
Institute of the History of Medicine 300
Institute International d'Agriculture of Rome 3168
Institute of International Education 1219
Institute of International Studies (Yale University) 3168, 5313
Institute of Minor Nationalities 5129
Institute of National Economy (Moscow) 5320
Institute of National Minorities 2721
Institute of Nationalities 2721
Institute of Nuclear Studies 3539
Institute of Oceanography 189, 648, 2611, 2614, 2615, 2723, 3934, 4499, 4508, 4509, 4553–4557, 4561, 4567, 4568, 4573, 4922.
Institute of Oriental Languages (Leningrad) 2691
Institute of Oriental Study 2699
Institute of Orientology 4578
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) 1, 2, 4, 6–13, 15–19, 24, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 38, 40–46, 50–53, 60, 63–65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 80–82, 86, 106, 109, 113–115, 117, 118, 121–125, 131, 133–137, 140–145, 148, 149, 156, 158, 160, 161, 163, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 178, 189, 191, 195, 198, 202–206, 208–210, 213, 216, 218, 220, 237, 238–240, 241, 246–248, 250–255, 259, 261–264, 265–271, 277–280, 283, 284, 287, 289, 295, 305, 306, 313, 315, 319–321, 323, 325, 336–340, 341, 343, 346, 347, 349, 375, 378, 381, 384, 386, 388, 389, 391, 392, 394, 395, 399, 406–409, 412–418, 424–438, 440, 441, 443, 445–447, 451, 452, 462, 467, 468, 470, 471, 474, 475, 477–484, 487, 488, 491, 492–494, 497, 506, 516, 517, 518, 522, 524, 525, 527–530, 535, 536–540, 541, 549–551, 567, 568–570, 571–576, 581–583, 587, 589, 591, 593, 620–622, 628, 629, 634, 640–646, 650–653, 659–661, 663–665, 667–670, 672, 674–676, 682–686, 688–697, 699, 701, 709, 710, 711, 712, 747, 751, 753, 754, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 787, 788, 789,

Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)—Continued Page
836, 837, 838, 850, 856, 858, 859, 861, 862, 863, 864, 883, 886, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 896, 901, 906, 908, 909, 911, 916, 918, 920, 923, 924, 925, 928, 934, 935, 937–942, 1004, 1013, 1014, 1032, 1033, 1035–1037, 1071, 1088, 1090, 1093, 1108, 1110, 1144–1148, 1150, 1153, 1155, 1158, 1160–1177, 1181–1188, 1191, 1199, 1200–1206, 1209, 1212–1225, 1227–1235, 1237, 1238, 1244–1246, 1298, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1319, 1320, 1327, 1381, 1400, 1456, 1511, 1512, 1549, 1551, 1686, 1696, 1706, 1728–1730, 1756, 1760–1763, 1783, 1785, 1797–1803, 1831–1834, 1842–1850, 1854–1856, 1887, 1906–1927, 1932–1939, 1979–1983, 1997, 1998, 2004–2006, 2014–2020, 2023–2025, 2050, 2059, 2080, 2093, 2096, 2097–2101, 2104, 2114–2119, 2122–2124, 2127–2134, 2136, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2144, 2146–2148, 2150, 2151, 2219, 2245–2250, 2266–2269, 2294, 2477–2494, 2500, 2506–2511, 2516, 2532, 2546, 2560–2596, 2600–2616, 2619–2646, 2651–2655, 2669, 2689, 2692, 2698–2703, 2707–2721, 2727–2730, 2739–2744, 2749, 2771, 2774–2794, 2804–2820, 2832, 2846, 2854, 2855, 2865–2870, 2877–2895, 2899, 2901, 2903–2907, 2910, 2915, 2917, 2918, 2921, 2923–2925, 2927, 2929, 2940, 2942, 2943, 2948, 2951–2954, 2980–2986, 2989–2998, 3023, 3055, 3058, 3099–3102, 3106, 3123, 3131–3139, 3144–3149, 3152–3159, 3167, 3168, 3171–3174, 3176, 3177, 3191, 3195, 3199–3208, 3212, 3220, 3221, 3225, 3229, 3233–3244, 3248–3254, 3263–3272, 3279–3280, 3284, 3286, 3288, 3310–3316, 3319–3323, 3325–3326, 3329, 3331, 3333, 3337, 3343, 3346–3348, 3354–3355, 3359, 3361–3364, 3376, 3379, 3415, 3420, 3422, 3424–3425, 3428–3430, 3434–3436, 3439–3442, 3446, 3449, 3450, 3452–3455, 3460, 3462, 3465–3467, 3469, 3473–3474, 3478–3483, 3487, 3509–3510, 3514–3517, 3520, 3522–3523, 3543, 3545–3548, 3551, 3569, 3577, 3579–3581, 3585, 3587–3588, 3590, 3593–3594, 3604, 3614–3616, 3636, 3638, 3642, 3645, 3654, 3675, 3677–3679, 3723–3725, 3738–3744, 3746, 3749–3754, 3765, 3774, 3775, 3777, 3778, 3784, 3785, 3792, 3794–3798, 3802, 3806, 3809, 3832, 3840–3842, 3849, 3850, 3852, 3853, 3855–3863, 3865–3874, 3877–3882, 3884–3887, 3890–3905, 3912–3943, 3950, 3952, 3957, 3959–3961, 3963–3965, 3969–3980, 3983, 3991, 4005, 4010–4015, 4018, 4019, 4022, 4023, 4026–4028, 4033, 4035, 4038–4039, 4042, 4044–4046, 4048–4052, 4054–4057, 4059, 4062–4063, 4065, 4067, 4070, 4074–4076, 4078, 4081, 4083–4085, 4088, 4091–4093, 4097–4101, 4105–4106, 4108–4109, 4111, 4114, 4119–4120, 4122–4127, 4129–4131, 4134, 4136, 4138, 4140–4141, 4143, 4145–4147, 4149, 4158, 4160–4161, 4190, 4195, 4199, 4206, 4208, 4210–4211, 4223–4231, 4236, 4239, 4242–4246, 4252, 4261–4262, 4278–4280, 4292, 4294–4296, 4306–4307, 4313–4314, 4339, 4349, 4373, 4374, 4382, 4420, 4445, 4452, 4462, 4463, 4472, 4476, 4477, 4488, 4490–4495, 4498, 4500, 4501, 4502–4505, 4514, 4516, 4517, 4522, 4525, 4530, 4532, 4545, 4546, 4553, 4554, 4557, 4561, 4562, 4568, 4572–4574, 4576, 4578–4580, 4586, 4590, 4627, 4628, 4629, 4682, 4692, 4716, 4780, 4787, 4802, 4805, 4806, 4807, 4808, 4809, 4810, 4811, 4812, 4816, 4829, 4843, 4846, 4849–4853, 4859–4861, 4870–4872, 4887, 4888, 4890–4892, 4896, 4901, 4904, 4907–4924, 4933–4949, 4953–4956, 4959, 4961, 4962–5091, 5105, 5108, 5118, 5119, 5133–5136, 5195–5197, 5200, 5253, 5268, 5302, 5305, 5314, 5316–5336, 5337, 5338, 5339, 5341, 5342, 5344, 5345, 5346, 5347, 5348, 5350, 5351, 5352, 5353, 5355, 5356, 5360, 5364, 5366, 5367, 5373, 5374, 5378, 5379, 5414, 5424, 5427, 5463, 5467, 5470, 5471, 5473, 5476, 5483, 5484, 5506–5633, 5643, 5647, 5662, 5666, 5674, 5683, 5684, 5685, 5686, 5687, 5688, 5689, 5691, 5692, 5693, 5695, 5699–5711.
American Council 364, 366, 384, 385, 389, 390, 391, 394, 425, 426, 431, 432, 443, 446, 451, 469, 470, 472, 473, 474, 480, 481, 494, 515, 518, 527, 528, 451, 469, 470, 472, 473, 474, 480, 481, 494, 515, 518, 527, 528, 533, 534, 536, 537, 538, 540, 564, 565, 566, 568, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 628, 646, 650, 663, 668, 682, 683, 687, 692, 693, 694, 696, 697, 711, 753, 754, 788, 836, 850, 858, 861, 862, 863, 864, 886, 901, 928, 935, 937–942, 945–951, 957–962, 968–984, 988–997, 1002, 1003, 1144–1148, 1150–1153, 1166–1168, 1171–1175, 1184, 1188,

Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)—Continued
American Council—Continued Page
1192, 1212–1225, 1227–1235, 1237, 1238, 1244–1246, 1313, 1456, 1551, 1831, 1832, 1887, 1888, 1938, 1979, 2006, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2093, 2096, 2115, 2116, 2133, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2511, 2522, 2523, 2566, 2567, 2571, 2580, 2581–2583, 2588, 2589, 2593, 2608–2613, 2615, 2616, 2623–2640, 2652, 2692, 2707, 2710, 2828, 2809–2811, 2820, 2828, 2870, 2884, 2980, 2985, 3055, 3058, 3102, 3137, 3171, 3204, 3205, 3206, 3208, 3233, 3244, 3254, 3272, 3284, 3316, 3334, 3344–3347, 3440–3442, 3447–3448, 3482, 3485–3486, 3506, 3611–3612, 3618, 3640, 3645–3646, 3743, 3753, 3775, 3797, 3798, 3859, 3862, 3865, 3870–3874, 3876, 3878–3881, 3883–3885, 3890, 3893, 3897, 3904, 3905, 3918, 3920, 3922, 3929, 3935, 3942, 3943, 3945, 3946, 3969, 3971, 3972–3979, 3981–3983, 3988, 3989, 4011, 4021, 4026, 4034, 4044, 4046, 4056–4057, 4065, 4067, 4074, 4087, 4092–4094, 4096, 4099, 4100, 4104–4109, 4111–4112, 4114, 4124–4127, 4130, 4134–4135, 4141, 4143, 4145, 4225–4226, 4253, 4262–4263, 4265, 4287, 4352, 4488, 4493, 4495, 4497, 4500–4502, 4554, 4556, 4568, 4571, 4576–4580, 4587, 4680, 4681, 4693, 4787, 4813, 4814, 4835, 4850, 4855, 4856, 4878, 4888, 4889, 4898, 4899, 4911, 4934, 4938, 4942, 4955, 4956, 4959, 4962, 4967–4972, 4974–4978, 4980–4983, 4997, 4999, 5008, 5013, 5020, 5023–5030, 5051, 5061–5063, 5070, 5078, 5081, 5105, 5107, 5113–5116, 5123, 5125, 5126, 5134, 5140, 5141, 5144, 5153, 5154, 5162, 5164, 5167, 5174, 5180–5182, 5184, 5186, 5193, 5194, 5196, 5198, 5204, 5207, 5217, 5225, 5227, 5228, 5230, 5236, 5237, 5247, 5255, 5257, 5260, 5264, 5267, 5278, 5279, 5282, 5284, 5285, 5288, 5289, 5293, 5298, 5301, 5302, 5314, 5323, 5327, 5328, 5329, 5330, 5331, 5332, 5334, 5337, 5338, 5342, 5343, 5344, 5351, 5356, 5357, 5358, 5359, 5360, 5364, 5365, 5366, 5367, 5378, 5413, 5414, 5643, 5644, 5658, 5659, 5683, 5689, 5690, 5693, 5694, 5696, 5698, 5699, 5703, 5711.
American Delegation 1730, 1761, 1798, 1832, 1833, 1844, 1927, 2104, 2127, 2133, 2147, 4122, 4123.
American Delegation to Atlantic City 3975, 3976, 3980, 3987–3989
American Board of Trustees 3870–3872, 3969, 3972, 3978, 3982
American Headquarters 1844
American-Northwest Council 3264
American officers in 1941 3859, 3868, 3869
American-Pacific Conference 504
Amsterdam 4569
Atlantic City Conference 4123
Australian Council 2728, 3139, 5008, 5027, 5250, 5342
Bay Region Division of American Council 2138, 2139, 5152, 5186, 5242, 5243, 5289, 5290
Biennial Report 564
Board of Trustees 4941, 4943, 4944, 4967, 5228, 5238, 5288, 5290, 5339
British 7, 4985, 5002, 5027, 5066, 5147, 5250, 5284, 5342, 7144
British Council 1217, 3136, 3138, 3147, 3149, 3154, 3157, 3233, 3236, 3316, 3438, 3441, 3486, 3487, 3634
California 3517
Canadian Council 3264, 4554, 4556, 5009, 5019, 5020, 5027, 5115, 5243, 5250, 5267, 5270, 5271, 5276, 5333, 5342, 5405, 5411
Canadian Delegation 997, 998, 1217
Central Library, Honolulu 3593
Central Secretariat 4100, 4102
Chicago Office 938
Chinese 18, 38, 427, 535, 538, 539, 651, 4939, 4996, 5017, 5031, 5062, 5114, 5115, 5119, 5121, 5125, 5157, 5159, 5184, 5203, 5237, 5246, 5329, 5333, 5342
Chinese Council 989, 1160, 1217, 1228, 1938, 2523, 2647, 3136, 3138, 3147–3149, 3152, 3154, 3233, 3236, 3285, 3316, 3331, 3438, 3593, 3594, 3797, 3916, 3918, 3927, 3939, 3977
Dutch Council 3587, 3633, 5329, 5342, 5711
Education Committee 1221
Executive Committee 4106, 4111, 4125, 4126, 4130, 4131, 4135, 4136, 4145, 4941, 4943, 5164, 5167, 5225, 5228, 5296, 5343, 5366, 5367

Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)—Continued Page
Far Eastern Branch 4556
Files 3283, 3294, 3447
French 4985, 5329, 5333, 5342, 5711
Hawaii Council 2720, 3604, 4125, 4126, 5207
History 3881
Hot Springs Conference Caucus Meeting 3514, 3515
India-American Conference, American Delegation 469, 474
Indian 5027, 5028, 5348
Inquiry Series 3880, 3924, 4014, 4270
International Branch 364, 389, 415, 425, 451, 468, 475, 536, 571, 582
International Conference 1148, 1150–1152, 1216, 1228
International Council 3743, 3869, 3973, 3975, 5011, 5012
International Finance Committee 976, 1147, 1314
International Program Committee 976, 1220, 1314
International Research Committee 976, 1314, 3509, 3531
International Research Secretary 5024, 5066, 5126, 5130, 5135, 5136
International Secretariat 68, 72, 161, 189, 190, 267, 289, 306, 389, 451, 468, 475, 536, 537, 571 582, 641, 642, 661, 663, 664, 711, 768, 788, 956, 957, 967, 978, 998, 1235, 1982, 2453, 2509, 2576, 2578, 2728, 2742, 2744, 3311, 3315, 3440, 3442, 3483, 3485, 3550, 3587, 3588, 3590–3592, 3860, 3872, 3917, 3922–3924, 4068, 4095, 4131, 4135, 4150, 4270, 4571, 4576, 4578, 4999, 5009, 5016, 5023, 5024, 5027, 5046, 5061, 5062, 5063, 5118, 5134, 5145, 5148, 5160, 5161, 5166, 5170, 5171, 5174, 5175, 5188, 5191, 5194, 5215 5217, 5226, 5228, 5234, 5244, 5246, 5247, 5249, 5250, 5257, 5268, 5301, 5302, 5327, 5331, 5342, 5356, 5358, 5359, 5414, 5660.
Japanese Council 41, 255, 321, 363–366, 375, 450, 505, 653, 695, 989, 1213, 1215, 1217, 3135, 3176, 3233, 3331, 3438, 3482, 3556, 3579, 3580, 3585, 3587, 3589, 3591, 3592, 3633, 3825, 3927, 3928, 4102, 4229–4231, 4263, 4264, 4999, 5021, 5025, 5031, 5123, 5125, 5157, 5190, 5192, 5204, 5217, 5318, 5328, 5329, 5333, 5342.
Latin-American Division 491
Library 4146
Los Angeles, Office 4990
Mexico Council 3924
National Councils 2990, 3168, 3238, 3243, 3244
Netherlands Indies 5329
New Delhi, Indian Conference 1801
New York Office 938, 942, 3294, 3440, 3442, 3443, 3452, 3511, 3522, 3523, 3552
New York Research Staff 1998, 2488, 2580, 2582
New Zealand 5027, 5342
Notes 3244, 3934
Pacific Council 365, 366, 425, 426, 480, 481, 494, 537, 663, 664, 694, 768, 769, 850, 858, 859, 957, 971, 976–978, 995, 1003, 1145, 1184, 1215, 1216, 1225, 1226, 1235, 1237, 1314, 2593, 2810, 2870, 3102, 3168, 3171, 3208, 3254, 3430, 3441, 3448, 3482, 3483, 3580, 3587, 3588, 3591–3593, 3751, 3852, 3859, 3877, 3918, 3928–3930, 3934, 4099, 4101, 4121, 4135, 4137, 4143, 4501, 4568, 4570, 4576, 4577, 4850, 4851, 4911, 4938, 4987, 5021, 5023–5027, 5030, 5067, 5081, 5114, 5115, 5121–5127, 5130, 5131, 5136, 5139, 5140, 5158, 5159, 5162, 5163, 5174, 5179, 5184, 5194–5196, 5199, 5203, 5207, 5215, 5217, 5228, 5242, 5247, 5267, 5269, 5272, 5300, 5318, 5321, 5325, 5327, 5328, 5329, 5331, 5332, 5333, 5334, 5335, 5358, 5703.
Pamphlet Series 4016, 4017
Pakistan 5027, 5299
Philippine-American Council 2886
Philippine Council 1215, 2718, 3349, 3350, 3483, 5027, 5160, 5322, 5711
Philippine Delegation 2125
Political Intelligence Department 480, 481
Popular Pamphlet Series 564
Princeton Meeting 3581, 4242
Prouts Neck Conference 2820, 2830, 2831
Russian 191, 2613, 2416

Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)—Continued Page
Russian Institute 3229
San Francisco Bay Region 976, 996, 1147, 1148, 1220, 2138, 2139, 2580, 2582, 2583, 2633, 3264, 3918, 3932, 4093, 4105, 4106, 4226.
San Francisco Conference 939, 954, 995, 996, 1220
San Francisco Office 939, 996, 3516
Scholfield Conference 4125
Seattle Office 938
Secretariat 1938
Secretariat Inquiry 3587
Secretary-General 3277, 3603, 3638, 4130, 4147, 4149, 4224–4226, 4230, 4231
U. S. S. R. Council 187, 645, 646, 1203, 1225, 2607–2609, 2611, 2612, 2615, 2701, 2707, 2710, 2711–2714, 2728–2730, 2908, 3023, 3123, 3135, 3138, 3139, 3155, 3156, 3173, 3174, 3176, 3177, 3229, 3233, 3234, 3239, 3240, 3241, 3244, 3316, 3317, 3319–3322, 3435, 3436, 3438, 3453, 3481, 3482, 3483, 3484, 3485, 3486, 3582, 3603, 3633, 3928, 3930, 3934, 3936, 3977, 3978, 4035, 4047, 4146, 4476, 4477, 4491, 4492, 4493, 4495, 4496, 4498, 4500–4508, 4554, 4557, 4566–4573, 4576, 4577, 4909, 4997, 5007, 5027, 5083, 5084, 5115, 5124–5128, 5130, 5134–5139, 5141, 5147, 5148, 5157, 5160–5162, 5187, 5200, 5218, 5242, 5246, 5274, 5282, 5318, 5329, 5332, 5342, 5642.
Washington Office 938, 939, 951, 955, 956, 984, 1761, 1923, 1998, 2248, 2582, 2593, 2625, 2643, 2774, 3310, 3566, 3570, 4961–4963, 4975, 4978, 4988–4990, 4995, 5011, 5032, 5061, 5286, 5287, 5294, 5295.
Binational Conference 5322–5326
Eighth International Conference, Mont Tremblant, Canada, 1942 571, 641, 663, 850, 856, 858, 1215, 1221, 2626, 2739, 2742, 2744, 3550, 3632, 3887, 3924, 3925, 3930, 3973, 4099, 4958, 4976–4978, 4981, 4982, 5009, 5057, 5067, 5262, 5271, 5272, 5319, 5321, 5325, 5331, 5347, 5357.
Eleventh International Conference, Lucknow, India, 1950 5024–5027, 5319, 5322
Fifth International Conference, Banff, Canada, 1933 571, 850, 1221, 2720, 3190, 3600, 3603, 3604, 3632, 3851, 3862, 3881, 4046, 4099, 4102, 4579, 4586, 4596, 4955, 5114–5116, 5123, 5276, 5281, 5285, 5319, 5320, 5331.
First International Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1925 5318, 5326, 5331
Fourth International Conference, Hangchow and Shanghai, China, 1931 1220, 4046, 4101, 4135, 4956, 5115, 5228, 5279, 5319, 5320, 5331, 5333
Ninth International Conference, Hot Springs, Va., 1945 394, 468, 494, 628, 641, 642, 709, 710, 850, 856, 897, 898, 968, 969, 975–980, 984, 986, 987, 989, 991–993, 995, 998, 1000, 1002, 1004, 1005, 1078, 1136, 1143, 1185, 1207, 1220, 1221, 1686, 1696, 1697, 1706, 1728, 1760, 1761, 1763, 1798, 1842, 1844, 1916, 1917, 1927, 2104, 2123, 2130–2133, 2140, 2151, 2219, 2486, 2490, 2522, 2622, 2623, 3515, 3520, 3594, 3870, 3973, 3975, 3988, 4123, 4291–4296, 4313, 4319, 4339, 4681, 4850, 4610, 5062, 5079, 5198, 5319, 5321, 5322, 5325, 5331, 5552, 5553, 5703, 5710.
Round Table on Atomic Energy 4921, 5031–5033
Second International Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1927 5319, 5331
Seventh International Conference, Virginia Beach, Va., 1939 468, 1162, 1221, 3881, 3917, 4046, 4077, 4099, 4100, 4610, 5319, 5320, 5321, 5331.
Sixth International Conference, Yosemite National Park, 1936 72, 177, 279, 361–363, 364, 576, 641, 642, 661, 662, 890, 1221, 2891, 3278, 3243, 3260, 3311, 3317, 3318, 3320, 3481–3483, 3486, 3543, 3548, 3634, 3881, 3883, 4046, 4121, 4127, 4230, 4526, 4571, 4888, 5118–5120, 5140, 5141, 5150–5152, 5249, 5319, 5320, 5324, 5331, 5346, 5703.
Tenth International Conference, Stratford-on-Avon, England, 1947 571, 3547, 3632, 3918, 4892, 4893, 5319, 5322, 5331, 5378
Third International Conference, Kyoto, Japan, 1929 1221, 3857, 4035, 4046, 4890, 5122, 5151, 5152, 5276, 5319, 5320, 5324, 5331.

Page
Institute of Pacific Relations in Wartime 2579, 2583
Institute of Physical Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R. 362
Institute of Public Administration (Chinese Communist Party) 2406
Institute of Royal Economics and Politics 4516
Institute of Scientific Publications of the Great Soviet World Atlas 3934, 4499
Institute of Social Research 270, 311
Institute of Soviet Construction and Law 3934, 4506, 4509
Institute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (Geneva) 996
Institute of Vostokvedenie 4508
Institute of World Economics and World Politics 189, 2729, 3485, 4488, 4494, 4508, 4578, 4579, 4588, 5009, 5161, 5200
Institute of World Economics and World Politics of the Communist Academy 3934
Insurance Co. of North America 101
Intelligence. (*See* United States Army Intelligence.)
Intelligence (Naval) 1080, 1081, 1112
Intelligence Branch (Royal Canadian Air Force) 999, 1001
Intelligence Department (Chinese Communist Party) 2365, 2459
Intelligence Group. (*See* United States Air Force.)
Intelligence, Military Reserve 3968, 4001
Intelligence Research Office 1286
Intelligence Service, American. (*See* United States Intelligence Service.)
Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan 2258
Inter-American Conference (Rio de Janeiro) 743, 2303
Inter-Continent News 128, 529, 531, 3284, 4284
Interdepartmental Psychological Warfare Committee (Canada) 999, 1000
Interdepartmental Regional Committee 1801
Interim International Information Service 3817
Interior Department. (*See* United States Department of Interior.)
Internal Affairs Security Police 196
Internal Security Committee 16
International (Communist Party) 1690, 1957, 1959, 2499, 2999, 3132, 3183
International Affairs 178, 3580
International Assets Commission 1770, 1916
International Association (report, annual) 3587
International Association of Machinists (AFL) 1104
International Bank 1609, 1620
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1593, 4834
International Book Store (San Francisco) 3071, 3072, 3073
International Bibliography of Historical Sciences 5132
International Broadcasting Division on Korea 1646
International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers (AFL) 2639
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL) 2628
International Business Machines Corp 1217
International Children's Emergency Fund 3931
International Civil Aviation Conference (Chicago) 996
International Committee on African Affairs 4116
International Committee for Chinese Industrial Cooperatives Production Relief Fund 4619
International Communist Movement 2306, 2311
International Communist Party. (*See* Communist Party, International.)
International Conference for the Boycott of Japanese Goods 4276
International Correspondence 511
International Defense 3336, 4275
International Economic Conference 3950, 3951
International Education Institute 1219
International Film Foundation 5696
International Friends of the Chinese People 3472
International General Electric Co 433, 444, 857, 900, 1151, 1217, 1219, 1551, 3868, 4835
International Harvester Co 101
International Hotel 260
International Industrial Relations Institute 682, 683, 4260
International Institute for Social History 5200
International Institute of Social Research 3611, 4107

Page
International Insulating Corp 101
International Journal 3906, 5328, 5405
International Labor Conference (Philadelphia) 995
International Labor Defense (New York Section) 3337
International Labor Office 441, 489, 2728, 3851, 4108, 4890
International Labor Office (Geneva) 5214
International Labour Office (Montreal) 5067, 5068
Internation Labor Office Conference 825
International Labor Organization 5322
International Ladies Garment Workers Union 149, 293–295, 300
International Migration Service 2831
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) 1221
International Missionary Council 432 444, 857, 900, 1551, 3704, 4835, 4973, 4983
International Monetary Fund 4676
International News Service (INS) 386, 1142, 1507, 1540
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission 995
International Peace Hospitals 1247, 3758
International Press 47, 48
International Press Correspondence (Inprecorr) 869, 871, 4234, 4236, 4880, 4886
International Publishers Company 252, 517, 647, 2877, 2878. 2883, 2887, 3184, 3481, 3829
International Quarterly 9
International Red Cross 1218
International Refugee Organization 4724
International Relations Office 2583
International Release Committee 4234, 4253, 4254
International Relief Commission 4071
International Relief Committee 1324, 5345
International Reply Coupons 3168
International Research Committee 2730, 2888, 4499, 4503
International Research Fund 3916, 3924, 4224
International Research Program 4224, 4231
International Research Series 2581
International Rotary 1213
International Seamen's Union 2667
International Secretariat. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat.)
International Security 4100
International Statue of Manchuokuo 3935
International Studies Conference 3174
International Telephone & Telegraph Co 1217
International Union of Academies 2568, 5220
International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers (CIO) 2639, 4116
International Workers Order 515, 540, 1103, 3337, 4275
International YMCA 1213, 1215
Internationale (Third) 2468
Interprofessional Association 3548, 3549
Intourist 5161, 5162, 5191
Intourist Hotel (Moscow) 3221, 3222, 3484
Inverchapel, Lord 692
Investors Service Co 102
Ioffe, S. S 189
Iowa Farm and Labor News 2665
Iowa State University 905
Iowa University 1167
IPR. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations.)
Iran 3464, 3465, 3504
Iranian Institute 621, 622
Ironside, Major General 5075
Ironsides of Chang-Fa-kuei (Kuomintang Fourth Army) 2463
Irvine, P. F. 5556, 5557
Irwin, Mr 1141, 1142
Irwin, Don 4374
Isaac, Harold Robert 748, 749, 753, 2483, 2607, 2916, 3138, 3627, 3628, 4103, 4104, 4136, 4824, 4831, 4847, 4848, 4861, 4872, 4882, 5219, 5556, 5557, 5624

Page
Isaacs 5679, 5680, 5681, 5682
Isaacs, Lt. Col. Irwin 4904, 5040
Isaacs, Sidney 5674, 5676
Isaacs, Stanley M 1240, 1513
Isbrandtsen Steamship Line 1067, 1133, 1258, 1259, 1274, 1567, 2528
ISC 239, 240
Ishii, Mr 4587
Ishii, Viscount K 365, 1216, 3587, 4271
Ishimoto, Baroness 4184
Ishiwata, Sataro 4268
Isikoff, Mr 5295
Isis 342
Isley, Jeter A 5555, 5557
Isolated America 1982
Isserman, A. J 4136
Israel, Dorothy 4988, 4989, 4994
Issen, Anita 4992, 4994
Istorii, Voprosy 1226
Itagaki Division (Japanese) 2463
Italian Action Party 4283
Italian Chamber of Deputies 1268
Italian Fascist Party 404
Italian Library of Information 404
Italian Navy (China) 2324
Italian Parliament 1268
Italy 3584, 3693, 3700, 3703, 4058, 4201, 4203, 4214, 4699, 5074, 5222, 5231, 5426, 5665, 5673
Italy, Government of 1268, 1714, 2011, 2324, 2342, 3110, 3186
Itch 5233
Ito, Prince 2891
IUMMSW. (*See* International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.)
Ivanov. (*See* Pavlov.)
Ivens, Germaine Krull 5556, 5557
Ivens, Joris 4141
Ives, Senator Irving M 452, 464, 1197, 3738, 5350
Iwanaga, Y 5333
Izard, Ralph 3700
Izvestia 308, 309, 1226, 2386, 2719, 2840, 3134, 3318, 3460, 3461, 3484, 3536, 4585, 5146, 5393

J

Jack, Josephine 320, 4170, 4171, 4176
Jackman, W. T 5556, 5557
Jackson, Mr 5682
Jackson, Mrs Ada 1105
Jackson, C. D 5020
Jackson, Gardner 2684
Jackson, Justice 740
Jackson, Rev. Otis G 4259
Jacob 506
Jacobs, Joseph E 5480
Jacoby, Annalee 458, 460, 465, 466, 1513, 4822, 4824, 5649, 5652–5654, 5656, 5657, 5659
Jacoby, Mr. Erich H 53, 54
Jaffe, Mrs 5710
Jaffe, Agnes 5232, 5299, 5709
Jaffe, Bernard 5041
Jaffe, Philip J. (*See also* J. W. Philip) ..... 35, 71, 114, 115, 220, 276, 284, 285, 288, 303, 304, 311, 409, 410, 437, 477, 618, 653–658, 686, 907–911, 956, 1156, 1157, 1161, 1162, 1164–1166, 1206, 1229, 1245, 1513, 1514, 1737, 1754, 1916, 1924, 2113, 2789, 2811, 2812, 2881, 2882, 2978, 3165, 3169, 3290, 3297–3300, 3302–3304, 3308, 3331, 3543, 3544, 3552, 3794, 4015, 4017, 4058, 4065, 4171–4173, 4176, 4177, 4213, 4218, 4278, 4299, 4314, 4316, 4317, 4545, 4560, 4561, 4567, 4824–4826, 4831, 4842–4849, 4859–4861, 4865, 4941, 4984, 5000, 5020, 5031, 5084, 5085, 5167, 5168, 5192–5194, 5217, 5254, 5346, 5424, 5684, 5685, 5709.

Page
Jaffe, Mrs. Philip J 303, 304, 686, 3290, 3298, 3793
Jaffe, Sam 4259
Jahnke, Mr 4440
Jakob, Berthold 4236
James, Burton 2161
James, F. Cyril 5078, 5323
James, Florence B 2161
James, Grace 2891, 5556, 5557
James, Henry 5302
James, Jack 5556, 5557
James, M 4883
James, Mrs 5299
James, Roy 2522, 2809, 5701
James, Roy E 5558, 5559
James, R. W 5558, 5559
Jan, Lieutenant 998
Janeway, Eliot 2891, 4960, 5558, 5559
Janson, J. D 4499, 4505, 4508, 4562, 4567
Janow, Mr 3964
Jao, Chang-hu 2461
Japan 2482,
3280, 3281, 3289, 3292, 3297, 3304, 3305, 3306, 3317, 3323, 3324, 3325, 3326, 3329, 3332, 3342, 3349, 3356, 3358, 3361, 3373, 3374, 3375, 3376, 3382, 3383, 3388, 3391, 3392, 3393, 3394, 3398, 3401, 3411, 3412, 3413, 3414, 3437, 3439, 3452, 3455, 3456, 3470, 3472, 3473, 3481, 3483, 3488, 3489, 3498, 3500, 3501, 3503, 3545, 3547, 3548, 3566, 3568, 3580, 3581, 3582, 3583, 3584, 3589, 3591, 3592, 3593, 3594, 3608, 3609, 3622, 3623, 3624, 3625, 3627, 3628, 3632, 3640, 3650, 3661, 3668, 3669, 3676, 3680, 3682, 3683, 3685, 3686, 3687, 3690, 3691, 3693, 3697, 3698, 3699, 3700, 3701, 3703, 3706, 3707, 3708, 3712, 3713, 3758, 3785, 3801, 3804, 3810, 3811, 3814, 3817, 3851, 3857, 3865, 3867, 3870, 3876, 3881, 3882, 3885, 3907, 3909, 3910, 3912, 3917, 3919, 3929, 3936, 3944–3947, 3958, 3962, 3976, 3977, 3985, 3991, 3994, 4001, 4004, 4009, 4021, 4037, 4046–4047, 4053, 4057–4058, 4061, 4069, 4071–4073, 4076, 4090, 4096, 4098, 4101–4104, 4106, 4108–4109, 4112–4114, 4123–4124, 4129, 4131–4132, 4134–4135, 4147, 4149, 4151, 4160, 4161, 4166, 4183, 4200, 4201–4202, 4214–4216, 4218–4219, 4223–4226, 4229, 4231, 4240, 4270–4276, 4285–4286, 4311, 4313, 4332–4333, 4433, 4441, 4489, 4493, 4494, 4526, 4533, 4537, 4542, 4543, 4588–4590, 4683, 4684, 4686, 4690–4692, 4698–4711, 4715, 4772, 4814, 4815, 4826, 4830, 4840, 4852, 4854, 4855, 4871, 4877, 4892, 4894, 4897, 5306, 5318, 5319, 5320, 5327, 5328, 5330, 5331–5335, 5339, 5340, 5348, 5349, 5354, 5356, 5358, 5370, 5378, 5382, 5383, 5385, 5395, 5397, 5403, 5404, 5425, 5426, 5427, 5470, 5500, 5501, 5641, 5663–5667, 5669–5674, 5698, 5699, 5705, 5706, 5708.
Japan United States Post Surrender Policy 1862, 1863, 1868, 1905
Japan Advertiser 4134
Japan and Asia's Captive Colonies 2580
Japan in China (book) 4089, 4218
Japan Christian Year Book 1936 306
Japan in the Philippines 2887
Japan Picks Up the Pieces (publication) 4188, 4200
Japan Policy as Related to China Policy 3387
Japan Prepares for Peace Offensive 4265
Japanese-American Commercial Treaty 4201
Japanese-American Committee for Democracy (JACD) 2238–2240, 2242, 2243, 4941
Japanese-American Trade Treaty 4202
Japanese-American War in the Pacific 4205
Japanese-Americans (Hawaii) 742, 2168, 2302
Japanese Anti-War League 2467, 2468
Japanese Army 355,
359, 361, 368, 379, 734, 738, 805, 811, 1440, 2090–2092, 2164, 2204, 2207, 2209–2211, 2298, 2307, 2313, 2325, 2328–2334, 2337, 2339, 2340, 2342, 2345–2348, 2350, 2353–2373, 2386–2390, 2392, 2396, 2397, 2400, 2401, 2418–2421, 2428, 2430, 2432–2434, 2438–

Page
Japanese Army—Continued
2441, 2446, 2447, 2463, 2467, 2468, 2472, 2473, 2544, 2545, 4342, 4442, 4529, 4530, 4856, 4932, 4936, 4959, 5011, 5012, 5062, 5070, 5074, 5151, 5189, 5208, 5231, 5332.
Japanese Army Yangtzpoo Clearing Hospital 4133
Japanese Attorney General's Office (Special Investigation Bureau) 499
Japanese Broadcasting Co 614
Japanese Cabinet 367, 1018, 3850
Japanese Cabinet (Higashi-Kuni) 2166, 2299
Japanese-Chinese Relations 4219
Japanese Communist League 2468
Japanese Communist Party. (*See* Communist Party, Japan.)
Japanese Cooperative Societies Law 2234
Japanese Council, IPR. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Japanese Council.)
Japanese Diet 667, 1018, 1638, 2231, 2234, 2628
Japanese Emancipation League 2382, 2451, 2467, 2468
Japanese Emancipation League (Yenan) 5062
Japanese Embassy in London 3925, 3926
Japanese Embassy (Washington) 3589, 4961, 5145
Japanese Emperor. (*See* Hirohito.)
Japanese Expeditionary Force (China) 2363, 2366
Japanese Foreign Office 2682, 3681, 3682
Japanese General Staff 1869
Japanese Government ..... 360, 366, 372, 398, 499, 500, 503, 579, 613, 617, 645, 719, 722, 728, 733, 738, 739, 741, 1019, 1072, 1652, 1770, 1869, 1872, 2000, 2043, 2044, 2052, 2068, 2069, 2071, 2076, 2089, 2091, 2094, 2145, 2153, 2154, 2157, 2160, 2162, 2164, 2165, 2167, 2168, 2170, 2172–2176, 2208, 2226, 2229, 2231, 2235, 2283, 2285, 2299, 2301, 2306–2312, 2317, 2318, 2324–2334, 2337–2348, 2353–2377, 2380, 2383, 2386–2398, 2400, 2401, 2412, 2413, 2418–2422, 2429, 2431, 2446, 2447, 2463, 2503, 2516, 2519, 2520, 2544, 2546, 2550, 2555, 2557, 2634, 2679, 2708, 2784, 2847, 2982, 3011, 3048, 3054, 3112, 3113, 3114, 3119, 3135, 3137, 3138, 3139, 3173, 3187, 3188, 3194, 3202, 3217, 3266, 3269, 3274, 4184, 4929, 4931, 4935–4937, 4940–4942, 4959, 4964, 4968, 4970, 4971, 4979, 4981, 4982, 4999, 5000, 5007, 5008, 5014, 5021, 5025, 5026, 5062, 5066, 5069, 5071–5074, 5087–5089, 5108, 5130, 5164, 5174, 5176, 5177, 5185, 5189, 5190, 5215, 5218, 5222, 5223, 5231, 5233, 5240, 5258, 5275, 5298, 5663, 5709.
Japanese Holding Company Liquidating Commission 2225, 2229
Japanese House Of Peers 1216
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters 1869
Japanese Imperial Household 1872
Japanese Imperialist System 2374
Japanese Industrialists. (*See* Zaibatsu.)
Japanese Invasion (Manchuria, 1931) 2389
Japanese Itagaki Division 2463
Japanese Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1770, 1772
Japanese Liberal Party 1018
Japanese Lines (China) 2313, 2400, 2401, 2412, 2418, 2419
Japanese-Manchoukuo Troops 265, 2574, 2718
Japanese Ministry of Finance 2231
Japanese Monroe Doctrine 3137
Japanese Naval Base (Rashin) 2716
Japanese Naval Blockade 2679
Japanese Navy 355, 361, 379, 738, 1518, 2164, 2298, 2324, 2716, 2847, 4112, 4113, 4133, 4265, 4374, 5072, 5189, 5231, 5232
Japanese-Occupied Southeast Asia 4226
Japanese Oil Embargo 1987
Japanese Peace Society 411
Japanese Peace Treaty 919, 920, 1916
Japanese Police 366, 2370
Japanese Postal Savings System 2231
Japanese Prisoners of War (China) 2382
Japanese Progressive Party 1018
Japanese Public Library System 2792

Page
Japanese Puppet Central Reserve Bank Currency (Nanking Government) 2421
Japanese Puppet Federal Reserve Bank Currency (North China) 2421
Japanese Railways 2418–2420, 2425, 2447
Japanese School System 2168
Japanese Secret Service 371, 2164, 2298
Japanese Social Democratic Party 1018
Japanese South-Manchurian Railway 49
Japanese State Department 363, 367, 379
Japanese State Funds (Switzerland) 1770, 1772
Japanese State Property (Switzerland) 1771, 1772
Japanese Surrender Policy 2145, 2152–2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
Japanese Trade Unions 2468
Japanese in the United States 2581
Japanese Workers and Farmers School 2382, 2468
Japanophiles 2239
Japan's Emergence as a Modern State 3469
Japan's Foreign Relations (1542–1936) 2891
Japan's Place in the Modern World 3167
Japan's Policies and Purposes 3167
Japan's Red Flirtation 3705, 3706
Japan's War Hunger 2891
Jardine Matthewson Firm 1566
Jardine, R. J 5558, 5559
Java 3592
Jay, Augusta 4987, 4991
Jayson, Alice 4988, 4989, 4994
JCRR. (*See* Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction.)
JCS. (*See* Joint Chiefs of Staff.)
Jean, Sally Lucas 409, 410
Jebb, Sir Gladwyn 2849, 2850, 2860, 5484
Jeffe, S. S. (Joffe, S. S.) 2703
Jefferson Book Store 2243
Jefferson School 2243, 4614
Jefferson School Book Shop 3055, 3056, 3058, 3060, 3061, 3363, 3825, 3826
Jefferson School of Social Science 2540, 2747, 3055, 3056, 3058, 3060, 3061, 3825, 3829, 3832, 3833, 3835, 3843
Jefferson, Thomas 1287, 1606
Jehol 4700
J. E. N. (*See* Edmund O. Clubb)
Jenckes, Marcien 4692
Jen Chih-pin 2461
Jen Pi-shih (Zeng Pi-shu) 812, 2461, 2474
Jenkins, Mr 5299
Jenkins, Mrs 950
Jenkins, David R 3964, 5558–5559, 5701
Jenkins, Louise 4989, 4994, 5299
Jenkins, Shirley 376, 940, 996, 2248 2482, 2521, 2523, 2776, 3964, 4989, 5294, 5295, 5299, 5558, 5559
Jenkinson, Anthony 71, 658–662, 2642, 3543, 3794, 3903, 4077, 4100, 4336, 4807, 4958, 4979
Jenks. (*See* Anderson, Wrenn & Jenks.)
Jennings, W. Ivor 5558, 5559
Jenriche, Elsie 5414, 5415
Jenzen, David 5701
Jerome, V. J 554
Jervey, Huger W 5002
Jessup Commission 1075, 1293
Jessup, Dr. Philip C 32, 121–124, 150, 172–174, 177, 238, 315, 425, 431–433, 443, 444, 477, 495, 527, 528, 663, 670, 687, 712, 713, 768, 769, 844–847, 851, 852, 854–862, 864, 889–892, 896–899, 917–928, 932, 970, 971, 979, 985–989, 991–995, 1003, 1004, 1037–1039, 1046, 1054, 1056, 1059, 1062–1065, 1068, 1075, 1113, 1114, 1118, 1119, 1128–1134, 1137, 1138, 1145, 1216, 1219, 1227, 1228, 1247, 1253, 1255, 1258–1260, 1264–1266, 1269–1271, 1275–1277, 1290–1293, 1505, 1506, 1553, 1556, 1565, 1574, 1575, 1583, 1586, 1602, 1609, 1618, 1627, 1634,

Jessup, Dr. Philip C.—Continued Page
1650, 1657, 1660, 1668, 1672, 1674, 1761, 1833, 1925, 1933, 1934, 2104, 2476, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2500, 2511, 2518, 2533, 2585, 2623, 2626, 2727, 2746, 2794, 2809, 2810, 2811, 2831, 2868–2870, 2905, 3167, 3263, 3264, 3333, 3515, 3612, 3644, 3857, 3859, 3868, 3881, 3883, 3923, 3974, 3976, 3980, 3982, 3988, 3989, 4014, 4015, 4017, 4044, 4051–4053, 4074, 4087, 4092, 4097, 4099, 4100, 4109, 4121–4123, 4131, 4134–4136, 4143, 4227, 4228, 4532, 4533, 4535, 4536, 4770, 4800, 4834, 4918, 4938, 4943, 4973, 4976, 4984, 4999, 5002, 5003, 5014, 5016, 5023, 5031, 5045, 5054, 5058, 5059, 5079, 5085, 5183, 5186, 5189, 5195, 5197–5200, 5209, 5210, 5216, 5220, 5224, 5225, 5227, 5228, 5231, 5239, 5247, 5253, 5261, 5263, 5266, 5268, 5271, 5289, 5321, 5322, 5324, 5327, 5333, 5341, 5342, 5344, 5360, 5365, 5366, 5558, 5559, 5642, 5643, 5645–5647, 5703.
Jessup, Mrs. Philip C 409, 410, 3923
Jewish City Club Committee 3337
Jewish Joint Distribution Board 4260
Jiji Press (English Edition) 395
Jinnah, Mr 910, 4984, 5004, 5006, 5042, 5243
Jiyu Gakuin School (Tokyo) 4263
Joffe, Adolph Abramowicz 2318, 2319, 2461
Joffe, S. S 4499, 4508, 4560, 4561, 4567, 5384
Johns, Helen. (*See* Elizabeth Bentley.)
Johnansen, C. E 2789
Johns Hopkins University ..... 176, 251, 255, 300, 320, 326, 328, 330, 342, 343, 385, 474, 561, 570, 670, 707, 900, 927, 928, 996, 1136, 1220, 1237, 1551, 1738, 1766, 1982, 1983, 2145, 2146, 2517, 2589, 2834, 2900, 2901, 3037, 3083, 3084, 3107, 3191, 3198, 3211, 3215, 3218, 3242, 3250, 3266, 3368, 3389, 3404, 3423, 3430, 3442, 3448, 3454, 3490, 3509, 3510, 3522, 3552, 3557, 3558, 3563, 3567, 3580, 3581, 3582, 3585, 3588, 3590, 3636, 3638, 3641, 3642, 3924, 3957, 4104, 4111, 4119, 4136, 4294, 4296, 4331, 4339.
Johns, Orrick 4170, 4171, 4176, 4259
Johnson, Mr 753, 1672, 5423, 5680
Johnson Act 2673, 2676, 2677
Johnson, Alva 262
Johnson, Ambassador 5187
Johnson, Arnold 5675
Johnson, Charles S 2890, 5323
Johnson, Col. Dana 727
Johnson, Eugene I 5558, 5559
Johnson, Franklin R 4692
Johnson, Guy B 2876, 5558, 5559
Johnson, Hiram 2124, 2127
Johnson, James B 1106
Johnson, Joan 5701
Johnson, Joseph E 568
Johnson, Louis 1120
Johnson, Luther A 2835, 4977, 5049, 5053
Johnson, Nelson T 113, 582, 922, 2224, 2912, 3794, 4056, 4057, 5294, 5558, 5559
Johnson, Mrs. Nelson T 3794
Johnson, Representative 3406
Johnson, Robinson 262
Johnston, Bruce 5558, 5559
Johnston, Eric 494, 858, 859, 1400, 2809, 2834, 4898, 5558, 5559, 5703
Johnston, Reginald F 4271, 5558, 5559
Johnstone 5685
Johnstone, Anne Hartwell (Mrs. William C.) 996, 2248, 2831, 3310, 3794, 4129, 5199, 5261, 5263, 5264
Johnstone, William Crane (Bill) ..... 147, 148, 161, 440, 477, 938, 976, 980, 984, 990, 994, 996, 1313, 1680–1682, 1747, 1748, 1761, 1762, 1802, 2080, 2124, 2127, 2147, 2148, 2523, 2580, 2582, 2588, 2594, 2809, 2810, 2811, 2831, 3310, 3794, 3965, 3989, 4087, 4122, 4123, 4124, 4629, 4860–4862, 4988, 4989, 4994, 5048, 5049, 5051, 5053, 5061, 5062, 5089, 5261, 5284, 5301, 5558, 5559, 5648, 5684, 5701, 5711.

Page
Johnstone, William T 4911, 4984, 5016
Joint American and Indian Conference (New Delhi) 3632
Joint Army-Navy Exercises 2538
Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States) 382, 737, 782, 859, 1015–1017, 1021, 1023–1025, 1087, 1088, 1119, 1432, 1492, 1864, 1872, 1891, 2155, 2163, 2253, 2281, 2297, 2883, 2836, 2842, 3597, 3598, 3622, 3706.
Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) 1632–1633
Joint Intelligence Committee 1015, 1022
Joint Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities (Second Report of 1948 on Un-American Activities in the State of Washington) 2160–2162, 2183
Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs 3350
Joint Report of Chinese Journalists 4060
Joint Soviet-American Commission 2258
Joint Strategic Survey Committee 1015, 1021, 1022, 2836
Joint War Plans Committee 1023
Jonathan, Nelson T 721
Jones 5685
Jones, Arthur Creech 5027, 5334, 5528, 5529
Jones, Catesby 327, 3641–3643, 3961, 4456–4461, 4464–4472
Jones, E. Stanley 4116
Jones, F. C 5350, 5558, 5559, 5684
Jones, George E 5558, 5559
Jones, Jesse 1101, 1102, 1104, 1105, 2837
Jones, Joseph 441, 4960, 4964, 4969, 4972, 5070, 5558, 5559
Jones, Marvin 2836
Jones, Paul 4823, 4824, 4829, 4831
Jones, Stella 5558, 5559
Jones, S. Shepard 5701
Jonkinson, Anthony 5704
Jonns, Allen L 5701
Jordan, L. J 253, 2880
Jordan, Myra M 1108, 1314, 4992, 4994
Jorgensen, Arthur 5558, 5559
Jorgensen, Elizabeth 5111, 5558, 5559
Jorgenson, Miss 4075
Joseph, J. Julius 4719
Josephs, Devereux 5298, 5299
Josephs, Ray 5657
Josephson, Matthew 4259
Josephy, Robert 2659
Jouhaux 4234
Journal-American 619
Journal of American Surgeons 1647
Journal du Moscow 4482
Joxe 238, 5209
Joyce, James 5648, 5654
Judd, Charles H 4119
Judd, Rita 2789
Judd, Congressman Walter H 145, 1027, 1071, 1393, 1456, 2397, 2809, 2810, 3114, 3141, 3160, 3388, 3403, 3404, 3409, 3478, 3490, 3501, 3609, 3610, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5377.
Juggins, G. Elsworth 4983
Juikoff 3482
Julian 4829
Julius Rosenwald Fund (Chicago) 4977
Jung, Mr 1610, 4439
Jung, Wu-sheng 2405, 2461
JUSMAG 1579
Justice Department. (*See* United States Department of Justice.)

K

Kabir, Huamyan 5323
Kades, Charles L. (Colonel) 4184, 5415
Kafoid, Professor 4556

Page
Kahane, Rita ---- 4990, 4994
Kahin, Mr. George Mct ---- 327, 3961, 5560, 5561
Kahn, Albert ---- 3071, 3073, 3092, 4513
Kahn, Walter B ---- 5701
Kai Feng (Ho Ko-chuan) ---- 2403, 2404, 2457, 2459, 2461
Kaim, J. R ---- 5560, 5561
Kain, Richard Morgan ---- 5654
Kai-shek, Generalissimo Chiang ---- 12, 21, 29, 38, 49, 56, 57, 62, 67, 119, 125–130, 137, 148, 149, 156–158, 163, 168, 170, 193, 195, 213, 277, 325, 381, 382, 390, 436, 450, 451, 456, 457, 461, 462, 496, 529–531, 533, 551, 557, 561, 594, 596, 599, 600, 606, 610, 612, 614–617, 622, 623, 635, 637–639, 698, 701, 706, 731, 732, 771, 772, 775, 780–786, 792–808, 811, 812, 817, 822–825, 828, 839, 848, 851, 852, 866, 880, 923, 925, 927, 929, 933, 988, 992, 996, 1011–1015, 1017, 1021, 1023–1025, 1029–1031, 1045, 1047, 1049, 1058, 1064, 1067–1069, 1082–1085, 1087, 1091, 1093–1096, 1109, 1113, 1116, 1124, 1125, 1136, 1227, 1261, 1262, 1268, 1280, 1289, 1291, 1307, 1335–1338, 1346–1348, 1350, 1351, 1359–1364, 1366–1368, 1370–1375, 1382–1386, 1391–1393, 1395–1398, 1406–1408, 1410–1414, 1416–1418, 1425, 1429–1433, 1435, 1440–1445, 1447, 1450, 1456, 1457, 1460–1463, 1469, 1477, 1484, 1496, 1505, 1506, 1518, 1521, 1524, 1525, 1532, 1536, 1546, 1568, 1577, 1579, 1581, 1588, 1598, 1611, 1626, 1629, 1653, 1654, 1657, 1667, 1668, 1670, 1682.
Kai-shek, Madam Chiang ---- 435, 827, 1249, 1362, 1366, 1373, 1414–1416, 1478
Kaiser ---- 2809
Kaji, Ryuichi ---- 3167, 3168, 4351, 5560, 5561
Kaji, Wataru ---- 2467, 4184
Kalaw, Maximo M ---- 5560, 5561
Kaletsky, Michael ---- 4721
Kalgan Pass ---- 3709, 3710
Kalgan Press ---- 4418
Kalinin ---- 3484
Kallen, H. M ---- 5078, 5560, 5561
Kalvar, Mrs. Robert ---- 4277
Kamagar, Girni (Textile Union) ---- 2638
Kamanev ---- 2741
Kamchatka Joint Stock Co ---- 189, 3324, 3326, 4477, 4508, 4556
Kamehameha School ---- 4126
Kampai (Political Police) ---- 738
Kan, Shina ---- 5560, 5561
Kan, Ssu-ch'i ---- 2403, 2461
Kanai K ---- 5684
Kane, Albert E ---- 3794
Kang, Chen Chia ---- 4080
Kang-jih Chun-cheng Ta-hsueh (Anti-Japanese Military Academy) ---- 2433, 2438, 2463
Kang, Kao ---- 812
Kang, Ko-ching (Mrs. Chu Te) ---- 2457, 2461
Kang, Sang (Hsieh Kang-chih) ---- 2461
Kang, Sheng (Kang Sin) ---- 812, 2329, 2403–2405, 2461, 2462
Kang, Sin (Kang Sheng) ---- 2329, 2403–2405, 2461, 2462
Kang, Younghill ---- 5321
Kanner, David ---- 3337
Kansu Corridor ---- 2374
Kansu Province ---- 2384
Kansu Soviet (Military Department) ---- 2459
Kansu Warlords ---- 2459
Kantorovich, Mr. Anatole J ---- 190, 2608, 2609, 2700, 2708, 2709, 2715, 3173, 3174, 3927, 3928, 3930, 3934, 4108, 4489, 4490, 4499–4502, 4516, 4561, 4562, 4567–4569, 4575, 5083, 5126–5129, 5132, 5134, 5136–5140, 5178, 5560, 5561
Kao, Chung-shan (Kao Tsung-Shan) ---- 2405, 2461, 2462
Kao, Kang ---- 812, 2403–2405, 2461
Kao, Kuei-tze ---- 2345
Kao, Lang-ting ---- 2405, 2462

Page
Kao, Su-hsien 2405, 2462
Kao, Tsung-shan (Kao Chung-shan) 2405, 2461, 2462
Kao, Tzu-li 2403, 2405, 2462
Kano, R 4963
Kanta, K. A. Nila 5560, 5561
Kapitsa, Peter L 3620, 3621
Kaplan 5688
Kaplan, Dorothy (Mrs. Irving) 4754, 4758
Kaplan, Irving 4629, 4636, 4647, 4648, 4652–4656, 4658, 4671, 4672, 4735, 4737–4761, 4756, 4781, 4782
Kaplan, Jenni 4740
Kaplan, Morris 4740
Karachi Embassy (Afghanistan) 3219
Karakhan, Commissar 5122, 5501
Karakhan, Mr 4522–4524, 4529, 4583
Karakhan, Leo (Leo Mikhailovich) 2319, 2462
Kara-Murza, Mr 4516–4518, 4884
Karavaev, A. A 4506, 4508
Karig, Walter Patrick 5654
Karr, David 3369
Karst, Eugene 5295
Karunakaran, K. P 5560, 5561
Kasenkina, Mrs. Oksana S 3536
Kashi, Tomohaiko 363
Kass, Rudolph 3812
Katayama 2468
Kate 320, 321
Kates, Beatrice 410, 427, 1513
Kato, Kanju 4143, 4183
Katsuyo, Mrs. Takeshita 499
Kattenburg, Paul M 2482, 4018, 4019, 5560, 5561
Kauffman, George 4259
Kaufman, James Lee 721, 722, 2223, 2224
Kaufman, Milton 4117
Kaufmann, Felix 5367
Kaun, Prof. Alexander 4259
Kawagoo 4151, 4213
Kawai, Dr 4127
Kawei, Kazuo 5560, 5561
Kawai, Teitchi (*see also* Mrs. Max Klausen) 355, 367, 369, 383, 4127
Kawakami, K. K 5560, 5561
Kawata, George 4991, 4992, 4994
Kayser 4234, 4236
Kazak Rebellion (1943) 2374, 2384, 2389, 2392
Kazakevich, Vladimir 441
Kazakh Republic 3460, 3463, 3464
Kazaniev, V 5274, 5275
Kearney, Bernard W 4863
Kechtunan, Professor 2710
Keenan, Joseph D 640
Keene, Mrs 3488
Keeney, Mrs. Mary Jane (Mrs. Philip O. Keeney) 2521, 2773–2780, 2791, 3545, 3775, 3964, 4389, 4394, 4396, 4397, 4643, 5701
Keeney, Philip Olin 2789, 2791, 2794, 2986, 3545, 3775, 4165, 4166, 4182, 4183, 4388, 4394, 4396, 4397, 4610, 5560, 5561
Keenleyside, Hugh L 472, 5259, 5270, 5560, 5561
Keeny, S. M 5268
Keesing 4997, 5003, 5289, 5685
Keesing, Mr. Felix M 319, 321, 976, 996, 1220, 1222, 2809, 3907, 3909, 5560, 5561, 5684
Keesing, Mrs. Felix M 3907, 3909
Keesing, Marie 5560, 5561
Keeton, G. W 5684
Kefauver, Senator Estes 4428, 5337, 5352
Kefauver, Grayson N 5040
Keia University 2468

Page
Keil, Dorothea 4990, 4994
Keir Hardeians 2315
Keitel, Mr 4440
Keith, Mrs. Agnes 5654
Keliher, Alice V 3794
Keller, Arthur S 5560, 5561, 5701
Kellner, Rev. Henry 3630
Kellogg, Helen 4987
Kellogg Pact 2389
Kelly, Fred C 4259
Kelly, Helen G 5560, 5561
Kelly & Walsh, Ltd 4150
Kemenov 2592, 3313, 3314
Kemp, Maude 1513
Ken, George 5560, 5561
Kendall, John W 5701
Kenkyusha 5022
Kennan, George F 925, 926, 973, 1050–1052, 1128, 1129, 1272, 1504, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1560–1565, 1577, 1583, 1585, 1587, 1592, 1673, 2515, 3000, 3010, 3011, 3048, 3076, 3986, 3987, 3990, 3995, 3996, 4841, 4944, 5314.
Kennard, J. Spencer 2789, 5062
Kennecott Copper 100
Kennedy 305
Kennedy, Bernice 4990, 4994
Kennedy, Dr 1739, 1765, 1931, 1965
Kennedy, George 475, 3470, 5111, 5229, 5560, 5561
Kennedy, Capt. Malcolm D 2891
Kennedy, Ray 3971
Kennedy, Raymond 4893, 4944, 5560, 5561
Kennedy, Van Dusen 2659
Kennedy, W. P. M 5562, 5563
Kent, P. H. B 5562, 5563
Kent, Rockwell 2657, 2659, 4116, 4259
Kentucky University 475
Kepner, Tyler 2585
Keppel, Frederick P 264, 1219, 1227, 2831, 5085, 5123, 5181, 5261
Kerensky, Alexander 566, 603, 962
Kerner 4226
Kerner, Robert J 1222, 2981, 5032, 5058, 5186, 5562, 5563
Kerner, William 56
Kernpictai (gendarmerie) 395
Kerr, Mr 5708
Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark 2248, 3931, 5190
Kerr Committee 4239–4246
Kerr, George H 392–394, 4984, 5001, 5002, 5562, 5563
Kerr, Mrs. Isadora W 4277
Kerr, John H 890, 4244, 4245, 5047
Kerr, John R 172, 173, 176, 177
Kerr, Philip 5349
Kessler, Colonel 154
Kesting 375
Keswick 5233
Kewanee Manufacturing Co 2639
Key Economic Areas in Chinese History 3138, 3165, 3594
Keynes, J. M 5367
Kfare, Louis 3336
KGEI (San Francisco) 2787
Khabarovsk (Russia) 4589
Khabarovsk Territorial Executive Committee 1327
Khan, Genghis 4899
Khan, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah 1216, 5334
Khmelnitskaya, Mr 4588, 4589
Kholokhoze 4556
Khorezm 4593
Kiangsi 3292, 3306

Page
Kiangsi-Anhwei Border 2473
Kiangsi Communists 2460
Kiangsi-Fukien Border Area 2325, 2326
Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government 2324
Kiangsi Soviet 2455
Kinagsu Bureau of Organization 2454
Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhui Area 2333
Kiangsu Province 2419, 2455
Kiaotsi 4061
Kibbey, Bessie J 5295, 5701
Kido, Marquis Koichi 4267
Kiendl. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Kilner, E. B 712
Kilpatrick, Mary J 4992, 4994
Kilpatrick, William H 1219, 4037
Kim, Yougjeung 5062, 5562, 5563
Kimball, Dan A 671, 672, 4810
Kimoto, Jack Dinichi 3341
Kimura, Shoji 4443
Kindelberger, Charles 2832
Kindersley, Sir Robert 3694
King Edward (England) 3140, 3248
King, Admiral Ernest J 1492, 1530, 1547, 2181
King, P. S 4587
King, P. Z 5344, 5361
King, Prime Minister 2674, 2832
King, T. P 143
King, William (Prussia) 3224
Kingsbury, John A 2659, 4091, 4145, 4259
Kingsland, R 5562, 5563
Kingsley, J. Donald 4724
Kinkead, Beatrice 4259
Kinkead, Robin 3545
Kinney 265
Kinger, Robert 603
Kiralfy, Alexander 5562, 5563
Kirby, E. Stuart 1222, 5562, 5563
Kirchwey, Fread 620
Kirghiz 3463
Kirk, Alexander C 893, 894
Kirk, Grayson 494, 858, 859, 970, 996, 1220, 2809, 2811, 4999, 5002, 5053, 5365, 5562, 5563, 5703
Kirkland, James R 4902
Kirkpatrick, Paul H 4904, 5040
Kirov 297
Kirstein, Lincoln E 4259
Kishi, Shinsuke 4268
Kislova, Miss 3484, 3487
Kisselev, Eugene D 3313, 5032, 5057
Kitadai, S 5026, 5027
Kittridge 5208
Kittredge, Mr 238
Kittredge, Mrs 3932
Kiukiang 4132, 4133
Kiukiang Army Hospital 4133
Kiyaba, Hiroyo 4990, 4994
Kiying 2389
Kizer, Benjamin H 115, 122, 264, 266, 425, 426, 443, 444, 494, 567–578, 713, 857–860, 900, 921, 933, 979, 1147, 1219, 1261, 1262, 1275, 1278, 1281, 1400, 1551, 1568, 1579, 1595, 1607, 1614, 1625, 1626, 1640, 1659, 1668, 2511, 2581, 2622, 2809, 2810, 2819, 3199, 3545, 3612 3645, 3859, 3868, 3896, 3904, 3905, 4044, 4092, 4109, 4134, 4143, 4330, 4835, 4859–4862, 4944, 4958, 4973, 4975–4977, 5184, 5186, 5286, 5314, 5323, 5562, 5563, 5685.
Kizer, Carolyn A 266, 989, 996, 2523, 4989, 4994

Page
Kizer & Graves (Spokane) 1219
Klausen, Max 355, 370–372, 380, 381, 383, 500, 501, 507–509
Klausen, Mrs. Max (*see also* Teikichi Kawai) 367, 369, 383
Klecki, Michael 4649, 4650, 4653
Kleidmann, R 3337
Klein, Alfred 3514
Klein, Mildred 4988, 3989, 3994
Kleinman, I 3337
Klemova, Mr 4555
Klien, Dr. Isadore 1513
Klineberg, Otto 5562, 5563
Kluckhohn, Clyde 342
Kluckhohn Russian Institute 5454, 5457
Klueva, Mrs. V. N 4508, 4509
KMT. (*See* Chinese National Party.)
Knight 5085
Knight, Felix 1104
Knight, Frank H 4119
Knight, M. M 5562, 5563
Knight, Max 4823, 4824
Kniper, F. B. J 5562, 5563
Knopf, Alfred A 349, 473, 474, 655, 1167, 1239, 2481, 5661
Knorr, K. E 5562, 5563
Know Your Enemy—Japan 2580, 3882
Knowland, William F 2237, 3029, 3038–3040, 3044–3046, 3330, 3668, 4927, 4944, 5364, 5377
Knowles, Col. Kenneth 1108, 1314
Knox 446
Knox, Miss Lucy 2719, 2720, 3906, 3907
Knox, Secretary 4975, 4976
Ko, Siang-Feng 5562, 5563
Kobe, Japan 4134
Kober, Arthur 2659, 4259
Koblenhavn, Gyldenal 4591
Kobulov, A. Z 1328
Kodama, Count Hideo 4268
Koerber, Lenka Von 3167
Koestler, Arthur 5651
Kohlberg, Alfred 46, 74, 712, 923, 974–978, 1203, 1204, 1228, 1229, 1313, 1344, 1345, 1387, 1445, 1455, 1457, 1458, 1471, 1480, 2690, 2981, 3037, 3042, 3054, 3106, 3277, 3752–3754, 3920, 4933–4935, 4938, 4944, 5023, 5078, 5286, 5287, 5289, 5337, 5343–5345, 5359, 5360, 5366, 5367.
Kohler, Foy D 4350, 4351
Koide, Teiji 3297
Koike (Atsunosuke) 4263
Koiso Cabinet (Japan) 4266–4268
Koiso, General 4268, 4269
Kok, Gerard P 4990, 4994
Koketuy (Blue Banner) Periodical 4418
Koksovaret 1317
Kokusai Hotel (Seishin) 2716, 2717
Kokusai, Tshuhin. (*See* International Correspondence.)
Kolar, Mrs. Julia Church 4275, 4277
Kolb, Albert 5562, 5563
Kolchak, Admiral 5075, 5145
Kolokoff 5045
Kolossen Asien 4591
Kolyma, Road (Russia) 1323
Komorowski, Conrad 4274, 4277
Komsomol Pravda 4508
Komsomols. (*See* Communist Party.)
Kondapi, E 5562, 5563
Konijn, H. S 5701
Konoye Cabinet 279, 363, 366, 367, 379, 381, 382, 501–504, 506, 2716, 4092
Konoye, Prince Fumimore 2717, 4267, 5233, 5249, 5348
Konoye, Prince. (*See* Konoye Cabinet.)

Page
Koo, T. Z. 5280, 5284, 5705–5709
Koo, Ambassador Wellington 2256, 2716, 2859
Koo-sek, Kim 1769, 1880
Korea 2482, 2580, 3405, 3433, 3622, 3679, 3703, 3704, 3706, 3758, 3811, 3837, 3851, 3946, 3986, 3987, 3993–3996, 3999, 4000, 4053, 4129, 4148, 4207, 4217, 4226, 4269, 4272, 4281, 4519, 4536, 4538, 4574, 4711, 4767, 4871, 4876, 4893, 5308, 5315, 5316, 5318, 5321, 5327, 5340, 5348, 5375, 5394, 5396, 5412, 5453.
Korea, North 5389, 5390, 5392, 5394
Korea, South 5389, 5390, 5394
Korean Army 1581
Korean Commission 1920
Korean Crisis and the United States 2482, 2556
Korean Government 1769, 1770, 1916
Korean Military Government 2249, 2250
Korean War 1959, 2557, 2821, 3664, 3968, 3981, 4000, 4001
Korn, Capt. V. E 2836
Korneichuk, Alexander 3620, 3621
Kornfeder, Joseph Zack 864–896
Kornfetter, Mr 4785
Koron, Chuo 5000
Koshiro 369
Koshland, Daniel E 4944
Kournakoff, Sergei 71, 3545, 5346
Kovanolov 170–172, 178
Kowloon 3910
Kraal, Johanna Felhoen 5562, 5563
Kracke, Edward A., Jr 3964
Krader, Lawrence 5562, 5563
Kramer, Aaron 3061, 3841
Kramer, Charles 441, 442, 2799, 2800, 2803, 2875, 4678, 4722, 4737, 4752, 4755
Kramer, Sonia 4990, 4994
Kraemer, H 5562, 5563
Kransky, Ferdinand 4752
Krasavtsev, Mr 2712, 3486, 4562, 4570
Krasnoiarsk 191
Krasnow, Beatrice 4989, 4994
Kravchenko, Victor 3365, 3499
Kravel, Professor 3318, 3486
Kreger, Dorothy 4463
Kremlin 128, 131, 178, 202, 209, 297, 308, 309, 782, 783, 799, 804, 805, 834, 887, 907, 914, 916, 919, 920, 1009, 1051, 1532, 1562, 1564, 1584, 1611, 1613, 1650, 1656, 1731, 2332, 2387, 2498, 2867, 2915, 2919, 3098, 3113, 3114, 3134, 3224, 3333, 3357, 3405, 3500, 4506, 4569, 5314.
Krentz, Kenneth 5452
Kreps, Theodore J 5562, 5563, 5684
Krevitsky, Charles. (*See* Kramer, Charles.)
Kreymborg, Alfred 4259
Krichbaum, Philip E 5701
Krivitsky, General 4136, 4784
Krivitsky, Charles 2803, 2875
Krivitsky, Gen. Walter 206–212, 217, 218, 234, 1218, 3102, 3486
Kroeber, A. L 5564, 5565
Krog 5302
Kroner, Hayes A 2836
Krupskaya 4503
Krushinitsky 2730
Krotov, Ivan 5270
Krug, Secretary 5288, 5291, 5292
Ku, Cheng-lun (Bloody Ku) 2291
Ku, General Cho-tung 2631
Ku, Chu-tung 2351, 2352

Page
Ku Klux Klan 2340, 2683
Ku, Po 5381, 5420, 5421, 5423
Kuan, Hsiang-ying 2404, 2462
Kuan Wen-wei 2462
Kubanin 4506, 4508
Kublin, Hyman 5564, 5565
Kubota, Miko 4273, 4277
Kuchymov, V 4883
Kuei, Po 4701
Kuffman, James Lee 1885
Kuhn, Mrs. Irene 377, 399
Kulak Resistance 2328
Kuliabko 4497, 4504, 4505, 4509
Kulik (Marshal) 4481
Kulin Cotton Producing District 2424
Kuling, China 3788, 4151
Kullak 2720
Kullgren, John F 4423, 5701
Kung, Dr 5017, 5193, 5203, 5211, 5233
Kung Group 1415–1417, 1441, 1629, 1816, 2292
Kung, H. H 12, 13, 15, 16, 85, 91, 139, 825, 1094, 1441, 1698, 1699, 1725, 2334, 3737, 3791, 3874, 3939, 4320, 4687, 5341, 5424, 5710.
Kung, Madam H. H 1414–1417, 2078, 2292, 3551, 5211
Kung, Ho-chung 2341
Kung-Nung Kang-jih Chun (Workers and Farmers Anti-Japanese Army) 2462
Kung, P'eng 3549, 3550
Kung, Yin-Pin 93, 104
Kungchantang 3608
Kuni 739
Kunming 3658, 3806, 3916, 3936, 3939, 4768, 4771, 4773, 5342, 5357, 5408
Kunming (American Consulate) 3658
Kunming Cable 3625, 3659
Kunming Embassy 1969, 1970, 1987
Kunzru, Hriday Nath 5027, 5322, 5323
Kunzru, Pandit H. N 1216, 2124
Kuo, Mr 39
Kuo, Mrs. Moh Rio 1514
Kuo, Mojo 2454, 4879
Kuo, Ping-chia 5564, 5565
Kuo Shu-chung 2462
Kuo, Yen-ti 5564, 5565
Kuomintang. (*See* Chinese National Party.)
Kuomintang Honan Provincial 2460
Kuomintang Armies 2307, 2310, 2311, 2319, 2320, 2322–2327, 2330–2333, 2337, 2340–2343, 2345–2348, 2350–2353, 2356–2359, 2361, 2362, 2371, 2372, 2374, 2383, 2386, 2387, 2392, 2393–2397, 2418, 2438, 2441–2443, 2445, 2447, 2455, 2457, 2460, 2463, 2469.
Kuomintang Blockade 1992, 1993, 2345, 2445
Kuomintang Central Executive Committee 2321, 2355
Kuomintang Central Political Council 2326, 2341, 2342, 2345, 2350
Kuomintang-Communist Civil War (1927–36) 2321–2326
Kuomintang-Communist discussions (1944) 2464
Kuomintang-Communist split (1927) 2387, 2390, 2464, 2469, 2473
Kuomintang Communist Relations 3800
Kuomintang-Communist United Front 2457, 2467
Kuomintang Congress 2316, 2343, 2394, 2397
Kuomintang Demands 3800
Kuomintang Doctrine 2317
Kuomintang Executive Committee (Shanghai) 2467
Kuomintang Fourth Army (Ironsides of Chang Fa-kuei) 2463
Kuomintang Massacres 2322, 2323
Kuomintang Military Committee (Leftist) 2455

Page

Kuomintang Government (National Peoples Party) 12, 13, 55–57, 61, 62, 130, 163, 165–167, 213, 214, 308, 348, 351, 455, 458, 460, 461, 464–466, 476, 532, 538, 596, 599, 600, 610, 612–615, 635, 636, 638–651, 654–656, 658, 698, 706, 707, 711, 772, 780–797, 800, 805, 806, 808–827, 866, 877, 879, 880, 886, 917, 989, 991 1030, 1056, 1083, 1085, 1086, 1090, 1093, 1094, 1097, 1197, 1227, 1239, 1345, 1348, 1377, 1383, 1385, 1386, 1394–1398, 1406, 1408, 1410, 1414–1417, 1440–1442, 1444, 1462, 1484, 1485, 1524, 1525, 1566, 1573, 1578, 1590, 1596, 1600, 1631, 1632, 1640, 1651, 1656, 1657, 1667, 1712, 1724, 1725, 1790–1792, 1916, 1955–1957, 1988, 1990, 1992–1994, 2010, 2011, 2016, 2039–2044, 2048, 2049, 2052, 2062, 2082, 2186 2218, 2288, 2292, 2306–2308, 2311–2365, 2367–2402, 2415, 2418–2422, 2426, 2433, 2436, 2442, 2443, 2451–2460, 2463–2470, 2501, 2502, 2514, 2516, 2525, 2532, 2541–2443, 2548–2557, 2631, 2639, 2693, 2719, 2990, 2995, 3027, 3033, 3134, 3182–3186, 3307, 3337, 3411, 3476, 3498, 3502, 3535, 3536, 3538, 3540–3542, 3586, 3595, 3596, 3623, 3627, 3628, 3683, 3684, 3705.
Kuomintang Party (KMT) 3737, 3755, 3782, 3783, 3802, 3803, 3809, 3814, 3815, 3836, 3931, 3939
Kuomintang Party Congress (1924) 2319
Kuomintang Secret Service 2467
Kuomintang Sixth National Congress 2397
Kuomintang-Soviet-Chinese Communist Alliance 2551
Kuomintang-Soviet Entente Cordiale 2461
Kuomintang Twentieth Army 2457
Kuo-wen Weekly 4885
Kurihara, Kenneth K 2581, 5564, 5565, 5684
Kurile Islands 3007, 3324, 3326
Kuroda, Rev. Andrew Y 499, 748, 752, 5564, 5565
Kurovia 5155
Kurt 4822
Kushinsky, Morris 3336
Kuznetzov 4829
Kwang Hwa Tuen (shop) 2421
Kwangsi-Kweichew Railway 2387
Kwangsi-Kwangtung (Southwest Military Group) 2341
Kwangsi Military Clique 2329, 2355, 2396
Kwangtung 4131
Kwangtung Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps 3249
Kwangtung Army 509, 616, 4134, 4267
Kwangtung Army (Japanese) 3698, 3710
Kwangtung East River Fight 2455
Kwangtung Gendarmerie 2473
Kwangtung Government 2464
Kwangtung Guerrilla Corps 2090, 2187, 2206
Kwangtung Military School 2473
Kwangtung Peoples Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps 2471
Kwangtung People's Militia 1441
Kwangtung Province 2473, 4700, 4701
Kwangtung Province Bases 2432
Kwangtung Provincial Army 2473
Kweichow 4068, 4686
Kweilin 2790, 3791, 3936, 3937, 3939
Kwong, Victor 4870
Kyodo News Agency (Japan) 1216
Kyoto Conference 11
Kyoto Imperial University 4263
Kyuichi, Tokuda. *(See* Tokuda, Kyuichi.)
Kyushu (Nagaski Region) 4149

L

Labarca, Carlos Contreros 4080
Labor Advocate:
Racine 2665
Tacoma 2665
Labor Age 2665

Page
Labor in China 2581
Labor Committee (House) 515
Labor Congress (Mexico) 5179
Labor Herald 2665
Labor Heroes 2416
Labor Journal 2665
Labor Leader 2665
Labor-Management Charter 608
Labor Monthly (London) 684
Labor in Nationalist China 2266
Labor in Nationalist China, 1945–48 4306
Labor Party (British) 1267, 3373
Labor in the Philippines 2581
Labor Research Association 3061
Labor Sports Union 3336, 3337
Labor Unity 2665
Labor Youth League 3059, 3058, 3061, 3846
Labour-Progressive Party 1000, 1001
Lacam, Guy 668, 5684
Lachatanere, Romolo 4136
Ladd, Milton 4316
Ladejinsky, Wolf 477, 4263, 4982
Lader, Lawrence 5564, 5565
Lafayette 636
Lafayette College 5662
LaFollette, Charles M 1539
La Guarida, Fiorella Henry 297, 3070, 4738–4732, 5657
Lahey Clinic in Boston 3767
Lai, Chuan-chiu 2404, 2448, 2462
Laidler, Harry 5564, 5565
Laisve 2665
Lamb, Beatrice P 5323
Lamb, Edward 4259
Lamb, Mrs. Helen B 3967, 5701
Lamb, L. H 5566, 5567
Lamb, Robert 5112
Lambie, Margaret 5701
Lampell, Millard 4724
Lamont, Corliss 72, 159, 160, 162, 168, 267, 268, 296, 300, 573, 574, 673, 674, 687, 836–838, 2657, 2659, 2881, 2882, 3060, 3359, 3360, 3396, 3415, 3545, 4036, 4089, 4105, 4170, 4171, 4259, 5274, 5282, 5337, 5346, 5564, 5565, 5645.
Lamont, Margaret L 4259
Lamont, Thomas W 9, 159, 170, 836–838, 1151, 1217, 1219, 2677, 4280, 3353, 3354, 3359–3365, 3372–3376, 3378, 3380–3382, 3390, 3391, 3394–3397, 3402, 3417, 3497, 5346, 5357.
Lamont, Mrs. Thomas W 1217
Lamott, Willis Church 668, 5674
Lan Ping. (*See* Mrs. Mao Tse-tung.)
Lancaster, William W 687, 2518, 2566, 4091, 4155, 5183, 5199, 5269, 5270, 5298, 5299
Lanchow, China 4432, 4442
Land Down Under 3943
Land and Sea and the Destiny of Japan 3194
Land of the Soviets 2652, 2653, 3896, 3941–3944
Landau, Frances P 4922, 4994
Landau, Jocob 3035
Landhier, Bartholomew 5564, 5565
Landis, James M 4834
Landon, Mr 319, 321, 450, 2913
Landon, Governor 5165
Landon, Kenneth Perry 2248, 2624, 2653, 5564, 5565, 5684
Landres, Mrs. Rose W 264, 3859, 3869, 4988
Landreth, Helen 5657

Page
Landy, J 3337
Lane, Clayton 346, 474, 568, 837, 838, 911, 1168, 1173, 1175, 1176, 1187, 1188, 1219, 2494, 2518, 2519, 2651, 2552, 3878, 3894, 3982, 4034, 4991, 4994, 5023–5025, 5273, 5274, 5299, 5302, 5689.
Lane, Robert P 4959
Lang 5685
Lang, Olga 72, 269, 270, 682, 3126, 3128, 3545, 3793, 4231, 4611, 4612, 4623, 4624, 4859, 5287, 5564, 5565, 5651
Langer, Paul 1222, 4888, 5566, 5567
Langer, Senator William 3070, 5116
Langdon, William R 2717
Langevin, Paul 4089
Lanham, Buck 5090
Lankes, J. J 4259
Lanphier, Col. Thomas G 2836
Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1919 3691
Lapham 5152
Lapham, Lewis L 1219, 4944
Lapham, Roger 1505, 1666, 4532, 5315
Lapie, M 4985
Lapie, Pierre Olivier 5564, 5565
LaPierre, Richard T 5564, 5565
Lapin, Adam 602, 1100
Lapwood, Ralph 5368
Lardner, Ring W 2659
Larken, E. T 5566, 5567
Larkin, Oliver 4089
La Roche, Jean de 5596, 5597
Larry 2116
Larsen, Emmanuel Sigurd 3964, 4842, 4846, 5701
Larsen, Harold W 5566, 5567
Larson 2978
Larson, Ed 1038
Larson, Roy 1393
Lash, James F 3264 5243
Lash, Joseph 1514, 4073, 4116
Lasker, Bruno 8, 250, 287, 571, 864, 945, 996, 2523, 2580, 2595, 2611, 2707, 2708, 2720, 2886, 3167, 3168, 3592, 3593, 3884, 3907, 4075, 4102, 4129, 4859, 4861, 4958, 4987–4989, 4994, 5064, 5078, 5119, 5120, 5131, 5132, 5182, 5225, 5564, 5565 5648, 5704.
Lasker, Gabriel 5564, 5565
Laski, Professor 4261
Laski, Harold 5179
Lasky, Victor 1294, 1295, 2240, 2897
Lasser, David 4116
Lasswell, Mr. Harold 40, 3967, 4834, 5174, 5358
Last Chance in China 3669
Latin America 4118, 4737
Latin-American Republic 4070
Latin-American Section (OSS) 419
Latourette, Kenneth S 2891, 3971, 3972, 4108, 4834, 4944, 5336, 5564, 5565, 5661, 5664, 5684
Lattimer, Murray 4630, 4641, 4642, 4674, 4675, 4735, 4636
Lattimore, David 3194, 3266, 3340, 3601, 4422, 4866, 5564, 5565
Lattimore, Eleanor Holgate (Mrs. Owen J.) 864, 886, 888, 951–953, 996, 1142, 1143, 1203, 1210, 1227, 1233, 1298, 1300, 1306, 1307, 1309–1312, 1319, 1400, 1738, 1740, 1785, 2115–2120, 2145, 2147, 2482, 2513, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2692, 2776, 2898, 2901, 3065–3068, 3259, 3282, 3283, 3312, 3315–3517, 3533, 3552, 3560, 3561, 3564, 3584, 3590, 3599, 3607, 3617, 3641, 3646, 3654, 3793, 3819, 3943, 3979, 3983, 4002, 4358, 4359, 4361, 4369–4371, 4375, 4376, 4378, 4379, 4382, 4389, 4392, 4395, 4396, 4399, 4422, 4455–4466, 4469–4472, 4477, 4526, 4681, 4682, 4692, 4830, 4844, 4867, 4984, 4989, 4994, 5018, 5061, 5119, 5286, 5295, 5310, 5312, 5564, 5565, 5647–5652, 5657, 5660, 5662, 5697.

Page
Lattimore, Margaret 5566, 5567
Lattimore, Owen J 19–21, 24, 26, 29–31, 35–39, 42, 47, 57–63, 66–69, 72, 107–109, 112, 115, 120, 121, 147, 148, 150, 151, 156–161, 168, 173, 176, 177, 179, 182, 200–204, 208–215, 217–221, 250, 251, 253–255, 270, 277, 278, 281, 287–291, 301–311, 314, 319, 320, 325–335, 339, 340, 373–375, 378, 382, 385, 386, 390, 414, 415, 424, 425, 433, 439, 454, 455, 458–460, 462, 465, 472–478, 481, 483, 494, 521–526, 529, 549, 558, 560–563, 568–570, 578, 583, 584, 624, 625, 627, 654, 655, 657, 658, 669, 670, 678, 679, 685, 688, 689, 696, 704, 705, 707, 711, 713–716, 720, 723–726, 730, 731, 750–752, 838, 839, 858–860, 888, 900, 912–915, 919–923, 925–928, 931–933, 938, 951, 963, 967, 970, 979, 988, 989, 991–994, 996, 1003, 1004, 1010–1017, 1019–1021, 1025, 1027–1029, 1044–1047, 1049, 1050, 1054, 1060–1063, 1066, 1067, 1069–1071, 1075, 1076, 1079, 1085, 1107, 1108, 1114, 1118, 1119, 1123, 1130 1131, 1133–1136, 1147, 1177, 1188, 1192, 1197, 1203, 1210, 1219, 1227, 1228, 1233, 1235, 1237, 1239, 1252, 1253, 1255, 1261, 1262, 1264, 1266, 1270, 1272, 1278, 1289, 1291, 1305, 1312–1314, 1320, 1323–1328, 1331, 1332, 1342, 1344, 1345, 1357, 1360, 1363, 1364, 1379–1382, 1390, 1400, 1427, 1445, 1456, 1457, 1479, 1480, 1551, 1561, 1563, 1572, 1578, 1590, 1592, 1593, 1600, 1610, 1611, 1613, 1615, 1619, 1622, 1624, 1662, 1668, 1676, 1679, 1680, 1737, 1738, 1740–1744, 1747, 1764–1768, 1778, 1783, 1785, 1802, 1805, 1806, 1809–1811, 1815, 1820, 1824, 1825, 1828, 1838, 1847, 1849, 1855, 1911, 1916, 1925, 1926, 1929–1933, 1935–1937, 1940–1943, 1947, 1948, 1951–1954, 1958–1960, 1963–1971, 1978, 1980–1983, 1985–1987, 2003, 2028–2030, 2063, 2075, 2076, 2080, 2081, 2083–2085, 2115, 2117–2120, 2145, 2147, 2150, 2222, 2245–2248, 2266, 2287, 2476, 2482, 2497, 2512–2518, 2522, 2532, 2582, 2588–2590, 2608, 2622, 2702, 2703, 2711, 2712, 2717–2722, 2724–2726, 2730, 2735, 2749, 2794, 2810, 2812, 2877, 2880, 2892, 2897–3275, 3277–3714, 3718–3720, 3727–3729, 3741, 3753, 3793, 3818–3822, 3829–3831, 3877, 3880, 3899, 3907, 3909, 3923, 3950, 3952, 3955, 3958–3960, 3965, 3966, 3978, 3979, 3982–3984, 4001, 4005, 4009, 4012–4017, 4027–4030, 4048, 4059, 4068, 4082, 4086, 4087, 4100, 4103, 4104, 4106, 4109–4111, 4123, 4124, 4136, 4150, 4161, 4195, 4206, 4208, 4210, 4212, 4213, 4218, 4219, 4264, 4265, 4270, 4280, 4296, 4301–4304, 4331, 4353, 4355, 4358–4365, 4369–4390, 4392, 4393, 4395, 4396, 4399, 4416, 4418, 4420–4431, 4435, 4436, 4456–4458, 4461, 4462, 4465–4472, 4475–4477, 4501, 4516–4519, 4522–4530, 4544–4546, 4554, 4555, 4562–4566, 4570–4575, 4582, 4590, 4591, 4630–4637, 4681–4683, 4692, 4739, 4779, 4807, 4815, 4816, 4820, 4823, 4824, 4830, 4831, 4833–4836, 4844, 4851, 4852, 4859–4862, 4867, 4871, 4893, 4894, 4896–4898, 4900, 4933–4935, 4941, 4944, 4958, 4963, 4968, 4987, 5000, 5008, 5010, 5018, 5023, 5024, 5032, 5062, 5079, 5080, 5084, 5085, 5111–5114, 5118–5120, 5132, 5136, 5148, 5149, 5163, 5168, 5173, 5178, 5181, 5882, 5185, 5187, 5188, 5190, 5192, 5193, 5197, 5198, 5204, 5207, 5214, 5215, 5218–5221, 5225, 5228–5230, 5241, 5243, 5249, 5253, 5254, 5268, 5271, 5274, 5275, 5277, 5278, 5281, 5289, 5300, 5301, 5305–5313, 5317, 5323, 5329, 5337, 5341, 5352, 5358, 5365, 5427, 5566, 5567, 5647–5651, 5653–5674, 5683, 5685, 5601, 5703, 5704, 5706, 5708
Lattimore Report 1224
Latvia 4486
Lau, Mildred 5295
Laundry Workers Industrial Union 336
Lauren College 5491
Laurent 2714
Lausche, Governor 5679
Lauterbach, Mr 5299
Lauterbach, Mrs 5299
Lauterbach, Richard E 1513, 5566, 5557
Lauterpacht, H 5684
Laval 597
Laves, Walter C 2585, 5053
Lavey 5131

Page
Lavietes, Paul H 2659
Laviolette, Forrest 5566, 5567
Laviolette, Robert E 5566, 5567
Lawrence College 5489
Lawrence, David 834, 4834
Lawrence, Gertrude 5648
Lawrence, Oliver 5566, 5567
Lawrence, William H 3336, 4898
Lawson, John Howard 4259
Lawson, William T 1000
Lawyers Club (New York City) 892
Lawyers' Guild, National 3841
Lazarus, Ruth J. (Ruth Turbin) 4989, 4994, 5064
Leach, E. R 5566, 5567
Leach, Mrs. Henry Goodard 3794
Leacock, David J 5566, 5567, 5709
Leadership School (Young Communist League) 1000, 1001
Leaf, Earl H 4087, 4131, 4860
Leaftad, Catherine 2789
League Against Imperialism, First Congress 312
League Against Imperialism, Second Congress 276
League Against War and Fascism 447, 2160
League of American Writers 2658, 4116
League of Democratic Parties (China) 1442
League of Nations 232, 235, 240, 271, 489, 579, 996, 1003, 1485, 1660, 1747, 2343, 2584 2671, 2792, 2716, 2862, 2891, 2991, 2997, 3168, 3332, 3584, 3695, 3851, 3930, 4055, 4077, 4204. 4481, 4484, 4485, 4518, 4526, 4563, 4880, 5016. 5035, 5162, 5167, 5317, 5320–5322, 5335, 5346.
League of Nations Association 2582
League of Nations Economic Intelligence Service 3700
League of Nations Mission of Education Experts. The Reorganization of Education in China 3430
League of Nations Secretariat 5009, 5068, 5270
League of Nations Statistical Yearbook 3696
League of Polish Patriots 2839
League of Women Shoppers 411, 4116, 4139, 4275, 4395
League of Women Voters 1220, 4961, 5040, 5711
League of Women Voters—National Council 3885
Leahy, Admiral 1515, 5376, 5484
Leaing, John 5268
Leak, Ora 4991, 4994
Leal, Castro 5056
Lealtad, Catherine D 1513
Leaning, John 4987, 5111
Leaning, W. J 72, 254, 476, 2880, 3343, 4208–4210, 5566, 5567
Lease-Lend Dictatorship 2676
Leathem, S 5566, 5567
Leatherman, C. D 5091
LeBranchu, Jean Yves 5516, 5517
Lederer, Emil 5891, 5566, 5567
Lederer Ilse 4989, 4994
Lee 5685
Lee, Alwyn 5566, 5567
Lee, Betty 4990, 4994
Lee, Mr. Canada 2242
Lee, Duncan Chaplin 72, 143, 365, 409, 410 476, 477, 580, 1002, 1218, 1743, 3546, 4719, 4823, 4830, 5346.
Lee, Edmund J 5701
Lee, Franklin C. H 5566, 5567
Lee, H. K 5684
Lee, Higginson & Co 1216, 1219
Lee, J. S 1982, 2518
Lee, John 4771, 4772
Lee, Dr. Kan 440, 2832, 5049, 5051–5053, 5566, 5567
Lee, Michael 72, 997, 1743, 1744, 2626, 4623, 5346

Page
Lee, Pao-Chen ... 4990, 4994
Lee, Rosamund ... 938, 4937, 4988, 4989, 4994, 5299
Lee, S. C ... 5566 5567
Lee, Shao-chang ... 4125, 4126, 5207
Lee, Stephen ... 5566, 5567
Lee, York ... 3060
Leebuck ... 4127
Leffingwell, Russell ... 4054, 4055
Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder ... 1689, 2270, 4335
Left Wing Socialists ... 1613
Left Writers Union (China) ... 2470
Leftist Kuomintang Group ... 2458
Legal Status of Aliens in the USSR ... 3935
Legation of Britain (Bern, Switzerland) ... 1770, 1771
Legation of China (Bern, Switzerland) ... 1770, 1771
Legation of Russia (Bern, Switzerland) ... 1770
Legation of United States (Bern, Switzerland) ... 1692, 1770–1772, 1916
Legge, J. D ... 5568, 5569
Legett, T. P ... 5568, 5569
Legislative Reference Service (Library of Congress) ... 674, 677
Legislative Reorganization Act ... 1353
Legislative Yuan (Chines Nationalist) ... 2384
Lehman, Herbert H ... 1481, 1487, 1488, 3887, 3888, 4640, 4642, 4675, 4935, 4979, 5050, 5052, 5058, 5059
Lehmann, Rosamond ... 5648
Lei, Ching-tien ... 2405, 2462
Lei, Kit-king ... 5568, 5569
Leiberman, Henry R ... 5568, 5569
Leifert, Janet ... 4988
Leighton, Alexander H ... 5568, 5569
Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick ... 2716
Leland Stanford University ... 264, 283, 976, 996, 1153, 1216, 1219, 1220, 1227, 2250, 2615, 2616, 2658, 2740, 2748, 3338, 3621, 4099, 4119, 4225, 4226, 4258.
Leland Stanford University (Hoover Library) ... 2250
Leland, Waldo G ... 5701
Lend Lease Act ... 2679, 2676
Lend-Lease Administration ... 1325, 1621
Lend-Lease (Division of Soviet Supply) ... 1325
Lend-Lease Bill ... 3581
Lengyel, Emil ... 675, 4259
Lenin ... 334, 335, 343, 771, 865, 869, 884, 1098, 1108, 1530, 1616. 1620, 1653, 2047, 2066, 2242, 2243, 2270, 3185, 3187, 3189, 3236, 3582, 3705, 3739, 3944, 4110, 4111, 4257, 4335, 5149, 5161, 5219, 5220, 5280, 5308, 5310, 5381, 5386, 5420, 5422, 5426, 5454, 5500.
Lenin of China ... 3500
Lenin Library of Leningrad ... 2592, 4579
Lenin Memorial Meeting (Madison Square Garden) ... 2242, 2243
Lenin Pedagogical Institute (Moscow) ... 3621
Lenin School (Moscow) ... 865, 868
Lenin, Vladimir I ... 515, 517, 559, 565, 647, 1789, 1690, 2306, 2317, 2318, 2379, 2380, 2387, 2451, 2452, 2466, 2517, 2572, 2592, 2693, 2694, 2698, 2702, 2703, 2705, 2729, 2890.
Leningrad ... 3633, 4486
Leningrad University ... 2691
Leninist Communist International ... 2066
Leo, Jen-ming ... 3951
Leonard ... 477
Leonov, Leonid ... 3620, 3621
Leontiev, B ... 4816
Leouzon, Lieutenant ... 4434
Lerman, Louis ... 4157
Lerner, James ... 4142
Lerner, Prof, Max ... 4116, 4259

Page
Lerrigo, Miss Edith 5290
Lescaze, William 4091, 4145
LeSeuer, Meridel 4259
Leshinsky, Solomon 4678, 4679, 4737
Leslie, Kenneth 300
Lessing, Ferdinand D 4421, 4422
Lester, Robert M 5123
Letters from China 3826
Letting Britain Down 2679
Leung, George Kin 5568, 5569
Levanesky & Co 2611
Levenson, Joseph R 5568, 5569
Lever Bros. (London) 1151, 1217
Levi, M 2659
Levi, Werner 5568, 5569
Levin, Betty 4299, 4300, 4304–4306, 4308, 4327
Levin, Emmanuel 3337
Levin, M 3337
Levin, Meyer 4259
Levina 5161
Levine, Harriet (*see also* Mrs. Chao-ting Chi) 2808, 2812, 5193
Levine, Isaac Don 5354, 5355
Levine, J 4897
Levinthal, Harriet 4987, 4958, 5989, 4994
Leomore, Bernard W 5568, 5569
Levy 2714, 4999, 5299
Levy, David M 5299
Levy, Mrs. David M 5299
Levy, Ellen B 4990, 4994
Levy, H 4089
Levy, Jenny 4404
Levy, Marion J., Jr 5568, 5569
Levy, Roger 668, 670, 671, 1222, 3167, 3270, 5027, 5183, 5333, 5568, 5569
Lew, Daniel H 2589, 5568, 5569, 5684
Lewis 5337
Lewis, A. B 5568, 5569
Lewis, Fulton, Jr 3041, 3726
Lewis, Mr. John L 141, 638
Lewis, Morris R 5701
Lewis, Rhoda 4989, 4994
Lewis, Roger A 1513
Lewis, Vinita V 5323
Lewis, Willmott 5701
Leyda, Jay 4259
L'Heureux, H. J 138, 1003
L'Humanite 1465, 1466
Li, An-che 5568, 5569
Li, Chi-shen 2322, 2396, 2474
Li Chieh-yung 2462
Li, Chien-nun 4880
Li, Choh-Ming 4141, 5568, 5569, 5684
Li, Chu-chen 3951
Li, Fu-chen 812
Li Fu-Chun 2462
Li, Hsiao-li 5369
Li, Hsien-liang 5407
Le Hsien-nien 2462
Li, K. C 1216, 5065, 5066
Li Kuang 2463
Li, Kung-su 5408
Li, Li-san 2321, 2322, 2324, 2380, 3300, 3304, 4883
Li, Peng 3786, 3787
Li, Pong 2404, 2463
Li, Shao-Chi 812, 1743
Li, Ssu-Kuang 2518
Li, T. H 3335

Page
Li Ta-chao 2453
Li, Tai 5016, 5017
Li, Teh-chuan 3537
Li, Ting-ming 2405, 2463
Li, Ting-sheng 4880
Li, Tsung-jen (Gen.) 2329, 2355, 4061
Liang, Hubert 5203, 5295
Liangchow 3631
Liao 341, 3612–3614, 5309, 5311–5313
Liao, Cheng-chih (S. C. Liao) 2404, 2463, 2465
Liao Chung-ksi 2463
Liao, S. C. (Liao Cheng-chi) 2404, 2463, 2465
Liao, T'ai-chu 5568, 5569
Libby, Fred 4129
Liberal Club 286
Liberal Party (British) 1216
Liberated Areas Branch (FEA) 995
Liberator 3498, 3529
Liberte (Steamship) 590, 591
Liberty Book Club 3836
Liberty League 546
Liberty Magazine 3356
Library of the Communist Academy 3929
Library of Congress 144
145, 161, 192, 253, 325, 336, 462, 674, 676, 677, 747, 748, 752, 962, 969, 1172, 2170, 2568, 2698, 2792, 2793, 2833, 2834, 2836, 3107, 3153, 3154, 3266, 3311, 3786, 3787, 3805, 3950, 3951, 3965, 3967, 4393, 4394, 4591, 4593, 4895, 4896, 4931, 5000, 5008, 5010, 5110, 5256, 5268, 5295, 5691, 5694, 5696, 5700.
Library of International Relations 2583, 4062, 4066
Licht, Sarah 3337
Lichter, Mr 4439
Licorich, Rev. David 4117
Lie, Trygve 931, 1663, 2556, 4655
Liem, Chauning 5568, 5569
Lien-fang Ssu-tung-pu (United Defense Headquarters, Yenan) 2404, 2451, 2458, 2460
Lieu 5685
Lieu, D. K 1221, 1222, 3167, 3916, 5568, 5569
Lieu, Dang-chan 5568, 5569
Life Book Co. (Shang-huo Shu-chu) 2453
Life Looks at China 2544
Life Magazine 163, 212, 1204, 1221, 1393, 1647, 1846, 1847, 2505, 2544, 3009, 3801, 5008, 5040, 5329, 5349, 5673
Li-fu, Chen 1094
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co 100
Lightbody, Prof. Charles W 4259
Ligutti, Msgr. L. G 3794
Lila 695
Lilenthal, Philip E 450, 451, 471, 481, 659, 660, 1246, 1887, 2115, 2249, 3430, 3918, 4263, 4612, 4613, 4987, 4991, 4992, 4994, 5021, 5023, 5030, 5031, 5183, 5250, 5266, 5299, 5300, 5329, 5568, 5569, 5666.
Lillenthal, Mrs. Joseph 264, 5299
Lillick, Ira S 264, 5186
Lim, Dr 5237
Lim, Robert K. S 1514, 2524, 5344
Limits of Land Settlement 2891
Lin Chu-han (Lin Tsu-han) 2341, 2399, 2403, 2405, 2452, 2463
Lin Chun 2463
Lin, J. H 4277
Lin Mai-ko (*see also* Michael Lindsay) 2463, 2464
Lin Pai-hsu (Lin Tsu-han, Lin Pei-chu, Lin Pei-yu) 2463
Lin Piao 1762, 1787–1791, 1916, 1988, 1990, 1992 1994, 2327, 2332, 2318, 2391, 2403, 2438, 2453, 2463, 2465

Page
Lin Po-chu (Lin Tsu-han, Lin Chu-han, Lin Pai-hsu. Lin Pei-chuh, Lin Pei-yu ---- 2463
Lin, Po-hu ---- 812
Lin, Robert K. S ---- 5361
Lin, Tso-han ---- 1441, 2044
Lin, Tsu-han (Lin Chu-han) ---- 2341, 2391, 2399, 2403, 2405, 2452, 2463
Lin, W. L ---- 3910
Lin, W. Y ---- 3916
Lin, Wo-chiang ---- 143
Lin, Yu ---- 3133, 3167, 3168, 5568, 5569
Lin, Yu-tang ---- 827, 1221, 1222, 1235, 1239, 3167, 3501, 5283, 5568, 5569, 5649, 5685
Lin, Yuwan ---- 3173, 5184
Lin Yu-ying (Chang, Hao) ---- 2403, 2451, 2464
Lincoln, Abraham ---- 994, 1099, 1287, 1400, 1530, 1606
Lincoln Battalion ---- 598
Lincoln, G. A ---- 4984, 5001
Lincoln, General ---- 831
Lind, Andrew ---- 2581, 5570, 5571, 5684
Lind, W. L ---- 5163, 5348
Lindbeck, J. M. H ---- 5570, 5571
Lindbergh, Charles Augustus ---- 2730, 5180, 5657
Linde ---- 4497, 4504, 4509
Lindeman, Edward C ---- 1514, 5323
Lindgren, Dr ---- 178, 2710
Lindley, Ernest K ---- 3609, 3610, 4833, 5701
Lindley, Sir Francis ---- 3584
Lindsay, Ladt ---- 5370
Lindsey, Michael (Lin Mai-Ko) ---- 72, 171, 2248, 2463, 2464, 2543, 2643, 2789, 3476, 3545, 3546, 3903, 3064, 3965, 3983, 4336, 4337, 5276, 5283, 5288, 5367–5412, 5570, 5571.
Lindsey, H. A. L ---- 171
Lindt, A. R ---- 3167
Linebarger ---- 661
Linebarger, Paul Myron Anthony ---- 1222, 4029, 4823, 4824, 4830, 4831, 5294, 5570, 5571, 5657, 5701
Lines of Cleavage in Inner Mongolia ---- 3240
Lin-fu, Chen ---- 1398, 1441
Lingard, C. Cecil ---- 5570, 5571
Lingelbach, William E ---- 342
Linton, Ralph ---- 3611
Lintung Hot Springs ---- 2330
Lipper, Elinor ---- 1321, 1322, 1324, 2325
Lippmann, Walter ---- 406, 494, 691, 692, 858, 859, 1098, 1230, 2248, 2552, 2557, 2735, 2809, 2811, 3703, 5000, 5070, 5280, 5701, 5703.
Lischinsky, Ferdinand ---- 4752
Lipshitz, Dora ---- 678
Lipson, Leslie ---- 5570, 5571
Lipton, Sony ---- 4990, 4994
Li-sian, Li ---- 2694, 2695
Lismore Hotel (New York) ---- 2656
List, Eugene ---- 1528
Litag ---- 4514
Litchfield, Edward H ---- 1539
Literary Digest ---- 2981
Literature on the Chinese Communist Movement ---- 3316
Literary Revolution (1917) ---- 2452
Litgle Vanguards ---- 2335
Litka, S. S ---- 5112
Littell, Robert ---- 4091, 4145
Littell, Bishop S. Harrington ---- 3793
Little, Ballard (*see also* Ballard) ---- 161
Little, Brown & Co ---- 452, 463–465, 590, 609, 650, 665, 666, 668, 1020, 1136, 3056, 3158, 3362, 3556, 3739, 3842

Page
Little Brown Girl Degree ... 3193
Little Era in Old Russia ... 4091
Little, General ... 446, 4975
Little, Herbert S ... 264, 568, 1313, 2819, 3902, 3903, 4824, 4831, 4944, 5085, 5156, 5175, 5179, 5185, 5359
Little, Maj. H. S ... 2566
Little Khiral ... 4525
Little Vanguards, Eighteenth Group Army (Chart) ... 2448
Litvinoff, Ivy ... 5570, 5571
Litvinoff, Maxim ... 184, 191, 300, 2730, 3311, 3313, 3333, 3484, 3857, 3934, 4043, 4135, 4204, 4485, 4503, 4506, 4512, 4513, 4515, 4518, 4519, 4524, 4558–4560, 4564, 4565, 4569, 5051, 5122, 5184, 5192, 5201, 5266, 5368, 5501, 5692.
Litvinoff, Mrs. Maxim ... 5032, 5045, 5056
Litvinov. (*See* Litvinoff.)
Litvinova ... 5135
Litwinowa ... 4526
Liu, Mr ... 5706, 5708
Liu, C. Y ... 97, 105, 260
Liu, Chieh ... 4323
Liu, Ching-fan ... 2405, 2464
Liu, Ching-jen ... 2405, 2464
Liu Chun-hsien, Mrs. (Chin Pang-hsien) ... 2454, 2464
Liu, Fu-wan ... 5061
Liu I ... 2464
Liu, James T. C ... 5570, 5571
Liu, N. C ... 5570, 5571
Liu, Ning-I ... 5375
Liu, Ning-yi ... 3951
Liu Pai-cheng (Liu Po-cheng) ... 2332, 2347, 2364, 2465
Liu, Po-cheng (Liu Pai-cheng) ... 2332, 2347, 2364, 2465
Liu, Shao-chi (Hu Fu) ... 2403, 2404, 2460, 2465, 2557, 5423
Liu, Shao-wen ... 2403, 2465
Liu, Shih ... 2405, 2406, 2465
Liu-shou Ping-tuan (Hehan Garrison Army) ... 2458, 2471
Liu, Tien-chi ... 2405, 2465
Liu, Tse-chiu ... 3951
Liu Tse-ju ... 2465
Liu, Tzu-tan ... 2327, 2465
Liu, Wellington ... 650, 651, 3593, 5016
Liu, Wen-hui ... 2326
Liu, Miss Wu-Kou ... 3791
Liu, Yen ... 2465
Liu, Yu-wan ... 426, 427, 537, 652, 3317, 3486, 3910, 3929, 3939, 4087, 4108, 4121, 4987, 4996, 5016, 5017, 5161, 5183, 5310, 5348
Livesay ... 5224
Liverpool University ... 3168
Living Age ... 4147
Living Buddha ... 4149
Livingston, Mrs. Goodhue ... 3794
Llano Colonist ... 2665
Lloyd, Trevor ... 5570, 5571, 5705
Lo Jui-ching ... 2465
Lo Jung-heng ... 2465
Lo, Lita ... 3536
Lo, Mai ... 2403, 2405, 2465
Lo Ping-hui ... 2465
Lo, Robert ... 3536
Lo, Tse-Kai ... 2090, 2091, 2186, 2187
Lobanov ... 4091
Lobenstine ... 4107
Lobinger, C. Sumner ... 5570, 5571
Local 401, U. of W. Teachers Union ... 2161
Lochhead, Archie ... 433, 857, 4973
Lochner, Louis ... 2666

Page
Locke, Edwin A 2248
Lockhart, Mr 2124, 5233
Lockhart, Oliver C 4834
Lockwood, Edward T 5570, 5571
Lockwood, Virginia C 266
Lockwood, Mrs. W. W 4824, 4831
Lockwood, William W 158, 237, 248, 253, 254, 266, 267, 291, 336, 338, 383–385, 390, 395, 396, 399, 425–428, 431, 432, 445, 446, 474, 477, 481, 568, 572, 573, 575–577, 661, 687, 856, 857, 908–911, 937, 938, 945, 1185, 1219, 1230, 1836, 2518, 2560, 2562, 2585, 2587, 2602–2604, 2610, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2642, 2643, 2652, 2783–2785, 2830, 2880, 2883, 2884, 2887, 3199, 3343–3345, 3807–3809, 3854, 3862–3889, 3902, 3903, 3965, 3966, 3980–3982, 4027, 4058, 4075, 4086, 4093, 4094, 4096–4107, 4129–4131, 4208, 4209, 4226, 4228, 4263, 4859, 4861, 4862, 4872, 4907, 4908, 4915, 4944, 4958, 4960, 4961, 4963–4967, 4969, 4972–4974, 4976, 4978–4984, 4988, 4998, 5032, 5045, 5049, 5050, 5052–5054, 5084, 5089, 5111, 5166, 5169, 5176, 5179, 5186, 5193, 5198, 5199, 5208, 5218, 5227, 5236, 5239, 5247, 5248, 5254, 5255, 5257, 5259, 5260, 5264–5266, 5268, 5270, 5317, 5350, 5355, 5357, 5427, 5570, 5571, 5699.
Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot 2955, 2956, 4832, 4943, 5145, 5146
Loeb, Edwin M 5560, 5571
Loeb, Julius 3169, 4272, 4277
Loeb, Philip 2659
Logan, Richard F 5570, 5571
Logemann, J. H. A 5570, 5571
Lohia, Rammanohar 2891, 5570, 5571
Lokanathan, P. S 5323
Lolo Tribes 2465
Lominadze 2321, 2465, 2467
London, England 3414, 3450, 3483, 3536, 3589, 3632, 3634, 3648, 3698, 3880, 3903, 3907, 3909, 3927, 3929, 3931, 3932, 4047, 4049, 4098, 4108, 4124, 4128, 4136, 4201, 4204, 4286, 4307, 4308, 4588, 4699, 5329, 5349, 5369
London Airport 3231
London Daily Herald 2666
London Foreign Ministers Conference 178
London School of Economics 1836, 2721, 3611, 4348, 4499, 4560, 4567, 4956, 5321, 5327
London Times 171, 177, 178, 3288, 3291, 3294, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3353, 3629, 3678, 5177, 5231, 5284, 5368, 5372.
London University 177, 1009
Long, Breckinridge 139, 140, 2835
Long, Huey 1680
Long March 2326, 2329, 2352, 2452, 2453, 2455, 2457–2460, 2463–2465, 2469, 2695
Longfellow, Mrs. Frederick W 3794
Longnin 1619
Longshore, W. Allen, Jr 5570, 5571
Loo, Pin fei 5651
Loo, Sun 2463, 2465
Look at Latin America 2586
Loomis, Charles F 11, 568, 713, 997, 1182, 1313, 2523, 2622, 2718, 2720, 2811, 3909, 4086, 4099, 4100, 4125–4127, 4145, 4984, 4996, 5023, 5198, 5200, 5207, 5208, 5318, 5334, 5335, 5559, 5704.
Loomis, Miss Helen 4942
Loong, Mr 5706, 5707, 5709
Lopez, Francisco 4235, 5400
Lopez, Marina 4136
Lorden, Doris 5570, 5571
Lorimer, Frank 5294, 5570, 5571, 5701
Loring, Marcella 4276
Lorwin 3323
Lorwin, Lewis L 72, 2642, 2831, 3964, 5261, 5276, 5570, 5571, 5701

Page
Lorwin, Val 2642
Los Alamos 3538, 3539
Los Angeles Committee 712
Los Angeles Daily News 4136
Losovsky, Mr. S. A 2590, 2592, 2593, 2723, 2727, 2729, 3313, 3314
Lost Illusion 3669
Lothian, Lord 3917, 5195, 5348, 5349
Lou Ning-hsien 2465
Loudon 18, 1161
Louisville Courier 3035
Louisville & Nashville Railroad 100
Love, J. B 2659
Loveday, A 2831, 5247, 5260
Lovestone, Jay 1075, 1292, 1293
Lovett, Robert A 4682, 4814
Lovett, Prof. Robert M 411, 1125, 1126, 2659, 2684, 4073, 4089, 4117, 4142, 4170, 4171, 4259, 4277, 4682, 4814.
Low Memorial Library 5305, 5311, 5313
Low, Seth 5002
Lowdermilk, W. E 2509, 3794, 5570, 5571, 5701
Lowe, C. H 4127, 5684
Lowe, Pardee 499, 5119, 5572, 5573, 5704
Lowe, W. S 5572, 5573
Lowell 5116
Lowell Institute 4422
Lowenthal, Max 4426, 4663, 4675, 4679, 4735, 4736
Lowenthal, Rudolf 5572, 5573
Lower, A. R. M 5572, 5573, 5684
Lowrey, Dr. Lawson G 410, 1513
Loyalist Spain 569, 570
Loyalty Board Hearings 1774, 1776, 1777, 1913
Loyang (China) 4213
Lu, Cheng-ts'ao 2465, 5368
Lu, Chih-chun 2405, 2466
Lu, Chung-Lin 2401
Lu, Dr. Gweidjen 3794
Lu, Han 1580
Lu, Hsu-cho 3951
Lu, Hsun 2351
Lu-Hsun Art College 2406
Lu Hsun Fine Arts College (Yenan) 2462
Lu Kwang-mien (K. M. Lu) 4619
Lu, Mark M 143
Lu, Ting-i 2403, 2466
Lu, Ting-yi 5383
Luan River (China) 4151
Lubin, I 857, 2831, 4973, 5261
Lucas, General 1026, 1027
Lucas, Scott W 2835
Luccock, Emory 3144
Luccock, Prof. Halford E 4259, 5662
Luce, Mr 5337
Luce, Miss Clare Booth 4275, 4620, 4934
Luce, Henry R 264, 278, 433, 444, 660, 713, 728, 788, 857, 928, 1217, 1221, 1313, 1422, 1467, 1846, 1856, 2151, 2152, 2622, 2809, 3096, 3388, 3403, 3404, 4140, 4545, 4974, 5123, 5249, 5344, 5349, 5377, 5385.
Luce Publications 1846, 1856, 2982
Luchenhaus, Mr 4439
Luchnow, India 3866, 5319, 5322
Lud 4822
Ludden, Paul 4768
Ludden, Raymond P 636–638, 776, 811, 828, 830, 903, 1026, 1436, 1446, 1447, 1483, 1512, 1744, 1758, 1764, 1914, 1916, 1968–1971, 1980, 1984, 1998, 2003, 2063 2535, 2717, 4531, 4532, 4824, 4830, 4831, 4840, 5480.

Page
Ludlam, Kennedy 743, 2169, 2303
Ludwig. (*See* Ignatz Reiss.)
Ludwig, Albert P 5572, 5573
Ludwig, Dorothy S 4989, 4994
Ludwig, William 4677
Lui, Yu-wen 4068
Lukashev 5045
Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937) 4131
Lumpkin, Katherine DuPre 4259
Lumpkin, Miss Grace 4275
Lund, Thora 4170, 4171, 4176
Lunatcharsky, Anatole 5692
Lunghai Railway 2349, 2420, 2434, 2544
Lung, Ho 812
Lung Ling 2466
Lung, Pi-win 4822
Lung, Yun 2326, 2397
Lurie, D. G 4506, 4508
Lushan, China 3788
Lustig, James 3336
Lutheran Evangelical Church 1315
Lutkin, Thomasine 5572, 5573
Luxury of Liberty 2669, 2680, 2684
Luzon, Philippine Islands 4046, 4448, 4454
Lydall, L. A 4271
Lyde 4146
Lyell, Sir Charles 545
Lyell, L. A 5572, 5573
Lyell, T. R. S 5572, 5573
Lynd, Robert D 5173
Lynd, Robert S. (Bob) 687, 2518, 2684, 2881, 2882, 4075, 4958, 4965, 5084, 5172
Lynd, Mrs. Robert S 5173
Lyon, Bayard 5572, 5573
Lyon, Freddy 4824, 4831
Lyon, Lewis 4299
Lyon, Miss Sarah 5268
Lyons, Eugene 270
Lysenko, —— 341
Lytton Commission 1749, 3906

M

Ma, General 4534
Ma, Hai-teh 2466, 3169
Ma Hsi-wu 2466
Ma Hsi-wu Court Method 2466
Ma, Hung-kuei 2345
Ma, Ming-fang 2405, 2466
Ma, Ning 2971
Ma, Pi-ching 2345
Ma, Pu-fang 2345
Ma Pun-chi 2466
Ma, Yin-tsu 2524, 3950, 3951
Ma, Yin-tsy 5237
Macadam, Ivison 16–19, 1159, 1160, 3453, 5207, 5334
Macao 3910, 4700
MacArthur, General Douglas 143, 144, 289, 354, 395, 396, 618, 638–640, 717, 719, 720, 736–746, 749, 752, 777, 794, 832, 835, 849, 859, 901, 912, 932, 1018, 1036, 1042, 1046, 1062–1065, 1113, 1118–1120, 1137, 1138, 1264, 1539, 1596, 1637, 1638, 1649, 1651, 1652, 1674, 1686, 1768, 1769, 1864, 1866, 1869, 1871, 1872, 1875, 1885, 1888, 1903, 1916, 1919, 1921, 2152–2155, 2158, 2163, 2165–2172, 2174, 2175, 2177, 2193, 2223, 2236–2238, 2283, 2286, 2297–2299, 2301–2303, 2535, 2544–2557, 2738, 2997, 3053, 3054, 3070, 3392, 3452, 3622, 3632, 3667, 3703, 3706, 3811, 3875, 3942, 4182, 4223, 4224, 4452, 4453, 4543, 4545, 4546, 4814, 4815, 4845, 4856, 4876, 4877, 4935, 4940, 4981, 4982, 5283, 5375, 5389, 5390, 5396, 5406, 5414, 5486.

Page
MacArthur hearings 1113, 1118–1120
MacDonald Government (England) 2461
MacDonald, Jeannette 4127
MacDonald, Malcolm 5334
Macdonnell, James M 5270
MacDonnell, W. H 5572, 5573
Macfalyen, Eric 5572, 5573
MacFisher 5293
MacGibbon, D. A 5572–5573
Machida, Chuji 4148, 4268
Machine Tool Import 193
Machinists International Association (AFL) 1104
Mack, Federal Judge Julian M 296
Mack, Virginia 4991, 4994
MacKay, Mr 4958
MacKay, J. A 5703
MacKay, James A 494, 568, 858, 859, 996, 1219, 2810
MacKay, John A 3704
MacKay, Robert A 5572, 5573
MacKenzie, Mr 4569, 4577
MacKenzie, Norman A. M 5130, 5270, 5333, 5572, 5573, 5684
Mackey, Argyle R 4716, 4717
Mackinder 911
Mackintosh, W. A 5270
MacLachlan, John M 5572, 5573
MacLeish, Archibald 336, 338, 729, 2124, 2836, 4078, 5000, 5182, 5183, 5256, 5661
MacLennan, Douglas 4984, 5009, 5019, 5027, 5572, 5573
MacLeod, A. A 3470, 3471
MacMahon, Aline 4259
MacMahon, Arthur W 5002
MacMahon, Senator 5660
MacManus, M. J 5651
MacMillan 3498
MacMillan Co., The 1168, 2529, 3627, 4166, 4270, 4278, 4587, 4591
MacMurray, Howard J 5049
MacMurray, John Van A 2835, 5701
MacNair, Harley F 474, 2809, 5217, 5229, 5674
MacNaughton, Ernest B 901, 1144, 1147, 1148, 1551, 1576, 1579, 1617, 1637, 1638, 1640, 1650, 1659, 4835
MacVeagh, Ewen Cameron 3902
Macy's 4275
Maddalena 4234
Maddocks, Ray T 4430
Madison, Joan 4136
Madison Square Garden 295
Madison Square Garden (Lenin Memorial Meeting) 2242, 2243
Madjar 324
Madrid, Spain 4429
Madyar, L 4352, 4589, 4878, 4879
Maeda Tamon 5572, 5573
Maeda, Yonezo 4148, 4268
Magdoff, Harry Samuel 4645, 4646, 4669, 4671, 4672, 4679, 4725, 4737, 4743, 4752, 4755
MAGIC (United States Military Adviser Group in China) 3837, 3994
Magidoff, Nila 2583
Magill, Robert M 3964, 4958, 4978, 5701
Magistretti, William 5572, 5573
Magnolia Petroleum Co 102
Magnitogorsk Kombinat 1317
Magruder, General 446, 4975
Mah, Dr 5706
Mah, N. Wing 5572, 5573
Mahasabha 5043
Mahindra, K. C 2582, 5049
Mahlin (Martin, Marlin) 2466, 2467

Page
Main Highways (China) 2419, 2421
Mail and Empire 3472
Maillart, Ella 2891
Mainichi Shimbun 2373
Maintenance of Way Employees Brotherhood 1104
Maisky, Mr 3931, 5191, 5484
Makers of Public Opinion about the Far East 3167
Maki, John McGilvery 2482, 4982, 5574, 5575, 5684, 5649, 5701
Making of Modern China, The 3462, 3621
Makower, Miss 5137
Malania, Leo 4659
Malaya 3596, 3623, 3696, 3837, 3946, 4098, 4536, 4539, 4871, 5388
Malayan and Thailand Railways 3936
Malcott, D. W 5323
Maleek, Verlag 256
Males, William 4117
Malik, Ambassador 4919, 5501
Malikoff (Malikov) 199, 202, 203
Malin, Patrick M 2831, 5261
Malinin, L. A 1327
Malinowski 2721
Malisoff, William M 2659
Mallan, Colonel 4436, 4437, 4438
Mallery, Helen 4277
Mallik, H. S 2480
Mallory, Walter H 4834
Maloney, James J 5198, 5244
Malott 1167
Malraux, Andre 4301
Maltz, Albert 2659
Mamaiev 201, 202
Management Employee Relations, Inc 1220
Manchester Guardian 3168, 3498, 4832, 5178, 5374, 5375, 5383, 5389, 5395, 5396, 5412
Manchoukuo 4500, 4702
Manchu Abdication and the Powers 3167
Manchu Dynasty 1159, 1301, 2555, 3306
Manchukuo 2376, 3630, 3631
Manchukuoan Government 2708, 2716
Manchuria 3360, 3366, 3367, 3393, 3401, 3406, 3453, 3454, 3463, 3464, 3483, 3498, 3503, 3583, 3599, 3622, 3631, 3632, 3687, 3698, 3706, 3707, 3709–3712, 3809–3811, 3836, 3838, 3979, 3981, 3986, 3994, 4004–4007, 4029, 4047, 4055, 4071, 4129, 4205, 4216, 4217, 4226, 4267, 4269, 4281, 4285, 4425, 4490, 4516–4517, 4530, 4544, 4551, 4552, 4589, 4684, 4690, 4699, 4700, 4708, 4766, 4877, 5339, 5340, 5348, 5349, 5378, 5392, 5393, 5396, 5404, 5409, 5410, 5667, 5671, 5708.
Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict 3266
Manchuria Japanese Invasion (1931) 2380, 2389
Manchurian (Tungpei) Army 2327, 2330, 2355, 2357
Manchurian and Korean Lines 3936
Manchurian Incident 3906
Manchurian Northeastern Army 2329
Manchurian Railroads 2388
Mandated Islands 4112
Mandel, William Marx 72, 662–664, 674–677, 766–770, 1196, 1745, 2483, 2733–2749, 2986, 3061, 3546, 3585, 3775, 3835, 4155, 5023, 5574, 5575.
Mander, Linden A 3167, 3168, 5574, 5575
Mandlbaum, David G 5323, 5574, 5575
Manifesto (First Kuomintang Congress, 1924) 2316, 2414
Mangahas, Mr. F 3917, 3918, 4987
Mangold, William P 4142
Manhattan Center 300, 863, 2242
Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades 473, 474
Manhattan Project 1352

Page
Manila 4125
Mann, Heinrich 5649
Mann, Klaus 4259
Mann, Thomas 4257
Mannerheim Finland 596
Manning, C. A. W 5574, 5575
Mansergh, Nicholas 5574, 5575
Mansfield, Representative Mike 2363, 3409, 3490, 3608, 3609, 4834, 5062, 5064
Mao Tse-tung 782, 800, 812–816, 844–846, 852, 913, 914, 1253, 1268, 1282, 1304, 1483–1485, 1521, 1537, 1596, 1653, 1656, 1708, 1745, 1761, 1927, 1928, 2186, 2270, 2315, 2316–2318, 2322–2325, 2327, 2329, 2331, 2332, 2339, 2341, 2342, 2344, 2346, 2347, 2351, 2353, 2362, 2375, 2378–2382, 2392, 2393, 2395, 2398, 2399, 2403–2406, 2413, 2414, 2425, 2427, 2435, 2452, 2453, 2455, 2457, 2458, 2460, 2462, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2505, 2542, 2548, 2551, 2717, 2976, 3009, 3059, 3186–3188, 3288, 3292, 3293, 3297, 3298, 3300–3305, 3307, 3308, 3500–3503, 3593, 3669, 3739, 3815, 3829, 3832, 3836, 3837, 3839, 4212, 4213, 4270, 4334, 4687, 4704, 4707, 4708, 4710, 4711, 4713, 4842, 4844, 4846, 4872, 4874–4876, 4883–4885, 4895, 5219, 5373, 5381, 5384, 5387, 5388, 5393, 5420, 5421, 5422, 5423, 5641.
Mao Tse-tung, Mrs. (Lan Ping) 2462, 2467
Mao Tse-tung Government 12
Marburg, Anita 4259
Marcantonio-Quill 295
Marcantonio, Vito 4117, 4620, 5645
Marceuse. (*See* M. Marukyusu.)
March, Frederick 4062–4064, 4066
March of Labor 2619, 2640, 2641
Marco Polo Bridge 58, 1460, 1516
Marcusson, Ruth 4992, 4994
Marder, Mr 1141, 1142
Margalo 5651
Mariana Islands 4265
Marin 2318
Marine Corps 583–585, 597, 633, 2095
Marine Jumper (steamship) 4869
Marine Raiders (Carlson) 2547
Marine Tiger (steamship) 4868, 4869
Marine Transport Workers 2667
Marine Workers Industrial Union 3336
Marini, Ferruci 520
Maritime Commission. (*See* United States Maritime Commission.)
Maritime Labor Herald 2665
Markham, Mrs 1189, 1190
Markin, Valentine (*see also* Walter) 229, 231, 261
Markoff, A 3335
Marks, Regina 4990, 4994
Marks, Stuart 3849, 3862, 3889, 4908, 4909, 4913–4920, 4922, 4923, 4933, 4945, 4946, 4948, 4949, 4957
Markus 2728, 2730
Marquess of Crewe 909
Marquis 464
Marsh, Mr 3512, 4439
Marsh, Charles 1315
Marsh, Frank 3159, 3160, 3163
Marshall, C. B 5452
Marshall, Clifford B 568, 1219
Marshall Directive 1716–1719, 1724, 1725, 1880, 2195, 2197–2199, 2202, 2203, 2215, 3661
Marshall, Gen. George C 65, 177, 179, 452, 459, 463–465, 508, 633, 700, 729, 730, 732, 733, 797, 831–833, 835, 901, 925, 932, 1024, 1049, 1051, 1052, 1054, 1056, 1060, 1064, 1086, 1087, 1119, 1120, 1124, 1126, 1128, 1131, 1132, 1134, 1148, 1198, 1253, 1254, 1256, 1270, 1271, 1359, 1450, 1452, 1493–1497, 1499–1501, 1504, 1521, 1525, 1528, 1536, 1551, 1555,

Page
Marshall, Gen. George C.—Continued
1570, 1577, 1579, 1585, 1586, 1589, 1596, 1616, 1628, 1631, 1641, 1642, 1646, 1650, 1651, 1654, 1656, 1659, 1661, 1668, 1676, 1681, 1708–1711, 1713–1725, 1769, 1845–1847, 1854, 1880, 1889, 1890, 1892, 1894, 1907, 1916, 1960–1962, 1992, 2011–2013, 2046, 2051, 2052, 2068, 2073, 2098, 2150, 2195, 2197–2207, 2215, 2216, 2218, 2250, 2252–2255, 2259, 2265, 2266, 2295, 2519, 2548, 2549, 2652, 3007, 3008, 3012, 3026, 3039, 3109, 3111–3114, 3116, 3118, 3397, 3399, 3400, 3406, 3408, 3622, 3624, 3658, 3661, 3662, 3664–3667, 3706, 3708–3712, 3724, 3738, 3740, 3746, 3775, 3783, 3788, 3985, 3992, 4004, 4340, 4424, 4430, 4437, 4438, 4534, 4542–4544, 4547–4551, 4708, 4710, 4764–4767, 4835, 4934, 4943, 4944, 5278, 5284, 5293, 5359, 5376, 5392, 5393, 5405, 5408–5411.
Marshall, Humphrey 2388
Marshall, John 5111
Marshall, Kendric N 5701
Marshall Library (Cambridge) 4089
Marshall Mission 1450, 1493, 1497, 1628, 1708–1710, 1716, 1719, 1889, 1960, 1992, 2012, 2068, 2205, 2254, 2259, 2265, 2548, 3007, 3008, 3012, 3026, 3378, 3708, 3709, 5392.
Marshall Plan 1049, 1051, 1052, 1054, 1060, 1119, 1120, 1270, 1271, 1528, 1536, 1570, 1585, 1586, 1625, 1631, 1641, 2265, 2887, 3118, 3539, 3663, 3771, 3837, 5387.
Marshall Policy—A Steady Pattern 3664
Marshall Report 2013, 2254
Martha 4822
Martial Spirit, The 4109
Martin, Boyd A 4944
Martin, Charles E 568, 712, 713, 1313, 2622, 2819, 3883, 4104, 4944, 5289, 5574, 5575
Martin, Edwin M 1918, 1919, 5021, 5294, 5659, 5701
Martin, Kingsley 5181, 5574, 5575
Martin, Marlin (Mahlin) 2466, 2467
Martin, Mulford 262
Martin, Truman M 5032, 5049, 5050, 5053, 5089, 5199, 5265, 5701
Martin, W 3337
Marukyusu, M 748, 753
Marx 4895
Marx, Daniel 5574, 5575
Marx Engels Institute 227
Marx, Karl 214, 224, 302, 321–333, 515, 517, 545–548, 552, 565, 630, 647, 771, 783, 797, 835, 869, 870, 884, 885, 913, 1010, 1013, 1089, 1106, 1108, 1290, 1562, 1563, 1587, 1588, 1600, 1616, 1654, 1689, 1741, 1952, 2022, 2047, 2270, 2306, 2317, 2318, 2380, 2399, 2413, 2451, 2452, 2460, 2464, 2466, 2467, 2469, 2551, 2572, 2607, 2693, 2694, 2698, 2703, 2705, 2801, 2887, 2890, 3060, 3130–3132, 3138, 3177–3182, 3184, 3185, 3187, 3188, 3196, 3236, 3248, 3249, 3251–3253, 3255, 3257, 3501, 4335, 5148, 5149, 5151, 5167, 5240, 5280, 5284, 5308, 5310, 5379, 5420–5422, 5425, 5426, 5500.
Marxian Quarterly 4089
Marxism-Leninism 3731, 3798, 3825, 3828, 3830, 3837, 3842, 3843, 3862, 3868, 3974
Maryknoll Mission in Fushun, Manchukuo 3630
Maryland University 589–591
Masani, M. R 1222, 4888, 5574, 5575
Masland, John W 5186, 5574, 5575, 5684
Mason, Leonard 5574, 5575
Mason, Mr 2874
Mass Journal (Chinese Communist Party) 2406
Massachusetts Co 4699
Massachusetts House Committee on Un-American Activities 4616
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 300, 1037, 2659, 4089, 4260, 5297
Masselman, George H. A 3964, 5574, 5575, 5701
Masselman, Wilhelmina 4991, 4994

Page
Masses 3498
Masses and Mainstream 3835
Massey, Vincent 5115, 5333
Massing, Mrs. Hede (Mrs. Paul Massing) 223–271, 292, 358, 489, 490, 837, 2559, 2822, 2870, 2894, 4402, 4403, 4404, 4798–4804, 5337, 5354, 5356, 5357.
Massing, Paul 229, 231, 232, 244, 270
Massing, Mrs. Paul. (*See* Mrs. Hede Massing.)
Masso, John 4142
Masson, John 4893
Master of Balliol (Head of Oxford) 170–172, 2464
Mastin, Floyd E 4417, 4425
Mather, Kirtley F 2659, 4116
Mather, Rufus G 3794
Matheson, W. B 5320
Mathews, Mr 2124, 2127, 2845
Mathews, J. B 5353
Mathiessen, Prof. F. O 4259
Matlis, James 3336
Matson Steamship Co 1217
Matsamura 2717
Matsue, Mr 3937
Matsui, Miss Haru 3169, 4273
Matsui, Shichiri 5574, 5575
Matsukata, Saburo 4101, 4229, 4230, 4263, 5333, 5574, 5575
Matsukata, Yoshisaburo 364, 365, 1216
Matsumoto, Mr. Shigeharu 3589, 3925, 3926, 5217, 5333, 5574, 5575
Matsuo, M 320, 395, 477, 3167, 3168, 4230 4262, 4263, 4987, 4990, 4994, 5021, 5027, 5333, 5574, 5575, 5704
Matsuoka 279, 4148, 5249
Matsuoka, Komakichi 5322
Matsuzaka, Hiromasa 4268
Matteson, Robert 1039, 1121
Matthews, Mr 2872, 2873, 2874, 5484
Matthews, J. B 1189
Matthews, Phillip 5574, 5575
Matthewson, Jarden 1566
Mattusch, Kurt R 908
Matusow, Harvey M 3055–3063, 3362, 3824–3847, 5413, 5414
Matveev, Illarion 5574, 5575
Matzkevich, S. P 4506, 4508
Mau, Ming 3146, 3148
Maul, Grace (Mrs. Max Granich) 254, 1972, 1973, 3471, 5356
Maurer, Adrienne 4989, 4995
Maurer, Herrymon 1222, 5574, 5575
Maurer, Isabel Avila 5574, 5575
Max, Alfred 5576, 5577
Max, Allen 3060
Max, F 4987
Maxted, Edward G 2659
Maxwell, B. W 3167, 4351
Maxwell, General 390
May 1648
May Day 1316, 1317, 1319
May Day in Tokyo 3169
May, Jean 4989, 4995
May, Rene A 4944
May, Stacey 2481, 2818, 2831, 4107, 5026, 5261
Mayala 2482
Mayeda, Mr 3925, 3926
Mayeda, Miyeko 5576, 5577
Mayeda, T 5333
Mayer, Adrian 5576, 5577
Mayer, Arthur 574, 575
Mayer, Hilda 4991, 4995
Mayer, Laura 4987, 4995

Page
Mayer, Miss 5160
Mayer, W 4416, 4417, 4419, 4824, 4831
Mayer, Col. William 3965, 4907, 4958, 4982, 5048, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5163, 5348, 5703
Mayer, Mrs. William 3965
Mayfield, Arthur 3964
Mayflower Hotel 26, 30, 988, 1553, 1602, 2246, 3263, 3265
Maynor, Dorothy 1528
Mayo, Dorothy 4988, 4989, 4995
Mazuruk 626, 627
McAfee, William 5295
McAllister, Parker 4675
McAlpin, David H 5299
McAuley, James 5580, 5581
McAvoy, Clifford T 300, 4136, 4259
McCall, Professor 4277
McCallum, J. A 5580, 5581
McCann, Col. Coward 117, 1129, 1289, 1578, 1580–1583, 1610, 1611, 2518, 4120, 4900
McCarran Act 3046
McCarran, Senator Patrick A 282, 3797, 3891, 3896, 3955, 3956
McCarthy, Joseph R 1172, 1175, 1187, 1189, 1228, 1230, 1905, 1906, 2294, 2298, 2746, 2946, 2955, 2981, 3036, 3054, 3077, 3078, 3083, 3085, 3096–3098, 3103, 3108, 3218, 3219, 3231, 3277, 3281, 3282, 3553, 3555, 3562, 3615, 3617, 4028, 4030, 4833, 4835, 4934, 4935, 4943, 5023, 5353, 5377, 5385, 5395, 5396.
McClellan, Senator John L 3069
McCloy, John J 639, 2163, 2184, 2296, 2297
McConaughy, Dr. James L 970, 971, 1219, 2622, 5079, 5337, 5345, 5361, 5365
McConnell, Dorothy 409, 410, 4142
McConnell, Bishop Francis J 411, 1504, 4116, 5152
McConnell, Frederick J 4741, 4743
McCormack, Col. Alfred 2310
McCormack, John W 5049, 5053
McCormick 596, 597
McCormick, Ann O'Hare 2832, 2834, 4835, 5334
McCormick, Colonel 5710
McCoy, Gen. Frank R 33, 155, 157, 158, 264, 495, 966, 1071, 1221, 1881, 2522, 2622, 2811, 4054, 4055, 4236, 4977, 5002, 5263, 5295, 5342, 5701.
McCrimmons, Mary A 4992, 4995
McCulloch 5266
McCulloch, John I. B 2586
McCullough, Admiral R. P 3159–3161, 3163, 3512
McCulloch, Rhoda E 4116
McCune, Evelyn 5582, 5583
McCune, George 4226
McCune, George McAfee 5229, 5350, 5582, 5583, 5660
McCune, Shannon 2482, 4199, 5009, 5336
McCure, Shannon 5582, 5583
McDermott, Mr. M. J 1118, 1123, 2088–2093, 2183, 2184, 2186–2188
McDiarmid, Onville J 5582, 5583
McDonald, A. H 5582, 5583
McDonald, C. M 5582, 5583
McDonald, James G 1221, 5084, 5111, 5152, 5153
McDougall, Sir Raibeart 2124
McDuffie, Mrs. Duncan 5186
McFadyean, Sir Andrew 1216, 2125, 4893, 5322, 5334
McFall, Jack K 1294
McGarry, Mrs 3340
McGechan, R. O 5027
McGill 238, 5208
McGill University 3869
McGill, Prof. V. J 4089, 4259
McGovern, William Montgomery 1007–1034, 1069, 1087, 1088, 1291, 1300, 2928, 3053, 3054, 3069, 3097, 3105, 3614, 3727–3729, 3747

Page
McGrath, J. Howard 5440, 5441, 5678, 5681, 5682
McGraw-Hill 377
McGregor, Prof. Robert 4259
McGuffey Electric Readers 545
McHugh, Colonel 4824, 4831
McInerny, Katherine 4116
McInerney, James M 5441–5443
McInerney, Mr 4825, 4826
McInnis, Edgar 2891, 3167, 3168, 5026, 5322, 5333, 5582–5584
McIntosh, A. D 5582, 5583
McIntyre, Harry 3842
McJennett, John 1895, 1896, 2278
McKay, Vernon 5582, 5583
McKeever, Harold Porter 4724
McKelvey 6285
McKenney, Ruth 4259
McKinlay, A. D 5582, 5583
McKinley Tariff 3687
McLaughlin, Mrs. Alfred 264, 477, 1219, 1313, 2622, 4090, 4093, 4105, 4106, 4944, 5040, 5186, 5273, 5274, 5289
McLaughlin, Arthur J 4117
McLean 5045
McLean, Evalyn Walsh 603
McLean, Robert Leroy 4393
McMahon, B. B 4958, 4966
McMahon, Senator Brien 1079, 2236, 2237, 3069, 4826, 4935, 4943
McMasters, Harry L 5701
McMichael, Jack 300
McMillen, William H 3159, 3162
McMurray, Howard J 5052, 5053
McMurray, John V. A 2912
McNair, Harley Farnsworth 4861, 5582, 5583
McNally, E. J 4824, 4832
McNaughton 1274, 1288
McNelly, Theordore 5582, 5583
McNutt, Mrs. Paul V 3794
McNutt, Waldo 4142
McSweeney, John 4903, 5502
McWilliams 5187
McWilliams, Carey 2581, 2684, 3588, 4611, 5582, 5583
McWilliams, Mrs. Robert 5040
MDAP Philippines Mission 1120
M-Day 2674
Mead, Margaret 5576, 5577
Mead, Senator 1104
Meaney 1075, 1292, 1293
Mears, Elliot G 5576, 5577
Mears, Helen 5576, 5577, 5657
Mecca Temple 160, 295, 296, 299
Mechanics Institute Building (San Francisco) 3176
Mededeelingen 5329
Medical Bureau for Spain (Women's Division) 4275
Medical Pharmaceutical Information Bureau 4401
Medical Service for the Masses (Chinese Communist Party) 2404
Medina, Judge 2897, 2970, 2985, 3718
Medynsky, Eugene 3620, 3221
Meeus, Father Charles 3144
Meharally 5179
Mehta, D. H 5576, 5577
Mei, Dr 5281
Mei, Ju-ao 5576, 5577
Meija Restoration 366, 375, 2702, 3688
Meiji Era (Japan) 4151
Meiklejohn, Alexander 5661
Meisinger, Mr 4441
Meisling, Vaughn F 5052, 5053, 5089

Page
Mekeel, H. Scudder 5576, 5577
Mekhanoshin, K. A 189, 4508, 4553–4555, 4557, 4573
Mekhlis, Leo 5185
Meldon, John 619
Melish, Rev. William H 3793, 4611, 5576, 5577
Mellon Gallery 144, 145
Mellon, Paul 5300
Melton, James 1528
Memering, H. P 3159
Mencken, H. L 2659
Menefee, Audrey (Mrs. Selden Menefee) 2116, 2162, 2521, 2776, 3965, 5576, 5577, 5701
Menefee, Selden 1744, 1745, 2116, 2158, 2160–2162, 2169, 2177, 2303, 2521, 2776, 2809, 3546, 3965, 4611, 4887, 5701.
Meng, C. Y. W 143
Meng, Chih 5576, 5577
Meng, Fu-tang 2467
Meng, Yung-chien 3951
Menges, Dr. Earl H 327, 3611, 3637, 3961
Menjies, A. R 5576, 5577
Mentnow (Republic) 1609
Menzies, James M 5576, 5577
Menzies, Robert G 2635, 2636
Menzles, A. R 3472
Mercer University 1966
Mercury (Periodical) 142, 399
Merill, Frederick T 5350
Merkuloff, Mr 3224
Merner, Garfield D 5040
Merrell, Elinor 1513
Merrell, George 5061
Merrell, W. P 3167
Merriam, Charles E 4119, 5661
Merrill, General 1436
Merrill, Lewis 477, 620, 622, 2242, 4116
Merritt, General 848
Mertsky, (Colemen) Jeannette 4824, 4832
Meserole, Darwin J 4260
Messer, Barbara 4987
Messenger, Miss 5173
Meston, Lord 5576, 5577
Metcalf, Josephine 4988
Metcalfe, John C 744, 745, 1887, 1888
Methodist Federation for Social Service 411, 2160
Methuen & Co., Ltd 4591
Metropole Hotel (Moscow) 2714, 2718
Metropolitan Benjamin of the Russian Orthodox Church 297
Metropolitan Broadcasting Co 2521, 2776
Metropolitan Club 1728
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co 4119
Metropolitan Police Board, Tokyo 4134
Metzmaekers, L 5576, 5577
Meuvret, Colette 5575, 5577
Mexican Friends of the Chinese People 4273
Mexico 3696, 3697, 4069, 4070, 4584, 5332
Meyer, Catharine 2659
Meyer, Eugene 2248, 4834, 5701
Meyer, Ernest L 4152
Meyer, Major 5181
Meyer, Paul 1732, 2124
Meyer, Peter 2529, 2534
Meyer, Raymond T 5702
Meyers, Merrill 1738
Mez, John Richard 5576, 5577
Miami Valley Socialist 2665

Page
Miaja, General 4481, 4482
Michael, Dr. Francis Henry 327, 3962
Michael, Franz 5576, 5577, 5684
Michael, Mr 4513
Michigan University 474, 1539, 2480, 2659, 3168
Mickey, Margaret Portia 5576, 5577
Mickle, J. J 997
Mickle, Joe 4983, 5578, 5579
MID (Military Intelligence Division). (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Middle Temple of London 358
Midkiff, Frank E 264, 568, 4125, 4126, 5207, 5578, 5579
Midston House (New York City) 970, 971
Midway Island 4266
Midwest Daily Record 514, 523, 4388
Midwest Labor News 2665
Mierendorff 4234
Mif, Mr 4589, 4883
Mikado. (*See* Hirohito.)
Mikhailov, Nicholas 663, 664, 2592
Mikhailovitch, General 784, 787, 852, 1594, 3503
Mikolajczyk 1083
Mikoyan 3313, 3314
Miles, Commodore 5376
Military Affairs Committee (House) 1686, 1915, 4543
Military Affairs Commission (Chinese Nationalists) 2331
Military Affairs Commission (Communist Military Council) 2435
Military Collegium of the Supreme Court (U. S. S. R.) 5152–5156
Military Council (Chinese Communist Party) 2448
Military Government (Korea) 2249, 2250
Military Intelligence. (*See* Army Intelligence.)
Military Intelligence (Russia) 4561, 4562, 4566, 4581, 4584, 4590
Military Intelligence Service (MIS) 4832
Military Mission (China) 1026, 1069
Military Training School (Nanchang) 2457
Military Weakness and Military Invention 3800, 3985, 3986
Mill, Edward W 5578, 5579, 5701
Millegan, Lloyd 5295
Miller, Agnes R 5578, 5579
Miller, Clayton 5578, 5579
Miller, Clyde 1514
Miller, Frances F 5295
Miller, Helen Hill 326, 3794
Miller, Prof. Herbert A 4260
Miller, J. Clayton 2546
Miller, J. I 2603, 2604
Miller, Jesse I 4958, 4972, 4974
Miller, John C 5661
Miller, Justin 1648
Miller, Margaret 3167, 3168, 5578, 5579
Miller, May 54, 55, 4297
Miller, Robert T 134–136, 242, 243, 439, 3546, 4398, 4473–4475, 4719, 4737, 4947
Millet 2912
Millikan, Dr. Clark B 712, 3794
Millikan, Robert A 3794, 5274, 5281, 5282
Milliman, E. E 1104
Millis, Walter H 1122, 1124, 1125, 1222, 3167, 4109, 4959, 5578, 5579, 5654
Millman, Abe J 4990, 4995
Millman, Benjamin 4990, 4995
Mills, Mr 319, 321, 375, 414, 5685
Mills College (*see also* Mills Summer Institute) 264, 712, 5040
Mills, Harriett 989, 997, 2523, 4989, 4995
Mills, Lennox A 1221, 1222, 5078, 5578, 5579
Mills, Saul 1104, 4081
Mills Summer Institute 584, 585, 1220, 1221, 2817

Page
Mills, Sol 2646
Milner, Ian F. G 5578, 5579
Milner, Lucile B 4234
Milwaukee Leader 2665
Minarovich, Michael 945, 4987, 4988, 4990, 4995
Mind Medicine and Man 3621
Mindszenty, Cardinal 1533, 3942
Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, CIO 622
Minerva, D. F. Ediciones 4591
Ming, Li 2832
Ming, Yui 2729
Minh, Ho Chi (*see also* Ho, Chi Minh) 930, 1031, 1282, 1610, 1612, 1613, 1620, 1622, 2553, 2557, 5394
Ministry of Aviation (Nationalist China) 195
Ministry of Construction (Nanking Puppet Government) 2369
Ministry of Economic Affairs Bulletin 2646
Ministry of Finance (Japan) 2231, 3850
Ministry of Food Supply (Nanking Puppet Government) 2369
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nationalist Government) 2350, 2356
Ministry of Social Affairs (Nanking Puppet Government) 2369
Ministry of Textile Industries (Chinese) 3951
Ministry of Trade (Chinese) 3951
Minneapolis Labor Review 2665
Minneapolis Tribune 1220
Minnesota Union Advocate 2665
Minnesota University 901, 1036, 1050, 1132, 1551, 1583, 2658
Minobe, Tatsukichi 4184
Minor, Robert 162, 286, 548, 595, 599, 600, 605, 2809, 3956, 4924–4926
Minorities Department, Secretariat (Chinese Communist Party) 2471
Minority Nationalities Activities Department 2408
Minorities in the Soviet Far East 3461, 3462, 3617, 3618, 3621
Mins, H. F., Jr 4089
Minseito 2628, 4148
Minton, Justice Sherman 3777
Mintz, Jeanne S 5578, 5579
Minusinsk 3463
Mirkovic, General Bor 852
Mirkowich, Nicholas 5578, 5579
Mirror 619
Mirsky, D. S 5135, 5136
Mirsky, Jacob 4117, 4142
Mirsky, Prince 4503, 4506, 4507
Mississippi Valley Historical Association 3969
Missouri (United States Ship) 1906, 2294, 4877
Misumi Kikan 4443
MIT. (*See* Massachusetts Institute of Technology.)
Mitchell, Broadus 4089
Mitchell, C. Clyde 5578, 5579
Mitchell, Gloria 4992, 4995
Mitchell, Kate L 35, 72, 115, 260, 263, 474, 477, 654, 655, 660, 663, 664, 712, 768, 769, 908, 911, 955, 956, 1228, 1229, 1746, 2579, 2581, 2718, 2891, 2978, 3481, 3483, 3581, 3587, 3588, 3592, 3926, 3934, 3943, 4015, 4017, 4096, 4100, 4109, 4264, 4497, 4504, 4584, 4586–4588, 4611, 4616, 4842, 4844, 4847, 4861, 4910, 4914, 4916, 4987, 4998, 5003, 5032, 5042, 5061, 5078, 5083–5085, 5111, 5118, 5119, 5129, 5132, 5152, 5153, 5156–5160, 5172, 5175, 5180, 5188, 5194, 5195, 5198, 5210, 5214, 5238, 5356, 5578, 5579, 5684, 5685, 5703, 5704.
Mitchell, Wesley C 4119, 5002
Mitrany, D 179, 2891, 5081, 5300, 5578, 5579
Mitsubishi (Japanese big business firms) 666, 740, 1830, 1878, 2166, 1271, 2300, 2628, 3583, 4148, 5150, 5666
Mitsui (Japanese big business firms) 666, 740, 1830, 1865, 2166, 2171, 2300, 2628, 3583, 4148, 5666
Mitsusada, Mr. Yoshikawa 359, 360
Mixed Frontier Commission (Japanese) 2697

Page
Miyamoto, Tetsuii 2467
Mo, James 1646, 3335
Mobilization Committee (Tung Yuan Hui) 2333, 2334, 2336
Model Peace Zones 2370, 2371
Modern Age Books, Inc 2658, 4258
Modern Japan 3943
Moe, Henry Allen 237, 239, 4095, 5123, 5209, 5299, 5355
Moe, Kilmer 5578, 5579
Moeller, Heinz (Asiatieus) (Hans Mueller) 36–40, 47, 48, 50, 58, 60, 180, 308–310, 915, 973, 974, 1012, 1762, 1763, 1850, 2467, 2890, 2891, 3128, 3130–3134, 3139, 3148, 3154, 3156–3158, 3167, 3170, 3174, 3175, 3177, 3181, 3182, 3185–3188, 3190, 3236, 4575, 4807, 4860, 4861, 5085, 5180, 5337, 5341, 5508, 5509.
Moerman, Elodie 4987
Moffat, Abbot Low 494, 858, 859, 1313, 2124, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2521, 2776, 2810, 3894, 3900, 4944, 5293, 5294, 5701.
Moffat, Mrs. Abbott Low 2521, 2776, 5701
Mohammad, Saadullah Khan 5006, 5044
Mohammedan Column (Eighteenth Group Army) 2466
Mohammedans 2394
Mohanimed, Azizah F 5578, 5579
Mok, P. K 5578, 5579
Moldauer, Frances (Sharve) 4988, 4989, 4995
Moll, J. T 254, 5334, 5578, 5579, 5684
Mollegan, A. T 2684
Molnar, Ferenc 5660
Molotoff, Vyacheslaff M. (*see also* Molotov) 3224
Molotov, V. M. (*see also* Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff) 178, 266, 1852, 2315, 2385, 2398, 2635, 2637, 2729, 2849, 2850, 2860, 2863, 4100, 4150, 4152, 4202, 4495, 4511, 5077, 5185, 5199, 5262, 5284, 5393, 5484, 5578, 5579.
Molyneaux, Peter 433, 857, 4974
Monarch Life Assurance Co 157, 1216
Mongol Garrison (Karashar) 2385
Mongolia 3318, 3463, 3488, 3552, 3599, 3634, 3638, 3909, 4100, 4150, 4152, 4202, 4418, 4419, 4422, 4425, 4429, 4433, 4504, 4516–4519, 4523, 4526, 4527, 4562–4566, 4570, 4571, 4590, 4631, 4632, 4836.
Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet 2482
Mongolian Atlas 3322
Mongolian Government 2724
Mongolian People's Army 2724
Mongolian Peoples Republic 931, 1944, 1947, 2385, 2722, 3323, 4523, 4525, 5087, 5088
Mongols 2384
Mongols of Manchuria 3266, 4029
Mon-lin (Monlin) Dr. Chiang 651, 1216, 1222, 1631, 1633, 4893
Monroe Doctrine 4070
Mont Tremblant. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Mont Tremblant Conference.)
Montagne, R 5578, 5579
Montana, Marjorie 4991, 4992, 4995
Montello, Dominick 3336
Montelibano 4857
Monthly Labor Review 4320
Montreal 3582
Moo, P. T 3546
Mood, Fulmer 4089
MooKerjee, Girija 5580, 5581
Moon, Penderel 5580, 5581, 5649
Mooney, James D 1219, 5123
Mooney, Martha 5053
Mooney, Tom 2161, 2665
Moore, Miss 5705

Page
Moore, E. S. 5580, 5581
Moore, Eddie 5238
Moore, Harriet Lucy (*see also* Harriet Moore Gelfan) 72, 115, 148–150, 170, 171, 176, 177, 238, 253, 254, 260, 261–267, 291, 293, 293–300, 302, 307, 350, 433, 438, 443, 444, 472, 530, 549, 550, 628, 629, 647, 687, 857, 937, 938, 988, 1108, 1220, 1313, 1314, 1320, 1938, 2986, 3126, 3128, 3132, 3133, 3135, 3136, 3149, 3156, 3167, 3168, 3171, 3172, 3236, 3241–3244, 3265, 3316–3318, 3321, 3323, 3329, 3343, 3449–3452, 3454, 3456, 3457, 3466, 3479–3481, 3483–3485, 3547, 3570, 3775, 3858–3860, 3862, 3868, 3888, 3908, 3929, 3930, 3933, 3934, 4090, 4091, 4145, 4188, 4208, 4209, 4351, 4476–4478, 4497, 4502–4506, 4526, 4554, 4555, 4568, 4569, 4571, 4574, 4859–4861, 4897, 4915, 4917, 4941, 4958, 4965, 4974, 4977, 4987–4989, 4995, 4997, 5013, 5024, 5031, 5032, 5045, 5046, 5051, 5053, 5083–5085, 5111, 5112, 5120, 5126, 5129, 5130–5132, 5134, 5136–5138, 5140, 5150, 5151, 5156, 5160, 5162, 5172, 5178, 5181, 5190, 5198, 5201, 5208–5210, 5218, 5227, 5230, 5238, 5268, 5282, 5284, 5299, 5337, 5356, 5357, 5580, 5581, 5654, 5704.
Moore, Maurice T 5299
Moore, Mrs. Maurice T 5079, 5299
Moore-McCormack Lines 4869
Moore, Moris T 4835
Moore, Philip 5165
Moore, Mrs. Philip 5165
Moore, R. Walton 893
Moore, Richard 3335
Moore, T. Inglis 5580, 5581
Moore, Wallace 4834
Moorehead, Helen Howell 5580, 5581
Moorhead, Mrs 2248
Moorhead, Mrs. Boswell 5701
Moorhous, Margaret H 5674
Moos, Malcolm W. (Moss) 4045, 4046
Moose, Elizabeth 3556
Moose, Professor 3552, 3556
Morales, Alfredo T 5580, 5581
Moran, William T 5580, 5581
Morantie, P. C 5580, 5581
Morgan, Mr. 2960–2962, 2966, 2968, 4821, 4824–4826, 4829, 4832, 4833
Morgan, A 4270
Morgan, Mr. Edward P 4836
Morgan, Gwen 560
Morgan, J. P 1217, 1219, 4055, 4105
Morgan, J. P. & Co 49, 159, 836
Morgan, Leslie 4991, 4995, 5580, 5581
Morgan, Richard C 5677
Morgan, Mrs. Richard C. (Anna Haas) 5674–5683
Morgenthau, Mr. Henry, Jr 419, 420, 422, 423, 431, 556, 604, 1017, 1028, 1029, 1758, 2837, 4056, 4745, 5045, 5059.
Morgenthau Plan 556, 604, 1017, 1028, 1029, 3669, 4877
Mori, Iga 4125, 4126, 5207
Morison, George Abbot 5703
Morita, Betty 4989, 4995
Morley, Lorna 5295
Mormacsun (steamship) 891, 892
Morrill, J. L 4902
Morris 5681
Morris, David Elyn 5659
Morris, George W 3964, 5701
Morris, Homer L 3794
Morris, John 5580, 5581
Morris, Lawrence 712, 713, 970, 971, 1220, 1313, 2622, 5365

Page
Morris, Marion 4989, 4995
Morris, Robert 293, 294, 300, 1080, 1474, 1687, 1688
Morris, Roland 5263
Morris, S. V. C 5704
Morris, Stephanus V. C 3934
Morris, Susan 4659
Morris, William 5079
Morris, Wilson 4988, 1990, 4995
Morrish, William F 4093, 5186
Morrison, Angelina 4990, 4995
Morrison, George Abbot 494, 712, 713, 858, 859, 996, 1313
Morrison, Ian 668, 5231, 5580, 5581
Morrison, Phoebe 5701
Morrison, William D. F 5701
Morrisson, Mrs. James W 1220
Morizon, Col. Victor 2124, 2126
Morse, Senator Wayne 452, 464, 1197, 3738, 4834, 4935, 5350
Morse, Richard 5580, 5581
Morseley, Hilton 4989, 4995
Morton, Robert S 5580, 5581
Morton, Rev. Richard 621, 622
Morton, W. L 5580, 5581
Moscow 3277,
3284, 3317, 3318, 3320, 3322, 3327–3329, 3331, 3332, 3365, 3388, 3405, 3434, 3439, 3467, 3468, 3481, 3483, 3484, 3486–3488, 3499, 3500, 3502, 3503, 3533, 3536, 3538, 3558, 3559, 3596, 3603–3605, 3614, 3632–3634, 3638, 3702, 3703, 3705, 3815, 3828, 3857, 3880, 3892, 3908, 3909, 3927–3929, 3931, 3932, 3934, 3943, 3950, 3951, 4019, 4035, 4042, 4049, 4108, 4120, 4151, 4203, 4284, 4286, 4404, 4442, 4475, 4476, 4482, 4486–4488, 4490, 4492, 4495, 4498–4500, 4502, 4510, 4514, 4516, 4520, 4522, 4525–4527, 4545, 4553, 4561, 4562, 4568, 4574, 4575, 4577–4583, 4586, 4712, 4713, 4771, 4789, 4872, 4873, 4878, 4880–4883, 4890, 4896, 5318, 5331, 5356, 5380, 5391, 5393, 5463–5465, 5473.
Moscow Airdrome 3224
Moscow Berlin Non-Aggression Pact 5075, 5195
Moscow Conference 1089, 1485, 1881, 2828, 2841, 3156
Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries 1729
Moscow Daily News 243,
2451, 2719, 2720, 3526, 3529, 3906, 3907, 4403, 4404, 4508, 4583
Moscow Garrison 3224
Moscow Government 894
Moscow Meetings (1936) 3315, 3316, 3321, 3323, 3547, 3603, 3604, 3679
Moscow Military Academy 2458
Moscow Military College 2464
Moscow New Times 3758, 3767, 3768
Moscow Radio 395, 1226
Moscow Stock Exchange 4505, 4567
Moscow Trials 889,
890, 3364, 3466, 3468, 3499, 3581, 4105, 4144, 4145, 4559, 4584, 4585, 4587, 5149, 5152–5155, 5157, 5168, 5169.
Moscow University 868
Moscow-Volga Canal 3484
Moscow, Warren 5657
Moseley, Philip E 178, 2523, 5116, 5221, 5580, 5581
Moser, C. K 5007, 5008, 5198, 5206, 5236
Mosimien (China) 3630
Moslems 2327, 2384, 2385, 2394
Moss, Malcolm W. (Moos) 4045, 4046
Moss, Warner 5702
Motion Picture Artists Committee 4066
Motion Picture Democratic Committee 4062, 4063, 4066
Motion Pictures and Distributors of America 1219
Mott, Celestine G 4990, 4995

Page
Motylev, V. E. (Motiliev) 40, 50, 52, 189, 190, 239, 259, 265, 577–580, 891, 892, 1225, 1746, 2590, 2697, 2698, 2705, 2706, 2711–2713, 2715, 2727–2730, 3135, 3137, 3147, 3149, 3152, 3155, 3171–3174, 3176, 3221, 3222, 3229, 3234, 3236, 3238–3240, 3243, 3247, 3248, 3311, 3315–3319, 3322–3326, 3331, 3333, 3434, 3437, 3443, 3446, 3450, 3453, 3457, 3481–3487, 3881, 3933–3935, 4020, 4021, 4146, 4476, 4477, 4495, 4498, 4500–4503, 4505, 4507, 4560–4563, 4566–4571, 4574, 4859, 4861, 4895, 4916, 5025, 5045, 5056, 5084, 5085, 5112, 5132–5135, 5139, 5140, 5149–5151, 5157, 5158, 5160–5163, 5165, 5172, 5175, 5178–5180, 5184, 5187, 5190, 5192–5195, 5198–5201, 5209, 5215, 5219, 5221, 5225, 5228, 5230, 5246, 5262, 5266, 5275, 5320, 5359.
Moulder, Morgan M 4903, 5502
Mount Holyoke College 3981
Mountbatten, Earl 4331
Mountbatten, Lord Louis 776, 1414, 1416, 1448
Movement Against War and Fascism (New Zealand) 4235
Mowrer, Edgar A 5701, 5278
Mowry, George E 5039, 5040
Moy, Eugene 4037, 4355
Moyer, Raymond 1631, 3512, 3514, 3965, 5295, 5580, 5581
Moyer, Mrs. Raymond 5295
Mu, Ch'Iao 3341, 3509
Mudaliar, A. Ramaswami 5321
Mudd, Harvey 712
Mueller, Hans. (*See* Moeller, Heinz.)
Muenzenberg, Willy 311, 312
Mueschke, Paul 2659
Mueshkov 1317
Muhle 253, 254, 687, 2518, 2880, 4208, 4209
Mukden 3711
Muller, H. J 4089
Muller, Mrs 4439
Mullin, V 4506, 4508
Mundt, Senator Karl E 1189, 5049, 5053, 5353, 5355
Munich 3421, 3712
Munich Agreement 4115, 4204
Munichmen 597, 598, 603
Municipal Congress (Hsieu) 2408
Munitions Assignments Board 446
Munson, Lyle A 2751, 2771, 2854, 3007, 3763–3766, 3771, 3772, 5437–5442
Munzenberg, Mr 285
Murby, T 2518
Murdoek, George P 342
Murdoek, James 5702
Murmansk 4555, 4556
Murmansk Railway 296
Murota, Ayaka 4992, 4995
Murphy 1272, 1274, 1289, 2652
Murphy, Bob 1744
Murphy, Charles 4932, 4933
Murphy, Gardner 4119, 4834
Murphy, J 4988
Murphy, J. Morden 568, 901, 1144, 1147, 1148, 1220, 1551, 1562, 1575, 1578, 1579, 1595, 1608, 1610, 1613, 1617, 1622, 1627, 1637–1640, 1646, 1660, 1675, 3079, 3704, 4835, 5323.
Murphey, Roads 5580, 5581
Murray full-employment bill 640
Murray, Senator James E 3666, 3667
Murray, Philip 559, 946, 947, 1100, 1104, 2621, 2834, 3794
Murray, R. Stuart 5199, 5248
Murray, Wallace A 428, 445, 1100, 2835, 4975
Murrow, Edward R 3041, 5355
Mus, Paul 5580, 5581
Museum of Western Art (Moscow) 2730
Mussolini, Benito 279, 317, 602, 2671, 3586, 4106, 4204, 5249, 5681

Page
Muster, Morris 4116
MVD 869
My Country and My People 3167
My Life in China 3705
My 25 Years in China 3498
Myers, Frederick N 621, 622, 5045, 5274, 5286, 5294
Myers, William Starr 4027
Myrdal 238, 5209
Myyagi 372
NAACP. (*See* National Association for Advancement of Colored People.)
Nadal, Brother Paschal O. F. M 3630
Nagakura 578
Nagano, Mr. Y 4270, 4860
Nagasaki (Japan) 4112
Naggiar, Paul Emile 2124, 2125, 5026, 5027, 5062, 5321, 5333
Nagtegoal, C 5582, 5583
Nakamura, Nobuyoshi 3297
NAM 56, 605, 606
Nan, Han-cheng 2405, 2467, 3950, 3951
Nan-chang Police 2457
Nan-chang Uprising 2454, 2455, 2457, 2458, 2460, 2463, 2473, 3306
Nankai (China) 4108
Nankai Middle School (Tientsin) 2455
Nankai University (Peiping) 2455, 3593
Nanking, China 3289, 3291, 3294, 3304–3306, 3475, 3482, 3535–3537, 3582–3584, 3589, 3622, 3523, 3685, 3706, 3710, 3711, 3788, 3836, 3962, 3979, 3989, 3994, 4047, 4133, 4150, 4151, 4169, 4213, 4215, 4217, 4220, 4271, 4273, 4322, 4424, 4426, 4442, 4443, 4570, 4770.
Nanking Embassy 1749, 1968, 1971, 1985
Nanking Government 251, 350 1975 2545 2702
Nanking Puppet Government 2318, 2360, 2369, 2370
Nanking Regular Army Troops 2330
Nanking University 444
Narkomindel (Soviet Foreign Office) 2729, 3319, 3323, 4572, 4577
Nash, Phil 5016
Nash, Prof. J 4277
Nash, Vernon 5582, 5583, 5659
Nash, Walter 1216, 3881, 5062, 5319–5321, 5334, 5582, 5583
Nasu, Dr 5218, 5705, 5706
Nasu, Shiroshi 1222, 3585, 4231
Nater, W. R 5584, 5585
Nath, Vishwambhar 5582, 5583
Nathan, George Jean 5649
Nathan, R. S 5582, 5583
Nathan, Robert 432, 444, 857, 4973
Nathausen, Miss 5112
Nation, The 563, 564, 620, 622, 714, 1841, 1867, 2651, 2659, 2661, 2669–2681, 2684, 2688, 3465, 3705, 3706, 3903, 4260, 4275, 4592, 4615, 4935, 5040, 5278, 5648–5650, 5640–5660, 5673.
National Academy of Science 5038, 5291
National Assembly (China) 2259, 2307, 2308, 2312, 2342, 2394, 2396, 2398
National Association for Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 2769, 2683
National Board (Politburo) 398, 516–522, 526, 528, 529, 535, 543, 549, 550, 555, 556, 558, 559, 581, 600, 604, 605, 608, 616, 619, 625, 631, 650, 657, 659, 665, 667, 679, 1078, 1079, 1084, 1085, 1088, 1091, 1099, 1101, 1103, 1109, 1328, 1357, 1404, 1409, 1427, 1451, 1452, 1464, 1471, 1478, 1522, 1687, 2562.
National Board (Communist Political Association) 707
National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) 1744, 2116, 2160–2163, 2169, 2296, 2303, 3965.
National Bureau of Economic Research 4638, 4639, 4664
National Bureau of Standards 4727
National Cash Register Co 1217

Page
National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service 3630
National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief 433, 858
National City Bank (New York) 996, 1151, 1217, 1219, 2070, 2810, 4830
National Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners 2655
National Committee of Friends of the Soviet Union 2655
National Committee to Win the Peace 3477–3479, 4328
National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 2409, 2410, 2411, 2550
National Constitutional Convention (China) 1518
National Convention (Chinese Communist Party) 2410
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc 2655, 2656, 4328, 4842
National Council of Jewish Women 4304, 4327
National Council for the Prevention of War 4127
National Credit Office 475
National Currency (China) 2421, 2431
National Defense. (*See* United States Department of Defense.)
National Defense Council (India) 5005, 5006, 5042, 5043
National Diet (Japan) 4185
National Education Committee on Communist Policy in China 55
National Emancipation Vanguards 2344
National Farm Holiday Association 4116
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties 4754
National Federation of Womens Clubs 5067
National Foreign Trade Council 1916, 1917, 2256, 2263, 4544
National Geographic Magazine 1136, 1323, 1324
National Geographic Society 1231
National Government of China. (*See* Chinese National Government.)
National Herald:
China 2356, 2392, 2409
India 5278
National Hosiery Manufacturers Association 4275
National Indusco Guild 5213
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 555, 2638, 4623
National Labor Union (Chinese Communist Party) 2404, 2416, 2465
National Lamp Shade Manufacturers Association 4275
National Lawyers Guild 621, 622
National League of Women Voters 444, 5067
National Legislature of China 103
National Library (Peiping) 3593
National Maritime Union 621, 622
National Mediation Board 2639
National Military Council (China) 2218, 2331, 2341, 2343, 2348, 2351, 2391, 2433, 2455, 2545, 2631
National Military Establishment Officials 2538
National Negro Congress 4116, 4596, 4598, 4607
National Negro Council 3847
National Normal University (Peking) 2473
National Party of China. (*See* Chinese Nationalist Party.)
National Peace Conference 4106
National Peasants Union 4857
National Peking University 539, 3168
National People's Army (Kuominchun) 2329
National Peoples Congress (National Assembly) 2307, 2308, 2312, 2342, 2394, 2396, 2398
National People's Party. (*See* Kuomintang and Kuomintang Government.)
National Planning Association 2831
National Planning Board (China) 2374
National Policy of the Soviet Government in the Far East and in the Northern Regions of Siberia 3935
National Preparatory Committee 3950, 3951
National Production Authority 4758, 5711
National Public Housing Conference 4258
National Recovery Administration (NRA) 488, 659, 2643, 4638, 4733
National Reconstruction Loan (Hopeh-Shansi-Shangung-Honan Border Region Government) 2422
National Republican Program Committee 995
National Research Project. (*See* Work Project Administration, National Research Project.)

Page
National Resources Planning Board 432, 568, 570–573, 857, 995, 2601, 2602
National Revolutionary Army (Communist) 2331
National Salvation Association 2333, 2335, 2473
National Salvation Cooperative Society (Shansi) 2422
National Salvation Loan (Hopeh-Shansi-Chahar Border Region Government) 2422
National Salvationists 821
National Security Council 1125, 1126, 1276
National Shinto (Japanese) 736, 742, 2162, 2168, 2302
National Staff College 1521
National Steel Corp 3703
National Students League 2795, 2796, 2874, 2875
National Trade Council 1795
National United Front 4022
National Wallace for President Committee 1336
National War Fund, Inc 410, 1247
National War Labor Board 571
Nationalist Blockade (China). (*See* Chinese Nationalist Blockade of Communist China.)
Nationalist Chinese Army. (*See* Chinese Nationalist Army.)
Nationalist Chinese Government. (*See* Chinese Nationalist Government.)
Nationalist Chinese Mission (Bern, Switzerland). (*See* Chinese Nationalist Mission, Bern, Switzerland.)
Nationalist Garrison (Chou Ping Fort) 2326
Nationalist Revolution (China) 2470
Nationalist Revolutionary Forces (Third Division) 2458
Nationalist Secret Police (Blue Shirts) 2330
Native Customary Law in the Netherlands East Indies 3167
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 1119, 1120
Natsuda, Mr 4439
Natural History Museum (New York) 686
Naval Intelligence of the Soviet Union 4533, 4554, 4561, 4573
Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md. (*See* United States Naval Medical Center.)
Naval Military Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922 1514
Naval Military Arms Limitation Treaty of 1930 1514
Naval Operations (Office of Chief). (*See* United States Naval Operations Office of Chief.)
Naval School of Military Government and Administration, Columbia University. (*See* United States Naval School of Military Government and Administration, Columbia University.)
Navy. (*See* United States Navy.)
Navy Department. (*See* United States Department of Navy.)
Navy General Board. (*See* United States Navy General Board)
Navy Intelligence. (*See* United States Navy Intelligence.)
Navy Mission (China) 1026
Navy Labor Victory Committee 1105
Navy Radio Personnel. (*See* United States Navy Radio Personnel.)
Nazi. (*See* Germany, National Socialist Party of.)
Nazi Congress at Nuremberg 4200
Nazi-German Pact 3228, 3230
Nazi Intelligence 4423, 4433
Nazi Party (*see also* German, National Socialist Party of) 504, 596, 605, 606, 1120, 1441, 1533, 2169, 2303, 2328, 2381, 2467, 2532, 2546, 2655, 2673, 2674, 2677, 2680, 2683, 2685, 2688, 2783, 2804, 3073, 3094, 3226, 3228, 3230, 3241, 4421.
Nazi-Soviet Pact 2655, 2684, 2804
Nazi Underground 3387
NBC. (*See* National Broadcasting Co.)
NBC University of the Air 736, 743
Neal, Arthur L 5582, 5583
Neal, Elizabeth 4987, 4991, 4995
Nebokov, Vladimir Vladimirovich 5654
Need of an American Policy Toward the Problems Created by the Rise of the Chinese Communist Party (report) 1927
Need for Constitutional Reform 3167

Page
Needham, Joseph ... 4089, 5584, 5585
Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union ... 3335, 3336
Needleman, Isadore Gibby ... 4753
Negro Question in the United States ... 2887, 2890, 3843
Negro Workers Congress ... 162
Negroes in a Soviet America ... 2887
Nehmer, Stanley ... 5584, 5585
Nehru, Jawaharial Pandit ... 18, 239, 276, 1045, 1049, 1050, 1053, 1055, 1066, 1067, 1167, 1252, 1258, 1272, 1586, 1589, 1593, 1594, 1600, 1613, 1615, 1678, 1681, 2530, 2531, 2556, 2638, 3078, 3568, 3605, 3931, 5027, 5209, 5348, 5462.
Neibuhr, Reinhold ... 4116
Neilson, William Allen ... 4091, 4145
Neiman, Gilbert ... 5654
Neineman, Mrs. Arthur ... 264
Nelson, Benjamin ... 3963
Nelson, Bert ... 4887
Nelson, Carl ... 3965, 5295
Nelson, Donald M ... 154, 638, 1221, 1393, 1397, 1398, 1439, 1441, 1443, 2385, 2392, 3626, 4691, 4853, 4944
Nelson, Harry A ... 4989, 4995
Nelson, John ... 5335
Nelson, Melvin Frederick ... 5649
Nelson Mission ... 1441
Nelson, Steve ... 4902, 4903
Nelson, William E ... 5576, 5577
Neprud, Carl ... 5584, 5585
Nerenberg, Clara ... 4989, 4995
Nesi (Jim) James ... 3058, 3060, 3061, 3825, 3826, 3832, 3836
Nesi, Ruth ... 3058
Nessin, Sam ... 3336
Netherlands ... 4569, 4893, 5130, 5191, 5222, 5224, 5320, 5321, 5322, 5329, 5635, 5636, 5639, 5640, 5641, 5642
Netherlands Government ... 2170, 2376, 3592
Netherlands Indies ... 3881, 3936, 4098, 4104, 4113, 4114, 4267, 4493, 5322, 5329, 5334
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council ... 440
Neugebauer, Frieda ... 4989, 4995
Neu-Koelln ... 4236
Neumann, Heinz ... 2321, 2467, 2805
Neutrality Act ... 447, 2672, 2673, 2676, 4115, 4128, 4202, 4203
Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law ... 3167
Neutrality Pact With Japan ... 2374, 2375
Never Let the Right Hand Know ... 2789
Nevins, Allan ... 5661
New Advance ... 1000, 1001
New Armory Building (Washington) ... 2604
New Cemetery for Revolutionists ... 258
New Century Publishers, Inc ... 89, 105, 106, 540, 2889, 3061, 3829
New China ... 3839
New China Daily News ... 2341, 2342, 2344, 2377, 2453, 2469, 3144, 3163, 3164, 3168, 3195, 3596, 3832–3834, 4036, 4037, 4079, 4355, 4356, 4357, 4807, 5369, 5370
New China News Agency ... 5379, 5412
New China's Economic Policy ... 2369, 2789
New Chinese Army ... 270
New Citizen Movement (Hsin Kuo Min) ... 2369
New College, Oxford ... 171, 178
New Conspiracy Against China ... 2679
New Deal ... 1734, 1735, 1741, 1742, 1760, 3907
New Defense Frontier ... 2674
New Delhi ... 3605, 3880, 5349
New Delhi Conference ... 1237, 1801, 2789
New Delhi Congress ... 1627
New Democracies in China ... 3839

Page
New Democracy (Principles of New Democracy)--- 2315, 2317, 2329, 2414, 2466
New Economic Policy (Soviet Russia)---- 2414
New Fourth Route Army. (*See* Chinese Communist Army, New Fourth Route.)
New Guinea---- 3702
New Haven Register---- 3035
New Ilhan---- 5062, 5584, 5585
New Leader---- 213, 2529, 3638, 4939, 5041, 5683, 5686
New Life Movement---- 476
New Majority---- 2665
New Masses---- 9, 10, 12, 15, 19, 21, 22, 105, 106, 116, 117, 125, 220, 231, 345, 460, 465, 495, 496, 540, 657, 658, 1199, 2161, 2266, 2657, 2658, 2662, 2663, 2670, 2671–2680, 2682, 2887, 3003, 3297–3299, 3202–3204, 3465, 3529, 3830, 3920, 4069–4071, 4093, 4094, 4179–4182, 4238, 4281, 4853, 4877, 4878, 4937, 4939, 5337, 5338, 5340 5352, 5356
New People's Republic of China---- 3834
New Republic---- 4592 4935, 4977, 5041, 5647–5660, 5673
New Republic Magazine---- 714, 1220, 1841, 2542, 2659, 3035, 3465, 4259, 4315
New Role of China---- 2886
New School for Social Research---- 3615, 4273, 4871, 4872, 5208, 5323
New Stage in the Far East---- 2887
New Statesman and Nation---- 3706, 4264, 5181, 5278, 5386, 5388
New War Economy---- 2887
New World, The. (*See* Novyi Mir.)
New York Age---- 1106
New York American---- 4234
New York Bar---- 2775
New York Call---- 2665
New York China Daily News---- 634–636
New York City Board of Education---- 470, 486, 515
New York City School System---- 2478–2480, 2585, 2740
New York Committee for Constitutional Government---- 2283
New York Communist Party---- 3835
New York Compass---- 1914, 4335
New York Council on Foreign Relations---- 1214
New York Daily Compass---- 2780
New York Daily Worker---- 118
New York Federal Court---- 2970
New York Herald Tribune---- 209, 542, 612–614, 633, 744, 745, 891, 892, 1117, 1124, 1141, 1148, 1193, 1230, 1276, 1887, 1916, 2185, 2186, 2550, 2552, 2557, 2658, 2737, 3035, 3627, 3664, 3666, 3703, 3755, 3828, 3883, 4373, 4374, 4543, 4544, 4713, 4832, 4893, 4894, 4925, 4927, 4930, 4932, 5159, 5163, 5227, 5234, 5235, 5285, 5297, 5298, 5323, 5355, 5652–5660
New York Herald Tribune Book Review---- 4029
New York Herald Tribune Newspaper Syndicate---- 1124
New York Journal-American---- 4350, 4466, 4472
New York Journal of Commerce---- 4544
New York Mirror---- 1188
New York News---- 1105
New York Polytechnic Institute---- 2659
New York Post---- 609, 1105, 1189, 4234, 4935, 5278, 5353
New York Public Affairs Committee---- 1214
New York Public Library---- 1106, 2873, 4579
New York Star (formerly PM)---- 542, 5216
New York State---- 3824, 3826, 3828, 3836, 3839, 3958
New York State Committee (Communist Party)---- 2243
New York State Consumers League---- 4115
New York State Department of Labor---- 994
New York State Educational Committee---- 3058, 3059, 3062, 3063
New York State Legislative Committee---- 1168
New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools (Coudert committee)---- 469
New York State Legislative Record---- 486
New York Telephone Co---- 252, 253, 2880

Page
New York Times 159, 162, 163, 166, 169 258, 296, 346, 454-456, 458, 459, 465, 495, 614, 634, 635, 674, 677, 698, 892, 893, 922, 926, 927, 928, 955, 1007, 1008, 1105, 1129, 1142, 1171, 1197, 1204, 1229, 1230, 1267, 1273, 1376, 1394, 1398, 1469, 2185, 2186, 2260, 2315, 2549, 2729, 2737, 2746, 2834, 2979, 2997, 2998, 3040, 3069, 3108, 3222, 3223, 3224, 3265, 3266, 3353–3355, 3360, 3361, 3374–3376, 3382, 3390, 3396, 3503 3518, 3519, 3535, 3589, 3615, 3685, 3700, 3704, 3705, 3741, 3744, 3757, 3828, 3938, 4235, 4280, 4286, 4330, 4331, 4374, 4375, 4530, 4830, 4835, 4849, 4891, 4892, 4898, 4930, 4932, 4935, 5005, 5019, 5043, 5083, 5135, 5152, 5160, 5165, 5169, 5175, 5224, 5230, 5276, 5287, 5296, 5329, 5334, 5336, 5337, 5355, 5357, 5364, 5427.
New York Tribune 4234
New York University 2585, 2658, 2659, 4089, 4116, 4258–4260
New York World Fair 685
New York World-Telegram 485, 764, 765, 2240, 2242, 2967, 4299, 4326, 4327, 4543
New York Worker Peasant Alliance 3335, 3337
New Yorker, The 1601, 4258, 4610
New Zealand 3167, 3318, 3592, 3593, 3791, 3851, 3881, 3936, 4002, 4235, 4526, 4893, 4971, 5130, 5318–5322, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5334, 5349, 5356, 5694
New Zealand Cabinet 279
New Zealand Government 2013, 2015–2017, 2170, 2679
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs 254, 1215
New Zealand Legation (Washington) 5049, 5052, 5053
Newark Leader 2665
Newcombe, Robinson 5584, 5585
Newman, Eugene 4990, 4995
Newsletter (China Defense League) 2524
Newsholme 4091
Newspaper Guild (New York) 4260
News Week 721, 748, 753, 1187
Newsweek, Washington Bureau 4831, 4833
Next Step in Asia 3758, 3767
Neyhaus, David (David Niles) 4753
Neymann, Mr 3318, 4042
Neymann, Mrs 4042
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp 101
Nicholas II 1620
Nicholas, Mrs 5295
Nichols, Roy F 4119
Nicholsky, Miss Alexandra 5055
Niebuhr, Reinhold 1514, 5202, 5661
Nieh Jung-chen 2334, 2404, 2405, 2459–2461, 2466, 2468, 5368, 5369
Nieh Yung-chen. (*See* Nieh Jung-chen.)
Nieman Foundation 3757
Nigata 4149
Nightingale 1000, 1001
Nig-Yi, Liu 119
Nihon Taiheiyo Mondai Chosakai 5027
NII (Institute for Scientific Research) Great Soviet World Atlas 189
Nikishov, Ivan 1323
Niles, David 2883, 2836, 4753
Nimitz, Admiral Chester 777, 1071, 1500, 2530, 3632, 4934, 4943
Nimmo, Mr 5707
Nine Power Treaty 579, 580, 1517, 2388, 2584, 4148
Ningpo, China 3936, 4700
Ninomiya, Lt. Gen. Harushige 4268
Ninth Army (Nationalists) 2351, 2631
Ninth IPR Conference. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Ninth IPR Conference.)
Ninth War Zone (China) 2396
Nisei 355, 362
Nishio 5233

Page
Nitka, Helen E. 4989, 4995
Nitobe, Dr. Inazo 1216, 1221, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5583, 5584, 5684, 5685
Nixon, Raphael I. 4863
Nixon, Senator Richard M. 492, 2809, 3056, 4903, 5354, 5355, 5487, 5502
NKVD. (*See* OGPU.)
NLRB. (*See* National Labor Relations Board.)
NMU 405
No Peace for Asia 3627
Nobel Fund, Trustees of the 3932
Nobel Prize 1215, 1220
Noble, G. Bernard 5702
Noble, William S. 2659
Nock, Albert J. 545
Noel-Baker, Philip 2891
Nolde, John J. 5584, 5585
Nomura, Admiral Naokumi 153, 154, 1987, 4265, 4941, 4942
Nord Rouge 118
Norees, Mrs. P. E. L. 5299
Norfolk & Western Railroad 2689
Norms, Martin R. 4861, 5250, 5584, 5585
Norma, Winifred 3841
Norman, E. Herbert 318, 319, 321, 339, 373–378, 449–451, 471, 748, 749, 753, 1153, 1154, 1164, 1166, 1222, 1234, 2518, 3469–3473, 3547, 3548, 3568, 4064–4066,4154, 4225 4229,4231, 4859, 4893, 4984, 5007, 5021, 5022, 5031, 5584, 5585, 5685.
Norman, Irene 5022
Norman, Montague 5164
Norman, Winifred 3061
Normandie (steamship) 4275
Normano, J. F. 5584, 5585
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy 2656
North American Group (Military Intelligence Service) 573
North American Trade Consultants 4079
North Atlantic Conference 156
North Atlantic Institute 2820
North Atlantic Treaty 1268, 5316
North Carolina University 2890
North China 3707, 3708, 3757, 4058, 4131, 4132, 4201, 4214, 4218, 4226, 4228
North China Daily News 1567, 2718, 3163, 3164, 3168
North China Front 2543
North China Language School 4092
North China Political Branch Bureau (Chinese Communist Party) 2404
North China Political Council 2368
North China Problem, the 4150
North China Railway Network 2336, 2551
North China Unconquered 2545
North China Youth Party 5176
North Dakota Nonpartisan League 565
North East Kiangsi Border Area 2325
North Honau 4131
North Huai Military Region 2400, 2413, 2434, 2435, 2448
North, Joe 654
North Kiangsu Bank 2422
North Kiangsu Base 2461
North Kiangsu Military Region 2400, 2413, 2422, 2434, 2435, 2448, 2462
North Korea 3409
North Korea People's Army 1028
North Korean Communists 3432
North Korean Forces 2556, 2738, 2739
North Korean Government 3029, 3031
North Manchuria Railway 579
North Pacific 4124
North Pacific Conference 2061, 2062, 2064, 2065, 2066
North Pacific Fisheries 2611, 3481, 3482
North Pole 4042

Page
North, Robert C 1222, 5584, 5585
North Shensi Public School 2406, 2454
Northeastern Army (Manchurian) 2329, 2330, 2331
Northern California Council of World Affairs 1182, 1512, 1551, 1666
Northern Chinese 1306
Northern Korean Forces 1581
Northern Pacific International Planning Project 568–570, 1147
Northern Punitive Expedition 2320, 2377, 2451, 2455, 2473
Northern Shansi District Government (China) 1702
Northern States Power Co 100
Northey, J. F 5027
Northwest Agricultural Bank (Shansi) 2422
Northwest Airlines 100, 2810
Northwest Bureau (Chinese Communist Party) 2461
Northwest Farmers Bank 2429
Northwest Political Branch Bureau 2404, 2472
Northwest Regional Planning Commission 444
Northwestern Army (Hsipei) 2330, 2331
Northwestern University 30, 900, 905, 909–911, 923, 1007–1010, 1069, 1088, 1251, 1277, 1551, 2658, 2928, 3727, 3729, 3979.
Norton, Henry K 5584, 5585
Norton, Robert 3169, 3616, 3861
Norway 3467, 3600, 3632, 3932, 4113, 4236
Norway Invasion 2673
Norwegian Government 2556, 4789
Norwegian News Agency 4226
Nosaka. (*See* Susumo Okano.)
Noteboom, C 5584, 5585
Notes on Labor Problems in Nationalist China 2266
Notestein, Mrs. Ada Comstock. (*See* Ada Comstock.)
Notestein, Mr. Adam Comstock 858, 859
Notestein, Frank W 2811
Notter, Harvey A 2827, 2831, 5261
Noulens, Mr 2328, 2408
Noulens, Mrs 2328
Nov-Sibirsk Oblast Executive Committee 1328
Novy Mir (New World) 3107, 4815, 4816, 4820
Noyes, Mrs. C. Reinold 410
Noyes, Frank B 5702
Noyes, Katherine Macy 2659
Noyes, Laboratory of Chemistry 2659
Noyes, William Albert 2659
NPA. (*See* National Production Authority.)
NRA. (*See* National Recovery Administration.)
Nugent, Donald 5684
Nuhle 3343
Nung-min Pu (Department of Peasantry) 2464
Nung, Su Yu 91, 93, 103
Nuremberg Congress 4201
Nuremberg, Germany 4426
Nusbaum, Gladys 4991, 4995
NVD (*see also* Internal Affairs Security Police, Russian Security Policy) 196, 218
Ny Tid 2665
Nyon 5163

O

Oahu Land & Railway Co 1219
Oak, Liston M 4142
Oakie, Alsberg, Wilbur 8
Oakie, Jack 3517
Oakie, John H 584, 585, 2580, 3878, 3923, 4086, 4093, 4105, 4106, 4111, 5085, 5186, 5199, 5243, 5584, 5585, 5666.
Oasis Interdites 2891
Oatis, William 3942

Page
Obana, Tsutomu 5584, 5585
Oberg, Mr 4423
Oberg, Mrs 4423
Obermeier, Michael 2242, 2243
O'Brien, Howard Vincent 3450
Obstacles to China's War Effort 3799, 3800
Occidental College (Los Angeles) 900, 995, 1132, 1551, 5703
Occidental Life Insurance Co 1219
O'Connor, Colonel 4431, 4437, 4438
O'Connor, Harvey 1514, 2659, 4260
O'Connor, Oleta 3548
October Revolution 2497
Odate, Shigeo 4268
Odegard, Professor 1153, 4160
Odell, Lawrence H 5584, 5585
Odessa 3536
O'Donnell, John 2993
Odets, Clifford 300, 4260
Odlum 2809
Office of Censorship (Washington, D. C.) 568–570
Office of Coordinator of Information 27, 5475
Office of Economic Warfare (OEW) 1796
Office of Education. (*See* U. S. Office of Information.)
Office of Emergency Management (OEM) 1796, 4622, 4623
Office of Export Control 481, 1595
OEEC 1056
Office of Facts and Figures 336
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation 937, 4099
Office of Intelligence Research 1286
Office of Inter-American Affairs 1644
Office of Naval Procurement 4680
Office of Naval Research 2749
Office of Price Administration (OPA) 278.
390, 432, 444, 446, 608, 857, 4973, 4975, 5249, 5291
Office of Public Affairs 313
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 33,
34, 108, 147, 175, 212, 221, 412, 413, 419, 428, 440, 443, 444, 747, 912, 934, 1002, 1015, 1025, 1033, 1693, 1760, 1792, 1802, 2310, 2624, 2793, 3280, 3339, 3805, 3806–3809, 3817, 3824, 3845, 3846, 3968, 3980, 3981, 4009, 4395, 4416, 4417, 4429, 4693, 4716, 4737, 4829, 4830–4832, 4842, 4877, 4975, 4977, 4978, 5003, 5008, 5013, 5017, 5018, 5342, 5475.
Far Eastern Division 912
Japan Section 912
Office of War Information (OWI) 34,
108, 175, 213, 281, 328, 348, 378, 383, 399, 414, 437, 444, 446, 613, 652, 729, 730, 751, 766, 825, 826, 839, 912, 914, 938, 996, 1004, 1015, 1021, 1025, 1033, 1034, 1136, 1150, 1213, 1323–1325, 1360, 1379, 1381, 1592, 1644, 1646, 1704, 1738, 1760, 1765, 1796, 1805, 1849, 1926, 1942, 1986, 2003, 2145, 2146, 2287, 2509, 2810, 3053, 3159, 3160, 3161, 3207, 3213, 3333, 3334, 3338, 3339, 3363, 3386, 3511–3514, 3517, 3518, 3576, 3597, 3598, 3621, 3632, 3645, 3659, 3758, 3805, 3807, 3808, 3817, 3978, 4355, 4395, 4693, 4815, 4826, 4827, 4830–4832, 4836, 4855, 4940, 4941, 4975, 5008, 5010, 5047, 5058, 5061, 5311, 5475, 5662.
China Division 3517
New York Office 3334, 3339, 3512, 3595, 3597
Pacific Operations 3511
Personnel Security Committee 3513, 3595, 3597
San Francisco 3285, 3287, 3339, 3545
San Francisco Office, Chinese Section 3340, 3513
Japanese Desk, San Francisco Office 3598
Security Board 3510
Washington 3363, 3389
Office of War Mobilization 2836, 4623, 4746, 4747
Office Workers Union 3336

Page

OFRRA (*see also* U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation) 995
OFRRO 2595
Ogata, Taketora 4268
Ogburn, William F 4119
OGPU. (*See also* Soviet Military Intelligence) 360, 404, 999, 1001, 1319, 1323, 2451, 3224
Ohara Institute of Social Research 4263
Ohashi, Haideo 369, 371, 2717
Ohio Oil Co 101
Ohio State Assembly 3823
Ohio State Journal 5679
Ohio Supreme Court 5680
Ohio Un-American Activities Committee 3823, 5674, 5678–5681
Ohtani, Count 4149
Oil Embargo on Japan 1987
Oil Wells (Yen-shang) 2425
Oka, Kazu 4992, 4995
Okada, Admiral Keisuke 4267
Okamoto 2468
Okamura, General 2366, 5406
Okano, Susumo 747, 1861, 2089, 2091, 2121, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2187, 2467, 2469, 4183, 4184, 4272, 4273, 4844
Okashi 510
Okinawa 3622, 3625, 3706, 3707, 3838, 4443, 4764, 4769
Okita, Saburo 5584, 5585
Oklahoma Communists. (*See* Communist Party, Oklahoma.)
Oklahoma Leader 2665
Oklahoma Republican State Convention (1926) 637
Okura, Baron 4275
Old State Department Building 1906
Old State, War, and Navy Building 2921, 3209
Oldham, Rt. Rev. G. Ashton 3974
Oldham, John 5295
Olgin, M. J 3335
Olive, Col. James F 2836
Oliver, Douglas 5291
Oliver, Robert T 5584, 5585
Olmstead, General 2488
Olshausen, George G 5584, 5585
Olson, Culbert L 1100
Olver, A. S. B 5584, 5585
Olympic Games (Germany) 4234
One Big Union Bulletin 2665
One Hundred and Fifteenth Division (Eighth Route Army) 2332, 2453, 2463, 2465, 2468
One Hundred and Twentieth Division (Eighth Route Army) 2332, 2453, 2456, 2458–2460, 2464, 2465, 2472
One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Division (Eighteenth Group Army) 2464, 2465, 2472
One Hundred Regiment Offensive (1941) 2453
One-One Program (Mao Tse-tung) 2414
One Who Survived 3102, 3103, 3704
Onon, Mr. Peter Urgunggi 327, 3962
Ootacamund Conference 15
Ooty 5300
OPA. (*See* Office of Price Administration.)
OPC. (*See* Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Policy Coordination.)
OPD (Operations Division, War Department) 2310
Open Door Agreements (China) 2388
Opie, Eugene L 3983
Opler, M. E 5323
Oppenheimer, Mrs 4903
Oppenheimer, Frank Friedman 4901, 4903, 4904, 4905, 5040
Oppenheimer, J. R 4905
Orchard, Dorothy J 5007, 5586, 5587
Orchard, John E 474, 3323, 3486, 4590, 5586, 5587, 5684

Page
Ordeal by Slander 3231, 3259, 3277, 3279, 3369, 3486, 3603, 3614, 3617
Order of Battle (Second War Zone) 2349
Order of Railway Conductors 1104
Oregon Commonwealth Federation 4260
Oregon State College 5014
O'Reilley, Claude 4887
Orel, Mrs. Jeannette 56
Organization of Class A Regiment, Chinese Communist Party (Chart 3) 2449
Organization of Class C Regiment, Chinese Communist Party (Chart) 2450
Organized Labor Faces the New World 3073
Organized Labor in Mexico 3167
Organization of Soviet Science, The 3620
Organized Workers International 4545
Oriental Institute (Leningrad) 2697
Orlov, Andrew 2469
Ormont, Zelda 4989, 4995
Ornitz, Sallie 4989, 4995
Ornitz, Samuel 2659, 4116
O'Rourke, Katherine 5675
Orrick 5111
Orrick, William H 5186
Ortega, Y Gasset E 4236
Orwell, George 5385, 5398
Osaka Building (Tokyo) 3927, 3934
Osaka, Japan 4134, 4148
Osaka Mainichi (publication) 4134
Osborn, Fred 4054, 4055, 5342
Osborne, Clay 3598
Osborne, Ernest G 1240, 1243, 1247, 1248, 1513
Osborne, Herman P 4136
Osgood 4067
O'Sheel, Shaemas 2659, 4260
Oshima, Chiya 4992, 4995
Oshima, H. T 5586, 5587
Oshima, Lt. Gen. Hiroshi 4202
Osias, Camilo 5321
Oslo, Norway 3467, 3932
Osmena 4857
OSS. (*See* Office of Strategic Services.)
Ossietsky 4234
Ost-Europaisches Institute in Berlin 4579
Ota, Lillian 5586, 5587
Ota, Marjorie 4992, 4995
Ostiministerium 4487
Ostrander, Mr. S. Taylor 3455
Osumi, Admiral 4201
OSW (Office of the Secretary of War) 2310
Otis, Brooks 4089
Otsuka, R 4888
Ott, General 379, 501, 503, 504, 508
Ottawa 3582
Ottenheimer, Albert 2161
Ottosen, Colonel 4104
Ou, Pao-San 5586, 5587
Ouchi, Professor (Hyoe) 4263
Oudendyk, W. J 2916, 4888, 5586, 5587
Oumansky, Constantine 603, 685, 686, 889, 988, 1746, 3260, 3262–3269, 3329, 3638, 4043, 4044, 4584–4588, 4779, 5032, 5055–5057, 5083–5085, 5094, 5152, 5162, 5165, 5168, 5170, 5183–5185, 5186, 5198, 5199, 5201, 5204, 5226, 5230, 5243, 5262, 5274, 5300
Oumansky, Mrs. Constantine 4040, 5032, 5056, 5057, 5169, 5191, 5196, 5226
Our Children 3169
Our Far Eastern Record 2512, 2580, 2587, 3880
Our Foreign Policy 2162, 2169, 2296
Our Job in the Pacific 3055, 3058, 3654, 3655, 3832, 3896, 3946, 3947
Our Occupation Policy for Japan 2162, 2296

Page
Outer Mongolia 1740, 2374, 2376, 2384, 2385, 3311, 3313, 3323, 3328, 3483, 3632, 3634–3636, 3638, 4118, 4202, 4419, 4525, 4526, 4528, 4574, 5089, 5501
Outer Mongolian People's Republic 4120
Outline for a Proposed Study of Chinese Political Unification and Economic Reconstruction, 1931–38 4068
Outline on the Significance of the Recent Events in China 3826
Outlook, The 4150
Overgaard, Andy 3336
Overseas Masonic Lodge (Providence, R. I.) 638
Overseas News Agency 3026, 3032, 3034, 3035, 3508, 3668
Ovington, Mary White 4260
Owen, David 4630, 4632–4636, 4654–4656, 4671, 4672
Owen, Fred 5189
Owen, Henry 3965
Owen, Josephine 4988
Owen, Mrs. Monica B 661, 1513
Owens 5488
Owens, Courtney E 4863, 5502
Owens, Hamilton 3231, 3268, 3648, 4834
Owens, Louis B 4869
OWI (*See* Office of War Information.)
Oxford University 150–152, 170–172, 178, 179, 342, 714, 1008, 1009, 2620
Oxford University Press 2588, 4591, 5062, 5240, 5661
Oxon Hill Manor 693
Oya, Kuso 614
Oyama, Richard Hiroshi 4441, 4442
Ozaki, Hotsumi or Hozumi 72, 355, 361–364, 366–370, 372, 379, 381, 501, 503–506, 509, 3548, 3785, 5324, 5346, 5684.
Ozet 2722

P

Paalov, General 4481
Paasche, John H 5586, 5587
Pacciardi, Randolfo 1268
Pacco. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations Pacific Council.)
Pace, Frank 4808
Pacific 3856, 3857, 3863, 3865–3867, 3880, 3881, 3929, 3935, 3943, 3945, 3968, 3985
Pacific Affairs 9, **21**, **39**, **66**, **72**, **82**, 173, 178, 180, 191, 209, 248, 250, 251, 253, 255, **270**, **281**, **283**, **287**, 305, 306, 310, 319, 320, 325, 326, 334, 338, **344**, **345**, **373**, 375–378, 389, 390, 415–418, 462, 468, 473, 481, 522, **529**, **550**, **551**, 582, 644, 645, 648, 649, 651, 653, 657, 661, 668–670, **681**, 682, 684, 688, 911, 957, 967, 1013, 1136, 1147, 1148, 1151, **1162**, 1202, 1213, 1221, 1225, 1231, 1246, 1785, 1786, 1849, 1971, 1982, 1983, 2513, 2517, 2518, 2546, 2567, 2605, 2607, 2700, 2701–2703, 2713, 2719, 2720, 2791, 2865, 2869, 2876, 2877, 2884, 2885, **2890**, 2905–2913, 2916, 2918, 2921, 2925, 2956, 2980–2983, 2991, **3019**, **3101**, 3125, 3139, 3144–4149, 3152–3157, 3166–3168, **3173**–3197, 3203–3208, 3231–3238, 3242, 3244, 3248–3257, 3266, **3267**, 3271, 3277, 3284, 3299, 3306, 3304, 3309, 3312, 3315–3317, 3319–3321, 3324, 3325, 3329–3333, 3344, 3345, 3348, 3349, 3430, 3433–3438, 3440–3442, 3445, 3447–3449, 3451, 3453, 3454, 3465–3467, 3469, 3472, 3473, 3482–3484, 3486, 3487, 3505, 3521, 3522, 3529, 3545, 3548, 3568, 3569, 3577, 3579–3582, 3585, 3588–3594, 3600, **3603**, 3604, 3615, 3633, 3634, 3679, 3680, 3728, 3775, 3865, 3888, 3907, 3918, 3923, 3978, 4014, 4015, 4017, 4029, 4047, 4089, 4102–4104, 4109–4111, 4124, 4125, 4135, 4147, 4150, 4161, 4184, 4188, 4264, 4271, 4278, 4418, 4420, 4462, 4464, 4477, 4492, 4501, 4568, 4570, 4574, 4575,4578, 4580, 4590, 4853, 4878, 4879, 4882, 4884, 4888, 4890, 4896, 4897, 4940, 4956, 4959, 4987, 4999, 5010, 5011, 5013, 5016, 5021, 5022, 5025, 5046, 5058, 5063, 5066, 5071, 5080, 5123, 5125, 5127, 5131, 5136, 5168, 5187, 5190, 5192, 5195, 5214, 5216, 5218, 5220, 5225, 5226, 5230, 5238, 5240, 5250, 5256, 5259, 5267, 5274, 5287, 5297, 5300, 5301, 5307, 5328, 5329, 5345, 5347, 5358, 5378, 5504, 5505–5633, 5648, 5662.

Page
Pacific Affairs Bibliographies 3167
Pacific Club 4127
Pacific Coast 3851, 3879
Pacific Coast Regional Committee of Social Science 995
Pacific Digest (Publication) 4141
Pacific Front in the Global War 2887
Pacific Gas & Electric Co 4741
Pacific Institute of Amsterdam 3486
Pacific Institute of the U. S. S. R 50, 189, 190, 2590, 2709–2715, 2728
Pacific Island Bases 2248
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission 433, 857
Pacific Ocean (*see also* Political, Social and Economic Quarterly of the Soviet Union) 187, 189, 190
Pacific Ocean Cabinet of the Communist Academy 4499, 4504, 4560, 4567
Pacific Pact 1056, 1287, 1337, 1552, 1586, 1626, 1627
Pacific Problems 3195
Pacific Publishing Foundation, Inc 3073
Pacific Theater and War 3839, 3991
Pacific War 2378, 2380, 2383, 2464
Pacific Weekly 3168
Pacific Worker 511
Packard, Arthur W 5123
Packer, Earl L 5702
Packer, Gerald 5586, 5587
Paddock, Bishop Robert L 411, 1514, 4116
Padilla, Pedro 5586, 5587
Page 5484
Page, Ann 3965
Page, Charles, Jr 264, 4063, 4066, 5186
Page, R 3480
Page, Walter Hines 483, 561, 996, 1136, 1219
Paige, Mrs. Harold L 4944
Pai, Chen-pang 2405, 2409
Pai, Chung 1577, 1633
Pai, Chung-Hai 1087, 1368, 1578, 2289, 2291, 2329, 2349, 2352, 2455, 4141
Pai, Chung-Hsi 1087, 1580
Paine, Mrs. Frances Flynn 4145
Paine, Thomas 548
Pakh 2482
Pakhoi, China 4046
Pakistan 2482, 3955, 4871, 5318, 5322, 5328, 5331–5334
Pakistan Council of International Affairs 5329
Pakistan Government 1663, 1678–1681
Pakistan Institute of International Affairs 1215
Palace Hotel (San Francisco) 3264
Paland, Ernest O 5644
Palembang 4114
Palestine 3592
Paley, William S 5299
Pallisen, A. F. E 5586, 5587
Palma, Rafael 5320, 5334
Palmer, Howard 2248
Palmerston 4699
Palmquist, Elim A. (Rev.) 4116
Pan American Airways 12, 20, 928, 1217, 4835
Pan American Clipper 3600
Pan American Room (Mayflower Hotel) 2246
Pan, Kung Chan 5586, 5587
Pan-Pacific Union 883
Pan-Pacific Club (Shanghai) 3604
Pan, Quentin 18
Pan, Tzu-nien 2404, 2469
Panama Canal Manual 2613
Panama Canal Record 647
Panay. (*See* U. S. S. *Panay.*)
Panay Incident 2584

Page
Pandit, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi 1216, 1679, 1680, 3313, 3314, 3605, 5062, 5321, 5334
Pang, Ping-hsun 2355, 2357
Panikkar, K. M 5070, 5586, 5587
Panvor 2665
Panyushkin, Mr. (Soviet Ambassador) 3311
Pao, Ta-kung 5233
Paochia 4061, 4062
Paoting 4103
Paoting Military Academy 2452, 2473
Paotingfee, China 4047
Pardee, Ruth E 3965, 5586, 5587, 5702
Pares, Bernard 5047, 5586, 5587
Paris, France 4201, 4531, 4724
Paris Exposition 3484
Paris, Leonard 2977
Paris Peace Conference 746, 5317
Paris Police. (*See* French Secret Police.)
Paris University 2460
Park, Richard L 5586, 5587
Park, Robert E 5586, 5587
Park, Unsoon 4992, 4995
Park, William Z 4719
Parker, Mr 5228
Parker, Belzy M 4991, 4995
Parker, Harriet H 997, 2523, 4989, 4995
Parker, Harrison 5586, 5587
Parker, Philo W 122, 123, 264, 528, 713, 862, 1220, 1227, 2511, 2622, 2810, 3612, 3859, 3868, 4086, 4109, 4114, 4135, 4143, 4907, 4958, 4983.
Parker, Phyllis Eugenia 5313
Parkes, Harry 4699, 4701
Parkin, G. R 5259, 5333, 5684
Parkins, Helen 4137, 4138
Parlett, Harold 5586, 5587, 5684
Parliament 617, 1267
Parnoch 4519
Parrington, Vernon L 5661
Parry, Albert 5586, 5587
Parseghian, Miss Nuvart 5301
Parson, William W 4624, 4625
Parsons, Miss Katrine 440, 2566, 2467, 2590, 4987, 4995, 5048-5050, 5239, 5266
Parsons, Reginald 712
Parsons, Rudy 1079
Parsons, Ruth 4991, 4995, 5586, 5587
Parton, Margaret 5223
Partridge, P. H 5588, 5589
Party Affairs Committee (Chinese Communist Party) 2448
Party Central Research Institute 2451
Party Front Committee 2323, 2467
Party National 2411
Party Organizer 1973
Party Paper Editorial Committee (Chinese Communist Party) 2459
Party School, Pao-an, Shensi (Chinese Communist Party) 2471
Party School, Yenan (Chinese Communist Party) 2404
Paschal, Marion 4092
Pashtoon Jirga 5006, 5044
Paskoff, Benjamin 4157
Pass. Joseph 4142
Passos, John Dos 5650
Pasvolsky, Leo 428, 2124, 2828, 2831, 2832. 2835, 2837. 2859, 4476, 4977, 5224, 5247, 5248, 5261, 5484, 5702
Patel, Surendra J 5588, 5589
Patent Law License 2227
Paterson, Ellis E 633
Patri, Giacoma 3621

Page
Patrick, Professor 5135
Patrick, George F 5588, 5589
Pattani, P. S 5323
Patterson, Mr 2271
Patterson, Ernest M 5078
Patterson, J. A 5588, 5589
Patterson, John M 1855, 1894, 4544, 4545
Patterson-McCormick 596, 597
Patterson, R. P 5274, 5292
Patterson, Samuel C 4142
Patterson (Secretary of War) 4097
Patterson, William 3336
Patton, H. S 5588, 5589
Patumanon, Prasert 5588, 5589
Paul, Arthur 5112
Paul, Daisy 5112
Paul, Elliot 2658, 2659
Paul, Rodman W 2891
Pauley, Bill 5296
Pauley, Ambassador Edwin M 750, 753, 1766, 1767, 1936, 1937, 2221, 2222, 2791, 2794, 3053, 3054, 3489, 5283, 5698, 5699
Pauley Reparations Commission 2222, 2794, 5283
Pauley Reparations Mission 752, 1766, 1936, 1937, 3053, 3054, 3282, 3297, 3473, 3488, 3489, 3521, 3632, 3652, 4836
Pauley Report 750, 753, 1027, 1767, 2221, 2791, 3054
Pavlenko 3484
Pavlov, Mr 1001, 4649, 4735
Pavon, Benito 4235
Payne, Pierre Stephen Robert 5588, 5589, 5649–5651, 5654
Pe, Melvin Tun 5588, 5589
Peabody, P. E 2310
Peace With China Association 5412
Peace Mobilization 31
Peace Preservation Corps 2358, 2359, 2369, 2370, 2405, 2461
Peace Treaty (Japan) 1916
Peake, Cyrus H 35, 474, 670, 916, 4226–4228, 4859–4861, 5193, 5248, 5340, 5588, 5589, 5702
Pear, Sir Bernard 177
Peardon, Thomas P 5588, 5589
Pearl Harbor 38, 58, 154, 165, 167, 419, 464, 501, 502, 510, 663–665, 667, 972, 989 991, 1012, 1154, 1447, 1492, 1522, 1524, 1527, 1530, 1531, 1536, 1595, 1711, 1865, 2315, 2343, 2463, 2464, 2583, 2829, 2982, 3060, 3070, 3113, 3217, 3391, 3411, 3623, 3700, 3836, 3850, 3880, 3968, 3977, 3991, 4001, 4112, 4266, 4687, 4688, 4853, 4936, 4939, 4942, 4968, 4978, 5067, 5070, 5071, 5076, 5267, 5279, 5283, 5318, 5340, 5342, 5370, 5501
Pearl Harbor Attack, Joint Committee on 156
Pearl Harbor hearing 380, 381
Pearn, B. R 5588, 5589
Pearson, Mr 5022
Pearson, Drew 928, 1393, 3368–3370, 4830, 4943, 5355
Pearson, F. A 5588, 5589
Pearson, Hesketh 5651
Pearson, L. B 440, 4629, 5049, 5052, 5053
Peasant Department (Kuomintang) 2322
Peasants and Workers Army 2467
Peck, Graham 2124, 3794, 5588–5660
Peffer, Lillian 4860, 4987, 4999, 5193
Peffer, Nathaniel ..... 471, 474, 477, 670, 901, 920, 1254, 1255, 1262, 1270, 1278, 1281, 1551, 1611, 1612, 1614, 1620–1622, 1627, 1639, 1660, 1663, 2717, 2718, 3323, 3592, 3794, 4086, 4089, 4102, 4107, 4134, 4835, 4859–4861, 4872 5002, 5014, 5220, 5221, 5234, 5235, 5588, 5589, 5650, 5653, 5656, 5660.

Page
Pagoraro, Rev. Epiphany O. F. M. 3630
Pei, Professor 5010
Pei Hai Bank (Northeast Shantung) 2422
Pei Tou Magazine (Great Dipper) 2470
Peiping, China 3580
3593, 4047, 4057, 4102, 4141, 4218, 4220, 4227, 4307, 4335, 4406, 4412, 4416, 4418, 4421, 4422, 4425, 4426, 4433, 4434, 4436, 4439, 4442, 4570, 4701, 4702, 4831, 5341, 5348, 5368, 5369, 5380, 5395, 5404, 5406, 5461.
Peiping-Hankow Railroad 2337, 2347, 3477
Peiping Government 2318, 2319, 2462
Peiping National University 2453, 2466
Peiping Normal University. (*See* Shih Ta.)
Peiping Student Union 4215
Peizer, Karl 54
Peking 3287,
3290, 3295, 3303, 3304, 3322, 3568, 3632, 3634, 3651, 3670, 3727, 3729, 3747, 3766, 3813, 3814, 3821, 3826, 3870, 3950, 3951, 3969, 3979, 3980.
Peking Government 2553, 3184
Peking Medical Society Hospital 1696
Peking National University 18, 539, 996, 3168, 3951
Peking and Tientsin Times 3024
Peking Union Medical College 3870
Pelan, Frank 4990, 4995
Pelcovits, N. A 5588, 5589, 5684
Pelliott, Paul 3333, 4192, 5333
Pelzer, Karl J 266,
268, 327, 2521, 2776, 3962, 5294, 5588, 5589, 5684, 5685, 5688, 5702.
Pelzer, Mrs. Karl 2521, 2776
Pembroke College, Cambridge 179
Pen, Tah-huai 812
Pence, Captain H. L 494, 859, 2809, 2811, 2836
Pendleton, Robert L 5588, 5589, 5684
Penfield, Mr. James K 722,
1721, 1839, 1888, 1980, 2222, 2249, 2250, 2913, 3646, 4823, 4832, 5274, 5297, 5480, 5702.
Peng, Chen 812
Peng, Hsueh-feng 2451
P'eng, Mr. Kung 3341
Peng, Te-jiao 2324, 2327, 2332, 2341, 2403, 2404, 2433, 2448, 2456, 2469, 5368
Pengra, Charles O 4692
Pennsylvania (United States steamship) 1527, 1530
Pennsylvania Railroad 100, 2667
Pennsylvania University 901, 1035, 1071, 1111, 1114, 1132, 1252, 1551, 2876
Pennsylvania Worker 2665
Penrose, E. F 3167, 3168, 3323, 5588, 5589, 5684
Penseler, Herr 4235
Pentagon 420, 729, 733, 1126, 1365, 1366, 1412, 1720, 1853, 1960, 2206
People of the China Seas 3943
People's Allied Anti-Japanese Army (1930's) 3538
Peoples Anti-Japanese Military-Political University 657, 3300, 3305, 3308
Peoples Army (China) 2546
People's Bank of China 1160
People's China 2557, 3538, 3542, 3543, 3826
People's Commissar for Economies (Chinese Communist Party) 2472
People's Commissar for Education 2456
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chinese Communist Party) 2471
People's Commissar for Inspection of Labor and Agriculture (Chinese Communist Party) 2458
People's Commissar for Internal affairs (Chinese Communist Party) 2471
People's Commissar for Military Affairs 2457
People's Communist Republic of China 1253,
1263, 1266, 1268, 1269, 1275, 1279, 1286, 1493, 1504, 1505, 1605
People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance 2437, 2448

Page
People's Congress (Citizens General Assembly) 2334, 2335, 2392
People's Congress (Chiu-Cha-Chi Border Region) 2339
People's Congress (Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region) 2392, 2468
People's Consultative Council (Nationalist Chinese Government) 4542, 4543
People's Council (Chinese Communist Party) 2452
People's Daily World 3045, 3071–3073, 3700
People's Forces (Chinese Communist Party), (chart) 2448
People's Government 4070
People's Liberation Army 2550, 3541, 3836
People's Livelihood, The 4110
People's Militia 1441, 2403, 2432, 2434, 2437, 2440, 2441, 2448
People's National Party. (*See* Kuomintang and Kuomintang Government.)
People's Political Council 167, 351, 785, 809, 817, 2353, 2391, 2405, 2415, 2451, 2453, 2454, 2456, 2459, 2461, 2463, 2467, 2666.
People's Press 2643
People's Republic of China 82–84, 104, 105
People's Republic of Outer Mongolia 4524
People's Resistance Committee 2334
People's Revolutionary Army 4149
People's Self Defense Corps 2335, 2338, 2447
People's Songs, Inc 3056, 3057, 3841
People's Soviet Government (China) 2329
People's Voice 2665
People's Volunteer Corps 812, 813, 814
People's World (publication) 4137
P. E. P 238
Pepper, Claude 2800, 2835, 4823, 4829
Perez, S. E. M 5692
Perazick, George N 4667–4753
Perkins 4252
Perkins, B. Ward 5588, 5589
Perkins, Dexter 4834
Perkins, Eleanor 2115, 3965
Perkins, Miss Frances 2837
Perkins, G. W 2664, 2665, 2668
Perkins, Milo 428, 432, 443–445, 857, 2831, 2836, 4973, 4975, 5032, 5054, 5261, 5266
Perlin, B 4884
Perleman, S. J 4260
Perlo Group. (*See* also Victor Perlo.) 441, 4673, 4737, 4755, 4759, 4778
Perlo, Victor 441, 442, 1218, 2799, 4674, 4677, 4722, 4737, 4753
Pescadores 5671
Pershing, Gen. John J 3708
Persia 3909
Persian Government 187
Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution 2607, 3138
Petain, Marshal 669, 5277
Pete (Communist courier) 4803
Peter, King 784, 787
Peters, J 490,493, 494, 514, 520, 526, 542, 543, 590, 634, 654, 688, 1218, 1746, 4756
Peters, Mr 5504
Peters, Dr. John P 4260
Peterson, J. Hardin 2835
Peterson, Marshall N 5702
Peterson, Representative 5699
Petroff, Mr 4826
Petrov, Ivan Petrovich 566, 961, 5121
Petropavlovsk 4442
Pettigrew, M. W 4958, 4982, 5009, 5032, 5048, 5049, 5053, 5264, 5265
Pettus, W. B 5588, 5589
Peurifoy, John 1905, 1908, 1916, 1917, 2294, 4833, 4836
Peyrouton, Marcel 4876
Pfeffer 241, 242

Page
Pfeifer, G. 5588, 5589
Pflamm, Irving 2781
Pfotenhauer, Herr Hans 3593
Phelps, Ward 5588, 5589
Phibul, Premier 1286
Phil 320, 375, 4828, 4829
Philbrick, Herbert A 4299, 4782–4798, 4790, 4792, 4793, 4794, 4797, 4798, 4800, 4801, 4803, 4804.
Philip, Cyril 4117
Philippine Army 4855, 4857
Philippine Emergency 2587
Philippine Friends of the Chinese People 4273
Philippine Government 2170, 2258
Philippine Islands 2482, 2580, 3323, 3324, 3348, 3349, 3483, 3592, 3593, 3622, 3661, 3689, 3696, 3701, 3702, 3706, 3707, 3837, 3851, 3882, 3884, 3909, 3946, 4020, 4454, 4693, 4710, 4711, 4852, 4853, 4855–4857, 4971, 5130, 5292, 5296, 5318, 5322, 5327, 5331–5334, 5339, 5349, 5395, 5639, 5642, 5666, 5671, 5690.
Philippines Masses 4070
Philippine Problem Enters a New Phase 2887
Philippine Rehabilitation Act 2258
Philippine Republic 1596, 1608, 1625, 1655, 4893
Philippine Trade Act of 1946 2258
Phillips, Mr 5116
Phillips, Herbert J 4089
Phillips, Mr. John W 285, 653, 1160, 1161, 2660, 4069, 4071, 4170–4173, 4176, 4615, 4885
Phillips, Lillian M 3548, 3549, 5040
Phillips, P. D 3167, 5590, 5591, 5684
Phillips Petroleum Co 102
Phillips, William 568, 656, 2017, 2582
Philosophical Library 3060
Phinney, Archie 5590, 5591
Photo History (publication) 4145
Piao, Gen. Lin (*see also* Lin Piao) 792
Pichkova, Olena 4350
Picked Army, Simplified Government Principle 2463
Pickens, William 2659
Pickering, E. H 3167
Pickersgill, J. W 5590, 5591
Pickett, Clarence 2831, 5002, 5260
Pickford, Mary 2730, 4127
Picon, Jean 4643
Pitchford, H 4426
Pien Chu (Border Region Governments) 2400
Pierson College 5269
Pierson, Dr. Emily M 4260
Pierson, L. B 5270
Pierson, W. L 2832
Pierson, Mrs. Warren Lee 3794
Pietrowski, Rose 4991, 4995
Pigulevskaya, E 5590, 5591
Pilat, Oliver 5353
Pin, Paul Yu 5344, 5361
Pinchot, Gifford 5654
Pinchot, Mrs. Gifford 2567, 3793, 5062, 5294, 5702
Ping-Han Railway 2435
Ping-hsing-kuan (Pinghsing Pass) 2463
Pinghsing Pass (Ping-hsing-kuan) 2463
Ping Ming Girls School 2470
Ping-pei Area 2435
Ping-Sui Railway 2345
Ping, T'ai 1282
Ping, Tong 3335
Pinghan Railroad 3624

Page
Pinner, Dr. Max 410
Pitt, Malcolm 5590, 5591
Pittman Bill 5187
Pittman, Senator Key 4128
Pittsburgh University 1398
Pivot of Asia 3104, 3636, 3958, 3961, 4029
Pivowitz, Abe 5702
Piwu, Tung. (*See* Tung, Pi-wu.)
Pizer, Morris 3336
Pladjoe (Netherlands East Indies) 4114
Plain Talk 4939, 4942
Platt, Phillip S 4125, 4126, 5207
Plenn, Abel 5651, 5657
Plimpton, Jane F 5050, 5059, 5702
Plimsoll, James 5702
Plopkin 4044, 5183
Plot Against Peace 3071, 3073
Plotkin, M. A 190
Plott, Leon 3335
Plumptre, A. F. W 3430, 5590, 5591
PM. (*See* New York Star.)
Po-ku. (*See* Ch'in Pang-hsien.)
Pobeda (Russian motorship) 3536
Pod Znamenem Marxzma 5219
Poffenberger, A. T 4119
Point 4 3815
Points, Julian Stewart 4784
Poison for Profit 3169
Polakov, Walter N 4260
Poland 3592, 3631, 3633, 3664, 3931, 3942, 3944, 4113, 4136, 4261, 4264, 4265, 4433, 4542, 4637, 4649, 4650, 4653, 4654, 4658, 4740, 5382, 5386, 5638.
Poland, Fred W 72, 998–1001, 1004, 3549, 3550, 3903, 4807, 5019, 5346
Poleman, Jenny F 5590, 5591
Policy of Anti-Soviet Encirclement 2887
Polier, Justine Wise 19, 21, 26, 112
Poling, Chang 5320
Polish Communist Government 137, 138, 1003
Polish Government 2309, 2462, 2839, 3223, 4653, 4654, 5188
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 138
Polish Situation 2309
Polish-Soviet Delegation 3930, 3931
Politburo. (*See* National Board.)
Politburo (Chinese Commission) 192–196, 198, 201
Politburo (Moscow) 517, 526, 539, 541, 551, 552, 555, 556 558, 625, 630, 631, 657, 4486, 4496, 4511, 4564, 5500, 5501
Politbureau 2323, 2335
Political Action Committee (CIO) 1100
Political Action Committee (Wayne County) (Detroit) 1104
Political Affairs 4616, 4882, 4898, 5338, 5634
Political Bureau (Chinese Communist Party) 2321, 2403, 2410, 2452, 2453, 2455, 2457–2459, 2461, 2464, 2465, 2467, 2471–2473, 2550
Political Commissar:
Central Anhwei Base, New Fourth Army 2470
Central Government 2473
Communist First Army Corps 2468
Eighth Route Army 2461
First Division, New Fourth Army 2465, 2469
Fifth Division, New Fourth Army 2461
Fourth Division, New Fourth Army 2459, 2470
New Fourth Army 2472, 2473
One Hundred and Fifteenth Division, Eighteenth Group Army 2465, 2468
One Hundred and Twentieth Division, Eighteenth Group Army 2460
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region 2468
Sixth Division, New Fourth Army 2470
Third Division, New Fourth Army 2461
United Defense Headquarters, Yenan 2460

Page

Political Committee:
Fifth Division, New Fourth Army 2462
Independent Communist Division of Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi 2460
Seventh Division, New Fourth Army 2470
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region Government 2452, 2460, 2468, 2470
Political Consultative Conference (Kuomintang) 2548, 2549, 3788
Political Department:
Eighteenth Group Army 2317, 2465, 2471
First Division, New Fourth Army 2457, 2465
Fourth Division, New Fourth Army 2459
Kuomintang Twentieth Army 2457
Second Division, New Fourth Army 2462
Third Division, New Fourth Army 2472
Political Problems Subcommittee 2852
Political Quarterly 5392
Political Reorientation of Japan (Report) 2236, 2237
Political Science Review 5673
Political, Social, and Economic Quarterly of the Soviet Union (*see also* The Pacific Ocean) 187
Political Weekly (Kuomintang) 2467
Politics in Tokyo (publication) 4121
Polk. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Pollard, Arthur L 4963
Pollard, John A 26, 27, 692, 2248, 3965, 4086, 4097, 4098, 4990, 4995, 5199, 5257, 5258, 5287
Pollard, R. T 3167, 3168
Pollard, Robert 5590, 5591
Pomfert, John E 4119
Pomona College (San Francisco) 3286
Pone, D 5590, 5591
Pons, Wei-ta 4991, 4992, 4995
Postal System (Chinese Communist Party) 2420
Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome 3168
Pontius, Dale 5590, 5591
Pontius, Hilda C 5702
Poole, Major General 5075
Poore, A. S 4903, 5502
Pope, Prof. Arthur Upham 300, 409, 621, 622, 1245, 1513, 3794, 4075
Pope, Everett P 5590, 5591
Pope, Frederick 5590, 5591
Pope, James P 4116
Pope Pius XII 2834, 5116
Popov, Mr 4589
Poppe, Nicholas N 2691–2731, 3235, 3236, 3240
Popper, David H 35, 4859–4861, 5193
Popper, Martin 86, 621, 622, 4081, 4605
Popular Republic of Mongolia 4563
Population Theories and Their Application 3168
Populist 565
Porter. (*See* Arnold, Fortas & Porter.)
Porter, Alan 2659, 4260
Porter, Catherine 8, 72, 266, 336, 390, 476, 477, 483, 536, 537, 689, 938, 945, 2248, 2521, 2580, 2581, 2587, 2604, 2610, 2624, 2627, 2633, 2776, 3167, 3193, 3241, 3440, 3441, 3465, 3466, 3480, 3481, 3581, 3937, 3963, 4075, 4086, 4093, 4096, 4100, 4104, 4106, 4108, 4122, 4241, 4852, 4853, 4861, 4862, 4958, 4967, 4972, 4987–4989, 4995, 5053, 5084, 5149, 5160, 5162, 5169, 5179, 5198, 5199, 5228, 5239, 5246, 5256, 5257, 5274, 5294, 5300, 5329, 5424, 5590, 5591, 5685, 5702, 5704
Porter, Mrs. George F 4091, 4145
Porter, Paul 640, 661
Porteus, S. D 5590, 5591
Portugal 5318
Portus, G. V 5590, 5591
Porua, Enrique 4235
Position of and Struggle by the Peasantry for Improved Conditions in Japan 3485

Page
Post-Dispatch (St. Louis) 3035
Post Office Clerks Union 4887
Postal Remittances and Savings Bank of Peking 82, 92, 99, 100, 104
Postal Savings System (Japan) 2231
Posti, Professor 2710
Postolsky, Max 3337
Postsurrender Policy for Japan 1854, 1862, 1863, 1868, 1905, 2145, 2152–2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 2826, 2833, 2867, 2868
Postwar Period in the Far East 2193
Postwar Planning Committee 2852
Potash, Irving 3336
Potemkin, Vladimir P 3224
Potsdam 3378, 3413, 3709
Potsdam Conference 1772–1774, 1851, 1852, 1854, 1855, 1861, 1889, 1916, 2555, 4229, 4541, 4544, 4545
Potsdam Declaration 354, 368, 369, 395, 611, 731, 732, 2207, 2209, 2210, 2225, 2282, 4543, 4551
Potter, Brooks 4692
Potter, Pittman 2831, 5260
Potter, P. B 5323
Pottinger, Henry 4699
Pougatchef, Simeon 5692
Pound, Roscoe 4934, 4944
Poweles, G. R 5590, 5591
Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr 1514, 2242, 4117
Powell, C. I 5674
Powell, Ifor B 2590, 2591, 5590, 5591
Powell, John Benjamin 141, 143, 159, 169, 838, 3353, 3355, 3361, 3391, 3497, 3498, 4942, 5274, 5297, 5298, 5590, 5591, 5649
Powell, John W 143
Powell, Roberta 4988
Powell, Webster Clay 488, 489
Power, Cynthia 4107
Power, Sir John 4107
Power, Eileen 4037, 5334, 5590, 5591
Power, Joseph E 5590, 5591
Powles, G. R 5702
Powles, Mrs. G. R 5702
Practical Political Program 2339
Praesidium of the Soviet Council 3934
Praesidium (U. S. S. R.) 3242, 3243
Pramof, M. R. Seni 2124, 2126, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5089, 5321, 5322, 5590, 5591
Prasad, P. S. N 5323
Pratt, Eliot D 1514
Pratt, Mrs. Eliot 687, 2518, 2882
Pratt, George D., Jr 4260
Pratt, Frances 5300
Pratt, Frederick 5590, 5591
Pratt, Helen Gay 5592, 5593, 5654
Pratt, Sir John 2582, 5334, 5389, 5390, 5592, 5593
Pravda 309, 802, 2383, 2461, 2719, 2839, 2840, 3365, 3460, 3461, 3499, 3536, 4020, 4503, 4585, 5150, 5162, 5164, 5185
Prebbles 5680
Preface to Peasantry 2890
Pregel, Boris 3576
Premier (Communist China) 1700
Prentis, Albert 4117
Preparatory Commission for Inauguration of Constitutional Government 2394
Present Conditions in China 3681
Present, Richard D 5041
Present Situation and the Next Tasks, The 3414
President and I (message) 1828, 1829
Presidential Directive 387, 388, 1685, 1777, 1917, 2202, 2267, 2268
President's Advisory Commission 2832
President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees 2831

Page
President's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy 2830, 2832, 2833, 2836–2838, 2852
President's Cabinet 1105, 1106, 1113, 1116, 1126, 1149, 1340
President's Committee on War Relief Appeals 2831
President's Loyalty Program 2267, 2268
President's Loyalty Review Board 3001, 3049
Presidium (Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee) 2452, 2454–2458, 2465, 2470, 2471
Presidium (Executive Committee) 2329, 2453
Presidium of the Comintern 2331, 2453, 2458, 2461
Press Club (Tokyo) 3521
Press Club (Washington) 1065, 1275
Press Hostel 268, 269, 538
Press Party (Yenan, 1944) 2452, 2456, 2459, 2471
Pressman, Lee 2620, 2799, 2801, 2802, 2808, 2809, 3550, 4722, 4737, 4753, 5502–5504
Prestiz, Mr 2663
Preston, John Hyde 4260
Preuss, Lawrence 3167, 3168, 5592, 5593
Price, Ernest B 2523, 2580, 2583, 2811, 5592, 5593
Price, Harriet 2986
Price, Harry B 123, 477, 680, 681, 687, 1784, 1916, 2518, 2832, 2881, 2882, 3144, 4104, 4616, 4724, 4861, 5052, 5053, 5189, 5190, 5210, 5215, 5592, 5593, 5711.
Price, Mary 406, 407, 413, 1218, 1242
Price, Maurice T 5592, 5593
Price, M. Phillips 5592, 5593
Price, Mildred (Coy) 72, 406–417, 436–439, 677, 1218, 1242, 1246, 1247, 1513, 1747, 1784, 2524, 2529, 2643–2650, 2986, 3062, 3550, 3551, 3560, 3733, 3736, 3738, 3775, 4079, 4318–4322, 4337, 5346, 5684, 5709.
Price, Willard DeMille 5649
Prien, Charles H 5592, 5593
Priest, Alan 5592, 5593
Prince, Igor Book 2708
Princeton Conference 2728
Princeton University 444, 474, 481, 535, 537, 1185, 1219, 2585, 2658, 2659, 2728, 2820, 3200, 3869, 3883, 3903, 3968, 3977, 3979, 4027, 4053.
Princeton University Press 267, 340, 349, 468, 1167, 2577, 3796, 3939, 5041, 5282
Principle of Economic Reconstruction in China 3916
Pritt, D. N 5156
Private IPR Discussion group on United Nations cooperation 440
Private Manufacture of Armaments 2891
Privy Council (Canada) 1216
Problem of Asia, The 4006
Problem of Japan 2891
Problem of Unification of China 3935
Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea 3592
Problems of Communism 2270
Problems of Leninism 1690
Problems of the Pacific 2721, 2891, 3483, 3933, 4100
Proceedings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court 3932
Procopé, Hjalmar 603
Proctor, Robert 4692
Producers' News 2665
Production Branch Headquarters (Chinese Communist Party) 2408
Program of the Communist International and Its Constitution (Third American Edition) 1690, 2270
Progress of Pan-American Cooperation 2586
Progressive Party 1106, 1336, 3057
Progressive Party Bookshops 3827, 3830, 3831, 3841
Progressive Ticket 407, 632
Progressive Women's Council 4275

Page
Prokopovich, Professor 3444
Prolog to the Liberation of the Negro People 2886
Propaganda and War 4102
Prosin, V. F 4039
Prospects for Democracy in Japan 4165, 4166
Prostov, Eugene 5182
Prosveta 2665
Protestant Digest 300
Provincial Committee (Chinese Communist Party) 2448
Provincial Congress 2409
Provisional Supreme Court (Jui-chin, Kiangsi) 2471
Pruitt, Betram 305, 306
Pruitt, Ian 587
Pruitt, Ida 305, 306, 680, 681, 3793, 4002, 4003, 5198, 5202, 5203, 5592, 5593, 5709
Pso-an-Tung-kuan District 2472
Psychological Warfare Department 727, 731, 734
Pu, Wei-meng 5592, 5593
Public Affairs Committee (New York) 1214, 2650, 4047, 4102, 4190, 4194, 4198
Public Affairs Pamphlets 564
Public Library of New York 2873
Puerto Rico 3834
Pulitzer Prize 300, 1221
Purcell, Victor 1222, 1237, 1421, 5062, 5350, 5592, 5594, 5684
Purdy, Rosella 4863
Pure Oil Co 102
Purvis 5189
Pushkin 3621
Puskin, Alexander 4091, 4144
Putnam, Israel 2659
Putnam, Samuel 4136, 4260
Putnam's Sons, G. P. (New York) 3624, 3626, 3706
Putney School (Vermont) 3601, 4867–4869
Puttkamer, B 4440
Puttkammer, Ernest W 4428
Pyke, Richard 263, 2891, 3481, 3483, 3486, 4987, 5119, 5161, 5356, 5592, 5593, 5704

Q

Queens College 2585
Queen Mary (steamship) 4049
Quezon 249, 2884, 2885, 2887
Quezon, Mrs 4451
Quezon and the Philippines 2887
Quick, Percy 4277
Quigley, Mr 4580, 4835
Quigley, Harold S 901, 1050, 1132, 1144, 1147, 1148, 1551, 1583, 1600, 1618, 1656, 1668, 1677, 2891, 3993, 4225, 4229, 4231, 4999, 5229, 5592, 5593, 5684.
Quigley, Herb 4263
Quirino, President (Philippines) 1053, 1337, 1586, 1626
Quo, Tai-chi 2290
Qureshi, I. H 5592, 5593

R

Rabbins 4497, 4504, 4509
Rabinowitz, Victor 75, 114, 127
Racial Myth, The 4351
Radcliffe, College 140, 1219, 1227, 3868, 4392
Rade 5132
Radek, Karl 3467, 4352, 4879, 5125, 5151–5154
Radin, Prof. Paul 4260, 4351
Radio City 743, 2169, 2303
Radio Communications (Chinese Communist Party) 2420
Radio Institute of America 762
Radio Moscow 4485

Page
Radio News Conference (State Department) 2183
Radio News Room. (*See* Also Coordinator of Information) 396
Radio Personnel (Navy) 2182
Radio Service (United States Armed Forces) 2162
Radius, Walter A 1153, 1166, 2581, 4093, 4094, 5186, 5592, 5593
Radnik 2665
Radom, Jane 4990, 4995
Rae, Hilda Austern. (*See* Austin, Hilda) 4807
Rager, F. A 5592, 5593
Rahder, J 5592, 5593
Rahman, Obaidur 5062
Rahna-Trone (Rayna Prohme) 4958
Railroad Amalgamation Advocate 2665
Railroad Brotherhood 607
Railroad Clerks Brotherhood 1104, 2665
Railroad Retirement Poard 4641, 4665
Railway Carmen Brotherhood 1104
Railway Conductors Order 1104
Rajchman, Ludwig 72, 137–140, 1003, 1747, 2589, 2702, 2832, 3551, 3930, 4077, 4129, 4807, 5216, 5270, 5346.
Rajchman's China Report 2702
Rakovsky 3467
Rally for Democratic Japan 2242, 2243
Raman, T. A 5592, 5593
Ramsey, David 4089
Ramspeck, Robert 282, 1033, 1034, 1149, 4246, 4621, 4624
Ramuz, Charles Ferdinand 5654
Rand, Christopher 455, 465, 1198, 3742, 3757
Rand, Stuart C 4692
Randall Philleys Associates 4402
Randolph, A Philip 411, 1514
Randolph, Jeannette 945, 4108, 4988, 5592, 5593
Ranga, N. G 5323
Rankin 1545
Rankin, Lieutenant Colonel 4823, 4829
Rao, B. Shiva 1167, 2124, 5062, 5594, 5595
Rao, V. K. R. V 5323
Raper, Arthur 2890
Rappaport, Arthur Vincent 5675, 5676
Rasminsky, Louis 5270
Rasmussen, A. H 5594, 5595
The Rate of Growth in the Soviet Union 3451
Rathborne, Mervyn 4116
Ratham, P 5594, 5595
Ratner, David L 3812
Rauch, Mrs 2138, 2141
Raushenbush, Joan 2586, 4964
Raushenbush, (Steve) Stephen 1980, 2831, 3794, 5261
Raushenbush, Mrs. Steve 1980
Rautenstrauch, Walter 2659, 3793, 4260
Raw Materials in Peace and War 2891
Rawlings, Bernard 5594, 5595
Rawson, Geoffrey 5594, 5595
Ray, Frank 4824, 4832
Ray, Hilda Austern. (*See* Austern, Hilda.)
Ray, Jefferson Franklin 72, 4623, 4624, 4716, 4725, 5286, 5594, 5595
Ray, Thomas 3336
Raymond, Elizabeth 945, 4987, 4988
Rayner, Charles 4967
RCAF. (*See* Royal Canadian Air Force.)
Rea, Gardner 2659
Rea, Howard 1997, 2079, 2122, 2189
Read, Arthur 4131
Read, T. T 2891, 5594. 5595

Page
Reader's Digest 159, 169, 212, 213, 215, 217, 220, 221, 838, 1204, 1217, 1229, 1322, 1325, 2981, 3353, 3355, 3356, 3361–3365, 3375, 3378, 3380–3382, 3390, 3391, 3497, 3498, 3801.
Realpolitik 4124
Reasons of the Denunciation of the Washington Treaty and the Situation in the Far East 3935
Reber, Miles 840
Recht, Charles 4136, 4860
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) 1104, 4830
Reconstruction Loan (Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government) 2422
Reconstructionist (publication) 4115
Red Academy (Yenan) 3292, 3299
Red Army. (*See* Russian Army.)
Red Army (China). (*See* Chinese Communist Army.)
Red Army (Fourth Section). (*See* Chinese Communist Army, New Fourth Route.)
Red Army in Germany 178
Red Army (Soviet). (*See* Russian Army.)
Red Cross 258, 259, 1846, 2624, 2834, 3827
American 1551
International 1218
Red Cross Mission to Russia 300
Red Mongolian Army 2724, 2818
Red Guards (Russian) 566, 961
Red Star Over China 1782, 1847, 2891, 3062, 3182, 3185, 3188, 3829, 3831, 3840, 4082
Reday, Joseph Z 5594, 5595
Reddick, Olive I 5702
Redfield, A. H 5594, 5595
Redfield, Robert 4119
Redman, H. Vere 5594, 5595
Redmond, Roland 2814
Redmont, Bernard 4719
Reed College 4259
Reed, John 4090
Reed, Marie 4139
Reed, Stephen W 5684
Rees, Frederick 5594, 5595
Rees-Williams, D. R 4893, 5594, 5595
Reese, Curtis W 1514
Refregier, Anton 2659
Regimental Medical Station 2444
Register of State Department. (*See* Biographical Register, U. S. Department of State.)
Reich (Germany) 2685, 4136
Reichner, Phoebe 4823, 4824, 4829, 4832
Reichshauer 3486
Reichstag 312
Reichswehr 380
Reid, Escott 263, 2124, 2125, 4569, 5115, 5333, 5356, 5594, 5595
Reid, Helen Dwight 4713, 5702
Reid, John Gilbert 3167, 5594, 5595
Reid, Ogden 5235
Reid, Mrs. Ogden 444
Reid, Paul M 4142
Reid, Thomas 1267
Reider, Robert W 5674
Rein, David 2559, 2595, 2619, 4863
Reinhardt, Mrs. A. W 264
Reinhardt, Mrs. Aurelia Henry 1221
Reinhold, Anna 4991, 4995
Reis, Bernard 4260
Reischauer, A. K 5594, 5595

Page
Reischauer, Edwin Oldfather 901, 920, 1025, 1144, 1147, 1148, 1259, 1260, 1262, 1266, 1267, 1278, 1281, 1623, 1627, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1681, 2527, 2611, 2809, 3727, 3728, 3965, 4125, 4206, 4835, 4930, 4931, 5111, 5198, 5229, 5594, 5595, 5655, 5660.
Reischauer, Robert Karl 4860, 4861
Reiss, Ignatz 184, 207, 226–229, 234, 244
Reissig, Herman F 4117, 4142
Relations Between Japan and China During the World War 3935
Relief Loan (South Hopeh) 2422
Remer, Mr 4590
Remer, Carl F 147, 161, 393, 443, 445, 446, 474, 476, 1802, 2809, 2810, 2832, 3167, 3168, 3280, 3281, 3310, 3311, 3690, 4919, 4958, 4975, 4977, 4984, 5001, 5007, 5008, 5199, 5226, 5254, 5259, 5594, 5595.
Remington, William 3556, 4720, 4747, 4800, 4801
Renault Motor Works 2468
Rene, Mr 2818
Renner, Gordon 5674, 5678–5682
Renwanz, Lt. Col. Rowland H 4072
Reorganization Act 1139, 1140
Repertory Playhouse (University of Washington, Un-American Activities of certain professors) 2160–2162, 2183
Report on Political Work in the Army 2470
Report from Red China 3500
Report 2050, Senate. (The index for this report appears on p. 5948 of this volume.)
Reporter, The 3813
Reports, Russia 4090
Republic of China 2209, 2210, 2212, 2215, 2316, 4523, 4542
Republic of Mentnow 1609
Republic Oil Refining Co 102
Republic Steel 2684
Republic of Vietnam 1285, 1604, 1608
Republican Herald Tribune 1105
Republican Party ((USA) G. O. P.) 544, 547, 638, 639, 784, 797, 827, 833, 836, 837, 839, 1097, 1102, 1104–1106, 1114, 1443, 1470, 1474, 1535, 1536, 1906, 2117, 2288, 2294, 2554, 2628, 2835, 2948, 2949, 3026, 3045, 3110–3112.
Requa, Eloise 4062, 4066
Research and Analysis Branch of Strategic Services 3805, 3807–3809
Research Bulletin 296
Research Bulletin on the Soviet Union 4145
Research Committee 477
Residence Certificates 2370
Resnick, Ruth 4989, 4995
Resolution on the Chinese Question Passed by the Sixth Plenum of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International 4352
Resources and Trade of Central America 2586
Reston, James 1273, 1275
Results and Prospective Plans of Socialist Construction in the Soviet Far East 3935
Retail Store Employees 4275
Reubens, Edwin P 5594, 5595
Reustle, Rev. Frederick 4117
Reuters 51, 131, 839, 840, 5217, 5326, 5334, 5348
Reuther, Walter P 2834
Reviewing Board at Munich 4428
Revolutionary Army (1911) 2466
Revolution in Chinese Legal Thought 2890
Revolution and Nationality 2721
Revolutionary East 2694
Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission (Chinese Communist Party) 2455, 2457, 2464
Revolutionary Military Council 4213
Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies (a resolution of the Six World Congress of the Comintern) 1690, 2270, 4336, 4352

Page
Rex (steamship) 3931
Reynal & Hitchock 626, 627
Reynaud 669
Reynolds, Bertha C 4260
Reynolds, Judge 5681
Reynolds, Robert 1393
RFC. (*See* Reconstruction Finance Corporation.)
Rhee, Syngman 1053, 1586, 1879, 3026–3029, 3032, 4861
Rheinische Zeitung (Cologne) 1013
Rhetts, Charles Edward 788, 4821, 4823, 4824, 4825, 4831, 4837, 4845
Rhoads, Charles J 1220, 2610, 3917, 4044, 4092–4094, 4105, 4106, 4108, 4134, 5186
Rhodes Trust, Cecil 5349
Rhodesia 4596
Ribbentrop, Joachim Von 3223–3225, 4434, 4440
Rice, Elmer 4117
Rice Export from Burma, Siam, and French Indochina 3167
Rice, Lloyd P 2912, 3965, 5594, 5595
Richards, C. A 4834
Richards, I. A 5594, 5595
Richards, Mrs. I. A 5177
Richardson, Gerald 3794
Riches, E. J 5594, 5595
Richmond Hotel (Geneva) 2712
Riddell, R. G 5594, 5595
Ridley, John 5596, 5597
Reifler, Winfield 432, 857, 2831, 4973, 5261
Reinaecker, Victor 5596, 5597
Riess, La Verne 566
Rieve, Emil 946
Rifchin, Frances 4988
Riggs, Fred W 5596, 5597
Riggs, Lynn 4260
Rigland 2831
Rigor, Mayor 4857
Riley 2004
Rinehart 4120
Rodman, Bella 4757, 4758
Rodman, Samuel 3551
Rodwell, H. R 5596, 5597
Roe, Gilbert E 3766
Roe, Wellington 2659
Roeder, Ralph 4260, 5655
Roerich 2710
Ring, Martin H 327, 3962
Ringwait, Arthur 3965
Ringwald 2913
Ringwalt, Arthur R 5261, 5480, 5702
Ringwalter, Mr 2489
Rise of American Civilization, The 3689
Rise of Land Tax and Fall of Dynasties in Chinese History 3167
Risenfeld 4997
Rishauer, Professor (Reischaver) 1076
Rivers, Juan Santo 3057
Rivers, W. F 5324, 5596, 5597
Rivet, Paul 5321
Riznik, Charlotte 5295
Roach, James R 5596, 5597
Road to the Ocean 3621
Road to War 3167
Roar, China, Roar 2807
Robequain, Charles 1222, 5259, 5333, 5596, 5597, 5684, 5685, 5692
Roberson, W. S 4983
Robert, Mr 5216
Robert, Father 5333
Roberts, Holland 3620, 3621, 5040

Page
Roberts, Rankin 4824, 4832
Roberts, Stephen H 5596, 5597
Robertson, A. W 1313
Robertson, C. J 3133, 3167, 3168, 5596, 5597
Robertson, Gwendolyn 4990, 4995
Robertson, Walter 1494, 4834
Robertson, William S 901, 1148, 1257, 1261, 1262, 1278, 1551, 1664, 1665, 1668, 2528, 3079, 3704, 4835
Robeson, Paul 300, 2659, 2789, 3477, 3556, 3570, 3835, 3842, 4606, 4607, 4612, 4613, 4620
Robeson, Paul, Jr 3842
Robin Hood Gang 2458
Robins, Joseph 1249
Robins, Col. Raymond 295, 296, 299, 300, 4091, 4145
Robinson, Earl 2659
Robinson, Dr. G. Canby 3794
Robinson, Geroid T 4091, 4145, 4580, 5111, 5173
Robinson, Gerry 5286
Robinson, Henry M 1220
Robinson, Jay 3965, 5219, 5220, 5247, 5248, 5702
Robinson, Kenneth A 5674
Robinson, Reid 622, 4116
Rochester, Mrs. Anna 4275
Rochdale 5210
Rock, Nathan 2789
Rockefeller Brothers' Fund 901, 1551, 4835
Rockefeller Fellowship 338, 451
Rockefeller Finance Project 173
Rockefeller Foundation 31, 36, 177, 179, 239, 323, 339, 346, 433, 451, 473, 474, 858, 916, 928, 1146, 1151–1154, 1159, 1166–1168, 1215, 1217, 1223, 1234–1236, 1237, 1618, 1696, 2481, 2482, 2493, 2494, 2523, 2613, 2614, 2817, 2870, 2981, 3637, 3638, 3795, 3850, 3887, 3916, 3969, 3998, 4021–4023, 4065, 4093–4095, 4103, 4107, 4119, 4160, 4217, 4244, 4579, 4849–4851, 4900, 4974, 4979, 5003, 5021, 5023, 5025, 5026, 5029, 5030, 5111, 5120, 5166, 5177, 5209, 5250, 5263, 5322, 5327, 5335, 5688, 5689.
Rockefeller Foundation Conference on Slavic Studies 2568
Rockefeller Grant 310
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research 3850
Rockefeller, John D., III 901, 1148, 1551, 1609, 1618, 1639, 2566–2568, 4835
Rockefeller, John D., Jr 4105, 4276
Rockefeller Memorial, Laura Spelman 5335
Rockefeller, Nelson A 439, 2836, 5299
Rockefellers 293, 294
Rockley, Glen 5596, 5597
Rockport Press 538
Rockwood, Charles P 5596, 5597
Rodgers, Manville 3169, 4277
Roever, Reel & Donovan 4426–4428
Rogers, Agnes 5655
Rogers, Daisy Fiske 3794
Rogers, Mrs. Dorothy 712
Rogers, Lettie 5651
Rogers, Mr. Lindsay 4119, 4274, 5002
Rogers, Pauline 3337
Rogers, Representative 3407
Rogers, Rima S 4990, 4995, 5290
Rogers, Sadie 5704
Rogers, William Garland 5657
Rogge, Mr 357
Rogoff, Vladimir. (*See* Vladimir Rogov.)
Rogov, Vladimir 127, 128, 131–133, 140, 144, 145–148, 167, 178, 529–531, 539, 1747, 1748, 1778, 1801, 1802, 1916, 2383, 3174, 3274, 3280, 3283, 3284, 3309–3311, 4284, 4286, 4584, 4585, 5011, 5012, 5059, 5060, 5334, 5347.

Page
Rohde, Ruth Bryan 5643
Rohrbough, Edward 2789
Rolfe, Mary 4988
Rollins, William Jr 4260
Rolph, Earl 5596, 5597
Roman, Agnes 4103, 5295, 5596, 5597
Rome, Harold J 4260
Rome (Italy) 4201, 4203
Romm, Alexandre 5122
Romm, Michael 4584, 4585, 4587, 4588
Romm, Vladimir 1748, 3173, 3311, 3318, 4047, 4050, 5150–5154, 5596, 5597
Rommel 5679
Romulo, Brig. Gen. Carlos 1625, 3070, 5596, 5597
Ronan, William 5596, 5597
Rooks, General 4732
Roosevelt Administration 175, 176, 180
Roosevelt-Churchill Pledge 3503
Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano 20, 21, 29, 35, 67, 68, 133, 155, 175, 175, 213, 278, 297, 328, 348, 381, 382, 390, 528, 584, 586, 596, 597, 599, 600, 606, 607, 633, 637–640, 656, 657, 683, 707, 728, 729, 785, 787, 825, 829, 833, 839, 902, 985, 1014, 1016, 1023, 1024, 1030, 1085, 1087, 1092, 1094, 1097–1100, 1102, 1104–1106, 1109, 1113, 1136, 1298, 1306, 1325, 1326, 1329, 1330, 1333, 1334, 1336–1338, 1341, 1342, 1346, 1351, 1357–1359, 1361–1364, 1366–1368, 1377, 1391, 1397, 1404, 1412–1415, 1417–1419, 1425, 1431, 1438, 1439, 1442, 1443, 1446, 1448–1450, 1453, 1454, 1456, 1457, 1460, 1463, 1470, 1623, 1727, 1734, 1738, 1791, 1795, 1809, 1811, 1813, 1819–1823, 1825, 1826, 1831, 1852, 1855, 1917, 1937, 1965, 1966, 1981, 1986, 1994, 2002, 2009, 2010, 2029, 2031, 2037, 2039–2041, 2045, 2046, 2048, 2052, 2057, 2058, 2062, 2064, 2068, 2072, 2075–2077, 2080, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2144, 2216, 2269, 2287–2289, 2292, 2379, 2380, 2385, 2392, 2628, 2657, 2658, 2672, 2674, 2676–2679, 2682–2685, 2737, 2791, 2827–2840, 2844, 2849–2852, 2858–2863, 2868, 2869, 2890, 2921, 2976, 2977, 2979, 3052, 3053, 3087, 3088, 3198, 3202, 3209–3210, 3265, 3269, 3324, 3330, 3374, 3377, 3379, 3479, 3499, 3624, 3626, 3650, 3651, 3658, 3659, 3667, 3693, 3696, 3700, 3702, 4071, 4128, 4137, 4340, 4523, 4545, 4691, 4825, 4839, 4854, 4872, 4873, 4927, 4937, 4941, 4964, 4968, 4977, 5035, 5040, 5052, 5055, 5057–5060, 5071, 5072, 5073, 5112, 5190, 5249, 5253, 5268, 5280, 5328, 5349, 5364, 5379, 5422, 5483, 5484, 5655, 5664, 5671.
Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin D 2582, 2831, 3794, 4834, 5261, 5643, 5682
Roosevelt Hotel (New York) 2689
Roosevelt, James 2284
Roosevelt, Nicholas 2981, 5596, 5597
Roosevelt, Theodore 1564, 2388, 4138, 5635
Root, Constance 4990, 4995
Root, Elihu 462, 995, 4100
Roots, Miss Frances 1514
Roper, E. C 5299
Ropes, E. Clarence 432, 857, 2248, 4973, 5205, 5276. 5294, 5596, 5597
Rosas, Señor (Mexican Embassy) 3924, 3925
Rosberg, Lillian 4992, 4995
Rose 4823
Rose, (Archie) Archibald 40, 578, 1216, 5175, 5334, 5359
Rose, S 5596, 5597
Rosecrans, W S 264, 712, 713, 2622
Rosen, Edward 3963
Rosen, Dr. Joseph A 4260
Rosenberg 5678
Rosenberg, Allan 4487, 4679, 4737
Rosenberg, B 3337
Rosenberg, Isadore 3336
Rosenberg, Max 3336
Rosenborg, Mr 4636

Page
Rosenborg, Jacquelin 4659
Rosenfeld, Sylvia 4990, 4995
Rosenman, Judge 729, 3640
Rosenthal, Alma 5596, 5597
Rosenthal, Laura 4991, 4995
Rosenthal, Morris 2430, 4641, 4674, 4675, 4735, 4736
Rosenwald Fund 4092
Rosinger, Lawrence K 72, 125, 313–315, 318, 340, 341, 345, 346, 350–352, 467–482, 654, 655, 670, 671, 687, 901, 919–921, 932, 997, 1044–1046, 1049, 1050, 1069, 1070, 1076–1078, 1118, 1119, 1123, 1130, 1133, 1136, 1148, 1167–1172, 1221, 1234, 1235, 1237, 1239, 1240, 1252, 1253, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1262, 1266, 1269, 1278, 1279, 1513, 1551, 1554, 1572, 1573, 1599, 1601, 1610, 1617, 1636, 1665, 1783, 1797–1801, 1939, 1998, 2004, 2005, 2018, 2145, 2475–2557, 2881, 2882, 2986, 3021, 3059, 3067, 3075, 3078, 3079, 3126, 3128, 3249, 3253, 3551, 3552, 3775, 3794–3796, 3895, 3939, 3980, 3981–3984, 4018, 4019, 4022, 4023, 4093, 4155, 4279, 4834, 4835, 4860, 4861, 4872, 4900, 4939, 4991, 4995, 5021, 5027, 5195, 5214, 5237, 5284, 5299, 5301, 5596, 5597, 5648–5653.
Rosinski, Herbert 2890, 2891, 4124, 5598, 5599
Ross, Andrew 4999
Ross, Charles G 3640, 4551
Ross, G. A. Johnston 5598, 5599
Ross, Ian Clunies 1075, 1222, 1292, 1293, 3167, 5322, 5684
Ross, John C 2867, 4724, 4959
Ross, Lloyd 5598, 5599
Ross, Michael 4835
Ross, Norman 3061
Rossbach, Mr 5299
Rossbach, Mrs 5299
Rossiter, Fred J 499, 4999, 5598, 5599
Rostovsky 4091
Rotary Club, Peking 3604
Rotary International 1213
Roth, Andrew 72, 472, 477, 609, 625, 654–673, 955, 997, 998, 1748, 1833, 1843, 1844, 1853, 2107, 2113, 2114, 2144, 2239, 2241–2243, 2487, 2624, 2627, 2632, 2638, 2813, 3552–3556, 3903, 4155, 4311–4314, 4316, 4332, 4333, 4616, 4681, 4682, 4807, 4814, 4815, 4824, 4829, 4832, 4842, 4844, 4846–4848, 4861, 4862, 5220, 5248, 5249, 5278, 5598, 5599, 5649.
Roth, Mrs 4829
Rothchild, John 4091, 4145
Rothe, Cecile 5598, 5599
Rothman, Michael 3169, 4277
Rothman, Rhoda 4989, 4995
Rothwell, Easton 2843
Rotor, Mr 5049
Rotterdam 3604, 3633
Roudabush, Steven 3646
Roudabush, Mrs. Steven 3646
Round Table 577
Rowe, David Nelson 976, 1071, 1222, 1291, 1783, 1800, 2819, 3312, 3967–4031, 4446, 4447, 4944, 5111, 5229, 5598, 5599, 5649, 5683, 5686–5691.
Rowe, James 4834
Rowell, Chester M 264, 713, 1220, 1313, 2622, 3923, 4021, 5150, 5153, 5156, 5186, 5318, 5326, 5334, 5704
Rowell, Newton R 5115, 5156
Rowell, Newton W 1216, 5319, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5598, 5599
Rowland, D. W 5598, 5599
Roxas, Manuel 4855, 4857, 5858, 5598, 5599
Roxby, P. M 2891, 5598, 5599
Roy, M. N 2321, 2469, 5005, 5043, 5046, 5598, 5599
Royal Anthropological Institute (London) 3604

Page
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 999–1001
Royal Central Asian Society 2900, 2901
Royal Commission 365
Royal Geographical Society 2900, 2901, 3024
Royal Institute (London) 7, 19, 390, 2250
Royal Institute of Internation Affairs 171, 279, 1214–1216, 1236, 2817, 3131, 3435, 3436, 3486, 3582, 3604, 3775. 3929, 4047, 4064, 4893, 5317, 5329, 5330, 5356, 5378, 5412
Royall, Mr 357
Royama, Masamichi 5598, 5599, 5684, 5685
Rozenholz 194, 198
Rubens, Doris 5655
Rubin, Barnard 5598, 5599
Rubin, Jay 3336
Rubin, Rose 687, 2518, 2592, 2881, 2882, 5299
Rubin, Ruth 4277
Rubio, Alfred 5674, 5677, 5678
Rubio, Anna H. (*see also* Morgan, Mrs. Richard) 1514
Rubio, Carlos 5678
Rucker, Arthur 4724
Rudlin, Mrs. Eryl 5702
Rue, Edgar H 409, 410
Ruebens, Beatrice G 5598, 5599
Rueff, Gaston 5598, 5599, 5684
Rufus, W. Carl 5598, 5599
Rugh, Elizabeth 1784
Rukeyser, Miss Muriel 4275
Rukovina, Margaret 4659
Rumania 3942, 4350
Ruml, Beardsley 5041
Runes, I. T 2633
Rural Pacification Movement 2369
Rural Reconstruction Commission 1631
Rushmore, Howard 4349, 4350
Rusk, Dean 1499, 1504, 1648, 2870, 4925, 4926, 4984, 5023, 5025, 5026, 5363, 5391
Ruskin 547
Russell, Bertrand 5041
Russell & Co 4701
Russell, Cyrus W 5364
Russell, Donald 1903
Russell, Francis H 1042, 1132, 1552–1555, 1574, 1575, 1579, 1580, 1601, 1671, 2477, 2537, 3086, 3992, 4135
Russell, Helen E 4992, 4995
Russell, Louis J 4903, 5502
Russell, Maud 1514, 2690, 2789, 4163, 4164, 4602, 4604, 4620
Russell, Representative 4904
Russell, Senator Richard B 3069, 4428
Russell Sage Foundation 682, 683, 4119
Russia. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Russia and Asia 4091
Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East 4091, 4120
Russian Academy of Science 2699, 3235
Russian-American Institute. (*See* American Russian Institute.)
Russian-American Society 4504
Russian Army 222, 359, 361, 362, 364, 383, 501, 597, 605, 805, 872, 1084, 1557, 1563, 2310, 2328, 2384, 2388, 2389, 2724, 2997, 3098, 3224, 3270, 3365, 3484, 3709, 4480, 4481, 4486, 4490, 4506, 4569, 4873, 4897.
Russian Brest-Litovsk Peace Delegation 2462
Russian Calendar (Old) 566
Russian-China Pact 4189
Russian Civil War 2451
Russian Consulate:
  Moscow 5025
  New York City 5154, 5275
  Shanghai 5158

Page
Russian Consul (Vienna) 5162
Russian Consul General (San Francisco) 3270, 3271, 3274
Russian Dominated Areas (Manchuria) 2305
Russian Economic Institute 2569
Russian Embassy:
Mexico City 5055, 5056
Tokyo 4020, 5108, 5115
Toronto 5270, 5271
Washington, D. C 243, 3268, 3646, 3648, 5057, 5152, 5162, 5165, 5168, 5169, 5183–5186, 5196, 5201, 5204, 5226, 5230, 5246, 5262, 5266, 5267, 5300.
Russian Far East Police 2719
Russian Foreign Office (Moscow) 146, 152, 1328, 2710, 3224, 3235, 4515
Russian-German Nonaggression Pact 3220, 3222–3224, 3227, 3308
Russian-German Pact, 1939 4971, 5206
Russian Government. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Russian Imperial Army 5115, 5146
Russian Information Bureau 2723
Russian-Japanese Nonaggression Pact 2982, 3279
Russian Legation:
Bern, Switzerland 1770, 1772
Ottawa 5262
Russian Military Government 219
Russian Military Intelligence 209, 210, 219, 860, 3327
Russian Mutual Aid 3337
Russian Orthodox Church 297
Russian Research Institute (Harvard) 2753
Russian Revolution of 1905 3107
Russian Revolution of 1917 1319, 1953, 1954, 2451, 2456, 2466, 2468, 2608, 2693, 3463
Russian Secret Police. (*See* Soviet Military Intelligence.)
Russian Security Police (*see also* NVD, Internal Affairs Security Police) 196
Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party 3107
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic 1958
Russian Trials (1937) 2746
Russian Troops 2218, 2219
Russian War Relief 149, 175, 293, 294, 296, 299, 300, 438, 549, 630, 631, 1174, 1175, 2564, 2565, 2594, 2669, 3615, 4097, 4940, 5090, 5275, 5282, 5285, 5298, 5344.
Russian Zone of Military Operations (Europe) 2305, 2310
Russo, Augusto 3224
Russo-Chinese Border 3463
Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact 2351
Russo-Japanese Neutrality Declaration 5240
Russo-Japanese Pact 351, 3522, 3523, 3669
Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) 2388
Russo-Polish-Ukrainian Treaty 2461
Rutgers College 322
Rutgers Press 1686
Rutgers University 4152
Ruthenberg 2667
Rutherford, Robert 5702
Rayn, Rt. Rev. Msgr. John A 3167
Ryder, Oscar B 2837
Rykoff 5156
Ryu, Shintaro 5598, 5599
Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) 2163, 2297, 2535

S

Sa, Kung-liao 5059
Sabarwal, K. R 5598, 5599
Sabotage 3071
Sacher, Harry 2659, 2967, 2969, 2985, 4364, 4365
Sacks, Michael R 1513
Sacks, Milton 1222, 3971, 3972, 4888, 5598, 5599
Sacramento Bee 1309

Page
Sadler, A. L. 5598, 5599
Safarov, Mr 4352, 4589, 4879
Sagar, T. H 5600, 5601
Sah, Pan-tung 5345, 5361
Saha, Art 3842
Sahajanand, Swami 2638
Sahalimsk 5008
Saigon 3623, 3706
Saigon Airport 2632
Saionji, Kimikazu (Kimi Kazu) 364–366, 504, 506, 694, 3556, 3557, 3589, 3592, 3925, 3983, 5156, 5174, 5189, 5208, 5249, 5258
Saionji, Kinichi 4229–4230, 4263
Saionji, Prince 366
Saipan 4265
Saito, H 3167
Saito, Soichi 5333, 5335, 5600, 5601
Saito, Takio 2628, 4184
Saiyidain, K. G 5600, 5601
Salim, Hadji Agoes 5322
Sakamo Tetsu 2468
Sakanishi, Shio 5600, 5601
Sakhalin, Mr 4556
Sakhalin Agreement 2043
Sako, John Kita 3965
Salem Methodist Church (New York City) 1105
Salisbury, Lawrence E 621, 622, 753, 754, 950, 971, 996, 1749, 1758, 1780, 1785, 1914, 4263, 4472, 4473, 4611, 4848, 4989, 4995, 5024, 5084, 5173, 5282, 5283, 5289, 5296, 5329, 5600, 5601, 5703.
Salmen, Stanley 3508
Salmony, Alfred 5600, 5601
Salter, Sir Arthur 178, 3333, 3681, 3682, 3688, 3696, 3699, 5192, 5600, 5601
Samoa 3909, 4053
Samson, Mr 5387
Samson, Gerald 5600, 5601
Samuel, Herbert 5320, 5334, 5600, 5601
San Francisco, California-Peoples World 3045, 3071–3073
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce 1666, 4207, 4208, 5315
San Francisco Chronicle 1014, 1220, 1529, 5084, 5151, 5326, 5335
San Francisco Conference (UN) 815, 2398, 2451, 2471
San Francisco Daily News 3581, 5149
San Francisco Examiner 965
San Francisco News 5040
San Francisco Regional Labor Board 995
San Francisco State College 5040
San Francisco World Affairs Council 4226
San Min Chu I 2414, 2452, 2459
San Min Chu I Youth Corps 2344
Sanctions or War 2671
Sandan Bailie School 3793
Sanders, Florence E 4991, 4995
Sang, H. K 5600, 5601
Sanger, Mr. Richard R 384, 385
Sano Hotel 371
Sansom, Sir George 38, 238, 239, 440, 1153, 1216, 1221, 1314, 2582, 3920, 4224, 4982, 4984, 5009, 5021–5023, 5026, 5051–5053, 5072, 5189, 5190, 5208, 5209, 5322, 5333.
Sansom, George Bailey 5600, 5601, 5660
Santillan-Castrence, Pura 5600, 5601
Santos, Bienvenido N 5600, 5601
Santos, John (Alias Desideriu Hammer) 2955, 2962, 2967–2969, 4364, 4366
Saposs, David 640
Sarafam, Bertram D 5600, 5601
Sarah Lawrence College 4259
Sarekat Rayat 878

Page
Sargeant 1609, 1642, 1645, 1646, 1647, 1648, 1650, 1682
Sarrant, Albert 1216, 2713, 2714, 3933, 5147, 5320, 5600, 5601
Sarton, George 342
Sassaman, Mr 3965
Saturday Evening Post 9, 680, 681, 1434, 1436, 1452, 1781, 2740, 2800, 2803, 2981, 2982, 3466, 3508, 4135, 5465, 5466.
Saturday Review of Literature 674, 675, 1230, 3669, 5648, 5650, 5651, 5653, 5654, 5659, 5660
Saugstad 4997, 4998
Saunders, Kenneth 5600, 5601
Sauvy, Alfred 5600, 5601
Savage, Charles 633, 634
Savord, Ruth 5600, 5601
Sawayanagi, Masataro 4319
Sawer, Beatrice 5600, 5601
Sayers, Mr 4513
Sayer, Raphael 2659
Sayers, Mentana 407–410
Sayers, Michael 407
Saypol, Irving H 4836
Sayre, Francis B 432, 857, 1735
Sayre, Mrs. Francis B 3794, 5702
Sayre, Harry 946
Sazer, H 3335
Scalapino, Robert A 4160, 5600, 5601
SCAP (*see also* Supreme Commander Allied Powers) 373, 374, 386, 395, 396, 748, 749, 753, 901, 1027, 1622, 1635, 1639, 1640, 1770, 1879, 1881, 1884, 2225, 2227, 2229, 2230, 2232, 2235, 2236, 2281, 2790, 2793, 3452
SCAP Directive 1770
Schachner, A. E 4273
Schapova, Miss 2730
Schappes, Morris U 4926
Scharf, Lee 3962
Scharffenberg, W. A 5702
Scharrenberg, Paul 5186
Schechtman, Joseph B 5600, 5601
Schatz, Louise H 4990
Schefer, E. E 5702
Scheffer, Paul 5174, 5458
Scherer, Marcel 4037, 4038, 5168
Schiller, A. Arthur 3133, 3167, 3168, 5003, 5602, 5603, 5684
Schiller, Harry 3337
Schillinglaw 577, 579, 580
Schlauch, Margaret 2659, 4089, 4117, 4260
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr 3666, 4119
Schmitt, Bernadotte 2568, 4433, 4434, 4499, 4560, 4567. 5112, 5113
Schneer, Sophie 4989, 4995
Schneider, Mr 1077
Schneider-Creusot Arms Factory 2468
Schneider, Helen 72, 1077, 1078, 1246, 3557, 4992, 4995, 5347
Schneider, Isidore 3557, 4170, 4171, 4177, 5655
Schneider, Louis, J., Jr 5674
Schneiderman, Anna C 4117
Schneiderman, William 118, 605, 2883
Schneller, Oscar 4117
Schnulz, J. W 4824
Schoellkopf, Mrs 5299
Schoen, Eugene 4260
Schoenfield, H. F. Arthur 2836
Scholefield, Guy H 3167
School of Advanced International Studies (Washington, D. C.) 996, 5313, 5703
School of Business (Columbia University) 1219
School of Chinese Studies (Columbia University) 449
School for Democracy 4156, 4157

Page
School for Democracy (NYC) 4926
School of Economics and Political Science (London) 4046
School of Military Government (University of Virginia) 2603, 2604
School of Oriental Studies (London University) 1009
School of Slavonic Studies 177, 178
School of Slavonic Studies in London 4579
Schou, Sam 2636
Schoyer, B. Preston 4616, 4988, 5602, 5603
Schrachner, Eugene 4277
Schraml, Richard 327, 3962
Schraven, Most Reverend Hubert Francis 3631
Schrieke, B 5602, 5603
Schriftgiesser, Karl 5657
Schroeder, Mr 1189
Schroeder, Johannes 5202, 5204
Schulberg, Budd Wilson 5655
Schubert, W. H 2832
Schuirmann, Mr 2809
Schulenberg, Count Frederich Werner 3224, 3225
Schulman, Marshall D 4724
Schulthers, Frederic D 5602, 5603
Schultz, Mr 2890
Schulz, John Wesley 4832
Schuman, Frederick L 1514, 4243, 4244, 4260, 4512, 4513, 5205, 5602, 5603
Schuman, Julian 143
Schumpeter, Elizabeth Boody 2981, 3887, 5264, 5265, 5602, 5603
Schutzer, Arthur 2789
Schwartz, Benjamin K 1222, 2753, 2755, 2761–2763, 2767, 5438, 5439, 5444, 5447, 5452–5455, 5457, 5461, 5466, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5481, 5482, 5602, 5603
Schweinfurt, Mr 3811
Schweitzer, Leonard J 3094, 5602, 5603
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B 433, 444, 857, 1163, 3199, 4974, 4977, 5702
Schwellenbach, Senator 3144
Science and Society 3060, 3568, 3843, 4089
Scientific Publishing Institute 4507
Scotland 4699
Scotland Yard 290, 2468
Scott, Byron N 4116
Scott, Ernest 5320, 5602, 5603
Scott, F. R 2580, 3195, 3264, 4067, 5084, 5153, 5154, 5156, 5602, 5603
Scott, Marcia T 4897, 4898
Scott, Natalie Anderson 5655
Scott, Sidney 4893
Scott, Walter K 904, 2540, 4616, 4617
Scott, Warren 5243
Scottsboro Struggle 2886
Scripps-Howard newspapers 444, 619
Scripps-Howard Press 4544
Scripps Institute in California 4556
Scroggs, William O 3167, 5602, 5603
Scudder, Prof. Vida D 4260
Scully, Madeline F 5310
Seabald 849
Seagrave, Gordon S 5651
Searchlight 2665
Searles, P. J 5602, 5603
Sears, Louis M 3167, 4426
Sears, Roebuck & Co 100
Seattle AFL Central Labor Council (Teachers Union) 2161
Seattle Chamber of Commerce 995
Seattle Newspaper Guild 1887
Seattle Post Intelligencer 4887
Seattle Star 4887
Seattle Union Record 2665
Seattle Unity Labor Council 4887

Page
Seattle Web Pressman's Union No. 26 4887
Seaver, Edwin 2659
Sebatz, Louise H 4995
Secker and Warburg (Publishers, London) 4136
Second All-China Soviet Congress 2326
Second Bandit Extermination Campaign 2325
Second Chinese Soviet Central Executive Committee 2454, 2456–2458, 2465
Second Congress of the Soviets 3107
Second Degree Graduate (Chu-ien) 2463
Second Division (Chien-kuo Army) 2458
Second Division (New Fourth Army) 2452, 2465
Second Five Year Plan (Russia) 2328, 2329
Second Front Army 2327, 2453, 2458
Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics 2586
Second National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Second People's Political Council (Chungking) 2471, 2472, 2474
Second War Zone 2332, 2456, 2457, 2459
Second World War 2661, 2723, 2990, 2999, 3007, 3060
Secret Police (Japan) 2164, 2298, 3800
Secretarial Bureau (Jui-chin, Kiangsi) 2453, 2458, 2465, 2472, 2473
Secretariat (CCP) 2404, 2452, 2453–2455, 2459, 2465, 2471
Secretariat (United Nations Conference, San Francisco) 2120, 2121, 2135, 2136, 2138
Secretariat of the League of Nations 137, 996
Secretariat, Industrial Workers Department (CCP) 2454
Secretariat Paper No. 1 2742
Secretary's Staff Committee 2852
Security—Can it be Retrieved 3333
Security Council. (*See* United Nations, Security Council.)
Security First National Bank (Los Angeles) 1220
Security in the Pacific 394, 2138, 4100
Seeds, Sir William 2729
Seeger, Elizabeth 4898, 4899
Seely, Lt. Comdr. Charles S 300
Seeman, Bernard 1338, 2789, 4611
Segrae-Ebro 4519
Seidensticker, Edward G 5602, 5603
Seitelman, Max 5602, 5603
Seitz, H. F 3965
Seiyukai (Japanese Political Party) 2628, 4148
Sekiguchi, Yasushi 2890, 5602, 5603
Selassie, Haile 5708
Seldes, George 2657, 2659, 4260, 5657
Seldes, Helen 2659
Self Defense Detachments, Eighteenth Group Army (Chart) 2448
Self Defense Government 2334
Selle, Earl Albert 5657
Sellers, Dick 668
Sellin, Thorsten 4119
Selsam, Howard 2659
Selsbee, Elizabeth 1338, 2789
Selwyn-Clarke, Hilda 5602, 5603
Sen, Gertrude Emerson 5602, 5603
Sen, Henry 4152
Sen, Dr. Sun Yat (*see also* Sun, Dr. Yat-Sen 801, 1096
Sen, Madam Sun Yat (*see also* Sun, Madam Yat-Sen) 826
Senate. (*See* United States Senate.)
Senate Appropriations Committee 313, 860, 1532, 3081
Senate Committee on Armed Services 1532
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1027, 1041, 1049, 1065, 1071, 1072, 1079, 1144, 1265, 1275, 1473, 1913, 2487, 2812, 2849, 2859
Senate Committee Investigating Communism in the State Department 1474
Senate Press Gallery 1355
Serene 5358
Sereno 5174
Serenos, Renzo 40

Page
Sergeev, M. A. 270
Sergeyer 5008
Serot, Louise B. 4990, 4995
Serot, Rhoda 4990, 4995
Servants of India Society 1216
Service, Donald 2912
Service, Jack 427, 652, 776, 4822
Service, John Stewart 72, 618, 619, 624, 626, 632–633, 679, 779, 780, 783–789, 793, 807, 808, 811, 828, 830, 903, 955, 956, 1021–1023, 1025, 1026, 1078, 1218, 1436, 1446, 1447, 1483, 1721, 1749–1751, 1753, 1754, 1758, 1759, 1781, 1788–1791, 1815, 1816, 1823, 1879, 1901–1903, 1912, 1913, 1916, 1920–1924, 1927, 1929, 1950, 1967, 1970, 1971, 1980, 1984, 1987, 1988–1990, 1994, 1997–1999, 2003, 2063, 2073–2075, 1083, 2113, 2114, 2213, 2214, 2240, 2241, 2486, 2490, 2535, 2866, 2961, 3000, 3002, 3004, 3048, 3049, 3068, 3410, 3552–3555, 3557, 3983, 4001, 4313, 4314, 4322, 4545, 4546, 4716, 4768, 4773, 4820, 4821, 4824–4826, 4829–4832, 4837–4849, 5061, 5062, 5347, 5415–5424, 5480.
Service, R. M. 4824, 4832
Setalvad, M. C. 5323
Settlement of the Australian Tropics 3167
Sevensix, Markus 5161
Seventh Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 2373, 2410
Seventh Division (Fourth Army) 2452, 2465, 2470
Seventh Fleet. (*See* United States Seventh Fleet.)
Seventh National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Seventh Red Army 2452
Seventh World Congress (Comintern) 2327–2329, 2377, 2381, 2386, 2398, 2399, 2410, 2452, 2453, 2455, 2461
Seventh World Congress Communist International 350
Severino, Rodolfo 5295
Seville Hotel 2005, 2006
Seychelles Islands (British possession) 4337
Seymour, Gideon 4976
Seymour, Lawrence D. 712, 713, 1003, 1220, 2622
Seymour, Whitney 4091, 4145
Sforza, Count Carlo 1267, 1268, 4283, 5078, 5602, 5603
Shackelford, F. 4908, 4810, 4815
Shaeker, Eugene 2660
Shadow over Asia 2587
Shadow of the Plantation 2890
Shahn, Judy 5602, 5603
Shahn, Tillie G. 938, 1313, 4988, 4989, 4992, 4995, 4300, 5064, 5300
Shall America Stop Arming Japan? 3430
Shan, Hsiang 1249
Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region 2366, 2374, 2392
Shan, Tsi-hang 2465
Shan, Yen Hsi 5404
Shanahan, Eileen 5602, 5603
Shang-huo Shu-chu (Life Book Co.) 2453
Shang-Kuan, Yun-hsiang 2351
Shang Tang Bank (Southeast Shansi) 2422
Shang Ying (Hsiang Ying, Han Ying, Hong, Ying) 2351, 2352, 2457, 2458, 2469, 2473
Shanghai, China 4119, 4421, 4427, 4429, 4433, 4434, 4436, 4442, 4690, 4700, 4701, 4702, 4765, 4769, 4770, 4829, 4830, 4832, 5319, 5320, 5331, 5333, 5334, 5356, 5383, 5417.
Shanghai Commercial Bank 18, 1216
Shanghai Commercial Press 2541
Shanghai Embassy 1973, 1975, 1984
Shanghai Evening Post 142
Shanghai Industrial and Commercial Association 3951
Shanghai Military Commission 4435
Shanghai Monthly Bulletin 397

Page
Shanghai Municipal Council 4202
Shanghai Police 1975
Shanghai Truce 1932 4151
Shanghai University 2459, 2470
Shankaikway (China) 4151
Shannon, William V 1189, 5353
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Base 2464, 2468
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government 2334, 2335, 2337–2339, 2348, 2352, 2366, 2405, 2413, 2418, 2419, 2421, 2422, 2428, 2430, 2448, 2454, 2465, 2470.
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region People's Political Council 2454
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Executive Committee 2462
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Military Region 2448, 2459, 2464, 2466
Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government (Administrative Committee) 2460
Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government 2400, 2401, 2422, 2433, 2435, 2448, 2452, 2460, 2465, 2470
Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Frontier Bank 2422
Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Border Region 2400, 2413, 2418, 2419, 2421, 2429, 2433, 2448
Shansi-Hopei-Honan Military Region 2448, 2464
Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government 2461, 2473
Shansi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government 2453
Shansi New Army 2459
Shansi Province, China 2333, 2334, 2468, 3287, 4103, 4122, 4131
Shansi Provincial Government 2333
Shansi-Suiyuan Administrative District 2472
Shansi-Suiyuan Base (Eighteenth Group Army) 2456
Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region 2400, 2413, 2413–2421, 2426, 2427, 2433, 2435, 2448
Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area Administrative Committee 2472
Shansi-Suyuan Military Region 2448, 2459, 2465
Shantung 2400, 2413, 2421, 2448, 3709, 4060, 4061, 4103, 4131
Shantung Base Area 2430, 2453
Shantung Hsing-cheng Wei-yuan-hui 2400
Shantung Liberated Area 2430
Shantung Military Region 2433, 2435, 2448, 2452, 2465
Shao-Chi, Li 812
Shao, Li-tze 2549
Shao, Yu-lin 2124, 2125
Shaokwan, China 4169
SHAPE. (*See* Supreme Headquarters of American Forces in Europe.)
Shapley, Harlow 2659, 5041
Sharecropping as a Remnant of Chattel Slavery 2887
Shariat 5044
Sharman, Lyon 3167
Sharp 4999
Sharpe, Frances (Moldauer) 997, 2523, 4988, 4989, 4995
Sharp, Lt. Col. Frederick D 391, 392, 4045, 4073, 5198, 5199, 5237, 5242, 5247, 5250, 5251, 5254, 5255
Sharp, R. Lauriston 3965, 5336, 5602, 5603
Shattuck, Mrs. George C 3794
Shaughnessy, Edward 2967
Shavelson, Clara 3337
Shavelson, Rita 4989, 4995
Shaw, Albert 5078
Shaw, Glen E 5323, 5602, 5603
She-yang River (Central Kiangsu Military Region) 2434
Sheeks, Robert B 5604, 5605
Sheehan, Vincent 622, 3794, 4260, 4958
Sheehan, Mrs. Vincent 295
Sheik, Julie 3824
Sheldon, Frederick 5176
Sheldon, George F 5604, 5605
Shelesnyak, M. C 3557, 3558
Shell Oil Co 102, 1217

Page
Shen, Hung-lieh 2290, 2348
Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region 2332, 2345, 2346, 2348, 2349, 2351, 2353, 2361, 2406, 2448
Shen-Kan-Ning Military Region 2448
Shen-Kan-Ning Pien Chu 2400
Shen-Ken-Ning Border Region 2332
Shen, Sheng-chang 4883
Shen, T. H 1631
Sheng, Kang 812
Sheng, Pi-hua 3951
Sheng, Shi-ts'ai 2289, 2290, 2385
Shensi Border Army 1703
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Base Medical Service 2466
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Area 2327
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region 2544
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Bank 2461
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Congress 2392, 2468
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Cultural Association 2472
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Garrison 2459
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Government 2335, 2339, 2400, 2401, 2405, 2413, 2416–2423, 2427, 2429, 2433, 2435, 2451, 2454, 2456, 2458, 2459, 2461–2470, 2472–2474.
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Trading Co 2473
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government (Supreme Court) 2462
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government (Trade Director) 2473
Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Frontier Bank 2421, 2426
Shensi Province 2452, 3304, 3306, 3307, 3541, 3624, 4122, 4213
Shepard, Oscar F 5207
Shepardson, Whitney H 155, 157, 158, 3167, 5167, 5298, 5299, 5303
Sheperd 5685
Shepherd, Jack 238, 476, 659, 660, 687, 2518, 2636, 4861, 4987, 5209, 5236, 5268, 5320, 5604, 5605.
Sheppard, Oscar F 260, 3336, 4125, 4126
Sheppard, William R 5604, 5605
Sher, Mort 3336
Sherbourne, Maj. Everett 4262
Sherman, Admiral 1500
Sherman, Katherine 5702
Sherman, Stirling & Wright 977
Sherwani, Latif Ahmad 5604, 5605
Sherwood 5486
Sherwood, Robert 446, 1450
Shibusawa, Keizo 4263
Shi-chieh, Wong 651
Shidachi, Tetsujiri 5604, 5605
Shidihara, Baron 729, 739
Shidehara Cabinet (Japan) 4263
Shiehkin 2809
Shields, Art 614, 633, 639
Shiga, Yoshio 747–749, 752, 753, 1879, 2155–2157
Shigemitsu, Mamoru (Ambassador to London from Japan) 2369, 4202, 4267, 4268
Shih, Chao-Ying 5630, 5631
Shih, Heng-Kuo 5604, 5605
Shih, Hsin Hua 5379
Shih, Hsiung 4884
Shih, Hu 40, 427, 1216, 1222, 1401, 5174, 5310, 5320, 5333, 5335, 5358
Shih-Kai, Yuan 466
Shih, Yu-san 2336
Shi-shueh, Wang. (*See* Wang, Shi-shueh.)
Shillinglaw, David L., & Co 1220, 2819
Shimada, Admiral Shigetaro 4265, 4267
Shimada, Toshio 4103, 4108, 4130
Shiman, Russell G 475, 477, 945, 2610, 3485, 3592, 4103, 4108, 4130, 4987, 4988, 5084, 5161, 5162, 5168, 5169, 5241, 5242, 5247, 5268, 5329, 5604, 5605

Page
Shimura, Lieutenant 4439
Shinkle, Elodie 4988
Shinto. (*See* National Sinto, Japanese.)
Shipler, Guy Emery 1514, 4116, 4118
Shippe, M. G. (*See* Hans Moeller); (Asiaticus.)
Shiratori, Toshio (Japanese Ambassador in Rome) 2682, 4202
Shirer, William Lawrence 2103, 5655
Shiskin, Boris 444, 445, 4975, 4977, 5703
Shishko, Jerome 4990, 4995
Shively, Donald 4160
Shoe and Leather Workers Industrial Union 3336
Shoeki 5022
Shoemaker, Col. James H 266, 432, 494, 568, 857–859, 2809–2811, 2832, 3200, 4893, 4967, 4973, 5007, 5008, 5052–5054, 5089, 5604, 5605, 5684, 5711.
Sholoskhov, Mr 4091
Shore, Maurice 4110, 5219, 5675
Shore, Viola Brothers 4116, 4260
Short, Joseph 2286
Shortwave Research 2784, 2785
Shostokovich 5266
Shotwell Commission 2831
Shotwell, James T 238, 264, 444, 661, 662, 1216, 1220, 2831, 2834, 3923, 4037, 5002, 5041, 5067, 5166, 5207, 5208, 5260, 5263, 5350, 5604, 5605, 5661
Shotwell's committee 238
Showdown at Singapore 2587
Shri, Ram 5323
Shridharani, Krishnalal 5604, 5605
Shu, Ch'ing-Ch'un 5649, 5658
Shu Fan-ting 2469
Shu, Hsi-Hsu 5604, 5605
Shu, Pin 4884
Shu, Y. Y. (*See* Hsu, Y. Y.)
Shubin, Mr 4584
Shueh, Yueh 1412, 1417
Shuhsi, Hsu 1221, 1222
Shuji, Fujii 1338
Shull, George H 2587
Shulpin 5008
Shumlin, Herman 300, 2659, 4260
Siam 4533, 4536, 4611, 4871, 5331
Siam Government 1780
Sian 3287, 3289, 3291, 3292, 3304, 3306, 3625, 4213, 4214, 4272, 5368, 5403
Sian Incident 2330, 2454, 2455, 2473, 3305, 3307, 4150, 4151, 5215
Sian Kidnapping 2331, 2382
Siang, V 4884
Siao, Emi 2695
Siberia 3324, 3365, 3499, 3623, 3632, 3646, 3660, 3706, 3710, 3909, 3943, 3979, 4479, 4489, 4503, 4578, 4897, 4898, 5340, 5424
Siberian Cheka 4489
Siberian Railways. (*See* Trans-Siberian Ry.)
Siberian Russian Army 3011
Sibley, Harper 5067
Sibley, H. Norman (Rev.) 4116
Sidwell, Alfred E 3793
Sieedlung, Friedrich Ebert 269
Siegel, Bernard 4304, 4327
Sifton, Victor 5326
Sigal, Marlowe A 3812
Sigerist, Dr. Henry E 295, 296, 299, 300, 4091, 5252, 5338
Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity 1906, 2294
Significance of the Great Northern Sea Passage 3935
Sikander, Hyat Khan 5004, 5042, 5043
Sikang Lolo Tribes 2465

Page
Sillen, Samuel 460, 466, 665, 666, 1235, 1239, 4089
Silver Problem and the Colonial Countries in the Far East 3935
Silver Shirts 2683
Silverman, Abraham George 4649, 4664–4667, 4670, 4673, 4677, 4733–4735, 4737, 4755, 4756, 4758–4760
Silverman, Arthur G 4136
Silverman, George 423
Silverman, Harriet 3335
Silvermaster, Helen Witte 4753, 4754
Silvermaster, Nathan Gregory 418–424, 434, 439, 440, 1218, 4402, 4667, 4669, 4737, 4759
Silvermaster Spy Group 2250, 2869, 4637, 4722, 4755, 4759, 4778
Simester, Miss 5295
Simkins, Francis Butler 5658
Simmons College (Boston) 474, 4965, 5008
Simmons, Ernest J 3620, 3621, 4260, 5079
Simmons, William M 3812
Simms, William Philip 597, 5702
Simon, Helen 634, 635
Simon, J. P 5020
Simon, Lord 2396
Simones, A 118
Simons, Grace 4958
Simons, William 3337
Simonson, Lee 4091, 4117, 4145
Simpson, Sockless Jerry 548
Sinclair, Archibald 5349
Sinclair, George M 5604, 5605
Sinclair, Gregg M 568, 4944
Sinclair, Harry F 3702
Sinclair Prairie Oil Co 102
Sinclair, Upton 2652, 2667
Singapore 3596, 4053, 4113, 4150, 4205
Singer, Joseph 3337
Singer, Marcia 4660
Singh, Anup 5604, 5605
Sinicus. (*See* W. L. Holland.)
Sinkiang, China 3323, 3463, 3464, 3705, 3931, 4005, 4007, 4029, 4303, 4425, 4516
Sinkiang Incident 2386, 2389
Sinkiang-Mongolian Frontier 2384
Sino-American Agricultural Commission 1631, 1632, 1633
Sino-American Corp 475
Sino-American Cultural Society 2523, 5337
Sino-American Military Cooperation 2339
Sino-American Pact 3626, 3709
Sino-Japanese War 2307, 2311, 2315, 2327, 2343, 2348, 2363, 2382, 2383, 2388, 2454, 2459, 2511, 2512, 2628, 2638, 3188, 3476, 3866, 4056, 4057, 4103, 4286, 4685, 4690, 5194, 5217, 5219, 5221–5223, 5341.
Sino-Soviet Agreements 2592
Sino-Soviet Negotiations 2062, 2065, 2206, 2207, 2209, 2210
Sino-Soviet Treaties 949, 1852, 1857, 1860, 1916
Siskind, George 3335
Sister, Miss Marion 4062, 4066
Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi 5604, 5605
Sitsen, Peter H. W 5350, 5604, 5605, 5684
Situation in Asia 4029
Situation in China 3316, 4352
Sixth Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party (fifth plenary session) 2458
Sixth Enlarged Plenum (Communist Central Committee) 2331
Sixth Extermination Campaign (Nationalist) 2330
Sixth National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Sixth National Congress (Kuomintang) 2397, 2410
Sixth Route Army 1702
Sixth War Zone (Hupeh) 2341

Page
Sixth World Congress (Comintern) 1690, 2324, 2410, 2455, 4336, 4352
Sixth World Congress, Communist International 48, 352
Sjahrir, Soetan 5639, 5640, 5659
Skariatina, Irina 4091, 4260
Skelton 5259
Skinner, G. Williams 5604, 5605
Skladyar, Mr 4589
Skrefstad, Betty 4987, 4991, 4994, 4995
Slack, F. V 5268
Slack, Frank W 5604, 5605
Slade, Mrs. F. Louis 264, 1220, 4108
Slagel, Fred 1806, 2294
Slagel, John 1906, 2294
Slaski, J 5604, 5605
Slaughter, Major 5145, 5146
Slavonic Institute in Prague 3444
Slesinger, Mr 5229
Slichter, Sumner H 4119
Slipping Past Japan's Censor (publication) 3169
Sloane, Gordon 4117
Sloane, William 1406
Smedley, Agnes 73, 213, 217, 255–260, 355–362, 367–370, 377, 380, 383, 384, 399, 460, 466, 496, 506, 507, 658, 677, 1218, 1338, 1755, 1783, 1939, 2005, 2042, 2043, 2753, 2755, 2761, 2767, 2768, 2789, 3060, 3061, 3300, 3304, 3308, 3558, 3559, 3763, 3765–3767, 3831, 3840, 3909, 3912 4146, 4219, 4242, 4271, 4301, 4305, 4306, 4337, 4353, 4354, 4807 4860, 4884, 5337, 5347, 5356, 5438, 5444, 5445–5447, 5467–5474, 5481, 5482, 5684.
Smerling, Helen 4724
Smirnov, Mr 3484, 3487
Smith, Mr 3511, 5112
Smith, Adam 3695
Smith, Alexander 1137
Smith, Rear Adm. Allan E 1906, 1981, 2294
Smith, Barbara B 4990, 4995
Smith, Bradford 5604, 5605, 5658
Smith, C. P 5606, 5607
Smith College (New York) 2658, 4258, 5288
Smith, Edith Lawrence 5427
Smith, Edwin K 5606, 5607
Smith, Elmer R 5606, 5607
Smith, Farrar 3514
Smith, Fay 266
Smith, Fayette 5606, 5607
Smith, Ferdinand 4136
Smith, Florence M 5702
Smith, Miss Ford 178
Smith, Guy Harold 5606, 5607
Smith, H. Alexander 4943, 5642, 5643
Smith, H. Bowen 3965, 4394
Smith, Mrs. H. Bowen 3965
Smith, Homer 4936
Smith, Jessica 4256, 5178, 5199, 5251
Smith, Joseph 5295
Smith-Lolita W 4991, 4992, 4995
Smith, M. Paske 5606, 5607
Smith, Maggie 4989, 4995
Smith, Marion W 5606, 5607
Smith-Mundt Act 1644
Smith, N. Skeene 5606, 5607
Smith, Nan Lincoln 5158, 5159, 5704
Smith, Miss Nora Ford 5082
Smith, Paul C 568
Smith, Rennie 5606, 5607
Smith, Richard 1703

Page
Smith, Russell 5002
Smith, Senator 1905
Smith, Stephenson 4260
Smith, Miss Susan T 4086, 4090, 4091
Smith, Sydney B 477, 4978
Smith, T. V 5661
Smith, Dr. Tredwell 1108, 1314, 4136
Smith, Gen. Walter Bedell 2530, 5481, 5483
Smith, Warren D 5606, 5607
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell 2891, 5606, 5607
Smith, Willis 1689
Smithsonian Institution 300, 2729
SMR 265
Smuts, General 5077
Smyth, F. Hastings 2659
Smyth, Helen 5606, 5607
Smyth, Henry Dewolf 5041
Smythe, Lewis 3794, 5062, 5606, 5607
Snell, Lord 5334, 5606, 5607
Snow 4824
Snow, Conrad E 2854, 2855
Snow, Edgar 73, 213, 299, 303, 351, 458, 460, 465, 680–682, 1235, 1239, 1514, 1781, 1847, 1968, 2016, 2063, 2524, 2315, 2351, 2426, 2427, 2524, 2592, 2753, 2755, 2757-2761, 2789, 2891, 3061, 3126, 3128, 3182–3184, 3185, 3188, 3291, 3300, 3304, 3355, 3380, 3382, 3391, 3500, 3501, 3669, 3765, 3829, 3830, 3840, 3983, 4002, 4082, 4110, 4136, 4212, 4218, 4301, 4339, 4832, 4860, 5188, 5194, 5198, 5200, 5201, 5203, 5213, 5219, 5235, 5281, 5138–5440, 5444, 5445 5447, 5461–5464, 5466, 5467, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5481, 5482, 5606, 5607, 5648–5650, 5652, 5653, 5658–5660, 5684.
Snow, Mrs. Edgar (Nym Wales) 73, 126, 622, 680, 682, 1783, 2646, 3127, 3128, 3295, 3296, 3298, 3300,3304, 3560, 3568, 4218, 4339, 4808, 5232, 5474, 5480, 5620, 5621, 5649
Snyder, Alice D 2659, 3640
Snyder, Maium 4990, 4995
SOBDI. (*See* All Indonesian Federation of Trade Unions.)
Social Affairs Department (Chinese Communist Party) 2459
Social Democrat Party 323, 324, 640, 881, 3180, 4766
Social Democratic Party (Japan) 1018
Social Democratic Party of Latvia 3107
Social and Economic Consequences of the War and the Crisis in Japan 3935
Social and Economic History of Japan 3167
Social Interpretation of History, The 4110
Social Science Research Council 1136, 1167, 1968, 3266, 4118, 4120, 5220 5295, 5355, 5662
Social Welfare Society of Hupeh 2451
Social Worker Today 300, 4258
Socialist Party 771, 885, 1317, 1613, 2461, 2667, 3130, 3131, 3183, 3186, 3189
China 1239
Japan 742, 872, 2168, 2302
United States 3305
Socialist Revolution (Russian) 962
Socialists Student Clubs 4236
Socialist Youth 2463, 2469
Society for Applied Anthropology 996
Society of the Catholic Commonwealth 2659
Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) 4504, 4508, 4509, 4572, 4577, 4890
Society for Cultural Relations With Other Countries 2706, 3857
Society of Old Bolsheviks 1316, 1317
Society for Sino-Soviet Cultural Relations 3317
Socoline-Schapiro, Vladimir 5692
Socony 5638
Soebandrio, Dr 5606, 5607
Soekarno, President 5640, 5641

Page
Soga, Shigeo 5606, 5607
Soga, Yasutaro 4125, 4126, 5207
Sohio Petroleum Co 101
Sokolove, Henri 5702
Sokolsky, George E 3043, 4125, 4590, 5023
Sol 4822
Soldiers Club, Eighteenth Group Army (Chart) 2446
Soljak, Phillip L 5606, 5607
Solomon, Rae 4992, 4995
Soltan, Joseph 3337
Solution in Asia ..... 1743, 1931, 2724, 2725, 3054–3056, 3058, 3059, 3062, 3063, 3069, 3071, 3073, 3089, 3105, 3311–3313, 3357, 3362, 3363, 3364, 3376 3476, 3499, 3578, 3829, 3831, 3840, 3899, 4006, 4029, 4082, 4302, 4590.
Some Aspects of Psychiatry in the U. S. S. R 3621
Some Lesson of the Fateful Decade 2887
Sommerich, Jane 5606, 5607
Somervell, General 1416, 1417
Somerville, Rose 687, 2518, 2881, 2882
Somov, M. P 4509
Sondergaard, Hester 4260, 4275
Sonfu 1438
Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution 544
Soong Family ..... 1359, 1360, 1366, 1367, 1372, 1373, 1375, 1385, 1414, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1418, 1431, 1448, 1461, 1514.
Soong, Sing Ling 3477
Soong, T. V ..... 12, 21, 137, 139, 143, 537, 1087, 1360, 1366, 1367, 1372, 1373, 1375, 1385, 1414–1418, 1431, 1448, 1461, 1514, 1725, 1747, 1809, 1815, 1852, 1856, 1857–1859, 1861, 2041–2043, 2288–2291, 2309, 2331, 2399, 2543, 2544, 2863, 3266, 3551, 3626, 3639, 3800, 3939, 4077, 4436, 4545, 4686, 4687, 4826, 4878, 4969, 5045, 5047, 5178, 5211, 5328, 5346.
Sorbonne (Paris) 1008
Sorge, Richard ..... 143, 226, 227, 256, 267, 354, 356, 358–362, 364, 366–373, 379–383, 384, 500–511, 840, 1755, 2770, 3560, 3566, 3785, 4319, 4374, 4433.
Sorge-Smedley Report. (*See* Sorge Spy Ring.)
Sorge Spy Ring (report of Army Intelligence) 359
Sorkin, Isidore 4117
Soto, Foreign Minister 2718
Soule, George 1220, 2659
Soule, Isobel Walker 4260, 4275
Souschak, Constantine 2730
South America 4486
South China 4132, 4218
South Hopeh Administrative Office (Chinese CommunistParty) 2467
South Jopeh Bank 2422
South Huai Military Region 2400, 2434, 2435, 2448, 2465
South Hunan Uprising 2457
South Kiangsu Military Region 2400, 2413, 2434, 2435, 2448
South Korean Government 1625, 3025, 3028–3032, 3035, 3047, 3048
South Korean Troops 2557, 2737, 2738
South Manchurian Railway 509, 3023, 4132
South Manchuria Railway Co 3168
South Philadelphia High School for Girls 2585
South Wales Miners Federation 5379
Southard, Ernest 4618
Southard, Mary Boggs 4618, 4886
Southard, Ordway 3560–3562, 3565, 4618, 4886
Southard, Mrs. Ordway (Mary) 3560–3562, 3565
Southeast Asia 3758, 3816, 3882, 3892, 3936, 3994, 4098, 4104, 4105, 4228, 4267
Southeast Asian Revolution 1284, 1285
Southeast Political Branch Bureau (Chinese Communist Party) 2404, 2465
Southerland & Cromwell 45

Page
Southern Cement Co 2630
Southern Conference for Human Welfare 407, 3735, 4757, 4758
Southern Hopeh Military Area 2470
Southern Huai River 2413
Southern Kiangsi Campaign 2457
Southern Negro Youth Congress 4116
Southern Political Branch Bureau 2404, 2454
Southern Tenant Farmers Union 2643
Southwest Associated University (Kunming) 651, 3939
Southwest Military Group (Kwangsi-Kwangtung) 2341
Southwestern Political Council (Chinese) 4151
Sourvarine, Boris 3365, 3499
Sovani, N. V 5606, 5607
Soviet. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Soviet Administration of Criminal Law 4091
Soviet Air Force 199
Soviet Air Force Purchasing Commission 192
Soviet Ambassador (Chungking) 3931
Soviet Arctic Encyclopedia 2748
Soviet Army 379, 2549, 4581
Soviet Asia Mission. (*See* Wallace Mission.)
Soviet Atlas 4146
Soviet-British-American Anti-Fascist Front 2377
Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Athens 183
Soviet China 3306, 4071, 4492, 4504, 4517
Soviet-Chinese Agreement 2295
Soviet Communism a New Civilization 3167, 3444
Soviet Constitution 3460
Soviet Consul (Tihwa) 2384
Soviet Consul General in Bokhara 185
Soviet Consul General in Northern Persia 185
Soviet Consulate (New York) 3928, 3929
Soviet Council for Foreign Relations 4561
Soviet Council of Pacific Affairs 4490
Soviet Culture in Wartime No. 3 3617–3619
Soviet Embassy 631, 685
  Athens 184
  Chungking 2380, 2383, 2386
  Lanchow 2384
  Peiping 4499, 4568
  Washington 889, 2895, 4038, 4040, 4670
Soviet Embassy Consulate 529, 555
Soviet Embassy in Latvia 185
Soviet Embassy (Tokyo) 372, 3482
Soviet Encyclopaedia 4507, 4568, 4589
Soviet Far East 3317, 3318
Soviet Far East and Central Asia 2739, 2742, 2743
Soviet Far Eastern Army 2451
Soviet Five-Year Plans 3176
Soviet Foreign Broadcast System 4485
Soviet Foreign Trade Department 193, 201
Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact 2671, 4187, 4201
Soviet-German Trade Treaty 2574
Soviet Government (Jui-chin, Kiangsi) 2473
Soviet Government Commissar of Foreign Affairs and Social Insurance 2461, 2462
Soviet Invasion of Finland 3419–3432, 3445
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact 2376, 2381, 2382, 2398, 2682, 4211
Soviet-Japanese Pact in Historical Perspective 4189, 4203, 4311
Soviet Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1772
Soviet Military Intelligence 192, 197, 199, 201, 204, 273, 360, 404, 412, 417, 424, 435, 507, 520, 678, 1319, 3103, 4434, 4491–4493, 4497.
Soviet Ministry of Industry 193, 194
Soviet-Mongolian Forces 265, 2574
Soviet Nations and Tehran 2886

Page
Soviet Navy Purchasing Commission 192
Soviet Polish Delegation (U. N.) 3551
Soviet Press 894, 1225, 2392, 2699, 2723
Soviet Press and Japan's War on China 2890
Soviet Purchasing Commission (Washington) 3499
Soviet Purchasing Mission 4670
Soviet Radio 1203, 1226
Soviet Russia. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Soviet Russia Fights Crime 3167
Soviet Russia Today (publication) 530, 549, 662, 684, 2604, 2669, 2708, 2744, 3426–3428, 3529, 4079, 4189, 4256, 4261, 5156, 5177, 5251, 5252.
Soviet Russia Today Publications, Inc 102, 299, 300
Soviet Russian-German Nonaggression Pact (1939) 2375, 2377
Soviet Russian Loans (China) 2343
Soviet Secret Police (GPU, NKVD) 4510, 4524, 4525, 4574, 5185, 5463, 5464
Soviet Secret Service 184
Soviet State Bank 4483, 4560, 4567
Soviet Trade-Union 529, 531
Soviet Union or Soviet Russia. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
Soviet Union in World Problems 4091
Soviet War Department 193–195, 198, 202
Soviet World Atlas 1225, 4504
Soviet Zone (Germany) 2184
Soviets in World Affairs 4091
Sovietskie Kraebedenie 3317
Soward, F. H 5333, 5606, 5607, 5608, 5609
Soward, F. W 5684
Soyer, David 4989, 4995
Soyer, Moses 2659
Spain 3430, 3467, 3584, 3586, 3592, 3614, 3703, 4069, 4115, 4216, 4235, 4273, 4481, 4482, 4515, 4519, 4520
Spalding 5267
Spalding, W. F 5608, 5609
Spanish-American War 2257
Spanish Civil War 4481, 5206
Spanish Earth (motion picture) 4141
Spanish Government 2637, 2657, 2945, 3120
Spanish Legal Commission of Inquiry 4235
Spanish Relief Organization 2597
Spanish Republican Government 636
Spanish War 2396, 2676
Sparkman Committee 1253, 1266, 1270, 1277
Speaking of India (publication) 2580
Special Administrative Areas 2370, 2371
Special Administrative Commissioner (East Shensi) 2466
Special Border Areas (China) 2387
Special Committee on Un-American Activities 1162, 4616
Special Correspondent with Bandit and General in Manchuria 3167
Special Far Eastern Army (Russia) 2328
Speer, James P 5608, 5609
Speer, Robert K 4117
Speier, Hans 5608, 5609
Spelman, Laura (Rockefeller Memorial) 1235, 1236
Spencer 5169, 5170
Spencer, Frederick (*see also* Frederick V. Field) 15, 115–117, 2662
Spencer, J. E 1237, 5608, 5609, 5684
Spenser, Hazelton 570
Speshneff, Mr 4439
Spewack, Samuel 5658
Spidell, Clara 4987, 4991, 4995
Spiegelglas 207
Spillum, Mary 4992, 4995
Spinks, Charles Nelson 5062, 5608, 5609, 5684
Spitzer, H. M 3965, 5608, 5609, 5702
Spofford, William N 1514, 4116, 4142
Spoor, S. H 5635

Page
Spotlight on Asia 3880, 3882
Spotlight on the Far East 771, 1017, 1334, 1336, 1338, 3839, 3943, 4281, 4283, 4298
Spravedlnost 2665
Spread of the Soviet Movement in China (publication) 4104
Sproul, Allan 433, 444, 858, 4974
Sproul, Robert Gordon ..... 45, 73, 122, 264, 444, 568, 713, 928, 976, 1220, 1313, 2506, 2511, 2622, 2985, 3612, 3857, 3859, 3868, 3881, 3920, 4093, 4105, 4106, 4109, 4126, 4143, 4546, 4938, 4942, 4944, 5013, 5026, 5186, 5243, 5289, 5703.
Sprouse, Mr. Philip D 1892, 3882, 5480
Sprout, Harold 494, 858, 859, 2811, 3970, 5608, 5609
Spuler, Bertold 342
Spvack, Robert G 4116
Spykman, Nicholas J 3883, 4107, 4587
S. R. T. Publications, Inc. (*See* Soviet Russia Today.)
Srinivasan, C. R 5323
SSRC Committee (Social Science Research Committee) 250, 2886
Ssu, Ko-ching 2440, 2470
St. Bees School (England) 5662
St. Cyr 4536
St. George, Joan 4992, 4995, 5694
St. John, Robert 5657
St. Johns 179
St. Laurent, Mr 156
St. Lawrence University 4259
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1105, 3035, 4935
St. Paul Pioneer Press 1131, 1133
St. Petersburg (Russia) 2388
St. Timothy's School 5702
Stabilization Board. (*See* United States Stabilization Board.)
Stabilization Fund (China) 2214
Stabilization Fund and Reconstruction and Development Bank Committee 2869
Stacey, C. P 5608, 5609
Stachel, Jack ..... 527, 535, 550, 552, 553, 555, 556, 558, 567, 595, 626, 679, 1218, 1687, 1904, 1999, 3905, 4237.
Stachel, Jacob 4836
Stade, Odo B 5608, 5609
Stahmer, Mr 4441
Staley, A. Eugene ..... 264, 411, 432, 651, 857, 901, 921, 976, 996, 1148, 1260, 1313, 1512, 1514, 1551, 1555, 1562, 1576, 1595, 1609, 1620, 1629, 1634, 1641, 1650, 1658, 1666, 2116, 2816, 2817, 2831, 2891, 4226, 4835, 4944, 4973, 5197, 5200, 5289, 5313, 5314, 5316, 5608, 5609, 5703.
Staley, Helen Teresa Browne 5313
Staley, Pamela Myrick 5313
Staley, Phyllis Eugenia Parker (Mrs. Alvah Eugene) 5313
Staley, Thomas Eugene 5313
Stalin, Joseph ..... 150–152, 178, 188, 196, 198, 214, 279, 296–300, 302, 308, 315–317, 323–325, 334, 339, 343, 517, 522, 527, 555, 559, 563, 565, 627, 647, 657, 771, 784, 805, 815, 868–870, 884, 886, 891, 1010, 1012, 1014, 1057, 1107, 1304, 1321, 1327, 1331, 1358, 1393, 1530, 1558, 1562, 1608, 1612–1614, 1620, 1639, 1653, 1654, 1669, 1690, 1824, 1852, 1856, 1858, 2022, 2043, 2044, 2047, 2270, 2306, 2309, 2317, 2329, 2375, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2387, 2414, 2465, 2529, 2530, 2572, 2577, 2683, 2694, 2699, 2723, 2804, 2816, 2827, 2828, 2838, 2858, 2861, 2862, 2997, 3115, 3139, 3140, 3185, 3205, 3220, 3222, 3226, 3227, 3235, 3241, 3247, 3264, 3328, 3355, 3357, 3364, 3365, 3387, 3390, 3413, 3499, 3500, 3502, 3503, 3581, 3608, 3627, 3702, 3739, 4043, 4063, 4066, 4105, 4106, 4136, 4137, 4335, 4350, 4352, 4486, 4511, 4536–4538, 4802, 4880–4882, 4895, 4935, 4938, 5075, 5077, 5149, 5154, 5184, 5186, 5191, 5243, 5249, 5280, 5374, 5376, 5384, 5385, 5388, 5420, 5483, 5484, 5500.

Page
Stalin-Hitler 150–152, 178, 188, 196, 198, 214, 279, 296–300, 302, 308, 315, 316, 317, 323–325, 334, 339, 343, 891.
Stalin-Hitler Pact 3856
Stalin, S 5221
Stalin University of the Toilers 2694
Stalingrad 3942
Stallman, Ben 3336
Stamp, L. Dudley 5608, 5609
Standard of Living in the Soviet Union 3443
Standard Oil Co 548, 666, 1974, 4114
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana 102
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey 1621
Standard-Vacuum Oil Co 1151, 1217, 1219, 1220, 1227, 2810, 3868
Stander, Lionel 4260
Standish, Robert 5649
Standley, Admiral W. H 2839, 2840, 3880, 5045, 5349
Stanford Research Institute 5313
Stanford University. (*See* Leland Stanford University.)
Stankevich 4506, 4508
Stanko-Import, Machine Tool Import (*see also* Foreign Trade Corp.) 193
Stanley, Jean 4276
Stanley Prison 5357
Stanner, W. E. H 5608, 5609
Stanolind Oil Purchasing Co 102
Stanton, Mr Edwin F 1780, 1827, 1841, 1851, 1853, 1998, 2036, 2039, 2101, 2124, 2141, 2488, 5702.
Star Weekly (Canada) 5278
Stark, Irwin 5658
Starnes 2873, 2874
Starobin, Joseph 611, 632, 636, 637, 654, 655, 1095, 1376, 1392, 1422, 1424, 1425, 1438, 1469, 1470, 3828.
Starr, C. V 2809
Starr Park and Freeman 2810
Stary, Jeri 4724
Stassen, Commodore Harold E 494, 901, 921, 932, 933, 934, 1035–1075, 1111–1138, 1143, 1144, 1146, 1149, 1251–1277, 1278–1290, 1291–1294, 1551, 1553, 1582, 1583, 1586–1590, 1593–1597, 1600, 1627, 1630, 1652, 1654, 1668, 1671, 1676, 2476, 2513, 2515, 3074–3078, 3082–3085, 3097, 3404, 3991, 3992, 4835, 4900, 4901.
State of Asia (symposium edited by Lawrence Rosinger) 2481–2483, 2494, 2515, 2548, 2553, 3795, 3895, 4018, 4022
State Committee of New York 588
State, County and Municipal Workers of America 4116
State Department. (*See* United States Department of State.)
State Farms Institute 4508
State Planning Commission (Russia) 3935, 4483
State and Revolution 1689, 2270, 4335
State Teachers College (Milwaukee) 2658
State University of Iowa 905
State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 704, 716, 717, 722, 736, 737, 743, 1732, 1733, 1773, 1838–1841, 1854, 1862–1864, 1866, 1867, 1872, 1881–1883, 2094, 2095, 2149, 2150, 2152–2155, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2193, 2222, 2223, 2250, 2296, 2297, 2847, 4263, 4324–4326, 4543, 4877.
Statemans Year Book (London) 3686
Statistics Research Bureau (Chinese Communist Party) 2404, 2466
Stead, Christina 4260
Stead, Geoffrey 5608, 5609
Steak House (Anthony's) 2096
Steamship *Washington* 3193
Steffens, Lincoln 4142
Steger, Mr 4440

Page
Steel, Johannes 1432
Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union 3336
Steel Workers Organizing Committee (CIO) 2630
Steele, Arch T 455, 465, 612, 1198, 2550, 2574, 3731, 3742, 3755 3757, 4982
Steely, E. Newton 3158–3165, 3512, 3679
Stefansson Library 2748
Stefansson, Vilhjalmur, Dr 295, 296, 299, 300, 685, 686, 687, 2518, 2748, 2881, 2882, 3546, 3557, 3558, 3560–3565, 5229, 5238.
Stefansson, Mrs. Vilhajalmur (Evelyn) 2749, 3560–3565
Steig, A. E 4260
Steiger, Andrew J 662, 664, 699, 1108, 1314–1316, 1320, 1322, 1327, 1329, 1330–1332, 3126, 3128, 3567, 3653, 3903, 4724, 4807, 5608, 5699, 5651, 5684
Steiger, G. Nye 474, 1313, 4861, 4965, 5008, 5608, 5609
Stein, Arthur 4733
Stein, Boris 5692
Stein, Gertrude 5655
Stein, Guenther 73, 143, 144, 167, 267, 268, 269, 355, 356, 359–362, 369–378, 383–386, 398–401, 460, 466, 506, 536, 538, 539, 556, 557, 634–636, 654, 655, 1005, 1756, 2186, 2542, 2789, 3126, 3128, 3133, 3157, 3167, 3168, 3331, 3566, 3806, 3809, 3903, 4301, 4318, 4319, 4332, 4334, 4351, 4807, 4824, 4832, 4861, 4893–4896, 5004, 5010, 5062, 5192, 5279, 5284, 5299, 5608, 5609, 5648–5650.
Stein, Mrs. Guenther 4314
Stein, Ruth V 4991, 4995, 5299
Steinbeck, John 5655, 5658
Steiner, Dr. H. Arthur 1071, 1222, 5608, 5609
Steiner, Jesse F 5608, 5609
Steinhart, Jesse 5186
Steinhart, Jesse M 264, 4105, 4106
Steinhardt, Laurence A 892–894
Steintorf, Mr 2124
Steinmetz, Harry C 4089
Stekoll, Harry 4090
Stelle 5294
Stenhouse, John 3965, 5702
Stepanov 3313, 3314
Sterling, J. Wallace 568, 4835
Stern, Alfred K 4260
Stern, Dr. Bernhard J 4089, 4260
Stern, Renee 4987
Sternberg, Fritz 2677, 2689
Stettinius, Edward R., Jr 606, 706, 707, 754, 1823, 2843, 2850, 2851, 2858–2861, 2863, 3011, 4542, 5078, 5484.
Steuben, John 2619, 2640, 2641
Stevens, Dr 2567, 2569, 2570
Stevens, Adlai 446, 4975
Stevens, David H 5123
Stevens, Edmund 5650
Stevens, Harley 5610, 5611
Stevens, Mrs. Harley 4824, 4832
Stevens, John 5704
Stevens, Dr. MacKenzie 589, 590, 5062
Stevenson, Alexander 5610, 5611
Stevenson, J. A 5610, 5611
Stevenson, Philip 2659
Stewart, Ambassador 4770
Steward, Mrs 5288
Stewart, Dean Robert 4326, 4349
Stewart, Donald Ogden 300, 2659, 4116, 4260
Stewart, Mrs. Donald Ogden 1514
Stewart, Downie 5610, 5611
Stewart, John R 474, 482, 4063, 4066, 4988, 5236, 5237, 5264, 5265, 5299, 5610, 5611, 5684

Page
Stewart, Kermit G---- 5610, 5611
Stewart, Marguerite Ann (Mrs. Maxwell Stewart)---- 73, 565, 566, 660, 886, 938, 940, 950, 957, 958, 960, 962, 964–966, 974, 975, 978, 987, 997, 1313, 2115, 2116, 2118, 2147, 2148, 2523, 2572, 2580, 2651–2654, 2692, 2819, 3640, 3798, 3896, 3905, 3941, 3942, 3983, 4124, 4263, 4937, 4989, 4990, 4995, 5031, 5032, 5058, 5063, 5064, 5078, 5079, 5276, 5277, 5279, 5286, 5289, 5277, 5299, 5343, 5366, 5610, 5611, 5695–5697.
Stewart, Maxwell S---- 73, 411, 563–566, 629, 630, 960, 1076, 1077, 1514, 1927, 1937, 1939, 1977, 1978, 2017, 2018, 2022, 2023, 2025, 2057, 2507, 2508, 2572, 2580, 2650–2690, 2831, 3169, 3793, 3796–3800, 3942, 3944, 3945, 3983, 4102, 4170, 4171, 4173, 4177, 4189–4199, 4260, 4272, 4275, 4277, 4542, 4860, 4937, 4939, 4958, 4965, 4981, 4990, 4995, 5081, 5151, 5184, 5238, 5261, 5299, 5610, 5611, 5685.
Stewart, Oliver---- 5610, 5611
Stewart, Peggy---- 5286
Stewart, Ralph A---- 4692
Stewart, Senator Tom---- 3070
Stigall, John---- 5610, 5611
Stilwell, Joseph W., Gen---- 125, 614, 615, 636–638, 775, 776, 778–780, 785, 830, 1021, 1025, 1030, 1031, 1094, 1349, 1350, 1360, 1362–1379, 1390–1399, 1404–1440, 1442, 1443–1446, 1448–1450, 1453–1472, 1478, 1483, 1485, 1728, 1749, 1793, 1813–1816, 1823, 1826, 1916, 1917, 1921, 1922, 1924, 1989, 2001, 2034, 2072–2075, 2077, 2083, 2288, 2292, 2293, 2387, 2392, 2552, 3501, 3503, 3624–3627, 3657, 3667, 3708, 3709, 3801, 3994, 4330, 4331, 4687, 4688, 4691, 4764, 4768–4772, 4830, 4839, 4840, 4843, 4845, 4853, 4854, 4878, 4940, 5048, 5061, 5283, 5379, 5462, 5658.
Stilwell, Mrs---- 1407
Stilwell Papers---- 1408, 1432
Stimson, Colonel---- 1453, 4054, 4055
Stimson, Secretary Henry L---- 446, 580, 729–731, 830, 1302, 1322, 1359, 1450, 1522, 1528, 1872, 2051, 2052, 2389, 2674, 3816, 4689, 4838, 4975, 5427.
Stine, Leo, C---- 5610, 5611
Stinebower, L. D---- 432, 857, 4973
Stines, John---- 765, 766
Stirling. (*See* Sherman, Stirling & Wright.)
STKM---- 3221
Stock, Mr---- 4439
Stockholm, Sweden---- 4429
Stockton, Charles H---- 4692
Stolley, Herman---- 4117
Stomonyakov---- 4522
Stone---- 5337
Stone, Edward---- 4394, 5610, 5611
Stone, Irving F---- 2659, 2684, 5658
Stone, Julius---- 5610, 5611
Stone, Mark---- 668, 4152, 4244
Stone, William T---- 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 73, 107–109, 120, 121, 175, 180, 266, 270, 432, 443, 444, 445, 857, 1756, 1758, 1914, 2585, 2831, 2836, 2868, 2869, 3200, 3883, 3885, 4860–4862, 4911, 4959, 4962, 4973, 4975, 4977, 4984, 5003, 5004, 5054, 5193, 5261, 5263, 5644, 5610, 5611
Stopp, Ann---- 4991, 4995
Storey, Russell M---- 5610, 5611
Storm, Hans Otto---- 2659
Storry, G. R---- 5610, 5611
Strachan, J. E---- 5320
Stradneks---- 3107
Strahov (Chu Chiu-po)---- 4880
Straight, Michael---- 2831, 3794, 4975, 4977, 5261, 5299
Straight, Mrs. Michael---- 5299
Straits Settlements---- 3592

Page
Strand, Paul ... 2659, 4260
Strang, Sir William ... 2729
Strategic bombing survey in Japan ... 4161, 4184
Strategy of Sino-Japanese conflict ... 2890
Stratemeyer, General ... 5061
Stratton, Samuel S ... 5610, 5611
Straus, Donald B ... 568, 1220, 1313, 4611, 4944
Straus, Robert K ... 389–391
Streccius, Colonel ... 5691
Stresemann ... 5708
Stripling, Mr ... 4403
Strohm, John Louis ... 5655
Strong, Anna Louise ... 56, 73, 688, 1756, 1757, 1778, 1779, 2592, 2753, 2755, 2761, 2763, 2768, 3126, 3128, 3523–3530, 3533, 3534, 3559, 3567, 3763, 3765, 3766, 3828, 3903, 3979, 4338, 4583, 4807, 4860, 4861, 4881, 4897, 4941, 5219, 5232, 5238, 5241, 5281, 5383, 5438, 5439, 5444, 5447, 5472–5474, 5481, 5482, 5610, 5611, 5659, 5684.
Strong, Colonel ... 5163
Strong, Edward E ... 4116
Strong, Maj. Gen. George V ... 2836, 4976–4978, 5163, 5348
Strong, Robert ... 850
Strongholds of Chineses communism, a journey to North Shensi ... 3288
Struik, Dr. Dirk J ... 300, 1338, 2659, 2746, 4089, 4960
Stuart, Graham ... 5610, 5611
Stuart, John ... 125
Stuart, Leighton ... 455, 456, 461, 465, 1026, 1198, 1500, 1545, 1565, 1568, 1569, 1600, 1601, 1624, 1631, 1651, 2549, 2552, 3742, 3788, 4141, 4420, 4423, 4424, 4437, 4438, 4531, 4532, 4958, 5084, 5175, 5278, 5350, 5369, 5610, 5611.
Studebaker Corp ... 1217
Studebaker, John W ... 444
Student Anti-Japanese movement ... 2471, 2472
Student movement, 1919 (China) ... 2318
Student Review ... 2802, 2874, 2875
Study of the history of Chinese society ... 2581
Study of wartime communications ... 3967
Stufflebeam, Robert E ... 2121–2123
Su, Doctor ... 1514
Su, Frank Kai-Wing ... 5610, 5611
Su-nan Hsing-cheng Wei-yuan-hui ... 2400
Su-pei Hsing-cheng Wei-yuan-hui ... 2400
Su Yu ... 2465, 2469
Subversive Activities Control Board ... 3719
Subversive organizations and publications guide (House Committee on Un-American Activities) ... 3073, 3080
Su-ching Hsing-cheng Wei-yuan-hui ... 2400
Suehsdorf, A. D ... 5610, 5611
Suekawa, Hiroshi ... 4301, 4302, 4313
Sues, Illona Ralf ... 622, 698, 699, 1338, 2689, 4301, 4302, 4313, 4605, 4611
Suetsugu, Admiral ... 4148
Suez Canal ... 2678–2680, 3632
Sugita ... 5231
Sugiyama, General ... 4267
Suguitan, Lucrecia ... 4991, 4995
Sui-te (in Shensi) ... 2451
Suiyuan Invasion ... 4151
Suiyuan Province ... 3539
Suiyuan-Shansi-Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia border region ... 2404, 2458, 2460
Sullivan & Cromwell ... 977, 1216, 1219, 2519, 4889
Sullivan, Phil ... 4824, 4832
Sullivan, Richard ... 3336
Sullivan, Walter ... 5612, 5613
Sultan, Daniel I ... 7687
Sulzberger, Arthur Hays ... 125, 2582, 2809

Page
Suma 3589
Sumitomo (Japanese big business) 666, 740, 2166, 2171, 4148
Summy, Ethel 2521, 2776, 5697
Sumner, B. H 5612, 5613
Sun, Chih-yuan 2405, 2470
Sun Fo 455–457, 465, 821, 851, 1021, 1198, 1470, 1817, 1819, 1826, 2076, 2290, 2329, 2374, 2375, 2384, 2392, 2395, 2544, 2729, 3070, 3598, 3742, 4283, 4939.
Sun, E-Tu Zen 5612, 5613
Sun, J. S 5612, 5613
Sun-Joffe Manifesto 2461
Sun Yat-sen, Dr 168, 476, 801, 814, 878, 880, 1096, 1282, 1301, 1816–1818, 2077, 2209, 2212, 2315, 2316, 2318–2320, 2340, 2341, 2353, 2377, 2380, 2413, 2414, 2451, 2459–2461, 2464, 2466, 2516, 2517. 2541, 2551, 2631, 2693–2696, 2719, 2729, 3167, 3168, 3182, 3188, 3300, 3304, 3475–3477, 3498, 3537, 3595, 3683, 3684, 3691, 3755, 3814, 3947, 4110, 4111, 4271, 4352, 4685, 4687, 4695, 4700, 4706–4709, 4859, 4879, 4880, 4933, 5219, 5220, 5373, 5384, 5421, 5422, 5425, 5640.
Sun Yat-sen, Madam 436, 437, 455, 456, 457, 465, 826, 1198, 1247, 1414, 1415, 1438, 1470, 1478, 1483, 1803, 1804, 1816–1819, 1926, 2020, 2021, 2058, 2076–2078, 2290, 2329, 2333, 2473, 3167, 3477, 3551, 3567, 3658, 3730, 3731, 3734, 3742, 3755, 3757–3760, 3790, 4858, 4859, 4885, 4931, 4932, 5709.
Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning 3167, 3168
Sun Yat-sen Institute 4996
Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum 2459
Sun Yat-sen University. (*See* Far Eastern University.)
Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism (Publication) 4110
Sun Yat-senism 4110, 4111
Sunages, Mr 2250
Sunday Compass 3024–3026, 3040
Sunday News 2161
Sunday Times (London) 5284
Sunday Worker 594, 611, 3529, 3844
Sundberg, George 572, 573
Sunde, T. R 5612, 5613
Sunderland. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wadell, Sunderland & Kiendl.)
Sung, General 1629, 2718
Sung, Jen-chiung 2470
Sung, Shao-wen 2333, 2334, 2405, 2470
Sunoo, Hagwon W 2789, 5612, 5613
Sunray Oil Corp 101
Sunset Farm, Lee, Mass 263, 365
Supomo, R 5612, 5613
Supplies, Priorities, and Allocations Board 1358
Supreme Board of the Great Northern Sea Passage 3934, 4508
Supreme Command Allied Powers. (*See* SCAP.)
Supreme Court (United States) 1100, 1742
Supreme Court (Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government) 2462
Supreme Headquarters of American Forces in Europe 4620
Supreme National Defense Council (China) 234, 2350, 2392, 2455, 2457, 2464, 2467, 2469, 5409
Surine, Mr 1189, 5353
Surplus War Property Administration (SWPA) 2310
Surrender Policy for Japan 2145, 2152–2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
Surrete Nationale. (*See* French secret police.)
Surrey, Walter Sterling 1684, 1693, 1727, 1785, 1837, 1899, 1997, 2079, 2122, 2189
Survey 712, 3205
Survey Associates, Inc 2587
Survey Graphic 2586
Survey of International Affairs, 1934 3167
Susumu, Okano. (*See* Okano, Susumo.)

Page
Sutch, W. B 5612, 5613
Sutsuki, Mr 4148
Suveroff, General 3224
Suzuki, Admiral Bunji 728, 4274
Svirsky, Leon 5655
Swabeck, Arne 2666
Swan, Joseph E 1513, 5296
Swanhauser, Miss Jane 1514
Swanidze, A. S 188, 189, 196, 2703, 4499, 4504, 4508, 4560, 4561, 4567
Swarajists 876, 877
Swarthmore College 2658, 2659
Swaswamy, K. G 5612, 5613
Swatow Uprising 2460, 2473
Swearingen, Roger 1222, 4888, 5612, 5613
Sweden 3592, 3600, 3632, 4636, 5671, 5673
Swedish Prime Minister 4234
Sweet, Lennig 4983, 5052, 5612, 5613
Sweetland, Monroe 433, 445, 858, 2646, 4974
Sweetser, Arthur 2718, 5702
Sweezy, Paul M 4089
Swidensticker, Edward G 5604, 5605
Swift, Carlton B 5702
Swift, O. P 5274, 5277
Swing, Betty Gram 3794
Swing, Raymond Gram ..... 495, 565, 859, 1978, 2022, 2248, 2487, 2488, 2542, 2566, 2693, 2811, 3798, 3799, 4075, 4286, 5040, 5112, 5612, 5613, 5702.
SWINK. (*See* State, War, Navy, Coordinating Committee.)
Swire, G. W 5684
Swire, John & Sons 4893
Swisher, Earl 5229
Swiss Foreign Office 1771
Swiss Government 1770, 1771
Switzerland 3599, 3652, 4200, 4319, 4550, 4807, 5362
SWNCC. (*See* State, War, Navy, Coordinating Committee) (SWINK.)
Swope, Gerard 568, 1217, 1220, 1232–1234, 3897, 5026, 5317, 5343, 5351, 5612, 5613
SWPA. (Surplus War Property Administration) 2310
Sydney University 2627, 2737
Syllabus for Teachers on the United States and the Far East 2587
Syllabus for Teachers on the United States and Latin America 2586
Symonds, Richard 5612, 5613
Symposium on China 3485
Symposium on Chinese Culture 427
Symposium on Fifth Anniversary of Japanese Invasion of Manchuria 3485
Syracuse University 4258
Syrian American 2466
Szechwan Lolo Tribes 2465
Sze, Mai-mai 5658
Szechwan Military Clique 2464
Szechwan 2456–2458, 2460, 3306, 4061, 4068
Sze, Sao-Ke Alfred 5321, 5600, 5601

T

Ta-hung Mountains 2434
Ta Kung Pao (Manchester Guardian of China) 791, 2396
Ta-pieh Mountains 2434
Tada, Lieutenant General 2366
Taeuber, Irene B 5612, 5613
Taft, Charles P 2124, 2127
Taft-Hartley Act 3046
Taft, Senator Robert A 603, 611, 784, 2555, 2643, 5394
Taggart, Miss Genevieve 4089, 4275
Taguchi 369
Tai-Chi-t'ao 2400
Tai Lake 2434

Page
Tai, Li ---- 2331
T'ai Ping ---- 1282
Tai Shan Bank (Shantung) ---- 2422
Taiehrchuang ---- 4061, 4131
Taiheiyo Mondai Chosakai (Pacific Problems Research Institute) ---- 4264, 5329
Taiheiyo Rodo-sha. (*See* Pacific Worker.)
T'aipei ---- 5390
Taiping Rebellion ---- 2388, 2541, 2551
Taiyuan Arsenal ---- 2426
Takagi ---- 5217
Takahashi, Masao ---- 578, 5612, 5613
Takaki, Yashaka ---- 4127, 4264, 5333, 5612, 5613
Takano, Dr. Twasaburo ---- 4263
Takayanagi ---- 366, 694, 3587, 3592, 3933
Takayanagi, Kenzo ---- 5147, 5148, 5151, 5175, 5217, 5359, 5612, 5613, 5684
Takayarogi ---- 4264
Takeda, Shiro ---- 3297
Talbot, Phillips Dr ---- 901, 1056, 1134, 1148, 1258, 1271, 1272, 1551, 1581, 1582, 1588, 1591, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1615, 1617 1618, 1627, 1663, 1664, 1667, 1668, 1678, 1681, 4835, 5324, 5612, 5613.
Talbott, E. Guy ---- 3169
Talkington, Marie ---- 4990, 4995
Tally-Ho Restaurant (Washington) ---- 1999
Tamagna, Frank M ---- 238, 994, 1221, 5209, 5268, 5328, 5612, 5613, 5684
Tamaris, Helen ---- 2659
Tamura ---- 579, 580
Tan, Cheng ---- 2405, 2470
Tan, Chen-lin ---- 2470
Tan, Hsi-ling ---- 2452
T'an, Pei-Ying ---- 5650
Tanaka, Baron ---- 3702
Tanaka Cabinet ---- 4148
Tang, Cheng-chi ---- 2458
Tang, En-po ---- 1394, 1412, 2396
T'ang, Liang-li ---- 4881, 4884
Tang, Shao-yi ---- 2340
Tang, Sheng-shih ---- 2475
Tang, Tien ---- 2470
Tang, Ting-san ---- 881
Tang, Yu-jen ---- 2326
Tang, Yu Ying ---- 1249
Tangiers ---- 1686
Tangku (China) ---- 4132, 4134
Tangku Truce ---- 4151
Tangu, China ---- 4421
Tani, Masayuk ---- 4266
Tannenbaum, Frank ---- 4934
Tannenbaum, Gerald ---- 4328, 4329
Tannenwald, Ted ---- 5295
Tano System ---- 914
Tao, Heng-chi ---- 4277
T'ao, Hsi-sheng ---- 4879, 5310
Tao, L. K ---- 18, 5612, 5613
Tara, Chand ---- 5323
Tarakanova ---- 1318
Taracouzio ---- 3242
Tarasov ---- 4829
Tarawa ---- 3502
Tariff Commission. (*See* United States Tariff Commission.)
Tarr, Edgar J ---- 768, 769, 1216, 3588, 3589, 3751, 4087, 4121, 5032, 5041, 5054, 5157, 5195, 5199, 5265, 5269–5271, 5287, 5320, 5321, 5324, 5333, 5614, 5615.
Tarr, Mrs. Edgar J ---- 155, 157, 535, 537, 663, 664
Taruc, Luis ---- 4449, 4450, 4855–4858, 5614, 5615

Page
Tasca ---- 477
Tasker, Robert ---- 4260
Tass News Agency ---- 127, 128, 131, 144, 145, 146, 245, 529, 539, 895, 1203, 1226, 1327, 1747, 1748, 1802, 2380, 2384, 3274, 3284, 3536, 3828, 4284, 4572, 4577, 4779, 5121, 5122, 5150, 5197, 5199, 5256.
Tata Institute (India) ---- 5062
Tateyania, Y ---- 5614, 5615
Ta-tu River ---- 2326
Taub, A ---- 5297
Taub, E. S ---- 5297
Taussig, Mary ---- 4988, 5614, 5615
Tavenner, Frank S ---- 4863, 4864, 4865, 4866, 5502, 5504
Tawney, R. H ---- 238, 239, 342, 1213, 1221, 3103, 3611, 3612, 3881, 5208, 5209, 5311, 5350, 5614, 5615.
Taxi Workers Union ---- 3336
Tayler, William Lonsdale ---- 5702
Taylor, Mr ---- 1055, 2652, 5685
Taylor, A. H ---- 5261, 5614, 5615
Taylor, Admiral ---- 578, 579
Taylor, Amos ---- 2831
Taylor, C. Fayette ---- 2659, 2684, 4260
Taylor Committee ---- 2869
Taylor, Deems ---- 3794
Taylor, Edmond ---- 5655
Taylor, Esther ---- 4990, 4995
Taylor, Frank ---- 1513
Taylor, Prof. George Edward ---- 40, 306, 321, 332, 342–352, 417, 418, 568, 901, 1148, 1221, 1222, 1273, 1313, 1551, 1574, 1582, 1592, 1594, 1601, 1615, 1616, 1620, 1634, 1635, 1640, 1649, 1650, 3584, 3594, 3611, 3805, 3817, 3943, 4012, 4124, 4683, 4824, 4832, 4884, 4999, 5008, 5173, 5229, 5234, 5250, 5312, 5350, 5368, 5614, 5615
Taylor, Graham R ---- 4091, 4145
Taylor, Griffith ---- 5614, 5615
Taylor, J. P ---- 5053
Taylor, Jack ---- 3336
Taylor, Janet ---- 4990, 4995
Taylor, K. W ---- 5614, 5615
Taylor, Margaret R ---- 945, 3931, 4062, 4086, 4092, 4097, 4988, 5085, 5179, 5180, 5187
Taylor, Paul S ---- 5614, 5615
Taylor, Robert Lewis ---- 5660
Taylor, Senator ---- 3069
Taylor, Telford ---- 1539
Taylor, Wayne C ---- 2831, 2832, 2837, 5261, 5702
Taylor, William H ---- 421, 4677, 4737, 5614, 5615
Teacher and International Relations ---- 2582
Teachers College (Columbia University) ---- 1218, 1220, 2582
Teachers Union (Seattle, Wash.) ---- 4887
Teachers' Union of the City of New York ---- 4259
Teamsters Brotherhood (AFL) ---- 1104
Technical Assistance Administration. (*See* United Nations Technical Assistance Administration.)
Teddy ---- 4822, 4824
Tee-Van, Mrs. John ---- 410, 1513
Teh, Chu. (*See* Chu, Teh.)
Teggart, Frederick J ---- 5614, 5615
Tehran ---- 4831
Tehran Conference ---- 606, 1485, 2828, 4938, 5071, 5075, 5076, 5077
Taigan, Henry G ---- 4116
Teikichi, Kawai ---- 367
Tele-Press ---- 2789
Temple, Shirley ---- 5682
Templewood, Samuel John Gurney Hoare ---- 5655

Page
Ten Days That Shook the World 4090
Ten Year History of the IPR 3173
Tendetnick, Frances 4990, 4995
Teney, Jack B 2651, 2652
Teng Chih-hui 2459, 2470
Teng, Fa 2403, 2470
Teng, Tai-yuan 2405, 2470
Teng, S. Y 5614, 5614
Teng, Ying-chao (Mrs. Chou En-Lai) 2403, 2455, 2456, 2470
Teng, Mrs. Ying Chow 1514
Tennent, Hugh C 4125, 4126, 5207
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 1742, 3520, 4712
Tenney Committee. (*See* California Committee on Un-American Activities.)
Tenney, Helen 419, 4719
Terauchi, General 4201
Terentiev, Mr 4589
Terian, General 199, 200, 202, 203
Terlin, Rose 3794, 4600, 5709
Terrell, Gerald 4823, 4824, 4829, 4832
Terrell, Katherine 295, 1514, 2242, 4117, 4170, 4171, 4178
Terrell, Robert 659, 5680, 5682
Territorial Problems Subcommittee 2852
Terte, Judge Ben 2632
Teschner, Rosamond 4891
Tewksbury, Donald G 568, 1220, 1338, 4611, 4893, 4944, 5614, 5615
Texas Co 102
Texas Weekly 433, 857
Textile Workers Union of America 946
Texton, Robert B 4852, 5614, 5615
Thacher, Judge Thomas D 5252
Thackrey, Mr 3034
Thaelmann, Ernst 4232–4236
Thailand (Siam) 2482, 4098, 4876, 5089, 5321, 5322
Thakur, B. T 5614, 5615
Thalheimer 322
The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Publication) 3627
Theater Guild 2807
Theater Intelligence Division (Far East Command) 843, 844, 848
Theatre Arts Committee 4275
Theoretical Analysis of Chinese History 4352
Third Alternative 3203, 3206
Third Chinese Communist Party Congress (Canton) 2466
Third Column (Eighteenth Group Army) 2451
Third Communist International 2318, 2321
Third Division (Nationalist Revolutionary Forces) 2458
Third Internationale 2046, 2062, 2468, 3160, 3163
Third Naval District (United States) 1112
Third National Congress (Chinese Communist Party) 812
Third Nationalist Campaign 2325
Third Peoples Political Council (Chungking) 2452, 2464, 2471, 2472
Third Reich 4235
Third World War 3073
This is the Hour (Publication) 3621
This Soviet World (Publication) 3528
Thomas, Charles W 5362
Thomas, E. P 4546
Thomas, Senator Elbert D 713, 1218, 2248, 2622, 2809, 2810, 2835, 5207
Thomas, Elbert H 4977
Thomas, Harrison C 2585
Thomas, Senator J. A 133
Thomas, Mendell 5614, 5615
Thomas, Norman 2890, 3190, 4234, 5046, 5614, 5615
Thomas, S. B 2482, 4910, 4984 5028, 5614, 5615
Thomason, Mrs. Florence 5698
Thompson 3600, 5292, 5685

Page
Thompson, Dorothy ... 1393, 1647, 3507, 3508, 5204
Thompson, Frederick ... 2659, 2809
Thompson, John ... 5149
Thompson, John B. Rev ... 694, 3581, 4053
Thompson, John T ... 4443
Thompson, L. (Kennedy) ... 5289
Thompson, Laura ... 375, 996, 3965, 5614, 5615, 5702
Thompson, Paul W ... 5091
Thompson, Robert ... 54, 605
Thompson, Virginia McLean ... 476, 1222, 2482, 2523, 2627, 2630, 3333, 4135, 4616, 4834, 4861, 5061, 5169, 5170, 5192, 5214, 5236, 5248, 5259, 5268, 5614, 4660, 5692
Thompson, Warren S ... 5614, 5615
Thompson, Mrs. Yates ... 51
Thomson, Charles A ... 5199, 5264
Thomson Electric Co. (France) ... 2468
Thong, M ... 5616, 5617
Thoreau ... 547
Thornburg, Mrs. Pherbia ... 3794
Thorne, James ... 2629
Thorner, Alice ... 5615, 5617
Thorner, Daniel ... 321, 322, 326, 327, 335–338, 483, 2483, 2484, 2485, 3567, 3636, 3637, 3955–3966, 4153, 5257, 5616, 5617, 5702.
Thorner, Mrs. Daniel ... 3637
Thorp ... 2652
Thorpe, C. A ... 4436, 4856
Thorpe, General ... 3053, 3547, 3548, 3670
Thorpe, James ... 5616, 5617
Thornton, Ernest ... 4080
Three Hundred and Fifty Ninth Brigade (120th Division, 18th Group Army) ... 2471
Three Principles—Nationalism, Democracy, and Peoples Livelihood (Sun Yat Sen) ... 2315, 2316
Three Principles of the People ... 3947, 4111, 4122
(San Min Chu I) ... 3187, 3188, 3475
(Sun Yat-sen) ... 2541
Thresher, M. B ... 5616, 5617, 5702
Through the Eves of a Japanese Newspaper Reader ... 3157, 3167
Thurber, Mr. James ... 391, 392, 4260
Thurnwall, Richard C ... 5616, 5617
Tiao, Shan San ... 18
Tibet ... 3292, 3552, 4005, 4007, 4631, 4632
Tibetans ... 2584
Ticky, Mr ... 4439
Tideman, J ... 5616, 5617
Tidemann ... 5299
Tiffany, Mrs. Gordon M ... 409, 410
T'ien Hsia Monthly ... 3167
Tientsin (China) ... 3651, 4047, 4134, 4151, 4201, 4202
Tientsin Industrial and Commercial Association ... 3951
Tientsin-Mukden Railroad ... 2367, 2372
Tientsin-Pukow Railway ... 2333, 2352, 2364
Tientsin-Pukow War Front ... 4059, 4060
Tikhii Okena (Pacific Ocean) ... 2713, 3137, 3173, 3174, 3241, 3318, 3319, 3482, 3485, 3581, 4499, 4570, 4575, 4884, 5150
Tillie ... 2117
Tilney, Frederick ... 4091, 4145
Tilton, Mrs. L. Deming ... 5040
Timbres, Rebecca Janney ... 4260
Time, Inc ... 433, 444, 857, 1217, 1221, 1393, 1647, 1846, 1847, 4835, 4974, 5008, 5020, 5060, 5279, 5349.
Time-Life-Fortune ... 4545
Time Magazine ... 212, 487, 2505, 2736, 4038, 4592, 4593
Times. (*See* New York Times.)

Page
Time Atlas in English 4146
Times-Herald (Washington) 1481
Timken Roller Bearing Co 101
Timoshenko, Mr 597
Timperley, H. J 39, 40, 2582, 3133, 3167, 3168, 4860, 4861, 5178, 5616, 5617
Ting, Leonard G 4108
Ting Ling (Chiang Ping-Chih) 2454, 2470, 3169, 3300, 3304
Tingpien 3308
Ting-pien Salt Fields 2419, 2424
Ting, Sa 5616, 5617
Ting, V. K 4504
Tingfu, Dr. Tsiang 5062
Ting, Yeh 5234, 5418
Tiniur 5318
Tippy, Worth M 4116
Tirana, Rifat 440, 4629
Titan Co 5106, 5107
Tito 4802, 5315, 5462, 5465
Tito for Japan 2089, 2091, 2121, 2179, 2187
Tito, Marshal 316, 317, 341, 784, 787, 811, 828, 852, 1055, 1537, 1552, 1563, 1594, 1596, 1619, 2386, 2554, 3503.
Tixier, A. P 440, 5049, 5053
Todd, E 4988, 5197
Todd, Larry 147, 161, 3310
Todd, Laurence 1757
Togo, Alice M 4992, 4995, 5616, 5617
Togowa, Daikichiro 4184
Tojo 4708
Tojo Cabinet 503, 4266
Tojo. General 715, 720, 4265–4268
Tokuda, Kyuichi 747–749, 752, 753, 1879, 2155–2157, 3567, 3568
Tokugawa, Lieutenant General 4134
Tokyo, Japan 3855, 3907, 3925, 3926, 3927, 3929, 3930, 3931, 3934, 4108, 4134, 4147, 4150, 4182–4185, 4200, 4201, 4224, 4225, 4262, 4443, 4453, 4500, 4501, 4546, 4589, 4892, 5346, 5414, 5665.
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun 362, 363, 5346
Tokyo Criminal Court 500
Tokyo Criminal District Court, Procuration Bureau 500
Tokyo Embassy 2912
Tokyo Imperial (Public Finance Japan) 4263
Tokyo Imperial University 3168, 3200, 4127
Tokyo Martyrs 2789
Tokyo-Moscow-Yenan Axis 2381
Tokyo University 342
Toledano, Vincenta Lombardo 3924, 3925, 4087, 5041
Toledano, Ralph 399
Tolischus, Otto D 3070, 3223, 5650
Toller, W. Stark 5616, 5617
Tolmachoff University 2696
Tolman, Edward C 2659
Tolokonody 5135
Tolokonski, Mrs 4041, 4042
Tolstog 4824
Tolstoi, Maj 4832
Tom Mooney's Monthly 2665
Tomo 2718
Tomorrow's China 3827, 3828
Tompkins, Pauline 5616, 5617, 5660
Tompkins Square Youth Club 3060
Tong, Chu 634, 636, 1338, 1514, 3832, 3833
Tong, Chew (*See* Hong, Chew.)
Tong, Hollington Kong 536, 538, 2524, 3536, 5237, 5347, 5650
Tongking (China) 4046
Tongyai, Chakkratong 5616, 5617

Page
Tooker, Dorothea 3169
Topics in Brief (By T. A. Bisson) 265, 2574
Torgny, Mr 4423
Toronto, Canada 3470, 3471
Toronto Board of Education 1000, 1001
Toronto University 3168
Torrens, James G 5616, 5617
Totten, Ashley P 4117
T'ou-tung Aircraft Assembly Plant 2384
Touset 2714
Tovarich 4091
Toveri 2665
Town Hall, Inc 1504, 1527, 1528, 1531, 1534, 1535, 1538, 1539, 3212
Town Meeting Bulletin 1535
Townsend, Dallas S 5049, 5053
Townsend, Peter 3892, 3903, 4808, 5616, 5617
Townsend, Simon P 4692
Township Affairs Congress (Chinese Communist Party) (Chart) 2448
Toyin, Neyici 4426, 4428
Toynbee, Arnold J 239, 471, 1216, 1222, 2981, 3167, 4893, 5209, 5334, 5616, 5617
Tozzer, Alfred M 4119
Trachtenberg, Alexander 517, 529, 540, 647, 650, 2883, 2961, 3283, 3335, 4614
Trachtenberg International Publishers 245
Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific 3167
Trade Union Congress (India) 2638
Trade Union Service Association 4079
Trade Union Service, Inc 98, 101
Trade Union Unity Council 3336
Train, Admiral Harold C 2836
Trainin, Mr 4509
Trammell, Mr 4939
Trans-Pacific Air Service 3324, 3325
Trans-Siberian Railway 238, 389-392, 675, 676, 1517, 2592, 3632, 3701, 3936, 4956, 4968, 5209
Transplantation Songs 2406
Transport Workers Union 4364
Treasury Department. (*See* United States Treasury Department.)
Treat, Harry Price 5189
Treaty of Freindship, Commerce and Navigation (China) 2259
Tredwell, Dr. F 4260
Tressider, Donald B 4944, 5303
Trewartha, Glenn T 5616, 5617, 5684
Tri-City Labor News 2665
Trials of the Soviet generals 3930, 3932
Triano, Anne 4723
Tribune 152, 456
Tribune (Chicago) 2998, 3043
Tribute to Alexander Kaun 3621
Trident Conference 1413, 1414
Trigg, Charles Y 1105
Trinin, Mr 4506
Trinity College 2823, 2826, 5250, 5701
Triple Demism of Sun Yat-sen 3168
Trippe, Juan 19, 713, 928, 1217, 1313, 2899, 4944
Trivedi, H. M 5323, 5616, 5617
Troiano, Rose 4116
Trone, Solomon 2497, 3568, 3605, 4091, 4145, 5202, 5324
Trone, Mrs. Solomon 3605
Trotsky, Leon 169, 230, 554, 674, 866, 1012, 1524, 1698, 2321, 2328, 2329, 2339, 2387, 2454, 2461, 2607, 3138, 3185, 3187, 3205, 3356, 3361, 3467, 3627, 3705, 4104, 4110, 4216, 4511, 4881, 4882, 5150, 5152-5156, 5165, 5181, 5191, 5280.
Trotskyites 2339
Trotter, Reginald 5616, 5617

Page
Troyanovsky, Mrs. Alexander A 4041
Troyanovsky, Ambassador Alexander A 239, 295, 296, 299, 684, 687, 2730, 4589, 5209
Trud 2386, 3460, 4897
Trueblood, Howard J 2586
Truman Doctrine 3539, 3665
Truman, President Harry S 56, 178, 388, 607, 608, 613, 617, 620, 622, 623, 632, 633, 637, 639, 640, 691, 692, 730–733, 736, 745, 776, 782, 784, 901–903, 928, 1032, 1033, 1063, 1065, 1068, 1112, 1115, 1119–1121, 1124–1126, 1149, 1150, 1275, 1333, 1357, 1370, 1388, 1493, 1515, 1523, 1525, 1671, 1685, 1710, 1717, 1720, 1777, 1855, 1862, 1863, 1868, 1872, 1894, 1917, 1949, 1950, 1951, 2038, 2153, 2195, 2196, 2197–2212, 2243, 2251, 2253, 2254, 2257, 2260, 2268, 2286, 2287, 2289, 2505, 2538, 2548, 2552, 2554, 2555, 2556, 3001, 3009, 3026, 3045, 3049, 3086, 3087–3089, 3115, 3116, 3117, 3355, 3357, 3366, 3370–3372, 3375–3390, 3394–3404, 3409, 3412, 3413, 3416, 3493–3497, 3573, 3574, 3639, 3640, 3661, 3665, 3676, 3677, 3704, 4280, 4535, 4542, 4545, 4551, 4605, 4606, 4714, 4825, 4929, 4932, 4933, 5281, 5284, 5292, 5302, 5339, 5376, 5377, 5403–5306, 5410, 5669, 5677, 5679, 5681
Truman, Mrs. Harry 2289
Truman, Miss Margaret 2289
Trusts (German) 2166, 2300
Tsa-Chuang 4060
Ts'ai Aos Yunnan Army 2456
Tsai Chang (Miss)—Chief of Women 2403, 2404, 2470
Tsai, Ho-sen 4881
Tsai, Shu-fan 2403, 2470
Ts'ai, Ting-Kai 5383
Tsai, Yu 1249
Tsao, Iou 2405, 2470
Ysao, Lan-ju 2405, 2470
Tsarist Russia 1944, 1947, 3188, 3189
Tse-tung, Mao. (*See* Mao Tse-tung.)
Tseng, Choa-lun 5616, 5617
Tsen, Hsi-sheng 2470
Tseng, K. C 104
Tseng, S. Y 4504
Tseng, Shan 2403, 2471
Tseng, Sheng 2349, 2471
Tseng, V. G 4910, 4984, 5028
Tseng, Yang-fu 1397, 1398, 3404
Tsiang, Dr. H. T 1660, 3337
Tsiang, Tingfu F 5344, 5361, 5616, 5617
Tsienpu 4061
Tsinan 4061
Tsinan Embassy 1969
Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway 2430
Tsinghau University 18
Tsingtao (China) 3838, 4132, 5406, 5429
Tsinpu Railroad 2434
Tso Chi 2471
Tso-han, Lin 1441
Tsou, Mr 5390, 5391
Tsu Chiu-pai 2471
Tsuitsui 2717
Tsur Y. T 5344 5361
Tsuru, Shigeto 510, 3568, 3925, 4096, 4963, 5168, 5616, 5617
Tsuru, Jr., Shigeto 3925
Tu, Yueh-sen 4302
Tuan, Chi-nie 2471
Tucker, Luther 264, 687, 2518, 2881, 2882
Tuckman, Mr. W. W. L 5299
Tugan-Bavanovsky 5008
Tukachevsky, Marshal 184, 194, 197, 198, 303, 2451, 4482
Tugwell, Mr 546, 3883

Page
Tun, U. Myat 5294
Tung, Mr 4828
Tung, Chao 5369
Tung Chiang Pase 2401
Tung Kuan Area 2472
Tung Kuan Pass 2346
Tung, Meng Hui 2456, 2459, 2469
Tung, Pi-wu 1757, 2353, 2399, 2403, 2404, 2451, 2471, 4080, 4083, 4231, 4232, 4332, 4861
Tung Ting Lake Area 1632, 1634
Tung Yuan Hui (Mobilization Committee) 2333, 2334, 2336
Tungpei Army (Manchurian) 2330, 2331
Tungpei Warlords 2327, 2330, 2355, 2357
Turbin, Ruth (Ruth J. Lazarus) 4989 4994
Turkestan 3707, 3909
Turkey, Government of 197, 2462, 2629 2462
Turkemenia, Republic of 4593
Turlington 3167
Turner, Bill 2101, 2117
Turner, Bruce 279, 2124, 2125, 5049, 5053, 5249, 5704
Turner, Clair E 1513
Turner, Jeanette 2789
Turner, Margaret 143
Turner, Ralph E 4967, 5324, 5703, 4871
Turner, Richard S 264, 5186
Turner, Robert K 2548
Turner, Mrs. W. H., Jr 5702
Turning Points in China (Pamphlet) 3829, 3832, 3837, 3839
Turning Point for Chinese Students (Pamphlet) 2789
Tushan Oil Fields 2384
Tusurumi 5204
Tuttle, Frank 4116
Twaddell, Emily C 945, 4988
Twain, Mark 3250
Twelfth Plenum, Executive Committee (Communist International) 2327
Twelfth Red Army 2457, 2467
Twentieth Army (Kuomintang) 2457
Twentieth Bomber Command 2290
Twentieth Century Association 4299
Twentieth Century India 2579, 2581, 3943
Twenty-eighth Route Army (Nationalist) 2325
Twenty-fourth Division, Fourth Army (Nationalist) 2473
Twenty-ninth Red Army 2459
Twenty-sixth Chinese Communist Army 2465
Twin Loyalties in Siam 3133, 3167
Two Fathers of Their Countries 3169
Tydings' Committee 109, 114, 221, 222, 313, 1080, 1081, 1224, 1225, 1473, 1687, 1904, 2903, 2904, 2928, 2947–2952, 2955–2962, 2964–2966, 2968, 2969, 2972, 2973–2976, 2980, 2981, 3019, 3045, 3052, 3053, 3071, 3093–3097, 3108, 3136, 3144, 3145, 3148, 3190, 3191, 3251, 3345, 3350, 3493–3497, 3507, 3573, 3574, 3628, 3668, 3676, 3960.
Tydings hearings 4363, 4364, 4365, 4465, 4820, 4821–4849
Tydings, Senator Millard E 109, 114, 221, 222, 313, 515, 1078, 1079, 2903, 2904, 2928, 2947–2952, 2955–2962, 2964–2966, 2968, 2969, 2972–2976, 2980, 2981, 3019, 3045, 3052, 3053, 3071, 3093–3097, 3108, 3136, 3144, 3145, 3148, 3190, 3191, 3251, 3282, 3286, 3480, 4028–4030, 4821, 4823–4825, 4829, 4832, 4836, 4926, 4935.
Tydings report 1007
Tyler, Charlotte 3167, 3322, 3480, 3481, 4917, 4987, 5119, 5121, 5140, 5618, 5619, 5704
Tyler, Dolly 4526
Tyler, R. G 2160, 2161, 2689
Tyomies 2665
Tyrell, Edith 5618, 5619

Page
Tyson, Russel 3794
Tze-Ch'uan, Mr. Ho 327
Tze-tung Youth Cadre School 2406
Ubaldo, Mr 5295
Uchida, Yoshi 4990, 4995
UCLA. (*See* University of California at Los Angeles.)
UCR. (*See* United China Relief.)
UERMW. (*See* United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, CIO.)
Ugaki, General 4148
UGT 3057
Uhl, Alex 4315
Uhlman, Lt. George 5618, 5619
Uj Elore 2665
Ukraine 3943, 3944, 4506, 4728–4730
Ulan Bator 3318, 3936
Ullman, William Ludwig 421, 4314, 4737
Ultee, A. J 5618, 5619
Umezu, Gen. Yoshijiro 4265, 4267
Un-American Activities Committee (California) 1162, 2652
Un-American Activities Committee (Dies) 2657, 2658, 2683, 2684
Un-American Activities Committee, House of Representatives 17, 136, 301, 492, 509, 510, 515, 1406, 1705, 1901, 1973, 2117, 2160, 2215, 2277, 2999, 3013, 3071, 3073, 3080, 3102, 3246, 3247, 3847, 3920, 4374, 4672, 4733, 4734, 4755, 4757, 4842, 4862, 4863.
Un-American Activities Committee Report, 1947 3071, 3073
Un-American Activities Committee Report, 1948 (California) 3073
Un-American Activities Special Committee (House of Representatives) 1162, 1229, 1230, 4187
Un-American Activities in Washington State 2160–2162, 2183
Under Trojan Horse Tactics (Report) 2998
Underground Chinese Communist Organization (Hong Kong) 2463
Underhill, William Amory 5441
Unemployed Councils 3336
UNESCO. (*See* United Nations Economic and Social Council.)
Unfinished Revolution in China 2266, 3059, 3738, 3829, 3840, 4082
Unger, Neel A 5704
Ungphakorn, Puey 5618, 5619
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA) 938–941, 945–947, 5251, 5366, 5413
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America (Local 18, New York City, N. Y.) 938–941
Union Producing Co 102
Union Seminary, New York 3979
Union of South Africa 4596
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 11, 36, 38, 52, 53, 58, 60, 61, 150, 169, 171, 178, 179, 186, 187, 189, 190, 194, 202, 203, 214–218, 220, 225, 229, 231, 236, 238, 242, 243, 246, 262, 263, 269, 275, 276, 290, 291, 295–300, 324, 328, 329, 331, 340, 341, 343, 346, 349–351, 377, 381, 398, 404, 459, 508, 516, 517, 523, 525, 530, 546, 548, 550, 554, 562, 563, 567, 577–580, 587, 603, 604, 606, 613, 623, 638, 645–647, 649, 663, 664, 675–677, 683, 685, 687, 706, 707, 716, 718, 722, 732, 733, 738, 744–746, 766, 770, 774, 786, 791, 793, 794, 796–801, 805, 806, 815, 818, 834, 835, 844, 845, 847, 860, 865, 868, 869, 872, 881, 886, 887, 890–895, 907, 913, 914, 921, 927, 929–931, 949, 954, 958–961, 964, 968, 969, 973, 983, 985–987, 999, 1001, 1013, 1015, 1024, 1028, 1034, 1041, 1049–1053, 1055, 1057–1060, 1082, 1084, 1085, 1087, 1090, 1092, 1093, 1096, 1099, 1102, 1106, 1107, 1109, 1119, 1128, 1193, 1202, 1212, 1213, 1216, 1218, 1222, 1225, 1226, 1240, 1246, 1268, 1274, 1282–1284, 1286–1288, 1290, 1292, 1301–1307, 1315–1318, 1323, 1325, 1327, 1328, 1330, 1331, 1337, 1338, 1358, 1359, 1362, 1377, 1381, 1393, 1401, 1408, 1461, 1484, 1492, 1496, 1503, 1504, 1507, 1508, 1517, 1519, 1522, 1525, 1528–1532, 1534, 1537, 1540, 1552, 1557, 1558, 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565, 1573, 1574, 1576, 1581, 1583–1585, 1590, 1591, 1594, 1595, 1597, 1600–1606, 1611–1615, 1620–1624, 1630, 1637, 1638, 1641, 1643, 1647, 1649, 1652–1655, 1660, 1662, 1663, 1665,

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Continued Page
1667, 1669, 1670, 1672–1674, 1676, 1677, 1686, 1690, 1709, 1710, 1713, 1718, 1731, 1745, 1746, 1748, 1753, 1770, 1811, 1823, 1824, 1852, 1857–1859, 1861, 1880, 1881, 1895, 1901, 1906, 1908, 1915–1917, 1927, 1944, 1945, 1947, 1952–1954, 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1972, 1991, 2000, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2039–2041, 2046, 2047, 2059, 2062–2067, 2071, 2086, 2087, 2137, 2143, 2161, 2164, 2170, 2179, 2183, 2184, 2193–2196, 2206–2212, 2217, 2218, 2220, 2248, 2250, 2257, 2258, 2270, 2287, 2289, 2291, 2292, 2294, 2295, 2297, 2305–2312, 2314, 2315, 2317–2321, 2323, 2325, 2327–2329, 2331, 2342–2345, 2351, 2373–2392, 2396–2398, 2414, 2451, 2461–2465, 2467–2469, 2483, 2501, 2504, 2505, 2516–2520, 2532, 2536, 2541, 2543, 2548–2557, 2562–2578, 2583, 2584, 2589, 2592, 2607, 2608, 2616, 2629, 2634, 2637, 2654–2656, 2667, 2671–2679, 2682, 2684, 2691–2713, 2716–2731, 2734–2744, 2804, 2838–2851, 2856–2864, 2867, 2889, 2895, 2903, 2916–2920, 2925, 2947, 2977–2982, 2991, 2997–3002, 3007–3011, 3018, 3023–3026, 3032, 3048, 3076, 3087–3093, 3103, 3107–3114, 3117–3125, 3128, 3135–3140, 3146, 3149, 3152, 3167, 3168, 3174, 3176, 3182–3197, 3201, 3203, 3223–3232, 3236, 3240–3243, 3248, 3252, 3255, 3260, 3262, 3265, 3268–3274, 3307, 3317, 3320, 3323, 3325, 3326, 3329, 3330, 3335, 3346, 3382, 3423, 3435, 3436, 3453, 3475, 3476, 3483, 3487, 3533, 3592, 3608, 3615, 3621, 3647, 3679, 3700, 3701, 3703, 3775, 3787, 3790, 3835, 3856, 3881, 3907–3909, 3917, 3929, 3931, 3932, 3935, 3942–3944, 3946, 3958, 3979, 3987, 3996, 4000, 4006, 4015, 4018, 4029, 4030, 4037, 4039–4041, 4043, 4070, 4071, 4090, 4100, 4105, 4106, 4109, 4129, 4134–4136, 4144, 4201–4204, 4214–4216, 4256–4258, 4261, 4272, 4283, 4284, 4349, 4351, 4389, 4403, 4404, 4450, 4481, 4484, 4486–4488, 4491, 4496, 4502–4507, 4509–4512, 4518, 4519, 4522, 4526–4528, 4530, 4534, 4537, 4543, 4545, 4551, 4553, 4554, 4557, 4558, 4563–4572, 4574–4583, 4586–4590, 4645, 4655, 4657, 4686, 4735, 4780, 4816, 4825, 4840, 4841, 4872, 4873, 4877–4880, 4883, 4887–4889, 4894, 4895–4898, 4905, 4920–4922, 4929, 4932, 4937–4942, 4954, 4956, 4963–4971, 4997, 5000, 5007–5009, 5025, 5032–5039, 5045–5047, 5055, 5056, 5060–5064, 5069–5082, 5086–5095, 5103, 5112–5117, 5120–5128, 5132–5135, 5138–5140, 5145, 5148–5150, 5154–5156, 5159–5161, 5164, 5165, 5172, 5173, 5177, 5181–5187, 5191, 5195, 5196, 5201, 5205–5208, 5215–5221, 5226, 5230–5233, 5238, 5240, 5246, 5251–5253, 5256, 5263, 5265–5267, 5272, 5275, 5279, 5280–5282, 5284–5287, 5298, 5302, 5306, 5307, 5309, 5312, 5315, 5316, 5318, 5320, 5321, 5327, 5328, 5331, 5332, 5356, 5365, 5367–5370, 5373, 5374, 5376, 5379, 5380, 5382, 5387, 5391, 5393, 5395, 5400, 5412, 5419, 5425, 5460, 5462, 5500, 5501, 5639, 5640, 5642, 5664, 5668–5670, 5672, 5692, 5696, 5706, 5707.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Air Force 3623
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Army 3498, 3499, 3703, 5074, 5077, 5092, 5094, 5183, 5185, 5232, 5252
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Chamber of Commerce 2730
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Foreign Office 4480, 4481, 4484, 4491, 4492, 4494, 4496, 4510, 4522, 4524
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Handbook 3317, 3321, 3322
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Construction 2608, 2708
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Figures 2608
Union Trust Co 100
United Aircraft (Corp.) 100
United Airlines 100
United All-China Central Government 2331
United America Spanish Aid Committee 4757
United American Artists 4116
United Australia Party 2636
United Automobile Workers (West Side Local) 4152
United Cannery, Agriculture, Packing and Allied Workers of America 4116
United China Front 2455, 2469, 2470
United China Relief (Indusco) 141, 410, 444, 585, 1218, 1219, 1221, 1241, 1247, 1248, 2544, 2579, 2581, 3730, 3734, 3880, 4318, 4619, 4936, 4937, 4968, 4983, 5252, 5284, 5298, 5337, 5344, 5345, 5349, 5360, 5709, 5710.

Page
United Church Council for Democracy ... 621, 622
United Council for Civilian Relief ... 4138
United Country Party (Australia) ... 2636
United Defense Headquarters, Yenan (Lien-fang Ssu-ting-pu) ... 2404, 2451, 2458, 2460
United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union ... 516, 2628, 2634
United Federal Workers of America ... 4396, 4398, 4733
United Front Movement ... 2327, 2330, 2332, 2338, 2452, 2453, 2455, 3293, 3306, 3307, 3586, 3669, 3684, 3931
United Furniture Workers of America ... 4116
United Garrison Forces (Chinese Communist Party) ... 2448, 2465
United Gas, Coke, and Chemical Workers ... 946
United Kingdom. (*See* Great Britain.)
United Nations ... 5, 6, 13, 16, 17, 83, 86, 135, 167, 168, 215, 235, 323, 330, 332, 353, 435, 440, 562, 571, 598, 600, 611, 641, 710, 725, 746, 765, 793, 794, 815, 819, 853, 918, 924, 931, 968, 969, 973, 975, 977, 979, 993, 1003, 1021, 1032, 1036, 1053, 1056–1058, 1061, 1070, 1072, 1073, 1088, 1090, 1096, 1098, 1132, 1134, 1135, 1161, 1162, 1215, 1220, 1255–1257, 1262, 1267, 1268, 1273, 1275, 1276, 1308, 1337, 1505, 1517, 1526, 1528, 1532, 1544, 1545, 1551, 1552, 1555, 1559, 1565, 1569, 1570, 1585, 1586, 1595, 1609, 1620, 1628, 1654, 1658, 1660, 1662, 1663, 1665, 1667, 1668–1671, 1731, 1757, 1864, 1868, 1870, 2120, 2121, 2134–2136, 2138–2141, 2149, 2208–2212, 2220, 2236, 2267, 2307, 2381, 2482, 2483, 2485, 2500, 2528, 2529, 2539, 2553, 2556, 2557, 2595, 2735, 2774, 2778–2780, 2814, 2818, 2826, 2840, 2841, 2843, 2844, 2847, 2850, 2851, 2854, 2856–2864, 2867–2869, 2895, 2990, 3034, 3069, 3073, 3117, 3120, 3220, 3357, 3479, 3551, 3632, 3704, 3813, 3880, 3881, 3945, 3974, 4231, 4286, 4316, 4317, 4321, 4323, 4326, 4339, 4397, 4441, 4551, 4552, 4592, 4627, 4628, 4630, 4631, 4634, 4639, 4643, 4647, 4649, 4651, 4652, 4653, 4654, 4656, 4658, 4661, 4662, 4663, 4666, 4670, 4671, 4672, 4673, 4683, 4684, 4687, 4688, 4713, 4721, 4723, 4725, 4727, 4739, 4742, 4748, 4781, 4782, 4805, 4807, 4828, 4836, 4854, 4925, 4968, 4969, 4977, 5034, 5036–5039, 5047, 5066–5077, 5079, 5090, 5267, 5269, 5272, 5280, 5281, 5285, 5289, 5316, 5322, 5523, 5325, 5345, 5375, 5389, 5390, 5394, 5396, 5397, 5412, 5484, 5634, 5636, 5639, 5642, 5643, 5664, 5665, 5669, 5671–5673, 5676, 5693.
  Armies and Navies ... 968, 969
  Charter ... 56, 1036, 1273, 1532, 1559, 1569, 1868, 2778, 2839, 2840, 2860, 2861, 2868, 3407, 3408
  Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) ... 1003, 4349–4351
  Chinese Delegation, San Francisco Conference ... 1757
  Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes ... 2857
  Economic Commission for Aid in the Far East ... 1595, 1628
  Food and Agricultural Organization ... 1595, 1620
  General Assembly ... 1570, 1609, 1658, 1660, 1667, 4644, 4679, 4900
  Information Conference, Relief and Rehabilitation Program ... 2595
  International Secretariat ... 4290, 4291, 4294
  Russian delegation ... 3646
  San Francisco Conference ... 815, 2539, 2622, 2826, 2841, 2843, 2844, 2847, 2850, 2860, 2862, 2863, 2867, 2868, 2869, 3355, 4232, 4290, 4541, 4826.
  Secretariat ... 2120, 2121, 2135, 2136, 2138, 4635, 5313, 5323, 5689
  Secretary General, San Francisco ... 1736
  Security Council ... 746, 924, 1053, 1256–1258, 1545, 1569, 1570, 1585, 1660, 2556, 2859, 2864
  United States Mission ... 763–765, 2500
  World Health Organization ... 1595
Atomic Commission ... 4055
Commission ... 4351
Conference (1945) ... 975–977, 979, 1032, 1036, 1072, 1073, 1730, 1736, 1757, 2120, 2121, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2149, 2220.
Conference (Freedom of Information, Geneva) ... 2267
Conference (presented by the Communist Political Association of San Francisco) ... 118

United Nations—Continued Page
Conference on International Organization (UNCIO)..... 710, 2857, 2858
Department of Economic Affairs..... 4627, 4642, 4738, 4747, 4748
Economic Commission for Asia..... 13
Economic and Social Council..... 16–18, 276, 1161, 1162, 3903, 4644, 5337,
Journal..... 2864
News, The..... 5323
Personnel Bureau..... 4659, 4661
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)..... 141,
937, 995, 996, 1058, 1145, 1526, 1551, 1579, 1607, 1621, 1626, 1633, 1733, 1772, 2003, 2259, 2552, 2868, 3645, 3991, 4099, 4330, 4639–4642, 4664, 4668, 4670, 4675, 4676, 4678, 4679, 4723, 4727–4732, 4940, 4941, 5286, 5287, 5295, 5313, 5322, 5387, 5406, 5432, 5686.
Atlantic City Conference..... 478, 1733, 2868
China Office..... 571
London Conference..... 1772, 2826, 2839, 2864
Technical Assistance Administration..... 4636, 4650, 4659, 4660, 4762
World (publication)..... 562
United Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA)..... 408,
620, 622, 2242, 3061, 3840, 4116, 4143, 4275
United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO (Social Service Employees Union Local 19)..... 4300, 4327
United Paperworkers of America..... 946
United Press (UP)..... 539,
556, 557, 616, 839, 1113, 1114, 1142, 2184, 3032, 3100, 3220, 4284, 4830, 5106, 5334.
United Public Workers..... 4398
United Russian Relief..... 5252
United Revolutionary Front..... 3839
United Service to China..... 1214, 1247–1249, 1579
United States:
Air Force (USAF)..... 597,
745, 779, 780, 827, 849, 856, 1395, 1398, 1411, 1430, 1440, 1442, 1444, 1447, 1448, 1460, 1462, 1463, 1500, 2290, 2310, 2356, 2361, 2367, 2368, 2371, 2535, 2836, 4045, 4073, 4429, 4441, 4666, 4667, 4936, 5340, 5429.
Air force, Fourteenth..... 4687, 4688
Air Force (Intelligence Group)..... 1792, 1809
Air Transport Command..... 4687, 4788, 4689
Armed Forces..... 1710,
1712, 1714, 1715, 1719, 1721, 1730, 1748, 1791, 1792, 1809, 1812, 1813, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1883, 1890, 1891, 1906, 1995, 2001, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070–2073, 2075, 2076, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2167, 2178, 2180–2182, 2193, 2197–2199, 2200–2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2250, 2252, 2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301, 2305, 2310, 2356, 2361, 2367, 2368, 2419–2421, 2468, 2487, 2535, 2537, 2538, 2555, 2556, 2590, 2593, 2603, 2604, 2737, 2738, 2739, 2749, 2760, 2770, 2771, 2830, 2833, 2836, 3011–3013, 3022, 3060, 3160, 3263, 3399, 3406, 3541, 3667, 4936, 4940, 4958, 4959, 4965, 4966, 4968, 4972, 4974–4977, 4979–4983, 5001, 5002, 5009, 5013, 5033, 5040, 5045, 5048–5050, 5052, 5053, 5056, 5062, 5063, 5066, 5070, 5071, 5083, 5090, 5092, 5100, 5109, 5112, 5143–5146, 5163, 5187, 5144–5146, 5229, 5231, 5238, 5241–5243, 5247–5249, 5251, 5252, 5255, 5259, 5263, 5265, 5268, 5278, 5288, 5292.
Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE)..... 4857
Armed Forces Institute..... 4682
Army..... 106,
174, 183, 278, 353, 354, 356, 357, 359, 386, 387, 390, 405, 416, 417, 419, 568–570, 596–598, 608, 618, 623, 636, 642, 646, 729, 736, 738, 748, 753, 757, 759, 775, 779, 785, 792, 810, 820, 823, 825, 826, 833, 843, 849, 853, 901, 958, 959, 962, 964, 970–972, 988, 996, 997, 1026, 1030, 1031, 1060, 1086, 1132, 1136, 1221, 1224, 1275, 1289, 1333, 1359, 1365, 1367, 1370, 1448, 1497, 1500, 1551, 1638, 1649, 2310, 2356, 2358, 2361, 2362, 2367, 2419–2421, 2468, 2537, 2538, 2590, 2593, 2604, 2737–2739, 2760, 2770, 2771, 2830, 2833, 2836, 3060,

United States—Continued
Army—Continued Page
3160, 3263, 3702, 4035, 4036, 4045, 4064, 4072, 4074, 4075, 4185, 4429, 4430, 4529, 4537, 4582, 4687, 4763, 4764, 4830, 4832, 4855, 4858, 4940, 4958, 4968, 4972, 4974, 4983, 5040, 5045, 5056, 5062, 5063, 5070, 5083, 5090, 5145, 5146, 5249, 5254, 5259, 5339, 5371, 5414, 5415, 5419, 5429, 5678.
Army (Educational and Information Branch) 959
Army (Observer Section) 2374, 2378, 2382, 2390, 2395, 2419, 2420, 2439, 2468
Army Chemical Warfare School 3702
Army Corps of Engineers 646
Army Counter-Intelligence Corps 4858
Army Industrial College 3702
Army Intelligence (G–2) 19, 21, 22–26, 28–31, 33, 34, 106, 111, 112, 121, 182, 353, 354, 357, 359, 388, 391–394, 400, 416, 417, 481, 572, 573, 779, 813, 844, 849, 860, 2051, 2060, 2070, 2071, 2290, 2305, 2310, 2312, 2412, 3327, 3670, 3731, 4045, 4046, 4064, 4072–4074, 4125, 4184, 4416, 4431, 4432, 4436, 4829, 5339.
Army, Navy, Marines, Air Corps 3800, 3806, 3823, 3837, 3838, 3880, 3994, 4016
Army Ordnance 4691
Army War College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans 3702
Army War College (Washington, D. C.) 3643
Asiatic Fleet 995, 1221
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 1221, 4624, 4901, 4904, 4905
Attorney General 4162–4164, 4166, 4187, 4244
Bureau of Budget 432, 857, 2921
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce 432, 477
Bureau of Mines 4960
Bureau of Navigation 672, 673
Cabinet 2656
Canadian Northwest 2581
Chamber of Commerce 640, 2834, 5703
China 3212
China Fleet 1547
China and the World Market 3254, 3259, 3260, 3680
Civil Service Commission 282, 302, 756, 1033, 1034, 1149, 2781, 4621–4624, 4837, 5239, 5243
Civil Service, Loyalty Review Board 4611, 4837, 4838, 4845, 4849
Congress 444, 462, 603, 606, 736, 833, 862, 902, 935, 995, 1026, 1043, 1049, 1055, 1069, 1071, 1098, 1118, 1119, 1128, 1195, 1197, 1254, 1261, 1301, 1486, 1493, 1494, 1504, 1507, 1550, 1556, 1584, 1618, 1644, 1645, 1652, 1653, 1659, 1661, 1681, 1905, 1907, 2127, 2131, 2132, 2162, 2243, 2296, 2502, 2537, 2554, 2556, 2673, 2676, 2678, 2687, 2834, 2835, 2862, 2920, 2957, 2978, 3026, 3029, 3111, 3169, 3769, 3779, 3944, 3956, 4072, 4076, 4098, 4113, 4128, 4129, 4241, 4290.
Constitution 545, 1287, 1606
Consulate:
Changsha 1966, 1967
Dairen 1796, 1969, 1970
Kunming (same as Yunnanfu) 1969, 1970, 1971
Tsinan 1969
Consulate General in Shanghai 3968
Court of Claims 2836
Declaration of Independence 1287, 1606
Department of Agriculture 857, 1631, 1649, 2798, 2837, 2890, 3693, 4623, 4731, 4732, 4960, 4964, 4973, 4999, 5203, 5261, 5295, 5325, 5503, 5504.
Department of Army 3669, 3701, 4808, 4813–4815, 5359, 5430, 5431, 5433
Department of Commerce 857, 1104, 1106, 1743, 1744, 2831, 2837, 3685, 4623, 4646, 4869, 4973, 4977, 5003, 5008, 5036, 5205, 5206, 5036, 5249, 5261, 5297, 5432, 5703.
Department of Defense 5428, 5429
Department of the Interior 1104, 4364

United States—Continued Page
Department of Justice 2854, 2855, 2955, 2956, 2957, 2958, 2959, 2967, 2972, 2973, 4244, 4716, 4743, 4744, 4805, 4807, 4836, 5165, 5288, 5291–5294, 5437, 5440–5443, 5452, 5634.
Department of Labor 2633, 2837, 5171
Department of Navy 135, 382, 390, 422, 433, 445, 446, 464, 583, 584, 597, 613, 614, 618, 639, 671, 672, 673, 704–707, 717, 731, 734, 736, 737, 743, 824, 995, 996, 998, 1026, 1080, 1112, 1221, 1224, 1474, 1492, 1493, 1498, 1500, 1507, 1508, 1512, 3474, 4716, 4810, 4842, 5359, 5430, 5433, 5435, 5687, 5703.
Department of Navy (Communication Division) 2181
Department of Post Office 4621
Department of State 17, 32–34, 66–68, 112, 113, 131–136, 138, 139, 161, 170, 183, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240–242, 244, 250, 271, 282, 306, 313, 314, 341, 345, 348, 349, 364, 380, 391, 417, 421, 424, 425, 428, 432, 439, 440, 443–445, 452, 462, 463, 464, 477–479, 488–490, 495, 497, 560, 576, 577, 580, 589, 591, 594, 595, 597–599, 601, 604, 606, 607, 609, 610, 612–614, 616, 619, 623–627, 631–633, 636, 638, 639, 654, 655, 678–691, 694–696, 703, 704, 706–710, 713, 716, 719, 721, 723, 725–727, 729–731, 733, 735–738, 743–746, 748, 751–756, 758, 760, 764–766, 771, 777, 778, 784, 787–789, 793, 794, 800, 804, 807, 808, 824, 831, 832, 835, 840, 847–849, 857, 859, 860, 892–894, 899, 900, 902–904, 913, 914, 917–919, 921–928, 932, 933, 976, 980, 985, 995–997, 1003, 1007, 1008, 1015, 1016, 1021, 1027, 1028, 1032–1038, 1041–1043, 1046–1050, 1059, 1060, 1062, 1064–1068, 1071–1076, 1091, 1092, 1112–1134, 1136, 1137, 1144, 1145, 1147, 1148, 1178, 1195, 1198, 1218, 1221, 1223, 1224, 1226, 1230, 1249, 1251, 1252, 1255, 1258, 1262, 1263, 1267, 1270, 1271, 1274–1282, 1289, 1290, 1293–1295, 1334–1336, 1359–1364, 1370, 1386, 1389, 1403, 1432, 1434, 1456, 1457, 1468, 1481, 1482, 1493, 1498–1501, 1504, 1505, 1508, 1523, 1525, 1526, 1532, 1534, 1539, 1551, 1553–1556, 1570, 1571, 1578, 1579, 1587, 1596, 1608, 1614–1616, 1619, 1628, 1635, 1637, 1638, 1642, 1644, 1645, 1648, 1649, 1651, 1654, 1655, 1662, 1668, 1681, 1683, 1684–1705, 1710–1733, 1736–1744, 1749–1761, 1766–1780, 1784–1787, 1790–1805, 1808, 1812, 1813, 1818, 1821–1827, 1829–1855, 1859–1862, 1866–1884, 1890–1896, 1901–1931, 1935–1951, 1957–1983, 1987–1993, 1997–1999, 2001, 2002, 2006–2008, 2112, 2014, 2020–2023, 2026–2028, 2032, 2035–2037, 2039, 2044, 2045, 2049–2055, 2058, 2066, 2070, 2071, 2073, 2079, 2081–2084, 2088–2095, 2097–2102, 2106, 2109–2112, 2114, 2120–2124, 2127–2133, 2136, 2138–2149, 2151, 2152, 2156, 2157–2160, 2162, 2169, 2170, 2177, 2178, 2181, 2183, 2185, 2187, 2188, 2191, 2193–2197, 2200–2208, 2210, 2215, 2217–2219, 2221–2224, 2236, 2237, 2239, 2240–2247, 2249–2253, 2255, 2256, 2261, 2264, 2267–2272, 2273–2275, 2277, 2278, 2287, 2294–2298, 2303, 2310, 2389, 2476, 2477, 2485–2490, 2494, 2500–2505, 2509–2514, 2520, 2521, 2525, 2532–2540, 2548, 2551, 2554, 2555, 2615, 2624, 2692, 2753, 2755–2757, 2765–2767, 2770, 2774, 2780, 2782, 2810–2812, 2823, 2826, 2840, 2844–2850, 2853–2859, 2864–2870, 2886, 2893, 2894, 2899, 2901, 2905–2907, 2910–2913, 2917–2921, 2940–2945, 2948, 2951, 2961, 2968, 2975–2977, 2982, 3000–3007, 3010, 3011, 3017–3022, 3026, 3027, 3030–3051, 3053, 3068, 3071, 3074–3076, 3078–3080, 3092, 3108, 3113, 3115, 3197, 3203, 3209, 3214–3219, 3281, 3282, 3310, 3361, 3367, 3369, 3371, 3376–3378, 3380, 3382–3386, 3399–3402, 3410, 3414, 3488, 3494, 3503, 3520, 3553, 3556, 3577, 3601, 3615–3617, 3659, 3661, 3666, 3667, 3676, 3677, 3689, 3709, 3712, 3738, 3740, 3746, 3763–3765, 3786, 3806, 3808, 3813, 3816, 3883, 3887, 3894, 3945, 3956, 3957, 3965, 3966, 3968, 3986, 3987, 3989–3992, 3995, 3997, 3998, 4006, 4007, 4018, 4069, 4086, 4099, 4108, 4118, 4169, 4207, 4223, 4263, 4289, 4291, 4293–4296, 4301, 4302, 4311–4316, 4319, 4321, 4323–4326, 4329, 4332–4334, 4336, 4340–4343, 4347–4351, 4395, 4398, 4402, 4403, 4420–4423, 4430, 4436, 4512, 4515, 4527, 4530, 4532–4534, 4539, 4541, 4544, 4545, 4547–4551, 4558, 4559, 4627, 4633, 4641, 4673, 4694, 4703, 4715, 4716, 4721–4723,

United States—Continued
Department of State—Continued Page
4728–4730, 4737, 4746, 4747, 4774, 4799, 4815, 4816, 4821, 4825, 4830–4834, 4836–4844, 4869, 4876, 4877, 4899–4901, 4924–4927, 4929, 4931, 4935–4946, 4948–4953, 4960, 4963, 4967, 4973, 4975–4979, 4998, 5007–5010, 5013, 5014, 5021, 5023–5026, 5040, 5049, 5052, 5053, 5062, 5066, 5068, 5070, 5084, 5111, 5112, 5115, 5116, 5142, 5145, 5146, 5169, 5170, 5172, 5173, 5179, 5187, 5199, 5202–5206, 5214, 5224, 5225, 5247, 5252–5254, 5261, 5264, 5266, 5269, 5280, 5283, 5291, 5292, 5295, 5296, 5297, 5300, 5301, 5313, 5314, 5321, 5334, 5341, 5342, 5347–5359, 5363, 5371, 5376, 5392, 5393, 5395, 5429–5432, 5435, 5443–5445, 5449, 5453, 5454, 5457, 5458, 5467–5469, 5472, 5474, 5475, 5477, 5479, 5480, 5482, 5484, 5486, 5645, 5663, 5667, 5687, 5695, 5698, 5699, 5700, 5701, 5703, 5711.
Administrative Division 1924
Area Committee 4323, 4325
Asiatic Section 1128
Biographical Register 495, 497, 576, 577, 709, 710, 754, 2141–2143, 2766, 2767
Building Guard Office 2294
Bulletin 735, 736, 1916, 2170, 2195, 2196, 2208, 2210, 2277
Conference, October 1949 2476, 2525, 2534, 3704
Department of Public Liaison 1855
Division of Chinese Affairs 618, 704, 705, 707–709, 788, 824, 903, 983, 996, 1092, 1359, 1389, 1463, 1481, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1765, 1773, 1780, 1795, 1825, 1833, 1836, 1850, 1854, 1918, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1927, 1936, 1998, 2006, 2008, 2020, 2039, 2066, 2082, 2088, 2097–2101, 2105, 2106, 2120, 2142, 2487–2490, 4290, 4303, 4321, 4325.
Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements 2835
Division of Communications and Records 2121
Division of Cultural Relations 479, 2509
Division of European Affairs 2836
Division of Foreign Service Personnel 709, 710, 760
Division of International Labor, Health, and Social Affairs 4289, 4321, 4325
Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs 1918
Division of Labor Relations 710, 2539, 4289
Employee Loyalty Investigation 1007, 1774, 1776, 1777, 1913, 1997, 1998, 2073, 2241, 2948, 2961, 2968, 2975–2977, 3000–3002, 3049.
European Section 708
Far East Desk 1718, 1719, 1846, 1850
Far Eastern Division 417, 462, 463, 604, 616, 626, 628, 704, 708, 726, 727, 736, 743, 754, 755, 831, 1123, 1554, 1693, 1720, 1730, 1757, 1765, 1766, 1768, 1769, 1773, 1797, 1848, 1888, 1889, 1892, 1918, 1925, 1935, 1936, 1959, 1998, 2002, 2012, 2028, 2037, 2050, 2051, 2058, 2066, 2071, 2099, 2101, 2105, 2106, 2110, 2120, 2123, 2142, 2152, 2159, 2162, 2169, 2202, 2203, 2219, 2222, 2239, 2240, 2243, 2251, 2255, 2256, 2294–2298, 2303, 2485, 2486, 2911, 3209, 3398, 3520, 3666, 3667.
Far Eastern Office 1715, 1716, 1718, 1721, 1749, 1757, 1765, 1766, 1773, 1780, 1797, 1826, 1827, 1840, 1843, 1844, 1850, 1851, 1889, 1891, 1906, 1907, 1925, 1931, 1935, 1936, 1963.
FEC–230, Far East Commission 1071, 1221, 1672, 1674, 1881–1885, 2125, 2164, 2169, 2170, 2222, 2224, 2236, 2237, 2258, 2281, 2298, 4325, 5342.
Foreign Affairs Publication Section 766
Foreign Economic Administration for Chinese Affairs 627
Foreign Office 1795, 1918
Foreign Service 1289, 2899, 2901, 2945, 3000, 3005, 3006, 3037, 3051
Foreign Service Auxiliary 709, 710, 760, 4290, 4294, 4342, 4343, 4348
International Security Organization 2857, 2868
Japan Division 704, 708, 912, 1839
Labor Division 1730, 1732, 1797, 1840

United States—Continued
Department of State—Continued
Page
Latin-American Division 488
Legal Advisers' Office 2237, 2274, 2275, 2278
Legal Section 708, 1699, 1974
Loyalty Appeal Board 1950
Loyalty and Security Board 784, 788, 789, 793, 807, 1753, 1755, 1759, 1760, 1773–1776, 1950, 1997, 1998, 2073, 2241, 2487, 2854, 2943–2945, 2948, 2961, 2968, 2975–2977, 3000–3002, 3049, 3110, 4837, 4844, 4845, 4849.
Loyalty Board Hearings 1774, 1776, 1777, 1913
Mission at the United Nations 4299
Near Eastern Division 428, 445
Office of American Republic Affairs 743, 2169, 2303
Office of the Assistant Adviser on International Economic Affairs 4289
Office of Director General of Foreign Service 1749, 1755, 1884
Office of Economic Adviser 2249, 3209
Office of European Affairs 2127
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation 4628, 4629, 4640, 4641, 4642, 4664, 4668, 4675, 4678
Office of Public Affairs 899, 1132
Old and New Buildings 1906
Office of Special Political Affairs 995
Personnel Division 1902, 1903, 2766
Plans and Policies Division 1554, 1556
Policy Committee 729, 1854
Policy Planning Board 2765–2767
Post Surrender Policy for Japan 1854
Postwar Planning Division 2823, 2826, 2837, 2865, 2867, 2870
Postwar Trends Unit 2826, 2827
Press Office 2158, 2188
Press and Radio News Conference 2183
Protocol Division 4291–4293
Psychological Warfare Department 727, 731, 734
Public Affairs Division 1642
Public Liaison Division 1855
Public Relations Division 2278
Publication No. 4255, Far Eastern Series 43 2218, 2219
Radio News Conference 2183
Register 1704, 1797, 1969, 2219, 2766, 2767
Round Table 2537
Science, Education and Arts Division 2811
Security Board 1760
Security Division 2054, 2110–2112, 2215, 2240, 2241, 2243–2245
Security Office 1760, 1843, 1906
Southeast Asian Office 1749
Special Political Affairs Division 2837
White Paper 1049, 1076, 1091, 1092, 1290, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1432, 1456, 1523, 1526, 1534, 1579, 1587, 1615, 1724, 1827, 2039, 2049, 2055, 2088, 2201, 2206, 2251, 2253, 2269, 2287, 2501, 2504, 2505, 3406, 3650.
Visa Division 1003
Department of Treasury 135, 390, 419–421, 428, 432, 434, 440, 441, 443, 444, 446, 464, 491, 493, 824, 857, 1002, 1188, 1220, 1691–1693, 1733, 1758, 2810, 2831, 2837, 2868, 2920, 3364, 3368, 3697, 4048, 4049, 4069, 4623, 4624, 4678, 4745, 4746, 4964, 4973, 5017, 5066, 5077, 5178, 5203, 5244, 5245, 5249, 5252, 5261, 5268, 5430–5433, 5488–5490, 5709.
Department of War 11, 135, 144, 145, 175, 258, 348, 353, 354, 357, 359, 367, 378, 382, 384, 388, 390, 391–394, 400, 406, 416, 417, 464, 481, 568–570, 572, 573, 603, 610, 639, 642, 646, 659, 660, 704, 717, 736, 741, 743, 745, 824, 835, 840, 901, 914, 965, 995, 1004, 1034, 1149, 1334, 1370, 1406, 1415, 1430, 1432, 1482, 1652, 1710, 1712, 1714–1716, 1719, 1720, 1796, 1812, 1813, 1868, 1872, 1883, 1890, 1891, 2012, 2051, 2052, 2055, 2056, 2060, 2070–2072, 2075, 2076, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2167,

United States—Continued
Department of War—Continued Page
2193, 2197–2207, 2211, 2220, 2223, 2237, 2242, 2250, 2252, 2289, 2290, 2292, 2294, 2296, 2301, 2305, 2310, 2603, 2604, 2833, 2836, 3626, 3627, 3872, 3965, 4071–4073, 4185, 4423, 4426, 4548, 4622, 4623, 4683, 4688, 4829, 4830, 4853, 4958, 4965, 4966, 4968, 4972, 4974, 4983, 5001, 5002, 5009, 5048, 5049, 5050, 5052, 5163, 5238, 5241–5243, 5247–5249, 5251, 5252, 5255, 5263, 5265, 5268, 5292, 5339, 5348, 5415.
Civil Affairs Division 995, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2296, 2303
General Staff 393, 394
Military Intelligence 2305, 2310, 4966, 4980, 4982, 5001, 5002, 5009, 5011, 5012, 5048, 5049, 5050, 5052, 5163, 5241, 5243, 5247, 5248, 5265, 5268, 5348, 5703, 5710.
District Court (Baltimore) 3247
District Court (Spokane, Wash.) 433, 444, 857
Division of Central Services 4716
Embassy (Bombay) 2638
Embassy (Chungking) 1691, 1701, 1702, 1704, 1729, 1738, 1786, 1787, 1817, 1856, 1915, 1921, 1922, 1985, 1987, 1999, 2000, 2076, 2089, 2102, 2182, 2185, 2187, 2188, 3212, 3213.
Embassy:
China 3735, 3787, 3788, 3801, 3805, 3968, 3986, 4001, 4007, 4009, 4010
Karachi, Afghanistan 3219
London 703, 5480
Moscow 144, 704, 765, 771, 893, 896, 2295, 2711, 2712, 2729, 5460, 5466, 5473
Mukden 2554
Nanking 1749, 1968, 1971, 1985, 2536, 2551, 4531
Pekin 5461
Shanghai 758, 1973, 1975, 1894
Tokyo 703, 704, 747, 2912
Yugoslavia 722
Far Eastern Policy 3721, 3891, 3894, 3896, 3897, 3900, 3956, 3970–3972, 4030
Fifth Army (Headquarters) 2537
Fleet 1530, 1547
Foreign Service 703, 710, 746, 754, 760, 778, 793, 799, 804, 808, 825, 829, 830, 903, 1570, 1615, 1684, 1688, 1705, 1731, 1734, 1744, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755, 1904, 1921, 1940, 1950, 1967, 1968, 1971, 1979, 1980, 1987, 2029, 2101, 2105, 2144, 2241, 2244, 2272, 2540, 2766, 2767, 2899, 2901, 2945, 3000, 3005, 3036, 3037, 3051.
Foreign Service School 1967
Fourteenth Air Force 1395, 1430, 1442, 1444, 1447, 1460, 1462, 1463
Fourth Army (Presidio, San Francisco) 3263
Government 387, 389, 390, 397, 405, 413, 419, 421, 435, 475, 480, 481, 484–486, 491, 527, 545, 558, 584, 586, 596, 599, 601, 672, 728, 730, 732, 733, 756, 757, 760, 771, 777, 824, 825, 834, 844, 845, 848, 849, 851, 860, 861, 892, 894–896, 901, 912, 918–920, 924, 933–935, 981, 989, 991, 997, 1033, 1034, 1042, 1043, 1047, 1051, 1062, 1098, 1099, 1119, 1120, 1128, 1136, 1150, 1153, 1195, 1197, 1198, 1224, 1229, 1302, 1392, 1396, 1397–1399, 1443, 1471, 1473, 1496, 1507, 1508, 1510, 1515, 1525, 1531, 1540, 1556, 1571, 1597, 1616, 1618, 1620, 1635, 1638, 1658, 1688, 1720, 1724, 1728, 1741, 1742, 1751, 1752, 1754, 1823, 1855, 1865, 1904, 1905, 1907, 1951, 1959, 1963, 1992, 2012, 2014–2017, 2026, 2052, 2057–2059, 2065, 2067, 2069, 2079, 2090, 2091, 2093, 2099, 2146, 2170, 2176, 2177, 2183, 2187, 2193, 2207–2213, 2215, 2219, 2224, 2225, 2241, 2248, 2260, 2263, 2264, 2273, 2279, 2293, 2295, 2306–2312, 2314, 2316, 2317, 2319, 2324, 2340, 2341, 2343, 2354–2356, 2358, 2363, 2373–2383, 2386–2389, 2392, 2393, 2397, 2398, 2475, 2478, 2483, 2500–2506, 2508–2513, 2516, 2520, 2526–2530, 2532, 3538, 2548, 2549, 2551–2556, 2566, 2580, 2585,

United States—Continued
Government—Continued Page
2600–2603, 2613, 2651, 2658, 2671, 2677, 2680, 2682, 2684, 2713, 2734, 2736, 2738, 2748, 2757, 2761, 2767–2769, 2774, 2775, 2782, 2792, 2793, 2797–2803, 2821, 2822, 2830–2834, 2837–2841, 2849–2851, 2858–2863, 2869, 2873, 2875, 2885, 2889, 2905, 2906, 2910, 2920, 2922, 2942, 2961, 2973, 2982, 2985, 2987–2991, 3011, 3019, 3027–3034, 3039, 3046, 3049, 3052, 3054, 3070, 3073, 3078, 3087 3091, 3092, 3106, 3110, 3113, 3115, 3119, 3120, 3137, 3161, 3263, 3201, 3210, 3213, 3216, 3265–3267, 3308, 3325, 3326, 3342, 3350, 3360, 3365, 3374, 3382, 3393, 3394, 3398, 3400, 3409, 3415, 3459–3472, 3476, 3484, 3498, 3499, 3503, 3536, 3537, 3570, 3574, 3575, 3581, 3583, 3586, 3592, 3595, 3599, 3600, 3602, 3609, 3610, 3615, 3616, 3622, 3627, 3632, 3633, 3639, 3640, 3662, 3663, 3666, 3675, 3676, 3679, 3681, 3684–3688, 3690, 3692, 3693, 3796, 3697, 3699, 3702, 3704, 3706–3709, 3711–3714, 3723, 3724, 2763, 3790, 3844, 3854, 3862, 3880, 3892, 3966, 3967, 3986, 4010, 4013, 4056, 4057, 4069, 4070, 4164, 4290, 4291, 4311, 4312, 4326, 4348, 4394, 4479, 4485, 4486, 4488, 4536, 4537, 4629, 4630, 4638, 4639, 4644, 4645, 4648, 4649, 4664, 4665, 4678, 4691, 4714, 4717, 4734, 4745, 4747, 4760, 4766, 4769, 4770, 4774, 4776, 4782, 4786, 4795, 4799, 4801, 4805, 4815, 4901, 5330, 5339, 5355, 5363, 5399, 5432, 5449, 5466, 5486, 5634, 5663, 5676.
Government agencies 3880, 3885
Group Control Council in Germany 4745
Gunboats 4118
House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2129, 2131, 3026, 3110
House Committee on Un-American Activities (*see also* Un-American Activities Committee, House of Representatives) 5355, 5487, 5488, 5502, 5711
House of Representatives 1039, 1073, 1406, 1411, 1915, 1916, 2127, 2132, 2540, 2810
Immigration Service 2967, 4364, 4365
Information Service 1509, 1531, 1642, 1649, 3787, 3788, 3818, 3968, 3997, 3998, 4000
Information Service in China 3212
Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan 1854, 1862, 1863, 1868, 2145, 2152–2154, 2162, 2163, 2169, 2225, 2281
International Student Service 4116
Japanese Negotiations 381
Joint Chiefs of Staff 1864, 1872, 1891, 2155, 2163, 2253, 2281, 2297
Legation (Bern, Switzerland) 1692, 1770–1772, 1916
Liberation of Philippines 3324
Library of Congress 2170, 2568, 2698, 2792, 2793, 2833, 2834, 2836, 3107, 3153, 3156, 3266
Lines 3191, 3193
Marine Corps 2095, 2207, 2209–2211, 3473, 3474, 3509, 4169, 4552, 4831, 5109, 5408, 5431, 5436
Maritime Commission 405, 1567, 2678, 4869, 5429, 5430, 5432, 5433
Military Academy. (*See* West Point Military Academy.)
Military Commission in China 4427, 4436
Military Command in China 4840
Military Government 4680
Naval Intelligence 112, 1080, 1081, 1112, 1473, 1474, 1688, 2181, 3556, 4073, 4127, 5348
Naval Reserve 609, 671, 672
Naval Medical Center (Bethesda, Md.) 928
Naval Operations, Office of Chief 2180, 2181
Naval Radio Personnel 2182
Naval School of Military Government and Administration (Columbia University) 494
Navy 218, 278, 382, 390, 422, 433, 445, 446, 464, 583, 584, 597, 613, 614, 618, 639, 671–673, 737, 745, 849, 858, 928, 958, 959, 962, 964, 970–972, 995–998, 1026, 1067, 1080, 1112, 1136, 1221, 1224, 1307, 1473, 1474, 1491–1493, 1498–1500, 1507, 1508, 1512, 1518, 1522, 1523, 1530, 1535, 1539, 1547–1549, 1471, 1748, 1809,

United States—Continued
Navy—Continued Page
1867, 1868, 1872, 1906, 2007, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2122, 2143, 2162, 2163, 2178, 2180–2182, 2193, 2203, 2211, 2220, 2237, 2242, 2248, 2294, 2296, 2310, 2324, 2356, 2361, 2367, 2487, 2538, 2555, 2556, 2593, 2749, 2787, 2830, 2833, 2836, 3012, 3013, 3392, 3473, 3689, 4113, 4311, 4318, 4680, 4831, 4854, 4959, 4968, 4974, 4975–4977, 4979, 5013, 5040, 5062, 5063, 5066, 5109, 5112, 5143, 5144, 5163, 5187, 5231, 5249, 5259, 5278, 5288, 5292, 5415, 5429, 5430
Navy General Board 995
Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence 4842, 4844
News 834, 4592, 4834, 5040
News and World Report 2923, 2980, 3896
Office of Education 444, 2521, 2776, 3965
Office of Naval Research 2749
Pipe and Foundry Co 2630
Policy in Korea 2249
Policy toward China 2196, 2198, 2200, 2208, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2218, 2251
Quarterly Book List 1172
Recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic 3324, 3702
Reparations Mission to Japan 4833
Relations with China 2549, 2551, 2554, 3705
Reports 2925, 2927
Rubber 100
Senate 710, 905, 1302, 1303, 1419, 1481, 1487, 1488, 1526, 1684, 1711, 1913, 1915, 1917, 1997, 2127, 2218, 2268, 2271, 2286, 2483, 2500, 2532, 2534, 2536, 2539, 2540, 2559, 2599, 2673, 2677, 2688, 2735, 2738, 2773, 2778, 2780, 2800, 2810, 2897, 2934, 2963, 2966, 2968, 2976, 3014, 3045, 3098, 3114, 3209, 3275, 3674, 3722, 3818, 4116, 4169, 4244, 4540, 4816, 4821
Senate:
Armed Services Committee 4845, 5364
Committee on Foreign Relations 1997, 2129, 2131, 2201, 2203, 2948, 2949, 2961, 2968, 2976, 2977, 3114, 3960, 4316, 5364, 5642, 5645
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 5487
Judiciary Committee 3862, 3889
Securities and Exchange Commission 5203
Senators 3902, 3946
Seventh Fleet 1067 1069, 1119
Shipping in the Pacific, 1914–40 2581
Sixth Army 2537, 2538
Stabilization Board 1698
Steel Corp 101, 546, 1317
Strategic Bomb Survey Mission 3297, 4161, 4182
Supreme Court 1100, 1742, 2970, 3645, 3784, 4128, 4435, 5027, 5678
Tariff Commission 481, 2837, 5009, 5268, 5700, 5702
War Asset Administration 5429, 5430, 5431
War Production Board 2392
White Paper on China 5392, 5393
Women's Army Corps 4830
in World Affairs in 1934–35 3167
and the World Court 4100
Universal Trading Corp 390, 433, 474, 857, 3913, 3914, 4973, 5234, 5235
University of Aberdeen 4089
University of the Air (NBC) 2162, 2163, 2169, 2296, 2303
University, American 5323
University of Atlanta 2658
University of Berlin 1008
University, Bombay 5323
University of British Columbia 768, 770, 5327
University, Brown 4967, 5303
University, Calcutta 5321
University of California 8, 254, 320, 341, 375, 427, 444, 450, 474, 476, 670, 768, 770, 928, 995, 1216, 1220, 1836, 2109, 2532, 2581, 2659, 2981, 3168, 3536, 3868, 3881, 3913, 3916, 3921, 3924, 3929, 3936, 4022, 4023, 4159, 4160, 4225, 4226, 4258–5260, 4289, 4339, 4421, 4422, 4556, 4579, 4835, 4902, 4903, 4944, 4998, 5010, 5013, 5025, 5040, 5058, 5135, 5186, 5205, 5323, 5336, 5703

Page
University of California at Los Angeles 1071
University of California Press 3287
University of Cambridge (England) 1153, 4805, 5231
University of Canton 2454
University of Chicago 342, 445, 474, 475, 485, 715, 720, 901, 996, 1221, 1227 1551, 2585, 2834, 3538, 4047, 4119, 4135, 4259, 4387, 4428, 4835 4977, 5228, 5313, 5340, 5661, 5668, 5673, 5674.
University of Chicago Press 81, 571, 4890
University of Chungshan 2349, 2453, 2456, 2464
University of Cincinnati 474, 901, 1551, 4835
University, Clark 5321, 5335
University, Colgate 4900, 4983, 5336
University, College of Wales (England) 3850
University, Columbia 4474, 4503, 4506, 4509, 4579, 4580, 4622, 4638, 4741, 4758, 4788, 4834, 4835, 4872, 4893, 4938, 4944, 4965, 4973, 4983, 4999, 5003, 5014–5016, 5018, 5026, 5111, 5135, 5153–5155, 5172, 5173, 5179, 5183, 5210, 5216, 5217, 5224, 5225, 5227, 5253, 5257, 5263, 5268, 5305, 5311–5313, 5318, 5321–5323, 5327, 5336, 5340, 5344, 5345, 5703.
University of Copenhagen 342
University, Cornell 4422, 4853, 4944, 5079, 5111, 5323, 5336
University, Delhi 5323
University, Duke 4830
University, Fisk 5323
University, Fordham 4375
University of Frankfurt 274
University, Fu-jen 4416, 4418, 4419
University, Georgetown 4834, 5061
University of Hamburg 342
University, Harvard (*see also* Harvard University) 4420, 4503, 4579, 4618, 4693, 4831, 4834, 4835, 4886, 4931, 4944, 4956, 4959, 4963, 5067, 5111, 5116, 5117, 5126, 5134, 5167, 5176, 5177, 5227, 5229, 5276, 5289, 5303, 5320, 5335, 5336, 5372, 5411, 5453, 5454, 5456, 5457, 5491, 5662, 5701.
University of Hawaii 996, 1227, 4093, 4893, 4997
University of Illinois 2659
University of Iowa 1167
University of Iowa, State 5323
University, Johns Hopkins 4358, 4360, 4384, 4416–4418, 4421, 4424–4426, 4428, 4468, 4633, 4833, 4834, 4835, 4871, 4893, 4900, 5080, 5111, 5175, 5178, 5182, 5187, 5192, 5214, 5219, 5220, 5225, 5240, 5301, 5310, 5312, 5313, 5323, 5359, 5700, 5703.
University of Kansas 5323
University of Kentucky 475, 4835
University of Leningrad 2691
University of Leyden 5320
University, Lincoln 4595
University of Liverpool 3168
University of London 342, 1009, 4037, 4296, 5428
University of Madras 5323
University of Manitoba 5320
University of Maryland 589–591, 4387, 5699
University, McGill 5159, 5319, 5323, 5355
University of Melbourne 5320
University of Michigan 147, 341, 474, 1539, 2480, 2659, 3168, 3985, 4258, 4446, 5176, 5186
University of Minnesota 901, 1036, 1050, 1132, 1551, 1583, 2585, 2658, 4093, 4119, 4835, 4902
University of Missouri 3498
University of Moscow 868, 4879
University, Nankai 2455, 5320
University of Nanking 444, 3979, 4694, 5250
University, National 5329
University, National Peking 5320, 5321
University, New Brunswick (Fredericton, N. B.) 5270
University of North Carolina 2890, 5166

Page
University, Northwestern ... 4835, 5340
University, Ohio State ... 5682
University, Oxford ... 4588, 5025, 5131, 5232, 5276, 5320, 5323, 5349 5386, 5411
University of Paris ... 2460
University of Peking ... 996, 5320
University of Pennsylvania ... 342, 1035, 1071, 1111, 1114, 1132, 1252, 1551, 2876, 3636, 3903, 3955, 3957, 4012, 4119, 4835, 4872, 5078, 5336
University of Petrograd (Leningrad) ... 4479
University of the Philippines ... 5296, 5319, 5320
University of Pittsburgh ... 1398, 4967
University, Princeton (*see also* Princeton University) ... 4834, 4872, 4915, 4969, 4981, 5009, 5048, 5068, 5111, 5167, 5191, 5239, 5248, 5355, 5357, 5427.
University of Rochester ... 4834
University Settlement Mothers Clubs ... 4275
University of Shanghai ... 2459, 2470
University of Shizuoka ... 4963
University of Sidney ... 2627, 2637
University, Sind ... 5026, 5322
University, Sino-Japanese ... 5188
University of Southern California ... 5165
University, Stanford (*see also* Leland Stanford University) ... 4588, 4835, 4870, 4954, 5009, 5013, 5024, 5040, 5155, 5282, 5289, 5313, 5319, 5320, 5322, 5335, 5341.
University, Syracuse ... 5336
University of Toilers of the East ... 2717
University, Tokyo National ... 5021
University of Toronto ... 3168, 5026, 5130, 5321, 5322
University of Virginia ... 1167, 4972, 5049, 5323, 5700
University of Virginia (School of Military Government) ... 2603, 2604
University of Vladivostok ... 2700, 2701, 4492
University of Washington ... 273, 274, 342, 1219, 1551 2580, 2691, 2726, 3168, 3235, 3611, 3883, 4104, 4832, 4835, 5019, 5250, 5305, 5323
University of Washington (un-American activities of certain professors) ... 2160, 2162, 2183
University of Washington Teachers Union ... 2161
University of Wisconsin ... 3538, 3539, 5214
University, Xavier ... 466
University, Yale (*see also* Yale University) ... 4834, 4835, 4871, 4893, 4944, 4959, 5040, 5269, 5289, 5324, 5336, 5686, 5687, 5688, 5689, 5690, 5703.
University of Yenching ... 1221, 1968, 2464, 4420, 4423, 4424, 5173, 5175, 5229, 5248, 5250, 5276, 5281, 5368, 5369
University of Yenan (Chinese Communist Party) ... 2405, 2406, 2456, 4832
UNRRA. (*See* United Nations Relief and Rahabilitation Administration.)
UNRRA. Atlantic City Conference. (*See* United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Atlantic City Conference.)
UNRRA, China Office. (*See* United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, China Office.)
UNRRA Conference, London. (*See* United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Conference, London.)
UOPWA. (*See* Union of Office and Professional Workers of America.)
Untermeyer, Jean Starr ... 2659, 4260
Untermeyer, Louis ... 4260
UP. (*See* United Press.)
Upgren, A. R ... 2831, 5261
Upholsterers' Journal ... 2665
UPOWA. (*See* United Office andProfessional Workers of America.)
Upper Canada College ... 3472
Uramatsu, Sanutaro ... 5123, 5333, 5618, 5619
Urey, Harold C ... 2659
Urice, Jay ... 5268
Urnov, Mr ... 2592
Urumatsu, Mr ... 3927–3939
USAF (*see* United States Air Force) ... 2290
USAF-CBI ... 779, 780, 785

Page
Useem, John ... 5618, 5619
Usene, John ... 2248
Ushiba ... 5183, 5189, 5208, 5217, 5218, 5233, 5249
Ushiba, Tomohiko ... 238, 279, 363–365, 471, 510, 3167, 3317, 3331, 3925, 3926
USIE ... 1643, 1649
USIS ... 1612
U. S. S. *Missouri* ... 1906
U. S. S. *Panay* ... 618, 4876
Ussachevsky, Mrs. Betty ... 956, 2115–2118, 2147, 2150, 2248, 3640
Ussachevsky, Elizabeth ... 3965, 4990, 4991, 4995, 5061
Ussachevsky, Vladimir ... 3965
U. S. S. R. (*See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.)
U. S. S. R.-Netherlands Trade Treaty ... 5191
Ussuri River ... 2387
Utley, Freda ... 40, 306, 1228, 1230, 2702, 2928, 3042, 3077, 3094, 3095, 3108, 3144, 3587, 3610, 3668, 3669, 3705, 4060, 4124, 4504, 4516, 5185, 5295, 5308, 5310, 5368, 5382, 5383, 5618, 5619.
U. T. W. of A ... 296
Uveda, T ... 3867
Uyeda, Teijiro ... 5618, 5619, 5684, 5685
Uzbekistan ... 3463, 5077
Uzebeks ... 3907

V

Vail, Chester R ... 4984, 5002
Vakil, C. N ... 5323
Valencia (Spain) ... 5235
Valentine, A ... 5324
Valtin, Mr ... 4136, 5271
Van Asbeck, F ... 5334, 5618, 5619
van Beusekon, J ... 5512, 5513
Van Bloklan, F. Beelaerts ... 5514, 5515
Van Buren, Dolores ... 4990, 4995
Van Clief, Jeffry ... 2789
Van der Kolff, G. H ... 5562, 5563
Van Der Kroef, Justus M ... 5618, 5619
Van Der Valk, M. H ... 2890, 5618, 5619
Van Dijk, R ... 5532, 5533
Van Doren, Carl Clinton ... 5658
Van Eeghen, Geertrui M. (Gertrude) ... 5534, 5535, 5618, 5619, 5704
Van Gogh ... 2643
Van Helsdingen, W. H ... 5550, 5551
Van Kirk, Walter ... 2831, 4107, 5260
Van Kleeck, Mary ... 73, 582–685, 2318, 3126, 3128, 3466, 3568, 4091, 4145, 4260, 4611, 4808, 5182, 5347, 5618, 5619.
Van Le, Nguyen ... 5566, 5567
Van Lummell, Mr ... 5572, 5573
Van Mook, Hubertus Johannes ... 279, 578, 580, 1222, 3881, 5249, 5333, 5660, 5578, 5579
Van Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O ... 5584, 5585
Van Nostrand, P. E ... 5163, 5348
Van Patten, Louise Merrick ... 5618, 5619
Van Scheltema, Mrs. A ... 5198, 5200
Van Tassel, Alfred James ... 4660
Van Veen, Stuyvesant ... 2659, 4260
Van Waldheim, Harold ... 5620, 5621
Van Walree ... 3486
Van Zandt, J. Parker ... 996, 3965, 5702
Van Zandt, Mrs. J. Parker ... 5702
Vance, Ruppert B ... 2890
Vancouver, Canada ... 5368
Vancouver Daily Province ... 4893
Vandenberg ... 4713

Page
Vandenberg, Arthur H ---- 452, 463, 464, 597, 606. 611, 633, 706, 707, 1039, 1041, 1049, 1068, 1072, 1113–1118, 1120–1123, 1125, 1126, 1148, 1149, 1197, 1275, 1276, 3738–3740, 4540, 4541, 5350.
Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr ---- 1116, 1117. 1123, 1148
Vandenberg Diary ---- 1116, 1117, 1148, 1275, 1276
Vandenbosch, Amry ---- 475, 4835, 5618, 5619, 5684
Vanderbilt, Commodore ---- 494, 4127
Vangley, Anthony ---- 5618, 5619
Vansittart, Lord ---- 5375
Varga, Eugene S ---- 2723, 2728, 2729, 3235, 3313, 3314, 4488, 4504, 4516, 4517, 4561, 4567, 4580, 4588, 4589, 5200, 5262
Varley, Mr ---- 4661
Vasilevitch, Pavel. (*See* Ian Antonovich Berzin.)
Vassar College ---- 403, 2659, 4260, 5050, 5051
Vatmanov ---- 201, 202
Vaughan, Prof ---- 4556
Vaughan, David D ---- 4116
Vauxhall (England). (*See also* Ford Co., Alexandria, Egypt.) ---- 194
Veatch, Roy ---- 2630, 2890, 2831, 2886, 3794, 3882, 5045, 5046, 5199, 5202, 5260, 5261, 5644
V-E day ---- 5100
Veinberg ---- 4510, 4514
Veith, Ilza ---- 5618, 5619
Veith, Mrs. Ilza ---- 5702
Velde, Harold H ---- 4863, 5502
Velebit, General ---- 1055
Velleman, Ruth A ---- 4992, 4995
Venkatasubbiah, H ---- 5618, 5619
Ventaryman, A ---- 5618, 5619
Verbeeck, Jules ---- 2633
Verdoorn, J. A ---- 5618, 5619
Verlag, Agis ---- 50, 3170
Vernadsky ---- 177
Vernon, Robert, Jr ---- 4991, 4995
Versailles Conference ---- 2318, 3684, 5164
Versailles Treaty ---- 844, 5708
Vesper ---- 5193
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade ---- 2597, 2657, 3834
Veterans' Administration ---- 608
Veterans of Foreign Wars ---- 2556
Veth, K. L ---- 5702
Vichy, France ---- 596, 603
Vicinus, Henry F ---- 5295
Victor Gollanz, Ltd ---- 4859
Victoria College (Wellington, New Zealand) ---- 1216, 3472, 5009
Viet Minh ---- 4871, 5394, 5395
Viet-Nam (Republic) ---- 464, 1285, 1604, 1608, 3816, 3837, 4871, 5639, 5642
Vietnamese army ---- 4536
Vietnamese Forces ---- 2557
Viking Press ---- 1124
Village Citizens General Assembly (Chinese Communist Party) (Chart) ---- 2448
Village Committee for Armed Resistance Against Japan ---- 2334
Village Delegates' Assembly (Chinese Communist Party) ---- 2334, 2448
Village Government Committee (Chinese Communist Party) (Chart) ---- 2448
Villamor, Jesus A ---- 5620, 5621
Villareal, Mr ---- 5295
Villasenor, Maria E ---- 5202
Vilnis, Mr ---- 2665
Vinacke, Harold M ---- 474, 901, 1148, 1551, 1571, 1573, 1579, 1582, 1589, 1601, 1607. 1608, 1612, 1614, 1619, 1621, 1636, 1641, 1647–1649, 1660, 1661, 1675, 1676, 1681, 3965, 4835, 4861, 5231, 5620, 5621, 5684.
Vince, Jacob ---- 432, 857, 4973

Page
Vincent, John Carter 66, 67, 73, 113, 147, 161, 348, 452, 463–465, 478, 494, 618, 624–633, 679, 704, 705, 708, 711, 713, 715–718, 722–724, 726, 727, 730, 734–744, 750, 755, 788, 792, 831, 839, 858–860, 979–981, 983, 996, 1025, 1079–1081, 1085, 1092, 1107, 1305, 1329, 1331, 1332, 1342, 1344–1347, 1350, 1357, 1359, 1361, 1363–1367, 1369, 1370, 1372, 1373, 1375, 1376, 1380, 1382, 1388–1390, 1403–1405, 1410, 1423, 1425–1429, 1433, 1434, 1437, 1438, 1443–1454, 1456, 1458, 1463, 1464, 1467, 1468, 1470–1476, 1479–1482, 1488, 1499–1501, 1684–1995, 1997–2121, 2122–2180, 2182–2303, 2486–2490, 2622, 2809, 2810, 2854, 2912, 2945, 2957, 2978, 3000, 3003, 3004, 3032, 3048, 3068, 3077, 3086, 3089, 3092, 3108, 3280, 3281, 3311, 3371, 3377, 3383–3386, 3397–3400, 3520, 3568, 3640, 3641, 3650–3652, 3655–3662, 3667, 3738, 3740, 3796, 3799, 3939, 3983, 3986, 4001, 4004–4007, 4279, 4280, 4291, 4293, 4313, 4314, 4324–4326, 4339, 4340, 4343, 4421, 4422, 4423, 4540–4550, 4877, 4941, 5214, 5278, 5334, 5350, 5480, 5684, 5685, 5702, 5703.
Vinegar Joe. (*See* Gen. Joseph Stilwell.)
Viner, Jacob 445, 2831, 4834, 4977, 5260, 5488, 5489
Vinogradoff, Eugene 3484, 4824
Vinson 3640
Vinter. (*See* Ian Antonovich Berzin.)
Virata, Leonides S 5620, 5621
Virgin Islands Civil Government 5288
Virginia Beach Conference (1939). (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Virginia Beach Conference.)
Virginia Co 4699
Virginia Quarterly Review 265, 266, 3333, 4592, 5204, 5377
Virginia University 1167
Vishinsky, Andre 1663, 2895, 4486
Visman, Frans H 2124, 5322, 5620, 5621, 5684
Vixman, Mrs. A. H 4116
Vize, V 5620, 5621
V-J day 2502, 3814, 4935, 5392, 5406, 5429, 5430
Vladimar, Dimitry 4660
Vladivostok 3484, 3702, 4037, 4442, 4556, 4589
Vladivostok University 2700, 2701
Vlassov, General 4486, 4487, 4488, 4581, 4582, 5501
Vlekke, Bernard H. M 5283, 5620, 5621
Vlieland, C. A 5620, 5621
Vluz 5112
Vogel, Werner 5620, 5621
Voi 3313
Voice of America 183, 221, 756, 765, 766, 770, 771, 1064, 1133, 1644, 3968, 3997, 4349–4351.
Voice of China 1735, 1972–1978, 4037
Voice of Labor 2665
Voice of Moscow (radio) 4485
Voitinski, Mr. Grigorii N 187–189, 191, 239, 2590, 2699, 2700–2703, 2706, 2713, 2715, 2728, 2729, 2730, 3135–3140, 3147, 3149, 3152, 3171–3174, 3232, 3234, 3235, 3241, 3313–3319, 3333, 3439, 3441, 3482, 3484, 3934, 4352, 4477, 4489, 4492–4494, 4499, 4501, 4508, 4560, 4561, 4567, 4570, 4574, 4575, 4588, 4589, 4860, 4880, 4881, 5009, 5056, 5057, 5125, 5127, 5128, 5132, 5133, 5150, 5133, 5159, 5160, 5175, 5192, 5199, 5200, 5209, 5262, 5266, 5269, 5359.
Voks (*see also* Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) 2705, 2706, 2708, 2710, 3242, 3452, 5083, 5121, 5127
Volkszeitung 2665
Von Beckwrath 5205
von Boetticher, F 5691
Von Briessen, Mr 4439
Von Kirkson 503
Von Faulkenhausen, General 2343, 5469

Page
von Freyberg-Eisenberg, Contre-Admiral Baron 5691
Von Haast, H. F 5620, 5621
Von Hapsburg, Otto 5271
Von Koerber, Lenka 3167, 4351
Von Plettenberg, Count 4233
Von Ribbentrop, Joachim 2673, 2674, 3223–3225
Von Reichenau, Ernst 4433, 4434
Von Reichenau, Walter 4433
Von Seckt, General 2225, 4061
Von Trott, Adam ..... 73, 238, 3917, 4077, 4083, 4084, 4933, 5195, 5196, 5198–5200, 5201, 5204, 5208, 5226.
Von Valree, Mr 4569
Voorhis, Jerry 433, 858, 3794, 4833, 4974
Voprosy Economiki (Communist publication) 1067
Vostokryba (Eastern Fisheries Trust) 4508
Vorys, Representative 3407
Voukelitch, Branko de 372, 373
Voxs 3484, 3487
Vreeland, Mr. Harold H., III 327, 3962, 4463, 4464
Vyshinsky, Mr 5397, 5484

W

Wa, Bok-san 2471
WAC. (*See* U. S. Women's Army Corps.)
Wada, S 342
Wadham, Mr 177, 5685
Wadleigh, Julian 1757, 2486, 2831, 5199, 5247, 5261
Wadsworth, Elliot 4955, 4956, 5702
Wadsworth, James W 5052, 5053
Wafdists 876, 877
Wagenknecht, Alfred 3337
Wagner, Joyce 4991, 4995
Wagner, Martin 946
Wagner-Murray-Dingell social-security bill 608
Wagner, Senator Robert F 1104, 5468
Wah Chang Trading Co. (New York City) 1216
Wahl, David 4393, 4394
Wahs (Naval Treaty) 578
Waibel, Dr. Leo 327, 3962
Wait, Richard 4692
Wakatsuki, Baron Reijiro 729, 4267
Wake Island Conference 5486
Wakefield, Harold 4823, 5620, 5621, 5658
Wakeman, Frederic 5655
Wakukawa, Seiyer 5620, 5621
Walcutt, Roscoe R 5674
Wald, Lillian D 296
Waldheim, Van 5704
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel (Annual Foreign Trade Convention) 1092, 1167, 2256
Wales, Nym. (*See* Mrs. Edgar Snow.)
Walker, Elnora 4989, 4990, 4995
Walker, E. Roland 3167, 5620, 5621
Walker, Frank 1101
Walker, Miss 4093, 4931, 5166
Walker, Richard L 1240, 4014–4016, 4018, 5683, 5686
Walker, Sydnor 5026, 5084, 5171
Wall Street Journal 2982
Wallace, Benjamin B 3965, 5702
Wallace, DeWitt 5079, 5080
Wallace, Henry A. (Vice President) 327, 329, 331, 334, 432, 444, 550, 552, 553, 625, 626, 627, 679, 693, 694, 780, 825, 838, 839, 857, 950–953, 959, 1023–1025, 1030, 1081, 1084, 1085, 1087, 1093, 1095, 1096–1106, 1108, 1110, 1177, 1296–1405, 1408–1413, 1417–1419, 1423, 1425–1430, 1433, 1438, 1439, 1443–1452, 1454–1462, 1467, 1471, 1472, 1475, 1476, 1478, 1480–1483,

Page
Wallace, Henry A. (Vice President)—Continued
1485, 1487, 1488, 1524, 1738, 1741, 1743, 1792, 1794, 1795, 1804–1826, 1828, 1831, 1837, 1907, 1916, 1917, 1942, 1966, 1993, 1994, 2029–2048, 2051, 2052, 2055–2058, 2060, 2064, 2065, 2067, 2068, 2071, 2072, 2074–2078, 2080, 2081, 2083–2088, 2146, 2248, 2269, 2270, 2280, 2286–2290, 2292, 2295, 2392, 2775, 2809, 2831, 2836, 2957, 2961, 3024, 3053, 3055, 3058, 3112, 3460–3462, 3567, 3575, 3576, 3625, 3632, 3646, 3647, 3649, 3650, 3652–3657, 3659, 3660, 3709, 3832, 3837, 3946, 3947, 4005, 4007, 4252, 4544, 4472, 4807, 4853, 4861, 4897, 4898, 4941, 4973, 5003, 5018, 5261, 5266, 5276, 5307, 5312, 5364, 5651, 5695.
Wallace Mission ..... 1085, 1106–1109, 1314, 1321, 1323, 1326, 1404, 1405, 1409, 1426, 1427, 1433, 1444, 1457–1459, 1471, 1476, 1478, 1480, 1488, 1738, 1794, 1804–1806, 1810, 1813, 1814, 1819, 1821–1828, 1907, 1719–1942, 1966, 1994, 2029–2043, 2045–2058, 2075, 2080–2087, 2269, 2270, 2286, 2295, 3652, 3658, 3660.
Wallace, Henry A. (Truman letter) 2038
Wallace, Henry A. (Summary Report of China Mission) 1819, 1823, 2037, 2038, 2080, 2081
Wallace Mission (Goglidze Toast) 1824, 1825, 2083, 2084
Wallace (Seattle Speech) 2084, 2085
Wallace, Mrs. Henry A 2289
Wallace, Malcolm 5321
Wallace M. Alexander & Bruno Lasker, Inc 5182
Wallace, R. C 5620, 5621, 5705
Wallace, Schulyer 4911, 4984, 5003, 5014, 5015, 5016
Wallart, Erika Glaser 231
Waller, Ella S 4990, 4995
Waller, Tom 4823, 4831
Walree, Van 5191
Walsh (*see also* Kelly & Walsh) 5031
Walsh, Edmund A 4834
Walsh, J. Raymond 4260
Walsh, Paul (*see also* Eugene Dennis) 1758
Walsh, Ray 2624, 2625, 2809
Walsh, Richard J 3580, 4245, 4852, 5032, 5047, 5123, 5177, 5255, 5620, 5621
Walsh, Robert M 5620, 5621
Walsh, Dr William Henry 4260
Walter. (*See* Valentine Markin.)
Walter, Francis E 5502
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations ..... 325, 326, 335, 483, 561, 900, 928, 996, 1136, 1219, 2900, 3141, 3460, 3462, 3585, 3621, 3636, 3666, 3957, 3961, 4358, 4418, 4419, 4420, 4421, 4424, 4426, 4459, 4463, 4833, 4835, 4836, 4871, 5080, 5301, 5312, 5313, 5323, 5586, 5587, 5662.
Walton, Miss Eda Lou 4275
Walton, Lieutenant 4417, 4419
Walworth (of Houghton-Mifflin) 4107
Walworth, Arthur C 5651
Wan, Fulin 2337, 2338, 2347, 2466
Wan, Lin Yu 5620, 5621
Wanamakers' 4275
Wanderman, Francis Dick 4991, 4995
Wang, Mr 651, 5332
Wang, C. C 3594
Wang, Dr. C. H 4150, 4151
Wang, Cheng 2186
Wang, Chi-Chen 5620, 5621, 5655
Wang, Chia-hsiang 2317, 2404, 2448, 2471
Wang, Chia-ze 2403, 2404, 2471
Wang, Chien-an 2472
Wang, Ching-wei ..... 476, 2316, 2320, 2339, 2340, 2342, 2354, 2360, 2469, 2516, 2787, 3595, 3596, 3684, 4708, 4881, 5391, 5403, 5667.
Wang, Chiu-An 5620, 5621
Wang, Chu 2472

Page
Wang, Chu-ching (Wang Tso-yao) 2471, 2472
Wang, Chung-hui 2376
Wang, Gung-hsing 5652
Wang, H. C 5622, 5623
Wang, K'e-min 5391
Wang, Kung-Ping 5622, 5623
Wang, Li-hsi 4879
Wang, Ming (Chen, Shao-yu) 2322, 2329, 2403, 2404, 2453, 2454, 2459, 2470, 2472, 4884–4886
Wang, Po 2472
Wang, Samuel Hsuan 5622, 5623
Wang, Shan 2472
Wang, Shih-chieh 2393, 5062
Wang, Shi-hsueh 1856, 1857, 4545
Wang, Shih-ying 2404, 2472
Wang, Tieh-Yai 5622, 5623
Wang, Tso-yao (Wang Chu-ching) 2471, 2472
Wang, Tsung-yen 143
Wang, Mrs. William C 5344, 5361
Wang, Yu-chuan 1982, 3133, 3167, 3168, 4879, 5622, 5623
Wang, Yun-Sheng 5622, 5623
Wanger, Ruth 2585
War Areas (Kuomintang) Affairs Board 2349, 2456
War Department. (*See* United States Department of War.)
War Labor Board 571
War Manpower Commission 2651
War Production Board (WPB) 432, 441, 444, 603, 640, 857, 1221, 1393, 2831, 2836, 4640, 4665, 4674, 4691, 4734, 4745, 4755
War Shipping Administration 4869
War and the Working Class (periodical) 529–531, 539, 2383, 2386, 2387, 3309, 3310, 4284
Warburg, Eddie 5116
Warburg, Ingrid 5198, 5202–5204
Warburg, James Paul 5622, 5623
Warburg, Mrs. James 5196
Ward, Angus 1133, 1529, 3616, 3814, 4527, 5161
Ward, Barbara 5334
Ward, E. E 5622, 5623
Ward, Francis Xavier 1798
Ward, Dr. Harry F 411, 1078, 2160, 3169, 3979, 4116, 4118, 4142, 4143, 4170, 4171, 4178, 4260
Ward, Mrs. Harry F 4127
Ward, Isabel 2521, 2776, 4987, 4988, 5294, 5295, 5622, 5623, 5702
Ward, John M 5622, 5623
Ward, Lester F 548
Ward, Lynd 4260
Ward, Mrs 3592, 3921
Ward, Robert Spencer 5650
Wardell. (*See* Davis, Polk, Wardell, Sunderl & Kiendl.)
Wardwell, Allen 149, 4091, 4145, 4956, 5252, 5285
Ware-Abt-Witt group (*see also* Harold Ware) 2874, 4722, 4737
Ware, Harold 2798–2802, 2808, 2874, 4720, 4737, 4754
Ware, James R 3611
Warnecke, G. W 5622, 5623
Warner, F. W 5622, 5623
Warner, Kenneth 5622, 5623
Warner, L 5622, 5623
Warren, George L 5002, 5260
Warnshuis, Mr 3486
Warson, Ann 4988
Warren, Franklin E. N 358
Warren, George 2831
Warren, Gov. Earl 3046
Warren, Lindsay C 4811, 4812, 4813, 4814
Warren, Susan 1338, 2789
Wartime China (by Maxwell Stewart) 1977, 2022, 2692, 3944–3946

Page
Wartime Information Board (Canada) 999, 1000
Wartime Politics in China (Book) 1797, 1799–1801, 2005, 4279
Washburn, John N 1222, 4888, 5622, 5623
Washington Arms Conference of 1921 3702
Washington Bookshop Association of Washington 3833, 4395, 4396
Washington Commonwealth Federation 2160, 2161, 4115
Washington Daily News 1188
Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R 630, 631
Washington League of Women Shoppers 4757
Washington Naval Treaty 190
Washington Pipeline (from Far East Spotlight) 2789
Washington Post 1141, 1142, 1172, 2658, 3040, 3609, 3610, 4514, 4833, 4935, 5023, 5112, 5323
Washington Star 2273, 4902
Washington Square School 4638
Washington State Federation of Teachers 2160
Washington State Un-American Activities Committee (Second Report of 1948) 2160–2162, 2183
Washington State University 575
Washington Times-Herald 1481, 4544
Washington Treaty 576–579, 3194
Washington University 901, 1219, 1551, 2580, 2691, 2726, 3168, 3235
Washington University (Un-American activities of certain professors) 2160–2162, 2183, 2658
Wasserman, Ursula 4723
Watanists 878
Watchdog committee (Committee on Appropriations) 485
Watertown Times (New York) 3035
Watkins, Mr 5254
Watkins, James T., IV 5702
Watson, Clifford 3965
Watson, Dr. Goodwin 2665, 2809, 4116, 4243, 4244
Watson, J. H 5622, 5623
Watson, Morris 4260
Watson-Schuman-Dodd Case 4244
Watt, Mr. Alan S 440, 2124, 5049, 5052, 5053
Watt, Robert 4834
Watt, Robert J 494, 858, 859, 2809, 2810, 2834
Watts, Richard 622, 668, 1338, 3793, 4091, 4145, 4605, 4611, 4824, 4832, 5647–5660
Watts, Richard, Jr 5622, 5623
Waugh, Coulton 5656
Waugh, Evelyn 5655
Wavell 5060
Way, Madame Dow Ming 3737
Way of A Fighter (by Chennault) 3029, 3411, 3622–3624, 3626, 3706
Waymack, W. W 264, 444, 495, 568, 859, 996, 1221, 5026, 5326, 5703
Wayne County (Detroit) Political Action Committee 1104
Weatherwax, Clara 4260
Weaver, Capt 4823, 4824, 4829, 4832
Weaver, G. R 5622, 5623
Weaver, James T 5702
Weaver, Leon H 5622, 5623
Webb, Beatrice 645, 649, 3167, 3444, 4351, 4509, 5622, 5623
Webb, Guy P 3965, 5702
Webb, James E 1122, 1123, 1126, 1553–1557, 2278, 2279, 2477, 2533, 2534, 2536, 2537,
Webb, Richard E 5622, 5623
Webb, Sidney 645, 649, 905, 3140, 3167, 3173, 3444, 4351, 4509
Webber, Charles C 4142
Weber, Max 4260
Webster, Charles 5334, 5624, 5625
Webster, David L 4904, 5040
Webster, Professor 2709, 4037

Page
Webster Publishing Co 565, 566, 864, 866, 888, 957–959, 962, 969, 2651, 2692, 3942, 3843, 4898
Webster Series 2579, 2581, 2651, 2692
Wechsberg, Joseph 5652
Wechsler, James 2659, 2684
Wedekind, Mr 4439
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C 604, 612, 613, 614, 617, 620, 622–624, 636, 775–841, 933, 1022–1025, 1031, 1071, 1086, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1095, 1214, 1338, 1365, 1368, 1373, 1374, 1376, 1404, 1405, 1414, 1416, 1419, 1434, 1438, 1440, 1442–1444, 1447, 1448, 1450, 1452, 1453, 1456, 1472, 1476, 1477, 1492, 1495–1497, 1503, 1512, 1515, 1516, 1526, 1579, 1671, 1721, 1793, 1794, 1809, 1813–1815, 1853, 1892, 1913, 1916, 1717, 2031, 2068, 2072, 2143, 2144, 2199, 2202–2204, 2206, 2207, 2216, 2217, 2266, 2288, 2293, 2392, 2488, 2534, 2536–2538, 2552, 3004, 3005, 3012, 3014, 3356, 3625, 3627, 3669, 3670, 3708–3710, 3712, 3994, 4419, 4430, 4431, 4534, 4547, 4548, 4687, 4702, 4771, 4772, 4773, 4774, 4825, 4838, 4839, 4878, 5376, 5377, 5393, 5394, 5407.
Wedemeyer, Mrs. Albert C 2537, 2538
Wedgwood, Camilla 5624, 5625
Wee, David 3337
Weekly Book Review 5649–5652
Weems, Benjamin 5299, 5626, 5627
Wei, Francis Cho-Min 5624, 5625
Wei, Li-huang 2332, 2346
Wei, Mme. Tao-ming 409
Weichew Agricultural School 2473
Weidon, Albert A 4992, 4996
Weigle, Richard D 3992
Weinberg, Albert K 5624, 5625
Weinberg, Joseph W 4901–4905, 5040
Weiner, Robert William 528, 540, 541, 3282
Weiner, Tom 3637
Wehrmacht 4487
Weintraub, David 441, 4627, 4737, 4739, 4742
Weintraub, Sylvia 4674, 4727
Weisberg, Isador 3336
Weisner, Louis 4089
Weiss, Leonard 5624, 5625
Weiss, Louis 5299
Weitzel, Frank H 4813
Weizmann Institute (Palestine) 3558
Welch, Clifford 4117
Welch, Richard J 2835
Welles, Benjamin 455, 456, 1198, 3742, 5276, 5287
Welles, Sumner 428, 444, 455, 494, 568, 595, 598, 600–603, 690–698, 826, 858, 859, 902, 1221, 1294, 1295, 1313, 1978, 2522, 2652, 2682, 2811, 2829, 2835, 2839, 2921, 3327, 3956, 3966, 4924–4928, 4944, 4976, 5045, 5047, 5088, 5172, 5195, 5199, 5224, 5251, 5252, 5273, 5274, 5276, 5277, 5286, 5288, 5293, 5300, 5658, 5693, 5702.
Wellesley College 1686, 4260
Welling, Mrs. John Paul 1220, 3794
Wellington 661
Wellon, Alfred E 5702
Wells, Henry 4019, 4021, 4031, 4445, 4446, 4447, 4449, 4451, 4454
Wells, Katherine A 5624, 5625
Welsh, Gertrude 3335
Weltfish, Gene 4611, 5624, 5625
Wen-chia-keu Arsenal 2429
Wen, Chih-kung 4880
Wen, I-to 5408
Wendt, Dr. Gerald 4261
Weng, W. W 4504
Wenthelt, Henrietta 4990, 4995
Wentworth, Edna C 5624, 5625

Page
Werner, Ludlow 1105
Werner, Max 4969, 4970
Werth, Alexander 5656
Wertham, Barbara 5083, 5123, 5624, 5625
Wertheim, Maurice 4091, 4145, 5123
Wertheim, W. F 5624, 5625
Wesley, Charles H 2659
West Point Military Academy 432, 444, 857, 3701, 3704, 4973, 5255
West, Rebecca 5656
West Seattle High School 2161
West Suiyuan Province 2451
Western Big Three 2183, 2184
Western German Government 2183
Western Powers 1613, 2503, 2526, 2529, 2530, 3029, 3867
Westinghouse Manufacturing Co 2634
Westphal, Albert C. F 5624, 5625
Weston, Lora S 5624, 5625
Westra, H 5624, 5625
Weygand, General 5075
Weyl, Nathaniel 2795–2823, 2871–2876, 3347, 3543, 3776, 3953
Whampoa Military Academy 2319, 2451, 2452, 2455, 2458, 2460, 2463, 2470, 2473
Wheare, K. C 5624, 5625
Wheatley, Dr. George M 410, 1513
Wheeler, Anne 5112
Wheeler, Donald Niven 4679, 4737
Wheeler, L. Richmond 5624, 5625
Wheeler, Leslie 432, 857, 4973, 5261
Wheeler, Oliver P 5040
Wheeler, Mrs. S. M 3965
Wheeler, Mrs. Stafford M 5102
Wheeler, William A 4903
Wheeler, W. E 2891, 5624, 5625
Wheeler, W. M 597
Whitaker, Arthur Preston 5658
Whitaker, Rev. Robert 4261
Whitaker, Urban G 5624, 5625
White, Dr 4918, 4919, 5198, 5245
White, Frederick 5624, 5625
White, Gerald, T 5624, 5625
White, Harry Dexter ..... 73, 153, 155, 157–159, 382, 419–424, 428, 431, 434, 443, 444, 445, 446, 491, 492, 494, 857–860, 979–981, 984, 985, 1002, 1017, 1195, 1196, 1206, 1207, 1218, 1758, 2508–2510, 2815, 2831, 2832, 2837, 2868, 2869, 3568, 3569, 3669, 4575, 4625, 4667, 4676, 4677, 4679, 4745, 4754, 4973, 4975, 5051, 5294, 5347, 5487, 5499, 5684.
White, Harry Victor 4756
White House ..... 22, 24, 25, 31, 33, 67, 68, 116, 133, 348, 382, 413, 414, 424–434, 443, 444, 479, 480, 528, 717, 730, 733, 736, 745, 752, 826, 857, 860, 863, 894, 901, 981, 983–985, 1068, 1069, 1112, 1113, 1116, 1118, 1121, 1122, 1125, 1126, 1149, 1150, 1295, 1349, 1357, 1371, 1387, 1388, 1393, 1404, 1414, 1438, 1442, 1450, 1453, 1456, 1473, 1481, 1685, 1712, 1717, 1727, 1734, 1826, 1831, 1862, 1889, 1890, 1916, 1917, 1936, 2028, 2029, 2038, 2072, 2082, 2086, 2087, 2163, 2193, 2287, 2289, 2293, 2296, 2310, 2506, 2833, 2836, 2839, 2840, 2859, 2920, 3052, 3053, 3199–3202, 3208, 3211, 3212, 3367–3370, 3377, 3385, 3387, 3401, 3409, 3412, 3480, 3493, 3494, 3495, 3573, 3625, 3649, 3650, 3678, 3702, 3805, 3806, 4073, 4074, 4098, 4531, 4542, 4550, 4930, 4932, 4939, 4973, 5013, 5047, 5051, 5052, 5055, 5057, 5058, 5258, 5259, 5261, 5262, 5272.
White, J. Patrick 5624 5625
White, Lynn, Jr 712, 1220, 1313, 2817, 4944, 5040
White, President 2819
White Paper on China (*see also* American White Paper and State Department) 1807, 2673, 2674, 3011, 3813, 5371

Page
White Russian Armies ... 2699, 3235
White Russian Government ... 5075, 5109, 5145, 5185
White Russian Republics ... 2722, 2850, 2851, 2860, 2861, 2863
White Russians ... 172, 304, 441, 872, 873, 2385, 2451
White Russians (Crimea) ... 2451
White, Theodore H ... 458, 460, 465, 466, 1393, 1406, 1855, 1856, 2151, 2544, 4545, 5176, 5177, 5261, 5269, 5278, 5624, 5625, 5652, 5655, 5695, 5697
White, Tommy ... 5112
White, Vaughan ... 5652
White, Wallace H ... 2835, 3070
White, William Lindsay ... 3669, 5656, 5660
White, William S ... 788, 1142, 5337, 5357
Whitney, A. F ... 4116
Whitney, Gen. Courtney ... 3895, 4185, 5415
Whitney, John Hay ... 5299
Whitson, Roswell Hartsen ... 1768
Whittlesay (Princeton) ... 3883
Who wanted to recognize Red China? (Lattimore) ... 3478, 3611, 3703
Who said the Chinese Communists were not real Communists? (Lattimore) ... 3705
Wholesale Book Corp ... 3060
Who's Who in Communist China ... 2451
Whyte Article ... 3137, 3139, 3172, 5150
Whyte, Sir Frederick ... 1216, 1222, 2582, 2891, 5319, 5334, 5624, 5625
Wickard, Claude R ... 2837
Wickersham, Brig. Gen. C. W ... 5049
Wickes, George A ... 5626, 5627
Wickett, F. A ... 712, 713, 5040
Wickett, Walton A ... 4904, 5040
Widener, Mrs. William Harry (Alice) ... 755–773, 2539, 4299, 4308, 4309, 4310, 4328, 4341, 4344, 4349, 4350, 4351
Wiener, Mr. Thomas G ... 327, 3962
Wiens, Herold J ... 5626, 5627
Wigmore on Evidence ... 519
Wilbur ... 2653, 3264, 5151, 5152, 5242, 5243
Wilbur, Brayton ... 425, 426, 494, 568, 712, 713, 858, 859, 1221, 1313, 2622, 2809–2811, 4944, 4977
Wilbur, C. Martin (Marty) ... 341, 3793, 4823, 4824, 4828, 4830, 4832, 5336, 5626, 5627, 5702
Wilbur, Ellis Co. (San Francisco) ... 1217, 1221
Wilbur, Ray Lyman ... 73, 122–124, 263, 264, 292, 444, 447, 713, 975, 1216, 1220, 1227, 2511, 2622, 2651, 2653, 2985, 3612, 3851, 3857–3859, 3868, 3881, 4044, 4092, 4093, 4105, 4106, 4109, 4134, 4140, 4143, 4944, 4954, 5013, 5182, 5186, 5282, 5283, 5318, 5319, 5324, 5325, 5333, 5335.
Wilbur, Brig. Gen. Wm. H ... 4904, 5040
Wileox, Francis ... 5643
Wild, Payson ... 713, 2622
Wilder, Nancy ... 2523, 4988, 4990, 4995, 5626, 5627
Wilder, Thorton Niven ... 5658
Wiley, Robert L., Jr ... 3812
Wilgus, A. Curtis ... 5626, 5627
Wilhelm, Hellmut ... 5626, 5627
Willard, Mrs. Daniel, Jr ... 5702
Willard, Howard W ... 2659, 2789
Willauer, Whiting ... 1448, 1450, 2810
Willett, Mary Jane ... 3794
William Sloane Associates ... 1406
Williams, Albert Rhys ... 645, 648, 649, 1108, 1314, 2124, 4261, 5112
Williams College ... 3945, 4259, 4260, 4977
Williams, E. K ... 5626, 5627
Williams, Emilio ... 5626, 5627
Williams, J. W ... 5626, 5627
Williams, L. F. Rushbrook ... 5626, 5627
Williams, Maurice ... 4110, 4111, 4271
Williams, Dr. William Carlos ... 4261

Page
Williams, W. Wynne 3133, 3167, 3168, 5626, 5627
Williamson County Miner (publication) 2665
Williamson, John 605, 3335
Williamson, Pauline B 1513
Willingdon, Lord 5349
Willis, Z. F 179
Willits, Joseph H 433, 858, 2523, 4974, 5081, 5300
Willkie Award 3767
Willkie, Wendell L 278, 433, 827, 858, 1098, 1322, 1326, 1694, 4974, 5047, 5249, 5349, 5656, 5627.
Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A 353–401, 840, 845, 901, 2770, 2771, 3566, 3807, 3808, 4184, 4374, 4999, 5414, 5415.
Wilson 4985
Wilson, Admiral 1022
Wilson, C. E 433, 445, 858, 859, 4974
Wilson, Edwin B 2124, 4119
Wilson, Francis 5626, 5627
Wilson, General 1032
Wilson, Geoffrey 687, 2518, 2537, 3931
Wilson, Howard 445, 494
Wilson Teachers College 2521, 2776, 5295, 5697
Wilson, Thomas George 5652
Wilson, Walter 2890
Wilson, Woodrow 299, 603, 1906, 2294, 3701, 3850
Wilson's 14 Points 5664, 5673
Windett, Mr 4587
Wineberg 3484
Winfield, Gerald Freeman 1221, 1222, 2582, 5382, 5658
Wingfield-Digby, Simon 5129
Winnick, B 3337
Winnipeg Free Press 1216, 5271, 5320
Winslow, C. E. A 5626, 5627
Winslow, R 4987, 5254
Winstedt, R. O 5626, 5627
Winston, Sadie 4991, 4995
Wint, Guy 5626, 5627
Winter, Carl 3336
Winter, Ella 73, 688–690 2895 2896, 3127, 3128, 3569, 3903, 4261, 4808, 5347, 5626 5627, 5650.
Winter Palace (Russia) 566
Winterbottom, F. S 5626, 5627
Winterfield, Mr 4440
Winterton, Paul 5285
Wise, James Waterman 296, 1514, 4119
Wise, Masha Switzer 4990, 4995
Wise, Rabbi Stephen S 411, 1514
Wiss, Helen 8, 945, 3580, 4108, 4988, 5179
Wissler, Clark 4119, 5626, 5627
Witt, Nathan 2799, 4722, 4737
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl August 269, 273–342, 345, 352, 373–376, 386, 449, 450, 475, 476, 483, 1154, 1170, 1982, 2475, 2581, 2717, 2890, 2928, 3097, 3103, 3106, 3132–3134, 3141, 3165, 3166, 3194, 3545, 3611–3614, 3679, 3875, 3917, 3918, 3962, 3993, 4096, 4097, 4106, 4107, 4147, 4153, 4155, 4278, 4835, 4860, 4879, 4999, 5083, 5305, 5306, 5309, 5310, 5311, 5312, 5313, 5626, 5627.
Wittfogel, Mrs. Karl August (*see also* Esther S. Goldfrank) 5306, 5310, 5313
Wittke, Carl 5626, 5627
Wixon, I. F 5084, 5171
Wold, Emma 5628, 5629
Wolf, Benedict 4356
Wolf, Charles 5658
Wolf, Charles, Jr 5628, 5629, 5684

Page
Wolfe, Thelma ... 4824, 4832
Wolfe, Mr ... 3539
Wolfers, Arnold ... 5628, 5629
Wolfert, Ira ... 5650
Woll, Matthew ... 2664, 2665, 2668
Wolman, Leo ... 4638, 4639
Woltman, Frederick ... 764, 765, 2242, 4299, 4300
Wolverton, Charles A ... 2835
Women of the World (radio show) ... 762
Women's Action Committee ... 5040
Women's Advertising Guild ... 4275
Women's Congress. (*See* Fourth Annual Women's Congress.)
Women's Detachments, Eighteenth Group Army (Chart) ... 2448
Women's National Salvation Association ... 2335
Women's Peace Union ... 4275
Women's Press, The ... 4116
Women's University Club in New York ... 3920
Wood (*see* Delafield and Wood) ... 5685
Wood, Bryce ... 5628, 5629
Wood, F. L. W ... 5009, 5628, 5629
Wood, G. L ... 5628, 5629, 5684
Wood, Galahad ... 143
Wood, Herbert J ... 568, 1313
Wood, John S ... 4903, 5502, 5503, 5504
Wood-Forbes Philippines Mission ... 996
Woodhead, H. G ... 5628, 5629
Woodman, Dorothy ... 5412, 5628, 5629
Woodrow Wilson School (Princeton University) ... 1219
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ... 3903, 4872
Woodruff, Susan H ... 2659
Woods, Caroline ... 4990, 4995
Woods, Hubbard ... 5165
Woodworth, Charles J ... 5628, 5629
Woolworth ... 4275
Woosung, China ... 4690
Wooton, Barbara ... 40, 5175, 5359, 5628, 5629
Worchester House ... 680, 681
Work Projects Administration ... 4623, 4640, 4741, 4742, 5710
Work Projects Administration, National Research Project ... 4645–4648, 4665, 4675, 4677, 4678, 4756
Work Together ... 3793
Worker, The ... 639, 690, 1103, 1392, 1440, 4876, 4925–4928
Worker's Alliance of America ... 4116, 4275
Workers of All Countries, Unite (Communist International) ... 2066
Worker's Bookshop ... 2243, 3058, 3060, 3061, 3825, 4179, 4181, 4182, 4238, 4615
Workers Communist Party of America ... 286
Workers Ex-Servicemen's League ... 336, 337
Workers and Farmers Anti-Japanese Army (Kung-Nung Kang-jih Chun) ... 2462
Workers International Relief ... 3337
Workers Library ... 2887
Workers Library Publishers ... 2999, 4541
Worker's Mass Organization (Chinese Communist Party) ... 2427
Workers Monthly ... 47, 161, 162, 285, 286, 3529
Workers' Party ... 2667
Workers and Peasants Army (Hupeh) ... 2460
Workers and Peasants Government (China) ... 2329
Workers and Peasants Party (Japan) ... 667
Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Committee ... 2467
Works Progress Administration (WPA) ... 2161, 4259
Workers-Students Hunanese Delegation to France ... 2460
World Affairs, Council of ... 2471, 5277, 5278
World Affairs Council (Cleveland) ... 5067, 5068, 5300, 5344
World Affairs Council of Northern California ... 901, 1148, 1512, 1551, 1666, 4207, 4835, 5313
World Assembly at San Francisco ... 2887
World Atlas (Russian) ... 4567, 4568, 4570

Page
World Bank 861, 5701
World Cooperation and Post-War Prosperity 2888
World Court 995
World Education Conference 4126
World Fair 271
World Federation of Trade Unions 607, 5641
World Institute of Current Affairs 17, 1617, 1618
World Labor Conference 606, 607
World Monopoly and Peace 2887
World Peace Foundation 937, 1219, 2548, 2585, 2587, 2814, 2817, 2819
World Policies and World Economics (publication) 2699, 3235
World Production and Consumption of Sugar 3168
World Reports, Inc 101, 4834
World Student Christian Federation 5280
World-Telegram (New York) 441, 764, 2240, 2242, 2967
World Theater. (*See* Die Weltbuhne.)
World Tomorrow (publication) 2665, 2670
World Tourist Agency 678
World Trade Association (San Francisco) 1666
World Trade Union Conference (London) 2386
World Trade Union Council 4829
World War I ..... 578, 637, 1136, 1516, 1523, 1613, 2318, 2451, 2460, 2629, 2658, 2666, 2682, 2834, 3421, 3479, 3635, 3691, 3701, 4528, 4637, 5066, 5067, 5074, 5298, 5317, 5319, 5636, 5640, 5664, 5679.
World War II ..... 784, 1136, 1227, 1248, 1287, 1302, 1325, 1523, 1533, 1564, 1605, 1613, 1618, 1667, 2307, 2661, 2723, 2990, 2999, 3007, 3060, 3537, 3538, 3635, 3706, 3823, 4518, 4528, 4531, 4538, 4889, 4970, 5066, 5067, 5222, 5255, 5256, 5281, 5318, 5330, 5678.
World War III 1532, 3073, 3623, 3706, 5068, 5281
Worldwide Campaign for Thaelmann, the 4234
World Youth Congress 4138, 4277
World Youth Festival (Budapest) 3057, 4866, 4868
World Youth Festival (Prague) 3601, 3636
Worster, James F 5674–5680
Worth, Alexander 5284
Worvill 4395
WPA. (*See* Works Projects Administration.)
W. P. A. Teachers Local 4275
WPB. (*See* War Production Board.)
Wrad, Mrs 321
Wrenn, Heaton L 565, 1220, 4125, 4126, 4944, 5207
Wright 579, 5685
Wright. (*See* Sherman, Sterling & Wright.)
Wright, Arthur F 4420–4423, 4426, 5628, 5629
Wright, Chester M 2664, 2665, 2668
Wright, Curtis 5193
Wright, George 5628, 5629
Wright, Sir Hazeburg 5137
Wright, Louise L 568, 713, 1313, 2622, 2819, 4944
Wright, Mary Clabaugh 2748, 4420, 4422, 4426, 4835, 5628, 5629
Wright, Nellie 4991, 4995
Wright, Philip G 1221, 3167, 5684
Wright, Quincy ..... 1221, 1227, 2831, 3323, 3685, 4959, 4999, 5199, 5253, 5260, 5628, 5629, 5687, 5706.
Wright, Mrs. Quincy 264, 712, 3794
Wright, Richard 2659, 4261
Wright, Ruth C 5628, 5629
Wright, Thomas 3793
Wriston, Henry M 5303
Wu, Mr. (Chinese Nationalist Minister to Switzerland, 1950) 1772, 4569
Wu, Chan 93, 104
Wu, Chi-Yuen 5628, 5629, 5694
Wu, Ching-Chao 5628, 5629

Page
Wu, Han-chieh 2472
Wu, Hsin-yu 2472
Wu, Hua-wen 2355, 2357
Wu, Dr. K. C 2357
Wu-Keu, Miss Liu 436
Wu, Leonard T. K 263, 3682, 3685, 5356, 5628, 5629
Wu, Liang-ping 2472
Wu, Li-ping 2403, 2472
Wu, Man-yu 2472
Wu, Pei-fu 2466
Wu, Po-hsiao 2472
Wu-tai Mountains 2333
Wu, Tieh-cheng 2355, 4881, 5330
Wu, Ting-chang 4151
Wu, Wen-yu 2472
Wu, Yu-chang 2403, 2405, 2472
Wubnig, Arthur 5628, 5629
Wuhan Youth National Salvation Corps 2343
Wyatt, Woodrow 5628, 5629
Wyn, C. Kay 5628, 5629

Y

Yaffe, Richard 2789
Yakhontoff, Victor 73, 2662, 3128, 3169, 3569, 3903, 3947, 4086, 4091, 4119, 4120, 4144, 4170, 4171, 4178, 4179, 4182, 4338, 4616, 4725, 4884, 5114, 5115, 5630, 5631.
Yakobsen, Sergius 969, 4896
Yakut Republic 675
Yale Institute of International Studies 976, 3980, 3998, 4004–4006
Yale Review 5648–5650, 5673
Yale University 177, 342, 475, 714, 900, 996, 1071, 1216, 1219, 1291, 1551, 1739, 1931, 2658, 2659, 3168, 3751, 3883, 3967–3973, 3992, 3998, 4014, 4019, 4021–4023, 4259, 4260.
Yale University Press 178, 270, 3971, 5661
Yalta Agreement 606, 607, 949, 979, 1008, 1525, 1740, 1851, 1852, 1856–1858, 1861, 1916, 2137, 2979, 3007–3013, 3395, 3412, 3709, 3956, 4005, 4006, 4544, 4545, 5673.
Yalta Conference 1850–1852, 1916, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2578, 2736, 2738, 2828, 2838, 2841–2845, 2848, 2858, 2859, 2862, 2869, 4929, 5280, 5483, 5487, 5672
Yamaishi Securities Co 4263
Yalu River 3994
Yamakawa, Tadao 364, 365, 5320, 5630, 5631
Yamasaki, Keichi 5630, 5631
Yanaga, Prof. Chitoski 4021, 5630, 5684, 5688
Yanaihara, Tadao 1237, 3176, 3581, 3592, 4229, 4230, 5630, 5631
Yang, Mr 4427
Yang, C. K 5630, 5631
Yang, Cheng-wu 2472
Yang, Ching-Chih 5630, 5631
Yang, Ching-yu 2403, 2472
Yang, Hsin-pao 5630, 5631
Yang, Hsiu-feng 2405, 2473
Yang, Hu-cheng 2330, 2331
Yang, L. S 5630, 5631
Yang, Li-K'uei 4214
Yang, Mon-Ch-un 5652
Yang, Shang-kun 2403, 2404, 2473
Yang, Tai-hui 2467
Yang, Yun-chu 2124
Yangtze River 2348, 2350, 2352–2354, 2356, 2358, 2362, 2364, 2434, 2474, 3838, 4132, 4058
Yangtze Valley 3520, 3586, 3622, 3624, 3706, 3708, 3710, 3712, 3713, 4009, 4133

Page
Yangtzepao Clearing Hospital 4133
Yao Kai 2473
Yao, Shu-shih 2404, 2448, 2473
Yardumian, Rose ..... 73, 140–145, 147, 160, 161, 266, 938, 956, 957, 997, 1003, 1844, 2580, 2593–2595, 2624, 2625, 3280, 3309–3311, 3552, 3566, 3567, 3570, 3792, 3903, 4087, 4122, 4314, 4328, 4329, 4334, 4808, 4823, 4824, 4829, 4832, 4844, 4988, 4995, 5011, 5058, 5061, 5063, 5630, 5631, 5710.
Yarmolinsky, Aorahin (Avrahm) 4091, 4145
Yarnell, Admiral Harry E ..... 33, 264, 433, 445, 447, 481, 495, 713, 858, 990–993, 1221, 2622, 2908–2811, 3198, 3478, 3793, 4104, 4111, 4113, 4532, 4835, 4900, 4974, 4976, 4977, 5013, 5062, 5630, 531.
Yasudo (Japanese Big Business) 666, 5666
Yasumura, Michi 4991, 4995
Yasuo, Nagaharu 319, 321, 364, 465, 395, 450, 476, 3587, 3925, 3926, 4987, 5168, 5175, 5179, 5630, 5631
Yasuto 375, 2300
Yates, Elizabeth 4991, 4995
Yates, Oleta 118
Yates, P. Lamartine 5630, 5631
Yat-sen, Sun. (*See* Sun, Yat-sen.)
Yat-sen, Madame Sun. (*See* Sun, Madame Yat-sen.)
Yawakama 5217
Yeaton, Evan D 4431, 5370
Yeh, Chi-chuang 2405, 2473
Yeh, Chien-ying 2341, 2378, 2404, 2433, 2447, 2448, 2454, 2473, 5371
Yeh, George 2124, 2125, 5062
Yeh, Hsi-i 2324, 2351–2353, 2453, 2458, 2463, 2473
Yeh, Ting (Yeh Haii) 2324, 2351–2353, 2453, 2458, 2463, 2473, 2631
Yekelchik 3337
Yelk, Mr 4352
Yellow River 2332, 2346, 2348, 2349, 2358, 2419, 2426, 2430, 2435, 3501, 3624
Yen, Chung-fah 143
Yen, Hsi-shan 2332, 2334, 2372, 2459, 2460, 4882, 5275, 5369, 5410
Yen, Jan Keng 5630, 5631
Yen, W. W 1216, 5321, 5333
Yen, Dr. Y. C. James 79, 120, 1631, 2582, 4046, 5052, 5333
Yenan, China ..... 3287–3290, 3292–3294, 3296, 3297, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3304–3309, 3341, 3353, 3388, 3405, 3501, 3503, 3624, 3625, 3628, 3629, 4184, 4212, 4217, 4220, 4432, 4441, 4686, 4772, 4773, 4830, 5370–5374, 5379, 5381, 5383, 5391, 5403, 5420, 5422.
Yenan Area 2414, 2416, 2417, 2421, 2426, 2471
Yenan Army 2356, 2458, 2471
Yenan Arsenals 2425
Yenan Government 1073, 1787, 2356, 2424, 2426
Yenan Industrial Plants 2424
Yenan Press 2466
Yenan Proclamation (September 22, 1937) 2332
Yenan Radio (XNCR) 2371, 2372, 2380, 2381, 2398, 2420
Yenan University 2405, 2406, 2456
Yenanfu (Fushin) 4213
Yenbay Uprising 2632
Yenchang Cotton Producing District 2424
Yen-chang Petroleum Refinery (Shensi Province) 2452
Yenching, China 3308, 5370
Yenching University (*see also* University, Yenching) 1221, 1968, 2464, 3476, 4141, 4215, 5368
Yergan, Dr. Max 622, 1514, 2243, 3556, 3570, 4080, 4116, 4136, 4595–4626
Yi Chen 812, 5418
Ying, Han 5234
Yi, Lin Ching 97

Page
Yin, Ju-Keng 4702
Yin, K. Y 2832
Ying, Hsiang 2351, 2352, 2452
Y. M. C. A. (*See* Young Men's Christian Association.)
Y. M. C. A. (China) 1163
Y. M. C. A. (International) 1213, 1215, 1219
Yodh, Raj 5323
Yokose, Seishi 5630, 5631
Yokota, Professor (Kisaburo) 238, 4229, 4230, 4236, 5208, 5630, 5631, 5684
Yonai, Admiral Mitsumasa 4267, 4268
Yonai Cabinet (Japan) 4268
Yone, Edward M. Law 5630, 5631
York, Lee 3060
Yosemite Conference. (*See* Institute of Pacific Relations, Yosemite Conference.)
Yoshi 5695
Yoshida, Baron 1640
Yoshida Cabinet 1018
Yoshikawa, Mitsusada 499–551
Yoshino, Sakuzo 5630, 5631
Yoshio, Shiga. (*See* Shiga, Yoshio.)
Yoshizawa, Mr 279, 3933, 5147, 5249
Yost, Charles W 2831, 5261, 5702
Young 5178
Young, Mrs 5241
Young, A. Morgan 4987, 4999, 5630, 5631
Young, Arthur 2659, 3883, 4261
Young, C. Walter 5684
Young Communist Committee 2407
Young Communist League (Communist Youth Corps) 594, 598, 861, 1000, 1001, 1317, 2413, 4391, 4618, 4639, 4886
Young, Donald 4107, 4119
Young, E. H 4430, 4437
Young, Hobart N 5186, 5703, 5704
Young, John P 5630, 5631
Young Judaea 4116
Young, Margaret 3566
Young, Marguerite 231, 232
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) 276, 296, 633, 1661, 1967, 3144, 3602, 3745, 3758, 3982, 4138, 4596, 4597, 4626, 4713, 5317, 5319, 5334, 5335, 5345
Young Plan 4037
Young, Ruth Lee (Mrs.) 4086, 4099, 5704
Young Socialist League 4639
Young, Thomas 4117
Young, Walter 5248
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) 590, 591, 620, 621, 622, 2646, 2791, 3537, 3636, 3964, 4872
Young Women's Christian Association of China (National Committee) 5290
Youth 2319, 3059, 3477, 3478
Youth Congress at Vassar 4139
Youth Congress in Wisconsin 4139
Youth Detachment, Eighteenth Group Army (Chart) 2448
Youth Vanguards (Chinese Communist Party) 2437, 2448
Yozizawa, K 5333
Yu, Ai Kai 2468
Yu, Bishop Paul Pin 3144
Yu, Hsueh-chung 2348, 2355
Yu, Kuang-sheng 5379
Yu, Uck Kym 5319
Yu, W. Y 5630, 5631
Yu, Ying Tang 1249
Yueh, Gen. Shueh 1412, 1417
Yuan Kuo-ping 2474
Yuan Shin-kai 2466
Yudenich, General 5075

Page
Yugon, A 5007, 5008
Yugoslavia 4542, 4668, 5315, 5393
Yugoslavian Government 2556, 3503, 3664
Yui, David Z. T 5319, 5320, 5335
Yumashev, Audrei 4040, 4042
Yun, C 5632, 5633
Yun, Chen 812
Yun, Lung 2326, 2397, 5408
Yunnan 3625, 4046, 4068
Yunnan Army (Ts'si Ao) 2456
Yunnan Military School 2456
Yunnanfu Embassy. (*See* United States Consulate, Kunming.)
Yusami, Rokuro 358
Yutang, Lin 827, 1221, 1222, 1235, 1239
Yutang, Mrs. Lin 409, 410
Yu Tsai School for Talented Children 1249, 4318
Y. W. C. A. (*See* Young Women's Christian Association.)
Y. W. C. A. (China) 1249
Yzvestia Moscow (newspaper) 4049

Z

Za Industrializaciu (Soviet newspaper) 4039
Zablodowsky, David 4661, 4662
Zacharias, E. M 613, 614, 1536
Zafra, Urbano A 2124, 2125, 2593, 5053, 5089, 5322
Zagon, Rita 4988
Zaibatsu ..... 556, 560–562, 666, 715, 720, 725, 736, 740, 1017–1019, 1021, 1563, 1639, 1640, 1830, 1865, 1873, 1874–1878, 2162, 2166, 2171, 2225, 2227–2232, 2235, 2284, 2296, 2300, 4166, 4263, 4877, 5665, 5666, 5671.
Zap, Herman 4662
Zap, Mary 4662
Zelitch 4091
Zellerbach, J. D 4944
Zemelis. (*See* Ian Antonovich Bergin.)
Zen, H. C 5632, 5633
Zen, Sophia Chen 5632, 5633
Zeng, Pi-shu (Jen Pi-shis) 2461, 2474
Zeserson, Fred 1338, 2789
Zhdanov, A. A 3839, 4486, 5393
Zhukov, Marshal Eugene 4486, 5027, 5501
Zhulson 4264
Zilboorg, Gregory 3620, 3621
Zilliacus, Kodne 5375, 5652
Zimbalist, Mrs. Efram 4091, 4145
Zimmerman, Carle C 54, 5632, 5633
Zimmerman, Erich W 5166, 5632, 5633
Zimmerman, Walter 1616
Zimmern 5132
Zimmerwald Conference 3107
Zinkin, Maurice 1221, 5632, 5633
Zinoviev 2318, 2699, 2711, 3235
Zion's Herald (Publication) 4116
Zabotin, Colonel 999–1001
Zostchenko 4090
Zubelin, Elizabeth 261
Zubelin, Peter 243, 244
Zubillage, Luis 4235
Zucker, Edith 3337
Zugsmith, Leane 2659, 4261
Zukhov, Mr 2590, 2592, 3313, 3314

INDEX TO THE REPORT

NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.

A

Page

Abolin, Mr. 43
Abramson 19, 41, 46, 51, 163, 173
Academy of Science in Moscow 43, 163, 177
Acheson, Dean 193, 194, 196, 202, 211, 214
Adamdovich, I. A 20, 36, 159
Adler, Solomon (Schloma Adler) 130, 147, 148, 149, 151, 171, 179
Administration of the Great Northern Sea Route 19, 36
Alexander & Baldwin American Trust Co 4
Alexander, Mrs. Wallace 4
All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries 19, 20, 36, 41, 159, 163
Allen, James S. (Auerbach, Sol) 96, 97, 100, 129, 145, 149, 150, 151
Allied Labor News 95, 145, 146, 150, 153, 155
Alsberg 16, 54, 102, 109
Amerasia 54, 59, 71, 72, 95, 111, 145, 146, 148, 151–158, 170, 171
America 35, 44, 130
American 34, 42, 194
American Embassy at Moscow 14, 50
American-British-Chinese Currency Stabilization Fund 179
American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives (INDUSCO) 145, 146, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156–159
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans 70
American Field Museum (U. S. A.) 177
American Foreign Power Co 4
American Friends of the Chinese People 72, 145, 146, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159
American League for Peace and Democracy 70, 71
American League Against War and Fascism 71
American Participation in the China Consortium 144
American Peace Mobilization 108, 124, 125, 134, 143, 174, 181
American President Lines 4, 10, 140
American-Russian Institute 73, 92, 95, 110, 145, 146, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 168
American Technical Committee 196
American Russian Institute Bulletin 168
American Quarterly 111
Amsterdam 45
Amtorg 15
Andrews, Roy Chapman 177
Angus, H. F 102
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 111
Arneman, Lt. Col. George E 174
Arnold, John. (*See* Abraham Chapman.)
Arosev, A. J 20, 36, 41, 159, 163
Asia 53, 87, 207, 209–213, 215
Asiaticus (Hans Moeller) 46, 92, 97, 100, 114, 115, 116, 119, 123, 125, 145, 147, 149, 150, 151, 170, 216.
Atherton, Frank C 4
Atkinson, Ellen van Zyll (*see also* de Jong) 100, 123, 127, 150, 153, 174
Attorney General 70, 71, 125
Auerbach, Sol. (*See* James Allen.)
Austern, Hilda (*see also* Ray) 13, 21, 54, 61, 100, 123, 127, 145, 149, 151, 169
Australia 13, 19, 208
Auto-Motor Export Co 23
Avorin 43, 164, 171

B

Page
Bain, H. F---- 102
Ballantine, Joseph W---- 101, 200
Ballis, William---- 102
Bank of America---- 4
Bank of California---- 4
Bank of China---- 143
Bank of Foreign Commerce---- 41
Bank of Foreign Trade---- 20, 159
Bankers Trust Co---- 4
Barmine, Alexander---- 5,
21–30, 36, 41, 43, 61, 62, 90, 121, 147, 148, 149, 163, 171, 194, 218
Barnes, Joseph Fels---- 13,
18, 19, 25–29, 46, 54, 61, 67, 100, 104, 106, 147, 148, 149, 151, 163, 170, 171, 172, 173, 183.
Barnes, Mrs. Kathleen---- 13,
15, 47, 61, 67, 73, 99, 100, 104, 112, 141, 145, 147, 149, 151, 164, 165, 166, 170, 172, 173, 175, 191, 194.
Barnett, Robert W---- 100, 126, 145, 151, 183, 184
Barton, Sir William---- 102
Bates, M. S---- 102
Bauer, Paul T---- 102
Belden, Jack---- 215
Bentley, Elizabeth T-- 70, 71, 96, 97, 121, 122, 147, 148, 180, 181, 182, 194, 203
Berkovich, Ia M---- 20, 36
Berzin, General---- 22–26, 28, 29, 218
Bidien, Charles---- 100, 145, 151
Bisson, T. A---- 66,
71, 72, 97, 99, 100, 101, 107, 108, 115, 116, 125, 126, 136, 139, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 168, 175, 185, 194, 203, 209, 225.
Bloch, Kurt---- 101
Board of Economic Warfare---- 182, 186
Boeke, J. H---- 102
Bodde, Derk---- 100, 145, 152
Bogolepov, Igor---- 5,
19, 21, 22, 23, 31–38, 40–45, 47–49, 52, 61, 62, 89, 90, 93, 113, 121, 147, 148, 149, 162, 163, 164, 168, 171–173, 177, 194.
Bolshevik Soviet Encyclopedia---- 44
Bolton, Mrs. Frances---- 4, 67
Book and Magazine Guild, local 18---- 137
Book and Magazine Guild of the United Office and Professional Workers---- 55, 144
Borg, Dorothy---- 100, 145, 146, 150, 152
Borodin, Michael---- 18, 41, 60
Borrie, W. D---- 102
Borton, Hugh---- 146
Boyer, Raymond---- 143
Brandt, William---- 100, 105, 145, 152
Bremman, Y. P---- 14, 129, 175
Bretholtz---- 100
British---- 20, 194, 214
British Army Intelligence Service---- 174
British Embassy---- 14
Broek, Jan O. M---- 101
Brooke, Raymond C. (*See* Chen Han-seng.)
Browder, Earl---- 12, 60, 117, 121, 135, 144, 160, 175, 182, 188
Brunauer, Esther---- 196
Bryn Mawr---- 13
Budenz, Louis---- 5,
7, 8, 15, 62, 70, 72, 91, 97, 117, 121, 122, 143, 147, 148, 184, 189, 194, 203, 216, 218.
Bulgaria---- 211
Bullitt, Ambassador---- 2, 61, 115, 169, 170
Burdick, Virginia---- 168
Burma---- 208
Byrnes, James F---- 200, 201, 202

C

Page
Cairo agreement 214
Canada 17, 19, 44, 47, 208
Canadian Friends of the Chinese People 156
Canniff, A. W. (*See* Andrew Grajdanzev.)
Canning, William M 147, 148, 184
Canton 44
Carlson, Evans F 100, 106, 123, 145, 147, 149, 152, 176
Carnegie Corp 3, 4, 63, 87, 164
Carnegie Endowment 4
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 195
Castle & Cooke 4
Case, Everett 211, 212
Carter, Edward C 2, 7, 8, 9, 12–17, 18–20, 34, 35, 38, 39, 42, 44–48, 50, 53, 54, 56–60, 62, 66, 73, 87, 90, 91, 92, 94, 100, 109–111, 114, 115, 118–120, 124, 125, 127, 135–138, 141, 142, 144–147, 149, 152, 159 160–170, 172–178, 180–185, 194–197, 207, 208, 215, 225.
Carter, Mrs 175, 176, 203
Carter, Miss Ruth 176
Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center 168
Central Asia 177
Central Intelligence Agency 2, 219, 221, 224
Central Intelligence 218
Century Club 16, 109
Chakalsky 37
Chamber of Commerce 19, 20, 36
Chamberlain, Joseph P 4
Chamberlin, William Henry 45, 46, 90, 101, 110, 167, 168
Chambers, Whittaker 96, 122, 147, 148, 181, 194
Chan, Hansu. (*See* Chi, Ch'ao-ting.)
Chang, C. M 101
Chapman, Abraham 100, 123, 126, 145, 147, 149, 150, 152
Chapman, Royal N 102
Chase National Bank 4
Chatham House 92
Chen, Han-seng 15, 17, 39, 67, 96, 97, 99, 100, 104, 119, 145, 147, 149, 150, 152, 165, 169, 185
Chennault, Gen. Clair 204, 205, 207, 211
Chernavin 45, 90
Chi, Ch'ao-ting (Chan, Hansu) 67, 71, 91, 97, 98, 100, 118, 119, 123–126, 130, 145, 146, 147, 149, 152, 167, 179, 181, 216
Chi, Harriet Levine 147, 149, 152
Chiang Kai-shek 50, 54, 100, 108, 125, 147, 179, 180, 182, 188, 189, 190–193, 198, 200, 201, 204, 206, 207, 211, 213, 215, 217
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame 179
Chickerin 163
China 5, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 53, 87, 90, 92, 106–108, 115, 116, 119, 124, 125, 128, 131, 160, 177, 179–182, 185, 186, 188, 190–192, 194, 196, 198, 199, 200, 207–211, 213, 215, 216, 225.
China Aid Council 70, 71, 145, 146, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156–158, 185
China's Crisis 185
China Institute 37
China's Part in a Coalition War 115
China Today 72, 91, 95, 145, 151, 154, 155, 158, 159, 167
China's Wartime Politics 185
China Weekly Review 150
China Yesterday and Today 208
Chinese Communist Army 186
Chinese Communist Government 143, 214
Chinese Embassy (U. S. A.) 178
Chinese Government 50, 108, 186, 189, 194, 210, 213
Chinese Nationalists 136, 178, 182, 184, 185, 198, 199, 200, 201–206, 211
China National Aviation 143
Chinese Nationalist Government 128, 138, 142, 213
Chinese People's Republic 211

Page
Chinese Revolution 118
Chinese Titoism 210
Cholmeley, Elsie Fairfax 17, 185
Chou, En-lai 181, 186, 188, 198
Christian, John T 102
Chungking, China 179, 180
Chu Tong 97
City of Flint 17
Civil Aviation Day (Russia) 175
Clayton, Will 193
Coe, V. Frank (Frank V.) 136, 147, 148, 152, 171, 183, 193, 194, 196
Cohen, Jerome B 102
Colegrove, Kenneth W 4, 63, 68, 71, 113, 120, 135, 192, 212
Cologne 113
Columbia 18
Columbia University 32
Collins, Henry H 171
Cominform 31, 127
Comintern (Communist International) 12, 17, 36, 40, 43, 44, 51, 52, 60-62, 89-91, 119, 128, 163, 173, 179, 181, 209
Commissariat 15
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs 161
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy 70, 124, 135, 145, 146, 151, 154, 155-159, 191
Communist Academy 19, 20, 23, 36, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 161, 163
Communist International (Comintern) 17, 46, 129, 150, 160, 161, 163
Communist Party 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 22, 24, 25, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 51, 55, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 70-72, 87, 88, 90, 92, 95-100, 103, 106, 107-109, 111-113, 115, 117, 119-126, 128-132, 134, 135, 137, 142-144, 147, 149-151, 153-155, 159-160, 165, 169, 170, 174, 177-179, 181, 182, 184, 185, 189, 191, 192, 194-197, 199, 207-214, 216-219, 221-226.
Communist Party Book Shop 192
Communist Party (British) 97, 182
Communist Party (China) 18, 24, 44, 90, 93, 107, 108, 115-119, 123, 125, 129, 135, 136, 142, 149 150, 161, 164, 166, 167, 182, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192, 197-202, 204, 208-214, 216, 244.
Communist Party (German) 11, 97, 147
Communist Part (India) 116
Communist Part (Japan) 97
Communist Party (New York State) 70, 192
Communist Party (North Korea) 214
Communist Party (U. S. A.) 4, 12, 15, 60, 72, 93, 97, 121, 175, 198, 199, 203, 223
Communist Party (U. S. S. R.) 5, 18, 31, 34, 36, 40, 61, 98, 148, 161-163
Communist Political Association 143
Communist Revolution in China 60, 61
Condliffe, J. B 101
Congress 207
Congress of Industrial Organizations 55
Conspiracy Against the Soviet Union 34
Cooke, Admiral 205-207, 214
Corbett, Percy E 101
Cornell University 207
Cosmos Club 100, 170
Cressey, George B 101, 146, 168, 169
Crimea Conference 196
Crocker National Bank 10
Cromwell, Edith. (*See* Elsie Fairfax-Cholmeley)
Currie, Lauchlin 59, 114, 123, 125, 144, 170, 171, 174, 179, 180-185, 189, 192-194, 196, 197, 216, 218
Czarist treaties 138
Czechoslovakia 41, 212

D

Page

Dafoe, I. W. ---- 169
Daily Express ---- 31
Daily People's World ---- 217
Daily Worker ---- 10,
58, 72, 96, 105, 106, 122, 125, 188, 189, 190, 192, 200, 248
Davies, Joseph S ---- 135, 143, 144, 147, 150, 169, 182,
Davies, John P ----
Davis, Elmer ---- 4, 34, 102
Davis, J. Merle ---- 186, 218–222, 224, 226
Dean, Arthur H ---- 194
Deane, Hugh ---- 17, 60, 160
DeCaux, Len ---- 4
De Jong, Ellen Van ---- 58, 145, 149, 150, 153
Dennett, Raymond ---- 67, 100, 134, 136, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 153, 183, 194
Dennett, Tyler (Atkinson). (*See* Atkinson.)
Dennett, Ty ---- 4,
Dennis, E 55, 57, 58, 88, 98, 105, 106, 121, 127, 134–138, 193, 194, 195
Departr ---- 102
Depa gene ---- 203
D ent of Commerce ---- 150
rtment of Defense ---- 205, 206
partment of Justice ---- 218, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226
Department of Navy ---- 200
Department of War ---- 144, 200, 202
Dies committee of House of Representatives ---- 126, 150
Dimitrov, Georgi ---- 129
Directorate General of the Portal Remittances and Savings Bank ---- 143
Dolbin, G. G ---- 162, 193, 217
Dooman, Eugene ---- 193, 194, 200, 201
Draper, Theodore ---- 125
Dubinsky, David ---- 124
Duggan, Laurence ---- 148, 149, 153, 171
Dulles, John Foster ---- 135, 207
Dumbarton Oaks Conference ---- 196
Dupuy, R. Ernest ---- 102
Dutch ---- 47
Dutch East Indies ---- 180

E

East Fish Trust ---- 19, 20, 36, 159
Eastman, Max ---- 107
Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area ---- 144
Eggleston, Sir Frederic ---- 104, 166, 167
Eighteenth Congress ---- 205
Electric Bond & Share Co ---- 4
Epstein, Israel ---- 67,
96 100, 106, 115, 123, 125, 126, 135, 146–150, 153, 171, 185, 203 207, 208, 215.
Espionage Act ---- 225

F

Fahs, Charles B ---- 101
Fairbank, John K ---- 66,
100, 114, 120, 126, 133, 135, 139, 145, 147, 149, 153, 171, 182–185, 197, 207, 214, 215, 218–222.
Fairbanks, Mrs. John ---- 185, 218–220
Fairfax-Cholmeley, Elsie ---- 13, 17, 97, 100, 123, 130, 145, 149, 150, 153
Far East ---- 89, 109, 116, 127, 172, 191, 195, 199, 212, 215
Far East and United Nations Command ---- 4
Far Eastern Command ---- 212
Far Eastern Institute ---- 11
Far Eastern Survey ---- 71,
97, 99–101, 103, 105, 111, 112, 115, 123, 125, 144, 153, 156, 173, 177, 185, 215.
Far East Spotlight ---- 124, 145, 146, 191
Farley, Miriam S ---- 98–100, 104, 114, 136, 138, 145, 146, 150, 153, 175, 184, 185,
Farley, Miriam S ---- 98–100,
104, 114, 136, 138, 145, 146, 150, 153, 175, 184, 185, 194

Page
Farrell, Frank 173
Fascist 127
Faymonville, Col. Philip R 168, 179
Federal Bureau of Investigation 8, 9, 21, 28, 30, 96, 106, 127, 129, 192, 217–219
Federated Press 95, 146, 150, 152–154, 156, 158
Feng Y'hsiang, Gen 217
Field, Anita Boyer 143
Field, Frederick V 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 18, 38, 47–48, 54, 56–58, 61, 62, 65, 67, 71, 72, 87, 91, 94, 96–98, 100, 104, 105, 106, 111, 118, 119, 124, 126, 127, 130–132, 134–139, 141–147, 149–150, 153, 159, 164, 168–171, 173–174, 178, 181–183, 188, 191, 192, 194, 197, 203, 216, 225.
Field, William O 146
Finland 108
Finnish War 111
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co 4
Fisher, Galen M 102
Flanders, Senator 67
Fluegel, Dr. Edna 195
Flying Cloud 214
Fong, H. D 102
Ford, Anne 207
Fordham University 4
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence 124
Foreign Economic Administration 197
Foreign Minister of Communist China 186
Foreign Relations Committee 207
Foreign Service 186
Foreign Trade Department 23, 24
Forman, Harrison 177
Formosa 108, 205, 210, 213, 214
Fornwall, H. C 174
Forsythe, W. D 102
Fortas, Abe 30
Fortier, Gen. Louis 212, 214
Fortune 140
Fosdick, Raymond D 211, 214
France 22, 27, 150, 185, 208, 210
Friedman, Irving 100, 104, 145, 154
Friedman, Julian R 126, 130, 145, 148, 149, 154, 194
Friends of Chinese Democracy 146, 151, 153, 154, 157
Friters, Gerald M 101
Fry, Th. P 102

G

Gelfan, Mrs. Harriet Moore 54
Geneva 17, 52
Geneva Disarmament Conference 161
George, Harrison 160
Gerbode, Mrs. Frank 4
Gerlach, Talitha 123, 145, 146, 148, 149, 154
Germany 22, 23, 37, 111, 179, 196, 208
German Embassy in Tokyo 180
German High Command 173
Gilchrist 58
Glasser, Harold 196
Go, Toshi 102
Goglidze, Sergei Arsenevich 177, 191
Gokhman 110, 162, 218
Golos, Jacob 97, 121
Gorou, Pierre 102
Goshal, Kumar 145, 148, 154
Gould, Randall 101
GPU (Soviet Secret Police) 49, 50
Grady, Henry 133, 140
Grajdanzev (Grad), Andrew 87, 92, 93, 99, 100, 104, 124, 139, 145, 170, 194
Grattan, C. Hartley 102

Page
Graves, Mortimer 100, 145, 146, 154, 168
Great Britain 19, 32, 35, 167, 180, 196, 199, 201
Great Northern Sea Route 20, 159
Great Soviet World Atlas 19, 40, 171
Greece 21
Greece, Athens 121
Green, Joseph 61, 89, 94, 193, 194, 200, 201, 216
Greenberg, Michael 87,
88, 97, 100, 123, 127, 139, 145, 149, 150, 154, 171, 175, 182
Greene, Jerome D 4, 14, 64–67, 94, 120, 126, 159, 220
Greene, O. M 102
Greene, Roger S 55, 56, 131, 132, 138
Griffith, Ernest S 99
Gromyko, A 192
Gull, E. M 102

H

Hailey, Lord 102
Hamilton, Maxwell M 183
Han-seng, Chen 123, 124
Hansu Chan 91
Harper & Bros 115
Hart, George A. C 102
Hart, Thomas 67
Harondar, Eugene 15, 41, 42, 45, 48, 90, 165, 172
Harrison, Francis Burton 183
Harvard, Russian Research Institute at 219
Harvard 13
Harvard University 133
Hawaii, Bank of 4
Hayden, Albert C., Jr 218
Hazard, John N 32, 33, 34, 106, 169, 170, 189
Heissig, Walther F 173, 174
Hersey, John R 145
Higginson, & Co., Lee 126
Hillenkoetter, Admiral Roscoe H 2, 219
Hinder, Eleanor M 102
Hinton, W. J 102
Hirohito 194
Hiss, Alger 97, 124,
126, 129, 148, 150, 154, 170, 171, 183, 185, 194, 195, 196, 197, 226
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 15, 34
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Proceedings of the Eighteenth Party Congress 172
Hitler Invasion 39
Hitler-Stalin Alliance 17, 178, 217
Ho Chi Minh 210, 212
Hoffman, Paul G 140
Holland, Doreen 21
Holland, Wm 3,
8, 9, 13, 15–16, 18–19, 21, 42, 47, 54, 58, 60–68, 70, 72, 74, 76–78, 84–86, 88–89, 94–95, 98, 100–102, 108–109, 111, 120, 124, 126–127, 129, 131, 134, 136, 138, 140, 141, 144, 145, 147, 149, 154, 160, 164, 165, 169, 175, 179, 184, 185, 211, 212.
Honolulu 18
Hoover, Mr. J. Edgar 8
Hornbeck, Stanley 124, 133, 170, 179, 183, 193, 195, 197, 202, 203
House Committee on Un-American Activities 71, 72
Hsia, C. L 102
Hsu, Shuhsi 101
Hsu, Y. Y 97, 98, 100, 126, 130, 145, 149, 154
Hu Shih 101
Hubbard, L. E 90–93, 101, 104, 167
Hull, Cordell 179, 180
Hunsberger, Warren S 102
Hurley, Ambassador 203
Hyde, William S 218

I

Page
Ianson, Ia D 20, 36
India 215
Indochina 208, 210
Indonesia 87
INDUSCO. (*See* Chinese Industrial Cooperatives.)
Inner Mongolia 50, 177
Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences 40
Institute of Oceanography 19, 20, 36–38, 47, 159, 163, 172, 173
Institute of Oriental Study 44, 163
Institute of Pacific Relations ..... 2, 4–9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19–23, 25–30, 32, 34–37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 47, 48, 50, 54–56, 58–82, 84–98, 107, 110–114, 116–118, 120, 123–146, 164, 166, 171–173, 177, 179, 182–185, 191, 193, 195–197, 203, 207–209, 211–216, 223–226.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council) ..... 2–4, 8–10, 13–16, 21, 23, 37, 45, 48, 54–58, 61–63, 68–71, 88, 94, 98, 104, 114, 118, 120, 121, 124, 130, 132–134, 136, 140–144, 151, 153–155, 164, 165, 169, 170, 181, 186, 193, 195, 203, 215, 223, 224.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Atlantic City Conference) 56, 105, 135, 136, 144
Institute of Pacific Relations (Australian Institute of International Affairs) 3
Institute of Pacific Relations (Banff Conference) 13
Institute of Pacific Relations (British Council) 3, 92, 105, 155, 165, 167
Institute of Pacific Relations (In Canadian Institute of International Affairs) 3
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese Council) 20, 105, 141, 167
Institute of Pacific Relations (Comite d'Etudes des Problems du Pacifique France) 3, 68
Institute of Pacific Relations (Honolulu) 3, 63
Institute of Pacific Relations (Hot Springs Conference) 56, 94, 144, 193, 195, 215
Institute of Pacfic Relations (Indian Council of World Affairs) 3
Institute of Pacific Relations (Inquiry Series) 124
Institute of Pacific Relations (International Secretariat) 3, 4, 10, 63, 70, 87, 114, 120, 121, 167
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japanese Council) 3, 4, 61, 157
Institute of Pacific Relations (Mont Tremblant Conference) 54, 136, 183, 184, 193
Institute of Pacific Relations (New York Office) 18, 20
Institute of Pacific Relations (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs) 3
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific Council) 3, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 54, 68, 70, 87–98, 131, 134, 141, 142, 175
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs) 3, 68
Institute of Pacific Relations (Philippine Council) 3
Institute of Pacific Relations (San Francisco Office) 16
Institute of Pacific Relations (U. S. S. R. Council) ..... 13–15, 19, 20, 31, 36, 40, 41, 45–48, 60–62, 90, 114, 134, 159–164, 166, 167, 169–172, 175, 176, 223, 224.
Institute of Pacific Relations (Washington Office) 57, 105, 127, 133, 155, 197, 208
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite Conference) 13, 15
Institute of World Politics and Economics 19–21, 36, 37, 161–163, 173
Institute on China 20
Internal Affairs Security Policy (Ministry) 23
Intelligence report (G–2) on the Chinese Communist Party 129
International Business Machines Corp 4
International General Electric Co 4
International Labor Office 17
International Ladies Garment Workers 109, 124
International Press Correspondence 150, 152
International Telephone & Telegraph Co 4
Ioffe, S. S 36
Isaacs, Harold R 14, 46, 90, 91, 118, 126, 145, 167
Isvestia (Russian newspaper) 175
Ives, Senator Irving M 135, 207

J

Page

Jaffe, Philip J---- 67, 72, 127, 129, 145, 148–150, 154, 170, 171, 209
Janson, Ia. D---- 41, 159
Japan---- 5, 18–21, 34, 35, 47, 53, 59, 87, 108, 150, 160, 179, 180, 186, 188, 194, 199, 200, 213, 215
Japanese-American Committee for Democracy---- 146, 158
Japanese Government---- 2, 179, 180, 182
Japanese Monroe Doctrine---- 166
Japanese-Soviet Alliance---- 178
Jenkinson, Anthony---- 96, 17, 123, 129, 145, 148, 149, 150, 155
Jessup, Philip C---- 13, 14, 16, 17, 44, 45, 55, 57, 110, 114, 134, 136, 144, 162, 164, 165, 183, 193, 194, 196, 197, 207, 211–215.
Joffe, S. S---- 159
Johns Hopkins University---- 216
Johnstone, William C---- 100, 101, 104, 136, 145, 155, 170, 197
Joint Committee Investigating the Pearl Harbor Attack (1946)---- 179
Jones, Mrs. Catesby---- 149, 216, 217
Jones, F. C---- 102
Journal aux Moscow---- 161

K

Kahn, Albert---- 34
Kamchatka Joint Stock Co---- 19, 20, 36, 159
Kantorovich, Mr. Anatole---- 15, 20, 35, 36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 51, 159, 168
Kara-Murza, Mr---- 51, 164, 171, 173
Karakhan (Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Russia)---- 49, 50, 170
Kawai, Kazuo---- 102
Keeney, Philip O---- 100, 123, 124, 129, 145, 149, 155
Keeney, Mrs. Mary Jane---- 129, 149, 155
Keesing, F. M---- 102
Kerner, Robert J---- 101
Kerr committee---- 126, 150
King, Admiral---- 2
Kingsbury, John A---- 146, 168
Kirby, Stuart---- 101
Kislova, Miss---- 175
Kizer, Benjamin H---- 100, 145, 155, 183, 184, 194
Kleeck, Mary Van---- 110
Knox, Lucy---- 18, 127, 149
Kohlberg, Alfred---- 58, 127, 134
Kolchak---- 44
Komsomolsk---- 14
Korea---- 26, 53, 108, 114, 123, 128, 204, 205
Kornfeder, Joseph Zack---- 160
Krasnoiarsk---- 44
Kremlin---- 17
Krips, T. J---- 102
Krivitsky, Gen. Walter---- 22, 26, 27, 28, 173, 218
Kuliabko---- 37, 162
Kullak---- 18
Kunming (China)---- 190, 191
Kuomintang (Chinese)---- 115, 182, 186, 192, 198, 199, 208
Kurahara, K---- 102

L

Page

Lamont, Corliss---- 100, 107, 109, 145–149, 155, 168, 170
Lamont, Thomas W---- 107, 198–200
Lamont, Mrs. Thomas W---- 4
Land of the Soviets---- 88, 111, 134
Lane, Mr. Clayton---- 8
Lang, Olga---- 100, 145, 148–150, 155
Langer, Paul---- 101
Latourette, K. S---- 102
Lattimore, Eleanor (Mrs. Owen)---- 48, 57, 100, 106, 145, 150, 155, 170, 191, 216

Page

Lattimore, Owen 4, 12–18, 22, 25–29, 40, 45, 46, 48, 50–54, 57, 59–62, 66, 70, 71, 87–92, 94, 95, 97, 99–101, 103–108, 110–120, 125, 126, 129, 133, 134, 136, 138, 140, 144, 145, 148–150, 155, 165, 167–172, 174–182, 185, 189, 191–194, 197–203, 208–210, 212, 213, 217, 218, 223–226, 301.
Leaf, Earl H 174
League of Nations 17, 52, 169, 172, 217
League of Nations Division of the Soviet Foreign Office 121, 161
Lee, Duncan C 171
Lee, Michael 150, 155
Legislative Reference Bureau 205
Lehman, Gov. Herbert 184
Lenin 18, 31, 47, 60, 89, 129, 163
Lever Bros. (London) 4
Levy, Roger 101
Lew, Daniel H 102
Library of Congress 98, 103, 128, 186, 209, 215
Library of Congress, Legislative Reference 99
Li, Choh-ming 102
Lie, Trygve 213
Lieu, D. K 101
Life 140
Lind, Andrew 102
Lindsay, Michael 145
Linebarger, Paul M 101
Lin Piao 188, 198
Lin, Yutang 101
Litag 32, 45
Literature on the Chinese Communist movement 46
Little Brown & Co 207, 208
Little Khiral 50
Litvinov, Maxim 52, 161, 169, 217
Lockwood, William W 10, 14, 55, 56, 64, 66, 68, 71, 89, 94, 95, 100, 104, 130, 131, 136, 137, 138, 143, 145, 155, 174, 175, 183, 184, 185, 195, 196.
London 18, 45, 52, 197
London School of Economics 41
Long, Breckinridge 184
Loomis, C. F 159, 174
Losovsky, S. A 160, 162
Loyalty Review Board of Civil Service Commission 71
Lucas, General 206
Luce, Henry R 4, 133, 140
Ludden, Raymond 186, 206

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 127
MacArthur monthly report 175
Mackenzie, Norman 102
MacLeish, Archibald 194
Maki, John 102
Mao Tse-tung 129, 188, 192, 202, 209
Manchuria 26, 51, 108, 204, 206, 211
Mandel, William M 67, 97, 100, 126, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 156, 168, 170
Maquis 208
Marines 205, 206
Marshall, Gen. George C 132, 133, 135, 179, 186, 194, 202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209
Marshall mission 198, 203
Marx, Karl 113, 117
Marxism (Marxist) 33, 35, 127, 210
Masani, M. R 101
Masland, John W 102
Massing, Hede 11, 96, 122, 147, 148, 173, 194
Matson Steamship Co 4

Page
Matusow, Harvey M---- 106, 137, 147, 148, 192, 194, 217
Maurer, Herryman---- 101
McGovern, Prof. William---- 4, 87, 113, 121, 192, 206
McInnes, Edgar---- 103
Mekhonoshin, K. A---- 20, 36–38, 159, 163, 171, 172, 173
Menefee, Selden---- 146, 156
Meyer, Peter---- 116
Michael, Franz---- 102
Mikado---- 199
Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, U. S. S. R---- 109
Military Intelligence---- 22, 41
Military Intelligence, U. S. S. R---- 23, 24
Miller, Robert T---- 171
Millis, Walter---- 101
Mills, Lennox A---- 101
Minor, Robert---- 182
Mitchell, Kate---- 13, 34, 35, 54, 61, 62, 71, 100, 127, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 156, 168, 169, 171
Moeller, Hans (Asiaticus)---- 97, 115, 119
Moll, J. T---- 102
Molotov, V. M---- 31, 113, 162, 176
Mongolia---- 24, 48, 49, 51, 53, 176, 210, 213
Mongolian People's Republic---- 170
Mont Tremblant Conference---- 143
Moore, Harriet---- 13, 17, 21, 34, 45, 46, 48, 54, 61, 62, 66, 67, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 106, 110, 112, 114, 124, 126, 129, 132, 134, 136, 139, 143, 144 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 156, 165, 170, 176, 179, 183.
Morgan, J. P. (company)---- 4, 107
Morgenthau, Henry---- 181
Mormacsun---- 17
Morse, Wayne---- 135, 207
Moscow---- 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24, 25, 27, 37, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 54, 60, 61, 62, 89, 91, 105, 114, 115, 129, 134, 197, 209, 210, 212
Moscow Daily News---- 18, 127, 150, 171
Moscow meetings---- 164, 165, 176
Moscow trials---- 15, 16, 35, 62, 108, 109, 110, 168, 170
Motylev, V. E---- 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 36, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 46, 48, 53, 90, 91, 92, 114, 115, 129, 159, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 175, 176, 177
Mueller, Hans---- 92, 123
Munson, Lyle H---- 218, 219, 220, 221, 222
Murmansk---- 17

N

Narkomindel---- 20, 161
National Foreign Trade Council---- 206
Nationalist China---- 24, 115, 186, 212
Nationalist Communist forces---- 188
Nationalist Government---- 186, 207, 211
Nationalists---- 188, 190
Naumovich, Grigorii---- 44
Naval Intelligence of the Soviet Union---- 38
Nazi-Soviet pact---- 108, 110
Netherlands East Indies---- 47, 208
New Civilization---- 93
New Leader---- 22
New Masses---- 58, 96, 125, 143, 150
New York Compass---- 118
New York Herald Tribune---- 17
New York Public Library---- 21
New York Times---- 107, 198
New Zealand---- 19, 208
NII (Institute for Scientific Research)---- 19, 36
Nitobe, Inazo---- 120
NKVD---- 23, 24, 49, 53, 171, 173. 176
Norman, E. Herbert---- 100, 126, 129, 145, 148, 149, 156
North China---- 186, 188

Page
North Pacific Conference 190
North, Robert C 101
Northwestern University 4, 63, 121
Norway 177
Notestein, Mrs. Ada Comstock 57

O

Oakie 10, 54
O'Conor, Senator 191
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 22, 60, 170, 197
Office of War Information (OWI) 60, 128, 188, 192, 194, 197
Office of War Information, China Division (OWI) 183, 185
Okinawa 205
Omsk 44
Orchard, John E 102
Order of the Red Banner 163
Oumansky, Constantine 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 35, 109, 125, 162, 168, 170, 178, 179, 198, 217
Our Job in the Pacific 57, 58, 106, 135, 144, 191
Outer Mongolia 39, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 61, 114, 177, 216
Outer Mongolian People's Republic 169
Ozaki, Hotsumi 61, 97, 123, 148, 149, 150, 156, 171, 180

P

Pacific Affairs 4, 13, 14, 16, 18, 21, 40, 44, 45, 46, 48, 54, 71, 87–93, 97–99, 103–105, 110, 112, 114–117, 119–121, 125, 127–130, 140–144, 151, 157, 163, 165–169, 215, 216, 218.
Pacific War 188
Panama Canal 172
Pan American Airways 4
Paris 22, 27, 45, 52
Parker, Philo W 174
Parlett, Harold 102
Parnoch 52
Pasvolsky, Leo 183
Pauley Reparations Mission to Japan 128, 192, 215
Pearl Harbor 180
Peiping 42, 44
Peking Union Medical College 131
Pelcovits, N. A 102
Pelzer, Karl J 102
Pendleton, Robert L 102
Penrose, E. F 102
People's Republic 212
People's Republic of Outer Mongolia 49, 50
People's War 188
Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution 91, 167
Philbrick, Herbert 96
Philippines 19
Phillips, J. W 147
Phillips, P. D 102
Poland, Fred 148–150, 156, 171, 177, 183
Policies and World Economics 43
Polish Communist 183
Politburo 23, 24, 52, 72
Politburo of the United States Communist Party 91
Pollard, John 127
Poppe, Nicholas 31, 36–40, 42–44, 49, 53, 61, 88, 89, 90, 149, 161, 163, 168, 169, 176, 177
Porter, Catherine 100, 104, 125, 145, 146, 150, 156, 165, 209
Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 196
Powell, J. B 107
Pressman, Lee 129, 148, 156, 171
Price, Mildred (Coy) 121, 126, 130, 145, 148, 149, 156
Prime Minister (of Communist China) 186
Problems of the Pacific 17
Proceedings of the Military Collequim of the Supreme Court 16

Page
Pruitt, Ida ---- 145, 156
Purcell, Victor ---- 101

Q

Quigley, Harold S ---- 102

R

Radek, Mr. Karl ---- 110
Rajchman, Ludwig ---- 123, 150, 157, 172, 183
Rakovsky, Mr ---- 110
Rand, Christopher ---- 208
Ray, Hilda Austern. (*See* Austern, Hilda; *also* Bretholtz.)
Read, Lt. Arthur ---- 174
Reader's Digest ---- 4, 22, 107
Red Armies (Chinese) ---- 180
Red Army ---- 5, 41, 50
Red Army Club (Russia) ---- 175
Red China ---- 207, 212
Red Mongolian Army ---- 49
Red Star Over China ---- 115
Reichenau, Baron Von ---- 173
Reiss, Ignatz ---- 27
Remer, C. F ---- 170, 197, 183
Republic of Mongolia ---- 52
Robequain, Charles ---- 102
Rockefeller Bros. Fund ---- 4
Rockefeller Foundation ---- 3, 4, 63, 87, 164, 211
Rogov, Vladimir ---- 100, 108, 115, 124, 170, 197, 198, 218
Romm, Vladimir ---- 15, 168
Roosevelt, President F. D ---- 50, 54, 61, 169, 217
Rosinger, Lawrence K ---- 66, 67, 87, 97, 100, 104, 116, 126, 127, 135, 136, 139, 145, 148, 149, 157, 184, 185, 212, 213, 215, 218, 225.
Roth, Andrew ---- 100, 126, 127, 129, 130, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 157, 171
Rowe, Prof. David N ---- 4, 54, 56, 57, 87, 94, 101, 102, 105, 107, 113, 116, 120, 133, 137, 138
Royal Institute of International Affairs ---- 142
Royama, Massamechi ---- 102
Rueff, Gaston ---- 102
Rumania ---- 211
Russia ---- 18, 21, 34, 53, 88, 108, 111, 114, 176, 188, 210
Russian armies in Siberia ---- 43
Russian Foreign Office ---- 24, 31, 32, 53
Russian Foreign Office in Moscow ---- 18
Russian invasion of Poland ---- 111
Russian Military Intelligence ---- 25
Russian unit ---- 21
Russian War Relief ---- 146, 152, 154, 156, 158, 159
Russia's Red army ---- 5, 22
Russo-Czechoslovak ---- 53
Russo-Japanese ---- 217
Russo-Mongol ---- 53

S

Saionji, Kimikazu ---- 61, 97, 148, 150, 157, 171, 180
Saks, Milton ---- 101
Salisbury, L. E ---- 98, 100, 138, 146, 157, 203
Sanson, Sir George B ---- 101
Sarraut, Albert ---- 176
Sayers, Michael B ---- 34
Schiller, A. Arthur ---- 102
Schneider, Helen ---- 148, 149, 157
School of Military Government (IPR) ---- 175
Schuman, Frederick ---- 33, 34
Schwartz, Benjamin K ---- 101, 218, 219, 220, 221
Science and Society ---- 96
Scientific Research Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas ---- 159
Second World War ---- 52
Security in the Pacific ---- 193

Page
Security Police (Russian) 23
Service, John Stewart 71, 127, 148, 150, 157, 171, 182, 186, 195
Shanghai 44, 159, 205, 207
Shanghai Monthly Bulletin 150
Shell Oil Co 4
Shippe, M. G. (*See* Asiaticus.)
Shoemaker, James H 102
Siam 208
Siberia 21, 108, 180, 215
Siberian Cheka 43
Siberian Secret Police 163
Silverman, George 181
Sinkiang 22, 23, 24
Sino-Soviet Treaties of 1945 55
Sino-Soviet Treaties of 1949 138
Sitsen, P. H. W 102
Situation in Asia 213, 217
Situation in China 46, 209
Smedley, Agnes 123, 139, 145, 148, 149, 157, 171, 180, 218, 219, 220, 221
Smirnov, Mr 175
Smith, Senator H. Alexander 214
Snow, Edgar 100, 106, 115, 116, 126, 139, 145, 150, 157, 170, 218, 220, 221, 222
Snow, Mrs. Edgar (Nym Wales) 100, 145, 146, 148, 150, 157, 203
Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries 17, 20, 37, 160
Solution in Asia 22, 53, 112, 117, 192, 194, 216, 217
Sorge, Richard 61, 180, 185
Sorge Soviet espionage network 140
Sourwine, Mr. J 220
South Korea 118, 213, 214
Soviet 45, 88, 192, 216, 217, 223, 224
Soviet Academy of Science 49
Soviet Ambassador to the United States 178
Soviet Asia 106
Soviet Asia Mission 169, 191
Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade 163
Soviet Chamber of Commerce 42
Soviet China 47, 51
Soviet Communism and New Civilization 32
Soviet Communist Party 96
Soviet Conspiracy 214
Soviet Consulate 15
Soviet Embassy (Washington) 15, 16, 35, 42, 162, 193, 217
Soviet Encyclopedia 40, 163
Soviet Far East 14, 48, 49, 166, 168, 176
Soviet-Finnish War 110
Soviet Foreign broadcast system 161
Soviet Foreign Office 5, 17, 19, 20, 23, 33, 34, 35, 43, 50, 51, 52, 89, 93, 161, 162, 163, 172, 193, 217, 224
Soviet Government 12, 24, 41, 48, 50, 61
Soviet Institute 34
Soviet Military Intelligence 5, 22, 26, 29, 35, 161, 171, 172, 173, 180
Soviet (IPR) 124
Soviet Military Intelligence (apparatus) 30, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 156, 158, 159, 164, 218
Soviet Naval Intelligence 163
Soviet-Nazi Pact 176
Soviet Politico Abroad and at Home 33
Soviet Russia 37, 117, 161, 193
Soviet Russia Today 96, 109, 146, 154, 156
Soviet Secret Police (NKVD) 22, 33, 37, 38, 41, 42, 50, 52, 53, 61
Soviet Union 5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, 31, 32, 37, 39, 40, 49, 89, 90, 93, 104, 109, 110, 111, 112, 118, 121, 129, 130, 138, 146, 149, 150, 151, 159, 172, 176, 177, 178, 183, 190, 196, 198, 199, 201, 204, 217.
Soviet World Atlas 15, 38
Soward, F. H 102
Spanish Civil War 161
Spanish Republican 161
Spencer, Frederick 147, 151

Page
Spencer, J. E---- 102
Spinks, Charles M---- 102
Spotlight on the Far East---- 70, 95
Sproul, Robert G---- 58
Stabilization Fund and Reconstruction and Development Bank Committee---- 196
Stalin---- 4, 22, 24, 34, 40, 41, 43, 46, 60, 61, 90, 110, 113, 116, 122, 123, 129, 167, 169, 177, 191
Stalin-Hitler Pact---- 125, 134, 136, 143, 165, 174, 177
Standard-Vacuum Oil Co---- 4, 174
Stanford University---- 109
Stassen, Harold (Gov.)---- 212, 213
State Department---- 2, 52, 71, 124, 128, 129, 132, 133, 135, 150, 170, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 189, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 207, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 224, 226.
State Department Biographical Register---- 206
State Department China desk---- 197
State Department, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs---- 124, 179, 200, 216
State Department, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs---- 196
State Department, Far Eastern Section China Division---- 129, 130, 132, 192, 202
State Department, policy planning staff---- 219, 222
State Department, Voice of America---- 21
State of Asia (project under IPR)---- 185
Steele, Arch---- 208
Steely, E. Newton---- 179, 180
Steffansson, Vilhjalmur---- 146
Steiger, Andrew---- 100, 106, 123, 148, 149, 150, 157, 170, 191
Stein, Guenther---- 67, 97, 100, 139, 140, 145, 148, 149, 150, 158, 171, 180, 185, 186, 215
Steiner, H. Arthur---- 101
Stewart, John R---- 102
Stewart, Mauguerite Ann (Mrs. Maxwell Stewart)---- 57, 98, 100, 111, 127, 130, 134, 158, 171, 203
Stewart, Maxwell S---- 72, 98, 100, 111, 116, 136, 137, 138, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 158, 168, 171, 203, 225
Stilwell, General---- 188, 190
Stimson, Colonel---- 131
Stimson, Henry, Secretary of War---- 194
Stomonyakov---- 50
Stone, William T---- 59, 60, 144, 186, 196
Strong, Anna Louise---- 96, 100, 145, 148, 150, 158, 171, 218, 219, 220, 221
Stuart, Leighton (Ambassador)---- 208
Studebaker Corp---- 4, 140
Sun Fo---- 194, 208
Sun Yat-sen---- 44, 185, 194
Sun Yat-sen, Madame---- 188, 208
Sues, Ilona Ralf---- 145, 146, 148, 158, 203
Sunday Worker---- 150
Svanidze, A. S---- 20, 24, 36, 41, 61, 163, 171
Swearinger, Roger---- 101
Sweden---- 177
Swing, Raymond Gram---- 116
Swope, Gerard---- 4

T

Takayanagi, K---- 102
Tamagna, Frank M---- 102
Tarr, Edgar J---- 133, 169
Tass---- 20, 161, 162, 168, 170, 197
Taylor, Prof. George---- 11, 87, 88, 101, 102, 182, 185
Terrill, Katherine---- 145, 146, 147, 158
Tewksbury, Donald P---- 146
Third International---- 160
Thomas, Elbert---- 67
Thompson, Virginia---- 100, 104, 145, 146, 150, 158
Thorner, Daniel---- 100, 126, 139, 148, 149, 158
Tikhii Okean---- 19, 36, 45, 93, 114, 165

Page
Time, Inc. 4
Toynbee, Arnold J. 101
Trachtenberg, Alexander 7
Treasury Department 180, 181, 196, 225
Trewartha, Glenn T. 102
Trippe, Juan 4, 140
Trotsky 1, 16, 91
Trotskyism 167
Troyanovsky, Soviet Ambassador 16, 109
Trud (magazine) 150
Truman, President Harry S 202, 214
Tukachevsky, Marshal 23
Tydings committee 94, 103, 181

U

Unfinished Revolution, The 135, 207
Union of Office and Professional Workers of America 55, 98
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U. S. S. R.) 2, 13–16, 18–22, 37, 38, 40, 48, 62, 92, 108, 111, 119, 173, 179, 180, 185, 190, 211, 212, 214.
United Kingdom 208
United Nations 143, 183, 193–195, 210, 212–214
United Nations Conference at Atlantic City 193, 196
United Nations Conference at San Francisco 57, 193, 195, 196
United Nations Forces 2
UNRRA (China Section) 184
United Office and Professional Workers of America 55, 98, 137
United Press 29
United States 1, 2, 3, 5, 17, 19, 27, 28, 39, 41, 44, 45, 47–49, 52, 55, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 87, 90, 93, 108, 111, 116, 122, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195–205, 207, 209, 210, 214, 224–226.
United States Army 22, 181
United States Army Intelligence 58, 59, 60
United States Civil Service Commission 150
United States Command 212
United States Foreign Policy for a Postwar Recovery Program 205
United States House of Representatives 126
United States Immigration Bureau 150
United States-Japanese truce 179
United States Military Intelligence Division 174
United States Navy Intelligence Department 174
United States Navy (Seventh Fleet) 205
United States of America 22, 23, 28, 50, 177, 178, 179, 180–183, 211
United States Senate, Foreign Relations 28
United States Senate, Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 155
United States Strategic Bombing Survey 127
University of Leningrad 161
University of Washington 11, 182
Ussachevsky, Mrs. Betty 127
Uyeda, Toigiro 102

V

Vandenbosch, Amry 102
Van Kleeck, Mary 100, 145, 146, 148, 149, 158, 168, 171
Van Mook, H. J. 101
Vandenberg, Arthur 135, 207, 211
Varga, Eugene 40, 51, 161, 162, 163, 173
Veatch, Roy 195, 196
Veinberg 33, 34
Viet-Nam 208
Vietnamese 210
Vinacke, Harold M. 102
Vincent, John Carter 106, 128, 130, 132, 133, 135, 149, 159, 170, 177, 189, 190, 191–195, 197–206, 207, 208 216, 224
Vinogradoff 175, 176
Visman, Frans H. 102
Vladivostok 41

Page
Voice of America 5, 168
Voitinsky, G. N 15, 19, 36, 43–48, 44, 45, 61, 89–91, 93, 163, 165, 166, 171, 172, 223
Vostov 176
VOX (VOKS) 20, 37, 149, 172, 175

W

Wales, Nym (See Mrs. Edgar Snow).
Wallace, Henry A 2, 57, 58, 105, 106, 128, 133, 135, 169, 176, 186, 189, 190–193, 215
Wallace Mission to China 128, 189
Walter Hines Page School (Johns Hopkins University) 99, 128
War and the Working Class 100, 124, 197
War Department (US) 24
War Department (USSR) 23
Wartime China 114, 116
Washburn, John N 101
Washington, D. C 4, 7, 10, 18, 188
Watson, Dr. Goodwin 124
Watts, Richard Jr 100, 145, 146, 159
Webb, Beatrice 32, 93, 112
Webb, Sidney 32, 93, 112
Webbs 33
Wedemeyer, Gen. Albert C 188, 190, 201, 202, 203
Welles, Benjamin 208
Welles, Sumner 133, 182, 188
Weyl, Nathaniel 147, 148, 194
White, Harry Dexter 126, 148, 149, 159, 171, 180, 181, 193, 194, 196
White House 114, 125, 142, 174, 182, 185, 188, 197, 198, 216
Whyte, Sir Frederick 100, 166, 167
Widener, Mrs. William Henry 147, 168, 169
Wigmore on Evidence 8
Wilbur, Dr. Ray Lyman 54, 55, 132
Wilbur Ellis Co 4
Williams, Albert Rhys 106, 112
Wilkie, Wendell 176
Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A 4, 6, 148
Wineberg 175
Winter, Ella 100, 123, 146, 148, 149, 150, 159, 168
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl 72, 88, 97, 103, 117, 141, 147, 148, 179, 182, 184, 194
Wolf, Charles, Jr 102
Wood, J. W 102
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Princeton University) 64
Workers Monthly 150
World Atlas 42
World Peace Foundation 4, 88, 121
World War II 17, 40, 129, 216
Wright, Quincy 102
Wu, Chi yuen 102

Y

Yakhontoff, Victor A 100, 145, 147, 148, 150, 159, 171
Yale University 4, 87, 133
Yanaga, Chitoshi 102
Yardumian, Rose 100, 127, 136, 150, 159, 197
Yarnell, Admiral Harry 194
Yenan 125, 186, 188, 190, 192
Yergan, Max 70, 202
Yokota, Kisabura 102
Yoshikawa, Mitsusada 180
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) 3

Z

Za Industrial-Izaciu 169
Zeitung, Rheinisch 113
Zubelin, Peter 173

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